Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-18-03804/USCOURTS-ca3-18-03804-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William M. Tyson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 18-3804 

_____________ 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

 

WILLIAM M. TYSON, 

Appellant 

______________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. No. 1-17-cr-00316-001) 

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 

______________ 

Argued: September 11, 2019 

______________ 

Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, 

Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: January 14, 2020) 

______________ 

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2 

John A. Abom [Argued] 

Abom & Kutulakis, LLC 

2 West High Street 

Carlisle, PA 17013 

Counsel for Appellant

David J. Freed 

William A. Behe 

United States Attorney’s Office 

228 Walnut Street, Suite 220 

Harrisburg, PA 17101 

Francis P. Sempa [Argued] 

United States Attorney’s Office 

235 North Washington Avenue 

P.O. Box 309, Suite 311 

Scranton, PA 18503 

Counsel for Appellee

______________ 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

______________ 

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 

William Tyson was indicted for the transportation of a 

minor to engage in prostitution and the production of child 

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2251(a), respectively. During pre-trial proceedings, the 

District Court granted the Government’s motion in limine to 

exclude mistake-of-age evidence. Tyson and the Government 

Case: 18-3804 Document: 64 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
3 

then submitted a conditional plea agreement preserving his 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. The District Court 

sentenced Tyson to concurrent terms of 180 months’ 

imprisonment for each count.

Tyson appeals the District Court’s grant of the 

Government’s motion in limine precluding him from 

introducing mistake-of-age evidence at trial. He argues that the 

District Court erred in precluding the evidence because 

knowledge of age is an element of § 2423(a) and § 2251(a). He 

also urges us to read an affirmative defense on lack of 

knowledge into each statute. We disagree. The statutes’ text, 

context, and history make it clear that knowledge of age is not 

an element and mistake of age is not a defense. Therefore, we 

will affirm the District Court’s order. 

I. 

In August 2017, Tyson contacted a seventeen-year-old 

female on Facebook to engage her in prostitution. After 

communicating for several days via Facebook and text 

messages, Tyson traveled from Pennsylvania to New York 

City. Tyson picked up the victim and her friend and brought 

them to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. He then rented several 

rooms at a Motel 6 in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania between 

August 15 and August 20, 2017. Phone records reveal that 

Harrisburg-area individuals contacted the victim to engage in 

commercial sexual activity. 

On August 22, 2017, after a relative of Tyson brought 

the victim to a Quality Inn in New Cumberland, FBI agents and 

local law enforcement recovered her during a sting operation. 

Investigators interviewed her and reviewed her phone. They 

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4 

found an August 20, 2017 video of the victim performing oral 

sex on an adult male in a Motel 6 room. The victim identified 

the man in the video as “Real,” whom the investigators 

identified as Tyson. 

On October 18, 2017, Tyson was indicted for 

knowingly transporting a minor to engage in prostitution in 

violation of § 2423(a) and producing child pornography in 

violation of § 2251(a). Before trial, the Government filed a 

motion in limine to prohibit Tyson “from eliciting evidence to 

establish ‘mistake of age’” and from asserting “mistake of age” 

as an affirmative defense. App. 21. The District Court granted 

the motion on July 11, 2018. The Court found that evidence of 

mistake of age is irrelevant to § 2423(a) and § 2251(a) because 

the statutes do not require proof of defendants’ knowledge that 

the victim was a minor. As a result, the Court excluded the 

evidence because “its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a risk that the evidence will result in unfair 

prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury” under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See App. 10. 

Tyson and the Government subsequently entered a plea 

agreement. According to its terms, Tyson and the Government 

agreed to recommend to the District Court that the sentences 

be served concurrently for a total of 180 months’ 

imprisonment. The agreement also preserved Tyson’s right to 

appeal the District Court’s July 11, 2018 order granting the 

Government’s motion in limine. On December 19, 2018, the 

District Court sentenced Tyson to 180 months’ imprisonment 

for each count, to be served concurrently. Tyson filed a Notice 

of Appeal with this Court on December 24, 2018 challenging 

the District Court’s order. 

