Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05293/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05293-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sonya Marie Daniels
Petitioner
Gloria Henry
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

SONYA MARIE DANIELS,

Petitioner, 

 No C-03-5293 VRW

v

 ORDER

GLORIA HENRY, 

 Respondent.

_________________________________/

Petitioner Sonya Marie Daniels has filed a timely

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC section 2254. 

Respondent Gloria Henry opposes issuance of the writ. Petitioner

has exhausted available state remedies. It is therefore proper for

this court to exercise habeas jurisdiction over this matter. 

Having carefully considered the parties’ contentions and reviewed

the trial record and the dispositions of the state appellate

courts, the court DENIES the petition. 

\\

\\

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I

A

In 1998, petitioner Sonya Daniels and her husband Brian

Daniels were tried together before a superior court jury in Santa

Clara County on charges of homicide and felony child endangerment. 

The charges stemmed from the death of the couple’s oldest child,

Jory, and their alleged neglect of their second child, Anthony. 

After a forty-six-day jury trial, the trial court instructed the

jury on charges of first degree murder by torture, second degree

murder and involuntary manslaughter. After several days of

deliberations, the jury convicted both petitioner and her husband

of second degree murder and of felony child endangerment with a

great bodily injury enhancement in connection with Jory’s death and

of misdemeanor child endangerment in connection with Anthony. The

trial judge sentenced petitioner to fifteen years to life for the

second degree murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of seven

years for the felony child endangerment charge as to Jory. She

received a concurrent term for the misdemeanor child endangerment

charge as to Anthony. Clerk’s Transcript (CT), Resp Ex A (Doc #

9), 2346-47. 

Petitioner appealed her conviction. The court of appeal

affirmed and the California Supreme Court denied review. She next

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court, which denied the petition by means of a minute entry

on November 25, 2003. Resp Ex D (Doc # 9). 

Petitioner then brought a timely petition for writ of

habeas corpus in this court. In her amended petition (Doc # 3),

she asserts that she is entitled to habeas relief on the following

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six grounds: (1) the trial court erroneously excluded evidence

that her husband had battered her and evidence of the alleged

battering’s effects on her mental state, including expert testimony

regarding Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS), petitioner’s own

testimony, and evidence that her husband had been incarcerated for

several days in the period immediately prior to Jory’s death for

battering petitioner; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct while

cross-examining petitioner by pressing her for an explanation of

her conduct, knowing that she was barred by the trial court’s order

from testifying about Brian’s battering; (3) the trial court

prejudiced petitioner by “repeatedly denigrat[ing] [her] counsel’s

competence and integrity in front of the jury”; (4) the trial court

improperly admitted letters petitioner wrote to her husband from

jail after the two were incarcerated following Jory’s death; (5)

petitioner’s appellate counsel was ineffective; and (6) the trial

court improperly denied petitioner’s motion for a separate trial

from Brian. Am Pet (Doc # 3) at 12-26.

II

28 USC § 2254(e)(1) provides that “[i]n a proceeding

instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” Accordingly, pertinent factual findings

as set forth in the court of appeal’s opinion (Am Pet Ex E at 2-24;

2001 WL 1191114 (Cal App 6 Dist)) are repeated below. 

Sonya met Brian when she was 16 years old and became

pregnant with Jory at the age of 17. She dropped out

of high school, moved in with Brian’s family and

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married Brian. [FN1: Sonya’s father described her as

“very intelligent.”] Jory was born on August 23,

1988. Jory weighed 5 pounds and 7 ounces at birth and

was 18 inches long. His size equated to about the

25th percentile of newborns. He was a healthy baby,

and he had normal weight and height gains in his first

month of life. When Jory was one month old, Sonya and

Brian moved out of Brian’s family’s home and went to

live with Sonya’s aunt. Sonya took responsibility for

feeding Jory, bathing him and changing his diapers. 

Jory stopped gaining an appropriate amount of weight

after Sonya and Brian left Brian’s family's home. A

physician noted the weight loss and advised Sonya and

Brian to feed Jory formula whenever he was hungry

because Jory was not receiving enough calories. After

living with the aunt for less than a month, Sonya and

Brian moved on their own into an apartment.

On January 7, 1989 Sonya and Brian brought

four-and-a-half-month old Jory to the Washington

Hospital emergency room in Fremont. Jory had a very

serious skull fracture, a healing spiral tibial

fracture, swelling, bruising, an inguinal hernia and

an abrasion. Jory was very underweight for his age at

just 10 pounds and 13 ounces. He had dropped to the

10th percentile in size for his age. Jory’s skull was

swollen, bruised and fractured on both sides of his

head, and his ear was also bruised. There were two

bruises to the bone of his left arm. Jory had a

scrape on his knee and an abrasion on his back that

could only have been inflicted. The spiral tibial

fracture was at least a week old and would have been

painful. The skull fracture, on the other hand, was

less than a week old. The bruises on Jory’s head were

one to three days old. The swelling could have been

fresh or up to four days old. Spiral fractures are

usually caused by a twisting motion. An extreme

amount of force would be necessary to inflict the

spiral tibial fracture and the skull fracture on an

infant since infants have such bendable bones. 

Neither fracture could have been sustained by an

infant accidentally.

Sonya told the doctor that she had noticed bruising on

Jory’s face a month earlier. She was not concerned

about the bruises because she believed that babies

bruised easily. Sonya told the doctor she had noticed

the hernia a month earlier. Neither Sonya nor Brian

could provide any explanation for Jory’s injuries. 

Jory was hospitalized for four days as a result of his

injuries. While in the hospital, Jory “acted hungry”

and had a good appetite. There were no indications

that Jory suffered from any metabolic disorder. The

doctors who treated him concluded that he was a victim

of child abuse and battered child syndrome. After his

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hospitalization, Jory was declared a dependent of the

court, removed from the custody of Sonya and Brian and

placed in foster care. Sonya and Brian went back to

live with Brian’s family for a few months.

Jory thrived in foster care. The first foster mother

found Jory to be “very hungry.” Jory loved to eat and

was “quite a good eater.” He gained weight rapidly

and was up to 15 pounds and 11 ounces by March 7. 

This growth brought Jory back up to the 25th

percentile for his age. Initially, he did not move

around much and clearly had difficulty moving his

broken leg and his injured left arm. Jory also

suffered from significant developmental delays. Jory

quickly overcame some of his developmental delays in

the initial foster home. Sonya and Brian visited Jory

only once during the two months that he was in the

initial foster home.

Jory was moved to a second foster home in March 1989

where he remained until he was 31 months old. In

April 1989, Sonya and Brian went to live with Sonya’s

family. Initially, Jory was a very quiet child in the

second foster home. However, he made excellent

progress in this foster home and eventually became

active and grew “big” and “a little chunky.” By

August 11, 1989, Jory weighed nearly 21 pounds, and by

November 3, 1989, he was up to 22 pounds. He also

grew considerably in height and was “a healthy boy”

with no medical problems. Jory did not experience any

stomach or digestive problems or any other chronic

health problems while he was in foster care.

Sonya and Brian had a second son named Anthony in

1989. Sonya and Brian initially had supervised visits

and subsequently unsupervised visits with Jory while

he lived in the second foster home. During the

supervised visits, Brian would usually assume

responsibility for feeding, diapering and clothing

Jory. It appeared to the foster mother that Sonya

“wore the pants in the family.” Sometimes Sonya and

Brian brought Anthony along on their visits. Anthony

looked thin and dirty. Eventually, Brian and Sonya

were allowed to take Jory away for weekend visits.

Brian and Sonya were living with Sonya’s parents at

this time. Sonya’s parents lived in a house in a

“nice upper-middle class neighborhood” in Fremont. 

When Jory returned from these visits, he was usually

“very quiet” and ravenously hungry. Once, Jory was

returned with obvious bumps on his face which required

medical attention. Sonya disclaimed any awareness of

these bumps. Several times Jory was returned with

dirty diapers which had clearly been dirty for a long

time. On one occasion, the dirty diaper had caused

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Jory to have a very bad diaper rash which required

medical attention. After that incident, overnight

visits were suspended for a time.

The social worker thought that Brian and Sonya were

“extremely immature.” Brian was “particularly young

and naïve” and seemed less sophisticated than Sonya. 

Sonya told the foster mother that they went out to eat

a lot and that she really enjoyed eating. Sonya and

Brian both appeared to be well fed. Both Sonya and

Brian adamantly blamed “the aunt” for neglecting Jory.

By 1991, Jory was a healthy, chubby child. In May

1991, Sonya’s parents became Jory’s guardians, and

Jory came to live with Sonya, Brian, Anthony and

Sonya’s family in Sonya’s parents’ home. When Sonya’s

parents became Jory’s guardians, the dependency case

was apparently dismissed. Neither Jory nor Anthony

had any significant illnesses during their residence

with Sonya’s parents, and they both had good

appetites. Sonya’s parents paid for all living

expenses, but Sonya and Brian bought some food. 

Sonya’s parents were trying to help Sonya and Brian

save money. Sonya was responsible for cooking for the

children. Sonya and Brian often took the children

away from the home on the weekends. Sonya got upset

when she learned that her mother was “sneaking” food

to her children. 

Sonya and Brian had a third son, Nicholas, in 1992.

[FN2: Sonya testified that she and Brian did not use

any birth control.] Sonya showed “a lot of favoritism”

for Nicholas. Beginning in early 1992, some friends

of Brian and Sonya began spending a lot of time with

Brian, Sonya and the children. These friends observed

that Jory seemed hungry and looked malnourished. Jory

was extremely thin and had very thin arms and legs. 

Anthony did not seem as thin. These friends noticed

that Jory continued to look this way at least until

February 1993 when the friends last saw Jory. Jory

never seemed to gain weight or grow significantly

taller during this period of more than a year when

Jory was three and four years old. The friends never

saw Jory sick.

Brian and Sonya would sometimes punish Jory by

withholding food from him. Jory was generally quiet

and withdrawn when Sonya and Brian were present, and

he was always quiet and very obedient. However, he

“would move for some food.” Jory spoke little, and

when he did he usually sought food. On one occasion,

the friends fed Jory because he seemed to be very

hungry. When Brian learned of this, Jory was

punished. When Jory was spanked, he seemed very

fragile and tiny “like there was nothing there.” Jory

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frequently asked for something to drink when he was at

the friends’ home. Sonya would not permit Anthony or

Jory to drink any liquids between meals even when they

complained of thirst and asked for drinks. Both Jory

and Anthony frequently drank out of the toilet and

would be punished by Sonya and Brian for this

behavior. After drinking out of the toilet, Jory said

he was thirsty. Sonya and Brian told their friends

that they limited the children's fluid intake to avoid

the children urinating on themselves. Jory frequently

wet his pants and was not properly toilet-trained

during this period. The room in which the boys lived

at Sonya’s parents’ home smelled strongly of urine.

Sonya, Brian and the children remained at Sonya’s

parents’ home until the end of August 1993 or the

beginning of September 1993. In September 1993,

Sonya, Brian and the children left Sonya’s parents’

home and moved in with Brian’s mother and his two

brothers to live in their two-bedroom apartment. 

Sonya’s parents never saw Jory again. Brian’s mother

paid for most living expenses except for food.

Sonya was responsible for feeding the children when

they lived with Brian’s family. Sonya was very

particular about what the children ate. “[I]f [other

people] gave them food, [they] had to ask Sonya to

give it to them. See if it’s okay with her as far as

what they had. She had a diet she wanted them to be

on. As far as feeding them something without her

approval, you didn’t do it.” Even when the children

complained of hunger to others, Sonya would not allow

anyone to feed them. Brian’s mother saw Sonya feeding

the children. Often she fed them “frozen pot pies.” 

If the children did not finish the pot pies, Sonya

would reheat the pot pie at the next meal and at the

next meal after that until the children finished them. 

She would not provide the children with other food. 

When the children did not like the food she had

prepared, Sonya would become angry and tell them they

would “have to wait until the next meal.” There were

times when Jory “snuck food.” Sonya would then

reprimand him. When the family ate out at a

restaurant, Jory and Anthony would eat a large amount

of food. Sonya and Brian often ate fast food, but

they would not give any to the children. Jory and

Anthony always seemed to be hungry and thirsty. Jory

was again seen drinking out of the toilet. On one

occasion, Jory told Sonya he was thirsty, but she gave

him nothing to drink. He then went and drank out of

the toilet. Sonya called Jory “a pig” when he ate too

fast or too much. She also would take away food if

Anthony or Jory “ate too fast.”

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Jory was a very quiet child during this period. He

“didn’t really move around much,” and was fairly

inactive and “still.” Jory was a well-behaved child

who tried to avoid getting in trouble. Both Jory and

Anthony were quiet children who appeared to be

“nervous and afraid” that they might do something

wrong and get in trouble. By the time they came to

live with Brian’s family, both Jory and Anthony no

longer wore diapers. However, both of them frequently

wet their bed and their clothing, and Sonya and Brian

did not change their clothing or bedding sometimes for

as long as a day.

