Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02320/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02320-14/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Davis
Defendant
Joseph A. Sherman
Plaintiff

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH A. SHERMAN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2320 LKK EFB PS

vs.

CITY OF DAVIS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant.

 /

This action, in which plaintiff is proceeding in propria persona, was referred to the

undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 72-302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Defendant City

of Davis has filed a motion for summary judgment as to all remaining claims, which the court

addresses herein. In violation of the Local Rules, plaintiff has failed to file an opposition to the

motion, notwithstanding the court’s order to show cause directing him to file either an opposition

or a statement of no opposition. Notwithstanding his violation of a court order and Local Rule

78-230 (c), the court has evaluated the merits of the motion and for the reasons discussed below

recommends that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This action is proceeding on the original complaint filed by plaintiff on November 2,

2004. That complaint alleges various causes of action actions under the Fourth, Sixth and

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1

 See November 9, 2006, Findings and Recommendations and the December 22, 2006,

Order adopting Findings and Recommendations. 

2

Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and seeks damages in the amount of forty

million dollars. See Complaint (“Compl.”), p. 9, ¶ 11. On July 22, 2005, plaintiff filed an

“Addendum to Complaint” that the previously assigned magistrate judge construed as a

supplement to the original complaint. Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint alleges additional

claims for false arrest, “threat of false arrest,” and defamation. The complaint asserts, among

other things, that defendant is responsible for injuries plaintiff sustained while he was unjustly

incarcerated. The supplemental complaint demands damages in the amount of fifty-two million

dollars. See Supplemental Complaint (“Suppl. Compl.”), p. 6. 

Between the complaint and the addendum, plaintiff alleges seven claims for false arrest

relating to his arrests by the Davis Police Department on various dates and at various places in

Davis, California. Specifically, plaintiff claims he was falsely arrested at the Yolo County

Library, the Mansion Square business park, Albertson’s grocery store, Long’s Drugs, the Nugget

Market, The Belfry, and at a residence on El Cajon Avenue in Davis. The court dismissed

plaintiff’s causes of action as to the arrests at Long’s Drugs, Albertson’s, the Yolo County

Library, and Nugget Market based on the statute of limitations.1

 Thus, the remaining false arrest

claims concern plaintiff’s arrests at: (1) the residence on El Cajon Avenue; (2) the Mansion

Square business park, and (3) The Belfry. Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force arising out his

arrest at the Nugget Market also remains at issue. 

In addition to the claims for false arrest and excessive force, plaintiff alleges that

defendant’s police officers wrongfully threatened to arrest him on various occasions, and

committed perjury at his trial for resisting arrest and obstructing business operators or customers

at the Nugget market. He also alleges that defendant’s actions constitute discrimination and

harassment, are tantamount to “slavery,” and have damaged plaintiff’s reputation, resulting in

the revocation of his real estate license and leaving him with little hope for a career. See Compl., 

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2

 The court’s records show that plaintiff has at least seven cases pending in this district:

Sherman v. Chief Probation Officer, et al., 2:07-cv-2260-FCD-CMK; Sherman v. Yolo County,

Sheriff, 2:06-cv-0016-GEB-DAD; Sherman v. Yolo County Sheriff, 2:06-cv-0018-FCD-KJM;

Sherman v. CA Attorney Genaral, et al., 2:06-cv-0911-MCE-KJM; Sherman v. Yolo County

Chief Probation Officer, et al., 2:06-cv-2415-ALA; Sherman v. Yolo County Chief Probation

Officer, et al., 2:07-cv-2055-WBS-CMK; and, Sherman v. Yolo County Chief Probation Officer,

2:06-cv-0934 GEB KJM.

3

¶ 2; Suppl. Compl., p. 5. 

Defendant moves for summary judgment as to all these claims based on plaintiff’s failure

to present evidence showing that his constitutional rights were violated or that any of the alleged

incidents were the result of a municipal custom or policy. 

Plaintiff failed to file a timely opposition to defendant’s motion, and the court ordered

plaintiff to show cause why sanctions should not issue for such failure. The court also directed

him to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to defendant’s motion. Plaintiff

responded by filing a document styled, “Objection to Court Vacating Trial Date.” See docket no.

93. That document is largely unintelligible, and does not appear to contain any response to the

court’s order to show cause or defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Several weeks later,

plaintiff filed a document wherein he asserted that he had been incarcerated in the Sacramento

County Jail and was therefore unable to prosecute this case or to notify the court or defendants of

his change of address. He also claimed he had not received a copy of defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. 

