Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02298/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02298-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Johnson
Plaintiff
Nita C. Patel
Defendant
Chandrakant N. Patel
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHANDRAKANT N. PATEL; NITA C. 

PATEL; and Does 1-10,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-02298-MCE-EFB

ORDER GRANTING DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT

Through the present action, Plaintiff Scott Johnson (“Plaintiff”) seeks damages 

against Defendants Chandrakant N. Patel and Nita C. Patel (“Defendants”) for violations 

of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”) as well as 

California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-53 (“Unruh Act”). According to 

Plaintiff, who is disabled, he encountered various physical barriers when attempting to 

access Defendants’ motel in Stockton, California. Defendants failed to respond to 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, and the Clerk of Court entered default against them. Plaintiff has 

now filed a Motion to reduce that default to judgment (ECF No. 12) and seeking 

$8,000.00 in statutory fees and $4,180.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs. That Motion, 

which Defendants have not opposed, is GRANTED as set forth below.1

 1 Having determined that oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs in accordance with Local Rule 230(g).

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a level C-5 quadriplegic who cannot walk, has significant manual 

dexterity impairments, and uses a wheelchair for mobility. As such, he qualifies as a 

person with a disability under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

Plaintiff alleges that in November and December 2014 and March, July, and 

August 2015, he went to the Capri Motel located at 1140 N. Wilson Way in Stockton, 

California. He claims that as he approached the Motel, which is owned by Defendants, 

he could not locate any disability-compliant path of travel to either the guestrooms or the 

office. He also alleges that no service counter accessible to persons with disabilities 

was located outside the Motel’s office. Plaintiff therefore claims he was dissuaded from 

returning to the Motel.

Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Defendants on November 5, 2015 as 

indicated above. Proof of Service was thereafter filed on December 1, 2015, attesting to 

the fact that service of the Summons and Complaint was effectuated on both Defendants 

on November 30, 2015. ECF Nos. 4-5. On January 22, 2015, after Defendants failed to 

answer or enter any response to his Complaint, Plaintiff requested that default be 

entered in his favor. ECF No. 6-7. The Clerk of Court subsequently entered default 

against Defendants on January 25, 2016. ECF No. 8.

STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) permits a court-ordered default judgment 

following the entry of default by the clerk of the court under Rule 55(a). Default 

judgments are ordinarily disfavored (Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 

1986)) given the preference that cases should be decided upon their merits whenever 

reasonably possible. Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 

1985). Whether to grant a motion for default judgment in any particular instance is

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nonetheless a matter within the court’s sound discretion. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. The 

Ninth Circuit has set forth a variety of factors (the “Eitel factors”) which may be 

considered in exercising that discretion: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, 

(2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning 

material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong 

policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Id.

ANALYSIS

A. The Eitel Factors Favor Entry of a Default Judgment

On balance, the Eitel factors favor entry of default judgment in this case. 

Considering the first factor, if Plaintiff’s application for default judgment were to be 

denied, Plaintiff would be prejudiced because he would be left without a remedy. This 

factor consequently weighs in favor of default judgment. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 

Concepcion, No. C10-05092 WHA, 2011 WL 2220101 at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2011).

As to the second and third Eitel factors, Plaintiff’s substantive claims appear 

meritorious and his complaint is sufficiently pled. Plaintiff has identified specific barriers 

under the American with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines which he claims 

impaired his access. He has also identified at least five occasions on which he claims 

those barriers impeded that access. Under the ADA, Plaintiff is entitled to an order 

requiring Defendants to remove those unlawful barriers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188. 

Moreover, under the Unruh Act, Plaintiff has demonstrated his entitlement to actual 

damages in an amount not less than $4,000.00 for each time he suffered access 

discrimination. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). The $8,000.00 in statutory damages sought is 

less than Plaintiff could conceivably claim given the number of times he claims he visited 

Defendants’ Motel and encountered barriers.

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Where there is a properly pled and supported complaint and the defendants have 

failed to oppose the motion, as is the case here, “no factual disputes exist that would 

preclude the entry of default judgment” and this factor consequently “favors the entry of 

default judgment . . . “ Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 

2014). Moreover, with regard to the possibility of excusable neglect, while there is 

always a theoretical possibility that defendants might claim an excuse on that basis, 

where the defendants “were properly served with the Complaint, the notice of entry of 

default, as well as the papers served in support of the instant motion,” as they were 

here, this factor also favors entry of default judgment. Shanghai Automation Instrument 

Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Finally, although cases 

should be decided upon their merits wherever possible, the fact that Rule 55(b), by its 

terms, permits default judgment demonstrates that “this preference standing alone, is not 

dispositive.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Security Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177

(C.D. Cal. 2002). Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has shown that default judgment is 

appropriate.

