Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02090/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deshawn Lee Robinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee,/Cross-Appellant) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

DeSHAWN LEE ROBINSON a/k/a Leland Kirk, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

JEFFREY MEEKES a/k/a Orris Weathington, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

KEITH JACKSON a/k/a Kevin McElhannon, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

I 

I 

I FILi~D 

United States Court of Appeal, Tenth Circ:ult 

NOV 2 1992 

OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-2090 

No. 91-2130 

No. 91-2096 

No. 91-2100 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-90-348-01, CR-90-348-02, CR-90-348-03) 

Jenine Jensen, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. Katz, 

Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, 

for Defendant-Appellant Robinson. 

Michael W. Gross, Arthur M. Schwartz, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant Meekes. 

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Daniel J. Sears, Daniel J. Sears, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant Jackson. 

Tara C. Neda, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Don J. Svet, United States 

Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK, SETH and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

i<ELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Background 

In August 1990, officers executed a search warrant at an 

Albuquerque apartment. Officers found 700 grams of crack cocaine, 

some packaged and some drying on paper towels. In addition, 

scales, baking soda, a razor blade and a pan with crack residue 

were found in the kitchen. Various pictures, one depicting Mr. 

Jackson, also were found. Two guns were confiscated; one was in 

the living room under a couch and the other was in a bedroom in a 

sealed bag. Finally, the apartment contained various blue objects 

including a bucket, dish rack, bandanna, comforter, some clothing 

items and gravel in an aquarium. 

The four persons in the apartment were identified as Deshawn 

Robinson, Jeffrey Meekes, Keith Jackson and Terry Wirnberly. 1 Mr. 

Robinson was in the living room, Mr. Meekes and Mr. Jackson were 

apprehended in the kitchen and Mr. Wimberly was found in the 

utility room. Mr. Meekes had a New Mexico identification card and 

1 Later, their true identities were found to be Leland Kirk, 

Orris Weathington, Kevin McElhannon and Terry Johnson, 

respectively: 

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wore a pager. Mr. Jackson also had a New Mexico identification 

card and a California driver's license. Several traffic citations 

issued to Mr. Jackson were found elsewhere in the apartment, along 

with receipts issued to Mr. Jackson and Mr. Meekes for furniture, 

rent and utility payments and other services. 

All four were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent 

to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 

846, possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of 

cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a) (1) and (b) (1) (A), manufacture of 

more than fifty grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 

(b) (1) (A) and the use or carrying of a firearm to facilitate a 

drug conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After a jury trial, Meekes, 

Robinson and Jackson were found guilty of all but the firearm 

charge. They now appeal. Defendant Wimberly was acquitted. Our 

jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

All defendants challenge the admission of certain "gang 

affiliation" evidence, which was introduced through expert 

testimony. All defendants contend that insufficient findings 

support a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice under 

U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.1. All defendants challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence to convict . Mr. Robinson contends that the failure of 

the trial court to give a limiting instruction concerning a prior 

arrest was error and all defendants challenge the admission of 

prior arrest and conviction evidence. Mr. Meekes and Mr. Jackson 

both contend their sentence enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 

2D1.l(b) (1) for possession of a firearm were incorrect and the 

government cross-appeals, suggesting that the firearm enhancement 

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should have been applied to Mr. Robinson as well. Mr. Jackson and 

Mr. Meekes argue that the Sentencing Guidelines violate the equal 

protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Mr. 

Jackson contends that the government made prejudicial closing 

remarks and that erroneous instructions were given to the jury. 

Finally, Mr. Meekes seeks specific performance of an agreement 

allegedly entered into with the government b~fore trial. 

Although we find that the prior arrests of both Mr. Jackson 

and Mr. Meekes were improperly introduced, we conclude that, under 

the circumstances, such error was harmless and affirm their 

convictions along with the conviction of Mr. Robinson. Because it 

is not cl~ar that the Guidelines were correctly applied with 

respect to the obstruction of justice enhancement, we remand to 

the District Court for reconsideration as to the applicability of 

this particular enhancement. 

I. Prior Arrest Evidence 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible only 

for limited purposes and only when various prerequisites are 

satisfied. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); United States v. Kendall 766 

F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985), ~- denied, 474 U.S. 1081 

(1986). Because evidence of "other crimes" requires a defendant 

• to defend against past actions and tends to show that the 

defendant is "generally bad," United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 

201, 204 (10th Cir. 1972), we have long urged trial courts to 

determine that the proffered evidence: 

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(1) tends to establish intent, knowledge, motive, identity, 

or absence of mistake or accident; 

(2) is so related to the charged offense that it serves to 

establish intent, knowledge, motive, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident; 

(3) has real probative value and not just possible worth; 

(4) is close in time to the crime charged; and, 

(5) even if relevant, be excluded if the probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See 

Kendall, 766 F.2d at 1436; United States v. Nelson, 551 F.2d 266, 

271 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977). See also 

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988); United 

States v. Parker, 469 F.2d 884, 889 (10th Cir. 1972). 

In addition, the government should "articulate precisely the 

evidentiary hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be 

inferred from the evidence of other acts." Kendall, 766 F.2d at 

1436. In Kendall, we indicated that the "trial court must 

specifically identify the purpose for which such evidence is 

offered and a broad statement merely invoking or restating Rule 

404(b) will not suffice." Id. Subsequently, we held that the 

failure to specifically identify the purpose of the evidence was 

harmless error when "'the purpose for admitting the other acts 

testimony is apparent from the record, and the district court's 

decision to admit was correct.'" United States v. Record, 873 

F.2d 1363, 1375 n.7 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. 

Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir. 1988)). 

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Finally, "[t]here must be a clear and logical connection 

between the alleged earlier offense or misconduct and the case 

being tried." United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 

(10th Cir. 1983). A lack of clear association between the 

purported purpose for introduction of the evidence and the act 

itself renders the past conviction irrelevant, highly prejudicial 

and inadmissible. 

A. The prior arrests of Mr . Meekes and Mr. Jackson 

During the trial, evidence of several prior arrests was 

admitted through the testimony of an agent who was not the actual 

arresting officer and who could not and did not testify concerning 

the actual circumstances of the arrests. The prosecutor elicited 

testimony of prior arrests by asking whether the officer had 

. "knowledge" concerning the prior arrest. The officer, with the 

documentation of the arrests to aid him, recited the date, 

location and charge for each of the defendants. Mr. Meekes's 1988 

arrest in Oregon for delivery of controlled substance (cocaine) 

was introduced as was Mr. Jackson's 1987 arrest in Los Angeles for 

possession of a controlled narcotic substance for sale. Following 

testimony regarding each arrest, an instruction was given by the 

court explaining the limited purpose for which the evidence was to 

be considered. XVI R. 201-209. 

Rule 404{b) concerns the admission of evidence concerning 

particular acts and circumstances that would tend to indicate 

intent, knowledge, motive or similar permissible purposes. The 

mere fact that an arrest was made is not, in and of itself, a 

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"prior bad act" which the prosecution may introduce into evidence. 

"Evidence of prior arrest or the lodging of charges should not 

itself be admitted under Rule 404(b), since neither has been 

traditionally viewed as sufficiently probative of the basic 

question of whether the underlying act occurred." 2 David W. 

Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 140 at 177 

-(1985) (noting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 

(1948) wherein the Court concluded that "[a]rrest without more 

does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or 

impair the credibility of a witness. It happens to the innocent 

as well as the guilty. 11 )

2 Rule 404(b) "pertains only to evidence 

of acts extrinsic to the charged crime." Orr, 864 F.2d at 1510. 

