Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03520/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03520-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory Allen Sparkman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3520

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Missouri. 

Gregory Allen Sparkman, * 

*

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: April 10, 2007

Filed: September 6, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Gregory Sparkman of fifteen counts related to a scheme to

defraud his business’s insurer by burning an office building and two vehicles. On

appeal, Sparkman challenges various rulings of the district court1

 during the trial. We

affirm.

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I.

Sparkman and Tom Wilson co-owned West Park Motors, Inc., a pre-owned

vehicle dealership in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. In the mid-1990s, Sparkman and

Wilson leased a site for the dealership and built an office building there. They insured

the value of the office, the office’s contents, and their unsold vehicles with Safeco

Property and Casualty Insurance Companies.

On the night of December 12, 2000, the West Park Motors office was destroyed

by fire. Two unsold vehicles were also driven off the lot and then burned near a rock

quarry. Both police and insurance investigators concluded that these fires had been

set intentionally but did not identify a perpetrator. When questioned by investigators

about his whereabouts at time of the fires, Sparkman claimed that he had been with

Scott Smith, an employee of another business that Sparkman owned, at Smith’s

workshop. Safeco eventually reimbursed West Park Motors for its losses, but

Sparkman and Wilson chose not to reopen the business.

In 2003, Smith pled guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine. Shortly after

he was sentenced, Smith was interviewed by Special Agent David Diveley of the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”). According to

Diveley’s report, Smith told Diveley that on December 12, 2000, Sparkman had asked

him to move two unsold vehicles off the West Park Motors lot. While they were

moving the vehicles, Sparkman left Smith in a vehicle and walked away in the

direction the West Park Motors office carrying a gallon-sized container. He returned

ten minutes later. After Smith and Sparkman drove the vehicles away from the

dealership, Sparkman set them on fire. They then returned to Smith’s workshop,

where they turned on a police scanner and listened as the fire department was

dispatched to put out the fires.

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After the government obtained this information from Smith, a grand jury

charged Sparkman with one count of maliciously damaging and destroying property

by means of fire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), one count of using fire to commit

mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), and thirteen counts of mail fraud

under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. A jury convicted Sparkman of all fifteen counts.

II.

A.

Sparkman first argues that the district court violated his right to due process and

compulsory process by refusing to compel testimony from James Furr or to continue

the trial until Furr could appear. Furr was a long-time friend of Smith’s and had

manufactured methamphetamine with him. Furr, like Smith, had been interviewed by

ATF Special Agent Diveley. According to Diveley’s summary of this interview, Furr

stated that Smith had told him that he had burned the West Park Motors office himself

at Sparkman’s request. Sparkman contends that this statement shows that Smith lied

when he suggested at trial that Sparkman had burned the office. 

Furr was incarcerated at the time of the trial, and Sparkman requested of the

government shortly before trial that Furr be produced to testify as a witness for the

defense. The United States Marshals Service informed the parties that there was

insufficient time to move Furr from prison to the location of the trial. At that point,

Sparkman argues, the court should have ordered the Marshals Service to produce Furr

more promptly, or continued the trial until Furr could be produced.

We typically review constitutional questions de novo, e.g., United States v.

Lopez-Zepeda, 466 F.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 2006), and other circuits have reviewed

compulsory process claims under that standard. E.g., United States v. Bahamonde,

445 F.3d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). On some occasions, however, it appears that our

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court has applied an abuse of discretion standard to such a claim. United States v.

Youngman, 481 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. DeCoteau, 648 F.2d

1191, 1192 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). We conclude that the district court’s

decision in this case should be affirmed under either standard of review.

When reviewing compulsory process claims, we are guided by the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988). Taylor established that a

defendant does not have an absolute right to compel the testimony of witnesses in his

favor. Id. at 414. Rather, the defendant’s right to compel testimony must be weighed

against “countervailing public interests,” including the “integrity of the adversary

process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection

of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice,

and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process.” Id.

at 414-15. See also United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 36 (1st Cir.