Brian’s family thought Jory looked “skinny” but

normal. Brian’s mother observed that both Jory and

Anthony were thin and were “good eater[s].” Brian’s

brother expressed the belief that Sonya “broke Jory’s

personality and partially broke Anthony’s

personality.” Brian’s brother suggested to Sonya and

Brian that they take the kids to the doctor, but they

declined. Neither Anthony nor Jory appeared to suffer

any illnesses during this period. Sonya regularly

visited the doctor for her own ills. Sonya and Brian

generally would not allow Brian’s mother or father to

babysit the children, but they did let Brian’s mother

watch the children once for a two-hour period. Sonya

and Brian always took the children with them when they

left the apartment. Brian’s mother never bathed

Anthony or Jory or even saw either of them undressed. 

When Brian’s father saw Jory, Jory was always fully

dressed in heavy oversized clothes. Although Brian

worked during this period of time, he seemed to have a

lot of time off. Sonya and Brian did not lack

financial resources. They had saved around $10,000

with which they hoped to put a down payment on a home.

In early February 1994, Sonya, Brian and the children

left Brian’s family’s apartment and moved to a motel

room. This move was necessary because Brian’s family

had been threatened with eviction due to the

overcrowding of their apartment. Brian’s mother saw

the children only once more before Jory’s death. On

that occasion, Jory looked sick. On the only

occasions on which Jory was seen after that, Jory was

bundled up in a fully zipped jacket and hood so that

one could see nothing of his body but his face and

hands. Jory always seemed to be cold. On March 16,

1994, Sonya was prescribed medication by a Kaiser

doctor for scabies for the entire family. Brian,

Sonya and the children remained at the motel until

March 20, 1994.

On March 20, 1994, Sonya, Brian and the children moved

to an apartment in Milpitas. The Milpitas apartment

had two bedrooms and two bathrooms. While they lived

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at this apartment, a neighbor observed that the

children were dirty and unkempt and that “the kids

seemed to be locked up” in the apartment. A police

officer visited the Milpitas apartment on March 31,

1994. The apartment was a mess with dirty dishes all

over the kitchen and boxes, clothes and papers all

over the floor. Nicholas was lying on the floor

watching television. The officer heard noise coming

from one of the bedrooms, and Sonya said that her two

other children were sleeping in there. When the

officer started to open the bedroom door, Sonya

stopped her. The next day, the officer returned and

knocked on the apartment door. Sonya opened the door

only a crack and spoke to the officer through the

crack.

A police officer arrived at the Milpitas apartment

just after 4:00 pm on April 6, 1994 in response to a

911 call. Sonya opened the door and motioned the

officer inside. She said nothing. Brian was sitting

on the couch rocking Jory in his arms and crying

hysterically. The police officer asked Sonya when she

had last seen Jory breathing. Sonya said she did not

know, but she had heard Jory making noises right

before she called 911. Jory was wrapped in a blanket

and looked dead. He was not breathing and had no

pulse. His body felt cold, and his arm was “very

rigid.” Jory was so thin that his bones were visible

through his skin. His body was the size of a

two-year-old's body. There were bruises along the

bridge of his nose and around his eyes. He had a rash

all over his body and “small pock marks” around his

waist and stomach area, but his body appeared to be

clean.

The police officer began CPR. After the first breath

the officer gave Jory, an off-white liquid came out of

Jory’s mouth and nose. Fire department personnel

arrived about two or three minutes later. They took

over the provision of CPR. The attempts of fire

personnel to put an airway into Jory were unsuccessful

because his neck was stiff with rigor mortis. Two or

three minutes after the fire personnel arrived,

paramedics arrived, determined that Jory was dead and

discontinued CPR. The paramedics noted that Jory’s

jaw was so stiff that his mouth could not be opened

enough to allow ventilation. Jory also had stiffness

in his extremities and his body was cold to the touch. 

Fully developed rigor mortis takes more than an hour

to reach this stage. When a paramedic informed Sonya

that Jory was dead, Sonya made no physical, audible or

emotional response.

The Milpitas apartment was very “cluttered,” “very

unkept” and had a strong stench of urine and stale

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food. Both bathrooms were “very messy,” dirty and

smelly. In one bathroom, there was urine on the

floor. No towels or toilet paper were found in this

bathroom. The master bedroom had no beds or other

furniture. Instead the floor of the room was covered

in piles of clothes about 5 to 6 inches deep. The

room smelled dirty. The children’s bedroom had a “kid

guard” to keep the children from entering the hallway. 

There was one small child-sized bed in this room with

no sheets or blankets on or near it. No other beds

were found in the apartment. There were no bottles or

liquids found in the children's bedroom, nor was there

any food in the room.

A partially used bottle of “Pedialyte,” an empty

bottle of fruit-flavored “Infalyte,” a container of

“Flintstones” vitamins and a medicine bottle

containing scabies medication were found on the

kitchen counter. The vitamin bottle was a little over

a quarter full. The scabies medication bottle was

two-thirds full. A box of cream of wheat was

somewhere in the kitchen. The kitchen cabinets

contained mustard, ketchup, some crackers, a couple of

boxes of cream of wheat cereal, a bag of rice, pasta,

cans of tomato paste and a can of fruit. This food

was located on high shelves out of reach of a child. 

There were dirty dishes in the sink and clean dishes

in the dishwasher. The freezer contained frozen meat,

frozen chicken, frozen tortillas and frozen buns. The

refrigerator contained only bottles of “Arizona Iced

Tea,” mayonnaise, pickles, margarine, some bread and a

container of water. No milk or juice was found in the

apartment.

Both Sonya and Brian gave statements to the police

after Jory’s death. Sonya told the police that Jory

had last eaten the previous evening at 7:00 pm when

she had fed him one or two spoonfuls of cream of

wheat. Jory had awakened on the morning of his death

at 6:00 am. She gave him a couple of sips of

Pedialyte, and he lay back down. Between 9:00 and

10:00 am, Sonya called Kaiser in Fremont about Jory,

and the advice nurse told her that it sounded like

Jory had a virus. According to Sonya, the advice

nurse told her to give Jory some Pedialyte. She

claimed that the advice nurse told her “that there was

[sic] not very many appointments available and it did

not appear to be an emergency situation.” She took

the children to her parents’ home to do some laundry. 

Sonya said she was only there for ten minutes, and

Jory remained in the car sleeping. At noon, she left

there and returned to the Milpitas apartment. Sonya

then put Jory to bed. Sonya told the police that she

had tried to get Jory to drink as much Pedialyte as

possible so as to build up his strength to eat food. 

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At 1:00 pm, she tried to give Jory some Pedialyte, but

he would not drink it. At 3:00 pm, she took Jory out

of his bed and put him on the couch. At that point,

Brian noticed foam coming out of Jory’s mouth and told

Sonya to call 911. Just before she called 911, she

heard Jory making noise. Sonya did not tell the

police at that time that she had been to Kaiser

Fremont that day. She told the police that Jory had

last been seen by a doctor a year earlier for a skin

problem. Sonya insisted that she had been feeding the

children three meals and two snacks each day.

Brian told the police that he had gotten up at 7:00 am

that day. Anthony and Nicholas were awake, but Jory

and Sonya were still sleeping. Brian played video

games for a while. They all then drove to the home of

Sonya’s parents to do their laundry. Next, at about

10:30 am, they went to Kaiser. Sonya went inside to

have a pregnancy test while Brian and the children

waited in the car. They went back to Sonya’s parents’

home, and Brian changed the oil in the car while the

children remained in the car. Anthony and Nicholas

were playing in the car while Jory was sitting

quietly. They were at the house for about an hour. 

Then they drove to Grand Auto to drop off the used oil

and buy an oil treatment for the car. This errand was

followed by a trip to Lucky’s to buy Pedialyte for

Jory. From Lucky’s, they drove back to their Milpitas

apartment. Jory appeared to be weak or asleep and was

unresponsive, so Sonya carried Jory into the

apartment. Sonya gave Jory half a bottle of Pedialyte

and some cream of wheat.

Brian said that he returned to Sonya’s parents’ home

to finish the laundry. He forgot the keys so he had

to return to the Milpitas apartment to retrieve them. 

When he got to the apartment, Jory was lying on the

floor wrapped up in a blanket. Brian went back to get

the laundry and then returned to the apartment. When

he was bringing the laundry in, Sonya came to the

doorway with a worried look on her face. Sonya told

him to move the car. After he returned from moving

the car, Sonya said “Jory.” Brian went over to where

Jory was lying on the floor and immediately told Sonya

to call 911. Jory had white foam coming from his

mouth and he was cold. Brian disclaimed any knowledge

that Jory was sick or had been complaining of

anything. Brian told the police that he had not

observed any symptoms that Jory was ill. Brian also

told the police that he had not been home from the

evening of March 31 to the evening of April 4. 

Finally, Brian told the police that Sonya usually “fed

the children separately because Jory would eat all the

food.”

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While the police were at the apartment on April 6,

Anthony repeatedly asked for “Pedialyte” at a rate of

several requests in a span of five minutes. Anthony

also said that he was “thirsty.” Anthony continued to

request Pedialyte until he was given something to

drink by one of the police officers. He rapidly

consumed a whole glass of liquid when he was given

one. Anthony’s younger brother Nicholas was wearing a

dirty diaper and soiled clothes which smelled strongly

of urine. Later, both boys made further expressions

of thirst and hunger. They voraciously consumed food

and drinks as soon as they were provided and sought

more. Although Anthony was not wearing a diaper, he

did not appear to be toilet-trained.

While Anthony was twice as old as Nicholas, the two

boys appeared to be about the same size with Nicholas

seeming a bit larger than Anthony. Four-year old

Anthony was undernourished and “markedly small for his

age.” Anthony was determined to be suffering from

malnutrition and protein deficiency and had scabies

all over his body. Two-year-old Nicholas was not

malnourished but was dirty and had scabies. Anthony's

malnutrition appeared to be of a duration of at least

a few months, but it could have been caused by a

complete lack of food for as little as two weeks. His

abdomen was distended, and his legs had suffered

muscle wasting. Anthony exhibited an unusual thirst

for water. He could not stand or walk on his own and

had significant developmental delays. Anthony had an

enlarged fatty liver which was a product of “chronic

malnutrition.” He was tested for parasites and

bacteria, and all tests were normal. Anthony was 34.5

inches tall and weighed 26 pounds. Because Anthony’s

height and weight were both very low for his age, it

was determined that his malnourishment had been

“severe and chronic” and “very long term.” Anthony

was suffering from the worst case of malnutrition in

an otherwise normal child that the physician who

treated him had seen outside of Africa.

Anthony’s x-rays showed multiple growth arrest lines. 

Growth arrest lines are caused when a child’s growth

stops and then starts again. These lines can be

caused by malnutrition or a serious illness which

lasts more than several days. If growth does not

resume, the termination of growth does not cause a

growth arrest line. Only “very extreme” malnutrition

would cause a growth arrest line. There was no

evidence that Anthony had suffered from any serious

illness which could have caused these lines. The

physician attributed these lines to “different periods

of malnutrition in his life.”

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Anthony was placed in foster care. He ate voraciously

and constantly sought water and food. Anthony quickly

began gaining weight and gained four pounds in two

months. His height also increased rapidly. His liver

returned to normal size. Once he had gained weight

and height, his hunger and thirst diminished to a

normal level and his growth leveled out. The

physician concluded from this that Anthony’s condition

was solely attributable to severe chronic starvation. 

She believed that Anthony had been a victim of child

abuse, and that it was dangerous to his life for him

not to have received medical attention prior to April

7, 1994.

An autopsy was performed on Jory at 9:30 a.m. on April

7. His body was 35.5 inches tall and weighed 19

pounds. This height and weight indicated that Jory

had not gained even an inch in height since 1991 and

had lost 12 pounds since then. Jory was five years

and eight months old at the time of his death, but his

body was the size of a two-and-a-half-year-old to

three-year-old child. [FN3: His first foster mother

saw his body and thought that he looked about the same

size at death as he had when he left her care at the

age of six and a half months.] Jory had multiple

growth arrest lines.

Jory’s body was extremely thin. His body had

experienced such an extensive loss of subcutaneous

tissue and wasting of muscle that there was no

subcutaneous fat under his skin and no muscle on his

limbs. Jory’s pelvic bones, shoulder blades and ribs

were very prominent and were protruding out from under

his skin through which they could be seen. He had no

cheeks, his eyes were sunken and his face had no fat. 

No fat or muscle was present in his buttocks. Jory’s

heart, lungs, liver and kidneys were significantly

undersized with some of them being just half the size

that would be expected for a five to six-year-old

child. However, none of these organs appeared to have

malfunctioned. His lungs were not infected. His

heart and other tissues showed signs of atrophy. His

liver was atrophied but was not fatty. Jory had lost

about 70 percent of his glycogen stores in his liver. 

Only a prolonged lack of food would cause such a

reduction in stored glycogen.

The condition of Jory’s body was consistent with a

type of starvation called Marasmus. There are two

kinds of starvation. One kind is called Marasmus and

is caused by “a low intake of all dietary components.”

A human can die of marasmic starvation even though the

body is consuming some food if there is an

insufficient supply of calories. [FN4: It is

recommended that a five year old child consume a

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minimum of about 1200 calories per day, and most

children eat more.] Marasmus causes the body to

become weak and emaciated and results in the wasting

or loss of subcutaneous tissue and muscle. The liver

will generally appear normal other than being smaller

in size. The body’s organs will be of reduced size. 

