Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05370/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05370-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Clear Lake
Defendant
Greg Folsom
Defendant
Doug Herron
Defendant
Jane Wang
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANE WANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF CLEAR LAKE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05370-EMC 

ORDER DEFERRING IN PART; 

GRANTING IN PART; AND DENYING 

IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Docket No. 29

Plaintiff Jane Wang has filed suit against her former employer, the City of Clearlake, and 

two of its employees, Greg Folsom (City Manager) and Doug Herron (Director of Public Works). 

She asserts, for the most part, claims for employment discrimination based on sex and/or race. 

Currently pending before the Court is the City’s motion to dismiss the operative first amended 

complaint (“FAC”). 

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the FAC, Ms. Wang alleges as follows.

Ms. Wang is an Asian woman. She began to work for the City in September 2017. See

FAC ¶ 9. Although not entirely clear, it appears that she was hired to work as a City Engineer 

and/or Deputy Director of Public Works. See FAC ¶¶ 12, 75.

Immediately upon her tenure, Mr. Herron – the Director of Public Works – began to ask 

Ms. Wang out for drinks and/or food. See FAC ¶ 9. He also made comments about her body and 

showed off his body to her. See FAC ¶ 9. In addition, he seems to have suggested that Mr. 

Folsom (the City Manager) was also interested in her. See FAC ¶ 9. At one point, Ms. Wang 

rebuffed Mr. Herron, refusing to go out with him. He thereafter denied her the use of a 

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government car, “saying the type of car didn’t fit for a female like her to drive.” FAC ¶ 9.

It appears that, subsequently, Mr. Herron – along with Mr. Folsom – subjected her to other 

conduct. For example:

• They did not allow her to order supplies “even though she had a supply budget to 

use.”

• They did not invite her to work meetings even though other City Engineers or 

Deputy Directors were invited to the same meetings.

• They did not invite her to trainings and, if she was invited, “[s]he was not allowed 

to stay overnight [even] if the training was far away from the office.”

• They blamed her for work done by her co-workers, which was done without her 

approval.

• They did not allow her to use a government car for business travel, such that she 

was forced to use her own car.

FAC ¶¶ 10-12. Non-Asian men were not subjected to the same conduct. See FAC ¶ 10.

Ms. Wang reported the conduct of Mr. Herron and Mr. Folsom to her supervisor – and 

apparently even the two men themselves – but the City did not take any steps to address the 

conduct. See FAC ¶ 13.

In addition to the above, Ms. Wang alleges that, on several occasions in September and 

October 2017, she heard her co-workers “making fun” of photos of slum areas in China. FAC ¶

11. Ms. Wang reported the conduct to her supervisor, as well as Mr. Herron and Mr. Folsom, but 

nothing was done to address the conduct. See FAC ¶ 11.

In November 2017, just a few months after she started working for the City, Mr. Herron 

and Mr. Folsom terminated her employment with the City, “ostensibly because [she] would not 

refrain from managerial duty.” FAC ¶ 14. (It is not clear from the FAC what Ms. Wang means by 

“refrain[ing] from managerial duty.”).

Based on, inter alia, the above allegations, Ms. Wang has asserted the following causes of 

action:

(1) Sexual harassment/quid pro quo – against all Defendants (pursuant to Title VII and 

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FEHA). 

(2) Sexual harassment/hostile work environment – against all Defendants (pursuant to 

Title VII and FEHA). 

(3) Retaliation (i.e., termination based on Ms. Wang’s complaints about sexual 

harassment) – against all Defendants (pursuant to Title VII and FEHA). 

(4) Intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) – against all Defendants.

(5) Wrongful termination in violation of public policy – against the City only.

(6) Negligent hiring, training, and retention – against the City only.

(7) Discrimination based on race, color, and/or national origin – against all Defendants

(pursuant to Title VII and FEHA). 

(8) Breach of implied contract and/or covenant of good faith and fair dealing – against all 

Defendants.

(9) Violation of the Equal Pay Act – against all Defendants.

II. DISCUSSION

A. City’s Arguments

In its motion to dismiss, the City makes a number of arguments:

• Because there is a pending state court action based on the same underlying facts, 

the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the Colorado River

doctrine.

• If the Court does exercise jurisdiction, all federal claims should be dismissed 

because (1) the Title VII claims (for sexual harassment/quid pro quo, sexual 

harassment/hostile work environment, retaliation, and race discrimination) are 

untimely and (2) Ms. Wang has failed to state a claim for a violation of the Equal 

Pay Act.

• If the Court dismisses the federal claims (i.e., the Title VII and Equal Pay Act 

claims), then it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state 

law claims.

