Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02316/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02316-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Meza
Petitioner
Christian Pfeiffer
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD MEZA,

Petitioner, 

v. 

CHRISTIAN PFEIFFER, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:20-cv-2316 DAD CSK P

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

(ECF No. 40) 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment is 

before the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). As discussed below, it is recommended that the motion 

be denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

 1. On March 10, 2011, petitioner was convicted in the Sacramento County Superior Court 

of false imprisonment and various sex offenses against a child, and on April 8, 2011, was 

sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of 42 years-to-life. (ECF No. 10-1.) 

 2. Petitioner filed an appeal. On July 19, 2012, the California Court of Appeal for the 

Third Appellate District reduced the felony false imprisonment conviction to misdemeanor false 

imprisonment and remanded for resentencing, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (ECF No. 

10-2 at 2.) 

 3. Petitioner sought review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on 

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September 26, 2012. (ECF Nos. 10-3, 10-4.) 

4. On November 14, 2012, petitioner was resentenced. The Sacramento County Superior 

Court noted that petitioner’s April 8, 2011 sentence remained as imposed with the following 

exceptions: the false imprisonment conviction was deemed a misdemeanor, the prior felony false 

imprisonment conviction was vacated, and petitioner was sentenced to one year for misdemeanor 

false imprisonment, and such sentence was stayed. (ECF No. 10-5.) 

5. Petitioner did not appeal the new sentence, and following his resentencing, petitioner 

did not file any post-conviction collateral actions in state court.

 6. On November 5, 2020, petitioner filed the instant federal petition. (ECF No. 1.) 

Petitioner argued that the statute of limitations period should be equitably tolled because 

(a) petitioner is only semi-literate, with a sixth grade reading level (ECF No. 1 at 20); 

(b) petitioner had difficulty maintaining his legal materials (id.); (c) while petitioner had his legal 

paperwork in his cell, he feared for his life due to his sex offender conviction, which also 

interfered with his ability to obtain inmate assistance and law library access (id. at 21-22); and 

(d) since February 2020, petitioner suffered restrictions due to COVID-19 (id.). Petitioner 

included no claim to equitable tolling based on his mental health. 

 7. On March 8, 2021, respondent filed a motion to dismiss and argued the petition should 

be dismissed because it was filed over six years after the limitations period expired, and petitioner 

failed to demonstrate he was entitled to equitable tolling. (ECF No. 9.) On March 30, 2021, 

petitioner’s first request for extension of time to oppose the motion was granted. (ECF No. 15.) 

On May 5, 2021, petitioner’s second motion for extension of time was granted. (ECF No. 17.) 

When petitioner failed to file an opposition, on June 14, 2021, petitioner was ordered to show 

cause why such failure should not be deemed a waiver of non-opposition to the motion. (ECF 

No. 18.) On June 15, 2021, petitioner filed an opposition, but did not claim any mental health 

issue entitled him to equitable tolling. (ECF No. 19.) Respondent did not file a reply. 

 8. On October 22, 2021, the assigned magistrate judge found that petitioner failed to 

demonstrate he was entitled to equitable tolling because the limitations period expired on January 

15, 2014, yet petitioner failed to file the instant petition until November 5, 2020, and failed to 

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demonstrate that he was diligent throughout the limitations period and recommended that the 

petition be dismissed as untimely. (ECF No. 24 at 13-19.) 

9. Petitioner’s objections were originally due within thirty days of the Court’s October 

22, 2021 findings and recommendations. Petitioner sought four extensions of time to file 

objections, which the Court granted (ECF Nos. 26, 28, 30, 32.) On April 29, 2022, petitioner 

filed objections in which he first claimed he was entitled to equitable tolling on the basis of his 

mental health. (ECF No. 35.) Petitioner alleged that in 2014, he had a mental health crisis, was 

admitted to a crisis bed but not released until 2016. (Id. at 8.) Petitioner claimed that he “remains 

under CCCMS care and schizophrenic remission,” and claimed that he gradually regained 

“cognizance [sic] on or about 7/00/19.”1

 (Id. at 9.) Petitioner provided two pages of health 

records. (Id. at 17-18.) 

 10. On September 19, 2022, the district court adopted the findings and recommendations 

over petitioner’s objections, finding as follows: (a) petitioner failed to provide mental health 

records confirming his admission to a crisis bed, or his release therefrom, and his objections were 

not verified or accompanied by a declaration; (b) petitioner failed to show how such mental health 

condition, if present on December 6, 2014, kept him from diligently pursuing his habeas claims 

before he was admitted to the crisis bed or after he was released; (c) the medical record reflecting 

petitioner’s Schizoaffective Disorder was in remission as of April 11, 2017, rebutted petitioner’s 

claim that he did not regain his mental health until July 2019; and (d) petitioner wholly failed to 

address the April 11, 2017 to July 2019 time frame. (ECF No. 38 at 3.) Thus, even if petitioner 

were released from a crisis bed on December 10, 2016, petitioner did not file his federal petition 

until 2020, almost four years after the statute of limitations period expired. (ECF No. 38 at 3-4.) 

The district court dismissed the petition and entered judgment on September 20, 2022. (ECF 

Nos. 38, 39.) 

1

 The Mental Health Services Delivery System (“MHSDS”) Program Guide for the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation provides four levels of mental health care services: 

Correctional Clinical Case Management System (“CCCMS”); Enhanced Outpatient (“EOP”); 

Mental Health Crisis Bed (“MHCB”); and inpatient hospital care. Coleman v. Brown, 2013 WL 

6491529, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013). 

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 11. On January 29, 2024, petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 40.) Respondent filed an opposition. (ECF No. 

44.) Petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 50.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 60(b) provides for relief from a judgment or order on the following grounds: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 

discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have 

been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 

fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the 

judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 

discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed 

or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) 

any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment is brought under Rule 60(b)(6).2

 

(ECF No. 40 at 30.) 

 Under Rule 60(b)(6). the moving party must show “extraordinary circumstances justifying 

the reopening of a final judgment,” see Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005), and the 

motion must have been filed within a reasonable time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Rule 60(b)(6) 

should be ‘used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice.’” Hall v. Haws, 

861 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 

F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). To prevail, the moving party “must demonstrate both injury 

and circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from proceeding with the action in a 

proper fashion.” Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and 

quotations omitted). “Such circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas context.” Gonzalez, 

545 U.S. at 535. Moreover, Local Rule 230(j) requires a party to show the “new or different facts 

or circumstances claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, 

or what other grounds exist for the motion.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(j). 

///

2

 Petitioner contends that he has met at least two other unidentified subsections of Rule 60(b) 

(ECF No. 40 at 30), but because the motion to vacate was filed more than fourteen months after 

the court entered final judgment, petitioner is not permitted to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2) 

or (3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Subsections (4) and (5) of Rule 60(b) are not applicable.

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III. THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

A. Petitioner’s Motion 

 Petitioner contends that because he is “mentally ill and incompetent,” his motion to vacate 

should be considered even though it was filed more than a year after judgment was entered. (ECF 

No. 40 at 30.) Petitioner argues that he did not have the mental capabilities or the comprehension 

to be held legally accountable for the statute of limitations because since childhood he has 

suffered from mental health issues, has been diagnosed with “Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar 

Type,” medicated with various psychotropic drugs, and suffers from suicidal/homicidal ideations 

and auditory/visual hallucinations.” (ECF No. 40 at 7.) Petitioner argues that no one taking 

psychotropic medications “can function normally.” (ECF No. 40 at 12.) Petitioner obtained 

S.S.I. benefits in 2002 based on his schizophrenia diagnosis. (ECF No. 40 at 11, 65.) In addition, 

petitioner argues that his mental health issues have not been properly diagnosed, he has the 

thinking capacity of a fifth grader, his mental health has deteriorated since 2012, and following 

his assault in prison, he now also suffers from post traumatic stress syndrome (“PTSD”). (Id. at 

8-9, 13, 16.) Petitioner states that in 2014, he claimed all was well to avoid being placed in 

isolation or on suicide watch, yet received rules infractions for possessing alcohol, which he used 

to self-medicate. (ECF No. 40 at 13.) Petitioner claims that he is not required to attend GED 

classes because of his inability to comprehend and complete even a sixth grade TABE score. 

