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Sealed Case

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 7, 2001 Decided March 22, 2002

Nos. 00-3123 and 00-3124

In re: Sealed Case

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00106-01)

(No. 97cr00093-01)

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for the appellant. A.J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender, was on brief.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,

United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, William J.

O'Malley, Jr. and James H. Dinan, Assistant United States

Attorneys, were on brief for the appellee.

Before: Edwards, Henderson and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: This consolidated appeal arises from two criminal proceedings involving

the appellant. In Cr. No. 96-106-01, the appellant was

convicted by a jury of possessing with intent to distribute

cocaine base; in Cr. No. 97-93-01, he pleaded guilty to a drug

conspiracy charge pursuant to a plea agreement. The two

cases were consolidated for sentencing and appeal (Nos.

00-3123 and 00-3124). On appeal, the appellant seeks to

vacate his guilty plea in Cr. No. 97-93-01, claiming that the

district court did not comply with Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure. In particular, he contends that

the district court failed to ensure that he understood the

elements of the conspiracy charge to which he was pleading

guilty. If the Rule 11 plea colloquy is deficient, the appellant

further contends, the waiver provision of the plea agreement--which would otherwise bar his appeal of the jury trial

conviction in Cr. No. 96-106-01--is ineffective. His conviction after trial should be reversed, he asserts, because (1) the

district court gave a constitutionally deficient reasonable

doubt instruction to the jury and (2) the prosecutor made

several errors which cumulatively constitute "plain error."

We conclude that the district court accepted the appellant's

guilty plea in compliance with Rule 11 and, accordingly,

affirm the appellant's convictions in both cases.

I.

On April 4, 1996 a one-count indictment was filed in Cr. No.

96-106-01 charging the appellant with possessing with intent

to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

ss 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). His jury trial began on October 16,

1996 and the jury convicted him on October 21, 1996. Before

sentencing, the appellant decided to cooperate with the government in an attempt to reduce his sentencing exposure.

Subsequently, on March 4, 1997, the government filed in

district court a one-count information, in Cr. No. 97-93-01,

charging the appellant with conspiracy to distribute and to

possess with intent to distribute one hundred kilograms or

more of cannabis and five or more grams of cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 846. The

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conspiracy, which was alleged to have begun in 1990 and

continued until September 1996, included the offense conduct

set forth in Cr. No. 96-106-01 as one of the overt acts in

furtherance thereof. On the same day the information was

filed, the appellant signed a plea agreement and entered a

guilty plea to the information. According to the plea agreement, he agreed to cooperate with the government in return

for the government's promise to dismiss charges against him

in two pending District of Columbia Superior Court cases

and, depending on his level of cooperation, to file a "substantial assistance" downward departure motion. United States

Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, s 5K1.1 (Nov.

2001).

The appellant failed to appear for sentencing in the consolidated cases and a bench warrant was issued. After his arrest

on the warrant and his counsel's withdrawal, his new lawyer

filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the ground of

ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held a

hearing and on July 12, 2000 denied the motion. It sentenced

the appellant to concurrent sentences of 151 months in each

case and ordered him to serve supervised terms of release of

three years in Cr. No. 96-106-01 and four years in Cr. No.

97-93-01. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in

each case and on June 28, 2001 this court granted his motion

to consolidate.

II.

The appellant first asks this court to vacate his guilty plea

on the ground that the district court accepted his plea in

violation of Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

He contends that although the district court informed him of

the charge, it failed to detail the elements of the crime of

conspiracy and, consequently, did not ascertain that he understood the nature of the charge to which he was pleading

guilty. Accordingly, he argues that the guilty plea proceeding did not comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) and his plea

must be vacated. Ordinarily, if Rule 11 error occurs during a

plea hearing, the government bears the burden of demonUSCA Case #00-3123 Document #666905 Filed: 03/22/2002 Page 3 of 10
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strating that the error was harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(h) ("[a]ny variance from the procedures required by this

rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded"); see also United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1321, 1322

n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995). If the defendant allows an alleged error

to pass without objection, however, he then assumes the

burden of meeting the more exacting plain error requirement

of Rule 52(b), Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). See United States v.

Vonn, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 1048 (2002). Because the appellant

made no objection at the plea hearing, he has the burden to

show that the district court's alleged Rule 11 violation implicated "substantial rights" and that the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings." See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-

36 (1993).

Entry of a guilty plea is governed by Rule 11, Fed. R.

Crim. P., which provides in relevant part:

Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty

or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant

personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and

determine that the defendant understands, the following:

(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered,

the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any,

and the maximum possible penalty provided by law....

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). Regarding the requirement to

inform the defendant of "the nature of the charge," we have

adopted a standard mandating that the court "have a colloquy

with the defendant that would lead a reasonable person to

believe that the defendant understood the nature of the

charge." United States v. Dewalt, 92 F.3d 1209, 1212 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Frye, 738 F.3d 196, 201

(7th Cir. 1984)). We look to the "totality of the circumstances" to determine if the plea was properly accepted. See,

e.g., United States v. Liboro, 10 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir.

