Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06148/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06148-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Granville Humphrey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

\ 

-·' · ·· UNI-T-ED STATES COURT OF -APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Pl La D 

llilited Sr1re11 Courr of Appeals 

'Tenth Circuit 

JUN 2 0 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

GRANVILLE LEE HUMPHREY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 89-6148 

(D.C. No. CR-88-22-R) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges.** 

Defendant-appellant, Granville Humphrey, was sentenced to 

twenty-five years imprisonment upon a guilty plea of conspiring to 

possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 u.s.c. 

§ 846, and carrying firearms in relation to drug trafficking, 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(l). Humphrey did not take a direct appeal. Ten 

months later, however, Humphrey filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 to set aside his plea and sentence asserting that 1) he 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a): 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-6148 Document: 010110036877 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 1 
, recei ved -- inef f.e ct-i ve assi stance . of- counsel, 2) his gui 1 ty plea was 

coerced and involuntary, 3) he was not advised of his right to 

withdraw his plea or appeal, and 4) he was indicted as a result of 

perjured testimony. In an order analyzing each of Humphrey's 

claims, the district court dismissed the§ 2255 motion. We 

affirm. 

I. 

After sentence is imposed, "a plea may be set aside only on 

direct appeal or by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 32(d). The district court determined that defendant's claim 

under §2255 was procedurally barred because defendant had not made 

the necessary showing of cause and prejudice for his failure to 

take a direct appeal seeking withdrawal of his plea. Section 2255 

differs from direct appeal of a criminal judgment where all error 

except harmless error may be challenged. Section 2255 is not a 

substitute for appeal; "it does not encompass all claimed errors 

in convictions and sentencing," but rather is appropriate for 

jurisdictional and constitutional errors and only those legal 

errors which constitute "'a fundamental defect which inherently 

results in a complete miscarriage of justice. 111 United States v. 

Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United 

States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)); United States v. Khan, 835 F.2d 

749, 753-54 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1222 (1988). 

Thus, to be entitled to withdraw his plea, defendant's complaint 

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must be cogni"Zable under ·§ -2255. ~··United States v. T-immreck, 441 

U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979). 

In some instances, consideration of the merits of some claims 

in a federal habeas action may be foreclosed by procedural default 

when a defendant has not presented a claim in accordance with 

established state or federal procedural guidelines governing 

review. Two standards have developed for assessing whether a 

claim is procedurally barred: 1) cause and prejudice, and 2) 

deliberate bypass. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), the 

Court held that the failure to take a direct appeal of a state 

conviction bars consideration on federal habeas review if the 

defendant has deliberately bypassed his right to direct appeal. 

In later decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that the failure 

to comply with state contemporaneous objection rules or raise an 

issue on appeal will result in a procedural bar absent a showing 

of cause and prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 

(1986) (§ 2254): Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986) 

(§ 2254): United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-168 (1982) 

(§ 2255): Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)(§ 2254). 

Among the circuits, it is unsettled whether the deliberate 

bypass test or the cause and prejudice test should be used to 

determine procedural default when a defendant has not directly 

appealed a conviction. See United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 

1379, 1382-1383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 321 (1989) 

(noting Fifth Circuit cases using each standard). While some 

circuits have utilized the more stringent cause and prejudice 

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.,,,s-tandar-d--. when ev-aluat-ing whether 0 a . failure to .. take a direct appeal 

· constitutes procedural default, see Rosenwald v. United States, 

898 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1990) (§ 2255); 1 Meeks v. Cabana, 845 

F.2d 1319, 1323 (5th Cir. 1988) (§ 2254), other circuits have 

retained the deliberate bypass standard, see Cheek v. United 

States, 858 F.2d 1330, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988) (§ 2255); United 

States v. Smith, 844 F.2d 203, 206-207 (5th Cir. 1988) (§ 2255); 

Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 1988) (§ 2254); 

Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 244-245 (3d Cir. 1984) 

(§ 2255). 

