Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00152/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00152-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Corrections Corporation of America
Defendant
Summer Sanchez
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUMMER SANCHEZ, an individual, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF )

AMERICA, a Maryland Corporation; )

and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F 06-0152 AWI DLB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Document #33)

BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2005, Plaintiff Summer Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed her complaint in the

Kern County Superior Court. The complaint alleges that Defendant Corrections Corporation of

America (“Defendant”) discriminated against Plaintiff based on her national origin, race, and/or

ancestory in violation of FEHA, wrongfully terminated Plaintiff because of her national origin,

race, and/or ancestory in violation of FEHA, and terminated Plaintiff in violation of California’s

public policy. On February 10, 2006, Defendant removed this action to this court because the

parties are citizens of different states and over $75,000.00 is in controversy. 

On September 8, 2006, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On December

6, 2006, the court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that there

was a disputed issue of material fact on whether Warden Charles Glikey (“Glikey”)’s zeroCase 1:06-cv-00152-AWI-DLB Document 40 Filed 05/09/07 Page 1 of 20
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tolerance policy applied to sexually and racially offensive comments or applied only to racially

offensive comments. Because there was evidence that not all officers were treated the same if

both sexually and racially offensive comments were included in the zero-tolerance policy, the

court found a disputed issue of fact on pretext and declined to grant summary judgment to

Defendant.

On December 8, 2006, the court held a pretrial conference. On December 18, 2006, after

the court had allowed the parties time to submit additional potential witnesses and evidence to

the court, the court issued its pretrial order. In the pretrial order, the court set trial in this matter

for January 17, 2007. 

On December 22, 2006, Defendant filed an ex parte application for an order continuing

the trial date and to reopen the time for Defendant to file a motion for reconsideration of the

court’s order denying summary judgment. On January 4, 2007, the court granted Defendant’s

motion. The court vacated the January 17, 2007 trial date, and the court ordered Defendant to

file any motion for reconsideration of the court’s December 6, 2006 order denying summary

judgment by January 19, 2007.

On January 19, 2007, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration. Defendant contends

that on December 12, 2006, after the court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

Defendant’s attorney was informed by Plaintiff’s attorney of newly discovered evidence in the

form of minutes from Warden Glikey’s September 28, 2004 recall meeting (“Minutes”), at which

time the zero-tolerance policy was announced. Defendant then deposed Plaintiff regarding the

Minutes. Defendant contends that the newly discovered Minutes and Plaintiff’s second

deposition confirm that the zero-tolerance policy at issue concerned only sexual harassment and

racial slurs. Defendant argues that this evidence differs from Plaintiff’s evidence, on which the

court relied when denying summary judgment, that the zero-tolerance policy included all

sexually harassing comments and racial slurs.

On February 8, 2007, Plaintiff filed a late opposition. Plaintiff contends a motion for

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reconsideration is not appropriate because the Minutes are not newly discovered evidence. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant should have been in possession of its own Minutes. Plaintiff also

contends that Defendant has been changing its alleged zero-tolerance policy, and Defendant’s

changing position is evidence that Plaintiff was fired because of her race and not for a violation

of the zero-tolerance policy.

Apparently having received a copy of Plaintiff’s opposition earlier, on February 5, 2007,

Defendant filed a reply. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d

1185, 1198 (9 Cir.1994); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396 (9 Cir.1992). th th

“A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court's decision,

and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its

original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.” U.S. v. Westlands Water Dist., 134

F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion

of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v.

Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9 Cir. 1983) (en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law th

of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g.,

Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in

part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9 Cir. 1987). When filing a motion for th

reconsideration, Local Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or different facts or

circumstances claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or

what other grounds exist for the motion.”

COURT’S FINDINGS IN PRIOR ORDER

On the motion for summary judgment, the court found the following relevant facts were

undisputed:

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant Corrections Corporation of America

(“CCA”) as a Corrections Officer at its detention facility in California City,

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California (the “California City facility”) on or about July 12, 2002. 

At all times during her employment at CCA, Plaintiff was an at-will

employee pursuant to a written at-will agreement.

Plaintiff was terminated from her employment at CCA on October 22,

2004.

. . . .

The parties agree that after becoming warden of CAA’s facility in

California City in January 2003, Glikey adopted a zero-tolerance policy with

respect to racial comments in the workplace. Under the zero-tolerance policy,

employees were informed that they would be terminated if they made racial

comments in the workplace. Plaintiff provides additional evidence that Glikey’s

zero-tolerance policy was with respect to all harassing and offensive comments in

the workplace, including sexual comments. See Sanchez Dec. ¶ 3.

