Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06379/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06379-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Harold Carr
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

Uoitecl States Court of Appeals 

PUBLISH Tenth Cirruit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUl 2 51991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-6379 

HAROLD CARR, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-90-158-P) 

Howard R. Haralson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

appellant. attorney for 

M. Jay Farber, Assistant United States Attorney (Timothy D. 

Leonard, United States Attorney with him on the brief), Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, attorney for appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-6379 Document: 01019295247 Date Filed: 07/25/1991 Page: 1 
Harold Carr (Carr) appeals from his conviction and sentence 

following his conditional plea of guilty entered pursuant to Rule 

11 (a)(2), Fed. R. Crim. P., 18 u.s.c., to Count III of a threecount indictment charging him with possession with intent to 

distribute a quantity of phencyclidine (PCP), a Schedule III 

controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l). Carr 

was sentenced to fifty-nine (59) months imprisonment, two (2) 

years of supervised release and a special assessment of $50.00. 

Carr's conditional plea of guilty was and is dependent upon 

the validity of his Motion to Suppress all evidence obtained by 

federal agents during the early morning of July 4, 1990, from Room 

230 of the Crosswinds Inn at 1224 South Meridian, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on 

the motion and thereafter entered an order denying same. (R., 

Vol. I, Tab 26). The court found that Carr had no standing to 

contest the search in question and that the government had 

sustained its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

warrantless search conducted of Room 230 was justified, relying, 

in part, on United States v. Acquino, 836 F.2d 1268 (lOth Cir. 

1988). Id. The district court incorporated, by reference, all 

findings and conclusions announced at the evidentiary hearing. 

Id. 

The district court proceeded pursuant to Rule 12, Fed. R. 

Crim. P., 18 U.S.C. to hear and decide Carr's Motion to Suppress. 

In United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 375 (lOth Cir. 1985), we 

set forth the standard of appellate review of a district court 

denial of a motion to suppress: 

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[W]e must accept the trial court's findings of fact 

unless they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. 

Leach, 749 F.2d 592, 600 (lOth Cir. 1984); United States 

v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1344 (lOth Cir. 1979). 

Furthermore, we must consider 'the evidence adduced at 

the suppression hearing in the light most 

favorable to the government.' United States v. Leach, 

749 F.2d at 600 (quoting United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 

at 1344); see also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 

1371, 1376 (lOth Cir. 1984); United States v. Di 

Giacomo, 579 F.2d 1211, 1216 (lOth Cir. 1978). 

With respect to the trial court's conclusions of law, we have 

held that "the court's decision should identify the law upon which 

it relied and state the basis for its conclusion." Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health Centers v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (lOth 

Cir. 1988). We review questions of law de novo. Dixon v. Richer, 

922 F.2d 1456, 1460 (lOth Cir. 1991); Pueblo, supra; Osgood v. 

State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 

1988). The question of whether a search and seizure was 

reasonable is a question of law. United States v. McKinnell, 888 

F.2d 669, 672 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

On appeal, Carr contends that the district court erred in (1) 

concluding that he did not have standing to challenge the illegal 

search of his motel room, (2) finding that the exigent 

circumstances were caused by him (Carr) and not by the police, and 

(3) concluding that the warrantless search of his motel room was 

justified based upon the totality of the circumstances. 

I. 

We shall first consider Carr's contention that the district 

court erred as a matter of law in concluding that he did not have 

standing to object to the allegedly illegal s~arch of his motel 

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room. The facts are not in dispute because Carr did not offer any 

evidence relative to this issue. Thus, our review is de novo. 

United States v. Rascon, 922 F.2d 584 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, U.S. ___ (1991). 

In moving to suppress evidence, it is the duty of the moving 

party to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he/she was 

personally aggrieved by the alleged search and seizure because it 

invaded his/her subjective expectation of privacy which society is 

prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id. at 586. "It is 

immaterial if evidence sought to be introduced against a defendant 

was obtained in violation of someone else's Fourth Amendment 

rights." Id., quoting United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 

(lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1991). 

