Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01807/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01807-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Celgard, LLC
Appellant
SK Innovation Co., Ltd.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CELGARD, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SK INNOVATION CO., LTD.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1807

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of North Carolina in No. 3:13-cv-00254-

MOC-DSC, Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr.

______________________ 

Decided: July 6, 2015

______________________ 

MARTIN RICHARD LUECK, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & 

Ciresi, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, argued for plaintiffappellant. Also represented by ANDREW DOUGLAS 

HEDDEN, JAMIE R. KURTZ; BRYAN J. VOGEL, New York, NY.

J. MICHAEL JAKES, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for 

defendant-appellee. Also represented by CHARLES 

THOMAS COLLINS-CHASE, HALA S. MOURAD; CORTNEY 

SCOTT ALEXANDER, Atlanta, GA; CHARLES HYUK SUH, 

Reston, VA. 

______________________ 

Case: 14-1807 Document: 63-2 Page: 1 Filed: 07/06/2015
2 CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 

Before NEWMAN, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

Celgard, LLC appeals the dismissal of its patent infringement suit by the United States District Court for 

the Western District of North Carolina for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court determined it lacked 

personal jurisdiction over SK Innovation Co., Ltd. (“SKI”) 

under either a purposeful-direction theory or a stream-ofcommerce theory. For the reasons set forth below, we 

affirm the dismissal.

I. BACKGROUND

A. THE PARTIES AND THEIR BUSINESSES

Celgard is a developer and manufacturer of battery 

membranes. The membranes Celgard develops are used 

to separate chemical cell components in lithium-ion 

batteries, preventing contact between the positive and 

negative electrodes. Celgard developed a separator 

technology that uses a ceramic composite coating that 

helps prevent electrical shorting. Celgard obtained a 

patent for the ceramic-coated separator technology, United States Patent No. 6,432,586 (“ ’586 patent”). This

technology is used in rechargeable batteries in several 

emerging industries, including electronic vehicles (“EV”) 

and consumer electronic (“CE”) devices such as laptops

and cellular phones. Celgard is headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.

SKI is a manufacturer of separators for use in lithium-ion batteries. SKI mainly supplies the separators to 

third-party manufacturers. But SKI also manufactures 

batteries that include the separators it produces. SKI’s 

principal place of business is in Seoul, Korea. All of SKI’s

design, manufacturing, and sales operations are based in 

Korea. 

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CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 3

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 2013, Celgard sued SKI for infringement of 

the ’586 patent in the Western District of North Carolina. 

Celgard alleged in the complaint that SKI’s separators 

infringed the ’586 patent. Celgard sought to establish the 

district court’s jurisdiction based on allegations that SKI 

purposefully directed activities at the forum state through 

sales and offers for sale of its accused separators to residents of North Carolina. J.A. 66. The complaint did not 

specify to whom the offers or sales were made.

SKI moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis of an absence of evidence

that SKI ever sold or offered for sale the accused products 

in North Carolina. J.A. 129–31. In support of its motion, 

SKI provided a sworn declaration from a senior manager 

of SKI, stating that all of SKI’s sales are to customers 

outside of the United States. J.A. 111. The declarant 

stated that SKI had no knowledge of any established sales 

channels in North Carolina for its battery separators, and 

that SKI had no control over where or to whom SKI’s 

customers subsequently sold or distributed batteries 

incorporating SKI’s separators. Id. SKI, through the

declarant, agreed to be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York State. J.A. 113. 

Celgard opposed SKI’s motion. In its opposition, Celgard continued to assert that SKI was subject to personal 

jurisdiction under a purposeful-direction theory, based on 

offers for sale to a customer in North Carolina. J.A. 146. 

Celgard argued that jurisdiction was proper under a 

stream-of-commerce jurisdictional theory, based on alleged sales by SKI to third-party manufacturers of CE 

devices who, in turn, offer the devices for sale in North 

Carolina. Id. Celgard also filed an alternative motion for 

jurisdictional discovery related to sales and offers for sale 

of the accused products in North Carolina. J.A. 307.

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4 CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 

The district court granted Celgard’s motion to conduct 

jurisdictional discovery. J.A. 85. It also denied SKI’s 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without 

prejudice to SKI’s right to renew its motion following 

jurisdictional discovery. J.A. 108. During jurisdictional 

discovery, Celgard deposed SKI’s 30(b)(6) witness, subpoenaed numerous third parties, and obtained discovery 

from EV distributor Kia Motors of America (“KMA”) and 

CE manufacturers Dell and Apple. Appellant’s Br. 10; cf.

