Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05063/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joromi H. Bazuaye
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 29, 1996 Decided May 21, 1996

No. 95-5063

JOROMI H. BAZUAYE,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(93cv01767)

Deep S. Sran, student counsel, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Steven

H. Goldblatt, appointed counsel, and Daniel Crawford, student counsel.

Stacy M. Ludwig, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the

brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United

States Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Secret Service agents arrested Joromi H. Bazuaye on October

16, 1991, for engaging in a scheme of credit card fraud. Soon after his arrest, Bazuaye attempted to

secure his release on bail by having $11,000 in money orders, money transfers and U.S. currency

delivered to a bail bondsman in the District ofColumbia. But before Bazuaye could complete his bail

arrangements, a U.S. postal inspector seized the funds on suspicion that they represented ill-gotten

gains from Bazuaye's criminal activities. Bazuaye stayed in jail, and a federal grand jury returned a

12-count indictment against him. In February 1992, Bazuaye struck a deal with the government and

pled guilty to a single count of possessing, with intent to defraud, 15 or more counterfeit or

unauthorized "access devices" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3). He was sentenced to 37

months' imprisonment.

After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction and sentence, United States v. Bazuaye, 991

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F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 278 (1993), Bazuaye filed this suit in the U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia. In it, he invoked the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28

U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., to allege that the postal inspector acted negligently and improperly in seizing

the bail money. Bazuaye also claimed that the postal inspector's later forfeiture procedures were

deficient under both the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the United States

Constitution. The district court dismissed Bazuaye's FTCA claim and granted summary judgment for

the government on his APA and constitutional claims. Bazuaye appeals only the FTCA decision.

The FTCA provides that the United States shall be liable for damages, to the same extent as

a private party, "for injury or loss of property ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission

of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28

U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674; Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 851-52 (1984). This broad waiver

of sovereign immunity is subject to 13 enumerated exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)- (n). One of

them, § 2680(c), exempts from the FTCA's reach:

Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or

customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs

or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). The district court read that provision to preclude Bazuaye's claim. While

acknowledging that "postal inspectors have never expressly been determined to be "law-enforcement

officer[s]' " within the meaning of § 2680(c), the district court saw "no principled reason why they

should not be given [that] status due to the role that they play in forfeiture proceedings such as this

one." We come to the opposite conclusion.

The meaning of § 2680(c)'s "any other law-enforcement officer" language presents a question

of first impression in this circuit, a question left open in Kosak, 465 U.S. at 852 n.6. As a split in the

federal courts of appeals indicates, the language invites at least two plausible interpretations. Using

a literal approach, two circuits hold that "any officer of customs or excise or any other

law-enforcement officer" means any customs officers, any excise officers, or any other

law-enforcement officers engaged in any kind of work "within their lawful duties." See Halverson

v. United States, 972 F.2d 654, 656 (5thCir. 1992); Schlaebitz v. United States Dep't of Justice, 924

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1The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied § 2680(c) outside the customs and excise contexts

without discussing the scope of "any other law-enforcement officer." See Cheney v. United

States, 972 F.2d 247, 248 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. $149,345, 747 F.2d 1278, 1283 (9th

Cir. 1984); United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1979). But

see A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 593 F.2d 849, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1978) (Tang, J.,

concurring). 

2The related canon noscitur a sociisor "it is known from its associates"suggests the same

result. See Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961), holding that, in the clause

"exploration, discovery, or prospecting," the word "discovery" meant only the discovery of

mineral resources, and not the scientific "discovery" of a patented product. 

F.2d 193, 194 (11th Cir. 1991).1

Read in light ofthe traditional canons ofstatutoryinterpretation, however, the language takes

on quite a different meaning. The principle of ejusdem generisor "of the same kind, class or

nature"suggests that a general term should be read in light of the more specific terms preceding it.

Thus, if a statute lists "fishing rods, nets, hooks, bobbers, sinkers and other equipment," see United

States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2369 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting), "other

equipment" might mean plastic worms and fishing line, but not snow shovels or baseball bats. In the

clause "any officer of customs or excise or any other law- enforcement officer," the words "any other

law-enforcement officer" might mean other officers involved in customs and excise work, but not

officers involved in unrelated duties.2 Otherwise, "any officer of customs or excise" would be

surplusage, subsumed by the more general "any other law-enforcement officer." See United States

v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35 (1992). For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit has held that the

words "any other law-enforcement officer" should be read to mean "law-enforcement officers acting

in a tax or customs capacity." Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995). The Second and Seventh Circuits have suggestedwithout

decidingthat they would reach the same conclusion. Paul v. United States, 929 F.2d 1202, 1203

(7th Cir. 1991); Formula One Motors v. United States, 777 F.2d 822, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1985).

