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Parties Involved:
Albert N. Flores
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United St.at.ea Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

MAR 1 51989 

ALBERT N. FLORES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

~ ROBERT L. HOECKER 

> Clerk 

) 

v. ) No. 87-2147 

) (D.C. No. 84-M-2431) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) (D. Colo.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and JENKINS, Chief 

Judge.** 

**Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

The question in this case is whether the appellant, Albert N. 

Flores, suffered injuries arising out of and in the course of his 

employment so as to be covered under workmen's compensation, thus 

precluding his action against the appellee, the United States of 

America, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982). Ruling on the United States' motion 

*This order and 

be cited, or 

for purposes of 

res judicata, 

judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-2147 Document: 010110024614 Date Filed: 03/15/1989 Page: 1 
for summary judgment, the district court held that, based 

onundisputed facts surrounding Mr. Flores' accident at the Buckley 

Air National Guard Base, Mr. Flores ' injuries occurred within the 

scope of his employment and were compensable under Colorado's 

workmen's compensation statute. Since Mr. Flores' employer, the 

Hughes Aircraft Company, was a contractor of the United States and 

carried workmen's compensation insurance, the district court 

concluded that under Colorado law the United States was immune 

from federal tort liability as a "statutory employer." We affirm. 

Mr. Flores was employed by the Hughes Aircraft Company to 

work on classified defense contracts at the Aerospace Defense 

Facility (ADF) located at the Buckley Air National Guard Base in 

Aurora, Colorado. On December 29, 1982, while on his lunch break, 

Mr. Flores slipped and fell in the ADF parking lot, damaging the 

bone in his hip. At the time of his fall, Mr. Flores was heading 

to a cafeteria operated by Hughes Aircraft for the benefit of its 

employees at the base. Mr. Flores was not required to eat lunch 

at the cafeteria nor was his lunch hour compensated. The parking 

lot where he fell was available to both Hughes Aircraft employees 

and employees of other contractors at the ADF and was operated by 

the federal government. Mr. Flores was required to pass through 

two security checkpoints before entering the ADF. After his 

accident, the injury to Mr. Flores' hip did not improve, and he 

was forced to take extended sick leave. During this time, Mr. 

Flores was compensated by a combination of his accrued sick leave 

and workmen's compensation benefits provided by Hughes Aircraft's 

insurer, The Hartford. 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-2147 Document: 010110024614 Date Filed: 03/15/1989 Page: 2 
On December 28, 1984, Mr. Flores filed the instant action, 

seeking to recover damages resulting from his injury under the 

FTCA. On January 29, 1986, several named defendants were 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the case proceeded against 

the United States. On June 6, 1986, the United States moved for 

summary judgment. 

recommended it be 

The motion was referred to 

granted. The district 

a magistrate, who 

court, Chief Judge 

Finesilver presiding, rejected the magistrate's recommendation, 

finding that material issues of fact remained. On March 13, 1986, 

the case was transferred to Judge Matsch. The United States then 

renewed its motion for summary judgment, which the district court 

granted on July 6, 1987. Mr. Flores now appeals this order. 

Mr. Flores raises three issues in this appeal. First, he 

contends that the district court resolved a material issue of fact 

when it concluded that his injuries occurred within the scope of 

his employment and that summary judgment was therefore improper. 

Second, he argues that the district court erred in finding that 

the United States was a statutory employer under Colorado law 

because the term "employer" is not defined to include the federal 

government. Third, he asserts that the doctrine of "the law of 

the case" precluded the district court from granting a renewed 

motion for summary judgment which had been previously denied. We 

are not persuaded by these arguments. 

As to Mr. Flores' first contention, we agree that the 

district court may not resolve material issues of fact on a motion 

for summary judgment. The court may not make credibility 

determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-2147 Document: 010110024614 Date Filed: 03/15/1989 Page: 3 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Its 

role is limited to determining whether there is a genuine issue of 

material fact, and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Willner v. Budig, 848 F.2d 1032, 

1033-34 (10th Cir. 198 8). Mr. Flores asserts that throughout 

these proceedings, he has contested whether his injuries arose out 

of and occurred during the course of his employment, and that this 

raises a material issue of fact. 

While the determination of whether an injury occurs within 

the scope of employment depends, in the first instance, on the 

facts and circumstances of the particular case, see Bennett v. 

Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Colo. 1982); 

City & County of Denver School Dist. No. 1 v. Industrial Comm'n, 

196 Colo. 131, 581 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1978), once the essential 

facts surrounding the injury are established, the ultimate 

determination of whether the injury falls within the scope of 

employment is a matter of law. See,~, Tolbert v. Martin 

Marietta Corp., 858 F.2d 1479 (10th Cir. 1988)(decided on 

summary judgment); Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755 (10th 

Cir. 1982)(same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984). In this 

case, there is no dispute as to how the accident occurred. The 

only issue is whether these facts lead to the legal conclusion 

that Mr. 

employment. 

Flores' injuries occurred in the course of his 

The district court was therefore not required to 

resolve a material issue of fact in order to rule that Mr. Flores' 

injuries were compensable under workmen's compensation. 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-2147 Document: 010110024614 Date Filed: 03/15/1989 Page: 4 
Mr. Flores argues that, even if the facts surrounding his 

accident were undisputed, the district court's legal conclusions 

were in error. In this case, the district court determined that 

Mr. Flores' injuries fell within the coverage of Colorado's 

workmen's compensation statute, relying on this court's holding in 

Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755. We agree. Stewart 

involved a nearly identical set of facts as are presented here. 

The plaintiff, an employee of a government contractor, was injured 

in the parking lot of the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons facility 

several minutes before he was to have reported to work. He was 

not being paid at the time and was not required to park in the 

lot. The lot was also used by other employees of government 

contractors at the facility. 

In Stewart, we noted the many cases in which Colorado courts 

have recognized that an employee's injuries are covered under the 

statute even though the injury did not occur during working hours. 

Id. at 761-62. In such situations, an injury arises out of and in 

the course of employment even though incurred outside of working 

hours if ''special circumstances create a causal connection between 

the employee's injury and employment.'' Id. at 761. We concluded 

that the employer in Stewart benefited from the availability of 

the parking lot in which the employee was injured, and that his 

injuries were within the scope of his employment. There is no 

reason to apply a different rule simply because Mr. Flores' injury 

occurred during the lunch hour, while he was en route to an 

employer-provided cafeteria. See 1 A. Larson, The Law of 

workmen's Compensation§ 15.51 (1985). 

5 

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We are further persuaded that the district court's resolution 

of this issue was correct by the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling 

in In re Tolbert v. Martin Marietta Corp., 759 P.2d 17 (Colo. 

1988). In response to certain questions certified to it by this 

court, the Colorado court addressed whether damages for the rape 

of an employee by her co-worker while the employee was on her way 

to lunch were compensable under workmen's compensation. In 

assessing whether the employee's injuries arose out of her 

employment, the court applied a positional risk test. Under this 

test, 111 [a]n injury arises out of the employment if it would not 

have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations 

of the employment placed [the] claimant in the position where he 

was injured. 111 Id. at 20 (quoting A. Larson, supra p. 5, § 6.50 

at 3-6). The court further noted that "[t]he mere fact that an 

employee is on lunch hour does not prohibit worker's compensation 

coverage, . as long as the worker was at a place where the 

worker may reasonably be, at a time during which the worker is 

employed, doing what he or she may reasonably do." Id. at 22. 

The court concluded that an employee walking from a work station 

to an employer-provided cafeteria is doing what she may reasonably 

do in a place where she may reasonably be. Id. at 23. We are 

likewise convinced that under Colorado law, Mr. Flores was doing 

what he may reasonably do in a place he may reasonably be by 

walking from his workstation to the Hughes cafeteria. 

Consequently, the district court did not err in concluding that 

Mr. Flores' injuries arose out of and occurred in the scope of his 

employment. 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-2147 Document: 010110024614 Date Filed: 03/15/1989 Page: 6 
Mr. Flores additionally argues that the district court 

incorrectly determined that the United States was a "statutory 

employer" under Colorado law and that his FTCA action was thereby 

prohibited by the exclusive remedy provision of Colorado's 

workmen's compensation statute. Under the FTCA, the United States 

is liable for tort claims ''in the same manner and to the same 

extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 

28 u.s.c. § 2674. Further, the federal government's liability is 

determined in accordance with the law of the place where the 

injury occurred, in this case, Colorado. Richards v. United 

States, 369 U.S. 1, 10 (1962); Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 

