Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55289/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55289-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CPR for Skid Row
Appellant
City of Los Angeles
Appellee
Hamid Khan
Appellant
Peter White
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CPR FOR SKID ROW, an

unincorporated association; HAMID

KHAN; PETER WHITE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-55289

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-06274-

JFW-CW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 7, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed March 10, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit

Judges, and Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge.

*

Opinion by Judge Clifton;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Reinhardt

* The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, U.S. District Judge for the District

of Nevada, sitting by designation.

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2 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s summary judgment and remanded in an action

challenging a California statutory scheme pertaining to public

protests.

Plaintiffs, CPR for Skid Row and two of its members,

brought suit after the members were threatened with arrest

and plaintiff Peter White was arrested for chanting loudly in

protest of an organized walk by public officials and others

through Los Angeles' Skid Row. Plaintiffs challenged

California Penal Code § 403, which makes it a misdemeanor

to “willfully disturb[] or break[] up any assembly or meeting

that is not unlawful in its character, other than an assembly or

meeting referred to in . . . Section 18340 of the Elections

Code.” Section 18340 makes it a misdemeanor to willfully

hinder or prevent, by threats, intimidations, or unlawful

violence, “electors from assembling in public meetings for

the consideration of public questions.”

Affirming in part, the panel held that § 403 was not

unconstitutional on its face. The panel rejected plaintiffs’

challenge to § 403 on the grounds that it was

unconstitutionally vague or an unconstitutional restriction on

speech.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 3

Reversing in part, the panel held that California Penal

Code § 403 was unconstitutionally applied to CPR’s

activities. The panel held that the plain language of the statute

and its legislative history demonstrate that § 403 does not

cover political meetings, including the meeting at issue here. 

The panel held that because CPR’s activities fell within the

exception carved out by Elections Code § 18340, § 403 did

not criminalize CPR’s conduct.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Reinhardt

agreed with the majority’s reversal of the district court’s

judgment in favor of the defendant and its holding that § 403

of the Penal Code may not be applied to plaintiffs. Judge

Reinhardt would hold, however, that § 403 (and §§ 18340 and

302 as well) are unconstitutionally void for vagueness and not

simply as applied in the particular circumstances. In addition,

although he would not decide the question, Judge Reinhardt

believes the statutory scheme, or at least a part of it, is likely

also unconstitutional as content-based.

COUNSEL

Carol A. Sobel (argued), Law Office of Carol A. Sobel, Santa

Monica, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Kimberly Anne Erickson (argued), Deputy City Attorney,

Laurie Rittenberg, Assistant City Attorney, and Carmen A.

Trutanich, City Attorney, Los Angeles City Attorney’s

Office, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

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4 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the question of whether California

Penal Code § 403, which makes it a misdemeanor to

“willfully disturb[] or break[] up any assembly or meeting

that is not unlawful in its character, other than an assembly or

meeting referred to in . . . Section 18340 of the Elections

Code,” is constitutional. Plaintiffs challenge that statute both

facially and as applied to them. We hold that § 403 is not

unconstitutional on its face and affirm, in part, the decision of

the district court to that effect. Because § 403 does not

properly apply to Plaintiffs’ activity, however, we reverse the

district court’s summary judgment dismissing the action and

remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

Plaintiffs are an organization, CPR for Skid Row, and two

of its members, Hamid Khan and Pete White (collectively

“CPR” or “Plaintiffs”). CPR was founded in 2011 to

advocate for the rights of people who reside in the area of

downtown Los Angeles known as Skid Row. White is also

a founder and co-director of the Los Angeles Community

Action Network.

CPR and its members oppose walks through the Skid Row

neighborhood sponsored by the Central CityEast Association

(“CCEA”). CCEA is a non-profit corporation that

administers two Business Improvement Districts in

downtown Los Angeles and “serve[s] as the principal voice

of industrial downtown.” In conjunction with the Midnight

Mission and Los Angeles City Councilperson Jan Perry, the

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 5

CCEA in 2005 began organizing community neighborhood

walks through Skid Row (the “Walks”). According to the

CCEA, the Walks are attended by public officials, law

enforcement, members of the judiciary, students, academics,

local business owners, social service providers, and the

media. The Walks take place on the public sidewalks of the

Skid Row neighborhood and, according to the CCEA, allow

participants “to see for themselves and learn about the

challenges, not through a windshield, but from the experience

of walking through [Skid Row] and interacting with social

service representatives, police, residents and business

owners.”

Members of CPR, in contrast, believe that the Walks

“support[] and promote[]the criminalization of homelessness

and poverty and [are] comprised only of those from outside

of [the Skid Row] community.” According to CPR, the

Walks are “dominated by police officers and representatives

of the business community,” which are “exactly the same

institutions that are promoting the unprecedented levels of

police presence, citations and arrests in Skid Row that have

made many homeless and poor residents less safe and/or less

stable.” The Walks “do not represent the interests of the lowincome community, nor [CPR’s] vision for public safety.”

CPR members believe that “the public officials who

participate [in the Walks] are demeaning and depersonalizing

homeless individuals in order to gain support for repressive

measures against the low-income residents of Skid Row who

need critical assistance.”

CPR thus began staging protests of the Walks. In

preparation for the July 6, 2011, Walk, Lieutenant Shannon

Paulson, the Los Angeles Police Department officer in charge

of the Central Area Safer Cities Initiative Task Force in Skid

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6 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Row, held a meeting with her officers and distributed

photographs of particular individuals who had engaged in

what she had deemed to be “aggressive” behavior at previous

Walks in violation of California Penal Code § 403. White’s

photograph was not among those distributed.

At the July 6, 2011, Walk, CPR protestors shouted chants,

including: “We are not resisting. This is our First

Amendment Right.” They also banged on drums, often in

close proximity to the Walk participants. Lieutenant Paulson

and Captain Todd Chamberlain spoke with legal observers

from the National Lawyers Guild, informing them that the

protestors could demonstrate but that “if it gets to the point

when it is disturbing a lawful public meeting, just like we

wouldn’t let anyone do it to you, we can’t let anyone do it to

them.” They warned the protestors that they could be

arrested under § 403. Eventually, White, who was filming

the Walk and the protest, was arrested by the LAPD for

violating California Penal Code § 403, after he allegedly

yelled loudly less than a foot away from one of the Walk

attendees. He was booked and released on bail but was not

charged with any violation of the law.

CPR filed a lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles

asserting that California Penal Code § 403 is unconstitutional,

both on its face and as applied, under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments of the Constitution and analogous provisions of

the California Constitution.1 The parties filed cross-motions

for summary judgment. The district court granted the City’s

motion, holding that § 403 is constitutional both on its face

1 CPR notified the California Attorney General that it was challenging

the constitutionality of § 403, but the Attorney General did not intervene

to defend it.

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 7

and as applied, and denied CPR’s motions for summary

judgment, a preliminary injunction, and declaratory relief. 

Plaintiffs appeal.

II. Void for Vagueness Challenge

California Penal Code § 403 states, in its entirety:

Every person who, without authority of law,

willfully disturbs or breaks up any assembly

or meeting that is not unlawful in its

character, other than an assembly or meeting

referred to in Section 302 of the Penal Code

or Section 18340 of the Elections Code, is

guilty of a misdemeanor.

