Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01118/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01118-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Harrison
Respondent
Anthony Holguin
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY HOLGUIN,

Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL HARRISON, in his capacity as

Warden of the California State Prison, Los

Angeles County, in Lancaster,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 05-01118 CRB

OPINION

Petitioner Anthony Holguin, a mentally retarded 17-year old boy, was convicted of

first degree murder after a jury trial. There was no physical evidence linking him to the

crime; instead, he was convicted primarily on the basis of his multiple confessions and one

eyewitness. He seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds that his rights to Miranda

warnings and effective assistance of counsel were violated. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At about 6:40 p.m. on March 14, 2000, Eric Inzunza was shot and killed in Salinas,

California. Inzunza was a student at Alisal High School. There were three witnesses to the

murder who identified the shooter as short and thin and wearing a white 49ers sweatshirt and

a red baseball cap. Two of the witnesses claimed they saw the shooter get into a blue Honda

after the shooting. 

 

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Holguin was a 17-year old special education student at Alisal High School when the

crime occurred. Holguin is mildly to moderately mentally retarded and has an IQ between 47

and 65. He cannot read or write, but can copy letters. Although Holguin tried to socialize

with other students, he was only marginally successful. 

George Martinez, the campus security guard supervisor at Alisal High School, saw

Holguin at the scene of the murder at about 7:00 or 7:30 p.m. the evening of the shooting. 

Holguin was not wearing clothes that matched the description of the shooter. 

A. The Pre-Miranda Statements

The day after the shooting, March 15, Holguin was suspended from school. The VicePrincipal, Bernardo Munro (“Munro”), specifically told Holguin that he could not come to

school the next day, even to work in the cafeteria. Munro took extra time explaining the

suspension to Holguin because he knew Holguin was a special education student.

The next day, around lunchtime, Munro heard on his radio that Holguin had returned

to campus. Munro instructed a school official to bring Holguin to Munro’s office. On

Munro’s way to his office he met up with campus police officer Gilbert Bacis. Munro and

Officer Bacis took Holguin to Munro’s office. Munro talked to Holguin about his

trespassing (a student who returns to school while on suspension is guilty of trespassing). 

After Holguin agreed that he had been trespassing, Munro left Officer Bacis with Holguin to

either cite him for trespassing or release him. According to Munro, Holguin was not free to

leave the office at this time.

As Officer Bacis was talking to Holguin, he believed (mistakenly) that Holguin’s

clothing and build matched the description of Eric Inzunza’s shooter. He asked Holguin if

Holguin had done the shooting, and Holguin responded by shrugging his shoulders. Officer

Bacis knew that the detectives investigating the murder were coming to the school sometime

before lunch. He told Holguin that the detectives might want to talk to him, and then stepped

outside Monro’s office to telephone the detectives.

Detectives Craig Carmena and Gerry Davis arrived at Munro’s office a few moments

later. Officer Carmena walked into the office and overheard Holguin telling Officer Bacis

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that he (Holguin) had a beef with Eric Inzunza. Officer Carmena immediately asked Holguin

why he shot the victim even though Holguin had not said that he had been involved in the

shooting. Holguin responded: “I did what I had to do.” Officer Carmena then asked his

partner to retrieve a tape recorder.

After obtaining the tape recorder, the police officers questioned Holguin in Munro’s

office about the shooting for approximately 15 minutes. They did not read Holguin his

Miranda rights, nor attempt to contact his mother. Nor did they ever advise Holguin that he

was free to leave. Holguin admitted to shooting Inzunza. He stated that Inzunza “was the

wrong color I guess. The way I heard it that he had a blue sweater on and a blue cap, a blue

beanie.” After initially refusing to say why he killed Inzunza, Holguin then stated, “I didn’t

wanna do it, but I had to.” “I just shot him because, ah, you know I wanted to and I had to,

you know.” He said he used a .22 gun. Holguin said that he shot Inzunza “in the stomach.”

After initially saying he did not know where the gun was, Holguin then stated that he

would go by himself to get it. Then, after telling the officers that his homies would have

already taken the gun away, he agreed to show police officers where he put the gun. The

detectives then took Holguin, by patrol car, to the creek where Holguin had told them that he

hid the murder weapon. After looking around the creek, no weapon was found. 

