Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00809/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00809-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matthew R. Watts
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

Document Text:

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28 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW R. WATTS,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES A. YATES,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-00809 DLB HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING CLERK

OF COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN

FAVOR OF RESPONDENT

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge.

BACKGROUND

Following a bench trial in the Madera County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of

one count of carjacking (Cal. Pen. Code § 215(a)), one count two of attempted carjacking (§§ 1

664/215(a)), one count three of grand theft of a firearm (§ 487(c)), and one count four of arson of

an inhabited structure (§ 451 (b)). It was further alleged that during the commission of counts

one and two, Petitioner used a firearm within the meaning of section 1203.06(a)(1) and

12022.5(a)(2). On January 9, 2004, the court sentenced Petitioner to thirteen years six months in

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 Petitioner was sentenced as follows: Count one - five years; count two - ten months; count three - eight 2

months; count four - one year, eight months. Count One was designated as the principal term; sentence on counts

two through four was ordered to run consecutive to count one. Petitioner received an additional four years for the

section 12022.5(a) enhancement on Count One, and an additional one year and four months for the section

12022.5(a) enhancement on Count Two. (CT 105.) 

 “CT” refers to the Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal; “RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal. 3

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state prison. (CT 106-107.) 2 3

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. (Lodged Doc. No. 1.) On June 28, 2005, the judgment was affirmed. 

(Lodged Doc. No. 4.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court on July 29, 2005. 

The petition was denied on August 31, 2005. (Lodged Doc. No. 5.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 26, 2006. 

(Court Doc. 1.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on November 14, 2006, and Petitioner filed a

traverse on December 29, 2006. (Court Docs. 11, 15.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 28, 2003, at 8:00 a.m., as Renae Smith arrived at the parking lot of her place of

employment, and got out of her truck and shut the door, she heard a voice say, “Give me your

keys and your cell phone.” (RT 1257-1260.) She immediately turned around and saw Petitioner

holding a gun in his hand. (RT 1260, 1263.) She started to walk away toward the tailgate of the

truck, and Petitioner repeated his demand to give her the keys, to which she responded “[f]orget

you.” (RT 1262.) Her husband Russell Smith arrived and shoved Renae behind him and took

over the conversation with Petitioner. Petitioner continued to move toward them stating that he

needed to get out of there. (RT 1264, 1281, 1286-1287.) Russell had left his vehicle running and

the door open, which Petitioner entered and drove away in. (RT 1264.) 

After subsequently viewing a photo lineup, Russell recognized that he knew Petitioner

from high school. (Rt 1284, 1289.) 

Shannon Hard testified that he had known Petitioner for approximately fourteen or fifteen

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28 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 4

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years. (RT 1295.) In May of 2003, Hard allowed Petitioner to live on a piece of property he

owned. Petitioner asked Hard if he could provide him with a weapon for his protection from

wild animals while he was on the property. (RT 1291-1292.) Hard showed Petitioner a .45

caliber semi-automatic pistol that he owned; however, Hard had no intention of lending it to

Petitioner. (RT 1293.) Later that day, Hard discovered that his gun was missing after Petitioner

had left the property. Hard did not give Petitioner permission to take his weapon. (RT 1294.)

On May 30, 2003, California Department of Forestry Investigator Greg Grizzell

investigated a fire that occurred at a trailer owned by Petitioner’s father, Tony Watts. (RT 1226-

1227.) When he arrived at the scene, the trailer was engulfed in flames and it was completely

destroyed by the fire. (RT 1226.) It was determined that the fire was caused by arson. (RT

1227-1230.) 

Petitioner was interviewed by Madera County Sheriff’s Detective Jack Wayman, at the

Madera County jail. (RT 1241.) After being advised of his Miranda rights, Petitioner admitted 4

to the carjacking and the arson of his father’s trailer. (RT 1244-1246.)

Defense

Petitioner’s stepfather, Richard Regert, testified that in May of 2003, Petitioner was

driving a 1978 Ford 4x4. The vehicle was legally registered and had proper tags. (RT 1316-

1317.) Regert testified that he noticed a substantial change in Petitioner’s demeanor after he was

previously released from custody. (RT 1318.) He opined that Petitioner was not the same

person. (RT 1319.)

