Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02626/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02626-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Child Support Services State Hearing Office
Defendant
Stephanie McGee
Plaintiff
The State of California
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHANIE MCGEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT 

SERVICES STATE HEARING OFFICE, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02626-MEJ 

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 

PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 9

INTRODUCTION

On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff Stephanie McGee (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint and an 

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Compl., Dkt. No. 1; Appl., Dkt. No. 3. The Court 

granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis but pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2) dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint on the ground that Plaintiff’s allegations were unclear 

at that point, and as such, the Court could not find she stated a claim for relief under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 8 or that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. First Order, 

Dkt. No. 6. Additionally, the Court noted that, as it appeared Plaintiff was attempting to challenge 

a state court order, the “Rooker-Feldman doctrine” precluded such de facto appeals. Id. While the 

Court dismissed Plaintiff’s original Complaint, it also granted her leave to file an amended 

complaint. Id. Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on July 28, 2016. Dkt. No. 

7. The Court screened the FAC and dismissed it on the ground that it did not allege a federal 

question, and to the extent the Court construed the allegations as attempting to state a claims 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

Second Order, Dkt. No. 8. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend (id.), which Plaintiff did on 

August 30, 2016 (Dkt. No. 9).

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As Plaintiff continues to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is under a continuing 

obligation to screen Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having done 

so, the Court finds that it must now DISMISS Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

SUA SPONTE SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)

A. Legal Standards

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. To make this determination, courts assess whether there is a 

factual and legal basis for the asserted wrong, “however inartfully pleaded.” Franklin v. Murphy, 

745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984) (quotation omitted). Pro se pleadings are liberally 

construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). Unless it is clear that no 

amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is 

entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend before dismissal. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 

1448 (9th Cir. 1987). Because a dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) is not a dismissal on the 

merits, but rather an exercise of the court’s discretion under the IFP statute, the dismissal does not 

prejudice the filing of a paid complaint making the same allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 

U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

Additionally, a federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and may adjudicate only 

those cases authorized by the United States Constitution and by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The basic federal jurisdiction statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 

& 1332, confer “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively. Federal question 

jurisdiction requires that the complaint (1) arise under a federal law or the Constitution, (2) allege 

a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, or (3) be 

authorized by a federal statute that both regulates a specific subject matter and confers federal 

jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). To invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction, a 

plaintiff must specifically allege facts demonstrating that court has subject matter jurisdiction. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain 

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statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.”). A case presumably lies outside the 

jurisdiction of the federal courts unless demonstrated otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-78. 

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party or by the court. See 

Attorneys Tr. v. Videotape Comput. Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996).

B. Allegations in the SAC

Plaintiff alleges she began receiving public assistance for her son through the County of 

Alameda (the “County”) in 1995. SAC ¶ 5. In 1996, the Alameda County District Attorney sent 

Plaintiff a letter enclosing a copy of a Judgment and Order requiring Alvin Florida Jr. to pay the 

Treasurer of Alameda County for the support of his son, Stephan Florida. Id., Ex. B at 3. The 

letter further informed Plaintiff that an account had been established for enforcement of the order. 

Id., Ex. B at 2. Plaintiff alleges she is owed $347,000 in child support arrears, but has not 

“received a cent” of the monies collected by the State in her name. Id. ¶ 8. 

On August 18, 2015, the County sent Plaintiff another letter. Id., Ex. C. Plaintiff 

characterizes the August 18, 2015 letter as an admission by the State of California (“Defendant”) 

that “an error had been made” when it paid a $48,000 judgment in Plaintiff’s favor to the wrong 

person. Id. ¶ 9. The County’s August 18 letter does not state an error had been made in the 

payment of the $48,000—it corrects the County’s prior description of a 2005 Stipulation & Order

(the “2005 Stipulation”) in an earlier letter:

In our [A]ugust 5, 2015 letter we erroneously stated . . . that [by] 

“Stipulation & Order After Hearing filed 10/7/2005,[”] it was 

determined that you owed arrears of $48,000 to Herman Blade and 

any other amount claimed by our office was set aside.

We intended to say that by Stipulation & Order After Hearing filed 

10/7/2005, it was determined that arrears of $48,000 was owed to 

you. We were ordered by the court to set aside those arrears, 

dismiss and close this case and make no further efforts to collect on 

those arrears.

