Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01193/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01193-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Johnny Joe Lopez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

lJnitld Stiltes Court or Appeal& tenth Clrttdt 

AUG 1 9 1996 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 95-1193 

Johnny Joe Lopez, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-193) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and Susan L. Foreman, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellant. 

Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, and John M. Hutchins, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Denver, Colorado for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

• In her brief counsel for Lopez requested oral argument. The government in its 

answer brief waived oral argument. The case was later set for oral argument on May 15, 

1996. On April 16, 1996, counsel for Lopez filed a motion to submit the case on the 

briefs. This motion was granted on April 24, 1996, and on May 16, 1996, the case was 

submitted to this panel without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 

34.1.9. 

Appellate Case: 95-1193 Document: 01019279733 Date Filed: 08/19/1996 Page: 1 
Before TACHA, Circuit Judge, BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, and McWILLIAMS, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

This case involves the jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. 

On September 29, 1992, a federal parole violation arrest warrant was issued for 

Johnny Joe Lopez, the appellant. It was executed on January 13, 1993, at Lopez' 

apartment in Westminster, Colorado. An ensuing search ofhis apartment revealed eight 

kilograms of cocaine, twenty kilograms of marijuana, approximately $100,000 in United 

States currency, and a warranty deed conveying title to a residence located at 10736 

Livingston Drive, Northglenn, Colorado, to Lopez. 

The United States then filed a civil in rem forfeiture action pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 

881 and 18 U.S.C. § 981. The complaint sought forfeiture ofthe currency found in 

Lopez' apartment, his interest in the property located at 10736 Livingston Drive in 

Northglenn, his automobile, and some additional items of personal property. The 

government alleged that the items sought to be forfeited were used in, or were proceeds 

of, Lopez' drug activities. A settlement was reached in this proceeding whereby Lopez 

agreed to forfeit the currency found in his apartment, a car, jewelry, the residence on 

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Livingston Drive, and various items of personal property. A final order and judgment of 

forfeiture was entered on September 23, 1993. 

On September 22, 1994, the United States filed a two-count indictment against 

Lopez, charging him with the unlawful possession of cocaine and marijuana with an 

intent to distribute each, in violation of21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The 

indictment was based on the eight kilograms of cocaine and the twenty kilograms of 

marijuana found in Lopez' apartment on January 13, 1993. 

The parties thereafter entered into a plea bargain whereby Lopez agreed to plead 

guilty to a one-count information charging him with interstate travel in aid of a 

racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(l) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Lopez 

further agreed to provide testimony before the grand jury regarding the source of the 

drugs. The government, in turn, agreed to dismiss the original indictment. 1 On 

November 29, 1994, Lopez pleaded guilty to the one-count information. 

On January 27, 1995, Lopez filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which had 

not yet been dismissed, alleging that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment 

barred his criminal prosecution, because that prosecution was based upon the same 

"offense or conduct" as that relied upon in the prior civil forfeiture proceeding. At oral 

argument on the motion to dismiss, counsel indicated that if the court denied the motion 

1 The plea bargain contained a stipulation that during January, 1993, Lopez 

traveled from Colorado to Texas to make payment for the delivery of eight kilograms of 

cocaine to Colorado. 

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to dismiss, Lopez would still stand on his guilty plea to the one-count information, since 

Lopez basically sought only to avoid any imprisonment. 

On March 23, 1995, the district court denied Lopez' motion to dismiss the 

indictment. In so doing, the district court stated that Lopez had failed to show that 

prosecution for interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1952(a)(l) was the "same offense" as the civil forfeiture proceeding, citing 

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Specifically, the district court 

held that under 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(l), the government must show, inter alia, that Lopez 

"traveled ... in interstate or foreign commerce" in aid of a racketeering enterprise, and that 

such was not an essential element of the civil forfeiture proceeding brought under 21 

U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) and (a)(7). Conversely, the district court found that in the civil 

forfeiture proceeding the government must show, inter alia, that the property sought to be 

forfeited was used to facilitate a drug offense or was traceable to drug activities, neither 

of which was an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(l). A motion to reconsider 

was denied. 

At sentencing on May 5, 1994, the district court expanded a bit on its prior ruling 

and stated that neither the two-count indictment charging possession of cocaine and 

marijuana nor the one-count information charging interstate travel in aid of a racketeering 

enterprise charged the "same offense"as that charged in the civil forfeiture proceeding. 

The court then sentenced Lopez to imprisonment for sixty months. On that same day, the 

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district court, in accord with the plea bargain, dismissed the two-count indictment against 

Lopez. 

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 

"nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 

or limb .... " The foregoing constitutional provision has been held to encompass three 

separate guarantees: (1) it protects against a second prosection for the same offense after 

a prior acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosection for the same offense after a 

prior conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. 

Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306-7 ( 1984 ). 

