Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00222/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00222-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ryan Carroll
Petitioner
Dennis Smith
Respondent

Document Text:

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RYAN CARROLL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

DENNIS SMITH, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:07-cv-00222-LJO-TAG HC 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AS MOOT (Doc. 5)

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS

BE FILED WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS 

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant petition was filed on February 9, 2007. (Doc. 1). The petition contends that

Petitioner is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), but that the BOP has violated its duty

to consider the enumerated factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) in order to determine the

appropriate place of confinement. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Citing various circuit court decisions, Petitioner

contends that the BOP should make conduct an immediate assessment regarding his suitability for

placement in a Residential Re-entry Center (“RRC”) by referencing only the factors contained in 

18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), and without reference to 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21. (Doc. 1, p. 3). 

Petitioner also requests an immediate transfer to an RRC facility. (Id.). 

On May 4, 2007, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss, alleging that Respondent

had conducted an evaluation of Petitioner’s release date to RRC, without reference to the challenged

regulations, that the relief Petitioner had requested had been afforded to him, and therefore the

petition was now moot. (Doc. 5, p. 2). Respondent states, “[t]he BOP has evaluated petitioner

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‘without reference to the time constraints imposed by 28 CFR § 570.20-21 or the 2002 and 2005

Community Corrections Policies.’” (Id.). As a result of this evaluation, the BOP determined

Petitioner is to spend “30-40 days in a Residential Re-entry Center before his release.” (Id.). In the

motion to dismiss, Respondent has provided a copy of the completed form entitled, “Institutional

Referral for CCC Placement,” that indicates Petitioner has been placed in the 30-40 day RRC

placement range. (Doc. 5-4). Respondent’s motion also contains a copy of the BOP’s Program

Statement 7310.04 (“Program Statement”) which provides for an RRC placement assessment at least

eleven to thirteen months before the prisoner’s probable release date. (Doc. 5-5, ¶ 12). 

JURISDICTION

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United

States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While a federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or

constitutionality of his conviction must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, a petitioner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that sentence's execution must

bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See e.g., Capaldi v. Pontesso,

135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir.

1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-894 (6th Cir. 1991); Brown v. United States, 

610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1980). To receive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 a petitioner in federal

custody must show that his sentence is being executed in an illegal, but not necessarily

unconstitutional, manner. See e.g., Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1996)

(contending time spent in state custody should be credited toward federal custody); Jalili, 925 F.2d

at 893-894 (asserting petitioner should be housed at a community treatment center); Barden v.

Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 479 (3rd Cir. 1990) (arguing Bureau of Prisons erred in determining whether

petitioner could receive credit for time spent in state custody); Brown, 610 F.2d at 677 (challenging

content of inaccurate pre-sentence report used to deny parol). A petitioner filing a petition for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of the petitioner's

custodian. Brown, 610 F.2d at 677. 

///

///

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In this case, Petitioner alleges that BOP’s policy limiting placement in an RRC to ten percent

of his sentence violates federal law as well as BOP’s policy of making such placement decisions by

reference to allegedly illegal regulations and program statements. Petitioner is challenging the

legality of the manner in which his sentence is being executed. Thus, his petition is proper under

28 U.S.C. § 2241. In addition, because Petitioner is incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp, United

States Prison, Atwater, California, which is within the Eastern District of California, Fresno

Division, this Court has jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the petition.

EXHAUSTION

A preliminary question is whether petitioner has exhausted available administrative remedies. 

Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging any circumstance of

imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Western Radio Services Co. v. Espy,

79 F.3d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1996); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986); Chua Han

Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984); Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845

(9th Cir. 1983). 

The exhaustion prerequisite for filing a § 2241 petition is judicially created; it is not a

statutory requirement. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other

grounds, Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995). Thus, “[b]ecause exhaustion is not required by

statute, it is not jurisdictional.” Brown, 895 F.2d at 535. If a petitioner has not properly exhausted

his claims, the district court, in its discretion, may either “excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the

merits, or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court.” 

Id.; McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144-145 (1992), superceded on other grounds, 42 U.S.C.

§1997(e). 

One of the purposes of administrative exhaustion is to allow the agency an opportunity to

remedy its own mistakes before being haled into court, and this applies with particular force when

the challenged action involves an exercise of the agency’s discretionary power. See McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U.S. at 145. Thus, exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile and should

be excused if the agency lacks authority to grant the requested relief or has predetermined the issued

before it. See id. at 148. 

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Here, Petitioner has not indicated that he has undertaken any efforts to exhaust his

administrative remedies, but does claim that exhaustion would be futile. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Respondent

has not addressed the issue. As mentioned, futility is an exception to the exhaustion requirement. 

Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000-1001 (9th Cir. 2004). In the instant action, it is apparent that

it would be futile for Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies because he alleges he is being

denied an immediate RRC placement based on formally-adopted BOP regulations, the validity of

which BOP strenuously maintains. In the Court’s view, therefore, Petitioner’s exhaustion of his

administrative remedies is not a pre-requisite to the district court’s jurisdiction over the case because

of the BOP’s intractable and immutable policy against the relief sought.

DISCUSSION

The case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Federal Constitution deprives the

Court of jurisdiction to hear moot cases. Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 104

S.Ct. 373, 374-375 (1983); N.A.A.C.P., Western Region v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1352

(9th Cir. 1984). A case becomes moot if the “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties

lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982). The

federal courts are “without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of the litigants

before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)(citation omitted). 

Here, the instant petition requests an order directing the BOP “to correctly follow 3621(b)

and immediately transfer Petitioner to a RRC nearest his place of release.” (Doc. 1, p. 3). 

Respondent has submitted evidence that he has conducted an assessment of Petitioner’s RRC

placement without reference to either 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20 or 570.21. Here, the BOP has given

Petitioner the consideration he has requested. Because there is no further relief that this Court can

provide to Petitioner, the petition is now moot.

Although Petitioner words his request as one for immediate placement rather than for an

immediate assessment of RRC placement, he has not established any right to an immediate

placement. Program Statement 7310.04 , which governs when and how the BOP will conduct such

assessments, does not improperly limit the discretion of the BOP to make an RRC placement in any

individual case. The Program Statement only requires that the BOP make an RRC placement

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Moreover, a habeas claim cannot be sustained based solely upon the BOP’s purported violation 1

of its own Program Statement. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a petitioner’s custody need not be in violation

of the Constitution; a violation of federal law is sufficient. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). However, the

violation of a BOP Program Statement is not a violation of federal law. Program Statements are

“internal agency guidelines [that] may be altered by the Bureau at will” and that are not “subject to the

rigors of the Administrative Procedure Act, including public notice and comment.” Jacks v. Crabtree,

114 F.3d 983, 985 n. 1 (9th Cir.1997). BOP Program Statements are simply interpretive rules. Reno

v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995). “[T]he internal guidelines of a federal agency, that are not mandated

by statute or the constitution, do not confer substantive rights on any party.” United States v. Craveiro,

907 F.2d 260, 264 (1st Cir. 1990); see also, e.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (Social

Security Administration Manual was only regulation, had no legal force, and did not bind government);

United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir.1987) (United States Attorneys’ internal

guidelines do not create any rights enforceable at law); Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104, 1110

(9th Cir.1979) (government safetymanual or safety programs do not grant right to have them followed);

United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (failure to follow internal IRS regulations did not violate

federal law). 

U.S. District Court

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assessment at least eleven to thirteen months prior to the inmate’s release date. Nothing in the

Program Statement prevents the BOP, in the exercise of its statutory discretion, from making an

earlier determination, although the Court is not aware of any statute or regulation that would require

such expedited action by the BOP. In other words, the Program Statement simply insures that

inmates will receive an RRC assessment sufficiently in advance of their release date to permit them

to make appropriate plans prior to their transfer. Because the Program Statement does not limit or

otherwise intrude on the BOP’s exercise of discretion in making its RRC assessment, the Program

Statement is not in any way analogous to the 2002 and 2005 regulations that many courts, including

this one, have found to be an illegal limitation on the discretion vested in the BOP by § 3621(b). 

1

Moreover, the Court is unaware of any authority requiring the BOP to conduct its RRC

eligibility reviews or immediately transfer a prisoner to an RRC facility on demand of the prisoner. 

Indeed, while case law from this Court strongly suggests that Petitioner is entitled to an RRC

assessment made independently of the 2002 and 2005 regulations–something that appears to have

already occurred in this case--Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition that he has either a

statutory or constitutional right to an immediate transfer. 

Finally, for good reason, the Court is reticent, absent express statutory authority, to micromanage the BOP regarding inmate RRC assessments and placements. “[F]ederal courts ought to

afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile

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environment....Such flexibility is especially warranted in the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of

prison life....” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,

404-405 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), the

Supreme Court explained the basis for this deference:

Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of

prison administration. In part this policy is the product of various limitations on the scope of

federal review of conditions in state penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude

springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of

judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and

discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for

rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates

placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too

apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are

complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution

by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of

resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive

branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the

increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of

that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. 

Respondent has indicated that he has already conducted the RRC placement assessment for

Petitioner without regard to the discredited regulations. Petitioner has given the Court no reason to

doubt the BOP’s representations to the Court in that regard such that this Court should alter, amend,

oversee or otherwise micro-manage the BOP’s conduct of Petitioner’s RRC assessment and

placement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS as follows:

1. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5), be GRANTED;

2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), be DISMISSED as moot; and

3. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

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ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The District

Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 4, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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