Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03153/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03153-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ben Curry
Respondent
Marco Marroquin
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO MARROQUIN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 08-3153 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING

HABEAS PETITION

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. 

The petition is directed to a denial of parole.

The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For

the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

A Los Angeles County jury convicted petitioner of second-degree murder with use of

a gun. He was sentenced to prison for fifteen years to life. He began serving that sentence

in December of 1993. He alleges that he has exhausted these parole claims by way of

state habeas petitions. 

On July 25, 2007, after a hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”),

during which petitioner was represented and was given an opportunity to be heard, the

Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole. Pet., Ex. A at 1-50. 

The Board’s Presiding Commissioner read the facts of the crime, taken from the

appellate opinion, into the record. He apparently started reading in the middle of the

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appellate opinion’s statement of the facts, and thus had to return to the beginning. For the

sake of clarity, the quotations below are rearranged into chronological order.

[T]he evidence established that in August of 1991, Luis Silva and his

girlfriend, Delicia Lopez . . . agreed to buy a car from Mr. Marroquin. Silva

drove the car for several days and after discovering that it had quote, a lot of

defects, unquote, he returned the keys to Mr. Marroquin. Marroquin did not

want the keys back and told Silva that he wanted $1,000.00 for the days the

car was used. Silva replied that if he had had the $1,000.00, he would pay

him for the car. Mr. Marroquin told Silva that he would, quote, he would

regret what he had done to him, unquote.

Id. at 9-10.

At around 10:00 p.m. on January 12, 1992, Mr. Marroquin and another man

entered . . . LaBajadita Bar in Compton. Before entering, the security

checked the two men for weapons and found none. A little later, Silva also

entered the bar, but did not sit with Mr. Marroquin. Both men ordered beer. 

None of the personnel at the bar recall seeing any argument between Mr.

Marroquin and Silva or even seeing [the] men approach each other while

inside the bar.

Id. at 9.

At some point, Silva left the bar to move his car which was blocking a

driveway. Several minutes later, Marroquin also left. About ten minutes

later, Marroquin and his companion tried to reenter the bar, but were stopped

by the security guard because Marroquin was carrying a gun. Both men then

walked away to about three car lengths from the bar’s entrance. Meanwhile,

Silva crossed the street and was walking towards the bar when Marroquin

approached him and began yelling obscenities and vulgarities at him. 

Marroquin told him he had to pay for the car and that he really wanted to kill

him. Silva did not reply when he was being yelled at and he did not have

anything in his hands. Silva finally told Mr. Marroquin that he did not want to

have any problems with him. Marroquin called Silva, quote son of the big

whore, unquote, took a gun from his waistband and said, quote, I”m a real

man and you’re the type of guy that I would like to put a bullet through. I’m

going to kill you, end quote. Appellant, Mr. Marroquin, then pulled back the

slide of the gun and pulled the trigger, but it did not fire. He then pulled the

slide back a second time and shot Silva, who was about two feet away, in his

side. Silva bent over and the security guard placed him in the front of the

doorway. The bullet – in a footnote – entered and exited Silva’s upper arm,

then entered the abdominal cavity causing his death. Silva said nothing. 

Another footnote, Maria Gutierrez . . . who was selling hotdogs from a stand

outside the bar, heard Marroquin swearing at Silva and saying that he wanted

to kill him. She did not see any fight between Marroquin and Silva before

Marroquin pulled out the gun. She saw no menacing gesture on the part of

Silva, nor did she see anything in Silva’s hands. She did not see or hear Silva

break a bottle or use a bottle in a jabbing motion. The security guard also did

not hear any glass breaking. Marroquin and his companion turned and

walked away. The security guard and the manager of the bar ran up to

several officers in a patrol car and directed them to where Marroquin was

standing by a pickup truck with the gun still in his hand. The officers held

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Marroquin at gunpoint and ordered him to drop the gun. Marroquin complied

with the officers’ orders and threw his gun into a vacant lot. No weapons

were found around Silva or in his clothing. There were no broken bottles

around him either.

