Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30056/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30056-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel Navarrette-Aguilar
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SAMUEL NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR,

AKA Guayabo,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-30056

D.C. No.

3:12-cr-00373-

HZ-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 3, 2015—Portland, Oregon

Filed December 28, 2015

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Richard A. Paez,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez

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2 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated

in part a criminal judgment in a case in which a jury

(1) found the defendant guilty of conspiracy to distribute

heroin, distribution of heroin, and possession of heroin with

intent to distribute; and (2) made a special finding that the

quantity of heroin was at least one kilogram, triggering a

mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i).

 

The panel concluded, as did the district court, that the

testimonial and physical evidence cannot support a finding of

one kilogram. The panel held that the district court erred,

however, in determining that the pattern of transactions

permitted the jury to conclude that members of the conspiracy

would have eventually distributed one kilogram of heroin. 

The panel wrote that it would be speculative to infer that the

defendants agreed to any future transactions such that they

would reach the one kilogram mark. The panel held that the

error was not harmless, and therefore reversed the jury’s

quantity finding, vacated the sentence on all counts, and

remanded for re-sentencing. 

Affirming the convictions, the panel held that the district

court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the

government to ask the defendant’s sister, a defense witness,

about the defendant’s prior convictions, where the witness

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 3

opened the door to impeachment. The panel concluded that

even if the district court did abuse its discretion, the error was

harmless.

COUNSEL

Per C. Olson (argued), Hoevet Boise Olson Howes, Portland,

Oregon, for Defendant-Appellant.

Kelly A. Zusman (argued), Appellate Chief, Assistant United

States Attorney and S. Amanda Marshall, United States

Attorney for the District of Oregon, Portland, Oregon, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Samuel Navarrette-Aguilar (“Navarrette”) appeals his

conviction and sentence. A jury found him guilty of

conspiracy to distribute heroin, distribution of heroin,

possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and made a

special finding that the quantity of heroin was at least one

kilogram. Navarrette argues that substantial evidence did not

support the jury’s quantity finding. The evidence of historical

transactions adduced did not amount to one kilogram. 

Navarrette maintains that when the district court denied his

motions for judgment of acquittal, it erred in determining that

the pattern of transactions permitted the jury to conclude that

members of the conspiracywould have eventually distributed

one kilogram of heroin. Navarrette further argues that the

district court abused its discretion when it permitted the

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4 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR

government to ask a defense witness on cross-examination

about his prior convictions for drug trafficking and escape. 

Although we affirm Navarrette’s convictions on the

conspiracy and distribution counts, we reverse the district

court’s ruling on the jury’s quantity finding, vacate his

sentence, and remand for re-sentencing.

I.

Navarrette was charged with Conspiracyto Traffic Heroin

in a quantity of one kilogram or more; Distribution of Heroin

Resulting in Death; and Possession with Intent to Distribute

Heroin. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. He was also charged with

the penalty provision for distributing a kilogram or more of

heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i), which provides for a

mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence for a defendant

who, like Navarrette, has a prior felony drug conviction. The

government also charged him with the penalty provision for

distributing a schedule I controlled substance resulting in

death or serious injury, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The

government charged two co-defendants along with

Navarrette: Saul Guzman-Arias, who proceeded to trial with

Navarrette, and Antonio Equihua-Ramirez, who pled guilty

and became a witness for the prosecution.

A jury trial commenced on June 4, 2013. Because this

appeal turns on whether there was substantial evidence to

support the jury’s finding that Navarrette and his codefendants conspired to distribute at least one kilogram of

heroin, we discuss the evidence produced at trial in detail.

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 5

The government investigated and prosecuted Navarrette

as a “Len Bias”1case—that is, they sought to prove a supply

chain directly linking the top of the chain, Navarrette, to the

heroin overdose death of a woman named Erin Freeman. 

Distribution of a schedule I or II narcotic resulting in a death

or serious injury carries a twenty-year mandatory minimum

sentence, and a mandatory life sentence for those with a prior

felony drug conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Seeking

this heavy penalty, the government sought to prove the

connections among the members of the supply chain. As the

evidence at trial showed, the investigation proceeded byusing

information from lower-level dealers to pursue higher-level

distributors.

The government presented the jury with a narrative of the

investigation process through the testimony of several

officers, including Portland Police Officer Tim Manzella. 

