Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04084/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorge Enrique Arango
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

JORGE ENRIQUE ARANGO, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United State.t Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 2 8 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-4084 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-206J) 

Susan L. Foreman (Michael G. Katz, Federal 

Denver, Colorado, and Frances Smylie Brown, 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, with .her 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Public Defender, 

Assistant Federal 

on the briefs), 

Colorado, for the 

Richard D. McKelvie (Dee v. Benson, United States Attorney, with 

him on the brief), Special Assistant United States Attorney, Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-4084 Document: 01019384455 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 1 
Jorge Enrique Arango was convicted of possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to distribute in violation of 2·1 

u.s.c. section 841(a)(1). Arango appeals his conviction, arguing 

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

evidence of 100 kilograms of cocaine. We affirm. 

I. 

On November 16, 1988, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper James 

Hillin was traveling west on Interstate 70 when he noticed a pickup truck moving at a high speed in one of the eastbound lanes. 

Hillin turned on his rear radar and clocked the truck at 84 

m.p.h., which exceeded the area speed limit of 65 m.p.h. After 

pulling the truck over, Hillin noticed that there were two persons 

in the cab, a man and a woman, and two small clothing bags in the 

bed of the truck. The driver gave Hillin a California license 

identifying him as Jorge Enrique Arango and a California 

registration listing the owner as Walter A. or Linda A. 

McConaughy. Hillin then asked Arango to exit the truck and come 

sit in the police car so that Hillin could talk with him about why 

he had been stopped and show him the reading on the radar gun. 

While in the patrol car, Hillin asked Arango who the 

registered owner was. Arango replied that the registered owner 

was a friend, who had loaned the truck to him so that he could 

drive to Denver for a two week vacation. This answer aroused 

Hillin's suspicions because he thought that the two small bags of 

clothing could not contain enough clothing for a two week stay. 

Hillin asked Arango for the owners' phone number, but Arango told 

him that the owners did not have a phone. Hillin instructed his 

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dispatcher to contact directory assistance in the owners' hometown 

to see if the owners had a phone number. The dispatcher reported 

that California directory assistance had no listing for the 

McConaughys. The dispatcher also informed Hillin that the 

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computer did not indicate 

that the truck was stolen. 

Hillin gave Arango a citation for speeding and then asked if 

there was any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in the truck. Arango 

indicated that there was not. Hillin asked if he could "look in 

the vehicle for any of those items." Arango gave his consent. 

Meanwhile, Trooper Chester Johnson had arrived at the scene. 

The two troopers proc_eeded to search the truck. As Johnson walked 

up to the pick-up from behind, he noticed that the bed of the 

truck "didn't seem right" because it was very shallow. After 

lifting the tailgate corner of a rubber mat covering the bed of 

the truck, Johnson observed that the truck bed apparently had been 

modified. The section seams in the truck bed were wide and rough, 

as if they had been puttied in by hand. Bolts on the sides of the 

bed did not match the color of the pick-up, and the bed appeared 

to have been freshly painted. As they were examining the bed of 

the truck, Arango asked the officers what they were doing and 

whether anything was wrong. Hillin replied that they were looking 

at the bed of the truck. Arango said nothing more, and the 

officers continued with their search. By placing one hand on the 

bed of the truck and reaching around the side to the 

undercarriage, Johnson and Hillin discove~ed a gap of several 

inches existed. Both Johnson and Hillin took turns tapping on the 

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bed of the truck, but neither of them could feel the taps on the 

other side, suggesting that the truck had a false bed. The 

troopers next removed the rubber mat and observed that the same 

modifications had been made to the other three corners of the 

truck bed floor. Hillin retained Arango's license and vehicle 

registration and told Arango that he had to follow him seven miles 

to the sheriff's office in Richfield to post bail for the traffic 

citation. At the suppression hearing, Hillin admitted that this 

request was a pretext and that the real reason that he asked 

Arango to return to Richfield was to continue searching the truck. 

Arango drove to Richfield with Hillin in front of him and Johnson 

following him. 

When they arrived at the sheriff's office, Hillin asked 

Arango to sign a written consent to search form. Arango responded 

by stating: "I already told you, you could search, you could look 

in the truck; and you have looked." Hillin left and found Deputy 

County Attorney Paul Lyman. Arango told Lyman that he had already 

granted his consent to search and questioned why the form was 

necessary. Lyman replied that "they'd like to have it in 

writing." Arango then asked what would happen if he signed the 

form and Lyman replied that they would search the bed of the pickup and if they did not find anything, "you'll be on your way in 

fifteen minutes. If we find something, we'll go from there." 

