Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05005/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Leroy Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KEVIN LEROY SMITH,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-5005

 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

 (D.C. No. 4:14-CR-00112-JED-1) 

 

Barry L. Derryberry, Research & Writing Specialist (Julia L. O’Connell, Federal Public 

Defender, and William P.Widdell, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, with him on the 

briefs) Office of the Federal Public Defender, Northern and Eastern Districts of 

Oklahoma, for Defendant - Appellant. 

Jeffrey A. Gallant, Assistant United States Attorney (Danny C. Williams, Sr., United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief) United States Attorney’s Office, Tulsa, Oklahoma 

for Plaintiff - Appellee United States of America. 

 

Before HARTZ, GORSUCH, and PHILLIPS Circuit Judges. 

HARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

 

 Defendant Kevin Smith was convicted after a jury trial on eight counts of 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 29, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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distributing child pornography, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), 2252(b)(1), and one count of 

possessing child pornography, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B), 2252(b)(2). The 

distribution counts corresponded to eight separate dates on which an FBI agent 

downloaded child pornography onto the agent’s computer from a folder on Defendant’s 

computer that was shared over a peer-to-peer network. He was sentenced to 210 months’ 

imprisonment. 

Defendant appeals on two grounds: First, he contends that the eight counts of 

distribution were multiplicitous, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on 

double jeopardy. He argues that the proper unit of prosecution is his making the 

pornography available (which, he asserts, occurred only once), not every instance that the 

pornography is downloaded. Second, he contends that the district court violated Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) at sentencing when it adopted the presentence-report (PSR) account 

of his pending child-rape charge over his pro se objection without making a finding based 

on the preponderance of the evidence. We affirm. Defendant did not raise the doublejeopardy issue below and he has not shown plain error. And the district court’s refusal to 

address a pro se objection by a defendant represented by counsel was not an abuse of 

discretion and, in any event, was harmless. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Defendant used the Ares peer-to-peer file-sharing program to view child 

pornography. Peer-to-peer file sharing allows users to search content in the “shared” 

folders of other users’ computers. A user can then download content in those folders 

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directly from the other users’ computers. When a file is downloaded by an Ares user, it 

is placed in the user’s “shared” folder by default, although the downloader can set the 

program not to share files. Many of the images and videos downloaded by Defendant 

remained in his shared folder, available to any other Ares user wishing to download them. 

On January 8, 2014, FBI Special Agent Joseph Cecchini searched the Ares filesharing network for child pornography. He found child pornography at the internetprotocol address for Defendant’s computer and downloaded one such image. Using Ares, 

Agent Cecchini again downloaded images and videos from Defendant’s computer on 

January 24, January 25, January 26, February 3, February 6, February 7, and February 11. 

On April 9, 2014, agents executed a search warrant at Defendant’s residence and 

confiscated his laptop, which contained 290 images and 143 videos of child pornography. 

He admitted to police that he had used the Ares system to download child pornography. 

He also said he knew how the Ares system worked and was aware he was sharing files. 

He reported deleting the program many times, but he also said that he continued 

reinstalling it to access child pornography. 

Defendant was indicted on eight counts of distribution and attempted distribution 

of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. At trial 

Defendant denied making the prior confession and testified that he did not know what 

peer-to-peer file sharing is and did not intentionally use Ares to download child 

pornography. He said that he tried to delete the program but that it continued to run in 

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the background and put the files on his computer without his knowledge or permission. 

The jury convicted him on all nine counts. 

At sentencing, Defendant acknowledged that he had read the PSR and had gone 

over it with counsel in person. The PSR reported a pending state charge against him for 

first-degree rape of a child under the age of 14. It said that the DNA from the victim’s 

physical examination matched Defendant’s, and that there was a recorded jail telephone 

conversation between Defendant and his wife in which he said that the “authorities 

should not find any blood evidence in the vehicle because he did not force her, she told 

him that she was 17 years old, and he paid for it.” R., Vol. 3 at 25 (PSR). The PSR also 

mentioned that on a separate occasion Defendant allegedly attempted to abduct two 

young girls from a lemonade stand, but no charges had been filed. 

