Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-16-08015/USCOURTS-ca6-16-08015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Naomi Kidd Ramey

Document Text:

1

By order of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the precedential effect

of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th

Cir. BAP LBR 8024-1(b). See also 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8014-1(c).

File Name: 16b0004p.06

BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

In re: NAOMI KIDD RAMEY,

Debtor.

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No. 16-8015

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 

for the Eastern District of Kentucky.

No. 15-70787—Tracy N. Wise, Judge.

Decided and Filed: September 30, 2016

Before: HARRISON, HUMPHREY, and PRESTON, Judges of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Naomi Kidd Ramey, Pikeville, Kentucky, pro se.

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OPINION

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ISSUES ON APPEAL

GUY R. HUMPHREY, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. This appeal concerns the 

dismissal of a Chapter 7 case due to a debtor failing to complete the pre-petition briefing 

requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) and the denial of a motion to vacate the dismissal order.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit (“BAP”) has jurisdiction to decide 

this appeal. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky has authorized 

appeals to the BAP. A final order of a bankruptcy court may be appealed by right under 

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No. 16-8015 In re Ramey Page 2

28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). For purposes of appeal, an order is final if it “‘ends the litigation on the 

merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” Midland Asphalt Corp. 

v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S. Ct. 1494, 1497 (1989) (citations omitted). An order 

dismissing a bankruptcy case is a final order. Raynard v. Rogers (In re Raynard), 354 B.R. 834, 

836 (6th Cir. BAP 2006).

“Dismissal of a bankruptcy case is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Riverview Trenton 

R.R. Co. v. DSC, Ltd (In re DSC, Ltd.), 486 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Booher Enters. 

v. Eastown Auto Co. (In re Eastown Auto Co.), 215 B.R. 960, 963 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998)). 

A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when “it relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact 

or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Id. Factual 

determinations are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Fed. R. Bank. P. 8013. 

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been committed.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 

(1985) (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 

(1948)). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Nicholson v. Isaacman (In re Isaacman),

26 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir.1994).

FACTS

The Debtor, Naomi Kidd Ramey, filed a pro se Chapter 7 petition on December 2, 2015. 

Along with her petition, Ramey filed a motion for waiver of the pre-petition credit counseling or 

briefing requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 109(h).1 Section 109 requires a debtor to undergo the 

counseling or briefing as a prerequisite to filing a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. 

 

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Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), and notwithstanding any other provision of this section other 

than paragraph (4) of this subsection, an individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such 

individual has, during the 180-day period ending on the date of filing of the petition by such 

individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency described in 

section 111(a) an individual or group briefing (including a briefing conducted by telephone or on 

the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted such 

individual in performing a related budget analysis.

11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1). The exception under § 109(h)(2) is not at issue in this appeal.

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The motion sought a permanent waiver of the requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4),2

essentially arguing incapacity, but also appeared to raise what can best be described as exigent 

circumstances that would be relevant for a temporary waiver under § 109(h)(3).3 In any event, 

on December 7, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered an order that the motion failed to comply 

with the court’s local rules for noticing and provided that unless the filing was noticed properly 

within 7 days, the motion would be denied. Ramey renewed the motion, but a similar order was 

entered for the same noticing error. On December 23, 2015, the case was dismissed, not due to 

the missing credit briefing, but because Ramey failed to comply with an order to file her 

schedules and other initial documents. Ramey had filed some, but not all of those documents 

and was noticed by the clerk, prior to dismissal, that the initial filing documents for her case 

were incomplete.

On January 4, 2016, Ramey filed a credit briefing certificate that was completed postpetition and filed additional initial documents for her case. On January 13, 2016, Ramey sought 

to vacate the dismissal order, but that filing did not address the credit briefing issue. That motion 

 

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The requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a debtor whom the court 

determines, after notice and hearing, is unable to complete those requirements because of 

incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone. For the purposes of this 

paragraph, incapacity means that the debtor is impaired by reason of mental illness or mental 

deficiency so that he is incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with respect to his 

financial responsibilities; and “disability” means that the debtor is so physically impaired as to be 

unable, after reasonable effort, to participate in an in person, telephone, or Internet briefing 

required under paragraph (1).

