Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03011/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Grant Michael Nixon
Appellant
Rex Pryor
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

GRANT MICHAEL NIXON, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

WARDEN REX PRYOR, 

Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 15-3011 

(D.C. No. 5:14-CV-03130-SAC-DJW) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

Grant Michael Nixon, proceeding pro se,1

 is currently a state prisoner in Kansas, 

having pled guilty to and been sentenced for criminal sodomy, indecent solicitation of a 

child, and sexual exploitation of a child. He filed for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 on July 24, 2014. The district court dismissed the petition, explaining that (1) the 

one-year statute of limitations to file had expired on January 26, 2013, see 28 U.S.C. 

 

*This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1 Because Mr. Nixon is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 

972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e must construe [a pro se litigant’s] arguments liberally; 

this rule of liberal construction stops, however, at the point at which we begin to serve as 

his advocate.”).

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 18, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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§ 2244(d), and (2) Mr. Nixon failed to respond within the time allowed to the court’s 

request to address timeliness. Mr. Nixon now seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) 

from this court. 

Mr. Nixon may not appeal the district court’s ruling without a COA. See Miller-El 

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003); Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 713 (10th 

Cir. 2006). To obtain a COA, he must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Because the district court’s decision to 

dismiss Mr. Nixon’s petition as untimely filed rested on procedural grounds, he must 

“demonstrate both that [(1)] ‘jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition 

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that [(2)] jurists of reason 

would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” 

Clark, 468 F.3d at 713 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

On July 28, 2014, the district court issued an order stating that it was “considering 

the dismissal of this matter unless the submissions of the parties demonstrate either that 

tolling occurred or that extraordinary circumstances exist which warrant equitable 

tolling.” The respondent, Warden Pryor, was given until August 18, 2014, to respond 

regarding the petition’s timeliness. Mr. Nixon was granted 20 days to respond after 

receipt of the Warden’s reponse. Warden Pryor did not respond by the August 18, 2014 

deadline. Mr. Nixon filed his response on September 3, 2014, within 20 days of Warden 

Pryor’s deadline. On September 16, 2014, Warden Pryor moved for an extension of time 

to answer the July 28 order, which the court granted. Nixon opposed the motion to 

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extend, but only after the court had already granted the extension. On October 29, 2014, 

Warden Pryor finally filed his response to the court’s July 28 order. 

In his brief to this court, Mr. Nixon does not contest that the limitations period for 

his petition expired on January 26, 2013, almost six months before he filed. He argues 

that his response to the July 28, 2014 order was timely, and we agree. In that response, 

he correctly said a petition can avoid the one-year time bar by a showing of actual 

innocence. See Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding a 

sufficient showing of actual innocence can equitably toll the one-year limitations period 

for a § 2254 petition even when the actual innocence claim was not diligently pursued). 

But Mr. Nixon did not make a sufficient showing of actual innocence that would entitle 

him to equitable tolling. 

With his September 3, 2014 response filed in district court, Mr. Nixon attached the 

following materials from his prosecution in state court: various witness statements 

(including his own), police reports, charging documents (including arrest affidavits), his 

attorney’s entry of appearance, a custody slip, his motion for discovery, and the transcript 

from his sentencing. He further argues in his brief to this court that the prosecution and 

his attorney caused him to enter an involuntary plea. 

We have reviewed these materials, find no support for his actual innocence claim, 

and conclude there was no basis for equitable tolling. See Woodward v. Cline, 693 F.3d 

1289, 1294 (10th Cir. 2012). Reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the 

district court’s dismissal of the petition as time-barred. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 

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U.S.C. § 1291, we deny COA and dismiss this matter. We also deny Mr. Nixon’s motion 

to proceed ifp.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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