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Parties Involved:
Doug J. Cook
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL~D 

United States Co?rt <?f Appeals Tenth C1rcu1t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAR2 51992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DOUG J. COOK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 91-6060 

(D.C. No. CR-90-199-A) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, ALDISERT,** and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Defendant Doug J. Cook appeals his conviction for concealing 

stolen goods that had crossed state lines in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 2315. On appeal, defendant contends that the district 

court erred by admitting statements he allegedly made during a 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interrogation and by 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Circuit Judge for the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-6060 Document: 010110239053 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 1 
admitting hearsay statements of an alleged coconspirator without 

determining admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E). He 

also contends that evidence was insufficient to support the jury's 

guilty verdict. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 

and affirm. 

The government introduced evidence at trial indicating that 

the following events occurred. Defendant was acquainted with 

Thomas Baldwin and George Grace, who were cousins residing in 

Kentucky. Grace called Baldwin and asked him to steal a tractortruck. Baldwin stole an eighteen-wheel truck with a custom 

sleeper from Parkway Ford in Madisonville, Kentucky. Grace 

informed Baldwin that he had located a buyer for the truck and 

instructed Baldwin to drive toward Oklahoma. Grace met Baldwin in 

Missouri and told him that defendant, an Oklahoma resident, would 

accept the stolen truck as a down payment for the purchase of 

defendant's truck. Grace and Baldwin travelled to defendant's 

house in Oklahoma, where defendant informed them that he did not 

want to sell his own truck but had arranged for the truck to be 

sold for $6,000. Baldwin explained to defendant how he had stolen 

the truck. 

Defendant had previously spoken with a truck driver, Dale 

Miller, who also lived in Oklahoma. Miller's truck had broken 

down, and he asked defendant to keep his eye out for parts to fix 

the truck. Defendant later allegedly informed Miller that he had 

found something "that might be a good deal for both of us." He 

also allegedly told Miller that "he found something that was 

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Appellate Case: 91-6060 Document: 010110239053 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 2 
coming from over east" that would help Miller fix his broken 

truck. 

After defendant told Grace and Baldwin they would receive 

$6,000 for the stolen truck, he made a telephone call. After the 

call, defendant informed Grace and Baldwin that the buyer did not 

have $6,000 in cash, but would pay $7,000 within a week or two. 

Defendant then instructed Grace and Baldwin to deliver the stolen 

truck to the buyer's barn. Grace and Baldwin took the truck to 

the barn as instructed. Baldwin identified a photograph of 

Miller's barn as the place where he and Grace left the truck. 

After Miller found the truck at his barn, defendant called 

him and told him to remove the wheels, tires, and sleeper unit 

from the truck. Defendant went to Miller's barn and, together, 

defendant and Miller loaded these items in defendant's pickup 

truck. Then, in defendant's presence, Miller removed other parts 

from the truck to be used on Miller's truck. When defendant asked 

about the vehicle identification number, Miller told him he had 

removed it. Miller later burned the remaining parts of the truck 

in a trash pit behind his house. Also at a later time, Miller 

gave defendant $6,000 to give to Grace and Baldwin as payment for 

the truck. Defendant gave this money to a friend of Grace's who 

had come to Oklahoma. 

Baldwin and Grace were later arrested for theft of the truck. 

The FBI executed a search warrant for Miller's property, found the 

truck parts Miller had buried, and interviewed Miller. Miller 

gave Agent Larry Damron a metal plate identifying the truck's 

identification number, model number and serial number. Initially, 

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Appellate Case: 91-6060 Document: 010110239053 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 3 
Miller denied defendant's involvement, but later explained 

defendant's role in Miller's receipt of the truck. Miller told an 

FBI agent that defendant was the only person he had spoken to 

regarding the stolen truck. 

Agent Damron and another agent then questioned defendant at 

his trailer home. Initially, defendant denied his involvement. 

