Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03023/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Artur Tchibassa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 6, 2006 Decided July 7, 2006

No. 04-3023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ARTUR TCHIBASSA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cr00560-03)

Robert L. Tucker, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for the appellant. A. J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender, was on brief. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, entered an appearance.

Lisa H. Schertler, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein, United States

Attorney, Jennifer E. Levy, Attorney, United States Department

of Justice, and Laura A. Ingersoll and Roy W. McLeese, III,

Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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1

In resolving this case, we assume arguendo that Tchibassa was

entitled to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment before he was

arrested and brought to this country. We therefore need not decide the

question (not raised by the parties below or on appeal) whether the

Sixth Amendment speedy trial right attaches to a foreign

national—charged with a crime committed outside United States

territory—while he remains outside our borders. 

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Artur

Tchibassa, a former member of the Angolan “Front for the

Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda” (FLEC), appeals his

conviction stemming from his participation in the 1990 hostagetaking for ransom of Brent Swan, a United States citizen then

working in Cabinda, Angola. Tchibassa appeals his conviction

on the grounds that the government violated his Sixth

Amendment right to a speedy trial by waiting until 2002, some

eleven years after he was indicted, to arrest and prosecute him

and that the court erred under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)

in admitting testimony of a similar FLEC hostage-taking in 1994

and excluding testimony of FLEC hostage negotiations that he

participated in in 1992 and 2001. In addition, Tchibassa appeals

his sentence on the ground that the district court treated the

United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) as mandatory

in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

We reject Tchibassa’s speedy trial claim because the

government exercised reasonable diligence in seeking his arrest

and because Tchibassa, who was aware of the charges against

him since at least 1994, waited until after his arrest to assert his

speedy trial right.1

 We reject the evidentiary challenges

because, assuming the district court’s rulings were erroneous,

the error was harmless. Finally, we affirm Tchibassa’s sentence

because we conclude that the sentencing judge did not commit

plain error.

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I.

In 1990 Brent Swan was working as an aircraft mechanic in

Cabinda, a province of Angola, for Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.

(PHI). PHI was a contractor for Cabinda Gulf Oil Company

Ltd., a subsidiary of Chevron Overseas Petroleum, Inc.

(Chevron), a United States corporation. On October 19, 1990,

while traveling in a truck en route to the Cabinda Airport, Swan

was abducted by three men wearing camouflage uniforms.

Swan’s captors, who identified themselves as FLEC members,

forced Swan on a several-day trek on foot to a FLEC base camp

where he remained until moved to a second camp. 

Following extensive negotiations between FLEC and

Chevron, on December 17, 1990, Swan was taken by his captors

to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC)),

where he met a Zairean government official who was

accompanied by a number of FLEC officers, including

Tchibassa. From there he was driven to Moanda, Zaire and

released to PHI foreign supervisor Gary Weber and Chevron

executive Scott Taylor in exchange for a ransom.

Substantial trial evidence implicated Tchibassa as a highranking member of FLEC and a willing participant in Swan’s

abduction, detention and ransoming. Tchibassa was described

by one of Swan’s captors as a “major member” of FLEC, 9/4/03

Tr. 138, and was pictured alongside Swan, FLEC “President”

Tiburcio and “Major” Bento in a photograph taken around

Thanksgiving 1990 at the camp where he was being held.

During the five-week negotiations for Swan’s release, according

to Chevron negotiators, Tchibassa participated as the “chief

spokesman” and “did all the primary speaking as negotiator.”

9/9/03 Tr. 62; 9/5/03 Tr. 184-85. In an order signed by Tiburcio

authorizing Tchibassa to negotiate on behalf of FLEC,

Tchibassa was identified as “Major Artur Tchibassa” and FLEC

“Foreign Affairs Secretary.” 9/5/03 Tr. 127. Finally, after the

negotiators reached an agreement with Chevron requiring

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2

The indictment was unsealed on September 4, 2003.

Chevron to deliver a ransom in specified goods in exchange for

Swan’s release, Tchibassa was one of two men who signed

receipts for the goods when they were delivered.

On September 25, 1991 Tchibassa was indicted under seal2

on two counts: (1) conspiring to commit hostage-taking in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1203 and (2) hostage-taking

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1203. A bench warrant issued

for his arrest the same day. On July 11, 2002, he was arrested

in Kinshasa, DROC. His trial began on September 4, 2003 and

the jury convicted him of both counts on September 12, 2003.

