Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01507/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01507-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Petroleum Institute
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 30, 2000 Decided June 27, 2000

No. 94-1683

American Petroleum Institute, et al.,

Petitioners

v.

United States Environmental Protection Agency,

Respondent

Chemical Manufacturers Association,

Intervenor

Consolidated with

94-1684, 94-1686, 98-1494, 98-1506, 98-1507, 98-1514

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Michael W. Steinberg and Thomas Sayre Llewellyn argued

the causes for petitioners American Petroleum Institute, et al.

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With them on the briefs were G. William Frick, Ralph J.

Colleli, Jr., Joshua D. Sarnoff, David F. Zoll, Ronald A.

Shipley, Christopher H. Marraro and John W. Kampman.

Hunter L. Prillaman, David B. Graham and Judith A.

Wenker entered appearances.

David Frederick and David R. Case argued the causes and

filed the briefs for petitioners Louisiana Environmental Action Network, et al. Richard W. Lowerre entered an appearance.

Steven E. Silverman, Attorney, Environmental Protection

Agency, Patricia R. McCubbin, Attorney, and Martin F.

McDermott, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, argued

the causes for respondent. With them on the brief were Lois

J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, David J. Kaplan and

Alan Birnbaum, Attorneys, and Alan H. Carpien, Attorney,

Environmental Protection Agency. Christopher S. Vaden,

Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

Ralph J. Colleli, Jr. argued the cause for Intervenor American Petroleum Institute. With him on the brief were G.

William Frick and Thomas S. Llewellyn. David F. Zoll and

Ronald A. Shipley entered appearances.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.*

PER CURIAM: Two sets of petitioners challenge regulations of the United States Environmental Protection Agency

("EPA") promulgated under the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. s 6901 et seq. (1994). The

EPA rulemaking at issue concerned regulating several secondary materials generated by the petroleum refining and

petrochemical industries as "solid waste" and "hazardous

waste."

__________

* Judge Sentelle authored Part I of this opinion, Judge Williams

Part II, and Judge Rogers Part III.

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Industry petitioners, American Petroleum Institute

("API"), the Chemical Manufacturers Association ("CMA"),

and Texaco, Inc. (collectively, "industry petitioners"), assert

two main categories of challenges. The first category challenges EPA's regulation under RCRA of two materials as

solid waste. The second challenges EPA's listing of certain

refinery wastes as hazardous waste. Environmental petitioners, Louisiana Environmental Action Network ("LEAN"),

Communities for a Better Environment of California

("CBE"), the Sierra Club, and the Environmental Technology

Council ("ETC") (collectively, "environmental petitioners"),

challenge EPA's failure to list certain items and further

allege an Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C.

s 551 et seq. (1994), notice and comment claim.

We deny the petition of the industry petitioners on all

counts but one, on which we vacate and remand to EPA for

further proceedings. Finding that we lack jurisdiction to

consider the claims of environmental petitioners, we dismiss

their petition.

I. Industry Petitioners' Challenges to EPA's Regulation

of Recovered Oil and Wastewaters as Solid Waste

A. Statutory Framework

RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute granting

EPA authority to regulate solid and hazardous wastes. "Solid wastes" are governed by Subtitle D of RCRA, and are

generally subject to less stringent management standards

than "hazardous wastes" which are regulated under Subtitle

C. For purposes of RCRA, Congress defined solid waste as

follows:

The term "solid waste" means any garbage, refuse,

sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other

discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or

contained gaseous material resulting from industrial,

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commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and

from community activities....

42 U.S.C. s 6903(27).

In pursuit of its congressionally conferred duty and authority to regulate solid waste under RCRA, the EPA has

adopted regulations defining solid waste for purposes of its

hazardous waste regulations: "A solid waste is any discarded

material," 40 C.F.R. s 261.2(a)(1) (1999), subject to a number

of exclusions enumerated in s 261.4(a) and case-by-case variances under ss 260.30 and 260.31. The term "discarded

material" for purposes of the regulation means any material

which is abandoned, recycled, or considered inherently wastelike. 40 C.F.R. s 261.2(a)(2).

In 1994 and 1998 rulemakings in pursuit of its RCRA

obligations, the EPA examined the production processes of

the petroleum refining industry. As pertinent to the issue

before us, EPA considered whether to exclude from the

definition of solid waste two secondary materials: oil-bearing

wastewaters generated by the petroleum refining industry

and recovered oil produced by the petrochemical manufacturing industry. See Hazardous Waste Management System,

Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste; Petroleum

Refining Process Wastes; Land Disposal Restrictions for

Newly Identified Wastes; and CERCLA Hazardous Substance Designation and Reportable Quantities, 63 Fed. Reg.

42,110 (1998) ("Final Rule"); Hazardous Waste Management

System, Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste;

Petroleum Refining Process Wastes; Land Disposal Restrictions for Newly Identified Wastes; and CERCLA Hazardous

Substance Designation and Reportable Quantities, 60 Fed.

Reg. 57,747 (1995) ("Proposed Rule"); Identification and

Listing of Hazardous Waste; Amendments to Definition of

Solid Waste, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,536 (1994) ("1994 Rule"). EPA

determined that oil-bearing wastewaters are solid waste for

purposes of RCRA regulation, and that recovered oil from

petrochemical facilities is excluded from the definition of solid

waste only when specified conditions are met. See Proposed

Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 57,755/3-57,756/1; Final Rule, 63 Fed.

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Reg. at 42,128-30; 40 C.F.R. s 261.4(a)(12), (18). Industry

petitioners challenge these conclusions.

B. Oil-Bearing Wastewaters

In petroleum refining, impurities are removed and usable

hydrocarbon fractions are isolated from crude oil feedstock.

See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 42,113/3-42,115/1, 42,121/2.

Large quantities of water are used, and the resulting wastewaters contain a small percentage of residual oil. These "oilbearing wastewaters" are destined for ultimate discharge, but

only after a three-step treatment process is first applied.

The first phase of treatment, known as "primary treatment,"

removes certain materials including the oil. This phase has

at least two beneficial consequences: (1) it meets a Clean

Water Act requirement that refineries remove oil from their

wastewater, and (2) it allows refineries to recover a not

insignificant quantity of oil (which industry claims can range up to 1,000 

barrels a day

at certain refineries) which is cycled back into the refinery production process.

Industry petitioners and EPA disagree over when these

wastewaters become discarded for purposes of the solid waste

definition. While no one disputes that discard has certainly

occurred by the time the wastewaters move into the later

phases of treatment, the question is whether discard happens

before primary treatment, allowing regulation of wastewater

as solid waste at that point, or not until primary treatment is

complete and oil has been recovered for further processing.

