Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01637/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01637-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carol M. Browner
Respondent
Environmental Defense Fund
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 3, 1998 Decided March 2, 1999

No. 97-1637

Environmental Defense Fund,

on behalf of itself and its members,

Petitioners

v.

Environmental Protection Agency and

Carol M. Browner,

in her capacity as Administrator

of the United States Environmental Protection Agency,

Respondents

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Robert E. Yuhnke argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

Thomas A. Lorenzen, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief

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were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Karen L.

Egbert, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Sara Schneeberg, Attorney, Environmental Protection Agency, and Peter

J. Plocki, Attorney, U.S. Department of Transportation.

Before: Wald, Williams and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Petitioner challenges several provisions of the 1997 Final Rule issued by the Environmental

Protection Agency pursuant to the 1990 amendments to the

Clean Air Act. That statute prohibits a metropolitan planning organization from approving and the Department of

Transportation from funding any transportation project unless it comes from a regional transportation plan and program

that conform to applicable state-level air quality standards.

Because the challenged "conformity" and "grandfather" regulations allow both local approval and federal funding of transportation projects that satisfy neither this requirement nor

the single exception the statute permits, we hold that these

regulatory provisions violate the Clean Air Act. In addition,

we remand the regulations which allow conformity to be

based on emissions budgets unapproved or disapproved by

EPA for further proceedings to harmonize those regulations

with the statute's general conformity requirements. Finally,

we hold that the regulation which allows conformity to be

based on revised budgets that include "safety margin" emissions violates the statute's requirement that conformity be

evaluated against approved or applicable air quality standards.

I

The Clean Air Act establishes a joint state and federal

program for regulating the nation's air quality. The Act

requires EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality

Standards ("NAAQS") for various pollutants. See 42 U.S.C.

s 7409 (1994). It also requires each state to adopt a State

Implementation Plan (known as a "SIP") that "provides for

implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of [NAAQS]

in each air quality control region (or portion thereof) within

such State." Id. s 7410(a)(1). SIPs must include "enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, means,

or techniques ... , as well as schedules and timetables for

compliance, as may be necessary or appropriate" to meet the

NAAQS. Id. s 7410(a)(2)(A). "[A]fter reasonable notice and

public hearings," each state must submit a SIP with such

pollution control strategies to EPA. Id. s 7410(a)(1). EPA

typically approves SIPs pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking.

In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to ensure

that transportation planning at the local level conforms to

pollution controls contained in approved SIPs. To accomplish

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this, the 1977 amendments prohibit federal agencies from

assisting, approving, or supporting "any [transportation] activity which does not conform to [an applicable SIP]." Pub.

L. No. 95-95, tit. I, sec. 129(b), s 176(c), 91 Stat. 745, 750

(1977).

Because Congress "offered little guidance" on the 1977

conformity requirement, and because federal agencies "largely ... ignored" it, Clean Air Conference Report, 136 Cong.

Rec. 36,103, 36,105-06 (1990), Congress amended the Act

again in 1990 to expand the content and scope of this requirement. See Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. I, sec. 101(f), 110(4),

s 176(c), 104 Stat. 2409, 2470 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.

s 7506(c)). The focus of this case, the 1990 amendments do

two things. First, they establish general criteria for determining whether a transportation activity conforms to a SIP:

(1) .... Conformity to an implementation plan means--

(A) conformity to an implementation plan's purpose

of eliminating or reducing the severity and number of

violations of the national ambient air quality standards

and achieving expeditious attainment of such standards; and

(B) that such activities will not--

(I) cause or contribute to any new violation of any

standard in any area;

(ii) increase the frequency or severity of any existing violation of any standard in any area; or

(iii) delay timely attainment of any standard or any

required interim emission reductions or other milestones in any area.

42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(1). Heads of federal agencies have "an

affirmative responsibility" to assure conformity of any federally assisted or approved activity to an applicable SIP. Id.

Second, the 1990 amendments integrate the attainment and

maintenance of air quality standards with the specific transportation planning process prescribed by the Urban Mass

Transportation Act. As the Clean Air Conference Report put

it, "[t]he purpose of the new 'conformity' requirement is to

ensure that the transportation systems choices made by the

community and incorporated into the regional transportation

plan required by [federal transportation statutes] are consistent with achieving the allowable emission targets for each

pollutant assigned to mobile sources in the SIP." 136 Cong.

Rec. at 36,106 col.2. Under the Urban Mass Transportation

Act, the governor of each state, in agreement with local

officials, must designate a metropolitan planning organization

(known as an "MPO") for each urban area with more than

50,000 people. See 49 U.S.C.A. s 5303(c)(1). The MPO plans

for the transportation needs of that area. It develops a longrange transportation plan (referred to in the statute as a

"plan") which specifies the facilities, services, financing techUSCA Case #97-1637 Document #419830 Filed: 03/02/1999 Page 3 of 32
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niques, and management policies that will comprise the area's

transportation system over a 20-year period, see id. s 5303(f),

as well as a short-term transportation improvement program

(referred to in the statute as a "program" and in the regulations as a "TIP") which identifies and prioritizes the specific

transportation projects to be carried out over the next three

years, see id. s 5304(b). The heart of the Clean Air Act's

1990 conformity requirements consists of the following restrictions on approval and funding of transportation plans,

programs, and projects:

(2) Any transportation plan or program developed

pursuant to Title 23 or the Urban Mass Transportation

Act shall implement the transportation provisions of any

applicable implementation plan ... applicable to all or

part of the area covered by such transportation plan or

program. No Federal agency may approve, accept or

fund any transportation plan, program or project unless

such plan, program or project has been found to conform

to any applicable implementation plan in effect under this

chapter. In particular--

(A) no transportation plan or transportation improvement program may be adopted by a [MPO], or be

found to be in conformity by a [MPO] until a final

determination has been made that emissions expected

from implementation of such plans and programs are

consistent with estimates of emissions from motor

vehicles and necessary emissions reductions contained

in the applicable implementation plan ...;

....

(C) a transportation project may be adopted or approved by a [MPO] or any recipient of funds designated under Title 23 or the Urban Mass Transportation

Act, or found in conformity by a [MPO] or approved,

accepted, or funded by the Department of Transportation only if it meets either the requirements of subparagraph (D) or the following requirements--

(I) such a project comes from a conforming plan

and program;

....

(D) Any project not referred to in subparagraph (C)

shall be treated as conforming to the applicable implementation plan only if it is demonstrated that the

projected emissions from such project, when considered together with emissions projected for the conforming transportation plans and programs within the

nonattainment area, do not cause such plans and programs to exceed the emission reduction projections

and schedules assigned to such plans and programs in

the applicable implementation plan.

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42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(2). According to the Agency, these provisions apply only to "nonattainment" areas (i.e., areas that

have not met an air quality standard for a particular pollutant) and to "maintenance" areas (i.e., former nonattainment

areas that have met the appropriate standard). See 40

C.F.R. ss 93.101, 93.102(b) (1998).

