Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35615/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35615-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Amador
Appellee
Mercer Canyons Inc.
Appellant
Bacilio Ruiz Torres
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BACILIO RUIZ TORRES; JOSE

AMADOR, on behalf of

themselves and all other

similarly situated persons,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

MERCER CANYONS INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-35615

D.C. No.

1:14-cv-03032-SAB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Stanley Allen Bastian, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 8, 2016

Seattle, Washington

Filed August 31, 2016

Before: A. WALLACE TASHIMA, and MILAN D.

SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges, and LESLIE E.

KOBAYASHI,

*

 District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

 

*

 The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge for

the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

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2 RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS

SUMMARY**

Labor Law / Class Certification

The panel affirmed the district court’s order certifying a

plaintiff class of domestic farm workers who alleged

violations of the Agricultural Workers’ Protection Act and

Washington law.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant farm employer

failed to inform them of the availability of agricultural work

that was performed by temporary foreign workers under the

federal H-2A visa program, and failed to pay domestic

workers the same wage as the foreign workers.

The panel affirmed the district court’s certification of an

Inaccurate Information class and an Equal Pay subclass. The

panel held that as to the Inaccurate Information class, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in finding common

questions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) regarding a duty to

disclose information pertaining to H-2A jobs, nor in finding

that common issues predominated under Rule 23(b)(3). The

panel also affirmed the district court’s findings of

commonality and typicality with regard to the Equal Pay

subclass, as well as the district court’s finding of typicality

under Rule 23(a)(4).

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 3

COUNSEL

Eric D. Miller (argued), Michael T. Reynvaan, Frederick B.

Rivera, and William B. Stafford, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle,

Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.

Lori Jordan Isley (argued), Joachim Morrison, and David

Solis, Columbia Legal Services, Yakima, Washington; Adam

J. Berger and Martin S. Garfinkel, Schroeter Goldmark &

Bender, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Mercer Canyons, Inc. (Mercer) appeals the

district court’s order certifying a class of domestic farm

workers, represented by Bacilio Ruiz Torres and Jose

Amador (collectively, Plaintiffs). Mercer operates a fruit and

vegetable farm near Prosser, Washington. In 2013, Mercer

participated in the federal H-2A program, which permitted

Mercer to hire foreign workers to fill temporary agricultural

positions at an hourly wage of $12.

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action, claiming that

Mercer had a common policy or practice of failing to inform

domestic farm workers of the availability of H-2A work that

paid $12 per hour, in violation of the Agricultural Workers’

Protection Act (AWPA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1831(e) and 1821(f),

and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), Wash.

Rev. Code § 19.86.020. In addition, Plaintiffs alleged that

Mercer failed to pay its own domestic workers $12 per hour

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4 RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS

when they carried out the same tasks as foreign H-2A

workers, in violation of AWPA and state wage laws.

The district court certified an Inaccurate Information class

and an Equal Pay subclass, corresponding to Plaintiffs’

claims. We affirm the district court’s class certification order.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

A. Background

Mercer applied for, and was granted, permission to hire

temporary foreign workers under the federal H-2A program

in order to supplement its workforce for the 2013 season. In

February 2013, the Department of Labor issued Mercer a

Clearance Order, which described the terms and conditions of

Mercer’s participation in the H-2A program. Among other

things, the Clearance Order allowed Mercer to employ up to

44 foreign workers for temporary vineyard work from March

24 to September 1, 2013. It also listed the specific types of

tasks the H-2A workers would perform, along with the hourly

wage they would receive ($12).

One of the conditions of its involvement in the H-2A

program obligated Mercer to recruit domestic labor to

minimize the number of foreign workers filling the 44

available positions. See Alfred L. Snapp &Son, Inc. v. Puerto

Rico, ex. rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 596 (1982). Specifically,

Mercer was required to engage in the “positive recruitment”

of domestic workers from February 4 to March 21, 2013

through routine recruitment practices, such as telling former

employees about H-2A jobs and “solicit[ing] their return.”

20 C.F.R. § 655.135(c), 655.150–154, 655.158. Furthermore,

Mercer was required to hire any qualified domestic worker

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 5

who applied for H-2A work, a requirement that continued

through the first half of the contract period, in this case, until

June 15, 2013. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(a) & (d).

In 2013, Mercer maintained a call-back list to keep track

of workers who walked in seeking employment. The list,

entitled an “Employment Information Form,” allowed

prospective applicants to provide their names, phone

numbers, whether they had a driver’s license, and relevant

skills or experience so Mercer could “contact [them] for

future employment opportunities.”During the 45-daypositive

recruitment period, almost 200 people entered their

information on this list.

