Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00472/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00472-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lisa Galdos
Defendant
Hawley and Llewellyn, LLC
Defendant
Kathleen Llewellyn
Defendant
Albert Nicora
Defendant
Nicora and Minor, LLC
Defendant
Javaid Sheikh
Defendant
Danielle Sutton
Plaintiff
Gail Sutton
Plaintiff
John Sutton
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN SUTTON, GAIL SUTTON and

DANIELLE SUTTON,

Plaintiff,

 v

KATHLEEN LLEWELLYN, Individually

and DBA HAWLEY AND LLEWELLYN,

LLC; ALBERT NICORA, Individually

and DBA NICORA AND MINOR, LLC;

JAVAID SHEIKH; LISA GALDOS,

Individually and in her official

capacity as Court Executive

Officer, 

Defendants. /

No C 06-0472 VRW

ORDER

Defendants Kathleen Llewellyn and Lisa Galdos have filed

separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted under FRCP 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have moved

for entry of default judgment against defendants Albert Nicora and

Javaid Sheikh and moved for injunctive relief against Galdos. The

court has received and reviewed memoranda from the parties and

finds it appropriate for decision without oral argument. For the

reasons stated herein, Llewellyn’s and Galdos’s motions are GRANTED

and plaintiffs’ motions are DENIED. 

Case 3:06-cv-00472-VRW Document 42 Filed 08/11/06 Page 1 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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I

The instant action is one of three cases filed in this

court that arise from conservatorship proceedings opened in 2003 in

Monterey county concerning Letitia Breng Rose, Gail Sutton’s

mother. See CAND No C-04-4176 (Rose v Hogan); CAND No C-05-4469

(Sutton v Teets). Following are the undisputed facts pertinent to

these motions.

On January 23, 2004, the superior court in Monterey

County appointed Llewellyn as counsel to Rose in her

conservatorship proceeding. Doc # 1 at 4-6. Galdos served as the

Court Executive Officer for the superior court during this time. 

Id at 4. On April 30, 2004, the superior court granted Llewellyn’s

request to withdraw as counsel and appointed Nicora as her

replacement. Id at 4, 8. Subsequently, after Rose passed away,

Llewellyn placed her obituary in the newspaper, but she neither

requested nor received compensation for this service. Doc # 1 at

7; Doc # 8 at 3; Doc # 9 at 2; Doc # 12, Ex F at 2.

 Plaintiffs John, Gail and Danielle Sutton are Rose’s sonin-law, daughter and granddaughter, respectively. On January 24,

2006, they initiated this action pro se on behalf of themselves and

the estate of Rose against defendants “Kathleen Llewellyn,

individually and DBA Hawley and Llewellyn, LLC; Albert Nicora

individually and DBA Nicora and Minor, LLC; Javaid Sheikh; and Lisa

Galdos, individually and in her official capacity as Court

Executive Officer.” Doc # 1 at 1-2. Plaintiffs seek damages from

Llewellyn, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice,

deprivation of plaintiffs’ and Rose’s fundamental rights without

due process, conspiracy and fraud. Id at 5-10. They also seek the

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“disbarment of Kathleen Llewellyn.” Id. Plaintiffs assert nearly

identical claims against Nicora, with the exception of fraud and

conspiracy which they do not allege. Id at 10-15. Plaintiffs

further assert claims against Sheikh, a physician, for medical

malpractice, fraud, conspiracy and breach of “ethical” duty. Id at

15-16. Against Galdos, plaintiffs allege deprivation of their and

Rose’s constitutional rights, specifically “14th Amendment, Equal

Protection and First Amendment/Due Process.” Id at 17. Finally,

the complaint includes allegations of defendants’ defamation and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Doc # 1 at 18. 

