Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00156/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00156-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terese Marie Meadows
Plaintiff
Larry Norris
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

 PINE BLUFF DIVISION

TERESE MARIE MEADOWS PETITIONER

v. Case No. 5:05CV00156 JMM-JFF

LARRY NORRIS, Director,

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT

 PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District

Court Judge James M. Moody. Any party may serve and file written objections to this

recommendation. Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal

basis for the objection. If the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that

finding and the evidence that supports your objection. An original and one copy of your

objections must be received in the office of the United States District Court Clerk no

later than eleven (11) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. The

copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely objections may result

in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new,

different, or additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 20 Filed 04/04/07 Page 1 of 30
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District Judge, you must, at the same time that you file your written objections, include

the following:

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate.

2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before the District 

Judge (if such a hearing is granted) was not offered at the 

hearing before the Magistrate Judge. 

 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be introduced at the

hearing before the District Judge in the form of an offer of

proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or

other non-testimonial evidence desired to be introduced at

the hearing before the District Judge.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional

evidentiary hearing, either before the Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 402

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

DISPOSITION

Before the Court is the Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge undersigned

recommends that the petition be dismissed with prejudice.

On November 7, 2001, a trailer home in Carroll County, Arkansas, which

Petitioner’s estranged husband, Dale Meadows, had been sharing with Lorraine “Lori”

Pattison, caught fire and was destroyed. Ms. Pattison’s body was found inside the

trailer home. Petitioner subsequently was charged with premeditated capital murder

and, in the alternative, capital-felony murder with arson as the underlying felony. She

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also was charged with arson and tampering with physical evidence. Dale Meadows

was charged with capital murder and arson. He subsequently was convicted of those

offenses, and his convictions were affirmed on appeal. Meadows v. State, 358 Ark.

396, 191 S.W.3d 527 (2004).

On August 5th, 6th, and 7th of 2003, Petitioner was tried by a Carroll County

Circuit Court jury. At the close of the evidence, the State requested that the trial judge

instruct the jury on first-degree murder and second-degree murder as lesser-included

offenses of capital murder. Trial Transcript, State v. Meadows, CR 02-127, p. 794.

Petitioner’s counsel objected to the submission of instructions on lesser-included

homicide offenses, stating that “if [the jury is] going to find her guilty of any homicide,

it would be of capital murder and not anything that they might compromise on.” Tr. 794.

The trial judge, over defense counsel’s objection, instructed the jury on capital murder

(premeditated capital murder and, in the alternative, capital-felony murder with arson

as the underlying felony), first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and tampering

with physical evidence. Tr. 801-04. After the trial judge instructed the jury and the jury

was escorted from the courtroom, the trial judge and counsel engaged in the following

conversation about an arson instruction:

The Court: I did read two instructions that were not discussed in

chambers. That is, the standard concluding instructions on findings, I

added the instruction for arson and the instruction for tampering that were

not presented to me. I just read it off this one.

[Defense Counsel]: That’s fine, Your Honor.

The Court: We’ll prepare those and have them available to go into the

jury room. Anything further to be placed on the record, at this point,

[Prosecutor]?

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[Prosecutor]: Not that I’m aware of, Your Honor.

The Court: [Defense Counsel]?

[Defense Counsel]: No. Sir.

Tr. 808.

Defense counsel made no objection with respect to the arson instruction. After

closing arguments, the jury was excused to begin its deliberations. During its

deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking the following questions:

Are we supposed to decide?

1) Capitol [sic] Murder

2) Capitol [sic] Murder 1rst [sic] Degree

3) Capitol [sic] Murder 2nd Degree

One, Two, or Decide between all 3?

The trial judge reinstructed the jury, repeating the instructions previously given,

including the following instruction:

If you have reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of

capital murder, you will then consider the charge of murder in the first

degree. If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the

charge of murder in the first degree, you will consider the charge of

murder in the second degree.

Tr. 882.

The jury returned verdicts finding Petitioner guilty of capital murder, seconddegree murder, arson, and tampering with physical evidence. Tr. 884-94. The jury

found Petitioner not guilty of first-degree murder. Tr. 895-96. The prosecutor stated to

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the trial judge that sentencing Petitioner to capital murder and second-degree murder

was double jeopardy and suggested finding Petitioner guilty of capital murder, the

higher offense. Tr. 896. Petitioner’s counsel stated, “I think they’ve got inconsistent

verdicts.” Tr. 896. The trial judge polled each juror on whether his or her verdict was

that Petitioner was guilty of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Tr. 897-98.

After all twelve jurors responded affirmatively, the trial judge found that Petitioner “has

been found guilty of capital murder.” Tr. 898. The trial judge subsequently polled each

juror on its findings of guilt on the offenses of arson and tampering with physical

evidence, and each juror responded affirmatively with respect to each verdict. Tr. 900-

02. After deliberating on the sentence to be imposed, the jury returned sentences of

life imprisonment without parole for capital murder, ten years’ imprisonment for arson,

and three years’ imprisonment for tampering with physical evidence. Tr. 905.

Petitioner’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the verdicts were inconsistent.

Tr. 906. The trial judge postponed sentencing so that he could research the issue. Tr.

907. A sentencing hearing was held on August 29, 2003. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the trial judge denied Petitioner’s motion for mistrial, disregarded the seconddegree murder verdict, and sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without parole for

capital murder, ten years’ imprisonment for arson, and three years’ imprisonment for

tampering with physical evidence. Tr. 931-32.

