Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03047/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Morris Christian
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 13, 1998 Decided September 3, 1999

No. 98-3047

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Morris B. Christian,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00446-01)

Gregory L. Poe, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Susan B. Menzer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Silberman, Ginsburg and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland:

Garland, Circuit Judge: Morris Christian, who was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1), appeals the district court's

denial of his motion to suppress the firearm. He argues that

the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching

his car, next to which he was standing at the time of his

arrest. We agree with Christian that the search, which

yielded the firearm, cannot be justified as a search incident to

arrest because at the time of the search the police did not

have probable cause to believe he had committed a crime.

We agree with the government, however, that the search was

permissible as part of a valid investigatory stop and weapons

search under the Supreme Court's decisions in Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032

(1983). We therefore affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I

On the afternoon of October 12, 1997, Officer Allee Ramadhan of the Metropolitan Police Department and his partner

were stationed in an area of southeast Washington, D.C., that

they characterized as "notorious for drug selling and stolen

property." App. 22. From their squad car they observed

Christian standing "right next to" an empty, two-door Chevrolet Camaro. He was with a woman who was holding a

white plastic bag. Christian himself was holding three cans

of deodorant under his arm, and two unidentifiable objects in

his hand. According to Ramadhan, "as soon as he saw" the

police, Christian threw the two objects through the Camaro's

front window, which was open approximately five or six

inches. Id. at 23.

The officers approached Christian and the woman to investigate. Through the car's partially open window, Ramadhan

noticed a dagger with a six-inch blade wedged between the

driver's seat and the front passenger's seat. Ramadhan

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asked whose vehicle it was, and Christian said it was his.

Because the driver-side door was locked, Ramadhan asked for

the car keys. After Christian handed them over, but without

his consent to search, Ramadhan entered the car to secure

the dagger.

While retrieving the dagger, the officer noticed two tubes

of toothpaste on the floor, which Christian identified as the

items he had tossed through the window. Ramadhan also

noticed a bag lying on the front passenger's seat next to the

dagger. He picked up the bag, felt what he thought was a

weapon inside, and opened it to find a loaded, .45 caliber

handgun and additional ammunition. After learning that

Christian had a prior felony conviction, Ramadhan placed him

under arrest. Thereafter, he "did a pat-down ... to make

sure [Christian] didn't have any more guns on him." Id. at

39-40.

Christian was indicted for being a felon in possession of a

firearm, and moved to suppress the gun on the ground that

the warrantless search of his car violated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Ramadhan was the only witness at

the suppression hearing and testified as set forth above.

Crediting the officer's testimony, the district court denied

Christian's motion, stating:

The premise of ... the seizure of these items and the

arrest of this defendant begins with what I think is

appropriately categorized as a Terry stop.... [W]hen

the defendant saw him, the defendant threw a couple of

items into the car. That activity in that neighborhood

gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that something was going on; and ... it was proper for the officer

to follow up.... So that disposes of that question.

When the officer then saw what he described as a large

dagger sticking in between the seats, it gave rise to

appropriate further action on the officer's part, including

checking out that dagger [and] picking up the bag next to

it, because under Terry the officer is permitted to [examUSCA Case #98-3047 Document #461097 Filed: 09/03/1999 Page 3 of 14
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ine] by plain touch or plain feel that which might bear on

the safety of the officer himself.

Id. at 44-46.

Christian subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty,

reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. See Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). The court sentenced him to two years

probation. This appeal followed.

II

The government advances two exceptions to the Fourth

Amendment's warrant requirement that, it contends, validate

the officers' warrantless search of Christian's car. It argues,

first, that the police had probable cause to arrest Christian

for possessing a dangerous weapon, and therefore had authority to conduct a search incident to that arrest. It argues,

second, that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and

question Christian, and that, given their equally reasonable

fear that he was armed, they also had authority to conduct a

protective search for weapons.

We decide de novo whether the police had probable cause,

reasonable suspicion or reasonable fear. See Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). We review the

district court's "findings of historical fact only for clear error

and ... give due weight to inferences drawn from those

facts" as well as to the court's determination of witness

credibility. Id. at 699. After hearing the testimony of Officer Ramadhan, the district court accepted the government's

second argument. We do so as well.