On April 28, 2006, Llewellyn filed her motion to dismiss

all claims against her under Rule 12(b)(6). Doc # 7. On June 7,

2006, Galdos filed a similar motion with respect to the claims

against her. Doc # 15. On June 12, plaintiffs moved for entry of

default judgment against defendant Sheikh. Doc # 18. On June 14,

plaintiffs moved for entry of default judgment against defendant

Nicora. Doc # 25. Nicora filed his answer to the complaint on the

same date. Doc # 22. On July 13, plaintiffs filed a motion for

injunctive relief against Galdos. Doc # 33. On July 20, Sheikh

moved to dismiss the claims against him. Doc # 35. This order

addresses all but the last of these motions. 

II

As a preliminary matter, to the extent that plaintiffs

seek to recover on behalf of Rose or her estate, they lack standing

to sue. First, “[a] litigant appearing in propria persona has no

authority to represent anyone other than himself,” so plaintiffs,

filing pro se, cannot sue on Rose’s behalf. Russell v United

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United States District Court

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States, 308 F2d 78, 79 (9th Cir 1962). Secondly, plaintiffs admit

that they “are not executors” or personal representatives of Rose’s

estate, Doc # 10 at 5, so they cannot sue on behalf of the estate. 

Cal Prob Code § 9820; Bernard E Witkin, 4 California Procedure §

115 at 175 (4th ed 2006). Lastly, the standing issue has already

been litigated and determined against plaintiffs in New York

federal district court in related case C-05-4469 before it was

transferred to this court. Doc # 8, Ex A at 8-9. For reasons of

comity, the court defers to and applies that prior determination,

with which it, moreover, agrees. Plaintiffs have already been

afforded a full and fair opportunity to establish standing and may

not relitigate the issue here. 

The court now turns to the merits of the motions.

A

Defendant Llewellyn has moved to dismiss all claims

against her. Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs have any claims

against Llewellyn that are not brought on behalf of Rose or her

estate, all such claims are time-barred. California Code of Civil

Procedure § 340.6 provides in pertinent part:

An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or

omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in

the performance of professional services shall be

commenced within one year after the plaintiff

discovers, or through the use of reasonable

diligence should have discovered, the facts

constituting the wrongful act or omission * * *.

Cal Code Civ Proc § 340.6. Try as they might to characterize them

otherwise, all of plaintiffs’ allegations arise entirely from

Llewellyn’s performance of professional services as counsel for 

Rose. This relationship ended on April 30, 2004, when Llewellyn

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United States District Court

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withdrew as counsel, and her subsequent publication of the obituary

was not a legal service that extended the period of her

representation. Hence, plaintiffs’ suit filed on January 24, 2006,

was well beyond the one-year statute of limitations. 

Moreover, the very documents submitted to the court by

plaintiffs on this motion establish their deep involvement in

Rose’s affairs and in the conservatorship proceeding before and

during the period in which Llewellyn represented her. See Doc #

12, Ex D (letter from Kenneth Kroopf warning plaintiffs to stop

harassing Rose); id, Ex E (letter from Rose’s bookkeeper citing

plaintiffs’ persistent interference with her work); id, Ex G (email

from Llewellyn to John Sutton). See also Doc # 14, Ex A

(conservatorship proceeding minutes note appearance by Gail Sutton

on January 23, 2004). Given plaintiffs’ extensive involvement with

Rose’s affairs and those of her agents, including Llewellyn,

plaintiffs are without excuse for delaying their suit against

Llewellyn for allegedly wrongful acts beyond the statute of

limitations. 

Plaintiffs assert that their action is not time-barred

because the statute should toll due to fraud or concealment by

Llewellyn. In that regard, they attempt to invoke the exception in

§ 340.6 for “actual fraud.” But “[i]n all averments of fraud or

mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be

stated with particularity.” FRCP 9(b). “While statements of the

time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities are

sufficient, mere conclusory allegations of fraud are insufficient.” 

Moore v Kayport Package Express, Inc, 885 F2d 531, 540 (9th Cir

1989). Plaintiffs merely allege that Llewellyn “conspired with

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[others] for the sole purpose of defrauding Mrs Rose.” Doc # 1 at

10 (emphasis omitted). See also Doc # 9 at 2-3 (alleging fraud,

fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy and abuse of process

without supporting facts). Therefore, plaintiffs cannot invoke the

“actual fraud” exception to toll the statute.

