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Parties Involved:
Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Appellee
Keith A. Thompson
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-11196

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 9:16-cv-80811-KAM

KEITH A. THOMPSON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

 Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(February 6, 2020)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Keith Thompson, plaintiff pro se, alleged he suffered discrimination in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. 

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§ 2000e et seq., by his employer, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs 

(the “VA”). The Secretary of the VA (the “Secretary”) moved for dismissal or, in 

the alternative, summary judgment. The district court granted the Secretary’s 

motion for summary judgment and entered judgment for the Secretary. Thompson 

appeals from the grant of summary judgment. Following careful review, we 

affirm.

I.

A.

Thompson is an African American man of Bahamian descent who was 

approximately 51 years old at the time of the events in his complaint. Thompson 

was employed by the VA for two separate periods, both of which are crucial to 

understanding this appeal.

Thompson was first employed by the VA as a medical support clerk. He 

resigned from that position in January 2011 for medical reasons. Less than a year 

later, Thompson attempted to get rehired by the VA. During one of his interviews 

to get rehired, Thompson was allegedly “duplicitously recorded” without his 

consent. In September 2012, Thompson filed an internal equal employment 

opportunity (“EEO”) complaint based on that recording, and the VA ultimately 

entered into an agreement to rehire Thompson as a medical support assistant 

starting in November 2012.

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Thompson began work as a medical support assistant on November 18, 

2012. Thompson was assigned to the “phone room,” which is where he claims

“people with issues, mental, physical and discipline problems are sent.” Jean 

Brooks, Chief of Medical Ambulatory Services, testified that she assigned 

Thompson to the phone room to give him a “fair shot.” The supervisors there did 

not know about his prior complaint and had not worked with him before, so the 

idea was they would not have any preconceived notions about him. But Thompson 

did not like working in the phone room because all calls there are recorded. This 

made him “paranoid” and reminded him of the unconsented-to recording that led to 

his first EEO complaint. Thompson complained to Brooks about his placement in 

the phone room and she explained why she had put him there.

As the district court set forth, there were several incidents between 

Thompson’s date of rehire and the end of 2015 that he perceived to be unfair and 

hostile:

(1) In December 2012, one of Thompson’s supervisors, Catherine 

Bendig, told him that another VA employee felt that Thompson had 

not paid enough attention during a training class. Thompson said this 

claim was “ridiculous” and that it was “reprisal.” Thompson and 

Brooks ultimately met to discuss this issue, and Brooks told him that 

Bendig was just trying to give Thompson feedback without intending 

to be offensive.

(2) Also in December 2012, another one of Thompson’s supervisors, 

Lorraine Giglio, yelled at him in front of other employees for failing 

to sign out of the computer phone system. Thompson complained to 

Bendig about this and she convened a meeting between her, 

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Thompson, and Giglio. Giglio apologized to Thompson and said she 

had not realized she had spoken loudly.

(3) In January 2013, Thompson objected to being assigned to sit in the 

trainee seat, which was directly behind Giglio. He also said this seat

was too close to the communal refrigerator, microwave, and table for 

section events. Thompson complained to Bendig, so she moved the 

microwave and arranged for the refrigerator to be moved too. In the 

end, Thompson asked Bendig to leave the refrigerator where it was. 

He also retrieved the microwave and put it back in its original 

location. Eventually Thompson was moved to a permanent desk in 

the phone room.

(4) In March 2013, Thompson’s first-line supervisor, Maria Padilla, 

verbally counseled Thompson for combining his fifteen-minute break 

with his thirty-minute lunch break, a practice disallowed by the VA. 

Thompson was upset because another supervisor had told him he 

could combine his breaks that day. Thompson did not know about 

any other employees being allowed to combine their breaks in that 

way.

(5) In August 2013, Thompson asked to use annual leave in lieu of sick 

leave because he did not have enough sick leave built up to cover a 

full day. This request was denied because several other individuals 

were on leave. Brooks designated Thompson as being on “leave 

without pay AWOL,” which can sometimes lead to discipline but did 

not in this case.

