Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01412/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01412-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Octavio Delvillar
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 07-1412

________________

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Octavio Delvillar,

Appellant.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

District of Nebraska.

[UNPUBLISHED]

________________

Submitted: November 12, 2007

 Filed: November 26, 2007

________________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

________________

PER CURIAM.

Octavio Delvillar appeals from his conviction for possession with the intent to

distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable

amount of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Delvillar's post-briefing, pro-se

Motion to Amend Direct Appeal is also before this court. We deny Delvillar's motion

to amend, and we affirm his conviction. 

Appellate Case: 07-1412 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/26/2007 Entry ID: 3375482
1

 The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

-2-

I.

Early in the morning on April 6, 2005, Nebraska State Trooper David Frye

pulled over Delvillar's Ford Excursion for multiple traffic violations. Delvillar was

traveling with a passenger named Fernando Nunez. In the course of this traffic stop,

Delvillar gave Trooper Frye oral and written consent to search his vehicle. During

Frye's subsequent investigation, he discovered a hidden, after-market compartment

underneath the vehicle. Trooper Frye then handcuffed Delvillar and Nunez and placed

them in his patrol car. The vehicle was towed to the Nebraska State Patrol Office in

Lincoln, where the compartment was searched. During the search, Troopers

discovered 25 packages storing a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine.

The packages were substantially similar in weight, and the single package weighed by

the Nebraska State Patrol criminalistics laboratory totaled just under one kilogram.

In May 2005, Delvillar and Nunez were both indicted for knowingly and

intentionally possessing with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a

mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. After a three-day trial, the jury found

both Delvillar and Nunez guilty. The district court1

 sentenced Delvillar to 151 months

of imprisonment. This appeal follows.

II.

Delvillar's primary argument on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to

support the jury's verdict. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

de novo. United States v. Honarvar, 477 F.3d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 2007). We view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and will "reverse only if no

Appellate Case: 07-1412 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/26/2007 Entry ID: 3375482
-3-

reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United

States v. Spears, 454 F.3d 830, 832 (8th Cir. 2006). In reviewing the evidence, we do

not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence; these judgments

are squarely committed to the jury. Id. 

To convict a defendant of possession with the intent to distribute a controlled

substance, the government is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant: "(1) was in possession of [the controlled substance] ; (2) knew he was in

possession of [the controlled substance] ; and (3) intended to distribute some or all of

the [controlled substance]." United States v. Jenkins, No. 06-4136, 2007 WL

2963750, at *3 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2007). "Proof of constructive possession is sufficient

to satisfy the element of knowing possession." United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez,

239 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2001). To establish constructive possession, the

government is required to prove that the defendant had "knowledge and ownership,

dominion, or control over the contraband itself, or dominion over the vehicle in which

the contraband is concealed." United States v. Johnson, 470 F.3d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.

2006) (internal marks omitted), cert. denied, 2007 WL 2004796 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2007)

and 2007 WL 2818065 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007).

Specifically, Delvillar contends that the evidence is insufficient to permit a

reasonable jury to conclude that Delvillar knew he was transporting a substance

containing cocaine. We respectfully disagree.

The government's evidence showed that Delvillar bought, owned, and was in

control of the Ford Excursion carrying 25 packages of cocaine. This substance was

hidden in a concealed compartment affixed to the underside of the vehicle. Delvillar's

ownership of and control over the vehicle standing alone supports the jury's

determination that Delvillar knowingly possessed the cocaine. See United States v.

Flores, 474 F.3d 1100, 1105 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Flores's dominion over the vehicle alone

could support a finding that he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine . . . ."). 