Ultimately, Mercer hired only 22 domestic workers for

the H-2A program. Some workers were hired through an

organization called WorkSource, which provided job

referrals. Of the remaining 22 positions available under the

H-2A program, Mercer hired only 19 foreign workers. Those

19 workers arrived on May 2, 2013. Their H-2A contract

originally ran until September 1, 2013, but was extended two

weeks, until September 15, 2013.

During the course of the H-2A program, Mercer realized

that additional labor was needed because the H-2A employees

were not completing the work fast enough. As a result,

Mercer used its own domestic workers to perform some H-2A

tasks, such as grapevine tying. It also sought the services of

a labor contractor, M&L, which brought in 44 more domestic

workers to help with H-2A tasks. Mercer was required to

provide a copy of the terms of the work contract or Clearance

Order to any worker who performed qualifying H-2A work

during the contract period. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.122(q);

655.103(b) (defining “corresponding employment”). In

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6 RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS

addition, all H-2A workers, including any employees

performing qualifying H-2A tasks, were entitled to the same

wages of $12 per hour. See 20 C.F.R. §655.122(a).

B. Ruiz Torres and Amador

Ruiz Torres and Amador are domestic farm workers. Ruiz

Torres was a vineyard worker at Mercer in 2012. Ruiz Torres

later returned to work at Mercer from January 8 to September

6, 2013. During this period, Ruiz Torres claims to have

performed some qualifying H-2A work in Mercer’s

vineyards. He alleges that he was sometimes paid $12 an hour

for this work, and sometimes not. Mercer did not provide

Ruiz Torres with either a copy of the Clearance Order or a

written work contract. Neither did it inform him about

available H-2A work paying $12 per hour.

On March 19, 2013, during the positive recruitment

period, Amador walked into Mercer’s front office with his

wife and father-in-law. All three were looking for seasonal

farmwork in Mercer’s vineyards. Mercer did not tell Amador

about the availability of H-2A work for $12 per hour. Instead,

the front-office staff informed him that “the chances of

getting jobs were really low until the people from . . . Mexico

arrived, and they would have to see how many spots were

open.” Ultimately, Amador decided that he would not sign

the employment call-back list, although his wife and fatherin-law did. Mercer did not contact any of them about

employment opportunities.

C. Procedural History

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action in the Eastern

District of Washington, alleging that Mercer failed “to inform

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 7

local farm workers about the availability of $12 an hour

vineyard labor jobs.” According to Plaintiffs, Mercer’s failure

to disclose violated AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1831(e) and

1821(f), and the CPA, Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.020. In

addition, Plaintiffs claimed that Mercer failed to pay its

domestic workers $12 per hour for qualifying H-2A work, in

violation of AWPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1832(a), and 1822(a), and

Washington wage law, Wash. Rev. Code § 49.52.050.

Mercer moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

individual claims under AWPA, the CPA, and Washington

state wage laws. The district court denied summary judgment.

It further denied Mercer’s motion for reconsideration, and

Mercer’s request to certify the summary judgment order for

interlocutory appeal.

Subsequently, Plaintiffs moved to certify an Inaccurate

Information class and an Equal Pay subclass. The Inaccurate

Information class, numbering approximately 600 individuals,

includes the following members:

All domestic migrant and seasonal farm

workers who: 1) were employed as vineyard

workers by Mercer Canyons in 2012;

2) sought employment at Mercer Canyons in

2013 between February 4 and June 15, 2013;

or 3) performed vineyard work at Mercer

Canyons between March 24 and September

15, 2013, and were not referred by

WorkSource.

Within this class, Plaintiffs identified an Equal Pay subclass,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5), of approximately 200

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8 RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS

individuals. This subclass is comprised of the following

members:

All domestic and seasonal farm workers who

performed vineyard work between March 24

and September 15, 2013 for Mercer Canyons,

were paid less than $12 per hour, and were not

referred by WorkSource.

The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for class

certification, and appointed Ruiz Torres and Amador as class

representatives. This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e). We

review the district court’s class certification order for abuse

of discretion and the findings of fact upon which it relied for

clear error. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 673 (9th Cir.

2014). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court

. . . relies upon an improper factor, omits consideration of a

factor entitled to considerable weight, or mulls the correct

mix of factors but makes a clear error of judgment in assaying

them.” Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1018

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am.,

LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2010)). When reviewing

an order granting class certification, “we accord the district

court noticeably more deference than when we review a

denial.” Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 956

(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1171).