J.A. 704, 725. Neither party requested a jurisdictional 

hearing, and the court did not conduct one.

After the close of jurisdictional discovery, SKI renewed its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. SKI argued that jurisdictional discovery failed to 

establish jurisdiction on the basis of sales or offers for sale 

of the accused products in North Carolina, or that SKI 

directed any activities to that state. J.A. 701–03. SKI 

further argued that Celgard could not base jurisdiction on 

a stream-of-commerce theory because Celgard produced 

no evidence that any of SKI’s accused products had been 

present in North Carolina. J.A. 704. Celgard opposed 

SKI’s renewed motion to dismiss. 

SKI’s motion came before a magistrate judge, who 

recommended that SKI’s motion to dismiss be granted 

and that the case be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. J.A. 8. The magistrate judge explained that 

jurisdictional discovery “revealed precious little, if any 

contacts between SKI and North Carolina.” J.A. 4. The 

magistrate judge found that there was no evidence of SKI 

having sold or offered to sell its products into the forum 

state. J.A. 7. Further, none of SKI’s products had been 

found in North Carolina. The magistrate judge also found 

that there was no evidence that SKI had made any sales 

or offers to sell in North Carolina. J.A. 7. Thus, the 

magistrate judge concluded that there was no basis to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over SKI under either a 

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CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 5

purposeful-direction or stream-of-commerce theory. J.A. 

7. 

Celgard moved for reconsideration of the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation. The magistrate judge denied 

Celgard’s motion for reconsideration. After Celgard 

objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation and 

the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the district 

court judge adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. J.A. 16.

Celgard appeals the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1). 

I. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Celgard contends two types of contacts establish personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. First,

Celgard argues a “purposeful direction” jurisdictional 

theory, under which the advertisements of two Kia automobile dealers located in North Carolina, which suggest

that the 2015 Kia Soul EV would be available for purchase in North Carolina in late 2014, confer personal 

jurisdiction upon the district court. Second, Celgard 

advances a “stream of commerce” theory, relying on SKI’s 

sales in the CE market to original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) who distribute the products nationwide, 

including in North Carolina.

A. GOVERNING LAW

We review a district court’s determination on personal 

jurisdiction without deference, applying our own law

when a patent question exists. Grober v. Mako Prods., 

Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 

Our determination of whether a defendant is subject 

to specific personal jurisdiction in the forum state inCase: 14-1807 Document: 63-2 Page: 5 Filed: 07/06/2015
6 CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 

volves two inquiries: first, whether the forum state’s longarm statute permits service of process and, second, 

whether the assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with 

due process. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 

1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Due process requires that the defendant have sufficient “minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that 

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). We determine whether the due 

process requirement for specific personal jurisdiction is 

met by considering (1) whether the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum state, (2) 

whether the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s activities with the forum state, and (3) whether 

assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair. 

Grober, 686 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Elecs. for Imaging, 340 

F.3d at 1350). The plaintiff bears the burden of affirmatively establishing the first two elements of the due 

process requirement. Elecs. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 

1350. If the plaintiff meets its burden, the burden shifts 

to the defendant to prove that personal jurisdiction is 

unreasonable. Id. “The first two factors correspond with 

the ‘minimum contacts’ prong” of International Shoe, “and 

the third factor corresponds with the ‘fair play and substantial justice’ prong.” Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 

F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

The parties dispute whether Celgard must prove the 

existence of personal jurisdiction under a prima facie 

standard or a preponderance of the evidence standard. 

Celgard contends that it need only make a prima facie 

showing of jurisdiction because the district court did not 

hold an evidentiary hearing. SKI disagrees, arguing that 

the burden is one of a preponderance of the evidence 

because the parties conducted extensive jurisdictional 

discovery and no jurisdictional hearing was necessary. 

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CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 7

The district court agreed with Celgard and applied the 

prima facie standard.

We agree with the district court. When the district 

court’s determination of personal jurisdiction is based on 

affidavits and other written materials, and no jurisdictional hearing is conducted, the plaintiff usually bears 

only a prima facie burden. Elecs. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 

1349. On the other hand, we have explained that the 

preponderance standard applies where the parties conduct jurisdictional discovery but no jurisdictional hearing 

was necessary because the parties indicated to the district 

court that the jurisdictional facts were not in dispute. 

Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 265 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 

2001). 