Petitioner appealed her convictions to the Arkansas Supreme Court and raised

the following grounds for reversal:

1. The evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for capital

murder and arson; and

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2. The trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for

mistrial because the jury returned inconsistent verdicts for capital

murder and second-degree murder.

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. Meadows v.

State, 360 Ark. 5, 199 S.W.3d 634 (2004). The Court found that because Petitioner

failed to argue at trial that the State had not presented sufficient evidence on the

alternative charge of premeditated capital murder, she failed to preserve the argument

for appeal. Id. at 12, 199 S.W.3d at 638-39. Accordingly, the Supreme Court only

addressed Petitioner’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support her

convictions for capital-felony murder and arson. The Court found that the evidence was

sufficient to support those convictions. Id. at 12-15, 199 S.W.3d at 639-41. The Court

questioned whether Petitioner’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying her motion for mistrial because the jury returned inconsistent verdicts was

preserved for appeal. Id. at 16, 199 S.W.3d at 641. The Court found that Petitioner’s

motion for mistrial “does not appear to have been made at the first opportunity”

because she did not move for a mistrial based on inconsistent verdicts until after the

jury had returned its verdicts for sentencing after the penalty phase. Id. The Supreme

Court cited Ferguson v. State, 343 Ark. 159, 33 S.W.3d 115 (2000), for the proposition

that a motion for mistrial is procedurally barred when it is not made at the first

opportunity. Id. The Court found that “[c]ertainly stating defense counsel’s mere belief

that the verdicts were inconsistent is not enough.” Id. “[I]n addition to the preservation

point,” the Arkansas Supreme Court found that Petitioner’s argument that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying her motion for mistrial because the jury returned

inconsistent verdicts was without merit. Id. at 16-18, 199 S.W.3d at 641-43.

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 20 Filed 04/04/07 Page 6 of 30
 1 A pro se prisoner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed on the date it is

delivered to prison authorities for mailing to the clerk of the court. Nichols v. Bowersox,

172 F.3d 1068, 1077 (8th Cir. 1999). Petitioner signed her petition on May 11, 2005. 

Although it is unclear when she tendered her petition to prison authorities for mailing,

the Magistrate Judge will assume that the date was May 11, 2005.

 2 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

-7-

Petitioner did not seek post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 37 of the Arkansas

Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

On May 11, 2005, Petitioner filed the pending § 2254 petition in this Court.1 She

has raised the following grounds for relief:

1. The trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for mistrial and

convicting her of capital murder after the jury returned inconsistent

verdicts finding her guilty of both capital murder and seconddegree murder while simultaneously acquitting her of first-degree

murder;

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advance a proper and

timely objection on the issue of inconsistent verdicts;

3. Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated by the State’s failure

to submit a capital murder verdict form which clearly defined which

capital murder statute she was convicted of violating;

4. Apprendi v. New Jersey2 was violated because:

a. The State failed to prove each and every element of

capital-felony murder and arson;

b. Petitioner’s arson conviction was constitutionally deficient

because no arson instruction was provided to the jury;

c. Petitioner’s arson conviction was constitutionally deficient

because no non-hearsay evidence was presented to prove

that she committed arson;

d. Petitioner’s capital-felony murder conviction was

constitutionally deficient because the State failed to provide

an arson instruction to the jury; and

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 2 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

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e. Petitioner’s capital-felony murder conviction was

constitutionally deficient because the State failed to prove

the underlying felony of arson; 

5. Counsel was ineffective for failing to timely raise and object to the

issues raised in Claim 4 at trial and for failing to raise the issues

on appeal; and

6. The trial court violated Wong Sun v. United States2

 by erroneously

admitting inadmissible hearsay statements made by co-defendant

Dale Meadows, which were “not made during and in furtherance

of the conspiracy.” 

In his response to Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, the Respondent asserts

that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred. In considering a petition for federal

habeas corpus relief, a district court usually is precluded from considering any issue

that a state court has already resolved on an independent and adequate state law

ground. Reagan v. Norris, 279 F.3d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 2001). This includes cases in

which the state court judgment turns on an independent and adequate state procedural

ground, such as a determination that a claim is procedurally defaulted. Oxford v. Delo,

59 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1995); Reagan, 279 F.3d at 656. A district court also is

ordinarily precluded from considering any claim that a petitioner has failed to “fairly

present” to the highest state court. Wemark v. State, 322 F.3d 1018, 1020-1021 (8th

Cir. 2003); Trevino v. Dahm, 2 F.3d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1993). See also O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999) (a petitioner’s failure to present his claims to the

highest state court results in a procedural default of the claims). “A claim has been

fairly presented when a petitioner has properly raised the ‘same factual grounds and

legal theories’ in the state courts which he is attempting to raise in his federal habeas

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petition.” Wemark, 322 F.3d at 1021 (citing Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1240

(8th Cir. 1996)). “The federal legal theory or theories must plainly appear on the face

of the petitioner’s state court briefs.” Jones v. Jerrison, 20 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1994)

(holding that petitioner failed to fairly apprise the state court of his federal claim

because he did not refer to or rely on federal law in his appellate brief); McDougald v.

Lockhart, 942 F.2d 508, 510 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Explicit citation to the Constitution or to

a federal case is necessary for fair presentation of a constitutional claim in state court”);

Thomas v. Wyrick, 622 F.2d 411, 413 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that petitioner failed to

present his federal claim to the state courts because his state-court brief did not cite

any provision of the Federal Constitution or any federal case); Morris v. Norris, 83 F.3d

268, 269 (8th Cir. 1996) (“habeas petitioners must have explicitly cited to the United

States Constitution or federal case law in their direct appeal to preserve federal

review”). See also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) ("If a habeas petitioner

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him due process

of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal

court, but in state court").

