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Parties Involved:
Andy Laracuent
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 13-1365

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

ANDY LARACUENT,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Thompson, Kayatta, and Barron,

Circuit Judges.

Elaine Mittleman on brief for appellant.

Rosa Emilia Rodríquez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson

Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, and Tiffany V.

Monrose, Assistant United State Attorney, on brief for appellee.

February 17, 2015

Case: 13-1365 Document: 00116799505 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2015 Entry ID: 5886597
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Andy Laracuent

pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. His appeal seeks to

vacate this plea on grounds of factual insufficiency. Following

careful consideration, we reject Laracuent's claim of error.

BACKGROUND

On January 26, 2012, law enforcement officials observed

a Nissan Armada, along with two other vehicles, driving into a bay

area in Santa Isabel, Puerto Rico.1 At the same time, a vessel was

seen traveling into the bay. Several individuals were observed

offloading bales from the vessel into the vehicles, including

Laracuent. The vehicles then exited the bay area, where they were

stopped by DEA agents who conducted a traffic stop and arrested the

individuals inside of the vehicles, including Laracuent, who was

inside the Nissan Armada. The substance in the bales was

subsequently analyzed and confirmed to be cocaine. Additionally,

during the traffic stop, law enforcement found three firearms

inside the Nissan Armada.

In connection with these events, a grand jury returned a

three-count indictment against Laracuent and thirteen codefendants. Laracuent was charged with conspiracy to possess with

1 When an appeal follows a guilty plea, the facts are drawn

from some combination of "the change-of-plea colloquy, the

presentence investigation report, and the transcript of the

disposition hearing." United States v. Jiminez, 498 F.3d 82, 84

(1st Cir. 2007). 

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intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1),(b)(1)(A)(ii), 846 (Count 1); possession with intent to

distribute five kilograms or more of a substance containing a

detectable amount of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2); and possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 3).

Laracuent pleaded guilty to Count One and Count Three. 

Count Two was dismissed. He was subsequently sentenced to a prison

term of one hundred twenty months on Count One and sixty months on

Count Three, to be served consecutively, along with a supervised

release term of five years. Laracuent timely appealed, seeking to

vacate his conviction on Count Three only by challenging the

court's acceptance of his plea.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Typically, we review the district court's acceptance of

a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. NegrónNarváez, 403 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2005). However, where, as here,

a defendant is silent as to alleged errors in the district court

proceedings, and seeks to withdraw his plea for the first time on

appeal, we review his claim for plain error. Id.; United States v.

Ramos-Mejía, 721 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2013). Plain error review

puts a heavy burden on the defendant; he must show "(1) that an

error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only

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(3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4)

seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings." Negrón-Narváez, 403 F.3d at 37. 

DISCUSSION

Laracuent posits that the proffer at the plea colloquy

did not provide a sufficient factual basis for finding the

requisite intent for aiding and abetting possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Rule 11(b)(3) of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure guides our inquiry. It

requires that, "[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the

court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea." 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). In other words, the court must decide

that "the defendant's conduct actually corresponds to the charges

lodged against him." United States v. Jiminez, 498 F.3d 82, 86

(1st Cir. 2007). To satisfy the "factual basis" requirement, the

necessary showing is "fairly modest," that is, the government does

not have to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but instead

must "show a rational basis in fact for the defendant's guilt." 

Ramos-Mejía, 721 F.3d at 16. It need not support every element of

the charge with direct evidence. Id. (citing United States v.

Marrero-Rivera, 124 F.3d 342, 352 (1st Cir. 1997)).

Laracuent's quibble with the factual basis for his plea

is circumscribed. His primary contention is that there was an

insufficient showing that he had advance knowledge that one of his

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confederates would carry a gun. For support, Laracuent cites the

recently decided United States v. Rosemond, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 1249

(2014), which, in the context of a post-jury trial appeal, held

that "[a]n active participant in a drug transaction has the intent

needed to aid and abet a § 924(c) violation when he knows that one

of his confederates will carry a gun."2 In a more cursory fashion,

Laracuent also suggests that there was a lack of proof as to who

the principal was in this offense.3

Laracuent misses the mark. "[A]s long as the

government's proffered facts, conceded by the defendant to be true,

touch all the bases, there is a sufficient factual basis for the

tendered plea." Jiminez, 498 F.3d at 87. Here, during the plea

colloquy, the following exchange took place.

