Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-02134/USCOURTS-ca13-19-02134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry Golden
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

LARRY GOLDEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2019-2134

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:19-cv-00104-EGB, Senior Judge Eric G. Bruggink.

______________________

Decided: April 10, 2020

______________________

LARRY GOLDEN, Greenville, SC, pro se. 

 DAVID ALLEN FOLEY, JR., Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, GARY LEE HAUSKEN. 

 ______________________

Before O’MALLEY, MAYER, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Larry Golden (“Golden”) appeals an order of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) 

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2 GOLDEN v. UNITED STATES

dismissing his claims against the United States (“government”) pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules 

of the Claims Court (“RCFC”). The Claims Court held that

Golden’s complaint alleges a duplicative claim over which 

the court lacked jurisdiction, and his complaint fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Golden v. 

United States, No. 19-cv-00104 (Fed. Cl. May 14, 2019), 

ECF No. 12 (“Claims Court Op.”). For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Golden, proceeding pro se, filed this suit pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) on January 17, 2019, seeking “reasonable and entire compensation for the unlicensed use and 

manufacture” of his “inventions described in and covered 

by” various patents. Golden v. United States, No. 19-104C

(Fed. Cl. May 14, 2019), ECF No. 1; SAppx1012.1 Relevant 

to this appeal are certain other proceedings involving some 

or all of the patents that were the subject of Golden’s complaint in this case: Golden v. United States, No. 13-307C 

(Fed. Cl. May 1, 2013) (“Lead Case”) and U.S. Dep’t of 

Homeland Security v. Golden, No. IPR 2014-00714 (“the 

IPR”). Resolution of this appeal does not require a detailed 

recitation of the factual background of the Lead Case or the 

1 Golden filed an “Informal Brief Appendix” on September 3, 2019, using the prefix “Appx.” Golden also filed 

an additional appendix with his reply brief on November 7, 

2019. This Reply Appendix also uses the prefix “Appx,” and 

restarts the numbering at Appx1. The government, for its 

part, filed a Supplemental Appendix, using the same 

“Appx” prefix as Golden’s two appendices, but beginning 

the numbering at Appx1000. We cite to the government’s 

Supplemental Appendix as “SAppx,” Golden’s “Informal 

Brief Appendix” as “Appx,” and Golden’s Reply Appendix 

as “RAppx.” 

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IPR. Accordingly, only the facts relevant to this appeal are 

discussed below. 

A. Lead Case

On May 1, 2013, Golden filed the complaint in the Lead 

Case, alleging patent infringement by the government pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). The trial court allowed

Golden to amend his complaint five times, and, with each 

amendment, Golden added claims of infringement of additional patents. Starting with the second amended complaint, Golden also included allegations of “Government 

Taking,” alleging that the government had “taken the subject matter, scope, technology rationale, devices schematics, processes, methods, procedures and systems of what is 

now Golden’s patents . . . for public use without just compensation.” SAppx1791–93. Golden alleged that the 

Claims Court had jurisdiction over his takings claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1491. SAppx1791. Noting that the takings 

claims appeared to be duplicative of the patent infringement claims, the trial court initially stayed Golden’s takings claims, “pending determination of liability for the 

Government’s alleged patent infringement.” SAppx1794 

(citing Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012) (en banc)). 

On August 10, 2017, Golden filed his fifth and final 

amended complaint in the Lead Case. SAppx2040. This 

voluminous filing included a general “Count I,” alleging 

“Fifth Amendment Takings” of nine of Golden’s patents. 

SAppx2065–67.2 It also included additional specific “Count 

Is,” which recite takings allegations tailored to the use of 

specific electronic devices. See, e.g., SAppx2069–70 (LG 

2 Specifically, Golden alleged taking of the “subject 

matter as outlined in” his U.S. Patent Nos. 7,385,497; 

7,636,033; 8,106,752; 8,334,761; 8,531,280; RE43,891; 

RE43,990; 9,096,189; and 9,589,439. SAppx2065. 

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Electronics G5 Smartphone), SAppx2071–73 (LG Electronics V10 Smartphone), SAppx2074–75 (Apple’s iPhone/iPad 

Camera Biosensor for Facial Heart Rate Monitor). The 

complaint similarly included corresponding “Count IIs”—

patent infringement claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 referencing the same electronic devices. See, e.g., SAppx2067–

69; SAppx2070–71; SAppx2073–74; SAppx2075–76.3 

On March 29, 2018, the Claims Court issued a memorandum opinion and order, granting-in-part the government’s motion for partial dismissal of the Lead Case and 

denying Golden’s motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment. Golden v. United States, 137 Fed. Cl. 155, 

159 (2018) (dismissing certain patent infringement 

claims). Golden appealed the partial dismissal opinion to

this court. SAppx2301. We dismissed the appeal as premature because the Claims Court had not yet issued a final 

decision or judgment in the Lead Case. Order, Golden v. 

