Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03109/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03109-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary W. Sweatt
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 5, 1997 Decided December 5, 1997 

No. 96-3108

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WILLIAM H. SEALS, A/K/A PUDDIN,

A/K/A WILLIAM BROOKS,

APPELLANT

No. 96-3109

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

GARY W. SWEATT,

APPELLANT

-

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Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cr00284-01 & 03)

-

Daniel H. Bromberg, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause for appellant William H. Seals.

Lisa K. Coleman argued the cause for appellant Gary W. 

Sweatt. John P. Dean, appointed by the court, was on brief.

Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and 

John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and G. Bradley 

Weinsheimer, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on 

brief.

Before: WILLIAMS, GINSBURG and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The appellants, 

William Seals and Gary Sweatt, appeal their convictions on 

federal conspiracy, kidnapping and extortion charges. They 

contend that the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq.,

and Article III of the United States Constitution require 

dismissal of the indictment underlying their convictions. In 

addition, Sweatt argues that there was insufficient evidence 

to convict him of kidnapping and that the district court 

improperly sentenced him as a "career offender" under section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines). We affirm the appellants' convictions but vacate 

Sweatt's sentence and remand to the district court to resentence him not as a career offender.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 2, 1995 Seals and Sweatt were arrested and a 

criminal complaint was filed against them in D.C. Superior 

Court, charging them with armed kidnapping in violation of 

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D.C. Code Ann. §§ 22-2101, 22-3202 (1981 & Supp. 1995). 

They were not, however, immediately indicted on these 

charges. After their arrest by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, the FBI and the D.C. Metropolitan Police 

Department continued their joint investigation into the kidnapping. The investigation resulted in the arrest of two 

other suspects and additional evidence which persuaded the 

United States Attorney to alter his tentative decision to lodge 

D.C. charges against them and to instead indict them on 

federal charges. As a result, on October 31, 1995 a D.C. 

Superior Court grand jury returned an indictment in the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Before trial Seals and Sweatt moved to dismiss the indictment on Speedy Trial Act and constitutional (Article III) 

grounds. The lower court denied the motion, finding that the 

United States Attorney had not sent "the case back to D.C. 

Superior Court ... for the purpose of gaining additional time 

for federal prosecution." Pre-Trial Mot. Tr. 225. It further 

held that the Congress, with plenary authority over the 

District of Columbia, validly authorized the D.C. Superior 

Court, an Article I tribunal, to supervise a grand jury that 

can indict for both D.C. and federal offenses. Id. at 201.

At the appellants' trial the Government presented evidence 

showing that Sweatt had assisted in detaining the kidnap 

victim and in retrieving the ransom money. There was no 

evidence, however, from which the jury could infer that 

Sweatt had either been present at or assisted in the abduction 

and transport of the victim across state lines. At the close of 

the Government's case, Sweatt moved for acquittal on the 

ground that he could not be found guilty of kidnapping unless 

he was shown to have participated in the abduction or transport of the victim across state lines. His motion was denied.

The district court charged the jury on the kidnapping and 

extortion counts of the indictment under three theories: (1) 

liability as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (kidnapping) 

and 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (extortion); (2) liability as an aider and 

abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) liability as a Pinkerton

co-conspirator (Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-

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48 (1946)). The jury returned a general verdict, finding both 

Seals and Sweatt guilty of conspiracy, kidnapping and extortion. Seals and Sweatt were subsequently sentenced to identical, concurrent terms of imprisonment. They each received 

60 months for conspiracy, 240 months for extortion and life 

imprisonment for kidnapping.

At sentencing, Sweatt argued that he should be sentenced 

under the November 1994 version of Chapter 4, Part B, of the 

Guidelines and that, according to the 1994 version, as modified by United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1993), 

he did not have the requisite number of prior convictions to 

qualify as a career offender. The district court disagreed, 

concluding that the November 1994 and November 1995 

versions of the Guidelines were substantially identical, the 

only difference being that the 1995 version of section 4B1.1 

contained amended Background Commentary. Thus, the 

lower court ruled that Sweatt's prior convictions of robbery 

and attempted distribution of heroin required that he be 

sentenced as a career offender under both the 1994 and 1995 

versions of section 4B1.1.1

II. DISCUSSION

Despite the parties' contentions to the contrary, all of the 

appellants' claims involve the trial court's legal conclusions or 

its application of legal standards to the facts. Accordingly, 

we review their claims de novo. See United States v. AbdulSaboor, 85 F.3d 664, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

A. Timeliness of Indictment

The Speedy Trial Act (STA) provides that "[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission 

of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on 

which such individual was arrested or served with a summons 

__________

1

If Sweatt had not been sentenced as a career offender under 

section 4B1.1, the maximum term of imprisonment he could have 

received for the kidnapping conviction would have been 235 months, 

reducing his term of imprisonment from life to 240 monthsthe 

longest of the concurrent sentences imposed.

