Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35726/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35726-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Hillsboro
Appellant
Matthew Weaving
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATTHEW WEAVING,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF HILLSBORO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-35726

D.C. No.

3:10-cv-01432-HZ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 9, 2013—Portland, Oregon

Filed August 15, 2014

Before: Barry G. Silverman, William A. Fletcher,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher;

Dissent by Judge Callahan

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2 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

SUMMARY*

Americans with Disabilities Act

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment, after a

jury trial, in favor of a police officer who alleged that he was

terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities

Act.

The officer contended that he was disabled because his

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder substantially limited

his ability to engage in the major life activities of working

and interacting with others. He claimed that Hillsboro Police

Department discharged him because of his disabilities in

violation of the ADA. 

The panel held that as a matter of law the jury could not

have found that ADHD substantially limited the officer’s

ability to work or to interact with others within the meaning

of the ADA. The panel held that given the absence of

evidence that the officer’s ADHD affected his ability to work,

and in light of the strong evidence of his technical

competence as a police officer, a jury could not reasonably

have concluded that his ADHD substantially limited his

ability to work. The panel also held that the officer’s

interpersonal problems did not amount to a substantial

impairment of his ability to interact with others. 

Accordingly, based on the evidence presented, no reasonable

jury could have found the officer disabled under the ADA.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 3

The panel reversed the City of Hillsboro’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law and remanded the case to the

district court.

Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that the majority failed

to follow McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226

(9th Cir. 1999), and that there was sufficient evidence to

support the verdict based on the officer’s ADHD substantially

limiting his ability to interact with others.

COUNSEL

Matthew Kalmanson (argued) and Janet Schroer, Hart

Wagner LLP, Portland, Oregon, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jaime B. Goldberg (argued), Makler Lemoine & Goldberg

PC, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether, consistent with the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), an employer properly

terminated an employee who had recurring interpersonal

problems with his colleagues that were attributable to

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). Plaintiff

Matthew Weaving worked for the Hillsboro Police

Department (“HPD”) in Oregon from 2006 to 2009. HPD

terminated Weaving’s employment in 2009 following severe

interpersonal problems between Weaving and other HPD

employees. Weaving contends that these interpersonal

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4 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

problems resulted from his ADHD. After his discharge,

Weaving brought suit under the ADA. He contended that he

was disabled because his ADHD substantially limited his

ability to engage in two major life activities: working and

interacting with others. He claimed that HPD had discharged

him because of his disabilities in violation of the ADA.

The jury returned a general verdict for Weaving, finding

that he was disabled and that the City of Hillsboro (“the

City”) had discharged him because of his disability. The City

moved for judgment as a matter of law. It also moved for a

new trial on the ground of improper jury instructions. The

district court denied both motions, and the City appealed.

We reverse. We hold as a matter of law that the jury

could not have found that ADHD substantially limited

Weaving’s ability to work or to interact with others within the

meaning of the ADA.

I. Background

The evidence presented at trial showed the following. In

1973, Weaving, then six years old, was diagnosed with

“hyperkinetic activity,” known today as ADHD. His

pediatrician prescribed medication. Weaving stopped taking

medication at age twelve because, as his mother explained to

him, he seemed to have outgrown the symptoms of ADHD. 

He continued, however, to experience interpersonal problems

throughout childhood and adolescence.

Weaving joined the Beaverton Police Department

(“BPD”) in Oregon as a police officer in July 1995. During

the application process, he passed a battery of tests, including

psychological and medical evaluations. Because he believed

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 5

ADHD no longer affected him, Weaving did not disclose or

discuss his childhood diagnosis and medication. Weaving’s

evaluations during his employment at BPD described him as

“[a]loof, abrasive, too outspoken at inappropriate times,”

“forcefullyoutspoken,” “disgruntled,” and “intimidating,” but

also stated that he “works well with co-workers” and was

“friendly, helpful and hard working.” Some of his

supervisors noted that he “[h]ad difficulty working in a team

environment.”

In 2001, while employed by BPD, Weaving became a

narcotics detective on an interagency team. He was removed

from the team less than a year later because of “personality

conflicts” with another officer. Weaving filed a grievance

and was put back on the team in 2003. While still employed

byBPD, due to ongoing difficulties with colleagues Weaving

left the interagency narcotics team to join an FBI task force. 

Weaving later learned that an FBI agent had complained to

BPD about “communication issues” with him. The agent had

written a letter to the BPD Police Chief stating that Weaving

was “[f]requently critical and vocal about his fellow

investigators” and that he had an “overly aggressive style.”

Weaving was hired by HPD in 2006. During the

application process, Weaving disclosed what he described as

the “intermittent interpersonal communication issues” he

experienced at BPD. HPD offered Weaving provisional

employment, contingent upon passing a psychological

evaluation. Weaving disclosed his childhood history of

ADHD but did not believe at that time that ADHD continued

to affect him.

Weaving’s first-year evaluation at HPD was generally

positive. His supervisor, Lt. Jim Kelly, praised his

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6 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

experience and knowledge. Lt. Kelly wrote that he had seen

Weaving conduct all his investigations in a “thorough,

professional, and conscientious manner.” He wrote that

Weaving “maintains pos[i]tive and respectful relationships

with his teammates, his supervisors, and the community.” Lt.

Kelly noted that “[a] few members of the Department have

the misconception that Weaving is arrogant,” but that neither

he nor members of Weaving’s patrol team had found this to

be the case.

