Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02270/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02270-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Barrella
Appellee-Cross-Appellant
Andrew Hardwick
Appellant-Cross-Appellee
Village of Freeport
Appellant-Cross-Appellee

Document Text:

14‐2270‐cv (L)

Village of Freeport v. Barrella

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit    

AUGUST TERM 2015

Nos. 14‐2270‐cv (L), 14‐2349‐cv (CON), 14‐4287‐cv (CON),  

14‐4324‐cv (CON), 14‐3615‐cv (XAP)

VILLAGE OF FREEPORT AND ANDREW HARDWICK, AS MAYOR AND IN

HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,

Defendants‐Appellants‐Cross‐Appellees,

v.

CHRISTOPHER BARRELLA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee‐Cross‐Appellant.*

   

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of New York

   

ARGUED: DECEMBER 9, 2015

DECIDED: FEBRUARY 16, 2016

   

 * The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform to

the caption above.

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Before: LEVAL, CABRANES, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.

   

This case asks us to resolve a vexed and recurring question:

what does it mean to be Hispanic? Specifically, it presents the

question of whether “Hispanic” describes a race for purposes of

§ 1981 and Title VII.

Defendants the Village of Freeport, NY (“Freeport” or “the

Village”) and its former mayor, Andrew Hardwick (“Hardwick”),

appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York (Arthur D. Spatt, Judge) following a jury

verdict for plaintiff Christopher Barrella (“Barrella”). Barrella had

sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law

(“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., alleging that Hardwick

had not appointed him chief of police because Barrella was a white

Italian‐American, and that Hardwick had instead appointed a less‐

qualified Hispanic.  

Based on longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit

precedent, we reiterate that “race” includes ethnicity for purposes of

§ 1981, so that discrimination based on Hispanic ancestry or lack

thereof constitutes racial discrimination under that statute. We also

hold that “race” should be defined the same way for purposes of

Title VII. Accordingly, we reject defendants’ argument that an

employer who promotes a white Hispanic candidate over a white

non‐Hispanic candidate cannot have engaged in racial

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discrimination, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court

insofar as it denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of

law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

We also hold that the District Court erred in permitting lay

opinion testimony that speculated as to Hardwick’s reasons for not

appointing Barrella, in violation of Rule 701(b) of the Federal Rules of

Evidence. Because this case was factually close, we conclude that the

District Court’s error was not harmless. We therefore VACATE the

judgment of the District Court and REMAND for a new trial

consistent with this opinion.

   

KEITH M. CORBETT, Harris Beach PLLC,

Uniondale, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant‐

Cross‐Appellee Village of Freeport.

KENNETH A. NOVIKOFF (Evan H. Krinick,

Cheryl F. Korman, Scott R. Green, on the

brief), Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, NY, for

Defendant‐Appellant‐Cross‐Appellee Andrew

Hardwick.

AMANDA M. FUGAZY (Adam C. Weiss, Paul

P. Rooney, on the brief), Ellenoff Grossman &

Schole LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff‐

Appellee‐Cross‐Appellant Christopher Barrella.

   

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JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

This case asks us to resolve a vexed and recurring question:

what does it mean to be Hispanic? Specifically, it presents the

question of whether “Hispanic” describes a race for purposes of

§ 1981 and Title VII.

Defendants the Village of Freeport, NY (“Freeport” or “the

Village”) and its former mayor, Andrew Hardwick (“Hardwick”),

appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York (Arthur D. Spatt, Judge) following a jury

verdict for plaintiff Christopher Barrella (“Barrella”). Barrella had

sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law

(“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., alleging that Hardwick

had not appointed him chief of police because Barrella was a white

Italian‐American, and that Hardwick had instead appointed a less‐

qualified Hispanic.  

Based on longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit

precedent, we reiterate that “race” includes ethnicity for purposes of

§ 1981, so that discrimination based on Hispanic ancestry or lack

thereof constitutes racial discrimination under that statute. We also

hold that “race” should be defined the same way for purposes of

Title VII. Accordingly, we reject defendants’ argument that an

employer who promotes a white Hispanic candidate over a white

non‐Hispanic candidate cannot have engaged in racial

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discrimination, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court

insofar as it denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of

law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

We also hold that the District Court erred in permitting lay

opinion testimony that speculated as to Hardwick’s reasons for not

appointing Barrella, in violation of Rule 701(b) of the Federal Rules of

Evidence. Because this case was factually close, we conclude that the

District Court’s error was not harmless. We therefore VACATE the

judgment of the District Court and REMAND for a new trial

consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND1

In 2009, the Village elected its first black mayor, Andrew

Hardwick. Once in office, Hardwick sought to replace the Freeport

Police Department’s all‐white “command staff”—its chief, assistant

chief, and deputy chief—with officers who “shared his vision for

Freeport”2 and would help him “achieve his vision of community

unity.”3  

 1 Because this appeal follows a jury verdict, we view the facts in the light

most favorable to the prevailing party, namely, Barrella. See Altria Grp., Inc. v.

United States, 658 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2011).

2 Hardwick Br. 6.

3 Village Br. 7. Defendants also contend that Hardwick believed that the

salaries and benefits of the existing command staff had become fiscally

unsustainable. J.A. 2269. (References to “J.A.” are to the joint appendix.)

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Hardwick quickly identified Lieutenant Miguel Bermudez

(“Bermudez”) as his preferred candidate for the command staff and,

ultimately, for chief of police. Bermudez—“who identifies as a

member of the White race” and was born in Cuba4—had grown up in

Freeport and, after living for some time in nearby Massapequa Park,

had moved back to the Village in 2006. Bermudez and Hardwick had

known each other for more than 25 years,5 primarily through their

shared service in the Freeport Fire Department.  

Filling the positions of deputy chief and assistant chief

required approval by the Village Board of Trustees, of which the

mayor was a member. In April 2010, Hardwick recommended to the

Trustees that Bermudez be named deputy chief (the most junior of

the three command staff positions), and the Trustees unanimously

approved his appointment. Three months later, the mayor

recommended, and the Board confirmed, Bermudez’s promotion to

assistant chief. That promotion made Bermudez the de facto chief of

police because the nominal chief, Michael Woodward, was often

absent from Freeport, as he used up his accrued leave in preparation

for his pending retirement.

 4 Hardwick Br. 2.

5 The precise duration of their relationship is unclear. Hardwick testified

that he had known Bermudez for “[o]ver 40 years.” J.A. 3208. Hardwick’s counsel

told the jury that the number was 30 or 35 years, Barrella v. Vill. of Freeport, 43 F.

Supp. 3d 136, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), but now states that “Hardwick and Bermudez

had known each other for over twenty‐five (25) years at the time he was elected

Mayor,” Hardwick Br. 7.

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Unlike the positions of deputy chief and assistant chief, the

Freeport Chief of Police is a civil service position for which

candidates must take a promotional examination. The three highest

scorers are eligible for selection by the mayor, who exercises sole

control over the appointment.  

After the Village announced that it would be appointing a new

chief, six Freeport police lieutenants sat for a promotional

examination, in March 2010. Plaintiff Christopher Barrella, a white

Italian‐American born in the United States, scored highest.

Lieutenant Wayne Giglio, also white, earned the second‐highest

score. Bermudez came in third.  

Barrella testified that he considered himself more qualified

than Bermudez to serve as chief. Unlike Bermudez, who had not

completed college, Barrella had earned a master’s degree in criminal

justice and a law degree. Barrella also had more “time in rank” as a

lieutenant than Bermudez. And Barrella out‐scored Bermudez on the

promotional examination. At the same time, Barrella faced three

obstacles: he did not know Hardwick; he lacked any influential

political allies; and he was not, and never had been, a Freeport

resident. The parties dispute the relevance of these considerations.  

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In November 2010, Hardwick promoted Bermudez to chief

without interviewing Barrella or reviewing his resume, personnel

file, or other materials related to his candidacy for the position.6

In August 2011, Barrella filed a charge with the U.S. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that he

had not been promoted because of his race (non‐Hispanic white) and

national origin (American). After the EEOC sent Barrella a “Notice of

Right to Sue,” he commenced this action on January 25, 2012, against

Hardwick7 and the Village, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981

and 1983,8 Title VII, and NYSHRL.  