In this case, jurisdictional discovery was conducted

and the district court did not conduct a jurisdictional 

hearing, but we see no indication that the parties agreed 

that the jurisdictional facts were not in dispute. Because 

the parties do not agree on the jurisdictional facts, the 

exception in Pieczenik does not apply. As such, Celgard 

must make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Under 

the prima facie burden, the district court must resolve all 

factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor in evaluating the 

jurisdictional question. See, e.g., Deprenyl Animal Health, 

Inc. v. Univ. of Toronto Innovations Found., 297 F.3d 

1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

The parties do not contest whether jurisdiction was 

proper under North Carolina’s long-arm statute. Hence, 

we consider only the due process inquiry as it relates to 

Celgard’s purposeful-direction and stream-of-commerce 

theories. 

B. Celgard’s Purposeful-Direction Theory

Celgard’s purposeful-direction theory of jurisdiction is 

based only on SKI’s involvement in the EV market. 

Celgard contends that SKI has purposefully directed its 

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8 CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 

activities to North Carolina residents through a joint

venture, allegedly with “Kia,” to develop batteries for the 

2015 Kia Soul EV. Appellant’s Br. 23. Celgard argues 

that the joint venture demonstrates the 2015 Kia Soul EV 

was actively marketed in North Carolina. This marketing 

activity is allegedly shown by the advertisements of the 

two Kia dealers that suggest that the Soul EV would be 

coming soon to dealerships in North Carolina. According 

to Celgard, these ads constitute offers for sale under 35 

U.S.C. § 271(a), supporting jurisdiction in North Carolina. 

Celgard contends that it is irrelevant that the ads were 

placed by the dealers, and not by SKI, because when a 

defendant exploits the “typical industry medium” to reach 

customers, it has purposefully directed activities to the 

forum, establishing jurisdiction. Appellant’s Br. 25 (quoting Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 841 

F. Supp. 2d 514, 520–21 (D. Mass. 2012)). 

SKI responds that Celgard cannot show that SKI purposefully directed activity toward North Carolina because 

it was the dealers, not SKI or KIA, who made the statements that the Soul EVs were soon to arrive in North 

Carolina. SKI argues that to succeed on its purposefuldirection theory of jurisdiction, Celgard must show that 

the dealers were either SKI’s alter ego or its agents. SKI 

claims that Celgard makes no effort to show the dealers 

are SKI’s alter ego, and that Celgard has not provided 

evidence as to agency since SKI does not have any relationship with the Kia dealers or a right to control them. 

SKI points out that it has no joint-venture agreement 

with KMA; the agreement is with KMC, KMA’s parent 

corporation. SKI argues that Celgard has not shown a 

chain of imputation from the dealers to KMA to KMC to 

SKI, as would be necessary to show jurisdiction under an 

agency theory. SKI also contends that Celgard has failed 

to show that SKI has any relationship at all with the 

dealers.

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CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 9

We agree with SKI that personal jurisdiction cannot 

be established based on any SKI activity directed toward 

North Carolina. There is no record evidence that SKI 

purposefully directed its activities, related to the Kia Soul 

EV or otherwise, toward the forum state. Thus, we next 

consider whether the activities of another party, which 

acted on SKI’s behalf, could be imputed to SKI, and thus 

establish jurisdiction over SKI

For purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, the contacts of a third-party may be imputed to the defendant 

under either an agency or alter ego theory. In order to 

establish jurisdiction under the agency theory, the plaintiff must show that the defendant exercises control over 

the activities of the third-party. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. 

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 759 n.13 (2014) (“[A] corporation 

can purposefully avail itself of a forum by directing its 

agents or distributors to take action there.”). In Red Wing

Shoe, we rejected the notion that an agency relationship 

existed between the defendant and its licensees because 

the defendant did not exercise control over the licensees. 

Red Wing Shoe Co., Inc. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 

148 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Alternatively, a 

plaintiff may establish personal jurisdiction under an 

alter ego theory. In Nuance, we found that the out-ofstate corporate defendant purposefully availed itself of 

the forum state through an entity acting as its alter ego. 

Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d

1222, 1232–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The in-state, named 

defendant sold the software of a sister company in the 

forum state. The named defendant operated as the alter 

ego of the sister company, as shown by both entities being 

commonly owned and not transacting at arms-length, and 

by nearly all of the named defendant’s profits flowing

back to the sister company. Id. 

