Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03129/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Ray Bryant
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 7, 2008 Decided April 25, 2008

No. 06-3129

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WILLIAM RAY BRYANT, A/K/A DERRICK TONGUE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cr00139-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender. Lara G. Quint, Assistant Federal

Public Defender, entered an appearance.

John P. Gidez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S.

Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr.,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: RANDOLPH and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant William Bryant

and his co-defendant, Timothy Walker, were arrested on

February 9, 2005 and subsequently charged with possession of

an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and

possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Both men were convicted on March

27, 2006 on both counts. On August 29, 2006, appellant was

sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 46 months on each

count, followed by three years of supervised release. 

On appeal, Bryant alleges that his convictions on both

counts should be overturned because the Government presented

insufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the two

weapons in question, and because the District Court gave an

erroneous and misleading supplemental jury instruction

regarding the definition of constructive possession. In the

alternative, he argues that the unregistered firearm count should

be dismissed, because his trial was commenced beyond the 70-

day limit required by the Speedy Trial Act (“STA”), 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(c)(1). Finally, appellant seeks a remand of the case with

instructions to the District Court to review the preserved jury

records from his trial and to hold a hearing to determine whether

his jury venire violated the Jury Selection and Service Act

(“JSSA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq.

We reject appellant’s sufficiency claim on the § 922(g)(1)

charge. After reviewing the trial record “in the light most

favorable to the government,” United States v. Booker, 436 F.3d

238, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), we

conclude that the jury reasonably “could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Because it

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appears that appellant failed to raise his jury instruction claim

with the District Court, we normally would be constrained to

review this claim pursuant to the narrow plain error standard.

See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). This

is a moot question, however, because we find no error. We also

find no violation of the JSSA. 

Finally, we reverse appellant’s conviction on the § 5861(d)

charge – possession of an unregistered firearm – because his

trial was commenced more than 70 non-excludable days after

the speedy trial clock began running, in violation of the STA.

We remand the case with instructions to the District Court to

dismiss Count One of the superseding indictment and determine

whether the dismissal should be with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 9, 2005, Officer Charles Monk of the

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) was working an offduty security job at the Red Roof Inn in the Chinatown area of

Washington, D.C. At about 3:00 a.m., Officer Monk observed

a black Land Rover sport utility vehicle (“SUV”) pull up and

park in the 800 block of 5th Street N.W. Two men exited the

SUV while it was parked illegally in a bus zone. The driver,

who was later identified as Timothy Walker, wore a ski mask

that partially obscured his face, and a black and red Chicago

Bulls hat. The passenger – later identified as the appellant –

also wore a ski mask. Although it was an unusually mild night,

both men wore heavy black winter coats; in contrast, other

people in the area were wearing light jackets and t-shirts without

jackets. After Walker stepped out of the SUV, he reached back

inside and, from the rear of the SUV, retrieved a bulky item

which he slid inside his coat. Appellant also leaned into the

SUV, but Officer Monk did not see him retrieve anything.

Walker and appellant crossed the street and headed toward

a charter bus that was parked in the 500 block of H Street and

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waiting for passengers. Walker was “kind of limping[,] favoring

his left side.” Trial Tr. (3/21/06) at 50 (Testimony of Officer

Monk). Appellant and Walker kept looking at each other and

then finally approached the front of the bus. Officer Monk

briefly lost sight of the two men, but saw the bus driver stand

and look towards the door of the bus while shaking his head.

Walker and appellant started walking away from the bus, “back

towards the corner of Fifth and H Street.” Id. at 52. Officer

Monk noted that the two men were communicating with each

other nonverbally. Walker and appellant stood in an alley for a

minute or two, then walked back to the SUV. Appellant got into

the vehicle, while Walker “walked to the driver’s side, and he

opened the door, retrieved the item out of his jacket, placed it in

back, [and] got inside the vehicle.” Id. at 55. Then Officer

Monk watched them drive northbound on Fifth Street. 

One to two minutes later, Officer Monk saw the same

vehicle circling back to the area. They parked in a legal parking

space that was approximately 15 feet in front of their earlier

parking spot. Officer Monk observed that Walker “reached back

into the vehicle, retrieved an item,” and “stuck it back down

inside his jacket. This time he pulled his face mask back down

over his face.” Id. at 56. Appellant also pulled his face mask

down. Appellant “walked freely, as if nothing was wrong with

him,” but Walker was limping, “favoring his left side.” Id. at

57. They walked back towards the bus, and Officer Monk called

the police dispatcher to request assistance to stop “two

suspicious males.” Id. Officer Monk indicated that he “believed

that one of the individuals had a weapon.” Id. at 58. 

