Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00503/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00503-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aspen Properties
Plaintiff
Duane Evans
Counter Defendant
Northstar-At-Tahoe
Defendant
Trimont Land Company
Counter Claimant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DUANE EVANS d/b/a ASPEN

PROPERTIES,

NO. CIV. S-06-503 WBS PAN (JFM)

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION TO REMAND

TRIMONT LAND COMPANY, INC., a

California corporation, and

DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Duane Evans, d/b/a Aspen Properties, brought

this action in Placer County Superior Court for infringement of a

trademark issued under California law. The action was removed to

this court, and plaintiff now seeks a remand to state court and

attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with this motion. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is engaged in the business of real estate

agency, marketing, and brokerage services in the community of

Northstar and Northstar-at-Tahoe in California. (Pl.’s Mot. to

Remand 2.) Defendant Trimont Land Company, Inc. owns a

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recreational facilities resort and, relatedly, a service mark,

commonly known as a trademark, for “Northstar.” (Pl.’s Reply 2.) 

Defendant’s service mark was issued by the State of California on

April 2, 1982. (Notice of Removal Ex. 3 (Dec. 9, 2005

Defendant’s Cease and Desist Letter) at 1.) 

On December 9, 2005, defendant sent a cease and desist

letter to plaintiff, in which defendant stated that plaintiff was

infringing its service mark. (Id.) In the letter, defendant

explained that under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A), “it is unlawful to register or

use a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to

another person’s mark.” (Id.) Defendant closed the letter by

warning plaintiff that if he did not agree to the demands

contained therein, defendant would seek legal relief, including

“a suit for injunctive relief under California’s Trademark and

Dilution Statues, the Lanham Act, and the Anticybersquatting

Consumer Protection Act.” (Id. at 3.) 

After receiving this letter, on February 6, 2006,

plaintiff filed a complaint in state court for declaratory

judgment that he does not infringe any property interests claimed

by defendant on the basis of its service mark “Northstar.” 

(Notice of Removal Ex. 1 (Compl. ¶ 8).) Plaintiff also seeks a

declaration that his use of the name “northstar” on his business’

website is a non-infringing descriptive reference to his local

real estate market, and that such use falls under fair use of the

mark under Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 906

(9th Cir. 2003). (Compl. ¶ 10.) 

Defendant removed the action on March 8, 2006,

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contending that this court has original jurisdiction over the

claims in this case because they arise under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331. (Notice of Removal ¶ 3.) Plaintiff now contends that this

court does not have jurisdiction and should remand this case to

state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

II. Discussion

In any case over which federal district courts have

original jurisdiction, a defendant may remove the case from state

to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b). District courts have

original jurisdiction over “federal question” cases, or “all

civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “It is long settled

law that a cause of action arises under federal law only when the

plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.” 

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). 

Nevertheless, “[t]he artful pleading doctrine is a corollary to

the well-pleaded complaint rule, and provides that [a]lthough the

plaintiff is master of his own pleadings, he may not avoid

federal jurisdiction by omitting from the complaint allegations

of federal law that are essential to the establishment of his

claim.” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d

1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotations omitted). 

Additionally, an action may arise under federal law

based on state law claims raised by a plaintiff “where the

vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on

some construction of federal law.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v.

Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citation omitted). The

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ultimate question for “arising under” jurisdiction is: “does a

state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue,

actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may

entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance

of federal and state judicial responsibilities”? Grable & Sons

Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368

(2005). 

Plaintiff’s claims were brought in reaction to

defendant’s “Cease and Desist” letter, which warned plaintiff

that defendant would seek relief under state and federal law. In

particular, defendant’s letter mentioned that defendant would

seek relief under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115, and the

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §

1125(d)(1)(A). Although plaintiff alleged that defendant’s

letter is incorrect in that he does not infringe defendant’s

trademark, his complaint omits any specific reference to these

federal statutes.

Instead, plaintiff somewhat ambiguously seeks broad

declaratory relief that he does not infringe defendant’s

trademark “or any other statutory or common law rights possessed

by defendant.” Plaintiff’s request for a judicial declaration of

non-infringement is not only based on defendant’s allegations of

infringement under federal and state law, but it is also so

broadly phrased that it appears to encompass both federal and

state law. Moreover, plaintiff relies on Ninth Circuit caselaw

in his complaint to explain that “[u]nder the fair use doctrine,

the holder of a trademark cannot prevent others from using the

words that form the trademark in their primary or descriptive

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sense.” (Compl. ¶ 10.) Taken together, the fact that the

complaint is a response to defendant’s allegations of violations

of federal and state law, requests broad declaratory relief, and

cites Ninth Circuit caselaw to explain the federal fair use

doctrine all clearly demonstrate that plaintiff’s claims raise

substantial federal issues. Thus, the vindication of plaintiff’s

claims necessarily turns on the court’s construction of federal

law, Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808, and removal of this case was

appropriate. 

Additionally, because defendant’s removal was not

“wrong as a matter of law,” an award of fees and costs would not

be appropriate here. See Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film

Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (awarding

attorneys’ fees when “when a defendant’s removal, while ‘fairly

supportable,’ was wrong as a matter of law”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to

remand be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

attorneys’ fees be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: May 18, 2006

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