B. Attorneys’ Fees

Having determined, on the basis of Plaintiff’s Complaint and his application for 

default judgment, that his rights under both the ADA and the Unruh Act were violated, 

Plaintiff is entitled, as a prevailing party, to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees under 

both statutory frameworks. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). According 

to the Declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel, Mark Potter, he has spent a total of 8.8 hours 

litigating this matter. Citing his 22 years of practice in ADA and disability-related 

litigation, he seeks to be compensated for that time at the rate of $425.00 per hour. 

Potter Decl., ECF No. 12-4, ¶¶ 5-6. Potter consequently asks this Court to award 

attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,740.00, plus $440.00 in filing fees and services costs 

for a total of $4,180.00.

While Mr. Potter is unquestionably entitled to the fees and costs he claims, and 

although the 8.8 hours expended in this matter is admittedly modest, the Court still has a 

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duty to determine the reasonableness of the hourly rate he seeks. Once that amount is 

decided, then the lodestar recovery amount is derived by multiplying that reasonable 

hourly rate by the number of hours spent litigating the case. Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 

1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In Johnson v. Patel, No. 2:14-cv-02078-WBS-AC, 2015 WL 300740 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 22, 2015), this court analyzed another fee request made by the same counsel 

representing Plaintiff in this case. Following a review of applicable case law, the court 

determined that “the prevailing rate [for attorney’s fees under the ADA] is $250 per hour 

in the Sacramento division of the Eastern District of California for similar services by 

lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and quality.” Id. at * 4; citing 

Loskot v. D&K Spirits, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-00684-WBS-DAD, 2011 WL 567364 at * 5 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 15, 2011 (citing numerous Eastern District ADA cases where $250 was 

determined to be a reasonable rate on default judgment)); 2 Johnson v. Dhami, 

No. 2:14-cv-01150-KJM-AC, 2014 WL 4368665 at * 3 (same). Moreover, in Johnson v. 

Wayside Property, Inc., No. 2:13-1610 WBS AC, 2014 WL 6634324 at * 6 (E.D. Cal. 

2014), another case involving Plaintiff’s counsel, a district judge here in Sacramento 

found, in approving a $300 rate in a contested ADA case, that there was no evidence 

showing that Sacramento attorneys representing plaintiffs in routine disability access 

cases charge rates in excess of the $300. That case further cited yet another decision, 

made just seven months previously, to Mr. Potter in the amount of $300. Id. at * 5-6, 

discussing Johnson v. Allied Tractor Supply, No. 2:13-cv-01544-WBS-EFB, 2014 WL

1334006 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014).

No evidence has been presented in this proceeding that causes this Court to 

conclude that the prevailing Sacramento rate of $250-$300 as recently as two years ago 

has measurably increased. Consequently, Plaintiff is awarded $300 per hour for the 

 2 Although the Johnson v. Patel decision was subsequently vacated by Johnson v. Patel, 2:14-cv02078-WBS-AC, 2015 WL 3451753 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2015), the order was vacated because the 

judgment against Defendants was ultimately deemed to have been set aside, and not because its 

observations concerning the prevailing hourly rate for attorney’s fees were in any way misplaced had 

default been upheld.

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time expended by his counsel in this matter. Given the 8.8 hours in time expended, that 

yields a total fee award of $2,640.00. When added to the $440.00 in fees and costs and 

$8,000.00 claimed as statutory damages, the total amount of money damages to which 

Plaintiff is entitled is $11,080.00.

CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, and upon review of the Court files, the application for 

default judgment, the declaration submitted in support of the default judgment, and the 

other evidence presented, Plaintiff’s Application for Default Judgment (ECF No. 12) is 

accordingly GRANTED. It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that Plaintiff shall 

have judgment in his favor in the amount of $11,080.00 against Defendants. In addition, 

Defendants are ordered to provide compliant accessible parking spaces at their property 

located at or about, 1140 N. Wilson Way, Stockton, California, in compliance with the 

Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2017

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