Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-05182/USCOURTS-caDC-08-05182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. Berman
Appellee
Project on Government Oversight
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 5, 2009 Decided August 3, 2010

No. 08-5182

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT,

APPELLANT

ROBERT A. BERMAN,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 08-5465, 08-5466

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:03-cv-00096)

Ross A. Nabatoff argued the cause for appellant/crossappellee Project on Government Oversight. With him on the

briefs were Stanley M. Brand and Andrew D. Herman.

Robert A. Berman, appearing pro se, argued the cause and

filed the briefs for appellant.

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Judith Rabinowitz, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee/cross-appellant United States of

America. With her on the briefs was Douglas N. Letter,

Attorney.

Before: GARLAND and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

Opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS concurring

in the judgment and concurring in part in the opinion for the

Court.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: A non-profit organization gave

an Interior Department economist a monetary award for his

“public-spirited work [to prevent] oil companies[]” from

underpaying the Mineral Management Service for oil extracted

from federal lands. The government responded by charging

both the organization and the economist with violating 18

U.S.C. § 209(a), which prohibits giving or receiving any

contribution to or supplementation of salary “as compensation

for [an individual’s] services as an officer or employee of the

executive branch.” 18 U.S.C. § 209(a). 

The principal question in this case is whether intent is an

essential element of a § 209(a) violation. The government

persuaded the district court that intent is not an essential

element, and that it is irrelevant whether the defendants intended

or knew that the activities for which the employee was paid

were part of the employee’s official responsibilities. The jury,

instructed in accordance with this view, found that the

defendants had violated § 209(a). Because we conclude that a

defendant’s intent to give or receive compensation for

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government services is a required element of the offense, we

reverse.

I

The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) is a nonprofit organization “dedicated to remedying systematic abuses

of power, mismanagement, and subservience of the federal

government to special interests.” POGO Br. 2. On June 9,

1997, POGO filed two qui tam actions in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The complaints

alleged that major oil companies had violated the False Claims

Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, by undervaluing the oil they extracted

from federal and Indian lands and then underreporting and

underpaying the oil royalties they owed to the Mineral

Management Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior. 

After POGO filed suit, the United States intervened and entered

into settlements with the oil company defendants that resulted in

a recovery of $440 million. See United States v. Project on

Gov’t Oversight, 525 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164 (D.D.C. 2007)

(POGO III).1

During the course of the investigation that led POGO to file

the qui tam suits, the organization spoke with many people,

1

Section 3730(b) of the False Claims Act provides that a “private

person[,]” commonly known as a “relator,” may bring a civil action

for a violation of § 3729 “in the name of the Government.” 31 U.S.C.

§ 3730(b). Such an action is known as a “qui tam” suit. The statute

permits the government to take over the action and conduct it itself, or

to decline to do so, in which case the relator has the right to conduct

it. See id. The relator is entitled to different percentages of any

recovery from a successful False Claims Act suit, depending upon

whether the relator or the government conducts the action. See id.

§ 3730(d)(1)-(2). 

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including Robert A. Berman, a senior economist at the Interior

Department. Beginning in 1994, POGO’s executive director,

Danielle Brian, had between twenty and thirty telephone

conversations with Berman in which they discussed oil royalty

issues. Berman helped Brian understand the underpayment

question and draft Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests

for government documents. In 1996, Brian asked Berman

whether he wanted to join as a co-relator in the qui tam actions

that POGO intended to file. See supra note 1. Although

Berman declined POGO’s offer, he subsequently entered into an

agreement with POGO providing that he would receive

one-third of any money POGO recovered through the litigation. 

See United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 454 F.3d 306,

307 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (POGO I).

On November 2, 1998, POGO sent Berman a letter

enclosing a $383,600 check. The face of the check indicated

that it was a “Public Service Award,” and the accompanying

letter explained that POGO was awarding it to Berman for his

“decade-long public-spirited work to expose and stop the oil

companies’ underpayment of royalties for the production of

crude oil on federal and Indian lands.” Id. (quoting Letter from

Danielle Brian to Robert Berman (Nov. 2, 1998)). 

On January 21, 2003, the Justice Department filed a civil

complaint charging, inter alia, that POGO and Berman had

violated 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) in connection with the $383,600

payment. Section 209(a) states, in relevant part:

Whoever receives any salary, or any contribution to or

supplementation of salary, as compensation for his

services as an officer or employee of the executive

branch of the United States Government, . . . from any

source other than the Government of the United States

. . . ; or

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Whoever . . . makes any contribution to, or in any way

supplements, the salary of any such officer or

employee under circumstances which would make its

receipt a violation of this subsection –

Shall be subject to the penalties set forth in section 216

of this title.

18 U.S.C. § 209(a). Section 216, referenced in the last line

above, provides that whoever “engages in the conduct

constituting the offense” may be imprisoned for not more than

one year, and that whoever does so “willfully” may be

imprisoned for not more than five years. Id. § 216(a)(1), (2). 

The section also authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil

action, as he did in this case, against any person who “engages

in conduct constituting an offense under section . . . 209,” and

provides that “upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance

of the evidence, such person shall be subject to a civil penalty.” 

Id. § 216(b).

On April 28, 2003, the government moved for summary

judgment on the § 209(a) count. Thereafter, the district court

granted the government’s motion and certified its order for

immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Upon

review, this court reversed the district court’s order, finding “a

genuine dispute as to whether POGO issued the check as

compensation for [Berman’s] government service.” POGO I,

454 F.3d at 306. 

After the case returned to the district court for trial, the

defendants asked the court to instruct the jury that intent to

compensate Berman for his services as a government employee

was an essential element of a § 209(a) violation. At the

government’s urging, the court denied the request. The court

also denied Berman’s motion for summary judgment on the

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basis of his contention that § 209(a) does not, as a matter of law,

apply to lump-sum (as opposed to periodic) payments.

Trial commenced on February 5, 2008. On February 11, the

jury found POGO and Berman liable for violating § 209(a). 

Thereafter, the district court denied the defendants’ post-trial

motions for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for

a new trial.

The district court also considered the appropriate penalties

under 18 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides for “a civil penalty of

not more than $50,000 for each violation or the amount of

compensation which the person received or offered for the

prohibited conduct, whichever amount is greater.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 216(b). POGO argued that this section gave the court

discretion to impose any penalty up to the value of the $383,600

check that POGO had given Berman; and it asked the court to

exercise that discretion to impose no penalty. The government

countered that § 216(b) gave the court no discretion at all, but

rather required it to impose a penalty of $383,600 on each of the

defendants. The court agreed with POGO that it had discretion

and, while it assessed a penalty of $383,600 against Berman, it

imposed a penalty of only $120,000 against POGO because it

found that the organization had given Berman the check in good

faith. United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 543 F. Supp.

2d 55, 69 (D.D.C. 2008) (POGO VII).

POGO and Berman now appeal the district court’s denial of

their post-trial motions, and the government cross-appeals from

the court’s penalty determination with respect to POGO. In Part

II, we consider both defendants’ contention that the court erred

by refusing to instruct the jury that intent is an element of a

violation of § 209(a). Part III addresses Berman’s additional

contentions including, in particular, his claim that § 209(a) does

not apply to lump-sum payments. In Part IV, we examine the

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government’s challenge to the district court’s interpretation of

the penalty provision of § 216(b). 

II

In light of the plain language of § 209(a), the parties agree

that a government employee who receives a payment is not

liable unless the payment was received “as compensation for his

services as an officer or employee of the executive branch of the

United States Government.” 18 U.S.C. § 209(a); see POGO I,

454 F.3d at 309. “Despite the awkward drafting” of § 209(a)’s

two paragraphs, the same is true for a defendant who is a payor:

it must make the payment as compensation for government

services by the recipient. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S.

152, 159 (1990). Accordingly, the district court instructed the

jury that the government must prove that “the payment was as

compensation for Mr. Berman’s services as an officer or

employee of the executive branch of the United States

government.” Trial Tr. 97 (Feb. 11, 2008).

