Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35796/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35796-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elven Joe Swisher
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ELVEN JOE SWISHER,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-35796

D.C. Nos.

1:09-cv-00055-BLW

1:07-cr-00182-BLW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 16, 2014—Portland, Oregon

Filed October 29, 2014

Before: Arthur L. Alarcón, A. Wallace Tashima,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta;

Concurrence by Judge Tashima

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2 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Elven Joe

Swisher’s motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging

a conviction for wearing military medals without

authorization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2002 ed.).

Swisher argued that his conduct in wearing the medals

qualifies as expressive conduct, and therefore the application

of § 704(a) to him violated his First Amendment rights. The

panel held that Swisher’s contention is foreclosed by United

States v. Perelman, 695 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 2383 (2013), which concluded that the

First Amendment does not prevent Congress from

criminalizing the act of wearing military medals without

authorization and with intent to deceive. 

Judge Tashima concurred in the judgment, but only under

the compulsion of Perelman, with whose reasoning he

disagrees.

COUNSEL

Joseph Theodore Horras, Smith Horras, P.A., Boise, Idaho,

for Defendant-Appellant.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 3

Victoria L. Francis (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney; Jessica T. Fehr, Special Assistant to the Attorney

General, Billings, Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Elven Joe Swisher was convicted for wearing

military medals without authorization in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2002 ed.). After Swisher’s conviction

became final, the Supreme Court struck down 18 U.S.C.

§ 704(b) (2011 ed.), which criminalized making false claims

regarding an entitlement to military honors, on First

Amendment grounds. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.

2537 (2012). Swisher moved the district court under

28 U.S.C. § 2255 to have his conviction for wearing

unauthorized medals overturned on similar grounds, and the

district court denied relief. In the time since Swisher brought

this appeal, we have determined that § 704(a) is a facially

constitutional statute. See United States v. Perelman,

695 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2383

(2013). Because Swisher does not provide any basis for

concluding that § 704(a) is unconstitutional as applied to his

conduct, we affirm the district court’s denial of relief.1

I

Swisher enlisted in the United States Marine Corps on

August 4, 1954, a little over a year after the Korean War

1 We address Swisher’s other claims in an unpublished memorandum

disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.

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4 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

ended. He spent his first year stationed in Middle Camp Fuji,

Japan, and the following two at the Naval Annex in

Bremerton, Washington. In August 1957, he was honorably

discharged from the Marine Corps into the reserves. Upon

discharge, he was given a DD-214 discharge document, a

typewritten form that provided Swisher’s name, education,

type of discharge, last duty assignment, last date of service,

and similar information regarding his military service. 

Section 16 of the form required a listing of Swisher’s

“decorations, medals, badges, commendations, citations and

campaign ribbons awarded or authorized.” Section 17 asked

for a list of Swisher’s “wounds received as a result of action

with enemy forces.” In the authenticated copy of Swisher’s

original DD-214, the term “N/A” (not applicable) is typed in

Sections 16 and 17. The form was signed by the personnel

officer for Swisher’s unit, Captain W.J. Woodring.

In 1958, a year after his discharge, Swisher applied for

disability benefits from the former Veterans Administration

(VA) in connection with a shoulder injury stemming from a

drunk driving incident that occurred off base in Washington,

and a nasal operation that took place shortly before he was

discharged. The VA awarded Swisher ten percent disability

for shoulder arthritis, but denied Swisher’s subsequent

applications for increased disability benefits for the same

injuries.

