Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02190/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02190-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stan Musial Trujillo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

STAN MUSIAL TRUJILLO, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

Unit~ Srateti Couft of Appeals "tenth Clrr.uit 

.. JUN Z l3 '1900 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-2190 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 89-0049 JB) 

Tara C. Neda, Assistant United States Attorney (William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, with her on the 

brief), attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Ann Steinmetz, Assistant Federal Defender, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, attorney for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT AND BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 1 
Stan Musial Trujillo (Trujillo) appeals from the judgment and 

sentence entered by the district court following his guilty plea 

to violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 84l(a}(l), 84l(b)(l)(B), and 18 

u.s.c. § 2 (possession with intent to distribute more than 500 

grams of cocaine and aiding and abetting). The charge underlying 

Trujillo's guilty plea was based on his presence in a 1989 "Jetta" 

Volkswagen 

of cocaine, 

Trujillo's 

in January, 1989, which contained more than 500 grams 

while traveling in Quay County, New Mexico. 

co-defendant, David Bacoccini (Bacoccini), was the 

driver of the vehicle. 

Trujillo and Bacoccini were stopped when New Mexico State 

Police Sergeant Taylor (Taylor) observed that Trujillo was not 

wearing a seatbelt, as required by law. Subsequent investigation 

revealed that the Volkswagen was registered tb a Marilyn Grover, 

which led Taylor to ask for permission to open the trunk. 

According to offense reports, Trujillo consented. Bacoccini 

exited the vehicle and opened the trunk for Taylor. Located in 

the trunk were a black garment bag and a brown handbag. Both men 

consented to Taylor's request to look inside the bags. Taylor 

found approximately 16.7 pounds of cocaine in the bags, or a total 

of 6,909 grams. Bacoccini denied ownership of either bag. 

Trujillo admitted ownership of the black garment bag, containing 

1,970.8 grams of cocaine, but denied any knowledge of the brown 

handbag. 

On February 17, 1989, a grand jury returned an Indictment 

against Trujillo and Bacoccini, accusing them of knowingly and 

intentionally possessing more than five kilograms of cocaine with 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 2 
the intent to distribute. On April 28, 1989, Trujillo entered a 

guilty plea to an Information pursuant to a plea agreement 

memorialized in a document entitled "Memorandum of ·Understanding 

Regarding Guilty Plea." The indictment was dismissed pursuant to 

the agreement. 

Following Trujillo's guilty plea, a Presentence Report (PSR) 

was prepared by Anthony Baca (Baca) of the United States Probation 

Office. In the PSR, Baca refused to recommend that Trujillo 

receive credit for "Acceptance of Responsibility," as provided for 

in the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, 

(U.S.S.G.) § 3El.l. 

stated the following: 

In justification for this refusal, the PSR 

Defendant upon the advice of his attorney, declined to 

make a statement. The defendant's attorney directed the 

U.S. Probation Officer to review defendant's statement 

at the time of his arrest, and his cooperation with law 

enforcement officers. The investigative reports reflect 

that defendant answered all of the police officer's 

questions when asked about the contents in the trunk of 

the vehicle, he advised that there was clothing. Mr. 

Trujillo gave the officer permission to search the 

trunk. Both Trujillo and Baccocini [sic] denied any 

knowledge or the ownership of the brown overnight bag 

which contained the majority of the cocaine. Trujillo 

claimed ownership of the black garment bag. 3El.l(a) 

indicates that if a defendant clearly demonstrates a 

recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal 

responsibility for his criminal conduct, the offense 

level is to be reduced by two levels. There has been no 

demonstration of a recognition or affirmative acceptance 

of personal responsibility by the defendant for his 

criminal conduct, consequently, he does not qualify for 

the two level offense reduction. (Emphasis added). 

( PSR, pp. 3-4) • 

Trujillo challenged this conclusion in his "Sentencing 

Statement," filed July 10, 1989, and at his sentencing hearing. 

He contended that he was being improperly subjected to greater 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 3 
punishment solely because he had declined to make a statement 

during the presentence interview. 

Trujillo and Bacoccini were sentenced on July 21, 1989. 