This circuit has applied the deliberate bypass standard when 

evaluating procedural default in the absence of a direct appeal 

and we are compelled to follow our own precedent unless it may be 

distinguished. See Worthen, 842 F.2d at 1181; see also Osborn v. 

Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 624, 624 n.11 (citing Worthen and 

holding that deliberate bypass test applies to "decisions which 

properly rest with the defendant/petitioner," including the 

failure to file an appeal from denial of a state habeas petition). 

1 See also Williams v. United States, 805 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 

(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987); Norris v. 

United States, 68~2d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 1982). The Seventh 

Circuit has determined that the cause and prejudice test applies 

regardless of whether a judgment of conviction results from a 

guilty plea or verdict. Theodorou v. United States, 887 F.2d 

1336, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989). There must be a showing of cause and 

prejudice for the failure to raise alleged errors which could have 

been raised on direct appeal of the conviction resulting from the 

guilty plea. Bontkowski v. United States, 850 F.2d 306, 313 (7th 

Cir. 1988). In the Seventh Circuit, district courts "cannot reach 

the merits of an appealable issue in a section 2255 proceeding 

unless that issue has been raised in a procedurally appropriate 

manner." Theodorou, 887 F.2d at 1339. 

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.. .. -Al th0ugh, .. worthen ar-ose under -§ 22-54 and this .. case arises under 

-§ 2255, -t-here . is little basis for · evaluating · procedural default 

differently depending upon whether§ 2254 or§ 2255 is involved. 

See Diggs 740 F.2d at 245 (consistent treatment under§ 2254 and 

§ 2255 warranted). Accordingly, we are compelled to hold that 

when there has been no direct appeal and the§ 2255 claim could 

have been raised on direct appeal, the proper standard for 

evaluating procedural bar is whether defendant deliberately 

bypassed a direct appeal. The district court therefore erred in 

assessing the procedural bar issue under the cause and prejudice 

test. We need not remand the case for a determination on this 

point, however, because the district court dismissed the habeas 

petition on an alternative ground with which we agree. 2 See 

Prince, 868 F.2d at 1383. 

II. 

As an alternative ground for its decision and as part of its 

review of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 

district court considered the merits of defendant's points and 

found them wanting. We now review that determination. 

2 The government has not pressed the procedural bar issue on 

appeal, and while we recognize that the government can waive the 

issue, see Andrews v. United States, 817 F.2d 1277, 1278-79 n.l 

(7th Cir°:), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857 (1987); United States v. 

Auerbach, 745F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1984), the district court 

considered and relied upon the procedural bar issue in dismissing 

the petition. 

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A. 

Notwithstanding his stated .satisfaction with counsel's 

performance at the change of plea hearing, plea tr. at 9, 

defendant now argues that his guilty plea was the product of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that his counsel did 

not request discovery, review the prosecutor's files or conduct a 

background investigation concerning the charges. He also 

complains that counsel failed to file pre-trial or post-conviction 

motions. According to the defendant, he was prejudiced because he 

expected to prevail at a jury trial and was misinformed concerning 

the length of the sentence. 

When a defendant has pled guilty, ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims are e valuated under the two-prong test of 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 

1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1989). The first prong requires that the 

defendant show that counsel's performance was deficient, that it 

was not professionally reasonable given the facts of the 

particular case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. This requires the 

defendant to overcome the presumption that counsel's challenged 

conduct is professionally reasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689. The second prong requires that the defendant show prejudice 

resulting from counsel's ineffective act or omission. See id. at 

691-92. In making this assessment, the defendant must demonstrate 

that, but for ineffective assistance, there was a reasonable 

probability that he would not have pled guilty, but would have 

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. .. gone .to trial. . See .Hill, 47-4 U.S. at- 59; Laycock, 880 F.2d at 

1187. 

We have held that the failure to file motions, without a 

showing that the motions were necessary or appropriate, does not 

amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Laycock, 880 F.2d at 

1187. Defendant's claim is short on explaining the need for the 

strategy defendant now thinks is appropriate. Moreover, defendant 

has failed to make specific claims of prejudice that are 

cognizable. Although he claims he was misinformed concerning the 

length of his sentence, the plea transcript indicates that he was 

advised of the maximum sentence, plea tr. at 4, and the district 

court noted that his lawyer's estimate of a probable sentence was 

only one year off from the twenty-five year sentence he received. 

