Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03217/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03217-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Perry A. Graham
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 7, 1995 Decided May 21, 1996

Nos. 93-3217, 93-3218, 94-3001

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

PERRY A. GRAHAM,

APPELLANT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TERRENCE A. TERRELL

APPELLANT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROGER V. SMITH,

APPELLANT

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cr00287-01)

(No. 92cr00287-02)

(No. 92cr00287-03)

Robert E. Sanders, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant

Terrence A. Terrell.

Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant Roger V.

Smith.

Pleasant S. Brodnax, III, appointed by the court, was on the briefs for appellant Perry A. Graham.

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E. Vaughn Dunnigan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee with whom

Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, LynnC. Leibovitz,

Elizabeth H. Danello, and Geoffrey Bestor, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: RANDOLPH, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Perry A. Graham, Terrence A. Terrell, and Roger V. Smith appeal

their convictions of conspiring together and with others to distribute 50 grams or more of crack

cocaine and of several individual counts of distributing crack cocaine. They also appeal their life

sentences. Although we affirm their convictions, we vacate their sentences and remand for the district

court to resolve their factual challenges to the presentence report as required by Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1) and to make individualized findings as to whether the amount of crack

cocaine attributed to each appellant was within the scope ofthe conspiratorial agreement entered into

by that appellant and reasonably foreseeable by him. We also direct the district court to determine

whether Terrell's claimed vulnerability to prison abuse warrants a downward departure and whether

record evidence existsto support the upward enhancement of hissentence for his alleged managerial

role.

I.

The three appellants in this case were charged with conspiring together and with others from

July 1990 to January 1992 to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base (crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 21 U.S.C. § 846.

Appellants were also charged with eleven individual counts of distribution on specific dates between

July 1990 and January 1992 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Other members of the alleged

conspiracy were indicted separately; some, not now before us, were charged as "drug kingpins";

others pleaded guilty before trial.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, see United States v. Tarantino, 846

F.2d 1384, 1391 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 840, and 488 U.S. 867 (1988), the evidence at

trial established that the three appellants were part ofthe "Newton Street Crew," a cocaine trafficking

organization involving more than twenty people which operated on Newton Street between 14th

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Street and 16th Street from June 1987 until police shut it down through mass arrests on July 29,

1992. The Newton Street Crew consisted of three different "cliques" or groups of people selling

drugs together at three Newton Street locations. Mark Hoyle and John McCullough, the heads of

the Newton Street Crew, distributed crack through "lieutenants" in the three cliques, who in turn

distributed the drugs to "runners." Runners sold the crack to other runners or directly to customers.

Appellants were members of the same clique. They operated at the center of Newton Street

between 14th Street and 15th Street. Appellants Graham and Smith were lieutenants. After receiving

drugsfromHoyle, theydistributed themto runners, butsometimessold the drugs directlythemselves.

Operating just below Graham and Smith, Terrell functioned somewhere between lieutenant and

runner: he received drugs from Graham and Frank Lynch, another Crew lieutenant not before us,

selling the drugs directly to customers or through runners.

After the jury convicted appellants of all counts, the district court sentenced them to life

imprisonment on the conspiracy count and one to ten years on each of the remaining counts, all

sentences to run concurrently. Appellants now challenge their convictions and sentences.

II.

We begin with appellants' challenges to their convictions.

SINGLE V. MULTIPLE CONSPIRACY

Appellants first argue that the record contains insufficient evidence to convict them of the

conspiracy charged in the indictment. They argue that instead of proving a single overarching

conspiracy in which all three appellants were working together and with others towards a common

goal, the Government's evidence establishes only multiple conspiraciesseparate, unrelated, or at

most casually related, transactions. According to appellants, the evidence establishes no

interdependence or mutual benefit between the "cliques" selling drugs on Newton Street, or between

appellants' clique and Hoyle. Appellants second and related claim is that the evidence of multiple

conspiracies presented at trial materially varied from that charged in the indictment, depriving them

of a fair trial. Variance is grounds for reversal only if appellants can show that the variance is material

and that it substantially prejudiced them, such as by causing the jury to "transfer evidence from one

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conspiracy to a defendant involved in another." Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1391 (citation omitted).

Our role in reviewing these claims is limited. "[V]iewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution," we ask whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of[conspiracy] beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d

1128, 1135-36 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (internal

quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 98 (1994). The essential element of conspiracy

is an agreement with at least one other person to violate the law. See United States v. Lam KwongWah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In determining whether a single conspiracy existed, as

opposed to separate unrelated activities or multiple conspiracies, we look for several factors,

including whether participants shared a common goal ("such as the possession and distribution of

narcotics for profit"); interdependence between the alleged participants in the conspiracy; and,

though less significant, overlap among alleged participants. Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1393.

