Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00705/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00705-16/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benito Espino
Plaintiff
Marko Zaninovich, Inc.
Defendant
Juan Montes
Plaintiff
Guillermina Perez
Plaintiff
Josefino Ramirez
Plaintiff
Catalina Robles
Plaintiff
Santiago Rojas
Plaintiff
Sunview Vineyards of California, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANTIAGO ROJAS, JOSEFINO

RAMIREZ, CATALINA ROBLES, JUAN

MONTES, BENITO ESPINO, and

GUILLERMINA PEREZ, on behalf of

themselves and a class of others similarly

situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MARKO ZANINOVICH, INC. AND

SUNVIEW VINEYARDS OF

CALIFORNIA, INC.,

Defendants.

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CIV-F-09-0705 AWI JLT

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

I. History

Defendants Marko Zaninovich, Inc. and Sunview Vineyards of California Inc. are

commercial table grape growers based in Kern County. Plaintiffs are former employees of

Defendants. The case has a complex procedural history. The operative complaint alleges

Defendants violated various employment laws by, among other things, failing to properly pay

wages by forcing employees to work off the clock, forcing employees to purchase tools out of

pocket, failing to pay minimum required wages, failing to provide meal and rest periods, failing

to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and failing to maintain time records. Defendant

Marko Zaninovich was dismissed by stipulation of the parties. Plaintiffs have moved for class

certification against the remaining Defendant, Sunview. In support of their motion, they have

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provided Aaron Woolfson as an expert on database analysis. Defendant provided Plaintiffs with

internal records (in the form of databases) that set out payroll and time records. Mr. Woolfson

was retained by Plaintiffs to give an opinion on these records, specifically to quantify the number

of alleged labor law violations committed. 

Expert witnesses had to be disclosed by February 11, 2011, and expert discovery was to

be completed by April 1, 2011. Doc. 27. By stipulation of the parties, Magistrate Judge Thurston

modified the schedule to allow expert reports to be produced by April 18, 2011. Doc. 33. Mr.

Woolfson produced a timely expert report. Doc. 162, Part 3, Ex. 3. Mr. Woolfson gave opinions

as to the number of workers (and/or shifts) who were paid less than required under various

California regulations. He was given two datasets to work with: “Sunview’s payroll system

consists of two primary data sets: (1) a Payroll Detail file with individual records recording hours

worked, type of pay, and rates of compensation for employees at Sunview, and (2) a Payroll

Register file listing the checks issued with the total hours worked and the total payments made to

employees.” Doc. 144, Part 1, Nickerson Report, at 3:3-7. These datasets contained entries that

were labeled using a series of numerical codes. Mr. Woolfson was provided with a list of

confidential codes. Woolfson Deposition, at 84:1-5. That list does not appear to have been

provided to the court. Mr. Woolfson was also on a conference call with Defendant’s IT

representatives to resolve technical issues with transferring the information between different

database programs. Woolfson Deposition, at 82:7-25. From this data, Mr. Woolfson concluded

that 2,348 workers were paid below minimum wage in 391,276 shifts and received no overtime

pay in 4,500 shifts. Doc. 162, Part 3, Ex. 3, Woolfson Expert Report, at 8:17-9:3. 

Defendant’s counsel then deposed Mr. Woolfson on May 3, 2011. During the 1

The parties’ briefs and Judge Thurston’s September 19, 2011 order provide several pin 1

citations to the transcript of Mr. Woolfson’s deposition. The transcript itself has not been

included in any filing in this case. Instead, a copy of the whole transcript was e-mailed to Judge

Thurston’s chambers by Defendant’s counsel. That e-mail was forwarded to this chambers with

the filing of the reconsideration motion. This order relies heavily on the contents of that

transcript and makes extensive citation to it. To ensure a complete record for appeal, the entire

deposition transcript is being formally lodged in the files of this case. 