Case: 18-3804 Document: 64 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
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II. 

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

and 18 U.S.C. §3742(a). 

This Court reviews decisions on the admissibility of 

evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Higdon, 638 

F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2011). District court conclusions on 

whether “the risk of unfair prejudice does not substantially 

outweigh the probative value of otherwise admissible 

evidence” are reviewed under the same standard. Id. We 

exercise plenary review over legal questions and district court 

rulings based on interpretations of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence. See United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 160–61 

(3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 

n.14 (3d Cir. 2000). Statutory construction determinations are 

reviewed de novo. United States v. Cochran, 17 F.3d 56, 57 

(3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). 

III. 

Tyson posits that the District Court erred in prohibiting 

evidence related to mistake of age because § 2423(a) and § 

2251(a) require knowledge that the victim was a minor to find 

a defendant guilty. He characterizes knowledge of age as an 

element of each statute. Tyson points to title 18, section 5902 

of the Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes to 

suggest that Pennsylvania law provides a mistake-of-age 

defense to a prosecution based on § 2423(a). Tyson also turns 

to a Ninth Circuit decision interpreting § 2251(a) to require a 

mistake-of-age defense to correct the statute’s supposed 

constitutional deficiencies. We disagree and join the 

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overwhelming majority of our sister circuits holding that 

mistake of age is not a defense and knowledge of the victim’s 

age is not required for a conviction under either § 2423(a) or § 

2251(a). Thus, the District Court did not err in prohibiting 

Tyson from asserting a mistake-of-age defense under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 403.1

A. 

The grand jury indicted Tyson for “knowingly 

transport[ing] [the victim], an[] individual who had not 

attained the age of 18 years, in interstate commerce, with the 

intent that [the victim] engage in prostitution” in violation of § 

2423(a). App. 15. The statute provides: 

A person who knowingly transports an 

individual who has not attained the age of 18 

years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any 

commonwealth, territory or possession of the 

United States, with the intent that the individual 

engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity 

for which any person can be charged with a 

criminal offense, shall be fined under this title 

and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. 

§ 2423(a) (emphasis added). The District Court agreed with the 

Government’s position that Tyson need not have known the 

 1

 “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one 

or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 

issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

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victim’s age in order to have knowingly transported a minor. 

Tyson argues that the Government must prove the defendant’s 

knowledge of the victim’s age under § 2423(a). He points to 

the presumption that the mens rea requirement generally 

extends to each element of a criminal statute.

In Flores-Figueroa v. United States, the Supreme Court 

explained that “courts ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal 

statute that introduces the elements of a crime with the word 

‘knowingly’ as applying that word to each element.” 556 U.S. 

646, 652 (2009).2

 Even though the mens rea typically applies 

to all the elements, the majority recognized the existence of 

special contexts where courts may deviate from that general 

presumption. See id.

Concurring, Justice Alito elaborated on examples of 

special contexts that rebut the general presumption. He 

specifically mentioned § 2423(a) as an example of a statute that 

calls for a contextual approach to statutory interpretation and 

added that circuit courts “uniformly [hold] that a defendant 

need not know the victim’s age to be guilty under [§2423(a)].” 

Id. at 660 (Alito, J., concurring). The Flores-Figueroa majority 

referenced Justice Alito’s concurrence with apparent approval. 

Id. at 652 (noting that sentences where “knowingly” only 

 2

 At issue in Flores-Figueroa was whether the term 

“knowingly” applies to all the elements in 18 U.S.C. § 

1028A(a)(1). The statute imposes a two-year sentence on 

individuals who “knowingly transfer[], possess[], or use[], 

without lawful authority, a means of identification of another 

person” during the commission of statutorily-defined felonies. 

§ 1028A(a)(1). 

