Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00934/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00934-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Defendant
LeAnthony T. Winston
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEANTHONY T. WINSTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00934-KES-HBK (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g) 1

FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

(Doc. No. 6)

Plaintiff LeAnthony T. Winston, a prisoner incarcerated at USP-Atwater, initiated this 

action by filing a pro se prisoner complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) on 

August 12, 2024. (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). On August 13, 2024, the Court directed Plaintiff to 

either file an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) or pay the $405.00 filing fee for 

civil actions within 30 days. (Doc. No. 3). On September 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed an IFP 

application. (Doc. No. 8). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends the 

district court deny Plaintiff’s IFP motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because Plaintiff has had at 

least three actions or appeals that constitute strikes, and the Complaint does not establish that

Plaintiff meets the imminent danger exception.

////

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 

(E.D. Cal. 2023).

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BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The events giving rise to the Complaint took place at an unspecified correctional facility. 

(See generally Doc. No. 1). The Complaint identifies the United States of America as the sole 

Defendant. (Id. at 1). The Complaint alleges that Lt. Prince failed to secure Plaintiff’s legal 

property following Plaintiff’s transfer to the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”), and that Officer 

Hannsen, the SHU Property Officer, neglected to follow CDCR regulations which required that 

Plaintiff be provided a copy of the property inventory. (Id.). As a result, Plaintiff’s property was 

lost, and he was prevented from prosecuting unspecified legal proceedings. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). 

Plaintiff therefore seeks relief under the FTCA for loss of property, personal injury, and 

negligence. (See generally id.). Plaintiff seeks $10,000 in damages. (Id. at 1).

APPLICABLE THREE STRIKE LAW

The “Three Strikes Rule” states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or proceeding under 

this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal 

in the United States that was dismissed on grounds that it was 

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). As part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Three Strikes Rule was 

enacted to help curb non-meritorious prisoner litigation. See Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 

1721, 1723 (2020) (citations omitted)). Under § 1915(g), prisoners who have repeatedly brought 

unsuccessful suits may be barred from bringing a civil action and paying the fee on a payment 

plan once they have had on prior occasions three or more cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, 

or for failure to state a claim. Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.2d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2007). 

For a dismissal to count as a strike, the dismissal had to be on a “prior occasion,” meaning

the order dismissing the case must have been docketed before plaintiff initiated the current case. 

See § 1915(g). The reviewing court then looks to the basis of prior dismissals. Knapp v. Hogan, 

738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). A dismissal counts as a strike when the dismissal of the 

action was for frivolity, maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim, or an appeal was dismissed 

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for the same reasons. Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1723 (citing Section 1915(g)); see also Washington v. 

Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing dismissals that count 

as strikes); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1761 (2015) (dismissal that is on appeal counts 

as a strike during the pendency of the appeal). It is immaterial whether the dismissal for failure to 

state a claim to count was with or without prejudice, as both count as a strike under § 1915(g). 

Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1727. When a district court disposes of an in forma pauperis complaint 

requiring the full filing fee, then such a complaint is “dismissed” for purposes of §1915(g). Louis 

Butler O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Once a prisoner-plaintiff has accumulated three strikes, he/she may not proceed without 

paying the full filing fee, unless “the complaint makes a plausible allegation” that the prisoner 

“faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing” of the complaint. 

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2007) (addressing imminent danger 

exception for the first time in the Ninth Circuit). The court must construe the prisoner’s “facial 

allegations” liberally to determine whether the allegations of physical injury are plausible. 

Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2015). 

In order to avail oneself of this narrow exception, “the PLRA requires a nexus between 

the alleged imminent danger and the violations of law alleged in the prisoner’s complaint.” Ray 

v. Lara, 31 F. 4th 692, 700-701 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2022) (adopting nexus test). “In deciding 

whether such a nexus exists, we will consider (1) whether the imminent danger of serious 

physical injury that a three-strikes litigant alleges is fairly traceable to unlawful conduct asserted 

in the complaint and (2) whether a favorable judicial outcome would redress that injury.” Id. at 

700 (adopting test as articulated by Second Circuit, citation omitted). The three-strikes litigant 

must meet both requirements of the nexus test to proceed. Id. 

Assertions of imminent danger may be rejected as overly speculative, fanciful, or 

“conclusory or ridiculous.” Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1057, fn. 11. Similarly, “vague and utterly 

conclusory assertions” of imminent danger are insufficient. White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 

1231–32 (10th Cir. 1998). Instead, the “imminent danger” exception exists “for genuine 

emergencies,” where “time is pressing” and “a threat . . . is real and proximate.” Lewis v. 

