Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05135/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05135-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Normandy Apartments, Limited
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LIMITED,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5135

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:10-cv-00051-EGB, Senior Judge Eric G. 

Bruggink.

______________________ 

Decided: November 20, 2015

______________________ 

TERRY MICHAEL MCKEEVER, Foshee & Yaffe, Oklahoma City, OK, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

AMANDA TANTUM, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN,

JR., KIRK T. MANHARDT; PATRICIA SHARIN FLAGG, Office of 

General Counsel, United States Department of Housing 

and Urban Development, Washington, DC. 

 

______________________ 

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2 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

Before NEWMAN, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Additional views filed by REYNA, Circuit Judge, with 

whom WALLACH, Circuit Judge, joins. 

Dissenting opinion filed by NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Normandy Apartments, Ltd. (“Normandy”) appeals 

the United States Court of Federal Claims’ orders granting the government’s: (1) motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction; and (2) motion for summary judgment on 

Normandy’s takings claim. Normandy Apartments, Ltd. 

v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 431 (2014); see also Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 

247 (2011). For the reasons set forth below, this court 

affirms. 

BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Normandy owned and managed Normandy Apartments, a low-income rental housing project constructed in 

1968 in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Tenants’ rents at Normandy 

Apartments were federally subsidized under the Section 8 

project-based program, see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, which was 

created “to ‘ai[d] low-income families in obtaining a decent 

place to live . . . by subsidizing private landlords who 

would rent to low-income tenants.’” Cisneros v. Alpine 

Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 12 (1993) (alteration in original) 

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a)). In this system, a monthly 

rent is set for each apartment, the tenants pay a portion 

of that rent based on their ability to pay, and the United 

States Department of Housing and Urban Development 

(“HUD”) pays the difference between each tenant’s contribution and the allowable rent for the unit. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1437f(c)(3).

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 3

Effective October 1, 1992, Normandy and the United 

States, acting through HUD, entered into a Section 8 

rental subsidy agreement called a Housing Assistance 

Payments (“HAP”) contract (the “Original HAP Contract”). Pursuant to this contract, HUD agreed to pay the 

difference between the tenant’s contribution and the rent, 

and Normandy agreed it would “‘maintain and operate 

the contract units and related facilities so as to provide 

decent, safe, and sanitary housing as defined by HUD,’ to 

clean and ‘make repairs with reasonable promptness,’ to 

‘respond promptly to HUD’s Physical Inspection Reports 

and to implement corrective actions within a reasonable 

time.’” Normandy, 116 Fed. Cl. at 434 (quoting Original 

HAP Contract). HUD enforces these requirements 

through inspections, audits, and other actions, including 

withholding assistance payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(h); 

24 C.F.R. § 886.123. HUD’s Real Estate Assessment 

Center (“REAC”) inspects Section 8 housing and assigns a 

score on a 100-point scale. 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.705, 200.857

(2014). 

In 1997, the Original HAP Contract expired, and 

Normandy and HUD renewed the contract annually until 

2004. On October 1, 2004, when the prior year’s HAP 

contract had expired, Normandy entered into the next 

renewal contract (“2004 HAP Contract”)—the basis for 

Normandy’s breach of contract claims. Though the earlier 

HAP contracts had been made with HUD, in the 2004 

HAP Contract, the Oklahoma Housing Finance Authority 

(“OHFA”), a public housing agency (“PHA”), was identified as the “contract administrator.” Normandy, 116 Fed. 

Cl. at 434. While HUD was no longer a party to the 

contract, the rest of the contract terms in the Original 

HAP Contract were renewed, including the provision that 

Normandy “maintain and operate the contract units and 

related facilities so as to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing as defined by HUD.” Id. 

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4 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

On May 23, 2000, Normandy entered into a separate 

“Use Agreement” with HUD, which “allowed Normandy to 

prepay its HUD-backed mortgage and terminate the 1967 

Regulatory Agreement between it and HUD.” Id.; see also 

id. at 435 (“The Use Agreement is independent of the 

HAP contract, although the former contemplates the 

possibility that a HAP contract may cover some or all of 

the units.”). Under the Use Agreement, Normandy prepaid its HUD-insured mortgage, and, in exchange, Normandy agreed to continue housing low-income families 

until June 1, 2009, the original maturity date of the 

mortgage. Pursuant to the Use Agreement, Normandy’s 

use of the apartment complex was restricted to “rental 

housing for tenants of lower income,” Normandy agreed 

not to evict existing tenants based on income, J.A. 148, 

Normandy was required to maintain the apartment 

complex “in a condition that is decent, safe, sanitary, and 

in good repair, as well as in compliance with all applicable 

state and local building and health codes,” J.A. 151, and 

Normandy was required to obtain HUD’s approval before 

conveying the property. 

Pursuant to the 2004 HAP Contract, in November 

2004, REAC “inspected the Normandy Apartments to 

verify the units were safe, decent, and sanitary.” Normandy, 116 Fed. Cl. at 435. The apartments received a 

failing score. Normandy corrected the identified problems 

and, when OHFA conducted an inspection in February 

2005, it noted the previous deficiencies had been fixed. 

HUD itself did not reinspect the apartments, but notified 

Normandy in February 2006 that it was closing the 

November 2004 inspection. 

Under 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.855(c)(l), 886.323 (2014), HUD 

is required to inspect a property between nine and fifteen 

months from the date of the prior inspection. Here, the 

next REAC inspection did not occur until August 23, 

2006, more than twenty months after the November 2004 

inspection. Normandy failed this inspection, but subseCase: 14-5135 Document: 45-2 Page: 4 Filed: 11/20/2015
NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 5

quently requested that HUD adjust the score “because the 

apartment complex was undergoing repairs; specifically, 

all of the windows were being replaced.” Normandy, 116 

Fed. Cl. at 435. On October 15, 2006, Normandy inquired 

with HUD about the status of its appeal regarding its 

failing score. In November, HUD replied and notified 

Normandy that it had missed the deadline to appeal the 

score. 

