Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-40737/USCOURTS-ca5-09-40737-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerely Lee Birdow
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-40737

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JERELY LEE BIRDOW, also known as Jerbly Lee Birdow,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:06-CR-282-1

Before GARWOOD, DENNIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Jerely Lee Birdow appeals from the 405-month sentence imposed following

his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Birdow argues that

the district court erred by (1) applying 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because his prior

conviction for assault on a public servant did not constitute a violent felony and

1

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 13, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

This was a single prior judgment which convicted Birdow for two separate assaults on

1

a public servant, each committed on a separate occasion from the other. Birdow also had

(among other prior convictions) a prior conviction for burglary of a habitation (a violentfelony).

 Case: 09-40737 Document: 00511170864 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/13/2010
No. 09-40737

(2) cross-referencing to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 because he did not possess the firearm

in connection with the commission of an aggravated sexual assault. The

Government counters that Birdow’s claims are barred by the waiver provision

contained in his plea agreement providing, inter alia, that Birdow waives his

right to appeal his sentence unless it exceeds the statutory maximum or results

from his having received ineffective assistance of counsel (he makes no claim of

the latter).

Birdow characterizes both of his arguments on appeal as one challenging

his sentence as one that exceeds the statutory maximum. E.g., Blue Brief at 6.

However, both of Birdow’s issues on appeal contest the district court’s

calculation of the sentencing guidelines. The Supreme Court has decided that

the guidelines are not mandatory. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738,

764–68 (2005). Because the guidelines are advisory, they do not create a

statutory maximum that Birdow can appeal.

In any event, we need not decide whether this appellate briefing bars

Birdow’s § 924(e) claim because it is meritless. See United States v. Story, 439

F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that waivers are not jurisdictional). We

review the legal conclusions underlying a district court's application of § 924(e)

de novo. See United States v. Fuller, 453 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2006). A

conviction for assault on a public servant pursuant to TEX. PEN. CODE § 22.01(b)

constitutes a crime of violence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). See United

States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 355-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2814

2

Birdow also argues in his brief that United States v. Fierro-Reyna, 466 F.3d 324 (5th

2

Cir. 2006), suggests that the rule in Anderson is not a per se rule holding that all convictions

under § 22.01 are crimes of violence. Unlike Fierro-Reyna, but like Anderson, the instant case

involves a § 22.01(b) conviction as a crime of violence pursuant to U.S. SENTENCING

GUIDELINES § 4B1.2(a). Fierro-Reyna involved a question of whether an assault was a crime

of violence under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2L1.2. Fierro-Reyna, 466 F.3d at 326. The

Anderson court specifically addressed the differences between guidelines section 4B1.2 and

2L1.2 in deciding that a § 22.01(b) conviction would be a crime of violence purusant to

guidelines section 4B1.2.

2

 Case: 09-40737 Document: 00511170864 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/13/2010
No. 09-40737

(2009); United States v. Mohr, 554 F.3d 604, 609 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 130

S. Ct. 56 (2009) (noting that this court has applied case law under the residual

clause of § 924(e) to analyze the definition of crime of violence under § 4B1.2,

and vice versa). Although Birdow argues that Anderson was wrongly decided,

3

we may not overrule it without en banc reconsideration or a superseding

contrary Supreme Court decision. See Martinez-Lopez v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 500,

502 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2006). Applying the Anderson definition, we hold that Birdow’s

conviction for assault on a public servant contrary to TEX. PEN. CODE §

22.01(b)(1) was a violent felony for purposes of section 924(e). Because Birdow’s

statutory maximum sentence was life in prison pursuant to § 924(e), his

argument regarding the cross-reference to §2A3.1 is barred by the plea

agreement waiver, as his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See

United States v. Cortez, 413 F.3d 502, 503 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.

Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1992). We AFFIRM.

AFFIRMED

As we also noted in Mohr, ‘[t]he definition of violent felony [in § 924(3)] is identical to 3

that of ‘crime of violence’ in the Guidelines context.” Id. at 609. 

3

 Case: 09-40737 Document: 00511170864 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/13/2010