In addition to specifying general conformity criteria and

imposing restrictions on regional transportation planning, the

1990 amendments establish conformity criteria that apply to

transportation plans, programs, and projects prior to Agency

approval of a submitted SIP. See 42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(3).

The amended Act also authorizes EPA to promulgate criteria

and procedures for determining conformity, provided that "in

no case shall [conformity] determinations for transportation

plans and programs be less frequent than every three years."

Id. s 7506(c)(4)(B)(ii).

EPA first issued criteria and procedures for making conformity determinations in 1993. See 58 Fed. Reg. 62,188

(1993). It then amended those procedures in a series of

rulemakings. See 60 Fed. Reg. 40,098 (1995); 60 Fed. Reg.

57,179 (1995). In recent years, this court has heard two

challenges to these amended rules. See Sierra Club v. EPA,

129 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (invalidating one-year exemption from statutory conformity requirements for transportation activities in nonattainment areas); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(upholding various regulations as reasonable interpretations

of the statute).

In this case, petitioner Environmental Defense Fund argues that various provisions of EPA's most recent Final Rule,

see 62 Fed. Reg. 43,780 (1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R.

ss 93.100-93.128), violate the conformity requirements set

forth in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. Specifically, petitioner contends: (1) that section 93.121(a)(1) of the

regulations unlawfully permits local authorities to approve

transportation projects in the absence of a currently conforming transportation plan and program; (2) that section

93.102(c)(1) suffers from the same defect with respect to

federal funding of transportation projects; and (3) that secUSCA Case #97-1637 Document #419830 Filed: 03/02/1999 Page 5 of 32
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tions 93.118(e)(1), 93.120(a)(2), and 93.124(b) unlawfully require or permit conformity determinations to be based on

emissions budgets in SIPs that EPA has disapproved or not

yet approved.

Applying Chevron's two-step inquiry, we take up each claim

in turn. We begin by asking "whether Congress has directly

spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842

(1984). If so, "that is the end of the matter; for the court, as

well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. However, if

"the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

issue," we must defer to the Agency's construction of the

statute as long as it is reasonable. Id. at 843.

II

We start with EDF's challenge to section 93.121(a)(1) of the

regulations, which provides that an MPO or other recipient of

federal funds may adopt or approve a regionally significant

transportation project if "[t]he project was included in the

first three years of the most recently conforming transportation plan and TIP (or the conformity determination's regional

emissions analyses), even if conformity status is currently

lapsed." 40 C.F.R. s 93.121(a)(1). Conformity status of a

transportation plan or program lapses when more than three

years pass without a new conformity determination by an

MPO or the Department of Transportation. See 42 U.S.C.

s 7506(c)(4); 40 C.F.R. s 93.104(b)(3), (c)(3). Under section

93.121(a)(1), local officials may approve a transportation project as long as it once appeared in a conforming plan and

program, even if the plan and program no longer conform at

the time of project approval. By authorizing this result,

petitioner argues, section 93.121(a)(1) violates the Clean Air

Act's requirement that projects "come[ ] from a conforming

plan and program." 42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(2)(C). We agree.

At the outset, we think it important to make clear that this

dispute over the legality of section 93.121(a)(1) relates only to

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approval of non-federally funded projects. The Agency's rule

makes clear that local transportation projects receiving federal funds must satisfy a more stringent conformity requirement than section 93.121(a)(1). Federally funded projects

may not proceed unless there exists "a currently conforming

transportation plan and currently conforming TIP at the time

of project approval." 40 C.F.R. s 93.114 (emphasis added).

In other words, during a plan or program conformity lapse,

an MPO may not find a federally funded project to be in

conformity, and therefore that project may not go forward.

The question here is whether non-federally funded projects--

defined as "projects which are funded or approved by a

recipient of federal funds ... but which do not rely at all on

any [federal] funding or approvals," 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,788--

may attain conformity status in the absence of a currently

conforming plan and program.

We begin with the text of the Clean Air Act. Under

section 7506(c)(2)(C), an MPO may find a local transportation

project to conform with an applicable SIP only if the project

meets one of two requirements: Either it must "come[ ] from

a conforming plan and program," id. s 7506(c)(2)(C)(i), or its

"projected emissions..., when considered together with emissions projected for the conforming transportation plans and

programs within the nonattainment area, [must] not cause

such plans and programs to exceed the emission reduction

projections and schedules assigned to such plans and programs in the applicable [SIP]," id. s 7506(c)(2)(D). Claiming

that the requirement that a project "come from a conforming

plan and program" is ambiguous, EPA insists that it has

reasonably construed this requirement to permit project approval during a conformity lapse, as long as the project comes

from the first three years of a once-conforming plan and

program. This approach, EPA argues, strikes the proper

balance between protecting air quality and avoiding disruption to the transportation planning process. According to

petitioner, the statutory text leaves no ambiguity: A project

that "comes from a conforming plan and program" means a

project that comes from a currently conforming plan and

program. Therefore, EDF argues, the statute prohibits apUSCA Case #97-1637 Document #419830 Filed: 03/02/1999 Page 7 of 32
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proval of any projects, federally funded or not, during a

conformity lapse.

Giving these words their ordinary meaning, we interpret

the phrase "comes from a conforming plan and program"--a

phrase entirely in the present tense--to refer to projects that

come from a currently conforming plan and program. But

even were it possible to read the phrase, as EPA and our

dissenting colleague do, to refer to projects that come from a

previously conforming plan and program, we think this interpretation is foreclosed by Congress's use of the terms "conforming plan and program" in section 7506(c)(2)(D), by the

general conformity criteria of section 7506(c)(1), and by the

legislative history of the conformity requirements.

Section 7506(c)(2)(D) states that a project not included in a

conforming plan and program may be found to conform only

if its projected emissions "when considered together with

emissions projected for the conforming transportation plans

and programs within the nonattainment area," do not exceed

the SIP emissions budget. 42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(2)(D). This

provision enables a project to attain conformity status "only if

the regional plans and programs are in conformity at the time

the project is reviewed." Clean Air Conference Report, 136

Cong. Rec. at 36,108 col.1. Indeed, in its 1996 notice of

proposed rulemaking, which led to the Final Rule challenged

here, EPA acknowledged that

[t]he option provided in section [7506](c)(2)(D) for new

projects that were not previously included in a transportation plan/TIP or supporting regional emissions analysis

to demonstrate conformity cannot apply during a transportation plan/TIP conformity lapse, because it requires

a demonstration that "conforming transportation plans

and TIPs" would still conform when the emissions of the

new project are considered. Without a conforming

transportation plan and TIP in place, this cannot be

demonstrated.

61 Fed. Reg. 36,112, 36,120 col.2 (1996). We thus have no

doubt that the word "conforming" in section 7506(c)(2)(D)

means presently conforming. Since section 7506(c)(2)(D) proUSCA Case #97-1637 Document #419830 Filed: 03/02/1999 Page 8 of 32
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vides an alternative means of demonstrating project conformity when a project does not "come from a conforming plan and

program," it would be quite odd to read the word "conforming" in section 7506(c)(2)(C) to mean something different from

what it means in section 7506(c)(2)(D).

