Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04071/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04071-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chloe Allen Keller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United States Cottrt of AppeaJs 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 7 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-4071 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-198G) 

(D. Utah) 

CHLOE ALLEN KELLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, LOGAN and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant, Chloe Keller, 

was convicted in Utah federal district court of attempting to 

manufacture methamphetamine and possessing with intent to 

distribute the same in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l). The 

district court sentenced Keller to 24 months incarceration to be 

followed by three years supervised release. Keller now appeals 

from the judgment of conviction alleging that (1) the evidence 

used against him at trial was unlawfully obtained in a warrantless 

search of his car, and (2) the evidence, even if lawfully 

obtained, was insufficient to sustain the jury's finding that he 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-4071 Document: 01019962936 Date Filed: 02/07/1990 Page: 1 
intended to distribute methamphetamine. We exercise jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

I • 

On October 19, 1988, Terry Keefe, Assistant Chief of the West 

Valley, Utah, Police Department, was informed that the Drug 

Enforcement Agency (DEA) needed assistance surveilling Keller. 

According to the DEA, Keller was at High-Valley Chemical 

purchasing some precursors to be used in the production of 

methamphetamine. Accompanied by Detective William Salmon, Officer 

Keefe arrived near the scene in an unmarked police car. The two 

police officers observed Keller enter the driver's side of a green 

Cadillac and travel south from High-Valley Chemical. After 

following the Cadillac one to two miles, the officers decided to 

stop the vehicle for excessive weaving and a broken tail light. 

Keller explained to Officer Keefe that the weaving was due to 

the mechanical failure of a defective tie-rod. Keller further 

informed the officer, however, that he had neither a driver's 

license nor title to the vehicle. A registration card located in 

the glove compartment revealed that the Cadillac was registered to 

a California woman whom Keller claimed had recently sold him the 

vehicle. After observing that the Vehicle Identification Number 

on the dashboard did not match that on the registration card, 

Officer Keefe requested Keller's permission to search the vehicle 

for weapons and/or drugs. Keller consented to a search excepting 

a locked briefcase and cash box located in the back seat of the 

vehicle. 

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In the trunk of the vehicle, Officer Keefe discovered two 

large boxes marked ephedrine--a substance used to produce 

methamphetamine--as well as other chemicals and laboratory 

glassware. Keller was placed under arrest for attempting to 

manufacture a controlled substance and transported to police 

headquarters. The Cadillac was impounded. Subject to standard 

police procedure, an inventory search of the vehicle's contents, 

excepting the locked briefcase and cash box, was taken prior to 

the arrival of a tow truck. Once the vehicle arrived at 

headquarters, authorities requested Keller's assistance in opening 

the locked containers. Keller provided them with the locks' 

combinations. Inside the briefcase, Detective Salmon uncovered 

$36,000 in cash and two manila envelopes containing a large 

quantity of methamphetamine. 

II. 

Following an evidentiary hearing on Keller's motion to 

suppress evidence obtained in the search of his vehicle, the 

district court made findings as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 

12(e}. Based on its view of the testimony and the various 

witnesses' credibility, the court found that the government had 

met its burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions. 

See United States v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir. 

1989). In reviewing the district court's findings, we are mindful 

that "[a]t a hearing on a motion to suppress, the credibility of 

the witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence together 

with the inferences, deductions and conclusions to be drawn from 

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the evidence, are to be determined by the trial judge." United 

States v. Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Accordingly, we accept the evidence in a light most favorable to 

the district court's determination, United States v. Medlin, 842 

F.2d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 1988), and are not empowered to 

substitute our judgment for that of the district court absent 

clear error. See United States v. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654, 

658 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987). Because 

the district court's findings are not clearly erroneous in this 

instance, we decline to disturb them. See United States v. 

Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1989). 

A. 

Keller first complains that Officer Keefe's reasons for 

stopping his vehicle were merely a pretext for the subsequent 

search. In determining whether the stop of Keller's vehicle was 

pretextual and thus unlawful, we apply an objective test; we ask 

"not whether the officer could validly have made the stop, but 

whether under the same circumstances a reasonable officer would 

have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose." United 

States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (emphasis 

in original). Accord United States v. Neu, 879 F.2d 805, 808 

(10th Cir. 1989). Applying this test, we are satisfied that 

Officer Keefe's decision to stop the Cadillac complied with the 

fourth amendment. 

The government does not assert that a reasonable officer 

would have stopped Keller's vehicle for a broken tail light, but 

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rather relies on Keller's excessive weaving to justify the stop. 