Sanchez was aware that Warden Glikey had adopted a zero tolerance

policy with respect to racial comments and that she could be terminated if she

violated the policy. 

On September 1, 2004, Plaintiff was accessing certain chemicals when

Sergeant Yvette Garcia approached her and asked her to escort a prisoner. 

Plaintiff told Garcia that she had been ordered by her superior to attend to the

chemicals before engaging in other duties. Plaintiff admits that after Garcia

persisted, Plaintiff responded: “I wish you would get off my ass, you’re on me like

a black on watermelon.” Plaintiff was upset with Garcia and was not joking

when she made the comment.

At some time Plaintiff became aware that her comment would be

offensive, in particular to African-Americans, because she had used the word

“black.”

. . . .

Plaintiff admits that a comment about someone’s race was a violation of

CCA policy. At the time Plaintiff made her comment, she was aware that

Warden Glikey had stated there was a zero-tolerance policy against racial

comments.

On October 22, 2004, Plaintiff was terminated. CCA stated the reason

for the termination from CCA was because Plaintiff violated CCA’s zero

tolerance policy. The parties dispute the real reason Plaintiff was terminated.

Only two racial comments have been reported to CCA that were made

after Glikey issued his zero-tolerance policy – Comments by Reeve and Sanchez. 

In both cases, Glikey states in his declaration that he terminated the employees for

violation of the zero-tolerance policy and he is solely responsible for making that

decision. The parties dispute what the zero-tolerance policy was and if a

violation of the zero-tolerance policy was the real reason for Glikey’s actions.

Officer Reeve is White. At some time prior to Plaintiff’s statement,

Reeve said to Officer Spencer, an African-American employee, that Spencer “was

being treated like a nigger child.” Reeve was terminated for violating the zerotolerance of any racial comments policy sometime within a month to four months

after she made the “nigger child” comment. Plaintiff claims that prior to her

termination, Reeve was reprimanded on four separate occasions for making racial

comments. Other than Reeve’s hearsay statements to Plaintiff, there is no

evidence regarding what the prior reprimands were for. Regardless, Plaintiff

admits all of the prior incidents involving Reeve occurred before the adoption of

the zero-tolerance policy.

. . . .

Defendant suspended Burgess for making a sexual comment to another

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female correctional officer that she had “DSL.” When the female correctional

officer asked what DSL stood for, Burgess replied “Dick Sucking Lips.” Burgess

was subsequently given a forty hour suspension. This incident occurred on July

12, 2004. See Glikey Dec. at ¶ 7. Glikey states that he made the decision to

suspend Burgess for forty hours because “I did not consider the comment she

made to be a racial comment. I was solely responsible for that decision.” Id. 

. . . .

As discussed in more detail in the order denying summary judgment, in an employment

discrimination case, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment carries the initial burden of

establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411

U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1432-33 (9 Cir. 1993). While the th

specific elements of a prima facie case vary depending on the particular facts, the parties agree

that a plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was

qualified for the position she sought or was performing competently in the position she held, (3)

she suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an

available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. Guz v. Bechtel

Nat. Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (2000). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden

of production then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible

evidence, sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact and to justify a judgment for the employer,

that the employer’s actions were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Texas Dep't

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411

U.S. at 802; Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 355-56. If the employer can do so, the plaintiff must then raise a

genuine factual issue as to whether the employer’s articulated reasons were pretexts for

discrimination or offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive. Garrett, 10 F.3d at 1432-33;

Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 356. If the plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue regarding the

authenticity of the employer's stated motive, summary judgment is inappropriate because it is for

the trier of fact to decide which story is to be believed. Garrett, 10 F.3d at 1433.

At issue on the motion for summary judgment was whether Defendant had a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason to terminate Plaintiff and whether Plaintiff had provided evidence to

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rebut Defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination. In denying summary

judgment, the court made the following findings: 

Defendant offers evidence that it fired Plaintiff for violating Glikey’s zerotolerance policy toward racial comments. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no

evidence that anyone else who made a racial comment after the zero-tolerance

policy was in place and had their comment reported to CCA and/or Glikey was

not terminated. In fact, all evidence indicates that the only other person who

made a racial comment after the zero-tolerance policy was in effect – Reeve – was

also terminated. Based on this evidence, Defendant has come forward with a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination.

In her opposition, Plaintiff comes forward with several disputed issues of

fact to show pretext . . . .

The court then rejected most of Plaintiff’s attempts to show pretext. The court found it was

irrelevant if Plaintiff had evidence that she did not realize her statement was a racial insult when

she made the comment and whether anyone was offended by her comment. The court found that

there was no evidence that Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy had no exceptions. The court also

found that most of the other individuals discussed in the parties’ briefs did not provide evidence

of pretext. The court found that there was either no evidence that Defendant was aware of these

individuals’ improper comments and/or no evidence that they were made after Glikey’s zerotolerance policy was put into effect.

