Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05319/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05319-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association
Amicus Curiae for Appellant
Linda Solomon
Appellant
Thomas J. Vilsack
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 19, 2010 Decided December 21, 2010 

No. 09-5319 

LINDA SOLOMON, 

APPELLANT

v. 

THOMAS J. VILSACK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY 

OF AGRICULTURE, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cv-01590) 

John F. Karl, Jr. argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

Harry B. Roback, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney. 

Les Alderman was on the brief for amicus curiae 

Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association 

in support of appellant. 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 1 of 23
2 

Before: GINSBURG, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 

 TATEL, Circuit Judge: This case involves the interaction 

of two statutory regimes designed to benefit and protect 

federal employees with disabilities: the Rehabilitation Act of 

1973 and the disability retirement provisions of the Federal 

Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986. To prevail on a 

claim of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation 

Act, plaintiffs must show that they could “perform the 

essential functions” of their jobs either “with or without 

reasonable accommodation.” By contrast, disabled 

employees able to fulfill the duties of their positions with 

reasonable accommodation are ineligible for disability 

benefits from the Federal Employees Retirement System. 

Here the district court held that appellant’s receipt of federal 

disability retirement benefits precluded her from claiming that 

her employer, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, violated 

the Rehabilitation Act by failing to accommodate her 

disability. We disagree. Guided by the Supreme Court’s 

analysis in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 

526 U.S. 795 (1999), we conclude (1) that claims for federal 

disability retirement benefits and disability-discrimination 

claims under the Rehabilitation Act do not so inherently 

conflict as to justify presumptively barring recipients of such 

benefits from asserting Rehabilitation Act claims, and (2) that 

a reasonable jury could find that the statements appellant and 

her doctor made in support of her application for disability 

benefits are consistent with her current claim that she could 

have performed the essential functions of her position with 

reasonable accommodation. We thus hold that appellant’s 

receipt of disability benefits bars neither her claim that her 

employer failed to accommodate her disability nor a related 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 2 of 23
3 

set of claims that her supervisors retaliated against her for 

exercising her rights under federal antidiscrimination laws. 

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s entry of summary 

judgment on those claims and remand for the court to 

consider in the first instance whether appellant has raised 

trial-worthy issues of material fact. 

 

I. 

 Because this case comes to us on appeal from a grant of 

summary judgment, we present the facts in the light most 

favorable to appellant, the nonmoving party in the district 

court, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. See 

Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 604 (D.C. Cir. 

2010). 

 Appellant Linda Solomon began working as a budget 

analyst at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“Department”) 

in 1997. Solomon v. Vilsack, 656 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 

2009). Solomon “has a long history of depression” and has 

also been diagnosed with agoraphobia, “an anxiety disorder 

characterized by the fear of being around other people.” Id. at 

57 & n.3. In late 2003 and early 2004, Solomon experienced 

a number of personal hardships that exacerbated her 

condition. See id. at 57. Her mental health during this period 

“ ‘was often unpredictable,’ ” and she had “ ‘intermittent and 

sporadic’ problems sleeping, concentrating, and focusing.” 

Id. (quoting Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute & 

Material Facts Omitted by Def. 2). She also missed a 

considerable amount of work during the first ten weeks of 

2004, using more than 110 hours of leave, including 50 hours 

of leave without pay. Id. at 58. 

 Solomon contends that notwithstanding her declining 

mental health, she succeeded in performing her duties at the 

Department. Solomon Decl. ¶ 9. Indeed, she “received a 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 3 of 23
4 

superior performance rating in February 2004.” Id. Since 

Solomon’s depression made it difficult to maintain regular 

work hours, she would sometimes arrive at the office early, 

stay late, or work from home. Id. To block out distractions 

and help her concentrate, she also purchased and installed a 

privacy screen that covered the opening of her work cubicle. 

Id. ¶ 11. According to Solomon, her supervisor, Sylvia 

Booth, approved of both her working outside of regular office 

hours and her installation of the privacy screen. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. 

 On March 2, 2004, Solomon emailed Booth, apologizing 

for her erratic leave and explaining that she was suffering 

from a relapse of her chronic depression. Booth responded 

that if Solomon believed that she would “need special 

accom[m]odations,” she should provide medical 

documentation of her condition. Solomon then gave Booth a 

letter from her psychiatrist, Dr. Dennis Cozzens, stating that 

Solomon suffered from “chronic depression, anxiety and 

insomnia” and requesting that she be placed on “a flexible 

work schedule . . . to assist her with her medical treatment.” 

