Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03083/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03083-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Helery Price
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 13, 2012 Decided June 5, 2012

No. 08-3082

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ERNEST MILTON GLOVER,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 08-3083, 08-3084

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cr-00152)

Jenifer Wicks, Allen H. Orenberg, appointed by the court,

and Marcia G. Shein argued the causes for appellants Glover, 

Suggs, and Price, respectively, and filed the briefs for 

appellants.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, John K. 

Han, and Anthony Scarpelli, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Mary 

B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

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Before: HENDERSON, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge 

KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Ernest Glover, Anthony 

Suggs, and Helery Price were convicted for their roles in a 

PCP-distribution enterprise. We affirm the judgments of 

conviction.

I

In 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 

Metropolitan Police Department conducted a joint 

investigation of a PCP-distribution conspiracy operating in 

the District of Columbia. Investigators obtained approval 

from a federal district judge to wiretap Suggs’s cell phone. 

Investigators also obtained a search warrant from a D.C. 

Superior Court judge and searched Suggs’s house pursuant to 

that warrant. Glover, Suggs, and Price were ultimately

arrested and indicted. A federal jury found Glover, Suggs, 

and Price guilty of a PCP-distribution conspiracy offense. See 

21 U.S.C. § 846. The jury also found Suggs guilty of 

unlawful possession with intent to distribute PCP. See 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iv). The District Court 

sentenced Glover and Price to life imprisonment for the 

conspiracy offense and sentenced Suggs (who did not have 

quite as extensive a prior felony drug record as Glover and 

Price) to two 20-year terms for the conspiracy and possession 

with intent to distribute offenses.

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II

Defendants challenge their convictions on various 

grounds. We find none of their arguments convincing.

A

Before trial, Price moved under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 14 to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants. 

The District Court denied the motion.

On appeal, Price asserts that he should have been tried 

separately because there was less evidence against him than

against co-defendants Glover and Suggs. We review for 

abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to 

sever. See United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 844 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010).

In interpreting Rule 14, the Supreme Court has stated that 

joint trials “‘play a vital role in the criminal justice system’”; 

they “promote efficiency and ‘serve the interests of justice by 

avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.’” 

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) (quoting 

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209, 210 (1987)). A 

defendant is therefore not entitled to severance under Rule 14 

unless there is “a serious risk that a joint trial would 

compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or 

prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt 

or innocence.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.

Here, there was no such “serious risk.” The Government 

presented extensive evidence not just against Glover and 

Suggs but also against Price, including numerous wiretapped

conversations. Moreover, the District Court instructed the 

jury to consider each defendant’s guilt or innocence 

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separately based on the evidence pertaining to that defendant. 

As this Court has said, jury instructions of that sort mitigate 

the potentially negative impact of a joint trial. See United 

States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“absent a 

dramatic disparity of evidence, any prejudice caused by 

joinder is best dealt with by instructions to the jury to give 

individual consideration to each defendant”) (brackets and 

citation omitted).

In short, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Price’s motion to sever.

B

In searching Suggs’s house pursuant to a search warrant

that was issued by a D.C. Superior Court judge, law 

enforcement officers recovered 13 bottles of PCP, containing 

a total of 7.7 kilograms of PCP. The officers also seized four 

buckets with PCP residue, a measuring cup, a funnel, air 

freshener, $7,000 in cash, and a corresponding cash 

withdrawal receipt signed “Anthony M. Suggs.”

Before trial, Suggs moved to suppress the evidence 

seized from his house. The District Court denied the motion.

On appeal, Suggs raises two alternative arguments that 

the District Court erred in denying his suppression motion: (1) 

the law enforcement officers’ initial entry into his house was 

warrantless; and (2) the affidavit in support of the search 

warrant issued by the D.C. Superior Court judge did not 

establish probable cause. On those issues, we review the 

District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual 

findings for clear error. See United States v. Bailey, 622 F.3d 

1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

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1

While listening by wiretap to one of Suggs’s cell phone 

conversations, law enforcement officers learned that an odor 

consistent with PCP was emanating from Suggs’s house. Law 

enforcement and fire department personnel then went to the 

exterior of Suggs’s house. Investigator Eames of the 

Metropolitan Police Department smelled an odor consistent 

with PCP. Before the law enforcement officers obtained a 

search warrant, law enforcement and fire department 

personnel entered Suggs’s house and looked around to make 

sure that no evidence was destroyed and that there was no fire 

or hazardous materials risk. The officers seized no evidence

at that time.

