Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03152/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03152-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Denver Earl Anderson
Appellant
United Telephone Company of Kansas
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

PILBD 

Uaired Sr~ Cwn of Apj*ls 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAV S .. 1911 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DENVER EARL ANDERSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY OF 

KANSAS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 89-3152 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 86-2511-0) 

Kelly L. McClelland, Hale, Kincaid, Waters & Allen, P.C., Liberty, Missouri~ and Benjamin F. Farney, Law Offices of Benjamin F. 

Farney, Overland Park, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Arlyn D. Haxton (Jennifer A. Putman with him 

Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly, Davis & 

Missouri, for Defendant-Appellee. 

on the brief), of 

Dicus, Kansas City, 

Before SEYMOUR, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

~, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-3152 Document: 01019292086 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Denver Anderson appeals a district court 

order granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

in favor of defendant-appellee United Telephone Company of Kansas 

(UTC). On appeal, Anderson argues the district court erred by 

finding a criminal blacklisting conviction is required for civil 

blacklisting liability. Anderson also argues the district court 

erred in granting a judgment for UTC because UTC did not base the 

motion for judgment n.o.v. on the same grounds raised in the motion for directed verdict. We exercise jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

Anderson was terminated from his employment with UTC in 

November 1985. In December 1985, he interviewed with United 

Telephone Company of Missouri, a company affiliated with UTC. He 

was not offered employment with that company. Anderson also was 

denied employment with Installation Technicians, Inc., a company 

that has contracted with UTC for telephone installation. Anderson 

ultimately brought suit against UTC in federal district court, 

alleging civil blacklisting in violation of title 44, section 119 

of the Kansas Statutes; age discrimination and retaliation in 

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 

u.s.c. §§ 621 et ~; breach of an implied employment contract; 

and fraud. Anderson concedes UTC has not been prosecuted for 

criminal blacklisting. 

At the close of Anderson's case at trial, UTC moved for a 

directed verdict on the five claims. The district court entered 

judgment for UTC on the fraud claim. At the close of all the 

evidence, UTC moved for a directed verdict on the remaining 

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claims. UTC specifically argued the evidence was insufficient to 

support a claim for civil blacklisting under section 44-119. The 

court deferred ruling on UTC's motion for directed verdict and 

submitted the case to the jury. The jury found in favor of UTC on 

the age discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract 

claims. On the civil blacklisting claim, however, the jury 

returned a verdict for Anderson and awarded damages. 

Following the jury verdict, UTC filed a motion for 

judgment n.o.v. and a motion for a new trial on the blacklisting 

claim, again arguing the evidence is insufficient to support a 

jury verdict against UTC for civil blacklisting. In a 

supplemental brief supporting the motion for judgment n.o.v., UTC 

argued Anderson's failure to introduce evidence that UTC had been 

convicted of criminal blacklisting precluded recovery for civil 

blacklisting. Anderson filed a motion for new trial on the breach 

of contract claim. The court ultimately denied Anderson's motion 

for a new trial on the breach of contract claim but granted UTC's 

motion for judgment n.o.v. on the blacklisting claim. 

Anderson contends a criminal conviction under sections 44-117 

and 44-118 is not required for civil liability under 

section 44-119. We review this question of statutory interpretation de novo. See Stissi ~Interstate~ Ocean Transp. Co., 765 

F.2d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 1985); United States~ Horowitz, 756 F.2d 

1400, 1403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 822 (1985). In 

1897, the Kansas legislature enacted the blacklisting law at issue 

in this case. The statute states: 

Any employer of labor 

discharged any person 

in this 

from his 

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state, after having 

service, shall not 

Appellate Case: 89-3152 Document: 01019292086 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 3 
prevent or attempt to prevent by word, sign or writing 

of any kind whatsoever any such discharged employee from 

obtaining employment from any other person, company or 

corporation, except by furnishing in writing, on 

request~ the cause of such discharge. 

Kan. Stat. § 44-117 (1986). The statute establishes criminal 

penalties for a blacklisting violation: 

Any employer of labor, his agent or employee, who shall 

violate the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a 

misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction be fined for each 

offense the sum of one hundred dollars and thirty days' 

imprisonment in the county jail. 