Defendant responded to this filing by pointing to plaintiff’s activity in another case in this

district during the period of his alleged incapacitation.2

 In particular, the docket in Sherman v.

Yolo County Chief Probation Officer, 2:06-cv-0934 GEB KJM P, shows that plaintiff filed

several documents in that case – including a notice of his change of address – during the period

when defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed and this court’s order to show cause

issued. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (A court may take

judicial notice of its own records.). 

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3

 Items 1 through 3 concern the state court proceedings following plaintiff’s arrest for

trespassing at the Nugget Market on June 16, 2004.

4

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim that he was unable to notify defendant of his change of

address is disingenuous. Moreover, this district’s Local Rules provide that:

[E]ach party appearing in propria persona is under a continuing duty to

notify the Clerk and all other parties of any change of address or telephone

number of the attorney or the party if appearing in propria persona.

Absent such notice, service of documents at the prior address of the

attorney or party shall be fully effective. Separate notice shall be filed

with the Clerk and served on all parties in each action wherein an

appearance has been made.

E.D. Cal. L.R. 83-182(f). 

Defendant filed a proof of service of its motion for summary judgment showing service at

plaintiff’s address of record. See Proof of Service (docket no. 82). Under the rule, service at that

address was fully effective. Plaintiff failed to file a timely response to defendant’s motion, and

the court warned him that such failure would result in a recommendation of dismissal. See Jun3

13, 2007, Order (warning that court would recommend dismissal if plaintiff failed to oppose the

motion); see also Local Rules 78-230 and 11-110. The plaintiff’s failure to respond to that order

warrants dismissal on that basis alone. Nonetheless, the court has considered the merits of the

motion, including plaintiff’s subsequent, untimely filings which the court construes as an

opposition. See, e.g., docket no. 98. Having considered the record in its entirety, the court

further finds that defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be granted.

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant requests that this court take judicial notice of the following items: 

1. The proceedings in Yolo County Superior Court Case No. 04-4128, in which plaintiff

was charged and convicted by a jury of violating Cal. Pen. Code §§ 148(a) and 602.1 on October

12, 2004.3

2. The Yolo County Superior Court’s Docket, Minute and Commitment Sheet dated

October 8, 2004, for Yolo County Superior Court Case No. 04-4128 (certified copy attached as

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4

 Items 5 through 7 are documents concerning court proceedings following plaintiff’s

arrest for trespassing at Mansion Square on January 15, 2004, of which he was later acquitted.

5

 Item 8 concerns proceedings regarding the Nugget Market arrest, as well as other

arrests not at issue in this case. 

5

Ex. A to Sarno Decl.); 

3. The criminal first amended complaint filed by the Yolo County District Attorney’s

Office in case No. 04-4128 filed on October 7, 2004 (certified copy attached as Ex. B to Sarno

Decl.). 

4. The Decision of Acting Real Estate Commissioner, dated July 1, 2004, Case No. H3971 SAC, and the Decision of Acting Real Estate Commissioner, dated July 1, 2004, Case. No.

H-3972 SAC (decisions regarding revocation of plaintiff’s real estate license, true and correct

copies of which are attached as Exs. C and D to Sarno Decl.); 

5. The first amended criminal complaint filed against Mr. Sherman on March 12, 2004,

in People v. Sherman, Yolo County Superior Court Case No. 03-07477 (true and correct copies

of which are attached as Ex. E to Sarno Decl.);4

6. The March 19, 2004, Docket, Minute and Commitment Sheet for Yolo County

Superior Court Case No. 03-07477 (true and correct copies of which are attached as Ex. F. to

Sarno Decl.); 

7. The Misdemeanor Jury Trial Minutes for Yolo County Superior Court Case No. 03-

07477 (true and correct copies of which are attached as Ex. G to Sarno Decl.); and, 

8. The Proposed Settled Statement on Appeal in Yolo County Superior Court Case Nos.

04-3910, 04-4128 and 04-3801 (true and correct copies of which are attached as Ex. J to Sarno

Decl.).5

All requests for judicial notice are granted pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, as they do not

require the acceptance of facts “subject to reasonable dispute” and are capable of immediate and

accurate determination by resort to a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 

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See In re Tyrone F. Conner Corp., Inc., 140 B.R. 771, 781-82 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Fed. R. Evid.

201(b); Cal. ex rel. RoNo, L.L.C. v. Altus Fin. S.A., 344 F.3d 920, 931 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003). The

court also takes notice of its own records in this action. United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118,

119 (9th Cir. 1980) (a court may take judicial notice of its own records).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) avoids unnecessary trials in cases

with no disputed material facts. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of

Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52

(1986). 

