Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03122/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03122-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joel D. Martinez
Respondent
Mykal Durrell Myrick
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYKAL DURRELL MYRICK,

Petitioner,

v.

CRAIG KOENIG, Warden

Respondent.

Case No. 17-cv-03122-HSG 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at Correctional Training Facility – Soledad,

1

has 

filed this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the 

validity of a conviction obtained against him in state court. Dkt. No. 1 (“Pet.”). Respondent has 

filed an answer. Dkt. Nos. 22 and 23. Petitioner has not filed a traverse, and the deadline to do so 

has since passed. The Court has carefully considered the briefs submitted by the parties. For the 

reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 21, 2011, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged Petitioner with the 

first degree murder of Salvador Pena (Cal. Penal Code § 187) with a robbery-murder special 

circumstance (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)). The information also alleged the personal use of a 

deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code § 12022(b)(1)). Ans., Ex. A12(“CT”) at 77–79. 

On July 8, 2013, a jury acquitted Petitioner of first degree murder, but guilty of second 

 

1 Petitioner initially named Joel D. Martinez as the respondent in this action. In accordance with 

Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Habeas 

Corpus Cases Under Section 2254, the Clerk of the Court is directed to substitute Craig Koenig, 

the current warden of Correctional Training Facility – Soledad, in place of the previously named 

respondent because Warden Koenig is Petitioner’s current custodian.

2 The exhibits to the Answer are docketed at Dkt. No. 23.

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degree murder. The jury also found true the allegation of personal use of a deadly weapon. CT 

533–34.

On August 20, 2013, Petitioner was sentenced to a total term of sixteen years to life, fifteen 

years to life for second degree murder, plus a one year consecutive term for the personal knife use 

enhancement. CT 606–08 and Ans., Ex. B1 (“RT”) at 2460. 

On April 24, 2015, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in an 

unpublished decision. People v. Myrick, 2015 WL 1881385 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2015). On 

July 8, 2015, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review. Ans., Ex. 

D2. 

Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in the state courts, alleging prosecutorial 

misconduct, racially discriminatory jury selection, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Pet. 

at 19, 21–24. On December 21, 2015, the Santa Clara County Superior Court denied the habeas 

corpus petition. Pet. at 21–24. On October 31, 2016, the California Court of Appeal denied the 

habeas corpus petition. Pet. at 25. On February 15, 2017, the California Supreme Court denied 

the habeas corpus petition. Ans., Ex. E2.

On May 31, 2017, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition. On July 10, 2017, the Court 

found that the petition stated the following claims: (1) prosecutorial misconduct, (2) racially 

discriminatory jury selection, and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Dkt. No. 8. 

II. BACKGROUND

The following factual background is taken from the April 24, 2015 opinion of the 

California Court of Appeal:3

A. The Prosecution’s Case

1. The charged offense

The victim, Salvador Pena, owned a store in which he sold a variety of items, including 

jewelry, phone cards, and compact discs, and offered services such as check cashing and 

wire transfers. On the night of December 15, 2010, a witness, who worked in the area, saw 

 

3 The Court has independently reviewed the record as required by AEDPA. Nasby v. McDaniel, 

853 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2017). Based on the Court’s independent review, the Court finds 

that it can reasonably conclude that the state court’s summary of facts is supported by the record 

and that this summary is therefore entitled to a presumption of correctness, Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2004), unless otherwise indicated in this order.

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a man with his back against the front glass door of the store looking back and forth. The 

lights were off inside the store, but a shadow could be seen moving around inside. After a 

few seconds, the man went inside the store. The witness immediately called 911 at 9:36 p.m. 

to report the incident and to provide a description of the man.

The police arrived at the store at 9:41 p.m. When the police opened the front door, the victim 

was on his knees about four feet from the door. He was fully clothed, with blood on his chest. 

He also appeared to have a severe leg injury.

The police tried to get the victim to come outside, but the victim fell forward in a prone 

position. The police flipped him onto his back and pulled him out of the business. As officers 

went inside the business, another officer attended to the victim. The victim had a stab wound 

in the abdomen and in the chest. The stab wound in the chest had a knife blade partially 

protruding out. The victim’s right leg was fractured, and he had a small cut above the bridge 

of his nose.

