Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01636/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01636-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard J. Kirkland
Respondent
Juan Carlos Ruiz
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

Unless otherwise specified, citations to “Exh.” are to the exhibits lodged with

respondent’s answer.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN CARLOS RUIZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

RICHARD J. KIRKLAND,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-01636 WHA (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

This is a habeas case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. 

Respondent was ordered to show cause why the writ should not be granted based on the claim

set forth in the petition. Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and

authorities in support of it. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For the reasons set forth

below, the petition is DENIED.

STATEMENT

In 2001, petitioner was convicted in San Mateo County Superior Court of first-degree

murder pursuant to California Penal Code § 187 (Exh. B at 1638-42).1

 Petitioner was acquitted

on the lesser-included offense of dissuading a witness without force or threat, Cal. Pen. Code §

136.1(c)(1) (Exh. E at 2). The jury found true the allegation that petitioner committed the

murder for the benefit of a street gang, but found not true the allegation that petitioner

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 1 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

committed the murder by means of torture (id. at 3). The jury also found not true the allegation

that during the commission of the murder petitioner personally used a screwdriver as a deadly

weapon pursuant to California Penal Code § 12022(b)(1) (Exh. E at 3). The jury could not

agree on the allegation that petitioner personally used a knife, and this allegation was

subsequently stricken (ibid.). On January 11, 2002, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term

of twenty-five years to life on the first-degree murder conviction, plus a consecutive term of

three years on the gang allegation (id. at 2-3). 

Petitioner was tried with a co-defendant, Randy Reyes. Reyes was found guilty of

second-degree murder and dissuading a witness with force or threat, and was sentenced to

fifteen years to life for the murder conviction, plus a consecutive term of two years for

dissuading a witness with force or threat (ibid.). Another co-defendant, Edgar Hernandez,

entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to testify against petitioner and Reyes and to

plead guilty to assault with a deadly weapon and related enhancements in exchange for a

sentence of time served plus 364 days (Exh. B. at 1218-19).

Petitioner appealed the judgment against him, claiming that there existed no substantial

evidence to establish the premeditation and deliberation necessary for his first-degree murder

conviction, and that the trial court made numerous instructional and sentencing errors (Exh. E at

6). On April 19, 2004, the California Court of Appeal struck the three-year sentence

enhancement based on the special gang allegation, but affirmed the judgment in all other

respects (id. at 29). The California Supreme Court denied a petition for review on July 21, 2004

(Exh. F), and petitioner filed the present federal habeas petition on April 19, 2005.

The following background facts describing the crime are taken from the opinion of the

California Court of Appeal:

On January 8, 1999, Inspector Daniel Hance was sent to the scene of a

shooting in San Francisco. The victim of the shooting was a member of a

Surenos Street gang and witnesses stated that members of the Nortenos had done

the shooting. Hance subsequently interviewed William Tejada, who was to

become the victim in this case, after Tejada had been detained by police in the

car used in the drive-by shooting. Tejada told Hance that Manuel LaFontaine did

the shooting as Tejada was driving the car. Tejada also told Hance that while he

“hung with” a Nortenos gang called the Daly City Locos (DCL), he was not a

formal member of the gang but LaFontaine was a member.

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 2 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Hance testified that the concept of respect is very important in gang life

and that “snitching” is a violation of the first commandment of gang life. In

Hance's experience, members who snitch to the police are subject to “severe

aggravated” assault and even death in retaliation. When Hance dropped Tejada at

his home after taking his statement, he explained that after LaFontaine was

arrested his attorney would have access to police reports and see that Tejada had

made a statement to the police. Tejada seemed “somewhat concerned, but he

didn't seem overly concerned” about his personal safety. Tejada indicated that he

would try to “get in some sports program or athletic program at school and stay

away from the people that he was hanging around with.”

