Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03032/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03032-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clyde A. Townsend
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN '7 m~1 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L lfOECRER. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CLYDE A. TOWNSEND, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Clerk 

No. 90-3032 

(D. Kansas) 

(D.C. 89-20055-01) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Clyde E. Townsend, a county commissioner of Wyandotte County, 

Kansas, was convicted of extorting $5,000.00 under color of 

official right, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1951 (1984), in connection with the award of three county contracts for parking lot 

repairs. On appeal Townsend contends he is entitled to a new 

trial because of the following alleged errors which occurred 

during the trial of this case: (1) The district court erred in 

allowing the government to introduce evidence which improperly 

vouched for the credibility of government witness Edward A. 

Childs; (2) the government improperly cross-examined Townsend 

about prior "bump-ups" and kick-backs; and, (3) the district court 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

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erred by not giving limiting instructions with respect to Rule 

404(b) evidence. In addition, Townsend contends that he was 

denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 

counsel because of his trial counsel's failure to object in the 

first two instances listed above, and his failure to request a 

limiting instruction with respect to the third instance listed 

above. 

BACKGROUND 

The government's theory of the case, upon which the jury 

apparently based its decision, is as follows: Early in 1984 

Townsend colluded with Curtis Fairley of Fairley Construction 

Company to award county parking lot repair work on three lots to 

Fairley Construction in exchange for a kick-back of $5,000.00. To 

avoid statutory competitive bidding requirements for work exceeding $10,000.00, 1 the work was broken into three contracts--one for 

each lot--for the respective amounts of $8,250.59, $9,717.05, and 

$9,971.00. Fairley caused individual bids to be submitted in 

these respective amounts on different dates, March 1, 7, and 14, 

1984, so each bid would be separately considered at different 

county commission meetings. The bids were purposely inflated over 

the amount Fairley Construction would normally charge for the 

work--a process known as "bump-ups"--with the understanding that 

the excess was to be kicked back to Townsend. The work was 

awarded to Fairley Construction as bid. 

1 Under a Kansas statute, contracts under $10,000.00 are 

awarded on a non-bid basis. Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 19-214(a) (1988). 

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• Curtis Fairley unexpectedly died in March, 1984, after which 

Fairley Construction was operated by Edward A. Childs, formerly 

the vice-president of the company. Following Fairley's death, 

Townsend had two private meetings with Childs in which Townsend 

solicited a $5,000.00 cash kick-back in connection with the three 

repair contracts, indicating that this had been the agreement with 

Fairley. R. Vol. II at 149-150; Trial Transcript Vol. I at 143-

2 44, 146. Childs agreed. R. Vol. II at 150, 152-53. Subsequently, Townsend asked Childs to come to the Wyandotte County 

Courthouse where he introduced Childs to Tom Mauldin, a county 

employee under Townsend's supervision. Trial Transcript Vol. I at 

195-96. Townsend indicated to Childs that Mauldin would receive 

the $5,000.00 payment for Townsend. Id. When Childs obtained the 

$5,000.00 he called Townsend who told him to meet Mauldin at a 

certain parking lot. Id. at 201. Childs met Mauldin as directed 

and gave him an envelope containing fifty $100.00 bills. Id. at 

203. Mauldin delivered the cash to Townsend. R. Vol. III at 429-

30. Townsend's partial defense of campaign contribution was not 

substantiated by Townsend's campaign accounts. Trial Transcript 

Vol. III at 709, 712. 

The defendant, however, views the case differently and vigorously argues his theory on appeal. Townsend does not contest that 

Fairley Construction was awarded the contracts, but he states that 

2 In its brief, the government made numerous references to the 

trial transcript. Inexplicably, the government has failed to 

designate all referenced pages for the record on appeal. However, 

since Townsend does not contest the accuracy of any of these 

references in his reply brief, we take the government's recitations of the trial transcript as true. 

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he had no knowledge that the bids were inflated and did not 

receive any related kickback. R. Vol. IV at 624-27, 629-30. He 

claims that he met with Childs at his home at Childs's request. 

Id. at 643. At that meeting, Childs asked Fairley to help him 

with problems .he was having at Fairley Construction with Curtis 

Fairley's sister. Id. at 646. Townsend then gave Childs 40-50 

fundraising tickets to sell for him. Id. at 648. Townsend 

contends that any money transferred between Childs and Mauldin was 

payment for those tickets and not a kickback. Appellant's Brief 

at 13. 

