Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01854/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01854-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary Allen Reichow
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1854

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Gary Allen Reichow, * 

* 

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: November 18, 2004

Filed: August 5, 2005 

___________

Before SMITH, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Gary Allen Reichow pleaded guilty to one count of armed bank robbery and

one count of discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. He was

sentenced to consecutive sentences of 144 months' imprisonment on count one and

120 months' imprisonment on count two. In addition, Reichow was ordered to pay

restitution of $15,403.13. On appeal, Reichow argues that the district court erred in

awarding restitution for damages to the sheriff's property, medical bills for a sheriff's

deputy, and psychological counseling for bank employees. Reichow also argues that

the district court erred in imposing a number of enhancements. We affirm in part and

reverse in part.

Appellate Case: 04-1854 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/05/2005 Entry ID: 1936773
-2-

I. Background

Reichow, wearing a black mask and a bullet proof jacket, robbed the Farmer's

State Bank of Hartland, Minnesota, with a fully-loaded semiautomatic AK-47 rifle.

The AK-47 contained a 30-round magazine, which had a second fully-loaded

magazine taped to the rifle. Reichow had three more loaded magazines in a bandolier

that he was wearing. Reichow shot the rifle twice outside of the bank building and

fired at the ceiling after entering the building, announcing the bank was being robbed.

Upon entry, Reichow ordered Janice Beach, the bank's vice president, to empty

the teller drawers. She did so and Reichow took $9,639.00 and fled in his

Volkswagen Jetta. A utility company employee who was outside of the bank followed

Reichow in his car and told police the location and a description of the Jetta. Deputy

Golbuff spotted Reichow's car and followed him to a field. Before Deputy Golbuff

could exit his squad car, Reichow fired several rounds into it. Deputy Golbuff

returned fire and struck Reichow in the neck. Deputy Golbuff was also injured in the

exchange. When backup arrived, Reichow fired a number of rounds into that squad

car as well and then fled into some nearby woods. Sheriff Harig, who had also arrived

on the scene, used a PA system to ask Reichow to surrender, and, fortunately, he did.

A subsequent search of the scene revealed 42 shell casings of the same caliber as

Reichow's rifle. The stolen money was also recovered.

Reichow was indicted on one count of armed bank robbery in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and one count of discharging a firearm in relation to a crime

of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A). He pleaded guilty to both

counts of the indictment. The government moved for an upward departure and

requested restitution of $14,753.14 for damage to the police cars, destruction of

uniforms, and medical bills incurred by the sheriff's deputy, $125 for damage to the

bank building, and $525 for psychological counseling for the bank's employees.

Appellate Case: 04-1854 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/05/2005 Entry ID: 1936773
-3-

Reichow objected to the calculation of his offense level and the proposed restitution

order.

II. Discussion

A. Restitution for Damage to the Sheriff's Property and 

Medical Bills for the Sheriff's Deputy

Reichow argues the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A(a)(1)(A), does not require him to pay restitution for damage to the sheriff's

property and medical bills for the sheriff's deputy because those injuries are not the

direct or proximate result of the bank robbery or the flight therefrom. We review a

restitution order for abuse of discretion and the district court's application of the

restitution statute de novo. United States v. Bush, 252 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 2001);

United States v. Ross, 210 F.3d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 2000). The district court did not

abuse its discretion.

Under MVRA, a district court sentencing a defendant for committing a crime

of violence, shall order restitution in addition to any other penalty. 18 U.S.C. §

3663A(a)(1). Victim is defined as "a person directly and proximately harmed as the

result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered." 18

U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). The court has wide discretion in ordering restitution. United

States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir. 1995), citing United States v. Bartsh, 985

F.2d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1204 (1994). 

Reichow's argument centers on the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A),

which penalizes the use of a firearm during, or in relation to a crime of violence. He

contends that "during" is a limiting term. We have held that the escape phase of a

crime is part of the robbery and occurs "during" it. United States v. Pate, 932 F.2d

736, 738 (8th Cir. 1991) (bank robbery does not begin and end at the doors of the

bank). Other circuits agree. See United States v. Williams, 344 F.3d 365, 372 (3d Cir.