After discounting most of Plaintiff’s arguments concerning pretext, the court found that a

trier of fact could use two pieces of evidence submitted by Plaintiff to find pretext. The court

stated as follows:

While these disputed issues of fact are not material and do not show

pretext, in her opposition, Plaintiff has come forward with two pieces of evidence

that, if true, could show pretext. First, the court finds that Plaintiff has created a

disputed issue of material fact on what Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy was. In his

declaration, Glikey states that after he began his tenure as Warden, he issued a

zero-tolerance policy regarding any racial comment by a CCA employee. See

Glikey Dec. ¶ 3. In Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff’s declaration, Plaintiff states that in

a recall meeting, in front of a limited number of CCA employees, Glikey stated

that there would be a zero-tolerance policy with respect to all harassing and

offensive comments in the workplace, including sexual comments. See Sanchez

Dec. ¶ 3. While Defendant objects to the rest of Paragraph 3 and much of the rest

of Plaintiff’s declaration, Defendant does not object to this sentence. Because

this sentence appears to be based on Plaintiff’s personal knowledge of what

Glikey announced his policy would be, the court finds it admissible for the

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purposes of this motion. The court also does not find this statement directly

conflicts with Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. In the portions of Plaintiff’s

deposition cited by the parties, Plaintiff was asked if she was aware that there was

a zero-tolerance policy on racial comments in the workplace. See Sanchez Depo.

at 139 & 141. The parties have not cited the court to portions of Plaintiff’s

deposition in which she was asked what Glikey’s policy was and/or asked if it

included sexually offensive comments. Because Plaintiff did not testify at her

deposition Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy only included racial comments and

never stated it did not include sexual comments, the court does not find Plaintiff’s

declaration inconsistent with her deposition testimony. See Kennedy v. Allied

Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9 Cir.1991) (while a party cannot create an th

issue of fact by filing a declaration that contradicts prior deposition testimony, a

declaration is only a sham if it flatly contradicts earlier testimony). Thus,

Plaintiff has created a disputed issue of fact on whether Glikey’s zero-tolerance

policy only applied to harassing racial comments or applied to both harassing

racial and harassing sexual comments.

Taking Plaintiff’s evidence as true, the inclusion of sexually offensive

comments as part of Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy provides Plaintiff with

possible evidence of pretext. The evidence before the court reveals that Burgess

told another female correctional officer that she had “DSL”, a sexually offensive

comment. The evidence reveals that this comment was made after Glikey issued

the zero-tolerance policy. The evidence also reveals that Burgess was suspended

and not terminated for this comment. If Burgess is included in the group of

people who violated Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy, Plaintiff has provided

evidence that a white officer was treated differently than she was. 

The issue thus becomes whether evidence that one white officer was

treated differently than Plaintiff for violating Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy is

sufficient evidence to show a disputed issue of fact on pretext. Given the size of

the group of people who violated the zero-tolerance policy, the court finds

Glikey’s different treatment of Burgess is sufficient to show a disputed issue of

fact on whether Defendant’s stated reasons for terminating Plaintiff were pretext

for a racial motive. There is evidence that Defendant knew of only three people

who violated the zero-tolerance policy. The evidence before the court shows that

Plaintiff, Reeve, and Burgess were the only ones who made harassing statements

after Glikey announced the zero-tolerance policy and whose harassing statements

reported to CCA and Glikey. As such, only three people are in the relevant class. 

 Plaintiff was treated differently than 33.3% of the other officers who violated the

zero-tolerance policy. The officer who was treated differently was not Mexican,

but White. On this motion for summary judgment, the court finds Plaintiff has

created a genuine factual issue of material fact as to whether Defendant’s

articulated reasons were pretext for discrimination. 

In making this finding, the court does not find that Plaintiff has in fact

shown Defendant’s actions were discriminatory. A trier of fact may well find

that Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy only included racially offensive statements,

and was thus was applied consistently. In addition, even if a trier of fact finds

Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy included sexually offensive statements, a trier of

fact may find another explanation for the difference in treatment between Plaintiff

and Burgess other than illegal discrimination. However, at this time, the court

finds that given the evidence of a disputed issue of fact over Glikey’s exact policy

and the fact there is evidence Burgess, a white employee, may have violated

Glikey’s policy and not been fired, the court cannot grant summary judgment for

Defendant on Plaintiff’s first six claims.