• If the Court does consider the state law claims (based on FEHA and the common 

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law), they are deficient because, e.g., (1) Ms. Wang did not present her common 

law claims to the City before she filed suit1; (2) the common law claims for 

wrongful termination and breach of contract cannot be asserted against a public 

entity; (3) the common law claims for IIED and negligent hiring, training, and 

retention are barred based on the exclusive remedy provided by the workers’

compensation system; (4) the FEHA and common law claims are based on 

conclusory allegations only; and (5) punitive damages cannot be asserted against a 

public entity.

B. Colorado River

The City’s first argument is that this Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the 

instant case – or at the very least, stay the instant case – based on the Colorado River doctrine. 

See Seneca Ins. Co. v. Strange Land, Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that, although 

“federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them,’

including in cases involving parallel state litigation,” a court may abstain “[u]nder ‘exceedingly 

rare’ circumstances[] [based on] ‘considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to 

conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation’”). The City has 

asked the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that, in October 2018, Ms. Wang filed a suit in 

state court against the same three defendants as here (i.e., the City, Mr. Folsom, and Mr. Herron) 

and based on essentially the same underlying facts. See RJN, Ex. B (state court complaint). 

Although the instant case involves some different causes of action, there are many shared causes 

of action between the state and federal court cases, in particular:

(1) Sexual harassment/quid pro quo.

(2) Sexual harassment/hostile work environment.

(3) Retaliation.

(4) IIED.

1

See Garcia v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 173 Cal. App. 3d 701, 710 (1985) (noting that “[a]ctions 

brought under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California’s own statutory scheme 

to combat employment discrimination, have also been held exempt from the claim-presentation 

requirements of the general tort claims act”).

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(5) Wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

(6) Negligent hiring, training, and retention.

The causes of action asserted in this case, but not in the state court case, are: (7) race 

discrimination; (8) breach of implied contract and/or covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and 

(9) violation of the Equal Pay Act. 

As the Court stated at the hearing on the motion, the Court defers ruling on the request to 

stay pursuant to Colorado River. This is based on Ms. Wang’s statement at the hearing that she 

intends to dismiss her state court action. If Ms. Wang does dismiss her state court action, then the 

City’s Colorado River argument is moot (as the City conceded at the hearing). If she does not, the 

Court will rule on the stay request.

C. Federal Claims

1. Title VII Claims

The City argues that Ms. Wang’s Title VII claims are all time barred. Title VII provides in 

relevant part as follows:

If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) is 

dismissed by the Commission . . . , the Commission . . . shall so 

notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving 

of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent 

named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting 

that “[t]he language of the statute establishes the 90-day period as running from the ‘giving of 

such notice’ rather than from the date claimant actually ‘receives’ notice in hand”). Here, the City 

has asked the Court to take judicial notice of the Notice of Right to Sue that was issued by the 

EEOC in response to Ms. Wang’s charge of discrimination. The Notice appears to have been 

mailed on August 29, 2018. See Def.’s RJN, Ex. A (notice). The Notice states, on its face, that 

[y]ou may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law 

based on this charge in federal or state court. Your lawsuit must be 

filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or your 

right to sue based on this charge will be lost. (The time limit for 

filing suit based on a claim under state law may be different.)

RJN, Ex. A (emphasis in original). Assuming that Ms. Wang received the notice three days after 

the mailing date of August 29, 2018, the City argues that “[t]he 90-day limitations period . . . 

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began to run on September 1, 2018,” and ended on November 30, 2018; however, Ms. Wang did 

not file her federal action with the Title VII claim until August 27, 2019 (i.e., some eight months 

after the limitations period expired). See Docket No. 1 (complaint).

In response, Ms. Wang does not dispute that the Notice was mailed on August 29, 2018. 

In fact, in her FAC, she alleges that, “[o]n or around August 29, 2018, the EEOC issued Plaintiff 

Notices of Right to Sue.” FAC ¶ 5. She suggests, however, that the statute of limitations should 

be tolled for two reasons: (1) she was ill during the relevant period and (2) the EEOC gave her 

confusing and/or incorrect information about the statute of limitations. These reasons are not 

articulated in her FAC but rather in a declaration that she attached to her opposition brief.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the Title VII statute of limitations may be equitably tolled 

in certain circumstances. More specifically, 

relief from strict construction of a statute of limitations is readily 

available in extreme cases and gives the court latitude in a case-bycase analysis. The equitable tolling doctrine has been applied by the 

Supreme Court in certain circumstances, but it has been applied 

sparingly; for example, the Supreme Court has allowed equitable 

tolling when the statute of limitations was not complied with 

because of defective pleadings, when a claimant was tricked by an 

adversary into letting a deadline expire, and when the EEOC’s 

notice of the statutory period was clearly inadequate. Courts have 

been generally unforgiving, however, when a late filing is due to 

claimant’s failure “to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal 

rights.”