Petitioner testified on his own behalf. (RT 1320.) Petitioner testified that he believed his

father had placed a camera in his eye and talked to him when he was previously in jail. (RT

1322.) Petitioner stated that he took the gun, without permission, from Shannon Hard in order to

rob a bank to get money to go to China. (RT 1322-1323.) Petitioner admitted to carjacking the

Smiths using an unloaded weapon to scare them. He dumped their belongings out of the car and

took $20 from Russell’s wallet. (RT 1325.) 

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Petitioner also admitted that he set his father’s trailer on fire. (RT 1326.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Madera County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Trial Court’s Refusal to Suspend Criminal Proceedings

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suspend criminal proceedings

pursuant to section 1368, et seq., and commit him to the Department of Mental Health. (Petition,

at (5), 6-10.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the Fifth District Court of Appeal and California

Supreme Court. Because the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature,

however, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the

California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991)

(establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower

court's reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson,

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217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court

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opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, as a conviction of a

defendant who is legally incompetent is a violation of due process. See Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 510 (9 Cir. 1994). If the trial court has a good faith doubt th

concerning the defendant’s competence, due process mandates that the court order a psychiatric

evaluation or conduct a competency hearing. See Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 510; see also Davis v.

Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 644 (9 Cir. 2004). There is a good faith doubt of a defendant’s th

competence only upon a showing of substantial evidence of incompetence. Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d

at 510. California follows the same standards under sections 1367 and 1368. See People v.

Pennington, 66 Cal.2d 508, 5`7 (1967); People v. Stankewitz, 32 Cal.3d 80, 92 (1982). There are

several factors the Court may utilize to determine whether a competency hearing is necessary,

including evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior

medical opinion on competence to stand trial. See Loyola-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1314, 1318 (9th

Cir. 1997) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975)). 

“The test for competency to stand trial is whether the defendant ‘has

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding - - and whether he has a rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.

402, [] (1960) (per curiam); Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 518 (9 Cir. th

1981). 

Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9 Cir. 1985). On habeas review, a state court’s th

competency finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S.

731, 735 (1990). 

The Fifth District Court of Appeal properly set forth the factual and procedural

background regarding this claim:

We set forth the factual and procedural background relevant to the

question of [Petitioner’s] competency. [Petitioner] was arraigned on June 9, 2003. 

At his arraignment, [Petitioner] asked the court if it was aware that he was a

prince of a royal family. [Petitioner] told the court he wished to represent himself. 

The court questioned [Petitioner] about his wish to represent himself and asked if

it was his desire to present a defense of insanity. When [Petitioner] replied that he

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was going to proceed on a defense of insanity, the court refused his request to

represent himself and appointed an attorney to represent him. Immediately after

this appointment, defense counsel requested that two doctors be appointed to

examine [Petitioner] pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. The trial court granted

this request and suspended criminal proceedings. [Petitioner] then requested the

court to issue an order to have the camera inside of his skull removed. He

claimed the monitoring device was implanted in his head by his father and the

Army Corps of Engineers. The court denied his request.

Two doctors examined [Petitioner]. One found him competent; the other

found him incompetent to stand trial. The court appointed a third doctor to

evaluate [Petitioner]. A competency hearing was held by the court on August 25,

2003. The court considered the reports from Dr. Taylor and Dr. Zimmerman. 

Their reports were similar and found that, although [Petitioner] appeared to

understand the legal system and the charges against him, he was delusional and

this could impair his ability to work with his attorney. They concluded he was

incompetent to stand trial.

[Petitioner’s] mother testified at the hearing that [Petitioner] started

exhibiting unusual behavior beginning in November of 2002 after he had been

incarcerated for an unrelated offense. [Petitioner] claimed he was royalty, said

strange things, and said that people could hear his thoughts. [Petitioner] had not

received any prior mental health treatment. [Petitioner’s] mother stated that

[Petitioner] was aware he was in jail and was represented by an attorney.

[Petitioner] testified at the hearing. He reiterated that he was the Royal

Monarch and had a camera in his eye. He said that the United States government

had sabotaged his food and his car. He admitted he set his father’s (the king’s)

house on fire. On cross-examination, [Petitioner] testified he understood the

charges against him, he could recall the circumstances of the crime, he could

identify his attorney and the attorney’s role in the court proceedings, and he knew

the roles of the judge and the district attorney. The court questioned [Petitioner],

asking him if he knew what his attorney was supposed to be doing, if he knew

what the district attorney’s job is in the courtroom, and if he knew the nature of

the hearing currently underway. [Petitioner] correctly answered these questions. 

