Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01229/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01229-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Lance Richard Rhoades
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANCE RICHARD RHOADES, No. 2:14-CV-1229-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding

judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending

before the court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 13) and defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment (Doc. 15). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

1

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on January 6, 2011, and May 16,

2011. In the applications, plaintiff claims that disability began on June 9, 2008. Plaintiff’s

claims were initially denied. Following denial of reconsideration, plaintiff requested an

administrative hearing, which was held on February 28, 2013, before Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) Mark C. Ramsey. In a April 15, 2013, decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not

disabled based on the following relevant findings:

1. The claimant has the following severe impairment(s): bilateral shoulder

injuries status post three surgeries right shoulder, and obesity.

2. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations.

3. The claimant has the following residual functional capacity: the claimant

can perform light work except he is precluded from lifting, pushing, and

pulling of heavy objects with the bilateral upper extremities, and repetitive

work at or above shoulder level.

4. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, residual

functional capacity, and the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, there are jobs

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant

can perform.

After the Appeals Council declined review on April 28, 2014, this appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is: 

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

2

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

III. DISCUSSION

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ failed to

address all of Dr. Watkin’s opinions; (2) the ALJ failed to address the opinions of Drs. Acinas

and Kalen; (3) the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons supporting an adverse credibility

finding; and (4) the ALJ erred in applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. 

A. Evaluation of Medical Opinions

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are

proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual,

than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285

(9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given

to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4

(9th Cir. 1990).

/ / /

3

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner

properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are

in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted

by an examining professional’s opinion which is supported by different independent clinical

findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected only for “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a

finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and

legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional,

without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any

conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported opinion);

see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

1. Dr. Watkin

As to Dr. Watkins, the ALJ stated:

In March 2010, Dr. Watkin opines that with respect to the claimant’s right

upper extremity, he is precluded from lifting, pushing, and pulling of

heavy objects and repetitive work at or above shoulder level. . . .

. . .The undersigned . . . gives great weight to Dr. Watkin who opines that

with respect to the claimant’s right upper extremity, he is precluded from

lifting, pushing, and pulling of heavy objects and repetitive work at or

4

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

above shoulder level. Dr. Watkin’s findings and conclusions support a

limitation to at least light work with no lifting, pushing, and pulling of

heavy objects and repetitive work at or above shoulder level. . . .

Plaintiff argues:

. . .[P]laintiff contends that the ALJ erred to the extent of failing to

make findings without explanation of Dr. Watkin’s specific clinical

examination findings of signs that Range of Motion of the Shoulder

revealed active flexion on the right was 45 degrees, and active external

rotation on the right was 50 degrees, and active internal rotation was 45

degrees on the right, and active extension was 45 degrees on the right, and

active abduction was 45 degrees on the right, and active adduction was 20

degrees on the right (Tr. 488), and JAMAR grip dynamometer reading

revealed plaintiff had 28/15/30 on the right compared to 50/45/45 on the

left (Tr. 489). . . . Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should be found to have

erred by failing to set forth clear and convincing reasons for disregarding

and rejecting the uncontradicted full findings of his functional limitations

by Dr. Watkin. . . . 

Plaintiff’s somewhat convoluted argument fails to identify any opinion offered by

Dr. Watkin that was not addressed in the ALJ’s decision. A careful review of Dr. Watkin’s

March 2010 report indicates that the doctor offered the following opinion as to plaintiff’s

functional limitations: “Mr. Rhoades is precluded from lifting, pushing, and pulling of heavy

objects and repetitive work at or above shoulder level.” The doctor offered no other opinions

regarding plaintiff’s functional capacity based on the objective findings noted in the report. It is

for the doctor – not the ALJ – to translate clinical objective findings into an opinion as to

functional capacity. The ALJ’s duty is adequately discharged where an assessment as to the

weight given such opinion is made, as was the case here. 