The law enforcement officers sought a search warrant. 

Investigator Kyle of the Metropolitan Police Department 

prepared the supporting affidavit. The affidavit did not rely 

on what the officers observed during their initial entry into 

Suggs’s house. Rather, the affidavit stated among other 

things that while outside Suggs’s house, Investigator Eames 

smelled an odor consistent with PCP coming from the house. 

A D.C. Superior Court judge issued a search warrant. Acting 

pursuant to the search warrant, the officers then seized 

evidence from Suggs’s house.

Suggs contends that the law enforcement officers’ initial 

entry into his house was unlawful and that the evidence later 

seized from his house therefore should have been suppressed. 

But even assuming for the sake of argument that the initial 

entry was unlawful, evidence subsequently seized pursuant to 

a valid search warrant is admissible when “there was an 

independent source for the warrant under which that evidence 

was seized.” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 

(1984). Here, the officers had such an independent source –

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namely, before the law enforcement officers’ initial entry into 

Suggs’s house, Investigator Eames detected an odor 

consistent with PCP coming from the house. Suggs thus 

cannot use the initial entry as the hook to suppress evidence 

later seized pursuant to a valid and independently obtained 

search warrant. See id. at 813-14; see also Hudson v. 

Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Murray v. United States, 487 

U.S. 533 (1988).

2

Suggs also challenges the issuing judge’s probable-cause 

determination and on that basis says that the evidence seized 

from his house should have been excluded.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall 

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 

affirmation.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. When police obtain

evidence by way of an unlawful search, the exclusionary rule 

may require exclusion of that evidence in some 

circumstances. As the Supreme Court has instructed, 

however, the exclusionary rule has limited force in cases 

involving a search with a search warrant. In particular, 

reviewing courts may not exclude evidence “when an officer 

acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant 

from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.” 

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984). The reason 

is evident: “In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be 

expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause 

determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is 

technically sufficient.” Id. at 921. The “exclusionary rule 

was adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to 

punish the errors of magistrates and judges.” Massachusetts 

v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 (1984) (citation omitted). In 

this case, therefore, even assuming that probable cause was 

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lacking for the search warrant – which is not in any way clear 

– the evidence seized from Suggs’s house was properly 

admitted under Leon.

To get around Leon, Suggs invokes one of the recognized

exceptions to the Leon principle. Under Leon, suppression 

“remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in 

issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit 

that the affiant knew was false or would have known was 

false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.” Leon, 468 

U.S. at 923 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).

In the affidavit here, Investigator Kyle stated that 

Investigator Eames had smelled an odor consistent with PCP 

coming from Suggs’s house. According to Suggs, 

Investigator Eames lied. But the District Court specifically 

believed Investigator Eames on that point. Suggs presents no 

persuasive basis for us to disturb the District Court’s 

credibility finding.

Suggs separately asserts that the affidavit improperly 

failed to disclose the wiretapped conversation that initially 

prompted officers to head to Suggs’s house. For an omission 

to meet the Franks standard, the officer must at least have

knowingly and intentionally (or with reckless disregard)

omitted a fact that would have defeated probable cause. See 

United States v. Spencer, 530 F.3d 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 

2008); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.4(b), 

at 543-46 (4th ed. 2004). But here, including information 

about the wiretapped conversation would only have

strengthened the case for probable cause. So the argument 

fails.

Suggs also contends that the warrant affidavit improperly 

failed to disclose that law enforcement and fire department

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personnel had already entered Suggs’s house without a 

warrant. But that fact was not relevant to the probable cause 

determination. The question was whether the detection of an 

odor consistent with PCP by a trained law enforcement officer

established probable cause for the search warrant.

C

Before trial, defendants moved to suppress the recordings

obtained from the wiretap on Suggs’s cell phone. The District 

Court denied the motion.

