Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-73985/USCOURTS-ca9-08-73985-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric H. Holder Jr.
Respondent
Changiz Rahimzadeh
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHANGIZ RAHIMZADEH, 

Petitioner, No. 08-73985

v. Agency No.  98-764-810 ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

March 9, 2010—Seattle, Washington

Filed July 26, 2010

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Raymond C. Fisher, and

Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

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COUNSEL

Randy J. Tanner and Matthew B. Hayhurst, Boone Karlberg

P.C., Missoula, Montana, pro bono counsel for the petitioner.

Tony West, Terri J. Scadron, and Corey L. Farrell, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the

respondent.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Changiz Rahimzadeh (Rahimzadeh) testified that he was

persecuted first in Iran by the government on account of his

political activity and later in the Netherlands by Muslim

extremists on account of his conversion to Christianity. The

Immigration Judge (IJ) deemed Rahimzadeh’s testimony

credible and granted withholding of removal to Iran, but

denied asylum from, and withholding of removal to, the Netherlands. The IJ concluded that Rahimzadeh had not suffered

past persecution in the Netherlands and that his fear of future

persecution was not objectively reasonable, because he did

not show that Dutch authorities were unable or unwilling to

control his attackers. After the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) affirmed without opinion, Rahimzadeh petitioned this

court for review. We deny the petition, for reasons that will

duly appear.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Rahimzadeh’s Testimony

Rahimzadeh entered the United States on a B-1 visa on

September 6, 2006. He applied for withholding of removal to

Iran, and asylum from, and withholding of removal to, the

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Netherlands on November 6, 2007.1

 In his removal hearing,

Rahimzadeh testified to the abuse he suffered in Iran because

of his political leanings and in the Netherlands because of his

religious beliefs. The IJ deemed Rahimzadeh’s testimony

credible, and the BIA did not find otherwise, so “we accept

as undisputed the testimony of the applicant.” Baballah v.

Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 

Rahimzadeh was born on April 19, 1964 to a Muslim family in Tehran, Iran, where he lived until he turned sixteen. At

that time, his family moved to the nearby city of Karaj

because of difficulties arising from their pro-monarchy political leanings. Rahimzadeh helped the Mujahedin movement

oppose the Islamic Republic, although he never became a

Mujahedin member. Police arrested him for involvement with

the Mujahedin and sent him to Evin prison, where guards

interrogated and tortured him for three to four days using

techniques such as beating his feet with cables and contorting

his body into positions so he could not breathe. Rahimzadeh

was convicted of aiding terrorists and held in prison for

approximately three years.

After he was released, police arrested Rahimzadeh twice

more for attempting to escape Iran without permission. On the

first occasion, they sent him to Evin prison, where he

attempted suicide; on the second, they held him for nineteen

days. At some point, a doctor in Iran prescribed medication to

Rahimzadeh to treat PTSD.

Rahimzadeh later traveled to Turkey and Japan. While in

Japan, he converted to Christianity and was baptized. After

two years, in 1992, Japanese officials ordered him deported to

Iran, but he went to the Netherlands instead and applied for

asylum, which was granted in 1996.

1Although there were issues raised regarding the timeliness of the asylum application, the IJ found the application timely.

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While in the Netherlands, Rahimzadeh practiced Christianity, proselytized to Muslims, including a visit to a Dutch

mosque, and in 1994 gave a televised interview during which

he discussed the torture and abuse he suffered in Iran. In

1999, unidentified people whom Rahimzadeh believed to be

Muslims from Morocco came to his home in Amersfoort, put

a knife to his throat, blindfolded him, laid him on the floor,

read the Koran, and beat his feet with cables, all while complaining of his conversion to Christianity. The invaders threatened to kill him if he reported the incident to the police. After

the incident, fearing for his safety, Rahimzadeh went to Canada for three months and to the United States for five, on tourist visas. He then returned to the Netherlands to be with his

brother, with whom he feels close. (Both his sister and brother

live in the Netherlands and remain Muslims.)

