Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03114/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03114-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Dennis L. Webb
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 9, 2001 Decided July 27, 2001

No. 99-3114

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Dennis L. Webb,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00260-01)

Peter S. Spivack, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for appellant. With him on the briefs was Christopher T.

Handman.

Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R.

Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Sentelle and

Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: This case presents questions arising from the Supreme Court's opinion in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), including the impact of Apprendi

on the interpretation of the career offender provision of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1. Dennis Webb appeals from his conviction on three counts of

distributing and one count of possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841. Webb

contends that because a judge, rather than a jury, determined

facts concerning drug quantity and prior criminal convictions,

his sentence was imposed in violation of both the Constitution

and the Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons discussed

below, we reject those challenges. We also reject Webb's

subsidiary claims that the trial court erred in failing to credit

him with accepting responsibility for his offenses, in admitting evidence of Webb's prior drug transactions, and in

denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a

search of his apartment.

I

In the spring of 1998, the government began investigating

Webb for his suspected involvement in dealing cocaine base

("crack" cocaine) in Washington, D.C., and for his ties to a

New York drug supplier. The government recruited Danon

Johnson, a convicted drug dealer with whom Webb previously

had done business, to arrange several controlled purchases

from Webb. Webb sold Johnson cocaine base on May 14, 18,

and 28, 1998. Each of these transactions was preceded by

negotiations that were recorded on audiotape. The first two

transactions took place in Johnson's apartment; the third

transpired in a government car and was recorded on video

and audiotape. Government laboratory reports showed that

the quantity of cocaine base purchased on these occasions was

22.5, 34.7, and 53.5 grams, respectively. Following the sales,

on July 28, 1998, a federal grand jury handed down a sealed

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indictment charging Webb with three counts of distributing

cocaine base.

The government's investigation into Webb resumed on

September 3, 1998, when investigators asked Johnson to

attempt another purchase from Webb. Johnson contacted

Webb, but Webb told Johnson that he did not have any crack

for sale. Soon thereafter, the government obtained a search

warrant for Webb's apartment, seeking documents related to

Webb's drug business. The search warrant was executed on

September 15, 1998, and investigators found 6.52 grams of

crack, $15,114 in cash, drug packaging supplies, and a piece of

paper with the name and pager number of the New York

supplier sought by the government.

On December 3, 1998, a four-count superseding indictment

was filed against Webb. The indictment charged him with

one count of distribution for each of the three May drug

purchases: Counts One and Two each charged Webb with

distributing 5 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of

21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), and Count Three

charged him with distributing 50 grams or more of cocaine

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). A

fourth count, relating to the drugs seized from his apartment,

charged Webb with possessing with intent to distribute a

detectable amount of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

s 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).

Webb's case went to trial on April 27, 1999. Webb filed

pretrial motions to bar the government from introducing

evidence of his past drug transactions with Johnson, and to

suppress evidence collected from the search of his apartment.

The district court denied both motions. At trial, the government's evidence included the testimony of Johnson, as well as

that of investigators who surveilled the transactions between

the two men and who participated in the search. A government chemist testified and introduced lab reports that specified the weight of the cocaine base recovered from each

transaction and the search. Webb neither testified nor presented witnesses in his defense.

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Consistent with then-prevailing precedent in this circuit,

the trial court did not instruct the jury that it must find the

drug quantities recited in the indictment; instead, it instructed that "the government need not prove that the defendant

distributed any particular numerical amount of cocaine, but it

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

distributed a detectable or measurable amount of cocaine."

4/29/99 Tr. at 48. Similarly, the jury verdict form did not

specify quantities for any of the charges. See App. 202. On

May 4, 1999, the jury convicted Webb on all counts.

Based upon the presentence report ("PSR"), the district

court found that Webb had two prior felony drug convictions,

that he was on parole for one at the time of the offenses

charged in the indictment, that the quantities of cocaine base

involved in the indictment's four counts were as specified

above, and that the total quantity was 116.82 grams.1 This

would ordinarily have given Webb a criminal history category

of IV and an offense level of 32, which would have fixed his

sentencing range at 168 to 210 months. See U.S.S.G.

s 2D1.1(c)(4); id. s 4A1.1(a), (d); id. ch. 5, Pt. A. However,

because of his two prior narcotics convictions, Webb qualified

as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1.2 Under the

career offender guideline, Webb received a criminal history

category of VI and an offense level of 37. PSR p 18. These

figures exposed Webb to a sentencing range of 30 years to

__________

1 The PSR apparently made a mathematical error in totalling

drug quantity; the total should have been 117.22 grams.

2 Section 4B1.1 provides that: "A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time

the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction, (2) the

instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of

violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has

at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or

a controlled substance offense." U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1. If a defendant

meets these criteria, his offense level is determined by using a table

set forth in s 4B1.1--if the table produces a higher offense level

than that which the defendant would otherwise receive under the

guidelines. Id. All defendants qualifying as career offenders receive a criminal history Category of VI. Id.

