Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01681/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01681-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abdikadir Abdillahi Guled
Petitioner
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1681 

___________

Abdikadir Abdillahi Guled, *

also known as Mohamed Ali Jamal, *

also known as Yusuf Abdilahi Guled, *

also known as Mukhtar Fahiyeh, *

also known as Abdi Abuf Guled, *

also known as Guled Abdul Ali, also *

known as Abdisalan Mohamed Gure, *

also known as Jamal Ali Abdul, *

*

Petitioner, *

*

v. *

*

Michael B. Mukasey, *

*

Respondent. *

___________

Petition for Review of an 

No. 07-2339 Order of the Board of

___________ Immigration Appeals.

Abdikadir Abdillahi Guled, *

*

Petitioner, *

*

v. *

*

Michael B. Mukasey, *

*

Respondent. *

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The IJ found him to be a native and citizen of Somalia. The BIA found him

to be a citizen of Ethiopia, like his mother.

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___________

Submitted: January 18, 2008

Filed: January 31, 2008

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Abdikadir Guled seeks review of a final order of removal issued by the Board

of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision finding

him removable and denying his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum and

related relief. He also appeals the denial of his motion to reopen and reconsider.

After careful review, we deny Guled's petition.

I. Background

On or about September 30, 1991, Abdikadir Guled, a native of Somalia and

citizen of Ethiopia,1

 entered the United States at the age of eleven as a refugee. He

subsequently adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident on or about

October 20, 1992. Guled, currently twenty-seven years old, entered into a cultural,

but not legal, marriage with Yasmin Mohamed in 1999. Mohamed testified she

received asylum in 1998. The couple have two children together.

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Guled was convicted on October 20, 2000, of battery against his wife in

California and given three years of probation. He was convicted on April 2, 2001, of

resisting a police officer, also in California.

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A. Proceedings Before the IJ

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commenced removal proceedings

against Guled on August 28, 2003. DHS charged him as being removable pursuant

to Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 237 (a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), which allows the removal of an "alien who at any time after

admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising

out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct," and INA Section 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which allows the removal of an "alien who at any time after

admission is convicted of a crime of domestic violence."2

 The IJ noted Guled initially

admitted all of the allegations in the Notice to Appear and conceded the second charge

of removability. Upon changing attorneys, he later denied both charges of

removability and also denied allegation six, which alleged he was a citizen of Ethiopia

– the country in which his mother was born and raised.

The IJ did not sustain the first charge of removal, finding a conviction for

resisting a police officer is not a crime of moral turpitude. The IJ did sustain the

second charge of removal, based on Guled's conviction for a crime of domestic

violence. He declined to designate a country for removal, and the IJ designated

Ethiopia, or alternatively Somalia.

Guled originally applied for asylum on March 10, 2005, and submitted a second

application on October 19, 2005. He also applied for withholding of removal under

INA Section 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), for relief under Article III of the

Convention Against Torture, and for cancellation of removal for permanent residents.

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Guled claimed he suffered and fears persecution in Somalia because he

allegedly belongs to a despised minority clan, the Madhiban clan. The IJ made an

adverse credibility finding regarding his clan membership because of contradictions

in the record. He claimed to be from the Madhiban clan in Somalia, although the

asylum applications of his parents indicate they are from the Darod clan, and Guled's

original application listed him as a member of the Darod clan. Testimony from police

officer Brudenell, whom DHS called as a witness, revealed relatives of Guled stated

in an unrelated investigation the family was Darod. The IJ concluded the evidence

failed to establish Guled's membership in the Madhiban clan and failed to show

persecution of the Darod clan.

Regarding Brudenell's testimony, Guled points out the local rules required DHS

to file and provide him a witness list no later than ten calendar days prior to the final

hearing. DHS violated this rule, and he properly objected on the ground he had not

been given time and opportunity to prepare for cross-examination of witness

Brudenell. The IJ noted Guled's objection but allowed Brudenell to testify. Witness

Brudenell testified to Guled's membership in the Somali Crips street gang and stated

he is viewed as a leader in the gang. She testified an album of photographs found in

Guled's car depicted individuals throwing gang signs and wearing blue – the Crips'

color. At least one photograph pictured him with a person carrying a very dangerous

firearm. He did not request a continuance.