Id., Ex. C.

Plaintiff further alleges she requested a hearing when the County declined to take action, 

and that her request was denied. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff filed a writ of mandate on December 30, 2015. 

Id. ¶ 11. “[T]he State Attorney for CDCSS filed a demurrer”; she alleges this demurrer discloses 

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for the first time that her name had been replaced on her child support account; her son Stephan 

was listed as the “non-custodial parent”; his father Alvin was listed as the “child”; and “[t]he State 

pretended that Herman Blade” was Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 12. The document Plaintiff attaches in support 

of these allegations appears to be two pages from a demurrer filed in an unidentified action. Id., 

Ex. D. The Statement of Facts and Procedural History reads: 

Since 1995, petitioner has not had custody of her son, Alvin Florida, 

Jr., but instead the child’s maternal stepfather, Herman Blade, did.... 

On December 6, 1995, the Alameda County Superior Court . . . 

ordered the father of the child, Stephan Florida, to pay child support 

for Alvin to the Treasurer of Alameda County. . . In a Stipulation 

and Order After Hearing, dated October 7, 2005, although the Court 

had ordered defendant Stephan Florida to pay child support each 

month to the guardian, Herman Blade, and arrears in the amount of 

$48,000, and ordered Florida to pay any outstanding funds in two 

installments, the Alameda County Superior Court ordered the 

Alameda DCSS to dismiss and close the child support case and not 

make any further attempts to collect arrears from defendant Stephan 

Florida. . . Stephanie McGee is nowhere mentioned in either of 

these orders, and was not a party to them.

Id., Ex. D. Plaintiff does not identify the proceedings in which this document was filed, nor does 

she attach the exhibits it references. The Court accordingly cannot determine whether the 

misidentification of father and son was made by the author of the demurrer or appears in the 

exhibits. Plaintiff alleges her request for a jury trial was denied on May 15, 2016, and a judgment 

rendered. Id. ¶ 15.

Based on these facts, Plaintiff asserts two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 

1983”)1; a “Bradley Amendment” claim; a Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim; and common 

law claims for breach of contract and concealment. See generally SAC. Plaintiff’s factual 

allegations relate to conduct by the County, but she has only named the State of California and the 

 

1

In the Introduction to the SAC, Plaintiff alleges her Section 1983 claim is based on the violation 

of her “rights secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment and Title IV-D of the Civil Rights 

Act.” SAC ¶ 2. Her first claim for violation of Section 1983, however, is only premised on 

Constitutional violations. See id. ¶¶ 18-23. Plaintiff asserts a separate claim for violation of Title 

IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, et seq. (“Title IV-D”), and includes language 

in that claim confirming she is seeking to enforce rights conferred by Title IV-D through Section 

1983. Id. ¶¶ 24-26. The Court thus construes Plaintiff’s Title IV-D claim as a Section 1983 claim 

for violation of Title IV-D.

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Department of Child Support Services State Hearing Office as Defendants.

C. Analysis and Screening

The Court first screens the two new federal claims Plaintiff asserts in the SAC, then the 

Section 1983 claim, and finally, Plaintiff’s common law claims. 

1. Bradley Amendment & TILA Claims

In her Original Complaint, Plaintiff asserted claims under the Bradley Amendment and 

TILA. Compl. at 4. In dismissing that Complaint with leave to amend, the Court wrote: “Nor has 

Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate federal question jurisdiction. While Plaintiff 

alleges various federal laws were violated, she does not clearly explain how or when Defendant 

violated these federal laws or how the alleged violations harmed her. Her conclusory statements 

that there are violations of federal law and the United States Constitution do not create a sufficient 

basis to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” First Order at 4. Plaintiff did not include Bradley 

Amendment or TILA claims in the FAC. See Dkt. No. 7. In the SAC, Plaintiff now reasserts the 

same conclusory allegations that Defendants violated the Bradley Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 

666(a)(9)(c)) and TILA. SAC at pp. 10-11. The Court once more concludes these claims must be 

dismissed, but this time with prejudice, because, as explained below Plaintiff still has not shown 

she is able to state plausible facts supporting a claim against Defendants under these statutes. 