United States, No. 2018-1942 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2018); Order, Golden v. United States, No. 2018-1942 (Fed. Cir. May 

31, 2018).

In November 2018, the Claims Court lifted the stay on

Golden’s takings claims in the Lead Case, “[t]o pursue efficient resolution of all claims in th[e] case[.]” SAppx2303–4. 

The court permitted the government to file a motion to dismiss those claims. SAppx2304. On May 8, 2019, the trial 

court granted the government’s motion and dismissed

Golden’s takings claims. Golden v. United States, No.

13-307C, 2019 WL 2056662, at *3 (Fed. Cl. May 8, 2019). 

3 Golden’s generic patent infringement “Count II”

referenced the same nine patents as his takings claims, as 

well as his Continuation Patent Application 

No. 15/530,839, which later issued as U.S. Patent 

No. 10,163,287. SAppx2067–69.

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Certain patent infringement allegations from the Lead 

Case have not yet been resolved, however. SAppx2303. 

The case is stayed pending resolution of Golden’s petition 

in an inter partes review proceeding affecting one of the patents at issue in the Lead Case. SAppx2339–40. The 

court’s rulings on the takings claims in the Lead Case are, 

accordingly, not yet ripe for appeal to this court.

B. Inter Partes Review of 

U.S. Patent No. RE43,990

On April 30, 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(“Board”) for inter partes review of claims 11, 74, and 81 of

Golden’s U.S. Patent No. RE43,900. The Board instituted 

review on October 8, 2014. During this proceeding, Golden 

filed, pro se, a Patent Owner Response and Motion to 

Amend. The Board held a conference call with the parties 

following this filing, and informed Golden that it was unclear whether his Motion to Amend was contingent on the 

Board finding the challenged claims unpatentable. 

SAppx2434–36. The Board informed Golden that, if his 

Motion to Amend was non-contingent, he was “in essence, 

abandoning the claims at issue, and saying that we should 

only look at the claims as amended in the Motion to 

Amend.” SAppx2436. The Board also “urge[d]” Golden “to 

retain new counsel because of the possible consequences of 

this proceeding, as well as its very technical nature.” 

SAppx2437. In response, Golden again filed his Patent 

Owner Response, as well as two separate Motions to 

Amend, which the Board treated “in the collective as a single motion to amend.” SAppx2512. 

On February 3, 2015, the Board held another teleconference, and confirmed with Golden that his Motion to

Amend was, indeed, non-contingent. According to the 

Board, Golden confirmed “that he is abandoning the claims 

on which trial was instituted.” SAppx2512. The Board issued its final written decision on October 1, 2015. It 

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6 GOLDEN v. UNITED STATES

granted Golden’s non-contingent request to cancel the original claims. It also found that Golden had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his proposed 

substitute claims were patentable over the prior art. 

SAppx2547. 

Golden did not appeal the Board’s final written decision, but is currently petitioning the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) (through counsel) to strike the Inter 

Partes Review Certificate as an ultra vires agency action. 

In that petition, Golden argues that, under the Supreme 

Court’s recent decision in Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853 (2019), a government agency may not 

petition for IPR. SAppx2600–02.

C. The Present Case

Golden filed the present case in January 2019, shortly 

before the Claims Court granted the government’s motion 

to dismiss the takings claims in the Lead Case. In this action, Golden again seeks compensation for the government’s Fifth Amendment Taking of his property, i.e., 

several of his U.S. patents, which were also at issue in the 

Lead Case. Golden v. United States, No. 19-104C (Fed. Cl. 

May 14, 2019), ECF No. 1; SAppx1012. In this complaint,

Golden alleges takings of the subject matter of his patents 

based on actions by different entities, including the Board, 

the Department of Justice, DHS, the Claims Court, and our 

court. SAppx1011–12. The complaint alleges the takings

occurred by virtue of: (1) the government’s use, manufacture, development, and disclosure of the subject matter 

“outlined” in the claims and specifications of Golden’s patents; (2) the cancellation of certain patent claims during 

the IPR initiated by the government; and, (3) certain actions by the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit in the 

Lead Case. On January 29, 2019, the trial court determined that Golden’s complaint raises identical questions of 

law and fact as the Lead Case and consolidated the cases. 