A human suffering from marasmus will become lethargic,

the body temperature will fall and eventually the

heart will fail. The other kind of starvation is

called Kwashiorkor and results when there is an

adequate intake of calories but inadequate intake of

protein. The distinguishing symptoms of Kwashiorkor

are generalized edema or swelling of the body’s

tissues, distension of the stomach and accumulation of

fat in the liver. [FN5: A marasmic body may have a

distended stomach.]

In addition to his wasted condition, Jory had a bruise

in the shape of a loop on his leg. This bruise was at

least four days old. Due to the shape of the bruise,

it did not appear that it could have been caused by

accident. He also had bruises between his eyes and on

the bridge of his nose and seven separate bruises on

his scalp. These bruises could have come from a blow

or a fall. The facial and scalp bruises were no more

than two days old. The scalp bruises could have been

caused by a single impact or multiple impacts. These

bruises were not consistent with having been

accidentally suffered. His stomach was not distended,

and it contained a small amount (150 grams) of

partially digested rice cereal. This cereal had been

in his stomach for at least two hours prior to his

death.

The coroner determined that Jory had died from

“cachexia and inanition due to longstanding

nutritional deprivation.” Cachexia and inanition both

mean wasting. By longstanding, the coroner meant

“many weeks or months.” The coroner found nothing in

the autopsy which was inconsistent with death by

starvation. Every finding was consistent with death

by starvation. There was no evidence of any

congenital abnormality or organic disease. Jory had

not suffered from meningitis. A microscopic

examination of Jory’s stomach found no abnormalities. 

There was no sign that Jory had suffered from any

chronic malabsorption syndrome, but the coroner did

not microscopically examine the intestinal tract so

“acute” and “chronic” malabsorption could not be ruled

out solely on the basis of the autopsy. However, the

other evidence ruled out any chronic malabsorption

syndrome. Most malabsorption syndromes would produce

a Kwashiorkor condition, rather than a Maramus

condition, because protein would be the primary item

that could not be absorbed while other constituents of

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food would be absorbed. Further, since Jory had grown

rapidly in foster care and then failed to grow for

several years in his parents’ custody but had suffered

no other symptoms of any malabsorption syndrome, a

chronic syndrome could not have been responsible. 

There was no evidence that Jory had a malabsorption

syndrome called Celiac disease which involves a

sensitivity to wheat products. He had never exhibited

symptoms of a sensitivity to wheat, and Celiac disease

is rare in black children.

After Jory’s death, Sonya told her father that Jory

had died of meningitis. Anthony, Nicholas and Sonya’s

and Brian’s fourth son (born after their arrest) were

adopted by Brian’s mother. None of the children have

had any further health problems. Neither Sonya nor

Brian were “underweight” at the time of Jory’s death.

Sonya and Brian were charged by information with

murder (Pen Code, § 187), torture (Pen Code, § 206)

and two counts of child endangerment (Pen Code, §

273a, subd (a)(1)). The named victim for each count

was Jory except for the second child endangerment

count which was alleged to have been committed against

Anthony. The information specially alleged that each

of them had personally inflicted great bodily injury

(Pen Code, §§ 667, 1192.7, 12022.7, subd (a)) in the

commission of each of the child endangerment counts.

It was further alleged that Brian had suffered a prior

serious felony conviction (Pen Code, § 667, subds (a),

(b)-(i)). Brian’s motion to suppress evidence of his

statements to the police was denied. The court ruled

that in limine rulings were binding at trial and that

counsel did not have to renew their objections.

The prosecution presented a large quantity of expert

medical testimony at trial. These experts described

the process of severe malnutrition. A malnourished

child will first stop gaining weight. His height will

continue to increase until the malnourishment has been

ongoing for “quite a bit of time.” Then the child's

growth in height will slow down. When the child's

body’s fat stores are depleted, the child will begin

to lose weight. Food and water seeking behavior such

as drinking toilet water may occur. The child will

become weak, cold and inactive. These experts

concluded that Jory was a victim of Marasmus. The

prosecution’s expert witnesses were convinced that

Jory had not been suffering from any metabolic

disorder due to his history of growth in foster care,

the absence of any evidence of a metabolic disorder at

that time and the absence of any report of symptoms of

any metabolic disorder thereafter. The prosecution's

experts opined that the length of time that Jory had

lived with no growth and the presence of multiple

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growth arrest lines indicated that he “had

intermittent bursts of perhaps better nutrition

combined with poor nutrition.” In their opinion, Jory

would have required hospitalization “weeks” before his

death and only possibly could have survived if he had

been hospitalized a week prior to his death.

The prosecution presented evidence that Sonya had not

called Kaiser on the day of Jory’s death. Every phone

call to Kaiser’s advice center is logged by an advice

nurse by patient name. The logs for April 6, 1994

contained no record of a call regarding Jory Daniels. 

If someone had called Kaiser seeking an appointment,

an appointment would have been provided. Appointments

were available on April 6, 1994. No appointment had

been made for Jory. An advice nurse would not have

recommended Pedialyte for a five-year-old. The

prosecution presented evidence that neither Jory nor

Anthony had ever been treated by any Kaiser facility.

Brian presented testimony by defense medical experts

that they could not be certain how Jory reached the

physical state which caused his death although they

agreed that he suffered from severe malnutrition at

the time of his death. Their primary concern was the

absence of any microscopic examination of Jory’s

intestines during the autopsy. The defense experts

conceded that withholding of food could have been the

cause of Jory’s death and that the evidence was

consistent with starvation by that means, but they

felt that they could not be certain.

One expert, who agreed that Jory had been

malnourished, felt that the coroner’s failure to

microscopically examine Jory’s intestines during the

autopsy left open the possibility of a malabsorption

problem. [FN6: This expert also disputed the

coroner’s testimony that the loss of glycogen stores

in Jory’s body was consistent with long-term

malnutrition. This expert testified that glycogen

stores could be reduced to zero after 12 hours of

fasting. This expert was also concerned that the

presence of a small amount of food in Jory’s stomach

seemed inconsistent with food being withheld.] He

thought that Jory could have suffered from Celiac

disease. This expert disputed the prosecution's

contention that Celiac disease was rare in blacks and

simply asserted that the prevalence of the disease in

blacks was unknown. Although he conceded that Celiac

disease is something one is born with, he opined that

it “can become symptomatic” later in life. He stated

that Celiac disease would have had to have affected

Jory for “more than a year” for him to reach the state

he was in at death. This expert also believed that

Jory could have suffered from a “chronic parasitic

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infection” such as giardia or cryptosporidium or an

“inflammatory” disease such as Crohn’s disease or

ulcerative colitis.

This defense expert felt that a parasitic infection or

inflammatory disease could have caused Jory to go into

a “downward spiral” that produced death in “several

weeks.” This expert conceded that there was no

evidence that Jory suffered from any of these

infections or diseases. Furthermore, he conceded that

Jory must have been malnourished, no matter the cause,

for more than a year prior to his death since his

height was stunted and he had lost so much weight. He

also admitted that Jory’s condition at death was

inconsistent with death by a viral or bacterial

infection. This expert expressed the opinion that, if

Jory had actually suffered from untreated celiac

disease or any of these other diseases, failing to

seek medical attention would have been dangerous to

Jory’s life.

Another of Brian’s expert witnesses was primarily

concerned about the adequacy of the autopsy, but she

conceded that “clearly, this child has been sick for

some period of time, or has had some problem, and I

think he should have seen a doctor.” A third defense

expert testified that Jory’s heart tissue did not show

specific indications of starvation.

After Brian had presented his defense, Sonya, who had

originally rested without presenting any evidence, was

allowed to reopen her case and present her own

testimony and brief testimony from her father.

Sonya testified that she had never noticed Jory’s 1989

broken leg or fractured skull. Sonya admitted that

she had never taken Jory to the doctor again after the

1989 incident even when he was ill and had never taken

Anthony to the doctor even though she had herself gone

to the doctor on numerous occasions. She claimed that,

the one time she wanted to take Jory to the doctor,

Brian and his family members opposed the idea and she

tried but failed to accomplish this task. Sonya

maintained that Jory had been sick but twice between

1991 and his death.

Sonya asserted that Brian had not worked for several

months after they moved in with Brian’s family in

September 1993. She claimed that they simply used

their savings to pay for food. They had saved at

least several thousand dollars which they were

intending to use to purchase a condo. In 1992 and

1993, Sonya filed lawsuits against a bank, a

department store, Kaiser and other businesses. [FN7: 

She defaulted on all of the lawsuits but one which she

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settled.] She did all of the work on these lawsuits

personally. Sonya testified that Brian’s family

members frequently watched the children while Brian

and Sonya were away from Brian’s family’s apartment. 

Sonya claimed that she and Nicholas, but not Jory,

Anthony or Brian, moved to the motel room in February

1994. She asserted that Brian, Jory and Anthony

remained at Brian’s family’s apartment. Nevertheless,

she admitted that she saw Jory while she lived in the

motel and, according to her, he did not look any

thinner. Sonya testified that she became pregnant

while she was living at the motel. Sonya conceded

that she and the children moved to the Milpitas

apartment on March 20, 1994. Sonya testified that

“the very best part” of her marriage to Brian was the

time they spent together after Jory’s death without

any children.

Sonya “blame[d] a lot of people” for Jory’s death.

Sonya claimed that she had always fed Jory on a

regular basis, and she admitted that she had been

solely responsible for feeding and bathing the

children while they lived with her parents and that

she had been responsible for feeding the children

while they lived with Brian’s family in 1993 and 1994.

When they were living in the Milpitas apartment, Sonya

claimed that she fed the children three meals a day

and two snacks. Sonya contended that Brian was

responsible for disciplining the children but that

neither she nor Brian had withheld food from the

children. She asserted that Jory ate regularly until

the last three days of his life. It was only during

those last three days when he became sick with what

she thought was the flu that she had to feed him. On

the other hand, at another point in her testimony, she

asserted that Jory “didn’t feel like eating” some of

the time between March 31 and April 4.

Sonya admitted that she was aware that Jory was

“thin,” but she did not think that Anthony was

“skinny.” Sonya testified that she “didn’t notice”

that Anthony was very thin. She also did not notice

that Jory lost weight at any point or that his bones

were sticking out. Sonya testified that she had

weighed Jory only once in the last three years of his

life, in September 1993, and he weighed 35 pounds at

that time. She disclaimed having seen either boy's

body, and she reluctantly admitted that she might have

seen the two boys dressing themselves sometimes, but

she could not recall any occasions. She claimed that

she never saw Jory without his clothes on after

September 1993. Sonya testified that Jory always got

up and dressed himself including on the morning of his

death. She also asserted that he and Anthony bathed

themselves or that Jory bathed Anthony. Sonya

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asserted that she did not know how Jory came to be in

the condition he was in at death, and she had not

noticed him looking so thin. Sonya actually denied

that Jory had looked as the photographs showed him

looking at the time of his death.

Sonya’s description of the last few days of Jory’s

life gave no clue to the cause of his death. Sonya

thought that Jory might have had diarrhea in the few

days before his death because she saw him going into

the bathroom repeatedly. She made no effort to assist

him, nor did she ask him about it. Sonya testified

that three days before Jory died she thought he had

the flu. She did not notice that he had lost weight,

and it was only on the day of his death that she

thought he “didn’t look well.” Sonya asserted that

Jory had eaten “a lot of hash browns” the day before

his death. On the day of his death, she fed Jory some

cream of wheat and some juice. Although she said that

Jory looked sick, she claimed that he had gotten up

and dressed himself that morning, but she had needed

to feed him because he was sick.

Sonya’s testimony about the events on the day of

Jory’s death basically tracked the statements she and

Brian had given to the police. They went to her

parents’ home and did the laundry. Since Jory “didn’t

look well,” she called Kaiser from her parents’ home. 

[FN8: Although Sonya testified that Jory had only

been sick for three days prior to his death, she also

claimed that she had called Kaiser about him on April

2, four days prior to the day of his death. She

subsequently claimed that she had meant “about three

days” and that Jory had gotten sick on April 2.] 

Sonya claimed that she asked the advice nurse for

information about what to do for the flu that she

thought Jory was suffering from. She testified that

she was told that he did not need an appointment but

should simply be given Pedialyte or Gatorade and

Jello. They went to Kaiser for her to get a pregnancy

test. She and Brian discussed whether she should take

Jory in to be seen, and they decided that Jory would

not be taken in.

One portion of her testimony did not track their

statements. Sonya asserted for the first time that

Brian drove very quickly away from Kaiser and Jory

“flipped over” onto his seat belt. When Sonya tried

to help Jory sit up, she found him unresponsive. At

this point, she finally “noticed something was wrong

with him” and that Jory did not just have the flu. 

Jory was unconscious but was breathing and had a

pulse. [FN9: Prior to her trial testimony, Sonya had

not told the police or the juvenile court about this

incident in the car.] Brian refused to stop the car

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and “kept smacking me” and trying to get her to resume

her seat.

