Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01668/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01668-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cavendish Square Holding B.V.
Appellee
TNS Media Research, LLC
Appellee
TiVo Research and Analytics, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TNS MEDIA RESEARCH, LLC, dba Kantar Media 

Audiences, CAVENDISH SQUARE HOLDING B.V.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

TIVO RESEARCH AND ANALYTICS, INC., 

dba TRA, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2014-1668

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York in No. 1:11-cv-04039-SAS, 

Judge Shira Ann Scheindlin.

______________________ 

Decided: September 16, 2015 

______________________ 

MICHAEL A. ALBERT, Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.C., 

Boston, MA, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. Also represented by JOHN STRAND, ERIC J. RUTT, CHARLES T.

STEENBURG.

PERRY M. GOLDBERG, Progress LLP, Los Angeles, CA, 

argued for defendant-appellant. 

______________________ 

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Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and O’MALLEY, Circuit 

Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Tivo Research and Analytics, Inc. dba TRA, Inc. 

(“TRA”) appeals a judgment of the district court granting 

summary judgment in favor of TNS Media Research, LLC 

dba Kantar Media Audiences and Cavendish Square 

Holding B.V. (collectively, “Kantar”). Kantar initially 

filed suit in the district court, seeking a declaratory 

judgment that it did not infringe U.S. Patent No. 

7,729,940 (the “’940 Patent”). Tivo Research and Analytics, Inc. dba TRA, Inc. (“TRA”) counterclaimed, asserting 

infringement of the ’940 Patent, and also U.S. Patent Nos.

8,000,993 (the “’993 Patent”); and 8,112,301 (the “’301

Patent”), misappropriation of trade secrets, and breach of 

contract and fiduciary duty claims against Kantar. The 

district court determined at summary judgment that 

Kantar’s two categories of accused products—the Auto 

Products and the Consumer Packaged Goods (“CPG”) 

Products—did not infringe the patents-in-suit, that Kantar did not misappropriate TRA’s trade secrets, that TRA 

could not rely upon its damages expert’s testimony or 

report to support its claim for damages with respect to its 

non-patent claims, and that TRA could not seek punitive 

damages against Kantar. Ultimately, the district court 

determined that TRA only could pursue a request for 

nominal damages for its remaining breach of contract and 

fiduciary duty claims, but, was not entitled to do so before 

a jury. The parties agreed to settle that remaining claim, 

however, and the court entered final judgment. 

We affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-in part, and 

remand. Specifically, because the district court correctly 

determined that TRA’s Auto Products do not meet the 

“double blind matching” limitation, we affirm this part of 

the judgment. But because the district court’s noninfringement ruling as to Kantar’s CPG Products was 

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based on a disputed stipulation, we vacate this decision 

and remand for further proceedings. We also reverse the 

district court’s decision to dismiss TRA’s claims for misappropriation of trade secrets as a discovery sanction, and 

vacate and remand its alternative ruling that TRA’s client 

secrets and its TRAnalytics product are not protectable. 

We reverse the district court’s ruling that TRA’s financial 

projections and strategic plans are not protectable as a 

matter of law. We affirm, however, its determination that 

TRA’s product positioning secrets are not protectable as a 

matter of law. We also affirm the district court’s exclusion of the “frozen market” opinion expressed by TRA’s 

damages expert. But, we reverse its determination that, 

without this report, TRA submitted insufficient evidence 

to support a claim for compensatory damages. We also 

reverse the district court’s conclusion that TRA was only 

entitled to nominal damages on its non-patent claims 

after its summary judgment ruling, thereby mooting the 

district court’s determination that TRA was not entitled 

to a jury trial as to those claims. And, we reverse the 

district court’s conclusion that TRA is not entitled to 

injunctive relief on its fiduciary duty claims as a matter of 

law. Ultimately, although we agree with some of the 

district court’s rulings, we conclude that TRA has a right 

to a jury trial on at least a subset of its claims. Finally, 

we reject TRA’s request that the case be reassigned to 

another judge on remand.

BACKGROUND

Companies spend billions of dollars on advertising

each year hoping to reach potential customers. But it can 

be difficult to determine how effective these advertisements are. TRA sought to address this problem in the 

television context by developing techniques for processing 

television viewing data and consumer purchasing data to 

create reports that can be used to determine what households watch and what they buy. TRA claims its solution, 

implemented in its Media TRAnalytics product, allows 

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companies to target their advertisements more strategically and to assess the effectiveness of these ads. This 

solution is protected by the patents-in-suit, which all 

relate to systems and uses of consumer data in advertising. 

A. Patents-in-Suit

Specifically, the ’940 Patent is directed to a method 

for collecting, matching, and analyzing television viewing 

and consumer purchasing data to create reports determining the return on advertising investments and other 

metrics. Although there were other prior art methods for 

performing such a task, the ’940 Patent differed in that it 

claimed a method that did not require the installation of 

supplemental equipment in homes or retail locations or a 

consumer’s “opt-in” permission, all while maintaining the 

privacy of the consumer. 

Claim 71 is illustrative of the invention, and it recites:

[a] computer-implemented method for facilitating 

analysis of consumer behavior in association with 

advertising exposure or program delivery, the 

method comprising:

collecting in an advertising measurement system:

(i) clickstream data from a program delivery source of a consumer, wherein collecting the clickstream data is not dependent 

on a supplemental data collection device, 

and also wherein the collected clickstream 

data includes household level data associated with multiple consumer households;

(ii) advertising data associated with delivery of the program by the program delivery source, wherein collecting the 

advertising data is not dependent on a 

supplemental data collection device, and 

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also wherein the collected advertising data 

includes household level data associated 

with multiple consumer households;

(iii) program data associated with the program delivered on the program delivery 

source, wherein collecting the program data is not dependent on a supplemental data collection device, and also wherein the 

collected program data includes household 

level data associated with multiple consumer households; and,

(iv) purchase data from a purchase data 

source, wherein collecting the purchase 

data is not dependent on a supplemental 

data collection device, and also wherein 

the collected purchase data includes 

household level data associated with multiple consumer households; 

matching at least portions of the collected advertising data, the collected clickstream data, the collected purchase data, and the collected program 

data in the advertising measurement system at a 

household data level with a centrally located electronic computer processor configured for centrally 

processing data received from the program delivery source, the advertising data source, the program data source, and the purchase data source, 

wherein the matching further includes:

(i) grouping the collected data in association with an account identifier of each 

consumer household without processing 

any personally identifiable information

associated with the consumer household, 

and

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(ii) matching each account identifier associated with each consumer household with 

other account identifiers associated with 

the same consumer household without 

processing any personally identifiable information associated with the consumer 

household;

storing the matched advertising data, clickstream 

data, purchase data, and program data in at least 

one centrally located electronic data storage medium operatively associated with the computer 

processor;

applying at least one cleansing and editing algorithm to the matched and stored data; and,

calculating at least one true target index metric 

based on the matched and stored data.

The ’993 Patent, titled “Using Consumer Purchase 

Behavior for Television Target,” is similar to the ’940 

Patent, and is directed to a system for facilitating the 

analysis of consumer data associated with advertising 

exposure. Likewise, the ’301 Patent is directed to a 

related invention, a computer-implemented method and 

system directed towards facilitating the analysis of consumer behavior associated with advertising exposure. 

To help aid the growth of the company, TRA sought 

outside investment. It successfully went through three

rounds of financing, the first resulting in a post-money 

valuation of roughly $10 million in August 2007, the 

second resulting in a valuation of roughly $27 million in 

May 2009, and the third resulting in a valuation of roughly $54 million in May 2010. Kantar, a market research 

company, participated in these rounds via its investment 

arm, Cavendish Square Holding B.V., investing a substantial sum in each round. These investments granted 

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Kantar access to TRA’s board which, in turn, gave it 

access to TRA’s trade secrets. 

During this time, the companies also engaged in merger discussions, but these plans fell through shortly after 

Kantar spent almost two billion dollars acquiring TNS 

Media Research, a competing market analytics company. 

Soon after Kantar’s acquisition of TNS Media Research, 

Kantar released its own analytics product, which directly 

competed with TRA’s Media TRAnalytics product. It was 

during this time that TRA attempted to undergo a fourth 

round of financing, but was unable to raise the necessary 

funds. This led to a substantial drop in value and, subsequently, TiVO purchased TRA for approximately $20 

million in July 2012.

B. District Court Proceedings

Believing that Kantar’s competing product was in fact 

infringing its patent rights, TRA contacted Kantar in 

March 2011 about the product. In response, Kantar filed 

a declaratory judgment action, seeking a judgment that it 

did not infringe the ‘940 Patent. TRA answered and 

counterclaimed, alleging: (1) patent infringement of the 

‘940, ‘993, and ‘301 Patents; (2) misappropriation of trade 

secrets; (3) breach of contract; and (4) breach of fiduciary 

duty. The district court ultimately resolved every one of 

the many issues raised by these pleadings as a matter of 

law. A detailed description of the court’s multiple and 

interrelated rulings is, thus, necessary to understand the 

issues we address on appeal. 