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modifies a “transitive verb . . . typically involve special 

contexts . . . [a]s Justice ALITO notes, the inquiry into a 

sentence’s meaning is a contextual one”). Tyson does not 

provide a compelling reason for us to disregard Justice Alito’s 

concurrence and the majority’s recognition that the general 

presumption does not apply in all contexts.

An overwhelming number of our sister circuits that 

have considered § 2423(a)—both prior to and after FloresFigueroa—have concluded that “knowingly” does not extend 

to the victim’s age.3

 Interpreting a predecessor of § 2423(a), 

this Court held that “[t]he statute does not state or require 

knowledge of the victim’s age.” United States v. Hamilton, 456 

F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam). While Tyson is 

correct that Hamilton is not controlling authority as to the 

current statutory provision, in light of Flores-Figueroa, we are 

unconvinced that we should alter our approach. 

Arguing that the background presumption articulated in 

Flores-Figueroa applies to § 2423(a), Tyson ignores 

Congress’s clear intent that knowledge of age not be required 

for a conviction pursuant to the statute. Our role in interpreting 

statutes is to “give effect to Congress’s intent.” Idahoan Fresh 

 3 See, e.g., United States v. Lacy, 904 F.3d 889 (10th 

Cir. 2018); United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938 (4th Cir. 

2014); United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2013); 

United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2011); United 

States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Griffith, 284 F.3d 338 (2nd Cir. 2002); United States v. Taylor, 

239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Daniels, 

685 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing § 

2423(a) while interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)). 

Case: 18-3804 Document: 64 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
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v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998). 

“We . . . look to statutory context for evidence of congressional 

intent.” United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 79, 92 (3d Cir. 

2015). In considering statutory context, courts interpret statutes 

in accordance with their overall scheme. Gundy v. United 

States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019). 

Congress did not intend to require knowledge of a 

victim’s age for a conviction under § 2423(a). Congress’s 

purpose in enacting and amending § 2423(a) was to provide 

minors special protection against sexual mistreatment. See 

Taylor, 239 F.3d at 997 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105–557 (1998)). 

In the face of longstanding consensus among circuit courts that 

knowledge of age is not an element of § 2423(a), Congress has 

not added language to the statute “requir[ing] the government 

to establish the defendant’s knowledge of the alleged victim’s 

age.” United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 2006) 

(noting that Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 2423 nine times 

between 1978 and 2006). By not extending the mens rea 

requirement to the victim’s age, Congress eliminated 

offenders’ opportunity to prey on children without 

consequence by claiming ignorance of the victim’s age. Id. at 

540. A contrary interpretation would frustrate congressional 

intent to provide minors with heightened protection against 

sexual exploitation. 

The statute is best understood as establishing age as an 

aggravating factor that subjects defendants to increased 

penalties for conduct that is already prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2421.4

 Aside from § 2423(a)’s focus on minors, § 2421 and 

 4

 Section 2421 criminalizes “knowingly transport[ing] 

any individual in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent 

Case: 18-3804 Document: 64 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
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§ 2423(a) are nearly identical. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. As a 

result, those who transport individuals of any age across state 

lines to engage in prostitution are “already on notice that [they 

are] committing a crime.” Griffith, 284 F.3d at 351. Section 

2423(a) places the risk on perpetrators that the person they 

transport is a minor. Taylor, 239 F.3d at 977 (“As Congress 

intended, the age of the victim simply subjects the defendant 

to a more severe penalty in light of Congress’ concern about 

the sexual exploitation of minors.”). Requiring knowledge of 

age for a conviction under § 2423(a) would make it more 

difficult to prove sexual exploitation of a minor than an adult. 

See Washington, 743 F.3d at 942; Jones, 471 F.3d at 539; see 

also United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 227–28 (3d Cir. 

2012) (emphasizing that courts avoid absurd conclusions when 

interpreting statutes). Because knowledge of a minor’s age is 

not an element of § 2423(a), the lack of knowledge cannot be 

a defense. 

