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Parties Involved:
Jason Pepper
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2453 

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa.

*

Jason Pepper, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 15, 2008

Filed: March 11, 2008

___________

Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

This case is before us for the third time. In United States v. Pepper, 412 F.3d

995, 999 (8th Cir. 2005) (Pepper I), we held the district court erred by granting a 75%

downward departure for Jason Pepper’s (Pepper) substantial assistance and imposing

a sentence of 24 months imprisonment, because the district court erroneously based

the extent of the departure on matters unrelated to Pepper’s assistance. On remand,

the district court granted a 40% downward departure (five offense levels) for

substantial assistance, followed by a 59% downward variance (eight offense levels),

and again imposed a sentence of 24 months imprisonment. The government appealed.

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We reversed and remanded the case for resentencing by a different judge, pursuant to

our authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. United States v. Pepper, 486 F.3d 408, 413 (8th

Cir. 2007) (Pepper II). Pepper appealed. The Supreme Court vacated our judgment

and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Gall v. United States,

522 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007). Having carefully considered

Gall’s impact on Pepper’s case, we again reverse the sentence of the district court and

remand for resentencing by a different judge. 

I. BACKGROUND

From Pepper II we know Pepper pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute more

than 500 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A), and 846. Pepper’s total offense level of 30 and criminal history category

of I produced an advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines range of 97 to 121

months. Pepper was eligible for safety-valve relief, thus the statutory mandatory

minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment did not apply. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f), U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(6), and 5C1.2. In Pepper’s initial sentencing, the

government filed a motion for substantial assistance, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1,

and recommended a 15% downward departure. The district court departed downward

75% and sentenced Pepper to 24 months imprisonment. We reversed, finding the

district court erred by considering factors unrelated to Pepper’s assistance in granting

the § 5K1.1 downward departure motion, concluding “given the pedestrian nature of

Mr. Pepper’s assistance, it is far from certain that the court would have arrived at the

same guidelines sentence had it considered only assistance-related elements when

deciding the extent of the departure.” Pepper II, 486 F.3d at 410 (quoting Pepper I,

412 F.3d at 999). 

On remand, the district court found Pepper’s assistance merited a 40% § 5K1.1

downward departure, which reduced the bottom of the advisory sentencing Guidelines

range to 58 months. Then, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court granted a

downward variance of 59%, based on Pepper’s post-sentencing rehabilitation, lack of

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violent history, and, to a lesser degree, on the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

disparity among co-defendants. The district court again imposed a sentence of 24

months imprisonment. Pepper II, 486 F.3d at 410. We found the district court did not

abuse its discretion by the extent of the § 5K1.1 downward departure. Id. at 411. We

did find “[t]he district court impermissibly considered Pepper’s post-sentence

rehabilitation, and further erred by considering Pepper’s lack of violent history, which

history had already been accounted for in the sentencing Guidelines calculation, and

by considering sentencing disparity among Pepper’s co-defendants without adequate

foundation and explanation.” Id. at 413.

II. DISCUSSION

We review all sentences, whether inside or outside the Guidelines range, under

a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Before reaching

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we “must first ensure that the district

court committed no significant procedural error, such as . . . failing to adequately

explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the

Guidelines range.” Id. Although extraordinary circumstances are not required to

justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range, “a district judge must give serious

consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain his

conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in

a particular case with sufficient justifications.” Id. at 594. 

If [the district court] decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is

warranted, [the district court] must consider the extent of the deviation

and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the

degree of the variance. . . . [A] major departure should be supported by

a more significant justification than a minor one.

. . .

[T]he [appellate] court will, of course, take into account the totality of

the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the

Guidelines range. 

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 Id. at 597. An abuse of discretion may occur when a court “gives significant weight

to an improper or irrelevant factor.” United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th

Cir. 2005). See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. These rules guide our analysis. 

The district court erred because, to the extent the district court explained

Pepper’s sentence at all, the district court predominantly considered improper factors.

Put another way, the district court committed procedural error in failing adequately

to explain with sufficient justifications the court’s conclusion that a 59% variance

after the § 5K1.1 downward departure was warranted in this case. 

First, the district court considered Pepper had “no history of violence.”

