Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-13-03069/USCOURTS-ca8-13-03069-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Minneapolis
Appellee
Tim Dolan
Appellee
Michael Patrick Keefe
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-3069

___________________________

Michael Patrick Keefe, an individual

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

City of Minneapolis; Tim Dolan, former Minneapolis Chief of Police, in his

personal capacity; and Janeé Harteau, Minneapolis Chief of Police, in her official

capacity1

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: October 7, 2014

 Filed: May 11, 2015

____________

Before MURPHY, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

1

For Michael Keefe’s official-capacity claims, Janeé Harteau is substituted for

her predecessor, Tim Dolan, as the Minneapolis Chief of Police. See

Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

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Michael Keefe sued the City of Minneapolis (“City”) and Tim Dolan, the

formerChief of Police for the Minneapolis Police Department,for variousfederal and

state claims. The district court2 granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion

as to Keefe’s federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining

state claims. Keefe appeals this ruling, and we affirm.

I.

In March 2007, Keefe, a lieutenant of the Minneapolis Police Department

(“MPD”), was assigned to be the commander of the Violent Offenders Task Force

(“task force”). The task force was a collaboration between multiple agencies,

including the MPD, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Bureau of

Alcohol,Tobacco, Firearms, andExplosives(“ATF”), and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

MPD leadership removed Keefe from the task force in August 2007, and Chief Dolan

demoted Keefe to the rank of sergeant in September 2009.

During Keefe’s time as commander, the task force conducted a wiretap

investigation of a gang. Keefe learned that some gang members had threatened to kill

police officers. Keefe told an Assistant U.S. Attorney and an ATF agent about the

threat. Believing that local law enforcement should be notified, Keefe also told a local

police chief that the U.S. Attorney’s Office would brief the chief’s department about

an ongoing investigation. ATF officials believed that this disclosure was

inappropriate because the investigation involved a wiretap. Accordingly, an ATF

supervisor emailed Keefe stating that he was “a detriment to this investigation,” had

“exhibited . . . poor judgment in making [an] unauthorized disclosure,” and was

“prohibited from entering ATF office space.” An ATF agent forwarded this email to

Keefe’s captain.

2

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

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Later, as part of an unrelated investigation, the FBI and the MPD arrested a

suspected gang leader. During an interview, the suspect named six MPD officers who

he claimed were corrupt. Four of these officers were African American and two were

Caucasian. The suspect’s claims triggered a corruption investigation into the six

named officersin which the suspectserved as an informant. Keefe, who is Caucasian,

doubted some of the informant’s claims and confronted the informant about his

allegations during a second interview. Keefe claims that this second interview

exposed inconsistencies in the informant’s story, but an FBI agent thought Keefe’s

questioning was harming the investigation and ended the interview. Keefe then held

a meeting with other task-force members and explained his belief that the informant

was lying. Keefe also shared his concerns with his captain. After these events, FBI

officials met with Chief Dolan and told him that Keefe was harming the investigation. 

Chief Dolan removed Keefe from the investigation.

Sergeant Patrick King, an MPD officer who was part of the corruption

investigation, grew concerned that Keefe was harming the MPD’s relationship with

itsfederal task-force partners. Sergeant King reported his concern to MPD leadership. 

Around the same time, ATF officials shared their concerns about Keefe’s conduct

with the MPD. MPD leadership decided to remove Keefe from the task force. Shortly

after being reassigned, Keefe lodged a misconduct complaint against Sergeant King,

alleging that he used racial slurs, abused overtime procedures, and improperly

permitted unauthorized officials to be on a task-force email listserv. Internal Affairs

(“IA”)investigated the complaint and, afterinterviewing varioustask-forcemembers,

determined that Keefe’s complaint was unfounded.