The government urges us to read § 2680(c) in light of another canonone requiring strict

construction of waivers ofsovereign immunitybut the Supreme Court hasspecifically rejected that

canon as "unhelpful" in interpreting § 2680(c). Kosak, 465 U.S. at 854 n.9. Rather, the Court has

said that in construing § 2680(c), a court should "identify "those circumstances which are within the

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words and reason of the exception'no less and no more." Id. (quoting Dalehite v. United States,

346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953)). As we have just indicated, the "words" of § 2680(c) fall short of answering

the question before us. We will therefore move on to the "reason" for the exception § 2680(c)

creates.

The government directs us to a statement by Judge Alexander Holtzoff, who very likely

drafted the language that became § 2680(c). Holtzoff wrote that § 2680(c) would exempt from the

FTCA claims

arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty. This

exception appears in all previous drafts. It is expanded, however, so as to include

immunity from liability in respect of lossin connection with the detention of goods or

merchandise by any officer of customs or excise. The additional proviso has special

reference to the detention of imported goods in appraisers' warehouses or customs

houses, as well asseizures bylaw-enforcement officials, internalrevenue officers, and

the like.

A. Holtzoff, Report on Proposed Federal Tort Claims Bill 16 (1931). Any attempt to parse this

report suffers from the same interpretative problem plaguing § 2680(c) itself; the report, like §

2680(c), appears to concern solely customs and tax matters, with a few words about

"law-enforcement" officers tacked on to the end. There is another problem with Judge Holtzoff's

report. He wrote it 15 years before Congress adopted the FTCA. Whether any member of Congress

received a copy of the reportor relied on it in voting for the provisionis unknown. See Kosak,

465 U.S. at 856-57.

Other aspects of § 2680(c)'s origin are much more compelling. Congress carved out the

various § 2680 exceptions, at least in part, in order to preclude tort suits against the government

when other "adequate remedies were already available." Kosak, 465 U.S. at 858. Both the Senate

and the House committee reportsstate that the § 2680 exceptions covering "claims arising out of the

loss or miscarriage of postal matter; the assessment or collection of taxes or assessments; the

detention of goods by customs offices; admiralty and maritime torts; deliberate torts such as assault

and battery; and others" were meant to exempt from the FTCA "certain governmental activities"

which either "should be free from the threat of damage suits or for which adequate remedies are

already available." S. REP. NO. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 1287, 79th

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Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945).

Claims against federal officers carrying out the customs and tax laws were among those for

which adequate remedies were already available. At common law, a plaintiff could recover in a

lawsuit against a customs officer for negligently damaging goods he detained. See Kosak, 465 U.S.

at 860; States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974); Agnew v. Haymes, 141

F. 631 (4th Cir. 1905). And a plaintiff could recover in an action against a federal excise officer for

the improper seizure of his money or property. See, e.g., Elliot v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137

(1836); Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694

(1941).

Initially, these suits were considered personal actions against the individual customs officer

or tax collector involved. See Note, Developmentsin the Law: Remedies Against the United States

and its Officials, 70 HARV.L.REV. 827, 838 (1957). But in the early 19th century, a transformation

began. Congress adopted a statute in 1815 allowing any "collector, naval officer, surveyor, inspector,

or any other officer, civil or military" sued in state court for an act committed "as an officer of the

customs" to remove the case to federal court. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 267 (1879)

(describing Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, 3 Stat. 195, 198). In 1833, after one of the states attempted

to outlaw the collection of federal tariffs, id. at 267, Congress provided similar removal protection

to federal officers collecting revenue arising from import duties. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat.

632. And in 1866, Congress extended the removal protection to officers sued for acts committed

under the internal revenue laws. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98, 171 (current version at

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)); see City of Philadelphia v. The Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 728-29

(1866).

About the same time, Congress extended additional protection to federal officers engaged in

customs and tax work. Beginning in 1863, any officer sued over his customs or tax work became

entitled to indemnification, so long as a federal court certified that he had acted either with probable

cause or under the orders of his supervisors. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 76, 12 Stat. 737, 741 (current

version at 28 U.S.C. § 2006). As Justice Cardozo observed, this removal and indemnification process

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3

In 1922, Congress authorized department and agency heads to give claimants summary relief

for "damages to or loss of privately owned property ... caused by the negligence of any officer or

employee of the Government acting within the scope of his employment." Small Tort Claims Act,

31 U.S.C. § 215 (1940) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3723 (1994)); see United States v.

Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 n.6 (1951). That provision did not allow suits against the

government, however, and it was limited, at the time Congress adopted the FTCA, to claims not

exceeding $1,000. 

effectively transformed "the suit against the collector into a suit against the government." George

Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 381 (1933) (citing United States v. Sherman, 98 U.S.