1. Patent Claims

At the time of the district court’s November 2013 

summary judgment order, TRA asserted that Kantar’s 

two types of products—the Auto Products (comprising 

Kantar’s Rapidview Auto and Charter with Auto products) and the CPG Products (comprising its Rapidview 

Retail, Rapidview for Retail, and Charter with CPG 

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products)—directly infringed claim 71 of the ’940 Patent, 

claims 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9 of the ’993 Patent, and claims 1, 

23, 42, 47, 49, 63, 108, and 109 of the ’301 Patent. TNS 

Media Research, LLC v. TRA Global, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 2d

205, 209–14 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (“Summary Judgment Op.”). 

Kantar’s Auto Products match information regarding 

motor vehicle registrations maintained by J.D. Power & 

Associates (“J.D. Power”) with television viewing data, 

while its CPG Products match data collected from supermarket loyalty cards with television viewing data. Kantar countered that none of its accused products directly 

infringe the asserted claims, alleging that: (1) its Auto 

Products did not perform double blind matching of data as 

required by all asserted claims; (2) its CPG Products did 

not collect “purchase data” as all fifteen asserted claims 

require; (3) TRA waived any argument that its CPG 

Products infringed under the doctrine of equivalents; (4) 

Kantar’s accused products did not meet the “cleansing 

and editing algorithm to the matched and stored data” 

limitation of claim 71 of the ’940 Patent; and (5) that none 

of the accused products meet the claim limitation embodied in claim 42 of the ’301 Patent. The district court 

found that summary judgment was warranted based on 

the first three arguments, and declined to address the 

other two. 

With respect to the “purchase data” limitation, the 

parties stipulated that “purchase data” meant “data 

describing the purchase of a particular product at a given 

time, obtained from a purchase data source, such as a 

shopping loyalty card, point of sale collection means, or 

other record of a sale of a product or service.” Id. at 218

(emphasis added). Although Kantar conceded that its 

CPG Products did utilize information from “purchase data 

source[s],” it argued that its products did not meet the

“purchase data” limitation, because they did not collect

data about the time at which a purchase was made, but

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only categorized the users into types, such as heavy, 

medium, or light user. Id. 

Because the dispute between the parties concerned 

how to interpret the term “purchase data,” the district 

court found the issue was purely one of claim construction, and, thus, was amenable to summary judgment. Id.

at 243. It determined that the asserted patents distinguish between “purchase data” and “user types.” For 

example, the ’301 Patent explains that “[t]he ROI [return 

on investment] report may use the following data as 

inputs, for example: . . . purchase data; user type (heavy, 

medium, or light category purchase rate). . . .” 301 Patent 

col. 29:48–51). Although TRA argued that this distinction 

was meaningless because a classification of users into 

types necessarily must consider the users’ purchase of 

products over a given time, the district court disagreed, 

ruling that “user type” only conveys relative purchasing 

information, whereas “purchase data” requires data about 

when an actual purchase was made. Summary Judgment 

Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d at 243. Additionally, the district 

court rejected TRA’s allegation that Kantar should be 

estopped from arguing that it does not meet the “purchase 

data” limitation, because Kantar argued at the preliminary injunction stage that its current method of matching 

viewer data to purchase data was nearly identical to what 

it had been doing before TRA received a patent. Under

applicable Second Circuit law, judicial estoppel only 

applies when the court relies on a party’s prior inconsistent arguments. Here, because the district court did 

not rely upon Kantar’s assertion in denying TRA’s motion

for a preliminary injunction, it declined to find that TRA 

was estopped from raising its present argument. Id. at 

244.1 Accordingly, the district court concluded that 

1 This estoppel issue is not before us on appeal.

 

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Kantar’s CPG Products did not literally infringe the 

asserted claims.

The district court also concluded that the CPG Products did not infringe the asserted claims under the doctrine of equivalents. It found that TRA’s expert report 

only made conclusory statements about the doctrine of 

equivalents and did not mention the “purchase data” 

limitation in this discussion. Id. at 244. Because it felt 

that TRA failed to explain this theory adequately in its 

report, the district court found that TRA could no longer 

assert it. Although TRA attempted to amend its expert 

report by submitting an expert declaration during summary judgment briefing, the district court found that 

these untimely disclosures were barred under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 37(c). Thus, the district court also dismissed TRA’s 

doctrine of equivalents infringement theory for the CPG 

Products.

Regarding the accused Auto Products, both sides 

agreed that all the asserted patent claims require double 

blind matching. Double blind matching is a process 

where no data supplier provides both behavioral data—in 

this case automobile registration data and television 

viewing data—and personally identifying information—

such as names—to the same party at the same time. See 

’940 Patent, col. 9:26–34 (“[N]o single party has access to 

both household identity and household purchase or viewing behavior. A party that knows a household identity, 

for example, will not know the behavior of the household; 

likewise, a party that knows the behavior of a household 

will not know the identity of that household.”). Instead, 

one data supplier will provide a trusted third party with 

personal information and an abstract identification code 

for each household, while a second data supplier will 

provide the same third party with personal information 

and an abstract identification code. At the same time, the 

two data suppliers will each send the behavioral data 

linked to an abstract identification code to the party that

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ultimately will match the two sets of behavioral data, in 

this case the market researcher. By separating the identifying information from the behavioral data, a party, 

aside from the original data collectors, cannot know both 

the name of a person and behavioral information about 

that person. The third party will then correlate the two 

identification codes via matching personal information. It 

will then provide this correlation to the market researcher, who will use information to associate the two different 

behavioral data points, collected by the two data suppliers 

in order, to generate a market research report.

It was undisputed that in order to generate reports 

regarding the effectiveness of automobile advertisements, 

Kantar matches household automobile registration data 

and television viewing data. And, it was also uncontested

that Kantar relies upon Experian to provide it with 

automobile registration data. But the parties disputed 

whether Experian receives personally identifiable information along with the automobile registration data. To 

support its claims that Kantar’s Auto Products utilize 

double blind matching, TRA cited an unsigned draft 

contract between J.D. Power and Experian, which stated 

that J.D. Power would not send personal identifying 

information to Experian, and that Experian would use 

anonymous, blind matching to pair data from set-top 

providers, like DirecTV, with auto registration data 

provided by J.D. Power, using a unique identifier, as 

opposed to relying upon the names of consumers. Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d at 221. Kantar

disputed TRA’s interpretation of the contract, arguing 

that the contract did not address whether J.D. Power 

provides additional information to Experian and did not 

explain what “Unique Key ID” meant.

The district court agreed with Kantar. It first noted 

that TRA’s Experian contract was unsigned, and, thus, 

was of limited value. Id. at 245. But, more importantly, 

the district court concluded that the unsigned contract did 

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not contradict the declaration from Kantar Media’s president, Shabbab, who stated that “Experian . . . appends 

J.D. Power[s] purchase attribute data to the DirecTV 

[identifier], removes all [personally identifying information], and sends that data to [Kantar Media]. [Kantar 

Media] uses the same DirecTV [identifier] to correlate 

[set-top box] data with J.D. Power[s] purchase attribute 

data.” Id. In the absence of any evidence contradicting 

Shabbabb’s testimony, the district court granted Kantar’s 

motion for summary judgment of non-infringement with 

respect to Kantar’s Auto Products.

2. Trade Secret Claims

TRA also alleged that Kantar misused its confidential 

information—which Kantar received during the merger 

discussions and via its appointed board member—in order 

to assess whether to launch its competing product and to 

accelerate its own product development. But for this 

improper use, TRA contended that Kantar would have 

been unable to release a competing product as quickly as

it did. Originally, TRA asserted that Kantar misappropriated twenty four categories of trade secrets but, in 

order to streamline this case for trial, the district court 

ordered TRA to reduce the number of asserted trade 

secrets in April 2013. Following this order, TRA agreed to 

reduce the number of trade secrets to the following five: 

“(1) Media TRAnalytics’—TRA’s product—speed, reliability, scalability and performance; (2) TRA’s client lists and 

client interactions[;] (3) TRA’s strategic plans[;] (4) TRA’s 

product positioning[;] and, (5) TRA’s capital structure, 

financials, financing proposals target investor list, and 

offers to acquire or merge the company.” Summary 

Judgment Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d at 222.

After this reduction, Kantar filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, in part, that TRA could not show 

any misappropriation of a trade secret because it had 

failed to sufficiently identify any trade secret during 

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discovery. The district court agreed, ruling that TRA’s 

attempt to identify a small number of documents to 

support its five categories of trade secrets for the first 

time on the eve of summary judgment briefing was in 

violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e), which requires a party to 

supplement or correct its disclosure or response in a 

timely manner. Because allowing TRA to remedy its 

deficiency after the close of discovery would be prejudicial 

to Kantar and taxing on the district court, the district 

court dismissed TRA’s trade secret claim as a sanction 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. Id. at 239. 

