Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-03258/USCOURTS-ca10-19-03258-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jack R. LaPointe
Appellant
John Oliver
Appellee
Derek Schmidt
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

JACK R. LaPOINTE, 

Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN OLIVER, Warden, USP FlorenceHigh; DEREK SCHMIDT, Attorney 

General of the State of Kansas, 

Respondents - Appellees. 

No. 19-3258 

(D.C. No. 5:14-CV-03161-JWB) 

(D. Kansas) 

ORDER DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

Before BRISCOE, KELLY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

 Petitioner Jack R. LaPointe, a prisoner in Kansas state custody, seeks a Certificate 

of Appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A jury convicted Mr. LaPointe of aggravated 

battery and aggravated assault for robbing a shoe store. His § 2254 petition alleges that he 

received ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We 

decline to grant a COA and dismiss this matter. 

 *This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 10th Circuit Rule 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 18, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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BACKGROUND1

A. Factual History 

Mr. LaPointe did not provide a transcript of the proceedings in the trial court. We 

therefore rely on the opinion of the Kansas Court of Appeals for its summary of the 

evidence presented at Mr. LaPointe’s trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (state court’s 

factual findings are “presumed to be correct”); App. at 59 (“Here, Petitioner does not 

challenge the state court’s findings.”). The Kansas Court of Appeals described the facts 

as follows: 

The Robbery 

Around 8 p.m. on October 30, 2000, Carrie Wellman was checking 

out customers at the Payless store when a man walked in with a gun and 

proceeded to rob the store. Monica Ortiz was shopping in the Payless store 

with her three children and was completing her purchase when the robber 

walked in the store. The robber pointed the gun in Ortiz’ face and instructed 

her not to look at him. The robber also pushed Ortiz’ 5–year–old daughter 

to the ground when she tried to run to her mother. After Wellman gave the 

robber approximately $1,000 in a plastic shopping bag, he ran from the 

store. Wellman then called the police. 

Carrie Delaney and Brandy Loveall had been shopping at a store in 

the strip mall and were driving out of the parking lot when Loveall spotted 

a man carrying a gun and walking fast on the sidewalk. Loveall made eye 

contact with the man before he passed her and ran between two buildings. 

According to Loveall, Delaney was driving the car when Loveall saw the 

man. 

 1

 Mr. LaPointe’s appendix does not include his § 2254 petition, respondent’s 

answer, or transcripts from his jury trial. Per 10th Cir. R. 10.4(D)(2), “[w]hen the appeal 

is from an order disposing of a motion or other pleading, the motion . . . and other 

supporting documents . . . , filed in connection with that motion or pleading, and any 

responses and replies . . . must be included in the record or appendix.” We exercise our 

discretion to retrieve the § 2254 petition and respondent’s answer from the district court’s 

docket, though we are under no obligation to do so. See 10th Cir. R. 10.4(B). 

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When the police arrived at the scene, several officers went to a 

nearby apartment complex after learning that the robbery suspect had been 

seen there. Upon arriving at the apartment complex, Officer Eric Thompson 

saw a woman in the parking lot holding cash in her hand. The woman told 

Thompson that a Caucasian man had just run through the breezeway and 

had dropped the money on his way up the stairs. Thompson took the 

money, which was $138, from the woman and asked her to remain there. 

Thompson ran through the breezeway to look for the robber but was unable 

to find him. When Thompson returned to his patrol car, the woman was no 

longer there. 

During their search of the apartment complex area, officers found a 

plaid shirt and hat in a breezeway and a pair of cloth gloves in the front of 

one of the buildings. In addition, a police dog that had been brought to the 

apartment complex to track the suspect’s scent pulled a blue and white 

bandana from underneath a car parked at the complex. 

Eyewitnesses’ Description of Suspect 

Detective Karen Borstelman interviewed Loveall on November 1, 

2000, and completed a composite sketch of the man she saw carrying a gun 

on the evening of October 30, 2000. Loveall described the man as 

Caucasian and standing approximately 6 feet tall, wearing a blue and white 

bandana on his head, with blond hair sticking out from underneath the 

bandana. The man was wearing a blue and white flannel shirt and was 

carrying a double-barreled sawed-off shotgun. Loveall further described the 

man as being in his early 30’s and having a slender build. By the time of 

trial, Loveall had forgotten some of the details she had given Borstelman 

and described the man she saw as Caucasian and wearing a bandana on his 

head, wearing a coat, and carrying a gun. Moreover, Loveall could not 

recall whether the headlights of Delaney’s car were illuminating the 

shadowy area in which the man was walking. Nevertheless, at trial, Loveall 

identified LaPointe as the man she had seen on the evening of October 30, 

2000. 

The other witnesses’ descriptions of the robber differed somewhat 

from Loveall’s description. According to Wellman, the man was Caucasian, 

was in his mid- to late–20’s, stood about 6 feet tall, wore a plaid jacket and 

a bandana over part of his face, and had blond spikey hair with dark roots. 

Ortiz described the robber as a Caucasian man who was in his mid–20’s 

and of slender build. Ortiz testified that the robber was wearing a cap and 

had put a handkerchief over his face when he came into the store. Ortiz’ 

11–year–old daughter, Monserrat Santos, described the robber as a 

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Caucasian man with blue eyes and a muscular build. According to Santos, 

the robber had blond spikey hair, stood about 6 feet tall, had placed a 

bandana over his nose and mouth shortly after he had entered the store, and 

had not been wearing a hat. 