On February 27, 2004 the district court sentenced Tchibassa to

concurrent sentences of 60 months on the conspiracy count and

293 months on the hostage taking count, followed by three and

five years of supervised release, respectively. The court also

ordered Tchibassa to pay $303,957.34 in restitution and a $200

special assessment. Tchibassa filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II.

We address separately Tchibassa’s challenges to the district

court’s speedy trial right determination, evidentiary rulings and

Guidelines sentence. 

A. Speedy Trial Right

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

expressly guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.” Excessive

delay in prosecuting a defendant after he is indicted or arrested

violates this Sixth Amendment right. See Barker v. Wingo, 407

U.S. 514 (1972) (arrest); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647

(1992) (indictment). Tchibassa contends that the nearly 11 years

that elapsed between his September 25, 1991 indictment and his

arrest on July 11, 2002 constitute an excessive delay and that the

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district court therefore erred in denying his motion to dismiss on

that basis. We affirm the district court’s denial of the motion. 

In deciding a speedy trial claim a court applies a “balancing

test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the

defendant are [sic] weighed.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. The

United States Supreme Court has identified four factors to be

considered: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the

defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the

defendant.” Id.; see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651 (“Our

cases . . . have qualified the literal sweep of the [speedy trial]

provision by specifically recognizing the relevance of four

separate enquiries: whether delay before trial was uncommonly

long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more

to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant

asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered

prejudice as the delay’s result.” (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at

530)). The first factor entails “a double enquiry”: First,

“[s]imply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must

allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed

the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’

delay since, by definition, he cannot complain that the

government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact,

prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” Doggett, 505

U.S. at 651-52 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31). Next, once

the accused makes this threshold showing, “the court must then

consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the

delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger

judicial examination of the claim.” Id. at 652 (citing Barker,

407 U.S. at 533-34). None of the four factors is “either a

necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation

of the right of speedy trial”; “[r]ather, they are related factors

and must be considered together with such other circumstances

as may be relevant.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. 

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3

An Interpol Red Notice alerts foreign governments to the

issuance of a U.S. arrest warrant. See United States v. Bliss, 430 F.3d

640, 643 (2d Cir. 2005).

In order to balance the speedy trial factors, on August 26,

2003, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The

testimony from that hearing, supplemented by the parties’

written submissions, revealed the following facts. Tchibassa

testified that he resided in Kinshasa, Zaire from 1991 to 1998

and in Brazzaville, Congo, located across the Congo River from

Kinshasa, from April 1998 until his arrest in 2002. The

government filed a sealed arrest warrant for Tchibassa on

September 25, 1991 and subsequently requested that Interpol

issue “Red Notices” seeking his arrest (along with the arrest of

other alleged participants in the Swan hostage-taking), which

Interpol did in 1993.3

In 1994 Tchibassa learned that Interpol wished to speak with

him and, accordingly, traveled to Brazzaville, Congo to meet

with Interpol representatives, who questioned him about Swan’s

abduction. According to a transcription of Tchibassa’s

statement to Interpol at the meeting, he expressed surprise at

learning that, in his own words, “American Judicial authorities

issue [sic] an international arrest warrant for me for this case.”

6/21/94 Interpol Interview Tr. 3, Appellant’s App. (App.) 58.

Also in 1994, according to Tchibassa’s testimony, he visited the

U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa, Zaire more than 5 times for

“diplomatic activities,” 8/26/03 Tr. 27, and continued to visit the

Embassy (“[m]ore than five times” annually) until 1998, id. at

38. He also testified he visited the U.S. embassies in Lisbon in

1994 and Paris in 1995.

In 1996 the United States Department of State (State

Department) learned Tchibassa had been in Brazzaville and, at

the instance of the United States Department of Justice, cabled

the U.S. Embassy there to request that the Congolese

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government make “provisional arrests for the purpose of

extradition” of Tchibassa and others charged with Swan’s

kidnaping. App. 78. 

Finally, on July 11, 2002 the FBI arrested Tchibassa in the

office of the DROC Intelligence Bureau and he was flown to

Puerto Rico where he was arraigned on July 15, 2002. On April

21, 2003 he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, asserting

his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. 

