Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_07-cv-00288/USCOURTS-alnd-5_07-cv-00288-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Yeqing Bao
Plaintiff
Michael Chertoff
Defendant
Emilio T. Gonzalez
Defendant
Robert S. Muller
Defendant
Evelyn Upchurch
Defendant

Document Text:

Defendants are Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the department of Homeland Security; 1

Emilio T. Gonzalez, Director of the United States Citizen and Immigration Services (hereinafter

“USCIS”); Robert S. Muller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter “FBI”),

and Evelyn Upchurch, Director of the USCIS Texas Service Center (hereinafter “Defendants”). 

 As it must, the court views all facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

YEQING BAO,

Plaintiff,

v.

Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security,

et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 5:07-CV-288-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of 1

mandamus filed by the plaintiff,Yeqing Bao (hereinafter “Plaintiff”). For the reasons

set forth herein, the motion is due to be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

On December 24, 2002, Plaintiff filed an I-485 Application to Register

FILED

 2007 Jul-26 PM 12:08

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:07-cv-00288-VEH Document 18 Filed 07/26/07 Page 1 of 8
 Plaintiff’s wife was listed as a derivative beneficiary to the application. (doc. 1, ¶ 2). 3

 Specifically, Plaintiff avers that he has been unable to obtain a legal permanent 4

residence, or travel or work without restriction while his application is pending. (Id.). As a

faculty member of the University of Alabama at Huntsville, he cannot apply for tenure or qualify

for a research grant until his application is processed. (Id.). Plaintiff’s wife is unable to seek

employment until the application is adjudicated. (Id.). 

2

Permanent Resident or Adjust Status with the USCIS Texas Service Center. (doc. 3

1, ¶ 10). In March 2005, Defendant began processing applications received in

December 2002. (Id., ¶ 13). Plaintiff thereafter contacted Defendants at various

times to inquire into the status of his application. (Id.). He was informed by the

USCIS that his application was still pending a security check. (Id., ¶ 14). 

Plaintiff filed his complaint in this court on February 13, 2007, to compel

Defendants to process his application. (Id., ¶ 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

have “improperly handled and delayed processing” of the application to Plaintiff’s

detriment. (Id., ¶ 25). Plaintiff alleges further that Defendants have willfully, 4

arbitrarily, and inappropriately refused to adjudicate his petition. (Id.). 

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on April 23,

2007, arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (doc. 5). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the

Case 5:07-cv-00288-VEH Document 18 Filed 07/26/07 Page 2 of 8
 Because the court finds that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is 5

appropriate, it will not address the standard of review applicable to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss. 

3

dismissal of an action where the court finds that it does not have subject matter

jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal for failure of a party to state a claim

for which relief can be granted. Where “a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in

conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)

jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d

606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977).5

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted

“only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of

his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. Lack of

subject matter jurisdiction may be found through an examination of: (1) the complaint

alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record;

or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of

disputed facts. See Id. Because the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction, plaintiff

“constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” See

Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161, citing McDaniel v. United States, 899 F.Supp. 305, 307

Case 5:07-cv-00288-VEH Document 18 Filed 07/26/07 Page 3 of 8
 To be entitled to mandamus relief, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a clear right to the 6

relief sought; (2) Defendants’ clear, non-discretionary duty to act; and (3) no other remedy is

available. Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906, 911 (11th Cir. 2003), citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466

U.S. 602, 617, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984). 

 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter “APA”) requires

7

Defendants to adjudicate his application within a “reasonable time.” He cites to several cases in

support of this argument, including Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F.Supp. 35, 39 (C.D.Cal. 1980),

Paunescu v. INS, 76 F.Supp.2d 896, 901-02 (N.D.Ill. 1999), and Yu v. Brown, 36 F.Supp.2d 922,

928-32 (D.N.M. 1999). 