In response to questions from the police, the victim indicated that his name was Salvador 

Pena and that he was the owner of the store. He was 56 years old. The officer asked what 

happened, who did this, and what the person looked like. Pena had difficulty breathing and 

talking. He indicated that he was closing the store when someone pushed him back in and 

took his keys. The assailant punched Pena in the upper body and stabbed him. The assailant 

asked for money and did not demand anything else. Pena told the assailant that he did not 

have any money and showed the assailant his empty wallet. Pena reported to the police 

officer that he thought his wallet was in the store. Pena indicated that nothing else was taken. 

Pena gave a description of the assailant but never provided a name of the assailant.

Pena was taken to the hospital for surgery. He remained in the hospital, on a ventilator and 

unconscious, until he died on January 7, 2011.

Inside Pena’s store, a display cabinet appeared to have been pushed off its base and compact 

discs were scattered on the floor. There were bloodstains on the carpet as well as a knife 

handle with the blade missing. The knife handle and some of the blood were near a locked 

screen door, beyond which was a back office area.

The secured, back office area appeared undisturbed. A shipment of jewelry, worth about 

$15,000 to $20,000, had arrived for the holiday season, and the victim had been weighing 

and pricing the jewelry during the prior two days. On a desk was a bag of “gold-type” 

jewelry. There were also two locked safes. One safe contained checks and cash totaling 

approximately $4,100, while the other safe contained “more expensive-type” alcohol.

In the main store area, large bags of coins were in plain sight and appeared untouched. A 

key was in the lock of a cash register, which appeared undisturbed. A loaded Beretta pistol 

was located under a counter near the register.

The police did not locate a wallet in the store. In addition, the victim’s business key ring, 

which contained keys to the safes and to the front door of the store, was missing. At some 

point, the victim’s relative found the victim’s driver’s license and credit cards, which had 

about $300 wrapped around them, hidden in a drawer in the store.

The victim’s relatives continued operating the business after the victim died. When the 

police returned to the business on January 4, 2011, the police found a bag containing several 

packaged condoms and lubricant in an office desk drawer. The police had not previously 

checked the drawer.

Defendant was the source of the DNA found on the knife handle. The police also determined 

that there were phone calls between defendant and the victim during the months prior to the 

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incident. On the night of the incident, around 9:13 p.m., the victim had called defendant’s 

cell phone. Defendant’s cell phone had been disconnected or was otherwise not in service.

Subsequent to the incident, in early February 2011, a traffic stop was conducted on a vehicle 

in which defendant was a passenger and his girlfriend was the driver. Defendant was not 

arrested and was free to leave. He agreed to wait for detectives who wanted to talk to him 

rather than meeting them at the police station. The detectives told defendant that they were 

investigating burglaries or robberies on the east side. Defendant was shown a picture of the 

victim and the victim’s store. Defendant indicated that he was familiar with the area, but that 

he had not been inside the store and that the victim did not look familiar. Defendant went on 

his way after talking to the police.

Defendant was later arrested on the same date as the traffic stop. During an interview at the 

police department, defendant indicated that he was 28 years old. When the police told 

defendant that he had lied during the traffic stop about not knowing the man in the picture, 

defendant stated that he had seen the man in 2004, but that he did not actually know him. 

Defendant later admitted that the man was a good friend, that the two called each other on 

the phone, and that the man had helped defendant with money.

The police told defendant that they were investigating the assault of the man. Defendant 

eventually indicated that he was sexually involved with the victim and that the two engaged 

in oral sex. He stated that the victim took care of him, that he had feelings for the victim, 

and that he would not hurt the victim.

Defendant subsequently indicated during the police interview that, on the night of the 

incident, the victim had picked him up and they went to the victim’s store. At the store, the 

victim tried to grab defendant and have anal sex, which was something they did not 

“normally” do. Defendant did not want to have anal sex and wanted the victim to get away 

from him. Defendant stated that he did not intend to assault the victim. Defendant had a knife 

because he had problems with other people in the area. The knife was poking defendant, so 

he took it out and stabbed the victim. Defendant told the police that it was an accident and 

that he did not mean to hurt the victim. He also stated that he did not jump on the victim, did 

not break the victim’s leg, and did not remember punching him.