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Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, conditions that posed imminent danger to a 

plaintiff at some earlier time are immaterial, as are any subsequent conditions. Cervantes, 493 

F.3d at 1053; Blackman v. Mjening, 2016 WL 5815905, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016). 

Upon a finding that the plaintiff is barred by the three strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g), some courts have found that the proper procedure is to dismiss the case without 

prejudice to re-filing the action upon pre-payment of fees at the time the action is refiled. 

Hardney v. Hampton, 2021 WL 4896034, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2021), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 6051701 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2021) (citing Dupree v. 

Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002); Campbell v. Vance, 2005 WL 3288400, at *1 

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2005). Other courts have first afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to pay the 

filing fee before dismissing the case. See Gorby v. Internal Revenue Service, Fresno, 2021 WL 

1339146, report and recommendation adopted in part and rejected in part, 2021 WL 2227810 

(E.D. Cal. June 2, 2021) (rejected immediate dismissal, instead permitting 30 days to pay filing 

fee, and if not, then requiring dismissal); Trujillo Cruz v. White, 2019 WL 4917192 (Oct. 4, 

2019), report and recommendation adopted in part and rejected in part, Trujillo-Cruz v. White, 

2020 WL 1234201 (E.D. Cal. March 13, 2021) (rejected immediate dismissal, instead permitting 

30 days to pay filing fee, and if not then requiring dismissal).

The preceding law must be taken in the context of congressional intent when enacting the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Lomax, “[t]he point 

of the PLRA . . . was to cabin not only abusive but also simply meritless prisoner suits.” Lomax, 

140 S.Ct. at 1726. And the three strikes provision, in particular, was aimed “to disincentivize 

frivolous prisoner litigation.” Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2019). 

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff has three or more qualifying strikes

A review of the Pacer Database reveals that Plaintiff has filed more than 25 civil actions 

or appeals in a court of the United States.2 Although not exhaustive, for purposes of these 

2 http://pacer.uscourts.gov

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findings and recommendations, each of the following cases are properly deemed qualifying 

§ 1915(g) strikes and each was entered before Plaintiff commenced the instant action:

Date of Order Case Style Disposition

October 16, 2023 Winston v. United States, 

No. 1:23-cv-01086-JLTSAB (E.D. Cal.)

Dismissed at screening stage 

for failure to state a claim

because no Bivens remedy 

available for Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment claim.

May 11, 2018 Winston v. Robinson, No. 

2:18-cv-00045-RGD-LRL 

(E.D. Va.)

Dismissed for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A because defendants 

were not state actors and thus 

not amenable to suit under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.

June 16, 2017 Winston v. Martin, No. 

2:17-cv-315-RGD-RJK 

(E.D. Va.)

Dismissed for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1) because 

Plaintiff’s claims were 

facially barred by judicial and 

prosecutorial immunity.

June 6, 2017 Winston v. Doyle, No. 2:17-

cv-254-RGD-DEM (E.D. 

Va.)

Dismissed for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§1915A(b)(1) because 

Plaintiff’s claims were 

facially barred by judicial and 

prosecutorial immunity.

Plaintiff has previously been denied IFP status by other courts because of his three-striker 

status. See, e.g., Winston v. Smith, Case No. 2:21-cv-00285-AWA-LRL (E.D. Va. 2023). Each 

of the above dismissals was done at the screening stages by the district court after finding the 

operative complaint failed to state a claim and qualify as a strike under Ninth Circuit law for 

purposes of § 1915(g). 

B. The Imminent Danger Exception Does Not Apply 

Because Plaintiff has three qualifying strikes, he may not proceed IFP unless the 

Complaint contains plausible allegations that Plaintiff is in imminent danger of serious physical 

injury as of the date the complaint is filed. Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052-53 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Liberally construing the Complaint, there are no facts that indicate Plaintiff was in 

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imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed the action. Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

to the extent discernible, centers on the wrongful taking of his property, placement in the security 

housing unit, and interference with unspecified legal proceedings. (See generally Doc. No. 1). 

Plaintiff’s claims do not by their nature imply an imminent danger of serious physical injury, nor 

does Plaintiff allege any facts that articulate a risk of imminent physical danger.

Because Plaintiff’s claims do not plausibly allege a risk of imminent physical injury, 

much less one related to the underlying allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff does not satisfy 

either prong of the nexus test set forth above. 

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 6) be DENIED under 

§ 1915(g) due to his three-strike status and his failure to meet the imminent danger 

exception.

2. Plaintiff be directed to pay the full $405.00 filing fee by a date certain, absent which 

the Court dismiss this action without prejudice. 

NOTICE TO PARTIES

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the Court. Id.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The assigned District Judge 

will review these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). A party’s 

failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Dated: September 30, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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