Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03030/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03030-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy Richardson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 5, 1998 Decided February 26, 1999

No. 97-3030

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Billy Richardson,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00088-03)

Neal Goldfarb, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Elizabeth Trosman and

Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: Wald, Randolph and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Following a joint trial with two other

defendants, a jury convicted appellant of armed robbery,

assault with intent to murder, assault with a deadly weapon,

and related crimes in connection with a restaurant robbery

and a shooting outside a nightclub. His codefendants were

convicted of thirteen additional crimes, including murder.

The jury hung on RICO and RICO conspiracy counts. Seeking reversal of his convictions, appellant argues that the

RICO charges, together with his joint trial with codefendants

charged with more serious crimes, resulted in the introducUSCA Case #97-3030 Document #419044 Filed: 02/26/1999 Page 1 of 12
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tion of highly prejudicial evidence that would have been

inadmissible in the absence of the RICO charges. Because

we find that a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, could have found that

the government's evidence proved the elements of a RICO

violation beyond a reasonable doubt, we reject his claims.

We reverse one of appellant's two felon-in-possession convictions because, as the government concedes, it presented no

evidence that appellant possessed more than one gun or that

he acquired or stored them separately. Finding appellant's

remaining claims without merit, we affirm in all other respects.

I

A grand jury indicted appellant Billy Richardson and his

codefendants Harold Cunningham and Percy Barron on

RICO, RICO conspiracy, and other charges flowing from

their alleged participation in an armed robbery ring. According to the indictment, their criminal activity consisted of

fifteen separate incidents lasting from July 8 to October 17,

1993, the date on which the police apprehended the last of the

defendants after a shoot-out. Their crime spree began with

armed robbery of money and guns and escalated to shootings

of robbery victims, bystanders, and rivals in crime. They

killed five people. The indictment charged them with conUSCA Case #97-3030 Document #419044 Filed: 02/26/1999 Page 2 of 12
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ducting their crimes as an informal criminal enterprise with

Cunningham as its leader and primary decisionmaker.

The indictment identified Richardson as having participated

in four of the fifteen predicate acts of the alleged enterprise.

It formally charged him in connection with two. The first

charged incident occurred outside the Ibex nightclub in the

District of Columbia. Having left the club following an

altercation with a member of a rival street crew, Richardson

and his codefendants returned with guns and opened fire on

people standing in a crowd outside the club. They wounded

five. The second incident occurred a month later at Horace

& Dickie's carry-out restaurant, also in the District of Columbia. Entering the restaurant, Richardson and his codefendants brandished handguns, emptied the cash register, and

robbed the three employees. As the robbers fled, an employee followed to get the license plate number on their getaway

car. One of the robbers--the employee could not identify

which--fired at the employee but missed. The two uncharged incidents involved an armed robbery outside an

Annapolis apartment complex and a shoot-out with a Maryland police officer.

The indictment charged Richardson with RICO, 18 U.S.C.

s 1962(c) (1994), RICO conspiracy, id. s 1962(d), armed robbery, D.C. Code ss 22-2901, 22-3202 (1981), second degree

burglary while armed, id. ss 22-1801(b), 22-3202, assault

with intent to murder while armed, id. s 22-503, assault with

a dangerous weapon, id. s 22-502, possession of a firearm

during a crime of violence, id. s 22-3204(b), felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1), and use of a firearm

during a crime of violence under the Hobbs Act, id. s 924(c).

His codefendants were charged with additional counts of

armed robbery and assault and with five counts of murder.

Before trial, Richardson moved to sever his trial from that

of his codefendants. He claimed that joint trial would be

prejudicial because his codefendants were charged with more

serious crimes. Denying this motion, the district court said,

"[I]t certainly doesn't appear ... that the amount of evidence

or the type of evidence is so disparate in terms of Mr.

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Richardson as opposed to the other two defendants that there

would be compelling prejudice to his case." Tr. 11/20/95 a.m.

at 105. At the close of the government's case and again at

the close of all the evidence, Richardson moved to dismiss the

two RICO charges for insufficient evidence. The district

court denied the motions, finding that the government's evidence adequately supported the two RICO charges.

A jury convicted Richardson and his codefendants on virtually all predicate counts. It hung on the RICO and RICO

conspiracy charges, as to which the district court declared a

mistrial. Richardson then moved for a new trial on the other

substantive counts. Claiming that the RICO charges were

unsupported by the evidence, Richardson argued that the

charges enabled the government to introduce unfairly prejudicial evidence, including the two uncharged Maryland crimes

and his general association with the codefendants beyond the

two charged incidents. Moreover, he argued, it was the

RICO charges that made joint trial possible, and the joint

trial caused "spillover" prejudice stemming from the codefendants' more serious crimes. The district court denied the

motion.