2. Drs. Acinas and Kalen

Plaintiff argues: “[T]he ALJ should be found to have erred by failing to include

the State Agency non-examining physicians’ 5-19-11 and 10-18-11 additional finding that

plaintiff was limited to ‘occ(asional) front and lat(eral)’ reaching in the residual functional

capacity assessment without explanation (Tr. 100, 123). . . .” Plaintiff references Exhibits 2A

and 6A. In Exhibit 2A, agency reviewing doctor M. Acinas, M.D., cited decreased range of

motion and opined that plaintiff could do no overhead reaching on the right and was limited to

5

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

only occasional front and lateral reaching on the right. In Exhibit 6A, agency reviewing doctor

Vicki Kalen, M.D., rendered the same opinion.

The ALJ made only passing reference to these opinions as follows:

As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned gives great weight to the

conclusions and findings of the State agency physician[s] that the claimant

can perform light work except with the right upper extremity, precluded

from lifting, pushing, and pulling of heavy objects and repetitive work at

or above shoulder level. . . . (Ex. 2A, 6A. . .).

While the ALJ states that “great weight” was given to the opinions of Drs. Acinas and Kalen, the

ALJ does not accurately describe their opinions. Specifically, the ALJ’s residual functional

capacity assessment precluded lifting, pushing, and pulling of heavy objects and repetitive work

at or above shoulder level, but does not address the doctors’ restriction to no overhead reaching. 

Defendant acknowledges that the ALJ rejected specific limitations on front or

lateral reaching, but argues that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding nonetheless

accounts for limitations in this regard. Defendant points to the ALJ’s preclusion of repetitive

work at or above shoulder level as indicating the ALJ’s acceptance of the doctors’ reaching

limitations. The court agrees that “at or above shoulder level” indeed incorporates overhead as

well as front and lateral reaching. It is also reasonable to include a limitation to only occasional

front and lateral reaching in the ALJ’s assessment that plaintiff cannot perform “repetitive work” 

at or above shoulder level. Drs. Acinas and Kalen, however, opined that plaintiff is capable of no

overhead reaching whereas the ALJ found that plaintiff’s overhead reaching limitation applied

only to repetitive work. In other words, the ALJ allows for occasional overhead reaching but the

doctors do not. The ALJ erred by failing to explain this discrepancy. 

B. Plaintiff’s Credibility

The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the

court defers to the Commissioner’s discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and

provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). An explicit

credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903

6

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible

and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative

evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting testimony as not

credible must be “clear and convincing.” See id.; see also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d

1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lingenfelter v Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1936 (9th Cir. 2007),

and Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the

Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d

341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smolen v. Chater:

The claimant need not produce objective medical evidence of the

[symptom] itself, or the severity thereof. Nor must the claimant produce

objective medical evidence of the causal relationship between the

medically determinable impairment and the symptom. By requiring that

the medical impairment “could reasonably be expected to produce” pain or

another symptom, the Cotton test requires only that the causal relationship

be a reasonable inference, not a medically proven phenomenon. 

80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the test established in

Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of the symptoms alleged,

including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See Bunnell,

947 F.2d at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: (1) the

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent

testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant’s daily activities; (4) work records; and (5)

physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). It is also appropriate to consider whether the

claimant cooperated during physical examinations or provided conflicting statements concerning

7

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

drug and/or alcohol use. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). If the

claimant testifies as to symptoms greater than would normally be produced by a given

impairment, the ALJ may disbelieve that testimony provided specific findings are made. See

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Regarding reliance on a claimant’s daily activities to find testimony of disabling

pain not credible, the Social Security Act does not require that disability claimants be utterly

incapacitated. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has

repeatedly held that the “. . . mere fact that a plaintiff has carried out certain daily activities . . .

does not . . .[necessarily] detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” See Orn v.

