Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03098/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03098-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro Agramonte
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 2, 2001 Decided December 28, 2001

No. 00-3098

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Pedro Agramonte,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(99cr00043-06)

David B. Smith, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the brief for appellant.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Mary Patrice

Brown, Thomas C. Black and John Crabb Jr., Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

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Before: Edwards and Randolph, Circuit Judges, and

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Pedro Agramonte of four narcotics-related offenses. Count One alleged

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute

50 grams or more of cocaine base, 5 kilograms or more of

cocaine, and 1 kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21

U.S.C. s 846. Count Two charged unlawful distribution of 50

grams or more of cocaine base, in contravention of 21 U.S.C.

s 841(a)(1). Count Three charged possession with intent to

distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21

U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(i). Count Four charged unlawful possession with intent to distribute heroin within 1000 feet

of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 860.

The district court vacated Agramonte's conviction on Count

Three, considering it a lesser included offense of his school

zone possession with intent to distribute conviction. On

Counts One, Two, and Four the court sentenced Agramonte

to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 286 months; to terms

of supervised release on Counts One and Two of five years,

and to eight years of supervised release on Count Four, all to

run concurrently; and a special assessment of $100 for each

of the three counts.

Agramonte's appeal is on the ground that the sentence for

each of these three counts contravened Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).* Apprendi holds that the Sixth

Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury means that any

fact--other than a prior conviction--increasing the statutory

maximum sentence must be submitted to the jury and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions under 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)--Count Two of the

indictment--can trigger Apprendi. The statutory maximums

for a violation of s 841(a)(1), which prohibits possession with

__________

* In a separate judgment, we affirm the conviction co-defendant

Jose Diplan. Agramonte withdrew his brief challenging his conviction and now only contests the sentence he received.

intent to distribute a controlled substance, vary depending

upon the weight of the narcotics. See 21 U.S.C.

s 841(b)(1)(A)-(C); see also United States v. Webb, 255 F.3d

890, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For example, possession with

intent to distribute a detectable amount of a schedule II

narcotic (a list that includes cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C.

s 812), carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years.

See 21 U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(C). For 5 grams or more of a

mixture containing cocaine base, the maximum is 40 years.

21 U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). For 50 grams or more, the

maximum sentence authorized is life imprisonment. See 21

U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Because the punishment for conspiracy to violate s 841(a)(1)--Count One of the indictment--

is the same as the punishment for violating s 841(a)(1), see 21

U.S.C. s 846, the sentence for conspiracy too may raise

Apprendi problems.

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As to Count Four--possession with intent to distribute in a

school zone--21 U.S.C. s 860(a) authorizes a sentence of

"twice the maximum punishment" authorized by s 841(b).

Agramonte's sentence on Count Four does not raise any

difficulty under Apprendi for reasons we will explain in a

moment.

On none of the counts did the district court instruct the

jury that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt any specific

amount of drugs attributable to Agramonte. The court instructed instead that the jury need find only a "detectable

amount" in order to convict. Agramonte did not object to the

jury instructions, but did raise his Apprendi error contention

at sentencing, Apprendi having been decided in the interim.

See 8/21/00 Tr. at 16.

At sentencing the district court calculated the 286-month

term of imprisonment as follows. The court found, by a

preponderance of the evidence, 20 kilograms of cocaine and 5

kilograms of heroin attributable to Agramonte. 9/8/00 Tr. at

30:8-17. This resulted in a base offense level of 34. U.S.S.G.

s 2D1.1. After adding one level for conduct within 1000 feet

of a school, id. s 2D1.2, three levels for a leadership role in

the offense, id. s 3B1.1, and two levels for obstruction of

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justice, id. s 3C1.1, the guideline level totaled 40. This

resulted in an applicable range for Agramonte's criminal

history category of 292 to 365 months. The court chose to

apply the minimum range, and reduced it by another six

months because Agramonte faces deportation at the end of

his incarceration.

Because the jury was not instructed that it had to attribute

any threshold drug weights to Counts One and Two, the

government concedes that Agramonte's sentences on these

counts violated Apprendi. The maximum sentence under 21

U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(C) for possession or distribution of detectable amounts of drugs is 20 years. Agramonte's sentence of

imprisonment on Counts One and Two exceeded the maximum. If he were resentenced on those counts, he could

receive no more than 20 years' imprisonment for each.