Delaney was also interviewed by a detective and gave a description 

of the man, but she was unable to make a composite sketch. Delaney 

described the man as Caucasian and standing 5’10” tall, having a skinny 

build, wearing nothing on his head, wearing a blue flannel-type shirt, and 

carrying a white plastic trash bag. Delaney did not see the man carrying a 

weapon. According to Delaney, she was shown a photo lineup but was 

unable to make a positive identification. Delaney testified that she had 

suffered a stroke, which had affected her short-term memory, during the 

first part of October 2000. 

During the investigation of the robbery, one of the officers had 

commented that an individual named Joseph Seeber seemed to match the 

suspect’s description and lived in the apartment complex just north of the 

Payless store. A photo lineup was then put together with Seeber’s picture. 

Wellman’s Eyewitness Identification 

On November 9, 2000, Detective Scott Atwell showed Wellman the 

photo lineup. In looking at the photographs, Wellman used her hand to 

cover up the lower half of each of the faces. After approximately 5 minutes, 

Wellman identified the suspect in photograph number 1 as the robber. 

Nevertheless, according to Atwell, Wellman indicated that the person 

depicted in photograph 1 had a fatter face and longer hair than the robber. 

At trial, Wellman acknowledged that she was unsure of her pick in the 

photo lineup. Moreover, Wellman testified that she would not recognize the 

man who robbed her if she saw him again. The person in photograph 1 was 

Seeber, the target suspect in that photographic lineup. 

Loveall’s Failure to Identify Suspect in First Lineup 

On November 15, 2000, Atwell showed the same photo lineup to 

Loveall. Nevertheless, Loveall immediately stated that all the individuals in 

the photos were “way too young.” 

Atwell’s Testimony Concerning Eyewitness Identifications 

Despite Wellman’s identification of Seeber in the photo lineup, the 

police did not attempt to contact Seeber to question him about the robbery. 

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When questioned at trial about why he had not investigated Seeber further, 

Atwell testified that he had “absolutely no confidence in the way” Wellman 

picked out photograph 1. Moreover, Atwell explained that he had received 

a laboratory report stating that Seeber’s fingerprints were not those on the 

latent fingerprint cards collected at the Payless store. Atwell acknowledged, 

however, that the latent prints did not match LaPointe’s fingerprints either. 

Atwell further testified that he had confidence in Loveall’s identification 

“because she had observed the suspect under no stress whatsoever” and had 

seen the suspect bare-faced. 

Norton’s Interviews With FBI Agents 

During November 2000, Michael Norton was taken into FBI custody 

on suspicion of bank robbery. During his interview, Norton told FBI agents 

that he had been told by LaPointe that LaPointe had robbed the Payless 

store in Roeland Park. Norton stated that he believed that LaPointe had 

used a shotgun during the robbery and had thrown the shotgun on the roof 

of a nearby building after the robbery. 

After Norton pled guilty to federal bank robbery charges, FBI agents 

interviewed Norton on January 4, 2001, regarding the Payless robbery. 

During that interview, Norton admitted that he had been involved with 

LaPointe in the Payless robbery. Norton stated that he had driven LaPointe 

to the Payless store and had parked at a nearby apartment complex while 

LaPointe went to commit the robbery using a shotgun. Norton told the FBI 

agents that when LaPointe had returned to the car, LaPointe said that he had 

thrown the shotgun onto the roof of the Fashion Bug, which was a store in 

the same strip mall as the Payless store. 

Recovery of Sawed-off Shotgun 

Based on this information, FBI Agent Jeffrey Harris contacted 

Atwell and then met him in the parking lot of the Fashion Bug. With the 

fire department’s help, a 12–gauge sawed-off shotgun was recovered from 

the roof of the Fashion Bug. 

Loveall’s Identification of LaPointe in Second Photo Lineup 

On January 22, 2001, Atwell showed Loveall a second photo lineup 

with LaPointe’s picture in it. According to Atwell, as soon as the photo 

lineup hit Loveall’s hand, she pointed to photo 4 and said “that’s the guy.” 

LaPointe was the individual in photograph 4. The ages of the other 

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individuals depicted in the photo lineup were 21, 21, 20, 19, and 25, while 

LaPointe was 31. This second photo lineup was never shown to Wellman. 

LaPointe’s Trial 

LaPointe went to trial on charges of one count of aggravated robbery 

and one count of aggravated assault. The State’s main evidence against 

LaPointe at trial was Loveall’s identification of LaPointe and Norton’s 

statements and testimony that LaPointe had committed the robbery. 

Although Norton implicated himself in the Payless robbery during his 

testimony at trial, he had been given immunity in exchange for his 

testimony against LaPointe. Norton had not received any reduction in his 

federal sentence for his cooperation in LaPointe’s criminal case. 

Norton’s Testimony 

During his testimony at trial, Norton stated that he and LaPointe had 

known each other since 1998. Moreover, both Norton and LaPointe had 

worked for Norton's father during 2000. 

According to Norton, on October 30, 2000, he and LaPointe had 

planned to do a robbery in a low-key area that had a quick get-away to the 

highway. Norton testified that he was supposed to get 3/4 of the money that 

LaPointe got from the robbery because LaPointe owed him money. Once 

LaPointe decided to rob the Payless store, Norton pulled into the parking 

lot behind the Fashion Bug to wait for LaPointe. 

Norton testified that he brought a sawed-off shotgun that he had 

obtained from LaPointe. Norton further testified that when LaPointe got out 

of the car, he took the shotgun and placed it up the sleeve of his sweater. 

According to Norton, LaPointe was wearing jeans, a pull-over sweater, a 

ball cap, and a bandana when he got out of the car. 