Moreover, were we to read the word "conforming" the way

EPA suggests, then there would be no assurance that projects approved under section 7506(c)(2)(C) would help eliminate, reduce, or prevent violations of national ambient air

quality standards, as required by section 7506(c)(1). According to that provision, a "conforming" transportation project is

one that will contribute to "eliminating or reducing the severity and number of violations of the [NAAQS] and achieving

expeditious attainment of such standards," 42 U.S.C.

s 7506(c)(1)(A), and that "will not--(i) cause or contribute to

any new violation of any standard in any area; (ii) increase

the frequency or severity of any existing violation of any

standard in any area; or (iii) delay timely attainment of any

standard or any required interim emission reductions or other

milestones in any area," id. s 7506(c)(1)(B). Though doubting the applicability of section 7506(c)(1) to projects approved

under section 7506(c)(2), the dissent nevertheless concedes

that section 7506(c)(2)(A) expressly incorporates the requirements of section 7506(c)(1)(B) and makes them applicable to

projects approved under section 7506(c)(2). See Dissenting

Opinion ("Dissenting Op.") at 7. Absent a currently conforming plan and program, there is no certainty that a regionally

significant transportation project will satisfy any of the section 7506(c)(1)(B) conformity criteria. EPA's interpretation

of section 7506(c)(2)(C) thus eviscerates the requirements of

section 7506(c)(1)(B) and therefore also the requirements of

section 7506(c)(2)(A), creating an untenable inconsistency not

only between section 7506(c)(1) and section 7506(c)(2), but

also within section 7506(c)(2) itself.

Our dissenting colleague accuses us of "embrac[ing] an

argument" raised by petitioner "in two sentences of its 'Summary of Argument,' but not at all thereafter." Dissenting Op.

at 4. With all due respect, we think the dissent unfairly

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characterizes petitioner's brief. It is true that petitioner first

sets forth this argument in the "Summary of Argument":

The rule ... undermines Congress' decision to ensure

that long-term investment of resources in regional transportation systems contribute to 'eliminating or reducing

the severity and number of [NAAQS violations]' (required by s 176(c)(1)(A)) by requiring re-assessment of

the conformity of the planned regional transportation

system every three-years [sic]. 42 U.S.C.

s 7506(c)(4)(B)(ii). By allowing projects from a plan that

no longer meets regional emission budgets to be approved, the rule allows elements of the non-conforming

plan to be implemented which can interfere with progress toward attaining the NAAQS.

EDF Br. at 13 (alteration in original). But far from failing to

mention this argument later in its brief, petitioner devotes

three pages of its "Argument" section to developing the claim.

See id. at 23-25. EDF opens this discussion by citing section

7506(c)(4)(B)(ii) for the proposition that "conformity determinations for a plan and/or program expire at least every three

years by operation of law." Id. at 23. It then argues that

"[t]he three-year limit on transportation plans and TIPs plays

an important role by assuring that plans and TIPs continue to

reflect the latest emission targets for a region," specifically

mentioning emission reduction targets related to statutorilyprescribed ozone and carbon monoxide attainment goals. Id.

at 24. "Without the obligation to renew conformity findings

every 3 years," EDF concludes, "regions could continue implementing transportation systems designed to meet older

emission targets no longer adequate to attain the NAAQS."

Id. In addition to paraphrasing the claim first stated in the

"Summary of Argument," which explicitly invokes section

7506(c)(1), this last sentence plainly manifests petitioner's

belief that EPA's rule fails to ensure that transportation

plans, programs, and projects will help "achieve expeditious

attainment of [NAAQS]" and will not "delay timely attainment of any [NAAQS]," as section 7506(c)(1) requires. 42

U.S.C. s 7506(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(iii). We think that petitioner

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has adequately challenged EPA's regulation under section

7506(c)(1).

The legislative history of the 1990 conformity requirements

provides one final reason why we think the phrase "conforming plan and program" refers to currently conforming plans

and programs. Congress imposed new conformity requirements in order to integrate transportation planning at the

local level with attainment and maintenance of air quality

standards at the state level. See Clean Air Conference

Report, 136 Cong. Rec. at 13,106 col.1 (noting that the statute

"will require transportation planning agencies to view their

task as the development of a transportation system that

meets ... both mobility needs and air quality objectives").

By requiring plans and programs to conform to applicable

SIPs at the time of project approval, Congress sought to

ensure that "transportation plans and programs [would] serve

as part of the pollution control strategy for the metropolitan

area." Id. To be sure, plans and programs could also serve

this pollution control function, as EPA explains, by "account[ing] for and offset[ting] if necessary the emissions of

any non-federal projects that are implemented during a conformity lapse." 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,790 col.1. But that

approach would invite local decision-makers to approve transportation projects while deferring development of pollution

control strategies during conformity lapses, thereby subverting Congress's intent that the two processes--transportation

planning and pollution control--occur simultaneously. See

136 Cong. Rec. at 36,107 col.2 (regional planning process

should identify "the comprehensive transportation system for

a metropolitan area" in the context of a "comprehensive

consideration of alternatives ... and careful analysis of options that can contribute toward achieving the air quality

objectives of the Clean Air Act").

The Conference Report also describes section 7506(c)(2)(D)

as an "exception"--indeed, it is the only exception--to the

general rule of section 7506(c)(2)(C). Id. at 36,108 col.1.

Under section 7506(c)(2)(D), an excluded project may go

forward only if its expected emissions, together with the

expected emissions from currently conforming plans and

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programs, do not exceed the emissions ceilings in the applicable SIP. As we indicated earlier, both Congress and EPA

interpret the word "conforming" in this provision to mean

currently conforming. See supra at 9. Section 7506(c)(2)(D)

thus shows that Congress wanted no transportation projects

to proceed without assurance that they would not undermine

attainment or maintenance of current air quality standards.

Directly contravening this mandate, the Agency's rule allows

local officials to approve transportation projects included in

plans and programs that previously conformed but presently

do not. See 40 C.F.R. s 93.121(a)(1). Because the conformity status of such projects bears no relation to current air

quality attainment or maintenance goals, their approval carries no guarantee that their emissions will neither violate

current standards nor contribute to existing violations. Indeed, in the preamble to the 1997 Final Rule, EPA admits--

without qualification and contrary to its position in this case--

that "projects cannot be approved if the plan and TIP have

lapsed." 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,797 cols.1-2.

EPA offers two additional justifications for its interpretation of section 7506(c)(2)(C). Neither survives scrutiny.

First, the Agency points out that under a regulation effective

since 1995, a certain category of transportation projects called

transportation control measures ("TCMs") may proceed even

in the absence of a currently conforming plan and program.

See 40 C.F.R. s 93.114(b). According to the Agency, this

exemption shows that section 7506(c)(2)(C) of the statute

requires no currently conforming plan and program at the

time of project approval. But we see no reason to extend the

exemption for TCMs to ordinary transportation projects,

since the former reduce pollution, see id. s 93.101, while the

latter add to it. TCMs are "specifically identified and committed to in the applicable implementation plan," id., and

exempted from the requirements of section 7506(c)(2)(C) because, as the Agency explained in the preamble to the 1995

rule, "[b]y definition, a TCM in an approved SIP conforms to

the SIP because it is contained in the SIP." 60 Fed. Reg. at

57,180 col.2. This rationale has no applicability to non-TCM

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projects because such projects never appear in SIPs. See id.

at 57,180 col.3.