Where the state court dismisses a habeas petitioner’s claims on independent

and adequate state law grounds or the petitioner has failed to fairly present his claims

to the state court, the claims are procedurally defaulted, and a federal district court

cannot consider them unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the default and

actual prejudice as a result of the alleged constitutional violation, or actual innocence.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 744, 750-51 (1991); Prewitt v. Goeke, 978 F.2d

1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 1992); Wemark, 322 F.3d at 1021-22; Reagan, 279 F.3d at 656.

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The existence of cause "must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show some

objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the

State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). At a minimum,

a petitioner must show that something “external to [him], something that cannot be fairly

attributed to him,” caused the procedural default. Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1140

(8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 753). For example, a

showing that the factual or legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available to

counsel, that some interference by officials made compliance impracticable, or that

counsel's performance was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984), would constitute factors external to the defense and cause for a

procedural default. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 753. Where a prisoner has no

constitutional right to an attorney, such as in state post-conviction proceedings, any

attorney error that led to default cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal

court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 757; Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1151

(8thCir. 1997). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be presented in state

court as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a

procedural default in a habeas corpus proceeding. Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963,

971 (8th Cir. 2003); Frasier v. Maschner, 304 F.3d 815, 817 (8th Cir. 2002).

A narrow exception to the cause and prejudice standard exists where the

petitioner can show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496. “To

establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.”

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Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 1023, 1029

(8th Cir. 2001); Brownlow v. Groose, 66 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 1995). To be credible,

“a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent

person” must be supported with “new reliable evidence - - whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence - -

that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 at 324; House v. Bell, U.S.

 , 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2078 (2006). “Evidence is only ‘new’ if it was ‘not available at

trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence.’”

Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 920 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Amrine, 238 F.3d at

1029). 

Petitioner did not fairly present Claims 2 and 5, which allege ineffective

assistance of counsel, pursuant to Rule 37, the appropriate state court remedy for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Rowe v. State, 318 Ark. 25, 26-27, 883

S.W.2d 804, 805 (1994) (adjudicating claim, on appeal from the denial of Rule 37 relief,

that counsel was ineffective). In Claim 3, Petitioner contends that her constitutional

rights were violated by the State’s failure to submit a capital murder verdict form which

clearly defined which capital murder statute she was convicted of violating. The

appropriate state remedy for this claim was direct appeal. See Spears v. State, 264 Ark.

83, 86-87, 568 S.W.2d 492, 495-96 (1978) (reversing conviction on direct appeal on the

basis that the verdict forms were incorrect). However, Petitioner did not raise Claim 3

in her brief on direct appeal.

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 20 Filed 04/04/07 Page 11 of 30
 3

 In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held: “Other than the fact of a

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 490.

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 In Claims 4(b) and 4(d), Petitioner contends that Apprendi v. New Jersey3 was

violated for the following reasons: (1) her arson conviction was constitutionally deficient

because no arson instruction was provided to the jury, and (2) her capital-felony murder

conviction was constitutionally deficient because the State failed to provide an arson

instruction to the jury. The appropriate remedy for these claims was either direct appeal

or a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 37. Burton v. State, 2006 Ark.

LEXIS 421 at * 6 (Ark. June 29, 2006) (adjudicating Apprendi claim in appeal from the

denial of Rule 37 relief). Cf. Hardman v. State, 356 Ark. 7, 12-15,144 S.W.3d 744, 747-

49 (2004) (adjudicating, on direct appeal, Petitioner’s argument that the trial court erred

in refusing to give jury instructions on lesser-included offenses); Gaines v. State, 354

Ark. 89, 93-98, 118 S.W.3d 102, 103-07 (2003) (adjudicating, on direct appeal,

Petitioner’s argument that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on a

lesser-included offense). As noted above, Petitioner did not seek relief pursuant to

Rule 37. Not only did Petitioner fail to cite Apprendi in her brief on direct appeal, she

did not complain that no arson instruction was given to the jury, much less argue that

her constitutional rights were violated because no arson instruction was given to the

jury. In adjudicating Petitioner’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying her motion for mistrial because the jury returned inconsistent verdicts, the

Arkansas Supreme Court did note that an arson instruction was not included in the

record, even though the circuit judge specifically announced that he had instructed the

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jury on arson. Meadows v. State, 360 Ark. at 18, 199 S.W.3d at 642. The Supreme

Court found that even if the arson instruction had not been given, the jury “could well

have convicted Meadows of premeditated capital murder since it was instructed on that

offense, all of which would render the arson instruction irrelevant.” Id.,199 S.W.3d at

642-43. The Court found “no reversible error in this regard.” Id., 199 S.W.3d at 643.

In so finding, the Court did not consider the federal constitutional significance of any

error by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury on arson. The Magistrate Judge finds

that Petitioner did not fairly present Claims 4(b) and 4(d) in state court. 

In Claims 4(a), 4(c), and 4(e), Petitioner contends that Apprendi was violated

for the following reasons: (1) the State failed to prove each and every element of

capital-felony murder and arson, (2) her arson conviction was constitutionally deficient

because no non-hearsay evidence was presented to prove that she committed arson,

and (3) her capital-felony murder conviction was constitutionally deficient because the

State failed to prove the underlying felony of arson. To the extent that Claims 4(a), 4(c),

and 4(e) are construed simply as Apprendi claims, they are procedurally defaulted. To

the extent they are construed as due process challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), they are without merit as will

be discussed below. 

