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Parties Involved:
Lois Bean
Appellant
Shirley S. Chater
Appellee

Document Text:

Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 stout street 

Denver, co 80257 

February 26, 1996 

Elisabeth Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 95-1037, Bean v. Chater 

Filed December 7, 1995 by Judge Briscoe 

Please be advised that the hard copy version of the 

captioned decision contained an incorrect file date. 

Attached is a substitute first page with the correct file 

date of December 7, 1995. 

Attachment 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 1 
PUBLISH VnltedEa! L E D 

Te!:h Cco~rt ot Ai'Pcala •rcuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT DEc 0 71995 

________________________ PATR[!c~~F~HER •erlr 

LOIS BEAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 95-1037 

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of 

Social Security,* 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 93-F-2587) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Stephen A. Flynn, of Pikes Peak Legal Services, of Colorado 

Springs, Colorado, for the appellant. 

Richard A. Kaufman, Assistant u.s. Attorney, and Henry L. Solano, 

u.s. Attorney, of Denver, Colorado, Frank v. Smith, Acting Chief 

Counsel, Region VIII and Deana R. Ertl-Lombardi, Assistant 

Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Denver, 

Colorado, for the appellee. 

Before BRISCOE and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and 

District Judge. 

THOMPSON,*** 

* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services in social security cases were 

transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 

103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley s. Chater, 

Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. 

Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant 

in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for 

the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to 

the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of 

the underlying decision. 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 2 
Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United states courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, co 80257 

February 23, 1996 

Elisabeth Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 95-1037, Bean v. Chater 

Filed December 7, 1995 by Judge Briscoe 

Please be advised that the court has entered an order 

granting the appellee's motion to publish. Attached is a 

published version. 

Attachment 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 3 
LOIS BEAN, 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

. FILED 

nrtcd States Court of A-..,-~·~ Tenth Circuit .............. 

DEC .J51996 

PATRiCK FISHE~ Cieri\ 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 95-1037 

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of 

Social Security,* 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 93-F-2587) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Stephen A. Flynn, of Pikes Peak Legal Services, of Colorado 

Springs, Colorado, for the appellant. 

Richard A. Kaufman, Assistant u.s. Attorney, and Henry L. Solano, 

u.s. Attorney, of Denver, Colorado, Frank v. smith, Acting Chief 

Counsel, Region VIII and Deana R. Ertl-Lombardi, Assistant 

Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Denver, 

Colorado, for the appellee. 

Before BRISCOE and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and 

District Judge. 

THOMPSON,*** 

* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services in social security cases were 

transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 

103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley s. Chater, 

Commissioner of social security, is substituted for Donna E. 

Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant 

in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for 

the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to 

the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of 

the underlying decision. 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 4 
**Honorable Ralph G. Thompson, District 

District Court for the Western District of 

designation. 

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge. 

Judge, United States 

Oklahoma, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f) and lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff Lois Bean appeals from a judgment upholding 

defendant the Secretary of Health and Human Services' decision 

denying plaintiff's application for supplemental security income 

(SSI) . Plaintiff contends the Secretary was biased against poor 

persons who have not established a satisfactory work-history, that 

her findings concerning plaintiff's credibility are not supported 

by substantial evidence, and that the Secretary erred in rejecting 

the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician. We reject these 

contentions and affirm. 

Plaintiff applied for SSI on April 28, 1992, claiming she had 

been disabled since 19841 due to a back injury. Her claim was 

denied initially and on reconsideration. 

At an evidentiary hearing, the following evidence was 

presented. Plaintiff was thirty-three years' old and had a GED. 

She last worked in 1981 as a label shipper, but quit because she 

could not find a baby-sitter. She alleged disabling pain in her 

1 Although plaintiff's application claimed her disability began 

in 1984, the medical records indicate the car accident that 

allegedly caused her disability occurred on January 5, 1985. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 5 
back, arms, hands, and head that requires she lie down about four 

times a day for an hour to an hour and a half. She takes three 

Advil and three Tylenol to relieve the pain. Her pain had become 

much worse since she fell and hit her head in January 1992. 

