Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00093/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00093-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Delano, California
Defendant
Robin Moniz
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Defendant City of Delano, California, filed a motion for summary judgment on May 19, 2014. 

(Doc. 24.) In her opposition to the motion, Plaintiff asserted that she was “abandoning her claims 

other than her 1st and 2nd claims for relief.” (Doc. 25 at 1.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third, fourth, and 

fifth claims for relief are DISMISSED.

Plaintiff’s remaining claims for retaliation in violation of Title VII and California’s Fair 

Employment and Housing Act relate to her job reassignment, which occurred in May 2010. (See Doc. 

4 at 4; Doc. 25-10 at 1, UMF 3.) Importantly, however, it is not clear that the Court has jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s first cause of action. 

Although the City did not raise the issue in its motion for summary judgment, the Court may 

raise the issue sua sponte. See Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (“a court may 

raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the 

action, even on appeal”). Recently, the Ninth Circuit determined the Court is “obligated to consider 

sua sponte requirements that go to subject-matter jurisdiction.” Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 

ROBIN MONIZ,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF DELANO, CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:13-cv-00093 - JLT

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S THIRD, 

FOURTH, AND FIFTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

ORDER VACATING THE HEARING DATE OF 

JUNE 30, 2014 AND DIRECTING THE PARTIES 

TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

Case 1:13-cv-00093-JLT Document 29 Filed 06/27/14 Page 1 of 3
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). Consequently, the Court has an obligation to assure 

itself that it has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for violations of Title VII and FEHA.

To establish subject matter jurisdiction over a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must exhaust her 

administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 

349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707-708 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (holding timely exhaustion of administrative remedies is a statutory prerequisite to filing suit 

under Title VII, and affirming the dismissal of Title VII claims for lack of jurisdiction); B.K.B. v. Maui 

Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (“to establish subject matter jurisdiction over her 

Title VII claim, Plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies”).

A plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged violation, unless 

the complainant initially institutes proceedings with a state or local agency, in which case the EEOC 

charge must be filed within 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also MacDonald v. Grace 

Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2006). “A claim is time barred if it is not filed within 

these time limits.” AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002). Here, Plaintiff alleged that she filed 

a charge with the EEOC, but has not provided information regarding the contents of the charge, or the 

date it was filed. (See Doc. 4 at 3, ¶ 14.) If the job reassignment occurred beyond the statutory period 

applicable to Plaintiff’s EEOC charge, it is not actionable and the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Title 

VII claim. 

Moreover, if the Court lacks jurisdiction over the only remaining cause of action arising under 

federal law, it is not clear with the Court should exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim for 

retaliation in violation of FEHA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Accordingly, supplemental briefing on 

the matter of the Court’s jurisdiction is appropriate. 

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s third, fourth, and fifth claims for relief are DISMISSED;

2. The hearing date of June 30, 2014 is VACATED1;

3. The parties SHALL file supplemental briefing no later than July 10, 2014, addressing 

 

1

The Court will re-set a hearing on the motion if, after the supplemental briefs are filed, it appears argument may be 

helpful in determining the motion.

Case 1:13-cv-00093-JLT Document 29 Filed 06/27/14 Page 2 of 3
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the issues of the Court’s jurisdiction in 10 pages or less including:

a. Whether Plaintiff’s first claim for relief for retaliation in violation in Title VII is 

time-barred; and

b. Whether the Court should maintain jurisdiction over the FEHA claim if it lacks 

jurisdiction over the Title VII claim.

4. Any briefs in reply SHALL be filed by the parties no later than July 17, 2014. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00093-JLT Document 29 Filed 06/27/14 Page 3 of 3