The rest of her description basically tracked the

statements. They went to Lucky’s and thereafter to

Grand Auto. When they got back to the Milpitas

apartment, Sonya carried Jory into the apartment and

put him on the floor. She claimed that she did not

notice his bones sticking out when she carried him

into the apartment. Brian went back to get the

laundry. When Brian returned, he gave Jory a bath and

then dressed Jory in clothes of Nicholas. Jory

remained unconscious, but Sonya heard him “making

these noises.” Sonya admitted that she and Brian

talked for “a long time” which “seemed like hours”

about what to do as Jory lay on the floor in the

living room. Eventually, after she knew that Jory was

dead, she called 911.

On rebuttal, the prosecution presented further

testimony by their experts that Jory could not have

had Celiac disease, ulcerative colitis or an

inflammatory intestinal disease such as Crohn’s

disease because his history and the autopsy findings

were inconsistent with these illnesses. The

prosecution also presented reiterative testimony that

Celiac disease is “very rare” in African-American

children. An inflammatory disease could be ruled out

because it would have caused persistent illness or

persistent symptoms, and the evidence established that

Jory had not been persistently ill or suffered chronic

symptoms.

The prosecution proceeded solely on a theory of

implied malice as to the murder count. The prosecutor

argued that Sonya and Brian “just didn’t feed this

poor kid enough” and then failed to take Jory to a

doctor “when he needed it.” She asserted that it was

not possible that Sonya and Brian could have failed to

“notice” Jory’s life-threatening condition. Sonya’s

trial counsel argued that the evidence did not show

any “intentional misconduct” by Sonya and that Jory

might have died from an infection or a “malabsorption

disease.” He asked the jury to find Sonya guilty of

involuntary manslaughter for Jory’s death. Brian’s

trial counsel asserted that Brian had lacked any

culpable mental state and therefore should not be

found guilty of murder or involuntary manslaughter. 

He contended that Brian had not been aware of Jory’s

condition because he had been working a lot, was not

around when Jory was fed and reasonably inferred that

Sonya was feeding him. Brian’s “inattention or

mistake in judgment are not enough.” Brian’s trial

counsel conceded that Jory was malnourished, but he

argued that this could have come about as a result of

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a disease, infection, virus, bacteria or parasitic

infection rather than starvation. Brian’s trial

counsel asked the jury to simply convict Brian of

felony child endangerment as to Jory.

The great bodily injury enhancement accompanying the

child endangerment count as to Anthony was dismissed

by the prosecution before the case went to the jury. 

The jury was instructed on first degree murder by

torture, second degree murder and involuntary

manslaughter as to the homicide count.

The jury deliberated for several days. During its

deliberations, it requested, among other things, that

the testimony of Brian’s friend (to whom he had

admitted battering Jory in 1989) be reread. The jury

returned verdicts finding Sonya and Brian guilty of

second degree murder and of the felony child

endangerment count involving Jory. The great bodily

injury allegations accompanying this child

endangerment count were found true. The jury found

Sonya and Brian guilty of the lesser included offense

of misdemeanor child endangerment on the count

involving Anthony. The jury acquitted both Brian and

Sonya of torture. Brian waived his right to a jury

trial on the prior conviction allegation.

Motions seeking a new trial by both Sonya and Brian

were denied. The prosecution’s motion to strike the

prior conviction allegation as to Brian was granted. 

Sonya and Brian were each committed to state prison to

serve a term of 15 years to life. * * * They each

filed a timely notice of appeal.

Am Pet Mem Ex F at 2-24. 

B

Petitioner’s and Brian Daniels’s appeals were consolidated

and considered together by the Sixth District court of appeal. 

Petitioner retained private counsel, Brenda Malloy (State

Bar number 88626), to assist her on appeal. Ms Malloy filed a

twenty-seven-page brief in which she raised eight issues including,

as relevant here, that: (1) the trial court erred in excluding BWS

evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in denying petitioner’s

\\

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motion for a separate trial. No federal constitutional grounds were

set forth in support of the BWS evidence issue, Am Pet Mem Ex D(1)

at 8-20. The section of her appellate brief discussing the trial

court’s denial of her severance motion characterized the ruling as

“a federal constitutional violation.” Id at 28. After oral

argument, at which Ms Malloy failed to appear, petitioner,

represented by her current counsel, moved to strike the brief and to

substitute new counsel. The court of appeal granted the motion to

substitute new counsel but denied the motion to strike the brief. 

Am Pet Mem Ex E(2).

 The court of appeal issued a sixty-six-page unpublished

opinion affirming the convictions of both petitioner and Brian

Daniels. Am Pet Mem Ex F. The opinion specifically discussed

petitioner’s challenges on appeal to the following rulings by the

trial court: (1) the exclusion of BWS evidence (at 24-34); (2) the

denial of petitioner’s motion for a separate trial (at 34-36); and

(3) the exclusion of evidence that Brian tried to persuade

petitioner to have an abortion (at 37-38). It also considered

petitioner’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial

to support the verdict on two points: (1) the “implicit finding of

implied malice” (at 39-41); and (2) the cause of Jory’s death (at

41-42). The court of appeal mentioned three other issues cursorily

raised in petitioner’s brief (and omitted from her reply brief) that

it deemed not sufficiently well-articulated to warrant

consideration. Id at 42-44. None of these issues appears in

petitioner’s federal habeas petition. 

The court of appeal’s opinion contains numerous references

to deficient, confusing and/or inadequate briefing submitted by

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Malloy. For example, towards the beginning of its extensive

discussion of petitioner’s contention that “the trial court

prejudicially erred in precluding her from presenting at trial an

expert witness on [BWS],” the court commented as follows about the

briefing submitted on that issue:

Her opening brief contains 12 pages devoted to this

contention. The first three and a half pages of

this discussion contain no citation to the record or

to any authority. The next five and a half pages of

this discussion are an unattributed verbatim

reproduction of a brief submitted by Sonya’s trial

counsel to the trial court. These pages cite one

book, three statutes and, in the very last

paragraph, a single case authority. The final three

pages of this discussion contain extensive

quotations from the prosecutor’s argument to the

jury and the trial court’s ruling that BWS evidence

was not admissible. This discussion ends with the

following sentence “Please see also RT 3005 through

3008; RT 3885 through 3890; RT 3530 at lines 8-12;

and RT 1605 through 1621.” No explanation or

argument accompanies these record citations.

The Attorney General maintains that Sonya’s briefing

on this issue is so deficient that she has failed to

preserve it for review. While the briefing

submitted by Sonya’s retained appellate counsel on

this issue does not comport with the standards of

competent appellate counsel, we are loath to deprive

Sonya of appellate review of this issue and provoke

a habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel where her retained appellate

counsel has actually presented some discernable

arguments in support of her contention. We

therefore consider the merits of her appellate

contention.

Am Pet Mem Ex F at 24-25. 

The court of appeal then considered and rejected three

theories of relevance petitioner offered in support of her argument

for reversal based on the exclusion of BWS evidence: (1) it was

relevant to a “mental impairment” defense; (2) it offered “an

alternative explanation for facts which might otherwise lead to an

inference of intent to kill”; and (3) it could have rehabilitated

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petitioner’s credibility as a witness. The court held that Penal

Code sections 28 and 29, which limit the admissibility of evidence

of “mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder” for the

purpose of negating the relevant mental state for a crime, “clearly

bar[red] admission,” Am Pet F at 32, of BWS testimony for the

purpose sought —— to show that BWS “deprived [petitioner] of the

capacity to either form the intent to kill or to subjectively

appreciate Jory’s need for food or medical attention.” Id at 31-32. 

The court found no foundation in the trial evidence for petitioner’s

second theory –— that her acts and omissions or her contemporaneous

mental state were “related to misconceptions about battered women”

warranting clarification by means of BWS expert testimony. Id at

33. And the court found no basis for admitting BWS expert testimony

for the purpose of rehabilitating petitioner’s credibility, given

that she never testified that she failed to feed or seek medical

care for Jory because her husband was battering her; rather, she

insisted that she had always fed Jory regularly, had not noticed his

weight loss and had never thought he required medical attention. 

Id. The court commented, moreover, that petitioner’s testimony “as

a whole was riddled with both internal inconsistencies and

inconsistencies with other evidence and her own prior statements”

that could not have been rectified through the admission of BWS

expert testimony. Id. 

On the issue of the trial court’s denial of the motion for

severance, the court of appeal observed that petitioner’s primary

argument for severance was the potential for conflicts over the

admission of evidence that Brian Daniels battered her. The court

held that since the BWS evidence was properly excluded on relevance

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grounds anyway, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to sever the trials. Id at 36. 

With regard to the trial court’s exclusion of evidence

that Brian Daniels had allegedly tried to force petitioner to have

an abortion, the court of appeal wrote that petitioner’s briefing

raised the issue “in summary fashion” without argument or citation

to authority or to the record, and that the Attorney General was “at

a loss to understand the basis for Sonya’s claim.” Id at 38. The

court, while “reject[ing] her claim as not properly raised”

nonetheless disposed of it in a footnote, writing “[w]e can only

surmise that she is relying on her trial counsel’s assertion that

Brian’s alleged desire that she abort her pregnancy showed that he

wanted to ‘destroy a child’ which would somehow establish a pattern

of conduct which would incriminate Brian in Jory’s death. * * * * 

We cannot even imagine any merit that this contention could have.” 

Id at 38, n 16. 

On the sufficiency-of-evidence issues (implied malice and

cause of death), the court wrote that petitioner’s brief contained

no citations to the record and citations to case authorities that

bore no relevance to the issue at hand. The court nonetheless

addressed both in detail. Applying as the standard for affirmance 

“whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” id at 39, the

court held that “substantial evidence” supported the implied malice

elements of the prosecution’s case –— specifically, that petitioner

intentionally deprived Jory of food and/or medical attention; that

the consequences of these deprivations were dangerous to life; and

that petitioner knew that these deprivations endangered Jory’s life. 

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Id at 41. The court concluded that “[t]he jury could have

reasonably inferred from all of the evidence that [petitioner] was

in fact aware of Jory’s need for food and for medical attention but

nevertheless intentionally failed to provide food or take him to the

doctor knowing that she was endangering his life.” Id. 

Regarding the cause-of-death issue, the court of appeal

noted that “[t]his argument stands out in [Sonya’s] brief because it

actually includes citations to the record. She of course includes

no citations to any case or statutory authority.” Id at 42, n 19. 

The court held that the record contained a “more than adequate basis

for the jury to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Jory

died of starvation.” Id at 43. 

After her appeal was denied, petitioner unsuccessfully

sought rehearing (Resp Ex C (Doc # 9)(Ex B thereto)), then sought

review by the California Supreme Court. In her petition for review,

petitioner presented three issues: (1) ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel; (2) exclusion of BWS evidence at trial; and (3)

denial of the motion for separate trials. Resp Ex C. Her brief

included federal constitutional arguments regarding each of these

issues. Id. On January 16, 2002, the California Supreme Court

denied review by means of a one-sentence order. Resp Ex D.

Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Supreme Court. Resp Ex E. In her petition and

accompanying 132-page brief, petitioner presented, supported by

federal constitutional arguments, five of the six issues that she

has raised before this court on the instant petition. Id. She did

not raise the issue of separate trials. Id. On November 25, 2003,

the petition was denied without comment. Resp Ex F. 

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III

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA), 28 USC § 2254, the scope of this court’s habeas review

is limited to considering challenges to a state conviction or

sentence on the basis of a claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim

—— “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d). 

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge either

the fact or length of their confinement collaterally in federal

habeas proceedings are first required to exhaust state judicial

remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings,

by presenting the highest state court available with a fair

opportunity to rule on the merits of every claim they seek to raise

in federal court. See 28 USC § 2254(b), (c); Rose v Lundy, 455 US

509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v Serrano, 454 US 1, 3 (1981);

McNeeley v Arave, 842 F2d 230, 231 (9th Cir 1988). The state's

highest court must be given an opportunity to rule on the claims

even if review is discretionary. See O’Sullivan v Boerckel, 526 US

838, 845 (1999) (petitioner must invoke “one complete round of the

State’s established appellate review process.”).

To comply with the “fair presentation” requirement, a

claim must be raised at every level of appellate review; raising a

claim for the first time on discretionary review to the state’s

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highest court is insufficient. Casey v Moore, 386 F3d 896, 918 (9th

Cir 2004) (holding that where petitioner only raised federal

constitutional claim on appeal to the Washington State Supreme

Court, claim not fairly presented). Exhaustion does not require

repeated assertions if a federal claim is actually considered at

least once on the merits by the state’s highest court. See Castille

v Peoples, 489 US 346, 350 (1989); Greene v Lambert, 288 F3d 1081,

1086-87 (9th Cir 2002); Turner v Compoy, 827 F2d 526, 528 (9th Cir

1987). For purposes of exhaustion, federal courts presume that an

ambiguous or summary denial was a decision on the merits, because

the higher court is presumed to have ruled on the same grounds as

the lower court. Ylst v Nunnemaker, 501 US 797, 803 (1991).

State courts must be alerted that prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution in order to be given the

opportunity to correct alleged violations of federal rights. Duncan

v Henry, 513 US 364, 365-66 (1995). To raise a federal claim in a

state-court proceeding, it is not sufficient to raise only the facts

supporting the claim; rather, “the constitutional claim * * *

inherent in those facts” must be brought to the attention of the

state court. Picard v Connor, 404 US at 277. See also Dye v

Hofbauer, 126 S Ct 5, 7 (2005) (federal due process claim based on

prosecutorial misconduct was fairly presented where the text of the

brief cited the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and federal

prosecutorial misconduct cases). 