Officer Manzella testified that, with the assistance of

Freeman’s boyfriend, he set up a controlled purchase of

heroin from her immediate supplier, Bruce McDaniel. While

watching McDaniel’s house, Officer Manzella saw Josef

Burns arrive; after he left, Manzella conducted a traffic stop

 

1 Many of the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841, including

the twenty-year minimum prison term for causing a

heroin overdose death, are often referred to as the Len

Bias laws after a popular college basketball star. Len

Bias played basketball for the University of Maryland

until a drug overdose caused his untimely death in

1986. Congress enacted the provisions of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841 under the theory that but for their purchase of

drugs the overdose victims would not have died.

Katherine Daniels & Carol M. Bast, Difficulties in Investigating and

Prosecuting Heroin Overdose Cases, 41 Crim. L. Bull. 513, 517 (2005).

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6 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR

of Burns. During their encounter, Burns admitted that he was

McDaniel’s heroin supplier. Officer Manzella then

engineered another controlled purchase of heroin using

Burns, which led local law enforcement officers to the next

supplier up the chain, Antonio Equihua-Ramirez. EquihuaRamirez was arrested at the buy location, and officers found

sixty-two grams of heroin and between $7,600 and $7,800 in

cash in his vehicle. Equihua-Ramirez agreed to cooperate

with the police and consented to a search of his home, where

police found approximatelythirteen grams2of heroin. Officer

Manzella testified that Equihua-Ramirez had told him that the

cash in his car was the profits from his sale of 150 grams of

heroin, which he planned to turn over to his supplier, who had

“fronted” him the drugs. Additionally, upon seizingEquihuaRamirez’s phone, Officer Manzella found a text message,

sent to a number later determined to be Navarrette’s, in which

Equihua-Ramirez attempted to place an order for eight more

pieces of heroin (200 grams) once he finished selling what he

had.

Using Equihua-Ramirez, officers set up another

controlled buy, this time from Equihua-Ramirez’s supplier,

whom he knew as “Califas,” for the 200 grams that EquihuaRamirez had already attempted to order. Officers arrested

Saul Guzman-Arias, who appeared at the appointed time. 

Equihua-Ramirez identified him as the go-between who

delivered the drugs that Equihua-Ramirez ordered from

“Califas.” Officers searched Guzman-Arias’s car and

2 Throughout their testimony, witnesses used different measurements –

ounces, pieces, and grams – to describe the quantities oftheir transactions. 

An ounce is approximately twenty-eight grams; a “piece” is approximately

twenty-five grams. We have converted all measurements to grams using

this scale.

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 7

recovered 199.03 grams of heroin (the eight piece order) from

a hidden compartment, capable of holding up to forty pounds

of contraband, in his car. The police officers obtained cell

site information relating to the phone Equihua-Ramirez used

to place orders for heroin and used GPS to find the location

of the phone he called, belonging to “Califas.” Police

arrested “Califas,” revealed to be Navarrette, at his home. 

They did not find any drugs, but they did recover $1,860 in

cash, and also discovered a large hidden compartment in his

vehicle that could have held up to thirty pounds of

contraband. Thus, the total amount of heroin recovered and

presented as physical evidence at trial was approximately 274

grams.

In addition to the physical evidence, the government

presented several defendants’ phone records, as well as a few

wiretapped calls from a federal investigation that had also

ensnared Guzman-Arias, but none of these yielded evidence

of the specific quantity of heroin transacted. Instead, the

phone records presented, which included the records of

Equihua-Ramirez,Navarrette, and Guzman-Arias,showed the

number and frequency of calls and text messages among

several members of the conspiracy. Local law enforcement

officers also testified that they used a call placed from

Equihua-Ramirez to Navarrette to triangulate the location of

Navarrette, in order to arrest him, as evidence of Navarrette’s

identity as “Califas.” As none of these other pieces of

evidence would permit the jury to find that the conspiracy

involved at least a kilogram of heroin, the government’s main

evidence of quantity came from the testimony of EquihuaRamirez and Burns.