Solomon also asked for a different work space where she 

would have more room and would be less bothered by her coworkers. On April 6, Deborah Lawrence, another supervisor, 

sent Solomon a memorandum asking that she submit further 

“medical documentation” by April 16 to demonstrate “the 

existence of [her] medical condition and the necessity for the 

[requested] changes in duty location and hours of duty.” 

Although Solomon failed to provide Lawrence with additional 

medical documentation by this deadline, she alleges that the 

Department was nonetheless “fully aware of [her] medical 

problems.” Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute & 

Material Facts Omitted by Def. ¶ 19. 

 According to Solomon, Lawrence ordered her to take 

down her privacy screen and barred her from working past 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 4 of 23
5 

6:00 p.m., thus “rescind[ing] the informal accommodations” 

Booth had previously granted. Appellant’s Opening Br. 8. 

Solomon’s difficulties at work soon came to a head. 

Although Solomon had planned to work late on the evening of 

April 23, a supervisor prohibited her from working past 5:30 

p.m. Upset, she never returned to work. 

 Cozzens sent the Department several letters about 

Solomon after she stopped working. Solomon, 656 F. Supp. 

2d at 58. On May 10, Cozzens informed the Department that 

Solomon’s prognosis was “guarded.” In a June 2 letter, he 

stated that although Solomon remained “unable to work due 

to the severity of her psychiatric symptoms,” she might 

nonetheless be able to return to work in mid-July if afforded 

appropriate accommodations. Solomon also continued 

communicating with her supervisors even though she was no 

longer appearing for work. Id. On May 26, she sought 

permission “to telecommute on a part-time schedule.” Her 

supervisors said no. She also requested advanced, paid sick 

leave. Although her supervisors again said no, they did allow 

her to participate in the Department’s Voluntary Leave 

Transfer Program through which Solomon’s co-workers 

donated 56 hours of sick leave. In addition, the Department 

granted Solomon over 1000 hours of leave without pay in 

2004. 

 On August 30, Solomon submitted an application for 

disability retirement benefits through the Federal Employees 

Retirement System (FERS). The FERS statute provides that 

disability retirement benefits are available only to federal 

employees who have “complete[d] at least 18 months of 

civilian service” and have become “unable, because of disease 

or injury, to render useful and efficient service in [their] 

position.” 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(A)–(B). Under Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM) regulations, employees are 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 5 of 23
6 

eligible for the benefits only if accommodating their 

disabilities would be “unreasonable.” 5 C.F.R. § 

844.103(a)(4). An official FERS handbook clarifies that a 

“ ‘[r]easonable accommodation’ is any action that [an] agency 

would be obligated to take under the Rehabilitation Act,” 

which protects federal employees from discrimination based 

on their disabilities. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., CSRS and 

FERS Handbook for Personnel and Payroll Offices: 

Disability Retirement 16, 52 (1998); see also 29 U.S.C. § 791. 

 The FERS application that Solomon completed, however, 

nowhere directly inquired whether she could work with 

reasonable accommodations, such as modified work hours or 

working conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (defining the 

term “reasonable accommodation”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 

791(g) (providing that section 12111(9)’s definition applies to 

suits under the Rehabilitation Act); 5 C.F.R. § 844.102 

(defining the term “accommodation” for purposes of the 

regulations governing FERS disability benefits). Instead, the 

application asked, “What accommodations have you 

requested from your agency?” to which Solomon responded, 

“A flexible work schedule, relocation of work station, 

advanced sick leave and entry into the leave donor program.” 

The form next asked, “Has your agency been able to grant 

your request?”—a question Solomon answered by checking 

the box marked “no.” Solomon also stated in her application 

that she “became disabled for [her] position” in May 2003 and 

that she had “been unable to work” since April 2004 because 

her medical condition was “in crisis . . . [despite] continued 

treatment.” In addition, Cozzens submitted a letter in support 

of Solomon’s application asserting that “disability retirement 

[was] the only viable option in [her] case” in light of her 

severe depression. 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 6 of 23
7 

 OPM approved Solomon’s application on December 16, 

and “she began receiving benefits (retroactive to the date of 

application) in January 2005.” Solomon, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 

58. Since then, she has not worked, and her doctor “has 

continued to represent [to OPM] that she cannot return to 

work because of her disability.” Id. at 58–59. 