Rule 56 serves to screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of

genuine disputes over facts material to the outcome of the case; e.g., issues that can only be

determined through presentation of testimony and evidence at trial such as credibility

determinations of conflicting testimony over dispositive facts.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

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 The nonmoving party with the burden of proof “must establish each element of his

claim with significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Barnett v. Centoni,

31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). A complete failure of proof on an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case renders all other facts immaterial, and entitles

the moving party to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

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precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

“genuine issue as to material fact,” if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Thus, to overcome summary judgment an opposing party must show a dispute that is both

genuine, and involving a fact that makes a difference in the outcome. Two steps are necessary. 

First, according to the substantive law, the court must determine what facts are material. 

Second, in light of the appropriate standard of proof, the court must determine whether material

factual disputes require resolution at trial. Id. at 248. 

When the opposing party has the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the

moving party need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v.

National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). The moving party need only point to matters

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex v. Cattret, 477

U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish

genuine material factual issues. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.6

 The

opposing party must demonstrate that the disputed facts are material, i.e., facts that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that

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 A verified complaint may be used as an affidavit in opposition to the motion. 

Schroeder v McDonald, 55 F. 3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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disputes are genuine, i.e., the parties’ differing versions of the truth require resolution at trial, see

T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 631. There can be no genuine issue as to any material fact where there is

a complete failure of proof as to an essential element of the nonmoving party's case because all

other facts are thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The opposing party may

not rest upon the pleadings’ mere allegations or denials, but must present evidence of specific

disputed facts. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.7

 Conclusory statements cannot defeat a properly

supported summary judgment motion. See Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir.

1983). 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 249, 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the proponent must adduce

evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American Int’l Group, Inc. v.

American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322).

If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at issue, summary judgment is

inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other

hand,”[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation

omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary judgment. 

B. Defendant’s Motion

Plaintiff’s poorly articulated claims concern three separate arrests, a subsequent trial

related to one of the arrests, his incarceration in connection with an arrest, various threats of

“unlawful” arrest, and alleged damage to plaintiff’s reputation as a result of these and other

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incidents. He sues defendant, City of Davis, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on alleged

violations of his constitutional rights. The City moves for summary judgment on the grounds

that there is no evidence that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated or that any alleged

violation is attributable to an official policy or custom promulgated by defendant.

Plaintiff bears the burden under § 1983 to establish: (1) a constitutional violation (2) that

is attributable to the municipality. See Morse v. North Coast Opportunities, 118 F.3d 1338, 1340

(9th Cir. 1997). He has failed to oppose defendant’s motion, and even construing his untimely

objections to the motion as an opposition, has not met his burden in opposing this motion. He

has not pointed to specific facts or probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material

fact as to either element. It is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial on

each of these elements to his cause of action. Therefore, to withstand defendant’s motion, he

may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings and must demonstrate a genuine

issue for trial, Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989), and he must do

so with evidence upon which a fair-minded jury “could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence

presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 252. He has failed to present any such evidence, and the

“court is not required to search the record sua sponte for some genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 1183. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be granted. 

1. No Constitutional Violations

Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated in connection with the

remaining arrests that are the subject of this action and the various incidents related thereto. 

Defendant have presented evidence showing that the arrests were supported by probable cause,

and that plaintiff’s related claims are insupportable. Plaintiff has failed to refute that evidence

and fails to point to specific facts showing a lack of probable cause for the arrests or to other

evidence showing a constitutional violation. 

////

////

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8

 Plaintiff did not submit a statement of undisputed or disputed facts in connection with

his objections (i.e., opposition) to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

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a. Validity of Arrests

Plaintiff alleges Davis police officers falsely arrested, or “kidnaped,” him on three

different occasions: (1) on September 2, 2003, at a residence on El Cajon Avenue (the “El Cajon

arrest”); (2) on January 15, 2004, at Mansion Square business park (“Mansion Square arrest”);

and, at The Belfry on December 9, 2004 (“Belfry arrest”). See Compl., ¶ 2; Suppl. Compl., ¶ 1. 

To prevail on a § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was

no probable cause to arrest him. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th

Cir. 1998) (per curiam). In establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the claim

of a citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate the basis

of the witness’ knowledge or interview other witnesses. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp.

Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). “Probable cause exists when, under the totality of

the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that

there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime.” United States v.

