Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30244/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Thorvald Laursen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL THORVALD LAURSEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-30244

D.C. No.

3:13-cr-05634-RJB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Robert J. Bryan, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 6, 2016

Seattle, Washington

Filed January 30, 2017

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson;

Concurrence by Judge Hawkins

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2 UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed convictions for production and

possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2251(a) and 2252A.

The panel held that the government sufficiently

established that the defendant, a 45-year-old man, “used”

J.B., a 16-year-old girl, to produce sexually explicit images,

as required for a conviction under § 2251(a). The panel wrote

that the defendant’s theory that he was not the man depicted

in the photographs was unconvincing.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contentions that

§§ 2251 and 2252A are unconstitutionally vague and

overbroad, violate the Tenth Amendment, and exceed

Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. The panel

specifically rejected the defendant’s argument that the

legality of his relationship with a 16-year-old under

Washington state law precluded prosecution under federal

law.

The panel held that the district court’s evidentiary rulings

were sound.

Judge Hawkins concurred. To prevent the statute from

being overbroad and unconstitutionally vague, he would

require the government to show some taking unfair advantage

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 3

of the minor to establish “uses” under the statute, but wrote

that there were sufficient indicia in this case of a coercive or

exploitative element to satisfy the more narrow definition he

proposes.

COUNSEL

Lynn C. Hartfield (argued), Law Office of Lynn C. Hartfield

LLC, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Helen J. Brunner (argued), First Assistant United States

Attorney; Annette L. Hayes, United States Attorney; United

States Attorney’s Office, Seattle, Washington; for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we address whether taking consensual nude

“selfies”1

involving a forty-five-year-old man and a sixteenyear-old girl is sufficient to support a conviction for

production and possession of child pornography. We

conclude that this evidence was sufficient to support the

conviction, and we specifically reject the argument made by

defendant Michael Thorval Laursen (Laursen) that the

legality of his sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old

1 A Selfie is “an image of oneself taken by oneself using a digital

camera . . .” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/selfie (last visited September 22, 2016).

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4 UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN

under Washington state law precluded prosecution under

federal law.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Investigation of Sexual Abuse and Laursen’s

Arrest

In July, 2012, Laursen reported to police that a sixteenyear-old girl, referred to in this opinion as J.B., was being

prostituted by her uncles. At the time, J.B. lived with her

adoptive father Art Brown. Laursen and J.B. were involved

in a consensual sexual relationship, but neither of the two

apprised detectives of that fact.

As part of the investigation into the sexual abuse of J.B.,

Detective Rodriguez met with Art Brown, J.B.’s adoptive

father, who produced J.B.’s laptop, cell phone, and cell phone

records. A forensic examination of J.B.’s laptop revealed

“sexually explicit images” of J.B. and Laursen.

Seven months later, Laursen’s sister Maureen Gonzales

contacted Detective Rodriguez after finding a digital camera

in her kitchen that belonged to Laursen. The digital camera’s

memory card contained sexually explicit photos of J.B. 

Maureen gave police the digital camera and Laursen’s laptop. 

Maureen acknowledged that Laursen was incarcerated when

she gave detectives the digital camera. Detective Rodriguez

subsequently obtained a search warrant for the digital camera

and for Laursen’s laptop.

A forensic examination of the camera’s memory card

revealed an array of photos. Nine pictures on the memory

card contained nude images of J.B. Several non-sexual

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 5

pictures were also on the memory card. The laptop did not

contain sexually explicit photos.

On February 21, 2013, detectives interviewed Laursen. 

Detectives informed Laursen that they knew about the nude

photos he had taken with J.B. Laursen initially denied taking

the nude photos, but later admitted that he took them. When

detectives continued questioningLaursen, he asked detectives

to stop recording. Laursen then inquired: “This is what this

is about, the pictures we took? I can really get in trouble for

the pictures I took with her?”

The answer to Laursen’s question was a definitive yes. 

Laursen was charged with one count of production of child

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). A

subsequent indictment added possession of child pornography

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). 

Laursen waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to trial

before a judge.

B. The Bench Trial

Prior to trial, the district court agreed with Laursen that

federal jurisdiction in the case was predicated on “a pretty

narrow nexus” because there was “no production of pictures

over the Internet here, for example, to third parties or

anything like that[.]” Nevertheless, the court ultimately

determined that production of child pornography with a cell

phone that traveled across state lines satisfied “the federal

nexus under 2251 and 2252(a) (sic).”

