Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05178/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05178-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Action for Children's Television
Appellant
American Civil Liberties Union
Appellant
EZ Communications, Inc.
Appellant
Evergreen Media Corporation
Appellant
Federal Communications Commission
Appellee
Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc.
Appellant
Fox Television Stations, Inc.
Appellant
Greater Media, Inc.
Appellant
Infinity Broadcasting Corporation
Appellant
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
Appellant
National Association of Broadcasters
Appellant
National Association of College Broadcasters
Appellant
National Public Radio
Appellant
People for the American Way
Appellant
Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc.
Appellant
Public Broadcasting Service
Appellant
Radio-Television News Directors Association
Appellant
Shamrock Broadcasting, Inc.
Appellant
Society of Professional Journalists
Appellant
South Fork Broadcasting Corporation
Appellant
The Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc.
Appellant
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 30, 1994 Decided July 18, 1995

No. 93-5178

ACTION FOR CHILDREN'S TELEVISION;

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION;

THE ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.;

EVERGREEN MEDIA CORPORATION; EZ COMMUNICATIONS, INC.;

FOX BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.;

FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.; GREATER MEDIA, INC.;

INFINITY BROADCASTING CORPORATION;

MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.;

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS;

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE BROADCASTERS;

NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO; PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY;

POST-NEWSWEEK STATIONS, INC.; PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE;

RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION;

SHAMROCK BROADCASTING, INC.;

SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS;

South Fork Broadcasting Corporation; 

Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 

Appellants

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(93cv00400)

Timothy B. Dyk argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.

Sally M. Rider, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief

were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

United States Attorneys.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, GINSBURG, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

Opinion concurring with reservations filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

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GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Various broadcasters and public- interest groups representing

listeners and viewers appeal a judgment of the district court dismissing their constitutional and

statutorychallengesto the FederalCommunicationCommission'sscheme for imposing forfeituresfor

the broadcast of indecent material. The appellants' central argument is that the procedures for

enforcement set out in 47 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) and 504(c) lack appropriate safeguardsincluding

prompt judicial reviewwhich forces broadcasters to conform with potentially unconstitutional

restrictions upon their speech. We hold that the provisions at issue are capable of constitutional

implementation and therefore reject the appellants' facial challenge to the statutes. Though we agree

that the FCC's implementation of its enforcement scheme is potentially troubling in some respects,

we also conclude that the appellants have not alleged factssufficient to show that the FCC is currently

applying the statutesin an unconstitutional manner. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I. Background

Section 1464 of 18 U.S.C. provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane

language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not

more than two years, or both." In addition, the FCC may impose a civil forfeiture for each violation

of the same statute. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D); see id. § 503(b)(2)(A) (maximum forfeiture penalty

of $25,000 for each violation but not in excess of $250,000 for any continuing violation). The

Commission's imposition of a penalty for the broadcast of indecent materialdefined by the

Commission as "patently offensive descriptions of sexual or excretory activities or organs as

measured bycontemporarycommunitystandardsforthe broadcast medium"is not inconsistent with

the first amendment. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (in which the Court also

held that the FCC's ruling speech indecent does not violate 47 U.S.C. § 326, which prohibits

censorship by the agency).

There are limits, however, to the FCC's authority to proscribe indecent speech. Unlike

obscenity, indecent speech is protected under the first amendment; it may be regulated only by the

least restrictive means necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Sable Communications of

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California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). While other cases have examined the substantive

limits of the Government's ability to regulate broadcast indecency, see Pacifica; Action for

Children's Television v. FCC, ___ F.3d ___, Dkt. No. 93-1092 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1995) (en banc),

the questions we address today concern only the procedures by which it does so.

A. The Enforcement Scheme

Section 503(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the Commission to impose a

forfeiture for the violation of a Commission order or regulation. While these provisions govern all

types of forfeitures, the appellants challenge them only insofar as they are used to impose forfeitures

arising from the broadcast of allegedly indecent material.

The Commission may take either of two routesto impose a forfeiture. First, the Commission

may proceed against a broadcaster under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3), which authorizes the Commission

to determine the penalty after a hearing, subject to review in the court of appeals. 47 U.S.C. §§

402(a), 503(b)(3)(A). If, once the forfeiture determination becomes final, the penalty is not paid, then

the Commissionmayrefer the matter to the AttorneyGeneralfor collection in the appropriate district

court. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(B). In such a collection action, "the validity and appropriateness of

the final order imposing the forfeiture penalty shall not be subject to review." Id. While the

Commission has stipulated that it generally does not use the procedures of § 503(b)(3) in imposing

forfeitures for broadcast indecency, it reserves the authority to do so whenever that would "better

serve the ends of justice." 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(g). Although the appellants claim that these procedures

"ensure neither prompt administrative adjudication nor prompt completion of judicial review," they

do not seriously challenge their constitutionality. In any event, because the Commission does not use

§ 503(b)(3), we express no view upon the subject.

The alternative, and in practice the exclusive, means ofimposing a forfeiture for the broadcast

of indecent material is for the Commission to issue a "notice of apparent liability" to the broadcaster,

setting forth the relevant facts and granting the potentially liable party "an opportunity to show, in

writing, ... why no such forfeiture penalty should be imposed." 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4). The

Commission initiatesthe forfeiture process only after receiving a complaint from a listener or viewer.

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The agency staff reviews each complaint to determine whether it suggests that there has been a

violation of the ban on indecent broadcasting. In the course of this review, the staff may send the

broadcaster a Letter of Inquiry seeking more information or inviting the broadcaster to respond to

the complaint. After further consideration, the Commission decides whether to issue a Notice of

Apparent Liability (NAL). The stipulated facts in this case concerning the indecency cases pending

when the complaint wasfiled in district courtshow that the Commission issues a NAL anywhere from

six months to three years after the broadcast to which it relates. During that time, the broadcaster

may or may not be aware that the agency is considering whether the broadcast at issue contained

indecent material.