Meanwhile, Walker and appellant stood on the corner of 6th

and H Streets. Both men were “looking around nervously”

when Officer Monk saw a marked FBI police car drive by. Id.

at 59. The men noticed the car as well, and both of them moved

their ski masks so that their whole faces were revealed. Two

MPD police cars then arrived on the scene. Officer Monk used

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his radio to speak with the officers in one of the police cars –

Officers James Burgess and Steven Greene – and gave them a

description of Walker and the appellant. Appellant and Walker

“began to walk away” from the area; after turning onto Sixth

Street, they “began walking at a faster than normal pace.” Id. at

134 (Testimony of Officer Greene). Walker was walking “with

a limp, stiff legged” as if he “were trying to conceal or carry a

large object in a portion of [his] body under [his] clothes.” Id.

at 135. Officers Burgess and Greene got out of their squad car

and approached Walker and appellant. They asked the two

gentlemen to stop. Appellant remained on the scene and was

detained by Officer Burgess. Walker, however, broke into a

“full sprint,” showing no sign of a limp. Id. at 144. Walker was

cornered a few blocks later by Officer Greene and another police

officer in a fenced-in area behind the MPD Traffic Division

building at 501 New York Avenue, N.W. Officer Greene

ordered Walker to get on the ground. “As he was getting on the

ground,” Walker “dropped a .12-gauge shotgun into” an

“exterior window basin.” Id. at 143. According to Officer

Greene, the shotgun appeared to have been concealed in

Walker’s sleeve. Id. at 144. After Walker was taken into

custody, Officer Greene, using a flashlight, looked through the

grate into the window well and saw the shotgun. Id. at 193.

Meanwhile, MPD Officer Steven Schwalm, who had also

responded to the call for assistance, found a sawed-off shotgun

on the passenger’s side floorboard of the SUV that Walker and

Bryant had been using. 

Officer Burgess patted down appellant while detaining him,

but found no weapons of any kind. The shotgun recovered from

the window well was a sawed-off Stevens .12-gauge shotgun,

loaded with one .12-gauge shotgun shell. The firearm found in

the SUV was a sawed-off, Harrington and Richardson Bay State

Model 7 shotgun. The Harrington and Richardson gun was 18

inches long (with a 12-inch barrel). The weapon had been

modified in a way that required it to be registered in the National

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Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. It was not

registered, however. No fingerprints were recovered from either

gun. A partial print was recovered from the shotgun shell, but

it was of no value. 

Appellant and Walker were each indicted on one count of

possessing an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C.

§ 5861(d) on April 21, 2005. This indictment was defective,

because it specified that appellant and Walker had possessed

both shotguns without properly registering them; however, only

the Harrington and Richardson shotgun had to be registered

pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). On February 16, 2006 – a

week before trial was scheduled to begin – the Government filed

a superseding indictment, correcting the error in the unregistered

firearm counts by deleting the reference to the gun that had been

recovered from the window well and adding felon-in-possession

counts against both appellant and Walker, and charging them

with possession of the car gun, the window-well gun, and the

ammunition from the window-well gun. At a hearing on

February 17, 2006, counsel for defendant Walker made an oral

motion to dismiss on grounds that the STA had been violated,

Hearing Tr. (2/17/06) at 3-4, and subsequently submitted a

written motion to dismiss. Counsel for appellant joined the

motion to dismiss at a subsequent status conference on March

14, 2006, Hearing Tr. (3/14/06) at 16, but the trial judge denied

the motion, id. at 29-30. Appellant and his co-defendant stood

trial from March 21-23, 2006, and a jury convicted both men on

both counts on March 27, 2006. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

When faced with a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting his conviction, this court “review[s]

the evidence of record de novo, considering that evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, and [will] affirm a

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guilty verdict where ‘any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Upon review, “we giv[e]

full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh

the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact.” United

States v. Littlejohn, 489 F.3d 1335, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

If Bryant failed to raise and preserve his objection to the

trial court’s supplemental jury instruction, his challenge to the

instruction would entail only plain error review. FED. R. CRIM.

P. 52(b). The plain error standard requires Bryant to establish

that the supplemental jury instruction was “(1) a legal error that

was (2) ‘plain’ (a term that is synonymous with ‘clear’ or

‘obvious’), and that (3) affected [his] substantial rights.” United

States v. Brown, 508 F.3d 1066, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(alteration in original) (internal citations omitted); see also

Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-34. Even if these three conditions are

met, we will correct a plain error as a matter of discretion only

“if the error ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736

(quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).

We need not decide whether the plain error standard controls

here, because we find no “error.”

Appellant’s allegation that his trial violated the provisions

of the STA is “reviewed de novo on matters of law, and for clear

error as to findings of fact.” United States v. Sanders, 485 F.3d

654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

Finally, on his JSSA claim, appellant seeks to have his case

remanded to the District Court for discovery and a hearing on

the adequacy of the jury venire, suspecting a possible violation

of the statute. We will review appellant’s JSSA claim de novo.