Burns testified that, during the time period alleged

(approximately two and a half months, from mid-March to

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earlyJune), he only purchased heroin from Equihua-Ramirez,

and Equihua-Ramirez testified that he only purchased heroin

from Navarrette. Equihua-Ramirez further testified that

Burns was his biggest customer, and his “[a]bout five” other

customers only bought about a gram of heroin at a time,

without specifying in greater detail how much heroin they

purchased. Therefore, the government had to prove an

agreement to distribute a kilogram of heroin from either

a) Equihua-Ramirez’s testimony as to how frequently he

purchased heroin from Navarrette; b) Equihua-Ramirez’s

testimony as to how frequently he sold heroin to Burns; or

c) Burns’s testimony as to how frequently he purchased

heroin from Equihua-Ramirez.

A. Testimony of Josef Burns

Josef Burns could not state with certainty how many

times and in what quantities he had purchased heroin from

Equihua-Ramirez. For example, Burns initially stated that he

had purchased heroin “more than a dozen times,” but later

said that he “[did]n’t know [how many times].” When

pressed on cross-examination, he agreed that a more realistic

range was twelve to sixteen transactions, and stated “I mean,

whatever. I mean, I’m not sure. I can’t exactly say.” On

cross-examination, Burns also waffled on how long he had

been buying from Equihua-Ramirez:

Q. Yeah. Is it possible your relationship

started sometime in late April?

A. In April?

Q. Correct. So it would have been about a

month and a half?

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 9

A. March, April, something like that. April,

May, June, yeah, something around there.

Q. You don’t really have a definite memory of

that?

A. I don’t have a definite—I don’t have a

definite time on that.

Describing his purchasing practices, Burns stated that he

began by buying “one piece [twenty-five grams] and then two

or three.” He testified that he could not estimate the total

amount of heroin that he purchased, but that it took him “a

month or two” to “wor[k] up to two or three pieces.” We

note again that the entire time period of the conspiracy

alleged was approximately two and a half months. When

questioned about the frequency with which he purchased

heroin, Burns stated that it could be one or two times a week,

but also “maybe a few more times . . . maybe three or four

max.” He went on to explain that the frequency with which

he purchased and the amount he purchased “would all just

depend” on the level of demand, which was “different all the

time.” The variation in the amount Burns purchased is borne

out by other record evidence. Notably, on May 26, Burns

received a text message from Equihua-Ramirez asking him

why he was not purchasing more heroin. When presented

with this evidence, Burns responded

Yeah. I think I just—I just hadn’t called them

in a little bit or whatever. I was not very—I

didn’t really want to sell heroin. I did it

because I didn’t know what else to do, really. 

I couldn’t do what I used to do, any of the

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jobs I used to do. But I didn’t want to do it. 

I just did it because—I don’t know.

Burns testified several times that he had difficulty

remembering details of the time period in question. For

example, when questioned more specifically about his

practice of selling heroin, Burns answered, “I’m trying to

think. I’m not prepared for all this. I can’t really remember.”

And, later, Burns stated in response to further questioning: 

“I’m not really on it. . . . I just had a lot going on in the last

year since this happened so I haven’t been dealing with any

of this.”

In sum, Burns’s testimony was vague; he could not

provide an estimate as to how much heroin he sold or

purchased, and could not clearly remember or describe his

practices during the time in question.

B. Testimony of Antonio Equihua-Ramirez

Like Burns, Equihua-Ramirez gave equivocal testimony

regarding the frequency with which he bought and sold

heroin. Officer Manzella’s testimony revealed that, before

trial, Equihua-Ramirez contradicted himself in his statements

to the police. For example, he initially told Officer Manzella

that he had been dealing for a period of six months, but later

stated that he had only been dealing since mid-March. It

“seemed to [Officer Manzella] that he was pretty confused

about the exact start and end date.” Equihua-Ramirez also

gave different statements to police at different times

regarding the amount that he sold to Burns.

At trial, Equihua-Ramirez testified that he began selling

heroin in March of 2012, upon taking over the business of a

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 11

friend of his while that friend returned to Mexico. It was to

be a temporary arrangement. Equihua-Ramirez only bought

drugs from “Califas,” the name by which he knew Navarrette. 

Navarrette “fronted” him the drugs, meaning that EquihuaRamirez only paid for the drugs after he sold them to others,

and did not order more until he had sold all of the drugs that

he had previously bought. It also meant that he did not buy

more than he thought he could sell.

Equihua-Ramirez testified that he began by ordering an

ounce (twenty-eight grams) at a time, which would take him

about three days to sell. Equihua-Ramirez further testified

that he purchased drugs “thirteen or fourteen” times.

