Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02287/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02287-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Eagle Airlines
Appellant
Jake Pittari
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 05-4181/06-2287

___________

Jake Pittari, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeals from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

American Eagle Airlines, Inc., *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 29, 2006

Filed: November 9, 2006

___________

Before RILEY and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and KYLE,1

 District Judge.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

American Eagle Airlines, Inc. (American Eagle), appeals from a jury verdict in

favor of Jake Pittari (Pittari) on his claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. American Eagle argues Pittari failed to

prove unlawful discrimination and his claim is preempted by the Railway Labor Act

(RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188. American Eagle also appeals the district court’s denial

of its motion for post-offer costs, and the district court’s award of attorney fees and

costs to Pittari. Following our thorough review of the record, we vacate the jury’s

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verdict, and we reverse the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs to Pittari

and its denial of post-offer costs to American Eagle. We remand to the district court

to determine the amount of American Eagle’s post-offer costs. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

American Eagle, a commercial airline carrier regulated by the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) and the Department of Transportation (DOT), employs Pittari

as a flight attendant. Because flight attendants are responsible for the safety of airline

passengers and must think clearly and quickly in emergency situations, the FAA

classifies this position as a “safety sensitive position.” A safety sensitive position

features job functions that may impact the safety of the public, an employee’s coworkers, or the employee. The essential functions of a flight attendant position

include being able to: handle and provide effective leadership in emergency situations;

assess situations quickly; deal with disorderly, sick, or injured passengers; determine

whether to initiate emergency procedures; memorize the location of emergency

equipment; methodically apply emergency procedures; and evacuate passengers from

an aircraft rapidly.

In June 2002, Pittari informed American Eagle’s Medical Department (Medical)

by letter he was taking the medication Neurontin. Dr. Rosalyn B. Beaty (Dr. Beaty),

a Medical staff physician, acknowledged receiving Pittari’s letter, but took no action

to prohibit Pittari from working as a flight attendant. 

In April 2003, Pittari submitted a request for intermittent leave under the

Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to obtain treatment for depression and

anxiety. American Eagle policy mandates disclosure of all medications taken by

employees in order for Medical to determine whether a flight attendant is fit for duty.

In compliance with this policy, Dr. William McCollum (Dr. McCollum), Pittari’s

physician, informed American Eagle of Pittari’s medications, which included

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A MicroCog is administered via computer to the testee and measures the

testee’s cognitive functions, such as attention, mental control, reasoning, response

time, and information processing speed and accuracy. American Eagle requires flight

attendants who are taking certain medications or who present concerns regarding their

cognitive abilities to take a MicroCog. 

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Neurontin, Baclofen, and Provigil. Medical became concerned these medications,

specifically Neurontin and Baclofen, could impair Pittari’s cognitive ability to perform

the safety-sensitive duties of Pittari’s position as a flight attendant. 

Based on its concerns about Pittari’s possible cognitive impairment, American

Eagle arranged for Pittari to take a MicroCog screening test2

 (MicroCog) on June 5,

2003. Dr. Anne-Marie Moreault (Dr. Moreault), an independent psychologist,

reviewed Pittari’s computer-generated MicroCog results. In Dr. Moreault’s opinion,

the test indicated a below-average ability to think, process information, and reason

generally and abstractly. Additionally, the test revealed stress, fatigue, or anxiousness

might further compromise Pittari’s reaction time. Dr. Moreault also concluded

Pittari’s problem-solving skills might prove challenging, particularly during

emergency situations. 

On June 11, 2003, after reviewing Pittari’s MicroCog results, Medical placed

Pittari on temporary work restriction from safety-sensitive duties. Both Dr.

McCollum and Pittari agreed, as of June 19, 2003, based upon the MicroCog results,

American Eagle had legitimate concerns about allowing Pittari to work as a flight

attendant. Pittari understood if his cognitive abilities improved, American Eagle

would return him to his former position. Despite being restricted from working as a

flight attendant, Pittari was capable of performing other roles, such as gate agent,

ticket agent, and baggage handler, or other duties, such as directing passengers in need

of assistance, or performing administrative or secretarial computer work. However,

Pittari never worked in these capacities.

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On July 21, 2003, Dr. McCollum notified American Eagle by letter he had

changed Pittari’s medications and Pittari was ready to be retested. On July 29, 2003,

Pittari took a second MicroCog, the results of which indicated little or no change from

the initial test. After the second MicroCog, Dr. Moreault recommended a more

complete assessment to ensure Pittari could work as a flight attendant. On August 27

and 28, 2003, Pittari underwent a neuropsychological evaluation, performed by Dr.

Gene Chambers (Dr. Chambers). On October 6, 2003, at Pittari’s request, Dr.