Tejada's mother testified that a couple of months later when she was out

with Tejada, her son became nervous when he saw some Hispanic men in a car

making signs with their hands simulating a gun. One of the men was

LaFontaine's brother and another was the brother's friend. Tejada told his mother

that he was afraid he might be retaliated against for having talked to the police

about the January shooting.

On the afternoon of April 23, 1999, Tejada went to a party at the M.P.

Brown School in Daly City. When he arrived, approximately 20 people already

were there. Edgar Hernandez and Alex Obregon, both DCL members, were

there. At some point, Obregon and a few others went to get some food at

McDonald's. On their way back they were flagged down and got into a car with

Ruiz and Reyes. Someone asked, “What are we going to do about [Tejada]?”

Ruiz replied, “Don't worry about it. We'll handle it tonight.” Obregon thought

this meant Tejada would be “jumped out” of the gang, meaning he would be

beaten up, but he was not overly concerned because DCL members did not use

weapons on other DCL members.

When they returned, Obregon told Tejada that “they're plotting on you,

you know” and to “watch your back.” Tejada, however, did not believe his

friends would hurt him. Meanwhile, defendants were in a group with other DCL

members, including Hernandez, talking about Tejada. Hernandez testified that

Ruiz said that “something should be done about him.” Someone said Tejada

“should get jumped out” of the DCL and Hernandez agreed. Ruiz, however,

“said something like ... he wasn't going to buy that plan.” Hernandez suggested

that another individual, who wanted to join the DCL, challenge Tejada to a

one-on-one fight in order to jump himself into the gang and jump Tejada out.

Hernandez left the group after making the suggestion and did not know whether

the others adopted his plan.

About 10:30 p.m., people started leaving the school grounds. Hernandez

and a number of other gang members were walking down the pathway out of the

school when Hernandez saw Ruiz grab Tejada by the neck and take him to the

ground. Four others, including Reyes, began hitting and kicking Tejada. He saw

Reyes crouching down and thought he might be holding Tejada's legs. Although

Hernandez denied seeing any weapons, he admitted that he had previously told

the police that he saw Ruiz using a knife. He explained that when he initially

talked to the police he thought he had seen a knife, but in fact he had not.

Hernandez joined in the attack and kicked Tejada twice in the legs, but he left

before the attack was over.

Obregon testified that as he and Tejada were leaving the school, Ruiz

grabbed Tejada and took him to the ground. The others began kicking and

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 3 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

punching Tejada while Reyes was holding his legs. Obregon testified that after

watching the attack for a short while, he was chased away by Reyes and other

members of the gang. Obregon was impeached during cross-examination with

prior inconsistent statements he made to the police and with the acknowledgment

that he had lied at the preliminary hearing. Obregon admitted that he had

testified at the preliminary hearing that it was too dark to see any faces and he

could not remember who surrounded Tejada at the time of the attack.

Nester Silva, who was with Hernandez, testified that he watched the

attack for a few minutes before heading to Hernandez's car, and that he saw a

sharp object that “looked like blade” dropped by or near Ruiz. When he met

Hernandez at his car, Hernandez said he had not expected the assault to go so far

and that he had not known that Tejada would be “shanked.” On

cross-examination Silva acknowledged that it was dark at the time of the attack

and he could not see who was kicking Tejada.

On the morning of April 24, 1999, Tejada's dead body was found on the

path near the school. His body had many injuries, including abrasions,

contusions, and numerous stab wounds. Some of the stab wounds had been

inflicted with a knife and some possibly with a screwdriver. Approximately 44

were to the neck and head, including Tejada's eyes. The immediate cause of his

death was venous air embolism, caused by two wounds to his jugular vein. Other

concurrent blunt, sharp, and penetrating injuries also contributed to Tejada's

death.

When the police first interviewed Ruiz on April 27, he told them that

Reyes had picked him up that evening about 9:00 p.m. and drove around various

parts of San Francisco and the Peninsula looking to pick up girls. Reyes told

police the same story when he was interviewed later that day. Reyes's sister

testified at trial on his behalf, stating that Reyes was a full-time college student

and that she would be surprised to learn that her brother was in a gang. Three

other former gang members testified that Reyes was not a gang member and

Ruiz had begun distancing himself from the gang after he found out his girlfriend

was pregnant.