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life. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. On August 13, 1999, the court

sentenced Webb to 30 years' imprisonment and 10 years of

supervised release.

II

Webb's principal challenge to his sentence is that it is

contrary to the rule announced in Apprendi, that "any fact

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. Specifically,

Webb first contends that, because the jury merely found him

responsible for a detectable amount of cocaine base and made

no findings concerning his prior convictions, his 30-year

sentence exceeds the 20-year maximum constitutionally authorized by the jury's findings. See 21 U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(C).

Second, Webb contends that even if his sentence of 30 years

did not exceed the lawful maximum, the district court committed error by sentencing him, under the career offender

provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1, to a

sentence greater than that justified by the jury's determination alone. We consider these contentions in Parts B through

D below. We begin with an explication of the relevant

statutory provisions, and with a discussion of the case law

leading to, and following from, the Supreme Court's opinion

in Apprendi.

A

Section 841(a) of Title 21 of the United States Code makes

it "unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally" to

distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled

substance. Section 841(b) specifies sentences for "any person

who violates subsection (a)." For violations involving cocaine

base, s 841(b) establishes three categories of penalties, depending upon the amount of the drug involved: s 841(b)(1)(A)

sets a maximum sentence of life in prison for violations

involving 50 grams or more; s 841(b)(1)(B) sets a maximum

sentence of 40 years for violations involving 5 grams or more

(or life, if the defendant has a prior felony drug conviction);

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and s 841(b)(1)(C) sets a maximum sentence of 20 years for

any other amount (or 30 years, if the defendant has a prior

felony drug conviction).3

Until 2000, well-established precedent in this circuit held

that drug quantity was a sentencing factor to be determined

by the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence, and not

an element of the s 841 offense to be determined by a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v.

Williams, 194 F.3d 100, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v.

Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United

States v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991, 995-96 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

That precedent was consistent with the rule in the other

circuits. See Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d at 685 (collecting

cases). The fact of a defendant's prior conviction was also

treated as a sentencing factor and, in Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, the Supreme Court confirmed that prior conviction could constitutionally be determined by a judge rather

than a jury. 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998). In accord with this

precedent, standard practice in the district court was for the

judge at sentencing, rather than the jury at trial, to make the

necessary findings about drug quantity and prior conviction.

This was the procedure the district court followed in Webb's

case.

In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), the Supreme

Court considered the statute that makes carjacking a federal

crime, 18 U.S.C. s 2119. That statute has a tripartite structure, with a base penalty of imprisonment for a maximum of

15 years, and greater penalties dependent upon whether the

offense involved the injury or death of a victim. The Court

suggested that it could well be unconstitutional for Congress

to remove those latter determinations from a jury's consideration, pursuant to the principle that "under the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial

guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than

__________

3 Section 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) establish different quantity

thresholds for other drugs. They also establish mandatory minimum sentences, but Webb raises no claim concerning the mandatory minimum penalties on this appeal. See generally United States

v. Camacho, 248 F.3d 1286, 1288-89 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2001).

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prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a

crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,

and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 526 U.S. at

243 n.6. To avoid doubt about the constitutionality of s 2119,

the Court construed the statute "as establishing three separate offenses by the specification of distinct elements, each of

which must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a

reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict."

Id. at 252.

The next Term, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v.

New Jersey. Confirming what the Court said it had "foreshadowed" in Jones, Apprendi held that due process requires

that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 476, 490. Such a

fact, the Court said, was the "functional equivalent of an

element of a greater offense than the one covered by the

jury's guilty verdict." Id. at 494 n.19. In Apprendi, the

defendant had pled guilty to a state firearms charge that

exposed him to a sentencing range of 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. Id. at 469-70. However, pursuant to a separate state

statute enhancing punishment for hate crimes, a defendant's

maximum sentence could be increased to 20 years if the

sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the offense was motivated by racial bias. Id. at 470.

The judge made that finding and sentenced Apprendi to 12

years' imprisonment. Id. at 471. The Supreme Court held

this sentence unconstitutional, because it exceeded the statutory maximum for the firearms offense based upon the

judge's factfinding concerning racial bias.

Apprendi contained two important caveats. First, the

Court confirmed that Almendarez-Torres was still good law,

and hence that a judge rather than a jury could continue to

determine whether a defendant had prior convictions, regardless whether that determination increased the defendant's

sentence above a statutory maximum. Id. at 489-90. The

Court added, however, that it is "arguable that AlmendarezTorres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application

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of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue

were contested." Id. Second, the Court made clear that it

was not suggesting "that it is impermissible for judges to

exercise discretion--taking into consideration various factors

relating both to offense and offender--in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute." Id. at 481. In

so doing, Apprendi expressly preserved the holding of

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), that sentencing factors that determine where a defendant's sentence falls

within a statutory maximum need not be proven to a jury.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13, 494 & n.19. Indeed, the

Court suggested that it would be permissible for a legislature

to set a crime's maximum sentence at, 34for example, 50 years

and [to] giv[e] judges guided discretion as to a few specially

selected factors within that range.34 Id. at 490 n.16.