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DISCUSSION

On the motion for summary judgment, the court found a disputed issue of fact on the

confines of Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy. Defendant had provided evidence that the zerotolerance policy applied to racial comments. Plaintiff had provided additional evidence that

Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy was with respect to all harassing and offensive comments in the

workplace, including sexual comments. All parties have now modified their description of

Glikey’s zero-tolerance policy. The parties now agree on Warden Glikey’s stated zero-tolerance

policy. Glikey’s second declaration and the Minutes state that the zero-tolerance policy applied

to: “Sexual harassment”, “Racial slurs, etc.”, and “Providing false/untruthful statements.” See

Glikey Dec. II at ¶ 4; Recall Minutes of 9/28/04. In her December 19, 2006 deposition, Plaintiff

agreed that this statement – zero-tolerance for the following: sexual harassment, racial slurs, etc.,

providing false/untruthful statements – was also her understanding of the zero-tolerance policy. 

See Sanchez 12/19/06 Depo. at 218 & 221. Plaintiff states that she did not have an

understanding of the zero-tolerance policy different from this description. See id. at 221-22. 

Thus, the undisputed facts now include as an undisputed fact that the zero-tolerance policy

applied to “sexual harassment” and “racial slurs”, along with providing false/untruthful

statements.

The issue currently before the court is whether, based on the now undisputed fact that the

zero-tolerance policy applied to “sexual harassment”, rather than Plaintiff’s previous evidence

that the policy applied to “sexually harassing comments,” there is still a disputed issue of fact on

pretext. The court previously found that Burgess’ comment would meet the zero-tolerance

policy if the policy included sexually harassing comments. Because Burgess was not fired, the

court found that evidence of Burgess’s violation of the zero-tolerance could be evidence of

pretext. On this motion for reconsideration, Defendant contends that Burgess’s statement did not

constitute sexual harassment under the zero-tolerance policy. Defendant then argues that if

Burgess’s statement did not violate the zero-tolerance policy, Plaintiff has not shown pretext. 

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A. Consideration of “Newly Discovered Evidence”

Preliminarily, the court notes that Plaintiff contends in the opposition that the court

should not consider the evidence about the confines of the zero-tolerance policy found in the

Minutes and Plaintiff’s second deposition because this evidence does not meet the standard for

“newly discovered evidence”. Defendant apparently received a copy of the Minutes from

Plaintiff’s attorney on December 12, 2006. Because the Minutes – defining the zero-tolerance

policy in a way differently than both of the possibilities addressed by the court on summary

judgement – were not considered by the court on summary judgment, Defendant contends both

the Minutes and Plaintiff’s deposition are newly discovered evidence. Plaintiff contends this

evidence does not meet the standard for newly discovered evidence. 

Rule 59 concerns motions for a new trial Under Rule 59, a new trial based on newly

discovered evidence requires: (1) evidence discovered after trial, “(2) the exercise of due

diligence would not have resulted in the evidence being discovered at an earlier stage and (3) the

newly discovered evidence is of such magnitude that production of it earlier would likely have

changed the outcome of the case.” Far Out Productions, Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 993 (9th

Cir. 2001); Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 928-29 (9 Cir. 2000). Rule 60(b)(2) th

provides for relief from a judgment or order on the ground of “newly discovered evidence which

by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule

59(b).” As with Rule 59 motions, Rule 60(b) requires that the newly discovered evidence not

have been in the party's possession at the time of summary judgment or discoverable with

reasonable diligence. Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th

Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s evidence is not newly discovered because Defendant

has not shown that the Minutes could not have been discovered earlier by Defendant with

reasonable diligence. The court must agree that it has a similar question as the one Plaintiff asks

in her opposition – Why would Defendant not have a copy of Minutes from its own meeting

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until provided one by Plaintiff’s attorney? This question is not answered in Defendant’s motion

or reply. Instead, Defendant focuses on Defendant’s diligence in requesting all discovery from

Plaintiff and Defendant’s quick actions in bringing this evidence to the court’s attention. 

Defendant has never explained how Defendant could be diligent in researching its own records

regarding the zero-tolerance policy and not found a copy of the Minutes. However, the court

does not find that this failure on the part of Defendant and/or Defendant’s attorneys requires the

court to deny Defendant’s motion on its face.

This motion is not being considered under the standards of Rule 59 or Rule 60. 

Defendant is not seeking reconsideration of a final judgment, final order, or verdict. Defendant

is seeking reconsideration of a motion for summary judgment that the court denied. The court’s

order was not a final order disposing of this case. This motion for reconsideration does not fall

within either Rule 59 or Rule 60. As discussed above, the court will address the pending

motion based on the court’s inherent power and Local Rule 78-230(k). Unlike Rule 59 or Rule

60, these standards do not automatically require Defendant to prove due diligence. In addition,

under the unique facts of this case, the court finds Defendant’s diligence, or lack there of, not

particularly relevant to whether the motion for reconsideration should be considered.

