Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_04-cv-02355/USCOURTS-alnd-2_04-cv-02355-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Covenant Classical School of Trace Crossing, LLC
Defendant
Tessana Lewis
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TESSANA LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COVENANT CLASSICAL SCHOOL OF

TRACE CROSSING, LLC,

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

04-AR-2355-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this case Tessana Lewis (“Lewis”) sued her former employer,

Covenant Classical School of Trace Crossing, LLC (“Covenant”),

claiming that she was discharged because of her pregnancy in

violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), an amendment

to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. Lewis

was terminated on her third day of employment after Covenant

learned that she was pregnant and unmarried. Covenant holds itself

out as a Christian daycare and kindergarten. It had express

written policies by which its employees were required to subscribe

to Covenant’s code of conduct. These materials mentioned the Bible

as the primary source of instruction on matters of morality, but

did not expressly mention extramarital sexual intercourse as

proscribed conduct that would automatically result in termination.

After hearing four days of evidence, the jury answered “Yes”

to the first question put to it, namely: “Do you find from a

preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff’s pregnancy was a

FILED

 2006 Feb-14 PM 03:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:04-cv-02355-WMA Document 64 Filed 02/14/06 Page 1 of 6
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motivating factor in defendant’s decision to discharge her?”. It

was the jury’s answers to questions numbered 2 through 7 that,

despite plaintiff’s pregnancy being a factor that motivated

Covenant’s decision, determine that Covenant did not violate the

PDA. These questions, and the jury’s answers to them, are as

follows:

2. ONLY IF you have answered “YES” to question no. 1,

do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the

real or overriding reason for plaintiff’s discharge was

not plaintiff’s pregnancy, but rather was defendant’s

belief that plaintiff had not adhered to a code of

morality expected by defendant of its employees?

YES X NO _______

3. ONLY IF you have answered “YES” to question no. 1,

do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that

defendant would have discharged plaintiff for engaging in

sexual activity outside of marriage if it had known of

such extramarital sexual activity, without regard to

whether or not the extramarital sexual activity resulted

in pregnancy?

YES X NO _______

4. ONLY IF you have answered “YES” to question no. 1,

do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that

defendant was a religious corporation or educational

institution that employed only individuals who subscribed

to defendant’s particular belief system?

YES X NO _______

5. ONLY IF you have answered “YES” to question no. 4,

do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that

plaintiff did not subscribe to defendant’s belief system

at the time of her discharge?

YES X NO _______

6. ONLY IF you have answered “YES” to question no. 1,

do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that

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defendant was an educational institution or institution

of learning that was, in whole or in substantial part,

owned, supported, controlled or managed by a particular

religion or by a particular religious corporation,

association or society, or that the curriculum of

defendant was directed toward the propagation of a

particular religion and that defendant had an employment

practice of hiring employees only if their religion

conformed to defendant’s particular religious beliefs?

YES X NO _______

7. ONLY IF you have answered “YES” to question no. 6,

was defendant’s decision to discharge plaintiff made for

the purpose of implementing defendant’s said employment

policy? 

YES X NO _______

The court has no quarrel with the conclusion reached by the

jury that Lewis’s pregnancy played a part in the decision to

terminate her. It was clearly the pregnancy that alerted Covenant

to the fact that Lewis had engaged in sexual activity outside of

marriage. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the

jury to have answered otherwise. Its answer was certainly

consistent with what this very court held in a non-jury pregnancy

discrimination case decided before Title VII was amended to

guarantee trial by jury. This court said in Hargett v. Delta

Automotive, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 1487 (N.D. Ala. 1991):

The traditional McDonald-Burdine formula breaks down when

one attempts to apply it to a pregnancy termination case

in which the Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides that

any adverse action based on an employee’s pregnancy

constitutes a per se violation, whether plaintiff is

replaced or not. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 546

F.Supp. 259 (N.D. Ala. 1982), aff’d 726 F.2d 1543,

rehearing den’d, 732 F.2d 944 (11 Cir. 1984). In other th

words, if pregnancy plays any role whatsoever in the

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adverse employment decision, the legislative intent was

to prevent it.

Id. at 1493.

In Hargett a pregnant unmarried female had been fired by her

employer. This court did not allow the employer to articulate as

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination that it

had a rule requiring female employees to be “ladylike”. This court

decided that such could not be recognized as a bona fide

occupational qualification in the context of that particular

employment relationship. There is, however, an obvious distinction

between what constitutes a legitimate reason for an ordinary

business enterprise to make such an adverse employment decision in

today’s Title VII world, and what is appropriate for an employer

which enjoys the protection of the First Amendment’s freedom of

religious exercise, something that Congress expressly recognizes

for those employers which are religious enterprises and which

sincerely insist on inherence to their religious precepts, such as

refraining from extramarital sexual intercourse. 

Exploiting the argument that this court articulated in

Hargett, Lewis moved for judgment as a matter of law on the

question of liability, arguing that the only reason articulated by

covenant is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Lewis has

consistently contended that unless Covenant can articulate a reason

for the termination that has no connection with Lewis’s pregnancy,

she is entitled to a verdict. The court would agree with Lewis but

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for the statutory escape routes referred to above and that

specifically exempt employers which are bona fide religious

organizations under certain circumstances. The two pertinent

statutory provisions are as follows:

This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious

corporation, association, educational institution, or

society with respect to the employment of individuals of

a particular religion to perform work connected with the

carrying on by such corporation, association, educational

institution, or society of its activities.

42 U.S.C. §2000e-1(a).

and

Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter

. . . it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for

a school, college, university, or other educational

institution or institution of learning to hire and employ

employees of a particular religion if such school,

college, university, or other educational institution or

institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial

part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a

particular religion or by a particular religious

corporation, association, or society, or if the

curriculum of such school, college, university, or other

educational institution or institution of learning is

directed toward a propagation of a particular religion.

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e).

Because of these statutes, ample evidence existed upon which

the jury could answer questions numbered 2 through 7 as it did.

The questions tracked these statutory provisions.

Ostensibly not understanding that their answers to questions

numbered 2 through 7 precluded the awarding of any damages to

Lewis, the jury purported to award her compensatory damages of $600

for back wages and $15,000 for mental anguish, and no punitive

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damages. Whatever may have occasioned this non-sequitur, it does

not subtract from the clear jury findings in favor of Covenant on

dispositive questions of material fact.

A separate judgment consistent with this opinion will be

entered.

DONE this 14 day of February, 2006. th

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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