The district court, moreover, concluded that, even if it 

did consider the merits of TRA’s misappropriation claims,

TRA had failed to submit sufficient evidence that would 

demonstrate that Kantar used TRA’s alleged trade secrets

or that TRA’s secrets were protectable. Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d at 239. Specifically, with 

respect to the Media TRAnalytics trade secret, the district 

court determined that TRA had disclosed most of the 

properties of the system to the public, such as its use of

application program interfaces (“APIs”) to handle legacy 

clients, and that TRA failed to provide evidence that

Kantar’s products used any of TRA’s technical information. Id. Similarly, the district court found that TRA’s 

client lists were also disclosed to various companies, that 

there was no evidence to support the claim that TRA took 

the necessary steps to protect this information, and that 

there was no proof that Kantar used these client lists. Id. 

at 240. Regarding TRA’s strategic plans, the district 

court concluded that these plans were merely goals of the 

company, which are not protectable trade secrets under 

New York law, and, thus, failed as a matter of law. Id. 

Likewise, the district court determined that TRA’s product placement strategies did not qualify as a trade secret, 

because they were mere marketing plans, which are 

unprotectable as a matter of law. Id. Lastly, the district 

court concluded that TRA’s financial information was not 

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secret because it was publicly disclosed by TRA and that,

even if the information was undisclosed, there was no 

evidence that Kantar used this information. Therefore, 

assuming arguendo that TRA was allowed to supplement 

its responses to add details regarding its trade secrets, 

the district court concluded that summary judgment 

would have been appropriate nevertheless. Id. 

3. Non-Patent Damages

In addition to arguing that TRA could not satisfy its 

burden of proving that Kantar misappropriated TRA’s 

trade secrets and Kantar infringed TRA’s patents, Kantar 

also argued that TRA could not establish that it was 

entitled to damages for Kantar’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and misappropriation of 

trade secrets. Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d 

at 233–34. TRA’s main damages theory turned on Kantar’s decisions to release a competing product and to file a 

declaratory judgment against TRA which, according to 

TRA, froze the market. Specifically, TRA alleged that 

Kantar’s actions spooked investors, because investors are 

hesitant to fund companies embroiled in litigation and are 

reluctant to invest in less-established companies—like 

TRA—when they are competing against a powerful and 

well-known company such as Kantar. Id. at 235. TRA 

estimated Kantar’s actions cost it $21–23 million. TRA 

calculated this figure by considering the value of TRA

before Kantar’s allegedly improper acts—$54 million—in 

May 2010 and after—$20 million—in July 2012 and 

reducing this figure by thirty percent because only seventy percent of this loss was attributable to Kantar. Id. at 

234. To support its damages theory, TRA submitted: (1)

an expert report by its damages expert, Melissa Bennis; 

(2) a portion of a declaration of its CEO, Mark Lieberman; 

(3) a portion of a declaration of Naveen Chopra, TiVo’s 

CEO; and, (4) a portion of a declaration of Stephen B. 

Morris, another TRA expert that had been proffered, in 

support of its motion for an injunction. Id. at 234. 

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As for TRA’s claim that Kantar’s release of a competing product caused TRA harm, the district court determined that the opinion of TRA’s damages expert, Ms. 

Melissa Bennis, did not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (“FRE”) for several reasons. 

Bennis asserted that TRA’s inability to acquire more 

financing in a fourth round of investments was caused, in 

large part, by Kantar’s decision to release a competing 

product. The district court found that this opinion, based 

solely on a temporal relationship, was insufficient to 

satisfy the rigors of FRE 702(c). Summary Judgment Op., 

984 F. Supp. 2d at 241. The district court also found that 

Bennis’s opinion was flawed because it failed to consider 

the alternative explanations given for TRA’s failure—that 

investors were concerned about TRA’s lack of revenue 

given the amount of capital already raised. Id. Lastly, 

the district court determined that Bennis’s report relied 

upon mere speculation by Chopra that Kantar’s product 

caused the market to freeze, making it difficult for TRA to 

compete. Id. For these reasons, the district court excluded Bennis’s report.

Without Bennis’s report, the only other evidence proffered by TRA to support its “frozen market” theory was 

Liberman’s testimony. But the district court found that 

his testimony was based on conjecture and could not alone 

be relied upon to justify TRA’s damages. Id. at 242. 

Thus, the district court excluded the entire theory from 

the case. Id. Without this theory, the court found no 

other basis for a request for compensatory damages and, 

thus, barred TRA from seeking any. 

As for TRA’s possible claim for nominal damages for 

TRA’s remaining non-patent claims—breach of fiduciary

and contract claims—its request for attorneys’ fees for its 

breach of fiduciary duty claim and its request for equitable relief for both claims in the form of an injunction, the 

district court concluded that Kantar’s motion for summary judgment did not dispose of these claims, and the 

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court delayed consideration of these claims until a later 

date. Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d at 242, 

246. The district court subsequently ordered the parties

to meet and confer to decide what, if any, remedies were 

still available to TRA and, if the parties disagreed, to file 

an appropriate motion. TNS Media Research, LLC v. 

TRA Global, Inc., No 1:11-cv-4039, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 

April 7, 2014), ECF No. 185 (“Damages Order”). Unable 

to reach an agreement, Kantar filed a motion to limit 

TRA’s remedies and strike its jury demand. Upon consideration, the district court granted in part the motion,

concluding that TRA was not entitled to any remedy, 

aside from nominal damages. Id. at 13.

With respect to TRA’s request for injunctive relief for 

its breach of fiduciary duty claim, the district court concluded that such relief was now moot. TRA argued that 

Kantar breached its fiduciary duty to TRA by manipulating its representative on TRA’s board to gain improper 

access to TRA’s confidential information. In light of this 

access, TRA sought to enjoin Kantar from continuing to 

breach its fiduciary duties to TRA. Since 2012, Kantar no 

longer had a representative on the board, however. Id. at 

3. With no fiduciary to enjoin, the district court concluded 

that TRA had no basis for injunctive relief. 

As for TRA’s breach of contract claim, the district 

court determined that two out of the four asserted contracts—a 2008 non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) and a 

2009 NDA—had expired, mooting a request for injunctive 

relief as to those contracts. Id. at 4. And, although the 

other two contracts—a 2007 NDA and an End-User 

License Agreement (“EULA”)—had yet to expire, the 

district court concluded that its prior summary judgment 

ruling foreclosed any relief. Under the 2007 NDA, TRA 

granted Kantar access to its confidential information. 

TRA alleged Kantar used this information to copy TRA’s

patented method of creating target indices, but the district court had already determined that Kantar’s accused 

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method of creating market research reports was different 

than TNA’s and granted summary judgment of noninfringement on this basis. Damages Order, at 5. Therefore, the court concluded that TRA could not now claim 

damages for Kantar’s alleged misuse of this information. 

Similarly, the EULA between TRA and Kantar granted 

Kantar access to TRA’s Media TRAnalytics product. TRA 

asserted that Kantar breached the contract by incorporating this information into its own products, but the district 

court had already determined that Kantar did not use any 

of TRA’s technical information related to the TRAnalytics 

product. Without evidence that TRA improperly used this 

confidential information, the district court determined 

that TRA could not pursue damages for Kantar’s alleged 

breach of this agreement. 

TRA also sought a jury trial on attorneys’ fees, based 

on the disputed contracts.2 The district court denied this 

request. It explained that attorneys’ fees are only awarded after entry of judgment unless the law requires those 

fees be proven at trial as an element of damages. Id. at 6. 

Because none of the contracts asserted by TRA included a 

provision for attorneys’ fees, the district court concluded 

that TRA could not rely on those contracts to support its 

claim to a jury trial. Accordingly, the district court found 

that TRA was not entitled to a trial on attorneys’ fees, but 

the court recognized that TRA could request those fees

after a judgment had been entered. 

Next, the district court considered whether TRA could 

recover nominal damages for its breach of contract and 

fiduciary duty claims. Id. at 7. TNS alleged that TRA 

waived any claim to such damages by failing to specifically plead them in its complaint. But, the district court 

found that this failure did not prevent TRA from pursuing 

2 The district court rejected this claim, but TRA 

does not dispute it on appeal.

 

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such relief, because a general request for damages can 

include nominal damages. Id. Thus, the district court 

found that TRA could seek nominal damages in this case. 

Id. It, however, concluded that TRA could not try this

issue to a jury, noting that TRA’s request was below 

twenty dollars—the threshold amount for a right to a jury 

trial under the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Damages Order, at 7 n.23.

In addition to its other damages theories, TRA also 

argued that the district court’s prior decision eliminating 

its frozen market theory did not foreclose its ability to 

pursue its compensatory damages theories, including “loss 

of exclusive use” and unjust enrichment. The district 

court disagreed. It first noted that it understood TRA’s 

only compensatory damages theory to be its “frozen 

market” theory, because TRA stated in its summary 

judgment briefing that it was not seeking “lost profits,” 

“lost sales,” or “price erosion.” Id. at 8. Because the 

district court had already addressed this theory in its 

resolution of Kantar’s motion for summary judgment, the 

district court found that TRA could no longer pursue any 

other theory for compensatory damages. 