Scholar, 963 F.2d at 268; see also Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating 

that equitable tolling may be applied “where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his 

adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass,” or “when extraordinary 

circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control [such as severe mental incapacity], made it 

impossible to file a claim on time”). The Ninth Circuit has also noted that,

[b]ecause the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine often 

depends on matters outside the pleadings, it “is not generally 

amenable to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” A motion to 

dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations period may 

be granted only “if the assertions of the complaint, read with the 

required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the 

statute was tolled.” . . . For this reason, we have reversed dismissals 

where the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine depended 

upon factual questions not clearly resolved in the pleadings. 

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Similarly, we must reverse if the factual and legal issues are not 

sufficiently clear to permit us to determine with certainty whether 

the doctrine could be successfully invoked.

Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1995).

In the instant case, Ms. Wang’s FAC on its face does indicate a statute-of-limitations 

problem. However, as stated above, she has now articulated in her opposition brief/declaration 

reasons why she should be allowed to amend her pleading to assert a basis for equitable tolling. 

Unless the reasons would be futile, Ms. Wang should be permitted to amend.

To the extent Ms. Wang claims that she did not timely file her Title VII claim because she 

was sick, the Court finds that position futile. In her opposition brief, she asserts that she had 

“[p]hysical or mental incapacity” based on “bacterial flesh eating symptom[s]” and attaches a 

doctor’s prescription to her declaration. See Opp’n at 3; see also Wang Decl., Ex. C (prescription 

issued by Dr. Wong; appearing to prescribe a cream to be applied to the affected area). In her 

declaration, she also claims that she “had [a] very high fever on and off at that time.” Wang Decl. 

¶ 3. Even if the Court were to credit this information, that does not explain why Ms. Wang took 

eight months (i.e., until August 2019) to file her Title VII action in federal court. As the City 

points out, Ms. Wang managed to file her suit in state court in late 2018/early 2019. See Def.’s 

RJN, Ex. B (state court complaint). If she successfully managed to file her suit in state court, she 

should have been able to do the same in federal court. Cf. Brown v. Dep’t of Navy, No. 90-55789, 

1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7378, at *9 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 1992) (noting that “[i]t would have been 

impossible for Brown to serve the Navy in a timely fashion after she received the return of 

service”; “[i]n such a circumstance, equitable tolling will operate to give her a reasonable time in 

which to effect service [but] Brown made no attempt to serve the Navy within a reasonable time 

after receiving notice that such service was required,” and so “she cannot benefit from the 

equitable tolling doctrine”). 

However, to the extent Ms. Wang argues for equitable tolling because of confusing and/or 

incorrect information provided by the EEOC, the Court shall give Ms. Wang leave to amend 

because it is not clear that this position would be futile. Ms. Wang indicates that the situation was 

confusing because, on the same day that the EEOC issued the Notice of Right to Sue, it sent her a 

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letter stating that “the investigation [had] just started” on her charge of discrimination. Wang 

Decl. ¶ 3. Ms. Wang further argues that the EEOC gave her bad information – i.e., when she 

called the EEOC (presumably, to clear up her confusion), she was told that she had “one year to 

file.” Wang Decl. ¶ 3.

In its reply brief, the City argues that 

it is not believable that the EEOC would misstate the federal 

statutory deadline to file her lawsuit. It is far more likely that if this 

conversation occurred, it was with California’s Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), which would have very likely 

advised a claimant that they [sic] had one year to file state claims 

under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), 

per the then[-]applicable Cal. Government Code section 12965.

Reply at 2. While the City may ultimately be right (or it may even be that Ms. Wang did call the 

EEOC and it told her that she had one year to file her state claims), on a motion to dismiss, the 

Court cannot resolve factual disputes. Therefore, the Court cannot say that Ms. Wang’s claim for 

equitable tolling based on an EEOC mistake would be futile. See, e.g., Viveros v. United States 

Postal Serv., No. CV 10-8593 MMM (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160753, at *13 n.34 (C.D. Cal. 

Dec. 8, 2011) (not ruling on equitable tolling issue but noting “the strong precedent in favor of not 

penalizing litigants for mistakes and misinformation from the EEOC”; citing cases from the 

Second and Eighth Circuits).

In summary, based on the face of the complaint, Ms. Wang’s Title VII claims have a 

timeliness problem but the Court shall give Ms. Wang leave to amend to plead a basis for 

equitable tolling – in particular, based on confusing and/or incorrect information given by the 

EEOC. She must plead specific facts and those facts must be based on a good faith belief; she 

must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2 Ms. Wang is not allowed to assert 

equitable tolling on any other basis, including but not limited to alleged sickness.