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in connection with such charges." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). The 

appellants contend that the clock began on the date of their 

August 1995 arrests and expired thirty days later in September 1995. They therefore argue that their October 1995 

indictment should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1).2 We disagree.

In United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.) (en 

banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992), we determined that 

"[u]nder the most natural reading" of section 3161(b), "an 

arrest starts the clock only if it is 'in connection with' federal

charges" and thus, "[i]f ... the arrest [is] accompanied by a 

complaint charging violations of the D.C. (not U.S.) Code, it 

[is] not 'in connection with' federal charges." 964 F.2d at 

1189 (emphasis original). Further, we concluded that the 

remedial provision for an untimely indictment, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3162(a)(1), "also suggests that the [STA] is triggered only 

by arrests that are accompanied by the filing of a federal

complaint against the defendant." Id. (emphasis original); 

see also id. at 1193 (Congress adopted "language in 3161(b) 

that addresses solely federal complaints and their attendant 

arrests") (emphasis added). We therefore held that because 

the Mills defendants were initially charged with violations of 

the D.C. Code, the section 3161(b) clock did not start on their 

arrest dates and thus the federal indictments (returned, in 

__________

2 This subsection provides:

If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is 

filed charging such individual with an offense, no indictment or 

information is filed within the time limit required by section 

3161(b) as extended by section 3161(h) of this chapter, such 

charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall 

be dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining whether to 

dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall 

consider, among others, each of the following factors: the 

seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the 

case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.

18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1).

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one instance, one year after arrest) were not untimely. 964 

F.2d at 1188-93.

Our Mills decision disposes of the appellants' STA claims. 

Their August arrests, accompanied by the filing of D.C. 

charges only, cannot be deemed arrests "in connection with" 

federal charges and thus cannot start the STA clock. Nonetheless, Seals and Sweatt invite us to fashion an exception to 

Mills for the "unusual" circumstances of this case which (in 

their view) consist of (1) the FBI's involvement in the arrests 

and its continuing role in the post-arrest investigation of the 

kidnapping, (2) the United States Attorney's "contemplation" 

of federal charges when they were arrested and charged with 

violations of the D.C. Code, (3) the alleged tentativeness of 

the U.S. Attorney's initial decision to bring D.C. rather than 

federal charges and (4) the identity of the prosecuting personnel. We decline their invitation.

First, the fact that the FBI was actively involved in their 

August arrests does not make them arrests "in connection 

with" federal charges. See United States v. Gerald, 5 F.3d 

563, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (where arrest was followed by 

indictment for D.C. Code violations, fact that defendant arrested by federal law enforcement officer held not to trigger 

STA clock), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1144 (1994); cf. Mills, 964 

F.2d at 1192 (recognizing "the now well-established principle 

that a state arrest does not start the clock no matter how 

extensive the federal involvement in the original arrest") 

(emphasis added). Nor does the fact that the FBI actively 

participated in the post-arrest investigation make Seals's and 

Sweatt's August apprehension an arrest "in connection with" 

federal charges. See United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 

262-69 (4th Cir. 1982) (federal investigation undertaken after 

defendant's arrest and indictment on state charges and leading to discovery of additional evidence prompting federal 

indictment did not mean STA clock began on date of original 

arrest); cf. Gerald, 5 F.3d at 565 (STA clock not triggered by 

original arrest on D.C. charges even though prosecutor subsequently decided to seek federal indictment as result of postarrest review of defendant's criminal record and seriousness 

of D.C. charges); United States v. Candelaria, 704 F.2d 1129, 

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1130 (9th Cir. 1983) (arrest by military police did not trigger 

STA clock despite subsequent FBI involvement).

Second, whether the prosecutor contemplated the filing of, 

or only tentatively decided not to bring, federal charges at 

the time of the appellants' arrests is irrelevant to deciding 

when the clock starts. Cf. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d at 269 (suggesting inappropriateness of probe into federal prosecutor's 

motives because prosecutor not required to file federal 

charges as soon as he has enough evidence to prosecute). At 

the very least, such an inquiry is proscribed by the long line 

of cases holding that a federal prosecution based on the same 

conduct as a failed state prosecutionand which is pursued in 

order to salvage the prosecutionis not prohibited by the 

STA because the state arrest does not start the STA clock. 

See Mills, 964 F.2d at 1189-90 (citing Second, Third, Fourth, 

Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions for "the 

undisputed rule that a state arrest does not trigger the 

Speedy Trial Act's clock, even if the arrest is for conduct that 

is the basis of a subsequent indictment for a federal offense").

Nor do the decisions upon which the appellants purport to 

relye.g., United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th 

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1197 (1995); United States v. 

Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1993)require a 

different result. The cases do not authorize a wide-ranging 

judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's motives or the finality of 

his decisionmaking processes. Rather, they merely carve out 

a narrow exception to prevent prosecutorial manipulation of 

STA deadlines. The "ruse" exception is inapposite here 

because the court below expressly found that "there was no 

effort to manipulate the system to gain more time" (Pre-Trial 

Mot. Tr. 225) and the appellants do not contest the finding.