Id. § 44-118. The statute also provides for civil penalties: 

Any person, firm or corporation found guilty of the 

violation of this act, shall be liable to the party 

injured to an amount equal to three times the sum he may 

be injured, and such employers of labor shall also be 

liable for a reasonable attorney fee, which shall be 

taxed as part of the costs in the case. 

Id. § 44-119 (emphasis added). 

In discerning the Kansas legislature's intent in 

section 44-119, we first look to the statutory language. Mead 

Corp. ~Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 722 (1989); Watt~ Alaska, 451 

U.S. 259, 265-66 (1981). Legislative purpose generally is 

expressed in the ordinary meaning of the words the legislature has 

used. See United States~ Locke, 471 u.s. 84, 95 (1985); Perrin 

~United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). Further, the 

legislature's use of two different terms is presumed to be 

intentional. National Wildlife Fed'n ~ Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 

172 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing Russell ~ Law Enforcement Assistance 

Admin. of the United States, 637 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 

1981)). 

Here, an examination of the statutory language indicates a 

criminal blacklisting conviction is required for civil recovery 

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under section 44-119. The statute states: "Any ... corporation 

found guilty of the violation of this act, shall be liable to the 

party injured .... " 44 Kan. Stat. § 44-119. In this provision, the legislature specifically used the terms "guilty" and 

"liable." Presuming the use of both terms to be intentional, we 

construe these terms in an ordinary way to mean criminal guilt and 

civil liability. When these terms are regarded in the context of 

the entire provision, we are convinced the Kansas legislature 

meant a corporation shall "be liable" only when it has been "found 

guilty" of criminal blacklisting. Based on the plain language of 

the statute, we hold a criminal blacklisting conviction is an 

element of a civil blacklisting claim against an employer under 

Kansas law. 

Anderson contends the district court erred in granting 

judgment for UTC because UTC did not base the motion for judgment 

n.o.v. on the same grounds raised in the motion for directed 

verdict. Rule 50(b) states: "Whenever a motion for a directed 

verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any 

reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the 

action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal 

questions raised by the motion." According to Rule 50(a), "[a] 

motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds 

therefor." A motion for judgment n.o.v. cannot assert new matters 

not presented in the motion for directed verdict. Dow Chemical 

Corp. ~ Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481, 486 (lOth Cir. 1990); 

United States~ Penix~ Scisson, Inc., 360 F.2d 260, 265 (lOth 

Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967). 

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This court has recognized that in satisfying the requirements 

of Rule 50, technical precision is unnecessary. Fenix ~ Scisson, 

360 F.2d at 266. Because the requirement of Rule 50 that a 

directed verdict motion must precede a motion for judgment n.o.v. 

is "'harsh in any circumstance[],'" a directed verdict motion 

should not be reviewed narrowly but rather in light of the purpose 

of the rules to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of a case. 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure§ 2537, at 597 n.32 (1971) (quoting Mosley~ Cia. Mar. 

Adra S.A., 362 F.2d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 

u.s. 933 (1967)); see also National Indus., Inc.~ Sharon Steel 

Corp., 781 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986) (taking liberal view 

because "rule is a harsh one"). As the Fourth Circuit has noted, 

"rigid application of this rule is inappropriate . . . where such 

application serves neither of the rule's rationales -- protecting 

the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, and ensuring that 

the opposing party has enough notice of the alleged error to 

permit an attempt to cure it before resting." FSLIC ~Reeves, 

816 F.2d 130, 138 (4th Cir. 1987); see also McCarty~ Pheasant 

Run, Inc. 826 F.2d 1554, 1556 (7th Cir. 1987) (modern rationale of 

rule is opposing party should have opportunity to rectify 

deficiencies in evidence presented to jury before it is too late); 

Miller~ Rowan Cos., 815 F.2d 1021, 1024 n.4, 1025 (5th Cir. 

