Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50529/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50529-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hector Soto-Zuniga
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HECTOR SOTO-ZUNIGA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50529

D.C. No.

3:13-cr-02706-AJB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 5, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed September 16, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski, William A. Fletcher,

and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

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2 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a jury conviction for possession with

intent to distribute methamphetamine, reversed discovery

rulings, and remanded with instructions.

The panel held that the district court abused its discretion

by denying the defendant’s pretrial motion for discovery

relating to the constitutionality of a Border Patrol checkpoint

at which the defendant was detained and his car searched. 

The panel concluded that discovery of the checkpoint search

and arrest statistics was pertinent to the issue whether the

checkpoint was invalid under the Fourth Amendment because

its primary purpose was to advance the general interest in

crime control, rather than to control immigration. The panel

held that this issue of the constitutionality of a search or

seizure was subject to discovery under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E). The panel reversed the

district court’s denial of the discovery motion relating to the

checkpoint’s arrest statistics and remanded for the district

court to assess the constitutionality of the checkpoint in

further proceedings.

The panel held that the district court abused its discretion

by denying the defendant’s motion for discovery on the

government’s investigation into a drug smuggling operation. 

After reviewing sealed documents submitted by the

government, the panel concluded that the documents were

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 3

discoverable because they were material to preparing the

defense under Rule 16(a)(1)(E). The panel reversed the

denial of the discovery motion, vacated the conviction, and

remanded with instructions to grant the motion. The panel

also instructed the district court to consider the government’s

request for a window of time before production to determine

whether to continue to pursue the case, and to consider the

government’s request for protective measures that would

maintain the security of the information in the documents

while allowing the defense to adequately prepare a defense.

The panel affirmed the denial of a suppression motion

insofar as it was based on a claimed lack of probable cause

for the search of the defendant’s car. The panel held that the

district court did not err in instructing the jury on reasonable

doubt. It also held that knowledge of drug type and quantity

is not an element of possession with intent to distribute in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.

COUNSEL

Paul Allen Barr (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego,

Inc., San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Kyle B. Martin (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Peter Ko, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; Laura

E. Duffy, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Hector Soto-Zuniga appeals his jury conviction for

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Soto-Zuniga was arrested

at a checkpoint in San Clemente, California, after Border

Patrol agents found 2.9 kilograms of methamphetamine on

the floor of the backseat of his car during a search. Before

the first trial, which ultimately resulted in a hung jury and a

mistrial, Soto-Zuniga filed motions to suppress the drug

evidence. In one of the motions he argued that the checkpoint

was unconstitutional and requested discovery of the

checkpoint’s arrest and search statistics. The district court

denied these motions.

At both his first trial and his subsequent re-trial, SotoZuniga testified that before being stopped at the checkpoint,

he had given a ride to three teenagers he did not know as a

favor to his cousin’s husband, Christian Rios Campos.1 The

government stipulated that Rios was a known drug smuggler

who recruited juveniles to smuggle drugs into the United

States, and Soto-Zuniga’s primary defense was that the

teenagers had planted the drugs in the car without his

knowledge. Before the second trial, Soto-Zuniga moved for

discovery of the government’s investigation of Rios’s drug

smuggling operation, which may have identified the three

teenagers by name. This, too, was denied. Soto-Zuniga was

convicted after the second jury trial and sentenced to six years

in prison.

1

 Although this individual’s name appears in several spellings in the

record, we use this version throughout this opinion for consistency.

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 5

Soto-Zuniga raises several arguments on appeal, and we

conclude that two have merit: (1) the district court abused its

discretion by denying Soto-Zuniga’s pretrial motion for

discoveryrelating to the constitutionality of the San Clemente

checkpoint, and (2) the district court abused its discretion by

denying Soto-Zuniga’s motion for discovery on Rios’s drug

smuggling operation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we reverse the district court’s rulings on the

discovery motions, vacate the conviction, and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

On June 29, 2013, at around 3:50 p.m., Soto-Zuniga was

stopped in his car at a Border Patrol checkpoint near San

Clemente, California. U.S. Border Patrol Agent Ivan Favela

questioned Soto-Zuniga, who told Agent Favela that he was

coming from Tijuana. Agent Favela testified at trial that

Soto-Zuniga appeared nervous and that his hands were

shaking. Agent Favela directed Soto-Zuniga to a secondary

inspection area. There, two additional agents, Raymond

Rabreau and Brian Chang, approached Soto-Zuniga’s car. 

