Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01309/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01309-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald C. Ridley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1309

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DONALD C. RIDLEY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:13‐CR‐30084‐DRH‐002 — David R. Herndon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 9, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 13, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and

PALLMEYER, District Judge.



HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. A jury found appellant Donald

Ridley guilty on several felony charges for participating in a

bank robbery. On appeal he challenges his convictions on

three separate grounds: the sufficiency of the evidence that he

                                                  

The Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer of the Northern District of Illi‐

nois, sitting by designation.

Case: 15-1309 Document: 41 Filed: 06/13/2016 Pages: 14
2 No. 15‐1309

brandished a firearm during the robbery; admission of an FBI

agent’s lay testimony regarding cell phone tracking infor‐

mation; and the district court’s supplemental instruction to ju‐

rors when they said they were at an impasse. We affirm.

I. The Bank Robbery

On the morning of May 7, 2008, two men staged an armed

robbery of the Farmers & Merchants Bank in Hoyleton, Illi‐

nois. The robbers entered the bank dressed all in black, wear‐

ing ski masks, and carrying guns. One robber held employees

and customers at gunpoint while the other went to the bank’s

vault and took about $115,000 in cash.

A key witness to the robbery was Cathy Michelle Livesay,

who had arrived at the bank on May 7 for just her third day

of work as a teller. She testified that each robber carried a

black handgun resembling a 9‐millimeter pistol. Livesay also

caught a glimpse of the getaway vehicle, a “bluish purple

Ford.” Once the robbers had driven off, she called her hus‐

band and told him of the robbery, the getaway car, and the

direction the suspects were headed. Her husband was able to

place himself along the getaway route and saw a Ford Ranger

matching the description his wife had given him and driving

at high speed. He noted the license plate number as the sus‐

pects sped past. He lost track of the Ranger as it drove on

Route 127 headed in the direction of Liberty School Road.

Earlier that day, at 3:30 a.m., a Liberty School Road resi‐

dent named Dennis Windler had awoken and looked out his

bedroom window. To his surprise, he noticed a truck and a car

driving slowly in tandem down Liberty School Road. He tes‐

tified that the truck was a blue pick‐up and that the car was a

light color and damaged along its side. He returned to bed.

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No. 15‐1309 3

Later that morning, he was tending to his farming and saw

that the same truck he had seen earlier was now parked in a

nearby field. He investigated with his neighbor, Dennis Witte,

and discovered the truck was empty and had no license

plates.

An hour or two later, Windler returned to discover the

truck was gone but the same car—which Windler described

as painted white—was now parked in the same location.

Along with Witte, Windler noted the license plate number of

the car and returned home. A short time after that, Windler

returned to find the blue truck back in the field, and he heard

police sirens in the distance heading for Hoyleton. He also

saw the damaged white car from earlier, but this time it was

occupied. Windler tried to stop the car, but it sped past him.

He then inspected the truck. The doors were flung open and

the interior was covered in pink dye. Windler immediately

understood what had happened: “Uh‐oh. Bank robbery.” A dye

pack in the stolen cash had exploded in the truck. Windler and

Witte called the police.

The FBI quickly learned the truck had been stolen from a

dealer in Belleville, Illinois, near the home of Donald Ridley’s

grandmother. The white car’s license plate was registered to

Ridley. DNA evidence gathered from the truck matched Rid‐

ley. Officers located and spoke to Ridley, who denied involve‐

ment and claimed he had spent the day with his cousin Terry

Smith. When officers talked with Smith about his story, he ad‐

mitted that Ridley had asked him to cover for him. Smith also

revealed that he had spent the evening of May 6 with Ridley

and an acquaintance named Joe Johnson.

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Faced with mounting evidence, Johnson turned on Ridley

and admitted that they were the Hoyleton robbers. He re‐

vealed details of the scheme: on the morning of the robbery,

he and Ridley each brought gloves, a change of clothes, and

something to obscure their faces. They planned vehicle swaps

consistent with Livesay’s and Windler’s observations. John‐

son also said that during the robbery, he held customers and

employees at gunpoint while Ridley entered the bank vault to

steal the money.