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deposition, Mr. Woolfson discovered that Defendant was using certain codes in a way that did

not correspond to his analysis. Further, Mr. Woolfson discovered that Plaintiffs’ counsel, on

April 5, 2011, had deposed Daniel Gallegos, Defendant’s person most knowledgeable about the

datasets. In the course of his deposition, Mr. Gallegos appears to have produced another list of

codes that helped to explain the datasets. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not provide this second list to

Mr. Woolfson, he appears to have seen it for the first time during his deposition on May 3, 2011.

Woolfson Deposition, at 176:1-179:2. On May 16, 2011, Mr. Woolfson submitted a declaration

in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification which supplemented his earlier expert

report to account for some of the new information he learned at his deposition. Doc. 39. 

Plaintiffs seek to use this declaration as a supplement to Mr. Woolfson’s earlier submitted expert

report. 

Defendant made a motion to strike both Mr. Woolfson’s declaration and his original

expert report on the basis that (1) the supplement was untimely, (2) Mr. Woolfson is not qualified

as an expert, and (3) Mr. Woolfson’s conclusions are methodologically unsound as they are

based on Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ representations rather than the underlying data. Doc. 105. 

Plaintiffs opposed the motion. Doc. 150. Judge Thurston held a hearing on the motion. Doc.

177, September 16, 2011 Transcript. She ultimately granted Defendant’s motion; in her

September 19, 2011 order, Judge Thurston found that Mr. Woolfson’s May 16, 2011 declaration

was an improper supplement to his earlier expert report and that Mr. Woolfson’s methodology

was flawed; as a sanction, she ordered the May 16, 2011 declaration stricken and all opinion by

Mr. Woolfson up to that point stricken. Doc. 158. Plaintiffs have sought reconsideration of the

order. Doc. 161. Defendant opposes reconsideration. Doc. 175. No hearing on this motion was

held. 

II. Legal Standards

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 72(a) allows a party to serve and file objections to a Magistrate

Judge’s nondispositive order, to be decided by the District Judge. In the Eastern District of

California, this type of objection is treated as a motion for reconsideration by the assigned

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District Court Judge. See Local Rule 303. 

When filing a motion for reconsideration, Local Rule 230(j) requires a party to show

“what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not

shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.” The court reviews a

motion to reconsider a Magistrate Judge’s ruling under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law”

standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). See also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 72(a). “A finding is

‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, after

reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see also Anderson v.

Equifax Info. Services LLC, 2007 WL 2412249, *1 (D. Or. 2007) (“Though Section

636(b)(1)(A) has been interpreted to permit de novo review of the legal findings of a magistrate

judge, magistrate judges are given broad discretion on discovery matters and should not be

overruled absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.”). Motions to reconsider are committed

to the discretion of the trial court. Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983). 

III. Discussion

A. Mr. Woolfson’s Methodology For His Original Expert Report

Judge Thurston outlined the many problems with Mr. Woolfson’s original analysis

contained in his expert report:

Mr. Woolfson fails to adequately explain why he took certain actions, i.e. excluding

certain ‘pay types’ such as ‘make boxes’ or to outline the assumptions he made in his

tabulations. For example, he asserts that Defendant is flat wrong that there are no ‘purely

piece rate workers’ - he concludes this is the case because he finds pay codes without

associated hours - and that it has wrongly described its pay codes....Perhaps most

damning is Mr. Woolfson’s admission that, ‘So there’s certain things that I was aware of

and how to use them, but the description here and the way that I was told to use it is

different than what I had been led to understand it to mean.’ Therefore, considering

Woolfson’s admitted error regarding the pay code 031, his failure to conduct any expert

investigation or analysis into the meaning of Defendant’s pay codes, his apparent

willingness to offer conclusions about ultimate issues, i.e. lack of meal and rest breaks,

without adequate foundation and given that he failed to conduct a holistic verification of

his results by comparing them against Defendant’s payroll register, the Court lacks any

confidence in the reliability of Mr. Woolfson’s findings.

Doc. 158, September 19, 2011 Order, at 14:10-15:9. 