Buckner, 179 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Garza, 980 F.2d 546, 550

(9th Cir. 1992)). Probable cause does not require overwhelmingly convincing evidence, but only

“reasonably trustworthy information.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001). 

With regard to the El Cajon arrest, plaintiff has presented no evidence, other than his own

conclusory allegations, that the arrest was unsupported by probable cause. See Objection to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Objs.”)(docket no. 98). That arrest was

effected pursuant to a citizen’s complaint to the Davis Police Department after plaintiff refused

to leave his property. See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 2, Decl. of Keirith Briesenick

(“Briesenick Decl.”), ¶ 3, 11, and Ex. B thereto; Defs.’ Stmt. of Undisp. Facts (“SUF”), 11.8

 The

property owner had considered renting plaintiff a room earlier that day, but later decided against

it after discussing the possibility with the other renter. Briesenick Decl., ¶ 5. When the owner

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returned to the property to inform plaintiff of his decision, plaintiff refused to leave. The

property owner called the Davis police, who arrived on the scene and interviewed the owner and

plaintiff. Briesenick Decl., ¶¶ 4-6; SUF 5, 6, 42. Plaintiff insisted the owner had agreed to rent

him the room, but the owner denied any such agreement. Briesenick Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7. Plaintiff

persisted in his refusal to leave the premises, and after being escorted out of the residence, tried

to push his way back in. Briesenick Decl., ¶¶ 4-6; 10-11; SUF 8, 9, 10, 42. The officers then

took plaintiff into custody pursuant to the citizen’s arrest. Briesenick Decl., ¶¶ 3, 11; Ex. B

thereto; SUF 11, 12. Plaintiff was cited for trespassing pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 602 and for

willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a). 

Briesenick Decl., ¶¶ 11-12; Ex. B thereto; SUF 13. 

Although it is unclear why the property owner effected a citizen’s arrest rather than

having the officers arrest plaintiff, there was nonetheless probable cause for the arrest. The

arresting officers were summoned to the property by the owner after plaintiff refused to leave. 

Briesenick Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 5; Ex. A thereto; SUF 1, 2, 6. Upon the officers’ arrival at the property,

plaintiff persisted in his refusal to leave, and the officers took plaintiff into custody pursuant to

the owner’s citizen’s arrest of plaintiff. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person in the

officers’ position would have believed there was a “fair probability” that plaintiff was

trespassing on the owner’s property in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 602(m) (a person commits a

trespass if he or she willfully enters and occupies the real property or structures of any kind

without the consent of the owner). Plaintiff has presented no evidence to the contrary. 

Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. 

Similarly, plaintiff has presented no evidence establishing a lack of probable cause for

the Mansion Square arrest or The Belfry arrest. With regard to both arrests, the evidence

presented by defendant shows that plaintiff was arrested for trespassing at both places after he

refused to leave. Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that the arrests were unlawful because

both places were public. See Pl.’s Objs. (docket no. 98). However, he points to no specific facts

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 Section 602(n) was amended in 2003 to add subdivision (h) and subdivision (n) was

renumbered to subdivision (o). Current section 602(o) makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to leave

“land, real property, or structures belonging to or lawfully occupied by another and not open to

the general public.” Cal. Pen. Code § 602(o). 

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contradicting defendant’s evidence that plaintiff had been previously barred from both places. 

“[P]remises are not open to the public with regard to a particular individual when that

person has previously been barred from the property.” James v. City of Long Beach, 18 F. Supp.

2d 1078, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1998)). In

James, the court found that under the totality of the circumstances, an officer had probable cause

to believe the plaintiffs were committing trespass in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 602(n) where

they had been previously barred from the property.9

Here, the police had probable cause to arrest plaintiff at the Mansion Square business

park because plaintiff had been previously barred from that property in August 2003. Defs.’

Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 3, Decl. of Paul Doroshov (“Doroshov Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-7, Ex. A thereto;

SUF 14-17. When plaintiff returned there in January 2004, a business park merchant informed

the Davis police that plaintiff was there in violation of the owner’s wishes. Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J., Attach. 5, Decl. of Gutierrez (“Gutierrez Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-4; Ex. A thereto. Officers were

dispatched to the property and when they arrived on the scene, they reminded plaintiff that he

had been previously banned from the premises and asked him to leave. Gutierrez Decl, ¶¶ 3-5,

Ex. A thereto; SUF 19-21. When plaintiff refused to leave, he was arrested. Gutierrez Decl, 

¶¶ 3-5; SUF 22. 