Just before the fifth anniversary of the robbery, a federal

grand jury indicted Ridley for armed bank robbery and re‐

lated charges. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found

Ridley guilty of armed bank robbery, brandishing a firearm in

relation to a crime of violence, making false statements to a

federal law enforcement officer, and obstruction of justice.

Ridley was sentenced to 246 months in prison and five years

of supervised release and was ordered to pay $115,000 in res‐

titution.

II. Evidence of Brandishing  

On appeal, Ridley contends first that the evidence was not

sufficient to convict him for brandishing a firearm in relation

to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting a criminal conviction, we ask “whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prose‐

cution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also United States v. John‐

son, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010) (in reviewing sufficiency

challenge, “we view all evidence and draw all reasonable in‐

ferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution”).  

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No. 15‐1309 5

The jury heard conflicting testimony about whether Rid‐

ley carried and displayed a firearm during the bank robbery.

As noted, teller Livesay testified that both robbers carried fire‐

arms where she could see them. A bank customer, Kimberly

Connelly, described the robbers and also testified that each

carried a firearm, one of which appeared to be a heavy, black

pistol. Ridley’s partner Johnson, however, testified that Ridley

had not possessed or brandished a firearm during the rob‐

bery.

Ridley argues that Johnson’s “unequivocal” testimony that

Ridley did not have a firearm undermines the conviction for

possession and brandishing. Because the government did not

challenge Johnson’s truthfulness as a witness and used some

of his statements to its advantage, Ridley argues, the govern‐

ment implicitly endorsed all of Johnson’s testimony and is

stuck with his assertion that Ridley did not carry a gun. Rid‐

ley contends that the conflicting testimony as to whether he

carried and brandished a firearm must therefore be resolved

entirely in Johnson’s and thus Ridley’s favor.

We disagree. The government is not necessarily stuck, as a

matter of law, with every detail of a cooperating witness’s tes‐

timony. Under the general standard of Jackson v. Virginia, the

jury could reasonably decide to credit Livesay’s and Con‐

nelly’s testimony that both robbers carried and displayed fire‐

arms. Theirtestimony on that point is legally sufficient to con‐

vict Ridley on the brandishing charge. Where plausible (i.e.,

not impossible) witness testimony conflicts, it is the jury’s role

to resolve those conflicts. E.g., United States v. Hodges, 315 F.3d

794, 799 (7th Cir. 2003), citing United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d

937, 942 (7th Cir. 1998). The jury had sufficient grounds to

credit the testimony of the teller and customer over the word

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6 No. 15‐1309

of Ridley’s partner in crime and to find that Ridley actually

possessed and brandished a firearm during the robbery.

III. Cell Phone Location Testimony

Ridley also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because

the district judge allowed a non‐expert FBI agent to testify

about a map showing the locations of Ridley’s and Johnson’s

cell phones the day before and day of the robbery. The defense

did not object to the testimony at trial, however. We find no

plain error.

As part of the investigation, the FBI obtained the cell

phone records for Ridley and Johnson. The records showed

that Ridley’s phone was in southern Illinois near Hoyleton in

the early hours of May 7. Johnson’s phone records showed a

similar pattern. Ridley and Johnson had also called each other

several times on May 6 and 7.

Special Agent Dolan, who has special technical training in

interpreting the raw data provided in the cell records, used

those records to create a map that showed call locations. The

finished map was intended to be, as FBI Special Agent Nich‐

olas Manns put it colorfully, “agent‐proof,” that is, clear

enough that technical expertise would not be required to ex‐

plain or understand it. The government presented the evi‐

dence not through Dolan but through Manns.