Tyson alternatively suggests that mistake of age is an 

affirmative defense to § 2423(a). However, the statute’s 

language does not create an affirmative mistake-of-age 

defense. Instead, § 2423 limits a mistake-of-age defense to a 

prosecution for a commercial sex act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 

2423(f)(2). Id. § 2423(g) (“In a prosecution under this section 

based on . . . subsection (f)(2), it is a defense . . . that the 

defendant reasonably believed that the person with whom the 

defendant engaged in the commercial sex act had attained the 

age of 18 years.”). Section 2423(a) does not contain 

comparable language. The fact that Congress included a 

mistake-of-age defense for one subsection but not another 

 

that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any [criminal] 

sexual activity.” 

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indicates that Congress intended to limit the defense to the 

particular circumstance in § 2423(f)(2). 

Tyson next argues that § 2423(a) produces a piggyback 

offense requiring the Government to prove that he violated 

some other state or federal law. He suggests that we consider 

Pennsylvania’s law criminalizing prostitution of a minor. See

18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5902(b.1)(3) (defining 

“knowingly promot[ing] prostitution of a minor”—including 

“encouraging, inducing or otherwise intentionally causing a 

minor to become or remain a prostitute”—as a third degree 

felony). Tyson invokes Pennsylvania law to claim that it 

provides a mistake-of-age defense and therefore, a mistake-ofage defense to a charge under § 2423(a).5

We do not adopt Tyson’s approach for two reasons. 

First, as the District Court noted, § 2423(a) criminalizes two 

categories of offenses: (1) engaging in prostitution and (2) 

engaging in any other sexual activity prohibited by state or 

federal law. Tyson was indicted on a prostitution charge rather 

than under the catch-all category.6

 Adopting Tyson’s approach 

 5

 Tyson cites to statutory language providing that 

“[w]hen criminality depends on the child’s being below a 

critical age older than 14 years, it is a defense for the defendant 

to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she 

reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age.” 18 

Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3102. 

6

 Tyson evokes the Seventh Circuit’s recognition that 

“Section 2423(a) creates a piggyback offense” requiring the 

Government to “show that the sexual activity after crossing the 

state line violated some other statute.” United States v. Ray, 

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would deprive the term “prostitution” of meaning since § 

2423(a) already prohibits sexual activity that constitutes a 

criminal offense. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 

(2001) (“[A] statute ought . . . to be so construed that . . . no 

clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 

insignificant.”). 

Second, even if section 5902(b.1)(3) were to constitute 

the specific offense in this case, it does not provide a mistakeof-age defense. Though Pennsylvania law does provide a 

mistake-of-age defense, it is limited to sexual offenses listed in 

Chapter 31 of Pennsylvania’s consolidated statutes. See § 3102 

(clarifying situations where the defense is available “in this 

chapter” for criminal conduct). Section 5902(b.1)(3), which is 

listed under Chapter 59, neither requires knowledge of age as 

an element of a prostitution offense nor provides a mistake-ofage defense.7

We join our sister circuits and hold that mistake of age 

is not a defense to § 2423(a) and that the Government is not 

required to prove knowledge of the victim’s age. Thus, the 

District Court did not err in concluding that mistake-of-age 

 

831 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2016). However, unlike Tyson, the 

defendant in Ray was indicted for a state offense under § 

2423(a)’s catch-all category. See id. (“The indictment charged 

Ray with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, in violation of 720 

ILCS 5/11-1.60 . . . .”). 

7

 Tyson acknowledged that Pennsylvania law does not 

recognize a mistake-of-age defense to the crime of prostitution. 

Oral Arg. at 10:48. 

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13 

evidence is irrelevant to a prosecution pursuant to § 2423(a) 

and would likely mislead the jury.

B. 

