Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-15-04402/USCOURTS-ca6-15-04402-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Jose Dolores Reyes
Petitioner

Document Text:

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 16a0210p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

JOSE DOLORES REYES, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

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No. 15-4402 

On Petition for Review from a Final Order 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals. 

No. A075 880 596. 

Decided and Filed: August 26, 2016 

Before: MOORE, ROGERS, and SENTELLE,*

 Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ON BRIEF: Blake P. Somers, BLAKE P. SOMERS LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Petitioner. 

Dawn S. Conrad, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for 

Respondent. 

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Jose Dolores Reyes is a native 

and citizen of Mexico. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Reyes removed to Mexico after 

finding that Reyes had been “convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude,” 

 *

The Honorable David B. Sentelle, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit, 

sitting by designation. 

>

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8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed. Reyes 

petitions for review of the BIA’s opinion, arguing that his 2000 conviction for soliciting 

prostitution is not a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). For the following reasons, we 

DENY Reyes’s petition for review. 

I. BACKGROUND

 Reyes entered the United States from Mexico, without inspection, in September 1994; 

Reyes became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1998. See Administrative 

Record (“A.R.”) at 140–41 (Application for Cancellation of Removal at 1–2). Reyes is married 

and has five children, all of whom were born in the United States. See id. at 141 (Application for 

Cancellation of Removal at 2); id. at 178–82 (Birth Certificates). 

 The Department of Homeland Security served Reyes with a Notice to Appear on March 

3, 2015. Id. at 281 (Notice to Appear at 1). Reyes was charged with removability pursuant to 

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for “hav[ing] been convicted of two crimes involving moral 

turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” Id. The Notice to Appear 

listed three prior criminal charges. Id. at 283 (Notice to Appear at 3). First, on August 17, 2000, 

Reyes was “convicted in the Hamilton Municipal Court [at] Hamilton Ohio, for the offense of 

Soliciting, in violation of 533.09 of the Codified Ordinances of Hamilton, Ohio and ORC.” Id.; 

see also id. at 285 (8/17/00 Judgment Entry). Second, on September 19, 2003, Reyes was 

“convicted in the Hamilton Municipal Court [at] Hamilton Ohio, for the offense of Passing Bad 

Checks, in violation of 2913.11 of the Codified Ordinances of Hamilton, Ohio and ORC.” Id. at 

283 (Notice to Appear at 3); see also id. at 290 (9/19/03 Judgment Entry). Third, on January 18, 

2005, Reyes was “convicted in the Hamilton Municipal Court [at] Hamilton Ohio, for the offense 

of Resisting Arrest, in violation of 2921.33 of the Codified Ordinances of Hamilton, Ohio and 

ORC.” Id. at 283 (Notice to Appear at 3); see also id. at 297 (2/25/05 Judgment Entry). 

 The IJ issued an opinion on June 2, 2015, finding that Reyes’s prior charges for soliciting 

prostitution and passing bad checks were CIMTs. Id. at 134 (6/2/15 IJ Op. at 4). With regard to 

Reyes’s conviction for soliciting prostitution, the IJ noted that “[p]rior published BIA cases do 

not address this crime specifically.” Id. at 133 (6/2/15 IJ Op. at 3). The IJ agreed with the Ninth 

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Circuit’s decision in Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012), however, which held that 

solicitation of prostitution was a CIMT because it was “similar to other crimes the Board has 

previously found to be morally turpitudinous, including renting a room with knowledge that it 

will be used for prostitution, keeping a house for prostitution, and the act of prostitution.” A.R. 

at 133 (6/2/15 IJ Op. at 3). The IJ issued an oral decision on June 18, 2015 that ordered Reyes 

removed. Id. at 71–73 (6/18/15 IJ Op. at 1–3). 

