Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03083/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03083-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andrew H. Bernard
Petitioner
Department of Agriculture
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ANDREW H. BERNARD,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3083

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DE-0752-11-0222-C-1.

______________________ 

Decided: June 11, 2015

______________________ 

GERALD CUNNINGHAM, Law Office of Gerald Cunningham, Pensacola Beach, FL, argued for petitioner.

ZACHARY JOHN SULLIVAN, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also 

represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, 

JR., REGINALD T. BLADES, JR. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE, and TARANTO,

Circuit Judges.

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2 BERNARD v. AGRICULTURE

TARANTO, Circuit Judge. 

Andrew Bernard and his employer, the U.S. Forest 

Service (an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture), entered into an agreement that settled a case he 

had filed against the Forest Service at the Merit Systems 

Protection Board. Within a year of resuming his employment based on the agreement, Mr. Bernard petitioned the 

Board to enforce the agreement, which he asserted the 

Forest Service was violating. The Board denied enforcement. We conclude that the Board improperly denied Mr. 

Bernard discovery of potentially relevant evidence. We 

vacate the decision and remand for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

The Forest Service removed Mr. Bernard, a firefighter, from his position as supervisor of a hotshot firefighting 

crew in February 2011. Mr. Bernard appealed his removal to the Board, seeking reinstatement, back pay, and

attorney’s fees. The agency and Mr. Bernard settled the 

matter in August 2011, executing an agreement under 

which the agency replaced Mr. Bernard’s removal with a 

14-day suspension, reinstated him in a non-supervisory 

role, and provided lump-sum payments for back pay and 

fees. Corrected Joint Appendix (J.A.) 629–30. The agency 

promised that Mr. Bernard would not be “restricted from 

applying for future supervisory positions” and would be 

“allowed to go on future fire assignments . . . the same as 

any other employee in the fire organization.” J.A. 630. 

The parties agreed “[t]o cooperate and communicate in 

good faith to implement and to abide by the terms of [the]

agreement.” J.A. 630. 

Under the agency’s policy, a firefighting employee, to 

receive firefighting assignments, must have an unexpired 

Incident Qualification Card (or “red card”), which lists the 

specific firefighting positions the employee is qualified to 

fill, based on work history and training. Each firefighter 

must renew his red card each year, and the red-card 

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BERNARD v. AGRICULTURE 3

listing limits what assignments the firefighter may receive. An agency official must annually evaluate and 

certify “[e]ach employee’s incident and prescribed fire 

position qualifications . . . and a new [red card] must be 

issued.” J.A. 52. A card may not be issued until the 

employee successfully completes the annual training 

course on safety. 

In February 2012, five months after his reinstatement 

to employment, Mr. Bernard successfully completed the 

annual safety course. Other employees who participated 

in the course received renewed red cards in early March 

2012, but the agency did not issue a red card to Mr. 

Bernard. After Mr. Bernard inquired about the status of 

his red card, an agency administrator, Christina McKerracher, informed him that, although the computerized 

system that tracks each employee’s qualifications appeared to reflect his full record of work and training, “[a] 

recent audit” of his records found too few hard-copy 

documents supporting those entries. J.A. 133.

 In response, on March 15, 2012, Mr. Bernard provided the agency a copy of his 2010 red card. That card, 

signed by certifying official Helen Graham, listed Mr. 

Bernard as qualified, until 2014, for eleven firefighting 

positions. J.A. 62. In April 2012, Ms. Graham wrote Mr. 

Bernard a letter stating that as a prerequisite to receiving 

a new red card, Mr. Bernard had to provide “acceptable 

documentation” sufficient to support three specific positions that she stated were inadequately documented: 

Incident Commander Type 3, Incident Commander Type 

4, and Prescribed Fire Burn Boss 2. J.A. 68. Ms. Graham’s letter did not refer to Mr. Bernard’s 2010 red card, 

on which Ms. Graham had certified Mr. Bernard as qualified for those specific positions. J.A. 62. Mr. Bernard 

notified the agency of a potential breach of the settlement 

agreement, and in late May 2012 he received a red card 

certifying him as qualified for seven (of the original eleven) positions. J.A. 76. 

