Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01812/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01812-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dani Yaacoub Masse
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_______________

 No. 05-1644

_______________

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Patrick Allen Vasquez, also known

as Benji Vasquez,

Appellant.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

_______________

Appeals from the United States

 No. 05-1812 District Court for the

_______________ Northern District of Iowa.

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Dani Yaacoub Masse,

Appellant.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Appellate Case: 05-1812 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/11/2006 Entry ID: 1995777
1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

-2-

________________

 Submitted: December 14, 2005

 Filed: January 11, 2006 

________________

Before BYE, BOWMAN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

________________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Dani Yaacoub Masse (“Masse”) and Patrick Allen Vasquez (“Vasquez”) pled

guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846. The district

court1

 sentenced Masse to 151 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised

release and Vasquez to 135 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.

Masse appeals his sentence on the grounds that the Government breached his plea

agreement, the district court applied the wrong standard of proof at sentencing, and

the district court erred regarding certain sentencing adjustments and departures. Both

defendants appeal their sentences as unreasonable under United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm both sentences.

I. BACKGROUND

Masse and Vasquez pled guilty pursuant to written plea agreements and were

sentenced in separate post-Booker sentencing hearings. At Vasquez’s hearing, the

district court calculated a United States Sentencing Guidelines range of 135-168

months’ imprisonment and imposed a sentence of 135 months. At Masse’s hearing,

Appellate Case: 05-1812 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/11/2006 Entry ID: 1995777
-3-

the district court calculated a guidelines range of 151-188 months and imposed a

sentence of 151 months.

In Masse’s plea agreement, Masse stipulated that certain co-conspirators made

statements about his involvement in the conspiracy but added handwritten

amendments that he did not stipulate to the veracity of these statements. His plea

agreement also contained the following provision:

[A]s of the date of this agreement, [Masse] appears to qualify for a twolevel downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility . . . .

However, the government shall be free to contest this adjustment should

[Masse] subsequently fail to continue to accept responsibility . . . by

acting in a way that is inconsistent with . . . the granting of the

adjustment under USSG § 3E1.1(a).

Prior to Masse’s sentencing hearing, Masse objected to certain offense-conduct

paragraphs in his Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) which were identical to

the aforementioned stipulations as modified by the handwritten amendments.

The Government responded to Masse’s objections in its sentencing

memorandum. In Part B of the memorandum, captioned “Defendant should not be

entitled to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility if he continues to

frivolously contest facts,” the Government contended that Masse “lodged numerous

objections to the factual section of the PSR” and warned that “if defendant frivolously

contests relevant conduct at the time of his sentencing hearing, the United States will

ask that the Court deny a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.”

In response to this memorandum, Masse filed a motion for specific performance

of the plea agreement, requesting that the district court order the Government not to

oppose a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. In that motion,

Appellate Case: 05-1812 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/11/2006 Entry ID: 1995777
-4-

Masse argued that the Government breached the plea agreement in its sentencing

memorandum because the memorandum contained an impermissible argument against

his downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.

The district court addressed Masse’s motion at the onset of his sentencing

hearing. When the court asked the Government if it was “intending to resist the

Defendant receiving adjustment of responsibility,” the Government indicated, “we

are not . . . [but] if the Defendant contests relevant conduct, we will be.” The

Government also explained that, after speaking with Masse’s attorney, it now

understood Masse’s objections to be legal arguments instead of denials of relevant

conduct. The district court proceeded to deny Masse’s motion because the court did

not believe that the Government was in breach of the plea agreement. Just prior to the

district court’s imposition of sentence, the Government told the district court that

Masse is “eligible for acceptance of responsibility,” and the district court granted

Masse a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Breach of Masse’s Plea Agreement

Masse argues that he should be resentenced because the Government breached

his plea agreement by contesting his adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. We

review de novo issues pertaining to the interpretation and enforcement of a plea

agreement. United States v. Has No Horses, 261 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2001).

We conclude that the Government did not breach the plea agreement because

the Government never contested the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. In

Masse’s plea agreement, the Government agreed that it would not contest this

adjustment provided that Masse did not act in a manner inconsistent with acceptance

of responsibility. Masse argues that the Government contested this adjustment in its

Appellate Case: 05-1812 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/11/2006 Entry ID: 1995777
-5-

sentencing memorandum. This argument, however, is factually inaccurate. The

Government never contested the adjustment–it simply reiterated the terms of the plea

agreement consistent with the commentary to the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,

cmt. n.1(a) (“a defendant who . . . frivolously contests . . . relevant conduct that the

court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of

responsibility”). The Government’s sentencing memorandum stated, “[I]f defendant

frivolously contests relevant conduct at the time of his sentencing hearing, the United

States will ask that the Court deny a downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility” (emphasis added). At the sentencing hearing, the Government

indicated that it was not resisting the adjustment because it understood Masse’s

objections to the PSR to be legal in nature but that it would resist the adjustment if

Masse contested relevant conduct. After the district court denied Masse’s motion for

specific performance, Masse did not contest relevant conduct, the Government

affirmed that Masse accepted responsibility and even recommended an extra level of

reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and Vasquez received a three-level downward

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. We agree with the district court that the

Government did not breach the plea agreement.

B. Standard of Proof

Masse argues that the district court erred in requiring proof of sentencing

enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence instead of requiring proof beyond

a reasonable doubt. “This claim has been squarely rejected by our circuit.” United

States v. McKay, No. 05-1823, slip op. at 14 (8th Cir. Dec. 13, 2005). We have held

that, post-Booker, sentencing courts should continue to apply a preponderance of the

evidence standard. See, e.g., United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 552 n.4 (8th Cir.

2005) (en banc).