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The root of the methodological problem is the fact that Mr. Woolfson relied upon the

representations of Plaintiffs’ attorneys instead of directly examining any additional materials

provided by Sunview. When asked, Woolfson admitted that “I have not seen any transcripts of

anything in this case.” Woolfson Deposition, at 43:9-10. In fact, he was not aware that Mr.

Gallegos had been deposed and was not given the documents he produced. Woolfson Deposition,

at 174:24-175:3 and 183:2-7. As part of his deposition, Mr. Gallegos gave to Plaintiffs’

attorneys a document which listed certain pay codes and explained their meaning. Woolfson did

not learn the content of that document before producing his expert report. Woolfson Deposition,

at 176:1-179:2. Based upon the discussion between Defendant’s counsel and Mr. Woolfson in

his deposition, the court surmises that this list produced by Mr. Gallegos is in the record as Doc.

162, Part 1, Ex. 1. This document is entitled “List Pay Codes” and provides a basic description

and explanation for the pay codes 010, 011, 021, 031, 400, 412, and 413. The record reflects that

Mr. Woolfson relied upon the representations of Plaintiffs’ attorney, Tom Lynch, to understand

what several of these pay codes meant. Woolfson Deposition, at 114:7-19 and 145:21-146:7. Mr.

Woolfson admitted: “Q. The answer is - who told you how to use pay code 31? A. Oh, okay.

Tom Lynch....Q. Who told you how to use pay code 10? Who? A. It’s - well, Tom Lynch. Q.

Tom Lynch - A. Tom Lynch told me how to use all the pay codes, except they were to apply

specifically not to certain job codes.” Woolfson Deposition, at 181:18-182:3. Indeed, Mr.

Woolfson also admitted that he had to call Tom Lynch and Steve Hernandez, both attorneys for

Plaintiffs, during a break in his deposition to learn more about the pay codes. Woolfson

Deposition, at 128:14-130:8. At one point, Mr. Woolfson does deny relying on anything but the

Payroll Detail, Payroll Register, confidential list of pay codes, and Sunview IT in producing his

expert report, but that assertion is contradicted by his other testimony. Woolfson Deposition, at

84:13-88:2. Mr. Woolfson admitted that the deposition transcript of Mr. Gallegos and the list of

pay codes he produced would have changed his analysis: “I think that any information that I can

get from anyone to most effectively assert my expertise as a database analyst is important. So I

think that it would have been extremely helpful to have that piece of information. If I had had

this list that I just - this list along with this list - I think this exhibit, which is Exhibit 7, would

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have been not a point of contention.” Woolfson Deposition, at 175:7-14. Relying on Plaintiffs’

counsel’s assertions instead of seeing the information directly provided by Defendant lead Mr.

Woolfson to misunderstand how the various codes were used to record workers’ pay. 

The main dispute concerns entries with pay code 031. The code is labeled “P/R-MKUP

Makeup hours (computer generated rate to bring earnings to minimum wage).” Doc. 162, Part 1,

Ex. 1. These entries refer to payments made to workers to raise their pay above a minimum

wage. Defendant made these payments when a worker’s total pay over a week divided by the

hours worked during that week was less than minimum wage. Thus, when Defendant

supplemented wages for this reason, there was one 031 entry per pay period. Plaintiffs point out

that California law requires wages to be calculated on a daily basis to meet minimum wage; an

employer can not average wages over an entire week to do so. Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.

App. 4th 314, 323-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2nd Dist. 2005). Mr. Woolfson took the 031 supplemental

wages and applied it to the day the code appeared and that day only. Instead, it should have been

applied to any day during the pay period in which the worker’s pay was less than minimum wage. 

Defendant’s method of supplementing wages may very well result in a number of California

minimum wage law violations. However, Mr. Woolfson’s role is not to give a legal opinion but

to interpret the raw data in order to quantify what Defendant paid each worker. By

misinterpreting how Defendant calculated wages, Mr. Woolfson’s expert report was flawed. Mr.