Although plaintiff was not ultimately convicted of trespassing at Mansion Square, see

Sarno Decl., Exs. F, G, that is of no moment given the facts before the court. The ultimate

inquiry for purposes of probable cause is “not whether [plaintiff] was trespassing . . . [r]ather, it

is whether a reasonable officer had probable cause to think he could have been.” Blankenhorn v.

City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 475 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Tobias v. County of Putnam, 191 F.

Supp. 2d 364, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Whether or not the criminal trespassing charge would have

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led to an indictment or a conviction is of no moment. It is sufficient for the officer defendants to

show that they had arguable probable cause to believe that [the section 1983 plaintiff] was

committing a trespass.”)). The Court in Blankenhorn concluded there was probable cause to

arrest the § 1983 plaintiff for trespassing under California law where the plaintiff had previously

been banned from the mall property, and both the officers and plaintiff were aware of that fact. 

See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 472-73, 475 (noting that former § 602(n) does not provide that a

request to leave be contemporaneous with the trespass). 

As in Blankenhorn, the plaintiff in this case had been banned from the property, the

arresting officers were aware of that fact, they reminded plaintiff of it, and based on his refusal to

leave, arrested him for trespassing. Plaintiff has pointed to no facts or evidence contradicting

this evidence or otherwise raising an issue as to probable cause.

 Similarly, on December 9, 2004, the Davis police responded to a call from The Belfry, a

ministry for young adults, regarding a suspect who refused to leave the building. Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J., Attach. 4, Decl. of Glenn Glasgow (“Glasgow Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. A thereto; SUF 35. 

Dispatch officers informed the arresting officer that plaintiff was advised the previous Sunday

that he was not to return to the premises. Glasgow Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A; SUF 36. Upon arriving at

The Belfry, the pastor advised the arresting officer that the meeting plaintiff wished to attend

was for board members and was not open to the public, and that plaintiff refused to leave. 

Glasgow Decl., ¶¶ 6, 9; SUF 38. When the officer advised plaintiff to leave, plaintiff refused

and was arrested for trespassing. Glasgow Decl., ¶¶ 9, 10; SUF, 39-40. 

Under these circumstances, a reasonable person in the officers’ position would have

believed there was a “fair probability” that plaintiff was trespassing. Plaintiff has pointed to no

specific facts to contradict this conclusion, and has thus failed to meet his burden to show that a

constitutional violation occurred. Based on the foregoing, defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiff’s false arrest claims. 

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b. Search Incident to Arrest at The Belfry

In connection with the arrest at The Belfry, plaintiff alleges that he was searched without

probable cause. Suppl. Compl., ¶ 1. However, as discussed above, the arrest of plaintiff at The

Belfry was lawful. Accordingly, a search of plaintiff’s person incident to the lawful arrest was

per se reasonable. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Chimel v.

California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 513 F.2d 928,

931 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[I]t is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested.”).

Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that this search was anything other than a search

incident to a lawful arrest. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this

claim. 

c. Threats Regarding Arrests

In addition to his allegations of false arrest, plaintiff alleges that various Davis police

officers made “threats of false arrest/kidnap” on several occasions. See Compl., p. 4-6, ¶¶ 1-6.

Even assuming the threatened arrests would have been unconstitutional, a “threat to do an act

prohibited by the Constitution is [not] equivalent to doing the act itself.” See Gaut v. Sunn, 810

F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff has not elucidated which federal right he believes was

implicated by such threats. Moreover, he has failed to establish an actual deprivation of a

protected right. See Gaut, 810 F.2d at 925. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for “threats of false arrest.” 

d. Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the Davis police used excessive force in effecting his arrest at the

Nugget Market in June 2004. Compl., p. 3, ¶ 6. Plaintiff was arrested for trespassing, and when

the officers attempted to handcuff him, plaintiff pulled away and resisted. Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J., Attach. 7, Decl. of Rod Rifredi (“Rifredi Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-4; SUF 24-26. During the

struggle to handcuff him, plaintiff was taken to the ground and eventually handcuffed. Rifredi

Decl., ¶ 6; SUF 26-27. Plaintiff was charged with trespassing and resisting arrest pursuant to

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10 Section 148(a)(1) provides: “Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs

any . . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or

employment, . . . shall be [guilty of a misdemeanor].” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 694

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1)). Under California law, persons who violate

§ 148(a)(1) in a number of respects in the course of a single incident may be charged and

convicted only once. Smith, 394 F.3d at 699 n.5 (citing People v. Simon, 21 Cal. App. 88, 131 P.

102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913)). 