 Reyes appealed to the BIA, arguing that the single act of solicitation of prostitution for 

one’s own behalf does not constitute a CIMT. Id. at 22 (Brief on Appeal to BIA at 8). Also 

finding the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rohit persuasive, the BIA issued a separate opinion 

adopting and affirming the IJ’s decision on November 30, 2015. Id. at 3–4 (9/30/15 BIA Op. at 

1–2). Reyes now petitions for review of the BIA’s decision. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

 We begin by addressing the scope of our jurisdiction. Although the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (“INA”) generally strips courts of “jurisdiction to review the removal orders of 

petitioners deemed removable for having committed a CIMT,” we retain “limited jurisdiction to 

review questions of law and constitutional claims arising from such orders.” Ruiz-Lopez v. 

Holder, 682 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). The only question 

presented in Reyes’s petition for review is whether his conviction for solicitation of prostitution 

is a CIMT, Pet’r Br. at 14, a pure question of law. See Ruiz-Lopez, 682 F.3d at 516. We 

accordingly have jurisdiction to review Reyes’s claim. 

B. Standard of Review 

 “Where, as here, the BIA expressly adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision but adds 

comments of its own, we directly review the decision of the IJ while also considering the 

additional comments made by the [BIA].” Yeremin v. Holder, 738 F.3d 708, 714 (6th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “The BIA’s construction of ambiguous statutory 

provisions—such as the term ‘crime involving moral turpitude’—is generally entitled to Chevron 

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deference,” and we accordingly “must uphold the BIA’s construction [of the definition of a 

CIMT] unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” Ruiz-Lopez, 682 

F.3d at 516 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 

(1984)). The BIA’s interpretation of a state criminal statute is not entitled to deference and is 

reviewed de novo. Ruiz-Lopez, 682 F.3d at 517. 

C. Reyes’s Solicitation Conviction 

 The sole issue raised by Reyes in his petition for review is whether his conviction for 

solicitation of prostitution is a CIMT. Our Circuit has yet to address this question. 

 We apply the “categorical approach” to determine whether a crime involves moral 

turpitude. Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686, 689 (6th Cir. 2009). Under this framework, 

“we consider not whether the actual conduct constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, but 

whether the full range of conduct encompassed by the statute constitutes a crime of moral 

turpitude.” Id. at 689–90 (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we look only to the 

elements of the offense, not to the specific facts underlying the conviction. Id. at 690. “If all 

offenses under the statute necessarily meet the definition of a CIMT, the analysis ends,” but if 

“some offenses contemplated by the statute do not fit the BIA’s definition of a CIMT, we move 

to the modified-categorical approach” and “examine[] certain record documents to determine 

whether the petitioner’s specific offense under the statute qualifies as a CIMT.” Ruiz-Lopez, 

682 F.3d at 518. Reyes was convicted under § 533.09(a) of the Hamilton Codified Ordinances, 

which states that “[n]o person shall solicit another to engage with such other person in sexual 

activity for hire.” See A.R. at 285 (8/17/00 Judgment Entry). This statute prohibits solely 

solicitation of prostitution, and thus the categorical approach is appropriate; we need only resolve 

the legal question of whether the BIA correctly determined that a conviction for solicitation of 

prostitution constitutes a CIMT. 

 “The term ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ is not defined in the INA or by agency 

regulations.” Yeremin, 738 F.3d at 714. “The BIA has held that “a criminal offense ‘involves 

‘moral turpitude’ if the relevant statute defines the offense in such a manner that it necessarily 

entails conduct on the part of the offender that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary 

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to accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.’” 

Serrato-Soto, 570 F.3d at 689 (quoting Matter of Kochlani, 24 I. & N. Dec. 128, 129 (BIA 

2007)). “Although not a universal rule, offenses that can be classified as ‘malum in se’ generally 

do involve moral turpitude, while those classified as ‘malum prohibitum’ do not.” Ruiz-Lopez, 

682 F.3d at 519. 

 The IJ and BIA both relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rohit in holding that 

solicitation of prostitution is a CIMT. In Rohit, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “[t]he [BIA] 

has, in precedential decisions, identified certain crimes that involve moral turpitude that are quite 

similar to solicitation of prostitution.” Rohit, 670 F.3d at 1089. Specifically, the BIA has found 

that the act of prostitution is a CIMT, In the Matter of W----, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951), 

and the BIA has also found that “keeping a house of ill-fame” and “renting rooms with 

knowledge that the rooms were to be used for the purpose of . . . prostitution” are CIMTs, Matter 

of Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340, 342 (BIA 1965). Because these BIA decisions “are entitled to 

