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Parties Involved:
Thomas B. Ruth
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL _i!j D 

United Sta~s Court of Appc&l:; Tenth Cir_-:ui': 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 1 4 1992 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKEE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

THOMAS RUTH, 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Clerk 

No. 91-3249 

(D.C. No. 89-20080-02) 

(D. Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, ALDISERT** , and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

This appeal is from the district court's denial of 

defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Rule 

32(d}, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court found that 

there was no basis for the withdrawal of the guilty pleas. We 

hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

* This order and judgment has not precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3 

** Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge, united states 

Court of Appeals for the Third circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-3249 Document: 010110249170 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 1
defendant's motion to withdraw the pleas. In addition, we hold 

that at neither the initial sentencing nor the re-sentencing did 

the court abuse its discretion in finding an adequate factual 

basis to exist for defendant's firearms charge. We also hold 

that the court did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary 

hearing on the issues, and that counsel at the pleading stage was 

not ineffective. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

I; 

Thomas B. Ruth, was indicted on October 18, 1989, for 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine and 

using or carrying a firearm during a distribution of cocaine. On 

November 30, 1989, he pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the 

indictment, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and to Count 5, 

using or carrying a firearm during a distribution of cocaine. 

Attorney Robert E. Jenkins represented Ruth at the plea hearing 

and subsequent sentencing hearing on February 26, 1990, at which 

time Ruth was sentenced to 60 months on Count 1 and five years on 

Count 5, to run consecutively; a three-year term of supervised 

release; a fine of $12,000.00; and a special assessment of 

$100.00. 

On May 30, 1990, Ruth filed a notice of appeal in the 

district court, but we dismissed the appeal as untimely filed. 

He then filed a motion in the district court to vacate, set aside 

or correct his sentence, alleging that he was denied his Sixth 

Appellate Case: 91-3249 Document: 010110249170 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 2
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel for various 

reasons. 

By memorandum and order entered June 10, 1991, the 

court granted Ruth's motion on the sole ground that defense 

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice of 

appeal. The district court further ordered that he be resentenced in order to provide him an opportunity to exercise his 

appellate rights. The re-sentencing hearing was held on July 10, 

1991, at which time he moved to withdraw his guilty plea as to 

Count 5 only, pursuant to Rule 32(d), Fed. R. Crim. P., on the 

grounds that he did not understand the consequences of pleading 

guilty and that the plea was coerced. The court denied the 

motion and Ruth filed a timely notice of appeal . On appeal, Ruth 

alleges that: 1) the court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion to withdraw the guilty plea; 2) at both the original 

sentencing and at re-sentencing, the court failed to determine 

that a factual basis existed for the firearms charge; 3) the 

court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing at the re-sentencing; 

and 4) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel when he entered the plea and at the 

original sentencing. 

II. 

Ruth contends that at re-sentencing the court 

improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, 

because when he entered his pleas, the court failed to comply 

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with Rule ll(c) (1), Fed. R. Crim. P., and because he was not 

adequately informed of the consequences of pleading guilty. Rule 

32(d), Fed. R. Crim. P., provides that a district court may 

permit withdrawal of a guilty plea upon a showing by the 

defendant of any fair and just reason. Our review of an order 

denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 32(d) is 

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F . 2d 

992, 994 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Kearney. 684 F.2d 

709, 711 (10th Cir. 1982). 

1. 

He argues that when he entered his plea on the firearm 

charge, the court did not comply with Rule ll(c) (1), which 

requires that the court advise the defendant of the maximum 

penalty and any mandatory minimum penalty he faces. The district 

court's compliance with Rule 11 before accepting a guilty plea is 

primarily a question of law subject to de novo review. United 

States v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521, 1524 (10th Cir. 1990). 

During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the court mistakenly 

stated that a five-year term of imprisonment on the firearm 

charge was the maximum penalty instead of the mandatory penalty. 

Ruth contends that, had he known the firearms penalty carried a 

mandatory five-year penalty, he would not have pleaded guilty to 

the charge. 

A defendant's guilty plea must be knowing and 

voluntary. Id. (citing McCarthy v. United states, 394 U.S. 459, 

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466 (1969)). Rule 11 prescribes procedures designed to ensure 

that a plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. 

Elias, 937 F.2d 1514, 1517 {10th Cir. 1991) (citing Gomez-Cuevas, 

917 F.2d at 1524-25). our determination whether a defendant's 

guilty plea is knowing and voluntary does not consist simply of 

checking the trial court's incantation of the formula of Rule 11. 