The NAL is both sent to the broadcaster and published in the FCC Record. The NAL advises

the broadcaster of its "apparent liability for a forfeiture" in a stated amount for an "apparent violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1464," and gives the broadcaster 30 days to pay or otherwise to respond. See, e.g.,

Letter to Mr. Mel Karmazin, President, Sagittarius Broadcasting Corporation, 5 F.C.C. Rcd 7291

(December 7, 1990). Once the broadcaster has responded or the 30 days have run, the Commission

decides whether to order the forfeiture. As far as we can discern from the current record, the FCC

has never failed to impose a forfeiture after issuing a NAL.

The Commission's internal guidelines exhort the responsible officials "to initiate forfeiture

orders expeditiously, generally within 60 days after issuance of [the NAL]." In the seven instances

in which the Commission imposed a forfeiture between January 1987 and March 1993, it took from

two to 23 monthsand an average of approximately nine monthsfor the FCC to make its decision.

Generally the forfeiture order recapitulates the history of the case, addresses any arguments

raised by the broadcaster in response to the NAL, and orders payment of the forfeiture within 30

days. As with any Commission order, the broadcaster may petition for reconsideration, see, e.g., In

the Matter of Liability of Sagittarius Broadcasting Corporation, 7 F.C.C. Rcd 6873 (Oct. 23, 1992),

recon. denied, 8 F.C.C. Rcd 3600 (May 20, 1993), recon. denied, 8 F.C.C. Rcd 7975 (Nov. 10,

1993), but it may not obtain judicial review at that stage. Pleasant Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 564

F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1977). If the order becomes final and the broadcaster does not pay the forfeiture,

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the Commission issues progressively stiffer dunning letters, and threatensto refer and after 165 days

does indeed refer the matter to the Department of Justice "for commencement of [a] civil action ...

to recover the forfeiture," in accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 504(a). In defending that suit the

broadcaster is entitled to a trial de novo on the question whether its broadcast was indecent. Id.

At the time the complaint in this case was filed, there were only three cases in which a

broadcaster had held out long enough for the Commission to refer the matter to Justice, and the

Department had actually filed only one case in district court. That case was settled after the court

denied defense motionsfor partial judgment on the pleadings and forsummary judgment. See United

States v. Evergreen Media Corp., 832 F. Supp. 1179 and 1183 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Thus, as far as we

can discern, no broadcaster has yet gone to trial on the merits of an FCC indecency determination,

as envisioned by the statute; every one has either paid the forfeiture imposed or is awaiting action

by the Commission or the Department of Justice.

Although the issue has never been litigated, we assume that the general five-year period of

limitations on forfeiture proceedings, see 28 U.S.C. § 2462, would effectively prevent the

Government fromfiling a civil action more than five years after the indecent materialwas aired. Once

an action is timely filed, however, there is no law limiting the amount of time that may pass before

the case is actually tried. In an extreme case, therefore, a broadcaster could wait as long as six or

seven years from the time a program was aired until its first opportunity for judicial review of the

Commission's decision that the material was indecent.

By all indications, a long wait promises to be the rule rather than the exception. The single

forfeiture suit pending in district court as of March 1993 was filed two days before the five-year

statute oflimitations would have run, and was apparently close to disposition a little more than a year

later. Evergreen Media, 832 F. Supp. 1179 and 1183. Based upon the shortest times reflected in the

record, the earliest a broadcaster could hope to be brought into court is some two years after the

offending broadcast.

This delayis unfortunate enough, but a number of other factorsserve to exacerbate the effects

of uncertainty about the outcome. First, a broadcaster claiming that a forfeiture is unconstitutional

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runs the risk of incurring an increased forfeiture for any subsequent indecency violation, see, e.g.,

Letter to Mr. Mel Karmazin, President, Sagittarius Broadcasting Corporation, 8 F.C.C. Rcd 2688,

2689 & n.3 (December 18, 1992) (giving notice of intent to impose $600,000 forfeiture in light of

"apparent pattern of indecent broadcasting"), and the possibility that the Commission will invoke the

ultimate sanction, revocation of the broadcaster's license. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307-309. Second,

individual Commissioners have taken an active public role in criticizing broadcasters for airing

indecent material and have let it be known that sanctions for such activity are likely to increase.

Furthermore, the Commission will not, as a matter of policy, issue a declaratory ruling on whether

a proposed broadcast isindecent. Thus, the only official guidance about the Commission's standards

of decency available to a broadcaster is what can be gleaned from published NALs and forfeiture

orders.

Against this background, the parties to this case have stipulated that:

At a hearing, plaintiff broadcasters would testifythat because ofthe delays ofsecuring

administrative and judicial determinations in indecency forfeiture proceedings, and

uncertainties as to the permissible scope of FCC indecency regulation, they attempt

to conform their conduct to the indecency standards articulated by the FCC and its

Commissioners, whether or not they believe those standards are constitutional,

especially because of the various sanctions to which broadcasters are potentially

subject.

The FCC does not concede that this testimony would be credible, but in light of the district court's

grant of summary judgment to the Commission we must accept the appellants' version of the facts.

B. The Appellants' Claims

The appellants do not argue that the delay they face in getting a final decision under the

Commission's proceduresisin itself unconstitutional. Rather they claim that the delay allows the FCC

to take action against them without affording them the proceduralsafeguards necessary to avoid any

abridgment of their first amendment rights.

The appellants challenge the forfeiture scheme on both constitutional and statutory grounds.

As to the former, they claim that by forcing broadcasters to comply with the Commission's

unreviewed determinations of indecency the scheme operates as a system of "informal censorship"

similar to the one held unconstitutional in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). As

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to the latter, they argue that the Commission also forces broadcasters to comply with its (perhaps

invalid) standards by taking unpaid and unreviewed forfeiture orders into account in assessing

subsequent forfeitures, see, e.g., Letter to Mr. Mel Karmazin, President, Sagittarius Broadcasting

Corporation, 8 F.C.C. Rcd 2688, 2689 & n.3 (December 18, 1992) (giving notice ofintent to impose

forfeiture in light of "apparent pattern of indecent broadcasting"), in violation of the

anti-bootstrapping provision of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 504(c). That section provides:

In any case where the Commission issues a [NAL] looking toward the imposition of

a forfeiture under this chapter, that fact shall not be used, in any other proceeding

before the Commission, to the prejudice of the person to whom such notice was

issued, unless (i) the forfeiture has been paid, or (ii) a court of competent jurisdiction

has ordered payment of such forfeiture, and such order has become final.