The appropriate state remedy for Claim 6, in which Petitioner contends that the

trial court violated Wong Sun by erroneously admitting inadmissible hearsay statements

made by co-defendant Dale Meadows, was direct appeal. Baird v. State, 357 Ark. 508,

515-16, 182 S.W.3d 136, 141 (2004) (adjudicating, on direct appeal, the defendant’s

argument, which relied on Wong Sun, that trial court erred in denying defendant’s

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motion to suppress statements). However, Petitioner did not present Claim 6 on direct

appeal. 

Petitioner contends that her claims are not procedurally defaulted because under

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), the Arkansas Supreme Court, when the sentence is death or

life imprisonment, “must review all errors prejudicial to the appellant in accordance with

Ark. Code Ann. §16-91-113(a).” If this Court were to accept Petitioner’s argument and

conclude that where a habeas petitioner who is sentenced to death or life imprisonment

fails to present her federal claims to the Arkansas Supreme Court, her claims are not

procedurally defaulted in light of the Supreme Court’s obligation under Rule 4-3(h) to

review, on direct appeal, all errors prejudicial to the appellant, such a conclusion would

be inconsistent with well-established United States Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit

precedent holding that a petitioner’s failure to present her claims to the highest state

court results in a procedural default of the claims. In Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d

1044 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit addressed an argument substantially identical

to the one Petitioner is making in this case. The Court rejected the petitioner’s

argument that statutorily required independent review on direct appeal by the Arizona

Supreme Court for fundamental errors affecting the judgment and sentence constituted

a full and fair presentation of the petitioner’s federal claims and that several of his

claims therefore were not procedurally defaulted. Moormann, 426 F.3d at 1057-58. It

also is important to note that the Eighth Circuit has held that “a properly limited plain

error review by a state court does not cure procedural default.” Toney v. Gammon, 79

F.3d 693, 699 (8th Cir. 1996). 

The Magistrate Judge concludes that Claims 2, 3, 4 (other than a due process

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challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support Petitioner’s convictions for arson

and capital-felony murder), 5, and 6 are procedurally defaulted even though the

Arkansas Supreme Court is required to review, on direct appeal, all errors prejudicial

to the appellant pursuant to Rule 4-3(h). Even if the Court were to hold that Petitioner

could avoid her procedural default in light of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s obligation

under Rule 4-3(h) to review, on direct appeal, all errors prejudicial to the appellant, this

holding would not apply to her ineffective assistance of counsel claims as they either

were not cognizable on direct appeal or could not have been raised on direct appeal.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not cognizable on direct appeal unless

“the appellant first presented the claim to the trial court during the trial or in a motion

for new trial.” Walker v. State, 330 Ark. 652, 657, 955 S.W.2d 905, 908 (1997); Smith

v. State, 328 Ark. 249, 250, 943 S.W.2d 234, 235 (1997). Furthermore, the Arkansas

Supreme Court will not consider an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct

appeal unless “the surrounding facts and circumstances were fully developed either

during the trial or during other hearings conducted by the trial court.” Walker, 330 Ark.

at 658, 955 S.W.2d at 908; Chavis v. State, 328 Ark. 251, 253, 942 S.W.2d 853, 854

(1997). Petitioner did not present, during her trial or in a motion for new trial, her claims

that trial counsel was ineffective, and the facts and circumstances surrounding trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness were not developed at trial or during hearings conducted by

the trial court. With respect to Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing

to present the issues raised in Claim 4 on direct appeal, this claim could not have been

raised on direct appeal. 

As cause for her procedural default of her ineffective assistance of counsel

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 20 Filed 04/04/07 Page 15 of 30
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claims, Petitioner asserts that interference by state officials made compliance

impracticable because the Arkansas Supreme Court, by finding no merit to her appeal,

made it impossible for her “to show the court the errors made by ineffective counsel.”

The Magistrate Judge finds that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s determination that

Petitioner’s appeal had no merit does not constitute cause for her failure to raise her

ineffective assistance of counsel claims pursuant to Rule 37. A state appellate court

decision finding that an appeal is without merit certainly does not constitute interference

by state officials. Petitioner also asserts that the State’s concealment of false testimony

by several witnesses constitutes cause for her procedural default. However, she has

not explained how the State’s concealment of false testimony caused her failure to

raise her procedurally defaulted claims in state court. The Magistrate Judge finds that

Petitioner has not shown cause for her procedural default.

Petitioner also asserts that she is actually innocent. Petitioner alleges that Linda

Jane Pierpont, a long-time acquaintance who testified on Petitioner’s behalf at her trial,

has discovered evidence proving Petitioner’s actual innocence. Petitioner alleges that

Ms. Pierpont contends that “the Carroll County Sheriff’s Office was less than scrupulous

while conducting interviews.” She also alleges that Ms. Pierpont discovered several

video tapes that were the basis for the State’s case against Petitioner, that the video

tapes were lost and never admitted into evidence, and that Ms. Pierpont “has two (2)

videos and the typed version of witness Statements vary from the video’s.” Petitioner

has submitted a letter from Ms. Pierpont to the Magistrate Judge undersigned. Ms.

