Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01285/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01285-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald C. Calhoun
Appellant
Carolyn W. Colvin
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

RONALD C. CALHOUN, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner Social Security 

Administration, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 15-1285 

(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-02837-CBS) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before GORSUCH, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Ronald C. Calhoun appeals from the denial of his motion to extend the time to 

file a notice of appeal in his Social Security case. Exercising jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm in part and dismiss in part. 

Mr. Calhoun worked as a civil engineer and mechanical engineer. In 1995, he 

was awarded Social Security disability benefits because of kidney disease. After he 

received a kidney transplant, his condition improved, and his benefits were 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

February 11, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-1285 Document: 01019569311 Date Filed: 02/11/2016 Page: 1 
2 

terminated (effective September 2003) in a 2005 decision. He did not appeal at the 

time, but since then he has tried to challenge that termination by filing new 

applications for benefits and raising the issue in those proceedings. He does not 

contend that he is unable to work; to the contrary, he concedes that he is physically 

able to work. The real issue, he asserts, is that his benefits were improperly 

terminated in 2005. 

This appeal arises from an April 2, 2013, administrative law judge decision 

denying a 2011 application for benefits. That decision became the Commissioner’s 

final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. Mr. Calhoun appealed to the 

district court, where he consented to have a magistrate judge preside over the case. 

He again challenged the 2005 termination of benefits. On March 24, 2015, the 

magistrate judge held that he could not consider the termination because the only 

administrative decision properly before the district court was the 2013 denial of 

benefits. The magistrate judge affirmed the 2013 decision. 

On May 26, 2015, Mr. Calhoun inquired as to the status of the case. The next 

day, on May 27, the court informed him the case had been decided and enclosed a 

copy of the March 24 decision. Mr. Calhoun received this mailing by the end of 

May. On June 29, he moved for an extension of time to appeal from the March 24 

decision. Identifying Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6) as the only sources of 

authority to grant an extension, the magistrate judge determined that Mr. Calhoun 

could satisfy neither rule and denied relief. Mr. Calhoun then appealed to this court. 

Appellate Case: 15-1285 Document: 01019569311 Date Filed: 02/11/2016 Page: 2 
3 

 Although Mr. Calhoun proceeds pro se, he must “follow the same rules of 

procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 

425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he timely 

filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. 

Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). The only timely notice of appeal relates to the 

July 6, 2015, order denying the extension, and so that is the only order before this 

court for review. We have no jurisdiction to review the district court’s March 24 

merits decision. 

Mr. Calhoun argues he was denied due process because he was not notified of 

the March 24 decision in a timely manner. He complains that there is no proof that 

the court mailed the decision to the correct address. But even assuming Mr. Calhoun 

did not receive a copy of the March 24 decision until the court responded on May 27, 

Mr. Calhoun was afforded due process. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d)(2) provides that “[l]ack of notice of the entry does not 

affect the time for appeal or relieve—or authorize the court to relieve—a party for 

failing to appeal within the time allowed, except as allowed by Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 4(a).” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) allows the district court to grant 

an extension if a party moves for one within 30 days of the expiration of the original 

appeal period. And Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) preserves a party’s right to appeal if the 

party did not receive a court judgment—so long as the party acts within 180 days of 

the decision or 14 days of receiving actual notice of the decision, whichever is 

earlier. Mr. Calhoun acknowledges receiving a copy of the March 24 decision by the 

Appellate Case: 15-1285 Document: 01019569311 Date Filed: 02/11/2016 Page: 3 
4 

end of May. If he had promptly filed his motion for an extension, he would have 

been eligible for relief under either Rule 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6). But he did not file his 

motion until June 29, more than 30 days after his original appeal period expired and 

more than 14 days after he received the March 24 decision. Because of this delay, by 

the time he filed his motion for extension, the magistrate judge had no power to grant 

it. Mr. Calhoun’s inability to appeal the March 24 decision thus was caused by his 

own delay, not a failure of process. 

Mr. Calhoun also seeks to attack the March 24 merits decision, asserting that 

he was denied due process because the magistrate judge misconstrued his case, 

complaining that the magistrate judge ruled differently than the district judge 

previously assigned to the case, and raising issues related to the 2005 termination of 

benefits. But as stated, the only decision properly before this court is the denial of 

the extension of time to appeal. Because we lack jurisdiction to review the March 24 

merits decision, we do not address these arguments. 

The district court’s July 6, 2015, order denying an extension of time to appeal 

is affirmed. The arguments as to the March 24, 2015, decision are dismissed for lack 

of jurisdiction. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 15-1285 Document: 01019569311 Date Filed: 02/11/2016 Page: 4