Rec. vol. II, doc. 182 at 4-5. Most significantly, these facts do 

not establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

alleged deficiencies, defendant would not have pled guilty. 

B. 

Defendant next argues that he was not advised by either the 

district court or his attorney of the right to appeal, to enter a 

conditional plea or to withdraw his plea. We begin with the claim 

concerning the court's alleged duty to notify the defendant 

concerning the right to appeal. Defendant apparently relies upon 

Fed. R . . Crim. P. 32(a)(2) which . provides in pertinent part: 

"There shall be no duty on the part of the court to advise the 

defendant of any right of appeal after sentence is imposed follow-

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ing .. a .pl-ea of- gui-1-ty -or nolo . contendere,, --except -that the court 

shall advise the defendant of any right to appeal the sentence." 

However, this current version of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2), which 

requires the district court to advise a defendant pleading guilty 

of a right to appeal the sentence, did not apply to defendant's 

change of plea proceeding. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 

525, 528-29 (9th Cir. 1985). 

In 1984, with the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, 

Rule 32(a)(2) was amended to its present form requiring the court 

to advise a defendant of the right to appeal the sentence when the 

defendant pled guilty. Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 215. 

The effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act was "the first day 

of the first calendar month beginning twenty-four months after the 

date of enactment (October 12, 1984)," and was later extended by 

amendment to a period of thirty-six months after enactment. See 

Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 235(a)l, 98 Stat. 2031 (October 

12, 1984), as amended by§ 4 of Pub. L. 99-217, 99 Stat. 1728 

(December 26, 1985); United States v. Stewart, 865 F.2d 115, 116 

(7th Cir. 1988). The Sentencing Reform Act became effective 

November 1, 1987, and applies only to offenses committed on or 

after that date. See United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 

1040 (10th Cir. 1990); Stewart, 865 F.2d at 116. 

Defendant's offenses occurred before the effective date of 

the Sentencing Reform Act as amended. Because the offenses in 

this case occurred between June 19, 1987 and August 20, 1987, they 

predate the effective date of amended Rule 32(a)(2). The prior 

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version .. of the :Rule 32 (a} (,2} .. provided in ,pertinent part: "There 

shall be no duty on the court to advise the defendant of any right 

of appeal after sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty or 

nolo contendre." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a}(2}; Crow v. United 

States, 397 F.2d 284, 285 (10th Cir. 1968). Thus, the district 

judge was under no statutory responsibility to inform the 

defendant of a right to appeal his pre-Sentencing Guidelines 

sentence. 

Defendant also claims that his attorney was required to 

notify him of the right to appeal his sentence. There is no 

"absolute duty in every case to advise a defendant of his limited 

right to appeal after a guilty plea." Laycock, 880 F.2d at 

1187-88. At least prior to the imposition of the Sentencing 

Guidelines, an attorney's failure to notify a defendant of the 

limited right to appeal would not, standing alone, constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. 

Defendant's argument that the court abused its discretion in 

failing to advise him of his right to plead conditionally is 

unconvincing. Rule ll(a}(2), Fed. R. Crim. P., provides: 

Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and 

the consent of the government, a defendant may enter a 

conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendre reserving 

in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to 

review the adverse determination of any specified 

pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal 

shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 

The rule does not provide that a defendant has. an enforceable 

right to make a conditional plea, or that the trial court is 

required to inform a defendant that such a right exists. United 

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- .,States v. _ F-isher, 772.- F.2d 371, . 375 ,-- (7th Cir. 1985) • .. On the 

_ contrary, the ~ule grants the trial court absolute discretion to 

permit entry of a conditional plea; "the court can refuse to accept a conditional plea for any reason or for no reason." United 

States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1527 (10th Cir. 1990). Moreover, 

with respect to the claim that counsel's performance was deficient 

because counsel did not advise him of the possibility of a 

conditional plea, we are aware of no facts which would support 

such an option in this case, nor has defendant shown prejudice 

from not being allowed to enter a conditional plea. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1187. Accordingly, there is no ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this 

point. 

