Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01014/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adams County School District No. 50,
Appellee
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado, Inc.
Amicus Curiae
American Jewish Congress
Amicus Curiae
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
Amicus Curiae
Kathleen Madigan
Appellee
Marc Nelson
Appellant
Zay Nelson
Appellant
Kenneth Roberts
Appellant
Debra J. White
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeal& Tenth eir.cuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

KENNETH ROBERTS, MARC NELSON, ) 

and ZAY NELSON, Parents and Next ) 

Friends of Kelly Nelson and Amy ) 

Nelson, and DEBRA J. WHITE, ) 

Parent and Next Friend of Kelly ). White, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

KATHLEEN MADIGAN and ADAMS 

COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 50, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI 

B'RITH, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 

UNION FOUNDATION OF COLORADO, 

INC., and AMERICAN JEWISH 

CONGRESS, 

Amici Curiae. 

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DEC 171990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1014 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-F-1908) 

Jordan W. Lorence of Concerned Women for America Legal Foundation, 

Washington, D.C. (Cimron Campbell and Mark N. Troobnick of Concerned Women for America Legal Foundation, Washington, D.C.; 

Wendell R. Bird, Atlanta Georgia; and Roger Westlund, Thornton, 

Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Martin Semple (Franklin A. Nachman with him on the brief), Semple 

& Jackson, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees. 

(Phillips. Figa and Candace C. Figa of Burns & Figa, P.C., Denver 

Colorado; Bradley A. Levin of Breit, Best, Richman & Bosch, P.C., 

Appellate Case: 89-1014 Document: 01019627370 Date Filed: 12/17/1990 Page: 1 
Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae; and Jeffrey P. 

Sinensky, Steven M. Freeman, Richard E. Shevitz, and Meyer 

E5.senberg of Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, New York, New 

York; and Professor Ruti Teitel, New York Law School, New York, 

New York, Of Counsel, on the brief for Amicus Curiae AntiDefamation League of B'Nai B'rith.) 

(John Preston Baker of Coghill & Goodspeed P.C., Denver, Colorado; 

Robert w. Thompson, Jr., Denver, Colorado; and David Miller, Legal 

Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado, Denver, 

Colorado, on the brief for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties 

Union of Colorado.) 

(Marc D. Stern, Lois C. Waldman, Amy Adelson, and Jeremy S~ 

Garber, American Jewish Congress, New York, New York, on the brief 

for Amicus Curiae American Jewish Congress.) 

Before McKAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR,! Chief 

District Judge. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

This is an appeal from a judgment by the district court denying plaintiffs' claims for damages and all but one claim for 

injunctive relief against defendants Kathleen Madigan and the 

Adams County School District No. 50. 

I . Facts 

Plaintiff Kenneth Roberts is a fifth-grade school teacher at 

the Berkeley Gardens Elementary School in Denver, which is part of 

the Adams County School District No. 50. Kelly Nelson, Amy 

Nelson, and Kelly White are or were students at Berkeley Gardens 

1 Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Chief United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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Elementary. Plaintiffs Marc and Zay Nelson are the parents of 

plaintiffs Kelly and Amy Nelson. Plaintiff Debra Jean White is 

the parent of plaintiff Kelly White . None of the plaintiff students were enrolled in Mr. Roberts' class at the time this suit 

was filed, although Kelly Nelson was previously in Mr. Roberts' 

class. Defendant Kathleen Madigan is the principal at Berkeley 

Gardens. 

As part of his classroom curriculum, Mr. Roberts spent a significant amount of time teaching reading skills to his fifth 

graders. One method he used to teach the value of reading was to 

devote fifteen minutes each day to a "silent reading period." 

During this silent reading period, students were allowed to choose 

their own reading materials; they could have been brought from the 

students' homes, chosen from the school library, or selected from 

Mr. Roberts' classroom library. The classroom library was a collection of about 239 books of varying content that Mr. Roberts had 

compiled over his nineteen years of teaching. In order to set an 

example for the students, Mr. Roberts silently read his own materials during the silent reading time. 

Frequently, the book Mr. Roberts chose to read silently was 

the Bible, which he kept on his desk throughout the school day. 

Mr. Roberts never read from the Bible aloud nor overtly proselytized about his faith to his students. Mr. Roberts also displayed 

a poster in his classroom that read, "You have only to open your 

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eyes to see the hand of God." The trial court found that, in context, Mr. Roberts' Bible reading, the poster, and the presence of 

two Christian books in Mr. Roberts' classroom library created the 

appearance that Mr. Roberts was seeking to advance his religious 

views. 

The events leading to this litigation took place during the 

1987-88 school year. On September 10, 1987, a parent/teacher open 

house was held, at which time a parent complained to Principal 

Madigan about the presence of two Christian religious books on the 

shelves of Mr. Roberts' classroom library. The two books are 

titled The Bible in Pictures and The Life of Jesus. 2 That same 

evening, Ms. Madigan entered Mr. Roberts' classroom, perused the 

two books, and directed Mr. Roberts to remove them from the classroom library. Ms. Madigan did not ask Mr. Roberts how the books 

were being used before she ordered their removal. She explained 

to Mr. Roberts that "separation of church and state" required that 

the books be removed. Ms. Madigan also noticed the Bible that 

Mr. Roberts kept on his desk and requested that he keep it out of 

2 The Bible in Pictures is a 320-page volume with over one 

thousand illustrations. The illustrations are designed to provide 

both children and adults with a better understanding of the Bible. 

In the book's preface, the author states: "I pray that this book 

may bring a fresh vision of Christ, and God's purpose in Him, to 

you who now read it in the midst of the heartache and frustration 

of our modern world." 

The Story of Jesus is a 128-page volume that depicts through 

illustrati ons and text the birth, life, and resurrection of Jesus 

Christ. The book concentrates on the teachings of Jesus of 

Nazareth with the underlying premise that he is the Son of God. 

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sight during classroom hours. Mr. Roberts immediately complied 

with the directive. 

Ms. Madigan testified that she had spoken to Mr. Roberts on 

two previous occasions concerning the Bible on his desk. In 

September of 1986, Ms. Madigan made a routine visit to 

Mr. Roberts' classroom and observed him reading his Bible 

silently. Ms. Madigan told him at that time that she expected him 

to keep the Bible off his desk between 8:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. 

Later, in November 1986 1 Ms. Madigan again visited Mr. Roberts' 

classroom and found him reading his Bible. She repeated her earlier admonition that he should keep his Bible in his desk during 

school hours. 

On September 14, 1987, a few days after Ms. Madigan ordered 

Mr. Roberts to remove the two books from his classroom, 

Mr. Roberts discussed the matter with Principal Madigan. 

Mr. Roberts questioned the propriety of Ms. Madigan's directive 

and asked her for any written school district guidelines or policies that he had violated or that would enlighten him as to what 

types of materials he could keep in his classroom. Ms. Madigan 

denied his request and simply stated that common sense and her 

previous remarks were sufficient. 