See United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir.

1995) (reviewing de novo “constitutional challenges to jury

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selection processes”). Defense counsel first raised the claim that

the jury venire was disproportionately white on March 21, 2006

– the day after voir dire was completed – when counsel for

Walker moved to disqualify the entire jury. The Government

argues that because appellant did not raise his concerns with the

jury venire “before the voir dire examination beg[an],” as 28

U.S.C. § 1867(a) requires, he is prohibited from raising the

claim now. In United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293 (D.C.

Cir. 1997), this court suggested that procedural noncompliance

might be overlooked if “the [JSSA] and the jury selection

procedures utilized by the district court effectively foreclosed

the filing of appellants’ motion at an earlier time.” 129 F.3d at

1300. However, as in DeFries, “we need not decide whether

appellant[] would be entitled to such an exception [to the JSSA’s

timeliness requirement], because appellant[’s JSSA] claim is

unsupported by the evidence necessary for the court to conclude

that there has been a ‘substantial’ violation of the [Act].” Id.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Constructive

Possession

To convict Bryant of unlawful possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government was required

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Bryant knowingly

possessed a firearm, (2) the firearm was transported in or

affected interstate commerce, and (3) at the time of his

possession, Bryant had been previously convicted of a felony.

See United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 127 n.18 (D.C.

Cir. 2003). Conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) obligated the

Government to prove that (1) Bryant knowingly possessed a

firearm (2) whose registry in the National Firearms Registration

and Transfer Record was required. The parties agreed that both

guns were firearms within the definitions of the relevant statutes,

that both guns were “possessed, shipped, and transported” in

interstate commerce, that the Harrington and Richardson

shotgun was not properly registered, and that both appellant and

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Walker previously had been convicted of a felony. Thus, all that

remained for the Government to prove was that appellant

possessed the guns. 

“Criminal possession of a firearm may be either actual or

constructive.” Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127. Moreover,

“possession need not be exclusive in a single person; joint

possession is possible in the criminal law.” 1 WAYNE R.

LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1(e) (2d ed.). In

order to prove that appellant constructively possessed the guns,

the Government was required to show that Bryant “knew of, and

was in a position to exercise dominion and control over, the

contraband, ‘either personally or through others.’” United

States v. Byfield, 928 F.2d 1163, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting

United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).

When evaluating whether Bryant had “dominion and control”

over the firearms, “[t]he essential question is whether there is

‘some action, some word, or some conduct that links the

individual to the [contraband] and indicates that he had some

stake in them, some power over them.’” Byfield, 928 F.2d at

1166 (quoting United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 549 (D.C.

Cir. 1980)). In other words, the Government’s case must rest on

“something more than [the defendant’s] mere presence at the

scene of a criminal transaction.” Pardo, 636 F.2d at 549; see

also Littlejohn, 489 F.3d at 1338-39; Alexander, 331 F.3d at

127; In re Sealed Case (Sentencing Guidelines’ “Safety Valve”),

105 F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1997). However, proximity plus

another factor may well be enough to prove that the defendant

exercised “dominion and control” over the contraband.

“[E]vidence of some other factor – including connection with a

gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive

conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise

– coupled with proximity may suffice [to prove constructive

possession].” Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127 (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d at 1463.

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On appeal, counsel for appellant concedes that “viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there

was sufficient evidence that [Bryant] knew of the existence of

both guns, and sufficient evidence that he and Walker were

doing something in concert.” Br. for Appellant at 34. However,

counsel argues that “there was no evidence that [Bryant’s]

gestures implied control over the gun Walker was carrying or

that any of his evasive actions related to the gun.” Id. at 35.

Appellant also contends that “the prosecutor’s suggestion that

Bryant was covering or otherwise exerting control over the car

gun” is “purely speculative.” Id. at 37. We disagree. 

First, the Government established that appellant had been

in close proximity to both guns during the events in question:

Appellant remained close to Walker (and therefore close to the

Stevens .12-gauge shotgun on Walker’s person) from the time

they exited the SUV until they were approached by police

officers and Walker ran away. In addition, the Harrington and

Richardson firearm was found on the passenger’s side

floorboard of the SUV – the same SUV in which appellant was

seen sitting in the passenger’s seat. However, the Government’s

case was not dependent on proximity alone. Both men were

walking in Chinatown at 3:00 a.m., wearing bulky winter jackets

and ski masks on a relatively mild evening. The jury heard

testimony that Walker had concealed the Stevens .12-gauge gun

in his oversized coat. Jurors reasonably might have assumed

that Bryant wore similar outerwear in case he decided to carry

one of the guns. Jurors also could have inferred from the

testimony about Bryant’s and Walker’s behavior that they were

preparing to rob the bus driver or passengers, supplying a

possible motive for their actions. Similarly, as counsel for

appellant conceded, the nonverbal communication signals

between Walker and appellant demonstrated that the two men

were acting in concert. Finally, appellant and Walker engaged

in evasive conduct. The jury heard testimony that when the two

men first observed the police car carrying Officers Burgess and

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Greene, they began walking in the opposite direction from the

police car and, after turning a street corner, they began walking

at a much faster than normal pace. 