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vertigan v. Heller, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th

Cir. 2001)); see also Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that a

claim of pain-induced disability is not necessarily gainsaid by a capacity to engage in periodic

restricted travel); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the

claimant was entitled to benefits based on constant leg and back pain despite the claimant’s

ability to cook meals and wash dishes); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (observing that “many home

activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the

workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication”). Daily

activities must be such that they show that the claimant is “. . .able to spend a substantial part of

his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable

to a work setting.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. The ALJ must make specific findings in this regard

before relying on daily activities to find a claimant’s pain testimony not credible. See Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The ALJ stated as follows regarding plaintiff’s statements and credibility:

The claimant. . . alleges he is unable to work due to a torn right rotator

cuff with three surgeries on his shoulder. However, when the claimant

filed his application, the Social Security District office employee noted

that the claimant states he can only raise his arm shoulder height. 

However, his hands are greasy as if he was doing car repair. The claimant

8

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

states he has problems reaching, lifting, and using his hands. He states he

can walk 1/2 mil, lift about 10-15 pounds, cannot reach at all with his right

arm, and his right hand is numb. He requires no assistive device. In June

2011, he states his left shoulder pain is worse; he is stiff and unable to use

his right arm in any significant manner as all use causes severe right

shoulder pain. He can stand about five to ten minutes and then sit for 10

to 15 minutes and then needs to sit or walk about. He estimates he can

walk about 100 feet slowly. In April 2012, he reports more severe

shoulder pain. He also has neck pain down to his elbow. He reports

weight gain and that he does not use his right arm. He also states he has

had balance problems since December 2011 (Ex. 1E, 2E, 4E, 6E, 8E). 

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s

statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of

these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this

decision. 

In terms of the claimant’s alleged right shoulder injury, he states his arm

was fine until mid-2008. He was working on a logging site on a steep hill

using heavy equipment and the vehicle rolled. Redding Rancheria records

and Dr. Reinhardt indicate right shoulder massive rotator cuff tendon tear

with retraction, biceps tendon instability, probable labral internal

derangement, and axillary nerve injury. Dr. Reinhardt notes biceps tendon

instability associated with subscapular full thickness tear, labral internal

derangement, and axillary nerve damage. The claimant had an operation

on his right shoulder in July 2008. Based on the MRI and EMG findings

in November 2008, the claimant had additional surgery in December 2008,

to do a revision repair. In April 2009, the claimant’s shoulder MRI shows

a re-tear with retraction of supraspinatus tendon to AC joint. In June

2009, his doctor was able to repair the rotator cuff and release the

subacromial adhesions. There was no evidence of malignant neoplastic

process, crystal deposit, or significant acute inflammatory elements. The

claimant was to remain off work for six weeks. January 2010 records

indicate stabilization of his scapula. However, he has a permanent

impairment with respect to motion and strength and cannot return to

operation of heavy equipment. Redding Rancheria records for 2010

continue to note some right shoulder pain with decreased range of motion

secondary to pain (Ex. 1F-4F, 12F-16F). 

The ALJ then commented on Dr. Watkin’s report, discussed above, and continued as follows:

. . .Treatment in 2010 and 2011 consists of medication to control pain and

range of motion exercises. There is no indication of significant side

effects from medication (Ex. 17F). 

There is little additional treatment until February 2012 when the claimant

complains of pain in his left shoulder that he initially states is due to

overuse since he has trouble with his right shoulder but later states he fell

9

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

and hurt his left shoulder about six weeks previously. It is not until

February 2012 that the claimant fell and injured his left shoulder. The

claimant gives conflicting statements about the injury. He first states the

pain is due to overuse and later alleged that he fell and hurt his shoulder. 

X-ray of his left shoulder in February 2012 shows no significant

abnormality. March 2012 records indicate probable adhesive capsulitis. 

However, Dr. Verhoog notes improvement in range of motion with

forward flexion and increased abduction and external rotation. He has

very restricted motion in his right shoulder from three previous surgeries

consistent with probable adhesive capsulitis. With one month of physical

therapy, the claimant has significant improvement in full passive range of

motion. In May 2012, Dr. Verhoog notes improved forward active flexion

of about 150 degrees and passively he goes to about 160 degrees. X-rays

of the shoulder are normal but a MRI scan indicates a supraspinatus

tendon tear. Dr. Verhoog suspects he will do very well from surgery based

on the MRI findings of his left shoulder. In May 2012, the claimant

underwent uncomplicated left shoulder rotator cuff repair and left shoulder

anterior acromioplasty. Treatment in 2012 consists of medication to

control pain and range of motion exercises. He has mild crepitus and

some reduced range of motion. In November 2012, he reports moderate

pain in his shoulder but there are no significant findings other than

bilateral shoulder decreased range of motion. Treatment consists of pain

medication and there is no indication of significant side effects from

medication (Ex. 18F-23F).