Faced with these same claims and on cross-motionsfor summary judgment, the district court

held that: (1) it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' facial challenge to the

constitutionality of the forfeiture scheme; but (2) owing to the primary jurisdiction of the

Commission, the court did not have jurisdiction over the appellants' bootstrapping claim based upon

47 U.S.C. § 504(c); (3) the plaintiffs representing listeners and viewers do not have standing to

challenge the forfeiture scheme; (4) the broadcaster plaintiffs that had never been subject to a

forfeiture order do not have standing to challenge the scheme; (5) as for the three broadcaster

plaintiffs that had received NALs, the claims of the one that was then challenging the forfeiture in

another forum should be dismissed as a matter of comity, and the claims of a second were not ripe

as no forfeiture had yet been imposed, but the claims of the third were reviewable; and, finally, (6)

the enforcement scheme is not unconstitutional. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 827 F.

Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1993).

II. Jurisdiction

All of the issuesraised in this appeal are matters of law, which we review de novo. We affirm

the judgment of the district court because we come independently to the same conclusions.

A. The Constitutional Claim

Although none of the parties now questionsthe district court'sjurisdiction over the plaintiffs'

constitutional claim, we have an independent obligation to consider the matter, for our own

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jurisdiction depends upon it. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).

Because a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute raises a federal question, the

district court would ordinarily have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. When an agency is

involved, however, the issue is more complicated.

In Telecommunications Research &Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

(TRAC), we held that "where a statute commits final agency action to review by the Court of

Appeals, the appellate court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear suitsseeking reliefthat might affect its

future statutory power ofreview." In this case the district court rejected the Commission's argument

that TRAC oustsit ofjurisdiction, holding that there is a general exception to TRACfor constitutional

claims. 827 F. Supp. at 10 n.6. We have encountered the question of such an exemption before, but

we have not had to resolve it. See Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 743 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (opinion of Edwards, J.); id. at 757 (opinion of Green, J.); Ukiah Adventist Hospital v. FTC,

981 F.2d 543, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Nor need we do so today.

The district court was authorized to decide this case without need for an exception to TRAC

because it isthe district court that would have original jurisdiction over an FCCforfeiture proceeding.

In other words, the district court'sjurisdiction over the plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of

the forfeiture statute is no threat to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals because review of a

Commission order imposing a forfeiture (in the defense against a collection suit) would itself be in

the district court, not in the court of appeals.

B. The Statutory Claim

In the absence of a definitive ruling by the Commission, the district court properly declined

to address the plaintiffs' claim that the Commission's administration of the forfeiture scheme violates

47 U.S.C. § 504(c) because it takes previous incidents of alleged indecency into account when

assessing a forfeiture. The Congress has given the district court jurisdiction to review a Commission

decision imposing a forfeiture decision only in the course of a suit brought by the United States to

collect the forfeiture. 47 U.S.C. § 504(a). Well-established principles of administrative law,

moreover, dictate that the courts allow the agency to interpret the law before they determine whether

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the agency has violated it. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 1086-87 (1992) (recounting

reasons for requiring exhaustion of agency remedies prior to judicial review).

The parties and the district court addressed the question of the district court's jurisdiction

solely as the reciprocal of the Commission's primary jurisdiction; they would have been more

appropriately concerned with the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. See

generally Reiter v. Cooper, 113 S. Ct. 1213, 1220 (1993) (discussing this distinction). Although it

istrue that the Commission did not have a prior opportunity to applyits expertise to the interpretation

of the statute in the light of the plaintiffs' objections, a concern addressed by the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction, that is only because the plaintiffs were trying to shortcut the administrative processan

effort barred by the requirement that they first exhaust their administrative remedies. See id.

Asthe SupremeCourt pointed out inUnited States v. Western Pacific RailroadCo., 352 U.S.

59, 63-64 (1956):

"Exhaustion" applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an

administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative

process hasrun its course. "Primary jurisdiction" ... applies when a claim is originally

cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim

requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed

within the special competence of an administrative body.

While the present claim raises a question of first impression for the Commission, as is often the case

as well where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies, see, e.g., Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile

Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973), that does not remove it from the ambit of the exhaustion

requirement; indeed, the novelty of the question of statutory interpretation is an additional reason

that the court should allow the administrative process to run its course before taking the matter into

its own hands.

Regardless of the label employed, however, the substance of the matter is clear: it would be

premature for a court to interpret the statute in a void, i.e., without the agency itselfas opposed to

the lawyers defending the agency in courthaving done so first. In this case there is not even an

allegation before the court that the agency violated the statute in any particular case. The closest the

plaintiffs come isthe stipulation that "[i]n determining whether to increase the amount of a forfeiture

because of a pattern of indecent broadcasting, the FCC has twice cited prior alleged indecent

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broadcasts that are the subject of contested and judicially unreviewed indecency forfeitures." See

Letter to Mr. Mel Karmazin, President, Sagittarius Broadcasting Corporation, 8 F.C.C. Rcd 2688,

2689 & n.3 (December 18, 1992); Letter to Evergreen Media Corp., 8 F.C.C. Rcd 1266, 1267 &

n.5 (February 25, 1993). So far as we are informed, however, in neither of those cases had the

Commission imposed an increased forfeiture upon the basis ofthe prior allegations. The district court

in this case was in no position even to consider the propriety of the forfeitures in those cases: the

amount of each contemplated forfeiture was clearlywithin the limit authorized by the statute, and the

agency had yet actually to impose it.

The broadcasters involved in any pending forfeiture cases are, of course, free to make their

own § 504(c) arguments before the agency (and again before the district court if necessary). The

Commission itselfmaythen adopt or not, asit thinks best, agency counsel's current litigation position,

and we presume it will also then provide an explanation for its policy choice.

In a strikingly similar situation, Judge Sneed once wisely observed:

The position of the FCC in this lawsuit is clear enough .... It is not known, however,

what the position of the FCC would have been, or in the future will be, when

confronted by the plaintiffs' claim in a proper administrative proceeding. ... Children

shortly after leaving the cradle understand the difference between being forced to

defend against a charge of naughtiness and being asked to consider whether they

thought they had been nice. In the latter posture their response is much more likely

to be open and forthcoming. Human psychology does not change too much between

the cradle and the grave.