Second, the Agency argues that although the statute requires plan and program conformity determinations at least

once every three years, see 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(4)(B)(ii), the

statute contains no such requirement for project conformity

determinations. Inferring from this that Congress intended

project conformity to be determined not more than once,

EPA maintains that a project included in a previously conforming plan and program retains its conformity status, even

if conformity of that plan and program eventually lapses. We

disagree. Although the statute suggests that Congress did

not intend project conformity determinations to occur every

three years, it does not follow that Congress intended project

conformity determinations to occur only once. Based on our

analysis above, we read the statute to require non-federally

funded projects to follow the three-year conformity determination schedule applicable to transportation plans and programs up to the point of MPO approval. After MPO approval, non-federally funded projects need undergo no further

conformity determinations.

In sum, the language and history of the statute's conformity requirements show that Congress intended transportation

planning and air quality management to proceed in lock step.

By allowing local approval of transportation projects in the

absence of currently conforming plans and programs, the

Agency's regulation undermines section 7506(c)(2)(C)'s criteria for demonstrating conformity of regionally significant

transportation projects to state-level air quality standards.

Finding clear congressional intent and thus no need to proceed to Chevron's second step, we hold that section

93.121(a)(1) of the regulations violates the Clean Air Act.

III

Next, petitioner challenges section 93.102(c)(1) of the regulations, which provides that

[p]rojects subject to this subpart for which the NEPA

process and a conformity determination have been completed by DOT may proceed toward implementation

without further conformity determinations unless more

than three years have elapsed since the most recent

major step (NEPA process completion; start of final

design; acquisition of a significant portion of the right-ofway; or approval of the plans, specifications and estimates) occurred.

40 C.F.R. s 93.102(c)(1). Known as the "grandfather" rule,

this section reflects the Agency's view that "there should only

be one point in the transportation planning process at which a

project-level conformity determination is necessary." 62 Fed.

Reg. at 43,783 col.2. According to petitioner, this regulation,

like the one discussed above, violates section 7506(c)(2)(C) of

the statute because it allows transportation projects to reUSCA Case #97-1637 Document #419830 Filed: 03/02/1999 Page 13 of 32
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ceive federal funding in the absence of a currently conforming

plan and program. Again, we agree.

To understand how the "grandfather" rule works, consider

the following hypothetical: In 1993, an MPO approves and

adopts a regional highway project--for example, an urban

beltway. At the time, the beltway is included in both a

conforming plan and a conforming program. Three years

later, in 1996, the conformity status of the plan and program

lapses. In 1997, the MPO acquires a significant portion of

the right-of-way for the beltway. Today, ready to start

building, the MPO seeks funding from the Department of

Transportation. EPA's "grandfather" rule would allow DOT

to fund the beltway, since a "major step"--acquisition of

right-of-way--occurred within the past three years. But

section 7506(c)(2)(C)'s conformity requirement expressly prohibits DOT from "approv[ing], accept[ing], or fund[ing]" the

beltway unless it "comes from a conforming plan and program." This means that no transportation project may receive federal funds in the absence of a currently conforming

plan and program. See supra Part II. Therefore, to the

extent that section 93.102(a)(1) of the regulations allows projects to receive federal funds during plan and program conformity lapses, it violates the Clean Air Act.

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Defending its "grandfather" rule, EPA cites Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, supra. But that case sustained the "grandfather" rule only as a transition measure "to

avoid immediate 'retroactive' implementation of the new

[1990] conformity requirement which would impose a substantial and unforeseen burden on federal projects that had

already satisfied existing federal requirements [i.e., NEPA

review]." 82 F.3d at 456. Nothing in that decision supports

what the Agency has done here--forever exempting a project

from further conformity determinations where the project's

most recent conformity determination occurred more than

three years ago and where a "major step" occurred within the

past three years.

While invalidating section 93.102(a)(1) with respect to federally funded projects, we note that the statute does not

preclude the "grandfather" clause from applying to nonfederally funded projects. Although section 7506(c)(2)(C) of

the statute prohibits MPO or DOT approval of non-federally

funded projects during a plan and program conformity lapse,

it nowhere prohibits implementation of such projects as long

as their approval occurred prior to the conformity lapse.

IV

We turn finally to petitioner's challenge to those sections of

the regulations that permit or require plan, program, and

project conformity to be based on motor vehicle emissions

budgets in SIP revisions that a state has submitted to EPA,

but that EPA has not yet approved or has disapproved. See

40 C.F.R. ss 93.118(e)(1), 93.120(a)(2), 93.124(b). Under

these regulations, if EPA disapproves a submitted SIP revision without a "protective finding"--i.e., a determination that

the submission "contains adopted control measures or written

commitments to adopt enforceable control measures that fully

satisfy the [relevant statutory] emissions reductions requirements," id. s 93.101--then "[d]uring the first 120 days following [such] disapproval..., transportation plan, TIP, and project conformity determinations shall be made using the motor

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gy implementation plan." Id. s 93.120(a)(2). Emissions budgets contained in a submitted SIP revision also guide conformity determinations when EPA makes no finding within 45

days of submission regarding the adequacy of the budgets.

See id. s 93.118(e)(1); see also id. s 93.124(b) (allowing conformity to be based on submitted but not-yet-approved SIP

revisions). Submitted budgets, however, do not supersede

emissions budgets in an approved SIP for the years covered

by the SIP. See id. s 93.118(e)(1).

Conceding that the Clean Air Act generally requires conformity to be evaluated against approved SIPs, the Agency

argues that these regulations represent reasonable responses

to statutory silence as to how conformity should be determined when no approved SIP exists or when the approved

SIP contains no adequate motor vehicle emissions budget.

We disagree. Although the statute nowhere explicitly dictates how conformity should be determined under the circumstances EPA describes, any attempt by the Agency to fill

these gaps must satisfy section 7506(c)(1)(B)'s generally applicable conformity requirements. Where EPA disapproves a

SIP revision without a protective finding, i.e., without determining that it contains adequate measures to reduce emissions to statutorily required levels, see 40 C.F.R.

s 93.120(a)(2), or where EPA fails to determine the adequacy

of motor vehicle emissions budgets in a SIP revision within 45

days of submission, see id. s 93.118(e)(1), there is no reason

to believe that transportation plans and programs conforming

to the submitted budgets "will not--(i) cause or contribute to

any new violation of any standard in any area; (ii) increase

the frequency or severity of any existing violation of any

standard in any area; or (iii) delay timely attainment of any

standard...." 42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(1)(B). Indeed, nothing in

the regulations requires MPOs to show that an area's projected emissions would be lower if plans and programs conforming to a submitted budget were implemented than if they

were not. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,781 col.2 (noting that

submitted budgets replaced "build/no-build test" as measure

of conformity under Final Rule). Even if it were true that

section 93.118(e) gives states an incentive to file emissions

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budgets conforming to law, see Dissenting Op. at 10, the

regulation would still violate the statute by allowing conformity determinations to take effect where federal agencies and