(ECF No. 40 at 15.) He contends that his mental impairment keeps him from following simple 

directions and instructions. (ECF No. 40 at 17, 25.) While petitioner is currently not taking 

psychotropic medications, he “still displays radical behavior and is self-medicating, without 

incident from any correctional officers.” (ECF No. 40 at 16.) 

Petitioner denies that he wrote the federal petition or any of the letters referred to therein 

and argues that he “cannot be held accountable for any false assertions made on his behalf by so 

called ‘legal litigators.’” (ECF No. 40 at 18.) He contends that he has been the victim of several 

“jail-house lawyers” who just took plaintiff’s money and failed to provide valid assistance. (ECF 

No. 40 at 21-25.) Petitioner argues that the court “should not impute their malfeasance to 

petitioner.” (ECF No. 40 at 21.) Petitioner argues that the record demonstrates that petitioner is 

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mentally incompetent to “comprehend, [or] articulate, even a simple judicial form.” (ECF No. 40 

at 26.) 

 Finally, petitioner contends that due to petitioner’s mental illness, the limitations period 

should be tolled through the filing of petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment. (ECF No. 40 at 27-

29.) 

1. Petitioner’s Declaration

 In his declaration, signed January 23, 2024, petitioner states that about two to three 

months prior, he was referred to his legal assistant by a friend. (ECF No. 40 at 34.) Petitioner 

was informed that the previous persons petitioner paid did not know what needed to be done to 

toll the statute of limitations. Petitioner states he is confused about the legal standard for this 

litigation and could not fill out judicial forms. Petitioner tried to get the Federal Defender’s 

Office to help him. “Everyone was telling what to do, but I just cannot comprehend. That is why 

I dropped out of school, I am ashamed I cannot follow simple instructions.” (Id.) Petitioner 

states that he read the “Due Diligence Statement” several times and believes it is accurate. 

“There are still things I do not understand and never will.” (Id.) He avers that if any one had 

noticed that he was incapable of filling out a court form, his federal petition would have been 

timely filed, provided someone assisted him. (Id.) 

2. Ms. Bryant’s Declaration

Petitioner also provided the declaration of his sister, Rhonda Bryant, attesting to his 

mental health issues beginning when petitioner was 16 and Ms. Bryant was 10. (ECF No. 40 at 

47.) Ms. Bryant states that petitioner was mentally impaired, dropped out of high school, failed 

to get his GED, was paranoid, and at age 18, petitioner suffered a mental breakdown and was 

hospitalized for two weeks in a mental ward where he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. (Id.) 

Ms. Bryant avers that petitioner was able to have a seven year relationship with a girlfriend, but 

because of his mental issues and inability to hold a job, they broke up. During that relationship, 

the girlfriend handled all of the finances and other essential documents. After that split, petitioner 

was homeless for “quite some time,” but eventually secured a job as a day laborer earning 

minimum wage. Ms. Bryant helped petitioner find a place to live, shopped for his groceries, and 

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managed all of petitioner’s finances. In 2002, petitioner applied to receive Social Security 

benefits. (Id.) Eventually, petitioner moved in with his brother, Ricardo, and his wife, Maricela. 

Petitioner worked side jobs with Ricardo, who was a commercial painter. Both Ms. Bryant and 

Ricardo experienced petitioner’s lack of understanding and inability to follow simple instructions; 

Ms. Bryant claims that petitioner’s “understanding of how life works was limited.” (Id.) 

 Finally, petitioner also provided mental health and other records. (ECF No. 40 at 36-214.) 

B. Respondent’s Opposition 

 Respondent contends that petitioner failed to bring his Rule 60(b) motion within a 

reasonable time and has not shown an extraordinary circumstance that warrants relief from the 

judgment. (ECF No. 44 at 4.) Respondent points out that (1) petitioner’s federal petition was 

filed over six years late; (2) when the petition was filed in 2020, petitioner was aware the petition 

was late and set forth four arguments in support of equitable tolling, none of which included his 

mental health issues; (3) petitioner did not raise mental health issues until he did so in conclusory 

fashion in his objections to the recommendations that the petition be dismissed as untimely; 

(4) the district court rejected petitioner’s objections, dismissed the petition as untimely, and 

entered judgment in September 2022; and (5) now that the judgment has been final for well over a 

year, petitioner seeks relief by again raising equitable tolling and submitting additional health 

records. Respondent argues that petitioner’s evidence is not new and was not unknown to 

petitioner before judgment was entered, and therefore his motion was unreasonably delayed and 

fails to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances supporting relief under Rule 60(b). 

Further, respondent argues that petitioner’s reliance on Milam v. Harrington, 2018 WL 

1155969 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2018) is unavailing because in Milam, the extraordinary circumstances 

were that the prisoner’s retained federal habeas counsel failed to defend against the motion to 

dismiss for untimeliness by filing no opposition or objections, despite mental health evidence that 

would have supported an equitable tolling argument. (ECF No. 44 at 4-5.) Respondent argues 

that there were no such procedural defects in this case that would demonstrate extraordinary 

circumstances. (Id. at 5.) 

 Respondent contends the motion to vacate judgment should be denied as untimely and not 

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supported by extraordinary circumstances. 

1. Respondent Contends Additional Records Insufficient 

Nevertheless, even if the Court considers petitioner’s motion, respondent argues that 

petitioner’s additional records demonstrate that “petitioner’s mental health impairments were not 

so severe that he was unable to file a timely federal petition despite his diligence.” (ECF No. 44 

at 5.) 

a. Ms. Bryant’s Declaration

First, respondent argues that Ms. Bryant’s declaration does not show petitioner’s mental 

health status during the relevant limitations period January 15, 2013, through January 14, 2014. 

Second, her declaration does not indicate on what basis petitioner received SSI payments. Third, 

because Ms. Bryant is related to petitioner, respondent contends the declaration is inherently 

biased. (Id. at 6) (citations omitted). Finally, there is no evidence that Ms. Bryant has medical 

expertise to opine as to petitioner’s mental condition and does not have personal knowledge or 

medical expertise to provide evidence as to petitioner’s mental competence during the limitations 

period. (Id. at 7.) 

b. Petitioner’s Additional Mental Health Records

 Further, respondent points out that petitioner was not included in the mental health 

treatment program until November 23, 2013 (ECF No. 40 at 52-53), at which time less than two 

months remained in the limitations period. (ECF No. 44 at 7.) Respondent argues that petitioner 

failed to demonstrate he was reasonably diligent throughout the limitations period, as required 

under Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2020), and presented no evidence of mental 

impairment or other extraordinary circumstance caused his untimeliness during that ten month 

period. (ECF No. 44 at 7.) Further, respondent contends that the additional mental health records 

do not show an extraordinary circumstance made it impossible for petitioner to file during the last 

two months. (Id.) Petitioner was admitted into the mental health program on November 23, 

2013, based on his claim he was suicidal, but he quickly expressed a safety concern based on his 

sex offenses and “feigned being suicidal to secure a safe environment.” (Id. at 8) (citing ECF No. 