The district court concluded, moreover, that even considering the merits of these alternative theories, it would

conclude that TRA’s alternative theories failed as a matter of law. Id. TRA alleged that part of its loss in value 

was attributable to its loss in the exclusive use of its trade 

secrets. The district court, however, found it already had

ruled that TRA failed to put forth sufficient evidence that 

Kantar caused any of TRA’s loss in value, thereby barring 

a “loss of exclusive use” claim. Id. at 9. As for TRA’s 

unjust enrichment claim, the district court found that

TRA’s damages expert’s brief discussion of this theory was 

legally insufficient. Thus, the district court found that

TRA had failed to meet its burden that it was entitled to 

damages under this theory. Id. at 10.

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Lastly, the district court considered TRA’s assertion 

that it was entitled to punitive damages on its breach of 

contract and fiduciary duty claims because of Kantar’s 

egregious behavior. The district court stated that, in 

order to be awarded punitive damages, one must “satisfy 

the [] ‘very high threshold of moral culpability.’” Damages

Order, at 10–11 (quoting In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl 

Ether, 725 F.3d 65, 128 (2d Cir. 2013)). Under New York 

law, a party must demonstrate that a defendant acted 

with actual malice or such reckless disregard that borders 

on criminality to be awarded punitive damages. Although

there was evidence that Kantar hoped to starve TRA for 

cash, there was no evidence that Kantar actually acted on 

those intentions. It determined that there was also 

evidence that TRA authorized the disclosure of confidential information to Kantar, which suggested that Kantar

had a good faith belief that it was authorized to share this 

information. Without any proof of egregious conduct, the 

district court concluded that TRA was not entitled to 

punitive damages. Id. at 13.

Following this decision, only TRA’s claim for nominal 

damages arising from Kantar’s alleged breach of contract 

and fiduciary duty remained. TNS Media Research, LLC 

v. TRA Global, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-4039, slip op. at 1 

(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2014), ECF No. 188. Ultimately, the 

parties agreed that it would be wasteful to conduct a 

bench trial on these claims when so little was at stake. 

Accordingly, Kantar agreed to pay TRA $1 in nominal 

damages, thereby mooting the final issue left in the case. 

The parties acknowledged that this agreement did not 

foreclose the parties from pursuing claims reinstated after 

an appeal. Id. In light of the parties’ agreement, the

district court entered a final judgment.

TRA timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).

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DISCUSSION

A. Trade Secret Claims

Trade secret misappropriation is a matter of state 

law. See Atl. Res. Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Troy, 659 F.3d 1345, 

1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The parties agree that New York 

law applies to TRA’s trade secret claims against Kantar. 

We review the grant of summary judgment under the law 

of the regional circuit. Charles Mach. Works, Inc. v. 

Vermeer Mfg. Co., 723 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

The Second Circuit reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 

210, 219 (2d Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when, drawing all justifiable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, there exists no genuine issue of material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Additionally, this court reviews 

a district court’s decision to exclude evidence and impose 

discovery sanctions under the law of the relevant regional 

circuit. See Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 

690 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In the Second 

Circuit, such rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

See Phoenix Assocs. III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 

1995); Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 

522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990).

1. Discovery Sanctions

TRA argues that the district court erroneously dismissed its trade secret claims, contending that the district 

court abused its discretion in dismissing the claims as a 

sanction for TRA’s discovery violations. First, TRA disputes the district court’s conclusion that it improperly 

waited until summary judgment to narrow its claims. See 

Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d at 239. According to TRA, it voluntarily agreed to reduce the number of 

asserted trade secrets and did so, in part, at the district 

court’s express invitation. To be punished for such a 

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reduction was improper especially considering that it had 

not violated any court order previously, which is a prerequisite to dismissal of all or part of a cause of action as 

a sanction under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Additionally, TRA claims that the district court’s conclusion that Kantar was severely prejudiced by TRA’s discovery failures is unsupported as there was no evidence 

suggesting that Kantar misunderstood TRA’s claims or 

that it required additional depositions or subpoenas for

additional documents. Because this was TRA’s only 

discovery shortcoming, it argues that there was no reason 

for the district court to issue such as a harsh sanction. 

Kantar disputes TRA’s allegations, explaining that 

TRA failed throughout the course of the litigation to 

sufficiently identify its trade secrets. For example, when 

Kantar requested more information about TRA’s trade 

secrets in June 2012, TRA conceded that its responses 

were inadequate. Although TRA amended these responses in October 2012, Kantar alleges that these amendments were still insufficient because they merely listed 

several hundred documents, without explaining how these 

documents demonstrated the existence of trade secrets. 

And, even though the district court suggested that TRA 

reduce the number of its trade secrets in April 2013, 

Kantar contends that this was not an invitation for TRA 

to supplement its deficient disclosures because the discovery deadline had passed. Because TRA failed to identify 

its trade secrets adequately, Kantar contends that the 

district court correctly concluded that TRA had violated 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) (“FRCP”). And, 

because FRCP37(c) permits a district court to exclude 

information that should have been disclosed under FRCP

26, Kantar contends that dismissing TRA’s claims was 

well within the district court’s discretion. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1)(A) provides 

that a party who has responded to an interrogatory “must 

supplement or correct its disclosure or response . . . in a 

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timely manner if the party learns that in some material 

respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has 

not otherwise been made known to the other parties 

during the discovery process or in writing . . . .” “If a 

party fails to provide information or identify a witness as 

required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to 

use that information or witness to supply evidence on a 

motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was 

substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(c) (emphasis added). 

Additionally or instead of this sanction, a district 

court:

(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure;

(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and

(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 

37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).

Id. Therefore, a failure to follow Rule 26(e) will warrant 

preclusion of omitted information, “unless the failure was 

substantially justified or is harmless.” Id. “Failure to 

timely amend a contention interrogatory can bar use of a 

theory of liability, especially when such failure results in 

prejudice to the adverse party.” N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. 

v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 1:00-cv-1898, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 15966, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2014) (citing 

Unigene Labs. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 06-cv-5571, 2010 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 67444, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2010), aff’d, 

655 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]here there is substantial prejudice to the Plaintiffs—namely, not being advised 

of the contours of [a] claim until long after the termination of discovery and the filing of dispositive motions—the 

Defendants’ failure to amend their contentions results in 

[a] claim being deemed waived.”)).

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Here, the district court concluded that TRA violated 

Rule 26 when it narrowed its trade secret claims on May 

10, 2013. We note that on April 23, 2013, the court ordered TRA to reduce its trade secret claims. In response 

to that order the parties stipulated, with the court’s 

approval, that TRA would reduce its trade secret claims 

by May 10. While this does not necessarily establish that 

TRA complied with Rule 26, it is also not clear that TRA’s 

actions—to reduce its trade secret claims on the courtapproved timeline—rise to the level of violating the rules 

of procedure. For the reasons below, we conclude the 

district court abused its discretion when it dismissed all of 

TRA’s trade secret claims as a discovery sanction. On 

remand, the district court should both address whether 

TRA violated Rule 26 and, if there was a violation, craft a 

more appropriate sanction. 

We find that the district court abused its discretion 

when it dismissed all of TRA’s trade secrets claims as a 

discovery sanction. Generally, “[a] district court ‘abuses’ 

or ‘exceeds’ the discretion accorded to it when (1) its 

decision rests on an error of law (such as application of 

the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual 

finding, or (2) its decision—though not necessarily the 

product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual 

finding—cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 277 F.3d 635, 

650 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Zervos v. Verizon N.Y, Inc., 

252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2001)). In order to determine 

the appropriate sanction for a discovery violation, the 

Second Circuit considers several factors including “(1) the 

willfulness of acts underlying noncompliance; (2) the 

efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of noncompliance; and (4) whether the noncompliant party was on 

notice that it faced possible sanctions,’” but no one factor 

is dispositive. Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555 

F.3d 298, 302–03 (2d Cir. 2009); see also SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that "these 

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factors are not exclusive, and they need not each be 

resolved against the [sanctioned] party").

Considering these factors, it is clear that a dismissal 

was an inappropriate sanction in these circumstances. 

First, there is no indication that TRA purposefully 

shirked its discovery obligations. Cf. Robertson v. 

Dowbenko, 443 F. App’x 659, 661 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting 

that willful non-compliance exists when a party has 

“repeatedly failed to respond to interrogatories and produce documents . . . in violation of the district court’s 

orders”). Instead, the record suggests that TRA actually 

tried to meet its obligations, as evidenced by its decision 

to amend its initial disclosures in response to Kantar’s 

complaint that such disclosures were deficient and the 

fact that it was not until Kantar lobbied the court in April 

2013 to order TRA to identify and limit its trade secrets in 

anticipation of trial that TRA became aware that Kantar 

still believed its disclosures were inadequate. When the 

court ordered the parties to confer in the hopes of streamlining the case, moreover, TRA responded by reducing the 

number of trade secret claims asserted. It did so within 

days of the court’s suggestion and well before Kantar filed 

its motion for summary judgment. We see no discovery 

violation which would warrant such a harsh sanction, 

especially one imposed without warning. 