On September 18, 1987, Mr. Roberts gave Ms. Madigan a written 

memorandum asking her to reconsider her directive. In the memorandum, Mr. Roberts again asked Ms. Madigan for any written 

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guidelines the school district had pertaining to censorship of 

books and placement of items on teachers' desks. Ms. Madigan 

discussed the matter with various school officials but did not 

change her position. On September 24, 1987, Mr. Roberts met with 

Principal Madigan, Michael Bassett, the head of personnel for the 

school district, and Anita Ratliff, the other fifth-grade teacher 

at Berkeley Gardens Elementary. At the meeting, Ms. Madigan and 

Mr. Bassett gave Mr. Roberts a written directive reaffirming 

Ms. Madigan's earlier instructions stating: "The law is clear 

that religion may not be taught in a public school. To avoid the 

appearance of teaching religion, I have given you this directive. 

Failure to comply with this directive will be considered insubordination and could result in disciplinary action." Recordf 

vol. 1, doc. 1, at 14. Mr. Roberts later appealed to the district 

superintendent, Mr. Masarotti, but Mr. Masarotti did not override 

the directive handed down by Ms. Madigan. 

In addition to the action taken in Mr. Roberts' classroom, 

plaintiffs alleged that sometime in September 1987, Ms. Madigan 

visited the school library at Berkeley Gardens Elementary and 

r emoved a Bible f rom the library shelves. Defendants contended 

the Bible was not removed by Ms. Madigan. They stipulated at 

trial, however, that the Bible would be replaced and not removed 

again. 

Mr. Roberts, along with the plaintiff students and their parents, brought this action seeking damages and injunctive relief 

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against Ms. Madigan and the school district. Plaintiffs based 

their claim on the theory that the school district, by ordering 

the two books off Mr. Roberts' shelf, by directing him to keep his 

Bible out of sight during school hours, and by removing the Bible 

from the school library, violated the plaintiffs' first amendment 

rights of free speech, academic freedom, and access to information. Plaintiffs also asserted that the district's actions violated the Establishment Clause by treating Christianity in a nonneutral, disparaging manner. 

After a trial before the district court, the court ·Ordered 

the school district to return the Bible to the Berkeley Gardens 

school library. Concerning Ms. Madigan's actions in Mr. Roberts' 

classroom, however, the court concluded not only that the school 

district acted properly but that the Establishment Clause required 

such action. See Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1514-17 

(D. Colo. 1989). Accordingly, the court went on to conclude that 

the district did not violate the principle of government neutrality toward religion, but that it simply acted appropriately in its 

effort to prevent Mr. Roberts from teaching religion. See id. As 

for the plaintiffs' free speech claims, the court held that in the 

balance between Mr. Roberts' rights to freedom of expression and 

academic freedom on the one hand, and the students' rights to be 

free from religious indoctrination on the other, the students' 

interests must prevail. Consequently, the court rejected 

Mr. Roberts' free speech arguments and denied the relief he 

sought. Finally, the court dismissed the student plaintiffs' 

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claims and the claims of their parents for lack of standing. The 

court noted that none of the student plainti ffs were in 

Mr. Roberts' class at the time their suit was filed. 

II . Standing of Parents and Students 

The district court dismissed the parents' and students' 

claims for lack of standing. Plaintiffs now argue that the district court erred in its assessment of the students' and parents' 

standing to assert claims for both injunctive relief and damages. 

At the outset, we note that in order to satisfy the Article 

III "case or controversy" requirement, the students and parents 

must a llege that they have ·"such a personal stake in the outcome 

of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which 

sharpens the presentation of issues." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 

186, 204 (1962). Thus, standing has been held to exist only if 

the aggrieved party makes a two-fold showing. First, the plaintiffs must show that they have suffered a "distinct and palpable 

injury." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 

u.s. 59, 72 (1978). Second, the plaintiffs must demonstrate a 

causal link between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. 

Id . This second prong may be satisfied by showing that there is a 

substantial likelihood that the relief sought will address the 

claimed injury. See id at 75 n.20; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Ri ght s Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1975). 

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In this case, the district court dismissed the parents' and 

students' claims because none of the students were in Mr. Roberts' 

class at the time this law suit was filed. We now address separately the standing issues with respect to injunctive relief and 

damages. 

A. Injunctive Relief 

Plaintiffs argue that the school district's removal of the 

two books and its order requiring Mr. Roberts to cease his silent 

Bible reading give the students and parents standing to seek 

injunctive relief. Plaintiffs claim that because all the students 

involved are or have been enrolled at Berkeley Gardens, they all 

have standing to challenge ·state action that touches Mr •. Roberts' 

classroom. In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite a number 

of cases in which students and their parents were found to have 

standing to challenge alleged first amendment violations in the 

public schools. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 u.s. 39 (1995) 

(Alabama statute authorized one-minute period of silence for 

prayer or meditation each day in all public schools); School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) 

(Pennsylvania law required ten verses of Bible to be read at 

beginning of each school day in each class); McCollum v. Board of 

Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1949) (religious instruction carried out in 

all classrooms for a certain period each week); Bell v. Little Axe 

Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391 (lOth Cir. 1985) {weekly 

religious meetings held on school premises, supervised by 

teachers, and advertised on school premises by posters and in 

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school publications). We agree that each case cited by plaintiffs 

supports the notion that students and their parents may challenge 

unconstitutional actions in the public schools that directly 

affect the students. The cases cited, however, are distinguishable from the present case because each involved religious activities occurring school wide or within the plaintiffs' own classrooms. Because none of the students involved in this suit were in 

Mr. Roberts' class at the time this suit was filed, none of the 

students, and therefore none of their parents, were directly 

affected by the district's actions in Mr. Roberts' classroom. 3 We 

thus conclude that none of the students or parents satisfy the 

two-prong standing requirement set forth above. 

Kelly White and Amy Nelson were both too young to be in 

Mr. Roberts' class at the time of this suit. There is no more 

than a speculative likelihood that either of these students will 

be in his class in the future. Accordingly, we conclude that 

Kelly White and Amy Nelson fail to satisfy the first prong of the 

standing requirement because they can demonstrate no "distinct and 

palpable injury" caused by the district's directive to 

Mr. Roberts. In this regard, we find persuasive the district 

3 Plaintiffs argue that the students and parents were directly 

affected by, and thus have standing to challenge, Ms. Madigan's 

alleged removal of the Bible from the school library. Following 

the trial, the district court ordered the district to replace the 

Bible in the library and to refrain from removing it again. 

Neither party challenges this part of the district court's order. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs' standing on that issue is not before us 

on appeal. In addition, standing to challenge the removal of the 

Bible does not create standing for plaintiffs to challenge the 

other actions taken by the school district. 