40 at 57, 60-62, 68, 71, 75-76, 77.) Respondent argues that these records demonstrate petitioner’s 

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“propensity to exaggerate his circumstances to achieve a desired goal,” and thus “his claim that 

he was so mentally impaired that he was unable to timely file his federal petition should be 

viewed with skepticism.” (ECF No. 44 at 8.) 

Respondent claims that with the exception of a couple of days where petitioner’s insight 

and judgment were limited and his thought process was distracted, (a) petitioner’s other cognitive 

functions were within normal limits; (b) he was oriented and without hallucinations, delusions, or 

psychosis, with linear, organized, and clear thoughts, and normal insight and judgment; 

(c) petitioner reported his medication was working and he was doing fine; and (d) he was housed 

in general population and included at the lowest level of psychiatric care, CCCMS. (ECF No. 44 

at 8) (citing ECF No. 40 at 52-79). Respondent suspects that for the two days when petitioner’s 

insight and judgment were limited and his thought process was distracted it is possible that 

petitioner exaggerated his symptoms to achieve his goal of being housed in a more protective 

environment, or that mental health staff assessed him in that way because they discovered he was 

using the mental health treatment program to secure a more protective environment. (ECF No. 44 

at 9.) In any event, respondent argues that two days of such assessment does not excuse a federal 

petition filed six years too late. Further, respondent points out that the records show petitioner 

had the ability to effectively communicate by writing during this period because he informed a 

clinician that petitioner regularly wrote to his aunt and cousin (ECF No. 40 at 79). (ECF No. 44 

at 9.) 

Respondent contends that the remainder of the mental health records provided by 

petitioner are not relevant because they cover time periods after the limitations period expired. 

(ECF No. 44 at 9) (citing ECF No. 40 at 78-214 (covering the period February 21, 2014 through 

May 2, 2019).) Further, respondent points out that petitioner provided no mental health records 

for May 3, 2019, through November 5, 2020, the date the instant petition was filed, and therefore 

petitioner failed to show he was mentally impaired for the eighteen months prior to the filing of 

this action. (ECF No. 44 at 9.)

Thus, respondent argues that the records provided by petitioner fail to demonstrate his 

diligence, either throughout the running of the limitations period, or for the entire time it took 

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petitioner to file his federal petition. (ECF No. 44 at 9) (citing Smith, 953 F.3d at 582 (finding 

diligence required before, during and after the existence of an “extraordinary circumstance” in 

order to determine whether the extraordinary circumstance actually prevented timely filing)). 

Respondent contends that the two periods of inactivity by petitioner—the first ten months of the 

limitations period and the eighteen months before he filed his federal petition—preclude 

application of equitable tolling. (ECF No. 44 at 9-10.) Further, because petitioner pursues the 

very claim he raised on direct appeal, respondent argues that there is no valid justification for the 

lengthy delay. (Id. at 10) (citations omitted). Finally, respondent points out that the newly 

submitted mental health records demonstrate that petitioner was housed in a mental health crisis 

bed for a short period between December 6 through 10, 2014 (ECF No. 40 at 105) (outside the 

limitations period), and not for the lengthy time he claimed in his objections to the findings and 

recommendations (ECF No. 35 at 8-9). Thus, respondent argues petitioner fails “to show the 

Court’s rejection of his mental health equitable tolling claim was error.” (ECF No. 44 at 10.) 

2. Non-Mental Health Records Exhibit Petitioner’s Ability to Self-Advocate 

 Finally, respondent argues that the petition and its attachments demonstrate petitioner had 

the ability to self-advocate. (ECF No. 44 at 11.) Respondent points to the following: 

(a) Petitioner stated he wrote his attorney numerous times about the appellate record (ECF No. 1 

at 20); (b) Before October 26, 2012 (three months before the limitations period began), petitioner 

wrote appellate counsel asking for his assistance in filing a federal habeas petition and provided 

counsel with forms (ECF No. 1 at 44); (c) On January 6, 2013 (nine days before the limitations 

period began), petitioner wrote another letter to counsel; (d) During the limitations period, 

petitioner wrote at least seven written requests to prison officials (ECF No. 1 at 53-61); (e) The 

federal petition is well articulated, clear, neatly written, and includes an equitable tolling 

argument with four stated reasons, demonstrating petitioner’s ability to prepare and file his own 

federal petition and declaration (ECF No. 1); and (f) Petitioner has written to the Clerk of Court 

(ECF No. 1 at 48). Respondent contends this demonstrates petitioner has not established his 

mental health was so impaired it constitutes extraordinary circumstances that caused his late 

federal petition despite his diligence. (ECF No. 44 at 11.) 

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C. Petitioner’s Reply

Petitioner, through his new legal assistant, now claims that all of petitioner’s legal 

arguments to respondent’s motion to dismiss were “frivolous and without merit,” and petitioner 

was unable to fully comprehend such deficiencies, and unable to comprehend the truth of his 

assistant’s claim that petitioner is well versed in the law. (ECF No. 50 at 7-8.) Petitioner avers 

that he was not capable of writing the declaration submitted with the petition. (Id. at 8.) 

Petitioner cites Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans’ Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990), to support his claim 

that “even non-attorney[s] can create deception and fraud” to unsuspecting laypersons and cause 

them to forfeit constitutional rights. (ECF No. 50 at 8.) Petitioner maintains he was “conned by 

‘jailhouse’ litigators.” (Id. at 9.) Petitioner denies he wrote the letters cited by respondent, 

claiming petitioner “had assistance.” (Id. at 10.) Petitioner did not write the federal petition, his 

legal assistant did. (Id.) 

Petitioner argues that all of his medical records from 2010 to 2019 support his claim that 

he is mentally impaired to a point where he cannot be held accountable for his late filings. (Id. at 

7.) Petitioner contends that his sister’s declaration shows that he “has been mentally impaired at 

least one decade prior to his arrest and conviction.” (ECF No. 50 at 7.) He points out that the 

findings and recommendations confirmed petitioner filed no post-conviction challenges in state 

court. (Id.) Petitioner argues that although petitioner’s TABE reading score was 6.2 in 2016 

(ECF No. 1 at 39), petitioner’s TABE reading score was lower in 2012 (5.1). (ECF No. 50 at 7) 

(citing (ECF No. 40 at 49). Petitioner argues his mental illness has progressed with age, and the 

medical records support his condition. (Id. at 8.) Petitioner also contends that the CDCR “refuses 

to diagnose petitioner’s mental defects,” instead “rely[ing] on a medical evaluation that is over a 

decade old. (Id.) Petitioner explains that he received SSI payment “because he is impaired to a 

point of being dysfunctional.” (Id.) He quit going to “mental health” because all they did was 

medicate him, and no therapy or counseling is provided unless you are in crisis mode. (Id. at 10.) 

 Finally, petitioner argues that two Supreme Court cases fully support petitioner’s 

allegations. (ECF No. 50 at 12) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Matthews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). Petitioner contends mental illness and/or impairment give 

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rise to equitable tolling. (ECF No. 50 at 12) (citing Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 

2007); Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)). Mental 

illness is a justifiable excuse for untimely filing in federal court. (ECF No. 50 at 12) (citing 

Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2000); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d 

Cir. 2000)). Mental impairment has been considered an extraordinary circumstance beyond a 

prisoner’s control. (ECF No. 50 at 12) (citing Chesbro v. Idaho, 190 F. App’x 538, 539 (9th Cir. 