There is also nothing in the record that evinces the 

district court considered the efficacy of lesser sanctions. 

World Wide Polymers, Inc. v. Shinkong Synthetic Fibers 

Corp., 694 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that a 

dismissal of a party’s damages claim was inappropriate, 

in part, because “there [was] no indication in the record 

that the district court considered any lesser sanctions”). 

Most importantly, there was no indication prior to the 

district court’s summary judgment order that TRA’s 

discovery shortcomings could result in a dismissal of its 

trade secret claims. Id. at 160 (“Parties must be given 

notice and an opportunity to respond before a cause of 

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action, or potential remedy, is dismissed as a sanction for 

failure to comply with court orders.”); cf. Sit-Up v. 

IAC/InterActive Corp., No. 05-CIV.-9292, 2008 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 12017, at *16–19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008) (before 

dismissing trade secret claims, the court afforded plaintiff 

two opportunities to amend its disclosures and warned 

them that failure to provide more detailed responses 

would result in their dismissal). Although Kantar disputes this conclusion, arguing that the district court did 

warn TRA at the April 2013 conference that its trade 

secret claims may be dismissed, a review of the record 

belies that contention. The district court did no more than 

state that Kantar’s motion for summary judgment of no 

trade secret misappropriation would be granted if the 

secrets identified did not meet the legal definition of a 

trade secret—it did not say that TRA’s claims might be 

dismissed as a discovery sanction. And, although the 

district court justified its decision because it said TRA’s 

actions were prejudicial to Kantar, the district court failed 

to explain why this was the case. See Shcherbakovskiy v. 

Da Capo Al Fine, Ltd., 490 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2007) 

(“With no findings or explanation from the district court, 

we cannot conclude that the sanction of dismissal of the 

complaint and granting of the counterclaims was appropriate.”). Thus, while the facts perhaps suggest that some 

sanction was appropriate, the record before us does not 

support dismissal. Accordingly, we reverse the district 

court’s decision to dismiss TRA’s trade secret claims. 

2. Summary Judgment of Trade Secrets

In the alternative, the district court concluded that 

TRA’s trade secrets claims would be dismissed on the 

merits even if they had not been dismissed as a sanction. 

TRA argues that this decision was incorrect because there 

were material factual disputes that prohibited it, both 

regarding whether TRA’s information was secret and 

whether Kantar wrongfully used it. 

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Under New York law, a trade secret is “any formula, 

pattern, device or compilation of information which is 

used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not 

know or use it.” Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 

395, 407 (1993) (quotation omitted). When a party alleges 

misappropriation of a trade secret, they must show: “(1) 

that it possessed a trade secret, and (2) that the defendants used that trade secret in breach of an agreement, 

confidential relationship or duty, or as a result of discovery by improper means.” N. Atl. Instruments, Inc. v. 

Haber, 188 F.3d 38, 43–44 (2d Cir. 1999). “The existence, 

vel non, of a trade secret usually is treated as a question 

of fact.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Roxen Serv., Inc., 813 

F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1987). 

In determining whether information constitutes a 

trade secret, New York courts have considered the following factors:

(1) the extent to which the information is known 

outside of the business; (2) the extent to which it 

is known by employees and others involved in the 

business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the 

business to guard the secrecy of the information; 

(4) the value of the information to the business 

and its competitors; (5) the amount of effort or 

money expended by the business in developing the 

information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which 

the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 

N. Atl. Instruments, Inc., 188 F.3d at 44 (quoting Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b). 

a. Media TRAnalytics 

With respect to TRA’s proprietary information related 

to how Media TRAnalytics operates, i.e. its speed, reliability, scalability, and performance, the district court conCase: 14-1668 Document: 58-2 Page: 26 Filed: 09/16/2015
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cluded that the evidence on the record demonstrated that 

TRA disclosed most of the product’s properties it was now 

claiming as a trade secret, and that Kantar’s accused 

products did not make use of any of the allegedly protected technical information. Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. 

Supp. 2d at 239. Because TRA failed to submit evidence 

from which a reasonable jury could find that its Media 

TRAnalytics secrets were in fact secret and that Kantar 

used this information, the district court granted summary 

judgment as to this information.

The evidence, however, does not support the district 

court’s decision. A review of the record reveals that the 

publicly available documents that allegedly disclosed 

TRA’s highly confidential information merely provided an 

overview of Media TRAnalytics. There remains an unresolved question of fact as to whether the propriety information about Media TRAnalytics was known outside 

TRA. See Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 298 

(2d. Cir. 1986) (“Secrecy is a question of fact.”). And, this 

fact is material because it bears on whether this information constitutes a trade secret. See N. Atl. Instruments, Inc., 188 F.3d at 44. Thus, it was inappropriate for 

the district court to grant summary judgment of no trade 

secret misappropriation as to the Media TRAnalytics 

secret.

The district court also erred in its determination regarding Kantar’s use of the Media TRAnalytics secret. 

TRA accused Kantar of using this proprietary information 

in order to gain a competitive advantage over TRA. It did 

not allege that Kantar incorporated TRA’s technical 

information into its own product. The district court only 

considered the later possibility and disregarded evidence 

that Kantar improperly used this secret to create a product that could compete with Media TRAnalytics product, 

something it allegedly could not have done but for its 

improper use of the trade secret. Accordingly, there is 

still a question as to whether Kantar used the proprietary 

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information, and, thus, summary judgment was improper 

under these circumstances. 

b. TRA’s Customer Information

The district court also concluded that TRA’s information regarding customer contract terms and pricing, 

customer negotiations, customer proposals, and potential 

customers were not protectable as trade secrets. Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d at 239–40. Specifically, the district court found that TRA publicly disclosed 

its clients and that there was no evidence that TRA 

attempted to develop its client list in a way that would 

render the list proprietary. Id. at 239. It also determined 

that TRA failed to provide evidence that Kantar used 

TRA’s client list. Id. at 240. Accordingly, the district 

court also granted summary judgment of no trade secret 

misappropriation as to TRA’s customer information.

With respect to customer lists and information associated with customer preferences, even where some of that 

information may be publicly available, courts have held 

that “where a company's customers are not readily ascertainable, but must be cultivated with great effort and 

secured through the expenditure of considerable time and 

money, the names of those customers are [protectable] 

trade secrets.” Tactica Int'l, Inc. v. Atl. Horizon Int’l, Inc., 

154 F. Supp. 2d 586, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quotations and 

citations omitted); see also Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. 

Northstar Agri Indus., LLC, No. 651839/2103, 2013 N.Y. 

Misc. LEXIS 5142, at *20 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (“The identity of 

a client is not a trade secret ‘where the customers are 

readily ascertainable outside the employer’s business as 

prospective users or consumers of the employer’s services 

or product.’”) (quoting Leo Silfen v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 

392 (1972)). Here, there was no evidence that TRA undertook the type of effort required to develop a proprietary 

client list. Additionally, there was unrefuted evidence 

that TRA’s customers were not secret. See Defiance 

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TNS MEDIA RESEARCH, LLC v. TIVO RESEARCH AND ANALYTICS 29

Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 

1053, 1063 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining that once a client 

list is disclosed, even if inadvertently, the “information 

ceases to be a trade secret and will no longer be protected”). Thus, the district court did not err in its analysis 

with respect to this information.

But in addition to TRA’s client list, TRA also alleged 

other client information was protectable, such as customer contract terms, customer proposals, and customer 

pricing. The district court did not, however, consider 

whether this customer data was protectable. The Second 

Circuit has recognized that such “non-business information—for example, related to customers, merchandising, cost and pricing, and systems and methods—are also 

protected.” Lehman v. Dow Jones Co., 783 F.2d 285, 297 

(2d Cir. 1986). Because the district court failed to evaluate whether all of TRA’s customer information was protectable, summary judgment that Kantar did not 

misappropriate TRA’s client information was inappropriate. 

c. TRA’s Financial Information

Similarly, the district court concluded that details 

about TRA’s capital structure, income statements, financial projections, and strategic plans were not entitled to 

protection because the information was publicly disclosed 

and there was no evidence that Kantar used the information. Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d at 240. 

We disagree. Confidential business documents alone are 

not trade secrets because these documents are “simply 

information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business [and not] a process or device for 

continuous use in the operation of the business.” Softel, 

Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Comm’ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 

968 (2d Cir. 1997); see Bear, Stearns Funding, Inc. v. 

Interface Grp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 283, 305–06 (S.D.N.Y. 

2005) (finding that financial information, including terms 

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of a loan agreement, and personal financial information, 

is not a trade secret). It is also true that market research 

and business goals are not protectable trade secrets. 