Writers Guild of America West, Inc. v. American BroadcastingCo., Inc., 609 F.2d 355, 364 (9thCir.

1979) (involving a similar confluence of concerns about exhaustion and primary jurisdiction). We

agree. Therefore we affirm the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' statutory claim.

C. Standing and Ripeness

The district court concluded that only one of the plaintiffs, Infinity Broadcasting, has both

standing and a constitutional claim ripe for adjudication. 827 F. Supp. at 12-16. The Commission

concedes Infinity's standing but argues that its claim is not ripe.

We agree with the district court and the parties that Infinity has standing. The Commission

imposed a $6,000 forfeiture against Infinity in October 1992. See In the Matter of Liability of

Sagittarius Broadcasting Corporation, 7 F.C.C. Rcd 6873 (Oct. 23, 1992), recon. denied, 8 F.C.C.

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Rcd 3600 (May 20, 1993), recon. denied, 8 F.C.C. Rcd 7975 (Nov. 10, 1993). Keeping in mind that

"[f]or purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing

courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint," Metropolitan Washington

Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 264 (1991),

we accept Infinity's allegation that it is suffering collateral effects of that forfeiture

determinationarguably in violation of the first amendment. Specifically, Infinity alleges that it is

"chilled" from broadcasting protected speech for fear that the Commission will impose upon it a new

forfeiture and will increase the amount of the penalty on the ground that Infinity has violated the

indecency ban before. In view of the substance of Infinity's complaintthat the forfeiture scheme

operates as a scheme of informal censorshipwe conclude that Infinity meets the requirements of

Article III, i.e., that it is suffering a concrete injury traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to

be redressed bya favorable decision. See Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. FEC, 13 F.3d 412, 415 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992)). See also Bantam

Books, 372 U.S. at 64 n.6 (discussing publisher's standing to challenge regulation by standards of

which commission suspected its books were illegal).

The Commission argues that Infinity's claim is not ripe for adjudication because the

broadcaster does not allege sufficient hardship to justify judicial interference with an on-going agency

proceeding. The FCC also points out that at the time Infinity filed the complaint in this case the

company was still seeking Commission reconsideration of the forfeiture order, further undermining

its claim that the court should hear its complaint outside of the ordinary process for review of a

forfeiture order.

Ripeness turns upon two factors: "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the

hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). Infinity's claim is a legal one, abstracted from the particular facts of any

forfeiture. There is no dispute about the working of the procedures being challenged and there is

therefore little or nothing more that the agency could do in a particular adjudication that would likely

inform the court's decision on the question whether the enforcement scheme is currently being, or is

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capable of being, administered in accordance with the first amendment.

Under the law of this circuit, once we have determined that an issue is clearly fit for review,

there is no need to consider "the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration," Abbott

Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149, because there would be no advantage to be had fromdelaying review.

See Great Lakes Transmission Limited Partnership v. FERC, 984 F.2d 426, 431 & n.9 (D.C. Cir.

1993). Denying immediate review would be particularly ironic in this case: if Infinity has a valid

claim, delay would only exacerbate the very wrong of which it complains. A collateral claim that

certain procedures are unconstitutional because they unduly postpone judicialreview isripe when the

claimant is adversely affected by those procedures. Under the Commission's suggested

approachthat Infinity wait until the United States institutes a collection proceeding in the district

court before challenging the procedures that put it therethe broadcaster would have to wait until

judicial review is at hand before it could argue that judicial review does not come soon enough.

Tellingly, the Commission does not argue that this dispute would look any different, be more

ripe if you will, were we to put off review until another day. As the Supreme Court has said:

The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in an overrefined technique, but

in the need of the review to protect from the irreparable injury threatened in the

exceptional case by administrative rulings which attach legal consequences to action

taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications that may follow, the results of

which the regulations purport to control.

Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942). Though we ultimately

conclude that the FCC is not operating a scheme of informal censorship like the one held

unconstitutional in Bantam Books, the possibility that the agency's actions might similarly run afoul

of the first amendment demands prompt judicial scrutiny.

III. The Merits

At oral argument in this court, counsel for the appellants made it clear that they are

challenging the scheme for enforcing forfeitures (for indecent broadcasts only) both on its face and

as applied. Because of the very general nature of the statutory provisions at issue, and because there

is no individual forfeiture case before the court, we are in no position to assess the application of the

Commission's proceduresto any specific case. On the other hand, the Commission has stipulated that

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its practices in applying the forfeiture scheme in indecency cases are as described in the record. We

are being asked, therefore, to evaluate a process that is more fleshed-out than those courts often see

in cases raising a facial challenge to a statutory scheme that is not highly specified. See, e.g.,

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).

Accordingly, we shall take the appellants at their word and answer two questions: (1) Are

the statutes that prescribe the procedures by which the Commission may impose a forfeiture for the

broadcast of indecent material capable of constitutional application? and (2) If so, then does the

record show that the Commission is applying the statutes in a constitutional manner?

A. The Facial Challenge

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that:

A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to

mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances

exists under which the [Act] would be valid. The fact that [the regulations] might

operate unconstitutionallyundersome conceivable set of circumstancesisinsufficient

to render [them] wholly invalid.

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991) (quoting with changes United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.

739, 745 (1987)). With this teaching in mind, we readily reject the appellants' claim insofar as they

are arguing that the statutory enforcement scheme is incapable of constitutional application with

regard to indecency violations. Prompt and efficient enforcement by the Commission could surely

expedite the administrative processto an extent that leaves ample breathing space forfirst amendment

rights.