Equihua-Ramirez later testified that he purchased heroin from

his supplier “between ten and thirteen [times],” but that he

“[did]n’t remember well.” He maintained that it could not

have been fewer than ten times.

Equihua-Ramirez testified that, while he did not always

purchase a single ounce (28 grams), the most that he ever

purchased at a single time was four ounces (112 grams),

which he did shortly before he was arrested. However, his

last order had been for 200 grams; this would have been his

largest order.

Equihua-Ramirez testified that Josef Burns was his

biggest customer, and that the last sale that he made to Burns

was for fifty grams. He further stated that Burns usually

purchased “sometimes one, sometimes two” pieces at a time

(twenty-five to fifty grams), and once purchased three pieces

(seventy-five grams). At one point, Equihua-Ramirez

testified that there was a period in April during which the

heroin was bad, and his customers stopped buying from him;

he stated that, as a result, he sold heroin only once in the

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month of April. He further testified that the poor quality of

the heroin angered him, and that he wanted to quit as a result. 

He later testified, however, that the period in which Burns

refused to buy from him was approximately fifteen days, that

Burns then bought an ounce (twenty-eight grams) from him

in order to test the quality, and that he did not recall when that

purchase had taken place.

Like Burns, Equihua-Ramirez did not concretely or

consistently testify as to the number of transactions or their

amount, and no clearer pattern of sales emerges from his

testimony than from Burns’s.

C. The District Court’s Ruling and Order

The jury found Navarrette and Guzman-Arias guilty of

the Conspiracy, Distribution of Heroin, and Possession

charges, but did not find true that the distribution of heroin

resulted in the death of another. The jury, however, found

true that Navarrette conspired to distribute a kilogram or

more of heroin. After the verdict, Guzman-Arias renewed his

motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the evidence was

insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the conspiracy

involved a quantity of at least one kilogram of heroin;

Navarrette joined in the motion, which the court denied in a

written order.

The court first summarized the evidence discussed above. 

Noting that the testimony of both Burns and EquihuaRamirez was vague and failed to specify the total quantity of

heroin that either purchased, and applying the substantial

evidence standard from United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d

1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), the court employed two

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 13

different approaches to determine the amount of heroin that

the jury could have found without speculation.

First, the court analyzed the amount of heroin the jury

could have inferred from Equihua-Ramirez’s testimony as to

the number of purchases he made from Navarrette through

Guzman-Arias. Construing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, id. at 1161, the court concluded

that the jury could have found that Equihua-Ramirez

purchased heroin fourteen times, and that the last purchase

was for 100 grams.3 Adding the 274 grams that both

defendants conceded were attributable to the conspiracy (the

75 grams found in the two searches of Equihua-Ramirez’s

property, and the 199 grams found in Guzman-Arias’s car),

the court reached a total of 374 grams. However, the court

concluded that for the remaining thirteen purchases, the jury

could only speculate as to how many times Equihua-Ramirez

purchased one, two, or three ounces. Therefore, the court

concluded that the only amount that the jury could have found

without engaging in speculation was the least of these, as it

was certain that Equihua-Ramirez purchased at least one

ounce in each of the thirteen transactions. Thus, taking

Equihua-Ramirez’s testimony and physical evidence alone,

the court concluded that the jury could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that the conspiracy involved 699 grams of

3

It is unclear whether the district court meant pieces (25 grams) or

ounces; four ounces would be 112 grams, whereas four pieces would be

100.

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heroin (274 grams found, plus 100 grams admitted as the last

purchase, plus 325 grams).4

Next, the court analyzed Burns’s testimony to determine

the quantity of heroin that the jury could have inferred

without speculation. Noting again the inconsistencies in

Burns’s testimony with regard to the frequencywith which he

purchased heroin, the court turned to the phone records

showing calls between Equihua-Ramirez and Burns in order

to estimate the number of transactions between them. While

the court arrived at a number of transactions it believed was

adequately supported by the phone records and testimony, the

court observed that, again, the jury would have had to

speculate as to how much heroin was involved in each. 

Nonetheless, the court concluded that the jury could have

found without speculation that Burns purchased 750 grams

from Equihua-Ramirez, based on Burns’s testimony that he

purchased “a few,” or three pieces (75 grams) per week, and

based on the assumption of a ten-week period.

Thus, the court found that the physical and testimonial

evidence did not reach the one kilogram quantity threshold. 