Apprendi did not address the interpretation or constitutionality of s 841. Apprendi itself involved two 34separate

statute[s].34 Id. at 468-69. One fixed a 10-year maximum

sentence for possessing a firearm for an unlawful purpose.

The other--the hate crime law--increased the maximum sentence for any crime (with certain exceptions) where a judge

found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant

committed the offense out of racial bias. Id. Section 841, by

contrast, is a single statute with two subsections. One subsection, s 841(a), is entitled "Unlawful acts" and specifies that

it is unlawful to knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled substance. The other, s 841(b), is entitled "Penalties"

and specifies three categories of sentences for "any person

who violates subsection (a)." See s 841(b)(1)(A), (B), (C).4

Following the logic of Apprendi, if s 841 were interpreted as

a unitary statute--establishing a single crime with a statutory

maximum of life in prison and three sentencing factors dependent upon drug quantity--then drug quantity in a particular

case may be decided by a judge. However, if s 841 were

interpreted as a tripartite statute--establishing three sepa-

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4 Section 841(b) includes a fourth category, s 841(b)(1)(D),

which applies to offenses involving (inter alia) less than 50 kilograms of marijuana and which is not applicable here.

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rate crimes with three different statutory maxima depending

upon the drug quantity categories of s 841(b) (hereinafter the

(A), (B), and (C) offenses)--then the drug quantity thresholds

effectively are elements that must be decided by a jury.

Since Apprendi was decided, numerous circuits have held

that Apprendi requires that the drug quantity thresholds of

s 841(b) be treated as offense elements and thus "charged in

the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable

doubt." United States v. Promise, No. 99-4737, 2001 WL

732389, at *5 (4th Cir. June 29, 2001).5 In several cases,

including the instant case, the government has conceded the

point. Br. for Gov't at 11-12.6 Subsequent to the oral

argument in this case, another panel of this court agreed,

holding in United States v. Fields that, "[i]n light of Apprendi, it is now clear that, in drug cases under 21 U.S.C. ss 841

and 846, before a defendant can be sentenced to any of the

progressively higher statutory maximums that are based on

progressively higher quantities of drugs specified in subsections 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the Government must state the drug

type and quantity in the indictment, submit the required

evidence to the jury, and prove the relevant drug quantity

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Fields, 242

F.3d 393, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Fields I"), aff'd and amended

on reh'g, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Fields II");

accord In re Sealed Case, 246 F.3d 696, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2001).7

__________

5 See, e.g., United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820, 824-25 (7th

Cir. 2000); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir.

2000); United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir.

2000); United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1058-59 (9th Cir.

2000); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th

Cir. 2000).

6 See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1044 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) ("Fields II"); United States v. Swatzie, 228 F.3d 1278,

1282 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 575

(5th Cir. 2000).

7 Although failure to follow these requirements constitutes error, it is not reversible error if it is either "harmless" under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) or not "plain" under Federal Rule

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Fields also held, however, that "Apprendi does not apply to

enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines when the

resulting sentence remains within the statutory maximum."

Fields II, 251 F.3d at 1043-44; see United States v. King, No.

00-3023, 2001 WL 739813, at *4 (D.C. Cir. July 3, 2001); In

re Sealed Case, 246 F.3d at 698-99; see also Fields II, 251

F.3d at 1044 (collecting cases from other courts of appeals).

These holdings are now the law of the circuit.

As will be evident in our discussion below, in order to

decide this case it is important to know whether s 841 is

properly interpreted as a unitary (one crime with a life

maximum) or tripartite (three crimes with three increasing

maxima) statute. The defendant argues that it is the latter.

Although the Fields court did not explicitly address the

question, it must have understood s 841 to be tripartite.

Otherwise, and contrary both to Fields' holding and to the

government's concession in this case, drug quantity would not

need to be decided by a jury because a judge's determination

would not increase the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum--life imprisonment.8 Accordingly, the question

of the statute's structure is not open for us to consider de

__________

of Criminal Procedure 52(b). See Fields II, 251 F.3d at 1045; infra

Parts II.B-D.

8 In her dissent in Apprendi, Justice O'Connor wrote that

"[t]he actual principle underlying the Court's decision may be that

any fact (other than prior conviction) that has the effect, in real

terms, of increasing the maximum punishment beyond an otherwise

applicable range must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 543-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Such a principle, Justice O'Connor said, would also apply "to all

determinate-sentencing schemes in which the length of a defendant's sentence within the statutory range turns on specific factual

determinations (e.g., the federal Sentencing Guidelines)." Id. at

544. But this expansive reading of Apprendi would effectively

overrule McMillan, a step the majority expressly stated it was not

taking. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13. As noted above, this

circuit has taken a narrower view of the meaning of Apprendi. See

Fields II, 251 F.3d at 1043-44; In re Sealed Case, 246 F.3d at 698-

99.