EPA's initial proposal excluded oil-bearing wastewaters.

See 1994 Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 38,540/3 (citing Identification

and Listing of Hazardous Waste; Amendments to Definition

of Solid Waste, 53 Fed. Reg. 519, 525-26 (1988)). However, it

changed its mind in 1994 and concluded that even before the

oil is recovered in primary treatment, "the wastewaters are

discarded materials and hence solid wastes subject to regulation under RCRA." 59 Fed. Reg. 38,540/1. EPA stated:

"Primary wastewater treatment operations exist to treat

plant wastewaters." Id. at 38,539/3. It noted that the percentage of oil in the wastewater is very small and "not

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significant in the context of a refinery's overall production

activities," and that the Clean Water Act mandates such

treatment. Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. Part 419; API v. EPA,

540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976) (discussing water discharge

regulations). For these stated reasons, EPA concluded that

"[c]learly, wastewater treatment is the main purpose of the

systems in question, and any oil recovery is of secondary

import." 59 Fed Reg. at 38,539/3.

EPA restated its conclusion in its subsequent 1995 Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 57,755/3, and retained it in the

Final Rule. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 42,184 (codified at 40 C.F.R.

s 261.4(a)(12)(ii)). The actual regulation does not mention

wastewaters. But by not being excluded, all wastewaters

including oil-bearing wastewaters are considered to fall under

EPA's general regulatory definition of solid waste.

Whether a material has been "discarded," subjecting it to

RCRA regulation, is a question we have considered in four

prior cases. First, in American Mining Congress v. EPA,

824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("AMC I"), we held that the

term "discarded" conforms to its plain meaning. Id. at 1193.

Thus, items that are "disposed of, abandoned, or thrown

away" are discarded. Id. AMC I concluded that "in-process

secondary materials," that is, materials "destined for immediate reuse in another phase of [an] industry's ongoing production process," are not discarded under RCRA. Id. at 1185,

1193. We recently reaffirmed that holding in Association of

Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir.

2000), where we reiterated that EPA cannot regulate as solid

waste secondary materials "destined for reuse as part of a

continuous industrial process" that is therefore "not abandoned or thrown away." Id. at 1056.

At the other end of the spectrum we have held that a

material that has been "indisputably 'discarded' " can, of

course, be subjected to regulation as solid waste. API v.

EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 741 (1990). Where a material was

"delivered to [a metals reclamation] facility not as part of an

'ongoing manufacturing or industrial process' within 'the generating industry,' but as part of a mandatory waste treatment

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plan prescribed by EPA," we concluded that a material was

not precluded from being classified by EPA as a solid waste.

Id.; see also United States v. Ilco, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126, 1132

(11th Cir. 1993) ("Previously discarded solid waste, although

it may at some point be recycled, nonetheless remains solid

waste.").

A material somewhere between the extremes of ongoing

production and indisputable discard was addressed in American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

("AMC II"). Industry petitioners claimed that sludges from

wastewater stored in surface impoundments, which "may"

later be reclaimed for treatment, could not be regulated. Id.

at 1186. We disagreed and deferred to EPA's determination

that such sludges have been discarded. Nothing, we reasoned, prevents EPA from regulating as "solid wastes" materials managed in land disposal units which are no longer part

of an industrial process. See id. at 1186-87; see also Owen

Elec. Steel Co. of S.C., Inc. v. Browner, 37 F.3d 146, 150 (4th

Cir. 1994) (slag recycled after sitting for up to six months was

reasonably classified as solid waste).

Industry petitioners rely primarily on AMC I. They first

contend that the oil-bearing wastewaters at issue in this case

cannot be classified as discarded because AMC I already said

they are not. We disagree. True, API's brief in AMC I

characterized oil-bearing wastewaters as part of an ongoing

industrial process. Our opinion in AMC I, however, did not

decide this question. We only held that in-process secondary

materials are not "discarded" so that EPA could not regulate

them; we did not address the discard status of any of the

particular materials discussed in the briefs. See AMC I, 824

F.2d at 1181 (describing the petroleum refining process); cf.

Battery Recyclers, 208 F.3d at 1056 (holding that "all we can

say with certainty is that at least some of the secondary

material EPA seeks to regulate" is not discarded).

Industry petitioners also contend that even if AMC I did

not decide the issue, oil-bearing wastewaters cannot be regulated because they are (as claimed in API's AMC I brief)

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nately, even if the status of oil-bearing wastewaters is not so

plain, petitioners assert that EPA's conclusion is arbitrary

and capricious because it is not based on reasoned decisionmaking. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United

States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983) (agency must "articulate a satisfactory explanation for

its action including a rational connection between the facts

found and the choice made") (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioners emphasize that primary treatment yields

valuable oil that is reinserted into the refining processes in a

continuous operation. They also claim that oil recovery operations began long before Clean Water Act regulations required it. In sum, they contend that oil recovery in primary

treatment is a part of in-process oil production.

At bottom, the parties disagree over the proper characterization of primary treatment. Is it simply a step in the act of

discarding? Or is it the last step in a production process

before discard? Our prior cases have not had to draw a line

for deciding when discard has occurred. While the issue was

closest in AMC II, the sludges in dispute there were described as being stored in surface impoundments "that may at

some time in the future be reclaimed." AMC II, 907 F.2d at

1186. We concluded that EPA's interpretation of "discarded"

as including the sludges was reasonable and entitled to

deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). See AMC

II, 907 F.2d at 1186-87; Battery Recyclers, 208 F.3d at 1055;

cf. Owen Elec., 37 F.3d at 150. We did not, however, focus on

whether EPA's reasoning to reach that result was arbitrary

or capricious under the APA. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at

43; 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A) (1994). The second step of Chevron

analysis and State Farm arbitrary and capricious review

overlap, but are not identical. See Michigan v. EPA, ---

F.3d ----, 2000 WL 180650, *17 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Arent v.

Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 614-16 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

It may be permissible for EPA to determine that the

predominant purpose of primary treatment is discard. Legal

abandonment of property is premised on determining the

intent to abandon, which requires an inquiry into facts and

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circumstances. See Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580,

597-98 (1911); International Finance Corp. v. Jawish, 71

F.2d 985, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1934); see also Katsaris v. United

States, 684 F.2d 758, 761-62 (11th Cir. 1982) (collecting

cases). Where an industrial by-product may be characterized

as discarded or "in process" material, EPA's choice of characterization is entitled to deference. See AMC II, 907 F.2d at

1186. However, the record must reflect that EPA engaged in

reasoned decisionmaking to decide which characterization is

appropriate. The record in this case is deficient in that

regard. EPA has noted two purposes of primary treatment

and concludes, "[c]learly, wastewater treatment is the main

purpose." 1994 Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,539/3. As English

teachers have long taught, a conclusion is not "clear" or

"obvious" merely because one says so.

