Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02971/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02971-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Akers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2971

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa.

Daniel Akers, * 

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: March 4, 2005

Filed: June 1, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Daniel Akers appeals an 87-month sentence entered by the district court.1

Akers argues that an Iowa state jail term was constitutionally invalid and should not

have counted in his criminal history and that the Iowa Department of Corrections

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to administratively sentence him. We disagree and

affirm. 

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I. Background

Daniel Akers was on probation for two felony offenses. Officers went to

Akers's residence to serve a probation-violation warrant on him. Akers's girlfriend

told the police that she had not seen Akers for several days. The officers requested

permission from Akers's girlfriend to search the home. She consented to the search.

During their search, the officers found Akers hiding in a closet and arrested him.

Additionally, the officers found ammunition for a wide variety of firearms, two stun

guns, and some marijuana in Akers's home and vehicle. 

Akers was charged as a felon-in-possession of ammunition and entered a plea

of guilty. Akers's underlying Iowa felony conviction was for third-degree burglary for

which he received only probation. Akers violated that probation and was sentenced

to 60 days in jail by an administrative judge in the Iowa Department of Corrections

pursuant to a pilot sentencing program. Subsequently, the Iowa Supreme Court

declared the program unconstitutional. Klouda v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Dep't of Corr.

Serv., 642 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 2002). 

At Akers's federal sentencing, because of the 60-day state sentence, he received

two criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b), instead of only one criminal

history point under § 4A1.1(c). In addition, Akers received another criminal history

point under § 4A1.1(e). As a result, Akers had an offense level of 21 and a criminal

history category of V for a sentencing range of 70 to 87 months. The district court

sentenced Akers to 87 months' imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and

a $100 special assessment. From this sentence, Akers appeals.

II. Discussion

Akers first argues that his 60-day jail term is constitutionally invalid under

Klouda, and therefore, should not be counted in his criminal history under U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2 ("Sentences resulting from convictions that . . . have been ruled

constitutionally invalid in a prior case are not to be counted"). Additionally, Akers

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contends that the 60-day jail sentence is invalid because the Iowa Department of

Corrections lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose a sentence. Both of Akers

arguments are without merit.

While it is true that § 4A1.2 prohibits using sentences derived from

unconstitutional decisions to calculate criminal history, Akers misreads Klouda.

According to Akers, Klouda automatically and retroactively invalidated all prior

sentencing made under the administrative procedure employed by the Iowa

Department of Corrections. This is incorrect. The Iowa Supreme Court expressly

restricted the application of Klouda, stating, "[o]ur decision shall not apply

retroactively to cases in which a final decision has been rendered unless the case is

pending on appeal and the issue was preserved." Klouda, 642 N.W.2d at 263. Akers

failed to preserve the issue. He did not challenge the Iowa Department of Corrections

administrative procedure at the state level, and thus, Klouda did not apply to

invalidate his 60-day jail term. Akers's jail sentence is not unconstitutional.

Akers also argues that the Department of Corrections did not have subject

matter jurisdiction when it administratively sentenced him. We disagree. A court must

have subject matter jurisdiction "to hear and determine cases of the general class to

which the proceedings in question belong." Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d

447, 450 (Iowa 1989) (citing Wederath v. Brant, 287 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 1980)).

A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be brought at any time, even for the

first time on appeal. State ex rel. Vega v. Medina, 549 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Iowa 1996).

The Iowa supreme court based its Klouda decision on the principle of separation of

powers. It did not hold that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. If it had done so,

the Klouda court would have applied its decision retroactively but the court expressly

refused to do so. 

For the foregoing reasons we affirm the decision of the district court.

______________________________

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