Applying these standards, we review the record to determine whether the Government

presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that a drug-selling conspiracy controlled by

Mark Hoyle and joined by appellants operated onNewton Street. Six Government witnesses testified

to the existence of the conspiracy and to appellants' participation in it: Kenneth Forgy, Jr., an

associate of Mark Hoyle, who distributed drugs on Newton Street until his arrest in 1989; Lazaro

Santa Cruz and Frank Lynch, lieutenants in the Newton Street Crew; William "Poopie" Woodfork,

a member of appellants' clique; Cornelius "Googie" Wooten, a member of the Newton Street Crew

distributing drugs on the 16th Street end of Newton Street; and Anthony Pratt, a former drug dealer

turned informant. Several of these witnesses testified that Hoyle was the common source of drugs

on Newton Street, tr. 7/16/93, at 28; that Hoyle, "the boss," managed the "business" on Newton

Street, tr. 7/16/93, at 34; 7/20/93, at 60-61; that appellants sold crack supplied by HoyleGraham

and Smith receiving from Hoyle directly and Terrell receiving his share from Graham, tr. 7/29/93, at

30; and that appellants either paid Hoyle upfront or after selling their share of drugs on the street,

tr. 7/26/93, at 31-34. According to the Government's witnesses, appellants were members of one of

the three cliques operating as part of the Newton Street Crew. Tr. 7/20/93, at 10-11, 13; 7/26/93,

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at 31; 7/29/93, at 25-29. Witnesses testified that although the cliques did not share profits with

members of other cliques and sometimes competed with each other for sales, tr. 7/27/93, at 130-31,

they all shared a common goal: selling Hoyle's cocaine for profit. See, e.g., tr. 7/15/93, at 178-79

("[T]here were different little cliques amongst one huge clique on Newton Street, but all of us got

our drugs from [Hoyle]"). Hoyle supplied the cliques and all proceeds went to him. Tr. 7/29/93, at

41-43. Moreover, the cliques were interdependent. Participants served as police look-outs for other

cliques. Tr. 7/20/93, at 65. When one clique ran out of cocaine, buyers were sent to another clique

to make a purchase. Tr. 7/16/93, at 38-39. Members of different cliques sometimes worked together

to store, bag, and distribute cocaine. Tr. 7/16/93, at 38-39; 7/20/93, at 26-27; 7/30/93, at 33-35.

We have no doubt that this evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that

appellants and others shared the common goal of distributing crack cocaine for profit and that the

cliques were dependent on each other and on Hoyle. Because the evidence was sufficient, any

variance from the indictment did not substantially prejudice the appellants. See United States v.

Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 709-15 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding no prejudicial variance where sufficient

evidence existed of single conspiracy), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 825 (1996); Tarantino, 846 F.2d at

1393-94 (analyzing variance under sufficiency standard).

Appellants argue that the district court improperly denied their request for a jury instruction

on multiple conspiracies. Our rejection of appellants' insufficiency claim does not obviate the need

to addressthisissue, for ifrecord evidence supportsthe existence ofmultiple conspiracies, the district

court should have so instructed the jury. See Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1400 ("trial court ... required

to instruct on the defendant's theory of the case if supported by the evidence"); United States v.

Shorter, 54 F.3d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 250 (1995). To convict, the jury

must find appellants guilty of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, not some other, separate

conspiracy.

Appellants requested the following instruction:

In this case, the defendants contend that the government's proof failsto show

the existence of the conspiracy charged in Count I of the indictment. Rather, they

claim that if an agreement to distribute cocaine base existed then there were actually

several different separate and independent conspiracies with various members,

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constituting multiple conspiracies.

Proofofseveralseparate and independent conspiraciesis not necessarilyproof

of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, unless one or more of those conspiracies

proved happens to be one of the conspiracies charged in the indictment. However,

if you are satisfied that such a conspiracy existed then you must go further; you must

determine who were the members of that conspiracy.

The district court refused to give this instruction because it found no evidence of a "different"

conspiracy from that charged in the indictment. We think the district court was correct. If the

evidence had shown that all three appellants did not conspire together, but that Grahamwasinvolved

in a conspiracy with Santa Cruz or that Smith was involved in another separate conspiracy with

Hoyle, then appellants' proposed instruction would have been necessary. But as the district court

found, there was no such evidence. Rather, the evidence showed that appellants worked together and

with Hoyle and others to distribute cocaine. Appellants' suggestion that the three cliques may have

actually formed three separate conspiracies, even if supported by record evidence, would not help

them; the evidence showed that appellants were part of the same clique, and thus part of the

conspiracy charged in the indictment.

FORGY'S TESTIMONY

Appellants argue that the district court violated Rule 404(b)'s restriction on prior bad acts

evidence by admitting the testimony of Kenneth Forgy, a Government witness who testified to

appellants' alleged criminal activity up to three years preceding the conspiracy for which appellants

were indicted. Although forbidding evidence of other crimes or bad acts "to prove the character of

a person in order to show action in conformity therewith," Rule 404(b) allows such evidence "for

other purposes,such as proof of motive, ... intent, ... [or] knowledge." If relevant to other purposes,

the evidence is admissible as long as its "probative value is [not] substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice." FED.R.EVID. 403; see also United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 775

(D.C. Cir.) (describing two-step analysis), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 327 (1995). We review the district

court's decision to admit "other crimes" evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Watson, 894 F.2d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Forgy's testimony focussed on the drug distribution activities on Newton Street from 1987

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when he arrived there, until his arrest in late 1989. Forgy testified that beginning in 1987, he, Hoyle,

Graham, and Terrellsold cocaine on Park Place in Mount Pleasant, tr. 7/14/93, at 76; that Hoyle "ran

[the Park Place] group," id. at 78; that he and Hoyle moved to Newton Street after a dispute with

others selling near Park Place, id. at 79-80; that he, Hoyle, Graham, Terrell, and others began

distributing on Newton Street in about 1987, id. at 81-82; that Hoyle organized all the sellers on

