Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05307/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05307-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John W. Magaw
Appellee
Sendra Corporation
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 1997 Decided April 22, 1997

No. 95-5307

SENDRA CORPORATION,

APPELLANT

v.

JOHN W. MAGAW, DIRECTOR,

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(94cv00949)

Stephen P. Halbrook argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant.

Fred E. Haynes, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With him on the brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

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U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: SILBERMAN, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the 

district court's judgment rejecting Sendra Corporation's challenge to a decision of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms. Procedural principles of administrative law lead 

us to affirm the judgment for reasons different than those 

given by the district court. 

I

Sendra Corporation, an Illinois company, manufactures 

firearms. At one time, it made machineguns. The National 

Firearms Act regulates the manufacture of machineguns. 

The statute defines "machinegun" to mean "any weapon 

which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored 

to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual 

reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26 U.S.C. 

§ 5845(b). The "frame or receiver" of such a weapon is also a 

"machinegun." Id. Regulations define "frame or receiver" 

to mean the "part of a firearm which provides housing for the 

hammer, bolt or breechblock and firing mechanism, and 

which is usually threaded at its forward position to receive 

the barrel." 27 C.F.R. § 179.11.

In amendments to the Gun Control Act, Congress banned 

private possession and transfer of machineguns manufactured 

after May 19, 1986. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(2)(B). Regulations 

issued under the National Firearms Act require manufacturers to file with the Bureau a notice showing, for each firearm, 

the date of its manufacture, its type, model, gauge or size, 

and serial number. 27 C.F.R. § 179.103. In anticipation of 

the 1986 Gun Control Act amendments, "manufacturers seeking to register machineguns prior to the cutoff date flooded 

the Bureau with applications." F.J. Vollmer Co. v. Higgins,

23 F.3d 448, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Between April 24, 1986, and May 14, 1986, Sendra submitted registration applications to the Bureau for 3,119 machineUSCA Case #95-5307 Document #267315 Filed: 04/22/1997 Page 2 of 10
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guns, consisting of seven different models. The Bureau 

inspected Sendra's premises to determine whether the firearms reported by Sendra had actually been manufactured. 

The Bureau took samples of Sendra's receivers. In a letter 

of August 11, 1987, the Bureau informed Sendra that it would 

not register the 3,119 items because they "were not in a stage 

of the manufacturing process whereby they were National 

Firearms Act firearms as defined in 26 USC, Section 

5845(b)." Letter from Terry L. Cates, Chief, National Firearms Act Branch, to Cynthia E. Aleo, Secretary for Sendra 

Corp. 1 (Aug. 11, 1987).

Sendra objected to the Bureau's decision regarding some of 

these items and requested an informal conference with the 

Chief of the Bureau's National Firearms Act Branch so that 

it could "explain the facts and circumstances more fully." 

Letter from Stephen P. Halbrook, Attorney for Sendra Corp., 

to Wayne Miller, Chief, National Firearms Act Branch 1 

(Aug. 23, 1990). On October 3, 1990, the Bureau responded, 

stating that "our position regarding these items continues to 

be that they are not" machineguns "and are not registrable." 

Letter from Evans W. Miller, Chief, National Firearms Act 

Branch, to Stephen P. Halbrook, Attorney for Sendra Corp. 2 

(Oct. 3, 1990). The letter continued: "As for your request 

that" the Bureau "reexamine" specific machinegun models 

"on Sendra's premises, we do not believe that a further 

inspection would be fruitful. Assuming that a current inspection would indicate that these items are [machineguns], such a 

finding would not establish that they were in the same 

condition when the applications to register them were filed. 

Accordingly, we do not intend to conduct a reinspection at 

this late date." Id. If Sendra wished "to present additional 

facts or arguments," it should do so in writing. Id. A 

conference, the Bureau's letter concluded, was "unnecessary." 

Id.

On November 30, 1990, Sendra submitted a memorandum 

and exhibits to the Bureau "in further support of" its "request that the firearms in question be registered." Letter 

from Stephen P. Halbrook to Evans W. Miller 1 (Nov. 30, 

1990). In a letter of April 19, 1991, Sendra repeated its 

"request" that the Bureau "register these machineguns as 

having been manufactured before May 19, 1986," and "apUSCA Case #95-5307 Document #267315 Filed: 04/22/1997 Page 3 of 10
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1 The criminal activities, which occurred contemporaneously 

with the denial of registration, do not appear to involve the weapons 

at issue here. See generally United States v. Drasen, 665 F. Supp. 