Likewise, neither counsel or the court was under a duty to 

advise defendant of the possibility of plea withdrawal. Prior to 

sentencing, "the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a 

showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason." Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32(d). The district court's decision on whether to 

permit withdrawal before sentencing is reviewable for an abuse of 

discretion; there is no absolute right to withdrawal. 8A J. 

Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ,1 32.07[1] (1990). Against this 

backdrop, Rule 11 does not require the district court to advise a 

defendant concerning the possibility of plea withdrawal prior to 

sentence. Nor can we say counsel was required to advise the 

defendant of this possibility given the lack of colorable facts to 

support a pre-sentence motion to withdraw the plea. See United 

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· ·States v. - Pogue, 865 F~2d 226, - 229 (10th Cir. · 1989) (defendant may 

- have - been unaware of potential for restitution}. 

c. 

We review allegations that a plea is involuntary de nova. 

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431 (1983). A guilty plea 

must represent a knowing and voluntary choice open to the defendant. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 

459, 466 (1969). The defendant must have "an understanding of the 

law in relation to the facts." McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. A plea 

is voluntary when the defendant is aware of the consequences of 

his plea and the plea has not been induced by threats of misrepresentation. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 

A plea may be involuntary, however, if a defendant's attorney 

''materially misinforms the defendant of the consequences of the 

plea or the court's probable disposition" or places undue pressure 

on the defendant to accept a plea agreement. Laycock, 880 F.2d at 

1186; United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 

1988). 

When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives substantial 

constitutional protections. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466; United 

States v. Ray, 828 F.2d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

484 U.S. 1045, 485 U.S. 964 (1988); United States v. Fountain, 777 

F.2d 351, 354 - (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029 (1986). 

To insure that the defendant's rights are protected, Rule 11 

requires the court to make a record indicating that the defendant 

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- .- has been .,advis-ed of~ the oons-tit-utJon-al •implicabions of a guilty 

plea and reflecting tbat- the plea is voluntary ~ · Fed. R. Crim. P. 

ll(c) & (d); see United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, , 109 S. 

Ct. 757, 762-63 (1989); United States v. Lovett, 844 F.2d 487, 492 

(7th Cir. 1988); Ray, 828 F.2d at 404. 

Defendant alleges "that he clearly misunderstood the nature 

of the charges and was uninformed as to the actual penalties he 

faced regarding count 24." Defendant's Brief at 2. The plea 

transcript does not support this allegation. Rule ll(c)(l), Fed. 

R. Crim. P., requires the district court to advise the defendant 

of any mandatory minimum and maximum penalty. United States v. 

Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1564 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. petition 

filed, No. 89-7490 (May 15, 1990). In reviewing whether the 

district court's colloquy with the defendant is sufficient to 

comply with Rule ll(c)(l), we take a practical approach which asks 

whether the purpose of the rule has been served given the totality 

of the circumstances. United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 

1294 (7th Cir. 1989). The colloquy between the district court and 

the defendant indicates that: 1) defendant had been furnished 

with a copy of the indictment prior to the plea proceeding, 2) he 

read it and discussed it with his counsel, and 3) he was present 

when the government read the charges from the indictment, which 

included a discussion on the maximum penalties associated with the 

counts of conviction. Plea tr. at 3-5. When further questioned 

by the district judge, defendant indicated that he fully 

understood the charges and the maximum punishment as well as the 

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__ __ ,-rights - implicated -by -a .. guLlty plea, Fed-~ R. Cr.im. P. __ ll(c) (.1). 

Plea tr. at 5. Defendant -answered affirmatively that _ the plea was 

made voluntarily and of his own free will, that he was not 

threatened or forced to plead guilty, and that the government had 

not promised leniency or a particular sentence in exchange for his 

guilty plea. Plea tr. at 7. 