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court's observation that the students "cannot claim First Amendment violations for the removal of books to which they did not 

have access, nor for actions against a teacher in whose class they 

were not enrolled." Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1519 

(D. Colo. 1989). 

Kelly Nelson, who was in Mr. Roberts' class at the time of 

the school district's directive, presents a closer standing question. She nevertheless fails to show standing. Because Kelly 

Nelson had graduated from Mr. Roberts' class before this suit was 

filed, 4 she fails to satisfy the second of the two standing 

requirements. 5 Although Kelly Nelson would ·have had access to the 

two Christian books were it not for the actions of the school district, she nevertheless lacks standing because injunctive relief 

cannot redress her injury now that she is no longer in 

Mr. Roberts' class. 

B. Damages Claims 

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erroneously ignored 

the existence of their damages claims when it dismissed them for 

lack of standing. We recognize that standing may exist where a 

4 The record indicates that Kelly Nelson was enrolled in Mr. 

Roberts' class during the 1987-88 school year, which ended in June 

1988. See Record, vol. 2, at 98-100. This suit was not filed, 

however, until November 22, 1988. 

5 We acknowledge that Kelly Nelson's claim for damages would 

satisfy the "causal link" requirement. It is necessary to note, 

therefore, that our conclusion here applies only to Kelly Nelson's 

standing to seek injunctive relief. 

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claim for damages is still alive despite mootness or lack of 

standing for injunctive relief. Cf. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 

Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station 

Employees, 466 u.s. 435, 441-43 (1984); Powell v. McCormack, 395 

u.s. 486, 495-500 (1969); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. 

No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1398-99 (lOth Cir. 1985). Because the students and parents sought damages as well as injunctive relief, 

Kelly Nelson would appear to have standing to challenge the district's actions in Mr. Roberts' classroom. We note, however, that 

plaintiffs failed to preserve their damages claims at the trial 

level. 

The district court, pursuant to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, held a consolidated hearing for both preliminary and permanent injunction. At the close of those proceedings, the court requested post-hearing briefs on a number of 

issues. See Record, vol. 2, at 198-200. Included among those 

issues was the issue of the students' and parents' standing. 

After considering the evidence adduced at the hearing and the 

briefs submitted, the district court dismissed all the students' 

and parents' claims for lack of standing. 

We have examined the post-hearing briefs submit ted to the 

district court. There is no discussion in the plaintiffs' brief 

concerning their damages claims and how the existence of those 

claims affected standing. In order to review an issue on appeal, 

we require the spe cific issue to be raised before the district 

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court. "It is well established in this circuit that 'a party may 

not sit idly by, watching error ~~ing committed, and then raise 

the claimed error on appeal without having accorded the trial 

court the opportunity to correct its action.'" Chevron, U.S.A., 

Inc. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184, 1186 (lOth Cir. 1985) (quoting Gundy 

v. United States, 728 F.2d 484, 488 (lOth Cir. 1984)). In Gundy 

we stated that "failure to raise the issue with the trial court 

precludes any review except for the most manifest error." Gundy:, 

728 F.2d at 488. See also Burak v. General American Life Ins. 

Co., 836 F.2d 1287, 1291 (lOth Cir. 1988); United States v. 

Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1444 (lOth Cir. 1987); United States v. 

Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654, 657 (lOth Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs 

did no t raise the issue of standing based on their damages. claims 

at the hearing or in their post-hearing briefs. Moreover, when 

the district court dismissed all the parents' and students' 

claims, plaintiffs made no post-judgment motion suggesting that 

their damages claims preserved the parents' and students' standing. Accordingly, the students' and parents' damages claims cannot now form the basis for urging standing. We do not find the 

district court's finding that plaintiffs lacked standing on this 

issue to be manifest error. 

For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the district 

court properly dismissed the students' and parents' claims for 

lack of standing. Nevertheless, we address the merits of 

Mr. Roberts' claims, which are largely equi valent to the claims 

asse rte d by the students and parents. 

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III. Establishment Clause 

Mr. Roberts claims that the school district violated the 

Establishment Clause by: (l) removing The Bible in Pictures and 

The Story of Jesus from the classroom library, (2) ordering 

Mr. Roberts not to read his Bible in the classroom during school 

hours, (3) ordering Mr. Roberts to keep his Bible off his desk 

during school hours, and (4) removing the Bible from the school 

library. 6 The district court examined each of the challenged 

actions and concluded that, with the exception of the Bible in the 

school library, the school district had not violated the Establishment Clause. 

The proper relationship between religion and the state under 

the Establishment Clause 7 is difficult to determine. Clearly, 

religion is a pervasive force in our society. "This is not to 

say, however, that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as 

strongly imbedded in our public and private life." School 

District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 u.s. 203, 214 

6 We note that, contrary to the argument of defendants, the 

Bible in the school library was an issue in this case. The 

parties agreed at the hearing that the Bible should be in the 

library. However, the issue was not removed from the case until 

defendants stipulated to remedial steps. This explains the trial 

court's injunction requiring defendants to replace the Bible and 

not remove it in the future. Thus, the Bible was in issue, and 

plaintiff s prevailed on that part of the case. 

7 Under the first amendment, "Congress shall make no law 

respecting an establishment of religion .... " u.s. Const. 

amend. I. 

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(1963). Here, we face the difficulty of determining the proper 

balance between the freedom from religious coercion created by 

state-sponsored religion and the inescapable reality that our culture is permeated by religious symbols and rituals. Nowhere has 

the proper line of demarcation been more difficult to define than 

in our nation's public schools. 

Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed a three-part 

test for determining the propriety of state action under the 

Establishment Clause as it applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 8 First, state action must have a secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of any state action must be one 

that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Finally, state 

action must not foster excessive government entanglement with 

religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The 

first two criteria thus require that governmental action be neutral with respect to religion, both in purpose and primary effect. 

This requirement of government neutrality prohibits governmental 

action whose purpose or effect is to suppress religion as well as 

action that advances it. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 

n.42 (1985). Against this background, we now consider the constitutionality of the school district's conduct in the case at bar. 

8 It is well-settled that the first amendment prohibitions on 

congressional action now apply to state action by virtue of the 

fourteenth amendment due process clause. See Cantwell v. 

Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 

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A. The School District's Purpose 

At trial, Mr. Roberts claimed that the school district acted 

against him in order to disapprove of Christianity. The district 

court, however, found that the school district had a secular purpose in taking the challenged actions. Having examined the 

record, we do not hold the district court's finding clearly 

erroneous. 

The only evidence relating to the school district's motives 

indicates that the district simply wanted to prevent Mr. Roberts 

from violating the Establishment Clause. When asked whether 

Ms. Madigan gave any reason for her directive of September 10, 

1987, Mr. Roberts testified that Ms. Madigan told him it was necessary "because of separation of church and state." Record, vol. 

