Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-01168/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-01168-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Berrios
Defendant
Investment Retrievers, Inc
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

INVESTMENT RETRIEVERS, INC.,

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

JESUS BERRIOS individually and dba 

INTERNATIONAL GENETRACE, INC., 

 Defendant. 

Case No: C 10-1168 SBA 

ORDER REMANDING ACTION

Plaintiff, Investment Retrievers, Inc., filed the instant debt collection action against 

defendant, Jesus Berrios, in San Mateo County Superior Court on August 17, 2009. In its 

complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant defaulted on his credit card payments, and owes a 

principal balance of $2,625.82, and $656.45 in interest. The Judicial Council form complaint 

alleges state law causes of action for breach of contract and common counts. No federal claims 

are alleged. On March 19, 2010, Defendant, acting pro se, filed a Notice of Removal. Though 

not entirely clear, Defendant appears to predicate the removal on diversity jurisdiction and on 

the ground that Plaintiff’s causes of action sound in admiralty law. (Notice of Removal at 1.) 

He also purports to allege federal counterclaims, presumably as another basis for the removal. 

(Id. at 9-10.) 

The federal removal statute permits the removal from state court to federal court of 

cases that might have been filed in federal court originally. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Under 

section 1441(b), an action may be removed if the complaint alleges “a claim or right arising 

under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States ....” Alternatively, an action may 

be removed only “if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a 

citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). A district court has 

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“a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action sua sponte, whether the 

parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 

F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). A district court must remand a case to state court “if at any time 

before the final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal, and the removal statute is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Prize Frize Inc. v. Matrix Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 

1265 (9th Cir.1999). 

The Court has carefully reviewed the Notice of Removal and attachments thereto, and 

has concluded that removal jurisdiction is absent. The diversity jurisdiction statute confers 

jurisdiction in cases where the parties are citizens of different states and where the amount in 

controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Here, the amount in controversy 

is approximately $3,300, which is well below the jurisdictional minimum. In addition, Plaintiff 

filed its complaint as a limited jurisdiction action, meaning that the amount recoverable 

pursuant to the complaint cannot exceed $10,000. Based on the record presented, it is plain 

that diversity jurisdiction is absent. 

Defendant’s Notice of Removal also makes a passing reference to “Admiralty” law, 

presumably in an attempt to establish that Plaintiff’s collection claims arise under federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the 

courts of the States, of: [¶] (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to 

suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”). In determining 

the boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction, the court looks to the purpose of the Congressional 

grant. Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991). The fundamental 

interest giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is “the protection of maritime commerce.” Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Ventura Packers, Inc. v. F/V Jeanine 

Kathleen, 305 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Though not confined to vessels, admiralty 

naturally centers around them, as the great agents of maritime affairs.”). This case, however, 

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does not involve maritime commerce or affairs; it merely involves the collection of a credit 

card debt.1

 

Defendant also seems to posit that the action is removable based on his purported 

counterclaims based on federal law. Specifically, attached to the Notice of Removal are 

counterclaims which allege that Plaintiff violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and 

the Privacy Act in the course of attempting to collect the underlying debt. Notice of Removal 

at 9-10. However, it is well settled that a complaint that is based entirely on state law is not 

removable by virtue of anticipated federal defenses or counterclaims. See Louisville & 

Nashville R.R. Co., v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding that an anticipated defense 

may not be used to establish subject matter jurisdiction); Takeda v. Northwestern Nat’l Life 

Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[R]emovability cannot be created by defendant 

pleading a counterclaim presenting a federal question.”) (citations omitted); accord Schwarzer, 

Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civ. P. Before Trial, § 1.121 at 2B-50 (TRG 2008). Since 

Plaintiff’s complaint sounds only in state law and there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction, the 

Court finds that the action is not removable. Accordingly, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the instant action 

is REMANDED to the San Mateo County Superior Court. The Clerk shall close the file and 

terminate all pending matters. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 6/1/10 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

United States District Judge 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 1 Even if the saving to suitors clause set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 were germane, 

Defendant still would need to demonstrate an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction 

in order to remove the action, which he has failed to do. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. 

Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 153 (5th Cir. 1996).

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FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

INVESTMENT RETRIEVERS, INC et al, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

BERRIOS et al, 

 Defendant. 

 / 

Case Number: CV10-01168 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District 

Court, Northern District of California. 

That on June 2, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said 

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing 

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle 

located in the Clerk's office. 

Jesus Berrios 

20 Nancy Lane 

Daly City, CA 94014 

Dated: June 2, 2010 

 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk 

 

 By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:10-cv-01168-SBA Document 20 Filed 06/02/10 Page 4 of 4