After filing this complaint against Sergeant King, Keefe made an anonymous

telephone call to Chief Dolan’s wife. Keefe told her that Chief Dolan needed to know

that the FBI was corrupt and that “they’re blackmailing the lieutenant.” During an

interview as part of an IA investigation, Keefe admitted that he placed this telephone

call and that he had not carried his gun or badge for several months while serving as

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a police officer because he was afraid of being framed or shot by federal agents. As

Keefe explained, “I quit carrying a badge and gun because of these dirty bastards,

fearful that they’d shoot me.” On February 27, 2008, Keefe was placed on

administrative leave with pay pending the outcome of this investigation. As part of

the investigation, Keefe submitted to a psychological fitness-for-duty exam, and a

psychologist cleared him to return to work without restriction. The IA investigation

found that Keefe had violated MPD policy by anonymously calling Chief Dolan’s

wife and failing to carry his gun and badge. As a result, Keefe received an eight-hour

suspension without pay. 

The MPD brought two additional IA cases against Keefe. In case 08-010,

Keefe was accused of making false statements about Sergeant King, making false

accusations about anothersergeant, using racist epithets, being banned from the FBI’s

and the ATF’s offices, andmaintaining inappropriate relations with themedia. In case

09-086, Keefe was accused of several violations of MPD policy related to his

statements that fellow MPD members were going to be indicted. On May 8, 2009,

Keefe was again placed on administrative leave pending the result of the

investigations. Around this time, the FBI banned Keefe from its office space and

circulated a notification that included a photograph of Keefe and urged its employees

to “PROCEED WITH CAUTION” if they encountered Keefe. 

Keefe received disciplinary hearingsfor cases 08-010 and 09-086 where he was

represented by his union. At the hearing for case 08-010, Keefe gave a lengthy

statement of about forty minutes, insisting that other officers were going to be

indicted. Keefe’s statements and behavior during the hearing made the disciplinary

panel members concerned. After this hearing, Keefe was relieved from duty with pay

and subjected to a second fitness-for-duty examination. A psychologist found Keefe

conditionally fit for duty but noted in his report that “[i]f Lieutenant Keefe is unable

to immediately let go of his obsession(s) that indictments are pending . . . it would

demonstrate to the MPD that his behavioral issues cannot be resolved and

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subsequently could render an opinion that he is unfit for duty.” The MPD sustained

several allegations against Keefe in case 08-010 and sustained three allegations from

case 09-086. Specifically, in case 08-010, a disciplinary panel found Keefe

responsible forlevying untruthful allegations against other MPD officers, using racist

language, being banned from the FBI’s and the ATF’s offices, and having

inappropriate relationships with the media. In case 09-086, a disciplinary panel found

that Keefe had violated the MPD’s code of conduct as to truthfulness, ethics, and

discretion. Chief Dolan demoted Keefe to the rank of sergeant on September 27,

2009. 

Meanwhile, the corruption investigation of MPD officers led to the arrest and

indictment of Michael Roberts, then an MPD officer. Keefe received a subpoena to

testify at Roberts’s criminal trial but never testified because Roberts pleaded guilty. 

Around the time ofRoberts’sscheduled trial, the StarTribune, a newspaper, published

an article titled “Did Minneapolis police officer spin lies?” The article reported that

Keefewassuspended for “allegedly spreading rumorsthat officers and FBI agents lied

about their handling of a long-term police corruption investigation and were going to

be indicted.” 

Keefe filed an action in Minnesota state court, bringing both federal and state

claims against the City and Chief Dolan. The defendants removed the case to federal

court. Keefe’s federal claims were (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 substantive due process

claim, (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim for failure to prevent a conspiracy to interfere

with civil rights, (3) a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 retaliation claim, and (4) a Monell claim

against the city, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The

defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary

judgment to the defendants on each of Keefe’s federal claims and then declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Keefe’s state-law claims. The district court

remanded the remaining state-law claims to Minnesota state court. Keefe appeals. 

