Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05068/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05068-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General
Appellee
Edward L. Evans
Appellee
Ervin Hawkins
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

Ualted States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

ERVIN HAWKINS I 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

vs. 

EDWARD L. EVANS, Warden; 

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 95-5068 

AUG 2 2 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 94-C-178-B) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Ervin Hawkins, pro se. 

W.A. Drew Edmonson, Attorney General, William L. Humes, Assistant 

Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Petitioner Ervin Hawkins, appearing pro se, appeals the 

district court's denial of his motion to reconsider its order 

dismissing as successive his second 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for 

* After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 95-5068 Document: 01019279628 Date Filed: 08/22/1995 Page: 1 
a writ of habeas corpus. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and affirm. 

The procedural history of this case is as follows. In 1986 

Petitioner was charged in Oklahoma state court for the rape and 

sodomy of his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. On May 30, 1986, 

pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to three 

counts of first degree rape, one count of causing a minor to 

participate in lewd photographs, and one count of forcible sodomy. 

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. 

On April 18, 1992, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the district court. 

In the petition, Petitioner argued: (1) his guilty plea was 

involuntary because the trial court did not elicit a factual basis 

for the plea; (2) his counsel was constitutionally ineffective; 

(3) due process violations occurred during trial and post-trial 

proceedings; and (4) the State of Oklahoma breached the terms of 

the plea agreement. The district court referred the matter to a 

magistrate judge who recommended dismissal of the petition on 

procedural default grounds because Petitioner had failed to appeal 

his conviction in state court. After de novo review, the district 

court adopted the magistrate judge's recommended disposition and 

dismissed the petition on grounds of state procedural default. 

Petitioner did not appeal the district court's finding of state 

procedural default. 

On February 28, 1994, Petitioner filed a second petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus in the district court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner argued in his petition that: (1) he is 

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entitled to file successive habeas corpus petitions; (2) his 

guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court 

did not follow the proper procedures for acceptance of a guilty 

plea; and (3) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary 

because of the bias and prejudice of the trial court. Respondent 

moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it was 

successive pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing§ 2254 

Cases. The district court referred the matter to a magistrate 

judge who determined that in the second § 2254 petition, 

Petitioner raised the same issues that the district court had 

dismissed as procedurally barred in the first habeas petition. 

Because the petition raised the same grounds for relief raised in 

the first habeas petition, the magistrate judge recommended that 

the district court dismiss the petition as successive under Rule 

9(b). In so doing, the magistrate concluded that the finding of 

state procedural default in the first habeas petition was a 

determination on the merits for purposes of the Rule 9(b) 

successive petition doctrine. 

Petitioner objected to the magistrate's report and 

recommendation. On July 6, 1994, the district court adopted the 

magistrate's report and recommendation and denied Petitioner's 

second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On July 15, 1994, 

Petitioner filed a "Motion to Reconsider Order With Authorities" 

in the district court. On October 6, 1994, Petitioner filed a 

"Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing" in the district court, arguing 

that his allegations that his trial counsel was ineffective and 

that the State of Oklahoma breached his plea agreement required 

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the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. By order 

dated March 23, 1995, the district court denied Petitioner's 

motions for reconsideration and for an evidentiary hearing. This 

appeal followed.l 

On appeal, Petitioner contends the district court erred in 

denying his motion to reconsider. The district court erred, 

Petitioner argues, because the dismissal of his first federal 

habeas petition on the grounds of state procedural default did not 

constitute a determination on the merits for purposes of the Rule 

9(b) successive petition doctrine.2 

1 On April 25, 1995, the district court issued Petitioner a 

certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and 

Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). 

2 Petitioner also argues on appeal that the district court 

erred because: (1) it denied his motion for an evidentiary 

hearing; (2) the bias and prejudice of the Oklahoma trial court 

rendered his guilty plea involuntary; and (3) the ineffective 

assistance of his trial counsel constituted sufficient cause to 

excuse his procedural default in state court. Because we conclude 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining his second habeas petition was successive under Rule 

9(b), we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Petitioner's motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding 

issues raised in the petition. See Dever v. Kansas State 

Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1535 (lOth Cir. 1994) (district 

court's decision whether to hold evidentiary hearing reviewed for 

abuse of discretion). Under similar logic, we do not address 

Petitioner's argument regarding the voluntariness of his guilty 

plea because we find that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in dismissing his habeas petition (and the 

voluntariness issue) as successive under Rule 9(b). Finally, 

Petitioner did not appeal the district court's dismissal of his 

first federal habeas petition. By so doing, Petitioner did not 

challenge the district court's ruling that he procedurally 

defaulted in state court without cause when he failed to directly 

appeal his conviction. Because Petitioner did not appeal the 

federal district court's ruling of state procedural default, we 

reject his attempts to collaterally attack that unappealed final 

order in this proceeding by arguing that he had cause to excuse 

the state procedural default. 