Here, Celgard does not point to any evidence on the 

record establishing that the dealers were operating either 

as SKI’s agents or alter egos. The record does not show 

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10 CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 

any attempt by SKI to purposefully direct or control the 

activities of the dealers in North Carolina. As such, 

Celgard has not shown the requisite control for jurisdiction to be premised on the acts of agents. Similarly, 

Celgard has not alleged facts sufficient to base jurisdiction on the acts of an alter ego. The joint venture agreement is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under an 

alter ego theory because the agreement is between SKI 

and KMC, a company that is based in Korea. While KMC 

is the parent company of KMA, there is no evidence that 

KMA or the two Kia dealers were aware of the joint 

venture agreement, or that the advertisements were in 

any way related to the joint venture. Nor is there any 

evidence of common control of the Kia dealers and SKI, or 

any flow of profits from the former to the latter. Put 

simply, there is no evidence of any relationship between 

SKI and the North Carolina Kia dealers. Absent such 

evidence, Celgard cannot establish personal jurisdiction 

by arguing that SKI was directing its activities to North 

Carolina through the Kia dealers there. 

We conclude that, the posting of the internet pages by 

the North Carolina dealers were unilateral actions taken 

by third parties unrelated to SKI. The Supreme Court 

has forbidden the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant 

on the basis of unilateral acts of third-parties. In Hanson 

v. Denckla, the Supreme Court explained that the “unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a 

nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of 

contact with the forum State” because it is essential that 

the defendant take actions purposefully availing him or 

her of the privileges and benefits of the forum state. 357 

U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). 

This purposeful-availment requirement is tied to the 

principle that a defendant should be able to reasonably 

foresee litigation in the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (citing World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); 

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Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). Indeed, the purposefulavailment requirement ensures that a foreign defendant 

will not be unexpectedly “haled into a jurisdiction solely 

as a result of . . . the unilateral activity of . . . a third 

person.” Id. at 475. Thus, the unilateral advertising 

activities of the Kia dealers do not support the exercise of 

jurisdiction over SKI in North Carolina. 

Celgard has failed to allege facts that allow it to meet 

its burden under a purposeful-availment theory of jurisdiction. We hold that the district court was correct in 

declining to exercise jurisdiction over SKI based on any 

activity of SKI directed at the forum state, the joint 

agreement between SKI and KMC, or the unilateral 

actions of the two Kia dealers. 

C. Celgard’s Stream-of-Commerce Theory 

Celgard asserts an alternative, stream-of-commerce

theory of personal jurisdiction over SKI. This theory is

based on SKI’s participation with CE manufacturers to 

use their established distribution channels to avail SKI of 

the North Carolina market. Celgard points out that 

neither this court, nor the Supreme Court, has decided

whether stream-of-commerce jurisdiction requires merely 

placing goods into the stream of commerce with the 

expectation that they would be purchased in the forum 

state, or if “something more” is required, i.e., the purposeful direction of activities toward the forum. Appellant’s 

Br. 26–27. 

Celgard argues that, under either formulation of the 

stream-of-commerce theory, minimum contacts to satisfy 

due process are established whenever a defendant purposefully uses an established distribution channel that 

brings the defendant’s products into the forum. According 

to Celgard, personal jurisdiction exists if the plaintiff can 

show that (1) the defendant purposefully takes advantage 

of the channel; and (2) the channel reaches the forum 

state. Celgard contends that SKI satisfies these requireCase: 14-1807 Document: 63-2 Page: 11 Filed: 07/06/2015
12 CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 

ments because it sells separators to other companies, with 

established distribution channels, that incorporate the 

infringing separators into CE devices that are sold in 

North Carolina as a result of those channels. Celgard 

alleges that its tests show that separators have been 

found in batteries in CE devices purchased in North 

Carolina that are consistent with SKI separators. Appellant’s Br. 13–14.

SKI acknowledges that neither this court nor the Supreme Court have answered whether mere placement into 

the stream of commerce is sufficient to establish jurisdiction, or if “something more” (activities directed at the 

forum state) is required. Appellee’s Br. 30. SKI contends 

there is no jurisdiction under either test. SKI alleges that 

Celgard failed to identify a single accused product in 

North Carolina. SKI points out that while Celgard asserts that tests of products purchased in North Carolina 

are consistent with the use of SKI separators, Celgard 

does not show that the tested products use the ceramic 

coated separator required by the ’586 patent. Moreover, 

Celgard acknowledges that SKI is not the sole supplier for 

the manufacturers that supply batteries to Apple and 

Dell. 