At no time during the course of the trial court's hearings on 

the Motion to Suppress conducted on September 7, 10 and 11, 1990, 

did the defendant Carr offer any evidence, (R., Vol. II, p. 33), 

notwithstanding his obligation to establish a subjective 

expectation of privacy in the room searched. Smith v. Maryland, 

442 u.s. 735, 740 (1979). During the September 11, 1990, 

hearing, the following colloquy occurred: 

THE COURT: Counsel, before I rule I want to 

address one issue that was raised in the briefs which we 

didn't discuss yesterday and that is the issue of 

standing. What's your position, Mr. Haralson [counsel 

for defendant Carr] with respect to the standing issue? 

MR. HARALSON: 

to object to this. 

He was there. You 

you don't register 

hotel. 

THE COURT: 

record show with 

Our position is that he has standing 

He was a resident of the hotel room. 

only register the name of one person; 

the name of all the occupants in the 

All right. 

respect to 

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What does th~ evidentiary 

the registration? The 

Appellate Case: 90-6379 Document: 01019295247 Date Filed: 07/25/1991 Page: 4 
government says it's registered in the name of another 

individual. I assume that is somewhere in the 

affidavits or in the reports. 

MR. HARALSON: I believe it is. 

THE COURT: Is there any reference at all with 

respect to a nexus between your client and that hotel 

room prior to the entry into the hotel room? In other 

words, if I were to read these affidavits with a finetooth comb again, would I see anything in terms of 

knowledge about your client that the officers had prior 

to entering that hotel room? 

MR. HARALSON: I don't believe so. 

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Farber, [the 

prosecutor], your position with respect to standing. 

MR. FARBER: Your Honor, in the defendant's brief 

or otherwise, the defendant has never asserted any 

standing to my knowledge. Again, the court has pointed 

out that the registration was not to him. There is no 

nexus. That all he was was there. I don't believe that 

that raises sufficient standing to warrant him having 

standing to assert any violation of his constitutional 

rights. 

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to deny the 

motion to suppress the court further finds in 

this matter that the defendant has no standing to assert 

any potential fourth amendment violation. The decisions 

of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rakas v. 

Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 and United States v. Salvucci, 

100 s. Ct. 2547 made clear that the burden is upon the 

defendant, not the government, to establish standing in 

the form of a reasonable expectation of privacy with 

regard to the search of the motel room. There was nQ 

evidence offered Qy the defendant on this point. There 

was no affidavits or testimony with respect to the issue 

of standing. Further the only evidence presented to the 

court, specifically the reports before the court 

accompanying the affidavits and accompanying the various 

motions revealed that the motel room had been rented by 

a third party individual not presented during the course 

of these events, and, in my view, the defendant has not 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that he 

has standing, a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 

search of the hotel room. (Emphasis supplied). 

(R., Vol. II, pp. 42-3, 57-8). 

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After the district court ruled on the defendant's motion to 

suppress, counsel for Carr stated that he (counsel) had 

misunderstood his burden of proof relative to the issue of 

standing and, while recognizing that the court had made 

"sufficient findings and sufficient rulings," he asked the court 

to accept an affidavit of his client taken by the government at 

the time of his arrest as a supplement to the record. Counsel 

stated, however, that he was "not asking the court to take and 

reopen this whole matter. " (R., Vol. II, p. 56). The court 

directed that the affidavit be handed to the clerk and marked as a 

rejected exhibit. Id. 

The rejected exhibit contains Carr's statement that he had 

left Los Angeles, California, about three weeks before the arrest 

by bus for Oklahoma City and that since then "I have been staying 

at the Crosswinds Motel, Room 230, on South Meridian, Oklahoma 

City, Okla " (R., Vol. I, Tab 25). The exhibit further 

contains Carr's statement that he went to the Crosswinds with 

Eddin Price, Jr., who was jointly indicted with Carr, and that 

they stayed there until their arrest. Id. 

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in refusing to accept the preferred affidavit following the 

suppression hearings and the court's findings/conclusions thereon. 