2, at 28. Further, when Mr. Roberts asked Ms. Madigan for written 

guidelines and policies that he had violated, Ms. Madigan 

responded with a brief written directive. The directive stated 

her sole purpose as follows: "The law is clear that religion may 

not be taught in a public school. To avoid the appearance of 

teaching religion, I have given you this directive." Record, vol. 

1, doc. 1, at 14. We find no evidence in the record that suggests 

a purpose for the district's action other than that stated in the 

written directive. We therefore affirm the district court's finding that the school district had a secular purpose for its 

actions, namely, to assure that none of Mr. Roberts' classroom 

materials or conduct violated the Establishment Clause. 9 The 

9 The appropriate standard of review we should apply to the 

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Supreme Court has held that the state is constitutionally required 

to see that state-supported activity is not used for religious 

indoctrination. See Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & 

Religious Liberty, 413 u.s. 472, 480 (1973); Lemon, 403 u.s. at 

619. See also Breen v. Runkel, 614 F. Supp. 355, 358 (W.D. Mich. 

1985). Cf. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, i10 S. Ct. 2356, 2371 

(1990); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 

Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987); 

Gillette v. United States, 401 u.s. 437, 453 (1971). 

B. Primary Effect 

Mr. Roberts further challenges the school district's actions 

arguing that regardless of the district's motives, the actual 

effect of Ms. Madigan's directive was a disparagement of Christianity. As we examine the school district's conduct under the 

"effect" prong of the Lemon test, we again point out that public 

school officials "must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, 

that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion." Lemon, 403 

u.s. at 619. As Mr. Roberts correctly notes, however, school 

officials must carry out this duty in a way that neither endorses 

nor disparages a particular religion or religion in general. 

Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the effect 

district court's findings under the Lemon test is not clear. See 

Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 

779 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). 

Whether it is appropriate to apply a clearly erroneous standard, 

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984), or a de novo 

standard, id. at 693-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring), however, is of 

no consequence here. We would affirm under either standard. 

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prong is not satisfied if official action, regardless of its purpose, .. conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval" of religion. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 u.s. 38, 56 n.42 (1985); School 

District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985)i Lynch 

v. Donnelly, 465 u.s. 668, 690 (1984). 

Mr. Roberts contends that the district, by removing the two 

Christian books and the Bible from the classroom, necessarily conveyed a message of disapproval toward Christianity. He notes that 

the school district removed only the two Christian books and disallowed Mr. Roberts 1 reading of only the Bible in class. At 

trial, testimony showed that while the school district removed The 

Bible in Pictures and The Story of Jesus from the classroom 

library, the district ignored the presence of books dealing with 

Greek gods and goddesses and American Indian religions. The evidence also indicates that the school district did not allow 

Mr. Roberts to read his Bible or keep it on his desk, but nevertheless allowed him to teach actively about Navajo Indian religion. Mr. Roberts was also allowed to read silently a book 

dealing with the life of Buddha and keep it on his desk for some 

period. 

Because the school district allegedly treated the Christian 

materials differently than any other materials, Mr. Roberts concludes that the primary effect of the district's action must have 

been a disparagement of Christianity. Mr. Roberts infers that 

"[t]he school's actions do not convey a message of obeying the 

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Establishment Clause, because then the school district would have 

removed all religious books, and prohibited teachers from silently 

reading any religious book." Brief of Appellants at 23. 

Mr. Roberts' argument sweeps much too broadly. Were we to 

accept his characterization of the school district's actions, any 

official removal of specific religious materials from public 

schools would necessarily be considered non-neutral toward religion. The fallacy of this position is exposed when we recognize 

that all corrective actions taken to assure that individual 

teachers do not teach religion must be aimed at the specific religions or value systems being taught. The removal of materials 

from the classroom is acceptable when it is determined that the 

materials are being used in a manner that violates Establishment 

Clause guarantees. Thus, the Establishment Clause focuses on the 

manner of use to which materials are put; it does not focus on the 

content of the materials per se. For example, the books about 

American Indian religion could be used in violation of the Establishment Clause if they were taught in a proselytizing manner. 

Because they were not so used, however, those books do not violate 

the Establishment Clause by the very existence of their content. 

It is neither wise nor necessary to require school officials to 

sterilize their classrooms and libraries of any materials with 

religious references in order to prevent teachers from inculcating 

specific religious values. Instead, school officials must be 

allowed, within certain bounds, to exercise discretion in determining what materials or classroom practices are being used 

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appropriately. "[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need 

for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of 

school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker 

v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 u.s. 503, 507 

(1969). 

Considering the evidence, we affirm the district court's 

finding that the primary effect of the school's actions was not to 

disapprove of Christianity. The mere fact that the actions were 

aimed exclusively at Christian religious materials does not automatically mean the actions' primary effect was to send a disapproving message regarding Christianity. If we must draw any 

message from the actions, that message must be that the school 

district disapproves of the teaching of Christianity in the public 

schools. Here, we are particularly mindful, as was the district 

court, that there is a "difference between teaching about religion, which is acceptable, and teaching r eligion, which is not." 

Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1517 (D. Colo. 1989). 

Mr. Roberts' avowed purpose for reading his Bible in class was to 

model reading for the students. Because Mr. Roberts chose to keep 

his Bible on his desk continuously and r ead it frequently, 

Ms. Madigan feared that Mr. Roberts was setting a Christian tone 

in his classroom. Having formed that impression, Ms. Madigan had 

a duty to take corrective steps, and to do so in a religiously 

neutral manner. Ms. Madigan's only stated reasons were that the 

Christian books and the Bible might violate "separation of church 

and state" and that "religion may not be taught in a public 

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school." We discern no anti-Christian message here. The school 

district's conduct thus satisfies the "primary effect" test as 

well as the "purpose" test under Lemon. 

None of the parties suggest that the school district's 

activities involved any excessive entanglement of the state with 

religion. Accordingly, we hold that the entire Lemon test was 

fulfilled and the school district did not violate the Establishment Clause by issuing the challenged directive. 

IV. Free Speech and Academic Freedom 

Mr. Roberts claims that the school district violated his 

first amendment rights of free speech and academic freedom by 

removing the two Christian books from the classroom and ordering 

him to stop reading his Bible in class. According to Mr. Roberts, 

his Bible reading and the presence of the two Christian books were 

expressive activities that were protected from content-based censorship under the first amendment. 

Plaintiffs argue that the school district's conduGt violated 

the student plaintiffs ' free speech rights by denying the students 

access to the two books and the opportunity to observe Mr. Roberts 

reading his Bible silently in class. We recognize the similarity 

between the facts of this case and those involved in Board of 

Educ. v. Pice, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). In Pice, a plurality of the 

Supreme Court recognized a free speech "right to receive" informa -

tion and held unconstitutional a school board's censorship of 

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several books from a school library. See Pico, 457 u.s. at 866-

67. Because the student plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the 

removal of the Christian books, however, we express no opinion 

regarding the impact of the district's directive on the students' 

asserted rights to receive ideas. Our holding is therefore 

limited to the issues regarding Mr. Roberts' rights to selfexpression and academic freedom in the classroom. 