We review all alleged Rule 11 violations in accordance with the 

mandate of Rule ll{h), which states that "any variance from the 

procedures required by this rule which does not affect 

substantial rights shall be disregarded." Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 

at 1524 n.2. We have construed the Rule ll{h) language as 

requiring that a defendant show that knowledge of the omission or 

variance from Rule 11 "would have changed his decision to plead 

guilty." United States v. Wright, 930 F.2d 808, 811 {10th Cir. 

1991) (citing Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d at 1527). 

The court advised Ruth that he could receive up to 

forty years on the conspiracy count and up to five years on the 

firearms charge. Ruth received five years for the conspiracy 

count and five years for the firearms count. Because, 

ultimately, Ruth fared no worse than the worst-case scenario 

portrayed by the court, the court's variance from Rule 11 was not 

outcome-determinative and was therefore harmless pursuant to Rule 

ll(h). See Elias, 937 F.2d at 1518; United States v. Barry, 895 

F.2d 702, 704 (10th Cir. 1990); Evers v. United States, 579 F.2d 

71, 72-73 {10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1988). 

Accordingly, we hold that in this case any variance from the Rule 

11 colloquy requirements was harmless error. 

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2. 

Next, appellant appears to argue that the court abused 

its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea 

on the conspiracy charge, because he was not adequately informed 

of the consequences of entering a plea of guilty as distinguished 

from proceeding to trial. Ruth contends that his counsel at the 

pleadings stage told him that if he went to trial, the government 

would recommend a twenty-year sentence on the conspiracy charge, 

but failed to inform him that under the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines, the penalty imposed following a guilty plea is 

substantially the same as the penalty imposed after being found 

guilty at trial. Accordingly, Ruth contends he was coerced into 

pleading guilty and received no substantial benefit from his 

plea. 

When Ruth entered his plea, the court specifically 

asked him about the voluntariness of his plea, in accordance with 

Rule ll(d) . He acknowledged that his guilty plea was not the 

result of force, threat, promises or inducements, and that he was 

entering the plea freely and voluntarily. Tr. 11/30/89 at 8 

(Appellant's Br. at App . , Ex. B). Ruth also acknowledged that he 

was entering the plea solely because he was guilty of the crimes 

charged and not for any other reason. Id. The court also asked 

Ruth questions aimed at determining whether his plea was entered 

knowingly. The court asked Ruth, "You also realize that even 

though you enter pleas of guilty to these two charges, the Court 

may still impose the same punishment, just as if you had pleaded 

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not guilty, stood trial and been convicted by a jury?" Id. at 5. 

Ruth answered, "Yes, your honor." Id. He also acknowledged that 

he and his counsel had talked about how the sentencing guidelines 

applied in his case. Id. at 6. In addition, Ruth acknowledged 

that he was satisfied with his counsel's performance. Id. at 17. 

The truth and accuracy of Ruth's statements are 

regarded as conclusive in the absence of a valid, believable 

reason justifying departure from their apparent truth. United 

States v. Bambulas, 571 F.2d 525, 526 (10th Cir. 1978) (citing 

Hedman v. United States, 527 F.2d 20, 22 (10th Cir. 1975)). The 

court ultimately determined that Ruth entered his guilty plea 

freely and voluntarily and that he understood the nature of the 

charges, his rights and the consequences of his pleas. Tr. at 

17. Based upon our examination of the record, we find that the 

court did not err in the determination. Accordingly, we conclude 

that he was not coerced into the plea on a theory that his 

counsel failed to adequately inform him of the consequences of 

his plea . We conclude that counsel adequately informed him and 

that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruth's 

32(d) motion on re-sentencing. 

B. 

Ruth next argues that at sentencing and at resentencing, the court failed to determine, as required by Rule 

ll(f), Fed. R. Crim. P., that an adequate factual basis existed 

for the firearm charge. He argues that, accordingly, his guilty 

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plea was invalid. We review a court's finding of a factual basis 

for a plea under the abuse of discretion standard. Elias, 937 

F.2d at 1517. 

He contends that the court relied on the government's 

statement of the facts rather than on a statement from Ruth. 