2 We agree with the general rule as stated by Louisell and 

Mueller notwithstanding their incorrect cite from the Tenth 

Circuit case. The erroneous reference in the treatise is as 

follows: 

Contra: 

United States v . Brown, (1985, CAl0 Okla) 770 F.2d 912, 

914 (trial court "properly allowed evidence of the 

arrest to be admitted for propensity purposes" under FRE 

404(b) [this careless language approves testimony by 

deputy sheriff who had personally observed defendant 

engage in narcotics transaction, held admissible here as 

evidence of "scheme"].) 

2 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 140 n.10 at p. 64 (1992 

Supp.) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 

912, 914 (10th Cir. 1985), rev'd .Qil other grounds, 479 U.S. 314 

(1987)). The actual language of Brown makes no reference to 

propensity, rather it provides that "the district judge properly 

allowed evidence of the arrest to be admitted for permissible 

purposes." Brown, 770 F.2d at 914 (emphasis added). Indeed, 

Brown directly supports our discussion here. Not only was a 

purpose other than propensity identified by the trial court, but 

also the deputy sheriff who had actually arrested the defendant 

testified, describing the actual events that lead to defendant's 

prior arrest for drug smuggling. We found the defendant's prior 

acts "highly probative of defendant's scheme to possess and 

distribute marijuana." I,d. Brown is neither careless nor 

out-of-step with the general rule. 

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Thus, the evidence of mere arrest, as was admitted against 

Defendants Meekes and Jackson, without any evidence of. the 

particular act or circumstance that would tend to show intent or 

knowledge, should not have been admitted as an "other crime[], 

wrong[], or act[]" under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) allows 

evidence concerning the prior activity of a particular defendant, 

not simply testimony that records indicate an arrest took place. 

However, error which does not affect substantial rights does 

not require reversal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). In Kotteakos v. 

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946), the Court held that as to 

nonconstitutional error, the inquiry is "what effect the error had 

or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision." 

The error is to be considered in "relation to all else that 

happened." Id. "If . .. the error did not influence the jury, 

or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should 

stand .... " Id. See also United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 

1462, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (discussing the harmless 

error standard for constitutional and nonconstitutional error). 

The Court relied on the Kotteakos test in United States v. 

Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449-450 (1986) and concluded that a misjoinder 

was harmless error. The "overwhelming evidence of guilt" and the 

trial court's "proper limiting instruction" were important 

considerations. I.Q at 450. A limiting instruction was given 

contemporaneously with the admission of the arrest evidence in 

this case. XVI R. 206-07. Likewise, the ~vidence of guilt in 

this case is ample. Appellants were apprehended in an apartment 

where a considerable amount of crack cocaine was found in various 

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stages of manufacture, i.e. being cooked, measured and packaged. 

Each appellant also was linked to the Crips gang, a gang formed 

for the main purpose of distributing crack cocaine, according to 

the government's uncontradicted evidence. The sole references to 

the improperly admitted arrests are brief in the context of 

voluminous trial testimony. 

Based on the trial record as a whole, we conclude that the 

error in admitting the two arrests had no substantial influence on 

the jury's verdict and therefore was harmless. While we do not 

condone the practice, a jury certainly could base its decision of 

guilt on the overwhelming and properly admitted evidence presented 

at trial. See United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1455 (10th 

Cir. 1991) (improper evidence of a prior drug related conviction 

was harmless error), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1680 (1992). 

B. The prior arrests of Mr. Robinson 

Officers testified not merely to prior arrests but to 

specific acts of Mr. Robinson and the circumstances that 

culminated in arrest. Thus, such evidence was properly admitted. 

Concerning one such incident, Officer Smyth identified the type of 

drugs found in an apartment where Mr. Robinson was present and 

described Mr. Robinson's attempted escape by way of a second story 

window. Officer McAllister described the other incident and his 

observation of Mr. Robinson engaging in an apparent drug 

transaction. Conviction is not necessary for evidence of "past 

acts" to be admitted under Rule 404(b), Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 

689-91, and, as discussed, this testimony went substantially 

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beyond the mere fact of an arrest. Here, the particular actions 

of Mr. Robinson were described by an officer who observed them. 

The trial court properly found that the evidence concerning the 

prior incidents was probative on the subject of intent and 

knowledge. 

Mr. Robinson also objects to the trial court's failure to 

give a limiting instruction concerning his prior arrests. Mr. 

Robinson concedes that no such instruction was requested 

contemporaneously with the testimony. Aplt. Robinson Brief at 46. 

We reach the same result as in United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 

1135 (10th Cir. 1978) . "[N]o limiting instruction was ever 

offered or requested. In the absence of such a request we 

- may reverse only if plain error exists. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). We 

' do not believe the impact of this evidence was so critical that 

reversal is required." Bridwell , 583 F.2d at 1140. 

However, Mr. Robinson also points out that, although he 

tendered a limiting instruction to be included in the final 

charge, the instruction was not given by the trial court. The 

government counters that the instructions given adequately 

cautioned the jury as to the use of evidence as to "an alleged act 

of a like nature.• Aplee. Brief at 42. While counsel had 

requested a different type of limiting instruction, no objection 

was raised to the instruction given. It has long been the rule 

that a specific objection to the instructions actually given must 

be made to preserve any alleged error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30; 

United States v. Fountain. 642 F.2d 1083, 1095 (7th Cir.),~-

denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981 ) . When "no objection on this point was 

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~·-

made to the court's final instructions," this court will only 

reverse in the face of plain error. Bridwell, 583 F.2d at 1140. 

We do not find plain error in this instance. 

II. Gang Affiliation Evidence 

The prosecution offered, by way of a police officer/gang 

expert, testimony supporting an inference that the defendants were 

active members of a gang known as the Crips. There was 

uncontroverted testimony that the main purpose of the Crips was to 

sell cocaine. 3 XVI R. 255. Testimony was admitted as to the 

presence of various blue items in the apartment. XVI R. 300-01. 

Mr. Robinson and Mr. Johnson wore blue outer clothing at the time 

of the arrest and Mr. Jackson and Mr. Meekes wore blue underwear. 

XVI R. 297-298. The prosecution contended that such a preference 

for things blue tended to show that the defendants were involved 

in the Crips gang. A picture of Mr. McElhannon with two other 

unidentified males in a gang pose known as "dogging" also was 

admitted. XVI R. 310. 

The government argued that the evidence was not to show 

propensity, but rather tended to show that the defendants 

possessed the requisite knowledge and intent. Finding that to be 

a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), the trial court admitted 

3 In closing argument, the prosecution stated that the "sole" 

purpose of the Crips was to promote the sale of crack. The actual 

testimony was that distribution was a "primary" purpose. The jury 

was instructed that the arguments of counsel could not substitute 

for their independent recollection of the evidence. Given that no 

other testimony concerning the purpose of the Crips was adduced, 

the dissent's characterization of the government's statements as 

"egregious" is extreme. 

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-the evidence. Whether evidence is relevant for a permissible 

purpose under Rule 404(b) is left to the discretion of the trial 

court. United States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751, 759 (10th Cir. 

1991). The tests for admission under both Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 

403 are also given deference by this court upon review. Whalen v. 

Unit Rig. Inc., 1992 WL 215956, *3, 4 (10th Cir. 1992). Only if 

abuse of discretion is apparent will we upset the ruling of the 

trial court. We find no such abuse here. 