Chambers sent Medical a letter stating although Pittari suffered a cognitive

impairment that was the result of a closed-head trauma Pittari incurred while working

for American Eagle, Pittari currently had the mental capacity to perform as a flight

attendant, particularly because he had performed the job repetitively in the past.

However, because Medical was still concerned about Pittari’s response to potential

unique emergency situations (rather than repetitive functions), Medical maintained

Pittari’s job restrictions and requested a copy of Dr. Chambers’s neuropsychological

assessment of Pittari. 

On October 31, 2003, Medical received Dr. Chambers’s report, which indicated

Pittari had a mild to moderate range of impairment, resulting in low processing speed

and problem-solving deficits, as well as impaired mental flexibility, judgment, and

mental efficiency. Medical did not believe the report’s assessment and

recommendations correlated with Dr. Chambers’s earlier letter, and therefore declined

to remove Pittari’s work restriction. 

In December 2003, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement

between American Eagle and the Association of Flight Attendants, Pittari requested

a binding third-party medical evaluation. On January 21 and 30, 2004, Dr. Ronald E.

McInroe (Dr. McInroe), a clinical neuropsychologist, evaluated Pittari and concluded

Pittari was fit for duty as a flight attendant. In Dr. McInroe’s opinion, Pittari’s

cognitive function had improved since Dr. Chambers’s evaluation. Dr. McInroe

concluded either Pittari’s medications were controlling his condition or Pittari no

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longer needed the medications. In a letter dated February 18, 2004, Dr. McInroe

opined Pittari was able to perform the essential functions of a flight attendant and he

was fit for duty as of January 30, 2004. Medical released Pittari to return to work as

a flight attendant on February 20, 2004, after receiving Dr. McInroe’s report and

letter. 

B. Procedural Background

In August 2004, Pittari brought suit against American Eagle, alleging violations

of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 (ACRA), Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-123-101 to

16-123-108; the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213; and the FMLA, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 2601 to 2654. After American Eagle moved for summary judgment on all of

Pittari’s claims, Pittari conceded his ACRA claim should be dismissed. With regard

to Pittari’s remaining claims, the district court denied American Eagle’s summary

judgment motion. 

Approximately four months before trial, American Eagle made an offer of

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 in the amount of $5,497.50,

inclusive of prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. Pittari did not accept the

offer of judgment. 

Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in Pittari’s favor on the ADA

claim and in American Eagle’s favor on the FMLA claim. The jury awarded Pittari

$2,000 in actual damages and $1 in compensatory damages. After the district court

entered judgment on the jury’s verdict, Pittari moved to recover his attorney fees and

costs, and American Eagle filed an application for costs under Rule 68. The district

court denied American Eagle’s application and granted Pittari’s motion, awarding

Pittari $24,000 in attorney fees and $5,906.06 in costs, including $3,000 in expert

witness fees. This appeal followed.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Preemption of ADA Claim

American Eagle first contends Pittari’s ADA claim should have been dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the claim is preempted by the RLA. A

decision on preemption of federal law under the RLA is a question of subject matter

jurisdiction, see Bloemer v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 935, 938-39 (8th Cir. 2005),

which this court reviews de novo, see Jenisio v. Ozark Airlines, Inc. Retirement Plan,

187 F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1999). 

To promote stability in labor-management relations, Congress passed the RLA,

which establishes a mandatory arbitral regime for “minor” disputes. 45 U.S.C. § 184;

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994). Minor disputes are

“controversies arising out of the application or interpretation of the collective

bargaining agreement, and therefore, complete preemption applies to disputes

involving duties and rights created or defined by the collective bargaining agreement.”

Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir. 2000). “Courts can resolve

questions of federal . . . law involving labor claims only if the issues do not require

the court to construe the collective bargaining agreement.” Deneen v. Nw. Airlines,

Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 439 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,

Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 411 (1988)).

In support of its preemption argument, American Eagle contends the collective

bargaining agreement between American Eagle and the Association of Flight

Attendants sets forth standards and procedures for determining whether a flight

attendant should be removed from flying status due to an impairment. It further

argues Pittari’s ADA claim is dependent on an interpretation of the collective

bargaining agreement and thus preempted by the RLA.

The district court rejected American Eagle’s preemption argument, concluding

Pittari’s ADA claim arises independent of the collective bargaining agreement and

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derives from federal law. We agree. By asserting an ADA discrimination claim,

Pittari seeks to enforce a federal statutory right, not a contractual right embodied in

the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R.

Co., 327 F.3d 707, 718 (8th Cir. 2003); Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108,

1115 (8th Cir. 1995). Indeed, Pittari’s ADA claim can be resolved without any

reference to the collective bargaining agreement. “The ADA provides a more

extensive and broader ground for relief, specifically oriented towards the elimination

of discriminatory employment practices, and, thus, is not preempted by the [RLA].”

