Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02716/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02716-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kera Evans
Petitioner
Jenkins
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KERA EVANS,

Petitioner,

v.

JENKINS,

Respondent.

Case No. 18-cv-02716-SI 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Kera Evans, a federal prisoner at Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin, California, has 

filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the 

determination that she is not eligible for a sentence reduction upon completion of a drug abuse 

treatment program. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

A. Criminal Conviction and Sentence

Kera Evans pled guilty and was convicted in the United States District Court for the District 

of Montana in 2014 of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A)). Docket No. 17-1 at 11. 

The presentence investigation report in her criminal case stated that Evans and the driver of 

the pickup truck in which she was a passenger were arrested when they arrived at a motel with 

methamphetamine for a pre-arranged sale. The report also described the guns found in the truck: 

A 9 mm pistol was located concealed in [the driver’s] back waist[band]. Also inside 

the vehicle along the driver’s side seat was a tactical shotgun which was in plain 

view. 

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The vehicle was searched and law enforcement located a black purse which 

contained a plastic baggie with a white crystal substance inside, a smaller plastic 

baggie with a white crystal substance inside, and a glass pipe with white residue. A 

Ruger M77 22-250 rifle, serial number 78606869, was located on the passenger side 

front seat. . . .

A High Standard Sport King .22 caliber pistol, serial number 503887 was found 

between the center counsel [sic] and the front seat. . . . A Marlin Glenfield 60, a .22 

caliber rifle, serial number 24378426, was located on the back seat of the vehicle. 

Docket No. 17-1 at 51. 

In a section labelled “Specific Offense Characteristic,” the presentence investigative report 

stated: “Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), the offense level is increased by two (2) levels as 

firearms were possessed during the drug transactions, listed in the Offense Conduct.” Docket No. 

17-1 at 53. 

Evans was sentenced to a term of 96 months in prison followed by five years of supervised 

release. Id. at 12-13. In calculating Evans’ sentence, the trial court “adopt[ed] the presentence 

investigation report without change.” Id. at 55.

B. The Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program

The U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) must “make available appropriate substance abuse 

treatment for each prisoner the BOP determines has a treatable condition of substance addiction or 

abuse.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). In order to carry out this requirement, “the Bureau of Prisons shall, 

subject to the availability of appropriations, provide residential substance abuse treatment (and make 

arrangements for appropriate aftercare) . . . for all eligible prisoners . . . , with priority for such 

treatment accorded based on an eligible prisoner's proximity to release date.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3621(e)(1)(C). The BOP offers an intensive nine-month residential treatment program and 

incentivizes prisoners to enroll in that program by offering a possible reduction in sentence. “The 

period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing 

a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more 

than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(A-B). 

A prisoner may be admitted into the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP) regardless 

of her eligibility for early release under the incentivizing provision in § 3621(e)(2)(B). 

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As part of the RDAP admission process, a prisoner is considered for a sentence reduction. 

Docket No. 17-1 at 4-5. Various persons at the BOP determine whether the prisoner qualifies for 

early release by, among other things, examining information about the prisoner’s current offense. 

Id. The Designation and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC) Legal Department determines, in 

accordance with applicable regulations and BOP Program Statement 5162.05, whether a prisoner is 

precluded from receiving early release. To do so, the DSCC Legal Department reviews the

prisoner’s DSCC-maintained electronic sentence computation file, which includes the Judgment and 

Commitment Order, Statement of Reasons, Presentence Investigation Report, and any other relevant 

sentencing documentation. Id. The DSCC also will consider whether early release consideration 

is precluded by prior offenses if it is not precluded by the current offense. Docket No. 17-1 at 5. 

In deciding whether the current offense precludes early release consideration, the DSCC 

decides whether any of the prisoner’s current offenses satisfy the criteria in 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b), 

and related BOP Program Statements 5331.02 and 5162.05. The regulation provides, in relevant 

part, that, “[a]s an exercise of the Director's discretion, the following categories of inmates are not 

eligible for early release: . . . Inmates who have a current felony conviction for: . . . [a]n offense that 

involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives 

(including any explosive material or explosive device)” or “[a]n offense that, by its nature or 

conduct, presents a serious potential risk of physical force against the person or property of another.” 

