Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_16-cv-08027/USCOURTS-alnd-1_16-cv-08027-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Ronald Chandler
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID RONALD CHANDLER, )

)

Petitioner/Movant )

)

vs. ) Case No. 1:16-cv-08027-VEH

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner, David Ronald Chandler, filed a Motion for Relief from Federal

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) (Crim. Doc. 5751) on April 12,

2016.2 On April 22, 2016, he filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 2).

He challenges the validity of his 1991 convictions and sentence in this district of a

number of drug-related crimes, including operating a continuing criminal enterprise

and the murder-for-hire of informant Marlin Shuler. (Crim. Doc. 115). On direct

appeal, Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit

1 References to “Crim. Doc.” are to docket sheet in the corresponding criminal action in

which Petitioner was convicted, United States v. Chandler, 1:90-cr-00266. 

2 The motion was filed in the Clerk’s office on April 15, 2016, but, under the prison

mailbox rule, it is deemed filed as of the date that Petitioner placed it in the prison mail. The

motion is dated April 12, 2016, so that is the date the court will use.

1

FILED

 2016 Apr-28 PM 04:16

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:16-cv-08027-VEH Document 3 Filed 04/28/16 Page 1 of 6
Court of Appeals. United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1993).

Petitioner bases his motion on his assertion that he can demonstrate he is

“actually innocent,” “in light of the only eyewitness[’s] recantation before he died of

the involvement of [Petitioner] in the murder of Marlin Shuler....” (Doc. 1 at 3).

Petitioner identifies that “only eyewitness” as Charles Ray Jarrell, Sr. (Doc. 1,

passim).

I

Because Petitioner is contesting the legality of his sentence, his claim falls

within the parameters of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, Petitioner, who is proceeding

pro se, implicitly contends that he qualifies for the savings clause of that statute,

which provides that a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 may be brought if the

remedy available by a § 2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality

of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). This escape hatch is satisfied if a petitioner

“(1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed

procedural shot at presenting that claim.” Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 959

(9th Cir.2008) (quoting Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir.2006)).

Petitioner does not satisfy either requirement.

2

Case 1:16-cv-08027-VEH Document 3 Filed 04/28/16 Page 2 of 6
Although Petitioner arguably

3

asserts he is actually innocent of one of the

crimes he was convicted of — paying Charles Ray Jarrell, Sr. to kill Marlin Shuler

— he does not even assert that he has not had an “unobstructed procedural shot at

presenting that claim.” A prisoner’s “procedural shot” is “obstructed” only if, under

binding authority in effect at the time of the conviction, conduct is a crime and, later,

the Supreme Court holds that conduct is not a crime in a holding made retroactively

applicable to cases not on direct appeal.

4

The burden of showing that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective lies with

Petitioner and requires more than a showing merely that relief under § 2255 has

previously been denied. See McGhee v. Hanberry, 604 F.2d 9, 10 (5th Cir. 1979).

5

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated plainly that the savings clause

applies only where: “(1) the petitioner’s claim is based on a retroactively applicable

Supreme Court decision; (2) the holding of that decision established that the

3

Petitioner merely asserts that, due to the post-trial recantation of the actual murderer,

Charles Ray Jarrell, Sr., who testified at trial that Petitioner hired him to murder Shuler, of that

testimony, no rational jury could have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of that

count.

4

Further, Petitioner presented this very claim in his first § 2255 petition, which was

denied after an evidentiary hearing, and which denial was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals.

5

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent decisions of the former Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals rendered prior to October 1, 1981.

3

Case 1:16-cv-08027-VEH Document 3 Filed 04/28/16 Page 3 of 6
prisoner was convicted of a ‘nonexistent offense’ and (3) ‘circuit law squarely

foreclosed such a claim at the time it otherwise should have been raised at the

petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.’” Campbell v. Yates, 196 Fed.

Appx. 744, 2006 WL 2012334, *1 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wofford v. Scott, 177

F.3d 1236 at 1244) (overturned on other grounds by Gilbert v. United States, 640

F.3d 1293, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011)).

The mere fact that a § 2255 motion is procedurally barred by the statute of

limitations or restriction on second or successive motions does not make it

inadequate or ineffective. See Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d at 1245 (Cox, J.,

concurring specially) (“I also agree that the remedy by motion under § 2255 is not

rendered ‘inadequate or ineffective’ because an individual is procedurally barred

from filing a second or successive § 2255 motion.”); United States v. Lurie, 207

F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000) (bars on successive motions and statute of

limitations do not render § 2255 motion inadequate or ineffective); Charles v.

Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (statute of limitations bar does not

make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective).

Petitioner does not even attempt to argue that his claim is based on any

retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision. Accordingly, he has failed to carry

his burden to show that his motion should be analyzed under § 2241. Accordingly,

4

Case 1:16-cv-08027-VEH Document 3 Filed 04/28/16 Page 4 of 6
his motion is properly analyzed under § 2255.

II

This is Petitioner’s third motion under § 2255. “The bar on second or

successive motions is jurisdictional.” In re Morgan, 717 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir.

2013) (Pryor, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). “Whether a petition is

second or successive depends on ‘the judgment challenged.’” Patterson v. Sec'y,

Florida Dep't of Corr., 812 F.3d 885, 898 (11th Cir. 2016) (Pryor, J., dissenting)

(quoting Insignaries v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 812 F.3d 885, 898 (11th

Cir. 2014)). Petitioner’s motion is “second or successive” because it challenges the

same judgment as his previous two motions. Accordingly, he cannot proceed in this

court unless he first receives permission to do so from the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Finding no such permission, the motion is due to

be DENIED for want of jurisdiction.

6

III

A prisoner seeking to vacate his judgment has no absolute entitlement to

appeal a district court's denial of his motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a

district court must first issue a certificate of appealability (COA). Id. “A [COA] may

6

In light of this denial, Chandler’s motion for the appointment of counsel (Doc. 2) is

termed as MOOT.

5

Case 1:16-cv-08027-VEH Document 3 Filed 04/28/16 Page 5 of 6
issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” Id. at § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a petitioner

“must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment

of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,

282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the

issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”

Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle,

463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4 (1983)). When a district court dismisses a federal habeas

petition on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim,

a COA should issue only when a petitioner shows “that jurists of reason would find

it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional

right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was

correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Because the instant motion

is clearly a successive section 2255 motion, Petitioner cannot make the requisite

showing. Finally, because Petitioner is not entitled to a COA, he is not entitled to

appeal in forma pauperis.

DONE this 28th day of April, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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