Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02312/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02312-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Gerald Davis
Defendant
Protective Life Insurance Company
Plaintiff
Richard Douglas Rison
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE No. 2:10-cv-02312-MCE-EFB

COMPANY, 

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DONALD GERALD DAVIS; RICHARD

DOUGLAS RISON,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Protective Life Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”)

initiated this interpleader action against Defendants Donald

Gerald Davis (“Davis”) and Richard Douglas Rison (“Rison”) on

August 27, 2010. Presently before the Court is Rison’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). For the following reasons,

Rison’s Motion is DENIED.1

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. R. 230(g). 

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BACKGROUND

Davis and Rison both claim to be the beneficiary of a

$500,000 life insurance policy (“Policy”) issued by Plaintiff to

Cynthia Davis (“Decedent”), who was Rison’s mother and Davis’s

wife. Prior to the spring of 2010, Davis was listed as the

Policy beneficiary. However, just a few weeks prior to

Decedent’s death, on approximately April 27, 2010, a Service

Request Form was submitted to Plaintiff, changing the Policy

beneficiary to Rison. Rison thus claims he should receive the

proceeds of Decedent’s policy to the exclusion of anyone else. 

Davis contends to the contrary that Decedent only changed the

beneficiary on her Policy from Davis to Rison on the condition

that Rison would return the proceeds to Decedent or Davis, or

give up his beneficiary status at some point in the future,

namely, after the Decedent and Davis filed for bankruptcy relief,

so that the Policy proceeds, among other assets, could

essentially be hidden from the bankruptcy estate. Some

background facts are thus necessary to understand the parties’

current dispute. 

According to Davis, in 2009, Davis and Decedent fell behind

on their mortgage. Deposition of Donald Gerald Davis (“Davis

Dep.”), 10:11-11:25. In June of 2009, Decedent was diagnosed

with ovarian cancer. Id., 20:12-14. Davis was also later

diagnosed with colon cancer. Id., 51:23-52:4. Mounting medical

bills purportedly added to the couple’s money troubles. Id.,

57:25-58:12; Deposition of Richard Douglas Rison (“Rison Dep.”),

29:9-17, 60:19-61:7, 68:22-70:13. 

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Decedent allegedly thereafter expressed concern about losing the

couple’s home. Davis Dep., 69:9-71:5. Accordingly, as Davis

testified in his deposition, the couple hatched a plan to

transfer their assets to third parties who would return those

assets to the couple once any potential bankruptcy proceedings

were completed. Davis Dep., 66:25-68:7. 

Plaintiff was eventually hospitalized in the spring of 2010,

first from March 20 through April 20, and then from April 21

through April 27. On March, 25, 2010, while in the hospital, the

above-mentioned Service Request Form was submitted to Plaintiff,

changing the beneficiary under the Policy to Rison. According to

Rison, Decedent signed the beneficiary change form “knowingly,

voluntarily and with the requisite mental capacity.” Rison’s

Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Rison’s

SSUMF”), Nos. 2, 4. 

More specifically, Rison claims that during Decedent’s March

hospital stay, she called her half-sister, Judy Stiedl

(“Stiedl”), and asked that she come visit. Deposition of Judith

Stiedl (“Stiedl Dep.”), 76:10-18. Stiedl, who lives in Alaska,

arrived shortly thereafter. Id., 88:23-89:2. Upon her arrival,

Decedent informed Stiedl that doctors had told her to “get her

affairs in order.” Id., 103:5-20. Decedent then indicated she

had previously filled out forms to change her life insurance

beneficiary from Davis back to Rison. Id., 103:23-104:7. When

Decedent realized that she had never received a confirmation that

any such Policy changes were actually made, however, Decedent

determined it necessary to find out who was “on [her] life

insurance.” Id., 102:15-103:2. 

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Decedent thus asked Stiedl to call Rison and ask him to bring to

the hospital the “little metal box” in which Decedent’s life

insurance information was contained. Id., 108:12-22. Rison did

as asked and, the following morning, Decedent asked Stiedl to

call Plaintiff to identify the beneficiary listed on the Policy. 

Id., 108:22-25; 109:17-111:9. After being informed Davis was the

beneficiary, Stiedl requested that Plaintiff fax a beneficiary

change form to Decedent. Id., 111:7-11. 

Upon receiving that form, which was the above-mentioned

Service Request Form, Decedent instructed Stiedl as to how it

should be completed. Id., 100:3-102:14. Decedent purportedly

signed the form changing her beneficiary to Rison and dictated a

cover letter to be included. Id., 113:19-114:4. The Service

Request Form was faxed back to Plaintiff on March 25, after which

Decedent received a confirmation from Plaintiff that her

beneficiary had in fact been updated. Id., 113:22-24;

Declaration of Stephen T. Doge (“Hodge Decl.”), ¶ 4, Exh. C. 

According to the deposition testimony of Rison and Stiedl,

Decedent was alert, clear and coherent during this time. Rison

Dep., 95:10-11, 109:22-110:5; Stiedl Dep., 154:13-25. Hospital

records further indicate Plaintiff was awake, alert and oriented. 

Hodge Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. D. In addition, friends who visited

Decedent also found her to be mentally clear, alert and coherent. 

Declaration of Cindy Castle, ¶ 5; Declaration of Ricky M.

Grimshaw, ¶ 4; Declaration of William Douglas Rison, ¶ 4. 

Davis, however, paints a different picture of Decedent’s

mental and physical state at the time the beneficiary change form

was submitted. 