2. Equal Pay Act Claims

In addition to the Title VII claims, Ms. Wang asserts one other federal claim – i.e., a claim 

for violation of the Equal Pay Act. The Equal Pay Act provides in relevant part as follows:

2

See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (providing that sanctions may be issued against a party who 

violates Rule 11).

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No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the 

basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the 

rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for 

equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, 

effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar 

working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to 

(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which 

measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a 

differential based on any other factor other than sex . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has stated that, “[t]o make out a case 

under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must prove that an employer is paying different wages to 

employees of the opposite sex for equal work.” Hein v. Or. Coll. of Educ., 718 F.2d 910, 913 (9th 

Cir. 1983); see also Kevari v. Scottrade, Inc., No. CV 18-819-JFW(GJSx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

227343, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2018) (stating that, “[t]o allege an Equal Pay Act claim, a 

plaintiff must allege facts showing that employees of the opposite sex are: (1) working in the same 

establishment; (2) doing work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which is 

performed under similar working conditions; and (3) receiving unequal pay because of their sex”). 

According to the City, Ms. Wang has failed to state a claim for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss after the Supreme Court’s decisions in 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), 

a plaintiff’s “factual allegations [in the complaint] ‘must . . . suggest that the claim has at least a 

plausible chance of success.’” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). The court 

“accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 

1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But “allegations in a complaint . . . may not simply recite the 

elements of a cause of action [and] must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give 

fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1135 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

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unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Based on the allegations in the FAC, the Court agrees that Ms. Wang has not plausibly 

alleged an Equal Pay violation. For example:

• In her FAC, Ms. Wang indicates she was not given equal pay because she “was not 

allowed to have [the] same accommodation/budget [as] the similar male employees 

doing substantially equal work.” FAC ¶ 77; see also FAC ¶ 10 (alleging that “she 

was not allowed to order supplies even though she had a supply budget to use”). In 

her opposition, she suggests that, as a result, she was forced to buy her own 

supplies, which included software and a laptop. See Opp’n at 5. But even if 

similarly situated male employees were allowed to use their budgets as they 

wished, there is no indication that their budgets were part of the compensation that 

they received from the City – i.e., remuneration for employment. See 29 C.F.R. §

1620.10 (“Under the EPA, the term ‘wages’ generally includes all payments made 

to [or on behalf of] an employee as remuneration for employment.”).

• In her FAC, Ms. Wang also indicates that she was not given equal pay because “she 

was not allowed to use [the] City’s vehicle for business travel.” FAC ¶ 10. 

According to Ms. Wang, “[o]n and off Nov. 1, [2017], she went to the sites . . . 

using [her] own car, . . . which she bought on the cost of about $16k to handle work 

and commute for this job only as her other car is not that reliable for . . . driving”

on “treacherous, deteriorated roads.” FAC ¶ 12. The federal regulations do 

indicate that “use of company car” can be a wage. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.10. They also 

indicate that certain business expenses can also be deemed a wage. The problem 

for Ms. Wang is that she does not allege in her complaint that (1) she asked the 

City to compensate her for the use of her personal vehicle for business purposes

(e.g., based on mileage incurred) and that (2) the City denied her request. Nor does 

she allege that the men who were allowed use of a company car (or who were given 

compensation for use of a personal vehicle) were similarly situated. 

• In her FAC, Ms. Wang further suggests she was not given equal pay because “[s]he 

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was not allowed to stay overnight if the training was far away from the office.” 

FAC ¶ 10. Section 1620.10 indicates that hotel accommodations can be a form of 

wage. But similar to above, Ms. Wang has not alleged in the complaint that (1) she 

paid for any hotel accommodations out of her own pocket, (2) she asked the City to 

compensate her for that expense, and (3) the City denied her request. Nor does she 

allege that male workers who were given hotel accommodations were similarly 

situated to her (e.g., lived the same distance away).

The Court also notes that new assertions made by Ms. Wang in her opposition brief also do 

not support an Equal Pay claim – at least, not as they are currently framed. For example:

• In her opposition brief, Ms. Wang alleges for the first time that she was actually 

given a smaller salary compared to certain men: “[I]n the organizational chart, 

same level as Doug [Herron], [Greg] Folsom, etc., but she got about 50% less pay.” 

Opp’n at 4. In its reply brief, the City argues that this is not an Equal Pay violation 

because Mr. Herron and Mr. Folsom had completely different titles and job duties 

from Ms. Grant (being, respectively, the Director of Public Works and the City 

Manager in contrast to City Engineer/Deputy Director of Public Works). The City 

raises a fair point. Given the different job titles, which suggests different job 

duties, there is not a sufficient basis to infer that Ms. Wang and the two men were 

doing “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, 

and responsibility.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

• In her opposition brief, Ms. Wang alleges for the first time that she was not given a 

relocation fee (minimum of $5,000). See Opp’n at 5. Although this potentially 

could support a claim of differential wages, there is no indication that (1) other 

similarly situated male employees received relocation fees and (2) Ms. Wang and 

those men were doing “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal 

skill, effort, and responsibility.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Equal Pay claim as alleged. The Court shall give Ms. 