At a November 25, 2003 hearing the district court denied

Tchibassa’s motion based on the parties’ submissions and the

hearing testimony. Initially, the court determined that the 11-

year delay between indictment and arrest “obviously . . . was

long” so as to trigger the balancing of the Barker factors.

11/25/03 Tr. 9. With regard to the second factor, the court

found that the delay resulted “not only from the government’s

not arresting him once they had indicted him originally back in

‘91 . . . but from the defendant’s own actions” because “at the

time in the country where he was residing and was a citizen of,”

meaning Zaire/DROC, “they did not have an extradition treaty.”

Id. at 10. Absent a treaty, the court concluded, the government

was under no obligation to take any extraordinary measures to

negotiate for Tchibassa’s extradition. The court found the third

factor also weighed against dismissal because, although

Tchibassa was aware of the charges against him since June

1994, he did not assert his speedy trial right until nine months

after he was arrested in 2002. Finally, as to the fourth factor, the

court characterized Tchibassa’s claim of prejudice as

“speculative” because the court “d[id]n’t see any defense

strategies or positions that would have been different except for

the delay” or “any particular witnesses he didn’t bring that he

could have.” Id. at 11. In sum, the court concluded that the

record “strongly indicates . . . that the defendant did not want a

speedy trial” and that “the government had no either [sic]

obligation or opportunity to make arrest or get Mr. Tchibassa

USCA Case #04-3023 Document #978921 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 7 of 19
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extradited to the United States because of the political situation

and the statutory requirements that existed at that time.” Id. at

12. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error

and its application of the Barker factors to the facts de novo.

See United States v. Parish, 468 F.2d 1129, 1134 (D.C. Cir.

1972) (factual findings reviewed for clear error) (citing Jackson

v. United States, 353 F.2d 862, 864-65 (D.C. Cir. 1965)); United

States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1469 (9th Cir. 1988) (legal

conclusions reviewed de novo); Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d

1431, 1437-38 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); see also United States v.

Frye, 372 F.3d 729, 736 (5th Cir. 2004) (suggesting, without

deciding, review is de novo because “generally, a district court’s

balancing of factors, resulting in a decision, are [sic] akin to, if

not, conclusions of law, or at least rulings on mixed questions of

fact and law, reviewed de novo”). Applying these standards, we

uphold the district court’s ruling because its factual findings are

not clearly erroneous and it correctly applied the law to the facts

it found. 

Initially, the parties agree that the district court correctly

concluded that the length of the delay between Tchibassa’s

indictment and arrest—some eleven years—was long enough to

be considered “presumptively prejudicial,” i.e., beyond “the

point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to

trigger the Barker enquiry.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1; cf.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (undertaking inquiry where “length of

delay between arrest and trial–well over five years–was

extraordinary”); Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (“[T]he extraordinary

8 1⁄2 year lag between Doggett’s indictment and arrest clearly

suffices to trigger the speedy trial enquiry.”). 

We next address Barker’s second factor—“whether the

government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that

delay,” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. Initially, the government was

decidedly slow to seek Tchibassa’s arrest. It does not appear

from the record that it made any attempt to apprehend Tchibassa

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4

The district court’s reasonable diligence finding is reviewed

“with considerable deference.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652.

5

Tchibassa claims that “the government admitted that Tchibassa

had been at the U.S. Embassy in Brazzaville on several occasions from

1992-1994,” Opening Br. 20 (citing 9/3/03 Tr. 2-5), but the cited

transcript pages refer to Tchibassa’s visits to the U.S. Embassy in

Kinshasa, which is in Zaire/DROC, with which the United States had

no extradition treaty. 

6

Tchibassa contends the government should have used “available

alternatives” to extradition to effect Tchibassa’s arrest, noting that his

arrest in DROC in 2002 was not through extradition. Opening Br. 22.

