Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01423/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01423-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricardo Perales
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1423

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Ricardo Perales, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 31, 2007

Filed: June 8, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Ricardo Perales appeals the 121-month prison sentence the district court1

imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Over Perales’s objection and in reliance on the

government’s evidence at sentencing, the district court calculated a Category II

criminal history based on 3 points: 1 point for a 2004 California drug-possession

conviction upon Perales’s guilty plea, for which he received an 18-month deferred

entry of judgment involving several conditions; plus 2 points for committing the

Appellate Case: 06-1423 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/08/2007 Entry ID: 3317582
-2-

instant offense (in March 2005) while under that criminal justice sentence, see

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). On appeal, Perales’s counsel has filed a brief under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), contesting the section 4A1.1(d) assessment.

We hold that the district court correctly determined that Perales committed the

instant offense while he was under a criminal justice sentence. See United States v.

Blanton, 281 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2002) (district court’s interpretation and

application of Guidelines reviewed de novo). The deferred entry of judgment--in

effect at the time of the instant offense, and requiring Perales to complete certain

conditions in order to be discharged from further liability in the case--was a countable

sentence having the necessary “supervisory component” to constitute a “criminal

justice sentence.” See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, comment. (n.4) (defining “criminal justice

sentence”); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1), (a)(3) (defining “prior sentence”; providing that

conviction for which imposition of sentence “was totally suspended or stayed shall be

counted as a prior sentence under § 4A1.1(c)”); cf. United States v. Norman, 129 F.3d

1393, 1401-02 (10th Cir. 1997) (where state court imposed “probation-like”

conditions that provided judgment would be entered and sentence imposed if

conditions were breached, deferred judgment constituted criminal justice sentence

within “broad reading” of § 4A1.1(d), and district court properly added criminal

history points).

After reviewing the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), and finding no nonfrivolous issues, we affirm the judgment of the district

court, and we grant counsel’s request to withdraw. We direct counsel to inform

Perales about the procedures for filing a petition for rehearing and for certiorari.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-1423 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/08/2007 Entry ID: 3317582