Wang leave to amend her Equal Pay claim but, if she does amend, she must do so in good faith 

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(i.e., consistent with her obligations under Rule 11) and she must address the deficiencies 

identified above. Again she must allege in good faith specific facts. She may not amend, 

however, to assert an Equal Pay claim based on the claim that she “was not allowed to have [the] 

same accommodation/budget [as] the similar male employees doing substantially equal work.” 

FAC ¶ 77.

3. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Because the Court is not, at this time, dismissing the federal claims with prejudice, it does 

not, at this time, decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

D. State Claims

Ms. Wang’s state claims are as follows:

• Employment discrimination pursuant to FEHA (based on sex discrimination, race 

discrimination, and retaliation).

• IIED.

• Wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

• Negligent hiring, training, and retention.

• Breach of implied contract and/or covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

1. FEHA Claims

The City argues that the FEHA claims (and presumably the Title VII claims as well) are 

deficient because they are conclusorily pled. The specific FEHA claims at issue are as follows: 

sexual harassment/quid pro quo; sexual harassment/hostile work environment; retaliation; and race 

discrimination. It is difficult to understand why the City is contending that these claims are not 

pled with sufficient specificity. For example, it is clear why Ms. Wang asserts a quid pro quo 

sexual harassment claim based on the alleged conduct of her supervisor, Mr. Herron. The Court 

therefore denies the motion to dismiss the FEHA claims.3

3

In so ruling, the Court is not expressing any opinion on whether, e.g., the sex harassment claims 

against Mr. Folsom (in contrast to Mr. Herron) are plausible and whether the race discrimination 

claim (which seems to be a claim for racial hostile work environment) is supported by sufficient 

allegations of severe or pervasive conduct.

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2. IIED

The City challenges the IIED claim on various grounds – e.g., (1) it is conclusorily pled; 

(2) Ms. Wang failed to present the IIED claim to the City as required by the California Tort 

Claims Act (“CTCA”); and (3) the claim is barred by workers’ compensation preemption. 

The first argument is weak because the IIED claim seems to be based on the employment 

discrimination claims, and the basis for those claims is sufficiently clear (i.e., there are 

nonconclusory allegations in support of the claims).

The City’s third argument is also problematic. The City correctly notes that, in Miklosy v. 

Regents of University of California, 44 Cal. 4th 876 (2008), a whistleblower retaliation case, the 

California Supreme Court found that an IIED claim was not viable because of workers’

compensation law.

Plaintiffs allege defendants engaged in “outrageous conduct” that 

was intended to, and did, cause plaintiffs “severe emotional 

distress,” giving rise to common law causes of action for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. The alleged wrongful conduct, 

however, occurred at the worksite, in the normal course of the 

employer-employee relationship, and therefore workers’

compensation is plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy for any injury that may 

have resulted.

Shoemaker v. Myers is of particular relevance here because it 

involved termination of a whistleblower employee. We said: “To 

the extent plaintiff purports to allege any distinct cause of action, not 

dependent upon the violation of an express statute or violation of 

fundamental public policy, but rather directed at the intentional, 

malicious aspects of defendants’ conduct ... , then plaintiff has 

alleged no more than the plaintiff in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire 

Protection Dist. . . . . The kinds of conduct at issue (e.g., discipline 

or criticism) are a normal part of the employment relationship. Even 

if such conduct may be characterized as intentional, unfair or 

outrageous, it is nevertheless covered by the workers’ compensation 

exclusivity provisions.” We reaffirmed this holding in Livitsanos v. 

Superior Court, which also involved a terminated employee: “So 

long as the basic conditions of compensation are otherwise satisfied 

(Lab. Code, § 3600), and the employer’s conduct neither 

contravenes fundamental public policy nor exceeds the risks 

inherent in the employment relationship, an employee’s emotional 

distress injuries are subsumed under the exclusive remedy 

provisions of workers’ compensation.”

Id. at 902 (emphasis omitted and added).

But Miklosy is not dispositive with respect to instant case because, as noted above, Miklosy 

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was a whistleblower retaliation case and here Ms. Wang’s IIED claim seems to be based on 

employment discrimination – which is not a normal part of an employment relationship. See, e.g., 

Hardin v. Mendocino Coast Dist. Hosp., No. 17-cv-05554-JST, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100238, at 

*25-26 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2018) (holding that IIED claim was not barred by workers’

compensation exclusivity because claim was based on employment discrimination and retaliation);

Silva v. Solano Cty., No. 2:13-cv-02165-MCE-EFB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154362, at *9 (E.D. 

Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) (stating that, “[w]here an employer’s illegal discriminatory practices cause 

emotional distress to an employee, the law is clear that such distress is not barred by workers’

compensation exclusivity”); City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1155 (1998) 

(indicating that “compensation bargain cannot encompass conduct, such as sexual or racial 

discrimination, obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound 

morality”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Light v. Cal. Dep’t of Parks & Rec., 14 Cal. App. 

5th 75, 101 (2017) (stating that “unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA falls 

outside the compensation bargain and therefore claims of intentional infliction of emotional 

distress based on such discrimination and retaliation are not subject to workers’ compensation 

exclusivity”); Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 341, 352 (1993) (stating that “a claim 

for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the 

distress is engendered by an employer’s illegal discriminatory practices”).

Nonetheless, the City’s second argument has merit. The CTCA generally provides that 

“all claims for money or damages against local public entities” “shall be presented” to the public 

entity before an individual may file an action against the public entity. Cal. Gov’t Code § 905; see 

also id. § 945.4 (providing that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public 

entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim 

therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been 

deemed to have been rejected by the board”). There is no indication in the FAC that Ms. Wang 

presented her claim to the City prior to filing suit, and, in her opposition, Ms. Wang does not make 

any assertion that she did in fact present her claim. Rather, in her opposition, Ms. Wang suggests 

that she is “excused from the requirements of the Government Claims Act,” Opp’n at 6, but the 

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basis of that argument is unclear. She mentions equitable tolling for her employment 

discrimination claims (Title VII at least) but that has nothing to do with her separate claim for 

IIED; filing a claim under the CTCA is different and distinct from filing claims with the EEOC or 

DFEH.

The Court therefore dismisses the IIED claim based on the failure to present. The 

dismissal is with leave to amend if Ms. Wang can, in good faith (i.e., consistent with her Rule 11 

obligations), assert that she did present a claim to the City or that she has a valid basis for not 

complying with the presentment requirement. 

3. Wrongful Termination

The City moves for dismissal of the wrongful termination claim on various grounds – e.g., 

(1) it is only conclusorily pled; (2) such a claim cannot be asserted against a public entity; and (3) 

Ms. Wang failed to present the claim to the City as required by the CTCA. Here, the Court need 

only entertain the second argument.

As the City points out, the California Supreme Court has held that a claim for wrongful 

termination is not available against a public entity. See Miklosy, 44 Cal. 4th at 899. In Miklosy, 

the Court explained as follows:

The Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) establishes the limits of 

common law liability for public entities, stating: “Except as 

otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is not liable for 

an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the 

public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (§ 815, 

subd. (a), italics added.) The Legislative Committee Comment to 

section 815 states: “This section abolishes all common law or 

judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for 

such liability as may be required by the state or federal constitution, 

e.g., inverse condemnation. ...” (Legis. Com. com., 32 West’s Ann. 

Gov. Code (1995) foll. § 815, p. 167, italics added.) Moreover, our 

own decisions confirm that section 815 abolishes common law tort 

liability for public entities. (See Eastburn v. Regional Fire 

Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1179; Zelig v. County 

of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1127-1128; see also Adkins 

v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 1802, 1817-1818; 

Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 

Cal. App. 3d 859, 866-867.)

Id. (emphasis in original). 

Miklosy remains good law on this issue. See, e.g., Johnson v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. 16-

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cv-02913-SI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166377, at *21-22 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017) (agreeing that 

“plaintiff’s claim is barred under the California Government Code because plaintiff cannot assert a 

common law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy against a public entity”; 

citing Miklosy and § 815). Moreover, none of the cases cited by Ms. Wang indicate to the 

contrary. See, e.g., Derby v. City of Pittsburg, No. 16-cv-05469-SI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

25660, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017) (noting that, “[u]nder the Government Claims Act, public 

entities are not liable for injuries arising from acts or omissions of the public entity except as 

provided by statute”; one “statutory exception can be found in Government Code § 815.6, which 

provides[:] ‘Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is 

designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an 

injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity 

establishes that is exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty’”) (emphasis added). Ms. 

Wang has not asserted a wrongful termination claim based on a statute.

Moreover, for the reasons stated above, Ms. Wang failed to comply with the CTCA. The 

Court thus dismisses the claim for wrongful termination with prejudice.

4. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Retention

The City moves to dismiss the claim for negligent hiring, training, and retention based on 

several grounds: (1) the claim is conclusorily pled; (2) Ms. Wang failed to present the claim to the 

City as required by the CTCA; and (3) the claim is barred by workers’ compensation preemption.

