Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01713/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01713-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom L. Carey
Respondent
Kenneth D. Phelon
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH D. PHELON,

Petitioner,

 v.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-1713 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a prisoner at California State Prison, Solano, seeks a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 USC § 2254. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of the State of California in

and for the County of San Francisco of kidnaping with intent to commit rape and various

other related crimes and enhancements. On April 19, 2000, he was sentenced to 11 years in

state prison.

On May 23, 2002, the California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim that the

trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and affirmed the judgment. On August

14, 2002, the Supreme Court of California denied review.

On July 29, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 in this court. See Phelon v. Carey, No. C 03-3501 CRB (PR) (N.D. Cal. filed

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July 29, 2003). Per order filed on November 24, 2003, the court dismissed petitioner’s

Fourth Amendment claim under the rationale of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), but

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted as to

petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent instead moved for

dismissal on the ground that the claims were not exhausted because they were not fairly

presented to the Supreme Court of California. Per order filed on July 14, 2004, the court

granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the petition without prejudice to refiling after

exhausting state judicial remedies.

Petitioner returned to state court and filed three habeas corpus petitions in the

Supreme Court of California. All the petitions were denied.

On April 26, 2005, petitioner filed the instant petition in this court. On July 27, 2005,

this court again dismissed petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim, and issued an order to show

cause why it should not grant relief on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause and petitioner has filed a traverse. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as follows:

On September 27, 1997, Kristine B. arrived at a San Francisco nightclub

intoxicated. Feeling ill, she left the club and returned to her car, where she sat

on the curb waiting for her friends to return. Appellant approached Kristine B.

from behind, grabbed her arms, and said, “Don't say anything. Get up or I will

kill you.” Complying with his orders, she followed appellant to a small

stairwell not far from the club and adjacent to appellant’s apartment building. 

Appellant pushed Kristine B. down the stairs, picked her back up, pushed her

up against a wall, and began hitting her face with his closed fist. While

restraining the victim against the wall, appellant removed her underwear and

began reaching for his pants before footsteps were heard. Appellant then left

the scene.

The footsteps belonged to Jerry Davis, the front desk security officer at

appellant’s residential building, who had observed appellant and the victim

walk to the stairwell area from his security monitor. As Davis walked toward

the crime scene, he observed the victim in the stairwell, legs in an awkward

position, motionless, underwear off, and pubic region exposed. He saw

appellant walking away from the area; appellant looked at Davis and the two

walked toward each other. Appellant informed Davis that Kristine B. was with

him, that they were having problems, but the situation was resolved. Davis

warned appellant that he and the victim were trespassing and instructed them to

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leave the area. Appellant agreed and returned to the stairwell where he struck

the victim one more time, while Davis returned to his post at the front desk. 

Kristine B. testified that she tried to yell for help but could not make her

voice project. Appellant came back down the stairs and hit her “really hard” in

the face, then left. 

Kristine B. struggled unsuccessfully to find her underwear, ascended the

stairs, and returned to the nightclub. A police officer at the club, Ian

Furminger, observed feces on the victim’s legs and blood on her swollen face. 

After the officer spoke with Kristine B. and an ambulance had arrived, Officer

Furminger discovered the crime scene nearby, where he found women's

underwear, earrings, blood, and feces. He also encountered Davis, who

directed him to appellant’s apartment. 

At appellant’s door, Officer Furminger noticed blood below the handle.

He proceeded to knock for about five to ten minutes and eventually appellant

opened the door, dressed only in his underwear. Officer Furminger performed

a “leg sweep” to place appellant on the floor and handcuffed him. The door to

appellant’s apartment had automatically closed and locked behind appellant. 

Officer Furminger asked appellant’s permission to enter the apartment to obtain

clothes for appellant and appellant consented.

Inside appellant’s apartment, Officer Furminger noticed a pair of pants

over a chair, a wet white T-shirt, and a shoe with feces on it. These items, in

addition to a washcloth found on appellant's bed and another shoe discovered

in a subsequent warrantless search, were seized. 

DNA testing on a shoe indicated blood consistent with the victim’s

DNA. The washcloth revealed the presence of feces. Blood near appellant’s

door handle was consistent with his own DNA and blood found at the scene of

the crime tested consistent with that of Kristine B.

Appellant testified at trial that he did not assault the victim, but rather

that she was already battered and bruised when he first approached her. 