We begin by noting recent circuit precedent on this matter 

which we are obliged to follow. In United States v. Hartsfield, 

1992 WL 253650 (10th Cir. 1992), testimony concerning the 

defendant's membership in the "Black Mafia Crip Dawgs" was 

admitted. Id. at *2. A fellow gang member confirmed that the 

defendant belonged to the gang and a police detective served as an 

expert witness, explaining that the gang's "main purpose is to 

distribute cocaine and crack cocaine." Id. An envelope bearing 

the "Black Mafia Crip Dawgs" insignia that was found in a car used 

to transport cocaine was introduced. Id. On appeal, the 

defendant argued that the evidence of gang affiliation was both 

irrelevant and prejudicial . .IQ. This court concluded that "this 

evidence was probative of the existence of the actual conspiracy 

alleged" and properly admitted by the trial court. Id. The 

position of the dissent is inconsistent with Hartsfield. 

At oral argument, counsel for Appellant Robinson questioned 

whether proof of gang affiliation is evidence of "other crimes, 

wrongs, or acts" under Rule 404(b). The government conceded that 

the evidence might have been wrongly classified, but argued that 

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it would still be admissible as direct evidence, relevant to the 

issue of the formation and purpose of the conspiracy. If Rule 

404(b) does not apply, the pertinent test becomes relevancy, 

(under Fed. R. Evid. 401), and the Rule 403 balancing of the 

probative value of the evidence against the potential harm to the 

defendant. 

If evidence is admissible under any of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence, this court may affirm the admission. Fortier v. Dona 

Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir. 1984) ("[T)his 

court is not bound by the evidentiary basis relied upon by the 

trial court for the admission of the challenged evidence.") 

(citing United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980)). We conclude that "[i)t matters 

little, however, whether [Rule 404(b)) encompasses the challenged 

testimony, since the evidence was ultimately used to 'enhance the 

trier's understanding of the event, and not to prove propensity.'" 

United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 977 (11th Cir. 1984) 

(quoting 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, 1 

404(10) at 404-61 (1982)), .Q.e.I:t.. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985). 

Thus, in United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 

1990), cert. dismissed, 112 s. Ct. 353 (1991), "skinhead evidence 

was relevant" to a specific element of the offense, "interfering 

with a person's housing rights on account of 'race' or 'color.'" 

Skillman, 922 F.2d at 1374 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3631). After 

finding an avenue of relevancy, the court balanced the probative 

value of the "skinhead" evidence versus prejudice to the defendant 

under Rule 403. Indeed, in Skillman, the probative value of the 

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evidence was wrapped up in the particular elements of the crime, 

including a showing of racially motivated action, and the 

particular defense advanced, mere presence. Id. at 1374. The 

Skillman opinion does not mention Rule 404(b). 

Several cases decided by other circuits show that 

associational or affiliation type evidence is often deemed 

yrobative of something other than either character evidence or 

evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, subject to Rule 404. 

See Hartsfield, 1992 WL 253650 at *2; United States v. Lewis, 910 

F.2d 1367, 1372 (7th Cir. 1990) (and cases cited therein); United 

States v. Thomlinson, 897 F.2d 971, 973 (8th Cir. 1990). Indeed, 

this court approached the issue in a similar fashion when 

considering evidence of a defendant's affiliation with the Aryan 

Brotherhood. United States v . Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 866 

(10th Cir. 1984). We are persuaded that associational evidence 

may be directly relevant on the issues of formation, agreemen~ and 

purpose of a conspiracy. 

Circumstantial evidence is often the strongest evidence of 

conspiracy. United States v . Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S . Ct. 199 (1990). Gang membership 

helped to establish an agreement among the subjects, the purpose 

of the conspiracy and knowledge on the part of these defendants. 

We share the appellants' concern and reiterate that affiliation 

evidence alone could not support a conviction. However, as the 

government emphasized at oral argument, gang membership was but 

one piece of evidence. 

'An item of evidence, being but a single link in the 

chain of proof, need not prove conclusively the 

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proposition for which it is offered .... It is enough 

if the item could reasonably show that a fact is 

slightly more probable than it would appear without that 

evidence. . A brick is not a wall.' 

United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 887 (10th Cir.) (quoting 

McCormick on Evidence, § 185 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (footnotes 

omitted)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). The dissent misses 

this point altogether, arguing that "'proof that a person fits the 

profile, unsupported by evidence of drug trafficking, proves 

nothing.'" Dissent at 2 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 910 

F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, there is ample evidence of 

drug trafficking in addition to the gang related items discovered 

at the apartment, which we conclude are not profile evidence in 

any event. 

As for the claim that undue prejudice resulted, the trial 

court specifically found that the probative nature of the evidence 

and its value to the factfinder outweighed any potential 

prejudice. This balancing test is within the sound discretion of 

the trial court. Silverstein, 737 F.2d at 866. Only if the trial 

court abused its discretion would we disturb the result. We find 

no abuse here. ~ Hartsfield, 1992 WL 253650 at *2. 

The appellants also contest the introduction of expert 

testimony concerning gang affiliation. On appeal, they frame the 

issue as one concerning the admissibility of "profile" type 

evidence. We disagree. We think an appropriate starting point 

here is a review of what is included in the term "profile" 

evidence. In United States v, McDonald. 933 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 112 s. Ct. 270 (1991) we noted the 

definitions offered by several courts, and concluded that "[a) 

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profile is simply an investigative technique. It is nothing more 

than a listing of characteristics that in the opinion of law 

enforcement officers are typical of a person engaged in a specific 

illegal activity." A more tailored definition was offered in 

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 (1983), where "'drug courier 

profile'" was describ~d as "an abstract of characteristics found 

to be typical of persons transporting illegal drugs." 

We decline to classify the testimony offered in this case as 

mere "profile" evidence. Courts which have dealt with the issue 

effectively decided that the characteristics that make up the 

profile were indicators of a specific illegal activity, most 

usually the transportation of drugs. McDonald, 933 F.2d at 1521. 

Generally, profiles are used to detect crime, before the police 

have investigated or gathered evidence. Conversely, here, the 

alleged profile characteristics did not necessarily indicate, nor 

did the expert equate the characteristics to, a specific criminal 

activity. Rather, the expert testified that these particular 

items and clues lead him to the conclusion that the defendants 

were gang members. This evidence was used after the investigation 

was complete to explain the items found in the possession of the 

defendants. The prosecution was later able to connect gang 

membership to the uncontroverted evidence that the main purpose of 

the Crips was to traffic in crack cocaine. 

Certainly, the gang -related items are similar to other items 

found at the scene, such as a beeper, cellular telephone and 

triple-beam scale, which are undoubtedly admissible as 

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circumstantial evidence. Similar to tools of the trade, the gangrelated items may necessitate the appearance of an expert witness 

if the jury could not understand the significance of possession of 

these items. McDonaid, 933 F.2d at 1522 (evidence concerning 

possession and probable use of single-edge razor, beeper and gun 

was admissible). See also United States v. Martinez, 938 F.2d 

1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 1991) (testimony regarding possession of 

guns and scales is admissible as "'tools of the trade' - that is, 

means for the distribution of illegal drugs") (citing United 

States v. Wiener~ 534 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 

U.S. 820 (1976)); United States v. Young. 745 F.2d 733, 761 (2d 

Cir. 1984) {expert testimony was permissible "to explain physical 

evidence [of heroin manufacturing paraphernalia] that was in the 

case"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985). 