 6 Nor did Hardwick thoroughly review Bermudez’s personnel records. For

instance, before making his decision, Hardwick did not bother to learn whether

Bermudez had obtained a college degree.

7 Barrella sued Hardwick in his official and individual capacities. At the

end of the trial, the District Court “implicitly dismissed any claims against

Hardwick in his official capacity” as merely duplicating the suit against the

Village. Barrella, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 172.  

8 Section 1983 provides in relevant part that  

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

Because § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but “merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred,” Patterson v. Cty. of

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After extensive discovery, defendants filed motions for

summary judgment. On April 26, 2014, the District Court denied the

motions except with respect to Barrella’s claim of national‐origin

discrimination. The case then proceeded to trial, during which the

jury heard testimony from twelve witnesses over a period of three

weeks. At the conclusion of the trial, and after five days of

deliberation, the jury rendered a verdict against both defendants on

May 28, 2014, finding that Hardwick had intentionally discriminated

against Barrella on the basis of race. The jury awarded Barrella

$150,000 for lost back pay, $1,000,000 for lost future pay, and (against

Hardwick only) $200,000 in punitive damages. The District Court

denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law under

Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for a new trial or

remittitur under Rule 59. The Court also awarded attorneys’ fees and

costs to Barrella, but denied his motion to augment his damages to

offset the negative tax consequences of receiving his lost income as a

lump sum. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Is “Hispanic” a “Race”?

Defendants’ principal argument is that “Hispanics” do not

constitute a distinct “race” as a matter of law. As a result, defendants

argue, Barrella and Bermudez are both white in the estimation of

 

Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), we

need not consider Barrella’s § 1983 claims separately from his § 1981 claims.  

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federal antidiscrimination statutes, and Hardwick’s decision to

promote one white candidate rather than another could not have

constituted racial discrimination.9 Defendants raised this argument in

 9 We express no opinion as to whether it is accurate, as defendants insist,

that “if Bermudez was of the same race as . . . Barrella, there can be, as a matter of

law, no inference of racial discrimination.” Hardwick Br. 54; cf. Village Br. 21 (“It

is axiomatic[ ] that a Plaintiff attempting to establish [that] he is a member of a

protected class . . . is required to demonstrate that he suffered racial

discrimination as a result of an individual of a different race receiving a benefit to

which the Plaintiff was denied.”). Neither defendant cites a published appellate

decision supporting this notion. Of course, the fact that an employer favored

someone outside of the relevant protected class “will ordinarily suffice” to sustain

an inference of discrimination. See Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 313

(2d Cir. 2015). Conversely, a plaintiff who cannot show an employer’s “preference

for a person not of the [plaintiff’s] protected class” will usually be unable to

sustain a claim of disparate treatment. See James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149,

154 (2d Cir. 2000). But we have nonetheless suggested that a plaintiff may be able

to plead a prima facie case under Title VII even without showing that the

defendant favored someone outside of the plaintiff’s protected class. See Leibowitz

v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 502 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70

F.3d 1420, 1448 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[F]avorable treatment of one member of a

protected class does not rule out the possibility that another member of the same

class suffered discrimination.”), reheard en banc on other grounds, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d

Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133 (2000).

It would seem especially inappropriate to require such a showing in the

instant case, “in which the [mayor’s] discretion [was] circumscribed by a

promotion list limiting [him] to three choices.” Carroll v. City of Mount Vernon, 707

F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). If, as defendants maintain, Bermudez is

white as a matter of law, then the results of the March 2010 promotional

examination forced Hardwick to choose among three “white” candidates for

chief: Barrella, Giglio, and Bermudez. Accordingly, Hardwick’s ultimate decision

to appoint a “white” chief in those circumstances would hardly prove the absence

of discriminatory intent. Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (recognizing that

white and Hispanic firefighters could bring a claim under Title VII after their

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their motions for summary judgment, motions in limine, and at trial.

They renew the same argument here in challenging the District

Court’s denial of their Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of

law.10

In addressing this argument, we need not answer the vexed

question posed by the Village’s brief: “What is Race?”11 We do,

however, need to resolve a narrower issue: whether “Hispanic” is a

“race” for purposes of § 1981 and Title VII.

 

municipal employer voided the results of their promotional examination due to

race, even if the employer intended to offer a second promotional examination

that might also have led to the promotion of white and Hispanic firefighters).

Nonetheless, we need not address this argument, as we conclude below that

Bermudez and Barrella belong to different races for purposes of § 1981 and Title VII.

10 Defendants also raise this argument in challenging the District Court’s

denial of summary judgment. In general, we will not consider an appeal from a

denial of summary judgment, which does not qualify as a “final decision” for

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188 (2011), and

which is in any case unappealable following a trial on the merits, id. at 183‐84. We

have recognized an exception to this rule, however, “where the district court’s

error was purely one of law.” Stampf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 761 F.3d 192, 201 n.2

(2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). But that exception does not

apply here, because defendants raise both legal and fact‐based challenges to the

denial of summary judgment. See, e.g., Village Br. 20‐23 (challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence); see also Stampf, 761 F.3d at 201 n.2 (noting that purely

legal questions do not “typically involve” disputes about “why an action was

taken” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, to the extent that

defendants’ summary judgment arguments do raise pure questions of law, we

fully consider them in the context of defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter

of law.

11 Village Br. 4.

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1. “Hispanic” in Common Usage  

The parties and the District Court experienced some confusion

in unraveling the legal definitions of “race” and “Hispanic,” thanks

partly to the federal government’s less‐than‐straightforward use of

those terms.12 The Census Bureau, following standards issued by the

Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), treats “Hispanic or

Latino” as an ethnicity, the members of which may belong to any

race.13 This bureaucratic definition, however, often fails to resonate

with Hispanics themselves, who may hail from societies with quite

different notions of racial identity.14 Nor is this definition entirely

 12 Such confusion has been enduring. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,

316 n.39 (1987) (“[I]n our heterogeneous society the lower courts have found the

boundaries of race and ethnicity increasingly difficult to determine.”).

13 See Hispanic Origin, U.S. Census Bureau (July 25, 2013),

http://www.census.gov/topics/population/hispanic‐origin/about.html. The Census

recognizes five races: “White,” “Black or African American,” “American Indian or

Alaska Native,” “Asian,” and “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.” Race,

U.S. Census Bureau (July 8, 2013), http://www.census.gov/topics/population

/race/about.html. The government has differentiated “race” from “ethnicity” at

least since Directive 15, issued by OMB in 1977. OMB’s 1997 race and ethnicity

standards use the same distinction. See Karen Humes & Howard Hogan,

Measurement of Race and Ethnicity in a Changing, Multicultural America, 1 Race &

Soc. Probs. 111, 119 & n.5 (2009) (article by Census Bureau professionals).

14 See Nat’l Research Council, Multiple Origins, Uncertain Destinies:

Hispanics and the American Future 41 (Marta Tienda & Faith Mitchell eds., 2006)

(“Multiple Origins”). Puerto Rico provides one example of the potential

absurdities generated by the imposition of North American racial taxonomies on

Hispanic communities. After the United States acquired Puerto Rico in 1898, the

percentage of Puerto Ricans classified as “white” grew with each decade of

colonial rule, so that North American commentators hypothesized that the

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intuitive to the mainstream media, which sometimes identifies

“Latinos” with “blacks,”15 and at other times rounds “Hispanic” to

“white.”16 In response to this enduring confusion, the Census Bureau

 

island’s black population was disappearing (whereas Puerto Ricans were perhaps

simply learning the hard consequences of being identified as non‐white in the

United States). For sources, see José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American

Empire 98 n.475 (1979) (“It is to be observed that while the census taken in 1887

shows a black population of 76,985, and that taken in 1897 reduces the figure to

75,824, the census of 1899 further reduces the figure to 59,390. If this decrease

should continue for a number of years, the black race would eventually disappear

from Porto Rico . . . . This is the only island in all the West Indies where the white

population is so overwhelmingly in the majority. . . . In 1910 the colored

population was 34.5 per cent of the whole; in 1920 it had declined to 27.0 per

cent.” (quoting 22 Encyclopedia Americana 403 (1939))).  