Plaintiff Danielle Sutton also argues that her claims are

not time-barred because “she was a minor in 2003.” Doc # 23 at 3. 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 352(a) provides that “[i]f a

person entitled to bring an action * * * is, at the time the cause

of action accrued either under the age of majority or insane, the

time of the disability is not part of the time limited for the

commencement of the action.” Even if Danielle Sutton were able

avail herself of the tolling provision by establishing that she did

not reach the age of majority more than one year before the filing

of this action, however, her effort to pursue claims against

Llewellyn would be futile. Danielle Sutton has no cause of action

for breach of fiduciary duty or legal malpractice since she was

never represented by Llewellyn. The complaint does not allege that

Llewellyn defamed Danielle Sutton or intentionally inflicted

emotional distress on her, and the fraud allegations suffer from

lack of particularity as stated above. Hence, even if Danielle

Sutton is not time-barred from bringing suit, her claims still

would not survive a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6). 

In fact, even if John and Gail Suttons’ claims were not

time-barred, their allegations lack merit. The court has already

determined that plaintiffs have no claims for breach of fiduciary

duty and legal malpractice since Llewellyn only represented Rose,

and plaintiffs lack standing to sue on her behalf. Also, as

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discussed above, plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud and conspiracy to

commit fraud lack the requisite particularity under Rule 9 to

survive a motion to dismiss, and their opposition papers contain

nothing but more conclusory allegations of sufficiency. See Doc #

10 at 7 (denying pleading’s deficiency and asserting the existence

of a prima facie case without adducing additional facts). 

As for plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, they must allege: (1) “extreme and outrageous

conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress;” (2)

that plaintiff[s] suffered “severe or extreme” emotional distress;

and (3) causation. Christensen v Superior Court, 54 Cal 3d 868,

903 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). In order to be

“outrageous,” conduct “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds

of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. 

Further, “[i]t is not enough that the conduct be

intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the

plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the

defendant is aware.” Id at 905. “The only exception to this rule

is that recognized when the defendant is aware, but acts with

reckless disregard, of the plaintiff and the probability that his

or her conduct will cause severe emotional distress to that

plaintiff.” Id. “Where reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s

interests is the theory of recovery, the presence of the plaintiff

at the time the outrageous conduct occurs * * * justifies recovery

* * *.” Id at 906 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs do not allege that Llewellyn, or any

defendant, directed their actions to plaintiffs so as intentionally

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to cause emotional distress. Nor do plaintiffs allege that any

defendants acted with reckless disregard in their presence to cause

such distress. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to set forth a claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiffs’ claims for defamation are equally deficient. 

They allege Llewellyn defamed them in a letter to a New York

district attorney when she attempted to secure a restraining order

against plaintiffs. Doc # 1 at 18. But as Llewellyn correctly

points out, a communication “in the initiation or course of [a]

proceeding authorized by law,” such as a request for a restraining

order, is absolutely privileged under California law. Cal Civil

Code § 47. Plaintiffs also allege defamation based on Llewellyn’s

letter to Montgomery Jones, Doc # 1 Ex H, but the letter contains

only a recitation of facts known to both Llewellyn and Jones and

statements of opinion, which are not actionable. Hence, plaintiffs

have not alleged a cause of action for defamation against

Llewellyn. 

 The court has determined that amendment would be futile

to cure the deficiencies in plaintiffs’ pleadings against

Llewellyn. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendant Llewellyn’s

motion to dismiss. All claims against defendant Llewellyn are

DISMISSED without leave to amend. 

B

 Defendant Galdos moves to dismiss all claims against

her on the ground of absolute judicial immunity. “Court clerks

have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights

violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the

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judicial process.” Mullis v United States Bankruptcy Court, 828

F2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir 1987). For example, in Mullis, the

plaintiff alleged that a bankruptcy court clerk failed to give him

proper counseling and notice on how to file his petitions, accepted

and filed an incomplete petition, and refused to accept an amended

petition. Id. The court held that “[e]ven if all of these

allegations are taken as true, they all properly are characterized

as integral parts of the judicial process.” Id. “The clerk of

court and deputy clerks are the officials through whom such filing

is done. Consequently, the clerks qualify for quasi-judicial

immunity unless these acts were done in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction.” Id. 