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 9

ANALYSIS

Rule 23 sets forth a series of pre-requisites to class

certification, including the existence of (1) “questions of law

or fact common to the class,” and (2) “claims or defenses of

the representative parties . . . typical of the claims of defenses

of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), (a)(4). Rule 23(b)(3),

applicable here, additionally requires that common questions

of law or fact found under Rule 23(a)(2) “predominate over

any questions affecting only individual members, and that a

class action is superior to other available methods for fairly

and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”

On appeal, Mercer raises numerous challenges to the

district court’s certification decision. In particular, it contends

that the district court found common issues where there were

none. Next, it contends that the district court abused its

discretion byfinding that these common issues predominated.

Finally, it challenges the district court’s finding that Ruiz

Torres and Amador’s claims and defenses were typical of

those of the class. We address each of these arguments in

turn.

I. Inaccurate Information class

A. Rule 23(a)(2) commonality

“What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising

of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but, rather the

capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common

answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). To

satisfy Rule 23(a)(2) commonality, “‘[e]ven a single

[common] question’ will do.” Id. at 359 (quoting Richard A.

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10 RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS

Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,

84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).

In finding commonalitywithin the Inaccurate Information

class, the district court identified two related common

questions it believed would drive the resolution of the

litigation:

(1) “Whether Mercer Canyons had a policy or

practice to withhold information pertaining to

H-2A jobs from job-seekers and current

employees”

(2) “Whether such withholding constituted

providing false or misleading information

concerning the existence of, or terms and

conditions of, jobs . . . under the AWPA and

CPA.”

Mercer argues that the district court “committed a per se

abuse of discretion by misinterpreting the substantive law

governing plaintiffs’ claims, which led it to divine common

issues.” This is essentially the same argument made by

Mercer in its motion for summary judgment, wherein it

asserted that AWPA imposes no such disclosure duty

concerning H-2A work. To resolve this question at the class

certification stage would provide Mercer the sort of

interlocutory review of the summary judgment order that the

district court had declined to certify.

Instead, we consider merits questions at the class

certification stage only to the extent they are relevant to

whether Rule 23 requirements have been met. Stockwell v.

City of S.F., 749 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2014). With this

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 11

principle in mind, we conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion by identifying the existence of a legal

issue common to the class. The district court found that one

reading of the relevant statutes supports the existence of a

disclosure duty, and that an answer to this threshold question

would drive the resolution of the litigation. Without such a

duty, the claims of the class as a whole would fail. With it,

Plaintiffs would clear a significant legal hurdle.

In particular, the district court focused on Sections

1831(e) and 1821(f) of AWPA. Section 1831 relates to

seasonal agricultural workers, while Section 1821 concerns

migrant agricultural workers. These two provisions exhibit

significant parallels, and the language of § 1831(e) is nearly

identical to that of § 1821(f).1 Section 1831(e) states:

No farm labor contractor, agricultural

employer, or agricultural association shall

knowingly provide false or misleading

information to any seasonal agricultural

worker concerning the terms, conditions, or

existence of agricultural employment required

to be disclosed by subsection (a), (b), or (c) of

this section.2

1 The text of Section 1821(f) differs from Section 1831(e) in two

respects, neither of which is material here. First, it refers to subsections

“(a), (b), (c), or (d)” of that provision because Section 1821 includes an

additional subsection concerning disclosure requirements for housing

providers. In addition, it substitutes the word “seasonal agricultural

worker” for “migrant agricultural worker.”

2 Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of § 1831 deal with written disclosure

requirements, posting requirements, and recording keeping requirements

imposed on employers of agricultural workers.

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12 RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS

In construing the meaning of AWPA’s reference to “false

or misleading information,” the district court considered a

separate, but related, set of regulations concerning an

employer’s duties under the H-2A program, see, e.g.,

20 C.F.R. §§ 655.122, 655.135, 655.153, and determined that

AWPA’s prohibition on the provision of “false or misleading

information,” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1831(e), 1821(f), could include a

material omission. For the purposes of class certification, we

need not presently decide whether Plaintiffs’ construction of

Sections 1831(e) and 1821(f) of AWPA is correct, only that

it raises a common legal question.

Mercer counters that since H-2A positions are not

specifically referenced in AWPA, such positions are not

“required to be disclosed,” and therefore fall outside the

scope of the statute. That argument is susceptible of classwide resolution. While we do not here decide the common

question, we agree with the district court that Mercer’s failure

to disclose “information pertaining to H-2A jobs,” such as the

existence or pay-rate of such work, may constitute “false or

misleading” information, and therefore poses a common

question of liability.

Moreover, the district court identified a related question

of fact. Plaintiffs presented evidence that Mercer had a

“common policy or practice of withholding information

pertaining to H-2A jobs from job-seekers and current

employees.” The answer to this question, too, will help to

drive the resolution of the litigation for all class members. See

Jiminez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1165–66 (9th Cir.

2014) (holding that “[p]roving at trial whether such informal

or unofficial policies existed” would drive the resolution of

class claims).