Bacoccini was sentenced to a term of seventy (70) months in prison 

and Trujillo was sentenced to a term of one-hundred-and-twenty-one 

(121) months in prison. ~oth were sentenced under the Sentencing 

Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 u.s.c. § 3551, et seq. 

Trujillo does not contest his conviction. The issues in this 

appeal arise solely £rem the district court's sentencing 

decisions. 

I • 

Trujillo first contends that it was error for the district 

court to deny him a two-level reduction in his sentence for 

"acceptance of responsibility,"· as provided for in u.s.s.G. § 

3El.l. Trujillo maintains that his sentence was imposed in 

violation of the law because his assertion of his Fifth Amendment 

right against self-incrimination during his presentence interview 

was unfairly used against him in denial of a two-level reduction 

for "acceptance of responsibility" in determining the offense 

level. 

u.s.s.G. § 3El.l provides: 

Acceptance of Responsibility 

(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition 

and affirmative acceptance of personal 

responsibility for his criminal conduct, reduce the 

offense level by 2 levels. 

(b) A defendant may be given consideration under this 

section without regard to whether his conviction is 

based upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by 

the court or jury or the practical certainty of 

conviction at trial. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 4 
(c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not 

entitled to a sentencing reduction under this 

section as a matter of right. 

The Application Notes to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l suggest a number of 

factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant 

qualifies for his downward adjustment, to-wit: 

1. In determining whether a defendant qualifies for 

this provision, appropriate considerations include, but 

are not limited to, the following: 

(a) voluntary termination or withdrawal from 

criminal conduct or associations; 

(b) voluntary payment of restitution prior 

to adjudication of guilt; 

(c) voluntary and truthful admission to 

authorities of involvement in the offense 

and related conduct; 

(d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly 

after commission of the offense; 

(e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the 

recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities 

of the offense; 

(f) voluntary resignation from the office or 

position held during the commission of the 

offense; and 

(g) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in 

manifesting the acceptance of responsibility. 

* * * 

3. A guilty plea may provide some evidence of the 

defendant's acceptance of responsibility. However, it 

does not, by itself, entitle a defendant to a reduced 

sentence under this section. 

u.s.s.G. § 3El.l, comment. (n. 1 and 3). 

Our standard of review is delineated under u.s.s.G. § 3El.l, 

comment. ( n. 5) : 

[t]he sentencing judge 

evaluate a defendant's 

is in a unique position to 

acceptance of responsibility. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 5 
For this reason, the determination of the sentencing 

judge is entitled to great deference on review and 

should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation. 

In United States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d 917, 924 (10th Cir. 

1990), this court held that: 

[t]he burden of proof for establishing entitlement to a 

reduction of the offense level for acceptance of 

responsibility is on the defendant, who must establish 

the mitigating factor by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See United States v. Orrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 

1234, 1238-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 346 

(1989). 

* * * 

Furthermore, the denial of a downward adjustment under§ 

3El.1 does not constitute a penalty or an enhancement of 

sentence. There is a difference between increasing the 

severity of a sentence for failure. to demonstrate 

remorse and refusing to grant a reduction from the 

prescribed base offense level. 

Therefore, "[b]ecause the trial court's assessment of a 

defendant's contrition will depend heavily on credibility 

assessments, the 'clearly erroneous' standard will nearly always 

sustain the judgment of the district court in this area." United 

States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, 

this court has held that "the quantum of proof required for 

factual determinations under the Sentencing Guidelines is a 

preponderance of the evidence and the burden of proof generally is 

allocated to the government for sentence increases and to the 

defendant for sentence decreases." United States v. Rutter, 897 

F.2d 1558, 1560 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Trujillo maintains that the 

question presented here raises an issue concerning the sentencing 

court's misapplication of the guidelines based upon impermissibly 

penalizing his right to remain silent. Trujillo contends that 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 6 
this is not purely a factual question, but rather, one involving a 

question of law subject to de nova review. 

Under u.s.s.G. § 3El.l(a), a defendant is entitled to a 

reduction of his base offense level by two levels when the 

defendant "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative 

acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct." 

