Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02236/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02236-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Lewisbey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2236

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID LEWISBEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 12-cr-354 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 13, 2015 — DECIDED DECEMBER 9, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. David Lewisbey was a Chicagobased gunrunner who used a fake Indiana I.D. to buy guns

at Indiana gun shows and bring them back to Illinois to sell. 

He came to the attention of law enforcement when he 

bragged about his gunrunning exploits on Facebook. Federal 

agents set up a sting, and Lewisbey was arrested and 

charged with multiple counts of unlawfully transporting 

and dealing firearms. A jury convicted him on all counts.

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Lewisbey now argues that his attorney was operating 

under a conflict of interest in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. He also challenges the 

admission of incriminating text-message and Facebook

evidence at trial. Finally, he claims that the testimony of the 

government’s cell-phone location expert did not satisfy the 

requirements of Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

509 U.S. 579 (1993). We reject these arguments and affirm.

I. Background

David “Big Dave” Lewisbey conducted a thriving interstate gunrunning business from his home in Chicago. He 

purchased guns at Indiana gun shows with a fake Indiana 

I.D. and then sold them in Illinois. Federal authorities 

learned of these activities when Lewisbey boasted about 

them on his Facebook page; an undercover operation was 

commenced. After Lewisbey sold a total of 43 guns to a 

confidential informant in five separate controlled purchases, 

law enforcement moved in and arrested him. He was

charged with one count of unlawful dealing in firearms

without a license, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A); two counts of

illegally transporting firearms across state lines, id.

§§ 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D); and two counts of traveling across 

state lines with intent to engage in the unlicensed dealing of 

firearms, id. § 924(n). 

Lewisbey’s defense at trial was that he was a gun collector rather than a gunrunner. The evidence showed otherwise. The prosecution’s case included video recordings of 

Lewisbey’s sales to the confidential informant, text messages

showing that Lewisbey habitually sold guns to purchasers 

other than the confidential informant, and Facebook photos 

depicting Lewisbey with lots of guns and large sums of 

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No. 14-2236 3

money. Michael Hall, a business contact of Lewisbey’s who 

occasionally acted as his go-between, testified to the details 

of some transactions. Another witness testified about selling 

guns to Lewisbey in a McDonald’s parking lot in Indiana. 

Multiple witnesses testified that they knew Lewisbey from 

Indiana gun shows and knew that he used a fake Indiana 

I.D. to illegally purchase guns. Finally, FBI Special Agent 

Joseph Raschke testified, based on his analysis of Lewisbey’s 

phone records, that calls were made from Lewisbey’s phones

at times and locations consistent with the illegal gun transactions described by other witnesses. A jury returned a verdict 

of guilty on all counts, and the judge sentenced Lewisbey to 

200 months in prison.

Lewisbey was represented in the district court by Attorney Beau Brindley. At the time Brindley was himself facing a 

criminal contempt proceeding in the Central District of 

Illinois. When questioned by the judge about the potential 

conflict of interest, Lewisbey expressly waived any conflict 

and consented to Brindley’s continuation as his counsel.

Following the entry of judgment, and soon after this appeal 

was filed, the government sought a limited remand to 

address a different conflict of interest stemming from a new

federal criminal investigation targeting Brindley. We remanded the case so the district judge could determine 

whether a conflict of interest existed and obtain a waiver if 

necessary. Brindley promptly withdrew and another attorney took over Lewisbey’s appeal. With a new attorney in 

place, the judge canceled the conflict hearing and the appeal 

resumed.

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II. Discussion

Lewisbey raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that Brindley’s troubles with law enforcement created 

an unconstitutional conflict of interest in violation of his

Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. Second, he 

challenges the admission of his text messages, Facebook 

posts, and the testimony of Special Agent Raschke, the 

government’s cell-phone location expert.

A. Sixth Amendment Right to Conflict-Free Counsel

Because the Sixth Amendment protects the right to counsel “whose undivided loyalties lie with the client,” a defendant whose trial attorney was “burdened by a conflict of 

interest” may be entitled to a new trial. United States v. 

Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1065 (7th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks 

omitted) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)). 

Conflicts of interest in this context usually arise in cases 

involving joint representation, but a conflict may also arise 

“when a client’s interest conflicts with that of his attorney.” 

United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1106–07 (7th Cir. 1986).

Lewisbey argues that Brindley’s interests conflicted with 

his own because Brindley was the subject of not one but two 

criminal investigations, giving him an incentive to curry 

favor with the government. To establish a violation of the

Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel, the defendant “must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest 

adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler,

446 U.S. at 348. The mere possibility of a conflict is “insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.” Id. at 350.

Because Lewisbey affirmatively waived any conflict arising from Brindley’s contempt proceeding, see United States v. 

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Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 61 (7th Cir. 1992), his Sixth Amendment

claim can only relate to the second criminal investigation 

against Brindley. But that investigation came to light after

Lewisbey was convicted and sentenced and his case had 

already moved to this court. When Brindley learned that he 

was the subject of this second investigation, he immediately 

withdrew; a new, conflict-free attorney thereafter assumed 

responsibility for the appeal. Brindley’s withdrawal cured 

the potential conflict, removing any possible Sixth Amendment concern. 

B. Evidentiary Rulings

1. Text Messages and Facebook Posts 

Over Lewisbey’s objection the judge allowed the government to introduce certain inculpatory text messages from 

Lewisbey’s phones and posts from his Facebook page. We 

review evidentiary rulings deferentially, for abuse of discretion only. United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 

2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1537 (2015). “[W]e will defer to 

the district court unless no reasonable person could adopt its 

view. Even then, reversal only follows if admission of the 

evidence affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

Lewisbey argues that the Facebook posts and the text 

messages taken from two phones—a Samsung and an 

iPhone—should have been excluded on both hearsay and 

authentication grounds. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 901. He also 

argues that the prejudicial impact of this evidence substantially outweighs its limited probative value and thus the 

evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence.

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The hearsay objection is a nonstarter. The text messages 

Lewisbey sent are his own statements and as such are excluded from the definition of hearsay by Rule 801(d)(2)(A). 

The messages he received were admitted not for the truth of 

the matter asserted but instead to provide context for 

Lewisbey’s own messages See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2); United 

States v. Robinzine, 80 F.3d 246, 252 (7th Cir. 1996) (Statements offered not to prove “the truth of the matter asserted” 

but for another legitimate purpose do “not even fit the 

definition of hearsay.”). And Lewisbey admitted that the 

Facebook posts were his, so like his “sent” text messages, the 

posts qualify as nonhearsay admissions under 

Rule 801(d)(2).

The authentication objection fares no better. To authenticate the text messages, the government needed only to 

“produce evidence sufficient to support a finding” that the 

messages were actually sent and received by Lewisbey. FED.

R. EVID. 901(a). The government clearly did so. The iPhone 

was confiscated from Lewisbey at the time of his arrest, and 

in a recorded phone call from the jail, he told his mother that

the police took his phone. The Samsung device was recovered from his bedroom at his parents’ home, a room that 

both parents identified as belonging exclusively to him. The 

“Properties” section of the iPhone described the phone as

“Big Dave’s,” and the contacts directory included information for Lewisbey’s mother listed under the heading 

“Mom,” and also the name and number of his former attorney. Both phones listed contact information for the Texas 

Home Depot stores where Lewisbey used to work. And the 

confidential informant arranged gun sales with Lewisbey on

the Samsung phone. That’s more than enough to establish 

that the two phones were indeed Lewisbey’s. See FED. R.

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EVID. 901(b)(4) (“The appearance, contents, substance, 

internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the 

item, taken together with all the circumstances,” can establish that “the item is what the proponent claims it is.”). 