We begin our discussion by noting that "[n]either students 

[n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 

speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des 

Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the 

rights of students and teachers in the public schools "are not 

automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings." Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 u.s. 675, 682 

(1986); ~Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 u.s. 260, 266 

(1988). We are thus faced with the tension between Mr. Roberts' 

right of expression and the need of public school officials to 

censor classroom materials for the sole purpose of eliminating a 

possible constitutional violation. 

We apply the "substantial interference" or "balancing" standard enunciated in Tinker to the competing interests of Mr. Roberts 

and the school officials. There, the Court concluded that "students may express their opinions at school, even on controversial 

subjects, so long as they do so without materially disrupting 

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classwork, creating substantial disorder, or invading the rights 

of others."10 Tinker, 393 u.s. at 513. We find no reason here to 

draw a distinction between teachers and students where classroom 

expression is concerned. Thus, if the speech involved is not 

fairly considered part of the school curriculum or schoolsponsored activities, then it may only be regulated if it would 

"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 

appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Tinker, 

393 u.s. at 509. If, on the other hand, the conduct endorses a 

particular religion and is an activity "that students, parents, 

and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 

imprimatur of the school," Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271, creating 

the requisite state action, then the activity infringes on the 

rights of others and must be prohibited. 

We return to the factors set forth in Lemon, 403 u.s. at 612-

13, then, to determine whether Mr. Roberts' actions violated the 

Establishment Clause. The district court, after reviewing the 

10 In Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 u.s. 260 (1988), 

the Supreme Court granted school officials broad discretion when 

the decision involved "school-sponsored publications, theatrical 

productions, and other expressive activities that students, 

parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to 

bear the imprimatur of the school." Id. at 271. The Court held 

that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 

school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions 

are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. 

at 273. The school district here, however, claims that the books 

were removed to avoid an Establishment Clause violation rather 

than for educational or pedagogical reasons. Because the school 

district asserts a constitutional justification, a claim that this 

body is well-equipped to evaluate, we do not accord it the same 

deference as in other cases involving issues that school officials 

are uniquely qualified to handle. 

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testimony and evidence, correctly found that there was an improper 

religious purpose behind Mr. Roberts' use of the Bible and the 

presence of the religious books in his classroom library. Upon 

analyzing Mr. Roberts' actions within the classroom environment at 

the time the dispute arose, including the poster on the classroom 

wall requesting readers to open their eyes to see the hand of God, 

we agree that the evidence sufficiently demonstrated that Mr. 

Roberts' actions were prompted by a religious purpose. Although 

Mr. Roberts testified that he was acting as a role model for his 

students when he read the Bible, his underlying purpose for reading the Bible was, at best, ambiguous . As the district court 

noted, Mr. Roberts offered nothing to suggest that his actions 

were non-religious. 11 

We believe that the district court also properly concluded 

that Mr. Roberts' actions, when viewed in their entirety, had the 

primary effect of communicating a message of endorsement of a 

religion to the impressionable ten-, eleven-, and twelve-year-old 

children in his class. 

"The meaning of a statement to its audience depends 

both on the intention of the speaker and on the 'objective' meaning of the statement in the community .••. 

If the audience is large, as it always is when government 'speaks' by word or deed, some portion of the audience will inevitably receive a message determined by the 

'objective' content of the statement, and some portion 

11 We note the conflict in the record concerning Ms. Madigan's 

purpose in prohibiting Mr. Roberts from reading the Bible in 

class. There is some indication that she did not want him reading 

anything during class so that he could "be actively involved in 

teaching children." Record at 117. To the extent that this was 

her purpose, we uphold her decision as "reasonably related to 

legitimate pedagogical concerns." Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 260. 

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will inevitably receive the intended message.. Examination of both the subjective and the objective components 

of the message communicated by a goverrunent action is 

therefore necessary to determine whether the action 

carries a forbidden meaning. " 

Lynch, 465 u.s. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Here, it is 

reasonable to conclud~ that not all of Mr. Roberts' students would 

receive a purportedly secular message. Mr. Roberts left his personal Bible on his desk in his fifth-grade classroom at all times 

and read it during class time. Like his Bible, the two other contested books were Mr. Roberts' personal property and were not used 

as part of the class curriculum. Further, the three books were 

the only books in the classroom that were demonstrated to contain 

religious themes; all three pertained to Christ ianity. Considering these factors in light of the environment of a fifth-grade 

classroom, the district court properly conc luded that the books 

had the primary effect of advancing reli gion. See Edwards v. 

Aguillard, 482 u.s. 578, 584 (1987) (noting that elementary 

schoolchildren "are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary"). When viewed from the eyes of the children in Mr. 

Roberts' class, the placement of the two books in the class 

library, the placement of Mr. Roberts' Bible on his desk, and Mr. 

Roberts' reading of the Bible during the r e ading period provided 

"a crucial symbolic link between goverrunent and religion." Grand 

Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 u.s. 373, 385 (1985). 

Unde r both the purpose and the effect prongs of the Lemon 

test, the district court properly determined that the censored 

actions, when viewed in their entirety, violated the Establishment 

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Clause of the first amendment. The censored conduct therefore 

substantially infringed on the rights of Mr. Roberts' students. 12 

Because " [t]he State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, 

that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion," Lemon, 403 

u.s. at 619, we conclude that the school district's actions were 

not constitutionally infirm. 

v. Costs 

As a final ma tter, plaintiffs complain that the district 

court erred when it awarded defendants their entire costs. Plaintiffs note that the district court ordered defendants to return 

the copy of the Bible to the school library and enjoi ned them from 

removing it in the future. · Thus, plaint i f fs argue that the 

defendants were not "prevailing parties" on all issue s within the 

meaning of Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Under Rule 54(d), "costs shall be a l lowed as of course to the 

prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(d). We acknowledge that defendants in this case are 

not "pre vailing parties" on the issue relating to the Bible in the 

school library. Thus, this case presents a situation where both 

12 In Engel v . Vitale, 370 u.s. 421, 431 (1962), the Supreme 

Court recognized that "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial 

suppor t of government is placed behind a particular religious 

belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities 

to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is 

plain." Such coercive pressure is surely at its peak when the 

religious minorities are impressionable children who look to their 

teacher as a role model. 

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parties have "prevailed" on at least one claim. 

In reviewing the district court's decision to impose costs, 

we reverse only for an abuse of discretion. See Howell Petroleum 

Corp. v. Samson Resources Co., 903 F.2d 778, 783 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

In this case, we conclude that the district court's decision to 

award costs to the party that prevailed on the vast majority of 

issues and on the issues truly contested at trial was not an abuse 

of discretion. 

