Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00759/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00759-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Claude Finn
Respondent
Adam Salas Ramirez
Petitioner

Document Text:

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM SALAS RAMIREZ, No. CIV S-04-0759-MCE-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CLAUDE FINN, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel, brings this petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the denial of parole. 

Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on

April 15, 2004, respondents’ answer (Doc. 5), filed on June 21, 2004, and petitioner’s pro se

traverse (Doc. 6), filed on July 1, 2004. Respondents filed a supplemental answer (Doc. 16) on

August 11, 2005, to assert lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as a defense. On August 28, 2006,

the court appointed counsel to represent petitioner and provided the parties with leave to file

supplemental briefing. Petitioner, through counsel, filed a supplemental memorandum (Doc. 28)

on November 9, 2006, and respondents filed a further supplemental answer (Doc. 29) on

December 11, 2006. 

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I. BACKGROUND

The following statement of the case and facts is taken from the state court’s

opinion affirming petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal:

After a trial by jury, Adam Ramirez was found guilty of

conspiracy to commit murder, murder, and robbery. The jury also found

that he personally used a firearm. (citations omitted). The allegation that

Ramirez has a prior felony conviction . . . was tried by the court and found

to be true. 

Ramirez was originally charged with two co-defendants, Jeanette

Hughs (Jeanette) and Adam Edward Ramirez (Edward). Edward pleaded

guilty prior to trial and Jeanette successfully moved for severance during

trial. Trial continued as to Ramirez, who was convicted of all charges.

Ramirez, Jeanette (his girlfriend) and Edward (Ramirez’s son)

were charged with the murder and robbery of Jeanette’s husband, James,

on January 10, 1984. The weapon used was a rifle which was brought to

Jeanette’s and James’ residence by Ramirez on the night of James’ death. 

Ramirez testified that he delivered the weapon to the home at the request

of Jeanette who wanted it for self defense against her abusive husband,

James. Ramirez contended at trial Jeanette then took the weapon into the

bedroom, where James was sleeping, shot and killed James, and then

returned the rifle to Ramirez, requesting that he dispose of it. Expert

testimony indicated that prior to James’ death an unsuccessful attempt had

been made to suffocate him and that James was unconscious or asleep

when we was fatally shot. 

Petitioner appeared before the California Board of Prison Terms (“Board”) for an initial parole

suitability hearing on June 6, 2001. The Board denied parole and also ruled that petitioner was

ineligible for parole for five years. The instant petition challenges this first denial of parole. 

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Superior Court

challenging the denial of parole. That petition was denied in a reasoned opinion issued on

August 15, 2002. As to petitioner’s due process claim, the state court concluded that California

law does not create a liberty interest in parole. The California Court of Appeal and Supreme

Court both denied habeas relief without comment or citation. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to

reach petitioner’s claim under its “relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,

1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refused to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

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erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot

necessarily be found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision

is clearly erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear

error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that the Board violated his due process rights by denying him

parole based solely on the immutable factors of his commitment offense and pre-commitment

history. Similarly, petitioner asserts additional due process error because the Board recited and

relied upon the same immutable factors to conclude that petitioner should not be eligible for

parole for five years as opposed to sooner. The gravamen of petitioner’s claim is that immutable

factors cannot constitute evidence sufficient to deny parole. 

/ / /

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Petitioner argues that the “some evidence” standard does not apply. Specifically,

petitioner reasons that, because parole is related to sentencing, see In re Roberts, 36 Cal.4th 836,

839 (2001), a habeas corpus petition attacking a parole denial is equivalent to a challenge to the

length of the sentence. From this, petitioner concludes that the same standard should apply to a

parole decision as does to sentencing decisions – the preponderance of the evidence standard. 

According to petitioner, this means that the Board’s decision must be based on “substantial

evidence.” 

For their part, respondents contend that: (1) this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because there is no liberty interest in parole; (2) even if there is jurisdiction,

petitioner received all the process he was due when the Board provided him an opportunity to be

heard and gave him a statement of reasons for its decision; and (3) even if the “some evidence”

standard applies, the Board’s decision is supported under this standard. 