598, 604-05 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (criminal prosecution), rev'd in part, 845 

F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1988). 

prove the enclosed applications and any further transfer 

applications Sendra submits for the machineguns in question." Letter from Stephen P. Halbrook to Evans W. Miller 

1 (Apr. 19, 1991). With this letter, Sendra enclosed documents and a supplemental memorandum explaining that its 

delay was caused by its decision to wait until the conclusion of 

the criminal prosecution of some of Sendra's former officers 

for violation of the Gun Control Act.1

The Bureau responded on October 2, 1991. After restating 

the reasons for its 1987 decision not to register the items as 

machineguns, the Bureau concluded: "In view of these circumstances and since over five years have elapsed, we are not 

willing to accept these receivers for registration prior to May 

19, 1986." Letter from Wayne Miller to Stephen P. Halbrook 

2 (Oct. 2, 1991).

For reasons that do not appear in the record, the Bureau 

nevertheless conducted another inspection of Sendra's facilities on December 16, 1991. On May 8, 1992, the Bureau 

wrote to Sendra:

By letter dated October 3, 1990, we again advised you 

that these items were not registrable as [machineguns] 

prior to May 19, 1986. We also advised that we would 

not reexamine several of the items, since, assuming that 

they are now complete [machineguns], this would not 

establish that they were in the same condition when 

[Sendra applied for registration] in 1986.

As you are aware, your request for ATF to reexamine 

the alleged machineguns at Sendra's premises was recently granted. On December 16, 1991, ATF personnel 

visited Sendra's premises in Barrington, Illinois, for this 

purpose. This letter will discuss the results of the 

examination as well as a number of points raised in your 

recent correspondence concerning this matter.

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Letter from Wayne Miller to Stephen P. Halbrook 2 (May 8, 

1992). The letter went on to describe why the Bureau 

decided as it did in 1987 and explained why newly-presented 

evidence from Sendra was not credible. Two receiver modelsthe M60 and the XM15E2were clearly registrable as 

of December 16, 1991, but the Bureau had "insufficient evidence from which to conclude that Sendra was in possession 

of" completed receivers "on May 19, 1986." Id. at 4; accord 

id. at 7-8. As to the third modelthe STENthe Bureau 

reiterated its earlier decision, denying registration on the 

basis that an individual in the Sendra factory told investigators in 1986 that the STEN receivers were to be used for 

semi-automatic weapons, not machineguns. Id. at 3. Therefore, the Bureau allowed the receivers to "be finished as 

semiautomatic firearms and sold as weapons not subject to 

the" National Firearms Act, but if "these items are further 

machined and finished as machinegun receivers," the Bureau 

said it would deny registration. Id. For the M60 receivers, 

the Bureau stated that if Sendra were "to submit additional 

documentary evidence indicating that all of the parts necessary to assemble complete M60 receivers were on the premises on May 19, 1986," it would "reconsider the above decision." 

Id. at 4. The Bureau concluded:

Finally, we would point out that Sendra's delay in 

requesting ATF's reconsideration of this matter has 

made it extremely difficult to determine the validity of 

the arguments made on their behalf....

... The fact that ATF complied with your request to 

reexamine the items on Sendra's premises demonstrates 

that ATF has considered the arguments made on Sendra's behalf and has dealt fairly with your client. ATF's 

disapproval of the registrations is based on the fact that 

there is insufficient evidence from which to conclude that 

the items were at a state of manufacture as of May 19, 

1986, as to be subject to the [National Firearms Act].

Id. at 8.

In response, Sendra submitted numerous affidavits stating 

that the receivers were manufactured prior to May 19, 1986. 

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Sendra also asserted that the STEN "has been a fully operable machinegun from its inception" and sent a videotape 

demonstrating a "STEN submachinegun" in action. Letter 

from Stephen P. Halbrook to Wayne Miller (Oct. 6, 1992). In 

the final letter between the Bureau and Sendra, the Bureau 

denied reconsideration. The Bureau wrote that Sendra's 

affidavits were not "persuasive evidence that the "firearms' at 

issue were in fact manufactured prior to May 19, 1986. 