Appellant stated his intention throughout the night was to assist the victim,

given the unsafe location of the club and early morning hour, but that his

efforts were frustrated by Kristine B. For example, appellant wanted to call the

police, but Kristine B. refused, preferring not to have her parents notified.

Appellant testified that he offered to take the victim into the lobby of his

building to help her clean up, but when they arrived at the building Kristine B.

said she did not want anyone to see her. Instead, appellant and the victim went

to the stairwell adjacent to appellant’s building so that Kristine B. could sit

while appellant grabbed a towel from his apartment. Appellant testified that

Kristine B. fell face first as she descended the stairwell; he went down to help

her up; she removed her earrings and underwear; and he told her to “get it

together” and put her underwear on while he went for a towel. Appellant

noticed there was feces on his shoe, “like she had went to the bathroom on

herself.”

Roosevelt Campbell, who lived in appellant’s building and knew

appellant, testified that he saw appellant at about 2:00 a.m. on September 27,

sitting on the curb of Third Street and talking with a young woman whose face

was swollen and who had a “busted lip.” Campbell exchanged greetings with

appellant and did not see any struggle or argument between appellant and the

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woman. As he walked away, Campbell glanced back and saw appellant and

the woman walking together but not touching.

Appellant presented several character witnesses who testified to his

honesty and peaceful nature. He had served as a student body officer while

attending Chabot College in 1995 and 1996 and had coordinated events

including a “stop the violence” campaign addressing domestic violence, suicide

prevention and rape prevention.

People v. Phelon, No. A091478, slip op. 3-7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2002). 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies that correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. 

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

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The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C § 

2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a state

court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme

Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Claims & Analysis

On April 26, 2005, petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under §

2254 alleging sixty-eight instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to prevail on

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective

standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. 

Id.

To aid in the discussion of each of petitioner’s numerous claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, the court has grouped the claims into four categories: (1) counsel’s

tactical errors; (2) counsel’s improper advice; (3) counsel’s failure to investigate; and (4)

counsel’s failure to report misconduct. 

1. Counsel’s Tactical Errors

The majority of petitioner’s claims pertain to specific tactical errors allegedly

made by petitioner’s counsel during the course of the trial. 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s tactical decisions must be highly deferential. United

States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 777 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1985). A difference of opinion as

to trial tactics does not constitute denial of effective assistance, and tactical decisions are not

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ineffective assistance simply because in retrospect better tactics are known to have been

available. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mayo,

646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981). Nevertheless, the label of “trial strategy” does not

automatically immunize an attorney’s performance from Sixth Amendment challenges. 

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d at 1389-90 (9th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, prejudice may result

from the cumulative impact of multiple tactical errors. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325,

1333 (9th Cir. 1995). In a case involving multiple alleged deficiencies, the petitioner must

prove that there is a reasonable probability that absent the various deficiencies, the outcome

of the trial might well have been different. Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir.

1995). 

Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective with respect to his (a) cross

examination, (b) direct examination, (c) treatment of physical evidence and exhibits, (d)

closing argument and (e) voir dire. Petitioner’s tactical error claims are without merit. In

light of the overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s guilt, it is not reasonably probable that the

alleged tactical errors, whether taken singly or together, affected the outcome of the trial. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

a. Tactical Errors Related to Cross-Examination

Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s tactical decision to

refrain from impeaching or from asking a particular line of questions to the following

witnesses: (i) Jerry Davis, (ii) Kristine B., (iii) Kelly Ryan, (iv.) police officers Furminger

and Ortega; (v.) Brian Wraxall; and (vi.) Anthony Belmonte.

i. Jerry Davis

Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective because of his failure to

cross-examine Jerry Davis effectively. Petitioner specifies four separate errors with respect

to counsel’s cross-examination of Davis: (1) counsel failed to challenge Davis’s bias with

respect to possible leniency from the prosecution in a matter involving the Social Security

Administration; (2) counsel failed to question Davis about his inconsistent testimony; (3)

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counsel failed to use audio-tapes and posterboards in his cross-examination of Davis; and (4)

counsel failed to impeach Davis with Davis’s prior convictions.