Trujillo argues that the following factors, as enumerated under 

the Application Notes to § 3El.l, apply to his conduct and 

indicate that he accepted responsibility for his criminal actions: 

(a) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or 

associations (Trujillo was cooperative with the police); (c) 

voluntary and truthful admission to authorities of involvement in 

the offense and related conduct (he willingly answered all 

questions, gave permission to search, and voluntarily admitted 

ownership of the black garment bag containing cocaine at the time 

of the search); (d) voluntary surrender to authorities after 

commission of the offense (he cooperated at arrest, making no 

attempt to flea or to resist and he entered a guilty plea to 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute); and (g) the 

timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the 

acceptance of responsibility (he accepted responsibility from the 

very beginning when Sergeant Taylor searched the vehicle). 

Upon advice of counsel, Trujillo declined to discuss the 

circumstances surrounding his offense with Probation Officer Baca, 

who prepared the PSR. Instead, Trujillo asked that Baca refer to 

his statements and conduct at the time of arrest to determine his 

acceptance of responsibility. Trujillo asserts that he was not 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 7 
given credit for acceptance of responsibility because he invoked 

his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the 

time of the presentence interview. Trujillo relies on United 

States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1989). In that 

case, Perez-Franco 

possession of heroin. 

government agreed to 

was indicted on five charges 

He pled guilty to one count, 

involving 

and the 

dismiss the other counts and recommend a 

sentence of ten years imprisonment. The sentencing court, at the 

recommendation of the probation officer who prepared the 

presentence report, refused to give Perez-Franco credit for 

acceptance of responsibility because, during the presentence 

interview, he refused to make admissions concerning all of his 

criminal conduct. On appeal, the court reversed and held that 

·"acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct'' 

within the meaning of§ 3El.l means conduct to which the defendant 

pled guilty; ''criminal conduct" does not mean all criminal 

conduct, including counts to which the defendant did not plead 

guilty. Id. at 459. Thus, § 3El.l does not require a defendant 

to accept responsibility for charges that are dismissed as part of 

a plea agreement. Id. 

Trujillo's reliance on Perez-Franco, is misplaced. That case 

is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In that case, 

Perez-Franco did not wish to provide information on criminal 

conduct other than the offense to which he pled guilty for fear of 

incriminating himself on the counts to which he maintained a not 

guilty plea. The court held that "a defendant cannot have a 

reduction in sentence predicated upon his making self-

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 8 
incriminating statements relating to counts which he has not pled 

guilty and which are to be dismissed as part of a plea agreement." 

Id. at 464 (Emphasis added). In the case at bar, Trujillo 

refused, on the advice of counsel, to provide Probation Officer 

Baca any information regarding his conduct relative to the offense 

to which he pled guilty. Thus, Trujillo was not refusing to 

incriminate himself on counts to which he had pled not guilty; he 

was refusing to provide information on the count to which he had 

admitted his guilt. No Fifth Amendment privilege exists in the 

latter case. 

Trujillo rests his argument on the faulty characterization 

that denial of a sentence reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility is a penalty. However, this court held in United 

States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d at 924 (10th Cir. 1990) that u.s.s.G. § 

3El.l neither compels a defendant to incriminate himself nor, if 

he chooses silence, would the denial of a reduction under that 

section constitute a penalty in violation of a defendant's Fifth 

Amendment rights. "[T]he denial of a downward adjustment under§ 

3El.l does not constitute a penalty or an enhancement of 

sentence." Id. Furthermore, since the implementation of the 

Sentencing Guidelines, other courts have also held that denial of 

a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3El.l because of a 

defendant's refusal to admit guilt is not unconstitutional. United 

States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) (U.S.S.G. § 

3El.l does not violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution) and United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3172 (1989) ("The fact that a more 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 9 
lenient sentence is imposed upon a contrite defendant does not 

establish a corollary that those who elect to stand trial are 

penalized."). Consequently, Trujillo was properly denied a twolevel sentence reduction for his failure to accept responsibility 

for the offense to which he pled guilty. 

II. 

Trujillo argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the 

district court to refuse to award him credit for "acceptance of 

responsibility" based on its determination that such "acceptance'' 

was not timely. On the issue of timelinesst the district court 

has substantial discretion. United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 

F.2d at 464. This conclusion is supported by the Application 

Notes to u.s.s.G. § 3El.l, which state: 11 1. In determining 

whether a defendant qualifies for this provision, appropriate 

considerations include, but are not limited to, the following: 

. (g) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the 

acceptance of responsibility." 

