Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05302/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05302-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 16, 2000 Decided January 26, 2001

No. 00-5116

In re: Sealed Case 00-5116

Consolidated with

00-5302

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00ms00162)

Thomas W. Kirby argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Jan Witold Baran.

David Kolker, Attorney, Federal Election Commission, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

Lawrence M. Noble, General Counsel, and Richard B. Bader,

Associate General Counsel.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Henderson,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: In conjunction with an ongoing

investigation of Appellants, the Federal Election Commission

("FEC" or "Commission") issued a subpoena to a third-party

witness. When the witness refused to comply with the

subpoena, the FEC petitioned the district court to enforce it.

As part of the petition, the FEC included a number of

exhibits providing information about the ongoing investigation. Immediately after the FEC filed its petition, Appellants

moved to intervene and asked the court to place the enforcement action under seal pursuant to 2 U.S.C. s 437g(a)(12)(A).

After a brief hearing, the district court denied Appellants'

motion.

On appeal, Appellants argue that the district court abused

its discretion in refusing to seal the case. They submit that

s 437g(a)(12)(A) plainly protects the confidentiality of the

subjects of ongoing FEC investigations. In response, the

Commission contends that we do not have jurisdiction over

this case because (1) Appellants did not properly intervene

and (2) the district court's denial of Appellants' motion was

not a final, appealable judgment. The Commission also suggests that the statutory context, the legislative history, and

an FEC regulation demonstrate that s 437g does not protect

subjects' confidentiality in the context of subpoena enforcement actions.

For reasons more fully set out below, we conclude that this

Court has jurisdiction over Appellants' case. Furthermore,

we hold that the FEC failed to act in accordance with law by

submitting the exhibits on the public record. The district

court's decision is therefore reversed.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellants are the focus of an ongoing FEC investigation

concerning alleged violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), 2 U.S.C. s 431 et seq. During the

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course of its investigation, the FEC issued a subpoena to a

third-party witness seeking information concerning Appellants' activities. After the third party declined to comply

with the subpoena, the FEC decided to petition the district

court for an order enforcing it. On March 16, 2000, FEC

counsel notified Appellants that it planned to file the petition.

That filing would include a number of exhibits containing

information about the ongoing investigation. The next morning, Friday March 17, Appellants asked the FEC to refrain

from disclosing the information or to file it under seal. The

FEC refused and later that afternoon filed the petition and

exhibits. Among the exhibits, the FEC included a copy of

the complaint that prompted the investigation, an FECprepared "Factual and Legal Analysis" detailing Appellants'

alleged FECA violations, an FEC certification finding "reason to believe" that Appellants had violated FECA, and

information referencing a separate FEC investigation that

had no bearing on the subpoena enforcement action or the

investigation of Appellants.

Within moments of the petition being filed, Appellants filed

an Emergency Motion to seal the case. In support of this

motion, Appellants argued that by placing the exhibits in the

public record the Commission violated the broad confidentiality federal law affords the subjects of FEC investigations.

After holding an abbreviated hearing that same afternoon,

the district court denied Appellants' motion. Contending that

public disclosure of the exhibits would be irrevocable, Appellants immediately moved for "an administrative ruling holding

this matter" so that they could appeal the court's decision.

The court denied this motion as well.

Fortunately for Appellants, the hearing ended after the

district court clerk's office had closed for the weekend. As a

result, the exhibits would not be available to the public until

Monday afternoon, March 20. Appellants took advantage of

"this fortuitous de facto stay of disclosure" by filing a notice

of appeal. Appellants' Brief at 10. They also filed an

emergency motion asking this Court to seal the case to

permit the parties to file briefs on the merits of the appeal.

Meanwhile, the district court issued two written orders adUSCA Case #00-5302 Document #571838 Filed: 01/26/2001 Page 3 of 18
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dressing the same questions decided at the March 17 hearing.

