Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02216/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02216-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Malcolm Archer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JAMES MALCOLM ARCHER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

FILED . United States Court of Appcn:s 

Tenth Circuit 

NOV 2 1 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Cleric 

No. 93-2216 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CR 92-226SC) 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Thomas J. Clear, III, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for DefendantAppellant. 

John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, and Mary L. Higgins, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, LOGAN and REAVLEY,* Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, Senior United States Circuit 

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-2216 Document: 01019279000 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 1 
Defendant James Malcolm Archer appeals after sentencing on 

his guilty plea to one count of bank fraud and aiding and abetting 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344(1) and 2.1 He ·contends that we 

must remand for resentencing because the district court (1) failed 

to assure that defendant and his counsel timely received and had 

the opportunity to review and object to his presentence report 

(PSR), as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, and (2) denied his 

allocution rights under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a) (1) (C) .2 

I 

The original PSR applied the 1992 Sentencing Guidelines, and 

calculated a base offense level of 6. U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(a). The 

base offense level was increased eleven levels for a loss of more 

than $800,000, id. § 2Fl.l(b) (1) (L); increased two levels for more 

than minimal planning; and decreased two levels for acceptance of 

responsibility. The total offense level of 17 and criminal history category of I resulted in a guideline sentencing range of 

twenty-four to thirty months. 

Defendant filed objections to the PSR, arguing that an 

eleven-level increase for an $816,000 loss was not warranted 

because he was significantly less involved in the scheme than two 

other participants. He also asserted that he was entitled to a 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

2 Citations to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 are to the version in effect 

in July 1993, the date of sentencing. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2216 Document: 01019279000 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 2 
two-level decrease for role in the offense because he was a minor 

participant. 

The first addendum to the PSR recommended rejecting defendant's objections. A second addendum recalculated the sentence 

based on the 1988 Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense. 

Defendant and his counsel did not receive a copy of either addendum until after sentencing. The earlier loss tables provided for 

only an eight-level increase for a loss of $800,000. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2F1.1(b) (1) (I) (1988). The recalculated total offense level was 

14, resulting in a sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-one 

months. 

At sentencing, the district court adopted the guidelines 

application in this second addendum. The court granted the government's motion for downward departure for substantial assistance 

under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, based on defendant's assistance in investigation of the bank fraud scheme and his testimony against two 

others involved in the scheme. The court departed downward one 

level to a guidelines range of twelve to eighteen months, and 

imposed a sentence of twelve months with three years supervised 

release. 

Defendant argues that we must remand for resentencing because 

the district court failed to ensure compliance with Rule 32. Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 32(a) (1) provides that: 

Prior to the sentencing hearing, the court shall ... 

(A) determine that the defendant and defendant's 

counsel·have had the opportunity to read and discuss the 

presentence investigation report . . . [and] 

(B) afford counsel for the defendant an opportunity 

to speak on behalf of the defendant. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2216 Document: 01019279000 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 3 
Rule 32(c) (2) requires that the PSR contain the "classification of 

the offense level" used to determine the suggested sentencing 

range, and Rule 32(c) (3) requires that the court provide defendant 

and his counsel with a copy of the PSR at least ten days before 

sentencing. 

The government concedes that the district court failed to 

determine whether defendant and his counsel had the opportunity to 

review and discuss the PSR. The record on appeal confirms that 

counsel was not aware of the addenda. See IV R. 8 (at sentencing 

defense counsel. argued for reduction from an offense level of 17 

in the original PSR, obviously unaware of the revised offense 

level of 14 calculated in the second addendum) . The district 

court thus failed to comply with Rule 32(a) (1) (A) and 32(c) (3) (A). 

We will remand for resentencing, however, only if defendant 

suffered prejudice as a result of the Rule 32 violation. United 

States v. Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d 1519, 1526 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Defendant argues that he was prejudiced because if he had seen the 

addenda he would have challenged the $800,000 loss calculation. 

But his counsel addressed the loss calculation at sentencing, 

pointing out that the government had agreed not to oppose a 

reduction in the amount of loss. Although defendant asserts that 

he would have offered evidence to contradict the loss level, under 

the Guidelines, sentences accommodate the total amount of money 

involved in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1). Defendant 

offers no evidence that the total amount of loss applied by the 

district court was incorrect. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2216 Document: 01019279000 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 4 
Defendant further contends that his role in the offense was 

minimal. Defendant's counsel also made this argument at the sentencing proceeding; the district court rejected· it. Because 

defendant does not assert contradictory facts that challenge the 

accuracy of the PSR, he suffered no prejudice from the Rule 32 

violation, and 11 it would be meaningless to remand for resentencing. 11 Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d at 1526.3 

III 

Defendant also asserts that the district court denied him the 

right to allocution because it did not address him personally to 

determine whether he wished to speak on his own behalf before 

sentencing. The applicable rule provides that before imposing 

sentence the court must 11 address the defendant personally and 

determine if the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence ... Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32(a)l) (C). 11 The right to allocution is an integral part 

of the sentencing process which if not fully afforded to the 

defendant requires a reversal of the sentence imposed. 11 United 

States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1025 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 114 

S. Ct. 575 (1993) (citing Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 

304 (1961)). 

