Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00887/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00887-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martin Biter
Defendant
D. Davey
Defendant
Scott Kerman
Defendant
S. Lopez
Defendant
Antoine Slaughter
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTOINE SLAUGHTER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MARTIN BITER, et al., 

Defendants.

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1:14cv00887 DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 

Plaintiff Antoine Slaughter (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action. Plaintiff filed this action on June 11, 2014. He names Kern 

Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) Warden Martin Biter, KVSP Chief Deputy Warden D. Davey, 

Secretary of Corrections Scott Kerman,1and KVSP Chief Medical Doctor S. Lopez as 

Defendants.2

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

 

1

 Plaintiff spells his last name as “Kerman,” though it appears the correct spelling is “Kernan.” 

2

Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on June 25, 2014.

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legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the 

actions or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat 

superior liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 

(9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

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B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is incarcerated at KVSP in Delano, California, where the events at issue 

occurred.

According to Plaintiff’s allegations and his exhibits, he filed an administrative grievance 

complaining of a toxic amount of arsenic in the drinking water at KVSP on June 6, 2013. As a 

result of the arsenic levels, Plaintiff suffered from severe “circulatory system reactions,” which 

caused shortness of breath, rashes and overwhelming anxiety. 

Plaintiff had been seen by Nurse M. Francis in May 2013, who confirmed the diagnosis 

and referred Plaintiff for further evaluation of stomach pains, headaches and vomiting.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Biter and Davey are legally responsible for the 

operations of KVSP, and for the welfare of all KVSP inmates. He contends that Defendants 

Biter and Davey “made or carried out” a policy or practice that led to a widespread health and 

safety problem. Plaintiff alleges that this problem created an unreasonable risk of serious harm, 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff further alleges that the wrongful actions of Defendants Lopez and Kerman 

deprived him of his right to be free from arsenic. 

C. DISCUSSION

1. Defendants Lopez and Kerman

As noted above, detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

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Here, Plaintiff alleges that the wrongful actions of Defendants Lopez and Kerman 

deprived him of his right to be free from arsenic. He does not include any further allegations 

against them. These conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a claim against either 

Defendant Lopez or Defendant Kerman.

2. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and 

only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are 

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of 

the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison 

officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 

2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 

1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff alleges that his health problems are related to Defendants’ inaction, and that as a 

result of the arsenic levels, he suffered from severe “circulatory system reactions.” These 

reactions caused shortness of breath, rashes and overwhelming anxiety. In support of his 

allegations, he states that Nurse Francis confirmed the diagnosis in May 2013 and referred him 

for further evaluations.

Plaintiff attaches medical records from May 2013, to his complaint. On May 20, 2013, 

Plaintiff asked to be seen because he threw up twice in the morning, and had stomach pain and 

headaches from drinking arsenic water. ECF No. 1, at 14. RN Francis saw Plaintiff on May 20, 

2013, and referred him to “TTA” for further evaluation. ECF No. 1, at 15. A May 21, 2013, 

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progress note states that Plaintiff was seen in TTA for abdominal pain and constipation. Plaintiff 

said all symptoms were resolved. ECF No. 1, at 17.

Plaintiff’s medical records do not show that he was denied the minimal civilized measure 

of life’s necessities, or that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious 

harm. In fact, Plaintiff received treatment for his stomach problems and states that they were 

resolved the next day.

Moreover, there is no indication that Plaintiff’s medical problems, even if severe, were 

caused by the arsenic. Plaintiff’s inmate appeal was submitted in June 2013, apparently after he 

was seen for stomach problems in May 2013. However, while Plaintiff believes that his health 

problems were caused by arsenic in the drinking water, his exhibits show that the levels had been 

in compliance since the beginning of 2013.3 Plaintiff does not appear to allege that the water 

after the beginning of 2013 was non-compliant. Rather, his complaints relate to an alleged delay 

in proper remediation long before his May 2013 medical issue.4 

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any 

doubt resolved in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), but Plaintiff’s claims must be facially 

plausible to survive screening, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to 

reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009). Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet this standard and he therefore fails to state a claim 

under the Eighth Amendment. 

 

3

Plaintiff attaches a March 28, 2013, memorandum written by Defendant Biter. The memo sets forth the 

compliance issues and states that KVSP has been compliant since the beginning of 2013. ECF No. 1, at 13.

4

In explaining why he was dissatisfied with the Second Level response, Plaintiff states that he has been at KVSP 

since May 2010, and that Warden was aware of the contamination was responsible for fixing it. He states that the 

Warden kept changing the projected repair date, which went from June 2010 to October 2011. ECF No. 1, at 10.

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3. Defendants Biter and Davey

Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of 

subordinate employees based on respondeat superior, or vicarious liability. Crowley v. 

Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and 

Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 711 F.3d 941, 

967-68 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 

banc). 

“A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Snow, 681 

F.3d at 989) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 

F.3d at 915-16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal 

participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the 

policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional 

violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 

1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In his complaint, Plaintiff attempts to state a claim against Defendants Biter and Davey 

based on his contention that they “made or carried out” a policy or practice that led to a 

widespread health and safety problem. However, as explained above, Plaintiff fails to state a 

claim under the Eighth Amendment. He is therefore unable to state claim by arguing that 

Defendants Biter and Davey implemented a policy “so deficient that the policy itself is a 

repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” 

Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendants Biter or Davey.

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D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a cognizable claim against any Defendant.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he 

believes, in good faith, he can cure the identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 

1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the 

nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under 

section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under 

the mere theory of respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 

1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). Although accepted as true, the 

“[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . .” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file 

an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order; and

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3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, without 

prejudice, for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2014 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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