Newton Street, id. at 83, 87, 111; that Smith began working with Hoyle in 1989, id. at 88, 111-13;

that the group, including appellants, sold on Newton Street every day, id. at 98-99; that Terrell and

Graham worked together, id. at 111; and that Graham and Smith distributed drugs together, id. at

115. Although this testimony related to events taking place outside the indicted period, because it

focussed on the origin and scope of the Newton Street conspiracy in which appellants participated,

it was relevant to establish the formation and contours of the conspiracy and to show appellants'

knowledge of the conspiracy and their intent to join. See United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 776

(7th Cir. 1994) (holding prior bad acts evidence admissible to "show the formation of the conspiracy

or the prior relationship between conspirators"). Forgy's testimony was therefore admissible under

Rule 404(b).

The question then is whether Forgy's testimony was substantially more prejudicial than

probative. Although the district court admitted the evidence, it failed to perform the Rule 403

balancing on the record. We do not reverse for failure to make such a balancing, however, " "if the

considerations germane to balancing probative value versus prejudicial effect are readily apparent

from the record.' " United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting United

States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990). We

think they are. The district court characterized the evidence as relevant to "the formation of the

larger conspiracy which is the thrust of the government's case." Tr. 7/15/93, at 5-6. The district

court also gave a limiting instruction, cautioning the jury to consider the evidence only to the extent

that it related to the Government's theory "that on Newton Street there was a master conspiracy of

which the conspiracy charged in thisindictment is a part," not "to infer that because [appellants] may

have done things between 1985 and 1990 they are, therefore, guilty of the offenses with which they

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stand charged under the indictment on trial here." Tr. 7/15/93, at 118. To us, these statements

suggest that the district court found that the probative value of the evidence in establishing the

contours of the conspiracy was not substantially outweighed by the risk that the jury would make

inferences about appellants' propensity to commit the charged offenses. On the basis of these

statements, together with our own review of Forgy'stestimony, we find no abuse of discretion by the

district court.

Appellants have a second argument based on Forgy's testimony. Relying on Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), they claim the Government failed to disclose a deposition in which

Forgy recounts his participation in several drug-related murders, as well asthe results of a polygraph

test in which he admitted committing two murders but allegedly gave several deceptive responses

when asked about the involvement of others in the murders. Appellants say they would have used

both the deposition and the polygraph to impeachForgy. When a witness's credibility is determinative

of guilt or innocence, such impeachment evidence issubject to Brady's disclosure requirements. See

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Under Brady, evidence is considered "material"

and thus must be disclosed by the government if there is a reasonable probabilitythat is, a "

"probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' "that "had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different." United States v.

Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 135-36 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682

(1985) (Opinion ofBlackmun,J.)). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(C) likewise requires

disclosure of information "material to the preparation of the defendant's defense." Under Rule 16,

evidence is material if "there is a strong indication that it will "play an important role in uncovering

admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, ... or assisting impeachment or rebuttal.' " United

States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. George, 786 F. Supp.

56, 58 (D.D.C.1992) (in turn quoting United States v. Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179, 186 (D.D.C. 1979))).

Although the materiality standard is "not a heavy burden," id. at 351, the Government need disclose

Rule 16 material only if it " "enable[s] the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his

favor.' " United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d 158, 164 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting United

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States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975)).

We are not persuaded that the polygraph results would have significantly aided impeachment.

As the district court found, Forgy "had already admitted to the deceptions in other contexts in the

course of direct examination, and there is a limit to the number of deceptions which operate for

impeachment." Tr. 8/2/93, at 63. Appellants have likewise failed to show what additional

impeachment information theywould have learned fromthe deposition. On direct examination, Forgy

admitted that he had participated in three killings, including the two at issue in the deposition.

Pleading guilty to having committed two, he was convicted at trial of the other. Tr. 7/14/93, at 67,

70. Defense counsel cross-examined Forgy extensively about the killings. Tr. 7/14/93, at 132-37,

142-44. Because the jury was well-aware of Forgy's involvement in several killings and previous

deceptions, we think it unlikely that any additional impeachment of Forgy would have significantly

altered the quantumof proofin appellants'favor, much less produced a different outcome. Cf. United

States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (impeachment evidence is cumulative "only if the

witness was already impeached at trial by the same kind of evidence").

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Appellants claim that the district court restricted their cross-examination of Government

witnessesin violation ofthe ConfrontationClause ofthe Sixth Amendment. See Davis v. Alaska, 415

U.S. 308, 315-317 (1974) (Constitution guarantees right to meaningful cross-examination).

According to appellants, the district court limited the scope of cross-examination to the witness's

immediately preceding testimony, rather than allowing appellants to cross-examine on issues raised

by the witnesses in their earlier appearances. This ruling, appellants argue, prejudiced them by

limiting cross-examination on questions of bias and motive.

District courts "enjoy[ ] wide discretion to control cross-examination." Harbor Ins. Co. v.

Schnabel Found. Co., 946 F.2d 930, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992). Limits

on cross-examination amount to an abuse of discretion only if they "result[ ] in prejudice to the

substantial rights of the appellant." Harbor Ins. Co., 946 F.2d at 935. Not every limitation on

cross-examination violates the Confrontation Clause. Rather "violations are found primarily where

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defendants have been given no realistic opportunity to ferret out a potential source of bias" and are

not found "so long as defense counsel is able to elicit enough information to allow a "discriminat[ing]

appraisal of the witness's motives and bias.' " United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (alteration in the original) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 832 F.2d 366, 373 (7th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988)); see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)

("Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not

cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might

wish.").