Certainly nothing in the statutes or regulations preventsthe Commission fromissuing a NAL,

imposing a forfeiture, and if need be referring a case to the Department ofJustice all within a period

oftime short enough virtually to eliminate any concern with delay. The whole course could probably

be run in most cases within, say, 90 days. No case of this type is very complex; each turns simply

upon whether a certain broadcast was indecent. Indeed, under the Commission's own internal

guidelines, after a broadcaster has had 30 days to respond to the NAL, the target for imposing a

forfeiture is only 60 more days. If the FCC met this goal and then allowed the broadcaster to

stipulate that it will not pay unless ordered by a district court to do so, then judicial review could

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begin almost immediately. Cf. 47 C.F.R. § 1.822(b) (providing for expedited FCC hearing

procedures); 29 C.F.R. § 101.17, et seq. (expedited bargaining-unit certification procedures under

the NLRA); 49 U.S.C. § 10905 (expedited land-valuation procedures under the Interstate Commerce

Act); 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq. (Speedy Trial Act). In practice, no case has moved through the

pipeline that quickly, but we are aware of no reason why the Commission could not, in principle, act

with such dispatch. Reducing delay would also cabin the Commission's opportunity to rely upon its

own unreviewed forfeiture decisions in setting standards of decency, thereby reducing the tendency

for one unconstitutional decision to beget others.

In short, the FCC's indecency-enforcement scheme is clearly capable of constitutional

application. Indeed, were the administration of this scheme merely expedited it would be

indistinguishable, relative to the first amendment concern, from the undoubtedly constitutional

process whereby the Government may bring a criminal action in district court for a violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1464.

B. The challenge to the statutes as applied

The more difficult question is whether the statutes as applied pass muster under the teaching

Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). We agree with the appellants that some of the

Commission's procedures are troubling but, on the basis ofthe record before us, we cannot agree that

those procedures violate the first amendment. The centerpiece of the appellants' grievance is that:

[B]ecause of the delays of securing administrative and judicial determinations in

indecencyforfeiture proceedings, and uncertainties asto the permissible scope ofFCC

indecency regulation they attempt to conform their conduct to the indecency

standards articulated by the FCC and its Commissioners, whether or not they believe

those standards are constitutional.

That simply does not establish a violation of the Constitution.

In Bantam Books, Rhode Island had established a Commission to Encourage Morality in

Youth and authorized it to determine whether publications were "objectionable for sale, distribution

or display to youths." 372 U.S. at 61. Upon an affirmative finding, the Morality Commission would

send a letter urging the distributor of the offending material not to carry the publication, and would

refer the matter to the local police for investigation and possible prosecution under the state obscenity

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law. Id. at 62. The Supreme Court struck down this scheme because it "amount[s] to ...

governmental censorship devoid of the constitutionally required safeguards for state regulation of

obscenity, and thus abridge[s] First Amendment liberties." Id. at 64.

The lesson of Bantam Books is that the state may not move to suppress speech by means of

a scheme that, as a practical matter, forecloses the speaker from obtaining a judicial determination

of whether the targeted speech is unprotected, lest the state be able effectively to suppress protected

speech. In that case it was established, as a matter of fact, that a notice from the Commission would

cause the distributor to cease selling the listed publications without a judicial determination of

whether the material was legally subject to proscription. Id. at 62-64. Thus, the Court concluded,

"What Rhode Island has done, in fact, has been to subject the distribution of publicationsto a system

of prior administrative restraints, since the Commission is not a judicial body and its decisions to list

particular publications as objectionable do not follow judicial determinations that such publications

may lawfully be banned." Id. at 70.

The appellants argue that the FCChassimilarlyimplemented a systemof "prior administrative

restraint" that, for want of appropriate procedural safeguards, forces protected and unprotected

material alike off the air. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (striking down

motion-picture censorship scheme for lack of such safeguards). Unlike the state in Freedman,

however, the Commission is not administering anything akin to a literal prior restraint. Broadcasters

are free to air what they want; if and only if what they air turns out to transgress established

guidelines do they face a penaltybut that is very much after the fact, not prior thereto. The

Commission's ability to penalize a broadcaster in this manner was upheld by the Supreme Court in

Pacifica, where the Court specifically rejected the argument that the agency's enforcement ofthe ban

on indecency violates the statutory prohibition of censorship by the Commission. See 438 U.S. at

735-38.

As the Court recognized in Bantam Books, however, a scheme may also be a prior restraint

in effect even though specific materials are not evaluated prior to publication (or here broadcast) if

that scheme in practice causes a speaker of reasonable fortitude to censor itself in order to conform

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with an unconstitutional standard. This case therefore turns upon the question whether the regime

that leads broadcasters to "attempt to conform their conduct to [FCC] indecency standards" is

analogous to the scheme that forced booksellers in Rhode Island to drop publications officially

declared "objectionable" for fear of a possible prosecution for selling obscene materials.

We cannot help but conclude that the appellants have failed to establish anyessentialsimilarity

between this case and Bantam Books. Unlike the Rhode Island Commission, which sought to

regulate materials that could not be proscribed as obscene, 372 U.S. at 62 n.4, so far as this record

shows the FCC is not enforcing the statutory ban on indecency against material that is not indecent.

Again unlike the Rhode Island Commission, which could and did avoid judicial oversight because the

mere threat of prosecution coerced booksellers into complying with its recommendations, id. at 62

n.5, we have no indication that the FCC has done anything actively to discourage judicial review of

any indecency forfeiture it imposed. That no case has yet progressed to judicial review may be the

effect of any of several inoffensive causes: the Commission has only recently stepped up its

enforcement efforts; the violators penalized thus far may very well have broadcast the indecency as

charged and thus seen no point in contesting the forfeiture in court; and broadcasters may be

self-censoring only indecent material, eliminating the need for many prosecutions. Indeed, some

degree ofself-censorship isinevitable and not necessarily undesirable so long as properstandards are

available. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 ("At most [self-censorship] will deter only the broadcasting

of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities. While some of the

references may be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern").

Finally, there is no indication that the FCCunlike Rhode Island's free-roving Commission

to Encourage Morality in Youth, 372 U.S. at 70has failed or will fail to follow judicial guidelines

for determining what is indecent and what is not, as they have developed and will develop in judicial

decisions. The suggestion that every determination of indecency must be a judicial one simply proves

too much; the Commission could then play no role in developing or enforcing the Congress's

declared policy of banning indecency from the airwaves during certain hours of the day. We have no

indication that the Commission is developing a body of precedent in any way at odds with the first

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*Our dissenting colleague points out (at 1) that no one can "show that non-indecent speech is

unaffected by the forfeiture scheme, since an impartial, independent Article III court has never

evaluated any of the Commission's indecency decisions"; the plaintiffs in this case, however, have

failed to allege that non-indecent speech is being affected. While the Government does have "the

burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the material is unprotected" (dissent

at 6) when it seeks to impose liability for an indecent broadcast, the broadcasters brought this case

and they had the burden of alleging a set of facts that would, if proved, entitle them to the relief

they seek. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). 

amendment, or that the agency would continue to do so in the face of a corrective court decision.