The first exception identified in § 403 is § 302 of the

Penal Code. It concerns meetings “for religious worship” and

states, in relevant part:

Every person who intentionally disturbs or

disquiets any assemblage of people met for

religious worship at a tax-exempt place of

worship, by profane discourse, rude or

indecent behavior, or by any unnecessary

noise, either within the place where the

meeting is held, or so near it as to disturb the

order and solemnity of the meeting, is guilty

of a misdemeanor . . . .

The second exception listed in § 403, and the one

particularly relevant to this case, is § 18340 of the Elections

Code. It states, in its entirety:

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8 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Every person who, by threats, intimidations,

or unlawful violence, willfully hinders or

prevents electors from assembling in public

meetings for the consideration of public

questions is guilty of a misdemeanor.

The Elections Code defines “elector” as

any person who is a United States citizen 18

years of age or older and . . . is a resident of

an election precinct at least 15 days prior to an

election[, or is not a resident but either]

(1) He or she was a resident of this state when

he or she was last living within the territorial

limits of the United States or the District of

Columbia[, or]

(2) He or she was born outside of the United

States or the District of Columbia, his or her

parent or legal guardian was a resident of this

state when the parent or legal guardian was

last living within the territorial limits of the

United States or the District of Columbia, and

he or she has not previously registered to vote

in any other state.

Cal. Elec. Code § 321.

A. CPR’s Challenge

CPR contends that § 403 is void for vagueness because it

is not clear what conduct is subject to the criminal penalties

of § 403 and what conduct is covered by § 18340 and thus

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 9

excluded from the reach of § 403. Section 18340 refers to

“public meetings for the consideration of public questions,”

a category of meetings that, argues CPR, appears from the

face of the statute to encompass the type of meeting at issue

in this case. Electors, similarly, by the statutory definition,

include anyone over 18 who resides in any election precinct. 

That is a vast group of potential participants that, again,

encompasses the participants in the meeting at issue here.

This is significant, argues CPR, because § 18340 sets

forth a standard for a misdemeanor that is different from, and

higher than, the standard for a misdemeanor under § 403. 

While a person is subject to criminal penalties under § 403 if

he “willfully disturbs or breaks up” a meeting, under § 18340

he is subject to penalties only if he uses “threats,

intimidations, or unlawful violence”—more egregious

conduct—to hinder or prevent the meeting in question from

assembling. Thus, knowing what type of meeting is covered

by § 18340, and therefore excluded from coverage under

§ 403, is critical to understanding what type of conduct

exposes a person to criminal penalties under § 403.

A penal statute must “define the criminal offense with

sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand

what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not

encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). An

insufficiently definite statute is void for vagueness. Id.

“[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in

the area of free expression.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,

432 (1963). “Laws that are insufficiently clear are void for

three reasons: (1) To avoid punishing people for behavior that

they could not have known was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective

enforcement of the laws based on arbitrary or discriminatory

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10 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

interpretations by government officers; and (3) to avoid any

chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.” 

United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 1996).

“[W]here a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of

basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the

exercise of those freedoms. Uncertain meanings inevitably

lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the

boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.” 

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972)

(internal quotation marks, footnote, and alterations omitted). 

That § 403 “abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First

Amendment freedoms” is evident in the facts of this case and

in every available case involving the statute, all of which

involve not merely speech or expressive conduct but core

political speech. See, e.g., In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 936

(1970) (rhythmic clapping during a congressman’s speech);

McMahon v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., 104 Cal. App. 4th

1275, 1280–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (dumping gallons of

garbage on the floor during a school board meeting as part of

a speech about the problem of litter in the area of the high

school); Saraceni v. City of Roseville, No. C041085, 2003

WL 21363458, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2003)

(attempting to address the city council and city attorney at a

city council meeting after the public comment period had

ended); Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 970 (9th

Cir. 2010) (en banc) (giving a silent Nazi salute and

whispering to another meeting attendee in city council

meetings); Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 07–5132

GHK (JC), 2011 WL 6951822, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31,

2011) (attending a city council meeting with a pillow case,

attached to a shirt, that read “CRA Destroys Communities”).

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 11

“[A] plaintiff seeking to vindicate his own constitutional

rights may argue that an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague

or impermissibly restricts a protected activity.” Santa

Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d

1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations, alterations, and internal

quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, plaintiffs make a

facial constitutional challenge to a state law, “a federal court

must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state

court or enforcement agency has proffered.” Vill. of Hoffman

Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494

n.5 (1982).

The California Supreme Court has interpreted § 403 only

once. In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 936–37 (1970), concerned the

arrest and conviction of four people for engaging in

“rhythmical clapping” and “some shouting for about five or

ten minutes” during the speech of a congressman in a public

park at an Independence Day celebration. The California

Supreme Court noted that § 403 could be read to cover

speech protected by the First Amendment. Applying the

common presumption that the legislature intended to enact a

valid statute, however, it interpreted the statute more

narrowly to render it constitutional. It held that § 403

requires “that the defendant substantiallyimpair[]the conduct

of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation

of implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for

governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a

reasonable man should have known.” Id. at 943. The court

specified that criminal sanctions could be imposed “only

when the defendant’s activity itself—and not the content of

the activity’s expression—substantially impairs the effective

conduct of a meeting.” Id. at 942.

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12 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

In so construing § 403, the California Supreme Court did

not consider the statute’s exceptions for political meetings

and religious meetings. In fact, the court omitted all

reference to the exceptions when citing the statute and in its

discussion of the statute’s origins.2 Nonetheless, the court set

aside the criminal conviction at issue, concluding that the

defendants’ rhythmical clapping did not rise to the level of a

misdemeanor under § 403.

B. Interpretation of Section 403

Because no state or federal court has expressly construed

§ 403 in relation to § 18340, we interpret those statutes by

applying California’s rules of statutory construction. In re

First T.D. & Inv., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under California law, the “fundamental task” of statutory

interpretation is “to determine the Legislature’s intent so as

to effectuate the law’s purpose.” People v. Cornett, 53 Cal.

4th 1261, 1265 (2012) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Where the plain language of a statute is ambiguous

or uncertain, we may consider “the purpose of the statute, the

evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy,

and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.” Id.

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see People

v. Van Alstyne, 46 Cal. App. 3d 900, 911–14 (Cal. Ct. App.

1975) (consulting the legislative history after finding that the

statutory definition of marijuana as Cannabis sativa L. was

ambiguous despite its specificity).

2 The court quoted an expurgated version of § 403: “Section 403 of the

Penal Code provides: ‘Every person who, without authority of law,

willfully disturbs or breaks up any assembly or meeting, not unlawful in

its character, . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.’” Kay, 1 Cal. 3d at 937–38

(alteration in original).

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 13

By its express terms, § 403 does not apply to activity in

connection with “an assembly or meeting referred to in

Section 302 of the Penal Code or Section 18340 of the

Elections Code.” It is the latter exception for meetings

covered by § 18340, namely “public meetings for the

consideration of public questions,” that is at issue in this case. 