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 13

B. Rule 23(b)(3) predominance

The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry asks the court to

make a global determination of whether common questions

prevail over individualized ones. For purposes of this

analysis, “[a]n individual question is one ‘where members of

a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies

from member to member,’ while a common question is one

where ‘the same evidence will suffice for each member to

make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to

generalized, class-wide proof.’” Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo,

136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (quoting 2 W. Rubenstein,

Newberg on Class Actions § 4:50, 196–97 (5th ed. 2012)).

Predominance is not, however, a matter of nose-counting.

Jiminez, 765 F.3d at 1165. Rather, more important questions

apt to drive the resolution of the litigation are given more

weight in the predominance analysis over individualized

questions which are of considerably less significance to the

claims of the class. It is an assessment of “whether proposed

classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by

representation.” Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

571 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).

1. Common proof of injury under the CPA

Mercer’s primary challenge to predominance is that the

district court erred concerning the elements of a CPA claim

under Washington law. Specifically, Mercer claims that “[the

district court] failed to appreciate that . . . injury is an element

of [CPA] liability, not just a component of damages.” Here,

the district court did not commit such a clear legal misstep.

Rather, it acknowledged that a CPA claim requires the

following five elements:

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(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice;

(2) which occurs in trade or commerce;

(3) that impacts the public interest;

(4) which causes injury to the plaintiff in his

or her business or property; and

(5) which injury is causally linked to the

unfair or deceptive act.

See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons

Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1061 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).

The district court then weighed whether common issues

predominate within the Inaccurate Information Class. First,

it noted that Plaintiffs could satisfy at least the first three CPA

elements by “proving the common questions.” It then

remarked that any individualized questions raised by Mercer

“nearly all go to the issue of damages rather than liability.”

Thus, it concluded that predominance was not defeated,

notwithstanding the existence of some individualized

questions.

Because this reasoning does not reveal an error of law

concerning the kinds of factors to be weighed, Mercer must

rely on the claim that the district court “mull[ed] the correct

mix of factors but [made] a clear error of judgment in

assaying them,” Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1018 (quotations

omitted). But the district court recognized that important

questions, regarding the existence of a common policy of

non-disclosure, and whether such non-disclosure constituted

false and misleading information, would “drive the

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 15

resolution” of the AWPA and CPA claims. Wal-Mart,

654 U.S. at 350. Considered in light of these core claims, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that

the existence of some individualized issues did not

overwhelm an overall finding of predominance.

2. “Informational” injury

Moreover, it is not clear that Plaintiffs’ showing of

“injury” under the CPA would necessarily be wholly

individualized. Plaintiffs characterize their injury as an

informational one. This informational injury, they claim,

stems from a common policy of non-disclosure byMercer. As

a result of this non-disclosure, class members were deprived

of the opportunity to pursue H-2A work at $12 per hour.

The CPA is a remedial statute that defines “injury”

liberally to include when “the plaintiff’s property interest or

money is diminished . . . even if the expenses caused by the

statutory violation are minimal.” Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co.

of Wash., 204 P.3d 885, 892 (Wash. 2009) (en banc)

(quotations omitted). “[T]he injury involved need not be

great, or even quantifiable.” Ambach v. French, 216 P.3d 405,

407 (Wash. 2009) (en banc). Rather, the limitation that a

defendant’s conduct cause injury in “business or property”

has only been deployed to exclude suits for personal injury

and emotional distress. See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch.,

858 P.2d at 1063.

Under Plaintiffs’ theory, an individual may experience

“injury” under the CPA if, for example, Mercer’s omission

causes her to expend time or resources looking for other jobs.

In this manner, informational injury need not result in direct

pecuniary loss, although it may do so. See Panag, 204 P.3d at

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900; Handlin v. On-Site Manager, Inc., 351 P.3d 226, 230

(Wash Ct. App. 2015) (holding that “consumer disclosures

mandated by the [state Fair Credit Reporting Act] are a form

of property,” and that “sufficient injury is therefore pleaded

if a plaintiff alleges that she was deprived of the use of her

property for even a short amount of time”). Moreover, a

reasonable fact finder could conclude that, but for Mercer’s

alleged policy of non-disclosure, class members would have

had the opportunity to seek H-2A work at the $12 hourly

rate.3See Schnall v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d

129, 137 (Wash. 2011) (adopting a “proximate cause

standard” for causation under the CPA).

In contrast, Mercer interprets the nature of the alleged

“injury” more narrowly as being deprived of an H-2A job.

