Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07069/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07069-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee
Marva J. Sneed
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MARVA J. SNEED,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7069

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 11-2715, Judge William A. Moorman.

______________________ 

Decided: April 22, 2016

______________________ 

 BENJAMIN A. HERBERT, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Los 

Angeles, CA, argued for claimant-appellant. Also represented by WILLIAM H. BURGESS, Washington, DC.

 RENEE GERBER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented 

by SCOTT D. AUSTIN, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

BENJAMIN C. MIZER; MEGHAN ALPHONSO, DAVID J.

BARRANS, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 1 Filed: 04/22/2016
2 SNEED v. MCDONALD

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALLACH. 

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) denied 

Marva J. Sneed’s claim for dependency and indemnity 

compensation. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Court”) dismissed Ms. Sneed’s appeal because 

it was untimely filed and declined to find equitable tolling

based on attorney abandonment. We hold that, even 

assuming Ms. Sneed showed that there was attorney 

abandonment, she failed to demonstrate that she diligently pursued her rights. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Ms. Sneed’s husband, Reginald A. Sneed, served on 

active duty from June 1964 to June 1968. Mr. Sneed 

suffered from numerous service-connected disabilities. In 

January 2001, Mr. Sneed suffered a spinal cord contusion 

from a fall, which left him quadriplegic and confined to a 

chin-operated wheelchair. In October 2003, Mr. Sneed 

was living in a nursing home for paralyzed veterans when 

a fire broke out, and all of the residents, including Mr. 

Sneed, died of smoke inhalation. 

Following the death of her husband, Ms. Sneed filed a 

claim for dependency and indemnity compensation under 

38 U.S.C. § 1310. Mr. Sneed’s service-connected disabilities were alleged to have been principal or contributory 

causes of his death, see 38 C.F.R. § 3.312, based on the 

theories that Mr. Sneed’s service-connected spondylosis 

and spinal stenosis contributed to his fall and resultant 

quadriplegia, and that Mr. Sneed’s service-connected 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 2 Filed: 04/22/2016
SNEED v. MCDONALD 3

posttraumatic stress disorder, tinnitus, and hearing loss 

prevented him from leaving the nursing home during the 

fire. 

The regional office of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) denied Ms. Sneed’s claim, and the Board

affirmed. The Board’s decision was mailed to Ms. Sneed

on April 5, 2011. Ms. Sneed’s notice of appeal to the 

Veterans Court was due on August 3, 2011, 120 days after 

the Board mailed its decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a).

On April 13, 2011, well within the 120-day period, Ms. 

Sneed contacted a lawyer, Katrina J. Eagle, requesting

that Ms. Eagle represent her in an appeal to the Veterans 

Court. According to Ms. Sneed, at the request of Ms. 

Eagle’s secretary, she transmitted case materials to Ms. 

Eagle’s office by mail and fax, and had several oral communications with Ms. Eagle’s office. The record does not 

describe the exact nature of the material transmitted or 

the substance of the communications. On August 2, 2011, 

Ms. Sneed received a letter from Ms. Eagle. In her letter, 

Ms. Eagle provided an assessment of Ms. Sneed’s service 

connection claim, explaining her view that the claim “does 

not meet the criteria under 38 C.F.R. § 3.312,” and concluded, “I do not believe the VA erred in denying your 

claim; thus, I will not be able to represent you for any 

subsequent appeal for entitlement to service connection 

for the cause of death, and for [dependency and indemnity 

compensation] benefits.”1 J.A. 53.

 

1 Ms. Eagle’s assessment was based on the Board’s 

conclusion that “the immediate cause of [Mr. Sneed’s] 

death was smoke inhalation” and “not . . . a result of a 

service-connected disability, nor did a service-connected 

disability cause or contribute substantially or materially 

to his death.” J.A. 16. 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 3 Filed: 04/22/2016
4 SNEED v. MCDONALD

Ms. Eagle further stated, “[y]ou are free to seek another opinion from another attorney, of course. Moreover, 

you are not required to have an attorney to proceed before 

the Court. However, should you decide to appeal the 

Board’s adverse decision, you must file your Notice of 

Appeal no later than August 5, 2011.” J.A. 53–54. The 

August 5 statement was erroneous; the correct deadline 

was August 3, the next day following Ms. Sneed’s receipt 

of Ms. Eagle’s letter. Ms. Sneed stated that, between 

August 2 and August 31, 2011, she contacted at least 

fourteen lawyers, who all turned down her case. Having 

failed to secure a lawyer to take her case, Ms. Sneed filed 

the notice of appeal herself on September 1, 2011—

twenty-nine days after the deadline. 