Appellate Case: 07-1412 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/26/2007 Entry ID: 3375482
-4-

But we need not rely on this evidence alone. The jury's verdict is also

supported by Trooper Frye's discovery of air fresheners inside the vehicle, an item

commonly used to mask the odor of illegal drugs. See id. (discussing circumstantial

evidence supporting the jury's verdict, including the discovery of multiple cell phones

and air fresheners). Furthermore, Trooper Frye testified that Delvillar appeared

extremely nervous during the traffic stop. See United States v. Timlick, 481 F.3d

1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that the defendant's nervousness during a traffic

stop is a fact that a reasonable jury may "interpret as suggesting a consciousness of

guilt"). Additionally, Delvillar and Nunez gave inconsistent accounts of how he and

Nunez met, and Delvillar made several false statements to Trooper Frye regarding the

vehicle and the details of his trip. See id. (noting that the inconsistent accounts of the

defendant and the passenger supported the inference that the defendant had knowledge

that illegal drugs were hidden inside the vehicle). Just as damaging was the way that

Delvillar chastised Nunez for straying from their agreed-upon story after Trooper Frye

placed them in his patrol car, a conversation that was recorded unbeknownst to

Delvillar and Nunez. This circumstantial evidence supports the jury's determination

that Delvillar knew that there was cocaine hidden in the vehicle.

The government also offered evidence tending to show that at the time Delvillar

purchased the Ford Excursion, there was no hidden compartment affixed to the

vehicle. Delvillar purchased the Excursion from The Auto Yard on March 16, 2005,

paying cash. The Auto Yard purchased the vehicle from Quincy's Auto Auction on

January 10, 2005, and the owner of the Auto Yard testified that The Auto Yard would

not have performed any body work on the Excursion before it sold the vehicle to

Delvillar. Further, the general manager of Quincy Auto testified that Quincy Auto's

vehicle-condition report of December 9, 2004, indicated no frame damage or

alterations. Quincy Auto's records also indicated that no work was done on the

vehicle before it was sold to The Auto Yard. This evidence is sufficient to permit a

reasonable jury to infer that Delvillar facilitated the construction of the hidden, afterAppellate Case: 07-1412 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/26/2007 Entry ID: 3375482
-5-

market compartment, which in turn supports the jury's determination that Delvillar

knew that cocaine was hidden in the concealed compartment.

Delvillar relies on United States v. Mendoza-Larios, 416 F.3d 872 (8th Cir.

2005), and United States v. Pace, 922 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1990), to support his

contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding of knowing

possession. In Mendoza and Pace, we concluded that there was insufficient evidence

to support the defendants' convictions for possession with the intent to distribute

illegal drugs, even though the defendants were driving vehicles containing illegal

drugs hidden in concealed compartments. Mendoza, 416 F.3d at 876 (noting that

neither defendant was nervous, both gave generally consistent stories, and both were

cooperative); Pace, 922 F.2d at 453 (noting that the defendant had no reason to know

drugs were contained in the other traveler's luggage). But here, unlike the evidence

produced in Mendoza and Pace, the government's case is sufficient to prove that

Delvillar bought and owned the Excursion, and that Delvillar constructed the

compartment in which the substance containing cocaine was concealed. Cf. Mendoza,

416 F.3d at 873 (noting that neither defendant owned the vehicle); Pace, 922 F.2d at

452 (noting that the defendant did not own the vehicle or the luggage containing the

drugs). Delvillar and Nunez's incriminating conversation in Trooper Frye's patrol car

combined with the other circumstantial evidence cited above also makes the

government's evidence here stronger than that in Mendoza and Pace. While

superficially similar, Mendoza and Pace in no way foreclose our ultimate conclusion

that the evidence is sufficient to support Delvillar's conviction. 

Based on the foregoing evidence and analysis, we conclude that the

government's case is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that Delvillar knew he was in possession of five kilograms of cocaine. 

Appellate Case: 07-1412 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/26/2007 Entry ID: 3375482
-6-

III.

After briefing, Delvillar filed a pro-se motion to amend his direct appeal, which

was referred to the panel considering the merits of the appeal. In Delvillar's

supplementary brief, he contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated in

the course of Trooper Frye's traffic stop and subsequent investigation. Because it is

not our practice to consider pro se briefs submitted by counseled parties, we deny

Delvillar's motion to amend. See United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408, 411 n.2 (8th

Cir. 2007) (summarily dismissing defendant's pro se filings); United States v.

Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 734 n.7 (8th Cir. 1997) ("It is not our practice to consider pro

se briefs filed by parties represented by counsel . . . .").

Delvillar's motion to amend is denied. The judgment of the district court is

affirmed. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 07-1412 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/26/2007 Entry ID: 3375482