In the 1950s, a growing recognition of the unreliability of Puerto Rico’s

racial Census data, as well as the Puerto Rican government’s conviction that racial

categorization was counterproductive, led the Census Bureau to stop collecting

information about race in Puerto Rico altogether. (The practice resumed with the

2000 Census.) See Jorge Duany, The Puerto Rican Nation on the Move: Identities on the

Island and in the United States 252‐53 (2002); Mara Loveman & Jeronimo O. Muniz,

How Puerto Rico Became White: Boundary Dynamics and Intercensus Racial

Reclassification, 72 Am. Soc. Rev. 915, 935 (2007).

15 Debates about affirmative action, for instance, often merge “black” and

“Hispanic” into “minority.” See, e.g., Ford Fessenden & Josh Keller, How Minorities

Have Fared in States with Affirmative Action Bans, N.Y. Times (June 24, 2013),

http://www.nytimes.com /interactive/2013/06/24/us/affirmative‐action‐bans.html.

16 This tendency surfaced, for instance, in coverage of Ricci v. DeStefano,

557 U.S. at 557, in which the plaintiffs were eighteen firefighters, whom media

reports often described as simply white, even though one of the plaintiff

firefighters was Hispanic. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justices Rule in Favor of White

Firefighters in Racial‐Bias Case, Wash. Post (June 30, 2009),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2009/06/29

/AR2009062901608.html. Academic discussion of the case sometimes makes the

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is now considering whether to abandon separate taxonomies of

“race” and “ethnicity” altogether: the 2020 Census may instead ask

respondents to select the “categories” to which they belong.17 Small

wonder, then, that the parties in this case have struggled with

whether, or in what sense, Bermudez might be both white and

Hispanic.

Compounding the confusion, the relevant terminology has

changed substantially over time. In 1930, but neither before nor since,

the Census counted the “Mexican” race.18 It was not until the 1950s,

 

same elision. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 Harv. L. Rev.

1, 52 (2013).

17 See D’Vera Cohn, Census Considers New Approach to Asking About Race—

By Not Using the Term at All, Pew Research Ctr. (June 18, 2015),

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact‐tank/2015/06/18/census‐considers‐new‐

approach‐to‐asking‐about‐race‐by‐not‐using‐the‐term‐at‐all.  

18 Until 1930, Mexicans had been presumed to be white. Enumerators for

the 1930 Census, however, were instructed that “all Mexican laborers are of a

racial mixture difficult to classify”; at the same time, Mexicans who were

“definitely white, Negro, Indian, Chinese, or Japanese” were to be counted in

those respective categories. After the 1930 Census, Mexican‐Americans—backed

by the Mexican government—successfully lobbied to eliminate the “Mexican”

category, largely because many civil rights, including the right to become an

American citizen, depended on whiteness. See Humes & Hogan, ante note 13, at

117; cf. Morrison v. People of State of Cal., 291 U.S. 82, 85 (1934) (noting that “[t]he

privilege of naturalization is confined to aliens who are ‘free white persons, and

to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent,’” a definition that

excluded people of Chinese, Japanese, Indian, American Indian, and Filipino

descent (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 359)); id. at 95 n.5 (“There is a strain of Indian blood in

many of the inhabitants of Mexico as well as in the peoples of Central and South

America. . . . Whether persons of such descent may be naturalized in the United

States is still an unsettled question.”).

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however, that the federal government consistently started tracking

other Spanish‐heritage groups, under the denomination of “persons

of Spanish surname”19—a term that seems workable only if one

ignores the possibility of intermarriage or the prevalence of “non‐

Spanish” surnames in Spanish‐speaking countries.20 As a result,

many writers quickly adopted alternative terms that remain current

today: “Hispanic” and “Latino.”21

 

The stakes of Mexican‐Americans’ “whiteness” were evident in a seminal

Fourteenth Amendment case, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954), which

found that “persons of Mexican descent constitute[d] a separate class in Jackson

County, [Texas,] distinct from ‘whites,’” whose systematic exclusion from juries

was unconstitutional.

19 For a summary of the Census Bureau’s protean efforts to classify

Hispanics, see the Appendix to this opinion. We note here that in the 1950 and

1960 Censuses, the federal government tracked only “white persons of Spanish

surname.” In other words, when Title VII was enacted in 1964, “Hispanics” were

presumptively white.  

20 For example, the Chilean patriot Bernardo O’Higgins; the Dublin‐born

governor of Spanish Louisiana, Alejandro O’Reilly (who also designed the

fortifications of San Juan, Puerto Rico); Vicente Fox, the former President of

Mexico; and any number of Argentine presidents, including Arturo Frondizi,

Néstor Kirchner, and Mauricio Macri—not to mention the Catholic Church’s first

Latin American pope, Jorge Bergoglio. The use of Spanish surnames for purposes

of group identification was already under attack by the early 1950s. See Hernandez,

347 U.S. at 480‐81 (using “persons with Mexican or Latin American surnames” to

draw demographic conclusions); id. at 480 n.12 (“The State challenges any reliance

on names as showing the descent of persons in the County. However, just as

persons of a different race are distinguished by color, these Spanish names

provide ready identification of the members of this class.”).  

21 The choice between “Hispanic” and “Latino” occasionally provokes

anxiety. See Nate Cohn, Speaking of Identity: Choosing Between Latino and Hispanic,

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N.Y. Times (May 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/upshot/speaking‐

of‐identity‐choosing‐between‐latino‐and‐hispanic.html. As we have previously

observed, the terms reflect “nuanced differences of perspective” regarding

personal or ethnic identity. Latino Officers Ass’n, N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 196

F.3d 458, 460 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999). “Hispanic” emphasizes links to the language,

people, or culture of Spain. “Latino” avoids that connection to the “Mother

Country” and points instead to “Latin” America, a geographic entity fostered,

ironically enough, by French imperialists who hoped to gain influence over the

region by emphasizing historical and linguistic ties between France and the

former colonies of Spain and Portugal. Id.

Despite occasional attempts to make one label more “correct” than the

other—see, e.g., Henry Fuhrmann, Usage: ’Latino‘ Preferred over ’Hispanic‘, L.A.

Times (July 28, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/readers/2011/07/latino‐

preferred‐over‐hispanic‐in‐most‐cases.html—both terms have respectable

pedigrees. The Oxford English Dictionary records “Latino” as first appearing in

English in 1946, but the word does not seem to have entered widespread use until

the 1960s, see Multiple Origins, ante note 14, at 52 n.1. “Hispanic” began to be used

in its modern ethnic sense in politics and public affairs at about the same time.

See, e.g., Br. of Amicus Curiae Louis J. Lefkowitz, Att’y Gen. of State of N.Y., at 39,

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Nos. 847, 877), 1966 WL 115487. (The

word itself has a much longer history in other contexts, as suggested by

institutions like the Hispanic‐American Historical Review (founded 1918) and the

Hispanic Society of America (founded 1904).) The idea that Hispanics formed a

recognizable political bloc apparently did not emerge until the 1960 presidential

election, when the Associated Press ran a two‐sentence report that Senator John F.

Kennedy had formed a national “Viva Kennedy” campaign to court “Spanish‐

speaking communities.” Kennedy Seeks Spanish Vote, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1960, at

22; see also Bonnie Angelo, Bob Kennedy Tells How His Brother Did It, Newsday,

Nov. 10, 1960, at 5 (reporting the “new political development” of forming “clubs”

to court voters “of Spanish extraction”); Peter Kihss, City Spanish Vote at a Record

High, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1960, at 30 (reporting Kennedy’s predicted dominance

among New York’s “Puerto Rican and Spanish‐speaking community”). Federal

courts began using both “Hispanic” and “Latino” in the early 1970s. See Officers

for Justice v. Civil Serv. Commʹn of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 371 F. Supp. 1328,

1332 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (first reported use of “Latino”); Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ.,

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2. Section 1981

Despite societal confusion regarding Hispanic identity, the

existence of a Hispanic “race” has long been settled with respect to

§ 1981.22 Although that statute never uses the word “race,” the

Supreme Court has construed it as forbidding “racial” discrimination

in public or private employment.23 The Court has further defined

“racial discrimination,” for purposes of § 1981, as including

discrimination based on “ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”24

As a result, two people who both appear to be “white” in the

vernacular sense of the term, and who would both identify as

“white” on Census forms and the like, may nonetheless belong to

different “races” for purposes of § 1981. Similarly, someone may

 

350 F. Supp. 879 (D. Conn. 1972) (Jon O. Newman, J.) (first reported use of

“Hispanic”).  