The defendants, however, asked the court to further instruct

the jury that the government had to prove they “intended [the

payment] as compensation for [Berman’s] services as an officer

or employee of the United States.” Def. [POGO’s] Requested

Instructions at 27 (Jan. 29, 2008) (emphasis added); see also

Def. Berman’s Special Instruction at 2 (Jan. 30, 2008). This the

district court declined to do. Instead, the court told the jury that

it could, but was not required to, consider the defendants’ intent,

and then only for a limited purpose. See Trial Tr. 98 (Feb. 11,

2008) (stating that the jury may consider intent in determining

which particular services POGO paid Berman for).

The court offered two reasons for rejecting the defendants’

request to instruct that intent to compensate for government

services is an essential element of a § 209(a) violation. First, the

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court said, even if the “parties’ subjective intent may be relevant

to determining what [work] the payment was for,” it was not

relevant to whether the payment was for government work. See

POGO VII, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 62. Second, the court indicated

there was a strong argument that § 209(a) contains no intent

requirement at all. Id. at 63-64. The government pressed both

positions below and presses both here.

We take the more absolutist position first and ask: Does

§ 209(a) contain an intent requirement of any kind? After

concluding that proof of intent is required, we proceed to

examine the limited intent instruction that the court gave the

jury. We review de novo the court’s refusal to instruct the jury

that intent is an element of the offense. United States v. Perkins,

161 F.3d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

A

The government begins its argument for no intent

requirement at all by reciting the district court’s observation that

§ 209(a) does not contain the word “intent.” Based on a

presumption that, “when Congress sought to add such ‘intent’

elements, it did so clearly and unequivocally,” the court

concluded that “[t]he choice to omit those terms from § 209(a),

then, appears deliberate.” United States v. Project on Gov’t

Oversight, 531 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2008) (POGO V); see

Gov’t Br. 12. Accordingly, the court suggested, and the

government argues on appeal, that “the defendants’ subjective

intent was neither an element of the offense nor a relevant

defense.” Gov’t Br. at 9. We disagree. 

1. The same language that renders defendants civilly liable

under § 209(a) also renders them guilty of a criminal offense, for

which they may be “imprisoned for not more than one year.” 18

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U.S.C. § 216(a)(1).2

 A long line of Supreme Court cases

therefore requires us to reject the presumption relied upon by the

government: contrary to the government’s position, the Court

has repeatedly stated that the “mere omission . . . of any mention

of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from”

a criminal offense. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,

263 (1952) (emphasis added).3

 Instead, “offenses that require no

mens rea generally are disfavored.” Staples v. United States,

511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994).4

 Indeed, even where “the most

grammatical reading of the statute” indicates otherwise, the

Court has instructed us to read statutes “to include broadly

applicable scienter requirements [though] the statute by its terms

2

As we discuss in Part II.A.4, the statute further provides that

whoever “willfully engages in the conduct constituting the offense”

may be imprisoned for not more than five years. 18 U.S.C.

§ 216(a)(2) (emphasis added). 

3

See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994)

(“[S]ilence on this point by itself does not necessarily suggest that

Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element,

which would require that the defendant know the facts that make his

conduct illegal.”); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)

(“[F]ar more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase . . . is

necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.” (quoting

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978)) (internal

quotation mark omitted)); see also Carter v. United States, 530 U.S.

255, 269 (2000); United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 70

(1994).

4

See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426; U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at

437-38; Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263; see also Staples, 511 U.S. at 605

(“‘[T]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the

exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal

jurisprudence.’” (quoting U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436)).

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does not contain them.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,

513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994).5

As a consequence, we must not only reject the

government’s presumption, but adopt the opposite principle: 

“[W]e must presum[e] that criminal statutes and regulations

contain a mens rea element unless otherwise clearly intimated

in the language or legislative history.” United States v. Sheehan,

512 F.3d 621, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see Staples, 511 U.S. at 606 (“[S]ome indication of

congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense

with mens rea as an element of a crime.”); Liparota v. United

States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1985) (concluding that a statute

requires a mens rea element “[a]bsent indication of contrary

purpose in the language or legislative history”). Neither we nor

the parties have found anything in the legislative history to

suggest a legislative purpose to do without an intent

requirement. Nor is there any such intimation in the statutory

language.

Moreover, although the language of § 209(a) does not

include the word “intent,” it is not truly silent on the issue. 

Rather, it includes words that strongly intimate a mens rea

requirement. To violate the statute, it is not enough to make or

receive a contribution. In addition, that contribution must be

made or received “as compensation for” the recipient’s services

as a government employee. This is the language of intent. To

conclude that a payment was made “as compensation,” one must

determine the intent of the payor. To conclude that a payment

5

The government points to precedent noting that this line of cases

does not apply to what the Supreme Court has termed “public welfare”

or “regulatory” offenses. As we discuss below, § 209(a) is not such

an offense. See infra note 15.

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was made as compensation “for” something, one must determine

what the intended object was.6

Indeed, the Supreme Court has drawn much the same

conclusion from similar language in the gratuities statute, 18

U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A). Like § 209(a), § 201(c)(1)(A) lacks an

express scienter term. Instead, it simply proscribes the giving of

“anything of value to any public official . . . for or because of

any official act performed or to be performed.” Id. (emphasis

added). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has described that

language as containing an “intent element,” United States v.

Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404 (1999),

namely, a “connection between respondent’s intent and a

specific official act,” id. at 405. This court has reached the same

conclusion. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of

California, 138 F.3d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“To satisfy the

criminal intent requirement embodied in the phrase ‘for or

because of any official act,’ the giver must intend either to

reward some past concrete official act or acts, or to enhance the

likelihood of some future act or acts.”), aff’d 526 U.S. 398

(1999); see also United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1522

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that, “to convict for accepting a

gratuity[,] the jury need only find that the defendant acted

‘knowingly and willingly’” (quoting United States v. Campbell,

684 F.2d 141, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1982))). 

Courts have been particularly concerned to require a

showing of intent where “necessary to separate wrongful

conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’” Carter v. United

States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (quoting X-Citement Video,

513 U.S. at 72); see also Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406-07

6

Similarly, to conclude that a payment was received “as

compensation for” something, one must determine the intent of the

recipient.

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(interpreting the gratuities statute narrowly so as not to produce

the “peculiar result[]” of criminalizing such conduct as giving

the President a jersey for receiving a sports team at the White

House or giving a cabinet secretary a school cap for visiting a

high school). And there is a risk of criminalizing otherwise

innocent conduct here. Without the requirement of an intent

element, a parent’s monthly checks to a child who works for the

government could be construed as violating § 209(a): only the

parent’s intent distinguishes payments to help cover the rent

from payments to subsidize what the parent regards as an

insufficient public-sector salary. The government demurs,

saying that “[w]hen parents subsidize their children’s low

income, most likely they are helping with the rent . . . ; they are

not paying for the child’s services.” Gov’t Br. 31. But unless

the government envisions instructing the jury as to what is “most

likely” as a matter of law, it is only the parent’s actual intent that

spells the difference between legal and illegal conduct.

To take another example, under the government’s theory a

publishing company that pays a Justice Department lawyer to

write a manual on appellate advocacy on his own time violates

§ 209(a) if -- unbeknownst to the company -- the Department

has assigned the employee to write a similar manual as part of

his official duties. See Oral Arg. Recording 43:56-44:16

(acknowledgment by government counsel). Indeed, this is so

even if the employee lies to the publishing company about the

scope of his government work.