The record demonstrates, however, that alternative efforts would have

been futile and ill-advised. See Decl. of Vincente Valle, App. 76 ¶ 3

from the time he was indicted on September 25, 1991 until

Interpol issued the “Red Notices” sometime in 1993. This gap

of more than two years casts some doubt on the government’s

diligence and might, under other circumstances, tip the balance

against it. Here, however, the district court found that Tchibassa

was more to blame than the government for the initial delay

because he maintained his residence in Zaire, beyond the

government’s diplomatic reach, and this finding is not clearly

erroneous.4 Subsequently, when the government learned in 1996

that Tchibassa had been sighted outside Zaire—in Brazzaville,

Congo in 1996—it cabled its Brazzaville Embassy to request

that the Congolese government, with which the United States

had an extradition treaty in force, effect his arrest. The

Congolese government, however, did not do so even after

Tchibassa moved to Brazzaville in 1998, notwithstanding the

Red Notices were in effect until at least 1999.5 While the

government might have undertaken more frequent and extensive

efforts to secure Tchibassa’s arrest, it is not clear that any such

effort would have succeeded so long as Tchibassa voluntarily

remained beyond the United States’ legal or practical reach.6

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(“U.S. relations with the governments of [Zaire/DROC] over the

relevant period would have made cooperation in the arrest of Mr.

Tchibassa difficult”); App. 83, 84 (July 1996 cable from U.S.

Embassy in Kinshasa to State Department advising extradition was

“not practical” and “any attempt to take one or all [of four accused

FLEC members] into U.S. custody will create the risk of retaliation

against other U.S. citizens”). Further, there is persuasive authority

that the government need not take extraordinary measures in order to

satisfy the reasonable diligence standard. See United States v.

Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Because the government’s

failure to obtain defendant’s extradition was the result of reliance upon

United States policy not to seek extradition outside the extradition

treaty with Greece, we conclude that the government has satisfied its

burden of demonstrating due diligence in seeking defendant's return

for trial without unnecessary delay.”).

Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the

government had no “opportunity to make arrest [sic] or get Mr.

Tchibassa extradited to the United States.” 11/25/03 Tr. 12. We

therefore agree with the district court that the second factor

weighs against Tchibassa because the fault for the delay in arrest

lay primarily with Tchibassa himself. In this respect, the delay

between Tchibassa’s indictment and arrest differs significantly

from the situation in Doggett, in which the Supreme Court found

the defendant’s speedy trial right had been violated.

In Doggett the defendant fled to Colombia, South America

shortly after he was indicted on federal drug charges. After a

brief incarceration in Panama, he was released to Colombia and

he returned to the United States about 2 1⁄2 years after the

indictment. He settled in the Commonwealth of Virginia where

he lived openly under his own name for six years before the

government discovered him through a credit check and then

made the arrest. The Supreme Court, upholding the district

court’s finding that the government was not diligent, concluded

that the second Barker factor weighed heavily in Doggett’s

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7

At a pretrial motions hearing, Tchibassa engaged in the following

colloquy with the prosecutor:

Question: Sir, when did you first learn of the criminal

charges against you?

Answer: When I was interviewed by Interpol [in 1994].

Question: So they described the nature of the charges that

the United States had filed against you?

Answer: Of course there was an interview, so they had to

disclose the charges.

8/26/2003 Hearing Tr. 40; see also 6/21/94 Interpol Interview Tr. 3,

JA 58 (Tchibassa stating: “I am surprised to see that the American

favor because “[f]or six years, the Government’s investigators

made no serious effort to test their progressively more

questionable assumption that Doggett was living abroad, and,

had they done so, they could have found him within minutes.”

505 U.S. at 652-53. Here, the record does not indicate U.S.

authorities had any opportunity to readily apprehend Tchibassa.

The delay in arresting Tchibassa was attributable primarily to

his continued residence in an area over which the United States

had no control and little influence. The second factor therefore

favors the government. 

For similar reasons, the third Barker factor—the defendant’s

invocation of the speedy trial right—favors the government as

well. The district court found that, notwithstanding Tchibassa

knew of the charges against him at least since the time of his

1994 meeting with Interpol, he made no effort to assert his

speedy trial right until he filed a motion to dismiss on April 21,

2003, nine months after his arrest. Tchibassa disputes that he

was aware of the charges before his arrest but the district court’s

contrary finding, based on the Interpol transcription, is not

clearly erroneous.”).7

 Tchibassa may have not have known that

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Judicial authorities issue [sic] an international arrest warrant for me for

this case . . . .”).