 On September 7, 2007, Solomon filed suit against the 

Secretary of Agriculture in the U.S. District Court for the 

District of Columbia, alleging that the Secretary violated her 

rights under the Rehabilitation Act by refusing to provide 

reasonable accommodations for her disability. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 791(g); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5). (Throughout this 

opinion, we shall refer to this claim as Solomon’s 

“accommodation claim.”) Among other things, she claimed 

that by denying her requests for reasonable accommodations, 

her supervisors effectively “forced [her] to apply for disability 

retirement.” Compl. ¶ 17. In addition, Solomon alleged that 

her supervisors unlawfully retaliated against her for engaging 

in activities protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act of 1967 (ADEA), and the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 

U.S.C. § 12203 (anti-retaliation provision of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act of 1990, which applies to actions under 

the Rehabilitation Act by virtue of 29 U.S.C. § 791(g)); 

Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 477 (2008) (holding 

that a federal employee who is retaliated against based on the 

filing of an age-discrimination complaint may assert a claim 

under 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), the federal-sector provision of the 

ADEA); Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

(noting that Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity in 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-16 for claims under Title VII includes claims 

of retaliation). Although Solomon also alleged that her 

supervisors discriminated against her based on age, her 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 7 of 23
8 

counsel advised us at oral argument that she is no longer 

pursuing that claim. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 13:12–20. 

 The Secretary moved for summary judgment on all 

claims. Ruling on that motion, the district court began with 

the “threshold” question of whether a recipient of FERS 

disability benefits is barred from asserting a claim of 

disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, which 

forbids federal agencies from engaging in any discrimination 

prohibited by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 

(ADA). Solomon, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 59; see also 29 U.S.C. § 

791(g). The ADA’s list of prohibited forms of discrimination 

includes failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the 

known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 

qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or 

employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the 

accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 

operation of [its] business.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To 

be a “qualified individual” entitled to protection from 

discrimination under the ADA, an individual must be able to 

perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, “the 

essential functions of the employment position that such 

individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Thus, to 

prevail on her accommodation claim, Solomon must show 

that she could have performed the essential functions of her 

job as a budget analyst with reasonable accommodation. See 

Breen v. Dep’t of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C. Cir. 

2002). As explained above, however, OPM regulations 

provide that individuals able to fulfill the duties of their 

positions with reasonable accommodation are ineligible for 

FERS disability benefits. See 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a)(4). 

 The district court concluded that Solomon’s claim for 

FERS disability benefits and her contention that she had been 

discriminated against in violation of the Rehabilitation Act 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 8 of 23
9 

were “mutually exclusive.” Solomon, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 62. 

It thus ruled that Solomon’s application for and receipt of 

FERS disability benefits “precluded” her accommodation 

claim. Id. at 59. Relying on similar logic, the district court 

also barred Solomon from pursuing her claim that she had 

been retaliated against for engaging in activities protected by 

Title VII. Noting that her Title VII claim rested on the 

allegation that her supervisors retaliated against her by taking 

the “ ‘materially adverse’ ” action of denying her 

accommodation requests, the court reasoned that the 

supervisors’ actions could not have been “adverse” if no 

reasonable accommodations could have been made for 

Solomon’s disability. Id. at 62 (quoting Burlington N. & 

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). Since 

individuals whose disabilities can be reasonably 

accommodated are ineligible for FERS disability benefits, the 

court held, Solomon’s receipt of such benefits “precluded” 

her Title VII retaliation claim. Id. at 57, 62. Without 

separately addressing Solomon’s distinct retaliation claims 

under the ADEA and the Rehabilitation Act, the district court 

granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment in its 

entirety. Id. at 63. 

 Solomon now appeals, reiterating the arguments she 

made in the district court. Since the district court relied on 

the same rationale in holding that Solomon’s accommodation 

and retaliation claims were barred—i.e., that recipients of 

FERS disability benefits are precluded from later claiming 

they could have performed the essential functions of their 

position with reasonable accommodation—our analysis will 

focus primarily on the question of whether Solomon’s 

accommodation claim is foreclosed. If the district court erred 

in barring Solomon’s accommodation claim, its holding with 

respect to her retaliation claims must fail as well. 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 9 of 23
10 

II.

 Solomon argues that the district court adopted a “per se 

rule” that bars recipients of FERS disability benefits from 

asserting disability-discrimination claims under the 

Rehabilitation Act. Appellant’s Opening Br. 22. She 

contends that our review of this legal issue is de novo. The 

Secretary, arguing that the district court grounded its decision 

on the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel, contends that 

our review is limited to determining whether the district court 

abused its discretion in estopping Solomon’s claims. See New 

Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001) 

(explaining that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that 

seeks to “protect the integrity of the judicial process” by 

prohibiting a party who has successfully maintained a certain 

position in an adjudicative proceeding from assuming a 

contrary position in a subsequent proceeding) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Moses v. Howard Univ. 

Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 797 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that the 

circuits are split on the issue of whether district court 

applications of judicial estoppel are reviewed de novo or for 

abuse of discretion, but taking no position on the issue). We 

agree with Solomon that our review is de novo. 

 In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., the 

Supreme Court addressed a question closely resembling the 

one we face here—whether an individual who received Social 

Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits was barred from 

pursuing an ADA claim based on her employer’s failure to 

accommodate her disability. In doing so, the Court did not 

expressly rely on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Although 

the Secretary nonetheless insists that the Court implicitly 

“appl[ied] the judicial estoppel doctrine,” Oral Arg. Tr. at 

30:12–17, and although some commentators seem to agree, 

see 18 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 

134.30, at 134-63 to 134-64 & nn.4.1–4.2 (3d ed. 2000); 18B 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 10 of 23
11 

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 4477.1 (2d ed. 2002), we 

think it best to follow the Court’s analysis exactly as it is set 

forth in Cleveland. That opinion requires us to resolve two 

legal questions as to which our review is plenary. See United 

States v. Berry, 618 F.3d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that 

“questions of law” are reviewed de novo). First, do claims for 

FERS disability benefits and disability-discrimination claims 

under the Rehabilitation Act so inherently conflict that we 

should presumptively bar recipients of FERS disability 

benefits from asserting Rehabilitation Act claims? Second, 

even if no inherent conflict between the two claims exists, is 

the Secretary nonetheless entitled to summary judgment 

because Solomon has failed to reconcile her statements in her 

FERS application with her current claim that she could have 

worked with reasonable accommodations? In the following 

pages, we summarize the facts of Cleveland and then consider 

each of these questions in turn. 

 Carolyn Cleveland applied for and received SSDI 

benefits, for which an individual is eligible only if she suffers 

from “a disability so severe that she is ‘unable to do [her] 

previous work’ and ‘cannot . . . engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national 

economy.’ ” 526 U.S. at 797 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(2)(A)). Much like Solomon in her application for 

FERS benefits, Cleveland represented in her SSDI application 

that she was “unable to work” due to her disability. Id. at 798 

(internal quotation marks omitted). She then brought suit 

under the ADA, claiming that her former employer had 

discriminated against her based on her disability by failing to 

afford her reasonable accommodation. The Fifth Circuit held 

that applying for or receiving SSDI benefits “creates a 

rebuttable presumption” that the claimant or recipient is 

barred from pursuing a claim of disability discrimination 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 11 of 23
12 

under the ADA. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 

F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 

Concluding that Cleveland failed to overcome that 

presumption, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer. Id. 

Although the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s 

“special judicial presumption” that would ordinarily preclude 

SSDI recipients from asserting ADA claims, it nonetheless 

held that to survive summary judgment Cleveland had to 

explain on remand how her statements in support of her SSDI 

application were “consistent with her ADA claim that she 

could ‘perform the essential functions’ of her previous job, at 

least with ‘reasonable accommodation.’ ” Cleveland, 526 

U.S. at 798, 802. 

 To reach this conclusion, the Court began its analysis by 

asking whether a claim for SSDI benefits and an ADA claim 

are so “inherently” inconsistent as to justify a “special 

negative presumption” such as the one adopted by the Fifth 

Circuit. Id. at 802. Examining the SSDI program in detail, 

the Court concluded that there are “too many situations in 

which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim can comfortably 

exist side by side” to warrant such a presumption. Id. at 802–

03. Accordingly, we too begin our analysis by asking 

whether there is such an “inherent[] conflict” between the 

receipt of FERS disability benefits and the elements of a 

discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act that we 

should adopt a “special judicial presumption” that “would 

ordinarily prevent a plaintiff like [Solomon] from successfully 

asserting [a Rehabilitation Act] claim.” Id. at 802. 

 The district court began and ended its analysis with this 

“threshold issue.” Solomon, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 59. Having 

determined that an “ ‘inherent conflict’ ” does indeed exist, id. 

at 60 (quoting Chinchillo v. Powell, 236 F. Supp. 2d 18, 27 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 12 of 23
13 

(D.D.C. 2003)), the district court adopted what appears to be a 

conclusive, irrebuttable presumption that recipients of FERS 

disability benefits are “precluded” from asserting disabilitydiscrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, id. at 59. 

