Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01652/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01652-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Allen Lee Swetalla
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLEN LEE SWETALLA, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

____________________________________

Case No. 1:13-cv-01652-SKO

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

(Doc. No. 19)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Allen Lee Swetalla (“Plaintiff”), seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying his application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) benefits pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c). The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, 

which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States 

Magistrate Judge.1

 

1

 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 7, 8.)

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on October 4, 1941, and alleges disability beginning on October 10, 

2009. (AR 169-176; 199.) Plaintiff claims he is disabled due to “knees and shoulder pain” and 

because he “can’t get up.” (See AR 199.)

A. Relevant Medical Evidence

1. State Agency Consultative Examining Physician

Plaintiff did not submit records from any treating physician with his initial application for 

benefits, so the state agency ordered an orthopedic examination and x-ray imaging of his knees. 

(AR 241.) On February 26, 2011, state agency examining physician Dr. Fariba Vesali, M.D., 

performed a comprehensive orthopedic evaluation, and x-rays of Plaintiff’s bilateral knees were 

taken. (AR 242-48.) The x-rays revealed no joint effusion, satisfactory alignment, wellpreserved joint spaces, and no foreign bodies in Plaintiff’s bilateral knees. (AR 242-43.) The 

impression on both knees was “no acute findings” though Plaintiff reported pain and swelling in 

both knees. (AR 242-43.) 

Dr. Vesali noted that Plaintiff complained of gradually worsening pain from an old injury 

caused to his left shoulder by falling off a truck in the mid-1970’s. (AR 244.) Plaintiff also 

reported gradually worsening pain in his bilateral knees, caused by nonspecific injuries from 

playing football in the 1960’s and 1970’s and aggravated by “[g]etting up from bending, walking 

more than five minutes, and going downhill[.]” (AR 244.) Plaintiff reported that he takes Motrin 

for his shoulder pain, and “[g]etting off his feet” helps the knee pain “subside.” (AR 244.) 

Plaintiff has not undergone physical therapy for his shoulder pain. (AR 244.) 

During the examination, Plaintiff “walk[ed] slowly with no particularly abnormal gait[,]” 

did not use an assistive device for walking, and “did not have any difficulties [getting] on and off 

the examination table.” (AR 245.) When asked to remove his shoes, Plaintiff “untied his shoes 

and took them off using both hands showing no difficulties.” (AR 245.) Dr. Vesali observed that 

Plaintiff exhibited full muscle strength in his upper and lower extremities, as well as mild atrophy 

of the left supraspinatus muscle, and had no pain on motion, tenderness, or obvious inflammation 

in his left shoulder. (AR 246.) Dr. Vesali did observe tenderness on the bilateral medial joint 

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space of the knees and crepitus of the knees with flexion/extension, but there was no obvious 

inflammation in the shoulder joints or bilateral upper and lower extremities. (AR 246.) Plaintiff 

reported that he lived alone, drives a car, cleans his “space” and does dishes and laundry. 

(AR 245.) He did not cook or do his own grocery shopping. (AR 245.) 

Dr. Vesali diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic bilateral knee pain, probable knee 

osteoarthritis, and chronic left shoulder pain, left shoulder impingement syndrome. (AR 247.) In

his Functional Assessment, Dr. Vesali opined that Plaintiff 

...should be able to walk and stand six hours in an eight-hour day with normal 

breaks. The limitation is due to bilateral knee osteoarthritis. 

He does not need an assistive device for ambulation. 

He should be able to lift/carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. 

The limitation is due to chronic left shoulder pain, possibly left shoulder 

impingement syndrome, possibly left shoulder osteoarthritis. 

He should be able to do occasional crouching, kneeling, and crawling. The 

limitation is due to bilateral knee osteoarthritis. 

There is limitation on work that requires overhead activities with the left hand. 

The limitation is due to decreased range of motion of the left shoulder. Otherwise 

he should be able to do frequent manipulative activities with the left hand, and 

there is no limitation on manipulative activities with the right hand. 

There are no workplace environmental limitations otherwise. 

(AR 247.)