For the sake of consistency, we use “Hispanic,” which Hispanics

themselves are more likely to choose (to the extent that they wish to adopt a pan‐

ethnic identity at all), and which, in any event, is entirely appropriate. See Cohn,

ante. “Hispanic” also sidesteps the need for awkward neologisms, such as

“Latin@” or “Latinx,” in the name of “gender‐neutral” language.

22 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides in relevant part that “[a]ll persons within

the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and

Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”

23 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al‐Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 613 (1987).

24 Id. at 613.

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belong to more than one “race” for purposes of that statute.25 For

instance, in Saint Francis College v. Al‐Khazraji, the Supreme Court

found that employment discrimination “based on the fact that [a

plaintiff] was born an Arab” constitutes racial discrimination under

§ 1981, even though “under current racial classifications Arabs are

Caucasians.”26  

As defendants themselves insist, Hispanics clearly constitute

an ethnic group.27 Defendants should hardly be surprised, then, that

 25 Consider a hypothetical white applicant whose ancestry is one‐half

Hispanic and one‐half Irish. That person could, in principle, bring a race‐

discrimination suit if an employer

 refuses to hire him because he is Irish‐American, and instead hires

a white Italian‐American;

 refuses to hire him because he is Hispanic, and instead hires a non‐

Hispanic Irish‐American; or

 refuses to hire him because he is white, and instead hires a black

Hispanic.

26 481 U.S. at 607, 613; cf. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615,

616‐17 (1987) (holding that Jews may bring a claim against non‐Jewish whites

under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which forbids racially discriminatory interference with

property rights).

27 The Supreme Court has treated “Latinos” as an ethnic group in, for

example, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (plurality). Hernandez

involved a claim that a state prosecutor had “exercised peremptory challenges to

exclude Latinos from the jury by reason of their ethnicity.” Id. Because Hernandez

was part of the line of cases flowing from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), it

hinged on whether the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes “violate[d] the principle

of race neutrality.” Id. at 362. Although the Hernandez plurality found that the

prosecutor had “offered a race‐neutral basis for his exercise of peremptory

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shortly after the Supreme Court decided Saint Francis College, our

Court drew the obvious inference that discrimination against

Hispanics—or “Latins” (sic), as Judge Winter’s opinion put it—

constitutes “racial discrimination” under § 1981.28 Because § 1981 also

forbids so‐called “reverse discrimination,”29 our 1988 holding in

Albert necessarily implied that § 1981 also protects against

discrimination based on lack of Hispanic ethnicity—something we

had already assumed several years earlier.30  

In short, despite defendants’ repeated attempts to confuse an

already complicated, vexed issue, it has long been settled in this

circuit that Hispanics comprise a distinct race for purposes of § 1981.

 

challenges,” id. at 372—implicitly treating “Hispanic” as a race—the Court

expressly declined to “resolve the more difficult question of the breadth with

which the concept of race should be defined for equal protection purposes,” id. at

371.

28 Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also

Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 607 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that § 1981

“protect[s] against discrimination on the basis not only of race, but also of

ancestry or ethnic characteristics” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lopez v.

S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987) (“There can be no question that

[§ 1981’s ban on racial discrimination] includes persons . . . who are of Puerto

Rican descent.”).

29 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286‐87 (1976).

30 See Krulik v. Bd. of Educ., 781 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1986).

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3. Title VII

In contrast to our longstanding clarity with respect to § 1981,

we have not yet resolved whether Hispanics constitute a race for

purposes of Title VII. Title VII obviously affords a cause of action for

discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity—but why?

Title VII provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be an

unlawful employment practice for an employer” to take adverse

action against an employee because of that employee’s “race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.”31 These categories—known as

“protected characteristics” or “protected classes”—are not mutually

exclusive. In particular, claims based on race and national origin

“may substantially overlap or even be indistinguishable depending

on the specific facts of a case.”32

As a result, courts and litigants alike have struggled with the

proper characterization of claims based on Hispanicity. Most courts

have assumed that Hispanics constitute a “protected class” but

without saying whether that protection derives from race or national

origin.33 Others have declared expressly that the underlying rationale

 31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a).

32 Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2003).

33 See, e.g., De la Cruz v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 82

F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1996).

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is irrelevant.34 We have also recognized claims based on “Hispanic

ethnicity,” a term not used in Title VII.35  

Although we have avoided the question so far, the proper

categorization of Hispanicity has important analytical implications.

Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race but not on

the basis of national origin.36 Accordingly, if we were to treat

Hispanicity as a national origin, but not as a race, for purposes of

Title VII, plaintiffs in cases involving pro‐  or anti‐Hispanic

discrimination might in some circumstances need to present two

different factual arguments in order to invoke the distinct remedies

of that statute along with those of § 1981.37  

In the present case, the District Court decided at the summary

judgment stage that Hispanic did not constitute a national origin as a

 34 See, e.g., Alonzo v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 25 F. Supp. 2d 455, 459

(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Whether being Hispanic constitutes a race or a national origin

category is a semantic distinction with historical implications not worthy of

consideration here.”).

35 Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 88 (2d Cir. 2015)

(emphasis supplied); see also Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d

14, 19 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing requirements for showing “an inference of ethnic

discrimination” under Title VII).

36 Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1998).

37 Although Title VII and § 1981 overlap in many respects, there are

significant differences with respect to their statutes of limitations, employers’

respondeat superior liability, the cognizability of claims against individuals (as

opposed to organizations), and whether a plaintiff must show that discrimination

was intentional. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 225‐27.

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matter of law.38 At the same time, the District Court “assumed as a

matter of law that Hispanic was a type of race.”39 Later, however, the

Court reversed course and determined that the existence of a

Hispanic “race” was a question of fact to be decided by the jury.40  

We disagree with the District Court’s ultimate decision to treat

the existence vel non of a Hispanic “race” as a question of fact. The

meaning of the word “race” in Title VII is, like any other question of

statutory interpretation, a question of law for the court.41 Here,

however, the District Court’s error was harmless, because the jury

reached the same conclusion as we do today: that discrimination

based on ethnicity, including Hispanicity or lack thereof, constitutes

racial discrimination under Title VII.  

We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, we analyze

claims of racial discrimination identically under Title VII and § 1981

in other respects, and we see no reason why we should not do the

same with respect to how we define race with for purposes of those

 38 See Barrella, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 145.

39 Id.

40 See id. at 170, 172.

41 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976) (defining

“discrimination”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Pregnancy Discrimination

Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95‐555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076; McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241

F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000)

(defining “sex” under Title VII).

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statutes.42 Second, we have repeatedly assumed that claims of

ethnicity‐based discrimination, including discrimination based on

Hispanicity, are cognizable as claims of racial discrimination under

Title VII, albeit without holding so explicitly. In Malave v. Potter

(2003), for instance, we implicitly acknowledged the viability of a

Title VII race‐discrimination claim based on Hispanic ethnicity.43

Similarly, in Krulik v. Board of Education (1986), we assumed the

viability of a Title VII claim for intentional racial discrimination

based on the plaintiff’s status as “white, Jewish, and/or not

Hispanic.”44 The Supreme Court has similarly assumed that Title

VII’s definition of race encompasses ethnicity.45  

To be clear, a claim of discrimination based on Hispanic

ethnicity or lack thereof may also be cognizable under the rubric of

national‐origin discrimination, depending on the particular facts of

 42 See, e.g., Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015); Wiercinski v.

Mangia 57, Inc., 787 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2015); Choudhury v. Polytechnic Inst. of

N.Y., 735 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1984).

43 320 F.3d 321, 324 (2d Cir. 2003).

44 781 F.2d at 21.

45 See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 464

n.37 (1986) (plurality opinion) (discussing a potential Title VII claim of

“preferential treatment to blacks and Hispanics based on race”); cf. Burlington N.

& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (“The antidiscrimination

provision [of Title VII] seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated

against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender‐based status.”

(emphasis supplied)).

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each case.46 We hold only that for purposes of Title VII, “race”

encompasses ethnicity, just as it does under § 1981.47

 46 See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (treating

“Hispanic” as a national origin); Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305,

313 (2d Cir. 1997) (same).