Applying these standards, we find no error in the district court's ruling. Because the

Government presented its evidence count by count, two of the Government's central witnesses

testified numerous times over fifteen days: Lazaro Santa Cruz testified seven times; William

Woodfork testified five times. To limit repetitive examination, the district court ruled that for those

Government witnesses who were to be recalled, cross-examination "should be deferred until the last

appearance." Tr. 7/14/93, at 6. Accordingly, when Santa Cruz testified for the first time, the court

ruled that appellants could not cross-examine him until later. Tr. 7/16/93, at 47. But when counsel

objected that this would reduce the effectiveness of cross-examination, the judge allowed

cross-examinationafter eachofSantaCruz's appearances, emphasizing that "I'mgoing to then restrict

you rather severely with respect to his subsequent appearance, and I'm not going to let you replow

ground that you have already covered." Id. at 49. The court continued: "Clearly, there are

circumstances that could arise which would entitle you to reopen subjects that you had covered on

the initial cross-examination. However, as a general proposition, you will be confined to the

testimony that he gives on a subsequent appearance." Id. at 49-50. Several days later, the court

allowed defense counsel a choice between cross-examining after each appearance or after the final

appearance, emphasizing that if they decided to wait until the final appearance, they could still

cross-examine with respect to all matters to which witnesses had testified. Tr. 7/19/93, at 17-19.

Quite obviously, the trial court did not, as appellants contend, restrict them to

cross-examination only as to the witness's immediate past testimony. If appellants chose to

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cross-examine a witness after the final appearance, the district court allowed them to cross-examine

with respect to the witness's entire testimony. Only if appellants chose to cross-examine after each

appearance did the district court limit subsequent cross-examinations to the immediately preceding

testimony. Ruling that repeated cross-examination on bias would be unnecessary and excessive was

well within the district court's discretion. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)

(district court maylimit cross-examination "based onconcerns about ... interrogation that isrepetitive

or only marginally relevant"). Although cross-examining Santa Cruz and Woodfork on motive and

bias during each appearance might have marginally increased the jury's perception ofthese witnesses'

credibility, we think the district court permitted defense counselsufficient cross-examination to allow

the jury a "discriminating appraisal of the witness's motives and bias."

PRATT

Appellants claim that the Government allowed one ofits witnesses, Anthony Pratt, to perjure

himself about his motivation to testify. In support of this argument, they point to Pratt's testimony

in an earlier case, claiming that it contradicts histestimony in this case. According to appellants, Pratt

testified in the earlier trial, a murder case, that he had volunteered information to the police about the

killing because he feared he would be implicated or harmed by the killer. When asked in this case

why he stopped selling drugs, Pratt explained that though he was not a suspect, a killing had led him

to stop selling drugs. Tr. 7/22/93, at 9. Explaining that he became a cooperating witness in this case

because he was "just trying to do some kind of good," he testified that he had "sold drugs for three

years, and it took a killing for me to open my eyes and see where my life was really going and what

I was doing to the community that was around me." Tr. 7/22/93, at 52-53. We see no conflict

between Pratt's testimony in the two trials. He simply gave different answers to different questions.

At the first trial, Pratt explained why he testified against the accused killer; at this trial he explained

why he stopped selling drugs and why he became a cooperating witness against the Newton Street

Crew. Pratt's statements thus do not constitute perjury. 

GRAHAM'S AGE

The final challenge to the jury's verdict comes from Appellant Perry Graham. He claims that

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the Government failed to present sufficient evidence of his age to charge him under 21 U.S.C. § 861,

which makes it a crime for any person at least 18 years old to use persons under 18 in drug

trafficking. But Forgy testified that he grew up with Graham, tr. 7/14/93, at 74, and that Graham was

"about 22, 23," id. at 142. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, this testimony is

sufficient for a "rational trier of fact" to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Graham was at

least 18 years of age.

III.

We turn next to appellants' challengesto theirsentences. Their central claim is that the district

court erred in determining the amount of drugs each appellant had distributed.

Under the Sentencing Guidelinesfor drug trafficking offenses, a sentence'slength dependsin

large part on the quantity of drugsthe defendant distributed. As we have explained, "the base offense

level is determined by the amount of drugs involved in the "relevant conduct'the greater the

quantity, the higher the base level." United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1994),

on reh'g in part, 59 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 542 (1995). "Relevant conduct"

is defined in the guidelines as "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,

commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant ... that occurred during the

commission of the offense of conviction, [or] in preparation for that offense...." U.S.S.G. §

1B1.3(a)(1) (Nov. 1993). Under the guidelines in effect at the time of appellants' sentencing,

distribution of amounts greater than 15 kilograms produced a base level of forty-two, carrying a

sentence of thirty years to life. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (c) (Nov. 1993); U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Nov.

1993).

