Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07074/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Betty J. Hutchins
Appellant
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT F IL .. _~ i.> 

United Stat. Comt of Appeal, Tenth Cil"CUit 

BETI'Y J. HUTCHINS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of 

Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

FEBO 8 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-7074 

(D.C. No. CV-91-463 ) 

( E. D. Okla. ) 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Clarence A. 

District Court for the 

designation. 

Brimmer, 

District 

District Judge, United States 

of Wyoming, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed . R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9 . 

submitted without oral argument . 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law o f 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. · 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3. 

Appellate Case: 92-7074 Document: 010110170316 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Betty J. Hutchins appeals from a district court 

order affirming the Secretary's decision to deny supplemental 

security income benefits under Title II of the Social Security 

Act. We review the record "to determine whether the findings are 

supported by substantial evidence and whether the Secretary 

applied correct legal standards." Pacheco v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 

695, 696 (10th Cir. 1991). Satisfied in both of these respects, 

we affirm the Secretary's denial of benefits. 

Plaintiff alleged a disability commencing in May of 1987, 

caused by numerous psychological and physical impairments . As the 

administrative law judge (ALJ) noted, however, the focus of 

plaintiff's disability claim shifted somewhat over the course of 

the three separate evidentiary hearings held in this case, from 

bodily conditions, such as back pain, arthritis, high blood 

pressure, headaches, faulty vision, and diarrhea, to the mental 

disorders of depression and dependant personality. The details of 

these complaints, as well as the relevant medical evidence, are 

thoroughly recounted in the ALJ's third, and final, decision 

denying benefits. 

The ALJ rejected plaintiff's claim for benefits at step four 

of the five-step evaluative sequence established by the Secretary 

for determining disability. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F . 2d 748, 

750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (describing steps in detail) . In short, 

the ALJ found that, despite severe, though unlisted, impairments 

to her mental health, plaintiff retained the capacity to satisfy 

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Appellate Case: 92-7074 Document: 010110170316 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 2 
the demands and duties associated with her past relevant work as a 

lf we are provi 'd er 1 and, consequently, was not disabled. The ALJ 

discounted the functional significance of plaintiff's alleged 

physical impairments, which he concluded had little support in the 

record. 

Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

underlying the ALJ's step four determination, arguing that the 

limitations imposed by her mental condition preclude any return to 

he r past relevant work .

2 See Aplt. Brief at 7-12. She points out 

that she would be deemed disabled {at step five of the evaluative 

process) under the Secretary's medical -vocational guidelines, or 

"grids," and charges that the "[ALJ's] finding that [she] can 

perform her past work is a 'smoke-screen' set by the [ALJ] to 

preclude a full evaluation of this case." Aplt. Brief at 12. For 

1 The ALJ also included plaintiff's past 

this assessment, but, as we may dispose 

addressing this less substantiated finding, 

on whether plaintiff could, in fact, return 

work as a waitress in 

of this appeal without 

we exp~ess no opinion 

to waitressing. 

2 Consistent with the sharpe r focus her claim acquired during 

the administrative proceedings, plainti ff does not now 

specifically challenge the ALJ's adverse treatment of her alleged 

physical disabilities, but only "contends that she is unable to 

work because of her severe mental impairments. " Aplt . Bri ef a t 9. 

Nevertheless, we have also considered plaintiff's alleged physical 

disabilities in conjunction with our gene ral review of the record. 

In light of the paucity of objective corroborative evidence f or 

the degree of impairment alleged--as well as the relatively 

minimal demands imposed by plaintiff's prior job as welfare 

provider, discussed infra above --we cannot say the ALJ erred in 

concluding that plaintiff's alleged physical problems do not 

impose additional functional limitations significant enough to 

prevent her from engagi ng in past relevant work. See Casias v. 

Secre tary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 801 {10th Cir. 

1991) ; see also Diaz v. Secre tary o f He alth & Human Servs. , 898 

F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990) . 

