Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-01687/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-01687-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melinda James
Plaintiff
Morayma McKinney
Defendant
Total Solutions Inc
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

MELINDA JAMES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

TOTAL SOLUTIONS INC., et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil Action Number

 5:14-cv-01687-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Melinda James brings this case against Total Solutions, Inc. (“TSI”) and 

Morayma McKinney (“McKinney”) alleging racial discrimination (Counts I and II) 

and retaliation (Counts III and IV), in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981 and Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq., as amended. Doc. 1. 

Defendants now move for summary judgment, and their motion, doc. 25, is fully 

briefed and ripe for review, see docs. 26, 35, and 37. For the reasons explained 

more fully below, the motion is due to be granted.

1

I. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary 

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

 1

 The court also has for consideration the Defendants’ Motion to Strike and Objections to 

Portions of the Declaration of Melinda James, doc. 36. Because the declaration helped the court 

to understand James’ contentions in this case, the motion to strike is DENIED.

FILED

 2016 Apr-29 PM 03:38

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:14-cv-01687-AKK Document 42 Filed 04/29/16 Page 1 of 16
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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “Rule 

56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery 

and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which 

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence 

of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish that 

there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising 

from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress 

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all 

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor). Any factual 

disputes will be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor when sufficient 

competent evidence supports the non-moving party’s version of the disputed facts. 

See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276-1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (a court is not 

required to resolve disputes in the non-moving party’s favor when that party’s 

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version of events is supported by insufficient evidence). However, “mere 

conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a 

summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 

2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 

1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the 

opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that 

the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 

1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). 

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Morayma McKinney (Cuban-American) is the owner and CEO of TSI. 

Docs. 27-1 at 2; 27-2 at 95; 27-3 at 12, 17-18. James (Caucasian) initially worked 

for TSI in 2008. Doc. 27-2 at 16, 36. TSI re-hired James in December 2009 as 

Program Manager for its Domestic Technical Operations Professional Services 

(“DTOPS”) contract with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“the 

CDC”). Id. at 39-42, 44, 86; docs. 26 at 7; 27-3 at 52; 27-4 at 52-56. James held 

this position until her termination in October 2010. Doc. 27-2 at 47-48. 

The CDC is one of TSI’s primary customers. Doc. 27-1 at 2. TSI supports 

the CDC’s “Programs” sector and “Procurement and Grants Office” (“the PGO”). 

Id. In the Programs sector, TSI provides employees to the CDC under specific task 

orders, which strictly limit the hourly rates, number of hours, and types of work 

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TSI employees may perform. Id. TSI employs a Program Manager to manage the 

TSI employees assigned to the CDC. Id. The Program Manager also interacts 

with CDC representatives to ensure that TSI meets the needs of the CDC. Id. 

As Program Manager, James’ duties included recruiting employees for the 

CDC contract, approving timesheets and overtime, tracking hours on task orders,

managing task orders and preparing proposals as necessary, preparing employee 

work authorizations and personnel action notices, and conducting evaluations. 

Docs. 27-2 at 394-395; 27-4 at 54-56. Throughout James’ tenure as Program 

Manager, McKinney received complaints about James’ performance from TSI

employees and the CDC. Docs. 27-1 at 3; 27-3 at 114-116. Stan Twyman, TSI’s 

contracts manager, also received complaints about James from the CDC. Docs. 

27-2 at 104; 27-5 at 18. The complaints involved employee turnover and 

government/employee relations. Doc. 27-4 at 12-16. For example, James 

purportedly failed to maintain a viable pool of potential employees to contact about 

promptly filling vacancies at the CDC, which resulted in TSI losing money until it 

could fill the vacancies. Docs. 27-1 at 3; 27-4 at 12-16, 34. James also 

purportedly had difficulty keeping up with work authorizations that governed the 

amount of hours the CDC authorized each TSI employee to work during a contract 

year. Docs. 27-1 at 3; 27-3 at 124; 27-4 at 34. James’ purported mistakes led to 

unauthorized hours worked by TSI employees, which TSI had to absorb as losses. 

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Docs. 27-1 at 3; 27-4 at 34-35. TSI also absorbed unnecessary costs to correct 

purported mistakes James made by inaccurately recording the hourly rates of some 

of the TSI employees she managed. Doc. 27-1 at 3; see also doc. 27-2 at 152-160, 

404-410. 

To minimize the impact of James’ deficiencies, McKinney assigned some of

the Program Manager duties to Leslie Lewis (African-American) in May 2010. 

Docs. 27-2 at 121, 104; 27-3 at 64-69. The reorganization entailed Lewis working

out in the field and interfacing with the CDC and the TSI employees assigned to 

the CDC, while James primarily performed the office-based contractual-type 

actions, including performance evaluations. Docs. 27-2 at 121; 27-3 at 67-69. 