In addition to the § 2423(a) count, the grand jury 

indicted Tyson for knowingly using a minor to produce child 

pornography in violation of § 2251(a). The statute states: 

Any person who employs, uses, persuades, 

induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage 

in . . . or who transports any minor in or affecting 

interstate or foreign commerce . . . with the intent 

that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit 

conduct for the purpose of producing any visual 

depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of 

transmitting a live visual depiction of such 

conduct, shall be punished as provided under 

subsection (e), if such person knows or has 

reason to know that such visual depiction will be 

transported or transmitted using any means or 

facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or 

affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 

mailed . . . or if such visual depiction has actually 

been transported or transmitted using any means 

or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in 

or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 

mailed. 

§ 2251(a). In granting the Government’s motion in limine, the 

District Court concluded that “any evidence of mistake of age 

. . . is irrelevant” and would likely “confuse or mislead the 

jury” because the Government does not need to prove 

Case: 18-3804 Document: 64 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
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knowledge of age under § 2251(a). App. 12–14. Tyson raises 

two arguments as to § 2251(a). First, he points to a perceived 

circuit split and lack of controlling authority on whether the 

Government must prove knowledge of age. Second, even if 

knowledge of age is not an element, Tyson argues that the First 

Amendment requires an affirmative mistake-of-age defense.

Tyson claims that neither the Supreme Court nor this 

Court have definitely ruled on whether the Government must 

prove knowledge of age. In United States v. X-Citement Video, 

the Supreme Court analyzed § 2251(a) to clarify the meaning 

of 18 U.S.C. § 2252. The majority stated that child 

pornography “producers may be convicted under § 2251(a) 

without proof they had knowledge of age.” 513 U.S. 64, 76 n.5 

(1994); see also Cochran, 17 F.3d at 60–61 (concluding that § 

2252 requires knowledge of age after contrasting it with § 

2251(a)). While Tyson is correct that these cases consider § 

2251(a) in dicta, we nonetheless view them as persuasive 

authority. See In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 

2000) (“[W]e should not idly ignore considered statements the 

Supreme Court makes in dicta. The Supreme Court uses dicta 

to help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide 

because of its limited docket.”). 

To limit the persuasiveness of the § 2251(a) discussion 

in these cases, Tyson points to a supposed circuit split on the 

issue.8

 Our sister circuits, however, have unequivocally held 

 8

 Tyson cites to decisions from the First and Ninth 

Circuits to support his argument that there exists a circuit split. 

See United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581 (1st Cir. 

2015); United States v. U.S. District Court (Kantor), 858 F.2d 

534 (9th Cir. 1988). We are unpersuaded. While EncarnaciónCase: 18-3804 Document: 64 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
15 

that knowledge of age is not an element of § 2251(a).9

 “In the 

wake of the X-Citement Video decision, all of the federal courts 

of appeals that have considered the issue of scienter under § 

2251(a) have held that a defendant’s knowledge of the minor’s 

age is not an element of the offense.” Humphrey, 608 F.3d at 

960. We see no reason to depart from this consensus. Because 

of § 2251(a)’s unambiguous text and history, we join our sister 

circuits and hold that the Government is not required to prove 

knowledge of age. 

The statute’s text and history indicate that Congress did 

not intend to require the Government to prove knowledge of 

age or provide defendants with an affirmative mistake-of-age 

defense. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 171–72. Indeed, Congress 

specifically removed “knowingly” from § 2251(a)’s age 

element to facilitate enforcement of laws prohibiting the 

production of child pornography. See Cochran, 17 F.3d at 60–

61 (discussing Congress’s decision to delete “knowingly” from 

 

Ruiz is limited to an “aider and abettor’s knowledge that the 

victim was a minor,” 787 F.3d at 584, Tyson was solely 

charged as a principal. Furthermore, Kantor explicitly states 

that knowledge is not an element of the statute. 858 F.2d at 538 

(“The defendant’s awareness of the subject’s minority is not an 

element of the offense.”). 

9 See, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395 (7th 

Cir. 2011); United States v. Humphrey, 608 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 

2010); United States v. Pliego, 578 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2009); 

United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2009); United 

States v. Deverso, 518 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2008); United 

States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. 

