Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00740/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00740-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
John Darwin IV
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN DARWIN IV, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-0740 AC 

ORDER 

This case was referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(15). Before the court is 

defendant Colvin’s (“the Commissioner”) motion to reconsider the court’s order granting 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanding for the determination of benefits. ECF 

No. 27. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny the Commissioner’s motion. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

In general, there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) 

motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct 

manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if 

such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or previously 

unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent 

manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an 

intervening change in controlling law. 

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing McDowell v. Calderon, 

197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1082 (2000)). 

However, “amending a judgment after its entry remains an extraordinary remedy which should be 

Case 2:14-cv-00740-AC Document 29 Filed 12/03/15 Page 1 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

used sparingly.” Allstate, 634 F.3d at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted). Amendment of 

judgment is sparingly used to serve the dual “interests of finality and conservation of judicial 

resources.” See Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On March 21, 2014, plaintiff filed this action seeking reversal of the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny him benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 401-34, 1381-1383f. ECF No. 1. On July 6, 2015, the court granted plaintiff’s subsequent 

motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, 

reversed the Commissioner’s decision, and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for the 

immediate calculation and award of benefits. ECF No. 25. The court found that the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) improperly rejected the opinion of plaintiff’s treating 

physician, and improperly rejected plaintiff’s testimony regarding his limitations. The court 

further concluded that, crediting the testimony and opinion as true, plaintiff was disabled. The 

court therefore remanded for payment of benefits, principally under the authority of Benecke v. 

Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 2004) and Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 On August 3, 2015, the Commissioner moved to alter or amend the court’s judgment. 

ECF No. 27. The motion argues only the first Allstate ground, and is based upon the 

Commissioner’s view that it was legal error to remand for payment of benefits rather than for 

further proceedings. Plaintiff opposes the motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 28. 

III. ANALYSIS 

 The court will deny the Commissioner’s motion because its order remanding for the 

payment of benefits is not based on a manifest error of law. As the Commissioner correctly 

argues, the Ninth Circuit law governing remand for payment of benefits has been further 

developed beyond the cases cited by the court in its decision. However, that further development 

does not compel a different result in this case. The Ninth Circuit has devised a three-part creditas-true standard, each part of which must be satisfied in order for a court to remand to the 

Commissioner with instructions to calculate and award benefits: 

//// 

Case 2:14-cv-00740-AC Document 29 Filed 12/03/15 Page 2 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 

to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand. 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). There is “flexibility” built into the rule, 

however. Specifically, even if all three above factors are satisfied, the court should still remand 

for further proceedings, rather than for an award of benefits “when, even though all conditions of 

the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt 

that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Id. at 1021. 

 However, “where the record has been fully developed and where further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose,” remand for the payment of benefits is warranted. 

Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2012) (remanding for 

immediate payment of benefits where, as here, “there are no outstanding issues to be resolved,” 

the complete record shows that plaintiff “is likely to miss multiple days of work per month,” and 

“[t]he vocational expert testified that a person with Brewes’ characteristics who would miss that 

much work was not employable.”) 

 Although the court’s decision did not specifically list the Garrison factors, the court 

considered those factors in determining that the matter should be remanded for the immediate 

calculation and payment of benefits. See ECF No. 25 at 27 (citing the equivalent Benecke 

standard requiring that “there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made”), 23 (finding the ALJ rejected medical opinion without 

meeting the applicable standard of Tomasettit v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2008)), 26-27 

(crediting the opinion and testimony as true, plaintiff is disabled). The record as a whole does not 

create “serious doubt” that plaintiff is, in fact, disabled, warranting dismissal under Garrison. 

 The Commissioner’s motion offers no reason for the court to alter its judgment other than 

disagreement with the court’s decision. This court has already rejected the Commissioner’s 

argument, offered in her cross-motion for summary judgment, that “[s]hould the Court overturn 

the agency’s decision, the proper remedy is a remand for further administrative proceedings.” 

Case 2:14-cv-00740-AC Document 29 Filed 12/03/15 Page 3 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

See ECF No. 21 at 21-22. The motion for reconsideration will be denied where, as here, the 

Commissioner offers mere disagreement with the court’s decision, and recapitulates the 

arguments it made before the court in its cross-motion for summary judgment. See Arteaga v. 

Asset Acceptance, LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1237 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (rejecting Rule 59(e) 

motion where plaintiff’s “arguments on reconsideration simply recapitulate her original 

argument”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s 

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (ECF No. 27), is DENIED. 

DATED: December 3, 2015 

 

Case 2:14-cv-00740-AC Document 29 Filed 12/03/15 Page 4 of 4