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II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, Jackson v. Buckman,

756 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 2014), and we affirm if “there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The non-moving party receives the benefit of all reasonable

inferences supported by the evidence, but has the obligation to come forward with

specific factsshowing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Walz v. Ameriprise Fin.,

Inc. 779 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting B.M. ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R-II

Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2013)). “At the summary judgment stage, facts

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “A complete failure by the non-moving party ‘to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case . . . necessarily renders all other factsimmaterial.’” Walz, 799 F.3d at 844

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). “[W]e may affirm

a district court’s order, including an order granting summary judgment, on any basis

supported by the record, even if that ground was not considered by the district court.” 

Saulsberry v. St. Mary’s Univ. of Minn., 318 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Viking Supply v. Nat’l Cart Co., Inc., 310 F.3d 1092, 1097 (8th Cir. 2002)).

A. Section 1983—Substantive Due Process

To recover under § 1983 for a substantive due process violation, Keefe must

show, among other things, that the offender violated a fundamental right in a way that

“shocks the conscience.” See Folkerts v. City of Waverly, Iowa, 707 F.3d 975, 980

(8th Cir. 2013). Keefe claims that a conscience-shocking constitutional violation

arose from the defendants’ interference with “his right to enjoy employment

opportunities in his chosen field.” Specifically, Keefe alleges that the defendants

“engineered and steered sham investigations” in order to discredit and silence him. 

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Assuming without deciding that these allegations show a violation of a fundamental

right, we hold that Keefe’s § 1983 claim nonethelessfails because the alleged conduct

on which Keefe relies does not rise to the level of “so egregious, so outrageous, that

it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary consciences.” See Cnty. of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998). 

In support of his argument that the defendants engineered sham investigations

that violated his substantive due process rights, Keefe cites Moran v. Clarke. 296

F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). As we explained in Moran, “substantive due

process is concerned with violations . . . so severe . . . so disproportionate to the need

presented, and . . . so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or

unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official 

power literally shocking to the conscience.” Id. at 647 (second and third ellipses in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Scott Cnty. Master Docket,

672 F. Supp. 1152, 1166 (D. Minn 1987)). In Moran, the plaintiff presented evidence

thatstate actors purposefully manufactured false evidence that led to his criminal trial. 

Id. at 639-42. Moran explained that an employee has a right to be free from

“stigmatizing conduct, at least without an opportunity for a name-clearing response.” 

Id. at 645 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)).

But here, none of what Keefe experienced was so severe as to shock the

conscience. Keefe claims that he unjustly suffered multiple adverse employment

actions including a suspension, removal from the task force, placement on

administrative leave, and demotion. None of these adverse employment actions were

so severe as to shock the conscience in the way that pursuing a criminal conviction of

an innocent man does. See id. at 639-47. This is particularly true because Keefe

admitted to some of the misconduct that supported the resulting adverse employment

actions. Indeed, Keefe admitted to placing an anonymous phone call to Chief Dolan’s

wife and to failing to carry hisfirearm and badge forseveral months. These violations

resulted in his eight-hour suspension without pay. In addition, the FBI and the ATF

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banned Keefe from their office spaces. These bans were relied upon as part of the

basis for Keefe’s demotion. Moreover, Keefe was demoted only after receiving two

disciplinary hearings. At its core then, Keefe’s argument is that the MPD improperly

steered the IA investigations in a way that contributed to some of the MPD’s adverse

employment actions and that his “opportunity for a name-clearing response” at his two

disciplinary hearings was somehow insufficient. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. Even if

true, these allegations simply do not rise to the level of conduct “inspired by malice

or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal [such] that it

amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the

conscience.” See Moran, 296 F.3d at 647. 

Keefe next alleges that Chief Dolan’s defamatory statements violated a

fundamental constitutionalright. Keefe points to Chief Dolan’s alleged statement that

“Keefe had leaked a classified investigation to black officers” and Chief Dolan’s

action of “intentionally instigat[ing] stories that damaged Keefe in the StarTribune.” 