Applying the rules regarding exhaustion to the claims

presented in the instant petition, it appears that all claims have

been exhausted; the court may therefore proceed to adjudicate all

claims in the petition. 

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A

Petitioner’s challenge to her conviction largely turns on

the viability of one, over-arching issue: petitioner’s contention

that the trial court should have allowed the jury to hear testimony

that Brian battered her and testimony about the effect of the

alleged battering on her mental state as it related to her care of

Jory. Petitioner contends that the trial court’s refusal to admit

BWS evidence in connection with her defense violated her

constitutional rights. 

Respondent contends, as a preliminary matter, that the

state appellate court’s affirmance of the trial court’s decision to

exclude BWS evidence rests on an adequate and independent state

ground and that therefore this federal court lacks jurisdiction to

consider petitioner’s BWS-evidence claim. See, e g, Vang v Nevada,

329 F3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir 2003). This is the only claim that

respondent argues is procedurally barred. Specifically, respondent

argues that the court of appeal’s holding that petitioner’s trial

counsel had failed to meet his burden under California Evidence Code

section 354 to lay an adequate foundation for the introduction of

the evidence is an adequate and independent state ground barring

federal habeas review, even though the court of appeal also

adjudicated the merits of petitioner’s BWS evidence claim. Resp Mem

at 20. Respondent correctly points out, moreover, that petitioner’s

brief on appeal set forth no federal constitutional argument in

support of the BWS-evidence issue; rather, arguments based on

federal law first appeared in the petition for review to the

California Supreme Court and were repeated in the habeas petition

presented to that court. 

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A federal court will not review questions of federal law

decided by a state court if: (1) the state court’s decision was

also based on a state law ground and (2) the state law ground was

both independent and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v

Thompson, 501 US 722, 729 (1991). “The independent and adequate

state ground doctrine prohibits the federal courts from addressing

the habeas corpus claims of state prisoners when a state law default

prevented the state court from reaching the merits of the claims.” 

Thomas v Lewis, 945 F2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir 1991).

California Evidence Code section 354, which respondent

contends operates as a procedural bar to review of the BWS evidence

claim, provides: 

A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor

shall the judgment or decision based thereon be

reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of

evidence unless the court which passes upon the

effect of the error or errors is of the opinion

that the error or errors complained of resulted in

a miscarriage of justice and it appears of record

that:

(a) The substance, purpose, and relevance of the

excluded evidence was made known to the court by

the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any

other means;

(b) The rulings of the court made compliance with

subdivision (a) futile; or

(c) The evidence was sought by questions asked

during cross-examination or recross-examination.

Cal Evid Code § 354. Respondent contends that petitioner’s trial

counsel “failed to comply with his burden * * * to make an adequate

showing of the purpose of the evidence.” Resp Memo at 20. 

To be “adequate,” the state procedural bar cited must be

“clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of

the petitioner’s purported default.” Calderon v United States

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District Court (Bean), 96 F3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir 1996). The state

bears the burden of proving the adequacy of a state procedural bar. 

Bennett v Mueller, 322 F3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir 2003). 

Once the state has adequately pled the existence

of an independent and adequate state procedural

ground as an affirmative defense, the burden to

place that defense in issue shifts to the

petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy this

burden by asserting specific factual allegations

that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state

procedure, including citation to authority

demonstrating inconsistent application of the

rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate

burden is the state’s.

Id. 

“Procedural default requires the by-pass of a procedural

requirement, and not merely the by-pass of a procedural

opportunity.” English v United States, 42 F3d 473, 477 (9th Cir

1994) (it was not procedural default for § 2255 petitioner to fail

to raise claims for first time in petition for certiorari or motion

to recall mandate, either of which would have been improper). It is

only the actual violation of a state procedural rule, and not, for

example, mere failure to raise a claim in circumstances where no

rule requires raising it, that triggers the procedural default

doctrine. Id.

Evidence Code section 354 employs two prongs: the

“miscarriage of justice” prong and the “substance * * * made known

to the court” prong. The state’s procedural bar argument rests on a

footnote in the court of appeal’s opinion observing: “it is worthy

of note that Sonya’s trial counsel never presented a coherent

relevant basis for admission of the BWS evidence he sought so

stridently to present,” citing Evidence Code section 354. Am Pet

\\

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Mem Ex F at 30, n 11. The purported bar therefore rests on the

second prong of Evidence Code section 354’s two-part test. 

This is not a case in which trial counsel failed to set

forth his arguments on behalf of admitting the excluded evidence.

See, e g, People v Pride, 3 Cal 4th 195, 234-35 (1992)(citing

Evidence Code § 354, California Supreme Court upheld exclusion of

tape-recorded conversations where counsel had offered them for

defendant’s “state of mind” at trial, then urged a different ground

on appeal —— that the tapes should have been admitted to rebut

inference that defendant lied to police). Rather, as is detailed in

the Court of Appeal’s opinion (Am Pet Mem Ex F at 25-30),

petitioner’s trial counsel repeatedly advocated for the

admissibility of the BWS evidence on much the same grounds as those

presented to this court. The trial court ruled that the proffered

BWS evidence was not relevant to any issue in the case —— not once,

but repeatedly. Id at 26-30. 

Here, therefore, the purported bar effectively merges with

the merits of the BWS-evidence issue. The evidence was excluded,

not because trial counsel failed to present an argument for its

admission, but because the evidence was in fact irrelevant, as both

the trial court and the court of appeal held. Because petitioner’s

trial counsel repeatedly presented as arguments for admitting the

BWS evidence the same arguments made in petitioner’s collateral

proceedings, this court is not convinced that the purported

procedural bar is “adequate” —— that is, “clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner’s

purported default.” Calderon, 96 F3d at 1129. The court,

therefore, proceeds to the merits of the BWS evidence claim. 

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Petitioner has not challenged the instructions given to

the jury. According to those instructions, the prosecution was

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt on an implied malice

theory for second-degree murder that: (1) Jory’s death was the

result of a deliberate act committed by petitioner, (2) petitioner

was aware of the high probability that her actions would result in

Jory’s death and (3) petitioner performed the act with knowledge of

the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, Jory’s life. 

Recorder’ Transcript (RT), Resp Ex B (Doc # 9) 4956:19-24, 25-26 -

4957:3-17. As expressed by the court of appeal, the elements of the

prosecution’s case on this charge were:

(1) Sonya intentionally deprived Jory of food

and/or medical attention, (2) the lack of food

and/or medical attention for a young child had

consequences which were dangerous to life; and

(3) Sonya knew that the lack of food and/or

medical attention endangered Jory’s life. 

Am Pet Ex F at 41. 

For felony child abuse, the prosecution was required to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) petitioner, with specific

intent to inflict substantial injury on Jory, purposefully (or with

reckless disregard of the consequences) inflicted unjustifiable

physical pain or mental suffering or otherwise permitted Jory to be

placed in a situation where his person or health was endangered and

(2) petitioner acted under circumstances likely to produce great

bodily harm or death to Jory. RT 4960-63. 

For misdemeanor child abuse, the prosecution was required

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner purposefully (or

with reckless disregard of the consequences) permitted her younger

son Anthony to become injured or to endure unjustifiable physical

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pain or mental suffering or that petitioner otherwise permitted

Anthony to be placed in a situation where his person or health was

endangered. RT 4963-64.

In support of her BWS-evidence claim, petitioner submits a

declaration by Dr Renata Vasselle-Augenstein, a psychotherapist and

self-described expert in family violence who counseled petitioner in

prison. Dr Vasselle-Augenstein’s declaration recites the history of

petitioner’s behavior and her relationship with Brian Daniels and

states in pertinent part:

Sonya eventually suffered from severe generalized

anxiety which paralyzed her in relation to what

[sic] her ability to relate and care for the

children and impaired her daily functioning. She

was unable to notice physical and/or emotional

changes in her children and to realistically

assess what their needs were. Her ability to

think like an adult and make rational decisions

was systematically eroded by Brian’s overt and

controlling and abusive behavior and the lack of

any support system in her life. 

Am Pet Mem Ex A at 6-7)

* * * 

The culmination of her traumatic childhood

experiences, the several and growing abuse at the

hands of her husband as well as the overwhelming

isolation left her believing she had no options

other than to tolerate the intolerable. This

resulted in unintentional fail [sic] to protect

her children. In her mind, unable to assess what

her children needed, nor being able to see her

children’s dis-ease [sic], she believed she

protected them so no harm could come to them

through Brian. Without any truly caring adult’s

intervention, she was left to her own devices in

her own internal and external prison.

 Id at 8.

I am aware that when she cross-examined Sonya,

the District Attorney asked her many questions

which appear to support an inference that Sonya

was fully capable during this period of time. I

believe that the jury could not adequately assess

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her behavior without knowing of her psychological

state of Battered Women’s Syndrome and [PostTraumatic Stress Disorder].

 Id . 

Dr Vasselle-Augenstein’s declaration goes on to state that

she could have offered testimony to explain certain of petitioner’s

actions and behaviors that were remarked on by the prosecution at

trial: (1) her reluctance to let police into the house when she

reported Brian’s abuse of her on March 31; (2) her inconsistent

statements to the police; (3) her flat affect when police came to

the apartment after Jory’s death; (4) her assertive behavior toward

Brian in public situations (no specifics are provided); (5) her

declining counseling even though it was a condition of

reunification; (6) her filing lawsuits against businesses; (7) her

failure to call police or seek medical care for Jory even when Brian

was away at work or incarcerated; (8) her “flirtatious” letters to

Brian when they were both in jail after Jory’s death; and (9) her

failure to realize that Jory was seriously ill. Id at 9-11. 

Petitioner also submits her own declaration dated March

31, 2003, reciting details of Brian’s alleged abuse of her and of

Jory that she would presumably have testified to at trial if

allowed. Am Pet Mem Ex B. 

The most-cited description of BWS in California case law

appears in People v Aris, 215 Cal App 3d 1178, 1194-95 (1989), in

which the court of appeal summarized the testimony of Dr Lenore

Walker, “a clinical and forensic psychologist who is a nationally

recognized authority on battered women and is largely responsible

for the development of BWS.” Id at 1194. According to Aris, BWS

includes increased sensitivity to danger from the batterer;

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involvement in an abusive relationship that follows a three-stage

cyclical pattern of “tension-building,” “acute explosion” and

“loving contrition” together with “learned helplessness” leading to

“a kind of psychological paralysis.” Id.

The legislature first enacted California Evidence Code

section 1107 in 1991 to authorize the use of BWS evidence and has

frequently amended it in the years since. At the time of the

Daniels’s 1998 trial, it provided in pertinent part:

(a) In a criminal action, expert testimony is

admissible by either the prosecution or the defense

regarding battered women’s syndrome, including the

physical, emotional or mental effects upon the

beliefs, perceptions or behavior of victims of

domestic violence, except when offered against a

criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the

act or acts of abuse which form the basis of the

criminal charge.

(b) The foundation shall be sufficient for admission

of this expert testimony if the proponent of the

evidence establishes its relevancy and the proper

qualifications of the expert witness. Expert

opinion testimony on battered women’s syndrome shall

not be considered a new scientific technique whose

reliability is unproven.

Cal Evid Code § 1107. 

Of note, Evidence Code section 1107(d) provides: “This

section is intended as a rule of evidence only and no substantive

change affecting the Penal Code is intended.” It must therefore be

read together with earlier-enacted Penal Code sections 28 and 29. 

The former provides:

(a) Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or

mental disorder shall not be admitted to show or

negate the capacity to form any mental state,

including, but not limited to, purpose, intent,

knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice

aforethought, with which the accused committed

the act [and] is admissible solely on the issue

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of whether or not the accused actually formed a

required specific intent, premeditated,

deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought,

when a specific intent crime is charged.

(b) As a matter of public policy there shall be

no defense of diminished capacity, diminished

responsibility, or irresistible impulse in a

criminal action or juvenile adjudication hearing.

* * * 

(d) Nothing in this section shall limit a court's

discretion, pursuant to the Evidence Code, to

exclude psychiatric or psychological evidence on

whether the accused had a mental disease, mental

defect, or mental disorder at the time of the

alleged offense.

Cal Pen Code § 28.

Penal Code section 29 limits the use of psychiatric or

mental-illness expert testimony in the guilt phase of a criminal

trial: 

[A]ny expert testifying about a defendant’s

mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect

shall not testify as to whether the defendant had

or did not have the required mental states, which

include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent,

knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes

charged. The question as to whether the

defendant had or did not have the required mental

states shall be decided by the trier of fact. 

Cal Pen Code § 29. 

California courts have deemed BWS evidence admissible in

criminal trials for a number of different purposes, but never as

evidence of diminished capacity in connection with the abused

party’s crime against a third party. See, e g, People v Humphrey,

13 Cal 4th 1073, 56 Cal Rptr 2d 142 (1996) (BWS expert testimony

admissible in murder prosecution not only on question of whether

defendant actually believed that it was necessary to kill in

self-defense, but also on question of reasonableness of that

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belief); People v Gadlin, 78 Cal App 4th 587, 92 Cal Rptr 2d 890

(2000)(BWS evidence admissible to explain recantation of evidence of

defendant’s violent acts by prosecution witness); People v Williams,

78 Cal App 4th 1118, 93 Cal Rptr 2d 356 (2000)(BWS evidence

admissible to explain changed testimony by victim of assault after

single, severe incident of physical abuse). 