Woolfson admits this point by providing a later supplement that analyzed the data using

Defendant’s way of allocation pay code 031 payments. The misinterpretation of 031 also

negatively affected Mr. Woolfson’s calculation of the number of overtime shifts for which

workers were not paid at an overtime rate. Woolfson Deposition, at 147:2-149:24. Mr. Woolfson

discovered this discrepancy in usage of 031 while Defendant’s attorneys were deposing him. The

deposition also revealed that Mr. Woolfson was not able to clearly explain how he accounted for

other pay codes 400, 412, and 413. Woolfson Deposition, at 134:4-135:8. These pay codes were

at least partially explained in the document Mr. Gallegos gave to Plaintiffs’ attorneys. Doc. 162,

Part 1, Ex. 1. 

A second issue is the fact that Mr. Woolfson did not use all of the data that was provided. 

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Defendant’s expert on data set analysis, Peter Nickerson states “[the Payroll Register] allows us

to cross-check our understanding of how the payroll system actually works. One ought to be able

to take the data from the [Payroll Detail], write a program based on the rules Sunview uses to pay

employees, and come up with the same pay numbers contained in the [Payroll Register]. Mr.

Woolfson ignores the Payroll Register data and creates his own data set based upon his own

assumptions regarding how the data should work....Mr. Woolfson received data files from

Sunview for his analysis but ignored some of these files, neglecting to confirm whether his

calculations matched what Sunview actually paid its employees. In his analysis, Mr. Woolfson

uses the Payroll Detail data but he completely neglected to utilize the Payroll Register files also

provided to him by Sunview. This neglect resulted in his failure to verify any of his conclusions.”

Doc. 144, Part 1, Nickerson Report, at 3:26-4:6 and 7:16-20. Mr. Woolfson responded, “I

analyzed the register of hours worked and compared them against the payroll register containing

the dollar amounts on paychecks - I was not asked to analyze the payroll register - I was asked to

analyze the constituent components, in specific the number of hours worked and the payments

that were made for various hours worked or for piece-rate work.” Doc. 151, Woolfson

Declaration, at 6:6-11. That is Mr. Woolfson may have confirmed that the raw Payroll Detail

data matched the Payroll Register before conducting any analysis on the Payroll Detail. See Doc.

162, Sutton Declaration, at 3:1-3. Judge Thurston became very concerned with this issue and

noted that “what [Woolfson] isn’t saying to me as flat-out is, when I did my analysis, I came to

certain conclusions, then I compared those conclusions with the payroll register to determine that

my numbers were accurate. There’s no cross-checking and I think that’s a point that Mr.

Knickerson brings up that when - if he had done that, it would have revealed the problems that

apparently were ultimately revealed to [Woolfson] at his deposition.” Doc. 177, September 16,

2011 Hearing, at 10:1-8. This methodological concern has still not been resolved though

Plaintiffs and Mr. Woolfson have had ample opportunity both before Judge Thurston and the

present court to clarify how the Payroll Register was used. 

The potential failure to match the results of the analysis with the Payroll Register is

significant because Mr. Woolfson appears to have excluded data from the Payroll Detail before

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starting his analysis. Mr. Woolfson states that Defendant provided 7,266, 238 rows of data

which he pared down to 3,123,934 entries for analysis by excluding all entries “where the

Sunview data indicated that there was no time worked in a particular day and no piece rate paid

for duties conducted on that day” and entries from certain pay codes (including “Make Boxes”

and “Lab”) he found irrelevant. Doc. 162, Part 3, Ex. 3, Woolfson Expert Report, at 2:15-3:8. 