The first three of petitioner’s four claims are without merit. Petitioner has provided

no evidence to support Davis’s alleged “trouble with Social Security Administration.” The

claim is entirely speculative. This cannot do. It is well established that unsupported claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to warrant habeas relief. Dows v. Woods,

211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). As to

Davis’s alleged inconsistencies, the record demonstrates that the few inconsistent statements

Davis made that were significant to the case, such as Davis’s speculation that he discovered

Kristine B. unconscious on the stairwell after he had previously stated that he discovered her

face down and could not tell if she was unconscious, were indeed challenged by counsel

during the cross-examination. Furthermore, counsel’s decision not to use audio-tapes and

posterboards in his cross-examination was by no means unreasonable under professional

norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. 

Counsel’s failure to impeach Davis with his prior convictions also fails to provide a

basis for habeas relief. A prior conviction of a crime of moral turpitude may be used for the

purpose of impeaching a witness’s credibility if the conviction is not too remote in time. Cal.

Evid. Code § 788. As the record demonstrates, Davis had convictions from 1978, 1981 and

1991, which may have been for robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. In view of the

convictions’ remoteness and likely inadmissibility, it cannot be said that it was unreasonable

for counsel to refrain from attempting to impeach Davis with the prior convictions. But even

if there was no reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel’s decision to refrain from

impeaching Davis’s testimony with his prior convictions, the evidence of petitioner’s guilt

was overwhelming to such a degree that no prejudice could have resulted. The record is

replete with evidence supporting petitioner’s conviction: Kristine B.’s identification of the

petitioner in a photo spread despite having never met the petitioner before September 27,

1997; Kristine B. was covered in blood and feces after the incident and stated to police that

she had lost her underwear; women’s underwear, earrings, blood and feces discovered at the

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crime scene; blood found on the door of petitioner’s apartment was consistent with

petitioner’s DNA; blood and feces found on a shoe obtained inside petitioner’s apartment

was consistent with Kristine B.’s DNA; a security camera placing petitioner at the crime

scene with the victim; petitioner’s testimony admitting he was with the victim on the night in

question; and Kristine B.’s detailed testimony of the assault committed by the petitioner. In

light of all this incriminating evidence, it simply cannot be said that there is a reasonable

probability that, had counsel impeached Davis’s testimony with his prior convictions, the

verdict would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

ii. Kristine B.

Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to crossexamine Kristine B. effectively. Petitioner specifies five separate errors with respect to

counsel’s questioning of Kristine B.: (1) counsel failed to challenge Kristine B.’s

misidentification of petitioner’s clothing; (2) counsel failed to impeach Kristine B. with

inconsistent statements as to whether the petitioner “unfastened his pants”; (3) counsel failed

to impeach Kristine B. as to an abortion in her medical history; (4) counsel failed to question

the manner in which Kristine B.’s earrings were removed; and (5) counsel failed to question

Kristine B. as to the reason she was denied entry into the nightclub. 

All of these claims lack merit. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to impeach

Kristine B. with respect to her alleged misidentification of petitioner’s clothing because

petitioner did not base his defense on mistaken identity. Rather, petitioner testified at trial

that he was with Kristine B. on the night in question; petitioner’s defense was that he was

helping the victim. Moreover, Kristine B. testified that the petitioner was wearing a white tshirt and jeans. This was consistent with the wet white t-shirt officers found in petitioner’s

apartment immediately after the assault. Furthermore, Kristine B. positively identified

petitioner in a photographic lineup and at trial. 

Kristine B.’s testimony at the preliminary hearing on the issue as to whether petitioner

“unfastened his pants” was not inconsistent with her statements at trial. Kristine B. testified

at the preliminary hearing that petitioner’s arms went down to his pants. At trial, she stated

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that petitioner “went to reach for like the button, like the waistline of his pants.” These

statements are consistent, and not a basis for impeachment.

Petitioner does not set forth any facts showing how the victim’s medical history, the

removal of her earrings, and/or her alleged denial of entry to the night club were relevant to

this trial. The claims are at best speculative and not a basis for federal habeas relief. See

James, 24 F.3d at 26. 

iii. Kelly Ryan 

Petitioner claims that his counsel failed to cross-examine Kelly

Ryan effectively on two grounds: (1) counsel should have impeached Kelly Ryan’s

testimony that she knew Kristine B. was outside the club with the statement Ryan made on

Inspector O’Connor’s report where she said that she did not know if Kristine B. was outside

the club; and (2) counsel should have challenged Ryan’s testimony that she did not remember

what Kristine B. told her when Ryan encountered Kristine B. outside of the club after the

assault. 