In 2001, more than forty years after his discharge,

Swisher filed a new claim for service-related Post-Traumatic

Stress Disorder (PTSD). In his application, Swisher claimed

he suffered from PTSD as a result of his participation in a

secret combat mission in North Korea in August or

September 1955. Along with his application, Swisher

provided a self-published narrative that described the North

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 5

Korea operation. According to the narrative, Swisher was

selected for a secret combat mission while stationed at

Middle Camp Fuji, Japan. Swisher and approximately 130

other Marines were flown by helicopter to an unknown

location in China or North Korea. After the unit disembarked

and began to approach a designated hill, it came under heavy

enemy gunfire and sustained significant casualties. Swisher

was severely wounded and flown back to Japan where he

received medical treatment. He later learned he had sustained

a “concussion, broken nose, (lost a piece of meat out of the

right side), broken foot, broken teeth, collar bone separation,

cracked ribs and grenade fragments in both arms, both legs,

and torso.”

While in the Third Battalion Medical Center recovering

from his wounds, Swisher claimed that he and the other

wounded were visited by an unnamed captain, who presented

a Purple Heart to each of the wounded men, including

Swisher. The Captain “then told us that because of the

participation in combat, all the survivors were entitled to and

should wear the National Defense Medal, Korean War

Service Medal and the Korean War U.N. Service Medal and

Ribbons,” along with Navy Commendation Ribbons with a

Bronze V. Swisher claims he also received a Silver Star. The

Captain cautioned the men not to talk about “the incident”

and warned that “anyone who talks will wind up in federal

prison.” When Swisher asked the Captain “exactly where we

had been and what happened to the others,” the Captain “left

abruptly without answering.”

After reviewing Swisher’s application for PTSD benefits

and the accompanying narrative, the VA denied the claim

because Swisher failed to provide corroborating evidence

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6 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

beyond his own statement that his PTSD was service

connected.

Swisher appealed the denial and submitted a photocopy

of a second DD-214, which included the typewritten

comment that “[t]his document replaces the previouslyissued

transfer document” and “[c]hanges and additions have been

verified by Command.” Section 16 of the second DD-214

stated that Swisher had received the Silver Star, Navy and

Marine Corps Medal with Gold Star, Purple Heart, and Navy

and Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal with Bronze “V.” 

Section 17 stated that Swisher had received “[m]ultiple

shrapnel and gunshot [wounds]—September 1955, Korea.”

The form was again signed by Captain W.J. Woodring. 

Swisher also submitted a letter signed by Captain Woodring,

dated October 16, 1957, that confirmed Swisher’s

involvement in a “Top Secret” expeditionary mission, and

verified his awards. Based on this information, the VA

reversed its previous decision in July 2004, ruled that

Swisher’s PTSD was a compensable disability, and granted

Swisher a total of $2,366 a month in benefits.2

2 Swisher’s claim that he was awarded a Purple Heart became a key

issue in a criminal trial involving defendant David Hinkson, who was on

trial for solicitation of murder. See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d

1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). According to testimony at trial in 2004,

Swisher told Hinkson “he was a veteran ofthe United States Marine Corps

and a firearms expert who had killed a number of people in the Korean

War.” Id. at 1251–52. Apparently impressed by Swisher’s war record,

Hinkson asked him to torture and kill various individuals. Because

Swisher wore a Purple Heart while testifying, the defense counsel

attempted to impeach his credibility by producing military records

showing that Swisher had not been awarded any medals. Id. at 1254. On

re-cross, Swisher produced the replacement DD-214 described above. Id. 

The district court denied Hinkson’s motion for a mistrial and instructed

the jury to disregard the testimony about whether Swisher had a right to

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 7

About a year later, the VA received information from the

military personnel division that the replacement DD-214 was

fraudulent. In July 2006, after further investigation

confirmed that the DD-214 was forged, the VA reversed its

determination that the PTSD was service connected and

required Swisher to pay back the PTSD benefits that he had

received.

In July 2007, a grand jury indicted Swisher for four

violations of federal law: (1) wearing unauthorized military

medals in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 704(a); (2) making false

statements to the VA regarding his military service,

disabilities, and honors, in an effort to obtain benefits in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); (3) forging or altering his

certificate of discharge, also in an effort to obtain benefits, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3); and (4) theft of

government funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.