The standing issue was clearly raised by the government. At no 

time during the suppression hearings did the defendant Carr 

address the issue. It was only after the district court denied 

the motion to suppress that counsel for Carr presented the 

affidavit as a "supplement to the record.", We reject Carr's 

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argument that "the inadvertence of defendant's counsel to not 

timely present to the court based upon a misunderstanding of the 

burden of proof should not be held against this defendant and 

accordingly should be considered and thereby allowing the 

defendant the requisite standing to object to the illegal search 

and seizure." (Brief of Appellant, p. 12). 

The affidavit of Special Projects-Narcotics Division Agent 

Jim Hughes, admitted in evidence during the suppression hearing, 

states, in part, that "[o]n July 4, 1990, Kevin Waters, Special 

Agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, informed me that 

evening that Room 230, Crosswinds Inn, 1224 s. Meridian, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, was registered to a female not located in the 

room." (R., Supplemental Vol. I, Exhibit 1, p. 3). The affidavit 

of Special Agent Kevin D. Waters, admitted in evidence during the 

suppression hearing, did not in anywise contain any information 

relative to Carr's basis for occupancy of Room 230 at the 

Crosswinds Inn. 

In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128 (1978), the Supreme Court 

reaffirmed the rule of standing in Fourth Amendment cases stated 

in Alderman v. United States, 394 u.s. 165, 174 (1969) that 

"Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some 

other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted," and 

that "a person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure 

only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a 

search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of 

his Fourth Amendment rights infringed." 439 u.s. at 134. 

Furthermore, a court must consider all of the facts and 

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circumstances of the case in determining whether a defendant's 

subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate. United States v. 

Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-93 (1980). 

Significant to the case at bar, the majority in Rakas v. 

Illinois, supra, abandoned the "legitimately on the premises" 

measure of Fourth Amendment rights for the rule that "[c]apacity 

to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a 

property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person 

who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the invaded place." 439 u.s. at 143. In 

Rakas, the petitioners did not assert a property or a possessory 

interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized 

from the glove compartment of the vehicle. However, because they 

were "legitimately on the premises" of the automobile in that they 

were in the car with the permission of the owner, they asserted 

"standing" to raise Fourth Amendment protections. The majority 

rejected this contention and stated: 

But here petitioners' claim is one which would fail 

even in an analogous situation in a dwelling place, 

since they made no showing that they had any legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area 

under the seat of the car in which they were merely 

passengers. 

439 u.s. at 148. 

Thus, even if the rejected affidavit of Carr were to be 

considered, it would demonstrate only that he and co-defendant 

Eddin Price, Jr. had occupied Room 230 at the Crosswinds Inn for 

about three weeks prior to the alleged illegal search and seizure. 

That in itself would not constitute a showi~g of a legitimate 

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expectation of privacy inasmuch as Carr did not in anywise 

demonstrate that the room was registered to him or to Price or 

that he was sharing it with someone to whom the room was 

registered. Important considerations in the expectation of 

privacy equation include ownership, lawful possession or lawful 

control of the premises searched. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 

U.S. at 143 n. 12. It is to be recalled that Agent Jim Hughes' 

affidavit related information that Room 230 of the Crosswinds Inn 

had been registered to a female who had not been "located in the 

room." Carr does not explain why he did not testify personally at 

the suppression hearing especially when that testimony could not 

have been used against him at trial. Simmons v. United States, 

390 u.s. 377, 394 (1968). 

In Minnesota v. Olson, u.s. ___ , 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. 

Ed.2d 85, 58 U.S.L.W. 4464 (1990), the Supreme Court held that a 

place need not be one's "home" in order for one to have a 

legitimate expectation of privacy. In Olson, the Court recognized 

that one who was an overnight guest in the house could treat that 

house as his "home" for Fourth Amendment privacy purposes and 

could successfully challenge the legality of his warrantless 

arrest there. The Court held that an overnight guest in a hotel 

room or in the home of a friend has a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the premises. It is important to observe, however, 

that in Olson the defendant established his status as an overnight 

guest, whereas in the instant case Carr did not present any 

evidence of his expectation of privacy. In all cases, the burden 

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of proof lies with the proponent of a motion to suppress. Rakas 

v. Illinois, supra, at 130 n.l. 