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According to Davis, Decedent’s “reactions were slow and the

ability to understand things said to her were slowed and

affected.” Davis’s Response to Rison’s SSUMF, No. 4 (citing

Davis Dep., 24:14-19; 25:1-20; 35:18-36:11; 88:23-89:6; 89:19-

90:11; 96:18-97:22; 100:1-15). In addition, Davis “observed

problems with [Decedent’s] memory and understanding and

responding to questions with confusion and conversation

problems.” Id. Davis also witnessed what he believed to be

Decedent’s “periods of incoherency and shouting out odd comments

on occasions.” Id. 

Davis likewise has his own take on the events underlying

Decedent’s decision to change her Policy beneficiary. According

to Davis, he only discovered Decedent had changed her beneficiary

when he opened the confirmation received from Plaintiff in the

mail. Rison Dep., 124:12-18; Stiedl Dep., 117:15-17; Davis Dep.,

79:17-81:6. Davis eventually asked Decedent why she made the

change to her Policy, and she responded that she still intended

to file bankruptcy and thus intended to put the assets, including

the Policy, into Rison’s name for a temporary period to end upon

the completion of any bankruptcy proceedings. Davis Dep.,

79:17-81:6. 

Davis further contends that, both before and after

Decedent’s death, he and Rison engaged in several discussions

with respect to the Policy and other assets. For example, Davis

recalls a conversation in which Davis indicated he believed Rison

was designated as the Policy beneficiary only to protect any

proceeds from being included in the bankruptcy estate. Davis

Dep., 81:20-82:14. Rison purportedly said nothing, shook his

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head from side to side, and walked away. Id. In addition, in

another conversation, Rison purportedly indicated that “if

[Davis] want[ed] any of his money, he need[ed] to just be quiet.” 

Rison Dep., 140:19-143:12. 

Given the above record, Protective was unable to determine

whether the Policy proceeds are payable to Davis or Rison. 

Plaintiff thus deposited those benefits with the Court and filed

its Complaint in Interpleader asking the Court to resolve the

parties’ dispute. Plaintiff has since been discharged from this

action. On February 23, 2012, Rison moved for summary judgment,

arguing Davis cannot prove Decedent changed her beneficiary as

the result of any fraud or undue influence or attributable to

Decedent’s lack of mental capacity. Given the factual disputes

presently before the Court, Rison’s Motion is DENIED.2

///

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///

 Both parties filed objections to the other party’s 2

evidence. To the extent Rison objects to Davis’s evidence as

irrelevant, his objections are overruled. The remaining

objections are overruled as moot because the evidence objected to

was not necessary to resolution of the instant Motion.

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STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations..., admissions interrogatory answers,

or other materials” “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defenseor the part of each claim or defense–on which summary judgment is

sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374,

378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the

initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file together with

the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Schuylkill and Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson,

81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)). As the Supreme Court explained,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule

56(c)), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... 

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Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Rison moves for summary judgment on the grounds that he is

the person named as beneficiary on the Policy, and Davis is

unable to show any fraud, lack of capacity or undue influence

affected Decedent’s decision to change the beneficiary from Davis

to Rison. Rison believes Decedent acted of her own free will in

making the above Policy change. Moreover, Rison argues there is

no evidence in the record to indicate Decedent lacked her

decision-making faculties or that Rison acted in any way to

influence his mother’s decision. In fact, according to Rison,

“his only ‘involvement’ in th[e] process was to bring the ‘little

metal box’ containing his mother’s insurance information to her

at the hospital - which was pursuant to his mother’s request.” 

Motion, 8:24-26. 

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Davis disputes Rison’s characterization of the above events

and argues that the issue of capacity is not relevant to whether

Decedent was fraudulently induced or unduly influenced to change

the beneficiary on her Policy. To the contrary, Davis believes

that the real issue in this case is why Decedent changed her

Policy beneficiary in the first place. According to Davis,

Decedent made the change as part of the couple’s plan to protect

their assets from being included in their anticipated bankruptcy

estate. Pursuant to this theory, Davis believes Rison is holding

several assets, including the Policy proceeds if released to him,

in a constructive or resulting trust for Davis. Davis seems to

be arguing, therefore, that Rison deceived or defrauded Decedent

into believing that if she transferred her assets to Rison, Rison

would hold them for Davis and give those assets back at an

appropriate time. Rison and Seidel both purportedly exercised

undue influence over Decedent to convince her to proceed with

those transfers. Finally, Davis indicates that Decedent may have

been all the more susceptible to the efforts of Rison and Stiedl

given her weakened mental state at the time. 

As is clear from the Court’s above recitation of the facts,

the parties hotly contest the reasons underlying Decedent’s

decision to change her beneficiary from Davis to Rison. Rison

incorrectly attempts to cast a number of Davis’s facts, namely

those pertaining to the financial woes of Davis and Decedent and

their plans to avoid including Decedent’s assets in a future

bankruptcy estate, as irrelevant, which they are not. Moreover,

Rison himself admits those facts are disputed. 

///

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See, e.g., Rison’s Response to Davis’s SSUMF, No. 4 (“Defendant

Rison disputes that Cynthia Davis changed the beneficiary on the

Policy to her son as part of a plan for the Davis’s to file

bankruptcy, and then have everything returned to them after the

bankruptcy was completed.”). The disputed facts going to those

issues, which will ultimately turn on witness credibility, are

not only material, they could prove to be dispositive. 

Accordingly, summary judgment in this case is entirely

inappropriate. Rison’s Motion is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons just stated, Rison’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 21), Rison’s Objections to Evidence (ECF

No. 33) and Davis’s Objections to Evidence (ECF No. 25) are

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2012

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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