A

A search incident to arrest is a well recognized exception to

the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. As the Supreme Court held in Chimel v. California, "[w]hen an arrest

is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the

person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the

latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his

escape." 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). "In addition," the

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Court held, "it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer

to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person," as well as in "the area 'within [the arrestee's] immediate

control.' " Id.

The government argues that the police officers had probable cause to place Christian under arrest once they detected

the dagger in plain view in the car's front seat and confirmed

that the car was his. Possession of the dagger, the government contends, is a violation of D.C. Code Ann. s 22-3214(b).

The problem with the government's theory, however, is that

the cited statute does not make possession of a dagger,

without more, a crime.

Section 22-3214 is composed of two subsections. Subsection (a) makes it a crime to possess certain listed weapons,

including machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, blackjacks,

switchblades, and metal knuckles--none of which Christian

had. That subsection has no specific intent requirement

because, according to the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals, the listed weapons are "so highly suspect and devoid

of lawful use that their mere possession is forbidden." United States v. Brooks, 330 A.2d 245, 247 (D.C. 1974). The

subsection at issue here, however, s 3214(b), makes it a crime

to "possess, with intent to use unlawfully against another, an

imitation pistol, or a dagger, dirk, razor, stiletto, or knife with

a blade longer than 3 inches, or other dangerous weapon."

Id. at 246 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals has

repeatedly held that mere possession of one of these items is

not sufficient to violate the statute; there must also be

evidence that the possessor intended to use it "in an assaultive or otherwise unlawful manner." Id. at 247.1 Without

such evidence, possession of a "dagger" is no more unlawful

than possession of a kitchen knife or, for that matter, a

__________

1 See McBride v. United States, 441 A.2d 644, 648-49 (D.C.

1982); Jones v. United States, 401 A.2d 473, 475-76 (D.C. 1979);

H.R. Rep. No. 82-538, at 8 (1951) ("The mere possession of these

weapons cannot, your committee realizes, be barred; but if the

possession, coupled with criminal intent, can be shown to exist, your

committee feels that appropriate punishment should follow.").

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furniture leg. See Jones v. United States, 401 A.2d 473, 475

(D.C. 1979) (holding that defendant may be convicted for

possession of furniture leg if he had "specific intent to use the

weapon unlawfully against another").

Lacking any direct evidence that Christian intended to use

the dagger unlawfully, the government offers two pieces of

circumstantial evidence. First, it contends that "[s]ince daggers, unlike kitchen knives, have no obvious utilitarian purpose, particularly in cars, this dagger's incriminating nature

was self-evident." Gov't Br. at 8. Second, it asks us to infer

a possible criminal intent from the fact that the dagger and

the car were in a high-crime neighborhood. But as the

government conceded at oral argument, there is at least one

"utilitarian" and perfectly lawful purpose for keeping a dagger in a car, particularly in a high-crime neighborhood: selfdefense. See McBride v. United States, 441 A.2d 644, 649 &

n.9 (D.C. 1982) (holding that self-defense is a lawful purpose

for possession of a weapon listed in s 3214(b)). Given the

possibility of a lawful purpose, and the absence of any evidence whatsoever that Christian possessed the knife for an

unlawful one, the officers lacked probable cause to believe a

crime had been committed.

Nor is the government assisted by the Supreme Court's

statement, in Adams v. Williams, that "[p]robable cause does

not require the same type of specific evidence of each element

of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction."

407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). In Adams, although the police

lacked direct evidence that the defendant unlawfully possessed the pistol in question, the circumstances surrounding

his arrest supported the necessary inference. An informant

had told the officers that the defendant, who was seated in a

nearby vehicle, was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his

waist. The Court held that the fact that "the policeman

found [defendant] in possession of a gun in precisely the place

predicted by the informant ... tended to corroborate the

reliability of the informant's further report of narcotics and,

together with the surrounding circumstances, certainly suggested no lawful explanation for possession of the gun." Id.

at 148. Here, however, there was a "lawful explanation" for

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Christian's possession of the dagger. Here the officers did

not simply lack the "type of specific evidence of" Christian's

intent "as would be needed to support conviction," id. at 149;

they lacked any evidence at all that Christian intended to use

the dagger unlawfully. Without such evidence, there was no

probable cause for arrest. See Gasho v. United States, 39

F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that although "an

officer need not have probable cause for every element of the

offense ... when specific intent is a required element of the

offense, the arresting officer must have probable cause for

the element in order to reasonably believe that a crime has

occurred."). And without a valid arrest, the warrantless

search cannot be justified by the "search incident to arrest"

exception.