Unlike most motions based on newly discovered evidence, Defendant is not attempting to

reverse the court’s prior order based on new evidence that Plaintiff disputes. To the contrary,

Plaintiff does not dispute the evidence found in the Minutes and has used this same evidence to

clarify her own position. Based on the Minutes, the parties now all agree that the zero-tolerance

policy included sexual harassment, racial slurs, and providing false/untruthful statements. 

Unlike the parties’ positions on summary judgment, the zero-tolerance policy is now undisputed. 

 Thus, a trier of fact no longer needs to resolve what the zero-tolerance included. All parties

agree the zero-tolerance policy applied to sexual harassment, racial slurs, and providing

false/untruthful statements. 

The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute

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as to the facts before the court. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9 Cir. 1975). Under th

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to summary judgment where

the evidence produced by the parties permits only one conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Summary judgment is precluded if there exists a genuine

dispute over a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248. “Summary judgment has, as one of its most important goals, the elimination of

waste of the time and resources of both litigants and the courts in cases where a trial would be a

useless formality.” Zweig, 521 F.2d at 1135-36; see also Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S.

Dept. of Agriculture, 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9 Cir. 1994); Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 2007 WL th

214554, *2 (E.D.Cal. 2007). With this guidance, the court finds no legal reason to refuse to

consider the new evidence. All parties agree the new evidence edits the facts the court

previously found disputed. Thus, the court will consider the Minutes on this motion for

reconsideration even assuming Defendant has not sufficiently shown that Defendant could not

have discovered this evidence earlier. 

B. Evidence of Pretext 

The parties agree that the issue that was before the court on summary judgment and is

currently before the court on this motion for reconsideration is whether Plaintiff has evidence to

refute Defendant’s legitimate reason to fire Plaintiff. “Legitimate” reasons in this context are

reasons that are factually unrelated to prohibited bias, and therefore, if true, would preclude a

finding of discrimination. Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 358. This burden is a minimal one. Board of

Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 & n.1 (1978). Here, Defendant’s

stated reason for firing Plaintiff is that she violated the zero-tolerance policy on making racial

slurs or statements. 

Once the employer has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination, 

the plaintiff must provide evidence that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant is false,

creating an inference that those reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v.

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Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. at 142; Guz; 24 Cal.4th at 356. “Pretext” means

a dishonest explanation, “a lie rather than an oddity or error.” O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums,

Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7 Cir. 2001). Once the employer’s stated justification has been

th

eliminated, discrimination becomes the most likely alternative explanation because the employer

is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147

If the plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue regarding the authenticity of the

employer's stated motive, summary judgment is inappropriate because the trier of fact decides

which story is to be believed. Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9 Cir. 1993). th

1. Whether the New Undisputed Evidence of the Zero-Tolerance Policy Still Shows a

Disputed Issue of Fact on Whether Defendant’s Stated Reason is Pretext

The undisputed facts now show that the zero-tolerance policy applied to sexual

harassment. As discussed in the court’s order denying summary judgment, if Burgess’s sexual

comment also violated the zero-tolerance policy, there is a disputed issue of fact on whether

Defendant treated everyone who violated the zero-tolerance policy the same. This in turn

created a disputed issue of fact on pretext. On this motion, the court must determine if, based on

the new undisputed fact that the zero-tolerance policy applied to sexual harassment, Burgess’s

statement still violated the zero-tolerance policy. There is limited evidence before the court on

what conduct constituted “sexual harassment” under the zero-tolerance policy. The only specific

evidence defining “sexual harassment” is Glikey’s second declaration in which he stated that

Burgess’s statement did not constitute sexual harassment. 

Unlike terms such as “sexually harassing statements”, or “racial slurs”, the term “sexual

harassment” has a very specific definition under the law. Sexual harassment under both Federal

and California law requires: (1) sexual advances or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual

nature; (2) conduct that was unwelcome; and (3) conduct that was “sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working

environment.” See Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9 Cir.1995); Ellison v. th

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Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-876 (9 Cir.1991); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, 214 th

Cal.App.3d 590, 608 (1989). In determining whether the offending conduct was sufficiently

severe or pervasive, the relevant factors include “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Harris v. Forklift

Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The showing of severity can be reduced

by the frequency of the conduct, and while a single incident may be sufficient, “generally

repeated incidents create a stronger claim of hostile environment, with the strength of the claim

depending on the number of incidents and the intensity of each incident.” Ellison, 924 F.2d at

877-78. 