Defendant stated that the victim fell backward. At some point, defendant asked the victim if 

he was “okay,” and the victim responded, “Yeah” and “I’m okay.” Defendant stated that he 

used the victim’s keys to unlock the door to get out of the store, and that he threw or dropped 

the keys somewhere. Defendant denied taking anything else from the store. Defendant stated 

that he tried to call the victim later.

One of the police detectives who interviewed defendant testified that during the interview, 

defendant indicated that he and the victim had had anal sex at the store on the night of the 

incident.

The victim’s nephew, who frequently helped in the store after school, testified that he had 

seen defendant in the store monthly and later every two months before the incident. Most of 

the time, defendant was complaining to the victim about financial issues and needing money 

from the victim. Afterward, the victim would appear really irritated about defendant wanting 

money.

Gustavo Betancourt Ortiz, a friend of the victim, testified that he had helped at the victim’s 

store almost every week. The victim confided in Ortiz that he had been having a sexual 

relationship with defendant for a long time, and that the two engaged in oral sex. [FN 2] 

Ortiz saw defendant in the store on three or four occasions asking the victim for money. The 

victim gave defendant small amounts, such as $5. The victim later told Ortiz that he believed 

defendant had stolen several thousand dollars in cash from the back office of the store in 

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2004. The victim indicated he was afraid of reporting defendant to the police because he 

believed defendant would retaliate when he got out of jail. The victim also stated that 

defendant had called him on the phone a couple of times asking for money and promising 

that he would treat the victim better. Ortiz testified that the victim had used a wallet in the 

past, but he did not know whether the victim had used a wallet recently.

FN 2: Ortiz’s testimony about statements made by the victim were not admitted for 

the truth of the matter stated, but to show the victim’s state of mind and/or explain 

the victim’s subsequent conduct.

. . .

B. The Defense Case

Defendant testified in his own defense. He had been in a sexual relationship with the victim 

since late 2003. They engaged in oral sex but never anal sex. Defendant had “a lot of 

financial issues,” and the victim helped him with money for rent, groceries, or other items. 

The amount the victim gave depended on defendant’s need and might include $200 if 

defendant was behind on rent.

Defendant testified that the day before the incident, he and the victim planned by phone to 

meet the following night. On the night of December 15, 2010, the victim drove to pick up 

defendant and they went to the victim’s store. The victim went inside the store to turn off an 

alarm while defendant waited outside. Defendant admitted that he was the person who the 

witness had seen standing outside the store. Defendant testified that the victim unlocked the 

front door and defendant went inside the store.

Defendant testified that the victim indicated that he wanted to have anal sex. The victim 

tugged at defendant’s pants and grabbed at defendant roughly and forcefully. Defendant did 

not want to have anal sex and told the victim “no.” The victim did not answer defendant and 

continued to grab at defendant’s upper body, tug at defendant’s pants, and try to turn 

defendant around. Defendant tried to take the victim’s hands off him but the victim’s hands 

kept coming back onto defendant.

Defendant was able to get the victim a half foot away from him, but the victim came back at 

him. Defendant felt afraid. He thought the victim was “going to have his way” with 

defendant, even though defendant had told him “no.” Defendant had brought a knife with 

him that night. He testified that the knife, which was in his coat pocket, was poking him so 

he pulled it out. When the victim came back at him, defendant “panicked” and stabbed him. 

Defendant testified that he did not stab the victim intentionally, and that it was a “reaction” 

when the victim came at him. Defendant testified that he might have “overreacted” out of 

panic.

Defendant testified that he brought the knife to protect himself because the area was not safe. 

He testified that there were times when the victim would not drive him home and he had to 

take the bus or light rail home.

Defendant denied being at the store that night to rob the victim. He also denied bringing the 

knife to stab or rob the victim. He further denied breaking the victim’s leg or punching him.

Defendant testified that he lied to police during the traffic stop because his girlfriend was 

nearby. He did not want her to know about his sexual relationship with the victim or about 

the incident at the store. Defendant testified that after he was arrested, he told the police that 

the victim “was trying to do me in my ass. And they interpreted it as ‘did’ me in my ass, 

which is not true.”