Accordingly, we must again decline your request to register 

the items as machineguns which were manufactured prior to 

May 19, 1986." Letter from Wayne Miller to Stephen P. 

Halbrook (Aug. 17, 1993). Thus ended the administrative 

phase of this case.

On April 28, 1994, Sendra filed suit in the district court 

seeking, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 & 

2201, a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus to 

compel the Bureau to register the receivers. In its answer to 

the complaint, the government raised the defense of the 

statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), arguing that the 

suit was brought more than six years after Sendra's claim 

first accrued. The government moved for summary judgment on the statute of limitations grounds. The district court 

denied the motion, finding that the Bureau's "August 11, 1987 

decision, though perhaps "final' at the time, was ultimately 

rendered nonfinal," and that "the 1993 agency decision is 

reviewable as a reopened, final agency action filed within the 

statutory period." Memorandum Opinion at 11 (Nov. 1, 

1994). Thereafter, on cross-motions for summary judgment, 

the district court ruled in favor of the Bureau on the merits.

II

First points. We are dealing here with informal agency 

adjudication. No statute required the Bureau to reach its 

decision only after holding a hearing on the record. See 5 

U.S.C. § 554. Nonetheless, the Administrative Procedure 

Act subjects "final agency action" of this sort to judicial 

review. 5 U.S.C. § 704. Unless another statute provides 

otherwise (there is no other statute here), judicial review of 

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such agency actions is barred unless the suit is commenced 

"within six years after the right of action first accrued." 28 

U.S.C. § 2401. The right of action first accrues on the date 

of final agency action. Spannaus v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 824 

F.2d 52, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Sendra's right of action first accrued in 1987, when the 

Bureau refused to register the receivers. But Sendra did not 

file this action until 1994, more than six years later. In the 

interim it asked the Bureau four timesin August 1990, in 

November 1990, in April 1991, and in October 1992to 

reconsider the agency's initial registration decision.

Second points. Agency action is final "whether or not 

there has been presented or determined an application for 

... any form of reconsideration." 5 U.S.C. § 704. Parties 

therefore do not have to seek rehearing before they commence an action for judicial review, unless there is a statute 

requiring them to do so (there is none here). Interstate 

Commerce Comm'n v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,

482 U.S. 270, 284 (1987); cf. Darby v. Cisneros, 490 U.S. 137, 

144-47 (1993). But in formal APA adjudications, if a party 

does file a timely request for reconsideration, this tolls the 

running of the period of limitations; until the agency disposes 

of the request, the original agency decision remains "nonfinal." Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 285.

Whether, in regard to informal adjudications, the limitations period is also tolled when a party timely seeks reconsideration is a question not before us. See Spannaus, 824 F.2d 

at 60; cf. Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 850-51 

(D.C. Cir. 1983). Sendra has expressly disclaimed any challenge to the Bureau's 1987 decision. Therefore it is of no 

moment whether Sendra's 1994 suit was timely with respect 

to that decision. The only "final agency action" Sendra 

identifies is the Bureau's letter of August 18, 1993, declining 

for the fourth time since 1987 to register the receivers as 

machineguns. If the 1993 letter is reviewable as final agency 

action, Sendra's suit was timely filed.

Third points. Assume for the moment that the Bureau's 

1993 letter represents only the Bureau's refusal to reconsider 

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its earlier decision. An agency's denial of a petition, or a 

request, for reconsideration is not itself subject to judicial 

review if the petition alleges only "material error" in the 

agency's original decision. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 279. For formal adjudication, judicial 

review of such a denial would serve no useful purpose because 

the complaining party could still seek review of the original 

order, the period of limitations having been tolled. Id. Furthermore, an agency's denial of such a request for reconsideration is, under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), "committed to agency 

discretion by law." Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,

482 U.S. at 282 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 

(1985)). "This rule is familiar from other contexts. If a 

judicial panel or an en banc court denies rehearing, no one 

supposes that that denial, as opposed to the panel opinion, is 

an appealable action...." Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 280. On the other hand, if an agency 

denies a petition for reconsideration alleging "new evidence" 

or "changed circumstances," the agency's denial is reviewable 

as a final agency action, but it will be set aside only for the 

"clearest abuse of discretion." Id. at 278 (quoting United 

States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 534-

35 (1946)).

