Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cr-00253/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cr-00253-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
Luis Fidencio Sainz Vasquez
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

United States Attorney 

ANGELA L. SCOTT 

Assistant United States Attorney 

501 I Street, Suite 10-100 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Telephone: (916) 554-2700 

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

United States of America 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

LUIS FIDENCIO SAINZ VASQUEZ, 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 2:22-CR-253-JAM 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

[PROPOSED] ORDER 

CURRENT DATE: February 14, 2023 

PROPOSED DATE: March 14, 2023 

COURT: Hon. John A. Mendez 

BACKGROUND

This case is set for status conference on February 14, 2023. On May 26, 2021, this Court issued 

General Order 631, which reopened the courthouses in this District, but which left it to “each Judge [to] 

determine whether to hold proceedings . . . in person or by telephone or videoconference.” The order 

further authorized each Judge to “exercise his or her authority to continue [criminal] matters” and 

“exclud[e] time under the Speedy Trial Act.” This and previous General Orders were entered to address 

public health concerns related to COVID-19. 

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

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509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”). 

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, 618, and other orders require specific supplementation. 

Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of 

his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is 

excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or 

finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of 

the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption created “appreciable difficulty” for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-69; see 

also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus poses a similar, albeit more enduring, “appreciable difficulty” to the prompt 

proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a “nonexhaustive” list of seven factors it found to be “relevant” in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act 

continuances “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036, 1046 

(9th Cir. 2022). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is detained pending trial; (2) 

how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked speedy trial rights since 

the case’s inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a population that is particularly 

susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness of the charges a defendant 

faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes; (6) whether there is a reason 

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to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed; and (7) whether the district 

court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. Id. 

In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding 

excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) 

(Local Code T4).1 If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. 

United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be 

“specifically limited in time”). 

STIPULATION 

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant LUIS 

FIDENCIO SAINZ VASQUEZ, by and through his counsel of record, Megan Hopkins, hereby stipulate 

as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on February 14, 2023. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 

14, 2023, at 9:00 a.m., and to exclude time between February 14, 2023, and March 14, 2023, under 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has produced over 850 pages of discovery and several audio 

recordings. 

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with her client, review 

the current charges, conduct investigations and research related to the charges, review discovery, 

discuss potential resolutions, prepare pretrial motions, and otherwise prepare for trial. 

c) Additionally, given the voluminous discovery, it is unreasonable to expect 

adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself prior to March 14, 2023. 

d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence. 

1

 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020). 

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e) Defendant has not invoked his speedy trial rights since the inception of the case. 

f) The government does not object to the continuance. 

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 14, 2023, to March 14, 

2023, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. 

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED. 

Dated: February 9, 2023 PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

United States Attorney 

/s/ ANGELA L. SCOTT 

 ANGELA L. SCOTT 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: February 9, 2023 /s/ MEGAN HOPKINS per 

email authorization

MEGAN HOPKINS 

Counsel for Defendant 

LUIS FIDENCIO SAINZ 

VASQUEZ 

// 

// 

// 

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// 

ORDER 

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 9th day of February, 2023. 

 /s/ John A. Mendez 

 THE HONORABLE JOHN A. MENDEZ 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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