An intent element may also be necessary to distinguish

between lawful and unlawful public service awards that nonprofit organizations bestow on public servants. The Justice

Department itself has recognized this point. In 1997, the

Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) was asked to

determine whether § 209(a) prohibits a non-profit from making

payments to grant the wishes of terminally ill children of FBI

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agents. Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 209 to Acceptance by FBI

Employees of Benefits Under the “Make a Dream Come True”

Program, 21 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 204 (1997), 1997 WL

33100655. “The question before us,” OLC said, “is whether

there is an intentional, direct link between a benefit given under

the Program . . . and the FBI employee’s services to the

government.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added). Concluding that

“private payments to government employees because of their

status as employees of the executive branch are not

automatically intended as compensation for services to the

government,” OLC ruled that § 209(a) does not bar FBI

employees from accepting the payments. Id. at *4 (emphasis

added).7

 As the U.S. Office of Government Ethics (OGE) has

summarized: “[T]he Department of Justice has consistently held

that [§ 209(a)] applies only to payments made with the intent to

compensate for Government services and that the requisite intent

may not be inferred from the bestowal upon a public official of

a bona fide award for public service or other meritorious

achievement.” Letter from David H. Martin, Director, OGE, to

a Designated Agency Ethics Official (July 26, 1983), 1983 WL

31714, at *1 (citing OLC opinion letters) (emphasis added).8

7

Accord OLC, Application of 18 U.S.C. § 209 to EmployeeInventors Who Receive Outside Royalty Payments (Sept. 7, 2000),

2000 WL 33952879, at *3 (concluding that § 209 does not bar

government employee-inventors from receiving outside royalties

because there is “no intentional, direct link between an employeeinventor’s government services and the licensing of patent rights”

(emphasis added)); see also 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 217, 217, 220-21

(1955) (concluding that “whether a payment to an officer or

employee” violates the statute “is often a matter of ascertaining the

intent of both the payor and the payee” (emphasis added)).

8

Accord OGE Memorandum to Designated Agency Ethics

Officials Regarding 18 U.S.C. § 209 Guidance (July 1, 2002), 2002

WL 32100961, at *9 (reaffirming that “an intent to compensate for

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We agree with the government that we are not required to

defer to the views of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal

Counsel. Gov’t Br. 35-36. But nothing bars us from regarding

OLC’s views as more persuasive than those expressed in the

Department’s appellate brief.

2. The government contends that several statements in the

Supreme Court’s opinion in Crandon indicate that intent is not

an element of § 209(a). Crandon did not involve the issue we

have here, but rather the question of whether § 209(a) applies to

payments that a company makes to its departing employees

before they enter government service. In the course of holding

that such payments are not covered, the Court stated that

“[n]either good faith, nor full disclosure, nor exemplary

performance of public office will excuse the making or receipt

of a prohibited payment.” 494 U.S. at 165. Relying on this

statement, the government contends that because good faith is

not a defense to a § 209(a) violation, there is no intent element

to the offense: “[I]f good faith is not a defense, intent (i.e., the

absence of good faith) cannot be an element of the offense.” 

Gov’t Br. 22.

The problem with the government’s argument is its

premise: that “intent” is “the absence of good faith.” It is true

that some kinds of heightened mens rea may involve the absence

of good faith (i.e., the presence of bad faith). Accordingly, for

crimes that involve those kinds of more culpable mens rea, good

faith may constitute an excuse or defense. This is true, for

example, of crimes that require that the defendant act

“fraudulently” or “corruptly,” and is sometimes true of crimes

Government services cannot be inferred from a bona fide award for

public service” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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that require “specific intent.”9

 It is also sometimes true of

crimes that require that the defendant act “willfully.”10

9

See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 28 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (stating that, because the Lobbying Disclosure Act requires

the government to prove the defendant acted “knowingly and

corruptly,” “good faith mistakes will [not] result in criminal liability”);

United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(holding that the district court erred in failing to instruct that good

faith reliance on counsel’s advice is a defense to the fraudulent intent

required for embezzlement under 29 U.S.C. § 501(c)); see also United

States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1201 n.65 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding

that “a finding of specific intent to defraud necessarily excludes a

finding of good faith”); United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 454 (5th

Cir. 2007) (indicating that a requirement that the defendant acted

“corruptly” would be inconsistent with “good faith”); United States v.

Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 508 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that “good faith

is a complete defense to fraud charges -- negating specific intent”).

10See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (“As a

general matter, when used in the criminal context, a ‘willful’ act is one

undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ In other words, in order to establish

a ‘willful’ violation of a statute, the Government must prove that the

defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S.

135, 137, 142 n.10 (1994) (holding that, “[t]o establish that a

defendant ‘willfully violat[ed]’ the antistructuring law, the

Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that

his conduct was unlawful,” and stating that “[s]pecific intent to

commit the crime[s] . . . might be negated by, e.g., proof that

defendant relied in good faith on advice of counsel” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202

(1991) (holding that proof of willfulness in criminal tax cases

“requires negating a defendant’s claim of ignorance of the law or a

claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a goodfaith belief that he was not violating” the law); United States v.

Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973) (holding that “[t]he requirement of

an offense committed ‘willfully’ is not met . . . if a taxpayer has relied

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But crimes requiring only a more basic level of intent do not

require that the defendant act in bad faith. As the Court

explained in Carter v. United States, a general intent crime

requires only that the perpetrator “kn[ow] that [his act] ha[s] the

characteristics bringing it within the scope of the statute,” not

that those characteristics make the acts unlawful. 530 U.S. at

269. Accordingly, for such crimes, good faith is generally not

a defense -- notwithstanding that intent to do the things that

constitute elements of the offense is required. See id. at 269-

70.11 In short, Crandon’s observation that good faith will not

in good faith on a prior decision of this Court”); United States v.

Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that good faith

is a defense to “the willful filing of false statements” under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1001). But see United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 393 (2d Cir.

2004) (noting that “the Second Circuit has held that the term

‘willfully’ in criminal statutes typically does not require the

government to prove the defendant’s specific intent to violate the

particular criminal statute in question”).

11See, e.g., United States v. McLean, 131 F. App’x 34 (4th Cir.

2005) (holding that a “good faith” belief that the defendants were

participating in a lawful investor program was not a defense to a

charge of knowingly passing false mortgage instruments); United

States v. Preciado-Hernandez, No. 91-10086, 1992 WL 46682, at *1

(9th Cir. Mar. 12, 1992) (noting “that good faith [i]s not a defense to

a general intent crime”); United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54,

55 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that because “the government need not

show that a defendant specifically intended to disobey the law in order

to prove a violation” of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 -- which makes it a felony for

a previously deported alien to reenter the United States without the

express permission of the Attorney General -- the defendant’s “good

faith or mistaken belief . . . that she could reenter lawfully is not a

defense”); see also Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 n.9 (noting that,

although it is “a defense to a charge of knowing receipt of stolen

goods that one did not know that the goods were stolen,” it is not a

defense “that one did not know that such receipt was illegal”).

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17

excuse the making of a payment prohibited by § 209 means

nothing more than that § 209 does not require proof of

heightened intent. It does not mean that it has no intent element

at all.12

The government also calls our attention to Crandon’s

statement that, “[w]hile some sections focus on bribes or

compensation offered as a quid pro quo for Government acts,

. . . § 209 is a prophylactic rule that aims at the source of

Government employees’ compensation.” Crandon, 494 U.S. at

159. A “prophylactic” rule, the government maintains, is one

that bars conduct regardless of intent. But Crandon did not say

that. As the quoted excerpt indicates, Crandon merely

distinguished provisions like the bribery statute (18 U.S.C.

§ 201), which requires that the offending payment be made as a

quid pro quo -- that is, as a payment “to influence” an official

act -- from § 209, which bars a non-government source from

paying for an employee’s government services regardless of

whether the source seeks to influence the employee to do

anything in exchange. 

Later in Crandon, the Court repeated its characterization of

§ 209 as a “prophylactic” rule, “intended to prevent even the

appearance of wrongdoing and that may apply to conduct that

has caused no actual injury to the United States.” Id. at 164. In

the context of the Court’s prior statement, this again appears to

be a reference to the fact that § 209 proscribes payments made

12We note that Crandon was decided under the pre-1989 version

of § 209(a). That version did not contain the current cross-reference

to § 216(b), which was enacted in 1989 and now makes a “willful”

violation of § 209(a) a felony. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 209, 216(b); Ethics

Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, tit. IV, § 407, 103 Stat.

1716, 1753. Thus, Crandon does not determine whether good faith is

a defense to a felony violation under current law.

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18

as compensation for government services because such

payments may create the appearance of wrongdoing, even if

they cause no actual injury by changing the recipient’s behavior. 

Of course, the section would be even more “prophylactic” if it

covered payments to a government employee regardless of the

intent with which they are made. But Crandon goes on to

instruct that “it is . . . appropriate, in a case that raises questions

about the scope of the prohibition, to identify the specific

policies that the provision serves.” Id. at 165. Here, the best

way to determine the specific policies that § 209 serves is to

read the statutory text -- which is aimed at payments made “as

compensation for” government services, not at all payments to

government employees.

