Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02260/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02260-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Beyers
Appellee
Burke
Appellee
Hart
Appellee
P. McKissock
Appellee
Anthony E. Proctor
Appellant

Document Text:

BLD-041 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-2260

___________

ANTHONY E. PROCTOR, in his official capacity,

Appellant

v.

SGT. BURKE, Captain, in his official capacity; C.O. HART, in his official capacity; 

CAPT. BEYERS, in his official capacity; HEARING EXAMINER P. MCKISSOCK, in 

his official capacity

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-01284)

Magistrate Judge Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 5, 2015

Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 10, 2015)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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Pro se appellant Anthony E. Proctor appeals from the judgment of the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in his civil rights case. As 

the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the decision 

of the District Court.

I.

Anthony E. Proctor is a state prisoner, in the custody of the Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections and previously incarcerated at SCI-Mercer. Proctor assaulted 

an inmate, Kevin Davis, in order to defend another inmate’s honor, and refused to talk to 

a guard about the incident. Subsequently, he tried to enter a yard without authorization 

and was told to leave. During his next attempt to enter the same yard, Proctor was 

ordered to submit to a pat search. He refused to do so and resisted. He was handcuffed 

and forced to the ground. Because Proctor refused to walk, guards carried and then drove 

him from that location to the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”). At the RHU, Proctor 

refused to allow a prison guard to photograph his hands. The prison filed two misconduct 

reports against Proctor, and he was subject to disciplinary hearings. 

Proctor filed an amended complaint against Sergeant Burke, Correctional Officer 

Hart, Captain Byers, and Hearing Examiner P. McKissock,1 proceeding under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Proctor alleged that: (1) Sergeant Burke and C.O. Hart used excessive force 

against him; (2) they and Captain Byers retaliated against him for asserting his due 

process rights and exercising his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-

 

1 Hearing Examiner P. McKissock was referred to as both the “hearing examiner” and 

“HEX” in the record below.

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incrimination; and (3) Hearing Examiner McKissock violated his procedural due process 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Proctor asked for $1,200,000 in compensatory 

and punitive damages, “a life-time of full medical coverage from a medical provider 

chosen by the Plaintiff,” and $100,000 to educate himself. After discovery closed, the 

Court found that Proctor had not adduced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of 

fact on any of his claims, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.2

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District 

Court’s order granting summary judgment. 3 See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 

(3d Cir. 2009). A district court may grant summary judgment only when the record 

“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When making this analysis, a 

district court must credit the evidence of the non-moving party, and draw all justifiable 

inferences in the non-movant’s party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 255 (1986). A mere “scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party]’s 

position will be insufficient” to create a genuine issue of fact. Id. at 252. The nonmoving party “must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a 

material fact.” See Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007). The 

 

2 The parties consented to have the case heard by a magistrate judge, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

3 We may summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a 

substantial issue. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

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non-moving party cannot rest on his complaint or answer, but must point to affidavits, 

depositions, interrogatory answers, and/or any admissions in establishing that there are 

material, disputed facts. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

A. Retaliation Claims

The District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Proctor’s retaliation 

claims because at a minimum, he did not provide evidence to establish that the 

disciplinary actions taken against him were for invoking his due process rights and right 

against self-incrimination. In order to succeed in a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must 

establish three elements. First, he must demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally 

protected. Then, he must show retaliatory action “‘sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 

firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights[.]’” Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 

333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)). 

Finally, he must establish a causal link between his constitutionally protected conduct 

and the adverse action taken against him. Id. In the prison context, the plaintiff has the 

“initial burden of proving that his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or 

motivating factor’ in the decision to discipline him.” Id. If the plaintiff meets this 

burden, it shifts to the defendants to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they 

would have taken the same action absent the protected activity. Id. When prison 

disciplinary hearings are used to retaliate against prisoners for their exercise of a 

constitutional right, such proceedings can violate due process. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 

F.3d 523, 530-31 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Mensinger, 229 F.3d at 653)).

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Proctor alleged that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in response to questioning by Defendant Burke about his assault of Kevin 

Davis. Proctor also alleged that Captain Byers ordered Proctor to submit to having his 

hands photographed, and that Proctor invoked his right against self-incrimination in 

response. He alleged that the pat search and the disciplinary hearings were retaliatory 

actions taken for exercising his Fifth Amendment right. He also argued that the 

misconduct charges, the disciplinary hearings, and his RHU placement were retaliatory 

actions taken for his demands for due process.

The defendants filed several declarations and official reports in support of their 

motion for summary judgment. Defendant Charles Hart’s declaration stated that “[p]at 

searches are randomly conducted throughout the prison to maintain discipline and ensure 

the safety and security of other inmates and staff.” Dist. Ct. dkt. # 24-3, ¶ 6. Hart stated 

that Proctor refused to submit to the pat search, and the other exhibits that the defendants 

submitted state the same. The defendants pointed to this evidence to show that the 

misconduct charges were properly filed, as Proctor refused to follow orders, verbally 

abused the officers, and again refused orders at the RHU. The defendants also cited to 

the record to demonstrate that the core elements of due process were followed.

The only evidence that Proctor submitted to defend against the defendants’ 

evidence was an “Affidavit of Confession, Pre-Trial Narrative, in Part, In Argument 

Diagram Form, In part, Venn Diagram Form, in Part, Deductively Valid Conditional 

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Arguments” (hereafter “Affidavit”).4 Proctor’s Affidavit is a mix of narrative and 

argumentation, but we will treat the factual assertions as if filed in an affidavit, as Proctor 

swore them under oath.5 In the Affidavit, Proctor does not state that he submitted to the 

pat search, although he states the attempt was a pretext for an investigation, because he 

assaulted Kevin Davis and then refused to answer questions. The District Court stated 

that there was no evidence that Proctor had assaulted the other inmate, but Proctor’s own

Affidavit is evidence that he did. See Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 n.7 (3d Cir. 