Lewisbey’s admission that the Facebook posts were his is 

enough for authentication, but if more were needed, the 

Facebook page lists Lewisbey’s nickname, his date of birth, 

and his place of residence (Houston) where he lived prior to 

Illinois. The email addresses associated with the Facebook 

account correspond to both the email linked with Lewisbey’s 

iPhone and his former email address at the University of 

Kansas. The Facebook page contains more than 100 photos 

of Lewisbey—including a profile picture—and many of the 

Facebook photos match photos also found on Lewisbey’s

iPhone. The Facebook application on Lewisbey’s iPhone was 

linked to this Facebook account. And messages on the 

account discuss Lewisbey’s trips to gun shows in Fort 

Wayne and Indianapolis on dates when gun shows actually 

occurred at these locations.

Finally, Lewisbey argues that the text messages and 

Facebook posts should have been excluded under Rule 403 

because they were merely cumulative. This argument is 

frivolous. The text messages and Facebook posts were

corroborative, not cumulative. Recall that Lewisbey’s defense at trial was that he was just a gun collector. The text 

messages and Facebook posts were admitted to rebut this 

defense by corroborating the witnesses who testified about 

Lewisbey’s gunrunning activities. The evidence was neither 

needlessly cumulative nor unfairly prejudicial and was 

properly admitted.

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2. Cell-Phone Expert Testimony

Finally, Lewisbey challenges the judge’s decision to allow 

Special Agent Raschke to testify about Lewisbey’s phone 

records. Agent Raschke explained that Lewisbey’s phone 

records showed calls made at places and times that corresponded to the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses.

Lewisbey claims that this testimony did not meet the requirements of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires that 

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will help the trier of 

fact to understand the evidence or to determine 

a fact in issue; 

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts 

or data; 

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable 

principles and methods; and 

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 

Under the familiar framework established in Daubert, the 

district judge consults a nonexhaustive list of factors to 

determine whether the requirements of Rule 702 are met; 

these include: (1) whether the expert’s technique or theory is 

testable or has been tested; (2) whether the technique or 

theory has been subject to peer review and publication; 

(3) the known or potential rate of error in applying the 

technique or theory; (4) whether standards and controls exist 

and were maintained; and (5) whether the technique or 

theory is generally accepted in the scientific community. 

509 U.S. at 593–94. The court’s gatekeeping function applies 

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to all expert testimony and not just scientific expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 (1999).

On appeal we ask first whether the judge applied the proper 

framework. C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827, 

835 (7th Cir. 2015). If the judge did so, then we review the

decision to admit the expert’s testimony for abuse of discretion. Id.

The record reflects that the judge conducted a thorough 

Daubert analysis of Agent Raschke’s proposed testimony and 

soundly exercised his discretion to admit it. Using call 

records and cell towers to determine the general location of a 

phone at specific times is a well-accepted, reliable methodology. See, e.g., Rick Ayers, Sam Brothers & Wayne Jansen, 

Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Guidelines on Mobile Device

Forensics, § 6.3 at 54 (2014), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/

nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-101r1.pdf (“Call 

detail records can also be used with cell site tower information obtained from the service provider to translate cell 

identifiers into geographic locations for the cells involved 

and identify the general locale from which calls were 

placed.”); United States v. Jones, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 

2013) (“[T]he use of cell phone location records to determine 

the general location of a cell phone has been widely accepted 

by numerous federal courts.”). With 350 hours of training in 

the systems used by the relevant network service providers, 

Agent Raschke had ample expertise in this methodology. 

And the judge also appropriately recognized the limits of 

this technique by barring the agent from couching his testimony in terms that would suggest that he could pinpoint the 

exact location of Lewisbey’s phones. We find no abuse of 

discretion.

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We note in closing that no evidentiary error requires reversal unless it affected the defendant’s substantial rights; 

this in turn requires that “the average juror would have 

found the prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive 

absent the erroneous evidentiary ruling.” United States v. 

Trudeau, 812 F.3d 578, 590 (7th Cir. 2016). The record contains prodigious evidence of Lewisbey’s guilt. We’re confident that none of the claimed evidentiary errors—if indeed 

they were errors—had a significant effect on the jury’s 

verdict.

AFFIRMED.

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