Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50033/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50033-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arturo Esparza
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ARTURO ESPARZA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50033

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-01451-

MMA-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 18, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed June 29, 2015

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, 

Circuit Judges, and Jack Zouhary, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Nguyen

 *The Honorable Jack Zouhary, District Judge for the U.S. District Court 

for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

 

 

 

 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 1 of 16
2 UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a conviction for importing marijuana 

and remanded, in a case in which the defendant attempted to 

enter the United States, driving a car that had multiple 

packages of marijuana hidden in the gas tank and dashboard.

The only contested issue at trial was the defendant’s 

knowledge, and specifically who owned the car. At the time 

of the defendant’s arrest, Diana Hernandez was the car’s 

registered owner.

The panel held that Hernandez’s statement to the 

Department of Motor Vehicles – that she had sold the car to 

the defendant six days before the defendant’s arrest – was 

testimonial, and that because the defendant was not given an 

opportunity to confront her as a witness, the government’s 

use of the hearsay statement violated the defendant’s rights 

under the Confrontation Clause. The panel concluded that 

the admission of Hernandez’s statement, which the 

government used as proof that the defendant owned the car 

and therefore knew about the hidden drugs, was not harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

 ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 2 of 16
UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA 3

COUNSEL

Kent D. Young (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego, 

Inc., San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section, 

Criminal Division, and D. Benjamin Holley (argued), 

Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

Arturo Esparza appeals his conviction for importing 

marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. On 

February 19, 2011, Esparza attempted to enter the United 

States, driving a car that had multiple packages of marijuana 

hidden in the gas tank and dashboard. At trial, the only 

contested issue was the critical fact of Esparza’s knowledge, 

and specifically who actually owned the car he was driving.

At the time of Esparza’s arrest, Diana Hernandez was the 

car’s registered owner. The government did not call 

Hernandez as a witness. Instead, the government relied on 

two hearsay documents containing Hernandez’s statement 

that she had sold the car to Esparza six days before his arrest. 

Hernandez made this statement to the California Department 

of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) only after she was notified by 

law enforcement that her car had been seized for smuggling 

drugs. The government used Hernandez’s statement as 

proof that Esparza actually owned the car, and therefore 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 3 of 16
4 UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA

knew about the hidden drugs. Esparza, on the other hand, 

claimed that he borrowed the car from a friend to visit his 

children and attend their soccer game. At the time of his 

arrest, Esparza’s children lived in San Diego, California, 

with his mother, while he lived just across the border in 

Tijuana, Mexico.

The question that we must decide is whether the 

government’s use of Hernandez’s hearsay statement violated 

the Confrontation Clause. We hold that because 

Hernandez’s statement was “testimonial,” see Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), Esparza had the right to 

confront her as a witness. His rights were violated because 

he was not given an opportunity to do so. We also conclude 

that the admission of Hernandez’s statement was not 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus we vacate 

Esparza’s conviction and remand.

I

A

In 2010, Esparza moved with his family from California 

to Tijuana, Mexico, just south of the border. Shortly after 

the move, he separated from his girlfriend and the mother of 

their two children. Esparza then sent his children to live with 

his mother in San Diego, California.

On February 19, 2011, Esparza drove a 1999 Chevy 

Lumina to the San Ysidro port of entry, which lies at the 

border between Tijuana and San Diego. At the border 

checkpoint, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) 

narcotics dog alerted to the car’s gas tank. When questioned,

Esparza claimed that the car belonged to a friend named 

Julio. However, the CBP officer noticed that the registration 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 4 of 16
UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA 5

document given to him by Esparza showed that the 

registered owner was Diana Hernandez, a resident of 

California, not a person named Julio. Officers searched the 

car and found multiple packages containing over 50 

kilograms of marijuana hidden in the gas tank and the 

dashboard.

Five days after Esparza’s arrest, on February 24, 2011, 

CBP sent Hernandez a written Notice of Seizure, informing 

her that the government had seized the Chevy Lumina 

registered in her name on February 19, 2011 at San Ysidro 

“because it . . . transported, concealed, or facilitated the sale, 

receipt, possession, or importation of 50.12 kgs marijuana” 

in violation of four federal criminal statutes. The Notice 

further stated, “If you no longer own or hold an interest in 

the seized property, please return this notice to our office and 

provide the name and address of the party that currently 

owns the property.”