1987) (aims of rule include avoiding trapping plaintiff after 

submittal to jury because he cannot then cure defects in proof and 

securing fair trial); Lifshitz~ Walter Drake~ Sons, Inc., 

806 F.2d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir. 1986) (purpose of directed verdict 

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motion is to provide notice of claimed evidentiary insufficiencies 

and preserve issue of sufficiency of evidence as question of law); 

Sharon Steel Corp., 781 F.2d at 1549 (purpose of directed verdict 

requirement is to avoid ambushing court and opposing party after 

the verdict so that only remedy is completely new trial) (citing 

Quinn~ Southwest Wood Prods., Inc., 597 F.2d 1018, 1025 

(5th Cir. 1979)); Acosta~ Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 831-32 

(3d Cir. 1983) (same) (citing Wall ~ United States, 592 F.2d 154 

(3d Cir. 1979)). 

Here, UTC moved for a directed verdict on the blacklisting 

claim after Anderson had presented his case at trial. At the 

close of all the evidence, UTC again moved for a directed verdict 

on the blacklisting claim. In this directed verdict motion, UTC 

specifically argued there was insufficient evidence to support a 

claim for civil blacklisting under section 44-119. Following the 

jury verdict, UTC filed a motion for judgment n.o.v. and a motion 

for new trial on the grounds the evidence was insufficient to support the civil blacklisting claim. Because UTC raised insufficiency of the evidence on the blacklisting claim as specific 

grounds for both the motion for directed verdict and the motion 

for judgment n.o.v., we hold UTC has complied with the requirements of Rule 50. 

Anderson argues Rule 50 demands that UTC must have stated in 

the directed verdict motion the evidence is insufficient to prove 

the element of a criminal blacklisting conviction. Although Rule 

50(a) requires a motion for directed verdict to state the 

"specific grounds," the rule does not define how specific the 

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Appellate Case: 89-3152 Document: 01019292086 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 7 
grounds must be. We are convinced that UTC's directed verdict 

motion satisfies the rule's requirement. To be sure, a more 

specific motion may be upheld. See, ~' Acosta, 717 F.2d at 

832; Thezan ~Maritime Overseas Corp., 708 F.2d 175, 179 n.2 

(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984). However, a 

significant number of the cases interpreting Rule SO's specificity 

requirement have accepted less specificity in directed verdict 

motions. See, ~' Sharon Steel, 781 F.2d at 1548-49 (motion 

raising issue of sufficiency of evidence for liability, damages, 

and future lost profits sufficient to raise sufficiency of 

evidence of injury to goodwill and reputation); Stewart~ 

Thigpen, 730 F.2d 1002, 1006 n.2 (5th Cir. 1984) (motion requesting "the verdict be directed in the plaintiff's favor and award 

damages to the plaintiff" sufficient when parties and court 

understood basis for motion was sufficiency of evidence to support 

claim); Acosta, 717 F.2d at 832 (motion raising sufficiency of 

evidence for "Counts I and the remaining counts" under theories of 

strict liability and negligence sufficient to raise issue of punitive damages); Cortez~ Life Ins. Co. of America, 408 F.2d 500, 

503 (8th Cir. 1969) (motion based on lack of grounds for liability 

sufficient) . 

Because Rule SO(a) does not itself define "specific grounds," 

we must determine in each case whether the purposes the rule 

embodies have been served. See Acosta, 717 F.2d at 832 ("communicative content, 'specificity' and notice-giving function of an 

assertion [in a directed verdict motion) should be judged in 

context"); see also K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 157-58 (1960) 

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Appellate Case: 89-3152 Document: 01019292086 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 8 
("[T]he rule follows where its reason leads; where the reason 

stops, there stops the rule."); cf. Benson~ Allphin, 786 F.2d 

268, 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 848 (1986) (construing 

Rule SO(b) liberally to serve rule's purpose). 

We believe requiring more specificity in this case would be 

harsh and run contrary to the policy favoring a liberal application of the rules to allow correction of evidentiary shortcomings 

and provide a just and efficient determination of the case. More 

specific notice would be useless here because there is no possibility Anderson could have corrected the evidentiary shortcoming 

during trial. Like the Fourth Circuit in Reeves, we refuse to 

reverse the district court's judgment and grant a new trial based 

on an alleged procedural error that did not prejudice the 

plaintiff in any way. 816 F.2d at 138; see also Benson, 786 F.2d 

at 274 (because question of qualified immunity is addressed to 

court, not jury, strict compliance with Rule 50 not necessary when 

no prejudice involved). The defendant here raised the defense of 

failure to state a claim for blacklisting at the first opportunity 

in the answer to the complaint. Clearly, Anderson's right to a 

jury trial and possible lack of notice of the deficiency of the 

blacklisting claim did not prejudice him. Further, granting 

Anderson a new trial on the blacklisting claim would defeat the 

rule's objective of ensuring a just and efficient determination 

since the record shows Anderson cannot prove he is entitled to 

relief based on our interpretation of section 44-119. 