During the one-week trial, Lieutenant Colonel Elaine

Hensen, the assistant head for the Military Awards Branch at

Headquarters Marine Corp, discussed her review of the

Marine Corps files and her determination that the files

contained no record of Swisher suffering any injuries in

combat or receiving or being awarded the Purple Heart or any

other medal or award. The government also introduced

Exhibit 67, a photograph showing Swisher and another man

wear a Purple Heart. Id. at 1255. We ultimately upheld Hinkson’s

conviction. Id. at 1268. The parties agreed that any evidence related to

the Hinkson trial would be excluded from Swisher’s trial.

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8 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

in Marine Corps League uniforms.3In the photograph,

Swisher is wearing several military medals and awards, and

shaking hands with a person in civilian garb. The parties

stipulated that the photograph was authentic. Lt. Col. Henson

testified that the photograph showed Swisher wearing the

Silver Star, the Navyand Marine Corps Ribbon, Purple Heart,

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with a Bronze

V, and the UMC Expeditionary Medal. She reiterated that

there was nothing “in the United States Marine Corps’ files

. . . to substantiate Mr. Swisher’s entitlement to wear any of

those awards.” In addition, Jeffrey Shattuck, the head of the

Records Correspondence Section for the Personnel

Management Support Branch of the Marine Corps, outlined

in detail the numerous indicia of fraud on Swisher’s

replacement DD-214 and accompanying letter from Captain

Woodring that Swisher had used to verify his awards.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Swisher

guilty on all counts. The court imposed a below-guidelines

sentence of 12 months and one day, with a three-year term of

supervised release. This court affirmed Swisher’s conviction

and sentence on appeal. United States v. Swisher, 360 Fed.

App’x 784 (9th Cir. 2009).

Swisher subsequently challenged his conviction through

a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and claimed that his

conviction for wearing the medals violated the First

Amendment under the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s

intervening decision in United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d

1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010). The district court denied the

3 The Marine Corps League is a congressionally chartered veterans

organization that has its own Marine-related uniforms. See 36 U.S.C.

§§ 140101–04.

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 9

motion. See United States v. Swisher, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1215,

1245–46 (D. Idaho 2011). This appeal followed. In the

interim, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s

Alvarez decision. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.

2537 (2012).

II

We review de novo a district court’s denial of relief to a

federal prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v.

Aguirre-Ganceda, 592 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Section 2255 is a substitute for habeas corpus relief for

federal prisoners, see Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333,

343–44 (1974), and allows a petitioner to file a motion to

“vacate, set aside or correct” the petitioner’s conviction or

sentence “upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or

that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum

authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral

attack,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In evaluating a § 2255 motion,

we are not constrained by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which

precludes federal courts from granting habeas relief to a state

prisoner with regard to any claim adjudicated on the merits

unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established” Supreme Court precedent, or “resulted in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” Section 2255 does not have a similar

restriction on review of claims by federal prisoners.

Although Swisher’s challenge to his conviction is based

on a Supreme Court decision decided after his conviction

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10 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

became final, we are not barred from considering his claim. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), generally precludes the

application of “new constitutional rules of criminal

procedure” to cases that “have become final before the new

rules are announced.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.

614, 619–20 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

While Teague is applicable in the § 2255 context, see United

States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir.

2002), Teague does not bar the retroactive application of

decisions holding “that a substantive federal criminal statute

does not reach certain conduct,” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620

(internal quotation marks omitted), and Alvarez is a

substantive decision of that sort. Nor does Swisher’s failure

to raise his constitutional claim at trial or on direct appeal

prevent us from reviewing his claim. Although federal

prisoners are generally barred from raising claims on

collateral review that they could have raised on direct appeal,

see Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621, the government can waive a

procedural default defense by failing to raise it, see United

States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 1999) (en

banc), and has done so here.

III

On appeal, Swisher contends that the Supreme Court’s

decision in Alvarez, which struck down § 704(b)’s prohibition

on making false claims regarding medals as facially

unconstitutional, applies equally to § 704(a)’s prohibition on

the unauthorized wearing of medals, the provision under

which Swisher was convicted.

