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Parties Involved:
Lorenzo R. Sanders
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2007 Decided May 11, 2007

No. 05-3133

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LORENZO R. SANDERS,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 05-3155

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00055-01)

(No. 02cr00055-02)

Howard B. Katzoff, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for appellant Lorenzo R. Sanders. Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant John

Turner. With them on the briefs was A. J. Kramer, Federal

USCA Case #05-3133 Document #1040063 Filed: 05/11/2007 Page 1 of 12
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1

 Sanders’ name was misspelled as “Saunders” in earlier

proceedings. See 8/25/05 Tr. at 13.

Public Defender. Shawn Moore, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, entered an appearance.

John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A.

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and David B.

Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In this appeal, the court must

decide whether the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161

et seq., was violated in the prosecutions of Lorenzo R. Sanders1

and John Turner. The Act requires criminal trials to commence

within seventy days after a defendant is indicted or appears in

court, whichever is later, after certain periods prescribed by the

statute are excluded. Following appellants’ convictions by a

jury, the Supreme Court clarified the operation of the Act in

view of its twin goals of effectuating the interests of the public

and of the defendant in a speedy trial. See Zedner v. United

States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1984 (2006). Given the guidance of this

new decision, we hold that the district court did not make the

necessary findings to support its exclusion of certain periods of

delay. As a result, appellants’ rights under the Act were violated

and our only recourse is to vacate the convictions and remand to

the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment. See

id. at 1989-90.

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I.

Sanders and Turner were indicted on February 5, 2002, on

charges stemming from the execution of a search warrant the

month before, when they were found in an apartment containing

evidence of a drug trafficking operation and a loaded pistol that

was stowed between the headboard and a bedroom wall. A trial

commenced in December 2002 that resulted in a conviction of

both appellants of possession with intent to distribute a

detectable amount of heroin; the jury was unable to reach a

verdict on the remaining counts. The district court declared a

mistrial on the deadlocked counts and granted a motion for a

new trial on the heroin count because a poll of the jury revealed

that its verdict was not unanimous.

A second trial was held in September 2003 that resulted in

convictions of both appellants of possession with intent to

distribute cocaine base and heroin and possession of a firearm

by a felon; the jury acquitted on the charge of possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. On appeal,

this court vacated the original sentences, imposed on March 12,

2004, in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

United States v. Saunders, No. 04-3040 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2005);

United States v. Turner, No. 04-3024 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2005).

On remand, the district court sentenced Sanders to concurrent

terms of imprisonment of 168 months and Turner to concurrent

terms of imprisonment of 200 months. Sanders and Turner now

challenge their convictions, contending among other things that

they were denied their right to a speedy trial.

II.

The Speedy Trial Act provides that “the trial of a

defendant . . . shall commence within seventy days from the

filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment,

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or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial

officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever

date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act lists periods

of delay that are excludable from the seventy-day maximum, see

id. § 3161(h). On appeal, Sanders and Turner contend that their

convictions must be reversed and the indictment dismissed

because more than seventy non-excludable days elapsed before

their trial began. The speedy trial challenge is reviewed de novo

on matters of law, United States v. Fonseca, 435 F.3d 369, 371

(D.C. Cir. 2006), and for clear error as to findings of fact, see

United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

We first address the government’s waiver arguments and then

turn to appellants’ contentions that not enough days were

properly excluded by the district court to satisfy the Act.

A.

The Speedy Trial Act provides that “[f]ailure of the

defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial . . . constitute[s]

waiver of the right to dismissal.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); see

also United States v. McNeil, 911 F.2d 768, 772 (D.C. Cir.

1990) (dictum). The government maintains that appellants

waived their rights because, first, they failed to file a formal

motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial, and

second, they failed to reassert their right at the second trial.

Neither argument has merit. 

Prior to the first trial, the district court alerted the parties

that the Clerk’s Office had discovered a possible Speedy Trial

Act issue. After consulting the parties’ counsel as to which

periods of delay might be excludable, the district court stated:

“nobody has made a motion, but I’m going to deem defense

motions to dismiss to have been made for violations of the

Speedy Trial Act, and . . . I’m going to deny the motions.” The

government maintains that, notwithstanding the district court

having deemed the motion filed, because appellants themselves

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never filed a formal motion, the speedy trial right has been

waived. However, it would be odd if a defendant relinquished

a right after the district court acknowledged the issue and

resolved it by ruling on the merits. By deeming a motion to

dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds to have been

filed, the district court obviated any need for appellants to raise

the issue themselves. The government points to no reason for

adding an unneeded layer of complexity to the statutory scheme.

See also United States v. Arnold, 113 F.3d 1146, 1148-49 (10th

Cir. 1997).

The government further maintains, albeit only in a footnote

to its brief, cf. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 546

(D.C. Cir. 2006), that appellants waived their rights under the

Act by failing to renew their speedy trial objection at the second

trial. It relies on United States v. Akers, 702 F.2d 1145 (D.C.