Weaving applied for a promotion to sergeant in 2007. 

The application process included a “psychological leadership

assessment,” conducted by an off-site psychologist. Weaving

did not mention ADHD during the application process

because he believed he had outgrown it. The psychologist

provided a six-page report in which he described Weaving as

having a profile similar to individuals who “tend to be

dominant in interpersonal relationships.” He described

Weaving as “socially interactive” and engaging in

“cooperative and outgoing” relationships with others. He

observed that Weaving “projects a comfortable social

presence” and stated that Weaving “likely presents himself

well in just about any type of social situation and is likely to

participate with any social group.” He described Weaving as

“poised in his presentation and articulate in answering the

scenarios.”

Weaving was promoted to sergeant in April 2007. In his

annual evaluation, covering the period from May 2007

through April 2008, Lt. Kelly wrote that Weaving’s

interactions with the public were professional and that he

displayed empathy toward members of the public. Lt. Kelly

wrote that Weaving’s communication style (“[d]irectness”)

came across to officers as “arrogant” and inspired fear, but

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 7

that he personally did not have difficulties with Weaving. Lt.

Kelly wrote that Weaving was aware of his communication

issues and seemed willing to try new approaches.

Weaving’s interpersonal difficulties continued after Lt.

Kelly’s 2008 evaluation. One subordinate testified at trial

that he found Weaving’s responses to his questions

“demeaning.” Another subordinate testified that Weaving’s

responses to questions were “intimidating,” making him “feel

stupid and small.” In May 2008, a fellow sergeant wrote an

email to Weaving and two other officers complaining about

the number of “unapproved reports” that had been waiting for

him when he arrived for his shift on Sunday morning, and

questioning an earlier shift’s decision to tow two cars. 

Weaving replied in an email:

Allow me to respond to your email that by

the way is a “PUBLIC RECORD”;

. . . .

I’ll respond to the second part of your

inquisitive email [the part about the two cars]

with a metaphorical analogy. Envision a

swimming pool with a deep end and a shallow

end separated by a floating rope. . . .

There are many more potential hazards in

the deep end and a person would be foolish to

venture there without the technical expertise,

stamina and initiative to keep from drowning. 

There are countless people who are good

swimmers but still remain in the shallow end

for fear of the potential danger the deep end

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8 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

harbors. Still, there are others who

negligently and recklessly venture to the deep

end without any technical proficiency and

tragically drown. My recommendation to you

is that you remain in the shallow end where

you can splash around with the kids.

What really upsets me about your inquiry

is not the simple fact that you question my

judgment and knowledge but the manner in

which you have done so. If you have any

desire to discuss this incident further or any

other incident please do not do so in a public

record email, come and find me any day of the

week! I’m easy to locate, I’m in the deep end

so bring your water wings!

In addition, Weaving referred to some HPD officers in a

derogatory fashion, calling them “salad eaters,” rather than

“meat eaters” or “warriors,” to imply that the officers were

weak. He also criticized the language skills of a newly hired

Latino officer who did not speak English as his first language.

In March 2009, Weaving issued a several-page

disciplinary letter to a subordinate who had driven a marked

police vehicle through a surveillance area. At the time of the

incident, Weaving had verbally rebuked the officer over the

open radio. The officer believed the letter was a

disproportionate response to what he had done. He filed a

grievance against Weaving with the City Human Resources

Department. On April 7, 2009, the City placed Weaving on

paid administrative leave pending investigation of the

grievance.

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 9

Weaving testified that, while he was on leave, it occurred

to him that some of his interpersonal difficulties at HPD

might have been due to ADHD. He met with a mental health

nurse practitioner who prescribed him a low dose of

medication and referred him to Dr. Gary Monkarsh, a clinical

psychologist. Dr. Monkarsh concluded that Weaving

suffered from adult ADHD. Dr. Monkarsh testified at trial

that people with ADHD “have a hard time understanding

their emotions, the emotions of others, the ability to regulate

one’s emotions and the emotions of others, the ability to

empathize with others.” He also testified that someone with

Weaving’s characteristics “could be an excellent police

officer.”

On May 7, 2009, Dr. Monkarsh sent a letter to the HPD

Police Chief stating that he had diagnosed Weaving as having

ADHD. A day later, Weaving wrote to the City Human

Resources director informing her of Dr. Monkarsh’s

diagnosis and attaching his letter to the Police Chief. He

wrote:

My Psychologist . . . has advised me that

he is confident that with sustained treatment I

will eliminate communication issues that

currently are being considered adverse to the

work environment of the Hillsboro Police

Department (HPD). . . .

During my three years of service with

HPD I have been told multiple times by

several ranking members that my experience,

leadership and knowledge are a tremendous

asset. I’m excited about transforming an

identified weak area into an area of strength

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10 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

and becoming an even greater asset to the City

of Hillsboro. I look forward to receiving the

positive support from the City that other HPD

employees, who are afflicted with a mental

disorder or an addiction, receive.

Weaving requested “all reasonable accommodations,”

including reinstatement to his position as an active-duty

sergeant.