Officer Keefe testified that he viewed the Cadillac weave to the 

edge of the road and back to the center three or four times. 

Detective Salmon confirmed Officer Keller's account of the 

situation. The possibility that Keller was impaired and presented 

a danger to both himself and other motorists justified the stop of 

his Cadillac. Any officer who witnesses a vehicle weaving 

excessively is entitled to stop that vehicle. Under identical 

circumstances, a reasonable officer would have made the stop. 

Uni t ed States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 272 (10th Cir. 1989). 

B. 

Keller next argues that his consent to search the Cadillac 

was not freely and voluntarily given. That a police officer may 

search one's vehicle without probable cause if voluntary consent 

is given is beyond peradventure. Consent to search is voluntary 

if it is not the product of duress or coercion. Schneckloth v. 

Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 227 (1973); United States v. 

Carson, 762 F.2d 833, 836 (10th Cir. 1985). We have established 

three criteria to guide the district court's in determining the 

voluntariness of a consent to search: (1) clear and positive 

testimony must be present that consent was unequivocally, freely 

and intelligently given; (2) the government must prove the absence 

of duress or coercion; and (3) the court must indulge every 

reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights 

and convincing evidence must support a finding of waiver. United 

States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing 

United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir. 1985)). 

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Mindful of these factors, we conclude that the district 

court's finding that Keller voluntarily consented to a search of 

his vehicle, excepting the locked briefcase and cash box, was not 

clearly erroneous. The testimony at the suppression hearing was 

uncontradicted. Upon Officer Keefe's request to search, Keller 

responded "sure, go ahead," and exited the vehicle. No threat, 

promise or force was used to obtain consent. Keller stood by and 

without objection watched as Officer Keefe searched the 

automobile. 

C. 

Keller also contends that the inventory search of his vehicle 

following his arrest was merely a pretext for searching the locked 

briefcase and cash box. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 

364, 369 (1976), the Supreme Court explained that when impounding 

a vehicle, police departments generally follow a practice of 

securing and inventorying the vehicle's contents to protect (1) 

the owner's property while it remains in custody, (2) the police 

against claims over lost or stolen property, and (3) the police 

from potential danger. To insure these important governmental 

interests, the Court held that warrantless inventory searches 

pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable under the 

fourth amendment. Id. at 372. Accord Colorado v. Bertine, 479 

U.S. 367, 374 (1987) (reasonable police regulations relating to 

inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the fourth 

amendment). 

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In this case, authorities inventoried the contents of 

Keller's Cadillac, aside from the briefcase and cash box, pursuant 

to standard police procedures before the vehicle was towed. 

Because the briefcase and cash box were locked and Keller had been 

transported to police headquarters, officers responsible for the 

i nventory, instead of breaking into the containers, waited until 

they could obtain the locks' combinations from Keller. Given that 

Keller had declined to consent to a search of these items, the 

district court was required to weigh the evidence and determine 

whether the inventory search was performed pursuant to police 

procedure or was merely a pretext for an unlawful search. Under 

the circumstances, we cannot say that the district court committed 

c l ear error in finding that the authorities' actions were in 

accordance with standard police procedures to secure both their 

safety and the safety of Keller's property, rather than a pretext 

concealing an improper police motive. 

III. 

Lastly, Keller asserts that even assuming the legality of the 

vehicle's search, the government's evidence at trial was 

insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent 

to distribute methamphetamine. In reviewing Keller's final 

assertion, we must ask whether the record evidence reasonably 

supports -the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, we will uphold the conviction if satisfied that "any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

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.. ' ' . 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (emphasis in original). We must remember 

that the responsibility of resolving conflicts in the testimony, 

weighing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences from basic 

to ultimate facts is that of the jury, not the court of appeals. 

At trial, the government presented evidence that at the time 

of Keller's arrest, he was in possession of 56 grams of 

methamphetamine with a purity of 72.5 percent accounting for over 

8000 standard doses. Experts estimated that this amount might 

well last a user over ten years. Even if Keller consumed 100 

doses per day, the amount of methamphetamine located in his 

briefcase would have lasted him three months. Furthermore, 

receipts obtained by the government indicated that Keller had 

purchased 201 pounds of ephedrine and had ordered another 385 

pounds for a total of 586 pounds. With a 50 percent yield, 586 

pounds of ephedrine would produce 293 pounds of methamphetamine 

with a street value of about $2,900,000. Keller had expended over 

$56,000 on ephedrine, other chemical and laboratory equipment. In 

view of this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that the 

methamphetamine recovered from Keller's briefcase was intended for 

distribution. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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