Pierpont sent the same letter directly to the Magistrate Judge undersigned and

enclosed a copy of a compact disc, which she alleges is a copy of “an audio tape made

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 20 Filed 04/04/07 Page 16 of 30
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in April 2003, following a conversation with Thomas Conner,” a witness for the State at

Petitioner’s trial in August of 2003. Ms. Pierpont alleges that the compact disc contains

a description by Grace Lange-Way, a friend of Ms. Pierpont, of a conversation between

Lange-Way and Thomas Conner. Ms. Pierpont states that the contents of the compact

disc “will not be as enlightening as Terese believes it will be,” but that she can call

attention “to information that might be helpful.” Ms. Pierpoint alleges that she believes

Petitioner is innocent for the following reasons, among others: (i) Thomas Conner “is

not known to be a truthful man” and “is rarely sober”; (ii) Mr. Conner was a close

companion of Lori Pattison, the victim, and was convicted of accidentally shooting Lori’s

husband in the head five months before her death, (iii) Mr. Conner gave several

accounts of the fire, and for over a year denied being present at all; (iv) “6 weeks before

the fatal fire, Dale Meadows was involved in an identical fire, which caught Ms. Pattison

asleep in the trailer bedroom”; (v) “the explanation for the first fire was nearly identical

to the explanation for the second fire”; (vi) Petitioner was not in the area at the time of

the first fire; (vii) a witness, Patty Lively, in a video tape of an interview, expressed fear

of Dale Meadows only, and initially denied fear of Petitioner; (viii) the typed interview

varies from the video tape; and (ix) video tapes of interviews of other witnesses were

lost.

The Magistrate Judge undersigned has listened to the compact disc, which

contains a bizarre, rambling conversation, apparently between Grace Lange-Way and

Ms. Pierpont, concerning, inter alia, one of the women’s stress reactions when visiting

the murder scene (including a “black flash,” arm pain, and an “ice cold feeling”), Lori

Pattison’s “yearning” for self-mutilation, and Thomas Conner’s conversation with Ms.

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Lange-Way about Conner’s accidental shooting of Lori Pattison’s husband. The

compact disc contains no information or evidence even tending to show that it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Petitioner in light of the

information or evidence.

Petitioner also alleges that Thomas Conner had an affair with Lori Pattison one

week after Pattison’s husband’s death and that Pattison subsequently “started an affair”

with Dale Meadows. She alleges that Mr. Conner was bitter over the affair and “this

would have shown cause” for his wanting revenge. Petitioner also alleges, inter alia,

that the State presented false testimony by several witnesses.

The Magistrate Judge finds that much of the “evidence” submitted by Petitioner

and Ms. Pierpont is not new as it either was presented at Petitioner’s trial, available at

the time of trial, or could have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due

diligence. For example, at Petitioner’s trial Thomas Conner admitted that he had told

several versions of what happened on the day of Lori Pattison’s murder. He also

testified that he was a chronic alcoholic and that he was intoxicated on the day of Lori

Pattison’s murder. Mr. Conner testified that Lori Pattison’s husband died in an

accidental shooting and that he (Conner) was there when Pattison’s husband died. Not

only is much of the evidence not new, it does not constitute reliable evidence

demonstrating that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted Petitioner in light of the new evidence. The Magistrate Judge recommends

that Claims 2, 3, 4 (other than a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence to support Petitioner’s convictions for arson and capital-felony murder), 5, and

6 be dismissed with prejudice as procedurally barred.

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In Claim 1, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s

motion for mistrial and convicting her of capital murder after the jury returned

inconsistent verdicts finding her guilty of both capital murder and second-degree

murder while simultaneously acquitting her of first-degree murder. In the interest of

judicial economy, the Magistrate Judge declines to address whether Claim 1 is

procedurally barred as the claim is easily resolvable against Petitioner on the merits

while the procedural bar analysis is complicated. Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155,

1162 (8th Cir. 1989) (”Judicial economy sometimes dictates reaching the merits if the

merits are easily resolvable against a petitioner while the procedural bar issues are

complicated”).

On direct appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s argument

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for mistrial because the

jury returned inconsistent verdicts for capital murder and second-degree murder, finding

as follows:

For her second point, Meadows argues that the circuit court abused its

discretion in denying her motion for a mistrial, because the jury returned

inconsistent verdicts for capital murder and second-degree murder.

Meadows also argues that the inconsistency was not cured by the court's

reinstructing the jury or by its polling the jury on the capital murder verdict

alone, because the court should also have polled the jury on its verdict

for second-degree murder.

We have said that a mistrial is an extreme remedy that should be used

only when the error is beyond repair and cannot be corrected by any

curative relief. See, e.g., Ray v. State, 342 Ark. 180, 27 S.W.3d 384

(2000). A circuit court's decision to grant or deny a mistrial will not be

disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. See id.

. . .

Meadows's arguments on appeal are without merit. See Ferguson v.

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State, supra (legitimacy of denying mistrial motion addressed, although

motion appeared to be made late). She contends that the verdicts of

capital murder and second-degree murder were inconsistent and should

not be allowed to stand. This court hasfound "inconsistent" verdicts to be

those verdicts with some logical impossibility or improbability implicit in

the jury's findings. See Ray v. State, supra.

In the case at hand, any ostensible confusion on the jury's part evidenced

by the completion of the verdict forms for both capital murder and

second-degree murder was cured when the circuit judge polled the jurors

individually on whether each juror had found that Meadows was guilty of

capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Each juror responded

affirmatively that he or she had. The sentencing phase then followed the

finding of guilt, and the jury sentenced Meadows to life in prison without

parole.

Polling individual jurors on whether this was each juror's verdict is an

entirely reasonable method for confirming a verdict. Indeed, this court

recently affirmed a death sentence where each juror confirmed that that

was his or her decision. See Robbins v. State, 356 Ark. 225, 149 S.W.3d

871, 2004 Ark. LEXIS 130 (2004). Furthermore, in a case with facts very

analogous to those of the instant case, the Wyoming Supreme Court held

that where the jury found the defendant guilty of both greater and lesser

offenses, polling the jury on the greater offenses and sentencing the

defendant accordingly was the appropriate way to proceed. See Johnson

v. State, 695 P.2d 638 (Wyo. 1985).