The Government’s constructive possession case against

Bryant certainly is not overwhelming. Nonetheless, we must

review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the

government” in determining whether “any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt,” Wahl, 290 F.3d at 375 (quoting Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319). Given this deferential standard of review, we hold

that a reasonable jury could have concluded from the totality of

the circumstances that Bryant exercised “dominion and control”

over both firearms sufficient to support a conviction under both

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Appellant’s

proximity to both guns, coupled with his suspicious attire, his

initial evasive conduct towards the police officers, and the

evidence that Bryant was acting in concert with an individual

who was actually carrying one of the weapons on his person,

provided adequate evidence for a juror to conclude that Bryant

constructively possessed both firearms. 

C. The Supplemental Jury Instruction

At the end of the trial, the District Court initially gave the

standard “red book” jury instruction on constructive possession.

This instruction states in part that an individual “has

constructive possession of something when he does not have

direct physical control over it, but if he knowingly has both the

power and the intent at a given time to control it, either by

himself or through another person.” Trial Tr. (3/23/06) at 534-

35. During its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the District

Court, asking “[c]an we have the definition of ‘control’ w/regard

to intent in the definition we’ve received of constructive

possession?” The trial judge met with counsel on March 24,

2006, to discuss the possibility of a supplemental instruction.

Lawyers for appellant and Walker wanted the District Court to

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reread the original instruction or, in the alternative, to read the

definition of “control” from a District of Columbia Court of

Appeals case, Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255 (D.C. 1987).

The Curry definition states in part that “[d]ominion or control

over an object is shown when the accused has some appreciable

ability to guide its destiny.” Curry, 520 A.2d at 263. The

Government urged the District Court to read the language from

Alexander, noting the “plus factors,” because, according to the

prosecutor, it would provide more clarity for the jury than the

Curry language. Counsel for both defendants objected on the

grounds that the Alexander “plus factor” language would

confuse the jury. Trial Tr. (3/24/06) at 8-9. In the end, the

District Court reread the original instruction, then provided

language from the Curry, Pardo, and Alexander decisions. Id.

at 10-13.

On appeal, appellant objects to the District Court’s

supplemental instruction, because, in his view, the court’s

endorsement of “the [Alexander plus factor] examples” allowed

the jury to find possession without finding “control.” Br. for

Appellant at 45. Put another way, “[b]y reducing the difficult

control inquiry – with which the jury was struggling – to the

simpler question of whether there was ‘evidence of some other

factor’ in addition to proximity, the instruction reduced the

government’s burden of proof and greatly increased the

likelihood of conviction.” Id. This is not precisely the same

objection that appellant’s counsel raised at trial. Below,

appellant did not clearly allege that the Alexander instruction

reduced the Government’s burden of proof; appellant focused

more on a claim that the Alexander instruction would cause

more confusion than it would eliminate. Trial Tr. (3/24/06) at

8-9. If appellant did not properly preserve his supplemental jury

instruction argument, we would be obliged to review this claim

pursuant to the narrow plain error standard. This is a moot

question in this case, however, because we find that the trial

court did not err in giving the supplemental instruction. 

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On this record, it is clear that the District Court did not err

at all – much less plainly err – when it provided the Alexander

language as part of its supplemental jury instruction. First,

Alexander remains controlling precedent in this circuit.

Therefore, we can hardly hold that a trial judge abuses his

discretion by citing a legal standard whose continued validity

has been recently confirmed by this court. See Booker, 436 F.3d

at 242. Second, the District Court’s supplemental instruction

clarified the proper role of the Alexander factors. In the course

of giving the instruction, the trial judge stated that “[o]n another

occasion the courts have said . . . evidence of some other factor

. . . coupled with proximity, may suffice. And I emphasize

‘may’ because every case is different. . . . And so you have to

keep in mind that [the other courts] were always talking about

a particular factual situation that they had, which is undoubtedly

not precisely the same factual situation that we have in this

case.” Trial Tr. (3/24/06) at 12-13. Thus, the trial judge

afforded the jury the benefit of the Curry, Pardo, and Alexander

explanations of constructive possession, and then emphasized

that, although the “plus factors” might help illuminate whether

either defendant exercised “dominion or control,” the plus

factors could not be substituted for the ultimate question. The

jury was not left confused. In sum, the trial court’s

supplemental instruction did not constitute error. 

