Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00354/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00354-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Avila
Defendant
Sean Dias
Plaintiff
Dominick Garay
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN DIAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM AVILA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00354-SAB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

AND DIRECTING THE CLERK OF THE 

COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN THIS 

MATTER TO A DISTRICT JUDGE

(ECF No. 4)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN TWENTYONE (21) DAYS

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 4.) 

Following amendment of the Local Rules effective March 1, 2022, a certain percentage 

of civil cases shall be directly assigned to a Magistrate Judge only, with consent or declination of 

consent forms due within 90 days from the date of filing of the action. L.R. App. A(m)(1). This 

action has been directly assigned to a Magistrate Judge only. Not all parties have appeared or 

filed consent or declination of consent forms in this action yet. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 302(c)(7), and Local Rule Appendix A, subsection (m), the Court shall 

direct the Clerk of the Court to assign a District Judge to this action and the Court shall issue 

findings and recommendations as to the pending motion to dismiss. 

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For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss be granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff is required to comply with the legal standard 

set forth below in setting forth his claims in any amended complaint.

I.

BACKGROUND

Sean Dias (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action in the California 

Superior Court in the County of Tulare on March 7, 2024, alleging violations of the First and 

Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Compl., ECF 1 at 6-14.1) Plaintiff 

alleges that on March 30, 2022, at Santa Fe Street and Center Avenue in Visalia, California, 

Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution by 

a “pretextual traffic stop, illegal search including warrantless blood draw without probable cause, 

consent or legally justifying exigent circumstances.” (Compl. 10.) Plaintiff alleges a battery 

claim under California law based on the allegedly illegal blood draw. (Compl. 11.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Avila and Garay and the State of California violated 

his rights under the First Amendment in response to his criticism and complaints about June 8, 

2021, among other dates. Around June 10, 2021, Plaintiff attempted to file a written complaint 

about his mistreatment by Defendants Avila and Garay, including pretextual traffic stops but was 

denied a form to do so. Plaintiff alleges retaliation by a series of pretextual traffic stops 

ostensibly premised upon false reasons but that were taken with a retaliatory motive, including 

June 8, 2021, through the date of Plaintiff’s arrest on March 30, 2022. (Compl. 12.) 

Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim for conversion under California law against Defendants 

Avila and Garay, stating on March 30, 2022, at Santa Fe Street and Center Avenue in Visalia, 

California, there was “[t]heft-conversion of Plaintiff’s dash camera, 2 Baofeng radios-scanners 

from Plaintiff’s vehicle.” (Compl. 13.)

On March 26, 2024, William Avila and Dominick Garay (“Defendants”) removed this

action to the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) On March 27, 2024, Defendants filed a 

1 All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the 

CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

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motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Defs.’ Mot. 

Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 4.) The motion to dismiss was served on Plaintiff at his address of 

record on March 27, 2024. (Cert. of Service, ECF No. 4 at 3.) On April 15, 2024, Defendants 

filed a notice that no opposition to the motion to dismiss had been served. (ECF No. 5.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on 

the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A 

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding a motion to dismiss, “[a]ll allegations 

of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). The pleading 

standard under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require “ ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed-me 

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, all wellpleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. However, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. To avoid a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint 

must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570.

In deciding whether a complaint states a claim, the Ninth Circuit has found that two 

principles apply. First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth the allegations in the complaint 

“may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations 

of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Second, so that it is not unfair 

to require the defendant to be subjected to the expenses associated with discovery and continued 

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litigation, the factual allegations of the complaint, which are taken as true, must plausibly 

suggest an entitlement to relief. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. “Dismissal is proper only where there 

is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable 

legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 

699 (9th Cir.1988)). 

B. Section 1983

Plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of his constitutional rights arise under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). To state a claim under section 1983, 

Plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted under color of state law and (2) each 

defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long, 442 F.3d at 

1185. There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and therefore, each 

defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. 

To bring a claim under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Simmons v. 

Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 

F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Further, the complaint must allege that 

every defendant acted with the requisite state of mind to violate the underlying constitutional 

provision. OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012).

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendants bring the instant motion arguing that the complaint fails to state sufficient 

facts to show an entitlement to relief above the speculative level for each of the causes of action. 

(Mot. 1.) Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any content that can be 

properly recognized as a factual allegation that is to be afforded the presumption of truth in 

evaluating whether he has stated a cognizable claim. (Mot. 3.) Defendants contend that the only 

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discernable factual content from Plaintiff’s complaint is that he interacted with Defendants on 

March 30, 2022, and there are no facts alleged regarding what transpired on that date that would 

support a claim. (Mot. 4.) 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment cause of action merely provides 

legal conclusions and is void of any facts regarding how the traffic stop was pretextual or how 

any search or the blood draw was illegal under the circumstances. Defendants argue that each 

cause of action is similarly deficient because all are pled in the same conclusory fashion without 

any facts that would state a plausible claim for relief. (Mot. 4.)

Defendants seek to have the motion to dismiss granted and for Plaintiff to be ordered to 

state his claims consistent with the federal pleading standards. (Mot. 5.) 

A. Fourth Amendment Claims

The Fourth Amendment provides that ‘the right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[T]he Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States 

through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 

387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). “To establish a viable Fourth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must 

show not only that there was a search and seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment, 

but also that said search and seizure was unreasonable and conducted without consent.” Rakas v. 

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 796–97 (9th Cir. 1983).

A police officer may make a brief investigatory stop to investigate possible criminal 

behavior when he has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. U.S. v. MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). The officer “must be able to articulate more than 

an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion’ or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.” Montero-Camargo, 

208 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 (2000)). “[R]easonable 

suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific, articulable facts which, when considered 

with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for particularized suspicion.” MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d at 1129. This requires an assessment based on the totality of the 

circumstances and the circumstances must arouse reasonable suspicion that the particular 

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individual being stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that on March 30, 2022, at Santa Fe Street and Center Avenue in Visalia, 

California, Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution by a “pretextual traffic stop, illegal search including warrantless blood draw without 

probable cause, consent or legally justifying exigent circumstances.” (Compl. 10.) Here,

Plaintiff has merely alleged a cause of action, violation of the Fourth Amendment, along with 

mere conclusory statements of an illegal search and seizure which do not suffice to state a 

plausible claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

1. Pretextual traffic stop

“It is well established that a vehicle stop ... effectuates a seizure within the meaning of 

the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000)). “A pretextual stop occurs when the 

police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person or place, or to 

interrogate a person, for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable 

suspicion necessary to support a stop.” United States v. Hernandez, 55 F.3d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 

1995) (quoting United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir.1994) and United States v. 

Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir.1988)).

While Plaintiff alleges that there was a pretextual traffic stop, the subjective motivation 

of the officers does not invalidate a search where reasonable suspicion exists that an individual is 

engaged in criminal activity. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996); see also

Orozco, 858 F.3d at 1210 (“Where the circumstances of a vehicle stop, viewed objectively, are 

sufficient to justify the detention based on either reasonable suspicion or probable cause that a 

crime has been committed, the subjective intent of the law enforcement officers is irrelevant.”);

United States v. Cruz, 400 F.Supp.3d 844, 851 (D. Ariz. 2019) (“Even if a stop is pretextual, it 

does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it was supported by reasonable suspicion.”). Plaintiff 

has alleged no facts to support the allegation that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. 

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim based on the traffic stop.

///

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2. Warrantless blood draw

Generally, a blood test obtained without a warrant or consent violates the Fourth 

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 

579 U.S. 438, 474 (2016). A warrantless blood test may only be obtained where exigent 

circumstances exist based on a case-by-case assessment of all the facts and circumstances of the 

particular case. Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 457 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 151 

(2013)).

While Plaintiff alleges a warrantless blood draw without his consent, he has merely 

recited the elements of the cause of action without any factual allegations that would lead the 

Court to reasonably infer that the named defendants are liable for the conduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. The mere allegation 

that Plaintiff was subjected to a warrantless blood draw without his consent or any exigent 

circumstances fails to state any facts by which the Court can conclude that his rights were 

violated, nor does it link any conduct by Defendants Avila or Garay to the alleged violation of 

his rights. Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim based upon the alleged blood draw.

3. Conclusion

To avoid a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, and Plaintiff’s 

complaint is devoid of any allegations by which the Court could reasonably infer that 

Defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment.

B. Retaliation under the First Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that his rights under the First Amendment were violated by Defendants 

Avila, Garay, and the State of California stating he suffered retaliation by being refused a form to 

file a written complaint and by pretextual traffic stops. 

