Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00965/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00965-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Omar Brown
Defendant
Christopher Compton
Defendant
County of Trinity
Defendant
Ron Hanover
Defendant
Eric Heryford
Defendant
Mike Rist
Defendant
Robert Michael Scharringhausen
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MICHAEL 

SCHARRINGHAUSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF TRINITY; SGT. 

CHRISTOPHER COMPTON; CPL. 

OMAR BROWN; CPL. RON HANOVER; 

SGT. MIKE RIST (All Officers 

serving on the Trinity County 

Narcotics Task Force); ERIC 

HERYFORD; and DOES 1 through 

50,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-00965-JAM-CMK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

In the Complaint (Doc. #1), Plaintiff Robert Michael 

Scharringhausen (“Plaintiff”) alleges two causes of action 

against Defendants County of Trinity (“the County”); Trinity 

County District Attorney, Eric Heryford (“Heryford”); and Trinity 

County Sheriff’s Deputies Christopher Compton (“Compton”), Omar 

Brown (“Brown”), Ron Hanover (“Hanover”), and Mike Rist (“Rist”)

(collectively “the Deputies”). The County, Heryford and the 

Deputies (collectively “Defendants”) now move to dismiss (Doc. 

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#8) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings the first cause of action against all 

Defendants. Comp. ¶ 14. In it, Plaintiff alleges that the 

Deputies conducted a raid on his property, during which they 

confiscated documents that included privileged communications 

between Plaintiff and his attorney. Id. ¶ 10. These documents 

were copied and disseminated to “prosecutorial agencies” without 

any independent review and at the behest of Heryford. Id. The 

claim alleges a violation of Plaintiff’s attorney-client 

privilege leading to an unlawful deprivation of “his rights in 

subsequent criminal defense issues and to his access to the 

Courts,” and violations of his rights under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶¶ 11-14. 

The second cause of action is brought against the Deputies 

and alleges that they provided knowingly “false and malicious 

information” regarding Plaintiff’s use of various aliases and his 

connection to several criminal convictions associated with those 

aliases. Comp. ¶ 16. This information was subsequently used to 

increase Plaintiff’s bail and to prevent him from being released. 

Id. He alleges the Deputies’ conduct therefore “deprived him of 

his liberty.” Id. ¶ 17. 

///

///

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for September 2, 2015.

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II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

Defendants request the Court take notice (Doc. #9) of seven 

exhibits in support of their motion. In his Opposition, 

Plaintiff argues these documents are not properly noticed at this 

stage of the litigation. Opp. at p. 9. He also objects to the 

exhibits as impermissible hearsay. 

The Court declines to take notice of Defendants’ exhibits. 

Although the exhibits are public records, they are not necessary 

for the Court’s consideration of the current motion. 

B. Discussion

1. Municipal Liability

Defendants first challenge Plaintiff’s claims against the 

County. MTD at pp. 5-6. They argue the claim is improperly 

premised on a respondeat superior theory of liability as the 

Complaint makes no allegations regarding an official policy or 

custom of the County.

In his Opposition, Plaintiff recites case law regarding the 

imposition of liability on a municipal defendant, but does not 

directly address Defendants’ arguments or point to any support in 

the Complaint for a claim based on Monell v. Department of Social 

Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Opp. at p. 2. 

To properly state a Monell claim, allegations in a complaint 

“may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but 

must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give 

fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 

631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 

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1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). “A Monell claim may be stated under three 

theories of municipal liability: (1) when official policies or 

established customs inflict a constitutional injury; (2) when 

omissions or failures to act amount to a local government policy 

of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or (3) when 

a local government official with final policy-making authority 

ratifies a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.” Sants v. 

Seipert, No. 2:15-CV-00355-KJM, 2015 WL 5173075, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

2015) (citing Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 

1249–50 (9th Cir. 2010)).

The Complaint is devoid of allegations supporting any of 

these theories of Monell liability. As pointed out by 

Defendants, the only connection the County had to the underlying 

conduct was that it employed the Deputies. The County cannot be 

held liable pursuant to §1983 based upon a respondeat superior 

theory. See Sants, 2015 WL 5173075, at *3. Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s claims against the 

County. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to impose 

Monell liability through the claims against the individual 

Defendants in their official capacities, they are dismissed on 

the same grounds. See Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 

1079, 1114 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“Official capacity suits generally 

represent only another way of pleading an action against the 

entity that employs the agent.”)