Here, Sendra alleged no changed circumstances. And it 

did not, in any of its requests for reconsideration, allege new 

evidence of the sort the Supreme Court had in mind in 

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineersnamely, "facts which, 

through no fault of [the petitioner], the original proceeding 

did not contain." Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 

U.S. at 279. The information Sendra supplied to the Bureau 

after 1987 was available before the Bureau first acted. It was 

evidence within Sendra's control. And Sendra could have 

presented it before the Bureau reached its initial decision. 

Cf. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston 

Co., 984 F.2d 469, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1993); National AntiHunger Coalition v. Executive Comm. of the President's 

Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1075 

n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Furthermore, the Bureau's 1993 lettera letter Sendra considers final agency actionconstituted the Bureau's fourth refusal to reconsider its 1987 decision. 

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While an agency's first refusal to grant reconsideration may 

be reviewable in limited circumstances, its denials of successive requests for reconsideration of the same decision are not. 

Whether an agency should even respond to such entreaties is 

"committed to agency discretion by law," and therefore not 

subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).

Fourth. If for any reason the agency reopens a matter 

and, after reconsideration, issues a new and final order, that 

order is reviewable on its merits, even though the agency 

merely reaffirms its original decision. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 278; Poulin v. Bowen, 817 

F.2d 865, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. 

FEC, 854 F.2d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The new order is, 

in other words, final agency action and as such, a new right of 

action accrues and starts the running of a new limitations 

period for judicial review.

Thus, if the Bureau's 1993 letter represented its decision 

after reopening the proceedings, Sendra is entitled to judicial 

review of that decision.

Fifth and final points. That the agency discusses the 

merits at length when it denies a request for reconsideration 

does not necessarily mean the agency has reopened the 

proceedings. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 

at 280-81. For formal agency adjudications, an agency order 

stating only that it is denying reconsideration is conclusive, so 

long as the agency has not altered its original decision. 

Courts will not, in other words, look behind the agency's 

formal disposition of the reconsideration request to see 

whether the agency "in fact" reopened its original decision 

(and thus rendered a new final order). Id. There is a 

corollary to this rule. Only "when the agency has clearly 

stated or otherwise demonstrated," that it has reopened the 

proceeding will the resulting agency decision be considered a 

new final order subject to judicial review under the usual 

standards. Morris v. Sullivan, 897 F.2d 553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 

1990); see Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 

1966) (Friendly, J.). These principles of administrative law 

have no less force in informal adjudications. In both formal 

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and informal adjudications, the agency must accompany its 

denial "of a written application, petition, or other request of 

an interested person" with "a brief statement of the grounds 

for denial," except when the denial is "self-explanatory." 5 

U.S.C. § 555(e); see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 

ACT 70 (1947), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 

UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 67, 136 (2d ed. 1992). But when the agency is merely 

"affirming a prior denial," no explanation is required, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 555(e), and none is normally given. See Brotherhood of 

Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 283. It would make no 

sense whatsoever to hold that when an agency offers an 

explanation for "affirming a prior denial," it 

has in effect reopened the proceedings and rendered a new, 

judicially-reviewable decision. See id. at 281; Morris, 897 

F.2d at 559. Thus, unless the agency clearly states or 

indicates that it has reopened the matter, its refusal of a 

request for reconsideration will be treated as simply that. 

See id.

Here, the Bureau's 1993 one-page letter to Sendra did not 

expressly say that it had reopened the matter and we detect 

nothing in the letter to indicate that it had done so. The 

Bureau examined the affidavits Sendra submitted, but did 

"not find any of the statements to be persuasive evidence that 

the "firearms' at issue were in fact manufactured prior to May 

19, 1986." Letter from Wayne Miller to Stephen P. Halbrook 

(Aug. 17, 1993). "Accordingly," the Bureau continued, "we 

must again decline your request to register the items as 

machineguns which were manufactured prior to May 19, 

1986." Id. Under Morris, the Bureau's letter constituted 

nothing more than a statement of the reasons why Sendra's 

request did not warrant reopening the matter. Morris, 897 

F.2d at 557 n.8. The 1993 letter, in other words, denied for 

the fourth time Sendra's request for reconsideration and, as 

such, it was not subject to judicial review.

Affirmed.

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