Trujillo asserts that he manifested acceptance of 

responsibility early on, before court proceedings had even begun. 

He cooperated with police and voluntarily admitted to owning the 

black garment bag containing 1,970.8 grams of cocaine. In 

addition, he pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute. 

The government contends that Trujillo has misstated the 

sentencing court's finding that a sentence reduction was denied 

him merely because his acceptance was untimely. The district 

court noted that Trujillo had provided no information to the 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 10 
Probation Office upon which it could rely in assessing his 

acceptance of responsibility. Furthermore, the court stated that 

Trujillo did not admit or assume full culpability for the offense. 

The PSR indicates that Trujillo informed Police Sergeant 

Taylor that he was only carrying clothing in the trunk. Nothing 

in the record reveals that Trujillo ever acknowledged culpability 

in the offense to which he pled guilty. Moreover, Trujillo's 

guilty plea, standing alone, does not entitle him to a two-level 

sentence reduction under u.s.s.G. § 3El.l. "A guilty plea may 

provide some evidence of the defendant's acceptance of 

responsibility. However, it does not, by itself, entitle a 

defendant to a reduced sentence under this section." u.s.s.G. § 

3El.l comment. (n.3). As stated by the district court, "[t]he 

pre-,-sentence report affords the defendant an opportunity to state 

their side of the case and present the best position that may 

benefit them." (R., Vol. II, p. 9). 

The sentencing court was in the best position to evaluate 

Trujillo's demeanor, and the timeliness and quality of his 

admissions. The court's determination that Trujillo's conduct did 

not warrant a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3El.l was not an 

abuse of discretion. 

III. 

Trujillo contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing 

hearing on the issue of whether the disparate sentence imposed 

against him and his co-defendant, Bacoccini, abrogated his rights 

to due process and equal protection, and violated the statutory 

and congressional mandates of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 11 
This argument is based on the fact that Trujillo received a 

sentence of 121 months in prison whereas Bacoccini was sentenced 

to a total of 70 months in prison. 

A 

Trujillo's first contention under this argument is that he is 

entitled to a new sentencing hearing on due process grounds 

because the district court failed to allow him to make a record on 

his equal protection claim at the sentencing hearing. This 

contention is based on the colloquy that took place between the 

district court and Trujillo's attorney at the sentencing hearing 

on July 21, 1989. Immediately after the court stated its 

sentence, defense counsel attempted to raise an equal protection 

claim on behalf of Trujillo: 

Ms. Steinmetz: 

The Court: 

Ms. Steinmetz: 

The Court: 

Ms. Steinmetz: 

The Court: 

Ms. Steinmetz: 

The Court: 

Ms. Steinmetz: 

Your Honor, I would just point out that 

Mr. Bacoccini is the co-defendant in 

this case, he received a sentence.of 

seventy months --

I understand that, Ms. Steinmetz. 

-- a difference of fifty-one months 

I'm not going to argue with you Mr. 

[sic] Steinmetz. 

-- under the guidelines which are 

supposed to be the same for codefendants. 

Ms. Steinmetz, I'm not committed to 

give him the same sentence of his codefendant, you understand? 

I --

And I've passed my sentence. I'm not 

going to argue with you. 

Yes. I just wanted to point out --

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 12 
The Court: That'll be all, Ms. Steinmetzo 

Ms. Steinmetz: -- that under the --

(R., Vol. II, pp. 13-14). This discussion was terminated when the 

prosecutor interjected and moved the court to dismiss Indictment 

89-49 as to Trujillo, pursuant to the plea agreement. 

Trujillo maintains that the foregoing indicates that the 

district court violated its duty to afford him an opportunity to 

be heard at the sentencing hearing on the equal protection and due 

process challenges to his sentence; Trujillo contends that he is 

entitled to a new sentencing hearing on this matter. We disagree. 

Trujillo's argument that he had no opportunity to be heard 

ignores critical facts. Although his counsel's argument was 

interrupted, Trujillo's position on the disparity was 

understood by the court. Moreover, the facts giving rise to· the 

disparity between Trujillo and Bacoccini could have been addressed 

by Trujillo's counsel. Trujillo had ample opportunity to contest 

the recommendations of the Probation Office; instead, he refused 

to make a statement to Officer Baca. Furthermore, a sentencing 

statement was filed and argument was heard on the matters which 

determined Trujillo's sentence. 