Crow, 164 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 1999).

Case: 18-3804 Document: 64 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
16 

a draft bill due to the Department of Justice’s concern that it 

would increase the difficulty of prosecuting child pornography 

producers). 

Criminal statutes aimed at protecting children from 

sexual offenses have long been considered exempt from the 

general scienter presumption. See Morissette v. United States, 

342 U.S. 246, 251 n.8 (1952) (“Exceptions [to the common law 

presumption] came to include sex offenses, such as rape, in 

which the victim’s actual age was determinative despite 

defendant’s reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of 

consent.”). Courts are particularly reluctant to impose a mens 

rea requirement to a minor’s age because the Government is 

“entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic 

depictions of children.” See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 

756 (1982). 

Perhaps recognizing the lack of a textual or historical 

basis for a mistake-of-age defense, Tyson invites us to read an 

affirmative defense into the statute. He cites a Ninth Circuit 

decision holding that the First Amendment requires a mistakeof-age defense to a prosecution under § 2251(a). Appellant’s 

Br. 16–18 (citing Kantor, 858 F.2d at 540). In that case, the 

Ninth Circuit reasoned that the “imposition of criminal 

sanctions on the basis of strict liability . . . would seriously chill 

protected speech.” Kantor, 858 F.2d at 540. Rather than 

invalidating the statute, the majority instead recognized an 

affirmative mistake-of-age defense. Id. at 542. We decline 

Tyson’s invitation to join the Ninth Circuit in recognizing an 

affirmative defense under the First Amendment. See 

Humphrey, 608 F.3d at 960 (noting that “the Ninth Circuit 

Case: 18-3804 Document: 64 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
17 

stands alone in its determination that the First Amendment 

requires a reasonable mistake-of-age defense”).10

We are unconvinced that excluding mistake-of-age 

evidence poses a substantial risk to protected expression. 

Perpetrators are well positioned to know the age of a victim 

because they “confront[] the underage victim personally.” XCitement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.2. As for legitimate 

producers, only a small subset of pornography—that which 

involves “youthful-looking” performers—can conceivably be 

subject to criminal prosecution under § 2251(a). Malloy, 568 

F.3d at 175–76. Most prosecutions involving this subset 

include performers that are undoubtedly children rather than 

adults that appear to be young. Id. at 176. In fact, producers are 

already required to verify the ages of performers. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2257(b)(1) (requiring producers to “ascertain . . . the 

performer’s name and date of birth”). 

Even if interpreting § 2251(a) to preclude mistake-ofage evidence chills some protected speech, the risk is 

significantly outweighed by the Government’s compelling 

interest in protecting children from child pornography. 

“[S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being” of 

children is a compelling government interest. Globe 

Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). 

 10 Regardless, Kantor is of limited applicability to the 

issue at hand in this case. Kantor involved the production of a 

non-obscene film and was decided six years prior to the 

Supreme Court’s X-Citement Video decision. Kantor, 858 F.2d 

at 538 (“[N]o one claims that [the film] is obscene; the film 

would therefore enjoy the protection of the [F]irst 

[A]mendment were it not for its depiction of a minor.”). 

Case: 18-3804 Document: 64 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/14/2020
18 

Here, Tyson recorded a video of the underage victim 

performing oral sex on him. Section § 2251(a) was enacted 

precisely to protect children from the conduct Tyson engaged 

in. After all, “[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, 

upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into 

full maturity as citizens.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 

158, 168 (1944). 

We hold that mistake of age is not a defense to § 2251(a) 

because knowledge is not an element of the offense. The statute 

also does not contain an affirmative mistake-of-age defense, 

and such a defense is not mandated by the Constitution. 

Therefore, the District Court did not err in excluding mistakeof-age evidence. 

IV. 

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we will 

affirm the District Court’s grant of the Government’s motion 

in limine precluding mistake-of-age evidence. 

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