Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03234/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03234-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George Harris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3234

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

George Harris

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: May 11, 2015

 Filed: July 29, 2015

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Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

George B. Harris challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. He argues

that the search that uncovered the firearm in his car was an unlawful inventory. 

Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

A Kansas City police officer stopped Harris for speeding. Before the stop, the

officer saw himreaching below the driver’s seat and center console. Approaching the

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car, the officer smelled marijuana, but could not determine the source. The officer

ordered Harris out of the car and soon found marijuana in Harris’s wallet. Finding

that Harris was driving with a revoked license, the officer arrested him. Because the

car was parked on the left shoulder of a highway, the officer called for a tow truck. 

He inventoried the car, discovering a loaded 9mm semi-automatic handgun under the

driver’s seat. Harris admitted he was a convicted felon, knew the gun was in the car,

and had handled it before. 

Harris plead guilty to possessing a firearmafter having been convicted of three

previous violent felonies in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He reserved the right to

appeal the motion to suppress.

Reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the court reviews “the factual

findings underlying the suppression ruling for clear error, and the court’s legal

conclusions de novo.” United States v. Arrocha, 713 F.3d 1159, 1160 (8th Cir.

2013). 

The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 

U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The “ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment

is reasonableness.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). Under a

community caretaking function, the “authority of police to seize and remove fromthe

streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is

beyond challenge.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). If the

police seize a vehicle, “it isreasonable to search the container to itemize the property

to be held by the police.” Id. at 371. 

Harris does not dispute the legality of the stop. He argues that the officer

conducted the inventory as a pretext to seize evidence. 

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The district court found that Harris’s car was towed pursuant to police policy. 

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The department’s Procedural Instruction on Towing/Protective Custody of Vehicles

states that, in the officer’s discretion, a vehicle may be towed when the “driver of any

vehicle istaken into custody by the police department and such vehicle would thereby

be left unattended upon a street or highway.” The city requires a content inventory

for all towed vehicles. The tow-in report must describe, among other things, the

vehicle, any damage to it, and its contents.

Harris asserts that the police officer had too much discretion in deciding

whether to tow his vehicle. Nothing “prohibits the exercise of police discretion so

long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of

something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Colorado v.

Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987). See United States v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 1012

(8th Cir. 2004) (“an impoundment policy may allow some . . . exercise of judgment

by a police officer when those decisions are based on concerns related to the purposes

of an impoundment”).

Harris further claims that the officer was really looking for incriminating

evidence, not performing a caretaking function, because the officer believed he had

probable cause to search for incriminating evidence based on the marijuana in

Harris’s wallet. “The police are not precluded from conducting inventory searches

when they lawfully impound the vehicle of an individual that they also happen to

suspect is involved in illegal activity.” United States v. Pappas, 452 F.3d 767, 771

(8th Cir. 2006). See Petty, 367 F.3d at 1013 (same); United States v. Garner, 181

F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 1999) (same). Rather, when police are conducting “inventory

searches according to such standardized policies, they may keep their eyes open for

potentially incriminating items that they might discover in the course of an inventory

The Honorable David Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the

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Western District of Missouri.

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search, as long as their sole purpose is not to investigate a crime.” United States v.

Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1176 (8th Cir. 1993). “Something else must be present to

suggest that the police were engaging in their criminal investigatory function, not

their caretaking function, in searching the defendant’s vehicle.” United States v.

Taylor, 636 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2011). In Taylor, that “something else” was the

officer’s admission that the sole basis for the traffic stop, arrest, towing and inventory

search was her belief that the vehicle contained narcotics. See id. Here, Harris claims

only that the police were motivated in part by the desire to search for evidence. An

inventory search that follows standard police procedures is generally not a pretext to

illegally obtain evidence. See id. at 464; Pappas, 452 F.3d at 771 (“[a]n inventory

search by police prior to the impoundment of a vehicle is generally a constitutionally

reasonable search”). Harris had been taken into custody, and his parked car was a

hazard to other vehicles. The district court properly concluded that Harris’s car was

towed pursuant to police policy (a standard criteria) and on the basis of safety

(something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity). 

Harris also asserts that the tow-in report does not list “one thing” found in his

car and simply checks off eight areas of minor damage, showing a lack of interest and

seriousness in the caretaking function. In fact, the tow-in report notes a radio and

CD player in the car, as well as standard hubcaps. More importantly, Harris fails to

note any errors in the report. Harris invokes the Taylor case. However, there the

officer found hundreds of tools, several pieces of equipment, clothing, toiletries, and

paper, but wrote only the two words “misc. tools” on the tow-in report. Taylor, 636

F.3d at 463. Here, there is no such evidence.

* * * * * * *

The judgment is affirmed.

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