Manns testified that “the records provide what we call cell

site data, which ... when we use the phone it touches towers

and the towers transfer, etc., so we’re able to tell from those

towers where the phone” was located. Manns added that the

“FBI has specialized agents that are very good at analyzing

these phone records,” but also noted that the records were

“pretty self‐explanatory.” Manns also said he was “not real

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No. 15‐1309 7

tech savvy” but that the map was easy to understand. The

map was then admitted into evidence without objection.

Manns explained the map and various cell locations on May

6 and 7 placing Ridley’s cell phone in the vicinity of the rob‐

bery. Again, the defense did not object.

When a party makes a timely objection to admitting evi‐

dence, we review the decision for abuse of discretion, giving

considerable deference to the trial judge on the spot. E.g.,

United States v. Wantuch, 525 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2008). But

because Ridley did not object to this testimony by Agent

Manns, we review only for plain error. United States v. Chris‐

tian, 673 F.3d 702, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2012) (also involving Agent

Manns, coincidentally). This means Ridley must demonstrate

an obvious and prejudicial error that caused a “miscarriage of

justice, in the sense of seriously affecting the fairness, integ‐

rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 708,

quoting United States v. Orr, 622 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2010);

see generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993);

United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).

In challenging this testimony by Agent Manns, the defense

had two principal strategies available at trial. First, it could

raise no objection but then challenge Manns’ credibility and

expertise on cross‐examination and in closing argument.

That’s what happened. Ridley’s lawyer questioned Manns as

to inferences he was drawing from the cell phone location

data, trying to inject doubt into his testimony. That strategy

did not work, and we assume that Manns’ testimony contrib‐

uted to the jury’s guilty verdicts.

With the benefit of hindsight, Ridley now wants a chance

to try the second strategy that was available at trial: try to ex‐

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8 No. 15‐1309

clude the testimony by Agent Manns by challenging his qual‐

ifications. It’s not hard to understand, though, why a trial at‐

torney would not make this objection. If it had been sustained,

the government could have fixed the problem easily by call‐

ing Agent Dolan, who prepared the map and had more tech‐

nical expertise. The defense then would have had to try to

challenge a better qualified witness. By allowing the defense

to pursue its own strategy on this point, rather than interven‐

ing to bar some of Agent Manns’ testimony, the district court

did not commit a plain error.

We have addressed similar problems in cases raising Con‐

frontation Clause issues for the first time on appeal. For ex‐

ample, in United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008), a

defendant raised a Crawford challenge to a government wit‐

ness’s testimony relaying a colleague’s findings. See Crawford

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). We found no plain error, ex‐

plaining that a proper objection against this witness’s testi‐

mony would have left the defendant worse off because the

government then could easily have produced the better qual‐

ified colleague who could speak directly to technical aspects

of the trial with greater authority. Moon, 512 F.3d at 361. And

when the defense chooses not to seek the readily available fix

for the arguable evidentiary problem, enabling the defense to

cross‐examine the less credible witness, we are especially re‐

luctant to find plain error when that strategy does not pay off.

See United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 728 (7th Cir. 2013)

(determining that there was no plain error if “it may be to de‐

fendants’ advantage to accept the hearsay version of evidence

... . The lack of a demand for testimony by an available de‐

clarant leads to the conclusion that the appellate argument is

strategic rather than sincere.”), quoting Moon, 512 F.3d at 361.

See also Melendez‐Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 328

Case: 15-1309 Document: 41 Filed: 06/13/2016 Pages: 14
No. 15‐1309 9

(2009) (“It is unlikely that defense counsel will insist on live

testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than

cast doubt upon the forensic analysis.”). Allowing Agent

Manns’ testimony was not a plain error.1

IV. Jury Instruction

After four days of evidence, the jury began deliberations.

The jury instructions included the standard instruction from

United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc),

about seeking a unanimous verdict. After deliberating just a

few hours, the jury sent a note to the court: “Judge Herndon,

The jury is stuck on a verdict and cannot come to a unanimous

agreement. What should the jury do? Do we wait until a unan‐

imous agreement is reached? Or is there another option for

the jury?” Ridley’s lawyer asked for a mistrial, which the court

denied.