On June 16, 2009, Lt. Richard Goerling wrote a

memorandum summarizing the findings of the investigation

of the grievance against Weaving. The investigation,

conducted while Weaving was on leave, included interviews

of 28 HPD employees. Lt. Goerling concluded that Weaving

had “creat[ed] and foster[ed] a hostile work environment for

his subordinates and peers; in particular, he has been

described in terms such as tyrannical, unapproachable, noncommunicative, belittling, demeaning, threatening,

intimidating, arrogant and vindictive.” He wrote, “In the

short time Weaving has been employed at HPD, he has

demonstrated time and again unacceptable interpersonal

communication that suggests he does not possess adequate

emotional intelligence to successfully work in a team

environment, much less lead a team of police officers.”

On Lt. Goerling’s recommendation, the City conducted an

independent medical evaluation and evaluated Weaving’s

fitness for duty. Two doctors found Weaving fit for duty

despite his ADHD diagnosis. On November 24, 2009, the

Deputy Chief of Police sent Weaving, through his attorney,

a sixteen-page letter advising him of the City’s intention to

terminate his employment “unless you persuade me

otherwise.” The letter described in detail Weaving’s

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 11

interpersonal problems and their effect on HPD. After a

hearing, the City terminated Weaving’s employment effective

December 11, 2009.

Weaving sued the City in federal district court under the

ADA. He alleged that (1) the City fired him because he had

an impairment that limited his ability to work or interact with

others, and (2) the City fired him because it regarded him as

disabled. The case was tried to a jury. The City moved for

judgment as a matter of law at the close of Weaving’s casein-chief. The district court denied the motion. The City

renewed its motion at the close of all evidence. The district

court again denied the motion.

The district court instructed the jury that Weaving was

disabled if he had a mental impairment that substantially

limited one or more major life activities, including

“interacting with others, working and communicating.” It

also instructed the jury, over the City’s objection, that

“[c]onduct resulting from a disability is part of the disability

and not a separate basis for termination.”

The jury returned a verdict for Weaving, finding him

disabled under the ADA. It found that the City had

terminated him because of his disability. The jury awarded

Weaving $75,000 in damages. The district court awarded

$232,143 in back pay, $330,807 in front pay, and $139,712 in

attorney’s fees. The district court refused Weaving’s request

for reinstatement because of “hostility and antagonism

between” Weaving and HPD.

The City filed a renewed motion for judgment as matter

of law based on insufficient evidence to support the verdict,

as well as a motion for a new trial based on an allegedly

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12 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

erroneous jury instruction. The district court denied both

motions. The City timely appealed.

We reverse the denial of the motion for judgment as a

matter of law. We do not reach the denial of the motion for

a new trial.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo a denial of a motion for judgment as

a matter of law to determine whether substantial evidence

supported the prevailing party’s claims. Erickson v. Pierce

Cnty., 960 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1992). “Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is

possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the

evidence.” Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Can.,

833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987). “It is error to deny a

judgment [as a matter of law] when it is clear that the

evidence and its inferences cannot reasonably support a

judgment in favor of the opposing party.” Erickson, 960 F.2d

at 804.

III. Discussion

The ADA forbids discrimination against a “qualified

individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 

A disability is “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities of [the]

individual [who claims the disability],” or “a record of such

an impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an

impairment.” Id. § 12102(1). The ADA provides a

nonexhaustive list of “major life activities.” Such activities

include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 13

hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,

speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,

thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A).

A 2008 amendment to the ADA provides, “The definition

of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of

broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the

maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” Id.

§ 12102(4)(A). “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be

interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the

ADA Amendments Act of 2008.” Id. § 12102(4)(B). Those

findings and purposes specifically express Congress’s view

that prior Supreme Court and lower court cases, as well as

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

regulations, had given “substantiallylimits” an undulynarrow

construction. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(a)(4)–(8),

Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553. “An impairment

that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit

other major life activities in order to be considered a

disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C). According to post2008 regulations promulgated by the EEOC,

An impairment is a disability . . . if it

substantially limits the ability of an individual

to perform a major life activity as compared

to most people in the general population. An

impairment need not prevent, or significantly

or severely restrict, the individual from

performing a major life activity in order to be

considered substantially limiting.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Determining whether an

impairment is substantially limiting “requires an

individualized assessment.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv).

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14 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

Weaving contends that the evidence at trial shows that he

is substantially limited in the major life activities of working

and of interacting with others. We take these two activities

in turn.

A. Working

The ADA specifically lists working as a major life

activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12012(2)(A). Under our pre-2008

case law, in order to show a substantial limitation on his

ability to work, a plaintiff had to establish that his impairment

precluded working not only at a particular job, but also a class

of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. See Sutton

v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999); Holihan

v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996). The

plaintiff had to present specific evidence about relevant labor

markets in order to avoid summary judgment on a claim that

he was substantially limited in his ability to work. Thornton

v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir.

2001); Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540

(9th Cir. 1997).

The 2008 amendments to the ADA relaxed the standard

for determining whether a plaintiff is substantially limited in

engaging in a major life activity, but Weaving cannot satisfy

even the lower standard under current law. The record does

not contain substantial evidence showing that Weaving was

limited in his ability to work compared to “most people in the

general population.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). On the

contrary, there is evidence showing that Weaving was in

many respects a skilled police officer. Dr. Monkarsh and

Weaving both testified that Weaving had developed

compensatory mechanisms that helped him overcome

ADHD’s impediments and succeed in his career. Weaving’s

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 15

supervisors recognized his knowledge and technical

competence and selected him for high-level assignments. In

2007, before receiving any treatment for adult ADHD, he was

promoted to sergeant. In 2009, a psychologist and a

physician/psychiatrist both deemed Weaving fit for duty as a

police officer.

