Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07051/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07051-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karen Dixon
Appellant
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KAREN DIXON,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7051 

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 08-1475, Chief Judge Bruce E. 

Kasold. 

______________________ 

Decided: March 9, 2016 

______________________ 

HOLLY ELIZABETH STERRETT, Arnold & Porter, LLP, 

Denver, CO, argued for claimant-appellant. Also represented by THOMAS W. STOEVER, JR. 

ALEXANDER V. SVERDLOV, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. 

Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR.; Y. KEN LEE,

MARTIN J. SENDEK, Office of General Counsel, United 

States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

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2 DIXON v. MCDONALD

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. 

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

Karen Dixon, recently substituted as appellant for her 

deceased husband Donald Dixon, appeals a decision by 

the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans 

Court) dismissing her appeal based on a nonjurisdictional timeliness defense that Robert McDonald, 

Secretary of Veterans Affairs (the Secretary) 

waived. Because the Veterans Court does not have the 

sua sponte authority to grant the Secretary relief on a 

defense he waived, we reverse the dismissal of 

Mrs. Dixon’s appeal and remand for consideration on the 

merits. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Dixon served in the Army from 1979 through 

1992, including in the Persian Gulf War. Dixon v. 

Shinseki, 741 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Dixon 

I). Mr. Dixon was diagnosed in 2003 with sarcoidosis of 

the lungs and transverse myelitis. Id. He filed a claim 

with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) seeking 

benefits for his sarcoidosis, which he alleged was connected to his service. Id.

A VA regional office denied Mr. Dixon’s claim, and the 

Board of Veterans Appeals affirmed this 

denial. Id. Acting pro se, Mr. Dixon filed a notice of 

appeal with the Veterans Court. Id. He filed this notice 

of appeal late, sixty days beyond the 120-day filing 

deadline set out in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). Id.

The Veterans Court found that, because Mr. Dixon 

had filed late, it was without jurisdiction to hear his 

appeal or to take up any argument that equitable tolling 

excused his filing delay. J.A. 130. Although the Veterans 

Court offered no explanation for its determination that it 

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DIXON v. MCDONALD 3

lacked jurisdiction, it presumably believed itself bound by 

the Supreme Court’s Bowles opinion, which clarified that 

Article III appellate courts lack jurisdiction to excuse a 

filing delay when a notice of appeal has been filed out of 

time. See, e.g., Henderson v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 217, 221 

(2008) (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007)). 

After the Veterans Court dismissed Mr. Dixon’s appeal, 

the Supreme Court held that Bowles did not extend to 

appeals before the Veterans Court. Henderson v. 

Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 431 (2011). After determining 

that the Henderson holding would alter the reasoning 

underlying its dismissal of Mr. Dixon’s appeal, the Veterans Court informed Mr. Dixon that he could move to 

recall the mandate based on an equitable-tolling argument. Dixon I, 741 F.3d at 1371. He made this motion. 

Id.

The Veterans Court denied Mr. Dixon equitable tolling. Id. He obtained pro bono counsel and filed a request 

for reconsideration of this denial, but the Veterans Court 

denied that request too. Id. Mr. Dixon appealed, but 

then he died of his medical conditions while his appeal 

was pending before us. We reversed because the Veterans 

Court’s denial of an extension of time had effectively 

denied Mr. Dixon’s new pro bono counsel access to evidence he would need to prove his claim, and we remanded 

to the Veterans Court with instructions to consider the 

evidence Mr. Dixon obtained after the deadline. Id. at 

1379. On remand, the Veterans Court substituted Mrs. 

Dixon and requested briefing from the parties on whether 

equitable tolling excused Mr. Dixon’s late filing. Mrs. 

Dixon submitted evidence and argument supporting her 

claim that equitable tolling excused her husband’s filing 

delay. The Secretary responded by waiving1 his objection 

 

1 The Secretary’s briefing before the Veterans Court 

stated that “it appears the criteria [for equitable tolling] 

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4 DIXON v. MCDONALD

that Mr. Dixon filed his appeal out of time. Despite this 

waiver, the Veterans Court considered and rejected Mrs. 

