Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00778/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00778-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Melissa D. Bumpus
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MELISSA D. BUMPUS, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 06-0778-M

 :

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, :

Commissioner of :

Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Award of

Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc.

21) and Defendant's Notice of Intent Not to Object to Plaintiff's

Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access

to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Doc. 22). After consideration

of the pertinent pleadings, it is ORDERED, without objection,

that the Application be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's attorney be

AWARDED an EAJA attorney's fee in the amount of $4,495.98.

Plaintiff filed this action on November 15, 2006 (Doc. 1). 

On June 19, 2007, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and

Order and Judgment, reversing the decision of the ALJ and

remanding this action to the Commissioner for further proceedings

not inconsistent with the Orders of this Court (Docs. 19, 20). 

On September 4, 2007, Gilbert B. Laden, counsel for Plaintiff,

filed a Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal

Access to Justice Act, in which Plaintiff requests a fee of

Case 1:06-cv-00778-M Document 23 Filed 09/25/07 Page 1 of 7
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$4,495.98, computed at an hourly rate of $162.31 for 27.7 hours

spent in this Court (Doc. 21). Defendant in his Notice filed

September 18, 2007, stated that he does not oppose Plaintiff’s

Motion (Doc. 22). 

The EAJA requires a court to 

award to a prevailing party ... fees and

other expenses ... incurred by that party in

any civil action ..., including proceedings

for judicial review of Agency action, brought

by or against the United States ..., unless

the court finds that the position of the

United States was substantially justified or

that special circumstances make an award

unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA further requires that a

prevailing party file an application for attorney's fees within

thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(B). The court's judgment is final sixty days after it

is entered, which is the time in which an appeal may be taken

pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct.

2625, 2632 (1993).

Defendant concedes that Plaintiff became the prevailing

party when the Court remanded this action, Schaefer, 113 S.Ct. at

2631; that the fee application was timely filed; and that his

position was not substantially justified (Doc. 22).

The EAJA, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is a fee-shifting statute. 

The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful starting

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point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied

by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d

1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985)(EAJA), quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt,

461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983)(§ 1988). In

describing this lodestar method of calculation, the United States

Supreme Court stated:

This calculation provides an objective basis

on which to make an initial estimate of the

value of a lawyer’s services. The party

seeking an award of fees should submit

evidence supporting the hours worked and the

rates claimed. Where the documentation of

hours is inadequate, the district court may

reduce the award accordingly. The district

court also should exclude from this initial

fee calculation hours that were not

“reasonably expended” .... Cases may be

overstaffed, and the skill and experience of

lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the

prevailing party should make a good-faith

effort to exclude from a fee request hours

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private

practice ethically is obligated to exclude

such hours from his fee submission. In the

private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an

important component in fee setting. It is no

less important here. Hours that are not

properly billed to one’s client also are not

properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant

to statutory authority.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use

professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should

only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he

would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on

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vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836

F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).

 The Court, after examination of Plaintiff’s Motion and

supporting documentation, and after consideration of the

reasonableness of the hours claimed, finds that Plaintiff’s time

expended in prosecuting this action for a total of 27.7 hours is

reasonable. 

With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to apply

in a given EAJA case, the express language of the Act provides in

pertinent part as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this

subsection shall be based upon prevailing

market rates for the kind and quality of the

services furnished, except that ... attorney

fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125

per hour unless the court determines that an

increase in the cost of living or a special

factor, such as the limited availability of

qualified attorneys for the proceedings

involved, justifies a higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp. 1997).

In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be

applied in calculating attorney's fees under the Act.

The first step in the analysis, ... is to

determine the market rate for "similar

services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and

reputation." ... The second step, which is

needed only if the market rate is greater

than $75 per hour, is to determine whether

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 Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour to

$125.00 per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp.

1997).

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the court should adjust the hourly fee

upward...to take into account an increase in

the cost of living, or a special factor.

Id. at 1033-34 (citations omitted & footnote omitted)1

. The

applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence

that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates. 

NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more than the affidavit of

the attorney performing the work. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 (1984). Where the fees or time claimed

seem expanded or there is lack of documentation or testimony in

support, the court may make an award on its own experience. 

Norman v. City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.

1988). Where documentation is inadequate, the court is not

relieved of its obligation to award a reasonable fee, but the

court traditionally has had the power to make such an award

without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. 

Id. 

For years, the prevailing market rate in the Southern

District of Alabama has been $125.00 per hour. See e.g., Smith

v. Massanari, Civil Action 00-0812-P-M (October 25, 2001); Boone

v. Apfel, Civil Action 99-0965-CB-L (August 30, 2001); Lee v.

Massanari, Civil Action 00-0518-RV-S (June 29, 2001); Willits v.

Case 1:06-cv-00778-M Document 23 Filed 09/25/07 Page 5 of 7
2“The appropriate endpoint for computing the cost of living

adjustment is the temporal midpoint of the period during which

the compensable services were rendered[;] ... [t]he temporal

midpoint is calculated by computing the number of days from the

date the claim was prepared until the date of the Magistrate or

District Judge’s Order and Judgment.” Lucy v. Barnhart, CA 06-

0147-C, Doc. 31, at 3.

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Massanari, Civil Action 00-0530-RV-C (May 4, 2001); and Square v.

Halter, Civil Action 00-0516-BH-L (April 12, 2001). Recently, in

an action before Judge Cassady, that rate was increased to

account for the ever-increasing cost of living. Lucy v.

Barnhart, CA 06-0147-C. In Lucy, the Court adopted the following

formula to be used in calculating all future awards of attorney’s

fees under the EAJA: “‘($125/hour) x (CPI-U Annual Average “All

Items Index”, South Urban, for month and year of temporal

midpoint2)/152.4, where 152.4 equals the CPI-U of March 1996, the

month and year in which the $125 cap was enacted.’” (Id. At 11,

quoting Doc. 31, at 2). The undersigned agrees with Judge

Cassady that the time has come to adjust the hourly rate and also

adopts this formula in arriving at the appropriate hourly rate.

The temporal midpoint in this action was March 2007, the

complaint having been filed on November 15, 2006 (Doc. 1), and

the Court having entered its Order and Judgment on June 19, 2007

(Docs. 19, 20). The CPI-U for March 2007 was 197.9. Plugging

the relevant numbers into the foregoing formula renders the

following equation: $125.00 x 197.9/152.4. Completion of this

equation renders an hourly rate of $162.31. 

Case 1:06-cv-00778-M Document 23 Filed 09/25/07 Page 6 of 7
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 In conclusion, it is ORDERED, without objection, that

Plaintiff's Motion be granted as set out above and that

Plaintiff's attorney be awarded an EAJA attorney's fee in the

amount of $4,495.98.

DONE this 25th day of September, 2007.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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