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novo, and we therefore accept for purposes of our analysis

that it is tripartite, without examining the indicia of legislative

intent ourselves.

B

Webb's first challenge to his sentence is that, because the

jury did not determine drug quantity, he may not lawfully be

sentenced to a term greater than that authorized for the (C)

offense--the only one of the three s 841(b) offenses for which

drug quantity is not an element. See 21 U.S.C.

s 841(b)(1)(C); United States v. Allen, 960 F.2d 1055, 1058

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that s 841(b)(1)(C) is satisfied if the

defendant's violation involves "any detectable amount" of

cocaine base). Further contending that the maximum sentence under the (C) offense is 20 years' imprisonment, Webb

argues that, in light of Apprendi, he should not have been

sentenced to any more than 20 years.

Webb did not raise this objection below, and the parties

agree that as a consequence we must review it under the

four-pronged plain error standard of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Fields II,

251 F.3d at 1045; In re Sealed Case, 246 F.3d at 698. Under

that standard, "before an appellate court can correct an error

not raised at trial, there must be (1) 'error,' (2) that is 'plain,'

and (3) that 'affect[s] substantial rights.' " Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quoting United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). "If all three conditions are

met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to

notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 'seriously

affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.' " Id. at 467 (additional internal quotations and

citations omitted). In evaluating whether an error is "plain"

in a case like Webb's, where the law has changed since the

time of the trial, "it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the

time of appellate consideration." Id. at 468.

The problem with Webb's claim to a 20-year maximum

sentence is that, although the basic (C) violation is subject to

a 20-year cap, the statute provides that "[i]f any person

commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony

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drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced

to a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 years." 21

U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(C). Moreover, as discussed above, in Almendarez-Torres the Supreme Court expressly held that an

enhancement for prior convictions need not be based on a

jury's finding--a holding the Court preserved in Apprendi.

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted

to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis

added)). Webb nonetheless notes the skepticism about Almendarez-Torres expressed in Apprendi, and asks us to

disregard the earlier case because he counts five Justices as

no longer supporting its holding. That, of course, we may not

do. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) ("[I]f a

precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet

appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of

decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which

directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of

overruling its own decisions." (internal quotation omitted)).

Thus, taking into consideration the district court's recidivism

finding, Webb faced a maximum sentence of 30 years even if

he had been convicted of the (C) offense alone. And because

he was only sentenced to 30 years, Webb was not sentenced,

as he claims, to a term greater than the statutory maximum

of s 841(b)(1)(C).

C

If this case were not complicated by the application of the

career offender guideline, the fact that the defendant received

a sentence within the statutory maximum of the (C) offense

might well end the analysis, notwithstanding that a judge

rather than a jury made a quantity determination that could

have exposed the defendant to a higher maximum. In such

cases, some courts of appeals have held that, because the

defendant was sentenced below (C)'s maximum, there was no

"Apprendi error" at all.9 Such an approach seems appropri-

__________

9 See, e.g., United States v. Angle, No. 96-4662, 2001 WL

732124, at *2 (4th Cir. June 29, 2001); United States v. Meshack,

225 F.3d at 576.

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ate where the defendant was charged with and convicted of

the (C) offense (or with an unspecified s 841(b) offense not

based on quantity). In such a case, drug quantity is not an

element of the offense that must be decided by a jury, and

the defendant's sentence was determined by the Sentencing

Guidelines' drug quantity table, U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(c), which

assigns offense levels based on drug quantities rather than

statutory maxima.10

Other courts of appeals have found "Apprendi error" where

the trial court determined a drug quantity that would qualify

the defendant for an enhanced maximum sentence, but have

concluded that the error did not "affect substantial rights,"

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52, because the defendant's actual sentence

fell below the maximum for the (C) offense.11 This approach

is appropriate where the defendant, like Webb, was charged

with and convicted of the (A) or (B) offense. See App. 11-12

(indictment); App. 216 (judgment of conviction). In such a

case, there is error because an element of the offense (the

quantity threshold) was not submitted to the jury. See

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Such an error does not affect the

defendant's substantial rights, however, because the application of the Sentencing Guidelines' drug quantity table resulted in the same guidelines sentence the defendant would have

received had he only been convicted of (C).

But Webb's case presents an additional complication. Because of his two prior felony convictions, Webb was not

__________

10 The drug quantity table assigns a defendant a base offense

level depending upon the type and quantity of the drug involved in

his offense. For example, the drug quantity table assigns a base

offense level of 32 to a crime involving at least 50 but less than 150

grams of cocaine base. See U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(c)(4). For a person

with Webb's criminal history category of IV (prior to application of

the career offender guideline), this results in a sentencing range of

168 to 210 months--notwithstanding the statutory maximum of 360

months for an offense involving 50 grams or more of cocaine base.

See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.

11 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 234 F.3d 483, 488

(9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th

Cir. 2001).

sentenced under the drug table but instead under the career

offender guideline, U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1. See supra note 2.