These claims are without merit. Petitioner fails to show the relevance of the alleged

inconsistent statements. Again, the claims are at best speculative and not a basis for federal

habeas relief. See id.

iv. Police Officers Furminger and Ortega

Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective in crossexamining Furminger and Ortega by refraining to ask about (1) information obtained from a

Pitchess motion regarding Furminger’s history, (2) inconsistencies in Furminger’s and

Ortega’s reports and (3) the fact that there was no reference in the officers’ reports of

petitioner removing Kristine B.’s underwear or that he tried to rape her.

These claims are without merit. Petitioner has not presented any support for his

allegation regarding Officer Furminger’s past nor shown how Furminger’s past was relevant

to this case. As to the inconsistencies in the officers’ reports and/or there being no mention

of petitioner removing the victim’s underwear or trying to rape her in the reports, there is no

reasonable likelihood that, had counsel brought up these matters, the verdict would have been

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different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. After all the alleged inconsistencies and

omissions in the officers’ reports could have easily been attributable to the urgency of the

victim’s injuries and the fact that the assailant was still at large. 

v. Failure to Question Brian Wraxall

Brian Wraxall, the state’s forensic serologist, testified at trial as

to the extracting, preparation, and analyzing of DNA evidence taken from the petitioner’s

apartment. Wraxall testified that one of the blood stains on the petitioner’s door consisted of

a “mixture.” Wraxall concluded that the “primary stain” was consistent with petitioner and 

that the secondary stain was not consistent with either petitioner or the victim. Wraxall

deemed the secondary stain “background material,” noting that “doors and areas that are

constantly touched contain small amounts of DNA that can build up.” Petitioner claims that

counsel should have asked Wraxall additional questions about the secondary stain. 

Petitioner, however, does not show why counsel’s failure to do so was unreasonable and that

this resulted in prejudice. A review of the record in fact indicates that counsel challenged the

validity of the testing and the statistical significance of Wraxall’s findings to no avail. It is

not reasonably probable that, had counsel asked Wraxall additional questions about the

secondary stain, the verdict would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

vi. Failure to Question Anthony Belmonte

Petitioner argues that counsel should have elicited testimony

from Anthony Belmonte that petitioner was a “friendly guy who sometimes had guests stay

after visiting hours” and that Davis was “strange and weird.” Petitioner does not show how

Belmonte’s impression of Davis and petitioner was relevant or how such testimony would

have resulted in a more favorable outcome for petitioner. The claim is without merit.

b. Tactical Errors Related to Direct Examination

Petitioner claims that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance during direct examination. Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for (i)

failing to ask specific questions to defense witnesses and (ii) for failing to call three

potentially favorable witnesses. 

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//

i. Failure to ask specific questions

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in the questioning

of defense witnesses by (1) failing to ask defense witness Bette Davis to read her letter of

reference and (2) failing to question petitioner about his alcohol and drug use on the night of

the assault, thereby eliminating the possibility of a voluntary intoxication defense. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on these claims. Petitioner makes no

showing on why Davis’s letter was relevant. Regardless, counsel had already presented

several other witnesses who testified as to petitioner’s good character and reputation for

honesty. Davis’s letter testimony likely would have been cumulative. Nor was counsel

ineffective for failing to question petitioner about his alcohol and drug use. A voluntary

intoxication defense would have contradicted petitioner’s testimony at trial that the victim

had already been assaulted when petitioner encountered her. 

ii. Potentially favorable witnesses

Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to call the

following three potentially favorable witnesses: (1) additional medical personnel; (2)

nightclub personnel; and (3) Frances Ku.

Petitioner claims that the paramedics who took Kristine B. to the hospital and the

medical staff that treated her after the incident would have testified that the victim did not

claim that petitioner tried to rape her and that the victim was intoxicated. Petitioner claims

that nightclub personnel also would have testified as to the victim’s intoxicated state. Such

testimony, however, likely would have been cumulative, as the victim’s alcohol consumption

and the fact that no rape had occurred had already been established by previous testimony. It

is not reasonably probable that additional testimony on these issues would not have resulted

in a more favorable outcome for petitioner. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Frances Ku, a former

tenant in petitioner’s building who allegedly threatened to sue Davis for sexual harassment. 