The only evidence Weaving presents regarding ADHD’s

effects on his ability to work pertains to his interpersonal

problems. He contends in his brief that “[t]he impairment of

the major life activity of ‘working’ was derivative and

resulted from the impairments of the major life activities of

communication and interaction with others.” We discuss in

a moment the lack of evidence showing a substantial

impairment of Weaving’s ability to interact with others. 

Given the absence of evidence that Weaving’s ADHD

affected his ability to work, and in light of the strong

evidence of Weaving’s technical competence as a police

officer, a jury could not reasonably have concluded that

Weaving’s ADHD substantially limited his ability to work.

B. Interacting with Others

Weaving also argues that he is disabled because his

ADHD substantially limits his ability to interact with others. 

Unlike many of our sister circuits, we have specifically

recognized interacting with others as a major life activity. Cf.

Bodenstab v. Cnty. of Cook, 569 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir.

2009) (assuming, without deciding, that interacting with

others is a major life activity); Heisler v. Metro. Council,

339 F.3d 622, 628 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); Steele v. Thiokol

Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Soileau

v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997)

(assuming, “dubitante, that a colorable claim may be made

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16 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

that ‘ability to get along with others’ is or may be . . . a major

life activity under the ADA”).

We wrote in McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d

1226 (9th Cir. 1999), that “[b]ecause interacting with others

is an essential, regular function, like walking and breathing,

it easily falls within the definition of ‘major life activity.’” Id.

at 1234. There was evidence in McAlindin that the plaintiff

suffered from panic attacks, “fear reaction[s],” and

“communicative paralysis,” which caused him to stay at

home for at least twenty hours per day. Id. at 1235. We held

that this evidence was enough to defeat the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1235–36. However, we

cautioned:

Recognizing interactingwith others as a major

life activity of course does not mean that any

cantankerous person will be deemed

substantially limited in a major life activity. 

Mere trouble getting along with coworkers is

not sufficient to show a substantial

limitation. . . .

In addition, the limitation must be

severe . . . . We hold that a plaintiff must

show that his “relations with others were

characterized on a regular basis by severe

problems, for example, consistently high

levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or

failure to communicate when necessary.”

Id. at 1235. In Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d

1053 (9th Cir. 2005), we held that a plaintiff who “avoid[ed]

crowds, stores, large family gatherings, and even doctor’s

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 17

appointments,” and who did not leave the house for weeks

after losing his job, had offered sufficient evidence of

disability to survive summary judgment. Id. at 1060–61.

The evidence in this case differs starkly from that in

McAlindin and Head. The plaintiffs in those cases were so

severely impaired that they were essentially housebound. 

McAlindin’s doctor described him as “barelyfunctional,” and

there was evidence that he “suffer[ed] from a total inability to

communicate at times.” McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235. Head

avoided contact with others, even members of his family, and

had difficulty even carrying on conversations over the

telephone. Head, 413 F.3d at 1061.

The evidence at trial showed that Weaving has

experienced recurring interpersonal problems throughout his

professional life. Those problems have had significant

repercussions on his career as a police officer, resulting, most

recently, in the termination of his employment with HPD. 

But Weaving’s interpersonal problems do not amount to a

substantial impairment of his ability to interact with others

within the meaning of the ADA. Weaving’s ADHD maywell

have limited his ability to get along with others. But that is

not the same as a substantial limitation on the ability to

interact with others. See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235; see

also Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir.

2004) (distinguishing “‘getting along with others’ (a

normative or evaluative concept) and ‘interactingwith others’

(which is essentially mechanical)”).

In contrast to the plaintiffs in McAlindin and Head,

Weaving was able to engage in normal social interactions. 

His interpersonal problems existed almost exclusively in his

interactions with his peers and subordinates. He had little, if

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18 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

any, difficulty comporting himself appropriately with his

supervisors. A case like Weaving’s is what we described in

McAlindin as not giving rise to a disability claim. 192 F.3d

at 1235; see also Weidow v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 460 F.

App’x 181, 185–86 (3d. Cir. 2012) (stating that, assuming

that interacting with others was a major life activity, a

plaintiff who failed to show that her condition caused her to

have trouble getting along with people in general was not

disabled because she was not substantially limited in her

ability to interact with others); Doebele v. Sprint/United

Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2003) (same);

Steele, 241 F.3d at 1255 (same).

As we wrote in McAlindin, a “cantankerous person” who

has “[m]ere trouble getting along with coworkers” is not

disabled under the ADA. 192 F.3d at 1325; see also EEOC

Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities

Act and Psychiatric Disabilities, U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (March 25, 1997),

http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html (“Some

unfriendliness with coworkers or a supervisor would not,

standing alone, be sufficient to establish a substantial

limitation in interacting with others.”). One who is able to

communicate with others, though his communications may at

times be offensive, “inappropriate, ineffective, or

unsuccessful,” is not substantially limited in his ability to

interact with others within the meaning of the ADA. Jacques,

386 F.3d at 203. To hold otherwise would be to expose to

potential ADA liability employers who take adverse

employment actions against ill-tempered employees who

create a hostile workplace environment for their colleagues.

