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Parties Involved:
Horace Joseph Big Medicine
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

HORACE JOSEPH BIG MEDICINE, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

DEC 2 D 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

C!erlt 

95-8001 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-84) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

David D. Freudenthal, United States Attorney, John R. Green, 

Assistant United States Attorney, District of Wyoming, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Corinne A. Miller, Casper, Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Circuit Judge. 

Horace Joseph Big Medicine pled guilty to one count of sexual 

abuse of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §~2243(a) and 1153. 

In sentencing Big Medicine, the district court upwardly departed 

Appellate Case: 95-8001 Document: 01019280390 Date Filed: 12/29/1995 Page: 1 
from the Sentencing Guidelines, and Big Medicine challenges the 

departure on appeal. Because we conclude that one of the bases 

for the upward departure was improper, we vacate the sentence and 

remand for resentencing.l 

I. 

In May 1994, Big Medicine's stepdaughter disclosed that Big 

Medicine and she had engaged in sexual intercourse and that she 

was pregnant. At the time, the stepdaughter was fifteen years old 

and was living with her mother and Big Medicine on the Wind River 

Indian Reservation in Wyoming. Following initiation of an 

investigation, Big Medicine admitted that he had had sexual 

intercourse with his stepdaughter on about seventy-five occasions 

over the previous four years, beginning when she was twelve years 

old. A grand jury indicted Big Medicine on three counts of sexual 

abuse of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243(a) and 1153. 

Big Medicine initially pled not guilty, but later agreed to plead 

guilty to one of the counts as part of a plea agreement. In the 

plea agreement, which the district court accepted, Big Medicine 

acknowledged he understood that the government would seek a 

sentence at the highest level allowable pursuant to the United 

States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (hereinafter 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is 'therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-8001 Document: 01019280390 Date Filed: 12/29/1995 Page: 2 
Guidelines) . He also acknowledged the government would seek an 

upward departure outside the applicable G~idelines range.2 

The presentence report indicated that the appropriate 

Guidelines section for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) is 

§ 2A3.2, which provides a base offense level of fifteen. The 

report stated that because the victim was in Big Medicine's 

custody and care, the offense level would be increased by two 

levels pursuant to § 2A3 . 2 (b) ( 1 ) . Because Big Medicine 

demonstrated acceptance of responsibility, the offense level would 

be decreased by three levels pursuant to § 3E1.1. With an 

adjusted offense level of fourteen and a criminal history category 

of I, the Guidelines range was fifteen to twenty-one months. 

The report also suggested that an upward departure from the 

Guidelines might be appropriate to reflect the numerous admitted 

instances of criminal acts, the age of the victim, and the bodily 

injury suffered by the victim as a result of the pregnancy and 

subsequent abortion. Relying on the multi-count analysis of 

Guidelines § 3D1.4, the report suggested an increase of five 

levels. Using the enhancements for age and bodily injury under 

§ 2A3.1 for criminal sexual abuse, the report suggested a 

two-level increase under both § § 2A3 . 1 (b) ( 2 ) (B) and 

2A3 .1 (b) (4) (B) . Addition of these nine levels would result in an 

offense level of twenty-three, with a corresponding imprisonment 

range of forty-six to fifty-seven months. 

2 References to the Guidelines are to those incorporating 

amendments effective November 1, 1993. 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-8001 Document: 01019280390 Date Filed: 12/29/1995 Page: 3 
In sentencing Big Medicine, the district court concluded that 

the seventy-five criminal acts were aggravating circumstances and 

used the multi-count analysis of § 3Dl.4 to add five levels. The 

court also found it appropriate to increase the offense level by 

two to account for the victim's age,· relying on § 2A3.l(b) (2) (B). 

Addition of these seven levels to the fourteen initially 

determined resulted in a total offense level of twenty-one .and a 

corresponding imprisonment range of thirty-seven to forty-six 

months. The court used the victim's pregnancy and abortion as a 

reason to sentence Big Medicine to forty-six months.3 

II. 

We apply a three-step process in reviewing the propriety of a 

district court's decision to depart upward from the Guidelines. 