2006). And petitioner again argues that Milam, 2018 WL 1155969, “completely supports [his] 

plight of being mentally ill and illiterate.” (ECF No. 50 at 12.) 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. No Defect in Prior Federal Proceeding

 A proper Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a habeas action attacks “some defect in the integrity of 

the federal habeas proceedings.” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014). Rule 

60(b)(6) relief is meant to be case-specific, but there are factors that inform the analysis. A party 

seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “must show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the 

reopening of a final judgment.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). Courts also 

consider the petitioner’s exercise of diligence, the interest in finality, delay between the finality of 

the judgment and the Rule 60 motion, the connection between the extraordinary circumstance and 

the judgment the movant wants reopened, and comity with state courts. Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 

977, 987 (9th Cir. 2017). A district court’s evaluation of those factors and grant of relief from 

judgment is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Id. at 984. 

 Circumstances warranting Rule 60 relief “occur rarely in the habeas context” and should 

be found “sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice.” Hall, 861 F.3d at 987. 

The rule is ordinarily “to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party 

from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” United States v. Alpine 

Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Petitioner claims that his former legal assistants or jailhouse lawyers rendered deficient 

assistance, and conned petitioner out of his money. Where other inmates fail to provide proper 

legal assistance that results in an adverse ruling, including a finding that a habeas petition is 

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untimely, such actions generally do not provide grounds for equitable tolling. Wallace v. 

Mahanoy, 2 F.4th 133, 150 (3d Cir. 2021) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that he relied on the 

mistaken advice of a fellow inmate in reaching the incorrect conclusion that filing state 

postconviction relief proceedings would reset the federal deadlines; “erroneous legal advice is not 

a basis for invoking equitable tolling”); Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (N.D. Tex. 

1998) (equitable tolling not justified where fellow inmate, who claimed to be a lawyer and former 

law clerk to a federal judge, deceived prisoner by telling him that fellow inmate had prepared and 

filed a petition on prisoner’s behalf and showed prisoner what appeared to be a filed-stamped 

copy of the petition); Mendez v. Artuz, 2000 WL 991336 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (fellow inmate’s 

inaccurate legal advice did not excuse prisoner from complying with statute of limitations); cf.

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (reliance on allegedly incompetent 

jailhouse lawyer not cause for procedural default). 

The Court is not persuaded that petitioner’s prior legal assistants’ involvement in pursuing 

habeas relief for petitioner resulted in a defect in the federal habeas proceedings. The Court 

agrees with respondent that petitioner’s reliance on Milam, 2018 WL 1155969, is unavailing 

because there were no procedural defects in this action that demonstrate extraordinary 

circumstances. 

Indeed, contrary to petitioner’s claim that his mental illness has worsened, the mental 

health records provided by petitioner demonstrate his psychotropic medications were 

discontinued on June 22, 2016. (ECF No. 40 at 205.) On January 12, 2017, petitioner’s 

Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type, was noted to be in remission, and his Global Assessment 

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of Functioning (“GAF”) 3 was listed at 70.

4

 (ECF No. 40 at 205.) While not definitive, at that 

time a GAF score of 70 indicated “some mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild 

insomnia) or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school function . . . but generally 

functioning pretty well.” DSM IV-TR at 34. On April 11, 2017, it was recommended that 

petitioner be discharged from the mental health program because he was able to maintain stability 

without psychotropic medications for over six months. (ECF No. 40 at 206.) Further, despite one 

later incident in 2019, which required no change in petitioner’s mental health treatment or 

placement, petitioner was again returned to general population. (ECF No. 40 at 219.) Petitioner 

concedes he achieved a 6.2 reading level in 2016. (ECF No. 40 at 24.) 

Petitioner’s new legal assistant argues that petitioner is “mentally incompetent to 

comprehend, articulate, and follow simple directions.” (ECF No. 40 at 25.) But the record 

reflects that petitioner was able to obtain assistance, even though petitioner’s current legal 

assistant disputes the quality of the assistance provided. Despite that petitioner did not write the 

federal petition and may not have written the letters to his appellate counsel, they demonstrate 

3

 “GAF” is an acronym for “Global Assessment of Functioning,” a scale used by clinicians to 

assess an individual's overall level of functioning, including the “psychological, social, and 

occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” Am. Psychiatric 

Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders with Text Revisions 34 (4th ed. 

2004) (“DSM IV-TR”). A GAF of 61-70 indicates some mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood 

and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school function (e.g., occasional 

truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some 

meaningful interpersonal relationships. Id. A GAF of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., 

flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, 

occupational, or school function (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers.) Id. A 

GAF of 41-50 indicates serious symptoms such as suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, or 

serious impairment in social, work, or school functioning. Id. A GAF of 31-40 indicates: “Some 

impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure, or 

irrelevant) OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, 

judgment, thinking, or mood (e.g., depressed man avoids friends, neglects family, and is unable to 

work; child frequently beats up younger children, is defiant at home, and is failing at school.).” 

Id. A GAF of 21-30 indicates: “Behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or 

hallucinations OR serious impairment in communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes 

incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation) OR inability to function in 

almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day; no job, home, or friends).” Id. 

4

 This further rebuts petitioner’s claim in his objections that he did not regain his mental health 

until July of 2019. (ECF No. 35 at 18; 38 at 3.) 

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petitioner’s ability to seek and obtain assistance. In addition, petitioner provided copies of 

numerous administrative requests he submitted throughout 2013 (ECF No. 1 at 53-61), which also 

demonstrate petitioner’s ability to self-advocate, even while he was receiving mental health care 

at the CCCMS level and taking psychotropic medications. Further, the record reflects that on 

February 21, 2014, petitioner reported he regularly wrote to his aunt and cousin, and on August 

14, 2015, he was attending school daily, and denied he had problems concentrating in class. 

(ECF No. 40 at 78, 167.) Finally, by January 12, 2017, petitioner’s GAF was 70, and his TABE 

score was 6.2. (ECF No. 40 at 205.) None of the records provided by petitioner demonstrate that 

petitioner’s mental health status declined after January 12, 2017; rather, he was released from the 

CDCR MHSDS on April 11, 2017, and is no longer taking psychotropic medications. 

The motion to vacate was filed over a year and four months after judgment was entered. 

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that an unjustified delay of just two years between the entry 

of judgment and the filing of a motion for relief is unreasonable. See, e.g., Burton v. Spokane 

Police Dept., 473 F. App’x 731 (9th Cir. 2012) (lapse of almost two years between judgment and 

filing of 60(b)(6) motion was unreasonable); In re Hammer, 940 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(bankruptcy court did not abuse discretion in concluding that unexcused two year delay before 

filing motion for relief from default judgment was unreasonable); see also Morse-Starrett 

Products Co. v. Steccone, 205 F.2d 244, 249 (9th Cir. 1953) (unexplained 22-month delay in 

filing motion for relief was unreasonable). As argued by respondent, petitioner did not bring his 

motion for relief under Rule 60(b) within a reasonable time and does not demonstrate 

extraordinary circumstances support his belated motion for relief from judgment. 

The Court recommends that petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment (ECF No. 40) be 

denied. 

B. There Remains No Basis for Equitable Tolling 

 Even assuming, arguendo, that petitioner brought his motion within a reasonable time, the 

records provided by petitioner fail to demonstrate, as discussed below, that petitioner’s mental 

health was so impaired throughout the limitations period that it constitutes extraordinary 

circumstances that caused his late federal petition despite his diligence. 

