Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03977/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03977-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli
Defendant
PayJoy, Inc.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAYJOY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-03977-HSG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 

Re: Dkt. No. 2

Pending before the Court is a motion for a temporary restraining order and motion to show 

cause filed by Plaintiff PayJoy, Inc. (“PayJoy”) on July 11, 2019. Dkt. No. 2 (“Mot.”). In short, 

PayJoy alleges that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) wrongly 

denied PayJoy’s H-1B petition, which sought to classify the beneficiary Qihan Xie as a temporary 

worker in a specialty occupation under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). PayJoy contends that the 

agency’s decision that the position did not meet the statutory requirement that entry into the 

occupation normally requires a bachelor’s degree or higher was an arbitrary and capricious final 

agency action. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 28–39. Plaintiff currently seeks “an order temporarily enjoining 

[USCIS] from withholding the benefits associated with an approved H-1B.” Mot. at 7. On July 

15, 2019, Defendant Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, in his official capacity as Acting Director of USCIS, 

opposed Plaintiff’s motion. Dkt. No. 9 (“Opp.”). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES

the motion.1

//

//

 

1 The Court finds that this matter is appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the 

matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b).

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Prior to any association with PayJoy, Ms. Xie worked as a “financial specialist” for a raisin 

packing company pursuant to an approved H-1B visa. Mot. at 10. On May 6, 2019, PayJoy filed 

a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129), which sought to transfer Ms. Xie’s H-1B visa 

to PayJoy, for a “financial analyst” position. Id.; see also Dkt. No. 2-2 (“AR”) at 16–23. On May 

16, 2019, USCIS issued a Request for Evidence (“RFE”), seeking additional information from 

which the agency might conclude that the proffered position constitutes a “specialty occupation.” 

AR at 109–18. Plaintiff responded to the RFE on June 5, 2019, id. at 119–44, but the agency 

nonetheless concluded on June 18, 2019 that the position did not qualify as a “specialty 

occupation” under the statute, id. at 4–11. Among other reasons, USCIS determined that PayJoy 

did not show that the financial analyst position required a bachelor’s degree or higher in a specific 

specialty. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order and issuing a preliminary injunction 

are substantially identical. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 

839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Either is an “extraordinary remedy” that the court should award only 

upon a clear showing that the party is entitled to such relief. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief must establish: (1) that they are

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) that an injunction is in 

the public interest. Id. Preliminary relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded 

upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. A court must find that 

“a certain threshold showing” is made on each of the four required elements. Leiva-Perez v. 

Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the Ninth Circuit’s sliding scale approach, a 

preliminary injunction may issue if there are “serious questions going to the merits” if “a hardship 

balance [also] tips sharply towards the [movant],” and “so long as the [movant] also shows that 

there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” All. for 

the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Where a plaintiff seeks mandatory injunctive relief instead of prohibitory injunctive relief 

to maintain the status quo, a plaintiff’s burden is “doubly demanding.”2 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 

786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Such a plaintiff “must establish that the law and facts clearly 

favor her position, not simply that she is likely to succeed.” Id. And the Ninth Circuit often 

cautions that a mandatory injunction “goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo 

pendente lite [and] is particularly disfavored.” Id. (quoting Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 

1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted)). District courts thus should deny such 

requests “unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1320

(quoting Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979)). Put differently, 

mandatory injunctive relief should never issue in “doubtful cases.” Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740 

(quoting Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th 

Cir. 2011)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the extraordinarily high burden to warrant 

mandatory injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to show that the law and facts clearly 

favor its position. See id. And because Plaintiff’s request for mandatory injunctive relief fails on 

this ground, the Court need not address the other Winter factors.

Plaintiff’s dispute concerns whether USCIS erred in finding that PayJoy’s “Financial 

Analyst” position is not a “specialty occupation.” As defined by statute, a “specialty occupation” 

for present purposes is “an occupation that requires theoretical and practical application of a body 

of highly specialized knowledge, and attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific 

specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1)(A)–(B). Pertinent regulations clarify:

Specialty occupation means an occupation which requires theoretical 

and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge 

in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, 

engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, 

 

2 There is no dispute that Plaintiff here seeks a mandatory injunctive relief because an order 

enjoining USCIS from withholding benefits is the same thing as an order directing USCIS to 

provide such benefits. 

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medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, 

theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a 

bachelor’s degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, 

as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). And as detailed under those same regulations, PayJoy can establish that 

Ms. Xie would perform a “specialty occupation” by proving to USCIS by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the Financial Analyst position meets one of four criteria:

(1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 

requirement for entry into the particular position;

(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 

similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular 

position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual 

with a degree;

(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or

(4) The nature of the specific duties are so specialized and complex that knowledge 

required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a 

baccalaureate or higher degree.

Id. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (providing the burden of proof).

In this suit, PayJoy principally takes issue with the following: (1) USCIS’s interpretation 

of the “degree” requirement “to mean not just any bachelor’s or higher degree, but one in a 

specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position,” see, e.g., Mot. at 33–34, 36; and

(2) USCIS’s authority to determine whether a proffered position “actually requires the theoretical 

and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge,” id. at 34–36. 

PayJoy’s challenge to USCIS’s interpretation of the “degree” requirement is defective in 

several respects. First, as to PayJoy’s contention that USCIS lacks the requisite expertise in 

determining what constitutes a specialty occupation, it is unclear at this stage that this Court is 

even the proper place to raise that challenge. Given that it appears Congress delegated such

determinations to USCIS, it does not appear that the exercise of that authority, in and of itself, is 

improper. Second, and most important, although PayJoy maintains that there is no specific 

specialty requirement, the plain statutory and regulatory text indicates otherwise. See 8 U.S.C. 

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§ 1184(i)(1)(B) and (2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). PayJoy even goes so far as to characterize 

the statute and regulation as merely requiring any bachelor’s degree while omitting the “specific 

specialty” language from each. See Mot. at 8 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i) but omitting the 

requirement that the proffered position requires “attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the 

specific specialty (or its equivalent)”) (emphasis added); id. at 41 (quoting 8 C.F.R. 

§ 214.2(h)(4)(i)(A)(1) but omitting language providing that the beneficiary must be “qualified to 

perform services in the specialty occupation because he or she has attained a baccalaureate or 

higher degree or its equivalent in the specialty occupation”) (emphasis added). Nor does PayJoy 

cite to a single case to support its interpretation of the degree requirement. To the contrary, the 

Court’s own research has only uncovered cases supporting USCIS’s interpretation. See Innova 

Sols., Inc. v. Baran, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding USCIS did not abuse its 

discretion in reading the degree requirement together with the “specific specialty” language). 

Given that the statutory and regulatory text appear to support USCIS’s interpretation that 

the degree requirement must be read in conjunction with the “specific specialty” requirement, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff has not met its high burden to establish that the law and facts clearly 

favor its position. See Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.

3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 

3 Defendant notes, and the Court agrees, that this case appears to be subject to the Court’s General 

Order No. 61 for Immigration Mandamus Cases. See Opp. at 1. The parties are DIRECTED to 

comply with the general order, including all deadlines set forth therein. If Plaintiff disagrees that 

General Order 61 applies, it must file a statement of its position not to exceed two pages by July 

19, 2019. 

7/16/2019

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