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 19

Conclusion

Based on the evidence presented in this case, no

reasonable jury could have found Weaving disabled under the

ADA. His ADHD did not substantially limit either his ability

to work or to interact with others. The district court erred in

denying the City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

A jury of Matthew Weaving’s peers sat in a courtroom for

four days. They observed and listened to his coworkers, his

supervisors, his doctors, his wife, as well as Weaving,

himself. After being properly instructed on the law of our

circuit, they dutifully studied the evidence and deliberated for

eight hours over the course of two days. They found that

Weaving was disabled and that the City of Hillsboro fired

him because of his disability in violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

Now on appeal, the majority decides that it knows better. 

It reweighs the evidence on a cold record and issues its own

diagnosis: Weaving isn’t disabled, he’s just a jerk. Therefore,

the City was free to fire him. In the course of doing so, the

majority usurps the jury’s role and guts our controlling circuit

precedent, McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226

(9th Cir. 1999). Instead of following McAlindin, as it was

bound to do, the majority abrogates McAlindin sub silentio

and replaces our circuit’s standards with those announced in

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20 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

another circuit’s patently incompatible decision, Jacques v.

DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2004). I cannot concur.

I

The majority selectively reviews the evidence to cast

Weaving in an unsympathetic light.1 But there are two sides

to every story and the one that the jury heard was more

nuanced than the majority acknowledges.

The evidence showed that Weaving was diagnosed with

ADHD as a child but had been led to believe that he had

“outgrown” his symptoms.2 As an adult, Weaving had a

strong dedication to police work, and initially “was a strong

performer” as a patrol officer who was promoted to sergeant

over several others. However, he had difficulty in his jobs

both at the Beaverton Police Department and the Hillsboro

1 Significantly, the majority places undue emphasis on several incidents,

such as the “water wings” email Weaving sent to a coworker. Weaving’s

supervisor took no issue with the email when Weaving sent it, and the

supervisor initially said that he thought the email was “funny.” 

Additionally, although Weaving occasionally used terms such as “meat

eaters” and “salad eaters” to refer to his coworkers, those terms had been

used in the local police culture for a long time and Weaving was not the

only sergeant to use them. Similarly, Weaving’s supervisor approved

Weaving’slengthy reprimand of a subordinate who drove a marked police

car through a surveillance area, which later became the basis for the

subordinate’s grievance against Weaving. Moreover, although a sergeant

recalled Weaving disparaging the work of an officer who spoke English

as a second language, that sergeant agreed that the report that Weaving

was referring to was of “poor” quality.

2

In fact, although ADHD behavior can evolve over time, ADHD is

thought to be a “lifetime condition.” See ADHD: ‘You don’t outgrow it,’

Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 2013, at E5.

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 21

Police Department (“HPD”), particularly once he was

promoted beyond patrolman. In particular, his coworkers

said that: they would avoid interactions with him; he would

engage in lengthy lectures in response to simple questions; he

would send impulsive emails; he would “beat a dead horse”;

he was “socially retarded”; he made them feel intimidated

and demeaned; he lacked any awareness of the reactions of

others; and that he was hard to approach.

Lieutenant Richard Goerling’s investigation was critical

to the City’s decision to terminate Weaving. Goerling found

that Weaving had difficulty interacting with subordinates,

peers, supervisors, and informants throughout his career. 

Among other things, Goerling concluded that Weaving

refused to accept responsibility for his behavior. Goerling

also repeatedly suggested that Weaving was a bully and

intimidated his coworkers. At trial, however, Goerling

admitted on the stand that he was biased against Weaving and

that his report contained numerous inaccuracies and

omissions in what were represented as interviewees’ direct

quotations. Additionally, none of the City’s witnesses

actually suggested that Weaving had bullied or intentionally

intimidated his coworkers.

Deputy Chief Chris Skinner adopted Goerling’s

characterization of Weaving as a “bully” and suggested that

he was “hostile” in his letter advising Weaving of the City’s

decision to terminate Weaving’s employment. Despite the

fact that Weaving was found “fit for duty,”3 Skinner

concluded that Weaving was critically deficient in the area of

3 The “fitness-for-duty” assessment came as a result of a psychiatrist and

a psychologist concluding that Weaving’s ADHD would not prevent him

from returning to work as a police officer.

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22 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

emotional intelligence. At trial, Skinner testified that

Weaving’s lack of emotional intelligence was the

“foundation” of his decision. Skinner recognized that

Weaving said that he had ADHD, but suggested that

Weaving’s recent diagnosis was inconsistent with his earlier

statements indicating that he had outgrown his symptoms and

found that it did not substantially limit him in any major life

activity, including work as a law enforcement officer. 

Skinner thus concluded that Weaving was not disabled and,

in any event, that HPD could not accommodate him by

returning him to duty as a sergeant.

At trial, Weaving explained that although he was aware

that he had a history of childhood problems with ADHD, he

initially did not believe that he was affected by it as an adult

and also “didn’t want to be stigmatized as a police officer

with a mental disorder.”4 Weaving’s treating psychologist,

Dr. Gary Monkarsh, testified that Weaving displayed “one of

the clearest examples of adult ADHD I’ve ever encountered

in my clinical practice in 25 years.” Dr. Monkarsh’s

testimony suggested that much of Weaving’s problematic

behavior was attributable to his ADHD, and that it could be

successfully treated with medication and therapy. Among

other things, Weaving had been able to improve his weak

emotional intelligence—a common symptom of those

suffering from ADHD—through therapy. Dr. Monkarsh

elaborated that there is a “big difference” between someone

who is simply “a jerk” and someone who has ADHD.

4

Indeed, the City’s human resources director suggested that Weaving

might prefer to resign after he notified the City that he had ADHD because

the information would “get out” to other potential law enforcement

employers.

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 23

Driven by his love of his profession, Weaving had been

able to become a successful police officer by developing

compensatorymechanisms, such as calendaring systems, that

allowed him to prioritize his tasks and overcome some of the

effects of his disability, like slow processing speed. 

Nonetheless, Weaving was “unable to self-regulate” some of

the other symptoms of ADHD without therapy, including

impulsiveness, “not seeming to listen when spoken to, . . .

interrupting others, . . . difficultywaiting his turn, blurting out

comments without having emotional intelligence, [and lack

of] awareness of the effect that that communication would

have on his other workers at the police department.” ADHD

thus impaired Weaving’s major life activities, including his

“work.” Dr. Monkarsh also indicated that although

Weaving’s ability to articulate sounds was not impaired, his

communication was impaired because of his lack of ability to

speak with emotional intelligence.

Dr. Leslie Carter, an examining psychologist, agreed with

Dr. Monkarsh’s diagnosis. Dr. Carter explained that

Weaving had difficulty with his visual processing speed, an

ADHD symptom. Dr. Carter elaborated:

[W]hat most people find is that they are

inattentive to visual details, one thing that

they have difficulty doing is paying attention

to the facial expressions that people give. If

they take—if a person takes more than 10

seconds to register facial expressions and

respond to them, like processing speed, then

they are thought to be out of sync or

unempathetic to other people, and they don’t

feel right. And they—they make other people

irritable, because they’re not quick enough

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24 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

with their responses, and they’re not

recognizing the other person’s needs as

quickly as they should.

Despite these diagnoses, based on a “file review” and without

an actual examination, the City’s expert testified that

Weaving did not have ADHD.

In his closing argument, Weaving’s counsel explained

that he was substantially impaired in the major life activities

of “interacting with others, working and communicating,”

and continued:

Communicate, well, what does that mean?

Well, it means a lot of what Dr. Monkarsh

said, about what Chief Skinner said. Those

are emotional intelligence things about

communicating. It means not being

impulsive, not being impulsive, where these

things are coming up over and over again,

pushing those e-mail buttons, giving those 30-

minute lectures over and over and over again. 

That’s communicating.

The City argued that Weaving was not disabled.

The district court instructed the jury with the following

variant of the model instruction:

Major life activities are the normal

activities of living which a non-disabled

person can do with little or no difficulty, such

as caring for oneself, performing manual

tasks, walking, sleeping, seeing, hearing,

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 25

speaking, breathing, learning, engaging in

sexual relations, reproducing, interactingwith

others, working, and communicating.

A limitation is substantial if the disabled

person is unable to perform the major activity

or is significantly restricted in doing so, when

compared to the average person in the general

population.

Factors to consider in deciding whether a

major life activity is substantially limited

include:

(1) the nature and severity of the

impairment;

(2) the duration or expected duration of

the impairment; and

(3) the permanent or long-term impact of

the impairment.

The jury found that Weaving had proven that he had a

disability under the ADA, that the City failed to reasonably

accommodate his disability, and that the City discharged him

because of it. Nonetheless, the jury found that Weaving had

not proven that he was regarded as having a disability. The

district court subsequently awarded equitable relief in the

form of significant back and front pay in light of Weaving’s

inability to find other employment and the court’s finding that

Weaving would not be rehired in law enforcement.

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26 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

II

We review the district court’s denial of a renewed motion

for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Escriba v. Foster

Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Such a motion should be granted “if the evidence, construed

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits

only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is

contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citation omitted). In

reviewing such a motion, we must scrutinize the entire

evidentiary record and “draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party and ‘disregard all evidence

favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to

believe.’” Id. at 1242–43 (citation omitted).

III

A

Weaving’s claims were predicated on impairments in his

ability to communicate, interact with others, and work. He

contended that his disability substantially impaired his ability

to communicate and interact with others. His alternative

(unsuccessful) theory was that HPD perceived him as having

a communication disability that prevented him from working

as a police officer.

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating

against qualified individuals on the basis of a disability. 

42 U.S.C. § 12112. A “disability” is “a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). An

individual may establish coverage under the ADA based on

an actual impairment, a record of having an impairment, or

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 27

being regarded as having an impairment. Id.; 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(g)(2). Major life activities “include, but are not

limited to . . . speaking . . . communicating, and working.”5

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The current version of the

regulations, effective May 24, 2011, further indicates that

major life activities “include, but are not limited to . . .

communicating, interacting with others, and working.” 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). Additionally, the ADA provides

that: “The definition of disability . . . shall be construed in

favor of broad coverage of individuals.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(4)(A). Thus, mental impairments are covered in

addition to physical impairments. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(g)(1)(i). Such impairments consist of “[a]nymental

or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability

(formerly termed ‘mental retardation’), organic brain

syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning

disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). ADHD qualifies as

an “impairment” under the ADA. See Davidson v. Midelfort

Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1998).

There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict based

on Weaving’s ADHD substantially limiting his ability to

interact with others. However characterized, the gist of

Weaving’s primary claim all along has been that he suffered

from the type of impairment that we recognized in McAlindin

v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234–35 (9th Cir.