We severed Richardson's appeal from his codefendants'.

In United States v. Cunningham, we affirmed the codefendants' convictions except for the multiple felon-in-possession

counts, which we found merged into one. 145 F.3d 1385 (D.C.

Cir. 1998). In this appeal, Richardson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the two RICO charges and argues

that the district court erred in denying his motions for

severance and to declare a mistrial on the substantive counts.

He also claims ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that

his defense counsel failed to seek dismissal under the Speedy

Trial Act; unconstitutional variance between the indictment

and the evidence presented to support his convictions for

assault with intent to murder while armed; merger of his

convictions for armed robbery and assault with a dangerous

weapon; and merger of his two felon-in-possession convictions. We consider each argument in turn.

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II

Richardson's primary argument centers on the district

court's denial of his pretrial motion to sever and his post-trial

motion for a new trial. In multi-defendant cases, Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 authorizes joinder of defendants and charges if the charges arise from "transactions

connected together or constituting part of a common scheme

or plan," Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), and if the defendants are

alleged to have participated in "the same series of acts or

transactions constituting an offense or offenses," Fed. R.

Crim. P. 8(b). Joint trials are favored in RICO cases. Cf.

United States v. Ford, 870 F.2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

("The joinder presumption is especially strong where ... the

respective charges require presentation of much the same

evidence, testimony of the same witnesses, and involve two

defendants who are charged, inter alia, with participating in

the same illegal acts.") (internal quotation omitted); United

States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Where ...

the crime charged involves a common scheme or plan, a joint

trial of the participants is proper, absent a clear showing of

prejudice."). However, when improper joinder of charges

allows the government to introduce prejudicial evidence that

would have been inadmissible had the charges been tried

separately, or when the prosecution joins defendants with

significant disparities in the seriousness of their alleged

crimes, we have recognized that there is a high risk of

prejudice that might require reversal. See United States v.

Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v.

Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 645-48 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also

United States v. Guiliano, 644 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1981)

("One of the hazards of a RICO count is that when the

Government is unable to sustain a conviction under this

statute, it will have to face the claim that the prejudicial effect

of tarring a defendant with the label of 'racketeer' tainted the

conviction on an otherwise valid count.").

In this case, the RICO and RICO conspiracy counts functioned as the "connective tissue," as the district court put it,

that allowed joinder of all fifteen incidents and all three

defendants in a single trial. United States v. Cunningham,

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No. 95-88, at 23 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 1996) ("District Court

Order"). Reiterating the arguments that he made in district

court, Richardson claims that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to support either RICO or RICO

conspiracy and that his joint trial was unfairly prejudicial.

Starting with his sufficiency of the evidence argument, we ask

whether a reasonable trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the government and drawing all

reasonable inferences in the government's favor, could find

the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Dingle, 114 F.3d 307, 310

(D.C. Cir. 1997).

Richardson's sufficiency of the evidence argument focuses

on two of the four elements of a RICO violation: the "existence of an enterprise" affecting interstate commerce and his

participation in it through a "pattern of racketeering activity."

See United States v. Hoyle, 122 F.3d 48, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(the other two elements are that the defendant "associated

with" the enterprise and "participated in the conduct of the

enterprise's affairs"). As to the first element, a RICO enterprise may be "any union or group of individuals associated in

fact although not a legal entity," 18 U.S.C. s 1961(4), so long

as it involves "some structure, to distinguish an enterprise

from a mere conspiracy." United States v. Korando, 29 F.3d

1114, 1117 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation omitted). Under the test we set out in United States v. Perholtz, the

enterprise is established by (1) a common purpose among the

participants, (2) organization, and (3) continuity. 842 F.2d

343, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Richardson does not claim that the government failed to

prove a "common purpose" among the participants (the first

Perholtz factor), and for good reason: As the district court

observed, the government presented "undeniable" evidence

that their common purpose was "to obtain money or other

property by robbery." District Court Order at 5. Focusing

instead on the second and third Perholtz factors, Richardson

contends that the government presented only minimal evidence of "organization" and "continuity" beyond that necessary to commit the individual predicate crimes. We disagree.

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To begin with, the evidence showed that Richardson and

his codefendants organized themselves hierarchically and

planned their activities. According to trial witnesses, Cunningham served as the leader: He was usually first through

the door and first to display a firearm. He announced the

robbery, gave orders to the victims, and directed Richardson

and Barron during the course of the robberies. Additional

evidence of organization and continuity comes from the robberies' consistent pattern; from testimony that Richardson

and his codefendants borrowed or rented cars to commit their

crimes and attempted to switch license plates to avoid detection; from ballistics analysis establishing that they used guns

stolen in earlier crimes to facilitate later robberies and shootings; from testimony that they committed acts of violence

and retaliation to protect their armed robbery enterprise;

and from evidence that the three had social ties and were

often seen together during the summer of 1993, thus further

supporting the existence of an association independent of

their individual crimes.