950, 953 (10th Cir. 1984). Colorado's workmen's compensation 

statute provides that if an injury falls within its coverage, any 

other civil action against an employer relating to the injury is 

barred. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-104 (1986). This provision is 

based on the principle that, in electing to provide workmen's 

compensation coverage, the employer assumes a new liability 

without fault but is relieved of the risk of large damage 

verdicts. 2A A. Larson , supra p. 5, § 65.11 at 12-9 (1988). In 

addition, under Colorado law, when a private person has contracted 

with another entity that has obtained workmen's compensation 

insurance for its employees, that person is exempted from 

liability as a statutory employer. Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 8-48-101(1), (2). Since the United States had contracted with 

the Hughes Aircraft Company, and Hughes had procured workmen's 

compensation insurance for its employees, the United States is 

likewise immune. Stewart, 716 F.2d at 765; cf. Griffin v. United 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-2147 Document: 010110024614 Date Filed: 03/15/1989 Page: 7 
States, 644 F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir. 198l)(applying the same 

analysis under Kansas law). 

Mr. Flores argues, however, that the United States cannot be 

a statutory employer because it is not an ''employer" as that term 

is defined in the Colorado statute. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 8-41-105. This argument overlooks the language of the FTCA 

which provides that the United States is liable only to the extent 

a private person would have been liable under the same 

circumstances. See Stewart, 716 F.2d at 763. Thus, whether the 

federal government is included in the term "employer" is 

irrelevant, since the rights and liabilities of the United States 

are determined by r eference to federal, not state, law. 1 

Giannuzzi v . Doni nger Metal Prods., 585 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (W.D. 

Pa. 1984). 

We are likewise not persuaded by Mr. Flores' argument that he 

never elected to receive workmen's compensation and therefore he 

should not be precluded from bringing an action under the FTCA. 

The operative fact in establishing 

workmen's compensation remedy] 

coverage, not of election to claim 

particular case. 

exclusiveness [of the 

is that of actual 

compensation in the 

Even if the employee himself has never made 

application for compensation, his right to sue his 

employer at common law is barred by the existence of the 

l It seems fairly clear that the federal government was not 

intended to be included as an "employer" under the Colorado's 

Workmen's Compensation Act, since the United States government's 

liability as an employer is governed by several federal workmen's 

compensation laws,~, United States Employees' Compensation 

Act, 5 u.s.c. § 8101 (1982). Moreover, the power of the state to 

compel the federal government to participate in the state's 

workmen's compensation program appears questionable and, at a 

minimum, would be preempted by federal action in the field. See 

Giannuzzi v. Doninger Metal Prods., 585 F. Supp. at 1309. 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-2147 Document: 010110024614 Date Filed: 03/15/1989 Page: 8 
" compensation remedy. If the Compensation Commission has 

made a valid and unappealed award for compensation, this 

is res judicata on the issue of coverage, and is binding 

on the court .... 

2A A. Larson, supra p. 5, § 65.14 at 12-15 (1988). Mr. Flores 

misconstrues the term "election" as referring to an employees' 

election to claim benefits, instead of the employer's election to 

provide them in accordance with the statute. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§§ 8-41-105(5), 8-43-104. Consequently, whether Mr. Flores ever 

chose to receive workmen's compensation benefits for this injury 

is immaterial. 

Finally, we disagree with Mr. Flores' contention that "the 

law of the case" precluded the district court from entering 

summary judgment in favor of the United States after the earlier 

motion for summary judgment was denied. The law-of-the-case 

doctrine '"merely expresses the practice of courts generally to 

refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit on their 

power.'" Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 108 S. Ct. 

2166, 2178 (1988)(citation omitted). A court has the power to 

address prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any 

circumstances, although normally a court will do so only for 

cogent reasons. Id.; Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 

(1983); United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1147 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986). When a lower court has made an 

interlocutory ruling which it believes to be substantially 

erroneous, however, "the only sensible thing to do is to set 

itself right to avoid subsequent reversal." Major v. Benton, 647 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-2147 Document: 010110024614 Date Filed: 03/15/1989 Page: 9 
• 

• F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1981). The district court in this case 

did just that, and we conclude that its ruling was not in error. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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