2000). However, nothing in the Affidavit itself or otherwise found in the record 

demonstrates that the attempted pat search was the result of a retaliatory motive. In fact, 

viewing the record in the light most favorable to Proctor, any pat searches of Proctor 

appear entirely appropriate.

With regards to the disciplinary hearings, there is also insufficient record evidence 

to establish that they were retaliatory actions. Proctor refused to follow two orders and 

was properly disciplined for the failure to do so. He was, in fact, found guilty of 

threatening an employee, using abusive language to an employee, and twice refusing to 

obey an order. Even if Proctor is correct that he was being retaliated against, the 

defendants have adequately shown that the attempted pat search and the hearings would 

have occurred regardless of Proctor’s refusal to answer questions or have his hands 

photographed. As such, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

 

4 Often, prisoners may only have their own affidavits due to the practical difficulties of 

investigating from behind bars. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993); see 

also Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000).

5 See Hurd v. Williams, 755 F.2d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating similar, pro se filed 

documents similarly).

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B. Eighth Amendment Claim

The District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Proctor’s Eighth 

Amendment claim because he did not provide evidence to establish that the force that 

was used against him was maliciously and sadistically intended to cause harm. The 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain is considered cruel and unusual punishment 

under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). When 

evaluating excessive force claims, the key inquiry is “whether force was applied in a 

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 

harm.” Id. at 7. In making this inquiry, courts examine a number of factors: “(1) the 

need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of 

force that was used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the 

safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis 

of the facts known to them; and (5) any efforts to temper the severity of a forceful 

response.” Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106. De minimis injuries may suffice to state a claim for 

excessive force. Id. at 103.

The defendants provided evidence showing: (1) that there was a need for the 

application of force; (2) that the relationship between the need and the use of force was 

reasonable; (3) a lack of injuries inflicted; and (4) efforts to temper the severity of the 

forceful response. The declarations and reports that the defendants submitted show that 

Proctor failed to cooperate; that he issued verbal threats; and that he refused to walk. In 

Incident Report B 172125, which was admitted into evidence by both Proctor and the 

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defendants, Proctor threatened, “If I whipped one of you pigs asses, you would quit 

picking on a [expletive deleted.]” 

Proctor does not deny that he issued threats, although he contends that a portion of 

the videotape has been suppressed. The video shows Proctor refusing to walk on his own 

and being carried by four officers. At the beginning of the video, he yells, “carry me.” 

He repeats this several times over the course of the video. Dist. Ct. Dkt. # 24-8. He 

further yells, “Earn your fucking keep.” He repeats that “you threw me down.” In fact, 

he yells, “This is how I go now – this is how I go now – I go down with a fight, I’m not a 

pussy,” in addition to a number of other inflammatory statements. The officers carrying 

him lower him to the ground twice, and do not throw him or slam him down. When 

placing him onto the cart, they do not drop him or shove his head into the cart. Proctor’s 

medical records show only bruising to his chin. There is no indication in the record that 

this particular video has been suppressed, and the video file appears complete. In fact, 

Proctor’s Affidavit again undercuts his case. Even crediting the facts in his affidavit, he 

has offered no evidence that the officers utilized excessive force. Indeed, they had reason 

to view him as a threat to inmate and staff safety if they knew he had assaulted another 

inmate. As such, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

Finally, the District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Proctor’s 

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. When raising a procedural due process claim, 

a plaintiff must allege an injury to his life, liberty, or property. See Tillman v. Lebanon 

Cty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2000). In analyzing these claims, courts 

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must determine whether the injury alleged is an injury within the meaning of the “life, 

liberty, or property” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 

140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). Regarding procedural fairness in prison proceedings, where a 

prisoner has the opportunity to have his case heard and to defend against “allegedly 

falsified evidence and groundless misconduct reports,” due process is satisfied. Smith v. 

Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002). Similarly, confinement alone will not 

always violate a protected liberty interest. Id. at 654. Where the plaintiff is a prisoner, a 

state-created liberty interest can arise only when a prison’s action “imposes atypical and 

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 

Proctor alleged that the prison filed false misconduct charges and conducted sham 

disciplinary hearings. He also alleged that his placement in the RHU was unjustified. He 

argued that the misconduct charges, the disciplinary hearings, and his RHU placement 

violated his due process rights. 

Again, the defendants pointed to evidence contained in the declarations and the 

misconduct reports to show that the misconduct charges were properly filed, as Proctor 

refused to follow orders, verbally abused the officers, and again refused orders at the 

RHU. The defendants also cited to the record to demonstrate that the core elements of 

due process were followed, and that Proctor had the opportunity to have his case heard 

and defend himself. The defendants stated that because the misconduct reports were 

properly filed and the disciplinary hearings properly conducted, Proctor’s placement in 

the RHU was appropriate. The record evidence illustrated that Proctor’s placement in the 

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RHU did not appear to impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary 

prison life. 

Again, the only evidence that Proctor provided is contained in his Affidavit. His 

Affidavit provided no factual basis to think that the misconduct charges were misfiled, as 

Proctor admitted that he disobeyed an order from Captain Byers. Again, Proctor did not 

deny that he disobeyed the pat search. The failure to submit to the pat search, the manner 

in which he conducted himself in the video, and his admission that he disobeyed an order 

from Captain Byers adequately demonstrate the reasons for the misconduct charges and 

the disciplinary hearings. Proctor also provides no evidence to support his claim that his 

RHU placement imposed any atypical and significant hardship.

For the reasons stated above, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

decision.

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