(Exh. E at 3-5).

ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 4 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong

applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of 2254(d)(1), only if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached

by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

[the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry), 529

U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" Supreme Court

authority, falls under the second clause of 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing

legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle to

the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue

the writ "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at

411. Rather, the application must be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting the writ. 

See id. at 409. 

"Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state

trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present clear and

convincing evidence to overcome Section 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory

assertions will not do. Ibid.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision "based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v.

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner's claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion, which in this case is that of the

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 5 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

California Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford

v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

B. ISSUES PRESENTED

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims: (1) there was insufficient

evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support the first degree murder verdict;(2) his due

process rights were violated by the trial court’s refusal to instruct on voluntary manslaughter;

(3) his right to have the jury instructed on his theory of defense was violated by the trial court’s

refusal to give lesser related offense instructions; and (4) the instructions on aiding and abetting

and the natural and probable consequences doctrine violated his due process rights. 

1. INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Petitioner claims that there is insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to

support the verdict of first-degree murder. In collaterally reviewing a claim that there is

insufficient evidence supporting a prisoner’s state court conviction, the federal court must

determine whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319. Only if no rational trier of fact

could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may a writ be granted. Id. at 324. 

Under AEDPA, the federal habeas court must ask whether the operative state court decision

reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson to the facts of the case. Juan H. v. Allen, 408

F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence of premeditation and deliberation supporting his first-degree murder conviction and

the California Supreme Court denied a petition for review (Exh. E at 9; Exh. F). The California

Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim based on the following reasoning:

Ruiz contends that there is no substantial evidence of premeditation and

deliberation. “When considering the claim of a criminal defendant that a verdict

was not supported by sufficient evidence, ‘the court must review the whole

record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it

discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and

of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ “ ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 955,

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 6 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

overruled on different grounds in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 .)

In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 25-26, the California

Supreme Court clarified the difference between first and second degree murder

and the bases upon which a reviewing court may find the evidence sufficient to

support a verdict of first degree murder. The court stated, “we find no indication

that the Legislature intended to give the words ‘deliberate’ and ‘premeditated’

other than their ordinary dictionary meanings. Moreover, we have repeatedly

pointed out that the legislative classification of murder into two degrees would

be meaningless if ‘deliberation’ and ‘premeditation’ were construed as requiring

no more reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific

intent to kill. [Citations.] [¶] Thus we have held that in order for a killing with

malice aforethought to be first rather than second degree murder, ‘ “[t]he intent

to kill must be ... formed upon a pre-existing reflection,” ... [and have] been the

subject of actual deliberation or forethought ....‘ [Citation.] We have therefore

held that ‘[a] verdict of murder in the first degree ... [on a theory of a wilful,

deliberate, and premeditated killing] is proper only if the slayer killed “as a result

of careful thought and weighing of considerations; as a deliberate judgment or

plan; carried out coolly and steadily, [especially] according to a preconceived

design.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶] The type of evidence which this court has

found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation falls into

three basic categories: (1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the

actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed

toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing-what may be

characterized as ‘planning’ activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior

relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably

infer a ‘motive’ to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts

of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that the killing was the

result of ‘a pre-existing reflection’ and ‘careful thought and weighing of

considerations' rather than ‘mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed’

[citation]; (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer

that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must

have intentionally killed according to a ‘preconceived design’ to take his victim's

life in a particular way for a ‘reason’ which the jury can reasonably infer from

facts of type (1) or (2).[¶] Analysis of the cases will show that this court sustains

verdicts of first degree murder typically when there is evidence of all three types

and otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of

(2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3).” (Id. at ¶. 26-27.) Subsequent Supreme

Court authority has explained that “these guidelines ‘were formulated as a

synthesis of prior case law, and are not a definitive statement of the prerequisites

for proving premeditation and deliberation in every case.’ “ ( People v. Welch

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 758.)

