Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03470/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03470-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lenard Dixon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM BELL and

LENARD DIXON,

Defendants‐Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.

No. 2:13‐cr‐00021‐JMS‐CMM— Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 27, 2015 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 17, 2016

Before KANNE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges and BRUCE,

District Judge.*

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.  A jury convicted William Bell and

Lenard Dixon of first‐degree murder and being an accessory

*

  The Honorable Colin S. Bruce, of the Central District of Illinois, sitting by

designation.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
2 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

after the fact to the murder, respectively, in the death of a

fellow inmate at the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute,

Indiana. Each appeals the sufficiency of the evidence underly‐

ing his conviction: Bell contends in particularthat the evidence

is insufficient to establish that he premeditated the murder,

and Dixon contends that the evidence is insufficient to estab‐

lish that he aided Bell with the intent to prevent Bell from

being held to account for the murder. Bell additionally chal‐

lenges the decision to admit evidence concerning an inculpato‐

ry statement he made regarding the murder, and Dixon

challenges the decision to shackle his legs during the trial. We

affirm the convictions.

I.

In 2011, Bell and Dixon were cellmates in the United States

Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana. The cell they shared was

located on the ground floor in Unit E‐1 of the Terre Haute

facility, a two‐level unit which was triangular in shape and

housed some 121 inmates. Inmate cells occupied two legs of

the triangle, with correctional staff offices and activity, shower,

and laundry rooms occupying the third leg. A recreational

“day room” occupied the center of the unit. Six security

cameras were positioned throughout the tier, and although

none were positioned so as to record activity occurring within

individual cells (except as might be revealed by an open cell

door), the cameras did record what occurred in the common

area of the tier outside of the cells. Video recorded on the

evening of June 18, 2011, revealed the following sequence of

events.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 3

At approximately 6:45p.m.,Bell emergedfrom Cell 103,the

cell that he shared with Dixon, and walked two doors down to

Cell 105, which was occupied by Brian Pendelton. Bell was

wearing a white t‐shirt and khaki pants, and he appeared to

have something in his right hand, which he kept in his pants

pocket as he walked toward Pendelton’s cell. When Bell

arrived at Cell 105, he opened the cell door with his left hand,

keeping his right hand in his pocket. He then entered the cell

and closed the door behind him.

In the meantime, Dixon emerged from Cell 103, milled

around the cell doorway for a moment, and eventually sat

down in a chairjust outside of the cell, facing a television in the

day room. At one point, while Bell was inside of Cell 105, it

appears from the video that Dixon turned to look in the

direction of that cell.

Bell emerged from Cell 105 roughly 70 seconds after he

entered. When he left the cell, he was shirtless and carrying a

t‐shirt in his right hand. In his left hand, it appears he was

carrying a long, slender object. Bell walked, unhurried, back to

his own cell. As he approached, Dixon arose from his chair and

entered Cell 103 ahead of Bell.

Dixon re‐emerged from Cell 103 some 25 seconds later and

walked to Cell 113 near the end of the row of cells, carrying

clothing in his right hand. His path took him directly by

Pendelton’s cell, number 105, the door to which was open.

Pendelton was struggling to lift himself off the floor and

walk out of his cell as Dixon passed. He was, according to

witness testimony, bleeding profusely from a stab wound to

the left carotid artery on his neck. From the video recording, it

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
4 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

appears that Dixon turned in the direction of Pendelton and

the open door to Cell 105 as he walked by, but Dixon contin‐

ued walking without pause toward the end of the row.

When he arrived at Cell 113, Dixon stepped inside for a

period of approximately 20 seconds. The door to the cell was

ajar during that period, and another inmate could be seen on

the video surveillance standing near the cell’s sink. Dixon left

the cell again carrying clothing, walked to a trash can in the

eastern portion of the day room and placed the clothing in the

trash can underneath other objects already in it, and fluffed the

trash on top before walking away.

At that point in time, Bell left Cell 103, clad once again in a

white t‐shirt and carrying a towel, and proceeded to one of the

showers along the south portion of the unit.

Pendelton, meanwhile, after emerging from Cell 105

bleeding, had collapsed on the day room floor as he tried

unsuccessfully to reach a correctional staff officer who was

walking out of his office in response to a panic alarm Pendelt‐

on had sounded. Prison staff came to his aid but were unsuc‐

cessful in saving his life. An autopsy would later disclose that

he bled to death from the stab wound to his left neck; he also

had two superficial stab wounds to his back that likely were

non‐fatal.

