Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00239/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00239-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Allen
Defendant
Death Penalty
Interested Party
Louise Harris
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

LOUISE HARRIS, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:07cv239-MHT

) (WO) 

RICHARD ALLEN, )

Commissioner, Alabama )

Department of Corrections, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION

When petitioner Louise Harris filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, she immediately moved to stay and hold in

abeyance federal proceedings on that petition. The court

granted the motion. Harris’s petition is again before

the court, this time on a motion to dissolve the stay so

that her petition can now be heard on the merits. The

court will grant Harris’s motion and dissolve the stay,

but, for the reasons that follow, will also dismiss her

petition without prejudice. 

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1. The jury recommended, by a vote of 7 to 5, that

Harris be sentenced to life without the possibility of

parole. In Alabama, “[w]hile the jury’s recommendation

concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is

not binding on the court.” 1975 Ala. Code § 13A-5-47.

2

I. BACKGROUND

In 1989, Harris was convicted of capital murder in a

state trial court in Montgomery County, Alabama.

Following her conviction, she was sentenced to death by

the judge who presided over her trial.1

 On direct appeal,

her conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals, Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d

503 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), and the Alabama Supreme

Court, Ex parte Harris, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993). The

United States Supreme Court “granted certiorari to

consider [Harris’s] argument that Alabama’s capital

sentencing statute is unconstitutional,” Harris v.

Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 505 (1995), but rejected that

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2. Harris argued that “Alabama’s capital sentencing

statute is unconstitutional because it does not specify

the weight the judge must give to the jury’s

recommendation and thus permits arbitrary imposition of

the death penalty.” Harris, 513 U.S. at 505.

3

argument and “affirm[ed] the judgment of the Alabama

Supreme Court,” id. at 515.2

Subsequently, pursuant to Ala. R. Crim. P. 32, Harris

sought state post-conviction review of her conviction and

sentence. Upon review, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed Harris’s conviction again, but found

that her “counsel were ineffective at the penalty phase

of the trial,” reversed her death sentence, and remanded

her “cause ... for a new penalty-phase hearing before a

jury.” Harris v. State, 947 So. 2d 1079, 1132 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2004). The Alabama Supreme Court denied the

State’s petition for certiorari on the issue of Harris’s

sentence reversal, Pet., Ex. C (Doc. No. 1-4), but, on

the same day, granted certiorari to consider several

challenges to her conviction, Pet., Ex. D (Doc. No. 1-5).

The court affirmed Harris’s conviction on May 12, 2006,

Case 2:07-cv-00239-MHT-SRW Document 30 Filed 02/08/10 Page 3 of 25
4

Ex parte Harris, 947 So. 2d 1139 (Ala. 2006), and

overruled her application for rehearing on July 21, 2006,

Pet., Ex. F (Doc. No. 1-7).

Less than a year later, on March 16, 2007, Harris

filed a habeas petition in this court, raising

constitutional challenges to her conviction. As noted

above, her petition was accompanied by a motion for stay

and abeyance of federal proceedings. Specifically, she

requested that proceedings “be held in abeyance pending

her resentencing hearing and a state court resolution of

the penalty phase claims that may arise from that

proceeding.” Mot. for Stay at 2 (Doc. No. 7). After

considering her request and receiving no objection from

respondent Richard Allen, the court granted the motion.

Although nearly three years have passed since Harris

filed her habeas petition in this court, the Alabama

trial court has not held, or even scheduled, a resentencing hearing. The trial court held a status

conference on December 13, 2007, but “decided that it

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5

needed to reschedule the conference to have Ms. Harris

present (although she had waived her right to be present

at the status conference).” Pet’r Memo at 2 (Doc. No.

15). The conference has yet to be rescheduled.

Moreover, on October 31, 2008, the district attorney for

Montgomery County moved the trial court to “enter an

Order to Stay any further proceedings in State Court

until the Federal Court has completely ruled on all of

the Defendant’s pending Writs and Motions.” Mot. to

Dissolve Stay, Ex. D at 1 (Doc. 13-5). Although the

trial court has not granted the requested stay, Harris

has notified that court that she “agree[s] to a stay of

the state court proceedings as long as [the federal]

Court proceeds to review [her] pending federal habeas

petition.” Mot. to Dissolve Stay at 3 (Doc. No. 13). In

keeping with her notice to the state court, Harris filed

the instant motion to dissolve the stay of federal

proceedings. 

