Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02017/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stan Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 1 61991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

STAN 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) No. 90-2017 

) 

SMITH, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF HEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-88-244-1) 

Robert J. Gorence, Assistant United States Attorney (William L. 

Lutz, United States Attorney, and Robert J. Baca, Assistant United 

States Attorney, with him on_the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

William D. Fry, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY, MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and SPARR,* District 

Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Daniel B. Sparr, United States District Court 

Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-2017 Document: 01019299027 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant Stan Smith appeals the sentence imposed 

by the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico 

upon our vacation of his previous sentence and remand for 

resentencing in United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720 (lOth Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 1786 (1990). Because the new 

sentence was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of 

the sentencing guidelines, we vacate the sentence and remand the 

case for resentencing. 

A brief recap of the events to date is useful to an 

understanding of the dispute. On March 14, 1988, Mr. Smith robbed 

the First National Bank in Las Cruces, New Mexico while dressed in 

a coat and tie and disguised by dark glasses, a moustache, and a 

hat covering most of his forehead. After entering the bank, Mr. 

Smith held a pellet gun to a customer's head and ordered the 

tellers to put money in a bag that he was carrying. He then left 

the bank and drove off in car which he had stolen in a grocery 

store parking lot one half-hour before the robbery. Smith, 888 

F.2d at 721. Mr. Smith stole the car by falsely telling its 

occupant that her right front tire was very low, and offering to 

help her. When the car owner walked around the car to examine the 

tire, Mr. Smith entered the car, backed out and drove off. 

After indictment and a jury trial, Mr. Smith was convicted of 

bank robbery in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2113. Mr. Smith was 

sentenced under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) 

on November 4, 1988 to a term of eighty-four months imprisonment 

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Appellate Case: 90-2017 Document: 01019299027 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 2 
and three years of supervised release, and assessed a $50 special 

fee. 1 That sentence incorporated an upward departure from the 

guideline range based upon "the force and violence used by the 

defendant in committing the offense." Mr. Smith successfully 

appealed that sentence to this court in Smith, 888 F.2d 720. We 

there held the district court's explanation of its reasons for 

upward departure to be "insufficient," largely because "the 

offense of which the defendant was convicted subsumes acts of 

'force and violence.'" Id. at 724. We therefore vacated the 

sentence and remanded the matter to the district court for 

resentencing including a statement of reasons for any departure 

from the guidelines' recommended sentence. 2 Id. 

A revised presentence report was subsequently prepared for 

Mr. Smith. The presentence report correctly determined a base 

offense level of 

u.s.s.G. s 2B3.1 

eighteen (18) 

( Oct . 19 8 7 ) . 3 

for 

In 

the charged offense. See 

the presentence report 

1 The sentence was imposed as an alternative in light of the 

court's ruling that the Sentencing Guidelines were 

unconstitutional. When the guidelines were upheld in Mistretta v. 

United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the sentence became operative. 

See Smith, 888 F.2d at 722 n.2. 

2 Appellant's challenge to the underlying conviction was 

rejected. 888 F.2d at 723. We address only appellant's challenge 

to his sentence in this appeal. 

3 18 u.s.c. § 3553(a)(4) directs us to apply the version of the 

guidelines section in effect at the time of sentencing. Where the 

possibility of retrospectively enhanced punishment raises ex post 

facto concerns, however, we apply the guidelines section in effect 

at the time of the offense conduct. See Miller v. Florida, 482 

U.S. 423 (1987). In this case, because amendments effective 

November 1, 1989 increased the offense level applicable to the 

charge offense, we apply the guideline version in effect on the 

date of the offense conduct -- March 14, 1988. 

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calculations, the probation officer added two offense levels for a 

value of property taken that was greater than $10,000 but less 

than $50,000. See § 2B3.1(b)(1)(C) (Oct. 1987). Four offense 

levels were added for defendant's use of a firearm during the 

offense. See § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) (Oct. 1987). As no other 

adjustment was made, Mr. Smith's total offense level was 

calculated to be twenty-four. 

In calculating the total offense level, the probation officer 

wrote: "15. Victim Related Adjustment: None." (Emphasis 

added.) Further on in the presentence report, however, the 

probation officer identified defendant's involvement "in the 

taking of a motor vehicle directly from ~ vulnerable victim, that 

being an elderly woman" as one factor among several that "would 

warrant consideration for an upward departure." (Emphasis added.) 