At trial, Damron testified that after defendant learned that 

others had implicated him in the theft, defendant admitted that he 

had assisted in obtaining the truck for Miller. Damron testified 

that defendant then explained that Miller had needed parts and 

that he had spoken by telephone to Grace regarding the stolen 

truck. Damron also testified that defendant admitted picking up 

the tires, wheels and sleeper unit and that he knew he had 

violated the law. The agents did not tape record the conversation 

wi th defendant . 

Defendant's first contention on appeal is that the district 

court erred in admitting testimony regarding statements he 

allegedly made without first establishing that he had voluntarily 

waived his privilege against self-incrimination. See Miranda Y..!.. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant raises this issue for the 

first time on appeal . He failed to move to suppress this evidence 

prior to trial, and he did not object to Agent Damron's testimony 

at trial. In United States .Y:.!.. Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 665 (10th Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161 (1985), we held that "where no 

objection on Miranda grounds was made to the use of the confession 

throughout the trial court proceedings, ... the objection [is] 

waived." We also held that the trial court has no obligation sua 

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Appellate Case: 91-6060 Document: 010110239053 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 4 
sponte to hold a voluntariness hearing when the defense fails to 

challenge the admission of a confession. Id. at 666. Because 

defendant failed to raise this issue prior to or during trial, he 

waived the objection. 

Defendant next contends that the district court erred by 

admitting hearsay testimony elicited from witness Dale Miller. 

Specifically, he argues that the court failed to find that 

defendant and Miller were coconspirators before admitting the 

hearsay testimony. We review the district court's determination 

whether to admit evidence, including coconspirator hearsay 

statements, under an abuse of discretion standard. United States 

L.. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1366 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 

1255 (1984) . 

In his appellate brief, defendant does not specify which of 

Miller's statements he considers to be hearsay, nor does he show 

where defense counsel contemporaneously objected to the admission 

of these statements at trial. Therefore, it is very difficult to 

review his contention. When the defense fails to object 

contemporaneously to admission of hearsay, the objection is waived 

and we review only for plain error. United States L.. Bowser, 941 

F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1991). Because we find no plain error, we 

hold that defendant's hearsay objections are waived to the extent 

he failed to object to any hearsay that might have been admitted 

at trial. In addition, even if some of Miller's statements 

constituted coconspirator hearsay, we hold that the district court 

properly made an adequate finding, as required under Bourjaily L.. 

United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), and United States L.. Radeker, 

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664 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1981), that a coconspirator 

relationship existed between the defendant and the trial witness. 

Therefore, we hold that defendant's contention is without merit. 

Finally, defendant contends that evidence was insufficient to 

support the jury's guilty verdict. "'Evidence is considered 

sufficient to support a criminal conviction if, when viewed in the 

light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could 

find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" United 

States~ Ratchford, 942 F.2d 702, 703 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

United States~ Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987)), 

cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3544 (U . S. Feb. 24, 1992). 

In his appellate brief, defendant lists the elements that 

must be proven to convict a person of a conspiracy to commit a 

crime against the United States, 18 u.s.c. S 371 -- presumably to 

argue that the government failed to prove these elements. Because 

the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on Count I (alleging a 

violation of S 371), we need not review sufficiency of evidence on 

Count I. 

Defendant also asserts that because the jury acquitted 

defendant on Count I, the jury must have chosen not to rely on the 

testimony of witness Timothy Baldwin. Defendant then argues that 

because the jury discounted Baldwin's testimony, we -- in 

reviewing whether evidence was sufficient for the conviction on 

Count II -- should disregard Baldwin's testimony related to Count 

II as evidence that supports the guilty verdict on that count. 

Defendant misunderstands our role in reviewing a jury's verdict. 

We do not conjecture why the jury chose to acquit defendant on 

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Count I . Nor do we pick and choose what evidence the jury might 

have relied on to convict defendant on Count II; instead, we 

review all evi dence in the light most favorable to the government . 

Having done so, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have 

found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of 

violating 18 u.s.c. S 2315 . 

AFFIRMED. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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