According to the presentence report in this case, Graham personally distributed 21.9

kilograms between 1988 and 1992. The report held him accountable for an additional 20.5 kilograms

distributed by Smith and Lynch, for a total of 42 kilograms. The presentence report charged Terrell

with 34.9 kilograms during the period from 1989 through 1992, representing the total of the amount

that he sold himself and the amount that he assisted in packaging for distribution, distributed, or

reasonably foresaw the distribution of by Lynch and appellant Graham. The presentence report

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attributed 8.1 kilogramsto Smith plus 34.9 kilograms in furtherance of the conspiracy, for a total "in

excess of 42 kilograms." Based on each defendant's distribution of more than 15 kilograms of crack,

their criminal offense category of one (none of the appellants had prior adult convictions), and three

level upward adjustments for their roles as managers or supervisors of drug distribution, the

presentence report recommended mandatory life sentences for all three.

Each defendant submitted written objections to the court arguing that no record support

existed for many of the presentence report's claims. In response, the Government submitted a

memorandum, providing specific citations to the record to support the presentence report's quantity

determinations. At the presentencing hearing, after "review[ing] the submission of all parties with

respect to the calculations of quantities of contraband distributed or attributed to these defendants

bythe presentence report writers," the district court found each defendant responsible for distributing

at least the 15 kilograms required to impose a life sentence. Tr. 12/13/93, at 2. Graham and Terrell,

the court stated, were responsible personally for distributing at least 15 kilograms. As to Smith, the

district court found that although the presentence report did not establish that he had distributed 15

kilograms personally, the distribution activities of the codefendants could be attributed to him as

relevant conduct. Id. at 3. Claiming that they did not have sufficient time to respond to the

Government'sMemorandum, defendantsrepeated their objectionsto the presentence report's quantity

determinations. See, e.g., id., at 5, 8, 10, 20-24, 26. The district court rejected defendants' claims,

stating that it "ha[d] made the findingsthat [it had] heretofore indicated that [it] intended to make and

the objections to the presentence report are denied." Id. at 35.

We begin with appellants' claim that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32 by failing to resolve their challenges to the information contained in the presentence

report. Rule 32(c)(1) requires that when defendants allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence

report, the court should either make a finding resolving the controverted matter or determine that it

willnot consider the controverted matter in sentencing the defendant. Rule 32 also directs the district

court to reduce its findings to writing and attach them to the presentence report. Rule 32's

requirement serves more than the purely ministerialfunction of "furnish[ing] accurate information to

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the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission," United States v. Chaikin, 960 F.2d 171, 175

(D.C. Cir. 1992); it "protect[s] a defendant's due process rights to be sentenced on the basis of

accurate information," id. (quoting United States v. Hanono-Surujun, 914 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1990)

(in turn quoting United States v. Bruckman, 874 F.2d 57, 63-64 (1st Cir. 1989))) (internal quotation

marks omitted), and facilitates appellate review by furnishing a "clear record of the resolution of

disputed facts," United States v. Smith, 844 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1988). See also United States

v. Alvarado, 909 F.2d 1443, 1445 (10th Cir. 1990) (findings necessary for appellate court to know

upon which facts district court relied). Although remanding for resentencing is unwarranted for

"every failure of literal compliance with Rule 32," we have held that remand is appropriate where the

district court failsto make even oralfindings on a "serious and potentially pivotalsentencing factor."

Chaikin, 960 F.2d at 175 (noting that remand may not be necessary where district court has met

"substantive requirements of Rule 32" but has failed to perform the ministerial task of appending its

findings to the presentence report).

Conceding that the district court failed to make express findings on the matters raised by

appellants, the Government argues that the district court made implicit findings by stating, after

hearing appellants' objections, that it was adopting the presentence report. Under the circumstances

of this case, we find the district court's response entirely inadequate. Appellants' objections to the

presentence report quantity determinations are serious matters. If appellants are correct and if the

quantities attributable to them are significantly less, their sentences could be reduced from life to 30

years. Determining the quantity of drugs that appellants sold required culling together statements

from several witnesses who testified during the course of a fairly long trial. Yet the presentence

report contained absolutely no citations to the trial transcript to support its quantity calculations.

Because appellants claim that insufficient record support existed for these calculations, we fail to see

how simply adopting a presentence report, itself void of any detail, could constitute a "finding" on

appellants' claims. Rule 32 requires more than the district court's statement that it "had made the

findings that I have heretofore indicated that I intended to make."

The absence of detail and clarity in the presentence report distinguishes this case from cases

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relied on by the Government in which adoption of the presentence report was found to satisfy Rule

32. Unlike those cases, the facts here are not "determinable from a PSR that the court has adopted

by reference," United States v. Sherbak, 950 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1992) nor are the "findings

in the PSR ... so clear that the reviewing court is not left to "second-guess' the basis for the

sentencing decision," United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1231 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation

omitted). Instead, "[w]hen faced with specific allegations of factual inaccuracy by the defendant, the

court cannot satisfy Rule 32 ... by simply stating that it adopts the factual findings and guideline

application in the presentence report." United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1530 (10th Cir.)

(citation omitted), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 347, and 115 S. Ct. 520 (1994); see also United States

v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 980-81 (10th Cir. 1993) (district court's cursory adoption of findings in

presentence report wasinsufficient to satisfyRule 32'srequirements). Although the district court also

had before it the Government's Memorandum which includes more detailed support from the trial

transcript, we cannot tell from the record whether the district court relied on the Memorandum in

determining the sentences. Because appellants made specific challenges to the Government's

Memorandum, the district court should have made explicit written findings that it had resolved each

matter by adopting the Government's Memorandum, if indeed that is what it did.