Although the district court attempted to distinguish Pepper’s lack of a violent history

from Pepper’s lack of a violent criminal history, in Pepper II we found this distinction

vague and unpersuasive because “[t]he district court did not substantiate what it meant

by ‘no history of violence.’” Pepper II, 486 F.3d at 412. Because the district court

did not adequately explain what it meant by “no history of violence,” we reached the

“inescapable conclusion” the district court improperly “double counted” Pepper’s lack

of a violent history in arriving at Pepper’s sentence. Id. We reasoned:

[I]f Pepper had a violent criminal history, he would have been ineligible

for safety-valve relief, subject to the 120-month statutory mandatory

minimum, and the possibility of an enhancement or an upward departure.

To the extent the district court considered the absence of violence in

Pepper’s life generally, we have previously held the absence of grounds

that justify further punishment is not a ground for a downward variance.

Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Our reasoning in Pepper II is consistent with

Gall. Gall requires a district judge to explain adequately and provide sufficient

justifications for why an unusually lenient sentence such as Pepper’s is appropriate.

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The district court indicated it was “not giving a lot of weight” to this factor. 

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Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 527. The district court in Pepper’s case provided insufficient

explanation of the “no history of violence” factor. 

The district court next considered the desire to avoid unwarranted sentencing

disparity among co-conspirators.1

 Pepper’s three co-defendants were sentenced to 35,

75, and 90 months imprisonment. As we noted in Pepper II, “[t]he district court never

mentioned the [unwarranted sentencing] disparity to be avoided, the relative

culpability of the co-defendants, the extent of any co-defendant’s assistance, the codefendants’ reductions, or whether Pepper was similarly situated to the codefendants.” 486 F.3d at 412. Indeed, considering co-defendant Baragan-Torres’ 90

month sentence and co-defendant Blankenship’s 72 month sentence, it appears

Pepper’s 24 month sentence creates, rather than avoids, sentencing disparity among

co-conspirators. In light of Gall’s requirement that sentencing judges adequately

explain the chosen sentence, we correctly concluded in Pepper II that “[t]he district

court did not adequately explain and support its rationale for sentencing Pepper to 24

months’ imprisonment in contrast to Pepper’s co-defendants[.]” Id. at 413.

 Finally, and most significantly, the district court apparently gave significant

weight to Pepper’s post-sentence rehabilitation. As we discussed in Pepper II,

“‘evidence of [a defendant]’s post-sentence rehabilitation is not relevant and will not

be permitted at resentencing because the district court could not have considered that

evidence at the time of the original sentencing.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

Jenners, 473 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 2007)). See also United States v. McMannus,

496 F.3d 846, 852 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that “allowing [post-sentence

rehabilitation] evidence to influence [a defendant]’s sentence would be grossly unfair

to the vast majority of defendants who receive no sentencing-court review of any

positive post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts”).

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At resentencing, Pepper testified extensively, and almost exclusively, about his

post-sentencing rehabilitation, including participation in a drug treatment program

while incarcerated, community college attendance, work record, and compliance with

the conditions of his supervised release. Pepper’s father also testified about Pepper’s

maturity and sobriety since his release. In addition, a substantial portion of the

sentencing memorandum prepared by the United States probation officer discussed

Pepper’s post-sentence rehabilitation. The district court explicitly adopted as its

findings of fact the testimony of Pepper, Pepper’s father, and the sentencing

memorandum. Although the district court acknowledged it may not be appropriate

to consider Pepper’s post-sentence conduct, the court nevertheless stated, “I’m not

going to be disingenuous and say that I haven’t considered [Pepper]’s post-release

conduct because I have considered it. Exactly how much weight I’m giving it, I don’t

know exactly.” The record leaves little doubt Pepper’s post-release rehabilitation was

indeed given significant weight, and possibly overwhelming weight, in imposing the

24 month sentence. Gall does not alter our circuit precedent or our conclusion in

Pepper II that post-sentence rehabilitation is an impermissible factor to consider in

granting a downward variance. 

Because the district court procedurally erred by failing to explain adequately

Pepper’s sentence and by relying predominantly on improper factors to determine the

sentence variance, we need not reach the issue of whether Pepper’s sentence was

substantively reasonable.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we again reverse and remand Pepper’s case for

resentencing consistent with this opinion. As the district court expressed a reluctance

to resentence Pepper again should the case be remanded, we again remand this case

for resentencing by a different judge, pursuant to our authority under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2106. See United States v. Rogers, 448 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2006) (per

curiam) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) (noting the authority

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to assign a case to a different judge on remand comes from “the appellate courts’

statutory power to ‘require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under

the circumstances’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106))). The chief judge of the district court

shall reassign this case, in the ordinary course, for resentencing by another judge.

______________________________

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