The first order denied Appellants' Emergency Motion. The

second order denied what the court described as Appellants'

"certification for interlocutory appeal." That same day, in

response to Appellant's motion to this Court, we ordered the

district court to place the case under seal pending our consideration of the merits of Appellants' motion. Subsequently, on

June 7, the district court issued a final order enforcing the

subpoena against the third-party witness. In due course, the

FEC obtained the information it sought from the witness.

Appellants appeal from the district court's decision not to

seal the subpoena enforcement action. They argue that

because 2 U.S.C. s 437g(a)(12)(A) provides that information

concerning an ongoing investigation "shall not" be made

public, the district court abused its discretion in denying their

Emergency Motion.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

The FEC asserts that we lack jurisdiction to consider this

case. Its assertion is based on two separate premises. First,

the FEC suggests that Appellants were not parties to the

subpoena enforcement action and did not seek to intervene.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). The FEC claims that because

Appellants did not move to intervene, the district court did

not deny any motion from which Appellants could appeal.

See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 896 & n.5

(1990). Second, the FEC submits that Appellants seek review of the district court's March 17 and March 20 orders,

which simply declined Appellants' motion to place the case

under seal. According to the FEC, these decisions are not

appealable because they did not "end[ ] the litigation on the

merits"--that is, they did not address the underlying subpoena enforcement action. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437

U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (internal quotes omitted). In relying on

these premises, the FEC misconstrues the facts of this case

and misapprehends the law in this area.

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This Court unquestionably has jurisdiction to hear the

present case. Appellants attempted to intervene, and the

district court effectively--and erroneously--denied that attempt. Even if Appellants had not intervened, they could,

and did, bring a simple motion to preserve their rights as

contemplated in United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293

(1980). Under either approach, Appellants properly appealed

from the district court's denial of its Emergency Motion

pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.

Appellants' March 17 Emergency Motion expressly stated

that Appellants "move[ ] for leave to intervene in the FEC

subpoena enforcement action for the limited purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosures." Emergency Motion to

Place Under Seal and for All Other Appropriate Relief at 2,

In re Sealed Case, No. 00-MS-162 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2000).

Both the district court and the FEC were aware of Appellants' desire to intervene. The March 17 Motion was entered

on the district court's docket sheet as a motion "to intervene."

Likewise, at the March 17 hearing, FEC counsel argued that

Appellants were "not a party" and should not be permitted to

intervene because they must "show harm to intervene."

Transcript of Emergency Hearing at 18, In re Sealed Case,

No. MISC. 00-162 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2000).

At the close of the hearing, the district court denied

Appellants' motion to seal the record in the subpoena enforcement action. Three days later, the court issued a written

order memorializing that decision. See Order, In re Sealed

Case, No. 00-162 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2000). Although neither

the court's oral nor written order specifically addressed Appellants' motion to intervene, they both denied the Emergency Motion as a whole, thereby effectively denying the intervention motion.

Under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

an applicant may intervene as of right when it "claims an

interest relating to the property or transaction which is the

subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that

disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or

impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest." Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 24(a). An applicant does not possess a right to

intervene, however, if its "interest is adequately represented

by existing parties." Id.

Appellants readily meet the basic requirements necessary

to intervene as of right. First, Appellants have a protected

interest in the "transaction which is the subject of the action."

As we explain below in more detail, they have a legally

cognizable interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the

documents the FEC seeks to disclose in the public record.

See 2 U.S.C. s 437g(a)(12)(A); cf. United States v. AT&T, 642

F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (explaining that by asserting

the work product privilege to protect the confidentiality of

certain documents a third party had asserted a "legal interest" of "direct and immediate character" (internal quotes

omitted)).