While the prospect of a forfeiture trialmay understandablycause some broadcastersto forego judicial

review of a Commission determination that a program was indecent, we find no indication in this

record that the FCCistaking the opportunityafforded thereby to impose unconstitutionalrestrictions

upon broadcast speech.

Under the statute as administered, a broadcaster need do nothing at all until it is served with

a complaint, at which point it is entitled to a trial de novo in district court. Nothing but the timing

would be different if the Congress were to change the current scheme so asto allow the Commission

to bring a forfeiture action in district court immediately after the airing of an allegedly indecent

broadcast, which would be unquestionably constitutional. The distinction, i.e., the delay inherent in

the current scheme, is of constitutional significance only if it burdens broadcast speech that is not

indecent. The parties have stipulated that some speech is being burdened in that broadcasters

"conform their conduct to the indecency standards articulated by the FCC ... whether or not they

believe those standards are unconstitutional." The broadcasters would go one step farther and argue

that the delay thereby chills protected as well as indecent speech; however, they have failed to make

any such showing.*

Alternatively, the broadcasters' claim might be more compelling if in a particular case the

Commission increased the fine for a subsequent violation or decided not to renew a license when the

broadcaster had neither acquiesced in the former determination of indecency nor yet had its day in

court. Such a situation creates a greater risk that material that is not indecent is being kept off the

air. Even that, however, would still be the stuff upon which an individual, not a generic, challenge

to enforcement would be built.

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Several additional factors might also serve to distinguish the scheme administered by the

Commission from the one struck down in Bantam Books. As the district court noted: (1) that case

concerned the printed word, which, unlike broadcasting, has historically enjoyed the broadest

protection under the first amendment; (2) the FCC, unlike the Rhode Island Commission, gives a

putative violator notice and an opportunity to respond to the charge against it; (3) the decisions of

the FCC are subject to judicial review; and (4) the broadcaster that would avoid a dispute with the

FCC need only move its arguably indecent material to a different time of day, not refrain from

broadcasting it altogether. In light of the appellants' failure to show that speech that is not indecent

is in fact being chilled, however, we need not decide whether these differences actually serve to

distinguish the two regimes. Still, they are points of difference, and they serve to underscore the

bottom line: The allegation that the FCC is chilling protected speech by means of the forfeiture

scheme is not nearly as compelling as was the corresponding claim in Bantam Books. There is no

indication in the case law that such a scheme is unconstitutional absent some showing that the agency

is forcing off the air material that is not indecent.

IV. Conclusion

Although the appellants have failed to show that the Commission's administration of the

statute is unconstitutional, we cannot fail to acknowledge that the agency's practices could give rise

to some of the evilsthat the appellants claim are already at hand. Two avenues of relief are available,

however, to any broadcaster that in fact comesto the grief alleged in this case. First, the broadcaster

could stipulate the facts giving rise to the Notice of Apparent Liability and state that it will not pay

the forfeiture unless ordered to do so in district court; the Commission could then forward the matter

to the Department of Justice immediately, so that the broadcaster could get a trial on the merits of

the forfeiture relatively quickly.

Alternatively, if the Commission will not cooperate in order to expedite judicial review as

outlined above, then as we noted inPleasant Broadcasting, 564 F.2d at 502, a broadcaster "suffering

from demonstrably adverse consequences from government delay in initiating the collection

proceeding ... could bring a declaratory judgment action against the United States in the district

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court." A broadcaster that refrains from airing material that is not indecent because of a legitimate

fear, based upon the Commission's prior indecency cases, that it would be subject to a forfeiture

should in this way be able promptly to dispel any unwarranted chilling effect. Its claim would seem

to be ripe for review if it is suffering a current injury that could be remedied by a judicial

determination that the material is not indecent. In short, a broadcaster is free to prove up, in a

specific case, the general claim that we adjudge deficient today.

For the reasons stated in Parts II and III above, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

EDWARDS,Chief Judge, concurringwith reservations: After grappling in recent months with

several cases involving the application of the First Amendment in the context of Government

regulation of "indecent" speech in the broadcast media, see, e.g., Action for Children's Tel. v. FCC,

11 F.3d 170, 183-86 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Edwards, J., concurring); Alliance for Community Media v.

FCC, No. 93-1169, slip op. at 1-8 (D.C. Cir. June 6, 1995) (en banc ) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting in

part); Action for Children's Tel. v. FCC, No. 93-1092, slip op. at 1-28 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1995) (en

banc ) ("ACT III ") (Edwards, C.J., dissenting), I have come to the conclusion that the law is in a

state of disarray. Application of the First Amendment in this context seems to border on whimsical,

for as often as not there is little coherence in the case law. For example, I have yet to comprehend

the distinction that is drawn between broadcast and cable television, with broadcast stations having

reduced First Amendment rights even though cable is concededly much more responsible for the

showing of indecent programming. This is but a tip of the iceberg, so I will not dwell on my

incredulity.

I join the majorityopinion, because, absent anyaspirationalgloss, I believe that it is essentially

correct in stating and applying extant law. This is not to say that the extant law makes any sense

when considered carefully, but that is a matter beyond my authority.

My concurrence comes with a caveat, however. Not surprisingly, the majority opinion is

underscored by several references to FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). However,

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insofar as Pacifica commands a distinction in the treatment of broadcast and cable media in the

application of the First Amendment, I think that it has no place in our constitutional jurisprudence.

See Act III, No. 93-1092,slip op. at 6-15 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, although the Supreme

Court declined to revisit Pacifica in itsrecent decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,

114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456-57 (1994), I do not understand how the two opinions can stand together.

Although I reject Pacifica, I do not doubt that the Government can regulate "indecent" speech, so

long as "the Government's interests[are] "compelling,' and the method of regulation chosen [is] "the

least restrictive means' to achieve those compelling interests." ACT III, No. 93-1092, slip op. at 15

(Edwards,C.J., dissenting)(quoting SableCommunications, Inc. v.FCC, 492U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).