On appeal, defendants contend that the District Court 

erred in denying their suppression motion for any of three 

alternative reasons: (1) extension of the wiretap beyond the 

initial 30-day period did not satisfy the statutory necessity

requirement; (2) the law enforcement officers’ minimization 

efforts were not reasonable; and (3) the wiretap did not 

authorize interception of one of the snippets of conversation 

introduced at trial.

1

During the investigation, law enforcement officers sought 

to extend the wiretap on Suggs’s cell phone beyond the initial

30-day period set forth by the authorizing federal district

judge. To grant such an extension, the authorizing judge had 

to find probable cause and necessity. The authorizing judge 

did so here.

On appeal, defendants do not contest probable cause. 

They challenge only the authorizing judge’s necessity 

determination. We review that necessity determination for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 

544, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2010). A district court gives deference to 

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the authorizing judge’s necessity determination. But the court 

of appeals does not typically give a second layer of deference 

to a district court’s assessment of the authorizing judge’s 

necessity determination. Not much turns on that point, but we 

note it for purposes of analytical clarity.

To authorize a wiretap, an authorizing judge must 

determine that the wiretap is supported by probable cause and 

necessity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). The necessity 

determination requires the judge to find that “normal 

investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 

reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be 

too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). That requirement is 

satisfied when “traditional investigative techniques have 

proved inadequate to reveal the operation’s full nature and 

scope.” United States v. Becton, 601 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The wiretap may 

be authorized for a maximum of 30 days. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2518(5). A judge may extend the authorization for 

additional periods of up to 30 days each after finding probable 

cause and necessity for the extension. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); 

see also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).

To support extension of the wiretap on Suggs’s cell

phone, law enforcement officers submitted affidavits to the 

authorizing federal district judge explaining that traditional 

investigative methods were still inadequate to reveal the full 

nature and scope of the PCP-distribution conspiracy. Those 

affidavits stated that Suggs was “extremely surveillance 

conscious” and that “the use of the cooperating witnesses 

alone would not have provided the type and quality of 

evidence necessary to prosecute Suggs.” United States v. 

Suggs, 531 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2008). The affidavits

also specified aspects of the PCP-distribution conspiracy that 

law enforcement had been unable to uncover, including 

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“where the PCP distributed by the organization was 

manufactured” and “how it was transported into the 

Washington D.C. area.” Id.

Given the explanation in the affidavits, the authorizing 

judge did not abuse her discretion in finding that the necessity 

requirement was met.

2

Law enforcement officers intercepted more than 4,000

phone calls to and from Suggs’s cell phone over the course of 

the wiretap. During more than 600 of those phone calls, law 

enforcement officers recognized that the conversations were 

not relevant and stopped monitoring them so as to comply 

with the statutory minimization requirement. See 18 

U.S.C. § 2518(5); United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 

342 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Defendants maintain that law enforcement’s

minimization efforts were not reasonable because too few 

calls were minimized. They argue that the wiretapped 

conversations therefore should have been excluded from

evidence.

The statute requires that wiretaps “be conducted in such a 

way as to minimize the interception of communications not 

otherwise subject to interception.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). But 

that statutory command “‘does not forbid the interception of 

all nonrelevant conversations.’” United States v. Carter, 449 

F.3d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Scott v. United 

States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)). Rather, it requires only 

that the Government “make reasonable efforts to ‘minimize’

the interception of such conversations.” Carter, 449 F.3d at 

1292. As one would expect, determining the reasonableness 

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of minimization efforts is a fact-specific inquiry; “there can 

be no inflexible rule of law which will decide every case.” 

Scott, 436 U.S. at 139.

The District Court here determined that law 

enforcement’s minimization efforts were reasonable. Our 

cases have not set forth a clear standard of review on this 

question. Regardless of the appropriate standard of review, 

we find no reversible error here.

The District Court correctly concluded that a low number 

of minimized calls does not itself show that the minimization 

efforts were unreasonable. We have held that “a defendant 

who does not identify specific conversations that should not 

have been intercepted, or even a pattern of such conversations 

has offered no concrete indications that the government failed 

to meet its obligations to minimize intercepted 

communications, and thereby failed to show error by the 

district court.” Carter, 449 F.3d at 1295 (ellipsis and internal 

quotation marks omitted). A low number of minimized calls 

does not tell us much because the minimization inquiry 

focuses on the content of the intercepted communications, not 

the number.