Cir. 1983), where the court emphasized that a defendant cannot

justifiably rely on a judge making identical evidentiary rulings

at a retrial following a mistrial, see id. at 1147-48. Akers does

not support a requirement to relitigate all pretrial issues before

a second trial. Although the partial mistrial and partial grant of

a new trial nullified the original trial, those rulings did not

nullify all proceedings. For example, the indictment underlying

the speedy trial issue was not compromised by the first jury’s

failure to reach a unanimous verdict on all counts. Further, the

Act provides for a separate seventy-day clock to run upon a

mistrial or new trial, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e), and nowhere

provides that the original speedy trial right is affected when the

right is not reasserted upon retrial. In any event, the law-of-thecase doctrine underlying Akers does not support the

government’s position. In Christianson v. Colt Industries

Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988), the Supreme Court

summarized the doctrine as providing that “when a court decides

upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the

same issues in subsequent stages of the same case.” For midUSCA Case #05-3133 Document #1040063 Filed: 05/11/2007 Page 5 of 12
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trial evidentiary rulings, a new trial will result in different

factual and evidentiary circumstances occasioning a new

exercise of the district court’s discretion. However, an alleged

violation of the Speedy Trial Act will not change between trials

and is constrained by the principle that “the same issue

presented a second time in the same case in the same court

should lead to the same result.” LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d

1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). Thus, requiring a

defendant to re-raise the issue upon a retrial would be an

exercise in wasteful formality.

B.

The speedy trial clock begins to run when a defendant is

indicted or first appears in court, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(c)(1). For a case involving multiple defendants, the Act

excludes “[a] reasonable period of delay when the defendant is

joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial

has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.” Id.

§ 3161(h)(7). Consistent with the statute, the parties agree that

the clock began to run when Sanders first appeared in court on

March 4, 2002. They also agree that the clock was tolled (after

59 days had elapsed) from May 3, 2002, through July 2, 2002,

when the district court was considering appellants’ motion to

suppress evidence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), and stopped

again on July 25, 2002, when appellants filed another motion.

This adds up to 81 days, 11 in excess of maximum prescribed by

the Act.

When the district court addressed the speedy trial issue on

August 5, 2002, it acknowledged that “[t]he Speedy Trial

Act . . . confers real rights which in this case have been bruised

but . . . not broken.” In denying relief under the Act, the district

court relied principally on appellants’ prospective waiver of

their speedy trial rights when they agreed, before the speedy trial

clock had run, to a trial date of August 5, 2002. In Zedner,

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however, the Supreme Court held that a district court may not

rely upon a defendant’s prospective waiver of speedy trial rights

because such an approach would bypass the Act’s

comprehensive scheme for granting ends-of-justice continuances

and would eliminate consideration of the public’s interest in a

speedy trial. 126 S. Ct. at 1985. The government agrees with

appellants that this aspect of the district court’s reasoning is

unsustainable after Zedner. However, the government maintains

that the district court properly excluded two periods of delay

from the speedy trial tally: fifteen days (April 18 through May

2, 2002) as either motions preparation time under 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(1) or an ends-of-justice continuance under

§ 3161(h)(8)(A), and twenty-seven additional days (March 22

until April 18, 2002) attributable to the unavailability of Sanders

under § 3161(h)(3).

1. 

Section 3161(h)(1)(F) provides that “delay resulting from

any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the

conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of,

such motion,” may be excluded from the speedy trial

calculation. In United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440 (D.C.

Cir. 1987), relying on the non-exhaustive nature of

§ 3161(h)(1)(A)-(J), the court noted that “time allotted by the

trial judge for preparation of motions” may be excluded in the

“sound discretion” of the district court. In that case, the district

court “explicitly exercised” its discretion in granting the

government’s motion to exclude such time as was requested by

the defendants. Id. at 1444. This court limited this allowance to

instances “where the trial court has expressly granted time for

the purpose,” lest a party’s “continuous and leisurely preparation

of motions” be used for indefinite delay. Id.; see United States

v. Tibboel, 753 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1985); see also United

States v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d 232, 238 (1st Cir. 1982).

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Unlike Wilson, the government here never filed a motion to

exclude days under the general language of § 3161(h)(1).

However, the government maintains that the district court was

exercising its discretion to exclude days for motion-preparation

time in the following exchange with defense counsel:

MR. POE: . . . There’s a substantial amount, in my

view, of outstanding discovery. There may be

disputes. I don’t have any problem with if the Court

wants to set a date for filing motions doing that. I

would probably file -- in addition to whatever motions

I file -- a standard motion asking to -- to late file any

additional motions relating to discovery not yet

produced. That would -- if the Court has concerns

about the Speedy Trial Act, I think those motions

would toll it. . . .

THE COURT: If we were to set a motions date today

with appropriate reservation for incomplete discovery,

how much time do you need for that -- for those

motions? A couple of weeks?

MR. POE: A couple of weeks is fine, Your Honor.

Maybe the -- Friday the 3rd or Thursday the 2nd.