2. Case Analyses by Non-Examining State Agency Physicians

On March 24, 2011, state agency consultative physician Dr. P. Frye, M.D., completed a 

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) form during the initial disability determination. (AR 59-

78.) He agreed with Dr. Vesali, finding that Plaintiff was able to engage in medium work with 

postural limitations and occasional overhead reaching of the left upper extremity. (AR 62.) 

On June 22, 2011, Dr. J. Frankel, M.D., reviewed the medical evidence on reconsideration. 

(AR 81-100.) Dr. Frankel noted that Plaintiff had reported his condition was unchanged and

presented no additional treatment records. (AR 85.) Dr. Frankel affirmed Dr. Frye’s assessment 

that Plaintiff was able to engage in medium work with postural limitations and occasional 

overhead reaching of the left upper extremity. (AR 85.) 

//

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3. Treatment Records from Clinica Sierra Vista 

Plaintiff received primary care treatment at Clinica Sierra Vista from August through 

December 20112for chronic bilateral knee and shoulder pain, diabetes, and hypertension. 

(AR 249-66.) Providers at the clinic prescribed Vicodin to treat Plaintiff’s pain, Allopurinol to 

treat his elevated uric acid levels, and Amlodipine to treat his blood pressure. (AR 249-66.) He 

was also prescribed a low-purine diet, and was noted to be “overweight.” (AR 259; 260.) 

4. Arthritis Questionnaire by Treating Physician 

On May 18, 2012, Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Robert Wolney, M.D., completed an 

arthritis questionnaire indicating that he had treated Plaintiff for one to two years, opining that he 

had diagnosed Plaintiff as overweight with diabetes, high blood pressure, arthritis, and gout, and 

opining that Plaintiff was disabled due to his impairments. (AR 268-71.) Dr. Wolney identified 

“joint pain, elevated uric acid, elevated blood sugar, [and] weight 322 lbs, 6’2” ” as his “clinical 

findings” supporting his diagnoses, and identified as “objective signs” of impairment Plaintiff’s 

reduced range of motion in all joints, numbness and tingling, joint warmth, joint deformity, joint 

instability, reduced grip strength, sensory changes, reflex changes, impaired sleep, abnormal 

posture, tenderness, crepitus, trigger points, redness, swelling, muscle spasm, muscle weakness, 

abnormal gait, positive straight leg raising, other clinical findings, and fatigue. (AR 268.) 

“Muscle atrophy” was one of the only three boxes left unchecked on the form. (AR 268.) 

Dr. Wolney also opined that depression and anxiety were contributing to Plaintiff’s symptoms and 

functional limitations. (AR 268.) 

Dr. Wolney listed “bilateral” pain of 8/10 - 9/10 in Plaintiff’s “lumbosacral spine, cervical 

spine, thoracic spine, chest, shoulders, arms, hands/fingers, hips, legs, knees/ankles/feet.” 

(AR 269.) Every possible box was checked on the form, as well as the box opining that Plaintiff’s 

impairments were “reasonably consistent with the symptoms and functional limitations described 

in this evaluation[.]” (AR 269, emphasis in original.) Dr. Wolney opined that Plaintiff’s pain was 

severe enough to constantly interfere with his attention and concentration, but that Plaintiff could 

 

2

 Plaintiff’s medical record also contains progress notes from June 2008 and January 2012, both of which are 

marked “failed to show” and do not reflect any sort of treatment or medical opinion. (AR 252; 258.) 

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tolerate moderate stress. (AR 270.) Dr. Wolney opined Plaintiff needed to use a cane or other 

assistive device, and needed a job enabling him to shift from sitting to standing at will and 

permitting him to take frequent unscheduled breaks to lie down with his legs elevated waist high. 

(AR 271.) In his opinion, Plaintiff could walk only a “1/2 block” without rest or severe pain, and

was limited to sitting and stand/walking less than 2 hours total in an 8-hour workday, must walk 

around every ten minutes, and could only stand for 20 minutes and sit for 10 minutes at one time. 

(AR 270-71.) Dr. Wolney also checked the box affirming that Plaintiff had “significant 

limitations with reaching, handling or fingering.” (AR 271.) Finally, Dr. Wolney limited Plaintiff 

to never carry 50 pounds, occasionally carry 20 pounds or less, and frequently carry less than 10 

pounds, to only rarely climb stairs and never twist, stoop, crouch/squat, or climb ladders, to only 

rarely look down, turn head right or left, or look up, and to only occasionally hold his head in a 

static position. (AR 271.) 