The City’s first argument is not without some merit. Although the FAC indicates that the 

negligence claim is based on the City’s failure to train (e.g., with respect to sex and race 

discrimination), see FAC ¶¶ 53-54, Ms. Wang does not provide any specific information about the 

alleged failure to train, other than the fact that the discrimination occurred and that a “proper 

investigation” was not conducted into her complaints about discrimination.

The second argument also has merit for reasons similar to those stated above (on the IIED 

claim).

However, the Court rejects the third argument. Several courts have found that a 

defendant’s allegedly negligent “failure to fulfill its duty to prevent sexual harassment [is] conduct 

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that falls outside the normal risk of the compensation bargain.” Evans v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l 

(USA), Inc., No. 2:07-cv-1074 FCD DAD, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70432, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 

24, 2007); see also Muniz v. UPS, 731 F. Supp. 2d 961, 976 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (Wilken, J.) (noting 

that plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring, training, and supervision “rests on facts supporting her 

claim for general discrimination” and therefore is not preempted by the California Workers’

Compensation Act).

The Court therefore dismisses the negligence claim based on failure to state a claim for 

relief and failure to comply with the CTCA presentment requirement. The dismissal is with leave 

to amend (e.g., if Ms. Wang can provide more specificity and if she can, in good faith, assert that 

she did present a claim to the City or that she has a valid basis for not complying with the 

presentment requirement).

5. Breach of Implied Contract or Implied Covenant.

For Ms. Wang’s claim for breach of implied contract or implied covenant, the City makes 

the following arguments: (1) the claim is conclusorily pled; (2) “‘no public employee has a vested 

right to continue in public employment beyond the time or contrary to the terms and conditions 

fixed by law,’” Mot. at 9 (quoting Miller v. State of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 808, 813 (1977)); and (3) Ms. 

Wang failed to present her claim to the City as required by the CTCA. 

The Court rejects the City’s first argument. Ms. Wang has alleged that she had an 

employment agreement with the City under which she would not be disciplined or terminated 

“except for good cause and with notice and an opportunity to be heard” and under which she 

“would be evaluated in a fair and objective manner and afforded progressive discipline.” FAC ¶

64. She has also alleged that the “employment agreement was evidenced in various written 

documents, including but not limited to defendant’s employee handbook and personnel policies 

and procedures.” FAC ¶ 65.

The Court also rejects the City’s second argument. As noted above, the City bases its 

second argument on Miller. In Miller, the plaintiff had been a civil servant employed by the state. 

He brought a mandamus action and an action for breach of contract against the state when he was 

forced to retire at the age of 67 pursuant to an amendment to a state statute (instead of age 70 as 

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provided in the statute when he first entered state service many years earlier). 

If the compulsory age of retirement had not been reduced from 70 to 

67, plaintiff would have been permitted to continue in state 

employment until September 1, 1977. Had he done so, remaining in 

his final position and receiving salary increases as the Legislature 

provided, his retirement pension at age 70 based on the benefit 

factor in effect under former law would have been at least $ 2,365 

per month [which was more than he was receiving under the current 

law having been forced to voluntarily retire at age 67].

Id. at 812.

The California Supreme Court in Miller first addressed the plaintiff’s argument that he had 

“a vested, contractual right based on the mandatory retirement age in effect when he was first 

employed by the state, to continue in state service until age 70.” Id. at 813 (emphasis in original). 

The Court rejected the argument, stating as follows:

[I]t is well settled in California that public employment is not held 

by contract but by statute and that, insofar as the duration of such 

employment is concerned, no employee has a vested contractual 

right to continue in employment beyond the time or contrary to the 

terms and conditions fixed by law. . . .

In view of these long and well settled principles, we conclude that 

the power of the Legislature to reduce the tenure of plaintiff’s civil 

service position and thereby to shorten his state service, by changing 

the mandatory retirement age was not and could not be limited by 

any contractual obligation.

Id. at 813-14; see also Bernstein v. Lopez, 321 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that “neither 

an express nor an implied contract can restrict the reasons for, or the manner of, termination of 

public employment provided by California statute”).

Miller, however, does not stand for the proposition that a public employment relationship 

is governed only by statute. Indeed, in Retired Employees Association of Orange County, Inc. v. 

County of Orange, 52 Cal. 4th 1171 (2011) – a post-Miller decision – the California Supreme 

Court rejected the proposition that “public employee compensation is strictly limited to that which 

is expressly provided in a statute or ordinance” and explained that “‘[g]overnmental subdivisions 

may be bound by an implied contract if there is no statutory prohibition against such 

arrangements.’” Id. at 1180-81. The Court also indicated that Miller and similar cases stood 

simply stood for the principle that “‘the law does not recognize implied contract terms that are at 

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variance with the terms of the contract as expressly agreed or as prescribed by statute.’” Id. at 

1181. (In Retired Employees, the Court went on to give the cautionary note that “our ‘often 

quoted language that public employment is not held by contract’ has limited force where . . . the 

parties are legally authorized to enter (and have in fact entered) into bilateral contracts to govern 

the employment relationship.” Id. at 1182 (noting, e.g., that local governments are authorized to 

meet and confer with employee bargaining units).)