* * *

THE COURT: Defense motions are due May 3. The

defendants may take a save on discovery that’s not yet

complete. They don’t even need to file a motion to late

file. Some motions must be filed by May 3.

Nothing in this exchange suggests that the district court

contemplated reserving time under the Act, as distinct from

setting a routine deadline for motions to be filed. Therefore,

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because the government made no request to exclude time from

the speedy trial calculation at the April 18 hearing and the

district court never acknowledged the possibility of excluding

days under § 3161(h)(1), this provision cannot serve as a basis

for discounting the fifteen-day period. 

2.

Section 3161(h)(8)(A) authorizes the exclusion of “[a]ny

period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any

judge . . . if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of

his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a

speedy trial.” The district court’s reasoning must be set forth “in

the record of the case, either orally or in writing,” id., and

“without on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion under

§ 3161(h)(8),” Zedner, 126 S. Ct. at 1989. The government

maintains that the district court engaged in the required on-therecord balancing when it denied appellants’ motion to dismiss

on August 5, 2002, and, therefore, the fifteen days from April 18

through May 2 are excludable under the ends-of-justice

exception. 

In Zedner, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he best

practice, of course, is for a district court to put its findings on the

record at or near the time when it grants the continuance.” Id. at

1989 n.7. The district court made no such findings when it set

the May 3 deadline on April 18. It was not until August 5 that

the district court made its only findings:

I note that on April 18th, at a time when there were still

I think 25 days left on the Speedy Trial clock, there

was some discussion of the Speedy Trial Act on the

record, and Mr. Poe noted that if I was concerned about

the Speedy Trial Act clock, he was going to file

motions to late-file his motions, and that would stop

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the running of the Speedy Trial Act clock. I expected

those motions to late-file promptly, and I didn’t get

them until Mr. Poe filed his [other pretrial] motions.

So on some rough justice basis, it seems to me, it is in

the interest of justice to add those 15 days to the clock.

The district court clearly erred in characterizing the April 18

exchange. Far from expecting a prompt motion to late-file, the

district court had advised defense counsel that “[t]hey d[id]n’t

even need to file a motion to late file.” And neither defense

counsel nor the district court suggested that a motion to late-file

was desired or required to toll the speedy trial clock.

Additionally, insofar as the district court made no mention of the

countervailing interests, its August 5 statement fails to meet the

Act’s requirement of on-the-record findings that a continuance

“outweigh[ed] the best interest of the public and the defendant

in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). After Zedner, the

ends-of-justice exception cannot support exclusion of the fifteen

days from April 18 through May 2. Nor, as the government

acknowledges, can this court engage in harmless error analysis,

much less remand the case for the district court to engage in the

proper balancing now; the Act “does not permit those findings

to be made on remand.” Zedner, 126 S. Ct. at 1988.

3. 

Section 3161(h)(3)(A) excludes “[a]ny period of delay

resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant or

an essential witness.” Sanders was not present at the March 22,

2002 status hearing because he was in custody in the State of

Maryland. A writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum was issued

on April 2, 2002, to return Sanders to the District of Columbia,

and he was present at the next status hearing on April 18, which

apparently was delayed by a week in order to ensure Sanders’

presence. The government therefore maintains that the twentyseven-day period from March 22 until April 18 is excludable. 

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However, § 3161(h)(3)(B) modifies this exclusion by

providing:

For purposes of [§ 3161(h)(3)(A)], a defendant or an

essential witness shall be considered absent when his

whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he is

attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his

whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence.

For purposes of such subparagraph, a defendant or an

essential witness shall be considered unavailable

whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence

for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he

resists appearing at or being returned for trial.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, whereas a

defendant whose whereabouts are unknown stops the clock for

as long as the government exercises due diligence to apprehend

him, where a defendant’s whereabouts are known only

unavailability “for trial” tolls the speedy trial clock. Setting

aside whether an exercise of due diligence could justify a

twenty-seven-day delay in transferring a prisoner from nearby

Charles County, Maryland to the District of Columbia, cf. 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H), Sanders’ whereabouts were known to

the government, but he was not unavailable “for trial.” The

government cites no authority to support its countertextual

reading. Because Sanders missed only a status hearing, and

because the district court made no findings that he was

unavailable “for trial,” the twenty-seven-day period is not

excludable from the seventy-day maximum.

Accordingly, in light of Zedner, we hold that appellants’

Speedy Trial Act rights were violated. Therefore, the court is

obliged to reverse the convictions and remand the cases to the

district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment. See

Zedner, 126 S. Ct. at 1989-90. The district court shall, in the

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2

 We do not reach either appellants’ challenges to the jury

instructions and the sufficiency of evidence as to the gun charges or

Turner’s challenges to the exclusion of testimony under FED.R.CRIM.

P. 403, the refusal to disclose the identity of a confidential informant,

the denial of the severance of appellants’ trials pursuant to FED. R.

CRIM. P. 14, and whether his sentencing comported with 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a) and Booker, 543 U.S. 220.

first instance, determine whether to dismiss the indictments with

or without prejudice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a); see also id. §

3288.2 

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