Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02044/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary V. Austin
Appellee
Fletcher Long
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2044

___________________________

Gary V. Austin

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Fletcher Long, in his individual and official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for

the First Judicial District for the State of Arkansas

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Helena

____________

 Submitted: January 14, 2015

 Filed: February 23, 2015

____________

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

Gary Austin brought this employment discrimination suit under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981 and 1983 against Fletcher Long, the head prosecutor for an Arkansas judicial

district. Austin is an African American who alleges that Long fired him because of

his race. Long moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The

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district court denied the motion, concluding that the undisputed summary judgment

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record gave rise to disputes of material fact over whether Long's stated reasons for

firing Austin were a pretext for racial discrimination. Long appeals, and we affirm.

Long is the elected head prosecutor for the first judicial district of Arkansas. 

He supervises deputy prosecutors who represent the state in each of the district's six

counties. In January 2006, Long hired Austin as the second deputy prosecutor for

Phillips County. The prosecutor Long had previously hired for that position was

African American, as wasthe prosecutor Long eventually hired to replace Austin. As

a deputy Austin handled misdemeanor cases and assisted with felony cases for Long

and Todd Murray, the county's senior deputy prosecutor. 

The undisputed record establishes that Austin and Murray disagreed over how

they should allocate the county funds they received to cover their operation expenses. 

The county provided both prosecutors with a monthly check for expenses. Long and

Murray agreed that Austin should contribute his expense check to Murray, who

would then pay the office expenses. Austin failed to contribute any operating

expenses for four separate months, however, even after Long expressly told him to

follow Murray's directions regarding the funds. 

According to Long, Murray reported several other problems with Austin's job

performance, all of which Austin disputes. Long asserts that Murray and other court

personnel had trouble contacting Austin during business hours, that Austin deviated

from office policy on felony bond reduction orders and expungement orders, and that

Austin incurred extraordinary expenses without prior approval. In addition, an

Arkansas judge was said to have reportedly contacted Long to ask why Austin had

failed to appear in court. 

The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Arkansas.

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Austin contends that Long never provided him with a formal evaluation

outlining any of these problems in either oral or written form. Austin had met with

Long in August 2011, and Long reportedly asked himabout the problems Murray had

identified. After Austin offered no explanation, Long fired him. Austin contendsthat

Long never explained to him why he was fired.

Austin filed an employment discrimination action against Long under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, seeking money damages and reinstatement. He alleges that

Long fired him because of his race and treated him more harshly than two similarly

situated white prosecutors. One of those prosecutors had been convicted of driving

while intoxicated, and the other had been sanctioned by the Arkansas professional

conduct committee for an ethical violation in his private practice. Long had not fired

either of those prosecutors despite their violations. 

Long moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, arguing that

no reasonable jury could find a constitutional violation and that no reasonable official

in Long's position would have known that his actions violated Austin'sright to be free

from racial discrimination. The district court denied Long qualified immunity, and

Long filed this interlocutory appeal. 

We must "first address our jurisdiction" to review an interlocutory appeal from

the denial of a motion for summary judgment. White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 812

(8th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment "determinations are appealable when they

resolve a dispute concerning an abstract issue of law relating to qualified

immunity—typically, the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was

clearly established." Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996). A district court's

summary judgment order denying qualified immunity may not be appealed "insofar

as [it] determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact

for trial." Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1995). This court does not have

jurisdiction to consider the appeal if "at the heart of the argument is a dispute of fact." 

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Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2000). Even "if a

defendant frames an issue in terms of qualified immunity, we should determine

whether he is simply arguing that the plaintiff offered insufficient evidence to create

a material issue of fact." White, 519 F.3d at 813.

Here, Long argues that "Austin did not put forth sufficient evidence to

demonstrate that Long’s decision to terminate his employment was motivated by any

racial animus," so the district court erred in finding a dispute of material fact over

whether Long's stated reasons for firing Austin were a pretext for racial

discrimination. By "challenging the district court's finding of the sufficiency of the

evidence," Long is "asking us to engage in the time-consuming task of reviewing a

factual controversy about intent." Thomas v. Talley, 251 F.3d 743, 746 (8th Cir.

2001). This is "precisely the type of controversy that the [Supreme] Court concluded

should not be subject to interlocutory appeal" because of unnecessary delay, the

"comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and wise use of appellate

resources." Id. (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 317). We conclude that we lack

jurisdiction to consider Long's sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the district

court's findings on pretext. See id.

To the extent that Long challengesthe district court'sinterpretations oflaw, we

review them de novo. See Jones v. McNeese, 746 F.3d 887, 894 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 135 S. Ct. 688 (2014). Long is not entitled to qualified immunity if Austin

establishes that Long violated his clearly established constitutional rights. See

Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 446 (8th Cir. 2010). Austin asserts that Long

violated his clearly established right to be free from racial discrimination in the

workplace. Austin supportsthis assertion by offering evidence that Long treated him

differently fromsimilarly situated coworkers, thus proving that Long'sstated reasons

for firing him were a pretext for racial discrimination. See Bone v. G4S Youth

Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 955 (8th Cir. 2012).

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Long argues that the district court erred in interpreting the law by focusing on

whether his decision to fire Austin was a pretext for racial discrimination. See

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). The district court

correctly stated, however, that Austin could demonstrate a triable issue of fact

concerning pretext by showing that he was treated differently than "other employees

[who] were similarly situated in all relevant respects." Ridout v. JBS USA, LLC, 716

F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2013). Long asserts that the employees here were not

similarly situated because their misconduct was of a different nature, but the

"similarly situated coworker inquiry is a search for a substantially similar employee,

not for a clone." Id. Coworkers can be similarly situated in all relevant respects if

their misconduct is comparable to or "more seriousthan that of the plaintiff." Id. The

district court did not err in concluding that the conduct of prosecutors who had been

convicted for driving under the influence and who had been formally sanctioned for

ethics violations was comparable to ormore seriousthan Austin'sfailure to contribute

funds to his operational expense account—his only misconduct established by the

undisputed summary judgment record here. See id.

Long also argues that Austin failed to allege the violation of a clearly

established constitutional right. We have observed, however, that the constitutional

right to be free from "invidious discrimination is so well established and so essential

to the preservation of our constitutional order that all public officials must be charged

with knowledge of it." Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis Cnty., 729 F.2d 541,

546 (8th Cir. 1984). The district court thus appropriately concluded that Austin had

alleged the violation of his clearly established constitutional right to be free from

employment discrimination, and it did not err in finding a triable issue of fact on

whether Long's stated reasons for firing Austin were a pretext for racial

discrimination. 

For these reasons we affirm the order of the district court. 

______________________________

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