We first note that the dismissal of most of plaintiffs' 

claims makes defendants the prevailing party on those issues. 10 

c. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 

§ 2667 (2d ed. 1983). We recently held that it was not an abuse 

of discretion for a district court to refuse to award costs to a 

party that was only partially successful. See Howell, 903 F.2d at 

783. We now hold that the district court in this case did not 

abuse its discretion when it awarded full costs to the party prevailing on the majority of claims and the central claims at issue. 

Other circuits have upheld awards of full costs to a party prevailing in only part of a case. See United States v. Mitchell, 

580 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1978); K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 

Inc., 506 F.2d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 1974). Our holding is based on 

the broad discretion of the district court. As Professor Moore 

has noted, under Rule 54 the district court has discretion to 

award costs to a nonprevai1ing party. J. Moore, w. Taggart & J. 

Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice§ 54.70[4] (2d ed. 1988). 

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"[W]here the court exercises its discretion the identification of 

the prevailing party may become so unimportant as to be almost 

immaterial." .!Q. . Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 

exercise of its discretion in awarding costs to defendants. 

VI. Conclusion 

Mr. Roberts' Establishment Clause claims fail because the 

school district acted for the valid purpose of preventing him from 

promoting Christianity in a public school. Moreover, the primary 

effect of the school district's actions was not to send a message 

of disapproval of Christianity. If we must draw any message from 

the district's actions, then that message must be that the district properly disapproves·of classroom activity that appears to 

promote a particular set of religious concepts. 

As for Mr. Roberts' free speech and academic freedom arguments, we conclude that the district's removal of two Christian 

books from the classroom shelves and its directive ordering 

Mr. Roberts to cease his silent Bible reading in the classroom did 

not violate the first amendment. Mr. Roberts' conduct, in the 

context of a fifth-grade class full of impressionable children, 

had the purpose and effect of communicating a message of endorsement of religion in a manner that might reasonably be perceived to 

bear the imprimatur of the school. 

We conclude further that the district court correctly dismissed the claims of the student and parent plaintiffs for lack of 

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standing. None of the students were in Mr. Roberts' class at the 

time this suit was filed. Thus, none of the students had standing 

for purposes of injunctive relief. Although the students and parents also asserted claims for damages, plaintiffs failed to preserve those claims for appeal. We thus affirm the district 

court's dismissal of all the student and parent plaintiffs' 

claims. 

Finally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion when it awarded the defendants their costs. 

The judgment of the district court is the refore AFFIRMED. 

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No. 89-1014 - ROBERTS v. MADIGAN 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent. 

The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall 

make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting 

the free exercise thereof " The Founding Fathers were 

specially concerned that these United States would not labor under 

a state sponsored church or religion. The United States Supreme 

Court has made it abundantly clear that the Constitution does not 

require complete separation of church and state and that it 

"[a]ffirrnatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of 

all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. See, ~, 

Zovach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306-314, 315 (1952); Illinois ex rel. 

McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 u.s. 203, 211 (1948)." Lynch 

v. Donnelly, 465 u.s. 668, 673 (1984). I believe that those 

mandates were violated by Principal Madigan and the School 

District in this case. Their actions forbidding Mr. Roberts from 

reading his Bible during his fifth grade class' 15-minute silent 

reading period and ordering the removal of the two challenged 

books from his classroom library were acts of intolerance, lack of 

accommodation and hostility toward the Christian religion. 1 

1 Principal Madigan also requested that Mr. Roberts remove a 

poster depicting a mountain scene with the inscription: "You have 

only to open your eyes to see the hand of God." Mr. Roberts 

complied with the request and, at trial, did not challenge the 

poster's removal. Thus, the poster should not be considered when 

determining whether the defendants violated the Establishment 

Clause by prohibiting Mr. Roberts' other practices. Even if the 

poster ~ to be considered, I believe that its nonsectarian 

reference to "God" is, at best, only minimally relevant to the 

issue of whether Mr. Roberts was unconstitutionally promoting 

Christianity in the classroom. 

Appellate Case: 89-1014 Document: 01019627370 Date Filed: 12/17/1990 Page: 30 
There is no assertion by Mr. Roberts that his reading the 

Bible during the class silent reading period was an exercise 

compelled by his religious beliefs. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 

u.s. 398 (1963). By the same token, this is not a case involving 

a religious practice in violation of a state statute. Employment 

Div., Oregon Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___ , 58 

u.S.L.W. 4433 (April 19, 1990) (claimed religious use of peyote 

cannot prevail under the Free Exercise Clause in light of Oregon's 

statute declaring it a felony to knowingly possess the drug); 

Reynolds v. United States, 98 u.s. 145 (1879) (religious belief in 

polygamy cannot prevail over state criminal statute outlawing the 

practice). Thus, in the instant case, none of Mr. Roberts' 

practices constituted any per ~ violation of any Colorado law, 

custom or policy. Accordingly, the district court should have 

judged the case with a view to accommodate Mr. Roberts' practices. 

The burden was cast on the school district to demonstrate, as the 

majority opinion now agrees, that Mr. Roberts' challenged 

practices materially and substantially interfered with the 

operation of the school. This burden is analogous to the 

"compelling governmental interest" test announced in Wisconsin v. 

Yoder, 406 u.s. 205 (1972), which requires that religious liberty 

under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment cannot be 

interfered with or encroached upon, directly or indirectly, unless 

required by clear and compelling governmental interests "of the 

highest order." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. 

It is a far cry from tolerance and accommodation toward 

Christianity to interpret the practices in Mr. Roberts' classroom 

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as "teaching" or "endorsement" of Christianity in violation of the 

Establishment Clause. I observe that such findings by the 

district court, which the majority here upholds under either the 

clearly erroneous standard or the de n2YQ standard, have no basis 

in any aggrieved testimony of fifth grade students or their 

parents, past or present. The only "live" complainant in this 

case was Principal Madigan, whose views on separation of church 

and state are absolute. She applied a "bright line" approach. 

The district court's "findings" are really legal conclusions. 

There is no basis, other than speculation, for implying, as does 

the majority opinion, that the practices in Mr. Roberts' classroom 

constituted religious indoctrination. (Slip ·Opinion, pp. 17-19). 

Presumably, such would not ·have been the case had Mr. Roberts read 

the books on Buddhism or Indian religions. Principal Madigan did 

not object to them. Thus, it seems that any concern that 

elementary children are "vastly more . impressionable than high 

school or university students," (Appellee's Briefs, p. 32), cannot 

be a serious defense. In this case, it was Principal Madigan and 

the School District who violated the Establishment Clause. 

In the following Supreme Court opinions interpretive of the 

Establishment Clause in the context of the public schools, it is 

important to note that the condemned activity was openly pursued 

or actively - rather than passively sponsored: Stone v. 