Second, if the FEC's enforcement action were allowed to

proceed on the public docket, then "as a practical matter"

Appellants' ability to protect their confidentiality would be

irrevocably impaired. Once the information included in the

FEC's subpoena enforcement action is released, "the cat is

out of the bag," and Appellants' statutorily guaranteed confidentiality would be forever lost. In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d

247, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Finally, neither party to the enforcement action could have

adequately represented Appellants' interest. Because the

third-party witness was not the subject of the FEC's investigation, the witness was not entitled to the same legal protection afforded to Appellants. See s 437g(a)(12)(A). In addition, it is unclear on what grounds the witness even could

have asked the court to place the case under seal. Obviously,

the FEC refused to represent Appellants' interest and instead sought to run roughshod over that interest by seeking--unjustifiably and unexplainably--to place legally confidential information on the public record. The FEC chose this

misguided course despite commands in its own governing

statutes and regulations to keep ongoing investigations confidential. Because Appellants met the necessary criteria to

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intervene as of right, the district court erred by denying their

motion to intervene. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

Even if Appellants did not move to intervene under Rule

24(a) as the FEC now argues, as noted above, Appellants

could, and did, bring a simple motion to preserve their own

rights as contemplated in United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d

293 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Hubbard, this Court held that a

third party may attempt to "maintain the confidentiality" of

materials that are under the control of a court in a pending

case by filing a motion initiating a distinct ancillary proceeding without intervening in the underlying case. Id. at 311.

In Hubbard, the third party had a protectible "combination of

property and privacy interests" in the materials controlled by

the court. Id. at 307. Similarly, Appellants have a protectible interest in the confidentiality of the petition and exhibits

the FEC filed in the district court. As we explain below,

Congress explicitly established this interest with respect to

the subjects of FEC investigations. See s 437g(a)(12)(A).

Accordingly, under Hubbard, Appellants properly initiated an

ancillary proceeding in the district court in order to protect

this interest by moving to place the subpoena enforcement

action under seal. See Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 311-12; cf.

United States v. RMI Co., 599 F.2d 1183, 1186 (3d Cir. 1979)

(discussing the "principle in permitting intervention for the

assertion of claims of privilege when subpoenas are addressed

to third parties").

Whether the district court's order in this case denied

Appellants' application to intervene or denied their Hubbard

motion to place the subpoena enforcement action under seal,

Appellants properly appealed that order to this Court pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. See Hubbard, 650 F.2d

at 314; AT&T, 642 F.2d at 1296. Under that doctrine, an

order is appealable if it "conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, resolve[s] an important issue completely separate

from the merits of the action, and [is] effectively unreviewable

on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand, 437

U.S. at 468; accord In re Sealed Case, 192 F.3d 995, 999

(D.C. Cir. 1999). In this case, the district court conclusively

determined that the record would not be sealed, an issue

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completely separate from the underlying subpoena enforcement action. See In re Reporters Cmte. for Freedom of the

Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Because the

public would have had immediate access to the record, the

issue would have been effectively unreviewable by the time

the district court had decided whether to enforce the FEC

subpoena. See Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 314 ("[B]ecause public

access to the documents at issue will to some extent irreparably damage the interests asserted, an order which has the

effect of permitting such an invasion, as a practical matter,

'finally determine[s]' the claim."). Consequently, the district

court's March 17 and March 20 orders are appealable under

the collateral order doctrine. See AT&T, 642 F.2d at 1295-

96; cf. RMI, 599 F.2d at 1186.

Alternatively, were we to conclude that the district court's

March 17 and March 20 orders did not deny Appellants'

motion to intervene, as the FEC suggests, the court's final

June 7 order did so. That order ended all issues related to

the enforcement proceeding, including the motion to intervene. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).

At that point, Appellants could properly appeal the final

order, see 28 U.S.C. s 1291, which they did with a timely

notice of appeal on July 24. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2).

Because our jurisdiction to hear this case is firmly established, we now turn our attention to the merits of Appellants'

appeal.

B. The Merits of the Motion to Seal

The FEC is authorized to investigate potential violations of

the Federal Election Campaign Act. See 2 U.S.C.

s 437g(a)(2). When the FEC receives a complaint alleging

FECA violations, it must provide written notification to the

person accused of committing the violation and provide that

person with an opportunity to respond to the accusation. See

id. s 437g(a)(1). The Commission then determines, based on

a vote of its members, if there is "reason to believe that [the]

person has committed" a FECA violation. Id. s 437g(a)(2).