Norton testified that LaPointe came running to the car approximately 

15 to 20 minutes later without the gun. LaPointe told Norton that there was 

a Hispanic woman in the store that was trying to leave, but he had forced 

her back and told her that no one was leaving. According to Norton, he 

heard a thump before he saw LaPointe and assumed that LaPointe had 

probably thrown the gun in a dumpster or on the roof of a building. When 

LaPointe returned to the car, he told Norton that he had thrown the gun on 

the roof of the building. 

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According to Norton, he dropped LaPointe off at the home of 

LaPointe’s girlfriend, Deanna Burch, about 45 minutes after the robbery. 

Norton testified that Burch’s car was parked outside when he dropped off 

LaPointe. Nevertheless, Burch testified that she was working at an event at 

Wal–Mart on October 30, 2000, and did not get home until around 9:30 that 

night. According to Burch, LaPointe did not have a key to her home, and he 

was not there when she got home that evening. Norton testified that he later 

disposed of LaPointe’s bandana and gloves in a dumpster at his apartment 

complex. Norton testified that he has been bald on top of his head since he 

was 20, and his hair is brown but turns semi-blond with a lot of sunlight. 

During his testimony at trial, Norton admitted that he had 10 prior 

convictions for dishonesty or false statement. His criminal history included 

several convictions for armed robbery and auto theft, which dated back to 

when he was a juvenile. 

Seeber’s Testimony 

The State called Seeber as a witness at trial. Seeber testified that he 

was not the individual who had robbed the Payless store with a sawed-off 

shotgun. Seeber further testified that he did not have a car and did not know 

Norton or LaPointe. At the time of trial, Seeber was 22 years old, 5’9”, and 

170 pounds. 

Loretta LaPointe’s Testimony 

Loretta LaPointe, who married Jack LaPointe on March 15, 2001, 

testified that she had seen LaPointe pull a sawed-off shotgun out of the 

trunk of her car around the beginning of October 2000. Loretta immediately 

told LaPointe that the gun was not staying there, and she never saw it again. 

LaPointe told Loretta that he had gotten the shotgun from one of their 

friends to compensate Norton for a pistol that Loretta had thrown in the 

river after she had found it in her car. 

Forensic Evidence 

Lila Thompson, a latent print examiner, testified that she was unable 

to develop any latent prints on the gun that was found on the roof of the 

Fashion Bug store. Thompson was able to find latent fingerprints on the 

latent print cards recovered from the Payless store. Thompson compared 

these latent fingerprints against Seeber’s fingerprints, but they did not 

match. Another latent fingerprint examiner compared the fingerprints on 

three of the latent print cards with the fingerprints of LaPointe and Norton, 

but they did not match. He also tested the money recovered from the 

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woman at the apartment complex for fingerprints, but no prints of sufficient 

value for comparison purposes were obtained. 

Sally Lane, a forensic chemist at the Johnson County crime lab, 

examined the shirt, cap, gloves, and bandana recovered from the apartment 

complex for DNA evidence. Lane found two hairs on the bandana and 

additional hairs on the shirt, cap, and gloves. Lane sent the hairs to the 

Kansas City, Missouri, police crime lab. Lane attempted to obtain 

additional DNA evidence from the items submitted to her, but she was 

unable to obtain a sufficient DNA sample. 

Robert Booth, the chief criminalist at the Kansas City, Missouri, 

police crime lab, examined four head hairs and microscopically compared 

them against LaPointe’s hair. Booth compared the hairs with 34 of 

LaPointe’s hairs, which were taken from the top, sides, and front of his 

head. Booth testified that none of the four head hairs matched LaPointe. 

According to Booth, his comparison testing did not definitively establish 

that the head hairs did not come from LaPointe because he had only a 

representative sample of LaPointe’s hair or because LaPointe could have 

changed his hair since the hairs were deposited. Nevertheless, Booth 

testified that those two explanations were “rather remote in occurrence” and 

that the explanation that the hairs were not LaPointe’s was “the most likely 

outcome.” Booth did not compare the hairs to any from Seeber or Norton. 

Alibi Evidence 

LaPointe’s alibi presented at trial was that he had been at the home 

of Loretta LaPointe, his girlfriend and later his wife, on the evening of 

October 30, 2000. According to LaPointe, he had broken up with Burch by 

that time and was living with Loretta. Loretta testified that on October 30, 

2000, she received a call from work at 7:35 p.m. that she needed to report 

for the night shift that evening. According to Loretta, she left her home 

around 9:45 p.m. to work the 10:30 p.m. shift. Loretta testified that she 

remembered LaPointe being home that evening and eating Halloween 

candy with her daughter. Loretta further testified that LaPointe was at home 

from the time she received the call at 7:35 p.m. until she left for work and 

that he also babysat her children while she was at work. 

The State presented rebuttal evidence from Detective Atwell that 

when he went to Loretta’s home on December 18, 2003, she never told him 

that LaPointe was at home on October 30, 2000. According to Atwell, he 

served Loretta with a subpoena on March 18, 2004, and asked her then 

where LaPointe was on the day of the robbery. At that time, Loretta told 

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Atwell that LaPointe had been at home on October 30, 2000, eating 

Halloween candy with her daughter while she was preparing for work. 

LaPointe’s Testimony 

LaPointe testified that he did not see Norton on October 30, 2000, 

and he did not go to the Payless store. LaPointe further testified that he did 

not commit the armed robbery and aggravated assault. According to 

LaPointe, he weighed approximately 240 pounds in October 2000 and was 

6 feet tall. During Loretta’s testimony, a picture was admitted that was 

taken of LaPointe around October 28, 2000, which showed him having 

short dark brown hair. 

