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Parties Involved:
Gary DeLand
Appellee
Ernest John Young
Appellant

Document Text:

. . "" 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals •r enth Circuit 

AUG 121991 

ROBERT L. 1-iOECKER 

ERNEST Clerk JOHN YOUNG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GARY DELAND, 

Defendant-Appel lee. 

) 

) 

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No. 90-4180 

(D.C. No. 89-CV-1143) 

( D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. Young, a state inmate, filed a pro se habeas corpus 

petition requesting relief from a parole revocation proceeding. 

The district court denied relief and Mr. Young appeals prose. 

Mr. Young was convicted and committed to prison in 1986 and 

was paroled in 1988. Approximately eight months after he was 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36. 3. 

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,., 

paroled Mr. Young was arrested and charged with two counts of 

assault against his wife, one against his five-year-old son, a 

charge of consuming alcohol (which was forbidden by his parole 

terms) and a charge that he had used a controlled substance. Mr. 

Young waived his prerevocation hearing and was returned to prison 

where he was scheduled for a parole revocation hearing. At the 

hearing Mr. Young was represented by appointed counsel and Mr. 

Young admitted an assault upon his wife and the consumption of 

alcohol and in return the remaining charges were dropped. 

Mr. Young subsequently filed a petition for postconviction 

relief in the state court alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel at the parole revocation hearing and the state courts 

denied relief. 

Mr. Young next filed his prose habeas corpus petition with 

the federal court and alleged he did not knowingly, wilfully and 

intelligently admit his guilt to the parole violation charges and 

he raised ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The district court reviewed the transcript of the parole 

revocation hearing and concluded Mr. Young's "plea" was made 

voluntarily and knowingly. The district court further concluded 

Mr. Young's attorney competently represented him. The district 

court then denied habeas corpus relief. 

Mr. Young appeals prose, raises the same issues, and argues 

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that the true facts were suppressed. 

The record on appeal has been examined and we cannot conclude 

the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. Substantial 

evidence exists to support the district court's findings. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRM.ED. 

outstanding motions are denied. 

forthwith. 

The mandate shall 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

All 

issue 

United States Circuit Judge 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT' 

DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAf."'~ 

ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

GARY DELAND, 

Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

AND ORDER 

Civil No. 89-C-1143G 

On December 22, 1989, the plaintiff, an inmate under 

the jurisdiction of the Utah Department of Corrections, filed a 

prose petition under 28 u.s.c. § 2254 for writ of habeas corpus. 

The petition makes two claims for post-trial relief arising out 

of a parole revocation hearing held before the Board of Pardons 

on March 1, 1989. First, plaintiff claims that his pleas of 

guilty to the parole violations were unlawfully induced and were 

not made voluntarily. Second, plaintiff claims that he was 

denied his right to effective assistance of counsel at his parole 

revocation hearing. 

On November 27, 1988, plaintiff was arrested and 

charged with five parole violations: Counts 1 and 2 alleged 

assaults on his wife; Count 3 alleged assault on his stepson; 

Count 4 alleged aicohol consumption; and Count 5 alleged use of a 

controlled substance. Plaintiff waived his right to a 

preliminary revocation hearing and at the March 1, 1989 hearing 

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he plead guilty to Counts 2 and 4, and the Parole Department 

agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. Plaintiff's parole was 

revoked and he was returned to the Utah State Prison. He was 

given a new parole date of November 27, 1990--two years from the 

date of his arrest on the parole violation charges. The Board of 

Pardons appointed Mr. Earl Xaiz to serve as plaintiff's attorney 

at the parole revocation hearing. 

On January 5, 1990, the court referred the case to the 

magistrate pursuant to 28 u.s.c § 636(b} (1) (B}. The magistrate 

directed that the defendant ~ilea response to the habeas 

petition, which was done. The magistrate has also entered orders 

relative to certain discovery motions filed by plaintiff. 1 On 

September 17, 1990, the magistrate submitted a Report and 

Recommendation that the petition be dismissed. On September 21, 

1990, plaintiff filed an Objection to the magistrate's Report and 

Recommendation. 2 The court has reviewed the entire file in 

this case, including the petition and the affidavits submitted in 

connection therewith, as well as the transcript of the parole 

hearing of March 1, 1989. This Order is based upon a de nova 

One such discovery order was objected to by plaintiff, and this court considered that 

objection but affirmed the magistrate's order dismissing the motion for discovery in an Order 

dated August 20, 1990. 