Here, there is ample evidence of types (1) and (2), planning activity and

motive, to support the verdict. First, there is no dispute that the motive for the

attack was revenge for the victim having “snitched” on a fellow gang member.

Tejada had told the police that LaFontaine had committed a drive-by shooting,

and LaFontaine was in jail pending trial on the charge. There was evidence that

LaFontaine had contacted gang members from jail and asked them to remove

Tejada from the gang, and that LaFontaine's brother had made hand signals at

Tejada simulating a gun. Hernandez testified that he had heard that Tejada had

snitched from members of the DCL prior to the night of the attack. The jury

could reasonably infer that because Ruiz was involved in the discussions about

Tejada's fate on the night of the attack, he was aware of LaFontaine's request and

of the reason for the prior threats to Tejada.

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 7 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Because we conclude that there is substantial evidence of Ruiz's premeditation and

deliberation, we need not consider whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Ruiz

under the alternative theories of murder by torture or of vicarious liability for the

premeditation and deliberation of his accomplices.

8

There is also substantial evidence that Ruiz participated in planning the

killing on the night of the attack. On his way to the school that evening, Ruiz

was asked what they were going to do about Tejada. Ruiz replied, “Don't worry

about it. We'll handle it tonight.” Later that night, as the gang members

assembled at the school, Ruiz stood talking with his accomplices. Ruiz told the

group that “something should be done about [Tejada].” Although one gang

member said that Tejada should be jumped out of the gang, and another

suggested that Tejada should fight one-on-one with a man who wanted to join

the gang, Ruiz indicated that “he wasn't going to buy that plan.” Ruiz said they

would follow a different plan under which the new guy would stop Tejada and

challenge him, and then he and the other gang members would jump in. Just

prior to the attack, a gang member told a number of friends who had gathered at

the park to leave because “something was going to happen to [Tejada], and that

he didn't want us to be there when it happened.”

Finally, the use of deadly weapons during the attack and the severity of

the wounds inflicted permit a reasonable inference that Ruiz and his accomplices

intended more than merely to jump Tejada out of the gang. (See People v. Miller

(1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 993 [possession of a deadly weapon used on an unarmed

victim is strong circumstantial evidence of plan to kill]; People v. Memro (1995)

11 Cal.4th 786, 863-864 [method of killing can support finding that murder was

premeditated].) As asserted repeatedly by Ruiz, these were experienced gang

members who had participated in jump-outs before and knew what to expect.

There was testimony that gang members do not use weapons against fellow

members during a jump out. If they used weapons in the attack on Tejada, the

jury could reasonably infer that they did so because they planned to kill him

rather than, as Ruiz suggested, that some of his accomplices became more

violent than he had anticipated. The severity of the beating, including more than

44 stab wounds to Tejada's neck and head, is also consistent with such an

inference. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Ruiz

premeditated Tejada's killing.2

(Exh. E at 6-9) (footnote in original).

The state court’s rejection of petitioner’s challenge was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law under federal law and Jackson. In reviewing the trial

record, the California Court of Appeal found ample evidence supporting a finding of

premeditation and deliberation (id. at 7-9). First, there is substantial evidence that Petitioner

helped plan the killing. When asked on the day of the killing what they were going to do about

the victim, petitioner responded, “Don’t worry about it. We’ll handle it tonight” (id. at 8). 

Additionally, on the night of the killing petitioner disagreed with one gang member’s

suggestion that the victim fight a man who wanted to join the gang, stating that “he wasn’t

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 8 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

going to buy that plan” (ibid.). Instead, petitioner suggested that the prospective gang member

challenge the victim to fight, and petitioner and the other gang members would join in the fight

(ibid.). 