If this standard is met, the FEC investigates the alleged

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violation. See id. During the course of its investigation, the

FEC is empowered to (1) order any person to submit written

reports and answer questions, and (2) subpoena witnesses to

testify or to produce documentary evidence. See 2 U.S.C.

s 437d(a)(1), (3). Although the FEC has no power to enforce

such orders and subpoenas, it may petition the district court

for judicial enforcement. See id. s 437d(b).

Following its investigation, the Commission may vote to

determine if there is "probable cause to believe that [the]

person has committed" a FECA violation. s 437g(a)(4)(A)(i).

If the Commission finds probable cause, it must attempt "to

correct or prevent such violation by informal methods of

conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id. If the FEC's

attempt at conciliation is unsuccessful, the Commission is

authorized to enforce FECA through a civil suit brought in

district court. See id. s 437g(a)(6)(A).

In the statutory section detailing the Commission's enforcement authority, FECA states that:

Any notification or investigation made under this section

shall not be made public by the Commission or by any

person without the written consent of the person receiving such notification or the person with respect to whom

such investigation is made.

Id. s 437g(a)(12)(A). Similarly, the FEC's regulations provide that:

[N]o complaint filed with the Commission, nor any notification sent by the Commission, nor any investigation

conducted by the Commission, nor any findings made by

the Commission shall be made public by the Commission

or by any person or entity without the written consent of

the respondent with respect to whom the complaint was

filed, the notification sent, the investigation conducted, or

the finding made.

11 C.F.R. s 111.21(a).

Appellants point to these two provisions to argue that the

district court abused its discretion in denying their March 17

Emergency Motion to seal the record of the subpoena enforcement action. According to Appellants, both the statute

and the regulation permit disclosure of information concerning an ongoing FEC investigation only if the subject of that

investigation provides written consent. Because Appellants

did not consent, they contend that the district court erred in

allowing the action and accompanying exhibits to be placed on

the public record.

Ordinarily, we review a district court's decision not to seal

court records for abuse of discretion. See EEOC v. Nat'l

Children's Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In

the general case, there is a "strong presumption in favor of

public access to judicial proceedings." Johnson v. Greater

Southeast Community Hosp. Corp., 951 F.2d 1268, 1277 (D.C.

Cir. 1991). As we explained in Hubbard, this presumption

can be overcome based on the following six factors:

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(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue;

(2) the extent of previous public access to the documents;

(3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and

the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any

property and privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the

purposes for which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceedings.

Nat'l Children's Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1409 (citing Hubbard, 650

F.2d at 317-22).

The district court denied Appellants' March 17 Emergency

Motion, treating it "sort of as a TRO request." Transcript of

Emergency Hearing, In re Sealed Case, No. MISC. 00-162, at

12 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2000). In explaining its decision, the

court recognized the general understanding that "there is a

very strong presumption against filing pleadings under seal."

Id. The court's decision rested on this presumption, as well

as two other rationales. First, the district court concluded

that the FEC's regulations permit it to file unsealed pleadings. See id. at 12-13 (citing 11 C.F.R. s 111.21(c)). Second,

the court reasoned that there was not "any possibility of

irreparable harm" because the press had already published

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several stories about the FEC's investigation of Appellants.

Id. at 13.

If this were a typical case, we would hold that the district

court abused its discretion for treating Appellants' motion as

"sort of a TRO request" and for failing to consider any of the

Hubbard factors. That failure is particularly glaring in the

present case, because, as we discuss below, both FECA and

the FEC's regulations interpreting the statute create an

extraordinarily strong privacy interest in keeping the records

sealed absent a party's express written consent to the contrary. So strong is that interest that only rarely, if ever,

might the remaining five Hubbard factors counterbalance the

"strength of [the] ... privacy interests asserted." Moreover,

as we discuss below, the district court incorrectly interpreted

the FEC's regulations--they (and, more importantly, the

FEC's authorizing statute) plainly do not permit it to file

pleadings relating to an ongoing investigation on the record.