Soto-Zuniga presented Agent Chang with a Permanent

Resident Card and told Agent Chang that he was traveling to

Los Angeles from Tijuana. Agent Chang later reported that

he noticed Soto-Zuniga’s hand and leg shaking during the

exchange. Based on this nervous behavior, Agent Chang

asked Soto-Zuniga to step out of the car. Agent Chang said

that when he asked Soto-Zuniga if he had any contraband in

his car, Soto-Zuniga looked down before answering “no.” 

Agent Chang then asked Soto-Zuniga to open the trunk of his

car, and he complied. According to Agent Chang, SotoZuniga continued to fidget during their exchange. Agent

Rabreau, who approached Soto-Zuniga’s car from the

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6 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

passenger’s side, later reported that he smelled marijuana

coming from the vehicle, and he observed a “black and mild

cigarillo” in the car’s ashtray, as well as remnants of tobacco. 

Agent Rabreau reported that, based on his training and

experience, he suspected Soto-Zuniga had been smoking

marijuana in the car.

Next, a third agent at the secondary checkpoint, Anthony

Rodgers, also noticed that Soto-Zuniga was acting nervously

and observed that the carotid artery in his neck was

“bounding.” Agent Rodgers wrote in his report that SotoZuniga admitted to smoking marijuana in the car with a

friend. Agent Rodgers also reported that he performed a

Terry frisk2 of Soto-Zuniga, but found no weapons.

Other agents soon approached the secondary inspection

area, including Agents Favela and Buck. Agent Buck later

reported that he questioned Soto-Zuniga about smoking

marijuana, and that Soto-Zuniga denied ever smoking

marijuana, but admitted that he had friends that smoked. 

Agent Buck reported that he then asked Soto-Zuniga if he

allowed friends to smoke marijuana in his car, and SotoZuniga “became very defensive and became visibly agitated

with [his] questioning.” Agent Buck also wrote that when he

told Soto-Zuniga that his car would be searched because of

the smell of marijuana, Soto-Zuniga “adopted a defeated

body posture.”

Agent Rodgers’s report reflects that, due to Soto-Zuniga’s

alleged admission that he had smoked marijuana in the car

and the smell that Agent Rabreau reported, agents decided to

search Soto-Zuniga’s car at about 4:25 p.m., approximately

2

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 7

35 minutes after the initial stop. In searching the car, Agent

Favela recovered four bundles wrapped in brown tape from

behind the driver’s seat. The bundles were under a floor mat,

which was also covered by a sweater. A field test indicated

that the bundles contained methamphetamine, and SotoZuniga was arrested. Evidence at trial established that the

bundles contained 2.9 kilograms of methamphetamine, with

a street value of more than $80,000.

Soto-Zuniga was subsequently interviewed by Agent

Kameron Korte, who testified that Soto-Zuniga waived his

Miranda3rights through the Spanish translation of another

Border Patrol agent. During that interrogation, Soto-Zuniga

told Agent Korte that his cousin’s husband, Christian Rios

Campos, had called that morning and asked Soto-Zuniga to

give a ride to three teenagers from Otay Mesa to San Ysidro

in San Diego. Soto-Zuniga told Agent Korte that he picked

up the teenagers at a McDonald’s in Otay Mesa and dropped

them off at a Shell gas station close to a trolley station in San

Ysidro. By the time Agent Korte contacted the McDonald’s,

any video surveillance had been erased. Agent Korte never

contacted the Shell station.