MPOs have not discharged their "affirmative responsibility"

to provide an "assurance of conformity." 42 U.S.C.

s 7506(c)(1). To be sure, section 93.118(e)(6) of the regulations provides that "the MPO and DOT's conformity determinations [based on unapproved or disapproved SIPs] will be

deemed to be a statement that the MPO and DOT are not

aware of any information that would indicate that emissions

consistent with the motor vehicle emissions budget" would

violate section 7506(c)(1)(B)'s conformity criteria. But how

can an MPO or DOT satisfy its "affirmative responsibility" to

provide an "assurance of conformity" through a "deemed"

statement indicating mere ignorance of non-conformity? For

these reasons, we grant petitioner's request that we remand

sections 93.118(e)(1) and 93.120(a)(2) to EPA for further

rulemaking to harmonize these regulations with section

7506(c)(1)'s conformity requirements.

Section 93.124(b) is also inconsistent with the Clean Air

Act, but for a different reason. That provision reads:

If an applicable implementation plan submitted before

November 24, 1993, demonstrates that emissions from all

sources will be less than the total emissions that would

be consistent with attainment and quantifies that "safety

margin," the State may submit an implementation plan

revision which assigns some or all of this safety margin

to highway and transit mobile sources for the purposes of

conformity. Such [a SIP] revision ... may be used for

the purposes of transportation conformity before it is

approved by EPA.

Id. s 93.124(b). Unlike sections 93.118(e)(1) and 93.120(a)(2),

which apply when there is no applicable SIP or no SIP with

an applicable emissions budget, section 93.124(b) applies when

there is an applicable SIP--i.e., it does not purport to fill a

statutory gap. While it may be true that plans and programs

conforming to a SIP revision under section 93.124(b) "will not

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cause, worsen, or prolong violations of air quality standards,"

Dissenting Op. at 13, the statute nevertheless requires conformity determinations to be based on a SIP "approved or

promulgated under section 7410 of this title" where such a

SIP exists. 42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(1); see also id. s 7506(c)(2)

(requiring transportation plans, programs, and projects "to

conform to any applicable implementation plan in effect under

this chapter"). Indeed, EPA itself has said that it "does not

believe that it is legal to allow a submitted SIP to supersede

an approved SIP for years addressed by the approved SIP."

62 Fed. Reg. at 43,783 col.3; see also 40 C.F.R. s 93.118(e)(1).

Because section 93.124(b) would allow a submitted but unapproved SIP revision to supersede an approved SIP, it violates

the Clean Air Act.

V

Our dissenting colleague charges that our conclusions today

frustrate EPA's goal of allowing greater flexibility in the

conformity determination process. See Dissenting Op. at 1.

Whatever the Agency's policy goals, our job is to interpret

the statute. Here, the statute imposes an elaborate array of

requirements that, according to the dissent, amount to "a

congressional effort to micromanage local transportation

planning." Id. at 1. If this legislative scheme is too onerous,

it is up to Congress to provide relief, not this court.

We grant EDF's petition for review and hold that sections

93.121(a)(1) and 93.102(c)(1) of EPA's regulations are unlawful

because they depart from the criteria for demonstrating

project conformity established in section 7506(c)(2)(C) of the

Clean Air Act. In addition, we remand sections 93.118(e)(1)

and 93.120(a)(2) of the regulations for the Agency to align

these regulations with the general conformity criteria of

section 7506(c)(1)(B). Finally, we hold that section 93.124(b)

of the regulations violates section 7506(c)(1)-(2) of the Act by

allowing a submitted SIP revision to supersede an approved

or applicable SIP.

So ordered.

Williams, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The 1990 conformity

amendments to the Clean Air Act ("CAA") were intended to

harmonize the transportation planning process for polluted

metropolitan areas with air quality plans (technically, "state

implementation plans" or "SIPs") established by state authorities. In particular, the conformity amendments prohibit

certain transportation activities from going forward unless

relevant entities have determined that the activities are "in

conformity"--that is, that they meet certain criteria relating

to air quality. The Act's conformity requirements are astonishingly confusing, and could if interpreted as stringently as

possible seriously disrupt state and local transportation planning. That would "frustrate the process of state and federal

cooperation and the integrated planning that section 176(c)(1)

was created to foster." EDF v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 468 (D.C.

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Cir. 1996). The EPA attempted in this rule to reduce disruption and make the conformity determination process "more

logical and feasible" 62 Fed. Reg. 43,780, 43,781 (1997), by

allowing greater flexibility than it had permitted in its 1993

conformity regulations. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,780. In

accepting all the petitioners' challenges to the rule, the majority undoes much of what EPA intended to accomplish. Although I believe there are three respects in which the EPA

has not adequately explained itself, I cannot find it guilty of

the thoroughgoing misunderstanding of the statute that leads

the majority to find for EDF on every issue. Accordingly, I

dissent.

Of course when a congressional effort to micromanage local

transportation planning in as much detail as this statute is

followed by a judicial decision that the agency must put states

and localities in an even tighter straightjacket, one may feel

that Congress asked for it. But one cannot say the same for

the hapless citizens who must live with the results.

I.Local approval of nonfederal projects not from currently

conforming plan and program

The first regulation the majority strikes down is 40 CFR

s 93.121(a)(1). It allows certain nonfederal entities to adopt

or approve projects contained in the first three years of a

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transportation plan and program (i.e., designated for implementation within those years) that was once in conformity,

even if conformity has since lapsed. I disagree with the

majority here because I think the regulation reflects a reasonable interpretation of 42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(2)(C). That

provision prohibits metropolitan planning organizations

(known as "MPOs") and other recipients of federal funds

from approving certain transportation projects, including

those covered by the challenged regulation, unless the projects "come[ ] from a conforming plan and program." The

majority holds that this phrase requires the projects in

question to come from a plan and program that conforms at

the time of approval.

EPA argues that the phrase allows approval of any project

that comes from a plan and program that conformed at one

time, even if the approval is given after conformity has

lapsed. The statutory text permits EPA's view, and the

agency's interpretation is reasonable in light of its goal of

protecting localities from disruption caused by conformity

lapses, which appear frequently to be beyond local control.

The Department of Transportation must redetermine the

conformity of plans and programs every three years, and

must also make a new conformity determination within 18

months of EPA approval of a SIP revision that establishes or

changes emissions budgets, among other circumstances. If

the DOT fails to make the required determinations within the

prescribed time frames, conformity will lapse. See 40 CFR

ss 93.104(b)(3), 93.104(e).

The majority argues that since the phrase "comes from a

conforming plan and program" is in the present tense, its

"ordinary meaning" is "comes from a currently conforming

plan and program." Maj. Op. at 9. But that is too simple;

the phrase is ambiguous. "Comes from X" can mean "has its

origin in X," and when the phrase is used that way, the time

for determining X's qualities can be the time of origination.