(6) In June 2015, Thompson discovered that Padilla had placed a 

“magnifying mirror” on her desk that was aimed at the back of his 

chair and head. Thompson believed Padilla had done this to monitor 

him. Padilla told VA investigators she installed the mirror to be able 

to see if someone was standing behind her, and in any case she was 

not able to see Thompson in the mirror. Thompson complained about 

the mirror to Bendig and Norm Williams, a VA EEO supervisor, and 

requested a transfer out of the phone room. Thompson’s request was 

approved, but before he could move to another department he was 

required to make two separate “moves” within a two-week period. A 

coworker, Jerome Darville, who requested a transfer the same time as 

Thompson had his request approved “without delay.”

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(7) Thompson had other concerns with Padilla, including that she enlisted 

a coworker, Kristie Moquet, to spy on Thompson and monitor his 

workplace activities. Thompson’s evidence of this is that Moquet 

constantly sanitized her hands near his desk and that, on one occasion, 

she followed him into a bathroom.

(8) Thompson started working in the Mental Health Department in 

September 2015. Thompson didn’t like this either, so he requested a 

transfer back to the phone room, where Bendig and Padilla no longer 

worked. Thompson soon thereafter returned to work in the phone 

room, where he remained until his resignation in February 2017.

(9) In December 2015, Thompson learned that a non-manager named 

Trellis Jackson had been allowed to work overtime. Thompson had 

previously requested to work overtime but was told that overtime was 

reserved for managers and supervisors.

In February 2013, Thompson filed an EEO complaint alleging that the 

incidents that occurred in late 2012 and early 2013 were retaliation for his 

September 2012 complaint. Thompson later added allegations of discrimination on 

the basis of national origin and age. The VA Office of Resolution Management 

investigated the complaint and concluded that Thompson had failed to make out a 

case of disparate treatment, retaliation, or hostile work environment. The VA 

issued a final dismissal of his complaint in February 2016 and granted him a right 

to sue in federal court. Thompson filed another EEO complaint in July 2015 

alleging retaliation for his September 2012 complaint. The VA issued a final 

decision in July 2016 rejecting Thompson’s claims of discrimination and granting 

him a right to sue in federal court.

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Thompson filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 

Florida on May 24, 2016. He alleged unlawful retaliation, disparate treatment, and 

hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The Secretary moved to 

dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and in the alternative for 

summary judgment on the ground that Thompson could not succeed in his 

discrimination claims. The district court granted the Secretary summary judgment.

II.

“We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo and 

resolve all reasonable factual doubts in favor of the non-movant.” Mora v. Jackson 

Mem’l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The 

Secretary, “as the party moving for summary judgment, had the burden of 

demonstrating that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact, and that it 

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, 

LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014).

III.

A. RETALIATION

Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing a 

discriminatory employment practice, “or because he has made a charge, testified, 

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 

under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “To establish a prima facie case 

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of retaliation, plaintiffs must prove that: (1) they engaged in statutorily protected 

conduct; (2) they suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse 

action was causally related to the protected expression.” Trask v. Sec’y, Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1193–94 (11th Cir. 2016). “Once a plaintiff has 

established a prima facie case, the employer then has an opportunity to articulate a 

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment action.” Id.

at 1194 (quotation marks omitted). “The ultimate burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the reason provided by the employer is a 

pretext for prohibited, retaliatory conduct remains on the plaintiff.” Id. (quotation 

marks omitted).

To make out a claim of retaliation, “an employee must show a serious and 

material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Id. at 1195 

(quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has told us that “petty slights or 

minor annoyances” are not enough to satisfy this requirement. See Burlington N. 

& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). A 

work reassignment that “resulted in no decrease in pay or grade” does not 

constitute a material change in employment. Trask, 822 F.3d at 1194.

Thompson has not shown that any of these actions rose to the level 

necessary to support a prima facie case of retaliation. At the outset, Thompson has 

not shown any serious or material changes constituting adverse action. Even his 

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assignment to the phone room—the closest thing he alleged to an actual alteration 

in the terms and conditions of his employment—was not sufficiently adverse. At 

most, Thompson seems to characterize this reassignment as a loss of prestige or 

responsibility, but with no allegation of decreased pay or grade. See id.

