Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03196/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03196-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Air Force
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Richard D. Montgomery
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RICHARD D. MONTGOMERY,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3196

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DA-0752-14-0098-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: March 9, 2015

______________________ 

RICHARD D. MONTGOMERY, Seagoville, TX, pro se. 

KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH, Office of the General 

Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, 

DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G.

POLISUK. 

______________________ 

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2 MONTGOMERY v. MSPB

Before WALLACH and HUGHES, Circuit Judges, and FOGEL

District Judge.*

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Richard Montgomery appeals the decision 

of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Montgomery v. 

Dep’t of the Air Force, No. DA-0752-14-0098-I-1 (M.S.P.B. 

Feb. 10, 2014 (“Initial Decision”), Final Order, July 8, 

2014). For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Montgomery was an employee with the Department of the Air Force (“agency”) as an Aircraft Sheetmetal 

worker. When Mr. Montgomery failed to appear for work, 

the agency wrote him an undated letter, advising him 

that his absence since June 15, 2007, was unauthorized 

and he would be carried into Absent Without Leave 

(“AWOL”) status. The letter acknowledged Mr. Montgomery had been arrested and held without bond on June 

15, 2007, and notified him that if he was not available to 

work within ten days of the receipt of the letter, “action 

w[ould] be taken to propose [him] removal from Air Force 

employment.” Resp’t’s App. 23. 

On June 28, 2007, Mr. Montgomery sent a letter to 

the agency stating he was “unable to return to work at the 

present time or in the foreseeable future” and due to the 

need of the Air Force to have a full-time employee, he 

“resign[ed his] position effective this date.” Id. at 24. Mr. 

Montgomery notified the agency that if it had any issue 

processing his resignation it should contact his attorney. 

* Honorable Jeremy Fogel, District Judge, United 

States District Court for the Northern District of California, 

and Director of the Federal Judicial Center, sitting by 

designation. 

 

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MONTGOMERY v. MSPB 3

When the agency processed his personnel action, the 

“[r]eason for resignation” was listed as “[p]ersonal 

[r]easons.” Id. at 29. 

On November 26, 2013, Mr. Montgomery filed an appeal with the Board, alleging the agency coerced his 

resignation by threatening to remove him and failing to 

offer him retirement counseling. The Administrative 

Judge (“AJ”) issued an order stating resignations are 

assumed to be voluntary and the Board therefore lacked 

jurisdiction. The AJ informed Mr. Montgomery it was his 

burden to prove jurisdiction by preponderant evidence, 

and ordered him to submit evidence demonstrating his 

resignation had been the result of coercion. Mr. Montgomery filed two responses, and stated that at the time of 

his arrest he “had sufficient sick leave and annual leave 

which, if credited, would have allowed him to retire with 

the requisite thirty years government service.” Id. at 32. 

Mr. Montgomery also alleged the agency failed to meet its 

obligation to offer retirement seminars for eligible employees and “thus pressur[ed] [him] to either resign or be 

terminated without ever advising him that he had a third 

. . . option[,] that of retirement with all [of] its attendant 

benefits.” Id. at 33. 

On February 10, 2014, the AJ found Mr. Montgomery 

failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that his resignation was involuntary and dismissed his appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. Mr. Montgomery filed a petition for review 

but the Board denied the petition and affirmed the AJ’s 

decision. Mr. Montgomery appeals and this court has 

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9) (2012). 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

This court’s “scope of . . . review of [B]oard decisions is 

limited to whether they are (1) arbitrary, capricious, an 

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4 MONTGOMERY v. MSPB

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, 

rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” Forest v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

47 F.3d 409, 410 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) 

(1988)). The issue of Board jurisdiction is a question of 

law this court reviews de novo. Johnston v. Merit Sys. 

Prot. Bd., 518 F.3d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2008). This court is 

bound by the Board’s jurisdictional factual findings “unless those findings are not supported by substantial 

evidence.” Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 

1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

II. Legal Framework

Mr. Montgomery bears the burden of demonstrating 

Board jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence. Fields 

v. Dep’t of Justice, 452 F.3d 1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 5 

C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2)(i) (2013). The Board’s jurisdiction 

is “strictly defined and confined by statute and regulation” to appeals of decisions involving “adverse actions.” 

Bolton, 154 F.3d at 1316 (internal citation omitted). Such 

actions consist of: (1) removals; (2) suspensions for more 

than fourteen days; (3) reductions in grade; (4) reductions 

in pay; and (5) furloughs of thirty days or less. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7512(1)–(5) (2012). 

III. Mr. Montgomery Has Not Met His Burden to 

Demonstrate Board Jurisdiction

“Resignations are presumed voluntary, and the burden of showing the resignation was involuntary is on the 

petitioner.” Terban v. Dep’t of Energy, 216 F.3d 1021, 

1024 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Cruz v. Dep’t of Navy, 934 

F.2d 1240, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “The two principal 

grounds on which employees have sought to show that 

their resignations or retirements were involuntary are (1) 

that the resignation or retirement was the product of 

misinformation or deception by the agency, and (2) that 

the resignation or retirement was the product of coercion 

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MONTGOMERY v. MSPB 5

by the agency.” Conforto v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 713 F.3d 

1111, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted). 

“The touchstone of the ‘voluntariness’ analysis is whether, 

considering the totality of the circumstances, factors 

operated on the employee’s decision-making process that 

deprived him of freedom of choice.” Vitale v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, 509–10 (2007).

Mr. Montgomery contends “the [Board] should have 

considered the discriminatory failure of his superiors to 

advise him prior to resignation of resignation alternatives 

such as retirement.” Pet’r’s Br. 1. Though he argued to 

the Board he was pressured to resign or be terminated, 

nothing in the record suggests this is true. The letter 

from the agency notified Mr. Montgomery his removal 

would be proposed if he did not appear at work within ten 

days, it had no reference to any resignation. Indeed, the 

cautionary letter did not state that the agency was removing him nor did it actually propose his removal. His 

response was an unsolicited letter of resignation and an 

additional notice to contact his attorney if more information was needed. “It is well established that the fact 

that an employee is faced with the unpleasant choice of 

either resigning or opposing a potential adverse action 

does not rebut the presumed voluntariness of his ultimate 

choice.” Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. 

Cir. 1987). 

Mr. Montgomery also contends the Board “failed to 

adequately consider the fact that Petitioner was discriminated against due to his then pending charge.” Pet’r’s Br. 

1. Mr. Montgomery did not raise any argument related to 

his pending criminal charge before the AJ or the Board, 

and it was therefore not considered. In any event, Mr. 

Montgomery provides no support for this contention, and 

he is therefore unable to show he was discriminated 

against. 

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6 MONTGOMERY v. MSPB

Finally, Mr. Montgomery argues the Board “incorrectly based [its] decision on [the] erroneous belief that counsel rendered effective, or indeed any representation.” 

Pet’r’s Br. at 2. The Board noted Mr. Montgomery was 

represented by counsel in his criminal proceeding “who 

could have researched and/or inquired whether retirement was an option.” Initial Decision, at 5. This was not 

the primary ground for the Board’s determination that 

Mr. Montgomery’s resignation was not coerced or based 

on a misrepresentation; it was an observation that reinforced the Board’s conclusion. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Board’s determination 

that Mr. Montgomery’s resignation was voluntary is 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs. 

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