Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-23-10291/USCOURTS-ca11-23-10291-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arrmaz Products Inc.
Respondent
International Chemical Workers Union Council of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union
Intervenor
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10291

____________________

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

Petitioner,

INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION COUNCIL 

OF THE UNITED FOOD AND 

COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,

Intervenor,

versus

ARRMAZ PRODUCTS INC., 

Respondent.

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10291

____________________

Application for Enforcement of a Decision of the

National Labor Relations Board

Agency No. 12-CA-294086

____________________

Before WILSON, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

The International Chemical Workers Union Council of the 

United Food and Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO (the 

“Union”) and ArrMaz Products, Inc. (“ArrMaz”), a specialty 

chemical manufacturer, entered into a stipulated election 

agreement to govern an election to decide whether the Union 

would be the collective bargaining representative of the employees 

of ArrMaz. On the day of the representation election, the Union 

challenged two ballots because they were filed by employees of 

AMP Trucking, Inc. (“AMP”), a separate company but a wholly 

owned subsidiary of ArrMaz. The two disputed AMP ballots were 

not counted, and the Union won the election by a 20 to 18 vote.

In its certification order, the National Labor Relations Board 

(the “Board”) sustained the Union’s challenge to the two disputed 

AMP employee ballots and certified the Union as the bargaining 

representative of ArrMaz’s employees. The Board found that 

under the stipulated election agreement between ArrMaz and the 

Union, only ArrMaz’s employees—and not AMP’s employees—

were eligible to vote in the election. 

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Despite the certification order, ArrMaz refused to bargain. 

In a second order, the Board ordered ArrMaz to bargain with the 

Union. The Board severed and retained for further consideration 

the issue of whether to require ArrMaz to compensate its 

employees for the lost opportunity to engage in collective 

bargaining during the pendency of the post-election proceedings. 

The Board now applies for enforcement of its orders, and 

ArrMaz cross-petitions for review.

After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, 

we grant the Board’s application for enforcement and deny 

ArrMaz’s petition for review. As a threshold matter, we have 

jurisdiction to review the Board’s orders because the Board 

consummated its decisionmaking process on the validity of the 

Union’s certification and ArrMaz’s duty to bargain with the Union. 

On the merits, we agree with the Board that the parties’ stipulated 

election agreement plainly and unambiguously provided that only 

ArrMaz employees were eligible to vote. As a result, AMP’s 

employees were not eligible to vote, and the Board properly 

sustained the Union’s challenge.

I. BACKGROUND

A. ArrMaz

ArrMaz adopted its current name, ArrMaz Products, Inc., in 

July 2020. Before the election at issue, ArrMaz’s legal name was 

“Arr-Maz Products, Limited Partnership,” which was the name 

used in the election agreement with the Union.

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10291

At all relevant times, ArrMaz manufactured specialty 

chemicals used in the mining, fertilizer, phosphate, industrial 

ammonium nitrate, asphalt, and oil and gas industries. ArrMaz’s 

business includes sourcing raw materials, developing formulas, 

producing chemicals, and delivering those chemicals to its 

customers. ArrMaz employs about 18 Production Operators, 4 

Sulfonation Operators, 1 Railside Operator, 3 Small Blend and 

Warehouse Operators, 6 Plant Maintenance Technicians, 1 

Facilities Maintenance Technician, and 5 or 6 Electrical and 

Instrumentation Technicians. ArrMaz previously employed a 

Parts Clerk, but that position is now vacant.

ArrMaz operates out of a facility in Mulberry, Florida. The 

Mulberry facility consists of 18 buildings, rail lines, parking areas, 

and a single entrance/exit point that is used by everyone who 

enters or exits the facility. The facility houses all of ArrMaz’s 

operations, including administration, research and development, 

information technology, laboratories, production, and 

distribution.

B. AMP

As mentioned above, AMP is ArrMaz’s wholly owned 

subsidiary. AMP has a private truck fleet that transports and 

delivers ArrMaz’s chemicals. AMP was created as an entity 

separate from ArrMaz for liability purposes—to protect ArrMaz 

from liability related to transportation of its chemicals over public 

roads.