Mercer reasons that to show injury, one must demonstrate

eligibility for an H-2A job. Such a reading relies on an unduly

narrow conception of “injury.” Under the CPA, an injury

resulting from non-disclosure may include being denied the

opportunity to apply for an H-2A job. For similar reasons,

Plaintiffs’ theory of liability does not depend on a class

member’s immigration status.4 Underthe informational injury

theory, a class member’s status is irrelevant at the liability

phase, so long as she was denied the opportunity to apply for

a job as a result of Mercer’s policy of omission. The separate

question of actual damages will hinge on the amount of harm

caused by class members’ being deprived of the opportunity

3 WorkSource referrals are excluded from the class definition, as the

referred individualswere presumablyinformed about available H-2Ajobs.

4 Mercer initially sought discovery concerning the immigration status of

the lead plaintiffs. The district court denied Mercer’s motion to compel

and issued a protective order.

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to pursue those jobs. The presence of individualized damages

calculations, however, does not defeat predominance. Leyva

v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513–14 (9th Cir. 2013).

3. The presence of “non-injured” class members

Even crediting Plaintiffs’ theory of injury, Mercer falls

back on the argument that “a class cannot be certified if it

contains both injured and non-injured parties.” We find this

argument unpersuasive for several reasons.

First, Mercer’s statement is inaccurate, as even a welldefined class may inevitably contain some individuals who

have suffered no harm as a result of a defendant’s unlawful

conduct. See Newberg on Class Actions § 2:3; Messner v.

Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 823 (7th Cir.

2012) (“[S]ome class members’ claims will fail on the merits

if and when damages are decided, a fact generally irrelevant

to the district court’s decision on class certification.”).

Mercer’s claim that the presence of certain “non-injured”

individuals within the Inaccurate Information class defeats

predominance is also mistaken.Empirically, Mercer contends

that the class is too broad because it includes a subset of

people exposed to—yet ultimately not harmed by—a policy

of non-disclosure. This merely highlights the possibility that

an injurious course of conduct may sometimes fail to cause

injury to certain class members. However, it fails to reveal a

flaw that may defeat predominance, such as the existence of

large numbers of class members who were never exposed to

the challenged conduct to begin with. See Mazza v. Am.

Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th Cir. 2012);see also

Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1068–69

(9th Cir. 2014). Mercer’s remaining challenges concern the

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overbreadth of the class definition. Yet the class definition is

reasonably co-extensive with Plaintiffs’ chosen theory of

liability. Ultimately, Mercer’s argument reflects a merits

dispute about the scope of that liability, and is not appropriate

for resolution at the class certification stage of this

proceeding.

a. Empirical overbreadth

Mercer contends that, even if a common policy or practice

of non-disclosure existed, it did not result in injury to certain

class members. That is not because they were not subject to

the challenged practice in the first place. Rather, it is

Mercer’s contention that those class members, even had

Mercer provided them with the omitted H-2A job

information, would not have been any better off because they

were not looking for work at the time, would not have been

ultimately hired by Mercer, or for other individualized

reasons. Mercer’s examples each highlight the potential for

unlawful conduct in the absence of harm.5 We conclude that

such fortuitous non-injury to a subset of class members does

not necessarily defeat certification of the entire class,

particularly as the district court is well situated to winnow out

those non-injured members at the damages phase of the

litigation, or to refine the class definition. See Newberg on

Class Actions § 2:3.

This stands in contrast to the situation in Mazza, where

many class members were not injured by virtue of the fact

5

In only two cases did Mercer identify putative class members, former

employees Sandra Blanco and her sister Genoveva Guzman, who were

affirmatively contacted about available work by Mercer. Mercer does not

indicate, however, that the advertised work concerned the H-2A positions.

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that they “were never exposed to the allegedly misleading

advertisements.” 666 F.3d at 597. In Mazza, the defendant

subjected only a small segment of an expansive class of car

buyers to misleading material as part of a “very limited”

advertising campaign. Id. at 595. Under those circumstances,

we found that Rule 23 predominance was defeated, since “it

was unreasonable to assume that all class members

purchasing cars had seen the potentially misleading ads.” Id.

at 596. That is not the situation here, where the existence of

a common policy or practice, if proven, is evidence that the

class as a whole was exposed to purportedly misleading

omissions about H-2A jobs.6

Mercer counters that whether the omission was

misleading, and therefore injurious, will “turn on the minutia

ofindividual interactions and circumstances” between Mercer

and class members. However, Mercer has not shown that the

class as a whole was exposed to “disparate information from

various representatives of the defendant,” Stearns, 655 F.3d

at 1020, creating materially different impressions about the

availability of H-2A work. Rather, the conduct at issue is

reasonably uniform as the crux of Plaintiffs’ legal challenge

 

6 Mazza quotes a Second Circuit decision stating that “no class may be

certified that contains members lacking Article III standing.” Mazza,

666 F.3d at 594 (quoting Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264

(2d Cir. 2006)). However, that statement taken in context signifies only

that it must be possible that class members have suffered injury, not that

they did suffer injury, or that they must prove such injury at the

certification phase. See Denney, 433 F.3d at 263–64 (“We do not require

that each member of a class submit evidence of personal standing . . . .