Dixon’s equitable-tolling arguments sua sponte. It dismissed Mrs. Dixon’s appeal, granting the Secretary relief 

he had explicitly declined to seek on a defense he had 

waived. 

DISCUSSION

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(a). See Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000) (“The jurisdictional reach of the Veterans Court 

presents a question of law for our plenary review.”). 

In Henderson, the Supreme Court considered whether 

the 120-day period set out in 38 U.S.C. § 7266 to bring an 

appeal to the Veterans Court is jurisdictional in nature. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 434. It contrasted the 

language of § 7266 with that of the statute setting out an 

analogous time limit for appeals of Veterans Court decisions to the Federal Circuit. Id. at 438 (citing 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(a)). It found the time bar on appeals to the Federal Circuit to directly incorporate language from the jurisdictional time bars ordinarily applicable to appellate 

review of district courts, but § 7266 to use different language to describe its bar. Id. at 438–39. It found the 

placement of § 7266 in the enacting legislation—in a 

 

have been satisfied,” and that “the Secretary is unopposed 

to the application of equitable tolling.” J.A. 239–40. The 

Veterans Court took these statements not to be a waiver. 

The Veterans Court’s interpretation of these statements 

as anything but a waiver is incorrect, and both parties 

before us acknowledged during oral argument that the 

Secretary unambiguously waived his timeliness objection. We therefore engage the Veterans Court’s alternative reasoning that it can dismiss this case even in the 

face of a waiver. 

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DIXON v. MCDONALD 5

subchapter entitled “procedure”—to similarly provide no 

indication that Congress intended the time bar to be 

jurisdictional. Id. at 439. Lastly, it found Congress’s 

purpose in creating the Veterans Court—to “place a 

thumb on the scale in favor of veterans”—to imply that 

Congress could not have intended this time bar to subject 

veterans to the “harsh consequences that accompany the 

jurisdiction tag.” Id. at 440–41 (internal quotation and 

citation omitted). 

After the Supreme Court remanded Henderson to us, 

we in turn remanded the case without additional comment to the Veterans Court. On that remand, the Veterans Court considered a number of consolidated cases and 

issued an opinion captioned Bove v. Shinseki. 25 Vet. 

App. 136 (2011). The Veterans Court made a number of 

determinations as to how it would implement the Henderson holding that the statutory time bar was nonjurisdictional. It first held that, because the time bar is 

non-jurisdictional, equitable tolling may excuse a veteran’s failure to comply with it. Id. at 140. It went on to 

consider whether it had two types of sua sponte authority: 

(1) the authority to raise the time bar early at the outset 

of the proceedings, and (2) the authority to resolve whether an appeal is time-barred even in the face of a forfeiture 

or waiver by the Secretary. Id. at 140–43. It recognized 

that, as a general background rule, courts lack the authority to raise or resolve non-jurisdictional timeliness 

defenses sua sponte. Id. at 141 (citing John R. Sand & 

Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008)). It 

also noted that the Supreme Court has recognized an 

exception to this general rule where a district court considering a habeas petition may, under some circumstances, raise a non-jurisdictional timeliness defense sua 

sponte even after the state had failed to raise that defense. Id. (citing Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 

(2006)). Noting policy concerns—the need to prevent the 

Secretary from controlling the court’s docket by selectively 

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6 DIXON v. MCDONALD

raising the time bar and the court’s own interest in managing its docket—the Veterans Court determined itself to 

benefit from an exception to the general rule. Id. at 

143. It thus granted itself both the sua sponte authority 

to raise the timeliness issue early and the sua sponte 

authority to resolve this issue even in the face of a forfeiture or waiver by the Secretary. Id. 

In Checo v. Shinseki, we considered the first of the 

two types of sua sponte authority the Veterans Court 

granted itself in Bove: the authority to raise timeliness 

early and request preliminary briefing on it from the 

parties. 748 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In Checo, the 

Veterans Court had determined in its initial case screening that the veteran’s appeal might have been timebarred. Id. at 1376. As is apparently its general policy, it 

requested preliminary briefing specific to the issue of 

timeliness from both the veteran and the Secretary. Id. The veteran submitted briefing arguing that 

equitable tolling excused her filing delay, and the government submitted briefing asserting its defense and 

requesting dismissal because the facts did not satisfy the 

conditions for equitable tolling. The Veterans Court 

considered this briefing and granted the government the 

relief it sought on its defense. Id. at 1376. We held that 

the Veterans Court has broad autonomy to establish its 

own procedural rules, including the ability to identify an 

issue for early briefing. Id. at 1377–78. 