The court concluded, however, that Equihua-Ramirez’s and

Burns’s testimony provided the jury

a reasonable ‘guide’ as to the total amount

that was involved in the conspiracy. Based on

the history of dealing from mid-March to

4

It is again unclear whether the court meant “pieces” or ounces in

coming to the total of 325 grams; 28 grams per ounce multiplied 13 times

is actually 364 grams, which would bring the total to 750 grams – 274

grams found, plus 112 grams (four ounces) for the last purchase, plus 13

purchases totaling 364 grams.

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 15

early June 2012 . . . and construing the

evidence and inferences in the Government’s

favor, the jury could have made a reasonable,

non-speculative inference that Defendants

must have agreed to distribute as much heroin

as they could and that the distribution would

have continued in a similar fashion.

That is, the court concluded that the evidence in the record

established a pattern of transactions that would have allowed

the jury to infer a preexisting agreement to distribute at least

a kilogram of heroin.

Count One carried a mandatory minimum of twenty

years, due to Navarrette’s prior conviction and the jury’s

special finding. Count Two carried no mandatory minimum,

and Count Four carried a mandatory minimum of ten years. 

On the basis of the jury’s quantity finding, as well as an

increase of three levels for Navarrette’s role in the

conspiracy, and after subtracting two levels for an anticipated

change in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the court

calculated a base offense level of thirty-three. After

consideringNavarrette’s criminal history, the court calculated

the guideline range for each count as 168–210 months, before

taking into account the mandatory minimum on Count One. 

The court then sentenced Navarrette to 240 months on each

count of conviction (the mandatory minimum on Count One

due to the the one kilogram quantity), to run concurrently,

and to a 10-year term of supervised release following his

incarceration. The court used the same base offense level in

imposing the sentences on each count.

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II.

A. Standard of Review and Jurisdiction

Both with respect to his sentence and his conviction,

Navarrette appeals a final judgment of a district court, and

thus we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Navarrette first challenges the jury’s quantity finding for

the conspiracy to distribute and distribution charges. He does

not raise an evidence insufficiency challenge to the jury’s

verdict with respect to his convictions for any of the

substantive offenses. After Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466 (2000), “[w]e . . . trea[t] drug quantity and type, which

fix the maximum sentence for a conviction, as we would any

other material fact in a criminal prosecution: it must be

charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, subject to the

rules of evidence, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 2002);

see also United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2014). 

The jury’s quantity finding subjected Navarrette to a twentyyear mandatory minimum sentence, as he had previously

been convicted of a drug felony, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i);

setting aside this finding would mean that he is no longer

subject to that mandatory minimum. Thus, the jury had to

find the one kilogram quantity beyond a reasonable doubt.

We review a jury’s verdict and special findings for

substantial evidence, which requires that we first “construe

the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution,’

and only then determine whether ‘any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.’” Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1161 (quoting

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). This means that “when faced with

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 17

a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences

[we] must presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such

conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that

resolution.” Id. at 1164 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, “[a]lthough we must draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of the prosecution, a ‘reasonable’ inference is one

that is supported by a chain of logic, rather than . . . mere

speculation dressed up in the guise of evidence.” Juan H. v.

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1277 (9th Cir. 2005).

Second, Navarrette challenges the district court’s

admission of evidence of his prior convictions as

impeachment evidence following the testimony of his sister,

Mini Navarrette. We review a district court’s evidentiary

rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Castillo,

181 F.3d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999).

B. Conspiracy Generally

“To establish a drug conspiracy, the government must

prove: 1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective;

and 2) the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United

States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting United States v. Barragan, 263 F.3d 919, 922 (9th

Cir. 2001)). The government “can prove the existence of a

conspiracy through circumstantial evidence that defendants

acted together in pursuit of a common illegal goal.” United

States v. Bishop, 1 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation

omitted). “Express agreement is not required; rather,

agreement may be inferred from conduct.” United States v.

Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted). Thus, evidence of past transactions can constitute

circumstantial evidence of a preexisting agreement, because

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it can be inferred that the defendants agreed to carry out those

transactions.

Circumstantial evidence of a drug distribution conspiracy

is not limited to evidence of past completed transactions. 