See infra at 12-13. Further, the existence of press reports

about an investigation has no bearing on the issue raised by

Appellants. See infra at 17-18.

This is not a typical case, however, looking simply at

whether court records should be sealed. Rather, the question

before us is more properly posed as whether the FEC has the

authority to file information concerning an ongoing investigation on the public record when it seeks to enforce a subpoena.

See 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A). We hold that both 2 U.S.C.

s 437g(a)(12)(A) and 11 C.F.R. s 111.21(a) plainly prohibit

the FEC from disclosing information concerning ongoing

investigations under any circumstances without the written

consent of the subject of the investigation. Accordingly, we

conclude that the FEC failed to act in accordance with law

when it sought to file the subpoena enforcement action on the

public docket.

When interpreting a federal statute administered by an

agency such as the FEC, we employ the familiar two-step

inquiry of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-

43 (1984). In the first step, we consider whether the statute

speaks directly to the precise question at issue. If it does,

"the inquiry is at an end; the court must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." FDA v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1300

(2000) (internal quotes omitted). If the statute is silent or

ambiguous concerning the question, we advance to the second

step, deferring to the "agency's interpretation of the statute if

it is reasonable and consistent with the statute's purpose."

Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638,

643 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Likewise, we review an agency's interpretation of its own

regulations with "substantial deference." See, e.g., Thomas

Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). As the

Supreme Court recently stressed, however, judicial deference

towards an agency's interpretation "is warranted only when

the language of the regulation is ambiguous." Christensen v.

Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1663 (2000). The agency's

interpretation thus "will prevail unless it is 'plainly erroneous

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tion." Everett v. United States, 158 F.3d 1364, 1367 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).

In this case, the statute and regulation at issue are unambiguous and directly address the issue presented in this case.

Their plain meaning therefore controls our decision. Section

437g(a)(12)(A) unequivocally states that any investigation

"shall not be made public by the Commission or by any

person without the written consent of the person ... with

respect to whom such investigation is made." The FEC's

regulations are equally clear: no FEC investigation or findings "shall be made public by the Commission or by any

person or entity without the written consent of the respondent with respect to whom ... the investigation [is] conducted." 11 C.F.R. s 111.21(a). In other words, the Commission

shall not make public an ongoing investigation or its findings

concerning such an investigation without written consent.

Neither the statute nor the regulation provide any exceptions

to this rule. In light of these provisions' clear meaning, the

Commission shall not place information about an ongoing

investigation in the public record when it seeks to enforce a

subpoena. By doing so, the Commission unquestionably violates Congress's mandate and its own regulations.

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The plain language of these provisions and the overall

purpose and structure of the statutory scheme create a

strong confidentiality interest analogous to that protected by

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6). In both contexts, secrecy is vital " 'to protect [an] innocent accused who

is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been

under investigation.' " United States v. Proctor & Gamble

Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 n.6 (1958) (quoting United States v.

Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)). Given this

analogy, there is a strong presumption that, even if the FEC

possesses the power to file subpoena enforcement actions on

the public record, such actions should be sealed. Cf. In re

Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Unlike

typical proceedings, grand jury proceedings and related matters operate under a strong presumption of secrecy.").

We cannot help but question why the FEC opposed Appellants' Emergency Motion and why it continues to fight the

Motion on appeal. We would hope that its strident opposition

is not politically motivated nor compelled by some vindictive

desire to publicize allegations that are yet to be established.

Nevertheless, the weakness of the FEC's position in this case

invites the suspicion that its actions are externally motivated.

Still, the FEC has proffered several arguments opposing

Appellants' motion, and we must consider them.