Petitioner’s conversations with gang members on the night of the attack also show that

his motive for the attack was revenge. Petitioner discussed the attack with gang members who

were aware that the victim had “snitched” on a fellow gang member (id. at 7-8). A jury could

reasonably infer that petitioner was aware of the victim’s actions and that the killing was

motivated by revenge. Finally, the severity of the attack and the use of deadly weapons

suggests that petitioner killed in a particular and exacting manner. The victim was found with

over 44 stab wounds to the neck and head (id. at 9). 

The California Court of Appeal also correctly noted that there was little evidence

countering the inference that petitioner killed deliberately and according to a preconceived

design (ibid.). Even assuming, as petitioner argues, there exists evidence that would allow the

jury to make conflicting inferences regarding petitioner’s role in the attack, when viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could certainly have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that petitioner acted deliberately and according to a preconceived design.

Consequently, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law, and petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

his first claim. 

2. VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION

Petitioner next claims that he was prejudiced and his constitutional rights violated by the

trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.

Due process does not require that an instruction be given unless the evidence supports it. 

Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982). While the failure to instruct on a lesser included

offense in a capital case is constitutional error if there was evidence to support the instruction,

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980), a state trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser

included offense in a non-capital case does not present a federal constitutional claim, Solis v.

Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000). Although under Solis "the defendant's right to

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 9 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

adequate jury instructions on his or her theory of the case might, in some cases, constitute an

exception to the general rule," ibid. (citing Bashor v. Riley, 730 F.2d at 1240), Solis also

suggests that there must be substantial evidence to warrant the instruction on the lesser included

offense, see id. at 929-30 (no duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as lesser included

offense to murder because evidence presented at trial precluded a heat of passion or imperfect

self-defense instruction; no duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter because evidence

presented at trial implied malice). 

The state court denied petitioner’s challenge and denied relief on the grounds that an

instruction on voluntary manslaughter was not supported by the evidence. The California Court

of Appeal analyzed the issue as follows:

Ruiz contends that the jury should have been instructed on voluntary

manslaughter because there was evidence from which the jury reasonably could

have inferred that Tejada was killed because the gang members were “provoked

by [his] show of disloyalty, and his appearance at the park as if nothing had

happened.” The trial court refused to give the requested instruction, stating, “I

understand the defense argument that in this case, the-in a sense would argue that

the source of the provocation was the act of the victim himself, in that he was

thought to have and apparently did give information to the police regarding

criminal activities of a fellow gang member. [¶] But ... all the evidence in this

case indicates that there was such a considerable lapse in time between when the

victim gave that information to the police and when the Daly City Locos found

out about it, that as a matter of law, I would say that any passion being felt by the

defendants was based on those prior activities, was really a desire for revenge.

That the time lapse was so substantial, that you could not say it was either a

sudden quarrel or the heat of passion under circumstances where there was not

an adequate cooling time.”

Ruiz's argument that the gang members were provoked by Tejada's show

of disloyalty is essentially an acknowledgment that the motive for the attack was

revenge. To constitute voluntary manslaughter, however, the killing must occur

“suddenly as a response to the provocation, and not belatedly as revenge or

punishment.” ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 868.) The gang members

did not learn just prior to the attack that Tejada had talked to the police about the

January shooting. Rather, the evidence showed that gang members threatened

Tejada almost a month before the event, and that Ruiz was planning the attack

earlier in the day when he said that they would take care of Tejada that night.

The attack did not occur unexpectedly as Tejada appeared at the park, but after

Ruiz had discussed various plans with fellow gang members and warned others

to leave the park. On this record, a jury could not reasonably find that the attack

was suddenly provoked by Tejada's appearance at the park that night. The only

reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that the DCL gang members planned

to attack Tejada that night as punishment for talking to the police.

(Exh. E at 10-11).