Fenney, 327 F.3d at 718 (internal quotation omitted). Because federal law, not the

collective bargaining agreement, is the source of Pittari’s discrimination claim, the

RLA does not preempt the claim. See Deneen, 132 F.3d at 439.

B. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on ADA Claim

American Eagle asserts the district court erred by denying its motion for

judgment as a matter of law, arguing Pittari failed to offer sufficient evidence showing

American Eagle regarded Pittari as disabled. We review de novo the district court’s

denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Pittari, the prevailing party. See Knutson v. Ag Processing, Inc.,

394 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In doing so, we examine

whether sufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict. Ollie v. Titan Tire

Corp., 336 F.3d 680, 685 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). We will uphold the jury’s

verdict unless we conclude a reasonable jury could not have found for Pittari. See

Knutson, 394 F.3d at 1050 (citation omitted).

The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual with a

disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination

under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) his condition qualifies as a disability

within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions

of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he has suffered an

adverse employment action due to his disability. Samuels v. Ks. City Mo. Sch. Dist.,

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Pittari’s complaint alleged American Eagle withheld Pittari from duty based

on American Eagle’s “stereotypical attitude that [Pittari] would be unable to discharge

his duties as a flight attendant because of his physical and mental impairments.” 

4

Jury Instruction Number 10 stated the first element of Pittari’s prima facie case

on the ADA claim was whether American Eagle regarded Pittari’s “alleged cognitive

impairment as substantially limiting [Pittari’s] ability to work.” Similarly, Jury

Instruction Number 12 stated several factors for the jury to consider in “determining

whether [Pittari’s] impairment substantially limits [his] ability to work.” Finally, Jury

Instruction Number 13 informed the jury “the inability to perform a single, particular

job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”

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437 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Being “regarded as” having a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual’s

major life activities qualifies as a disability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).

The Supreme Court has defined two ways in which an individual may fall within this

statutory definition: (1) the employer mistakenly believes the individual has an

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) the

employer mistakenly believes an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits

one or more of the individual’s major life activities. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). The case at bar presents the second scenario: whether

American Eagle believed Pittari had a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact,

the impairment was not so limiting.

As an initial matter, Pittari contends the major life activity for the jury’s

consideration was his “cognitive abilities,” arguing the district court instructed the

jury to consider “whether American Eagle unlawfully discriminated against Pittari

because of an alleged defect in his cognitive skills.” Such an argument is wholly

contradicted by a reading of Pittari’s complaint3

 and the jury instructions,4 both of

which indicate the major life activity for the jury’s consideration was “working.”

Pittari’s argument on this point mistakenly conflates the major life activity at issue

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Although the Supreme Court has reserved judgment on and questioned whether

working is properly considered a “major life activity” under the ADA, see Toyota

Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002), and Sutton, 527 U.S. at

492, our court on occasion has considered it so, see Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distrib.,

Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2005). Given our precedent as well as the parties’

acceptance that the term “major life activity” includes working, this court assumes,

without deciding, working falls within this definition.

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with the impairment he suffered. We therefore consider whether American Eagle

regarded Pittari as disabled in the major life activity of working.5

 

“[F]inding a plaintiff is substantially limited in working requires a showing that

his overall employment opportunities are limited.” Breitkreutz v. Cambrex Charles

City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). “[T]he

statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’ requires, at a minimum, [Pittari show he is]

unable to work in a broad class of jobs.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491. “The inability to

perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major

life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3)(i); e.g., Murphy v. United Parcel

Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523 (1999) (“[T]o be regarded as substantially limited in the

major life activity of working, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a

particular job.”). Instead, Pittari must show, in light of his expertise, background, and

job expectations, he has suffered a significant reduction in meaningful employment

opportunities due to his impairment. See Cooper v. Olin Corp., Winchester Div., 246

F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2001). 

Pittari failed to meet this burden. “An impairment that disqualifies a person

from only a narrow range of jobs is not considered a substantially limiting one.”

Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted).

Although American Eagle restricted Pittari from performing safety-sensitive duties,

Pittari admitted he could have worked in other capacities with American Eagle. Pittari

testified at trial he could have performed the role of a gate agent, ticket agent, or

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baggage handler, or could have performed other duties, such as directing passengers

who needed assistance, or performing administrative or secretarial computer work.

Such evidence refutes Pittari’s assertion he suffered a significant reduction in

meaningful employment opportunities. If American Eagle regarded Pittari as

temporarily unable to perform “one particular job,” no violation of the ADA occurred.

See Wenzel v. Mo.-Am. Water Co., 404 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2005).