2003); Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 444-45 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson,

970 F.2d 907, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1466 (11th Cir.

1991). In particular, we consider, inter alia, the timeliness of the defendant’s request

for the testimony and the importance of the testimony to the defendant’s case. See

Taylor, 484 U.S. at 415 (holding that a court may exclude a witness’s testimony if the

defendant willfully delays requesting the witness’s appearance); United States v.

DeCoteau, 648 F.2d 1191, 1192 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (affirming a court’s

refusal to compel the testimony of witnesses when the defendant’s request for the

testimony was untimely); United States v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir.

2004) (stating that a defendant claiming violation of the Compulsory Process Clause

must show that a witness’s testimony is material and favorable).

We think it is significant here that Sparkman did not request Furr’s appearance

until late in the pre-trial process. His counsel asked the prosecutor to arrange for

Furr’s appearance no more than seven business days before trial (although the request

should have been directed to the United States Marshals Service), and the prosecutor

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communicated that request to the Marshals Service five business days before trial. As

a result of this short notice, the Marshals Service was unable to transfer Furr from a

prison in Colorado to the courtroom in Missouri in time for him to appear during the

defense portion of the trial, as it was scheduled. Sparkman’s counsel was aware of

Furr’s imprisonment and thus could have anticipated that transporting him to trial

would require significant lead time. The court has a substantial interest in the efficient

administration of justice, and we would not lightly conclude that the court was

required to continue a trial due to a timing problem that was largely of the defendant’s

own making.

In this case, the absence of Furr’s expected testimony does not undermine our

confidence in the verdict. If Furr’s testimony is believed, Smith gave two conflicting

accounts about the events of December 12. In the version he gave to Agent Diveley

and at trial, Smith suggested that Sparkman burned the office while Smith waited in

a vehicle nearby. According to the account allegedly given to Furr, Smith said that

he personally burned the office on Sparkman’s behalf. Either account, however,

inculpates Sparkman in the charged offenses. Thus, even if Furr’s testimony could

show that Smith changed the details of his account, it would also show that Smith was

consistent regarding Sparkman’s guilt. In view of the modest benefit that Furr’s

testimony might have offered, we believe the district court correctly ruled that the

countervailing public interests in the efficient administration of justice were sufficient

reason to deny the motion for a continuance of the trial.

B.

Sparkman also appeals several of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. We

review these rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054,

1060 (8th Cir. 2007).

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Sparkman argues that the court erred by excluding as hearsay Agent Diveley’s

report of his interview with Furr concerning statements that Smith allegedly made to

Furr. The report contains statements from three speakers. Smith made his alleged

statements to Furr, who then repeated them to Diveley, who then summarized them

in his report. Diveley’s summary was relevant to Smith’s credibility only if Furr’s

account of his conversation with Smith was believed. Furr’s statements were thus

“offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c),

and the report contains hearsay upon hearsay. For such a report to be admissible, each

layer of hearsay must be admissible under the rules of evidence. See United States v.

Turner, 189 F.3d 712, 719-20 (8th Cir. 1999). Sparkman, however, has not

demonstrated that Furr’s statements would fall into any exception to the hearsay rules,

and the district court thus properly excluded Diveley’s report of the interview.

Sparkman also appeals the court’s exclusion of Diveley’s report of his interview

with Smith. Sparkman argues that such reports are admissible as business records

under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). Other circuits differ on whether police

reports may be admitted against the government under Rule 803(6), compare United

States v. Pena-Gutierrez, 222 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2000) with United States

v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 967-68 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975), but we need not resolve that

issue here. Even if the report was admissible, its exclusion was harmless. During

cross examination and redirect examination, Smith was questioned at length and in

detail regarding the inconsistencies between his testimony at trial and the statement

that he gave to Diveley. Smith acknowledged that Diveley’s summary of their

conversation differed from his testimony, and testified that Diveley had made minor

errors when summarizing it. Thus, because the relevant portions of Diveley’s report

were discussed at trial and were not disputed, the written report itself would have been

largely cumulative. We are confident that the admission of this report, even if

required by the rules of evidence, would not have influenced the verdict substantially.

See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).