In his second challenge to the RICO charges, Richardson

argues that the government failed to present evidence sufficient to prove that he engaged in a pattern of racketeering

activity. He relies on H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., which held that "[p]redicate acts extending over a

few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal

conduct do not satisfy this [pattern] requirement: Congress

was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct."

492 U.S. 229, 242 (1989). Richardson argues that because the

four predicate acts in which he participated spanned only

thirty-four days, and the entire crime spree only three and

one-half months, the evidence does not satisfy H.J.'s "longterm criminal conduct" requirement. The government counters that had Richardson and his codefendants not been

arrested, their criminal enterprise would have continued indefinitely, thus "threatening ... future criminal conduct."

Id.

We agree with the government. The "fortuitous interruption of [racketeering] activity such as by an arrest" does not

grant defendants a free pass to evade RICO charges. United

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States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 1991). As the

district court observed, the sheer number of serious crimes,

"which victimized dozens of persons and led to five deaths

during the course of one summer, with no abatement of

activity in sight," made the "threat of future criminality ...

palpable." District Court Order at 17. We have no doubt

that a jury could reasonably infer from the frequency and

escalating seriousness of the defendants' crimes that their

"past conduct ... by its nature project[ed] into the future

with a threat of repetition," thus satisfying RICO's pattern

requirement. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241.

Because we have found sufficient evidence of an ongoing

RICO enterprise involving Richardson, Cunningham, and

Barron to support their joint trial and joinder of offenses, we

need not address Richardson's claim of prejudice. The district court did not err in denying Richardson's pretrial motion

to sever or in refusing to declare a mistrial on Richardson's

substantive convictions.

III

Richardson's remaining arguments require little discussion.

With one exception, they all fail.

Richardson first claims ineffective assistance of counsel

based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion to dismiss

under the Speedy Trial Act. Richardson's detention hearing

occurred on April 27, 1995, but his trial did not begin until

over a year later, on May 1, 1996. Accounting for speedy

trial clock suspension for consideration of pretrial motions,

Richardson argues that the delay violated the Act's seventyday maximum by more than a month, requiring dismissal of

the charges.

Because ineffective assistance claims usually require evidentiary hearings, we normally do not resolve such claims on

direct appeal. See United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296,

1303 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Although this rule has two exceptions--"when the trial record alone conclusively shows that

the defendant is entitled to no relief" and "when the trial

record conclusively shows the contrary," id. at 1303-04--we

agree with the government that this case falls into neither.

For one thing, nothing in the record conclusively shows that a

Speedy Trial Act violation occurred; further factfinding

would be necessary to determine the amount of time that the

speedy trial clock should have been stopped for the district

court to consider the multiple, complicated pretrial motions

with "reasonable promptness." United States v. Salerno, 108

F.3d, 730, 737 (7th Cir. 1997).

Even if the speedy trial clock did run out, moreover, the

record suggests that counsel might well have had sound

strategic reasons for not pursuing the violation. Asked by

the district court whether he objected to the May 1996 trial

date, trial counsel stated: "Given, from a lawyer's standpoint,

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tion, I obviously would tell him that I would feel as his

representative, to put it mildly, uncomfortable in trying to try

a case like this in 70 days, and that's putting it mildly." Tr.

5/22/95 a.m. at 22. Given the complexity of this case, involving fifteen different crimes, multiple defendants, and allegations of RICO and RICO conspiracy, we cannot assume that

counsel's failure to pursue a Speedy Trial Act claim amounted

to ineffective assistance. Under these circumstances, Richardson must pursue his claim under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 (1994).

Richardson next challenges his convictions for assault with

intent to murder while armed flowing from the Ibex nightclub

shooting, essentially contending that a variance between the

indictment and the government's evidence at trial violated his

right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment

returned by a grand jury. Richardson argues that because

the government's evidence proved at most that he and his

codefendants fired randomly into the crowd, it cannot support

the indictment's charge that they assaulted six specifically

named individuals each "with intent to murder him" (emphasis added). He relies on Joseph v. United States, 597 A.2d 14

(D.C. 1991), in which the D.C. Court of Appeals found a

violation of the Grand Jury Clause where the indictment

charged "assault[ing] another with intent to kill him" ("direct

intent"), but the government's evidence proved that the deUSCA Case #97-3030 Document #419044 Filed: 02/26/1999 Page 9 of 12
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fendant actually intended to kill someone else ("transferred

intent").