The probation officer's confusion of upward departure and 

offense level adjustment led to a misapplication of the guidelines 

by the sentencing court. The difference between adjustments and 

departures is, of course, significant. 

the sentencing guidelines provide 

As we discuss below, when 

adjustments that adequately 

appraise offense conduct, those adjustments cannot be passed over 

in favor of departure. Departure from the guideline range is 

authorized only when the circumstances found and cited by the 

sentencing court have not adequately been considered -- either as 

to kind or degree -- in the sentencing guidelines. 

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The district court resentenced Mr. Smith on January 12, 1990, 

to the same sentence: eighty-four months' imprisonment followed 

by three years of supervised release, plus a special penalty 

assessment of $50. The court reached the same result as the 

presentence report in determining Mr. Smith's total offense level 

to be twenty-four. The court then cited the aggravating factors 

of victim vulnerability and more than minimal planning in 

increasing appellant's offense level to twenty-eight. The court 

echoed the presentence report by stating, "the defendant took a 

vehicle in the furtherance of the crime from a vulnerable victim, 

that being an elderly woman." Mr. Smith now challenges the use of 

victim vulnerability to enhance his punishment4 and argues the 

district court exceeded the scope of this court's remand order. 

We address those arguments in turn. 

The district court's statement of reasons for the sentence 

imposed includes the following explanation: 

As to the indictment resulting in conviction for 

the offense of bank robbery, the Court finds that the 

defendant's base offense level is 18 pursuant to Section 

2B3.1 of the sentencing guidelines. 

The defendant used a dangerous weapon, to wit, a 

pellet gun, during the commission of the crime, 

resulting in a 4 offense level increase. 

Further, the loss to the bank is determined to have 

been $28,465.00, resulting in an additional 2 offense 

level increase. 

Defendant's total offense level is found to be 24, 

and his criminal history category is 1, resulting in a 

4 Mr. Smith has not appealed the court's use of "more than 

minimal planning" as a basis for either upward departure or 

offense level adjustment. We do not sua sponte raise this issue. 

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guideline imprisonment range for fifty-one to sixtythree months. 

Pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b), the Court finds 

that aggravating circumstances of a kind and to a degree 

exist in this matter that have not been adequately 

considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating 

the applicable guideline range as to this defendant, and 

that an upward departure is warranted. 

The Court takes judicial notice that in preparation 

for the bank robbery, the defendant took a vehicle in 

furtherance of the crime from a vulnerable victim, that 

being an elderly woman. Further, the offense conduct 

represented more than minimal planning, as evidenced by 

both the defendant's discussion with a government 

witness of his intent to commit the crime and his 

altered appearance to conceal his identity at the time 

of the bank robbery. Therefore, pursuant to 5K2.0, a 

departure is determined to be warranted based upon 

relevant specific offense characteristics not utilized 

in the applicable guideline range. 

Due to the specific offense characteristics of the 

vulnerable victim and more than minimal planning, the 

defendant's offense level shall be increased Qy four 

levels, for an adjusted offense level of 28, which 

combined with a criminal history category of 1 results 

in a guideline imprisonment range of seventy-eight to 

ninety-seven months. 

(Emphasis added.) The sentencing judge spoke both in terms of an 

upward departure and an adjustment of appellant's offense level. 

The court's remarks plainly carry forward the confusion -- between 

offense level adjustment and departure from the guideline range -

generated by the probation officer's failure to identify 

relevant adjustments in the presentence report. Both parties 

argued this appeal in terms of departure. This court is unable to 

determine whether the district court actually departed from the 

sentencing range or applied an offense level adjustment. We 

consider both alternatives below. 

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The distinction between adjustment and departure is critical 

because sentencing courts have no authority to depart from the 

sentencing guidelines "unless the court finds that there exists an 

aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 

not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 

Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 

sentence different from that described." 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b); see 

also u.s.s.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. This court also requires a higher 

degree of specificity in the explanation of departures. See 

United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531, 1535 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 3252 (1990). 

We review the validity of upward departures under the threestep process explained in United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 

277-79 (lOth Cir. 1990). We reach only the first step here. 

Under that step, "[w]e first review de novo whether the 

circumstances cited by the district court justify a departure from 

the Guidelines." White, 893 F.2d at 279. In resolving that 

question, "we must ascertain what circumstances the Commission has 

adequately considered." Id. at 278. 

