Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01241/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01241-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2924
Petitioner
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 2006 Decided December 5, 2006

No. 05-1241

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

LOCAL 2924,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Judith D. Galat argued the cause for petitioner. With her on

the briefs were Mark D. Roth and Charles A. Hobbie. Anne M.

Wagner entered an appearance.

William E. Persina, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief was William R. Tobey, Deputy Solicitor. David M. Smith,

Solicitor, entered an appearance.

Before: TATEL and BROWN,Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: The American Federation

of Government Employees, Local 2924 (“Union”) petitions for

review of a Federal Labor Relations Authority (“Authority”)

decision and order dismissing an unfair labor practice (“ulp”)

complaint filed pursuant to the Federal Service

Labor-Management Relations Statute (“Statute”), 5 U.S.C. §§

7101-7135. In its charge to the Authority, the Union alleged

that the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center at

Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (“Davis-Monthan AFB” or

“employer”) violated § 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by

repudiating certain provisions of the parties’ collective

bargaining agreements dealing with employee drug testing and

rehabilitation. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) agreed

that Davis-Monthan AFB repudiated the agreements by

terminating employees who were actively engaged in

rehabilitation. The employer filed exceptions to the ALJ’s

decision and the Authority reversed. U.S. Dep’t of the Air

Force, Aerospace Maint. & Regeneration Ctr., Davis-Monthan

Air Force Base, Tucson, Ariz., 60 F.L.R.A. No. 166 (May 12,

2005) (“Davis-Monthan AFB”), reprinted in Joint Appendix

(“J.A.”) 10-78. 

When a federal agency commits “a clear and patent breach”

of a collective bargaining agreement, this will be deemed an

unlawful “repudiation” of the contract if it “go[es] to the heart

of the parties’ agreement.” Dep’t of the Air Force, 375th

Mission Support Squadron, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. (Scott

AFB), 51 F.L.R.A. 858, 861-63 (1996). In this case, the

Authority held that the employer’s actions did not constitute a

clear and patent breach of the parties’ agreements. In reaching

this conclusion, the Authority relied primarily on the testimony

of employer witnesses who were at the bargaining table when

the contract language was negotiated. The Authority found that,

although the employer’s interpretation of the agreements was

not irrefutable, it was reasonable and fully consistent with the

testimony of the employer’s witnesses. Davis-Monthan AFB, 60

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F.L.R.A. No. 166, slip op. at 19-20. The Authority therefore

dismissed the complaint, relying on its Scott AFB rule that, “[i]n

those situations where the meaning of a particular agreement

term is unclear, acting in accordance with a reasonable

interpretation of that term, even if it is not the only reasonable

interpretation, does not constitute a clear and patent breach of

the terms of the agreement.” Id. at 14 (quoting Scott AFB, 51

F.L.R.A. at 862). 

The Union now seeks review, contending that the

Authority’s decision in this case must be reversed, because it

fails to follow well-established principles of contractual

interpretation. According to the Union, “[i]t is axiomatic that

courts must first look to the plain language of a contract

provision before considering extrinsic evidence as to meaning.”

Petitioner’s Br. at 15. We agree. The Authority’s interpretation

of the parties’ agreements in this case cannot be squared with

the plain language of those agreements. The agreements are

indisputably clear in establishing a temporary safe harbor for

employees who are properly engaged in rehabilitation and not

otherwise unsuitable for employment. The Authority erred in

considering extrinsic evidence – self-serving testimony from

employer witnesses – which purports to refute the plain terms of

the agreements. Where, as here, the language of a collective

bargaining agreement can bear only one reasonable

interpretation, the Authority may not “create” an ambiguity by

crediting extrinsic evidence offered by a party who is seeking to

nullify the plain terms of the contract. 

We hold that the Authority’s finding that Davis-Monthan

AFB did not clearly and patently breach the agreements is both

arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial

evidence. We therefore grant the petition for review, vacate the

Authority’s order, and remand the case to the Authority to allow

it to apply the second prong of its repudiation test.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Context

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute

makes it an unfair labor practice for a federal employer “to

interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee” attempting to

exercise his or her rights under the Statute, or “to refuse to

consult or negotiate in good faith with a labor organization as

required by [the Statute].” 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1), (5). Not

every breach of contract is an unfair labor practice, however.