2003) (escape is part and parcel of federal bank robbery—construing § 924(c));

Appellate Case: 04-1854 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/05/2005 Entry ID: 1936773
-4-

United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994), relevant part

reinstated, 38 F.3d 803 (en banc); United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1200 (9th

Cir. 1994) (escape phase is part of the robbery); United States v. Muhammad, 948

F.2d 1449, 1456 (6th Cir. 1991) (bank robbery necessarily includes flight); United

States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1000 (4th Cir. 1982) (escape phase part of the

robbery). 

In a case with similar facts but applying different law, the Seventh Circuit in

United States v. Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046, 1051–55 (7th Cir. 2003), addressed the

proximate cause issue. Donaby involved damage to apolice vehicle during a getaway,

but involved the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a),

rather than MVRA. The Seventh Circuit applied United States v. Hughey, 495 U.S.

411(1990), which interpreted the VWPA. VWPA and MVRA are similar. To be

recoverable, Hughey requires that the loss be caused by "specific conduct that is the

basis of the offense of the conviction." Hughey, 495 U.S. at 413. The Seventh Circuit

affirmed the district court, holding that the bank robbery directly and proximately

caused the damage to the police vehicle during the getaway. Donaby 349 F.3d at

1053. We agree with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Donaby and consider it

applicable to the MVRA as well as the VWPA. The damage Reichow caused to the

deputies' squad cars and deputy Golbuff's injury occurred "during" the robbery.

B. Restitution for Psychological Counseling for Bank Employees

Reichow also argues that the district court can only order restitution if the

offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(2)(A);

consequently, the court erred in ordering restitution in the amount of $525 for the

bank employees' psychological treatment expenses. According to Reichow, since no

one inside the bank suffered physical injury, such compensation is improper. We

review a restitution order for abuse of discretion and the district court's application

of the restitution statute de novo. Bush, 252 F.3d at 962; Ross, 210 F.3d at 924.

Reichow's argument has merit and we hold that the MVRA requires evidence of

Appellate Case: 04-1854 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/05/2005 Entry ID: 1936773
-5-

bodily injury to victims before restitution can be ordered for their psychological

treatment expenses.

§ 3663(b)(2)(A) specifically provides:

(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim

including an offense under chapter 109A or chapter 110--

(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and

related professional services and devices relating to physical,

psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care

and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing

recognized by the law of the place of treatment;

(Emphasis added).

The plain language of § 3663(b)(2)(A) authorizes restitution for professional

services for psychiatric and psychological care in cases where the offense results in

bodily injury to a victim. The statute does not provide for such an order in the absence

of bodily injury. United States v. Husky, 924 F.2d 223, 226 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 833; United States v. Hicks, 997 F.2d 594, 601 (9th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Follet, 269 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001). The evidence does not

show that the employees suffered any bodily injury. Therefore, we hold that the

district court abused its discretion in ordering Reichow to pay $525 for the

psychological counseling of the bank's employees.

C. Sentence Enhancement for Official Victim

At sentencing, Reichow objected to a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 3A1.2 for an official victim. The government sought a two-level enhancement for

injury to the sheriff's deputy under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) and a one-level

enhancement for damage to the squad car under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7). We review

the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States

Appellate Case: 04-1854 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/05/2005 Entry ID: 1936773
-6-

v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 (8th Cir. 2005). Reichow contends that the conduct

for the assault was already accounted for under Chapter 2 of the Guidelines and

therefore the increase under Chapter 3 amounted to double counting. We disagree.

Double counting occurs where "one part of the Guidelines is applied to

increase a defendant's punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already been

fully accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines." United States

v. Hipenbecker, 115 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 1997). Double counting is permitted

where "(1) the Commission intended the result and (2) each statutory section concerns

conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing." Id. at 583. The facts of this case

meet both requirements for permissible double counting. 

It is clear that the Commission intended double counting in some cases:

Absent an instruction to the contrary, enhancements under Chapter Two,

adjustments under Chapter Three and determinations under Chapter

Four are to be applied cumulatively. In some cases, such enhancement,

adjustments, and determinations may be triggered by the same conduct.