The court asked [Petitioner] if he wanted the court to find him competent. He

responded yes; in so answering, he wanted the court to issue an order to take the

camera out of his eye.

Dr. Della Porta filed a report and also testified at trial. It was Dr. Della

Porta’s opinion that [Petitioner] fabricated symptoms of his mental illness and

was competent to stand trial. Dr. Della Porta reviewed the reports of the other

doctors. Dr. Della Porta found Dr. Zimmerman’s report of no value because he

failed to come to a diagnosis. He discounted Dr. Taylor’s report because it

appeared to be merely a “self report” of [Petitioner’s] condition with nothing

about the diagnostic indicators for the diagnosis.

Dr. Della Porta found [Petitioner] was malingering based on several

factors. The first factor was that those who are mentally ill are often reluctant to

discuss their illness, yet [Petitioner] immediately began talking about his camera

issue and that he is royalty. Next, it was important to Dr. Della Porta’s

determination of [Petitioner’s] competency that there was no history of mental

illness. Additionally, [Petitioner] indicated he thought he would live at a mental

hospital but not in prison, thus setting forth a secondary gain for his behavior. 

Also, [Petitioner’s] affect was normal. Dr. Della Porta found it unusual that

[Petitioner] did not know the time of the onset of his mental illness. Finally, Dr.

Della Porta found nothing in the police reports indicating [Petitioner] suffered

from a mental illness. At the time he was interviewed by police, he did not come

forward with information about his eye camera or his royal background.

The court found that, although on some subjects [Petitioner] may be

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deranged, he was capable of understanding the nature and purpose of the

proceedings against him and was able to assist his attorney in conducting a

defense in a rational manner.

The preliminary hearing was held on October 20, 2003. At the close of the

hearing [Petitioner] stated his desire to plead guilty. The court advised

[Petitioner] to talk to his counsel before he made such a decision.

At his arraignment on October 22, 2003, [Petitioner] stated that he wanted

to enter a plea of not guilty and did not want to go forward with an insanity plea.

[Petitioner] stated that he had been trying to act crazy to get out of his situation. 

The court continued the hearing.

At the trial setting hearing on November 5, 2003, [Petitioner] refused to

come to court. His counsel indicated he might renew a request for Penal Code

section 1368 proceedings to be instituted. The court stated that it was not going to

suspend criminal proceedings at this time, but appointed Dr. Zimmerman to talk

with [Petitioner] regarding defense counsel’s concern that [Petitioner] may have

decompensated.

[Petitioner] refused to talk with Dr. Zimmerman. Dr. Zimmerman wrote a

report criticizing the report of Dr. Della Porta and again concluding [Petitioner]

was not competent to stand trial.

At the trial confirmation hearing on November 25, 2003, defense counsel

stated that he believed that [Petitioner] was not able to assist him at trial. The

court stated that it had previously found [Petitioner] competent to stand trial. In

the interim, [Petitioner] stated on the record that he was malingering when he was

making the comments that he had made. The court concluded that there “is not a

doubt in the Court’s mind as to the [Petitioner’s] competency. The Court finds

based on its knowledge of the entire case that [Petitioner] is competent to stand

trial.” 

On December 8, 2003, [Petitioner] waived his right to a jury trial. On the

day set for trial the court was told that [Petitioner] was going to plead guilty. 

Defense counsel stated that during the pendency of the case he had some concerns

regarding [Petitioner’s] mental health; however, while he still had concerns about

[Petitioner’s] mental health, he did not believe it rose to the level of the

requirements of Penal Code section 1368.

[Petitioner] told the court that he needed to be locked up or he needed the

camera taken out of his eye. When the court inquired regarding the proposed

guilty plea, [Petitioner] stated that he wanted to enter a plea of not guilty because

he was not guilty. [Petitioner] proceeded to trial before the court without a jury.

[Petitioner] testified on his own behalf. At the outset defense counsel

asked that [Petitioner] be allowed to testify in a narrative form because defense

counsel was not able to clearly identify issues that [Petitioner] wished to address.

[Petitioner] testified regarding his royal background and the camera in his eye, as

well as the crimes he committed.