Unlike the former, which determines offense level based upon

drug quantity, the latter determines a defendant's offense

level based upon his "offense statutory maximum," which is

defined as the "maximum term of imprisonment authorized

for the offense of conviction ... including any increase in that

maximum term under a sentencing enhancement provision

that applies because of the defendant's prior criminal record."

U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1, comment. n.2 (emphasis added). According

to Guideline s 4B1.1, a career offender convicted of an offense with a statutory maximum of life receives an offense

level of 37, while a defendant convicted of an offense with a

maximum of 25 years or more (but not life) receives an

offense level of only 34. All career offenders receive a

criminal history category of VI.

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If the district court had treated Webb as having been

convicted of the (C) offense, which carries a (recidivistenhanced) maximum of 30 years, s 4B1.1 would have assigned Webb an offense level of 34. This level, combined

with a criminal history category of VI, would have yielded a

sentencing range of 262 to 327 months--for a maximum

sentence of 27.25 years. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. However,

because the district court treated Webb as having been

convicted of the (A) and (B) offenses, both of which carry

(recidivist-enhanced) statutory maxima of life, s 4B1.1 assigned Webb an offense level of 37. That level, combined

with Webb's criminal history category of VI, produced a

sentencing range of 30 years to life. Thus, Webb argues,

although the district court only sentenced him to 30 years,

that sentence was greater than the sentence he would have

received had he been convicted of the (C) offense alone. And

that, Webb argues, constitutes plain error. Cf. United States

v. Camacho, 248 F.3d 1286, 1290 n.7 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding

that error "occurs when a defendant in a section 841 case is

sentenced on the basis of [a judge's determination of] drug

quantity and the sentence cannot logically be construed as a

section 841(b)(1)(C) sentence"). Accordingly, in order to

determine whether Webb's sentence passes muster under the

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plain error standard, we must consider whether the district

court's application of the career offender guideline does so.

D

The government contends that the district court's application of Guideline s 4B1.1 was not plain error because it was

not error at all. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67 (noting that

first prong of plain error standard requires that there be

"error.") As the government notes, even after Apprendi and

Fields, a judge may still make quantity determinations that

affect sentencing as long as the sentence a defendant receives

falls within the maximum sentence authorized by

s 841(b)(1)(C). The government argues that, subject to this

cap, a sentencing court can determine the "offense of conviction" (and hence the "offense statutory maximum") within the

meaning of s 4B1.1 based upon the court's own determination

of drug quantity--even if the defendant was only properly

convicted of the (C) offense.

The government's argument may well support a conclusion

that any error that was committed here was not "plain":

courts long thought that the drug thresholds of s 841(b) could

be determined by judges, and it is plausible that the Sentencing Commission likewise expected judges to determine the

meaning of "offense of conviction" based on nothing more

than their own determinations of drug quantity. In light of

this circuit's post-Apprendi decision in Fields, however, we

conclude that the district court's application of s 4B1.1 was

nonetheless error. After Fields, a conviction for the (A) or

(B) offense is not proper unless the relevant drug threshold

has been stated in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Fields II, 251 F.3d at

1043. Whatever the Sentencing Commission thought constituted an "offense of conviction" when the guidelines were

initially promulgated, we are confident that it intended that

only a conviction that was in accord with governing law would

qualify. See United States v. Gilliam, No. 00-2887, 2001 WL

723008, at *6-7 (7th Cir. June 28, 2001) (finding error where

court calculated sentence under career offender guideline

based on judge's determination of drug quantity); United

States v. Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 940-42 (9th Cir. 2001) (same);

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United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1329-30 (11th Cir.

2000) (holding that without a quantity finding by the jury, the

"offense statutory maximum" under s 4B1.1 must be that of

s 841(b)(1)(C)).

But although the district court committed error in its

application of s 4B1.1, and even assuming that error were

plain, Webb's sentence nonetheless survives plain error review under Rule 52(b) because his underlying convictions for

the (A) and (B) offenses survive such review. Counts One

through Three of the indictment expressly charged Webb

with offenses under s 841(b)(1)(A) and (B), and expressly

alleged that he distributed 50 grams or more of cocaine base

on one occasion (Count Three), and 5 grams or more on two

other occasions (Counts One and Two). App. 11-12. Under

Fields, those quantities constitute elements of the charged

offenses, and by failing to submit them to the jury, the

district court erred. As the Supreme Court directed in

Johnson, however, we may not "exercise [our] discretion to

notice" such an error unless the fourth prong of plain error

review is satisfied: the error must "seriously affect[ ] the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." 520 U.S. at 469-70; see Fields II, 251 F.3d at 1045

(noting that plain error review is applicable to Apprendi error

and finding plain error); Gallego, 247 F.3d at 1198 (applying

plain error review but finding none); United States v. Nance,

236 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). That prong is not

satisfied here.12

In Johnson, the Court considered the validity of Johnson's

conviction for perjury under 18 U.S.C. s 1623. The trial

court, without objection and following then-settled law, had

instructed the jury that the element of materiality was a

question for the court to decide, and that it had already

determined that the statements at issue were material. After

Johnson's conviction but before her appeal, the Supreme

__________

12 As in Johnson, in light of our conclusion that the trial court's

error does not satisfy the fourth prong of the plain error standard,

we need not consider whether it satisfies the third prong: that the

error "affec[t] substantial rights." Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69.