We affirm the district court's order denying Carr's Motion to 

Suppress on the ground that Carr failed to sustain his burden of 

proof that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Room 230 

when the search and seizure occurred on July 4, 1990. 

II. 

Carr contends that the district court erred in (a) finding 

that the exigent circumstances were caused by him and not the 

police, and (b) finding/concluding that the warrantless search of 

Room 230 was justified based upon the totality of the 

circumstances. The government restates the issues into one: 

"[W]hether the district court erred in its determination that 

police officers were justified in entering a motel room due to the 

exigent circumstances created by the defendant and his 

accomplice." (Brief of Appellee, p. 2). We address the issue as 

posed by the government. In doing so, we elect, just as did the 

district court, to address this issue notwithstanding our holding 

that the district court did not err in finding/concluding that 

Carr has no standing to contest the search in question. 

A statement of the relevant facts is as follows. On July 3, 

1990, pursuant to the drug investigation involving members of the 

Oklahoma City Police Department's Narcotics Division and agents of 

the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a confidential 

informant met with a Marvin Brown who was going ,to purchase about 

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a kilogram of cocaine. The informant and Brown were surveilled 

driving to the Crosswinds Inn Motel in Oklahoma city, where Brown 

entered Room 230. After Brown returned to the car where the 

informant remained, the informant, who was wired with a body 

transmitter, told the officers that Brown had shown him about a 

kilogram of cocaine and that Brown had in his possession a .25 

caliber pistol. Shortly thereafter, Brown left the motel area 

with the informant and was stopped and arrested. The informant 

then advised the officers that Brown had informed him that he had 

sampled some of the cocaine while in the motel room, was not 

satisfied with its quality, and had returned it to the individuals 

in the motel room. Brown also told the informant that there was 

an additional kilogram of cocaine in the motel room. 

At or about 2:15 a.m. on July 4, 1990 which was 

approximately one-half hour after Brown had been arrested -

officers approached Room 230 of the Crosswinds Inn Motel. 

Officer Kevin Waters testified that the officers had 

approached the door to Room 230 with the intent of interviewing 

the occupants (R., Vol. II, p. 12). Officer James Hughes 

testified that following Brown's arrest, the officers discussed 

their options and decided to speak with the occupants of Room 230 

in the hope that the occupants would consent to a search of the 

motel room. Id. at 28-29. He acknowledged, when questioned by 

the court, that the officers had obtained a passkey to Room 230 

from the motel manager which they planned to use to gain entry in 

order to detain the occupants if the occupants should refuse 

permission to search the motel room. Id. at 30. Officer Hughes 

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stated that had this occurred, the officers would have undertaken 

a protective sweep of the motel room area and the occupants would 

have been detained until a search warrant could be obtained. Id 

at 31. 

Officer Hughes knocked on the door of Room 230. He and the 

other officers accompanying him were dressed in plain clothes. No 

firearms were displayed when co-defendant Price pulled back the 

window curtain. He saw Officer Hughes and opened the door some six 

or eight inches. Officer Hughes then prepared to identify himself 

as a police officer and detected a strong odor of phencyclidine 

(PCP) emanating from the motel room. Hughes was familiar with the 

odor of PCP based upon prior experiences as a police officer. 

Before Officer Hughes had an opportunity to identify himself, 

Price slammed the door shut, locked it, and shouted to another 

individual inside the motel room that the police were outside the 

door. Officer Hughes heard a lot of commotion, shuffling and 

movement inside the motel room and was fearful that contraband was 

being destroyed. He testified that his past experiences and 

training as a police officer led him to believe that the occupants 

of the motel room were drug traffickers who were then attempting 

to destroy or otherwise dispose of narcotics. 