In March 2007, HUD requested that Normandy write 

a letter certifying that it was in compliance with the 

inspection requirements. Because the window replacement was ongoing, Normandy was not able to certify its 

compliance and instead provided a letter from its window 

contractor stating the anticipated completion date for the 

repairs. HUD then informed Normandy that it would 

perform a reinspection, but never did so. Instead, it sent 

a June 20, 2007, letter notifying Normandy that HUD 

“would cease to fund housing assistance payments because [Normandy] had defaulted on the HAP [C]ontract 

by repeatedly failing to maintain the apartments.” Id.

Specifically, on September 28, 2007, HUD warned 

Normandy that its assistance payments would be terminated and that Normandy should stop accepting new lowincome qualified tenants. HUD also notified Normandy 

that any affected tenants could apply for vouchers to 

offset their rent at the Normandy Apartments or enable 

them to move elsewhere. Shortly before November 1, 

2007, HUD informed Normandy that it was obligated to 

continue honoring the below-market rental rates during 

the existing lease terms. 

Normandy attempted to sell the apartment complex 

before the HUD payments stopped. Normandy alleges 

that on October 16, 2007, Summit Assets Management, 

L.L.C. (“Summit”) agreed to purchase the Normandy 

Apartments for $8 million. Pursuant to the Use Agreement, Normandy sought HUD’s approval of the sale, but, 

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6 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

according to Normandy, HUD withheld its approval and 

Summit did not purchase the apartments. “Normandy 

claims a loss of approximately $2.75 million because the 

apartments subsequently decreased in value and, as of 

2009, were appraised at $5.25 million.” Id. at 436.

II. Proceedings

On October 18, 2007, Normandy filed a lawsuit in the 

United States District Court for the Western District of 

Oklahoma, requesting, in relevant part, a preliminary 

injunction ordering HUD to continue making housing 

assistance payments pending the litigation. Normandy 

Apartments, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 

CIV-07-1161-R, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81330, at *1 (W.D. 

Okla. Nov. 1, 2007). The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Normandy’s claim fell under the Tucker 

Act and therefore belonged in the United States Court of 

Federal Claims. The court nevertheless addressed the 

merits of the preliminary injunction, and found Normandy was unable to satisfy the necessary irreparable harm 

element to obtain the injunction. 

Normandy appealed the district court’s decision to the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See 

Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & 

Urban Dev., 554 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 2009). The Tenth 

Circuit affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part, holding 

“when a party asserts that the government’s breach of 

contract is contrary to federal regulations, statutes, or the 

Constitution, and when the party seeks relief other than 

money damages, the [Administrative Procedure Act’s 

(“APA”)] waiver of sovereign immunity applies and the 

Tucker Act does not preclude a federal district court from 

taking jurisdiction.” Id. at 1300. 

Normandy did not pursue its APA claims and instead, 

on January 25, 2010, brought suit in the United States 

Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”). Normandy’s 

first Complaint asserted a breach of the 2004 HAP ConCase: 14-5135 Document: 45-2 Page: 6 Filed: 11/20/2015
NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 7

tract and requested approximately $3.5 million in damages. The government moved to dismiss the case for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the United 

States was not a party to the 2004 HAP Contract. The

Claims Court agreed, finding that without a contract 

between Normandy and the United States, it lacked 

jurisdiction. Normandy, 100 Fed. Cl. at 256–58. 

In an amended Complaint, Normandy alleged “that 

HUD’s actions interfered with [its] property interests in 

the apartment complex, the Use Agreement, the [2004] 

HAP [C]ontract, and its purchase agreement with Summit.” Normandy, 116 Fed. Cl. at 437. The government 

filed a motion to dismiss the takings claim. The Claims 

Court converted the motion into a summary judgment 

motion and granted that motion. It also reaffirmed its 

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction regarding Normandy’s 

contract claim. 

Normandy appeals; this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2012). 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“We review the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of 

summary judgment under a de novo standard of review, 

with justifiable factual inferences being drawn in favor of 

the party opposing summary judgment.” Winstar Corp. v. 

United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 

and remanded, 518 U.S. 839 (1996). A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

“The existence or nonexistence of a contract is a mixed 

question of law and fact; contract interpretation is a 

question of law, reviewed de novo.” S. Cal. Fed. Sav. & 

Loan Ass’n v. United States, 422 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005). 

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8 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

II. The Claims Court Correctly Dismissed Normandy’s 

Breach of Contract Claim for Lack of Jurisdiction

A. The United States Is Not a Party to the 2004 HAP 

Contract

The United States “is immune from suit save as it 

consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be 

sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 

(1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 

586 (1941)). “To maintain a cause of action pursuant to 

the Tucker Act that is based on a contract, the contract 

must be between the plaintiff and the government and 

entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of the 

government’s breach of that contract.” Ransom v. United 

States, 900 F.2d 242, 244 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In other words, 

privity of contract is a “prerequisite for standing to sue in 

the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act.” Nat’l 

Leased Hous. Ass’n v. United States, 105 F.3d 1423, 1435 

(Fed. Cir. 1997). 

The Claims Court held that “[t]he conclusion is inescapable: HUD and Normandy had no contractual relationship in the 2004 HAP [Contract]. [Normandy] is 

unable to enforce its rights in that [C]ontract against the 

federal government because the United States was not a 

party to it.” Normandy, 116 Fed. Cl. at 443. 

The named parties and the signatories of the 2004 

HAP Contract are OHFA and Normandy. J.A. 82 (naming, in a section titled “Parties to Renewal Contract,” 

OHFA as the “Contract Administrator” and Normandy 

Apartment Limited as the “Name of Owner”). HUD is 

neither a named party nor a signatory to the 2004 HAP 

Contract. Section 4a(1) of the 2004 HAP Contract states: 

“The Renewal Contract is a housing assistance payments 

contract . . . between the Contract Administrator and the 

Owner of the Project.” J.A. 84. Additionally, where the 

[C]ontract requires “Signatures” on its last page, the 

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 9

signing party under the line “Contract administrator 

(HUD or PHA)” is solely OHFA. J.A. 92. Normandy is 

the only other signatory that appears on the contract. 