In the immediate aftermath of Pendelton’s collapse, prison

authorities locked down Unit E‐1. A number of inmates had

been watching television and engaging in other activities in the

common area of the unit; they were ordered back to their cells.

Pendelton’s cellmate was in one of the showers at that time; he

was locked in the shower while correctional staff members

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 5

went about verifying that all inmates were present and

sweeping the area for evidence. Likewise, Bell, who by that

time was in a shower room, was confined there during the

lockdown.1 Dixon was locked in Cell 103.

An inspection of the trash can into which Dixon had

depositedclothing revealed whatlookedlike a large, makeshift

ice pick, comprised of a nine‐ to ten‐inch metal rod (possibly

derived from the innards of a printer cartridge) with a sharp‐

ened point and what appeared to be a handle crafted from the

casing of an ink pen, wrapped in bloody clothing. The latter

consisted of several items, including a pair of khaki pants with

a tag bearing Bell’s name and inmate register number, a khaki

shirt bearing the name “King” (an inmate assigned to a

different cellblock), two undershirts (one a white t‐shirt, the

other a grey tank top), and a green towel. The blood on the

clothing was later determined to be Pendelton’s. No blood or

fingerprints were found on the sharpened metal rod, which

was presumed to be the weapon used to attack Pendelton.2

Subsequent searches of individual cells in the unit un‐

earthed no weapons in Cells 103, 105, or 113. Photographs of

Cell 105 showed, inter alia, large and relatively undisturbed

pools of blood on the floor of the cell and a trail of blood and

1

   Bell was later escorted to a prison lieutenant’s office for questioning.

According to a prison guard, he spat out what looked like blood while en

route.

2

   The defendants argue that the sharpened rod could not have been the

murder weapon, as its size and shape were inconsistent with the nature of

Pendelton’s wounds. But the jury reasonably could have concluded to the

contrary that this was the weapon used to kill Pendelton.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
6 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

bloody footprints left by Pendelton when he made his way out

of the cell in search of help.

Bell was subsequently examined twice by nurses. The first

examination, on the evening of the attack, disclosed no

apparent injuries to his hands or elsewhere on his person.

Likewise there was nothing found under Pendelton’s finger‐

nails that might have indicated he had been in a physical

confrontation. The second examination, conducted three days

after the attack, disclosed a one‐centimeter abrasion on the

inside of his lowerlip. Bell would not say how he had incurred

that minor injury. There was no blood found on Bell’s shoes in

Cell 103. The doorway to Cell 105 was never dusted for

fingerprints to determine who (including orin addition to Bell)

might have recently been inPendelton’s cell; prison authorities

assumed that too many people would have touched the door

for such an examination to yield useful information.

Dixon was interviewed on the evening of the attack and

denied knowing anything about it. When he was interviewed

a second time on the following day, he said that he had thrown

Bell’s clothes into the trash can without Bell’s knowledge

simply because he had noticed the clothes were soiled. He

acknowledged that he had never done this before. Dixon said

that he had proceeded directly to the trash can from Cell 103 to

dispose of the clothing, which of course was inconsistent with

what the surveillance video showed. He denied that there had

been any blood on the discarded clothing.3 And although the

3

   More than six months later, Dixon told a prison counselor that he had

decided to throw Bell’s clothing away after he walked past the injured

(continued...)

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 7

video indicated that Dixon had walked right by the fatally‐

injured Pendelton as he struggled out of his cell, Dixon denied

seeing anyone injured, noticing any blood (including blood on

Bell’sperson), or knowing why the unit hadbeen lockeddown.

He told investigators that he didn’t see Bell do anything that

evening other than go to the shower.

In May 2013, a grand jury charged Bell with committing

premeditated murder within the special maritime and territo‐

rial jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1111, and Dixon with being an accessory after the fact to that

murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3. They were tried jointly

before a jury the following year and were both convicted.

Bell was sentenced to a mandatory life term of imprison‐

ment. Dixon was sentenced to a term of 156 months, to be

served consecutively to the federal sentence he was serving at

the time of Pendelton’s murder.

II.