The Government’s case against Laursen focused on two

sets of photographs. The first set of photographs were found

on the hard drive for J.B.’s Toshiba laptop. The second set of

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6 UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN

photographs came from the memory card for the digital

camera.

J.B.’s testimony was an integral part of the government’s

case. She testified that she met Laursen in March, 2012,

when she was sixteen, and around the time she suffered a

drug relapse. J.B. admitted that her memory of that time

period was “pretty cloudy,” and it was hard to remember

details. J.B’s and Laursen’s sexual relationship began the

second time they saw each other. Their relationship became

serious when J.B. ran away from home in July, 2012, and

commenced living with Laursen. During this period, J.B. and

Laursen interacted intimately in a variety of locations,

including motels and the homes of Laursen’s friends and

family. When Laursen took J.B. to the police in July, 2012,

J.B. told detectives that Laursen was her best friend and hero. 

However, J.B. acknowledged at trial that she often skipped

school to see Laursen, obtained drugs from Laursen, and ran

away from home because of Laursen’s influence.

J.B. recalled that she took the sexually explicit

photographs found on the Toshiba hard drive with her cell

phone before a motel room mirror in August, 2012. J.B.

identified Laursen as the man standing next to her in the

“selfie” photographs. J.B. testified that she took the

photographs with Laursen because he told her they “looked

good together” and said “he wanted to take pictures.”2

Although J.B. stated that she did not like “taking pictures like

that,” she and Laursen took sexually explicit photographs

each time they saw each other. However, J.B. deleted some

photographs at Laursen’s request. J.B. transferred the

2 The photographs depicted both J.B. and Laursen displaying full

frontal nudity and other pornographic poses.

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 7

sexually explicit photographs from her cell phone to her

Toshiba hard drive days after the photographs were taken. 

J.B. also sent some of the photographs to Laursen’s cell

phone.

J.B. also identified herself in the sexually explicit

photographs found on the memory card. J.B. assumed that

Laursen took the photographs because her hair was dyed red

in the pictures, which was the same time period when she and

Laursen were in a relationship and living together. J.B. also

identified a red blanket and brown pillow in the picture that

she said belonged to Laursen. In addition, J.B. identified the

digital camera in evidence as belonging to Laursen because

it had a burn mark on it.3

J.B. was adamant that she had never taken sexually

explicit photos with anyone other than Laursen. J.B. said she

lied when she previously told detectives that her uncle

recorded her performing sexual acts. She also lied to police

when she said that her uncles sexually abused her. The court

precluded Laursen from questioning J.B. about her sexual

relationships with other men in 2012.

Laursen’s sister Maureen and brother-in-law Adam

testified against him at trial. Laursen lived with Maureen and

Adam in 2012, and regularly brought J.B. to their home. 

Maureen and Adam identified the digital camera in evidence

as Laursen’s property. In early 2013, Maureen picked up the

digital camera from among Laursen’s belongings in her

kitchen area, and looked through the pictures on the camera. 

Maureen immediately contacted the police when she saw the

3 The photographs were close-ups of J.B.’s vaginal area, including

some photographs displaying blood from menstruation.

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8 UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN

nude photos of J.B. Maureen testified that the digital camera

had not been stolen, and she only told police it was because

Laursen had lied to her. Maureen and Adam identified

Laursen as the man pictured in the photographs stored on

J.B.’s Toshiba hard drive.

To satisfy the jurisdictional element of the offenses, the

government called a Toshiba representative who testified that

the hard drive in J.B.’s computer was shipped from another

country. A Kingston Technology representative similarly

testified that the company’s camera memory cards are made

in Japan and shipped to California.

In his defense, Laursen presented nude photographs he

took of himself and submitted in support of his theory that he

was not the man in the photographs submitted by the

government. The pictures Laursen submitted showed a scar

on Laursen’s left leg that was absent from the man’s leg in

one of the photographs submitted by the government. 

However, there was no evidence presented of when the scar

was acquired.

C. The District Court’s Verdict

The district court found J.B. to be “very believable” and

credited her “whole story of how these pictures were taken”

because her version was corroborated by other evidence. The

court also noted that Laursen’s lies to authorities about his

sexual relationship with J.B. reflected knowledge that J.B.

was a minor.

