Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00676/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00676-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California State Grange
Counter Claimant
National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry
Counter Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

THE NATIONAL GRANGE OF THE 

ORDER OF PATRONS OF 

HUSBANDRY, a District of 

Columbia nonprofit 

corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE, a 

California corporation,

 Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:14-00676 WBS DAD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: ENTRY 

OF FINAL JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT 

INJUNCTION

----oo0oo----

In an Order dated July 14, 2015, the court granted 

plaintiff National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry’s 

motion for summary judgment and held that, “upon entry of final 

judgment in this action defendant and its agents, affiliates, and 

assigns, or any party acting in concert with defendant and its 

agents, affiliates, and assigns, shall be permanently enjoined 

from using marks containing the word ‘Grange.’” (July 14, 2015 

Order at 19:28-20:4 (Docket No. 60).) The parties now stipulate 

Case 2:14-cv-00676-WBS-DB Document 85 Filed 09/30/15 Page 1 of 6
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to plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice of its claims

for damages and plaintiff seeks entry of final judgment and 

issuance of the permanent injunction. 

Plaintiff specifically requests that the court issue 

the following injunction: 

Plaintiff National Grange is granted final judgment 

permanently enjoining Defendant and its agents, 

affiliates, and assigns, or any party acting in 

concert with defendant and its agents, affiliates, and 

assigns, from using any name or mark containing the 

word “Grange,” including without limitation “Grange,” 

“Granger,” “California Grange,” “California State 

Grange,” or any word, acronym, abbreviation or 

initialism confusingly similar thereto, including 

without limitation “CG” and “CSG.”

Within 14 days of the date of this Order, Defendant 

shall transfer to Plaintiff National Grange the 

registration for the domain name 

www.CaliforniaGrange.org and the registrations for any 

domain names containing the word “Grange,” including 

without limitation the words “Grange,” “Granger,” 

“California Grange,” “California State Grange,” or any 

word, acronym, abbreviation or initialism confusingly 

similar thereto, including without limitation “CG” and 

“CSG.”

It is hereby further ordered that immediately upon the 

entry of this order, Defendant and its agents, 

affiliates, and assigns, or any party acting in 

concert with defendant and its agents, affiliates, and 

assigns, are permanently enjoined from representing or 

asserting, by words or actions, that they are 

affiliated or connected in any way with the Grange 

organization, including Plaintiff National Grange or 

any State, Pomona, or local community Grange.

(Docket No. 75 at 3-4.) Defendant opposes the request. The 

scope of this proposed injunction exceeds the allegations in

plaintiff’s Complaint and the court’s finding on summary judgment 

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that defendant “shall be permanently enjoined from using marks 

containing the word ‘Grange.’”

Plaintiff’s proposed injunction extends to defendant’s 

use of the word “Granger” and the acronyms “CSG” and “CG.” In 

the Complaint, however, plaintiff alleges only that defendant’s 

use of its “GRANGE Marks” infringes plaintiff’s trademarks. 

(E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 3, 10, 53, 69, 81, 97 (Docket No. 1).) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant infringed on ten registered 

trademarks, which were limited to “NATIONAL GRANGE,” “THE GRANGE 

FOUNDATION,” “NATIONAL GRANGE OF THE ORDER OF PATRONS OF 

HUSBANDRY,” two trademarks for “P OF H GRANGE,” and five 

trademarks for “GRANGE.” (Id. ¶ 20.) All of the allegations in 

the Complaint are limited to those “GRANGE Marks.” 

In its prayer for relief, plaintiff sought to enjoin 

defendant “from using the GRANGE Marks or any other mark, 

corporate name or trade name that contains the word GRANGE, or 

any other trademarks confusingly similar to the GRANGE Marks . . 

. .” (Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added).) While it could have been 

alleged that “Granger” and the acronyms “CSG” and “CG” are 

“trademarks confusingly similar to the GRANGE Marks,” plaintiff 

made no such allegations in its Complaint nor did plaintiff seek

summary judgment as to defendant’s use of “Granger” or the

acronyms. In fact, the Complaint does not even allege that 

defendant uses “Granger,” “CSG,” or any other offending acronym.1

 

1 Although plaintiff cites two cases in which acronyms 

were protected, whether the acronyms were in fact trademarks was 

litigated in those cases. See U.S. Jaycees v. San Francisco Jr. 