In a similar vein, the government maintains that the Court’s

opinion in Sun-Diamond also signaled that § 209 has no intent

requirement, by stating that § 209 “criminalizes the giving or

receiving of any ‘supplementation’ of an Executive official’s

salary, without regard to the purpose of the payment.” SunDiamond, 526 U.S. at 409. But this statement, too, must be read

in context. In Sun-Diamond, the Court faced the question of

whether the gratuities statute requires the government to prove

that a payment was made merely “because of the recipient’s

official position,” id. at 400, or rather “because of some

particular official act,” id. at 406. The Court chose the latter

interpretation, in part because § 209 already criminalizes the

former: it “refus[ed] to read § 201(c)(1)(A) as a prohibition of

gifts given by reason of the donee’s office” because in § 209(a)

Congress had “done so in a more precise and more administrable

fashion,” id. at 408 (emphasis added). This makes the Court’s

point clear: intent to compensate “by reason of the donee’s

office” is required for § 209(a); a purpose to reward “some

particular official act” is not.

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3. The government insists, and the district court ruled, that

even if there is a general presumption that criminal statutes

contain a mens rea element, the opposite presumption should

govern for federal conflict-of-interest statutes because “[w]hen

Congress sought to require mens rea elements [in such] statutes,

it did so clearly and unequivocally.” POGO VII, 543 F. Supp.

2d at 63. But while it is true that some federal conflicts statutes

contain express mens rea elements, others do not. And it is

decidedly not true that “the courts have refused to read a

scienter requirement into [such] statute[s] where none exists.” 

Gov’t Br. 12. Indeed, the principal cases cited by the

government stand for the opposite proposition.

The first case the government cites is Sun-Diamond. But as

we have already noted, Sun-Diamond held that intent is required

to violate the gratuities statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A),

notwithstanding that it is a conflicts statute that contains no

express mens rea term. See Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404-05;

discussion supra Part II.A.1. Far from suggesting that conflicts

statutes should be read broadly, the Court declared that “a

statute in this field that can linguistically be interpreted to be

either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be

the latter.” 526 U.S. at 412.

Nor did this court refuse to read a scienter requirement into

18 U.S.C. § 203(a) in United States v. Baird, 29 F.3d 647 (D.C.

Cir. 1994), although it did refuse to find the specific kind of

scienter requirement the defendant wanted. Like § 209, at the

time § 203(a) contained no express scienter term; it simply

barred government employees from receiving “any

compensation for any services rendered” in relation to a

proceeding in which the United States is a party. Id. at 649

(citing the 1982 version of § 203(a)). Although the court

rejected the defendant’s contention that the section required

proof that he knew he committed a crime, it found it sufficient

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20

that the trial judge had required the government to prove the

defendant “knew the facts that made the conduct criminal.” Id.

at 652. 

Finally, we simply do not understand how the government

can describe United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.

1989), as an example of a case in which we “refused to read a

scienter requirement into a [conflicts] statute where none

exists.” Gov’t Br. 12. In the first place, the statute at issue in

Nofziger, 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1982) -- which barred covered

former government officials from making certain contacts with

their former agencies -- did contain a scienter requirement: it

required that the defendant act “knowingly.” The problem

presented in Nofziger was that the statutory language was

ambiguous as to whether that requirement applied to all of the

facts necessary to constitute the offense. See 878 F.2d at 443,

452. Rejecting the government’s claim that the presumption of

mens rea should not apply, this court reversed the defendant’s

conviction because the jury had not been required to find “that

he had knowledge of each element of the offenses charged.” Id.

at 454. In so doing, we reaffirmed “that absent evidence of a

contrary legislative intent, courts should presume mens rea is

required,” id. at 452 -- even in the context of a conflict-ofinterest statute. See id. at 453-54.

4. We are also unpersuaded by the district court’s view that

“[t]he careful distinctions drawn between §§ 216(a)(1) and

(a)(2)” -- the penalty provisions applicable to § 209 -- “reinforce

the conclusion that the omission of mens rea terms in § 209(a)

was deliberate.” POGO VII, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 64. Section

216(a)(1) provides that whoever “engages in the conduct

constituting the offense” in § 209(a) may be imprisoned for not

more than one year. 18 U.S.C. § 216(a)(1). Section 216(a)(2)

provides that whoever “willfully” engages in such conduct may

be imprisoned for not more than five years. Id. § 216(a)(2). 

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We do not believe that the fact that it takes “willfulness” to

commit a felony means that Congress chose to require no intent

at all to commit a misdemeanor. 

First, as we have discussed above, “willfulness” may

connote a heightened mens rea requirement. See supra Part

II.A.2 and note 10. And while there is a “presumption in favor

of scienter,” that presumption does not “not justify reading a

specific intent requirement” into a statute where “a general

intent requirement suffices to separate wrongful from otherwise

innocent conduct.” Carter, 530 U.S. at 269-70 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, Congress may have thought

that the “as compensation for” language of § 209(a) was

sufficient to impose a general intent requirement for the

misdemeanor offense, but that if it wished to require a

heightened level of culpability for the felony, it would have to

do so expressly. 

Second, and perhaps more important, “[t]he careful

distinctions drawn between §§ 216(a)(1) and (a)(2)” can tell us

little about whether “the omission of mens rea terms in § 209(a)

was deliberate.” POGO VII, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (emphasis

added). That is because § 216 was enacted in 1989, long after

§ 209(a) was initially enacted, and did not change its text

(except to remove its penalty provision). See Ethics Reform Act

of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, tit. IV, §§ 406-07, 103 Stat. 1716,

1753. In fact, § 216 is not just the penalty provision for

§ 209(a); it sets the “punishment for an offense under section[s]

203, 204, 205, 207, 208, or 209.” 18 U.S.C. § 216(a) (emphasis

added). Some of those sections previously included express

mens rea terms; some did not; and the 1989 Act did not

substantially alter those terms. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 204,

205, 207, 208, 209 (1988), with 18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 204, 205,

207, 208, 209 (2006). 

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5. In sum, applying the generally applicable presumption

that “criminal statutes and regulations contain a mens rea

element,” Sheehan, 512 F.3d at 629 (internal quotation marks

omitted), as well as the strong textual signal given by the “as

compensation for” language in § 209(a), we conclude that intent

is a required element of the offense.

B

In addition to suggesting that § 209(a) contains no mens rea

requirement at all, the district court proffered a narrower

rationale for rejecting the defendants’ request for an instruction

that intent is an element of the offense. In line with that

narrower rationale, the court gave a more limited instruction on

the issue. The district court permitted -- but did not require --

the jury to “‘consider what services POGO subjectively intended

the payment to be for, and what [services] Mr. Berman believed

that the payment was for.’” Gov’t Br. 34 (quoting the district

court’s jury instructions) (emphasis added). It did not, however,

permit the jury to consider “whether the defendants intended the

payment to be for Berman’s Government service.” Id. This

meant, for example, that the jury was permitted to determine

whether POGO intended its payment to be compensation for

Berman’s “internal government memoranda (as the government

would have it),” or instead for his “generalized whistleblowing

activities (as POGO would have it).” POGO V, 531 F. Supp. 2d

at 60-61. But it also meant that the jury was not permitted to

consider whether POGO knew that either kind of service (and

particularly the latter) was actually part of Berman’s government

duties. Id. at 61; Trial Tr. 98-99 (Feb. 11, 2008) (jury

instructions).13

13The district court believed that this Circuit endorsed a similar

two-part approach in United States v. Muntain, in which we said: “For

there to be a violation of § 209, . . . the contribution must have been

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23

In accord with this two-part analysis, the court gave the

following instruction:

To determine what services POGO’s payment was

‘for’ you . . . may . . . consider what services POGO

subjectively intended the payment to be for, and what

Mr. Berman believed that the payment was for, to the

extent that you consider those facts to be relevant to

your assessment. 

However, in determining whether the services for

which POGO paid Mr. Berman were in fact

governmental, you must consider only the objective

facts. Whether POGO or Mr. Berman believed those

services fell within Mr. Berman’s official government

responsibilities is not relevant to your determination of

whether the services for which Mr. Berman received

the payment from POGO were in fact services as a

federal employee.