B. Administrative Hearing

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

During the administrative hearing, held by video on July 13, 2011, Plaintiff was 

accompanied by a disability advocate and testified that he had gout, problems with his knees, and 

swelling in his legs. (AR 37.) He stated that he had last worked as a ranch manager in 2007 or 

2008, and had since taken seasonal work as a “cowboy” that was slow and unsteady, and that he 

could no longer ride a horse, put on his boots, or get back up from the ground unassisted. (AR 35-

37.) Plaintiff testified he lived on a two-and-a-half-acre ranch and cared for his personal needs, 

cooked meals, cleaned his trailer, split firewood while sitting, and drove on his own the 75 miles 

into town about once a week. (AR 42; 43; 46.) 

2. Medical Expert’s Testimony

Medical Expert Dr. Galst testified at the hearing that Plaintiff had impairments of obesity, 

diabetes mellitus Type II, and hypertension, but there was “no indication within the medical 

records that, although these problems are present they are disabling, or substantially or [in] any 

way restrict his functional abilities.” (AR 47.) According to Dr. Galst, while the medical 

evidence did not support a diagnosis of gouty arthritis or gout, Plaintiff’s elevated uric acid level 

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was indicative of a “propensity for gout.” (AR 48.) 

Dr. Galst focused on Plaintiff’s complaints of bilateral knee and left shoulder pain. He 

concluded that Plaintiff’s knee pain was probably worsened by his obesity, and while the 

consultative examiner had noted bilateral crepitus on exam, “X-rays of both his left and right knee 

were obtained and they did not show any abnormalities” and the normal signs and symptoms of 

active arthritis were not seen. (AR 48-49.) Dr. Galst also reported the consultative examiner’s 

observations of “some very mild atrophy of one [of] the small muscles over the shoulder and that 

[Plaintiff] had some mild limitation in terms of being able to fully abduct his left shoulder” while 

emphasizing that Plaintiff is a right-hand dominant individual. (AR 48.) 

Dr. Galst opined Plaintiff had “some mild degree of age appropriate arthritis” and his 

weight “might have some functional bearing.” (AR 50.) However, Dr. Galst concluded that 

Plaintiff did not specifically “meet any muscular skeletal or any other orthopedic listings.” 

(AR 50.) Dr. Galst opined that Plaintiff would have limitations reaching overhead with his left, 

non-dominant shoulder, but he could lift 50 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally. (AR 

51.) He also concluded that Plaintiff “would have a problem riding a horse, which is his past 

relevant work or his immediate past relevant work.” (AR 50.) Dr. Galst further opined that while 

Plaintiff would not have “substantial limitations” in sitting or standing for several hours at a time 

or walking a mile or two at a time, he “might have some limitations repeatedly going up and down 

stairs” and could only occasionally squat. (AR 50.) 

3. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

The ALJ asked the Vocational Expert (“VE”) to consider a hypothetical person of

Plaintiff’s age, education, and with his prior work experience, and Residual Functional Capacity 

(“RFC”) for “medium” exertional work that “would preclude riding a horse; and would limit him 

to occasional stair climb; and occasional squatting and kneeling; and would limit[ ] him to 

occasional overhead reaching of the left nondominant arm.” (AR 53.) After some discussion 

between the ALJ, Plaintiff’s advocate, and Plaintiff over whether Plaintiff’s past relevant work 

was properly classified at the light or medium exertional level, the VE testified that as those jobs 

were defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), Plaintiff could not perform any 

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past relevant work as a ranch hand, DOT code 410.664-010, or a mechanic, DOT code 620.281-

050,

3

as they would require more than occasional squatting, kneeling, and overhead reaching. (AR 

53-54; 56; 57.) 

The VE testified that Plaintiff could perform other medium work, as a hand packager, DOT 

code 920.587-018, bagger, DOT code 920.687-014, or as a warehouse worker, DOT code 

922.687-058, all defined as medium work with an SVP:2.