The judge proposed instead that the following note be sent

to the jury: “The Court requests that the jury continue in their

deliberations in an effort to reach a unanimous verdict.” Nei‐

ther side objected, and the judge sent the note to the jury. Later

that day, the jury returned with its guilty verdicts.

Ridley argues on appeal that the judge erred by respond‐

ing to the jury’s note about an impasse by failing to give a full

                                                  1

Ridley also argues on appeal that Agent Dolan’s map of cell phone

locations was inadmissible hearsay. He did not raise this objection at trial,

and in fact, his counsel affirmatively stated “No objection” to the map’s

admission. This intentional choice not to object amounted to waiver.

United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 415–16 (7th Cir. 2001). If we consid‐

ered the possibility of a plain error, our reasoning would track our analy‐

sis of Agent Manns’ testimony.

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10 No. 15‐1309

Silvern instruction. Silvern was a response to decades of de‐

bates in the wake of Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896),

in which the Supreme Court upheld a supplemental jury in‐

struction that “encouraged the jurors to reconsider their indi‐

vidual positions” in the face of a deadlocked jury. United States

v. Collins, 223 F.3d 502, 508–09 (7th Cir. 2000) (summarizing

development of Silvern).

Recognizing the risk that an Allen instruction could un‐

duly pressure some jurors to go along with a majority merely

for the sake of unanimity, we adopted in Silvern a standard

script for judges to offer juries. Id. The script was meant pri‐

marily as a safe harbor to help minimize appeals of instruc‐

tions to divided juries “in the interest of judicial economy and

uniformity.” Silvern, 484 F.2d at 882–83. But the script was not

only a safe harbor. We warned in Silvern: “If in any jury trial

tried after thirty (30) days from this opinion a supplemental

instruction relating to a deadlock is given other than in the

above form, a resulting conviction will be reversed and re‐

manded for a new trial.” Id. at 883. Ridley argues that in re‐

sponse to the jury’s note, the district court was permitted only

to repeat the Silvern language without deviation.2  

                                                  2 The full text of the Silvern instruction reads:

The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each

juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each ju‐

ror agree thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous.

It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to

deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can

do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you

must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an im‐

partial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors.

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No. 15‐1309 11

Silvern itself, however, did not address issues of waiver or

plain error. Because Ridley did not object at trial, we review

the judge’s response to the jury note only for plain error. Fed.

R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Rodriguez, 67 F.3d 1312, 1320

(7th Cir. 1995) (reviewing instructions deviating from Silvern

for plain error where no objection was made); United States v.

Allen, 797 F.2d 1395, 1400 (7th Cir. 1986) (same). To show a

plain error, as noted above, Ridley must demonstrate that “(1)

there was error, (2) it was plain rather than subject to reason‐

able dispute, (3) it affected his substantial rights, and (4) the

court should exercise its discretion to correct the error because

it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputa‐

tion of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d

1038, 1045 (7th Cir. 2016).

We find no plain error. Despite the strong language in Sil‐

vern itself, quoted above, we have rejected the hard‐and‐fast

approach to Silvern that Ridley advocates. E.g., Collins, 223

                                                 

In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reex‐

amine your own views and change your opinion if convinced

it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction

as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the

opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of re‐

turning a verdict.

You are not partisans. You are judges—judges of the facts.

Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence

in the case.

484 F.2d at 883. This court’s pattern jury instructions for both criminal and

civil cases have made stylistic changes to this formula. See Pattern Crimi‐

nal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 7.03 (2012); Federal Civil Jury

Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 1.34 (2015), which are both available at

www.ca7.uscourts.gov.