* * *

In making this assessment, the undersigned considers the claimant’s

testimony of pain and inability to engage in work activity and finds that

the claimant’s testimony is not fully credible. The claimant testifies that

he does nothing around the house and does not drive. However, that is

inconsistent with earlier statements that he goes to the post office, visits

with friends both at his home and their homes, does not need special

reminders to take care of his personal needs, does light duty household

repairs, drives a car, shops in stores, and goes to movies with friends (Ex.

4E). Such activities do not indicate a disabling impairment of the

claimant’s residual functional capacity for light work activity, as described

above. Of note, the Social Security employee also observed his hands

were greasy and suggestive that he does work with his hands. He has

restricted shoulder range of motion but no significant atrophy,

neurological deficits, radicular pain, weakness, reflex absence, or

decreased sensation. The claimant has not participated in the treatment

normally associated with a severe pain syndrome. He takes medication but

alleges no significant side effects. He betrays no evidence of more than

mild pain or discomfort while testifying at the hearing. The hearing was

short-lived and it cannot be considered a conclusive indicator of the

claimant’s overall level of pain on a day-to-day basis, but the apparent lack

of discomfort during the hearing is given some slight weight in reaching

the conclusion regarding the credibility of the claimant’s allegations and

the claimant’s residual functional capacity. Finally, the type, dosage, and

side effects of medication employed to treat his impairment(s) would not

10

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

preclude him from performing work at a less than full range of light

exertion. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes his

allegations of limitations are unsupported by the evidence (Ex. 4E). 

Plaintiff argues:

. . .[P]laintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to consider all

of the extensive clinical findings of abnormality of his right shoulder, arm,

and hand in the medical records, particularly in regards to Dr. Watkin’s 3-

5-10 findings of clinical signs that some of the muscles in plaintiffs’ right

arm continued to be “significantly weak,” and there was evidence of 

“. . .detachment of the deltoid at the acromion with atrophy. . .(and) there

was wasting at the attachment of the deltoid,” and range of motion of the

right shoulder revealed limitations of active flexion to 45 degrees, external

rotation to 50 degrees, active internal rotation to 45 degrees, active

extension to 45 degrees, active abduction to 45 degrees, and active

adduction to 20 degrees (Tr. 488), and circumferential measurement of his

bicep revealed the right was 34 cm while the left was 35 cm, and JAMAR

dynamometer grip test revealed 28/25/30 on the right compared to

50/45/45 on the left (Tr. 24-26, 489). . . .

Plaintiff contends regarding his ability to occasionally take care of

his personal needs and perform some household chores and attend to his

daughter that those limited activities should be found not to constitute

substantial evidence to discredit his testimony because the ALJ should be

found to have erred by failing to make findings regarding whether these

activities provided him with transferable skills and whether these activities

occupied a substantial part of the day. . . . Plaintiff contends that gaps in

treatment for his alleged musculoskeletal impairments noted by the ALJ

(Tr. 26) should not have been used to discredit his testimony because

plaintiff testified that he had settled his Worker’s Compensation claim for

a small amount of cash without continuing medical care benefits (Tr. 41),

and the records show that thereafter he had to rely on a family health 

care clinic that offered nothing more than medication (Tr. 342-371, 608-

610). . . .

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should be found to have erred by

failing to make a specific credibility finding in regards to his allegations of

having numbness and problems using his hands (Tr. 124) because

Electromyogram testing revealed he had neurological abnormality on the

right (Tr. 452), and JAMAR dynamometer testing revealed he had

significantly reduced grim strength on the right (Tr. 489). . . .

