Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02185/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02185-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barry Brady
Defendant
Contra Costa Superior Court
Defendant
Thomas Maddock
Defendant
Randi Petersen
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The third cause of actionalleges a violation of “the Equal Protection Clause of the 1st,

4th, and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Cplt ¶ 33. As the First and Fourth

Amendments do not include an “equal protection” provision, the court interprets this as a claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment only.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDI PETERSEN,

Plaintiff, No. C 05-2185 PJH

v. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST

JUDGE BARRY BRADY, et al., TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Pro se plaintiff Randi Peterson filed this action on May 27, 2005, alleging

discrimination and retaliation, in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

§ 794; and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131; alleging violation of her

rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;1 and also alleging state law claims of intentional

infliction of emotional distress and discrimination in violation of public policy. Defendants are

the Honorable Barry Brady, and the Honorable Thomas Maddock, both judges at the Superior

Court of California, County of Contra Costa. Also named as a defendant is the Contra Costa
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff does not list Judge Baskinas a defendant in the caption of the complaint, and

does not identify Judge Baskin in the section of the complaint labeled “Defendants,” but alleges

in the “Statement of Facts” that Judge Baskin retaliated against her after she filed a lawsuit

against the Contra Costa Superior Court.

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Superior Court. In addition, plaintiff alleges various claims against a Judge Baskin, also on

the Contra Costa Superior Court.2 

According to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff is involved in a dispute with her

former husband regarding the custody of their children. Plaintiff asserts that after Judge

Baskin scheduled a custody trial for April 7, 2005, she (plaintiff) attempted to obtain a

continuance and leave to serve discovery on her ex-husband. She claims that Judge Baskin

denied her request to propound discovery prior to the trial, and that when she complained to

Judge Maddock (the Presiding Judge), she received no response. Plaintiff asserts that

Judge Baskin blocked her access to the court by imposing a “barrier” (denying her requests),

by failing to respond to her requests for a new trial date, and by refusing to accept mail or

filings that were not accompanied by a certificate of service on her ex-husband. Plaintiff

alleges that these acts were taken in retaliation because plaintiff had exercised her right of

opposing discrimination by filing civil lawsuit on March 4, 2005, against the Contra Costa

Superior Court for past retaliation and discrimination against her and her disabled children.

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Because the court finds that

the complaint must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), the request for leave to

proceed IFP is DENIED. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), "[a]ny court of the United States may authorize the

commencement . . . of any suit . . . without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor,

by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor." 

In reviewing an application to proceed IFP, the court may dismiss a case if the court

determines that the party applying for IFP status has filed a frivolous action, or that the

complaint fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages from defendants who are
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640

(9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1984). 

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a frivolous claim is one that lacks an arguable basis

in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an

arguable basis in facts or law only if controlling authority requires a finding that the facts

alleged fail to establish an arguable legal claim. Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495, 496 (9th Cir.

1990). Dismissal on these grounds is often ordered sua sponte prior to the issuance of

process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering

such complaints. Id. at 324. Where a litigant is acting pro se and the court finds the litigant's

complaint frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must give the

litigant notice of the deficiencies of the complaint and an opportunity to amend before final

dismissal, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured

by amendment. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); Eldridge v. Block, 832

F.2d 1132, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 1987). 

B. Analysis

The court has carefully reviewed the complaint, and finds that it constitutes an

impermissible attempt to collaterally attack state court custody proceedings, and that the

claims against Judges Brady, Maddock, and Baskins must be dismissed because those

defendants are immune from suit. In the absence of viable claims against the defendant

judges, the claims against the Superior Court must also be dismissed. 

1. State court custody proceedings

Plaintiff’s claims are based on her dissatisfaction with rulings by the defendant

Superior Court judges involved in the adjudication of a dispute between plaintiff and her

former husband regarding the custody of their children. Thus, plaintiff's claims are essentially

"nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack on prior state court decisions," Branson

v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1995), and lie outside this court's subject matter

jurisdiction. It is irrelevant in such a case whether federal constitutional issues are at stake. Id.

at 291. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In addition, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over

cases involving divorce, alimony, or child custody. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,

703-04 (1992) (domestic relations exception is judicially created doctrine that “divests the

federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees”); see also

Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983) (federal courts lack jurisdiction over

local matters such as child custody disputes). In the Ninth Circuit, district courts must refuse

jurisdiction over claims where the primary issue concerns child custody issues or the status of

parent and child or husband and wife. See Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.1987);

Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136-37 (9th Cir.1982). 

Here, while plaintiff asserts claims of constitutional violations and disability

discrimination and retaliation, those claims have no independent significance under the facts

alleged, apart from her challenge to the Superior Court’s handling of the custody dispute – that

is, her assertion that court rulings regarding discovery, requests for continuances, and other

procedural matters violated her constitutional rights, were retaliatory, and created “barriers” to

her ability to “access” the court. However, none of these allegations transforms plaintiff’s case

from a dispute relating to child custody into an action for violation of civil rights. While plaintiff

asserts that Judges Brady, Maddock, and Baskin deprived her of access to the judicial

system, she is in actuality simply attempting to challenge the rulings that were made during the

course of that child custody dispute. 

In California, parents in child custody or dependency proceedings can appeal or

otherwise challenge the legality of the proceeding itself. See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code § 238, Cal.

Welf. & Inst. Code § 395, 800. Parents can seek custody orders in the California Superior

Court that has jurisdiction over the child, can seek agency review, and can file a suit in state

court. Mazur v. Shelton, 637 F.Supp. 330, 335-36 (N.D. Cal. 1986). If plaintiff is dissatisfied

with the outcome of the custody proceedings involving her children, her remedy, if any, lies in

state court. 

2. Judicial immunity

Moreover, Judges Brady, Maddock, and Baskin are immune from suit. The Supreme
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Court has conclusively granted absolute immunity to judges from damage liability for acts of a

judicial nature. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-229 (1988); see also Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967). "[A]

judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he

has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-37; see also

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227 (a judicial act "does not become less judicial by virtue of an

allegation of malice or corruption of motive"); Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). 

Here, plaintiff challenges discovery and other pretrial procedural rulings. The claims

against the defendant Superior Court judges are based on “judicial acts” – acts performed in

his or her official capacity as a judge presiding over the custody proceedings involving

plaintiff’s children – and are therefore barred by judicial immunity. 

CONCLUSION

Because the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, the must

be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The court finds further that repleading will not cure the

deficiencies in the complaint. Accordingly, the dismissal is WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2005 

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge