Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01384/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01384-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Manfredi
Defendant
Arthur Matus
Plaintiff
Paul Van Dalen
Defendant

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Although Sgt. Manfredi and Officer Van Dalen (collectively “defendants”) styled their motion as seeking

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default judgment, this Court construes defendants’ papers to seek to dismiss plaintiff’s action as a discovery sanction.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR MATUS, CASE NO. CV F 05-1384 AWI LJO

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

TERMINATING DISCOVERY SANCTION

vs. (Doc. 35.)

SGT. RICHARD MANFREDI, JR.,

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

In this excessive force action, defendants Fresno Police Department Sergeant Michael Manfredi

(“Sgt. Manfredi”) and Fresno Police Department officer Paul Van Dalen (“Officer Van Dalen”) seek a

terminating sanction for plaintiff Arthur Matus’ (“plaintiff’s”) disobedience of this Court’s order to

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provide discovery responses. Plaintiff filed no timely papers to oppose defendants’ discovery sanction

motion. This Court considered defendants’ discovery sanction motion on the record, pursuant to this

Court’s Local Rule 78-230(c) and (m). For the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS

defendants’ discovery sanction motion to dismiss this action with prejudice for plaintiff’s failure to

comply with this Court’s order to provide discovery responses.

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BACKGROUND

On November 2, 2005, plaintiff filed his complaint to allege excessive force claims against

defendants arising out of his July 22, 2005 arrest. In response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, this

Court’s April 19, 2006 order concluded: “In all further proceedings in this action, plaintiff’s claim

alleging excessive force during his arrest will be construed and resolved as a claim of excessive force

in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” On May 24, 2006, defendants each served plaintiff with a set

of interrogatories to seek information to support plaintiff’s claims and alleged damages and basic

information regarding plaintiff. Sgt. Manfredi also served document requests to seek documents to

support plaintiff’s claims and alleged damages. Plaintiff responded to the interrogatories and document

requests with meritless objections and references to his complaint although defendants’ discovery sought

information easily available to and known by plaintiff. 

This Court’s July 17, 2006 order (“July 17 order”) compelled plaintiff to:

1. SERVE complete, straightforward responses to Officers Van Dalen and

Manfredi’s respective first sets of interrogatories; and

2. SERVE complete, straightforward responses to Officer Manfredi’s first set of

document requests and to produce to defense counsel all documents and things

in plaintiff’s possession, custody and control and subject to the document

requests.

The July 17 order admonished plaintiff that “failure to comply with this order and with plaintiff’s

discovery obligations may result in a defense motion and/or this Court’s order to dismiss this

action.” (Bold in original.)

On August 7, 2006, defendants filed their papers for a discovery sanction based on plaintiff’s

failure to provide further discovery responses to comply with the July 17 order. Plaintiff filed no timely

opposition papers.

DISCUSSION

Discovery Sanctions

Under F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2), if a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery” a

court “may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,” including to:

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1. Designate facts as established;

2. Refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims;

3. Prohibit the disobedient party from introducing designated matters in evidence;

4. Strike out pleadings or parts thereof;

5. Stay further proceedings until an order is obeyed;

6. Dismiss an action, proceeding or any part thereof; or

7. Render judgment by default against the disobedient party.

F.R.Civ.P. 37 authorizes a district court, in its discretion, to impose a wide range of sanctions when a

party fails to comply with the rules of discovery or with court orders enforcing those rules. National

Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2778 (1976); Wyle v. R.J.

Reynolds Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9 Cir. 1983); United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire th

Insurance Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9 Cir. 1980). th

Although the central factor to a F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) sanction is “justice,” Valley Engineers, Inc.

v. Electric Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9 Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064, 119 S.Ct. th

1455 (1999), the sanction “must be specifically related to the particular ‘claim’ which was at issue in

the order to provide discovery.” Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 707, 102

S.Ct. 2099 (1982). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the need for F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)

sanctions:

Litigants who are willful in halting the discovery process act in opposition to the

authority of the court and cause impermissible prejudice to their opponents. It is even

more important to note, in this era of crowded dockets, that they also deprive other

litigants of an opportunity to use the courts as a serious dispute-settlement mechanism.

G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of San Jose, 577 F.2d 645, 647 (9 Cir. 1978). th

“Where it is determined that counsel or a party has acted willfully or in bad faith in failing to

comply with rules of discovery or with court orders enforcing the rules or in flagrant disregard of those

rules or orders, it is within the discretion of the trial court to dismiss the action or to render judgment

by default against the party responsible for noncompliance.” G-K Properties, 577 F.2d at 647. “Where

the drastic sanctions of dismissal or default are imposed . . . the losing party’s non-compliance must be

due to willfulness, fault or bad faith.” Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 946 (9 Cir. 1993); th

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Fjelstad v. American Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9 Cir. 1985). “[D]isobedient conduct

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not shown to be outside the control of the litigant is all that is required to demonstrate willfulness, bad

faith, or fault.” Henry, 983 F.2d at 948 (quoting Fjelstad, 762 F.2d at 1341.) A single willful violation

may suffice depending on the circumstances. Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at 1056.

In National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, the United States Supreme Court

explained the rationale for severe F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) sanctions:

. . . as in other areas of the law, the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by

statute or rule must be available to the District Court in appropriate cases, not merely to

penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter

those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such deterrent.

Nonetheless, sanctions which interfere with “a litigant’s claim or defenses violate due process when

imposed merely for punishment of an infraction that did not threaten to interfere with the rightful

decision of the case.” Wyle, 709 F.2d at 591.