4

 (AR 54.) The VE testified that based 

on Plaintiff’s limitations, jobs as a warehouse worker would be subject to as much as a 50 percent 

erosion of the work base, to eliminate squatting and kneeling. (AR 54.) When Plaintiff’s 

representative modified the hypothetical to include the limitation that Plaintiff “would have to sit 

down at will to rest his knees and ankles every 30 minutes,” the VE testified that Plaintiff could 

not perform work as a hand packager, bagger, or warehouse worker. (AR 57.) 

C. Administrative Proceedings 

On June 21, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision and determined Plaintiff was not disabled. 

(AR 11-19.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments including osteoarthritis of both 

knees, degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder, morbid obesity, hypertension, and diabetes. 

(AR 13.) The ALJ determined these impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 

13-14.) The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the RFC “to perform medium work as defined in 20 

CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except [he is] precluded from riding a horse; occasional stair 

climbing, squatting or kneeling; [and] occasional overhead reaching with the left non dominant 

arm.” (AR 14.) 

Given this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant 

work. (AR 17.) After considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ 

determined that there were other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy 

he could perform, including work as a hand packager, bagger, and warehouse worker. (AR 18-19.) 

 

3

 Though the ALJ referred to a non-existent DOT code 620.281-051, mechanic, in his decision, it apparently 

referred to DOT code 620.281-050. 

4

 Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”), as defined in Appendix C of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, is the 

amount of lapsed time required by a typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the 

facility needed for average performance in a specific job-worker situation.

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The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

October 10, 2009, the alleged onset date, to the date of the decision. (AR 19.)

D. Plaintiff’s Complaint

On July 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint before this Court seeking review of the ALJ’s 

decision. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by deviating from the DOT without 

securing a sufficient explanation from the VE, and by failing to evaluate Plaintiff’s obesity 

consistent with Social Security Ruling (SSR) 02-1p. (Docs. 16, 18.) 

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld by a district 

court if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal 

standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); Morgan v. 

Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Davis v. Heckler, 868 F.2d 

323, 325 (9th Cir.1989); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999); Tidwell v. Apfel, 

161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999); Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985) (the 

findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.) 

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Ryan v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 

(9th Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison 

Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

“While inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those 

‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 846 

F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (the Court must review the record as a whole, “weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.”) 

The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports 

and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply by 

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isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 

(9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The role of the Court is not to substitute its discretion in the place of the ALJ – “[t]he ALJ 

is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Macri 

v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (the court 

may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a 

ground upon which he did not rely.”); see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 

1987) (if substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting 

evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive). The 

court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists 

only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 

1382c(a)(3) (A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment or 

impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are 

demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of 

such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering 

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that 

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exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).

The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential 

analysis in the process of evaluating a disability. In Step 1, the ALJ must determine whether the 

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 

416.920(b). If not, the ALJ must determine at Step 2 whether the claimant has a severe 

impairment or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic 

work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, the ALJ moves to Step 3 and determines 

whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal 

the requirements of the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 § 404, Subpart P, App. 1, and is 

therefore presumptively disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, at Step 4 the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC despite the impairment or various limitations 

to perform her past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, at Step 5, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers 

in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Tackett v. 

Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by deviating from the DOT without securing a sufficient 

explanation from the VE, and by failing to evaluate Plaintiff’s obesity consistent with SSR 02-1p.

A. The ALJ Erred by Relying on Vocational Testimony that was Inconsistent with the 

Dictionary of Occupational Titles

Plaintiff argues the VE’s testimony was inconsistent with the DOT, and the ALJ erred by 

failing to identify and obtain a reasonable basis for the VE’s deviation from the DOT and its 

companion publications. (Doc. 16, 6.) The Commissioner responds that testimony was not 

inconsistent because Plaintiff has “not been precluded from frequent or constant reaching, he has 

merely been limited to occasional performance of a subset of reaching[,]” and “[n]othing in the 

DOT description of the jobs in question indicates that ‘reaching’ is always ‘at or above shoulder 

level’” or that both arms would be required for overhead reaching. (Doc. 17, 6.) 