The dissent, however, mischaracterizes the evidence when it 

claims the expert "testified that the Defendants exhibited 

characteristics that were indicative of Crips gang members." 

Dissent at 2. The evidence offered related to the items found at 

the arrest scene and particular actions by the defendants at the 

arrest scene, the same location where the narcotics were 

confiscated. The expert simply explained the meaning of the 

physical evidence. The dissent's discussion of profile evidence 

is therefore not pertinent because the evidence presented in this 

case is direct evidence. The exemplar cases of the dissent, 

United States v. Williams, 957 F.2d 1238, 1240 (5th Cir. 1992) and 

United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 155 (4th Cir. 1990), 

involve testimony concerning suspicious behavior in airports which 

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-led officers to approach the defendants. In both cases, this 

evidence was then used as substantive evidence of guilt. The 

officers in Simpson observed a defendant attempt to pass through 

an airport security checkpoint with $450 in cash, "suspicious 

-looking metallic objects" and a pistol, giving them cause to 

investigate. Simpson, 910 F.2d at 155. In Williams, evidence 

concerning the nervousness and the slow movement of the defendant 

could not be used as substantive evidence of guilt. Williams, 957 

F.2d at 1242. The court emphasized: 

The profiles themselves are nothing more than a 

compilation of characteristics which aid law enforcement 

officials in identifying persons who might be 

trafficking in illegal narcotics. But the fact that an 

individual fits the profile does not necessarily mean 

that the evidence in a particular case will show that 

the person was carrying drugs. It is the evidence 

showing the person's connection to drug trafficking that 

must form the basis for the conviction. 

Id. (emphasis added). Items found in the apartment where both 

cocaine and the defendants were discovered are probative of the 

defendant's "connection to drug trafficking." Id. 

Profile evidence is a "point by point examination of profile 

characteristics" that enable the investigator to justify pursuing 

the matter. United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1022-24 (8th 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1091 (1990). As the dissent 

points out, because of the limited usefulness of profiles, courts 

have declared testimony concerning the defendants alignment with a 

particular profile incompetent as direct evidence of guilt. But 

after an investigation has culminated in the execution of search 

warrant, the evidence of criminal activity gathered at the scene 

is admissible . United States v. Dunn, 846 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C. 

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Cir. 1988) (officer may explain the packaging paraphernalia, 

including vials and wax paper bags found at the defendant's home); 

Young, 745 F.2d at 761 (expert testified as to the paraphernalia 

found at an alleged "heroin mill"). Indeed, it is a valuable 

"brick" that the prosecution may use to construct the "wall" of 

its case. 

In McDonald, 933 F.2d at 1523, we "reserv[ed] the question of 

whether expert testimony regarding profiles is--by itself--

substantive proof of crime .. n We again decline to decide 

that matter, both because this was not evidence of a profile under 

the McDonald definition and because the expertise of this 

particular witness was necessary. The specialized knowledge did 

assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. Fed. R. 

Evid. 702. The average juror would fail to recognize the 

"significance of this evidence without the particular background 

knowledge" of gangs and the philosophy of gang membership. 

McDonald, 933 F.2d at 1522. "Without [the expert testimony], the 

basic evidence would leave a juror puzzled." Id. 

Finally, the appellants argue that associational evidence is 

unconstitutional according to Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 

(1992), where the Court found that a stipulation read to the jury 

concerning the Aryan Brotherhood was violative of the defendant's 

First Amendment rights. That case is distinguishable, both 

because it involved the penalty phase of a trial and also because 

the evidence did not go beyond "abstract beliefs." Id. at 1098. 

The government, in Dawson, did not present an adequate foundation 

that would link the fact of an association to an issue relevant in 

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the penalty phase. "Delaware might have avoided this problem if 

it had presented evidence showing more than mere abstract beliefs 

on Dawson's part, but on the present record one is left with the 

feeling that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed simply 

because the jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible." 

Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1098. A similar result followed in United 

States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1991) when the 

prosecution called two witnesses to testify "generally about the 

Hell's Angels [gang] and their activities." 

After a review of the record, we believe that the government 

presented adequate expert testimony as to the meaning of the gang 

affiliation evidence. Gang experts from Albuquerque and from 

California testified as to the patterns of behavior of the gangs 

and the gang connection to "crack" and cocaine. The meaning of 

the various objects and writings found at the location where the 

warrant was executed were explained. The offenses charged in this 

case involved distribution of crack, the very purpose of the Crips 

gang. The foundation that was lacking in Dawson is present in 

this case. The evidence was not "general," as in Roark, but 

included the specific details of these defendants' activities and 

items found in the apartment where a drug manufacturing operation 

was discovered. 

III. Equal Protection and Due Process Challenges 

Both Mr . Jackson and Mr. Meekes argue that the Sentencing 

Guidelines have a discriminatory impact based on the 

differentiation of crack cocaine from other forms of cocaine. 

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Because African-Americans, they urge, are more likely to use and 

sell cocaine in its rock form than Caucasians and because cocaine 

base (rock) is punished more severely, the guidelines classify 

offenders based upon race. We find the reasoning and discussion 

in United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1992), 

sound and agree that there is a rational relationship between the 

classification and a legitimate end. 

We have rejected a similar argument under the due process 

clause. United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 960 (10th Cir.) 

{"We join those circuits holding that the different penalties for 

cocaine base and cocaine in its other forms do not violate due 

process."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 230 (1991). That case also 

quells Mr. Jackson's argument that the guidelines are 

unconstitutionally vague. Turner, 928 F.2d at 960 ("We find that 

defendant has not established that the term encourages arbitrary 

and discriminatory enforcement or that it is vague as applied to 

his conviction and sentence."). 

Mr. Jackson, however, expands his due process argument to 

object to the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

This, he contends, is an impermissible exercise of judicial power 

by the legislative branch . We have previously rejected this type 

of challenge and appellant does not persuade us otherwise. United 

States v. Hatch, 925 F.2d 362, 363 (10th Cir. 1991) {citing 

McMillan v. Pennsylvan ia . 47 7 U. S . 79, 84-91 (1986)); United 

States v. Alamillo, 941 F.2d 1085, 1085-86 (10th Cir. 1991). 

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IV. The Obstruction of Justice Enhancements 

Appellants strenuously object to the two-point enhancement 

for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.1. These 

enhancements were allowed when the trial court found that each 

defendant had provided a false name, date of birth and place of 

birth. 

We recently held that a two-point enhancement for obstruction 

of justice was improper because "[n]one of the false statements 

made by [the defendant] to the investigators impeded the 

investigation." United States v. Urbanek, 930 F.2d 1512, 1514 

{10th Cir. 1991). Mr. Urbanek's denial of any use of aliases in 

the past was insufficient to impede the investigation. The court 

continued, noting that "[i]n light of the 1990 Application Notes, 

even if Mr. Urbanek had given an alias, the enhancement would not 

,be justified since it is undisputed that his false statements did 

not significantly impede or obstruct the investigation." Urbanek, 

930 F.2d at 1515 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.1, comment. (n.3(g)) 

{footnotes omitted). "[A)ctual, significant hindrance to 

investigation is necessary when false aliases are given, not under 

oath, during the investigation." Id., 930 F.2d at 1515 n.2. 

Because any statements to either pretrial services or 

investigating officers were not under oath, we therefore look to 

the record to determine whether "significant hindrance" of the 

investigation occurred. 