Lyman also told Arango that if he did not sign the form, he would 

request a search warrant. 

Arango signed the form, and several troopers then assisted 

Hillin and Johnson in dismantling the bed of the truck. The 

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troopers found 100 kilograms of cocaine hidden in secret 

compartments underneath the bed in the four corners of the truck. 

Arango testified that he inferred from Lyman's comments that a 

judge would sign the form if he did not, that he did not feel he 

was free to leave, that no one explained his constitutional rights 

to him, that he was unfamiliar with his rights because he is a 

citizen of Colombia, and that he never would have signed the form 

had he known that the search of the truck included dismantling it. 

Arango admitted at the suppression hearing that he had not 

told the truth when he told Hillin that he received the truck from 

the registered owners. Arango stated that he actually received 

the truck from a person known as Jesus Gonzalez, who paid Arango 

$2000 to drive the truck to Denver. Arango presented no evidence 

at the suppression hearing showing that Gonzalez had lawful 

possession of the truck from the registered owners. Arango 

testified that Gonzalez told him that there was money hidden in a 

secret compartment somewhere in the truck. Arango denied any 

knowledge of the cocaine. 

In response to the government's argument that Arango lacked 

standing to contest the search, the district court observed: 

"There is some genuine question as to whether the defendant Jorge 

Enrique Arango has standing to challenge the search of the truck." 

The district court, however, found it unnecessary to resolve this 

issue, concluding that even if Arango had standing, he had 

consented to the search. Accordingly, the district court denied 

Arango's motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine. On April 10 

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and 11, the government tried Arango before a jury, which returned 

a guilty verdict. 

II. 

When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, we accept the district court's factual findings unless 

they are clearly erroneous. United States ~Berryhill, 880 F.2d 

275, 280 (lOth Cir. 1989). The ultimate determination of 

reasonableness under the fourth amendment, U.S. Canst. amend. IV, 

is a question of law, which we review de novo. United States ~ 

McKinnel, 888 F.2d 669, 672 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

Arango argues that the district court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress for the following reasons: (1) he has standing 

to contest the search; (2) his allegedly illegal det~ntion on 

Interstate 70 fatally tainted his subsequent oral consent to 

search; (3) his allegedly illegal arrest and transportation to the 

sheriff's office fatally tainted his subsequent written consent; 

. and {4) his written consent to search was invalid on its face. 

Arango argues that he has standing to contest the search of 

the truck because the government failed to introduce any evidence 

demonstrating that Arango's possession of the truck was not 

lawful. Arango contends that his mere physical possession of the 

truck at the time of the search gives him standing to object to 

the search. We disagree. 

In Rakas ~Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Supreme Court 

reformulated the issue of standing under the fourth amendment. 

Rakas concluded that the "Court's long history of insistence that 

Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already 

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answered many ••• traditional standing inquiries, and we think 

that the definition of those rights is more properly placed within 

the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law rather than within 

that of standing." Id. at 140. Because the issue of standing is 

"invariably intertwined" with substantive fourth amendment 

analysis, the most logical inquiry focuses solely on a particular 

defendant's rights under the fourth amendment. Id. at 139. In 

reviewing a motion to suppress, we must thus determine "whether 

the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment 

rights of [the] criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the 

evidence . . .. Id. at 140. It is immaterial if eVidence 

sought to be introduced against a defendant was obtained in 

violation of someone else's fourth amendment rights. Fourth 

amendment rights are .personal and cannot be asserted vicariously. 

See id. 

To ascertain whether a search has violated the rights of the 

particular defendant who seeks to exclude the resulting evidence, 

we consider two primary factors: whether the defendant manifested 

a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and 

whether society would recognize that expectation as objectively 

reasonable. See Smith~ Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). To 

decide whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, we 

consider concepts of real or personal property law, bearing in 

mind that "arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law 

between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to 

control." See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 & n.12. Although neither 

ownership nor lawful possession are determinative, they are often. 

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dispositive factors. "One of the main rights attaching to 

property is the right to exclude others and one who owns or 

lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood 

have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right 

to exclude." Id. at 143 n.12 (citation omitted). 

