Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03174/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03174-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Venus D. Baldwin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 18, 2008 Decided April 21, 2009

No. 05-3174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

VENUS D. BALDWIN, ALSO KNOWN AS TALISHA JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00323-01)

Howard B. Katzoff, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Suzanne G. Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S.

Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth Trosman, Thomas

E. Zeno, and Deborah L. Connor, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Thomas J. Tourish Jr. , Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an

appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judge, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: Venus Baldwin appeals her convictions and

sentence after a jury trial for health care fraud, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1347, mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and conspiracy to commit

money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The indictment

charged that Baldwin, her four co-defendants, and others set up

a scheme that defrauded Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. out

of a total of $1,159,958. Baldwin and her co-conspirators

created sham business entities to submit fraudulent invoices to

Kaiser Permanente requesting payment for various goods and

services that were never furnished, including dental chairs,

which qualified as “health care item[s]” within the meaning of

18 U.S.C. § 1347. They then created numerous bank accounts

to receive the payments and launder the money. 

When calculating Baldwin’s sentence range under the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the district court increased her

offense level upon finding that she was a leader or organizer of

the scheme, that she committed perjury, and that she committed

another offense while on release pending sentencing. See

generally United States v. Baldwin, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.

2005). The court ultimately sentenced her to concurrent prison

terms of 120 months on the money laundering count and 60

months on the health care and mail fraud counts. It ordered her

to pay restitution in the total amount of $893,085, for which she

was jointly and severally responsible with her co-defendants.

The judgment also provided that Baldwin “may make payment

of the special assessment and restitution through the U.S.

Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program”

during her incarceration. Any balance remaining after her

release was to be paid at a rate of $200 per month, but the U.S.

Probation Office could “revise the amount of monthly payments

in its discretion.” 

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Two of the issues Baldwin raises amount to nothing. There

is no room for doubting whether she committed health care

fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. As the district court

ruled, her fraud was directed against Kaiser, a “health care

benefit program,” and the payment requests for the dental chairs

were “in connection with the . . . payment for health care . . .

items.” See United States v. Baldwin, 277 F. Supp. 2d 67, 68–69

(D.D.C. 2003). Whether she was a leader or organizer of the

scheme, as defined in § 3B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines, is not a close question. The district court cited

ample evidence proving that she was. See Baldwin, 389 F.

Supp. 2d at 2.

A more serious issue is whether the district court

impermissibly delegated its authority to determine her restitution

obligations to the Bureau of Prisons during her incarceration,

and to the Probation Office upon her release. Citing this court’s

decision in United States v. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d

1348, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and cases from other circuits,

Baldwin argues that the district court could not give the

Probation Office the authority to modify her monthly restitution

payments while she was on supervised release. Baldwin also

contends that the district court was required to set the total

amount and schedule of restitution payments to be made during

her incarceration through the Inmate Financial Responsibility

Program.

 

Baldwin’s counsel did not object to the restitution order at

the sentencing hearing, so our review is for plain error. See Fed.

R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Watson, 476 F.3d 1020, 1023

(D.C. Cir. 2007). To overturn a district court’s decision under

plain error review, we must find that there is “(1) error, (2) that

is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights.” Watson, 476

F.3d at 1023 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

466–67 (1997)). If all three conditions are satisfied, we have

USCA Case #05-3174 Document #1176674 Filed: 04/21/2009 Page 3 of 5
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discretion to remedy the error only if (4) it “seriously affect[s]

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. at 1023–24.

Although the government did not alert the district court, it

tells us the court committed error in failing to specify the

amount and schedule of Baldwin’s restitution payments during

her incarceration and in giving the Probation Office discretion

to modify her monthly payment amounts on supervised release.

We are not obligated to accept the government’s confession of

error, United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (citing Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942)),

particularly when there is reason to doubt whether the

government’s position is correct. 

Braxtonbrown-Smith, on which Baldwin and the

government rely, contains no analysis of the issue. Citing two

cases, one from the Seventh Circuit and another from the Fourth,

United States v. Pandiello, 184 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 1999);

United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808–09 (4th Cir. 1995),

we remanded with instructions to the district court to “clarify”

that the Probation Office did not have authority to modify the

monthly restitution payments. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d

at 1356. On the issue of the Probation Office’s authority there

is now a split in the circuits. See Weinberger v. United States,

268 F.3d 346, 359–60 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases).

Some courts (apparently the majority) hold that allowing

probation officers to modify monthly restitution payments

conflicts with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663–3664 and Article III of the

Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806,

808–09 (4th Cir. 1995). Others hold that so long as the district

court determines the total amount of restitution to be paid, it

may properly allow the Probation Office to set the schedule of

payments. See, e.g., United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635,

641–42 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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As to the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program, it is not so clear that the district court

had to give more specific instructions regarding Baldwin’s

restitution payments during her incarceration. The Seventh

Circuit recently overruled Pandiello, the case on which

Braxtonbrown-Smith (and the government) relied for the

conclusion that the district court could not delegate its authority

to specify restitution payment schedules. See United States v.

Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 794–96 (7th Cir. 2008). Sawyer held that

a court may not set the terms of restitution payments made

through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, because

the Program is under the exclusive control and authority of the

Executive Branch (unlike the Probation Office, whose only

power derives from the court). Id. at 795. Only the Bureau of

Prisons could determine whether an inmate earned anything

while in prison, and whether and how much of the amount could

be used to make restitution payments. Id. Hence the

conclusion: the court is not delegating its authority when it

leaves it up to the Bureau of Prisons to determine the amount

and schedule of restitution to be paid during incarceration. Id.

While agreeing with two circuits in so holding, the Seventh

Circuit acknowledged that its decision on the issue conflicted

with that of six other circuits. Id.

Given the divergent views of the courts of appeals and the

shift in the authority on which we relied in Braxtonbrown-Smith,

we cannot say that the district court committed “plain error” in

its restitution order. 

Affirmed.

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