Also, McKinney assigned James to backfill a vacant contract specialist position in 

the CDC’s PGO sector in August, for approximately 45 days. Docs. 27-1 at 3; 27-

2 at 88; 27-3 at 70; 34-4 at 2. During this time, Lewis, Yvette West (also AfricanAmerican), and the corporate office assumed James’ Program Manager

responsibilities. Docs. 27-2 at 91-92, 103, 204; 27-3 at 71-75; 34-4 at 2. 

When James returned from the PGO backfill assignment, her performance 

issues worsened. Doc. 27-1 at 4. In late September, Ashley Wiggs, TSI’s Human 

Resources Director, met with James. Doc. 27-2 at 104, 144-147. Unfortunately, 

the performance problems continued. In October, James failed to timely provide 

McKinney with a plan of implementation to eliminate time overruns, and had 

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several issues with setting correct rates for employee compensation. Doc. 27-2 at 

155-160, 399-403, 406-410. Consequently, TSI discharged James on October 25, 

2010, for unsatisfactory performance, including budgeting issues, problems with 

program management, customer relations, employee relations, problems with time 

sheets, and an overall failure to reduce errors. Doc. 27-2 at 47-48, 101, 133-134, 

293, 388. James filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on January 26, 2011. Doc. 1-1. 

North American Management (“NAM”) hired James in November 2010 as a 

contract specialist for the CDC Information Management Service (“CIMS”) 

contract NAM had with the CDC in the PGO sector. Doc. 27-2 at 48-50, 52. 

NAM’s contract with the CDC had some overlap with TSI. Specifically, when the 

CDC’s Programs sector required assistance with a project, the PGO contractually 

defined the parameters, solicited bids, evaluated them, and awarded the contract to 

a winning bidder. Doc. 27-1 at 2. In this position, James solicited, obtained, and

provided proposals to the CDC’s technical organization for their review. Doc. 27-

2 at 54-55. James also provided the information that was required from the 

technical organization to the CDC contracting officer, who made a final 

determination and bound the government contractually. Id. 

At some point during James’ employment at NAM, TSI learned that James 

had management authority over proposals for CDC work from many different 

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companies, including TSI. Id. at 51-52. Because of concerns it had, TSI expressed 

to the CDC on July 25, 2012, that James may have a potential conflict of interest 

due to her pending EEOC charge against TSI. Docs. 27-3 at 135; 27-6 at 56-58, 

73-75, 114, 119. CDC representatives assured TSI that no such conflict would 

arise because James was not a member of, and could not influence, the voting 

board that made contract award decisions. Doc. 27-6 at 74, 120. Still, the CDC’s 

Alvin Hall instructed TSI to address any concerns to Dale DeFilipps if TSI needed 

further assurances. Id. at 58, 120. The parties apparently agree that TSI’s 

disclosure of James’ EEOC charge had no adverse impact on James’ employment 

at NAM. Doc. 27-2 at 58-59. In fact, James left NAM voluntarily in September 

2012 to accept a position as a contract specialist with the CDC. Id. at 59-61, 71, 

279. 

Two months after the CDC hired James, Hall approached McKinney to 

inquire about whether the CDC had resolved the potential conflict of interest 

between TSI and James. Docs. 27-1 at 4; 27-3 at 159. Hall directed McKinney to 

Steve Lester, the contracting officer at the CDC for the CIMS contract, and 

McKinney relayed her concerns to Lester. Docs. 27-1 at 4-5; 27-3 at 159-160. 

After this conversation, James continued working at the CDC, with no reduction in 

pay or responsibilities, until she resigned voluntarily to accept another position. 

Doc. 27-2 at 62-63. However, James contends that the CDC denied her a 

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promotion because of TSI’s disclosure of the EEOC charge and that the CDC did 

not try to encourage her to stay when she mentioned the employment offer.

III. ANALYSIS

James raises claims of race discrimination (Counts I and II) and retaliation 

(Counts III and IV). Specifically, she claims that TSI discharged her because of 

her race and retaliated against her for filing an EEOC charge. See doc. 1 at 17-20.

A. Counts I and II – Racial Discrimination Claims

Title VII makes it unlawful “to discharge any individual, or otherwise 

discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race,” and 42 

U.S.C. §1981 “prohibits intentional racial discrimination in the making and 

enforcement of . . . employment contracts.” Washington v. Kroger Co., 218 F. 

App’x. 822, 824 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) and 42 U.S.C. 