[Rather], the class must . . . be defined in such a way that anyone within

it would have standing.”); see also Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1021 (“At least

one named plaintiff must satisfy the actual injury component of standing

in order to seek relief on behalf of himself or the class.”); Bates v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

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involves a common failure to disclose information, and not

merely a disparate series of affirmative statements.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that whether a class-wide policy or practice of

non-disclosure existed was a common question of fact that

“predominates over the exact interaction between individual

job-seekers and Mercer.”

In sum, pursuant to Rule 23, “the court’s task at

certification is to ensure that the class is not ‘defined so

broadly as to include a great number of members who for

some reason could not have been harmed by the defendant’s

allegedly unlawful conduct.’” Newberg on Class Actions

§ 2:3 (quoting Messner, 669 F.3d at 824). We are satisfied

that condition is met here.

b. Definitional overbreadth

Mercer’s challenge also stems from an underlying

concern that the class was drawn too broadly, perhaps in the

interest of inclusion of all individuals who had potential

damages claims under AWPA and the CPA. This potential

flaw, however, is not fatal to certification. Mercer’s dispute

merely reflects the existence of contrasting litigation

positions on the proper scope of liability, and a merits issue

that the district court will later resolve concerning the breadth

of Mercer’s disclosure duty over time.

For now, Plaintiffs need not downsize their legal theory

that Mercer had a disclosure duty toward all members of the

class, in favor of a duty to target only those most likely to be

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 21

interested.7 What is critical is that Plaintiffs’ theory of

informational injury, through Mercer’s failure to disclose H2A job information to those it typically recruited or used for

H-2A work, actually maps onto the membership of the class.

In other words, class membership must fit the theory of legal

liability.

We conclude that the composition of the Inaccurate

Information class meets this requirement, given the

underlying legal framework upon which Plaintiffs rely.

Notably, none of the relevant disclosure regulations varies on

its face according to the existing knowledge or interest of the

worker. For example, an employer of seasonal or migrant

workers must contact former domestic workers “employed by

the employer in the occupation at the place of employment

during the previous year and solicit their return.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 655.153. This regulation corresponds to the portion of the

class definition that includes those “employed as vineyard

workers by Mercer Canyons in 2012.”

In addition, the class definition includes those seasonal

and migrant workers who “sought employment at Mercer

Canyons in 2013 between February 4 and June 15, 2013.”8

 

7

 Indeed, defining the class to include only those individuals who were

“injured” by non-disclosure threatens to create a “fail safe” class, one that

is defined so narrowly as to “preclude[] membership unless the liability of

the defendant is established.” Kamar v. RadioShack Corp., 375 F. App’x

734, 736 (9th Cir. 2010). As a result, we require no more than a

reasonably close fit between the class definition and the chosen theory of

liability.

8 Mercer also challenges the accuracy of the employment call-back list,

which Plaintiffs used to identify those class members who “sought

employment.” It notes that the list contains some Mercer customers who

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This part of the definition maps onto Mercer’s positive

recruitment and hiring obligations during this interval. See

20 C.F.R. § 655.154 (requiring an employer to engage in

“method(s) of “positive recruitment” “no less than the normal

recruitment efforts of non-H-2A agricultural employers”);

20 C.F.R. § 655.135(a) & (d) (requiring an employer to hire

all qualified domestic applicants up through the first half of

the contract period). As a result, this definition tracks the

group of job-seekers who were subject to, and therefore could

be harmed by, Mercer’s allegedlyunlawful failure to disclose.

The class definition also includes those domestic workers

who “performed vineyard work at Mercer Canyons between

March 24 and September 15, 2013.” Because H-2A work

encompassed many vineyard tasks such as vine-tying,

Plaintiffs contend that those who performed vineyard work

during the contract period were entitled to H-2A job

information pursuant to the regulations. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 655.122(q) (requiring an employer to disclose the terms of

the work contract to workers engaged in qualifying H-2A

work during the contract period); § 655.103(b) (defining

“corresponding employment”).

The composition of the Inaccurate Information class, as

reflected in these definitions, reveals a reasonably close fit

with Plaintiffs’ theory of liability, such that Rule 23(b)(3)

predominance is maintained. As a result, the membership of

the class is largely co-extensive with those who could have

erroneously signed it. However, this is an evidentiary quibble in the guise

of a challenge to the class definition. It does not bear on the salient

question of whether those workers who actually “sought employment,” as

the class definition provides, were unlawfullydenied information on H-2A

jobs.

