Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01802/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01802-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Iron Oak Technologies, LLC
Appellant
Microsoft Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

IRON OAK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2019-1802

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Texas in No. 3:18-cv-00222-M, Chief 

Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn.

______________________

Decided: June 8, 2020

______________________

ROBERT JAMES MCAUGHAN, JR., McAughan Deaver 

PLLC, Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also 

represented by ALBERT BERTON DEAVER, JR. 

 JOSHUA JOHN FOUGERE, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by CONSTANTINE L. TRELA, JR., RICHARD ALAN CEDEROTH, 

Chicago, IL; MICHAEL J. BETTINGER, San Francisco, CA. 

 ______________________

Case: 19-1802 Document: 53 Page: 1 Filed: 06/08/2020
2 IRON OAK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge.

Iron Oak Technologies, LLC appeals from the Agreed 

Final Judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Texas in Microsoft Corporation’s declaratory judgment action. Because resolving an appeal of

the Agreed Final Judgment would require this court to adjudicate the issue of notice as to the defendants in ongoing

consolidated cases, which are not parties to Microsoft’s declaratory judgment action, the entire appeal as presented 

is not from a final decision within the scope of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision only to the extent it held that Iron Oak did not provide 

sufficient notice under 35 U.S.C. § 287 to Microsoft. But to 

the extent the district court’s final judgment purports to 

extend beyond the only defendant in this case, Microsoft, 

and to the sufficiency of notice under § 287 to defendants 

outside of this case, we do not have jurisdiction.

I

In 2016 and 2017, Iron Oak sued various laptop, tablet, 

and mobile device manufacturers (hereinafter, the Manufacturers and the Manufacturer Suits), alleging that the 

Manufacturers’ products and services infringed two of Iron 

Oak’s patents.1 According to Microsoft, the lawsuits 

1 These cases, consolidated in the Northern District of 

Texas, are: Fujitsu America, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:16-cv3319; Toshiba America Information Systems Inc., Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-3320; Asustek Computer Inc., Civil Action 

No. 3:16-cv-3322; Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Ltd., 

Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-1259; Sharp Electronics Corp., 

Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-2699; Lenovo (U.S.) Inc., Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-1539; Dell Inc., Civil Action No. 3:18-cv1542; and Acer America Corp., Civil Action No. 3:18-cv1543.

Case: 19-1802 Document: 53 Page: 2 Filed: 06/08/2020
IRON OAK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 3

implicated Microsoft software and products installed on 

the manufacturers’ devices, and so Microsoft filed suit 

against Iron Oak “seeking a declaratory judgment action 

that Microsoft has not infringed, induced others to infringe, 

or contributed to the infringement of any claim of the” patents at issue (hereinafter, the Microsoft Action). Iron Oak 

Technologies, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 3:18-

cv-00222-M, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2018) (Partial 

Summary Judgment Order). Soon after, the Microsoft Action and the Manufacturer Suits were consolidated in the 

Northern District of Texas. Microsoft then moved for summary judgment in the Manufacturer Suits and the Microsoft Action, arguing that Iron Oak “did not provide 

notice to any Defendant [in the Manufacturer Suits] that a 

Microsoft product was alleged to infringe” and that therefore Iron Oak “cannot recover damages from the Defendants [in the Manufacturer Suits2] for infringement by the 

use of Microsoft products.” Partial Summary Judgment 

Order at 1−2 (footnote omitted). The district court granted 

Microsoft’s motion, holding that Iron Oak “may not recover 

damages from the Defendants [in the Manufacturer Suits] 

for infringement by Microsoft products or services” and 

2 Microsoft is not included in the district court’s definition of Defendants in the Partial Summary Judgment Order. Partial Summary Judgment Order at 1, n.2. (“As used 

herein, ‘the Defendants’ means all Defendants sued by 

Plaintiff, which does not include Microsoft.”). Nor should 

it be, considering that it is undisputed that there were no 

infringement claims pending against Microsoft at the time 

of the summary judgment order. Appellee’s Supp. Br. 3 

(“When Iron Oak subsequently abandoned any claim for 

‘damages from Microsoft’ directly, [J.A. 5], Iron Oak’s infringement claims against Microsoft customers for infringement by Microsoft software became all that remained in 

dispute in the declaratory judgment action.” (emphasis 

added)).