B 

Trujillo also contends that he is entitled to a new 

sentencing hearing on due process and equal protection grounds 

because the district court failed to give adequate reasons for the 

imposition of the disparate sentences imposed against Trujillo and 

his co-defendant, Bacoccini. Trujillo cites to 18 u.s.c. § 

3553(c) as authority for this argument. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 13 
In relevant part, 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c) states: 

Statement of reasons for imposing a sentence.-The court, 

at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the 

reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, 

and, if the sentence-

(1) is of the kind, an~ within the 

in subsection (a)(4) and that 

months, the reason for imposing a 

particular point within the range; or 

range, described 

range exceeds 24 

sentence at a 

(2) is not of the kind, or is outside the range, 

described in subsection (a)(4), the specific reason 

for the imposition of a sentence different from 

that described. 

Trujillo also relies on United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720 (10th 

Cir. 1989), to support his assertion that the district court erred 

by failing to adequately state the reasons for the disparate 

sentences. Trujillo has misconstrued the law on this subject. 

According to 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c), the sentencing court is 

required to state, in open ~curt, the r~asons for its imposition 

of the particular sentence in the case before it. Nowhere in the 

statute is there any requirement that the court discuss related 

cases or sentences. At the sentencing hearing the district court 

stated the reasons for Trujillo's sentence, and the reasons for 

imposing the sentence at a particular point within the Guideline 

1 18 u.s.c. § 3553(a)(4) provides: 

Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.-The court shall 

impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to 

comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this 

subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to 

be imposed, shall consider-

*** (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 

established for the applicable category of offense committed by 

the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the 

guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant 

to 28 u.s.c. 994(a)(l) and that are in effect on the date the 

defendant is sentenced; •.•• 

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range, to wit: 

[T]he Court in arriving at a sentence within the 

appropriate guideline range takes judicial notice that 

the amount of cocaine involved in the instant case was 

at the lower end of the drug table establishing the 

offense level. 

In addition, the defendant has no previous pattern of 

criminal behavior. Therefore, a sentence at the lower 

end of the guideline range would be appropriate as it 

addresses the sentencing goals of punishment and general 

deterrants [sic]. · 

Therefore, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 

1984, it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant 

is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of 

Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of one hundred and 

twenty-one months. 

(R., Vol. II, p. 12). The court was required to give no further 

statement. 

Trujillo's reliance on United States v. Smith, supra, is 

misplaced. In that case, the district court departed upward from 

the se~tencing range provided by the Sentencing Guidelines. In 

support of this departure, the court took '"judicial notice of the 

force and violence used by the defendant."' Id. at 724. This 

court held that the foregoing general recitation of the reasons 

for departure was insufficient under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c): 

[A]lthough we assume the court believed the defendant's 

acts were beyond the norm for the offense as set out in 

the guidelines, without the court's enumeration of the 

factors upon which that belief was predicated, we simply 

are left to speculation. 

Additionally, the district court failed to indicate 

whether it found the Sentencing Commission inadequately 

considered those factors in formulating the guidelines. 

Such a finding is a condition precedent to imposition of 

a sentence above the guideline range. (Citations 

omitted). 

Without particularization by the trial court of its 

reasons for an enhanced sentence, this court cannot 

engage in the kind of meaningful review intended by § 

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3742 of the Sentencing Reform Act, which provides that a 

sentence should be set aside by this court if it departs 

unreasonably from the Guidelines' recommended sentence. 

18 u.s.c. § 3742(e). 

Id. Thus, this court held, in accordance with§ 3553(c), that the 

district court must articulate specific reasons for a departure 

upward. We did not hold that the same type of articulation is 

necessary if the district court does not depart from the 

sentencing range provided by the Sentencing Guidelines, as in this 

case. See United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531, 1535-1536 

(10th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Pettit, F. 2d ___ , 

No. 89-3127, Slip Op. at 9 (10th Cir. May 25, 1990). 