565 (1878)).

This statutory framework remained in effect when Congress adopted the FTCA in 1948;

indeed, it still exists today under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (removal) and 28 U.S.C. § 2006

(indemnification). When Congress exempted from the FTCA claims "arising in respect of ... the

detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other

law-enforcement officer," 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), plaintiffs already had another way to recover from

the government for the actions of customs officers, tax officers, and other officers acting under the

customs and tax laws. Those plaintiffs did not need the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by

the FTCA. For them, "adequate remedies" were "already available."

The same could not be said for plaintiffs injured by federal law-enforcement officers acting

outside the authority of the customs and tax laws. No federal statute indemnified federal officers for

actions taken outside the customs and tax contexts. Plaintiffs injured by such actions could not

recover from the government indirectly through a fictional "personal" suit against the individual

officer, and the sovereign immunity ofthe United States barred themfromrecovering in a suit against

the government itself.3 Unlike plaintiffs injured by officers acting under the tax and customs laws,

then, plaintiffsinjured by federal officers acting in general law-enforcement capacities had no way to

recover in a suit against the government itself.

Read in light of this historical and statutory background, § 2680(c)'s "any other

law-enforcement officer" language exemptsfromthe FTCAonlythose claims arising fromthe actions

of a federal law-enforcement officer who, while not officially a customs or tax officer, is acting under

the authority of the tax or customs laws such that he would be eligible for indemnification under 28

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U.S.C. § 2006.

To resolve the case before us, then, we must ask whether the postal inspector who seized

Bazuaye's bail money would be eligible for indemnification under § 2006. The answer is no. The

statute purportedly authorizing the seizure18 U.S.C. § 981is part of the criminal code, not the

revenue or customs laws. Moreover, the bail money was seized not in an effort to enforce the tax

or customs laws, but rather in the course of an investigation into alleged criminal activity which had

little if anything to do with taxes or customs. Cf. People's United States Bank v. Goodwin, 162 F.

937 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1908) (postal inspector sued for libel as a result of action unrelated to raising

revenue could not invoke statute providing for removal of cases "against any officer appointed under

or acting by authority of any revenue law of the United States"). True, the criminal statute

purportedly authorizing the seizure directs officers acting under it to follow the procedures outlined

in the customs laws. 18 U.S.C. § 981(d). But a law-enforcement officer seizing property in the

course of a criminal investigation is not acting as a customs officer merely because he must follow

customs proceduresin carrying out duties authorized by the criminal law. Accordingly, we hold that

§ 2680(c) does not preclude Bazuaye from pursuing an FTCA claim arising out of that seizure.

* * *

Bazuaye raises another argument for the first time on appeal: A seizure is not a "detention"

and money orders, money transfers and cash are not "goods or merchandise" within the meaning of

§ 2680(c). Given our resolution of this case, there is no reason for departing from our usual practice

of refusing to consider issues not raised before the district court. See Marymount Hosp., Inc. v.

Shalala, 19 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

The government also has a new argument: under United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507 (D.C.

Cir. 1990), the district court had no jurisdiction over Bazuaye's FTCA claim. Challenges to subject

matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. See Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2

Cranch) 126 (1804). Raising the challenge is one thing; succeeding is another. Price held only that

once the government initiates administrative forfeiture proceedings, the court has no jurisdiction to

consider a defendant's motion for return of property under FederalRule ofCriminal Procedure 41(e).

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914 F.2d at 1513. Bazuaye has not made such a motion, and even if, as the government claims, Price

extends to "the issue of return of property" outside the Rule 41(e) context, it still would not apply.

Bazuaye is not seeking the "return of property." He is seeking money damages for negligence and

intentional interference with his rightsrelief available under the Federal Tort Claims Act but not in

the administrative proceedings. See Biens v. United States, 695 F.2d 591, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

Furthermore, while the FederalRules ofCriminalProcedure addressed inPrice expresslybarred their

application in civil forfeitures, 914 F.2d at 1511; FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5), the FTCA contains no

such provision. It is available even if the plaintiff could have sought administrative review instead.

Biens, 695 F.2d at 597.

That is not to say that Bazuaye's damages claim is a cognizable one under the FTCA. We do

not reach that question here. Rather we hold only that neither Price nor § 2680(c) precludes Bazuaye

from pursuing his FTCA claim, and we remand this case to the district court so that he may make the

attempt.

So Ordered.

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