J.A. 92; see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.201, 881.201 (noting, in 

the definition of “Contract,” that the HAP Contract is 

“entered into by the owner and the contract administrator,” and defining “Contract Administrator” as “[t]he 

entity which enters into the Contract with the owner”). 

Thus, by its plain language, the United States was not a 

party to the 2004 HAP Contract. 

Nonetheless, Normandy insists “HUD was a party in 

privity to the 2004 [HAP Contract]” and relies on Englewood Terrace Limited Partnership v. United States, 79 

Fed. Cl. 516, 534 (2007), aff’d in part and rev’d on other 

grounds, 479 F. App’x 969 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (unpublished), 

to argue that the Claims Court “should have drawn from

the reasoning” of that decision. Appellant’s Br. 19–20. 

In that case, HUD attempted to modify a HAP agreement by “substitut[ing] the short-term contracts for what 

was reasonably anticipated to be a four-year contract” to 

incentivize the property owner to improve its performance 

under the HAP Contract. Englewood, 79 Fed. Cl. at 534. 

Explaining “that a subsequent agreement between the 

parties could supercede [sic] a term in an earlier agreement by the same parties, if that was the mutual intent of 

the parties,” the Englewood court found “[b]ased on the 

record, [the] substitution was a unilateral act, on the part 

of HUD, imposed on Englewood.” Id. The court reasoned 

“[i]t is not logical, or based on the record, to conclude that 

Englewood . . . was a willing participant in converting its 

anticipated four-year contract into uncertain, short-term 

contracts of varying length.” Id. 

According to Normandy, “[t]he facts in this case can 

be plugged directly into the Englewood analysis. In order 

for the HUD to modify the prior Use Agreement and 

HAP[] Agreements in a manner that would revoke its 

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10 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

contract privity with Normandy, both parties must mutually assent.” Appellant’s Br. 21. Furthermore, Normandy 

argues that “[b]y signing the 2004 HAP Renewal Agreement, Normandy had absolutely no intention of sacrificing 

its ability to recover against the HUD in the event HUD 

breached its prior agreements with Normandy.” Id. 

As an initial matter, Normandy did not make this argument before the Claims Court and it is therefore 

waived. Gant v. United States, 417 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005) (“Arguments not made in the court or tribunal 

whose order is under review are normally considered 

waived.”). In any event, Englewood is inapposite and is 

not binding on this court. Here, the Original HAP Contract was between Normandy and HUD, with HUD noted 

as the contract administrator, while the 2004 HAP Contract was between Normandy and OHFA, with OHFA 

noted as the contract administrator. By contrast, Englewood dealt with “a subsequent agreement between the 

parties” and “an earlier agreement by the same parties.” 

Englewood, 79 Fed. Cl. at 534 (second emphasis added). 

Thus, the Englewood court had no need to address the 

question of privity, and its reasoning does not apply to the 

instant case. 

Normandy also argues that “[t]he purpose of the 

[2004] HAP [] Contract was to renew the expiring terms of 

the [O]riginal HAP [C]ontract except for those terms 

specifically modified by the Renewal Contract,” and “[i]n 

essence, the HUD remained a party to the provisions of 

the HAP Renewal Contract that pertained to HUD’s role, 

and this would include any renewed provisions.” Appellant’s Br. 22–23. The 2004 HAP Contract did specifically 

modify the earlier contract, however, in that OHFA was 

named the contract administrator, and HUD was not. See 

Senate Manor Props., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 

Dev., 315 F. App’x 235, 237–38 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (explaining HUD was not in privity because 

“section 4a of the 2005 HAP [R]enewal [C]ontract stated 

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 11

that terms of the expiring HAP [C]ontract were renewed 

‘[e]xcept as specifically modified by the Renewal Contract’” (fourth alteration in original)). 

Normandy also argues “HUD stepped in[to] the shoes 

of OHFA, giving itself privity” with respect to the 2004 

HAP Contract. Appellant’s Br. 26. However, that HUD 

provided funding, oversight, and enforcement does not 

make HUD a party under the contract. In Katz v. Cisneros, this court held that “a grant of benefits and subsequent oversight by HUD is insufficient to establish a 

contractual obligation between [a property developer] and 

the government.” 16 F.3d 1204, 1209–10 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 

“‘This is true even if the local agency is acting merely as a 

conduit for the federal funds.’” Id. (quoting Marshall N. 

Dana Constr., Inc. v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 862 

(1982)); see also Nat’l Leased Hous. Ass’n v. United States, 

105 F.3d 1423, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (plaintiffs arguing 

that the United States was in privity of contract because 

“the PHAs acted as ‘agents’ for the United States,” and 

this court finding the United States was not in privity of 

contract). Accordingly, Normandy fails to show HUD was 

in privity of contract. 

B. HUD Did Not Have an Implied-in-Fact Contract with 

Normandy

Normandy alternatively argues that “[e]ven if this 

court finds that the HUD was not a party in privity to the 

2004 HAP [Contract], HUD had privity with Normandy 

through an implied-in-fact contract.” Appellant’s Br. 29. 

“An implied-in-fact contract is one ‘founded upon a meeting of the minds, which, although not embodied in an 

express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the 

parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding.’” City of Cincinnati v. 

United States, 153 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 

597 (1923)). “It is well settled that the existence of an 

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12 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

express contract precludes the existence of an implied-infact contract dealing with the same subject matter, unless 

the implied contract is entirely unrelated to the express 

contract.” Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1278 

(Fed. Cir. 2002). Because the 2004 HAP Contract and 

Use Agreement contain requirements related to decent, 

safe, and sanitary conditions and the 2004 HAP Contract 

contained the requirements related to HAP payments, the 

existence of an implied-in-fact contract regarding the 

same requirements is precluded. 