On September 7, 2011, Ms. Sneed sent a letter to the 

Veterans Court explaining her late filing. On June 14, 

2012, the Veterans Court ordered Ms. Sneed to file a 

response discussing whether the circumstances in her 

case warranted equitable tolling of the 120-day deadline. 

In September 2012, the Veterans Court dismissed Ms. 

Sneed’s appeal as untimely filed, finding that equitable 

tolling did not apply because “the circumstances leading 

up to her late NOA are not extraordinary, but rather 

evidence general negligence or procrastination.” Sneed v. 

Shinseki (“Sneed I”), No. 11-2715, 2012 WL 4464874, at *2 

(Vet. App. Sept. 27, 2012). The Veterans Court distinguished Ms. Sneed’s argument for tolling from “circumstances [that] precluded a timely filing [justifying 

equitable tolling,] . . . such as (1) mental illness[,] . . . 

(2) reliance on the incorrect statement of a VA official, or 

(3) a misfiling at the regional office or the Board.” Id. at 

*2 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

On appeal we vacated and remanded. Sneed v. 

Shinseki (“Sneed II”), 737 F.3d 719, 728–29 (Fed. Cir. 

2013). We held that “attorney abandonment may justify 

equitably tolling the filing deadline in appeals to the 

Veterans Court.” Id. We also found, as the government 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 4 Filed: 04/22/2016
SNEED v. MCDONALD 5

conceded during oral argument in the first appeal, that 

the Veterans Court had not made any explicit findings 

with respect to diligence. Id. at 724. 

On remand, Ms. Sneed argued that the Veterans 

Court should find attorney abandonment by Ms. Eagle, 

warranting equitable tolling of Ms. Sneed’s deadline to 

file her notice of appeal. In October 2014, the Veterans 

Court again held that equitable tolling of the statutory 

deadline was not warranted. Sneed v. McDonald (“Sneed 

III”), No. 11-2715, 2014 WL 5365571, at *1 (Vet. App. Oct. 

22, 2014), available at J.A. 1–10. The Veterans Court 

concluded that there was no attorney abandonment 

“absent an agreement [between Ms. Eagle and Ms. Sneed] 

to represent [Ms. Sneed] or file the NOA.” J.A. 8. The 

Veterans Court also held that Ms. Sneed did not act 

diligently in pursuing her appeal rights. Ms. Sneed appealed. We have jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292. 

DISCUSSION

I 

Section 7292 of title 38 provides that we “shall decide 

all relevant questions of law” arising from appeals from 

decisions of the Veterans Court, but, “[e]xcept to the 

extent that an appeal . . . presents a constitutional issue, 

[we] may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied 

to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1), 

(d)(2). Though the “question whether equitable tolling 

applies in a particular case often involves, in part, the 

application of law to fact, . . . when the material facts are 

not in dispute and the adoption of a particular legal 

standard would dictate the outcome of the equitable 

tolling claim, this court has treated the question of the 

availability of equitable tolling as a matter of law that we 

are authorized by statute to address.” Bailey v. Principi, 

351 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also SantanaVenegas v. Principi, 314 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 5 Filed: 04/22/2016
6 SNEED v. MCDONALD

There is no dispute here as to the relevant facts, so the 

issue presented is one of law, a matter within our jurisdiction. 

II

In Henderson v. Shinseki, the Supreme Court held 

that “the deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the 

Veterans Court [under 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a)] does not have 

jurisdictional attributes, [though] [t]he 120-day limit is 

nevertheless an important procedural rule.” 562 U.S. 428,

441–42 (2011). Although the Supreme Court did not 

decide whether equitable tolling of the statutory deadline 

was available, see id. at 442 n.4, after Henderson, we have 

held that the 120-day deadline in § 7266(a) is subject to 

equitable tolling. See, e.g., Sneed II, 737 F.3d at 728; see 

also Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir.

2014). 

