Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02642/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02642-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Guaranteed Rate, Inc.
Defendant
Chun Ping Turng
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHUN PING TURNG,

Plaintiff,

v.

GUARANTEED RATE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-02642-EMC 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Docket No. 38

On January 17, 2019, the Court granted a motion to compel arbitration in this matter. In 

the Court’s order, it held that the arbitration clause at issue had a small degree of procedural 

unconscionability related to the adhesive nature of the employment contract. The Court also held 

that the contract had three substantively unconscionable provisions: the choice of law provision, 

the exemption to arbitration for all claims for equitable or injunctive relief, and the exemption for 

all claims (legal or equitable) arising from a non-solicitation violation. The Court found that 

severing these three provisions was appropriate to maintain the contracting parties’ intention to 

arbitrate. Plaintiff Turng now seeks leave from the Court to file a motion for reconsideration. For 

the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES Turng’s motion. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Local Rule 7-9 requires that a party must seek leave from the Court to file a motion for 

reconsideration. N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). To prevail, a party “must specifically show reasonable 

diligence in bringing the motion” and establish one of the following: 

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference 

in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the 

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Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which 

reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in 

the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for 

reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of 

the interlocutory order; or

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law 

occurring after the time of such order; or

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or 

dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the 

Court before such interlocutory order.

N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). 

Turng argues that the Court failed to consider material facts and dispositive legal 

arguments. 

A. Section V(e)

The Court did not fail to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments. To the 

extent it did not make its position clear enough to Turng, the Court clarifies its holding with 

respect to Section V(e). 

Turng challenges the mutuality of Section V(e). She argues this provision is a judicial 

carve out for “all the types of claims that a Defendant could conceivably bring against an 

employee.” Mot. at 1 n. 2. The relevant provision states: 

V. YOUR CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATIONS; NONSOLICITATION . . . 

(e) Enforcement; Remedies 

You covenant, agree and recognize that because the breach or 

threatened breach of the covenants, or any of them, contained in 

Section V hereof will result in immediate and irreparable injury to 

the Company, the Company shall be entitled to an injunction 

restraining you from any violation of the covenants and agreements 

contained in this Section V to the fullest extent allowed by law. 

Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting the Company, and 

its respective successors and assigns, from pursuing all legal or 

equitable remedies that may be available to them for any such 

breach, including the recovery of damages from you. 

Docket No. 18-2 at 11. This is not an explicit exemption from arbitration. Arbitrators can issue 

injunctive relief, and Section V authorizes such relief. Further, the language of Section V 

contrasts with explicit exemptions from arbitration under Section VII of the agreement. Although, 

as this Court held in its prior order, Section VII is substantively unconscionable, that 

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unconscionability stems from the non-mutuality created by Section VII, not Section V(e). Hence,

Section V(e), itself, is not substantively unconscionable. 

B. Inability to Sever

1. Severing Multiple Provisions

Turng repeats the same argument in its original motion that the Court cannot sever 

multiple unconscionable provisions. The Court considered and rejected this argument. Local 

Rule 7-9(c) prohibits repeating the same argument. N.D. Cal. L.R. 7-9(c). Nevertheless, she

argues that the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Ramos v. Superior Court stands for the 

proposition that “severance of multiple unconscionable provisions contained in an Arbitration 

Agreement was not permissible . . . .” Mot. at 1. This is not a new intervening case. In any event, 

Turng mischaracterizes Ramos. See Ramos v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 5th 1042, 1069 n. 14 

(Ct. App. 2018), as modified (Nov. 28, 2018), review denied (Feb. 13, 2019) (finding that “The 

fact that the arbitration agreement contains four unlawful provisions also weighs against 

severance” but not recognizing a per se rule that courts may not sever a multiple unconscionable 

provisions.). Further, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the argument that more than one 

unconscionable provision renders an arbitration agreement per se unseverable. See Poublon v. 

C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1273 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Poublon argues that an agreement is 

necessarily permeated by unconscionability if more than one clause in the agreement is 

unconscionable or illegal. We disagree; California courts have not adopted such a per se rule.”). 

For these reasons, the Court rejects this argument. 

2. Severing Non-Mutual Provisions

Turng also contends that the Court erred by severing the non-mutual provisions in the 

arbitration clause. Turng previously advanced this argument, and the Court considered and 

rejected her argument. This is not a proper basis for reconsideration. In any event, this position is 

inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit case law which has recognized that courts may sever judicial 

carve-outs. See Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1273 (finding it appropriate to sever a non-mutual provision 

because the “provision can be extirpated without affecting the remainder of the paragraph and is 

‘collateral to the main purpose of the contract,’ which is to require arbitration of disputes.”). For 

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this reason, the Court finds that Turng is not entitled to reconsideration on this basis. 

C. Bad Faith

Turng also makes the argument that the Court failed to engage in a bad faith analysis with 

respect to its decision to sever the unconscionable provisions. Mot. at 16–18. Turng did not 

previously present this argument in its opposition. A motion for reconsideration is not the place 

for new arguments not previously raised in the original briefing. See Whalen v. Ford Motor Co., 

No. 13-CV-03072-EMC, 2018 WL 6069812, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018) (citing Northwest 

Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925–26 (9th Cir. 1988)). Further, she 

has failed to show that either “at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or 

law exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for 

which reconsideration is sought” or “[t]he emergence of new material facts or a change of law 

occurring after the time of such order” warrant that the Court reconsider is prior decision. N.D. 

Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). For this reason, the Court finds Turng is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

II. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES Turng’s request for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. This 

order disposes of Docket No. 38. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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