Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00164/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00164-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Corizon Health
Defendant
Rusty Wayne Sample
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSTY WAYNE SAMPLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORIZON HEALTH,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-00164-SKO (PC)

FIRST SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

UNDER SECTION 1983

(Doc. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

First Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Rusty Wayne Sample, a former prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 30, 2015. The Court is 

required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or 

an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss 

a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or 

malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated 

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This 

requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners 

proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and 

to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the 

plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

II. Discussion

A. Summary of Allegations

Plaintiff, who is now out of custody, brings this action against Corizon Health for denying 

him adequate health care while he was at the Fresno County Jail.

1

Plaintiff alleges that he 

submitted sick call slips on December 6, 2014, December 13, 2014, December 19, 2014, and 

December 27, 2014, regarding a rash, blood in his urine, and pain in his ear, sinuses, shoulder, 

back, buttocks, and legs, but as of January 24, 2015, he had not been seen by Corizon Health. 

Plaintiff seeks money damages for medical negligence and to be seen by Corizon Health as soon 

as possible. 

///

///

 

1

Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address to a residential address on March 30, 2015. 

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B. Constitutional Right to Adequate Medical Care

1. Legal Standard

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Municipalities and other local government units are subject to suit under 

section 1983. Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Monell 

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978)). “Section 1983 is not 

itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 

elsewhere conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence 

of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or omissions and a violation of 

his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th 

Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff is protected from conditions of confinement which amount 

to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Simmons v. Navajo 

County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2010); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 

F.3d 1232, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010). While pretrial detainees’ rights are protected under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard for claims brought under the Eighth 

Amendment has long been used to analyze pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement claims. 

Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1017-18; Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1242; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 

(9th Cir. 1998).

For claims related to medical care, the Constitution is violated when jail officials act with 

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 

985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-

83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 

F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by 

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demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was 

deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2006)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective 

recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. “Medical malpractice does not become 

a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1977); Snow, 681 F.3d at 987-88; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

2. Findings

Corizon Health is the only defendant named in this action. A private entity may be subject 

to suit under section 1983 where (1) it acted under color of law and (2) the constitutional violation

alleged was caused by the private entity’s official policy or custom. Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1138-40;

M.H. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 62 F.Supp.3d 1049, 1085-86 (N.D.Cal. 2014). There is no respondeat 

superior, or vicarious liability, under section 1983. Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1138-39; Lacey v. Maricopa 

Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Here, Plaintiff alleges only that he 

submitted numerous sick call slips but had not been seen as of the date of his complaint. These 

conclusory allegations do not suffice to demonstrate that Corizon Health was acting under color of 

law, that the lack of response to Plaintiff’s sick call slips rose to the level of a constitutional 

violation, and that the violation was the direct result of Corizon Health’s policies, practices, or 

customs. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, __ F.3d __, __, 2015 WL 4731366, at *__ (9th Cir. Aug. 

11, 2015); Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1139-46; Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185-90 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Corizon Health under section 1983 for 

violating his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity to amend, however. 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th 

Cir. 2000).

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C. Claim for Injunctive Relief

In addition to damages, Plaintiff seeks an order requiring Corizon Health to provide him 

with medical care. However, Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Fresno County Jail and his 

claim for injunctive relief is moot. Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 

1114, 1119 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013); Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2012); Nelson v. 

Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (confining 

prospective “relief [to that which] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct 

the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation 

of the Federal right.”). Because this deficiency is not curable through amendment, the claim shall 

be dismissed. Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212-13; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 

1983.2 The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Akhtar,

698 F.3d at 1212-13; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130; Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 

1987). However, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims 

in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under section 1983, 

it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights and liability may not be imposed under the theory of mere respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676-77; Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-07. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations 

 

2 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to pursue only a negligence claim under state law, the Court lacks jurisdiction in the 

absence of a viable federal claim. Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001)

(The “plain language” of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) “makes clear that supplemental jurisdiction may only be invoked when 

the district court has the hook of original jurisdiction on which to hang it.”). Further, substantive deficiencies 

notwithstanding, Plaintiff may only pursue a negligence claim if he complied with the Government Claims Act, which 

requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation 

and Government Claims Board no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 

910, 911.2, 945.4, 950, 950.2. Compliance must be specifically alleged. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th

201, 208-09 (Cal. 2007); State v. Superior Court of Kings Cnty. (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004); Mabe v. 

San Bernardino Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001); Mangold v. California Pub. 

Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 

(9th Cir. 1988).

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must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey, 693 F.3d at 907 

n.1, and it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” 

Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is dismissed as moot;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim 

under section 1983;

3. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 

1983.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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