Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00512/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00512-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clyde T. Gambles
Petitioner
K. Prosper
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLYDE T. GAMBLES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-0512 LKK EFB P

vs.

K. PROSPER, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner without counsel seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254. On February 10, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. This action was

transferred to this court on March 16, 2005. Respondent moves to dismiss on the ground the

petition is untimely. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling because his legal

papers were lost in June 2004. For the reasons explained below, the court finds that the petition

is untimely.

I. Procedural History

On March 20, 2000, petitioner was convicted of robbery, false imprisonment by violence,

and assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to serve 15 years in prison. Cal. Pen. Code

§§ 211, 236, 24(a)(2). Petitioner appealed and the judgment was affirmed in its entirety on April 

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15, 2002. Ex. A. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, but that

court denied review on May 22, 2002. Exs. C, D. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the trial court on May 6, 2003. Ex. E. That court denied the writ on June 4, 2003. Ex.

F. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court (case

number S117681) on July 24, 2003. Ex. G. That court denied the writ on March 30, 2004. 

Petitioner returned to the trial court with a habeas petition on January 10, 2005, challenging his

sentence under the newly-decided case of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004)

(state court’s imposition of sentence beyond statutory maximum based on fact, other than prior

conviction, violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial). Ex. I. On March 21,

2005, petitioner filed a habeas petition containing his Blakely challenge in the state appellate

court. Ex. K. That court denied relief on March 25, 2005. Ex. L. On April 22, 2005, petitioner

filed a habeas petition raising his Blakely claim in the California Supreme Court. Ex. M. That

court denied the writ on March 15, 2006. Ex. N.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on February 10, 2005.

II. Standards

A one-year limitation period for seeking federal habeas relief begins to run from the

latest of: the date the judgment became final on direct review; the date on which a state-created

impediment to filing is removed; the date the United States Supreme Court makes a new rule

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or the date on which the factual predicate

of a claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1). The judgment on direct review becomes final when the 90-day limit for filing a

petition for certiorari expires. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). The period is

not tolled “from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal [to] the time the first

state collateral challenge is filed.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, a properly filed state post-conviction application tolls the statute of limitations. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In California, a properly filed post-conviction application is “pending”

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during the intervals between a lower court’s decision and the filing of a new petition in a higher

court. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). Petitioner has the burden of establishing

entitlement to tolling. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814-15 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A court may grant equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States

District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). “When external forces,

rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999). These circumstances must actually cause the untimeliness. Spitsyn v. Moore,

345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner has the burden of showing facts entitling him to

equitable tolling. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. Analysis

Since the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for review on May 22,

2002, and petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, his

conviction became final on August 20, 2002. He therefore had until August 20, 2003, to file a

federal habeas petition. Absent tolling, petitioner’s February 10, 2005, petition is nearly one and

one-half years late. However, plaintiff is entitled to 329 days of statutory tolling, from May 6,

2003, until March 30, 2004, based on the habeas petitions he filed in the trial court and in the

California Supreme Court shortly after his conviction was final. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

214, 223 (2002). Therefore, petitioner had to file his federal habeas petition no later than July

14, 2004. Even with this tolling period, the petition is six months and 27 days late.

The petitioner’s subsequent state petitions raise the question of whether there is a further

period of tolling. Respondent asserts that petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for his

January 10, 2005, and April 22, 2005, state-court habeas petitions because they constitute a

“second round” of state post-conviction relief. California prisoners are entitled to statutory

tolling while they properly pursue one “full round” of state post-conviction remedies. Carey,

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536 U.S. at 223. In California, a full round of review ordinarily begins when the petitioner files

a petition in the state court following the completion of direct review, and ends when the

California Supreme Court denies a petition. Carey, 536 U.S. at 220, 223. Applying these

principles, petitioner’s first full round began when he filed his May 6, 2003, petition in the trial

court, and concluded when the California Supreme Court issued its March 30, 2004, order

denying relief. Furthermore, the limitation period expired July 14, 2004, well before January 10,

2005, when petitioner filed his second habeas petition in the trial court. Therefore, even if the

second petition in the trial court and in the California Supreme Court somehow are not a “second

round” for purposes of Carey, they provide no basis for statutory tolling of an already expired

limitations period. See Fergusun v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (section

2244(d) does not permit re-initiation of the limitation period when it expires before a state

petition for post-conviction relief was filed). Therefore, petitioner’s federal habeas petition must

be dismissed as untimely unless he can demonstrate he is entitled to equitable tolling.

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling because, 

In the process of inmate property procedure all legal documents and transcripts

belonging to petitioner were lost and never recovered during the month of June

2004. Staff and petitioner’s attempt to retrieve legal documents and transcripts

were to no avail. 

Pet’r Opp’n at 1. A prisoner may be entitled to equitable tolling if prison officials deny him

access to his legal papers. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for

district court to determine whether equitable tolling warranted where prison denied petitioner

access to legal papers). As stated above, petitioner had until July 14, 2004, to file a federal

habeas petition. Therefore, a denial of access to legal papers beginning in June 2004 could be

grounds for equitable tolling. But petitioner’s only evidence is his own declaration stating,

“[O]n June 4, 2004, petitioner’s property containing his legal documents and transcripts were

misplaced during an ‘inmate property transfer.’ Correctional staff and petitioner’s attempts to

relocate legal documents and transcripts were to no avail.” Pet’r Opp’n, Ex. A. There is no

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evidence as to what petitioner did to obtain his legal materials or when they were returned to

him. Without evidence on these questions, the court cannot find that the loss of his papers

caused petitioner to be unable to file his petition despite exercising diligence. Nor can the court

determine the amount of tolling to which he would be entitled. Accordingly, petitioner has not

demonstrated that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

For all the reasons stated, the court finds that petitioner’s habeas petition was filed

beyond the one-year statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that respondent’s April 3, 2006, motion to

dismiss be granted and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 23, 2007.

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