EPA points out that primary treatment only recovers a

small amount of oil relative to the entire output of a typical

refining facility. However, the oil is still valuable and usable,

so that reason alone cannot show discard. The rock of a

diamond mine may only contain a tiny portion of precious

carbon, but that is enough to keep miners busy. According to claims by the

refining industry, the net amount of oil recovered may reach

1,000 barrels a day for certain refineries. It is plausible to claim, as 

industry

petitioners do, that refiners engage in primary treatment first

and foremost to recover this usable resource. At the very

least, EPA cannot merely rely on the small relative amount of

oil recovered from primary treatment without further explanation.

EPA also notes that the Clean Water Act requires primary

treatment before discharge. If refiners got nothing from

primary treatment, this might be a compelling rationale because it would be hard to explain why, other than to discard,

refiners would engage in a costly treatment activity with no

economic benefits. See API, 906 F.2d at 741. However,

petitioners claim they would engage in primary treatment

regardless of the treatment standards in order to recover the

desired oil. EPA does not explain why this possibly valid

motivation is not compelling. EPA makes no attempt to

balance the costs and benefits of primary treatment, or

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otherwise to explain why the Clean Water Act requirements

are the real motivation behind primary treatment. Indeed,

without further explanation, it is not inherently certain why a

substance is definitively "discarded" if its possessor is continuing to process it, even though the possessor's decision to

continue processing may have been influenced, or even predominantly motivated, by some external factor. Otherwise

put, it is not so obvious as EPA would have us hold that if the

industry petitioners conceded that their overriding motivation

in further processing the wastewaters was compliance with

Clean Water Act regulations that they would then conclusively be discarding the material in question even while further

processing it. If the non-Clean Water Act benefits of the

initial treatment are enough to justify firms' incurring the

costs (petitioners point to material in the record that may

support such a proposition), the EPA would have to reconcile

that fact with any conclusion that the Clean Water Act

purpose was primary.

In short, EPA has not set forth why it has concluded that

the compliance motivation predominates over the reclamation

motivation. Perhaps equally importantly it has not explained

why that conclusion, even if validly reached, compels the

further conclusion that the wastewater has been discarded.

Therefore, because the agency has failed to provide a rational

explanation for its decision, we hold the decision to be arbitrary and capricious. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-57;

Illinois Public Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 564

(D.C. Cir. 1997). We therefore vacate the portion of EPA's

decision declining to exclude oil-bearing wastewaters from the

statutory definition of solid waste, and remand for further

proceedings. We do not suggest any particular result on

remand, only a reasoned one demonstrating when discard

occurs if EPA wishes to assert jurisdiction.

C. Petrochemical Recovered Oil

Unlike petroleum refiners, petrochemical manufacturers do

not refine crude oil but instead use refined petroleum products and other feedstocks to produce petrochemical products

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such as organic chemicals. These production processes can

produce residual oil, known as "petrochemical recovered oil."

Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 42,114 n.2. This oil can be

inserted into the petroleum refining process.

EPA crafted a regulation excluding petrochemical recovered oil from the definition of solid waste, provided that

certain conditions are met. These conditions are designed to

disqualify from the exclusion oil that contains non-refinable

hazardous materials. See id. at 42,129-30. EPA was concerned that if additional unneeded materials present in petrochemical recovered oil were covered by the exclusion, it would

allow for the improper disposal of waste materials through

adulteration. Such activity is called "sham recycling." See

United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1361, 1365

(5th Cir. 1996). Simply put, if extra materials are added to

petrochemical recovered oil that provide no benefit to the

industrial process, EPA finds this to be an act of discard

under the guise of recycling. Although EPA apparently does

not know if sham recycling actually occurs in this industry, it

was concerned because some of the petrochemical recovered

oil samples it tested were contaminated with chlorinated or

other halogenated materials that were unexpected.

The EPA rule promulgated excludes from its solid waste

definition "petrochemical recovered oil ... to be inserted into

the petroleum refining process ... along with normal petroleum refinery process streams, provided [that] [t]he oil is

hazardous only because it exhibits the characteristic of ignitability ... and/or toxicity for benzene...." Final Rule, 63

Fed. Reg. 42,185 (codified at 40 C.F.R. s 261.4(a)(18)(i)).

EPA explained that the ignitability and benzene toxicity

properties are typical of or very similar to basic petroleum

refining feedstocks. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 42,130/1.

Thus, the exclusion does not cover petrochemical recovered

oil that is hazardous due to the presence of other hazardous

materials. The exclusion also contains other conditions

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cal recovered oil is "speculatively accumulated before being

recycled into the petroleum refining process." Id.

Industry petitioner CMA makes one argument, premised

solely on Chevron step one. CMA argues that EPA has no

authority to regulate any petrochemical recovered oil under

any circumstances because such materials are not "discarded." The reasonableness of the conditions adopted by EPA

as part of its exclusions are not challenged because, in CMA's

opinion, no such conditions may be imposed.

This Chevron plain meaning argument fails because EPA is

correct that abandoning a material is discarding even if

labeled recycling. EPA is not violating AMC I's definition of

discard. To the contrary, the premise of EPA's rule is sound

precisely because it is meant to regulate only discarded

materials. EPA can regulate material "discarded" through

sham recycling even though it cannot regulate under RCRA

materials that are not discarded. Speculatively accumulated

recovered oil is a clear example of a condition imposed under

the exclusion which shows that some petrochemical recovered

oil can indeed be considered as discarded. Even if, assuming

for the sake of argument, the rule's many conditions might

incidentally regulate oil containing chemicals not caused by

sham recycling (and therefore not discarded), that is beyond

the claim we consider today. Presumably a refiner in a

specific case could attempt to show that additional chemicals

in the oil are not a product of adulteration, not discarded, and

outside EPA's authority to regulate such material under

RCRA. We therefore deny CMA's petition as to petrochemical recovered oil.

II. Industry Petitioners' Challenges to Listing

of Refinery Wastes as Hazardous

Industry petitioners allege that the listed refinery residuals

do not pose a "substantial present or potential hazard to

human health or the environment," RCRA s 1004(5)(B), 42

U.S.C. s 6903(5)(B); 40 C.F.R. s 261.11(a)(3) (emphasis added), and thus were improperly listed as "hazardous waste."