THE COURT: Now, I'm addressing, at this

moment, Mr. Laracuent as to count three. Sir,

your Plea Agreement also indicates that you're

pleading guilty to count three of the

Indictment. Count three of the indictment

alleges that: "On January 26, 2012, in the

District of Puerto Rico, you, Andy Laracuent,

and two others named as Defendants, aiding and

abetting each other, did knowingly and

unlawfully possess a Glock pistol, Model 19, 9

millimeter caliber, a Smith & Wesson pistol,

.40 caliber, and one FNP pistol, .45 caliber,

2 Advance knowledge can include knowledge acquired prior to

the commission of a drug trafficking offense, or knowledge that is

acquired while an offense is in progress. Rosemond, 134 S.Ct. at

1253, n.1 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

3

 Count Three was levied against Laracuent and two codefendants. It read: "the defendants herein, aiding and abetting

each other, did knowingly and unlawfully possess firearms."

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in furtherance of the drug trafficking

crime.." that I just summarized to you in

count one of the Indictment... "all in

violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Section [9]24(c)(1)(a) and (2). Mr.

Laracuent, is this the other count to which

you're pleading guilty to?

[LARACUENT]: Yes, yes.

THE COURT: And, do you admit that you

committed this offense knowingly, in other

words, not by accident or by mistake, but

rather were fully aware of what you were

doing?

[LARACUENT]: Yes.

The government described the evidence it would have offered at

trial. In relevant part, the prosecutor stated: 

At the time of his participation [in] the

[drug] offense, Defendant Andy Laracuent knew

that the bales he helped unload contained

cocaine. For purposes of (unintelligible),

Defendant is held responsible for at least

fifteen kilograms, but less than fifty

kilograms, of cocaine. Inside the Nissan

Armada, Agents also found three firearms, one

Glock pistol, Model 19, 9 millimeter caliber,

bearing Serial #MFN-989, one Smith & Wesson

pistol, .40 caliber, bearing Serial #PEN-0659,

and one FNP pistol, .45 caliber, bearing

Serial #61-DMR-1474. Defendant possessed

these firearms in furtherance of the abovedescribed drug trafficking crime. At trial

the United States would have established these

facts proving Defendant's guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt as to count[]...three of the

Indictment by presenting the testimony of

witnesses, including law enforcement officers,

surveillance photographs, photographs of the

vessel and the narcotics, the narcotics

seized, the laboratory results, the firearms

and ammunition, as well as any other pertinent

documentation.

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Laracuent was then asked: "do you admit as true the summary of the

evidence that has just been given by the Prosecutor?" He twice

answered "Yes."

In other words, Laracuent does not contest these facts.

At both the plea colloquy and in his signed plea agreement,

Laracuent agreed with the factual accounting -- namely that law

enforcement officials observed Laracuent loading bales of what was

confirmed to be cocaine into three vehicles, including the Nissan

Armada in which he was stopped at the time of his arrest. The

officials found three firearms in the car with the drugs. At the

plea hearing, Laracuent agreed that he himself knowingly and

unlawfully possessed these firearms, making his arguments as to

advance knowledge and the identity of the principal seem

particularly flimsy.

"The component facts [that form the rational basis for

accepting a guilty plea] may come either from the defendant's

admissions and concessions or from credible evidence proffered by

the government and not contradicted by the defendant." NegrónNarváez, 403 F.3d at 37. Based on Laracuent's own concessions, the

court below could conclude that the government's proffered facts

provided a rational basis from which to infer that Laracuent had

the requisite intent. Laracuent's sudden speculation that he may

not have known about the firearms in advance is insufficient. As

we have said, a "mere possibility . . . might constitute a

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plausible line of defense at trial, but such possibilities, without

more, are not enough to dissipate an intact factual basis for a

guilty plea." Jiminez, 498 F.3d at 87.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained, we see no clear or obvious

error and are satisfied that the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3) have

been met in this case. The change-of-plea record provides ample

factual support for Laracuent's guilty plea. His conviction as to

Count Three is affirmed.

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