Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03806/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03806-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Ashcroft
Respondent
Haregu Berhe Kinfe
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3806 

___________

Haregu Berhe Kinfe, *

*

Petitioner, *

* Petition for Review of an Order

v. * of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

*

John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the * [UNPUBLISHED] 

United States, *

* 

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: December 16, 2004

 Filed: February 7, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Haregu Berhe Kinfe claimed to be an Ethiopian national of Eritrean

ethnicity and sought asylum in the United States after a war broke out between Eritrea

and Ethiopia. The immigration judge (IJ) and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

found that Kinfe was not a national of Ethiopia as claimed, but rather was a national

of Eritrea. On that basis, the IJ and BIA denied relief, though the IJ did grant

withholding of removal to Ethiopia finding that Kinfe would more likely than not be

persecuted there. We deny the petition for review.

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I.

Eritrea was formerly a province of Ethiopia. In the early 1990s, it declared

independence. In the late 1990s, fighting between the two countries and persecution

of ethnic Eritreans within Ethiopia ensued. 

Kinfe was born in 1946 in Mesafro, Ethiopia (now a part of Eritrea). She was

married to an Ethiopian soldier in Mek’ele, Ethiopia and resided in the Tigray region

of Ethiopia (both of which are still in Ethiopia today). They had three children before

her husband died in 1976.

Kinfe contends that Yosef Gebramikel (who is apparently either a U.S. citizen

or lawful resident) arranged for her to come to work in his house in the United States.

She also contends that Gebramikel’s sister arranged for Kinfe to go to Asmara, Eritrea

to obtain a passport (rather than Addis Ababa, Ethiopia). Kinfe testified that she had

nothing to do with obtaining the passport other than having her picture taken.

Kinfe arrived in the United States around March 30, 1997. She claims that she

worked as a servant for the Gebramikel family with extremely long hours and almost

no contact with the outside world. Eventually, she learned she had a cousin in

Minnesota and was able to visit him. She applied for asylum after learning of the war

between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the persecution within Ethiopia of ethnic Eritreans.

The IJ held a hearing at which Kinfe and another witness testified. The IJ

initially found that Kinfe was a national of Eritrea because of the passport she carried

and his belief that she is eligible for Eritrean nationality on the basis of her ethnicity.

The IJ explicitly concluded that Kinfe’s testimony was “generally credible” despite

her problem with remembering dates. The IJ then rejected Kinfe’s argument that she

would be subject to persecution in Eritrea, but did find that she would be subject to

persecution in Ethiopia and therefore granted withholding of removal to Ethiopia.

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The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, adopting it as its own, and went on to reject

the due process arguments that Kinfe raised on appeal.

II.

We affirm the BIA’s decision if “it is supported by substantial evidence on the

administrative record considered as a whole.” Awale v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 527, 530

(8th Cir. 2004). A BIA finding of fact is “conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

We reverse only if “no reasonable fact-finder could arrive at the conclusion[ ]” of the

BIA. Mwangi v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2004).

A.

The attorney general has discretion to grant asylum to a person physically

present in the United States if that person meets the definition of a “refugee.” 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). In turn, a refugee is “any person who is outside any country of

such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is

unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country

because of a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. §

1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). One of the first determinations to be made in an

asylum case, therefore, is the country of the alien’s nationality. The alien is eligible

for asylum only if she has a well-founded fear of persecution in the country of her

nationality. 

The IJ undertook the asylum analysis with respect to Eritrea because he found

that Kinfe was a national of Eritrea. This finding was largely based on two factors.

First, the IJ noted that Kinfe possessed an Eritrean passport (that states that her

address at the time was in Eritrea). Second, the IJ analyzed the nationality laws of

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Eritrea and concluded that Kinfe had a claim to nationality based on the undisputed

facts of her birthplace and heritage. Kinfe claims that the BIA and IJ’s conclusion

was wrong because she did not participate in the procurement of the passport,

testified that she is an Ethiopian national, and was married to an Ethiopian solider.

Kinfe relies heavily on Palavra v. INS, 287 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 2002),

which states that possession of a passport is evidence of nationality in the issuing

country, but is not conclusive on the point. In Palavra, the IJ and BIA found that a

family that was ethnically Croatian, but that claimed to be nationals of Bosnia, were

Croatian nationals. Id. The IJ and BIA relied on the Palavras’ passports which

indicated that they were Croatian nationals, statements on their asylum applications

indicating that they were Croatian nationals, and the fact that they had referred to

themselves as Croatian nationals “from time to time in the past.” Id. Despite this, the

Palavras contended that they were not Croatian nationals, but were ethnic Croatians

who were nationals of Bosnia. They contended that they sought Croatian passports

because it was difficult for an ethnic Croatian to secure a Bosnian passport and their

son needed medical treatment. Id. at 693. This court vacated the BIA’s decision

because it had failed to consider the evidence proffered by the Palavras. Id. at 694.