11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4).

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(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to 

a debtor who submits to the court a certification that--

(i) describes exigent circumstances that merit a waiver of the requirements of 

paragraph (1);

(ii) states that the debtor requested credit counseling services from an approved 

nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency, but was unable to obtain the 

services referred to in paragraph (1) during the 7-day period beginning on the 

date on which the debtor made that request; and

(iii) is satisfactory to the court.

(B) With respect to a debtor, an exemption under subparagraph (A) shall cease to apply to that 

debtor on the date on which the debtor meets the requirements of paragraph (1), but in no case 

may the exemption apply to that debtor after the date that is 30 days after the debtor files a 

petition, except that the court, for cause, may order an additional 15 days.

11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3).

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was re-filed after yet another order concerning procedural error, and ultimately the court set a 

hearing on the motion to vacate for March 9, 2016. Following that hearing, the court entered an 

order denying Ramey’s motion, specifically mentioning the lack of a pre-petition credit briefing.

On April 20, 2016, Ramey again moved for an order waiving the credit briefing 

requirement under § 109(h) and vacating the dismissal of her case. Ramey essentially argued 

various medical issues demonstrated her incapacity or disability justifying a permanent waiver 

under § 109(h)(4). The court denied this latest motion on April 26, 2016 explaining, among 

other points, that Ramey demonstrated she did not meet the narrow definition of incapacity or 

disability by virtue of having successfully completed a credit briefing, albeit post-petition. To 

the extent Ramey wanted a temporary waiver under § 109(h)(3), the court noted that Ramey had 

not alleged exigent circumstances or that she timely requested a briefing but could not obtain it 

within 7 days of that request. 

Ramey raised this issue again in further correspondence with the court, and ultimately 

appealed the denial of her motion to vacate the court’s dismissal order.

DISCUSSION

As part of the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Congress 

amended the Bankruptcy Code to require all individual debtors to complete a pre-petition credit 

briefing. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1). Pursuant to § 109 of the Bankruptcy Code, if the briefing is not 

completed, the debtor is not eligible for bankruptcy relief and the bankruptcy court may dismiss 

the case. In re Ingram, 460 B.R. 904, 910 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011). 

The exceptions to this requirement are narrowly tailored. The requirement does not apply 

to a debtor who “the court determines, after notice and a hearing, is unable to complete those 

requirements because of incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone.” 

11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4). Incapacity “means that the debtor is impaired by reason of mental illness 

or mental deficiency so that he is incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with 

respect to his financial responsibilities. . . .” Id. Disability means that “the debtor is so 

physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort, to participate in an in person, 

telephone, or Internet briefing required under paragraph (1).” Id.

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The record shows that Ramey was able to complete a briefing. Although it was postpetition, the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Ramey did not meet the strict definitions of 

incapacity or disability is supported by the record. While Ramey apparently has had serious 

medical issues in the past, the evidence in the record does not meet the definition required for a 

permanent waiver. It is important to recognize that Congress specifically defined incapacity and 

disability and the bankruptcy court cannot use any other definition. 

Further, the record does not support a temporary waiver under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3). 

As found by the bankruptcy court, the temporary waiver requires a finding that Ramey could not 

obtain a briefing within 7 days of a request. Ramey did not demonstrate that she met that 

requirement, nor did she establish exigent circumstances. Instead, it appears that Ramey simply 

misunderstood that the briefing needed to be completed pre-petition.

Finally, Ramey raises policy arguments relating to the credit briefing requirement. These 

arguments appear to include whether incapacity and disability are reasonably defined, whether 

waivers should generally be more available and easier to obtain, and whether the credit briefing 

is of any help to debtors. Ramey is not the first, and likely not the last, to raise arguments of this 

nature. However, such policy arguments are for Congress to address, not the courts. 

The bankruptcy court can only apply the statute as it is plainly written. Hildebrand v. Petro (In 

re Petro), 395 B.R. 369, 374 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (citing Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 

Union Planters Bank, N.A.), 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S. Ct. 1942, 1947 (2000)). That law was 

correctly applied in this instance. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the decision of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.

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