Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01794/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01794-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lakshmi Arunachalam
Appellant
SAP America, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

PRESIDIO BANK,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2019-1223

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 3:12-cv-04962-TSH, 

Magistrate Judge Thomas S. Hixson.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

SAP AMERICA, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________

2019-1794

______________________

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2 ARUNACHALAM v. PRESIDIO BANK

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 4:13-cv-01248-PJH, 

Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton.

______________________

Decided: February 13, 2020 

______________________

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM, Menlo Park, CA, pro se. 

 CANDICE C. DECAIRE, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton 

LLP, Seattle, WA, for defendant-appellee in 2019-1223. 

Also represented by ANDREW JAMES ISBESTER, San Francisco, CA.

 THARAN GREGORY LANIER, Jones Day, Palo Alto, CA, for 

plaintiff-appellee in 2019-1794. Also represented by 

JOSEPH BEAUCHAMP, Houston, TX. 

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam, proceeding pro se, appeals 

two decisions from the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of California. The first relates to a patent infringement suit filed by Dr. Arunachalam against Presidio Bank. 

The second relates to a declaratory judgment action filed 

by SAP America, Inc. Both decisions concluded that Dr. 

Arunachalam was collaterally estopped from asserting the 

patents in question because many of the patent claims already had been invalidated in prior cases, and the remaining claims all suffered from the same defect that led to the 

invalidity of the previously litigated claims. See Pi-Net 

Int’l Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 42 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D. 

Del. 2014); SAP Am. Inc. v. Arunachalam, No. IPR2013-

00194 (PTAB Sept. 18, 2014); SAP Am. Inc. v. Arunachalam, IPR2013-00195 (PTAB Sept. 18, 2014); SAP Am. Inc. 

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ARUNACHALAM v. PRESIDIO BANK 3

v. Arunachalam, No. CBM2013-00013 (PTAB Sept. 18, 

2014); and SAP Am. Inc. v. Arunachalam, No. CBM2014-

00018 (PTAB Mar. 6, 2015). Because the decisions apply 

collateral estoppel for the same reasons, we address both 

cases together. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dr. Arunachalam’s case against Presidio Bank asserted patent infringement of numerous claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,987,500 (the ’500 patent) and 8,108,492 (the 

’492 patent). SAP’s case requested declaratory judgment 

of non-infringement of all claims for the ’500 patent, the 

’492 patent, and U.S. Patent No. 8,037,158 (the ’158 patent). 

While these cases were pending, the U.S. District 

Court for the District of Delaware in JPMorgan invalidated 

claims 1–6, 10–12, 14–16, and 35 of the ’500 patent; claims 

1–8 and 10–11 of the ’492 patent; and claim 4 of the ’158 

patent. JPMorgan, 42 F. Supp. 3d 579. Moreover, in addition to its declaratory judgment action, SAP also filed for 

inter partes review (IPR) and covered business method 

(CBM) review of those patents. The Patent Trial and Appeals Board (the Board) in the IPRs and CBMs entered its 

decisions after the district court in JPMorgan entered its 

decision. The Board found claims 1–6, 10–12, 14–17, and 

35 of the ’500 patent; claims 1–8 and 10–12 of the ’492 patent; and claims 1–6 and 9–11 of the ’158 patent unpatentable. Appeal Order, Arunachalam v. SAP Am. Inc., No. 

2015-1424 at 4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 23, 2016). Dr. Arunachalam 

appealed the Board’s decisions and we dismissed the appeal because Dr. Arunachalam was collaterally estopped 

from challenging the Board’s decision in light of JPMorgan. 

Id. at 7. In our decision, we held Dr. Arunachalam collaterally estopped from challenging the Board’s decision to invalidate claims that were not invalidated in JPMorgan

because those claims “suffer[ed] from at least one of the 

same fatal lack-of-enablement flaws” as the claims 

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invalidated in JPMorgan. Id. at 5. In other words, because 

the additional claims suffered from the same invalidating 

defect as the claims invalidated in JPMorgan, we ruled 

that those additional claims likewise could not survive. 

As a result, by the time the district court in the cases 

on appeal entered its decisions, the only claims not invalidated were claims 7–9, 13, and 18–34 of the ’500 patent; 

claims 9 and 13 of the ’492 patent; and claims 7 and 8 of 

the ’158 patent. See id. at 3–4. Applying similar reasoning 

we used in our 2016 Arunachalam decision, the district 

court, in both decisions, held that Dr. Arunachalam was 

collaterally estopped from asserting all claims of the asserted patents, because the patent claims that had not been 

previously invalidated in earlier litigation nevertheless 

suffered from the same invalidating defect as the previously litigated claims. 

II. DISCUSSION

When reviewing the application of collateral estoppel, 

we are “generally guided by regional circuit precedent, but 

we apply our own precedent to those aspects of such a determination that involve substantive issues of patent law.” 

Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 

1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the Ninth Circuit, “[c]ollateral 

estoppel applies to a question, issue, or fact when four conditions are met: (1) the issue at stake was identical in both 

proceedings; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the prior proceedings; (3) there was a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was necessary to decide the merits.” Oyeniran v. Holder, 672 F.3d 

800, 806 (9th Cir. 2012). “Where a patent has been declared invalid in a proceeding in which the ‘patentee has 

had a full and fair chance to litigate the validity of h[er] 

patent,’ . . . the patentee is collaterally estopped from relitigating the validity of the patent.” Miss. Chem. Corp. v. 

