Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-01142/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-01142-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dragan Ubiparipovic
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dragan Ubiparipovic, 

Defendant. 

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CR-04-1142-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant has filed a trial memorandum with an offer of proof regarding the

affirmative defense of entrapment by estoppel. Dkt. #168. The Government has filed a

memorandum in response. Dkt. #170. The Court has advised the parties that it will

determine whether the defense is unavailable as a matter of law. If so, the Court will

withdraw its authorization of the expensive and time-consuming overseas discovery planned

by Defendant. If the Court cannot determine the defense is unavailable as a matter of law,

the discovery will be permitted as authorized.

“Entrapment by estoppel is the unintentional entrapment by an official who

mistakenly misleads a person into a violation of the law.” United States v. Ramirez-Valencia,

202 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1999). “It derives from the Due Process Clause of the

Constitution, which prohibits convictions based on misleading actions by government

officials.” United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United

States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

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The Government argues that Defendant cannot be sure that IOM employees will

testify at trial because of certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities that were granted

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To establish entrapment by estoppel, a defendant must show that (1) an authorized

government official, empowered to render the claimed erroneous advice, (2) who has been

made aware of all the relevant historical facts, (3) affirmatively told him the proscribed

conduct was permissible, (4) that he relied on the false information, and (5) that the reliance

was reasonable. Id. at 1216-17 (quotations and citations omitted). A defendant must

establish this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d

112, 124 (3d Cir. 1999). 

I. Authorized Government Official.

Defendant was assisted in the refugee application process by the International

Organization for Migration (“IOM”). Dkt. #168 at 4. According to Defendant, the IOM was

contracted to act as an agent of the United States Department of State pursuant to a

Memorandum of Understanding. Id. The Government argues that no authorized government

officials worked for the IOM because its employees were not employees or contractors of the

State Department. Dkt. #170 at 3. The parties do not dispute that the IOM assisted the State

Department in processing immigration applications in Bosnia and that IOM officials spoke

with Defendant numerous times before he signed and swore his I-590 refugee application.

This relationship may be sufficient to render IOM employees authorized agents of the

United States government for purposes of preparing and processing immigration applications.

In Tallmadge, the Ninth Circuit held that a federally licensed gun dealer was an agent of the

government for the purpose of advising a convicted felon that his firearm purchase was

lawful. 829 F.2d at 774. Like IOM employees, federally licensed gun dealers are not

employees or contractors of the United States government. Id. Because the State

Department relied on the IOM to process Bosnian immigration applications, IOM employees

may well have been “empowered to render the claimed erroneous advice.” Batterjee, 361

F.3d at 1216 (quotation omitted).1

 

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to the IOM by Executive Order 10335. Dkt. #170 at 3. Defendant readily admits as much.

Dkt. 3168 at 6-7. For purposes of deciding whether the defense of entrapment by estoppel

in unavailable as a matter of law, the Court will assume that Defendant can prove the facts

he alleges. 

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II. Relevant Historical Facts.

Defendant states that IOM officials knew he was a soldier in the Army of the Republic

of Srpska before they provided the allegedly misleading advice. In support, Defendant states

that “[i]t was common knowledge that all able bodied Bosnian-Serb men were expected to

serve in the Army of Republic of Srpska.” Dkt. #168 at 5. Defendant also stated to IOM

employees that he had had “enough of war.” Id. Upon hearing this, an IOM official stated:

“Wait a moment, that subject is not talked about in this building.” Id. 

The Government argues that these facts did not apprise IOM officials that Defendant

had served in the Army of the Republic of Srpska. Dkt. #170 at 4. The Court cannot

conclude the Government is correct as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit has permitted the

entrapment by estoppel defense to be used even when the defendant did not explicitly state

the relevant facts to government officials, provided the officials gave the same advice they

would have given had they been explicitly told all the relevant facts. Batterjee, 361 F.3d at

1218. The Court finds it plausible that IOM officials knew Defendant served in the Army

based on the fact that he was a young, healthy man who indicated that he was tired of war.

Even if they did not know this fact for certain, the statement by IOM officials that the war

was not to be spoken of indicates that IOM officials may not have acted differently had

Defendant explicitly stated he served in the Army of the Republic of Srpska. It appears

Defendant might be able to satisfy the second element of the test. 