On March 21, 2011, about four weeks after Hernandez 

received the Notice of Seizure, she sent the DMV a Notice 

of Transfer/Release of Liability form, which is a standard 

DMV form that owners file to notify the DMV of a vehicle 

sale. This form also transfers liability for traffic violations 

and civil litigation from a car’s seller to its new owner. The 

form that Hernandez sent to the DMV contains her signed 

statement that she sold the Lumina to “Arturo Esparza” on 

February 13, 2011—six days before Esparza’s arrest.

On April 15, 2011, Esparza was indicted on one count of 

knowingly importing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 956 and 960. Prior to trial, Esparza moved to exclude the 

Notice of Transfer/Release of Liability form and a printout 

of information stored in DMV computers concerning the 

Chevy Lumina (the “DMV Printout”). Similar to the Notice 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 5 of 16
6 UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA

of Transfer/Release of Liability form, the DMV Printout 

reflects Hernandez’s out-of-court statement that she sold the 

Chevy Lumina to Esparza on February 13, 2011. During two 

pretrial hearings, Esparza argued that the two documents 

should be excluded on the grounds that Hernandez’s 

statement was inadmissible hearsay, and its admission 

would violate the Confrontation Clause. In response, the 

government said that Hernandez would testify during trial, 

and thus there was no right to confrontation concern. The 

district court’s analysis then focused mainly on whether a 

hearsay exception applied, and did not address the Sixth 

Amendment objection. After concluding that several

hearsay exceptions applied to Hernandez’s statement, the 

district court ruled that the documents were admissible.

B

In July 2012, the district court presided over a three-day 

jury trial. On the second day, the government informed the 

court that it had decided not to call Hernandez as a witness, 

even though she was on the government’s witness list and at 

the courthouse. The government then called Department of 

Homeland Security (“DHS”) Special Agent Dina Glaze, who 

testified at length about Hernandez’s hearsay statement that 

she had sold the car to Esparza, as reflected on the DMV 

Printout, which the court admitted over Esparza’s renewed 

objection. Agent Glaze testified that the DMV Printout 

reflected the recording of Hernandez’s Notice of 

Transfer/Release of Liability form, which meant that “the 

ownership of the vehicle” changed from Hernandez to 

Esparza—i.e., that Esparza owned the car.

Esparza did not testify, but called four witnesses in the 

defense case. The first was Hernandez’s ex-boyfriend, 

Felipe Sanchez Escobedo (“Sanchez”), who testified that he 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 6 of 16
UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA 7

did not know Esparza. Sanchez explained that in January 

2011, his ex-girlfriend Hernandez gave him her Chevy 

Lumina to sell. Around February 2011, he sold the car to a 

man named Ricardo Dominguez Morales (“Dominguez”), 

who was a friend of Sanchez’s boss. On the day of the sale, 

Sanchez did not have the car’s title with him, so he arranged 

to have Dominguez return the next day to pick up the title. 

However, Dominguez, who took possession of the car on the 

day of the sale, never returned for the title.

Three weeks after the sale, Sanchez received a call from 

Hernandez, who was very upset. (Agents had seized the car 

and arrested Esparza in the interim.) Concerned that 

Hernandez “was going to be in trouble” because of Esparza’s 

arrest, Sanchez went to Dominguez’s house to confront him 

and force him to “assume responsibility for the car.” After 

the confrontation, Dominguez gave Sanchez documents 

relating to the sale of the car, including a Notice of 

Transfer/Release of Liability form that was partially filled 

out to indicate that Hernandez sold the car to “Arturo 

Esparza.” Dominguez’s name does not appear anywhere on 

the form. In turn, Sanchez gave the form to Hernandez, who 

presumably signed it and sent it in to the DMV. On crossexamination, the government attempted to impeach Sanchez 

with the Notice of Transfer/Release of Liability form signed 

by Hernandez. However, Sanchez repeatedly insisted that 

he sold the car to Dominguez, not Esparza, contrary to what 

the form reflects.

The defense also called as a witness DHS Special Agent 

Jeffrey Richardson. Agent Richardson testified that on July 

7, 2011, as part of the government’s continuing investigation 

after Esparza’s arrest, he interviewed Hernandez, the 

registered owner of the car. During the interview, 

Hernandez admitted to Agent Richardson that she did not 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 7 of 16
8 UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA

personally sell her car, but instead gave it to her exboyfriend, Sanchez, who sold it for her in January 2011. 