Trial Tr. 98-99 (Feb. 11, 2008) (emphases added). There are

two errors in this instruction. 

received as compensation for services and those services must have

been rendered as an employee of the United States.” 610 F.2d 964,

969 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis

added). But by listing two elements of the offense, we did not mean

to distinguish the way in which intent applies to those elements. 

Indeed, in Muntain the government did not dispute that it was required

to prove the defendant intended to receive the payment for his

government work. To the contrary, the indictment expressly charged

him “with violating [§ 209] by having knowingly received $800 as ‘a

contribution to, and a supplementation of, the salary he received from

the United States Government as compensation for his services as the

Assistant to the Secretary.” Id. (emphases added). 

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First, even if the instruction were otherwise correct, it was

error to tell the jury that the defendant’s subjective intent was

something that it “may . . . consider . . . to the extent that [it]

consider[s] those facts to be relevant.” Id. As we held in Part

II.A, intent is an essential element of § 209(a): something that

the jury “must find” to hold the defendants liable, not something

that it “may consider” in its discretion.

Second, the court was wrong to effectively cut off the key

statutory phrase at the word “services.” The statute bars

payment to an individual as compensation “for his services as an

officer or employee of the executive branch.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 209(a). There is no punctuation or other reason to suggest that

the phrase should end at “services.” This indicates that it is the

entire statutory phrase that describes the evil Congress sought to

prohibit: payment intended as compensation not just for

“services,” but for “services as an officer or employee of the

executive branch.” And as the Supreme Court held in United

States v. X-Citement Video, “the presumption in favor of a

scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory

elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” 513

U.S. at 72 (emphasis added) (citing Morissette and Staples).14

14Based on that presumption, X-Citement Video held that 18

U.S.C. § 2252, which makes it a crime to “knowingly transport[] . . .

any visual depiction, if . . . the producing of such visual depiction

involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,”

requires proof not only that the defendant knowingly transported the

depiction, but also that he knew the depiction was of a minor. 

X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68, 78. Otherwise, the Court said, “we

would sweep within the ambit of the statute actors who had no idea

that they were even dealing with sexually explicit material.” Id. at 69. 

For similar reasons, this court held in Nofziger that, to prove a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 207(c), the government had to show not only

that the former government official knowingly communicated with his

former agency, but that he also knew the agency had “a direct and

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In Staples v. United States, the Court applied the

presumption in just this manner. At issue in Staples was the

proper construction of the National Firearms Act, which makes

it “unlawful for any person . . . to receive or possess a firearm

which is not registered to him in the National Firearms

Registration and Transfer Record.” 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The

Act defines the term “firearm” to include a “machinegun,” id.

§ 5845(a)(6), and defines a “machinegun” as any weapon that is

fully automatic, id. § 5845(b). See Staples, 511 U.S. at 602. 

The question in the case was whether it was sufficient for the

government to prove that the weapon was fully automatic and

that the defendant knew he possessed it -- or whether it also had

to prove that the defendant knew the weapon he possessed was

fully automatic. Although the Court noted that “[s]ection

5861(d) is silent concerning the mens rea required for a

violation,” it also declared that “silence on this point by itself

does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense

with a conventional mens rea element, which would require that

the defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal.” Id.

substantial interest” in the matter. 878 F.2d at 443 (quoting the

statute). Otherwise, we explained, if the “ex-official tries to interest

his former agency in a particular project in the mistaken belief that it

had no ‘direct and substantial interest’ in it, he will have committed a

felony.” Id. at 444 (emphasis omitted); see also Flores-Figueroa v.

United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1888 (2009) (holding that 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028A(a)(1), which makes it an aggravated crime to “knowingly

transfer[] . . . , without lawful authority, a means of identification of

another person,” requires proof that the defendant not only knowingly

transferred something, but that he knew it was “a means of

identification” and that it belonged to “another person”); Liparota, 471

U.S. at 433 (holding that 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1), which prohibits

“knowingly . . . acquir[ing] . . . [food stamps] . . . in any manner not

authorized by [law],” requires proof not only that the defendant knew

he acquired the stamps, but also that he knew he did so in an

unauthorized manner).

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at 605. Because “the Government’s construction of the statute

potentially would impose criminal sanctions on a class of

persons whose mental state -- ignorance of the characteristics of

weapons in their possession -- makes their actions entirely

innocent,” id. at 614-15, the Court held that the government

must prove the defendant “knew the weapon he possessed had

the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition

of a machinegun,” id. at 602.15

15The government argued in Staples that “this case fits in a line

of precedent concerning . . . ‘public welfare’ or ‘regulatory’ offenses,

in which [the Court has] understood Congress to impose a form of

strict criminal liability through statutes that do not require the

defendant to know the facts that make his conduct illegal.” 511 U.S.

at 606. The Court rejected the argument, noting that “[t]ypically, our

cases recognizing such offenses involve statutes that regulate

potentially harmful or injurious items,” id. at 607, such as certain

narcotics, dangerous devices, toxic waste materials, and hand

grenades, see id. at 607-08. Section 209 plainly does not fall into this

category. 

The government further argues here that the Staples Court was

influenced by the penalty of up to ten years’ imprisonment that

potentially attached to a violation of § 5861(d). The Court did note

that, “[h]istorically, the penalty imposed under a statute has been a

significant consideration in determining whether the statute should be

construed as dispensing with mens rea.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 616. 

But the statutory penalty was only the final consideration the Court

took into account, and one that merely “confirm[ed]” its reading of the

statute. Id. Moreover, in describing what it regarded as the “light

penalties” that “first defined the concept of the public welfare

offense,” the Court referred to terms of incarceration shorter than the

one year applicable to non-willful violations of § 209(a). See id.

(citing cases involving small fines or imprisonment of three or six

months).

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We are guided by the same considerations here. It is not

enough for the government merely to prove which services an

outside entity intended to compensate a government employee

for, and then to prove that those services actually fell within the

employee’s official responsibilities. Rather, it must also prove

that the entity intended to compensate the employee for his

government services. Not to require the latter “would impose

criminal sanctions on a class of persons whose mental state --

ignorance of the [scope of the employee’s duties] -- makes their

actions entirely innocent.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 614-15. As we

explained in Part II.A, without requiring proof that a payor

intended to compensate for government services, payors who

pay for services that they mistakenly think are nongovernmental would be caught in the statute’s web. Hence, the

intent to compensate for government services is the fact

necessary to “separate wrongful . . . from otherwise innocent

conduct,” by ensuring that the perpetrator “knew that [his act]

had the characteristics bringing it within the scope of the

statute.” Carter, 530 U.S. at 269 (internal quotation marks

omitted).16

The district court’s principal explanation for not permitting

the jury to consider the defendants’ intent to compensate or

receive compensation for government services was that

“[n]either POGO’s nor Berman’s subjective belief or

understanding concerning whether Berman’s . . . work

16In Carter, the Court construed 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), which

punishes “whoever, by force and violence . . . takes . . . from the

person or presence of another any . . . thing of value belonging to, or

in the . . . possession of, any bank.” Id. at 280. Noting that the

subsection “contains no explicit mens rea requirement of any kind,”

the Court applied “the presumption in favor of scienter” to “requir[e]

proof of general intent,” although not of specific intent to steal or

purloin. Id. at 267-68 (emphasis omitted).

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constituted [such services] is relevant to the proper

characterization of that work.” POGO VII, 543 F. Supp. 2d at

62. But even if it were true that POGO’s or Berman’s

understanding is analytically irrelevant to determining whether

the work Berman did was actually part of his official duty,17 that

does not mean POGO’s intent to compensate Berman for doing

his official duty is not an element of the offense. To the

contrary, this analysis merely makes clear that there are two

separate statutory elements at work here: (1) the payor must

intend its payment to compensate for the employee’s

government work, and (2) the work at issue must actually be his

government work. Both must be proven for the conduct to come

within the ambit of the statute.18

The district court’s second rationale for restricting the

relevance of intent was based on Crandon’s statement that

§ 209(a) is a “‘prophylactic rule[ ] . . . intended to prevent even

the appearance of wrongdoing . . . that may apply to conduct

17Although it may be correct that POGO’s understanding of the

scope of Berman’s government work is not relevant to the jury’s

determination of what the scope of that work really was, it is not clear

that the same is true of Berman’s understanding of the scope of his

own work -- any more than it would be correct to exclude testimony

from Berman’s supervisors about their understanding of the nature of

his duties. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means

evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that

is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

less probable than it would be without the evidence.”); FED. R. EVID.