Beyond that, even if we assume his assignment to the phone room was a 

prima facie example of retaliation, Thompson has not rebutted the Secretary’s 

argument that there was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for assigning him 

there. As the district court recognized, it was reasonable for the VA to have 

assigned Thompson to the phone room to give him a fresh start with new 

supervisors and coworkers. We are satisfied this reason was not mere pretext for 

invidious retaliation.

B. RETALIATORY HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

This circuit recognizes a cause of action under Title VII for retaliatory 

hostile work environment. Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 

2012) (per curiam). To prevail on a retaliatory hostile work environment claim, a 

plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) after doing so, he 

was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) his protected activity was a “but for” 

cause of the harassment, and (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the terms of his employment. See id. at 1311. The fourth prong 

of this inquiry includes both “an objective and a subjective component,” requiring 

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courts to consider the frequency and the severity of the conduct, whether it is 

threatening or humiliating, and whether it interferes with the employee’s job 

performance. See id at 1312. The allegedly harassing acts must be considered “in 

context, not as isolated acts.” See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 

(11th Cir. 1999).

Like with Thompson’s claim for retaliation, his claim for retaliatory hostile 

work environment fails because he has not shown he suffered sufficiently severe or 

pervasive harassment. As the district court rightly observed, the actions Thompson 

complains about “are the stuff of ordinary office life and the type of petty 

squabbling which is fairly typical between employees working in close quarters.” 

Considered as a whole, these “petty and trivial actions” are insufficient to make out 

a claim of harassment. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973 n.13 (11th Cir. 

2008) (citing Burlington, 548 U.S. at 71, 126 S. Ct. at 2417).

C. DISPARATE TREATMENT

To make out a prima facie case of discrimination a plaintiff must show (1) 

he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified to do the job; (3) he was 

subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) his employer treated similarly 

situated employees outside his class more favorably. Lewis v. City of Union City, 

934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019). Even if the plaintiff does not produce a 

similarly situated comparator, he “will always survive summary judgment if he 

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presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the 

employer’s discriminatory intent.” Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted). 

“[A] convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer 

intentional discrimination . . . may be shown by evidence that demonstrates, among 

other things, (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, and other bits and 

pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn, 

(2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the

employer’s justification is pretextual.” Id. (alteration adopted and quotation marks 

omitted).

Thompson’s claim of discrimination founders for a few reasons. First, as the 

Secretary notes in his brief, Thompson has not alleged he experienced 

discrimination because of his membership in a protected class. He has disclaimed 

reliance on age and national origin as the cause for the discrimination he alleges, 

even though these were the two non-retaliatory bases he asserted in his 2013 EEO 

complaint. Additionally, as discussed above, he has not shown that he was 

subjected to any adverse employment actions. But even if Thompson had made 

such a showing, he has not produced a similarly situated comparator who was 

treated better, nor has he presented a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence 

showing he experienced discrimination. Thompson points to two coworkers as 

comparators: Jerome Darville, who requested a transfer out of the phone room the 

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same time Thompson did; and Trellis Jackson, the non-manager who was allowed 

to work overtime. But as best we can tell, Thompson does not allege that either 

coworker was outside either of his protected classes. This dooms his ability to rely 

on either of them as a comparator. See Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 

1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2011). Nor can Thompson use the mosaic theory of 

discrimination, as the allegations in his complaint fall well short of “systematically 

better treatment of similarly situated employees.” See Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185.

D. DISCRIMINATORY HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

“To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff 

must show that the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 

ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Trask, 822 F.3d at 

1195 (alteration adopted and quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must “show the 

hostile treatment was based on [his] protected status.” Id. at 1196.

Thompson has not pointed us to any comments or actions that were overtly 

“related to [his] protected characteristics,” nor has he presented us with evidence 

that the “alleged hostility was in any way motivated by a discriminatory animus 

regarding” his age or national origin. See id. Without either of these, his claim of 

a discriminatory hostile work environment cannot succeed.

AFFIRMED.

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