The case now before us presents the second type of 

sua sponte authority that the Veterans Court determined 

itself to have in Bove: the authority to resolve timeliness 

in the face of the Secretary’s waiver by granting him relief 

that he explicitly declined to seek. The Veterans Court 

erred in determining itself to have this power. It correctly 

recognized the “general rule” that courts cannot grant 

relief on a non-jurisdictional timeliness defense in the face 

of a waiver. J.A. 6; accord Bove, 25 Vet. App. at 141. Its 

conclusion that it fell within an exception to this general 

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DIXON v. MCDONALD 7

rule, however, was incorrect for three primary reasons: 

(1) it failed to account for statutory limits to its jurisdiction, (2) it misread the Supreme Court precedent creating 

an exception to the general rule, and (3) it misapprehended the relevant policy considerations. For these reasons, 

we overrule the Veterans Court’s holding in Bove that 

timeliness is not a matter subject to waiver by the Secretary. See Bove, 25 Vet. App. at 143. 

First, the Veterans Court failed to consider the statutory limits to its jurisdiction. “Courts created by statute 

can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.” 

Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 

818 (1988) (quoting Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 

(1850)). The Veterans Court was created by statute, so 

we look first to that statute to determine the scope of its 

authority. In doing so, we apply the interpretive canon 

that statutes benefitting veterans are to be construed in 

the veterans’ favor. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 441; King v. 

St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220–21 n.9 (1991); Coffy 

v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980). When 

Congress granted the Veterans Court jurisdiction, it 

included an explicit limit: the court may decide issues 

only “when presented.” 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a); see also 38 

U.S.C. § 7252(b) (limiting the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction to the scope of review set out in § 7261). The plain 

language of this limit suggests that the Veterans Court 

cannot consider a non-jurisdictional time bar that the 

government, through a waiver, has declined to “present[].” 

This jurisdictional grant echoes—and uses the same 

“when presented” language from—the Administrative 

Procedures Act’s grant of jurisdiction to Article III courts 

to review agency action. See Henderson, 562 U.S. at 432 

n.2 (comparing 5 U.S.C. § 706 to the Veterans Court’s 

scope of review under § 7261). The similarity between the 

limit Congress set for the Veterans Court and the corresponding limit for a type of case in Article III courts 

further suggests that Congress did not intend to grant the 

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8 DIXON v. MCDONALD

Veterans Court sua sponte powers that would set it apart 

from other courts. This statutory language does not 

conclusively resolve the question before us, but it implies 

that Congress intended the Veterans Court to abide by 

the general rule that would proscribe the sua sponte 

authority it asserted.2

Second, the Veterans Court misread Supreme Court 

precedent creating an exception to the general rule. It 

correctly recognized that the Supreme Court created an 

exception that applies in certain types of habeas cases. See Bove, 25 Vet. App. at 141 (citing Day, 547 U.S. at 

202). As an initial matter, habeas law may be of limited 

applicability to other areas of law. See Menominee Indian 

Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 756 n.2 

(2016) (“[W]e have never held that [the habeas] equitabletolling test necessarily applies outside the habeas context.”). For instance, habeas procedure is governed in 

part by a special set of rules that grants courts some 

additional sua sponte powers. See Day, 547 U.S. at 207 

(quoting Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases in the United States District Courts and noting 

district courts’ sua sponte authority to consider and 

 

2 We note that the language of § 7261(a) does not 

conflict with our Checo holding. The “when presented” 

language only limits the Veterans Court’s authority to 

decide an issue and grant relief, not to request early 

briefing on it. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1)–(4). In Checo, after 

the Veterans Court requested early briefing on timeliness, 

the Secretary “presented” the issue for purposes of 

§ 7621(a) by taking the position in that briefing that 

equitable tolling did not excuse Ms. Checo’s violation of 

the time bar. See Checo v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 130, 132 

(2013). 