Through his counsel, Defendant unsuccessfully objected to the PSR 

recommendation for an obstruction-of-justice enhancement of his sentencing-guidelines 

offense level based on his perjury at trial. Counsel also argued for a downward variance 

from the guidelines recommended sentencing range. He discussed Defendant’s age, the 

chances of recidivism, and the enhancement for use of a computer, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G2.2(b)(6). He also briefly addressed the pending rape charge, stating: 

I do want to point out just in the government’s response they spend a long 

time talking about Mr. Smith’s state court charges. And I think what I 

would like to say is, that I don’t know the facts of those state court charges. 

I know that an Information has been filed on at least one of those and it 

hasn’t gone any further than that. I anticipate that Mr. Smith will have a 

jury trial and the state court will decide if Mr. Smith has violated state laws. 

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R., Vol. 2 at 274. After the government responded, the court asked Defendant if he had 

anything to say before being sentenced. Defendant made a statement in which he 

contested his guilt on the state-court charge and complained about other aspects of the 

trial. 

The court adopted the PSR’s findings of fact, calculated the applicable guidelines 

sentencing range as 262–327 months, and varied downward on the ground that the twolevel offense-level enhancement for use of a computer was duplicative, as it applies in 

virtually every child-pornography case. The court stated that the variance “results in a 

variance guideline range of 210 to 262 months.” R., Vol. 2 at 290. Regarding the 

pending state charge, it said: 

[T]he defendant’s unrelated pending criminal case involving the alleged 

rape and kidnapping of a prepubescent girl, a case in which the defendant’s 

DNA was matched and a recorded jail conversation between the defendant 

and his wife acknowledged sex with a girl, . . . was also considered in 

determining a sufficient but not greater [than] necessary sentence within the 

aforementioned variance guideline range. 

Id. at 290–91. The court sentenced Defendant to 210 months’ imprisonment, the bottom 

of the variance guideline range. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Double Jeopardy 

Defendant complains that his convictions on eight counts of distributing child 

pornography violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the convictions are all for a 

single offense. He is correct that the Clause prohibits multiplicity—convicting a person 

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on more than one count for a single offense. See United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 

541 (10th Cir. 1987). Because each of the distribution counts charges “a separate crime 

under the same statute[,] . . . [t]he pertinent inquiry becomes defining the correct unit of 

prosecution.” Id. That is, we must determine “whether conduct constitutes one or 

several violations of a single statutory provision.” Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 

587, 597 (1961). 

Section 2252(a)(2) prohibits the knowing distribution of child pornography; and 

§ 2252(b) sets the punishment for anyone who “violates, or attempts or conspires to 

violate” § 2252(a)(2). Defendant argues that our cases establish that the proper unit of 

prosecution when a defendant distributes child pornography over a peer-to-peer network 

is the act of making the pornography available on the peer-to-peer network, not each 

instance in which an individual downloads an image from the defendant’s shared folder. 

Because Defendant did not make this argument in the district court, our review is for 

plain error only. See United States v. Frost, 684 F.3d 963, 971 (10th Cir. 2012). We will 

grant relief under the plain-error standard only if (1) the district court committed an error, 

(2) the error is clear at the time of the appeal, (3) the error “affects substantial rights,” and 

(4) the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An error is clear “when it is 

contrary to well-settled law.” United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1309 (10th Cir. 

2000). For us to characterize a proposition of law as well-settled, we normally require 

precedent directly in point from the Supreme Court or our circuit or a consensus in the 

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other circuits. See United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1319 (10th Cir. 2006) (“If 

neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has ruled on the subject, we cannot find 

plain error if the authority in other circuits is split.”); United States v. Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d 

1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (“In general, for an error to be contrary to well-settled law, 

either the Supreme Court or this court must have addressed the issue.”); United States v. 

Rickett, 535 F. App’x 668, 677 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]o render an alleged error ‘clear’ or 

‘obvious,’ Mr. Rickett needs controlling Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent, or a 

hefty weight of controlling authority from other circuits.” (emphasis omitted)). We need 

not inquire beyond the first two requirements of plain-error review, because even if there 

was error in this case, it was not clear. 