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4 IRON OAK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

dismissed Microsoft’s declaratory judgment claims as 

moot. Id. at 9−10. The district court entered identical summary judgment orders in the Microsoft Action and each of 

the Manufacturer Suits. After denying Iron Oak’s motion 

for reconsideration, but providing some clarification on its 

order, the district court ultimately entered an Agreed Final 

Judgment in the Microsoft Action confirming that Microsoft’s summary judgment was granted and that, as a result, Microsoft’s declaratory judgment claims and Iron 

Oak’s infringement counterclaims were dismissed as moot. 

Iron Oak Techs., LLC v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action 

No. 3:18-cv-00222-M (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2019) (Agreed Final Judgment).

Iron Oak now appeals, arguing that the district court 

applied the incorrect standard under 35 U.S.C. § 287 in determining that Iron Oak’s pre-suit notice letters to the 

Manufacturers did not provide sufficient notice regarding 

infringement by Microsoft products and services on the 

Manufacturers’ devices. 

II

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), we have jurisdiction only 

over an appeal from a district court’s final decision. And

“[e]ven though the parties have raised no objection to our 

jurisdiction over this appeal, we are obligated to consider 

whether there is a final judgment of the district court.” 

Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 

1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A final decision is one which “ends 

the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court 

to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 

324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). The final judgment rule is not 

merely a technicality; it “exists to prevent the piecemeal 

litigation of issues that practically constitute a single controversy, which as separate appeals would otherwise frustrate efficient judicial administration.” Enzo Biochem, Inc. 

v. Gen-Probe Inc., 414 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 

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IRON OAK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 5

mandate recalled and dismissal vacated, 143 F. App’x 350 

(Fed. Cir. 2005).

The procedural posture of this case is unconventional. 

The only underlying case on appeal—the Microsoft Action—includes only Iron Oak and Microsoft. Yet the briefing focuses entirely on whether the notice letters Iron Oak 

sent to the Manufacturers, not Microsoft, were sufficient 

under 35 U.S.C. § 287 as to Microsoft products and services 

installed on the Manufacturers’ laptops and tablets. To be 

clear, Iron Oak never sent any notice letter to Microsoft before the patents-at-issue expired, Iron Oak does not seek 

damages from Microsoft, Microsoft is not a defendant in the 

Manufacturer Suits as defined in the district court’s decision,3 and the Manufacturers were not parties to the Microsoft Action below and are not here on appeal to defend 

it. We therefore do not, and indeed cannot, entertain any 

challenge to the summary judgments entered in the Manufacturer Suits because, as the parties concede, those cases 

remain ongoing as to the Manufacturers’ infringement liability and the sufficiency of notice under § 287 for non-Microsoft products and services installed on the 

manufacturers’ devices. See, e.g., Appellee’s Supp. Br. 6; 

Appellant’s Br. 15 n.4; Oral Arg. at 33:00−34:30, available 

at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2019-1802.mp3. The only judgment that 

would be final for purposes of our review is as to Microsoft. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s decision only insofar as it held that Iron Oak did not provide sufficient notice under 35 U.S.C. § 287 to Microsoft that Microsoft’s 

3 Microsoft did intervene in at least one case—Iron 

Oak’s suit against Dell—to seek a declaration of noninfringement, and Iron Oak counterclaimed: Dell Inc., Civil 

Action No. 3:18-cv-1542 (prior to transfer, the case was Dell 

Inc., Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-00999 (W.D. Tex.); see also 

J.A. 212─228. 