Petitioner does not set forth a declaration from Ku or other evidence in support of his claim. 

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Regardless, in light of the overwhelming evidence against petitioner, it is not reasonably

probable that, had Ku’s alleged testimony been presented, the verdict would have been

different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 694.

c. Tactical Errors Related to Physical Evidence

Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by the alleged tactical errors counsel

made with respect to his treatment of physical evidence. Petitioner claims that counsel was

ineffective by (i) failing to introduce defense evidence and (ii) by neglecting to challenge

prosecution evidence.

i. Failure to Introduce Defense Evidence

Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance with regard to defense evidence. Petitioner claims the following: (1) counsel

failed to introduce a business card on which petitioner claimed he wrote the victim’s

telephone number when he and the victim were allegedly talking on the curb on the night in

question; (2) counsel failed to introduce investigation reports from a private investigation

company which would have impeached Davis’s alleged statement at trial that petitioner

claimed the victim was his girlfriend; (3) counsel withdrew two exhibits introduced at trial

regarding the victim’s medical care; and (4) counsel failed to introduce any physical

evidence for the jury to consider.

The first two claims are without merit. Petitioner fails to provide evidence that the

alleged business card exists; petitioner made no reference to it during his testimony at trial

nor supported this allegation with an affidavit. Conclusory allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel are insufficient to warrant habeas relief. James, 24 F.3d at 26. Much

less where, as here , there is no showing of prejudice either. As to the private investigator’s

reports, these documents likely constitute inadmissible hearsay. Moreover, the reports fail to

contradict Davis’s testimony at trial on this issue. At trial, Davis stated that the petitioner

said that “the girl was with him”; he gave the private investigator a nearly identical account. 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the other two claims either. A review of

the record demonstrates that counsel’s decision to withdraw the two exhibits introduced at

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trial regarding the victim’s medical care was reasonable. Before asking to withdraw the

exhibits, counsel noted that the documents contained hearsay statements that were “really

detrimental to my client’s case.” Additionally, the favorable evidence that petitioner alleges

the exhibits would have provided - the fact that the victim stated to medical personnel that no

sexual assault occurred - was already brought to light by Dr. Stephens’s testimony. Nor does

petitioner show prejudice from counsel’s decision not to introduce any physical evidence for

the jury to consider during deliberation. Petitioner does not point to any physical evidence

that, had counsel introduced during jury deliberation, would have made it reasonably

probable that the jury would have returned a different verdict. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694. 

ii. Failure to Object to Prosecution Evidence

Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object

to the following evidence offered by the prosecution: (1) an incident report written by Davis

which the defense did not possess at the preliminary hearing; (2); false and irrelevant

evidence; and (3) DNA-related evidence.

The first two claims are without merit because petitioner could not have been

prejudiced by Davis’s incident report because it was never introduced at trial. As to

petitioner’s claim that counsel failed to object to false and irrelevant evidence, petitioner fails

to articulate what evidence was false and irrelevant. Such conclusory allegations do not

warrant habeas relief. James, 24 F.3d at 26.

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s

introduction of DNA evidence because it was “contaminated,” irrelevant due to the fact that

contact between petitioner and the victim was conceded, and prejudicial because of evidence

of a penile swab. The claims are without merit. Nothing on the record suggests that the

DNA samples were contaminated in such a way that compromised their reliability; the DNA

evidence was relevant to proving an essential element of the charge, that petitioner was in

contact with the victim; and no evidence of a penile swab was admitted during trial. 

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d. Tactical Errors Related to Closing Argument

Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance during closing argument. Among the errors and omissions that petitioner takes

issue with are counsel’s failure to argue each and every element of the charges, the fact that

counsel “played the race card,” and counsel’s decision not to use a timeline during closing

argument. 

“While the right to effective assistance extends to closing argument, judicial deference

to counsel’s tactical decisions in closing presentation is particularly important because of the

broad range of legitimate defense strategy at the time.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-

6 (2003) (per curiam) (counsel’s exclusion of some issues in closing did not amount to

professional error of constitutional magnitude where issues omitted were not so clearly more

persuasive than those raised). The record shows that counsel reasonably disputed the most

important elements of the charges: the force used to move the victim, petitioner’s intent, the

duration of the encounter and the absence of great bodily injury. The issues that petitioner

alleges that counsel omitted were not essential, and by no means more persuasive than those

raised. Cf. id. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

e. Tactical Errors Related to Voir Dire 

Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective during voir dire is

without merit. Petitioner argues that defense counsel failed to ask the first 18 prospective

jurors the questions he submitted to the trial court for voir dire. However, petitioner provides

no evidence that the prospective jurors were not asked questions similar to those submitted or

that any of these prospective jurors were part of the jury. Moreover, petitioner does not show

how counsel’s decision during voir dire ultimately prejudiced the outcome of the trial. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This claim is entirely speculative. 

