Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02758/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02758-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Centimark Corporation
Appellee
James Turnell
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2758

JAMES TURNELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CENTIMARK CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 2660 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 23, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 29, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and TINDER, Circuit 

Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. After losing his job at CentiMark 

Corporation, Appellant James Turnell went to work for one 

of its competitors. That created a problem, as Turnell’s employment contract contained restrictive covenants barring 

him from competing with CentiMark or soliciting its customers for two years after termination. The district court issued a preliminary injunction partially enforcing the restricCase: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
2 No. 14-2758

tive covenants, but only to the extent the court deemed necessary to protect CentiMark’s legitimate interests. Turnell 

challenges the preliminary injunction on appeal. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

CentiMark is a large, nationwide roofing company that 

primarily sells and installs flat, single-ply roofing for commercial and industrial customers. CentiMark hired Turnell 

as a laborer in its Chicago office in 1978, when he was eighteen years old. Over the course of thirty-five years with the 

company, Turnell worked his way up the ranks. In 1988 

CentiMark promoted him to Chicago District Operations 

Manager and increased his salary from $45,000 to $50,000 

per year. In return, CentiMark required him to sign an employment agreement (the “Agreement”). 

Turnell’s new role would give him access to CentiMark’s 

proprietary information and trade secrets, including sales 

methods and materials, customer accounts, and pricing data. 

So, in return for his promotion and salary increase, Turnell 

agreed to a non-disclosure provision (§ 4.01 of the Agreement) requiring him to maintain the confidentiality of 

CentiMark’s information. 

He also agreed to two restrictive covenants that CentiMark regularly requires its management-level employees to 

execute. The first is a non-compete clause (§ 4.05) prohibiting 

Turnell from “engag[ing] ... in any Competing Business” 

during the period of his employment and for two years afterward in any of the “regions and/or divisions and/or territories” in which he “operated” as a CentiMark employee. 

“Competing Business” includes any company that “sells or 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2758 3

attempts to sell any products or services” that are “the same 

as, or similar to,” CentiMark’s.

The second restrictive covenant is a non-solicitation provision (§ 4.06) providing that Turnell “shall not ... solicit the 

trade of, or trade with,” any of CentiMark’s “customers or 

suppliers, or prospective customers or suppliers” during his 

employment and for two years afterward. “Prospective customer” is defined broadly to include anyone “contacted by 

[CentiMark] during the restrictive periods mentioned in this 

Agreement.” But the Agreement does not prohibit all contact 

with customers or prospective customers—only those that 

“would constitute [Turnell’s] engaging in a competitive 

business, as described in [the non-compete clause].”

After his promotion in 1988, Turnell’s ascent within the 

company continued. He rose from operations manager to 

branch manager to regional manager and, finally, to Senior 

Vice President and Regional Manager for the Midwest Region, which encompasses western Michigan, northwest Indiana, central and northern Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and 

North and South Dakota. This region is one of CentiMark’s 

largest and most productive, generating over $25 million in 

annual revenue. Turnell was responsible for all regional sales 

(including pricing, marketing, and customer relationships) 

and operations (including staffing, personnel, and financial 

performance). He had regular contact with customers, reviewed all major proposals, and had access to a passwordprotected intranet portal containing information on proposals, leads, quotes, financial performance, and other data. 

He also participated in monthly conference calls with senior 

executives on company-wide financial projections and strategy. As regional manager, Turnell earned over $250,000 per 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
4 No. 14-2758

year in base salary and bonuses; in addition, CentiMark 

compensated him with shares in the company worth more 

than $3 million.

The relationship between Turnell and CentiMark came to 

an end when the company fired him on January 8, 2013. The 

reason, according to CentiMark, is that Turnell had misappropriated company resources and covered up fraudulent 

billing by Vacuum Resources, a subcontracting company 

owned by his wife. According to Turnell, this was a pretext; 

the real reason for his termination had to do with his age, his 

health (he has diabetes and high blood pressure), and his 

high level of compensation.

Within a week after being fired, Turnell interviewed with 

Windward Roofing and Construction, Inc., a smaller, more 

local roofing company in Chicago. Commercial roofing accounts for about half of Windward’s business and makes it a 

competitor of CentiMark. But Windward also does other 

work that CentiMark does not, such as shingled residential 

roofing and masonry. CentiMark caught wind of Turnell’s 

discussions with Windward and demanded that he cut them 

off. Turnell testified that he was aware of his contractual obligations but did not care whether he was competing with 

CentiMark because he “needed a job.” Turnell made little 

effort to find a job outside commercial roofing.