A Belfaster who 10 years from now says he "comes from a

bleeding land" will be understood--no matter how effective

the recent peace accord. A layabout who says he "comes

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from a hard-working family" can be telling the truth even if

all his relatives are dead.1

The majority advances three arguments against EPA's

interpretation here--one based on the use of the word "conforming" elsewhere in the statute, another on the requirements of another statutory provision dealing with conformity,

and the third on the legislative history. None is persuasive.

First, the majority appeals to the use of the word "conforming" as an adjective in s 7506(c)(2)(D). This argument

starts with the decision that the "conforming" is used in that

provision to mean "currently conforming." Next, the majority argues that since (c)(2)(D) and (c)(2)(C) provide alternate

ways of determining project conformity, the term should be

read to mean the same thing in each paragraph. Together,

these propositions lead the majority to the conclusion that

(c)(2)(C) also requires a "currently conforming" plan.

The determination that (c)(2)(D) requires a "currently conforming" plan is surely contestable.2 But even if it is correct,

it was reasonable for EPA to decide that this stricture did not

carry over to (c)(2)(C). First, the provisions differ in lan-

__________

1 It might be said that transportation projects do not "originate"

in transportation plans or programs; projects in a plan may be

more like stories in an anthology than chapters in a novel. But the

hypothesis is not strong enough to give the phrase "comes from a

conforming plan" the clear meaning that the majority finds. The

statute establishing the federal transportation planning process

prescribes the designation of MPOs to carry out a "continuing,

cooperative, and comprehensive" planning process, 23 U.S.C.

s 134(a), by developing plans and programs that contain the projects to be implemented, id. s 134(h)(2)(A). This language, if

anything, suggests the novel metaphor more than the anthology; in

any event, it cannot be said to establish the anthology metaphor

with the clarity necessary for the majority's interpretation.

2 The majority cites two pieces of evidence for its idea that the

plan must be currently conforming, the Clean Air Conference

Report and a statement by EPA. Assertions contained in the

former document, despite what the majority says, are not interpretations by "Congress," Maj. Op. at 12-13, but by committee draftspersons. With respect to the EPA's statement, even if the majority were correct that the agency has contradicted itself in its

interpretations of (c)(2)(D) and (c)(2)(C), the existence of that

guage: the former provision lacks the phrase "comes from,"

and has no other linguistic hook suggesting that one should

look back to an earlier time of origin. Second, I find nothing

"odd," Maj. Op. at 10, from a substantive point of view about

the difference EPA's interpretation creates between the two

ways of determining project conformity. Section

7506(c)(2)(C) governs projects that were included in plans and

programs that have gone through a conformity determination,

while (c)(2)(D) governs projects that were never before considered in such a determination. In light of the intent of the

Clean Air Act amendments to foster state-federal partnership, it is not unreasonable for EPA to protect states' reliance

interest where a project has already been considered in a

conformity determination; no such reliance interest exists for

projects that fall under (c)(2)(D).

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The majority next finds EPA's regulation flawed because it

allows approval of projects that violate s 7506(c)(1), which

defines conformity in general terms and applies to all federal

activities, not just transportation-related ones. In its essence

s 7506(c)(1) forbids federal activities that will cause, worsen,

or prolong violations of air quality standards. It also forbids

MPO approval of projects with such effects.

The majority holds that because EPA's rule allows MPO

approval of transportation projects from transportation plans

that are not in conformity at the time of approval, it allows

MPOs to approve projects that do not meet s 7506(c)(1)'s

requirements and thus violates that section.

In doing so, the majority embraces an argument that

EDF's opening brief raised only in a novel and somewhat

deceptive way. It mentioned the claim in two sentences of its

"Summary of Argument," but not at all thereafter. See EDF

Br. at 13. In its main argument, instead, EDF claimed that

s 93.121 violated s 7506(c)(2). Its only argument from

s 7506(c)(1) was a general one--that EPA should issue fur-

__________

contradiction tells us at most that one of the interpretations must

be wrong--not that the EPA's reading of (c)(2)(D) must be right.

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ther regulations implementing that provision; and on that

subject it didn't mention s 93.121, although it gave examples

of other regulations that in its view showed that the new

conformity rule allowed violations of s 7506(c)(1). Unsurprisingly, EPA did not respond to the (c)(1) argument.

The majority argues that EDF did come through with an

elaboration of its (c)(1) claim at pages 23-25 of its brief. But

the referenced argument is quite distinct. It is based on a

perceived tension between EPA's interpretation of (c)(2)(C)

and another statutory provision, s 7506(c)(4). There is no

explicit mention of (c)(1) in the passage, nor is there an

implicit claim that EPA's interpretation violates (c)(1). Instead, the discussion elaborates on the supposed problems for

EPA's interpretation created by s 7506(c)(4), which calls for

periodic redetermination of the conformity of transportation

plans and programs. EDF's heading says that the EPA's

regulation "Eviscerates Congress' Decision to Set Time Limits on Plan, TIP and Project Conformity," EDF Br. at 23, and

the text goes on immediately to cite s 7506(c)(4), which

indeed sets such time limits. Raising one argument is not an

implicit raising of the other.

The closest EDF comes to making the (c)(1) argument is its

claim that EPA's interpretation allows regions to "continue

implementing transportation systems designed to meet older

emissions targets no longer adequate to attain the NAAQS."

EDF Br. at 24. This sentence appears in the midst of the

(c)(4) argument and is best read as an illustration of the

alleged tension between that provision and EPA's regulation,

not as raising a claim based on (c)(1). Though the sentence

does contain the word "attainment," which also appears in

(c)(1), there is no other textual reference to the statutory

provision, and no implicit reference is obvious. A project

does not violate the relevant provisions of (c)(1) unless it

actually causes, worsens, or prolongs a violation of the

NAAQS, or is not in "conformity to [the relevant SIP's]

purpose of ... achieving expeditious attainment" of the

NAAQS. It is by no means clear that progress toward

targets that are "no longer adequate" fits into any of those

categories. The vaguely drafted last category (requiring

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"conformity to [a plan's] purpose of ... achieving expeditious

attainment") is the most likely candidate, but EDF never

even hints at an explanation of how a purpose is thwarted by

inadequate contribution to its realization. That judges are

able to find a dim connection between EDF's argument and

(c)(1)--after the fact--is hardly a showing that EDF raised a

(c)(1) argument.

In the interests of fairness to parties and avoidance of

improvident decisions, we normally refuse to consider arguments that are raised only in the reply brief. See, e.g.,

Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. OTS, 156 F.3d 190, 191 (D.C. Cir.

1998). This rule also extends to arguments raised in only a

conclusory fashion in the opening brief and not addressed by

appellee. See Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs.

Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The rule is

especially compelling when the statutory and regulatory

scheme presents as many opportunities for error as this one.

In any event, even if the argument had been properly

raised it should have been rejected. To understand why, we

have to look at the overall structure of s 7506(c). Section

7506(c)(1) is a general requirement covering federal activities.

