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Parties Involved:
Champ Jenkins
Appellant
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

(. ' 

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Statn Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci~cuit 

OCT .. 3 1990 

CHAMP JENKINS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of 

Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-5147 

) (D.C. No. 88-C-677-C) 

) (N.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the district court 

affirming the final decision of the Secretary denying his 

application for Social Security disability benefits filed pursuant 

to 42 u.s.c. §§ 416(1) and 423. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5147 Document: 010110053469 Date Filed: 10/03/1990 Page: 1 
' 

Plaintiff, who was born in 1938 and has a seventh grade 

education, applied for benefits alleging that he was disabled 

because of rheumatoid arthritis and ankylosing spondylitis as of 

October 1, 1985. His application was denied and he requested a 

hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found 

that while plaintiff was suffering from rheumatoid arthritis, his 

condition was not severe enough to meet or equal a listed 

impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 

subpt. P., app. 1 § 1.02. The ALJ then found that plaintiff could 

return to his previous work as a janitor. The Appeals Council 

affirmed and plaintiff appealed to the district court. 

The case was referred to a magistrate, who recommended that 

benefits be awarded. The magistrate found that the Secretary's 

determination that plaintiff's impairment did not meet or equal 

the listed impairment for rheumatoid arthritis was not supported 

by substantial evidence. The district court did not follow the 

magistrate's recommendation, holding that criterion A of section 

1.02 was not met because plaintiff had presented no evidence of a 

significant restriction of function. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in 

finding that he did not meet or equal the listed impairment, the 

Secretary and district court failed to assess his pain and the 

ineffectiveness of his medication, he does not have the residual 

functional capacity (RFC) to perform his past work, and he is 

unable to perform any substantial gainful activity. 

"Our review of social security administration cases is 

usually quite limited. 'The Secretary's decision 

2 

must be 

Appellate Case: 89-5147 Document: 010110053469 Date Filed: 10/03/1990 Page: 2 
' 

sustained if supported by substantial evidence. The reviewing 

court does not weigh the evidence and may not substitute its 

discretion for that of the agency.'" Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d 

706, 710-11 (10th Cir. 1989)(quoting Cagle v. Califano, 638 F.2d 

219, 220 (10th Cir. 198l))(citations omitted). Substantial 

evidence is "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (197l)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. 

v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

"The Secretary has established a five-step sequential 

evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled." 

Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520. The Secretary found that plaintiff was disabled at 

steps one and two in that he was not presently engaged in 

substantial gainful activity and he had a medically severe 

impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 1520(b), (c). 

In step three, the Secretary must determine whether 

plaintiff's impairment is equivalent to one of the listed 

impairments that the Secretary has previously determined are so 

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity pursuant to 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d). Yuckert at 141. In order to be 

adjudged disabled at step three, plaintiff had to meet both 

requirements under the listing: 

A. History of persistent joint pain, swelling, and 

tenderness involving multiple major joints (see 1.00D) 

and with signs of joint inflammation (swelling and 

tenderness) on current physical examination despite 

prescribed therapy for at least 3 months, resulting in 

significant restriction of function of the affected 

joints, and clinical activity expected to last at least 

12 months; and 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-5147 Document: 010110053469 Date Filed: 10/03/1990 Page: 3 
B. Corroboration of diagnosis at some point in time by 

either. 

1. Positive serologic test for rheumatoid factor; or 

2. Antinuclear antibodies; or 

3. Elevated sedimentation rate; or 

4. Characteristic histologic changes in biopsy of 

synovial membrane or subcutaneous nodule (obtained 

independent of Social Security disability evaluation). 

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P., app. 1, § 1.02. The Secretary 

agreed that plaintiff met criterion B because he had shown an 

elevated sedimentation rate. However, the Secretary found that 

plaintiff had not met criterion A. We agree. While plaintiff has 

demonstrated some swelling and tenderness of major joints and some 

decrease in range of motion, he has not shown that this resulted 

in a "significant restriction of function" of those joints. 

Therefore, because plaintiff was not conclusively presumed 

disabled, the Secretary next had to determine under step four 

whether plaintiff could perform his prior work. The ALJ held that 

[a]fter assessing the claimant's remaining capacity for 

work, and the physical and mental demands of the work he 

has done in the past, . claimant has the residual 

functional capacity to do his past relevant work of 

janitor. 

7. The claimant has the residual functional capacity 

to perform work-related activities except for work 

involving heavy exertion on a sustained basis (20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1545). 

8. The claimant's past relevant work as a janitor did 

not require the performance of work-related activities 

precluded by the above limitations (20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1565). 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-5147 Document: 010110053469 Date Filed: 10/03/1990 Page: 4 
9. The claimant's impairments do 

claimant from performing his past 

janitor. 

not prevent the 

relevant work of 

1 ALJ's Decision of January 14, 1988, at 5-6. 

In order to meet his burden of proof at step four, the 

plaintiff must show that he is unable to perform his past relevant 

work. "Past relevant work is defined as work that (1) occurred 

within the past fifteen years (the so-called recency requirement), 

(2) was of sufficient duration to enable the worker to learn to do 

the job (the so-called duration requirement), and (3) was 

substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a)(l986)." 

Jozefowicz v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1987). 

All of plaintiff's prior jobs meet the recency requirement 

having been performed after 1970. He had worked as a dishwasher, 

truck driver, janitor, and at a transmission shop. 

