Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01460/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01460-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy's Trucking
Appellee
Brad Perkins
Appellee
David Smith
Appellee
Timothy Watkins
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1460

___________________________

Timothy Watkins

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Brad Perkins, Individually; Billy's Trucking; David Smith, Individually

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: September 7, 2015

Filed: October 14, 2015

[Unpublished]

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Before SHEPHERD, BYE, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Timothy Watkins appeals the district court’s adverse grant of summary

judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Arkansas Highway Police (AHP)

officers Brad Perkins and David Smith, and Billy’s Trucking (Billy’s), a towing

company, arising from an incident in which he was stopped while driving a tractortrailer in Arkansas for following too close. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

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This court reviews de novo the grant ofsummary judgment, viewing the record

and all reasonable inferences from it in a light most favorable to Watkins. See Mack

v. Dillon, 594 F.3d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). We conclude that the AHP

officers failed to meet their burden as summary judgment movants. See Carrington

v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 481 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 2007) (at summaryjudgment stage, moving parties carry ultimate burden of proof to establish no material

facts are in dispute). Specifically, in finding that the material facts as to the officers’

actions were undisputed and that they had not violated Watkins’s constitutional

rights, it appears that the district court considered the officers’ unauthenticated and

unsigned memoranda, as well as the other unauthenticated documents they offered,

although those materials would not be admissible in evidence. See Shanklin v.

Fitzgerald, 397 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (summary judgment documents must

be authenticated by and attached to affidavit made on personal knowledge setting

forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence or deposition, and documents not

meeting such requirements cannot be considered). For purposes of his Fourth

Amendment claims against the officers, while Watkins admitted not signing the

citation for following too close, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop himfor such

a violation–especially given his testimony that he had not even seen the truck

carrying logs he was charged with following too close. See United States v. Houston,

548 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 2008) (traffic stop is seizure within meaning of Fourth

Amendment and thus must be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause);

Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 755-58 (8th Cir. 2001) (in case where

plaintiff was arrested for tampering with car and driving without license, noting that

false arrest claim required showing arrest was made without probable cause).

Further, although the admissible evidence showed that Watkins did not own

the tractor-trailer or its contents, he had standing to assert a claimbased on the towing

of the tractor-trailer, because he testified as to the adverse consequences to him from

the towing, arising from the fact that as an employee of A & H Cartage LLC, he was

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responsible for the tractor-trailer and its contents. See Turkish Coalition of Am., Inc.

v. Bruininks, 678 F.3d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 2012) (standing requires injury that is

particularized and concrete and actual, not merely conjectural, that is fairly traceable

to action of defendant, and that is likely to be redressed by favorable decision); see

also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (indicating a "seizure" of property

occurs "when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory

interest in that property."); United States v. Fuller, 374 F.3d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 2007)

("It is important to realize that a person's interest in his or her loaned effects is not

identical to the possessory interest of the bailee [i.e., Watkins] who has direct control

of the effects, and the lender cannot assert the bailee's independent Fourth

Amendment right to have the bailee's interest protected from unreasonable

government interference."). Thus, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to

whether there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the stop, and because

he would not have been arrested and the tractor-trailer towed absent the stop, there

is also a jury issue on the Fourth Amendment claim arising from the towing. See

Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 903-04 (6th Cir. 2013) (seizure of vehicle in

connection with arrest not supported by probable cause violates Fourth Amendment

in same manner that arrest itself violates Fourth Amendment).

We find no basis for overturning the grant of summary judgment to Billy’s,

given that Watkins testified in his deposition that Billy’s was not involved in the

matters giving rise to the damages at issue in the instant suit, and the fact that

Arkansas has adequate post-deprivation remedies for the loss of Watkins’s personal

property during the period Billy’s stored the tractor-trailer. See Willis Smith & Co.

v. Arkansas, 548 F.3d 638, 640 (8th Cir. 2008). Finally, we find no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s denial of Watkins’s motions for leave to amend. See

Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (court does not

abuse its discretion when it denies motion to amend where there is undue delay or

undue prejudice to non-moving party).

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Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on the Fourth

Amendment claims for false arrest and seizure of property against the officers, and

remand for further consideration of these claims; and in all other respects we affirm. 

On remand the district court may wish to reconsider whether appointment of counsel

is warranted.

______________________________

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