Their argument is based on EPA's explicit recognition that

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for some of the wastestreams at issue "population risk" is

"near zero." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Hazardous

Waste Management System, 60 Fed. Reg. 57,747, 57,789/2

(1995). Our disposition of this claim turns on the relationship

between "individual risk," which EPA regarded as substantial, and "population risk," which for some wastestreams it

acknowledged as negligible. Until a letter filed after oral

argument, petitioners did not attack the EPA's characterization of the individual risks, and thus we have no occasion to

consider whether the agency lawfully characterized such risks

as substantial.

Before considering this claim, we pause for a brief explication of these concepts. "Population risk" is, as its name

suggests, the risk of the population at large, generally calculated as an "upper bound" estimate of risk for the population

overall. It is commonly measured in terms of health effects

cases over a given time period (e.g., cancer deaths caused per

year). Draft Report: Assessments of Risks From the Management of Petroleum Refining Wastes: Background Document 2-25 (October 1995) ("Draft Report"). "Individual risk"

is calculated variously as a "bounding estimate," a "central

tendency estimate," or a "high-end estimate," for a member

of a particular segment of the population. Id. at 2-33. (For

high-end estimates, the agency set the two most sensitive

parameters at the high end (90th percentile point on the

distribution), and set the others at their central tendency.

Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 42,117/2, 42,120 (Table IV-2)

(1998).) Unlike population risk, individual risk is commonly

measured in terms of lifetime risk. As the term population

risk seems to imply, it is an aggregate, calculated either by

"summing the estimated individual risk over all of the individuals in the population," Draft Report at 2-34, or by estimating methods aimed at the same goal, id. EPA counsel

confirmed at oral argument that population risk aggregates

individual risk.

Suppose, for example, that a particular waste poses an

individual 1-in-100,000 lifetime risk of death from cancer to

100 people. The estimated annual population risk is 1 in

100,000 divided by 70, since the "individual" risk estimate

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assumes a 70-year lifespan, and multiplied by 100, to reflect

the 100 persons exposed; thus the estimated additional annual cancer incidence for this population is 100 X 1/7,000,000 =

1.4 X 10-5 (or, 1.4 cases every 100,000 years). Of course any

other cancer cases estimated to result from exposure to the

waste across the overall population would be added in to

produce the complete population risk estimate.

According to established EPA practice, wastestreams with

"high-end individual cancer-risk level[s]" of 1 in 100,000 lifetimes or higher "generally are considered initial candidates"

for listing, and those that pose a risk of at least 1 in 10,000

lifetimes are "presumptively assumed" to merit listing. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Hazardous Waste Management

System, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,072, 66,077 (1994). EPA found that

the risks posed by the refinery residuals generally met at

least the candidate level for listing. See Final Rule, 63 Fed.

Reg. at 42,150-55. But in the case of one subcategory of

clarified slurry oil ("CSO") sediment, namely landfilled sediments, EPA appears to acknowledge that high-end individual

risk was actually as low as 4 X 10-6, i.e., 4 cancer deaths in

one million lifetimes of exposure, id. at 42,152/2 (expressed as

"4E-6"), and "that the incremental [population] risk in terms

of cancer cases avoided would be near zero." Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking: Hazardous Waste Management System, 60 Fed. Reg. 57,747, 57,789 (1995). Petitioners argue

that EPA's failure to consider the "near zero" population risk,

which by their calculations based on EPA's figures ranged

from 0.3 cancer cases in 10,000 years to 0.7 cases in 1 million

years, API's Initial Br. at 34, rendered its listing unlawful. 5

U.S.C. s 706(2)(A).1

__________

1 The passages of the record cited by petitioners for a population risk as low as 0.7 cases in a million years appear to refer not to

an overall aggregate but only to the risk for a subset of the exposed

population, 76 home gardeners. See Joint Appendix at 2592. EPA,

however, does not defend on the basis that petitioners have chosen

an incomplete figure for population risk. (We note that a population risk of 0.7 cases in a million years is equivalent to an individual

risk of 5 cancers in 100,000 lifetimes, which would be within EPA's

"candidate" levels for listing.)

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Were population risk a factor that EPA had to weigh with

and against individual risk to determine whether a particular

hazard was "substantial," the Agency would have to provide a

reason for ignoring it in this instance. Dithiocarbamate Task

Force v. EPA, 98 F.3d 1394, 1398-99 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But

neither the statute nor the regulation identifies population

risk per se as one of the mandatory factors that the Agency

must consider. See 42 U.S.C. s 6921(a); 40 C.F.R.

s 261.11(a)(3). Under EPA's regulations, the Administrator

must "consider[ ]" "[t]he nature and severity of the human

health and environmental damage that has occurred" from

mismanagement of the waste, 40 C.F.R. s 261.11(a)(3)(ix);

but this does not necessarily imply that substantial individual

risk alone, without high population risk, cannot be enough to

constitute a "substantial ... hazard."

Much of what EPA has written could be taken as requiring

substantial population risk. Thus, here it observed, "Population risk is only one of many factors to be considered," Final

Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 42,138/3, arguably suggesting that it

always "consider[s]" it, so that zero or near-zero population

risk would exonerate, or tend to exonerate, a wastestream.

In context, however, we believe we may discern the Agency's

path to its conclusion that individual risk alone may be

enough to justify a hazardous waste listing, regardless of

population risk. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United

States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983). EPA states, for instance, that it "does not believe

that it is appropriate to allow contamination from waste

management units to cause substantial risk to nearby residents simply because there are few wells in the immediate

area" and that its "decision to list these wastes is based

primarily on the concern over risks to those individuals who

are significantly exposed, even if there are relatively few of

them." Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 42,138/3 (emphasis

added). These justifications are consistent with its 1995

Guidance for Risk Characterization, which states that when

small populations are exposed (and thus population risk is

low), "individual risk estimates will usually be a more meaningful parameter for decision-makers." Id. Moreover, EPA

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cited instances (primarily in the Superfund context) in which,

consistent with this reasoning, it "rejected using population

risk as the point of departure" and took action because of the

high individual risk even though population risk was low. Id.

at 42,139/1. We thus read EPA as saying--in consonance

with both the governing statute and regulation--that it will

regulate a waste that poses a substantial risk to highly

exposed individuals, even if that risk poses a relatively small

risk to the population at large.

Petitioners also argue that if RCRA is read to allow EPA

to list wastes that pose "near zero" population risk without

establishing a stopping point, then the statute effectuates a

violation of the nondelegation principle. See American

Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (per curiam), modified on reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir.