The court found [Petitioner] guilty as charged. The court stated that

although [Petitioner’s] reasons for doing what he did were delusional, he did form

the required specific intent to commit the crimes.

[Petitioner] claims the trial court erred when it did not suspend criminal

proceedings and commit him to the Department of Mental Health. He contends

that the events leading up to and following the issuance of Dr. Zimmerman’s

second report demonstrate the error.

[Petitioner] argues that when the trial court requested Dr. Zimmerman to

conduct a second evaluation, it implicitly rejected Dr. Della Porta’s finding of

malingering. When Dr. Zimmerman again found [Petitioner] mentally

incompetent, the court was left only with the mental health reports that concluded

that he could not assist in his legal defense in a rational manner. [Petitioner]

claims it was error for the trial court to reject Dr. Zimmerman’s second report.

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 Petitioner’s claim in his traverse that Doctors Taylor and Zimmerman were not allowed to testify at the 5

competency hearing is unfounded. Although these doctors did not testify at the competency hearing, their reports

were appropriately presented and considered by the trial court. (See RT 305-306, 346-347.) 

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. . . . .

The court was acting out of an abundance of caution and at the request of

defense counsel when it had Dr. Zimmerman do a second report. Dr. Zimmerman

was not able to interview [Petitioner] and did not have any new information for

his conclusion that [Petitioner] was incompetent. We do not find that the court’s

decision to have Dr. Zimmerman conduct a second examination was a rejection of

its earlier decision, particularly since the court declined to suspend criminal

proceedings at that time. In addition, the court did not disregard that [Petitioner]

suffered from a mental condition; it found that [Petitioner] was competent to

proceed to trial. The manifestations of [Petitioner’s] mental state did not change

from the outset; he continued to talk about the camera in his eye and that he was

royalty.

(Lodged Doc. No. 4, at 3-8.)

Here, as thoroughly summarized by the California Court of Appeal, the trial court found

based on representations made in court there was substantial evidence as to whether Petitioner

was competent to continue with the criminal proceedings. The trial court conducted a thorough

hearing to determine whether Petitioner was competent to proceed with the criminal trial. In

addition to thoroughly questioning Petitioner regarding his understanding of the nature of the

criminal proceedings, the trial court considered the reports of three experts it appointed to

evaluate Petitioner and concluded that Petitioner was competent to stand trial. (RT 331-334,

349; CT 29.) The fact that two of the three court appointed experts opined that Petitioner was

incompetent to stand trial, Dr. Della Porter concluded otherwise finding several factors lead to

his conclusion that Petitioner was malingering. (RT 340-341.) The trial court was free to

determine how much weight and credibility to give to these experts’ reports. This Court is

presently bound by that finding as Petitioner has failed to overcome § 2254(d)’s presumption of

correctness, and the state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

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D. Trial Court’s Refusal to Hold Subsequent Competency Hearing

Petitioner contends further that following his trial testimony, the court should have

suspended the criminal proceedings and committed him to the Department of Mental Health or

had him reevaluated by mental health experts. 

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As with Petitioner’s previous claim, this claim was presented to the Fifth District Court of

Appeal and denied summarily by the California Supreme Court. Accordingly, this Court looks

through to the California Court of Appeal’s reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at

804-05 & n. 3. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal held:

In a continuation of the above argument, [Petitioner] contends the court

erred when it did not hold a further competency hearing or commit him to the

Department of Mental Health based on his trial testimony and the events

preceding it. In particular, [Petitioner] cites numerous instances demonstrating

mental instability, such as: he presented bizarre testimony at trial, took adversarial

positions against counsel, sought to remove his counsel from the case, withdrew a

not guilty by reason of insanity plea, demanded to plead guilty, refused to

cooperate with Dr. Zimmerman, and withdrew from a favorable plea bargain.

[Petitioner] argues that the court took action indicating that it questioned his

competency, such as having him reevaluated, not revisiting his request to

represent himself, permitting him to testify in the narrative, questioning

[Petitioner] at trial, and expressing doubts about his mental state at sentencing.

We note that many of the above behaviors listed as unusual are common

occurrences in trials. [Petitioner] frequently take adversarial positions against

counsel, seek to remove them from their case, and change their plea. The court

never doubted that [Petitioner] exhibited some unusual behavior, but it found that

he was competent to stand trial. Although [Petitioner] exhibited some bizarre

behavior, the record does not demonstrate the trial court erred in finding him

competent or erred in continuing in this belief throughout the course of the trial.

