Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01217/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01217-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Myra M. Samiere
Plaintiff
San Francisco Unified School District
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYRA M. SAMIERE

Plaintiff, No. C 07-1217 PJH

v.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED 

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff Myra M. Samiere filed this action on March 1, 2007, against defendant San

Francisco Unified School District (“SFUSD”), alleging discrimination in employment, in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. SFUSD moved for

judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that the action was time-barred under 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f)(1) because plaintiff filed her complaint more than ninety days after the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) gave plaintiff notice of her right to sue. 

The EEOC notice was dated November 27, 2006, but plaintiff alleged that she did

not receive it until December 27, 2006. Nevertheless, SFUSD argued that plaintiff had

received the notice on November 27, 2006. On July 30, 2007, the court denied the motion,

based on SFUSD’s failure to provide any evidence regarding the date plaintiff received the

notice, and also based on plaintiff’s statement at the hearing that she received the notice

on December 27, 2006.

On August 2, 2007, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion clarifying the standard to be

Case 4:07-cv-01217-PJH Document 32 Filed 10/09/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

applied in determining whether a Title VII action is timely filed. See Payan v. Aramark

Mgmt. Servs. Limited Partnership, 495 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007). On August 3, 2007, in

light of the Payan decision, the court issued an order to show cause, directing plaintiff to

show cause in writing why the case should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the

jurisdictional prerequisites. The court ordered plaintiff to provide evidence in the form of a

declaration supporting her claim that she did not receive the right-to-sue letter until

December 27, 2006. The court provided a detailed explanation of what is required for a

declaration to be considered competent evidence. 

On August 22, 2007, plaintiff filed a response to the order to show cause, stating

that “a postcard/notice was mailed to me in December 2006,” that she “turned in the

postcard/notice in exchange for a letter,” which she then “learned was a right to sue letter.

Thus, she asserts, “on December 27, 2006, I received the right to sue letter at question.” 

She attached a copy of the envelope from the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights and

Employment Litigation, in Washington, D.C. The envelope, which was sent “Certified Mail,”

bears a postmark from Washington, D.C., 20530, postmark dated November 27, 2006, and

also bears a hand-written notation of “12/1.” 

Under Payan, the issuance date of the right-to-sue letter is presumed to be the date

of mailing. Id. at 1123. Here, the date of the postmark on the envelope and the date of the

right-to-sue letter itself are the same – November 27, 2006. In addition, the date of receipt

of the letter is presumed to be three days after the date of mailing. Id. at 1125. “This

presumption – that the plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter by the date presumed under a

three-day rule – is a rebuttable one.” Id. at 1126. In order to rebut the mailing

presumption, “the plaintiff must show that she did not receive the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter

in the ordinary course.” Id. The plaintiff must do this by providing sworn testimony or other

competent evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the letter took longer

than three days to reach her by mail. Id. (citing Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d

522, 526 (2d Cir. 1996)). 

In the order to show cause, the court directed plaintiff to provide “a declaration

Case 4:07-cv-01217-PJH Document 32 Filed 10/09/07 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

describing in detail the circumstances under which she received the right-to-sue letter.” 

The court explained, 

For example, she must state how she received the letter – whether it was

placed in her mailbox, or she received it some other way – and the date she

received the letter. She must state whether she knows the date the letter

arrived at her building, and if so, what that date was. She must state whether

each residential unit in her building has its own mailbox, and if so, whether

she checks her mailbox every day. In addition, she should state any other

facts that she has which bear on the issue. If some other individual has

personal knowledge of the factual circumstances regarding plaintiff’s receipt

of the letter, plaintiff should endeavor to obtain a written declaration under

penalty of perjury from that individual as well.

Order to Show Cause, at 3. The court also provided instructions regarding the format of

the declaration, adding that “[a]t the end of the declaration, the following statement should

appear: ‘I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct,’” and that

the declaration should be dated and signed. Id.

Plaintiff’s response does not comply with the court’s directives. Plaintiff simply

states that a “postcard/notice” was mailed to her in December 2006, and that she turned

the postcard into the post office on December 27, 2006, and received the letter containing

the right-to-sue notice. This is a not the same story she told the court on July 25, 2007, at

the hearing on defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, where she stated that

she had received the letter on December 27, 2007, and added that she was living in an

apartment building where the mail was sometimes delayed (suggesting that the letter had

simply been misdelivered). 

Plaintiff has provided no evidence establishing the date the postcard was delivered

to her address or the date she received the right-to-sue letter; and no evidence rebutting

the presumption that the letter was mailed on November 27, 2006, or that the letter arrived

at her address three days letter. Indeed, plaintiff’s response cannot be considered

competent evidence as it is not a declaration signed under penalty of perjury. Further, the

court declines to interpret the hand-written notation “12/1" on the envelope as an indication

of the first date that the post office attempted delivery at plaintiff’s address, because plaintiff

has not provided a declaration stating that this is the envelope the right-to-sue letter arrived

Case 4:07-cv-01217-PJH Document 32 Filed 10/09/07 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

in, and has not stated that the notation “12/1" was on the envelope when she received it. 

The ninety-day period within which to file suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1), did not begin on the date that plaintiff decided to go to the post office to pick up the

letter which had been addressed to her at her address of record. Rather the 90-day period

“beg[an] running when delivery of the right-to-sue notice was attempted at the address of

record.” Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Based on plaintiff’s failure to rebut the presumption that the letter was mailed on

November 27, 2006, and was received on November 30, 2006, the court finds that the

lawsuit was not timely filed, as 90 days from November 30, 2006, was February 28, 2007. 

Accordingly, the court finds that defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings must be

GRANTED, and that the action must be DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 9, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-01217-PJH Document 32 Filed 10/09/07 Page 4 of 4