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AMP operates out of a truck shop within the Mulberry 

facility. AMP delivers finished chemicals from the Mulberry facility 

to ArrMaz’s customers, transports raw materials to the Mulberry 

facility, and inspects and maintains a fleet of trucks, trailers, and 

other heavy equipment.

AMP owns about 65 trailers, some of which are used to store 

raw, intermediate, and finished chemical products. AMP also owns 

and operates several trucks, but the trucks bear decals identifying 

them as ArrMaz. AMP’s trailers also bear ArrMaz decals so 

customers will know where the trailer is coming from.

AMP employs a supervisor, nine drivers, and two 

maintenance technicians. Jesse Hargadine and Robert Strickland

are the two maintenance technicians. Hargadine and Strickland are

responsible for maintaining and repairing AMP’s trucks, trailers, 

and other heavy equipment. Like all AMP employees, Hargadine 

and Strickland work in the truck shop at the Mulberry facility.

AMP does not have any of its own customers; AMP 

transports only ArrMaz’s products and materials. ArrMaz fully 

funds AMP’s operations and files a consolidated federal tax return 

that includes AMP. ArrMaz and AMP do not bill each other for 

services rendered. AMP’s accounting, human resources, and safety 

functions are performed by ArrMaz.

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C. Arkema

ArrMaz and AMP are both part of a larger five-level 

corporate structure that is principally owned by Arkema Delaware, 

Inc. (“Arkema”). ArrMaz and AMP are entirely responsible for the 

day-to-day operations of the whole enterprise and are the only 

companies with employees. 

D. The Stipulated Election Agreement

On February 10, 2020, the Union filed with the Board a 

petition for a representation election. The Union sought to 

represent a bargaining unit of “Production, Warehouse, Rail Side 

Workers, Maintenance & Electrical Workers” at the Mulberry 

facility.

On February 18, 2020, ArrMaz and the Union entered into a 

stipulated election agreement (the “Agreement”). The Agreement 

detailed the procedure for the representation election and defined 

which employees would be included in the collective bargaining 

unit. 

The Agreement was between and executed by only ArrMaz 

as the employer and the Union. Specifically, the Agreement listed 

(1) “Arr-Maz Products, Limited Partnership” at the top of the 

document next to the case number, and (2) “Arr-Maz Products, 

Limited Partnership” at the end of the document on the signature 

line under which “(Employer)” is typed. Neither Arkema nor AMP 

were referenced anywhere in the Agreement.

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The Agreement contained a “Commerce” section, which 

similarly referred to only ArrMaz as the “Employer” as follows:

Arr-Maz Products, Limited Partnership is a Delaware

limited partnership with an office and place of 

business located at 4800 State Road 60 E, Mulberry, 

Florida, and is engaged in the business of 

manufacturing and providing specialty chemical 

additives to the fertilizer manufacturing, mining, and 

asphalt paving industries. During the past 12 month 

period, in conducting these business operations 

described above, the Employer purchased and 

received at its Florida facilities goods valued in excess 

of $50,000 directly from points located outside the 

State of Florida.

The Agreement defined the “Unit and Eligible Voters” as those 

persons “employed by the Employer” as follows:

Included: All full-time and regular part-time 

production operators, sulfonation operators, railside 

operators, small blends and warehouse operators, 

maintenance technicians, electrical and 

instrumentation technicians, custodians, and parts 

clerks employed by the Employer at its Mulberry, Florida 

facility.

Excluded: All other employees, professional 

laboratory technicians, quality assurance laboratory 

technicians, engineers, office clerical employees, 

managers, guards, and supervisors as defined in the 

Act.

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-10291

(emphasis added). The Agreement also provided that employees 

in the “Included” unit who were employed during the payroll 

period ending February 16, 2020 were eligible to vote in the 

representation election.

