Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01416/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01416-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ezekiel Simpson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1416

___________

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

* Appeal From the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Ezekiel Simpson, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 9, 2006

Filed: January 17, 2006

___________

Before BYE, HEANEY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

On May 26, 2004, officers in St. Louis, Missouri, received a tip that an

individual known as “Zeke” would be selling crack on the corner of Russell and

Jefferson. The officers undertook surveillance, and eventually Ezekiel Simpson

stepped out of a vehicle adjacent to that corner. As an officer approached, Simpson

fled, dropping a bag containing over one hundred grams of crack along the way. He

was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more

of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Subsequently, a superseding

indictment was filed that included notice that the government intended to rely on

Simpson’s prior conviction of a felony drug offense. This had the effect of increasing

his statutory minimum sentence from ten years to twenty years. See 21 U.S.C §

Appellate Case: 05-1416 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/17/2006 Entry ID: 1997589
1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

-2-

841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Simpson was found guilty by a jury, and the district court1

 imposed

the mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence. This appeal followed.

Simpson contends that before his prior felony drug conviction may be used to

increase his sentence, it must be proven to the jury that considered the instant offense.

As Simpson recognizes, this is at odds with Supreme Court sentencing jurisprudence.

See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (establishing that the

fact of a prior conviction need not be proven to a jury for sentencing purposes);

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (reaffiming the Almendarez-Torres

“fact of prior conviction” exception); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301

(2004) (same); United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005) (same). Our court

has not deviated from this path. See, e.g., United States v. Vieth, 397 F.3d 615, 620

(8th Cir. 2005) (“As to the enhancement for a prior conviction, the Supreme Court has

consistently said that the fact of a prior conviction is for the court to determine, not

a jury.”); see also United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 634 (8th Cir. 2005) (same);

United States v. Reeves, 410 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no error in the

district court’s use of a defendant’s prior convictions to apply the career offender

enhancement even when those prior convictions were not submitted to the jury). We

are not at liberty to reconsider the Supreme Court’s position on this matter, nor may

we overrule the decisions of our circuit. Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-1416 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/17/2006 Entry ID: 1997589