III. Affirmative Statement that Proscribed Conduct was Permissible.

Defendant argues that IOM officials made it clear that it was permissible to omit

reference to his participation in the army by stating the “much broader prohibition that

anything regarding the war was not to be talked about in the building.” Dkt. #168 at 5. The

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Government counters that such a statement does not amount to an affirmative representation

that it was acceptable for Defendant to omit that he served in the army. Dkt. #170 at 4. 

The Ninth Circuit has rejected an entrapment by estoppel defense when a federally

licensed firearms dealer did not tell the defendant that it was lawful to purchase firearms, but

rather processed his application without making an affirmative statement. United States v.

Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d at 1109

(no affirmative representation that it was lawful for a defendant to return to the United States

five years after being deported when the immigration form at issue stated simply that any

deported person who returned within five years would be guilty of a felony). On the other

hand, the Ninth Circuit has allowed a defendant to raise the defense even when an affirmative

representation was not made. Batterjee, 361 F.3d at 1217-18. In Batterjee, the defendant

was a legal alien on a non-immigrant visa who illegally purchased a firearm. The outdated

form he was given upon the purchase of the firearm indicated that the only immigrationrelated ground for not being able to purchase a firearm was illegal status in the United States.

Id. at 1218. The court construed the form as indicating affirmatively to the defendant that

a legal alien could purchase a gun. Id.

Depending on how they develop during discovery, the facts of this case might more

closely resemble Batterjee than Brebner. Defendant was told that the war was not to be

spoken of in the IOM building – the very place where advice on visa applications was given.

While there was no affirmative statement that Defendant could omit his participation in the

army, it is possible that a reasonable interpretation of the IOM official’s statement was that

one should not discuss or admit any participation in the army while working with the IOM.

The Government argues that Defendant’s admission that he learned that participation

in the Army of the Republic of Srpska would result in a denial of refugee status renders the

entrapment by estoppel defense inapplicable, and that the “Due Process Clause of the

Constitution is not implicated when the defendant knew his conduct was not permissible.”

Dkt. #170 at 4. The Government does not cite any authority for this position, which is

contradicted by Ninth Circuit law. “[E]ntrapment by estoppel rests on a due process theory

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which focuses on the conduct of the government officials rather than on a defendant’s state

of mind.” Batterjee, 361 F.3d at 1218. “While one of the elements of an entrapment claim

is the absence of predisposition on the part of the defendant, a defendant’s predisposition to

commit an offense is not at issue in an entrapment by estoppel defense.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted). 

IV. Reliance on False Information.

Defendant must demonstrate that he relied on false information. Id. at 1216. He

argues that he omitted reference to serving in the Army of the Republic of Srpska based upon

hearing from an IOM official that the war was not to be spoken of in the IOM building.

Dkt. #168 at 6. The Government responds that Defendant cannot meet this fourth element

of the test because Defendant knew that his application would be denied if he admitted to

serving in the army. Dkt. #170 at 4. As stated above, even if Defendant knew that his

participation in the army would preclude the United States from granting his application, he

has alleged facts that may enable him to show that he relied on the false information that it

was permissible to omit reference to military service.

V. Reasonable Reliance.

“[A] defendant’s reliance is reasonable if a person sincerely desirous of obeying the

law would have accepted the information as true, and would not have been put on notice to

make further inquiries.” Batterjee, 361 F.3d at 1216-17 (citations omitted). Defendant

claims that his participation in the immigration application process shows that he desired to

obey the law. Dkt. #168 at 6. Defendant further argues that because the IOM-Belgrade

office had been processing applications of Bosnian refugees for over a decade, he had no

reason to believe he should make further inquiries. Id. 

The Government contends that Defendant’s admission that he knew his application

would be denied if he truthfully reported his military service shows that he was not desirous

of obeying the law. Dkt. #170 at 5. Without knowing all the facts Defendant may develop

through discovery, the Court cannot conclude that it would be unreasonable for a person in

Defendant’s position, upon hearing the statement that the war was not to be spoken of in the

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IOM building, to assume that it was acceptable to omit reference to military service. IOMBelgrade’s decade of experience might make his reliance more reasonable.

VI. Conclusion.

The Court does not conclude that Defendant is entitled to the defense of entrapment

by estoppel. The Court merely holds that the defense cannot be eliminated at this stage as

a matter of law. Defendant should be permitted to develop facts to support his defense.

Those facts may or may not ultimately warrant application of the defense, but that is a

decision that should be made only after the facts have been obtained and considered.

DATED this 2nd day of July, 2007.

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