47 We recognize that the Executive Branch may disagree with our

interpretation. As we noted above, the federal government generally treats

“Hispanic” as a national origin, not as a race. For instance, OMB guidelines

require the Census Bureau and other federal agencies to classify “Hispanic” as a

national origin. See ante note 13 and accompanying text. Similarly, although the

EEOC has not adopted a definition of race for purposes of Title VII, it generally

follows OMB in treating “Hispanic” as a national‐origin category. See EEOC

Compliance Manual § 15‐II.  

At the same time, the EEOC has recognized that discrimination based on

ancestry can qualify as racial discrimination under Title VII; the EEOC has also

noted the possibility of “considerable overlap” between “race” and “national

origin” categories. Id. Moreover, the EEOC has suggested that discrimination

complaints involving Hispanics may implicate race. See, e.g., id. (noting that “a

discrimination complaint . . . by a dark‐skinned Latino” might “implicate race,

color, and national origin”); id. § 15‐V (discussing a hypothetical “race/national

origin” claim by a Hispanic); id. § 607.2 (noting that an employer might

acknowledge, as part of an affirmative‐action plan, that “race and national origin

played a part in” selecting a “Hispanic male” instead of an “Anglo male”).  

In any case, we need not grapple with these nuances of Executive Branch

practice. No party has argued that the Government’s reading of Title VII is

controlling; and the EEOC’s interpretation is entitled at most to so‐called Skidmore

deference—i.e., “deference to the extent it has the power to persuade.” Townsend

v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2012); see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.

Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); Barrows v. Burwell, 777 F.3d 106, 109 n.6

(2d Cir. 2015) (“[U]nder so‐called ‘Skidmore deference,’ we give effect to an

agency’s non‐legislative interpretation of a statute to the extent we find it

persuasive.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323

U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).

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4. Defendants’ Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law

We now apply these conclusions to the present case. We

review de novo a district court’s decision whether to grant a motion

for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.48 Where, as here, a jury has returned a

verdict in favor of the non‐movant, a district court may grant a Rule

50 motion “only if the court, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non‐movant, concludes that a reasonable juror

would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party.”49  

That is not the case here. Defendants offer three arguments on

appeal as to why the District Court erred in denying them judgment

as a matter of law: (1) “Hispanic” is not a race as a matter of law; (2)

even if “Hispanic” is a race as a theoretical matter, it was not shown

at trial that Bermudez and Barrella are members of different races;

and (3) Hardwick should in any case be protected by qualified

immunity, because it was not clearly established in 2010 that

Bermudez and Barrella belonged to different races as a matter of law.  

Each argument fails. As we have just established, Hispanics

constitute a race as a matter of law, under both § 1981 and Title VII.

And the evidence presented at trial unambiguously showed that

Hardwick considered Bermudez, but not Barrella, to be Hispanic.

Hardwick repeatedly identified Bermudez as Hispanic or Latino, and

 48 Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2011).

49 Id. at 333 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted).

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he frequently referred to him as the Village’s “first Hispanic police

chief.”50 Furthermore, although Bermudez self‐identified as “white,”

he also described himself as “Hispanic.”51 Barrella, for his part,

described himself as “White of Italian descent,” and there is no

indication that anyone ever considered him to be Hispanic.52

Accordingly, the jury had ample justification for concluding that

Barrella and Bermudez belonged to different “races” for purposes of

§ 1981 and Title VII.53

Finally, we reject Hardwick’s qualified‐immunity argument,

which contends—rather incredibly—that it was “objectively

reasonable” for him to believe in 2010 that federal law did not forbid

discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity.  

As is well known, “[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity shields

officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate

 50 See Barrella Br. 9‐10, 12, 40; see also J.A. 3189 (recounting Hardwick’s

testimony that he “kn[e]w that [Bermudez] was Hispanic”); J.A. 3188 (noting

Hardwick’s acknowledgment that Bermudez is “a White Latino male”); see also

Hardwick Reply Br. 13‐14 (“Hardwick has never claimed that he was unaware

that Bermudez was Hispanic.”).

51 Village Br. 41.

52 See, e.g., J.A. 3141. Defendants’ repeated insistence that Barrella “fail[ed]

to establish his own race,” e.g., Village Reply Br. 25, is baseless.  

53 Because the parties agree that Bermudez is Hispanic—even if they

contest the significance of that designation—we need not decide whose definition

of “Hispanic” matters. Cf. Jana‐Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Econ. Dev.,

438 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that federal and New York law define

“Hispanic” differently).  

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clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.”54 The determination of

qualified immunity depends both on the specific facts of an official’s

actions—e.g., “what situation confronted [him], what acts he

performed, and his motivation in performing those acts”—and on the

clarity of the legal rules governing that particular conduct.55  

This case presents many knotty legal and factual issues. For

purposes of qualified immunity, however, the question is simple. The

jury found that Hardwick appointed Bermudez rather than Barrella

because the former was “a White person of Hispanic origin” and the

latter was “a White person of Italian origin.”56 Would a reasonable

official in Hardwick’s position have known that such intentional

discrimination against non‐Hispanic whites violated Barrella’s rights

under federal antidiscrimination law?57  

 54 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

55 Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 162 (2d Cir. 2012).

56 Hardwick Reply Br. 10; see J.A. 2379.

57 Importantly, Hardwick does not argue that the law was not clearly

established with respect to when intentional racial discrimination might be

permissible. For instance, he does not claim that he gave preference to a Hispanic

as part of an arguably lawful affirmative‐action program, or that he was

attempting to appeal to Hispanic voters. See Section II.B.2, post. Accordingly, we

consider qualified immunity with respect to “unjustified” racial discrimination

only.

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The answer is plainly yes. As Hardwick acknowledges, a right

is clearly established if “the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has

recognized the right.”58 Under that standard, it has been clear since

the Reagan Administration that § 1981 bars employers from

discriminating based on Hispanic ethnicity or lack thereof.59 Indeed,

defendants manage to obscure the clarity of established law only by

failing to cite Albert v. Carovano in any of the four briefs they

collectively submitted, despite the District Court’s citation of that

case in its opinions below.60

 58 Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

59 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al‐Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); Albert v.

Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc). That the District Court

expressed some confusion about this issue does not alter the clarity of existing

law. Cf. Mangino v. Incorporated Vill. of Patchogue, 808 F.3d 951, 959 n.9 (2d Cir.

2015) (noting that multiple district‐court decisions may serve as evidence of an

ambiguity in case law only where conflicting Second Circuit precedents created

such ambiguity). Defendants point to no case suggesting that a plaintiff may not

bring a claim of discrimination based on Hispanicity under § 1981 or Title VII.  

60 Nor did either defendant cite Saint Francis College in its principal brief.

We remind counsel that attorneys have an ethical obligation to “disclose to the

tribunal controlling legal authority known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to

the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.” N.Y. Rules of

Prof’l Conduct 3.3(a)(2). That duty of candor extends to an appellant’s opening

brief. See La Cucina Mary Ann, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 541 N.Y.S.2d 220, 220 (2d

Dep’t 1989) (“[W]e remind counsel for the appellants of his affirmative obligation

to advise the court of authorities adverse to his position . . . .”); cf. United States v.

Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2002) (observing that “failure to cite controlling

authority is at best inexcusably poor lawyering and at worst suggests counsel’s

ignorance or violation of” the rules of professional conduct (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Jorgenson v. Cty. of Volusia, 846 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1988)

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The most charitable reading of Hardwick’s assertion of

qualified immunity is that the law was unsettled with respect to Title

VII. But Title VII is irrelevant to Hardwick’s personal liability, which

stems solely from § 1981.61 And in any event, it has long been obvious

under Title VII that employers may not discriminate based on

Hispanic ethnicity, even if it has not hitherto been clearly established

that such discrimination would constitute discrimination on the basis

of race.

62 In short, we conclude that the District Court correctly denied

defendants’ pre‐ and post‐verdict motions for judgment as a matter

of law pursuant to Rule 50.63

 

(“The appellants are not redeemed by the fact that opposing counsel subsequently

cited the controlling precedent. The appellants had a duty to refrain from

affirmatively misleading the court as to the state of the law. They were not

relieved of this duty by the possibility that opposing counsel might find and cite

the controlling precedent . . . .” (emphasis in original)).