8

The Doggett Court appeared concerned generally with Doggett’s

awareness vel non that charges were pending against him rather than

with his specific knowledge that a formal indictment had been filed.

See 505 U.S. at 653-54 (citing as “substantiat[ing]” evidence of

Doggett’s “ignorance” “the testimony of Doggett’s wife, who said that

she did not know of the charges until his arrest, and of his mother,

who claimed not to have told him or anyone else that the police had

come looking for him”).

a formal indictment had issued—or even that one was

necessary—but if he was aware that charges were pending

against him (as the district court reasonably found he was), his

failure to make any effort to secure a timely trial on them (and

his apparent desire to avoid one) manifests a total disregard for

his speedy trial right. Thus, in this respect too, Tchibassa’s

situation differs from Doggett’s, whose claim of ignorance of

the charges against him was “unrebutted and largely

substantiated.” 505 U.S. at 654. The Doggett Court expressly

noted that, if it were true, as the government suggested (contrary

to the record), “that Doggett knew of his indictment years before

he was arrested . . . , Barker’s third factor, concerning

invocation of the right to a speedy trial, would be weighed

heavily against him.”8

 Id. at 653. Because the record supports

the district court’s finding that Tchibassa knew of all of the

charges contained in the sealed indictment as early as 1994, the

third factor also weighs against his speedy trial claim.

Finally, the fourth Barker factor—prejudice from delay—

does nothing to advance Tchibassa’s speedy trial claim.

“[U]nreasonable delay between formal accusation and trial

threatens to produce more than one sort of harm, including

‘oppressive pretrial incarceration,’ ‘anxiety and concern of the

accused,’ and ‘the possibility that the [accused’s] defense will

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9

Nor was Tchibassa subject to public suspicion and hostility as the

contents of the sealed indictment were not made public. See Barker,

407 U.S. at 533 (“[E]ven if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial,

he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under

a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.”). 

10Tchibassa does point to his inability to recall the identity of the

interpreter Taylor used in a 1994 conversation with Tchibassa in

which, Taylor testified, Tchibassa admitted his role in the 1994

abduction of Dietrich. As we conclude below, however, the testimony

regarding Dietrich’s abduction, while probably wrongly permitted,

was of little consequence to Tchibassa’s defense or conviction.

Tchibassa also cites his inability to identify some of the persons he

met in the United States embassies in 1995 but does not explain—and

we cannot discern—how the visits were material to his defense on the

merits or how lacking the persons’ identities impaired the defense.

be impaired’ by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory

evidence.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S.

at 532). The first two listed harms are of no significance here

as Tchibassa was not imprisoned until after his arrest and he

displayed no concern over the years about the pending criminal

charges, in fact denying he was even aware of them.9 Cf. id.

(noting Doggett could probably not claim first two harms “since

he was subjected neither to pretrial detention nor, he has

successfully contended, to awareness of unresolved charges

against him”). This leaves only the third form of prejudice—

possible impairment of the defendant’s case—which the

Supreme Court has described as “ ‘the most serious . . . because

the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews

the fairness of the entire system.’ ” Id. (quoting Barker, 407

U.S. at 532). Tchibassa alleges only generally that the passage

of time compromised his “ability to locate witnesses in West

Africa who could confirm Tchibassa’s role in FLEC and the

Swan negotiations in 1991,” Opening Br. 26, without identifying

any material witness much less a failed attempt to locate one.10

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In the absence of specific, articulable prejudice, Tchibassa relies

largely on the “presumptive” prejudice that results from the

mere passage of time. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654-55. As the

Doggett Court noted, however, while “we generally have to

recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the

reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for

that matter, identify,” “such presumptive prejudice cannot alone

carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other

Barker criteria.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-56 (citing United

States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986)). Because two

of the other Barker criteria— fault for the delay and timely

assertion of the speedy trial right—weigh heavily against

Tchibassa, his claim of presumptive prejudice does not tip the

scales in his favor. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 (“[I]f the

Government had pursued Doggett with reasonable diligence

from his indictment to his arrest, his speedy trial claim would

fail. Indeed, that conclusion would generally follow as a matter

of course however great the delay, so long as Doggett could not

show specific prejudice to his defense.”); Barker, 407 U.S. at

536 (“[B]arring extraordinary circumstances, we would be

reluctant indeed to rule that a defendant was denied this

constitutional right on a record that strongly indicates, as does

this one, that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.”).