In the instant case, the City does not point to any conflict between the implied contract 

terms asserted by Ms. Wang and any statute. Hence, Miller is not a bar to Ms. Wang’s implied 

contract/covenant claim.

While, for the reasons stated above, the City’s first and second arguments lack merit, its 

final argument – based on the CTCA presentation requirement – is valid. See, e.g., City of 

Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 737-38 (2007) (holding that contract claims are 

subject to the CTCA’s presentment requirement; adding that the CTCA is better referred to as the 

Government Claims Act “to reduce confusion”); Loehr v. Ventura Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 147 Cal. 

App. 3d 1071, 1079 (1983) (stating that “[a]ctions for breach of contract also fall within the scope 

of claims for ‘money or damages’”). That is, there is no indication in the FAC that Ms. Wang 

presented her claim to the City prior to filing suit, and, in her opposition, Ms. Wang does not make 

any assertion that she did in fact present her claim. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the implied contract/covenant claim based on the failure 

to present. The dismissal is with leave to amend if Ms. Wang can, in good faith, assert that she 

did present a claim to the City or that she has a valid basis for not complying with the presentment 

requirement.

6. Punitive Damages

The City’s final argument is that, for the state claims at least, punitive damages against it, 

as a public entity, are not available.4 The City is correct. California Government Code § 818 

4 The City does not clearly make an argument that punitive damages are unavailable against it 

under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. See Harvey v. City of San Diego, No. 09-CV-0740 DMS 

(RBB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140911, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2009) (stating that “punitive 

damages are not available against municipalities in Title VII claims” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

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provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages 

awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code [i.e., punitive damages] or other damages imposed 

primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” Cal. Gov’t Code §

818. See, e.g., Williams v. Lorenz, No. 15-cv-04494-BLF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190023, at *9 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2018) (stating that “the California Supreme Court has interpreted § 818 to 

prohibit awards of punitive damages against municipalities in cases involving FEHA claims”). 

Ms. Wang’s citation to California Government Code § 825 is unavailing. Section 825(a) 

includes the following provision: “Nothing in this section authorizes a public entity to pay that 

part of a claim or judgment that is for punitive or exemplary damages.” Id. § 825. So too is Ms. 

Wang’s reliance on California Government Code § 820.2, which simply provides that, “[e]xcept as 

otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act 

or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in 

him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Id. § 820.2. 

The Court therefore dismisses all claims for punitive damages against the City.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court defers in part, grants in part, and denies in part the 

City’s motion to dismiss. More specifically:

• The Court defers ruling on the motion to dismiss or stay pursuant to the Colorado 

River doctrine. It is the Court’s understanding that Ms. Wang will dismiss her state 

court action, in which case the Colorado River argument will be moot.

• The Court dismisses the Title VII claims because the face of the complaint 

indicates that there is a time bar. Ms. Wang, however, has leave to amend her Title 

VII claims to assert equitable tolling – more specifically, based on confusing and/or 

incorrect information given to her by the EEOC. Ms. Wang is not allowed to assert 

equitable tolling based on any other grounds.

1981a(b)(1)); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing that “[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of 

section 206 or section 2017 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the 

amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may 

be, and in additional equal amount as liquidated damages”). 

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• The Equal Pay claim is dismissed but with leave to amend. In amending, Ms. 

Wang must address the deficiencies identified above, if she can do so in good faith 

(i.e., consistent with her Rule 11 obligations).

• The FEHA claims are not conclusorily pled and therefore shall not be dismissed at 

this time.

• The claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is dismissed with 

prejudice under Miklosy.

• The remaining state law claims – for IIED, negligence, and breach of implied 

contract/covenant – are dismissed for failure to comply with the CTCA’s 

presentment requirement. Ms. Wang has leave to amend if she can, in good faith 

(i.e., consistent with her Rule 11 obligations), assert that she did present a claim to 

the City or that she has a valid basis for not complying with the presentment 

requirement. The negligence claim is also dismissed based on a failure to plead 

with sufficient specificity. If Ms. Wang amends the negligence claim, she must 

provide more specificity – i.e., explain the factual basis of the claim.

• On punitive damages for the state claims, the City’s motion to dismiss is granted. 

Ms. Wang shall file an amended complaint by April 2, 2020. The City shall file its 

response to the amended complaint by April 23, 2020.

This order disposes of Docket No. 29.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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