“A litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden 

of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way” and prevented timely 

filing. Sneed II, 737 F.3d at 725 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); see also Menominee 

Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 755 

(2016) (explaining that the “diligence prong . . . covers 

those affairs within the litigant’s control; the extraordinary-circumstances prong, by contrast, is meant to cover 

matters outside its control”). “Equitable tolling’s two 

components [are] ‘elements,’ not merely factors of indeterminate or commensurable weight.” Menominee Indian 

Tribe, 136 S. Ct. at 756 (citation omitted). 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 6 Filed: 04/22/2016
SNEED v. MCDONALD 7

Although attorney abandonment may support equitable tolling,2 attorney negligence is not sufficient to justify 

equitable tolling. To the contrary, the client is normally 

responsible for the malfeasance of the attorney, and in 

such cases has a malpractice remedy, not a tolling remedy. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012)

(“[U]nder well-settled principles of agency law, the principal bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his 

agent.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Equitable tolling does not extend to “a garden variety 

claim of excusable neglect, such as a simple miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline.” Sneed 

II, 737 F.3d at 727 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

631, 651–52 (2012)).3 The Supreme Court has held, for 

example, that a litigant’s failure to file a Title VII claim

within the statutory period set by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(c) 

after receipt of an EEOC decision cannot be excused based 

on her lawyer’s absence from his office at the time that 

the agency notice was received. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). Attorney abandonment, 

under which “a client cannot be charged with the acts or 

omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him,” Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924, is a narrow exception to the usual 

rule. 

 

2 See Sneed II, 737 F.3d at 728 (citing Maples v. 

Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 

U.S. 631 (2010)).

3 Unrepresented litigants also routinely face conditions that, while challenging, are not “extraordinary.” See 

Menominee Indian Tribe, 136 S. Ct. at 757 (“[I]t is common for a litigant to be confronted with . . . limited financial resources, an uncertain outcome based on an 

uncertain legal landscape, and impending deadlines. 

These circumstances are not ‘extraordinary.’”) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 7 Filed: 04/22/2016
8 SNEED v. MCDONALD

III

The Veterans Court found that attorney abandonment 

had not been established because an attorney-client 

relationship did not exist between Ms. Sneed and Ms. 

Eagle. “[L]acking” from Ms. Sneed was any “declar[ation] 

that a written agreement for legal services existed between her and Ms. Eagle. She does not declare she entered into a written retainer agreement with her or even 

that an oral contract of some sort was formed. [Ms. Sneed] 

does not declare she was ever billed by or made payments 

to Ms. Eagle or that she agreed to make any payment 

. . . .” J.A. 7. In short, the Veterans Court concluded that 

there were no extraordinary circumstances justifying 

equitable tolling because “[n]either [Ms. Sneed’s] statement nor her attached exhibits and evidence indicate the 

existence of an (explicit or implicit) attorney-client relationship between herself and Ms. Eagle after issuance of 

the April 2011 Board decision.” J.A. 8. 

Both Ms. Sneed and Ms. Eagle reside in California, 

and the parties here agree that California law controls on 

the issue of whether an attorney-client relationship 

existed. As the government points out, California requires 

an express or implied contract to create an attorney-client 

relationship. See, e.g., Responsible Citizens v. Superior 

Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1717, 1732 (1993). But it is also 

true that California appears to give a very liberal construction of the implied contract requirement. Thus, for 

example, an undertaking by a lawyer to provide legal 

advice or the giving of actual advice as to a course of 

action is sufficient, even though the attorney and prospective client had never entered into a formal agreement for 

representation. Under California law, it is clear that 

neither the absence of an agreement as to services and 

fees, nor the preliminary nature of Ms. Sneed’s and Ms. 

Eagle’s communications, precluded the formation of an 

attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep’t 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 8 Filed: 04/22/2016
SNEED v. MCDONALD 9

of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371 

(Cal. 1999). 

In SpeeDee, the California Supreme Court declared

that “[t]he fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer 

and client extends to preliminary consultations by a 

prospective client with a view to retention of the lawyer, 

although actual employment does not result. . . . The 

absence of an agreement with respect to the fee . . . does 

not prevent the relationship from arising.” Id. at 379–80 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather, 

the relationship is created when “the attorney knowingly 

obtains material confidential information from the client 

and renders legal advice or services as a result.” Id. at 

380, 382–83; see also Perkins v. W. Coast Lumber Co., 62 

P. 57, 58 (Cal. 1900) (“When a party seeking legal advice 

consults an attorney at law, and secures that advice, the 

relation of attorney and client is established prima facie.”); 7 Cal. Jur. 3d Attorneys at Law § 170 (2015). 