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice and without 

leave to amend is appropriate “only if it appears beyond doubt 

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 

claim which would entitle him to relief.” Navarro v. Block, 250 

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F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Because the Court is not certain that Plaintiff 

cannot properly plead a Monell claim, any municipal liability

claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

2. First Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is based on the alleged 

seizure and dissemination of documents protected by the attorneyclient privilege. Comp. ¶¶ 10-14; Opp. at p. 9. 

The Ninth Circuit has discussed the constitutional nature of 

the attorney-client privilege:

Standing alone, the attorney-client privilege is merely 

a rule of evidence; it has not yet been held a 

constitutional right. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 

449, 466 n. 15 (1975); Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 

F.2d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1978). In some situations, 

however, government interference with the confidential 

relationship between a defendant and his counsel may 

implicate Sixth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 

L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). Such an intrusion violates the Sixth 

Amendment only when it substantially prejudices the 

defendant. United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 

1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980); see United States v. Glover, 

596 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 

860 (1979).

Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985)

(emphasis added).

Defendants contend there are no allegations in the Complaint 

that the alleged conduct interfered with Plaintiff’s relationship 

with his counsel or resulted in “substantial prejudice.” MTD at 

p. 9. Defendants are correct. 

The Complaint fails to properly allege that Plaintiff was 

substantially prejudiced by the seizure and dissemination of the 

documents. The alleged conduct in and of itself does not 

establish a constitutional violation cognizable under §1983. Nor 

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do Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that his rights were 

violated establish the necessary element of prejudice. The Court 

therefore dismisses the first cause of action but does so with

leave to amend.

3. Prosecutorial Immunity

Because the only claim brought against Heryford has been 

dismissed, the Court need not and does not address Defendants’ 

arguments regarding prosecutorial immunity.

4. Second Cause of Action

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s second cause of action should 

be dismissed because it fails to assert a viable claim regarding 

Plaintiff’s bail and confinement in jail. MTD at p. 10-11. 

It is unclear from the face of the Complaint exactly what is

the basis for Plaintiff’s second cause of action. The Court 

adopts the plausible interpretation utilized by Defendants in 

their Motion that Plaintiff is attempting to allege a claim for 

violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive 

bail, despite the Complaint completely failing to reference the 

Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does nothing to resolve the mystery 

in his Opposition, as he fails to address Defendants’ arguments

and includes only one sentence referencing this second cause of 

action. Opp. at p. 9.

The Complaint alleges that the Deputies fabricated previous 

convictions in order to deny Plaintiff bail. Comp. ¶¶ 16, 18. 

However, in California, judicial officers are vested with the 

exclusive authority to enhance or reduce bail, not law 

enforcement. See Cal. Penal Code § 1269c. In order to state a 

claim against the Deputies, Plaintiff must establish that their 

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conduct caused the constitutional violation. “Pursuant to 

traditional tort law principles of causation, which we apply to § 

1983 claims, . . . a judicial officer's exercise of independent 

judgment in the course of his official duties is a superseding 

cause that breaks the chain of causation linking law enforcement 

personnel to the officer's decision . . . .” Galen v. Cnty. of 

Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 663-64 (9th Cir. 2007). The Deputies 

can only be held liable under Plaintiff’s theory “if they 

prevented the [judicial officer] from exercising his independent 

judgment.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that such a claim 

requires two key elements: (1) that law enforcement “deliberately 

or recklessly misled” the judicial officer; and (2) that the 

plaintiff’s bail “would not have been unconstitutionally 

excessive but for the officers' misrepresentations.” Id. The 

Complaint does not include any factual allegations that the bail 

was in fact constitutionally “excessive” or that it would not 

have been set at that level but for the Deputies’ 

misrepresentations. Rather, it simply makes conclusory and vague 

allegations that the fabrications were used “to increase 

Plaintiff’s bail” and therefore his rights were violated. Comp. 

¶¶ 16-18. Plaintiff’s second cause of action fails to state a 

claim for relief and is dismissed.

It is not clear to the Court that amendment of this claim

would be futile, and therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend. 

However, as to this claim, and any other claim which the Court is 

granting leave to amend, Plaintiff is “admonished that failure to 

cure the defects identified in this Order will be grounds for 

dismissal without further leave to amend.” See Dick v. Am. Home 

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Mortgage Servicing, Inc., CIV. 2:13-00201 WBS, 2013 WL 5299180, 

at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2013).

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint must be filed within twenty (20) days 

from the date of this Order. Defendants’ responsive pleading is 

due within twenty (20) days thereafter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 9, 2015

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