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6

II. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Harris initially sought to stay

federal review of her conviction-related claims until she

had been re-sentenced by the state trial court. The

timing of Harris’s filing in federal court and her

decision to seek a stay pending re-sentencing were driven

by then-reasonable concern that provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA) might otherwise block review of her existing

conviction-related claims and any potential sentencerelated claims. Harris now contends that, 

“In the two years since [she] filed her

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and

Motion for Stay and Abeyance ...

decisions by the United States Supreme

Court and the Eleventh Circuit have

clarified what constitutes a ‘judgment’

for purposes of the procedural

requirements of [AEDPA], and, thus, what

will be considered a ‘successive’

petition under AEDPA. In view of these

recent decisions, Mrs. Harris now

believes that she will not be prejudiced

if she moves forward with her innocence

claims in federal court before

proceeding with her resentencing in

state court.” 

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3. Of course, it is not entirely accurate to say

that Harris has a bifurcated set of habeas claims;

although she currently challenges only her conviction she

could not possibly have sentence-related claims because

she has yet to be re-sentenced. It is certainly

accurate, however, to describe her current position as

“unusual.” 

7

Mot. to Dissolve Stay at 3 (Doc. No. 13) (internal

citations omitted). The court concludes, however, that

in “clarif[ying] what constitutes a ‘judgment’ for the

purpose of ... AEDPA,” these very decisions establish

that the court lacks jurisdiction over Harris’s petition.

As suggested by the above-quoted excerpt from

Harris’s motion, the court’s analysis of her request

requires an examination of the interplay among, and

evolving interpretation of, various provisions of AEDPA.

In conducting this analysis, the court finds it useful to

explain first why Harris finds herself in, as she puts

it, “the unusual position of having an involuntarily

bifurcated set of habeas claims.” Pet’r Memo at 1 (Doc.

No. 15).3

 The court then explains why the necessary

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8

response to this particular “bifurcation” is a dismissal

of her petition without prejudice. 

Harris’s decision to file her petition and motion to

stay proceedings was driven by the decision of the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Rainey v. Sec’y for

the Dep’t of Corr., 443 F.3d 1323 (2006). In that case,

the appellate court interpreted and applied AEDPA’s

statute of limitations, which states, in pertinent part,

that, 

“A 1-year period of limitation shall

apply to an application for writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run

from ... the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The court held that “when a

[habeas] petitioner who has been resentenced brings an

application challenging only his original judgment of

conviction, the one-year statute of limitations under the

AEDPA runs from the date the original judgment of

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4. This was only a possibility, as the Rainey court

also held that, “when a petitioner brings a single

petition challenging his original judgment of conviction

and his resentencing judgment, the statute of limitations

under § 2244(d)(1)(A) runs from the date the resentencing

judgment became final.” Rainey, 443 F.3d at 1327-28

(emphasis added). Thus, had Harris waited to exhaust any

potential sentence-related claims, Rainey established

(continued...)

9

conviction became final and not the date the resentencing

judgment became final.” Rainey, 443 F.3d. at 1326. 

The Rainey court’s interpretation of § 2244(d), when

read with other provisions of AEDPA, raised some

difficult questions for Harris and similarly situated

would-be federal-habeas petitioners. In addition to

establishing a statute of limitations, AEDPA requires

petitioners to “exhaust[] the remedies available in the

courts of the State” before filing in federal court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Because Harris had exhausted

state remedies with respect to her “judgment of

conviction,” the Rainey decision created the possibility

that the statute of limitations would bar un-filed

federal challenges to her conviction after one year.4

 On

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(...continued)

that her petition would be time-barred only if it was

filed more than one year after her sentence became final

or if it failed to raise any challenges to her new

sentence. 

5. Harris did not explicitly raise these concerns

when she filed her motion to stay federal proceedings.

Instead, the core of her argument was that a stay would

allow her, 

“to revise or supplement the ...

(continued...)

10

the other hand, because she had not been re-sentenced,

she could not have exhausted, or even identified, any

sentence-related claims and thus could not file them in

federal court. Harris’s circumstances were further

complicated by the possibility that a later federal

petition challenging only her sentence might be treated

as a “second or successive” petition and thus dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244; see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 521 (1982) (“[A] prisoner who decides to proceed

only with his exhausted claims and deliberately sets

aside his unexhausted claims risks dismissal of

subsequent federal petitions.”).5

 

Case 2:07-cv-00239-MHT-SRW Document 30 Filed 02/08/10 Page 10 of 25
(...continued)

petition [following re-sentencing], and

present all of her claims to this Court

at the same time. From the standpoint

of judicial economy, that is clearly the

better option.” 