Instead, he accepted an offer from Windward and began 

selling commercial roofing for his new employer on or about 

March 1, 2013. He was hired not to service existing accounts 

but to develop new business. To that end, Turnell contacted 

numerous customers or former customers of CentiMark, 

some of whom he had personally worked with during his 

tenure there. He sold services to at least one of those cusCase: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2758 5

tomers. And he submitted two bids in head-to-head competition with CentiMark, winning one of those jobs for Windward. 

CentiMark demanded that Turnell stop working for its 

competitor. After an unfruitful exchange of letters, the parties took their dispute to court. Turnell and Windward sued 

first, on March 11, 2013, seeking a declaration from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois that the Agreement’s restrictive covenants were unenforceable. CentiMark removed 

that lawsuit to the federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois on April 9. The following day, CentiMark filed 

its own separate action in the Northern District of Illinois 

against Turnell, Windward, and Vacuum Resources to enforce the restrictive covenants and to obtain other relief. The 

district court consolidated the two actions.

CentiMark moved for a preliminary injunction against 

Turnell under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. After expedited discovery 

and an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted 

CentiMark’s motion on July 10, 2014. But the court found 

Turnell’s restrictive covenants too broad, so it enforced them 

only to the extent it judged “reasonably necessary for the 

protection of CentiMark.” The preliminary injunction reads:

James Turnell shall not sell, attempt to sell, or help 

sell any products or services, or any combination 

thereof, related to commercial roofing to any person or entity who was a customer of Centimark 

Corporation as of January 8, 2013 and who is located in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North 

Dakota, South Dakota, or Wisconsin. 

The court provided that “[t]his injunction shall remain in effect until the earlier of a decision on the merits ... or two 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
6 No. 14-2758

years from the date of this order.” The court counted from 

the date of the order rather than the date of Turnell’s termination because Turnell’s breach tolled the running of the restrictive periods under the Agreement. Finally, the court required CentiMark to post a $250,000 bond. 

The preliminary injunction is narrower than the contractual covenants in three respects. First, whereas Turnell’s noncompete clause bans all competing business (i.e., sales of 

products or services similar to CentiMark’s), the injunction 

does not. It allows Turnell to remain in commercial roofing, 

subject to restrictions on his ability to sell to CentiMark’s 

customers.

Second, the injunction only forbids commercial roofing 

sales to actual customers of CentiMark as of Turnell’s termination date. Unlike the non-solicitation provision, the injunction does not extend to prospective CentiMark customers or to 

persons who were customers in the past.

Third, the injunction is geographically narrower. There is 

no geographical limitation in the non-solicitation provision, 

and the non-compete covers any region where Turnell “operated” as a CentiMark employee. But the district court limited the injunction’s reach to the Midwest—the region where 

Turnell primarily worked throughout his career and which 

he managed at the time of his departure.

The district court rejected CentiMark’s request to enjoin 

Turnell from working at Windward altogether. So long as he 

abided by the terms of the preliminary injunction, he was 

free to remain in his new job. The court also rejected CentiMark’s separate claim that Turnell had violated the nondisclosure provision, as there was no evidence of breach. 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2758 7

Nevertheless, Turnell took exception to the court’s order and 

filed a timely notice of appeal. 

We have subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of 

citizenship under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a)-(b) and 1332. And although this is an interlocutory appeal, we have authority to 

decide it under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 

II. ANALYSIS

Federal courts sitting in diversity “apply state substantive law and federal procedural law” under the eponymous 

Erie doctrine. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (citing 

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The district court 

here applied Pennsylvania law, pursuant to a choice-of-law 

clause in the parties’ Agreement, to determine the enforceability of the restrictive covenants; and it looked to federal 

law for the standard governing the availability of a preliminary injunction. Both parties agree with the first decision, 

and neither party contests the second. (They simply do not 

address the Erie issue). Choice-of-law arguments are normally waivable, see Vukadinovich v. McCarthy, 59 F.3d 58, 62 (7th 

Cir. 1995), so we need not analyze these issues here; we will 

instead follow the same course as the district court.