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12 No. 15‐1309

F.3d at 509 (“Any deviation from Silvern is not necessarily re‐

versible error.”); Rodriguez, 67 F.3d at 1319–20 (“[W]e have not

required trial courts to replicate the approved [Silvern] lan‐

guage with no deviation.”). At least when a defendant does

not object to the phrasing of a supplemental jury instruction,

our inquiry “is not whether the trial court recited the ap‐

proved language with perfect accuracy, but rather whether

the judge’s departure from the approved language changed

the balance struck by the approved language in such a way as

to be more coercive of unanimity.” Id. at 1320.3

Our primary concern in such cases is whether the court’s

instructions “pressured the jury to surrender their honest

opinions for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.” United

States v. Crotteau, 218 F.3d 826, 835 (7th Cir. 2000), quoting

United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 489 (7th Cir. 1992). The

judge’s response to the jury note did not do that. It merely re‐

quested that the jury continue to deliberate. The response did

not require continued deliberations and did no more than en‐

courage the jury to reach a unanimous verdict, as the full Sil‐

vern instruction had done a few hours earlier as part of the

complete set of jury instructions.

In United States v. Degraffenried, 339 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2003),

we confronted a nearly identical response to a jury note. The

                                                  3 We reject Ridley’s assertion that his lawyer did object to the jury in‐

structions. His lawyer moved for a mistrial on the ground that the jury

seemed deadlocked. Not surprisingly, the judge denied that motion, com‐

ing as it did so early in deliberations. The judge then consulted both coun‐

sel as to the wording of the instruction. Ridley’s lawyer made a wording

suggestion that the judge adopted. The defense made no further objection,

though the judge asked for suggestions a second time, and neither side

asked the court to give further Silvern instructions.

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No. 15‐1309 13

judge had given the full Silvern instruction before delibera‐

tions began, and the jury sent a note indicating it was dead‐

locked. The judge sent the jury a note reading: “Members of

the jury, I’ve read your note. Please continue deliberations.”

We held this to be non‐coercive, neutral, and “entirely

proper.” Id. at 579–81.    

The judge’s response here was similarly neutral, like other

instructions we have found acceptable. For instance, a judge

may request that a jury continue to deliberate without provid‐

ing the full Silvern instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Smith,

818 F.3d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 2016) (note to jury saying “each of

you is part of the jury that has been picked to decide this case.

Each of you must continue to deliberate.”); Kramer, 955 F.2d at

489 (note to jury said only “Continue your deliberations.”);

United States v. D’Antonio, 801 F.2d 979, 983–84 (7th Cir. 1986)

(note to jury saying “Please continue your deliberations. I

shall call you into the courtroom at 4:30 p.m.”). This is not the

rare case where the instruction is coercive in context. See

United States v. Blitch, 622 F.3d 658, 669–71 (7th Cir. 2010) (re‐

manding for new trial where, after poll revealed jury was one

vote short of unanimity, district judge instructed jury to con‐

tinue deliberating toward unanimous verdict even though

jury had previously been told they could leave early that day).

There is no doubt that a defendant has a constitutional

right to an impartial, uncoerced jury. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484

U.S. 231, 241 (1988); Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 535 (7th Cir.

1999). But as we explained in United States v. Sblendorio, our

Silvern instruction is a supervisory rule with no “constitu‐

tional overtones.” 830 F.2d 1382, 1388 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting

that Silvern instructions are within the constitutional bounds

set by the stronger Allen instructions). The model instruction

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14 No. 15‐1309

was designed “in the interest of the effective administration

of justice,” as a method of eliminating excess litigation by de‐

fendants challenging jury instructions. Id. The Silvern model

was not intended as an indispensable safeguard of constitu‐

tional rights, and there is no “right” to receive a Silvern in‐

struction, especially when the defense does not ask for it. Id.;

see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (“viola‐

tions of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not violate the

constitutional rights of any person”).

In addition, to show plain error, a defendant must show

that the error was prejudicial, resulting in a miscarriage of jus‐

tice. See United States v. Williams, 552 F.3d 592, 593–94 (7th Cir.

2009). The judge’s neutral response to the jury in this case was

not prejudicial for the reasons explained above. The district

court did not commit plain error by requesting, in language

approved by counsel for both sides, that the jury continue de‐

liberations.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  

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