United States v. Okane, 52 F.3d 828, 831 (lOth Cir. 1995); United 

States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 277 (lOth Cir. 1990). First, we 

examine the record de novo to determine whether the circumstances 

cited by the district court justify departure. Okane, 52 F.3d at 

831. Second, we assess under the clearly erroneous standard 

whether the record contains a factual basis to support the 

circumstances relied upon by the district court. Id. Finally, we 

determine whether the degree of departure was reasonable. Id. On 

appeal, Big Medicine does not challenge the factual bases for the 

upward departure. He ·contends that the circumstances did not 

3 The court also recommended that Big Medicine be placed in a 

sex offenders treatment program during the last twenty-four months 

of his imprisonment, and ordered him to pay $1,328.90 in 

restitution and a $50.00 special assessment fee and to be placed 

on three years' supervised release following his imprisonment. 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-8001 Document: 01019280390 Date Filed: 12/29/1995 Page: 4 
justify departure and that the degree of departure was not 

reasonable. 

Big Medicine argues that the district court's consideration 

of uncharged conduct to increase his sentence through its 

multi-count analysis was improper for two reasons. First, he 

contends that in the plea bargain he pled guilty to only one act 

of statutory rape and did not stipulate to the other seventy-four 

acts to which he admitted. He argues that because he did not 

stipulate to the other acts, and in fact pled guilty to one count 

only in exchange for dismissal of the other two counts, the ·court 

violated the plea agreement by sentencing him based on the 

uncharged conduct and dismissed charges. See, e.g., United States 

v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1990). Second, 

he contends that under United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 

342 (lOth Cir. 1990), the district court could not use the 

multi-count analysis to sentence him to more time (forty-six 

months) than it could have sentenced him had he been convicted of 

all three counts contained in the original indictment (which he 

claims is a maximum of thirty-seven months). 

Big Medicine's arguments are based on his contention that the 

court relied solely on the charges dismissed as part of the plea 

bargain as the basis for the upward departure, as was the case in 

Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d at 1082. We see the court's 

multi- count departure analy.sis differently. 

When a defendant stipulates to misconduct in a plea 

agreement, he must be sentenced as if he had been convicted of 

this misconduct. See Zamarripa, 905 F.2d at 341. However, the 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-8001 Document: 01019280390 Date Filed: 12/29/1995 Page: 5 
reverse--that unstipulated misconduct cannot increase a 

sentence--is obviously not- true. Id. at 341-42 (adopting 

discussion of 11means by which misconduct not resulting in 

conviction may be factored into the district court's sentencing 

decision 11 stated in United States v. ·Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 682-85 (2d 

Cir. 1990)). Guidelines § 5K2.0, which the district court used 

here, allows uncharged misconduct to support an upward departure. 

Zamarripa, 905 F.2d at 341. The government need prove such 

misconduct only by a preponderance of the evidence. United States 

v. Sapp, 53 F.3d 1100, 1104 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

Nothing in the plea agreement prevented the district court 

from considering uncharged misconduct in sentencing. The 

agreement simply did not address this issue.4 Thus, the sentence 

did not violate the plea agreement or make it an 11 empty bargain, 11 

as Big Medicine contends. 

Big Medicine is incorrect that the district court's departure 

would have been different had it been based on only the 

seventy-two instances of the 11 never charged 11 criminal sexual abuse 

without consideration of the two charged but dismissed instances. 

Although the district court in fact considered all seventy-five 

acts of misconduct to which Big Medicine admitted, the inclusion 

of the two dismissed counts did not make a difference in the 

multi-count analysis. Because acts of criminal sexual abuse are 

excluded from being grouped together under the multi-count 

analysis, each act counts separately as one unit. See § 3Dl. 2 

4 Although the agreement stated that the government would seek 

upward departure, it did not state on what bases. 

6 

Appellate Case: 95-8001 Document: 01019280390 Date Filed: 12/29/1995 Page: 6 
commentary application note 4, ex. (5) (rape of same victim on 

separate days ·not subject to grouping). For anything more than 

five units, the increase is five levels. Regardless of whether 

the precise number of units here was seventy-two, seventy-four or 

seventy-five, the multi-count analysi·s would remain the same.5 

Big Medicine's second argument regarding the district court's 

consideration of uncharged misconduct fails for the same reason. 