Accordingly, neither of these statutes gives the Court subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

a. Bradley Amendment

As another Court explained when dismissing an earlier complaint filed by Plaintiff:

Section 666 generally requires that each state must have in effect 

certain laws intended to improve the effectiveness of the child 

support system. Section 666(a)(9)(c) states that with respect to 

procedures requiring support payments, an order of support may not 

be subject to retroactive modification by the state or any other state 

except through petitions for modification. Plaintiff does not assert 

that California has not implemented the procedure required under 

section 666(a)(9)(c), but she challenges actions taken by Defendant 

in her specific child support case. This section does not provide the 

Court with jurisdiction to review the handling of Plaintiff’s specific 

state court custody matters and/or payments of child support. 

McGee v. Cal. Dep’t of Child Support Svcs., Case No. 12-cv-3764, Dkt. No. 10 (N.D. Cal., filed 

Nov. 5, 2012) (“McGee I”); see also id., Dkt. No. 13 (dismissing FAC on same ground: “Section 

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666 does not provide the Court with jurisdiction to review the handling of Plaintiff’s specific state 

court custody matters and/or payments of child support.”) Plaintiff’s Bradley Amendment claim

in this case suffers from the same problems the McGee I Court identified; the Court thus adopts 

the same reasoning here and concludes Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Bradley 

Amendment.

b. TILA

Plaintiff argues Defendants violated TILA “by not entitling my c/s judgment full faith and 

credit in the state of Calif. and in any of the states that full faith is a ‘constitutional principle.’” 

SAC ¶ 30. The purpose of TILA is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 

consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid 

the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit 

billing and credit card practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601. It is unclear how Plaintiff alleges Defendants 

offered her credit or violated TILA. Once again, Plaintiff’s conclusory statements that Defendants 

violated a federal statute do not suffice to state a claim. See First Order at 4. Moreover, the Court 

finds this claim is frivolous as there is no arguable basis in either law or fact that Defendants

violated TILA in connection with the underlying child support proceedings. 

2. Section 1983 Claims

In its Order dismissing the FAC, the Court held any Section 19832claim Plaintiff might 

have pleaded was time-barred. See Second Order at 4-7. The Court nonetheless granted Plaintiff 

leave to amend in the event she could show a basis for delayed accrual or could clarify the nature 

of her Section 1983 claim. Id. at 6-7. In the SAC, Plaintiff premises her Section 1983 claims on

the violation of two distinct rights. First, she alleges her requests for a “State Hearing” and jury 

trial were denied, and her case dismissed, depriving Plaintiff of her property without due process 

of law in violation of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. SAC ¶¶ 18-23. Second, she 

 

2

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States. . . . [It] is not itself a source 

of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere.” Drawsand v. F.F. Props., LLP, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 

(citations omitted). 

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alleges Defendants’ action breached several of their duties under Title IV-D. Id. ¶¶ 24-26.3 As 

discussed below, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims must be dismissed without 

leave to amend.

a. Denial of State Hearing/Dismissal of Action

To the extent Plaintiff bases her Section 1983 claim on the denial of a “State Hearing” in 

August 2015, Plaintiff fails to simply, directly, and concisely state the connections between each 

of the Defendants, the alleged violations, and the alleged harm caused to Plaintiff. Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))). The SAC 

does not provide a clear description of what hearing Plaintiff requested in what forum or of who 

denied her request for a hearing (e.g., one of the Defendants, an agency, a judge); fails to provide 

facts sufficient to show Plaintiff was entitled to such a hearing (e.g., based on something other 

than her mischaracterization of the August 2015 letter); fails to establish Plaintiff followed the 

proper requirements for requesting such a hearing; and fails to describe how each Defendant 

harmed Plaintiff. To the extent it attempts to state a Section 1983 claim based on the denial of a 

“State Hearing,” the SAC fails to meet the basic requirements of Rule 8(a). 

To the extent the Section 1983 claim challenges a California State Court’s order sustaining 

the demurrer she attaches to her SAC and dismissing her action (SAC ¶¶ 15-17 & Ex. D), that 

claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See First Order at 4 (“[T]he Court cautions 

Plaintiff that this Court does not have the power to review errors allegedly committed by state 

courts.” (citing Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 

263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983))).