Third, as the Government properly notes, the fact that the 

same personnel were responsible for prosecuting Seals and 

Sweatt in the D.C. Superior Court and United States District 

Court does not transform their arrests on D.C. charges into 

arrests "in connection with" federal charges. See Mills, 964 

F.2d at 1192-93 (rejecting claim that identity of non-federal 

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and federal prosecutorial personnel triggers STA clock on 

date of arrest accompanied by filing of non-federal charges).

Fourth, we reject the appellants' other argumentsnamely, that the STA's language, structure and purpose suggest 

that an arrest on D.C. charges merely establishes a "presumption" that the arrest does not trigger the STA clock and 

that the "presumption" is rebutted by the unique circumstances of this case. To the extent that the arguments have 

any merit, they are plainly foreclosed by Mills. See 964 F.2d 

at 1193 (section 3161(b) "addresses solely federal complaints

and their attendant arrests") (emphasis added).3

B. Constitutionality of Indictment

D.C. Code Ann. § 11-1916(a) (1981 & Supp. 1995) (section 

1916(a)) provides that "[a] grand jury serving in the District 

of Columbia may take cognizance of all matters brought 

before it regardless of whether the indictment is returnable in 

the Federal or District of Columbia Courts." The appellants 

argue that the provision is unconstitutional because it vests 

the judicial power of the United States outside Article III and 

it does so by improperly empowering the executive branch.4

__________

3 Thus, contrary to the appellants' argument, we decline to read 

section 3161(b) without reference to section 3162(a)(1) (see supra

note 2). See Mills, 964 F.2d at 1189 ("There appears to be 

undisputed support among the circuits for this reading of the 

interplay between §§ 3161(b) and 3162(a)(1)."). Similarly, we reject 

their assertion that the STA clock should be understood to start on 

the same date the Sixth Amendment clock starts. See id. at 1193 

("[T]he [STA] is not intended to track the Sixth Amendment. 

Within the set of cases covered, it establishes bright-line rules 

assuring minimum speed, while at the same time preserving defendants' Sixth Amendment claims in full.").

4 The appellants also claim that section 1916(a) deprives them of 

the constitutional safeguards associated with Article III supervision 

of federally-indicting grand juries. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) ("Article III, § 1, 

serves both to protect the role of the independent judiciary within 

the constitutional scheme of tripartite government, ... and to 

safeguard litigants' right to have claims decided before judges who 

are free from potential domination by other branches of government.... Although our cases have provided us with little occasion 

to discuss the nature or significance of the latter safeguard, our 

prior discussions of Article III, § 1's guarantee of an independent 

and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within 

the judicial power of the United States intimated that this guarantee serves to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, 

interests.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Peretz 

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v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 929 (1991) (noting that Gomez v. 

United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989), had construed statute to 

avoid "substantial question whether a defendant has a constitutional 

right to demand that an Article III judge preside at every critical 

stage of a felony trial"); but cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 

389, 400 (1973) (rejecting view "that criminal offenses under the 

laws passed by Congress may not be prosecuted except in courts 

established pursuant to Art. III [because] [i]n our view, ... there is 

no support for this view in either constitutional text or in constitutional history and practice"); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 382 

(1977) ("[T]he Constitution does not require that all persons 

charged with federal crimes be tried in Article III courts.").

To the extent this claim is distinguishable from the appellants' 

other claims, it implicates personal, not structural, constitutional 

rightsinsofar as such rights might exist in the grand jury context 

(about which we express no opinion here). Assuming the right 

exists and assuming it was violated as alleged, the appellants would 

not be entitled to a dismissal of the indictment unless the violation 

prejudiced them, which they do not contend and which the trial 

judge explicitly rejected. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United 

States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) ("We hold that as a general matter, 

a district court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand 

jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants."). 

While Bank of Nova Scotia involved violations of Fed. R. Crim. P. 

6(d) & (e), the decision plainly suggests that the analysis for 

constitutional errors is no different from that used to assess other 

types of errors. See id. at 256 ("It would be inappropriate to devise 

a rule permitting federal courts to deal more sternly with nonconstitutional errors than with constitutional errors."). Moreover, if the 

petit jury ultimately returns a guilty verdict, any error committed 

at the grand jury stage is (with exceptions not applicable here) nonprejudicial. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986) 

("But the petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict means not only that 

there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty 

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(1) Judicial Supervision of Grand Jury as 

"Judicial Power of United States"

The only reference to the grand jury in the Constitution is 

found in the first clause of the Fifth Amendment.5 The grand 

jury "has not been textually assigned, therefore, to any of the 

branches described in the first three Articles." United States 

v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).6 Accordingly, it has been 

described as "an institution separate from the courts, over 

whose functioning the courts do not preside." Id.; see also 

id. at 48 ("[I]n its day-to-day functioning, the grand jury 

generally operates without the interference of a presiding 

judge."); but cf. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 278 

(1919) ("At the foundation of our federal government the 

inquisitorial function of the grand jury and the compulsion of 

witnesses were recognized as incidents of the judicial power 

of the United States."); Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 

610, 617 (1960) ("The grand jury is an arm of the court and its 

in camera proceedings constitute a judicial inquiry.") (internal quotation omitted).