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Mr. Bernard then petitioned the Board to enforce the 

settlement agreement under 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.181–

1201.183. He argued that the agency, by not timely 

issuing him a complete (eleven-position) red card, was 

retaliating against him and thereby breaching the agreement’s good-faith and equal-opportunity commitments.1 

He argued that the breach caused him to lose $12,400 in 

wages and that the agency had not responded to his 

requests for a revised red card containing all of his previously certified qualifications. He also requested “limited 

discovery to resolve any major factual disputes” regarding 

the charge of retaliation. J.A. 47. After receiving the 

agency’s response, Mr. Bernard filed a reply in which he 

again asked for discovery, requesting “a brief discovery 

period directed to the events of the audit, the two individuals who determined the documents were insufficient, 

and the cause of the missing records.” J.A. 204. 

The administrative judge denied the petition for enforcement, concluding that Mr. Bernard had failed to 

meet his burden of proving a breach of the agreement. 

J.A. 16–17; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(d) (party seeking to 

enforce a settlement agreement has the burden to prove 

breach). As to Mr. Bernard’s allegations of retaliation 

and bad faith, the administrative judge concluded—

without acknowledging Mr. Bernard’s repeated requests 

for discovery—that Mr. Bernard “did not support his bare 

allegations with any evidence illustrating bad faith.” J.A. 

16. 

1 We do not understand Mr. Bernard to allege that 

the agency’s actions constitute retaliation under the 

Whistleblower Protection Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 1221, but 

rather that evidence of retaliation is relevant in determining whether the agency breached its contractual obligation of good-faith cooperation, see Kuykendall v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 68 M.S.P.R. 314, 325 (1995).

 

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BERNARD v. AGRICULTURE 5

The Board affirmed. In addressing Mr. Bernard’s argument that the administrative judge improperly denied 

his discovery requests, the Board concluded that parties

in enforcement proceedings generally do not need to

request permission for discovery and that “the Board 

generally only becomes involved in discovery matters if a 

party files a motion to compel.” J.A. 4. Because Mr. 

Bernard did not file a motion to compel discovery, the 

Board concluded, the administrative judge did not err in 

ignoring Mr. Bernard’s several requests.

Mr. Bernard appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Bernard asks us to set aside the Board’s decision 

because the administrative judge was required to respond 

to his discovery requests. He also asks that we reverse 

the Board’s determination that he failed to prove breach 

of the settlement agreement. We agree with Mr. Bernard 

as to the first issue. And because the Board’s discovery 

error impaired Mr. Bernard’s ability to gather evidence 

that may help prove breach, the proper course is to vacate 

the Board’s decision and remand for further proceedings. 

We review the Board’s decision to determine whether 

it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs 

where the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported 

by substantial evidence, or represents an unreasonable 

judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Star Fruits 

S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). 

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Mr. Bernard twice asked for discovery, but the administrative judge never acted on those requests, and he 

denied the enforcement petition without receiving evidence Mr. Bernard might have gathered in the discovery 

he requested. In affirming the denial of enforcement, the

Board did not conclude, and the agency here does not 

contend, that in an enforcement proceeding like this one 

the Board may deny a complainant like Mr. Bernard all 

discovery, including discovery of potentially relevant 

evidence, even if sought through the proper channels. 

Rather, the Board concluded, and the agency argues, that 

Mr. Bernard clearly had, but simply bypassed, the opportunity to obtain discovery. In the Board’s view, Mr. 

Bernard could have directly asked individuals to sit for 

depositions, or to respond to other discovery requests, 

and, if he met resistance, moved to compel the requested 

discovery. But the Board had no sound foundation, in 

general regulations, Board precedents, or case-specific 

orders, for its conclusion that it was permissible for the 

administrative judge to disregard Mr. Bernard’s clear 

requests for discovery. Mr. Bernard did not have a clear 

right to engage directly in discovery without obtaining 

permission before the administrative judge made his 

agreement-compliance decision under the enforcement 

procedures, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(4). 

No regulation makes clear that Mr. Bernard could 

proceed directly to take discovery, without permission 

from the administrative judge, before the administrative 

judge rendered his initial decision on the agency’s compliance. The discovery regulations cited by the Board, 5 

C.F.R. §§ 1201.71–1201.75, appear in subpart B of 5 

C.F.R. pt. 1201, covering “appellate cases,” see 5 C.F.R.

§§ 1201.11–1201.113. That subpart is distinct from 

subpart F governing “Enforcement of Final Decisions and 

Orders,” 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.181–1201.183, under which the 

present enforcement proceeding was brought. It is anything but clear that the former is applicable to the latter. 