Without deciding whether it may compel Defendants to act within a “reasonable time,” the court

finds that none of these cases supports Plaintiff’s argument that the delay is unreasonable. In

Galvez, the district court held that, due to the government’s “ignorance of the law” and erroneous

rejections of I-485 applications, a six-month delay was unreasonable. 503 F.Supp. at 39. In

Paunescu, the district court exercised jurisdiction because the government had failed to act on

the plaintiffs’ applications. 76 F.Supp.2d at 900. In Yu, the court found jurisdiction “‘[w]hen an

agency's recalcitrance, inertia, laggard pace or inefficiency sorely disadvantages the [plaintiff]. . .

.’” 36 F.Supp.2d at 929, quoting In re Amer. Feder. of Gov. Employees, AFL-CIO, 790 F.2d 116,

117 (D.C.Cir.1986). 

4

(E.D.Tex. 1995), and Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp, 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.

1980).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asks this court to compel Defendants to adjudicate his I-485

application more quickly. Defendants respond that the court lacks jurisdiction to 6

grant such relief. 

Without deciding whether it has mandamus jurisdiction under § 1361, the court

finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Specifically, the

court finds no basis to conclude that Defendants must adjudicate Plaintiff’s

application within a definite period of time. 

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Case 5:07-cv-00288-VEH Document 18 Filed 07/26/07 Page 4 of 8
Plaintiff does not argue that Defendants’ delay is due to their ignorance of the law, errors in the

adjudication process, failure to act, or recalcitrance or inefficiency. Plaintiff concedes that the

Immigration and Nationality Act provides no discrete time period within which Defendants must

adjudicate his application. Due to the high volume of cases similar to Plaintiff’s throughout the

country, the court cannot find that the length of the adjudication process is unreasonably long. 

While Plaintiff argues that his FBI name check alone has taken more than three years, other

courts have held that such a delay is not uncommon. In Cho v. Jarina, No. 07-629 (E.D.La. July

10, 2007), the district court explained that 

[w]hile the court is not aware of any statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence indicates that

the delay faced by plaintiff is not extraordinary in the post-September 11 environment. In

addition to the sheer number of district court opinions on cases similar to these facts,

other courts have noted the high number of cases filed by plaintiffs facing FBI name

check delays.

Cho, No. 07-629, slip op. at 23 n. 26, citing Yan v. Mueller, 2007 WL 1521732 at * 7 n. 8

(S.D.Tex. 2007) (“The court takes judicial notice of an increasing number of cases in the

Southern District of Texas which make claims concerning the delays experienced in the FBI

name check process under one theory or another.”).

5

In Grinberg v. Swacina, 2007 WL 840109 (S.D.Fla. 2007), the court explained

that 

[w]ithout any Eleventh Circuit law addressing the immigration issue

presented here, this Court elects to follow the majority of courts that

have dismissed similar actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

under the rationale that Sections 242 and 245 of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a), 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006),

as amended in 2005, preclude judicial review of any discretionary

“decision or action” of the Attorney General in immigration matters.

See Safadi v. Howard, 466 F.Supp.2d 696 (E.D.Va.2006); Alkenani v.

Barrows, 356 F.Supp.2d 652 (N.D.Tex.2005); Maldonado-Coronel v.

McElroy, 943 F.Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y.1996); Zheng v. INS, 933 F.Supp.

338, 341 (S.D.N.Y.1996); Zaytsev v. Gantner, No. 04 Civ. 7101, 2004

WL 2251665 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2004). These courts have held that

this phrase includes the pace at which immigration decisions are made.

See Safadi, at 698. Accordingly, they have reasoned that neither

mandamus jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 nor the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in conjunction with 28 U.S.C.

Case 5:07-cv-00288-VEH Document 18 Filed 07/26/07 Page 5 of 8
 Similar to this action, the plaintiff in Li had waited for her I-485 application to be 8

adjudicated for four years before filing her complaint in federal court. 482 F.Supp.2d at 1174. 

6

§ 1331 confer jurisdiction to compel adjudication. Id. at 700-01. This

Court agrees.