Mr. Jackson represented himself to be Keith Jackson to police 

and pretrial service officers, but through fingerprint analysis, 

he was identified as Kevin McElhannon. XXI R. 58-59. However, 

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the government concedes that Mr. Jackson was known in Albuquerque 

solely as Jackson and that officers found, at the scene of the 

arrest, a California driver's license with Mr. Jackson's picture 

and the name Kevin McElhannon. XXI R. 59. Mr. Meekes used the 

name Meekes when he was arrested and throughout trial, although he 

later admitted that his true name is Orris Weathington. XXI R. 

22. Mr. Robinson provided his alias both at the time of arrest 

and to pretrial services. XXI R. 92. All defendants utilized 

their aliases throughout trial, even though their true names were 

known by that time and used by various witnesses. 

Mr. Meekes directs us to United States v. Manning, 955 F.2d 

770 (1st Cir. 1992), in response to the government's contention 

that a fair amount of research and effort was necessary to 

determine the true identity of the appellants. Aplt. Meekes Reply 

Brief at 4. Although fingerprinting, checking and 

crossreferencing may have been required, we, as the First Circuit 

in Manning. cannot conclude that the investigation was 

significantly hindered on this record. 

We liken the case to United States v. Tabares, 951 F.2d 405 

(1st Cir. 1991). In that case, the court could not "find, nor can 

we realistically imagine how the falseness of the [social 

security) number could have impeded the investigation." Tabares, 

951 F.2d at 411. In fact, the Tabares court remarked that it was 

more likely that the incorrect information aided in the 

investigation of the defendant because his tax returns were filed 

with the social security number given and his prior work records 

were associated with that number, as opposed to his "real number." 

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-Id. Similarly, here , Mr . Meekes gave the name under which he had 

rented the apartment where the cocaine was found. Mr. Robinson 

gave the name under which he had been arrested twice within the 

last year, arrests which the government introduced. Mr. Jackson's 

California driver's license was located in the apartment with his 

real name. 

Still, it is not clear from the record if the trial court 

correctly applied the Guidelines under the principles of Urbanek. 

Therefore, the sentences must be remanded for reconsideration of 

the applicability of this particular enhancement. Our dis cussion 

here does not preclude the enhancement if "actual, significant 

hindrance to investigation" can be shown. Urbanek, 930 F.2d at 

1515 n.2. 

V. The Government's Closing Argument 

In the course of closing argument, the government remarked 

that what the jury had heard from Mr. Jackson during his testimony 

were "lies." XIX R. 847. The government made two additional 

references to lying. Id. Mr. Jackson contends that these 

statements were improper and prejudicial, citing United States v. 

Garcia, · ·s1s F. 2d 136 ( 1st Cir. 1987) . We reiterate and emphasize 

the point made in Garcia-·"a prosecutor would be well advised to 

avoid directly accusing a defendant of lying." Garcia, 818 F.2d 

at 143-44 . As in Garcia. though, "we are confident that the 

statements in this case would have been perceived only as 

commentary on the implausibility of the defendant's story." Id. 

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VI. The Motion to Suppress 

In challenging the district court's denial of their 

suppression motion, all appellants rely heavily on the testimony 

of a witness-neighbor who testified that the time between the 

officers' knock on the apartment door and their breaking in was 

insufficient for anyone to have responded. Certainly, if it were 

established that "the executing officers failed to announce their 

authority and purpose before forcibly entering the dwelling, and 

that no exigent circumstances were shown, the evidence seized must 

be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search." United States 

v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 383 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Sabbath v. 

United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586, 589 (1967)). However the trial 

judge specifically found that the contrary testimony of the 

officer was more reliable. The officer was planning the maneuver 

and aware of what was likely to occur, in contrast to a neighbor 

inside his own apartment talking with friends, startled by loud 

and unfamiliar noises. There was no finding that the neighbor was 

not a credible witness, simply that it was more likely that the 

officer would have made a point of noting and remembering the 

sequence of events. Because a finding of fact is involved, this 

court gives deference to the trial court and will only reverse if 

the finding is clearly erroneous. Ruminer, 786 F.2d at 383. We 

are satisfied that the district court's factual finding is not 

clearly erroneous. 

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VII. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

On appeal, the record is reviewed in a light most favorable 

to the government to determine whether the evidence, both direct 

and circumstantial, and the reasonable inferences connected to 

that evidence, is such that any rational trier of fact could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A criminal conviction may be 

sustained on circumstantial evidence as well as inferences drawn 

therefrom, considered in the aggregate. United States v. Hooks, 

780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 

(1986). 

We have reviewed the record and find sufficient evidence 

supporting the convictions. Crack cocaine was found "drying" on 

paper towels in the kitchen, sitting on triple-beam scales and 

packaged, in both the kitchen and living room areas. A cellular 

telephone and a pager were found on the living room divider. Two 

guns were seized, one was in the southeast bedroom and another was 

found under the couch in the living room. We have noted that 

these items are "tools of the trade" for those who deal in drugs. 

United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1008 (10th Cir. 

1992). The apartment was rented to Mr. Meekes. Mr. Jackson had 

used the apartment to leave various personal items and had 

purchased furniture for the apartment. The neighbor testified 

that he had seen Mr. Meekes, Mr. Jackson and perhaps Mr. Robinson 

corning and going from the apartment at other times. In addition, 

there was the gang affiliation evidence discussed previously and 

testimony that both Robinson and Meekes had admitted membership in 

the Crips. XVII R. 563-64. 

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Defendants, both at trial and on appeal, argued that the 

evidence establishes no more than their "mere presence" at a crime 

scene, which cannot sustain a conviction. United States v. 

Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1294 (10th Cir. 1988). "However, a jury 

need not ignore presence, proximity and association when presented 

in conjunction with other evidence of guilt." United States v. 

Richard, 1992 WL 140535, *6 (10th Cir.) (citing United States v. 

Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1393 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 

1023 (1985)), petition for cert. filed, 92-5243 (1992). Indeed, 

presence at the scene where drugs are being processed and packaged 

is "a material and probative factor which the jury may consider." 

Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1294. Drug dealers of any size and crack 

cocaine manufacturers probably are reticent about allowing the 

unknowing to take view of or assist in the operation. Cf. 

Richard, 1992 WL 140535, *6. The evidence presented, taken with 

all its inferences in a light most favorable to the government, is 

sufficient to support the conviction of each defendant. 

VIII. The Dangerous Weapon Sentence Enhancement 

Findings of fact that are related to the Sentencing 

Guidelines are reviewed for clear error. United States v. 

Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1040 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 2064 (1991). The relevant finding to justify a 

§ 2Dl.l(b) (1) enhancement was discussed in United States v. 

McFarlane, 933 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1991). There we concluded 

that "sentencing courts [may] attribute to a defendant weapons 

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possessed by his codefendants if the possession of weapons was 

known to the defendant or reasonably foreseeable by him." Id. 

The trial court's factual findings are adequate under 

McFarlane. The trial court made clear that it found there was a 

"difference between Mr. Robinson and Mr. Meekes and Mr. 

McElhannon" with respect to the weapons in the apartment: 

I think it's pretty clear that both Meekes and 

McElhannon had regularly been in that apartment for 

quite sometime and there's much more reason to believe 

that they should have had knowledge of that weapon and 

probably did have knowledge of that weapon ... [F]or 

the limited time that Mr. Robinson was there, I don't 

think I can find by a preponderance of the evidence that ... there was sufficient knowledge on his part of the 

presence of the weapon .... 