The court found Laursen guilty of production and

possession of child pornography. The court found that

Laursen knowingly “used [J.B.] to take part in sexually

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 9

explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual image

of such conduct.” The court concluded that Laursen

produced or aided and abetted J.B. in producing the

photographs, and knew that J.B. was sixteen years old. The

court did not consider one of the photographs because of the

issue of the scar on Laursen’s leg, and also excluded

consideration of one nude photograph that was not clearly

pornographic.

The Court also determined that Laursen produced the

photographs found on his camera’s memory card. Finally,

the court ruled that the child pornography was produced and

possessed using materials that had been transported in

interstate commerce.

At sentencing, Laursen argued that the district court

should have dismissed his case due to a lack of jurisdiction,

because under state law J.B. was “a young woman of legal

consensual age and is therefore, by definition, not a child.” 

The court overruled his objection and sentenced Laursen to

fifteen years’ imprisonment for the production of child

pornography, and ten years’ imprisonment for possession of

child pornography. The judge told Laursen that the sentence

was the only one “available” because the judge was “bound

by the law, whether I agree with it or not.” Laursen filed a

timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We apply de novo review to the denial of a motion for

acquittal predicated on insufficiency of the evidence

presented at trial. See United States v. Gonzalez, 528 F.3d

1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008). “There is sufficient evidence to

support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most

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10 UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. . . .” Id. (citation omitted).

“Following a bench trial, a district court’s conclusions of

law are reviewed de novo and findings of fact are reviewed

for clear error . . . .” United States v. Temkin, 797 F.3d 682,

688 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). A challenge to the

constitutionality of a federal statute is a question of law

reviewed de novo. See United States v. Lujan, 504 F.3d 1003,

1006 (9th Cir. 2007). We also review de novo whether an

evidentiary ruling violates a defendant’s constitutional rights.

See United States v. Waters, 627 F.3d 345, 352 (9th Cir.

2010), as amended.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of The Evidence

Laursen contends that the Government’s evidence was

insufficient to support a conviction for production of child

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).4 To secure

4

 Section 2251(a) provides in pertinent part:

Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces,

entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any

sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing

any visual depiction of such conduct . . . shall be

punished as provided under subsection (e), if such

person knows or has reason to know that such visual

depiction will be transported or transmitted using any

means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or

in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or

mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or

transmitted using materials that have been mailed,

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 11

a conviction under that statute, the government was required

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) J.B. was a minor

(less than eighteen years old); (2) Laursen employed, used,

persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced J.B. to take part in

sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a

visual depiction of that conduct; and (3) that visual depiction

was produced using materials that had been transported in

interstate or foreign commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); see

also United States v. Sheldon, 755 F.3d 1047, 1049–50 (9th

Cir. 2014); Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th

Cir. 2015) (stating that the federal statute defines a “minor”

as a person under the age of eighteen). Laursen’s challenge

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the

second element: he contends that he did not “use” J.B. to

take part in sexually explicit conduct “for the purpose” of

producing visual images.

“The question of whether the pictures fall within the

statutory definition is a question of fact as to which we must

uphold the district court’s findings unless clearly erroneous

. . . .” United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 688 (9th Cir.

2009), as amended (citation omitted). The term “use” is not

defined in § 2251(a). Thus, traditional rules of statutory

interpretation are employed, commencing with the plain and

common meaning of the word derived from dictionary

definitions. See United States v. Flores, 729 F.3d 910, 914

shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or

foreign commerce by any means, including by

computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been

transported or transmitted using any means or facility

of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting

interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.

18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).

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(9th Cir. 2013). As one might expect, “use” has many

definitions, but the most relevant is “to put into action or

service [;] to avail oneself of [;] employ.” Merriam-Webster

Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/use (last visited August 15, 2016). “[T]he . . .

doctrine of noscitur a sociis—the principle that a word is

known by the company it keeps” confirms the plain meaning

of the term “use.” Flores, 729 F.3d at 915. Indeed, one of

the other means of violating the statute, “employ[ing]” a

minor, is listed as a synonym for “use.” Merriam-Webster

Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/use (last visited August 15, 2016); see also Bailey

v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (including

“employ” as a definition of “use”).