The ALJ cited a number of reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s statements as not

credible, and any one of them, if supported by substantial evidence, is sufficient to support the

ALJ’s credibility finding. In particular, the ALJ observed that plaintiff made inconsistent

statements regarding his daily activities. At the February 28, 2013, hearing, plaintiff testified that

he does not change the sheets on his bed, does not vacuum, does not mop the floor, does not

11

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

scrub his bathroom tub and shower, does not cook at all, does not shop for groceries, does not

mow the lawn, does not rake leaves, does not cut wood, does not go to church, does not go to the

movies, does not go fishing, does not go camping, does not play any sports, does not do any work

on his truck, does not shop for clothes, does not talk on the phone, and has no hobbies. In a

Function Report, however, plaintiff stated that he does the following: performs light duty

household repairs; drives a car; shops in stores for clothes and music; and regularly goes to the

movies with friends. These inconsistent statements – which plaintiff does not address in his

motion for summary judgment – constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s adverse

credibility finding. 

C. Application of Medical-Vocational Guidelines

The Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) provide a uniform conclusion about

disability for various combinations of age, education, previous work experience, and residual

functional capacity. The Grids allow the Commissioner to streamline the administrative process

and encourage uniform treatment of claims based on the number of jobs in the national economy

for any given category of residual functioning capacity. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458,

460-62 (1983) (discussing creation and purpose of the Grids). 

The Commissioner may apply the Grids in lieu of taking the testimony of a

vocational expert only when the Grids accurately and completely describe the claimant’s abilities

and limitations. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Heckler v.

Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462 n.5 (1983). Thus, the Commissioner generally may not rely on the

Grids if a claimant suffers from non-exertional limitations because the Grids are based on

exertional strength factors only. See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(b). 

“If a claimant has an impairment that limits his or her ability to work without directly affecting

his or her strength, the claimant is said to have non-exertional . . . limitations that are not covered

by the Grids.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 20 C.F.R., Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(d), (e)). The Commissioner may, however, rely on the Grids

12

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

even when a claimant has combined exertional and non-exertional limitations, if non-exertional

limitations do not impact the claimant’s exertional capabilities. See Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d

1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990); Polny v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 661, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1988).

In cases where the Grids are not fully applicable, the ALJ may meet his burden

under step five of the sequential analysis by propounding to a vocational expert hypothetical

questions based on medical assumptions, supported by substantial evidence, that reflect all the

plaintiff’s limitations. See Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995). Specifically,

where the Grids are inapplicable because plaintiff has sufficient non-exertional limitations, the

ALJ is required to obtain vocational expert testimony. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 587 F.2d 1335,

1341 (9th Cir. 1988). 

In applying the Grids to this case, the ALJ stated:

If the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform the full

range of light work, considering the claimant’s age, education, and work

experience, a finding of “not disabled” would be directed by MedicalVocational Rule 202.21. However, the additional limitations have little or

no effect on the occupational base of unskilled light work. A finding of

“not disabled” is therefore appropriate under the framework of this rule as

most light jobs do not require lifting, pushing, and pulling of heavy objects

and repetitive work at or above shoulder level. 

The ALJ in found that the Grids could be applied because most light jobs do not require

repetitive work above shoulder level and plaintiff is only precluded from repetitive reaching

work. As discussed above, however, the ALJ failed to take into account the two state agency

doctors’ opinion that plaintiff cannot perform any overhead reaching. Given that the ALJ did not

provide any reasons for rejecting the state agency doctors’ overhead reaching limitation, the court

cannot say that the ALJ properly applied the Grids in this case. It is possible that, taking a

limitation to no overhead reaching into account, vocational testimony would be required. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

13

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this matter will be remanded under sentence four of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) for further development of the record and/or further findings addressing the

deficiencies noted above. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 13) is granted;

2. Defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment (Doc. 15) is denied;

3. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order;

and

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file.

DATED: October 21, 2015

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14

Case 2:14-cv-01229-CMK Document 18 Filed 10/22/15 Page 14 of 14