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable 

remedy that is available only when the movant shows clear 

need. Goodman v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. and Prof’l Regulation, 430 

F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2005). In our circuit, a district court 

engages in a two-step analysis to decide whether such relief 

is warranted. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts 

of USA, Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 2008). In the first 

phase, the party seeking a preliminary injunction must make 

a threshold showing that: (1) absent preliminary injunctive 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
8 No. 14-2758

relief, he will suffer irreparable harm in the interim prior to a 

final resolution; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; and 

(3) he has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Id.

at 1086; see also Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 

1999).

If the movant makes the required threshold showing, 

then the court proceeds to the second phase, in which it considers: (4) the irreparable harm the moving party will endure 

if the preliminary injunction is wrongfully denied versus the 

irreparable harm to the nonmoving party if it is wrongfully 

granted; and (5) the effects, if any, that the grant or denial of 

the preliminary injunction would have on nonparties (the 

“public interest”). Girl Scouts, 549 F.3d at 1086; Cooper, 196 

F.3d at 813; Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 

380, 386-88 (7th Cir. 1984). The court weighs the balance of 

potential harms on a “sliding scale” against the movant’s 

likelihood of success: the more likely he is to win, the less 

the balance of harms must weigh in his favor; the less likely 

he is to win, the more it must weigh in his favor. Girl Scouts, 

549 F.3d at 1086; Roland, 749 F.2d at 387-88. 

On appeal, we review the issuance of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Cooper, 196 F.3d at 813. 

“[B]ecause preliminary injunctions are an unusual remedy 

requiring the application of a definite set of standards, we 

subject them to ‘effective, and not merely perfunctory, appellate review.’” Id. (quoting Roland, 749 F.2d at 389). A district 

court may abuse its discretion by making a clear factual error or a mistake of law. Id. But we give substantial deference 

to the court’s weighing of evidence and balancing of the various equitable factors. Id.; Girl Scouts, 549 F.3d at 1086.

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2758 9

Only two of the preliminary injunction factors are at issue in this appeal: CentiMark’s likelihood of prevailing in its 

effort to enforce the restrictive covenants (factor 3), and the 

balance of potential harms to the parties (factor 4). 

A. CentiMark’s Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The district court concluded that CentiMark would likely 

prevail in its action to enforce Turnell‘s non-compete and 

non-solicitation covenants, but only to the extent reasonably 

necessary for CentiMark’s protection. Pennsylvania law disfavors restrictive covenants because it views them as restraints on trade and impediments to an employee’s ability 

to earn a living. Hess v. Gebhard & Co., 808 A.2d 912, 917 (Pa. 

2002). But Pennsylvania also recognizes restrictive covenants 

as “important business tools.” See id. at 917-18; cf. Outsource 

Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting) (discussing the economic benefits of covenants not to compete). Pennsylvania courts will therefore enforce a restrictive covenant so long as it is “incident to an 

employment relationship between the parties; the restrictions imposed by the covenant are reasonably necessary 

for the protection of the employer; and the restrictions imposed are reasonably limited in duration and geographic extent.” Hess, 808 A.2d at 917. 

If the covenant’s restrictions are too broad, “a court of 

equity may grant enforcement limited to those portions of 

the restrictions that are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer.” Id. at 920. Partial enforcement in these 

circumstances is sometimes called “blue penciling” (apparently a throwback to the days when lawyers edited written 

work with a blue pencil). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has “repeatedly held” that courts have discretion to use 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
10 No. 14-2758

the blue pencil. Id. “The reason for this policy is a refusal to 

allow the employee to profit, at the expense of his former 

employer, from his wrongful and inequitable conduct.” Sidco 

Paper Co. v. Aaron, 351 A.2d 250, 255 (Pa. 1976).

There is a limit, however, to Pennsylvania courts’ willingness to reform a restrictive covenant. If the restrictions are 

so “gratuitous[ly]” overbroad that they “indicate[] an intent 

to oppress the employee and/or to foster a monopoly,” a 

court of equity may refuse to enforce the covenant at all. Id.

at 257. The leading case is Reading Aviation Service, Inc. v. Bertolet, 311 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1973). Bertolet left his job at Reading 

Aviation and went to work for a competitor located 600 feet 

away from his former employer. He was subject to a noncompete agreement lacking both a temporal limitation and a 

geographical one—even though Reading Aviation operated 

entirely within Pennsylvania. Id. at 629. The lower court refused to enforce the non-compete even in part. Id. at 630. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed because it found the 

“open-ended restrictions” to be “far greater than ... reasonably necessary” and “unconscionable.” Id.