Similarly, in Miller v. Metzinger, the California Court 

of Appeal held that “an attorney-client relationship giving 

rise to fiduciary obligations” could arise where an attorney “undertook to obtain . . . records necessary to an 

evaluation of [a legal claim] and to advise concerning 

appropriate action to be taken.” 91 Cal. App. 3d 31, 40 

(1979); see also Perkins, 62 P. at 58 (the lawyer “advised 

the [client] . . . not to file for record . . . any claim of lien”).

Thus the attorney’s statements that “his function was 

purely investigatory and that he did not agree to represent [the client], charge any fee for his services or secure a 

retainer agreement” did not preclude the existence of an 

attorney-client relationship. Miller, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 39. 

Here, there was no evidence that Ms. Eagle agreed to 

provide an evaluation of the case, nor did she provide any 

evaluation until she declined to represent Ms. Sneed and 

explained her reasons for doing so. There is, as well, no 

evidence that Ms. Sneed provided confidential materials 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 9 Filed: 04/22/2016
10 SNEED v. MCDONALD

to Ms. Eagle. The California cases do not address whether 

accepting non-confidential materials in order to consider a 

case and providing an evaluation of the case while declining representation creates an attorney-client relationship. 

We need not decide whether, under California law, there 

is an attorney-client relationship in such circumstances. 

Nor do we decide whether, assuming that an attorneyclient relationship was formed, there can be attorney 

abandonment satisfying the extraordinary circumstance 

requirement when the attorney did not undertake the 

representation. 

Even assuming there was attorney abandonment, Ms. 

Sneed does not satisfy the diligence prong. See Pace, 544 

U.S. at 418 (“Even if we were to accept petitioner’s theory 

[that he satisfied the extraordinary circumstance test], he

would not be entitled to relief because he has not established the requisite diligence.”); see also Menominee 

Indian Tribe, 136 S. Ct. at 756, 757 n.5 (holding that 

“equitable tolling’s two components [are] ‘elements,’” and 

noting that “[b]ecause we hold that there were no extraordinary circumstances, we need not decide whether 

the Tribe was diligently pursuing its rights”) (citation 

omitted); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 

(2007) (rejecting equitable tolling without addressing 

diligence because petitioner fell “far short of showing 

‘extraordinary circumstances’”). 

The reasonable diligence element demands a showing 

of diligence during the alleged extraordinary circumstance period. See Checo, 748 F.3d at 1380 (holding that 

the party “must only demonstrate due diligence during 

the extraordinary circumstance period” of her homelessness). Under Checo’s “stop-clock approach,” if diligence is 

shown, the 120-day filing period would be tolled during 

the extraordinary circumstance period and resume running when the extraordinary circumstance ended. Id. Ms. 

Sneed, then, was required to show reasonable diligence 

between April 13, 2011, when Ms. Eagle allegedly began 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 10 Filed: 04/22/2016
SNEED v. MCDONALD 11

representing her, and August 2, 2011, when Ms. Eagle 

allegedly abandoned her. 

While “[a] client [cannot] be faulted for failing to act 

on [her] own behalf when [she] lacks reason to believe 

[her] attorneys of record, in fact, are not representing 

[her],” Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924, Ms. Sneed had reason to 

suspect that Ms. Eagle was not representing her. Where 

the attorney has not undertaken the representation, 

reasonable diligence requires that the client check with 

the attorney before the statutory filing time is about to

run out to confirm that the attorney will undertake the 

representation. There is no suggestion that Ms. Sneed did 

this. The Veterans Court found that Ms. Sneed “asserts 

that she assumed that Ms. Eagle would file the NOA for 

her and . . . does not state that she took any action during 

the 120-day period to confirm that . . . an appeal had been 

filed with this Court.” J.A. 9. 