In United States ~ Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 271 (lOth Cir. 

1989), application of these factors led to our conclusion that the 

defendant in that case did not have a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in an automobile in which he was a passenger. The 

evidence in Erwin suggested that the defendant had loaned the 

automobile in which he was riding to the driver. However, the 

automobile was registered to a third-party and we noted that the 

defendant failed to introduce any ev~dence "concerning where or 

from whom [he] obtained the vehicie or whether his apparent 

possession was lawful." Id. at 271. On this basis, we concluded: 

"The mere fact that defendant apparently transferred control of 

the vehicle to [the drlver] is not sufficient to establish 

defendant's legitimate possession of the car or that he had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched." Id. 

The government contends that Arango did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the truck. We agree. Like the 

defendant in Erwin, Arango has failed to introduce evidence that 

his possession of the truck was lawful. Although we recognize 

that the proponent of a motion to suppress need not always come 

forward with legal documentation establishing that he lawfully 

possessed the area searched, see Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548 & n.2 

(11th Cir. 1987) (standing established by uncontradicted testimony 

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of defendant that he borrowed car from friend), the proponent must 

at least state that he gained possession from the owner or someone 

with the authority to grant possession. See id. Arango concedes 

that he obtained the truck from Jesus Gonzalez and that he knew 

before Trooper Hil.lin stopped and questioned him that Gonzalez was 

not the registered owner. 1 Arango introduced no evidence showing 

that Gonzalez had gained lawful possession of the truck from the 

registered owners. See Erwin, 875 F.2d at 271. Because Arango 

failed to present any evidence that Gonzales lawfully possessed 

the truck, 2 we conclude that Arango did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the truck. See id. at 271-72; United 

States ~Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (lOth Cir. 1984) 

(defendant driver had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 

1 On direct examination, Arango stated that he believed that 

the person from whom he borrowed the vehicle was the owner. 

However, on cross-examination, Arango testified: 

2 

Q. And had you, prior to that time [when Arango was pulled 

over], looked at the registration in the glove 

compartment of the car? 

A. Yeah, that's correct. 

Q. And you, so you knew that it was registered in the name 

of Walter McConaughy. 

A. Yes. 

Q. And when Trooper Hillin asked about the ownership of the 

car, what did you tell him? 

A. I said that it was a friend of mine, which I lied at 

that point, now. 

We do not, of course, require Arango to produce legal 

documentation showing a chain of lawful custody from the 

registered owner to Gonzaqlez to himself. We emphasize, however, 

that Arango presented no evidence "concerning where or from whom 

[Gonzalez] obtained the vehicle or whether his apparent possession 

was lawful." Erwin, 875 F.2d at 271. 

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rental car by virtue of his mere physical possession where rental 

agreement provided the car had been rented by unrelated third 

party and there was no evidence of any arrangement with the rental 

company allowing defendant lawfully to drive the car); United 

States Y.:.. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788, 790 (lOth Cir. 1984) (defendant 

had no reasonable expectation of privacy in aircraft where he 

failed to demonstrate credibly that he had authority from the 

registered owner to possess, use, or fly the aircraft); United 

States Y.:.. Smith, 621 F.2d 483, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1980) (driver of 

automobile did not have standing to contest search where he was 

not owner and failed to establish that he lawfully possessed the 

vehicle), cert. denied, 449 u.s. 1086 (1981). We hold that Arango 

has failed to carry his burden of proof at the suppression hearing 

that the challenged search violated his fourth amendment rights. 

See Rakas, 439 u.s. at 130 n.l (burden of proving a reasonable 

expectation of privacy is on the proponent of a motion to 

suppress). 

III. 

Arango also argues that we should grant his motion to 

suppress because the troopers seized evidence that was the result 

of his allegedly illegal detention and arrest. We disagree. 

Although Arango cannot challenge the search of the truck, he 

can, of course, challenge his own seizure. See United States Y.:.. 

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) {"Fourth Amendment 

applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that 

involve only a brief detention short of arrest"); Erwin, 875 F.2d 

at 270 {"It is beyond dispute that a vehicle's driver may 

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challenge his traffic stop . . . . . ") If Arango's seizure was 

illegal, evidence obtained as a result of the illegal seizure must 

be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Erwin, 875 F.2d 

at 269 n.2. 

A. 