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 11

A

We begin by considering the applicable legal framework. 

At the time of Swisher’s relevant conduct, § 704 had two

substantive prohibitions. Section 704(a), the provision under

which Swisher was convicted, criminalized the unauthorized

wearing of “any decoration or medal authorized by Congress

for the armed forces of the United States . . . except when

authorized under regulations made pursuant to law.”4 Section

704(b), added by the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.

109-437 § 3, 120 Stat. 3266, prohibited anyone from “falsely

represent[ing] himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to

have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by

Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States.”

 

4

 At the time of Swisher’s offense, the provision read:

In general. —Whoever knowingly wears, purchases,

attempts to purchase, solicits for purchase, mails, ships,

imports, exports, produces blank certificates of receipt

for, manufactures, sells, attempts to sell, advertises for

sale, trades, barters, or exchanges for anything of value

any decoration or medal authorized byCongress for the

armed forces of the United States, or any of the service

medals or badges awarded to the members of such

forces, or the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such

badge, decoration or medal, or any colorable imitation

thereof, except when authorized under regulations made

pursuant to law, shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2008 ed.). Congress has since removed the word

“wears” from the list of prohibited actions. See 18 U.S.C. § 704(a). That

is, § 704(a) no longer prohibits the conduct for which Swisher was

convicted.

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12 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

In Alvarez, the defendant was convicted under § 704(b)

for falsely claiming that he had received the Congressional

Medal of Honor. 132 S. Ct. at 2542. The defendant

challenged his conviction on the ground that § 704(b) was a

content-based suppression of pure speech and therefore

facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id. at

2543. The Supreme Court agreed, and invalidated § 704(b)

as facially violating the First Amendment, though no

rationale commanded a majority. A four-justice plurality

agreed that false speech was generally entitled to protection

under the First Amendment, id. at 2547, and held that

§ 704(b) was a content-based restriction subject to “the most

exacting scrutiny,” id. at 2547–48. Applying this test, the

plurality held that § 704(b) did not survive strict scrutiny

because the government had not carried its burden of showing

that there was a close fit between the restriction imposed and

the injury to be prevented or that the government had chosen

the least restrictive means available to achieve its ends. Id. at

2550–51.

Two other justices agreed with the result, but took a

different analytical approach. See id. at 2551 (Breyer, J.,

concurring). These justices read the Stolen Valor Act

narrowly, as criminalizing “only false factual statements

made with knowledge of their falsity and with the intent that

they be taken as true.” Id. at 2552–53. Because “[s]uch false

factual statements are less likely than are true factual

statements to make a valuable contribution to the marketplace

of ideas,” the concurrence applied intermediate scrutiny. Id.

at 2552. The two justices would have held that § 704(b)

failed to pass muster under intermediate scrutiny, because the

government could achieve its objectives in less burdensome

ways. Id. at 2555–56.

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 13

While Alvarez did not mention § 704(a)’s prohibition on

the wearing ofmedals without authorization, we subsequently

addressed § 704(a)’s constitutionality in light of Alvarez. See

United States v. Perelman, 695 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2012). In

Perelman, the defendant claimed that a self-inflicted gunshot

wound was actually a service-related shrapnel injury. Id. at

868. Based on this misrepresentation, the government

awarded him a Purple Heart, and he received more than

$180,000 in military benefits from the VA. Id. After the

government discovered the fraud, it indicted the defendant for

violating § 704(a) by wearing the Purple Heart without legal

authorization. Id.