B. The Post-Miranda Statements

Holguin was placed under arrest and read his Miranda rights. The officers recorded

an interview of Holguin in the patrol car. They then brought Holguin to the police station,

where he was again read his Miranda rights and was interviewed on videotape.

The same day Holguin confessed, a witness identified Holguin as the shooter when

showed a photo lineup by police. The witness testified that he saw a newspaper picture of

Holguin subsequent to the lineup that strengthened his certainty. The witness said that he

was struck by a mark on one of Holguin’s eyebrows, and said that he had “no doubt” that

Holguin was the killer. 

The police never found any physical evidence linking Holguin to the shooting. 

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Holguin was charged with first degree murder. Prior to trial his counsel moved to

suppress his statements made to police both before and after he was read his Miranda rights.

On the day of the hearing, however, counsel withdrew the motion regarding suppression of

post-Miranda statements. After the evidentiary hearing on the pre-Miranda statements, the

trial court denied the motion on the ground that Holguin was not in custody at the time the

officers questioned him. A jury found Holguin guilty of first degree murder and of using a

firearm during the commission of the murder. The trial court sentenced Holguin to 50 years

to life. 

On direct appeal, Holguin argued, among other things, that (1) the trial court erred by

admitting his pre-Miranda statements, and (2) he was deprived of effective assistance of

counsel when his counsel failed to challenge the admissibility of his post-Miranda statements

as involuntarily made. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. 

With respect to the Miranda violation, the court held:

Here defendant was not under formal arrest at the time of his statements. He

was engaged in a discussion about trespassing, which was not an unfamiliar

situation. He was not handcuffed. Though the detention in the office lasted

about 20 minutes, the questioning occurred while the door remained open and a

secretary continued working. Defendant then agreed to show the officers

where the gun was located. Defendant chose to ride with Bacis and was

allowed to move freely about at the creek before he was arrested. There was

no evidence that the demeanor of the officers was overbearing or that their

questions were confrontational or accusatory at any time. Accordingly,

considering the totality of circumstances, we agree with the trial court that a

reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have believed that his

freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal

arrest. 

Pet. Ex. 8 at 768.

The court went on to hold that even if the police had violated Holguin’s Miranda

rights, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:

[Holguin] made three subsequent Mirandized confessions. [A witness]

also positively identified [Holguin] as defendant’s killer. Thus, absent

evidence of the confession at the school, the jury would have found

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the murder.

Id.

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The court also rejected Holguin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court

reviewed the voluntariness of Holguin’s post-Miranda statements de novo under the totality

of the circumstances and found the statements were voluntary and therefore there was not

ineffective assistance of counsel: “Though defendant was 17 years old and possessed

subnormal intelligence, there was no evidence that the police used force, overbearing threats

or promises of leniency.” Id. at 771. 

The California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal in a one-line order. 

Holguin then filed a state habeas petition with the California Supreme Court. In addition to

renewing his previously-made assertions, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to move to suppress his post-Miranda statements on the ground that his waiver of

Miranda rights was not knowing and intelligently made. After the Supreme Court summarily

denied his petition, he filed the pending federal habeas petition. He again alleges that (1) the

admission of his pre-Miranda statements was in error and not harmless, and (2) his postMiranda statements were involuntary and he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his

Miranda rights, and therefore his counsel was ineffective by not moving to suppress the

statements. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

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“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. section

2254(d) “is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). “While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for purposes of

determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

law, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those

holdings need be ‘reasonably’ applied.” Id.

Furthermore, if a constitutional error occurred, a federal habeas court may grant relief

from a state court’s unreasonable application of federal law only if the violation “had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

//

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DISCUSSION

I. The Pre-Miranda Statements

 Holguin argues that the State court’s conclusion that he was not “in custody” when he

made his pre-Miranda statements involved an unreasonable application of federal law and

was not harmless error.