Defense counsel attempted to discredit Childs's testimony by 

establishing that he embezzled $11,000.00 from Fairley Construction Company which he funneled through to Suburban Company, 

purportedly to pay the $5,000.00 kickback. He intended to show 

that Childs has now benefitted from this payment to Suburban, 

however indirectly, as an employee and a 40% owner. R. Vol. II at 

218-21. To cover up his own misdealings, Childs then blamed 

Townsend of accepting a kickback. R. Vol. IV at 798. 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

LETTER REGARDING IMMUNITY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS 

During the direct examination of Edward Childs, government 

counsel introduced, without objection, a letter dated February 7, 

1989, signed by Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney 

for the District of Kansas, written to Thomas M. Bradshaw, 

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Childs's attorney. The letter contained the following paragraph, 

the underlined portion of which Childs read to the jury: 

Therefore, as Mr. Streepy has informed me that you 

contacted him requesting a grant of immunity for Mr. 

Childs in this matter, I am writing to advise you that 

immunity is not appropriate to this case for the simple 

reason that Mr. Childs has never been suspected of 

violating any criminal laws of the United States. Of 

course, my statement that this office has no intention 

to prosecute Mr. Childs is being based upon his truthful 

cooperation with the FBI, and, of course, should the FBI 

discover through subsequent investigation that Mr. 

Childs has not been truthful, this nonprosecution letter 

would not be binding upon the United States Attorney for 

the District of Kansas or his successor, and we would 

take whatever action we deem appropriate under the 

circumstances. 

R. Vol. II at 96-98 (emphasis added). No further reference was 

made to the letter during the trial. 

Townsend contends that admission of the letter constituted 

improper government vouching for the credibility of its own witness. See United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1498 (10th Cir. 

1990) ("It is error for the prosecution to personally vouch for 

the credibility of its witnesses."). The government responds that 

it is permissible to introduce plea or cooperation agreements 

which contain a commitment by the witness to tell the truth. Id. 

at 1499 ("[A]lthough the agreement contains an obligation to tell 

the truth, the witness may be testifying solely to obtain the 

benefits of the cooperation agreement."). 

The letter constituted improper vouching. Contrary to the 

government's argument, there is a difference between an agreement 

stating that the witness must speak truthfully in order to be 

granted leniency in his own prosecution and a one-sided endorsement of the good character of the witness. Unlike situations 

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involving plea or cooperation agreements, there was no implied 

coercion in Childs's testimony, no exchange of testimony for 

leniency or freedom from prosecution, no pressure on Childs to 

testify in a manner favorable to the prosecution to benefit 

himself. The letter tended solely to vouch for his credibility 

and innocence and was not counterbalanced by simultaneously establishing a motive to lie. The government advanced no substantial 

reason for the introduction of the letter in question, either in 

its brief or at oral argument where government counsel was 

expressly quizzed on the point. Accordingly, we conclude that it 

was error to admit the letter into evidence. 

However, because no objection was made to the introduction of 

the letter, the standard of review on appeal is plain error. Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 52(b). "Plain error is 'fundamental error, something 

so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice 

cannot have been done.'" United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 

1397 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Coppola, 486 F.2d 

882, 884 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974)) 

(emphasis in original). 3 Applying this standard, we conclude that 

3 The government argues that the plain error standard of review 

is that of sufficiency of the evidence, "the evidence -- both 

direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom -- is sufficient if, when taken in the light 

most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," citing our recent 

decision in United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 

1990). However, this is a mischaracterization of the case and the 

plain error standard. The defendant in that case failed to renew 

his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of all 

evidence. Although we reviewed for plain error, we acknowledged 

that the standard actually applied was essentially the same as if 

there had been a timely motion for acquittal. We did not purport 

to alter the application of the plain error standard in other 

types of cases such as the one before us now. 

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introduction of the letter did not constitute plain error. Doubtless, as Townsend argues at great length, Childs's testimony was 

very important to the government's case. Townsend's elaborate 

recitation of the evidence and conflicts in evidence is offered to 

support Townsend's position that at best this was a very close 

case which could well have turned on the support that the letter 

in question gave to Child's credibility. We disagree. There was 

ample circumstantial evidence, as well as the testimony of such 

witnesses as Tom Mauldin and George Andrisevic (who testified, 

among other things, that Townsend told him to inform Childs that 

Townsend wanted his money, R. Vol. III at 477), to support the 

government's case. Furthermore, the government did not refer to 

the letter after its introduction, including any mention of the 

letter in closing argument to the jury. Under these circumstances 

it is impossible to say that Townsend would have been acquitted if 

the letter had not been introduced. 