B

The government's second justification for the seizure of the

gun is that it occurred during a valid protective search for

weapons under the "stop and frisk" doctrine of Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court held that police do not

need probable cause to conduct a brief, investigatory stop of

an individual if they are "able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from

these facts," give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity. Id. at 21; see United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,

7 (1989); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117 (1986). The

Court further upheld an officer's authority to search the

individual for weapons where he has a "reasonable fear for

his own and others' safety" based on an articulable suspicion

that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at

30, 27; Long, 463 U.S. at 1034.

In Michigan v. Long, the Court, employing the same

standard applied in Chimel, held that the scope of a Terry

search may extend beyond the person of the suspect. 463

U.S. at 1035, 1049. The police, the Court said, may search

" 'the [suspect's] person and the area "within his immediate

control" ... mean[ing] the area from within which he might

gain possession of a weapon.' " Id. at 1048 (quoting Chimel,

395 U.S. at 763). In Long, the Court found that area to

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include the passenger compartment of a car outside of which

the defendant was standing, after he had driven the vehicle

into a ditch and gotten out to meet the investigating officers.

Id. at 1049. The search of the compartment was "limited to

those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden." Id.

In the case at bar, the district court found that a police

officer who had regularly worked "an area notorious for drug

selling and stolen property" could reasonably be suspicious of

someone who, "when seeing the officer," immediately "throws

something into a car." App. 53. Defendant does not dispute

the court's assessment that there was sufficient basis for a

brief Terry stop,2 and we agree because the defendant's

actions raised a reasonable suspicion that he was trying to

hide contraband from the officers.3 See United States v.

__________

2 In a footnote, defendant does suggest that any justification for

the stop and subsequent weapons search dissipated once the officer

saw the tubes of toothpaste on the floor and heard Christian say

they were what he had tossed. Def. Br. at 15 n.9. But at that

point the officer did not know defendant was telling the truth (the

officer had not yet searched for any other objects that might have

been thrown), and hence he was not obligated to break off his effort

to secure the area on Christian's word alone.

3 The government contends that once Officer Ramadhan "observed a dagger in plain view in the car, he had a reasonable

articulable suspicion to believe that appellant was committing a

weapons offense." Gov't Br. at 16. For the same reasons discussed in Part II(A), we do not agree that the presence of the

dagger in the car gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Christian

was in possession of a prohibited weapon, an offense which requires

specific intent. Nor do we understand why the government makes

this argument. The officer did not mention the dagger as a basis

for the suspicion that led to the stop. See App. 30-31. Although

the district court did rely on the dagger to establish the reasonable

fear required for the car search (as do we, see text infra), the court

did not rely on it for the reasonable suspicion required to justify the

initial Terry stop. See App. 45 ("[W]hen the defendant saw him,

the defendant threw a couple of items into the car. That activity in

that neighborhood gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion

that something was going on."). As noted in the text, Christian's

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Smith, 614 F. Supp. 25, 26-27 (D.D.C. 1994) (upholding Terry

stop where, upon seeing police officers, defendant "immediately bent forward as if to hide something under the front

seat"); see also United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 283

(D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174,

1176, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Nor does Christian dispute that

if the officer could lawfully search the area where the bag

was found, he was entitled to open the bag once he felt the

gun. See Williams, 822 F.2d at 1184 ("[N]o warrant is

needed for an opening of a container whose contents become

known through a lawful touching of the outside."); see also

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993); United

States v. Russell, 655 F.2d 1261, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Defendant does, however, dispute that the police had the

kind of "reasonable fear" necessary to justify a search for

weapons. He further contends that, even if the police did

have such reasonable fear, the car's passenger seat was not

an area within his "immediate control" from which weapons

could be obtained. Def. Br. at 14. We consider these two

arguments in turn.

First, we agree with the district court that Officer Ramadhan had sufficient indication Christian might be armed and

dangerous to justify a protective search for weapons. In

Long, the Court said that "danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect."

463 U.S. at 1049. Here, the presence of a weapon was not

merely "possible"; when Ramadhan arrived at Christian's

car, he saw the dagger in plain view near the defendant.