LinkCo. v. Fujistu Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (S.D.N.Y 

2002) (“Marketing concepts and new product ideas are not 

considered trade secrets. Similarly, information consisting simply of business possibilities or goals is not a trade 

secret.”); see also Hudson Hotels Corp. v. Choice Hotels 

Int’l, 994 F.2d 1173, 1177 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that a 

marketing concept is not a trade secret). Proprietary 

financial projections and strategic plans may be protectable trade secrets, however, where it is not publicly known, 

not readily identifiable without inside information, or 

otherwise complex. Here, Kantar’s appointed Board 

member allegedly learned critical proprietary plans for 

future development. TRA alleges that Kantar then decided to go into competition using this proprietary information, to which TRA claims Kantar did not otherwise 

have access. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 

TRA, we find that TRA’s allegations are sufficient to 

survive summary judgment. The district court’s summary 

judgment concerning financial information and strategic 

plans is modified accordingly; further factual development 

as to these claims remains. 

d. TRA’s Product Positioning

As for TRA’s information related to its relative position in the market compared to similar companies, the 

district court found that such information was not protectable as trade secrets. Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. 

Supp. 2d at 240. Additionally, the district court concluded 

that, even if the documents could be protected, the documents alleged to constitute product positioning secrets 

were publically disclosed. Id. 

As previously explained, “[a] trade secret is a process 

or device for continuous use in the operation of a business”—it does not encompass marketing materials. Here, 

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TRA only cites to documents that generically compare 

Media TRAnalytics to other systems on the market and 

list the potential return on investment for Media TRAnalytics’ users. Because this information is not recognized 

as a trade secret, the district court properly dismissed this 

allegation. 

B. Damages for Non-Patent Claims

1. TRA’s Frozen Market Theory

TRA also disputes the propriety of the district court’s 

decision to exclude Bennis’s opinion that Kantar’s actions 

froze the market to TRA’s detriment. TRA additionally 

contends that the district court’s decision to find that, 

absent this report, TRA had failed to produce sufficient 

evidence to establish it was entitled to compensatory 

damages was improper.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires an expert’s testimony to be based on sufficient facts or data and be the 

product of reliable principles and methods. A district 

court “should exclude expert testimony if it is speculative 

or conjectural or based on assumptions that are ‘so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith’ or to be 

in essence ‘an apples and oranges comparison.’” Zerega 

Ave. Realty Corp. v. Horneck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 

F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Boucher v. U.S. 

Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996)). But, 

when a party objects to an expert simply on grounds that 

the report is based on questionable data, this objection 

goes to the weight of the evidence and not the admissibility and, thus, does not provide a basis for excluding an 

expert’s report. Id. 

We review the district court’s decision to exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Tokai Corp. v. 

Easton Enterprises, Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 

2011); Amorgianos v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 

F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 2002). And we conclude that the 

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court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the 

“frozen market” opinion in Bennis’s report. In her report, 

Bennis explained TRA’s state in 2008 and its optimistic 

outlook for future growth. She then detailed the problems 

associated with TRA’s fourth round of financing, noting 

that many investors declined to invest because of a lack of 

strategic fit whereas others mentioned concerns about 

management structure and sales cycle length. But, 

Bennis also noted that the timing of TRA’s fourth round of 

financing occurred after Kantar decided to release a 

product that competed directly with TRA’s Media TRAnalytics product. Because the investors’ comments were 

similar to those made in prior rounds of financing, Bennis 

determined that these types of miscellaneous individual 

concerns did not hinder TRA’s ability to raise capital 

during its fourth round of investing. Instead, Bennis 

concluded that it was Kantar’s decision to enter the 

market that severely impacted TRA’s financial future. 

But Bennis did not analyze the actual impact of Kantar’s release of a competing product into the marketplace; 

she merely assumed that this factor impacted TRA’s 

market value without any explanation. Although TRA 

argues that these criticisms go to the weight—not the 

admissibility—of the report, her report merely speculates 

why TRA’s value dropped from $54 million to $20 million. 

She provides no reason why the loss in TRA’s value is 

actually linked to Kantar’s behavior aside from the fact 

that Kantar’s conduct occurred between the third and 

fourth round of investing. See R.F.M.A.S. Inc. v. So., 748 

F. Supp. 2d 244, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“As one court has 

observed, it is well settled that a causation opinion based 

solely on a temporal relationship is not derived from the 

scientific method and is therefore insufficient to satisfy 

the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 702.”). This error is 

compounded by the fact that Bennis ignored the undisputed statements from investors, who said they did not 

invest in TRA’s fourth round of financing because they 

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were concerned about TRA’s lack of revenue traction 

given the amount of capital already raised. And, on the 

fact that her opinion was based, in part, on Kantar’s 

decision to file its declaratory judgment action—which is 

not a “bad act” that could cause compensable damages for 

TRA. For these reasons, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Bennis’s expert report.3

Without this report, the district court determined that 

TRA lacked sufficient evidence to support a request for 

compensatory damages. A party need not rely upon an 

expert to demonstrate it is entitled to damages, however. 

See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1330 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014) (finding that the absence of expert testimony

did not negate the right to recover damages). While it 

may be inappropriate to allow an expert to premise an 

opinion upon no more than a temporal relationship between TRA’s dramatically divergent valuations, the jury 

is entitled to consider that fact, among others, when 

assessing TRA’s request for compensatory damages. See 

Brooktree Corp v. AMD, 977 F.2d 1555, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 

1992) (“As in damages determinations in general, the 

measurement of actual damages is a question of fact.”). 

Here, TRA had lay witness testimony from its own 

CEO, Mark Lieberman, and TiVo’s CEO, Naveen Chopra,

to support its claim for damages. “The Federal Rules of 

Evidence allow a lay witness to testify in the form of an 

opinion, provided such testimony ‘is limited to those 

opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on 

the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 

understanding of the witnesses’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.’” Lightfoot v. Union Carbide 

3 Of course, the district court has the discretion to 

allow supplemental expert reports on remand if it deems 

such reports appropriate.

 

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 34 TNS MEDIA RESEARCH, LLC v. TIVO RESEARCH AND ANALYTICS

Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting Fed. R. 

Evid. 701). A CEO with personal knowledge of his business is certainly capable of providing evidence regarding 

the impact of a new competing product and estimating the 

losses attributable to this new product. See Securitron 

Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 

1995) (stating that a company president can testify about 

“lost profits where the projection is based on evidence of 

decreased sales”). Because TRA was able to cite to other 

evidence in the record indicating that Kantar’s actions led 

to confusion in the marketplace and affected TRA’s market position and ability to raise capital, it was inappropriate for the district court to prohibit TRA from pursuing a 

claim for damages premised on its contention that Kantar’s actions had a deleterious effect on its market value.4

2. TRA’s unjust enrichment theory

TRA also challenges the district court’s decision that 

TRA was not entitled to seek damages based on an unjust 

enrichment theory. First, TRA argues that the district 

court erred when it concluded that TRA had only asserted 

one compensatory theory, i.e. its “frozen market” theory, 

and that, even if TRA had asserted more theories, the 

district court erred when it concluded TRA could not 

assert them as a matter of law. 

During the summary judgment stage, Kantar alleged 

that TRA failed to offer any admissible evidence that 

Kantar caused TRA any non-patent damages. In re4 TRA also argues that the district court erred 

when it concluded that TRA had no right to a jury trial 

solely on its claim for nominal damages regarding its 

breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims. Because we 

conclude that TRA can still pursue a theory for compensatory damages, we need not consider whether TRA was 

entitled to a trial on nominal damages alone. 

 

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sponse, TRA noted that it did not seek lost profits, lost 

sales or price erosion, asserting that its damages theory 

was based on the diminution of TRA’s value caused by

Kantar’s bad acts. Although TRA may have alluded to 

other theories to support its damages claim earlier in the 

litigation, TRA expressly limited itself during the summary judgment phase to just one theory. Accordingly, the 

district court did not err in concluding that TRA dropped 

its other compensatory damages theories before the 

summary judgment phase of the case.5

3. Punitive Damages

TRA also argues that the district court erred when it 

concluded that TRA was not entitled to punitive damages

for its breach of fiduciary duty and contract claims.6 TRA 

contends that it was at an unfair disadvantage when the 

district court entertained Kantar’s motion to strike TRA’s 

jury demand, because the district court treated this 

motion effectively as a summary judgment motion, without affording TRA the benefit of additional pages to detail 

its opposition. It alleges that the district court failed to 

address these procedural concerns, and also failed to draw 

5 At the district court, TRA also asserted a “loss of 

use” damages theory, but in its opening brief here, TRA 

does not discuss this theory. Because TRA failed to 

address this issue in its opening brief, TRA has waived

any argument regarding its “loss of use” damages theory. 

See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 

1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Our law is well established 

that arguments not raised in the opening brief are 

waived.”) (citation omitted).

6 This ruling assumed that TRA’s trade secret 

claims were no longer in the case. To the extent those 

claims result in any compensatory damages judgment, 

they may also support a request for punitive damages. 

We leave that question to be resolved on remand.