D. The Speedy Trial Act

“The [Speedy Trial] Act generally requires a federal

criminal trial to begin within 70 days after a defendant is

charged or makes an initial appearance, [18 U.S.C.]

§ 3161(c)(1), but the Act contains a detailed scheme under

which certain specified periods of delay are not counted

[towards the 70-day clock].” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S.

489, 492 (2006). Appellant argues that his conviction under 26

U.S.C. § 5861(d) should be reversed because his trial on that

count began more than 70 non-excludable days after the speedy

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trial clock began running. The Government argues that certain

actions tolled the speedy trial clock such that fewer than 70 days

passed before appellant’s trial began. Appellant is correct: The

speedy trial clock could not be tolled for the lengths of time

sought by the Government, and as such we dismiss appellant’s

indictment on the § 5861(d) charge.

Both parties agree that although Bryant was arrested on

February 9, 2005, and arraigned on May 4, 2005, the speedy trial

clock only began ticking on June 11, 2005 – the day after his

co-defendant’s arraignment in the District of Columbia. 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7); Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321,

323 n.2 (1986) (“All defendants who are joined for trial

generally fall within the speedy trial computation of the latest

codefendant.”). As noted above, the initial indictment of both

appellant and Bryant was faulty. A superseding indictment was

not filed until February 16, 2006 – more than a full year after

their arrest. The new indictment charged Bryant with one count

of violating 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), correctly noting that only the

Harrington and Richardson shotgun was carried in violation of

§ 5861(d), but added the felony possession charge pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Defense counsel moved to dismiss the

superseding indictment based on the STA, but the trial judge

denied the motion. Trial finally began on March 20, 2006.

We note that “the filing of a superseding indictment does

not affect the speedy trial timetable for offenses either charged

in the original indictment or required under double jeopardy

principles to be joined with such charges.” United States v.

Marshall, 935 F.2d 1298, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Thus, the

critical time frame in this case remains the period between June

2005 and March 2006. The parties agree that as of August 8,

2005, at least 32 non-excludable days had been logged on the

speedy trial clock. Br. for Appellee at 23; Reply Br. for

Appellant at 3. We focus our attention on the Government’s two

arguments for tolling the speedy trial clock during the period

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between October 28, 2005 and February 16, 2006. Because we

find that more than 39 non-excludable days passed during that

time period, we agree with appellant that his speedy trial rights

were violated.

The Government first argues that the time period between

October 28, 2005 and February 16, 2006 is excluded because the

Government had an outstanding motion filed with the District

Court at that time. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (stating that

the speedy trial clock will be tolled for “delay resulting from any

pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the

conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of,

such motion”). On August 8, 2005, the Government filed two

documents titled “Notice of Intention and Motion to Admit

Evidence of Defendant’s Prior Conviction Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Evidence 609” – one for each defendant. At a status

hearing on October 7, 2005, Walker’s counsel requested an

opportunity to respond to the Government’s Rule 609 filing.

Hearing Tr. (10/7/05) at 125. The District Court granted

permission for counsel to respond, but noted in his order after

the hearing that any response had to be filed prior to the status

conference scheduled for October 28, 2005. As of the October

28 status hearing, no response had been filed; in fact, neither

defense counsel filed a response to the Rule 609 submission

until March 16, 2006. The Government argues that the entire

time period after August 8 is excluded for STA purposes,

because the Rule 609 filing was pending per § 3161(h)(1)(F)

until trial began on March 20, 2006. 

Appellant responds that the speedy trial clock was not tolled

after August 8 because the Rule 609 filing was not a motion and,

thus, it did not trigger § 3161(h)(1)(F)’s tolling provision. In

United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440 (D.C. Cir. 2007), we held

that a document titled “Government’s Notice of Intent To

Impeach Defendant [Harris] with His Prior Convictions

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609” was “not a motion,”

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but that the defendant’s “response ‘request[ing] that the Court

preclude the admission of the above mentioned evidence at trial’

was one, and it tolled the clock . . . from the date of its filing.”

491 F.3d at 443-44 (alterations in original). Appellant argues

that, under Harris, the time prior to March 16, 2006 – when

appellant filed a response to the Rule 609 filing – cannot be

excluded from the speedy trial clock, because appellant’s answer

to the Rule 609 filing was not a response to a government

“motion.” The Government claims that Harris is

distinguishable because the document the Government filed in

that case was merely called a notice, whereas the submission in

this case was styled as a motion and repeatedly referred to as

such by both parties and the trial judge. Additionally, the

Government’s filing included an attached proposed order, “thus

seeking a ruling from the district court.” Br. for Appellee at 24.