1993). In addition to the judge's inquiry, the circumstances

we consider include: the defendant's level of intelligence;

whether he was represented by counsel; the complexity of

the charge against him; and his own statements at the plea

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hearing. See United States v. Musa, 946 F.3d 1297, 1304 (7th

Cir. 1991) (cited approvingly in Dewalt, 92 F.3d at 1212).

Rule 11 prescribes a procedure " 'designed to assist the

district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary ...

[and] to produce a complete record at the time the plea is

entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination.' " Dewalt, 92 F.3d at 1211-12 (quoting McCarthy v.

United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969)). A guilty plea is not

"voluntary in the sense that it constitute[s] an intelligent

admission that [the defendant] committed the offense unless

the defendant received 'real notice of the true nature of the

charge against him, the first and most universally recognized

requirement of due process.' " Henderson v. Morgan, 426

U.S. 637, 645 (1976) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court

also recognized that each case presents its own facts and, as a

consequence, declined to delineate a specific procedure for a

trial court to follow beyond the language of the rule itself,

observing that "[i]n all such inquiries, [m]atters of reality, and

not mere ritual should be controlling." McCarthy v. United

States, 394 U.S. at 467 n.20 (internal quotations omitted).

During the plea colloquy, in response to the district court's

inquiries, the appellant stated that he was twenty-two years

old, had an eleventh-grade education and had no difficulty

communicating in English. 3/4/97 Tr. at 2. He also affirmed

that he had been allowed sufficient time to discuss the plea

with his lawyer and that he was satisfied with his lawyer's

services. Id. at 3. The court then asked if he understood

that he was "charged with conspiracy to distribute and to

possess with intent to distribute one hundred kilograms or

more of cannabis and five or more grams of cocaine base?"

Id. at 5. The appellant replied "yes." Id. at 6. Later, the

court inquired, "Did you, as charged in this information, ...

conspire with [the co-conspirators] and other people to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a large quantity

of marijuana and crack cocaine?" Id. at 10-11. The appellant initially responded "just marijuana, sir." The district

court then asked, "I beg your pardon?" The appellant responded, "It wasn't crack cocaine. I didn't conspire with

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them on crack cocaine." 3/4/97 Tr. 10-11 (emphasis added).

After the appellant conferred with his lawyer, the district

court then repeated the question and the appellant responded

"yes."1 That he used the word "conspire" to describe (and

minimize) his criminal conduct indicates that he indeed understood the nature of the conspiracy charge against him. While

the appellant argues that he was simply parroting the court's

terminology, see Reply Br. at 6, the fact that he used the

word in a contextually appropriate manner is, we believe,

significant. His own words, in combination with the other

evidence detailed below, lead us to conclude that a "reasonable person" would believe that the appellant understood the

nature of the conspiracy charge. See Dewalt, 92 F.3d at

1212.

The district court also considered the factual proffer filed in

the case, which the appellant acknowledged he had read, and

with which, by his signature on the sixth page thereof, he

indicated that he agreed. In the proffer, he admitted that he

"participated in a loosely knit, violent drug organization that

sold crack cocaine and marijuana" and that "the members or

the organization protected the [ ] housing complex as its own

open air drug market ... and cooperated to protect each

other from detection by police." See Appellant's App. at 14.

The appellant further acknowledged in the proffer that he

"sold marijuana at [location] with [the] co-conspirators ...,

and others known and unknown to the government." Id. at

15. As part of their modus operandi, "the members took

turns selling to customers in order to allow everyone to profit,

and warned one another when the police came into the area

to protect against arrest and seizure of drugs." Id. at 15.

He also admitted selling cocaine base in the area named in

the proffer in a similar manner. Id. at 15.

Despite his assurances to the contrary during the plea

hearing, the appellant now claims he in fact lacked the

__________

1 The appellant's lawyer explained his client's initial response by

stating, "with regard to cocaine, my client admitted that in the last

case that was tried before your honor, in the process of that period

of time he sold some crack cocaine." 3/4/97 Tr.at 11.

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requisite understanding of the crime to which he pleaded

guilty because the district court did not adequately explain

the elements of the crime of conspiracy. Neither Rule 11 nor

case law, however, "specifies the minimum that a district

judge must do to inform the defendant of the nature of the

charge." Dewalt, 92 F.3d at 1212. In particular, we have

held that Rule 11(c)(1) does not require that the district court

spell out the elements of the charge in order to inform the

defendant adequately. See Liboro, 10 F.3d at 865. In Liboro, we stated that "[t]he contention that ... the judge must

deliver to the defendant the equivalent of a jury charge finds

no support in the language of [Rule 11] and runs counter to

the legislative history. There is no requirement that the

elements of the offense be explained." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).2 While the district court must

assure itself that the defendant understands the nature of the

charge to which he is pleading so that his plea is a knowing

one, it need not, in every case, specially isolate each element

of the particular crime.

