Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03145/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. J. Kramer
Appointed Amicus Curiae for Appellant
Robert Moore
Petitioner

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 8, 1999 Decided November 26, 1999

No. 98-3145

In re: Robert Moore

Petitioner

Petition for Authorization to File a Second or Successive

Motion under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 in the

United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cr00202)

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, appointed by the

court, argued the cause and filed the briefs as amicus curiae

for petitioner.

Robert Moore, appearing pro se, was on the briefs for

petitioner.

John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for respondent. With him on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis,

U.S. Attorney, and Thomas S. Rees, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

USCA Case #98-3145 Document #480717 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 1 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Ginsburg, Rogers, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Robert Moore, a federal prisoner,

asks this court to certify to the district court a "second or

successive" habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. s 2255.

Because we conclude that Moore has not yet filed a first

petition, however, he does not need such an order from this

court; he may file a s 2255 petition directly with the sentencing court. Accordingly, we dismiss Moore's request for certification.

I. Background

In February 1993 Robert Moore pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine

base in violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(iii).

The presentence report recommended that he be sentenced

as a career offender, see U.S.S.G. ss 4B1.1 & 4B1.2, based

upon two convictions dating from 1984: attempted robbery in

Washington, D.C., and housebreaking in Prince George's

County, Maryland. In accordance with the recommendation

in the presentence report, the district court increased

Moore's criminal history category to level VI from level V.

This increased the applicable sentencing range for his offense

to between 188 and 235 months from a range of between 168

and 210 months. The district court sentenced Moore in April

1993 to serve the minimum 188 months in prison.

In May 1993 Moore's counsel filed with the district court a

pleading styled "Motion to Reconsider Sentence." In it he

argued that under United States v. Spencer, 817 F. Supp. 176

(D.D.C. 1993), remanded for resentencing, 25 F.3d 1105 (D.C.

Cir. 1994), which had been issued shortly after Moore was

convicted, sentencing Moore as a career offender violated the

Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution of the

United States. The Government opposed the Motion to

Reconsider on its merits, arguing both that the district court

properly applied the career offender guidelines to Moore and

that Spencer was improperly decided. The district court

USCA Case #98-3145 Document #480717 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 2 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

summarily denied the Motion to Reconsider "without prejudice,"* and Moore did not appeal.

In December 1994 Moore, acting pro se, filed a motion

under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 asking the district court to vacate his

sentence for the federal drug conviction. Moore argued that

his counsel had been ineffective in that he had failed to

challenge the applicability of the career offender guidelines.

Specifically, Moore contended that the court had erred in

treating his conviction for attempted robbery as a predicate

for sentencing him as a career offender because he had been

under the influence of illegal narcotics when he pleaded guilty

to that charge. The district court denied this motion in an

order stating that "the defendant has previously submitted a

motion to vacate, set aside or modify sentence, and ... the

Court 'is not required to entertain a second or successive

motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.' "

Though the district court thus concluded that the 1994 motion

was Moore's second under s 2255, the court did not specifically refer to the 1993 Motion to Reconsider or provide any

other basis for its conclusion that Moore had previously filed

a s 2255 motion.

After pursuing a collateral attack upon his attempted robbery conviction in D.C. Superior Court, Moore asked this

court to certify to the district court a second or successive

petition under s 2255. He again argues that his counsel in

the federal drug case was constitutionally ineffective for

failing to contest the applicability of the career offender

guidelines, but he offers two new legal bases upon which he

says his counsel should have challenged the enhancement:

First, the D.C. conviction can not properly serve as a predicate offense under the career offender guidelines because

attempted robbery is an inchoate crime. See United States v.

Seals, 130 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Price,

990 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Second, even if attempted

__________

* The district court's order reads in full, "Upon consideration of

the 'Motion to Reconsider Sentence' of Robert Moore, and the

opposition thereto, it is this 21st day of May, 1993 ORDERED, that

the motion is denied without prejudice."

USCA Case #98-3145 Document #480717 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 3 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

robbery can be a predicate offense, it does not necessarily

involve violence; and it can not serve as a predicate offense

unless the Government proves that the defendant's attempted

robbery did involve violence. See United States v. Hill, 131

F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Mathis, 963 F.2d

399 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

II. Analysis

A federal prisoner seeking relief from his sentence must

file a petition, subject to limitations not relevant here, in "the

court which sentenced him." 28 U.S.C. s 2255. Under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,

Pub.L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA), however, a

federal prisoner may not file a "second or successive" such

petition unless he first obtains an order from the appropriate

court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the

petition. Specifically, s 2255 mandates that a "second or

successive motion must be certified as provided in section

2244," which in turn provides:

(b)(3)(A) Before a second or successive application ... is

filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the

appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the

district court to consider the application.