 

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all reasonable inferences in TRA’s favor when it decided 

that TRA could not pursue its claim for punitive damages. 

This was especially prejudicial, according to TRA, because 

the district court previously had limited the parties to a 

single round of summary judgment briefing. 

TRA overstates what occurred at the district court. 

Although TRA did raise its procedural concerns with the 

district court, TRA did not request additional pages or file 

a motion to strike Kantar’s purported summary judgment 

motion as untimely. Further, to the extent that TRA was 

disadvantaged by the district court’s failure to allow TRA 

to present additional evidence, TRA has not cited to any 

rule or procedure that prevented TRA from submitting 

additional documentation with its opposition to Kantar’s 

motion. Thus, it is difficult to say that TRA truly was at a 

disadvantage here. Additionally, while TRA asserts that 

the district court stated there would only be one round of 

summary judgment briefing, this statement was made 

before the district court, in its ruling on Kantar’s motion 

for summary judgment, asked that the parties attend a 

scheduling conference to address how to best proceed with 

the remaining claims. At this scheduling conference, the 

district court discussed the possibility of allowing Kantar 

to file a motion to strike, and the district court agreed to 

allow Kantar to file such a motion. See TNS Media Research, LLC v. TRA Global, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-4039 (Jan. 9, 

2014), ECF No. 164 (Transcript of Dec. 20, 2013 hearing). 

Thus, there is no reason to find that the district court’s 

procedures in disposing of TRA’s claims for punitive 

damages were improper in this case.

We agree with TRA, however, that in resolving this 

question as a matter of law, the district court did not 

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to TRA. 

Here, the district found that “TRA present[ed] no evidence 

that Kantar acted on its alleged intentions” to starve TRA 

for cash. Damages Op. at 12. But there was evidence on 

the record that Kantar “intended to starve TRA for cash,” 

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attempted to “slow and frustrate TRA’s ability to obtain 

financing,” and “disclosed confidential information in 

violation of the NDAs.” Damages Op. at 11–13. In order 

to receive punitive damages, one must demonstrate that a 

party has acted with actual malice or such wanton, willful 

or reckless disregard for a plaintiff’s rights. See In re 

Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether, 725 F.3d at 128. Intent is 

quintessentially a question of fact. See Waltree Ltd. v. 

ING Furman Selz LLC, 97 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 

2000) (“Under New York law, punitive damages are 

available in a tort action . . . Whether to award punitive 

damages . . . is a question of fact for the jury.”) And, 

where there is a genuine issue of material fact, summary 

judgment is inappropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In this 

case, TRA presented sufficient evidence to create a colorable question about Kantar’s intent to injure TRA. Thus, 

it was inappropriate for the district court to find, as a 

matter of law, that TRA could not demonstrate that it was 

entitled to punitive damages.

4. Injunctive Relief

Additionally, TRA challenges the district court’s ruling that TRA could not seek injunctive relief for its remaining non-patent claims. In particular, TRA alleges 

that the district court erred when it concluded that the 

2009 NDA had expired, thereby mooting its claim for 

injunctive relief on its breach of contract theory, and that 

relief for its fiduciary duty claim was also moot, because 

Kantar no longer had a fiduciary on TRA’s board. We 

agree with TRA’s position.

With respect to the 2009 NDA, TRA does not dispute 

that the 2009 NDA contained a confidentiality provision 

lasting for 18 months. TRA argues that, because other 

provisions of the contract were still enforceable—

especially, the term affording TRA the right to seek 

equitable relief, including an injunction, in the event of a 

breach—TRA could still pursue its claim for injunctive 

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relief based on the NDA. After a contract has expired, 

injunctive relief based upon that contract is moot. Carbon 

Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 444 U.S. 212, 214 

n.2 (1979) (“The contracts have expired, and the question 

of injunctive relief is out of the case.”); Planned 

Parenthood v. Steinhaus, 60 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1995) 

(noting that a request for injunctive relief is moot after a 

contract has expired). TRA accused Kantar of breaching 

the confidentiality provision of the 2009 NDA, but once 

that provision expired, TRA’s ability to seek injunctive 

relief was moot. The fact that other aspects of the contract remained enforceable cannot revive the NDA. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing 

TRA’s claim for an injunction under the 2009 NDA. 

The district court did err, however, in dismissing as 

moot TRA’s theory that Kantar breached its fiduciary 

duty to TRA . In its ruling, the court emphasized that

Kantar no longer has a member on TRA’s board and there 

is no indication that Kantar would rejoin its board. But 

the district court ignored TRS’s allegation that Kantar’s 

representative learned critical information during his

time of active board membership. TRA alleged that 

Kantar violated its fiduciary obligation to TRA when it 

manipulated its own TRA board member to obtain improper access to TRA’s confidential information and trade 

secrets. Under New York law, “a fiduciary relationship is 

necessarily fact-specific, and is not dependent on a contractual relationship.” Koether v Sherry, 977 N.Y.S.2d 

667, 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (citing First Keystone Consultants, Inc. v DDR Construction Services, 904 N.Y.S.2d 

113 (2d. Dept 2010)). And, a Board member’s fiduciary 

obligations do not cease when his or her term of office 

ceases. See Roslyn Union Free School Dist. v Barkan, 16 

N.Y.3d 643, 647 (2011) (reinstating cause of action for 

breach of fiduciary duty against a former board member). 

TRA’s request for injunctive relief is not moot simply 

because Kantar no longer has a representative on its 

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Board. The district court could issue an injunction prohibiting use of information learned while Kantar did have 

a representative on TRA’s Board. We find that the district court should consider a renewed request by TRA for 

injunctive relief if, after trial, TRA establishes that Kantar has breached and threatens to continue to breach its 

fiduciary duties to TRA. 

C. Patent claims

To prove infringement, the patentee must show that 

the accused device contains each and every limitation, 

literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). In this case, TRA argues that the district court 

erred when it concluded that all of TRA’s accused products do not infringe the patents-in-suit.

1. CPG Products

When determining whether a patent is infringed, the 

court must first construe the disputed claims and then 

compare the claims to the allegedly infringing devices. 

See Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012) (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 

F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 

During claim construction, the parties agreed to construe “purchase data” as “data describing the purchase of 

a particular product at a given time, obtained from a 

purchase data source, such as a shopping loyalty card, 

point of sale collection means, or other record of a sale of a 

product or service.” See Summary Judgment Op., 984 F. 

Supp. 2d at 218. But at the summary judgment stage, the 

parties contested whether they actually agreed how 

“purchase data” should be construed. In particular, the 

parties disputed if the phrase “at a given time” should be 

defined. TRA asserted that it should, because it impacted 

the scope of the claim. Kantar disagreed, arguing that 

the issue could be avoided because the accused CPG 

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Products indicated nothing at all about time, meaning

there was no need to construe what “at a given time” 

might mean. In order to resolve Kantar’s summary 

judgment motion, the district court decided to further 

construe the parties’ stipulated construction. It then 

applied this second construction to the disputed CPG 

Products, without further input from the parties. We find 

this procedure improper.

“[P]arties in patent cases frequently stipulate to a 

construction or the court construes a term, only to have 

their dispute evolve to a point where they realize that a 

further construction is necessary.” GE Lighting Sols., 

LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 

2014). Generally, when a determinative claim construction dispute arises, a district court must resolve it. See 02 

Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 

1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The purpose of claim construction is to determine the meaning and scope of the 

patent claims asserted to be infringed. When the parties 

raise an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of 

these claims, the court, not the jury, must resolve that 

dispute.”) (quotation omitted); see also Advanced Fiber 

Techs. Trust v. J&L Fiber Servs., Inc., 674 F.3d 1365, 

1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that a court may construe a 

term found only in the construction, and not in the claims, 

if the correct construction of a claim term necessitates it). 

And, although a district court has great latitude in how it 

conducts the claim construction process, the parties must 

be involved. See Ballard Med. Prod. v. Allegiance 

Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(“Markman does not require a district court to follow any 

particular procedure in conducting claim construction.”); 

Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 249 F. App’x 189, 198 

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (vacating and remanding a summary 

judgment ruling because the district court had failed to 

afford the non-moving party notice and opportunity to 

present its claim construction arguments during the 

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relevant briefing). Here, neither party was afforded the 

opportunity to present its own claim construction arguments before the district court sua sponte decided the 

claim construction issue, i.e. how to define “at a given 

time” itself. It appears, moreover, that additional input 

may have altered the court’s view of this determinative 

question. Because the district court improperly construed 

the parties’ stipulation and granted summary judgment 

based on that construction, without affording TRA or 

Kantar notice or opportunity to present argument about 

the appropriate construction, we vacate the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement 

as to Kantar’s CPG Products and remand for further 

proceedings. 

TRA also objects to the district court’s ruling that it 

could not pursue its doctrine of equivalents argument 

simply because its infringement expert did not opine 

adequately on the matter. TRA explains that it supported 

this theory with both expert and non-expert testimony, 

and that the district court erred when it found that TRA 

needed expert testimony to prove infringement under the 

doctrine of equivalents. 