 

3

For purposes of this Order only, the Court assumes that the Title IV-D provisions Plaintiff 

identifies are enforceable through Section 1983. But see Consumer Advocates Rights Enf’t Soc’y,

Inc. (Cares, Inc.) v. State of Cal., 2005 WL 3454140, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2005) (“Title IV-D 

does not provide plaintiffs with enforceable personal rights. Even if the laws have the effect of 

benefitting them, their failure to qualify as ‘intended beneficiaries’ of the provisions precludes 

them from maintaining a Section 1983 private right of action against defendants”). 

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b. Title IV-D

The Court already found that a Section 1983 claim based on violations of Title IV-D, the 

waiving of arrears, the closure of the child custody proceedings, or the payment of child support 

funds to someone other than Plaintiff accrued no later than October 2005 with the entry of the 

Stipulation & Order After Hearing (the “2005 Stipulation”). See Second Order at 5-7. The statute 

of limitations for a Section 1983 claim is 2 years. See id. at 5. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim thus 

expired in 2007. In the SAC, Plaintiff argues delayed accrual applies because an August 18, 2015 

letter revealed for the first time that Defendants had mistakenly paid a $48,000 judgment owed to 

Plaintiff to the wrong person. SAC ¶ 9. Plaintiff’s characterization of the August 18, 2015 letter 

is not supported by the document. The letter does describe the 2005 Stipulation in which “it was 

determined that arrears of $48,000 was owed to” Plaintiff. Id., Ex. C. But rather than revealing 

Defendants paid the arrears to the wrong person, the letter merely corrects the description of the 

2005 Stipulation the County had included in an August 5, 2015 letter to Plaintiff. Id. The August 

18, 2015 letter thus does not present a basis for delayed accrual.4 

Nor does the excerpt of the demurrer Plaintiff attaches to the SAC (Ex. D) provide a 

ground for delayed accrual. At most, the Court can infer the author of the demurrer filed in the 

unidentified state court action mistakenly identified the participants in the child support 

proceedings; Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to show the mistake was made by Defendants 

in the child support proceedings, that the mistake harmed Plaintiff, or that Plaintiff was unaware of 

the mistake during the child support proceedings. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing 

delayed accrual applies. 

 

4 Moreover, the factual allegations in the SAC are premised on the same facts Plaintiff described 

in a March 2009 Complaint filed in another action before this Court. See McGee v. Cty. of 

Alameda, Case No. 09-cv-1377 (N.D. Cal. filed on March 30, 2009), Compl. at 2, Dkt. No. 1 

(“Child support collections have been distributed and disbursed incorrectly. . . . Alameda county 

child support agency’s decision to close a child support Case. . . . The waiving of child support 

arrears”), at 4 (“Child Support services closed my child support case and WAIVED all the arrears 

owed to the mother. Herman Blade was never awarded guardianship of our son . . . .”)). 

Plaintiff’s March 2009 Complaint establishes she was fully aware of the factual basis for the 

claims she asserts in this action no later than March 2009—7 years before she filed the original 

complaint in this case. 

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For the reasons stated in its Second Order, the Court reaffirms (1) Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated delayed accrual applies, and (2) Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under the continuing 

violations doctrine. See Second Order at 4-7. 

3. State Law Claims

Plaintiff is a citizen of California suing the State of California and a California State 

agency. SAC ¶ 1. Because all parties are citizens of the same state, Plaintiff cannot invoke 

diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Finding it lacks jurisdiction to hear some of 

Plaintiff’s federal claims, and that the remainder of her federal claims are barred by the statute of 

limitations, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s common law 

claims for breach of contract and concealment. The Court will not further analyze these claims to 

determine whether they are sufficiently pleaded. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are either 

barred by the statute of limitations or by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine; Plaintiff’s TILA claim 

against Defendants is frivolous; and the Bradley Amendment does not provide a basis for federal 

subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiff twice has been granted leave to amend her 

complaint. Because it is now “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 

cured by amendment” (Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1235 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984)), the Court 

now DISMISSES the federal claims WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court also declines 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, and dismisses those without 

prejudice to refiling them in state court.

The Clerk of Court shall close the file in this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 23, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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