In our view, however, disability-benefit and Rehabilitation 

Act claims are not so inherently inconsistent as to justify any 

sort of special presumption, whether rebuttable or 

irrebuttable, against recipients of FERS disability benefits 

who charge their employers with discrimination based on 

failure to accommodate. True, unlike the SSDI program 

considered in Cleveland, the OPM regulations governing 

FERS “take the possibility of ‘reasonable accommodation’ 

into account.” Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803. That is, 

individuals whose disabilities can be reasonably 

accommodated are ineligible for FERS disability benefits. 5 

C.F.R. § 844.103(a)(4). In Cleveland, however, the Supreme 

Court did not just compare the text of the ADA, the Social 

Security Act, and their implementing regulations. Instead, it 

considered how the SSDI program is implemented in practice, 

emphasizing that the Social Security Administration never 

asks applicants about “the possibility of reasonable 

accommodation.” Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803. 

 So too here. The FERS application forms nowhere 

directly ask applicants whether they can perform the essential 

functions of their positions with reasonable accommodations. 

Standard Form 3112A, entitled “Applicant’s Statement of 

Disability,” instead asks applicants to “[g]ive the approximate 

date [they] became disabled for [their] position”; to describe 

how their disabilities “interfere[] with [the] performance of 

[their] duties, [their] attendance, or [their] conduct”; and to 

explain “any other restrictions” that their disabilities impose 

on their activities. The form also asks, “What 

accommodations have you requested from your agency?” and 

“Has your agency been able to grant your request?” Although 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 13 of 23
14 

other parts of the FERS application packet do mention the 

possibility of reasonable accommodation, those references 

appear on forms completed by supervisors and other agency 

officials rather than by applicants themselves. For example, 

Standard Form 3112B, the “Supervisor’s Statement,” defines 

the term “accommodation” and gives examples of various 

“reasonable accommodation[s]” that may be offered to 

disabled employees. The forms completed and signed by the 

applicant contain no similar discussion of what constitutes a 

“reasonable accommodation.” Indeed, only the agency, not 

the applicant, is asked, “Has reasonable effort for 

accommodation been made?” See OPM Standard Form 

3112D: Agency Certification of Reassignment & 

Accommodation Efforts. 

 In sum, the FERS application forms nowhere require 

applicants to expressly represent that their disabilities cannot 

be reasonably accommodated. Therefore, as the Merit 

Systems Protection Board concluded in a decision addressing 

the very issue raised in this case, an individual’s application 

for and receipt of FERS disability benefits do not necessarily 

constitute “an affirmation . . . that [her disability] could not be 

accommodated.” Lamberson v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 80 

M.S.P.R. 648, 657 (MSPB 1999). Of course, the Board’s 

decision is not binding on us, and Solomon does not argue 

that we owe the decision any deference under cases such as 

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984), Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 

323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), or Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 

461 (1997). Nonetheless, for the reasons given above, we 

agree with the Board that it would be inappropriate to 

preclude an individual from asserting a disability 

discrimination claim “merely because she either applied for or 

is in receipt of . . . FERS disability benefits.” Lamberson, 80 

M.S.P.R. at 658. 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 14 of 23
15 

 Like the Board, we believe that this conclusion accords 

with “Congress’s intent that continuation of work with 

accommodation [be] preferred over disability retirement.” Id. 

This intent is evident in 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(2), which requires 

an agency to consider reassigning an employee who applies 

for disability retirement to another vacant position and 

disqualifies an individual who declines a reasonable offer of 

reassignment from receiving FERS disability benefits. Since 

one of the forms of relief available under the Rehabilitation 

Act is reinstatement, see 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5(g); Frye v. Aspin, 997 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1993), 

allowing recipients of FERS disability benefits to pursue 

Rehabilitation Act claims comports with Congress’s 

preference that disabled employees continue working with 

accommodations rather than being nudged toward retirement. 

See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1167, at 206 (1980) (“If the employee 

is able to perform useful and efficient service in another 

position and a vacancy exists, the employee must be 

reassigned rather than retired.”), reprinted in 1980 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5651. 

 Refusing to create a presumption that recipients of FERS 

disability benefits are precluded from asserting disabilitydiscrimination claims also furthers the Rehabilitation Act’s 

objective of “ensur[ing] that the Federal Government plays a 

leadership role in promoting the employment of individuals 

with disabilities.” 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2). Individual lawsuits 

under the Rehabilitation Act are one mechanism for ensuring 

that the federal government stays faithful to this goal. Not 

only do such suits offer the possibility of compensation and 

other relief to individuals whose rights under the Act may 

have been violated, but they also reveal shortcomings in how 

federal agencies treat their disabled employees. 