C. The Claims Court Correctly Found that HUD Did Not 

Breach the 2000 Use Agreement

On May 23, 2000, Normandy entered into a separate 

“Use Agreement” with HUD, which allowed Normandy to 

prepay its HUD-backed mortgage and terminate a previous Regulatory Agreement between it and HUD. Normandy contends that HUD “breached its obligations 

under the 2000 Use Agreement” because “HUD’s conduct 

at issue took place within [the Use Agreement] time 

period” and the “[Use] [A]greement incorporates any 

applicable HAP contract.” Appellant’s Br. 17. The Claims 

Court found there was “not the slightest hint that the 

parties to the Use Agreement intended to incorporate 

therein the provisions of current and future HAP contracts dealing with the payment of rent subsidies.” J.A. 

466–67. Normandy points to the Use Agreement’s reference to § 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act, now 12 

U.S.C. § 1715l, to argue that HUD was required to provide subsidies to property owners through HAP contracts. 

Normandy asserts that 12 U.S.C. § 1715(d)(3) is an “express part of the Use Agreement.” Appellant’s Br. 19. 

The reference to § 221(d)(3) Normandy relies on is in 

the section of the Use Agreement reciting facts, and is 

referenced in order to note that Normandy had “covenanted that, in the event the Regulatory Agreement terminated by prepayment, in full, . . . [Normandy] would continue 

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 13

to operate the Normandy Apartments project (as defined 

therein) in accordance with Section 221(d)(3) of the NHA, 

or any successor legislation, until the Maturity Date.” 

J.A. 145. The other reference to § 221(d)(3) pertains to 

the insurance of the loan secured by the mortgage of the 

Normandy Apartments, and is not relevant here. 

“[T]he incorporating contract must use language that 

is express and clear, so as to leave no ambiguity about the 

identity of the document being referenced, nor any reasonable doubt about the fact that the referenced document is being incorporated into the contract.” Northrop 

Grumman Info. Tech., Inc. v. United States, 535 F.3d

1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Furthermore, “[t]his court 

has been reluctant to find that statutory or regulatory 

provisions are incorporated into a contract with the 

government unless the contract explicitly provides for 

their incorporation.” St. Christopher Assocs., L.P. v. 

United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

Here, the reference to § 221(d)(3) is reciting facts and, 

even if it were expressly part of the contract as Normandy 

claims, it does not unambiguously incorporate the 2004 

HAP Contract. 

Normandy insists that “[e]ven if such language does 

not incorporate all of into [sic] the contract the parties’ 

statutory obligations under the statute, there still remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 

HUD breached the Use Agreement.” Appellant’s Br. 18. 

Normandy misunderstands the decision below: the Claims 

Court did not grant summary judgment in favor of the 

government; it dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because 

HUD was not in privity of contract. See Normandy, 116 

Fed. Cl. at 443 (“Defendant has maintained and we previously held that plaintiff was not in privity with HUD and 

thus could not sue to enforce the [2004] HAP [] [C]ontract 

in this court. . . . We reach the same conclusion again.”

(citation omitted)). Accordingly, because the reference to 

§ 221(d)(3) does not make HUD in privity of contract, we 

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affirm the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 

over the breach of contract claim. 

III. HUD’s Conduct Did Not Constitute a Regulatory 

Taking

The Claims Court found HUD’s conduct was not a 

taking because “[Normandy’s] right to receive the housing 

assistance payments was controlled by the HAP 

[R]enewal [C]ontract with OHFA. Those payments were 

conditioned, however, on performance to the satisfaction 

of a third party, HUD.” Id. at 442. The court further 

explained that though Normandy “may disagree with how 

HUD handled the administrative procedures involved in 

weighing the performance and the conclusion that HUD 

reached, [] there is no question that the right to receive 

those payments was limited by contract, and, indirectly, 

by the regulatory regime incorporated into that contract.” 

Id. “The result,” the court stated, “is that HUD was not 

‘taking’ a property interest when it exercised its regulatory role of monitoring the condition of the building. [Normandy] did not, by contract, have the right to those 

payments free of potential HUD oversight. It had contracted away that right.” Id. 

On appeal, Normandy’s primary argument is that it 

“had an investment-backed expectation to collect minimum rents set forth under the 2000 Use Agreement and 

applicable HAP contract unless Congress failed to appropriate funds or HUD exercised its regulatory and contractual remedy to abate or terminate HAP payments after 

complying with the applicable contracts and HUD regulations.” Appellant’s Br. 15. Normandy also contends that 

it “received minimal rent from the tenant-based voucher 

program. And some low-income tenants paid no rent for 

several months after HUD’s abatement of the HAP payments.” Id. at 37. Thus, to Normandy, “the government . . . went too far when it abated the HAP contract 

payments and shifted a public burden of providing housCase: 14-5135 Document: 45-2 Page: 14 Filed: 11/20/2015
NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 15

ing to low-income tenants disproportionately to Normandy.” Id. at 37–38. 

“A ‘taking’ may occur either by physical invasion or by 

regulation.” Acceptance Ins. Cos. v. United States, 583 

F.3d 849, 854 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “Typically, when considering whether government action constitutes a regulatory 

taking, we apply factors set forth in Penn Central [Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)]: (1) 

‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant’; 

(2) ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with 

distinct investment-backed expectations’; and (3) ‘the 

character of the governmental action.’” CCA Assocs. v. 

United States, 667 F.3d 1239, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). 

The Claims Court correctly determined that the Penn 

Central factors do not support Normandy’s takings claim. 

With regard to the first Penn Central factor, the economic 

impact of the regulation, Normandy argues that “HUD 

failed to give it notice of default, the corrective action 

required, and a reasonable time to cure the default before 

HUD abated the HAP payments”; Normandy has found 

“no compensation alternative that was directly available 

to Normandy once the HAP payments were abated”; and 

Normandy was unable to sell the apartments because 

“HUD did not give reasonable, if any, consideration to the 

proposed sale before its denial.” Appellant’s Br. 36, 39. 