1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (May 22, 2000). But

petitioners failed to attack EPA's judgment that the individual risks presented here alone constituted a "substantial"

hazard; rather they assumed the necessity of a population

risk factor, and then attacked any notion of population risk

that could slide so low. But in the EPA view population risk

drops out of the calculation altogether under the facts presented, so we have no occasion to review petitioners' claim

that the "population risk" factor is unduly elastic.

Industry petitioners also allege that even if the listings are

valid, they nonetheless are overbroad and should be vacated.

Several of these contentions, we think, are not only adequately answered in the EPA's brief but are also too fact-specific to

justify exposition in a published opinion. The other two call

for explicit analysis.

First, petitioners argue that EPA's listing of CSO sediment

is overbroad. Although according to petitioners "CSO is

often blended, in various proportions, with other petroleum

products," EPA sampled only sediment from CSO stored by

itself. API's Initial Br. at 46. In defense of its action EPA

appeals to the well-established "mixture rule," providing that

the mixture of a solid waste and a listed hazardous waste is

itself a hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. s 261.3(a)(2)(iv).

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Although EPA's brief reads as if it viewed the decision here

as a simple application of the mixture rule, industry petitioners point out that, strictly speaking, this is not so: sediment

generated from a mixture of CSO and other refinery products

is not itself the mixture of CSO sediment with a solid waste.

To put it more generally, to say that any mixture of hazardous waste X and solid waste Y (the latter being any solid

waste whatever) is a hazardous waste--as the mixture rule

does--is not exactly the same as saying that where the

sediment of X is a hazardous waste, the sediment of X and Y

(Y being any substance whatever) is a hazardous waste.

Thus, we think EPA in fact extended its mixture rule, or

developed a corollary. But petitioners have pointed us to

nothing in the record or in common sense that would contradict EPA's belief that the sediment generated from a CSO

blend would contain CSO sediment. See Final Rule, 63 Fed.

Reg. at 42,153/2 (asserting that it would be likely to generate

CSO sediment). On this record, then, we see nothing to

upset the EPA decision.

Second, industry petitioners argue that EPA's listing of

guard beds was arbitrary and capricious. These are related

to hydrotreating and hydrorefining catalysts, which EPA

decided to list, and to hydrocracking catalysts, which it did

not list. EPA acknowledged that there is no "universally

established or accepted" way of distinguishing among these

three processes, although they can be viewed as differing in

terms of "degrees of severity of operating conditions and

conversion of larger hydrocarbons to smaller molecules

('cracking'), and/or feeds." Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at

42,155/1. The proposed regulations defined hydrorefining as

including "processes where 10 percent of the feed or less is

reduced in molecular size," and hydrocracking as including

"processes where 50 percent of the feed or more is reduced in

molecular size." Id. at 42,155/2. EPA rejected this proposal,

determining that the "simplest way" to distinguish hydrocracking catalysts from hydrotreating and hydrorefining catalysts was to rely on the categories used by the DOE's

Petroleum Supply Annual, under which refineries annually

submit data on operating capacity for catalytic hydrocracking

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and catalytic hydrotreating. Id. at 42,155/2-3. "[I]f a refinery has been classifying its hydroprocessor as a catalytic

hydrocracker for the purposes of the DOE's Form EIA-820,

spent catalyst from this unit would not be covered by K171 or

K172," and conversely for hydrotreaters. Id. at 42,155/3.

EPA, however, excepted "guard beds" from this criterion,

ruling that their wastes should be listed regardless of the

refinery's classification. Guard beds "are used to extend the

life of the downstream catalytic bed (e.g., reformer, hydrocracker, isomerization reactor) by removing sulfur, oxygen,

nitrogen, and/or heavy metals." Id. at 42,156/1. EPA provided little by way of explanation for its classification, except

to say that it "agrees [with the catalyst reclaimers] that these

pretreatment units, or 'guard units,' should be covered under

the listing descriptions in today's rule." Id.

EPA's description of guard beds as "desulfurization pretreaters," id., however, shows that it viewed them as fitting

squarely within the DOE definition of catalytic hydrotreating,

which includes "desulfurization [and] removal of substances

(e.g., nitrogen compounds) that deactivate catalysts." Id. at

42,155/3. Thus, if EPA was correct in using the DOE classifications generally, a proposition petitioners do not contest, and

if the reason for using those classifications here pointed

toward listing guard beds, it was reasonable for EPA to do

so--even though, for reasons that are unclear, guard beds

end up otherwise classified for DOE.

This is true even if, as industry petitioners commented

below and now argue, guard beds may involve some hydrocracking in reducing the feedstock molecular size. EPA

rejected a reliance on molecular conversion rates in favor

(implicitly) of the processes' roles in removing contaminants;

accordingly it could permissibly classify guard beds with the

other listed processes.

III. Environmental Petitioners' Challenges

to EPA's Non-Listing Determinations,

and Notice and Comment Claim

Environmental petitioners, see supra at 3, challenge EPA's

decisions not to: (1) classify unleaded gas storage tank sediUSCA Case #98-1507 Document #525987 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 18 of 30
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ment ("UGSTS") as a hazardous waste; (2) exempt otherwise

"hazardous" wastes from being classified as such if they are

used in the petroleum coking process, on the basis of inadequate notice and opportunity to comment on the exemption;

and (3) classify coke product and fines inadvertently released

from saleable piles of coke as hazardous waste. While EPA

joined issue on the merits of the environmental petitioners'

first two contentions, API, as intervenor with respect to their

petition, contends that they lack standing.2 Essentially, API

contends that the environmental petitioners fail to link the

harms of which their members complain with the regulatory

actions that they wish EPA to take. API and EPA also

contend that the court lacks jurisdiction over the environmental petitioners' third contention, regarding coke product and

fines, because EPA's decision not to list these substances is a

deferral of rulemaking, rather than a final rule. We hold that

the environmental petitioners have failed to establish that

they have standing to raise their contentions with respect to

UGSTS and the coking process exemption, and that EPA's

inaction on coke product and fines is not justiciable under the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42

U.S.C. s 7006(a). Accordingly, because the court lacks jurisdiction, we dismiss the environmental petitioners' petition.

A. UGSTS

The environmental petitioners challenge EPA's decision not

to list as hazardous waste the sediment found in discarded

storage tanks that once held unleaded gasoline, maintaining

in general terms that EPA's failure to list this waste as

hazardous has placed its members in harm's way. For

Article III standing, a petitioner must show that "(1) it has

suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action

__________

2 Because the environmental petitioners do not rely on the

Environmental Technology Council ("ETC") or its members for

standing, we need not address API's challenge to ETC's prudential

standing.