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Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1).10 Rifredi Decl., ¶ 8; Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 8, Decl. of

Alvina Tzang (“Tzang Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. A thereto; SUF 29. Plaintiff was subsequently

convicted by a jury of obstructing or intimidating business operators or customers, and of

resisting arrest pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1). Tzang Decl., ¶¶ 6-7, and Ex. B thereto;

Ex. B to Sarno Decl.; SUF 31.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim for excessive force is barred under Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), because that claim necessarily implicates the validity

of his conviction for resisting arrest. “Heck says that ‘if a criminal conviction arising out of the

same facts stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section

1983 damages are sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 695 (quoting

Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996)). “The relevant question is whether

success in a subsequent § 1983 suit would ‘necessarily imply’ or ‘demonstrate’ the invalidity of

the earlier conviction or sentence under § 148(a)(1).” Id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).

Here, following a jury trial, plaintiff was convicted for resisting arrest. See Tzang Decl.,

¶¶ 4-7; Ex. B thereto. His suit here claims that there was no probable cause to support the arrest

on that ground. Obviously, the conviction implies that force was necessary to effect the arrest

and any claim to the contrary here necessarily implies the invalidity of that conviction. The

question here raises the subtlety between the prior judgment (i.e. the conviction) that plaintiff

resisted and some force was necessary, and the allegation in this case that the force used was

greater than that reasonably necessary. Although the Ninth Circuit held in Smith v. City of

Hemet, that a § 1983 action for excessive force is not necessarily barred by Heck, that holding

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was predicated in part on the fact that the plaintiff’s conviction in that case was pursuant to a

plea rather than a trial. Smith, 394 F.3d at 693, 699, n. 5. The Court recalled its holding in

Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001), that a § 1983 action is “not barred by

Heck unless the alleged excessive force occurred at the time the offense under § 148(a)(1) was

being committed.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 699 (emphasis in original) (noting that success in § 1983

case for excessive force subsequent to an arrest would not invalidate a conviction under §

148(a)(1)). 

In Smith, the plaintiff pled guilty to resisting arrest rather than being convicted at trial

and the Court was unable to determine the factual basis for the conviction. The Court reasoned

that “the excessive force may have been employed against him subsequent to the time he

engaged in the conduct that constituted the basis for his conviction [under § 148(a)(1)],” and it

was therefore “entirely possible that . . . his plea was based on only those actions . . . prior to,

rather than at the time of, the arrest.” Id. at 699, n. 5.

The Court noted that such a possibility would not be at issue where a plaintiff was

convicted by a jury for violating § 148(a)(1). Where a defendant is charged with a single-act

offense such as § 148(a)(1), but there are multiple acts involved, each of which could serve as

the basis for a conviction, “a jury does not determine which specific act or acts form the basis of

the conviction.” Id. at 699, n. 5 (citing People v. McIntyre, 115 Cal. App. 3d 899, 910-11 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1981)). Because the jury must only agree that a culpable act occurred on the relevant

date, “the exact time or sequence in relation to the [offense] is not material.” Id. (quoting

McIntyre, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 910-11). “Thus, the jury’s verdict necessarily determines the

lawfulness of the officers’ actions throughout the whole course of the defendant’s conduct, and

any action alleging the use of excessive force would ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction.’” Id. at 699, n. 5 (citing Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1410

(Cal. Ct. App. 2002)) (emphasis in original).

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Because plaintiff was convicted at trial, by a jury, for violating § 148(a)(1) in connection

with his arrest for trespassing at the Nugget Market, his claim for excessive force in connection

with that arrest is barred under Heck, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that

claim must be granted. 

e. Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff’s complaint and its addendum are strewn with allegations that Davis police

officers have committed “invidious,” “intentional” and/or religious discrimination against him –

a “party of one.” See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 2, 6; Suppl. Compl., ¶¶ 2-3 . In connection with these

allegations, plaintiff cites Olech v. Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), in which the

Court found that plaintiffs had stated a claim pursuant to the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment “when a powerful public official pick[ed] [on them] out of sheer

vindictiveness.” Id. at 387. The gist of plaintiff’s allegations in this regard is that his frequent

arrests are motivated by defendant’s “vindictiveness” toward him, rather than by his own

actions. 