Normandy asserts it had an “investment backed expectation” that it would continue to receive HAP payments, even though it could “expect [that] subsidy 

payments might be abated.” Id. at 40. The Claims Court 

held Normandy “had neither an investment-backed 

expectation in the right to receive subsidy payments 

outside the limitations imposed by the HAP contract nor 

did it have such an expectation in the right to set rents 

after it voluntarily agreed to limit that right in exchange 

for the right to prepay its mortgage.” Normandy, 116 

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Fed. Cl. at 442. Though Normandy broadly addresses the 

first and second Penn Central factors, it does so without 

specificity. Additionally, because the Use Agreement was 

in effect until 2009, Normandy “was, completely independent of the HAP contract or any HUD regulations, 

obligated to preserve the Normandy project for low income tenants at reduced rents and could not raise rents 

without HUD’s approval.” Id. at 441. 

Normandy fails to at all address the third Penn Central factor, the character of the government regulation. 

As the Claims Court found, “[t]he [O]riginal HAP 

[C]ontract made it clear that, should Normandy fail to 

correct deficiencies in performance to the satisfaction of 

HUD, HUD could stop assistance payments.” Id. Thus, 

“[t]o the extent that plaintiff had a property right in 

receiving payments, it was one arising out of the HAP 

contract. The relationship between plaintiff and the 

Section 8 housing program is a voluntary one created by 

contract.” Id. (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Normandy’s right to the HAP payments was governed by the 

2004 HAP Contract with OHFA and conditioned upon 

third-party HUD’s inspections. As the Claims Court 

noted, Normandy may take issue with the process or 

administrative procedures of HUD, but its actions do not 

constitute a taking. 

Accordingly, Normandy “did not, by contract, have the 

right to those payments free of potential HUD oversight. 

It had contracted away that right.” Id. at 442. The same 

line of reasoning applies to Normandy’s ability to sell the 

apartment to Summit. That Agreement provides that 

Normandy “shall not without the written approval of the 

Secretary [of HUD] . . . convey . . . any part of the Residential Area.” J.A. 204. Normandy thus contracted away 

that right, and HUD’s withholding of approval does not 

constitute a taking. 

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 17

IV. The Dissent

The Dissent expresses concern whether “the United 

States was correctly eliminated from its contracts with 

Normandy Apartments, thereby eliminating Tucker Act 

jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.” Dissent Op. 

2. Specifically, the Dissent argues judicial estoppel prevents the government from first arguing before the district court that the United States was a contractual party 

and jurisdiction lies with the Claims Court and then later 

arguing, in the Claims Court, that OHFA is the contractual party, not the United States. See id. at 4–8. 

In support, the Dissent cites arguments made by the 

government to the district court and the Tenth Circuit. 

The Dissent states that before the district court, “[t]he 

United States responded that Normandy was in the 

wrong court, and that this was a Tucker Act suit on a 

contract with the United States. The government stated 

that ‘this case belongs in the Claims Court and [the 

Western District of Oklahoma] lacks jurisdiction.’” Id. at 

2 (alterations in original) (quoting Government’s Resp. in 

Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 20, Normandy Apartments, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81330). The Dissent also 

says that before the Tenth Circuit, the government stated 

“these were contracts with the United States and were 

actionable only in the Court of Federal Claims under the 

Tucker Act,” such that “‘the Tucker Act impliedly forbids 

the relief sought in this case.’” Id. (quoting Government’s 

Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 40, Normandy 

Apartments, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81330).1 

1 The Dissent quotes the government’s Tenth Circuit brief, which adopts a passage from the government’s 

district court brief. For purposes of clarity, we cite only 

the government’s district court brief. 

 

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18 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

The language cited by the Dissent was in the government’s Response in Opposition to Normandy’s Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction, specifically the section discussing 

why the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 

See Government’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. 

Inj. 20, Normandy Apartments, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

81330. Where a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction challenges the sufficiency of the pleading’s factual allegations, the court assumes those allegations are true. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 

1573, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Any factual statements 

made by the government within this portion of its brief 

must be viewed through that lens. 

The government noted the evidence submitted by 

Normandy “indicates that under its current HAP 

[C]ontract [it] is eligible for payments” that exceed the 

Tucker Act’s $10,000 ceiling for exclusive jurisdiction in 

the Claims Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). Government’s 

Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 21–22, Normandy Apartments, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81330. Thus, 

the government’s arguments imply that it considered 

Tucker Act jurisdiction to be appropriate in the Claims 

Court in situations where a party is ultimately seeking 

monetary relief in excess of $10,000. See id. That contention based on assumed facts, in Normandy’s Complaint 

and Motion, is simply irrelevant here.

The Dissent’s second quotation is found in the same 

brief. Id. at 40. The Dissent says the government stated 

“these were contracts with the United States and were 

actionable only in the Court of Federal Claims under the 

Tucker Act.” Dissent Op. 2. The quotation does not 

support this proposition when viewed in the context of the 

brief’s structure and surrounding arguments. It is found 

in the government’s preliminary injunction argument 

discussing jurisdiction and the likelihood of success on the 

merits. 

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 19

In discussing the likelihood of the merits, the government explicitly incorporated by reference arguments 

made in its discussion of subject matter jurisdiction. It 

stated “[t]he Tenth Circuit has held that the Tucker Act 

impliedly forbids federal courts from ordering declaratory 

or injunctive relief, at least in the form of specific performance, for contract claims against the federal government, and that the APA thus does not waive sovereign 

immunity for such claims.” Government’s Resp. in Opp’n 

to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 40, Normandy Apartments, 

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81330 (citing Robbins v. Bureau of 

Land Mgmt., 438 F.3d 1074, 1082 (10th Cir. 2006)). The 

government concluded that section by arguing if the 

District Court lacked jurisdiction, then Normandy did not 

show a likelihood of success. Id. 

The Dissent also contends the government, in this appeal, no longer argues the United States is not a contractual party and no longer directly challenges Tucker Act 

jurisdiction; and that instead the government argues the 

merits of the termination. Dissent Op. 8–9. 