* * *

(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a

second or successive application only if it determines that

the application makes a prima facie showing that the

application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.

If the petition Moore wants to file with the district court is

not "a second or successive motion," then the court of appeals

has no role to play at this point in the process; he may and

he must seek relief directly from the sentencing court. The

Government, however, maintains that Moore has previously

filed at least one s 2255 motion--his 1993 Motion to Reconsider--and therefore does need an order from this court

certifying his petition to the district court.

USCA Case #98-3145 Document #480717 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 4 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The Government's position is wholly without merit. The

Supreme Court has clearly held that when a motion is

dismissed "for technical procedural reasons" and "the habeas

petitioner does not receive an adjudication of his claim," a

subsequent petition is not "a second or successive motion"

under the AEDPA. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S.

637, 645 (1998). Here the district court denied the Motion to

Reconsider "without prejudice." Though the court did not

explain its disposition, there is no indication that the court

denied the petition on the merits.

The Government argues nonetheless that although the

district court denied the Motion to Reconsider "without prejudice" it actually ruled upon the merits of the motion. In

support of this position, the Government makes three points

none of which need detain us long. First, the district court

order recites that before denying the motion the court considered the Government's "opposition thereto"--in which it contested the motion on its merits. The district court's mere

mention of all the pleadings before it cannot bear the weight

the Government seeks to place upon it; that boilerplate

recitation would be the same regardless whether the court

were resolving the motion on the merits or on a procedural

defect. Second, the same judge who entered the order

denying the 1993 motion later denied the 1994 motion as

"second or successive." The Government urges us to infer

therefrom that the court intended the 1993 order to deny the

Motion to Reconsider on its merits, although there is no

indication of that in the order itself, and it would then have

been a mistake to specify that the order was "without prejudice." The district court might just as well have erred in

1994 as in 1993, either by misreading its earlier order or in

thinking that Moore had previously filed a s 2255 motion in

addition to the Motion to Reconsider. Furthermore, if the

Government were correct on this point, then the district

court's denial "without prejudice" would have become, without

notice and after the time for direct appeal had passed, a

denial "with prejudice." We cannot countenance an argument that entails so much potential for unfair surprise.

USCA Case #98-3145 Document #480717 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 5 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Finally, the Government points to cases in which courts

have understood a disposition to be on the merits though the

order indicated it was "without prejudice." The only case

potentially helpful to the Government is Dorsey v. United

States, 372 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The defendant there

was convicted of possessing heroin. At the pre-trial suppression hearing he sought to explore the sequence of events

surrounding the arresting officers' approaching him and seizing the drugs, but one of the officers was unavailable for

questioning at the time. The court denied the motion to

suppress without prejudice. In his post-conviction appeal the

defendant argued that his counsel should have been given

another opportunity to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the officers' initial approach in part because the

judge's denial of his motion to suppress without prejudice

showed that the judge "contemplated additional proceedings."

Id. at 931 n.4. After holding that the search was valid

regardless of the circumstances surrounding the officers'

initial approach, we wrote:

[A]lthough the use of the phrase "without prejudice" in

this context seems to us undesirably ambiguous in view

of the purposes of Rule 41(e), Fed.R.Crim.P., there is

nothing about its use in this case to suggest that the

hearing judge did not intend to deny the motion to

suppress on its merits.

Id.

Dorsey does not govern this case. One purpose of a

suppression hearing held pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) is

to determine whether evidence will be admissible at the

upcoming trial. The sentencing court in this case faced no

analogous time pressure, nor does the Government suggest

any other reason sensibly to think the district court intended

to resolve finally what it purported to resolve without prejudice to a later petition. We therefore conclude that the order

denying the 1993 Motion to Reconsider was not a first

adjudication of Moore's s 2255 claim.

We turn next to the question whether Moore's claim was

adjudicated when the court denied his 1994 motion; if so,

USCA Case #98-3145 Document #480717 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 6 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

then the present petition is his second and we must decide

whether to certify it to the district court. Recall that the

district court dismissed the 1994 motion as successive.

Whether in doing so the district court considered the 1993

motion to be Moore's first s 2255 petition, or mistakenly

thought Moore had at some other point filed a s 2255 motion

is unclear from the record. In either event, it is clear that

the district court dismissed the 1994 motion for a procedural

reason and did not resolve it on the merits. The 1994 motion,

therefore, does not present a barrier to Moore's now filing a

motion under s 2255. See Stewart, 523 U.S. at 645.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons we have no occasion either to

grant or to deny Moore authorization to proceed in district

court as provided in s 2244. Because Moore's claim has not

been resolved before, he may proceed under s 2255 in the

district court as of right. Accordingly, Moore's request for

certification is

Dismissed.

USCA Case #98-3145 Document #480717 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 7 of 7