Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-01182/USCOURTS-ca10-16-01182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pierre Rosario-Moore
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

In re: PIERRE ROSARIO-MOORE, 

 Movant.

No. 16-1182

(D.C. Nos. 1:13-CV-03516-MSK & 

1:12-CR-00290-MSK-1)

(D. Colo.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before KELLY, HARTZ, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Movant Pierre Rosario-Moore, a federal prisoner proceeding through counsel, 

seeks an order authorizing him to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in 

the district court so he may assert a claim for relief based on Johnson v. United States, 

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).1

 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h), 2244(b)(3). Because Movant has 

made a prima facie showing that he satisfies the relevant conditions for authorization 

under § 2255(h)(2), we grant authorization.

Movant received a sentence enhanced under the sentencing guideline for unlawful 

receipt, possession, or transportation of firearms or ammunition, which is triggered by the 

defendant committing the offense “subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of 

either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). 

The term “crime of violence” in § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) “has the meaning given that term in 

 1 The Federal Public Defender for the Districts of Colorado and Wyoming is 

appointed to represent Pierre Rosario-Moore pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

May 20, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 16-1182 Document: 01019624610 Date Filed: 05/20/2016 Page: 1 
2

§ 4B1.2(a) and Application Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. 

He alleges that his prior conviction was treated as a crime of violence by virtue of the 

residual clause in § 4B1.2, which encompasses crimes that “involve[] conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” id. § 4B1.2(a)(2). An 

identical clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act was invalidated in Johnson on the 

ground that it was unconstitutionally vague.

To obtain authorization, Movant must make a prima facie showing that his claim 

meets the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C); see Case v. 

Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015, 1028–29 (10th Cir. 2013). A claim may be authorized under 

§ 2255(h)(2) if it relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Johnson

announced a new rule of constitutional law that was made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). We held in In 

re Encinias, No. 16–8038, 2016 WL 1719323, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016) (per 

curiam), that second or successive § 2255 motions that rely on Johnson to challenge 

§ 4B1.2’s definition of “crime of violence” for a prior conviction qualify for 

authorization under § 2255(h)(2). Under the same reasoning, second or successive 

§ 2255 motions that rely on Johnson to challenge § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)’s definition of “crime 

of violence”—which incorporates the definition in § 4B1.2—for a prior conviction 

qualify for authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

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Accordingly, we grant Pierre Rosario-Moore authorization to file a second or 

successive § 2255 motion in district court to raise a claim based on Johnson v. United 

States.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 16-1182 Document: 01019624610 Date Filed: 05/20/2016 Page: 3