Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04069/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04069-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rahsaan Coleman
Petitioner
Joe McGrath
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAHSAAN COLEMAN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JOE McGRATH, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-4069 PJH (PR)

ORDER STAYING AND

ADMINISTRATIVELY

CLOSING CASE

This is a habeas case filed pro se by a state prisoner. The court granted

respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as mixed and dismissed with leave for petitioner

to chose from three possible courses of action: (1) dismiss the petition; (2) amend the

petition to delete the unexhausted issues; or (3) ask for a stay. In response he has filed a

motion for a stay, which respondent has opposed.

DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), held that a district

court may stay a mixed habeas case to allow exhaustion in state court. Id. at 277-78. 

Rhines requires that stays be granted only if the movant shows good cause for his or her

delay in exhausting the issues and that the issues are “potentially meritorious.” Id. at 277. 

The petitioner also must not have engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay,”

though the Court recognized that this requirement would usually be relevant only in capital

cases, where the petitioner, unlike those sentenced to a term of years such as petitioner

here, presumably wants to delay review. Id. at 278. Respondent contends that petitioner

has not met the “good cause” requirement of Rhines. 

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Case 4:04-cv-04069-PJH Document 13 Filed 06/25/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Although neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has defined “good cause,”

the Ninth Circuit has held that good cause is not the same as extraordinary circumstances. 

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 659-61 (9th Cir. 2005). Beyond that, the courts which have

considered the question are divided as to whether it is the same as the very difficult “cause”

standard for relief from a procedural default, or is less demanding. See Lawrence v.

Schirro, 2007 WL 433554 at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2007); Steele v. Ornoski, 2006 WL

2844123 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (citing cases). There is a strong hint what the

standard should be, however: in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005), which was

post-Rhines, the Court suggested that prisoners who are “reasonably confused” about

whether a state filing would be timely, and thus fear having the federal statute of limitations

expire while they are exhausting their state remedies, may avoid this predicament "by filing

a 'protective' petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey the

federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted." Id. at 416-17. That is,

reasonable confusion usually would be good cause. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 416-17. 

In this case petitioner contends that he failed to exhaust because (1) he knew no

law, thus was ignorant of the requirement that in state court he label federal constitutional

issues as such, in addition to presenting the facts underlying the claim; and (2) he was

misled by a letter from his attorney. 

As to the first contention, respondent asserts that if this were good cause for failure

to exhaust, there would virtually always be good cause, making the good cause

requirement meaningless. This argument has some force, but given that pro se state

habeas petitioners must attempt to deal with highly technical requirements, sometimes with

little education and usually without much access to legal materials, that petitioner lacked

legal knowledge and was pro se in state court is entitled to some weight in determining

whether there was good cause. 

In his second contention petitioner alleges that he understood his appellate attorney

to have told him that he could go to federal court with any of the arguments from his state

appeal. This was wrong, as it happens; the copy of counsel’s letter that petitioner attaches

Case 4:04-cv-04069-PJH Document 13 Filed 06/25/07 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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as an exhibit shows that counsel actually wrote: “You may present any of the arguments

from the appeal briefs, insofar as those arguments are based on your rights under the

United States Constitution.” Respondent contends that this was clear, but to a pro se

prisoner without knowledge of the law, it may be that “insofar” was incomprehensible or

thought to mean the same as “inasmuch.” Petitioner’s having attached the letter to support

his contention certainly suggests that even now he does not realize what it really means. 

On balance, the court concludes that petitioner has shown good cause. 

The three unexhausted issues were petitioner’s claims that his sentence was cruel

and unusual, that his double jeopardy rights were violated by his being sentenced on two

offenses which were part of the same series of events, and that his double jeopardy rights

were violated by enhancement of the sentence for use of a firearm. The issues are federal

and thus potentially meritorious, there is no reason to think he is asking for the stay for

purposes of delay, and he has shown good cause; the stay will be granted.

CONCLUSION

 Petitioner’s motion for stay (document number 10 on the docket) is GRANTED. This

case is STAYED to allow petitioner to present his unexhausted issues in state court,

presumably by way of state petitions for habeas corpus. If petitioner is not granted relief in

state court, he may return to this court and ask that the stay be lifted. 

The stay is subject to the following conditions: 

(1) petitioner must institute state court habeas proceedings within thirty days of this

order; and 

(2) petitioner must notify this court within thirty days after the state courts have

completed their review of his claims or after they have refused review of his claims. 

If either condition of the stay is not satisfied, this court may vacate the stay and act

on this petition. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278 (district court must effectuate timeliness

concerns of AEDPA by placing “reasonable limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and

back.”).

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Case 4:04-cv-04069-PJH Document 13 Filed 06/25/07 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The clerk shall administratively close this case. The closure has no legal effect; it is

purely a statistical matter. The case will be reopened and the stay vacated upon

notification by petitioner in accordance with section two above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 25, 2007 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.04\COLEMAN069.STAY

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