61 See Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Since

Title VII imposes no liability on individuals, the doctrine of qualified immunity is

irrelevant to plaintiffʹs Title VII claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

62 See, e.g., De la Cruz, 82 F.3d at 20.

63 Because § 1981 and Title VII provide sufficient bases for affirming the

District Court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law, we need not consider

whether NYSHRL likewise defines “Hispanic” as a race. Neither the District

Court nor the parties have suggested that NYSHRL provides any remedy or

substantive right at issue in this case distinct from those provided by § 1981 or

Title VII. Cf. Lore, 670 F.3d at 169 (“[D]iscrimination claims under the [NYS]HRL

are evaluated using the same analytical framework used in Title VII actions . . . .”).

More important, defendants forfeited any claim regarding NYSHRL’s arguably

different definition of race by failing to discuss the issue in their principal briefs.

See Norton v. Samʹs Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117‐18 (2d Cir. 1998).  

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B. The District Court’s Evidentiary Rulings

We next consider defendants’ argument that we should vacate

the District Court’s judgment and order a new trial because of several

erroneous evidentiary rulings permitting the admission of lay

opinion testimony in violation of Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence. We agree with defendants that the District Court erred in

allowing several witnesses to speculate about Hardwick’s motivation

for various employment decisions, and that the errors warrant a new

trial.64

A party challenging a district court’s evidentiary rulings is

generally entitled to a new trial if (1) “the district court committed

errors that were a clear abuse of discretion,” and (2) those errors

“were clearly prejudicial to the outcome of the trial, where prejudice

is measured by assessing the error in light of the record as a whole.”65

As we have often explained, “‘abuse of discretion’ is a distinctive

term of art that is not meant as a derogatory statement about the

 64 Defendants also challenge the District Court’s decision not to admit into

evidence 2010 U.S. Census data for Freeport. The Census data would have been

relevant, defendants argue, because it would have shown the jury that the federal

government defines “Hispanic” as an ethnicity, not a race. But as we have already

stated, Hispanics constitute a race under § 1981 and Title VII as a matter of law.

See ante Section II.A. Accordingly, the parties will have no need on remand to

present evidence on this issue.  

65 Marshall v. Randall, 719 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

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district judge whose decision is found wanting.”66 Rather, the term

merely signifies that a district court “based its ruling on an erroneous

view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,

or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of

permissible decisions.”67  

1. Did the District Court “Abuse Its Discretion”?

The Village argues that the District Court abused its discretion

in allowing the jury to consider unsupported lay opinion testimony

regarding Hardwick’s reasons for promoting Bermudez. The Village

objects principally to testimony by Alfred Gros and Raymond

Maguire, as well as by Anthony Miller, Shawn Randall, Debbie

Zagaja, and Michael Woodward. The Village contends that these

witnesses impermissibly speculated as to Hardwick’s motives for

various personnel decisions, in violation of Rule 701(b) of the Federal

Rules of Evidence.

Rule 701 permits a lay witness—i.e., one not testifying as an

expert—to testify “in the form of an opinion.” But as Rule 701(b)

provides, such opinion testimony is admissible only if it is “helpful to

clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a

 66 United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193, 199‐200 (2d Cir. 2014).

67 In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

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fact in issue.”68 As we explained in Hester v. BIC Corp., Rule 701(b)

helps to protect “against the admission of opinions which would

merely tell the jury what result to reach,” rather than providing

information that would assist the jury in drawing its own

conclusions.69 In employment discrimination actions, “Rule 701(b)

bars lay opinion testimony that amounts to a naked speculation

concerning the motivation for a defendant’s adverse employment

decision.”70 Although witnesses may testify regarding “their own

observations of the defendant’s interactions with the plaintiff or with

other employees,” they may not opine as to the motives, racial or

otherwise, underlying those interactions.71

We agree with the Village that the District Court permitted the

jury to consider testimony by several witnesses that amounted to the

“naked speculation” forbidden by Rule 701(b). We focus here on the

 68 Defendants do not challenge the admission of the testimony under Rule

701(a), which requires that such testimony be “rationally based on the witness’s

perception.”

69 225 F.3d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). Hester was

decided on September 14, 2000, at which time Rule 701(b) used slightly different

language: “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the

determination of a fact in issue.” See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b) (1987) (amended 2000).

That language remained unchanged by the 2000 amendments. The 2011

amendments, which brought the rule into its present form, were “stylistic only.”

Fed. R. Evid. 701(b) advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendments. Accordingly,

Hester’s interpretation of Rule 701(b) remains valid today.

70 Hester, 225 F.3d at 185.

71 Id.

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testimony of Albert Gros, Freeport’s former assistant chief of police,

and Raymond Maguire, Hardwick’s former chief of staff.72

We begin with Gros, who testified that “there might have been

a component of race involved in [Hardwick’s] decision” to promote

Bermudez.73 Gros repeatedly emphasized that this statement

reflected only his “own personal opinion.”74 On further probing from

Judge Spatt, Gros elaborated that his opinion was based on observing

“the actions that [he] saw leading up to” various other promotions

that had occurred in the Village at about the same time.75 Specifically,

Gros suggested that Hardwick had recommended new heads of the

Human Resources, Public Works, and Building departments because

of their respective races and despite their lack of qualifications.76 At

the same time, Gros testified that he had no personal knowledge of

 72 Barrella argues that defendants failed to preserve or to properly present

for appellate review their Rule 701(b) arguments, except possibly with respect to

the testimony of Gros. See Barrella Br. 48. That argument is meritless. Defendants’

counsel objected to the introduction of inappropriate lay opinion testimony

throughout the trial and in their Rule 50 motions. See J.A. 3445, 3447. The Village

raised these arguments again on appeal, arguing expressly that testimony by Gros

and Maguire did not comply with Rule 701. See Village Br. 28‐35.

73 J.A. 3225.

74 Id.

75 Id.

76 For instance, Gros testified that the new head of Human Resources

“couldn’t possibly be qualified to do what she was doing,” and that the only

explanation he could imagine for her being hired was “that she was a female

Hispanic.” J.A. 3225‐26.

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34

any of those new hires’ qualifications or the qualifications of their

predecessors. He also testified that he was not familiar with the

responsibilities that those positions entailed or the criteria Hardwick

used in making his appointments.77  

Maguire also testified that race was a motivating factor in

Hardwick’s personnel decisions.78 Like Gros, Maguire reached this

conclusion without any personal knowledge of Hardwick’s actual

reasons. Indeed, Maguire had “no firsthand knowledge whatsoever

with regard to . . . Hardwick’s thinking” in appointing Bermudez.79

Instead, Maguire based his conclusion on his “grave concerns” about

Hardwick’s decision to replace Superintendent of Buildings Joe

Madigan, who is white, with Richard Brown, who is black.80

Although Maguire initially suggested that Brown was so unqualified

that race must have played a role in his appointment, Maguire later

admitted that he was unaware of Brown’s qualifications.81  

In short, the District Court permitted Gros and Maguire to

testify that Hardwick had recommended individuals for promotion

 77 For instance, Gros testified that he had had “very, very little interaction”

with Hardwick and had never worked with him as assistant chief or deputy chief.

J.A. 3227.

78 J.A. 3260.

79 J.A. 3280.

80 J.A. 3262.

81 J.A. 3284.

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35

based on their race, despite those witnesses’ admissions that they had

no personal knowledge of Hardwick’s selection process and only the

vaguest idea of the relevant candidates’ qualifications. Such

testimony was not helpful to the jury in the sense required by Rule

701(b), and the District Court’s decision to allow the jury to consider

it was an “abuse of discretion.”82

2. Was the District Court’s Error Harmless?

This error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.

“[W]e are especially loath to regard any error as harmless in a close

case,” and this case “was factually very close.”83  

Defendants presented evidence showing that Hardwick had

several non‐discriminatory reasons to prefer Bermudez over Barrella.

Most important, Hardwick and Bermudez were longtime friends and

Fire Department colleagues, while Hardwick and Barrella barely

 82 We note that the District Court also may have admitted testimony in

violation of Rule 701(b) from Shawn Randall, a Freeport police officer and

president of the Police Benevolent Association, who testified that Hardwick had

favored two police officers because they were black. Like Gros and Maguire,

Randall offered unsubstantiated speculation regarding Hardwick’s motivations.