Officer Hughes identified himself as a police officer and 

advised the occupants of Room 230 to open the door. When there 

was no compliance, Hughes first attempted to gain access by use of 

the passkey. Failing to gain entry by use of the pass key, 

Officer Hughes forced the door open. As he entered the room, he 

heard the toilet flushing. Officer Williams apprehended Carr in 

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the bathroom pouring a bottle of PCP into the toilet. The room 

and the two suspects were secured at that time. No search of the 

room was conducted until a search warrant was obtained about two 

hours later. A search of the room following the issuance of the 

search warrant revealed two packages of what was believed to be 

cocaine and a quantity of PCP retrieved from the toilet. 

The district court opined that the officers could have 

obtained a search warrant prior to approaching the door to Room 

230. Even so, the court found that there were exigent 

circumstances which were not foreseeable to the officers when they 

approached the door and that the exigency, while perhaps not 

unexpected, was not created by the officers. The court identified 

the exigent circumstances created by the room occupants as the 

smelling of the PCP and the commotion and shouting inside the 

room, which gave the officers reasonable suspicion to believe that 

evidence was being destroyed. (R., Vol. II, pp. 44-45). 

The district court relied on United States v. Acguino, 836 

F.2d 1268 (lOth Cir. 1988). That case involved a warrantless 

search of an apartment, and, as here, an appeal was taken from a 

denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence involved in 

drug trafficking. There the police officers rushed into defendant 

Acquino's apartment with guns drawn, conducted a "protective 

sweep" of the premises and arrested Acquino. The sweep disclosed 

drug paraphernalia. Thereafter, the officers obtained consent to 

search the apartment. They found cocaine, guns and $3,000 in 

cash. We affirmed the district court. We reviewed governing 

Supreme Court cases in reaching the following co~clusions: 

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An exception to the warrant requirement that allows 

police fearing the destruction of evidence to enter the 

home of an unknown suspect should be (1) pursuant to 

clear evidence of probable cause, (2) available only for 

serious crimes and in circumstances where the 

destruction of evidence is likely, (3) limited in scope 

to the m1n~um intrusion necessary to prevent the 

destruction of evidence, and (4) supported by clearly 

defined indications of exigency that are not subject to 

police manipulation or abuse. 

836 F.2d at 1272. 

The district court applied the principles of Acguino in 

making the following oral findings: 

In this case, there was probable cause for the 

police to approach the door [of Room 230] on the evening 

in question. There was probable cause even prior to 

knocking on the door to search the room in question as a 

result of the activities at that room and associated 

with those suspects prior to the time the room was 

approached. Moreover, the court finds that there were 

independent exigent circumstances justifying the 

intrusion by the police officer in this case in the form 

of the odor of PCP, the slamming of the door, the 

commotion that took place inside, the communication 

between the suspects inside regarding the presence of 

police and the attempted destruction of evidence. 

Further, the court finds that while some of the 

exigent circumstances here were foreseeable -- or some 

of the circumstances that gave rise to the exigency were 

reasonably foreseeable, the critical factors here are 

not subject to police manipulation or abuse. 

(R., Vol. II, pp. 46-47). 

A trial court's determinations which rest upon credibility 

and reasonable inferences will not be set aside unless clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1417 (lOth 

Cir. 1987); United States v. Gagnon, 635 F.2d 766, 769 (lOth Cir. 

1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981). Here, the trial 

court's findings/determinations of probable cause and exigent 

circumstances are supported by the evidence. 

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The officers were armed with probable cause to believe that a 

crime had been committed in Room 230 when they approached the door 

to that room. Following Officer Hughes' knock on the door, the 

actions and activities which followed, coupled by Officer Hughes' 

detection of the odor of PCP inside the room, constituted exigent 

circumstances justifying the warrantless entry. Drug trafficking 

crimes are serious and in this case the destruction of evidence 

was underway when the police effected the warrantless entry. The 

intrusion was limited in scope to a minimum. The room was secured 

and no search was undertaken until a search warrant was obtained. 

"Reasonableness" is the overriding test of compliance with the 

Fourth Amendment. Zurcker v. Stanford Daily, 436 u.s. 547 (1978). 

See also, United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

The police conduct in this case was reasonable in the context of 

the Fourth Amendment. 

WE AFFIRM. 

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