In sum, we conclude that the balance of the four Barker

factors favors the government. Accordingly, the district court’s

denial of Tchibassa’s motion to dismiss for violation of his

speedy trial right is affirmed.

B. Evidentiary Rulings

Second, Tchibassa contends the district court erred in two

evidentiary rulings under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).

Rule 404(a) bars admission of “Character Evidence Generally,”

directing that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of

character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in

conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” Rule 404(b)

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11Additionally, the court found Dietrich’s testimony was not

prohibited under Rule 403 because its probative value was not

outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

similarly prohibits evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . .

to prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith” but permits such evidence “for other

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident.” The government proffered the testimony of Piotr

Dietrich, a Polish national, regarding Tchibassa’s role in a 1994

FLEC hostage-taking in Cabinda, Angola, in which Dietrich was

himself taken hostage, to show that Tchibassa was a willing

participant in Swan’s hostage-taking as well, and not, as

Tchibassa maintained, simply a well-intentioned negotiator

attempting to secure Swan’s release. For his part, Tchibassa

proffered the testimony of Martins Leitao, the owner of a

Portugese construction company, relating to Tchibassa’s role in

negotiations for the release of Leitao’s employees who were

taken hostage by FLEC in 1992 and 2001, to show that

Tchibassa’s intent was to obtain Swan’s freedom. The district

court admitted Dietrich’s testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)

“to show [Tchibassa’s] motivation, that is, intent and his actions,

and lack of mistake or accident” to counter Tchibassa’s claim,

as the court characterized it, “that he was not responsible, that he

came in as a person attempting to solve a difficult situation for

his people” and “that he had no prior knowledge, and the

subsequent knowledge was only as a participant in attempting to

resolve it, not in attempting to continue detention of Mr. Swan

in any way.” 9/09/03 Tr. 120.11 On the other hand, the court

excluded Leitao’s testimony, concluding that it “d[id] not meet

the rule of relevancy” and “d[id] not qualify under 404(b).”

9/11/03 Tr. 11. Tchibassa asserts the district court erred in

admitting Dietrich’s testimony and then excluding Leitao’s and

that the exclusion of Leitao’s testimony in particular deprived

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him of his right under the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment “to present witnesses in his own defense.”

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 302 (1973). We reject

Tchibassa’s challenge because, assuming arguendo the district

court erred, the error was harmless. 

 Dietrich’s testimony was of minimal value to the

government—or harm to the defense—because the record was

already replete with compelling and uncontradicted evidence

that Tchibassa was a willing participant in the Swan hostagetaking: his characterization by other FLEC members as a “major

member” of FLEC and by FLEC President Tiburcio as “Major

Artur Tchibassa” and FLEC “Foreign Affairs Secretary,” 9/5/03

Tr. 138; 9/5/03 Tr. 127; the photograph of Tchibassa in

“[m]ilitary combat clothing” with hostage Swan in the FLEC

base camp, 9/09/03 Tr. 49; 9/10/03 Tr. 37; the testimony of

Taylor PHI negotiator Weber that Tchibassa was FLEC’s “chief

spokesman,” “did all the primary speaking as negotiator,” was

“at times . . . quite forceful”—on occasions he would “raise his

voice . . . talking over them” and “would bang the table on

occasions—was “obviously passionate about his cause,” “quite

often” told the negotiators “how long he had been a member of

[FLEC] and just how much this all meant to him” and, along

with the other two FLEC negotiators, “took full claim and

credit” for the hostage-taking so that “there was never any

disputing the fact that they abducted and held Brent Swan,”

9/9/03 Tr. 64, 9/5/03 Tr. 184-85; 9/10/03 Tr. 29, 31-32; 9/5/03

Tr. 1845; testimony of both the government and Chevron

negotiators that Tchibassa was intent on obtaining a cash ransom

“specifically for the purchase of arms” in the face of the

negotiators’ contrary insistence and after they “managed to

persuade him that they could not have military equipment,”

9/5/03 Tr. 141, 9/10/03 Tr. 28; Tchibassa’s own characterization

of Swan’s abduction and imprisonment as simply “the

questioning of BRENT SWAN by the troops of our movement”

and an “incident,” insisting it was “neither a terrorist act nor an

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act of piracy or kidnapping [sic],” JA 58; and, finally,