Presumptively closing the courthouse doors to recipients of 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 15 of 23
16 

FERS disability benefits attempting to assert Rehabilitation 

Act claims, however, “would force disabled individuals into 

an ‘untenable’ choice between receiving immediate 

subsistence benefits . . . or pursuing discrimination remedies.” 

Swanks v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 

586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortg., 

Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1994)). This 

“choice”—hardly a choice at all for individuals without 

independent means—is especially daunting because, except in 

certain limited circumstances irrelevant here, former federal 

employees have only one year from the date of their 

separation to apply for FERS disability benefits. 5 C.F.R. § 

844.201(a)(1). Since Rehabilitation Act suits often last far 

longer than a year, individuals whose claims fail because their 

disabilities could not have been reasonably accommodated 

would likely find themselves time-barred from then applying 

for disability retirement benefits. Were we to accept the 

Secretary’s argument and require federal employees to choose 

between immediate FERS benefits and uncertain 

Rehabilitation Act remedies, many disabled employees might 

well forgo meritorious Rehabilitation Act claims, thus 

shielding from liability federal agencies that fail to abide by 

their statutory duty to grant reasonable accommodations to 

their disabled employees. See Swanks, 116 F.3d at 586. 

 Indeed, under the district court’s seemingly inflexible 

holding, agencies could force employees to seek disability 

retirement in an effort to escape their legal responsibility to 

provide reasonable accommodations. That, Solomon claims, 

is just what happened here. She alleges that she “was forced 

to seek disability retirement” because her supervisors refused 

to grant reasonable accommodations that would have 

permitted her to perform the essential functions of her job. 

Solomon Dep. Tr. at 147:1–2, 16–17 (Nov. 6, 2008); see also

Compl. ¶ 17. If Solomon’s allegation is true, the district 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 16 of 23
17 

court’s decision would grant immunity to Solomon’s 

employer precisely because it succeeded in forcing Solomon 

to accept disability retirement benefits by denying her 

accommodations to which she was legally entitled. Such a 

holding, which conceals rather than reveals disability 

discrimination, disserves the Rehabilitation Act’s purpose of 

ensuring that the federal government functions as a “model 

employer of individuals with disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 

1614.203(a). 

 For all these reasons, we conclude that recipients of 

FERS disability benefits are not presumptively barred from 

asserting Rehabilitation Act claims. Under Cleveland, 

however, our analysis cannot end there. Although the 

Supreme Court refused to adopt a special negative 

presumption that would generally bar SSDI recipients from 

pursuing ADA claims, it did hold that Cleveland could not 

“simply ignore the apparent contradiction” between her 

statements to the Social Security Administration and the 

elements of her ADA claim. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806. To 

avoid summary judgment, the Court explained, Cleveland had 

to reconcile this apparent discrepancy by providing an 

“explanation . . . sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s 

concluding that, assuming the truth of, or [Cleveland’s] goodfaith belief in, the earlier statement[s], [Cleveland] could 

nonetheless ‘perform the essential functions’ of her job, with 

or without ‘reasonable accommodation.’ ” Id. at 807. 

Although the Supreme Court remanded for the district court 

to hear additional arguments and receive further sworn 

declarations on this issue, id., the record in this case is 

sufficiently developed to allow us to determine whether 

Solomon has adequately reconciled the statements she made 

in her FERS application with her accommodation claim. 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 17 of 23
18 

 Solomon’s statements in her FERS application could 

conflict with her accommodation claim in two ways. First, 

the statements could contain factual assertions that contradict 

essential elements of her claim. Second, even if no direct 

factual inconsistency exists, her FERS application could 

nonetheless be viewed as containing “context-related legal 

conclusion[s]” that conflict with her accommodation claim. 

Id. at 802. 

 

 Because the Secretary most strenuously argues that the 

second type of inconsistency exists in this case, we begin 

there. The Secretary contends that when considered “in the 

context of an application for FERS disability benefits,” for 

which an individual is eligible only if her disability cannot be 

reasonably accommodated, Solomon’s August 2004 

statements to OPM constitute representations that no 

reasonable accommodation could have been made for her 

disability. Appellee’s Br. 31. The Secretary’s argument 

might have some force if there were evidence that Solomon 

knew when she applied for FERS disability benefits that 

individuals whose disabilities can be reasonably 

accommodated are ineligible for such benefits. But the record 

contains no such evidence. The application forms bearing 

Solomon’s signature nowhere warn that disabled employees 

able to work with reasonable accommodations are ineligible 

for disability retirement, and the Secretary has pointed to no 

evidence that Solomon was otherwise apprised of this 

eligibility qualification. We thus have no basis for treating 

Solomon’s statements in her FERS application as “contextrelated legal conclusion[s]” that she was unable to work even 

with reasonable accommodations. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 

802. 