In addition, polling the jurors on second-degree murder as well as capital

murder was not required. The jury had already assured the circuit judge

that each member had determined Meadows was guilty of capital murder

beyond a reasonable doubt, which, of course, is a homicide two degrees

higher than second-degree murder. Moreover, this court discussed Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-1-110(b) (1987) (lesser-included offenses), in a case

involving prosecution for more than one offense for the same conduct

under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110(a) (1987):

 . . . We have repeatedly interpreted this statute to mean that a

defendant may be prosecuted for more than one offense, but,

under specified circumstances, a judgment of conviction may

only be entered for one of the offenses. Hickerson v. State, 282

Ark. 217, 667 S.W.2d 654 (1984); Swaite v. State, 272 Ark. 128,

612 S.W.2d 307 (1981). Perhaps the best example of the way

the statute is intended to work is in the case where a prosecutor

is entitled to go to the jury and ask for conviction on the greater

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or the lesser offense, and the jury might find a defendant guilty

of both the lesser included offense and the greater offense.

Under the statute, the trial court should enter the judgment of

conviction only for the greater conviction. The purpose of the

statute in such a case is to allow a conviction of the lesser

included offense when the accused is not convicted of the

greater offense, but the trial court is clearly directed to allow

prosecution on each charge.

Hill v. State, 314 Ark. 275, 282, 862 S.W.2d 836, 840 (1993). See also

Johnson v. State, supra. The quoted language specifically discusses

what a circuit judge should do when a jury returns a verdict for a greater

and lesser-included offense. It says the judge shall enter judgment for the

greater offense, which is precisely what the circuit judge did here. Indeed,

the circuit judge specifically referred to the Hill decision and relied on it

before pronouncing sentence [footnote omitted].

As a final point, we note an arson instruction was not included in the

record, even though the circuit judge specifically announced, as quoted

in this opinion, that he had instructed the jury on arson. Of course, it is

the obligation of the appellant to present this court with a complete record

for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., Shankle v. State, 309 Ark. 40, 827

S.W.2d 642 (1992); Heinze v. State, 309 Ark. 162, 827 S.W.2d 658

(1992). We further observe that even if the arson instruction had not been

given, the jury still was instructed, in the alternative, on capital murder

committed with premeditated and deliberated purpose. The jury could

well have convicted Meadows of premeditated capital murder since it was

instructed on that offense, all of which would render the arson instruction

irrelevant. We certainly find no reversible error in this regard.

In short, the circuit judge entered judgment for the greater offense found

by the jury after polling the jurors individually to be certain of their guilty

verdict as an additional precaution. The jury subsequently returned a

sentence in the penalty phase of life without parole, which relates to

capital murder - not second-degree murder. We hold that the circuit

judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.

Meadows v. State, 360 Ark. at 15-18, 199 S.W.3d at 641-43. 

This Court’s power to review state court decisions in habeas corpus cases is

restricted to the "limited and deferential review" mandated by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790 (8th

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Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004)). Under the

AEDPA, if a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, a federal court

shall not grant habeas relief unless the adjudication of the claim: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Ligqins v. Burger, 422 F.3d 642, 646-647 (8th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 1359 (2006); Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 2004);

Johnston v. Luebbers, 288 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2002). 

“A state court decision is 'contrary to' clearly established federal law if the rule

applied by the state court directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent or if the state

court reached a result opposite a result reached by the Supreme Court on 'materially

indistinguishable' facts." Johnston, 288 F.3d at 1051 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 405 (2000)). "A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent if it correctly identifies the governing legal rules but

unreasonably applies them to the facts of the prisoner's case." Ford v. Bowersox, 256

F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407). “The focus

under the unreasonable application test is 'whether the state court's application of

clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable."' Hoon v. Iowa, 313 F.3d

1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). "An

incorrect decision is not necessarily unreasonable, and [a district court] may not grant

a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court decision is both wrong and

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unreasonable." Palmer v. Clarke, 408 F.3d 423, 429 (8th Cir. 2005); Colvin v. Taylor,

324 F.3d 583, 587 (8th Cir. 2003). "A reasonable application of established federal law

'does not require citation of [United States Supreme Court] cases-indeed, it does not

even require awareness of [these cases], so long as neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'" Cox v. Burger, 398 F.3d 1025,1030

(8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). "Finally, a state court

decision involves 'an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceedings,' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), only if it is shown by

clear and convincing evidence that the state court's presumptively correct factual

findings do not enjoy support in the record." Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 752 (8th

Cir. 2003). The provisions of § 2254(d) mandating deference to state court

adjudications on the merits apply to decisions of both state trial courts and state

appellate courts. Newton v. Kemna, 354 F.3d 776, 782-783 (8th Cir. 2004) (state trial

court decisions); Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1030-1032 (8th Cir. 2001) (state

trial court and state appellate court decisions); Ellis v. Norris, 232 F.3d 619, 622-623

(8th Cir. 2000) (state appellate court decisions). The “summary nature” of a state court

adjudication “does not affect the standard of review” mandated by § 2254(d). James

v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1999).

In Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932), the United States Supreme Court

held that a criminal defendant convicted by a jury of one count could not attack that

conviction because it was inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal on other

counts. Id. at 393-94. In so holding, the Supreme Court stated: 

Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment

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is regarded as if it was a separate indictment. . . . That the verdict may

have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the

jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry

into such matters. 