Swift Agric. Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

1983) (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. 

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Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971)). Further, “[o]ur precedent does not limit collateral estoppel to patent claims that 

are identical. Rather, it is the identity of the issues that 

were litigated that determines whether collateral estoppel 

should apply.” Ohio Willow Wood, 735 F.3d at 1342 (emphasis in original). 

To the extent that Dr. Arunachalam challenges the decisions in cases other than the cases directly on appeal 

here, including JP Morgan and the above-referenced Board 

decisions, Dr. Arunachalam was required to make those 

challenges in direct appeals from those cases. See Pers. Audio, LLC v. CBS Corp., 946 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Arunachalam v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 759 F. App’x 927 (Fed. 

Cir. 2019). As such, we will not address those challenges 

here. See Pers. Audio, 946 F.3d 1348; Int’l Bus. Machs. 

Corp., 759 F. App’x 927. Regarding Dr. Arunachalam’s 

challenges and motions under Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 

Cranch) 87 (1810), and “prosecution history estoppel” under Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 

2017) (en banc), we have previously addressed these arguments, stating that “[t]he Supreme Court in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, —

U.S.—, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1375 & n.2, 1377–78, 200 L. Ed. 2d 

671 (2018) rejected several similar constitutional challenges to the inter partes review process.” Int’l Bus. Machs. 

Corp., 759 F. App’x at 933. Dr. Arunachalam has not provided any reason that the same reasoning does not apply

to a district court’s authority to invalidate a patent. Accordingly, we reject Dr. Arunachalam’s constitutional challenges and deny her motions raising those same 

constitutional challenges.

As to Dr. Arunachalam’s challenges to the district 

court’s decisions on collateral estoppel, we agree with the 

district court that Dr. Arunachalam was collaterally estopped from asserting all claims under the ’500, ’492, and 

’158 patents. First, we hold that Dr. Arunachalam continues to be collaterally estopped from challenging the 

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invalidity of the claims held invalid in JPMorgan and the 

Board decisions. Appeal Order, SAP Am. Inc., No. 2015-

1424. 

We next turn to the claims that were not addressed in 

the prior proceedings, which are claims 7–9, 13, and 18–34

of the ’500 patent; claims 9 and 13 of the ’492 patent; and 

claims 7 and 8 of the ’158 patent. See Appeal Order, SAP 

Am. Inc., No. 2015-1424, at 3–4. 

As to the first condition for applying collateral estoppel 

(identical issue), we find that the remaining claims in the 

’500, ’492, and ’158 patents all rely on at least one of the 

claim terms found indefinite, not enabled, or failing written 

description by JPMorgan and that these remaining claims 

do not significantly alter the analysis of those terms. 

Claims 7–9, 13, and 18 of the ’500 patent; claims 9 and 13 

of the ’492 patent; and claims 7 and 8 of the ’158 patent are 

all dependent on previously invalidated independent 

claims and do not cure the deficiencies identified in the 

prior cases. See Appeal Order, SAP Am. Inc., No. 2015-

1424. Independent claims 19 and 27 of the ’500 patent warrant closer analysis. These claims are directed to a 

“method of enabling object routing on a network” and “[a]n 

object router on a network.” In JPMorgan, the district 

court found several claims in the patents lacked enablement because “the specification does not actually define, in 

language that would allow a person of ordinary skill in the 

art to make and use the invention, what a ‘VAN switch’ is 

and how it accomplishes ‘object routing’ or real-time transactions.” JPMorgan, 42 F. Supp. at 592. The district court 

also found that “[t]he specification offers no explanation or 

information on any software programs.” Id. at 593. As 

such, the district court found that the term “object routing,” 

like “VAN switch,” was not enabled. Id. at 592–93. For 

claims 19 and 27, none of the claimed steps therein describe what object routing is or how it is accomplished. 

Thus, the limitations recited in these claims do not cure the 

lack of enablement identified in JPMorgan. Because

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claims 20–26 and 28–34 of the ’500 patent are dependent 

on either claim 19 or 27 and do not cure the deficiencies in 

the enablement of “object routing,” they likewise fail for the 

same reason. Thus, the same issues are at stake in these 

litigations.

Regarding the second condition for collateral estoppel, 

whether the issues were previously litigated and decided, 

it is beyond dispute that the claim terms addressed in 

JPMorgan were previously litigated and finally decided. 

The third condition is whether Dr. Arunachalam was given 

a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues. Dr. Arunachalam was represented by counsel in the motions for 

summary judgment in JPMorgan. We find this proceeding 

to be a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues. Finally, for the fourth condition, the claim terms addressed 

in JPMorgan were determinative in the invalidity analysis. 

Thus, the issue of the validity of the remaining claims of 

the ’500, ’492, and ’158 patents satisfies all four collateral 

estoppel conditions, and we find Dr. Arunachalam collaterally estopped from asserting these patents in the cases on 

appeal. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered the rest of Dr. Arunachalam’s arguments, including her requests to disqualify opposing 

counsel, and find them too skeletal and unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the district courts’ decisions that Dr. 

Arunachalam was collaterally estopped from asserting the 

’500, ’492, and ’158 patents. We have also considered Dr. 

Arunachalam’s remaining motions and deny those motions. 

AFFIRMED

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