Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07022/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07022-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Does Company Distributors
Appellee
Diane Howe
Appellant
Romarm, SA
Appellee
Norman Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 24, 2014 Decided July 1, 2014

No. 13-7022

NORMAN WILLIAMS AND DIANE HOWE, AS LEGAL 

REPRESENTATIVE OF J.H.,

APPELLANTS

v.

ROMARM, SA AND DOES COMPANY DISTRIBUTORS,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00436)

Daniel M. Wemhoff argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellants.

Anthony M. Pisciotti argued the cause for appellees. 

With him on the brief were Jeffrey M. Malsch and James W. 

Porter III.

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

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BROWN, Circuit Judge: The choppy waters of the 

Supreme Court’s “stream of commerce” doctrine have 

plagued lower courts for years. The three competing opinions 

in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of 

California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), each offered conflicting 

standards for exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign 

manufacturer in a suit alleging injuries caused by its products

in the forum state. Thankfully, we need not plumb those 

currents today because the Supreme Court recently clarified 

the minimum requirements applicable to the facts of this case. 

In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 

2780 (2011), Justice Breyer’s narrow concurrence addressed 

the precise issue we face today and concluded a foreign 

corporation’s sale to a distributor, without more, is

insufficient to establish the minimum contacts necessary for a 

court to exert personal jurisdiction over the corporation, even 

if its product ultimately causes injury in the forum state.

Nicastro compels us to affirm.

I

In March 2010, J.H., the son of Appellants Norman 

Williams and Diane Howe, was tragically murdered in a 

drive-by shooting in the District of Columbia. Investigation 

revealed the assault rifle used in the attack was manufactured 

by Appellee National Company Romarm S.A. (“Romarm”). 

Romarm is a foreign corporation and firearms manufacturer 

owned by the Romanian government and located in 

Bucharest, Romania. Romarm sells its products in Romania 

to an American distributor that imports them into the United 

States for sale. Assault weapons, like the one used to kill 

J.H., are prohibited in the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE § 

7-2502.02(a)(6). 

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Two years after the shooting, Appellants filed a wrongful 

death action on behalf of J.H in the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint asserted 

claims under the District of Columbia’s Wrongful Death 

Statute, Survival Act, and Assault Weapons Manufacturing 

Strict Liability Act, in addition to common law claims based 

on negligence and public nuisance. Appellants argued the 

court had personal jurisdiction over Romarm through the 

District of Columbia’s long-arm statute and subject matter 

jurisdiction through diversity of citizenship. Appellants also 

alleged subject-matter jurisdiction was not divested through 

the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, because of the

“commercial activity” exception.

Romarm subsequently moved to dismiss Appellants’ 

complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, 12(b)(2) for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 

Appellants then filed a motion for extension of time to 

respond, which the district court interpreted as a request for 

jurisdictional discovery. In February 2013, the district court 

denied Appellants’ discovery request and granted Romarm’s 

motion to dismiss, finding Appellants “failed to allege 

personal jurisdiction over ROMARM.”1 Williams v. Romarm, 

No. 1:12-cv-00436, slip op. at 17 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2013), ECF 

No. 23. 

 

1 The district court chose to address personal jurisdiction before 

deciding whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. 

J.A. 42. This approach is permitted, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon 

Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) (“[T]here is no unyielding 

jurisdictional hierarchy.”), and Appellants do not challenge it.

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II

Appellants have raised three primary challenges to the 

district court’s ruling: (A) Romarm is not a “person” entitled 

to due process but is instead an agent of a foreign state; (B) 

Romarm’s sales to the United States through a distributor 

establish sufficient contact with the District to comply with 

due process; and (C) the district court abused its discretion in 

rejecting Appellants’ proposed limited jurisdictional 

discovery requests. We reject each challenge and affirm the 

district court. 