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DIXON v. MCDONALD 9

dismiss petitions before the government has filed any 

pleading). A holding that a court has enhanced sua 

sponte powers when reviewing a habeas case therefore 

may not imply the same for the Veterans Court. Additionally, the Day exception does not extend to the procedural scenario we face here, where the government has 

explicitly waived its defense. In Day, the Supreme Court 

allowed a district court to reach a defense that the state 

had accidentally forfeited by mistakenly failing to raise it 

in its pleadings. 547 U.S. at 202. It noted in dictum that 

the district court could not have reached this defense had 

the state deliberately waived it. Id. When faced with a 

deliberate waiver in a later habeas case, the Supreme 

Court confirmed that a court cannot consider a knowingly 

waived non-jurisdictional timeliness defense. Wood v. 

Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (2012). Therefore, even if 

the Day exception extends to veterans appeals, it does not 

permit the Veterans Court to reach the issue when, as 

here, the Secretary deliberately waived it. 

Third, the Veterans Court based its extension of the 

Day exception to veterans appeals on a misapprehension 

of the relevant policy considerations. We are aware of no 

other court that has the sua sponte authority to resolve a 

deliberately waived non-jurisdictional timeliness defense. 

Nonetheless, the Veterans Court determined itself exceptional because the Secretary is always the defendant 

before it and because it has an interest in enforcing nonjurisdictional time bars independent of the Secretary’s 

interest. But neither of these considerations sets the 

Veterans Court apart from other tribunals. For example, 

in criminal law “the Executive Branch has exclusive 

authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to 

prosecute a [federal] case,” U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 

693 (1974), but courts claim no special powers springing 

from the executive’s control over their criminal dockets. And the Veterans Court cannot reasonably claim its 

interest in controlling its own docket sets it apart from 

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10 DIXON v. MCDONALD

any other tribunal: judges generally must respect parties’ 

waivers of statutes of limitations, laches, and other nonjurisdictional timeliness defenses, even when these defenses would allow the court to avoid stale evidence, 

missing witnesses, and additional caseload. The only 

policy consideration relevant here that truly sets the 

Veterans Court apart from other tribunals is Congress’s 

intention in creating it to “place a thumb on the scale in 

the veteran’s favor.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440 (internal 

quotation and citation omitted). The policy considerations 

therefore suggest that the Veterans Court should not 

employ—at the expense of the veterans Congress created 

it to serve—an extension of the Day exception. 

The Secretary introduces an additional argument in 

support of the Veterans Court’s sua sponte authority to 

resolve this timeliness issue in the face of his waiver. We 

have recognized “the Veterans Court[’s] broad discretion 

to prescribe, interpret, and apply its own rules.” Checo, 

748 F.3d at 1377. The Secretary argues that, even if 

statute does not provide the Veterans Court the sua 

sponte authority it exercised, its inclusion of an identical 

time bar in its rules grants it this authority. See Veterans 

Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 4. This 

argument fails. The text of the rules contains nothing 

suggesting that the Veterans Court has a special power to 

enforce their time bar. Instead, the rules merely rephrase 

the statutory time bar in nearly identical language. Compare Veterans Court’s Rules of Practice and 

Procedure, Rule 4, with 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). A regulation 

parroting a statute does not somehow grant an agency or 

tribunal more expansive authority by rulemaking than it 

has under the statutory language. Parker v. Office of 

Pers. Mgmt., 974 F.3d 164, 167 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing 

Felzien v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 930 F.2d 898, 902 (Fed. 

Cir. 1991)). We therefore find these rules not to create 

any special sua sponte authority. 

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DIXON v. MCDONALD 11

CONCLUSION

The Veterans Court correctly recognized that, as a 

general rule, a court does not have the sua sponte authority to grant a party relief on a non-jurisdictional timeliness defense that the party has waived. It erred, 

however, in determining that it falls within an exception 

to this rule. Therefore, we reverse the Veterans Court’s 

determination that it had the authority to dismiss this 

appeal as time-barred and remand so that it may proceed 

with its consideration of the appeal on the merits. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

No costs. 

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