Suggs also raises a separate minimization issue. On one 

occasion, a law enforcement officer did not recognize that an 

attorney was calling Suggs. The officer inadvertently kept 

monitoring the call. Defendants contend that the improperly 

intercepted phone call between Suggs and the attorney 

demonstrates that law enforcement’s minimization efforts 

were not reasonable. That argument fails because law 

enforcement took a variety of measures to remedy the error. 

Law enforcement sealed the call, removed the responsible law 

enforcement officer from the investigation, and reviewed

some of the minimization procedures with the other law 

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enforcement officers participating in this part of the 

investigation. Particularly in light of these steps, this one 

episode does not demonstrate that the minimization efforts 

were unreasonable.

In short, the District Court did not commit any reversible 

error in concluding that the minimization efforts were 

reasonable. We therefore need not address the question of the

proper remedy for violation of the minimization requirement. 

See id. at 1296.

3

On one occasion when Price called Suggs, the wiretap 

captured Price talking before the call went to Suggs’s 

voicemail. Price apparently was speaking to another person 

in his presence while calling Suggs. Price was caught saying: 

“I know he ain’t got nothing. He’d a been called [t]he way 

we was moving that shit.” Supplemental Appendix tab 1. At 

trial, the District Court allowed introduction of that snippet

even though Suggs had not answered the call and thus was not 

participating in the conversation.

Defendants say that the authorization for the wiretap on 

Suggs’s cell phone did not cover the statements Price made 

before the call went to Suggs’s voicemail. Defendants 

contend that the introduction of those two sentences into 

evidence was error requiring a new trial.

Even if introducing those statements was erroneous and 

even if defendants properly objected to the error – neither of 

which is in any way clear – defendants have not shown

prejudice. Put simply, in light of the numerous wiretapped

conversations introduced against defendants, those two 

sentences constituted a very small drop in a very large bucket

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of evidence against them. Therefore, any potential error was 

harmless.

D

At trial, FBI Agent Bevington testified about the meaning 

of slang terms used by defendants in the wiretapped

conversations – terms such as “water” (PCP), “boat”

(marijuana laced with PCP), “16th Street” (16 ounces), and 

“32nd Street” (32 ounces). Agent Bevington also explained

where PCP is manufactured, in what quantities it is sold, and 

at what price.

Agent Bevington did not testify as an expert witness 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Rather, he testified as a 

lay witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 701.

On appeal, defendants assert that allowing Agent 

Bevington to testify as a lay witness, instead of requiring him 

to qualify as an expert witness, was reversible error.

Our recent decision in United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 

358 (D.C. Cir. 2011), addressed this precise issue. (Our 

decision in Smith came after the District Court’s ruling in this 

case, so the District Court was not aware of the Smith opinion

when it considered the issue here.) In Smith, we reviewed 

Agent Bevington’s testimony in another drug-distribution 

conspiracy case. We held that his testimony about the 

meaning of slang terms used for heroin in wiretapped

conversations constituted expert testimony within the scope of 

Rule 702. Id. at 365. We also ruled, however, that allowing 

Agent Bevington to testify as a lay witness in that case was 

harmless error because he “would have qualified as an expert 

. . . based on his 21 years with the FBI and 17 years 

investigating drug crimes, hundreds of drug investigations, 

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and thousands of hours listening to wiretapped conversations 

between drug dealers.” Id. at 366. That reasoning applies 

with equal force here and disposes of defendants’ argument 

concerning Agent Bevington’s testimony.

E

During the trial, a juror suddenly realized that she knew

defendant Glover’s wife. The juror told the District Court. 

After questioning the juror about the scope of the relationship 

between the juror and Glover’s wife, the District Court 

dismissed the juror over defendants’ objection and impaneled

an alternate juror.