CPR argues that there is uncertainty as to the type of

meetings excluded from § 403 because they are covered by

§ 18340.

We turn to the legislative history for guidance as to the

legislature’s intent in excluding meetings covered by § 18340

from coverage by § 403. See People v. Yoshimura, 62 Cal.

App. 3d 410, 415–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (where a defendant

asserted that the terms “substance” and “material” in a

criminal statute were unconstitutionally vague, the court

considered the legislative history of the criminal statute,

determined the statute’s legislative purpose, and found the

terms not to be vague). The legislative history, although

complex, shows that § 403 and the other two statutes it

identifies as exceptions were intended to apply to three

different types of meetings: religious meetings, political

meetings, and all other meetings.

Originally enacted in 1872 as part of the first California

Penal Code, § 403 had the headnote “Disturbance of public

meetings, other than religious or political”3

 and provided, in

terms very similar to today’s statute:

3

See Farraher v. Superior Court of Kern County, Dept. 3, 45 Cal. App.

4, 5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919) (the heading of the 1872 version of § 403

“must be deemed a part of the substance of the enactment and accorded

the same effect as though written into the body of the law” and, therefore,

a meeting must be public to fall within this section).

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14 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Every person who, without authority of law,

willfully disturbs or breaks up any assembly

or meeting, not unlawful in its character, other

than such as is mentioned in Sections 59 and

302, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Cal. Penal Code § 403 (Haymond & Burch 1874).4 The Code

Commentator’s note to the 1872 Code explained the coverage

of the three sections as follows:

The assembly specified in Sec. 59 is a

meeting of electors, held for the discussion of

public questions, and that in Sec. 302 a

religious meeting. This section includes

funerals, and like lawful meetings, and

corresponds with the N. Y. Penal Code, Sec.

473.

4 Compare to the current version of § 403 (differences indicated in bold):

Every person who, without authority of law, willfully

disturbs or breaks up any assembly or meeting that is

not unlawful in its character, other than an assembly or

meeting referred to in Section 302 of the Penal Code

or Section 18340 of the Elections Code, is guilty of a

misdemeanor.

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 15

Cal. Penal Code § 403 (Haymond & Burch 1874).5 Cf.

People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167, 175 (1956) (using the Code

Commissioner’s note from 1872 as an indication of prior

legislative intent).

In 1872, § 302, the religious-meetings exception to § 403,

was very similar to today’s version of that section,6

but the

 

5

 Section 473 stated:

Every person who, without authority of law, willfully

disturbs or breaks up any assembly or meeting, not

unlawful in its character, other than such as are

mentioned in sections 55, 79, and 359, of this Code, is

guilty of a misdemeanor.

Draft of a Penal Code for the State of New York (“Fields Draft”) § 473

(1864). The annotation to the Fields Draft explains that “The assemblies

specified in the sections referred to are religious meetings, meetings of

electors held for discussion of public questions, and funerals.” Id. The

California version of the statute does not have a separate statutory section

covering funerals and instead incorporates funerals into § 403.

 

6

 The 1872 version of § 302 provided:

Every person who willfully disturbs or disquiets any

assemblage of people met for religious worship by

noise, profane discourse, rude, or indecent behavior, or

by any unnecessary noise, either within the place where

such meeting is held, or so near it as to disturb the order

and solemnity of the meeting, is guilty of a

misdemeanor.

Cal. Penal Code § 302 (Haymond & Burch 1874). Compare to the current

version of § 302 (deletions indicated by strike-through; additionsindicated

by bold):

(a) Every person who intentionally disturbs or

disquiets any assemblage of people met for religious

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16 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

political-meetings exception, § 59, was notablydifferent from

today’s § 18340. Section 59, under the headnote

“Disturbance of publicmeetings, misdemeanor,” stated, using

a structure and a standard very similar to § 403:

Every person who willfully disturbs or breaks

up any public meeting of electors or others,

lawfully being held for the purpose of

considering public questions, is guilty of a

misdemeanor.

Cal. Penal Code § 59 (1874). This section is not the historical

predecessor of the current political meetings exception,

Elections Code § 18340, however. Section 18340 derived

from a different section of the original 1872 Penal Code,

specifically § 58. That section was not, in 1872, exempted

from coverage under § 403. Section 58 had the heading

“Preventing public meetings” and stated:

Every person who, by threats, intimidations,

or unlawful violence, willfully hinders or

prevents electors from assembling in public

worship at a tax-exempt place of worship, by [noise,]

profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or by any

unnecessary noise, either within the place where the

meeting is held, or so near it as to disturb the order and

solemnity of the meeting, is guilty of a misdemeanor

punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand

dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail

for a period not exceeding one year, or by both that

fine and imprisonment.

The current statute also contains sections (b)–(f), which provide additional

details on penalties for violation of § 302.

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 17

meeting for the consideration of public

questions, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Cal. Penal Code § 58 (1874). This is identical to the language

in current Elections Code § 18340, exempted from § 403.

In short, §§ 58 and 59 both applied to “public meetings

for the consideration of public questions,” but the two

sections had different standards for a misdemeanor. Under

§ 58, it was a misdemeanor to hinder such a meeting “by

threats, intimidations, or unlawful violence,” while under

§ 59, it was a misdemeanor simply to “willfully disturb[] or

break[] up” such a meeting. Only § 59 was referred to and

excluded from the coverage of § 403; § 58 was not mentioned

in § 403 at all.

How did it happen that the original 1872 version of § 403

referred to the now-extinct Cal. Penal Code § 59

(“Disturbance of public meetings”) but the current version of

§ 403 refers to a section identical to the 1872 version of § 58

(“Preventing public meetings”)? The first step in this shift

occurred in 1905 when § 59 of the Penal Code was amended

and its text wholly replaced with § 41 of the Purity in

Elections Act,7 which had been passed in 1893. The amended

§ 59 had the headnote “Force, violence or restraint used to

influence votes” in place of the original headnote

“Disturbance of public meetings, misdemeanor,” and it

contained lengthy prohibitions on voting intimidation and

7 The full title was “An Act to promote the purity of elections by

regulating the conduct thereof, and to support the privilege offree suffrage

by prohibiting certain acts and practices in relation thereto, and providing

for the punishment thereof.” 1893 Cal. Stat. 12.