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of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 704 (2000) (citing Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). An

organization has standing to sue "on behalf of its members

when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in

their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the

organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the

relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Id. (citing Hunt v. Washington State

Apple Advertising Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).

At issue is whether the environmental petitioners' evidence

demonstrates that EPA's alleged failings have caused a traceable "concrete and particularized" harm to their members

that is "actual or imminent". In Louisiana Environmental

Action Network v. EPA, 172 F.3d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("LEAN

I"), the court reiterated that for purposes of standing a

petitioner need not establish the merits of a case, i.e., that

localized harm has in fact resulted from a federal rulemaking,

but rather must demonstrate that there is a "substantial

probability" that local conditions will be adversely affected,

and thus will harm members of the petitioner organization.

LEAN I, 172 F.3d at 68 (citing Florida Audubon Society v.

Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)). In

LEAN I, petitioners alleged that their members would be

adversely affected by a federal rule permitting variances from

generally applicable treatment standards for waste prior to

landfill disposal. At least three LEAN members lived near

the Carlyss landfill where most waste from the state of

Louisiana "would be 'land disposed' if excavated and treated.

Under LEAN's theory, 'lower quality' (less treated) wastes

[would] be deposited in Carlyss" as a result of the variances.

Id. at 67. The court held that petitioners had standing:

Petitioners have noted that in the state of Louisiana

there are over 100 inactive or abandoned hazardous

waste sites for which cleanup has already been found

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necessary, as well as about thirty RCRA facilities designated "high priority." It is therefore all but certain that

remediation activities will continue to occur apace. Even

if the variance-to-remediation ratio is fairly low, the

amount of such activities creates a very "substantial

probability" that some variances will be granted, increasing risk to LEAN members near the Carlyss site.

Id. at 68 (citation omitted).

To establish their standing to challenge the non-listing of

UGSTS, environmental petitioners rely in part on two affidavits by Michelle McFaddin Atwell, an environmental regulatory affairs consultant. Based on her review of the digital

database of the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission on industrial hazardous waste shipments, Atwell concluded that "tank bottoms" have been shipped from refineries

to a municipal landfill in Sinton, Texas, and that other "Type

I" municipal landfills throughout Texas have received "tank

bottoms" and "oily sludge waste," including landfills in Houston, Conroe, and Altair. While Atwell never identifies unleaded gasoline tanks generating UGSTS, she explains that

standard listing codes preclude specific identification of "unleaded gasoline tanks"; generic codes such as "tank bottoms"

and "oily sludge waste" are employed, and encompass numerous wastes, including those generated by unleaded gasoline

tanks. Atwell notes that while "Class I industrial, solid

waste" generally is supposed to be shipped to "a permitted,

Class I industrial waste landfill rather than a Type I, municipal landfill," exemptions from this rule are routinely granted

in Texas with respect to those industrial wastes not listed as

hazardous, such as UGSTS, and the state conservation commission "rarely if ever track[s] the volumes of waste that are

actually shipped to Type I landfills under these case-by-case

requests."

Although the environmental petitioners have identified

landfills that have a substantial probability of receiving such

shipments, see LEAN, 172 F.3d at 68, namely, Type I municipal landfills likely to receive wastes within categories that

include UGSTS, they have failed to establish either a substanUSCA Case #98-1507 Document #525987 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 21 of 30
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tial probability that the shipments to these identified landfills

contain UGSTS, or a link between such deposits and the

specific harms alleged by their members. See, e.g., Laidlaw,

120 S. Ct. at 704; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; LEAN I, 172

F.3d at 68. As to the former, environmental petitioners do

not present, for example, either expert opinion that these

landfills are of a class substantially likely to receive UGSTSfilled shipments or an affidavit that the effects of UGSTS are

evident in the landfill's groundwater. As to the latter, by

failing to connect the alleged injuries to UGSTS, the environmental petitioners also have failed to establish a likelihood

that the injuries alleged will be redressed by a favorable

decision. See, e.g., Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 704; Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560-61.

Much of the environmental petitioners' standing problem

arises from the fact that their only affiant who lives in Sinton,

which Atwell identified as having a landfill likely to receive

UGSTS waste, has not shown that he was a member of a

petitioner organization at the time the petition challenging

the rule was filed, and his affidavit thus is legally insufficient.3

See Petro-Chem. Processing v. EPA, 866 F.2d 433, 437 (D.C.

Cir. 1989). The environmental petitioners' other affidavits,

involving general concerns about pollution at other locations,

do not cure the deficiency.

The affidavits of Tommy C. Douglas and H. C. Clark do

indicate that pollution in the Greens Bayou near Houston may

be linked to waste from the BFI-McCarty landfill in Houston,

which Atwell also identifies as among those landfills that

receive "tank bottoms" and "oil sludge waste," and that

Douglas no longer canoes in the Bayou as a result of his

concerns about pollution. The problem lies, however, in the

vagueness of Clark's and Douglas' affidavits. Clark, a geophysicist, states that public records at the Texas Natural

__________

3 Herbert H. Coleman's affidavit of August 11, 1999, states that

he "recently became a member of the Sierra Club," but does not

indicate that he was a member of the Sierra Club at the time the

petition was filed. Although API made this point in its brief, the

environmental petitioners did not submit a responsive affidavit.

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Resources Conservation Commission show that contamination

in the groundwater under and from the BFI landfill in

Houston, including "petroleum related organic chemicals,"

has migrated into the Greens Bayou. Douglas, a member of

a petitioner organization who lives in Houston, states that he

no longer canoes on the Greens Bayou because he and other

canoers have observed pollution in the Bayou, and because of

more general concerns about pollution in the Bayou, based in

part upon his knowledge that "there is a landfill just above

the location" where he once began a Bayou canoe trip.

