Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03103/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03103-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert D. Garner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court ofAppeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 2004 Decided February 4, 2005

No. 03-3103

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

V.

ROBERT D. GARNER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00179-01)

Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, argued the cause for

the appellant.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein, United

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr. and

Kenneth F. Whitted, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on

brief.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Felon Robert

D. Garner was convicted of possessing a firearm in violation of

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2

1

In light of our conclusion that admitting the testimony was not

error, we do not reach the government’s argument that it was harmless

error. 

2Haywood was also indicted on one count of carrying a pistol

without a license (in violation of D.C. Code § 22-4504(a)), which was

dismissed on the government’s motion.

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He appealed his

conviction on the ground that the district court erroneously

admitted as prior bad act evidence under Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b) a police officer’s testimony that Garner had

been found in possession of a handgun under similar

circumstances some four years earlier. Because the challenged

testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show that

Garner knew of and constructively possessed the gun, we

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the testimony and we therefore affirm Garner’s

conviction.1 

I.

In addition to the felon-in-possession count, Garner was

indicted, along with co-defendant Troy Haywood, on one count

of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute it (in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)) and one count of

using a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense (in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), (2)).2 Garner and Haywood

were tried in the district court June 5 to June 13, 2003. Viewed

in the light most favorable to the government, see United States

v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing United

States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1996)), the trial

evidence established the following facts. 

On March 21, 2002, in Southeast Washington, D.C., law

enforcement officers of the Washington Area Vehicle

Enforcement team (WAVE), a multi-jurisdictional stolen auto

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task force, stopped a green car that had been reported stolen.

Haywood was driving the vehicle and Garner was sitting in the

front passenger seat. The officers approached the car and

ordered its occupants to raise their hands in the air. Haywood

complied but Garner did not; he simply sat staring ahead and

smoking a cigarette as WAVE officers David Moseley and John

Trainum tried unsuccessfully to open the passenger door and to

persuade Garner to raise his left hand, which was in his

waistband. Then, Moseley testified, Garner removed a “large,

silver handgun” from his waistband, placed it under the

passenger seat and resumed his smoking. 6/5/2003 p.m. Trial

Tr. 101. Moseley immediately warned the other officers he had

seen a gun. Trainum, who was standing behind Moseley,

testified that he could not see Garner’s left hand but observed

him “going forward and back, forward and back” until “the one

time when he was forward and stayed forward” which is when

Moseley “called out gun” to him. 6/9/2003 a.m. Trial Tr. 92-93.

A third WAVE officer, Danita Matthews, who was standing by

the driver’s window, testified she saw Moseley “moving

around” with his hands “down, in a threatening manner” and

then heard Moseley’s gun warning. 6/5/2003 p.m. Trial Tr. 51-

52. When the officers finally got the passenger door open, they

wrestled Garner to the ground and secured him with handcuffs.

Inside the car, they found a nine millimeter semi-automatic

handgun under the front passenger seat and 43 zip-lock bags of

cocaine base in a container on the driver-side floorboard. On the

gun were found three latent fingerprints, only one of which was

readable and was matched to Haywood’s right index finger. 

At trial the government offered the testimony of United States

Park Police Officer Robert MacLean who stopped a car in

Southeast Washington for a traffic violation on January 12,

1999. MacLean testified that Garner had been seated in the

front passenger seat and that, after he removed Garner from the

car, he found an ammunition clip in Garner’s jacket pocket and

also a loaded semi-automatic handgun fitting the clip under the

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3Garner did not appeal the district court’s Rule 403 ruling.

front passenger seat. Garner was ultimately convicted of

carrying a pistol without a license in violation of District of

Columbia law. Garner objected to MacLean’s testimony as

inadmissible evidence of a prior bad act under Rule 404(b) and

as unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

Rejecting his challenge, the district court granted the

government’s pretrial motion to admit the testimony and denied

Garner’s motion to exclude it during trial.3 The court instructed

the jury, however, that Maclean’s testimony was “only offered

with respect to the issues of intent and knowledge” and the jury

could use the evidence “only to help [it] decide whether the

government ha[d] proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant, Mr. Garner, had the intent to possess the firearm” and

“that he acted knowingly and on purpose and not by accident or

mistake.” 6/10/03 a.m. Trial Tr. 40-41. 

On June 12, 2003 the jury acquitted both defendants of the

cocaine possession count and the district court accordingly

granted judgment of acquittal on the count alleging use of a

firearm during a drug offense. On June 13, 2003 the jury

convicted Garner of the felon-in-possession charge. On August

19, 2003 the district court sentenced Garner to 78 months’

incarceration to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Garner filed a notice of appeal on the same day. 

II. 