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Court decided United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23

(1995), holding that the materiality of a false statement under

18 U.S.C. s 1001 must be decided by the jury rather than the

court. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 464. When Johnson's

perjury case came before the Supreme Court, it held that the

trial court had committed error by failing to submit the

materiality question to the jury. The Court nonetheless

sustained the conviction, holding that the error did not affect

the integrity of the proceeding because the evidence that

Johnson's false statements were material was "overwhelming"

and "essentially uncontroverted." Id. at 470; cf. Neder v.

United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999) (finding that failure to

submit element of offense to jury was harmless error where

the "omitted element was uncontested and supported by

overwhelming evidence").13

As in Johnson, the evidence of the drug quantities charged

in Counts One through Three of Webb's indictment was both

overwhelming and uncontroverted. Those counts involved

three separate transactions: the government alleged that on

each occasion, Webb sold a quantity of crack to the government's cooperating witness. For the jury to have convicted

Webb of each of these three incidents, the jurors must have

believed that Webb engaged in each of the three transactions

and was responsible for the amounts he provided. The

specific amount involved in each transaction was established

__________

13 Johnson and Neder both involved a district court's failure to

submit an element to the jury. Webb contends that those cases are

inapplicable here. He argues that the error in this case was not

that the district court failed to submit the quantity elements of the

(A) and (B) offenses to the jury, but rather that the district court

sentenced Webb as if he had been convicted of (A) and (B) when in

fact he had only been convicted of (C). We need not decide

whether Johnson and Neder would apply where a defendant was

convicted only of the (C) offense, because in this case the (A) and

(B) offenses were charged in the indictment and entered in the

court's judgment of conviction. Thus, the error here was the

district court's failure to submit an element (the drug quantity

thresholds of (A) and (B)) to the jury for determination beyond a

reasonable doubt--the same error as in Johnson and Neder.

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by the testimony and report of a government chemist, and

was confirmed by tape recordings of conversations between

Webb and Johnson, in which the two discussed the quantities

of crack involved in the transactions. Webb did nothing to

challenge the evidence of drug quantity at either trial or

sentencing, and even on appeal offers no scenario under

which the jury could have convicted him of the transactions,

yet rationally found that they involved different quantities

than those testified to by the government chemist. See

Nance, 236 F.3d at 826 (finding Apprendi error not plain

because "[i]f this jury was going to convict [defendant] at all

... there is simply no way on this record that it could have

failed to find that he was conspiring to distribute 5 grams or

more of crack cocaine"); United States v. Swatzie, 228 F.3d

1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); cf. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19

(finding omission of element in jury instructions harmless

because "defendant did not, and apparently could not, bring

forth facts contesting the omitted element").14

Webb contends that he had no reason to contest drug

quantity below because his trial occurred before Apprendi

was issued, and hence before the drug quantity thresholds

were regarded as elements of the s 841 offenses. But even

accepting Webb's contention that he had no reason to contest

quantity at trial,15 he had every incentive to contest it at

__________

14 Webb's case is considerably different from that of the defendant in Fields. In Fields, although the court recognized the

application of Rule 52(b) to Apprendi error, it did not find "overwhelming" proof that the quantity of drugs involved exceeded the

threshold required to authorize a maximum sentence of life imprisonment under s 841(b). Fields II, 251 F.3d at 1045. By contrast

to Webb's case, in Fields the government had recovered only 7

grams of cocaine base and 20 kilograms of marijuana (compared to

50 grams of the former and 1000 kilograms of the latter required to

authorize a life maximum), and was forced to rely on "imprecise

testimony" of cooperating witnesses and vague admissions by the

defendant. See id. at 1044-45.

15 But see Williams, 194 F.3d at 102 (noting that defendant--

who was faced with the same pre-Apprendi circuit precedent as

Webb--argued at trial that drug quantity was an element of a

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sentencing. The presentence report's recommendations concerning the quantity of drugs involved in Webb's transactions,

and the district court's adoption of those recommendations,

dramatically affected Webb's sentencing range. Yet, while

Webb "noted one factual inaccuracy" in the presentence

report regarding an unrelated issue, he did not dispute the

accuracy of the drug quantities there reported. PSR at 12

(noting Webb's objections). Moreover, whatever his incentives below, Webb surely has an incentive on appeal to

suggest a scenario under which he could plausibly have

disputed the drug quantities specified by the chemist. Even

now, however, he suggests none. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at

470 (noting that "[b]efore the Eleventh Circuit and in her

briefing before this Court, petitioner has presented no plausible argument" that the false statement for which she was

convicted was not material).