Soto-Zuniga was charged with possession of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Before trial, he filed a motion to

suppress the drugs seized from his car, arguing that they were

the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure. Soto-Zuniga

contended that the agents lacked probable cause to detain him

and search his car; specifically, he argued that nervousness

alone was not sufficient to support probable cause, and that

Agent Rabreau’s report that he smelled marijuana coming

3

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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8 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

from the car was “unreliable” because no other agent reported

the smell and no marijuana was recovered from the car. He

also filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the

San Clemente checkpoint, arguing that the government was

using the checkpoint as a pretext to search for controlled

substances, not to control immigration. In an unsuccessful

attempt to support that argument for his suppression motion,

Soto-Zuniga also filed a motion seeking, inter alia, discovery

of statistics regarding the number and types of arrests and

vehicle searches at the San Clemente checkpoint.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the

pretrial motions. At the hearing, Agent Rabreau testified that

the main purpose of the San Clemente checkpoint was

immigration inspection and that 90 percent of the arrests were

immigration-related. He also detailed his account of the

events that led to Soto-Zuniga’s arrest, including smelling

marijuana coming from Soto-Zuniga’s car and seeing a “burnt

blunt,” which he described as a burned marijuana-filled

cigarillo, in the ashtray, as well as a small amount of loose

tobacco, a “black & mild wrapper,” and a lighter. He testified

that this was “consistent with marijuana paraphernalia.” 

Agent Rabreau also testified that the car had four air

fresheners, something “many smugglers use . . . to mask the

smell of their drug load.” He further testified that he believed

Agents Chang and Buck smelled marijuana as well, and that

the smell was the reason Agent Favela initially sent SotoZuniga to secondary inspection. On cross-examination,

Agent Rabreau said that, to his knowledge, no marijuana was

ever recovered from the car. Agent Rabreau also testified

that Soto-Zuniga had provided an “inconsistent route of

travel,” but acknowledged that he did not include this

information in his report.

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 9

In a declaration, Soto-Zuniga claimed that he had not

smoked marijuana in five or more years and that he had told

Agent Buck that he did not smoke marijuana. Soto-Zuniga

also said that he told Agent Buck that none of his friends had

smoked marijuana in the car. When called to testify during

the evidentiary hearing, Soto-Zuniga testified consistently

with his declaration on these points.

The district court denied Soto-Zuniga’s motions to

suppress and to compel discovery. The district court

reasoned that “the sequence of events [in the agents’ reports]

seems to be very consistent,” and that there was probable

cause based on several factors, including the smell of the

marijuana, Soto-Zuniga’s reported nervousness, the air

fresheners, the loose tobacco, the cigarillo wrappers, and

Agent Rodgers’s report that Soto-Zuniga admitted to him that

he had smoked marijuana in the car. The court noted that the

physical evidence was “where it nails the coffin here.” The

court further noted that, while Agent Rabreau was the only

agent who claimed to smell the marijuana, other agents

reported that Agent Rabreau had told them he smelled

marijuana at the scene so it was not “a post-arrest revelation.” 

The court also found that the testimony of Agent Rabreau,

“with regard to his role, his experience in terms of his own

arrests, and then his happening to be the conduit through

which reports pass, all support [the conclusion that] the

primary purpose of this checkpoint is immigration.” The case

was set for trial.

Before the start of the first trial and after jury selection, an

investigator for the defense obtained a social security number

for Marisol Diaz, Soto-Zuniga’s cousin and the wife of

Christian Rios Campos. The investigator then got an arrest

warrant for Diaz, which included a declaration from a

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10 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

Homeland Security Investigations agent that the government

had arrested three teenagers on suspicion of trafficking drugs

at the command of Rios. Defense counsel argued that this

new information corroborated Soto-Zuniga’s account of

events. The district court postponed the trial until the next

day. Defense counsel next filed an emergency motion for a

continuance to permit time to investigate the new

information. The government stipulated to the information

contained in the declaration, including that Rios had recruited

teenagers to traffic drugs. The district court concluded that

the stipulation was sufficient to meet the defense’s purpose,

and denied the motion for a continuance as well as defense

counsel’s subsequent motion for a mistrial.

During the trial, Soto-Zuniga sought specific jury

instructions that differed from the Ninth Circuit pattern jury

instructions on reasonable doubt. He also asked that the jury

be instructed that the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Soto-Zuniga “knew the substance [that

he possessed with intent to distribute] was 2.92 kilograms of

methamphetamine.” The district court rejected both

suggestions in favor of the pattern jury instructions. 