The court in Reading was concerned about the “possible 

adverse consequences” of partially enforcing an oppressive 

covenant: such enforcement tends to encourage employers 

with superior bargaining power to overreach. Id. at 630-31. 

That is a valid concern. If such a practice became widespread, it would chill lawful activity. Although judges could 

pare down the restrictions in the cases that make it to court, 

in the many cases that never go to court, or where the employee is deterred from even trying to leave, the employer 

would unfairly benefit from “the in terrorem effects of the 

oppressive and overly broad covenants.” Tradesman Int’l, Inc. 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2758 11

v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004, 1018 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring).

Not every overbroad covenant is oppressive, though. In 

many cases, overbreadth has a more benign cause (such as 

poor drafting), and to some extent overbreadth is unavoidable given the imprecision of our language. Thus, “absent bad 

faith, Pennsylvania courts do attempt to blue pencil covenants before refusing enforcement altogether.” Victaulic Co. v. 

Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 238 n.7 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Sidco, 351 

A.2d at 260 (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (characterizing “striking down such covenants in their entirety” as an “extraordinary sanction”). 

In the case before us, the district court wielded the blue 

pencil. In our view, the court could have narrowed Turnell’s

restrictive covenants even further than it did. The preliminary injunction’s prohibition on certain sales of “commercial 

roofing” is too broad, as CentiMark sells a more specific offering—commercial, flat, single-ply roofing. And the injunction need not cover all of Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois because only portions of those states were within the region 

that Turnell managed at CentiMark.1

But Turnell does not challenge the scope of the 

preliminary injunction on appeal. Instead, he argues that the 

district court should not have enforced the restrictive cove-

 1 The district court should take these issues into account when and if it 

issues a permanent injunction following a final determination on the 

merits, and the court may also wish to modify the preliminary injunction 

in the interim. CentiMark’s counsel stated at oral argument that his client 

has no objection to appropriately modifying the types of roofing and the 

geographic area covered by the injunction.

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
12 No. 14-2758

nants at all—even in blue-penciled form—because, like the 

covenants in Reading, they are overbroad and oppressive. 

We disagree. The covenants are incident to an employment relationship, and two years post-employment is a reasonable duration. See CentiMark Corp. v. Vitek, No. 08 C 7323, 

2010 WL 5490662, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2010). The covenants further CentiMark’s legitimate interest in preventing a 

former regional manager from using its customer relationships and proprietary business information, including its 

pricing models, for a competitor’s benefit. See Sidco, 351 A.2d 

at 254, 257 (holding that “Sidco clearly has a protectible interest in customer goodwill” and “properly used a restrictive 

covenant to protect its customer relationships”); see also Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 112-14 (3d Cir. 

2010) (noting that Pennsylvania law protects non-technical 

trade secrets); CertainTeed Corp. v. Williams, 481 F.3d 528, 530 

(7th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that under Pennsylvania law 

employers have a legitimate interest in “[k]eeping a business 

executive with a wealth of information from taking an 

equivalent position at a rival”). And while the district court 

found the scope of prohibited activity and the geographic 

reach of the restrictions broader than necessary, the covenants are not gratuitously or oppressively overbroad.

1. The Non-Compete Covenant

Turnell’s non-compete clause prohibits him from engaging in competing business, defined as selling products or 

services the same as or “similar” to CentiMark’s. This language might benefit from more precision (what counts as 

similar?) or a narrower focus (similar products do not necessarily compete, see, e.g., Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g

Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1370, 1388-90 (E.D. Wisc. 1992) (finding 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2758 13

that two different medical devices for treating impotence 

were not serious competitors), rev’d in part on other grounds, 6 

F.3d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). But that is beside the point. The 

provision reflects a good-faith attempt to tie the scope of the 

prohibitions to CentiMark’s protectable interests. 