Myrick, 2015 WL 1881385, at *1–*6.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by AEDPA. This Court may entertain a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States.ˮ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.ˮ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the 

constitutional error at issue “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court’s 

jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. A state court 

decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it “applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or if it “confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless 

arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Id. at 405–06. “Under the ‘unreasonable 

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that 

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue 

the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant stateCase 4:17-cv-03122-HSG Document 24 Filed 04/29/19 Page 6 of 17
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court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. “A federal court may not overrule a state 

court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme 

Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner first raised these claims in his state collateral 

proceeding. The Santa Clara County Superior Court’s December 21, 2015 decision was the last 

reasoned state court decision that addressed these claims. Accordingly, in reviewing this habeas 

petition, this Court reviews the Santa Clara County Superior Court’s decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. 

at 803–04; Barker, 423 F.3d at 1091–92.4

B. Petitioners’ Claims

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he referred to Petitioner 

as a liar, and minimized the sexual nature of the relationship between Petitioner and the victim. 

Pet. at 5 and 11. Respondent argues that this claim is procedurally defaulted and that Petitioner 

has failed to state a cognizable claim of prejudicial misconduct. Dkt. No. 22-1 at 12–15. The state 

court denied the prosecutorial misconduct claim as follows:

Petitioner also alleges that the prosecutor purposely misstated the circumstances of the 

case, apparently by minimizing the sexual nature of the relationship between Petitioner and 

the victim and calling him a liar on more than one occasion.

It is the longstanding rule that, when a defendant believes the prosecutor has made remarks 

constituting misconduct during argument, he or she is obligated to call them to the court’s 

attention by a timely objection. Otherwise no claim is preserved for appeal. (See People 

v. Osband (1996) 13 Cla. 4th 622, 696.) The defendant must have made an assignment of 

 

4 Although Ylst was a procedural default case, the “look through” rule announced there has been 

extended beyond the context of procedural default. Barker, 423 F.3d at 1092 n.3 (citing Lambert 

v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.17 (9th Cir. 2004), and Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112–13 

(9th Cir. 2003)). The look through rule is applicable here as the Ninth Circuit has held that “it is a 

common practice of the federal courts to examine the last reasoned state decision to determine 

whether a state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ or ‘an unreasonable application of’ clearly 

established federal law” and “it [is] unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to disrupt this 

practice without making its intention clear.” Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir.), 

amended, 733 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2013).

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misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. (See 

also People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 1048, 1072; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 

Cal.4th 795, 841.) Once again, there is no evidence or allegation that Petitioner made any 

objection to the prosecutor’s remarks, and any challenge on that basis is thus foreclosed 

(People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34.) Because it depends entirely on matters 

contained in the record of conviction, his failure to raise that issue on appeal will also 

result in a procedural bar. Habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal or other direct 

remedies. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813.)

Pet. at 23.

a. Procedural Default

A federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a state court if the 

decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate 

to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991). In the context of 

direct review by the United States Supreme Court, the “adequate and independent state ground”

doctrine goes to jurisdiction; in federal habeas cases, in whatever court, it is a matter of comity 

and federalism. Id. The procedural default rule is a specific instance of the more general 

“adequate and independent state grounds” doctrine. Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 

1994). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to 

an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred 

unless the prisoner can either (1) demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law, or (2) demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Here, the state court found that the prosecutorial misconduct claim was procedurally 

defaulted because Petitioner failed to contemporaneously object to the alleged instances of 

misconduct; and because he failed to raise this issue on direct appeal, citing to In re Clark, 5 

Cal.4th 750 (Cal. 1993), and In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th 813 (Cal. 1993). Both the contemporaneous 

objection rule and the requirement that claims be raised on direct appeal are adequate and 

independent state grounds that bar federal habeas review.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized and applied the California contemporaneous objection 

rule in affirming denial of a federal petition on grounds of procedural default where there was, as 

is the case here, a complete failure to object at trial to alleged prosecutorial misconduct. See 

Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 

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F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (review of evidentiary claim barred where state court held that 

claim was procedurally barred because petitioner failed to object at trial); Paulino v. Castro, 371 

F.3d 1083, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2004) (review of instructional error claim barred where state court 

found that claim was procedurally barred because defense counsel failed to contemporaneously 

object); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957–58 (9th Cir. 1999) (habeas review of peremptory 

challenge claim barred where state court found that claim was procedurally barred because 

defense counsel failed to contemporaneously object). In Zapata, the petitioner alleged that the 

prosecutor’s “fictional, inflammatory statements in the closing argument” constituted misconduct. 