Ms. Sneed’s activity during the statutory period 

stands in contrast to the situations in the Supreme 

Court’s decisions in Holland and Maples. In Holland, a 

prisoner’s lawyer missed the statutory deadline to file a 

federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), 

despite the prisoner’s repeated requests and reminders to 

his attorney to file the petition. 560 U.S. at 652.4 The

 

4 In Holland, the Court found that 

[the attorney] failed to file [the prisoner’s] federal 

petition on time despite [the prisoner’s] many letters that repeatedly emphasized the importance of 

his doing so. [The attorney] apparently did not do 

the research necessary to find out the proper filing 

date, despite [the prisoner’s] letters that went so 

far as to identify the applicable legal rules. [The 

attorney] failed to inform [the prisoner] in a timely manner about the crucial fact that the Florida 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 11 Filed: 04/22/2016
12 SNEED v. MCDONALD

prisoner “not only wrote his [appointed] attorney numerous letters seeking critical information and providing 

direction; [but] also contacted state courts, their clerks, 

and the [state] Bar Association in an effort to have [his 

attorney]—the central impediment to the pursuit of his 

legal remedy—removed from his case. And the very day 

that [the prisoner] discovered that his AEDPA clock had 

expired due to [his attorney’s] failings, [the prisoner] 

prepared his own habeas petition pro se and promptly 

filed it with the District Court.” Id. at 653. The Court held 

that the prisoner had satisfied the diligence requirement 

and remanded for a determination on the issue of extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 653–54.

In Maples, the issue was whether there was “cause” to 

excuse a state procedural default under Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). 132 S. Ct. at 922. 

The Court found that attorney abandonment constituted 

“cause.” Id. at 924. While the case did not involve equitable tolling, the Court’s analysis is nonetheless pertinent, 

as recognized in Sneed II. See 737 F.3d at 728. In Maples, 

a prisoner on death row was represented by two out-ofstate pro bono attorneys. 132 S. Ct. at 918. With their aid, 

the prisoner filed a petition for postconviction relief in 

state court. Id. After the petition was filed, both attorneys 

left the firm, but neither informed their client of their 

departure or of their inability to continue to represent 

him. Id. at 919. Upon denying the prisoner’s petition, the 

trial court sent copies of its order to the prisoner’s counsel 

 

Supreme Court had decided his case, again despite [the prisoner’s] many pleas for that information. And [the attorney] failed to communicate 

with his client over a period of years, despite various pleas from [the prisoner] that [his attorney]

respond to his letters.

560 U.S. at 652. 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 12 Filed: 04/22/2016
SNEED v. MCDONALD 13

of record, but no copy was sent or was forwarded to the 

prisoner. Id. at 920. Without knowledge of the trial court’s 

action, and “[g]iven no reason to suspect that he lacked 

counsel able and willing to represent him,” the prisoner 

missed his 42-day deadline, under Rule 4(a)(1) of the 

Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, to file a notice of 

appeal from the trial court’s order denying postconviction 

relief. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that attorney 

abandonment had been established, finding that the 

prisoner had no basis to believe that his petition had been 

denied or that he was unrepresented. Id. at 927.

The opposite situation was true for Ms. Sneed. Unlike 

the prisoner in Maples, she received notice of the filing 

deadline. Unlike the prisoner in Holland, she did nothing 

to ensure that the person she had asked to represent her

was acting to make the necessary filing. The Veterans 

Court did not err in holding that Ms. Sneed did not act 

diligently. The absence of diligence is particularly clear 

here because Ms. Eagle had never before represented Ms. 

Sneed and had not agreed to represent her in the appeal 

or to file a notice of appeal. Ms. Sneed’s failure to confirm 

that Ms. Eagle would be acting on her behalf and that she 

had filed a notice of appeal precludes a finding of reasonable diligence. The fact that Ms. Sneed thought that Ms. 

Eagle had agreed to represent her cannot excuse her lack 

of diligence given the want of any objective basis for such 

an assumption.

Because Ms. Sneed did not demonstrate that she had 

been diligently pursuing her rights, the Veterans Court 

did not err in holding that equitable tolling is not available. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 13 Filed: 04/22/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MARVA J. SNEED,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7069

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 11-2715, Judge William A. Moorman.

______________________ 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result.

The doctrine of equitable tolling “pauses the running 

of, or ‘tolls,’ a statute of limitations.” Lozano v. Montoya 

Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1231 (2014) (citation omitted). 