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 1. Governing Standards 

The Ninth Circuit has articulated a specific, two-part test for an equitable tolling claim 

based on a petitioner’s mental impairment:

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an 

“extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control by demonstrating 

the impairment was so severe that either

(a) petitioner was unable to rationally or factually understand 

the need to timely file, or

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to 

prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims 

to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental 

impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the 

totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access 

to assistance.

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (italics in original). 

“This reiterates the stringency of the overall equitable tolling test: the mental impairment must be 

so debilitating that it is the but-for cause of the delay, and even in cases of debilitating 

impairment the petitioner must still demonstrate diligence.” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 

1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100). 

 The Ninth Circuit provided guidance for applying its two-part test:

[T]o evaluate whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the 

district court must: (1) find the petitioner has made a non-frivolous 

showing that he had a severe mental impairment during the filing 

period that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing; 

(2) determine, after considering the record, whether the petitioner 

satisfied his burden that he was in fact mentally impaired; 

(3) determine whether the petitioner’s mental impairment made it 

impossible to timely file on his own; and (4) consider whether the 

circumstances demonstrate the petitioner was otherwise diligent in 

attempting to comply with the filing requirements.

Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100-01. 

A petitioner alleging a severe mental impairment during the filing period is not entitled to 

an evidentiary hearing unless he or she makes “a good faith allegation that would, if true, entitle 

him to equitable tolling.” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for 

consideration of whether the petitioner’s delayed filing was “attributable to psychiatric 

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medication which deprived Petitioner of any kind of consciousness” where the petitioner had 

demonstrated “evidence of serious mental illness” by attaching prison psychiatric and medical 

records); see Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100 (remanding where the petitioner was in the lowest 

percentile for verbal IQ, verbal comprehension and working memory, and, according to clinical 

psychologists, was incapable of inferential thinking necessary to complete a federal habeas form); 

see also Orthel v. Yates, 795 F.3d 935, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Where the record is amply 

developed, and where it indicates that the petitioner’s mental incompetence was not so severe as 

to cause the untimely filing of his habeas petition, a district court is not obligated to hold 

evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual record, notwithstanding a petitioner’s 

allegations of mental incompetence.”) (quoting Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 

2010).) 

 2. Newly Submitted Records 

With his motion to vacate, petitioner provided the Court with additional mental health and 

other records from the CDCR. (ECF No. 40 at 49-214.) Accordingly, the Court reviews the 

records in detail to see whether or not they are sufficient, on their own, to indicate whether 

petitioner’s mental impairment was so severe as to be the but-for cause of the untimely filing of 

his habeas petition. Orthel, 795 F.3d at 939-40. Although the limitations period is the focus of 

petitioner’s claim to equitable tolling, the Court also reviews the records preceding and following 

the limitations period for context.

a. Records Prior to Incarceration 

Petitioner provided the declaration of petitioner’s sister, but respondent is correct that 

there is no evidence that Ms. Bryant has the medical expertise necessary to comment on 

petitioner’s mental health issues. However, she can attest to witnessing petitioner placed in a 

mental ward at Sequoia Hospital in Redwood City when petitioner was 18. (ECF No. 40 at 47.) 

She knew petitioner, at age 19, had a seven year relationship with a girlfriend until they split. 

After a period of homelessness, Ms. Bryant declared petitioner secured a job as a day laborer 

earning minimum wage, and she helped him find a place to live, managed his finances and 

grocery shopped for him. By 2002, Ms. Bryant was still managing petitioner’s finances, and he 

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applied for Social Security benefits. At some point, petitioner moved in with his brother, 

Ricardo, who was a commercial painter, and petitioner would work side jobs with Ricardo. 

Petitioner lived with Ricardo until his arrest and incarceration in 2010. (Id.) 

Petitioner was represented by counsel at trial and on appeal. (ECF No. 10.) The limited 

state court records submitted in support of respondent’s motion to dismiss do not mention any

issues related to mental health, mental incompetency, illiteracy, or inability of petitioner to 

comprehend. (ECF Nos. 10-2 (state appellate court’s July 19, 2012 decision affirming criminal 

judgment), and 10-4 (petition for review).) 

b. Post Incarceration Records

Petitioner was incarcerated on April 19, 2011.5 Petitioner was not admitted to the CDCR 

MHSDS until late 2013. 

During the Statute of Limitations Period: Jan. 15, 2013 - Jan. 14, 2014 

On November 23, 2013, petitioner was seen for psychiatric evaluation. (ECF No. 40 at 

52.) The psychiatrist diagnosed petitioner with Schizoaffective Disorder -- depressed, found his 

thought process was distractible, his cognition was impaired, and his GAF was 23. (Id. at 52-53.) 

On November 25, 2013, petitioner was placed in the CCCMS level of care in the MHSDS, and by 

then, his GAF was listed as 60, and he was prescribed psychotropic medication, and evaluated for 

suicide risk, finding the risk was low. (Id. at 55, 56-57.) On December 2, 2013, petitioner denied 

he was suicidal, and was recorded as stating “I said I was suicidal but I wasn’t.” (Id. at 76.) On 

December 31, 2013, petitioner was diagnosed with major depression, with a GAF of 65. (Id. at 

69.) Petitioner was again classified as CCCMS, as he had a qualified mental disorder, his GAF 

score was listed as 60, and he was prescribed psychotropic medication. (Id. at 70.) Petitioner’s 

Interdisciplinary Treatment Team (“IDTT”) found petitioner’s continued placement in CCCMS 

was appropriate and he would “be removed from CCCMS when he is 6 months free of 

5

 This information was obtained from the CDCR Inmate Locator website, 

https://apps.cdcr.ca.gov/ciris (accessed August 11, 2024). Courts may take judicial notice of 

public records available on online inmate locators. See United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 

1165 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of Bureau of Prisons’ inmate locator available to the 

public); Foley v. Martz, 2018 WL 5111998, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2018) (taking judicial notice 

of CDCR’s inmate locator).

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medication and [symptoms] of mental illness.” (Id. at 71.) He was prescribed Citalopram and 

Depakote Geodon-Risperdal. (Id.) 

On January 3, 2014, petitioner reported that last November 2013 he was put on suicide 

watch for two days and stated, “I told the doctor that there was a kite out there for a hit list, the 

only way I could get out of there was to go suicidal. [W]hen I was 18 I thought I was Jesus b/c of 

some drugs.” (Id. at 77.) Petitioner claimed he had a history of “paranoia. The meds are good 

for controlling my mood swings.” (Id.) Petitioner “denie[d] any significant symptoms of 

depression, mania, psychosis, or anxiety,” and reported “good appetite, concentration [and] 

energy.” (Id.) The psychiatrist found petitioner’s thought process was goal directed without any 

looseness of association or flight of ideas, his thought content included no perceptual disturbances 

and no delusions, and his insight and judgment were good. (Id.) 

After Expiration of the Statute of Limitations Period: Post Jan. 14, 2014 

On February 21, 2014, the psychiatrist diagnosed petitioner with Schizoaffective Disorder, 

and his GAF was listed as 50. (Id. at 78.) That same day, petitioner was seen by a clinical social 

worker (“CSW”). (Id. at 79.) Petitioner reported he was taking his medications and “they’re 

working.” (Id.) He claimed a history of hearing voices but could not state what the voices said; 

he also reported history of depression and anxiety but did not report any major issues at that time. 

(Id.) Petitioner reported that “he maintains contact with his aunt and cousin and writes to them 

regularly.” (Id.) The CSW found petitioner’s “[t]hought content was free of bizarre and 

delusional material, denied ‘AH/VH’ [auditory or visual hallucinations].” The CSW noted 

petitioner’s diagnosis per the Mental Health Tracking System (“MHTS”)6 was “Adjustment 

Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depression,” and his GAF was listed as 60. (Id.) The CSW 

noted they would continue to meet with petitioner on a quarterly or as needed basis. (Id.) 