An identical base offense level of 32 was recommended for 

Trujillo and for his co-defendant, Bacoccini. This recommendation 

was accepted by the sentencing court. However, based upon 

information provided by_Bacoccini, his sentence was reduced for 

acceptance of responsibility under u.s.s.G. § 3El.l, and for his 

role as a minimal participant under u.s.s.G. § 3B1.2(a) 2 • 

Trujillo relies on United States v. Nowicki, 870 F.2d 405 

(7th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338 (7th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 2089 (1989) for the proposition 

2 u.s.s.G. § 3B1.2 provides: 

Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense 

level as follows: 

(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal 

activity, decrease by 4 levels. 

(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal 

activity, decrease by 2 levels. 

In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 16 
that a sentencing judge must give "thoughtful consideration'' to 

disparate sentences imposed on co-defendants. Trujillo contends 

that his sentencing court failed to follow this mandate and also 

violated the edict to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentence disparities among 

have been found guilty of 

defendants 

similar 

with similar records who 

conduct." 18 u.s.c. § 

3553(a) (6). 

argument. 

Trujillo ignores critical facts in advancing this 

The 

calculated 

base 

to 

offense 

be 32 

level 

because 

for 

of 

Trujillo and Bacoccini was 

the total amount of cocaine 

discovered in the trunk of the car. Probation Officer Baca, 

however, recommended a two-level reduction for Bacoccini pursuant 

to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l because of his acceptance of responsibility. 

Bacoccini also received a· four-level reduction pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) as a minimal participant based on his lack of 

knowledge or understanding of the scope of the enterprise and the 

fact that he had been hired by Trujillo to be a relief driver. 

Therefore, Bacoccini's offense level was reduced to a 26, with a 

sentencing range of 70 to 87 months, with a criminal history 

category of II. 

In Trujillo's PSR, Officer Baca did not recommend a two-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Furthermore, no 

reduction for Trujillo's role in the offense was recommended. 

Therefore, Trujillo and Bacoccini 

Congress sought uniformity in 

conduct by similar offenders." 

were not similarly situated. 

sentencing for "similar criminal 

U.S.S.G. intro. p. 1.2 

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Appellate Case: 89-2190 Document: 01019880500 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 17 
(Emphasis added). Thus, the district court was not required to 

give Bacoccini and Trujillo the same sentences. 

Trujillo's sentence did not exceed that mandated by statute 

and the Sentencing Guidelines. This disparate sentence challenge 

is based solely on the lesser sentence imposed on his codefendant, Bacoccini. We adopt the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in a 

case involving co-defendants similarly charged but whose criminal 

records were strikingly different: 

[A] mere disparity of sentences among codefendants does 

not, alone, constitute abuse of discretion, United 

States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1980), 

and a sentencing court is not required to enunciate the 

reasons underlying its decision. United States v. 

Garcia, 617 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980). A judge is 

to be accorded wide discretion in determining an 

appropriate sentence. Id. He is not obligated to 

consider codefendants' sentences when imposing sentence 

on a defendant. United States v. Lauga, 762 F.2d 1288, 

1291 (5th Cir. 1985). A defendant cannot rely upon his 

coqefendants' sentences as a yard-stick for his own. 

United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 827 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (100 S.Ct. 93, 62 L.Ed.2d 60] 

(1979). 

United States v. Boyd, 885 F.2d 246, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1989) 

(quoting United States v. Castillo-Roman, 774 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 

(5th Cir. 1985)). Although the cases cited in Boyd were decided 

prior to the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act, Boyd was 

decided under the Sentencing Guidelines. 

C 

Trujillo's argues that should this court determine that 

remand for resentencing is not necessary under subissues (A) and 

(B), his sentence should be vacated because his rights to due 

process and equal protection were violated by the disparate 

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sentences imposed against him and his co-defendant, Bacoccini. 

Trujillo claims that the only significant differences between the 

co-defendants appears to be Bacoccini's criminal history category 

indicating that he had a prior conviction, the fact that Trujillo 

admitted to ownership of a bag containing cocaine at the time of 

their arrest, while Bacoccini did not, and the fact that Trujillo 

invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege at the presentence 

interview. Further, Trujillo states that it is impermissible to 

impose a disproportionate sentence based on the exercise of a 

constitutional right. 

Trujillo again fails to recognize the facts of the case. 