A. Admission of Bell’s prior statement

OnDecember 31, 2013,roughly 18 months afterthemurder,

Bell was being housed in a holding facility of the Terre Haute

complex known as the Special Housing Unit. He had been

placed in hand and leg restraints after he had covered up the

windows into his cell the day before and refused correctional

officer Dennis Morris’s instruction to uncover them. Because

Bell was in restraints, he was being given simple bagged meals

3

  (...continued)

Pendelton while on his way to put the clothes into a washing machine and

blood had spurted from Pendelton onto Bell’s shirt.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
8 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

rather than the meal trays that he would normally have

received. According to Morris, on the morning of the 31st, as

he passed a bagged breakfast meal to Bell through the slot in

Bell’s cell door, a visibly angry Bell said to him, “I cannot wait

to get out of these restraints and kill you like I did the nigger

across the street.” Tr. 2‐422. Morris interpreted “across the

street” to mean the penitentiary portion of the complex where

Bell was normally housed. And the government’s view, of

course, is that Bell was referring to Pendelton’s murder.

Based on Morris’s report of the incident, Bell was charged

with engaging in threatening behavior. When he was notified

of the charge, Bell, who denied the allegations, asked other

inmates in the Special Housing Unit to submit written state‐

ments as to what they had heard. Roderick Davis, an inmate in

the cell next to Bell’s, submitted such a statement. Davis would

later testify that he was lying on his bunk at approximately

7:00 a.m. on the 31st and heard the jingle of keys as a correc‐

tional officer walked by his cell. He then heard the officer call

an inmate at the end of the hall (where Bell’s cell was) a

“bitch.” Tr. 2‐464. According to Davis, the inmate did not

respond, and the officer eventually walked away.

After reviewing the papers, a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)

hearing officer expunged the charge based on inconsistencies

in Morris’s incident report as to the particular cell from which

the alleged threat had emanated. (Morris apparently had

written the wrong cell number in his report of the incident.)

Pursuant to the practice of the hearing office staff, the original

paperwork related to the charge was destroyed after it was

digitally scanned. And although there had been video surveil‐

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 9

lance of the Secured Housing Unit on the date of the incident,

no video of Morris’s encounter with Bell was preserved.

Bell moved in advance of the trial to exclude testimony by

Morris as to what Bell had allegedly said during this incident.

Bell contended the government had violated his due process

rights by failing topreserve exculpatory evidence relatedto the

matter. In particular, Bell contended that the scanned copy of

Davis’s statement was illegible, and that the Bureau of Prisons

had not preserved video of the incident, which might have

presented a picture of the alleged exchange that was favorable

to Bell. The district court subsequently convened an eviden‐

tiary hearing on the motion at which Davis and two witnesses

from the Bureau of Prisons testified.

Tammy Myers worked as an administrative assistant to the

prison’sdisciplinary hearing officer, andamong herduties was

the maintenance of files related to disciplinary charges. She

testified that it was her practice to scan and shred original

documentation relatedto a charge where, as here,thedisciplin‐

ary report was expunged. Davis’s statement was digitized

pursuant to that practice. She said that the scanned copy of

Davis’s statement was illegible because the original had been

written in pencil and for that reason did not scan well. She

otherwise had no independent knowledge orrecollection with

respect to the charge against Bell. Myers further testified that

the disciplinary hearings office typically does not have contact

with the United States Attorney’s office with respect to a

disciplinary matter when the prisoner also has a federal

criminal charge pending, as Bell did. Finally, Myers acknowl‐

edged that surveillance video of the Special Housing Unit was

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
10 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

available, but she added that it was only preserved upon

request.

David Ezekiel was the disciplinary hearing officer for the

Terre Haute federal prison complex at the time of the incident

between Morris and Bell, and it was he who ordered the charge

against Bell expunged. Ezekiel had seen a copy of Davis’s

statement and had summarized it for his own report on the

charge.With respectto video surveillance,Ezekieltestifiedthat

video footage is not retained unless an inmate asks for it at the

initial unit disciplinary committee hearing that takes place

within five work days of the submission of an incident report

(and which the charged inmate attends); otherwise, such

footage is recorded over after an unspecified period of time.

Ezekiel recalled that Bell, at some point after that initial

hearing, had asked his staff advocate to review the video

recording of the encounter with Morris, but by the time Bell

made that request, the video was no longer available. Ezekiel

added that the video surveillance of the Special Housing Unit

did not have an audio component; further, the video would

have captured only the outside, rather than the inside, of the

cells in that unit.