2 Plaintiffs Objection does not address the analysis made by the magistrate regarding 

both claims in the petition. The Objection merely repeats the allegations raised in the Petition 

and in the affidavits submitted in connection therewith. 

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review. The court determines that oral argument would be of no 

material assistance and that the matter may be decided on the 

basis of the existing record. 

ANALYSIS 

I. CLAIM OF UNKNOWING ADMISSIONS OF GUILT 

Plaintiff's first claim in his habeas petition is that 

he did not knowingly plead guilty to parole violation Count 2, 

assault on his wife, and to Count 4, consumption of alcohol on 

November 29, 1989. Plaintiff indicated at the time of the 

hearing that he had previously been given a copy of the 

allegations and that he had just reviewed them. Plaintiff was 

specifically asked by the parole board how he plead to the 

allegation contained in counts 2 and 4, although the counts were 

not formally read to plaintiff. Transcript of March 1, 1989 

Parole Revocation Hearing, pp. 2-3. Plaintiff stated "Guilty" in 

answer to both inquiries. Id. at 3. The hearing transcript 

also indicates that these pleas were offered in connection with 

an agreement that parole violation counts 1, 3 and 5 would be 

dismissed by the Board of Pardons. Id. at 2. 

Following his guilty pleas on counts 2 and 4, plaintiff 

was given an opportunity to explain his views regarding the 

conduct alleged in the parole violation counts. Plaintiff stated 

that "my wife and kids are important to me now" and that "I don't 

want alcohol in my life no more." Id. at 6. Plaintiff further 

stated at his parole revocation hearing: 

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.I.g. at 6. 

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[T]here's a few problems I've had in my past 

and, you know, I need to put it all behind, 

it's time to forget it all and move on in 

life. I've got a wife and kids now and 

that's what I want, that's what my attention 

is on and that includes forgetting alcohol 

and drugs and getting them out of my life. 

Later in the parole revocation hearing, Board of 

Pardons member Ms. Palacios inquired further of plaintiff 

regarding his physical abuse of his family. Plaintiff gave 

inconsistent responses to these inquires. Plaintiff admitted to 

having hit his wife but he denied that he was the cause of her 

broken nose and dislocated shoulder. Id. at 8. Thereafter, the 

following colloquy occurred between Ms. Palacios and plaintiff: 

Ms. Palacios: Did she go to Castleview 

Hospital with injuries? 

Mr. Young: I believe that on the ·:night 

that that happened I contacted my parole 

officer and I contacted the Price City Police 

and I requested to take her to the hospital 

that night and everything because she told me 

she was okay. You know, I do try to take the 

right proper steps. I contacted Harold, my 

mental health worker and --

MS. PALACIOS: Did you hit her and hurt 

her? 

MR. YOUNG: Did I hit her and hurt her? 

Well, I have before, we've had a couple of 

fights and I have hurt her. 

MS. PALACIOS: Did you hit her more than 

once? 

MR. YOUNG: I think we fought twice. 

MS. PALACIOS: And the damage you do is 

damage that could be seen on the parts of her? 

MR. YOUNG: I think I've grabbed her on 

the arms before, she bruises really easy, and 

I've left bruises on her arms before and I 

think one time I did -- well, we were 

wrestling around and I did give her a black 

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eye but I received one too, I got one too. 

You know, we've fought a couple of times. 

You know, I'm not really a violent person, I 

don't want to be a violent person. 

lg. at 8-9. At the end of Ms. Palacios's questioning, which 

included questions regarding uncharged or dismissed charges, she 

remarked: "Mr. Young, I'm convinced I'm not getting a straight 

answer out of you. I have nothing further." Id. at 12. 