1999). In McAlindin, the plaintiff contended that he suffered

from anxiety and panic disorders that would cause him to

become “incapacitated” and force him to lie down “at least

once a month.” Id. at 1230–31, 1241. Among other things,

during one stress-induced incident that precipitated his taking

5 This suggests that “speaking” and “communicating” are distinct major

life activities.

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28 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

leave from work, he became agitated, accusatory, and shouted

at a supervisor. Id. at 1231.

We reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on the plaintiff’s ADA claim. Id. at 1230. We

recognized that a plaintiff with an “interacting with others”

impairment could prevail “[b]ecause interacting with others

is an essential, regular function, like walking and breathing.”6

Id. at 1234. Thus, we held that a plaintiff could prevail where

he showed “that his ‘relations with others were characterized

on a regular basis by severe problems, for example,

consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or

failure to communicate when necessary.’” McAlindin,

192 F.3d at 1235 (citation omitted). Summary judgment was

inappropriate on the plaintiff’s claim because the evidence

indicated that he “suffer[ed] from a total inability to

communicate at times, in addition to a more subtle

impairment in engaging in meaningful discussion.” Id. at

1235–36. We emphasized that the plaintiff’s claims were

supported by “clinical findings” and “medical evaluations.” 

Id. at 1235.

In so holding, we disagreed with the First Circuit, which

had found that “the ‘ability to get along with others’ was too

vague to be a major life activity.” Id. at 1234 (discussing

Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir.

6 Accord Lemire v. Silva, 104 F. Supp. 2d 80, 86–87 (D. Mass. 2000)

(“Human beings are fundamentally social beings. The ability to interact

with others is an inherent part of what it means to be human. Even if we

had the capacity to live without any human interaction, that capacity is

immaterial in view of the highly interactive society in which we live. The

ability to interact is thus both fundamental in itself and also essential to

contemporary life. Beyond doubt, the ability to interact is at least as basic

and as significant as the ability to learn or to work.”).

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 29

1997)). We noted that interacting with others was no more

vague than many other recognized major life activities, such

as “caring for oneself.” Id. at 1234–35. Nonetheless, we also

stated that merely being “cantankerous” or getting into

“trouble” with coworkers was not sufficient to show a

substantial limitation under the then-applicable ADA

standards. Id. at 1235. The dissent criticized the “interacting

with others” standard as “vague” and implying that “a

person’s foul temperament may no longer be a reason to deny

that person a job.” Id. at 1240.

In Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053,

1056–57, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2005), we reversed a grant of

partial summary judgment on a similar ADA claim where the

plaintiff suffered from the periodic inability to leave his

house. He admitted that the behavior did not occur all the

time, but asserted that it occurred “‘many times’ or ‘most’ of

the time.” Id. at 1061. Although recognizing that the

plaintiff’s impairment did not appear to be as severe as the

plaintiff’s in McAlindin, we found that it was sufficient to

avoid summary judgment. Id. at 1060–61.

In contrast, in Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192,

200–04 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit vacated a jury

verdict based on an instruction that tracked the McAlindin

standard. It held that in order to satisfy the standard for an

“interacting with others” impairment, a plaintiff must

establish that “the impairment severely limits the plaintiff’s

ability to connect with others, i.e., to initiate contact with

other people and respond to them, or to go among other

people—at the most basic level of these activities.” Id. at 203

(emphasis omitted). The court elaborated: “The standard is

not satisfied by a plaintiff whose basic ability to communicate

with others is not substantially limited but whose

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30 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

communication is inappropriate, ineffective, or

unsuccessful.” Id. In announcing this standard, the Second

Circuit disparaged McAlindin, stating:

While we accept the Ninth Circuit’s

premise that “interacting with others” is a

“major life activity” under the ADA, we

conclude that the Ninth Circuit’s test for

determining when a limitation on this activity

is “substantial” for ADA purposes is

unworkable, unbounded, and useless as

guidance to employers, employees, judges,

and juries. According to the Ninth

Circuit—whose opinion in McAlindin the

district court’s jury instructions in this case

tracked—a plaintiff’s impairment in

“interacting with others” is “substantial” for

purposes of the ADA when it is

“characterized on a regular basis by severe

problems, for example, consistently high

levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or

failure to communicate when necessary,”

McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235, so that a mere

“cantankerous[ness],” is not enough. Id.

The Ninth Circuit’s presumed

demarcation—between persons who are

“hostile” and those who are “cantankerous”—

does not exist. . . . In a similar vein, the Ninth

Circuit’s phrase, “consistently high levels of

social withdrawal,” fails to capture the

appropriate standard.

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 31

Id. at 202–03 (original ellipsis omitted). The court went on

to suggest—as the dissent in McAlindin did—that the “Ninth

Circuit approach” would frustrate “the maintenance of a civil

workplace environment” by exposing employers to the risk of

litigating hostile work environment claims by “unpleasant”

employees.7 Id. at 203.

The majority distinguishes McAlindin and Head by

claiming that Weaving was “able to engage in normal social

7 Contrary to the Second Circuit’s criticisms, the McAlindin standard

relies heavily on the existence of medical evidence to show a severe and

regular impairment and does not simply give the ill-tempered free reign

to cause havoc in the workplace. As one commentator explained:

The McAlindin standard, whereby those demonstrating

severe problems on a regular basis, such as

“consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal

or failure to communicate when necessary,” strikes a

good balance between frivolous and significant

interacting with others claims. . . . Just as an individual

in a wheelchair “may be mobile and capable of

functioning in society but still be disabled because of a

substantial limitation on their ability to walk or run,” an

individual capable of interacting with others some of

the time who nevertheless experiences significant

difficulty in doing so likewise is substantially limited in

the ability to interact with others. When applied

diligently but not insurmountably to protect those who

can demonstrate regular and severe difficulties

communicating with others and interacting within

appropriate social parameters, this standard should

effectively negate the possibility of a floodgate of

litigation.

Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity Under

the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 1139, 1194

(citations and footnotes omitted).

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32 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

interactions” and that the plaintiffs in those cases “were

essentially housebound.” Then, relying on the Jacques

standard and channeling the McAlindin dissent, it holds that

those who are capable of communicating but whose

communications may be “inappropriate, ineffective, or

unsuccessful” cannot prevail under the ADA because

otherwise, employers would be exposed to liability in the

form of actions by “ill-tempered employees who create a

hostile workplace environment for their colleagues.”

We, however, are compelled to construe the evidence in

favor of the jury’s verdict. See Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1242–43. 

Here, the evidence showed that Weaving was well beyond

being merely cantankerous or troublesome. To the contrary,

he had problems in his interactions with just about everyone

throughout his career in law enforcement. Not only was he

unable to engage in meaningful communication on a regular

basis, but his ADHD made him seem unapproachable to his

coworkers, thus completely precluding some interactions. 

Moreover, the majority’s suggestion that Weaving’s

“interpersonal problems” were limited to his interactions with

peers and subordinates is dead wrong. HPD’s own

investigation repeatedly suggested otherwise.8 His doctors

explained that his disability caused the severe lack of

emotional intelligence that the City invoked when it fired

him—he was not simply being “a jerk” who refused to

 

8 Goerling noted that supervisors regarded Weaving as “non-receptive

to constructive criticism, self-satisfying, assuming,” that Weaving filed

“formal complaints against his supervisors,” and Weaving seemed “to

create . . . interpersonal conflict everywhere he was assigned.” Skinner

concluded that Weaving was unable “to work and communicate

effectively with others in a team environment” given the “well

documented impacts of [his] past interactions with subordinates,

supervisors, and peers.”

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 33

control himself. The jury outright rejected the City’s

opposing argument that Weaving was not disabled.

Weaving’s relations with others were undoubtedly

characterized on a regular basis by severe problems including

“high levels of hostility,” “failure to communicate when

necessary” due to his perceived unapproachability, and a

constant inability to engage in “meaningful discussion.” See

McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235. That is sufficient to satisfy

McAlindin, which by its own terms, did not limit relief to the

“housebound.” Consequently, under the law of our circuit,

the jury was entitled to conclude that Weaving’s ADHD

substantially limited his ability to interact with others.9

B

The City argues that even if Weaving can prevail under

his “interacting with others” theory, the verdict should be

vacated and remanded for a new trial because he could not

prevail under his inability to “work” theory. Weaving’s ADA

claim was based on alternative predicates supporting one

legal claim. “When a general verdict may have rested on

9 Even if I were to agree that the Jacques standard is preferable as a

matter of policy, a three-judge panel cannot overrule McAlindin absent an

intervening controlling authority to the contrary. See Miller v. Gammie,

335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). No such authority exists.

Indeed, the only intervening authorities are the amendments to the ADA

and regulations, which if anything, support a more expansive

interpretation of the ADA. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.

No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (amending the ADA to

overrule Supreme Court decisions that had “narrowed the broad scope of

protection intended to be afforded by the ADA.”); 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (including “communicating” and “interacting with

others” among the list of major life activities).

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34 WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO

factual allegations unsupported by substantial evidence, we

will uphold the verdict if the evidence is sufficient with

respect to any of the allegations.” McCord v. Maguire, 873

F.2d 1271, 1273–74 (9th Cir.) (finding that a general verdict

on a single claim of medical negligence had to be upheld

where it was undisputed that four of the alleged acts of

negligence were supported by the evidence and the defendant

failed to request a special verdict form, despite the fact that

four other acts were disputed), amended on other grounds,

885 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, because Weaving

satisfied the McAlindin standard, it does not matter whether

he failed to establish that he had a work impairment.10

IV

Not all disabilities are obvious. To a casual observer,

Matthew Weaving may not appear to be disabled. But that

doesn’t give a panel of appellate judges license to brush away

the contrary medical evidence and jury findings. Mental

disabilities that cause socially unacceptable behavior are less

obvious than physical disabilities, but the Americans with

Disabilities Act protects those suffering from either form of

disability equally.

The majority may not like Matthew Weaving—or at least

the picture of him that it paints based on a cold record. But

the outcomes of our disabled litigants’ cases should not turn

10 I would also hold that the district court did not err in giving the

instruction providing that “[c]onduct resulting from a disability is part of

the disability,” which was fully consistent with our decisions in Gambini

v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 486 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2007), and

Humphrey v. MemorialHospitals Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1139–40 (9thCir.

2001).

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WEAVING V. CITY OF HILLSBORO 35

solely on the amount of sympathy they inspire. The law

protects the disabled, not the likeable. Cf. Planned

Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)

(“[N]o judicial system could do society’s work if it eyed each

issue afresh in every case that raised it. Indeed, the very

concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution

requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent

is, by definition, indispensable.” (citations omitted)). 

Because the majority has gutted our controlling precedent and

substituted its own factual findings for that of the jury, I

respectfully dissent.

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