In his motion to dismiss, Lopez sought to dismiss the indictment, and not the 

information. At the time the motion to dismiss was filed, Lopez had in fact entered a plea 

of guilty to interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise, and the government had 

agreed to dismiss the criminal indictment, which it later did. Be that as it may, the 

district court initially treated the motion to dismiss as challenging the information. As 

above stated, in denying the motion to dismiss, the district court held that the prior civil 

forfeiture action involved essential elements not present in the interstate travel offense, 

and vice versa. At sentencing, the district court, as indicated, elaborated a bit, and held 

that the prior civil forfeiture proceeding involved essential elements not present in the 

charges set forth in the indictment, i.e., unlawful possession of cocaine and marijuana, as 

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well as the information. 

Subsequent to the district court's judgment in the instant case, the Supreme Court, 

on June 24, 1996, announced its decision in United States v. Ursery, et. a!., __ U.S. 

__ , 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). We believe Ursery is depositive ofthe present appeal. 

In Ursery, the government argued that the civil forfeiture of property was not the 

"same offense" as the ensuing criminal prosecution and that the double jeopardy 

protection against multiple punishments for the same offense was not an issue in the case. 

The Supreme Court declined to address that particular argument because it concluded that 

the "civil forfeitures involved in these cases do not constitute punishment under the 

Double Jeopardy Clause ... " Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 2140. In other words, since the civil 

forfeiture in Ursery was not "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, the Supreme 

Court did not reach the question of whether the civil forfeiture was the "same offense" as 

the criminal charge. The Court stated that only if the civil forfeiture in a given case was 

so potentially punitive as to constitute punishment, would a court need to address the 

further question of whether the civil forfeiture was the "same offense" as the criminal 

one. I d. at 2142. Because, in the instant case, we ultimately find that under Ursery the 

civil forfeiture was not "punishment", we do not need to address the reason given by the 

district court for its denial of the motion to dismiss; viz., that the civil forfeiture action 

was not for the same offense as set forth in either the indictment or the information. So, 

we will resolve the present appeal on the same ground as that used by the Supreme Court 

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in Ursery. 2 

Ursery involved two cases, one from the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Ursery, 59 

F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), and one from the Ninth Circuit, United States v. $405,089.23 

United States Currency, 33 FJd 1210 (9th Cir. 1994). In the Sixth Circuit case, 

Michigan police found marijuana growing next to Ursery's house, and discovered 

marijuana seeds, stems, stalks and a "growlight" inside the house. The government then 

instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against the house, alleging that the house had been 

used to facilitate the unlawful possession and distribution of marijuana. Ursery ultimately 

paid the United States $13,250 to settle the forfeiture claim in full. Shortly before the 

forfeiture proceeding was settled, Ursery was indicted for manufacturing marijuana, in 

violation of21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l). A jury convicted him of the criminal charge and he 

was sentenced to 63 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 

Ursery's conviction on the criminal charge, holding that his conviction violated the 

Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

In the Ninth Circuit case, Charles Wesley Arlt and James Wren were convicted of 

various counts of conspiracy and money laundering. Arlt and Wren were both sentenced 

to life in prison. Before the criminal trial had started, the government filed a civil in rem 

complaint against various items of property seized from, or titled to, Arlt and Wren. The 

2 Our approach to this appeal should not be construed as indicating that the district 

court's reasoning that the civil forfeiture proceeding involved essential elements not 

present in the charges in the indictment or information, and vice versa, was faulty. 

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parties agreed to defer litigation of the forfeiture proceeding during the criminal 

prosecution. More than a year after the conclusion of the criminal prosection, the district 

court granted the government's motion for summary judgment in the civil forfeiture 

proceeding. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to the 

government in the forfeiture proceeding, holding that the forfeiture violated the Double 

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, that such forfeiture constituted punishment, 

and that Arlt and Wren had already been "punished" by the life sentences imposed in the 

prior criminal prosecution. 

As indicated, the Supreme Court in Ursery reversed both the Sixth and Ninth 

Circuits. In so doing, the Supreme Court used a two-part test to determine whether civil 

forfeiture constituted "punishment" for Double Jeopardy purposes. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 

2147. The Court first asked whether Congress intended proceedings under the forfeiture 

provisions to be criminal or civil. In the second prong, the Court inquired whether the 

forfeiture proceedings were "so punitive in fact as to 'persuade us that the forfeiture 

proceeding[ s] may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature,' despite Congress' 

intent." !d. 

Applying that test to the facts of Ursery, the Court then went on to state that 

"[t]here is little doubt that Congress intended these forfeitures to be civil proceedings". 

!d. As concerns the second part of the two-pronged test, the Supreme Court stated "there 

is little evidence, much less the 'clearest proof that we require ... suggesting that the 

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forfeiture proceedings ... are so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal 

despite Congress' intent to the contrary." !d. at 2148. Having thus concluded, the 

Supreme Court held in each case that "these in rem civil forfeitures are neither 

'punishment' nor criminal for purposes ofthe Double Jeopardy Clause." !d. at 2149. The 

Court's basic rationale was that the civil in rem forfeitures there involved were remedial 

civil sanctions, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties, such as 

fines, and were not "punishment," as such, under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

The instant case is, in our view, indistinguishable from Ursery, supra, and on that 

basis we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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