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18 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

interference. Cal. Penal Code § 59 (1905).8 Although § 59

 

8

 The amended § 59 stated, in full:

It is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by

himself or any other person in his behalf, to make use

of, or threaten to make use of, any force, violence, or

restraint, or to inflict or threaten the infliction, by

himself or through any other person, of any injury,

damage, harm, or loss, or in any manner to practice

intimidation upon or against any person, in order to

induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from

voting at any election, or to vote or refrain from voting

for any particular person or persons at any election, or

on account ofsuch person or persons at any election, or

on account of such person having voted or refrained

from voting at any election. And it is unlawful for any

person, by abduction, duress, or any forcible or

fraudulent device or contrivance whatever, to impede,

prevent, or otherwise interfere with the free exercise of

the elective franchise by any voter; or to compel,

induce, or prevail upon any voter either to give or

refrain from giving his vote at any election, or to give

or refrain from giving his vote for any particular person

or persons at any election. It is not lawful for any

employer, in paying his employees the salary or wages

due them, to inclose their pay in “pay envelopes” upon

which there is written or printed the name of any

candidate, or any political mottoes, devices, or

arguments containing threats, express or implied,

intended or calculated to influence the political

opinions or actions of such employees. Nor is it lawful

for any employer, within ninety days of any election, to

put up or otherwise exhibit in his factory, workshop, or

other establishment or place where his workmen or

employees may be working, any hand-bill or placard

containing any threat, notice, or information, that in

case any particular ticket of a political party, or

organization, or candidate shall be elected, work in his

place or establishment will lease, in whole or in part, or

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 19

no longer had anything to do with public meetings, § 403’s

exclusion of § 59 was not modified to reflect the change in

the function of § 59. The amendment of § 59 thus rendered

§ 403’s exclusion of meetings covered by § 59 nonsensical,

as § 59 was concerned not with meetings at all but with

voting interference. This problem was likely due to an error

by the legislature in failing to consider the effect of the

amendment of § 59 on § 403 and failing to amend § 403

accordingly. The error was noticed by Deering editors as

early as 1915, but the legislature did not take any steps to

amend § 403 at that time.9

In 1939, Penal Code §§ 58 and 59, among others, were

repealed as part of the adoption of California’s first Elections

Code. Section 58 (“Preventing public meetings”) became

Elections Code § 5004, and § 59 (“Force, violence, or

restraint used to influence vote”) was split among Elections

his place or establishment be closed up, or the salaries

or wages of his workmen or employees be reduced, or

other threats, express or implied, intended or calculated

to influence the political opinions or actions of his

workmen or employees. This section applies to

corporations as well as individuals, and any person or

corporation violating the provisions of this section is

guilty of a misdemeanor, and any corporation violating

this section shall forfeit its charter.

Cal. Penal Code § 59 (1905).

9

In the 1915 edition of the California Penal Code, although the statutory

text of § 403 still referred to § 59, the Deering’s annotations now pointed

to a Penal Code § 58, which had not previously been associated with § 403

in any way. Similarly, the Deering’s annotations pertaining to § 58, and

not to § 59, referred to § 403. Cal. Penal Code §§ 403, 58, 59 (Deering

1915).

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20 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Code §§ 11581, 11582, 11584–86. See Cal. Elec. Code

§§ 11581–82, 11584–86 (Deering Supp. 1939).

Finally, in 1949, the California Special Crime Study

Commission on Criminal Law and Procedure reported that

“[a] study of the code indicates that the reference to Section

59 of the Penal Code contained in Section 403 should have

been to Section 58 which is now Section 5004 of the

Elections Code,” and recommended amending § 403. 

SPECIAL CRIME STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, Recommendation 13, at

23–24 (1949). In accordance with this recommendation,

§ 403 was amended, and its reference to Penal Code § 59 was

replaced with a reference to Elections Code § 5004, the

successor to Penal Code § 58 and predecessor to § 18340. 

1949 Cal. Stat. 2119; Cal. Penal Code § 403 (1955). Since

1949, § 403 has not been amended substantively.

10

Thus, § 18340, which is currently exempted from

coverage by § 403, is the successor section to § 58, which

was not the original exemption. The substance of § 59, the

original exemption from § 403, no longer exists in any form

in the California Codes.

 

10 A mysterious legislative comment appeared in 1976, stating that the

Elections Code section (then § 12046, now § 18340) “is needed to prevent

conduct which would prevent a meeting from taking place at all, including

verbal threats, etc. since Penal Code 403 does not deal with verbal

behavior.” Cal. Elec. Code § 29440 (Deering 1977). This comment

contradicts all other indications ofthe legislative purpose ofthe exceptions

to § 403 and also contradicts the Kay court’s 1970 interpretation of § 403

as very much covering “verbal behavior,” as is clear in its extended First

Amendment analysis. We therefore give this comment little weight.

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In the face of this tortuous history of § 403 and its

exceptions, one thing remains clear. The original version of

§ 403 was enacted with the intent to exempt political

meetings from coverage by § 403. This intent was reaffirmed

in 1949, when the legislature, after careful consideration,

chose to exclude from § 403’s coverage a statutory section as

close as possible to the original exception, with the result that

the revised version of § 403 excluded the same meetings as

had the original version of the statute: political and religious

meetings. As to political meetings, however, unlike general

meetings and religious meetings, the legislature established

a higher threshold for unlawful conduct than the original

exception had done. The amended political-meetings statute

made it a misdemeanor to hinder or prevent such meetings by

“threats, intimidations, or unlawful violence,” but not to

“disturb or break up” such meetings by non-violent means.

C. Application of § 403 to CPR’s Activities

The plain language of the statute and its legislative history

demonstrate that § 403 does not cover political meetings,

including the meeting at issue here. It is a misdemeanor to

disrupt such meetings only under § 18340 and only if the

disruption consists of “threats, intimidations, or unlawful

violence.”

The “meeting” at issue here involved the consideration of

public questions, namely the conditions on Skid Row, and

involved people within the broad definition of “electors.” 

Those invited to participate in the Walk were people whom

the CCEA refers to as “stakeholders” in downtown business. 

As discussed below at 29, this conclusion leads us to reverse

the judgment of the district court in part and remand for

further proceedings.

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D. The Void-for-Vagueness Challenge Falls Short

Based on this understanding of the statute, though, we

affirm the portion of the district court’s judgment that

rejected CPR’s facial challenge to § 403 as unconstitutionally

vague. A facial challenge is “the most difficult challenge to

mount successfully.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,

745 (1987).

As expressed in his concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt

takes the position that the construction given to § 403 by the

California Supreme Court in Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, renders the

statute unconstitutionally vague because the court disregarded

the exception for assemblies covered by Elections Code

§ 18340. In support of his position, he cites to subsequent

decisions by the California Courts of Appeal and federal

courts that also disregarded the exception. In Judge

Reinhardt’s view, the disparity between the plain language of

the statutory exception and the interpretation in Kay that

appears to eliminate the exception in a factual context where

it should apply is too great for citizens to understand what

§ 403 actually covers. We think that conclusion assumes too

much.

We agree that the text and legislative history of § 403

demonstrate that it does not apply to assemblies of electors of

the type covered in § 18340. We also agree that the kind of

meetings discussed in Kay would appear to qualify as a public

meeting of electors under the Elections Code. But we cannot

assume that the California Supreme Court intended by its

decision in Kay to read the statutory exceptions to § 403 out

of the statute.

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There is no indication in Kay that either party raised the

question of the applicability of § 403 to political meetings. 

California appellate courts are not required to consider or

discuss arguments that were not developed in the briefs. 

People v. Stanley, 10 Cal. 4th 764, 793 (1995) (noting that if

a brief does not contain a legal argument with citation of

authorities on the points made, the “‘court may treat it as

waived, and pass it without consideration’” (quoting 9

Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Appeal § 479 (3d ed. 1985)));

Mansell v. Bd. of Admin., 30 Cal. App. 4th 539, 546 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1994) (“[I]t is not [the appellate] court’s function to

serve as . . . backup appellate counsel.”). If neither party

argued the exception applied, the California Supreme Court

would not be required to address the exception in its opinion,

even in a case in which the facts would support its

application.