It forbids federal entities to engage in activities that do not

conform to an applicable SIP and, in subparagraphs (A) and

(B), gives a definition of conformity. Sections 7506(c)(2) and

(3) both address transportation and provide rules for conformity determinations in that context. Section 7506(c)(3)

establishes interim rules, and s 7506(c)(2) is the main transportation conformity provision.

The majority's opinion assumes that situations governed by

(c)(2) are also governed by (c)(1). But the statute can

reasonably be read to say that (c)(2) and (c)(3) govern exclusively in their own domains. On this reading, s 93.121(a)(1),

which governs a situation covered by (c)(2)(C), would not be

subject to invalidation under (c)(1).

The most obvious support for this reading comes from the

fact that the specific transportation conformity requirements

are not entirely consistent with the general conformity requirements, so that applying (c)(1) to all situations governed

by (c)(2) and (c)(3) produces contradiction. Section 7506(c)(3),

for instance, provides that "conformity" of a plan "will be

demonstrated" if the plan contributes to annual emissions

reductions of ozone and carbon monoxide and meets certain

other requirements not relevant here. See

s 7506(c)(3)(A)(iii). Thus, a plan allowing activities that

cause a violation of (for example) particulate matter standards is in conformity under (c)(3) as long as the other

requirements are met. Not so under the general rules of

(c)(1), since that provision forbids activities that cause violations of "any standard." See s 7506(c)(1)(B)(i). The

transportation-specific (c)(3) rule triumphs in this conflict.

Each statutory provision is normally presumed to serve a

function; thus a specific provision governing a set of circumstances entirely within a more general one must, within its

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own scope, prevail over the more general. Otherwise it

would be deprived of its function. Cf. Hemenway v. Peabody

Coal Co., 159 F.3d 255, 264 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that where

the scope of one provision is not completely contained within

the scope of the other it is impossible to call either "more

specific"). That is the case here. Subsection (c)(1) nominally

covers all federal activities, and (c)(3) covers only transportation activities, and those only for a limited time.

Section 7506(c)(2)(A) also supports the view that the specific requirements replace the general ones. It requires a

finding that a transportation plan or program "will conform to

the requirements of [s 7506(c)(1)(B)]" before the plan or

program can be found in conformity. The majority dubs my

observation to this effect a "concession." Maj. Op. at 10.

But since the issue here is what (c)(2)(C) requires, (c)(2)(A)'s

specific imposition of the requirement makes clear that the

draftsmen, contrary to the majority, understood that the

generality of (c)(2) situations did not require compliance with

(c)(1).

Thus, it appears that it would be reasonable for EPA to

find that (c)(1)'s requirements do not apply to situations

governed by (c)(2) and (c)(3) except where specifically incorporated. There is no such specific incorporating language in

(c)(2)(C), the transportation project conformity provision that

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governs here. I cannot find any assertion of this analysis in

the record of the rulemaking, but as EDF did not properly

raise the issue, EPA has had no real opportunity to explain

its view of how (c)'s subsections relate to each other.

Finally, the majority points to statements in the legislative

history. In general these say that one purpose of the CAA

amendments was to promote integration of the air quality and

transportation planning processes, a proposition with which

neither EPA nor anyone else has any quarrel. And the

majority ends as it began, with an appeal to (c)(2)(D)'s

purported requirement of a "currently conforming" plan. As

I explained above, this stricture, if it exists, does not bind

EPA in interpreting (c)(2)(C).

Thus, Congress has not "directly addressed the precise

question at issue" in this case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,

467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), so we must uphold the EPA's

resolution of the statutory ambiguities if it is reasonable.

And it is, given the Act's overall purpose to promote a

cooperative regime of integrated planning.

Although the EPA's treatment of non-federally funded

projects seems to me reasonable as a matter of statutory

interpretation, I have found nothing in the record adequately

explaining its different treatment of federally and nonfederally funded projects. Under s 93.121(a)(1), a project

that is not federally funded may be approved by an MPO as

long as it comes from the first three years of a transportation

plan that once was in conformity. But a federally funded

project may not be approved unless there is a "currently

conforming transportation plan and currently conforming TIP

at the time of project approval." See 40 CFR s 93.114.

Nothing in the statute appears to justify such a distinction,

and EPA's only explanation for the disparate treatment appears to be that "the existence of a conforming plan and TIP

is not necessary to facilitate the implementation of [nonfederal] projects." 62 Fed. Reg. 43,780, 43,790 (1997). It is

undisputed that nonfederal projects can be funded without a

currently conforming plan and TIP in place, while federal

projects cannot. 42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(2) provides that "[n]o

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Federal agency may ... fund any ... project unless such ...

project has been found to conform to any applicable implementation plan.... ", while no such restriction covers nonfederal projects. But EPA has not explained why that difference is relevant to the project approval, as to which the

statutory requirements draw no evident distinction between

federal and nonfederal contexts. Because the EPA may be

able to explain the difference, and if not might adopt for

federal projects the rule it has chosen for non-federal ones,

and in order to avoid the disruption that would be caused by

an interim change that might itself be changed, I would

simply remand for further explanation. See A.L. Pharma,

Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

II.Grandfathering of federally funded projects unless three

years elapse between major steps

40 CFR s 93.102(c)(1) provides that transportation projects

that have been once determined to be in conformity may

proceed toward completion without further conformity determinations unless more than three years elapse between "major steps" of the project. The majority invalidates this socalled "grandfathering" provision on the basis of the same

construction of the statute that leads it to invalidate

s 93.121(a)(1)--its reading of the words "comes from a conforming plan and program" in s 7506(c)(2)(C)(i). For the

reasons given in the preceding section, I disagree.

III.Use of emissions budgets from unapproved/disapproved

SIP revisions and reallocation of safety margins

The majority next addresses three regulations that allow

conformity to be determined on the basis of emissions budgets contained in SIP revisions that EPA has not approved,

remanding two and vacating one. The first of these, 40 CFR

s 93.118(e)(1), allows an MPO or DOT to show consistency

with emissions budgets in unapproved SIP revisions in conformity determinations starting 45 days after submission of

the revision. In short, anticipating that sometimes it will be

unable to pass on proposed SIP revisions promptly, the

agency provides for use of a second-best substitute after 45

days.

The majority's sole basis for remanding this provision is

the proposition that the regulation is insufficient to ensure

compliance with 42 U.S.C. s 7506(c)(1)(B), the governmentwide conformity requirements. The theory is faulty. Even if

we assume that (c)(1) applies generally to transportation

projects covered by ss 7506(c)(2) and (3) (contrary to my

analysis in part I), s 93.118(e)(1) does not allow violations of

(c)(1).3

Section 7506(c)(1) makes it the "affirmative responsibility"

of an agency engaging in or supporting a federal activity to

assure that the activity does not cause, exacerbate, or prolong

any violation of air quality standards. For various reasons

s 93.118(e)(1) is adequate to ensure that the DOT (and

MPOs) carry out this mandate when emissions budgets have

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been submitted but not yet approved. First, because EPA

will approve SIP revisions only if the revised SIP, including

the budgets, includes enforceable control measures to reach

and maintain air quality standards by specified dates, see 42

U.S.C. ss 7410(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (k)(3), states have an incentive

not to submit the "inflated emissions budget[s]" about which

EDF is concerned. EDF Br. at 33. Furthermore, EPA's

regulations require a public hearing and consultation between

state, federal, and local agencies before the SIP revision can

be submitted. See 62 Fed. Reg. 43,780, 43,781 (1997).