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Appellate Case: 92-7074 Document: 010110170316 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 3 
the reasons that follow, we agree with the ALJ's dispositive 

finding at step four, and we emphasize that "[i]f at any point in 

the process the Secretary finds that a person is disabled or not 

disabled, the review ends." Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 

1329 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 805 

(10th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added); see Keith v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 

1089, 1093 n . 6 (2d Cir. 1984) (grids, under which claimant would be 

deemed disabled, could not be applied where claimant was properly 

found able to perform past relevant work). 

Consistent with the pertinent psychological evidence he 

reviewed in detail, the ALJ found that plaintiff's mental 

impairments precluded her from performing only work involving more 

than a mild to moderate level of emotional stress. Relying, 

appropriately, on plaintiff's own descriptions of her past work as 

a welfare provider, see Santiago v. Secretary of Health & Human 

Services, 944 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Social Security 

Ruling (SSR) 82-62), which reflect the relatively minimal demands 

made by this occupation, at least in plaintiff's personal 

experience, 3 see App . Vol . II at 90-93, 116-18, 146-49, the ALJ 

concluded that plaintiff's functional limitations would not 

3 Regardless of occupational demands generally found in the 

national economy, "[w]here the claimant can still perform the 

demands and duties of a former job as she actually performed it, a 

finding of non-disability is appropriate." Santiago, 944 F.2d at 

5 & n.l (discussing disjunctive test for identifying requirements 

of past relevant work at step four) (emphasis added); see Social 

Security Ruling 86-8 (Apr. 1986) at 21 (step four determination is 

made in reference to "either the specific job a claimant performed 

or the same type o f work as it is customarily performed throughout 

the economy"). 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-7074 Document: 010110170316 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 4 
prevent her return to past relevant work. We shall not disturb 

this reasonable, factually substantiated determination. See 

generall y Hamilton v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 961 F . 2d 

1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 1992). 

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred in failing to rely on 

favorable testimony the vocational expert gave in response to a 

hypothetical posed by counsel . Two considerations undercut this 

contention. First of all, given the proper determination of this 

case at step four based on the medical evidence and plaintiff's 

description of her actual work history, the expert's hypothetical 

vocational testimony--like the grids discussed already--dealing 

with the availability of jobs in the national economy would not be 

germane . See Lucas v . Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1573 n.2 (11th 

Cir. 1990) (no need to obtain vocational expert testimony where ALJ 

concluded plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work) ; 

see, e . g., Santiago, 944 F.2d at 5-7 (affirming ALJ's 

determination at step four based on plaintiff's description of 

past relevant work). Secondly, since counsel was able 

favorable testimony only by requiring the expert 

significant physical and mental limitations that the ALJ 

to elicit 

to assume 

properly 

deemed unsubstantiated, such testimony was not binding on the ALJ, 

in any event. See Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F . 2d 585, 588 (10th 

Cir. 1990) . 

Finally, plaintiff argues that, because of her advanced age, 

she should have been found disabled pursuant to 20 C.F .R. 

§ 404 . 1563 (d ), which virtually directs the award of benefits at 

step five to advanced-aged claimants who have no appre ciable 

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Appellate Case: 92-7074 Document: 010110170316 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 5 
skills to transfer to light or sedentary work . See also Emory v. 

Sullivan, 936 F . 2d 1092, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1991). Once again, 

however, plaintiff relies on a principle that has no application 

to the ALJ's disposition of this case at step four . The 

regulations make it abundantly clear that vocational factors such 

as age and transferable skills do not even come into play unless 

and until it is determined that the claimant cannot do past 

relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 . 1560(b) ( "If you still have the 

residual functional capacity to do your past relevant work, we 

will find that you can still do your past work, and we will 

determine that you are not disabled, without considering your 

vocational factors of age, education, and work experience . "); see 

also 20 C.F .R. § 1520(a), (e) (if claimant is found disabled or not 

disabled at any step in evaluative sequence, review does not 

proceed any further; if claimant can still do past work, she will 

be found not disabled at step four). See generally Trimiar, 966 

F.2d at 1329. Accordingly, notwithstanding plaintiff' s advanced 

age, the ALJ properly concluded his analysis with a finding of 

nondisability at step four. 

For the reasons expressed above, we AFFIRM the judgment of 

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Oklahoma affirming the Secretary's denial of benefits. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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