Rahimzadeh again experienced difficulties in the Netherlands in 2005, when he began to receive anonymous threatening calls to his cell phone. He believed the callers to be

fanatical Muslims based in the Netherlands. They threatened

to kill him because of his religious conversion and warned

that they would hurt or kill his sister if he reported the calls

to police. Rather than report the calls, Rahimzadeh traveled

again to the United States on a tourist visa for two to three

months. On his return to the Netherlands the phone calls

started again. Rahimzadeh did not buy a new cell phone

because of the cost and his belief that extremist Muslim

groups would find his new number. 

Ultimately, while Rahimzadeh was still living in Amersfoort, four people carrying guns forced him into a car for ten

to fifteen minutes. They threatened to kill him and harm his

family if he continued to attend his church and to kill his sister if he reported the incident to police. 

Rahimzadeh did not report this incident — or any other of

the threats and attacks — to Dutch police. Instead, one month

after the last incident, he left again for the United States.

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Before his departure, he stayed briefly in Amsterdam, where

he felt unsafe because he perceived the Netherlands to be a

small country with a large Muslim population and approximately “280,000 fanatic[s]” from whom the authorities were

unable to protect him. Rahimzadeh fears for his life if he

returns to the Netherlands.

B. Other Evidence

Rahimzadeh presented expert testimony that he suffers

from PTSD arising from the torture in Iran and the kidnapping

in the Netherlands. He also presented documentary evidence

detailing Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands and death

threats to Muslims who convert to Christianity. 

The government offered documentary evidence as well,

including the 2006 U.S. Department of State Country Reports

for the Netherlands, indicating that the Dutch government “at

all levels . . . did not tolerate [abuse of the right to freedom

of religion], either by governmental or private actors,” that the

Netherlands had taken “firm action against groups espousing

violence in support of an Islamic extremist agenda,” that the

law and the judiciary provide effective relief for abuses of

human rights, that police forces are “generally effective,” and

that the government takes steps to deal with any shortcomings

in its human rights record.

C. IJ and BIA Decisions

The IJ credited Rahimzadeh’s testimony; granted withholding of removal to Iran under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); did not reach his

application for withholding of removal to Iran under CAT;

and denied asylum from, and withholding of removal to, the

Netherlands. Although the IJ found that Rahimzadeh suffered

abuse rising to the level of persecution in the Netherlands on

account of his religion, the IJ determined that the Muslims

who abused Rahimzadeh were neither government agents nor

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individuals whom the government was unable or unwilling to

control. Noting that Rahimzadeh failed to report the incidents

to authorities, the IJ observed that recourse to the authorities

likely would not have been futile, because country reports

indicate that the Dutch government seeks to promote and protect religious liberty and that the law and judiciary provide

effective means of addressing individual instances of private

violence. 

The BIA affirmed without opinion. Rahimzadeh timely

petitioned for review.

II. DISCUSSION

Where, as here, the BIA affirms without opinion, the IJ’s

decision is the final agency determination for purposes of this

court’s review. Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076,

1081 (9th Cir. 2008). We review the IJ’s legal determinations

de novo, subject to established principles of deference.

Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir.

2006). We must uphold the IJ’s factual findings “if supported

by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the

record.” Id. at 1056 (internal quotations omitted). Thus,

“[e]ven if we might have reached a conclusion different from

that reached by the [IJ], we may not reverse unless we determine that any reasonable factfinder would have been compelled to reach that conclusion.” Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d

1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007).

[1] The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to

any alien who qualifies as a “refugee” within the meaning of

section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).

The applicant has the burden to establish his status as a refugee, id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), defined as a person “unable or

unwilling” to return to his home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,

or political opinion,” id. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Navas v. INS, 217

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F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2000). Central to this case is the

requirement that, to demonstrate persecution within the meaning of the Act, the applicant show that abuse was “committed

by the government or forces the government is either unable

or unwilling to control.” Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206,

1211 (9th Cir. 2004); Navas, 217 F.3d at 655-56.

[2] Dutch officials did not participate in or sponsor the

attacks on Rahimzadeh, so Rahimzadeh must establish that

the Dutch government was unable or unwilling to control his

attackers. He has not done so. Rahimzadeh never reported the

abuse to police; instead, his evidence of the government’s

inability or unwillingness to stop the attacks consists solely of

a private threat of harm and the presence of what he estimates

to be 280,000 extremist Muslims in the Netherlands. In concluding that Rahimzadeh failed to carry his burden to establish the Dutch government’s inability or unwillingness to

control his attackers, the IJ relied on the fact that Rahimzadeh

had never reported the abuse and on Department of State

country reports. Rahimzadeh claims that (1) the IJ erroneously imposed a reporting requirement for asylum, and (2) the

IJ erroneously relied on country reports in finding that the

Dutch authorities would have been able to control his attackers. Given the record and the IJ’s reasoning, we cannot agree.