For example, shooting a police officer during the commission of a

robbery may warrant an injury enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(3) and an

official victim adjustment under 3A1.2, even though the enhancement

and the adjustment are both triggered by the shooting of an officer.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, app. 4(b). It is also clear that Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of the

Guidelines involve distinct sentencing concerns both of which are implicated by the

instant facts. While the official victim enhancement considers the risk to law

enforcement officers posed by criminal conduct, the bodily injury adjustment

punishes the resulting injury. United States v. Swoape, 31 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1994)

(imposed bodily injury, official victim, and reckless endangerment enhancements).

We affirm the district court's three-level enhancement. 

Appellate Case: 04-1854 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/05/2005 Entry ID: 1936773
-7-

D. Booker Issues

For the first time in a supplemental brief, Reichow argues that at sentencing,

the district court's sentence is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004). Blakely invalidated the State of Washington's mandatory Sentencing

Guidelines. The court held, consistent with Apprendi, that sentence-enhancement fact

findings should be admitted by the defendant or determined by the jury and not the

judge. Id. at 2536. Below, the district court imposed: (1) a two-point enhancement for

injury to Deputy Golbuff during the offense; (2) one-point enhancement for amount

of loss; (3) a four-point enhancement for use of body armor; (4) a three-point

enhancement for assaulting a police officer; and (5) an increase based on the use of

a high capacity firearm. Reichow also argues that the restitution imposed violates

Blakely. 

Since the filing of the briefs, the Supreme Court has resolved the questions

raised by Blakely regarding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines continuing validity

and given lower courts guidance on their proper use. United States v. Booker, 125 S.

Ct. 738 (2005). In Booker, the Court made the mandatory federal Guidelines

effectively advisory and thus corrected the defect that rendered them unconstitutional

under the Sixth Amendment. Id. However, because Reichow failed to raise a Sixth

Amendment argument below, we review for plain error. United States v. Pirani, 406

F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Under Pirani, plain error can only be shown by satisfying all of the elements

set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).

Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. Because the district court treated the Guidelines as

mandatory, we find error that is plain. Id. However, Olano also requires Reichow to

establish by a reasonable probability that upon remand, he would obtain a more

favorable sentence. Id. Based upon the record, we hold that Reichow cannot make

such a showing. Nothing in the record shows even a slight inclination by the trial

judge to impose a more lenient sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines.

Therefore the sentence imposed by the district court stands.

Appellate Case: 04-1854 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/05/2005 Entry ID: 1936773
1

At issue in Behrman was an Apprendi argument in a MVRA case. The court

held "[section] 3663A does not include a 'statutory maximum' that could be

'increased' by a given finding." Id.

-8-

Lastly, we find no merit in Reichow's contention, that the restitution order also

violated Blakely. Reichow cites no authority for the proposition that MVRA suffers

from any constitutional infirmity addressed by the Court in Booker. In fact, courts

have squarely addressed this issue and found Sixth Amendment arguments unavailing

in the context of restitution orders. United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th

Cir. 2005); United States v. Trala, 386 F.3d 536, 547 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004); United

States v. DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203, 1221 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wooten,

377 F.3d 1134, 1144 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 159

(3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 1042 (6th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000).1

 Reichow does point to

authority in our circuit that a restitution order under the MVRA is a criminal penalty.

United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997). Because the issue in

Williams was whether restitution under MVRA was an ex post facto violation, our

language regarding restitution as a penalty established no controlling precedent. 

MVRA sets no limit on restitution but requires it to be ordered "in the full

amount" of victim loss. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). We have recognized that "there

isn't really a 'prescribed' maximum." United States v. Ross, 279 F.3d 600, 609 (8th

Cir. 2002). Consequently, neither Apprendi, Blakely, nor Booker are applicable to

restitution. As with the sentence enhancements, Reichow makes this argument for the

first time on appeal and it too is therefore subject to plain error review. Given the

discretionary nature of an order of restitution, Reichow cannot show that the district

court would impose any more favorable sentence upon remand. On the record before

us, we find the sentence and restitution imposed by the district court to be reasonable.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-1854 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/05/2005 Entry ID: 1936773