That is certainly true to the extent that the government no longer contested technical jurisdictional issues 

because Normandy’s case was in the proper venue to 

determine the merits of the case. Thus, the government 

addressed the merits—i.e., whether the United States 

was a party to the 2004 HAP Contract. The Claims Court 

determined HUD was not in privity with Normandy and 

accordingly, as a matter of fact, the Claims Court lacked 

jurisdiction to hear this case. 

Thus, the Dissent’s assertion of inconsistency evaporates under the light of a full review of the record upon 

which it relies. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the decisions of the 

Claims Court dismissing the breach of contract claim for 

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2 0 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

lack of jurisdiction and granting summary judgment on 

the takings claim are

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-5135 Document: 45-2 Page: 20 Filed: 11/20/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LIMITED,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5135

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:10-cv-00051-EGB, Senior Judge Eric G. 

Bruggink.

______________________ 

REYNA, Circuit Judge, additional views, with whom 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge, joins.

I join the court’s opinion. I write separately to explain 

why our opinion raises troubling concern. HUD is mandated by Congress to implement and administer the 

Section 8 program. Through its regulations and past 

practices, HUD has obligated itself to Section 8 property 

owners. Yet by creating a separate contract between 

OHFA and Normandy, HUD has insulated itself from 

liability. The court’s opinion describes why Normandy 

cannot recover from HUD on the basis of HUD’s breach of 

an express or implied contract. Nor can Normandy recover in property law for the reasons the court explains.

Case: 14-5135 Document: 45-2 Page: 21 Filed: 11/20/2015
2 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

Attempts to recover from HUD on other theories 

would also have likely failed. The court has generally 

rejected the notion that a local PHA acts as HUD’s agent 

in administering a HAP contract, despite HUD’s extensive 

involvement in contract administration. See, e.g., New 

Era Constr. v. United States, 890 F.2d 1152, 1154–57 

(Fed. Cir. 1989). Though Normandy could have claimed 

third-party beneficiary status under HUD and OHFA’s 

Annual Contributions Contract (i.e., the contract under 

which a local PHA receives HUD funding), this court has

refused to label a property owner a third-party beneficiary 

to such contracts. See, e.g., Nat’l Leased Hous. Ass’n v. 

United States, 105 F.3d 1423, 1436–37 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 

Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 

Judicial estoppel arguments would similarly fail because while HUD argued in the district court that Normandy’s claim belonged in the Court of Federal Claims, 

the government did not clearly maintain that HUD was a 

party to the 2004 HAP contract. J.A. 461 (HUD contended generally that “[a]llegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint 

and Motion [for injunctive relief] demonstrate that this 

case belongs in the [Court of Federal Claims] and that 

this Court lacks jurisdiction”). Judicial estoppel arguments thus fail at least because HUD’s position at the 

Court of Federal Claims was not “clearly inconsistent” 

with its earlier position in district court. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 743 (2001). 

In addition, Normandy could not recover from OHFA

under the 2004 HAP contract because HUD’s assistance 

payments to OHFA under HUD and OHFA’s Annual 

Contributions Contract would likely be a condition precedent to OHFA’s performance under the 2004 HAP contract. See Haddon Hous. Assocs., Ltd. P’ship v. United 

States, 711 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Generally, a 

party to a contract may assert the nonoccurrence of a 

contractual condition precedent as a defense to a claim of 

breach.”). In other words, OHFA’s performance under the 

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 3

2004 HAP contract depends on HUD funding under the 

Annual Contributions Contract. 

To be clear, this is not a typical case in which sovereign immunity bars suit against the government. HUD 

simultaneously obligated itself to OHFA—and, by extension, Normandy—under the Annual Contributions Contract and exercised significant control of Normandy’s 

property under the 2004 HAP contract, all while remaining insulated from liability. Under HUD’s scheme, the 

government conveniently escapes liability in contract 

under the Tucker Act—a statute that provided “the widest and most unequivocal waiver of federal immunity 

from suit,” see United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 215 

(1983), a waiver that Justice Holmes once deemed a 

“great act of justice,” United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer

Realty Co., 237 U.S. 28, 32 (1915). 

But justice is hard to find in this case. Despite Normandy’s alleged $2.75 million loss, Normandy appears to 

have no recourse against the government or anyone else. 

The government’s position in this litigation risks undermining Section 8 by discouraging property owner participation in the Section 8 program, the purpose of which is 

to provide low-income families with a decent place to live. 

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. By limiting incentives for 

property owner participation, HUD’s scheme may have 

negative consequences for Section 8 tenants. Be that as it 

may, problems offered up by this case and others like it 

are outside this court’s authority to remedy and are best 

left for another branch of government to address. 

Case: 14-5135 Document: 45-2 Page: 23 Filed: 11/20/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LIMITED,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5135

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:10-cv-00051-EGB, Senior Judge Eric G. 

Bruggink.

______________________ 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The United States, acting through the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development (HUD), has since 1968 

contracted with Normandy Apartments to provide federally subsidized low-income apartments, called “Section 8 

housing” as established by the National Housing Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 1437f. After inspections by HUD, wherein HUD 

criticized Normandy’s compliance with the requirement 

that the apartments be maintained in “decent, safe, and 

sanitary” condition, in 2007 HUD terminated its subsidy 

payments. Normandy objected to the termination, stating 

that the perceived non-compliance was based on temporary disruption due to the ongoing apartment project of 

installing double-pane windows throughout the complex, 

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2 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

and that it had inadequate opportunity to remedy any

perceived deficiency in property maintenance.

My concern relates to whether the United States was 

correctly eliminated from its contracts with Normandy 

Apartments, thereby eliminating Tucker Act jurisdiction 

in the Court of Federal Claims. The government successfully argued this position in the Oklahoma district court 

and in the Tenth Circuit, and successfully argued the 

contrary position in the Court of Federal Claims. The 

panel majority now denies Normandy Apartments all 

access to judicial review.