We easily conclude that the law regarding the unit of prosecution is unclear in this 

circuit because no precedent of this court has addressed, much less resolved, a claim of 

multiplicity under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) after convictions for distributing child 

pornography. And the only precedential decision of a sister circuit on the matter in the 

file-sharing context rejects Defendant’s position. See United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 

527, 541 (5th Cir. 2013) (charges based on separate downloads from shared files by FBI 

agents were “not multiplicitous because they involve . . . separate transactions in which 

multiple visual depictions were distributed”).

Defendant contends that his position is mandated by two of our cases—United 

States v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2007), and United States v. Dunn, 777 F.3d 

1171 (10th Cir. 2015)—but he reads too much into these opinions. Both involved childAppellate Case: 15-5005 Document: 01019578259 Date Filed: 02/29/2016 Page: 7 
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pornography convictions of a defendant who used a file-sharing program. In Shaffer the 

issue was what active conduct of the defendant was necessary before a jury could find 

that he distributed the pornography. See 472 F.3d at 1223–25. We held that all the 

defendant had to do in the file-sharing context was make files on his computer available 

for others through the file-sharing program. Id. We likened his distribution to that of an 

owner of a self-service gas station: 

The owner may not be present at the station, and there may be no attendant 

present at all. And neither the owner nor his or her agents may ever pump 

gas. But the owner has a roadside sign letting all passersby know that, if 

they choose, they can stop and fill their cars for themselves, paying at the 

pump by credit card. Just because the operation is self-serve, or in Mr. 

Shaffer’s parlance, passive, we do not doubt for a moment that the gas 

station owner is in the business of “distributing,” “delivering,” 

“transferring” or “dispersing” gasoline; the raison d’etre of owning a gas 

station is to do just that. So, too, a reasonable jury could find that Mr. 

Shaffer welcomed people to his computer and was quite happy to let them 

take child pornography from it. 

Id. at 1223–24. It was unnecessary for the defendant to actively send the unlawful 

images. In that case there was no question that the images had been downloaded to 

another computer; a law-enforcement officer had downloaded some images using the 

file-sharing program. See id. at 1222. And the defendant was charged with only one 

count of distribution, so multiplicity was not an issue. See id. at 1226. Shaffer does not 

help Defendant. 

Dunn differs from Shaffer in that there was no evidence that anyone had 

downloaded the defendant’s images to another computer. See Dunn, 777 F.3d at 1173–

75. The defendant had been convicted on one count of distribution or attempted 

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distribution of child pornography under § 2252A(a)(2) & (b). See id. at 1172, 1175. The 

jury was instructed: 

If a person knowingly makes images available on a peer-to-peer file sharing 

network, such as [the file-sharing program used by Defendant], this is 

considered “distribution” of the images. In other words, the Government 

may meet its burden of proof on this element by showing that Defendant 

knowingly allowed others access to his [file-sharing program] shared 

folder. 

Id. at 1175 (emphasis and original brackets omitted). The district court rejected the 

defendant’s proposed instruction that distribution requires that someone downloaded one 

of the defendant’s shared-file images. See Aplee. Br. at 11, Dunn, 777 F.3d 1171 (No. 

13-4104). The district court explained that the statute “collapsed distribution and 

attempted distribution into a single offense,” so “attempted distribution in and of itself . . 

. is sufficient to satisfy the elements of the charged offense.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

In our opinion in Dunn we wrote that “the defendant’s placement of child 

pornography files into a shared folder accessible to other users was itself sufficient for the 

trier of fact to conclude that the defendant had ‘distributed’ the material.” 777 F.3d at 

1175. We explained that “Shaffer controls this case,” id., even though there was no 

question in Shaffer that there had been a download of the defendant’s shared files. As we 

understand this passage in Dunn, all we were saying was that by placing the child 

pornography in a shared file, the defendant had done everything he needed to do to 

violate the statute, just as one who fires a gun at someone with intent to kill has done all 

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he needs to do to be convicted of murder or attempted murder, depending on what 

happens to the intended victim. See United States v. Vigil, 523 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th 