Garner’s sole challenge on appeal is to the admissibility of

MacLean’s testimony under Rule 404(b), which provides in

relevant part:

 (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.--Evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity

therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other

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4The Court observed that “there can be no question that evidence of

the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of

unfair prejudice to the defendant” and that the “risk will vary from

case to case.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 185.

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of

mistake or accident . . . .

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Garner contends the admission of

MacLean’s testimony was erroneous under this court’s opinion

inUnited States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “We

review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 616 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 742

(D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 919

(D.C. Cir. 1997)). We conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting MacLean’s testimony because

it was admissible under Rule 404(b). In reaching this

determination we apply three recent opinions addressing

admissibility under Rule 404(b). 

First, in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the

United States Supreme Court held that the district court abused

its discretion when, in a felon-in-possession prosecution, it

rejected the defendant’s offer to concede the fact of a prior

felony conviction and admitted under Rule 404(b) evidence (the

prior order of judgment and commitment) identifying the

predicate felony as assault. The Supreme Court premised its

decision, however, not on Rule 404(b) but on Rule 403, which

authorizes the trial court to exclude otherwise “relevant evidence

. . . if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste

of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”4 See

Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180 (“The principal issue is the scope of

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5Rule 401 provides: “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having

any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence

to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Rule 402

provides: “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise

provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,

by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court

pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 402.

a trial judge’s discretion under Rule 403, which authorizes

exclusion of relevant evidence when its ‘probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.’ ” (quoting Fed. Rule Evid.

403)). The Court emphasized, as the language of Rule 403

makes clear, that the evidence excluded under Rule 403 as

unfairly prejudicial nonetheless remains “relevant” and

“admissible” under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. See

519 U.S. at 179 (“If . . . relevant evidence is inadmissible in the

presence of other evidence related to it, its exclusion must rest

not on the ground that the other evidence has rendered it

‘irrelevant,’ but on its character as unfairly prejudicial,

cumulative or the like, its relevance notwithstanding.”).5

Similarly, with regard to Rule 404(b), the Court observed that

“if, indeed, there were a justification for receiving evidence of

the nature of prior acts on some issue other than status (i.e., to

prove ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, or absence of mistake or accident,’ Fed. Rule Evid.

404(b)), Rule 404(b) guarantees the opportunity to seek its

admission,” 519 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added), subject to the

limitation that, “when a given evidentiary item has the dual

nature of legitimate evidence of an element and illegitimate

evidence of character,” the court must make a determination

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“ ‘whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the

probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of

other means of proof and other facts appropriate for making

decision of this kind under 403,’ ” id. at 184 (quoting Advisory

Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 404, 28 U.S.C. App., p.

861). 

Next, in United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (en banc), (Crowder II) at the direction of the Supreme

Court, this court revisited its opinion in United States v.

Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), (Crowder I)

in light of the intervening decision in Old Chief. In Crowder I

this court had held that “[w]here a defendant offers

unequivocally to concede elements of a crime—intent and

knowledge in [] prosecutions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

[criminalizing possessing with intent to distribute and

distributing drugs]—and agrees to a jury instruction that the

Government need not prove those elements,” then “bad acts

evidence offered solely to prove those elements is inadmissible

because the defendant’s concession of intent and knowledge

deprives the evidence of any value other than what Rule

404(b)’s first sentence unambiguously prohibits: ‘to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity

therewith.’ ” 87 F.3d at 1407. In our reconsideration, we

concluded that, “[t]ested against the Supreme Court’s Old Chief

decision, the theory of Crowder I fails.” 141 F.3d at 1206

(citation omitted). We then held “that a defendant’s offer to

stipulate to an element of an offense does not render the

government’s other crimes evidence inadmissible under Rule

404(b) to prove that element, even if the defendant’s proposed

stipulation is unequivocal.” Id. at 1209. Having found the prior

bad act evidence admissible under Rule 404(b), we then

concluded it was not barred by Rule 403, rejecting the

appellants’ argument for “a per se rule of exclusion” in such

cases under that rule. Id. at 1210.

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Finally, in United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941 (D.C. Cir.

2004), which the appellant argues controls this case, the court

held that evidence of a prior bad act, admitted at trial under Rule

404(b), was inadmissible because it was not relevant under Rule

401. Linares, a felon, was arrested after shots were fired from

the car he was driving and he was subsequently convicted of the

offense of felon-in-possession. Three eyewitnesses—two police

officers and a female passenger in the car—testified that a male

passenger “handed Linares a gun, that Linares later fired it

several times, and that still later he held it out his car window

and tossed it away.” 367 F.3d at 946. In addition, the

government sought to introduce, to prove intent, knowledge and

lack of mistake, the testimony of a police officer that four and

one-half years earlier she had arrested Linares after she saw him

drop a loaded handgun onto the ground. The district court

admitted the testimony although it had already informed the

government that it would not instruct the jury on constructive

possession.