II. 

CROSS-EXAMINATION REGARDING PAST ACTS 

Townsend testified in his own defense at trial. During 

cross-examination government counsel asked the following 

questions, without objection from defense counsel: 

Q: (Prosecution): In 1983 a very similar pattern, 

wasn't there, Mr. Townsend? 

A: (Appellant): I don't know. This is the first time 

I've seen this. 

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Q: (Prosecution): But the point is, Mr. Townsend, you 

needed Fairley Construction to get these little contracts because then you could extort kickbacks, correct? 

A: (Appellant): Wrong. No, ma'am. 

Qi (Prosecution): You did it in 1984, didn't you? 

A: (Appellant): No, ma'am. 

Q: (Prosecution): Did you do it in 1983? 

A: (Appellant): No, ma'am. 

R. Vol. IV at 675-77. 

On appeal Townsend argues that this questioning constituted 

an improper accusation of wrongdoing and bad acts evidence, 

inadmissible under either Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), 4 or 404(b). 5 He 

states: 

4 

5 

[T)he 1983 bump-up and kickback accusations were 

improper under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) because there was no 

evidence of appellant's involvement in the 1983 bump-ups 

or kickbacks. 

Furthermore, appellant believes that the 1983 bump-up 

and kickback accusations were improper under 404(b) 

because "there was no evidence from which the jury could 

reasonably infer" that appellant was involved in 1983 

Rule 608(b) states, in part, that: 

[s)pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for 

the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' 

credibility ... may not be proved by extrinsic 

evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the 

court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, 

be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness. 

Rule 404(b) states: 

[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

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bump-ups or that there was [sic] any 1983 kickbacks, and 

because appellant's "denials were not contradicted by 

any government evidence, only by the skepticism of the 

prosecutor." (quoting United States v. DeGeratto, 876 

F.2d 576, 585 (7th Cir. 1989)). 

Brief of Appellant at 39-40. 

We are unpersuaded that the brief questioning of Townsend 

about illegal contracts in 1983 was improper, and it certainly did 

not constitute plain error (the applicable standard of review due 

to the lack of objection). Prior to Townsend's testimony, Edward 

Childs properly was allowed to testify that in 1983, Fairley asked 

him to bump-up three other county contracts. R. Vol. II at 127, 

136-37. He also testified that Fairley had broken that project 

down into separate contracts, each under $10,000.00, instead of 

making it a single more expensive project, to avoid having to bid 

on the contract. Id. at 128. The three 1983 contracts were 

admitted into evidence. This testimony not only showed the same 

contract splitting and bump-up mode of operation as employed by 

Childs, under Fairley's direction, in 1984, it countered 

Townsend's position that Fairley would not have been involved in 

"anything like this." R. Vol. III at 420, Vol. IV at 677 

In this setting it was entirely proper under Fed. R. Evid. 

608(b) to test Townsend's truthfulness by a single inquiry on 

cross-examination into conduct in 1983. The long standing 

relationship between Townsend and Fairley raised a reasonable 

inference that Townsend may have been involved in Fairley's 1983 

contract splitting and bump-ups, essential steps in the type of 

kickback scheme employed in 1984. 

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The purpose of Rule 608(b) is to avoid proof of the underlying behavior which may confuse the jury. United States v. Smith 

Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 531 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985); ~ Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's 

Evidence,§ 608[05]. No such extrinsic proof was admitted as to 

Townsend. The government merely cross-examined Townsend regarding 

his involvement and did not attempt to disprove his negative 

responses with any additional evidence. Such limited questioning 

does not violate Rule 608(b). 

Nor did the government try to prove the character of Townsend 

in violation of Rule 404(b). Rather, counsel merely asked 

Townsend if he had received any kickbacks or was aware of 

Fairley's bumping-up of contracts the previous year. Such questioning in view of Childs's testimony, was admissible to try to 

prove Townsend's plan, intent or opportunity to extort payments in 

1984. The Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 

681, 689 (1988), concluded that the trial court need not make a 

preliminary finding that the government has proved the prior act 

before admitting Rule 404(b) evidence. Rather, it stated that 

four tests protected the defendant from unfair prejudice. Id. at 

691. All the tests were met in this case. The evidence was 

offered for a proper purpose, was relevant, its probative value 

outweighed its prejudicial effect and a limiting instruction 

needed only to be given on request. See United States v. Record, 

873 F.2d 1363, 1374-76 (10th Cir. 1989). Thus, the crossexamination of Townsend was within the proper scope of relevant 

questioning. 