As noted earlier, the complexity of the charge is another of

the circumstances we consider in determining whether the

defendant's guilty plea was a knowing one. The United

States Supreme Court long ago declared that a conspiracy is

simply "a partnership in criminal purposes." United States v.

Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910). The elements of the crime of

conspiracy are (1) an agreement to commit a specific offense

(here, drug possession/distribution); (2) knowing participation

in the conspiracy with the intent to commit the offense; and

(3) commission of at least one overt act in furtherance of the

conspiracy. See United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 737

(D.C. Cir. 1998). As set forth in Instruction 4.92 of our

circuit's district court "Red Book," Criminal Jury Instructions

__________

2 The appellant attempts to distinguish Liboro by pointing to

Liboro's "education and sophistication" and the lack of "esoteric

terms or concepts unfamiliar to the lay mind" in the charges Liboro

faced. He omits that in Liboro we also emphasized the fact that

the defendant there, as here, had "his counsel at his side throughout

the plea negotiations [and] the government's case spread before

him." Liboro, 10 F.3d at 865.

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for the District of Columbia No. 4.92 (4th ed. 1993), "[t]he

essence of the offense of conspiracy is an agreement or

understanding to violate other laws, and at least a single act

done to carry out that unlawful agreement." The appellant's

responses to the district court's queries as well as his admissions regarding the uncomplicated charges against him manifest his understanding of the "nature of the [conspiracy]

charge" to which he was pleading guilty.

In Dewalt, we did find a plea colloquy defective where,

inter alia, the judge did not inform the defendant of the

"knowledge" element of a gun possession offense. Dewalt, 92

F.3d at 1212. Dewalt was charged with illegal possession of a

sawed-off shotgun, that is, "a weapon made from a shotgun

... [which] as modified has ... a barrel or barrels of less

than 18 inches in length." 26 U.S.C. s 5845(a)(2). Because it

was not clear from the indictment that the charge required

specific knowledge of the gun barrel length, we concluded

that the district court should have specifically ascertained

that the defendant knew the barrel length was shorter than

18 inches. Id.3 The shortcomings of the Dewalt plea proceeding are plainly distinguishable from the sole variance

alleged by the appellant. As the Seventh Circuit observed in

Musa, "[w]hile the subtleties of conspiracy law might be the

bane of criminal law students, the basic principle is easily

understood: a group of people agreeing to do something

illegal." Musa, 946 F.2d at 1305.

The trial court reasonably concluded that the appellant

understood the nature of the charge to which he was pleading

guilty as evidenced by: the numerous (at least three) times

__________

3 This error, however, was not the only one we ascribed to the

district court in Dewalt. We detailed a number of problems with

the district court's acceptance of the defendant's guilty plea: it

failed to ask Dewalt if he had read the indictment or whether his

counsel had assisted him in understanding it; it did not even

mention to the defendant that the charge involved possession of a

weapon; and the factual proffer did not include any information

that the defendant knew the barrel length of the shotgun. See

Dewalt, 92 F.3d 1212.

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during the plea colloquy that the court informed the appellant

of the charge (twice by reference to the factual proffer); the

detail of the factual proffer itself; the straightforward nature

of the charge against him; the fact that he was represented

and advised by counsel throughout; and, importantly, the

appellant's own use of the word "conspired" in response to

the court. Even assuming the district court erred in not

parsing the elements of the conspiracy charges, the error in

no way approaches plain error under Rule 52(b). At the

same time, however, we remind trial courts to exercise care

and precision in complying with Rule 11.

III.

The appellant also challenges his conviction in Cr. No.

96-106-01, claiming the district court committed plain error

by incorrectly defining reasonable doubt to the jury. In

addition, he alleges prosecutorial misconduct during crossexamination and in the government's closing argument. His

plea agreement, however, provides that he "agrees to withdraw all pending motions for new trial regarding his conviction in Criminal Case number 96-106 and to waive all further

challenges to or appeals of his conviction in that case."

(Appellant's App. at 5, p 1(c)). The appellant's sole response

is that the waiver of appeal should not be enforced because

his guilty plea failed to comply with Rule 11(c)(1). (Reply Br.

at 9).4 Because his guilty plea was in fact properly accepted

under Rule 11, the appellant has waived his right to appeal

Cr. No. 96-106-01.

__________

4 The appellant suggests, in a footnote, that "various individual

judges ... have rejected waivers of appellate rights." See Reply

Br. at 8 n.2. As the government notes, however, ten other circuits

have found waivers of appeals permissible and enforceable. See,

e.g., United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2001); United

States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v.

Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hare,

269 F.3d 859, 860 (7th Cir. 2001).

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellant's conviction in No. 00-3124 and we dismiss his appeal in No. 00-3123.

So ordered.

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