Based on the court's de novo review of the plaintiff's 

parole revocation hearing, the court finds that the plaintiff 

knowingly plead guilty to the parole violation allegations ~f 

Counts 2 and 4 which was the basis for plaintiff's parole 

revocation. In this regard, the court rejects plaintiff's 

numerous allegations submitted in connection with his habeas 

petition that he did not commit the acts which he plead guilty to 

but that he had been the victim of a police conspiracy. These 

allegations were noted in the parole violation report which was 

· before the Board at the time of the hearing. Nothing was said by 

plaintiff at the hearing about any police conspiracy or that a 

police officer had abused his wife, and not him. In fact, his 

statements at the hearing indicate to the contrary. 

Plaintiff's claim that his pleas of guilty to counts 2 

and 4 were based on a belief that he would not be incarcerated 

any further does not render his plea involuntary. The Tenth 

Circuit recently explained: 

(W]hen a defendant pleads guilty, he makes a 

decision based on a calculated risk that the 

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Appellate Case: 90-4180 Document: 010110131492 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 8 
consequences that will flow from entering the 

guilty plea will be more favorable than those 

that would flow from going to trial. This 

inherent uncertainty does not make the plea 

involuntary. See Johnson v. United States, 

539 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. 

denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977). 

Bailey v. Cowley, No. 89-5100, Slip Op. (10th Cir. Sept. 25, 

1990). In this case, plaintiff potentially could have had his 

parole revoked .until the end of his sentence, which was then set 

to expire on March 1, 1992. 3 After pleading guilty to two of 

the five charges, plaintiff was given a new parole date of 

November 27, 1990. 

Plaintiff testified that he had been given a copy of 

the allegations and that he had recently reviewed them. He did 

not equivocate in his answer of "guilty" to those specific 

charges. The record does indicate that plaintiff thereafter made 

some inconsistent statements when questioned about the 

particulars of those charges. The court views these 

inconsistencies as bearing upon plaintiff's credibility or upon 

his inability to accept responsibility for his actions. 

3 The Board's reference at the revocation hearing to an expiration date of March 1, 

1991, rather than March 1, 1992, was simply a misstatement. The Judgment and Commitment 

signed by Judge Bunnell on March 2, 1987, noted that defendant was to serve a term in the 

Utah State Prison "not to exceed five (5) years," i.e., until March 1, 1992. Accordingly, 

plaintiffs recent "Motion for Order Declaring Expiration Date of 3-1-91 and Affidavit in. Support 

of Request for Subpoena," filed on October 9, 1990, is without merit. The Board of Pardons has 

recently adjusted plaintiffs expiration date to November 17, 1991, to credit plaintiff for a total 

of 105 days that plaintiff was in custody for diagnostic evaluation. See letter from State Board 

of Pardons to Judge Greene dated Sept. 12, 1990. 

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Plaintiff's testimony does not indicate to the court that 

plaintiff did not understand the nature of the charges that were 

brought against him nor do they indicate that he did not 

knowingly plead guilty to those charges. Accordingly, the court 

agrees with the magistrate that plaintiff's first claim of not 

making a voluntary plea to parole violation counts 2 and 4 is 

without merit. 

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not normally 

attach to parole revocation hearings. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 

U.S. 471 (1972). However, if a probationer suffers from an 

intellectual deficit then he does have a Sixth Amendment right to 

effective counsel at his parole revocation hearing. Gagnon v. 

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973). Defendant has not argued 

that plaintiff did not have a federal constitutional right to 

counsel at his parole revocation hearing, and plaintiff alleges 

that he was represented by attorney Earl Xaiz because he has some 

possible intellectual deficits. Therefore, this court will 

assume, as did the magistrate in his Report and Recommendation, 

that plaintiff did have a Sixth Amendment right to effective 

counsel at his parole revocation hearing. 

The Supreme Court case Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984), sets forth a two-part test to establish an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth 

Amendment. First, the reviewing court "must judge the 

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Appellate Case: 90-4180 Document: 010110131492 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 10 
reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of 

the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." 

Id. at 690. In making this judgment, the court must determine 

whether, "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts 

or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance." Id. Second, if such an error was made by 

counsel, the court must determine whether the error affected the 

judgment of the tribunal in the nature of prejudice to the 

defendant. Id. at 661-62. The Court in Strickland indicated 

that "[i]n certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is 

presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of 

counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice." 

Id. at 692. 