See, e.g., United States v. Rosales, 516 F.3d 749, 755 (9th

Cir. 2008) (considering evidence of a hydraulic press and

metal molds that could be used to produce kilogram bricks of

cocaine in determining that sufficient evidence supported a

conviction of conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams of

cocaine). Moreover, a conspiracy conviction does not require

“the delivery, presence, or even existence of actual

contraband.” United States v. Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d

1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007). But in order for the defendant to

be subject to a mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A)(i),

the government still must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that an agreement to distribute one kilogram existed before

the expiration of the period alleged in the indictment. As we

explain below, the government failed to meet its burden of

proof.

C. Physical and Testimonial Evidence Presented

Before examining whether the circumstantial evidence of

the defendants’ pattern of transactions can support the one

kilogram quantity finding, we first consider whether the

government otherwise presented sufficient evidence to

establish that amount.

The government contends that the district court’s finding

of 750 grams, inferred from Burns’s testimony, plus the 274

grams conceded by Navarrette, exceeds one kilogram, and

thus the jury’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. 

Navarrette, in turn, argues that even if the district court failed

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to add all of the 274 grams of physical evidence in reaching

the 750 gram estimate, “it is fair to assume that [the district

court] counted at least the 62 grams seized from EquihuaRamirez, as this amount was earmarked for Burns.” Even

adding the remaining 212 grams to the 750 grams inferred

from Burns’s testimony, the quantity still falls short of one

kilogram. Navarrette further argues that the district court

erred when it determined that the conspiracy continued for

ten weeks, because it was “undisputed that the heroin went

‘bad’ for a while during which time Burns purchased heroin

from Equihua-Ramirez onlyonce,” and,moreover, “EquihuaRamirez testified that this was a substantial period during

April and May.”

While it is true that Equihua-Ramirez testified at one

point that the period during which the heroin went bad lasted

most of April, at another point during the trial, he testified

that it lasted approximately fifteen days. Burns likewise

testified that he did not purchase heroin from EquihuaRamirez for a period, although he did not testify how long

that lasted. Because we must resolve all conflicting evidence

in favor of the prosecution, we will use the lower of EquihuaRamirez’s estimates (that is, fifteen days), and conclude that

the period in which Equihua-Ramirez and Burns conducted

their transactions spanned eight weeks, not ten (ten weeks

minus fifteen days). Using the district court’s 75 gram per

week calculation (from Burns’s testimony that he purchased

“a few” each week) the total would thus come to 600 grams. 

Even adding 75 grams for the single instance in which Burns

purchased three pieces, and all of the 274 grams that

Navarrette conceded, the total amount of heroin established

would come to 949 grams. There was no evidence presented

that Equihua-Ramirez’s additional gram-level customers

would make up the difference.

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Turning to Equihua-Ramirez’s testimony, even if we

attempted to determine the quantity of heroin from his

testimony regarding his sales to Burns (instead of the 699

grams based on the number of Equihua-Ramirez’s purchases),

it still would not reach a kilogram. Equihua-Ramirez testified

that Burns bought “sometimes two, sometimes three” pieces

a week from him (fifty or seventy-five grams), but also

testified that Burns stopped buying from him for a period. 

Equihua-Ramirez also testified repeatedly that he only sold

Burns three pieces on one single occasion. Thus, a relatively

liberal calculation based on his sales to Burns, as well as his

admitted four-ounce buy (which risks double-counting, since

some of that could have been sold to Burns) and the 200

grams found on Guzman-Arias (his last order) would still not

total a kilogram: 50 grams multiplied by 8 weeks (two pieces

per week, and not counting the period the heroin went bad)

plus 75 grams (the single three piece buy) plus 112 grams

(the four ounce order) plus 200 grams (the final controlled

buy) totals 787 grams.

The district court did not attempt to determine an average

amount of heroin distributed either from Burns’s testimony or

from Equihua-Ramirez’s testimony, instead relying on the

least amount that either defendant testified was his minimum

sale or purchase. We have previously approved the

“multiplier method,” for approximating drug quantity “by

determining a daily or weekly quantity, selecting a time

period over which it is more likely than not that the defendant

was dealing in that quantity and multiplying these two factors

together,” United States v. Culps, 300 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th

Cir. 2002). However, we have done so only in the sentencing

context, in which the government was required to prove

quantity by a preponderance of the evidence for sentencing

purposes, and not, as here, where the factual issue had to be

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 21

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Jackson

standard, we are obliged to construe the evidence of drug

quantity adduced at trial “in the light most favorable to the

prosecution,” and only after viewing the evidence in this

light, determine whether, resolving all conflicting inferences

in favor of the prosecution, “any rational trier of fact could

have found” the one kilogram quantity “beyond a reasonable

doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at

319. Applying the Jackson standard, we conclude that the

district court did not err in declining to apply the multiplier

method given the facts of this case.

