Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cr-50064/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cr-50064-13/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hollis Wayne Fincher
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

V. Civil No. 10-5004

Criminal No. 06-50064

HOLLIS WAYNE FINCHER DEFENDANT/MOVANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently before the undersigned is a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255

motion (Doc. 101) filed by the Defendant/Movant Hollis Wayne

Fincher. The Government filed a response to the motion (Docs.

103, 104), and Fincher thereafter filed a reply (Doc. 107). The

matter is now ripe for consideration and the undersigned, being

well and sufficiently advised, finds and recommends as follows:

1. On January 12, 2007, a jury convicted Fincher of one

count of possession of a machine gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2), and one count of possession of an

unregistered sawed-off shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § §

5841, 5861(d), and 5871. (Doc. 35.)

2. On June 26, 2007, a judgment was entered sentencing

Fincher to 78 months imprisonment on each count, with the terms to

run concurrently; two years supervised released on each count,

with the terms to run concurrently; a $200.00 special assessment;

and a $1,000.00 fine. (Doc. 50.)

3. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Fincher’s

conviction. See United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868 (8 Cir. th

2008). 

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4. As grounds for the motion now before the undersigned,

Fincher asserts “Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and

Ineffective Counsel.” (Doc. 101 at pg. 4.) Specifically, Fincher

argues that his counsel was ineffective for not “requir[ing] the

Bureau of Alcohol T[o]bacco and Firearms [“ATF”] to prove

jurisdiction over subject matter.” (Id.) Fincher cites 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(2), which defines interstate commerce as excluding

“commerce between places within the same State but through any

place outside of that State.” Fincher also cites the following

language from 18 U.S.C. § 927, “No provision of this chapter shall

be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to

occupy the field in which such provision operated to the exclusion

of the Law of any State on the same subject matter....” Fincher

argues that pursuant to these two statutes, “The State of Arkansas

occupies, and has exclusive jurisdiction in the field in which

Fincher was unlawfully arrested.” (Id. at pg. 5.)

5. A § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing if

the motion, files, and record conclusively show that the movant is

not entitled to relief. See United States v. Regenos, 405 F.3d

691, 694 (8 Cir. 2005). Fincher did not raise his jurisdictional th

argument on direct appeal. Accordingly, he may not obtain § 2255

relief unless he can show cause and prejudice excusing this

procedural default. See United States v. Collier, 585 F.3d 1093,

1097 (8 Cir. 2009). Fincher asserts that he did not raise the th

argument on direct appeal “because of ineffective counsel.” (Doc.

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101 at pg. 11.) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may

constitute cause and prejudice to overcome a procedural default. 

See Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 545 (8 Cir. 2005). th

6. Essentially, Fincher is asserting – as an independent §

2255 claim – that his trial counsel was ineffective with regard

to the jurisdictional issue; and – as cause to excuse his

procedural default – that his appellate counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise the jurisdictional issue on appeal. To

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, both as an

independent claim and as cause and prejudice to excuse a

procedural default, Fincher must show that his counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).

7. Contrary to Fincher’s assertions, his trial counsel did

raise a jurisdictional challenge. In a Motion for Arrest of

Judgment (Doc. 37), trial counsel argued that the indictment

failed to plead jurisdiction, as there was “not a hint of an

accusation of any interstate commerce.” (Doc. 37 at ¶ 2.) The

District Court rejected this argument, observing that the “statute

does not contain a jurisdictional element and the Government is

not required to put on evidence of any connection with interstate

commerce.” (Doc. 40 at pg. 5.) Fincher’s argument in his current

motion regarding the definition of interstate commerce in §

921(a)(2) is merely a re-characterization of trial counsel’s

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argument and is without merit. Interstate-commerce is not an

element of either of the offenses of which Fincher was convicted

and the Eighth Circuit has specifically ruled that § 922(o)

(possession of a machine gun) and § 5861(d) (possession of an

unregistered firearm) are constitutional exercises of Congress’

commerce power. See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1017

(8 Cir.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1992). th

8. With regard to Fincher’s argument that § 927 grants

exclusive jurisdiction to regulate firearms to the States, Fincher

misreads the statute. § 927 merely provides that the federal

government does not intend to preempt any state firearm law unless

it is in conflict with federal law. Thus, Fincher’s argument in

this regard is without merit.

9. To the extent that Fincher may be challenging the

authority of the ATF, this argument is likewise without merit, as

Congress has specifically granted this agency the authority to

investigate violations of federal firearms laws. See 28 U.S.C. §

599A(b)(1).

10. Having concluded, for the reasons set out above, that

Fincher’s jurisdictional arguments are meritless, the undersigned

obviously must conclude that neither trial counsel nor appellate

counsel were ineffective for any alleged failure to raise these

arguments.

11. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that

Fincher has failed to state any claim entitling him to relief. 

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The undersigned, therefore, recommends that Fincher’s 28 U.S.C. §

2255 motion be DENIED.

The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the report and

recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may

result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The

parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and

specific to trigger de novo review by the District Court.

DATED this 22nd day of July, 2010.

/s/ Erin L. Setser 

HON. ERIN L. SETSER 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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