See J.A. 3303 (noting, with respect to one black police officer allegedly favored by

Hardwick, that “race must have been a factor” in her preferment because she had

unspecified “baggage”). Because the Village’s briefs never discussed Randall’s

testimony in the context of its Rule 701(b) argument, however, we do not consider

whether that testimony was in fact permissible under the Federal Rules of

Evidence.

83 Hester, 225 F.3d at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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36

knew each other.84 As courts have repeatedly held, federal

antidiscrimination law does not forbid an employer from making an

employment decision “based on loyalty to a friend or relative,” even

if that decision “benefit[s] the nonprotected friend or relative at the

expense of a more qualified, protected person.”85 To put it more

bluntly: neither § 1981 nor Title VII forbids favoritism, nepotism, or

cronyism, so long as it is not premised on animus against a protected

class.86 Furthermore, Hardwick repeatedly testified that it was

politically advantageous to appoint Bermudez, a Freeport native,

rather than someone who had never lived in the Village and who

apparently had no political allies there.87  

 84 See, e.g., J.A. 3151 (noting Barrella’s testimony that before taking the

promotional examination, he “had absolutely no relationship” with Hardwick).

85 Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2003).

86 See Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Assʹn, 78 F.3d 1079, 1096 (6th Cir. 1996);

Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1995); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823,

825‐26 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Krulik, 781 F.2d at 21 (“Nothing in §§ 1981 or 1983

prevents a municipal supervisor from promoting those employees with whom she

prefers to work.”); DeCintio v. Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir.

1986) (holding that an employer did not engage in sex discrimination by

appointing his female “paramour” rather than qualified male applicants). Of

course, it may be that an employment practice that rewards an employer’s friends

to the detriment of strangers could theoretically have an adverse impact on

members of a protected class and thus could be actionable under Title VII. But

Barrella did not assert an adverse‐impact claim in this litigation.

87 See, e.g., J.A. 3197, 3218. Hardwick testified “that he did not appoint

[Barrella] primarily because he did not receive ‘any real noticeable

encouragement’ from any of the members of the [Village] Board of Trustees or

anybody else regarding [his] candidacy.” Barrella, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (quoting

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37

Barrella, for his part, offered three pieces of evidence (not

counting the impermissible lay opinion testimony), each of which

suffers from potential defects.

First, Barrella offered evidence that during Hardwick’s tenure

as mayor, the Village’s hiring disproportionately favored non‐whites.

At the most senior level, however—the hiring with which Hardwick

was most closely involved—the appointment of new department

heads actually underrepresented Hispanics and overrepresented non‐

Hispanic whites compared to Freeport’s population.88 This hardly

constitutes unambiguous evidence of bias in favor of blacks and

Hispanics.

Second, Barrella argues that he had “vastly superior

qualifications” to Bermudez.89 But that claim is overstated.90 Barrella

 

J.A. 3199). As Hardwick’s counsel put it, “no one gave [Hardwick] a reason to

interview Chris Barrella.” J.A. 3097.  

88 Hardwick nominated 18 department heads, four of whom were Hispanic

(i.e., about 22 percent), six black (i.e., about 33 percent), and eight non‐Hispanic

white (i.e., about 44 percent). J.A. 2124. Freeport’s population is approximate one‐

third white, one‐third black, and one‐third “Hispanic.” Hardwick Br. 14.  

Barrella also presented evidence that “Blacks and Hispanics constituted 96

percent of seasonal hires,” 69 percent of part‐time hires, and 61 percent of full‐

time hires in the Village during Hardwick’s tenure. J.A. 3091‐92. However,

Barrella does not suggest that Hardwick was personally involved in those hiring

decisions. See also J.A. 3166 (recording Hardwick’s testimony that he exercised

sole appointing authority only for the position of Chief of Police).  

89 Barrella Br. 40.

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38

and Bermudez each offered distinct advantages, and Hardwick was

entitled to weigh which he most valued. Moreover, even to the extent

that Barrella was more qualified, federal antidiscrimination law

“does not require that the candidate whom a court considers most

qualified for a particular position be awarded that position; it

requires only that the decision among candidates not be

discriminatory.”91

Finally, Barrella points to Hardwick’s repeated references to

Bermudez as Freeport’s “first Hispanic” or “first Latino” police chief.

This last point raises some difficult questions of law, which we urge

the parties and the District Court to consider carefully on remand.

We begin with the obvious point that an employer need not

feign ignorance of an employee’s race to avoid violating federal

antidiscrimination law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly

 90 As Barrella concedes, Bermudez was legally eligible for appointment,

since both men earned one of the three highest scores on the March 2010

promotional examination. See J.A. 203.

Although Barrella had a higher test score, more degrees, and more time as

a lieutenant than Bermudez, Bermudez had served longer in the Police

Department, was a native and resident of Freeport, and had stronger ties to

Hardwick and to the Village. J.A. 107, 113. Hardwick frequently emphasized his

desire to appoint a Village resident as chief, and in fact, Police Department rules

seem to have required officers to live in the Village, although the requirement was

often honored in the breach. See J.A. 3120. Moreover, Hardwick testified that the

outgoing chief, Michael Woodward, recommended Lieutenants Bermudez and

Zagaja as his potential successors—not Barrella. J.A. 3184, 3190.

91 See Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1980).

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39

acknowledged the lawfulness of affirmative‐action initiatives

designed to remedy past discrimination, as long as they do not

employ tools, “such as quota systems, set‐aside programs, and

differential scoring cutoffs, which utilize express racial classifications

and which prevent non‐minorities from competing for specific

slots.”92 Accordingly, an employer’s stated desire for diversity in the

workplace does not, without more, establish discriminatory intent

with respect to any particular employment decision.93

Moreover, neither § 1981 nor Title VII categorically forbids

politicians from considering an appointment’s political implications.

As the Seventh Circuit has observed, “it is not a violation of Title

VII”—or of § 1981—“to take advantage of a situation to gain political

favor.”94 Indeed, the urge of politicians to take credit for hiring or

promoting members of hitherto underrepresented communities has

 92 Hayden v. Cty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1999); accord Johnson v.

Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620, 640‐41 (1987). Defendants do not argue that

Bermudez’s appointment was part of such an affirmative‐action program.

93 See Hayden, 180 F.3d at 48‐50; Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 947 F.2d 1021,

1022 (2d Cir. 1991).

94 See Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 567 (7th Cir. 2007). Federal

antidiscrimination statutes are not the only part of our law to sit uneasily with

some modes of traditional politics. The Seventh Circuit recently vacated certain

counts of conviction of former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich for trying to

“sell” a Senate seat, on the ground that prosecutors improperly conflated bribery

and extortion with ordinary political “logrolling”—a well‐established practice

than may be unethical or unwise, but which, like certain forms of ethnic politics, is

often permissible under federal law. See United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729,

734‐38 (7th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 17, 2015) (No. 15‐664).  

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40

often “been a powerful means of achieving the social and political

integration of excluded groups.”95  

Of course, ethnic politics is not always benign.96 A

governmental employer may not excuse otherwise unlawful

discrimination by pleading that it was simply responding to voters’

 95 See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 108 (1990) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 944 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,

dissenting) (describing the “ethnic character” of urban politics, including the use

of ethnically “‘balanced tickets’” to ensure broad electoral appeal (quoting Nathan

Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans,

Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City 20 (1963))). As the Supreme Court observed

in the context of the Voting Rights Act,  

there are communities in which minority citizens are able to form

coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having

no need to be a majority within a single district in order to elect

candidates of their choice. Those candidates may not represent

perfection to every minority voter, but minority voters are not

immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find

common political ground, the virtue of which is not to be slighted

in applying a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in

American politics.

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).

96 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)

(plurality opinion) (“Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for . . .

race‐based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications

are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by . . .

simple racial politics.”).

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41

preferences.97 Our point is only that an otherwise lawful employment

decision—one that was made for race‐neutral reasons or as part of a

lawful affirmative‐action plan—does not become unlawful merely

because the decision‐maker believed that some voters might evaluate

that decision at least partly through the lens of identity politics.  