While Clark provides a general link between Houston's

BFI landfill and the Greens Bayou, and Douglas suggests

generally that he is wary of Bayou pollution, neither affiant

traces the pollution of concern to UGSTS waste. Clark

refers to "petroleum related organic chemicals," but he does

not suggest the current or imminent presence of specific

chemicals found in UGSTS waste, such as benzene, and none

of Clark's statements refer to specific wastes generated from

unleaded gasoline storage tanks. Similarly, Douglas does not

describe the characteristics of the pollution that he has

observed, thus offering no basis to discern whether such

pollution, and hence his fears, were substantially likely to

have been derived, even in part, from unleaded gasoline

storage tanks. Nor does Douglas suggest that his general

concerns about current or imminent Bayou pollution, including his knowledge that a landfill exists nearby, are linked to

UGSTS waste, or to wastes with features characteristic of

UGSTS. While it is hardly necessary to present duplicative

evidence of reasonable fears that are fairly traceable, as

occurred in Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling

Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 153, 157-58, 161-62 (4th Cir. 2000) (en

banc), Douglas and Clark establish little more than that some

types of petroleum-related organic chemicals migrate from

BFI's Houston landfill to the Greens Bayou, and that Douglas

is concerned generally about pollution in the Bayou. This is

insufficient to establish the environmental petitioners' standing because there is no showing that the specific EPA listing

determination that they seek would redress Douglas' conUSCA Case #98-1507 Document #525987 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 23 of 30
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cerns. See, e.g., Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 704; Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 560-61.

Affiant W. H. Hilton is no more helpful to the environmental petitioners. He states that he owns property in Wilmer

and in Ellis County and that municipal landfills "in Texas are

allowed to accept significant quantities of industrial wastes

including.... Class 1 wastes [such as UGSTS,] even if the

[municipal landfill's] permit does not so state," but he does

not indicate any current or imminent harm to himself. To

the contrary, he states that he organized a successful effort to

halt plans for a new municipal waste landfill in Wilmer, and

that although at one time he was concerned that his Ellis

County property might be devalued in view of the potential

expansion of a local municipal landfill and existing groundwater contamination at that landfill, a political effort resulted in

a settlement to better protect the groundwater and his property. Hilton also states that a Chevron storage tank leaked

on land adjacent to land belonging to his mother-in-law's

estate, of which Hilton is co-executor, and that wells had to be

drilled on the estate's land to remedy the resulting water

contamination, but Hilton does not identify the circumstances

surrounding the leak, including whether it involved landfilled

unleaded gasoline tanks or whether any harms suffered by

the estate are current or imminent, and hence remediable.4

See, e.g., Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 704; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-

61.

Therefore, in addition to having failed to show the existence

or imminent existence of unleaded gasoline storage tanks in

the identified Type I landfills, the environmental petitioners

__________

4 We need not decide the question of executor standing. Although executors are granted standing to sue on behalf of the

deceased owner of the relevant estate, see, e.g., Nat'l Taxpayers

Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1995);

Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 751 (3d Cir. 1991), such standing

generally is based upon a vicarious, third-party representation

theory. In the Matter of Oil Spill, 954 F.2d 1279, 1319 (7th Cir.

1992). Whether such third-party standing could establish associational standing for an organization of which the third party is a

member is an open question in this circuit.

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fail to trace any harm to their members that flows from the

presence of UGSTS in waste streams from the landfills, and

thus to establish that their members' concerns are redressable through the listings sought by the environmental petitioners. Because the environmental petitioners have not demonstrated an injury to any of their members that is both

traceable to EPA's non-listing decision and redressable by

this court, we dismiss the UGSTS portion of their petition for

lack of jurisdiction. See Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 704; Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560-61; LEAN I, 172 F.3d at 68.

B. Coking process exemption: notice and comment claim

Similar deficiencies exist regarding the environmental petitioners' challenge under the notice and comment requirement

of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. s 553(b) & (c),

to EPA's decision not to regulate the solid wastes inserted

into the coking process, particularly those used in coke

quenching.5 EPA exempted from regulation those oil-bearing

hazardous secondary wastes inserted into the coking process,

noting in its final rule that such insertion generally occurs

during coke quenching rather than in the conventional coking

process. The environmental petitioners challenge this exemption on the ground that EPA failed to provide adequate

notice and opportunity for comment because EPA focused on

coke quenching only after the initial notice and comment

period had closed. We do not address this contention because the environmental petitioners have failed to establish a

substantial probability that their affiants will be exposed to

coke product quenched with hazardous materials. See id.

The environmental petitioners base their standing to raise

this contention on the affidavits of Zelda Champion, Frank

__________

5 "Coking," the process through which coke is produced, consists of two primary stages. In the first, or conventional coking

stage, heavy oil bearing feedstocks are placed into a coke drum and

heated at high temperatures, thus breaking the long-chain hydrocarbon molecules found in the feedstocks, and ultimately producing

coke. The second, or "coke quenching" stage, involves the injection

of water into the coke drum to quench and cool the coke.

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Gordon, and Dr. Charles Lamb. The Champion and Gordon

affidavits show that members of petitioner organizations are

exposed to coke product generally, including "fines" (i.e., tiny

coke particles). Both affiants state that they live near refineries or coke storage sites, have observed the storage and

transportation of coke at such sites, believe that such storage

and transportation is inadequately controlled, and have witnessed the release and windblown carriage of coke product

and fines from these sites. They also state that they have

had such product and fines tested to confirm their identity as

petroleum coke dust.6 While these affidavits demonstrate

exposure by members of environmental petitioners' organizations to coke product and fines, neither Champion or Gordon

avers that the coke product and fines to which they are

exposed are generated by a coking process into which hazardous secondary materials are inserted, or are substantially

likely to be inserted.

As to the coking process itself, the affidavit of Dr. Charles

Lamb establishes only that the quenching of coke in waste

increases the toxic nature of such coke, and that "the dust

from such coke [would contain] increased levels of toxic

contaminants." Attached to his affidavit is a report deriving

estimates of coke contamination levels that would be expected

from the use of specific refinery wastes in coke quenching.

Dr. Lamb states that his study showed that "there are

refinery wastes which contain [polynuclear aromatics] that

would deposit on the surface of coke particles if they were

used for coke quenching," and concludes that "[i]t is logical

that these contaminants would disproportionately partition to

the finer coke particles ... [and that] coke dust emitted from

the coke mass would have even higher concentrations of

__________

6 It is unclear whether Champion was a member of the Sierra

Club at the time the petition was filed, and thus eligible to provide

standing for the environmental petitioners. However, the affidavit

by Gordon, who was a member of petitioner Citizens for a Better

Environment when the petition was filed, is in relevant parts

cumulative of Champion's affidavit except as to the location of the

facilities each has identified, for Gordon lives in Pittsburgh, California, while Champion lives in Corpus Christi, Texas.

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contaminants than indicated previously." But the report

notes that "[a] site specific risk assessment would require

actual data of emission rates and ambient air concentrations...."

In sum, the environmental petitioners' affidavits establish

at most that the insertion of hazardous wastes into the

coking process is potentially unhealthy and environmentally

unsound, and that coke product and fines from such a process are likewise unhealthy and environmentally unsound.