The defendant did not argue that he was entitled to First

Amendment protection for his conduct in intentionally

wearing a fraudulently obtained medal; rather, he argued that

§ 704(a) on its face was unconstitutionally overbroad because

it criminalized innocent conduct that was inherently

expressive and protected bythe First Amendment. According

to the defendant, § 704(a)’s broad prohibition on wearing

military medals without authorization could sweep in the

following individuals:

Actors who have worn military medals (or

colorable imitations) in films or other

theatrical productions; schoolchildren who

have worn medals given to them by soldiers;

grieving spouses or parents who have worn

medals at military funerals; grandchildren

who have worn their grandparents’ medals in

Veterans Day parades; children and adults

who have worn medals (or colorable

imitations) to Halloween costume parties;

others who may have worn medals as part of

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14 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

other artistic expression, such as a

hypothetical band called “The Purple Hearts”;

others who have worn them simply as a

fashion statement or because they like the way

the medals look; a metal-worker who created

a replica of a Silver Star in the privacy of his

workshop, put it on, and then immediately

melted it down; and a protestor who has

dressed up like a Guantanamo prisoner and, to

make a political statement, wore a friend’s

medal.

Id. at 870. The individuals in these situations share one

common feature: they all wore the medals without having

any intention of falsely communicating that they had been

awarded the medals by government authorities. But

Perelman argued that the statute nevertheless reached such

conduct.

Agreeing that § 704(a) could “raise serious constitutional

concerns” if read so broadly, “as a matter of pure statutory

interpretation, constitutional avoidance, or both” Perelman

interpreted § 704(a) as criminalizing “the unauthorized

wearing of medals only when the wearer intends to deceive.” 

Id. “By prohibiting the wearing of a colorable imitation and

by including a scienter requirement, Congress made clear that

deception was its targeted harm.” Id. at 870–71. The word

“deceive” means “to make (a person) believe what is not

true.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary 374 (4th ed.

2005). Because § 704(a) requires the government to prove

that the defendant attempted to make a third party believe

something that was not true, the statute would not criminalize

the conduct of “the grieving widow, the proud grandchild, the

actor on stage, and the protestor” who wore a medal without

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 15

any such intent to deceive. Id. at 871. Section 704(a), then,

applies only to individuals who wear medals for the purpose

of falsely communicating they are entitled to wear them, as

opposed to individuals who wear the medals to express grief,

honor, or some other non-deceptive message. Id.

Having adopted this narrowing construction, Perelman

rejected the argument that § 704(a) violated the First

Amendment under the plurality’s reasoning in Alvarez. It

noted that while § 704(b) was a “content-based suppression

of pure speech,” § 704(a) was not. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). First, § 704(a) regulated harmful conduct

(deceptively wearing a medal), and “[e]ven if we assume that

the intentionally deceptive wearing of a medal contains an

expressive element—the false statement that ‘I received a

medal’—the distinction between pure speech and conduct

that has an expressive element separates this case from

Alvarez.” Id. at 871. Second, Perelman concluded that

§ 704(a) was content-neutral because its goal of “preventing

the intentionally deceptive wearing of medals” was unrelated

to the suppression of a particular viewpoint. Id. at 872. 

Given these conclusions, Perelman determined that § 704(a)

survived scrutiny under the test set forth in United States v.

O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for content-neutral statutes

that have the effect (but not purpose) of regulating some

speech. Id. at 872–73. Accordingly, Perelman upheld the

constitutionality of § 704(a).

B

We now turn to Swisher’s claim that his conviction

violated the Constitution. The nub of Swisher’s argument is

that his conduct in wearing the medals qualifies as expressive

conduct, and therefore the application of § 704(a) to him

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16 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

violated his First Amendment rights. To support the

argument that he was engaged in expressive conduct, he

states that “[b]y wearing said medals, Swisher was

communicating that he had served in the military, performed

acts in the military that were worthy of recognition and that

he was in-fact recognized,” and that “[t]he average person

who viewed the medals on Swisher’s clothing would

understand that Swisher served in the military and performed

acts worthy of commendation without further explanation.”

We cannot pursue this line of reasoning, because it is

foreclosed byPerelman. Perelman held that § 704(a) was not

“a content-based suppression of pure speech,” but rather

criminalized “the harmful conduct of wearing a medal

without authorization and with intent to deceive.” Id. at 871. 