On appeal the court concluded the prior crime testimony was

not admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove intent, knowledge or

mistake. The court found the evidence inadmissible to show

intent because “the government had no obligation to prove

intent.” 367 F.3d at 948. With regard to knowledge, the court

explained: “If the jury believed the[] eyewitnesses, then Linares

possessed the gun knowingly; if it did not, then it should have

acquitted based on the government’s failure to prove possession

rather than its failure to prove knowledge.” 367 F.3d at 946.

The court found the evidence inadmissible to show absence of

mistake “for essentially the same reason”: “Given the

government’s evidence, no reasonable jury could have found

that the government had proven possession but failed to prove

absence of mistake.” 367 F.3d at 947. Garner contends that for

the same reason the court should find MacLean’s testimony

about the 1999 handgun incident inadmissible in this

prosecution. We disagree.

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6The government argues that Linares is not binding because it

“cannot be squared” with Old Chief and Crowder II. Gov’t Br. 26.

Old Chief establishes that “evidentiary relevance under Rule 401” is

not “affected by the availability of alternative proofs of the element,”

Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 179; Crowder II makes clear that the focus of

Rule 404(b) is relevance and that, for evidence to be relevant, “[t]here

does not have to be an ‘actual issue’ about the facts sought to be

proven,” 141 F.3d at 1206. Linares, the government argues, diverges

from this approach because it makes admissibility under Rule 404(b)

hinge on the existence (or nature) of other evidence presented at trial.

Given this apparent discrepancy, the government urges us to ignore

Linares and adhere to the earlier decision in Crowder II. 

We cannot take the government up on its suggestion. Linares, after

all, expressly discussed Crowder II. A decision of the panel “is the

decision of the court.” LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (en banc). If the government believed Linares was

wrongly decided, it should have petitioned for rehearing by the panel

or en banc pursuant to District of Columbia Circuit Rule 35.

It is true that if the jurors believed Moseley’s testimony about

Garner’s handling the gun, as in Linares they would have had to

find actual possession and knowledge would not have been in

dispute. But, unlike in Linares, the trial evidence here, at the

time the district court ruled on MacLean’s testimony, did not

force the jury to a disjunctive choice between actual possession

or no possession at all.6 At the time the district court admitted

MacLean’s testimony, it could reasonably have believed the jury

might discredit Moseley’s testimony (based on his observations

through a tinted window and smoke-filled compartment) and

nevertheless convict Garner based on the undisputed testimony

that the gun was found under Garner’s seat when the car was

searched. In that event, the jury would have faced a

paradigmatic constructive possession scenario in which

contraband (here, a firearm) is found in proximity to a defendant

who may or may not have been “ ‘knowingly in a position to, or

[have] had the right to exercise “dominion or control” over the

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[contraband].’ ” United States v. Jenkins, 981 F.2d 1281, 1283

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d

1012, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added; alteration in

original)). Because “the ‘dominion and control’ must be

‘knowing,’ ” “mere proximity or accessibility to contraband is

not enough” and there must be “ ‘ “testimony connecting the

defendant with the incriminating circumstances,” ’ ” id. (quoting

United States v.Hernandez, 780 F.2d 113, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1986);

United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 885 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1978)

(quoting United States v. Ratcliffe, 550 F.2d 431, 434 (9th Cir.

1976)); internal citations omitted)—a requirement heightened

here by the possibility that Haywood, who also had physical

access to the gun and whose fingerprint was found on it, might

have had exclusive possession of it. See Jenkins, 981 F.2d at

1283 (“ ‘where, as here, contraband is discovered in a place

occupied by more than one person, “the sufficiency of the

evidence for jury consideration depends upon its capability

plausibly to suggest the likelihood that in some discernible

fashion the accused had a substantial voice vis-a-vis the

[contraband].” ’ ” (quoting United States v. Foster, 782 F.2d

1087, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Staten, 581 F.2d at 884)

(emphasis added by Foster court))); cf. id. at 1283-84 (finding no

evidence to support car passenger’s dominion and control over

nearby sawed-off shotgun bearing other passenger’s initials).

Under such circumstances, “ ‘ “where a defendant is charged

with unlawful possession of something, evidence that he

possessed the same or similar things at other times is often quite

relevant to his knowledge and intent with regard to the crime

charged.” ’ ” United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 793 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. King, 254 F.3d 1098, 1100

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.

