Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04118/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04118-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George Lawrence Ogg
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILL l) United States Court of Appeal!I 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS . Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GEORGE LAWRENCE OGG, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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APR 2 8 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-4118 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 92-CR-20-G) 

Jerome H. Mooney, III, Mooney & Associates, Salt Lake City, Utah, 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

Tiffany Romney, Special Assistant United States Attorney (David 

J. Jordan, United States Attorney and Richard N.W. Lambert, Assistant United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge, 1 and 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

l The Honorable John c. Godbold, Senior U. S. Circuit 

Judge for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-4118 Document: 010110220207 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 1 
GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge: 

Ogg pleaded guilty in Utah state court to sexual exploitation 

of a minor, based on materials found in a search of his home. In 

November 1991 he completed his state sentence of six months (nine 

months less three months good behavior). 

In January 1992 Ogg was charged in a federal indictment with 

interstate transportation of child pornography and aiding and 

abetting the same, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2252(a) (1) and (2). 

He pleaded guilty, and on July 7, 1992 was sentenced to 12 months 

confinement, supervised release, a $50 fee, and community service. 

At the time of sentencing u.s.s.G. § 5Gl.3(b), as then in effect, 

stated in pertinent part: 

(b) If subsection (a) does not apply2 , and the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense (s) 

that constituted part of the same course of conduct as 

the instant offense and have been fully taken into 

account in the determination of the offense level for the 

instant offense, • • . the sentence for the instant 

offense shall be imposed to result in a combined sentence 

equal to the total punishment that would have been 

imposed under§ SGl.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of 

Conviction) had all the sentences been imposed at the 

same time. 

The district court did not give Ogg credit for the state sentence 

imposed or the six months actually served. 

By its specific language § 5Gl.3(b) requires that the 

defendant be subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment. The 

background statement expresses the same limitation, as do the 

2 Subsection (a) applies where the instant crime is 

committed while the defendant is imprisoned for a different 

offense. It does not apply in this case because defendant did 

not commit this offense while subject to a term of imprisonment. 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-4118 Document: 010110220207 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 2 
Application Notes and Commentary. Ogg had fully completed his 

state sentence some eight months before he was sentenced on the 

federal charge (and two months before he was even charged in the 

federal indictment). Because of this conclusion we need not 

address Ogg's contention, and the state government's denial, that 

the two convictions arose out of the same course of conduct. 

Ogg suggests that the Guidelines do not clearly set forth what 

should occur where the government charges a defendant only after 

completion of his state sentence. But the commission repeatedly 

used the phrase "undischarged term of imprisonment." This creates 

a strong inference that the Commission did not intend 5Gl.3(b) to 

apply to sentences that had been fully served. This conclusion is 

reinforced by the Application Notes which do not contain any 

example showing subsection (b) applied to a fully-discharged term 

of imprisonment. 

Ogg suggests that his sentence must be vacated because the 

court erred in failing to consider the application to him of 

subsection (b). Defense counsel pointed out§ 5Gl.3 and the 1992 

amendments, discussed below, and asked the court to give credit for 

state time served. The court imposed a sentence without credit and 

this ensued: 

Q. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me, Your Honor. Is the 

court specifically ruling that 5Gl.3 is not applicable? 

A. [THE COURT]: I'm ruling that whether it's applicable 

or nor I'm not going to permit the credit of prior time. 

This, Ogg says, was error for failure to consider the applicable 

sentencing guideline. The short answer to this is that it was not 

3 

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error for the court to fail to explicitly consider a section that 

did not apply to him (because he had no undischarged term of 

imprisonment). 

There is no merit to the argument that it was unfair for the 

government to lengthen Ogg's overall time served by waiting to 

charge him until after completion of the state sentence. Even if 

we thought this unfair we are not authorized to rewrite guidelines 

for perceived unfairness. They permit the courts to correct 

unfairness in some situations by departing, but Ogg does not 

contend that the court should have departed. 

The 1992 Amendments changed§ 5Gl.3(b) but the changes were 

not in effect when Ogg was sentenced. Ordinarily a defendant must 

be sentenced under the Guidelines in effect on the date of 

sentencing. A court may, however, consider a clarifying amendment. 

As amended§ 5Gl.3(b) provides: 

(b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense (s) 

that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the 

sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run 

concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment. 

U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.3(b) (Nov. 1, 1992). The amendment changes both the 

requirements to make subsection (b) applicable and the sentence to 

be imposed once it is determined to be applicable. The "same 

course of conduct" requirement is omitted. The "combined sentence" 

provision has been replaced by a direction to impose concurrent 

sentences. The 1992 revision deletes the prong of subsection (b) 

pertaining to sentencing a defendant subject to an undischarged 

term of imprisonment previously imposed pursuant to the Sentencing 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-4118 Document: 010110220207 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 4 
Reform Act. These amendments do much more than clarify, so this 

court may only consider the 1991 Guidelines. Because of this 

conclusion we do not address whether the 1992 amendments would 

eliminate the requirement that the state conviction be undischarged. 

U. S . v. Gullickson, 981 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1992), is of no 

help to Ogg. It decided only that the sentencing court may not 

ignore§ 5Gl.3 if it is applicable to the defendant and must follow 

it unless sufficient justification for departure exists. This 

circuit agrees. U. S . v. Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 1126-28 (10th 

Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 s. Ct. 884 (1992). These cases do 

not require a court to expressly consider applicability of§ 5Gl. 3 

to defendants who are not within its scope. 

AFFIRMED. 

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