In the case at bar, plaintiffs allege that, as the Court

Executive Officer, Galdos “runs a kangaroo probate court” and that

she “deprived Mrs Rose and the Suttons of a Jury trial, the right

to speak and be heard in court * * *, the right to court orders and

document[s] and equal protection under the law.” Doc # 1 at 17

(emphasis removed). Even if these allegations are taken as true,

Galdos’s actions with respect to plaintiffs’ filings and

appearances in court are all properly characterized as integral

parts of the judicial process. Moreover, plaintiffs do not allege

that Galdos acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Hence,

Galdos is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. 

Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendant Galdos’s motion

to dismiss. All claims against defendant Galdos are DISMISSED

without leave to amend. 

\\

\\

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United States District Court

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C

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for entry of default

judgment against defendant Nicora. But entry of default under FRCP

55(a) must precede a grant of default judgment under FRCP 55(b). 

Because plaintiffs failed to seek from the clerk entry of default

against Nicora before filing their motion, their motion was

premature when filed and is now moot in light of Nicora’s

intervening answer. FRCP 55. The motion for entry of default

judgment is DENIED. 

D

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for entry of default

judgment against defendant Sheikh. As with plaintiffs’ motion for

entry of default against defendant Nicora, they failed to seek from

the clerk entry of default against Sheikh. Hence, their motion was

premature when filed and is now moot in light of Sheikh’s

intervening motion to dismiss. FRCP 55. The motion for entry of

default judgment is DENIED. 

E

Plaintiffs move to enjoin Galdos from her allegedly

discriminatory treatment of their filings. Doc # 33 at 1. In

their moving papers, they assert, inter alia, that: they were

unable to obtain a hearing because they did not pay the fee; they

were told they had to pay a fee, but no fee should have been

required; the fee they were required to pay was higher than it

should have been; their filings were refused for "frivolous"

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reasons, such as the certificate of service; and they were forced

to have hearings when they did not want a hearing. Id at 

The court first notes that plaintiffs’ allegations of

being overcharged and having filings refused for failure to pay fees

appear to lack merit. Plaintiffs attached the fee schedule from the

Monterey county superior court (id, Ex A), which shows that no fees

are required for “[o]ppositions to petition for appointment of

conservator * * * filed by or on behalf of the proposed

conservatee.” Doc # 33, Ex A. For all other types of filings, fees

are required. Since Rose was the conservatee and plaintiffs were

not her appointed representatives, their filings would not be “by or

on behalf of” Rose and would be subject to fees. 

Even if all of plaintiffs’ allegations were true,

however, Galdos’s alleged actions with respect to plaintiffs’

filings are properly characterized as integral parts of the

judicial process, for which she enjoys quasi-judicial immunity from

both damages and injunctive relief. 42 USC § 1983, the statute

under which plaintiffs would proceed against Galdos in federal

court, specifically provides that “in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” Hence, Galdos’s immunity extends to actions for

injunctive relief. See also Acuna v Fireside Thrift Co, 2006 US

Dist LEXIS 30102 (D Ariz 2006) (“[I]f a defendant can successfully

assert judicial immunity from damages, that immunity will also bar

declaratory and injunctive relief.”)

Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief is DENIED. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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III

This summarizes the court’s orders:

1) the court GRANTS defendant Llewellyn’s motion to

dismiss without leave to amend (Doc # 7); 

2) the court GRANTS defendant Galdos’s motion to dismiss

without leave to amend (Doc # 15);

3) the court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for entry of

default judgment against Sheikh (Doc # 18). 

4) the court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for entry of

default judgment against Nicora (Doc # 25). 

5) the court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive

relief against Galdos (Doc # 33). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

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