XXI R. 98. We therefore deny the cross-appeal of the government 

on this point and affirm the district court's refusal to enhance 

Mr . Robinson's sentence. 

The dissent argues that the court "effectively overrode" the 

jury's acquittal of the defendants on the count charging use of a 

firearm. This position is clearly contrary to established law. 

United States v. Eagan, 965 F.2d 887, 892 {10th Cir. 1992); United 

States v. Coleman, 947 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. 

denied, 112 S. Ct. 1590 (1992). 

IX. Specific Performance of Plea Agreement 

Prior to trial, Mr . Meekes entered into negotiations with the 

government and a written agreement was apparently drawn but not 

signed by the government. In effect, Mr. Meekes would agree to 

plead guilty to the charges in the indictment and provide 

substantial assistance, both by way of testimony against his 

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-codefendants as well as other information regarding drug 

trafficking. The government argued that no agreement came into 

existence because its representative did not sign the letter 

agreement it drafted and sent to Mr. Meekes. I R.S. 9. Sometime 

after these negotiations but before trial, Mr. Meekes granted an 

informational interview with the government. 

Mr. Meekes relies on Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 

(1971), but misapprehends the lesson of that case and fails to 

recognize the extreme difference in factual settings. Santobello 

concerns the prosecution's behavior after an agreement has been 

reached with a defendant and upon which a defendant relies. 

Santobello, 404 U.S. at 259, 262. The proposition established in 

that case, that "a guilty plea induced by an unkept bargain is 

involuntary," is simply not applicable here. See United States v. 

Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 1992). 

In a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the trial court did not 

make a specific finding as whether a valid agreement was entered 

into between the government and Mr. Meekes. Instead the court 

concluded that "although ... the letter of October 15, 1990, 

signed by [Mr. Meekes' attorney) and Mr. Meekes may well be 

considered a binding contract under contract law," the point was 

moot because, during Mr. Meekes interview he made "false, 

misleading or materially incomplete" statements which gave the 

government "the right ... to withdraw from [any agreement.]" I 

R.S. 71-72. 

We agree with the trial court. Assuming, arguendo, that the 

agreement did become binding, Mr. Meekes would not be entitled to 

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-specific performance. "When a plea agreement leaves discretion to 

the prosecutor, the court's role is limited to deciding whether 

the prosecutor has made its determination in good faith. United 

States v. Vargas, 925 F.2d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing 

United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 433 (1990)). The trial court specifically 

decided that "the Government would be acting in good faith if it 

declined to make a motion for downward departure under section 

5Kl.l of the guidelines." I R.S. 11. 

We reject the task of reviewing which lies are relevant and 

which lies are not, as the dissent is prepared to do. We note, 

however, that the terms of the agreement called for Meekes to 

reveal information about his supplier. During the forty-five page 

interview, Meekes gave several first names, but could not remember 

phone numbers, addresses or last names. While Meekes contended 

later that he could gather that information, "[t]he plea agreement 

held out the promise of a motion for a downward departure in 

return for the rendering of substantial assistance to the 

government; it did not promise to reward mere cooperative intent." 

Vargas, 925 F.2d at 1266. 

Conclusion 

We affirm each of the appellant's convictions, but remand 

each sentence to the district court with instructions to vacate 

the sentences and resentence in accordance herewith. 

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Nos. 91-2090, 91-2130, 91-2096, and 91-2100 - UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA V. ROBINSON, MEEKES, and JACKSON 

SETH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on 

several points. 

In my view, the district court abused its discretion in 

admitting gang affiliation evidence against the Defendants as 

substantive evidence of guilt of the conspiracy and underlying 

charges. The gang affiliation evidence is analogous to drug 

courier profile evidence that has been found in other 

jurisdictions to be inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt. 

United States v. Williams, 957 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.); United States 

v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.); United States v. Quigley, 890 

F.2d 1019 (8th Cir.); United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208 

(9th Cir.); United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552 (11th 

Cir.). The analysis of whether the gang affiliation evidence in 

this case was improperly admitted requires determining (1) whether 

the evidence was "profile" evidence, and (2) whether the profile 

was offered as substantive evidence of guilt. 

It is apparent also that the proof offered by the Government 

required an inference to be placed on another inference to reach 

the result the prosecution sought. 

The majority correctly points out that in United States v. 

McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir.), we defined profile 

evidence as "a listing of characteristics that in the opinion of 

law enforcement officers are typical of a person engaged in a 

Appellate Case: 91-2090 Document: 010110145650 Date Filed: 11/02/1992 Page: 31 
specific illegal activity." In the case before us, the 

prosecution's expert testified that the Defendants exhibited 

characteristics that were indicative of Crips gang members. This 

listing of the Defendants' characteristics was profile evidence 

because, as is discussed more fully below, the evidence was 

offered and admitted to show that the Defendants were 

n~nufacturing and dealing crack as well as conspiring to do so. 

In other words, the Defendants, by the way they dressed or 

decorated the apartment, exhibited characteristics of persons 

engaged in the charged specific illegal activities of 

manufacturing and distributing crack and conspiring to do the 

same. 

Profile evidence has been found to be inadmissible in most 

cases as substantive evidence of guilt because the profile easily 

fits innocent people. See United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154 

(4th Cir.). Profile evidence is an investigative tool commonly 

used to effectuate Terry stops. "However, proof that a person 

fits the profile, unsupported by evidence of drug trafficking, 

proves nothing." Id. at 157 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 

U .s. 1). 

Although declining to decide whether the gang affiliation 

evidence was profile evidence admitted as substantive evidence of 

guilt, the majority concluded that it was admissible expert 

testimony, but in my view this was not enough to support its 

admissibility. After reviewing the record in this case, I am 

convinced that the prosecution offered this profile evidence as 

substantive evidence of guilt, despite its assertion that the 

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evidence was merely explanatory, and that the court admitted the 

evidence as such. 

By way of example, in United States v. Williams, 957 F.2d 

1238 (5th Cir.), the court held drug courier profile evidence 

inadmissible even though the defendant's luggage contained over 

2,000 grams of cocaine. The prosecution maintained that it 

offered the profile evidence as "background" evidence as was done 

here in substance; however, the court concluded that the record 

clearly demonstrated that the evidence was in fact used as 

substantive evidence of guilt. IsL.. at 1241 (prosecution argued 

the profile as substantive evidence of guilt in closing argument 

and court admitted evidence for its probative value). 

Similarly to Williams, the prosecution admits that the 

evidence was introduced to explain "the purpose of [the 

Defendants'] presence in the apartment," and alleges that the 

purpose of the Crips is to distribute crack. Appellee's Brief at 

27 and 30 (emphasis added). The implication of its admission is 

that the prosecution was offering the gang affiliation evidence as 

substantive evidence that the Defendants were guilty of the 

alleged crimes because they were all gang members and were in the 

same apartment, therefore, they must have been pursuing the Crips' 

"purpose." Also, the prosecution asserts in a pretrial pleading 

that an "association wi th this type of gang is relevant to prove 

the specific intent cri me of conspiracy and underlying substantive 

crimes of manufacturing and possession with intent to distribute 

crack cocaine." Vol . I, document 68, at 2. This despite the 

double inferences required. 

