Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01648/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01648-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Monard D. Mosley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1648

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri. 

Monard D. Mosley, *

*

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: December 14, 2009

Filed: June 11, 2010

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Monard Mosley appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as

a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). After

a trial at which Mosley was represented by counsel, a jury found Mosley guilty as

charged, and the district court1

 sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. Mosley

appeals his conviction on the ground that the district court erroneously denied his

request to represent himself. We affirm.

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I.

On October 3, 2006, a security officer at the Research Medical Center notified

police that an individual, later identified as Mosley, had removed a handgun from his

clothing and left the gun in the center console of his vehicle in the parking lot. The

security officer detained Mosley, and when police arrived, they discovered that

Mosley had active warrants for his arrest. Police arrested Mosley and searched his

vehicle, where they found a firearm in the center console. A grand jury later charged

Mosley with unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon.

At a hearing before a magistrate judge on September 27, 2007, Mosley

expressed his desire to proceed without a lawyer. The magistrate judge granted

Mosley’s motion to allow his lawyer to withdraw, and provided Mosley with time to

consider whether there was a different lawyer whom Mosley would want to represent

him. At a pretrial conference before the magistrate judge on October 11, 2007,

Mosley again asserted his desire to proceed pro se. The magistrate judge engaged in

a colloquy with Mosley to ensure that the decision to proceed pro se was knowing and

voluntary, and then decided that Mosley could represent himself.

Mosley subsequently filed two pro se pleadings, including a “Motion to

Dismiss Case for Mistaken Identity & Jurisdictional Issues Over a Sovereign,” which

the magistrate judge was “hard pressed to decipher and discern.” R. Doc. 40, at 2.

Following Mosley’s motions, the government filed a motion for a mental examination

to determine Mosley’s competency to stand trial. The magistrate judge granted the

motion for a competency examination and also determined that Mosley should no

longer be permitted to proceed pro se. The court appointed counsel for Mosley in

December 2007.

At a competency hearing on May 27, 2008, Mosley was disruptive and

unresponsive. When the hearing began, Mosley stated that he was present for the

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matter, spelled his name, and asserted that “I am a live and living, flesh and blood

breathing man, who is a secured party who is sovereign. I am not a corporation.” R.

Doc. 122, Tr. 2. During the hearing, the magistrate judge asked whether Mosley had

read a competency evaluation prepared by the Federal Medical Center. Mosley

refused to answer repeated inquiries, and then exclaimed: “Do you know anybody

here in this courtroom who has a claim against me? I don’t understand, sir. Why am

I being detained if no one has a claim against me?” Id. at 3. Mosley also reserved his

right “not to be compelled to perform any adhesion contract or commercial

agreement.” Id. at 4.

Following these statements, the magistrate judge explained that his earlier order

had appointed counsel to represent Mosley, and that Mosley should not proceed pro

se because he “either [does] not understand these proceedings or [is] not willing to

participate in them.” Id. At the close of the hearing, the magistrate judge reiterated

that Mosley would be represented by appointed counsel for all pretrial matters and for

trial, because he refused to participate in the proceedings. The district court

eventually determined that Mosley was competent to stand trial.

Mosley continued his pattern of unresponsiveness at a pretrial conference on

July 10, 2008. Mosley again refused to answer the magistrate judge’s questions

directly and reiterated that he was a “secured party.” The magistrate judge also gave

Mosley the opportunity to address the court, at which time Mosley read from a

prepared statement making claims that were unrelated to his case.

Before trial, Mosley filed several more pro se motions to dismiss counsel and

to represent himself. At a pretrial conference on October 22, 2008, the magistrate

judge stated that he was denying Mosley’s motions to represent himself, and that

Mosley could appeal the decision to the trial judge when his trial occurred. In a

subsequent written order denying Mosley’s motions to proceed pro se, the magistrate

judge again explained that “[e]ach time the Court has attempted to engage the

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defendant in a discussion of his ability to represent himself, the defendant has been

completely unresponsive to the Court.” R. Doc. 70. In November 2008, Mosley

sought review in this court of the denial of his motions to proceed pro se, but we

dismissed the premature appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

At his trial, Mosley asserted his right to proceed pro se, saying he was

appealing the decision of the magistrate judge. Although the district court did not

state expressly on the record that Mosley’s motion was denied, the court never

discharged appointed counsel, and Mosley was represented by counsel throughout the

trial. 

