Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00042/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00042-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Johnson
Plaintiff
Remotigoe
Defendant
Shaw
Defendant
Tally
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

C/O SHAW, et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00042 LJO DLB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. RULE 

12(B)(6)

[ECF No. 23]

Plaintiff Timothy Johnson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action. Plaintiff filed this action on January 3, 2013. On October 9, 

2013, the Court screened the complaint and found it failed to state a cognizable claim. Plaintiff 

was granted an opportunity to file an amended complaint. On October 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). On October 20, 2014, the Court screened the FAC and 

found it stated a cognizable claim against Defendant Remotigoe for violation of the First 

Amendment. The Court granted Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint or notify 

the Court of his willingness to proceed on the cognizable claim. On November 17, 2014, 

Plaintiff notified the Court of his willingness to proceed on the remaining cognizable claim. On 

December 2, 2014, the Court dismissed all other claims and Defendants and directed Plaintiff to 

complete and return service documents. On December 31, 2014, the U.S. Marshal Service was 

ordered to serve the complaint on Defendant Remotigoe. On March 9, 2015, Defendant 

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Remotigoe filed a motion to dismiss the FAC under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that 

Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The motion is 

deemed submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

I. Summary of First Amended Complaint1

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California State Prison in Corcoran, California, 

where the events giving rise to this action occurred.

Plaintiff alleges the following. Plaintiff states he is a high risk patient who suffers from 

hypokinesia with a left ventricular hypertrophy. He states his heart only operates at a 40% 

capacity which requires him to take nitroglycerin pills. He further states he is in the Mental 

Health Service Delivery System.

On August 27, 2013, Plaintiff was called from his housing unit to the medical clinic for 

his weekly blood pressure check. As Plaintiff approached the clinic, he stopped Correctional 

Officer Lopez outside of the clinic and asked him who was working in the clinic that morning. 

After Plaintiff was informed who was working in the clinic, he notified Lopez that he wished to 

refuse any medical attention from any staff member who he had filed a complaint against or who 

he is currently in litigation against. As he was having this conversation with Lopez, Defendant

Remotigoe approached. Lopez advised Remotigoe that Plaintiff was refusing treatment. 

Remotigoe then told Plaintiff, “Johnson, ain’t nothing wrong with you. Nurse Tally told me what 

happened already, so stop being so dramatic and come in the clinic.” Plaintiff responded that he 

“would rather die than to be treated and abused by these medical staff and personnel.” Defendant 

Remotigoe responded, “You have no rights that say you can refuse or pick who you want to be 

treated by.” Plaintiff then asked to speak to a medical supervisor, but his request was denied. 

Plaintiff then told Remotigoe that he was obstructing his medical care, to which Remotigoe 

stated, “I ain’t got time for this shit! Is you coming in or not?” Plaintiff again asked for a medical 

supervisor but was denied. Plaintiff then advised Remotigoe that he would be filing a complaint 

against him, at which time Remotigoe stated, “Read my lips. You are not the only who knows 

 

1 The Court summarizes only the portion of the FAC relevant to Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation.

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how to file paperwork; I’m not Nurse Tally.” Plaintiff states that Remotigoe filed a false rules 

violation report two days later in retaliation.

II. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6)

A. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 

1955 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted); Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 

(9th Cir. 2011); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must 

accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the non-moving party. Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); 

Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007); Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 

F.3d 992, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2006); Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 

2000). Further, although the pleading standard is now higher, the Ninth Circuit has continued to 

emphasize that prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their 

pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 

680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

B. Analysis

1. First Amendment 

a. Legal Standard

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to 

petition the government may support a § 1983 claim. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 

(9th Cir. 2011); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. 

Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

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exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 658 at 1104; Brodheim v. Cry, 

584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

b. Discussion

Defendant Remotigoe alleges that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim 

because Plaintiff’s act of threatening to file a grievance was not protected conduct, Defendant’s 

conduct would not chill an ordinary person from engaging in First Amendment activity, and 

Defendant’s motive for issuing the RVR was not retaliatory in nature but legitimate. 

Defendant is correct that according to the complaint, Plaintiff’s conduct outside the 

medical clinic was obstructive. Plaintiff refused to accept treatment, which he is entitled to do. 

However, Plaintiff became increasingly argumentative with correctional officers and eventually 

threatened Defendant with a lawsuit. Defendant persuasively argues that threatening Defendant 

when Defendant was attempting to carry out his duties as a correctional officer is not protected 

speech. See, e.g., Jones v. Book, 404 Fed.Appx. 169, 170 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished decision). 

Plaintiff filed his grievance after Defendant issued the RVR; therefore, Plaintiff cannot show that 

the RVR was issued because of Plaintiff’s protected conduct.

Defendant also persuasively argues that his actions could not chill a person from 

protected conduct. Defendant’s version of events in the RVR agrees with Plaintiff’s version as 

stated in the complaint. The RVR was therefore accurate according to both parties. While the 

issuance of a false RVR in retaliation for protected conduct could chill a person from engaging in 

protected conduct, Plaintiff fails to show how an accurate RVR would do so. Thus, Defendant is 

correct that Plaintiff fails to establish this element of his claim.

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s version of events establishes that Defendant’s 

actions were motivated not out of retaliation but out of legitimate penological interests of safety 

and security. According to the complaint, Plaintiff was disruptive outside the medical clinic. 

Plaintiff engaged in argument with Lopez and then with Defendant. Plaintiff refused to go into 

the medical clinic, and when Defendant again asked him to do so, Plaintiff threatened him with a 

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lawsuit. Correctional officers are expected to document inmate misbehavior. See Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3312. Based on Plaintiff’s version of the events, Plaintiff fails to show that 

Defendant’s actions were motivated by retaliation; rather, the obvious explanation is that 

Defendant issued the RVR because of Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior. Indeed, Plaintiff’s version 

agrees with Defendant’s statement of facts in the RVR. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to establish this 

prong of his retaliation claim as well.

2. Qualified Immunity

Defendant further claims he is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate 

Plaintiff’s rights and his conduct was objectively reasonable.

Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and 

like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” 

Mueller v. Auer, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages unless their conduct 

violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). “Qualified 

immunity balances two important interests - the need to hold public officials accountable when 

they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, 

and liability when they perform their duties reasonably,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 

129 S.Ct. 808 (2009), and it protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law,” Mallei v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986). 

In resolving the claim of qualified immunity, the Court must determine whether, taken in 

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right, and if 

so, whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 

(2001); Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993. While often beneficial to address in that order, the Court has 

discretion to address the two-step inquiry in the order it deems most suitable under the 

circumstances. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (overruling holding in Saucier that the two-step inquiry 

must be conducted in that order, and the second step is reached only if the court first finds a 

constitutional violation); Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993-94. 

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Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As 

previously discussed, threatening an officer is not protected conduct. Thus, Defendant is entitled 

to qualified immunity.

Even if the Court were to consider Defendant’s actions as violating Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment rights, a reasonable officer in Defendant’s position could have believed that his 

conduct was lawful. Plaintiff was increasingly disruptive outside the clinic to the point where he 

threatened Defendant. Defendant could reasonably believe that Plaintiff’s conduct might lead to 

violence, and therefore he did not act unreasonably in issuing the RVR. Accordingly, Defendant 

is entitled to qualified immunity.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Remotigoe’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the 

grounds that the FAC fails to state a claim be GRANTED; and

2. Since the deficiencies at issue are not curable through amendment, Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012), the FAC be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE 

and without leave to amend, thereby terminating the case. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty 

one (21) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file 

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” A party may respond to another party’s objections by 

filing a response within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of that party’s 

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objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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