We need not decide whether the Government’s Rule 609

filing was a “motion” for § 3161(h)(1)(F) purposes, however.

Even assuming arguendo that it was a motion, it would not have

tolled the STA for as long as the Government claims. In

Henderson, the Supreme Court held that “all time between the

filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that

motion” should be excluded from the speedy trial clock, whether

or not the delay was “reasonably necessary.” 476 U.S. at 330.

However, the Court differentiated between motions that require

a hearing – in which case, all time is excluded, whether

“reasonably necessary” or not – and motions that were decided

solely on the basis of paper submissions to the trial court. For

motions that do not require a hearing, § 3161(h)(1)(J) tolls the

speedy trial clock only for “delay reasonably attributable to any

period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding

concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the

court.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J) (emphasis added). As the

Henderson Court explained:

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[18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F)], written in the disjunctive,

excludes time in two situations. The first arises when a

pretrial motion requires a hearing: subsection (F) on its

face excludes the entire period between the filing of the

motion and the conclusion of the hearing. The second

situation concerns motions that require no hearing and that

result in a “prompt disposition.” There, the promptness

requirement was “intended to provide a point at which time

will cease to be excluded, where motions are decided on the

papers filed without hearing.” S. Rep. No. 96-212 [(1979)],

at 34. The “point at which time will cease to be excluded”

is identified by subsection (J), which permits an exclusion

of 30 days from the time a motion is actually “under

advisement” by the court. Without the promptness

requirement in subsection (F), a court could exclude time

beyond subsection (J)’s 30-day “under advisement”

provision simply by designating the additional period as

time “from the filing of the motion” through its

“disposition” under subsection (F). As the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary explained: 

“In using the words ‘prompt disposition’, the

committee intends to make it clear that, in excluding

time between filing and disposition on the papers, the

Committee does not intend to permit circumvention of

the 30-days, ‘under advisement’ provision contained in

Subsection (h)(1)(J). Indeed, if motions are so simple

or routine that they do not require a hearing, necessary

advisement time should be considerably less than 30

days.” Ibid.

476 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added). 

In the instant case, the District Court never held a hearing

on the Rule 609 question, nor did it ever indicate that such a

hearing might be required. Thus, once Walker’s counsel failed

to file a timely response on or before October 28, 2005, the Rule

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609 filing was “under advisement” by the District Court. This

meant that the trial judge could toll the speedy trial clock only

for an additional 30 days while deciding the motion. As of

November 27, 2005, however, time began accruing on the

speedy trial clock again.

Allowing the District Court to exclude the time from

November 27, 2005 until February 16, 2006 would defeat the

purpose of the STA. Defense counsel chose not to file a

response to the Rule 609 motion within the court’s prescribed

deadline, so the time began accruing again under the STA at the

end of November 2005. The statute “was designed not just to

benefit defendants but also to serve the public interest by,

among other things, reducing defendants’ opportunity to commit

crimes while on pretrial release and preventing extended pretrial

delay from impairing the deterrent effect of punishment.”

Zedner, 547 U.S. at 501. The time between November 27, 2005

and February 16, 2006 cannot be excluded pursuant to the 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) exemption.

The Government also argues that the time period from

October 28, 2005 until February 16, 2006 is excluded because

the STA allows for the tolling of the speedy trial clock if a judge

grants a continuance “on the basis of [the judge’s] findings that

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the

best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.”

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The STA specifies that the trial

judge must “set[] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or

in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice” are

best served by the continuance. Id. Various factors are listed

for trial judges to take into account in making the “ends of

justice” determination. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i)-(iv). 

At the October 28, 2005 status hearing, after a short

conversation where both parties and the District Court tried to

accommodate one another’s schedules, the trial judge set a

tentative trial date for late February 2006. Hearing Tr.

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(10/28/05) at 2-5. At the March 14, 2006 hearing on the motion

to dismiss on STA grounds, the trial court judge stated that,

although he “[did not] have a transcript of the October 28th

hearing,” he thought he had “probably made a finding that [the

time period until February 22, the original trial date, was]

waived in the interest of justice,” to “coordinate the schedules of

the prosecutor, the two defense lawyers, and the Court,” because

“otherwise we would force one or the other of the defendants to

go to trial with somebody who is not their lawyer, or a lawyer

who is just coming off another trial.” Hearing Tr. (3/14/06) at

10. The trial judge went on to say that he “[did not] know

whether the statute or the case law requires an explicit finding,”

but he thought “it would have been implicit if we were going to

postpone all the way to the end of February.” Id. at 17. The

judge subsequently denied the motion to dismiss. Id. at 26-30.

