Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02826/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02826-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Best
Defendant
Richard Carrillo
Plaintiff
Cherry
Defendant
Mayberry
Defendant
Saltainian
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD CARRILLO, No. 2:14-cv-2826-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

SALTAINIAN, et a.,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges his Eighth Amendment rights have been

violated. He states that after receiving morphine during a medical visit, the unit officer had

plaintiff’s cell mate help him up the stairs. Plaintiff states that he blacked out and fell down the

stairs, which resulted in a trip to the hospital. He requested defendant Saltainian to give him a

first floor assignment chrono, but was refused. A few months later, plaintiff fell while getting

down off his upper bunk due to neuropathy causing his legs to feel numb. Defendant Mayberry

refused to log the incident; defendant Saltainian refused to give plaintiff a lower bunk or bottom

tier chrono again. Plaintiff fell from his upper bunk again the following month, injuring his head

and lower back. The officers had to pick him up and carry him back to the upper tier because he

couldn’t walk up the stairs. The next day, plaintiff informed both defendants Best and Cherry

that he could not walk the stairs, but they said he had no choice. Plaintiff then fell again trying to

climb the stairs. He was again transported to CTC, but was placed in a holding tank and not

provided treatment. 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by the

defendants’s deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The treatment a prisoner

receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny

under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v.

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McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth

Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,

humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of

confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter,

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are

met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison

official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a

“sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. 

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, plaintiff alleges Dr. Saltainian refused to give him a medical chrono for a

lower tier or lower bunk. Because he was denied the chrono, he continued to fall off his upper

bunk and on the stairs, resulting in injuries. His allegations as to how the other defendants

violated his rights are unclear. He claims defendant Mayberry refused to log an incident report,

and got frustrated with plaintiff because he thought plaintiff was trying to get special treatment. 

He further alleges he informed defendants Best and Cherry about his difficulties with the stairs,

but the defendants did not do anything about it. However, plaintiff does not explain how such

actions violated his rights. He fails to make any connection between the actions of defendants

Mayberry, Best, and Cherry, and his medical needs, and whether these three defendants had any

ability to assist plaintiff in obtaining the chronos he claims he was in need of. He further fails to

explain who was responsible for placing him in the holding tank instead of providing him

medical treatment. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. 

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See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations

are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the

plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

It would appear defendant Saltainian, as plaintiff’s medical provider, would be

able to issue a medical chrono for a lower tier and/or lower bunk, and the doctor’s refusal to do

so could possibly be the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation if his refusal to do so was a

result of being deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs. However, plaintiff fails to

make that actual connection. He fails to allege that defendant Saltainian refusal was the result of

deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs. Even more inadequate are plaintiff’s

allegations as to any of the other defendants. He fails to allege sufficient facts as to how the

other defendants violated his rights in any way. As such, plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed,

but he will be given an opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure these defects. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

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plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order.

DATED: April 25, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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