Dep’t of Def., Warner Robins Air Logistics Ctr., Robins Air

Force Base, Ga., 40 F.L.R.A. 1211, 1218 (1991). If an

employer commits “a clear and patent breach” of a collective

bargaining contract that “go[es] to the heart of the parties’

agreement,” the breach is considered to be an unlawful

“repudiation” of the contract under the Statute. Scott AFB, 51

F.L.R.A. at 861-63; see also Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648,

664-65 (1985) (“[I]f the violation constitutes ‘a clear and patent

breach of the terms of the agreement,’ the union may file an

unfair labor practice charge . . . .” (quoting Iowa Nat’l Guard &

Nat’l Guard Bureau, 8 F.L.R.A. 500, 510 (1982))). If “the

meaning of a particular agreement term is unclear,” and an

employer acts pursuant to a “reasonable interpretation of that

term,” the employer’s action “does not constitute a clear and

patent breach of the terms of the agreement.” Scott AFB, 51

F.L.R.A. at 862. 

B. Factual Background

In 1986, President Reagan issued an Executive Order

entitled “Drug-Free Federal Workplace,” directing agencies to

develop drug testing plans “designed to offer drug users a

helping hand and, at the same time, demonstrat[e] . . . that drugs

will not be tolerated in the Federal workplace.” Exec. Order No.

12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (Sept. 17, 1986). In 1991, the

Union and Davis-Monthan AFB executed an agreement

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designed to augment the Air Force’s plan. Air Force Civilian

Drug Testing Agreement Between Davis-Monthan Air Force

Base and AFGE Local 2924 (“Local Drug Agreement”),

reprinted in J.A. 150-60. Section 9 of the Local Drug

Agreement provides:

Employees whose tests have been verified positive will

be notified in writing to report to Social Actions for

evaluation and appropriate referral for counseling

and/or rehabilitation. Employees will be informed of

the consequences should they refuse counseling or

rehabilitation.

a. The Employer will retain employees in a duty or

approved leave status while undergoing rehabilitation.

J.A. 154. Section 12 provides: “If the report is positive and

employee does not wish to challenge its findings, the Employer

will make reasonable accommodations for the employee’s drug

problem by providing him/her access to a drug treatment and

rehabilitation program.” J.A. 155.

In 1998, the Union and Davis-Monthan AFB entered into a

collective bargaining agreement. Labor Management Relations

Agreement Between Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona and Local

2924 American Federation of Government Employees (“CBA”),

reprinted in J.A. 99-149. Article 27 of the CBA reads:

Section 1. For the purpose of this Article, alcoholism

and drug abuse are defined as illnesses in which the

employee’s job performance is impaired as a direct

consequence of the abuse of alcohol or drugs.

Section 2. The Union and the Employer jointly

recognize alcoholism and drug abuse as treatable

illnesses; therefore, employees having these illnesses

will receive the same careful consideration and offer of

assistance that is extended to employees having any

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other illness or health problem. Employees

participating in drug or alcohol abuse rehabilitation

programs may request sick, annual, or leave without

pay the same as they would for medical purposes. . . .

Failure to successfully complete a rehabilitation

program which results in acceptable work

performance, after a reasonable period of time, will

result in disciplinary procedures. 

Section 3. The ultimate objective of the drug and

alcohol abuse program will be to rehabilitate the

employee through counseling, referral for medical

assistance, and other such means as may be available

to aid in the recovery of the employee. Referral for

diagnosis and acceptance of treatment should in no

way jeopardize an employee’s job security or

promotional opportunities. 

J.A. 134. 

Beginning in 2001, several employees at Davis-Monthan

AFB faced dismissal for drug abuse, even while undergoing

rehabilitation. For example, in September 2001, Dana Clark, a

civilian Motor Vehicle Operator working at Davis-Monthan

AFB, tested positive for marijuana during a random drug test.