Many of the legal questions presented by this case have recently been addressed

by the Ninth Circuit in Sass v. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006). In particular,

the Ninth Circuit held that California’s parole statute does, in fact, create a federally cognizable

liberty interest. See id. at 1127-28. On the merits, the court also rejected the argument that the

“some evidence” standard does not apply. See id. at 1128-29. Under Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. 445, 455 (1985), due process requires a prison disciplinary hearing decision be based on

“some evidence” in the record as a whole which supports the decision. This standard is not

particularly stringent and is satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached.” Id. at 455-56. In Sass, the Ninth Circuit also addressed the

argument that the requirement of “some evidence” in the parole context has not been clearly

established by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit held:

Hill’s some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that “the

record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.” (citation omitted). Hill held that

although this standard might be insufficient in other circumstances, “[t]he

fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not

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The court is puzzled as to why petitioner’s counsel devoted over seven pages of 1

supplemental briefing to this argument and did not cite to Sass even once. In fact, as reflected in

the table of authorities attached to petitioner’s supplemental brief, Sass is not cited at all. This is

particularly curious given that counsel was appointed specifically to address the effect of Sass on

this case. By belaboring an argument that has clearly been rejected by the Ninth Circuit – which

this court is bound to follow – counsel suggests to the court that he has not even read Sass. 

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require courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have

some basis in fact.” (citation omitted). To hold that less than the some

evidence standard is required would violate clearly established federal law

because it would mean that a state could interfere with a liberty interest –

that in parole – without support or in an otherwise arbitrary manner. We

therefore reject the state’s contention that the some evidence standard is

not clearly established in the parole context. 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

Therefore, this court has jurisdiction to review petitioner’s claim and must apply the “some

evidence” standard on the merits. See id. The court rejects petitioner’s assertion that a

“substantial evidence” test should apply.1

The gravamen of petitioner’s claim is that immutable factors cannot constitute

evidence sufficient to deny parole at the first parole suitability hearing. This case is somewhat

different from Sass where the petitioner was challenging, among other things, the third denial of

parole arguing that the continued reliance on immutable factors violates due process. In Sass,

the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the habeas petition. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. The

court did not find that reliance on immutable factors – even for a third time – violated due

process. See id. In Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), where the petitioner was

challenging the first denial of parole based solely on immutable factors, the Ninth Circuit also

concluded that the denial was based on some evidence. In dicta, the court acknowledged that,

sometime in the future, the continued reliance on immutable factors could violate due process. 

See id. at 917. No court has drawn a bright line as to how many times the Board may rely on the

same immutable factors to deny parole, but in light of Biggs and Sass, it is clear that reliance on

immutable factors at an initial parole consideration hearing does not violate due process. 

/ / /

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In fact, the Board in petitioner’s case relied on much more than immutable 2

factors. For example, the record reflects that the Board considered a 2001 psychological

evaluation of petitioner as well as petitioner’s prison disciplinary history and lack of

participation in prison programs. 

To the extent petitioner claims that the Board violated state law with respect to 3

setting out its finding of unsuitability for five years, claims based on violation of state law are

not cognizable on federal habeas absent a due process aspect to the claim. For the reasons

outlined herein, the court concludes that no due process violation resulted on the facts of this

case. 

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In this case, petitioner is challenging the initial denial of parole. Assuming for the

moment that the Board relied solely on immutable factors such as the facts of petitioner’s

commitment offense and his pre-commitment history, such reliance does not violate due process 2

and the immutable factors constitute “some evidence” to support the denial. See id.; see also

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Sass, it is not this court’s function “. . . to

speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed.” See id. Whether continued reliance

on immutable factors violates due process is a question which is not before the court on the facts

of this case. 

As to petitioner’s contention that the Board’s reliance on the same factors to both

deny parole and find that he would not be suitable for parole for another five years, the same

logic applies. Because there is no due process violation resulting from reliance on immutable

factors to deny parole at a first hearing, a finding of unsuitability for five years based on the

same factors also does not violate due process. 

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Accordingly, the court cannot say that the state court’s disposition was either

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment

and close this file.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 6, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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