The independence of the grand jury reflects the protective 

role it plays in our system of criminal justice: "Historically, 

this body has been regarded as the primary security to the 

innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; 

it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing 

__________

as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury's verdict, then, any 

error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging 

decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.") (note omitted).

5 The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment recites:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 

Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 

or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 

danger;....

U.S. Const. Am. V, cl. 1.

6 The grand jury's lineage is outlined in Hurtado v. California,

110 U.S. 516 (1884), and dates back to at least 1164. Id. at 529.

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between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be 

an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether 

a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an 

intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will." Wood 

v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); accord Williams, 504 

U.S. at 47.7

The grand jury does depend on the judiciary in its role as 

an investigative body: "A grand jury is clothed with great 

independence in many areas, but it remains an appendage of 

the court, powerless to perform its investigative function 

without the court's aid, because powerless itself to compel the 

testimony of witnesses." Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 

41, 49 (1959), overruled on other ground by Harris v. United 

States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); accord United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n.4 (1974) ("[T]he grand jury must rely 

on the court to compel production of books, papers, documents, and the testimony of witnesses, and the court may 

quash or modify a subpoena on motion if compliance would be 

unreasonable or oppressive.") (internal quotation omitted). 

But even this dependence is limited as the grand jury must 

"remain 'free to pursue its investigations unhindered by 

external influence or supervision so long as it does not trench 

upon the legitimate rights of any witness called before it.' " 

Williams, 504 U.S. at 48-49 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973)) (emphasis added).

Moreover, an Article III judge's role in the grand jury's 

investigative process is often more attenuated as the respon-

__________

7 Under the Fifth Amendment, an indictment is not required to 

initiate prosecution of a state "capital[ ] or otherwise infamous 

crime." See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538. Although the District is 

treated like a state in many respectssee, e.g., Palmore, 411 U.S. 

at 397 (1973) (in District of Columbia "Congress may also exercise 

the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or 

municipal government would have in legislating for state or local 

purposes")the Supreme Court has held that the prosecution of a 

D.C. Code offense carrying the possibility of "infamous punishment" 

may not be commenced other than by grand jury indictment or 

presentment as required by the Fifth Amendment. See United 

States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).

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sibility for issuing subpoenas and for accepting returned 

indictments is vested in United States magistrate judges who 

are not Article III judges. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(a) 

(subpoenas "shall be issued by United States Magistrate 

Judge[s]"); Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(4) & 6(f) (indictment is to 

be returned to magistrate judge). Indeed, the significance 

attached to Article III supervision of a grand jury is so minor 

that the Supreme Court has held that the judge's absence 

from the federal judicial district in which the grand jury is 

sitting neither implicates constitutional rights of the defendant nor otherwise constitutes cognizable error. See Badders 

v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916). Therefore, "[g]iven the grand jury's operational separateness from its constituting court, it should come as no surprise that [the Supreme 

Court] ha[s] been reluctant to invoke the judicial supervisory 

power as a basis for prescribing modes of grand jury procedure." Williams, 504 U.S. at 49-50.

Accordingly, to the extent that the supervision of a federally competent grand jury implicates the Article III "judicial 

power of the United States," the power is a circumscribed one 

and is far removed from "the essential attributes of the 

judicial power" with which Article III is principally concerned. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). Moreover, section 1916(a) is applicable only to the "unique federal 

enclave," Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 

Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 75 (1982) (plurality op.) [hereinafter 

Northern Pipeline], that is the District of Columbia.

(2) Expanded Executive Branch Involvement with Grand 

Jury as Encroachment on Judicial Branch

Seals and Sweatt contend that section 1916(a), by substituting Article I for Article III supervision of a federallycompetent grand jury, unconstitutionally encroaches on the 

judicial branch. Their argument rests on the notion that a 

D.C. Superior Court judge, lacking life tenure and salary 

protections, is less able to curb federal prosecutorial abuses 

than his United States District Court counterpart. We think 

this notion is questionable at best. See Palmore v. United 

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States, 411 U.S. 389, 402 (1993) ("Nor, more particularly, has 

the enforcement of federal criminal law been deemed the 

exclusive province of federal Art. III courts. Very early in 

our history, Congress left the enforcement of selected federal 

criminal laws to state courts and to state court judges who 

did not enjoy the protections prescribed for federal judges in 

Art. III."); cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (Supremacy 

Clause required Rhode Island trial court to enforce non-penal 

provisions of federal penal price control statute). The delegation of certain Article III powers to United States magistrate 

judges, who are not Article III judges, has also been upheld. 