Moreover, the Kay court concluded that the conduct of the

defendants did not substantially impair or disturb the public

meeting. Kay concerned an Independence Day celebration in

a public park with a speech by a congressman who was also

a candidate for reelection. 1 Cal. 3d at 935–36. The speech

was interrupted by “rhythmical clapping” by protestors who

supported a consumer boycott of non-union table grapes,

which the congressman had declined to support. Id. The

California Supreme Court applied § 403 and held that the

conduct did not rise to the level required for a misdemeanor. 

An argument based on the statutory exception would have led

to exactly the same result. Courts need not deal with all

alternative routes to the same outcome. Any inference based

on the failure of the decision to discuss an alternative route

rests on an unpersuasive foundation.

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The California Courts of Appeal following Kay have not

addressed the interaction between § 403 and § 18340. See

McMahon, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 1286–87; Saraceni, No.

C041085, 2003 WL 21363458. Indeed, in no case—state or

federal, published or unpublished—in which a court has

addressed § 403 did any court construe Penal Code § 403 in

relation to Elections Code § 18340. See id.; Norse, 629 F.3d

at 970, 978; Sanchez, 2011 WL 6951822, at *13. As in Kay,

there is no indication in any of these cases that the exception

to § 403 was raised.11

Premising a conclusion that § 403 is unconstitutionally

void for vagueness based on an interpretation of that statute

that has never actually been expressed by the California

Supreme Court or by any court is a leap that we are not

prepared to take. We will not attribute that interpretation to

the California Supreme Court based on its silence in Kay. We

affirm the portion of the district court’s decision that

concluded that § 403 is not void for vagueness.

III. Other Facial Challenges

CPR also argues that § 403 is an unconstitutional

restriction on speech because it is content based, is not

narrowly tailored, and does not leave open ample alternative

 

11 As it happens, the one Ninth Circuit decision cited in the concurring

opinion, at 40, to illustrate the application of Penal Code § 403 to a

political meeting and judicial disregard of the statutory exception for

activity covered by Elections Code § 18340 is an opinion that both Judge

Reinhardt and Judge Clifton joined, as members of an 11-judge en banc

panel. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2010) (en

banc). It is safe to infer that neither of us, or any other member of the

panel, intended to cut the exception out of the statute. The subject was not

raised at the time.

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means of communication. The government “may impose

reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of

protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified

without references to the content of the regulated speech, that

they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental

interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels

for communication of the information.” Comite de

Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,

657 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

We “consider a rule content-based when it establishes a

general ban on speech, but maintains exceptions for speech

on certain subjects.” Glendale Assocs., Ltd. v. N.L.R.B.,

347 F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). CPR argues that § 403

is a content-based restriction on speech because, by its terms,

it does not apply to meetings covered by the two exceptions

identified above, for religious worship or for public meetings

of electors to consider public questions.

The exceptions here, however, distinguish certain types

of meetings, not speech on certain subjects at those meetings. 

Neither Penal Code § 302 nor Elections Code § 18340

pertains to speech itself. They pertain to the contexts in

which speech is regulated. The statute is silent with respect

to what subject matter of speech may or may not be spoken

at such meetings. Indeed, the exemptions from § 403 for

religious or electoral meetings are more accurately

differences in the standard for disruptive speech rather than

actual exceptions. For the same reasons, § 403 also does not

prohibit or protect specific messages, as did the flag-burning

statute at issue in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310

(1990).

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A statute may also be content based if it “would allow or

disallow speech depending on the reaction of the audience.” 

Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty.

Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 787 (9th Cir. 2008). 

“[L]isteners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis

for regulation.” Id. at 788 (quoting Forsyth Cnty. v.

Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992)).

Section 403 does not regulate speech based on audience

reaction. The California Supreme Court explained that

whether a disturbance triggers a § 403 violation depends on

“the actual impact of that misconduct on the course of the

meeting; the question cannot be resolved merely by asking

persons present at the meeting whether they were

‘disturbed.’” Kay, 1 Cal. 3d at 944. We agree with the

district court that § 403 does not regulate the content of

speech.

A content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction on

speech is narrowlytailored if it “does not burden substantially

more speech than is necessary to achieve a substantial

government interest. . . . [T]he existence of obvious, less

burdensome alternatives is a relevant consideration in

determining whether the ‘fit’ between ends and means is

reasonable.” Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1041

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations, quotation marks, and

modifications omitted). CPR argues that § 403 is not

narrowly tailored because it applies to expressive conduct, no

matter how momentary, and sweeps within its breadth large

amounts of protected speech.

The government interest at stake in this statute is

“ensuring that some individuals’ unruly assertion of their

rights of free expression does not imperil other citizens’

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rights of free association and discussion.” Kay, 1 Cal. 3d at

941. In short, the statute aims to prevent meetings from being

disrupted. A protestor’s conduct only violates the statute

when it “substantially impair[s] the conduct of the meeting.” 

Id. at 943. Further, as Kay emphasized, “the nature of a

meeting necessarily plays a major role” in determining

whether protestor conduct has substantially impaired the

meeting. Id. “The customs and usages at political

conventions maycountenance prolonged, raucous, boisterous

demonstrations as an accepted element of the meeting

process; similar behavior would violate the customs and

usages of a church service.” Id. This contextual inquiry into

the “customs and usages” of the meeting along with the

substantial-impairment standard narrowly tailor the statute to

the government’s substantial interest. Contrary to CPR’s

concerns, neither a momentary disruption nor large amounts

of protected speech would fall within the statute’s reach.

A time, place, or manner restriction on speech must leave

open ample alternatives for communication. Section 403

does. To violate the statute, a protestor must substantially

impair or break up a public meeting. The statute does not

prevent all protests or means of protest. It requires only that

a protest not be so disruptive as to break up or substantially

impair the meeting. There is nothing that prevents CPR from

communicating its message in non-disruptive ways, and CPR

does not allege that it has been precluded from doing so. By

allowing protest that does not substantially impair public

meetings, § 403 leaves open alternative communication

channels.

We therefore agree with the district court that § 403 is not

unconstitutional on its face.

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IV. As-Applied Challenge

Although § 403 is constitutional on its face, it does not

properly apply to CPR’s protests. As discussed above at 21,

Elections Code § 18340 governs “electors . . . assembling in

public meetings for the consideration of public questions.” 

Cal. Elec. Code § 18340. CPR’s activities fall within this

exception to § 403 because the Walks they have protested

consist of public officials and members of the public who

meet on public sidewalks to learn about the challenges in the

Skid Row neighborhood. By its terms, § 403 does not cover

meetings that are covered by § 18340, so § 403 does not

apply to CPR’s activities.

In rejecting CPR’s as-applied challenge, the district court

did not discuss that question. Rather, it focused on whether

White was arrested based on the content of his speech. It

concluded that “there can be no serious dispute that Mr.

White was arrested because his conduct substantially

impaired the conduct of the Skid Row Walk and was not

based upon, in any manner whatsoever, the content of his

chant.” That was true, but it does not speak to the threshold

question of whether § 403 applied to that activity in the first

place. Because we conclude that it did not, we reverse that

part of the district court’s decision and remand for further

proceedings, including the consideration of what relief is

appropriate.