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On May 14, 2019, upon the government’s motion pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the Claims Court dismissed Golden’s complaint in the present case as largely 

duplicative of the takings claims in the Lead Case, which 

the court had recently dismissed. Claims Court Op. at 1. 

The court held that, even if the complaint was not duplicative of the Lead Case, the Claims Court did not have jurisdiction over the takings claims because Golden cannot 

label his patent infringement claim as a “taking” in order 

to proceed under the court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction. According to the trial court, patent infringement claims 

against the government are to be pursued exclusively under § 1498, and “‘patent rights are not cognizable property 

interests for Takings Clause purposes.’” Id. at 3–4 (citing 

Zoltek v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 

(“Zoltek I”), vacated on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 

672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Zoltek II”) and quoting 

Christy, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 641, 657–60 

(2019)).

As to Golden’s IPR-based takings claims, the trial court

found that patent rights are not private property for purposes of a Fifth Amendment takings claim. The court then 

concluded, “setting aside whether an action by the Board

could ever constitute a government taking,” the cancellation of claims in the IPR was the result of Golden’s voluntary amendment of his claims. Id. at 4. Finally, as to

Golden’s grievances against the Claims Court and this 

court, the trial court explained that the courts adjudicate 

patent rights, and, “in any event, as Mr. Golden himself 

notes, both courts have allowed his patent claims to continue in the [Lead Case].” Id. Golden timely appeals. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

Whether the Claims Court properly granted the government’s motion to dismiss is a question of law. Rocovich 

v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This 

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8 GOLDEN v. UNITED STATES

court reviews a question of law de novo and reverses the 

Claims Court’s legal conclusion only if it is incorrect as a 

matter of law. See Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 

920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 

On appeal, Golden argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his takings claims based on: (1) the government’s infringement of his patents; (2) the institution of the

IPR; and (3) the Claims Court’s dismissal of his causes of 

action relating to patent claims that were “unjustly cancelled in the IPR.” Appellant’s Br. 5, 13. He also argues 

that there were “several breaches of implied-in-fact contracts” by the government. Id. at 5. We address each argument in turn. 

A.

We first consider the dismissal of Golden’s patent infringement-based takings claims. The Claims Court held 

that it did not have jurisdiction over these claims pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1491, because patent infringement claims 

against the government are to be pursued exclusively under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Claims Court Op. at 3–4 (citing 

Zoltek I, 442 F.3d at 1350–53). We agree.

The Claims Court has limited jurisdiction to entertain 

suits against the United States. The Tucker Act is the 

principal statute governing the jurisdiction of the Claims 

Court. It waives sovereign immunity for claims against the 

United States that are founded upon the Constitution, a 

federal statute or regulation, or an express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Section 

1491 carves out an important exception: it does not waive 

sovereign immunity for claims sounding in tort. Id. As 

relevant to this case, another statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) 

permits suits against the United States for its unauthorized use of a patented invention. Under this statute, a patent owner may “recover[] . . . his reasonable and entire 

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compensation for such use and manufacture.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1498(a). 

In support of its conclusion that § 1498 provides the 

sole avenue for pursuing a claim of patent infringement 

against the United States, the Claims Court relied on our 

decision in Zoltek I. There, we affirmed the Claims Court’s 

decision that patent owner Zoltek’s § 1498(a) infringement 

claims against the government were barred because every 

step of the claimed method was not performed in the 

United States. And, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894), we 

held that Zoltek was not permitted to proceed under the 

Tucker Act by alleging that the infringement was a taking. 

Zoltek I, 442 F.3d at 1350. As the subsequent history of the 

Zoltek case shows, our decision in Zoltek I does not control 

the jurisdictional analysis here.4 We agree, however, with 

the conclusion in Zoltek I that 28 U.S.C. § 1498 provides 

the only avenue for a patent owner to bring an action 

against the government for patent infringement. 

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states 

that private property shall not “be taken for public use, 

4 There, on remand, the Claims Court granted the 

patent owner’s motion to amend its complaint and to transfer the case, and certified that decision to us for an interlocutory appeal. We then voted en banc to vacate the 

Zoltek I holding that Zoltek’s § 1498(a) infringement claims

were barred. Zoltek II, 672 F.3d at 1326–27. And, we held

that, “[s]ince the Government’s potential liability under 

§ 1498(a) is established, we need not and do not reach the 

issue of the Government’s possible liability under the Constitution for a taking. The trial court’s determinations on 

that issue are vacated.” Id. at 1327. The Zoltek I takings 

analysis, is therefore, persuasive authority, but not binding 

on us.

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without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. But a

cause of action under the Fifth Amendment is unavailable 

to patent owners alleging infringement by the government.

Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 168–69. In Schillinger, the Supreme Court held that a patentee could not sue the government for patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment 

taking. Id. The Court explained that, under the Tucker 

Act, Congress waived its sovereign immunity as to certain 

types of claims, but that waiver does not extend to “claims

founded upon torts.” Id. at 168. According to the Court, a 

patent infringement action “is one sounding in tort[,]” and,

just as Congress could not have intended every wrongful 

arrest or seizure of property to expose it to damages in the 

Court of Claims under the Due Process Clause, the wrongful appropriation of a patent license cannot expose the government to liability under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 

Clause. Id. at 168–169. Thus, under Schillinger, prior to 

the Patent Act of 1910 (later codified as amended at 28 

U.S.C. § 1498), the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over 

patent infringement actions against the government. As

we recognized in Zoltek I, Schillinger remains the law. 

442 F.3d at 1350. 

Subsequent legislation confirms that a patent owner 

may not pursue an infringement action as a taking under 

the Fifth Amendment. Following Schillinger, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1910, which “augmented the Court 

of Claims’ Tucker Act jurisdiction by providing jurisdiction 

over the tort of patent infringement.” Id. at 1351. We explained in Zoltek I that 28 U.S.C. § 1498 “‘add[ed] the right 

to sue the United States in the court of claims’ for patent 

infringement.” Id. (quoting Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 304 (1912)) (alterations in 

original). Before the 1910 Act, no patent infringement action could be brought against the government “unless in 

the Court of Claims under a contract or implied contract 

theory.” Id. The Act “‘was intended alone to provide for 

the discrepancy resulting from the right in one case to sue 

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GOLDEN v. UNITED STATES 11

on the implied contract and the non-existence of a right to 

sue’ for infringement.” Id. (quoting William Cramp & Sons 

Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. Int’l Curtis Marine Turbine Co., 

246 U.S. 28, 41 (1918)). If the right to challenge the government’s infringement already existed under the Fifth 

Amendment, there would be no need to expressly add to the

Claims Court’s jurisdiction through the Patent Act. See id. 

Indeed, as we recognized in Zoltek I, holding to the contrary 

would “read an entire statute, § 1498, out of existence.” 

Id. at 1352. 

Schillinger mandates the conclusion reached by the 

Zoltek I court, which we expressly adopt today: the Claims 

Court does not have jurisdiction to hear takings claims 

based on alleged patent infringement by the government. 

Those claims sound in tort and are to be pursued exclusively under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Thus, the Claims Court was 

without jurisdiction to hear Golden’s patent infringementbased takings claims, and it properly dismissed these 

claims.5 

B.

We next turn to Golden’s IPR-based takings claims. 

We first address whether the Claims Court had jurisdiction 

to hear these claims. 

The government alleges that, “upon further consideration,” it has identified a jurisdictional problem that was not 

recognized below. Appellee’s Br. 40. The government argues that the American Invents Act (“AIA”)’s creation of 

5 Because we find the Claims Court did not have jurisdiction to hear Golden’s patent infringement-based takings claims, we need not address the court’s alternative 

holding that these claims are duplicative of the claims in 

the Lead Case. 

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inter partes review by the Board, followed by judicial review before this court, creates a “‘self-executing remedial 

scheme’ that ‘supersedes the gap-filling role of the Tucker 

Act.’” Id. at 41 (quoting United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 

6, 13 (2012)). According to the government, the AIA statutory scheme displaces Tucker Act jurisdiction because 

there is no procedural impediment to presentation of a takings claim to the agency and because the remedial scheme 

provides for judicial review of constitutional challenges to 

the agency’s action. Id. at 43–49. 

The government’s argument is without merit. In 

Bormes, the Supreme Court explained that Tucker Act jurisdiction is displaced “when a law assertedly imposing 

monetary liability on the United States contains its own judicial remedies.” 568 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added). More 

recently, the Court explained that, “[t]o determine whether 

a statutory scheme displaces Tucker Act jurisdiction, a 

court must ‘examin[e] the purpose of the [statute], the entirety of its text, and the structure of review that it establishes.’” Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 526–27 

(2013) (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 

(1988)). Thus, when there is a precisely defined statutory 

framework for a claim that could be brought against the 

United States, the Tucker Act gives way to the more specific statutory scheme.

Regardless of the structure of review it establishes, the 

AIA is not a statute that provides for claims against the 

United States. Looking to the purpose and text of the statute, the AIA represents an overhaul of the U.S. patent system from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file regime. 

