Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02243/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02243-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Ortega
Appellant
George E. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

.. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS . . F I L E D 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT United st•tes Coun of Appeals 

PAUL ORTEGA, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

GEORGE E. SULLIVAN, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Tench Circuit 

JAN ::1 U 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER, 

Clerk 

No. 89-2243 

(O.C. No. 87-493-JC) 

(0. N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, · and SPARR,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Daniel 

District Court for 

designation. · 

B. Sparr, District Judge, 

the District of Colorado, 

United States 

sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner appeals from the district court's denial of 

federal habeas relief, pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2254, from his 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or ~ollateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2243 Document: 010110083589 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 1 
state conviction for shoplifting. Petitioner entered a guilty 

plea to one count of shoplifting in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. 

S 30-16-20A, and the state court sentenced petitioner to eighteen 

months' imprisonment, see N.M. Stat. Ann. SS 30-16-20B(2); 

31-18-15A(4), plus an additional one-year term of imprisonment as 

a second offender under the New Mexico habitual offender statute, 

see N.M. Stat. Ann S 31-18-17B, as well as a mandatory one-year 

parole term to follow his incarceration, see N.M. Stat. Ann. 

SS 31-18-15C; 31-21-lOC. Petitioner asserts that, while the 

state court advised him of the maximum term of incarceration he 

faced as a result of his guilty plea, eighteen months plus one 

year, he was never informed nor was he aware, prior to entering 

his guilty plea, that he would also be subject to the mandatory 

parole term. 

This court reviews the district court's legal determinations 

de novo. Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir. 

1989). The district court's factual determinations, however, will 

not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Id. 

Because petitioner has completely served his prison sentence 

and has completed the mandatory parole term, to the extent that 

petitioner seeks specific performance of the plea agreement, his 

claims are moot. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1982). 

To the extent that petitioner seeks to withdraw his guilty plea, 

however, the merits of those claims are properly before this 

court. Id. at 631-32. 

A valid guilty plea must be intelligent and voluntary. Brady 

v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 n.4 (1970). A plea will not 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2243 Document: 010110083589 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 2 
• 

be knowing and voluntary unless the defendant is aware, at the 

time he enters his plea, of the direct consequences of the plea. 

Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984); Worthen v. Meachum, 

842 F.2d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 1988). A mandatory parole term is 

a direct consequence of a guilty plea. Carter v. McCarthy, 806 

F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 

(1987). 

The parties do not dispute that petitioner was not advised, 

during the plea or the sentencing proceedings, of the mandatory 

parole term. Further, the district court determined that it was 

unnecessary to decide whether, despite the trial court's failure 

to advise petitioner that he would be subject to mandatory parole, 

petitioner was actually aware of the parole term at the time he 

entered his plea. See Worthen, 842 F.2d at 1182. Assuming, 

therefore, that petitioner was unaware of the mandatory parole 

term at the time he entered his plea, petitioner's plea was not 

knowing and voluntary. See Carter, 806 F.2d at 1375-76. Because 

petitioner failed to show, however, that had he been properly 

advised of the mandatory parole term, he would not have pleaded 

guilty, any constitutional error was harmless. See id. at 1377. 

Petitioner was indicted on two counts of shoplifting 

merchandise valued at between $100 and $2,500, see N.M. Stat. Ann. 

S 30-16-20A, B(2), punishable by up to eighteen months' 

imprisonment, see N.M. Stat. Ann. SS 30-16-20B(2); 31-18-15A(4), 

plus an additional mandatory parole term of one year. See N.M. 

Stat. Ann SS 31-18-15C; 31-21-lOC. Because petitioner had 

suffered two prior felony convictions, see Magistrate's Proposed 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-2243 Document: 010110083589 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 3 
' 

• 

Findings and Recommended Disposition, 7-8, petitioner was also 

subject to a four-year sentence enhancement on each shoplifting 

count as an habitual offender. See N.M. Stat. Ann. S 31-18-17C; 

New Mexico v. Harris, 677 P.2d 625, 633 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). Had 

petitioner been convicted on all the indicted charges, therefore, 

he would have been subject to a possible term of up to eleven 

years' imprisonment, see New Mexico v. Mayberry, 643 P.2d 629, 632 

(N.M. Ct. App. 1982)(trial court has discretion to require 

sentences to be served consecutively), plus a one-year mandatory 

parole term. 1 See Brock v. Sullivan, 733 P.2d 860, 862-63 (N.M. 

1987)(under New Mexico law, mandatory parole term commences 

immediately upon completion of the period of incarceration for 

that particular offense; therefore, mandatory parole terms cannot 

be stacked at the end of consecutively running sentences). 

In exchange for petitioner's guilty plea to one of the 

shoplifting charges, the state dismissed the other shoplifting 

charge and treated petitioner as only a second offender for 

purposes of the habitual offender enhancement. See N.M. Stat. 

Ann. S 31-18-17B. By pleading guilty, petitioner was thus able to 

limit the maximum penalty possible upon conviction to eighteen 

months' incarceration, plus a one-year enhancement as an habitual 

offender and a mandatory one-year parole term. 

1 The district court determined 

penalty petitioner faced on the 

imprisonment. Assuming petitioner 

eleven, years' imprisonment, he 

significantly his risk of imprisonment 

plea agreement. 

that the maximum possible 

indictment was seven years' 

faced seven, rather than 

was still able to limit 

through the terms of the 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2243 Document: 010110083589 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 4 
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court 

determined that, even if petitioner had been aware of the 

mandatory parole term, he still would have pleaded guilty in order 

to avoid the possibility of a significantly longer term of 

imprisonment, particularly in light of the applicable habitual 

offender enhancement provisions. Upon review of the record, we 

determine this finding was not clearly erroneous. In light of the 

substantially greater potential punishment petitioner faced upon 

conviction under the two-count indictment as a third-time felony 

offender, petitioner failed to establish sufficient prejudice to 

entitle him to habeas relief. 

Petitioner's petition for a certificate of probable cause is 

GRANTED. The order of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico denying habeas relief is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-2243 Document: 010110083589 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 5