Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04069/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04069-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rahsaan Coleman
Petitioner
Joe McGrath
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAHSAAN COLEMAN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JOE McGRATH, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-4069 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

This is a habeas case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Before the court for ruling is

respondent's opposed motion to dismiss the petition as mixed.

DISCUSSION

Respondent contends that petitioner has not exhausted issues five, six and seven,

making this a mixed petition.

An application for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state

custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court may not be granted unless the prisoner has

first exhausted state judicial remedies, either by way of a direct appeal or in collateral

proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule

on the merits of each and every issue he or she seeks to raise in federal court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). Petitioner has the

burden of pleading exhaustion in his or her habeas petition. See Cartwright v. Cupp, 650

F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). 

If a habeas petition is mixed -- combines exhausted and unexhausted claims -- Rose

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982), requires dismissal of the entire habeas petition without

reaching the merits of any of its claims. Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1988). However, the rule is not as absolute as might first appear. Rose itself provides that

the dismissal must be with leave to amend to delete the unexhausted claims; if they are

deleted, the court can then consider those which remain. See Anthony v. Cambra, 236

F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 2000). And there are two other exceptions: One is that when the

petition fails to raise even a colorable federal claim, it may be denied even if it is partly or

entirely unexhausted, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), and the other is that rather than dismiss, the

court may stay a mixed petition to allow the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust the

unexhausted issue or issues, Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). 

Petitioner claims that: (1) His due process rights were violated by the trial court’s

refusal to give a proposed instruction that a killing may be justifiable homicide even if the

defendant feels other emotions in addition to fear; (2) His due process rights were violated

by the trial court’s refusal to give a proposed instruction that a killing may be justifiable

homicide even if the defendant fails to use due caution as to the amount of force; (3) his

counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence that he was unconscious when he

shot the victim, having suffered a concussion; (4) his due process rights were violated by

the trial court’s failure to grant his motion for new trial on grounds he had newly discovered

that he was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder at the time of the murder, or,

alternatively, his counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this defense at trial; (5) his

sentence was cruel and unusual; (6) his double jeopardy rights were violated by his being

sentenced on both offenses, when they were inseparable; (7) his double jeopardy rights

were violated by enhancement of the sentence for use of a firearm; and (8) the judges in

his case failed to sign, record and file their oaths of office, so their exercise of jurisdiction

over him violated due process. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal from his conviction. His appeal presented issues

factually similar to those argued here in his issues five, six and seven, but he did not allege

that the state law violations argued on appeal also constituted a violation of his

constitutional rights. Petitioner's state habeas petitions, which are attached to the motion to

dismiss, did not remedy this deficiency. Petitioner's argument in opposition is that he

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presented the facts of these claims to the state courts on direct appeal, so the claims are

exhausted. The decisive issue thus is whether presentation of the facts of a claim to the

state courts, without mentioning a federal legal basis for the claim, is sufficient to "fairly

present" the federal claim.

The exhaustion requirement is satisfied only if the federal claim has been "fairly

presented" to the state courts. Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim is

“fairly presented” only if the petitioner either referred to specific provisions of the federal

constitution or federal statutes, or cited to federal or state case law analyzing the federal

issue. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). It is not

sufficient to raise only the facts supporting the claim; rather, "the constitutional claim . . .

inherent in those facts" must be brought to the attention of the state court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277 (1971). State courts must be alerted to the fact that prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution in order to be given the

opportunity to correct alleged violations of federal rights. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365-66 (1995); see, e.g., Dye v. Hofbauer, 126 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2005) (federal due process

claim based on prosecutorial misconduct was fairly presented where the text of the brief

cited the 5th and 14th Amendments and federal cases concerning alleged violation of

federal due process rights in the context of prosecutorial misconduct – the "brief was clear

that the prosecutorial misconduct claim was based, at least in part, on a federal right"). 

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (characterizing Picard as requiring

"reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee" in state court; presentation of facts

underlying claim not sufficient). A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate

the federal law basis for his claim in a state court petition or brief, for example, by citing in

conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding

such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim “federal.” Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004).

Since petitioner did not specify the federal basis for claims five, six and seven in

state court, as the above authorities clearly show is required, he has not exhausted them. 

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1 This option is more apparent than real, because any subsequent federal petition

would almost certainly be barred by the statute of limitations. 

2 If he chooses this option he probably will not be able to file a future federal petition

containing the three unexhausted issues, because second federal petitions are generally

barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). 

4

The petition therefore is mixed. The motion to dismiss will be granted, with petitioner

permitted to choose how he wishes to proceed, as outlined below.

CONCLUSION

 1. Respondent's motion for an extension of time to move or answer (document

number 4 on the docket) is GRANTED. The motion to dismiss is deemed timely.

2. Respondent's motion to dismiss (document number 7) is GRANTED. 

3. Petitioner may chose from three possible courses of action: (1) he may dismiss

this petition with an eye to exhausting and then filing another federal petition;1 (2) he may

amend the petition to dismiss the unexhausted issue, and proceed with those which are

exhausted;2 or (3) he may ask for a stay of this case while he returns to state court to

attempt to exhaust the plea bargain issue, then, if unsuccessful in state court, return here

and ask that the stay be lifted. If he chooses the third option, asking for a stay, he must

show "good cause" for his failure to exhaust sooner, that the issue is "potentially

meritorious," and that he has not engaged in "dilatory litigation tactics." See Rhines v.

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). 

3. Petitioner must elect one of the three choices set out in section three within thirty

days of the date this order is entered. If he does not, this case will be dismissed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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