Following the trial, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous

decision, resulting in a mistrial.

Before the second trial, Soto-Zuniga requested discovery

on the government’s investigation of Christian Rios Campos

and Marisol Diaz, including any relevant information

regarding the three teenagers who were arrested for

trafficking at Rios’s command. The district court reviewed

the writtenmaterials related to the government’s investigation

and denied the motion, stating that any investigation of Rios

was “collateral. It is irrelevant. It is predominately

inadmissible in the forms in which you have it, and that’s the

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 11

ruling.” The district court also said that discovery would

extend the litigation and would present “a 403 problem[4] in

spades.” At the end of the second trial, the jury was

instructed with the same jury instructions used in the first

trial—after the district court noted that Soto-Zuniga had

preserved all prior objections. The jury returned a guilty

verdict.

At sentencing, Soto-Zuniga argued that the statutory

maximum sentence should only be one year because the jury

had not found that he had possessed a particular quantity of

methamphetamine. The district court rejected this claim and

sentenced Soto-Zuniga to 72 months (six years).

II

We review discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Amlani, 111 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 1997). 

To reverse Soto-Zuniga’s conviction, we must find that the

district court abused its discretion in denying his discovery

motions, and that the error resulted in prejudice to his

substantial rights, i.e., that there is “a likelihood that the

verdict would have been different had the government

complied with the discovery rules.” United States v. de Cruz,

82 F.3d 856, 866 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

4 The district court was doubtless referring to Fed. R. Evid. 403,

which states that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of

the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,

undue delay, wasting time, or needlesslypresenting cumulative evidence.”

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12 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

A

We first address Soto-Zuniga’s argument that the district

court abused its discretion in denying his motion for

discovery of the San Clemente checkpoint search and arrest

statistics. He contends that this evidence is necessary to

determine whether the checkpoint itself is constitutional. We

agree that the district court abused its discretion in denying

discoverythat could have revealed an unconstitutional seizure

and led to the suppression of the evidence that illicit drugs

were found in Soto-Zuniga’s car.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches

and seizures. “It is well established that a vehicle stop at a

highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,

531 U.S. 32, 40 (2006). As a general rule, a search or seizure

is unreasonable unless it rests on individualized suspicion of

wrongdoing. Id. at 37. But the Supreme Court has carved

out an exception to this rule for checkpoint seizures that serve

“special needs, beyond the normal need for law

enforcement.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also United States v. Fraire, 575 F.3d 929,

931–32 (9th Cir. 2009). In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,

which addressed the constitutionality of the San Clemente

checkpoint, theSupremeCourt identified immigration control

as a valid purpose for stopping cars and posing questions

without individualized suspicion. 428 U.S. 543, 556–64

(1976). The Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge

to the checkpoint, recognizing “that maintenance of a trafficchecking program in the interior is necessary because the

flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the

border.” Id. at 556. The Court also “stressed the

impracticality of the particularized study of a given car to

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 13

discern whether it was transporting illegal aliens, as well as

the relatively modest degree of intrusion entailed by the

stops.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38 (citing Martinez-Fuerte,

428 U.S. at 556–64).

The constitutionality of immigration checkpoints,

including the San Clemente checkpoint, was raised again

nearly two decades later in a separate case before our Court. 

See United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1993). In

Soyland, the defendants’ car was searched at an immigration

checkpoint’s secondary inspection, revealing drug

paraphernalia and small amounts of marijuana. Id. at 1314. 

A subsequent search of the defendants revealed 220 grams of

methamphetamine and a scale. Id. The majority declined to

address “the issue of whether checkpoint officers routinely

overstep their authority by conducting pretextual narcotics

searches,” noting that it had not been argued at trial nor on

appeal. Id. Judge Kozinski dissented, voicing his concern

that the San Clemente checkpoint and others like it may be

violating restrictions on suspicionless searches. Id. at

1315–20 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). While recognizing that

Martinez-Fuerte approved internal checkpoints for

immigration control purposes, Judge Kozinski warned that

“[t]here’s reason to suspect the agents working these

checkpoints are looking for more than illegal aliens. If this is

true, it subverts the rationale of Martinez-Fuerte and turns a

legitimate administrative search into a massive violation of

the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1316. He recommended

remanding the case for a factual inquiry into “whether the

policies, programs, directives and incentives put in place by

the government, or any customs and practices that have

developed with the government’s tacit approval, have turned

. . . San Clemente into [a] general law enforcement

checkpoint[].” Id. at 1319 (footnote omitted).