On March 16, 2014, petitioner reported that “everything is under control. My medication 

is good.” (Id. at 81.) He denied mood swings, racing thoughts, and hallucinations. (Id.) His 

6

 The CDCR used a web-based tool, the Mental Health Tracking System (“MHTS”), to “track 

clinical contacts, referrals, and other data related to the provision of mental health services.” 

Coleman v. Newsom, 424 F. Supp. 925, 942 (E.D. Cal. 2019). 

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TABE score was listed as 5.1. (Id.) On March 17, 2014, the CSW noted petitioner’s diagnosis 

was listed as “Schizoaffective Disorder,” with a GAF of 60. (Id. at 84.) Petitioner’s “thought 

content was free of bizarre and delusional material, denied ‘AH/VH.’ Thought process was clear 

and coherent.” (Id.) On March 18, 2014, psychiatrist Dr. Humeid ordered and reviewed labs 

with petitioner. (Id. at 87-88.) On one progress note, Dr. Humeid diagnosed petitioner with 

Schizoaffective Disorder, current GAF of 62. (Id. at 87.) On a second progress note for the same 

day, Dr. Humeid diagnosed petitioner as having bipolar disorder, current GAF of 63. (Id. at 88.) 

On both forms, Dr. Humeid noted petitioner showed improvement and progress on current 

medications. (Id. at 87-88.) On March 26, 2014, petitioner reported that he takes his medication 

every day and “it helps. I hear voices less than before. I don’t get mood swings. I am not 

suicidal or homicidal.” (Id. at 86.) The psychiatrist found petitioner’s thought processes were 

goal directed, linear and logical and his thought content was well organized. (Id.) There was no 

suicidal ideation, and petitioner’s insight and judgment were good; his TABE score was listed as 

5.1. (Id.) 

On June 10, 2014, the CSW noted (per MHTS) petitioner was diagnosed with 

“Schizoaffective Disorder,” GAF of 60, and his “thought content was free of bizarre and 

delusional material, denied ‘AH/VH.’ Thought process was clear and coherent, judgment/insight: 

intact/ fair.” (Id. at 89.) On July 8, 2014, petitioner reported “I take my meds, it helps. I don’t 

hear voices now. I don’t get mood swings now. I am not suicidal or homicidal.” (Id. at 90.) The 

psychiatry progress note reported that petitioner had no hallucinations or psychosis, his mood was 

stable, and his insight and judgment were good. (Id.) His TABE score was 5.1. (Id.) 

On July 14, 2014, petitioner received a rules violation report for refusing to provide a 

urine sample. (Id. at 149, 181.) Petitioner was seen on August 12, 2014, October 6, 2014, and 

October 20, 2014, and his diagnosis remained Schizoaffective disorder, GAF of 60 (per MHTS), 

and the CSW found petitioner’s thought content to be free of bizarre and delusional material, 

petitioner denied having auditory or visual hallucinations, his thought process was clear and 

coherent, and his judgment/insight was fair. (Id. at 91, 92, 93-94, 96-97.) 

On December 6, 2014, petitioner was admitted to a mental health crisis bed on suicide 

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precaution in the Correctional Treatment Center; his GAF was 25 and he was prescribed 

psychotropic drugs. (Id. at 99-101.) Petitioner was housed in the crisis bed for six days; on 

discharge, his diagnosis remained Schizoaffective Disorder, with a GAF score of 50. (Id. at 105.) 

On December 8, 2014, the IDTT found that petitioner “requires highly structured inpatient 

psychiatric care with 24-hour nursing supervision due to a major mental disorder; serious to 

major impairment of functioning in most life areas; ritualistic or repetitive self-injurious/suicidal 

behavior; or refractory psychiatric symptoms.” (Id. at 123.) Prior to this crisis bed placement, 

the record noted that petitioner had reported to clinic “presenting with self-report of suicidal 

ideation without a plan, anxiety, hopelessness/ helplessness, and voices telling him to ‘end my 

life, just do it.’” (Id.) Petitioner also stated: “I think I need a lot more help, I can’t express how I 

feel, I feel down and out, I don’t want to live, I need some counseling. I want to be in EOP.” 

(Id.) The IDTT noted that petitioner’s “claims appear to be an attempt to deal with safety 

concerns,” and he was not referred to EOP at that time. (Id.) 

On December 8, 2014, the psychologist listed petitioner’s diagnosis as Schizoaffective, 

Bipolar Type, GAF 25. (Id. at 129.) Petitioner was feeling depressed, but denied current suicidal 

ideation; reported auditory hallucinations, but none in the last two days. (Id.) Petitioner showed 

“no delusional thought process but acknowledged moderate paranoia related to being imprisoned 

and charged with sexual offenses. (Id.) Insight and judgment were both noted as limited. (Id.) 

On December 8, 2014, the psychiatrist’s note recorded petitioner as stating “I have safety 

concerns in the yard. Medication works. I feel depressed.” (Id. at 131.) On December 9, 2014, 

the psychiatrist listed petitioner’s diagnosis as Schizoaffective, Bipolar Type, GAF of 25, and 

noted “consider change of diagnosis upon discharge.” (Id. at 136.) The psychiatrist’s assessment 

was “[v]eracity of [auditory hallucinations] in question, as [petitioner] admits it is his own voice 

that he hears in his head. High potential for exaggerating symptoms due to safety concerns 

related to his controlling offenses.” (Id.) Petitioner’s TABE score of 5.1 was noted. (Id. at 131, 

136, 137.) Petitioner “received passing score on cognitive test,” diagnosis mood disorder not 

otherwise specified, and current GAF of 27. (Id. at 137.) Petitioner was oriented, his thought 

process was “illogical, but goal directed,” his thought content was noted as “paranoid ideations 

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present, but not grossly delusional, has occasional AH, has history of AH since age 18, no VH,” 

his cognition was normal, mood mildly depressed, affect was mood congruent; and insight and 

judgment were both limited. (Id. at 138.) 

On December 10, 2014, petitioner was discharged from the mental health crisis bed, 

remaining in the CCCMS level of mental health care, psychotropic medications prescribed, with a 

current GAF score of 55. (Id. at 140.) During the five day follow-up, mental health staff noted 

petitioner was not suicidal, was attending to his activities of daily living, and on December 12, 

2014, he reported he was “good,” and was reading a book at the time of contact. (Id. at 145.) 

On December 16, 2014, mental health staff noted petitioner was cooperative, his “thoughts 

appeared rational, non-delusional, and non-bizarre,” his memory was intact, insight and judgment 

were fair. (Id. at 147-48.) His diagnosis was listed as Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type by 

history, GAF of 60. (Id.) On December 23, 2014, the mental health treatment plan listed 

petitioner’s two problems: depression and psychosis (AH). (Id. at 144, 149.) Petitioner was 

prescribed Depakote for mood instability and Risperdal for psychosis and remained at the 

CCCMS level of care. (Id. at 149, 152.) 

After Expiration of the Statute of Limitations Period: 2015 Records

On March 4, 2015, mental health staff performed a ninety day suicide risk evaluation, 

finding petitioner was at low risk. (Id. at 155.) His “thoughts appeared rational, non-delusional, 

and non-bizarre,” his memory was intact, insight and judgment were fair. (Id. at 156.) His 

diagnosis remained Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type by history, GAF of 60. (Id.) On 

March 16, 2015, petitioner’s psychiatrist noted that petitioner’s thought process was “goal 

directed without any looseness of associations or flight of ideas, and his thought content included 

“no perceptual disturbances and no delusions.” (Id. 159-60.) Petitioner reported no auditory 

hallucinations for over a year. (Id. at 159.) 