Generally, a defendant's later self-serving statements will 

not undo statements made under oath at the plea and sentencing 

hearings. But a guilty plea is not completely invulnerable to 

subsequent challenges when there is no indication of a procedural 

defect in the record. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73 

(1977). In some circumstances, a defendant's claim of involuntariness may be predicated on facts outside the record. See 

United States v. Gutierrez, 839 F.2d 648, 652 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Thus, even though the record indicates that the plea was made 

knowingly and voluntarily, colorable facts outside the record 

might exist which would indicate that the plea in fact was not 

voluntarily made. In such case, a hearing would be required under 

Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing§ 2255 Proceedings. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 (where "motion and the files and records of the case 

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief" no 

hearing is required). 

Here, defendant's allegation that his plea was not made knowingly -0r _voluntarily is not supported by colorable extra-record 

facts. Defendant claims that he was threatened with prosecution 

on "all 24 counts of an indictment." He also claims that he was 

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.. --,,told- by -,his--cO\mse,l .. ,that • the -- court -would-,. dismiss 20 counts of an 

·indictment and _he --would receive "no more - than double the highest 

sentence received by his co-defendants.'' While the indictment 

contained twenty-four counts, the defendant was charged in only 

fifteen counts and he pled guilty to two counts. Under a best 

case scenario, the defendant could not expect dismissal of more 

than fifteen counts. And as noted, counsel's estimate of 

defendant's potential sentence was remarkably accurate. 

In general, "[t]he rule that a plea must be intelligently 

made does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if 

the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor 

entering into his decision." Brady, 397 U.S. at 757. Yet a 

government threat to prosecute a defendant for crimes in which the 

government has no basis to believe the defendant committed may 

render a plea involuntary. Estrada, 849 F.2d at 1306. During 

plea negotiations, the government's "interest at the bargaining 

table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not 

guilty." Bordenkircker v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). This 

persuasion is constitutionally permissible "so long as the accused 

is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." Id. at 363. 

Thus, the government is entitled to prosecute a defendant on all 

counts of an existing indictment in which the defendant is named 

if the defendant does not plead guilty. Defendant's allegations 

have . not overcome the "st-rong presumption" of validity which attach to his in-court statements indicating that the plea was 

voluntary. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. Defendant's allega-

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. , .. ":.tions -,are of "sthe .incredible w ar iety given the .,,histor ical facts of 

record and the lack of specific facts, either on or off the 

record, supporting his allegations. See Estrada, 849 F.2d at 

1307. 

D. 

Having determined that defendant's guilty plea was knowing 

and voluntary, he may not now challenge the validity of the 

indictment brought against him. When the judgment of conviction 

upon a guilty plea has become final, inquiry upon appeal is 

limited ordinarily to whether the underlying guilty plea was 

counseled and knowingly made. See Broce, 109 S. Ct. at 762. If a 

showing can be made that the defendant made a voluntary and knowing guilty plea, a collateral attack is foreclosed. See id. A 

voluntary and knowing guilty plea admits the charges presented in 

an indictment and waives all nonjurisdictional defects. See 

Davis, 900 F.2d at 1525-26; Lebowitz v. United States, 877 F.2d 

207, 209 (2nd Cir. 1989); Neville v. Butler, 867 F.2d 886, 888 

(5th Cir. 1989); O'Leary v. United States, 856 F.2d 1142, 1143 

(8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1324 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988). Where perjury is 

the subject matter of an issue brought on direct appeal, the 

courts have determined that perjury is a nonjurisdictional defect. 

See United States v. Davis, 608 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir. 1979); 

Franklin v. United States, 589 F.2d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 1979). 

Likewise, in a§ 2255 proceeding upon a conviction arising from a 

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--vol untar~and-; knowing. plea, , the court . will not consider claims 

that the -• indictment -was obtained uping pe-rjury. Franklin, 589 

F.2d at 194. 

We grant the defendant leave to appeal in forma pauperis and 

the judgment of the district court dismissing the petition is 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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