Hernandez later faxed to Agent Richardson a photocopy of 

the Notice of Transfer/Release of Liability form that she had 

sent to the DMV, along with a photocopy of Esparza’s 

driver’s license. Agent Richardson also testified that 

Esparza’s seized cell phone contained text messages from 

“Lulu,” who he determined to be the same person as 

Dominguez. This testimony confirmed that Esparza and 

Dominguez in fact knew one another. Esparza’s remaining 

witnesses were his mother and ex-girlfriend, who both 

testified that he had never owned a car. Esparza’s mother 

stated that he often crossed the border on foot and she would 

pick him up in her car on the U.S. side. Esparza’s exgirlfriend also testified that in 2010, she introduced Esparza 

to Dominguez, who was known to her as both “Julio” and 

“Lulu.”

During closing arguments, the only element in dispute 

was Esparza’s knowledge of the drugs. The government’s 

argument relied in large part on the fact that “it was the 

defendant’s vehicle,” as shown in the DMV documents 

containing Hernandez’s statement that she sold the car to 

Esparza. Esparza’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that 

he was an unwitting drug courier framed by Dominguez, 

who lent him the car. The defense asserted that after 

Dominguez learned of Esparza’s arrest, Dominguez 

provided Sanchez with documents, including a Notice of 

Transfer/Release of Liability that already had Esparza’s 

name filled out as the buyer. Sanchez then gave those 

documents to Hernandez, who, in turn, sent the Notice of 

Transfer/Release of Liability to the DMV. In its rebuttal 

argument, the government repeated its claim that Esparza 

bought the car a few days before his arrest. The government 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 8 of 16
UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA 9

attacked the credibility of Esparza’s witnesses, and reiterated 

that, “[a]gain, this defendant bought this vehicle. . . . He 

made a choice to enter that port of entry knowing he had 

drugs, hoping he would make it through.”

The jury convicted Esparza. The district court sentenced 

him to 24 months of custody, followed by three years of 

supervised release. Esparza timely appealed.

II

Esparza argues that the admission of the documents 

containing Hernandez’s statement violated the 

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We review 

whether a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause 

were violated de novo. United States v. Matus-Zayas, 655 

F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).

A

The Confrontation Clause states that “[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v. 

Washington, the Supreme Court abrogated decades of 

Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, which had allowed the 

admission of an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement 

so long as it “falls under a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’” 

or bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” 541 

U.S. 36, 60, 62–69 (2004) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 

U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). Instead, the Supreme Court held that a 

hearsay testimonial statement of a witness who does not 

appear at trial may never be used unless “the [witness] is

unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior 

opportunity to cross-examine.” Id. at 59. As the Court 

explained, the “bedrock procedural guarantee” of the 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 9 of 16
10 UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA

Confrontation Clause “commands, not that evidence be 

reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 

manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.” Id. 

at 42, 61.

While Crawford declined to provide a comprehensive 

definition of “testimonial,” see id. at 68, the Court stated 

“[v]arious formulations of [the] core class of ‘testimonial’ 

statements:”

ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 

equivalent—that is, material such as 

affidavits, custodial examinations, prior 

testimony that the defendant was unable to 

cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements 

that declarants would reasonably expect to be 

used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements 

contained in formalized testimonial 

materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 

prior testimony, or confessions; statements 

that were made under circumstances which 

would lead an objective witness reasonably 

to believe that the statement would be 

available for use at a later trial.

Id. at 51–52 (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and citations 

omitted). The Court thus held that defendant Crawford’s 

right of confrontation was violated when the state court 

admitted his wife Sylvia’s statements in response to police 

interrogation, and she did not testify at trial. Id. at 40–42, 

65–69. The Court found Sylvia’s statements to be 

testimonial, because she made them “while in police 

custody, herself a potential suspect in the case.” Id. at 65–

69.