On May 16, 2015, petitioner was seen by his psychiatrist for follow-up; petitioner reported 

he felt good, and the medication works well, denied any suicidal ideation, mood swings or racing 

thoughts. (Id. at 161.) The psychiatrist noted petitioner’s thought process was linear and logical, 

he had no delusions, hallucinations or psychosis, and his diagnosis as Schizoaffective Disorder, 

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GAF 50. (Id. at 161-62.) He was prescribed Risperdal and Depakote. (Id. at 161.) 

On May 28, 2015, August 14, 2015, and September 3, 2015, petitioner’s evaluation and 

diagnosis remained the same, and the GAF was listed as 60. (Id. at 165, 167, 170.) On August 

14, 2015, petitioner reported that he goes to school daily, denied problems with his concentration 

in class, and kept in touch with his cousin and aunt. (Id. at 167.) On September 13, 2015, 

petitioner was seen by the psychiatrist, who noted the same diagnosis, but a GAF of 58. (Id. at 

171.) Petitioner’s thought process was linear and goal-directed, no hallucinations, paranoia, or 

delusions, his insight and judgment were both good, and his cognition was “grossly intact,” and 

petitioner was still taking Depakote and Risperdal. (Id. at 172.) 

On December 2, 2015, petitioner was evaluated for suicide risk and found the risk 

remained low. (Id. at 173-74.) Petitioner reported some “ongoing occasional anxiety, which 

appears to be due to his controlling offense and status as a sex offender.” (Id. at 174.) The CSW 

noted petitioner’s attention and concentration appeared normal, his thought content was free of 

bizarre and delusional material, his thought process was clear and coherent, and he denied 

AH/VH. (Id.) The MHTS reflected the same diagnosis, Schizoaffective Disorder, and his GAF 

was 60. (Id. at 176.) 

On December 8, 2015, petitioner’s IDTT performed an annual review of petitioner’s 

mental health treatment plan and determined that petitioner did not need highly structured 

inpatient psychiatric care and “unanimously agreed that there is no indication for a higher level of 

care at this time.” (Id. at 181.) Petitioner was currently prescribed Depakote and Risperdal. (Id.) 

It was determined that petitioner should remain at the CCCMS level of mental health care. (Id. at 

181-87.) His diagnosis remained Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type, GAF of 60. (Id. at 

182.) 

On December 17, 2015, petitioner remained on the same psychiatric medications, and 

acknowledged he was taking his medications, was okay, and denied having any new problems. 

(Id. at 189.) He denied having mood swings. (Id.) The psychiatrist noted that petitioner’s 

thought process was linear and goal-directed, he had no auditory or visual hallucinations, 

paranoia or delusions, his insight was good, his judgment was limited, and his cognition was 

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grossly intact. (Id.) 

On December 30, 2015, petitioner received a rules violation for possession of inmate 

manufactured alcohol. (Id. at 195.) The Rules Violation Report: Mental Health Assessment 

form included the following: 

Are there any mental health factors that would cause the inmate to 

experience difficulty in understanding the disciplinary process and 

representing higher interests in the hearing that would indicate the 

need for assignment of a staff assistant? 

The inmate has a TABE score of 5.5 and has had several 115 hearings 

in the past; therefore, he is experienced in the disciplinary process 

and is easily able to articulate his interests. The inmate does not 

display or endorse any developmental disability/cognitive or 

adaptive functioning deficits. 

(Id. at 195.) The CSW also noted that petitioner’s “behavior was not influenced by his mental 

illness, and he has been adequately coping with his reported mental health symptoms for several 

years at the CCCMS level of care.” (Id. at 199.) It was recommended that if petitioner was found 

guilty, he be allowed to maintain his property, including his books, and a TV or radio to help 

maintain his mental health stability. (Id.) 

After Expiration of the Statute of Limitations Period: 2016 Records

On February 29, 2016, the psychiatrist noted petitioner’s “thought content was free of 

bizarre and delusional material, does not report AH/VH. Thought process was clear and coherent. 

Judgment/Insight: Intact/Fair.” (Id. at 191.) Diagnosis was Schizoaffective Disorder, GAF of 

60. (Id.) As of April 4, 2016, petitioner’s psychotropic medications were Risperdal and 

Depakote. (Id. at 194.) On May 26, 2016, the psychiatrist completed a mental heath referral 

chrono noting that petitioner wanted off his medications. (Id. at 192.) Petitioner’s psychotropic 

medications were discontinued on June 22, 2016. (Id. at 205.) 

After Expiration of the Statute of Limitations Period: 2017 Records

On January 12, 2017, the CSW noted petitioner’s request to be discharged from CCCMS 

because he had been stable without psychotropic medications. (Id. at 205.) He had an IDTT 

meeting on December 6, 2016, but was not discharged at that time because it had not been six 

months since medications were discontinued, but he would be scheduled for another IDTT to 

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address whether discharge from the MHSDS would be appropriate. (Id.) Petitioner denied 

hallucinations or suicidal ideation, and his thoughts appeared rational, nondelusional and 

nonbizarre. (Id.) His diagnosis was listed as Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type by history – 

in remission, GAF of 70, and TABE 6.2. (Id.) 

On April 11, 2017, petitioner’s mental health IDTT recommended discharging petitioner 

from the MHSDS because he was able to maintain stability without psychotropic medications for 

over six months. (Id. at 206.) His thought process was noted as “linear/goal directed,” and his 

thought content was “appropriate to situation,” his insight was noted as “understands problems or 

need for treatment,” and his judgment was “good/sound.” (Id. at 207.) His intellectual 

functioning appeared “average intelligence.” (Id.) 

After Expiration of the Statute of Limitations Period: 2019 Records

On April 30, 2019, petitioner was referred to mental health by custody because petitioner 

appeared anxious/nervous. (Id. at 214.) Petitioner was previously seen on April 24, 2019, after 

he reported suicidality following “a bad day,” but was no longer feeling suicidal and was feeling a 

bit better. (Id.) Petitioner was under more stress lately and having difficulties sleeping. (Id.) 

The psychologist noted that there was no evidence of loosening of associations, cognitive 

disorganization or racing thoughts, delusions, or significant paranoia. (Id.) She noted petitioner’s 

thinking was goal-directed and his thought content was within normal limits, his judgment and 

insight were adequate. (Id.) Petitioner was continued at the general population level of care. 

(Id.) 

 3. Discussion

 Review of petitioner’s mental health records demonstrate that he suffered from serious 

mental health symptoms toward the end of the limitations period, in late 2013. Petitioner was 

diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder - Depressed and was prescribed psychotropic 

medications. There is, however, some question as to the severity of petitioner’s symptoms at that 

time, given mental health professional’s concerns that petitioner might have been exaggerating 

his symptoms due to his safety concerns based on his sex offender status, as well as petitioner’s 

later concession that he claimed to be suicidal but was not. 

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In order to obtain equitable tolling, petitioner must demonstrate that his mental illness 

made it impossible for him to file his habeas petition. Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100-01. Here, there is 

no competent evidence that petitioner suffered from a severe mental illness that was the but-for 

cause of his failure to file his federal habeas petition during the first ten months of the limitations 

period. By November 23, 2013, 312 days of the limitations period had expired, and petitioner 

was not yet placed in the CDCR’s MHSDS. 