The IJ also found implausible Guled and Mohamed's account of his domestic

violence arrests and convictions. Guled claimed he had never hit his wife and only

pled guilty to assault in California because of advice from his public defender. He

explained Mohamed had him arrested for domestic violence because she thought he

was cheating. He also testified Mohamed was beaten badly by two women in

February 2006, but told the police he was responsible because she was mad at him.

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Mohamed first claimed Guled had never been arrested, the police had never

come to their home, and he was never charged with domestic assault. After being

shown a page from Guled's chronological criminal history, she admitted to calling the

police in October of 2000, and had him arrested because she was feeling jealous and

also because of problems with his brother. On cross-examination, she stated again

Guled had never been arrested and had never been to jail. In fact, he does have a

voluminous arrest and conviction record. Mohamed later submitted a statement

explaining she was on medication at the hearing and was confused about her

testimony. The IJ found Mohamed and Guled's explanations of the various domestic

assault charges brought against him to be implausible.

Addressing Guled's application for cancellation of removal, the IJ applied the

factors set out in Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978). The judge

considered his criminal record, describing it as "about the largest laundry list of arrests

this Court has seen for an individual in a long time." He considered evidence

indicating Guled had been involved in the Rough Tough Somali Crips gang. The IJ

also considered the limited evidence of his good character, acknowledging the

supportive testimony of his wife and mother, his significant family ties in the United

States, and the hardship to he and his family should he be deported. The IJ found no

other documented evidence of Guled's value and service to the community, no record

of military service, a spotty employment history, and no proof of rehabilitation with

his arrests continuing up through that year. The IJ concluded he was a danger and it

was not in the best interests of the United States to allow him to remain in this country

as a permanent resident. His application for cancellation of removal was denied.

Turning to Guled's application for asylum, the IJ determined he did not qualify

as he could not credibly demonstrate being a refugee within the meaning of INA

Section 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), i.e. he could not demonstrate any

past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

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We note the evidence presented by Guled regarding his fears of persecution

and torture pertained to Somalia. There is no evidence of any fear of persecution or

torture in Ethiopia, the proposed country of removal. 

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The judge found Guled's testimony as to his tribal affiliation incredible because it was

inconsistent and concluded there was no clear evidence of his membership in the

Madhiban clan or reason to fear persecution.3

Next, the IJ concluded Guled failed to meet the burden of proof for a grant of

withholding of removal because he failed to meet the lower burden of proof for a grant

of asylum. He could not prove it was more likely than not he would be persecuted

upon return to Ethiopia or Somalia. As for the claim for protection pursuant to the

Convention Against Torture, the IJ found the evidence did not establish any

government of Ethiopia or Somalia would have reason to want to torture him. The IJ

denied his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum and withholding of

removal pursuant to sections 240A, 208(b), and 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§

1229b, 1158(b) and 1231(b)(3), respectively, and protection pursuant to Article III of

the Convention Against Torture. The IJ ordered him removed to Ethiopia, or in the

alternative, to Somalia.

B. Proceedings Before the BIA

Guled appealed the decision to the BIA. He challenged the IJ's adverse

credibility findings, challenged the propriety of allowing the testimony of witness

Brudenell because DHS did not submit her name on a witness list, challenged the IJ's

determination it was not in the interest of the United States to allow him to remain a

permanent resident, and not having met his burden of proof with respect to claims for

asylum and related relief.