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Moreover, throughout the trial the prosecution made numerous 

substantive contentions equating gang membership with committing 

the charged crimes. Perhaps the most egregious of these was the 

prosecution's unsubstantiated statements in closing argument that 

the Defendants were Crips members and that the Crips' "sole" 

purpose was to promote crack, when in fact there was no such 

testimony. Instead the trial testimony only showed distributing 

crack to be the "primary" purpose. Lastly, the district court 

admitted the evidence because it was probative of motive and 

intent to commit the crimes alleged, and in its instructions to 

the jury, the court did not limit the use of the gang affiliation 

evidence . 

Not only does the record reflect that the gang affiliation 

evidence was used as substantive evidence of guilt, but as noted 

in Williams, case precedent illustrates that the mere act of 

comparing "an individual defendant's actions to a drug profile 

constitutes substantive evidence of guilt." 957 F.2d at 1241 

(citations omitted). Thus, when the prosecution provided a 

laundry list of Crips gang member characteristics, such as wearing 

blue clothing, "sagging", "mad-dogging" and decorating dwellings 

with predominately blue items, and then compared those 

characteristics to equivalent characteristics displayed by the 

Defendants, such as having a blue dish rack and trash can in the 

apartment and blue underwear, the prosecution was submitting the 

profile as substantive evidence of guilt. 

This type of gang merr~ership evidence is profile evidence 

because the record clearly shows that the Government sought to 

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prove that by exhibiting the characteristics of Crips members, the 

Defendants were guilty of the charged conspiracy and underlying 

crimes. In keeping with the decisions in other jurisdictions, 

gang membership evidence was here improperly admitted and used in 

contravention of Fed. R. Evid. 403 as substantive evidence of 

guilt because its probative value was grossly outweighed by its 

extreme prejudice. This was here clearly demonstrated by jurors' 

comments that they were afraid of gangs and by one juror having to 

be dismissed for fear of reprisals. This reaction of the jurors, 

and especially the need to excuse a juror, demonstrates that the 

Defendants were for all practical purposes tried for being gang 

members. Because the profile evidence was inadmissible under Fed. 

R. Evid. 403, it could not properly be admitted as expert 

testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because Fed. R. Evid. 702 

requires the same balancing as Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

Even if the gang affiliation evidence is not properly 

classified as profile evidence, it was inadmissible for the 

reasons set forth in United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426 (8th 

Cir.). In Roark evidence was admitted that the defendants were 

members of the Hells Angels and that the Hells Angels members are 

"involved in criminal activity and that they deal in 

methamphetamine and cocaine distribution and manufacture .... " 

924 F.2d at 1433. The court agreed with the district court's own 

declaration that evidence that the defendants were involved in a 

group would have been admissible as evidence of a conspiracy, but 

that the district court had erred in admitting evidence of the 

general reputation of the Hells Angels. Id. at 1433. The court 

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-also agreed that the evidence was extremely damaging and found 

that its admission could not be remedied by a jury instruction 

because it was not an isolated piece of evidence. Id . at 1433-34. 

The court concluded that the jury could not disregard the theme of 

the trial: "guilty by association." Thus the gang affiliation 

evidence was inadmissible because "it is inherently and unfairly 

prejudicial [and) deflects the jury's attention from the immediate 

charges and causes it to prejudge a person .... " Id. at 1434 

(citations omitted). 

Similarly, throughout the case before us, the prosecution 

relentlessly attempted to prove that the Defendants were guilty 

because of their association with the Crips. Like the Roark case, 

the prosecution in this case offered evidence of the general 

reputation of the Crips. By alleging that the Defendants were 

Crips, the prosecution was clearly attempting to prove guilt by 

association. Consequently, the "inherent risk of inflaming the 

jury, and of misleading it into focusing on the government's 

unsubstantiated and uncharged allegations of drug crimes, was 

unacceptably high." United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 158. -

See also Roark, 924 F.2d at 1432-34. 

There are many, many organizations in this country with 

purposes it would seem nobody could believe in, but each to his 

own, and in our legal system no one can be convicted by reason of 

a membership. 

Alternatively, I believe that the gang affiliation evidence 

was improperly used to prove the conspiracy charge because the 

nexus between exhibiting gang characteristics and being guilty of 

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.. 

the alleged conspiracy is tenuous at best. Proof of a conspiracy 

requires a showing by direct or circumstantial evidence that 

"two or more persons agreed to violate the 

law, that the defendant knew at least the 

essential objectives of the conspiracy, and 

that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily 

became a part of it .... 

"· .. Mere association with conspirators, 

even with knowledge of their involvement in 

crime, is insufficient to prove participation .in their conspiracy." 

United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir.). 

In United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir.), 

we held that 

"the Supreme Court has warned, however, 

caution must be taken that the conviction [for 

conspiracy] not be obtained 'by piling 

inference upon inference.' Direct Sales Co. 

v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 63 S. Ct. 

1265, 87 L. Ed. 1674. . Guilt must be 

determined individually and not merely by 

association." 

Accord Fox, 902 F.2d at 1513. In Fox, 902 F.2d at 1514, we 

further recognized that guilt "is not a matter of mass 

application." After looking carefully at the record, I feel that 

the jury was impermissibly allowed, even encouraged, to pile 

inference upon inference in order to convict the Defendants of the 

conspiracy. 

First, the jury was presented with evidence that, among other 

things, the Defendants wore some blue clothing, two Defendants 

were "sagging", and Meekes' apartment was furnished primarily in 

blue. From this evidence, the jury was asked to infer that the 

Defendants looked and acted like Crips members. During pretrial 

motions hearings, the prosecution asserted that it did not need to 

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prove that the Defendants were in fact gang members, but rather 

that by proving that they appeared to be Crips members, they 

possessed the requisite intent to commit the alleged crimes. This 

position was followed with the proof at trial. It is difficult to 

see how a Defendant can be guilty of conspiring to promote the 

alleged purpose of the Crips, i.e., to distribute crack, without 

even proving that the Defendant is a member of the gang. 

It became clear by the end of the trial that the evidence was 

used to prove that Defendants were not only "members" but were in 

fact active members of the Crips. This inference, that the 

Defendants looked like Crips, therefore they were active Crips, 

was made even more attenuated by each Defendant's denial that he 

was a Crip. I am unpersuaded by the officer's testimony that both 

Meekes and Robinson admitted in California to being Crips members 

three years prior to the arrests which led to this case. At best 

the officer's testimony creates an inference that the Defendants 

we r e Crips over three years ago. Moreover, the prosecution's 

expert testified that only hard-core members of the Crips admit 

their affiliation to the police. If that were true, arg_uably 

Defendants Meekes and Robinson would not have denied their 

membership at trial as they allegedly had admitted their 

membership to the police before, unless they were no longer or 

never had been Crips. 

Also, the prosecution's expert testified that there were 

various levels (peripheral, associate, hard-core) of involvement 

for Crips members. Yet at the evidentiary motions hearing the 

expert testified that one may be an associate without committing 

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major crimes. Vol. XIV at 39. At trial the expert also testified 

that some members are peripheral "wannabes" who presumably are not 

heavily involved with the gang. Vol. XVI at 350-51. Because 

there was no testimony elicited to prove the Defendants' position 

within the gang, the implication was that Defendants were hardcore members who according to the prosecution were involved in 

"major crack business." Vol. XIX at 843. I can find no credible 

direct evidence proving the Defendants to be Crips; instead, their 

"membership" in the gang was proven by inference and innuendo. 

Another inference was that because the Defendants were Crips, 

they necessarily were guilty of the conspiracy. For example, the 

prosecution argues in its brief that the gang affiliation evidence 

is "inextricably intertwined" with the crack conspiracy. Also, as 

previously noted, throughout this litigation the prosecution 

contended that the Defendants were or wanted to be Crips and that 

the Crips' purpose was distribution of crack, which implies that 

the Defendants are guilty of distributing crack and conspiring to 

do so. I am particularly concerned about this inference because, 

although there is testimony that the California Crips' "primary" 

purpose is to distribute crack, the prosecution's experts also 

testified that the Crips members commit other crimes, and that 

individuals may join only for •self protection." Also, there was 

no evidence of other specific occurrences of the Crips 

distributing crack which would have bolstered the police officer's 

sweeping testimony as to the Crips' •primary" purpose. There was 

no evidence whatsoever of specific sales of crack by the Crips in 

Albuquerque. Even assuming that the primary purpose of the Crips 

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in California is to promote crack, that is not enough to prove a 

conspiracy because a specific conspiracy charge cannot be proven 

by a general propensity to commit crimes or mere association with 

a group which commits various crimes. See United States v. Fox, 

902 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir.). 

Defendant Robinson has been seriously harmed by the use of 

inferences. Other than the police officer's testimony that 

Robinson was years ago a self admitted Crip, the only evidence 

pertaining to Robinson, which may have shown his association to 

the other Defendants or the gang, was his presence in the 

apartment and his wearing blue dickeys . However, the prosecution 

was allowed to offer all of the gang affiliation evidence, such as 

the decor of Meekes' apartment and Meekes' wearing blue underwear, 

against Robinson to imply that he was a Crip and therefore a 

conspirator. This inference is particularly troublesome because 

it does not logically follow that because others are allegedly 

dressed like Crips and because someone else's apartment is 

decorated in blue, Robinson by inference is a Crip and by a second 

inference is a conspirator. 

As the majority noted, the prosecution's expert testimony 

only supported "an inference that the defendants were active" gang 

members and that the Defendants' preference for blue "tended to 

show" that they were involved in a gang. Yet the jury was 

encouraged to use these inferences, coupled with the inferences 

that the Crips' "primary" purpose was to distribute crack and that 

being a Crip is tantamount to conspiring to promote crack, to 

convict the Defendants . This pyramid of inferences, when viewed 

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in light of the entire record, do not "generate more that a mere 

suspicion of guilt, and ... [because this] evidence is equally 

consistent with both guilt and innocence, the conviction cannot be 

sustained." Butler, 494 F.2d at 1252. Accord Fox, 902 F.2d at 

1513-14. 

I must also dissent .from the majority's position on Defendant 

Meekes' plea agreement. Contrary to the district court's holding 

that, if there were a contract, Meekes breached it by providing 

"false, misleading or materially incomplete statements" to 

investigators, the record shows the prosecution to be the 

materially breaching party of a valid plea agreement. 

Although the district court made no determination as to the 

validity of the agreement, it must be concluded that a binding 

plea agreement was formed because the letter from the prosecution, 

which offered the plea agreement, was signed by Meekes and his 

attorney, and the prosecution treated the agreement as valid and 

its offer accepted by taking Meekes' testimony. The agreement 

provided that the prosecution would request a§ 5Kl.1 sentence 

reduction if Meekes would plead guilty to all counts and provide 

substantial assistance to the prosecution. This substantial 

assistance consisted of (1) providing information regarding his 

associates in drug trafficking, and (2) testifying against his 

codefendants. By entering into the valid agreement, the 

prosecution was obligated in good faith to diligently pursue the 

information and to afford the defendant the opportunity to 

effectuate his end of the agreement. This means that the 

prosecution is the breaching party if it terminates the agreement 

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-without in good faith giving Meekes the opportunity to provide 

substantial assistance. Consequently, the issue presented to the 

court is whether the prosecution terminated the agreement in bad 

faith before Meekes could fulfill his end of the contract. 

In an attempt to substantially assist the prosecution, Meekes 

gave a forty-five page sworn statement in which he provided over a 

dozen names and other information concerning drug trafficking. In 

addition, he promised to provide further information on his 

supplier within a week after he gave the statement. In fact, a 

prosecution representative failed to appear at a scheduled meeting 

with Meekes, at which time he presumably would have provided 

further information concerning drug trafficking and his supplier. 

Also, there is nothing in the record to show that he was unwilling 

to testify against his codefendants or that his testimony would 

not have been of substantial assistance. However, before Meekes 

could divulge any additional information, the prosecution 

terminated the agreement. 

The purpose of an agreement such as the one at issue is not 

to obtain a confession from the defendant, but rather to obtain 

information that can be used by the prosecution in its 

investigation and prosecution of other suspects. The prosecution 

advanced as its reason for terminating the agreement that Meekes 

had lied during the initial oral test~mony. However, these 

alleged lies only concerned Meekes' criminal history, his 

affiliation with the Crips, and his prior residence and school in 

Washington, D.C. Therefore, they were irrelevant because at most 

these misstatements pertained only to personal matters or activity 

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and thus were only a confession which was not the subject of the 

agreement. Thus he did not materially breach the agreement as 

found by the district court. It follows that because the alleged 

misstatements by Meekes were immaterial to the agreement, the 

prosecution could not have terminated it in good faith. 

Consequently, the termination was a material breach of the 

agreement because the prosecution eliminated Meekes' chance to 

provide substantial assistance. 

Perhaps the most egregious conduct by the prosecution 

occurred after it breached the plea agreement. After claiming 

that it obtained no useful information from the statement and that 

the statement was unreliable, the prosecution used Meekes' 

statement as evidence during the hearing on standing and 

distributed copies to the other parties. In my view, the 

prosecution was prohibited from using the product of this plea 

agreement which the prosecution had sought to terminate. 

Based on the foregoing, I must conclude that Defendant Meekes 

is entitled to a§ SKl.1 departure as that is the only appropriate 

remedy for the prosecution's breach of the plea agreement and the 

misuse of the material acquired pursuant to the agreement. 

As an aside, I am very distressed that the sentencing 

guidelines permit a sentence reduction for a defendant who has 

entered into a plea agreement such as the one before us only upon 

a motion by the prosecution. In this agreement, the prosecution 

has sole discretion to determine whether Meekes had provided 

substantial assistance meriting a downward departure. We opined 

in United States v. Vargas, 925 F.2d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir.), that 

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"[w]hen a plea agreement leaves discretion to 

the prosecutor, the court's role is limited to 

deciding whether the prosecutor has made its 

determination in good faith." 

(CLtation omitted.) I am fearful that so limiting our review of 

the prosecutor's conduct will open the door to the type of abuse 

that I see in this case, i.e., the prosecution enters into plea 

agreements promising to request downward departures, obtains 

useful information, uses it, and then terminates the agreement 

claiming that there was no substantial assistance without 

providing the defendant with the opportunity to fulfill his part 

of the contract. 

The third basis for my dissent is that the district court 

imposed a two-level enhancement against Defendants Meekes and 

Jackson for possession of a firearm under§ 2D1.1. However, both 

Meekes and Jackson were acquitted by the jury of the substantive 

charge of carrying or using a firearm in furtherance of a crime. 

Consequently, in my view, despite the obvious difference in the 

proof required, the court improperly imposed the upward departure 

because it effectively overrode the jury's acquittal. It is pure 

speculation to hold that the two-level enhancement represents the 

difference in proof required. 

I would reverse. 

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