A

First, like the district court, we must decide whether the 

Due Process Clause applies to Romarm. If so, Appellants 

would have to establish both statutory and constitutional 

personal jurisdiction. The answer to this preliminary question 

depends, in part, on how completely the Romanian 

government controls the corporate entity—i.e., is the 

corporation an inseparable part of the foreign state? 

 

Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, “[p]ersonal 

jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim 

for relief over which the district courts have [subject matter] 

jurisdiction . . . [and] where service has been made.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1330(b). “In other words, under the [Act], subject 

matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal 

jurisdiction.” GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 

805, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Price v. Socialist People’s 

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 

And because a foreign state is not a “person” protected by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, minimum 

contacts between the foreign state and the forum state are not 

required for a court to constitutionally exert personal 

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jurisdiction over the state. See GSS Grp. Ltd., 680 F.3d at 813

(citing Price, 294 F.3d at 96). The Act itself defines “foreign 

state” expansively to include any corporation that “is an organ 

of a foreign state . . . or a majority of whose shares or other 

ownership interest is owned by a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1603(b)(2). Despite this broad statutory definition, however, 

constitutional protection will be accorded if a corporation 

“does not act as an agent of the state, and separate treatment 

would not result in manifest injustice[; if so, it] will enjoy all 

the due process protections available to private corporations,” 

which includes challenging the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction for insufficient minimum contacts. GSS Grp. 

Ltd., 680 F.3d at 815 (internal citations omitted); see also id. 

at 813, 817. Only when the foreign sovereign exercises 

control over the corporation to such a degree as to create a 

principal–agent relationship is the corporation considered part 

of the foreign state, rather than a “person” entitled to 

constitutional due process protection. Id. at 815.

The district court found that Romarm “consistently” 

represented itself as a separate entity from the Romanian 

State, despite its state ownership, and it rejected Appellants’ 

arguments to the contrary. Williams v. Romarm, No. 1:12-cv00436, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2013), ECF No. 23. 

Thereafter, the district court proceeded to the due process 

minimum contacts analysis, and ultimately concluded the 

alleged contacts were insufficient to justify jurisdiction. 

At oral argument, Appellants primarily challenged the 

district court’s conclusion that Romarm is juridically 

independent from Romania and thus entitled to due process. 

Specifically, Appellants pointed to a claimed “concession” by 

Romarm that it is both owned and operated by Romania. This 

concession, they say, establishes Romarm as a state entity that 

is not entitled to due process.

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However weighty this argument may be, we decline to 

consider it because Appellants failed to raise it in their briefs. 

Nowhere in their filings do Appellants cite to the document 

containing the alleged “concession” by Romarm on which 

they so heavily relied at oral argument. Nor do they ever 

explain (or argue in their briefs) the import of such a 

concession on personal jurisdiction. The majority of the

opening brief argues Romarm’s minimum contacts support 

personal jurisdiction. No attempt is made to couch the

minimum contacts analysis as an alternative argument to the

primary contention that due process never applied. In fact, 

Appellants’ opening brief is actually inconsistent with their 

new argument, asserting “in its role as a ‘private actor,’ 

Romarm is granted due process guarantees . . . necessary for 

the district court to assert personal jurisdiction.” Appellants’

Br. at 5–6; see also id. at 13–14 (“Personal jurisdiction must 

satisfy: (1) District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, and (2) 

the Due Process Clause.”). As Appellants conceded at oral 

argument, their new argument renders the “vast majority of 

the briefs . . . irrelevant,” including their own. Oral Arg. 

Tape, No. 13-7022, at 14:08–14:20 (Feb. 24, 2014).

When we asked Appellants why this argument was not 

raised in the briefs, Appellants claimed they “discovered” 

Romarm’s concession after the briefing deadline. Oral Arg. 

Tape, at 15:30–15:56. But this answer amounts to little, since

the “discovered” concession is contained in the district court 

record that was always available to the parties. Additionally,

the district court made a clear ruling on the due process issue, 

so Appellants easily could have challenged that issue in their 

briefs. 