Dismissal and default judgment are authorized only in “extreme circumstances.” See Fjelstad,

762 F.2d at 1338. “So, too, are orders taking the plaintiff’s allegations as established and awarding

judgment to the plaintiff on that basis.” United States v. Kahaluu Constr. Co., Inc., 857 F.2d 600, 603

(9 Cir. 1988). Terminating sanctions are appropriatewhere a “pattern of deception and discovery abuse th

made it impossible” for the district court to conduct a trial “with any reasonable assurance that the truth

would be available.” See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 352 (9

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Cir. 1995). To determine whether to impose a severe sanction of dismissal or default, a court considers:

1. The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation;

2. The court’s need to manage its docket;

3. The risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions;

4. The public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and

5. The availability of less drastic sanctions.

Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at1057; In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9 Cir. 1996); Henry, 983 th

F.2d at 948; Kahaluu Constr., 857 F.2d at 603; Thompson v. Housing Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782

F.2d 829, 831 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 112 (1986). th

“What is most critical for case-dispositive sanctions, regarding risk of prejudice and of less

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drastic sanctions, is whether the discovery violations ‘threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of

the case.’” Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Adriana International Corp. v. Thoeren, 913

F.2d 1406, 1412 (9 Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109, 111 S.Ct. 1019 (1991)). Prejudice arises th

when the ability to go to trial of the party seeking F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) sanctions is impaired. Adriana

International, 913 F.2d at 1412. “Failure to produce documents as ordered, however, is considered

sufficient prejudice. . . . [C]ontinuing refusal to comply with court-ordered production of documents

constitutes interference with the rightful decision of the case.” Adriana International, 913 F.2d at 1412.

However, delay alone does not warrant a terminating sanction. See Kahaluu Constr., 857 F.2d at 604;

Mir v. Fosburg, 706 F.2d 916, 919, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1983). th

A three-part analysis determines whether a court “properly considered the adequacy of less

drastic sanctions: (1) did the court explicitly discuss the feasibility of less drastic sanctions and explain

why alternative sanctions would be inappropriate, (2) did the court implement alternative sanctions

before ordering dismissal, and (3) did the court warn the party of the possibility of dismissal before

actually ordering dismissal?” Adriana International, 913 F.2d at 1412-1413. “But despite all this

elaboration of factors, we have said that it is not always necessary for the court to impose less serious

sanctions first, or to give any explicit warning.” Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at 1057.

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to defendants’ requested dismissal based on

plaintiffs’ disobedience of the July 17 order.

The import of defendant’s dismissal request is that plaintiff has failed to comply with the July

17 order to provide responses to defendants’ simple interrogatories and document requests seeking

information to support plaintiff’s claims and alleged damages and basic information regarding plaintiff.

Plaintiff has ignored the July 17 order and defendants’ motion. The result is plaintiff’s halting of the

discovery process and blatant disregard of this Court’s authority to prevent defendants to defend

plaintiff’s claims and prepare for trial. Plaintiff makes no attempt to demonstrate that responding to

defendants’ basic discovery is beyond his control. Plaintiff appears content to rest on his meritless

objections and unsatisfactory responses. Plaintiff fails to substantiate continuing delay and obstruction

to defendants’ legitimate discovery. Plaintiff’s inaction interferes with the rightful decision of this

action.

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The public policy factors enumerated above justify dismissal. Plaintiff’s inaction continues to

plague this Court and defendants and resolution of this action on the merits with unjustified delay.

Plaintiff’s obstruction has diverted this Court’s attention from other matters and thwarted docket

management. Defendants’ prejudice continues with their inability to conduct discovery to seek

resolution by dispositive motion or otherwise, especially given that defendants’ discovery seeks basic

information as to plaintiff’s claims and alleged damages. Plaintiff has ignored the July 17 order’s

specific admonishment that “failure to comply with this order and with plaintiff’s discovery

obligations may result in a defense motion and/or this Court’s order to dismiss this action.” (Bold

in original.) Such admonishment mitigates the policy of disposition of cases on their merits. In light

of plaintiff’s failure to divulge basic information at his disposal, less drastic sanctions would serve no

purpose other than delay and further prejudice to defendants. As noted by defendants, “there is no

indication that plaintiff will actually prosecute this case.” Plaintiff controls whether he will provide

meaningful responses to defendants’ basic discovery. He has chosen not to participate in defendants’

legitimate discovery and must face the consequences. 

F.R.Civ.P. 41(b) Dismissal

Alternatively, defendants seek dismissal under F.R.Civ.P. 41(b) which provides in pertinent part:

For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of

court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the

defendant. 

A district court has inherent power to control its docket and may impose sanctions, including when

appropriate, default or dismissal. Thompson, 782 F.2d at 831. Dismissal is appropriate for failure to

comply with pretrial procedures mandated by local rules and court orders. Thompson, 782 F.2d at 831.

In addressing dismissal, a district court needs to weigh factors addressed above, namely (1) the public’s

interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of

prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5)

the availability of less drastic sanctions. Thompson, 782 F.2d at 831. A district judge should consider

less drastic alternatives to a F.R.Civ.P. 41(b) dismissal but “need not exhaust them all before finally

dismissing a case.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9 Cir. 1996) (quoting Von Poppenheim th

v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm’n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1054 (9 Cir. 1971)). th

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F.R.Civ.P. 41(b) further bolsters dismissal of plaintiff’s action given his disobedience of the July

17 order and failure to participate in discovery and in turn, to pursue this action, including a timely

opposition to defendants’ motion.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. GRANTS defendants’ discovery sanction motion to dismiss this action with prejudice

for plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the July 17 order to provide discovery responses;

and

2. DIRECTS this Court’s clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendants Richard Manfredi,

Jr. and Paul Van Dalen and against plaintiff Arthur Matus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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