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 10 of 16
UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA 11

In a number of cases following Crawford, the Supreme 

Court provided further guidance on the parameters of 

testimonial evidence. For example, in Davis v. Washington, 

the Court held that statements made during a 911 call were 

nontestimonial because the “circumstances objectively 

indicat[e] that the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] 

to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” 

547 U.S. 813, 822, 827–28 (2006); see also Ohio v. Clark, 

576 U.S. —, 2015 WL 2473372, at *6 (2015) (holding that 

a child’s statements to teachers concerning his abuse by the 

defendant were not testimonial because the primary purpose 

of the conversation was to “identify[] and end[] the threat” 

of violence during “an ongoing emergency”); Michigan v. 

Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361 (2011) (stating that “the prospect 

of fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose of 

resolving [an] emergency is presumably significantly 

diminished”). In contrast, statements made to the police 

during an interview at a witness’s home about a domestic 

violence incident were testimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829–

30. There was no ongoing emergency, and “the primary 

purpose of the interrogation [was] to establish or prove past 

events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. 

at 822, 829–30; see also United States v. Brooks, 772 F.3d 

1161, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that responses to a 

U.S. Postal Inspector’s questions were testimonial because 

“a reasonable person would have understood the primary 

purpose to be investigative”).

The Supreme Court has also emphasized that 

Confrontation Clause analysis does not turn on the 

statement’s reliability, but rather on whether the out-of-court 

statement was “functionally identical to live, in-court 

testimony.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 

310–11, 317–18 (2009). Thus, the Court held in Melendez-

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 11 of 16
12 UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA

Diaz that a forensic analyst’s certificates of analysis attesting 

to the results of drug tests were testimonial, and the 

defendant had the right to confront the analyst conducting 

the examination. Id. at 310–11. The Court rejected the 

government’s argument that the certificates were akin to 

business or public records, explaining that such “records are 

generally admissible absent confrontation not because they 

qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but 

because—having been created for the administration of an 

entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or 

proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.” Id. at 

324; see also United States v. Bustamante, 687 F.3d 1190, 

1194 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a document created by a 

public official relating to person’s birth was testimonial, and 

distinguishable from ordinary public records, because the 

official created it at the request of law enforcement for use 

in an ongoing criminal investigation).

B

Turning to Hernandez’s statement, we easily conclude 

that it was testimonial. Prior to sending the Notice of 

Transfer/Release of Liability to the DMV, Hernandez was 

notified by CBP that her car had been seized because it was 

used to smuggle more than 50 kilograms of marijuana. 

Hernandez then called her ex-boyfriend Sanchez, upset that 

she was still the registered owner. Sanchez, in turn, 

confronted the man to whom he sold the car, Dominguez, 

and later received from Dominguez a DMV Notice of 

Transfer/Release of Liability form that indicated the car was 

sold to “Arturo Esparza.” Upon receiving this Notice form 

from Sanchez, Hernandez signed it and sent it to the DMV, 

despite having no personal knowledge of who actually 

bought her car.

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 12 of 16
UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA 13

At the time that Hernandez made her statement that she 

sold the car to Esparza, she had a strong incentive to lie. As 

the registered owner of a car that had hidden compartments 

used to smuggle drugs, Hernandez faced potential criminal 

exposure. She knew of the ongoing investigation and made 

her statement “under circumstances which would lead an 

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 

would be available for use at a later trial.” Crawford, 541 

U.S. at 52, 65 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. United 

States v. Marguet-Pillado, 560 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 

2009) (finding that a declarant’s expectation that her 

statement may be used in a future trial is a key factor in 

determining whether hearsay is testimonial). Hernandez was 

essentially testifying as a witness who bore testimony 

against Esparza for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. See 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65–69. Additionally, Hernandez was 

available. Indeed, prior to trial, the government stated to the 

district court that it would call her as a witness. She was on 

the government’s witness list, and was present in the 

courthouse on the second day of trial. Yet, the government 

elected not to call her, instead using the DMV documents as 

“weaker substitute[s] for [her] live testimony.” Davis, 547 

U.S. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 

394 (1986)).