On appeal, defendants challenge the juror’s dismissal. A 

district court may impanel alternate jurors to replace original 

jurors “who are unable to perform or who are disqualified 

from performing their duties.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(1). We 

review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to 

dismiss a juror and to impanel an alternate juror. See United 

States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

The District Court acted well within the bounds of its

discretion in dismissing the juror. While questioning the 

juror, the District Court learned that the juror’s daughter had 

gone to school with Glover’s wife and had been friends with 

her. Indeed, both the juror and her daughter continued to see 

Glover’s wife in their neighborhood. The juror also knew 

Glover’s wife’s mother, aunts, and cousins. The District 

Court reasonably explained that the connection between the 

juror and Glover’s wife, the continued interaction between 

their families, and the potential for implied bias counseled in 

favor of dismissing the juror.

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We find no reversible error in the District Court’s prompt 

and sensitive handling of this issue.

F

The District Court instructed the jury that if the jury

found a defendant guilty of conspiracy, the jury must 

determine the quantity of PCP for which the defendant was 

responsible. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the 

District Court about the drug quantity issue. The note asked:

“Is a co-conspirator responsible for the total amount of PCP 

of all co-conspirators even if the co-conspirator in question

did not know all of the co-conspirators and did not know the 

specific amounts each co-conspirator possessed?” Joint 

Appendix 659. In the hope that repeating the original drug 

quantity instruction would suffice to answer the jury’s 

question, the District Court reiterated its original instruction

to the jury. Defendants objected to that course of action, 

arguing that the District Court should give a supplemental 

instruction.

On appeal, defendants maintain that the District Court did 

not respond sufficiently to the jury’s question. We review for 

abuse of discretion a district court’s response to a jury 

question of this sort. See United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 

281, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Our case law dictates that district courts have 

“considerable discretion in determining how to respond, if at 

all, to a jury’s request for clarification of a jury instruction.” 

Id. “Where the jury explicitly reveals its confusion on an 

issue, however, the court should reinstruct the jury to clear 

away the confusion.” Id.

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Here, the District Court’s response did not constitute an

abuse of discretion. Rather than muddy the waters after 

receiving the jury’s inquiry, the District Court reasonably 

chose to repeat the original instruction (which has not itself 

been challenged on appeal). And in repeating the original

instruction, the District Court specifically told the jury that “if 

you have further questions, we will take them up after lunch.”

Joint Appendix 658. The jury asked no further questions. See

United States v. Heid, 904 F.2d 69, 70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 

(conviction affirmed when district court responded to jury 

question by repeating instruction and asking if that dispelled 

jury’s confusion).

G

Glover and Price challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting their convictions.

Evidence of a conspiracy is sufficient if, “when viewed in 

the light most favorable to the government, it would permit a 

rational jury to find the elements of conspiracy beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 

171 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The drug conspiracy statute under 

which defendants were convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 846, 

“dispenses with the usual requirement of an overt act and 

requires only an agreement to commit” any of the enumerated 

offenses. Id. We thus must uphold the convictions of Glover 

and Price if a rational jury could find that the evidence, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, showed

that Glover and Price were parties to an agreement to 

distribute or to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram 

or more of PCP. In undertaking our deferential review of the 

jury’s verdict, we draw “no distinction between direct and 

circumstantial evidence” and give “full play to the right of the 

jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and draw 

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justifiable inferences of fact.” United States v. Carson, 455 

F.3d 336, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Glover and Price do not deny that there was sufficient 

evidence to find an agreement to distribute or to possess with 

intent to distribute one kilogram or more of PCP. They argue

only that there was insufficient evidence to find that they were 

parties to that agreement. Given the voluminous evidence 

presented at trial, that is a fairly weak argument. Numerous

wiretapped conversations linked Glover and Price to Suggs 

and to the conspiracy. Moreover, when law enforcement 

officers ultimately searched Glover’s house, they seized three 

bottles containing 184.3 grams of PCP, 48 small bottles and 

tops, two funnels, two eye droppers, two turkey basters, a 

digital scale, $985 in cash, a sawed-off shotgun, a standard 

shotgun, a rifle, ammunition, marijuana, heroin, and 

resealable plastic bags. Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Government, as we must on appeal from 

a guilty verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could readily

find Glover and Price guilty.

* * *

We have carefully considered all of defendants’ 

arguments. We affirm the judgments of conviction.

So ordered.

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