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 23

been injured by Mercer’s conduct. As the case progresses, the

district court may elect to separate the class into subclasses,

or adjust the scope of the class definition, if it later finds that

the inclusiveness of the class exceeds the limits of Mercer’s

legal liability under AWPA or the CPA.

Finally, Mercer identifies one minor source of overexpansiveness. Specifically, it claims that some individuals

who “sought employment” at Mercer and might ostensibly

fall within the class definition, were actually seeking work as

tractor drivers, and thus presented unlikely candidates for H2A vineyard work.9

If necessary, however, the district court

may construe the class definition more narrowly, or otherwise

conform its interpretation of the class definition with the

prevailing theory of liability. See Messner, 669 F.3d at 826

n.15 (“In circumstances such as these, involving minor

overbreadth problems that do not call into question the

validity of the class as a whole, the better course is not to

deny class certification entirely but to amend the class

definition as needed to correct for the overbreadth.”).

II. The Equal Pay subclass

The district court certified an Equal Pay subclass within

the Inaccurate Information class, consisting of those workers

who “performed vineyard work between March 24 and

September 15, 2013, were paid less than $12 per hour, and

were not referred by WorkSource.” With respect to this

subclass, the district court identified a common question of

“whether Mercer Canyon had a practice to consistently fail to

9 Mercer’s argument relies on the assumption that those job-seekers who

listed “truck driving” as one of their skills on the employment call-back

list were not also interested in pursuing H-2A work.

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24 RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS

pay employees $12 [an hour] for corresponding Clearance

Order work.” It found that predominance existed because

Plaintiffs planned to prove liability for underpayment in the

aggregate, such that there was a common question of liability

amenable to class-wide proof.

A. Rule 23(a)(2) commonality

Plaintiffs proposed to demonstrate class-wide liability by

offering proof of underpayment in the aggregate.10 Mercer

protests that the common proof that Plaintiffs rely upon,

company accounting and payroll records, is inaccurate.

Rather, Mercer asserts that the records are simply accounting

cost codes for it to track work in the aggregate, and do not

show the actual rate at which individual employees were paid.

Instead, Mercer claims that it used timecards, which reflected

when an employee performed H-2A tasks. This information

was then manually entered into Mercer’s payroll system, so

that employees were allegedly paid $12 per hour for

performing corresponding work.

Whether the proffered evidence ultimately shows that

Mercer failed to pay its workers touches on a central element

of liability. “When, as here, the concern about the proposed

class is . . . an alleged failure of proof as to an element of the

plaintiffs’ cause of action—courts should engage that

question as a matter of summary judgment, not class

10 Under the aggregate approach, Plaintiffs need not identify specific

instances in which an employee was not paid $12 per hour for performing

H-2A work, as long as the records show (1) the total wages that non-H-2A

employees received for performing H-2A qualifying work, and (2) the

total number of hours of H-2A work performed by those employees. Since

H-2A work required compensation at $12 per hour, the existence of a

shortfall in aggregate wages would constitute proof of underpayment.

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 25

certification.” Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047 (quoting

Nagareda, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 107). As a result, we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

identifying a common question of fact concerning whether

Mercer’s domestic workers were consistently paid $12 per

hour for H-2A work.

B. Rule 23(b)(3) predominance

Mercer also claims that defending against the aggregate

underpayment claims will require it to raise individualized

defenses, thereby defeating predominance. Plaintiffs’

approach, it argues, would result in a “Trial by Formula,”

without allowing Mercer to engage in individual inquiries or

raise individual defenses that a particular class member was

paid the proper wages.

Mercer reasons that because these defenses would not be

“common to the claims made by all class members,” Tyson

Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047, Plaintiffs’ method of common

proof is deficient. Tyson Foods addressed the use of

representative samples and statistical methods of proof. Id. at

1046. Here, proof is not a matter of probability—it is a matter

of logic that an aggregate underpayment means that Mercer

underpaid some, possibly all, subclass members. In this

context, Plaintiffs’ method of establishing liability for

underpayment in the aggregate is a permissible means of

proceeding. See Newberg on Class Actions § 12:2 (“[T]here

is no absolute requirement in Rule 23 that aggregate damages

be calculable, but where they are, they may be all that

plaintiffs need to prove.”). Particularly where Mercer has

allegedly failed to keep adequate accounting records specific

to each employee, class members may be compelled to resort

to an aggregate method of proving wage underpayment. See

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26 RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS

Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687

(1946) (“[I]t is the employer who has the duty . . . to keep

proper records of wages, hours and other conditions and

practices of employment and who is in position to know and

to produce the most probative facts concerning the nature and

amount of work performed.”).