402 (providing that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible”). We do

not pass on this question, however, as neither POGO nor Berman

raises it.

18Similarly, (1) the payee must intend to receive the payment as

compensation for his government work, and (2) the work at issue must

actually be his government work.

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that has caused no actual injury to the United States.’” POGO

VII, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (quoting Crandon, 494 U.S. at 164). 

From this premise, the district court concluded that “Congress

drafted § 209(a) to prohibit all private payments in

compensation for an employee’s government services -- even

payments that simply appear to be for an employee’s

government work.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

This is an over-reading of Crandon. The Supreme Court

did declare that § 209(a) is a prophylactic rule. But a rule that

bars payments intended to compensate an official for his

government work is plainly prophylactic. As we discussed

above, such payments are barred because they give the

appearance of wrongdoing, even if they do not actually injure

the United States in the sense of altering an official’s behavior. 

See supra Part II.A.2. Crandon said that the purpose of the

statute was to prevent the “appearance of wrongdoing”; it did

not say that the purpose was to bar all payments “that simply

appear to be for an employee’s government work.” There is no

indication in either Crandon or the statute that the latter was the

“wrongdoing” at which the statute was aimed.

We do agree with the district court that Crandon made clear

that “[n]either good faith, nor full disclosure, nor exemplary

performance of public office will excuse the making or receipt

of a prohibited payment.” 494 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added). 

But as we explained above, this means only that the statute does

not require a heightened form of mens rea. See supra Part

II.A.2. A payment is “prohibited” by § 209(a) if it is intended

to compensate an employee for government work. And if a

defendant makes such a payment, its good faith is no defense. 

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C

Finally, the government urges that, even “if error does exist,

it is harmless, as the district court admitted evidence of the

defendants’ subjective intent and allowed them to argue their

good faith to the jury.” Gov’t Br. 13. In fact, the record is quite

muddy as to how much (and what kind of) evidence of intent or

good faith the court permitted the defendants to introduce or

argue. But even if the court had permitted the jury to hear such

evidence in full, we could not conclude that this rendered the

error nonprejudicial. See Muldrow ex rel. Estate of Muldrow v.

Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that

the civil harmless error rule directs courts to disregard errors

that are not prejudicial).

The heart of the defense was that the defendants did not

intend the payment to be for Berman’s government service. As

we explained in POGO I:

The government contend[ed] that . . . ‘POGO paid Mr.

Berman because of the work he had done for Interior

and for his assistance to POGO in connection with that

work.’ Appellee’s Br. 8. POGO, however, insist[ed]

that . . . [i]t gave the award . . . not as compensation for

Berman’s government work, but in recognition of

whistleblowing that assertedly was outside the scope of

that work. 

POGO I, 454 F.3d at 310. Moreover, while we have held above

that to find the defendants liable the jury must determine that

they intended the payment to be for Berman’s government

services, the district court instructed the jury that it need not

consider the defendants’ intent at all and could not consider

whether their intent was to compensate for government services. 

We cannot conclude that an error of this importance did not

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31

“affect[] the outcome of the district court proceedings.” 

Muldrow, 493 F.3d at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, we must vacate the verdict and remand the case for

a new trial.

III

In addition to his challenge to the intent instruction, Berman

raises two further challenges that we address below.

A

Berman contends that the district court erroneously failed

to instruct the jury that a lump-sum payment cannot qualify as

unlawful compensation within the meaning of § 209(a). 

Berman’s contention -- which was also the basis of his summary

judgment motion -- is that only an award that satisfies an

“objective definition of salary” or bears “indicia of salary” can

qualify. Berman Br. 12, 15-16; Berman Reply Br. 9. In

particular, he maintains that a single, non-periodic payment does

not meet this standard. There is no dispute that this case

involves only a single payment of $383,600. Thus, if Berman

is correct that a lump-sum payment does not fall within § 209(a),

the appropriate disposition would not simply be to remand for

a new trial, but to direct the dismissal of the case. 

Berman’s argument would have weight if the statutory text

merely barred outside sources from paying federal employees

“salaries.”19 But § 209(a) goes considerably further than that. 

Although it bars the payment of “any salary,” the section also

bars the payment of “any contribution to or supplementation of

19See MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1031 (10th

ed. 1996) (defining “salary” as “fixed compensation paid regularly for

services”).

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32

salary.” 18 U.S.C. § 209(a). The prohibition of a contribution

or supplementation plainly goes beyond a salary, and the

introductory adjective “any” expands the scope of coverage still

further. See MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 53

(10th ed. 1996) (defining “any” as “one or some,

indiscriminately of whatever kind”); Dep’t of Housing & Urban

Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) (noting that “the word

‘any’ has an expansive meaning” (quoting United States v.

Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Moreover, the statute uses the singular “contribution

to,” not “contributions to,” further suggesting that a one-time

payment can qualify.

An additional textual problem for Berman’s interpretation

is presented by subsections (d) and (e) of § 209, which exclude

from the coverage of subsection (a) some payments that are

typically lump-sum, or at least not periodic. Subsection (d)

provides, inter alia, that “[t]his section does not prohibit

payment [to] or acceptance of contributions” by employees for

certain travel and other expenses incident to attendance at

meetings authorized by Title 5. 18 U.S.C. § 209(d); see 5

U.S.C. § 4111(a). Similarly, subsection (e) provides that § 209

does not bar the receipt of relocation expenses for certain

executive exchanges. 18 U.S.C. § 209(e). If § 209(a) did not

cover lump-sum payments in the first place, it would have been

unnecessary for Congress to specify these exceptions. See, e.g.,

Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994) (declaring

that “[j]udges should hesitate” to treat statutory provisions

“essentially as surplusage -- as words of no consequence”).

Nor do we think it likely that Congress would have wanted

to bar small but periodic payments intended to compensate an

employee for his government services, but to permit large single

-- or irregular -- payments that total a far greater sum. If the

statute is intended to prevent the appearance of wrongdoing, as

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33

the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared, it is hard to see why

the public would regard the former as worse than the latter. 

This court has certainly assumed that § 209(a) prohibits

lump-sum payments, see United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d

964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (declaring that “there can be no

dispute that defendant . . . received a contribution from a source

outside the Government when he accepted [a one-time payment

of $800] for the Ireland trip”), as has the Seventh Circuit, see

United States v. Oberhardt, 887 F.2d 790, 793-94 (7th Cir.

1989) (holding that the defendant violated § 209 by paying a

government employee $200 for an official document). 

Berman’s argument to the contrary rests primarily on the

concurring opinion of three justices in Crandon, 494 U.S. at

168-69 (Scalia, J., concurring), with which we respectfully

disagree for the textual reasons we have just discussed. Berman

also relies on a Second Circuit case, United States v. Alfisi,

which held that payments to an Agriculture Department

inspector did not violate § 209(a) because they bore no indicia

of salary. 308 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). Regardless of

whether Alfisi is correct, the case did not address the relevance

of lump-sum payments at all, but rather turned on the fact that

the payments were “in cash and off-book.” Id. 

In sum, because § 209(a) bars the payment of a lump-sum

as compensation for an employee’s government services, the

district court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury

to the contrary.

B

 Berman also objects to the court’s failure to instruct the

jury concerning which activities constituted his official

government work. In particular, he objects to the court’s refusal

to instruct that certain of his activities -- his internal

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34

whistleblowing about oil companies’ undervaluation of the oil

they extracted from federal land -- were outside the scope of his

officially assigned duties. But as the district court noted, “[a]ll

throughout the summary judgment proceedings, both defendants

. . . maintained that the question of the nature and scope of

Berman’s official government duties was an issue of fact for the

jury to decide.” POGO VII, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 61. The court

correctly concluded that “it is for the jury to decide what

Berman’s official responsibilities were, what he did, and hence

whether his conduct constituted government services.” Id. And

the court’s instructions were adequate to guide the jury on this

issue. See Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549,

557 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

C

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Berman’s challenges

to the jury instructions.20

20In addition to those challenges, Berman raises a number of

arguments that can best be characterized either as evidentiary disputes

or as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

verdict. Because it is not possible to predict what the record will look

like after a new trial, there is no reason for us to address those

challenges now. Berman also disputes the district court’s conclusion,

with respect to a separate count of the complaint, “that the same facts

that rendered Berman liable under § 209(a) also support a finding that

he breached his fiduciary duty to the government.” United States v.