Pennsylvania courts and others applying Pennsylvania 

law have enforced comparable restrictions, sometimes in 

their entirety, e.g., CertainTeed, 481 F.3d at 529 (involving restriction on developing products “competitive with or similar to” the employer’s products); Vitek, 2010 WL 5490662, at 

*2 (enforcing covenants almost identical to Turnell’s), and 

sometimes with recourse to the blue pencil, e.g., CertainTeed 

Ceilings Corp. v. Aiken, No. 14-cv-3925, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

152446, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2014) (involving restriction on 

products “competitive with or similar to” the employer’s).

Nor does the non-compete cross the line with respect to 

its geographic reach. It applies only in the regions where 

Turnell “operated” as a CentiMark employee. This language 

is vague, at least at the margins: if Turnell placed a telephone 

call from Chicago to a customer in California, for example, 

does that mean he “operated” in California? What if he traveled there a few times on business? The answer is unclear. 

Turnell claims he “worked in” twenty-four different states 

during his thirty-five years at the company, but CentiMark 

agrees only that he operated in the seven states covered by 

the injunction. Their dispute illustrates the vagueness of the 

term “operate.” Perhaps the parties should have defined it 

more precisely. But they could not have foreseen in 1988 

what positions Turnell would later hold or where he would 

work. To some extent, the geographic language had to be 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
14 No. 14-2758

open-ended given the national scope of CentiMark’s business. 

None of this suggests deliberate or oppressive overreaching. Where the employer’s business was sufficiently widespread, courts have enforced restrictive covenants with even 

greater geographic reach than Turnell’s. Sometimes they 

have done so without even modifying the covenants, see, e.g.,

Mohr v. Bank of NY Mellon Corp., 393 F. App’x 639, 644-45 

(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (applying Georgia law); Quaker 

Chem. Corp. v. Varga, 509 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476-77 (E.D. Pa. 

2007); other times they have blue penciled first, see, e.g., CertainTeed Ceilings, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152446, at *31-36 (restricting enforcement to the employee’s former sales territory). 

Turnell invokes Reading, but the employer in that case 

was a one-state company trying to enforce a restrictive covenant with no geographic limit. 311 A.2d at 629. There is no 

similar mismatch here. The other case on which Turnell relies, Fres-Co System USA, Inc. v. Bodell, is distinguishable on 

similar grounds. No. Civ.A. 05-3349, 2005 WL 3071755 (E.D. 

Pa. Nov. 15, 2005) (applying Pennsylvania law). The employee in Fres-Co sold coffee packaging in the southeastern United States and the Caribbean, but his non-compete forbade 

him from selling packaging material in at least four industries having little to do with coffee, and on at least three continents. Id. at *4, 7. There were also other indicia of oppressive intent in Fres-Co, including a lack of consideration for 

the restrictive covenant, and a requirement that all employees, no matter how junior, agree to the same restrictions. Id.

at *5. Turnell’s non-compete, by contrast, reflects an attempt 

to tailor his restrictions to the products and services he sold 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2758 15

(commercial roofing) and the areas where he sold them, 

leaving him free to work in other product and geographical 

markets.

2. The Non-Solicitation Covenant

Turnell’s non-solicitation provision presents a closer call. 

It prohibits marketing not only to CentiMark’s actual customers but also to any “prospective customers” it has “contacted” during the restrictive periods. This language is too 

vague (what kinds of contact count?), too broad (what relationship can CentiMark legitimately seek to safeguard with a 

prospect it merely called a few years ago?), and impracticable (Turnell cannot know everyone his former employer contacted)—which is why the district court excised it.

The non-solicitation provision also contains no geographic limitation. It applies wherever CentiMark’s customers or 

prospective customers happen to be located. That reaches 

too widely. Although Turnell was a management-level employee with access to customer data, proposals, and customers themselves, he did not have relationships with all customers across the country. While the parties could not easily 

have predicted in 1988 where Turnell would operate, they 

still could have written a narrower restriction—for example, 

by limiting it to customers contacted by Turnell himself. Cf.

Mohr, 393 F. App’x at 642.

But there is no reason to suspect any more sinister cause 

of these shortcomings than poor drafting. It is reasonable for 

an employer to seek protection for budding customer relationships as well as established ones. And it is difficult to define in advance which relationships will warrant protection. 