V. Conclusion

We hold that California Penal Code § 403 was

unconstitutionally applied to CPR’s activities. Because

CPR’s activities fall within the exception carved out by

Elections Code § 18340, § 403 does not criminalize CPR’s

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conduct. Therefore, the district court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of defendants and denying

summary judgment to plaintiffs is reversed. We remand for

further proceedings, including the determination of what

relief, if any, may be appropriate.

Each party to bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

I concur in the majority’s reversal of the district court’s

judgment in favor of the defendant and its holding that § 403

of the Penal Code may not be applied to plaintiffs. I would

reach the latter decision, however, by holding that § 403 (and

§§ 18340 and 302 as well) are unconstitutionally void for

vagueness and not simply as applied in the particular

circumstances. In addition, although I would not decide the

question, I believe the statutory scheme, or at least a part of

it, is likely also unconstitutional as content-based. 

Essentially, I believe that the majority’s decision simply does

not go far enough and will lead to unnecessary confusion

regarding the applicability of the various sections of the

antiquated statutory scheme to expressive conduct that

interferes with or disrupts various types of public meetings. 

More important, it will leave the citizens of California

without clear guidance as to the exercise of their First

Amendment rights to engage in public protests. That, in my

view, is not an acceptable result.

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I.

Penal Code § 403 applies broadly to lawful meetings. It

provides simply that anyone who “willfully disturbs or breaks

up” such a meeting is guilty of a misdemeanor. Cal. Penal

Code § 403. Under that provision a willful disturbance is

enough to support a criminal conviction. Section 403

contains two exceptions, however: meetings referred to in

Elections Code § 18340, and meetings referred to in Penal

Code § 302. Section 403 and its statutory exceptions thus

form an integrated statutory scheme, and no definition of

§ 403 can be derived without also defining these exceptions.

The first exception, § 18340, governs political meetings,

defined as “public meetings” in which people “assembl[e] . . .

for the consideration of public questions.” Cal. Elections

Code § 18340. This provision is far more protective of

expressive conduct than is § 403. Section 18340 criminalizes

conduct only if it unlawfully hinders meetings through the

use of “threats, intimidations, or unlawful violence.” Id.

Section 302 governs religious meetings, defined as “any

assemblage of people met for religious worship at a taxexempt place of worship.” Cal. Penal Code § 302. It

specifically proscribes the use of “profane discourse, rude or

indecent behavior, or . . . any unnecessary noise” to

“intentionally disturb[] or disquiet[]” a religious meeting,

when the conduct is in or near the place of worship. Id.

Because meetings covered by § 18340 (political) and § 302

(religious) are excepted from § 403, and because these

provisions proscribe different levels of conduct than does

§ 403, in order to determine whether § 403 survives a facial

challenge for vagueness it is critical to know what meetings

are covered by that section and what meetings are covered by

its statutory exceptions. Unfortunately, it is not possible to

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determine the answer to that question if we follow the law

that controls our decision-making, including our obligation to

accept the construction of California statutes by the

California courts. Here, § 403, as construed by California’s

Supreme Court and by its Courts of Appeal, is

unconstitutionally vague; the end result of the courts’

decisions is that the statutory scheme as construed fails to

give clear notice of what meetings fall within § 403 and what

meetings are covered by § 18340 or even by § 302. In fact,

the California cases leave the people of that state without any

guidance as to when conduct is unlawful because it merely

willfully disturbs a meeting and what conduct is unlawful

only if committed by means of threats, intimidations, or

unlawful violence. This void is especially harmful to the

public interest as it pertains to expressive conduct that is

subject to the protection of the First Amendment. The failure

to provide notice of what expressive conduct is permitted and

what is prohibited chills First Amendment rights and thus

makes vagueness even more constitutionally unacceptable.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the plain

language of § 403 and its legislative history support the

conclusion that the provision does not cover political

meetings, including the meeting at issue in this case. I

disagree, however, as to the effect of the decisions of

California’s state courts, including its Supreme Court. Those

courts have applied § 403 to the very type of meeting at issue

here. To follow those decisions would lead us to the opposite

result than would the plain language of § 403 and its

legislative history, yet to ignore them is wholly

impermissible. The decisions uniformly apply § 403 to

political meetings and thus, contrary to the express exception

the provision contains, criminalize disruptions of political

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meetings by acts that fall far short of “threats, intimidations,

or unlawful violence.” Cal. Elections Code § 18340.

Unlike the majority, I do not believe that we can simply

disregard the consistent application of a state statute by the

state courts, including its Supreme Court, and by the federal

courts that have followed the state courts’ decisions. Because

we must follow the state courts’ interpretation of the statute,

Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,

455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982), the crux of our statutory

analysis here must be the meaning given to § 403 by the

California courts. As California courts have given § 403 a

fundamentally different application than the statute’s plain

language and legislative history would require, and have

failed consistentlyto applythe controlling statutoryexception

to political protests, I believe that it is not possible for

Californians to know in advance what conduct is prohibited

by § 403 and what is permissible under the far more speechprotective provisions of § 18340. In short, it is not possible to

determine what conduct involving the disruption of political

meetings is prohibited by which part of the California

statutory scheme and what conduct is permissible under the

statutory scheme as a whole. As a result we have no

alternative but to declare § 403 and its related sections void

for vagueness.

As to the controlling law, there is one California Supreme

Court case, two Courts of Appeal cases and several federal

cases applying § 403, each of which does so in a manner

directly contrary to that required by the statute’s plain

language and legislative history. Each applies § 403 to

interference with meetings that are undisputably political. 

None applies the exception that on its face governs such

meetings. In In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930 (1970), the only

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California Supreme Court decision directly construing § 403,

the Court applied § 403 to a political meeting clearly falling

within the ambit of Elections Code § 18340 and clearly

exempted from § 403 by its express language. Kay concerned

four people convicted under § 403 and sentenced to four

months in jail for protesting a congressman’s speech in a

public park by engaging in “rhythmical clapping” and several

minutes of shouting. Id. at 935–37. The Kay court noted that

it would be “blinking reality not to acknowledge that the

[congressman’s] July 4 speech was part [of] his political

campaign,” and acknowledged that the speech was by a

public figure on a public issue. Id. at 963 n.3 (citation and

internal question marks omitted).

Recognizing that the application of § 403 to the conduct

in question would be constitutionally overbroad, because it

would criminalize expressive conduct that disturbs “a

meeting only because the content ofthe expression conflicted

with the views espoused by the meeting’s organizers or

official speakers,” id. at 941, the Kay court narrowed the

statute to comport with the First Amendment, id. at 942. The

court held that under § 403 conduct could be punished only

where the “defendant substantially impaired the conduct of

the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of

implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance

of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man

should have known.” Id. at 943. Without mentioning the

exclusion of political meetings from § 403, the court then

applied that section and not § 12046 (as § 18340 was then

numbered) to the political meeting at issue, ultimately finding

that the conduct at issue did not rise to the level proscribed

under the court’s narrowed construction of § 403. Id. at

944–45.