That November, Davis-Monthan AFB issued a notice proposing

to terminate Clark, allowing him time to respond to the

allegation of drug use. Clark informed his employer that he had

immediately and voluntarily enrolled in a rehabilitation

program. The employer nonetheless terminated Clark that

December, while he was still in rehabilitation. 

These incidents caused Union officials to question

management’s commitment to the drug testing and rehabilitation

program. In November 2001, Union officials met with Colonel

Hendricks, the employer’s third-step grievance officer, to protest

the termination of employees for drug abuse. See J.A. 322-24.

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Jean Southam, a national Union representative at DavisMonthan AFB, testified that, when asked why an employee

would be fired while in rehabilitation, Colonel Hendricks said,

“My policy is zero tolerance.” J.A. 323. When he was

reminded that the parties’ collective bargaining agreements

afforded protection to employees, Colonel Hendricks reportedly

said, “I don’t care about your contract.” J.A. 323. 

C. Proceedings Below

The Union filed a charge with the Authority, claiming that

Davis-Monthan AFB repudiated Article 27 of the CBA by

removing employees while they were properly enrolled in

rehabilitation programs. Based on this charge, General Counsel

for the Authority issued a complaint alleging that DavisMonthan AFB had committed an ulp in violation of § 7116(a)(1)

and (5), by repudiating §§ 9 and 12 of the Local Drug

Agreement and Article 27 of the CBA. An ALJ reviewed the

two agreements and heard testimony, including descriptions of

bargaining history given by two Davis-Monthan AFB managers

who participated in negotiations on behalf of the employer.

These two managers testified that the parties intended only to

require that supervisors grant employees leave to participate in

rehabilitation during working hours, not to limit management’s

range of disciplinary options. In other words, notwithstanding

the clear language in § 9 – “[t]he Employer will retain

employees in a duty or approved leave status while undergoing

rehabilitation” – and Article 27 – “[r]eferral for diagnosis and

acceptance of treatment should in no way jeopardize an

employee’s job security or promotional opportunities” – these

employer witnesses claimed that employees could be fired while

in rehabilitation even if otherwise suitable to be retained in duty

or leave status. 

The ALJ issued a decision on September 26, 2003, finding

that “[r]ehabilitation is a key consideration in the Executive

Order, the [Air Force’s plan], the Local Drug Agreement and

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[the CBA].” Davis-Monthan AFB, 60 F.L.R.A. No. 166, slip op.

at 24. He found the testimony on bargaining history irrelevant

in light of § 9 of the Local Drug Agreement, which he found to

be “clear and wholly unambiguous.” Id. at 25-26. The ALJ

construed § 9 to mean that “[c]learly, if in rehabilitation, the

Employer shall not remove, or attempt to remove, the

employee.” Id. at 27. The ALJ concluded that Davis-Monthan

AFB repudiated both the Local Drug Agreement and the CBA

through “clear and intentional” violations of §§ 9 and 12 of the

former and Article 27 of the latter. Id. at 30-31. 

Davis-Monthan AFB filed exceptions with the Authority

seeking review of the ALJ’s decision. On review, the Authority

found “no evidence in the record that [Davis-Monthan AFB]

failed to provide the employees access to a drug treatment and

rehabilitation program” in violation of § 12 of the Local Drug

Agreement. Id. at 20. The Authority also held that DavisMonthan AFB did not repudiate the parties’ agreements,

because § 9 and Article 27 are not “clear and wholly

unambiguous,” but, rather, are “subject to more than one

interpretation.” Id. at 15. The Authority found the ALJ’s

interpretation of § 9 reasonable, but concluded that DavisMonthan AFB’s interpretation – that the provision is “silent with

regard to discipline and concerns only the leave status of

employees who attend rehabilitation during duty hours,” id. at

18 – is also “fully consistent with the testimony of the only

witnesses who participated in the negotiations,” id. at 16. After

deciding “that [Davis-Monthan AFB] acted under a reasonable

interpretation of § 9(a) and Article 27 and, as such, did not

commit a clear and patent breach of those provisions,” id. at 15,

the Authority dismissed the complaint. Member Pope filed a

strong dissent, claiming that Davis-Monthan AFB’s

“interpretation is far off the mark” and “unbelievable, in every

sense of the word.” Id. at 28-29. She added, “Bargaining

history testimony asserting an unreasonable interpretation does

not make the interpretation any more reasonable.” Id. at 29 n.1.