Chevron deference and are certainly permissible interpretations of the statute,” the Ninth Circuit 

held that solicitation of prostitution was also a CIMT because “[t]here is no meaningful 

distinction that would lead us to conclude that engaging in an act of prostitution is a crime of 

moral turpitude but that soliciting or agreeing to engage in an act of prostitution is not.” Rohit, 

670 F.3d at 1089–90. Following similar reasoning, the Tenth and Eighth Circuits have also 

recently found solicitation of prostitution to be a CIMT. See Gomez-Gutierrez v. Lynch, 

811 F.3d 1053, 1058–59 (8th Cir. 2016); Florentino-Francisco v. Lynch, 611 F. App’x 936, 938–

39 (10th Cir. 2015). 

 We agree with our sister Circuits. We give Chevron deference to the BIA’s reasonable 

interpretations of the INA issued in published opinions, see Ruiz-Lopez, 682 F.3d at 516, and the 

BIA has held that the act of prostitution itself is a CIMT, Matter of W----, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 402. 

Although Reyes argues that profiting from prostitution is meaningfully different from engaging 

in an act of personal solicitation of prostitution, see Pet’r Br. at 25, we disagree. As the Ninth 

Circuit concluded, “[s]olicitation is the direct precursor to the act” of prostitution. Rohit, 

670 F.3d at 1089. If the BIA considers prostitution to be a CIMT, there is no reason to consider 

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the solicitation of prostitution to be “significantly less ‘base, vile, and depraved’” than the act of 

prostitution itself. Id.

 Reyes’s additional argument to the contrary is also not persuasive. Reyes contends that 

solicitation of prostitution “is not uniformly[]regarded as illegal” and thus must constitute a 

crime that is malum prohibitum, rather than malum in se. See Pet’r Br. at 18. Reyes contends 

that countries such as Armenia, Poland, and the Dominican Republic have made prostitution 

itself legal, and even one jurisdiction in this country—Nevada—licenses the practice in some 

counties. Id. at 18–20; see also Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 201.354 & 244.345. According to Reyes, 

“[a]ctivity which is at least decriminalized, if not fully legalized and even governmentallyregulated, in countries around the globe . . . simply cannot be an activity ‘that shocks the public 

conscience,’ nor can it be considered ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved.’” Pet’r Br. at 20. This 

proves too much. Whether an act is universally criminalized can be a relevant factor to consider 

in determining whether a crime involving that act is malum prohibitum or malum in se, see, e.g., 

Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 2007), but the mere fact that other 

countries may permit an act does not prevent that act from reasonably being considered by the 

BIA to be an act that “shocks the public conscience,” Matter of Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 139 

(B.I.A. 1989), particularly when the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in this country still 

consider the practice illegal. 

 We acknowledge that the BIA’s precedential decisions on prostitution are several 

decades old, see, e.g., In the Matter of W----, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 402, and that there is now 

increased attention to the question of whether and to what extent prostitution should be 

criminalized. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Should Prostitution Be A Crime?, N.Y. Times (May 5, 

2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/should-prostitution-be-a-crime.html. 

Indeed, the BIA recently recognized that there has been a “transformation” of views relating to 

prostitution in recent years. In re: Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7 (BIA Aug. 19, 2014). 

Nonetheless, the BIA in Sehmi—an unpublished and thus nonprecedential decision—considered 

the same question that we are confronted with here, and ultimately found the Ninth Circuit’s 

reasoning in Rohit persuasive and that solicitation of prostitution was a CIMT. Id. at *6–7. 

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 Although our society’s—and the BIA’s—views regarding prostitution and solicitation of 

prostitution may continue to “transform[],” see id. at *7, the BIA’s precedential opinions on 

prostitution are entitled to Chevron deference and they are not unreasonable. Rohit, 670 F.3d at 

1089–90. Because there is no reason to treat the offense of solicitation of prostitution differently 

than the offense of prostitution itself, Reyes’s conviction for solicitation of prostitution 

constitutes a CIMT. 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. 

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