Trujillo and Bacoccini both received the same base offense level 

of thirty-two for possession of 6,909 grams of cocaine. However, 

Bacoccini rec·eived a six level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility and his role as a minimal participant in the crime. 

Trujillo did not receive these reductions. Thus, the sentences 

imposed against Trujillo and Bacoccini were different, not because 

Trujillo exercised his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, but because the sentencing court determined that 

Trujillo did not accept responsibility for his actions and was not 

entitled to a reduction for his role in the offense. The record 

supports the district court's action. 

IV. 

Trujillo contends that the district court incorrectly applied 

the Sentencing Guidelines in determining his base offense level. 

Trujillo's argument is that his base offense level should have 

been calculated based on the 1,970.8 grams of cocaine which were 

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actually found in his possession. He reasons that since he 

admitted only to possession of that quantity of cocaine, only 

that amount should have been used to establish his offense of 

conviction. Trujillo points out that, based on that quantity of 

cocaine, his correct base offense level was 26. This argument was 

rejected by the district court, and we reject it here. 

We review sentences imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines 

according to the standard provided by the Sentencing Reform Act of 

1984 and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742, which, under subsection 

(e), provides: 

(e) Consideration.-Upon review of the record, the 

court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence-

(!) was imposed in violation of the law; 

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 

application of the sentencing guidelines; 

(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, 

and is unreasonable, having regard for-

(A) the factors to be considered in imposing a 

sentence, as set forth in chapter 227 of this title; and 

(B) the reasons for the imposition of the 

particular sentence, as stated by the district court 

pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or 

(4) was imposed for an offense for which there 

is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly 

unreasonable. 

The court of appeals shall give due regard to the 

opportunity of the district court to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the 

findings of fact of the district court unless they are 

clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the 

district court's application of the guidelines to the 

facts. 

Furthermore, this court must also comply with the mandates of 

18 u.s.c. § 3742(f), which provides, in relevant part: 

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(f) Decision and disposition 

If the court of appeals determines that the 

sentence-

(1) was imposed in violation of law or imposed 

as a result of an incorrect application of the 

sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the case 

for further sentencing proceedings with such 

instructions as the court considers appropriate; 

(2) is outside the applicable guideline range 

and is unreasonable or was imposed for an offense for 

which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is 

plainly unreasonable, it shall state specific reasons 

for its conclusions; 

* * * 

(3) is not described in paragraph (1) or (2), 

it shall affirm the sentence. 

See also United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d at 723 (10th Cir. 1989). 

While this court must give "due deference to the district court's 

application of the guidelines to the facts," § 3 7 4 2 ( e) , we 

review the application of the guidelines for errors of law. The 

'circumstances of the case' govern the 'amount of 

deference due a sentencing judge's application of the 

guidelines to the facts.' United States v. Daughtrey, 

874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989). [T]he clearly 

erroneous standard is appropriate when 'the issue turns 

primarily on a factual determination,' but when 'the 

issue ••• turns primarily on the legal interpretation 

of a guideline term, [or on] which of several offense 

conduct guidelines most appropriately apply to the facts 

as found, ••• the standard moves closer to de novo 

review. ' Id. 

United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990). 

The Sentencing Guidelines contain a table in which applicable 

sentence ranges are established by the combination of various 

offense levels and criminal history categories. United States v. 

Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 255 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing u.s.s.G. Ch. 

5, part A, at 5.2): 

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Id. 

The offense level used to establish the appropriate 

sentence range is determined by adjusting an offensespecific base offense level. . §lBl.l. For drugrelated offenses, the primary determinant of the base 

offense level is the quantity of drugs involved in the 

offense. Id. §2D1.l(a)(3). In determining the 

quantity ofdrugs for computing the base offense level, 

Guidelines §§ 1Bl.3(a)(2) & 3D1.2(d) require 

consideration of 'all such acts and omissions that were 

part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or 

plan as the offense of conviction.' (Emphasis added). 

Apparently, Trujillo claims that he only pled guilty to 

possession of the one bag containing 1,970.8 grams. His position 

is that the other bag containing 4,936.5 grams of cocaine, also 

found in the trunk of the Volkswagen, should not be aggregated. 