This argument is apparently based on his contention that had he 

been convicted of the three counts contained in the original 

indictment, the multi-count analysis would have resulted-in an 

increase of only three levels instead of five. See Guidelines 

§ 3Dl. 4. Had this been the case, however, the court still could 

have considered the other seventy-two instances of uncharged 

misconduct in departing upward and could have arrived at the same 

five-level increase as it did here. Big Medicine did not "receive 

more time on a 'departure' than he could have received had he been 

convicted of the crimes leading the judge to depart." Zamarripa, 

905 F.2d at 342 (quotation omitted). 

Big Medicine next argues that the victim's pregnancy and 

abortion were not circumstances outside the "heartland" of typic_al 

sexual abuse cases and should not justify departure from the 

Guidelines. However, the district court did not depart upward 

based on the victim's pregnancy but instead used it only as a 

reason to sentence Big Medicine at the high end of the range it 

determined on the basis of other factors. We do not review a 

5 We therefore need not address Big Medicine's argument that a 

court cannot consider in its sentencing decision charges dismissed 

as part of a plea agreement. 

7 

Appellate Case: 95-8001 Document: 01019280390 Date Filed: 12/29/1995 Page: 7 
district court's rationale for imposition of a particular sentence 

within an appropriate Guidelines range. United States v. Flinn, 

987 F.2d 1497, 1505-06 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Finally, Big Medicine contends that the district court erred 

in upwardly departing based on the age of the victim. We agree. 

Big Medicine was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2443(a), 

sexual abuse of a minor. For violation of this statute, the 

victim must "ha[ve] attained the age of 12 years but ha[ve] not 

attained the age of 16 years." Id. § 2243(a) (1). Guidelines 

§ 2A3.2 covers violations of section 2243(a), and the commentary 

to § 2A3.2 states that it "applies to sexual acts that would be 

lawful but for the age of the victim." 

In determining that an offense level increase for the 

victim's age was appropriate, the district court relied on 

Guidelines § 2A3.1(b) (2) (B) to add two levels.6 However, § 2A3.1 

applies to violations of statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242) for 

which the victim's age is not a consideration. Similarly, § 2A3.4 

covers violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2244, abusive sexual contact, and 

also contains a provision in subsection (b) (2) for increasing the 

offense level in some circumstances based on the age of the 

victim. The background section of the commentary to § 2A3.4 

states that "[t]he enhancement under subsection (b) (2) does not 

apply, however, where the base offense level is determined under 

subsection (a) (3) because an element of the offense to which that 

offense level applies is that the victim had attained the age of 

6 Guidelines§ 2A3.1(b) (2) (B) states that "if. the victim had 

attained the age of twelve years but had not attained the age of 

sixteen years, increase by 2 levels." 

8 

Appellate Case: 95-8001 Document: 01019280390 Date Filed: 12/29/1995 Page: 8 
twelve years but had not attained the age of sixteen years." Cf. 

United States· v. Plaza-Garcia·, 914 F.2d 345, 347 (1st Cir. 

1990) ("Guideline § 3Al.l provides for a two-level increase if the 

victim is 'unusually vulnerable due to age;' but it also states 

that no increase is warranted· if 'the offense guideline 

specifically incorporates this factor.'"). 

We are persuaded that Guidelines § 2A3.2 already considers 

the victim's age because it applies to violations of a statute 

that prohibits sexual acts with another person of a specified age. 

Age is thus an aggravating circumstance adequately considered by 

the Sentencing Commission, and the district court should not have 

used it to increase Big Medicine's sentence. Although we affirm 

the court's use of uncharged misconduct to depart upwardly, the 

court's improper reliance on the victim's age as a departure 

factor requires that we remand for resentencing. Zamarripa, 905 

F.2d at 342. We do not address the reasonableness of the degree 

of departure. 

The case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions 

to VACATE the sentence and RESENTENCE Big Medicine in light of 

this opinion. 

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