Pet’r Memo, Mot. to Stay at 4 (Doc. No. 11). The instant

motion to dissolve the stay, however, suggests that

Harris was affected by these concerns. See Mot. at 3

(Doc. No. 13) (contending that the stay should be

dissolved because, “[i]n view of these recent decisions,

Mrs. Harris now believes that she will not be prejudiced

if she moves forward with her innocence claims in federal

court before proceeding with her resentencing in state

court”)(emphasis added).

11

Faced with the questions raised by the Rainey

decision, Harris prudently chose to file her habeas

petition and seek a stay and abeyance. See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005) (suggesting that a

petitioner facing similar concerns might “fil[e] a

‘protective’ petition in federal court and ask[] the

federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas

proceedings until state remedies are exhausted”). As

stated above, Harris is now confident that subsequent

decisions by the United States Supreme Court and the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals–-including the explicit

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12

overruling of Rainey–-clear the path for this court to

address immediately her conviction-related claims without

risking a procedural bar to any later sentence-related

claims. 

Harris relies in particular on Burton v. Stewart, 549

U.S. 147 (2007) (per curiam), and Ferreira v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2007). In the

former, the Supreme Court explained, as it had

previously, that: “‘Final judgment in a criminal case

means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.’” Burton,

549 U.S. at 156 (quoting Berman v. United States, 302

U.S. 211, 212 (1937)). Applying this definition of

“final judgment” to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the Court

concluded that AEDPA’s statute of limitations period does

“not begin until both [a] conviction and sentence ‘become

final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.’” Burton,

549 U.S. at 156-57 (emphasis in original). 

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13

In Ferreira, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a set of

facts materially indistinguishable from those it had

addressed in Rainey. See Ferreira, 494 F.3d at 1292

(“The main issue in [this case] is whether the

petitioner’s original conviction triggered the running of

AEDPA’s statute of limitations or whether the running of

the statute was triggered by the petitioner’s

resentencing, when the habeas petition only challenges

the original ... conviction.”). “Applying the Supreme

Court’s statutory interpretation in Burton, [the court

concluded that] the [AEDPA] statute of limitations is

triggered by the date the judgment, which is based on [a

petitioner’s] conviction and the sentence he is serving,

becomes final.” Id. at 1293. The court went on to

explain that: “That interpretation effectively overrules

our decision[] in Rainey ... where we defined ‘judgment’

differently. Our incorrect interpretation directly led

to our holding that [the Rainey] petition[] [was] timebarred.” Id. 

Case 2:07-cv-00239-MHT-SRW Document 30 Filed 02/08/10 Page 13 of 25
14

Applying the lessons of Burton and Ferreira to

Harris’s case, this court concludes that she need no

longer be concerned that AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations will run on her conviction-related claims

before she exhausts state remedies with respect to her

sentence; indeed, the clock will not begin to run until

such remedies are exhausted. 

Nonetheless, Harris urges the court to proceed on her

conviction-related claims before she is re-sentenced.

The court must refuse her request, as it concludes that

it cannot exercise jurisdiction over her petition until

there is a state judgment in her case. 

Harris filed her habeas petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a), which states that “a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court.” Burton implies, and Ferreira

explicitly states, that “the judgment to which

[§ 2254(a)] refers is the underlying conviction and most

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15

recent sentence that authorizes the petitioner’s current

detention.” Ferreira, 494 F.3d at 1292. Because

Harris’s conviction has been reversed and because she is

still awaiting re-sentencing, she is not in “custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a).

To be sure, at the time Harris filed her petition,

she reasonably believed that this court could address her

claims because binding Eleventh Circuit precedent

established that she was in custody pursuant to a

“judgment of conviction.” But the Eleventh Circuit has

now expressly recognized that what it “previously called

the judgment of conviction and the sentencing judgment

together form the judgment that imprisons the

petitioner.” Ferreira, 494 F.3d at 1293.

Harris is correct that, in addition to what has been

discussed above, Burton also stands for the proposition

that a district court may hear a habeas petitioner’s

conviction-related claims before her sentence is final

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16

under AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement and thus before

final judgment triggers AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

Indeed, according to Burton, petitioners with “exhausted

and unexhausted claims ... have two options. They may

withdraw [the so-called] mixed petition, exhaust the

remaining claims, and return to district court with a

fully exhausted petition. ... Alternatively, ... [they]

may proceed with only the exhausted claims.” Burton, 549

U.S. at 154. But allowing a petitioner to proceed with

some exhausted claims before a judgment is final for

purposes of § 2244(d) is not the same as allowing a

petitioner to file exhausted claims before she is in

“custody pursuant to [a] judgment” as required by

§ 2254(a). Burton stands for the former, but cannot be

read as endorsing the latter. 