Celgard replies that SKI’s biggest customers provide a 

“significant portion” of batteries to Apple and Dell, and 

that these companies sell their products in North Carolina. Reply Br. 7–8. Celgard argues that, when combining 

these facts with the results of its tests, the only reasonable inference is that SKI’s accused products have made 

their way into North Carolina. Celgard further argues 

that this evidence, coupled with SKI’s inability to show 

that its products were not in North Carolina, meets the 

prima facie burden, because it is more likely than not that 

SKI’s accused products were present in large quantities in 

North Carolina. 

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The precise requirements of the stream-of-commerce 

theory of jurisdiction remain unsettled. Whether mere 

placement into the stream of commerce is sufficient to 

establish jurisdiction, or whether intent that the products 

reach the forum is required, can be traced to Asahi Metal 

Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano 

County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Justice Brennan, joined by 

three other justices, opined that mere foreseeability that 

the defendant’s product would wind up in the forum state 

was sufficient to establish jurisdiction. To Justice Brennan, due process is satisfied when the defendant places a 

product into the stream of commerce while being “aware 

that the final product is being marketed in the forum 

State.” Id. at 117 (Brennan J., concurring in part). Due 

process is satisfied because the defendant directly benefits 

from “the retail sale of the final product in the forum

State” and indirectly benefits from the “laws that regulate 

and facilitate commercial activity.” Id. Justice O’Connor 

wrote separately and was joined by three justices. Justice 

O’Connor contended that something more than the foreseeability of entry of the defendant’s products into the 

forum state was required because that low threshold does 

not guarantee that due process’ purposeful-availment 

requirement is met. According to Justice O’Connor a 

“substantial connection . . . between the defendant and 

the forum State” must arise out of the activities of the 

defendant that are “purposefully directed toward the 

forum State.” Id. at 112 (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). Merely placing “a product into the stream of 

commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant 

purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id. (emphasis added). 

The Supreme Court recently reconsidered the requirements for establishing jurisdiction under a streamof-commerce theory in McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). Again, the Court did not reach 

consensus on whether something more than foreseeability 

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14 CELGARD, LLC v. SK INNOVATION CO., LTD. 

is required. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice 

Kennedy held that jurisdiction over the defendant was 

improper under a stream-of-commerce theory because the 

defendant had not purposefully availed himself of the 

forum state’s laws. Specifically, the jurisdictional facts 

did not “reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the 

protection of” the laws of the forum state. Id. at 2791. 

This court also has declined to take a position on the 

requirements of a stream-of-commerce jurisdictional test

because the resolution of the cases did not require us to do 

so. AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 

1358, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing cases). Similarly, in this case, we do not need to resolve the question 

as the results of the case are the same under either formulation of the stream-of-commerce test. 

Celgard is not able to meet the more flexible foreseeability standard articulated by Justice Brennan in Asahi. 

As Justice Brennan explained, due process is satisfied 

under the foreseeability standard when the defendant is 

aware that the product is being marketed in the forum 

state. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan J., concurring in 

part). The defendant’s knowledge gives rise to both the 

direct benefit from the retail sale of the defendant’s 

product and the indirect benefits related to the laws

enabling commerce in the forum state. Id. Celgard has 

not provided evidence that SKI was aware that its accused separators were marketed in North Carolina. The 

record evidence shows only that SKI sells its products to 

OEMs, who then sell completed batteries to CE manufactures that resell them in the United States. There is no 

evidence establishing that SKI’s products actually enter 

the forum state. Celgard’s evidence shows only that tests 

of separators from batteries taken from CE devices purchased in North Carolina are not inconsistent with SKI’s 

separators. Those tests do not rule out that other manufacturers’ separators do not have similar composition or 

that the separators were certainly manufactured by SKI. 

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Indeed, Celgard is unable to demonstrate that its own 

separators are present in North Carolina.

Celgard’s evidence fails to show that SKI’s separators 

actually have been found in North Carolina, much less 

that SKI can foresee that its separators will make their 

way there. Celgard’s inability to show that SKI can 

foresee that its separators will make their way to North 

Carolina also necessarily implies that SKI did not also 

have “something more,” a purposeful availment of the 

privileges and laws of North Carolina, as required by 

Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the stream-of-commerce 

test. Id. at 112 (plurality opinion). We hold that the 

district court correctly declined to exercise jurisdiction 

under a stream-of-commerce theory.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly declined to exercise personal jurisdiction over SKI under either a purposefuldirection theory or a stream-of-commerce theory. We note 

that Celgard is not without remedy, as SKI consented to 

be subject to jurisdiction in New York. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint 

without prejudice.

AFFIRMED

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