Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00212/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00212-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Marie Kaye Crawford
Plaintiff

Document Text:

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 1

No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MARIE KAYE CRAWFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:08cv212-WC

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Marie Kaye Crawford (Crawford) applied for supplemental security income

(SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (2000) (the Act),

alleging she suffered from a disability. Crawford’s application was denied at the initial

administrative level. Crawford then requested and received a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied the claims.

The Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s decision

consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(Commissioner). See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is 1

now before the Court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),

both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and entry of a final judgment

Case 2:08-cv-00212-WC Document 17 Filed 04/20/09 Page 1 of 8
A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or 2

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.

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by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. #7);

Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. #8). Based on the Court’s review of the record and the

briefs of the parties, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five step, sequential

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2006).

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the Listing of

Impairments]

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not

disabled.”

Case 2:08-cv-00212-WC Document 17 Filed 04/20/09 Page 2 of 8
 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case

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(SSI). The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are

appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.

1981) (Unit A).

See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 4

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McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). 

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The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357

F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying

disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 4. At Step 5,

the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a significant number

of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s Residual

Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still able to do

despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other evidence. Id. It also

can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 1242-43. At the fifth step,

the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine if

there are jobs available in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To

do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical Vocational Guidelines (grids) or call a vocational 4

expert. Id. at 1239-40.

The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary or

light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience.

Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available to an

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individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a statutorilyrequired finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This Court must

find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial

evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of

the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must view the record in its

entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ.

Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No similar

presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal conclusions,

including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating

claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ISSUES

A. Introduction

Crawford was thirty-nine years old and had at least a high school education at the time

of the hearing before the ALJ. (Tr. 27). Crawford’s prior work experience included

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employment as an industrial housekeeper (unskilled, heavy); nurses assistant (semi-skilled,

medium); laborer (unskilled, medium) and wire harness assembler (semi-skilled, light). (Tr.

27). 

Employing the five-step process, the ALJ found Crawford had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity at any time relevant to the decision (Step 1). (Tr. 21). At Step

2, the ALJ found Crawford suffered from the following severe impairments: hypertension,

insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, degenerative joint disease of the left knee, degenerative

disc disease of the lumbosacral spine, major depression with psychotic features, and diabetic

peripheral neuropathy. Id. Nonetheless, the ALJ found Crawford did not possess an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the criteria of any listed

impairment set forth in the Listing of Impairments (Step 3). (Tr. 23). At Step 4, the ALJ

determined Crawford did not possess the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform any

past relevant work. (Tr. 27).

At Step Five, the ALJ evaluated Crawford’s RFC, age, education, and work

experience, as well as testimony from a vocational expert (VE) regarding the availability in

significant numbers, of other work Crawford could perform in the national economy. Upon

consideration of this evidence, the ALJ determined Crawford possessed the RFC to perform

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 27). Consequently, the

ALJ found Crawford was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 28).

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B. Claims

Crawford presents one issue for this Court to consider: Whether the ALJ properly

considered the medical evidence.

IV. DISCUSSION

Crawford specifically argues that the ALJ erred by failing to afford proper weight to

consulting psychiatrist Dr. Demuth’s opinion and instead relied on non-examining sources.

The Commissioner argues the ALJ properly disregarded Dr. Demuth’s conclusions as they

were inconsistent with his own report and were based on Crawford’s subjective complaints

that were not credible.

“[T]he ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports

a contrary conclusion.” Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir.1985) (quotation

marks and citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b) (“[The ALJ] will always

consider the medical opinions in [the] case record together with the rest of the relevant

evidence ... receive[d].”). Here, the ALJ did not err in assigning minimal weight to the

medical opinion of Dr. Demuth because he found, after reviewing the entire record, that the

opinion was not supported by the evidence. See Wilkinson v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 289

Fed. App’x 384, 386 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding no error where ALJ rejected examining

physician’s opinion in favor of non-examining physicians’ opinions). 

Dr. Demuth opined that Crawford had moderate to severe impairments in her ability

Case 2:08-cv-00212-WC Document 17 Filed 04/20/09 Page 6 of 8
 Crawford does not challenge the ALJ’s determination that her subjective complaint 5

testimony was unreliable.

 According to Dr. Demuth’s records, Crawford was able to: complete serial four 6

additions; calculate multiplications; solve word problems; identify similarities and differences

between different objects; knew what to do in case of a fire or if she found a stamped envelope;

give details about the current news and identify the President and preceding Presidents, large

cities, and famous people; give a detailed description of her trip to the examination and describe

what she had done in the prior twenty-four hours. (Tr. 122-23).

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to understand, remember, and carry out instructions and to respond appropriately to

supervision, coworkers, and work pressures. (Tr. 123). In his opinion, the ALJ specifically

stated that Dr. Demuth’s “report faile[ed] to reveal the type of significant clinical and

laboratory abnormalities one would expect if [Crawford] were in fact so limited, and the

doctor did not specifically address this weakness.” (Tr. 26-27). The ALJ also pointed to the

fact that Dr. Demuth “relied quite heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and

limitations provided by [Crawford],” which the ALJ determined to be unreliable. Indeed, 5

Dr. Demuth’s report indicated that Crawford was oriented, demonstrated a logical stream of

thought, her memory was fair, and her judgment and decision making were only slightly

impaired. Id. The reported details of Dr. Demuth’s examination of Crawford regarding her

memory and mental capacities did not match his final conclusions.6

Further, the ALJ did not give undue weight to the opinions of the non-examining state

agency physicians because he did not rely solely on those opinions. Wilkinson, 289 Fed.

App’x at 386; see also Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir.1985) (holding

that, “taken alone,” the opinions of non-examining physicians “do not constitute substantial

Case 2:08-cv-00212-WC Document 17 Filed 04/20/09 Page 7 of 8
 Examining physician Dr. Colley assessed that Crawford could perform a range of work 7

at the light exertional level. (Tr. 28). 

 Crawford also argued that the ALJ should have discussed treating physician Dr. 8

Howell’s narrative report in his opinion. However, the “ALJ was not required to list in detail

every bit of evidence he relied on to reach [his] decision.” Wilkinson, 289 Fed. App’x at

386, (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.2005) (stating that “there is

no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his

decision”)). The Commissioner is correct that Dr. Howell’s narrative report does not “challenge

Dr. James Colley’s findings that [Crawford] was capable of light work.” (Doc. #15 at 5). 

Further, Crawford concedes that the narrative report does not “specifically cit[e] a complete

inability to work.” (Doc. #12 at 10). It is clear from the ALJ’s opinion that he considered Dr.

Howell’s opinion in making the RFC determination and the RFC determination was not

inconsistent with Dr. Howell’s treatment notes. 

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evidence on which to base an administrative decision”). The ALJ considered the opinions

of other treating, examining, and non-examining physicians, treatment notes, and 7

Crawford’s own testimony. Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s 8

determination in this case.

V. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the findings and conclusions detailed in this Memorandum Opinion and

Order, the Court concludes the ALJ’s non-disability determination and denial of benefits is

supported by substantial evidence. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the decision of the

Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A separate judgment is entered herewith. 

DONE this 20th day of April, 2009.

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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