Where the persecutor is not a state actor, “we consider

whether an applicant reported the incidents to police, because

in such cases a report of this nature may show governmental

inability to control the actors.” Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1078;

see also Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1037, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 1999); Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir.

1996). The reporting of private persecution to the authorities

is not, however, an essential requirement for establishing government unwillingness or inability to control attackers. See

Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1057. A government’s inability

or unwillingness to control violence by private parties can be

established in other ways — for example, by demonstrating

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tioner of any meaningful recourse to governmental protection.

See, e.g., In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1330, 1332-33,

1335 (B.I.A. 2000).

In In re S-A-, a Moroccan woman suffered emotional and

physical abuse by her father because her liberal Muslim

beliefs clashed with his orthodox Muslim beliefs. 22 I. & N.

Dec. at 1329. He burned her thighs, beat her in the face with

a ring, and beat her at least once a week with his hands, feet,

and belt. Id. She never went to the police because her mother’s previous attempts to get police protection had failed and

because under Muslim law, as enforced in Morocco, a father

has “unfettered” power over his daughter, including the ability to limit access to education and require her to stay at

home. Id. at 1330-31. In addition to being unproductive or

futile “in light of societal religious mores,” turning to the

police for protection also was “potentially dangerous.” Id. at

1332-33. The Country Report “corroborate[d] . . . testimony

concerning the futility and perils of seeking governmental

protection,” noting that few women report abuse because “domestic violence is commonplace and legal remedies are generally unavailable to women” who, upon losing in court, “are

returned to the abusive home.” Id. at 1333. The BIA held that

“[a]lthough she did not request protection from the government, the evidence convinces us that even if the respondent

had turned to the government for help, Moroccan authorities

would have been unable or unwilling to control her father’s

conduct.” Id. at 1335; cf. Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d

1069, 1070-72 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying asylum to a Honduran

national who not only failed to report being raped twice by

her boyfriend but also failed to show otherwise the inability

or unwillingness of the Honduran government to control rape,

which is classified in Honduras as a crime and punishable by

imprisonment). 

Prior interactions with the authorities also can establish a

government’s inability or unwillingness to provide protection.

See Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1054. In Ornelas-Chavez, a

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transgender Mexican national faced repeated abuse by private

and state actors. Id. His parents beat him, cousins and

acquaintances raped him, the police killed two of his homosexual acquaintances, and, on one occasion, the police

arrested and detained him for several hours with the police

chief threatening to detain him longer in the future if he again

heard about him having sex with men. Id. His coworkers at

a state-run prison repeatedly beat and threatened him. Id. He

never reported abuse to police because “indifference and danger . . . characterized his dealings with government officials,”

and the police had inflicted the same type of abuse on him.

Id. at 1057. The court held that he “need not have reported . . .

persecution [at the hands of private parties] to the authorities

if he can convincingly establish that doing so would have

been futile or [would] have subjected him to further abuse.”

Id. at 1058. 

[3] None of these cases, or any other we have found,

creates a freestanding reporting requirement to qualify for

asylum. The absence of a report to police does not reveal anything about a government’s ability or willingness to control

private attackers; instead, it leaves a gap in proof about how

the government would respond if asked, which the petitioner

may attempt to fill by other methods. These methods, in addition to those already surveyed, might include showing that

others have made reports of similar incidents to no avail, see

Afriyie v. Holder, No. 08-72626, slip op. at p. 10662-63 (9th

Cir. July 26, 2010), or establishing that private persecution of

a particular sort is widespread and well-known but not controlled by the government, see Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213

F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Rahimzadeh argues that the IJ did impose an absolute

reporting requirement and so erred. We disagree.