According to the Government, any failure to comply with Rule 32 was harmless because

appellants' objections were without merit. We disagree. Where "serious and potentially pivotal

sentencing factor[s]" are involved, we have directed the district courts to enter written findings to

facilitate appellate review of the sentences. Chaikin, 960 F.2d at 175. In this case, because of the

sheer number of allegations of factual inaccuracy and the substantial size of the record, we find it

particularly difficult, if not impossible, to exercise our appellate responsibilities without district court

findings on disputed matters.

Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in both the presentence report and the Government's

Memorandum heighten our concern about the absence of findingsparticularly as to the quantities

ascribed to Smith and Terrell. For example, although the presentence report states that in 1989 Smith

sold cocaine on a daily basis, it alleges no specific amounts. The report then says that in 1990, Smith

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worked with Graham to distribute 4.5 kilograms, again stating that in 1990 Smith personally

distributed 4.5 kilograms. Whether Smith's "personal" distribution is a separate amount from that

distributed with Graham is not at all clear; did Smith sell 4.5 kilograms in 1990, or nine kilograms?

For 1991, according to the presentence report, Smith distributed 0.5 kilogram. Yet the report

concludes that Smith was personally responsible for distributing 8.1 kilograms. From the numbers

provided in the presentence report itself, we cannot discern how the presentence report writers

arrived at 8.1 kilograms.

TheGovernment'sMemorandumcompoundsthe confusion. Although the presentence report

gave no distribution amountsfor 1989, the Government's Memorandumstatesthat Smith distributed

3 to 4 ounces a week in 1989 for a total of 4.5 kilograms. At oral argument, the Government told

us that the presentence report was incorrect and that one of the amounts listed for 1990 in the

presentence report should have been listed for 1989 instead. This conflict between the presentence

report and the Government's Memorandumis preciselythe type ofissue the district court should have

resolved through written findings.

Smith's challenges to the amounts the Government claims he sold in 1989 provide another

example of the need for district court findings. Although the Government's Memorandum states that

Smith sold about three ounces a week in 1989, it cites as support only testimony that Graham sold

that amount. Smith claims that no witness testified that he sold that amount. Furthermore, Smith

argues, the Government's Memorandum at least doubles the amount of crack for which he is

responsible. According to Smith, the Memorandum erroneously assumes that Smith sold drugs

throughout 1989, even though testimony indicatesthat he only began selling drugs on Newton Street

in the summer. See 7/20/93, at 142 (Woodfork testimony).

The presentence report and the Memorandumattribute to Smith an additional 34.9 kilograms

distributed by others in furtherance of the conspiracy: 21.9 kilograms distributed by Graham and 13

kilograms distributed by Lynch. According to Smith, neither the presentence report nor the

Government's Memorandum offersrecord support for the conclusion that Smith reasonably foresaw

the distribution of twenty-one kilograms by Graham. Cf. Childress, 58 F.3d at 723 (trial court must

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make individualized findings that the quantity of drugs attributed to defendant was reasonably

foreseeable to him). The Memorandum attributes all of Graham's drug sales to Smith, citing

testimony that Smith accompanied Graham's runner (Woodfork) to retrieve a "stash" of one-half

ounce amounts of crack left there by Hoyle for Graham and Smith, which, according to the record,

may only have happened once. Tr. 7/20/93, at 166.

A final example of a factual dispute requiring resolution is Smith and Terrell's challenge to the

attribution to them of 13 kilograms distributed by Lynch. To support the 13 kilograms, the

presentence report and the Government's Memorandum state that Smith and Terrell helped Lynch

cut and package for distribution one-eighth kilo of crack supplied by Hoyle each week from 1990

through July 1992. Lynch's testimony, which the Memorandum cites as support, was as follows:

Q: And from July of 1990 through July of 1992 how much crack would you get from Mark Hoyle

a week?

A: I would say an eighth, an eighth of a [kilogram].

...

Q: And what would you do with it?

A: I would cut it up.

...

Q: Did you ever have other people help you cut [it] up?

A: Yes.

Q: Who?

A: Terrence Terrell and Roger Smith.

Tr. 7/29/93, at 44 (emphasis added). By itself, this testimony does not support the conclusion that

Smith and Terrell were always, or even usually, present when Lynch cut the cocaine. Again, the

district court should have made specific findings on whether thistestimony adequately supported the

attribution of 13 kilograms to Smith and Terrell, or whether other evidence existed in the record to

support the 13 kilogram amount.

In addition to the district court's failure to make Rule 32 findings, we agree with appellants

that the district court failed to make individualized findings that the amounts of drugs attributed to

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each appellant as part of the conspiracy were within the scope of that appellant's agreement. When

determining relevant conduct, we have repeatedly emphasized that the sentencing judge should not

automatically hold each defendant accountable for the total amount of cocaine involved in the

conspiracy, but must instead make individualized findings as to the specific amount of drugs "each

appellant might have reasonably foreseen his or her agreed-upon participation would involve." 