E. The 2020 Election

The Board administered the representation election on 

March 12 and 13, 2020. Hargadine and Strickland, the two AMP 

maintenance technicians, attempted to vote in the election, but the 

Union challenged their ballots. The Union contended that 

Hargadine and Strickland were not eligible to vote because they 

were employed by AMP, not ArrMaz.

Because of the Union’s challenge, Hargadine’s and 

Strickland’s ballots were not counted. Of the remaining eligible 

voters, 20 employees voted in favor of the Union, 18 employees 

voted against the Union, and 2 employees abstained.

For the Union to be certified as a collective bargaining 

representative, a majority of the eligible employees choosing to 

vote needed to vote in favor of the Union. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); 

Regal 8 Inn, 222 NLRB 1258, 1259 (1976). Hargadine’s and 

Strickland’s ballots were therefore potentially determinative of the 

election outcome. With Hargadine’s and Strickland’s ballots 

excluded, the Union received a majority—20 out of 38—of the 

eligible votes. But if Hargadine’s and Strickland’s ballots counted 

and both voted against the Union, the vote would be 20 to 20, and 

the Union would not have a majority.

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F. Board Proceedings on the Union’s Challenge

The Board’s Regional Director ordered a hearing on the 

Union’s challenge to Hargadine’s and Strickland’s ballots. 

Following the hearing, a Hearing Officer issued a report sustaining 

the Union’s challenge. In the report, the Hearing Officer 

concluded that ArrMaz was “the sole employer named in the 

Agreement and the evidence presented establishe[d] that 

Hargadine and Strickland [we]re employed by AMP, not 

[ArrMaz].” ArrMaz filed exceptions to the Hearing Officer’s report.

Subsequently, the Regional Director upheld the Hearing 

Officer’s decision. The Regional Director concluded that the 

Agreement was unambiguous and the parties did not intend to 

include Hargadine and Strickland in the bargaining unit. The 

Regional Director therefore certified the Union as the bargaining 

representative.

ArrMaz filed a request forthe Board’s review of the Regional 

Director’s certification decision. The Board denied ArrMaz’s 

request, stating that it raised no substantial issues warranting 

review. The Board agreed with the Regional Director that the 

Agreement “expressed the parties’ intent in clear and unambiguous 

terms to exclude the two challenged employees.”

After the Union’s certification, ArrMaz refused to bargain 

with the Union. The Union filed a charge against ArrMaz with the 

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Board, and the Regional Director commenced an enforcement 

proceeding.1

The Board’s General Counsel filed a combined motion to 

transfer the enforcement proceeding from an administrative law 

judge to the Board and for summary judgment. The General 

Counsel asked the Board to require ArrMaz to bargain with the 

Union in good faith. Under its long-standing Ex-Cell-O Corp.

precedent, the Board lacked authority to order any compensatory 

remedies in enforcement proceedings for an employer’s refusal to 

bargain. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 NLRB 107, 108-10 (1970). Despite 

that, the General Counsel requested that the Board overrule its ExCell-O Corp. precedent and provide a new compensatory remedy 

for ArrMaz’s employees’ lost opportunity to bargain.

The Board granted the General Counsel’s motions to 

transfer and for summary judgment. The Board declined to 

reexamine the Union’s certification and determined that ArrMaz 

unlawfully refused to bargain. The Board thus ordered ArrMaz to 

bargain with the Union.

1 The Board’s certification decision was not directly reviewable by this Court 

as a final order of the Board. See Cooper/T. Smith, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 1259, 

1261 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, an employer who seeks judicial review of a 

certification decision must first refuse to bargain with the certified union. See 

id. The Union then files a charge with the Board, and the Board then will rule 

typically that the employer engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to 

bargain. The employer can then petition for judicial review of that subsequent 

Board order and challenge the certification decision. See id. That is what the 

employer ArrMaz did here.

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The Board reserved ruling on the General Counsel’s request 

to overrule its Ex-Cell-O precedent as to a compensatory remedy. 

The Board severed that issue and retained it for further 

consideration. The Board stated that it would issue a supplemental 

decision at a later time.