Swisher acknowledges that he knowingly wore medals in

order to communicate to others that he was “worthy of

commendation.” Indeed, the authenticated photograph

introduced at trial documented that Swisher wore several

medals at a Marine Corps League function. There was no

evidence that Swisher wore the medals innocently as an actor,

grieving spouse or parent, or as part of a Halloween costume. 

Cf. id. at 870. Finally, the government presented extensive

evidence that Swisher was not entitled to wear those medals,

as no military record documented the awards or Swisher’s

claimed combat injuries. Taken together, this evidence

demonstrates that Swisher wore the medals for the purpose of

claiming that he was “worthy of commendation,” when in

fact he was not. Given Perelman’s conclusion that the First

Amendment does not prevent Congress from criminalizing

the act of wearing military medals without authorization and

with an intent to deceive, Swisher’s constitutional challenge

to his conviction under § 704(a) fails.

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 17

Swisher raises two arguments against this conclusion.5

First, Swisher argues that the government failed to present

evidence that he wore the medals specifically in connection

with his attempts to obtain benefits from the VA, and, as a

result, there was inadequate evidence of intent to deceive. 

Swisher misreads Perelman. Nothing in § 704(a) or

Perelman requires the government to prove that the wearer

wore the medals as part of a scheme to obtain money or

benefits.

Second, Swisher argues that Perelman was wrongly

decided. According to Swisher, wearing a medal with the

intent to deceive conveys a particular false message (“I am

entitled to wear this medal”). Because § 704(b) is aimed at

prohibiting this specific message, Swisher claims, it is not

content-neutral, but rather a content-based prohibition of

inherently expressive conduct. In certain circumstances, the

Supreme Court has recognized similar symbolic conduct as

inherently expressive and therefore deserving of heightened

First Amendment protection. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.

397, 404–06 (1989) (holding that burning the American flag

was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment);

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,

506 (1969) (holding that wearing black armbands to protest

5 Swisher notes in passing that because Perelman was decided after his

conviction, the jury was not instructed that it needed to find an intent to

deceive. Swisher did not raise this argument at trial (indeed, he barely

presses it on appeal), and we conclude that any error in omitting this new

element fromthe jury instructions was harmless. Given the overwhelming

evidence that Swisher wore the medals with an intent to deceive, any error

in the jury instructions did not have a “‘substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” United States v. Montalvo,

331 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)).

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18 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

Vietnam War was “the type of symbolic act that is within the

Free Speech Clause” and “was closely akin to ‘pure speech’

which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive

protection under the First Amendment”). Under these

precedents, Swisher argues, wearing a medal with intent to

deceive is inherently expressive conduct entitled to

heightened scrutiny, and therefore we are bound by Alvarez’s

conclusion that a ban on such speech is unconstitutional.

Regardless of the strength of Swisher’s arguments, we are

not free to reconsider Perelman or depart from its reasoning. 

We may overrule a prior decision by a three-judge panel only

when there is intervening higher authority that is clearly

irreconcilable with the prior decision. See Miller v. Gammie,

335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Absent such a

decision by an en banc panel or a Supreme Court decision,

see, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir.

2001), a change in regulatory interpretation, see Nat’l Cable

&Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,

1002–03 (2005), or a change in state supreme court

interpretation of that state’s law, see Sandstrom v. Montana,

442 U.S. 510, 516–17 (1979), “a later three-judge panel . . .

has no choice but to apply the earlier-adopted rule.” Hart,

266 F.3d at 1171. Here, there is no such intervening

authority, and Perelman compels us to reject Swisher’s

challenge to § 704(a).6

Because § 704(a) can be constitutionally applied to

Swisher’s conduct, there was no “violation of the

6 The concurrence acknowledges that despite its view that Perelman was

wrongly decided, “as a three-judge panel, we are bound by Perelman.”

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 19

Constitution or laws of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(a), presented by Swisher’s collateral attack under

§ 2255.