To determine the validity of Arango's roadside detention, we 

balance the nature of the intrusion on fourth amendment interests 

against the importance of the governmental interests .involved. 

See United States ~ Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (validity of 

investigative Terry stop, short of arrest, determined by balancing 

governmental and fourth amendment interests). We must ascertain 

whether "the police diligently pursued a means of investigation 

that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, 

during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." Id. 

at 686. The actions of the police must be both justified at their 

inception and reasonably related to the circumstances which 

justified the interference at the outset. Terry~ Ohio, 392 U.S. 

1, 19-20 (1968). In United States~ Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (lOth 

Cir. 1988), we applied these principles to a traffic stop and 

concluded: 

An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a 

driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer 

check, and issue a citation. When the driver has produced a 

valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the 

car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being 

subject to further delay by police for additional 

questioning. In order to justify "a temporary detention for 

questioning," the officer must have reasonable suspicion "of 

illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious crime." 

Id. at 1519 (citations omitted). After the defendant in Guzman 

produced a valid license and a rental agreement authorizing him to 

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drive the car, a police officer asked him a series of questions 

relating to his destination, his place of employment, his date of 

marriage, and the amount of money he was carrying. Id. at 1514. 

We concluded that this line of questioning was not justified 

either by the officer's observation that the defendant's pregnant 

wife looked nervous or by the officer's opinion that the amount of 

money the defendant told him he was carrying, $4,000, was more 

than the defendant could have reasonably saved in his occupation 

as a laborer. Id. at 1520. 

Contrary to the defendant in Guzman, Arango never proved that 

he had lawful possession of the truck. Consequently, Hillin was 

justified in detaining Arango while he tried to contact the 

regis~ered owners. See Obregon, 748 F.2d at 1376 (continued 

detention justified where car rented in another's name, driver not 

listed as authorized operator, and driver unable to provide means 

of contacting lessee). We also conclude that Hillin's single 

. inquiry relating to the transportation of contraband was justified 

by Arango's inability to provide credible proof that he lawfully 

possessed the truck, combined with the inadequate amount of 

luggage in the truck for a two week vacation. Together, these two 

factors provided reasonable suspicion that the truck was being 

used to carry contraband. Hillin's question "accounted for but a 

moment of defendant's brief detention and was based upon specific 

and articulable facts and rational inferences." United States~ 

Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (lOth Cir. 1986) (brief inquiry 

concerning transportation of drugs justified by the two 

defendants' hesitation prior to answering questions, their 

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temporary license plate, the fact that the defendants were 

traveling from a known drug source area, and the relative lack of 

luggage carried by the defendants although they stated they were 

vacationing). We hold that Hillin's brief detention of Arango on 

the interstate was supported by reasonable suspicion. 

B. 

Arango next argues that he was illegally arrested when Hillin 

told him to follow him to the Richfie~d sheriff's office. We 

disagree. 

Once the police told Arango to come with them to the 

sheriff's office, the line between detention and de facto arrest 

was crossed. See United States~ Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1132 

(lOth Cir. 1985) (where police officer, while holding driver's 

license, registration, and title, asked defendant to go to police 

station, "defendant had no reasonable choice other than to 

accompany the officer no matter how polite the officer was in 

phrasing the request"); United States~ Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 

1452 (lOth Cir. 1985) (defendant was arrested where police still 

held license, registration, and speeding ticket and defendant 

drove to police station, sandwiched between two police cars, for 

further questioning). We are satisfied, however, that there was 

probable cause to arrest Arango for the transportation of 

contraband. By observing the bed of the truck and knocking on it, 

Hillin and Johnson discovered evidence indicating that the truck 

had a hidden compartment running underneath the bed. We hold that 

this evidence, together with the inadequate amount of luggage for 

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Arango's purported two-week vacation, supplied probable cause to 

arrest Arango. 3 

IV. 

Because Arango's arrest was supported by probable cause and 

because Arango lacks standing to challenge the search of the 

truck, we need not decide whether Arango voluntarily consented to 

the search of the truck at the roadside and at the Sheriff's 

office. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

3 Our decision is consistent with Recalde, in which we 

concluded that there was no probable cause to arrest where someone 

had tampered with the screws in the interior molding of a car, 

which led a police officer to take apart the molding under which 

he found contraband. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1452. The evidence of 

a secret compartment in this case is far more probative of illegal 

activity than the scratched screws at issue in Recalde. 

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