Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01399/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01399-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martin Diaz
Defendant
Dawn Dickey
Plaintiff
Eliberto Gracia
Defendant
Rene Luis
Defendant
Vital One Health Plans Direct, LLC
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAWN DICKEY, on behalf of herself and 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

VITAL ONE HEALTH PLANS DIRECT, 

LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company; 

et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:18-cv-01399-DAD-BAM

ORDER GRANTING THE PARTIES’ JOINT 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 

RULES 23(e) and 41(a)

(Doc. Nos. 49, 51)

This matter is before the court on the joint motions to dismiss filed by plaintiff Dawn 

Dickey and defendants Vital One Health Plans Direct, LLC; Rene Luis; Eliberto Gracia; and 

Martin Diaz. The court reviewed the papers filed in connection with the pending motions and 

deemed the matter suitable for decision on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). The court 

will, for the reasons set forth below, grant both joint motions to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint 

on October 10, 2018 seeking damages and equitable remedies based on defendants’ alleged 

violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 

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The parties, however, eventually reached a settlement and notified the court thereof on 

November 7, 2019. (Doc. No. 47.) Pursuant to the settlement, the parties moved jointly to 

dismiss plaintiff’s individual claims with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and class 

claims without prejudice pursuant to Rule 23(e). (Doc. Nos. 49, 51.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

An action may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 by filing a “a stipulation of dismissal 

signed by all parties who have appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). However, Rule 23(e) 

governs the dismissal of class actions, even before class certification has occurred. Diaz v. Tr. 

Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding “that Rule 23(e) applies 

before certification”).

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Accordingly, the “district court must ensure that the representative plaintiff fulfills his 

fiduciary duty toward the absent class members” and “inquire into the terms and circumstances of 

any dismissal or compromise to ensure that it is not collusive or prejudicial.” Id. Although the 

court “does not need to perform the kind of substantive oversight required when reviewing a 

settlement binding upon the class,” it must determine whether class members would be prejudiced 

by: 

(1) class members’ possible reliance on the filing of the action if 

they are likely to know of it either because of publicity or other 

circumstances, (2) lack of adequate time for class members to file 

other actions, because of a rapidly approaching statute of 

limitations, (3) any settlement or concession of class interests made 

by the class representative or counsel in order to further their own 

interests.

 

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 Although “Rule 23(e) was specifically amended in 2003 to make clear that court approval was 

not required for settlements with putative class representatives that resolved only individual 

claims,” and there “remains some uncertainty about whether the Diaz holding applies in the wake 

of the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(e),” district courts in the Ninth Circuit continue to apply the 

standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Diaz because it “strikes the right balance between the 

full-bore fairness review for settlement of certified class claims, and doing nothing at all to ensure 

that putative class members are protected from collusive deals.” Topete v. Ramos Furniture, No. 

1:16-cv-00271-DAD-EPG, 2018 WL 4006556, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2018), findings and 

recommendations adopted, No. 1:16-cv-00271-DAD-EPG, 2018 WL 6615107 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 

16, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see, e.g., Dunn v. Teachers Ins. & 

Annuity Ass’n of Am., No. 13-cv-05456-HSG, 2016 WL 153266, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2016); 

Tombline v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 13-cv-04567-JD, 2014 WL 5140048, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 10, 2014).

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Id. Regardless, “[i]n no pre-certification dismissal would the court reject the dismissal and 

require anything more than notice to the class and an opportunity to intervene.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Applying the three Diaz factors here, the court concludes that dismissal of plaintiff’s class 

claims without prejudice will not harm any putative class members. First, there is no evidence 

that any putative class members are relying on this action. Coverage of the case in the media has 

been limited to a few mentions on legal news and court docket aggregators such as 

www.law360.com and www.docketbird.com, and plaintiff has received no inquiries from anyone 

about the case. (Doc. No. 51 at 3.); see Tombline, 2014 WL 5140048, at *2 (noting that there is 

unlikely to be reliance when “no one purporting to be a putative class member [has] contacted 

plaintiffs’ counsel about this case”).

Second, putative class members would not be barred from filing their own individual or 

class claims by a statute of limitations. The TCPA has a four-year statute of limitations. See 

Giovanniello v. ALM Media, LLC, 726 F.3d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the generally 

applicable four-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) governs TCPA actions). 

Because the claims in this case are derived from phone calls allegedly made in the fall of 2016

(see Doc. No. 37 at 14–15), putative class members would still have at least six months from the 

time of dismissal of the class claims in this case to file a new class action. Individual claims 

would still be timely for an additional two years because any individual claims have been tolled 

since this action was filed in October 10, 2018. See China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, __ U.S. __, 138 

S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (2018) (holding that the statute of limitations is tolled for individual claims 

“during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing unnamed class members to join the 

action individually or file individual claims if the class fails”).

Finally, the settlement between plaintiff and defendants only resolves plaintiff’s individual 

claims—because the parties are only requesting dismissal of the class claims without prejudice, 

leaving putative class members free to pursue a new class action, no class interests are being 

conceded. (Doc. No. 51 at 3–4.)

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The court therefore deems the Diaz factors satisfied here. Because there is no risk of 

prejudice, notice to putative class members is not required. See Diaz, 876 F.2d at 1408 (“Notice 

to the class of pre-certification dismissal is not, however, required in all circumstances.”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. The parties’ joint motions to dismiss (Doc. Nos. 49, 51) are granted; 

a. Plaintiff’s individual claims are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule

41(a)(1)(A)(ii);

b. Plaintiff’s class claims are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 

23(e); and

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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