Had the government relied at trial on some theory of intent

other than that accepted by the grand jury in the indictment,

Richardson might well have a valid constitutional claim. Cf.

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) (alteration

as to a material fact in the indictment "destroy[s] the defendant's substantial right to be tried only on charges presented

in an indictment returned by a grand jury."). But unlike in

Joseph, here there is no indication that the government

switched theories of intent between the grand jury proceedings and the trial. Each relevant count of the indictment is

titled simply "Assault of [named person] with Intent To

Murder While Armed." Each count refers to the relevant

provision of the D.C. Code titled "Assault with Intent to

Murder While Armed." Because appellant and his codefendants fired into a crowd of people at close range, we have no

doubt that the grand jury, like the trial jury, understood the

government's theory of intent to mean "intent to murder the

persons in the crowd whom the bullets hit." We find nothing

significant in the addition of the object "him" to the end of

the phrase "assault[ ] ... with intent to murder" in other

parts of the indictment.

Next, relying on D.C. precedent that treats assault with a

dangerous weapon as a lesser included offense of armed

robbery, see Norris v. United States, 585 A.2d 1372 (D.C.

1991), Richardson argues that his conviction for assault with a

dangerous weapon for aiding and abetting the shooting at the

pursuing Horace & Dickie's employee merges with his conviction for armed robbery. According to Richardson, the

charges merge because the restaurant robbery and the shooting were both parts of the same criminal act. Citing general

principles of D.C. criminal law, Richardson argues that a

robbery continues until the robber has completed the act of

"asportation," i.e., carrying away the stolen property, and

that asportation continues while the robber is being pursued

immediately after the robbery. See Carter v. United States,

223 F.2d 332, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1955).

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To determine whether criminal acts are separate or part of

the same crime, the D.C. Court of Appeals uses a "fork in the

road" test. Spain v. United States, 665 A.2d 658, 660 (D.C.

1995). Acts are separate where "there was an appreciable

interval--albeit quite brief--between the two criminal episodes which showed that the defendant had reached a 'fork in

the road' or had acted in response to a 'fresh impulse.' " Id.

at 661. Robbery is particularly susceptible to "a series of

individually chargeable acts," Owens v. United States, 497

A.2d 1086, 1096 (D.C. 1985), because the crime "tends to be

completed quickly and to leave the perpetrator at a fork in

the road where he must consider whether to retreat or to

invade another interest," id. Where a "person not only robs

but also assaults the victim after the robbery is completed,

the assault will be treated as a separate offense." Id.

Applying these standards, we agree with the government

that Richardson's convictions for armed robbery and assault

with a deadly weapon do not merge. In Heiligh v. United

States, the D.C. Court of Appeals found that defendants

committed a fresh offense where, after making their robbery

victims lie on the floor and then exiting the building, they

threatened to shoot the victims who were following them.

See 379 A.2d 689, 694 (D.C. 1977). Having robbed and fled

Horace & Dickie's, Richardson and his codefendants had

likewise passed a "fork in the road" when one of them fired at

the pursuing employee.

In the alternative, Richardson argues that if the armed

robbery and the assault are different crimes, then the evidence showing only that he aided and abetted the robbery

cannot support his conviction for aiding and abetting the

assault. This is a non sequitur. Inferring from Richardson's

aiding and abetting the robbery that he aided and abetted the

assault in no way conflicts with the notion that the two are

separate crimes. In any event, evidence that Richardson was

present at the time of the shooting, that he and his codefendants were armed, and that he acted in concert with them to

flee the scene, supports an inference that Richardson could

have foreseen that one of his cohorts would fire at the

pursuing employee, and that he therefore aided and abetted

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that assault. See United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 176, 181

(D.C. Cir. 1975) (affirming defendant's convictions for armed

robbery and assault with a deadly weapon on an aiding and

abetting theory where four men robbed a bank and one shot a

police officer upon exiting the bank).

Relying on Cunningham, where we found that Richardson's codefendants' multiple felon-in-possession convictions

under 18 U.S.C. s 922(g) merged into one because the government presented no evidence that they possessed more

than one gun or that they acquired or stored them separately,

Richardson urges us to reverse one of his two felon-inpossession convictions for the same reason. See 145 F.3d at

1398-99. The government concedes that Cunningham controls. We accordingly vacate one of Richardson's felon-inpossession convictions and remand for resentencing.

We have considered Richardson's remaining arguments and

find them without merit. With the exception of one of his

felon-in-possession convictions, Richardson's convictions are

affirmed.

So ordered.

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