LaPointe v. State, 214 P.3d 684, 688–92 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009). 

B. Procedural History 

A jury convicted Mr. LaPointe of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. A 

judge then sentenced Mr. LaPointe to a 245-month term of imprisonment, to run 

consecutively to his sentences in three other cases. 

The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. LaPointe, No. 93,709, 2006 WL 

2936496 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2006). The Kansas Supreme Court denied review on 

February 14, 2007. 

Mr. LaPointe then filed a motion in state trial court for post-conviction relief under 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507. In that motion, Mr. LaPointe asserted seven reasons his trial 

counsel was ineffective: 

(1) failing to request independent DNA testing of hairs found on a bandana 

and biological material on clothing allegedly worn by the robber; (2) failing 

to object when Detective Atwell improperly bolstered the identification of 

LaPointe by Loveall; (3) failing to object when Atwell testified he had no 

confidence in Wellman’s eyewitness identification of Seeber as the 

perpetrator of the robbery; (4) placing an incorrect address on the notice of 

alibi, which allowed the State to impeach LaPointe’s alibi; (5) failing to 

object to improper comments by the prosecutor in closing argument; (6) 

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failing to thoroughly investigate the case and interview witnesses; and (7) 

failing to effectively cross-examine and impeach the State’s witnesses. 

LaPointe, 214 P.3d at 692. Mr. LaPointe also requested “production of the five head hairs 

and the clothing recovered by officers” for DNA testing. Id. at 692–93. On November 7, 

2007, the state trial court denied that motion. LaPointe v. State, No. 07 CV 5853, 2007 

WL 7758195 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Nov. 7, 2007). 

The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for 

an evidentiary hearing on three of Mr. LaPointe’s ineffective assistance theories. 

LaPointe, 214 P.3d at 688. First, that defense counsel failed to object to Detective 

Atwell’s testimony as to the credibility of the eyewitnesses. Id. at 696. Second, that 

defense counsel included an incorrect address in the notice of alibi. Id. at 698. And third, 

that defense counsel failed to request independent DNA testing. Id. at 699. The Kansas 

Supreme Court denied review of the State’s petition and Mr. LaPointe’s cross-petition on 

September 9, 2010. 

On remand, the state trial court held an evidentiary hearing and again denied Mr. 

LaPointe’s motion. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed. LaPointe v. State, No. 

106,492, 2012 WL 4372995 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2012). The court first held it was 

not ineffective for Mr. LaPointe’s lawyer not to object to Detective Atwell’s testimony, 

because “the testimony was elicited to explain the course of the investigation and to 

address the defense contention that Atwell conducted a shoddy investigation.” Id. at *7. 

Next, the court held Mr. LaPointe was not prejudiced by the error in the notice of alibi, 

because the jury was adequately apprised of the situation when defense counsel “admitted 

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the error.” Id. at *10. Finally, the court held it was not ineffective for Mr. LaPointe’s 

lawyer not to request independent DNA testing, because the decision “was part of his 

trial strategy.” Id. at 11. The court further rejected Mr. LaPointe’s assertion that his 

attorney had a conflict of interest solely because the attorney believed Mr. LaPointe was 

guilty. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court denied review on October 1, 2013. 

On February 27, 2014, Mr. LaPointe filed a petition for DNA testing of the hairs 

found at the crime scene under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-2512. The state trial court ordered 

DNA testing that ultimately “confirmed one hair did not belong to [Mr.] LaPointe, while 

the other was inconclusive but probably not his.” State v. LaPointe, 434 P.3d 850, 853 

(Kan. 2019). 

On September 2, 2014, Mr. LaPointe filed a § 2254 petition in the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, naming Warden John Oliver and Kansas 

Attorney General Derek Schmidt as respondents.2

 The § 2254 petition raised three 

theories of ineffective assistance: (1) defense counsel should have requested independent 

DNA testing of the hairs recovered near the crime scene; (2) defense counsel listed an 

incorrect address in the notice of alibi; and (3) defense counsel failed to object when 

Detective Atwell vouched for the credibility of eyewitnesses. 

 2

 Respondents pointed out in their answer that Mr. LaPointe may no longer be 

housed at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado, and that he is therefore no 

longer supervised by Warden John Oliver. Rather than amend the caption in this order, 

we use the term “respondents” to refer to Mr. LaPointe’s current warden and to Kansas 

Attorney General Derek Schmidt. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) (explaining that “any 

misnomer that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties may be disregarded”). 

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On April 1, 2015, despite the DNA test results, the state trial court denied Mr. 

LaPointe’s request for a new trial. 

On June 30, 2015, the district court issued an order to show cause why 

Mr. LaPointe’s § 2254 petition should not be dismissed as a mixed petition. Mr. LaPointe 

responded by requesting a stay. 

On July 30, 2015, the district court stayed Mr. LaPointe’s § 2254 petition “to 

allow [Mr. LaPointe] to complete exhaustion in the Kansas appellate courts of his claim 

based upon exculpatory post-conviction DNA results.” App. at 7. 

Mr. LaPointe appealed the state trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial. 

The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed because “it is clear that [Mr.] LaPointe was not 

convicted based on physical evidence.” State v. LaPointe, No. 113,580, 2016 WL 

6910200, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2016). Consequently, the court found he could 

not show “there was a reasonable probability a jury would have reached a different 

outcome had it considered the [DNA] test results.” Id. at *5. 