What is missing is an averment that such insertion occurs, or

is substantially likely to occur, at the facilities that produce

the coke complained of by affiants Champion or Gordon. It

is true that Dr. Lamb suggests that there is an economic

incentive for coke producers to avail themselves of EPA's

exemption and quench coke in hazardous waste, noting that

"[w]hile there may be some recovery of fuel values, the

overriding incentive for using refinery wastes for coke

quenching is to avoid the cost of waste disposal. The coke

product can be significantly degraded by waste contaminants

added in the quenching step." Such a generalized statement, however, is insufficient to demonstrate a substantial

probability that the specific coke product and fines to which

members of environmental petitioners' organizations are exposed will be quenched in hazardous waste. While Laidlaw

may not require very much to constitute a concrete and

particularized harm, 120 S. Ct. at 706-07, more is required

than the vague statement proffered here. In Florida Audubon, the court rejected the argument that a tax incentive to

produce a fuel derived from ethanol was substantially likely

to generate increased production of ethanol-producing crops,

given the "lengthy chain of conjecture," and thus to generate

increased agricultural pollution in the specific areas where

members of the environmental organization might face harm.

Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666. While the causal chain in

Florida Audubon was significantly more attenuated than

here, Florida Audubon requires some showing of a substantial likelihood that a specific, relevant actor will avail itself of

a given incentive. Id. at 669. No such showing is made

here, as nothing is averred to the effect that hazardous

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wastes are present, and hence available to quench coke, at

the specific facilities identified by affiants Champion and

Gordon, or otherwise to the effect that hazardous waste

quenching currently exists or is substantially likely to exist

in those facilities generating coke product to which members

of environmental petitioners' organizations are exposed.7

Consequently, the environmental petitioners have failed to

link the practices complained of to alleged harms or imminent harms to their members, and thus have failed to establish that they have standing to raise their coke processing

exemption claim. Accordingly, we dismiss the coking process portion of the environmental petitioners' petition for

lack of jurisdiction. See Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 704; Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560-61; LEAN I, 172 F.3d at 68.

C. Wind-blown Coke Product and Fines

Finally, the environmental petitioners seek review of EPA's

decision to defer a listing determination for coke product and

fines accidentally released into the air, or otherwise inadvertently released, from saleable piles of coke. Unlike the

environmental petitioners' coke quenching challenge, their

airborne coke product and fines contention does not relate to

the manner in which coke is processed, or to the materials to

which the coke is exposed in processing. Rather, this contention concerns the non-listing of those product and fines

released from saleable piles of coke, regardless of how the

coke is processed. As noted in subpart (B), affiants Champion and Gordon establish a link between coke product and

fines emissions generally, and their exposure to such product

and fines. Nonetheless, environmental petitioners face another jurisdictional obstacle: the determination they challenge is a deferral of rulemaking, not a final rule.

__________

7 In a supplemental filing on April 5, 2000, the environmental

petitioners repeat that hazardous wastes could, under EPA's rule,

be inserted into the coking process but do not state that this occurs

or is substantially likely to occur at a location referred to in their

affidavits, nor that such information cannot be obtained.

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Under RCRA s 7006(a), the court has jurisdiction to review three types of actions by EPA: promulgation of final

regulations, promulgation of requirements, and the denial of

petitions for the promulgation, amendment or repeal of

RCRA regulations. See American Portland Cement Alliance

v. EPA, 101 F.3d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 42 U.S.C.

s 6976(a) (1995). In determining whether an agency has

taken final action the court has looked to a variety of factors,

"including the agency's own characterization of its action,

publication or lack thereof in the Federal Register or Code of

Federal Regulations, and whether the action has a binding

effect on the rights of parties, and on the agency's ability to

exercise discretion in the future." American Portland Cement, 101 F.3d at 776. A decision by an agency to defer

taking action is not a final action reviewable by the court. As

the court explained in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction

under RCRA to review certain regulatory determinations:

An announcement of an agency's intent to establish law

and policy in future is not the equivalent of the actual

promulgation of a final regulation. EPA described in

detail the areas that will require further analysis before

final regulations can be promulgated, signaling that the

Regulatory Determination was not intended as the last

word on the subject....

American Portland Cement, 101 F.3d at 777 (citation omitted).

The environmental petitioners acknowledge in their initial

brief that EPA's failure to list product and fines from coke

piles is a "deferral" of a listing determination, but contend

nonetheless that it is reviewable under RCRA because EPA

lacked discretion to defer this determination under a consent

decree entered in Browner v. EDF, Civ. No. 89-0598 (D.D.C.

Dec. 9, 1994). The environmental petitioners' position has

three shortcomings.8 First, EPA's decision to defer has none

__________

8 The environmental petitioners attempted, in their reply brief

and at oral argument, to recast their position to be that EPA's

deferral effectively constitutes a final rule insofar as EPA lacked

discretion to defer ruling under both the Browner consent decree

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of the characteristics of final agency action. In explaining its

decision on those product and fines inadvertently discarded

from saleable piles of coke, EPA stated it would "defer"

making a listing determination because the Browner consent

decree did not require such a determination and no other

factors made such a determination immediately necessary.

Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 42,161. A decision to defer has

no binding effect on the parties or on EPA's ability to issue a

ruling in the future. American Portland Cement, 101 F.3d at

776.

Second, to the extent that the environmental petitioners

challenge EPA's interpretation of the consent decree, this

court lacks jurisdiction; an action to enforce the consent

decree must be brought in the district court that issued the

decree, see 42 U.S.C. s 6972(a); Beckett v. Air Line Pilots

Ass'n, 995 F.2d 280, 285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Figures v. Bd.

of Public Utilities of Kansas City, 967 F.2d 357, 361 (10th

Cir. 1992), even assuming that the environmental petitioners

have standing to bring such an enforcement action (for the

Environmental Defense Fund was the sole environmental

organization in the Browner case).9

Accordingly, because the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the environmental petitioners' contention regarding EPA's

decision to defer listing coke product and fines, we dismiss

that portion of their petition for review as well.

__________

and 42 U.S.C. s 6291(e)(2). Under either characterization, the

environmental petitioners' contention fails for the same reasons.

Furthermore, counsel for the environmental petitioners stated at

oral argument that they are not contending that jurisdiction should

be taken on the basis of unreasonable agency delay. See Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 76

(D.C. Cir. 1984).

9 The statute on which the environmental petitioners rely for a

"congressional mandate" for an EPA listing determination on coke

product and fines, 42 U.S.C. s 6291(e)(2), underlies the Browner

consent decree litigation with respect to coke product.

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