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Townsend's reliance on United States v. DeGeratto, 876 F.2d 

576 (7th Cir. 1989), is misplaced. DeGeratto involves significantly different facts than those with which we deal here. The 

defendant in DeGeratto was charged with transporting and receiving 

stolen meat. The prosecution introduced extensive extrinsic 

evidence concerning the unrelated crime of prostitution and crossexamined defendant about his testimony at a grand jury hearing for 

which he was "neither a target or [sic] a subject of [the] 

investigation." Id. at 580. The prosecutor continually focused 

on the prostitution and also argued in closing that the "prostitution business" was significant, drawing analogies between 

defendant's involvement with the meat thefts and with the prostitution ring. Although the evidence was allowed in as evidence of 

a prior bad act to impeach the defendant, "an effort was made by 

the prosecutor to convict DeGeratto of an uncharged prostitution 

conspiracy." Id. at 583-84. Such is not the case here where the 

government properly engaged in limited questioning of the 

defendant regarding potentially related activities. 

As in DeGeratto, there is no evidence that Townsend is guilty 

of receiving a kickback in 1983 or of being involved in the 1983 

bump-ups. However, unlike the prostitution allegations in 

DeGeratto, the prior acts by Fairley (splitting the contracts and 

bumping-up prices) were close enough in time and sufficiently 

similar to his actions surrounding the present case of alleged 

extortion to be relevant, and to justify the inquiry in question. 

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III. 

LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS FOR EVIDENCE ADMITTED 

UNDER FED. R. EVID. 404(b) 

The government introduced certain damaging evidence concerning Fairley Construction Company's personal property tax matters. 6 

Townsend acknowledges that such evidence was properly admitted 

under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), but argues that the trial court erred 

in failing to give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding 

the purposes for which the evidence could be considered. He also 

argues that if the cross-examination of Townsend regarding the 

1983 bump-ups and kickback is admissible under Rule 404(b), a 

similar limiting instruction should have been given. Since 

Townsend failed to object to or request limiting instructions, he 

concedes that the omission must be reviewed for plain error. 

In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988), 

the Supreme Court stated that a district court may protect against 

potential prejudice when admitting Rule 404(b) evidence by giving 

a limiting instruction, upon request. This court subsequently 

held that "it is not error for a trial court to fail to instruct 

the jury at the close of the case in the absence of a proper 

request by counsel." United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1376 

(10th Cir. 1989). Since Townsend did not object or submit 

6 Childs testified that he paid Townsend the $5000.00 because 

he believed that Townsend had helped appraise the Company's 

equipment at a lower value than usual. R. Vol. II at 153, Vol. 

III at 323. The evidence was admitted as probative of Curtis 

Fairley's state of mind, to refute Townsend's assertion that 

Fairley was an ethical and honest man, and to demonstrate Childs's 

motivation in paying Townsend. The prosecution also crossexamined Townsend regarding his involvement in the appraisal of 

the equipment. R. Vol. IV at 681. 

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.., 

instructions at trial, he must show plain error "amounting to a 

denial of a fundamental right of the accused" in the court's 

failure to give such instructions. United States v. Doran, 882 

F.2d 1511, 1525 (10th Cir. 1989). 

In deciding .whether the instructions (or lack thereof) 

constitute plain error, we look at the instructions as a body, 

together with the evidence adduced at trial. United States v. 

Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1398 (10th Cir. 1990). We must then 

determine whether "the instructional mistake had a probable impact 

on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty." United 

States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 763 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting 

United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1010 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978)), cert. denied, 109 s.ct. 3221 (1989). 

Despite the lack of a specific instruction limiting the use of bad 

act evidence, Townsend has not directed the court's attention to 

anything serious enough to be considered a "denial of a fundamental right of the accused." We do not find plain error where 

Townsend merely claims that it is a "close case" and issues of 

credibility exist, implying that any error must, therefore, be 

prejudicial. As previously stated, there was ample evidence in 

this case to support the verdict of guilt. We are unpersuaded 

that the outcome would have been otherwise if limiting instructions had been given. 