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Indeed, the opposite is suggested by the mismatch between the rules for discovery under § 1201.73, including 

timing rules that allow 20 days for response to a discovery 

request, § 1201.73(d)(2), and the much tighter schedule 

prescribed for enforcement proceedings: e.g., the agency 

must respond to an enforcement petition within 15 days, 

and the petitioner has only 10 days to reply before the 

administrative judge may make a determination of compliance, § 1201.183(a). Thus, the regulations themselves 

provide no clear guarantee of direct discovery applicable 

to Mr. Bernard’s case.

Nor do Board precedents interpreting the regulations

provide such a clear guarantee. The enforcementproceeding precedent on which the Board relied here does 

suggest a direct-discovery right, King v. Dep’t of Navy, 98 

M.S.P.R. 547, 552 (2005) (“a party does not need the 

Board’s approval to engage in discovery”), but King’s 

precise meaning on the facts presented—perhaps involving discovery after an initial compliance order under 5 

C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(5)—is not clear. Moreover, King’s 

only cited legal authority is § 1201.73, which, as we have 

just noted, appears not to apply to enforcement proceedings. In any event, King does not stand alone. In Ernst v. 

Department of Treasury, the Board, following earlier 

pronouncements, declared: “An employee is not entitled to 

discovery in enforcement proceedings, although the AJ 

has the discretion to grant such a request.” 69 M.S.P.R. 

133, 139 (1995), aff’d, 92 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table); see Forston v. Dep’t of Navy, 60 M.S.P.R. 154, 158 

(1993); Covert v. Dep’t of Navy, 31 M.S.P.R. 376, 382 

(1986). The Board in King did not address Ernst and its 

predecessors. And since King, the Board has repeated the 

Ernst proposition, citing Ernst as establishing that, “in an 

enforcement proceeding, an employee is not entitled to 

discovery to establish his allegations, although the administrative judge may grant discovery in his discretion, if 

necessary to resolve disputed facts.” Young v. U.S. Postal 

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8 BERNARD v. AGRICULTURE

Serv., 113 M.S.P.R. 609, 620 (2010). Thus, Board precedent, combined with the regulations, gave Mr. Bernard no 

genuine notice that he could take discovery in this enforcement proceeding without advance permission from 

the administrative judge. 

We also cannot find such notice in any orders issued 

in Mr. Bernard’s case. The government contends that the 

administrative judge in fact granted discovery by way of

an acknowledgment order sent to both parties upon 

receipt of Mr. Bernard’s petition for enforcement. J.A. 84 

(the “Enforcement Order”). That order does not mention 

discovery expressly, but it does state that “the procedures 

and filing requirements set forth in the Order acknowledging [Mr. Bernard’s] original appeal [the one that was 

settled] are applicable in this case.” J.A. 84 (emphasis 

added). The government argues that because the 

acknowledgement order in the underlying appeal granted 

discovery, see J.A. 279 (the “Appeal Order”), the Enforcement Order’s reference to those procedures did the same. 

But this argument fails to justify the administrative 

judge’s disregard of Mr. Bernard’s express discovery 

requests. 

The Board itself did not conclude that the Enforcement Order provided the opportunity for discovery. And 

there is good reason for the Board not to have relied on 

the reasoning the government now advances. The Enforcement Order does not provide meaningful notice that 

discovery was being authorized. In referring to the Appeal Order for “procedures and filing requirements,” it 

makes no mention of discovery specifically. And while 

that omission might not matter if the discovery provisions 

of the Appeal Order fit the enforcement context, they 

plainly do not. Most concretely, there is essentially the 

same timing-rules mismatch we identified above in discussing the regulations.

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Thus, the Enforcement Order provides three clear 

deadlines: (1) the agency must file its written response to 

Mr. Bernard’s petition “within 15 calendar days”; (2) Mr. 

Bernard may then file a reply within 10 days of being 

served with the agency’s filing; and (3) the evidentiary 

record closes the same day Mr. Bernard’s reply is due, i.e., 

“10 calendar days from the date of service of the agency’s 

reply to appellant’s petition.” J.A. 85. That schedule 

allows 25 days from petition to closure of the record. 

