Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01227/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01227-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roy L. Bowen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appoals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 0 G 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ROY L. BOWEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 90-1227 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C~ No. 89-CR-403-W) 

Michael P. Carey, Assistant United States Attorney (Michael J. 

Norton, u.s. Attorney, with him on the brief), for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Vicki Mandell-King, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, EBEL, and McWILLIAMS,. Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-1227 Document: 01019290947 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 1 
Buena Vista Bank and Trust Company (hereinafter referred to 

as the Bank) was a state chartered federally insured financial 

institution located in Buena Vista, Colorado. It was declared 

insolvent on August 28, 1986, at which time the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed receiver and took 

custody of the records and assets of the institution. 

In March, 1979, Roy L. Bowen, and others, purchased the Bank. 

Bowen was president, chief executive officer, and chairman of the 

board of directors, as well as a part owner of the Bank, from 1979 

until the Bank was closed in 1986. 

In a multi-count indictment Bowen was charged in twelve 

separate counts with misapplication of monies belonging to the 

Bank with an intent to injure or defraud the Bank, in violation of 

18 u.s.c. § 656 (1989). In two separate counts, Bowen was charged 

with making false statements to the FDIC, in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 1001 (1989). And in two other counts, Bowen was charged 

with making false statements to two lending banks which were 

federally insured, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1014 (1989). 

A jury convicted Bowen on six of the twelve counts charging 

him with misapplication of monies belonging to the Bank and 

acquitted him on the ·remaining six counts charging misapplication. 

The jury convicted Bowen on one of the two counts charging him 

with making false statements to the FDIC, and acquitted him on the 

second count so charging. He was also convicted on both counts 

charging him with making false statements to federally insured 

banks which made loans to him. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1227 Document: 01019290947 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 2 
As stated, the jury convicted Bowen on six of the twelve 

counts charging misapplication of monies belonging to the Bank. 

On four of those six counts Bowen was sentenced to imprisonment 

for five years. The jury also convicted Bowen on one of the two 

counts charging him with making false statements to the FDIC. 

Bowen was sentenced to five years imprisonment on that count. All 

of the five-year terms were to be served concurrently. 

The jury convicted Bowen on two counts charging him with 

making false statements to federally insured banks which made 

loans to him. On each of these counts Bowen was sentenced to two 

years imprisonment, to be served concurrently with each other, but 

consecutively to the five-year terms imposed on other counts. On 

the remaining two counts charging misapplication of the Bank's 

monies, Bowen was sentenced to five years probation to commence 

upon his release from confinement. Bowen appeals all convictions. 

I. Superseding Indictments 

On December 13, 1989, a sixteen-count indictment was returned 

against Bowen by a Grand Jury. On April 5, 1990, a First 

Superseding Indictment was returned by the Grand Jury charging 

Bowen in sixteen counts with the same crimes charged in the 

original indictment. 

On the day the First Superseding Indictment came on for 

trial, a Second Superseding Indictment was returned against Bowen. 

This indictment also contained the same sixteen counts, but there 

were some changes in dates and amounts of money involved in 

certain of the counts. Defense counsel objected to the Second 

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Appellate Case: 90-1227 Document: 01019290947 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 3 
Superseding Indictment on the grounds, inter alia, of untimeliness 

and was adamant that the matter go to trial on the First 

Superseding Indictment. The district court, over strenuous 

objection from the government, agreed with defense counsel and the 

case went to trial on the First Superseding Indictment, which, as 

indicated, is what defense counsel sought, and obtained. 

On appeal, different counsel now argues that the Second 

Superseding Indictment nullified the First Superseding Indictment, 

and that the district court should have dismissed the First 

Superseding Indictment and released the defendant. We disagree. 

When the Second Superseding Indictment was returned, Bowen 

had not been placed in jeopardy on the First Superseding 

Indictment. Indeed, when the Second Superseding Indictment was 

returned, Bowen had not yet been arraigned on the First 

Superseding Indictment. And counsel agrees that under these 

circumstances there is no double jeopardy problem in the present 

case. 

A "superseding indictment" means a second indictment issued 

in the absence of a dismissal of a prior indictment. United 

States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 u.s. 231, 237 (1985) (Blackman, J., 

concurring). A superseding indictment may be returned at any time 

before a trial on the merits of an earlier indictment. 

States v. Herbst, 565 F.2d 638, 643 (lOth Cir. 1977). * 

* 

United 

Ordinarily where there is a superseding indictment, trial is 

on the superseding indictment. The instant case presents the 

reverse: Because of untimeliness of the return of the second 

superseding indictment and because of defendant's objection 

thereto, trial, at the insistance of the defendant, was on the 

First Superseding Indictment. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1227 Document: 01019290947 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 4 
In United States v. Cerilli, 558 F.2d 697, 700 n.3 (3d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977), appears the following: 

Alternatively, the defendants appear to 

contend that the issuance of the "superseding" 

indictment necessarily constitutes a dismissal 

of the original indictment. Continuing this 

line of reasoning, they claim that, because 

jeopardy attached under the first indictment, 

and as the first indictment has, in effect, 

been dismissed, no prosecution is possible 

under the second indictment or, presumably, 

under any other one. 

The defendants' argument in this regard 

is not convincing, especially in the absence 

of any authority for such a theory. As we 

understand it, there are two pending 

indictments against the defendants, and the 

government may select one of them with which 

to proceed to trial. See cases cited in note 

8 and accompanying text infra. (emphasis 

added). 