Plaintiff testified that he quit his job at the transmission 

shop in 1975 after about two years because he "couldn't stay on 

the concrete" and his feet and legs were bothering him. He lost 

his next job as a janitor after six months when the store lost its 

contract. He then became a truck driver, but quit that job in 

1983 because he could no longer crawl up on the trailer to tie 

down the loads. His last two jobs were at a restaurant, in 1986 

and 1987. Plaintiff worked as a dishwasher and "tried to clean 

the kitchen up." He was let go from each of those jobs after five 

1 Because the ALJ did not address plaintiff's other prior jobs 

at a transmission shop and as a truck driver, we may assume that 

he determined plaintiff could not return to those jobs. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-5147 Document: 010110053469 Date Filed: 10/03/1990 Page: 5 
or six weeks because he was unable to perform his job duties since 

he had to go home sick three or four hours early "a lot" and 

needed help to do the job. 

Plaintiff's jobs as a dishwasher occurred during his alleged 

disability period. However, work done during that period "may 

show that you are able to do work at the substantial gainful 

activity level." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571. However, prior 

nonsubstantial gainful activity cannot be the basis for a step 

four determination of nondisability. Lauer v. Bowen, 818 F.2d 

636, 641 (7th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff's dishwasher jobs were not 

substantial gainful employment and cannot be considered here. 

Plaintiff's other jobs do meet all criteria for past relevant 

work. 

Once a determination is made that plaintiff has performed 

past relevant work, the ALJ must evaluate whether plaintiff is 

able to perform this work in light of his RFC. RFC is a medical 

assessment of what plaintiff is able to do and encompasses an 

evaluation of plaintiff's physical, mental, and any other 

impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. The ALJ must also 

consider other evidence of limitations including plaintiff's own 

testimony. Martin v. Sullivan, 901 F.2d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff's treating physician stated that plaintiff was 

currently disabled for an indefinite period. However, he could be 

helped with proper long-term treatment and "[i]f he can be 

improved with medication and physical therapy, he could return to 

some gainful employment." Record at 105-06. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-5147 Document: 010110053469 Date Filed: 10/03/1990 Page: 6 
Plaintiff testified he could not stay on his feet, could only 

walk about half a block before stopping to rest, and had problems 

with his hands in that he did not have much grip a lot of times. 

He was in "pretty constant pain" as the arthritis in his spine was 

"real bad." His ability to do things depended a lot on the 

weather. He had bad headaches and got dizzy at least every week. 

Plaintiff later submitted a letter to the Appeals Council stating 

that his vocational rehabilitation counselor had determined that 

he could not be helped and was not able to work at anything. 

The ALJ made no specific finding as to plaintiff's RFC. 

However, by finding that plaintiff could return to his prior work 

as a janitor, he impliedly found that plaintiff had the RFC to 

work and, thereby, rejected the treating physician's opinion that 

plaintiff was disabled. The ALJ gave no "specific, legitimate 

reasons" rejecting the treating physician's opinion. See Byron v. 

Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984). "Unless good cause 

is shown to the contrary, the Secretary must give substantial 

weight to the testimony of the claimant's treating physician." 

Id. The ALJ also found that plaintiff's subjective complaints 

were not credible to the extent alleged, but did not specify what 

aspects were not credible and which were credible. Giving 

substantial weight to the treating physician's opinion, plaintiff 

could only have had minimal, if any, RFC. 

After a determination of RFC is made, the ALJ must then 

evaluate the demands of plaintiff's former work and compare those 

demands with his present abilities. 

F.2d 172, 177 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). 

7 

See Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 

"The ALJ has a duty to fully 

Appellate Case: 89-5147 Document: 010110053469 Date Filed: 10/03/1990 Page: 7 
investigate and make explicit findings as to the physical and 

mental demands of a claimant's past relevant work and to compare 

that with what the claimant herself is capable of doing before he 

determines that she is able to perform her past relevant work." 

Nimick v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 887 F.2d 864, 866 

(8th Cir. 1989)(emphasis in original)(footnote omitted); see also 

Orlando v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1985)("[T]o 

determine that a claimant is unable to return to his former work, 

the administrative law judge must compare the demands of that work 

with the claimant's existing physical abilities"), citing to 

Strittmatter v. Schweiker, 729 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1984). 

This determination encompasses not only whether plaintiff has 

the RFC to perform the actual functional demands and job duties of 

his particular past relevant job, but also whether he can perform 

the functional demands and job duties of the occupation as 

generally required by employers throughout the national economy. 

Arbogast v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 1400, 1403 (7th Cir. 1988). 

While the ALJ determined that plaintiff could return to his 

past relevant work as a janitor, he made no findings as to the 

actual functional demands of that job. We hold that substantial 

evidence does not support the Secretary's determination that 

plaintiff could perform his past relevant work. 

functional demands placed on a janitor would clearly 

minimal RFC plaintiff possessed. 

The actual 

exceed the 

We note that no determination of permanent disability could 

be made at the time of the hearing. The treating physician 

reported that if plaintiff could be helped, he could return to 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-5147 Document: 010110053469 Date Filed: 10/03/1990 Page: 8 
• 

gainful employment. Because the potential for improvement was 

present, we must remand this case for further development of the 

record at step four to determine whether plaintiff remains unable 

to return to his prior relevant work. 

If plaintiff has not improved, the burden then shifts to the 

Secretary at step five, Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 751, 

(10th Cir. 1988), to show that there is work in the economy which 

plaintiff can perform based on his current physical condition, 

including consideration of plaintiff's complaints of pain and the 

effectiveness of his medication and therapy, id. at 753-57. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is 

REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this order and 

judgment. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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