Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04113/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04113-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Clark
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FI LED 

United Stares Coore of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 2 ~ 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-4113 

WILLIAM CLARK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D.C. No. 89-NCR-0l0J) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

Before TACHA, McWILLIAMS, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

This appeal is from defendant William Clark's conviction of 

bank robbery in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2113(a) after a trial by 

jury. Clark appeals on the grounds that the district court erred 

in denying his motion to suppress his confession and in refusing 

to dismiss the indictment because of the government's failure to 

comply with a discovery request. Clark also alleges that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm. 

I. 

After several hours of drinking in a local bar, Clark walked 

into a financial institution and pushed a note at the teller 

asking for money. When the teller replied that she could not 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-4113 Document: 010110041447 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 1 
provide the money, Clark left the bank and took the note with him. 

He returned to the bar and left. The next day two officers found 

Clark in the same bar and took him to the police station for 

questioning. Clark at that time confessed that the incident had 

occurred. He was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a 

Waiver of Rights form. 

II. 

Clark's first contention is that his confession was 

involuntary because he was intoxicated when questioned. We 

disagree. In Colorado Y.!.. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515 

(1986), the Supreme Court held that "[a]bsent police conduct 

causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for 

concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant 

of due process of law." 107 S. Ct. at 520. The Court emphasized 

that the Due Process Clause only prohibits police overreaching and 

that "mere examination of the confessant's state of mind can never 

conclude the due process inquiry." Id. at 521. The police 

involved in the questioning of defendant in this case were not 

coercive in their demeanor. The atmosphere under which the 

confession was given did not reach the level of police coercion 

required in Colorado Y.!.. Connelly. See United States Y.!.. QuinonesGonzalez, 452 F.2d 964, 965-66 (10th Cir. 1971) (heroin 

withdrawal); Stevens Y.!.. Armantrout, 787 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (8th 

Cir. 1986) (intoxication); United States Y.!.. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 

673-74 (9th Cir. 1985) (groggy from painkiller). Therefore, we 

cannot say that the trial court's determination that the 

confession was voluntary is in error. Clark's second contention 

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Appellate Case: 89-4113 Document: 010110041447 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 2 
' • ... 

is that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 

Construing the record in the light most favorable to the 

government, as we must, United States Y...!... Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 

1431 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986), we find 

that the record contains sufficient evidence that the bank teller 

was intimidated to support the statutory requirement of 

intimidation. See 18 u.s.c. § 2113(a). The teller testified that 

she was "frightened to death." It was clearly within the jury's 

province to accept her testimony even though the witness had 

indicated to the police shortly after the incident that she was 

not frightened. 

Clark's third contention is that the government did not 

produce sufficient evidence to rebut his insanity defense. We 

disagree. The defendant bore the burden of proving his insanity 

by clear and convincing evidence. See 18 u.s.c. § 17(b). The 

record clearly supports the jury's determination that defendant 

did not meet the burden of showing his insanity. 

Clark's final contention is that the district court should 

have dismissed the indictment because the government failed to 

turn over some notes relating to investigations by police officers 

and FBI special agents before trial. We find no error in the 

trial court's determination that the indictment should not be 

dismissed. Even if the notes were discoverable, they were made 

available to counsel after the first day of the trial and the 

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Appellate Case: 89-4113 Document: 010110041447 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 3 
trial court held that there was no prejudice. We cannot say that 

the district court was clearly erroneous in its finding. 

AFFIRMED. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-4113 Document: 010110041447 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 4