Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00663/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00663-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shawn Michael Rodriguez
Plaintiff
Stone
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

STONE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

1:06-cv-00663-OWW-SMS PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

ORDER FOR CLERK TO SEND PLAINTIFF

COMPLAINT FORM

Plaintiff, Shawn Michael Rodriguez (“plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the complaint on

April 11, 2006, at the Sacramento Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California. On May 31, 2006, the case was transferred to the Fresno Division of the

Eastern District.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may

dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that

could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff

will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . .

.’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,

122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982)).

II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that the events in the complaint occurred at Pleasant Valley State Prison

(“PVSP”), where he is currently incarcerated. Plaintiff names as defendants Sergeant Stone

(mailroom supervisor at PVSP) and “M” (mailroom employee at PVSP). Plaintiff alleges that

defendants denied him access to the courts in violation of the Constitution when “M” refused to

process plaintiff’s legal mail without postage, delaying filing and service of his habeas corpus

petition and rendering his certificate of service void. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief by a court

order requiring PVSP mailroom employees to provide postage for legal mail for indigent inmates

and to process such mail without delay.

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III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

A. Legal Standard

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted). “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal

Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person deprives another of a constitutional right, where that person ‘does an

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that

person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” 

Hydrick v. Hunter, No. 03-56712, 2007 WL 2445998, *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2007) (quoting

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be

established not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be

setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know

would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

B. Access to Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access to the courts is simply the “right to bring to court

a grievance,” and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus proceedings, and civil rights

actions challenging conditions of confinement. Id. at 355. Claims for denial of access to the

courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained”

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(forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried

(backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-

87 (2002). A prisoner alleging a violation of his right of access to the courts must demonstrate

that he has suffered “actual injury.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-50. The actual-injury requirement

mandates that an inmate “demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was

being impeded.” Id. at 353. To state a claim based on denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff

must allege facts demonstrating that he suffered an actual injury by being shut out of court. Id. at

351; Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 22, 2006, he attempted to serve a copy of his habeas

corpus petition on the Placer County District Attorney, the opposing counsel in his criminal case,

by delivering mail to the mailroom at the prison. Plaintiff alleges that on the following day, the

mail was returned to him with a note that plaintiff needed to provide postage. Plaintiff alleges he

is an indigent inmate and cannot pay postage. Plaintiff alleges that on February 23, 2006, he

tried again to serve his habeas corpus petition through the prison mailroom, and again the mail

was returned to him for lack of postage. Plaintiff alleges that on February 24, 2006, he made the

same attempt for a third time, with the same result. Plaintiff asserts that as an indigent inmate, he

has the right to be furnished unlimited postage for correspondence with the courts and those

holding public office, including lawyers, district attorneys, and senators. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant “M”, a mailroom employee, improperly refused to process his mail, which caused a

delay in the filing and service of his petition and rendered his certificate of service, signed under

penalty of perjury, void. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Sergeant Stone was supervising the

mailroom employees at PVSP when the events at issue occurred. 

Based on the above allegations, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim for

denial of access to the courts upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff

does not allege facts showing that he suffered an actual injury. Plaintiff alleges that defendants

caused a delay in the filing and service of his habeas corpus petition, but plaintiff does not allege

any facts showing that “a nonfrivolous legal claim [was] frustrated or was being impeded” or

that he was shut out of court as a result of defendants’ actions. Furthermore, plaintiff does not

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have a constitutional right to postage, even if he is indigent. The Constitution does not provide

plaintiff with any guarantee that he may mail whatever he chooses free of charge so long as the

documents are being mailed to the courts, those holding public office, lawyers, district attorneys,

or senators. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

section 1983.

C. Claim against Sergeant Stone

In his complaint, plaintiff names as defendant Sergeant Stone, supervisor of PVSP

mailroom employees. Plaintiff states he is suing Stone in his official capacity for injunctive

relief. By this order, plaintiff is provided with the opportunity to file an amended complaint. In

amending his complaint, plaintiff is advised to carefully review the following legal standards

with respect to his claims against supervisory personnel such as Sergeant Stone. 

The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions under section 1983 against state officials

in their official capacity. See Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.

1997); Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1996); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469,

472 (9th Cir. 1992). For this reason, a damages claim against defendant Stone in his official

capacity is not cognizable and must be dismissed from the action. “However there is one

exception to this general rule: When sued for prospective injunctive relief, a state official in his

official capacity is considered a “person” for § 1983 purposes.” Doe, 131 F.3d at 839. “[A] suit

for prospective injunctive relief provides a narrow, but well-established, exception to Eleventh

Amendment immunity.” Id. (citing Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)) 

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in

their personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Ashker v. California Dep’t

of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168 (1997); Pena, 976 F.2d

at 472. “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for

actions [the official] takes under color of state law. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1988). Where plaintiff is seeking damages against a state official, such as in the instant action,

this “necessarily implies” a personal-capacity suit because an official-capacity suit would be

barred. See Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 n.16 (9th Cir.

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1994); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994);

Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To show a prima

facie case of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege facts indicating that supervisory

defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew

of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so

deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force

of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal

citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal

pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under Section 1983. 

See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Stone was supervising the PVSP mailroom employees

during the time when “M” refused to send plaintiff’s mail because plaintiff had not provided

postage. However, plaintiff has not alleged specific facts indicating that Stone personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, knew of the violations and failed

to act to prevent them, or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy

‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional

violation.’” Hansen,885 F.2d at 646. For this reason, plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief

against defendant Stone under section 1983. 

C. Due Process

1. Procedural

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 556 (1974). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim that he was

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deprived of a protected interest without procedural due process. 

2. Substantive

 “To establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required

to prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no

substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular

amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular

sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive

due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d

868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117

S. Ct. 1845 (1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). Plaintiff has not

alleged any facts that would support a claim that his rights under the substantive component of

the Due Process Clause were violated.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for which relief

can be granted under section 1983 against any of the defendants. The court will provide plaintiff

with an opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court

in this order, if he wishes. 

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his amended complaint how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The amended complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 362; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);

Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. 

Plaintiff is also advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an

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original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d

at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord

Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint,

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended

complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT,” refer to the

appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint

form;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED, with leave to amend, for failure to state a

claim. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff

shall:

a. File a First Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

court in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and pursue the action, but instead wishes to voluntarily dismiss

the case;

3. Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in a

recommendation that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 6, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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