Appellate Case: 05-1812 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/11/2006 Entry ID: 1995777
-6-

C. Sentencing Issues

Masse argues that the district court erred in adjusting his sentence upward three

levels for his role in the offense and declining to depart downward for substantial

assistance and overstated criminal history. After Booker, we review de novo the

interpretation and application of the guidelines, and we review the district court’s

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th

Cir. 2005).

First, the district court did not err in increasing Masse’s offense level by three

levels for his role in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) (requiring the district court

to increase a defendant’s offense level by three levels if the defendant was a “manager

or supervisor” in a criminal activity involving five or more participants). Masse

argues that his role did not warrant a three-level upward adjustment and that the

district court should have considered a lesser adjustment “in between” the guidelines

parameters. This argument is misplaced. The district court did not clearly err in

finding that Masse was a manager or supervisor in this conspiracy because there was

sufficient evidence to establish that Masse organized the transmission of cocaine from

Nevada to Iowa by at least four other people and that there were at least five

participants in the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 431 F.3d 313, 317

(8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a § 3B1.1(b) adjustment is appropriate when a

defendant directs at least one other participant in a conspiracy involving at least five

people). Therefore, the district court did not err in adjusting his sentence by three

levels. See United States v. Scott, 243 F.3d 1103, 1108 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that,

if a three-level adjustment under § 3B1.1(b) is appropriate, the district court cannot

impose a two-level adjustment under § 3B1.1(c) as a compromise).

Second, the district court did not err in declining to depart downward for

substantial assistance because the Government did not make a motion for such a

departure. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (“Upon motion of the government . . . the court may

Appellate Case: 05-1812 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/11/2006 Entry ID: 1995777
-7-

depart from the guidelines.”); United States v. Hart, 397 F.3d 643, 646-47 (8th Cir.

2005) (holding that the district court did not err when it refused to compel the

government to file a § 5K1.1 motion); cf. United States v. Ziesman, 409 F.3d 941, 957

(8th Cir. 2005) (affirming that, post-Booker, district courts can only review the

Government’s refusal to make a § 5K1.1 motion if the refusal was based on an

unconstitutional motive or was not rationally related to a legitimate government

interest). Masse has never argued that the Government’s refusal to make a § 5K1.1

motion was based on an unconstitutional motive or was not rationally related to a

legitimate government interest. Therefore, the district court could not consider a §

5K1.1 departure.

Third, we cannot review whether the district court erred in declining to exercise

its discretion to depart downward for overstated criminal history. See U.S.S.G. §

4A1.3(b)(1) (“If reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history

category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal

history . . . a downward departure may be warranted.”) (emphasis added). “The

discretionary denial of a motion for downward departure is unreviewable unless the

court failed to recognize its authority to depart.” United States v. Andreano, 417 F.3d

967, 970 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court recognized its authority to depart

downward under § 4A1.3 and declined to do so. Therefore, we cannot review the

district court’s decision.

D. Reasonableness of Defendants’ Sentences

Masse and Vasquez appeal sentences at the bottom of their respective

guidelines ranges as unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence for

an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir.

2005). Sentences within the guidelines are “presumptively reasonable.” United States

v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir.2005). Nevertheless, a sentence within an

advisory guidelines range may be unreasonable if the sentencing court: (1) fails to

Appellate Case: 05-1812 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/11/2006 Entry ID: 1995777
-8-

consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the

appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.

United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005).

1. Masse’s Sentence

Masse’s sentence is reasonable because the district court imposed a sentence

within the advisory guidelines range pursuant to an explicit and appropriate

consideration of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Lincoln, 413 F.3d at 717

(holding that defendant failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness where the

district court expressly justified the sentence on grounds contained in § 3553(a)).

Masse argues that the district court abused its discretion under § 3553(a) by failing to

consider his attempts to cooperate and by giving too much weight to his role in the

offense and his criminal history. These arguments fail because the district court

considered all of the § 3553(a) factors. Regarding Masse’s attempts to cooperate, role

in the offense and criminal history, the district court explained, “[S]pecifically, I

considered . . . what I heard in court . . . on the issue of nature and circumstances of

the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant.” Therefore, the district

court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to use § 3553(a) to modify its rulings on

sentencing adjustments and departures contained in its calculation of Masse’s

presumptively reasonable guidelines range.

 

2. Vasquez’s Sentence

Vasquez argues that his 135-month sentence was unreasonable because the

district court failed to consider the relevant factor of avoiding unwarranted sentencing

disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (explaining “the need to avoid unwarranted

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found

guilty of similar conduct”). A co-defendant, Dori Masse (Dani Masse’s brother),

Appellate Case: 05-1812 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/11/2006 Entry ID: 1995777
-9-

received 31 months’ imprisonment for similar conduct. Vasquez’s sentence is

reasonable, however, because the disparity in this case is not unwarranted. Vasquez

received a greater sentence than Dori Masse because Vasquez was responsible for a

larger quantity of drugs and had a greater criminal history than Dori Masse. See

United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 878 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that

defendant’s sentence was reasonable despite his co-defendant’s shorter sentence

because defendant had a more significant criminal history than his co-defendant).

Vasquez also argues more generally that his sentence is unreasonable because

it frustrates the goal of eliminating sentencing disparities among similarly situated

defendants in different cases. In particular, he complains about the randomness of

determining offense levels, the “systematic inequity” regarding substantial assistance

reductions, and the arbitrariness in calculating criminal history. We do not believe,

however, that these arguments affect the reasonableness of Vasquez’s sentence, which

falls within the presumptively reasonable guidelines range and was imposed after the

district court announced its consideration of all the § 3553(a) factors. See Lincoln,

413 F.3d at 717. 

 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the sentences of both defendants.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-1812 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/11/2006 Entry ID: 1995777