Adopting the plain meaning of the term “use,” we agree

with the district court that the evidence presented by the

government sufficiently established that Laursen used or

employed J.B. to produce sexually explicit images. The

pornographic photographs were produced after Laursen told

J.B. that the two “looked good together” and that “he wanted

to take pictures.” (emphasis added). Importantly, J.B.

testified that she did not enjoy taking pornographic pictures. 

J.B. also deleted pictures at Laursen’s request. This evidence

established that Laursen directed J.B.’s actions, at a minimum

engaging in active conduct that resulted in the production of

child pornography. See Overton, 573 F.3d at 692 (requiring

proof of active or coercive conduct). Laursen is correct that

there was no evidence presented of physical coercion. 

However, in view of the disjunctive language contained in

Overton, active conduct alone suffices to sustain a conviction

under § 2251(a). See id.

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 13

Our reasoning is consistent with the rulings of our sister

circuits, which have broadly interpreted the “use” element of

the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 42

(2d Cir. 1996) (defining “use” as occurring whenever a minor

is the subject of the photography). Recently, the Sixth Circuit

adopted the Second Circuit’sinterpretation of “use,” similarly

holding that this element is “fully satisfied for the purposes of

the child pornography statute if a child is photographed in

order to create pornography.” United States v. Wright,

774 F.3d 1085, 1090 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The

Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected Wright’s argument that the

statute required proof of coercive conduct. See id. at 1091. 

The Eighth Circuit also agreed with the Second Circuit that

the “use of a minor” element is satisfied even without

solicitation or enticement if a defendant photographs a minor. 

See United States v. Fadl, 498 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the First Circuit recently upheld a defendant’s

conviction under § 2251 (a), even though he was in a

consensual relationship with a fourteen-year-old, holding that

“the statutory definition of ‘use’ is met when a defendant

makes a minor the subject of a visual depiction by

intentionally photographing the minor engaging in sexually

explicit conduct.” Ortiz-Graulau v. United States, 756 F.3d

12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1438

(2015).

Although application of the statute in these contexts may

lead to harsh results, we echo the persuasive reasoning of the

Seventh Circuit that “Congress may legitimately conclude

that even a willing or deceitful minor is entitled to

governmental protection from self-destructive decisions that

would expose him or her to the harms of child pornography.” 

United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 403 (7th Cir. 2011),

as amended (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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14 UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN

Finally, Laursen’s theory that he was not the man

depicted in the photographs is unconvincing. J.B. identified

Laursen as the man in the photographs, and testified that no

one else took sexually explicit photos of her. Laursen’s sister

and brother-in-law also identified Laursen as the man

pictured in the photographs. And it was especially telling that

Laursen asked detectives: “I can really get in trouble for the

pictures I took with her?”

Based on the evidence presented, the district court’s

finding that Laursen used a minor in the production of

pornography was not clearly erroneous. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there

was sufficient evidence to support the district court’s verdict

of guilt. See Gonzalez, 528 F.3d at 1211.

B. Constitutional Challenges

Laursen contends that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2252A5 as

5

 18 U.S.C. § 2252A provides in pertinent part:

(a) Any person who . . .

(5)(B) knowinglypossesses, or knowingly accesses

with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical,

film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material

that contains an image of child pornography that has

been mailed, or shipped or transported using any means

or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or

affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means,

including by computer, or that was produced using

materials that have been mailed, or shipped or

transported in or affecting interstate or foreign

commerce by any means, including by computer. . .

shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 15

applied are vague, overbroad, violate the Tenth Amendment,

and exceed Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. 

These challenges are primarily predicated on Laursen’s belief

that his conduct with J.B. was legal under Washington law. 

The governing Washington statute provides that “[a] person

is guilty of rape of a child in the third degree when the person

has sexual intercourse with another who is at least fourteen

years old but less than sixteen years old and not married to

the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight

months older than the victim.” Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9A.44.079. Thus, Laursen’s sexual relationship with J.B.

was legal under state law because she was not “less than

sixteen years old.” Id. However, a separate Washington

statute provides that “[a] person is guilty of sexual

exploitation of a minor” if the person “[a]ids, invites,

employs, authorizes, or causes a minor to engage in sexually

explicit conduct, knowing that such conduct will be

photographed . . .” Wash. Rev. Code § 9.68A.040. 