Petitioner, however, wishes to avail herself of BWS

evidence in support of her defense to crimes against a third party. 

Accordingly, petitioner has argued in every criminal proceeding

pertaining to Jory’s death, including her petition before this

court, that the trial court should have admitted evidence of Brian’s

abuse of her for the purpose of negating the mental state element of

the crimes with which she was charged. See, e g, Am Pet (Doc #3) at

9:26-10:7. In other words, while Evidence Code section 1107 does

not specifically limit its applicability to crimes committed within

the abuser-abused relationship, precedent for admitting BWS evidence

in criminal prosecutions for crimes against third parties is

lacking. The general use that petitioner proposes for the BWS

evidence is therefore not established under California law. 

Moreover, the trial court determined that petitioner’s

proposed BWS evidence was not relevant to any issue in the case; 

this determination was affirmed at all levels of review in the

California courts. 

A careful review of the lengthy trial transcript reveals

that the trial judge consistently ruled: (1) that evidence that

Brian Daniels abused Jory was admissible; and (2) that petitioner

would be allowed to introduce evidence that she failed to care for

Jory properly (by, for example, feeding him, taking him to school,

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taking him to the doctor) because her husband threatened to harm her

or Jory if she did so. Examples from the trial transcript follow. 

Petitioner never, throughout the entire trial, offered evidence of

the latter type. There appears in fact to be no evidence in the

record that Brian Daniels, despite his obvious shortcomings as a

father, insisted or even expressed the wish that Jory was to be

starved. Rather, petitioner sought over and over to introduce

evidence that her husband battered her, but without tying it in any

way to her failures in caring for Jory.

Before jury selection in the case began, the trial court

discussed the BWS evidence issue at length with petitioner’s

counsel, pointing out that the introduction of such evidence

typically occurred “in a context far different from what we have

here,” that is, in cases in which the defendant is charged with

homicide against the batterer. RT 792. He ruled, moreover, that

the defense’s proposed use of Dr Vasselle-Augenstein’s testimony ——

to establish that “this syndrome is a motivating factor, a causative

factor in either the action or lack of action on the part of Mrs

Daniels,” RT 794 —— was “totally inadmissible” because it was

offered for the “ultimate issue: state of mind.” Id. 

The following portion of one of the many colloquies

between the defense and the court about the inadmissibility of

evidence of Brian’s battering of petitioner, which occurred during

the prosecution’s cross-examination of petitioner, sets forth in

detail the trial judge’s stance on the issue:

I ruled that evidence of the battered spouse

syndrome is not relevant * * * as it bears upon a

state of mind which isn’t relevant in this case

where she is alleged to have committed a murder

against a third person and a child endangerment

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against a third person. The alleged batterer is

not involved as a victim. It really is a state of

mind issue that you have, basically, in California. 

That’s diminished capacity. It’s not relevant as

to why she did what she did with respect to the

third-person victims. 

But if, in fact, she did not do something that she

was required to do in the protection and caregiving

and safety of her children, or child Anthony, and

Jory, as to the murder count, if she did something

because she was threatened either to do something

or not do something, I always have said, and I’ve

been consistent, that she can testify that she

didn’t do something if she was threatened. But if

she didn’t do something because she had a state of

mind, or her state of mind was such that she didn’t

feel capable of doing it, I’ve ruled that that’s

not admissible.

But if somebody threatened her and said, for

instance, for purposes of this discussion, “if you

bring Jory to the doctor, I’m going to beat you

up,” she can say that. And I’ve never, by anything

I’ve ever said from the time this issue arose, said

anything to the contrary.

RT 3678:1-28.

Somewhat later on during the prosecution’s crossexamination of petitioner, the prosecutor displayed a photograph of

Jory’s emaciated corpse and asked petitioner how it was that she had

not noticed his “ribs sticking out.” Petitioner responded “I can’t

tell you. I want to, but I can’t.” RT 3884. The court declared a

recess. After the jury had been excused, the judge turned to

petitioner and engaged her in a lengthy colloquy with the purpose of

determining the nature of the testimony that she had stated she

could not give. In this exchange, the judge reiterated his view

that the excluded evidence of battering was inadmissible under

California Penal Code section 28: 

THE WITNESS: I thought [the prosecutor] was

asking me how come I couldn’t tell

how bad he was.

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THE COURT: Exactly.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. And that’s why I couldn’t

tell how bad. 

THE COURT: Why?

THE WITNESS: Because of the way I was. I was a

mess. I mean, do you want me to

name all of the – 

THE COURT: So you claim, again, that because

you were abused by Brian,

emotionally or physically, that you

could not see that your child was

in danger?

THE WITNESS: I’m just saying that I didn’t know

it was that bad. I didn’t. And I

should have.

THE COURT: See, that’s exactly * * * the issue

I addressed. That’s exactly the

area I held was totally

inadmissible. That’s the exact

replication, so to speak, of the

diminished capacity defense, which

California doesn’t acknowledge by

statute in case law [sic]. That’s

exactly what we ruled on so many

occasions was not admissible. The

shifting of responsibility because

somebody claims they haven’t got

the capacity to commit a crime

against a third person in this case

because their spouse abused them. 

That’s exactly what I ruled on so

many occasions she couldn’t say.

RT 3887:11-3888:8.

Petitioner’s amended petition states: “the prosecution’s

theory was that [Jory] died of starvation because he was

intentionally deprived of food and/or medical care.” Am Pet (Doc

#3) at 12:21. The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that

Jory died from the effects of starvation combined with his parents’

failure to obtain medical treatment for him. Critical evidence in

the prosecution’s case consisted of: (1) photographs of a severely

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emaciated five-year, eight-month old Jory, who weighed nineteen

pounds at the date of his death (e g RT 2311-15; 2319-22, 2467,

2692); (2) testimony by the coroner who performed the autopsy

stating that Jory died of starvation (RT 1140-81; 1188-1237; 1246-

1323); (3) expert medical testimony describing the process of severe

malnutrition and failure to thrive/grow, consistent with the

coroner’s examination of Jory; and testimony of various witnesses

establishing that petitioner was the adult with primary

responsibility for caring for the children during most of the

relevant period and especially the weeks before Jory’s death.

Petitioner’s defense, meanwhile, was primarily based on

challenging the prosecution’s theory that Jory had died of

starvation, apparently based on the premises that: (1) during the

relevant time period, petitioner did not notice anything wrong with

Jory and that he ate normally; (2) Jory might have died from disease

rather than starvation; and (3) petitioner failed to seek medical

attention for Jory because she was never aware he needed it or her

husband discouraged her from seeking it. The evidence on which

petitioner relied consisted of: (1) expert witnesses who testified

that the evidence used to establish death by starvation could be

attributed to certain organic diseases and infections (e g,

testimony of radiologist James S Vaudagna, RT 3103-36); and (2)

petitioner’s own testimony, in which she admitted that she was

responsible for caring for the children during the children during

the relevant time period (RT 3710). On cross-examination,

petitioner testified that neither she nor Brian had ever done

anything to prevent the children from having food, RT 3766, had fed

them regularly (RT 3637, 3710) and had told a police officer on the

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day Jory died that she had been feeding the children three meals and

two snacks and day (RT 3814). She also that she had never noticed

that anything was wrong with Jory until the last three days of his

life, when she thought he had the flu. RT 3898-3900, 3903, 3910.

Given the defense’s approach, it is difficult even to

follow its logic in seeking to introduce the BWS evidence. Numerous

colloquies on the record in the case make clear that the defense

sought to introduce BWS evidence in order to explain petitioner’s

failure to care for Jory —— to feed him, to obtain basic preventive

medical care and treatment for him, to enroll him in school and so

on. This is starkly inconsistent with the theory that petitioner

did in fact care for him adequately and undermines the credibility

of much of her testimony. Had the court admitted the BWS testimony,

the jury would have been placed in the awkward position of choosing

between two drastically different and conflicting versions of

reality offered by the defense. This fundamental problem is ignored

in petitioner’s papers and, for that matter, in a recent scholarly

article arguing that admission of BWS in the Daniels case would have

given the jury a more accurate view of petitioner’s mental state and

thus resulted in more fair adjudication of the charges against her. 

See Garcia, Kathy Luttrell, Battered Women and Battered Children:

Admissibility of Evidence of Battering and Its Effects to Determine

the Mens Rea of a Battered Woman Facing Criminal Charges for Failing

to Protect a Child from Abuse, 24 J Juv L 101, passim (2003-04). 

Petitioner’s primary defense fatally undermined the secondary one

she complains of being prevented from presenting. This means that

even if the BWS-evidence issue, viewed in isolation, had merit

(which it does not), the defense’s attempt to cast doubt on the idea

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that Jory died of starvation, together with petitioner’s attendant

credibility problems, effectively nullified any impact the purported

error could have had on the fairness of the trial. 

Respondent also argues that petitioner’s constitutional

argument is further weakened by the fact that the expert witness

testimony on BWS proffered by the defense did not comport with

reliability or validity requirements a state can impose on expert

testimony under the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert

v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579, 593-94 (1993). Resp

Mem at 24-26. This point has considerable merit. Respondent

argues: “The fact that BWS evidence is admissible under state law,

Cal Evid Code § 1107, does not mean that the Constitution requires

it to be admitted in every case, or that the state must assume that

any testimony Dr Augenstein might choose to give in the guise of BWS

evidence, is admissible.” Id at 25:5-7. For example, appropriate

screening criteria for expert witness testimony include whether the

scientific basis for the conclusion is testable and has been

adequately tested, the error rates associated with the technique or

science, whether research has been published in a peer reviewed

publication and whether the testimony grows out of research that has

been conducted outside the litigation context. Daubert, 509 US at

593-94. 

Although the California legislature, through Evidence Code

section 1007, has specifically authorized the use of expert

testimony on BWS for some purposes, other principles applicable to

the introduction of expert witness testimony continue to apply. For

example, the Vasselle-Augenstein declaration states she first

treated petitioner three and one-half years after Jory’s death (Am

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Pet Ex Mem A at 1), long after the critical events. Respondent

correctly cites the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Vincent v Heckler,

739 F2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir 1994) for the proposition that “afterthe-fact phychiatric diagnoses are notoriously unreliable.” 

Furthermore, the Vasselle-Augenstein declaration makes no mention of

empirical research supporting her theories about petitioner’s mental

state but rather relies heavily on the writings of Dr Lenore Walker. 

Am Pet Mem Ex 1 at 2-3. These writings have been sharply criticized

for their lack of scientific rigor. See, e g, David L Faigman and

Amy L Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome In the Age of Science, 39

Ariz L Rev 67, 68 (1997): 

[Lenore Walker’s second book] contains little

more than a patchwork of pseudo-scientific

methods employed to confirm a hypothesis that its

author and participating researchers never

seriously doubted. Indeed, the 1984 book would

provide an excellent case study for now not to

conduct empirical research. 

Faigman and Wright further opined that some courts have been overly

hasty about admitting BWS expert testimony given the shaky

scientific basis for the “syndrome.” Id. On the opposite side of

the coin, therefore, courts may nonetheless exclude specific expert

testimony concerning BWS in a particular case based on the lack of

scientific rigor establishing appropriate reliability or validity

requirements. Daubert, 509 US at 593-94. 

In presenting her federal habeas law arguments, petitioner

relies heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Greene v Lambert,

288 F3d 1081 (9th Cir 2002), which affirmed an order by a federal

district court in Washington State granting the writ. In Greene,

the defense had sought to proceed on an insanity-defense theory, yet

the trial court had refused to allow him to proceed on this theory

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or to present a defense of diminished capacity which, of note, was

specifically allowed under state law. The Washington Supreme Court

had, moreover, determined in the case record that “dissociative

identity disorder” (DID) (formerly referred to as “multiple

personality disorder”), with which the defendant claimed to be

afflicted, was “a generally accepted diagnosis in the relevant

scientific community, which can form the basis for a defense in a

criminal case.” Id at 1092. The trial court had further granted

the state’s motion to preclude any mention of DID on the ground that

there was “no discernable standard to justify a diagnosis.” Id at

1084-85. These rulings apparently resulted in “abridged” testimony

by the psychiatric nurse who had been the defendant’s therapist both

during a previous period of incarceration and after his release;

this nurse had both diagnosed and treated the defendant and had

later become the victim of the sexual assault that resulted in the

conviction that was the subject of the habeas proceedings. Id at

1090. Given the lack of a reasoned decision by the state court on

the federal claim, the Ninth Circuit found no basis for “AEDPA

deference” and therefore conducted an independent review of the

entire record in the Greene case. 