A. Custody

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that to protect an individual’s Fifth

Amendment rights, police must advise a suspect of the right to an attorney and to remain

silent before they can subject that person to custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. 436, 444

(1966). Thus, for Miranda protections to apply, there must be (1) an interrogation, (2) by a

police officer, (3) while the suspect is in custody. Here, the only factor in dispute is whether

Holguin was in custody during the interrogation.

The law is well-established that 

[t]wo discrete inquiries are essential to the [custody] determination: first, what

were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those

circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty

to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players’

lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to

resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom

of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.

Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). “Courts must examine ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ and

determine ‘how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would

gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action.’” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,

124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 325

(1994)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (stating that “the only

relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his

situation”). 

The California Court of Appeal determined that Holguin was not in custody because

he was not in an unfamiliar situation (he had been in the Vice Principal’s office on more than

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one occasion before), he was not handcuffed, the door to the office remained open and the

secretary was sitting outside. It also found relevant that Holguin agreed to show the officers

where the gun was located, was allowed to choose which officer to ride with, and was

allowed to move about freely at the creek to locate the gun. In addition, the Court of Appeal

stated that the police officers’ questions were neither confrontational nor accusatory. 

The Court of Appeal’s conclusion involved an unreasonable application of federal

law. Although the court recited that it was considering the totality of the circumstances, it

did not consider those factors that weigh in favor of an “in custody” finding. 

The State court ignored that at the time of the questioning Holguin was in custody for

the trespassing violation. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968) (“[W]hen an

individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by authorities in any

significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is

jeopardized,” even if the individual is “in custody” for a different offense from the one about

which he is being questioned). Holguin was brought involuntarily to the Vice-Principal’s

office because he was trespassing. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)

(holding that fact that defendant came to police station voluntarily and was told that he was

not under arrest suggested that he was not in custody). After Holguin agreed that he had

been trespassing, Vice-Principal Munro left Officer Bacis with Holguin to “cite” him or

“release him.” Holquin was thus not free to leave, as Munro acknowledged. As neither

Officer Bacis nor the other officers ever cited or released Holguin, he remained in custody. 

Nothing happened between the time Munro testified Holguin was not free to leave and the

officers’ questioning of Holguin that suggests a reasonable person in Holguin’s position

would have believed he had suddenly become free to leave. The State court, however,

simply ignored this critical fact. 

The State court also ignored that Holquin was questioned in a “police dominated”

location. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438-39. In Berkemer, the defendant was pulled over for

a traffic stop and asked by the officer if he had been using intoxicants. Id. at 423. In holding

that the roadside questioning of a motorist does not constitute “custodial interrogation,” the

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court explained that “the atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less

‘police dominated’ than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda

itself.” Id. at 439. Unlike the defendant in Berkemer, who was questioned in public by only

one officer, Holguin was questioned by three officers in the Vice-Principal’s office. Not

only did the interrogation take place at a “police dominated” location, but it also took place

in a disciplinary setting where a reasonable student, such as Holguin, would feel compelled

to obey authority and answer questions when asked. The State court, however, simply

ignored this factor too.

Moreover, in Stansbury v. California, the Supreme Court explained that “an officer’s

views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs concerning the potential

culpability of the individual being questioned” is a factor that bears on the custody

determination if those views are communicated to the person being questioned. 511 U.S.

318, 325 (1994). Here, the officers made it clear to Holguin that they suspected him of being

the killer and that he was the focus of their investigation. Officer Bacis called two other

officers to the school to question Holguin after telling Holguin that he matched the

description of the shooter. See United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir.

1985) (characterizing an interrogation as accusatory when defendant was told that he

matched description of rapist). The first question Officer Carmena asked Holguin was why

he shot Inzunza. These facts demonstrate that the officers conveyed to Holguin that they

believed he was the shooter. A reasonable person in Holguin’s position would not believe he

could simply get up and walk away while being accused by three officers of having

committed a murder. See United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir. 1989)

(holding that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave when an officer tells the person

that he matches the description of a drug criminal). Although the United States Supreme

Court has stated that such a factor is relevant to the custody analysis, again, the State court

gave no consideration to this fact.