Consequently, in the state of Washington, Laursen’s sexual

relationship with J.B. was legal but the production of

pornography stemming from that relationship was not.

1. Overbreadth Challenge

Laursen contends that the child pornography statutes at

issue are overbroad because he has a protected privacy

interest in taking intimate photographs in the course of a

consensual sexual relationship. We disagree. A consensual

sexual relationship between adults is constitutionally

protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453

(1972). However, that constitutional protection has not been

extended to sexual relationships between adults and children. 

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)

(distinguishing cases involving minors). In any event, the

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prohibited conduct engaged in by Laursen was producing

pornographic material involving J.B., not simply engaging in

a sexual relationship with her. And the Supreme Court has

made it crystal clear that child pornography is not

constitutionally protected. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.

747, 763 (1982). At the same time, the Supreme Court has

recognized that protecting children from sexual abuse and

exploitation constitutes a particularly compelling interest of

the government. See id. at 757. Given that J.B. was a minor,

using her to produce pornography is unquestionably

prohibited conduct, and Laursen’s overbreadth challenge

fails. See id. at 773 (explaining that a statute “whose

legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible

applications” is not overbroad).

2. Vagueness Challenge

“To avoid being unconstitutionally vague, a penal statute

must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness

that ordinary people can understand what conduct is

prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary

and discriminatory enforcement. . . .” United States v.

Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). A statute is void for

vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary

intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so

standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously

discriminatory enforcement . . . .” United States v. Williams,

553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). We have no doubt that a person of ordinary

intelligence would know that 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) prohibits

using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the

purpose of producing a photograph of the sexual conduct, and

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 17

that § 2252A prohibits possessing child pornography. See id.

at 306. In sum, we are not persuaded that the statutes of

conviction are unconstitutionally vague.

3. Tenth Amendment Challenge

Laursen’s Tenth Amendment challenge is premised on the

theory that the federal statutes under which he was prosecuted

usurp the state’s authority to determine the age of consent for

engaging in sexual relations. Laursen relies on the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct.

2077 (2014). In Bond, the Supreme Court invalidated a

conviction under the Chemical Weapons Implementation Act

for what the court described as a “purely local crime[].” Id. at

2083. The defendant was a microbiologist who sought

revenge on a romantic rival by spreading chemicals on the

other woman’s car door, mailbox and doorknob. See id. at

2085. The Supreme Court ruled that federalizing this

“common law-assault” “would dramatically intrude upon

traditional state criminal jurisdiction.” Id. at 2087–88.

We are not convinced that the Supreme Court’s Bond

decision dictates a similar outcome in this case. As a

preliminary matter, we note that the Supreme Court has

accepted the federalization of child pornography crimes by

upholding convictions brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. See

e.g., Williams, 553 U.S. at 291, 308. More importantly, the

facts of this case differ markedly from the facts in Bond. In

this case, the statutes of conviction include an interstate

nexus, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(a)(5), whereas in Bond,

the defendant was prosecuted for a garden variety assault that

is ordinarily prosecuted under state law. See Bond, 134 S.Ct.

at 2087–88. For these reasons, we reject Laursen’s Tenth

Amendment challenge.

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18 UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN

4. Commerce Clause Challenge

It is settled precedent that “Congress could rationally

conclude that homegrown child pornographyaffects interstate

commerce, and therefore Congress may regulate even purely

intrastate production of child pornography and criminalize its

intrastate possession . . .” United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d

623, 632 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S.Ct. 2408 (June 6,

2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Therefore, we also reject Laursen’s Commerce Clause

challenge. See id.

C. District Court’s Evidentiary Rulings

Laursen argues that he was denied his right to present a

defense by the district court’s ruling that testimony relating

to J.B.’s sexual relationships with other men was

inadmissible. “As amended in 1994, Rule 412 of the Federal

Rules of Evidence forbids the admission of evidence of an

alleged victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition in

all civil or criminal proceedings involving alleged sexual

misconduct except under limited circumstances . . . .” B.K.B.

v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002), as

amended (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 412) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Admittedly, preclusion of evidence of a

victim’s past sexual abuse by others may violate a

defendant’s constitutional rights. See LaJoie v. Thompson,

217 F.3d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended. However,

Laursen sought to question J.B. about possible sexual abuse

by other men to support his theory that he was not the

individual depicted in the photographs submitted by the

government. The district court’s ruling did not compromise

Laursen’s right to present this theory of defense, because

Laursen was permitted to ask J.B. if anyone else had taken

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 19

sexually explicit photographs of her. He also questioned J.B.

about her statements to detectives that her uncle

photographed her performing sexual acts. The district court

only precluded Laursen from asking whether J.B. had a

sexual relationship with someone other than Laursen in 2012. 