Yet the Appeal Order instructed the parties that “initial [discovery] requests . . . must be served on the other 

party within 25 calendar days of the date of this Order,” 

and “[r]esponses to initial discovery requests must be 

served promptly but no later than 20 days after the date 

of service of the other party’s discovery request or the 

MSPB order.” J.A. 279 (emphases added). If we strike 

out the phrase “the date of this Order” and replace it with 

a reference to the date of the Enforcement Order, we 

obtain an order under which the record closed before any 

response to a discovery request was required. Similar 

problems arise from trying to apply the Board’s discovery 

regulations for appellate cases, 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.71–

1201.75, which the Appeal Order designates as the “procedures [to be] used for discovery,” J.A. 279, and which 

establish timelines applicable unless the administrative 

judge instructs otherwise, § 1201.73(d). Under the regulations, parties must serve initial discovery requests 

“within 30 days after the date on which the judge issues 

an order to the respondent agency to produce the agency 

file and response”; the responding party has 20 days to 

respond to discovery requests; and discovery must be 

completed “no later than the prehearing or close of record 

conference.” Id. 

Perhaps it is possible to translate the terms of the 

regulations and Appeal Order into the enforcement setting. We might even construct a scenario in which Mr. 

Bernard could have initiated discovery within a few days 

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of filing his petition, even before getting the agency’s 

response to his charge of noncompliance (which would 

define the actual dispute), then awaited responses within 

the time allowed under the Appeal Order and regulations, 

and have had time to digest and use the discovered evidence before his last filing was due and the enforcement 

record closed under the Enforcement Order. But such an 

effort to force discovery into the Appeal Order schedule is 

so strained, and produces a discovery schedule so far from 

what the Board regulations indicate to be truly adequate, 

that Mr. Bernard cannot be expected to have understood 

the Enforcement Order to incorporate the Appeal Order’s 

authorization for discovery in the underlying appeal. It is 

hardly surprising that the Board did not conclude otherwise.

At oral argument, the government did not dispute 

that the Enforcement Order and Appeal Order deadlines 

were a mismatch, Oral Arg. at 22:40–23:00, but it urged 

that Mr. Bernard should have taken advantage of the 

Enforcement Order’s invitation to the parties to call the 

judge by phone if they were confused by any of the stated 

procedures, J.A. 84. But Mr. Bernard’s clear and explicit 

discovery requests—in two formal filings to the administrative judge—sufficiently conveyed his belief that discovery was unavailable without an order from the 

administrative judge. Under these circumstances, we 

conclude that the Board abused its discretion by holding 

that the administrative judge was not obliged to respond 

to Mr. Bernard’s requests. See Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley 

Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (a court 

may abuse its discretion by failing to explain its decision 

unless “the explanation is apparent” from the record) 

(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 

We cannot say that the error was harmless. Mr. Bernard’s allegations of breach-by-retaliation were detailed, 

particularized, and far from speculative given the questions raised and currently unanswered by the record. See 

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BERNARD v. AGRICULTURE 11

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). By 

way of example: Helen Graham, the agency certifying 

official, issued Mr. Bernard a red card in 2010 bearing her 

signature. The 2010 card indicated that he was qualified 

for 11 positions, each qualification to last until 2014. J.A. 

62. Ms. Graham was also the official charged with 

reevaluating Mr. Bernard’s qualifications in 2012. Yet, 

despite her signature on Mr. Bernard’s 2010 red card, 

listing 11 unexpired qualifications, Ms. Graham maintained that the documentation underlying those unexpired qualifications was now deficient. Moreover, while 

the agency withheld certification for only some, not all, of 

Mr. Bernard’s qualifications, Ms. Graham at one point 

stated that his hard-copy file was “empty.” J.A. 143. 

Given that issues of motivation are raised under the 

settlement agreement’s requirement of good-faith cooperation, we can hardly say that the record in this case 

supplies no basis for discovery. 

Finally, we reject the government’s argument that all 

Mr. Bernard seeks is $12,400 in damages, the Board 

cannot award damages, and therefore the Board cannot 

award a remedy even if he proves breach. See Lary v. 

U.S. Postal Serv., 472 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 

(“[T]he Board does not have authority to grant damages . . . .”). The Board did not refuse to reach the merits on 

any such basis. Moreover, Mr. Bernard did not limit his

petition to a damages remedy. His red card has admittedly not been fully restored to its pre-2012 status, and the 

Board’s enforcement authority is broad enough to facilitate such restoration, within the limits of the agency’s 

valid policies, see Smith v. Dep’t of Army, 458 F.3d 1359, 

1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In addition, the Board’s enforcement powers under 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(2) may in appropriate circumstances include the power to award both 

back pay “and other relief.” Lary v. U.S. Postal Serv., 493 

F.3d 1355, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (clarifying original 

opinion on petition for rehearing). On remand, the Board 

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12 BERNARD v. AGRICULTURE

may determine whether this case presents such circumstances. 

CONCLUSION

For those reasons, we vacate the Board’s decision and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

No costs.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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