In light of these circumstances, it was unreasonable for the State court to conclude

that Holguin was not in custody. The factors which the State court did consider do not make

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the court’s conclusion reasonable. First, the court’s reliance on the open door and secretary

sitting outside Munro’s office is not compelling. Just because the door was open does not

mean that one in Holguin’s position would feel free to get up and walk away from the three

officers who were questioning him about a murder, especially given that no one had released

him since he had been detained for trespassing. Moreover, the secretary’s presence had

nothing to do with the questioning and, if anything, a student in Holguin’s situation might

view her as an extension of the authority surrounding the office as opposed to an indication

that he was free to go. 

Second, that Holguin had been in the Vice-Principal’s office on prior occasions and

thus was in “familiar” surroundings does not support the conclusion that, under the

circumstances here, a reasonable person would feel free to leave. The scenario ceased to

resemble past office visits once Holguin admitted to trespassing, and two additional officers

arrived and accused Holguin of murder. 

 Third, that Holguin chose in which police vehicle to ride, and that he was allowed to

walk unrestrained at the creek bed while searching for the gun, do not suggest a reasonable

person in Holguin’s position would have felt free to leave the officers. Holguin did not get

to choose whether to accompany the police; rather, at most, he was given a choice as to with

which police officer to ride. Regardless of which car Holguin chose, the officers were still

directing him to get into a police vehicle. The officers allowed Holguin to move freely about

at the creek so that he could find the gun (which he never did). A reasonable person would

not have felt free to leave, or even have been able to leave; three armed officers took him to

this remote location and closely watched him while he looked for the weapon.

The State court’s reliance on the lack of handcuffs is also unreasonable. While

handcuffs may demonstrate that a defendant is in custody, the Supreme Court has never held

that the lack of handcuffs suggests that a reasonable person would believe he was free to

leave, especially where, as here, after already having been detained for another crime, he is

being accused by three armed officers of having committed a murder. 

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Finally, the State court’s assessment that “there was no evidence that . . . [the

officers’] questions were confrontational or accusatory at any time” is flatly contradicted by

the testimony of the officers and the State’s transcript of the officers’ interrogation of

Holguin. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (a federal court may grant a petition for habeas corpus if

the state court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Upon meeting Holguin, Officer

Carmena immediately asked Holguin why he murdered Inzunza. It is hard to imagine a more

accusatory question. The accusations continued, as is reflected by the State’s transcript of

the recorded interview. Officer Carmena questioned Holguin: “Why did you shoot him,

though. What kind of beef did you have with him?” “Where did you shoot this guy at?” 

“What kind of, what kind of gun did you use?” 

Officer Carmena asked Holguin, “And you got into a car?” because witnesses had

reported that the murderer had fled in a car. Holguin responded, “Nah, I didn’t get in no

car.” Officer Carmena, continuing with the accusatory nature of the interrogation,

nonetheless stated: “Just now you told me you did get into a car.” When Holguin told the

officers that he would not show them where the gun was located, Officer Carmena threatened

to search his home: “I don’t wanna start tearing up your place and disrespecting your, your

family your mom your, your brothers and sisters and all that. If you show us where the gun is

then we don’t have to do that.” The State court’s finding that the officers’ questions were not

confrontational or accusatory at any time cannot be reconciled with the undisputed record. 

And, the State court’s erroneous finding was critical to its custody determination because

confrontational and accusatory questioning would cause a reasonable person to feel

compelled to comply with the officers’ instructions.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Yarborough v. Alvarado--a case upon which

the State relies--highlights the unreasonableness of the State court’s analysis. The Supreme

Court concluded that the factors that weighed against a finding that the defendant (a minor)

was in custody included: the police did not transport the defendant to the station or require

him to appear at a particular time; the police did not threaten him or suggest he would be

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placed under arrest; his parents remained in the lobby during the interview; the officer

focused on the crimes of another rather than the defendant’s; instead of pressuring the

defendant with the threat of arrest and prosecution, the officer appealed to the defendant’s

interest in helping the police; the officer twice asked the defendant whether he wanted to take

a break; and, at the end of the interview, the defendant went home. 124 S.Ct. at 2149-50. 