Keefe argues this conduct violated his fundamental constitutional rights because it

impacted his employment interests. In support of his argument, Keefe cites several

of our cases where a plaintiff sued his government employer for making stigmatizing

statements during the course of termination. See Mascho v. Gee, 24 F.3d 1037, 1039

(8thCir. 1994); Shands v.City ofKennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1347 (8thCir. 1993); Green

v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 911 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1990). Even assuming that

defamation of this sort implicates a fundamental right protected by substantive due

process, see Shands, 993 F.2d at 1347 (discussing the plaintiff’s argument as a

“procedural due process” claim), the conduct at issue here is not conscience shocking. 

Keefe was not terminated from employment at all, let alone terminated in a fashion

that foreclosed his “freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” 

See Mascho, 24 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Shands, 993 F.2d at 1347). More importantly,

Chief Dolan’s actions did not amount to “a brutal and inhumane abuse of official

power literally shocking to the conscience.” See Moran, 296 F.3d at 647. 

Accordingly, construing the factsin the light most favorable to Keefe, we find that he

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hasfailed to present a genuine dispute of material fact asto a necessary element of his

§ 1983 substantive due process claim—that the defendants’ actions were shocking to

the conscience. See id.

B. Section 1986—Failure to Prevent a Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights 

In order to bring a § 1986 claim for failure to prevent a conspiracy to interfere

with civil rights, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendants had actual knowledge

of a § 1985 conspiracy, (2) the defendants had the power to prevent or aid in

preventing the commission of the § 1985 conspiracy, (3) the defendants neglected or

refused to prevent the conspiracy, and (4) a wrongful act was committed. Brandon

v. Lotter, 157 F.3d 537, 539 (8th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a § 1986 cause of action

is dependent upon a valid § 1985 claim. Barstad v. Murray Cnty., 420 F.3d 880, 887

(8th Cir. 2005). Keefe roots his claim in § 1985(3). Thus, per § 1985(3), Keefe is

required to show, among other things, that there was an actual conspiracy between

multiple persons, see Barstad, 420 F.3d at 887, and that “the conspiracy [was] fueled

by some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus,” see McDonald v. City of

St. Paul, 679 F.3d 698, 706 (8thCir. 2012)(quoting Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069,

1079 (8th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Assuming without deciding that Keefe has made a sufficient showing as to the

other elements of a § 1985(3) claim, we hold that Keefe failsto raise a genuine dispute

of material fact as to whether a conspiracy existed that was motivated by a classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus. Although it is not entirely clear, we

surmise that Keefe’s argument isthat a § 1985 conspiracy existed among several MPD

officersto influence the corruption investigation in a way that was motivated by racial

animus against the four African-American officers who had been identified by the

informant as corrupt. Keefe suggests that the conspirators harbored “racial animus

towards Black officers” and accordingly took steps to discredit him and remove him

from the task force. 

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Keefe fails to direct us to anything in the record showing that a conspiracy

existed that was fueled by some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. 

Keefe notes that four of the six officers that the informant claimed were corrupt were

African American. But the mere fact that four of the six officers investigated were

African American does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that the investigation

was motivated by a racially discriminatory animus. Keefe also points to several

instances where Sergeant King allegedly made racist statements. Both Keefe and

another MPD officer claimed to have heard Sergeant King use racial slurs. But none

of the instances when Sergeant King allegedly used racial slurs appear to be related

to the corruption investigation. In fact, Keefe’s IA complaint against Sergeant King,

which originated through amemorandumhe sent to Chief Dolan, alleged that Sergeant

King had used racial slurs multiple times, but Keefe’s memorandum did not include

any allegations that the corruption investigation was motivated by racial animus. 

Keefe does not refer us to anything in the record that raises a genuine dispute of

material fact that Sergeant King formed an agreement with other members of the task

force to influence the investigation in a way that was motivated by racial animus. 

Accordingly, Keefe’s § 1986 claim fails.