Finally, Davis himself testified at the hearing. Davis

identified the scanned copy of his written statement; stated

that he had provided it when Bell requested others on the

cellblock to provide witness statements; indicated that he

would have written the statement in pencil because that was

what was available in his cell; confirmed that he could notread

the scanned copy of his statement; but said that he independ‐

ently recalled the event summarizedtherein and recounted the

event as set forth above.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 11

In an oral ruling, the district judge overruled Bell’s objec‐

tion and permitted Morris’s testimony as to Bell’s alleged

remark. With respect to the poorly preserved copy of Davis’s

statement, the court observed that the original had been

scannedandthendestroyed in the ordinary course of business,

and there was no indication that the illegible scan was attribut‐

able to any bad faith on the part of the government. More to

the point,the courtreasonedthatDavis’s testimony ratherthan

his written statement was the relevant evidence insofar as the

trial was concerned;resortto the written statement wouldhave

beenpermissible only to refreshDavis’s recollection.ButDavis

recalled the event described in his statement, and his recall was

consistent with what was summarized in Ezekiel’s report. In

short, there was no evidence lost as a result of the illegible

scan.

As to the video recording of the encounter, the court

likewise found no evidence of bad faith in the failure to

preserve the recording. Rather, the testimony was that the

BOP, in the absence of a request to preserve it, had allowed the

recording to be taped over in the ordinary course of business.

Bell could have requested that the recording be preserved at

the time the disciplinary charge was filed (the court noted that

he had representation on the criminal charge at that time), but

he had not done so; and there was no reason for the BOP to

have independently perceived the need for preservation of the

video given that Bell had been exonerated of the charge. The

failure topreserve the recording certainly was “ripe groundfor

cross‐examination” at trial. Tr. 2‐223. But it was not a basis on

which to exclude Morris’s testimony.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
12 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

At trial, Morris was permitted to recount Bell’s alleged

statement over Bell’s renewed objection. Davis also testified,

and he again gave a summary of the encounter between the

correctional officer and Bell that directly contradicted Morris’s

account.

On appeal,Bell has renewedhis claim thattheBOP’s failure

to preserve the video recording and a legible copy of Davis’s

written statement deprived him of due process. This claim is

governed by Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333

(1988), which in relevant part states that the government’s

failure to preserve evidence favorable to the accused does not

deprive him of due process of law unless the defendant

establishes bad faith on the part of the pertinent government

actors, id. at 58, 109 S. Ct. at 337; see also United States v.

Valenzuela‐Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872‐73, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3449

(1982); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488‐89, 104 S. Ct.

2528, 2534 (1984); United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 407

(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chaparro‐Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616,

624 (7th Cir. 2000). This in turn requires proof of an “‘official

animus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evi‐

dence,’” id. (quoting Jones v. McCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477

(7th Cir. 1992)), and necessarily turns on an official’s subjective

knowledge thatthe evidence inquestionhadexculpatory value

at the time it was lost or destroyed, Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56

n.*, 109 S. Ct. at 336 n.*; Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 408. Only if bad

faith is shown does the court consider the constitutional

materiality ofthe evidence in question,to evaluate whetherthe

defendant ultimately was deprived of due process. See Jones,

965 F.2d at 477.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 13

The district court’s finding that Bell did not demonstrate

bad faith on the part of the BOP officials was well supported

by the evidence, and certainly no clear error has been shown in

that regard. As to the video, the testimony indicated that the

recording was taped over as a matter of routine, and nothing

in the record casts the veracity of that testimony into doubt. See

United States v. Cannon, 2006 WL 3206267, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr.

7, 2006) (Tinder, J.). Bell had been exonerated of the disciplin‐

ary charge, and he had not asked anyone to review or preserve

the recording until it had already been taped over. Moreover,

the undisputed testimony was that there had been no contact

between the BOP’s department of hearing officers and the U.S.

Attorney’s office regarding Bell, and so, as far as the record

shows, the BOP had no awareness that the encounter between

Bell and Morris, and the video footage thereof, might be

relevant to Bell’s trial on the criminal charge.