AFFIRMED.

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I concur in the result reached by the majority, but only

under the compulsion of United States v. Perelman, 695 F.3d

866 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2382 (2013). 

While the majority faithfully applies Perelman, Perelman

itself ignores the teaching of United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.

Ct. 2537 (2012), and sanctions the punishment of pure

speech, solely because that speech is a falsehood. Because I

cannot agree with Perelman’s reasoning, I concur only in the

judgment.

Elven Swisher wore military medals without authority to

a Marine Corps League event and was convicted of violating

18 U.S.C. § 704(a). The record contains only one photograph

of that event. No evidence suggests that Swisher wore the

medals in any other context, and no evidence connects

Swisher’s wearing of the medals to his scheme wrongfully to

obtain benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs orits

predecessor the Veterans Administration, or any other

fraudulent scheme. Swisher was convicted because he told a

lie. I do not believe that § 704(a) should be read to punish

such pure speech.

Perelman was a facial First Amendment challenge to

§ 704(a). The panel held that implying an intent to deceive

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as an element of the crime cured any First Amendment

problem. 695 F.3d at 871 (“Accordingly, we hold that a

person violates the unauthorized wearing portion of 18 U.S.C.

§ 704(a) only if he or she has an intent to deceive.”). As

construed by the majority, Perelman’s “intent to deceive” is

nothing more than the intent to tell a lie. See Maj. Op. at 14

(adopting dictionary definition of “deceive” as meaning “to

make (a person) believe what is not true”); id. at 15 (§ 704(a)

“applies only to individuals who wear the medal for the

purpose of falsely communicating they are entitled to wear

them”). This is hardly a “narrowing construction” of the

statute. Id. at 15 Adding intent to deceive as an element adds

nothing to “intent to wear the medal.” It has no narrowing or

limiting force. Perelman and the majority’s interpretation of

Perelman turn § 704(a) into a statute that criminalizes false

speech per se.

But we have observed that criminalizing pure speech is

contrary to the First Amendment. See United States v.

Alvarez, 671 F.3d 1198, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We are aware

of no authority holding that the government may, through a

criminal law, prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly

factually false.”), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). We further

observed in Alvarez that:

we presumptively protect all speech against

government interference, leaving it to the

government to demonstrate, either through a

well-crafted statute or case-specific

application, the historical basis for a

compelling need to remove some speech from

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 21

protection . . . for some reason other than the

mere fact that it is a lie [].

Id. at 1205.

More importantly Perelman and the majority’s

application of it in this as-applied challenge, are contrary to

the Supreme Court’s teaching in Alvarez. As the majority

reads Perelman, it allows a general “threat of liability or

criminal punishment to roam at large, discouraging or

forbidding the telling of [a] lie in contexts where harm is

unlikely or the need for [a] prohibition small.” Alvarez,

132 S. Ct. at 2555 (Bryer, J., concurring in the judgment). It

simply sweeps too broadly in terms of the First Amendment. 

It ignores that “cases that condone the criminalization of false

speech involve some sort of ‘legally cognizable harm

associated with [the] false statement.’” United States v.

Keyser, 704 F.3d 631, 640 (9th Cir. 2012). It fails to

understand § 704(a) “with the commands of the First

Amendment clearly in mind.” United States v. Bagdasarian,

652 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir 2011) (quoting Watts v. United

States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). It construes § 704(a) as a statute

that criminalizes false speech per se.

I quote just a few passages from Alvarez to illustrate just

how far from the teaching of Alvarez both Perelman and the

majority’s application of it have strayed:

! Absent from those few categories where the law

allows content-based regulations of speech is any

general exception to the First Amendment for false

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statement. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J.,

plurality opinion).1

! The court has never endorsed the categorical rule the

Government advances: that false statements receive

no First Amendment protection. Id. at 2545.

! [O]ur law and tradition . . . reject[] the notion that

false speech should be in a general category that is

presumptively unprotected. Id. at 2546–47.