C. Section 1981—Retaliation 

Section 1981 providesthat, “[a]ll persons. . .shall have the same right in every

State and Territory to make and enforce contracts. . . asis enjoyed by white citizens.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1981. A non-minority plaintiff, such as Keefe, can bring a § 1981 claim

“if he is discriminated or retaliated against for attempting to ‘vindicate the rights of

minorities protected by’ § 1981.” See Gacek v. Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., 666

F.3d 1142, 1146 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 398

U.S. 229, 237 (1969)). A prima facie claim for retaliation under § 1981 requires a

showing that (1) the plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) an adverse

employment action was taken against him, and (3) there is a causal connection

between the two events. Id. A § 1981 claim also “must initially identify an impaired

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contractual relationship under which the plaintiff has rights.” Gregory v. Dillard’s,

Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 468-69 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v.

McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We analyze § 1981 claims under the same framework as Title VII claims. 

Gacek, 666 F.3d at 1146. Under this framework, if the plaintiff is able to establish a

prima facie retaliation case, the defendant must provide a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. Id. If the defendant is able

to do so, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason

was merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. “To survive summary judgment, an

employee must both discredit the employer’s articulated reason and demonstrate the

‘circumstances permit a reasonable inference of discriminatory animus.’” Johnson v.

Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 769 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting

Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 856 (8th Cir. 2012)), cert. denied, ---

U.S.---, 83 U.S.L.W. 3661 (Mar. 30, 2015)(No. 14-951). Assuming without deciding

that Keefe has established a prima facie retaliation showing under § 1981, his claim

nonetheless fails because he does not establish a genuine dispute of material fact that

the defendants’ proffered reasons for each employment action were merely pretextual. 

Keefe claimsthat he suffered five adverse employment actionsin retaliation for

his attempt to vindicate the § 1981 rights of the four African-American officers under

investigation. The defendants have proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for each of these employment decisions. First, Keefe claims that his removal from the

task force was retaliatory. The defendants assert that Keefe was removed because he

had damaged hisrelationship with the FBI and the ATF, which made it impracticalfor

him to serve as the commander of a multi-agency task force. There is no dispute that

Keefe was removed from the task force only after officials from both the FBI and the

ATF expressed their dissatisfaction with Keefe’s behavior. Moreover, Keefe was

banned from the ATF’s office space. Keefe argues that “[e]ach adverse action was

deliberately aimed at dissuading and discouraging Keefe’s further reports and

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punishing himfor his previous protected conduct.” But Keefe fails to cite any specific

facts showing there is a genuine dispute that the defendants’ articulated reason for

removing him from the task force—that he had damaged hisrelationship with the FBI

and the ATF—was merely pretextual. See Walz, 779 F.3d at 844. Accordingly, Keefe

has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact discrediting the defendants’

articulated reason for this adverse employment action, and he thus fails to carry his

burden on summary judgment. See Securitas, 769 F.3d at 611. 

Second, Keefe argues that he suffered retaliation when he was placed on

administrative leave in 2008 pending the outcome of an IA investigation. In response,

the defendants assert that Keefe was placed on administrative leave after Keefe

admitted that he had anonymously called Chief Dolan’s wife and had not carried his

gun or badge for months. Third, Keefe argues that his later eight-hour suspension in

2008 was retaliatory. The defendants again respond that Keefe was suspended

because of the same admitted misconduct. Keefe admitted to this misconduct before

he was placed on administrated leave and before he was suspended. Again, Keefe

failsto point usto any specific facts discrediting the defendant’s articulated reason for

his placement on administrative leave and suspension. Therefore, Keefe cannot

establish a genuine dispute ofmaterialfact that the defendants’ proffered reasons were

pretextual. See id.