The petitioner in Burton filed his initial habeas

petition after he was re-sentenced, but before he had

exhausted state remedies with respect to his new

sentence. As discussed above, the Supreme Court held

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17

that, under § 2244(d), “Burton’s limitations period did

not begin until both his conviction and sentence ‘became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review’--which

occurred well after Burton filed his [initial] petition.”

Burton, 549 U.S. at 156-57 (emphasis in original). When

“Burton argue[d] in rebuttal that this reasoning would

necessarily mean the District Court lacked jurisdiction

to consider the [initial] petition,” the Court rejected

his argument. Id. at 157. The Court explained that

§ 2254(a) grants jurisdiction over “a habeas petition ‘in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court.’” Id. Because he had been re-sentenced

before “he filed [his initial] petition, Burton assuredly

was ‘in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court’–-even if, at that point, the ... judgment was not

final for purposes of triggering AEDPA’s statute of

limitations.” Id. Put simply, Burton was in “custody

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18

pursuant to the judgment of a State court” because he had

been convicted and sentenced by the state court. 

Harris argues that, like Burton, she “is currently in

custody pursuant to a judgment–-her 1989 conviction and

sentencing.” Pet’r Memo at 3 (Doc. No. 15). The court

struggles to understand how she could be in custody

pursuant to a sentence that no longer exists. Harris is

not in custody pursuant to a judgment, she is in custody

pending a judgment, just as she was in the interval

between her conviction and initial sentence. Harris’s

conviction without re-sentencing is no more a judgment for

federal-habeas purposes than it was a judgment for said

purposes prior to her initial sentencing.

The court finds persuasive support in Reber v. Steele,

570 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2009). In that case, “when Mr.

Reber filed his § 2254 petition in the federal district

court, ‘[he] had not been sentenced.’” Id. at 1209.

Relying upon Burton and Ferreira, the Tenth Circuit Court

of Appeals concluded that, “Mr. Reber’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254

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6. To the extent that Alabama law might also be of

persuasive value with respect to this issue, the court

notes that Alabama “law is well settled that a judgment

is the ‘decision or sentence of the law, pronounced by

the court.’” Gentry v. State, 51 So. 2d 558, 558 (Ala.

1951); see also Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.1 cmt. (“The Alabama

courts do not make a clear distinction between ‘judgment’

and ‘sentence.’ Alabama decisions define judgment to

mean the decision or sentence of the law, pronounced by

the court.” (citing Gentry, 51 So. 2d 558)); Ex parte

Woods, 371 So. 2d 944, 945-46 (Ala. 1979) (“[T]he entry

of sentence marks the termination of legal proceedings

against the defendant so that errors allegedly committed

during the course of the proceedings may be presented for

appellate review.”). 

19

petition was filed prior to the issuance of a final

judgment, and thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction

to review the petition.” Id. at 1210. The appellate

court “remanded the case to the district court with

instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice.”

Id.6

In addition to this persuasive support, this court

notes that Burton itself, while authorizing petitioners to

file exhausted claims before their judgments are final for

purposes of § 2244(d), also cautioned against an approach

that “would allow prisoners to file separate habeas

Case 2:07-cv-00239-MHT-SRW Document 30 Filed 02/08/10 Page 19 of 25
20

petitions in the not uncommon situation where a conviction

is upheld but a sentence is reversed.” Burton, 549 U.S.

at 154. The Burton Court explained that, “Such a result

would be inconsistent with ... AEDPA, with its goal of

‘streamlining federal habeas proceedings.’” Id. Harris

encourages this court to take a course that could

potentially arrive at exactly that result. Indeed, she

argues that “any future habeas petition based on her resentencing will necessarily be filed while she is in

custody pursuant to a different judgment from the one that

she currently contests” and thus will not be subject to

AEDPA’s strict limits on second or successive petitions.

Pet’r Memo at 8 (Doc. No. 15) (emphasis in original). The

court will not read Burton as endorsing a result that is

so deeply inconsistent with other language in the opinion.

Even if § 2254(a) authorized federal jurisdiction over

Harris’s petition, this court is troubled wether

exercising jurisdiction in these circumstances would be

prudent. Prior to Burton, the Seventh Circuit Court of

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7. The facts in Ben Yisrayl appear to be materially

indistinguishable from those before this court. See BenYisrayl, 114 Fed. Appx. at 761 (“[W]hile Ben Yisrayl’s

appeal was pending before [the Seventh Circuit], ... the

Superior Court of Lake County vacated [his] death

sentence, but did not set a date for him to be resentenced.”).