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 10 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

The state court correctly denied petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to

instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Petitioner argues that there is evidence from which

the jury could have inferred that he was provoked by the victim’s disloyalty and appearance at

the park on the night of the crime (id. at 10). However, there is no evidence in the record to

support petitioner’s claim that he acted out of passion. Rather, as the California Court of

Appeal noted, petitioner’s argument that he was provoked by the victim’s disloyalty supports

the conclusion that any passion he felt was actually a desire for revenge (ibid.). Furthermore,

the evidence shows that there was a substantial lapse of time between when petitioner learned of

the victim’s disloyalty and the attack, as well as between when the victim appeared at the park

and the attack (id. at 10-11). Because there was not substantial evidence that petitioner

committed the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the state court’s rejection of

petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, and

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his second claim.

3. INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER-RELATED OFFENSES

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s failure to give instructions on the lesser-related

offenses of simple battery, simple assault, battery with serious bodily injury, assault with a

deadly weapon, and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury violated petitioner’s

constitutional right to present a defense. Due process requires that “‘criminal defendants be

afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d

898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). 

Therefore, a criminal defendant is entitled to adequate instructions on his defense theory of the

case. See Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (error to deny defendant's request

for instruction on simple kidnaping where such instruction was supported by the evidence). 

However, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his defense theory only “if the theory is

legally cognizable and there is evidence upon which the jury could rationally find for the

defendant.” United States v. Boulware, 558 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations

omitted). 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim that he was denied an

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 11 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

opportunity to present a complete defense based on the following analysis:

In rejecting the proposed instructions, the trial court relied on People v.

Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 136, in which our Supreme Court held that a trial

court cannot instruct on lesser related offenses without the prosecutor's

permission. Permitting the court to instruct on lesser related offenses over the

objection of the prosecutor, the court ruled, would interfere with the prosecutor's

“sole discretion to determine whom to charge with public offenses and what

charges to bring.” (Id. at ¶. 134-136.)

Despite this clear authority, Ruiz argues that the trial court should have

instructed on the lesser related crimes because in this case they constituted a

defense, and the failure to instruct therefore impinged on his federal

constitutional rights to due process, compulsory process and fair trial by jury.

Ruiz confuses his theory of the case with an affirmative defense. Assault and

battery are offenses that may be charged by the prosecutor, but they are not

defenses to murder. If the jury had accepted Ruiz's theory of the case, that he had

not intended to kill Tejada, under the instructions that the court gave he would

have been entitled to an acquittal of the charged crimes. He had no right to have

the jury given the option of convicting him of a lesser crime not charged by the

prosecutor and not necessarily included in the offenses charged. ( People v.

Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 136.) Accordingly, defendant was not denied his

constitutional right to present a defense.

(Exh. E at 11-12).

The state court correctly held that the trial court’s refusal to give the requested

instructions on lesser-related offenses did not deny petitioner the opportunity to present a

complete defense based on his theory of the case. The instructions given did not prevent

petitioner from arguing as a defense to his first-degree murder charge that his role in the attack

was limited to the commission of lesser-related offenses, nor did the instructions inhibit the jury

from accepting petitioner’s theory of the case. As the California Court of Appeal noted, had the

jury accepted petitioner’s defense theory, petitioner would have been eligible for acquittal of his

first-degree murder charge (id. at 12). However, petitioner has no constitutional right to have

the jury instructed on lesser offenses not charged by the state. See Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S.

88, 88 (1998) (state trial courts are not required to instruct juries on offenses that are not lesser

included offenses of the charged crime under state law). Because the instructions did not deny

petitioner the opportunity to present his defense theory of the case, the state court’s rejection of

petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, and

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his third claim.