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. LaPointe, 434 P.3d at 858–59. The court 

cited Robert Booth’s testimony “that the fact the hair did not belong to [Mr.] LaPointe 

did not mean he did not wear the clothing.” Id. at 859. Moreover, the “jury heard 

testimony explaining why hair not belonging to [Mr.] LaPointe could be on the clothing 

and why his DNA might not be found there.” Id. And, apart from the forensic evidence, 

“key details to Norton’s testimony were corroborated by the recovered gun from the 

Fashion Bug roof based on his tip; testimony from [Mr.] LaPointe’s wife and 

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[Mr.] LaPointe confirming details about the sawed-off shotgun and the debt-repayment 

arrangement; and the eyewitness identification.” Id.

On March 22, 2019, the district court lifted its stay of Mr. LaPointe’s § 2254 

petition and ordered respondents to submit an answer. Respondents filed their answer on 

August 1, 2019. 

On September 16, 2019, Mr. LaPointe filed a traverse3

 to respondent’s answer. 

Respondents moved to strike Mr. LaPointe’s traverse for raising additional issues and 

arguments not included in the § 2254 petition. 

On October 31, 2019, the district court granted in part and denied in part 

respondent’s motion to strike Mr. LaPointe’s traverse and denied Mr. LaPointe’s § 2254 

petition. The district court struck only the portion of Mr. LaPointe’s traverse raising a 

“new claim of cumulative error.” App. at 67. 

Turning to the merits of Mr. LaPointe’s § 2254 petition, the district court first 

determined that Mr. LaPointe had not shown defense counsel was ineffective due to a 

conflict of interest. Even though defense counsel believed Mr. LaPointe was guilty, 

“[t]here is no evidence . . . that trial counsel had an interest in the outcome of the trial that 

was in conflict with [Mr. LaPointe’s] interest.” App. at 72. Moreover, defense counsel 

“zealously defended” Mr. LaPointe at trial. App. at 73. 

The district court then found that defense counsel’s decision not to request 

independent DNA testing did not constitute ineffective assistance. Defense counsel made 

 3

 A traverse is a “formal denial of a factual allegation made in the opposing party's 

pleading.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 

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a strategic decision not to request additional testing because he was “concerned that the 

testing could harm, rather than help,” Mr. LaPointe’s defense. App. at 73. 

The district court next addressed Mr. LaPointe’s notice of alibi claim, which it 

summarized as follows: 

The record shows that trial counsel was required to file a pre-trial 

notice of alibi in order to rely on the defense at trial. [Defense counsel] filed 

a notice of alibi that stated that Petitioner was at an address in Tonganoxie, 

Kansas, at the time of the crime. The problem with the notice of alibi was 

that Loretta [LaPointe] (and Petitioner) had never resided at that address in 

Tonganoxie. They were living together at the time of the crime at an 

address in Kansas City, Kansas. Loretta testified that she had lived at the 

Kansas City address for eight years. [Defense counsel’s] secretary had 

obtained the Tonganoxie address by using the internet to search for an 

address that was connected to Loretta’s phone number. 

At trial, the incorrect address came up during the prosecutor’s cross 

examination of Loretta. After a conference outside the presence of the jury, 

the court allowed the notice of alibi to be offered into evidence. Loretta 

testified that Petitioner was at home on the night of the crime. Loretta 

testified that she was called into work that evening and the Petitioner 

watched her children while she went to work. Besides identifying that the 

Tonganoxie address was incorrect, the prosecutor did not spend much time 

questioning Loretta about the notice of alibi. On re-direct, [defense counsel] 

questioned Loretta about the Tonganoxie address to which Loretta agreed 

that she had never provided the Tonganoxie address to [defense counsel’s] 

office. [Defense counsel] then questioned Loretta about her cooperativeness 

and Loretta agreed that she was not as cooperative with [defense counsel] 

in the few months prior to trial. [Defense counsel] then called his secretary, 

Courtney Beck, to testify how she obtained the address from the internet. 

During closing argument, [defense counsel] apologized to the jury for the 

mistake in the notice. [Defense counsel] again stated that there were things 

going on between Loretta and Petitioner and he wanted to make sure that 

she was at trial. He also brought up the cooperation problems. At the 

evidentiary hearing, [defense counsel] testified that he did not recall asking 

Petitioner if the address was correct. He further testified that he did not 

believe that he attacked Loretta’s credibility but that it could have enhanced 

her “credibility because it’s showing she had, quite frankly, had changed 

sides and wasn’t certain which side she would be on and came into court 

and testified to the best of her ability.” 

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App. at 75–76 (citations omitted). 

The district court found that defense counsel’s entry of an incorrect address on the 

pre-trial notice of alibi was not prejudicial because “the jury knew that the incorrect 

address was the result of a mistake made by [defense counsel] and not due to the 

witness.” App. at 79. 

Lastly, the district court found defense counsel’s failure to object to Detective 

Atwell’s testimony as to the credibility of the eyewitnesses was not ineffective assistance. 

The district court reasoned that when Detective Atwell testified to his confidence in Ms. 

Loveall’s identification of Mr. LaPointe, and lack of confidence in Ms. Wellman’s 

identification of Mr. Seeber, he was explaining to the jury “why he took the direction he 

did in the investigation.” App. at 85. 

The district court additionally found that Mr. LaPointe was not prejudiced by 

Detective Atwell’s testimony because (1) his testimony was consistent with that of the 

eyewitnesses, and (2) even without Detective Atwell’s testimony, the jury would likely 

have reached the same verdict based on the testimony of Ms. Wellman, Ms. Loveall, Mr. 

Norton, and Loretta LaPointe. 

On November 12, 2019, the district court declined to issue a COA. Mr. LaPointe 

timely filed a notice of appeal on November 27, 2019, followed by a formal request for a 

COA. 