First, the FEC argues that the confidentiality provision in

s 437g(a)(12)(A) does not apply to the statutory section that

authorizes the Commission to issue subpoenas and petition

the district court for their enforcement. This argument is

based on the fact that s 437g(a)(12)(A) refers only to "investigation[s] made under this section," while the subpoena authority is provided in a separate section, s 437d. At first

blush, this argument seems colorable--indeed, it appears to

be the strongest argument presented by the Commission.

On closer inspection, however, we see that, like the other

justifications proffered by the FEC, it is hollow.

Section 437g provides the basic scheme for the process the

Commission must follow in enforcing FECA. It sets forth,

for example, the steps the Commission must take in investiUSCA Case #00-5302 Document #571838 Filed: 01/26/2001 Page 13 of 18
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gating an alleged violation. See s 437g(a)(1), (2). The Commission's power "to conduct investigations," however, is found

in s 437d, see s 437d(a)(9), the same section that authorizes

the Commission to issue subpoenas, see id. s 437d(a)(3), (4).

In this case, the subpoena in question was issued as part of

the FEC's ongoing investigation of Appellants. At oral argument, FEC counsel acknowledged that the Commission issues

subpoenas as part of its investigations. This acknowledgment

is completely inconsistent with the FEC's strained interpretation of s 437g. We cannot fathom why the FEC's issuance of

a subpoena in furtherance of an ongoing investigation would

not be considered part of that "investigation" within the

meaning of s 437g. When the FEC issues a subpoena as

part of an investigation, s 437g mandates those subpoenas,

like other components of the investigation, "shall not be made

public." The FEC's position contemplates a bizarre result:

the FEC would be obligated to keep a subpoena confidential

until the target refused to comply, at which point the FEC

could publicize the subpoena. Of course, there is no basis in

the statute for this interpretation. Even if we assume that

the FEC's argument was correct (which it is not) and the

Commission could disclose the subpoenas themselves (which

it can not), the Commission would still lack the authority to

divulge information pertaining to the underlying investigation

as it has attempted to do here.

Second, the FEC contends that the legislative history of

s 437g demonstrates that the Commission is authorized to

disclose subpoenas issued in furtherance of an ongoing investigation. Specifically, the FEC directs us to two pieces of

"evidence" from which it claims to have intuited Congress's

intent. Initially, it asks us to consider the Conference Report

for the 1976 Amendments to FECA, which states that

s 437g(a)(12) is not violated "when actions taken carrying out

an investigation lead to public awareness of the investigation."

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1057, at 50 (1976) quoted in Brief for

the Appellee at 23. Next, it provides us with a clipped

excerpt from the House of Representatives' debate over these

amendments. During the debate the Manager of the bill

stated, "The Commission ... sent nine investigators into Mr.

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Rose's district, with eight-column headlines saying that he

had been charged with a flagrant violation of the election

law." 122 Cong. Rec. 8,566 (1976) (statement of Rep. Hays)

quoted in Brief for the Appellee at 22.

The FEC claims to have divined the meaning of an unambiguous statutory provision through this ambiguous legislative history. The FEC accomplishes this feat while acknowledging that the "legislative history does not mention judicial

proceedings." We also note that it does not mention, or even

allude to, FEC subpoenas. Still, the FEC relies on these two

disconnected bits of legislative history to urge a reading of

s 437g that calls for otherwise confidential information to lose

all protection whenever the Commission files a subpoena

enforcement action in the district court.

The limits on the Commission's authority--like that authority itself--are derived from statutory provisions, not from

loosely worded fragments extracted from congressional reports and speeches. "The law, as it passed, is the will of the

majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will

is spoken is in the act itself." Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S.

(3 How.) 9, 24 (1845). Here, the Act explicitly requires that

the FEC "shall not" make public its ongoing investigations.

Nothing in the Act can be rationally read to make an exception for subpoena enforcement actions. In the future, the

Commission would be best served if its counsel did "not

resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is

clear." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994).