Id. at 10-12.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

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convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a

state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d

1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present

clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness;

conclusory assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th

Cir.2000). 

II. Issues Presented

A. Respondent’s Contentions

In order to preserve the issues for appeal respondent argues that California

prisoners have no liberty interest in parole, and that if they do, the only due process

protections available are a right to be heard and a right to be informed of the basis for the

denial – that is, respondent contends there is no due process right to have the result

supported by sufficient evidence. Because these contentions are contrary to Ninth Circuit

law, they are without merit. See Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying

"some evidence" standard used for disciplinary hearings as outlined in Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1128-29 (9th Cir. 2006) (the some evidence standard identified in Hill is clearly established

federal law in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d)); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d

895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty

interest in release on parole.”). 

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B. Petitioner’s Claims

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) his equal protection

rights were violated when the State afforded more lenient treatment to a Swedish national

than to him; (2) the Board’s use of the “some evidence” standard violated his due process

rights; and (3) there was not “some evidence” to support the decision. 

1. Equal Protection

Petitioner contends that his equal protection rights were violated when the Board did

not set a release date for him. The state apparently entered into a settlement agreement

with a Swedish national that provided for the Swede’s transfer to his home country and for

his release from prison there on a date certain. Petitioner is not similarly situated to the

other prisoner: He has not been granted a writ of habeas corpus, as the Swede had, and

the State has not appealed; that is, in petitioner’s case there is no reason for the state to

enter into a compromise. There thus is a rational basis for treating the two differently. See

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that

"class of one" claim requires only that action be irrational and arbitrary, rather than

requiring discriminatory intent). 

2. Board’s Use of “Some Evidence” Standard

Petitioner also contends that the Constitution requires that the Board not use a

“some evidence” standard for deciding to deny parole. There is no evidence that the Board

uses that standard in making its decisions, and none that it used it in making the decisoin at

issue here. This claim is without merit. 

3. Whether There Was Some Evidence to Support the Parole Denial

Petitioner contends that denial of parole was not supported by “some evidence” and

thus violated his due process rights.

The Ninth Circuit has held that it violates due process if parole is denied without

"some evidence in the record" to support the denial or if the denial is "otherwise arbitrary." 

Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying "some evidence" standard used

for disciplinary hearings as outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445-455 (1985));

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McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (same). Ascertaining whether the some evidence standard is

met “does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is

whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the [parole] board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56; see Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. “[The] some

evidence standard is minimal, and assures that ‘the record is not so devoid of evidence

that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.’" 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). 

It is now established under California law that the task of the Board of Parole

Hearings and the governor is to determine whether the prisoner would be a danger to

society if he or she were paroled. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181 (2008). The

constitutional “some evidence” requirement, therefore, is that there be some evidence that

the prisoner would be such a danger, not that there be some evidence of one or more of

the factors that the regulations list as factors to be considered in deciding whether to grant

parole. Id. at 1205-06.

The circumstances of the offense, in which a person was murdered because of a

minor dispute over the sale of a car, was one basis for the Board’s conclusion that

petitioner would be a danger to society if paroled. At the time of the hearing in 2007,

petitioner was approximately fifty-one years old and had served a bit more than fourteen

years on his sentence of fifteen years to life. The court concludes that despite the passage

of time the circumstances of the offense still are entitled to significant weight; whether they

would be enough in themselves to constitute “some evidence” need not be resolved,

because the denial also is supported by other evidence. 

As the Board noted, petitioner had not worked in the prison, Pet., Ex. A at 17; had

not learned the twelve steps despite purporting to participate in Alcoholics Anonymous for

more than ten years, id. at 30-31; and had not developed any job plans if paroled, id. at 19. 

Taken together with the facts of the offense, there was “some evidence” to support the

denial. See Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2005) (facts of the offense

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and psychiatric reports about the would-be parolee sufficient to support denial).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2010. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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