The Government claims that the speedy trial clock was thus

properly tolled from October 28, 2005 until the trial began under

the § 3161(h)(8)(A) exclusion.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Zedner – which was

handed down approximately two months after the trial court

denied the motion to dismiss – forecloses the argument that the

Government now makes on appeal. Zedner makes it plain that

“implicit” findings are insufficient to invoke the § 3161(h)(8)(A)

exclusion. The Zedner Court held that before a judge could toll

the speedy trial clock under § 3161(h)(8)(a), the judge had to

make “express findings” about why the ends of justice were

served by a continuance, 547 U.S. at 506, and those findings had

to be “put on the record by the time a district court rules on a

defendant’s motion to dismiss under [18 U.S.C.] § 3162(a)(2).”

Id. at 507. The Supreme Court placed special emphasis on what

it called the “procedural strictness” of the STA, id. at 509, and

in particular on the trial judge’s obligation to make findings that

give due consideration to the weighty interests in favor of a

speedy trial that the STA was meant to embody. 

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The exclusion of delay resulting from an ends-of-justice

continuance is the most open-ended type of exclusion

recognized under the Act and, in allowing district courts to

grant such continuances, Congress clearly meant to give

district judges a measure of flexibility in accommodating

unusual, complex, and difficult cases. But it is equally clear

that Congress, knowing that the many sound grounds for

granting ends-of-justice continuances could not be rigidly

structured, saw a danger that such continuances could get

out of hand and subvert the Act’s detailed scheme. The

strategy of § 3161(h)(8), then, is to counteract substantive

open-endedness with procedural strictness. This provision

demands on-the-record findings and specifies in some detail

certain factors that a judge must consider in making those

findings. 

Id. at 508-09.

In this case, the District Court made no express findings

supporting a § 3161(h)(8)(A) continuance at the October 28,

2005 status conference. Although Zedner permits trial judges to

put their findings on record at the time they rule on a STA

motion to dismiss, rather than at the time when they grant the

continuance, the passing reference to the “interest of justice”

made by the trial judge at the March 14, 2006 status hearing

does not indicate that the judge seriously considered the “certain

factors” that § 3161(h)(8)(A) specifies. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at

507 (“[T]he District Court set forth no such findings at the

January 31 status conference, and § 3161(h)(8)(A) is not

satisfied by the District Court’s passing reference to the case’s

complexity in its ruling on petitioner’s motion to dismiss.”).

Zedner makes clear that trial judges are obligated to seriously

weigh the benefits of granting the continuance against the strong

public and private interests served by speedy trials; there is

nothing in the record to indicate that the latter were given any

serious consideration by the trial judge when he denied the

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motion to dismiss. See Sanders, 485 F.3d at 659 (“[I]nsofar as

the district court made no mention of the countervailing

interests, its August 5 statement fails to meet the Act’s

requirement of on-the-record findings that a continuance

‘outweigh[ed] the best interest of the public and the defendant

in a speedy trial.’ 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A).” (second

alteration in original)). Thus, the speedy trial clock was not

tolled between October 28, 2005 and February 16, 2006

pursuant to the § 3161(h)(8)(A) “ends of justice” exclusion.

Given that both parties agree that at least 32 days had

accrued on the speedy trial clock as of August 8, and it is clear

that at least 39 additional, non-excludable days accrued between

November 27, 2005 and February 16, 2006, we find that the

STA’s 70-day maximum was exceeded. We are therefore

obligated to reverse appellant’s conviction for possession of an

unregistered firearm and remand the case to the District Court

with instructions to dismiss the indictment on that count.

However, it is for the District Court to determine whether the

indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice. 18

U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). 

E. The Jury Selection and Service Act

In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Supreme

Court held that “the Sixth Amendment affords the defendant in

a criminal trial the opportunity to have the jury drawn from

venires representative of the community.” 419 U.S. at 537.

Although “[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any

particular composition . . . the jury wheels, pools of names,

panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not

systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and

thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.” Id. at 538.

The JSSA codifies this right, stating that federal litigants entitled

to a jury trial have “the right to grand and petit juries selected at

random from a fair cross section of the community in the district

or division wherein the court convenes.” 28 U.S.C. § 1861.

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Appellant contends that his venire was not comprised of “a fair

cross section” of Washington, D.C. due to the

underrepresentation of blacks, and thus his rights under the

JSSA were violated. The Supreme Court has established the

following test for determining violations of the “fair cross

section” requirement: 

[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be

excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that

the representation of this group in venires from which juries

are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the

number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this

underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the

group in the jury-selection process.

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).

The Government used a variety of statistical methods to

calculate the degree to which blacks were underrepresented in

appellant’s jury venire, and argues that the disproportionate

number of blacks did not rise to a legally cognizable level.

