Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13291/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13291-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Julio Ramirez-Ramirez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13291

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00398-WCO-ECS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

 versus

JULIO RAMIREZ-RAMIREZ,

 Defendant – Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(February 9, 2015)

Before HULL, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Julio Ramirez-Ramirez (“Ramirez”) appeals his sentence of 24 months’ 

imprisonment, imposed after the revocation of his supervised release pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Ramirez raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues his 

sentence was procedurally unreasonable because it exceeded the statutory 

maximum sentence available upon revocation of a class E felony, and his original 

indictment failed to allege the facts necessary to support a conviction for a class C 

felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Second, he contends his sentence was substantively 

unreasonable because it was excessive in light of the applicable 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors. Upon review, we affirm.1

We conclude Ramirez’s claim for procedural unreasonableness fails because 

a defendant facing incarceration upon the revocation of supervised release may not 

challenge the validity of his original sentence during the revocation proceedings. 

See United States v. White, 416 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] defendant 

may not challenge, for the first time on appeal from the revocation of supervised 

release, his sentence for the underlying offense.”); United States v. Almand, 992 

F.2d 316, 317 (11th Cir. 1993) (“A sentence is presumed valid until vacated under

[28 U.S.C.] § 2255.”).

 1

 We review Ramirez’s procedural unreasonableness claim for plain error because he did 

not raise it in district court. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). 

We review the sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for reasonableness, 

id., applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 

(2007).

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We also hold Ramirez’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable 

because the district court imposed it after properly considering the relevant 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the need for deterrence. See United States v. 

Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The weight to be accorded any given 

§ 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district 

court . . . .” (quotation omitted)). The district court acted well within its discretion 

in fashioning the 24-month sentence.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ramirez’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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