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14 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

Although Judge Kozinski’s dissent primarily discussed

the searches that occur at the San Clemente checkpoint, his

concerns are also relevant to the initial seizure—the vehicle

stop—at issue in Soto-Zuniga’s case. In City of Indianapolis

v. Edmond, the Supreme Court clarified that the

constitutionality of suspicionless immigration checkpoints is

governed by the same standard as administrative searches. 

531 U.S. at 37–38. The Court also reaffirmed that

checkpoints with the principal purpose of thwarting criminal

activity do not comport with the Fourth Amendment, and

noted that it had “never approved a checkpoint program

whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary

criminal wrongdoing,” as opposed to purposes of “policing

the border” or “ensuring roadway safety.” 531 U.S. at 38, 41. 

The constitutionality of the San Clemente checkpoint turns on

whether its “primary purpose” is to control immigration, as

has been contended by the government, or rather is to

interdict drug trafficking and other “ordinary criminal

wrongdoing.” Id.; see also Fraire, 575 F.3d at 932 (“[T]he

court must determine whether the primary purpose of the

checkpoint was to advance the general interest in crime

control. If so, then the stop is per se invalid under the Fourth

Amendment.” (internal citations, quotation marks, and

alterations omitted)). If the checkpoint’s primary purpose is

to detect evidence of drug trafficking, then the initial seizure

of Soto-Zuniga’s car and person offended the Fourth

Amendment and the drug evidence recovered from his car

must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963).

It is on this issue that the requested discovery is pertinent. 

Although the district court held an evidentiary hearing to

determine the checkpoint’s primary purpose, the only

evidence before it was the testimony of Agent Rabreau and

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 15

several news articles, including a few detailing the

interdiction of narcotics. Based on Agent Rabreau’s

testimony that he had reviewed seizure and arrest records and

that upwards of 90 percent of arrests were immigration

related, the district court concluded that the checkpoint was

constitutional and denied further discovery of the search and

arrest statistics.

It may well be that Agent Rabreau’s experience and

knowledge is consistent with the general practices at the San

Clemente checkpoint. But there is a risk that the district court

made its decision as if in part blindfolded, considering only

one version of the evidence. Our system of criminal justice

relies on an adversary system to help ensure that justice will

be done.

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E),

the government is required to produce, inter alia, documents

or data “if the item is within the government’s possession,

custody, or control and . . . the item is material to preparing

the defense.” The government, relying on United States v.

Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), contends that Soto-Zuniga

is not entitled to discovery under this Rule because the

evidence he seeks is not material to his defense against the

government’s case-in-chief. Armstrong, which concerned

discovery in a selective prosecution case, held that Rule

16(a)(1)(E)5

does not permit discovery of government

documents in selective-prosecution claims because such

discovery does not assist in “the preparation of their defense

against the Government’s case in chief.” Id. at 463. The

Supreme Court in Armstrong analyzed the meaning of the

5 Armstrong refers to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C), which was

recodified at 16(a)(1)(E) in the 2002 Amendments.

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term “defense” in the context of the Rule 16(a)(1)(E) and

reasoned that “[w]hile it might be argued that as a general

matter, the concept of a ‘defense’ includes any claim that is

a ‘sword,’ challenging the prosecution’s conduct of the case,

the term may encompass only the narrower class of ‘shield’

claims, which refute the Government’s arguments that the

defendant committed the crime charged.” Id. at 462.