The Court concluded that “these objective facts are consistent with an interrogation

environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and

leave.” Id. at 2150. The factors that weighed in favor of a finding that the defendant was in

custody included: he was interviewed at the police station; the interview lasted two hours; the

officer did not tell the defendant that he was free to leave; and the defendant was not brought

to the police station of his own accord, rather his parents brought him. Id. at 2150. The

Supreme Court concluded that as a reasonable jurist could find in these circumstances that

the defendant was in custody, and also that he was not, the state court’s determination that

the defendant was not in custody was a reasonable application of the law. Id.

Virtually none of the facts that supported the no custody finding in Alvarado are

present here. Holguin was involuntarily taken to the Vice-Principal’s office because he was

trespassing. Holguin was never released; instead, after over an hour of questioning he was

handcuffed and formally arrested. The police never contacted Holguin’s mother and Holguin

was alone during the entire interrogation. The officers’ questions focused on Holguin;

indeed, they immediately accused him of the murder. Holguin was never offered a break. 

And the officers threatened Holguin that if he did not cooperate, if he did not show them

where the gun was located, the officers would have to “start tearing up your place and

disrespecting your, your family your mom your, your brothers and sisters and all that.” 

Moreover, the factors that weighed in favor of an “in custody” finding in Alvarado are

present here: the officers interviewed Holguin for over an hour before they read him his

Miranda rights; they never told him he was free to leave; and he did not voluntarily appear

for questioning.

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In sum, the State court’s determination that Holguin was not in custody when the

officers questioned him for nearly an hour in the Vice-Principal’s office, the patrol car, and

while looking for the gun near the creek involved an unreasonable application of controlling

federal law. Although clearly established Supreme Court precedent establishes that a court

must weigh the “totality of the circumstances,” the State court’s analysis ignored material

factors that compel an “in custody” finding and it relied on factors that bore little, if any,

relevance to the inquiry. The decision was also based on findings of fact which the

undisputed record demonstrates were clearly erroneous.

B. Harmless Error

Having determined that Holguin’s statements made before he was read his Miranda

rights should not have been admitted at trial, and the State court’s conclusion to the contrary

was unreasonable, the Court must next determine whether the admission of the statements

was harmless error.

“The erroneous admission of statements taken in violation of a defendant’s Fifth

Amendment rights is subject to harmless error.” Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1126

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). On collateral review, the test is

“whether the error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1991) (citing Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir.

2000) (the Brecht standard applies uniformly in all federal habeas corpus cases under section

2254).

In determining whether an error is harmless, the reviewing judge should ask, “Do I,

the judge, think that the error substantially influenced the jury’s decision?” O’Neal v.

McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). “A reviewing court does not examine whether there

was sufficient evidence to support the conviction in the absence of constitutional error.” 

Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1127; see also Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993)

(emphasizing the Kotteakos Court’s caution that “[t]he inquiry cannot be merely whether

there was enough to support the result”). Instead, the reviewing “court must find that the

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error, in the whole context of the particular case, had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence on the jury’s verdict.” Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 147 (1998). Where

error is found, the state bears the burden of instilling in the court a “fair assurance” that it did

not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See Valerio v. Crawford,

306 F.3d 742, 762 (9th Cir. 2002). “When a habeas court is in grave doubt as to the

harmlessness of an error that affects substantial rights, it should grant relief.” O’Neal, 513

U.S. at 445.

Although the Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), that

the erroneous admission of confessions is subject to harmless error analysis, the Supreme

Court, along with state supreme courts and lower federal courts, have recognized the

substantial influence that a defendant’s confession usually has on a jury’s verdict. In Rice v.

Wood, 77 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit summarized Fulminante and

explained the effects of the admission of a confession on defense strategy:

All of the Justices in Fulminante agreed that a defendant’s full confession is

not just another piece of evidence; it is the one item that, alone, can form the basis of

conviction by removing what otherwise would be a reasonable doubt. Fulminante,

499 U.S. at 296 (White, J., opinion of the Court) (“A confession is like no other

evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and

damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.”) (internal quotations omitted;

id. at 312 (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion of the Court) (“An involuntary confession may

have a more dramatic effect on the course of a trial than do other trial errors--in

particular cases it may be devastating to a defendant . . .”; id. at 313 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (“Apart, perhaps, from a videotape of the crime, one would have

difficulty finding evidence more damaging to a criminal defendant’s plea of

innocence.”).

