Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00177/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00177-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delfina Leon Felix
Defendant
Joel Juarez
Defendant
Charley Noel Leon-Machado
Defendant
Erick Lopez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

JEFFREY A. SPIVAK

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

(1) JOEL JUAREZ (aka JOEL JUAREZLOPEZ, aka WUILBER LOPEZRODRIGUEZ, aka WILBERT LOPEZRODRIGUEZ), (2) DELFINA LEON FELIX, 

(3) ERICK LOPEZ, and

(4) CHARLEY NOEL LEON-MACHADO,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:19-CR-00177-NONE-SKO 

 

 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: April 20, 2020

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto

This case is set for status conference on April 20, 2020. On March 17, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to 

commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns 

related to COVID-19.

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

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judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the [event]. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial 

continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 20, 2020. 

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2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 20, 

2020, and to exclude time between April 20, 2020, and July 20, 2020, under Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case is 

voluminous and includes hours of recordings from controlled purchases, tens of investigative 

reports, hundreds of pictures, and other evidence. This case was a lengthy narcotics

investigation that lasted nearly a year. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to 

counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, review the 

charges, conduct investigation and research, review discovery and discuss potential resolution of 

the case.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 20, 2020 to July 20, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

///

///

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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 14, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ JEFFREY A. SPIVAK

JEFFREY A. SPIVAK

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: April 14, 2020 /s/ Virna Santos

Virna Santos

Counsel for Defendant 

Joel Juarez

(As approved by email 4/14/2020)

Dated: April 14, 2020 /s/ Mark Coleman

Mark Coleman

Counsel for Defendant 

Delfina Leon

(As approved by email 4/14/2020)

Dated: April 14, 2020 /s/ Monica Bermudez

Monica Bermudez

Counsel for Defendant 

Erick Lopez

(As approved by email 4/14/2020)

Dated: April 14, 2020 /s/ Dale Blickensetaff

Dale Blickenstaff

Counsel for Defendant 

Charley Leon-Machado

(As approved by voicemail

4/14/2020)

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: April 16, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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