The parties’ agree that Burgess’s conduct concerned Burgess, a female correctional

officer, stating to another female correctional officer that she had “DSL”. When the other

officer asked what “DSL” stood for, Burgess replied “Dick Sucking Lips”. There is no other

evidence of other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature involving Burgess. Assuming

Burgess’s DSL comment was an unwelcome verbal statement of a sexual nature, under the legal

definition of “sexual harassment,” the comment was neither sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of the other female’s employment nor sufficient to create an abusive working

environment The utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings is not sufficient to

affect the conditions of employment necessary to show sexual harassment. National R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S.

17, 21 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Kortan v. California

Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9 Cir. 2000). Thus, Burgess’s statement clearly did not th

met the legal definition of “sexual harassment”.

To show that Burgess’s statement met the definition of “sexual harassment” found in the

zero-tolerance policy, there must be a disputed issue of fact on whether the zero-tolerance

policy’s reference to “sexual harassment” included conduct less than that required for sexual

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 The court notes that Plaintiff has not asked for the opportunity to obtain discovery on 1

whether Defendant meant something other than the legal definition when using the term “sexual

harassment” as part of the zero-tolerance policy.

14

harassment by law. There is no evidence before the court that the “sexual harassment” all

parties agree was included in the zero-tolerance policy included conduct less than that meeting

the legal definition of the law. There is no evidence that Defendant, Glikey, or anyone else who

worked for Defendant ever defined the “sexual harassment” mentioned in the zero-tolerance

policy differently than the legal definition. There is no evidence that Defendant, Glikey, or

anyone else who worked for Defendant did anything inconsistent with the legal definition of

“sexual harassment” to indicate that the zero-tolerance policy’s definition was different from the

legal definition. Plaintiff has cited no legal authority that would indicate a term like “sexual

harassment”, which has a legal definition, should be given a different meaning absent evidence

that it meant something different in this particular context. As such, the court finds that absent

evidence that the term “sexual harassment” had a different meaning as used in the zero-tolerance

policy, the default definition of the term “sexual harassment” must be that found in the law. 

1

Thus, all evidence before the court is that Burgess’s statement did not constitute sexual

harassment in violation of the zero-tolerance policy.

If Burgess’s statement did not constitute sexual harassment in violation of the zerotolerance policy, than Plaintiff has provided no evidence of pretext to rebut Defendant’s evidence

of a non-discriminatory motive for firing Plaintiff. If Burgess is not included in the group of

people who violated the zero-tolerance policy, there is only evidence of two people who violated

the zero-tolerance policy. The evidence before the court shows that only two people – Plaintiff

and Reeve – made harassing statements after Glikey announced the zero-tolerance policy and

their statements were reported to CCA and Glikey. Plaintiff was treated the same as the other

officer who violated the zero-tolerance policy. Given the standards for summary judgment, the

court finds that the undisputed facts show a non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination. 

 Plaintiff has not created a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Defendant’s articulated

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reason was pretext for discrimination. Thus, summary judgment on behalf of Defendant is

appropriate.

2. Failure to Document Zero-Tolerance Policy

Despite the fact that the parties all agree racially offensive comments and sexual

harassment were included in the zero-tolerance policy, Plaintiff contends that there is still

sufficient evidence of pretext to require a trier of fact to resolve whether Defendant’s stated

reasons to terminate Plaintiff are true. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s failure to produce written documentation of its own

policy shows pretext. In a case in which the alleged legitimate reason for the Defendant’s

conduct was a hiring freeze, the Ninth Circuit remarked as follows when the defendant could not

produce written documentation of the hiring freeze policy:

the absence of any documentation confirming that a company hiring freeze was in

place during the relevant time period is sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute

as to whether the asserted reason was pretextual. Indeed, even if such decisions

were commonly conveyed to yard managers by word-of-mouth, the fact that a

company the size of GTE does not have a memorandum, meeting notes, or other

evidence of this hiring freeze or the financial difficulties that allegedly spurred the

hiring freeze provides circumstantial evidence that the hiring freeze did not in fact

exist.

McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9 Cir. 2004). th

The court finds McGinest’s finding – that pretext can be shown by the absence of any

documentation confirming the defendant’s policy – is distinguishable from the facts of this case. 