The Board timely applied for this Court’s enforcement of 

the Board’s order, and ArrMaz cross-petitioned for review.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its 

factual findings for substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 

Ridgewood Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 8 F.4th 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 

2021). “Provided any inferences drawn from the record were 

plausible, this Court may not overturn the Board’s determination 

even if it would make a different finding under a de novo review.” 

NLRB v. Contemporary Cars, Inc., 667 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 

2012). “But this deferential standard is not merely a rubber stamp 

on agency decisionmaking.” Ridgewood, 8 F.4th at 1275 (quotation 

marks and alteration omitted). We will not enforce a Board 

decision that bases its decision on facts not supported by the record, 

misconstrues or fails to consider relevant evidence, or fails to 

engage in reasoned decision-making. Id.

We review our jurisdiction de novo. Allen v. AT&T Mobility 

Servs., 104 F.4th 212, 215 (11th Cir. 2024). 

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III. JURISDICTION

Before reaching the merits of the Board’s certification and 

enforcement orders, we must first assess our jurisdiction. ArrMaz 

argues that we lack jurisdiction to review them because the 

enforcement order was not a final order. ArrMaz asserts that the 

Board’s enforcement order is not final because the Board severed 

and retained the issue of whether to overrule its long-standing ExCell-O precedent precluding a compensatory remedy.

This Court has jurisdiction over petitions for enforcement 

and review of the Board’s final orders. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f); 

NLRB v. Imperial House Condo., Inc., 831 F.2d 999, 1002 (11th Cir. 

1987). Two conditions must be satisfied for an agency action such 

as the Board’s to be final and reviewable. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 

154, 177-78 (1997). “First, the action must mark the consummation 

of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely 

tentative or interlocutory nature.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “And second, the action must be one by which 

rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal 

consequences will flow.” Id. at 178 (quotation marks omitted). 

Whether a Board order that severs and retains a remedial 

issue is final is a question of first impression in this Circuit. Three

of our sister circuits have answered the question, though, and all 

three held that the Board’s severance of the Ex-Cell-O remedial 

issue “does not affect [the court’s] jurisdiction to . . . adjudicate 

issues that the Board has resolved.” Longmont United Hosp. v. NLRB, 

70 F.4th 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2023); see also NLRB v. Siren Retail Corp., 

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99 F.4th 1118, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[W]e see no reason to 

conclude that severing the Ex-Cell-O issue from the other issues in 

the case renders the Board’s decision nonfinal.”); NLRB v. United 

Scrap Metal PA, LLC, 116 F.4th 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2024) (“[T]he orders 

represent the ‘consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking 

process’ and are therefore both final and reviewable.” (quoting 

Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178)).2

We agree with our sister circuits and conclude that the 

Board’s enforcement order is final and reviewable. The Board’s 

enforcement order is a “consummation” of the Board’s 

decisionmaking process regarding the unfair labor practice charge 

against ArrMaz. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. The Board’s 

enforcement order makes clear that ArrMaz must immediately 

begin bargaining with the Union; the order is not “tentative or 

interlocutory” in nature. Id. The enforcement order determines 

ArrMaz’s obligations and imposes prospective liabilities on ArrMaz 

“from which legal consequences will flow.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted).

Notably too, it is undisputed that the Board’s Ex-Cell-O

precedent provides that it lacks the authority to award a 

compensatory remedy. See Ex-Cell-O, 185 NLRB at 108-10. That 

rule has been followed for over 50 years. The hypothetical chance 

that the Board might someday overrule its precedent and provide 

2 The Third Circuit’s opinion does not expressly reference the Ex-Cell-O issue, 

but the Board’s order before the Third Circuit severed and retained the 

Ex-Cell-O issue, just as the Board’s enforcement order here did.