Id. 

Subsequently, in Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981), the United States

Supreme Court, relying on Dunn, held that any inconsistency in a judge’s verdicts

convicting one defendant but acquitting a co-defendant does not present a federal

constitutional claim cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. Id. at 344-48. In so

holding, the Supreme Court stated:

Apart from the acquittal of [a co-defendant], this record discloses no

constitutional error. Even assuming that this acquittal was logically

inconsistent with the conviction of respondent, respondent, who was

found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after a fair trial, has no

constitutional right to complain that the co-defendant was acquitted.

Id. at 348. 

Three years later, in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), the United

States Supreme Court, relying on Dunn and Harris, held that a jury’s inconsistent

verdicts, which acquitted the defendant on the charges of conspiracy to possess

cocaine and possession of cocaine but found her guilty of using the telephone to

facilitate those offenses, did not provide a sufficient basis to vacate her conviction. Id.

at 62-69. In so holding, the Supreme Court stated:

Review [of the sufficiency of the evidence] should be independent of the

jury’s determination that evidence on another count was insufficient. The

Government must convince the jury with its proof, and must also satisfy

the courts that given this proof the jury rationally could have reached a

verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not believe further

safeguards against jury irrationality are necessary. . . . [T]here is no

reason to vacate the respondent’s conviction merely because the verdicts

cannot rationally be reconciled. 

Id. at 67, 69.

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The United State’s Supreme Court’s decisions in Dunn, Harris, and Powell

establish that there is no violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights even if a jury’s

verdicts are inconsistent “so long as the evidence before the jury was constitutionally

sufficient to convict him.” See Nesbitt v. Hopkins, 86 F.3d 118, 121 (8th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Fuller, 374 F.3d 617, 623 (8th Cir. 2004). Based on Dunn, Harris,

and Powell, the Eighth Circuit and other federal circuit courts have held that

inconsistent verdicts do not warrant granting a mistrial or new trial. See United States

v. Driver, 945 F.2d 1410, 1414-15 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of motion for mistrial

or new trial due to inconsistent verdicts, concluding, on the basis of Powell and Dunn,

that the fact that the jury instructions “resulted in the jury returning inconsistent verdicts

provides inadequate grounds for reversal of [the defendant’s] conviction”); United

States v. Abbott Washroom Systems, Inc., 49 F.3d 619, 621-28 (10th Cir. 1995) (relying

on Dunn, Harris, and Powell and holding that the district court erred in granting a

mistrial and new trial on the basis of inconsistent verdicts); United States v. Cyr, 712

F.2d 729, 731-35 (1st Cir. 1983) (relying on Dunn and Harris and holding that

inconsistent verdicts did not require a new trial); United States v. Paone, 758 F.2d 774,

776 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Harris and concluding that inconsistent verdicts did not

require a new trial). 

With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Petitioner of capitalfelony murder and arson, the Arkansas Supreme Court found as follows:

Evidence presented at trial revealed that [Terese “Tracy’”] Meadows

arrived at the trailer home of Diane Sprague in Green Forest on

November 7, 2001, at approximately 4:30 p.m. Meadows subsequently

left Sprague's home and returned between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. to collect

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$ 20 that Sprague owed Meadows. To satisfy the debt, Sprague instead

agreed to buy groceries for Meadows at the Wal-Mart in Harrison. Each

took her own car, and the women met in the Wal-Mart parking lot. After

purchasing groceries, the women went their separate ways. Sprague

bought gas for her car and made a few telephone calls at a pay phone

before driving back to Green Forest. When she returned home, Sprague

found Tracy and Dale Meadows in her home. Dale Meadows told

Sprague that his trailer home had exploded and that he tried but failed to

remove Lori Pattison from the fire.

Around 12:30 a.m. on November 8, 2001, Gay Lynn Easter passed the

trailer home owned by Bob Trigg and occupied by Dale Meadows and

Lori Pattison. Easter testified that the trailer home had collapsed and was

burning around the edges. She tried to notify Trigg but was unable to

contact him. She then telephoned the Carroll County Sheriff's

Department to report the fire. Kim Marshall, a dispatcher with the sheriff's

department, took Easter's call. According to Marshall, no one reported the

fire except for Easter during her shift, which was from 12:00 a.m. until

8:00 a.m. on November 8, 2001.

After being notified of the fire, Gary Coleman, Captain of the Green

Forest Volunteer Fire Department, was the first to arrive at the scene.

According to Coleman, no one was around the trailer home when he

arrived and the structure was "already completely burned down."

Coleman testified that he attempted to see if there was anyone in the

trailer home, but he could not see anything because it was too dark in

the area.

Patty Lively testified that Tracy and Dale Meadows arrived at her home

early in the morning of November 8, 2001. Lively testified that Tracy

Meadows told her that Dale Meadows had killed Lori Pattison and asked

Lively to go with her to the fire scene. When they arrived at the scene,

Tracy Meadows walked directly to the area where Lori Pattison's body

was located. She then told Lively that the body's remains were Lori

Pattison's and then touched them, causing a piece of bone to break.

Lively testified that she convinced Meadows to leave the area by

promising her that she would later return and help her move the body.

The women returned to Lively's home, and Tracy and Dale Meadows left.

Lively then contacted her neighbor Brice Sneed and told him about going

to the fire scene with Tracy Meadows and about Tracy Meadows touching

the body. At about 9:30 a.m., Sneed contacted the Carroll County

Sheriff's Department to inform them that Lori Pattison had died in the

trailer home fire.