To establish that the IJ applied the wrong standard, Rahimzadeh cites the IJ’s statement of “disagree[ment] with

[Rahimzadeh’s] argument that he did not have to show that he

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reported incidents in which he was harmed to government

authorities in order to establish past persecution in the Ninth

Circuit,” and also to the IJ’s subsequent determination of ineligibility for asylum from the Netherlands “due to [Rahimzadeh’s] failure to report incidents of harm to the police and

evidence that the Dutch authorities are responsive to reports

of religious extremism.” 

[4] The objection is misplaced. While the IJ could have

crafted those sentences more artfully, in context it is clear that

the IJ treated the failure to report the persecution as merely

one factor in the assessment of the Dutch government’s willingness and ability to control private extremists, not as a per

se bar to asylum. The IJ found that the reasons Rahimzadeh

gave for not reporting the abuse, namely the private threat of

retaliation and his perception of the Netherlands as being

home to thousands of fanatical Muslims, did not independently satisfy his burden to establish that the Dutch authorities

would have been unable or unwilling to control his attackers,

particularly in light of Rahimzadeh’s failure to provide other

information about the record of the Dutch authorities in controlling private extremists. On the record as a whole, the IJ

found, “circumstances strongly suggest that if [Rahimzadeh]

had sought help from the Dutch authorities, they would have

been willing and able to assist him” because the government

made “active efforts to address and control violence by radical religious groups.” Ultimately, the IJ concluded that

Rahimzadeh did not qualify for asylum “because he failed to

show that the harm he suffered occurred at the hands of his

government or an agent that his government was unwilling or

unable to control.” 

[5] The IJ’s conclusion that the Dutch authorities in fact

would have been willing and able to control Rahimzadeh’s

attackers was supported by substantial evidence. The U.S.

Department of State’s 2006 Country Report on Human Rights

practices in the Netherlands notes that “[Dutch] law provides

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t[s] this right in practice.” As noted above, “the law and judiciary provide[ ] effective means of addressing individual

instances of [human rights] abuse” including “violence

against some religious and ethnic minorities,” and that “the

government [has taken] firm action against groups espousing

violence in support of an Islamic extremist agenda.” The 2006

U.S. Department of State International Religious Freedom

Report also indicates that “[t]he Government at all levels

sought to protect [the freedom of religion] in full and did not

tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.”

[6] Rahimzadeh contends that it was error to rely on the

State Department country profile of the Netherlands. Not so.

Even when an applicant is deemed credible, the IJ can rely on

other evidence in the record, including country reports, to

supplement the testimony. See, e.g., Castro-Perez, 409 F.3d

at 1072. Although general country-level information is ordinarily insufficient to contradict direct, specific, credited testimony, see Afriyie, slip op. at p. 10664-65; see also Chand v.

INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2000), the IJ did not

use the country reports for that purpose. Instead, the IJ

accepted Rahimzadeh’s testimony regarding threats, incidents

of abuse, and all the other factual circumstances as to which

Rahimzadeh had direct knowledge. The IJ turned to the country reports only to assess the likelihood that government officials would control the persecution, as Rahimzadeh failed to

provide any useful evidence on that point through his testimony. The IJ did not use the country reports to counteract

specific credible evidence of incidents inconsistent with the

country reports. Cf. Afriyie, slip op. at p. 10664-65.

Finally, that Rahimzadeh received private threats of retaliation does not compel the conclusion that the Dutch government is unable or unwilling to control private persecution. In

most cases of abuse by private actors, there will be at least an

implicit threat of retaliation for recourse to the authorities.

While private threats may explain an applicant’s reluctance to

go to the authorities, the question in an asylum case is

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whether the police could and would provide protection. See

Lolong, 484 F.3d at 1178. 

[7] In sum, substantial evidence in the record supported the

IJ’s conclusion that Rahimzadeh failed to carry his burden to

show the inability or unwillingness of police to provide that

protection. We thus cannot conclude that the record compels

the finding that Rahimzadeh is entitled to asylum.

III. CONCLUSION

Given that the burden was on Rahimzadeh to show that the

Dutch authorities were unable or unwilling to control his

attackers, we cannot say that the IJ erred in concluding that

he did not meet it. Because Rahimzadeh did not demonstrate

that he is eligible for asylum, his claim for withholding of

removal, governed by a more stringent standard, is also foreclosed. Gomes v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir.

2005).

Petition DENIED. 

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