In holding that the exclusion of both percipient and

expert witness testimony about DID “disproportionately infringed

upon weighty interests” of the accused under United States Supreme

Court precedents in Washington v Texas, 388 US 14 (1967) and Rock v

Arkansas, 483 US 44 (1987), the Ninth Circuit emphasized that its

holding in the case was narrow, requiring only that the defendant

and his victim be allowed to testify about his state of mind at the

time of the attack. 288 F3d at 1093. The court specifically stated

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that it did not hold, as relevant here: that “a defendant or a

victim must be allowed to present any defense, no matter how bizarre

or far fetched”; that the result would be the same if only expert

testimony were at issue; that expert testimony about DID must be

admitted as a matter of federal constitutional law; or that a state

could be precluded from requiring any appropriate foundation for

expert testimony in that or any other case. Id. 

The instant matter bears little similarity to the Greene

case. Petitioner did not present an insanity defense, but rather

presented a primary defense of contending that she fed her son

regularly and he did not starve to death. The federal grounds for

petitioner’s challenge to the exclusion of BWS evidence were

properly exhausted and addressed by means of a reasoned opinion of

the state court by means of the Ylst doctrine. The expert whose

testimony was excluded was not a percipient witness, but a therapist

who first met petitioner years after the events at issue in the

trial. And, most importantly, Washington State law expressly

provides for a defense of diminished capacity, whereas California

has expressly abolished this defense. Greene is therefore

inapposite. 

Much of petitioner’s argument on the BWS issue avoids the

central point that the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence, as

affirmed by the court of appeal, was correct under Penal Code

section 28 and 29; indeed, petitioner has never argued convincingly

otherwise. To attack the exclusion of this evidence on federal

constitutional grounds, therefore, petitioner must persuade the

court that Penal Code section 28’s abolition of the defense of

diminished capacity and the concomitant rules excluding evidence of

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mental-state evidence in Penal Code sections 28 and 29 violate due

process. Although petitioner has not made this argument directly,

the court will nonetheless address it for the sake of completeness,

given the importance of this issue in the context of the entire

petition. 

Relevant to the constitutionality of prohibiting expert

testimony regarding mental state to refute the presence of mens rea

is the Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Menendez v Terhune, 422 F3d

1012 (9th Cir 2005). Although it does not directly address the

potential constitutional issues arising from Penal Code sections 28

and 29, Menendez addresses closely related issues and is

instructive. Affirming the district court’s denial of a habeas

petition, the Ninth Circuit examined, as relevant here, the trial

court’s decision to exclude lay and expert witness testimony

proffered for the purpose of showing that the defendant and his codefendant brother “feared their parents.” Id at 1030. As in

Greene, the court reviewed the claim de novo because the state court

had not reached the merits of the federal issue. Id at 1026. As in

the instant matter, however, the brothers had never seriously placed

their sanity or capacity in issue as part of their defense. If they

had done so, the court noted, they would have been entitled to

certain constitutionally-mandated protections under Ake v Oklahoma,

470 US 68 (1985). Id at 1026-27. 

Instead, the Menendez defendants proceeded on an

“imperfect self-defense” theory which required them to establish

that “[t]hough a reasonable person need not view the peril as

imminent, the defendant must make some showing that he actually

believed the peril to be imminent.” Id at 1028. When defendants

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sought to introduce evidence that included, inter alia, expert

witness testimony by a Dr John Conte that one of the brothers

suffered from “Battered Person’s Syndrome,” the trial court excluded

the evidence on grounds of relevance. The trial court’s reasoning,

quoted at length in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, is set forth in

abbreviated form here: 

The issue * * * is the state of mind of the

defendants at the time of the killing as to

whether there was an actual belief of imminent

danger of death or great bodily injury and a

need to act.

* * *

It’s really irrelevant, and it would be

totally irrelevant to any trial, that the

defendants had been abused or that they fit a

particular diagnosis of being abused. That’s

totally irrelevant, unless it corroborates

their testimony as to their mental state at

the time of the crime. If it doesn’t do that,

then the fact that they happen to be abused or

happen to fit a particular diagnosis is

irrelevant.

Id at 1031. Applying a non-deferential rule of decision, the Ninth

Circuit found that the state court’s decision was proper and

affirmed the district court. This reasoning appears entirely

consistent with the trial court’s rulings on the BWS evidence in the

instant matter. 

In its recent term, the United States Supreme Court

offered significant guidance to courts considering constitutional

challenges to state statutes limiting the introduction of mental

state evidence. In Clark v Arizona, ___ US ___, 126 S Ct 2709

(2006), the court considered the constitutionality of a state law

limiting the presentation of mental capacity evidence on the issue

of mens rea. Noting the traditional recognition of states’ capacity

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to define crimes and defenses, the court observed that a state law

governing criminal responsibility would be deemed “fundamental” for

purposes of constitutional due process analysis only if it “offends

[a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience

of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” citing Patterson v

New York, 432 US 197 (1977). 126 S Ct at 2719. 

The court examined and upheld Arizona’s rule, articulated

in State v Mott, 187 Ariz 536 (en banc) (1997)(a case that,

coincidentally, concerned the culpability of a battered woman for

her child’s death at the hands of her batterer), allowing the

introduction of “observation evidence” —— i e, evidence relevant to

what in fact was in the defendant’s mind when he committed the

offense —— but prohibiting the introduction of “mental-disease

evidence” in the form of opinion testimony by mental health

professionals serving as experts in the proceeding and “capacity

evidence,” typically expert testimony regarding the details of a

specific mental condition. 126 S Ct at 2724-25.

The court further held that while a state statute

authorizing an insanity defense may place the burden of persuasion

on the defendants without running afoul of the Constitution, the

state “must be able to deny a defendant the opportunity to displace

the presumption of sanity more easily when addressing a different

issue in the course of the criminal trial.” Allowing the

introduction of expert testimony “for whatever a factfinder might

think it was worth on the issue of mens rea” would be such an

opportunity. 126 S Ct at 2732. The constitutionality of

California’s “presumption of sanity” and attendant burden-shifting

on the issue of competency was specifically adjudicated in the

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state’s favor in Medina v California, 505 US 437 (1992), reh’g

denied, 505 US 1244.

The court in Clark v Arizona held that a state “that

wishes to avoid a second avenue for exploring capacity, less

stringent for a defendant, has a good reason for confining the

consideration of evidence of mental disease and incapacity to the

insanity defense.” Id at 2733. Of particular relevance here, the

court observed that the term “diminished capacity” has traditionally

been associated with California law, citing California Penal Code

sections 28 and 29. Id at 2733 n 41. 

In upholding states’ right to limit evidence of mental

capacity to a defendant’s attempt to prove an insanity defense, the

court also considered the many uncertainties inherent in the use of

mental-disease evidence, including “the controversial character of

some categories of mental disease,” “the potential of mental disease

evidence to mislead,” and “the danger of according greater certainty

to capacity evidence that experts claim for it.” Id at 2734.

In summary, Clark v Arizona leaves no doubt as to the

constitutionality of California Penal Code sections 28 and 29 in

cases like petitioner’s. Given that the trial court’s rulings on

the BWS evidence in this case were consistent with Penal Code

sections 28 and 29 and that those sections are constitutional under

the principles enunciated in Clark v Arizona, there is no basis for

federal habeas relief in relation to trial court’s exclusion of BWS

evidence. 

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B

Petitioner next asserts that the prosecutor committed

misconduct while cross-examining her by pressing for an explanation

of her conduct knowing that she was barred from testifying about

Brian right’s physical abuse of her. 

Prosecutorial misconduct warrants federal habeas relief

when it amounts to a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it

infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v Wainwright, 477 US

168, 181 (1986). A defendant’s due process rights are violated only

when a prosecutor’s misconduct renders a trial “fundamentally

unfair.” Id at 183. Under Darden, the first issue is whether the

prosecutor’s conduct was improper; if so, the court considers

whether such conduct infected the trial with unfairness. Tan v

Runnels, 413 F3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir 2005). In Comer v Schriro, 463

F3d 934, 961 (9th Cir 2006), for example, the Ninth Circuit held

that while it was improper for the prosecutor to call petitioner a

“monster,” “filth” and a “reincarnation of the devil,” there was no

due process violation because the prosecutor did not misstate or

manipulate the evidence, the jury instructions provided by the court

were adequate and there was strong evidence of petitioner’s guilt.

The standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the

error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict, rather than whether it was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637-38

(1993).

According to her brief, petitioner was on the stand for

three-and-one-half days. Am Pet Mem (Doc # 4) at 45. The entire

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transcript of petitioner’s testimony begins on page 3540 and runs to

page 4218. The prosecutor’s cross-examination runs from page 3622

to page 3953. The court has carefully reviewed the entire

transcript of the cross-examination. 

It is neither possible nor necessary to address each

instance of alleged misconduct raised in petitioner’s brief

individually. It is noteworthy, however, that Brian Daniels’

attorney moved for a mistrial because of the way petitioner was

answering the prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination. e g RT

3894-95. The trial court instructed petitioner repeatedly not to

respond “I can’t answer that” or “there were things going on in the

home.” e g RT 3884-85. The manner in which the court handled

disagreements about petitioner’s answers during cross-examination by

the prosecutor was addressed in part III.A, supra. In addition, the

trial court directed the prosecutor to stop asking petitioner “why”

questions, explaining his reasoning as follows:

I understand the issue. And it’s somewhat of a

dilemma, because I can understand if she is

asked a question why didn’t you do something,

and if in her mind she didn’t do it because of

this situation that she found herself in with

the co-defendant, and that somehow affected her

judgment, so to speak, that she might tend to

want to respond in that fashion if the question

is asked, well, why didn’t you do that.

I’m just simply saying that that state of mind

that she wants to express is not admissible and

relevant in California as I understand it,

because it simply goes to diminished capacity;

but it might be responsive to the question. And

that’s the problem.

RT 3679-80. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and

continued to enforce its ruling despite repeated instances of noncompliance. See, e g, RT 3885-88, 3893-94 (colloquy between

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petitioner and court also discussed supra in Part III.A). The

prosecutor complied with the order. The trial court’s handling of

the issue was consistent with California law and the state appellate

courts’ decisions upholding the trial court did not unreasonably

apply federal law in upholding those rulings.

Petitioner’s contentions regarding prosecutorial

misconduct suffer from the same infirmities as her arguments in

favor of admitting BWS evidence generally. Petitioner’s incoherent

defense theory is more to blame for the problems petitioner

experienced under cross-examination than the prosecutor’s questions. 

The transcript makes clear that the prosecutor was making every

effort to carry out her responsibility to prove her 

case without running afoul of the court’s orders; there is no

misconduct under the standards applicable on habeas review. 

C 

Petitioner next asserts judicial misconduct. She contends

that the trial court prejudiced her by “repeatedly denigrat[ing]

[her] counsel’s competence and integrity in front of the jury,” thus

depriving her of a fair trial. In her lengthy briefing of this

issue (Am Pet Mem at 63-79), petitioner cites little federal law and

does not discuss AEDPA. Rather, most of her legal analysis rests on

state law principles, with which a federal court cannot concern

itself on habeas review. 

The pre-AEDPA case of Duckett v Godinez, 67 F3d 734 (9th

Cir 1995), remains the Ninth Circuit’s leading case on this type of

alleged judicial misconduct and is cited by both petitioner and

respondent. In Duckett, the court held that federal habeas review

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of a claim of judicial misconduct by a state judge does not simply

require that the federal court determine whether the state judge

committed judicial misconduct; rather, the question is whether the

state judge’s behavior “rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair

as to violate federal due process under the United States

Constitution.” Id at 740. The court considered the judge’s

actions, which included demonstrating “clear frustration and

hostility” toward a witness, “in the context of the trial as a whole

* * * not * * * ‘of sufficient gravity to warrant the conclusion

that fundamental fairness has been denied.’” Id. 

As respondent correctly points out, the first instance of

alleged judicial misconduct of which petitioner complains did not

occur until after the trial had been under way for six weeks, well

into the defense’s presentation of its case. The court has reviewed

all of the portions of the transcript petitioner has cited in

support of this claim. 

It is apparent from the first cited colloquy, at pages

3548-54, that while the trial judge was annoyed with petitioner’s

trial counsel, much of that annoyance was due to counsel’s

persistence in attempting to introduce evidence that the court had

already ruled inadmissible —— in this case, evidence that Brian

Daniels abused petitioner. In that instance, counsel had asked

petitioner in the presence of the jury whether Brian Daniels had

asked her to have an abortion when she was pregnant with Anthony, to

which petitioner readily answered “yes.” Id at 3548. In response

to a relevance objection from Daniels’s attorney, counsel stated

“It’s not irrelevant. It’s relevant on destruction of a baby. 

That’s exactly what this case is about.” Id at 3549. During the

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ensuing side-bar, the judge forcefully admonished counsel that he

considered the comment “highly prejudicial” and that the planned

series of questions was relevant only to spousal abuse (not child

abuse as counsel had urged) and was therefore inadmissible based on

the court’s earlier rulings:

Mr Leininger, it’s not relevant. It’s not

admissible. It’s evidence of alleged spousal

abuse. We have ruled on that. We have had

hearings on that. We have had points and

authorities submitted. We have had legal

arguments. We have had writs filed in the

appellate court on that issue. And this is

nothing other than evidence that Mr Daniels

committed spousal abuse.

Id at 3553:7-14. 