8. Prior to Burton, the Eleventh Circuit applied the

Younger doctrine in concluding that, “Because [a habeas

petitioner’s] resentencing had not occurred at the time

he filed his habeas petition, his state court judgment

had not become final, and thus his habeas petition, which

(continued...)

21

Appeals addressed whether a petitioner’s “convictions may

be ... considered separately from, and before

determination of, the sentence ultimately given by the ...

state court.” Ben-Yisrayl v. Davis, 114 Fed. Appx. 760,

761 (7th Cir. 2004) (unpublished).7

 The appellate court

determined that, “The Supreme Court decision in Younger v.

Harris, [401 U.S. 37 (1971)], answers this question,

holding that as a matter of comity, except in

extraordinary circumstances, a federal court must abstain

from deciding issues implicated in an ongoing criminal

proceeding in state court.” Id.8

 The court further

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(...continued)

challenged all of his convictions and sentences, was not

ripe for review at that time.” Maharaj v. Sec’y for the

Dep’t of Corr., 304 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002). It

is unclear, however, to what extent the reasoning in that

decision rested upon the fact that the petitioner

challenged his re-sentencing before it had occurred. See

id. at 1347 (“Maharaj challenged his ‘convictions and

sentences,’ and more specifically, ‘his convictions and

sentence of death,’ not just the convictions and noncapital sentences that had become final at the time of

filing.”); see also Rainey, 443 F.3d at 1327 n.4 (finding

the “Appellant’s case distinguishable from ... Maharaj

... because, unlike in [that] case[], Appellant’s

petition contested only his original judgment of

conviction and in no way challenged his resentencing

judgment”).

22

explained that “general principles of federal appellate

jurisdiction require that review of state court

proceedings await termination by final judgment, and in a

criminal case, final judgment does not occur until after

conviction and the imposition of sentence.” Id.

(citations omitted). Although this court need not now

rely on this reasoning, it finds both prongs of the

Seventh Circuit’s analysis compelling.

This is not to say that this court is unsympathetic

to Harris’s request. Harris “has maintained her innocence

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23

at all times since she was convicted in 1989, and has

expressed her desire for an expeditious resolution.”

Pet’r Memo at 2 (Doc. No. 15). Also, “during so long a

delay, there is a substantial likelihood that witnesses

will die or disappear, memories will fade, and evidence

will become unavailable. In short, the opportunity for a

fair retrial diminishes as each day passes.” Phillips v.

Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995). However,

although Harris is understandably frustrated with the slow

pace of state-court proceedings, she admits that she has

not turned to either the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

or the Alabama Supreme Court for assistance in expediting

her cause. See Oral Arg. Trans. at 13 (Doc. No. 29). In

fact, she has expressed a willingness to “agree to a stay

of the state court proceedings as long as [the federal]

Court proceeds to review Mrs. Harris’s pending federal

habeas petition.” Mot. to Dissolve Stay at 3 (Doc. No.

13). As this court now finds that it lacks jurisdiction,

it will dismiss her petition without prejudice. Although

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24

this course of action is dictated by congressionally

imposed limitations on federal jurisdiction, the court

also sincerely hopes that dismissal of the federal

petition will encourage the State to re-sentence Harris so

that she may, if she wishes, challenge her conviction in

a federal forum. 

In sum, Burton and Ferreira establish that AEDPA’s

statute of limitations will not begin to run on Harris’s

claims until she has exhausted state remedies with respect

to her sentence. Upon re-sentencing, Harris may choose to

pursue her conviction-related claims in federal court

before she exhausts any claims related to her new

sentence, see Burton, 549 U.S. at 153-54, but she should

be aware that “doing so risks subjecting later petitions

that raise new claims [regarding her sentence] to rigorous

procedural obstacles,” id. at 154. What Harris may not do

is file a federal-habeas petition pursuant to § 2254

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9. To be clear, Harris does not argue that the State

has refused to grant, or has unreasonably delayed, her

re-sentencing hearing. Thus, the court need not address

whether, in such circumstances, Harris could otherwise

seek a remedy in federal court. 

before she is in “custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court.”9

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Because she has not

been re-sentenced, there is no state judgment in her case

and this court lacks jurisdiction over her petition.

* * *

For the forgoing reasons, the court will grant

Harris’s motion to dissolve the stay of federal

proceedings and will dismiss her habeas petition without

prejudice. An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 8th day of February, 2010.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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