TRA is correct that a party is not required to submit 

expert testimony as evidence of equivalents. See AquaTex 

Indus. v. Techniche Sols., 479 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 

2007) (stating that “evidence of equivalents must be from 

the perspective of someone skilled in the art, for example 

‘testimony of experts or others versed in the technology; 

by documents, including texts and treatises; and, of 

course, by the disclosures of the prior art’”) (quoting 

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 

U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). But, despite its contention to the 

contrary, the only evidence TRA submitted to establish 

that Kantar’s CPG Products infringed under the doctrine 

of equivalents was its expert report. See Summary 

Judgment Op., 984 F. Supp. 2d at 222 (noting that “TRA’s 

sole evidence that the CPG Products infringe under the 

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doctrine of equivalents is Mela’s [TRA’s expert] declaration”). Where the nonmoving party submits evidence that 

is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, 

summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 249. Without any other evidence for the district court 

to consider, we find that the court did not err when it 

dismissed TRA’s doctrine of equivalents theory with 

respect to Kantar’s CPG products. 

2. Auto Products

The district court also found that Kantar’s Auto Products did not infringe the asserted claims because the 

products did not perform double-blind matching. Id. at 

244–45. Accordingly, the district court granted summary 

judgment of non-infringement as to these products as 

well. On appeal, TRA argues that the district court 

improperly found that there was no evidence to support 

TRA’s claim that Kantar’s Auto Products perform this 

required step. If the district court had properly made all 

reasonable inferences in its favor, as is required during 

summary judgment, TRA argues that the district court 

would have concluded that the unsigned draft contract 

between J.D. Power and Experian was evidence that 

refuted Kantar’s claim that Kantar’s Auto Products do not 

perform double blind matching. We find TRA’s arguments unpersuasive.

Essentially, the dispute between the parties is how

the unsigned draft contract between J.D. Power and 

Experian should be interpreted—does Experian receive

the behavioral data, in this case automotive registration 

data, in addition to the personal identifying information, 

such as names, or does it simply receive an account number linked to personal identifying information from J.D. 

Power. If Experian only receives an account number, 

without information about automotive purchases, TRA 

argues that Kantar’s Auto Products meet the double blind 

matching limitation. 

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The contested contract states that “J.D. Power will deliver to Experian . . . J.D Power’s data file, which include 

the following data fields: Unique Key ID, last name, 

address, city, state, zip code (“J.D. Power Data”).” Id. at 

221. Experian then will use this information: 

solely for the purpose of performing anonymous, 

blind matching of it to certain Client data (“[Kantar] data”) provided to Experian by Client [Kantar]. Experian will run a process to associate the 

names and addresses from Client with the names 

and address from Advertiser and create a unique 

identification number that anonymously links 

common names and addresses.

Id. After Experian matches the data, it “will send the 

matched IDs to KantarMedia for use by KantarMedia in 

order to improve advertising relevance and measurement.” Joint Appendix at 1669. 

“Summary judgment of non-infringement . . . is appropriate where the patent owner’s proof is deficient in 

meeting an essential part of the legal standard of infringement, because such failure will render all other 

facts immaterial.” TechSearch L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 

F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing London v. Carson 

Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1991)

(“There can be no genuine issue as to any material fact 

where the nonmoving party’s proof is deficient in meeting 

an essential part of the applicable legal standard.”)); see 

also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986) (explaining that proof is sufficient if “the evidence 

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party”). On summary judgment, all inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. In response to a wellsupported summary judgment motion, however, to create 

a triable issue of fact the nonmoving party must proffer 

evidence sufficient for a jury to find for that party. Id. at 

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249-50. In this case, we find that TRA failed to submit 

sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue as to whether 

Kantar’s Auto Products satisfy the double blind matching 

limitation. 

In its opposition to Kantar’s summary judgment motion, TRA alleged that the “Unique key ID” is the masked 

automobile registration data, such that Experian does not 

receive both individuals’ personal information and their 

automobile registration data, but it failed to provide any 

support for this allegation. And, a review of the record 

fails to provide any further insight. Without any evidence 

regarding the meaning of “Unique key ID,” one cannot say 

that it is necessarily an abstract identification code that

does not reveal anything about and individual’s automobile registration. See TechSearch, 286 F.3d at 1372 

(“[I]nfringement must be shown literally or equivalently 

for each limitation; general assertions of facts, general 

denials, and conclusory statements are insufficient to 

shoulder the non-movant’s burden.”). But, even assuming 

that “Unique key ID” is an abstract identification code 

related to automobile registration, the unsigned contract 

states Kantar will provide Experian with the other data to 

match to J.D. Power’s data. It is unknown if Experian 

utilizes the same process when it receives masked data 

from the set-top box provider, who provides Experian with 

the television viewing data in Kantar’s Auto Products 

process. There is also no indication if this other client 

data includes behavioral information. TRA was required 

to submit sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact. There is simply no evidence that Experian

utilizes double blind matching for Kantar’s Auto Products. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting 

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summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to 

Kantar’s Auto Products.7

D. Reassignment of the Case on Remand

Lastly, TRA argues that, if this case were to be remanded, it should be assigned to a new judge. Specifically, TRA alleges that, in light of the nature, extent, and 

frequency of the district court’s errors, it would be necessary to reassign the case, in order to avoid the district 

court’s bias against TRA to permeate the case. In response, Kantar contends that such a request is moot if 

this Court affirms the district court but, even if this Court 

does remand this case, Kantar argues that TRA has failed 

to demonstrate such a serious measure is required in this 

case. Kantar cites to several instances where the district 

court made allowances for TRA, such as allowing TRA a 

surreply during summary judgment briefing, affording it 

the opportunity to present its summary judgment arguments at a hearing, and granting TRA permission to 

amend its pleadings. Further, Kantar alleges that a 

7 TRA also argues that the district court’s ruling 

regarding the “cleansing and editing algorithm” limitation 

of the ’940 Patent was erroneous. TRA acknowledges that 

this construction was not the basis for the grant of summary judgment of non-infringement, but it nevertheless 

contends that this Court should address the construction. 

Although we may review a non-dispositive claim construction, we decline to do so on the record before us. See 

Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1375 n.2 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005) (deciding to consider the construction of a term 

that “was not dispositive to the district court's decision 

[because it] may be relevant on remand”); Arlington 

Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1256–

57 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (declining to address a non-dispositive 

claim construction, in part, because more briefing was 

required to address the issue).

 

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reassignment would waste judicial resources, as the 

district court judge has spent over three years working on

the case and, therefore, is the most familiar with it. 

Accordingly, Kantar argues that reassignment is not 

warranted in this case. 

We find TRA’s extraordinary request inappropriate in 

this case. In the Second Circuit, such a request “is a 

serious request rarely made and rarely given.” United 

States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2006). 

TRA is correct that the Second Circuit does allow such 

reassignment, but the instances where the Second Circuit 

reassigned a case are much more egregious than the case 

we have before us today. See United States v. Steppello, 

664 F.3d 359, 367 (2d Cir. 2011) (assigning the case to a 

new judge after the “district judge denied [a] motion [to 

reconsider] without comment” when the Second Circuit 

had clearly addressed the same issue after the district 

court’s original decision but came to the opposite conclusion); Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 113 (2d Cir. 

2006) (“Further, while we emphasize that we have never 

found any fault in Judge Owen's skillful handling of this 

case, we believe that on the seventh anniversary of Armstrong's confinement, his case deserves a fresh look by a 

different pair of eyes. We therefore direct the district 

court to reassign the case randomly to a different district 

court judge on remand.”); Chase Manhattan Bank v. 

Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) 

(reassigning the case because the original judge “was 

required to disqualify himself” since he had a financial 

interest in a party). While we have disagreed with some 

of the district court’s rulings, we have affirmed many 

others. Because there does not appear to be any glaring 

errors that warrant a fresh set of eyes, reassignment is 

not warranted in this case.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s conclusion that there is insufficient evidence from 

which a reasonable juror could conclude that Kantar’s 

Auto Products do not infringe the asserted patent claims, 

that TRA’s product positioning secrets are not protectable 

as a matter of law, and that TRA’s damages expert failed 

to comply with Fed. R. of Evid. 702. We reverse the 

district court’s ruling that TRA’s financial projections and 

strategic plans are not protectable as a matter of law. We 

reverse the district court’s decision to dismiss TRA’s 

misappropriation of trade secret claims as a discovery 

sanction and its decision to dismiss TRA’s remaining 

trade secrets claims as a matter of law. We also reverse 

the district court’s determination that TRA was entitled 

to only nominal damages on its non-patent claims, which 

moots the propriety of the district court’s conclusion that 

TRA was not entitled to a jury trial as to those claims. 

And, we reverse the district court’s conclusion that TRA is 

not entitled to injunctive relief on its fiduciary duty 

claims as a matter of law. Lastly, we vacate the district 

court’s decision that Kantar’s CPG Products do not infringe the asserted patent claims. We remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED

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