Anderson finally contends UTC waived the defense of failure 

to plead and prove a condition precedent -- here, a criminal 

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Appellate Case: 89-3152 Document: 01019292086 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 9 
conviction under section 44-118 -- by not pleading it with the 

specificity and particularity Rule 9(c) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure requires. Although the district court labeled the 

criminal conviction requirement a "condition precedent," thereby 

apparently implicating the special pleading requirements of 

Rule 9(c), we reject this characterization. 

We are convinced the requirement of criminal liability is 

simply a statutory element that does not implicate Rule 9(c). 

Rule 9(c) requires: "A denial of performance or occurrence (of 

conditions precedent] shall be made specifically and with 

particularity." This special pleading requirement has been applied to conditions precedent in common law contracts claims and 

nonjurisdictional agency exhaustion requirements in some federal 

statutory claims. See, ~' McKee-Berger-Mansueto, Inc. ~Board 

of Educ., 626 F.2d 559, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1980) (lack of specific 

statements in pleadings contesting adequacy of company's 

performance of contract for construction management services 

implicates Rule 9(c)); Ginsburg~ Insurance Co. of~ Am., 427 

F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (6th Cir. 1970) (failure to specifically deny 

timely filing of proof of loss in insurance contract implicates 

Rule 9(c)); Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co.~ Bowman, 313 F.2d 381, 387 

(lOth Cir. 1963) (proof of loss is condition precedent to enforcement of insurance contract); Jackson~ Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 

678 F.2d 992, 999 n.7, 1000-01 (11th Cir. 1982) (failure to allege 

in pleadings exhaustion of administrative remedies implicates Rule 

9(c)). We find no indication in the rules or the case law that 

the special pleading requirements of Rule 9(c) were meant to apply 

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more broadly to pleading the basic elements of a cause of action. 

Cf. EEOC~ Klinger Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 106-07 (5th Cir. 

Unit A Feb. 1981) (federal statute requiring "proper averment in 

[EEOC's] complaint that conciliation has failed" creates condition 

precedent subject to Rule 9(c)). Although we acknowledge the 

proof of all statutory elements may be described loosely as a 

precondition to recovery, we conclude the statutory requirement of 

criminal blacklisting is not a condition precedent as contemplated 

by Rule 9(c). 

Much of the confusion in this case rises from the fact the 

plaintiff simply failed to offer evidence at trial entitling him 

to relief. We refuse to find the defendant acquired responsibility to notify the court of specific factual shortcomings beyond 

raising the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on the blacklisting claim in the motions for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. 

When there have been no procedural violations, the benefit of 

hindsight will not cause us to conclude the defendant must suffer 

from both parties' failure to sharpen for the court the specific 

legal question of the statutory requirements of section 44-119. 

Under the facts of this case, we see nothing improper in the 

determination of this specific legal question post-verdict in the 

hearing on the judgment n.o.v. when it did not affect the factual 

determinations or weighing of the evidence on the issues before 

jury. In the interests of fairness to the parties and judicial 

efficiency, we AFFIRM. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3152 Document: 01019292086 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 11 
No. 89-3152, Denver Earl Anderson v. United Telephone Company of 

Kansas 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I must respectfully dissent. In my view the district court's 

actions here violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in at 

least two respects. The majority upholds this conduct by engaging 

in circular reasoning under which the lack of compliance with one 

rule is somehow excused by noncompliance with another. 

First, the grant of judgment n.o.v. in this case was a clear 

abuse of discretion under the case law of this and other circuits. 