The district court based the challenged enhancement on the 

alleged vulnerability of the automobile-theft victim. Mr. Smith, 

basing his argument on his perception that the sentencing court 

departed from the guidelines, cites U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, "Vulnerable 

Victim" in arguing that "the guidelines have already taken this 

factor into consideration, and there was no need for a departure 

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on this basis." The government counters that § 3A1.1 does not 

reflect adequate consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 

these circumstances, because "the 'vulnerable victim' to which the 

Court referred was not directly connected with the offense of 

conviction." 

U.S.S.G. Chapter 3, Part A provides for "Victim-Related 

Adjustments." The first of these, § 3A1.1 "Vulnerable Victim," 

provides: 

If the defendant knew or should have known that a victim 

of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, 

physical or mental condition, or that a victim was 

otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal 

conduct, increase by 2 levels. 

u.s.s.G. § 3A1.1 (Nov. 1989) (emphasis added).s 

The district court did not specifically address u.s.s.G. 

§ 3A1.1. Despite finding "that aggravating circumstances of a 

kind and to a degree exist in this matter that have not been 

adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission," the court 

offered no further elaboration of that finding. The court 

identified victim vulnerability as an aggravating circumstance and 

based its finding of vulnerability solely on the victim's status 

as "an elderly woman." Yet the court did not explain what it 

meant by "elderly," nor why it considered u.s.s.G. § 3A1.1 

inadequate to deal with that factor. 

5 Because the amendment to § 3A1.1 which occurred between the 

date of defendant's offense conduct and the date of resentencing 

does not retrospectively enhance defendant's punishment, we use 

the version in effect at the time of sentencing. See 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3553(a)(4), and note 3, supra. 

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The court cited u.s.s.G. § 5K2.0 as authority for its 

conclusion that "a departure is determined to be warranted based 

upon relevant specific offense characteristics not utilized in the 

applicable guideline range." Section 5K2.0 provides, inter alia: 

the court may depart from the guidelines, even though 

the reason for departure is listed elsewhere in the 

guidelines (~., as an adjustment or specific offense 

characteristic), if the court determines that, in light 

of unusual circumstances, the guideline level attached 

to that factor is inadequate. 

u.s.s.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. (Nov. 1989). The quoted sentence is a 

corollary of the now familiar mandate that departures can be based 

only on "circumstances ... not adequately taken into consideration 

by the Sentencing Commission." 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b) (emphasis 

added). Adequacy is the essential consideration: courts can 

depart on the basis of any factor (whether addressed by the 

guidelines or not) that is not adequately considered by the 

guidelines. Where, as in this case, departure is based on factors 

that are considered by the guidelines, the sentencing court cannot 

depart unless it finds that consideration to be inadequate in 

light of unusual circumstances. Under White, of course, such a 

finding must be explained. 893 F.2d at 278. 

The district court did not explain why it found the 

guidelines' treatment of victim vulnerability to be inadequate. 

The guidelines provide a two-level adjustment for both "vulnerable 

victim" and "more than minimal planning." See§ 3A1.1 and, ~' 

§ 2A2.1(b)(l). The district court cited both factors and 

increased Mr. Smith's offense level by an aggregate four levels. 

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Although such aggregation muddles the sentencing and appellate 

review process, a fair reading suggests the court assessed two 

levels for each cited factor -- the same offense level increase 

prescribed by the guidelines. 

The court specifically did not find a two-level adjustment to 

be excessive or insufficient to address the relevant facts in this 

case. Thus, the court implicitly found the guidelines do 

adequately address victim vulnerability and more than minimal 

planning. For that reason, we cannot accept the court's 

justification of its departure from the guideline range. Under 

these facts we hold the alleged, age-based vulnerability is a 

circumstance adequately considered by the sentencing commission in 

formulating § 3Al.l. 

Moreover, we reject the government's suggestion that 

departure was warranted because the auto-theft victim was the 

victim of an offense other than the charged bank robbery. 

Sentencing courts are authorized, under § 1B1.3, to consider a 

broad spectrum of relevant information in determining the 

guideline range. Section 1B1.3(a)(l) specifically authorizes 

consideration of: 

all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by 

the defendant, or for which the defendant would be 

otherwise accountable, that occurred during the 

commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation 

for that offense, or in the course of· attempting to 

avoid detection or responsibility for that offense, or 

that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense .... 

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u.s.s.G. § 1B1.3 (Nov. 1989). Because the district court found 

the auto theft was committed "in preparation for the bank 

robbery," the court was fully authorized to consider that conduct, 

and its victim, in determining the appropriate base offense level 

and adjustments. Those same factors, however, could not serve as 

a basis for departure under these facts, as departure is not 

warranted where the guidelines adequately address relevant 

sentencing factors. 