Of course, the partitioning of damages among class

members may lead to individual calculations. Yet those

calculations would not impact a defendant’s liability for the

total amount of damages. Cf. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,

103 F.3d 767, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) (class-action defendant’s

interest was “only in the total amount of damages for which

it will be liable,” not “the identities of those receiving damage

awards”). In wage-and-hour disputes, such individualized

damages inquiries are common, and typically do not defeat

certification. Leyva, 716 F.3d at 513–14.

III. Rule 23(a)(4) typicality

The test of typicality serves to ensure that “the interest of

the named representative aligns with the interests of the

class.’” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th

Cir. 1992).11“Under the Rule’s permissive standards,

representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably

coextensive with those of absent class members; they need

11 As the Wal-mart Court noted, “[t]he commonality and typicality

requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for

determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of

a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and

the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members

will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” 131 S. Ct. at

2551 n.5 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158

(1982)).

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 27

not be substantially identical.” Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685

(quotations omitted). In this context, “typicality refers to the

nature of the claim or defense . . . and not to the specific facts

from which it arose or the relief sought.” Id. Measures of

typicality include “whether other members have the same or

similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which

is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class

members have been injured by the same course of conduct.”

Hanon, 976 F.3d at 508.

The district court found that the typicality requirement

was met in this case. Mercer raises several arguments to the

contrary. First, Mercer emphasizes that the class definition

includes both “seasonal and migrant farm workers,” whereas

Amador and Ruiz Torres are only seasonal farm workers.

Mercer has not articulated how this would make a substantive

difference in the prosecution of the AWPA and CPA claims.

In fact, AWPA’s disclosure provision regarding seasonal

workers, 29 U.S.C. § 1821(f), is nearly identical to the one

involving migrant workers, 29 U.S.C. §1831(e). See supra

note 2. Nor does the CPA draw any such distinctions.

Next, Mercer notes that some of the workers performing

H-2A tasks were hired through a labor contractor, M&L,

whereas Ruiz Torres was directly hired by Mercer. However,

both allegedly experienced the same informational harm of

not being told about H-2A work paying $12 per hour, and the

harm of wage underpayment after performing qualifying H2A work. Moreover, for the equal pay claims, both must

prove that Mercer was an “employer” within the meaning of

federal and state labor law. See 29 U.S.C. § 1802(2), (5);

Wash. Rev. Code § 49.46.010(2), (4). The M&L workers

might also claim that M&L was a joint employer. Yet the

district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded

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28 RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS

that “the nature of the claim would appear to be the same

even if one additional question would need to be answered”

for the M&L workers.

Mercer further contends that Ruiz Torres is not a typical

“former employee,” since he is a former employee who later

returned to perform a non-H-2A job at Mercer. However, he

claims to have suffered the same class-wide harm of not

being told about the available H-2A work, and falls squarely

into the class of workers who allegedly performed H-2A tasks

for less than $12 per hour. Therefore, his claims are

sufficiently typical of that of the class.

Finally, Mercer argues that Amador is an atypical

representative for the Inaccurate Information class because he

never signed the call-back list when he visited seeking work.

Amador explained he was so discouraged upon learning that

H-2A jobs were being held for foreign workers that he

decided not to leave his contact information. Nonetheless, it

is undisputed that Amador “sought employment” from

Mercer, as the class definition requires, and that Mercer failed

to disclose to Amador the availability of $12-per-hour H-2A

jobs. Amador’s personal narrative is somewhat more colorful,

but it falls within the common contours of Plaintiff’s theory

of liability. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d

970, 985 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Differing factual scenarios

resulting in a claim of the same nature as other class members

does not defeat typicality.”). Here, the gravamen of the

Inaccurate Information claim is a common omission about the

availability of H-2A work paying $12 an hour. The “nature”

of Amador’s individual claim is thus “reasonably

coextensive” with that of the class of local farm workers who

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RUIZ TORRES V. MERCER CANYONS 29

did not receive the benefit of information about H-2A jobs.12

Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685. Moreover, Mercer does not

indicate how any differences would “preoccupy” Ruiz Torres

or Amador or “threaten to become the focus of the litigation,”

Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508, such that the district court

committed a clear error of judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court

did not abuse its discretion by certifying the Inaccurate

Information class and the Equal Pay subclass. The district

court’s class certification order is AFFIRMED.

12 It is possible that Mercer exposed Amador to both a misrepresentation

along with a common omission concerning the availability of H-2A jobs.

Nonetheless, Mercer fails to raise this particular challenge to typicality

and, moreover, the thrust of the misrepresentation essentially overlaps

with that of the material omission. Both create the false impression that

Mercer was not seeking to hire H-2A workers when he sought

employment.

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