An examination of the ten-odd instances petitioner points

to in her brief reveals, at worst, one occasion on which the judge

characterized counsel’s words as “petty comments,” (RT 3882:26-

3883:2) and another on which he accused counsel of “childish

tactics,” RT 3898:9-13. At another point, the judge took

appropriate and effective steps to correct a potential misstep or

misunderstanding arising from his comments following a defense

objection during the prosecutor’s rebuttal: having commented within

the jury’s hearing that “I think from a professional point of view,

that ethically a prosecutor would not prosecute a case unless he or

she felt that, in fact, the defendants committed the offense,” (RT

4869:16-20) the judge returned to the subject while instructing the

jury, giving a clarification that ran to thirty-three lines of

transcript; the following is a representative excerpt:

I made the comment that a prosecutor would

not charge a case unless he or she thought

they could prove it. It’s common sense,

unless you have a corrupt prosecutor. That

does not mean that your job is to rubberCase 3:03-cv-05293-VRW Document 17 Filed 02/05/07 Page 56 of 66
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stamp his or her value judgment because they

charged an offense. Because under the law,

* * * the defendant is presumed to be not

guilty.

RT 4983:14-21. The last third of the 5042-page trial transcript

contains hundreds of consecutive pages in which petitioner has

identified no instances of judicial hostility or even irritation

towards petitioner, her counsel or towards any defense witness. 

Applying the Duckett standard to the instant case,

petitioner has not established more than scattered instances of

irritation or impatience on the part of the trial judge, far short

of the kind and amount of judicial behavior that would “render[] the

trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process

under the United States Constitution.” Duckett, 67 F3d at 740. 

Applying AEDPA’s even more stringent standard, this court would have

to find that the California Supreme Court’s denial of petitioner’s

habeas petition, in which this issue was first raised and framed as

a federal constitutional violation, was “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 USC §

2254(d). This record does not support such a finding. 

D 

Petitioner next contends that the trial court’s ruling

allowing the prosecution to admit on cross-examination petitioner’s

letters to Brian Daniels from prison while awaiting trial, when

combined with the exclusion of the BWS evidence, “tipped the balance

even further against Sonya and prevented a fair and just

determination of her real degree of culpability.” Am Pet Mem (Doc

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#4) at 85. Specifically, the prosecutor read into the record

excerpts from a “stack of letters” petitioner had written to her

husband. Many of the letters are flirtatious in tone and most talk

about petitioner’s interest in obtaining various foods. RT 3690-

3702. With her traverse, petitioner offers as a separate, related

ground that this issue was not put before the court of appeal on

direct appeal due to her counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. 

Traverse Mem (Doc # 16) at 30-31.

After the prosecutor sought permission to cross-examine

petitioner about the letters, petitioner’s trial counsel argued that

they should be excluded as irrelevant “jail talk” because people who

are in prison often talk about food. RT 3683-84. The trial court

overruled the objection with the following comment:

Ordinarily, I would find it wouldn’t be

[relevant], because what happens in jail is

ordinarily not something for the trier of fact. 

It’s not relevant on any issue whether somebody is

in custody or is not in custody, et cetera. But

in view of the context of the charges in this

case, torture by starvation, in view of the fact

of the medical situation, size and weight of Jory

at his death, I think food is an issue. And so

I’ll allow it to come in because I think it is

relevant.

Id. The prosecutor then read or paraphrased more than thirty

passages of varying lengths from petitioner’s letters, of which the

following is illustrative: 

I just finished ordering my commissary. I bought

eatables [sic] cheese and crackers, cup of

noodles, trail mix, sugar and lemonade. They

have no chocolate. I lust for chocolate. I

desire and want it in the worst way. It’s such

torture too. [Etc.]

RT 3699:5-10. Petitioner argues that “in the context of a case of

starvation, such comments and apparent obsession with food would not

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be perceived by the jury as anything but extremely callous, perverse

and inflammatory.” Traverse Mem at 31. 

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas

review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the

error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v

Kernan, 197 F3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir 1999). Where, as here, the

evidence of petitioner’s guilt is overwhelming, it is even less

likely that admission of a particular piece of evidence will render

the trial fundamentally unfair. Dillard v Roe, 244 F3d 758, 766-67

(9th Cir 2001) (admission of prosecution’s expert testimony did not

render trial fundamentally unfair where evidence against petitioner

was overwhelming).

Of note, both defendants in the instant matter were

acquitted of the torture charge, to which the trial court found the

prison letters relevant. Petitioner’s contention before this court,

therefore, must be that the prison letters not only made the jury

more inclined to convict petitioner of second degree murder, but

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair into the bargain. 

Petitioner has not met this burden. The letters do not appear

squarely relevant to the charges, given that they were written after

petitioner was in prison for Jory’s death, but the trial court’s

decision to admit them, even if erroneous, could not warrant federal

habeas relief given the overwhelming evidence supporting the

conviction and the relatively inconsequential nature of the prison

letters in the context of the totality of the evidence presented. 

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E

As noted in Part II supra, the court of appeal made many

references to the deficient briefing and incompetent representation

provided by petitioner’s appellate counsel, Brenda Malloy. 

Petitioner now contends that the court of appeal’s refusal to strike

the brief prepared by Ms Malloy and to allow present counsel to file

a different one violated her constitutional right to effective

assistance of counsel on appeal. 

Respondent does not contend that Ms Malloy was effective,

but rather that when petitioner raised the ineffective assistance of

counsel (“IAC”) claim before the California Supreme Court and in her

state habeas corpus proceedings, she failed either to link Ms

Malloy’s ineffective assistance to a failure to raise any

potentially significant issue not raised or otherwise to explain how

Ms Malloy’s representation prejudiced her on appeal. Resp Mem (Doc

# 8) at 56-57. Respondent asserts, moreover, that petitioner’s IAC

claim before this court suffers from similar defects and that “[s]he

cannot raise a claim of prejudice for the first time in her

traverse.” Id at 57. 

Petitioner asserts in her traverse that she did, in fact,

argue prejudice in connection with her IAC claim in the state

courts, to wit: “the wrong entity constructed issues without acting

solely as her advocate, rejected its own issues, and * * *

determin[ed] * * * what a lawyer it believed a incompetent was

trying to say.” Traverse Mem at 32. Moreover, petitioner asserts,

the court of appeal “refused to follow the proper procedures

established in California when ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel is established.” Id. Specifically, petitioner asserts that

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the action of the court of appeal ran afoul of precedents

established in Smith v Robbins, 528 US 259, Penson v Ohio, 488 US

75 (1988) and Evitts v Lucey, 469 US 387 (1985). 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

guarantees a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel

on his first appeal as of right. See Evitts v Lucey, 469 US 387,

391-405 (1985). Although the right to the effective assistance of

counsel at trial is guaranteed to state criminal defendants by the

Sixth Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment, it does not address a defendant’s rights on appeal; the

right to effective state appellate counsel is derived purely from

the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee. Id at 392. Claims

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed

according to the standard set out in Strickland v Washington, 466 US

668 (1984). Miller v Keeney, 882 F2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir 1989);

United States v Birtle, 792 F2d 846, 847 (9th Cir 1986). Under

these authorities, petitioner’s burden is to show that (1)

“counsel’s advice fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness” and (2) that there is a “reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, [she] would have

prevailed on appeal.” Miller, 882 F2d at 1434 & n 9 (citing

Strickland, 466 US at 688, 694; Birtle, 792 F2d at 849).

In this case, Ms Malloy’s ineffectiveness as an attorney

in other clients’ matters has already been adjudicated by the State

Bar Court. According the State Bar’s website, on December 12, 2002,

Ms Malloy was suspended for two years for failure “to perform legal

services competently, release a client file, respond to client

inquiries, update her membership address or cooperate with the bar’s

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investigation, and she improperly withdrew from employment.” 

http://members.calbar.ca.gov/search/member_detail.aspx?x=88626. 

(Web page consulted December 11, 2006). The detail of the charges

against Ms Malloy includes failing to file an appeal after agreeing

to do so and failing to turn over a client’s file in order for him

to pursue an appeal. Id. Ms Malloy resigned in September 2003 with

charges pending. Id. 

Ms Malloy’s ineffectiveness in representing petitioner on

appeal is strongly suggested by the court of appeal’s scathing

critique of her briefing and by her unexplained failure to appear at

oral argument. Respondent does not contend that Ms Malloy’s

representation of petitioner met an objective standard of

reasonableness. Petitioner has therefore satisfied the first prong

of the Strickland/Miller analysis. 

Petitioner’s IAC claim, however, founders on the second

prong of the test, which requires her to establish that, but for Ms

Malloy’s unprofessional errors, she would have prevailed on appeal. 

In Miller, the court focused on counsel’s decision not to raise

certain issues on appeal and determined that the failure to do so

did not establish an IAC claim if the omitted issue gave the

defendant “only a remote chance of obtaining reversal * * *.” 882

F2d 1428, 1435. In petitioner’s case, respondent correctly points

out that petitioner has failed to identify any potentially

worthwhile issue that Ms Malloy did not include in her brief. 

Rather, her IAC claim rests on the quality of the briefing Ms Malloy

submitted and the fact that the court of appeal, rather than

petitioner’s chosen advocate, discerned and articulated some of

petitioner’s issues on appeal from poorly-written briefs. 

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 In the view of this court it is unfortunate, given the

serious and unusual nature of the charges and the obvious problems

with petitioner’s appellate representation (most dramatically

illustrated by her failure to appear at oral argument), that the

court of appeal did not grant petitioner’s motion to submit briefs

prepared by her new counsel. Nonetheless, it is not this court’s

function in connection with a habeas petition to second-guess or redo decisions made by state courts. Rather, its role under AEDPA is

to determine whether state courts are applying federal law

unreasonably; the record in this matter does not support a finding

that the court of appeal applied federal law unreasonably. 

F

Petitioner lastly contends that the trial court’s refusal

to grant her a trial separate from Brian Daniels amounted to a

constitutional deprivation of due process. 

California law favors joint trials of co-defendants

jointly charged with the same offense. Penal Code section 1098

provides: “When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any

public offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried

jointly, unless the court order separate trials.” The California

Supreme Court has held that Penal Code section 1098 means “a trial

court must order a joint trial as the ‘rule’ and may order separate

trials only as the ‘exception.’” People v Alvarez, 14 Cal 4th 155,

190 (1996). As the court of appeal observed, the “classic situation

for joint trial” is a case in which the co-defendants are charged

with “common crimes against common victims.” Am Pet Mem Ex F at 35,

citing People v Turner, 37 Cal 3d 302, 312 (1984). As in the

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federal system, the decision to grant or deny a motion for severance

in California is “committed to the sound discretion of the trial

court.” People v Cummings, 4 Cal 4th 1233, 1286 (1993). 

On habeas review of a state conviction under 28 USC §

2254, however, a federal court does not become involved in issues of

state law governing severance. Grisby v Blodgett, 130 F3d 365, 370

(9th Cir 1997). Its inquiry is limited to the petitioner’s right to

a fair trial under the United States Constitution. A petitioner’s

burden is to demonstrate that the state court’s joinder or denial of

his severance motion resulted in prejudice great enough to render

his trial “fundamentally unfair.” Id. This means that “the

impermissible joinder must have had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Sandoval v

Calderon, 241 F3d 765, 772 (9th Cir 2000). 

In this case, it was Brian Daniels, not petitioner, who

first moved for a separate trial. Petitioner first opposed the

motion, then later joined it. Brian Daniels first moved on grounds

that potential admission of extrajudicial statements by petitioner

would violate his due process rights under “Aranda/Bruton,” People v

Aranda, 63 Cal 2d 518 (1965) and Bruton v United States, 391 US 123

(1968) based on a prediction that petitioner’s defense would be

based in part on an attempt to shift responsibility for care of the

children during the weeks before Jory’s death to her husband (Resp

Ex A (CT 0718-25). Later, he augmented the motion with the argument

that the admission of evidence that Brian Daniels battered

petitioner and the expert testimony regarding BWS would prejudice

the jury unfairly in its determination of the charges against him. 

Am Pet Mem Ex F at 34. Because the Aranda/Bruton problems proved to

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be non-existent and the trial court disallowed the BWS evidence in a

motion in limine, the trial court denied the motion for severance. 

In her federal habeas petition, petitioner’s argument that

the trial court’s denial of her severance motion violated her due

process rights amounts to a re-hash of her BWS-evidence issues. She

asserts that she “was denied a fair trial by the joinder because the

court elected to protect Brian’s right to a fair trial over her

right to present a defense.” Am Pet Mem at 105. She asserts that

the trial court’s exclusion of the BWS evidence was “because it

would prejudice [Brian Daniels],” citing to a page in the transcript

(RT 2607) that has nothing to do with such evidence. Id. 

The record, however, abundantly demonstrates that it was

the lack of relevance, not concern over potential prejudice to Brian

Daniels, that led the trial court to exclude the BWS evidence. 

Given this court’s determination that the exclusion of BWS evidence

did not violate petitioner’s constitutional right to a fair trial,

her challenge to the trial court’s denial of severance is similarly

unavailing. 

The trial court’s denial of petitioner’s severance motion,

and the state appellate courts’ affirmance of that denial, were not

“contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” clearly

established federal law and therefore cannot form the basis for a

writ of habeas corpus. 

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IV

For all the reasons stated herein, the petition for writ

of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:03-cv-05293-VRW Document 17 Filed 02/05/07 Page 66 of 66