Whether it was an intentional strategy or a simple case of 

overlooking the record, Appellants cannot “sandbag” 

Romarm. See Sitka Sound Seafoods, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 

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1175, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Questions not presented and 

argued by the parties in a sequence affording appropriate

consideration are forfeited, and we accordingly decline to rule 

on the issue since it was not properly raised. See, e.g., Ark. 

Las Vegas Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 108 n.4 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003); Parsipanny Hotel Mgmt. Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 

413, 418–19 (D.C. Cir. 1996); C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 

844 F.2d 880, 883 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Carducci v. Regan, 

714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also FED. R. APP. P.

28(a)(8)(A).2 

B

Because we must assume, for the purposes of this appeal, 

the Due Process Clause applies to Romarm, we now address 

 

2 Appellants conceivably made a fleeting reference to the issue in 

their reply brief, where they cite the Act’s provision regarding 

personal jurisdiction. See Reply Br. at 2. However, Appellants 

discuss the statute in response to Romarm’s case summary of the 

Appellants’ lower-court arguments, so it is not clear Appellants are 

making any new argument with respect to it. Cf. Am. Wildlands v. 

Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that 

merely discussing the factual basis for an argument is insufficient to 

raise the claim). In fact, Appellants refer to the Act as granting 

“statutory jurisdiction” and go on to say “due process is invoked as 

if [Romarm were] a private actor.” Reply Br. at 2. Appellants’ 

point is unclear, and one must view the brief rather broadly with a 

generous eye to spy its relation to their contentions at oral 

arguments. Further, mere reference to an issue does not present it 

properly for review. See Am. Wildlands, 530 F.3d at 1001; Sitka 

Sound Seafoods, 206 F.3d at 1181. Nor would it have been proper 

for Appellants to wait until their reply brief to make the argument. 

See Am. Wildlands, 530 F.3d at 1001; Sitka Sound Seafoods, 206 

F.3d at 1181. 

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whether the district court could properly exercise jurisdiction 

over Romarm in accordance with due process. 

This court reviews dismissals for lack of personal 

jurisdiction de novo. GSS Grp. Ltd., 680 F.3d at 810–11. 

Appellants’ claims against Romarm concern “specific” 

jurisdiction, or jurisdiction that arises out of or in relation to 

the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 

at 2788.3

 Because subject matter jurisdiction in this case is 

based on diversity of citizenship, the forum “state” is that in 

which the federal court sits—here, the District of Columbia. 

See, e.g., Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 455–

56 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 

For a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant, including a corporation, the defendant

must “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such 

that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The “defendant’s 

conduct and connection with the forum State” must be “such 

that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 

there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 

286, 297 (1980). For example, when a “corporation 

 

3 In contrast, “general” jurisdiction gives the court jurisdiction over 

the defendant to resolve both matters that originate within the 

forum state and those based on activities and events elsewhere. The 

Appellants wisely have never asserted general jurisdiction against 

Romarm. To do so, they would have had to establish explicit 

consent, presence within the forum at the time suit commences 

through service of process, citizenship or domicile, or other 

examples where the circumstances or Romarm’s course of conduct 

revealed “an intention to benefit from” and thus “submit to the laws 

of the forum State.” See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality 

opinion). 

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purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities within the forum State, it has clear notice . . . it is 

subject to suit there.” Id. (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted). 

Personal jurisdiction can also be premised on a 

defendant’s participation in the “stream of commerce,” which 

“refers to the movement of goods from manufacturers through 

distributors to consumers.” Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 

(plurality opinion). However, “beyond that descriptive 

purpose its meaning is far from exact.” Id. The Court’s 

seminal stream-of-commerce case Asahi Metal Industry, for 

example, resulted in three competing interpretations, none of 

which garnered a majority. See 480 U.S. 102.