The line between legitimate politics and illegitimate racial

discrimination can be difficult to draw in practice98—which

reinforces our assessment of this case as factually close. This trial

presented inherently thorny questions of motivation, which were

further complicated by pervasive uncertainty about the definition of

race. In an otherwise confusing trial, the lay opinion testimony at

issue here presented some of the clearest claims about Hardwick’s

motives. Unsurprisingly, Barrella’s counsel emphasized that

testimony during the summation and rebuttal. The jury’s five‐day

deliberation suggests that it continued to regard this case as difficult

until the end. Accordingly, we have little trouble concluding that this

case was sufficiently close that “even the smallest error may have

 97 See Brennan, 650 F.3d at 115 n.51; United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837

F.2d 1181, 1224 (2d Cir. 1987); see generally Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle, State

Action, and Legal Rights, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2006).

98 Compare Ricci, 557 U.S. at 597, 605 (Alito, J., concurring) (condemning an

employment action as an “illegitimate” attempt “to placate a politically important

racial constituency,” but denying that he has “equat[ed] political considerations

with unlawful discrimination”), with id. at 642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]here

are many ways in which a politician can attempt to win over a constituency—

including a racial constituency—without engaging in unlawful discrimination.”).

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been enough to tilt the balance,”99 and that the prejudice caused to

defendants by the District Court’s Rule 701 rulings warrants a new

trial.

C. The Village’s Respondeat Superior Liability

Because we conclude that a new trial is required, we need not

consider the parties’ remaining arguments.100 Nonetheless, we offer

some guidance regarding one more issue that is likely to recur at

trial: whether the District Court erred in failing to instruct the jury

that a municipality may not be held liable under a theory of

respondeat superior.

The Village’s argument that Judge Spatt erred in this respect is

meritless. As the Village rightly points out, a municipality may not be

held liable under §§ 1981 or 1983 for an injury inflicted by its agents

unless “the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a municipal

 99 See Hester, 225 F.3d at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted).

100 Namely, defendants’ arguments that the District Court erred in denying

defendants’ Rule 59 motion for a new trial, because the jury’s verdict was against

the weight of the evidence; that the District Court improperly coerced the jury to

render a verdict; that the District Court erred in denying remittitur; and that the

District Court awarded unreasonably high attorneys’ fees to Barrella. Similarly,

we need not consider Barrella’s argument that the District Court erred in

declining to award additional compensation to offset the negative tax

consequences of his receiving his damages for front and back pay as a lump sum.  

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policy or custom.”101 But for two reasons, that argument carries no

weight in the present case.

First, Barrella sued under both § 1981 and Title VII, the latter of

which does indeed permit respondeat superior liability.102 Since the

same substantive standards govern claims under both statutes,103 a

verdict that Hardwick intentionally discriminated against Barrella

within the meaning of § 1981 would, absent any other defenses, entail

a violation of Title VII—and, thus, respondeat superior liability for

the municipality.

Second, even under § 1981, a municipality may be held liable

for the actions of high‐ranking officials with final policymaking

authority.104 In particular, even a single adverse employment action,

“if ordered by a person whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, can, by itself, support a claim against a

municipality.”105 Here, Freeport concedes that Hardwick exercised

“the sole authority to appoint a Chief of Police.”106 The Village may

 101 Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

102 See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013) (discussing

vicarious liability under Title VII in the context of workplace harassment).

103 See Wiercinski, 787 F.3d at 113.

104 See Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 315.

105 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

106 Village Br. 11.

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therefore be held liable in the event that the jury finds that Hardwick

intentionally discriminated against Barrella on the basis of race. 107

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize, we hold as follows:

(1) The meaning of “race” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and

Title VII is, like other questions of statutory interpretation, a

matter of law.

(2) As a matter of law, “Hispanic” is a race for purposes of

§ 1981 and Title VII.

a. Longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit

precedent defines “race,” for purposes of § 1981, as

encompassing ethnicity. Accordingly, it has been

clear at least since our decision in Albert v. Carovano,

851 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), that § 1981

protects against discrimination based on ethnicity,

including Hispanic ethnicity or lack thereof.

b. Because it has been clearly established at least since

1988 that “Hispanic” describes a race for purposes of

 107 See Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 331 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[S]ince the

City concedes that its mayor is a high‐ranking official with final policymaking

authority in the municipal employment area at issue in this case, the City can,

pursuant to § 1983, be held liable for the actions of its mayor.”).

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45

§ 1981, we reject Hardwick’s assertion of qualified

immunity based on his claim that it was “objectively

reasonable” for him to believe that discrimination

based on Hispanic ethnicity did not constitute racial

discrimination under federal law.  

c. Under Title VII, as with § 1981, “race” encompasses

ethnicity. Accordingly, a plaintiff who alleges

employment discrimination based on Hispanic

ethnicity or lack thereof may be able to state a claim

of racial discrimination within the meaning of Title

VII.

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court

insofar as it denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a

matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

(3) The District Court erred in admitting lay opinion testimony

that impermissibly speculated as to Hardwick’s reasons for

promoting Bermudez, in violation of Rule 701(b) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.  

a. Reviewing the District Court’s evidentiary rulings

under the so‐called “abuse of discretion” standard,

we conclude that the District Court erroneously

allowed lay witnesses to speculate that racial

considerations may have influenced Hardwick’s

appointment of Bermudez.

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b. Because this was a factually close case, we conclude

that the District Court’s error prejudiced defendants,

and that a new trial is necessary. Accordingly, we

VACATE the District Court’s judgment and

REMAND to the District Court for a new trial

consistent with this opinion.  

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Appendix: Census Treatment of “Hispanics”

The following table summarizes the various labels the Census has employed 

group we now call “Hispanic.” Unless otherwise specified, citations are to U.S. Cen

Measuring America: The Decennial Censuses from 1790 to 2000 (2002) (“Measuring America”)

Census

Year

Classification/Question “Hispanic” Responses Notes 

1930 “Color or race” “Mexican” Until 1930, “Mexicans” had

been “white.”

MeAm

1940 “Color or race” (None) “Mexicans” once again

became “white,” unless they

were “definitely” some other

race.

MeAm

“Mother tongue” Spanish First time Census tabulated

linguistic data on native‐born

Americans.

HuHo

13, 

1950 “White population of

Spanish surname”

Based on a list of 6,000

Spanish surnamescompiled by the

Immigration &

Naturalization Service

Compiled only for five states

(AZ, CA, CO, NM, TX).

U.

Sp

PerSp

3C

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48

Census

Year

Classification/Question “Hispanic” Responses Notes 

1960 Same as 1950 Census Census also counted “Puerto

Ricans in the United States.”

U.

Sp

Per

Sp

at 

1970 “Is this person’s origin or

descent—”?

“Mexican”; “PuertoRican”; “Cuban”; “Central

or South American”;

“Other Spanish”; “No,none of these”

MeAm

1980 “Is this person of

Spanish/Hispanic origin or

descent?”

“No (not Spanish/

Hispanic)”; “Yes, Mexican,

Mexican‐Amer., Chicano”;“Yes, Puerto Rican”; “Yes,

Cuban”; “Yes, otherSpanish/Hispanic”

MeAm

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Census

Year

Classification/Question “Hispanic” Responses Notes 

1990 “Is this person of

Spanish/Hispanic origin?”

Same as 1980, except that

“other Spanish/Hispanic”now asked to “Print one

group, for example:Argentinean, Colombian,

Dominican, Nicaraguan,Salvadoran, Spaniard, and

so on.”

MeAm

2000 “Is this person

Spanish/Hispanic/Latino?”

“No, not

Spanish/Hispanic/Latino”;“Yes, Mexican, Mexican

Am., Chicano”; “Yes,

Puerto Rican”; “Yes,

Cuban”; “Yes, otherSpanish/Hispanic/Latino—Print group”

MeAm

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Census

Year

Classification/Question “Hispanic” Responses Notes 

2010 “Is this person of

Hispanic, Latino, or

Spanish origin?”

“No, not of Hispanic,

Latino, or Spanish origin”;

“Yes, Mexican, Mexican

Am., Chicano”; “Yes,

Puerto Rican”; “Yes,

Cuban”; “Yes, another

Hispanic, Latino, or

Spanish origin—Print

origin, for example,

Argentinean, Colombian,

Dominican, Nicaraguan,Salvadoran, Spaniard, and soon.”

A new instruction was added:

“NOTE: Please answer BOTH

Question 5 about Hispanic

origin and Question 6 aboutrace. For this census,

Hispanic origins are notraces.”

U.

Hi

Pop

(20

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