To maintain an action under the equal protection clause for selective law enforcement or

discriminatory prosecution, the following showing is required: (1) that others are generally not

prosecuted for the same conduct; and (2) the decision to single out the defendant was based upon

impermissible grounds such as race, religion, or the exercise of constitutional rights. See Church

of Scientology v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 823 F.2d 1310, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988); see also United States v. Dumas, 64 F.3d 1427, 1431 (9th

Cir. 1995) (“Equal protection is violated when the decision to prosecute is based upon

impermissible factors such as race.”). 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that others in Davis are not prosecuted for

trespassing, nor has he pointed to any evidence that the officers’ decisions to arrest him were

based on any other grounds than plaintiff’s violating the law. To the contrary, defendant has

presented evidence that the officers who arrested plaintiff in connection with the incidents

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discussed above, did so only for that legitimate purpose. See, e.g., Glasgow Decl., ¶ 11

(declaring that, as to The Belfry arrest, he arrested plaintiff only “because he was on the property

of another person without their consent”); Briesenick Decl., ¶ 13 (declaring that the only reason

he arrested plaintiff in connection with the El Cajon arrest was because he was on the property of

another person without their consent); Gutierrez Decl., ¶ 8 (declaring that the only reason

plaintiff was arrested was because he was on another’s property without their consent and

refused to leave). Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to contradict these statements and he has

failed to meet his burden in opposing this motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Indeed, the

evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the police officers arrested plaintiff when they

concluded he violated the law. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, defendant is entitled

to summary judgment.

f. Attack by Inmate

Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated in the Yolo County Detention Center, he

was housed with a felony offender who attacked him. Suppl. Compl., ¶ 3. The offense for

which he was incarcerated at the time is unclear. In any event, plaintiff seems to allege that the

injuries he sustained from that attack are attributable to the City as they flowed from his “unjust

incarceration.” Id.

Plaintiff does not elucidate the theory under which he seeks to hold the city liable for

these injuries, and the court will not provide one for him. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to

present any evidence that defendant was responsible for placing him in that particular cell or that

it was even aware of the danger to him. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)

(Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment if

they are deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm at the hands of other prisoners; the official must

know of a risk of harm and fail to take reasonable actions to mitigate or eliminate that risk.).

Here, plaintiff does not point to any evidence showing that defendant knew plaintiff

would incur injuries when placed with his cellmate. Nor does he show that defendant was even

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responsible for making that particular housing decision. Indeed, the City does not participate in

the operation of the Yolo County Detention Center and had no role in assigning plaintiff to a

particular cell. See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 6, Decl. of Steve Pierce, ¶ 3; SUF 47. 

Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

g. Alleged Damage to Plaintiff’s Reputation

Plaintiff makes additional claims under § 1983, alleging that the actions of the Davis

police officers damaged his reputation and impaired his ability to maintain a living. See Compl.,

p. 3, ¶ 6; p. 5, ¶ 6; p. 8, ¶¶ 3-4, 6; Suppl. Compl. p. 2, ¶ 2. In particular, plaintiff alleges that

defendant slandered his name in connection with his arrest and trial for the 2004 Nugget Market

incident, that employees of the Davis summer youth program slandered his name “in front of

kids” by ordering him to leave and referring to previous arrests, and that defendant’s alleged

slander resulted in the revocation of his real estate license. 

“[R]eputation, without more, is not a protected constitutional interest.” WMX Techs., Inc.

v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1999). Damage to reputation is not actionable under 

§ 1983 unless it is accompanied by loss of a constitutionally-protected property or liberty interest

in conjunction with the alleged injury to reputation. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1532

(9th Cir. 1991) (citing Vanelli v. Reynolds School Dist. No., 667 F.2d 773, 777-78 (9th Cir.

1982)). A plaintiff may allege either that the injury to reputation was inflicted in connection

with a federally-protected right; or (2) that the injury to reputation caused the denial of a

federally- protected right. Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 645

(9th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff has failed to allege that the summer camp employees were city employees. 

Neither has he presented evidence that their statements were made in connection with any

constitutional right, or otherwise resulted in the denial of a federally-protected right. With

regard to his claims regarding revocation of his real estate license, plaintiff presents no evidence

that defendant was in any way connected with that event. In fact, based on the evidence

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11 The administrative law judge’s decision references plaintiff’s arrest by Woodland

police officers in 2003, and his subsequent conviction for violating Cal. Pen. Code § 602.1

(interfering with lawful business of public agency); Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1) (resisting or

obstructing a police officer); and Cal. Pen. Code § 243.3 (battery against a public transit

passenger). See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of Sarno in Supp. Thereof, Ex. C, pp. 2, 5; Ex.

D, p. 3, 5-6. 