Project on Gov’t Oversight, 572 F. Supp. 2d 73, 75-76 (D.D.C. 2008). 

Because that conclusion appears to have been largely premised on

Berman’s now-vacated liability under § 209(a), we leave this issue for

the court’s reconsideration upon remand.

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35

IV

We now turn to the government’s cross-appeal, which

maintains that the $120,000 penalty the district court imposed on

POGO contravenes the statutory penalty provision, 18 U.S.C.

§ 216(b), because it is less than the amount of POGO’s $383,600

payment. Although our decision to vacate the verdict

technically makes resolution of this issue unnecessary, we

resolve it now because the district court’s construction of the

provision is final and resolution will avoid the need for yet a

third appeal in the event the jury again returns a verdict against

the defendants.

The district court imposed a penalty on Berman in the full

amount of the payment he received, $383,600, reasoning that

“any lesser amount would mean that he still benefitted from the

violation of § 209(a).” POGO VII, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 69. As

for POGO, however, the court imposed a lesser penalty of

$120,000, stating that it was “persuaded that the record contains

adequate evidence that POGO made this payment openly and in

good faith.” Id.21 As the court explained: 

Although Crandon holds that good faith is no defense

to liability under § 209(a), it does not suggest that a

Court cannot take good faith into account when

considering the appropriate penalty to impose. The

penalty of $120,000 reflects POGO’s good faith while

also recognizing that the payment was ultimately

unlawful. It is also a sufficient penalty to deter similar

future conduct by POGO or others. 

21This evidence included: “[POGO’s] prior disclosure to [the

Justice Department of its plan to make the payment], POGO’s desire

to [issue] a press release concerning the payment, and the appropriate

tax filings made by POGO.” POGO VII, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 69.

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36

Id. (footnote omitted). 

The government contends, first, that § 216(b) leaves the

district court no discretion: it must impose a penalty on each

defendant in the full amount of the unlawful payment. 

Alternatively, the government contends that, even if § 216(b)

affords the court discretion, the court abused its discretion in this

case. 

Our review of the district court’s interpretation of § 216(b)

is de novo. United States v. Fonseca, 435 F.3d 369, 371 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). If we conclude that the court properly interpreted

the statute to give it discretion regarding the amount of the

penalty, we review the court’s determination of the specific

penalty only for abuse of discretion. Jankins v. TDC Mgmt.

Corp., 21 F.3d 436, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

A

Section 216(b) states that a defendant who has violated

§ 209(a) shall be subject to a civil penalty of:

not more than $50,000 for each violation or the amount

of compensation which the person received or offered

for the prohibited conduct, whichever amount is

greater.

18 U.S.C. § 216(b). The government maintains that the

introductory phrase, “not more than,” modifies only “$50,000

for each violation.” Thus, in the government’s view, the court

must impose a penalty of “either (1) not more than $50,000 [per

violation] or (2) the amount of illegal compensation, whichever

is greater.” Gov’t Reply Br. 4. In this case, because there was

only one violation, the penalty must be the greater of (a) $0 to

$50,000 or (b) $383,600. Gov’t Br. 53. And because $383,600

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37

is the greater amount, the court may impose nothing less than

that. Id.

The district court, by contrast, concluded that “not more

than” modifies both the $50,000 per violation amount and the

compensation amount. On this view, the court must impose a

penalty of “not more than [1] $50,000 for each violation or [2]

the amount of compensation . . . , whichever amount is greater.” 

18 U.S.C. § 216(b). In this case, that means the penalty must be

not more than the greater of $50,000 or $383,600. Because

$383,600 is the greater amount, the court may not impose more

than that. It may, however, impose less.

We agree with the district court that both “constructions of

the statute are plausible and can fairly comport with common

usage.” POGO VII, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 68. We also agree that

the court has chosen the better construction of the two.22

The government contends that its reading is the “far more

natural” one. Gov’t Reply Br. 1. We do not see why. To the

22We note that other courts -- albeit in dicta -- have construed

other statutory penalty provisions with nearly identical grammatical

constructions in the same way that we construe § 216(b). See United

States v. Rosen, 296 F. App’x 188, 194 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that 18

U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2), which provides that a defendant convicted of

money laundering shall be fined “not more than $500,000 or twice the

value of the [laundered] funds . . . whichever is greater,” authorizes a

fine of “up to twice the money laundered”; and affirming a fine of

$150,000 where twice the money laundered totaled more than

$600,000); United States v. Rasco, 853 F.2d 501, 503-04 (7th Cir.

1988) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1988), which provided that a

defendant found guilty of certain bribery offenses shall be fined “not

more than $5,000 or three times the value of the thing given . . . ,

whichever is greater,” “merely provides for the maximum amount of

fine which can be imposed”).

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38

contrary, it seems at least somewhat more natural to read the

introductory phrase -- “not more than” -- as modifying the next

two phrases in the sentence: “$50,000 for each violation” and

“the amount of the compensation.” On this reading, “not more

than” signals the two alternative ceiling amounts that follow: 

(1) $50,000 per violation; or (2) the amount of compensation. 

And the final clause, “whichever amount is greater,” then

provides a rule for deciding which of the two ceiling amounts

will govern. In so doing, the final clause ensures that, where the

payment is less than $50,000, the court may nonetheless impose

a sentence of up to $50,000. But in cases in which the payment

is more than $50,000, as it was here, the court may impose a

penalty of up to the full amount of the payment. 

In comparison, the government’s reading seems somewhat

less natural, although we agree that § 216(b) is not a model of

legislative drafting. In its view, the penalty is either (1) $0 to

$50,000 or (2) $383,600 (the amount of compensation here),

whichever is greater. Gov’t Br. 53. Under this interpretation,

the statute instructs the court to compare not two fixed amounts,

but rather one range and one fixed number, and then to decide

which is “greater.” This strikes us as less natural in several

respects: it is unusual for a statute to compare a range and a

fixed number; the mathematical meaning of “greater” is

somewhat ambiguous in reference to a range; and this

construction requires viewing a range as an “amount.” The

latter is required because the final clause directs the choice of

“whichever amount is greater” -- a point the government

obscures by repeatedly using the phrase “whichever is greater”

rather than the statutory phrase “whichever amount is greater” --

in paraphrasing its preferred construction. See, e.g., Gov’t Br.

52-53; Gov’t Reply Br. 4, 6.

The government maintains that the district court’s (and our

own) reading does not “give meaningful effect to the clause,

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39

‘whichever is greater.’” Gov’t Br. 52. Yet as we have just

explained, “whichever amount is greater” provides a rule for

deciding which of the two ceiling amounts will govern in a

particular case. Perhaps it could be said that the word “or” is

alone sufficient to permit the trial court to select the larger of the

two ceilings. But in our view, the decision rule would be at least

ambiguous if “or” were the only direction; the addition of the

final clause eliminates the ambiguity.

The government also insists that its view is “the only

construction consistent with the policy” of the statute because

“[t]here can be no policy interest in allowing a Government

employee to retain unlawful profits.” Gov’t Reply Br. 6. 

Although it recognizes that in this case the district court did

deprive the government employee of those profits by imposing

a penalty in the full amount of the payment, the government

worries that our construction would permit a court to impose

less than the full amount. And the government cannot perceive

any circumstance in which a lesser amount would be justified.

We agree that, in most cases, penalizing the payee less than

the amount he was paid would not be justified. But we cannot

say that it never would be. It is important to note that the text of

§ 216(b) does not end with the indented quotation set out at the

beginning of this subpart. Rather, the next sentence states:

The imposition of a civil penalty under this subsection

does not preclude any other criminal or civil statutory,

common law, or administrative remedy, which is

available by law to the United States or any other

person.