On February 3, 2007, the BIA dismissed his appeal. It rejected Guled's

challenge to witness Brudenell's testimony, noting he could have requested a

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continuance and his failures to show prejudice. The BIA reviewed the IJ's findings

of fact, including its credibility determinations, under a clearly erroneous standard.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3). First, the BIA affirmed the IJ's denial of Guled's

application for cancellation of removal as within the IJ's sound discretion. See Matter

of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978) (stating standard for discretion). It

found the IJ properly considered Guled's criminal history, long arrest record, gang

connections, lack of evidence of rehabilitation, and spotty employment history, as

compared to his family ties in the United States, length of residence, and potential

hardship to his family if he were removed and did not err in denying his application

for cancellation of removal. Second, the BIA affirmed the IJ's denial of his asylum

claim, finding the IJ's credibility finding on his clan membership and other reasoning

was not erroneous. Third, the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision as to not qualifying for

withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA or under the Convention

Against Torture because of failure to show a clear probability of persecution in

Somalia or Ethiopia.

C. Motion to Reopen and Reconsider

Guled filed a motion to reopen and reconsider, renewing his argument that the

officer was improperly allowed to testify and also the BIA erred in holding he failed

to demonstrate prejudice. The BIA rejected his claim about witness Brudenell's

testimony, reiterating he elected not to file a motion for a continuance. The BIA

concluded his explanation for the discrepancy as to his clan affiliation was not

convincing. It noted the only support for his claim to be a member of the Madhiban

clan was the testimony of his wife, his mother and himself and a letter from a Somali

organization, which did not explain the basis for its belief he was Madhiban.

The BIA found Guled had not cited to any mistake of fact or law to support his

motion and merely reiterated arguments from his previous appeal. It further

concluded he had not provided any new or previously unavailable evidence in support

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of his motion to reopen and reconsider. Since he did not meet the heavy burden

required to warrant reopening proceedings before the IJ, the BIA denied his motion.

II. Appeal of Final Order of Removal

Guled petitions this court for review of the BIA's final order of removal, which

affirmed the IJ's decision finding him removable and denying his applications for

cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

Convention Against Torture. He argues: (1) legal errors committed by the IJ and BIA

violated his due process rights; (2) the IJ misapplied the balancing test used to

determine whether cancellation of removal is appropriate; (3) the IJ abused its

discretion in denying his claim for asylum and in "failing to consider" his claims for

withholding of removal and relief under Article III of the Convention Against Torture.

A. Standard of Review

When the Court reviews a BIA determination regarding eligibility for asylum,

withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against Torture, the

substantial evidence standard is utilized. See Diallo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 451, 454

(8th Cir. 2007). Such is an "extremely deferential standard of review." Id. (citing

Salkeld v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 804, 809 (8th Cir. 2005)). The INA, as amended by the

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, states the court of

appeals is to decide the petition for review of a final order of removal "only on the

administrative record on which the order of removal is based." 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(A). It also provides “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive

unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The Attorney General's discretionary decision not to grant

asylum – delegated to the IJ, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(a) – is conclusive unless “manifestly

contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D). The

burden of proof is on the applicant to establish eligibility for relief, and the alien may

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sustain this burden by his own testimony, if credible. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(a),

1208.16(b) & 1208.16(c)(2).

B. Cancellation of Removal

Guled appeals the BIA's order denying his application for cancellation of

removal, arguing misapplication of law and a violation of his due process rights. An

alien may apply for relief in the form of cancellation of removal if he meets the

requirements set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Once an alien has cleared the nondiscretionary legal requirements for eligibility, the IJ makes a discretionary

determination whether the alien merits the relief of cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b). The decision to grant cancellation of removal is a discretionary act by the

Attorney General which this Court may not review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). We

may review the non-discretionary determinations underlying such a decision, such as

the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in

determining an individual's eligibility. Reyes-Vasquez v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 903, 906

(8th Cir. 2005). We may also review constitutional claims or questions of law. 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

It is undisputed Guled met the eligibility requirements set out in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b). He appeals the IJ's non-reviewable discretionary determination he did not

merit relief. He argues his appeal of the denial of cancellation of removal is properly

before this Court because he brings a constitutional claim, arguing the IJ deprived him

of his Fifth Amendment right to due process by allowing a witness to testify without

giving him proper notice. We do not have jurisdiction to review the denial of

cancellation of removal on this basis.