Within moments, Christian confirmed that the car containing

the dagger was his. Moreover, as we have noted before, the

presence of one weapon may justifiably arouse concern that

there may be more in the vicinity, as turned out to be the

case here. See United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664,

670 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

__________

throw, which gave rise to the suspicion that he was trying to remove

something from the officer's view, was sufficient to validate the

stop.

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Defendant protests that because his possession of the dagger was lawful, it cannot supply the justification for a protective search. But the Supreme Court expressly rejected the

same argument regarding a defendant's hunting knife in

Long itself. 463 U.S. at 1052 n.16 ("Long also argues that

there cannot be a legitimate Terry search based on the

discovery of the hunting knife because Long possessed that

weapon legally.... [W]e have expressly rejected the view

that the validity of a Terry search depends on whether the

weapon is possessed in accordance with state law."). Even a

lawfully possessed weapon may pose a threat, and because

"[t]he purpose of [a Terry] search is not to discover evidence

of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation

without fear of violence," the lawfulness of defendant's possession is irrelevant to this aspect of the Terry analysis.

Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.

Christian further contends that Officer Ramadhan's actions

belie the government's claim that he regarded Christian as a

threat. After all, he did not frisk Christian's person until

after he had found the gun and placed him under arrest.

Had the officer truly feared him, Christian argues, he would

have frisked him before turning to the car.

This argument misses the mark for two reasons. First, as

appellate judges we do not second-guess a street officer's

assessment about the order in which he should secure potential threats. To the contrary, we must defer to his "quick

decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible

danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 28; see also United States v.

Wilkerson, 598 F.2d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting

defendant's claim "that the search of the car was not a

protective search because the driver ... [was] not frisked

until after the officer found the gun," since this was tantamount to a request "to instruct the police on the priority of

search once reasonable suspicion of danger exists"). Second,

in assessing an officer's actions under Terry, we evaluate his

conduct objectively, not subjectively. See, e.g., Long, 463

U.S. at 1046 n.11 ("[T]he propriety of a Terry stop and frisk

is to be judged according to whether the officer acted as a

'reasonably prudent man' in deciding that the intrusion was

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justified."); see also Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696; Horton v.

California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) ("[E]venhanded law

enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective

standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon

the subjective state of mind of the officer."). Thus, Ramadhan's actual motives for conducting the search were not

relevant as long as his actions were objectively reasonable.4

Because we conclude that they were objectively reasonable,

we affirm the district court's finding that the police had a

reasonable basis for conducting a Terry search.

Christian's second argument is that, even if the police had a

sufficient foundation for a Terry search, the car's interior was

beyond its lawful scope. He correctly points out that unlike

the facts of Long, in which the defendant's car door was open,

the police knew Christian's driver-side door was closed and

locked, and the officer had taken the keys. Under those

circumstances, he contends, the car's interior was not "within

his immediate control."

We begin by noting that the fact that Ramadhan obtained

the keys is not relevant to the analysis. The officer requested the keys to use them to open the door to secure the knife.

As in the related context of searches incident to arrest, we

assess a Terry search from the standpoint of the moment of

the stop--at which time Christian still had the keys--not

from the subsequent period in which the officer begins to take

protective measures. Otherwise, "we might create a perverse

incentive for an arresting officer to prolong the period during

which the arrestee is kept in an area where he could pose a

danger to the officer." Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d at 669; see In

re Sealed Case, 153 F.3d 759, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Since, as

defendant concedes, Christian was "stopped" for Terry purposes from the moment the officer requested his keys, we

evaluate the risk to the officer at that time.

__________

4 For the same reasons, defendant is not helped by Ramadhan's

testimony that he initially entered the car "to get the knife, get the

stuff out of the vehicle [that Christian] just threw inside," rather

than to check for additional weapons. App. 35.

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Under these circumstances, the officers were "reasonably

warrant[ed] ... in believing that" Christian could have

"gain[ed] immediate control" of the weapon. It was not

unreasonable to fear he might lunge for the door, open it with

the keys, and grab the knife. As the Court stated in Long, it

is mistaken to discount police concern over an individual

simply "because he was effectively under their control during

the investigative stop." Long, 463 U.S. at 1051. To the

contrary, a Terry suspect might well "break away from police

control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile." Id.; see

Wilkerson, 598 F.2d at 625 ("[S]tanding next to the car

without handcuffs, either the driver or one of the passengers

could have bolted to it, seized a weapon and fired before the

officers could find cover."). Nor does it matter that the car

door was closed; as the Court said in Chimel, a "gun on a

table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as

dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the

clothing of the person arrested." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763

(quoted in Long, 463 U.S. at 1048) (emphasis added). And

while the time it would take to unlock the door would slow

Christian down, the police "cannot be expected to make

punctilious judgments regarding what is within and what is

just beyond the arrestee's grasp." United States v. Lyons,

706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Moreover, even if control were measured at the time the

officer had the keys, we would still conclude Christian had

sufficient control over the front seat of his car to satisfy the

Chimel standard. See United States v. Mancillas, No.