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6 IRON OAK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

products infringe the patents at issue. But to the extent 

the district court’s final judgment purports to extend beyond the only party to this case, Microsoft, and to the sufficiency of notice to defendants outside of this case, the 

judgment is not final. We take no position on the district 

court’s conclusion on the sufficiency of notice provided to 

the defendant Manufacturers in the Manufacturer Suits

because we do not have jurisdiction over that question 

while the Manufacturer Suits are still pending.

In their supplemental briefs, both parties argue that 

the district court simply, as is typical, “grant[ed] summary 

judgment for a nonmovant” after providing “notice and a 

reasonable time to respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). But 

again, the summary judgments entered for the nonmovants—here, the Manufacturers in the Manufacturer 

Suits—are not final and not on appeal. 

This case is also unlike the typical one where a supplier 

or manufacturer seeks a declaration of noninfringement 

through declaratory judgment because of allegations 

against its customers. In the typical case, the product supplier or manufacturer seeks a declaration of noninfringement as to its product or process—not the product or 

process of its customers. See, e.g., Arris Grp., Inc. v. British 

Telecommc’ns PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

(explaining that Arris, a supplier/manufacturer, sued a patent holder “seeking a declaratory judgment that . . . [the 

patents] are invalid and not infringed by Arris” (emphasis 

added)). The suit is not brought on behalf of the customer 

and the decision does not require the court to consider actions taken by or in relation to the customer. But here the 

summary judgment required the district court to consider 

the notice letters and claim charts sent to the Manufacturers, which though similar in some respects, were ultimately specific to each Manufacturer. Compare J.A. 97,

with J.A. 145. 

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IRON OAK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION 7

Microsoft also argues in its supplemental briefing that 

because it has indemnity agreements with the manufacturers, it has “standing to sue for a declaration of non-infringement by Microsoft customers accused by reason of their use 

of Microsoft products or services.” Appellee’s Supp. Br. 3. 

First, Microsoft cites Arris Group, 639 F.3d at 1375, and 

ABB Inc. v. Cooper Industries, LLC, 635 F.3d 1345, 1349

(Fed. Cir. 2011), to support this proposition. In both cases, 

the declaratory judgment preceded any infringement suit 

against a customer or indemnitee. In that scenario it 

makes sense that an indemnitor would have standing to 

file a declaratory action to “determin[e] whether it would 

be liable for indemnification” without waiting for suits to 

be filed. ABB Inc., 635 F.3d at 1349. But here, the Manufacturer Suits were ongoing before Microsoft filed its declaratory judgment action. Therefore, “Microsoft could 

defend its customers and efficiently and effectively participate in the [Manufacturer Suits].” Microsoft Corp. v. 

DataTern, Inc., 755 F.3d 899, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

Second, the record is largely devoid of the contours of 

Microsoft’s indemnity agreements. They are only mentioned in passing in the district court’s summary judgment 

opinion. Partial Summary Judgment Order at 5 n.4 (“Microsoft is involved in this litigation because Microsoft and 

Defendants have indemnity agreements in place that allow 

Defendants to recover from Microsoft if Defendants are required to pay damages for infringement by a Microsoft 

product.”). We do not know to what extent, if any, Microsoft is obligated to defend the Manufacturers under 

their agreements and therefore to what extent Microsoft 

may “stand in their shoes.”

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8 IRON OAK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

We therefore affirm-in-part and dismiss-in-part for 

lack of jurisdiction.4 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND DISMISSED-IN-PART 

No costs.

4 In their supplemental letter briefs, both parties note 

that this jurisdictional defect may potentially be cured 

through subsequent action in the district court. We leave 

that decision to the parties and to the discretion of the district court. We note, however, that if the parties elect to 

pursue certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) regarding 

the sufficiency of notice provided to the defendants in the 

Manufacturer Suits and if that request is ultimately 

granted by the district court and this court, we may consider whether further briefing and argument would be required as the issue has been developed in briefs already 

filed and in the March 4, 2020 oral argument.

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