Plaintiff claims that his attorney did not render him 

effective assistance because he did not take adequate time to 

interview the plaintiff or other relevant witnesses, such as 

plaintiff's wife, before the hearing, and also that his attorney 

did not attempt to have plaintiff's wife testify at the hearing. 

The initial comments at the revocation hearing made by plaintiff 

and by attorney Xaiz tend to indicate that Xaiz had not spent 

much time at all talking with plaintiff prior to the hearing: 

HEARING OFFICER: And is Mr. Xaiz 

representing you? 

MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. I believe so. I 

don't (inaudible.) 

MR. XIAZ: I introduced 

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. 

MR. XAIZ: We do. Just 

8 

myself as Earl. 

(Inaudible.) 

for the sake of 

Appellate Case: 90-4180 Document: 010110131492 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 11 
time -- well, I ought to indicate, one of the 

reasons that we've had to hold up on this 

hearing is that Mr. Young was in a different 

in -- or a different building here at the 

prison than what was indicated when I came 

out and we did not have a chance to interview 

him today. In order for the sake of time, 

however, we're in agreement with the Parole 

Department that Mr. Young would admit or 

plead guilty to allegations No. 2 and 

allegation No. 4 and, in return, allegation 

No. 1, allegation No. 3 and allegation No. 5 

would be dismissed. I think the Board 

probably would note from the space of 

allegation 1 that there's a timeliness issue 

and allegation 5 was based upon a hearsay 

type situation. Based upon that and other 

factors, in terms of what we've agreed to for 

recommendation, we would propose that we go 

that way and avoid reading those allegations, 

with the Board's permission. 

Transcript of March 1, 1989 Parole Revocation Hearing, pp.1-2. 

The hearing transcript does indicate that attorney Xiaz 

did not spend much time with plaintiff prior to representing him 

at the parole revocation hearing. However, from statements made 

by Mr. Xaiz and plaintiff at the hearing it is obvious that they 

had talked about a plea agreement whereby plaintiff agreed that 

he would plead guilty to counts 2 and 4 if counts 1, 3 and 5 were 

dismissed. It is apparent that Mr. Xaiz had reviewed plaintiff's 

file in advance of the hearing, and was aware of plaintiff's 

allegations that he was being victimized by certain police 

officers. However, the file also apparently contained a signed 

statement by plaintiff's wife that stated that she had been 

beaten by the plaintiff. Furthermore, the court considers the 

role of counsel in a parole revocation hearing to be much less 

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Appellate Case: 90-4180 Document: 010110131492 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 12 
extensive than that of counsel in a trial setting, or when a 

criminal defendant makes a plea to new criminal charges as 

opposed to parole revocation charges. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 

411 U.S. 778, 786-90; Annotation, Procedural Requirements. Under 

Federal Constitution. Applicable to Revocation of Probation or 

Parole, 36 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1974 & Supp. 1989). 

Under all these circumstances, the court concludes that 

attorney Xiaz's acts or omissions were not outside the wide range 

of professionally competent assistance. The court further 

concludes that even if Xiaz's conduct was considered by the court 

to have been inadequate, the statements and admissions made by 

plaintiff at his revocation hearing are such that the court is 

convinced that the judgment of the Board of Pardons would not 

have been any different. Only a finding of probable cause is 

necessary for revocation of parole. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11 

(1990). Accordingly, the court holds that plaintiff did not 

suffer a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel pursuant to the Supreme Court's two-step 

analysis in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

Based on the foregoing, the court agrees with the 

magistrate's Report and Recommendation and hereby orders that 

plaintiff's petition for a writ of habeas corpus be DENIED. 

The court further orders that all pending motions of 

plaintiff submitted in this case are accordingly DENIED and the 

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action is DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October ____ \S-b-- , 1990 • 

. THOMAS GREENE 

TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

COPIES TO: 

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Appellate Case: 90-4180 Document: 010110131492 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 14 
Re: 2:89-cv-01143 

United States District Court 

for the 

District of Utah 

October 15, 1990 

**MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK** 

mr 

True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the 

following: 

Ernest John Young 

Orange Street Correctional Facility 

80 South Orange Street 

Salt Lake City, UT 84116 

Mariane Baldwin, Esq. 

Utah Attorney General's Office 

6100 South 300 East #403 

Salt Lake City, UT 84107 

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