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Generally, “ ‘the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an 

individual to retaliatory actions’ for engaging in protected speech.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 

___, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). To 

state a claim for retaliation against a government official in violation of the First Amendment, a 

plaintiff must plead that “(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he 

was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness 

from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal 

relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action.” Mulligan v. 

Nichols, 835 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blair v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 608 F.3d 540, 543 

(9th Cir. 2010)). 

“[T]he First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge 

directed at police officers.” Duran v. City of Douglas, Ariz., 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 

1990) (quoting City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 460 (1987)). Where an official takes 

adverse action against someone based on a forbidden motive, and “non-retaliatory grounds are in 

fact insufficient to provoke the adverse consequences,” the person injured may seek relief by 

bringing a First Amendment claim. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Hartman, 547 U.S. at 

256). To prevail on a claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, the plaintiff must 

show “a ‘causal connection’ between the government defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the 

plaintiff’s ‘subsequent injury.’ ” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Hartman, 547 U.S. at 259).

It is not sufficient to show that the official acted with a retaliatory motive toward the 

plaintiff, rather the motive must cause the injury. It must be a “but-for” cause; absent the 

retaliatory motive, the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken. Nieves, 

139 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260) (recognizing that although it “may be 

dishonorable to act with an unconstitutional motive,” an official’s “action colored by some 

degree of bad motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that action would have been 

taken anyway”). To state a claim for retaliatory arrest or prosecution, the “plaintiff must show 

that the retaliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the [arrest], and, if that showing 

is made, the defendant can prevail only by showing that the [arrest] would have been initiated 

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without respect to retaliation.” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1725 (quoting Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 

585 U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1945, 1952-53 (2018).

Plaintiff alleges that in response to criticism and complaints to Defendants Avila and 

Garay on or June 8, 2021, among other dates, he was denied the official form to file a complaint 

at the Highway Patrol Office in Visalia, California, on June 10, 2021. (Compl. 12.) However, 

the complaint contains no facts regarding the complaints made to Defendants Avila and Garay 

and there is no allegation that Defendants Avila and Garay refused to provide the complaint 

form. Plaintiff has failed to link Defendants Avila and Garay to the conduct alleged. Jones, 297 

F.3d at 934. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to a series of pretextual traffic stops based on false 

reasons that were actually based upon an unconstitutional retaliatory motive, including June 8, 

2021, through his arrest on March 30, 2022. Although a court must accept as true all factual 

allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as 

true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ 

a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Therefore,

the complaint must contain sufficient factual content for the court to draw the reasonable 

conclusion that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Here, Plaintiff has alleged no facts by which the Court can infer that any named 

defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not included any factual 

allegations regarding the “pretextual” stops, what his complaints were, or who he complained to. 

The mere conclusory statement that an action was retaliatory is not entitled to the presumption of 

truth. To state a claim, Plaintiff must include supporting facts that provide sufficient information 

for the Court to reasonably infer that the alleged violation occurred. 

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.

C. State Law Claims

Plaintiff also brings claims for conversion and battery under California law. 

Initially, Plaintiff is advised that under the California Government Claims Act (“GCA”), 

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“no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for 

which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 ... until a written claim 

therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has 

been deemed to have been rejected.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4. 

The GCA “establishes certain conditions precedent to the filing of a lawsuit against a 

public entity. As relevant here, a plaintiff must timely file a claim for money or damages with 

the public entity. (§ 911.2.) The failure to do so bars the plaintiff from bringing suit against that 

entity. (§ 945.4.)” Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 246 (2019)

(citations omitted.); see also Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th 

Cir. 1988). To state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance 

with the GCA. Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.6; State v. Superior Court of Kings County (Bodde), 32 

Cal.4th 1234, 1244 (Cal. 2004). “[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance 

with the requirement subjects a compliant to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of 

action.” Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1239.

The purpose of the GCA is “to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable 

it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of 

litigation.” Stockett v. Assoc. of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Insurance Authority, 

34 Cal.4th 441, 446 (2004) (quoting City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455 

(1974)). The claim does not need to contain the detail and specificity required of a complaint 

filed in court, but it must fairly describe what the defendant is alleged to have done so the entity 

can investigate and evaluate the claims. Stockett, 34 Cal.4th at 446. 