In accord with Cerilli, see United States v. Stricklin, 591 

F.2d 1112, 1115-16, n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 

(1979), which reads, in part, as follows: 

A superseding indictment may be returned 

at any time before a trial on the merits. 

Indeed, two indictments may be outstanding at 

the same time for the same offense if jeopardy 

has not attached to the first indictment. 

Since the original indictment apparently was 

never dismissed, there are technically two 

pending indictments against Stricklin, and it 

appears that the government may select one of 

them with which to proceed to trial. 

(citations omitted). 

We have found no authority which supports the proposition 

that a superseding indictment zaps an earlier indictment to the 

end that the earlier indictment somehow vanishes into thin air. 

In the instant case, we are concerned with at least two 

outstanding indictments against Bowen. As indicated, counsel 

agree that we are not concerned with a double jeopardy problem. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1227 Document: 01019290947 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 5 
The district court did not err in holding that because of 

untimeliness Bowen would not be forced to trial on the Second 

Superseding Indictment which was only returned on the morning the 

First Superseding Indictment was set for trial, and that the trial 

on the First Superseding Indictment, which was set for that date, 

would proceed as scheduled. Indeed, that is what defense counsel 

insisted on in the district court. 

II. Severance 

In a pretrial motion, Bowen asked that the two counts 

charging him with making false statements to the FDIC and the 

additional two counts charging him with making false statements to 

federally insured financial institutions making personal loans to 

him be severed from the trial of the other twelve counts charging 

him with misapplying monies belonging to the Bank with an intent 

to defraud the latter. His argument was that in the counts 

charging him with misapplication of bank funds, he was charged in 

his official capacity as a bank officer, and in the four counts 

which he sought to have severed, he was not so charged, i.e., he 

was there only acting in a private capacity. After hearing, the 

district court denied the motion to sever. In so doing, we find 

no abuse of discretion. United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 

289-90 (lOth Cir. 1983). 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) permits two or more offenses to be 

joined in the same indictment if they are of the same or similar 

character or are based on two or more acts or transactions 

constituting a part of a common scheme or plan. In our view, the 

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Appellate Case: 90-1227 Document: 01019290947 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 6 
counts which Bowen sought to sever are similar to the other counts 

charging misapplication and are a part of an overall scheme or 

plan. The two cannot be viewed in splendid isolation. In United 

States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1231 (lOth Cir. 1988), we stated 

that the denial of a motion to sever counts will not be reversed 

on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of prejudice, and 

that the defendant's burden to show an abuse of discretion on the 

part of a district court is a "difficult one." Bowen has not met 

the test laid down in Hayes. 

III. Evidence of Loss and Closing 

Counsel agree that proof of actual monetary loss to the Bank 

is not necessary to sustain a conviction for willful 

misapplication of bank funds, citing United States v. Gallagher, 

576 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1978). In 

other words, it is sufficient to show a willful misapplication of 

bank funds with an intent to injure or defraud the Bank, and proof 

of actual loss is not essential. From this proposition, defense 

counsel argues that the district court erred in allowing into 

evidence certain testimony tending to show actual monetary loss to 

the Bank resulting from certain of Bowen's acts and some passing 

references by several witnesses to the fact that the Bank was 

eventually closed and taken over by FDIC. 

We do not regard this particular matter as being of any great 

moment. It certainly played no major role in this somewhat 

protracted trial. Although proof of loss may not be an essential 

element of a crime charging a violation of 18 u.s.c. § 656, 

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Appellate Case: 90-1227 Document: 01019290947 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 7 
evidence of such arguably has bearing on the issue of whether 

Bowen had an intent to injure or defraud the Bank. And the fact 

that the Bank was taken over by FDIC is an inescapable fact of the 

entire case. 

IV. Carl Wilson 

Count 9 of the First Superseding Indictment charged Bowen 

with the misapplication of $100,000 of the Bank's money involving 

an unsecured loan to one Carl Wilson. Count 10 charged the 

misapplication in the form of a $20,000 advance of the Bank's 

money to Carl Wilson for the benefit of Mount Princeton Hot 

Springs Resort. Carl Wilson appeared at trial and testified as a 

government witness. 

Prior to trial, the prosecution notified defense counsel that 

Carl Wilson and a company which he controlled were under 

investigation by the FBI, but that the investigative file 

contained no statements attributable to Wilson. At trial, defense 

counsel asked that he be given the government's file on Carl 

Wilson so that he could determine whether it contained any Brady 

material. Brady v. Maryland, 373 u.s. 83 (1963). Apparently, 

with the acquiescence of all concerned, the district court 

examined Wilson's file, in camera, and reported back that it 

contained no material which could conceivably be of help to Bowen, 

be it through the cross-examination of Wilson, or otherwise. 

On appeal, we too have read Wilson's file and we agree with 

the district court's reading thereof. We find no prejudice to 

Bowen in the way this matter was handled. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1227 Document: 01019290947 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 8 
V. Insufficient Evidence 

As her final ground for reversal, defense counsel argues that 

the evidence is insufficient to support Bowen's conviction on any 

of the nine counts of which he was convicted. Bowen did testify 

in his own behalf and testified, in effect, that he had no intent 

to injure or defraud the Bank and that in all his various 

he was simply trying to bolster a sagging local economy. 

our view, at best only posed issues of fact which have 

resolved by the jury. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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actions 

Such, in 

now been 

Appellate Case: 90-1227 Document: 01019290947 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 9