Once petitioner was evaluated, he was placed in the CCCMS level of mental health care, 

where he remained until he was discharged from the MHSDS on April 11, 2017. “[A]ssignment 

to the CCCMS level of care suggests that petitioner was able to function despite his mental 

problems.” Washington v. McDonald, No. 2010 WL 1999469, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010), 

report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1999465 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2010). This is 

because “[t]he CCCMS level of care is for inmates whose symptoms are under control or in 

partial remission and can function in the general prison population, administrative segregation, or 

segregated housing units.” Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 903 n.24 (E.D. 

Cal. 2009). 

In addition, although petitioner had a GAF of 23 at the time he presented on November 

23, 2013, two days later, his GAF was listed as 60, reflecting only moderate symptoms.7 Indeed, 

7

 In 2013, the American Psychiatric Association discontinued use of the GAF scale, noting its 

“conceptual lack of clarity” and “questionable psychometrics in routine practice.” Am. 

Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 16 (5th ed. 2013). But 

the Ninth Circuit continues to review GAF scores as a “rough estimate of an individual’s 

psychological, social and occupational functioning used to reflect the individual’s need for 

treatment.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1003 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (finding 

GAF scores are relevant in assessing social security disabilities); see also Dowdy v. Curry, 617 F. 

App’x 772 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s denial of equitable tolling, finding that 

“medication adequately controlled Dowdy’s mental impairment” during the relevant time frame, 

and his GAF score “indicated only moderate symptoms of impairment.”) Other district courts in 

the Ninth Circuit consider GAF scores in deciding whether to grant equitable tolling based on 

mental impairment. See, e.g., Aubrey v. Biter, 2019 WL 994399 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2019) 

(finding prisoner was not entitled to equitable tolling despite schizoaffective disorder diagnosis, 

where GAF scores from 51-60 reflected moderate symptoms, and psychotropic medications 

improved the prisoner’s symptoms); Caetano v. Sexton, 2018 WL 585602, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 

29, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 10456558 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2018) 

(finding prisoner not entitled to equitable tolling despite chronic paranoid schizophrenia 

diagnosis, where all but two GAF scores were between 55 and 67 and prisoner’s mental health 

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for most of the time during his CCCMS placement, his GAF score was in the moderate range. 

GAF scores are not dispositive, but petitioner’s GAF scores do not demonstrate that he was so 

impaired that he could not understand the need to seek habeas relief and to take steps to seek 

habeas relief. Aubrey v. Biter, 2019 WL 994399, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2019) (finding 

prisoner was not entitled to equitable tolling despite schizoaffective disorder diagnosis, where 

GAF scores from 51-60 reflected moderate symptoms, and psychotropic medications improved 

the prisoner’s symptoms); Sigmon v. Kernan, 2009 WL 1514700 at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2009) 

(finding GAF scores between 55 and 66 “indicate only mild to moderate impairment” and do not 

provide a basis for equitable tolling); Lawless v. Evans, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 

2008) (finding claim for equitable tolling based on mental incompetence not supported by GAF 

score of 65). The two day period petitioner’s GAF score was 23 would not be sufficient for 

tolling purposes given the lengthy delay at issue here. 

 Moreover, throughout his CCCMS placement, most of the records indicate petitioner’s 

thoughts were linear and logical, his thought processes were well organized, and he was not 

delusional or hallucinating. Petitioner noted that he regularly wrote to his aunt and cousin, and at 

one point the mental health clinician noted petitioner was reading when approached at his cell, 

and another clinician insisted that petitioner be allowed to bring his books and TV with him if he 

was found guilty of a rules violation and placed in administrative segregation. These records 

clearly demonstrate that petitioner’s mental illness was not so severe that it prevented petitioner 

from filing a timely federal habeas petition or seeking assistance in doing so. See, e.g., Yeh, 751 

F.3d at 1078 (although prisoner had history of mental illness, it was not severe enough to cause 

his delay because he repeatedly “sought administrative and judicial remedies, and throughout 

these proceedings showed an awareness of basic legal concepts”).

 On one occasion, after the limitations period had run, petitioner was admitted to a mental 

health crisis bed on suicide precaution for six days, with a GAF of 25. (ECF No. 40 at 99-105.) 

By December 10, 2014, when he was discharged from the crisis bed back to the CCCMS level of 

status continued to improve after limitations period expired.) 

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care, his GAF had returned to 55. (Id. at 140.) 

 Further, the records reflect no suicide attempts; rather, the records reflect that on the two 

occasions when petitioner reported he had suicidal thoughts, he sought mental health care. 

Although petitioner did not have a high school education, and his early TABE score was 5.1, the 

mental health records noted petitioner’s cognition was normal or grossly intact. (Id. at 138, 172, 

189.) A pro se petitioner’s illiteracy is not an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to justify 

equitable tolling. Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding prisoner’s 

second grade education and low level intelligence did not constitute “a mental impairment that 

made it impossible to meet the filing deadlines under the totality of the circumstances, including 

reasonably available access to assistance.”), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1109 (2013). 

After carefully considering the record, for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that 

petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling during the limitations period based on mental illness. 

While petitioner demonstrated that he suffered from a serious mental illness during the limitations 

period, he failed to show that such illness made it impossible to meet the deadline under the 

totality of circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance. See Bills, 628 F.3d 

at 1100; Smith, 953 F.3d at 582. 

In any event, petitioner did not file the instant habeas petition until November 2020, six

years after the statute of limitations had expired. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate his 

diligence throughout the entire time it took petitioner to file his federal petition. See Smith, 953 

F.3d at 582 (finding diligence required before, during and after the existence of an “extraordinary 

circumstance”). Thus, even assuming petitioner’s Schizoaffective Disorder and subsequent 

addition of Bipolar Type diagnosis precluded his timely filing within the limitations period or 

even through the duration of his placement in the CCCMS level of care, the records demonstrate 

that this accounts for only a portion of the six years it took petitioner to file his federal petition. 

Petitioner was successfully taken off psychotropic medications on June 22, 2016, and his mental 

illness went into remission by January 12, 2017. Petitioner was discharged from the MHSDS on 

April 11, 2017. By then, his GAF was 70, and the IDTT found petitioner’s thought process was 

linear/goal directed, his thought content was appropriate to situation, his judgment was 

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good/sound, and his insight was noted as “understands problems or need for treatment.” (ECF 

No. 40 at 207.) The IDTT noted petitioner’s intellectual functioning “appeared average 

intelligence.” (Id.) Therefore, petitioner failed to demonstrate his diligence during the three and 

a half years that it took petitioner to file his federal petition once his mental illness was in 

remission and he was removed from the MHSDS. 

Accordingly, even if petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment was timely filed, the Court 

concludes that petitioner’s mental health was not so impaired throughout the limitations period or 

during the subsequent period after petitioner’s mental illness was in remission and he was 

discharged from the MHSDS that it constitutes extraordinary circumstances that caused his late 

federal petition despite his diligence. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to equitable tolling for 

the lengthy delay in bringing his federal habeas petition.

C. No Evidentiary Hearing Required 

The Court finds that the record is sufficiently developed with regard to petitioner’s mental

impairments for the Court to make a recommendation regarding equitable tolling, as petitioner 

has filed petitioner’s mental health records for the relevant time period. See Roberts, 627 F.3d at 

773 (petitioner’s “extensive medical records” was an amply developed record upon which district 

court could find an evidentiary hearing unnecessary). Thus, no evidentiary hearing is required. 

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s motion to vacate 

judgment (ECF No. 40) be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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Dated: August 13, 2024

/1/meza2316.60b

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