See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937 (1991) 

(structural constitutional protection not abrogated by allowing 

magistrate to conduct voir dire); United States v. Raddatz,

447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980) (delegation of suppression hearing to 

magistrate did not violate Article III or Due Process Clause 

so long as Article III court retained final authority). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a D.C. Superior Court 

judge is presumed competent to pass on federal constitutional 

questions that may arise in the course of a criminal trial. See 

Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 383 (1977) ("[T]he judges of 

the Superior Court of the District of Columbia must be 

presumed competent to decide all issues, including constitutional issues, that routinely arise in the trial of criminal 

cases.").8

__________

8 We do not here conclude that there are no constitutional limitations on the Congress's authority to delegate either grand jury 

supervisory functions or federal felony trial supervisory powers to 

state and Article I judges, as controlling precedent suggests that, in 

at least some instances, a non-consenting defendant may have a 

personal constitutional claim to adjudication by an Article III 

judge. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 n.25 (1989); 

Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936 ("[I]t is arguable that a defendant in a 

criminal trial has the right to demand the presence of an Article III 

judge at voir dire."). Even if a defendant has such a constitutional 

right to Article III adjudication, it is far from clear that he has a 

corresponding right to indictment under Article III supervision. 

Further, because the grand jury conducts its proceedings ex parte,

it would be difficult (if not impossible) to obtain the accused's 

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The appellants' challenge requires us to assess the "practical effect" of the alleged infringement of Article III power:

[I]n reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a 

number of factors, none of which has been deemed 

determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the 

congressional action will have on the constitutionally 

assigned role of the federal judiciary. ... Among the 

factors upon which we have focused are [1] the extent to 

which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are 

reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, [2] the 

extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the 

range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in 

Article III courts, [3] the origins and importance of the 

right to be adjudicated, and [4] the concerns that drove 

Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 

851 (1986) (emphasis added). Applying the Schor test here, 

we conclude that section 1916(a) does not abrogate Article III 

structural protections.9

First, as discussed earlier, the power to supervise a federally-competent grand jury cannot fairly be described as an 

"essential attribute" of the "judicial power of the United 

States." The limited authority a supervising judge wields, 

the independence of the grand jury from both the judicial and 

__________

mental and independent role of the grand jury in the investigative 

and indictment processsomething Williams plainly proscribes. 

See Williams, 504 U.S. at 52-55 (rejecting judicial rule requiring 

presentation of exculpatory evidence to grand jury because it would 

"alter the grand jury's historical role").

9 While Schor addressed the constitutionality of the Commodity 

Futures Trade Commission's power to decide a state-law counterclaim in an administrative reparation proceeding, there is no reason 

that the structural constitutional analysis should be any different in 

the criminal context. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 

361, 382-83 (1989) (citing Schor in describing separation of powers 

analysis to be applied in determining constitutionality of grant of 

authority to Sentencing Commission to set mandatory minimum 

punishments for criminal violations of U.S. Code).

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executive branches, as well as the fact that such supervisory 

responsibilities are often discharged by a magistrate judge 

(without requiring the accused's consent)all manifest that 

the supervisory power at issue is not an "essential attribute" 

of the "judicial power of the United States." See generally 

Williams, 504 U.S. at 47-55.

Second, even if supervision of a federally-competent grand 

jury qualified as an "essential attribute," section 1916(a) 

authorizes only a limited sharing of the supervisory power 

with an Article I court. An Article III judge continues to 

preside at the defendant's trial and retains his authority to 

dismiss an indictment. Cf. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United 

States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) ("We hold that, as a general 

matter, a district court may not dismiss an indictment for 

errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants."); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 

667, 683 (1980) (delegation of authority to conduct suppression hearing to magistrate judge "does not violate Article III 

so long as the ultimate [suppression] decision is made by the 

district court").

Third, while indictment or presentment by a grand jury is a 

right secured to felony defendants by the Fifth Amendment, 

the history and origins of the grand jury suggest that any 

constitutional right to have it supervised by an Article III 

judge is of much more recent vintage:

The grand jury is an English institution, brought to this 

country by the early colonists and incorporated into the 

Constitution by the Founders. There is every reason to 

believe that our constitutional grand jury was intended to 

operate substantially like its English progenitor. The 

basic purpose of the English grand jury was to provide a 

fair method for instituting criminal proceedings against 

persons believed to have committed crimes. Grand jurors were selected from the body of the people and their 

work was not hampered by rigid procedural or evidential 

rules. In fact, grand jurors could act on their own 

knowledge and were free to make their presentments or 

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tory. Despite its broad power to institute criminal proceedings the grand jury grew in popular favor with the 

years. It acquired an independence in England free 

from control by the Crown or judges.

Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (emphasis 

added); accord Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 

(1884) ("When we add to this that the primitive grand jury 

heard no witnesses in support of the truth of the charges to 

be preferred, but presented upon common fame and general 

suspicion, we shall be ready to acknowledge that it is better 

not to go too far back into antiquity for the best securities for 

our 'ancient liberties.' "). Thus, the grand jury's reliance on a 

judge for subpoenas, immunity orders and the like is a 

relatively recent development in the history of the institution, 

resulting, no doubt, from proscribing the jurors' reliance on 

personal knowledge of events in the vicinage to form their 

opinions. Cf. Edward J. Finley II, Note, Ignorance as Bliss? 

The Historical Development of an American Rule on Juror 

Knowledge, 1990 U. Chi. Legal F. 457, 468 (jurors' use of 

personal knowledge not prohibited by many states until end 

of nineteenth century); see also Badders, 240 U.S. at 394-95 

(1916) (finding no error, constitutional or otherwise, in district 

judge's absence from District during grand jury deliberation).

Fourth, section 1916(a) promotes efficiency resulting from 

the identity (both in composition and function) of the D.C. 

Superior Court grand jury and the federal grand jury:

[G]rand jurors for both the District Court and the Superior Court are selected from the same pool of names, by 

the same jury commissioners, by use of the Superior 

Court computer, and pursuant to an identical method. 

Moreover the grand jurors in the two courts have identical qualifications and it is only by chance that a person 

may be selected to serve on one grand jury rather than 

the other. The grand jury procedure is virtually identical in both.

United States v. Hackney, 389 A.2d 1336, 1340 (D.C. 1978), 

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). In addition, the provision 

immediately following section 1916 directs:

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To the extent feasible, the Superior Court and the United States District Court shall consider the respective 

needs of each court in the qualification, selection, and 

service of jurors. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent such courts from entering into any 

agreement for sharing of resources and facilities (including automated data processing and hardware and software, forms, postage, and other resources).

D.C. Code Ann. § 11-1917 (1981 & Supp. 1995). Given the 

limited pool of potential jurors available to serve both the 

D.C. Superior Court and the United States District Court, it 

is hardly surprising that the Congress should vest a grand 

jury empaneled by either court with authority to return an 

indictment in the other or that judicial supervisory authority 

should be shared by the courts. See Atkinson v. United 

States, 295 A.2d 899, 901-02 (D.C. 1972) (observing that as of 

February 1971, grand jury sitting in one court could return 

indictment to other court). While the grand jury arrangement in the District of Columbia may be unique, "[o]ur 

constitutional principles of separated powers are not violated 

... by mere anomaly or innovation." Mistretta v. United 

States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1988).

The two cases Seals and Sweatt rely on do not suggest a 

different conclusion. They first cite O'Donoghue v. United 

States, 289 U.S. 516 (1932), in which the Supreme Court 

upheld the classification of District of Columbia courts as 

Article III courts because (1) the Congress did not expressly 

denominate them Article I tribunals, (2) the Congress consistently treated them like other Article III courts, (3) it vested 

them with broad powers to determine matters under national 

laws and (4) they were the only courts to which District of 

Columbia residents could turn to protect their federal statutory rights. See 289 U.S. at 534-35, 544-49; cf. Palmore, 411 

U.S. at 405-07 (O'Donoghue "[r]el[ied] heavily on congressional intent" to uphold D.C. courts as Article III courts). 

Some forty-one years later, after the Congress established 

separate Article I and Article III courts in the District of 

Columbia, the Supreme Court held that Article III did not 

prohibit the Congress from authorizing D.C. Superior Court 

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judges to hear federal criminal cases brought under corresponding provisions of the D.C. Code. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 

389. Accordingly, O'Donoghue offers the appellants no support for their challenge.

Second, the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline does not 

support the appellants.10 In that opinion, Justice Brennan 

likened the Congress's plenary Article I authority over the 

District of Columbia to its authority over territorial matters 

pursuant to Article IV and, with three other justices, held 

that, with respect to such enclaves, "the general principle of 

independent adjudication commanded by Art. III does not 

apply." 458 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added).

(3) Other Considerations

The line of cases confirming the Congress's plenary authority over the District of Columbia pursuant to Article I, § 8, cl. 

17, further fortifies our holding today.11 In particular, Palmore recognizes that "[i]t is apparent that the power of 

Congress under Clause 17 permits it to legislate for the 

District in a manner with respect to subjects that would 

exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the 

context of national legislation enacted under other powers 

__________

10 The precedential value of Northern Pipeline, which did not 

produce a majority opinion, has been subsequently weakened. See 

Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 

(1985) ("The Court's holding in [Northern Pipeline] establishes only 

that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to 

adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a 

traditional contract action arising under state law, without the 

consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate 

review.") (emphasis added); cf. Fields v. Washington Metro. Area 

Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 894 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

11 Article I, § 8, cl. 17, in relevant part provides:

[The Congress shall have Power] To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, 

and the Acceptance of the Congress, become the Seat of the 

Government of the United States....