Nor is the effect of a confession limited to the weight it might carry with the

jury: Admission of a full confession immensely complicates the defendant’s trial

strategy; it puts pressure on him to give up the right to remain silent; it can foreclose

alternative theories of the defense (such as an alibi) that are inconsistent with the

confession. A wrongfully admitted confession also forces defendants to devote

valuable trial resources neutralizing the confession or explaining it to the jury,

resources that could otherwise be used to create a reasonable doubt as to some other

aspect of the prosecution’s case. The devastating effect of a full confession on the

defendant’s case is not a matter of speculation -- it is hard fact documented in many

judicial opinions and discussed widely in law review articles.

Id. at 1142; see also United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1998) (a

defendant’s inculpatory statement “is probably the most probative and damaging evidence

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that can be admitted against him”) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296); Henry v. Kernan,

197 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999) (no other evidence of intent could have impressed the

jury in the same way that defendant’s own statements did, particularly because his confession

was played in full for the jury); People v. Neal, 31 Cal. 4th 63, 86 (2003) (although

erroneous admission of a confession might be harmless in a particular case, it nevertheless is

“likely to be prejudicial in many cases”) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).

Here, the State court concluded that the admission of the pre-Miranda statements was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the post-Miranda statements and one

witness’s identification of Holguin as the shooter. This conclusion, too, was objectively

unreasonable.

First, the State court failed to make the proper inquiry--whether admission of the

statements had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict; instead, the court appeared to

rule that because there was other, sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the

admission of the pre-Miranda statement was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Such

analysis was incorrect under federal law. See Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1127.

Second, the State court cited Arizona v. Fulminante in support of its decision. Yet, 

Fulminante demonstrates why the erroneous admission of the pre-Miranda statements was

not harmless. In Fulminante, the trial court admitted two confessions made by the defendant

to two different witnesses. The Supreme Court concluded that one confession was properly

admitted and one not, and the Court determined that the improper admission of one

confession was not harmless error despite the proper admission of the other confession. Id.

at 299. The Court observed that absent the confessions, it was unlikely the defendant would

have been prosecuted at all as the physical evidence and other circumstantial evidence would

have been insufficient to convict. Id. at 297. Thus, the Court concluded, a successful

prosecution depended on the jury believing both confessions. Id. The Court also concluded

that absent the first (improperly admitted) confession, the jury might not have believed the

witness testimony as to the second confession. Id. at 298.

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As in Fulminante, Holguin may not have been prosecuted but for his statements. 

There is no physical evidence connecting him to the murder, and his identification by a single

witness would probably not have been sufficient, especially given that Holguin did not match

the description of the shooter. Thus, Holguin’s statements, including his pre-Miranda

statements, were central to the prosecution’s case. The tape recording of the pre-Miranda

statements was played to the jury, witnesses were asked numerous questions regarding its

content, and the jury had a transcript of the statements with them during their deliberations.

And, as in Fulminate, the prosecution used the combined effect of all of Holguin’s

statements, including the pre-Miranda statements, in order to obtain Holguin’s conviction. 

For example, in closing argument the prosecutor emphasized the existence of the multiple

confessions:

“He confessed over and over and over and over that he was the person who

killed Erik.” 

“[D]oesn’t it take even more mental capacity to sit here and lie to the police 

officers on basically three different occasions, at the school, out at the scene

looking for the gun, and on the taped interview, and lie about details and keep

those lies pretty much straight.”

The prosecution had to rely on the aggregate strength of multiple confessions,

including the pre-Miranda confession, because Holguin’s “confessions” got nearly all of the

details of the murder wrong. For example, Holguin said Inzunza was wearing a blue sweater

and beanie when he was shot. The evidence was undisputed, however that Inzunza was

actually wearing a white shirt and no hat. Holguin also said that he was wearing his black

and red 49ers jacket and black beanie when he shot Inzunza. According to witnesses, the

shooter was wearing a white 49ers sweatshirt and a red hat. Holguin repeatedly told the

officers that he shot Inzunza five to six times, yet Inzunza was shot just twice. 