Fourth, Keefe similarly argues that his placement on administrative leave in

2009 pending the outcome of the other two IA cases was retaliatory. Chief Dolan

claims that he decided to place Keefe on leave because he considered Keefe to be

potentially dangerous. According to Chief Dolan, his belief was based on Keefe’s

behavior as well as the fact that the FBI had issued a notice urging its officials to

“PROCEED WITH CAUTION” if Keefe was encountered and to alert security if

Keefe attempted to enter the FBI building. Keefe responds that this reason is

pretextual because the “MPD, not the FBI, was responsible for the specious FBI alert

on Keefe.” But the record contradicts this claim. As shown by the record, an MPD

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official delivered a memorandum to a Deputy Chief that included a copy of the FBI’s

notice and explained that the notice was “hand delivered” by an FBI agent. An

electronic copy of the FBI’s notice was forwarded by email to another Deputy Chief,

who forwarded the email to Chief Dolan. Accordingly, Keefe again fails to raise a

genuine dispute of material fact to discredit the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

that Chief Dolan gave for his decision to place Keefe on administrative leave in 2009. 

See id.

Finally, Keefe asserts that his demotion was retaliatory. Chief Dolan decided

to demote Keefe after a disciplinary panel found Keefe responsible for multiple

violations of MPD policy. In case 08-010, Keefe was found responsible for being

untruthful in levying allegations against other MPD officers, using racist language,

being banned from the FBI’s and the ATF’s offices, and having inappropriate

relationships with the media. And in case 09-086, Keefe was found to have violated

the MPD’s code of conduct asto truthfulness, ethics, and discretion. According to the

defendants, the panels’ findings provided Chief Dolan with a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason to demote Keefe. 

Keefe argues that his demotion was a pretext for retaliation because Chief

Dolan was unfamiliar with the factssurrounding Keefe’s alleged improper disclosure

of a wiretap. Keefe further argues that the IA investigations were flawed, and he also

challenges a disciplinary panel’s finding that he was untruthful when he made

statements that certain MPD officers were going to be indicted. Keefe’s arguments

do not undermine Chief Dolan’s reliance on the disciplinary panel’s findings. First,

Chief Dolan was not a member of the disciplinary panels that reviewed the evidence

and determined that Keefe had violated MPD policy. Accordingly, it is not surprising

that Chief Dolan was not familiar with the nuances of Keefe’s violations. Next,

Keefe’s argument that the IA investigations were flawed does notshow pretext. Keefe

received two disciplinary hearings where he was represented by his union. And even

if the panel erred in reaching some of its conclusions, Keefe has failed to present

evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact that the MPD acted to retaliate. 

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Chief Dolan decided to demote Keefe only after lengthy IA investigations, two

hearingsin front of disciplinary panels where Keefe wasrepresented by his union, and

the panels’ decisions that Keefe had violated MPD policy numerous times. The

record shows that Keefe was afforded a substantial amount of process before he was

demoted. We decline to act “as a super-personnel department that reexamines an

entity’s business decisions.” Ebersole v. Novo Nordisk Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 927 (8th

Cir. 2014) (quoting Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d 806, 823 (8th

Cir. 2005)). Keefe has failed to point to specific facts that discredit any of the

defendants’ proffered explanations for the various employment decisions. See

Securitas, 769 F.3d at 611. Accordingly, Keefe has failed to show that there is a

genuine issue for trial as to his § 1981 claim. 

D. Monell Municipal Liability

Finally, Keefe argues that the City adopted “a policy of using it[s] internal

affairs division not to discipline officers, but to sanction and punish them for reports

of law violations.” See generally Monell, 436 U.S. 659. Generally, a government

entity is not liable for its employee’s actions under § 1983. Brockington v. City of

Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007). But a plaintiff can pursue a

Monell claim under § 1983 by identifying a government entity’s policy or custom that

caused the plaintiff’s injury. Id. Here, Keefe’s Monell claim is dependent upon his

§§ 1981 and 1983 claims. Because summary judgment is proper on those claims,

Keefe’s Monell claim also fails. See Brockington, 503 F.3d at 674. Accordingly, the

district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Keefe’s Monell claim.

III.

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

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