Likewise,there has been no showing thatDavis’s statement

was scanned and then destroyed in anything but the ordinary

course of business. Although the scanned copy proved

illegible, the explanation for why that was so was both plausi‐

ble and uncontested. There is no evidence suggesting that the

original was destroyed in bad faith: Bell had been exonerated

of the disciplinary charge, and again, according to the testi‐

mony, BOP staff were not in touch with the U.S. Attorney’s

office regarding Bell’s criminal case, and thus had no reason to

think that there might be a need to preserve Davis’s statement

for purposes of the criminal trial.

Even if we set aside the absence of evidence establishing

bad faith, neither the video recording nor Davis’s statement

was constitutionally material for purposes of the due process

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
14 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

claim. To be regarded as such, the evidence at issue must not

only have an apparent exculpatory value but be of such a

nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence

by other means. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S. Ct. at 2534;see

also McCarthy v. Pollard, 656 F.3d 478, 485, 486 (7th Cir. 2011).

Insofar as Davis’s statement is concerned, Bell was able to

present testimony from Davis himself; and as Judge Magnus‐

Stinson pointed out, his testimony ratherthan his prior written

statement was the relevant evidence.Davis recalledthe essence

of the event he had described in his statement and testified

accordingly; his testimony contradicted Morris’s account and

was plainly favorable to Bell. Bell thus was not demonstrably

harmed by the illegibility of the scanned copy of Davis’s

statement. As for the video, it is far from clear that the visual

recording of the encounter between Morris and Bell would

have been exculpatory, as the recording had no audio compo‐

nent, and so would not have disclosed what Morris and Bell

may have said to one another, and the recording did not

capture the interior of Bell’s cell such that the viewer could

have seen if he even said anything to Morris. The video would

only have shown whether Morris paused at Bell’s cell, which

in any event is something that Davis himself said Morris did.

Bell was not deprived of due process by the failure to

preserve the written statement or the video, and the court

properly admitted Morris’s testimony.

B. Sufficiency of the evidence to convict Bell of premeditated

murder

Bell was charged with committing first degree murder

within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 18 U.S.C.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 15

§ 1111 defines murder as “the unlawful killing of a human

being with malice aforethought.” The statute defines first

degree murder to include, inter alia, “[e]very murder perpe‐

trated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful,

deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing[.]” Murders

that do not fall into that group or that are otherwise identified

in the statute as felony murders, constitute second degree

murders. Thus, setting aside felony murders, it is premedita‐

tion that, in the main, distinguishes first from second degree

murder. United States v. Delaney, 717 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir.

2013). And, of course, the government alleged here that Bell’s

killing of Pendelton was premeditated.

Premeditation requires planning and deliberation beyond

the simple conscious intent to kill. There must be an apprecia‐

ble elapse of time between the formation of a design and the

fatal act, see id. at 556 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S.

463, 467 n.3, 66 S. Ct. 1318, 1320 n.3 (1946)), although no

specific period of time is required. See id. at 557 (quoting

district court’s jury instruction);United States v. Brown, 518 F.2d

821, 826 (7th Cir. 1975); see also United States v. Begay, 673 F.3d

1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Mulder,

273 F.3d 91, 117 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Shaw,

701 F.2d 367, 393 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 3108 (1987)).

But more is required than the simple passage of time: the

defendant must, in fact, have deliberated during that time

period. See Fisher, 328 U.S. at 467 n.3, 66 S. Ct. at 1320 n.3

(quoting district court’s jury instruction); United States v.

Catalan‐Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 474 (1st Cir. 2009) (“it is the fact

of deliberation, of second thought[,] that is important”)

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
16 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

(quoting United States v. Frappier, 807 F.2d 257, 261 (1st Cir.

1986)); see also Shaw, 701 F.2d at 393. Premeditation may, of

course, be proved circumstantially. See Brown, 518 F.2d at 826.

The jury in this case was given an instruction on premedita‐

tion that was consistent with the criteria we have just de‐

scribed, and Bell raises no objection to the adequacy of the

instruction. His contention, as we have said, is that the evi‐

dence on the element of premeditation was too thin to support

the jury’s finding of guilt. We will sustain the jury’s verdict so

long as there was sufficient evidence, viewed favorably to the

government, to permit a rational jury to find the essential

elements of the offense to have been proven beyond a reason‐

able doubt. See Musacchio v. United States, 2016 WL 280757, at

*5 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979)).