Just as the substantive rules and procedural controls on

SIP revisions create some probability that states will file

emissions budgets conforming to law, s 93.118(e)(6) makes

the MPOs and DOT a further screen. It provides that when

conformity determinations are made under s 93.118(e)(1),

"the MPO and DOT's conformity determinations will be

__________

3 The EPA argues that s 93.118(e)(1) covers a gap between

(c)(2) and (c)(3). If so, then even if (c)(2) and (c)(3) preempt (c)(1)

where they apply, (c)(1) might spring to life for areas left blank by

them. On the other hand, (c)(2) and (c)(3) might preempt (c)(1)'s

independent effect over the entire field of transportation, including

any gaps. Because I find that s 93.118(e)(1) is sufficient to guard

against violations of (c)(1), I need not reach that argument here.

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deemed to be a statement that the MPO and DOT are not

aware of any information that would indicate that emissions

consistent with the motor vehicle emissions budget" would

violate (c)(1). If an MPO or DOT official is legally deemed to

be making such a statement, presumably he or she will be

reasonably careful that its factual underpinnings are valid--

on pain, surely, of at least a bureaucratic black eye if later

experience should falsify the implicit representations.

Taken together, ss 93.118(e)(1) and (e)(6) establish a high

probability that submitted emissions budgets meet the requirements of (c)(1). And a decent probability is all that any

system can assure: even the EPA might err in giving an

approval. In light of the purpose of the Clean Air Act to

"foster" a "process of state and federal cooperation," EDF v.

EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and the procedures

nurturing sound state decisionmaking, it is hardly unreasonable for EPA to allow the implied representation of an MPO

or DOT as fulfilling its "affirmative responsibility" to assure

conformity.

The majority emphasizes the fact that the MPO or DOT

bears an "affirmative responsibility" to assure conformity.

But "affirmative" can be used essentially as an intensifier that

emphasizes the existence of a responsibility, rather than as a

prescription of some means for its accomplishment. See, e.g.,

Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538-39

(1979); CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1973).

EDF's principal argument against s 93.118(e)(1)--not addressed by the majority--is that that the regulation illegally

allows conformity determinations to be made on the basis of

something other than the "applicable implementation plan,"

as required by s 7506(c)(2) or (c)(3), or an implementation

plan that has been "approved," as required by s 7506(c)(1),

because it allows a submitted SIP revision to be treated as

approved before approval. This somewhat overstates the

case. The regulation provides only that the emissions budgets are to be used to determine conformity; neither the

regulation nor EPA's comments state that the revision may

be treated as approved. The potential problem with the

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regulation is that it does not provide a reasonable way of

determining conformity with the "applicable," that is, existing, SIP--not that it illegally allows revisions to be treated as

approved before they actually are. And the regulation does

provide a reasonable basis for determining conformity with

the applicable SIP, at least in some cases.

Section 93.118(e)(1) applies only when the most recent

approved SIP contains no motor vehicle emissions budgets.

In the absence of emissions budgets, the only possible relevant statutory provisions for finding conformity with the

"applicable implementation plan" are ss 7506(c)(3), which

governs an interim period that began with the passage of the

CAA amendment, and (c)(1), which as I argued at 15 n.3

above, may govern any gap between the end of the (c)(3)

interim period and the approval of SIPs with emissions

budgets. My conclusion above that ss 93.118(e)(1) and (e)(6)

together provide a reasonable means of determining conformity addresses any application of (c)(1).

That leaves the possible application of (c)(3). EPA has

included no requirement that the entity making the conformity finding consider the activity's consistency with (c)(3). So

there may be a deficiency here. But it is not clear whether

s 93.118(e)(1) and s 7506(c)(3) are ever in effect at the same

time; some statements of EPA in the rulemaking suggest

that the interim period (c)(3) covers is over before the emissions budget submission that triggers s 93.118(e)(1) takes

place. See 58 Fed. Reg. 62,188, 62,191/1 (1993) (stating that

although the interim period lasts only until the "conformity

SIP revisions are approved, EPA is extending the interim

requirements until the control strategy SIPs [i.e., the SIPs

with emissions budgets] are submitted"). Since no party has

briefed the issue and the present record is insufficient to

answer the question, I would remand the issue for further

explanation.

The next regulation that the majority remands, 40 CFR

s 93.120(a)(2), allows use of emissions budgets in SIP revisions that EPA has disapproved for 120 days after the

disapproval. The majority rejects it on the same ground as

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s 93.118(e)(1)--failure to ensure compliance with (c)(1). I

agree with the majority that if (c)(1) is applicable,

s 93.120(a)(2) cannot be said to satisfy it. Unlike

s 93.118(e)(1), this section cannot be defended as governing

cases where there are reasonable guarantees that the permitted transportation activities will not violate s 7506(c)(1); the

budgets at issue have actually been rejected as inadequate.

If (c)(3) is applicable to situations covered by s 93.120(a)(2),

that section is likely violated as well; (c)(3)(A)(iii) requires

plans and programs to "contribute to annual reductions" in

ozone and carbon monoxide nonattainment areas, and there is

no reason to believe that emissions budgets specifically disapproved without a protective finding meet that criterion. It is

possible, however, that none of (c)(1), (2), or (3) apply. Perhaps (c)(2) and (3) entirely preempt (c)(1) with respect to

transportation and s 93.120(a)(2) applies only during a gap

that may, as I explained above, exist between those two

provisions. Although EPA argues that s 93.120(a)(2) exists

in a statutory gap, its brief and rulemaking statements fail to

explain just why such a gap exists. Thus, I would require

further explanation of the statutory basis for this regulation

as well.

The last of the challenged regulations, 40 CFR s 93.124(b),

applies to states with SIPs that indicate that emissions from

all sources are less than the total emissions that would be

consistent with attainment of air quality standards and that

quantify that "safety margin." The regulation allows such

states to submit a SIP revision that assigns some of the

safety margin to transportation sources and to use the revision for conformity purposes before it is approved by EPA.

The majority invalidates this provision for the same reason

EDF argues the last two provisions should be invalidated--

the regulation violates the requirement that conformity determinations be "based on a SIP 'approved or promulgated

under section 7410 of this title.' " Maj. Op. at 19. Here, it

seems clear that activities found in conformity on the basis of

the "safety margin" will not cause, worsen, or prolong violations of air quality standards, and thus that they conform to

the applicable implementation plan under s 7506(c)(1). EDF

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has given no reason to doubt this conclusion, or to believe

that activities producing emissions within the "safety margin"

violate s 7506(c)(3). Thus, as above, the regulation can reasonably be read to authorize the "use" of the revision as a

reasonable alternate means of finding conformity with the

existing SIP, rather than an illegitimate means of prematurely amending one.

I dissent.

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