Notwithstanding that language and guidance of the

Supreme Court, we do not read Armstrong to preclude Rule

16(a)(1)(E) discovery related to the constitutionality of a

search or seizure. In our view, the holding of Armstrong

applies to the narrow issue of discovery in selectiveprosecution cases. See id. at 471 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)

(“I do not understand the Court to have created a major

limitation on the scope of discovery available under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. As I see it, the Court has

decided a precise issue: whether the phrase ‘defendant’s

defense,’[6] as used in Rule [16(a)(1)(E)], encompasses

allegations of selective prosecution . . . . The Court was not

called upon to decide here whether Rule [16(a)(1)(E)] applies

in any other context, for example, to affirmative defenses

unrelated to the merits.” (citation omitted and internal

quotation marks omitted)). Also, our post-Armstrong case

law within the Ninth Circuit indicates that Rule 16(a)(1)(E)

permits discovery related to the constitutionality of a search

or seizure. In United States v. Cedano-Arellano, a defendant

charged with cocaine smuggling sought discovery of the

training records of the narcotics detector dog that “alerted” on

his gas tank. 332 F.3d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 

We acknowledged that the materials at issue “were crucial to

6 The previous version of Rule 16(a)(1)(E) permitted discovery

“material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense.”

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 17

[the defendant’s] ability to assess the dog’s reliability, a very

important issue in his defense, and to conduct an effective

cross-examination of the dog’s handler” at the pretrial

evidentiary hearing. Id. at 571. We held that such materials

were discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(E). Id.; see also

United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1096–97 (9th Cir.

2013) (defendant was entitled under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) to

discovery of unredacted training and certification records of

a narcotics detector dog). Cedano-Arellano and Thomas

support the conclusion that Rule 16(a)(1)(E) permits

discovery to determine whether evidence in a particular case

was obtained in violation of the Constitution and is thus

inadmissible.

The government argues that Cedano-Arellano and

Thomas created a narrow “dog discovery” exception to the

general rule that Armstrong establishes. The government

points to our precedent in United States v. Chon, in which the

defendants were convicted of theft and conversion of

government property after they broke into a Naval facility

and stole military equipment. 210 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir.

2000). The defendants were caught and charged as a result of

a Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) investigation. 

Before the trial, the defendants moved for discovery on any

activities of the NCIS and its predecessor agencythat targeted

civilians to bolster their claim that NCIS violated the Posse

Comitatus Act (PCA), which prohibits the military from

participating in civilian law enforcement. Id. at 992–93. We

affirmed the district court’s determination that this request

was a “far reaching fishing expedition.” Id. at 992. We held

that the discovery request was “considerably broader” than

any materials that could be relevant to the specific charges

against the defendants and that the requested discovery did

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18 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

“not serve the purpose of fortifying the appellants’ ‘shield

claims.’” Id. at 995.

Chon turns on the determination that the requested

discovery had no relevance to whether NCIS violated the

PCA in the defendants’ particular case. The materials sought

were expansive, “implicating widespread and repeated

violations of the PCA in the State of Hawaii and within the

United States.” Id. at 994. By contrast, Soto-Zuniga sought

discovery of whether he and his automobile were

unconstitutionallyseized at the San Clemente checkpoint—an

issue that is central to his defense, because it could spell the

difference in a suppression motion of the key physical

evidence against him. Because the primary purpose of the

San Clemente checkpoint was placed squarely at issue by

Soto-Zuniga’s motion to suppress, defense counsel should

have been allowed reasonable discovery relating to this

primary purpose. After that discovery, and with all material

evidence on the table, the district court would have been in a

superior position to assess and decide the motion to suppress.

It has been forty years since the San Clemente checkpoint

was upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional. 

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556–64. Whether the primary

purpose of the checkpoint has evolved from controlling

immigration to detecting“ordinarycriminal wrongdoing,” see

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, is a question that is subject to

discovery under Rule 16. Soto-Zuniga “should not have to

rely solely on the government’s word that further discovery

is unnecessary.” United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105,

1113 (9th Cir. 2012). We conclude that the district court

abused its discretion by denying this discovery. See de Cruz,

82 F.3d at 866. However, because we do not have access to

the records in question, we cannot determine the likelihood of

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 19

whether Soto-Zuniga’s case would have had a different

outcome had he been permitted discovery. Id. The proper

course under such circumstances is to remand for discovery

and an evidentiary determination. See Thomas, 726 F.3d at

1097–98; see also United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134,

1151–52 (9th Cir. 2013). We reverse the district court’s

denial of the discovery motion relating to the checkpoint’s

arrest statistics, and remand for the district court to assess the

constitutionality of the San Clemente checkpoint in further

proceedings. See id. at 1097–98.