Having reviewed the trial record, we are satisfied that the

jury could reasonably find that Bell both had time to contem‐

plate killing Pendelton and did, in fact, deliberate on the

murder before he actually killed Pendelton. The circumstances

suggest that Bell left his cell with a plan already in place to kill

his fellow prisoner. First, Bell walked out of his cell with

something in his hand, and when he arrived at Pendelton’s

cell, he used his other hand to open the cell door. One could

reasonably surmise from what occurred next, and from the

sharpened rod that Dixon subsequently left in the trash can,

that Bell had a weapon in his hand, and so was walking to

Pendelton’s cell prepared to engage in violence. See Begay,

673 F.3d at 1044 (“Carrying the murder weapon to the scene is

strong evidence of premeditation.”) (collecting cases). Second,

Bell was in Pendelton’s cell for only a relatively brief period,

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 17

and there were no real signs of a struggle left either in the cell

or on Bell’s person. Although there was blood everywhere in

the cell, which is not surprising given the nature of Pendelton’s

injuries, nothing in his cell was knocked over or obviously out

of place. This suggests that Bell did not stab Pendelton in the

heat of an argument, for example, but rather that he entered

the cell with a plan to kill Pendelton and executed his design

quickly and efficiently. Cf. United States v. Esquer, 459 F.2d 431,

432‐33 (7th Cir. 1972) (testimony that defendant prisoner left

his position behind steam table in dining room serving line,

walked to center of room where victim was sitting, and

attacked him from behind, seizing him around the neck and

stabbing him in the back, was sufficient to support finding of

premeditation). Third, the actions of both Bell and Dixon

appear to have been coordinated, as evidenced by the way in

which Dixon left their cell shortly after Bell did, took up post

in a chair outside the cell while Bell was inside of Pendelton’s

cell, preceded Bell back into their cell as Bell returned, left the

cell again a short time later with the bundle of clothes, and

ultimately disposed of the clothing and weapon in the day

room trash can. Fourth, both Bell and Dixon appeared to take

these actions in a calm, unhurried, and deliberate manner,

which is somewhat inconsistent with the possibility that

Pendelton’s murder was an unexpected or unplanned crime.

We may assume that the jury could have rejected this

interpretation of events, concluded that premeditation had not

been proven, and acquitted Bell of first degree murder on that

basis. But the only question for us is whether a rational jury

couldhave foundpremeditation beyonda reasonabledoubt on

these facts, and for the reasons we have outlined, we believe

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
18 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

that it could have done so. Bell’s actions—seemingly calm,

deliberate, and efficient—and the evident concert of action

between him and Dixon,reasonably indicate that the killing of

Pendelton was pre‐planned and therefore premeditated. See

Brown, 518 F.2d at 826 (“deliberation and premeditation

involve a prior design to commit a murder”). And even if Bell

had not already deliberated and settled on a design to kill

Pendelton before he left the cell he shared with Dixon—which

the facts strongly suggest he did—he had an additional

moment during his walk to Cell 105 during which to contem‐

plate the matter, and the jury reasonably could have con‐

cluded, in light of the way events transpired, that this was an

“appreciable”periodoftimeduring whichBell consideredand

settled upon what he was about to do. In short, the evidence

supports the jury’s determination that this was a “pondered”

rather than a “spontaneous” killing. Delaney, 717 F.3d at 557.

C. Whetherthe district court abused its discretion in ordering

that Dixon’s feet be shackled during the trial

Before the trial began, the government filed a motion

asking that Dixon be physically restrained during the trial. (A

similar request was made, and granted, as to Bell, but he does

not appeal the shackling order, so we shall confine our

discussion toDixon.4

)The government askedonly thatDixon’s

4

   Among other grounds, the government asked that Dixon be shackled in

part so that there would be “symmetr[y]” in transporting Dixon with Bell,

as to whom it had made a separate requestfor shackling. Tr. 5‐28‐2014 at 46‐

47. As the district court expressly did not rely on that ground in granting

the request to shackle Dixon, United States v. Bell, 2014 WL 2547757, at*5 n.1

(continued...)

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 19

legs be bound, not his hands. The district court convened a

hearing on the matter. Gregory Snyder, the deputy United

States marshal in charge of the Terre Haute marshals’ office,

testified that, in his judgment, restraints were warranted in

view of both Dixon’s criminal history, which involved serious

and violent conduct, and his disciplinary history at the Bureau

of Prisons, which included, among other incidents, several

instances of Dixon possessing homemade weapons. (The

disciplinary records provided to the court indicated that

Dixon’s history also included multiple instances in which he

threatened bodily harm, and on two occasions, engaged in

sexual acts in front of female staff members.) Snyder acknowl‐

edged that Dixon had no history of escaping custody or of

attempting to do so; that there had been no problems with

Dixon during transport to the courthouse or in court in the

instant case; and that he had no information indicating Dixon

had ever been disruptive or had been shackled at any previous

court appearance or trial.