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-10291

a compensatory remedy—which the Board may never do—has no 

effect on the Board’s decisions to certify the Union and to order 

ArrMaz to bargain with the Union. The compensatory remedy “is 

not linked—inextricably or otherwise—with the order to recognize 

and bargain with the Union.” Siren Retail Corp., 99 F.4th at 1123 

(quotation marks omitted). The severed Ex-Cell-O issue “is not 

intertwined” with the Board’s findings about the Union’s 

certification, so our review of those findings “will not disrupt the 

orderly process of adjudication.” Stephens Media, LLC v. NLRB, 

677 F.3d 1241, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).

For these reasons, the Board’s enforcement order for 

ArrMaz to bargain with the Union is final and reviewable. See 

Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. We have jurisdiction over the Board’s 

application for enforcement and ArrMaz’s cross-petition for

review. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f).

IV. BALLOT CHALLENGE

The Board issued its enforcement order after it sustained the 

Union’s ballot challenge and the Regional Director’s certification 

of the Union. The Union’s ballot challenge is the heart of the 

dispute here.

In cases involving stipulated election agreements, the Board 

employs a three-step process to evaluate ballot challenges. Caesar’s 

Tahoe, 337 NLRB 1096, 1097 (2002); accord Associated Milk Producers 

v. NLRB, 193 F.3d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Board first

determines whether the stipulation is ambiguous. Caesar’s Tahoe, 

337 NLRB at 1097. “If the objective intent of the parties is 

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expressed in clear and unambiguous terms in the stipulation, the 

Board simply enforces the agreement.” Id. Only if the stipulation 

is ambiguous does the Board proceed beyond the first step. Id.

In its order certifying the Union, the Board determined that 

the Agreement “expressed the parties’ intent in clear and 

unambiguous terms to exclude” Hargadine and Strickland from the 

bargaining unit, rendering them ineligible to vote in the election. 

The Board thus found it unnecessary to proceed past the first step

of its three-step test.

We agree with the Board that the Agreement 

unambiguously included only ArrMaz employees within the 

bargaining unit. First, the Agreement clearly defines ArrMaz, not 

AMP, as the “Employer.” The Agreement listed Arr-Maz Products, 

Limited Partnership, ArrMaz’s name at the time, above the 

signature line for the “(Employer).” The Agreement also listed

ArrMaz’s name at the top of the document next to the case 

number. AMP, on the other hand, was not mentioned anywhere 

in the Agreement.

Second, the Agreement’s Commerce section also signaled

that ArrMaz was the “Employer.” The Commerce section stated

that ArrMaz was a limited partnership located in Mulberry, Florida. 

The next sentence in the Commerce section stated that the 

“Employer” purchased and received goods from outside the state 

of Florida. The reference to ArrMaz in the preceding sentence 

implies that ArrMaz is the “Employer” who purchased and 

received goods.

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Third, the Agreement defined as “Included” in the 

bargaining unit and among the eligible voters only those 

employees who were “employed by the Employer at its Mulberry, 

Florida facility.” Hargadine and Strickland are not “employed by 

the Employer” because they are maintenance technicians for AMP, 

not ArrMaz.

Interestingly, ArrMaz primarily contends that the 

Agreement unambiguously includes Hargadine and Strickland in the 

bargaining unit because the Agreement lists “maintenance 

technicians” as “Included” in the bargaining unit and Hargadine 

and Strickland were maintenance technicians. ArrMaz’s argument 

ignores that the Agreement also provided that only employees who 

are “employed by the Employer” are “Included” (emphasis added).

As discussed above, “Employer” is a defined term in the 

Agreement—and it is defined as ArrMaz, not AMP. Thus, to be 

included in the bargaining unit, the “maintenance technicians” had 

to be “employed by [ArrMaz].” Hargadine and Strickland were 

employed by AMP, not ArrMaz.

Moreover, ArrMaz itself had maintenance technicians. The 

inclusion of “maintenance technicians” in the bargaining unit is 

best read as a reference to the six Plant Maintenance Technicians 

and the Facilities Maintenance Technician employed by ArrMaz. 