28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii-iii).

C. Evans Was Admitted To RDAP But Denied Early Release Consideration

Evans was admitted into the RDAP on May 10, 2016. Docket No. 17-1 at 4. 

As part of the admission process, Irena Merk, a paralegal specialist in the Designation and 

Sentence Computation Center reviewed Evans’ file. Id. at 6. Merk found that Evans “is precluded 

from receiving § 3621(e) early release due to her current offense conviction for Possession with 

Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, because her guideline level included a two-level specific 

offense characteristic (SOC) enhancement as firearms were possessed during the drug transaction.” 

Docket No. 17-1 at 6; see also id. at 51, 53. This enhancement was reflected in the sentencing 

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court’s order adopting the two-level SOC enhancement that had been recommended in the 

presentencing report. See id. at 6-7, 53, 55. The DSCC Assistant General Counsel approved the 

offense review finding that Evans was precluded from receiving early release consideration. See id. 

at 7, 57-58. 

The BOP’s determination was that Evans was precluded from early release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3621(e)(2)(B) because her current offense conduct “involved the carrying, possession, or use of a 

firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives (including any explosive material or explosive 

device)” and “by its nature of conduct, presents a serious risk of physical force against the person 

or property of another.” Docket No. 17-1 at 57 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii)-(iii)).

The BOP also looks to Program Statement 5162.05 to determine whether a current offense 

precludes a prisoner from early release eligibility. Program Statement 5162.05 categorizes offenses 

to, among other things, “assist in the implementation of various Federal Bureau of Prisons policies 

and programs.” Docket No. 17-1 at 34. Section 4 of Program Statement 5162.05 lists offenses that, 

in the Director’s discretion, preclude a prisoner from receiving certain BOP program benefits, “such 

as early release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e).” Docket No. 17-1 at 41. Section 4.b describes 

convictions with specific offense characteristic (SOC) enhancements that may or may not preclude 

the prisoner from receiving certain BOP program benefits. Section 4.b includes an example of a 

person whose SOC enhancement will preclude her from receiving certain BOP program benefits –

an example that describes Evans’ situation rather closely (except that she was convicted of 

possession with intent to distribute rather than manufacturing). Docket No. 17-1 at 43. The example 

explains that a person convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 can receive a two-level increase in his or her 

base offense level because of an SOC if, for example, “a dangerous weapon was possessed during 

commission of the offense.” Docket No. 17-1 at 43. 

This particular “Special Offense Characteristic” (possession of a dangerous weapon 

during the commission of a drug offense) poses a serious potential risk that force 

may be used against persons or property. Specifically, as noted in the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1., application note 3, the enhancement for weapon 

possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess 

weapons. Accordingly, an inmate who was convicted of manufacturing drugs, (21 

U.S.C. § 841) and received a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm has 

been convicted of an offense that will preclude the inmate from receiving certain 

Bureau program benefits.

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Docket No. 17-1 at 43. 

D. Evans’ Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus And Response Thereto

Evans urges in her petition for writ of habeas corpus that the BOP’s reliance upon her 

sentence enhancement to determine that she was ineligible for early release consideration under 18 

U.S.C. § 3621(e) was “unconstitutional” because, by “ignoring the offense of conviction and looking 

only to sentencing factors, the BOP has attempted to transform a nonviolent offense into a crime of 

violence.” Docket No. 1-1 at 1. The court understands this to be a due process claim. Evans also 

contends that the BOP’s determination that she was precluded from early release consideration 

violated her right to equal protection of the laws because other prisoners purportedly received the 

sentence reduction even though they had been convicted of the same offense as hers. Docket No. 

1-1 at 2.

Respondent makes several arguments in response to the petition. First, Respondent argues 

that judicial review is not available for the BOP’s individualized decision to deny early release 

consideration for a particular prisoner. Second, he argues that the due process and equal protection 

claims are meritless. Finally, he argues that the BOP properly determined that Evans’ conviction 

offense precludes her eligibility for early release consideration under § 3621(e) because of the twolevel enhancement Evans received.

DISCUSSION

A. A Challenge To The Categorical Rule Precluding Early Release Consideration

Or To The Individualized Determination Under That Categorical Rule Fails. 