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We first must determine the scope of our appellate review in 

the instant case. "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize 

no 'motion for reconsideration.'" Hatfield v. Board of County 

Comm'rs for Converse County, 52 F.3d 858, 861 (lOth Cir. 1995) 

(quoting Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (lOth 

Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 89 (1992)). We construe a 

motion for reconsideration in one of two ways. Id. "If the 

motion is filed within ten days of the district court's entry of 

judgment, the motion is treated as a motion to alter or amend the 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) ." Id. "Alternatively, if 

the motion is filed more than ten days after the entry of the 

judgment, it is considered a motion seeking relief from the 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ." Id. "This distinction 

. . . [is] significant in determining the timeliness of a notice 

of appeal, for a Rule 59(e) motion tolls the 30-day period [for 

appeal] ... while a Rule 60(b) motion does not." Id. 

Consequently, an appeal from the denial of a motion to reconsider 

construed as a Rule 59(e) motion permits consideration of the 

merits of the underlying judgment, while an appeal from the denial 

of a Rule 60(b) motion does not itself preserve for appellate 

review the underlying judgment. Artes-Roy v. Aspen, (The) City 

of, 31 F.3d 958, 961 n.S (lOth Cir. 1994); Campbell v. Bartlett, 

975 F.2d 1569, 1580 n.lS (lOth Cir. 1992). 

In the instant case, the district court denied Petitioner's 

second habeas petition on July 6, 1994. Petitioner filed the 

motion to reconsider nine days later on July 15, 1994. We 

therefore construe Petitioner's motion to reconsider as a Rule 

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59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment because the motion was 

filed within ten days after the filing of the district court's 

order denying Petitioner's second habeas petition. ~. 

Hatfield, 52 F.3d at 861. Consequently, we may review the 

district court's determination that Petitioner's second habeas 

petition was successive under Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing 

§ 2254 Cases. ~. Artes-Roy, 31 F.3d at 961 n.S. 

We review the district court's determination that a § 2254 

habeas petition is successive under Rule 9(b) for an abuse of 

discretion. Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 

1995); see also Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-19 

(1963). Rule 9{b) bars federal review of a state prisoner's 

second or successive § 2254 habeas petition "if the judge finds 

that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and 

the prior determination was on the merits." Rule 9(b) of the 

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also Parks v. Reynolds, 958 F.2d 

989, 994-95 {lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 928 (1992). "A 

federal habeas court's rejection of a petitioner's constitutional 

clairn because of state procedural default and a failure to show 

cause and prejudice must be regarded as a determination on the 

merits in examining whether a subsequent petition is successive." 

Bates v. Whitley, 19 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994); accord Shaw 

v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. 

Ct. 1301 (1993); Howard v. Lewis, 905 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 

1990). In order to reintroduce a successive claim, the petitioner 

must show that "the ends of justice would be served by a 

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redetermination" of the issues previously found to be procedurally 

defaulted. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17. 

In the instant case, Petitioner does not dispute the district 

court's conclusion that he raised in his second § 2254 petition 

the same issues that the court determined were procedurally 

defaulted in his first federal habeas petition. Nor does 

Petitioner contend "the ends of justice would be served by a 

redetermination," id., of the issues. Rather, Petitioner 

maintains that the dismissal of his first habeas petition on the 

grounds of state procedural default did not constitute a 

determination on the merits for purposes of the Rule 9(b) 

successive petition doctrine. 

We reject Petitioner's argument and follow the well-reasoned 

authority of our sister circuits that have decided this issue. 

"While a court, in dismissing a petition because of state 

procedural default . . . is not determining the merits of the 

underlying claims, it is making a determination on the merits that 

the underlying claims will not be considered by a federal court 

for reasons of comity." Howard, 905 F.2d at 1322. Thus, "[s]uch 

a determination should be considered 'on the merits' for purposes 

of the successive petition doctrine." Id.; accord Bates, 19 F.3d 

at 1067; Shaw, 971 F.2d at 184. We therefore hold that a federal 

court's rejection of a state habeas petitioner's constitutional 

claim on grounds of state procedural default is a determination on 

the merits for purposes of the Rule 9(b) successive petition 

doctrine. Consequently, we find the district court did not abuse 

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its discretion in dismissing as successive Petitioner's second 

habeas petition. 

AFFIRMED. 

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