Mr. Nickerson points out how a number of these exclusions distorts the analysis, including the

following: “he excludes any hourly pay record for which the pay rate is greater than zero and less

than four dollars. This reflects a lack of understanding of Sunview’s payroll system and pay

codes. For hourly pay records, the pay code in Sunview’s system may be ‘010’, ‘011’, ‘031’,

‘400’, or ‘413’. The ‘010’ pay code is used to make manual payroll adjustments and the rate

potentially could be between zero and four dollar depending on the size of the adjustment needed

in a specific case....It is not clear why he excludes the ‘Make Boxes’ and ‘Lab’ job codes nor

does he understand why he excludes these jobs. Moreover, exclusion of voided records alters

total calculations and results in unreliable conclusions for employees affected....to reach his

conclusions, Mr. Woolfson must and does exclude records which represent hourly pay and

contain ‘units’ or hours less than negative twelve or greater than twelve. Mr. Woolfson’s

implementation of this restriction results in inaccurate calculations. For example, sometimes

Sunview payroll clerks enter a manual adjustment to payroll. In these cases, a ‘010’ hourly

payroll record will appear but the number of hours may represent any number of hours,

sometimes a week’s worth of hours. These adjustments must be included to accurately reflect the

total actual pay to employees.” Doc. 144, Part 1, Nickerson Expert Report, at 8:11-9:19. 

Plaintiffs and Mr. Woolfson have not addressed these allegations. Thus, Mr. Woolfson’s failure

to cross check his analysis with the actual pay checks of the Payroll Register appears especially

problematic. 

Mr. Woolfson’s original expert report is marred by serious methodological flaws. 

B. May 16, 2011 Supplement

Mr. Woolfson then redid his analysis by distributing the pay code 031 payments over a

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pay period to supplement any shift in which the worker was paid less than minimum wage, the

way Defendant used pay code 031. While this change is an improvement, it does not resolve all

of the methodological issues discussed above as it does not address the other pay codes Mr.

Woolfson appears to have misinterpreted, the effect of pay code 031 on overtime pay, and the

possibility that the analysis was conducted on less than all the available and relevant raw data. 

To be clear, even if the new filing were accepted, Mr. Woolfson’s supplemented expert report

would still be clouded by serious methodological questions. Further, Judge Thurston found the

supplement to be a violation of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. 

Mr. Woolfson was required to provide a written expert report that contained “a complete

statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). Experts must supplement their reports if they discover information that

renders the statements incomplete or incorrect; they must correct their expert reports if additional

information arises. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(e). “Case law interpreting the rule reflects that a

supplemental disclosure must be exactly that - i.e., a supplement. A party may not rely on Rule

26(e)(1) as a way to remedy a deficient expert report or as a means of getting in, in effect, a brand

new report.” Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Abbott Cardiovascular Sys., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

112148, *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2008). As noted in the prior order, “When the lawyers maintain

control of the information and parse out only what they choose, this presents a real risk of

sandbagging; not by the expert, but by the attorneys. However, the impact on the opponent is the

same: incomplete information and deprivation of a full and complete expert deposition. The

information was clearly available at the time Mr. Woolfson prepared his initial report [and]

should have been known to him at that time.” Doc. 158, Sept. 19, 2011 Order, at 10:1-6. In this

case, the original report was deficient due to the mishandling of information on the part of

Plaintiffs. “The Court cannot accept a definition of supplementation which would essentially

allow for unlimited bolstering of expert opinions. Rule 26(e) envisions supplementation when a

party’s discovery disclosures happen to be defective in some way so that the disclosure was

incorrect or incomplete and, therefore, misleading. It does not cover failures of omission because

the expert did an inadequate or incomplete preparation.” Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 212

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F.R.D. 306, 310 (M.D.N.C. 2002). Supplementation can not be used to frustrate the expert

discovery deadline. Plaintiffs cite to a case in which a court permitted an expert to provide a

supplement based on information that was already available at the time of the original expert

report. That case must be distinguished as the supplement was produced before the expert

discovery deadline had passed, a key fact discussed by the court. Talbert v. City of Chicago, 236

F.R.D. 415, 420 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Due to the fact that Mr. Woolfson did not use all available

information available at the time he analyzed his data, his report was flawed. He is not

automatically entitled to correct his expert report under Rule 26(e). Plaintiffs violated Rule

26(a)(2)(B) by presenting an expert report which did not analyzing the pay code 031 payments in

the manner in which Defendant used them. 