Cancellation of removal is a discretionary remedy, roughly equivalent to

executive clemency, over which the executive branch has unfettered discretion. INS

v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30 (1996). Because adjustment of status amounts to a power

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to dispense mercy, an alien can have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in

such speculative relief and cannot state a claim for a violation of due process rights.

Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 585 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Nativi-Gomez v.

Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2003)). "The failure to receive discretionary

adjustment-of-status relief does not constitute the deprivation of a

constitutionally-protected liberty interest." Nativi-Gomez, 344 F.3d at 808. For this

reason, Guled cannot state a claim for a violation of due process rights.

Guled further argues his appeal of the denial of cancellation of removal is

properly before this Court because the IJ misapplied the legal standard when making

its discretionary determination; he argues this is a reviewable question of law. He

agrees the IJ and BIA each applied the appropriate standard, as outlined in Matter of

Marin, 16 I&N Dec. at 584-85, but argues the IJ improperly weighed the factors in the

proper balancing test. Despite his characterization of the appeal as a question of law,

what he challenges is the discretionary conclusion of not meriting a favorable exercise

of discretion. This Court does not have jurisdiction to review the denial of

cancellation of removal on such a basis. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).

C. Asylum

Guled also appeals the denial of his application for asylum. He first argues the

IJ erred by discounting several critical parts of his testimony and asks this Court to

determine the IJ did not have valid grounds on which to conclude he was not credible.

The IJ found the testimony relating to Guled's clan membership, which is the

heart of his asylum claim, to be substantively inconsistent. Substantive

inconsistencies on key issues of an asylum claim can support an adverse credibility

finding. See Hong Zhang Cao v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 657, 661 (8th Cir. 2006). Where

an adverse credibility finding is at the heart of an alien's asylum claim, such credibility

determination can be dispositive as to whether the alien merits asylum. See Sheikh

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v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1077, 1080-81 (8th Cir. 2005); Jalloh v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d

894, 898-99 (8th Cir. 2005).

"[A]n IJ making a credibility determination must give reasons that are specific

enough that a reviewing court can appreciate the reasoning behind the decision and

cogent enough that a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to reach the

contrary conclusion." Chen v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 4482184, at *3 (8th

Cir. Dec. 26, 2007) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Singh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d

553, 557-58 (8th Cir. 2007)). Our review of the record confirms the discrepancies

described by the IJ are actually present and provide cogent reasons to conclude his

testimony was not credible. As the IJ noted, he did not provide a "convincing

explanation for the discrepancies" in the record regarding his clan membership. The

evidence was not so strong that any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to

conclude he belonged to the Madhiban clan and had a well-founded fear of

persecution. We see no reason to disturb the IJ's adverse credibility determination.

Guled next argues the IJ erroneously concluded he was ineligible for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We

disagree. The IJ found he did not qualify for asylum because he could not credibly

demonstrate as to being a refugee within the meaning of Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the

INA. Since substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the IJ's findings

he could not prove being a refugee and could not prove a well-founded fear of

persecution, we cannot say the IJ's decision to deny his application for asylum was

manifestly contrary to law or an abuse of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).

D. Withholding of Removal

An application for asylum automatically includes a request for withholding of

removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(b); see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 420 n.13 (1984). An

alien may not be removed if the alien shows there is a clear probability his “life or

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freedom would be threatened in [the alien's] country because of the alien's race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The standard for withholding of removal is a clear

probability of persecution, which is more rigorous than the well-founded fear standard

for asylum. Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 2004); Wondmneh v.

Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 2004). Therefore, an alien who cannot meet

the standard for asylum cannot meet the standard for establishing withholding of

removal. Ngure, 367 F.3d at 992. Accordingly, having found Guled failed to meet

the well-founded fear of persecution standard for asylum, we conclude the BIA did

not err in concluding he could not meet the standard for withholding of removal.