However, a district court may ascertain the sufficiency of a 

factual basis by considering anything in the record, including 

the petition to enter plea, the plea agreement or the 

prosecutor's statement. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d at 996. In this 

case, the sentencing court determined that a factual basis 

existed by considering the charges from the prosecution's 

statement of facts as well as from statements proffered by Ruth 

and his counsel. Ruth admitted that a gun was in the car during 

the drug transaction. Tr. 11/30/89 at 13. We have held that 

having a gun present in a car during a drug transaction 

constitutes "carrying" a firearm during a drug transaction, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). United States v. McKinnell, 888 

F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1989). Therefore, we conclude that the 

court did not abuse its discretion in finding an adequate factual 

basis existed for the firearms charge and that at re-sentencing, 

the court properly relied upon that factual basis. 

c. 

Next, Ruth argues that at re-sentencing, the court 

erred in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas without 

holding an evidentiary hearing. No hearing is required, however, 

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if the record demonstrates that a defendant was informed of the 

consequences of his plea. Baker v. United States, 404 F.2d 787, 

790 (10th Cir. 1968). As stated in parts A{l) and (2) above, the 

record discloses that Ruth was informed of the consequences of 

his pleas. Consequently, the court did not err by failing to 

hold an evidentiary hearing on re-sentencing. 

D. 

Ruth next contends that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to explain the mandatory nature of the firearms sentence. 

We review de novo a determination whether an attorney's 

performance is so deficient that it violates a defendant's right 

to effective assistance of counsel. Elias, 937 F.2d at 1520. 

The petitioner must show both that counsel's performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for 

counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 694 

(1984). 

Several factors indicate that counsel adequately 

informed Ruth of the mandatory nature of the firearms charge. 

First, Ruth signed the Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty and Order 

Entering Plea, which indicated that the conspiracy charge carried 

a penalty of five to forty years and that the firearms charge 

carried a penalty of five years. At the plea hearing, Ruth 

stated that he and counsel had discussed the petition to enter 

plea. Tr. 11/30/89 at 9. Second, counsel also stated in an 

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affidavit that, before the plea hearing, he fully explained to 

Ruth that a plea to the firearms charge would carry a five-year 

mandatory, consecutive sentence. Depo 1 3 (Appellant's Br. at 

App., Ex. A). Third, Ruth and his counsel reviewed the 

presentence report, which stated that the penalty for the 

firearms charge was five years, to be served consecutively with 

any penalty for the drug count. Id. 1 6. And finally, at the 

sentencing hearing, Ruth's counsel explained without objection or 

comment by Ruth that he and Ruth had "discussed and re-discussed" 

the guideline range and that there was an additional five-year 

penalty for the firearms charge. Tr. 2/26/90 at 4-5 (Appellant's 

Br. at App., Ex. C). Moreover, Ruth stated that he was satisfied 

with counsel's performance. Tr. 11/30/89 at 17. Following 

counsel's statements, the court provided Ruth with the 

opportunity to comment on the whole proceeding, and Ruth merely 

said, "Your Honor, I know I did wrong, I'm sorry, and it will not 

happen again." Tr. 2/26/90 at 5. It is clear from the record 

that plea counsel did in fact discuss the mandatory nature of the 

firearms penalty. Therefore, counsel's performance did not fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and no 

ineffectiveness of counsel is demonstrated. 

Ruth also alleges that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to or present evidence of Ruth's inability to 

pay the $12,000 fine. However, Ruth's pre-sentence report stated 

that Ruth was capable of paying a fine in the range of $5,000.00 

to $15,000.00 based on his net worth, employment history and 

prospects. Counsel stated in his affidavit that he discussed the 

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imposition of a fine with Ruth and that Ruth was concerned about 

paying the fine while he was in prison. Counsel stated that he 

assured Ruth that he would not have to pay until after he 

completed his prison sentence. Depo 1 6. Given the foregoing, 

it is clear that Ruth read the pre-sentence report but failed to 

voice to counsel any concerns about his general inability to pay. 

Ruth also failed to voice any concerns about the fine at the 

sentencing hearing. Thus, there is no indication that counsel's 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

III. 

We will affirm the re-sentencing court's denial of 

defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. We also hold 

that at the initial sentencing and at resentencing, the court did 

not abuse its discretion in finding an adequate factual basis for 

defendant's plea. We hold that the court did not err in failing 

to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues at re-sentencing. 

Finally, we conclude that counsel was not ineffective. The 

decision of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Ruggero J. Aldisert 

Circuit Judge 

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