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Although intended to bring (what it apparently thought to

be) § 403’s proscription of interference with a political

meeting into conformity with the First Amendment, Kay

provided no guidance as to what types of political meetings

are covered by § 403 and what types, if any, are excluded

from § 403 and covered by § 18340. Nor did it indicate in

any way the relationship between the two parts of the

integrated statutory scheme regulating core political speech. 

To the contrary, it simply treated § 403 as applicable to

political meetings. Kay and the cases which followed

it—every California political speech case, as far as I can

tell—thus give rise to a fundamental lack of certitude as to

how and to what extent Californians are free to exercise their

First Amendment rights without fear of criminal punishment

when they engage in protests that disturb political meetings

but do not involve “threats, intimidation, or unlawful

violence”. Similarly, limiting their exposure to the

“commi[ssion] [of] acts in violation of implicit customs or

usages” as did the Kay court, does nothing to cure that

constitutional defect. Id. at 943.

The majority concludes that the Kay court’s application

of § 403 to a political meeting and its failure to apply the

statutory exceptions to § 403, does not render the statute

unconstitutionally vague because there is no indication that

either party argued that § 403 did not apply to political

meetings, and because the Kay court was thus not required to

address Elections Code § 18340 (even though it, not § 403,

was the statutory provision applicable to the meeting). I

respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Kay

does not constitute binding precedent as to the applicability

of § 403, as, it appears, do all state and federal courts that

have dealt with the question of political meetings since Kay. 

All have unhesitatingly followed Kay and applied § 403 to

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political meetings in direct contradiction of the express

provisions of that statute. The majority’s rationale for its

conclusion is that Kay doesn’t expressly hold that § 403

applies to political meetings, so we can simply ignore the

case. No court to date, state or federal has taken that position. 

To the contrary, all have followed Kay and applied § 403 not

§ 18340 to interference with the conduct of political

meetings.

A.

Although it is of course true that courts are under no

obligation either to address arguments the parties fail to raise

in their briefs or provide alternative grounds for their

holdings, it is also true that courts must interpret statutes with

reference to the entire statutory scheme and seek to give

meaning to every provision. People v. Pieters, 52 Cal. 3d

894, 899 (1991) (“[W]e do not construe statutes in isolation,

but rather read every statute ‘with reference to the entire

scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be

harmonized and retain effectiveness.’” (quoting Clean Air

Constituency v. Cal. State Air Res. Bd., 11 Cal.3d 801, 814

(1974))); Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Governing Bd. of Rialto

Unified Sch. Dist., 14 Cal. 4th 627, 634 (1997) (“‘In

analyzing statutory language, we seek to give meaning to

every word and phrase in the statute to accomplish a result

consistent with the legislative purpose. . . ’” (quoting Harris

v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159

(1991))). Thus, canons of statutoryconstruction oblige courts

to consider the entire statute even where the parties fail to

argue one of its relevant provisions. As the United States

Supreme Court has recognized, legislative bodies must “be

able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive

rules, so that [they] may know the effect of the language

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[they] adopt[].” Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556

(1989).

Here, the California Supreme Court was not required to

review a set of complex provisions contained in a statutory

scheme set forth in a lengthy section of a voluminous Code. 

Section 403 consists of a single sentence that occupies only

two and a half lines. All the court needed to do was to read

that sentence and it would know (as I am sure it did) that

§ 403 did not apply to all meetings, but that on its face it

excluded certain types of gatherings. Sophisticated as that

nationally respected court was and sensitive as it

demonstrated itself to be to the requirements of the First

Amendment, it is inexplicable that the Court would be

unaware that political speech was excluded from the coverage

of § 403 by the second half of that one sentence provision. 

Nevertheless the court proceeded to analyze and apply § 403

to conduct that allegedly interfered with the political meeting

in question. To suggest that the California Supreme Court

would revise and limit § 403 in an attempt to bring it into

conformitywith the First Amendment without being aware of

the effect of the exclusion contained within the one sentence

it was revising or without being aware that its holding applied

to political meetings is simply not credible.

Generally, when an appellate court analyzes a statute in

a precedential opinion, it is not simply resolving the parties’

dispute, but is explaining the law in a manner that will bind

future litigants and courts. This is particularly true in a

decision based on constitutional grounds. The majority’s

reading of Kay in a manner that contravenes this rule might

have some credence had the California Supreme Court stated

that its decision was a narrow one applicable only to the case

before it, or given some indication that its construction of

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CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 37

§ 403 would not be applied if, in a subsequent case, the party

argued that political meetings are excluded from § 403. The

court took neither approach, however. By omitting any

discussion of why a speech by a local congressman to more

than 6,000 people is not a “public meeting[] for the

consideration of public questions,” and thus excluded from

coverage under § 403, and by instead tailoring

(unsuccessfully in my view) § 403 to meet the requirements

of the First Amendment, the Kay court left the ordinary

person with no basis for understanding why and when the

more speech friendly provision of § 18340 would apply, if it

would ever apply at all. Yet, there it is, plain on the face of

the statutory scheme, both in the exclusion from § 403 of

meetings referred to in § 18340 and in the express language

of § 18340 itself. Section 403 does not apply to political

meetings; section 18340 does.

B.

Even were we to accept arguendo the majority’s

unpersuasive explanation that the Kay court found it

unnecessary to discuss Elections Code § 18340 because it

determined the conduct at issue did not violate the lesser

restrictions imposed byPenal Code § 403, the same cannot be

said for the California Courts of Appeal cases applying Kay

to political meetings and affirming violations of § 403, in

reliance on Kay. In McMahon v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist.,

104 Cal. App. 4th 1275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), the California

Court of Appeal followed Kay and likewise omitted any

discussion of Elections Code § 18340 in concluding that a

violation of Penal Code § 403 had occurred. The case

concerned the citizen’s arrest of David McMahon at a school

board meeting held in the multipurpose room of an

elementary school, which was also used as the school’s

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cafeteria and for an after-school childcare program. Id. at

1280. During the public comment period, McMahon emptied

onto the floor several 13-gallon bags of garbage, that

contained alcohol bottles and drug paraphernalia, in order to

protest littering by local high school students. Id. at 1280–81. 

The superintendent then made a citizen’s arrest of McMahon

for violating Penal Code § 403; McMahon was subsequently

issued a citation by the police, but was not charged. Id. at

1281. McMahon sued the superintendent, a board member,

and the school district for false arrest and false imprisonment. 

Id. The court denied McMahon’s motion for a directed

verdict, granted a nonsuit as to the board member, and a jury

returned a special verdict in favor of the district and

superintendent. Id. at 1281–82.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. Id. It determined that the

trial court’s jury instruction on the elements of § 403

conformed with Kay, and that the jury’s conclusion that

McMahon violated § 403 was supported by substantial

evidence. Id. at 1286–87, 1289. The court discussed Kay at

length, upheld the application of § 403 to the meeting in

question, and made no mention of the statutory exceptions for

meetings for the consideration of public questions or why

Elections Code § 18340 did not apply to McMahon.

The California Court of Appeal similarly relied on Kay in

an unpublished decision, Saraceni v. City of Roseville, No.