The district court based its judgment on Anderson's failure to 

establish a prior criminal conviction for blacklisting, an element 

that the court viewed as a prerequisite for civil liability under 

the Kansas statute. The majority agrees with the district court's 

construction of this statute, stating that the statute's plain 

language requires proof of a criminal conviction. Notwithstanding 

this plain language, defendant did not originally move for either 

a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. on this ground. Indeed the 

district court raised the issue sua sponte after the jury had 

returned a verdict and after defendant had filed its post-trial 

motions on other grounds. 

In accordance with settled authority, this court has clearly 

held that "[o]nly questions raised in a prior motion for directed 

Appellate Case: 89-3152 Document: 01019292086 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 12 
verdict may be pursued in a motion for judgment notwithstanding 

the verdict." Dow Chemical Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 

481, 486 (lOth Cir. 1990); see Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 

F.2d 1452, 1455 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1987); SA J. Moore & J. Lucas, 

Moore's Federal Practice 11 50.08 (2d ed. 1990). Here, of course, 

the ground upon which the district court granted j.n.o.v. was not 

raised by defendant in either its motion for directed verdict or 

its motion for j.n.o.v. Two other circuits have reversed a 

district court's grant of j.n.o.v. under similar circumstances. 

See Kutner Buick, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 868 F.2d 614, 617 

(3d Cir. 1989); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 

171-72 (5th Cir. 1985). If, as the majority asserts, the statute 

plainly requires a prior conviction, defendant has no excuse for 

not asserting the requirement in a timely fashion. 

The majority seeks to avoid the fact that the court's grant 

of j.n.o.v. here clearly contravened governing authority by 

attempting to bring this case within a line of opinions excusing 

lack of technical compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. In so doing 

the majority is wrong on the record and the law. The cases upon 

which it relies that do not require technical compliance, see Maj. 

op. at 8, are readily distinguishable because they involve 

circumstances where the parties and the district court had 

adequate actual notice that the issue was in the case prior to 

jury deliberation. It is undisputed on this record that the need 

for a prior criminal blacklisting conviction was not anticipated 

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or addressed by either party until the court raised it sua sponte 

after defendant's post-trial motion had been filed. 1 The alleged 

requirement was simply not an issue in the case until that point. 

Indeed, defendant's motion for directed verdict and its 

original motion for j.n.o.v. made only general allegations that 

the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the 

blacklisting claim. Neither motion specifically raised the lack 

of evidence of a prior blacklisting conviction. "A motion for a 

directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefore." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (emphasis added). In the face of Rule 

50(a), the majority would hold that a general assertion of 

insufficient evidence preserves an argument that the evidence is 

insufficient in a particular respect. However, the law is clear 

that a general allegation of insufficiency does not preserve 

unarticulated specific arguments which might support that general 

assertion. See,~' Superturf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 

1275, 1279 (8th Cir. 1981); 9 c. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice & ProcedureS 2533, at 579 (1971)("A request for an 

1 The majority states that "[t]he defendant here raised the 

defense of failure to state a claim for blacklisting at the first 

opportunity in the answer to the complaint." Maj. op. at 9. Of 

course, all defendant asserted was "[t]hat Count V of plaintiff's 

Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may 

be granted against this defendant." Separate Answer of Defendant 

United Telephone Company of Kansas at 17. Defendant did not 

specify any failure it might have had in mind. The undeniable 

fact is that defendant never raised the issue on which the 

majority grants relief. The district court itself raised it posttrial. 

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instruction that 'on the basis of the evidence and the applicable 

law, you are directed to find a verdict for the plaintiff' is not 

sufficient compliance with [Rule 50(a)]."); cf. Brown v. Trustees 

of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 357 (1st Cir. 1989)("A general 

defense that the complaint fails to state a claim ordinarily will 

not preserve unarticulated arguments in support of that 

defense."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990); Brooks v. Monroe 

Sys. for Business, Inc., 873 F.2d 202, 205 (8th Cir.)(same), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 154 (1989). 

While technical compliance with Rule 50(a) may not be 

necessary in some circumstances, the majority's position here 

relieves a party from any compliance at all. Under the majority's 

holding, a defendant who moves for a directed verdict by merely 

asserting generally that the evidence is insufficient is 

thereafter free to raise any more specific argument for the first 

time after trial. The majority's broad view of "lack of technical 

compliance" thus simply swallows up the Rule itself. 