Thedistrict court grantedthe government’smotion,finding

that Dixon’s history presented an “extreme need that justifies

being restrained at trial for courtroom security.” United

States v. Bell, 2014 WL 2547757, at *5 (S.D. Ind. June 5, 2014).

The court cited the numerous occasions on which Dixon had

possessed dangerous weapons in prison, including a seven‐

inch piece of sharpened plexiglass in one instance. Dixon’s

disciplinary history, the court observed, reflects “a general

disregard for maximum security precautions.” Id. The court

4

  (...continued)

(S.D. Ind. June 5, 2014), we need not address it.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
20 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

also noted that Dixon’s criminal history included multiple

violent crimes against persons. Collectively, his criminal and

penal histories showed that Dixon was prone to outbursts of

violence. The court acknowledged that Dixon had no record of

disruptive behavior during court proceedings, but noted that

he was facing up to 15 additional years in prison if the jury

found him guilty of being an accessory after the fact to

Pendelton’s murder. The court agreed that minimum

restraints—specifically, modified leg restraints fitted with tape

and soft material to limit audible noise—were appropriate. To

protect Dixon’s interests, the court directed that the govern‐

ment and defense tables be skirted so that Dixon’s restraints

would be hidden from the jury; that Dixon (and Bell) would be

transported into and out ofthe courtroom with the jury absent;

and thatthe parties would not stand when the jury entered and

exited the courtroom, so as to minimize the possibility that the

jury might perceive that Dixon was shackled. Id.

We review the court’s decision on this matter for abuse of

discretion. E.g., United States v. Van Sach, 458 F.3d 694, 699

(7th Cir. 2006) (citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629,

125 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Fry v.

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S. Ct. 2321 (2007)). Consistent with the

presumption of innocence, a defendant has a right to appearin

front of a jury free from physical restraints, as such restraints

pose a danger, inter alia, that the jury will view the defendant

as both dangerous and guilty. See United States v. Cooper,

591 F.3d 582, 587‐88 (7th Cir. 2010). The defendant’s right to

participate in the trial unrestrained is not absolute, however; a

court may order the defendant restrained when justified by a

government interest specific to the trial. Deck, 544 U.S. at 629,

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 21

125 S. Ct. at 2012; Van Sach, 458 F.3d at 699, 700. As a rule,

restraints, because they are regarded as an extreme measure,

id., should be employed “only in the presence of a special

need,” Deck, 544 U.S. at 626, 125 S. Ct. at 2010—that is, when

restraints are necessary to maintain physical security in the

courtroom, to prevent escape, or to preserve courtroom

decorum, id. at 628, 125 S. Ct. at 2012; see also Cooper, 591 F.3d

at 588; Van Sach, 458 F.3d at 699; United States v. Amaro,

816 F.2d 284, 285 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (witness re‐

straints); United States v. Esquer, supra, 459 F.2d at 433 (same).

Dixon’s contention is that there was no such need in this case.

He believes thatthedistrict courtultimately reliedon his status

as a maximum security prisoner, without there being any

indication that he posed any sort of security, escape, or

disruptive risk in the courtroom and, indeed, without him

presenting any problems during transport to or from the

courtroom or during prior court proceedings.

The district judge did not abuse her discretion in ordering

Dixon shackled. She carefully assessed the circumstances of

Dixon’s history and the case at hand before concluding that

restraints were appropriate. See Van Sach, 458 F.3d at 700.

Dixon’s criminal history includes the commission of multiple

violent crimes againstpersons (including carjacking andarmed

robbery) from the age of 16 onward, and his prison disciplin‐

ary history includes multiple instances of possessing weapons

and engaging in violent acts. Cumulatively, these records

presented a possibility that Dixon might jeopardize the

security of the courtroom. We take Dixon’s point that he had

no history of attempting to escape or of causing trouble during

judicial proceedings or during transport to and from such

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
22 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

proceedings; and we may assume, given his clean history in

that regard, that different judges might have drawn different

conclusions as to the need for shackling. But as to matters

entrusted to a trial judge’s discretion, itis often true thatjudges

presented with the same record may reach different conclu‐

sions. See Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013)

(“discretion by its very nature permitsdifferentjudges to reach

different—but reasonable—conclusions on the same set of

facts”); United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 952 (7th Cir.