(You cannot simply list the customers, for example, because 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
16 No. 14-2758

the list will change over time.) CentiMark invested time, expertise, and money in developing its customers and potential customers. Turnell was directly involved in those efforts;

for instance, he reviewed significant proposals before they 

went out the door. That is reason enough for the restrictions 

on solicitation here. There is no evidence that CentiMark was 

actually trying to oppress Turnell or to somehow foster a 

monopoly. Cf. Outsource Int’l, 192 F.2d at 670 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that a non-compete in in an employment 

contract is unlikely to impair the vitality of competition).

Other courts have enforced similar agreements barring 

solicitation of prospective customers. See, e.g., Mohr, 393 F. 

App’x at 642, 645-46 (reversing district court’s denial of preliminary injunction and enforcing covenant under Georgia 

law); Diodato v. Wells Fargo Ins. Servs., USA, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 

3d 541, 549, 570 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (blue penciling under Pennsylvania law); Pulse Techs., Inc. v. Dodrill, No. CV-07-65-ST, 

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18520, at *6-7, 20-23 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 

2007) (same). 

We conclude that Turnell’s restrictive covenants are overbroad but not oppressively so. The district court therefore 

properly exercised its equitable discretion under Pennsylvania law to blue pencil the restrictions. And the court properly concluded that CentiMark has a strong chance of enforcing them, as narrowed, in a final resolution of this action.

B. The Balance of Harms

The district court found that “an injunction would weigh 

more heavily on Turnell than the status quo would [on] Centimark.” Nevertheless, using the sliding scale approach, see

Girl Scouts, 549 F.3d at 1086, the court concluded that CentiCase: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-2758 17

Mark’s strong likelihood of success outweighed the harm to 

Turnell.

We agree. Both parties claim that they will suffer monetary harm: lost income in Turnell’s case, and lost customer 

relationships and proprietary information in CentiMark’s. 

Neither party has quantified those harms. But in neither case 

do they seem likely to be crippling. Even under the preliminary injunction, Turnell is still able to work: he can remain at 

Windward and sell commercial roofing, just not to CentiMark customers in seven states; or he can sell other types of 

roofing without restriction. As a successful salesperson, he 

may also be able to work in another field. In short, the injunction does not prevent him from earning a living. On the 

other hand, CentiMark has no proof that it has lost customers or suffered any economic loss because of Turnell’s 

breaches. The harms are pretty evenly balanced, perhaps 

tipping in Turnell’s favor, as the district court thought. 

But that is not the end of the analysis. The kind of harm 

we are concerned about when deciding whether to issue a 

preliminary injunction is not harm tout court but rather irreparable harm. See Roland, 749 F.3d at 387. Turnell’s harm seems 

largely reparable. If he prevails in a trial on the merits, it 

should be possible to quantify his losses and compensate 

him fully with damages. Moreover, the bond posted by 

CentiMark ensures that any damages would be recoverable 

(at least up to $250,000). See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). Turnell has 

not explained why these remedies would be insufficient. 

There is no reason to think the preliminary injunction will 

consign him to poverty or bankrupt him: he earned a high 

salary at CentiMark, has at least $3 million in assets, and has 

income from his wife’s company, in addition to what he can 

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18
18 No. 14-2758

earn on his own. Cf. Roland, 749 F.3d at 386 (discussing various scenarios when damages after-the-fact would be inadequate).

The potential damage to CentiMark, on the other hand, is 

a canonical form of irreparable harm. The injuries that flow 

from the violation of a non-compete are difficult to prove 

and quantify. See CertainTeed, 481 F.3d at 529 (“[I]t may be 

very difficult to show that the ex-employee has used confidential information.”); John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing and 

Repair, Inc., 369 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Pa. 1977) (characterizing 

such damage as “incalculable”). That is what makes restrictive covenants prime candidates for injunctive relief. Turnell’s breaches, if left unchecked, might cause little harm to 

CentiMark, or they might cause great harm. But either way, 

the magnitude and even the existence of the injury will be 

difficult to discern. Injunctive relief is therefore the best, and 

probably the only, adequate remedy. 

On the whole, then, we think the balance of harms favors 

Turnell, if at all, only slightly. It is not enough to overcome 

CentiMark’s likelihood of success on the merits.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction in CentiMark’s favor is AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-2758 Document: 31 Filed: 07/29/2015 Pages: 18