In Asahi, Justice Brennan, joined by three justices, would 

have found personal jurisdiction under a stream-of-commerce 

theory “[a]s long as a participant . . . is aware that the final 

product is being marketed in the forum state.” 480 U.S. at 

116–17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 

judgment). In other words, when a manufacturer places its 

product into the stream of commerce, it should expect to be 

brought into court wherever its products land in the regular 

course of business. In contrast, Justice O’Connor, also joined 

by three members of the Court, posited the “placement of a 

product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an 

act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum 

State.” Id. at 112 (plurality opinion). Rather, she would have 

required some “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant 

[indicating] an intent or purpose to serve the market in the 

forum State.” Id. Simple awareness is not enough. Id. 

Finally, Justice Stevens, joined by two justices, found “the 

volume, the value, and the hazardous character” of the 

product affects the “purposeful availment” determination. Id. 

at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 

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judgment). Since Asahi issued in 1987, “courts have sought 

to reconcile the competing opinions.” Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 

2789 (plurality opinion).

We take no position here on which Asahi theory should 

prevail. Rather, we rely on Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 

Nicastro that certain facts, without more, are insufficient for 

personal jurisdiction. 131 S. Ct. at 2792; see Marks v. United 

States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court 

decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 

enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court 

may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 

concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.”); King 

v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) 

(“[O]ne opinion can be meaningfully regarded as ‘narrower’ 

than another . . . only when one opinion is a logical subset of 

other, broader opinions.”). Specifically, six justices agreed

the forum state could not constitutionally assert personal 

jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer based on the 

following facts: the distributor’s single sale to a customer in 

the forum state; the manufacturer’s desire that the distributor 

pursue customers throughout the United States; and the 

manufacturer’s business-related contacts with various states 

other than the forum state. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 

(plurality opinion); id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 

judgment). 

As Justice Breyer points out, such a “single isolated sale” 

from a distributor to a customer in the forum state has never 

been sufficient to establish minimum contacts between the 

manufacturer and the forum, under any stream-of-commerce 

interpretation. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., 

concurring). Thus, at a minimum, a plaintiff trying to 

establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation must 

show a “regular flow or regular course of sales” in the forum 

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state, or some additional efforts directed toward the forum 

state, such as “special state-related design, advertising, 

advice, [or] marketing.” Id.4

Appellants have the burden of establishing a factual basis 

for the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Romarm. 

See Crane, 894 F.2d at 456. Appellants argue their burden is 

met here because they alleged Romarm sold its products to an 

American distributor, fully aware the distributor would sell 

these products in the United States. Additionally, they insist 

Romarm should have been aware criminals would traffic the 

weapons into the District of Columbia, even though the 

District prohibits assault rifles. To illustrate this contention, 

Appellants point to police records showing that forty-one 

weapons manufactured by Romarm were recovered within the 

District during a four-year-period. Thus, Appellants argue it 

was “highly foreseeable, if not probable, that [Romarm’s] 

products [would], by [their] attractive nature to criminals and 

others, crossover into forums, such as the District of 

Columbia, where they are prohibited.” Appellants’ Br. at 7. 

Nicastro makes clear that a manufacturer’s broad desire 

to target the United States through a distributor will not 

suffice. See 131 S. Ct. at 2791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring in 

the judgment); see also id. at 2790 (plurality opinion) (“These 

facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they 

do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the 

New Jersey market.”). Rather, Appellants must allege

 

4 We do not take a position on whether a plaintiff can establish 

personal jurisdiction solely by showing a “regular flow of sales” to 

the forum state, without more. We simply note the absence of such 

sales, combined with the absence of additional efforts, will be fatal 

to a plaintiff’s claim.