However, her problems began in 1985 when she was in a car 

accident. Plaintiff and her witnesses testified that her daily 

activities are extremely limited and that she is in pain. A 

vocational expert (VE) testified that there are no jobs a 

hypothetical person with the limitations described by plaintiff 

could perform. However, a person with the limitations found in 

the residual functional capacity (RFC) form completed for 

plaintiff could perform plaintiff's past work as well as the 

sedentary jobs of animal shelter clerk, order clerk, and police 

aid. 

The administrative law judge (ALJ) made the following 

findings: 1) plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since she filed her application; 2) she suffers from 

chronic neck pain and complaints of low back pain, but does not 

have a listed impairment or equivalent thereto; 3) plaintiff's 

statements and the testimony of her witnesses as to the severity 

of her pain are not qredible and were exaggerated for the sole 

purpose of establishing that she is disabled for securing 

benefits; 4) plaintiff has the RFC to perform work-related 

activities involving occasionally lifting and carrying twenty 

pounds, frequently lifting and carrying ten pounds, standing and/ 

or walking two hours in an eight-hour work day, and sitting six 

hours in an eight-hour work day; 5) plaintiff's past relevant work 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 6 
as label shipper did not require the performance of activities 

precluded by the above limitations; 6) plaintiff's impairments do 

not prevent her from performing her past relevant work as label 

shipper; and 7) plaintiff was not under a disability at any time 

through the date of the decision. The Appeals Council concluded 

there was no basis for granting review. Consequently, the ALJ's 

decision stood as the final decision of the Secretary. The 

district court affirmed. 

We review the Secretary's decision to determine whether her 

factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether 

she applied correct legal standards. Andrade v. Secretary of 

Health & Human Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1047 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept 

Richardson v. Perales, 

omitted) . 

as adequate 

402 u.s. 

to 

389, 

support a 

401 (1971) 

conclusion." 

(quotation 

Plaintiff first contends the ALJ was biased against poor 

persons who have not established a satisfactory work history. She 

bases this contention on the ALJ's conunents that plaintiff "has a 

very poor work record," her "work history is not a factor in her 

favor," and "she indicated her daughter had turned eighteen, and 

the Welfare people advised her to file for supplemental security 

income benefits." Appellant's App. at 29. 

The ALJ made these comments in assessing the credibility of 

plaintiff's subjective complaints of disabling pain. "Credibility 

determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, 

and we will not upset such determinations when supported by 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 7 
substantial evidence." Kepler v. Chater, 68 F. 3d 387, 391 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). 

Social Security Ruling 88-13 (West's Soc. Sec. Rptg. Serv. 

Rulings 1983-91 (1992), at 655) requires ALJs to "investigate all 

avenues presented that relate to subjective complaints" of 

disabling pain, and lists a number of factors that should be 

considered. One factor is the claimant's prior work record. Id. 

Thus, the ALJ did not err in considering that plaintiff quit 

working several years before the alleged onset of her disability. 

Nor did he place undue emphasis on this factor, but considered it 

as one of several factors bearing on plaintiff's credibility. He 

considered that although plaintiff claimed her disability began in 

1985 after an accident, hospital records show she responded to 

therapy at that time and did not seek treatment for complaints of 

neck and/or back pain in 1986 and 1987, and that although she 

claimed she exacerbated her back and neck pain in a fall in 

January 1992, she did not seek medical treatment for the resulting 

injuries until April 1992. He also considered her use of 

medications and daily activities. We conclude the ALJ properly 

considered plaintiff's work history and did not exhibit bias 

against her. 

Plaintiff also claims the ALJ improperly evaluated her 

credibility by relying on inconsistencies in her report of daily 

activities that did not, in fact, exist. The ALJ noted plaintiff 

testified that she needed to lie down frequently throughout the 

day for extended periods. However, she had not made such claims 

early in the application process. Further, early in the process 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 8 
she described her daily activities as including cooking, dusting, 

doing laundry, grocery shopping, driving, and watching television. 