Here, the parties have provided the court with depositions, declarations, and Minutes that state

the zero-tolerance policy. Glikey’s declaration, Plaintiff’s second deposition, and the Minutes

all confirm the same zero-tolerance policy. In this case, the parties all agree that the policy

included sexual harassment, racial slurs, and providing false/untruthful statements. Defendant’s

failure to provide documentation to support the zero-tolerance policy is of minimal significance

in a case where all parties agree that the documentation ultimately provided by Plaintiff sets forth

the correct policy. In addition, this case differs from McGinest because, at this time, the court

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does have documentation to support Defendant’s zero-tolerance policy. Finally, the McGinest

court noted that there was additional circumstantial evidence of pretext in that case given the

defendant's “permissive response to harassing actions undertaken by coworkers and supervisors,

combined with the absence of black supervisors and managers in the workplace”. McGinest,

360 F.3d at 1123. In this case, there is no additional circumstantial evidence of discrimination. 

Thus, the court finds that Defendant’s failure to produce its own Minutes from its own records

does not show pretext because all parties agree that the Minutes finally produced by Plaintiff

accurately reflect the zero-tolerance policy. 

C. Changed Reasons for Termination

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant’s changed positions show provides evidence of

pretext. Plaintiff points out that in its original motion for summary judgment Defendant argued

only about Defendant’s zero-tolerance policy on racial slurs. Glikey’s declaration only

addressed a zero-tolerance policy on racial slurs, and Glikey claimed Burgess was not fired

because her DSL comment was not a racial slur. Plaintiff points out that Defendant now takes

the position that the zero-tolerance policy applied to sexual harassment, racial slurs, and

providing false/untruthful statements. Plaintiff argues this change in Defendant’s definition of

the zero-tolerance policy shows pretext.

It is well established that substantial changes over time in the employer's proffered reason

for its employment decision support a finding of pretext. Kobrin v. University of Minn., 34 F.3d

698, 703 (8 Cir. 1994). When a defendant gives different and arguably inconsistent th

explanations, a trier of fact may infer that the articulated reasons are pretextual. See, e.g. 

Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 432 (1 Cir. 2000); Thurman v. Yellow st

Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1167 (6 Cir. 1996); Castleman v. Acme Boot Co., 959 F.2d th

1417, 1422 (7 Cir. 1992); Alvarado v. Board of Trustees, 928 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4 Cir. 1991); th th

Schmitz v. St. Regis Paper Co., 811 F.2d 131, 132-33 (2d Cir.1987). “[I]n the ordinary case,

such fundamentally different justifications for an employer's action would give rise to a genuine

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issue of fact with respect to pretext since they suggest the possibility that neither of the official

reasons was the true reason.” Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9 Cir. 1993). th

Unlike these cases, Defendant’s stated reasons for terminating Plaintiff have not changed. 

 Defendant has always maintained that Plaintiff was fired because she violated Defendant’s zerotolerance policy toward racial slurs. Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that Defendant

indicated to her, or anyone else, that Plaintiff was fired for something other than her violation of

the zero-tolerance policy. Because Defendant has not “shifted” its reason for terminating

Plaintiff from one theory to another, Plaintiff cannot prove pretext by showing Defendant has

significantly changed its justification for firing Plaintiff.

The court does note that Defendant, or at least Defendant’s attorneys, have “shifted” the

definition of the zero-tolerance policy over the course of this case. In the original motion for

summary judgment, Defendant contended that the zero-tolerance policy applied to racial

comments. Defendant supported this position by Glikey’s First Declaration, which stated:

“During my tenure as Warden, I issued a zero tolerance policy regarding any racial comment by

any CCA employee.” See Glikey Dec. I at ¶ 3. In the same Declaration, Glikey addressed the

comment by Burgess and stated that he had made the decision to only suspend Burgess because

he “did not consider the comment she made to be a racial comment.” See id. at ¶ 7. The issue

of the zero-tolerance policy also applying to sexually harassing statements was not raised until

Plaintiff’s opposition brief. In support of her position that the zero-tolerance policy applied to

sexually harassing comments, Plaintiff provided her own declaration in which she stated Glikey’s

zero-tolerance policy was with respect to all harassing and offensive comments in the workplace,

including sexual comments. See Sanchez Dec. ¶ 3. Defendant provided no additional evidence

with its reply brief, such as another declaration from Glikey, a declaration from another

employee, or written records addressing Plaintiff’s allegations that the zero-tolerance policy

included other conduct. However, in the reply brief Defendant countered some of Plaintiff’s

evidence of other harassing comments by arguing that the zero-tolerance policy applied only to

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racial statements. In denying summary judgment, the court found that there was a disputed

issue of fact on whether the zero-tolerance policy applied only to racial statements, as Defendant

alleged, or whether it also included sexually offensive statements, as Plaintiff had alleged. In

this motion for reconsideration, Defendant now takes the position that the zero-tolerance policy

applied to sexual harassment, racial slurs, and providing false/untruthful statements.