Third, the FEC suggests that it has promulgated a regulation, 11 C.F.R. s 111.21(c), that interprets s 437g(a)(12)(A).

According to the regulation,

Nothing in these regulations shall be construed to prevent the introduction of evidence in the courts of the

United States which could properly be introduced pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence or Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

11 C.F.R. s 111.21(c). The FEC declares that this provision

"specif[ies] that the confidentiality provision is simply not

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applicable when evidence, like the exhibits to the Commission's enforcement petition, is filed in court." Brief for the

Appellee at 27. The Commission asserts that its interpretation of this regulation and s 437g(a)(12)(A) is due substantial

deference. See FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign

Cmte., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981).

The FEC's interpretation is not entitled to substantial--or

any--deference here. We only defer to an agency interpretation if a statute or regulation is unclear. See Brown &

Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1300; Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512

U.S. at 512. As explained above, the confidentiality provision

in s 437g is clear. See supra at 12-13. So too is 11 C.F.R.

s 111.21(c). This regulation simply states that the FEC's

regulations do not "prevent the introduction of evidence in

the courts" if that evidence could otherwise be properly

introduced. s 111.21(c). This text plainly addresses only

what evidence can be introduced, not how it should be

introduced. There is only one way to read this regulation

consistently with s 437g and s 111.21(a): the FEC can introduce evidence pursuant to the Federal Rules, but it cannot

introduce evidence concerning an ongoing investigation on the

public record--that is, any evidence may be introduced as

long as it is placed under seal. The resulting procedure does

not undercut the Federal Rules or adversely affect the FEC's

ability to enforce subpoenas. Cf. In re Motions of Dow Jones

& Co., 142 F.3d 496, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing advantages of closing judicial proceedings ancillary to grand jury

proceedings). Allowing the FEC to interpret s 111.21(c), an

entirely unambiguous regulation, as it suggests "would be to

permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation to create de facto a new regulation." Christensen, 120

S. Ct. at 1663.

The FEC's proposed interpretation would produce an absurd result: the FEC could not reveal information about an

ongoing investigation unless it did so in open court proceedings. This reading not only is "plainly inconsistent with the

wording of the regulation," LaRouche v. FEC, 28 F.3d 137,

140 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal quotes omitted), it also would

undermine Congress's clear directive that the FEC "shall

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not" make information about investigations public. Section

111.21(c) merely states that the Commission's "regulations"

do not prevent the introduction of evidence; it does not

undercut the statute's mandate--nor could it. Agencies are

not empowered to carve out exceptions to statutory limits on

their authority. Cf. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Nat'l

Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)

("Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an

express withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy

virtually limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping

with Chevron and quite likely with the Constitution as well."

(emphasis in original)).

The FEC further submits that its interpretation of the

statute and regulation merits deference in light of its continued practice of filing subpoena enforcement actions on the

public record. Even if the statute in question were ambiguous, such a supposed practice does not produce an agency

interpretation to which we accord deference. Cf. Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1662. The deference afforded to an

agency's interpretation of either a statute or a regulation

presupposes that the interpretation is presented as part of

notice-and-comment rulemaking or at least a reasoned decision-making process. See id.; cf. Democratic Senatorial

Campaign Cmte., 454 U.S. at 37-38 (addressing situation in

which the Commission formally adopted an interpretation on

three separate occasions). Choices made by FEC attorneys--without the Commission's ratification or acceptance--

do not stand as the authoritative interpretation of the agency

requiring deference.

Finally, the FEC suggests that Appellants would not suffer

any harm from the Commission breaching its duty of confidentiality because the press already has reported on some

aspects of the investigation. This also is unconvincing. Stories in the media have no bearing on the confidentiality

requirement Congress imposed on the FEC. It does not

matter that the media has published some information concerning the investigation--the FEC has a straightforward

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tion. Only the subject's written consent can relieve the FEC

of this duty. See s 437g(a)(12)(A).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision is

Reversed.

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