However, the record does not indicate that such a distinction was 

made in his plea. Trujillo pled guilty as an aider and abettor to 

one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 500 

grams of cocaine in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 84l(a)(l), 

84l(b)(l)(B), and 18 u.s.c. § 2. Nevertheless, the drug 

quantities in both bags would be aggregated because they comprised 

"such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of 

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction; •. 

" u.s.s.G. § 1Bl.3(a)(2). 

Trujillo relies on United States v. Restrepo, 883 F.2d 781 

(9th Cir. 1989), to support his argument. In that case, the court 

determined that the aggregation of the quantity of drugs i~volved 

in the defendant's offense of conviction together with the amount 

of drugs which his co-defendant possessed was improper. In 

reaching that decision, the court determined that the guidelines 

were ambiguous, and thus applied the rule of lenity to hold that 

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calculation of the defendant's base offense level should be 

restricted to the quantity of drugs involved in his offense of 

conviction alone. However, the Restrepo opinion has been 

withdrawn upon the grant of a petition for rehearing. See United 

States v. Restrepo, 896 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Furthermore, we rejected the Restrepo result in United 

States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d at 1562, and there agreed with those 

circuits which have held that u.s.s.G. § 1Bl.3(a)(2) requires 

aggregation of quantities from drug offenses encompassed by 

u.s.s.G. § 2D1.1 "'that were part of the same course of conduct or 

common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction,' regardless of 

whether the defendant was convicted of the underlying offenses 

pertaining to the additional amounts." Id. See also United 

States .v. Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1989) (quantities 

of cocaine not specified in the count to which the defendant pled 

guilty could be considered in computing the defendant's base 

offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. 

Taplette, 872 F.2d 101, 106 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 

128 (1989) (the Sentencing Guidelines allow the consideration of 

relevant conduct for which the defendant was not convicted in 

determining the actual guideline range); United States v. Ykema, 

887 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1989) (the base offense level under 

the Sentencing Guidelines used in sentencing Ykema for possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine was not required to be based on 

the amount of cocaine specified in the plea agreement and could be 

based on his conduct outside of the plea agreement); United States 

v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1989) ("when the 

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Guidelines provide tables that cumulate the amount sold . , 

any acts that 'were part of the same course of conduct or common 

scheme or plan as the offense of conviction' should be included in 

the computation of the amount on which the offense level depends, 

whether or not the defendant was convicted of selling ... these 

additional amounts."); United States v. Mann, 877 F.2d 688, 690 

(8th Cir. 1989) (the Sentencing Guidelines make clear that in 

determining the applicable range, multiple convictions are not 

required); and United States v. Sc~oggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1211-

1214 (11th Cir. 1989) (where prior thefts to which Scroggins had 

confessed were part of the same course of conduct as the theft to 

which he pled guilty, the sentencing court could properly consider 

evidence relating to other thefts in determining the guideline 

sentence). 

Particularly on point is United States v. Sailes, 872 F.2d 

735 (6th Cir. 1989). In that case, the defendant pled guilty to 

possession with intent to distribute less than 500 grams of 

cocaine. However, more than 800 grams were found in her 

residence. The defendant argued that she was only aware of 36 

grams of cocaine on her property. The court held that the entire 

amount of cocaine discovered must be included as relevant conduct 

in accordance with U.S.S.G. § lBl.3 because the total amount of 

cocaine comprised a common scheme. Id. at 738. 

The Sentencing Commission clearly intended such aggregation. 

U.S.S.G. § lBl.3, comment. (n.5) states the following: 

Subsection (a)(2) provides for consideration of a 

broader range of conduct with respect to one class of 

offenses, primarily certain property, tax, fraud and 

drug offenses for which the guidelines depend 

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substantially on quantity, • However, the 

applicability of subsection (a)(2) does not depend upon 

whether multiple counts are alleged. [For 

example] in a drug distribution case, quantities and 

types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction 

are to be included in determining the offense level if 

they were part of the same course of conduct or part of 

a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction. 

We hold that the district court did not err in aggregating the 

entire amount of cocaine found in the vehicle in determining 

Trujillo's base offense level. 

CONCLUSION 

Trujillo's arguments are without merit. 

sentence imposed by the district court. 

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We affirm the 

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