§1981).2 Where, as here, James is attempting to prove intentional discrimination 

through circumstantial evidence, see doc. 35 at 15, the court utilizes the McDonnell 

Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting method of 

proof. Under this method, James bears the burden of establishing a prima facie

case of racial discrimination. See Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, Fla., 447 F.3d 

1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). If James satisfies her initial burden, 

 2

 “Both Title VII and §1981 have the same requirements of proof and present the same 

analytical framework.” Washington, 218 F. App’x. at 824 (citing Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, 

161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998)). “As a result, [the Eleventh Circuit applies] cases from 

both bodies of law interchangeably.” Washington, 218 F. App’x. at 824. 

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“then [the Defendants] must show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 

[their] employment action.” Id. (citation omitted). “If [the Defendants do] so, then 

[James] must prove that the reason provided by [the Defendants] is a pretext for 

unlawful discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “[t]he ultimate burden 

of persuading the trier of fact that [the Defendants] intentionally discriminated 

against [James] remains at all times with [James].” Springer v. Convergys 

Customer Mgmt. Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation 

omitted). 

i. James’ race claims fail because she cannot establish pretext

Because Defendants “assume, arguendo, that James can establish a prima 

facie case . . . .,” doc. 26 at 25, the court also assumes that James has established 

her prima facie case. The court now moves to the next step in the McDonnell

framework and finds that Defendants have articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action — i.e. they discharged James 

“because she performed poorly as a Program Manager.” Doc. 26 at 26; see also

docs. 27-2 at 143, 288; 27-3 at 114. Consequently, the burden shifts back to James 

to prove pretext. See Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. In that regard, James may 

demonstrate pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory 

reason more [than] likely motivated the [Defendants], or indirectly, by showing 

that the [Defendants’] proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Texas 

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Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (citing 

McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 804-05). As to the latter method, James must rebut each 

of the articulated reasons. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1529 

(11th Cir. 1997). However, “[a] reason cannot . . . be a ‘pretext for discrimination’ 

unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the 

real reason,” Blue v. Dunn Constr. Co., Inc., 453 F. App’x. 881, 884 (11th Cir. 

2011) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphasis 

in original)). 

Turning to the contentions here, at the outset the court notes that James 

argues at length that the complaints about her poor work performance are 

unfounded, and contends that she performed her duties exceptionally. See doc. 35 

at 27. “[T]he fact that [James] thinks more highly of her performance than [the 

Defendants] is beside the point.” See Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 

610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). The court’s “sole concern is whether 

unlawful discriminatory animus motivate[d]” her discharge. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 

1266 (quoting Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir.2002)). James 

attempts to make this showing by shifting blame for the performance infractions to 

Lewis.3 See doc. 35 at 8, 25, 29. However, whether Lewis, rather than James,

 3

 James contends that Lewis had difficulty keeping up with employee work 

authorizations and monitoring time sheets, which resulted in cost overruns, and lost TSI money. 

Doc. 35 at 8, 25, 29. Additionally, James contends that any employee complaints after May 20, 

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caused the performance infractions overlooks that the relevant inquiry is whether 

the Defendants were dissatisfied with James for the articulated reasons, even if 

mistakenly or unfairly so, or instead merely used these reasons as cover for 

discrimination. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (citing Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & 

Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)). Ultimately, James has failed to 

present any evidence suggesting a race based reason for her discharge. In fact, 

James admits that she believes that McKinney, TSI’s decision-maker, is not racist. 

Docs. 26 at 31; 27-2 at 15-16, 102. While James may believe that she performed 

her duties exceptionally, that alone is not enough to establish discrimination. After 

all, an “employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason 

based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a 

discriminatory reason.” Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 

1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 

1077 (5th Cir. 1976)). Without any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder

could conclude that the Defendants acted with racial animus or evidence that the 

CDC never lodged the complaints at issue while James, instead of Lewis, was in 

charge, James cannot succeed on her race discrimination claims. See White v. 

Crystal Mover Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 3823716, at *1 (11th Cir. June 22, 2015) (“A 

 

2010, should be attributed to Lewis who took responsibility for customer and employee relations 

on that date. Id. at 6, 28. 

 

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plaintiff must show not merely that the defendant’s employment decisions were 

mistaken but that they were in fact motivated by race.”) (quotation omitted). 

Therefore, summary judgment is due to be granted on the discrimination claims.

B. Counts III and IV – Retaliation Claims

In Counts III and IV, James alleges retaliation claims based on TSI’s 

disclosures to the CDC on July 25, 2012, and November 14, 2012, that James filed 

a charge of discrimination against TSI. Doc. 35 at 34-36. Title VII makes it 

unlawful for an employer to retaliate “against any of his employees . . . because he 

has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 

subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter,” 42 

U.S.C. 2000e-3a, and section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims, see CBOCS 

West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1956 (2008). To establish a prima facie 

case, James must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) 

she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is a causal relation 

between the two events. See Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 

1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying the same three-part test to retaliation claims under 

§1981 and Title VII); Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 

1994) (internal citations omitted)). James’ claims fail because she cannot establish 

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that she suffered an adverse employment action — i.e. an “ultimate employment 

decision” or some other substantiality in the employment context, “such as 

termination, failure to hire, or demotion.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 980 

(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 617 (11th Cir. 