Under this standard, I believe that, in order to justify the regulation of indecency, the Government

must show that the "harms" it seeks to prevent " "are real, not merely conjectural, and that the

regulation will in fact alleviate these harmsin a direct and material way.' " Id., slip op. at 22 (quoting

Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470). There is no showing of harm in this case, so I remain

doubtful about the constitutionality of sections 503(b) and 504(a) of the Communications Act, 47

U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 504(a) (1988).

At bottom, there are two reasons why the concerns that I expressed in ACT III do not carry

the day for me here. First, the principal claim of the appellants in this case is that the FCC's delay in

enforcing the statute allows the agency to take action against them without affording them the

procedural safeguards necessary to avoid any abridgement of their First Amendment rights. This

position implicitly assumes that the regulation itself is constitutionally permissible, so the points that

I addressed in ACT III do not come into play in this case. Second, in ACT III, a majority of the en

banc court indulged a presumption that exposure to indecent speech always is harmful to minors.

I disagree with this finding, for, in my view, it rests on a baseless proposition. Nonetheless, ACT III

is the law of the circuit, so I am bound by the court's holding in that decision.

I agree with the majority opinion that there are some serious problems with the current

practice followed by the FCC in administering sections 503(b) and 504(a), and that "the agency's

practices could give rise to some of the evils that the appellants claim are already in hand."

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Appellants cannot prevail in this case, however, because they have failed to show that speech that is

not indecent is in fact being chilled. If such a claim is supported in the future, the parties will face a

different result.

I conclude with an innocent hope that the Supreme Court will one day soon lend some clarity

to these areas of First Amendment jurisprudence. And with that hope, I concur.

TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Because "the line between speech unconditionally

guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated ... is finely drawn," the Supreme Court

requires the use of "sensitive tools," including prompt judicial review, to draw that line. Bantam

Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66, 70 (1963) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Asthe Court hassaid, "only a judicialdetermination in an adversaryproceeding ensuresthe necessary

sensitivity to freedom of expression." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). The

Federal Communications Commission certainly could implement its indecency forfeitures under

section 503(b)(4) in a constitutional manner by allowing "judicial review [to] begin almost

immediately." Majority opinion (Maj. Op.) at 21. But it does not. The stipulated record in this case

demonstratesthat the Commission's actual implementation of the statute is characterized by years of

delay and a total lack ofjudicialreview: ofthe thirty-six FCC indecency forfeiture orders issued since

1987, not one has been reviewed by a court; and individual indecency forfeiture orders take from two

to seven years to get to court, if they get there at all. Stipulations of Fact WW 19, 21, in Joint

Appendix (J.A.) at 46, 47 & 95-102.

The court nonetheless rejects appellants' challenge to the FCC's indecency forfeiture

enforcement scheme, explaining that because the broadcasters have not proven the chilling of nonindecent speech, they have failed to demonstrate the requisite harm. See Maj. Op. at 26-27. With

all due respect, it is not clear to me how anyone could show that non-indecent speech is unaffected

by the forfeiture scheme, since an impartial, independent Article III court has never evaluated any of

the Commission's indecency decisions. To me, however, the constitutional infirmity of the FCC

forfeiture enforcement scheme turns not on whether the broadcasters have explicitly alleged the

chilling of non-indecent speechalthough I think such an allegation is inherent in their First

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Amendment challenge to this schemebut on the fact that it exhibits the same basic procedural

inadequacies as the censorship scheme that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Bantam

Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).

In Bantam Books, Rhode Island's "Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth" was

responsible for identifying publications with "obscene, indecent or impure language." Id. at 59-60.

The Commission wrote lettersto distributorsinforming them of certain "objectionable" publications

within their inventory and reminding them of the Commission's duty to report violations of the

obscenity laws to the Attorney General for prosecution. Id. at 61-62. The trial court found that

distributors receiving such letters discontinued the sale of the objectionable materials. Id. at 63.

According to the Supreme Court, the Rhode Island Commission operated a system of "informal

censorship" of books and publications that it found obscene or otherwise objectionable by means of

"informalsanctionsthe threat of invoking legalsanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion,

and intimidation." Id. at 67. The Court invalidated the Commission's "radically deficient"

procedures, finding that they provided no "judicial superintendence before notices issue or even for

judicial review of the Commission's determinations of objectionableness." Id. at 71.

Like theRhode Island Commission to Encourage MoralityinYouth, the FCCcensorsspeech,

buttressing its informal powers through coercion and intimidation. The Rhode Island Commission

warned that it would refer violators to the Attorney General, id. at 62-63; the FCC threatens to

increase fines, revoke licenses, and prevent acquisition of additionalstations,see Stipulations of Fact

WW 26-27, in J.A. at 48-49. While judicial review is possible in both schemesa criminal obscenity

prosecution in Bantam Books and civil enforcement of FCC forfeiture orders herein neither case

are the parties practically able to obtain judicial review within any reasonable time frame.

It is true that the FCC's indecency forfeiture scheme involves a different medium of

communication than the one in Bantam Books and that it includes a late-night safe-harbor period

during which the "arguably indecent material" may be broadcast. Maj. Op. at 27. These differences,

however, have no bearing on the fundamental procedural flaw in the FCC's indecency forfeiture

scheme. Like the "system of prior administrative restraints" invalidated in Bantam Books, 372 U.S.

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at 70, the FCC is an administrative agency charged with evaluating the decency of broadcasts and

operating, in practice, without judicial review. "Because the censor's business is to censor," the

SupremeCourt has consistentlywarned that administrative agencies "maywellbe lessresponsive than

a courtpart of an independent branch of governmentto the constitutionally protected interests

in free expression." Freedman, 380 U.S. at 57-58; see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,

420 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1975); see also Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83

Harv. L. Rev. 518, 523 (1970) (agencies tend to have a "narrow and restricted viewpoint" that is

"particularly perniciousin the obscenity area" because "those constantly exposed to the perverse and

the aberrational in literature are quick to find obscenity in all they see."). When administrators have

"unbridled discretion" to suppress speech, prompt review is all the more critical to prevent "the

danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms." Conrad, 420

U.S. at 553, 560.