2. Counsel’s Improper Advice

Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by trial counsel knowingly consenting to

his assistant’s advice to present false testimony. Petitioner claims that counsel’s assistant

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gave him false statements to say in trial. However, petitioner provides no evidentiary

support for this claim. James, 24 F.3d at 26. Nor does he show how this alleged malfeasance

prejudiced the outcome of his trial. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the

claim. 

3. Counsel’s Failure to Investigate

Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to make a

reasonable investigation by neglecting to interview potentially favorable witnesses and

failing to measure the distance moved by the victim and challenge it in the prosecution’s

case. 

Although petitioner provides a list of names of so-called “potential witnesses,” he has

presented no evidence whatsoever showing that they would have been found, would have

testified on his behalf, and would have provided useful testimony. See Wildman v. Johnson,

261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (absence of potential witness declaration rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to call witness speculative); Dows,

211 F.3d at 486 (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim because petitioner provided

no evidence that witness would have provided helpful testimony for defense). Petitioner’s

mere speculation that one of the listed potential witnesses might have offered helpful

testimony if interviewed is not enough to establish ineffective assistance of counsel and

obtain federal habeas relief. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997)

(speculating as to what expert would say is not enough to establish prejudice); Bragg v.

Galaza, 242 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).

Petitioner’s claim that counsel failed to measure or challenge the distance moved by

the petitioner and victim does not provide a basis for habeas relief either. First, California

law does not a minimum distance that a victim must be moved in order to satisfy the

movement prong of kidnaping. See People v. Rayford, 9 Cal. 4th 1, 12 (1994). Second,

there is no indication that counsel did not measure the distances involved in the case. On the

contrary, counsel challenged Inspector O’Connor’s testimony of the distance traveled along

3rd Street, therefore indicating that counsel likely measured the distances. Third, and most

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importantly, petitioner does not show prejudice. In light of the substantial evidence of guilt

against petitioner, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would

have been different simply if counsel had presented a more accurate measurement of the

distance traveled. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

4. Failure to Report or Challenge Misconduct

Petitioner alleges that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to report or

challenge three instances of misconduct: (1) counsel failed to notify the trial judge that

witness Davis asked petitioner for money in exchange for him not to testify at trial; (2)

counsel failed to request a copy of “notes” that were found in three jurors’ notepads during

trial; and (3) counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s characterization of petitioner as a

“predator” during opening statements. 

The claims are without merit. As to the claim involving Davis, petitioner provides no

evidence that Davis asked petitioner for money to “disappear,” or that counsel knew of this

incident. Moreover, such conduct likely would not have resulted in a mistrial because the

incident allegedly occurred outside the presence of the jury and would not be incurably

prejudicial. At most, counsel could have cross-examined Davis for bias on this issue, and, in

light of the substantial evidence tending to prove petitioner’s guilt, it is not reasonably

probable that the verdict would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Petitioner is incorrect when he claims that counsel was ineffective because he did not

“see nor ask to receive a copy of notes” that were found in three jurors’ notepads during trial. 

The record shows that the jurors alerted the court as to the existence of the notes; the court

took possession of the notes; the court stated on the record that the notes did not appear to be

related to this trial and were from another trial; the pages were shown to counsel; and both

sides stipulated that the pages should be destroyed. Counsel’s performance on this issue was

not unreasonable. Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s failure to obtain a copy of the

notes constituted professional deficient performance and prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s characterization

of petitioner as a “predator” during opening statements. “Absent egregious misstatements,

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the failure to object during the closing argument and opening statement is within the ‘wide

range’ of permissible professional legal conduct.” United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d

1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1993). Even if the prosecutor’s characterization bordered on

misconduct, it cannot be said that the single use of the word “predator” in the opening

statement prejudiced the outcome of the trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

court is satisfied that the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland, or involved an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). None of the myriad

claims petitioner has raised satisfy Strickland.

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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