18 U.S.C. § 216(b). We cannot say, for example, that it would

be unjustified for a judge to conclude, in a case in which a

defendant had already been subjected to an array of other

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40

criminal and civil remedies -- perhaps exceeding the amount of

the payment -- that a further penalty in the full amount was

unnecessary. Accordingly, it would have been reasonable for

Congress to have left the precise amount of the penalty to the

judge’s discretion. And unlike the government, we do not detect

a general congressional antipathy towards leaving the amount of

civil penalties to a trial court’s good judgment. 

Moreover, not even the government’s construction requires

the payee to disgorge the full amount of the payment in all

cases. Although it does have that effect when the amount of the

payment is more than $50,000 (per violation), that is not the

case when the payment is less. To the contrary, in that case the

government’s construction becomes somewhat indeterminant. 

For example, where the amount of the payment is $25,000, the

government’s construction would require a penalty of: (1) “$0 -

$50,000” or (2) $25,000 -- whichever is greater. Gov’t Reply

Br. 5. But what is the meaning of “whichever is greater” when

one comparator is a range and the other is a fixed number within

that range? In its opening brief, the government says that “[t]he

only way to give meaningful effect to the clause, ‘whichever is

greater,’ is to construe § 216(b) as giving discretion to impose

a penalty up to $50,000 when the amount of compensation is

equal to or less than that amount.” Gov’t Br. 14-15 (emphasis

added). This seems a sensible way of interpreting the

government’s own construction, but the consequence is that it

would permit a court to impose a penalty of less than the

$25,000 payment -- thus defeating the government’s

disgorgement principle. In its reply brief and at oral argument,

the government backed away from this interpretation, insisting

that its construction requires the court to pick a penalty between

$25,000 and $50,000. Gov’t Reply Br. 6 n.1; see Oral Arg.

Recording 54:03-54:19. We have difficulty seeing how the

government’s construction yields that result, at least without

considerable verbal gymnastics. 

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41

Finally, whatever the persuasiveness of the government’s

“disgorgement” rationale for penalizing the payee in the full

amount of the payment, it does not apply to the penalty imposed

on the payor. The payor has no “ill-gotten gains” to disgorge;

to the contrary, it is already out the amount it paid. Yet under

the government’s construction, POGO as well as Berman must

be penalized the full $383,600. This is not to say that the payor

should not be penalized. But it is to say that the government has

articulated “no sound policy interest” -- or any reason at all --

that Congress might have had for a mandatory doubling of the

payor’s loss in every case. And that is further support for the

proposition that Congress did not intend the construction upon

which the government insists.

B

The government argues, in the alternative, that even if

§ 216(b) gives the district court discretion to impose a penalty

in an amount less than the unlawful payment, the court “abused

its discretion in considering evidence of POGO’s good faith”

without “holding a fair hearing to provide the Government with

the opportunity to supplement the record” on that issue. Gov’t

Br. 57-58. We note that the government never expressly sought

such a hearing, but rather described to the court the evidence it

would proffer if the court were to hold one. U.S. Resp. to

[POGO’s] Req. that the Court Impose No Penalty Upon the

Organization at 6-7 (Feb. 29, 2008). In any event, because we

are remanding the case for a new trial, the government will have

an opportunity to request a penalty hearing if the jury again

finds the defendants liable.

V

The judgment of the district court is reversed in part and

affirmed in part. The case is remanded to the district court with

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42

instructions to vacate the jury’s verdict and to conduct further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in the

judgment and concurring in part in the opinion: I concur in the

judgment reached by the majority. I also concur in much of the

analysis supporting majority opinion. However, I cannot concur

in the majority’s disposition of the Government’s cross-appeal

challenging the District Court’s construction of 18 U.S.C.

§ 216(b). I agree that the Government loses on the merits, but

I think the issue is much closer than is suggested by the majority

opinion. 

As the majority opinion properly notes, our review of

§ 216(b) is de novo, so we owe no deference to the District

Court’s construction of the disputed penalty provision. It is

unclear whether the majority means to endorse the District

Court’s analysis of the disputed statutory provision or merely

affirm on other grounds. The latter appears to be the case. In

any event, the decision that we reach is far from ironclad. 

Section 216(b) provides that a party who violates § 209(a)

is subject to a civil penalty of “not more than $50,000 for each

violation or the amount of compensation which the person

received or offered for the prohibited conduct, whichever

amount is greater.” 18 U.S.C. § 216(b). 

The District Court found that “not more than” modifies both

the $50,000 per violation amount and the compensation amount.

Under this interpretation, a trial judge court may impose a

penalty of 

[1] not more than $50,000 for each violation 

or

[2] not more than the amount of compensation, 

[3] whichever amount is greater. 

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2

The Government contends that the phrase “not more than”

modifies only “$50,000 for each violation.” Under the

Government’s interpretation, a person “shall be subject to a civil

penalty” of

[1] not more than $50,000 for each violation 

or

[2] the amount of compensation which the person received

or offered for the prohibited conduct,

[3] whichever amount is greater.

 I agree with the majority and with the District Court that both

“constructions of the statute are plausible.” U.S. v. Project on

Gov't Oversight, 543 F. Supp.2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2008).

As I see it, the Government is right in its contention that the

District Court’s construction strains the language of the statute.

There are three obvious problems with the District Court’s

construction. First, the statute says that a person shall be, not

may be, subject to a penalty for statutory violations. However,

under the District Court’s view, a trial judge has the discretion

to impose no penalty. Second, under the District Court’s view,

the word “amount” in the phrase “whichever amount is greater”

is rendered meaningless. And, third, the District Court’s reading

effectively nullifies the entire phrase “whichever amount is

greater.” 

The District Court's construction unavoidably rests on the

assumption that “whichever amount is greater” refers to either

(1) “not more than $50,000" or (2) “not more than the amount

of compensation.” However, neither “not more than $50,000”

nor “not more than the amount of compensation” refers to a

discernable “amount.” Indeed, each range includes the

possibility of zero. Furthermore, under the District Court’s

construction, when a violation is $50,000 or less, “amount of

compensation” is irrelevant, since the trial court always retains

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3

discretion to impose a penalty from $0 up to $50,000. When the

violation is over $50,000,“not more than $50,000” is irrelevant,

since the trial court always retains discretion to impose a penalty

from $0 to the amount of the violation. In other words, the

possible penalty range for a violation is determined by whether

the compensation is above or below $50,000, not by reference

to a comparison of two discernable amounts. In every case,

there is really only one penalty range in play. Given this reality,

the Government is not wrong in suggesting that the District

Court’s approach renders the clause “whichever amount is

greater” largely superfluous. 

Obviously, the Government’s position is appealing. If

nothing else, it highlights the fact that § 216(b) is not a model of

legislative drafting. Nonetheless, as the majority correctly

notes, the Government’s view of the disputed language is not the

only plausible reading of the statute. Under the Government’s

construction of § 216(b), a penalty must be (1) “not more than

$50,000 ” or (2) “the amount of compensation,” “whichever is

greater.” Under this view, a trial judge would be required to

compare a range to a fixed value (the amount of compensation).

If compensation is below $50,000, then the penalty may fall

between the amount of the violation and $50,000. If the

compensation is above $50,000, then the penalty is the amount

of the compensation. The penalty can never be zero. This is a

plausible construction of the statute, but not more compelling

than the competing interpretation adopted by the majority

opinion. 

The Government’s construction is problematic for at least

two reasons. First, it is unusual for a statute to compare a range

and a fixed number, as the Government would have it. Second,

the rigid penalty formulation to which the Government

subscribes affords the trial judge no discretion, which seems odd

with respect to a statute that includes the words “not more than.”

And the Government is simply incorrect in suggesting that our

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4

construction of the statute fails to give any effect to the phrase

“whichever amount is greater.” Our interpretation is not

airtight, but this is because the statute is poorly worded. 

This is a case in which judges are required to do the best

they can in construing a statutory provision that does not admit

of a straightforward interpretation. Because I am satisfied that

the construction that we endorse is marginally better than the

interpretation offered by the Government, I join the result

reached by the majority. In a case such as this, marginally better

is enough to carry the day.

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