In sum, because the evidence of drug quantity was overwhelming and uncontroverted, and because even now Webb

offers no plausible scenario under which it could be disputed,

"there is no basis for concluding that the error 'seriously

affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings,' " and hence no grounds for noticing that error

under Rule 52(b). Id. Webb's convictions for selling 50 or

more and 5 or more grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21

U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(A) and (B), therefore survive plain error

review and remain intact. As a consequence, the sentence

that was based on those convictions would stand even if it had

exceeded the statutory maximum for the (C) offense. See

Nance, 236 F.3d at 826; Swatzie, 228 F.3d at 1284.16 That

__________

s 841 offense); Rogers, 228 F.3d at 1320 (noting that in reliance on

Jones, defendant argued that drug quantity was an element that

had to be determined by the jury).

16 For that reason, we reject Webb's argument (made in a

footnote) that the district court also imposed an improper term of

supervisory release, without deciding whether Webb is correct in

contending that the length of the term imposed is appropriate only

for a defendant convicted of the (A) offense. Similarly, our conclusion that the (A) and (B) convictions survive review eliminates any

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result follows a fortiori in a case like this one, in which the

sentence Webb actually received was below the statutory

maximum. See Gilliam, 2001 WL 723008, at *6-7 (affirming

defendant's sentence, notwithstanding that district court

erred in applying the career offender guideline as if defendant had been convicted of an (A) offense, because the error

passed plain error review); Saya, 247 F.3d at 940-42 (same).

III

Webb raises three additional arguments on this appeal, one

relating to his sentence and two concerning the validity of his

convictions. Only the third requires any extended discussion.

A

Defendant's additional sentencing contention is that the

district court erred by failing to reduce his offense level by

two points for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to Sentencing Guideline s 3E1.1. Because Webb neither sought

this reduction nor objected to the district court's failure to

grant it sua sponte, our review is again for plain error. The

standard of review is unimportant, however, because the

district court did not commit error, plain or otherwise.

The Sentencing Guidelines require a two-point reduction in

a defendant's offense level "[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense." U.S.S.G.

s 3E1.1(a) (emphasis added). The commentary to this provision explains that acceptance involves "truthfully admitting

the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction." Id.,

comment. n.1(a).17 Webb never did so. Although upon arrest

__________

argument (although Webb has made none) that those convictions

should themselves be vacated because they carry collateral consequences beyond those created by the alleged differential in sentences.

17 The commentary also states that "[t]his adjustment is not

intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its

burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of

guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses reUSCA Case #99-3114 Document #613349 Filed: 07/27/2001 Page 20 of 25
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he did waive his Miranda rights and admit to possession of

the crack found in his apartment and charged in Count Four,

Webb never admitted to the transactions for which he was

convicted under Counts One, Two and Three. During his

interview with the probation officer who prepared his presentence report, Webb "declined to discuss his involvement" in

the offenses of conviction. PSR p 8. When he stood before

the judge at sentencing and was asked whether he wished to

speak, Webb once again declined. 8/13/99 Tr. at 14. As we

have said before, "[w]hile the district court lacks the power to

force a defendant to express remorse he does not feel, it is

not required to reward a remorseless defendant with a decrease in his offense level." United States v. Dozier, 162 F.3d

120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the court did not err

in failing to reduce Webb's offense level for acceptance of

responsibility.18

B

Webb also contends that the court erred, under Federal

Rule of Evidence 404(b), in rejecting his request to bar the

government's cooperating witness, Danon Johnson, from testifying about his prior drug transactions with Webb. See

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (governing the admissibility of "[e]vi-

__________

morse." U.S.S.G. s 3E1.1, comment. n.2. Although "[c]onviction

by trial ... does not automatically preclude a defendant from

consideration for such a reduction," it will be only the "rare

situation[ ]" in which a defendant goes to trial and receives the

s 3E1.1 deduction. Id. Webb's is clearly not that situation--not

because he put the government to its proof by going to trial, but

because (as noted below) even after his conviction he failed either to

admit guilt or express remorse.

18 Webb further contends that his failure to accept responsibility at sentencing was due to the ineffective assistance of his counsel,

who he claims failed to prepare him properly for the proceeding.

But nothing in the transcript of the sentencing proceeding suggests

that it was Webb's lack of preparation, rather than his own recalcitrance, that caused his failure to accept responsibility. See 8/13/99

Tr. at 15 (statement by the sentencing judge that Webb was

evincing "an attitude ... like it's no big thing").

