Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02481/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02481-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Lizarraga
Respondent
Jose Luis Valdovinos
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS VALDOVINOS, No. 2:14-CV-2481-MCE-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

J. LIZARRAGA,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s

unopposed motion to dismiss (Doc. 31). In the motion, respondent argues that the instant

petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), the exhaustion of available state remedies is required

before claims can be granted by the federal court in a habeas corpus case. See Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509 (1982); see also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); Hunt v.

Pliler, 336 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2003). Claims may be denied on the merits notwithstanding lack of

exhaustion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). “A petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement

in two ways: (1) by providing the highest state court with an opportunity to rule on the merits of

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the claim . . .; or (2) by showing that at the time the petitioner filed the habeas petition in federal

court no state remedies are available to the petitioner and the petitioner has not deliberately

by-passed the state remedies.” Batchelor v. Cupp , 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations

omitted). The exhaustion doctrine is based on a policy of federal and state comity, designed to

give state courts the initial opportunity to correct alleged constitutional deprivations. See Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); see also Rose, 455 U.S. at 518. 

Regardless of whether the claim was raised on direct appeal or in a postconviction proceeding, the exhaustion doctrine requires that each claim be fairly presented to the

state’s highest court. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). Although the exhaustion

doctrine requires only the presentation of each federal claim to the highest state court, the claims

must be presented in a posture that is acceptable under state procedural rules. See Sweet v.

Cupp, 640 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, an appeal or petition for post-conviction relief that is

denied by the state courts on procedural grounds, where other state remedies are still available,

does not exhaust the petitioner’s state remedies. See Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 488

(1979); Sweet, 640 F.2d at 237-89.1

In addition to presenting the claim to the state court in a procedurally acceptable

manner, exhaustion requires that the petitioner make the federal basis of the claim explicit to the

state court by including reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); see also Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 998 (9th

Cir. 2000). It is not sufficient for the petitioner to argue that the federal nature of the claim is

self-evident. See Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 247 F.3d

904 (9th Cir. 2001). Nor is exhaustion satisfied if the state court can only discover the issue by

reading a lower court opinion in the case. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

1 This situation of procedural deficiency is distinguishable from a case presented to

the state court using proper procedures but where relief on the merits is precluded for some

procedural reason, such as untimeliness or failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. The former

represents an exhaustion problem; the latter represents a procedural default problem. 

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When faced with petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claim

(mixed petitions), the Ninth Circuit held in Ford v. Hubbard that the district court is required to

give two specific warnings to pro se petitioners: (1) the court could only consider a stay-andabeyance motion if the petitioner chose to proceed with his exhausted claims and dismiss the

unexhausted claims; and (2) federal claims could be time-barred upon return to federal court if he

opted to dismiss the entire petition to exhaust unexhausted claims. See 330 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th

Cir. 2003). However, the Supreme Court held in Pliler v. Ford that the district court is not

required to give these particular warnings. See 542 U.S. 225, 234 (2004).2 Furthermore, the

district court is not required to sua sponte consider stay and abeyance in the absence of a request

from the petitioner, see Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007), or to inform the

petitioner that stay and abeyance may be available, see Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066,

1070-71 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, in the absence of a stay-and-abeyance motion, the district

court should dismiss mixed petitions and need not provide any specific warnings before doing so. 

See Robbins, 481 F.3d at 1147 (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 510 (holding that the petitioner has the

“choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the

habeas petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court”)).

In this case, of the three claims raised in the instant federal petition, only one has

been presented to the California Supreme Court, by way of a state habeas petition filed on

February 13, 2014, and denied on April 23, 2014.3

 Petitioner’s remaining two federal claims are,

therefore, unexhausted. Petitioner has not requested a stay-and-abeyance order or otherwise

2 The Supreme Court did not address the propriety of Ninth Circuit’s three-step

stay-and-abeyance procedure which involves dismissal of unexhausted claims from the original

petition, stay of the remaining claims pending exhaustion, and amendment of the original petition

to add newly exhausted claims that then relate back to the original petition. See Pliler, 542 U.S.

at 230-31 (citing Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986-88 (9th Cir.

1998)). 

3 The court may take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of

matters of public record. See U.S. v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 530 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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opposed respondent’s motion, which should be granted. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that respondent’s

unopposed motion to dismiss (Doc. 31) be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 17, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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