Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01233/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01233-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lenford Never Misses A Shot
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1233

___________

Lenford Never Misses a Shot, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

United States of America, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: July 1, 2005

Filed: July 7, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, McMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Lenford Never Misses A Shot appeals the district court’s1

 judgment denying

his initial motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside his sentence. Never

Misses A Shot argues that his 220-month sentence for sexual abuse and escape

convictions was imposed in violation of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005). Because we conclude that Never Misses A Shot may not collaterally attack

his sentence based on Booker, we affirm. 

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Never Misses A Shot pleaded guilty to sexual abuse, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153

and 2242(2), and escape, see 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). At his May 2004 sentencing,

relevant to the sexual-abuse conviction, the district court increased Never Misses A

Shot’s base offense level of 27 by 4 levels because the victim was abducted, by 2

levels because the victim was in his custody or care, by 2 levels because the victim

was vulnerable, and by 2 levels for obstruction of justice. The total offense level of

37 and Category I criminal history resulted in a Guidelines imprisonment range of

210-262 months, subject to a 240-month statutory maximum. For the escape

conviction, the district court calculated a total offense level of 11 and a Category II

criminal history, for a Guidelines imprisonment range of 10-16 months. The court

sentenced Never Misses A Shot to consecutive prison terms of 210 months and 10

months, and 3 years of supervised release. Never Misses A Shot had retained in his

plea agreements only the right to appeal an upward departure from the Guidelines

sentencing range, and he did not appeal. His convictions became final on May 24,

2004, ten days after the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); Griffith

v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987). 

In November 2004, Never Misses A Shot filed this section 2255 motion,

claiming that the procedure employed in computing his offense level--whereby his

sentencing range was increased predicated on facts neither admitted by him nor

proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt--violated the Sixth Amendment. Never

Misses A Shot relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124

S. Ct. 2531 (2004), issued on June 24, 2004. He asserted that the appropriate

sentencing range for the sexual-abuse conviction--assuming an offense level of 27

and Category I criminal history--was 70-87 months imprisonment, and that the

appropriate sentencing range remained 10-16 months for the escape conviction. 

The district court denied relief, reasoning that movant’s convictions became

final prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely, and Blakely was not

retroactively applicable on collateral review. The district court granted a certificate

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of appealability on this issue. The Supreme Court then issued its Booker decision,

and Never Misses A Shot now seeks relief based on the rule announced therein--that

“[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence

exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a

jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt,” see 125 S. Ct. at 756.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a section 2255 motion. See

Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1094

(2003); see also Rogers v. United States, 1 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)

(noting that § 2255 motion may not do service for appeal, but considering merits of

issue not raised on direct appeal because district court did so). When a Supreme

Court decision results in a “new rule” of criminal procedure, that rule applies to all

criminal cases still pending on direct review, but, as to convictions that are already

final, the rule applies only in limited circumstances. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 124

S. Ct. 2519, 2522 (2004). New substantive rules--which narrow the scope of a

criminal statute or which place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute

beyond the State’s power to punish--generally apply retroactively. See id. at 2522-23.

New procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively unless the rule is of

“watershed” magnitude implicating “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the

criminal proceeding,” or unless the rule prevents the lawmaking authority from

criminalizing certain kinds of conduct. See id. at 2523; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

288, 310-11 (1989) (unless exception applies, new constitutional rules of criminal

procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before new

rules are announced; exceptions are for rules that (1) place conduct beyond power of

criminal law-making body to proscribe or (2) are “watershed rules of criminal

procedure”); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2001), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1097 (2002). 

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In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the Supreme Court

announced that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to

a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Applying Teague, we found that

“[p]ermitting a judge-found fact to affect the sentence imposed after a valid

conviction . . . cannot be said to have resulted in a fundamentally unfair criminal

proceeding.” See Moss, 252 F.3d at 999. We concluded that Apprendi is not of

watershed magnitude and does not apply retroactively in collateral proceedings. See

id. at 997. 

Similarly, as all circuit courts considering the issue to date have held, we

conclude the “new rule” announced in Booker does not apply to criminal convictions

that became final before the rule was announced, and thus does not benefit movants

in collateral proceedings. See Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 615-16 (3d Cir.

2005) (holding Booker does not apply retroactively on collateral review); Guzman

v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); Varela v. United States,

400 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Price, 400

F.3d 844, 845 (10th Cir. 2005) (same); Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855,

857 (6th Cir. 2005) (same); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th

Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 2005 WL 1105026 (U.S. June 6, 2005) (No. 04-9994); see

also Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525 (finding it implausible that judicial factfinding so

seriously diminishes accuracy as to produce impermissibly large risk of injustice). 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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