We further conclude that the district court did not err in

disregarding the circumstantial evidence of the secret storage

compartment in Navarrette’s vehicle, capable of holding 30

pounds of drugs. The government offered no evidence that

the storage compartment was used to transport heroin, as

opposed to any other kind of contraband, or that Navarrette

ever used the compartment. We also note that the

drug-sniffing dog did not alert to the compartment during the

search.5

Therefore, as did the district court, we conclude that the

testimonial and physical evidence cannot support a finding of

one kilogram.

5 While we have stated that a defendant’s mere access to equipment

capable of producing a kilogram of cocaine “supports the jury’s verdict

that it was reasonably foreseeable that the conspiracy involved 500 grams

or more of cocaine,” Rosales, 516 F.3d at 755, the government did not

raise this argument on appeal, and therefore we do not address it here. 

“Our circuit has repeatedly admonished that we cannot manufacture

arguments for an appellant.” Ind. Towers of Wash. v. Washington,

350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d

1070, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001)).

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D. The Pattern of Heroin Transactions

We turn to the district court’s conclusion that the

defendants’ pattern of transactions constituted circumstantial

evidence, such that “the jury could have made a reasonable,

non-speculative inference that Defendants must have agreed

to distribute as much heroin as they could and that the

distribution would have continued in a similar fashion.”

Even if some hypothetical pattern of transactions were

consistent and clear enough to infer a preexisting agreement

to surpass a certain quantity, such is not the pattern before us. 

While the testimony of Equihua-Ramirez and Burns could

prove repeated transactions over a period of eight weeks, the

testimony did not show any consistency in those transactions,

either with respect to amount or to frequency, from which a

jury could reasonably infer an agreement to distribute a

kilogram of heroin. This conclusion is underscored by the

vague and equivocal nature of the testimony itself. Both

witnesses at points contradicted themselves, and Burns

repeatedly indicated that his memory was unreliable.

Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, the purchases in this case appear to have

been ad hoc, and dependent on the level of demand at any

given moment. The evidence showed that Equihua-Ramirez

bought his supply of heroin from Navarrette only once he had

sold the amount he had previously purchased; that Burns was

Equihua-Ramirez’s biggest customer; that Burns only

purchased heroin when there was sufficient demand; that

demand was “different all the time”; and that there was a

period of approximately two weeks out of a total period of ten

weeks in which the heroin “went bad,” and Burns did not

purchase any heroin.

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Moreover, the testimony given at trial revealed that the

whole arrangement was temporary and unstable. During the

period alleged in the indictment, Equihua-Ramirez was

effectively subbing for his friend. He testified that he had no

intention of continuing once his friend returned, and, in fact,

that he became so frustrated with the bad heroin that he

considered quitting. Similarly, Burns repeatedlytestified that

he intended to quit selling heroin. In sum, it would be

speculative to infer that the defendants agreed to any future

transactions such that they would reach the one kilogram

mark. Speculation cannot constitute substantial evidence. 

See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1277.

Our conclusion is further supported by the Fourth

Circuit’s holding in United States v. Hickman, 626 F.3d 756

(4th Cir. 2010). In that case, the court held that substantial

evidence did not support a conviction for conspiracy to

distribute one kilogram of heroin where the past transactions

and future, expressly agreed-upon transactions amounted to

a maximum of 836 grams. Id. at 766. In Hickman, as in this

case, the government argued that the jury could conclude that

the transactions proven were part of an “ongoing course of

business.” Id. at 768. The government in that case further

argued that “[it was] clear that . . . [the defendant] would have

continued” to distribute heroin. Id. The Hickman court

disagreed. It concluded that such a finding would come

perilously close to impermissibly convicting the defendant of

“hypothesized future bad acts,” and, moreover, that “[w]here

no evidence exists to guide the trier of fact in determining the

outer scope of a conspiracy, the trier may not simply guess at

the magnitude or frequency of unknown criminal activity.” 

Id. at 768–69.