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The Union now petitions for review of the Authority’s

order, claiming that the Authority acted arbitrarily and

capriciously by dismissing the complaint based on bargaining

history testimony that directly contradicts the plain language of

the parties’ agreements. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We will set aside an order of the Authority if it is “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law,” or if it is “unsupported by substantial

evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E); see 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c)

(“Review of the Authority’s order shall be on the record in

accordance with section 706 of this title.”). In order to

determine whether the Authority acted arbitrarily and

capriciously, “we look to whether the Authority has offered a

rational explanation for its decision [and] whether its decision is

based on consideration of the relevant factors . . . .” Nat’l Ass’n

of Gov’t Employees, Local R5-136 v. FLRA (NAGE, Local R5-

136), 363 F.3d 468, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983)). “We will uphold the Authority’s decision ‘if, but only

if, we can discern a reasoned path from the facts and

considerations before the [agency] to the decision it reached.’”

Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA (NTEU), 466 F.3d

1079, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. Info. Agency v.

FLRA, 960 F.2d 165, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). To be upheld, the

decision “must come with ‘[such] relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’” Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees

Capital Area Council 26 v. FLRA, 395 F.3d 443, 447 (D.C. Cir.

2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229

(1938)). Certainly, if the result reached is “illogical on its own

terms,” the Authority’s order is arbitrary and capricious. IRS v.

FLRA, 963 F.2d 429, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

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B. The Issues on Review

The Authority’s determination that the employer did not

“fail[] to provide the employees access to a drug treatment and

rehabilitation program” as required by § 12 of the Local Drug

Agreement is supported by substantial evidence and it is not

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law. We therefore deny the petition for review

insofar as it challenges this decision. 

Davis-Monthan AFB argued before the Authority that “the

[disputed contract] provisions as [interpreted by the ALJ] are

unenforceable because they are contrary to management’s right

to discipline under [the Statute].” Davis-Monthan AFB, 60

F.L.R.A. No. 166, slip op. at 10. The Authority did not address

this contention below, and it has not raised the argument in its

briefs to this court. Therefore, this question is not before the

court on review. The principal issue here is whether the

Authority erred in its construction of § 9 of the Local Drug

Agreement and Article 27 of the CBA. 

C. The Meaning of the Parties’ Agreements

Interpretation of a contract, like statutory and treaty

interpretation, must begin with the plain meaning of the

language. See, e.g., NAGE, Local R5-136, 363 F.3d at 476

(examining the “express language” of a collective bargaining

agreement); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S.

432, 438 (1999) (“[I]n any case of statutory construction, our

analysis begins with the language of the statute. And where the

statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as

well.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Iceland

S.S. Co.-Eimskip v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 201 F.3d 451, 458 (D.C.

Cir. 2000) (“When interpreting a treaty . . . we . . . ‘must, of

course, begin with the language of the Treaty itself.’” (quoting

Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180

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(1982))). In analyzing the alleged ulp in this case, the Authority

seemed not to comprehend the principle of “plain meaning.”