However, as her claim progressed, she alleged significant 

restrictions until, by the time of the hearing, she required 

assistance with bathing and all housework chores and was no longer 

able to go grocery shopping or engage in any social activities. 

We have compared plaintiff's testimony to the July 1, 1992, report 

of contact, and conclude the record supports the ALJ's 

observation. 

The next contention is that the ALJ improperly found 

plaintiff had not complained of back pain before a 1988 

examination for social services. Plaintiff points to a 

November 23, 1987, report from her treating 

Higgins, indicating she was given medication for 

day. 

physician, 

back pain 

Dr. 

that 

We agree the ALJ erred when he observed that plaintiff was 

not treated for complaints of back pain in 1987. However, the 

ALJ's observation was to illustrate that, although plaintiff 

claimed disability since 1985, she was not treated for it until 

several years later. Whether that treatment first occurred in 

November 1987 or two months later on January 22, 1988, would not 

alter the ALJ's essential point: that plaintiff's medical records 

are not consistent with her claim that she became disabled in 

1985. We see no reversible error. 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ's assumption that she manufactured 

her disability claim in 1992 because her welfare benefits were 

about to run out is contradicted by her medical records showing 

6 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 9 
she started complaining of disabling pain as early as 1987. The 

ALJ did not find that plaintiff had experienced no pain before 

1992, but rather that her claims of disabling pain were 

exaggerated to obtain benefits. The fact that the first record of 

plaintiff complaining of disabling back pain coincided with an 

examination for social services for the purpose of obtaining 

benefits supports the ALJ's assumption that plaintiff exaggerated 

her symptoms to obtain benefits. We conclude plaintiff has not 

presented any grounds for overturning the ALJ's credibility 

determination. 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in rejecting the Decembe·r 1, 

1992, opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Higgins, that she 

suffers severe limitations in her ability to stand, walk, stoop, 

bend, lift, carry, and climb stairs. An ALJ is required to give 

controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion about the 

nature and severity of a claimant's impairments, including 

.symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, and any physical or mental 

restrictions, if "it is well supported by clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and if it is not inconsistent with other 

substantial evidence in the record." Castellano v. Secretary of 

Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

The ALJ's only comment about Dr. Higgins' opinion was that it 

was generic and did not accurately assess plaintiff's true 

functional capabilities. We agree. "Severe limitations" does not 

indicate exactly what plaintiff can do in relation to the physical 

exertional requirements of sedentary, light, moderate, or heavy 

work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.967. Even Dr. Higgins recognized as 

7 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 10 
much, recommending 

evaluation to more 

that plaintiff obtain a functional capacity 

objectively delineate her restrictions. 

Consequently, we find no error in the ALJ's treatment of 

Dr. Higgins' opinion. 

Plaintiff also claims the ALJ's finding that she has no 

memory or concentration deficit is not supported by substantial 

evidence. Plaintiff testified that she did not think she had 

trouble concentrating, and only sometimes had trouble remembering 

things. Appellant's App. at 59. Dr. Higgins stated that 

plaintiff had memory disturbances, but did not describe the 

severity. We conclude the ALJ's finding that this evidence was 

not strong enough to suggest plaintiff had disabling memory or 

concentration problems is supported by substantial evidence. 

Finally, plaintiff argues the VE's testimony that she could 

perform her past relevant work or other sedentary work cannot be 

relied upon because the hypothetical question to the VE did not 

relate with precision all of her impairments. The hypothetical 

question should include all--and only--those impairments borne out 

by the evidentiary record. Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 

(lOth Cir. 1995). The VE relied on the limitations found by the 

ALJ, which are reflected in the RFC ~ssessment form. The ALJ was 

not required to accept the answer to a hypothetical question that 

included limitations claimed by plaintiff but not accepted by the 

ALJ as supported by the record. See id. We conclude the ALJ did 

not err in relying on the VE's testimony. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

8 

Appellate Case: 95-1037 Document: 01019280402 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 11