A challenge to the BOP’s categorical rule precluding prisoners from early release 

consideration based on a special offense characteristic is foreclosed by Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 

230, 240–43 (2001), which upheld the BOP’s discretion to determine eligibility of inmates for early 

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) and to categorically exclude prisoners based on special 

offense characteristic enhancements. The Court explained that § 3621(e)(2)(B) categorically denied 

early release eligibility to inmates convicted of violent offenses and gave the BOP discretion to 

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impose other limitations as to which prisoners who completed the drug treatment program would be 

granted early release. See Lopez, 531 U.S. at 239-40. “When an eligible prisoner successfully 

completes drug treatment, the Bureau thus has the authority, but not the duty, both to alter the 

prisoner’s conditions of confinement and to reduce his term of imprisonment.” Id. at 241. The 

Court determined that the BOP could categorically exclude prisoners based on pre-conviction 

conduct and that the BOP had properly “conclud[ed] that an inmate’s prior involvement with 

firearms, in connection with the commission of a felony, suggests his readiness to resort to lifeendangering violence and therefore appropriately determines the early release decision.” Id. at 244. 

The Court held that the BOP had reasonably exercised its discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) 

in implementing the regulation (i.e., former 28 C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B)) that categorically 

precluded early release consideration for an inmate whose current offense involved the carrying, 

possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon. Id. at 232. (Former 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 

has been redesignated and is now 28 C.F.R. § 550.55. See 69 Fed. Reg. 39887–02 (2004).) 

Contrary to Evans’ argument, the BOP has not attempted to transform a nonviolent offense 

into a crime of violence. Rather, the BOP has determined that a category of inmates (i.e., those 

whose offenses involved possession of a firearm, as evidenced by the imposition of the SOC 

enhancement) who are not excluded by the text of § 3621(e)(2)(B) from consideration for early 

release are precluded from consideration for early release in the exercise of the BOP’s discretion. 

Lopez upheld that exercise of discretion. Evans’ reliance on Ward v. Booker, 202 F.3d 1249 (10th 

Cir. 2000), for a contrary view is misplaced because that case is no longer good law: it was vacated 

and remanded in light of Lopez. See Booker v. Ward, 531 U.S. 1108 (2001). 

In sum, the court rejects Evans’ argument that the BOP could not preclude from early release 

consideration all of those inmates whose offense involved the possession of a firearm. The next 

question is whether there is any merit to Evans’ challenge the BOP’s determination in her particular 

case that she was precluded from early release consideration due to her SOC enhancement. 

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a cause of action for persons “suffering 

legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within 

the meaning of a relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. But that cause of action does not exist if the 

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relevant statute precludes judicial review or agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 

Id. at § 701(a). 

The BOP’s discretionary determinations under 18 U.S.C. § 3621 are an instance where 

judicial review under the APA is precluded by statute. Congress has specified that the BOP’s 

discretionary determinations under 18 U.S.C. § 3621 are not subject to judicial review under the 

APA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3625. 

There is no ambiguity in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3625. The plain language of 

this statute specifies that the judicial review provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–

706, do not apply to “any determination, decision, or order” made pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. §§ 3621–3624. The BOP has authority to manage inmate drug treatment 

programs, including RDAP, by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3621. To find that prisoners 

can bring habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the BOP's 

discretionary determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621 would be 

inconsistent with the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3625. Accordingly, any substantive 

decision by the BOP to admit a particular prisoner into RDAP, or to grant or deny 

a sentence reduction for completion of the program, is not reviewable by the district 

court.

Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see, e.g., id. (BOP’s 

decision to expel petitioner from RDAP was not reviewable by the district court). 

The district court generally “lack[s] jurisdiction to review the BOP’s individualized 

determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621.” Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1228. In other words, this

court cannot consider or grant relief on a claim that the BOP did not properly apply the regulations 

and program statement when it determined that Evans was precluded from being considered for 

early release even if she completed the RDAP. The foregoing thus would be the end of the analysis 

but for the fact that Evans asserts that the BOP’s decision violated her rights to due process and 

equal protection. Judicial review remains available for allegations that the BOP’s action violated 

the United States Constitution., see Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1228, so the court next considers the 

constitutional claims. 