Mosley continued his disruptive behavior at trial. During voir dire, Mosley

interrupted the discussion between the attorneys and the judge on several occasions.

At trial, Mosley explained to the judge that the name on the indictment was not his,

but was that of a corporation. Later, Mosley interrupted the proceedings and declared

that his lawyer was being forced on his case.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court sentenced Mosley to a term

of 180 months’ imprisonment. Mosley appeals.

II.

Mosley argues that the district court erred in denying his right to selfrepresentation, asserting that because he “was determined to be competent for trial,

he should have been allowed to represent himself.” He also contends that the district

court failed to explain the basis for its denial of his request to proceed pro se. We

review the district court’s decision de novo. See United States v. Mahasin, 442 F.3d

687, 691 (8th Cir. 2006).

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The Sixth Amendment grants an accused the right to counsel, as well as the

related right to waive counsel and proceed pro se. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806, 807 (1975). A defendant’s right to self-representation, however, is not absolute,

and self-representation can be disallowed or terminated when the defendant “engages

in serious obstructionist misconduct.” United States v. Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 681 (8th

Cir. 2007); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (“The right of self-representation

is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.”). A defendant is not entitled

to use the right of self-representation “as a tactic for delay, for disruption, for

distortion of the system, or for manipulation of the trial process.” United States v.

Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 808-09 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). “[T]he

government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times

outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.” Martinez v. Court of

Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000). That a defendant is competent to stand trial

does not mean that he is automatically entitled to represent himself. The inquiries are

distinct. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1993).

Mosley argues that there is nothing in the record that explains why the court

denied him the right to represent himself. Although the district court did not expressly

articulate its reasons for denying Mosley’s appeal of the magistrate’s ruling, we are

satisfied that the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s reasoning. During trial,

the district judge explained to Mosley that he had reviewed the proceedings before the

magistrate judge, and stated that Mosley “wanted to talk . . . about everything but this

case.” R. Doc. 127, Tr. 7. The court warned Mosley that the court would “try this

case,” and that “we’re not going to try the United States Constitution or all of that

stuff.” Id. We take the district court’s statements as an adoption of the magistrate

judge’s conclusion that Mosley could not proceed pro se because he was unwilling to

participate in the proceedings.

The reasoning of the magistrate judge, as adopted, was sufficient to support the

court’s decision on self-representation. In the order appointing counsel for Mosley,

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the magistrate judge noted that good cause existed for a competency examination and

stated: “Under this circumstance, the serious penalties defendant Mosley faces if

convicted and his complete lack of any legal training or experience, the Court has

concluded that it is not in the interests of justice nor in the interests of defendant

Mosley to allow him to proceed pro se.” R. Doc. 37. Later, at a competency hearing,

the magistrate judge explained that it was not appropriate for Mosley to proceed pro

se because either he did not understand the proceedings or he was not willing to

participate in them. At that same hearing, the magistrate judge clarified that his

decision was based on the fact that Mosley refused to respond to his questions and

participate in the proceedings. The magistrate judge reiterated this rationale in an

order denying Mosley’s pro se motions to represent himself.

Mosley’s obstreperous conduct provided sufficient grounds for the district court

to terminate and disallow Mosley’s self-representation. Mosley’s behavior interfered

with pretrial proceedings and delayed the trial. There was good cause to believe that

Mosley would continue to disrupt the proceedings if the court permitted him to resume

self-representation. The district court thus did not err by concluding that Mosley

essentially forfeited his right to represent himself by engaging in conduct that

obstructed the proceedings against him. See Myers, 503 F.3d at 681.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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