Pursuant to the GCA, a claim must show “the date, place and other circumstances of the 

occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.” § 910(c). To comply with the 

GCA, the facts contained in the written claim form must correspond with the facts alleged in the 

complaint to fairly reflect the written claim. Blair v. Superior Court, 218 Cal.App.3d 221, 223-

24 (1990). A claim is not sufficient where it is entirely based upon a different set of facts from 

those stated in the complaint. Stevenson v. San Francisco Housing Authority, 24 Cal.App.4th 

269, 277 (1994). 

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If an injured party fails to present a timely claim, the party can present a written 

application to the public entity for leave to present the claim. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4(a). 

However, the application must be presented within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year 

after the accrual of the cause of action and must state the reason for the delay in submitting the 

claim. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4(b). If the agency denies the application to present a late claim, 

the party may petition to the court for an order of relief. Cal. Gov’t Code § 946.6(a). 

Here, Plaintiff checked the box that he has complied with applicable claim statutes, but 

the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations demonstrating compliance with the GCA. 

Plaintiff is required to allege facts demonstrating compliance with the GCA to state a claim 

under California law. Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1239.

Further, Plaintiff’s state law claims fail to plead sufficient facts for the Court to infer that 

the named defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. 

1. Battery

Plaintiff alleges a warrantless blood draw without probable cause, consent or legally 

justifying exigent circumstances on March 30, 2022, which he brings as a claim of battery. 

However, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to link Defendants Avila or Garay to the conduct 

alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for battery. 

To prevail on a claim for battery under California law Plaintiff must show “(1) the 

defendant touched the plaintiff or caused the plaintiff to be touched with the intent to harm or 

offend the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) the plaintiff was harmed 

or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in plaintiff’s situation would 

have been offended by the touching.” Avina v. United States, 681 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 

2012); Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 526–27 (2009). “A state law battery claim is 

a counterpart to a federal claim of excessive use of force. In both, a plaintiff must prove that the 

peace officer’s use of force was unreasonable.” Brown, 171 Cal.App.4th at 527. A claim that a 

police officer used excessive force during an “arrest, investigatory stop or other ‘seizure’ of a 

free citizen are analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution.” Id. at 527 (quoting Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal.App.4th 

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1077, 1102 ((2004)). The question is whether a peace officer’s actions were objectively 

reasonable based on the facts and circumstances confronting the peace officer. Brown, 171 

Cal.App.4th at 527 (quoting Munoz, 120 Cal.App.4th at 1102).

2. Conversion

Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendants Avila and Garay for conversion stating “theftconversion of Plaintiff’s dash camera, 2 Baofeng radios-scanners from Plaintiff’s vehicle on 

March 30, 2022. (Compl. 13.) Again, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts by which the Court

can reasonably infer that Defendants Avila and Garay are liable for the conversion of Plaintiff’s 

property. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for conversion.

“The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to 

possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of 

property rights; and (3) damages.” Duenas v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. EDCV 21-01645 (SPX), 

2022 WL 2163014, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2022) (quoting Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora, 

223 Cal. App. 4th 202, 208 (2014); see also Armstrong v. Sexson, No. CIV.S-06-2200 LKK 

EFB, 2007 WL 1219297, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007); Berry v. Frazier, 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 

1271 (2023), as modified on denial of reh’g (May 15, 2023), review denied (Aug. 9, 2023). A 

wrongful intent or motive is not required, but the defendant’s conduct must be knowing and 

intentional. Berry, 90 Cal.App.5th at 1271.

D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff brings his First Amendment retaliation claim against the State of California. 

(Compl. 12.) “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a 

state [and] its agencies . . .” Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 

2007), “regardless of the relief sought, unless the state unequivocally consents to a waiver of its 

immunity,” Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Washington, 176 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1999); 

see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996). Further, “a suit against 

state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages 

or injunctive relief.” Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity has not been abrogated with respect to claims brought under 

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section 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341–42 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781–

82 (1978). Plaintiff cannot bring his claims in this action against the State of California.

E. Leave to Amend

Defendants request that Plaintiff be ordered to file a complaint that complies with the 

federal pleading rules. Courts freely grant leave to amend a complaint which has been 

dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so 

requires.”); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 

1986) (“If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted 

unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (same). Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to file an 

amended complaint.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any factual allegations to state a 

claim for relief. The Court recommends that Defendants Avila and Garay’s motion to dismiss be 

granted.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed March 27, 2024, be GRANTED; and

2. Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint to cure the defects in his 

pleading.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within twentyone (21) days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these 

findings and recommendations with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document 

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The 

district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

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time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2024 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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