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1. Legal Standard

In determining whether appropriate jobs exist for the claimant, the ALJ generally will refer 

to the DOT. Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997). The procedural 

requirements of SSR 00-4p ensure that the record is clear as to why an ALJ relied on a vocational 

expert’s testimony, particularly in cases where the expert’s testimony conflicts with the DOT. In 

making disability determinations, the ALJ may rely on VE testimony that contradicts the DOT, 

but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation. Light, 119 

F.3d at 793; Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995); Massachi v. Astrue, 486 

F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007). Although evidence provided by a VE “generally should be 

consistent” with the DOT, “[n]either the DOT nor the VE . . . evidence automatically ‘trumps’ 

when there is a conflict.” SSR 00-4p at *2. Thus, the ALJ must first determine whether a conflict 

exists, and if it does, must then determine whether the VE’s explanation for the conflict is 

reasonable and whether a basis exists for relying on the expert rather than the DOT. Id. at *2-3. 

Only after determining whether the VE has deviated from the DOT, and whether any 

deviation is reasonable, can an ALJ properly rely on the VE’s testimony as substantial evidence to 

support a disability determination. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1152-54. Evidence sufficient to support 

a deviation from the DOT may be either specific findings of fact regarding plaintiff’s ability to 

perform particular jobs, or inferences drawn from the context of the expert’s testimony. See Light, 

supra at 1435 n. 7 (ALJ provided sufficient support for deviation by noting that the VE described 

characteristics and requirements of jobs in the local area consistent with claimant’s RFC); Terry v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1990) (ALJ may infer support for deviation where VE’s 

understanding of applicable legal standards is clear from context).

2. The ALJ Did Not Ask Whether the VE’s Testimony Was Inconsistent with the 

DOT, or, Whether There Was a Reasonable Explanation for the Conflict

SSR 00-4p explicitly requires that the ALJ determine whether the expert’s testimony 

deviates from the DOT, and whether there is a reasonable explanation for any deviation. At the 

hearing, the ALJ did not ask whether the VE’s opinions were consistent with the DOT, and, if so, 

whether there was a reasonable explanation for the conflict. (AR 52-58.) Although the VE was 

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not providing evidence about the “requirements of a job” by stating Plaintiff was qualified for 

certain jobs in response to the ALJ’s hypothetical question, the VE was indirectly providing such 

evidence. See SSR 00–4p at *4 (stating that an ALJ must inquire whether a VE’s testimony 

regarding “the requirements of a job or occupation” conflicts with the DOT). 

3. The VE’s Testimony Was Inconsistent with the DOT and No Reasonable 

Explanation for the Conflict was Offered

Unless the VE’s testimony actually conflicts with the DOT, by itself the ALJ’s failure to 

explicitly ask whether the VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT is not enough to warrant 

reversal. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1151 n. 19, 1152-53 (failure to ask whether the VE’s testimony is 

consistent with the DOT is harmless procedural error where there is no actual conflict, or the VE 

has provided sufficient support for her conclusion so as to justify any potential conflicts). The 

Commissioner argues there was no conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT because

Plaintiff was never precluded by either the ALJ or any doctor of record “from frequent or constant 

reaching[.]” (Doc. 17,6 (arguing Plaintiff “has merely been limited to occasional performance of a 

subset of reaching.”).) The Commissioner further contends there was no conflict because “[t]here 

is no indication that any of these jobs would require Plaintiff to use both arms for overhead 

reaching.” (Doc. 17, 6.) 

Contrary to the Commissioner’s contentions that “[n]othing in the DOT description of the 

jobs in question indicates that ‘reaching’ is always ‘at or above shoulder level’” (Doc. 17, 6), the 

meaning of “reaching” is not indeterminate. Within the meaning of the DOT, “reaching” is 

defined as “[e]xtending hand(s) and arm(s) in any direction.” Selected Characteristics of 

Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“SCO”), Appendix C 

(1993) (emphasis added). As defined in the SCO, the plain meaning of “reaching” encompasses 

above-the-shoulder reaching. Contrary to the Commissioner’s argument, when considered in light 

of the SCO and DOT, the VE’s testimony implies that Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs 

that require frequent or constant omni-directional reaching. 