Count Four is another matter. Even for only detectable

amounts of drugs, the school-zone doubling provision of 21

U.S.C. s 860 set his maximum sentence at twice 20 years, or

40 years. His sentence on Count Four was less than the

statutory maximum and therefore does not give rise to an

Apprendi error. Agramonte has two counter arguments

relating to Count Four, neither of which amount to anything.

The first is that the district court violated Apprendi by

increasing his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines three levels for his leadership role. Although we initially decided in United States v. Fields ("Fields I"), 242 F.3d

393 (D.C. Cir. 2001); but see In re Sealed Case, 246 F.3d 696,

698 (D.C. Cir. 2001), that Apprendi applied to enhancements

for a defendant's role in the offense, we corrected that

misapprehension on the government's petition for rehearing.

United States v. Fields ("Fields II"), 251 F.3d 1041, 1046

(D.C. Cir. 2001), holds that "Apprendi does not apply to

enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines when the

resulting sentence remains within the statutory maximum,"

as it did here and as it always will for leadership role

enhancements, see U.S.S.G. s 5G1.1. Agramonte asks us to

adhere to Fields I. But Fields II represents the law of the

circuit. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (en banc).

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Agramonte's second point is that Apprendi should be extended to cover situations in which district court findings at

sentencing trigger a mandatory minimum sentence. Although the Second Circuit hinted that it might take this step,

see United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2001),

the Supreme Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,

477 U.S. 79 (1986), is against it, see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at

485-87 & n.13, as is our decision in In re Sealed Case, 246

F.3d at 699, in which we refused to disregard the Court's line

in Apprendi between factors that increase the maximum

punishment and those that do not. The Supreme Court may

be set to reconsider McMillan. See United States v. Harris,

243 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 2001 WL 716327

(Dec. 10, 2001). But even if McMillan were overruled, this

could not assist Agramonte. Nothing the district court (rather than the jury) found resulted in a mandatory minimum

with respect to Count Four. The minimum sentence for the

Count Four offense of one year's imprisonment depended, not

on the weight of the drugs, but on the defendant's having

been within 1000 feet of a school while possessing a detectable quantity of drugs with intent to distribute them--a fact

submitted to the jury. See 21 U.S.C. s 860(a).

Although the usual remedy for an Apprendi violation is to

remand for resentencing, it would be senseless to have the

district court resentence Agramonte on Counts One and Two.

We are affirming his concurrent sentence of 286 months'

imprisonment and eight years of supervised release on Count

Four. He therefore cannot benefit from a shorter term of

imprisonment or supervised release on the other two counts.

This case does not case present a situation in which a court

imposed a mandatory minimum sentence on an Apprendiinfected count, and then imposed an equivalent concurrent

sentence on an error-free count within a guidelines range, but

above the guidelines minimum. In such a case, we might not

be able to say for certain that the error on the first count had

no effect on the sentence imposed on the second. But

nothing of the sort happened here. The sentence of 286

months was well above the ten-year mandatory minimum

sentence that would have been applicable for Counts One and

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Two had a jury, rather than the court, determined the

attributable drug weights. See 21 U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(A)(i).

There is no indication in the record that the court's sentences

for Counts One and Two were in any wise based on a

mandatory minimum.

As to the special assessments levied against Agramonte on

each of the three counts, these were not concurrent. But the

fines would be the same no matter what term of imprisonment he received on remand. Special assessments of $100

are mandatory for all felony convictions. See 18 U.S.C.

s 3013(a)(2)(A). The Apprendi errors on Counts One and

Two are therefore irrelevant to the special assessments. The

case is unlike United States v. Ray, 481 U.S. 736 (1987) (per

curiam), which spelled the death knell for the concurrent

sentence doctrine as applied to review of convictions. The

defendant there had been given concurrent sentences on

three counts. The court of appeals, having affirmed Ray's

conviction on two counts, declined to review his conviction on

the third, thinking this could have no effect on the amount of

time he would serve. The Supreme Court reversed on the

ground that Ray was "not in fact serving concurrent sentences," id. at 738, because a separate $50 special assessment

had been imposed on each count.

Agramonte's sentence on Count Four is affirmed. The

Apprendi error with respect to Counts One and Two is

harmless, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a), and entitles him to no

relief.

So ordered.

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