E. Convention Against Torture

An applicant seeking relief under the Convention Against Torture bears the

burden of establishing "it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if

removed to the proposed country of removal." 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Ngure, 367

F.3d at 992. Although the IJ's adverse credibility determination and adverse decisions

on asylum and withholding of removal are not determinative of a Convention Against

Torture claim, Guled has not met his burden. The record contains no evidence that

would establish any government would have reason to torture him. For the reasons

he failed to carry his burden for asylum and withholding of removal, he likewise fails

to carry his burden for relief under the Convention Against Torture.

Guled argues the IJ erred by not independently analyzing his claim for relief

under Article III of the Convention Against Torture. A separate analysis, however,

is required only when there is evidence the alien may be tortured for reasons unrelated

to his claims for asylum and withholding of removal. Alemu v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d

572, 576 (8th Cir. 2005). Guled does not point to any evidence in the record, nor have

we found any, which indicates he may be tortured for reasons unrelated to his claims

for asylum and withholding of removal. Thus, we conclude the BIA did not err.

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III. Appeal of Motion to Reopen and Reconsider

Guled also appeals the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen and reconsider.

A. Standard of Review

We review the BIA's decision denying a motion to reopen and reconsider for

an abuse of discretion. Habchy v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2006). The

BIA's discretion in deciding such motions is “broad,” since motions to reopen are

disfavored because they undermine the government's legitimate interest in finality,

which is heightened in removal proceedings “where, as a general matter, every delay

works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the

United States.” INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). The BIA abuses its

discretion where it gives no rational explanation for its decision, departs from its

established policies without explanation, relies on impermissible factors or legal error,

or ignores or distorts the record evidence. See Habchy, 471 F.3d at 861-62; Miranda

v. INS, 51 F.3d 767, 768-69 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding no abuse of

discretion where findings were a “reasonable interpretation” of record and did not

ignore or distort evidence).

B. Discussion

Guled argues it was an error of law for the BIA to rule he did not meet his

burden to show the proceedings should be reopened. He submitted additional

documentary evidence, which offered new material facts which were not available at

the prior hearing, to show he was a member of the Madhiban clan. This evidence

included affidavits from his family and a letter from a Somali organization supporting

his claims. He explains this evidence was not previously available because he was not

afforded an opportunity to supplement the record after the IJ and BIA determined the

evidence he first offered was insufficient.

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A motion to reopen must present “new facts that are material to the outcome of

the proceeding and were neither available nor discoverable at the prior hearing.”

Fongwo v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 944, 947 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3)). Motions

to reopen should only be granted if the new evidence presented "could not by the

exercise of due diligence have been discovered earlier." Fongwo, 430 F.3d at 947

(quoting Krougliak v. INS, 289 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2002)) (finding petitioner's

failure to provide certain evidence at the prior hearing because of his attorney's advice

did not render the evidence new, unavailable, and undiscoverable). The law expects

the applicant will present the strongest evidence at the outset and does not give him

another chance to bolster the record with evidence available earlier, but which he

decided to hold back. See Hailemichael v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 878, 883-84 (8th Cir.

2006) (stating "evidence that could have been gathered before the initial hearing does

not meet the regulation's requirement that a motion to reopen be supported with

evidence that was 'not available and could not have been discovered or presented at

the former hearing.'") (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3)); Eta-Ndu v. Gonzales, 411

F.3d 977, 987 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming BIA's denial of motion to reopen because

petitioner did not present new evidence and rejecting petitioner's explanation that he

did not present the "new" evidence earlier because he did not realize the current

evidence was insufficient until the IJ issued it's decision). Guled's additional evidence

did not meet the regulation's requirement because it was available to him earlier and

could have been presented at the initial hearing. The BIA did not abuse its discretion

when it ruled he had not presented any new material evidence to warrant reopening

the proceedings.

IV. Conclusion

We find the BIA's explanation for its decision to be rational and in accordance

with established policy. We find its interpretation of the record to be reasonable and

find no legal error in its reasoning or conclusions. We therefore conclude the BIA did

not abuse its discretion in denying Guled's motion to reopen and reconsider. 

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For the foregoing reasons, we deny Guled's petition for review.

______________________________

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