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dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts"). We need spend

little time on this point because even if admission of the

testimony were erroneous, it was also harmless. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 52(a). The government tape-recorded the conversations between Webb and Johnson that took place in connection with the three transactions charged in Webb's indictment. Those recordings contained numerous references to

the duo's prior drug transactions, and were admitted into

evidence without any objection from Webb. Even on appeal,

he does not dispute the admissibility of the tapes. We can

perceive no material additional harm that Webb suffered as a

consequence of Johnson's testimony on the same subjects,

particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence of Webb's

guilt. Cf. United States v. Lampkin, 159 F.3d 607, 615 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (holding inadmissible hearsay harmless where

"merely cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial");

United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(holding erroneous Rule 404(b) ruling harmless where evidence against defendant was overwhelming).

C

Finally, we consider Webb's claim that the district court

erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained

during the September 15, 1998 search of his apartment. The

search was undertaken pursuant to a warrant, which authorized a search for books and records relating to narcotics

transactions. It resulted in the seizure of evidence that

became the basis of Count Four of the indictment, including

6.52 grams of crack, $15,114 in cash, drug packaging supplies,

and a piece of paper with the name and pager number of

Webb's New York supplier.

Webb argued below and argues here that the warrant was

issued without probable cause because the affidavit upon

which it was based recited stale information: the affidavit was

sworn and the warrant issued on September 14, 1998, 109

days after the final drug transaction took place between

Webb and Johnson on May 28, 1998. The district court

denied Webb's motion to suppress, finding that although

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defendant's arguments were "certainly not frivolous," "a reasonable judicial officer could determine that it is likely that a

person who is engaged in drug selling in May, having not

been arrested, would continue to be engaged in such activities

three and a half months later." 4/27/99 Tr. at 5. Like the

district court, we give "a determination of probable cause by a

federal magistrate ... 'great deference.' " United States v.

Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)); see Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690, 698-99 (1996).

We find the issuance of this warrant troubling. The

Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable

cause...." U.S. Const. amend. IV. To protect that right,

the Supreme Court has declared that the facts supporting a

warrant must be "so closely related to the time of the issue of

the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that

time." Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932). Our

court has interpreted Sgro to mean that although the time

between the application for a warrant and the discovery of

the evidence supporting that application is "not controlling,"

it is nonetheless important. See Schoeneman v. United

States, 317 F.2d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In Schoeneman,

we found no probable cause to believe that classified government documents, last seen in the defendant's house 107 days

before the application for the warrant was made, were still

present in that house on the date of the application. Id. at

177-78.

In this case, as in Schoeneman, the search warrant sought

documents, here relating to Webb's alleged drug activity.

See App. 184-85. As in Schoeneman, the warrant was issued

more than 100 days after the government last had direct

information that there was evidence of criminal activity in the

defendant's home. Although the government's application

included its affiant's statement that those involved in drug

transactions typically keep records of such transactions in

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ble cause to believe that such records would still be there four

months after the last known transaction.

But even if the affidavit were insufficient to establish

probable cause, the Supreme Court has held that when police

officers obtain evidence through a search incident to a warrant, "suppression is appropriate only if the officers ... could

not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the

existence of probable cause." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897, 926 (1984); see United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028,

1034 (D.C. Cir. 1990).19 On that standard, suppression is

inappropriate in this case. Although Schoeneman concluded

that 107-day-old evidence was too stale to support probable

cause in that case, the evidence there consisted solely of an

informant's statement that he had seen classified documents

in the defendant's home on that single occasion. Schoeneman, 317 F.2d at 175-77. Here, by contrast, the affidavit

reported a series of three drug transactions between Webb

and Johnson, transactions that verified Johnson's statement

that Webb had been a supplier of narcotics "for an extended

period of time." App. 188. Courts have been considerably

more lenient in assessing the currency of information supporting probable cause in the context of extended conspiracies than in the context of single-incident crimes. See generally United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 568 (1st Cir.

1996); United States v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir.

1988); In re Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, 667 F.2d

117, 135-36 (D.C. Cir. 1981). While Webb was not ultimately

charged with conspiracy, the warrant application expressly

sought evidence regarding the crime of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. See App. 190. Moreover, even if Webb did

not have drugs in his apartment at the time of the application,

it would not necessarily have been unreasonable for an officer

to conclude that a longtime drug dealer, whose most recent

known deal had occurred three months earlier, would still

__________

19 Leon also permits suppression if "the magistrate abandoned

his detached and neutral role," or if the officers were "dishonest or

reckless in preparing their affidavit." 468 U.S. at 926. There is no

suggestion in the record that either circumstance applies to this

case.

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retain papers permitting him to get back in touch with his

customers or--as turned out to be the case--his supplier.

In sum, whatever may be said of the search warrant

affidavit in this case, we cannot say "that no reasonably well

trained police officer could have believed that there existed

probable cause to search" Webb's apartment. Leon, 468 U.S.

at 926. Accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to

suppress the evidence recovered from the search.

VI

We conclude that neither Apprendi and its progeny, nor

the Sentencing Guidelines, compel a conclusion that the sentence imposed upon Webb was reversible error. Nor do we

find reversible error in the district court's evidentiary rulings

or in its denial of Webb's motion to suppress. Webb's

convictions and sentence are therefore

Affirmed.

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