3 We note that 11 it is readily apparent that appeals such as this 

could be avoided if the district court would ask, without exception, a series of routine questions designed to provide it with 

the information necessary to make the determinations required by 

Rule 32(c) (3) (A) . 11 United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th 

Cir. 1995). 

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Appellate Case: 93-2216 Document: 01019279000 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 5 
The following exchange occurred at the beginning of the sentencing proceeding. Two attorneys, Thomas Clear and Arnold 

Miller, appeared on behalf of defendant. 

THE COURT: Will the defendant and counsel please 

come forward to the lectern. Previously I set this time 

and place for the ordering of a final disposition. The 

presentence report has been prepared and I have reviewed 

it. And at this time I am prepared to order a final 

disposition in this case. 

Before I do so, I will ask the defendant and his 

counsel if either can cite any reason to the Court as to 

why sentence should not be pronounced? 

MR. CLEAR: No, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Do any of you wish to make a statement 

in mitigation of punishment or do any of you wish to 

make any other statement which other statement is properly related to this proceeding? 

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I would like to make a 

very brief argument on behalf of Mr. Archer. 

IV R. 3-4. Miller then reiterated objections to the PSR and 

discussed defendant's background and his need to care for his 

children. Miller concluded by asking that the district court 

consider granting defendant probation. The court stated that 

probation was not a possibility. The district court adopted the 

PSR and imposed sentence. The judge then asked defendant if he 

would voluntarily surrender, and if he understood his appeals 

rights. Finally, the court asked: 

THE COURT: Anything further in this case at this 

time? 

[THE GOVERNMENT]: No, Your Honor. 

MR. MILLER: No, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: All right. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2216 Document: 01019279000 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 6 
Id. at 12. 

The government asserts that the district court included 

defendant in his invitation for statements in mit·igation of sentence, and points out that the sentencing judge need not address 

the defendant by name as long as the judge addresses the defendant personally. See United States v. Flores, 959 F.2d 83, 88 

(8th Cir.) (right of allocution afforded when district court 

asked defendant "Do you know of any reason why the Court should 

not pronounce sentence? That is, are you ready to receive the 

Court's sentence?" and defendant replied "Yes, sir"), cert. 

denied, 113 S. Ct. 469 (1992). Defendant acknowledges that the 

district court included him in the initial invitation to speak. 

However, after Miller argued on his behalf, defendant asserts 

that the district court should have afforded him an opportunity 

to speak. 

United States v. Franklin, 902 F.2d 501, 506 (7th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990), addressed facts very similar 

to the instant case.4 The Franklin court rejected the defen4 The Franklin court stated: 

Prior to sentencing Anderson, the district judge 

asked: "All right. Mr. Rose (Anderson's attorney) and 

Mr. Anderson, do either or both of you have any statement that you want to make in mitigation of sentence 

that the court ought to consider in determining the 

appropriate sentence in this case?" Anderson's counsel 

made a presentation to the court and argued for a sentence in the lower range of the Guidelines. The court 

then asked Anderson's counsel to comment on a couple of 

concerns the court had. After Anderson's counsel 

addressed those concerns, the court addressed counsel 

for the government. Finally, the judge asked, "All 

right. Is there anything you want to state further, Mr. 

Rose?" Anderson's counsel added nothing further and the 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 93-2216 Document: 01019279000 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 7 
dant's argument that the district judge was required to renew his 

invitation to defendant after his counsel finished speaking. 

"Wisely, neither Rule 32(a) (1) (C) nor any case law requires such 

a rigid procedural formula. Neither [the defendant] nor his 

counsel indicated that [the defendant] wished to accept the 

court's invitation to speak on his own behalf." Id. at 507. 

Thus, the court concluded that the defendant received his right 

of allocution. Likewise, in the instant case, the court's invitation unequivocally informed defendant that he had a right to 

speak before sentencing. Therefore, we hold that the district 

court afforded defendant his right to allocution. 

AFFIRMED. 

Continued from previous page 

court proceeded to sentence Anderson. 

902 F.2d at 507. 

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