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Holguin told the officers that, after the shooting, he got into the front driver’s side of a “blue

and black colorish” Oldsmobile, forcing the driver to get out and then back in again. 

Witnesses say that the shooter got into the back passenger side door of a blue Honda. 

Holguin reported that Inzunza did not say anything when he was shot. Eyewitnesses testified

that Inzunza yelled when he was shot.

Holguin’s confessions themselves were riddled with inconsistencies. For example,

Holguin said that he knew Inzunza and he also said that he did not know Inzunza. He told

the officers that he had a “beef” with Inzunza because he had problems with Inzunza’s

girlfriend, but he later said that Inzunza did not have a girlfriend. He also later stated that he

did not have a “beef” with Inzunza. Holguin reported that he loaded the gun while walking

up behind Inzunza. He also said that he loaded the gun in the car. When Officer Carmena

suggested that Holguin might have hid the gun “outside someplace in a creek,” Holguin said

no. Later Holguin said that he hid the gun “in Salinas going out of town, in a little creek.”

Holguin first said that he washed dishes at his home before the shooting. He later said that

he washed the dishes after the shooting.

Holguin’s confessions also included statements that suggested he had only heard

about the murder. He twice told the officers that he “heard” Inzunza was wearing a blue

sweater and cap when he was shot. When the officers asked how he knew the time of the

shooting, Holguin said “because it had it in the newspaper.” Holguin explained that he

returned to the scene, “to see, you know, maybe somebody shot somebody.” 

Thus, the prosecution was faced with a case with absolutely no physical evidence, one

eyewitness, and the several statements of a 17-year old mentally retarded boy that were

riddled with inconsistencies, got nearly all the details of the crime wrong, and suggested that

the boy was merely repeating what he had heard from others. In such a situation, the

prosecution had to, and did, emphasize that Holguin had repeatedly confessed in order to

counter the unreliability of the confessions. In light of this record, there is no question that

the admission of the pre-Miranda statements substantially influenced the jury’s decision. At

a minimum, there is certainly “grave doubt” as to the harmlessness of the error, and the State

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court’s conclusion to the contrary is unreasonable and contradicted by the very Supreme

Court case upon which it relied. Accordingly, Holguin’s conviction must be reversed.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Holguin also argues that his conviction should be reversed because his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress his post-Miranda statements on

the grounds that his waiver of his Miranda rights was involuntary and not knowing and

intelligent, and, in any event, his statements were involuntary.

At oral argument, the Court asked the parties whether Holguin’s ineffective assistance

claim would be moot if the Court concluded that Holguin is entitled to a new trial based

solely on the improper admission of the pre-Miranda statements. At a new trial, Holguin’s

counsel can move to suppress the post-Miranda statements, and the state trial court can

develop an evidentiary record and decide on a complete record, for the first time, whether

such statements should be admitted at trial. In the Court’s view, the interests of comity are

best served by such a procedure. 

The parties tentatively agreed that Holguin could move to suppress the post-Miranda

statements at his new trial; however, the Court is reluctant to dismiss the ineffective

assistance claims as moot if the State may take the position at Holguin’s new trial that he is

barred by res judicata or some rule of procedure from making such a motion. Accordingly, 

the State shall advise this Court in writing within 15 days of the date of this Order as to

whether it concedes that Holguin may move to suppress the post-Miranda statements at his

new trial, should the State choose to retry him. If the State does not so concede, the Court

will decide Holguin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

CONCLUSION

The State court’s decision that Holguin was not in custody when he made his first

confession and that, even if he was in custody and it was error to admit such statements, the

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, involved an unreasonable application of

federal law. The petition for habeas corpus is GRANTED. The State shall advise the Court

in writing within 15 days of the date of this Order as to whether it agrees that Holguin may

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move to suppress his post-Miranda statements at his new trial, should the State choose to

retry him.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 16, 2005

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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