2010); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th

Cir. 1986). Only if no one could reasonably have decided as the

district judge did in the case before us can we say that she

abused her discretion. E.g., United Cent. Bank v. KMWC 845,

LLC, 800 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 2015). And we cannot say that

here. In view of Dixon’s record, a judge plausibly could infer,

as this judge did,that Dixon was prone to outbursts of violence

and exhibited disregard for security precautions, and thus

might have an outburst in a criminal proceeding potentially

exposing him to a 15‐year sentence on top of the 35‐year

sentence he was serving at the time of the murder. See Van

Sach, 458 F.3d at 699‐700. The district judge applied the correct

legal standard and identified the facts that, in her considered

judgment, presented a special need for restraints. The record

does not permit us to second‐guess her in that regard.

We add that the judge took appropriate precautions to

minimize risk that the jury could infer that Dixon was shack‐

led. Only his legs were restrained, and those were hidden

behind the skirted table. Because both the government and

defense tables were skirted, and both sets of parties and their

counsel were directed not to rise when the jury entered the

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 23

courtroom, the jury had no reason to perceive or suspect that

Dixon was shackled. See Cooper, 591 F.3d at 588‐89; Amaro,

816 F.2d at 285. In short, Dixon has not demonstrated that he

was prejudiced by the decision to shackle him.

D. Sufficiency of evidence to convict Dixon of being an

accessory after the fact to the murder

Dixon, of course, was charged with being an accessory after

the fact to murder. See 18 U.S.C. § 3. That charge required proof

that Bell committed the offense of murder, that Dixon knew he

had done so, that Dixon assisted Bell in some way, and that

Dixon did so with the intent to hinder the investigation or to

prevent Bell from being arrested, prosecuted, or punished. See

United States v. Osborn, 120 F.3d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting

United States v. Lepanto, 817 F.2d 1463, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987));see

also United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 1998). The

jury was appropriately instructed on these elements. Dixon

argues, however, that the evidence was not sufficient to

support the jury’s verdict of guilt: he contends that there was

no direct evidence of his intent; no proof that he had any

motive to aid Bell; and no evidence of his complicity in the

murder to be found in the cell that he shared with Bell, in any

admission by either defendant, or in the statement of any

witness.

Dixon’s course of action, as revealed by the surveillance

video and the other evidence presented at trial, was sufficient

to show that he aided Bell with the intent to hinder his appre‐

hension, trial, and punishment for murder. § 3. We have

already spokenofthe apparent choreography betweenBell and

Dixon: Dixon left their cell shortly after Bell did, took a seat

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24
24 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470

outside of the cell, and then, as Bell returned from Cell 105

shirtless and with a bundle in his hand, arose and walked back

into their cell (103) ahead of him. A moment later, Dixon

emerged from the cell with a bundle of clothing in his hand,

walked right by Pendelton as he struggled to exit his cell and

as blood was squirting from his neck, proceeded to Cell 113,

and then walked from that cell to the day room trash can,

where he deposited the bundle and covered it over. One could

readily infer that this discarded bundle comprised Bell’s

bloody clothing and the murder weapon (as the search of the

trash can later revealed), and that Dixon was knowingly

disposing of evidence of the fatal attack on Pendelton. One

could also inferthat the weapon had been cleaned while Dixon

was in Cell 113. Moreover, during the investigation into the

incident, Dixon made inconsistent and demonstrably false

statements to investigators, from which one might reasonably

infer a consciousness of guilt. See United States v. Webber,

536 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Shorter, 54 F.3d

1248, 1260 (7th Cir. 1995). Considered collectively, all of this

evidence readily and reasonably supports an inference that

Dixon was privy to Bell’s intent to murder Pendelton from the

beginning, and in particular that he gave aid to Bell after the

murder withthe intenttohinderthe investigation,prosecution,

and punishment of Bell for that offense. The evidence was

more than sufficient to support Dixon’s conviction as an

accessory after the fact.

III.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the defen‐

dants’ convictions.

Case: 14-3470 Document: 37 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 24