Relying mainly on United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 

1194 (9th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Berry, 683 F.3d 

1015 (9th Cir. 2012), the government argues that 

Hernandez’s statement was nontestimonial because the two 

documents reflecting her statement were public records 

created for the administration of the DMV’s affairs. In 

Morales, we held that DHS field encounter forms prepared 

by CBP agents at the time that they arrested aliens were not 

testimonial. 720 F.3d at 1200–01. Comparing the

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 13 of 16
14 UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA

documents to business and public records, we concluded 

their primary purpose was “administrative, not for use as 

evidence at a future criminal trial.” Id. In Berry, we 

similarly held that Social Security application documents 

were not testimonial when introduced in a later criminal 

prosecution for Social Security fraud because, again 

comparing the documents to business and public records, the 

application was prepared by a Social Security employee “as 

part of a routine administrative process,” and not in 

connection with a criminal investigation. 683 F.3d at 1022–

23.

In contrast, Hernandez’s statement was not created for 

the routine administration of the DMV’s affairs. Of course, 

we recognize that the DMV does, as part of its administrative 

functions, maintain records of the sale and transfer of 

registered vehicles. But, unlike in Berry and Morales, 

Hernandez was not an agency employee who prepared or 

maintained documents as part of her official duties. Nor was 

she a private citizen who, in the course of a routine sale, 

simply notified the DMV of the transfer of her car. Instead, 

her car had already been seized for serious criminal 

violations, and she sent the transfer form to the DMV only 

after receiving a Notice of Seizure from CBP. That her 

statement is contained in documents that might otherwise 

qualify under a hearsay exception for public records makes 

no difference to our analysis. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 

(stating that “we do not think the Framers meant to leave the 

Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of 

evidence”). We therefore hold that the admission of 

Hernandez’s statement contained in the Notice of 

Transfer/Release of Liability and the DMV Printout violated 

Esparza’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 14 of 16
UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA 15

C

The government argues that, even if admission of 

Hernandez’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause, 

the error was harmless. The government bears the burden of 

proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt, see Bustamante, 687 F.3d at 1195, and we assess this 

issue by considering “the importance of the witness’ 

testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony 

was cumulative, . . . and, of course, the overall strength of 

the prosecution’s case,” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 684 (1986). Even when the government’s case is 

“strong,” a Confrontation Clause violation is not harmless 

where the erroneously admitted evidence could have 

“significantly altered the evidentiary picture.” Bustamante, 

687 F.3d at 1195.

Here, the question of who owned the car was critical 

because the only disputed element was Esparza’s 

knowledge. The government used Hernandez’s statement in 

its case-in-chief, when DHS Special Agent Glaze testified 

that the DMV Printout showed that Esparza owned the car 

that was used to smuggle the drugs. The government also 

used Hernandez’s statement to impeach defense witness 

Sanchez, introducing the DMV Notice of Transfer/Release 

of Liability during his cross-examination. Finally, during 

closing, the prosecution relied heavily on both documents to 

argue that Esparza was the car’s true owner and, therefore, 

must have known of the hidden drugs. In other words, the 

government used Hernandez’s statement as “an out-of-court 

substitute for trial testimony.” See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358.

Contrary to the government’s argument, we do not find 

Hernandez’s statement to be merely cumulative of other 

evidence indicative of Esparza’s knowledge. The 

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 15 of 16
16 UNITED STATES V. ESPARZA

government relies on the fact that there was other proof that 

arguably showed Esparza’s knowledge—namely, the fact 

that he drove the same car across the border on one other 

occasion, that the car had only one gallon of gas, and that the 

heating and air conditioning unit did not work properly. 

Nevertheless, the ownership of the car went to the heart of 

Esparza’s defense that he borrowed it on the day of his arrest, 

and both sides argued vigorously regarding the car’s actual 

ownership. Had Hernandez testified, Esparza could have 

directly challenged her statement that she sold her car to him, 

rather than Dominguez. Instead, the government used 

Hernandez’s hearsay statement to gut Esparza’s claim that 

he was an unknowing courier who borrowed the car from 

Dominguez, the real buyer of the car from Hernandez. The 

government’s heavy reliance on Hernandez’s statement 

shows that it was “very important to the prosecution’s case,” 

and the statement’s admission “may have significantly 

altered the evidentiary picture.” Bustamante, 687 F.3d at 

1195. Therefore, the violation of Esparza’s Confrontation 

Clause rights was not harmless.

* * *

We vacate Esparza’s conviction and remand. We need 

not address Esparza’s remaining arguments on appeal.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

 Case: 13-50033, 06/29/2015, ID: 9590943, DktEntry: 59-1, Page 16 of 16