The state court held that claim was procedurally barred because counsel did not object to these 

remarks at trial, but also addressed the claim on the merits. Zapata, 788 F.3d at 1111–12. Despite 

the state court addressing the claim on the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that it could not reach the 

merits of the prosecutorial misconduct claim because the state court’s application of the 

procedural bar rendered the claim defaulted. Id. The contemporaneous objection rule is an 

adequate and independent state ground that bars federal habeas review of this claim.

The procedural bar referenced in both Clark and Harris5is also referred to as the “Dixon

rule.” Under that rule, to bring a claim in a state habeas corpus action, a petitioner must first, if 

possible, have pursued the claims on direct appeal from his or her conviction, unless the claim 

falls within certain exceptions set forth in In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (Cal. 1953). See Park v. 

California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has recognized that the 

Dixon rule is both an adequate and independent state procedural rule. Johnson v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 

1802, 1803–04 (2016). The state court’s denial of the habeas petition on Dixon grounds bars 

federal habeas review. See id. at 1804 (Dixon is a well-established procedural bar that is adequate 

to bar federal habeas review). 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that this Court can nevertheless consider his claim. He has 

 

5

See Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 765–66 (“in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse 

for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, 

but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted, citing to Dixon); Harris, 5 Cal.4th at 829 (“an unjustified failure to present an 

issue on appeal will generally preclude its consideration in a postconviction petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus”) (citing to Dixon).

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not alleged, much less demonstrated, either (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice as a 

result of the alleged violation of federal law, or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result in 

a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The cause standard requires the 

petitioner to show that “‘some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts’”

to raise the claim. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 

477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). But nothing in the record indicates that Petitioner was prevented from 

objecting at trial to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, or prevented from raising this issue on 

direct appeal. The miscarriage of justice exception provides that a federal court may still hear the 

merits of procedurally defaulted claims if the petitioner can make a showing of actual innocence. 

See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 393–94 (2013). “The miscarriage of justice exception is 

limited to those extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his innocence and establishes that 

the court cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.” See Johnson v. Knowles, 541 

F.3d 933, 936–38 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). Petitioner has not established that the 

Court cannot have confidence in his guilt. Petitioner has not demonstrated “actual innocence,” 

which requires a petitioner to present new reliable evidence, such as exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence, that would create a 

credible claim of actual innocence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321, 324 (1995). Petitioner has 

only argued that the prosecutor minimized the sexual relationship between Petitioner and the 

victim, and that this caused the jury to view the crime differently than if the crime had been 

committed by a woman in a sexual relationship with the victim. Petitioner’s argument does not 

provide any evidence of actual innocence. Rather, it is an argument that the jury might have 

weighed the evidence differently if the crime were committed by a woman. 

The state court found that this prosecutorial misconduct claim was procedurally barred on 

independent and adequate state grounds, specifically the contemporaneous objection rule and the 

Dixon rule. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate either cause and prejudice to excuse the default, 

or that the failure to consider this claim on the merits would result in a miscarriage of justice. 

Because the state court denied this claim pursuant to adequate and independent state grounds that 

were correctly applied, federal habeas review of this claim is barred. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

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729–30. 

2. Batson/Wheeler Claim

Petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment to a fair and impartial jury pool 

composed of a cross section of the community because the prosecutor used peremptory challenges 

to systemically exclude African-American jurors or “anyone else who even remotely resembled” 

him. Pet. at 5, 12–14. The state court denied this claim as follows:

Petitioner alleges that he was deprived of his right to a jury selected from a fair cross 

section of the community because the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to 

systemically exclude African-American jurors or “anyone that even remotely resembled” 

him.

Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory strikes to remove 

prospective jurors on the basis of group bias, as has been alleged by Petitioner (Batson v. 

Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; Ct. 1712; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.) The 

Batson/Wheeler inquiry consists of three distinct steps. First, the opponent of the strike 

must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives 

rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 

Second, if the prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to the proponent of the 

strike to explain adequately the basis for excusing the juror by offering permissible, 

nondiscriminatory justifications. Third, if the party has offered a nondiscriminatory 

reason, the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved the 

ultimate question of purposeful discrimination. (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 

162, 168.) In order to preserve a Batson/Wheeler claim based on the prosecutor’s 

peremptory challenges, the defendant must make a timely objection before the jury is 

sworn. (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 622.)

