Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00198/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00198-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David A. Steinberg
Defendant
Sergio Mora
Plaintiff
Zeta Interactive Corp.
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SERGIO MORA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ZETA INTERACTIVE CORP. and 

DAVID A. STEINBERG,

Defendants.

No. 1:16-cv-00198-DAD-SAB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

(Doc. No. 34)

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss 

or stay this action. A hearing on the motion was held on October 6, 2016. Attorney Josh Arisohn 

appeared on behalf of plaintiff. Attorney John Du Wors appeared on behalf of defendants. 

Having considered the parties’ briefs and oral arguments and for the reasons set forth below, the 

court will deny defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sergio Mora proceeds on his first amended complaint against defendants Zeta 

Interactive Corp. (“Zeta”) and David A. Steinberg (“Steinberg”), the CEO and founder of Zeta. 

(Doc. No. 13.) Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a putative class of individuals who 

received allegedly unsolicited telephone calls from Ward Media, Inc. (“Ward Media”), a nowdefunct subsidiary of Zeta. (See id. ¶¶ 18–21.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that on November 

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13, 2015, he personally received two telephone calls from an entity known as Education Bridge, 

which is related to Ward Media. (Id. ¶¶ 14–16.) Plaintiff further alleges that prior to these 

telephone calls, he: (1) never had any contact with defendants; (2) never provided defendants with 

his telephone number; and (3) never consented, in writing or otherwise, to receive such calls from 

defendants. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

On August 26, 2015, defendants Zeta and Steinberg filed the instant motion to compel 

arbitration and to dismiss or stay this action. (Doc. No. 34.) In the alternative, defendants move 

to reopen discovery relating to the issue of arbitration. (Id.)

1

 Defendants argue that the alleged 

telephone calls from Education Bridge resulted from plaintiff’s visit to the website 

www.education4usa.info on two separate occasions—on January 22, 2015, and January 27, 2015. 

(Doc. No. 34 at 2) (citing Declaration of William Ettenger, Doc. Nos. 34-4–34-5 (“Ettenger 

Decl.”) ¶ 6, Exs. A–C).

2

 Defendants offer evidence that plaintiff filled out a form indicating that 

he wished to receive solicitations for educational opportunities. (Doc. No. 34 at 2–3.) 

Defendants argue that by visiting and filling out the form on the www.education4usa.info 

website, plaintiff not only consented to receive telephone solicitations, he also agreed to the 

website’s terms of use. (Id. at 3.) The website’s terms of use contained a dispute resolution 

clause that provided in relevant part that “[a]ny dispute relating in any way to your visit to 

Education4USA.info . . . shall be submitted to confidential arbitration.” (Id.) (citing Ettenger 

Decl., Ex. D). Defendants therefore argue that because plaintiff was bound by the website’s 

terms of use, this court must compel arbitration of his claims arising from plaintiff’s use of the 

website. (Id. at 3–4.)

On September 22, 2016, plaintiff filed his opposition to defendants’ motion. (Doc. No. 

36.) On September 29, 2016, defendants filed their reply. (Doc. No. 38.)

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1

In accordance with the court’s Phase One Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 20), and the parties’

later-filed stipulation (Doc. Nos. 28–29), discovery relating to arbitration ended on July 29, 2016.

2

Plaintiff disputes that he ever visited the website. (See Doc. No. 36 at 4; Declaration of Joshua 

D. Arisohn, Doc. No. 36-1 (“Arisohn Decl.”).) 

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LEGAL STANDARD

A written provision in any contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle 

a dispute by arbitration is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). 9 U.S.C. § 2. The 

FAA confers on the parties involved the right to obtain an order directing that arbitration proceed 

in the manner provided for in a contract between them. 9 U.S.C. § 4. In deciding a motion to 

compel arbitration, “[t]he court’s role under the Act is therefore limited to determining (1) 

whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement 

encompasses the dispute at issue.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Boardman v. Pacific Seafood Group, 822 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 

2016) (same). Defendants, the parties seeking to compel arbitration, bear the burden under the 

FAA to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.

Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 785 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 2015); Knutson v. Sirius 

XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 

14 Cal. 4th 394, 413 (1996)). 

DISCUSSION

To compel arbitration, this court must first determine whether a valid agreement to 

arbitrate exists. Boardman, 822 F.3d at 1017; Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1130. Here, as defendants 

concede, the www.education4usa.info terms of use constitutes a browsewrap agreement, “where a 

website’s terms and conditions of use are generally posted on the website via a hyperlink at the 

bottom of the screen.” Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428–30 (2d Cir. 2004)). As the Ninth 

Circuit has described,

“[A] browsewrap agreement does not require the user to manifest 

assent to the terms and conditions expressly . . . [a] party instead 

gives his assent simply by using the website.” Hines v. 

Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). . . . 

“The defining feature of browsewrap agreements is that the user 

can continue to use the website or its services without visiting the 

page hosting the browsewrap agreement or even knowing that such 

a webpage exists.” Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373-

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LHK, 2013 WL 5568706, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013). “Because 

no affirmative action is required by the website user to agree to the 

terms of a contract other than his or her use of the website, the 

determination of the validity of the browsewrap contract depends 

on whether the user has actual or constructive knowledge of a

website’s terms and conditions.” Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., 

LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 790 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Sw. Airlines 

Co. v. BoardFirst, LLC, No. 06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at 

*4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007)).

Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176. 

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff had no actual notice of the

www.education4usa.info website’s terms of use.3 Instead, they contend that the website puts a 

reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of use. (Doc. No. 34 at 7–9) (citing Specht 

v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002)). Specifically, defendants argue 

that by enrolling in the Education Bridge program on the www.education4usa.info website, 

plaintiff was required to fill out a detailed enrollment form, and that the website’s terms of use are 

conspicuously located on the website’s main page. (Id. at 7–8.) In support of their motion, 

defendants submit (1) a screenshot of the main webpage at www.education4usa.info as that 

website purportedly existed around the time plaintiff allegedly submitted his information, and (2) 

a copy of the enrollment form plaintiff visited and filled out. (Id.; Ettenger Decl., Exs. A–B.) 

However, defendants fail to identify, nor can this court find, any reference or hyperlink to the 

website’s terms of use in either document. (See also Arisohn Decl., Ex. C.) Because any 

reference to the website’s terms of use are absent from these documents, there exists no evidence 

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3 While defendants do mention that “Mora had actual knowledge” of the website’s terms and 

conditions (see Doc. No. 34 at ii), they pointed to no evidence in support of this assertion either in

their briefing or at the hearing on the pending motion.

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before the court that a reasonable user was placed on notice that the terms of use applied their 

visit.

4

 

Because defendants have failed to present any evidence that a reasonable user would have 

had a basis to believe the www.education4usa.info website’s terms of use existed, the court finds 

no valid agreement to arbitrate. In addition, defendants have offered no compelling reasons for 

why discovery should be reopened as to this issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to compel arbitration (Doc. No. 34) is 

denied. This matter is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for further scheduling 

consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

4

Even if a link to the website’s terms of use did exist, a reasonable user would not necessarily 

have had inquiry notice of those terms. In Nguyen, the Ninth Circuit held that 

{W]here a website makes its terms of use available via a 

conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise

provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any 

affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of 

the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without 

more—is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice. . . . [T]he 

onus must be on website owners to put users on notice of the terms 

to which they wish to bind consumers.

Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178–79.

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