Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03497/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03497-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clinton Ossie Taylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3497

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Clinton Ossie Taylor, also known as *

Larry McGee, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 15, 2005

 Filed: June 7, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Clinton Ossie Taylor (“Taylor”) appeals a denial of his motion to

suppress evidence of a firearm. We affirm. 

On March 24, 2003, Officer Wissink (“Wissink”) of Des Moines, Iowa,

stopped Taylor as he was driving. Wissink observed Taylor committing two traffic

violations: failing to stop at a stop sign and failing to wear a seat belt. In the process

of conducting the stop, Wissink asked Taylor to exit the vehicle. As Taylor was

stepping out of the car, Wissink observed the silhouette of a handgun fall down along

Appellate Case: 04-3497 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/07/2005 Entry ID: 1912165
1

The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief Judge for the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Iowa, presided over proceedings related to Taylor’s

motion to suppress. 

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the light-colored pant leg of Taylor’s trousers. Taylor was subsequently indicted for

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

In district court,1

 Taylor filed a motion to suppress evidence of the firearm,

arguing that the alleged traffic violations never occurred and that Wissink lacked

probable cause to conduct the stop. Because “[a] traffic violation – however minor

– creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle,” U.S. v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802,

805 (8th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted), the district court held that

Officer Wissink had probable cause to stop Taylor. Taylor appeals. 

“We must affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress unless it

is not supported by substantial evidence on the record . . . or upon review of the entire

record, [we] are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

made.” See United States v. Heath, 58 F.3d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal

quotation and citation omitted). 

Taylor contends that Wissink lied about the traffic violations and that the

police regularly stop citizens in his neighborhood and harass or search them. Two

witnesses testified in his favor. Lynette Johnson-Mustin, Taylor’s sister-in-law,

testified that she saw Taylor’s entire interaction with Wissink and saw Taylor wearing

his seat belt. Nathaniel Mustin (Lynette’s husband) testified that he and others were

regularly subject to unjustified stops and searches. Mustin also stated that Taylor

always wore a seatbelt because of the known police practices in their neighborhood.

Taylor notes that the district court’s order on the motion to suppress essentially

parrots Officer Wissink’s testimony given at the suppression hearing. He contends

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that in light of the testimony provided by defense witnesses, the Government failed

to meet its burden of proving that the traffic violations actually occurred.

We hold that the district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress was

supported by substantial testimonial evidence. The district court received two

different versions of the facts and ultimately chose to credit Wissink’s testimony,

which was not clear error. Indeed, a district court’s credibility determination almost

never constitutes “a clear error unless there is extrinsic evidence that contradicts the

witness’s story or the story is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that

a reasonable fact-finder would not credit it.” Heath, 58 F.3d at 1275. Since Taylor

concedes that Wissink’s testimony was plausible, and merely argues that the district

court did not give adequate weight to the testimony of the defendant’s witnesses, this

exception does not apply. 

AFFIRMED.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-3497 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/07/2005 Entry ID: 1912165