Cir. 2008) (“To prove an attempt crime, the government must prove an (1) intent to 

commit the substantive offense; and the (2) commission of an act which constitutes a 

substantial step towards commission of the substantive offense.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). The difference between this case and the murder example is merely that 

distribution and attempted distribution, unlike murder and attempted murder, are 

punished identically by the statute. In Dunn, whether the Defendant violated the statute 

by distributing or attempting to distribute could still depend on whether others 

downloaded the material; but because the statute equates the two offenses, Dunn did not 

need to decide which occurred. This reading of Dunn comports with Shaffer’s focus on 

only the action required by the defendant, which is why we could say that our conclusion 

was controlled by Shaffer. And our reading of Dunn avoids the unnecessary creation of a 

circuit split on the question of whether an actual download is required for distribution (as 

opposed to attempted distribution). See United States v. Husmann, 765 F.3d 169, 174–75 

(3d Cir. 2014) (“Several circuits have made clear that distribution occurs when 

pornographic materials are actually transferred to or downloaded by another person. . . . 

[And] no circuit [including the Tenth Circuit in Shaffer] has held that a defendant can be 

convicted of distribution under § 2252 in the absence of a download or transfer of 

materials by another person.”). 

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Most importantly, because Dunn concerned a conviction on only one count, it had 

no occasion to address the unit of prosecution for either distribution or attempted 

distribution, which need not be the same. The unit of prosecution for distribution, as 

charged in the case now before us, may be each actual delivery of images, see Woerner, 

709 F.3d at 541, while the unit of prosecution for attempted distribution may be each 

instance in which images are placed in the defendant’s shared folder. We leave those 

issues for another day. For now we need hold only that Defendant’s convictions were not 

clearly multiplicitous. 

B. Objection to the PSR 

Defendant’s second contention is that the district court’s consideration of his 

pending state-court charge violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B), which provides that the 

district court “must—for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other 

controverted matter—rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either 

because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the 

matter in sentencing.” Pointing to his assertions of innocence regarding the state-court 

charge in his allocution before sentencing, he contends that he objected to that portion of 

the PSR and that the court was therefore not permitted to rely upon the allegations 

without first finding their probable accuracy by a preponderance of the evidence. See 

United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1278 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When a defendant 

objects to a fact in a presentence report, the government must prove that fact at a 

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sentencing hearing by a preponderance of the evidence.”).1 

 

1

 The relevant allocution exchange was as follows:

THE DEFENDANT: . . . First of all, I’d like to say that I’m not 

guilty of any crime of raping anybody like he said. I’m innocent and have 

not been proven guilty of anything. Is that he’s just—that’s just—he’s just 

saying whatever he’s wanting to say there, but I have an opportunity—I’m 

still in the United States of America and I’m still innocent until proven 

guilty, regardless of what he’s saying there. 

These are only allegations, and if you read the PSR, you read the 

allegations, you read the statements, you should be able to read into the fact 

that there’s something amiss there. There’s somebody hiding something 

there. 

Those statements, if you read them, you will see that. You as a 

judge, you’ve got enough sense to realize that those statements—there’s 

something missing there. 

. . . . 

THE COURT: . . . I’ve read the [PSR], and more than once. What 

are the things that we’re jumping over? 

THE DEFENDANT: I’m just saying that if you’ve read the 

statements that they put in there that was made by the alleged victim, that 

there’s something being hidden there. Those statements don’t even make 

common sense. 

. . . . 

I have raised family. I’ve taken care of many people’s children. 

I’ve never in any shape, form or fashion hurt a child and I never would. 

These allegations they’re saying, that’s got to be proven, and 

they’re—it’s a long ways from being in concrete. He’s taking it as it’s in 

concrete but it ain’t. And I’m still in the United States of America and I’m 

still innocent of those crimes until proven guilty of them, so use those—that 

allegations to judge me here is unfair to me. 