In my view, moreover, the FCC's indecency forfeiture scheme poses a greater threat to free

expression than the system the Supreme Court struck down in Bantam Books. For one thing, the

FCC's forfeiture scheme regulates indecent speech, which is protected by the First Amendment,

whereas in Bantam Books the Supreme Court addressed the regulation of obscenity, which is not

constitutionally protected. Because a "dim and uncertain line" separated obscenity from

constitutionally protected speech, Bantam Books held that "sensitive tools" were needed to separate

protected from unprotected speech. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 66. Such tools are even more

critical where, as here, constitutionally protected speech lies on both sides of an equally imprecise

line.

Not onlyisjudicialreview unavailable, but theCommission relies on its unreviewed indecency

determinationsto impose increased penalties on broadcastersthat air materialthe FCC has previously

declared indecent. In several instances, the Commission has doubled and tripled forfeitures,

explaining that past violations "establish a pattern of apparent misconduct warranting the fine we set

today," Letterto the Rusk Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. 3228, 3229 n.3 (1993); that "the violation was repeated,

and ... your past compliance history includes similar apparent misconduct," Letter to Evergreen

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Media Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. 1266, 1267 (1993); and that the broadcast was "egregious," given the

Commission's prior determination that the same material was indecent, Letterto KGB Inc., 7 F.C.C.

Rcd 3207, 3207 (1992). While individual Commissioners admonish broadcasters "to learn from the

actionsthat are out there," Doug Halonen, Marshall Defines Stance on Indecency, Elec. Media,Jan.

15, 1990, at 136, in J.A. at 93, at the same time the Commission evaluates the decency of material

on a "case-by-case" basis, frequentlyrejecting broadcasters'defense that the airedmaterialwassimilar

to material that the FCC had previously chosen not to sanction, see, e.g., Liability of Sagittarius

Broadcasting Corp., 7 F.C.C. Rcd 6873, 6874 (1992).

Finally, unlike the "free-roving" Commission in Bantam Booksthat had no regulatory control

over the distributors it targeted, the FCC controls every aspect of the broadcaster's

livelihoodindeed, its very existence. In addition to the obvious adverse economic impact of large

fines, the parties stipulated that "the loss of a license would be catastrophic for any broadcaster, and

that a credible threat of a revocation proceeding can seriously impair a broadcaster's effort to raise

capital." Stipulations of Fact ¶ 29, in J.A. at 49.

The Commission'streatment ofInfinityBroadcasting Corporation demonstratesthe leverage

the agency has over broadcasters, as well as its use of unreviewed indecency determinations to

impose stiff monetary penalties. The Commission notified Infinity and one of its subsidiaries that it

intended to levy a $200,000 forfeiture on each of three stations that broadcast the same allegedly

indecent program. Letterto Mr. MelKarmazin, President, SagittariusBroadcastingCorp., 8 F.C.C.

Rcd 2688, 2689 (1992). It based this unusually large fine on "the apparent pattern of indecent

broadcasting exhibited by Infinity over a substantial period since our initial indecency warning." Id.

The Commission warned that any future failures to comply with its indecency regulations would

produce additional sanctions, including possible revocation of Infinity's broadcast licenses. Id. at

2690. Commissioner Quello made this threat explicit: "We could, for example, say "enough is

enough' and set all, or some, of Infinity'slicensesfor hearing to determine whether Infinity possesses

the character to continue to hold them or whether they should be revoked. At this timeand I

underline, at thistimeI am not persuaded to take thisstep." Id. at 2691 (Quello, Comm'r, separate

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statement). Because of Infinity's alleged indecent programming, the Commission also seriously

considered blocking its proposed acquisition of additional stations, but ultimately allowed the

acquisition to go through at least in part, according to one Commissioner, because Infinity bowed to

theCommission'sthreats and promised not to broadcast the programcontaining the allegedlyindecent

material on the newly acquired stations. See Applications of Cook Inlet Radio License Partnership,

8 F.C.C. Rcd 2714, 2721 (1992) (Quello, Comm'r, concurring). In a subsequent Notice of Apparent

Liability to Infinity, regarding material aired in a different segment of the same program, the

Commission acknowledged the extent to which the licensee had caved in to Commission pressure,

noting with approval its efforts to conform to the FCC's view of indecency by rigorously reviewing

and modifying programs, as well as by instituting a multiple "delay" mechanism and requiring

management-level personnel to monitor continuously the programs as they aired. Letter to Mr. Mal

Karmazin, Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. 6740, 6741 (1993). But again, the Commission

warned that "any future infractions [of the indecency regulations] would place Infinity's continuing

fitness as a Commission licensee in question." Id.

That broadcasters "attempt to conform their conduct to the indecency standards articulated

by the FCC and its Commissioners, whether or not they believe that those standards are

constitutional," Stipulations of Fact ¶ 30, in J.A. at 50, isthus not surprising. As the Supreme Court

recognized in Bantam Books, "[p]eople do not lightly disregard public officers' thinly veiled threats

to institute criminal proceedings against themifthey do not come around." Bantam Books, 372 U.S.

at 68. According to the record in this case, that is exactly what broadcasters are doing: they "come

around" in the face of economic and regulatory coercion, not necessarily because their speech is

indecent, but because they cannot get judicialreview of the Commission's indecency determinations.

This manipulation of speech without judicial review is unconstitutional.

While I enthusiastically support the suggestion that the FCC and the Department of Justice

speed things up, see Maj. Op. at 28, I do not think this offers broadcasters much relief since it

completely depends on the willingness of two different agencies to expedite their actions. Nor am

I reassured by the suggestion that broadcasters are "free to prove up" their claims in an action for a

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declaratory judgment, id. at 29, because it would shift the burden of obtaining judicialreview as well

as the burden of proof from the agency to the broadcaster. "Where the transcendent value of speech

is involved," Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)), the

government must bear "the burden ofinstituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the material

is unprotected." Conrad, 420 U.S. at 560.

I would remand the case for the district court to establish procedures to facilitate prompt

judicialreview of forfeiture determinations. Properly designed, such procedures would not interfere

with the Commission's implementation of its Congressional mandate to regulate indecency. Instead,

they would ensure that the agency fulfill its responsibilities within constitutional boundaries.

USCA Case #93-5178 Document #136334 Filed: 07/18/1995 Page 26 of 26