Anderson, 39 F.3d at 353 (remanding for resentencing). Recognizing that findings are necessary "to

ensure careful adherence to ... limitations on co-conspiratorial liability," Childress, 58 F.3d at 722,

we have not hesitated to remand for resentencing when the district court has failed to make these

individualized findings. See, e.g., Childress, 58 F.3d at 722-24; United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d

1080, 1103-06 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 539 (1995); Anderson, 39 F.3d at 353; United

States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 291-92 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Perkins, 963 F.2d 1523, 1528

(D.C. Cir. 1992); Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d at 307. That a jury has convicted defendants of

participating in a single conspiracy does not eliminate the need for individualized findings. As we

explained in Childress,

[s]uch a verdict speaksto the scope of the defendant's agreement only in very general

terms: It does not address the question of which specific actions demonstrated at trial

were in furtherance of that single conspiracy or were foreseeable to the conspirators.

And it is only these actions that may form the predicate for the defendants'sentences.

58 F.3d at 722. Conclusory statements by the district court that the quantity of drugs attributed to

the defendant were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant do not satisfy the individualized finding

requirement. The district court must explicitly " "set[ ] forth the reasons why the particular amount

of drugs was reasonably foreseeable to him, with reference to the evidence before the court.' " Id.

at 723 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1399 (7th Cir. 1991)) (alteration in the

original), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992).

At the presentencing hearing, both the Government and defendants asked the district court

to "make individualfindings with respect to the defendantsthat the amounts attributed to them were

within the scope of the agreement that each one entered into." Tr. 12/13/93, at 23-24, 30. In

response, the district court said it "had made that," presumably referring to itsinitialfinding that each

defendant's relevant conduct was about 15 kilograms. Apparently conceding that the district court

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did not make the requisite individualized findings, the Government now arguesthat findings were not

necessary because the district court adopted the presentence report which, according to the

government, contained particularized findings.

Even if adopting the presentence report could satisfy the requirement of individualized

findingsin some cases, it cannot do so here. Although the Government is correct that, unlike in some

of our recent conspiracy cases, the presentence report here makes some effort to define the scope of

each appellant's agreement and the amount of drugs that was reasonably foreseeable to each

appellant, the presentence report fails, in several instances, to " "set[ ] forth the reasons why the

particular amount of drugs was reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant], with reference to the

evidence....' " Childress, 58 F.3d at 723 (quoting Edwards, 945 F.2d at 1399) (first alteration in

original); see also id. at 724 ("The district court may not simply assert reasonable foreseeability: It

must articulate specific findings in support of its determination ..."). Neither the presentence report

nor the Government's Memorandum specifies why Smith was responsible for all of the drugs

distributed by Graham. In fact, according to the evidence, Smith could not have agreed to or

foreseen allofGraham's distribution activitiessince some ofthese activitiestook place in 1988, before

Smith began selling on Newton Street. The Memorandum and the presentence report also attribute

21.9 kilograms personally distributed by Graham to Terrell. Although both documents describe

significant cooperation between Terrell and Graham, neitherspecifies whether the entire amountsold

by Graham was within the scope of the Graham-Terrell agreement and reasonably foreseeable by

Terrell. Indeed, the Government's Memorandum points to numerous instances in which Graham used

other runnersto distribute drugs, sold the drugs himself, or distributed the drugsto other lieutenants.

The Government's Memorandum also holds Graham responsible for 20.5 kilograms

distributed by Smith and Lynch in furtherance of the conspiracy. Again, although asserting in a

conclusory fashion that this amount was reasonably foreseeable, the Memorandum points only to

testimony that Smith, Lynch, and Graham were in the same clique, utterly failing to explain which of

Smith and Lynch's distribution activities it is attributing to Graham or whether these amounts were

foreseeable and within the scope of Graham's agreement.

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We vacate the sentences and remand to the district court to make Rule 32 findings as well as

findings on the scope of the conspiratorial agreement entered into by each appellant and the amount

of drugsreasonably foreseeable to that appellant. Although we have focussed our attention primarily

on the claims raised by Smith and Terrell, we believe that remand of Graham's sentence is necessary

as well. Like the other two appellants, Graham alleges factual inaccuracies in the presentence report

and "absent a statement of findings, we cannot determine whether the [c]ourt relied on inaccurate or

unreliable facts." Chaikin, 960 F.2d at 176. Remand will further Rule 32's objectives. It will aid

appellate review and ensure that all defendants are sentenced on the basis of accurate information.

IV.

In addition to his claims that the district court failed to make proper findings, Terrell mounts

several separate challenges to his sentence. He begins by arguing that the district court failed to

realize that it could depart downward based on his unusual vulnerability to prison abuse. Although

no specific guideline allows for departure on this basis, Terrell claims the district court could have

departed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), which permits sentencing courts to depart downward to

address circumstances "of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the

Sentencing Commission." Whether the Sentencing Commission considered extreme vulnerability to

prison abuse in formulating the guidelines is a question we review de novo. See United States v.

Mason, 966 F.2d 1488, 1494 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1040 (1992).

Section 3553(b) permits sentencing courts to consider characteristics of the defendant, even

those unrelated to the defendant's blameworthinessfor the crime. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d

649, 651-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Relying on § 3553(b), other circuits have held that a sentencing court

may depart for extreme vulnerability to abuse in prison. See United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791,

797-98 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that departure may be based on extraordinary vulnerability, but

finding factsinsufficient to warrant departure); United States v. Tucker, 986 F.2d 278, 280 (8thCir.)