! The Government has not demonstrated that false

statements generally should constitute a new category

of unprotected speech on this basis. Id. at 2547.

! Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful

discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on

speech, absent any evidence that the speech was used

to gain a material advantage, it would give

government a broad censorial power unprecedented in

the Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition. 

The mere potential for the exercise of that power casts

a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if

free speech, thought, and discourse are to remain a

foundation of our freedom. Id at 2547–48.

! [T]he [Stolen Valor] Act conflicts with free speech

principles. Id at 2548.

Finally, Perelman’s limiting effort – the addition of

“intent to deceive” as an element of § 704(a) – was not even

1 The bullet-point quotations that follow are also from the plurality

opinion.

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necessary and is incomplete. Perelman holds that “[b]ecause

the statute requires an intent to deceive, the examples listed

above do not fall within the scope of the statute.” 695 F.3d

at 871. But no one ever contended that the Stolen Valor Act

reached such examples – movies, theatrical productions,

school children, Halloween costumes, and parades. See id. at

870 (listing examples). In fact, the Alvarez plurality assumed

“that [the Stolen Valor Act] would not apply to, say, a

theatrical performance.” 132 S. Ct. at 2547 (citing Milkovich

v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)). More

troubling, however, is that Perelman fails to address the very

evil addressed by Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Alvarez:

[F]ew statutes, if any simply prohibit without

limitation the telling of a lie, even a lie about

one particular matter. Instead, in virtually all

these instances limitations of context,

requirements of proof of injury, and the like,

narrow the statute to a subset of lies where

specific harm is more likely to occur. The

limitations help to make certain that the

statute does not allow its threats of liability or

criminal punishment to roam at large,

discouraging or forbidding the telling of the

lie in contexts where harm is unlikely or the

need for the prohibition is small.

The statute before us [i.e., the Stolen

Valor Act] lacks any such limiting features. 

It may be construed to prohibit only knowing

and intentional acts of deception about readily

verifiable facts within the personal knowledge

of the speaker, thus reducing the risk that

valuable speech is chilled. But it still ranges

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very broadly. And that breadth means that it

creates a significant risk of First Amendment

harm. As wrtten, it applies in family, social,

or other private contexts, where lies will often

cause little harm. It also applies in political

contexts, where although such lies are more

likely to cause harm, the risk of censorious

selectivity by prosecutors is also high. . . . 

And so the prohibition may be applied where

it should not be applied, for example to bar

stool braggadocio or, in the political arena,

subtly but selectively to speakers that the

Government does not like. These

considerations lead me to believe that the

statute as written risks significant First

Amendment harm.

Id. at 2555 (Bryer, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis

added).

Even accepting Perelman on its own terms that, unlike

§ 704(b)’s content-based restriction on speech, § 704(a) is

aimed at suppressing conduct, the majority recognizes the

inherent tension between Perelman and Supreme Court

precedent, noting that “[i]n certain circumstances, the

Supreme Court has recognized similar symbolic conduct as

inherently expressive and therefore deserving of heightened

First Amendment protection.” Maj. Op. at 17 (citing Texas

v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989) (holding that

burning the American flag was expressive conduct protected

by the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des MoinesIndep. Cmty.

Sch. Dist., 313 U.S. 503,506 (1969) (holding that wearing

black armbands to protest Vietnam War was “the type of

symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause” and “was

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UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 25

clearly akin to ‘pure speech’ which, [the Court has]

repeatedlyheld, is entitled to comprehensive protection under

the First Amendment”)). No conduct can be more “inherently

expressive and therefore deserving of heightened First

Amendment protection” than the wearing of a military medal

at a Marine Corps League event.

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there is, at the

least, substantial doubt as to whether Perelman was correctly

decided. I recognize, however, that, as a three-judge panel,

we are bound by Perelman. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d

1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001). I therefore reluctantly concur in

the judgment.

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