“[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of 

establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing 

his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citation omitted). An attorney’s

abandonment of a client may constitute extraordinary 

circumstances. See Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 726–

27 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The existence of an attorney-client 

relationship is a condition precedent to a finding of abandonment. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922–23 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 14 Filed: 04/22/2016
2 SNEED v. MCDONALD

(2012) (explaining that attorney abandonment may arise 

when an attorney severs an existing relationship with a 

client).

The majority concludes that the doctrine of equitable 

tolling is not available to Appellant Marva J. Sneed. Maj. 

Op. at 13. In reaching its conclusion, the majority does 

not decide whether the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) committed a legal 

error when it found that, under California law, no attorney-client relationship existed between attorney Katrina 

Eagle and Ms. Sneed and that, consequently, no extraordinary circumstances prevented Ms. Sneed from appealing to the Veterans Court. Id. at 10. 

I write separately because the Veterans Court’s extraordinary circumstances analysis is legally defective. 

The Veterans Court applied an improperly narrow legal 

standard in assessing whether an attorney-client relationship existed between Ms. Eagle and Ms. Sneed. 

Despite that error, I agree with the majority that the 

court should not provide any relief to Ms. Sneed because 

she did not diligently pursue her right to appeal to the 

Veterans Court.

I.

Ms. Sneed contends that the Veterans Court misapplied California law when it determined that no attorneyclient relationship existed between her and Ms. Eagle, 

which in turn meant that Ms. Sneed could not claim 

attorney abandonment as a basis for extraordinary circumstances. Ms. Sneed principally raises two arguments: 

(1) “the Veterans Court relied on an erroneous view of 

California law[1] regarding attorney-client relationships,” 

 

1 “Both Ms. Sneed and Ms. Eagle reside in California, and the parties here agree that California law conCase: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 15 Filed: 04/22/2016
SNEED v. MCDONALD 3

Appellant’s Br. 23 (capitalization modified); and (2) the 

Veterans Court “erred by substituting California’s legal 

technicalities for the equitable judgment the tolling 

inquiry requires,” id. at 30 (capitalization modified). I 

agree with Ms. Sneed’s first argument.

The Veterans Court articulated an incomplete and, 

thus, improperly narrow legal standard for determining 

when an attorney-client relationship exists under California law. It correctly found that (1) a contract is required 

to establish an attorney-client relationship and (2) a 

contract can be express or implied-in-fact. Sneed v. 

McDonald (Sneed III), No. 11-2715, 2014 WL 5365571, at 

*4 (Vet. App. Oct. 22, 2014) (citing Responsible Citizens v. 

Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1993)). Although the Veterans Court recognized an 

implied-in-fact contract could be created by the parties’ 

conduct, id., it failed to consider that an attorney’s provision of legal advice may constitute the required conduct. 

Over a century ago, the Supreme Court of California 

provided a broad standard for determining when an 

implied-in-fact contract may arise between an attorney 

and a client. It stated that “[w]hen a party seeking legal 

advice[2] consults an attorney at law, and secures that 

 

trols on the issue of whether an attorney-client relationship existed.” Maj. Op. at 8. 

2 Neither the legislature nor the courts of California 

have expressly defined what constitutes “legal advice.” 

However, the California State Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct has stated that legal 

advice includes “that which requires the exercise of legal 

judgment beyond the knowledge and capacity of the lay 

person,” such as when an attorney “mak[es] a recommendation about a specific course of action to follow.” Cal. 

State Bar Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, 

Formal Op. 2003-164, 2003 WL 23146203, at *4 (2003) 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 16 Filed: 04/22/2016
4 SNEED v. MCDONALD

advice, the relation of attorney and client is established 

prima facie.” Perkins v. W. Coast Lumber Co., 62 P. 57, 58 

(Cal. 1900). In the decades that followed, the Supreme 

Court of California and the California Courts of Appeal 

have cited this passage favorably and expanded upon it in 

deciding whether an implied-in-fact contract gave rise to 

an attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., People ex rel. 

Dep’t of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 

371, 379–80 (Cal. 1999); Beery v. State Bar of Cal., 739 

P.2d 1289, 1293 (Cal. 1987); Benninghoff v. Superior 

Court, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759, 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Gulf 

Ins. Co. v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & 

Gladstone, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); 

Miller v. Metzinger, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1979).