C. Sanctions

A violation of Rule 26 results in sanctions: “the party is not allowed to use that

information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at trial, unless the failure

was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(c)(1). Woolfson’s original

expert report is flawed and constitutes a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) violation. As Judge Thurston points out

“the original report contains erroneous conclusions; even Mr. Woolfson admits this. Though he

minimizes the degree to which his original report is wrong, the fact remains that it is wrong.”

Doc. 158, September 19, 2011 Order, at 14:7-9. “Faced with a proffer of expert scientific

testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the

expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to

understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the

reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that

reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). In this case, the question is whether Mr. Woolfson’s

methodology was acceptable given that he did not fully understand how Defendant recorded

worker pay in the Payroll Detail. When data is improperly manipulated the resulting analysis is

unreliable. See Floorgraphics, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., 546 F. Supp. 2d 155,

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168-69 (D.N.J. 2008). Judge Thurston’s finding that Mr. Woolfson’s original expert report was

produced through faulty methodology is sound. The original report is unreliable and can not be

used. 

Plaintiffs purport to correct the problems by having Mr. Woolfson provide the

supplement. Judge Thurston determined that Plaintiffs’ Rule 26 violation was neither

substantially justified nor harmless. The Ninth Circuit has stated that “A request for discovery is

‘substantially justified’ under the rule if reasonable people could differ as to whether the party

requested must comply.” Reygo Pacific Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir.

1982). Similarly, “a good faith dispute concerning a discovery question might, in the proper

case, constitute ‘substantial justification.’” Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the problem is a result of a good faith dispute or reasonable

actions. Plaintiffs’ attorneys did not give Mr. Woolfson all information in their possession,

resulting in a flawed report. Plaintiffs argue that the problem was the result of inadequate

production on the part of Defendant: “Throughout this litigation Plaintiffs’ counsel have sought

descriptions for the fields in the raw data Defendant produced to enable Woolfson to analyze that

data. For example, Exh. 7 details Plaintiffs’ counsel[s’] attempt to secure additional descriptions

from Defendant regarding various unexplained codes in the raw data, including job codes,

location codes, variety codes that were improperly withheld from production. (See Exh. 7

attached to Sutton Decl.).” Doc. 161, Reconsideration Motion, at 16:19-24. However, the exhibit

referred to does not address this point at all. See Doc. 162, Part 7, Ex. 7, Steven Zoppi Report;

Doc. 166, Part 7, Ex. 7, Guillermina Olvera Deposition. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how

they sought additional discovery from Defendant to give Mr. Woolfson a clearer picture as to

how the data was recorded. At base, the fault lies with Plaintiffs; their unreasonable actions in

withholding information from their own expert lead to the need for a supplement. Plaintiffs’

actions can not be termed to be substantially justified. 

“Among the factors that may properly guide a district court in determining whether a

violation of a discovery deadline is justified or harmless are: (1) prejudice or surprise to the party

against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; (3) the

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likelihood of disruption of the trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness involved in not timely

disclosing the evidence.” Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. Appx. 705, 713 (9th Cir.

2010), citing David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003). “[T]he burden is on

the party facing sanctions to prove harmlessness.” Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp.,

259 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001). Accepting the May 16, 2011 supplement Woolfson’s

expert report (and further supplements necessary to clarify the rest of the methodological issues),

would necessitate changing the case schedule to allow additional discovery for class certification. 

As Judge Thurston has pointed out, “Disruption to the schedule of the court and other parties in

that manner is not harmless.” Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th

Cir. 2005). Judge Thurston’s decision to exclude the entirety of Mr. Woolfson’s opinions up to

this point is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. 

IV. Order

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. To ensure that the record in this case

is complete, the transcript of Aaron Woolfson’s May 3, 2011 deposition is formally lodged with

the Clerk’s Office.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 21, 2011 

0m8i78 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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