98-1001, 1999 WL 460976 (7th Cir. July 7, 1999) (holding that

dashboard of car was within the area into which defendant

"might reach in order to grab a weapon" where officer made

Terry stop of defendant outside of locked car, saw gun on

dashboard, and requested keys from defendant in order to

open door) (quoting Chimel). The window of the driver-side

door was open approximately five to six inches, large enough

for Christian to reach his arm through to unlock the door

manually. And there is no indication the officers knew or

could have known whether the passenger-side door was

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mentarily broken away from police control, opened the passenger door, and seized either the dagger or the gun--which

was in a bag on the passenger's seat. That these scenarios

may not be probable is not decisive. As we have said before,

the Chimel test is not whether an area was probably accessible to the suspect at the time of the search, but whether it

was "conceivably" accessible. Lyons, 706 F.2d at 330; see

Sealed Case, 153 F.3d at 768; Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d at 669

("Showing that the area searched was 'conceivably accessible

at the time of the search' was not meant to be difficult.").

Accordingly, we have upheld searches "even when hindsight

might suggest that the likelihood of the defendant reaching

the area in question was slight," Lyons, 706 F.2d at 330, and

when that likelihood was substantially lower than it was

here.5

Finally, as the Court instructed in Long, we must also

consider that "if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he

will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then

have access to any weapons inside." Long, 463 U.S. at 1052.

Had no search been conducted here, and hence no gun found,

the police would eventually have permitted Christian to leave

and, presumably, to re-enter his car. At that point, Christian

would have had immediate access to both the knife and gun.

Under these circumstances, it was appropriate to conduct a

Terry search to ensure that such access would not endanger

the lives of the departing officers. See id.; United States v.

McClinnhan, 660 F.2d 500, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding

__________

5 See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1125-26

(sustaining search of closet three or four feet away from handcuffed

defendant). Compare Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d at 670-71 (upholding

search of room as "conceivably accessible" to defendant who was

"handcuffed, sitting on a chair" four feet outside the door with two

officers, at least one of whom was armed), with Lyons, 706 F.2d at

330 (finding it "inconceivable that [defendant] could have gained

access" to closet several yards away from where defendant, who had

briefly collapsed, was "sitting, handcuffed, on a chair ... [with] six

police officers, at least four of whom presumably were armed").

See generally Sealed Case, 153 F.3d at 768-69 (discussing AbdulSaboor and Lyons).

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Terry search of briefcase because "[m]erely separating [defendant] from his briefcase ... would obviate the danger only

for the length of the stop; at some point they would be

compelled to return the briefcase to appellant and thus place

themselves in the danger they sought to avoid"); see also

United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1995)

(upholding search of defendant's locked glove compartment

while he sat handcuffed in patrol car because of officers'

anticipation that defendant and passengers would eventually

return to their car).6

III

We conclude that the seizure of Christian's gun did not

violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court properly denied defendant's motion to

suppress the evidence, and we affirm his conviction.

__________

6 Our decision in United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C.

Cir. 1989), is not to the contrary. There we held that the "brightline rule" of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), "that the

passenger compartment lies within the reach of the arrested occupant," does not apply "when the police come upon the arrestees

outside of the automobile." 865 F.2d at 362. "[I]nstead, the normal

framework of Chimel applies" and the area searched must be

"within the 'immediate surrounding area' into which [defendants]

might have reached at the time the [police] caught up with them."

Id. In the instant case, the government does not urge the application of Belton, but rests instead on the normal framework of

Chimel. In Fafowora we found the car search to be outside the

immediate surrounding area of defendants since they were arrested

a car length away, walking in the opposite direction. Id. at 361-62.

Here, by contrast, the police confronted Christian when he was

standing directly next to the car.

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