 

 Turning to the other possible basis for a conflict, we 

consider whether Solomon’s statements in her FERS 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 18 of 23
19 

application are factually inconsistent with the elements of her 

accommodation claim. Asked to describe how her disability 

interfered with her job performance, Solomon responded that 

she had been “unable to work” since April 2004 “because 

[her] medical condition remain[ed] in crisis” despite 

treatment. Solomon also acknowledged that she had been 

“disabled for [her] position” since May 2003 and that her 

employer had been unable to grant her requested 

accommodations. According to Solomon, these statements 

merely reflect the fact that she was unable to work, and thus 

had no choice but to apply for disability retirement benefits, 

because her supervisors not only revoked informal 

accommodations that she had previously been granted—the 

privacy screen and permission to work outside of normal 

business hours—but also denied her requests for additional 

accommodations. See Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in 

Dispute & Material Facts Omitted by Def. ¶ 66; Pl.’s Opp’n 

to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 14, 17; Solomon Dep. Tr. at 

48:14–15, 146:19–149:18. The statements, Solomon insists, 

do not amount to concessions that she would have been 

unable to work in the spring and summer of 2004 even if her 

supervisors had granted her accommodation requests. 

 We think Solomon has sufficiently reconciled any facial 

tension that might exist between the statements in her FERS 

application and her accommodation claim. Nowhere in 

Solomon’s application did she directly discuss whether she 

could have worked with reasonable accommodations, nor did 

the application forms call for her to do so. Thus, her 

statements that she “became disabled for [her] position” in 

May 2003 and had been “unable to work” since April 2004 

could be perfectly consistent with her current claim that she 

could have fulfilled the essential duties of her position if 

granted her requested accommodations. Solomon’s answer 

“no” to the question, “Has your agency been able to grant 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 19 of 23
20 

your request [for accommodations]?” could likewise be 

viewed as consistent with her accommodation claim. To be 

sure, as the Secretary suggests, Solomon’s answer could mean 

that the Department was unable to grant the accommodations 

because they either were unreasonable or would have been 

ineffective in permitting Solomon to work despite her 

disability. But a jury could just as easily conclude that the 

Department was unable to grant the accommodations because 

Solomon’s supervisors unreasonably denied her requests. 

 

 The Secretary points to statements made by Dr. Cozzens, 

Solomon’s psychiatrist, in support of Solomon’s FERS 

application that, according to the Secretary, are inconsistent 

with Solomon’s accommodation claim. Even assuming the 

statements of a third party like Cozzens could bar Solomon’s 

claim, but cf. Pyramid Sec. Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 

F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (refraining from deciding 

whether the sham-affidavit rule, which requires parties to 

explain inconsistencies in their sworn statements, applies to 

non-party witnesses who have made inconsistent sworn 

statements), doing so would be inappropriate because 

Cozzens’s statements, like Solomon’s, can be reconciled with 

her accommodation claim. In an August 2004 letter to OPM, 

Cozzens stated that “disability retirement [was] the only 

viable option” for Solomon since her condition had shown 

“little improvement” over the spring and summer of 2004. 

Nowhere in that letter, however, did Cozzens mention the 

possibility of reasonable accommodations. Moreover, in his 

sworn declaration in this litigation, Cozzens states that 

Solomon “could have returned to work in July[] 2004” if the 

agency had afforded her certain accommodations, “such as 

giving her a quiet work space and allowing her to work 

flexible hours and/or to work at home.” Cozzens Decl. ¶ 7; 

see also id. ¶ 6 (explaining that disability retirement was “the 

only option left” for Solomon in August 2004 because her 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 20 of 23
21 

supervisors had “refused her request for advance sick leave 

and denied her the opportunity to work part-time and/or to 

work at home”). 