DISCUSSION

Normandy Apartments had initially filed suit against 

the United States Department of Housing and Urban 

Development in the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, asking that court to require HUD to continue the rental subsidies at least until 

the merits of the issue were resolved. The United States 

responded that Normandy was in the wrong court, and 

that this was a Tucker Act suit on a contract with the 

United States. The government stated that “this case 

belongs in the Claims Court and [the Western District of 

Oklahoma] lacks jurisdiction.” U.S. Dist. Ct. Br. 20. The 

district court agreed. Normandy Apartments, Ltd., v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. Civ.-07-1161-R, 2007 

WL3232610 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 2007).

Normandy appealed to the Tenth Circuit, and the 

United States again moved for dismissal, stating that 

these were contracts with the United States and were 

actionable only in the Court of Federal Claims under the 

Tucker Act. U.S. Br. to 10th Cir. (“The Tucker Act impliedly forbids the relief sought in this case”). The Tenth 

Circuit agreed, ruling that Normandy’s contract claims 

were within the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the Court of 

Federal Claims. Normandy Apartments., Ltd. v. U.S. 

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 3

Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 554 F.3d 1290, 1295-96 

(10th Cir. 2009). 

Normandy then filed suit in the Court of Federal 

Claims. However, in the Court of Federal Claims the 

United States argued that there was no jurisdiction in the 

Court of Federal Claims. The government argued that 

the contracts were not with the United States, but with 

an Oklahoma state agency that had signed the most 

recent Renewal Agreement as “Contract Administrator.” 

The Court of Federal Claims agreed, and dismissed the 

suit.

Thus the United States obtained dismissal of the contract claims by the Oklahoma district court and the Tenth 

Circuit on the argument that the contracts are with the 

United States and can be litigated only in the Court of 

Federal Claims. The United States then obtained dismissal of the contract claims by the Court of Federal Claims 

on the argument that the contracts are not with the 

United States, but with the Oklahoma Contract Administrator. Normandy has exhausted the supply of courts in 

which it can seek resolution of its claim for breach of 

contract. In its shifting positions, the government avoided judicial determination of the merits for eight years. I 

respectfully dissent.

The HUD contracts 

Normandy Apartments had two contracts with the 

United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) Renewal Agreement of 2004 traces its renewals to 1968. The 

Regulatory Use Agreement of 2000 stated the conditions 

of Normandy’s prepayment of its mortgage, and also

contained all of the substantive terms of the Renewal 

Agreement. 

The Renewal Agreement states that “the purpose of 

the Renewal contract is to renew the expiring contract for 

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4 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

a new term,” Contract Section 4c. Section 4 authorizes 

HUD to assign the contract to a PHA (public housing 

agency), but provides that “[n]otwithstanding such assignment, HUD shall remain a party to the provisions of 

the Renewal Contract that specify HUD’s role pursuant to 

the Renewal Contract, including such provisions of Section 9 (HUD requirements), Section 10 (statutory changes 

during term), and section 11 (PHA default) of the Renewal 

Contract.” Section 4(a)(2).

The Renewal Agreement, but not the Regulatory Use 

Agreement, was signed by the Oklahoma Housing and 

Finance Authority as “Contract Administrator,” as authorized by § 1437f(b)(1) of the Housing Act. No substantive changes were made to HUD’s continuing authority 

and responsibility. The government does not dispute that

the rental subsidies continued to be provided by HUD, 

and that HUD retained full control and responsibility for 

all of the contract provisions, including the rights of 

inspection and termination as here exercised. 

In accordance with the contracts, HUD conducted periodic inspections of the Normandy Apartments property. 

In 2007 HUD terminated the federal subsidy payments, 

on the ground that Normandy had not properly maintained the apartments, leading to the litigation starting in 

Oklahoma in October 2007, and ending with the Federal 

Circuit.

Suit in Oklahoma District Court

Normandy filed suit in the District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, seeking to enjoin the 

termination that was ordered by HUD, and to require 

that the rental subsidies be continued at least during 

resolution of the issues in dispute. The United States 

moved for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, stating 

that at “issue in the instant case are agreements between 

Plaintiff and HUD.” Def.‘s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. 

Inj. at 2. As the district court recited, the United States

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 5

raised the question ”whether this court has jurisdiction to 

entertain this action or whether jurisdiction lies exclusively in the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the 

Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491.” Normandy, 2007 WL

3232610, at *1.

The government provided the affidavit of Mr. Herman 

Ransom in his position as Director of the HUD Multifamily Hub responsible for HUD’s housing programs in the 

region that includes Oklahoma. He averred that “Normandy Apartments, Ltd. (‘the owner’) entered into a 

Housing Assistance Payments (‘HAP’) contract with HUD 

September 2004,” and that the contracts provided that 

HUD would pay Monthly Rental Assistance “according to 

HUD’s regulations and administrative procedures,” citing

Agmt. §7(a). Ransom Aff. Mr. Ransom also described the 

Regulatory Use Agreement of 2000, between Normandy 

Apartments and HUD. He stressed that the Normandy 

Apartments contracts are with the United States, with 

elaboration such as “HUD has not authorized OHFA to 

conduct physical inspections of Normandy Apartments.” 

Ransom Aff. Thus the government argued that these 

were contracts with the United States, and that remedy 

for the asserted breach was available only in the Court of 

Federal Claims. The Oklahoma district court agreed, and 

ruled that “Plaintiff’s claims arise out of a contract with 

the government and are for breach of that contract and 

breach of regulations covering and relating to that contract, the latter of which plaintiff could not even assert if 

it did not have a HAP contract with HUD.” Normandy, 

2007 WL 3232610, at *2. 

The district court recited “HUD’s decision to abate 

Housing Assistance Payments and to terminate the HAP 

contract,” and reiterated that “plaintiff’s claims are 

founded upon an express contract with the United States 

and on regulations of an executive department. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1491.” Normandy, 2007 WL 3232610, at *1, *2. 