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ANALYSIS 

In his application for a COA, Mr. LaPointe makes four arguments: (1) defense 

counsel’s failure to request independent DNA testing was based on a personal conflict of 

interest; (2) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request 

independent DNA testing; (3) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by putting 

the wrong address in the notice of alibi; and (4) defense counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to object to Detective Atwell’s testimony as to the credibility of the 

eyewitnesses. We first set forth our multi-layered standard of review before addressing 

each of these arguments in turn. 

A. Certificate of Appealability 

“[A] prisoner seeking postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 has no 

automatic right to appeal a district court’s denial or dismissal of the petition.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). “Instead, [a] petitioner must first seek and obtain a 

COA.” Id. To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 “At the COA stage, the only question is whether the applicant has shown that 

‘jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional 

claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

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17 

encouragement to proceed further.’” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017) (quoting 

Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 327). “This threshold question should be decided without ‘full 

consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.’” Id. (quoting 

Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 336). 

B. Attorney Conflict of Interest 

“The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel includes the right to 

representation that is free from conflicts of interest.” United States v. Williamson, 859 

F.3d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An actual conflict 

can support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the conflict prejudiced the 

defendant’s representation.” Id. at 852. “Generally, a defendant must demonstrate 

prejudice flowing from the conflict, but in some circumstances, a court will presume 

prejudice when the conflict amounts to the complete denial of counsel.” Id.

“So far, the Supreme Court has applied the ‘presumed prejudice’ rule only for 

conflicts of interest in multiple representation cases.” Id. We assume without deciding 

that the Supreme Court’s presumed prejudice cases apply outside the multiple 

representation context, and that Mr. LaPointe may consequently invoke a presumption of 

prejudice if “an actual conflict adversely affected his representation.” Id. at 853. 

 As the district court found, however, Mr. LaPointe has not identified a conflict of 

interest. Defense counsel’s private belief in Mr. LaPointe’s guilt does not amount to a 

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conflict of interest.4

 For a conflict to exist, “the interests of counsel and defendant must 

be divergent in the current litigation, such that the attorney has an interest in the outcome 

of the particular case at issue that is adverse to that of the defendant.” Hale v. Gibson, 

227 F.3d 1298, 1313 (10th Cir. 2000). Mr. LaPointe does not identify any adverse 

interest. As a result, we do not presume prejudice and our normal test for ineffective 

assistance of counsel applies to Mr. LaPointe’s conflict of interest claim. See Williamson, 

859 F.3d at 853. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel & § 2254(d) 

“A defendant making an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must show both 

that counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that 

‘the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’” Barkell v. Crouse, 468 F.3d 684, 689 

(10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)). “To 

be deficient, the performance must be ‘outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). “As for the prejudice 

prong, the defendant must establish a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

“When a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, a petitioner may obtain 

federal habeas relief only if the decision was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

 4

 Defense counsel did not express his private belief in Mr. LaPointe’s guilt until 

the evidentiary hearing that took place in conjunction with Mr. LaPointe’s petition for 

state post-conviction relief. 

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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States,’ or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Jackson v. Warrior, 805 F.3d 940, 

945 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). “Given that the standards of 

review under both Strickland and [28 U.S.C. § 2254] are ‘highly deferential,’ habeas 

review of ineffective assistance claims is ‘doubly so.’” Id. at 954 (quoting Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011)). “We defer both to counsel’s strategic decisions about 

how best to represent his client and to the state court’s determination that counsel's 

performance was not deficient.” Id. “We grant relief only where a state court disposition 

‘was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended 

in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Id. (quoting 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103). 

As a result, Mr. LaPointe is entitled to a COA on this claim only if, considering 

that doubly deferential standard, jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s 

resolution of his Strickland claim or “conclude the issues [he has] presented are adequate 

to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 773 (quoting Miller-El, 

537 U.S. at 327). For the reasons we now explain, Mr. LaPointe cannot meet that 

threshold. 

1. Defense counsel’s failure to request independent DNA testing. 

We address Mr. LaPointe’s first two arguments together because both involve 

defense counsel’s failure to request independent DNA testing of the hairs found near the 

crime scene. We assume without deciding that defense counsel was ineffective in failing 

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to request independent DNA testing, but nevertheless decline to issue a COA because 

reasonable jurists could not debate whether the failure to request a DNA test was 

prejudicial.5

 Mr. LaPointe has not advanced a debatable argument that there is a reasonable 

probability DNA testing would have changed the jury’s verdict. The case against Mr. 

LaPointe was not based, even in part, on inculpatory forensic evidence. To the contrary, 

the prosecution’s forensic analysts each testified to the absence of any link between Mr. 

LaPointe’s fingerprints, DNA, or hair and the crime scene. LaPointe, 214 P.3d at 691. 

Robert Booth, the prosecution’s hair analyst, told the jury “the explanation that the hairs 

were not LaPointe’s was ‘the most likely outcome.’” Id. at 691–92. He also told the jury 

that Mr. LaPointe could have changed his hair after the hairs were deposited, but that 

such an explanation was “rather remote in occurrence.” Id. at 691 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Any DNA test showing that the hairs recovered from the crime scene 

were not Mr. LaPointe’s hairs would merely have confirmed Robert Booth’s 

uncontradicted testimony. 

 Our decision in LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705 (10th Cir. 1999), is instructive. 

There, we reviewed a habeas petition brought by a capital defendant convicted of firstdegree murder. The defendant and another individual kidnapped an eighty-four-year-old 

 5

 The Kansas Court of Appeals determined that defense counsel’s decision not to 

request independent DNA testing was not ineffective because it amounted to a “tactical” 

or “strategic” decision. LaPointe v. State, No. 106,492, 2012 WL 4372995, at *12 (Kan. 

Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2012). Because we focus our analysis on Strickland’s prejudice prong, 

we express no view on the Kansas Court of Appeals’ analysis on this point. 

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woman, drove her to a secluded area, raped her, doused her in gasoline, and set her on 

fire. Id. at 709. The defendant argued his state appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to request a DNA test of blood recovered from the crime scene. Id. at 722. We 

rejected the claim “because even favorable DNA test results would not make a difference 

in this case.” Id.; see also Thompson v. Milyard, 444 F. App’x 249, 253 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(unpublished) (declining to issue a COA on an ineffective assistance claim based on a 

failure to request DNA testing due to “the prosecution’s scant reliance on the DNA 

evidence and the plethora of other evidence”). 

2. The incorrect address in the notice of alibi. 

Mr. LaPointe’s third argument is that defense counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by entering an incorrect address in the notice of alibi, which was later brought 

to the attention of the jury. We again assume defense counsel was ineffective, but 

nevertheless decline to issue a COA because reasonable jurists could not debate whether 

counsel’s error was prejudicial. 

The Kansas Court of Appeals determined that Mr. LaPointe had not shown 

prejudice because defense counsel “admitted the error” to the jury. LaPointe, 2012 WL 

4372995, at *10. We agree. 

After the incorrect address on the notice of alibi came up at trial, defense counsel 

devoted substantial time to explaining the error so that it would not undermine Mr. 

LaPointe’s defense. Defense counsel questioned Loretta LaPointe about the address mixAppellate Case: 19-3258 Document: 010110321528 Date Filed: 03/18/2020 Page: 21
22 

up. Then he asked his secretary to explain how she obtained the incorrect address from 

the internet. Finally, defense counsel apologized to the jury for his mistake. 

Mr. LaPointe argues defense counsel’s error was prejudicial because it might have 

led the jury to doubt whether Mr. LaPointe had ever communicated his correct address to 

defense counsel, thereby casting doubt on the veracity of Mr. LaPointe’s alibi. We agree 

with the district court that any confusion on this point was remedied by defense counsel’s 

thorough explanation of the situation. 

Because the prosecution spent very little time focused on the notice of alibi, and 

because defense counsel explained that the incorrect address was the product of, 

essentially, a clerical error, we conclude it is not debatable whether there is a reasonable 

probability a notice of alibi with the correct address would have changed the verdict. 

Contrast the facts in this case with those at issue in Stewart v. Wolfenbarger, 468 

F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2006), amended (Feb. 15, 2007). There, the court found ineffective 

assistance because defense counsel submitted a notice of alibi that contained only one of 

three possible alibi witnesses. Id. at 359. Counsel’s error was prejudicial because 

“Petitioner’s entire defense strategy was an alibi defense.” Id. at 360. “The jury had no 

idea that [the two omitted witnesses’] failure to testify was caused by the state trial 

court’s exclusion, as opposed to [their] unwillingness or inability to corroborate” the 

alibi. Id. Dissimilarly, here the defense fully informed the jury about the error in the 

notice of alibi, and the error did not prevent any alibi witness from testifying. 

 Mr. LaPointe cites Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2005), a case that 

reviewed an ineffective assistance claim based on defense counsel having elicited “an 

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alibi only for the night after the night of the crime.” Id. at 64. The court found prejudice 

because “the only evidence” connecting the defendant to the crime was one person’s 

identification, contradicted by the alibi. Id. at 66. Here, the incorrect address on the notice 

of alibi was only tangentially related to the evidence, and there is no indication it affected 

the verdict. 

 Mr. LaPointe also argues the Kansas Court of Appeals issued conflicting opinions 

on this question, one before the evidentiary hearing and one after. As the district court 

explained, however, the first Kansas Court of Appeals decision merely addressed whether 

an evidentiary hearing was required, whereas the second decision “reviewed the entire 

record.” App. at 78; see Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (explaining that 

we look “to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale”). 

We see no conflict. 

3. Defense counsel’s failure to object to Detective Atwell’s testimony. 

Mr. LaPointe’s fourth argument is that defense counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to Detective Atwell’s testimony as to the credibility of the eyewitnesses. 

Reasonable jurists could not debate whether Mr. LaPointe has shown that the Kansas 

Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in rejecting this 

ineffective assistance theory. We therefore decline to issue a COA and do not reach the 

question of prejudice. 

To reiterate, in response to a question about why he did not investigate Mr. 

Seeber, Detective Atwell testified that he had “absolutely no confidence” in Ms. 

Wellman’s identification of Mr. Seeber but did have confidence in Ms. Loveall’s 

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identification of Mr. LaPointe “because she had observed the suspect under no stress 

whatsoever.” LaPointe, 214 P.3d at 689–90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

According to the district court, defense counsel objected to the last portion of Detective 

Atwell’s testimony as “beyond the scope of the question,” App. at 83 n.3, a detail Mr. 

LaPointe does not acknowledge in his application for a COA. Moreover, the trial court 

sustained that objection. 

The Kansas Court of Appeals determined that defense counsel was not ineffective 

because Detective Atwell’s “testimony was elicited to explain the course of the 

investigation and to address the defense contention that Atwell conducted a shoddy 

investigation.” LaPointe, 2012 WL 4372995, at *7. The court also determined that Mr. 

LaPointe had not shown prejudice because “the jury received a proper instruction on the 

factors to consider in evaluating eyewitness testimony.” Id.