We now consider the validity of offense level adjustment on 

the basis of victim vulnerability under these facts. As noted, 

the district court did not expressly address § 3A1.1. The parties 

disagree as to its applicability. 

In its own words, § 3A1.1 applies only if the victim was 

"unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition," 

or was "otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal 

conduct. " U.S. S. G. § 3Al. 1 (emphasis added) . Whether a victim 

was "unusually vulnerable" is a question of fact subject to review 

under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Creech, 

913 F.2d 780, 781-82 (lOth Cir. 1990). In Creech, we rejected an 

argument that newlyweds are, as a class, unusually vulnerable in 

the meaning of § 3A1.1. Id. at 782. We further held the 

sentencing court's contrary finding to be "clearly erroneous 

because it did not focus on the victim, but rather upon a class of 

persons to which the victim belonged." Id. We also "assume[d] 

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the Commission adopted § 3A1.1 to enhance a defendant's punishment 

for an act of depravity." Id. 

There was no finding of unusual vulnerability in this case. 

In sentencing Mr. Smith, the court simply remarked that the 

automobile theft involved "a vulnerable victim, that being an 

elderly woman." The record is otherwise silent as to the age and 

physical condition of the victim. As revealed by her testimony at 

trial, the. victim's mental condition appears normal. The record 

is also silent as to Mr. Smith's motivation in selecting this 

particular victim. We note Mr. Smith perpetrated the theft 

through the use of trickery rather than physical force. 

Without more, it appears the district court equated "elderly" 

status with per se vulnerability. We hold the district court's 

finding to be insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify the 

adjustment of appellant's offense level under § 3A1.1. The label 

"elderly," like the label "young," is too vague, standing 

to provide the basis for a finding of unusual 

alone, 

victim 

vulnerability. 

punishment for 

The 

the 

use of § 3A1.1 

exploitation of 

to 

a 

enhance a defendant's 

vulnerable victim under 

§ 3A1.1 requires analysis of the victim's personal or individual 

vulnerability. Creech, 913 F.2d at 782. 

Accordingly, whether the court applied a departure or an 

adjustment, we hold that, to the extent it was based on a finding 

of victim vulnerability supported by nothing more than the 

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victim's "elderly" status, this sentence was "imposed as a result 

of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines." 18 

u.s.c. § 3742(e)(2). We therefore remand the case for further 

sentencing proceedings. See 18 u.s.c. § 3742(f)(l). The district 

court is instructed to determine the applicability of U.S.S.G. 

§ 3Al.l and to resentence Mr. Smith accordingly. The court shall 

set forth a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed in 

compliance with 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c). 

We now address appellant's second argument, as it may well 

resurface. Mr. Smith claims the district court exceeded the scope 

of our remand by considering new factors -- victim vulnerability 

and degree of planning -- at the resentencing hearing. We reject 

appellant's argument. This court's remand for resentencing was 

not, as appellant suggests, a narrowly confined request for an 

explanation of the court's reasons for imposing his sentence. 

Compare, ~' United States v. Davis, 912 F.2d 1210, 1215 (lOth 

Cir. 1990) ("We therefore will retain appellate jurisdiction and 

ask the district court to explain its reasons for the extent of 

departure above the guideline range.") Rather, we vacated Mr. 

Smith's sentence and remanded for resentencing. Smith, 888 F.2d 

at 724. Such an order directs the sentencing court to begin anew, 

so that "fully de novo resentencing" is entirely appropriate. The 

defendant is accorded the same procedural rights on resentencing 

as on the initial sentencing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(l). 

Therefore, no prejudice results from the reconsideration of 

sentencing factors under the guidelines. The law of the case 

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doctrine and the cases cited by Mr. Smith are inapposite, given 

this court's vacation of his initial sentence. 

Finally, we reject appellant's suggestion that the challenged 

sentence results from the district court's improper punishment of 

Mr. Smith for prosecuting an appeal. The argument that a 

resentencing to the same term of incarceration is "more severe" 

because it is supported by different aspects of defendant's 

conduct is simply nonsensical. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, we hold the facts cited by the sentencing 

court fail to justify either an upward departure or an offense 

level adjustment based on victim vulnerability. We reverse the 

two level increase for victim vulnerability, and hold that a bare 

finding that the victim was "elderly" is insufficient to warrant 

increased punishment under U.S.S.G. § 3Al.l. 

The sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for 

resentencing of the defendant in accordance with the analysis set 

forth in this opinion. 

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