Defendant has not explained why it argued in its reply brief that the zero-tolerance policy

applied only to racial comments but now argues the zero-tolerance policy applies to sexual

harassment, racial slurs, and providing false/untruthful statements. It remains unclear if

Defendant actually did not understand its own policy, Defendant’s lawyers did not understand the

policy, or Defendant and/or Defendant’s lawyers were purposely trying to mislead this court. 

However, any inconsistency is not sufficient to provide evidence of pretext as to avoid summary

judgment. 

In the original motion for summary judgment, Defendant and Glikey addressed the zerotolerance policy towards racial comments or slurs. The fact the supporting points and

authorities, proposed undisputed facts, and Glikey’s declaration only addressed the zerotolerance policy on racial comments appears to have been related to strategy. Given Defendant’s

position is that Plaintiff was terminated for violating the zero-tolerance policy on racial

comments, it was not unreasonable for Defendant to not include additional evidence and

discussion on what other conduct was also included in the zero-tolerance policy. However,

once Plaintiff took the position that other conduct was included in the zero-tolerance policy, the

court is troubled by Defendant’s references to the confines of the zero-tolerance policy in the

reply brief.

In their reply brief, Defendant never directly addressed Plaintiff’s contentions that the

zero-tolerance policy included sexually harassing statements. However, in several places,

Defendant took the position that the zero-tolerance policy was limited to racial comments or

slurs. On Page Three of the reply brief, Defendant stated “Warden Glikey submitted a

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declaration stating that the zero-tolerance policy applied to racial comments . . . .” On Page

Four, Defendant addressed Plaintiff’s evidence concerning Burgess, and argued that “Burgess

was suspended because her sexual comment did not fall under the zero tolerance policy, which

was directed at racial comments.” On Page Fourteen, Defendant argued that Plaintiff “fails to

realize that other employees were not similarly situated [to Plaintiff] because they did not make

any racial derogatory comments.” These statements, found in the reply brief, are different than

Defendant’s current position. 

However, the court does not find Defendant’s inconsistency sufficient evidence to create

a disputed issue of fact on pretext. While the reply brief described the zero-tolerance policy as

applying only to racial statements, neither Glikey’s declaration nor the evidence provided for by

Defendant stated the zero-tolerance policy was so limited. The court finds that Glikey’s

declarations are simply not inconsistent. Nowhere in the first declaration does Glikey state the

policy only applied to racial comments, and Glikey’s decision to focus on the policy as to racial

comments was reasonable given Defendant’s stated reason to fire Plaintiff was based on racial

comments that violated the policy. At the time it was made, Glikey’s declaration focused on the

relevant issue before the court. Even Glikey’s second declaration focuses on the relevant issues

before the court. For example, Glikey’s second declaration does not discuss whether he

considered Burgess’s comment to be a false/untruthful statement. The court presumes Glikey

did not add this detail because the portions of the zero-tolerance policy currently at issue are

sexual harassment and racial slurs. Simply put, while the position taken by Defendant’s

attorney, albeit on Defendant’s behalf, in the reply brief is contrary to that taken in the pending

motion, Defendant itself has never provided evidence that the policy was limited to racial

comments or slurs. 

In addition, the court’s reliance on Defendant’s assertions in the reply brief – that the

zero-tolerance policy only applied to racial statements – did not assist Defendant on the prior

motion. To the contrary, the court found that there was a disputed issue of fact on the scope of

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the zero-tolerance policy, and denied Defendant’s motion. This is not the case where the court

relied on Defendant’s prior inconsistent position to defeat Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment. 

Finally, as discussed above, Plaintiff does not disagree with the zero-tolerance policy now

advocated by Defendant. Plaintiff herself has modified her definition of the zero-tolerance

policy by stating that her understanding of the sexually offensive comments included in the

policy really meant sexual harassment. All parties now agree that the zero-tolerance policy

applied to sexual harassment, racial slurs, and providing false/untruthful statements. Because all

parties agree on the zero-tolerance policy, this case differs from those in which the defendant is

continually making up new reasons for termination, all of which the Plaintiff disputes. Here,

Plaintiff and Defendant are currently in agreement as to the policy. Thus, the court does not find

that the evidence of Defendant’s differing positions on the confines of the zero-tolerance policy,

alone, is sufficient evidence to establish pretext. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The parties agree that the newly discovered evidence accurately reflects Defendant’s zerotolerance policy. As such, the zero-tolerance policy is currently undisputed, and no trial on what

the zero-tolerance policy included is necessary. Under the zero-tolerance policy, all evidence

before the court shows that Plaintiff was treated the same as other employees who violated the

policy. Thus, there is insufficient evidence of pretext, and Defendant is entitled to summary

judgment. Accordingly, based on the above memorandum opinion, the court ORDERS that:

1. Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED;

2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 8, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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