2000)). To the contrary, James admits that her job responsibilities and 

compensation at NAM and the CDC did not change, and that she sustained no 

adverse consequence as a result of TSI’s disclosures.

4

 Doc. 27-2 at 58-59, 62-63, 

174-175. 

 4 Although she concedes that the CDC hired her after the disclosure of her EEOC charge,

see doc. 27-2 at 172-174, James alleges nonetheless that the CDC penalized her for filing the 

charge by denying her a promotion and not encouraging her to stay when she relayed that she 

had a job offer with another employer. Specifically, James maintains that after the CDC did not 

select her for a promotion, she asked Steve Lester if the decision had anything to do with the TSI 

issue, and that Lester’s failure to confirm or deny her suspicion is evidence that the EEOC 

charge factored into the decision. Doc. 35 at 39. Concerned that the decision meant she would 

not receive any promotions at the CDC, James applied for a position with NASA. Id. However, 

before accepting the offer, James spoke with Jeffrey Napier, Director of the Office of 

Acquisition Services at the CDC, and Napier encouraged James to accept the position at NASA, 

purportedly because he shared James’ view about the impact of the disclosure on her career at 

the CDC. Id. 

A party simply cannot defeat summary judgment based on speculation and conjecture. 

See Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd., 863 F.2d at 1563) (conclusory 

assertions are “legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.”). There is no 

evidence that Lester had any role in the promotion decision, and, even if he did, his silence may 

have been for a myriad of reasons unrelated to the EEOC charge. After all, Lester made it clear 

when he learned about the charge that it had no bearing on his assessment of James. See doc. 34-

4 at 10 (Lester describing James as “extremely hardworking and the consummate professional . . 

. . I have reviewed her work . . . and found it to be exceptional . . . . the CIMS team would be at a 

severe loss without [James].”). Likewise, Napier may have encouraged James to accept the job 

offer for reasons unrelated to the EEOC charge — it did after all offer James a higher salary. 

The point is that the court simply does not know Napier or Lester’s motivations for the two acts 

James mentions — and neither does James. Consequently, James’ attempt to defeat summary 

judgment through speculation fails. 

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Perhaps because she recognizes the absence of an ultimate employment 

decision, James primarily argues that the disclosure rises to an adverse 

employment action because of its dissuading effect. Specifically, because an 

employee’s decision to file an EEOC charge might be viewed negatively by future 

employers, James asserts that TSI’s disclosure of her protected activity could 

“dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination.” Doc. 35 at 38. Indeed, an adverse employment action is one “that 

a reasonable employee would have found [to be] materially adverse, which in [the 

retaliation] context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from 

making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 

Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). However, the

amendment James filed to her EEOC charge after the TSI disclosure belies her 

contention that the disclosure would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or 

supporting a charge of discrimination. See Shannon v. Postmaster General of U.S. 

Postal Serv., 335 F. App’x. 21, 27 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that the fact that the 

plaintiff filed his EEOC complaints after the adverse action casted doubt on 

whether the actions were the sort that might have dissuaded a reasonable worker 

from making a charge of discrimination). Moreover, while James contends that 

“the question is . . . whether she would have filed a charge in the first place [rather 

than an amendment],” doc. 35 at 39-40, the standard announced in Burlington is 

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meant to capture “those acts that are likely to dissuade employees from 

complaining.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 70. It is purely speculative to contend that 

a then non-existent act that a former employer may one day take – here two years 

later – would dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge 

of discrimination. See id. at 53, 68. 

Even if the court finds that James has established a prima facie case, her 

retaliation claims still fail because Defendants have articulated a non-retaliatory 

reason for their disclosure. Specifically, Defendants contend that they raised the 

issue initially – and again later at the CDC’s urging – to inquire about a perceived 

conflict of interest involving their former employee’s involvement in TSI’s receipt 

of contracts from the CDC. While James contends that the Defendants’ concerns 

were unfounded, James has failed to demonstrate that the Defendants did not 

reasonably have a concern about the alleged or potential conflict of interest. See

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256. In fact, James admitted that a

conflict would exist if, in fact, she could influence the decision. Doc. 27-2 at 56. 

This concession, albeit a theoretical one, supports Defendants’ position that they 

had a legitimate reason for concern, and that their concern is one that is not 

unworthy of credence, especially where, as here, according to the CDC, 

Defendants apparently raised the issue because they “ha[d] not yet received an 

award.” Doc. 34-4 at 11. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

The court will enter a separate order in accordance with this memorandum opinion. 

DONE the 29th day of April, 2016.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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