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delegated to it under Art I...." 411 U.S. at 397-98. Subsequently, the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline went even 

further in describing the extent of the Congress's plenary 

authority under Article I, § 8, cl. 17: "Congress' power over 

the District of Columbia encompasses the full authority of the 

government, and thus, necessarily, the Executive and Judicial powers as well as the Legislative." 458 U.S. at 76.

Moreover, we cannot find in the Fifth Amendment any 

basis for concern regarding the assignment of the grand jury 

supervisory function to a non-Article III judge. Instead, we 

conclude that if a D.C. Superior Court judge is competent, 

despite lacking life tenure and salary protections, to adjudicate a constitutional right as fundamental as that guaranteed 

by the writ of habeas corpussee Swain, 430 U.S. at 383we 

see no reason that the same judge cannot likewise protect 

whatever Fifth Amendment right the appellants might have 

to indictment by a federally-competent grand jury supervised 

by an impartial and independent judge.

C. Sweatt's Kidnapping Conviction

The federal kidnapping statute, in relevant part, provides:

Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, 

kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom 

or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of 

a minor by the parent thereof, when

(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or 

foreign commerce;

(2) any such act against the person is done within the 

special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 

United States;

(3) any such act against the person is done within the 

special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States as 

defined in section 46501 of title 49;

(4) the person is a foreign official, an internationally 

protected person, or an official guest as those terms 

are defined in section 1116(b) of this title; or

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(5) the person is among those officers and employees 

designated in section 1114 of this title and any such act 

against the person is done while the person is engaged 

in, or on account of, the performance of official duties;

shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years 

or for life and, if the death of any person results, shall be 

punished by death or life imprisonment.

18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (emphasis added). Sweatt contends that 

the word "when" as used in section 1201(a) means that the 

kidnapping ended after the victim was transported across 

state lines and before he became involved in holding the 

victim and retrieving the ransom.12 He therefore reasons 

that he cannot be held criminally liable as a principal, aider 

and abettor or Pinkerton co-conspirator under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1201(a). He is mistaken.

Sweatt's crabbed reading of section 1201(a) is contrary to 

the "natural meaning" of the term "when." See United 

States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 927 (1997) ("the first criterion 

in the interpretive hierarchy, a natural reading of the full 

text") (citing United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc.,

310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940)). The term "when" is used in 

section 1201(a) not in its temporal sensei.e., "at the time 

that"but rather in its categorical sensei.e., "in cases 

where." This is evident from the syntax and structure of the 

provision: the list of factors immediately following "when" 

describes activities the provision intends to forbid, not their 

chronology. Moreover, if "when" had the meaning Sweatt 

ascribes to it, the word "while" in subsection (5) of section 

1201(a) would be superfluousagain, a disfavored construction. See Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) 

(courts should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and 

word of a statute"); cf. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 

__________

12 According to the Government's evidence, Sweatt assisted in 

holding the victim in Maryland while the ransom demand was made 

and he and Seals traveled to the District of Columbia to pick up the 

ransom. See Trial Tr. 612-14, 619-20, 709-10, 1156, 1171. There 

was also evidence that a telephone call was placed to Sweatt shortly 

after the victim was abducted. Id. at 713-16.

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111 (1990) (declining to read provision narrowly so as to "limit 

it to instances of fraud rather than the class of fraud

encompassed by its language") (emphasis added); Bell v. 

United States, 462 U.S. 356, 362 (1983) ("[F]ederal criminal 

statutes that are intended to fill a void in local law enforcement should be construed broadly.").

Other courts have held that, even though a violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1201(a) occurs when all of the essential elements of 

the offense have been satisfied, the crime of kidnapping 

continues while the victim remains held and a ransom sought. 

See United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1018 (10th 

Cir. 1993) ("The broad language of § 1201(a) defines a continuing offense."); cf. United States v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340, 

344 (9th Cir. 1988) (federal kidnapping is continuing offense 

and therefore statute of limitations does not begin with 

transport of victim across state lines), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 

1094 (1989); cf. also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 

391, 403 (1957) ("Kidnapers in hiding, waiting for ransom, 

commit acts of concealment in furtherance of the objectives of 

the conspiracy itself, just as repainting a stolen car would be 

in furtherance of a conspiracy to steal; in both cases the 

successful accomplishment of the crime necessitates concealment.") (note omitted); see also McElroy v. United States,

455 U.S. 642, 654-56 (1982) (rejecting, as contrary to statute's 

purpose of aiding in apprehension of criminals who misuse 

channels of interstate commerce, argument that federal forgery conviction must be overturned because prosecutor had 

failed to establish instrument was forged before transport 

across state lines); United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 

1467 (10th Cir.) (in enacting section 1201(a) "Congress was 

attempting to address the misuse of interstate commerce by 

kidnappers to frustrate the efforts of state police"), cert. 

denied, 510 U.S. 878 (1993). Accordingly, there was sufficient 

evidence to convict Sweatt as at least an aider and abettor

which is all that is required to sustain his conviction. See 

Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49 (1991) ("[A] general 

jury verdict [is] valid so long as it [is] legally supportable on 

one of the submitted grounds....").