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 12 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

4. INSTRUCTIONS ON AIDING AND ABETTING AND THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCES

DOCTRINE

Petitioner argues that the instructions given by the trial court on aiding and abetting and

the natural and probable consequences doctrine were misleading in that they failed to inform the

jury that petitioner could be found culpable as an aider and abettor of a lesser offense than the

offense committed by the actual perpetrator. In order to establish a due process violation,

petitioner must show both ambiguity in the instructions and a "reasonable likelihood" that the

jury applied the instruction in a way that violates the Constitution, such as relieving the state of

its burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Waddington v. Sarausad, 129

S. Ct. 823, 831 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In reviewing an ambiguous

instruction, the inquiry is not how reasonable jurors could or would have understood the

instruction as a whole, but rather whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury has

applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. at 72 & n.4.

The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s claim that the jury instructions on

aiding and abetting and the natural and probable consequences doctrine were misleading, as

follows: 

Ruiz contends that the instructions failed to inform the jury that he could

be convicted as an aider and abettor of a lesser crime than the crime committed

by the actual perpetrator. He argues that by instructing the jury that the aider and

abettor was “equally guilty” as the perpetrator, the court misled the jury to

believe that it could not convict Ruiz of involuntary manslaughter if it found that

the perpetrator committed first degree murder. We disagree.

The instructions given by the court were not misleading. The jury was

instructed that an aider and abettor is regarded as a principal in the crime

committed by the perpetrator and is “equally guilty” regardless of the extent or

manner of his participation. (CALJIC No. 3.00.) [] The court also informed the

jury that one aids and abets in the commission of a crime when by act or advice

one aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of a crime with

knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent to

encourage or facilitate the crime. (CALJIC No. 3.01.) [] Finally, the jury was

instructed that an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the crime he knows the

perpetrator contemplates, but also of any crime that is the natural and probable

consequences of any criminal act he knowingly and intentionally aided and

abetted. ( CALJIC No 3.02.) [] In this instruction, the court identified aggravated

assault and battery as the potential target crimes that Ruiz and his accomplices

may originally have contemplated. Accordingly, based on these instructions, the

jury was asked to determine whether Ruiz aided and abetted in the commission

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 13 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

of an assault or battery and, if so, whether involuntary manslaughter, second

degree or first degree murder resulted as a natural and probable consequence of

the assault or battery.

Contrary to Ruiz's assertion, under these instructions the jury could have

found that Ruiz aided and abetted in only a battery and that, because he had no

knowledge of his accomplices' intent to use such extreme violence or to kill

Tejada, involuntary manslaughter was the only reasonably foreseeable

consequence of the battery. By informing the jury in CALJIC No. 3.00 that one

who aids and abets a crime is equally as guilty as the perpetrator of that crime,

the court did not imply that one who aids and abets one crime is equally as guilty

as the perpetrator may be of another crime. If the jury found that Ruiz aided and

abetted in the murder of Tejada, he would be just as guilty as the person who

actually inflicted the deadly blow. However, if the jury found that Ruiz aided and

abetted in only an assault or battery, Ruiz would be as guilty as the perpetrator of

the assault or battery and of any other crime which the jury found to be the

natural and probable consequence of the assault or battery. (CALJIC No. 3.02.)

The natural and probable consequences doctrine provided an alternative theory

under which Ruiz might have been found guilty of murder or manslaughter, but

nothing in the instructions suggests that liability imposed under this theory must

be the same for everyone who participated in the attack on Tejada. To the

contrary, CALJIC No. 3.02 stated that the natural and probable consequences for

which one is responsible is to be determined by what, “under all of the

circumstances surrounding the incident,” one should have “reasonably expected

to occur if nothing unusual has intervened.” What is a reasonably foreseeable

consequence “depend[s] on the circumstances surrounding the conduct of both

the perpetrator and the aider and abettor” and requires individualized

consideration by the jury for each participant. ( People v. Woods (1992) 8

Cal.App.4th 1570, 1587 ( Woods ).)

Although Ruiz suggests that Woods requires the reversal of his

conviction, the decision actually supports the opposite conclusion. In Woods, the

court concluded that a defendant who aids and abets in the commission of one

crime can be convicted of a lesser crime than the perpetrator. (8 Cal.App.4th at ¶.