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conduct specific to the forum in some way. Yet the only 

District-specific information Appellants proffer is that some 

Romarm-manufactured weapons have ended up in the District 

through criminal trafficking. Here, we do not even have the 

isolated sale that Nicastro found insufficient. Instead, 

Appellants rely solely on the “mere unilateral” (and criminal) 

activity of others—activity that takes place after the standard 

chain of distribution is complete; this cannot satisfy due 

process. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 298; 

see also Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in 

the judgment). Even under the broadest stream-of-commerce 

theory, stream of commerce cannot mean “unpredictable 

currents or eddies.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., 

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also 

Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 

judgment). Absent facts showing Romarm targeted the 

District or its customers in some way—which do not exist in 

the record—due process will not permit the district court to 

exercise its jurisdiction over Romarm.5

 

C

Appellants claim they were stymied in their attempt to 

show personal jurisdiction because the district court did not 

permit limited discovery. We find no error. 

We review a district court’s denial of jurisdictional 

discovery for abuse of discretion. FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX 

Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A

plaintiff “must have at least a good faith belief that such 

discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal 

 

5 Appellants contend numerous cases support personal jurisdiction 

here. We reject these arguments as superseded by Nicastro. 

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jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. at 1093–94. “[M]ere 

conjecture or speculation” is not enough. Id. at 1094.

The district court found Appellants’ requests did not relate 

to any specific connections between Romarm and the District 

of Columbia and were instead requests for “general and farreaching discovery regarding Romarm’s business activities as 

a whole.” Williams v. Romarm, No. 1:12-cv-00436, slip op. 

at 20 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2013), ECF No. 23. Appellants claim 

the “obvious aim of such discovery is to determine, exactly

what the volume of weapons sold by Romarm [is] in the US 

market.” Appellants’ Br. at 13 (emphasis added). Which is 

precisely the problem. Such broad-ranging questions lack 

specificity to the District, or even the broader metro area; and 

information about the U.S. market as a whole will be 

insufficient, no matter the answers to the questions. 

Additionally, even if Appellants learned about Romarm’s 

knowledge of any thefts and its anti-theft precautions (if any), 

our jurisdictional analysis is unlikely to change. “[E]ven if 

[a] defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, 

fully aware (and hoping) that . . . a sale will take place” in the 

forum, such an isolated sale will not constitute an adequate 

basis for personal jurisdiction. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 

2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). The requested 

discovery could not enable the Appellants to account for the 

tenuous connection between Romarm’s sale to its distributor 

and the sporadic, unilateral movement of its products into the 

District by unrelated third persons. The district court did not 

abuse its discretion. See Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 17

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting when this court does “not see what 

facts additional discovery could produce that would affect our 

jurisdictional analysis, [it] must conclude the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action when it did”); 

cf. Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 

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(D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting jurisdictional discovery should have 

been granted because plaintiff demonstrated it could

“supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery”). 

We will not reverse the district court in order to permit an 

unwarranted fishing expedition about the general way 

Romarm conducts its business, to support a broad-ranging 

theory on Romarm’s culpability in not preventing thefts. See 

FC Inv. Grp. LC, 529 F.3d at 1094 (finding no abuse of 

discretion in disallowing discovery based on a theory of 

“commuter jurisdiction”). 

D

We are left with one last matter to address. After oral 

argument, both parties submitted an extensive series of 

dueling 28(j) letters and motions. Because the subject matter 

of these letters relates to the previously unbriefed foreign 

entity issue we decline to address today, the correspondence is 

not relevant to our decision. The motions relating to this issue

are moot. We think it is worth noting the 28(j) process should 

not be employed as a second opportunity to brief an issue not 

raised in the initial briefs. The letters are more appropriately 

used to cite new authorities released after briefing is complete 

or after argument but before issuance of the court’s opinion. 

All post-argument requests and motions are denied.

III

Appellants have failed to allege any conduct by Romarm 

that was purposely directed toward the District of Columbia. 

Nor could their discovery requests supply the missing 

element. The district court appropriately dismissed the case 

for lack of personal jurisdiction over Romarm. 

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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is 

Affirmed. 

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