This reading is further strengthened by the fact that the Agreement 

lists the other job titles of ArrMaz’s non-supervisory employees as 

“Included.” Read in this context, the Agreement’s inclusion of 

“maintenance technicians” is intended to include ArrMaz’s Plant 

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and Facilities Maintenance Technicians, not AMP’s Hargadine and 

Strickland. The Agreement’s reference to “maintenance 

technicians” does not create an ambiguity as to whether Hargadine 

and Strickland were included in the bargaining unit.

ArrMaz also relies on the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that 

ArrMaz and AMP were “a single integrated enterprise.” To be 

sure, no party disputes that ArrMaz and AMP were and are

“integrated.” But that does not mean the parties intended the 

Agreement to encompass both ArrMaz and AMP employees. As 

discussed above, the clear and unambiguous terms of the 

Agreement provide that ArrMaz is the “Employer” and only 

employees of the “Employer” are “Included.”

Our reasoning is supported by the First Circuit’s decision in 

NLRB v. Barker Steel Co., 800 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1986). Like this case, 

Barker Steel involved a challenge to the ballot of an employee of a 

subsidiary trucking company that, together with a parent 

company, formed a “single employer.” Id. at 286-87. The First 

Circuit held that the employee was not eligible to vote because the 

parties’ stipulated election agreement defined only the parent 

company as the “Employer.” Id. at 287. The First Circuit noted 

that if the parties intended to include the trucking company’s 

employees in the bargaining unit, “they could easily have specified that 

additional entity as an employer or as a joint employer.” Id. (emphasis 

added). But because no mention of the trucking company was ever 

made, “[t]he joint employer issue [wa]s a red herring” and “ha[d] 

no relevance to a determination regarding the intention of the 

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-10291

parties in signing the consent agreement.” Id. So too here. The 

parties could have listed AMP as an additional entity or a joint 

employer in the Agreement, but they did not do so.

ArrMaz points to the Commerce section’s statements that it 

is “engaged in the business of manufacturing and providing” 

chemicals and that it “purchased and received” goods from outside 

of Florida” (emphasis added). ArrMaz argues that because AMP is 

the entity responsible for “providing” and “receiving” its products 

and goods, the parties must have intended the Agreement to 

include both ArrMaz and AMP as employers.

However, the Commerce section does not state, much less 

require, that ArrMaz must use its wholly-owned subsidiary to 

“provid[e]” and “receive[]” goods. In order to be “engaged in the 

business” of “providing” products and “receiving” goods, ArrMaz 

does not have to operate and use its own trucking company. It 

could, for example, hire an independent trucking company to 

handle those tasks. The Commerce section’s reference to 

“providing” and “receiving” goods therefore does not create an 

ambiguity regarding whether ArrMaz is the “Employer” under the 

Agreement.

As a final, alternative argument, ArrMaz contends that the 

case should be remanded for another election process with a 

clearly established voting unit. ArrMaz suggests that the parties 

“never reached a mutual understanding” on the issue of whether 

Hargadine and Strickland were included in the bargaining unit and 

eligible to vote.

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As both the Union and the Board point out, ArrMaz never 

raised any challenge to the parties’ mutual understanding before 

the Board, nor did it ask the Board to order a new election process. 

“No objection that has not been urged before the Board . . . shall 

be considered by the court [of appeals], unless the failure or neglect 

to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary 

circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). ArrMaz has not identified any 

“extraordinary circumstances” that excuse its failure to raise these 

points below, so we decline to address them now.3

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that (1) this Court has

jurisdiction; and (2) the Board properly certified the Union and 

ordered ArrMaz to bargain with the Union.4 Accordingly, we grant 

the Board’s application for enforcement and deny ArrMaz’s 

cross-petition for review.

APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT GRANTED; 

CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 We also do not address ArrMaz’s arguments that are based on extrinsic 

evidence such as the contents of the Union’s election petition and the 

pre-election voter list. We conclude, as the Board did, that the Agreement is 

unambiguous, and therefore we simply enforce the Agreement under the first 

step of the three-step analysis. See Caesar’s Tahoe, 337 NLRB at 1097.

4 ArrMaz’s motion to remand to the Board or for a stay of this proceeding is 

DENIED.

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