SpeeDee is particularly instructive in assessing when

legal advice is sufficient to establish an attorney-client 

relationship under Perkins. SpeeDee concerned “whether 

an attorney-client relationship ha[d] reached a point 

where the attorney can be subject to disqualification for a 

conflict of interest.”3 980 P.2d at 379. In that decision, 

the California Supreme Court held that an attorney-client 

relationship may arise from a preliminary consultation by 

 

(internal quotation marks, brackets, citation, and footnote 

omitted).

3 Although SpeeDee did not address the existence of 

an attorney-client relationship for purposes of attorney 

abandonment, California courts have considered the 

factors articulated in Perkins and its progeny in a number 

of contexts. See, e.g., Streit v. Covington & Crowe, 98 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 193, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Miller 

in the context of legal malpractice). Indeed, the Veterans 

Court relied upon Responsible Citizens in its analysis, 

which concerned attorney disqualification for a conflict of 

interest. See 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761. 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 17 Filed: 04/22/2016
SNEED v. MCDONALD 5

a prospective client who seeks, and receives, legal advice, 

even though no formal agreement for representation 

results.4 See id. at 379–80.

The Veterans Court committed error because it did 

not consider whether the August 2, 2011 letter5 from Ms. 

Eagle to Ms. Sneed constituted legal advice sufficient to 

establish an implied-in-fact attorney-client contract under 

Perkins and its progeny. Indeed, the Veterans Court did 

not discuss Perkins or SpeeDee in its analysis, see Sneed 

III, 2014 WL 5365571, at *3–7, despite Ms. Sneed’s argument that her communications with Ms. Eagle resulted in

an attorney-client relationship, see J.A. 80 (Appellant’s

Memorandum of Law in Response to the Veterans Court’s 

Order of Mar. 31, 2014, where she quoted Beery for the 

proposition that, when “a party seeking legal advice 

consults an attorney at law and secures that advice, the 

relation of attorney and client is established prima facie” 

 

4 This conclusion is sensible in light of an attorney’s 

duty under California law to advise individuals who 

reasonably believe they are clients that they are, in fact, 

not clients. See Butler v. State Bar of Cal., 721 P.2d 585, 

589 (Cal. 1986).

5 As the majority observes, in that letter

Ms. Eagle provided an assessment of Ms. Sneed’s 

service connection claim, explaining her view that 

the claim “does not meet the criteria under 38 

C.F.R. § 3.312,” and concluded, “I do not believe 

the VA erred in denying your claim; thus, I will 

not be able to represent you for any subsequent 

appeal for entitlement to service connection for 

the cause of death, and for [dependency and indemnity compensation] benefits.” 

Maj. Op. at 3 (footnote omitted) (quoting J.A. 53). 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 18 Filed: 04/22/2016
6 SNEED v. MCDONALD

(quoting 739 P.2d at 1293)).6 Thus, because the Veterans 

Court did not even consider whether the contents of the 

letter in question amounted to legal advice sufficient to 

establish an attorney-client relationship,7 it applied an 

improperly narrow legal standard in its analysis.

II.

Despite the improperly narrow legal standard applied 

by the Veterans Court, I agree with the majority that we 

cannot assess the merits of Ms. Sneed’s claim for compensation because Ms. Sneed did not diligently pursue her 

right to appeal to the Veterans Court. Maj. Op. at 13. 

Nevertheless, as the majority recognizes, Ms. Sneed may 

have another remedy at her disposal. See id. at 7 (citing 

Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922) (explaining that, under general 

principles of agency law, attorney malfeasance may give 

rise to a malpractice remedy).

 

6 The passage from Ms. Sneed’s Memorandum raises doubt as to whether the Veterans Court’s properly

concluded that Ms. Sneed “d[id] not assert that Ms. Eagle 

provided any advice to” her. Sneed III, 2014 WL 5365571, 

at *6.

7 To be sure, if the letter from Ms. Eagle stated only 

that she would not represent Ms. Sneed, there would be 

no dispute that an attorney-client relationship had not 

formed between them. However, in addition to declining 

to represent Ms. Sneed, the letter also contains legal 

analysis and advice. J.A. 53–54. The additional content 

suggests that Ms. Sneed sought legal advice from Ms. 

Eagle and secured it, even though Ms. Eagle ultimately 

declined to represent her. The additional content thus 

warrants an analysis under Perkins. 

Case: 15-7069 Document: 36-2 Page: 19 Filed: 04/22/2016