Investigator Alan Hoos with the Carroll County Sheriff's Department

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testified that he received Sneed's call. Investigator Hoos and Lieutenant

Leighton Ballard visited the scene to search for any human remains,

which they found near the remnants of a bed frame. The officers then

contacted Arkansas State Police for assistance in the investigation.

According to Investigator Hoos, while at the fire scene, he noticed Tracy

Meadows drive by in her vehicle. He conducted a traffic stop on Meadows

and she was subsequently transported to the sheriff's department for an

interview. According to Lieutenant Ballard, Meadows admitted that she

found and touched the body but stated that Dale Meadows was

responsible for whatever had happened. Tracy Spencer, an investigator

with the Arkansas State Police who conducted Meadows's interview, also

testified that Tracy Meadows stated that she had nothing to do with Lori

Pattison's death or with the fire.

A forensic pathologist with the Arkansas State Crime Lab, Dr. Steven

Erickson, testified that he examined the remains of Lori Pattison. Due to

the condition of the remains, Dr. Erickson was unable to determine

whether the victim had suffered stab wounds. But Dr. Erickson stated that

she was alive at the time of the fire and died from smoke inhalation.

At the jury trial, Thomas Conner testified that he was in the trailer home

with Dale Meadows and Lori Pattison on November 7, 2001, and that

they had been drinking alcoholic beverages all day. According to Conner,

Tracy Meadows arrived with a folding knife in her hand and asked where

Lori Pattison was. Meadows then went into the bedroom where Lori

Pattison was hiding from her. Shortly thereafter, Conner heard Lori

Pattison scream for help. Dale Meadows next went into the bedroom. He

later returned to the living room and stated that Tracy Meadows had killed

Lori Pattison. Conner testified that Dale Meadows had blood on his

forearms and on his blue jeans and told him to leave. As he was leaving,

Conner saw Dale Meadows take a can of kerosene from the front porch

and enter the trailer home with it. In addition, Earl Lee Sewell testified at

trial that he overheard Tracy Meadows say that she killed Lori Pattison.

Eddie Craig Monarch also testified that Tracy Meadows told him that she

killed Lori Pattison, that Dale Meadows poured kerosene throughout the

trailer home, and that he and Tracy Meadows lit it on fire.

Reviewing the presented evidence in the light most favorable to the State

and considering only the evidence that supports that jury's verdict, there

was substantial evidence presented to compel the jury's conclusion that

Meadows was guilty of capital murder and of arson. The jury heard

testimony that Meadows admitted killing Lori Pattison and that she was

involved in starting the fire in the trailer home that eventually caused Lori

Pattison's death. Meadows's arguments that the testimony was inherently

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improbable, physically impossible, and unbelievable are unpersuasive.

It falls within the province of the jury to resolve questions of conflicting

testimony and inconsistent evidence, and the jury chose in the instant

case to believe the witnesses supporting the State's theory of the case

rather than the defendant's. Meadows's argument regarding sufficiency

of the evidence is without merit.

Meadows v. State, 360 Ark. at 13-15, 199 S.W.3d at 639-41.

In assessing whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, a

federal court’s scope of review is “extremely limited.” Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d 538, 543

(8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Whitehead v. Dormire, 340 F.3d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 2003)). “It

is not relevant whether [the court] believe[s] that the evidence at trial established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Sera, 400 F.3d at 543. Rather, under Jackson v. Virginia

the court must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Sera, 400 F.3d at 543 (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318-319); Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2000).

“This standard recognizes that it is the province of the fact-finder, not this court, ‘to

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Sera, 400 F.3d at 543 (quoting Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318-319).

A person commits capital murder if “[a]cting alone or with one (1) or more other

persons, [she] commits or attempts to commit arson, and in the course of and in

furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight therefrom, [she] or an accomplice

causes the death of any person.” Ark. Code Ann. 5-10-101(a)(2) (Repl. 1997). A

person commits arson if she “starts a fire or causes an explosion with the purpose of

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destroying or otherwise damaging: (1) An occupiable structure or motor vehicle that is

the property of another person; . . . or (3) Any property, whether [her] own or that of

another person, if the act thereby negligently creates risk of death or serious physical

injury to any person.” Ark. Code Ann. 5-38-301(a)(1) & (3) (Repl. 1997). A person also

commits capital murder if “[w]ith the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing

the death of another person, [she] causes the death of any person.” Ark. Code Ann. 5-

10-101(a)(4) (Repl.1997). 

In considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the

Magistrate Judge finds that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of arson, capital-felony murder with arson as the underlying felony, and

premeditated capital murder. The Magistrate Judge finds that Petitioner’s claim that

the trial court erred by denying her motion for mistrial and convicting her of capital

murder after the jury returned inconsistent verdicts on the murder offenses does not

implicate the Constitution. Petitioner has not shown that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s

adjudication of her claim that trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for

mistrial because the jury returned inconsistent verdicts is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. Petitioner also has not shown that the Arkansas

Supreme Court’s adjudication of her claim that the evidence was insufficient to support

her convictions for arson and capital-felony murder is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. Finally, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the

Arkansas Supreme Court’s adjudication of her claims resulted in a decision that was

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceeding. 

In conclusion, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Petitioner’s claim that the

trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for mistrial and convicting her of capital

murder after the jury returned inconsistent verdicts on the murder offenses and her

claim that that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for arson and

capital-felony murder be dismissed with prejudice.

THEREFORE, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Petitioner’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be dismissed with prejudice.

Dated this 4th day of April, 2007.

 /s/ John F. Forster, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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