As an additional basis for overturning the jury’s verdict, we find the evidence

demonstrates American Eagle did not regard Pittari’s impairment as substantially

limiting. “In determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major life

activity, we consider (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or

anticipated duration, and (3) its actual or expected long-term impact.” Samuels, 437

F.3d at 802 (citation omitted); see, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)–(iii). Under the

ADA, a temporary impairment with little or no long-term impact does not constitute

a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)–(iii). Rather, “[t]he impairment’s impact

must . . . be permanent or long term.” Williams, 534 U.S. at 198. 

Guided by these considerations, we note Pittari agreed Medical had legitimate

concerns about Pittari’s cognitive functions based upon the first MicroCog test results.

Pittari understood his cognitive functions could be reevaluated if his medications or

medical condition changed. Indeed, Medical allowed Pittari to take another MicroCog

after Medical was notified Dr. McCollum had altered Pittari’s medications. Pittari

also recognized a successful neuropsychological exam would enable him to return to

his flight attendant position. A review of Medical’s documentation of Pittari’s

restriction indicates Medical deemed the restriction only temporary in nature. While

Pittari disputes whether American Eagle or Medical ever explicitly informed him the

restrictions were merely temporary, our review of the record convinces us American

Eagle did not regard Pittari’s impairment as more than a temporary condition. Pittari

offers no evidence to the contrary.

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Furthermore, we repeatedly have recognized “the provision addressing

perceived disabilities is intended to combat the effects of archaic attitudes, erroneous

perceptions, and myths that work to the disadvantage of persons with or regarded as

having disabilities.” Breitkreutz, 450 F.3d at 784 (quoting Brunko v. Mercy Hosp.,

260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2001)); see, e.g., Wooten, 58 F.3d at 385 (citing Sch. Bd.

of Nassau County, Fl. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279, 285 (1987)). Restrictions based

upon the recommendations of physicians are not based upon myths or stereotypes

about the disabled and thus do not demonstrate a perception of disability. Breitkreutz,

450 F.3d at 784. In this case, the decision to temporarily restrict Pittari from safetysensitive duties was based upon the results of two MicroCog screening tests and upon

the recommendations of Dr. Moreault, the independent psychologist who interpreted

Pittari’s MicroCogs. 

On the record before us, there is insufficient evidence to indicate American

Eagle regarded Pittari as disabled in the major life activity of working. We therefore

reverse the district court’s denial of American Eagle’s motion for judgment as a matter

of law.

C. Recovery of Fees and Costs

American Eagle next argues the district court abused its discretion by awarding

Pittari his attorney fees and costs, see Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 562, 576

(8th Cir. 2002) (stating standard of review is abuse of discretion), and erred by

refusing to award American Eagle its own post-offer costs pursuant to Rule 68, see

Perkins v. U.S. W. Comm., 138 F.3d 336, 338 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating standard of

review is de novo). Because we reverse the district court’s denial of American

Eagle’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the basis for the district court’s ruling

on these issues no longer exists. We therefore reverse the district court’s order

awarding Pittari recovery of his fees and costs and denying American Eagle its postoffer costs.

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First, with regard to Pittari’s recovery of attorney fees and expert witness fees,

under our holding today, Pittari is no longer the prevailing party. Thus, he cannot

recover his fees or costs under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (permitting the court,

in its discretion, to award attorney fees, litigation expenses, and costs to the prevailing

party). 

Second, American Eagle is entitled to its post-offer costs pursuant to Rule 68.

Under Rule 68, if a plaintiff rejects a defendant’s offer of judgment, and if the

judgment finally obtained by the plaintiff is not more favorable than the offer, the

plaintiff must pay the costs incurred by the defendant after the offer was made.

Perkins, 138 F.3d at 338; see, e.g., O’Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115,

1120 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding “a plaintiff who refuses an offer of judgment under Rule

68 and later fails to receive a more favorable judgment must pay the defendant’s postoffer costs”). Before trial, American Eagle made Pittari an offer of judgment in the

amount of $5,497.50, which Pittari did not accept. Under Rule 68, because Pittari

rejected American Eagle’s offer of judgment and failed to receive a more favorable

judgment, Pittari must now pay American Eagle’s post-offer costs. Because the

district court is in a better position to calculate American Eagle’s post-offer costs, we

remand this matter to the district court to determine the amount of American Eagle’s

recovery. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because Pittari did not meet his burden of showing that American Eagle

regarded Pittari as disabled in the major life activity of working, we reverse the district

court’s denial of American Eagle’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. We also

reverse the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs to Pittari and its denial of

post-offer costs to American Eagle. We therefore remand this matter to the district

court to determine the amount of American Eagle’s post-offer costs and to enter

judgment in accordance with this opinion. 

______________________________

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