Petitioner’s claim may not be considered for the first time on habeas corpus. Petitioner has 

not shown that his claim was properly preserved by a timely objection made in the trial 

court, and, even if it were, why it was not raised in his direct appeal (H040129). “The writ 

will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not raised upon a timely 

appeal from a judgment.” (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 813, citing In re Dixon (1953) 41 

Cal.2d 756.)

Pet. at 22–23.

a. Procedural Default

As discussed supra, a federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a 

state court if the decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal 

question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30. Here, the state 

court found that Petitioner’s Batson/Wheeler claim was procedurally defaulted because he failed to 

object before the jury was sworn, citing to People v. Cunningham, 61 Cal.4th 609, 622 (Cal. 

2015); and because he failed to raise this issue on direct appeal, citing to In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th 

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813 (Cal. 1993), and In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (Cal. 1953). The contemporaneous objection rule 

is both an adequate and independent state ground, and the state court’s denial of this claim 

pursuant to this procedural bar bars federal habeas review. Vansickel, 166 F.3d at 957–58 

(petitioner procedurally defaulted his federal due process claim regarding trial court’s improper 

denial of peremptory challenges when he did not timely object at trial). Similarly, the Dixon rule 

is also both an adequate and independent state procedural rule, and the state court’s denial of this 

claim on Dixon grounds also bars federal habeas review. Johnson, 136 S. Ct. at 1803–04.

Nor has Petitioner alleged, much less demonstrated, either cause for the default, or that 

failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750. Nothing in the record suggests that Petitioner was prevented from raising a Batson

claim at trial, or prevented from raising this issue on direct appeal. See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 

493. Moreover, even if he had shown cause, Petitioner’s Batson claim as articulated in his petition 

is conclusory, and provides no basis on which the Court could conclude that he suffered prejudice. 

Pet. at 12–14. Finally, as discussed supra, Petitioner has not presented new reliable evidence, 

such as exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence, that would create a credible claim of actual innocence and entitle him to the miscarriage 

of justice exception. See McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 393–94. To the extent that Petitioner is arguing 

that there was provocation in that the victim tried to force him to engage in anal sex, this argument 

was presented at trial and rejected by the jury, and Petitioner has not presented new reliable 

evidence that he acted in self-defense. 

Because the state court denied Petitioner’s Batson/Wheeler claim pursuant to adequate and 

independent state grounds that were correctly applied and Petitioner has not satisfied either the 

cause and prejudice exception or the actual miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural 

default rule, federal habeas review of this claim is barred. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30. In 

addition, a state court’s decision to deny a Batson/Wheeler claim because the petitioner failed to 

challenge the use of peremptory challenges either at voir dire or trial is not contrary to clearly 

established federal law. Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168, 1169, 1171–73 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“petitioner may not raise a Batson claim in his habeas petition if the petitioner failed to object to 

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the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges at trial”) (affirming district court’s denial of 

Batson claim). 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective because she did not make the sexual 

relationship between Petitioner and the victim a central theme in his defense, and because she did 

not explore whether the police might have caused the victim’s fatal injuries. Pet. at 5, 15–17. The 

trial court denied this claim as follows:

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under either the federal or state guarantee, a 

petition must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that counsel’s deficient 

performance was prejudicial, i.e., that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s 

failings, the result would have been more favorable to the petitioner. (Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 688) Petitioner has failed to show that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he suffered any 

prejudice.

To make out a prima facie case “the petitioner must establish prejudice as a demonstrable 

reality, not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel. The 

petitioner must demonstrate that counsel knew or should have known that further 

investigation was necessary, and must establish the nature and relevance of the evidence 

that counsel failed to present or discover. Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable 

probability that a more favorable outcome would have resulted had the evidence been 

presented, i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The 

incompetence must have resulted in a fundamentally unfair proceeding or an unreliable 

verdict.” (In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1016, citing In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 

766.) “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before 

examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . 

. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” (People v. 

Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 982, citing and quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 

466 U.S. 688, 697, In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 351-352, and In re Hardy (2007) 

41 Cal.4th 977, 1032.)

Petitioner claims that trial counsel should have explored the possibility that the conduct of 

the officers at the scene might have injured the victim further, “even fatally.” He offers no 

explanation other than his subjective expectation that some sort of follow-up might 

possibly have resulted in favorable evidence. This sort of unsupported speculation is 

insufficient to establish a demonstrable reality that any prejudice occurred, rendering moot 

the question of whether counsel’s performance was deficient. The same is true for 

Petitioner’s claim that counsel should have emphasized the nature of his relationship to the 

victim as a ‘central theme’ of his defense. Without any statement of how that issue was 

actually addressed at trial, what other defenses were presented, or why counsel’s strategy 

did not fall “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” this claim also 

fails. (See People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 875-76.)

Pet. at 15–17.

a. Standard

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A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any 

claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning 

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a petitioner must 

establish two things. 

First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an 

“objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687–88. This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687. The relevant inquiry is not what 

defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the choices made by defense counsel were 

reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). Judicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption 

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., 

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 

A federal habeas court considering an ineffective assistance claim need not address the 

prejudice prong of the Strickland test “if the petitioner cannot even establish incompetence under 

the first prong.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). Conversely, the court 

“need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice 

suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

considered to be “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. Daire v. Lattimore, 812 F.3d 

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766, 767–68 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011). A “doubly” 

deferential judicial review is appropriate in analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

under § 2254. See id. at 190; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88–89 (2011) (same); Premo v. 

Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011) (same). The general rule of Strickland, i.e., to review a defense 

counsel’s effectiveness with great deference, gives the state courts greater leeway in reasonably 

applying that rule, which in turn “translates to a narrower range of decisions that are objectively 

unreasonable under AEDPA.” Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010). When § 

2254(d) applies, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is 

whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.

b. Analysis 

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective because she did not emphasize the sexual 

relationship between Petitioner and the victim. He argues that counsel should have emphasized 

that he had been sexually exploited by the victim for several years; that he was suffering from 

Stockholm syndrome; and that he panicked when the victim tried to sodomize him. The record 

contradicts Petitioner’s allegation that counsel failed to emphasize these arguments. Counsel 

highlighted the sexual and romantic relationship between Petitioner and the victim by asking 

multiple witnesses about their knowledge of the relationship, thereby highlighting the relationship 

for the jurors, RT 961, 963, 965, 1301; and counsel focused Petitioner’s testimony on his sexual 

relationship with the victim, RT 2552–76. In the closing argument, counsel specifically argued 

that the relationship between Petitioner and the victim was unequal. She pointed out the age 

difference between Petitioner and the victim, and argued that the evidence showed that Petitioner 

acted in self-defense because the victim attempted to coerce him into anal sex. RT 2364–65, 

2367–68, 2378–80, 2397, 2410. Petitioner further argues that counsel was ineffective because the 

jury would have decided differently if he had been a white woman. Contrary to Petitioner’s 

allegation, counsel specifically asked the jury to consider how they would view the situation if 

Petitioner were a woman. RT 2377–78 (“[if] a woman was sitting next to me and was telling you 

about her night with a man that she’s known for six years and they’ve always agreed to do 

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something a certain way but tonight, this night, things got scary. He grabbed her, he turned her 

around, he pulled at her clothing. She told him no. She was objecting and he was continuing. 

How would you look at this situation?”). 

Petitioner also argues that counsel was ineffective because she did not explore whether the 

police might have caused the victim’s fatal injuries. However, as the state court correctly noted, 

Petitioner has not specified how the police moving the victim’s body caused the fatal injuries. To 

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must provide more than conclusory or 

speculative allegations. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim that counsel should have presented evidence that petitioner was not 

shooter when petitioner did not specify the exculpatory evidence and there was overwhelming 

evidence of petitioner’s guilt); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2001) (mere 

speculation that evidence might be helpful insufficient to establish ineffective assistance). 

The Court has carefully reviewed the record and, keeping in mind the doubly deferential 

judicial review required in federal habeas cases, finds no evidence that counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Because 

Petitioner “cannot even establish incompetence under the first prong,” the Court need not address 

the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Siripongs, 133 F.3d at 737. Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. The state court’s denial of the ineffective of 

assistance claims did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. Nor was the 

state court’s denial of these claims based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Federal 

habeas relief is denied on these claims. 

C. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

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certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, Petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and a 

certificate of appealability is DENIED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

4/29/2019

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