Palavra does not, however, control this case. Kinfe testified that she was

uninvolved in procuring the passport, but she has proffered no evidence to explain

why the Eritrean government issued the passport and exit permit, and then renewed

the passport in Washington, D.C. In contrast, the Palavras clearly explicated a

coherent rationale as to why they carried Croatian passports: the Croatian government

gave them to the family for humanitarian purposes. Here, there is nothing to explain

why Eritrea would give a passport to a non-Eritrean. Kinfe only testified that the

family she was going to work for in the United States told her to leave via Eritrea and

that she did not participate in acquiring the passport other than having her picture

taken. As the BIA commented, there is insufficient evidence to overcome the

presumption of nationality that a passport creates.

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The IJ and BIA also relied on Eritrea’s nationality laws. It is undisputed that

Kinfe is ethnically Eritrean. Her parents are Eritrean and she was born in what is now

Eritrea. The Eritrean nationality proclamation states that “any person born to a father

or a mother of Eritrean origin in Eritrea or abroad is an Eritrean national by birth.”

App. at 47. A person is of “Eritrean origin” if they were a resident of Eritrea prior to

1934. App. at 50. It is undisputed that Kinfe’s parents were of “Eritrean origin” and

therefore, under the nationality proclamation, Kinfe is an Eritrean by birth. Kinfe

points to the provisions of Eritrean law that disallow dual nationality and argues that

because she is an Ethiopian national she cannot be an Eritrean national. App. at 47.

Kinfe’s argument simply assumes the point in contention. She proffers no evidence

other than her own testimony that she believes herself to be an Ethiopian national.

Kinfe also argues that she forfeited her right to Eritrean nationality by marrying an

Ethiopian soldier, who passed away over twenty years ago. The record is, however,

devoid of any evidence to suggest that having been married to a low-ranking

Ethiopian soldier over twenty years ago divested Kinfe of her Eritrean nationality.

There is certainly evidence to support Kinfe’s contention that she is an

Ethiopian national, but that is not sufficient for relief. Hassan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d

661, 666 (8th Cir. 2004) (“We may not reverse merely because we would have

decided the case differently.”). We can only grant relief if no reasonable factfinder

could conclude that Kinfe is an Eritrean national. We cannot make that finding. The

Eritrean passport and nationality laws combined with the lack of explanatory

evidence for obtaining an authentic passport would allow a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that Kinfe is an Eritrean national. We therefore conclude that the BIA’s

determination that Kinfe is an Eritrean national is supported by substantial evidence.

B.

Kinfe also contends that the IJ and BIA erred in finding that Kinfe does not

have a well-founded fear of persecution in Eritrea. This argument is completely

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predicated on Kinfe’s contention that she is an Ethiopian national. We have already

determined that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination of Kinfe’s

nationality. There is no evidence that an ethnic Eritrean who is an Eritrean national

would face persecution in Eritrea. There is, therefore, no error in the BIA’s

determination.

III.

Kinfe claims violations of her due process rights in three respects. First, Kinfe

alleges that there were problems with translation during the hearing. Second, Kinfe

claims that the transcript from the hearing is insufficient to permit proper review

because it contains numerous “indiscernables.” Third, Kinfe claims that a witness

was improperly prevented from testifying. Claims of constitutional error are

reviewed de novo. Flores v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 727, 729-30 (8th Cir. 2003).

Kinfe must establish prejudice to succeed on her claim that her due process

rights were violated. Meas v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 729, 730 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing

Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1994)). Kinfe’s brief never describes or

even alleges that any prejudice resulted from the translation problems. Therefore,

Kinfe’s due process claims fail with regard to the alleged translation problems.

The transcript claim fails for the same reason as the translation claim: Kinfe

does not show prejudice. We also note that we were able to adequately review

Kinfe’s claims of error on the merits. It is quite clear that there was no prejudice, as

the operative facts from the transcript were described in the IJ’s opinion. Thus, there

was no due process violation regarding the failings of the transcript.

Kinfe further complains that her due process rights were violated when the IJ

declined to allow one of her witnesses to testify. According to the Revised Witness

List, Kinfe had two witnesses present: two of Kinfe’s first cousins that would “testify

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how [they] knew [Kinfe] in Ethiopia and to the problems that [she] will face in

Ethiopia if she is forced to return.” App. at 54. After hearing the testimony of one

of the cousins, the IJ determined that the evidence would be cumulative and declined

to hear testimony from the other cousin.

Kinfe identifies three Seventh Circuit cases she contends support her position.

Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2003); Podio v. INS, 153 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.

1998); Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2004). In these cases, the Seventh

Circuit found due process violations when the IJ wholly excluded proffered

testimony, which the court found prejudiced the aliens. The government contends

here that Kinfe has not shown prejudice because the witness would not have testified

to the nationality laws of Ethiopia “or any facts germane to the issue of whether Ms.

Kinfe is a national of Ethiopia, or the circumstances in Eritrea.” We agree. It is not

disputed that Kinfe spent much of her life living within Ethiopia, and the IJ and BIA

concluded that she would face persecution if she returned to Ethiopia. Because there

was already credible testimony on the points that the witness was likely to testify

about, the testimony of the second cousin would have been cumulative and

unnecessary. There is, therefore, no due process violation. See Laurent v. Ashcroft,

359 F.3d 59, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2004).

IV.

For the aforementioned reasons, we deny the petition for review.

______________________________

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