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In this case, the district court attempted to distinguish

Hickman. In Hickman, the defendants agreed to or actually

undertook three transactions, whereas in this case the number

is at least ten. Therefore, the district court concluded that,

unlike in Hickman, here there was sufficient evidence to

“guide” the jury “as to the total amount that was involved in

the conspiracy,” because there were “multiple purchases and

multiple sales and thus, there were more than a ‘limited

number of actual transactions.’” But though the evidence

here showed more transactions than in Hickman, Hickman is

not so easily distinguishable. In Hickman, the evidence

supported a finding that the defendants had distributed a

maximum of 836 grams over a period of four months, which

is not much different than the up to 750 grams over a period

of three months (according to the district court’s calculations)

in this case. And here, like in Hickman, the argument that the

co-conspirators would have distributed one kilogram if it had

not been interrupted potentially allows a quantity finding to

stand upon what Navarrette “would have continued to do[,]

which, to the extent these hypothesized future bad acts were

not captured by an agreement within the charged period, is

clearly improper.” Hickman, 626 F.3d at 768 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Such a theory impermissibly

“invites the jury to speculate as to the amount of heroin

involved in the conspiracy.” Id.

The government agrees that, should we conclude that

substantial evidence does not support the jury’s verdict on the

one kilogram quantity special finding, the error was not

harmless and re-sentencing would be appropriate. While the

special finding only resulted in a mandatory minimum

sentence on Count One, the district court imposed an identical

sentence on all counts. It is clear that the district court used

this twenty-year sentence as the “starting point and the initial

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 25

benchmark,” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108

(2007) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49

(2007)), and that, had the district court sentenced Navarrette

absent the special finding and mandatory minimum, “it may

have arrived at a different sentence,” see United States v.

Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Therefore, we reverse the jury’s quantity finding, vacate

Navarrette’s sentence on all counts, and remand for resentencing.

6

III.

Navarrette challenges his conspiracy and substantive

count convictions on the ground that the district court abused

its discretion when it permitted the government to ask his

sister, defense witness Mini Navarrette, about his prior

Washington state convictions for drug trafficking and escape.

The district court had originally granted a pre-trial motion

in limine to exclude these convictions as overly prejudicial. 

However, on cross examination, Mini Navarrette stated that

her brother could not drive because he did not have a license,

and that “[she knew] that [her] brother did not do any drugs

or anything.” The government argued that she had opened

the door to impeachment, because she knew that Navarrette

6 Because Navarrette’s evidence insufficiency claim is limited to the

jury’s quantity finding, we vacate his sentence, but we do not reverse the

underlying conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). As we have

explained, “[t]he tainted drug quantity verdict does not affect the validity

of the underlying conspiracy conviction because drug quantity was not an

element of the charged conspiracy offense; rather, it . . . had to be

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt for the purposes

ofsentencing alone.” United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir.

2014).

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could not drive because he was afraid that he would be pulled

over and the outstanding warrant stemming from his escape

discovered, and because she knew that he previously had

been convicted and imprisoned. Navarrette objected, but the

court allowed the government to question Mini Navarrette

about her brother’s prior convictions.

On cross-examination, a defense witness opens the door

to impeachment by the prosecution if she “truly volunteer[s]”

the impeachable testimony. Id. at 1134 n.1. Here, the

government directly asked Mini Navarrette why her brother

was unable to drive a car. The record does not support the

government’s contention that Ms. Navarrette volunteered that

her brother never used the car that was in her name and her

sister-in-law’s name. But, Ms. Navarrette opened the door to

impeachment later in her testimony, when she volunteered

that she knew that her brother was not involved in drugs. Ms.

Navarrette knew that her brother had previously been

convicted and imprisoned, and had escaped. While it is

possible that she did not know the exact nature of the

conviction, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

allowing the government to ask her about her brother’s prior

convictions.

Moreover, even if the district court did abuse its

discretion, the error was harmless. As the government

argues, Navarrette’s conviction was supported by phone

records tying him to Equihua-Ramirez, as well as by

Equihua-Ramirez’s testimony that Navarrette’s voice on a

recorded call was the voice of his supplier, “Califas.” Ms.

Navarrette’s testimony, intended to support the defense

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UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 27

theory that Navarrette had no involvement in the conspiracy,

could not have overcome the weight of this evidence. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s evidentiary ruling.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, VACATED

in part, and REMANDED for re-sentencing.

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