1577-1578.) “The fact the perpetrator cannot be found guilty of both a greater

and a necessarily included offense [citations] should not preclude an aider and

abettor from being found guilty of an uncharged, necessarily included offense

when the lesser, but not greater, offense is a reasonably foreseeable consequence

of the crime originally aided and abetted.” (Id. at ¶. 1587-1588.) In Woods, the

court did not find any fault with the CALJIC instructions on aiding and abetting,

which were the same as those given in this case, but reversed the conviction

because the trial judge had answered “no” when the jury asked whether the

defendant could be found guilty of aiding and abetting a murder in the second

degree if the actual perpetrator of the same murder were determined to be guilty

of murder in the first degree. (Id. at ¶. 1577-1579.) The Court of Appeal also

held that “If the evidence raises a question whether the offense charged against

the aider and abettor is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the criminal act

originally aided and abetted but would support a finding that a necessarily

included offense committed by the perpetrator was such a consequence, the trial

court has a duty to instruct sua sponte on the necessarily included offense as part

of the jury instructions on aider and abettor liability.” (Id. at p. 1593.) Here, the

instructions did instruct on every offense that is necessarily included in the

charge of first degree murder.

Thus, properly understood the instructions given in this case did correctly

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 14 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

advise the jury it might find Ruiz guilty of a lesser offense such as involuntary

manslaughter even if one whom Ruiz aided and abetted in committing the attack

was guilty of a more serious offense such as murder in the first degree. It may be

that the instructions could have been clearer on this point, but none of the

defendants requested a clarifying instruction, and the trial court was under no sua

sponte obligation to give such a pinpoint instruction. ( People v. Talamantes

(1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 968, 974-975.) At trial, Ruiz objected only to the

inclusion of CALJIC No. 3.02 and, as indicated above, that instruction was

perfectly appropriate. Moreover, there is no reason to believe the jury was

confused on this issue. Ruiz's attorney stressed the point during closing

argument, and neither the judge nor the prosecutor said anything to suggest that

the law was otherwise or that both defendants necessarily had to be guilty of the

same offense. Indeed, the verdicts reflect that the jury understood this fully, since

the jury found Reyes guilty of only second degree murder while convicting Ruiz

of murder in the first degree.

(Exh. E at 12-16) (footnotes omitted).

The state court’s conclusion that the instructions given were unambiguous and properly

applied by the jury does not violate federal law or McGuire. The California Court of Appeal

correctly found that under the instructions given the jury could have determined that petitioner

aided and abetted an aggravated assault or battery, the natural and probable consequence of

which was only involuntary manslaughter and not murder (id. at 14). Petitioner’s argument that

the jury misunderstood the “equally guilty” clause in CALJIC No. 3.00 to preclude convicting

him of a different offense than that committed by the actual perpetrator is belied by the jury’s

verdict finding petitioner guilty of first-degree murder and his co-defendant guilty of only

second-degree murder (id. at 12).

Finally, any error in the instructions on aiding and abetting did not prejudice petitioner

because, for the reasons discussed above, there was ample evidence that petitioner committed

first-degree murder under the alternative theory of premeditation and deliberation. Any error in

the jury instructions on aiding and abetting, therefore, did not have a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Because there is no reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied the aiding and abetting

instructions in a manner that violates the Constitution, the state court’s denial of petitioner’s

claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, and petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief on his fourth claim.

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 15 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases now requires a district court to

rule on whether a petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability in the same order in

which the petition is denied. Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that his claims

amounted to a denial of his constitutional rights or demonstrate that a reasonable jurist would

find this court's denial of his claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000). Consequently, no certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. 

The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 11 , 2010. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

G:\PRO-SE\WHA\HC.05\RUIZ636.RUL.wpd 

Case 3:05-cv-01636-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/11/10 Page 16 of 16