35 U.S.C. § 100. It also establishes post-grant review of 

patents. 35 U.S.C. § 321. The government is correct that, 

under the AIA, parties may raise constitutional challenges 

in our court on appeal from Board decisions. But this remedial scheme does not convert the AIA into a statutory 

framework for claims against the United States. The AIA

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is by no means “a law assertedly imposing monetary liability on the United States.” Borne, 568 U.S. at 12. Accordingly, we reject the government’s argument that the AIA

displaced Tucker Act jurisdiction over Golden’s IPR-based 

takings claims.6 

As to the merits of Golden’s IPR-based takings claims, 

on appeal, Golden argues, inter alia, that the government’s 

actions (including in the IPR) resulted in a reduction of 

value of his property, destroyed his competitive edge, and 

interfered with his “reasonable investment-backed expectations.” Appellant’s Br. 7–8. We rejected similar arguments in Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 

2019). There, we explained that inter partes review proceedings, like patent validity challenges in the district 

court, “serve the purpose of correcting prior agency error of 

issuing patents that should not have issued in the first 

place[.]” Id. at 1361. Additionally, we noted that “[p]atent 

owners have always had the expectation that the validity 

of patents could be challenged in district court. For forty 

years, [they] have also had the expectation that the PTO 

could reconsider the validity of issued patents on particular 

grounds, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 1362–63. Accordingly, we held that retroactive 

application of inter partes review proceedings to pre-AIA 

patents is not an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth 

Amendment. Id. at 1362. 

Although Golden does not challenge retroactive application of inter partes review in this case, Celgene controls 

the outcome here. Golden, as a patent owner, has “always 

had the expectation that the validity of patents could be 

6 This does not, of course, alter our conclusion that 

an action for patent infringement sounds in tort and the 

only avenue to sue the United States government for unauthorized licensing of patent rights is a suit pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1498. See supra, Section A.

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challenged in district court” or before the PTO. Id. at 

1362–63. Under Celgene, subjecting patents to inter partes

review proceedings is not an unconstitutional taking under 

the Fifth Amendment.7 Id. at 1362.

We are mindful, of course, of the unique circumstances

of the IPR in Golden’s case. This IPR was initiated by DHS, 

a federal agency. Following the cancellation of certain 

claims of his RE43,990 patent in the IPR, the Supreme 

Court made clear in Return Mail that “a federal agency is 

not a ‘person’ who may petition for post-issuance review 

under the AIA.” 139 S. Ct. at 1867. Golden may argue that, in view of Return Mail, the cancellation of the 

7 Although it does not expressly address the issue 

here, the government has “not dispute[d] that a valid patent is private property for the purposes of the Takings 

Clause.” Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1358. And, as we noted in 

Celgene, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Oil States 

Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. 

Ct. 1365 (2018), is not to the contrary. In Oil States, the 

Court explained that “the decision to grant a patent is a 

matter involving public rights—specifically the grant of a

public franchise.” 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (emphasis in original). 

At the same time, it “emphasize[d] the narrowness of [its] 

holding” explaining that it was addressing “only the precise 

constitutional challenges” raised in that case. Id. at 1379. 

The Court admonished that its “decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for 

purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.” 

Id. Despite the Claims Court’s express finding on the status of patent rights under the Fifth Amendment, we decline to address that question here, however, because, even 

if Golden’s patents are his private property for Takings 

Clause purposes, under Celgene, cancellation of patent 

claims in inter partes review cannot be a taking under the 

Fifth Amendment. 

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GOLDEN v. UNITED STATES 15

patent claims in an inter partes review initiated by the government could be considered an unconstitutional taking 

under the Fifth Amendment. We need not decide whether 

that is the case, however, for two reasons. First, Golden 

did not appeal the Board’s final written decision in the IPR

to this court, and the decision became final before the Return Mail decision was issued. Second, Golden voluntarily 

filed a non-contingent motion to amend the claims on 

which the IPR was instituted. His substitute claims were 

then found unpatentable. The claims at issue were therefore cancelled as result of Golden’s own voluntary actions. 

In these circumstances, cancellation of the claims in the 

government-initiated inter partes review cannot be chargeable to the government under any legal theory. 

C.

Finally, we address Golden’s arguments regarding the 

alleged takings by the Claims Court and the breach of “implied-in-fact contracts” by the government. Appellant’s Br. 

5, 13. As the Claims Court explained, the actions of the 

Federal Circuit and the Claims Court cannot be an unconstitutional taking, as both courts “adjudicate rights in patents.” Claims Court Op. at 4. As to the breach of “impliedin-fact contracts,” it appears these arguments are made either in support of Golden’s takings claims, discussed above, 

or raised for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, these 

arguments are either unpersuasive or waived. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Claims Court’s 

decision. We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. 

AFFIRMED

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