Here, the jobs identified by the VE are defined by the DOT as requiring “frequent” or 

“constant” reaching. This conflicts with Plaintiff’s limitation of only “occasional overhead 

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reaching,” because “overhead reaching is a specific subset of reaching.” See Carpenter v. Colvin, 

No. 1:13-CV-00984-SKO, 2014 WL 4795037, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2014); see also Kemp ex 

rel. Kemp v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 2014); Pacheco v. Astrue, No. EDCV 09-1063-

CW, 2010 WL 3488215, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010); Silvera v. Astrue, No. CV 09-1935-JC, 

2010 WL 3001619, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (citing Marshall v. Astrue, 2010 WL 841252, 

at *6 (S.D.Cal. Mar.10, 2010)), Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2006). At a

minimum, there is a potential conflict between the VE’s testimony about jobs Plaintiff could 

perform and the DOT description of those jobs, and an explanation of that deviation is necessary. 

Id. (testimony that a claimant limited to occasional overhead reaching can nonetheless perform 

frequent reaching is the exact type of deviation that should be resolved by explanation from the 

VE) (citing Winder v. Astrue, No. 12-CV-1048, 2013 WL 489611 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) 

(same); Richardson v. Astrue, 11-CV-1593-SP, 2012 WL 1425130, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 

2012) (reaching in “any” direction plainly encompasses overhead reaching, therefore VE’s 

testimony deviated from DOT and the ALJ was required to obtain “persuasive evidence” to 

explain the deviation)). 

Absent a determination that the VE’s explanation for the conflict was reasonable and a 

basis exists for relying on the VE’s conclusions rather than on the DOT, an ALJ cannot properly 

rely on the VE’s testimony as substantial evidence to support a disability determination. 

Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1152-54; see SSR 00-4p at *2-3. Here, the ALJ relied on VE testimony 

that conflicted with the DOT, and the ALJ was therefore required to explain the deviation by 

making either specific factual findings or drawing inferences from the context of the VE’s 

testimony. See Light, 119 F.3d at 793. Instead, the record contains only the VE’s conclusion that 

Plaintiff can perform work requiring “frequent reaching” despite an RFC limiting him to 

“occasional overhead reaching of the left nondominant arm.” “Where an ALJ fails to obtain an 

explanation for and resolve an apparent conflict – even where the VE did not identify the 

conflict – the ALJ errs.” Richardson, 2012 WL 1425130, at * 5. Remand is required to obtain 

further VE testimony to resolve the inconsistency with the DOT. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1155. 

The Court remands this case so the ALJ can apply SSR 00-4p’s requirements and 

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determine: 1) whether the jobs identified by the vocational expert are consistent with the 

definitions in the DOT and Plaintiff’s limitations; and, 2) whether there is a reasonable 

explanation for any inconsistencies between the VE’s testimony and the DOT.

B. The ALJ Adequately Considered Plaintiff’s Obesity throughout the Sequential 

Disability Analysis

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ failed to ask Dr. Galst, the Medical Expert (“ME”),

whether Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments, individually or in combination, met or 

equaled a Listing or further eroded Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. 16, 9.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ is 

required to consider the presence of obesity, and his failure to explicitly discuss SSR 02-1p or 

explicitly instruct the ME to consider obesity during the hearing constitutes reversible error. 

(Doc. 16, 9.) The Commissioner contends that both the ALJ and ME adequately considered 

Plaintiff’s obesity. (Doc. 17, 7-8.) 

Pursuant to SSR 02-1p, obesity must be considered throughout the sequential evaluation 

process, including when determining an individual’s RFC. “The combined effects of obesity with 

other impairments may be greater than might be expected without obesity.” SSR 02-1p. Here, the 

record reflects that both the ME and ALJ adequately considered Plaintiff’s obesity in compliance 

with the requirements of SSR 02-1p. For example, the ALJ identified Plaintiff’s morbid obesity as 

a severe impairment at Step 2 (AR 13), noting Plaintiff’s weight as 310 and 322 pounds on 

examination (AR 14-15). Based on his review of the medical evidence, including Plaintiff’s 

obesity in conjunction with Plaintiff’s other medically evident impairments, the ME concluded 

that Plaintiff “does specifically not meet any muscular skeletal or any other orthopedic listings” at 

Step 3. (AR 50.) The ME further listed Plaintiff’s obesity as a reason that Plaintiff “would have a 

problem riding a horse” and “might have some limitations repeatedly going up and down stairs 

and squatting[.]” (AR 50.) 