2007 WL 840109 at * 1. 

In Li v. Chertoff, 482 F.Supp.2d 1172 (S.D.Cal. 2007), the district court

explained that

[e]ven accepting as true all of Plaintiff's factual allegations, Defendants

have provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any delay in

adjudicating Plaintiff's I-485 application is not due to agency inaction,

but rather to the time required to resolve all concerns of a law

enforcement or national security nature. Therefore, Plaintiff's suit simply

seeks to force USCIS to complete the adjudication in a more expeditious

manner. . . . [A]s long as USCIS is making reasonable efforts to

complete the adjudication, the pace required to complete that process is

committed to USCIS's discretion. Therefore, this Court does not have

subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's mandamus petition

under § 1361 regarding USCIS's discretionary adjudication of Plaintiff's

I-485 application at this time.

Li, 482 F.Supp.2d at 1178.8

 

Similar to Li, the court finds that, as long as Defendants are making

“reasonable efforts” to adjudicate Plaintiff’s application, it does not have jurisdiction

to grant Plaintiff’s petition for relief. 

Pointing to the Declaration of Naboone Puripongs (hereinafter “Puripongs”),

a supervisor with the USCIS’s Texas Service Center where Plaintiff filed his

Case 5:07-cv-00288-VEH Document 18 Filed 07/26/07 Page 6 of 8
 The “above-mentioned expedite criteria” referred to by Puripongs includes (1) military 9

deployment, (2) age-out cases not covered by the Child Status Protection Act and applications

affected by sunset provisions, (3) compelling reasons provided by the requesting office, and (4)

loss of Social Security benefits or other subsistence at the discretion of the Director. Puripongs

Decl. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff does not argue that any of these criteria applies to his application.

 The court notes the district court opinion in Yong Tang v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1821690 10

(D.Mass., 2007), in which the court granted mandamus relief to a plaintiff whose I-485

application was pending for four years, and, after making a Freedom of Information and Privacy

Act (“FOIPA”) request to the FBI, was told there were no records relating to him. 2007 WL

1821690 at * 1. Similar to Yong Tang, Plaintiff has made a FOIPA request to the FBI, and has

been informed that no records relating to him were found in the FBI’s central records system. 

7

application, Defendants demonstrate that they are making reasonable efforts to

adjudicate Plaintiff’s application. (doc. 6, exh. A). Puripongs explains that 

[t]o date, Plaintiff Yeqing Bao’s application remains pending the

completion of national security background investigations. Once the

required national security background investigations are completed,

[P]laintiff’s application will be adjudicated. Because the plaintiff’s case

does not meet one of the above-mentioned expedite criteria, the agency

is unable to request that the national security agencies expedite their

national security background investigations. For this reason USCIS

cannot adjudicate [P]laintiff’s I-485 application for adjustment of status

until such time as all national security checks and background

investigations are complete.

Puripongs Decl. at ¶ 13.9

The court is not inclined to grant Plaintiff the relief he requests based solely on

the passage of time, where other applicants also await adjudication, Defendants are

making reasonable efforts to reach a final decision on Plaintiff’s application, and no

definitive time period has been established within which adjudication must be

complete. Consequently, the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to 10

Case 5:07-cv-00288-VEH Document 18 Filed 07/26/07 Page 7 of 8
(doc. 13). 

The court is not bound by the reasoning of Yong Tang or any other district court case cited by

Plaintiff for the proposition that, solely due to the passage of time, the court has jurisdiction to

compel Defendants to work faster. As discussed supra, the court finds no basis to conclude that

the delay is unreasonable. Hence, to the extent that these cases hold that Plaintiff is entitled to

mandamus relief, the court is not persuaded by them. 

8

grant Plaintiff mandamus relief. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is due to be

GRANTED. A separate Order will be entered. 

DONE this the 26th day of July, 2007.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

Case 5:07-cv-00288-VEH Document 18 Filed 07/26/07 Page 8 of 8