(Lodged Doc. No. 4, at 8-9.) 

As Respondent argues, a second hearing was unnecessary because no new evidence was

offered to conclude Petitioner was incompetent. Specifically, the trial court stated, “There’s no

doubt in the Court’s mind as to the defendant’s competency.” (RT 979.) There simply was not

substantial evidence that Petitioner was incompetent; as such, the court did not err in refusing to

hold a second competency hearing. Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 489 (9 Cir. 1997). th

Based on Dr. Della Porta’s report that Petitioner was malingering with no history of mental

illness (RT 340), along with Petitioner’s admission on the record that he was malingering (RT

10/22/03 at 933-935), the trial court did not have, nor should it have had, a bona fide doubt as to

Petitioner’s competency. The trial court was not presented with new evidence of Petitioner’s

alleged incompetence, and the trial court carefully considered Petitioner’s behavior throughout

the criminal proceeding in coming to its conclusion that Petitioner was not incompetent to stand

trial. (See RT 979.) The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

E. Insufficient Evidence to Support Carjacking Conviction

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty of carjacking. Petitioner claims the victim’s

testimony reveals “the automobile in question was not taken against the will of the person in

possession of it as required by section 215.” (Petition, at (6), 18-23.)

The law on insufficiency of the evidence claim is clearly established. The United States

Supreme Court has held that when reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim on habeas, a

federal court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from

it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324, n. 16. 

This claim was presented to the Fifth District Court of Appeal and denied summarily by

the California Supreme Court. Accordingly, this Court looks through to the California Court of

Appeal’s reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 804-05 & n. 3. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held, in

part, as follows:

Carjacking as defined in Penal Code section 215 is “the felonious taking of

a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate

presence, or from the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor

vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or

temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her

possession, accomplished by means of force or fear.” 

. . . . . . .

[Petitioner] claims that, unlike the victim in Coryell, Russell interjected

himself into the criminal episode and consented to the taking of his car by offering

it without a demand from [Petitioner]. We do not find Coryell distinguishable. 

Just as in Coryell, [Petitioner] here accosted one victim (Renae); the second

victim (Russell) witnessed the attack and became frightened, giving up possession

of a vehicle. Additionally, in this case, [Petitioner] demanded the car keys and

continued to demand the keys even after Russell intervened. The fact that he

ended up taking Russell’s car instead of Renae’s car does not defeat his

conviction. Russell was afraid; his fear was what allowed [Petitioner] to

accomplish the taking of his car. (See People v. Brito (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d

316, 325-326, where the court held the scope of a robbery is not limited to the

items identified at the time the robber initially applies the force.)

[Petitioner] demanded car keys. Although he did not specifically demand

Russell’s keys, the inference is inescapable that [Petitioner] was demanding

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transportation and that the taking of Russell’s car was accomplished by means of

[Petitioner’s] threat of force or fear. Russell was frightened into surrendering his

car to [Petitioner]. Substantial evidence supports the carjacking conviction.

(Lodged Doc. No. 4, at 9-11.)

Petitioner’s claim that he did not take Russell’s vehicle without his consent, is simply

nonsensical. Russell testified that when he approached the scene of the incident, Petitioner was

demanding the keys to his wife’s vehicle. Russell immediately got in front of his wife,

attempting to shield her from Petitioner who was displaying a firearm and repeatedly demanding

the keys to the pickup. After Russell’s wife refused to give up her keys, Russell fearing for the

safety of himself and his wife, told Petitioner to take his car. (RT 1281.) As Respondent

correctly argues, there is little, if any, doubt that Russell and Renae would have retained

possession of their vehicle had Petitioner not demanded the keys while displaying a firearm. As

the evidence overwhelming demonstrates that Petitioner took the vehicle without Russell’s

consent, the state court’s disposition is not an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard

and Petitioner’s claim must be denied. 

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; 

2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent; and

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3. The court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (a COA should be granted where

the applicant has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right,” i.e., when “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of

the constitutional claims debatable or wrong”; Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926,

943 (9 Cir. 2006) (same). In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable th

jurists would not find it debatable that the state courts’ decision denying

Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus were not “objectively

unreasonable.”

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 7, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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