 Since Solomon has demonstrated that a reasonable jury 

could find that the statements she and Cozzens made in 

support of her application for FERS disability benefits are 

consistent with her current claim that she could have worked 

in the spring and summer of 2004 with reasonable 

accommodation, her accommodation claim is not foreclosed 

under the standard set forth in Cleveland. See Cleveland, 526 

U.S. at 807. This is not to say that Solomon’s and Cozzens’s 

statements in support of Solomon’s FERS application are 

irrelevant to her accommodation claim. Indeed, given 

Solomon’s and Cozzens’s August 2004 representations to 

OPM, a jury might well be skeptical of their current positions 

regarding Solomon’s ability to work. See Whitbeck v. Vital 

Signs, Inc., 159 F.3d 1369, 1372–74 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding 

that information contained in applications for disability 

insurance benefits may be relevant to a plaintiff’s claim that 

her employer failed to reasonably accommodate her 

disability); Swanks, 116 F.3d at 587 (noting that claimants’ 

statements in support of their applications for SSDI benefits 

may be relevant in ADA suits). We hold only that a 

reasonable jury could find that their representations to OPM 

are not inconsistent with the elements of Solomon’s 

accommodation claim. 

 

 Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, despite the 

Secretary’s protestations to the contrary, allowing Solomon’s 

claim to proceed is not likely to unfairly benefit Solomon or 

unduly prejudice the government. Although the issue of 

remedies is not before us, the parties appear to agree that any 

award of back pay Solomon might obtain on her 

accommodation claim could be reduced by the amount of 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 21 of 23
22 

FERS disability benefits she has received. See Appellant’s 

Reply Br. 10 n.5; Oral Arg. Tr. at 40:21–41:10. As we have 

previously recognized, offsetting awards in disabilitydiscrimination cases by the amount of disability benefits the 

plaintiff has received “may provide a way to prevent windfall 

recoveries while guaranteeing disabled persons the full 

protection” of both federal antidiscrimination laws and 

programs designed to provide assistance to individuals whose 

disabilities prevent them from working. Swanks, 116 F.3d at 

587. 

 

 This brings us to Solomon’s claims that her supervisors 

unlawfully retaliated against her for engaging in activities 

protected by Title VII, the ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act. 

Addressing only Solomon’s Title VII retaliation claim, the 

district court rejected the contention that Solomon’s 

supervisors retaliated against her by taking the “ ‘materially 

adverse’ ” action of denying her accommodation requests. 

See Solomon, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (quoting Burlington N. & 

Santa Fe Ry., 548 U.S. at 68); see also Baloch v. Kempthorne, 

550 F.3d 1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“To prove retaliation, 

the plaintiff generally must establish that he or she suffered (i) 

a materially adverse action (ii) because he or she had brought 

or threatened to bring a discrimination claim.”). Reasoning 

that the Department’s failure to grant Solomon 

accommodations could not have been “ ‘adverse’ if she could 

not reasonably have been accommodated,” the district court 

held that Solomon’s application for and receipt of FERS 

disability benefits “precluded” her Title VII retaliation claim 

because she would have been ineligible for such benefits if 

she could have worked with reasonable accommodations. 

Solomon, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 57, 62. We reject this holding 

for the same reason we have concluded that Solomon is not 

precluded from pursuing her accommodation claim. See 

supra pp. 10–22. Since a reasonable jury could find that 

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 22 of 23
23 

Solomon’s statements in support of her FERS application are 

consistent with her current contention that she could have 

worked in the spring and summer of 2004 if afforded 

reasonable accommodations, neither her accommodation 

claim nor her retaliation claims are foreclosed. 

 

III. 

 The Secretary urges us to affirm the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment on alternative grounds. Specifically, 

the Secretary argues that the undisputed material facts 

demonstrate that no reasonable accommodation would have 

enabled Solomon to perform the essential functions of her 

position and that her supervisors did not retaliate against her 

for engaging in statutorily protected activities. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56. But the district court never reached these 

alternative arguments, grounding its decision instead on its 

“threshold” determination that recipients of FERS disability 

benefits are precluded from pursuing claims of discrimination 

under the Rehabilitation Act. Solomon, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 59. 

Lacking the benefit of the district court’s analysis of whether 

genuine issues of material fact exist that would preclude the 

entry of summary judgment, we believe the most prudent 

course is to remand for the district court to consider this issue 

in the first instance. See Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 693, 

695–96 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining to decide whether the 

government was entitled to summary judgment on alternative 

grounds not reached by the district court and remanding for 

the district court to consider the government’s arguments). 

 For the reasons given above, we vacate the district 

court’s entry of summary judgment with respect to Solomon’s 

accommodation and retaliation claims and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 

So ordered.

USCA Case #09-5319 Document #1284111 Filed: 12/21/2010 Page 23 of 23