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Sparkman next argues that the court erred by allowing Smith to testify that a

couple of months before December 12, 2000, Sparkman told him that he had run an

unsold truck into a pond and then reported it stolen to collect insurance on it. When

a defendant is charged with insurance fraud, prior instances of insurance fraud may

be admitted under Rule 404(b) to show the defendant’s intent to commit the charged

fraud if the prior fraud is similar to and not too remote in time from the charged fraud.

United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1332 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.

Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 908 (8th Cir. 1975). Here, both the prior offense and the

charged offense involved Sparkman’s destruction of vehicles to collect insurance and

occurred within a few months of each other. Smith’s testimony was thus admissible

under 404(b) and significantly probative, and the district court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting it.

Sparkman contends, however, that even if Smith’s “other act” testimony itself

was generally admissible, the district court erred in this case because it failed to

accompany the evidence with a proper limiting instruction to the jury. The district

court gave the following instruction:

[Y]ou are about to hear evidence that the defendant previously

committed an act similar to the ones charged in this case. You may use

this evidence to help you decide whether the similarity between the acts

previously committed and the ones charged show a common scheme,

pattern, or plan between the prior act and the present offenses.

Remember, however, that the mere fact that the defendant may have

committed a similar act in the past is not evidence that he committed

such acts in this case. The defendant is on trial for the crimes charged

and for those crimes only. You may not convict a person simply because

you believe he may have committed some acts, even bad acts, in the past.

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Sparkman claims that this instruction was flawed, and that the district court was

required to give model instruction 2.08 of the Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Jury

Instructions (2003). Sparkman argues that the district court’s instruction lacks two

essential provisions of the model instruction. First, the model instruction informs that

jury that before considering “other act” evidence, it must “unanimously find beyond

a reasonable doubt, based on the rest of the evidence introduced, that the defendant

carried out the acts involved in the crime charged in the indictment.” Eighth Circuit

Manual of Model Jury Instructions 2.08 (2003). Second, the model instruction states

that the “other act” evidence “must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence; that

is, you must find that the evidence is more likely true than not true.” Id.

At trial, Sparkman made only a cursory objection to the limiting instruction.

He did not alert the district court to the purported flaws in the instruction given or

propose an alternative instruction. Under our precedents, therefore, we review the

instruction only for plain error. See United States v. Looking Cloud, 419 F.3d 781,

788 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 516 F.2d 209, 213 (8th Cir. 1975). In

any event, we conclude that the instruction was not erroneous. The model jury

instructions are available for use by the district courts, but they are not binding.

Turner, 189 F.3d at 722. A district court may properly decide not to use them as long

as the instruction given accurately states the law, and we think the court’s limiting

instruction in this case was proper.

The model instruction does suggest that a jury be instructed to refrain from

considering “other acts” evidence unless and until it has determined beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the acts charged in the indictment.

The evident purpose of such an instruction is to ensure that the jury does not use

uncharged acts improperly as propensity evidence to conclude that the defendant

committed the charged acts. But the model instruction is not the only permissible

means to convey that message to a jury. Here, the jury was told that the “other acts”

evidence was admitted to show Sparkman’s “scheme, pattern, or plan,” and that “the

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mere fact that the defendant may have committed a similar act in the past is not

evidence that he committed such acts in this case.” (T. Tr. vol. 3, at 218). This

instruction was adequate to inform the jury of the limited permissible use of the

evidence of prior bad acts. 

Nor do we think the court was required to give a specific instruction identifying

the applicable standard of proof as a preponderance of the evidence. Before evidence

is admissible under Rule 404, there must be sufficient evidence for a jury to find by

a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the other alleged act.

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). So long as the jury

understands that it must actually find that the defendant did commit the other act

before that evidence may be given weight, we see no reason why the jury must be told

specifically to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard. United States v.

Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477,

500 (2d Cir. 1984). The preponderance standard is the lowest standard of proof

available in the law, so there is no likelihood that the defendant could be prejudiced

by the application of an unduly lenient standard of proof. The jury was informed that

it was the ultimate judge as to all factual issues, and it undoubtedly understood that

there was a dispute concerning the credibility of Smith’s testimony. We see no

reasonable likelihood that the instruction given by the court in this case led the jury

to believe that it could consider Sparkman’s prior acts without finding that Sparkman

actually committed the prior acts. Accordingly, we discern no error. 

* * *

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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