Grahamn, 449 u.s. 39, reh. denied, 449 u.s. 1104 (1980) (held that 

the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each 

public school room violated the Establishment Clause because no 

secular purpose had been demonstrated) ; Engel v. Vitale, 370 u.s. 

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421 (1962) (formulated prayers which were required to be repeated 

by students in public schools violated Establishment Clause); 

McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time 

arrangement whereby students who wished could attend religious 

instruction classe s during regular school hours in public school 

buildings, held to be violative of Establishment Clause by virtue 

of use of tax-supported property to promote religion). 

In those cases where a religious exception has not been 

allowed from a state statute or regulation, the Supreme Court has 

cast the burden on the government to rely on more than mere 

speculation about potential harms; the government has been 

required to present evidentiary support for a refusal to allow a 

religious exception. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-258 

(1982) (The government must demonstrate that unbending application 

of its regulation to a religious objector is essential to 

accomplish an overriding governmental interest); Thomas v. Review 

Board of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 u.s. 707, 719 

(1981), (rejected the state's reasons for refusing to grant a 

religious exemption for failure to demonstrate that the means 

employed were the least restrictive means of achieving a 

compelling state interest because no evidence in the record 

supported the state's reasons). 

Cases involving the challenges presented here must 

necessarily be decided on a case-to~case basis . A person in Mr . 

Roberts' position as an elementary school classroom teacher must 

be alert to the possibility that actions on his part could 

constitute government actions violative of the Establishment 

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Clause without further evidence. 

classroom scenario than that 

For example, in a less discreet 

presented in the case at bar, a 

violation could be found to exist. However, unlike Stone, Engel, 

and McCollum, the activities here were passive and de minimis. 

If the condemned activities in this case could, by simple 

inference, be held to be violative of the principle of separation 

of church and state, reliance would necessarily have to weigh 

almost entirely on the proposition that Mr. Roberts' fifth graders 

were ages 10 or 11 and thus easily proselytized. The problem is 

simply that there is llQ evidence to support such a bal d 

conclusion. No students or parents testified in support of 

Principal Madigan or the School District. No witness protested 

that Mr. Roberts' practice · of reading from his Bible or the 

maintenance in his classroom library of the two condemned books 

were motivated by Mr. Roberts' intention to promote belief in 

Christianity. Under these circumstances and on the record made, I 

would hold that the activities did not amount to an intrusion on 

the separation of church and state principle. 

Where disputes arise over government restrictions on a 

person's exercise of a religious practice (here, Mr. Roberts' 

desire to read from his Bible during the silent 15-minute class 

reading period), the court must determine whether the government 

has demonstrated a compelling interest in enforcing its policy 

(here, Principal Madigan's separation of church and state 

principle) and whether the policy represents the least restrictive 

means of fulfilling the governmental interest. Wisconsin v. 

Yoder, supra; Sherbert v. Verner, supra. Although he does not 

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Appellate Case: 89-1014 Document: 01019627370 Date Filed: 12/17/1990 Page: 34 
specifically so argue, Mr. Roberts' practice of reading his Bible 

during the class 15-minute silent reading period was a minimal, 

discreet exercise of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 

Amendment. As such, Principal Madigan and the School District 

unduly burdened Mr. Roberts' rights. See Hernandez v. 

Commissioner, 490 u.s. ____ (1989); Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, at 

p. 220. 

The majority has come to agree that the "substantial 

interference" standard of review set forth in Tinker v. Des Moines 

Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), applies here. 

In Tinker, three public school pupils were suspended from school 

for violating a school policy, with which they were aware, by 

wearing black armbands in protest of the government's policy in 

Vietnam. The students were quiet and passive, just as was Mr. 

Roberts, and they did not impinge upon the rights of others. 

There is no evidence that Mr. Roberts' actions impinged upon the 

rights of others. 

The Tinker court observed that the armband display "does not 

concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group 

demonstrations" and that there was no evidence that the armband 

display interfered with school work or collided with the rights of 

other students to be let alone . Id. at 508. By the same 

standard, there is no evidence that Mr. Roberts' actions 

interfered with school work or collided with the rights of the 

students. Tinker required evidence demonstrating that "[e]ngaging 

in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially 

interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 

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operation of the school . , " at 509. There is not a 

scintilla of evidence in the case at bar demonstrating that any of 

Mr. Roberts' practices materially and substantially interfered 

with the appropriate operation of the school. Thus, I submit 

that, under the strict Tinker standard, the defendants-appellants 

failed to carry their burden of proof. 2 This is a case in which 

to promote tolerance. In my view, under the strict standard of 

Tinker, the defendants failed to prove that Mr. Roberts' behavior 

"materially and substantially interfere[d] with the 

operation of the school." Tinker, 393 u.s. at 509. 

The maintenance of the two challenged books in Mr. Roberts' 

classroom library was entirely passive in character, just as was 

Mr. Roberts' practice of reading his Bible during the class' 15-

minute silent reading period. These books were not assigned to 

the students and there is no evidence that Roberts ever referred 

2 The majority relies on Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 

484 U.S. 260 (1988) to bolster its position that school officials 

have broad discretion in controlling school activities (Footnote 

10, p. 23 of Majority Slip Opinion). The problem is that Kuhlmeir 

differentiated between "personal expression that happens to occur 

on the school premises" protected under Tinker (which governs Mr. 

Roberts' practices) and school activities "[t]hat students, 

parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to 

bear the imprimatur of the school." Kuhlrneir, 484 u.s. at 271. 

The Tinker standard, it is agreed, controls in this case. The 

"substantial interference" standard applied in Tinker is far less 

deferential than the "greater control" standard applied in 

Kuhlmeir. It is to be noted that Kuhlmeir involved the 

constitutional right of the high school principal to censor 

certain articles submitted for publication in the student 

newspaper. It was in that context that the Supreme Court upheld 

the principal's actions as being "[r]easonably related to 

legitimate pedagogical concerns." 484 U.S. at 273. In the 

instant case, Principal Madigan's actions did not involve 

educational concerns calling for the expertise of school 

officials; on the contrary, she exercised a judgment involving a 

conflict relating to basic constitutional values. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1014 Document: 01019627370 Date Filed: 12/17/1990 Page: 36 
the students to them. Furthermore, Roberts' practice of reading 

his Bible while seated at his desk during the class 15-minute 

silent reading period was carefully exercised. Under these 

circumstances, the School District did not prove that there was a 

compelling governmental interest justifying its conunand that Mr. 

Roberts refrain from reading his Bible during the 15-minute silent 

reading period, and remove the two books from the classroom 

library. "First Amendment rights must always be applied in light 

of the special characteristics of the . . . environment in the 

particular case." Tinker, 393 u.s. at 506. 

In Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, the Supreme Court majority 

observed: 

The Court has invalidated legislation or 

governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose 

was lacking, but only when it has concluded that there 

was no question that the statute or activity was 

motivated wholly by religious considerations. See, 

~~ Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41; Epperson v. 

Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97, 107-09 (1968); Abington School 

District v. Schempp, supra, at 223-224; Engel v. Vitale, 

370 u.s. 421, 424-425 (1962). Even where the benefits 

to religion were substantial, as in Everson v. Board of 

Education, 330 u.s. 1 (1947); Board of Education v. 

Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Walz, supra; and Telton, 

supra, we saw a secular purpose and no conflict with the 

Establishment Clause. Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 

Inc., 459 u.s. 116 (1982). 

465 u.s. at 680. 

In my view, the Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1971) test 

is inapplicable in the instant case, simply because the actions 

condemned here are not of the type or character sufficient to 

implicate government entanglement with religion. In reality, out 

of concern for a "bright line" dem.and for separation of church and 

state, the defendants effectively denied Mr. Roberts that degree 

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Appellate Case: 89-1014 Document: 01019627370 Date Filed: 12/17/1990 Page: 37 
of tolerance to which he is entitled. At the evidentiary hearing 

conducted by the district court on the injunction issue, two 

witnesses, the school's librarian and music teacher, testified 

that Principal Madigan removed the Bible from the main school 

library in keeping with her concept of separation of church and 

state. While the district court did not agree with Principal 

Madigan's action in removing the Bible from the main school 

library (the district court enjoined Principal Madigan and the 

School District from removing the Bible from the school library), 

the court did uphold her actions, approved by the School District, 

in ordering Mr. Roberts to remove his Bible from his desk, not to 

read from his Bible during the 15-minute silent reading period and 

to remove "The Bible in Pictures" and "The Story of Jesus" from 

his 239-book classroom library. I would hold that Principal 

Madigan's actions were constitutionally unwarranted and that the 

district court was clearly erroneous. Principal Madigan insisted 

on the obliteration of all Christian books from the school 

premises. Her extreme stance would convert the "primary effect" 

prong of the Establishment Clause into governmental disapproval, 

disparagement and hostility toward the Christian religion. 

There is nothing in the record demonstrating, in fact, that 

Mr. Roberts' placement of his personal Bible on his desk, his 

habit of reading the Bible during the class' 15-minute silent 

reading period or the placement of the above-referred to books in 

the classroom library had a coercive effect on or that it tended 

to proselytize Mr. Roberts' fifth grade students. Any concerns 

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voiced in regard to the Establishment Clause impact are entirely 

speculative. 

There is no evidence that Mr. Roberts at any time ever spoke 

to his students concerning his possession of a Bible or his 

preference in reading from it. Thus, there is no evidence of any 

11Coercive" effect. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Mr. 

Roberts ever assigned any members of his fifth grade class to read 

any of the books in his classroom library, including a book on 

Buddhism and a book on American Indian religions. 

In my view, the district court erred in 

distinction between the maintenance of the Bible in 

drawing any 

the school 

library while denying the simple maintenance of "The Bible in 

Pictures n and "The Story of Jesus 11 in the classroom library. Not 

one word was spoken by Mr. Roberts concerning the Bible, his 

· reading of the Bible, or of the two condemned books in his 

classroom library which could involve any successful application 

of the Lemon test in favor of the state out of concern for 

violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 

In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783, 792 (1983), the Supreme 

Court majority held that the practice of opening each daily 

session of the Nebraska legislature with a prayer by a chaplain 

paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of the 

First Amendment because the practice had become historically 

accepted as "[p]art of the fabric of our society." Mr. Justice 

Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Marshall, dissented. They would 

hold the legislative prayer practice violative of the 

Establishment Clause. No one can logically argue that the daily 

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Appellate Case: 89-1014 Document: 01019627370 Date Filed: 12/17/1990 Page: 39 
prayer practice in Marsh could meet the test of the first prong of 

the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, i.e., the statute (or practice) must 

have a secular legislative purpose. And no justice on the Supreme 

Court ·in Marsh raised the contention addressed in Engel v. Vi tale, 

supra, that the legislature's daily prayer imposed an 

impermissible endorsement of prayer in public facilities or that 

it had a coercive effect upon non-religious minorities to conform. 

The 15-minute silent reading period was not a religious 

exercise. Just as a moment of silence does not endorse prayer 

over other alternatives, in my view, the fact that Mr. Roberts 

sometimes used the 15-minute silent reading period reading from 

his Bible does not, ipso facto, convey a message to his students 

that they should follow sui·t. 

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment mandates that 

the government not prohibit or interfere with the free exercise of 

religion. The clause imposes a burden on the government to 

facilitate the free exercise of religion. In that sense, the 

government is promoting a religious purpose and if the first and 

second prongs of the Lemon test were to apply, the Free Exercise 

Clause would necessarily fall because the government would not be 

pursuing a secular purpose, and the primary effect would be to 

advance religion. 

In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the Supreme Court 

struck down an Alabama statute authorizing a !-minute period of 

silence in all public schools for "meditation or voluntary prayer" 

because the majority held that the established purpose was to 

endorse religion, and the enactment was not motivated by any 

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Appellate Case: 89-1014 Document: 01019627370 Date Filed: 12/17/1990 Page: 40 
clearly secular purpose. The Court majority applied the Lemon 

test. 

Then-Chief Justice Warren Burger, in his dissent in Wallace 

v. Jaffree, made the following pertinent observations with which I 

agree and which I believe to be fully consistent with the majority 

opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, and applicable here: 

[TJhe Court's extended treatment of the 'test' of 

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1971) suggests a naive 

pre-occupation with an easy, bright-line approach for 

addressing constitutional issues. We have repeatedly 

cautioned that Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper 

capable of resolving every Establishment Clause issue, 

but that it sought only to provide 'signposts •. 

[O]ur responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas by 

rote; our duty is to determine whether the statute or 

practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state 

religion. 

* * * 

[T]he statute does not remotely threaten religious 

liberty; it affirmatively furthers the values of 

religious freedom and tolerance that the Establishment 

Clause was designed to protect. Without pressuring 

those who do not wish to pray, the statute simply 

creates an opportunity to think, to plan, or to pray if 

one wishes - as Congress does by providing chaplains and 

chapels. It accommodates the purely private, voluntary 

religious choices of the individual pupils who wish to 

pray while at the same time creating a time for nonreligious reflection for those who do not choose to 

pray. The statute also provides a meaningful 

opportunity for school children to appreciate the 

absolute constitutional right of each individual to 

worship and believe as the individual wishes. The 

statute 'endorses' only the view that the religious 

observances of others should be tolerated and, where 

possible, accommodated. If the government may not 

accommodate religious needs when it does so in a wholly 

neutral and non-coercive manner, the 'benevolent 

neutrality' that we have long considered the correct 

constitutional standard will quickly translate into the 

'callous indifference' that the Court has consistently 

held the Establishment Clause does not require. 

(Emphasis supplied). 

472 u.s. at pp. 89-90. 

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