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submitted by defendant, plaintiff’s real estate license was revoked pursuant to a decision of the

Acting Real Estate Commissioner, which was based on plaintiff’s convictions in 2003 for crimes

of moral turpitude, i.e, convictions based on an altercation on a public bus. See Exs. C and D to

Sarno Decl.; SUF 48.11 The administrative law judge found that plaintiff’s crimes and other

course of conduct were inapposite to the qualifications and duties of a real estate licensee and

that his license should be revoked on that basis. Id.

To the extent plaintiff alleges his conviction in connection with the Nugget Market arrest

constitutes defamation, plaintiff’s claim is Heck-barred. Plaintiff would have to show that the

conviction was wrongful in order to make out any kind of claim for defamation. He has failed to

make that showing. 

Because there is no evidence that defendant’s employees defamed plaintiff in connection

with any constitutional right, or that such action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional

right, defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim should be granted. Further,

because a defamation claim in connection with plaintiff’s conviction for trespassing and resisting

arrest at the Nugget Market in 2004 are barred under Heck, summary judgment in defendant’s

favor is appropriate on this basis as well.

h. Claims Alleging Denial of Fair Trial Are Heck barred

Plaintiff alleges that various Davis police officers perjured themselves during plaintiff’s

trial for charges stemming from the Nugget Market incident, thereby violating his right to a fair

trial under the Sixth Amendment. Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim for such alleged conduct is

barred under Heck. As previously explained, a plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim for an

unconstitutional conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged or invalidated. 

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Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff’s claim of an unfair trial “necessarily implies” the validity of

his conviction. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the conviction has been reversed,

expunged or invalidated. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be

granted as to this claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 

2. No Municipal Liability

Finally, defendant is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that the incidents at issue were the result of an official policy or custom attributable

to defendant.

 Since there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, counties and municipalities

may be held liable under § 1983 only upon a showing that the municipality inflicted the alleged

constitutional tort. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280

(1977); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Gibson v.

County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002).

A plaintiff can establish municipal liability in one of three ways. Gillette v. Delmore, 979

F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992). “First, the plaintiff may prove that a city employee committed

the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a ‘longstanding

practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local

governmental entity.’” Id. (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). 

Second, the plaintiff may show that the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an

official with final policy-making authority such that the alleged tort itself constituted an act of

official governmental policy. Id. (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81

(1986)) (internal quotations omitted). Third, the plaintiff may establish that such an official

ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional act. Id. at 1346-47 (citing City of St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123-24 (1988) (plurality opinion)). 

“After proving that one of the three circumstances existed, a plaintiff must also show that

the circumstance was (1) the cause in fact and (2) the proximate cause of the constitutional

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deprivation.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir.1981); see also

City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 266-68 (1987) (discussing causation requirement in

section 1983 municipal liability cases).” Id.

As discussed above, plaintiff has failed to present evidence in support of his claims that

defendant violated his constitutional rights. Even assuming he had, plaintiff provides no

evidence showing a governmental policy or custom promulgated by defendant that caused the

alleged deprivations. Rather, plaintiff makes vague allegations that defendant’s officers are

corrupt, malicious and generally out to get him. See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 1, 2, 4; Suppl. Compl., 

¶¶ 3, 4. 

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that any of the individual officers who arrested him during

the incidents at issue were officials with “final policy-making authority.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at

1346. The Ninth Circuit has refused to hold that rank-and-file police officers are “officials with

final policy-making authority.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 920 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The police officers who shot Bahena were

not ‘officials with final policy-making authority’ and they were not ordered to shoot by the

police chief, the City Council or anyone else possessing final policy-making authority.”) and Los

Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 882-83, 890 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating a

similar proposition)). Neither has plaintiff presented any evidence that an official with

policymaking authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional act. 

Although plaintiff has submitted an untimely affidavit stating that the “mayor and council

members” of Davis have failed to do anything to prevent, or remedy or correct the “violative

acts” referenced in the complaint, these unsupported, conclusory allegations are insufficient to

defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Pl.’s Objs. (docket no. 98). 

Indeed, as discussed above, the Davis Police officers had probable cause to arrest

plaintiff on the incidents at issue. Plaintiff has presented no evidence showing that the officers

arrested plaintiff for any reason other than his having committed a crime, and certainly no

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evidence of an official policy, custom, or established pattern and practice of arresting without

probable cause. Accordingly, he has failed to meet his burden of opposing summary judgment

on this ground as well. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Furthermore, his failure to establish this

element is fatal to all of his claims under section 1983. A complete failure of proof on an

essential element to a cause of action renders all others immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be granted in its entirety.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted in its entirety, and judgment be

entered in its favor; and,

2. The Clerk be directed to close this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 25, 2008.

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