Chamber of Commerce, 354 F. Supp. 61, 66 (N.D. Cal. 1972) 

(finding that plaintiff “owns the trademark[] . . . ‘J.C.’”); 

Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Problem Pregnancy of 

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That plaintiff is especially concerned about 

defendant’s use of “CSG” is of no surprise in light of 

defendant’s conduct since the court issued its July 14, 2015 

Order. In what appears to be a game of “gotcha,” defendant 

registered itself as doing business as the “California State 

Guild” only eight days after learning it would be enjoined from 

using “Grange.” (McFarland Decl. Ex. C (Docket No. 78-3).) 

According to defendant, “CSG” is simply its acronym for the new

“California State Guild.” (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) It is merely a 

convenient coincidence that this “new” acronym happens to be the 

same acronym defendant used when it went by “California State 

Grange.” (See Komski Decl. Ex. 4 (Docket No. 83-5) (numerous 

publications showing defendant’s use of “CSG” prior to 2015).)

While plaintiff’s concerns may be real, the Complaint 

defines the scope of this litigation and it neither sought 

trademark protection of nor requested the court enjoin defendant 

from using “Granger,” “CSG,” or “CG.” Because summary judgment 

was limited to the use of “Grange,” whether “Granger” or the 

acronyms are protected trademarks was never litigated or before 

the court. The court must therefore limit the permanent 

injunction to the relief requested in the Complaint and the 

trademark upon which it granted summary judgment. See Crawford 

 

Worcester, Inc., 498 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (Mass. 1986) (affirming 

the lower court’s finding “of secondary meaning as it was clearly 

established that the initials ‘PP’ were strongly associated with 

the organization Planned Parenthood in the public eye”). 

Similarly, in Wolfard Glassblowing Co. v. Vanbragt, the permanent 

injunction issued pursuant to the consent judgment had prohibited 

defendant from making “colorable imitations” of plaintiff’s 

product and the Ninth Circuit was applying the terms of that 

injunction. See 118 F.3d 1320, 1321-23 (9th Cir. 1997).

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v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] court may not, 

without the consent of all persons affected, enter a judgment 

which goes beyond the claim asserted in the pleadings.” (quoting 

Brawner v. Pearl Assurance Co., 267 F.2d 45, 47 n.2 (9th Cir.

1958))); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2) (“When an issue not 

raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or 

implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised 

in the pleadings.”) (emphasis added). 

For the first time in this case, plaintiff also 

requests that the court require defendant to transfer to 

plaintiff “the registration for the domain name[s]” that include 

the word “Grange.” Although the permanent injunction would 

preclude defendant from using a domain name with “Grange” in it, 

plaintiff neither sought in the Complaint nor articulated in its 

current motion why the court should require defendant to transfer 

that property to plaintiff. See Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini, 

596 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]omain names are intangible 

property under California law.”). The court therefore will not

require defendant to transfer any property, including a domain 

name or Grange regalia, to plaintiff. 

Lastly, plaintiff requests that the court enjoin 

defendant “from representing or asserting, by words or actions, 

that they are affiliated or connected in any way with the Grange 

organization, including Plaintiff National Grange or any State, 

Pomona, or local community Grange.” While defendant’s 

disaffiliation from plaintiff is undisputed, (see July 14, 2015 

Order at 2:16-20), its representation of or affiliations with any

local Grange was not at issue in this case and is currently being 

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litigated in state court. Again, the court will not enjoin 

conduct that was not raised in the Complaint or litigated in the 

case.2

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s claims for 

damages, including but necessarily limited to recovery of profits 

under 25 U.S.C. § 1117, are dismissed with prejudice and the 

trial date of October 14, 2015 is VACATED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that final judgment be entered 

permanently enjoining defendant and its agents, affiliates, and 

assigns, or any party acting in concert with defendant and its 

agents, affiliates, and assigns from using marks containing the 

word “Grange.”

Dated: September 29, 2015

 

2 To the extent defendant suggests the injunction should 

not extend to “any party acting in concert with defendant and its 

agents, affiliates, and assigns,” defendant is mistaken. This is 

the precise language the court used in its Order granting summary 

judgment. (July 14, 2015 Order at 19:28-20:4); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 65(d)(2) (proving that an injunction binds “(A) the 

parties; (B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, 

and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or 

participation with anyone described in . . . (A) or (B).”); 

(accord Compl. at 21-22 (requesting the court enjoin “all person 

in active concert or participation with Defendant”).)

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