(stating that "the potential for victimization can provide a proper predicate for a departure" but

finding that defendant's case was not "outside the perimeters of the ordinary case"), cert. denied, 114

S. Ct. 76 (1993); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 601 (2nd Cir. 1990) (sustaining departure

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where defendant's "diminutive size, immature appearance and bisexual orientation" made him a

"potential [candidate] for victimization"). These decisions rest on the proposition that defendants

subjected to repeated physical or sexual assault are, in effect, punished more severely than others.

See, e.g., Lara, 905 F.2d at 603. Although this circuit has not addressed whether extreme

vulnerability is a proper basis for departure, in holding that departure is permissible for "matters

unconnected to blameworthiness," we have taken approving notice ofthe "extreme vulnerability" line

of cases. Smith, 27 F.3d at 653. In Smith, we allowed downward departure because of a defendant's

status as a deportable alien, recognizing that because such aliens were ineligible for spending the last

10% of their sentences in community-based confinement and could not be assigned to minimum

security prisons, id. at 651, a defendant's deportable alien status would "substantial[ly] ... affect the

severity of his confinement," id. at 655.

Reviewing the guidelines ourselves, we find that although the Commission considered a

defendant's "mental and emotional condition," 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(4), and the "nature and capacity

of the penal[or] correctional" institution in formulating the guidelines, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(g), it did

not consider extreme vulnerability to physical or sexual abuse. We therefore join our sister circuits

and hold that extreme vulnerability to assault in prison may be a ground for departure. We emphasize

that, to qualify for a downward departure, a defendant's vulnerability must be so extreme as to

substantially affect the severity of confinement, such as where only solitary confinement can protect

the defendant from abuse. See Lara, 905 F.2d at 602-03.

In the case before us, the district court appeared to agree that Terrell was "very vulnerable"

to abuse in the prison system. Tr. 12/20/93, at 3. Acknowledging the Second Circuit's Lara decision,

the district court neverthelessstated: "unfortunately I am not aware of [vulnerability to prison abuse]

being a ground for departure." Tr. 12/20/93, at 3-4. Although the district court's statements are not

entirely clear, the court seemsto have thought that it lacked the authority to downward depart based

on Terrell's vulnerability. See United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding

that appellate courts may review a district court's refusal to depart if the district court has

misconstrued its authority, but not the "[district] court's discretionary decision that the particular

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circumstances of a given case do not warrant a departure"). On remand, the district court should

therefore determine whether Terrell's vulnerability and potential for abuse are so extreme as to

warrant downward departure.

Terrell raises two final challenges to his sentence: that the district court erred in refusing to

downward adjust and that it improperly enhanced his sentence. As to these issues, we review the

district court's factual findings under the "clearly erroneous" standard, granting " "due deference to

the district court's application ofthe guidelinesto the facts.' " See United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513,

517 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4) (1988)).

According to Terrell, the district courtshould have granted a two-leveldownward adjustment

because he was only a "minor" participant"any participant who is less culpable than most other

participants...." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) & comment. (n.3). As we read the record, however, Terrell

was not just a "lookout." He sold drugs directly to customers, see tr. 7/30/93, at 52-54, 129-30;

7/29/93, at 29-30, and "sometimes" played the role of lieutenant, supervising runners, tr. 7/20/93, at

61. We find no error in the district court's refusal to grant Terrell a downward adjustment.

Terrellarguesthat insufficient evidence existsfor enhancing hissentence pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(b), which allowsthe district court to increase a defendant's base offense level by three levels

if it finds that the defendant was a "manager or a supervisor" of a "criminal activity [that] involved

five or more participants or was otherwise extensive." Terrell claims that the evidence shows only

that he was a low-level dealer who did not in any way manage the affairs of the conspiracy or

supervise others. The Government maintains that Terrell, though a runner himself, occasionally

supervised other runners and sometimes played the role of "lieutenant." Reviewing the record

ourselves, we think whether the evidence was sufficient to support upward enhancement is a close

question. Cf. United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1348-50 (7th Cir. 1991) ("One's status as

a middleman in a drug distribution chain does not, standing alone, make one a manager or

supervisor." ), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1097 (1992). In order to clarify this issue, and since we are

remanding for other reasons, we ask the district court to make findings on this issue. 

V.

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Because we are remanding for resentencing, we need not reach appellants' argumentsthat the

district court erred in refusing to grant them an evidentiary hearing to resolve their sentencing claims

and that, in making findings on the amounts of drugs each appellant had distributed, the court

misconstrued the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. Nor need we reach Graham and

Terrell's claim that the district court erred by taking into account quantities of drugs distributed by

them in 1988 and 1989, before the period of time for which they were indicted, or Terrell's separate

argument that he was held responsible for amounts of cocaine distributed before he became eighteen

on August 27, 1989. Under the version of the Sentencing Guidelines now in effect, 15 kilograms no

longer requires a base offense level of forty-two. See United States v. Clark, 8 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) (resentencing occurs under version of Sentencing Guidelines in effect at time of

resentencing unlessthis would violate ex post facto clause). If the district court finds on remand that

appellants have distributed 1.5 kilograms or more, appellants will receive a base offense level of

thirty-eight. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1).

We affirmappellants' convictions. We vacate appellants' sentences and remand to the district

court to resolve appellants'factual challengesto the presentence report and for particularized findings

regarding the amount of crack cocaine attributable to each appellant. We also remand for the district

court to consider whether Terrellwas entitled to downward departure for extraordinary vulnerability

to abuse in prison and to explain the basis for enhancing Terrell's sentence.

So ordered.

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