681, 689 (1988))). Thus, stripped of Moseley’s actual possession

testimony, the district court, at the time it admitted MacLean’s

testimony, could have believed the facts offered “a classic case

for introducing prior instances of gun possession, since the

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7The conclusion that the prior bad act evidence is admissible under

Rule 404(b) does not usually end the inquiry. The government faces

“another hurdle, Rule 403,” Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1209; see Old

Chief, 519 U.S. at 184 (“when a given evidentiary item has the dual

nature of legitimate evidence of an element and illegitimate evidence

of character,” trial court must balance probative value and prejudice

under Rule 403). Here, however, as already noted, the district court

rejected Garner’s Rule 403 challenge to the prior bad act evidence and

Garner did not appeal the ruling.

government would otherwise find it extremely difficult to prove

that the charged possession was knowing.” Linares, 367 F.3d at

949.7 The government introduced just such evidence: McLean’s

testimony that Garner was previously found in the front

passenger seat of a car with a handgun under his seat and a

matching ammunition clip in his jacket pocket. This testimony

made it more likely that Garner was in knowing possession of

the loaded handgun found beneath his seat just as in Crowder II

evidence that the appellant had previously sold cocaine base

made it more probable that he knowingly possessed and intended

to distribute the cocaine base found in the brown paper bag he

discarded while running from police officers, 141 F.3d at 1209;

see also Cassell, 292 F.3d at 796 (fact that defendant previously

possessed weapons “tends to make it less probable that the

weapons recovered from his bedroom were there without his

knowledge, without intent, or by accident or mistake”) (citing

United States v. Brown, 16 F.3d 423, 432 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 513 U.S. 900 (1994)); United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d

923, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (evidence defendant “possessed and

passed counterfeit notes on a prior occasion” relevant because “it

decreased the likelihood that [he] accidentally or innocently

possessed the counterfeit notes”). Thus, under Old Chief, “there

w[as] a justification for receiving evidence of the nature of prior

acts on some issue other than status (i.e., to prove ‘motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

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absence of mistake or accident,’ ” and Rule 404(b) therefore

“guarantee[d] [the government] the opportunity to seek its

admission.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190. 

Garner argues against the constructive possession justification

on two grounds. First, he contends that even with the knowledge

element provided by MacLean’s 404(b) testimony, the evidence

of dominion and control was insufficient for the jury to have

found constructive possession. To the extent that more was

needed to connect Garner to the gun, we believe the testimony by

Trainum and Matthews about Garner’s movements toward the

area where the gun was later found is sufficient. Cf. United

States v. Gibbs, 904 F.2d 52, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding

testimony that defendant “reportedly turned, bent down, and took

some action below the line of vision of the officers while the car

was being followed” supported his constructive possession of

drugs found in car with three occupants). 

Further, Garner contends the prior possession evidence was

inadmissible because the government prosecuted the felon-inpossession case at trial as one of actual, rather than constructive,

possession. This is largely true, as the government

acknowledges, see Gov’t Br. 22, but constructive possession

(and more specifically, Garner’s knowledge of the handgun) was

an evident issue when the district court admitted MacLean’s

testimony. The government sought admission of the 404(b)

material “specifically to demonstrate that the gun under the

passenger seat, in this case, was put there knowingly and

intentionally, that the defendant intended to, and in fact, did

exercise dominion and control over it,” “[t]hat it was not an

accident or mistake that it happened to be under the seat that he

was [] seated in.” 6/25/2002 Status/Motion Hearing Tr. 28.

Further, Garner put knowledge of the gun at issue from the start

of the trial, when his counsel argued in his opening statement

that “[t]he case against Mr. Garner is about being at the wrong

place at the wrong time,” 6/5/03 p.m. Trial Tr. 34, a claim

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repeated in his closing, see, e.g., 6/12/03 a.m. Trial Tr. 52. Early

in the trial, and apparently before MacLean’s testimony was

admitted, Garner requested that the court read the jury a

statement offering as a defense to the felon-in-possession count

that Garner “never possessed or had any connection with . . . the

gun police recovered on March 21, 2002” and stating he “denies

possessing or having any knowledge that there was a gun in the

automobile.” Order Denying New Trial, at 5 (filed Aug. 15,

2003). Thus, when the district court admitted MacLean’s

testimony, the parties treated as material Garner’s knowledge vel

non that the gun was under his seat so as to connect him to it and

planned to incorporate the issue into their trial strategies. That

the government ultimately elected to focus on the actual

possession theory, foregoing a jury instruction on constructive

possession, does not render inadmissible evidence of

constructive possession offered during the government’s case-inchief when constructive possession was not only viable under the

facts but also still in play. 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior crime

testimony under Rule 404(b) to show Garner’s knowledge of the

gun’s location and of its accessibility to him. The judgment of

conviction is therefore affirmed.

So ordered.

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