C041085, 2003 WL 21363458 (Cal. App. Ct. June 13, 2003). 

In Saraceni, the court held that a police officer had probable

cause to arrest the plaintiff at a city council meeting for

violating Penal Code § 403, where the plaintiff attempted to

address the council and city attorney after the public

comment period had ended, and refused repeated requests

from the mayor and council members to take his seat. Id. at

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*5–6. Like the meeting in McMahon, the meeting in

Saraceni was unquestionably one at which people

“assembl[ed] in public meeting[] for the consideration of

public questions.” Yet, like the court in McMahon, the court

in Saraceni citing Kay applied § 403 to a political meeting

without any discussion of Elections Code § 18340.

 Even in the absence of Kay, we would be bound by the

McMahon court’s construction of § 403 short of a persuasive

indication that the California Supreme Court would decide

otherwise. Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1364 n.3 (9th

Cir. 1981), aff’d by Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)

(noting that the construction placed on a statute by a state’s

intermediate appellate court is regarded as authoritative);

Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1063 n.3 (9th Cir.

2009) (“Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its

considered judgment upon the rule of law which it announces,

that is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be

disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other

persuasive data that the highest court of the state would

decide otherwise” (quoting West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,

311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940))). No persuasive data indicate that

the California Supreme Court would decide McMahon

differently with respect to the application of § 403. All data

are to the contrary: McMahon faithfully follows Kay—the

only relevant decision by the state’s highest court—which

applied § 403 to a political meeting while ignoring Elections

Code § 18340. Moreover, although not binding on this court,

the Court of Appeal’s unpublished decision in Saraceni is

persuasive authority further illustrating the way in which

California courts apply § 403. Employers Ins. of Wausau v.

Granite State Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“[W]e may consider unpublished state decisions, even

though such opinions have no precedential value.” (quoting

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Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 943 n.4 (9th Cir.

1997))).

Federal courts have likewise applied Penal Code § 403 to

political meetings in accord with Kay, and ignored the

statutory exception in Elections Code § 18340, dismissing

§ 1983 claims for false imprisonment and false arrest for

arrests at political meetings on the ground that the arresting

officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs based on

violations of Penal Code § 403. See Norse v. City of Santa

Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

(finding probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff at city

council meetings for giving a silent Nazi salute and

whispering to another meeting attendee); Sanchez v. City of

Los Angeles, No. CV 07–5132 GHK (JC), 2011 WL 6951822

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011) (citing Kay and finding probable

cause existed to arrest plaintiff for attending a city council

meeting with a pillow case attached to a shirt that read “CRA

Destroys Communities”).

To what then does § 18340 apply? To what type of

meetings Californians might want to protest does § 403 apply,

and what type of political and religious meetings are excluded

from that provision? The California and federal cases

construing § 403 give us no help with these questions. More

important, they leave “ordinary people” unable to

“understand what conduct is prohibited.” Kolender, 461 U.S.

at 357. Is it a violation of the statutory scheme simply to

willfully disturb a political meeting by “committing acts in

violation of implicit customs or usages,” as provided by § 403

or is it an offense to disrupt such a meeting only by “threats,

intimidations, or unlawful violence” as § 18340 provides?

And do some political meetings fall in one category and some

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in the other? And, if so, how does anyone tell which fall

where?

Although I agree with the majority that the plain language

and legislative history of Penal Code § 403 suggest that the

statute does not properly apply to White’s activity, I conclude

that Kay, and particularly McMahon and Saraceni, limit our

ability to apply a plain language reading of the statute so as

to find that White’s conduct falls outside the conduct

proscribed by Penal Code § 403. Rather, I find that Kay and

Kay’s progeny have left the statutory scheme comprehended

by § 403 and its express exceptions without any means of

rational construction, and the people of California without

any means of determining how and when the various sections

apply. In short, because Californians are not adequately

informed of how or in what manner they must comport

themselves when engaged in protests regarding political

gatherings (such as a political party’s national convention) or,

critically, under what circumstances they face criminal

punishment for engaging in such First Amendment activity,

there is no alternative but to find that § 403 and its related

sections are unconstitutionally vague. Kolender, 461 U.S. at

357.

II.

Although I do not find it necessary to reach the issue, I

strongly question the majority’s determination that the

statutory scheme is not content-based. Penal Code § 403 and

its statutoryexceptions impose punishment on different forms

of expressive conduct on the basis of the subject matter of the

meeting being protested. This is a form of protection for

more favored or less favored speech which cannot be done

indirectly any more than it could be directly. Clairmont v.

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Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“Where the government may not prohibit certain speech, it

also may not [indirectly suppress that speech] in order to

‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’”

(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))

(alteration in original)). Moreover, the majority ignores the

significant correlation between the subject matter of the

meeting being protested and the subject matter of the speech

likely to be used to disrupt it. For example, as the foregoing

discussion of the caselaw illustrates, speech used to disrupt

political meetings is, by and large, political speech. In

addition the type of speech that is regulated or banned when

interfering with a religious issue is involved is speech that is

“profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, . . . .” Not

only is the type of speech regulated on the basis of the subject

of the meeting but so is the manner in which that speech is

delivered. Because I need not resolve this question I will end

the analysis by saying simply that whatever one might say

about two of the three sections under discussion here, the

section of the statutory scheme governing “profane discourse,

[and] rude or indecent behavior” seems to me to be clearly

unconstitutional either because the proscription of those

forms of speech are content-based, because the provision is

void for vagueness, or because it otherwise violates the

fundamental principles of the First Amendment.

* * *

The difference between my position and the majority’s

does not simply reflect an intellectual or academic

disagreement about judicial methodology. The case before us

has important practical ramifications. California is a highly

active political state with numerous political parties and

volunteer political groups many of which regularly hold

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political meetings, some of which are the object of fervent

demonstrations or protests. Equally, if not more important,

California has on a number of occasions, including six in the

period between 1956 and 2000, been the site of national

conventions of the two major political parties. Some of these

conventions have also been marked by major political

protests or demonstrations, not all of which have been

entirely peaceful. In view of the failure of the California

courts to treat the question before us with the careful

constitutional attention it deserves, it would be nice if our

court could get the answer right. I am afraid that my

colleagues in the majority fail to do so.

* * *

The holding that I believe we are required to reach—that

§ 403 and its related provisions are void for vagueness—

would not only be more respectful of the California courts

than the majority’s ruling but would better serve the people

of that state. If the State of California were to review the

three code sections that form the integrated statutory

scheme—the general provision, Penal Code § 403, the

political meetings provision, Elections Code § 18340, and the

religious meetings provision, Penal Code § 302—and the

checkered history of those sections, it might find that it

wishes not merely to amend its laws to bring them into

conformity with the Constitution, but also to consider how

best to update the antiquated provisions that have persisted

since they were originally drafted in the nineteenth century. 

“Rewriting the statute[, however,] is a job for the [state]

legislature, if it is so inclined, and not for this court.” Valle

del Sol, Inc., 732 F.3d at 1021. Thus, I can only suggest to

the Legislature that it might be well-advised to reform the

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statutory scheme rather than to allow the continuing

enforcement of clearly unconstitutional laws.

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