Nor can I agree with the majority's conclusion that affirming 

the district court is justified because Anderson will have 

suffered no prejudice. It is true that whether a prior conviction 

is an element of Anderson's claim is a legal issue that would not 

have gone to the jury in any event. Thus Anderson has suffered no 

prejudice to his right to a jury trial. See Benson v. Allphin, 

786 F.2d 268, 273-74 (7th Cir. 1986). Moreover, it is undisputed 

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that Anderson cannot establish a prior criminal conviction, so his 

lack of notice before the verdict was returned did not prejudice 

his ability to remedy the deficiency prior to jury deliberation. 

Id. at 273-75. Nevertheless, it is not accurate to state, as the 

majority does, that Anderson was therefore not prejudiced in any 

way. The "failure to raise the claim in a timely fashion obliged 

[Anderson] to expend the effort and expense of a trial and 

numerous post-trial motions which might have been avoided had the 

claim" been timely raised and decided favorably to defendant. 

Weaver v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1356, 1362 (3d Cir. 1981)(en bane). As 

a practical matter, such prejudice is real and substantial, and of 

the type that the waiver principles embodied in the Rules were 

designed to prevent. 

Finally, the majority acknowledges that the district court 

labeled the requirement a condition precedent and that defendant 

did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c), which requires that the 

"denial of performance or occurrence [of conditions precedent] 

shall be made specifically and with particularity." Defendant 

here, of course, did not raise the lack of a criminal conviction 

as the omission of a required condition precedent. This court has 

specifically held that when a defendant does not plead 

nonperformance of a condition specifically and with particularity 

as required by Rule 9(c), the failure of the condition is not an 

issue in the case and will not be addressed by the court on 

appeal. See Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 313 F.2d 381, 387 

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(lOth Cir. 1963); see also Brooks v. Monroe Sys. for Business, 

Inc., 873 F.2d 202, 205 (8th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast 

Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1001, 1009 (11th Cir. 1982); 

McKee-Berger-Mansueto v. Board of Educ., 626 F.2d 559, 562-63 (7th 

Cir. 1980); Ginsburg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 427 F.2d 1318, 

1321-22 (6th Cir. 1970). 

The majority seeks to avoid the import of these cases by 

concluding that "the requirement of criminal liability is simply a 

statutory element that does not implicate Rule 9(c)." Maj. op. at 

10. Even if I were to agree with the above statement, it does not 

support the majority's conclusion that the lack of the requirement 

may be raised for the first time after trial. If, as the majority 

asserts, a prior conviction is an element of Anderson's claim, the 

district court's ruling is necessarily grounded on Anderson's 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(h)(2), however, provides that 

"[a] defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted • • • may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered 

under Rule 7(a), or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at 

the trial on the merits."(Emphasis added). The failure to state a 

claim for relief cannot be raised for the first time after trial 

on the merits. Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l., Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 

1228 (lOth Cir. 1987)("[A] defense of dismissal is waived . 

when presented after trial."); see also Brown, 891 F.2d at 356-57 

(citing cases); Brooks, 873 F.2d at 205. 

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"According to the plain language of Rule 12(h)(2), the 

[defense of failure to state a claim is] waived if [it 

is] not presented before the close of trial. Thus, for 

example, [it] may not be asserted for the first time on 

appeal. Nor can [this defense] be asserted through any 

type of post-trial motion." 

SA C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1392, at 

763 (2d ed. 1990) (footnote omitted)(emphasis added. Accordingly, 

whether considered a condition precedent or an element of the 

cause of action, the issue cannot be raised for the first time 

post-trial. See Brooks, 873 F.2d at 204-05. 

In sum, I cannot concur in an opinion under which district 

courts are free to raise unpled issues sua sponte and out of time, 

in derogation of the pleading requirements of the federal rules. 

This case is like any other in which a party's failure to comply 

with the rules renders unavailable an issue that might otherwise 

be dispositive. The majority's approval of the district court's 

action resolving the case on what the district court believed 

ought to have been pled, rather than on the issues actually raised 

at trial, renders meaningless the rules meant to govern the 

orderly administration of justice. 

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