I’ve been—this whole trial has been unfair. I’ve been sitting here 

put in this trial—for two weeks prior to my trial that’s all in the media, 

there’s evidence of jurors on Facebook that knew about this beforehand. I 

have the evidence, my lawyer has the evidence. There’s evidence of a 

violation of the ABA 3.8(d) by this man next to me here of Brady, Giglio

violations. 

We’ve got evidence of it in the transcripts where he put a witness on 

Continued . . . 

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the stand to rebuttal my testimony that had already stated one thing and 

stated another. He knowingly put somebody on the stand to tell a lie. 

There’s a lot of things that’s happened in this trial that’s all 

speculation. I never in any shape, form or fashion distributed anything to 

anybody. They come onto an Ares program, the files were in Ares. He 

took the files. I didn’t distribute anything to him. 

I’ve been made out to be a monster and I am not. You can’t find a 

single kid nowhere in this country that would say that I’ve done a thing to 

them other than whoever this is that alleged I’ve done something. 

. . . . 

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, I think the bulk of those things 

that you are complaining about, at least from my perspective, have not been 

presented to the court by way of your counsel. So what I’m basing this 

sentencing on is the calculations made and observations made by the 

United States Probation Office, and your very able counsel has presented 

his motions that are considered, but these issues as to Giglio and other 

things that I really haven’t a clue of what you’re talking about is something 

that is just not on our plate, unless I’ve missed something. 

. . . . 

THE COURT: A lot of what you’re saying is somewhat cryptic to 

me. I was here. And I’m just not really certain about what you’re talking 

about in some respects. But again, if it’s not raised, and I have studied 

what has been raised, then I can’t do much about it. 

If [defense counsel] has anything he’d like to say about these things 

that are somewhat peripheral it seems, I’m happy to hear it, but it’s not 

before me. It is what it is. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would just say that—I mean, I’ve 

already said what . . . all I have to say is in regard to sentencing and I’ve 

said it. 

THE COURT: Unfortunately, I think it’s kind of a bad reflection of 

you, but so be that too. 

I think that one of the things that has, I think, and again I’m guessing 

here because of what I would consider to be, to some extent, a little bit of a 

rant, the reference to a recorded Creek County Jail telephone conversation. 

Is that the issue you’re concerned about? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You’re concerned about the substance of a charge 

that . . . that’s not been concluded. 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Continued . . . 

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But when Defendant voiced his objections, he was represented by counsel. And 

“a district court does not need to consider pro se objections made by defendants 

represented by counsel.” United States v. Harrison, 743 F.3d 760, 762 (10th Cir. 2014); 

accord United States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Because Mr. Jarvi 

was proceeding through counsel, the district court was within its discretion not to 

consider the pro se motion in connection with challenges to the PSR.”). The district 

court even gave counsel an opportunity to supplement his argument based on Defendant’s 

allocution, which counsel declined. The district court therefore properly refused to 

address the arguments. Because Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A) permits a district court to 

“accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact,” the court 

was free to rely upon the PSR’s description of the state rape charge in sentencing 

Defendant. 

In any event, Defendant did not appear to challenge the accuracy of the description 

of the DNA evidence or of the prison telephone conversation with his wife. And, more 

 

THE COURT: One of the issues that populates this report is a 

recorded telephone conversation with your wife. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand it. I read it.

THE COURT: And I did too. And I think that some of the things 

you’ve just said here, there’s—to put it mildly—a conflict between the 

recording and what you’re saying. That’s the only that I can glean from 

your statement that you’re talking about. So that’s where we are. 

Is there anything else you want to state, Mr. Smith, at this time? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 

R., Vol. 2 at 279–84 (emphasis added). 

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importantly, the state charge did not affect Defendant’s sentence. The district court did 

not consider the state charge in calculating the guideline sentencing range. And although 

it said that it would consider the charge in deciding where to impose sentence within the 

varied guideline range,2

 it ultimately imposed sentence at the bottom of the range. Any 

error was therefore harmless.

III. CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 

2 The court said that Defendant’s “unrelated pending criminal case . . . was also 

considered in determining a sufficient but not greater [than] necessary sentence within the 

aforementioned variance guideline range.” R., Vol. 2 at 290–91 (emphasis added). 

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