B. Due Process Claim

The first step in a due process analysis is determining whether any process is due. To obtain 

a constitutionally protectible right, “‘a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire 

for it’” and instead must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” Greenholtz v. Inmates of 

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Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). “There is no constitutional or inherent 

right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” 

Id. 

The problem for Evans is that there is no federal law that confers a protected right to early 

release under § 3621(e). As one court explained, the “hallmark of a statute that has not created a 

liberty interest is discretion. Where the statute grants the prison administration discretion, the 

government has conferred no right on the inmate.” Richardson v. Joslin, 501 F.3d 415, 419 (5th

Cir. 2007). Section 3621(e)(2)(B) plainly grants the BOP discretion in decisions regarding early 

release consideration, as it states that the period of custody after successful completion of RDAP 

“may be reduced” by up to one year. This statutory language shows the discretionary nature of the 

BOP’s decisions regarding early release consideration. See Richardson, 501 F.3d at 420 (“The grant 

of discretion to the BOP in § 3621(e)(2)(B) indicates that no entitlement and, hence, no liberty 

interest, was created.”); see generally Lopez, 531 U.S. at 241-42 (discussing BOP’s exercise of 

discretion under § 3621(e)(2)(B)). The Ninth Circuit rejected a claim of the sort Evans appears to 

make when it concluded that a prisoner challenging his removal from RDAP “cannot prevail on his 

due process claim because inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in either RDAP 

participation or in the associated discretionary early release benefit.” Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1228 n.4. 

Evans’ due process claim fails because she had no protected liberty interest in obtaining early release 

upon completion of RDAP. 

C. Equal Protection Claim

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall deny to 

any person “the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The equal protection 

component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes a similar obligation on the 

federal government. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 

570-71 (9th Cir. 1990). The Equal Protection Clause ensures that “all persons similarly situated 

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The 

Constitution does not, however, require things that are different to be treated the same. Plyler v. 

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Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 

Evans claims that she has been treated differently from other prisoners who were allowed 

early release even though their crimes were similar to hers. Docket No. 1-1 at 2 (“other inmates 

have received the reduction and have the same offense. I am entitled to equal treatment under the 

law”). She does not provide any evidence to prove this assertion, as she would need to do to have 

any hope of showing an equal protection violation. Similarly situated people would be inmates who 

had (a) convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841 for manufacturing or possession for sale or with intent to 

distribute, and (b) SOC enhancements for firearm possession. A prisoner who merely had a

conviction under § 841 but not the SOC enhancement is not similarly situated to a prisoner who has 

both circumstances. 

Evans cites to several cases that supposedly support her equal protection claim, but none 

persuade the court that she has a meritorious claim. The main problem with the cases she cites is 

that they are based on an outdated version of the regulations and/or have been overturned. She cites 

Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the 

2000 version of 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 was invalid under the APA due to the BOP’s failure to articulate 

its rationale in the administrative record. This problem no longer exists, as the Ninth Circuit has 

since recognized in Peck v. Thomas, 697 F.3d 767, 770-72 (9th Cir. 2012) (BOP did not violate the 

APA when, in 2009, it exercised its discretion under § 3621(e)(2)(B) by implementing a regulation

(28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)) that categorically excludes certain classes of inmates from eligibility for 

§ 3621(e)’s early release incentive). Arrington does not support Evans’ equal protection claim. 

Next, Evans cites Kilpatrick v. Houston, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Fla. 1999), but that case is not 

helpful because it is no longer good law as it was vacated by Houston v. Kilpatrick, 531 U.S. 1108 

(2011), in light of Lopez. The other two cases Evans cites suffer the same infirmity: they are based 

regulations that pre-date the 2009 regulation that Peck held was not invalid under the APA and that 

was applied to Evans: Bohner v. Daniels, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (D. Or. 2003), addressed the 1997 

version of the regulation and program statement, and Byrd v. Hasty, 142 F.3d 1395 (11th Cir. 1998) 

addressed a pre-1997 version of the regulation and program statement. 

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Evans fails to show that she was treated differently from similarly situated prisoners when 

she was determined to be precluded from early release consideration due to her SOC enhancement. 

Her equal protection claim fails.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2019

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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