Plaintiff’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Burch to support reversal is 

misplaced. (Docs. 16, 9; 18, 4-5, citing Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2005).) 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument that the Ninth Circuit “requires an exquisite recognition of the 

[obesity] condition and precise analysis” (Docs. 16, 9; 18, 4) – a position which the Court notes 

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the Burch Court never articulated – in this Circuit an “ALJ is not required to discuss the combined 

effects of a claimant’s impairments or compare them to any listing in an equivalency 

determination, unless the claimant presents evidence in an effort to establish equivalence.” Burch, 

400 F.3d at 682-83 (emphasis added). Here, the ME considered Plaintiff’s obesity, in conjunction 

with Plaintiff’s other medically evident impairments, when opining that Plaintiff does not 

specifically meet any muscular skeletal or any other orthopedic listings. (AR 50.) As such, the 

ALJ was not required to comprehensively and “exquisitely” discuss the combined effects of 

Plaintiff’s impairments or compare them to any listing in an equivalency determination, to 

determine that Plaintiff did not meet or equal a Listing. (AR 13-14.)

Plaintiff’s entire argument rests on the assertion that the “ALJ and [ME] did not probe into 

the effects of [Plaintiff]’s obesity and how that impairment further erodes his [RFC].” (Doc. 16, 

9.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ME and ALJ specifically addressed the “functional 

bearing” of Plaintiff’s obesity at the hearing and in the decision, including whether it was 

“disabling, or substantially or [in] any way restrict[ive of] his functional abilities” (AR 47; see AR 

16) and whether it worsened or aggravated his bilateral knee pain (AR 48; AR 16). At the final 

vocational steps of his analysis, after weighing the evidence, the ALJ specifically considered 

Plaintiff’s obesity in making his determinations regarding RFC and vocational ability. (AR 17.) 

The ALJ found that “due to his weight and osteoarthritis in his knees” Plaintiff “would be limited 

to medium work with occasional postural activities” and that “[d]ue to weight and orthopedic 

issues” Plaintiff “is precluded from riding a horse.” (AR 17, emphases added.) 

Finally, a review of the medical record reveals little objective evidence of any functional 

limitations as a result of Plaintiff’s obesity that the ALJ failed to consider. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 

684. The only evidence in the record relating to his obesity are medical notes observing that he is 

obese and recommending that he lose weight. (See AR 259, 260.) Despite complaints of knee 

pain and a single mention of low back pain, x-rays and examination of Plaintiff’s bilateral knees 

revealed no abnormalities. (AR 16-17; 48; 242-43.) Plaintiff himself has offered no examples 

specifying how his obesity limits his functional capacity or exacerbates his current existing 

condition, or showing that he established equivalency to a listing impairment. (See Doc. 16, 8-9.) 

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The ALJ adequately considered Plaintiff’s weight at all steps of the sequential disability analysis. 

Id. at 682-84. 

In sum, the record demonstrates that both the ME and ALJ adequately considered 

Plaintiff’s obesity to the extent required by SSR 02-1p.

C. Remand is Required

“The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a 

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, 

with or without remanding the cause for a hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In Social Security cases, 

the decision to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings or simply to award benefits is 

within the discretion of the court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). “If 

additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceedings, a social 

security case should be remanded. Where, however, a rehearing would simply delay receipt of 

benefits, reversal [and an award of benefits] is appropriate.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 

1399 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Generally, we direct the award of benefits in cases where no useful purpose 

would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has been thoroughly 

developed.” (citation omitted)). Here, the ALJ erred in relying on the testimony of the VE which 

is in apparent conflict with the DOT, and remand is appropriate for renewed consideration of this 

issue. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence and is, therefore, REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the ALJ for 

further proceedings consistent with this order. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter 

judgment in favor of Plaintiff Allen Lee Swetalla and against Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 5, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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