Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05105/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05105-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Lee Price
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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FILj]D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unit.ed Statre Co-m oi Appeals Tp,otl, ri:rcuit 

MAR 2 9 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ROBERT LEE PRICE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-5105 

(N.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-118-B) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Robert Lee Price was indicted for Possession of a Firearm by 

a Convicted Felon in violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 922(g)(l) and 

924(e). Because Price had not been given Miranda warnings, he 

filed a motion to suppress statements he made to the arresting 

officer during and subsequent to his arrest. The District Court 

granted the motion, which was subsequently upheld by this court. 

United States v. Price, No. 88-2860 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 1989) 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5105 Document: 010110031461 Date Filed: 03/29/1991 Page: 1 
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(unpublished opinion). Following a jury trial, Price was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years followed by 

five years of supervised release, pursuant to the Armed Career 

Criminal Act, 18 u.s.c. § 924(e)(l). He now appeals on three 

grounds. We find them all unpersuasive and affirm. 

Price first alleges that his right to due process was 

abridged by the government's loss of evidence that could 

potentially have exculpated him. Price's defense was that he did 

not knowingly possess the firearm found in the pocket of the 

jacket he was wearing at the time of his arrest because the jacket 

was borrowed and he was unaware of the gun's presence. Because 

the government lost the jacket, he was unable to introduce it into 

evidence for physical inspection by the jury. Thus, the jury was 

denied the opportunity "to make an informed judgment as to its 

weight, size, length, and true ownership." Appellant's Brief at 

4. For this reason, Price believes he was not "afforded a 

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense," California 

v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984), and, therefore, was denied 

his right to due process. 

Price's argument lacks merit. Price has produced no evidence 

to prove that the government ever possessed, much less lost, the 

jacket. All that is known is that the jacket became unaccounted 

for at some time between the arrest and the incarceration. Prior 

to Price's trial, in denying a motion to dismiss on the grounds 

that the government had lost or misplaced critical evidence, the 

district court judge observed that it was also possible "that the 

defendant threw [the jacket] out the window of the patrol car on 

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the way to the police station ... " R. Vol. III at 10. 

Because Price has wholly failed to establish a factual basis for 

his contention, it must fail. 

Price next argues that the government introduced evidence at 

trial contrary to a suppression order issued by the district court 

and affirmed on appeal by this court. The order mandated suppression of Price's responses to the arresting officer's questions or 

interrogation because Price's statements constituted responses to 

a custodial interrogation conducted without the benefit of Miranda 

warnings. Specifically, Price asserts that the following question 

by the prosecutor elicited testimony from the arresting officer 

that should not have been admitted pursuant to the court's order: 

Q: Did he [the defendant] at that time or later in the 

evening ask you any questions which led you to believe 

that he was aware of the gravity of the situation? 

R. Vol. III at 78. The arresting officer responded: 

A: Yes. He asked one question several times or 

actually made a statement several times that he would 

appreciate any break I could give him regarding the gun. 

Id. On the same grounds, Price objects to a statement made by the 

prosecutor during closing argument, in which she reiterated the 

essence of these remarks. 

The government argues that because Price made no objection 

during trial to either the question or the closing remark he now 

challenges on appeal, the objection is waived. We disagree. A 

preexisting order of the court cannot be waived. It is a standing 

order and preserves the issue for our review. 

The statements complained of implicate the United States 

Constitution's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-

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tion. Because a federal constitutional error is alleged, our 

analysis under the facts of this case must focus on whether we can 

"declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); Rose v. Clark, 

478 U.S. 570, 576 (1986); United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 

1470 (10th Cir. 1990). 

At the outset, we note that the statements complained of, 

contrary to the government's argument, do indeed fall within the 

purview of the district court's suppression order. The order is 

not so narrowly drawn as to be limited to the single question 

asked of the defendant concerning where he obtained the gun found 

in the pocket of the jacket he was wearing. Similarly, we find 

unpersuasive the government's argument that the statements 

complained of were not responses to the arresting officer's questions or interrogations, but rather questions asked by the defendant and, therefore, not within the ambit of fifth amendment 

protection. "[T]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not 

only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on 

the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 

arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably 

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 

We agree with the defendant that both the question the 

prosecutor asked of the arresting officer and the remark she made 

during closing argument were improper. We think, however, that 

the error was harmless. While the defense has not explained 

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precisely how the evidence at issue prejudiced his client, the 

argument presumably would be that Price's appeals for leniency 

incriminated him by implying that he had prior knowledge of the 

gun in his pocket. Because Price's statements came after the 

officer removed the weapon from Price's pocket, however, this 

argument fails. Once the officer removed the gun, Price became 

aware that the weapon had been in his possession, regardless of 

any earlier knowledge. At that point, given Price's status as a 

convicted felon, his concern for how the officer would deal with 

his possession of the gun is entirely credible, whether or not he 

knowingly possessed the gun prior to that time. Because Price's 

words do not amount to a confession or an admission to any part of 

the offense with which he was charged, see id. at 301 n.5, we 

believe the error was harmless. 

Finally, Price argues that he was improperly sentenced under 

the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 u.s.c. § 924(e), because the 

trial court failed to make "a finding of the existance [sic] of 

the elements of generic burglary. . . " Appellant's Brief at 

9. He argues that according to Taylor v. United States, 110 S. 

Ct. 2143 (1990), such a finding is necessary in order to use his 

three burglary convictions as a predicate to invoking the enhancement provisions of the Armed Career Criminal Act. 

At the outset, we note that we find no requirement of 

specific findings in Taylor. Indeed, the plain language of the 

case indicates that one threshold for an offense to constitute 

burglary for sentence enhancement purposes is met simply if "its 

statutory definition substantially corresponds to 'generic' 

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burglary . . II Id. at 2160. Such a threshold falls far short 

of requiring findings. 

We also note that Taylor was decided some nineteen days after 

Price was sentenced. Even were we to adopt defendant's argument, 

we would not apply it retroactively. Finally, the charging papers 

before us clearly indicate that the three burglaries used to 

invoke the sentencing enhancement provision of the Armed Career 

Criminal Act all contain the elements of "generic" burglary. 

Thus, had the trial court made any omission, it would be harmless. 

The decision of the district court is accordingly AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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