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Nor do the cases Sweatt cites compel a different conclusion. 

The cases hold only that unlawful abduction and transport 

across state lines is sufficient to violate section 1201(a); they 

do not hold, nor does it follow from their holdings, that the 

kidnapping concludes once the abduction and transport occur. 

See, e.g., United States v. Broadwell, 870 F.2d 594, 601 & n.16 

(11th Cir.) (holding that unlawful restraint began when victim 

was abducted and "continued" after he was transported 

across state lines even though crime "complete" upon transport), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 840 (1989). Accordingly, we 

uphold Sweatt's conviction on the kidnapping charge.13

D. Sweatt as "Career Offender" Under Section 4B1.1

We held in United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 

1993), that "the Sentencing Commission adopted §§ 4B1.1 & 

4B1.2 solely in an effort to fulfill the mandate of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 994(h)" and therefore only those offenses specified in section 994(h) can render the defendant a "career offender." 990 

F.2d at 1368. Because aiding and abetting, conspiring and 

attempting to commit certain narcotics offenses are not 

among those offenses listed in section 994(h), we held that the 

defendant could not be sentenced as a career offender on the 

basis of prior convictions of those offenses. Id. Price concluded that Application Note 1 to section 4B1.2 of the Guide-

__________

13 We express no opinion regarding the Government's and 

Sweatt's opposing arguments as to his culpability on a Pinkerton

theory. We also note that although the trial court's charge, in 

describing the elements of kidnapping required to convict Seals and 

Sweatt as principals, declared that Sweatt could not be convicted 

unless he was shown to have participated in the abduction or 

transport of the victim across state lines (Trial Tr. 1926), the aiding 

and abetting charge (id. at 1917-19) contained no such limitation 

and could have been used by a reasonable jury to convict Sweatt of 

kidnapping. See Griffin, 502 U.S. at 49. In any event, although we 

need not reach the issue today, we doubt that a criminal defendant 

can obtain reversal of his conviction solely on the basis of instructions that create erroneous and unnecessary impediments to conviction. See United States v. Bomski, 125 F.3d 1115, 1116 (7th Cir. 

1997).

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lines was invalid to the extent it suggested that convictions of 

certain inchoate offenses counted in treating the defendant as 

a career offender. Id. We held open the question, however, 

whether the Sentencing Commission could repromulgate Application Note 1 pursuant to statutory authority other than 

section 994(h), including its discretionary authority under 

section 994(a). See id. at 1370 ("Thus, without passing on the 

Commission's authority to re-adopt Application Note 1 to 

§ 4B1.2 (or some variation of Note 1) on alternative grounds, 

we vacate the sentence and remand the case to the district 

court for resentencing.").

The Commission responded by amending and repromulgating the Background Commentary to section 4B1.1 of the 

Guidelines. The repromulgated version clarified that, pursuant to the Commission's general statutory authority, 28 

U.S.C. § 994(a)-(f), and its amendment authority, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 994(o)-(p), prior convictions that can count toward career 

offender status include convictions of attempts, aiding and 

abetting and other inchoate offenses. See 1995 Guidelines 

Manual, App. C, Am. 528 at 434-35. The repromulgated 

Background Commentary to section 4B1.1 became effective 

on November 1, 1995.

Sweatt argues that in light of Price, the district court 

improperly sentenced him as a career offender under the 

repromulgated version of section 4B1.1 because his 1987 

conviction of attempted distribution of heroin could not be 

used under the November 1994 version of section 4B1.1the 

version in effect when he committed the crimes.14 By retroactively applying the November 1995 version of section 4B1.1, 

he reasons, the trial court imposed a greater punishment than 

it could have imposed under the law as it existed when the 

crimes were committed, violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

See, e.g., United States v. Stover, 93 F.3d 1379, 1386 (8th Cir. 

1996); United States v. Smallwood, 35 F.3d 414, 417-18 n.18 

(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1515 

(10th Cir. 1991).

__________

14 Sweatt does not dispute that his 1987 robbery conviction was 

properly counted as a prior conviction under section 4B1.1.

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The Government essentially concedes that Sweatt's reading 

of Price is correct but it contends that we should overrule 

Price. See Appellee Br. at 43. Nevertheless, the law is well 

settled that one panel may not "overrule the decision of 

another panel of this court." United States v. Doe, 730 F.2d 

1529, 1531 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Accordingly, we vacate 

Sweatt's sentence as a career offender pursuant to section 

4B1.1 of the Guidelines and remand to the district court for 

resentencing. See supra note 1.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellants' convictions. We vacate appellant Sweatt's sentence as a career 

offender and remand for resentencing in accordance with the 

terms of this opinion.

So ordered.

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