The district court’s ruling was consistent with our precedent

because Laursen was “seeking to introduce the evidence as

past behavior that was other than the offense charged.” 

United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, 814 (9th Cir. 1995)

(emphasis omitted). Further, any error was harmless: there

was an abundance of testimony to support the conclusion that

Laursen was the man depicted in the photographs. See id.

Laursen’s final contention—that the district court abused

its discretion in excluding the proffered photograph of his

body is unavailing. “If the district court finds that the

testimony would waste time, confuse or not materially assist

the trier of fact, or be better served through cross-examination

or a comprehensive jury instruction, it has the discretion to

exclude the testimony.” United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d

1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Excluding the proffered photograph was

well within the discretion of the district court. Laursen

argued that there was no visible scar on the man in the

photographs with J.B. that were offered by the government,

while the nude photographs he offered of himself showed a

visible scar on his left hip. Nevertheless, there was no

evidence presented as to when the scar came into existence. 

Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the proffered photograph would not

materially assist the judge in his capacity as the trier of fact. 

See id. at 1016.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Sufficient evidence was presented by the government to

sustain Laursen’s convictions for the production and

possession of child pornography. The fact that Laursen’s

sexual relationship with J.B. was legal under Washington law

did not legitimize the production and possession of child

pornography under state or federal law. Laursen’s

constitutional challenges lack merit, and the district court’s

evidentiary rulings were sound.

AFFIRMED.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Michael Laursen stands convicted of the “use” of a minor

to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of

producing visual depictions of that conduct and is currently

serving the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence the

statute requires. The photos in question were taken in the

course of an ill-advised, but perfectly legal, relationship

Laursen had with a young woman above the age of consent

under Washington law. The record shows no evidence that

Laursen distributed, transferred or otherwise displayed the

images to anyone outside that relationship. In this respect,

his situation is no different than the thousands of similar

photos taken everydaybyseventeen-year-old college students

engaged in intimate, consensual relationships. The

government admits the theory of prosecution here could be

used to prosecute anyone snapping a photo showing

consenting individuals engaged in intimacy.

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UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN 21

This is where I differ from my friends in the majority. To

prevent the statute from being overbroad and

unconstitutionally vague, I would adopt a narrower

construction of the term “uses” in the statute. The

government’s construction implies that one “uses” the minor

much as one “uses” a camera to take the photograph, and

their mere presence in the photo could suffice. As

the majority acknowledges, “uses” has a number of

meanings in ordinary language. To me, the one most likely

applicable here is: “to take unfair advantage of; exploit.” Use,

Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/use

(last visited December 13, 2016); see also American Heritage

Dictionary College Edition 1331 (2nd ed. 1991) (“to exploit

for one’s own advantage or gain”). Although I agree with the

majority that “a word is known by the company it keeps,”

Flores, 729 F.3d at 915, in my view, the rest of the terms in

the statute—employs, persuades, induces, entices or

coerces— suggest that the defendant must have exerted some

sort of improper influence on the minor for the purpose of

producing the visual depiction of sexual conduct.

Whether that something more has been shown here is

where I agree with my colleagues. At the time of the

relationship, Laursen was forty-five years old and J.B. was

only sixteen. While she was above the legal age of consent,

this very significant age difference, combined with the other

facts of this case—including her vulnerability from an

already abusive relationship with her relatives, and evidence

demonstrating that Laursen convinced J.B. that he was her

“hero” and “mentor,” all the while providing her with drugs

and moving her from motel room to motel room and into the

homes and bedrooms ofstrangers—provides sufficient indicia

of a coercive or exploitative element to satisfy even the more

narrow definition of “uses” I propose here.

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22 UNITED STATES V. LAURSEN

Thus, I would require the government to show some

“taking unfair advantage of” the minor to establish “uses”

under this statute (where no other statutory element is

present), but otherwise I concur in affirming Laursen’s

conviction and sentence on the facts of this case.

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