The Authority first noted that “it is not always necessary to

determine the precise meaning of [a contract] provision in order

to analyze an allegation of repudiation.” Davis-Monthan AFB,

60 F.L.R.A. No. 166, slip op. at 13-14 (citing Scott AFB, 51

F.L.R.A. at 862 n.4). This proposition is drawn from Scott AFB,

where the FLRA held that, “[i]n those situations where the

meaning of a particular agreement term is unclear, acting in

accordance with a reasonable interpretation of that term, even if

it is not the only reasonable interpretation, does not constitute a

clear and patent breach of the terms of the agreement.” 51

F.L.R.A. at 862-63. This principle has no bearing on this case,

however, because it applies only in situations when “the

meaning of a particular agreement term is unclear.” The

disputed contract language in this case – “[t]he Employer will

retain employees in a duty or approved leave status while

undergoing rehabilitation” and “treatment should in no way

jeopardize an employee’s job security” – is not unclear. In

concluding otherwise, the Authority followed an analytical path

which suggests that, in determining whether the breach of a

collective bargaining agreement is “clear and patent,” it need not

determine whether the agreement has a plain meaning. Needless

to say, this course of analysis is completely misguided and far

afield from the dictates of Scott AFB. 

Our review of the Local Drug Agreement and CBA reveals

mutually reinforcing terms establishing two general principles

applicable to employee drug use and addiction. First, Article 27,

§ 2 defines drug abuse as an illness: “The Union and the

Employer jointly recognize alcoholism and drug abuse as

treatable illnesses; therefore, employees having these illnesses

will receive the same careful consideration and offer of

assistance that is extended to employees having any other illness

or health problem.” Second, both agreements guarantee

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employees help enrolling in rehabilitation and treatment

programs. Article 27, § 3 provides: “The ultimate objective of

the drug and alcohol abuse program will be to rehabilitate the

employee through counseling, referral for medical assistance,

and other such means as may be available to aid in the recovery

of the employee.” Section 9 states that employees who test

positive will be referred “to Social Actions for evaluation and

appropriate referral for counseling and/or rehabilitation.” And

§ 12 provides: “[T]he Employer will make reasonable

accommodations for the employee’s drug problem by providing

him/her access to a drug treatment and rehabilitation program.”

 In service of these principles, the agreements establish a

safe harbor for employees, guaranteeing that the employer will

not dismiss any employee during the course of rehabilitation.

Section 9(a) provides that “[t]he Employer will retain employees

in a duty or approved leave status while undergoing

rehabilitation,” and Article 27 reads, “Referral for diagnosis and

acceptance of treatment should in no way jeopardize an

employee’s job security or promotional opportunities.” These

provisions unambiguously create a limited window – the time

period between when Davis-Monthan AFB learns of an

employee’s drug use and when the employee completes a

rehabilitation program – during which an employee cannot be

dismissed absent other cause. If an employee drops out of

rehabilitation, he immediately forfeits the protection of § 9 and

Article 27. 

Not all employees who suffer from drug abuse gain the

protection of the safe harbor. First, § 9 clarifies that the

agreements do not protect employees who refuse rehabilitation:

“Employees will be informed of the consequences should they

refuse counseling or rehabilitation.” Article 27 likewise states:

“Failure to successfully complete a rehabilitation program which

results in acceptable work performance, after a reasonable

period of time, will result in disciplinary procedures.” Second,

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the agreements do not shelter employees who, apart from their

drug problem, are insubordinate, have unacceptable work

performance, or otherwise engage in misconduct warranting

dismissal. And, finally, the agreements in no way restrict the

employer’s right to take appropriate action short of removal,

such as reassignment of an employee to a less sensitive position.

 At oral argument, in a vain attempt to refute the plain

meaning of § 9 and Article 27, counsel for the Authority argued

that if the parties had meant to establish a safe harbor they

would have agreed to different contractual language. According

to counsel, the following language would have been a model of

clarity: 

[T]he agency employer cannot terminate an employee for

illegal drug use until rehabilitation is concluded.

See Recording of Oral Argument at 15:31. This language

mirrors what the parties’ agreements say. Section 9 provides:

The Employer will retain employees in a duty or approved

leave status while undergoing rehabilitation.

And Article 27, § 3 states:

The ultimate objective of the drug and alcohol abuse

program will be to rehabilitate the employee through

counseling, referral for medical assistance, and other such

means as may be available to aid in the recovery of the

employee. Referral for diagnosis and acceptance of

treatment should in no way jeopardize an employee’s job

security or promotional opportunities. 