The court held that “jurisdiction over this case lies excluCase: 14-5135 Document: 45-2 Page: 28 Filed: 11/20/2015
6 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

sively in the United States Court of Federal Claims

pursuant to the Tucker Act.” Id. at *2.

Appeal to the Tenth Circuit

Normandy Apartments appealed to the Tenth Circuit, 

and the government again moved for dismissal for lack of 

jurisdiction. The Circuit court held that although Normandy’s APA claims were within the district court’s 

jurisdiction, since the contracts were between the United 

States and Normandy Apartments, the count “alleging an 

ordinary breach of contract, seeks equitable relief for a 

contract claim against the government. Because the 

Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear 

such a claim, the district court properly declined to take 

jurisdiction over it.” Normandy, 554 F.3d at 1299. 

The Tenth Circuit observed that “[u]nder HUD regulations and Normandy’s contract with HUD, Normandy 

was required to maintain the units,” id. at 1294, and 

reiterated that the Court of Federal Claims is the exclusive venue for suit for breach of a contract of this magnitude with the United States, id. at 1299. 

The Court of Federal Claims

Normandy Apartments then filed suit in the Court of 

Federal Claims. However, unlike the position on which it 

had prevailed in the district court and the Tenth Circuit, 

the government argued that the contracts are not with 

the United States, but with the Oklahoma housing authority as “Contract Administrator.” The principles of 

judicial estoppel foreclose such maneuvers:

Where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that 

position, he may not thereafter, simply because 

his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the 

party who has acquiesced in the position formerly 

taken by him.

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 7

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001); see, 

e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000) 

(“Judicial estoppel generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then 

relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another 

phase.”). 

This is not a new principle, see Davis v. Wakelee, 156 

U.S. 680 (1895): 

It may be laid down as a general proposition that, 

where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that 

position, he may not thereafter, simply because 

his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the 

party who has acquiesced in the position formerly 

taken by him.

Id. at 689. Nor is this principle new to the Federal Circuit. In Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1565 

(Fed. Cir. 1996) this court recognized that “where a party 

successfully urges a particular position in a legal proceeding it is estopped from taking a contrary position in a 

subsequent proceeding where its interests have changed.”

On this appeal the government does not dispute that 

HUD retained its full contract rights and obligations, 

including the right of termination. It was HUD that 

inspected the property, and it was HUD that terminated 

the contracts. This relationship is not overridden by the 

selection of a state housing authority as “contract administrator.” By the Housing statute, HUD “is authorized to 

enter into annual contributions contracts with public 

housing agencies pursuant to which such agencies may 

enter into contracts to make assistance payments,” 42 

U.S.C. §1437f(b)(1), and “[t]he Secretary shall embody the 

provisions for such annual contributions in a contract 

guaranteeing their payment,” 42 USC §1437c(a)(1). 

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8 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

However, such authorization does not remove HUD from 

its contractual obligations to the property owner.

HUD’s public housing Guidebook for Section 8 contracts is explicit that HUD is “contractually bound” by the 

Renewal Contract executed by a state housing authority: 

When a Renewal Contract is executed by a PHA 

[public housing authority] pursuant to this 

Guidebook, in accordance with HUD requirements

and on the form prescribed by HUD, HUD is contractually bound by the Renewal Contract provisions that specify HUD’s role pursuant to the 

Renewal Contract.

William C. Apgar, HUD Office of Multifamily Housing, 

Section 8 Renewal Policy (2001). The Guidebook is explicit that a renewal executed by a state housing authority 

does not relieve HUD of its contract obligations. And 

although the 2004 Renewal Agreement was signed by the 

Oklahoma authority, the Regulatory Use Agreement, 

which incorporates all of the contract obligations between 

HUD and Normandy Apartments, was executed by HUD, 

with no reference to any state authority.

Despite these explicit statements of HUD’s position, 

obligations, and authority, the Court of Federal Claims 

held that the “plaintiff is unable to enforce its rights in 

that contract against the federal government because the 

United States was not a party to it.” Fed. Cl. Op. at 20. 

The Court of Federal Claims also rejected Normandy’s 

alternative ground that its property had been taken in 

violation of its Fifth Amendment rights. Normandy now 

appeals to the Federal Circuit.

Appeal to the Federal Circuit 

The government no longer argues that these contracts 

are not with the United States, and does not directly 

challenge Tucker Act jurisdiction. The government recites that HUD funded the federal subsidy to Normandy, 

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NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES 9

that HUD inspected the Normandy Apartment premises, 

and that HUD terminated the subsidy payments. See, 

e.g., U.S. Br. 6-7 (“HUD abated—that is, suspended—

funding for HAP payments by OFHA to Normandy”). The 

government does not argue in this court that the Oklahoma “Contract Administrator” removed the United States 

from the contracts with Normandy.

Instead, the United States now seeks to argue the 

merits of the termination, stating that HUD did not 

breach the contracts because Normandy had not maintained the apartments in “decent, safe, and sanitary 

condition.” U.S. Br. 7. The propriety of the termination is 

the issue for which Normandy has been seeking a forum, 

now for eight years. The merits of the contract claim have 

never been decided. And the Federal Circuit is not a trial 

forum, for ab initio resolution of Normandy’s claim.

Summary

The United States argued successfully in the Oklahoma district court and the Tenth Circuit that this case 

belongs in the Court of Federal Claims because the contracts are with the United States. The United States then 

argued successfully in the Court of Federal Claims that 

the contracts are not with the United States. This is not 

only a classic exemplar of judicial estoppel, but the jurisdictional ruling of the Court of Federal Claims is incorrect, for the contracts are indeed with the United States, 

and subject to the Tucker Act.

I do not know how the merits would have been decided, had they been litigated. With the court’s ruling today,

however, all paths to judicial resolution appear to be 

closed. This is not the process envisioned by President 

Lincoln, his words carved at the entrance to this courthouse: “It is as much the duty of government to render 

prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens as it is to 

administer the same between private individuals.”

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10 NORMANDY APARTMENTS, LTD. v. UNITED STATES

I respectfully dissent.

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