B

We also reverse the district court’s denial of discovery of

the government’s investigation into Rios’s drug smuggling

operation. The district court reviewed the documents

submitted by the government, including reports from the

agents involved in investigating drug smuggling operations,

and concluded that the documents were irrelevant, that the

documents were inadmissible because they relied on hearsay,

and that permitting the requested discovery would

unnecessarily extend the litigation in violation of Fed. R.

Evid. 403. After reviewing the documents,7 we disagree both

with the district court’s characterization of the documents and

with its application of the law.

Soto-Zuniga has maintained that, before being stopped at

the checkpoint, he gave a ride to three teenagers at the request

of Rios. It is possible that discovery about the investigation

might help Soto-Zuniga identify the teenagers to whom he

gave a ride. Those persons might then provide direct

7 We grant the government’s Motion to Transmit Documentary

Evidence Under Seal for Ex Parte Consideration.

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20 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

testimony on whether one or more of them placed drugs in

the car of Soto-Zuniga without his knowledge. And even if

not, they might potentially give information that would lead

to the identification of the persons in question. Soto-Zuniga’s

defense was that the contraband must have been left in his car

by the teenagers to whom he gave a ride because he knew

nothing about it. If the persons are identified, they could

potentially either support or contradict Soto-Zuniga’s claim

that he did not knowingly or intentionally possess the drugs,

an element of the crime of which he was convicted of by a

jury. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E),

Soto-Zuniga has a right to discovery of documents that are

“material to preparing the defense.” Materiality is a “low

threshold; it is satisfied so long as the information . . . would

have helped” to prepare a defense. United States v.

Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). The test is not

whether the discovery is admissible at trial, but whether the

discovery may assist Soto-Zuniga in formulating a defense,

including leading to admissible evidence. See id.

(“Information is material even if it simply causes a defendant

to completely abandon a planned defense and take an entirely

different path.” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) (“This materiality standard normally is not a heavy

burden; rather, evidence is material as long as there is a

strong indication that it will play an important role in

uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation,

corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or

rebuttal.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The district court erred by finding that the documents were

not material to the defense and were not discoverable because

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 21

they were not admissible. We conclude that in this respect,

the district court abused its discretion. See United States v.

Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 

We also conclude that there is a likelihood that the discovery

of these documents would have identified the teenagers and

changed the outcome of the trial. de Cruz, 82 F.3d at 866.8

It has been said that it “behooves the government to

interpret the disclosure requirement broadly and turn over

whatever evidence it has pertaining to the case.” HernandezMeza, 720 F.3d at 768. While we recognize the sensitive

nature of the documents in question, Soto-Zuniga’s interest

in government materials that are pertinent to his defense takes

precedence. We reverse the district court’s denial of SotoZuniga’s discovery motion, vacate the conviction, and

remand with instructions to grant the motion. See Thomas,

726 F.3d at 1098. We also instruct the district court to

consider the government’s request for a window of time

before production to determine whether to continue to pursue

this case, and to consider the government’s request for

protective measures that would maintain the security of the

information in the documents while allowing Soto-Zuniga to

adequately prepare a defense.

8 The assessment of prejudice is different as to discovery ofthe names

of the teenagers involved in smuggling by Rios, on the one hand, and

discovery of checkpoint arrests statistics, on the other hand. On the

former, we have the pertinent documents and can assess their materiality

to the defense. On the latter, we do not have the arrest and search

statistics and can express no conclusion on prejudice, and hence remand

for the district court to assess prejudice in the first instance.

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22 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

III

Soto-Zuniga raises three additional arguments that we

briefly address here.

First, he argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the drug evidence on the basis that the

Border Patrol agents lacked probable cause to search the car. 

We review a denial of a suppression motion de novo and the

underlying factual findings for clear error. See United States

v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011).

Agents at a checkpoint may not search a private vehicle

without a warrant unless they have consent or probable cause. 

See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896–97 (1975). 

Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a

particular place based on a totality of the circumstances. 

United States v. Pinela-Hernandez, 262 F.3d 974, 978 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238

(1983)).

Here, the district court made factual findings that

supported probable cause, including (1) that Agent Rabreau

smelled marijuana, (2) that the car had multiple air

fresheners, (3) that there was a cigarillo wrapper and loose

tobacco in the car, (4) that Soto-Zuniga appeared to be

agitated and nervous, and (5) that Soto-Zuniga admitted to

smoking marijuana in the car. Even if neither marijuana nor

marijuana paraphernalia were ever recovered from the car, we

conclude that the district court’s factual findings were not

clearly erroneous. Agent Rabreau testified that he smelled

marijuana and that there was physical evidence in the car that

made him suspect drug use or trafficking. Deference must be

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 23

given to the district court’s determination that Agent Rabreau

was credible. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S.

564, 573–76 (1985). Also, other agents reported that SotoZuniga was agitated and at least one agent reported that SotoZuniga had admitted to smoking marijuana in the car. We

give due regard to the views of the agents, their recitals of

what Soto-Zuniga said and did, and items seen in the car,

once these have been confirmed by the district court’s factual

findings.

Viewing the entire record, we determine that the district

court’s account of the evidence is plausible, see id. at 573–74,

and that the totality of the circumstances supported probable

cause for the search. Cf. United States v. Koshnevis, 979 F.2d

691, 695 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a driver’s nervousness,

inconsistent statements, and lies about not possessing a trunk

key or a weapon constituted probable cause to search the

car’s trunk at an immigration checkpoint). We stress that

under the Supreme Court’s standard in Illinois v. Gates, it is

not certainty that is required to support a search orseizure but

only probable cause, based on the total circumstances, that a

search may yield evidence of crime. 462 U.S. at 238. We

affirm the district court’s denial of Soto-Zuniga’s suppression

motion, insofar as it is based on a claimed lack of probable

cause for the search of the car.

Soto-Zuniga also argues that the district court erred by

instructing the jury, using the Ninth Circuit pattern jury

instructions, that “[a] reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon

reason and common sense and is not based purely on

speculation.” Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions

§ 3.5 (9th Cir. 2010 ed.). Soto-Zuniga contends that this

phrasing interferes with the presumption of innocence. But

this argument is foreclosed by our precedent. See United

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24 UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA

States v. Alcantara-Castillo, 788 F.3d 1186, 1198 n.4 (9th

Cir. 2015) (noting that we have “repeatedly upheld the use of

the Ninth Circuit model jury instruction on reasonable doubt”

and collecting cases).

Soto-Zuniga also argues that knowledge of drug type and

quantity is an element of possession with intent to distribute

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Soto-Zuniga contends that

the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States,

133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), called our Circuit’s case law on this

issue into question. However, we have held that “Alleyne

does not alter our precedent that a defendant’s knowledge of

the type and quantity of the controlled substance he imports

is not such a fact, and therefore, not an element of the

offense.” United States v. Jefferson, 791 F.3d 1013, 1016

(9th Cir. 2015). The mens rea for the statute at issue in

Jefferson, 21 U.S.C. § 960, is the same as the mens rea for the

statute at issue in this case—that the defendant acted

“knowingly or intentionally.” We conclude that SotoZuniga’s knowledge of the type and quantity of the drugs

found in his car is not an element under 21 U.S.C. § 841. See

also United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550, 570 (6th Cir. 2014)

(“Drug type and quantity are irrelevant to [the] mens rea

element” under this statute).

IV

In conclusion, we vacate Soto-Zuniga’s conviction and

remand this case for a new trial. If the government decides

to proceed, the district court shall permit discovery of the San

Clemente checkpoint statistics. The court should also hold an

evidentiaryhearing on the checkpoint’s constitutionality, and,

as appropriate, publish an order or opinion on its findings. If

the checkpoint is found to be constitutional, then the district

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UNITED STATES V. SOTO-ZUNIGA 25

court shall also permit discovery of the investigation into

Rios’s drug smuggling operation.

The conviction is VACATED, the discovery rulings

REVERSED, and the caseREMANDED, with instructions.

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