The language suggested by the Authority’s counsel says, “the

employer cannot terminate.” The parties’ agreement says, “[t]he

Employer will retain employees,” and “[r]eferral for diagnosis

and acceptance of treatment should in no way jeopardize an

employee’s job security or promotional opportunities.” If the

employer must “retain employees” and rehabilitation can “in no

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way jeopardize an employee’s job security,” then an employee

who is in rehabilitation obviously is protected from termination.

No doubt, the parties could have been even clearer in expressing

their intention if they had added, “and we really mean what we

say.” But even without such a declaration, the agreements are

unambiguously plain in their meaning. Therefore, the Authority

was obliged to construe the parties’ contracts as written.

In an attempt to avoid the plain meaning of the agreements,

the Authority started its analysis by focusing on the testimony

offered by the employer regarding the parties’ bargaining

history. In so doing, the Authority conjured up an ambiguity in

unambiguous language by crediting self-serving parol evidence

that purported to refute what the contract said. The Authority’s

analysis was completely backwards and totally inconsistent with

the dictates of Scott AFB and other relevant precedent.

An agreement is only “ambiguous if it[s language] is

reasonably susceptible of different constructions or

interpretations, not simply because the parties later disagree on

its meaning.” Ameren Servs. Co. v. FERC, 330 F.3d 494, 499

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Resort to parol evidence may only be had where the language of

an agreement is ambiguous on its face. NTEU, 466 F.3d at 1081

(“[W]here the terms of a bargaining agreement are ambiguous,

we look to evidence of the parties’ contemporaneous

understanding.”); Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v.

Georgetown Univ., 347 F.3d 941, 946 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“If the

. . . language is unambiguous, the court need only apply the

meaning of the words. If the language is ambiguous, the court

must determine the parties’ intent . . . in light of the

circumstances surrounding [the agreement’s] execution.”);

Ameren, 330 F.3d at 498 (“[W]e first consider de novo whether

the . . . agreement unambiguously addresses the matter at issue.

If so, the language of the agreement controls for we must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of the parties.”)

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(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In short, where

the language of an agreement can bear only one interpretation,

contradictory extrinsic evidence must be ignored. Norfolk S. Ry.

Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 31-32 (2004) (“[W]here the words of

a law, treaty, or contract, have a plain and obvious meaning, all

construction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded.”

(quoting Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 89-90 (1823)));

Ameren, 330 F.3d at 498 n.7 (“The [agency] may consider

extrinsic evidence only if the . . . agreement is ambiguous.”).

The Authority plainly erred in considering parol evidence that

directly contradicts the unambiguous meaning of the contractual

terms. 

The agreements admit of no ambiguity. Section 9 and

Article 27 create a safe harbor that protects a narrow class of

employees for a limited period of time so that they may focus on

treatment and rehabilitation. The Authority’s decision defies

precedent and commonsense, and it reaches a conclusion that is

“so implausible that it [cannot] be ascribed to a difference in

view or the product of agency expertise.” State Farm, 463 U.S.

at 43. Because the Authority’s decision epitomizes arbitrary and

capricious action, we grant the petition for review.

III. CONCLUSION

Since the “Authority’s decision to dismiss the . . . complaint

is premised on an entirely untenable interpretation of the parties’

[agreements],” we set “aside the Authority’s dismissal of the .

. . complaint as arbitrary and capricious.” NAGE, Local R5-136,

363 F.3d at 471, 475. However, two elements must be analyzed

in repudiation cases: “(1) the nature and scope of the alleged

breach . . . (i.e., was the breach clear and patent?); and (2) the

nature of the agreement provision allegedly breached (i.e., did

the provision go to the heart of the parties’ agreement?).” Scott

AFB, 51 F.L.R.A. at 862. The Authority failed to ask the second

question, because it erroneously concluded that the employer did

not clearly and patently breach the agreements. We therefore

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remand the case to the Authority and instruct it to give effect to

the plain meaning of the agreements and apply the second prong

of its repudiation test in order to determine whether DavisMonthan AFB committed an unfair labor practice. 

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