Appellant does not directly refute the Government’s argument;

rather, he argues that the calculations “raise a red flag as to this

jurisdiction’s jury selection system, particularly in light of the

racial skewing that was observed in United States v. Spriggs,

102 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and United States v. DeFries,

129 F.3d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997).” Reply Br. for Appellant at 18.

However, in neither Spriggs nor DeFries did the court find that

the JSSA had been violated. See DeFries, 129 F.3d at 1301;

Spriggs, 102 F.3d at 1253-54. More importantly, this court

noted in DeFries that “[u]nderrepresentation of a cognizable

group in a single venire, without evidence of a greater pattern,

is insufficient to establish the ‘systematic exclusion of the

group’ required by Duren.” 129 F.3d at 1301 (citing Duren, 439

U.S. at 364). In this case, appellant appears to suggest that

DeFries and Spriggs themselves supply evidence that there is

“systematic exclusion,” but this argument fails for two reasons:

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(1) both DeFries and Spriggs concerned an alleged

underrepresentation of whites, whereas this case involves an

alleged underrepresentation of blacks; and (2) two cases decided

more than 10 years ago, in combination with appellant’s own

single venire, are insufficient to establish “systemic exclusion”

as required by Duren. In short, appellant has not offered

sufficient reasons to remand this case for further investigation

of his venire. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, the judgment of the District

Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is

hereby remanded for the District Court to dismiss Count One of

the superseding indictment after determining whether the

dismissal should occur with or without prejudice.

USCA Case #06-3129 Document #1112991 Filed: 04/25/2008 Page 23 of 26
Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree with the court

that Bryant’s conviction for possessing an unregistered firearm

must be reversed. On remand the district court will have to

determine whether to dismiss that count with prejudice or

without prejudice. In making this determination I believe the

court should take into account Bryant’s failure to demand a

speedy trial before the statutory period ran. 

As criminal defense attorneys know, delaying a trial often

works to the defendant’s advantage. On the other hand, there

are instances when a prompt trial may assist the defense. The

“demand rule,” as it came to be known, stated that a defendant

had “to demand a trial or resist postponement”; if he did neither,

he waived his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. United

States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1958); see also

Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1965);

United States v. Hill, 310 F.2d 601, 603 (4th Cir. 1962). The

underpinning of the rule was that the accused cannot have it

both ways: he cannot welcome delay and seek to gain an

advantage from it and then later avoid trial entirely by having

the indictment dismissed because of the delay. 

Barker v. Wingo relaxed the rigidity of the demand rule.

407 U.S. 514 (1972). The Supreme Court held that a defendant

who fails to demand a speedy trial does not forever waive his

right to one, but that his failure to make a demand is one of the

factors bearing on whether his Sixth Amendment right was

violated. 407 U.S. at 528; see United States v. White, 443 F.3d

582, 589-91 (7th Cir. 2006). 

The Speedy Trial Act provides that a defendant’s failure to

move for dismissal prior to trial constitutes a waiver of his rights

under the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act does not

require a defendant to make the motion before the statutory time

limit has expired. If, as in Bryant’s case, the time has expired,

the district court must dismiss the indictment but the court has

discretion to determine whether to do so with or without

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2

1

 Here, for example, the decision to delay the trial until February

2006 was made in order to accommodate the schedules of the lawyers

for all parties. Hearing Tr. (10/28/05) at 4-5. At a hearing on October

28, 2005, the court discussed trial dates with the parties. Id. Bryant

opted for a February 2006 trial date over a November 2005 trial date

to prevent him from having to find replacement counsel. Bryant

affirmatively agreed to the delay because it assisted his ability to

mount a defense.

prejudice. In making that determination, the court must

consider, among other things, “the seriousness of the offense;

the facts and circumstances of the case which lead to the

dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the

administration of this chapter and on the administration of

justice.” Id. § 3162(a)(2). 

Just as a defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial bears

on whether the delay violated the Sixth Amendment, a

defendant’s acquiescence in the delay bears on whether the court

should dismiss without prejudice and thus allow the defendant

to be reindicted. Defense counsel may have believed that as

time passed and memories dimmed the accused would benefit in

view of the government’s heavy burden of proof. See Bruce,

351 F.2d at 320. Or the defendant’s attorney may have thought

that the chances of a favorable plea bargain would increase as

the prosecutor’s office became occupied with more pressing

business. Or defense counsel may have believed that remaining

silent as the clock ticked away would increase the chances of an

inadvertent violation of the Act and, hence, dismissal of the

indictment. Or the defendant’s attorney may have been

indifferent to the delay, thinking that it would not hurt his

client’s case. These considerations and others go to the last two

of the factors identified in the Act and also to the question

whether the delay damaged the accused’s ability to mount a

defense.1 Barker v. Wingo, from which the Act’s factors appear

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3

to be derived, recognized as much and so, I believe, should

district courts in deciding on the form of relief for a violation of

the Act. 407 U.S. at 530-33. 

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