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IV. 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

Townsend's final argument is simply a cumulation of the three 

just addressed, packaged differently. He contends that his 

attorney's failure to object to the introduction of the letter 

from the U.S. Attorney regarding Childs's immunity, and to the 

government's cross-examination regarding the 1983 bump-ups and 

kickbacks, and his failure to request a limiting instruction with 

respect to Rule 404(b) evidence, denied him his Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel. 

The preferred and usual avenue for ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims is by way of collateral attack on the conviction, 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2255. This is so because it enables a 

complete record to be developed and a district court determination 

on the tactical reasons for trial counsel's decisions, the extent 

of trial counsel's alleged deficiencies, and the asserted prejudicial impact on the outcome. Because of the importance of such a 

record and district court consideration, at least one circuit 

follows the general rule that "a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel cannot be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has 

not been raised before the district court • • " United States 

v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1180 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting United 

States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 313-14) (5th Cir. 1987), cert. 

denied, 484 U.S. 1075 (1988)); see also United States v. Dukes, 

727 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1984) (trial record devoid of trial 

counsel's reasons for his tactical decisions and so no basis for 

setting aside defendant's conviction); United States v. Birges, 

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723 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1984) (challenges to effectiveness of 

defense counsel cannot be advanced without the development of 

facts outside the original record); Brien v. United States, 695 

F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Baumann v. United States, 692 

F.2d 565, 581 (9th Cir. 1982) (same). 

However, neither this nor any other circuit has adopted a 

rule barring ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct 

appeal under all circumstances. Most circuits entertain such 

claims in the "rare cases where the record is sufficiently 

complete" to enable a fair evaluation on the merits. United 

States v. Ugalde, 861 F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 1988); see also 

United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d at 670 (courts should exercise 

caution in reviewing insufficiency claims on direct appeal); Brien 

v. United States, 695 F.2d at 13 (some ineffective assistance 

claims might be determined solely on the record of the trial). In 

fact, at least one circuit holds that failure to bring an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal when the claim is available 

will result in a forfeiture. 7 United States v. Phillips, 914 F.2d 

835, 846 (7th Cir. 1990) ("when an appellate court is able to 

evaluate the grounds upon which trial counsel is said to be ineffective on the existing record, the claim of ineffectiveness is 

forfeited if not initially raised on appeal"). The Seventh 

7 Most courts use the deliberate bypass standard to allow 

claims in collateral proceedings when no direct appeal has been 

taken, but at least one court which discourages direct appeal 

indicates that the cause and prejudice test may apply. Brien v. 

United States, 695 F.2d at 14 n.6. Such a standard forces 

competent appellate counsel to bring all ineffective assistance 

claims on direct appeal to ensure preservation of the claim for 

collateral appeal. 

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Circuit noted in Phillips that ineffectiveness claims may be 

raised on collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 "when it is 

necessary to supplement the record to establish the claim." Id. 

In the case before us we are satisfied that this is one of 

the rare cases where the record is sufficiently complete to permit 

our review of Townsend's ineffectiveness of counsel claim. 

Townsend's counsel assured the court at oral argument that no 

further development of the record on this issue would be possible 

or desirable in further proceedings before the district court. 

Counsel for the government agreed. Accordingly, we will in this 

instance proceed to the merits of the ineffectiveness issue. 

The two-part test set forth by the Supreme Court in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), most recently 

construed by this court in United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 

1472 (10th Cir. 1990), states that the appellant must show both 

that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness and that but for the counsel's inadequacies the 

result of the proceedings would have been different. However, we 

do not need to determine whether trial counsel's performance was 

deficient before examining the second prong of the Strickland 

test. "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on 

the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, .•. that course 

should be followed." United States v. Taylor, 832 F.2d 1187, 

1194-95 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. at 697). 

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To show prejudice, Townsend bears the burden of showing that 

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had his attorney objected to the 

admission of the designated evidence and requested a limiting 

instruction. "It is not enough for the defendant to show that the 

error had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding .... '[A] reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" United 

States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, 1501 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694). 

As set out in our discussion of the individual issues, one 

and possibly two errors were made at trial with respect to the 

points raised on appeal, and neither constituted plain error. For 

the reasons we have previously stated in our discussion of plain 

error, our confidence in the outcome of Townsend's trial is not 

undermined by the errors in question. We have fully reviewed the 

record, Townsend's reargument of the evidence and his theory of 

the case, including attacks on the credibility of Edward Childs. 

Based on such review we are unable to say that prejudice of 

constitutional dimension resulted from the performance of 

Townsend's counsel. 

AFFIRMED. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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