The district court agreed with the Kansas Court of Appeals on both Strickland

prongs. First, the district court found that defense counsel was not ineffective because 

Detective Atwell “was testifying as to why he took the direction he did in the 

investigation.” App. at 85. Second, the district court found there was no prejudice, 

because Detective Atwell’s testimony was “consistent with” the testimony of the 

eyewitnesses. App. at 86. Moreover, the district court reasoned that the jury instructions, 

which stated “that it was up to the jury to determine the weight and credit [sic] of the 

testimony of each witness,” mitigated any risk of prejudicial error. App. at 87. 

Before we address the substance of Mr. LaPointe’s argument, we make two 

preliminary observations. First, the Kansas Court of Appeals described the rule “that a 

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witness may not express an opinion concerning the credibility of another witness” as “a 

correct principle of law.” LaPointe, 2012 WL 4372995, at *7 (citing Bledsoe v. State, 150 

P.3d 868, 882 (Kan. 2007)). We are bound by that description. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 

546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that “a state court’s interpretation of state 

law . . . binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus”). 

Second, Mr. LaPointe “has not cited any published case that holds vouching 

testimony itself violates the Due Process Clause.” Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1310 

(10th Cir. 2005). Consequently, the standard set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) means Mr. 

LaPointe may not rely on our vouching cases to establish an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court precedent. See id. (citing Hellums v. Williams, 16 F. App’x 905, 911 

(10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished)). He may, however, assert an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. See id. at 1320–21. And to assess whether counsel performed deficiently 

under the first prong of Strickland, we must necessarily consider the merit of the 

objection counsel failed to make. See id. at 1321 (evaluating defense counsel’s failure to 

object to vouching testimony “under Oklahoma precedent” that interpreted “the 

Oklahoma rules of evidence”). 

 Reasonable jurists could not debate whether the Kansas Court of Appeals 

unreasonably applied Strickland. When Detective Atwell testified that he lacked 

confidence in Ms. Wellman’s identification of Mr. Seeber, he was responding to a 

question about why he did not pursue an investigation of Mr. Seeber as a suspect. In 

context, it is clear Detective Atwell was recounting his impressions of Ms. Wellman at 

the time of the photo identification, and not expressing an opinion on her trial testimony. 

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Therefore, we agree with the Kansas Court of Appeals that Detective Atwell’s “testimony 

was elicited to explain the course of the investigation and to address the defense 

contention that Atwell conducted a shoddy investigation.” LaPointe, 2012 WL 4372995, 

at *7.6

Detective Atwell’s further testimony, that he believed Ms. Loveall’s identification 

of Mr. LaPointe, presents a closer call. After all, Detective Atwell expressed an opinion 

as to the credibility of Ms. Loveall’s identification seemingly based only on his secondhand assessment of the circumstances surrounding her identification. See LaPointe, 214 

P.3d at 690 (asserting that “she had observed the suspect under no stress whatsoever”). 

There might have been room for “fairminded disagreement,” Harrington, 562 U.S. 

at 103, whether Detective Atwell’s statement was admissible under the Kansas Supreme 

Court’s decision in Bledsoe. There, a sheriff interviewed a suspect about his daughter’s 

disappearance. 150 P.3d at 875. The suspect responded, “She’s dead isn’t she? Do you 

know if she’s dead?” Id. At trial, the sheriff testified that these statements were “unusual” 

because “most people put them thoughts out of their mind.” Id. The Kansas Supreme 

Court held it was not ineffective assistance for defense counsel not to object to the 

sheriff’s “admissible testimony.” Id. at 882. The sheriff’s testimony was admissible 

 6

 Mr. LaPointe argues that, at the time of Detective Atwell’s testimony, the 

defense had not (yet) accused the Detective of conducting a shoddy investigation. But 

defense counsel’s failure to object must be evaluated “in light of all the circumstances,” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, which in this case include defense counsel’s reference to Mr. 

Seeber in his opening statement. See LaPointe, 2012 WL 4372995, at *5 (quoting defense 

counsel’s opening statement: “Mr. [Seeber] was not investigated as part of this case and 

has never been charged in this case and has never been subject to examination regarding 

this case.” (alteration in original)). 

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because it “helped to explain the course of the investigation” and “was rationally based 

on the sheriff’s perception.” Id. Alternatively, the sheriff’s testimony was admissible as 

expert testimony because “it was based on data known to him and on his experience as a 

longtime law enforcement officer.” Id.

But because Mr. La Pointe failed to provide trial transcripts, we know only that 

Detective Atwell expressed “confidence” in Ms. Loveall’s identification of Mr. LaPointe. 

LaPointe, 214 P.3d at 690; see also LaPointe, 2012 WL 4372995, at *6. Without more 

information, it is uncertain whether Detective Atwell’s testimony was admissible under 

Bledsoe, either as lay or expert testimony. This ambiguity cuts against Mr. LaPointe 

because he bears the burden to show that he is entitled to a COA. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. 

at 348 (referring to the petitioner’s “burden”).7

Under these circumstances, it is not debatable whether the Kansas Court of 

Appeals applied Strickland erroneously, “beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement,” in determining that defense counsel’s performance did not fall outside the 

wide range of professional competence. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. We therefore deny 

a COA on this claim. 

 7

 Mr. LaPointe also argues that—other than Ms. Loveall’s identification—the state 

presented a “weak evidentiary case.” LaPointe Br. at 26. This observation, right or 

wrong, is beside the point for purposes of this order because Mr. LaPointe has not asked 

us to review the sufficiency of the evidence. 

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CONCLUSION 

Because reasonable jurists could not debate whether Mr. LaPointe is entitled to 

relief, we DENY his request for a COA and DISMISS the matter. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge 

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