Tchibassa’s signature on receipts for goods delivered to FLEC

as ransom in January 1991, 9/10/03 Tr. 33-34. On the other

side, there is not a shred of evidence to affirmatively support

Tchibassa’s defense of innocent motive. Nor would Leitao’s

excluded testimony have significantly aided the defense. That

Tchibassa may have striven zealously to negotiate the release of

other hostages—and the accompanying payment of ransom—is

fully consistent with the government’s theory that Tchibassa was

a willing participant in the entire Swan hostage-taking plan from

the abduction through the ransom, seeking release of hostages

in order to obtain ransom for FLEC. Nor does it blunt the

impact of the extensive evidence that he participated throughout

on behalf of FLEC and in furtherance of its goals. Given the

overwhelming evidence in the record that Tchibassa conspired

to commit hostage taking and committed hostage-taking as

charged, we conclude that any error in the district court’s

evidentiary rulings, whether or not of constitutional dimension,

was harmless. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256

(1988) (“We generally have held that if the prosecution can

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional error did

not contribute to the verdict, the error is harmless and the verdict

may stand.” (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967)); United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162, 1166 n.4

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[N]onconstitutional error is harmless if it did

not have ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict’ ” (quoting Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).

C. Sentencing

Finally, Tchibassa challenges his sentence on the ground that

the district court erred under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005), in treating the Guidelines as mandatory. Because

Tchibassa did not challenge the court’s reliance on the

Guidelines at sentencing, we review the sentence for plain error

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under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d

764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Under the plain-error standard,

“ ‘there must be (1) “error,” (2) that is “plain,” and (3) that

“affect[s] substantial rights.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quoting United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)) (alteration in Johnson)).

Under Coles, the first two plain error requirements are met if a

judge treats the Guidelines as mandatory because “[f]ollowing

Booker, this [is] error and it is undoubtedly ‘plain.’ ” Id. Thus,

we need decide only whether the sentencing error affected

substantial rights, that is, “whether there would have been a

materially different result, more favorable to the defendant, had

the sentence been imposed in accordance with the post-Booker

sentencing regime.” Id. In Coles, the court was unable to

answer this question because the record was “insufficient for

[the court] to determine with confidence whether the defendant

suffered prejudice from the Booker error.” Id. at 765. The court

recognized, however, that “[t]here undoubtedly will be some

cases in which a reviewing court will be confident that a

defendant has suffered no prejudice,” as, for example, “ ‘if a

judge were to impose a sentence at the statutory maximum and

say that if he could he would have imposed an even longer

sentence.’ ” Id. at 769 (quoting United States v. Paladino, 401

F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2005)). In such a case, the imposition of

the maximum sentence, combined with the judge’s

characterization of the sentence, makes manifest he would not

have imposed a materially different sentence were he not

constrained by the Guidelines. We find this to be such a case

as well. 

The district judge here sentenced Tchibassa at the very top

of the applicable range—293 months—and identified this

maximum permissible sentence as “appropriate” to “serve as a

warning to those who will kidnap Americans abroad” and

“entirely appropriate for the type of actions that occurred here

in depriving Mr. Swan not only of his freedom for two months,

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12In Coles, the sentencing judge apparently expressed no personal

view of the appropriateness of the 36 month sentence he imposed

(which was“ somewhat above the lower end of the 33-to-41 months

Guidelines range,” Coles, 403 F.3d at 769).

but basically of his life.” 2/27/04 Tr. 34, 35 (emphasis added).

The judge’s strong and unambiguous approval of the sentence

imposed, based—as he explained—on its deterrent effect and its

proportionality to the crime committed, makes us confident that

were the judge given the opportunity to resentence Tchibassa,

applying the Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory, he

would not impose a sentence materially more favorable than the

one he made plain he considered “appropriate.”12 Accordingly,

we conclude Tchibassa was not prejudiced by the judge’s

sentencing error and see no ground for a sentencing remand. Cf.

United States v. Smith, 401 F.3d 497, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (no

prejudice where judge twice—before and after

remand—departed upward and stated: “I believe, in my view,

that you deserve the sentence that will be imposed here.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant’s conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

So ordered.

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