Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cr-01244/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cr-01244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
Raul Zamorano-Ponce
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, No. 11CR01244-001-CKJ-JCG

vs. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER REGARDING

APPLICABILITY OF

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)

ENHANCEMENT

RAUL ZAMORANO-PONCE,

Defendant.

____________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 2

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ....................................... 6

A. The Applicable Guideline ............................... 6

B. Judicial Determinations Of “Crimes Of Violence” ............... 8

1. The two approaches ............................. 8

2. The categorical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3. Modified categorical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

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This case was assigned to me while I was serving as a visiting judge in the District

of Arizona. The statute authorizing such assignment provides as follows:

(d) The Chief Justice of the United States may designate and

assign temporarily a district judge of one circuit for service in

another circuit, either in a district court or court of appeals,

upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief

judge or circuit justice of the circuit wherein the need arises.

28 U.S.C. § 292(d). A related statute provides, inter alia, “A justice or judge shall

discharge, during the period of his designation and assignment, all judicial duties for which

he is designated and assigned,” and, with certain exceptions not relevant here, “shall have

all the powers of a judge of the court, circuit or district to which he is designated and

assigned.” 28 U.S.C. § 296.

2

This case is before me1

 on an issue of first impression: Does a conviction for

rape of a child in the third degree in violation of Revised Code of

Washington (RCW) § 9A.44.079 constitute an enumerated “crime of violence” resulting

in a 16-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, of the sentence of a defendant

who pleaded guilty to re-entry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)?

I. INTRODUCTION

According to the presentence investigation report (PSR), on March 13, 2011, U.S.

border patrol agents apprehended a group of 11 people, including defendant Raul

Zamorano-Ponce, near Lukeville, Arizona. Upon questioning, the group admitted being

citizens of Mexico without legal documentation to be in the United States. During the

presentence interview, Zamorano-Ponce indicated that his intention was to reside in

Washington and to work in the fields. The group were taken to the Ajo border patrol

station for processing. Zamorano-Ponce was eventually indicted on a charge of re-entry

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after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), with sentencing enhancement

pursuant to 1326(b)(2), a Class C felony. Zamorano-Ponce faces a maximum possible

sentence of 20 years of imprisonment and a maximum possible fine of $250,000. 

Zamorano-Ponce pleaded guilty to the charge on May 12, 2011, pursuant to a “fast

track” written plea agreement. Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure and U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1, the parties stipulate to a sentencing range of

33 to 41 months imprisonment based on a Criminal History Category II (down from the

calculated guideline range of 41 to 51 months), if Zamorano-Ponce is subject to the 16-

level enhancement for a prior “crime of violence” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) and

(b)(1)(A). However, if I find that such an enhancement is not applicable, only a 4-level

increase for a prior felony conviction is applicable, resulting in a stipulated sentence of 2

to 8 months (down from the calculated guideline range of 8 to 14 months).

The PSR provided the following explanation for application of the 16-level

enhancement:

8. Specific Offense Characteristic: Sixteen levels are

added because the defendant was deported subsequent

to an aggravated felony crime of violence conviction for

statutory rape (Case 03-1-0095-0). U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). 

Although a definition of Revised Code Washington

(RCW) §9A.44.079 is overly broad, court records

(including the charging instrument, plea agreement, and

sentencing document) establish that the defendant, age

24, engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with

a minor, age 15. Accordingly, this conviction meets

the definition of an aggravated felony and an

enumerated crime of violence (statutory rape) pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment. (n.1(.1(B)(iii)).

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PSR at ¶ 8.

Zamorano-Ponce objected to this enhancement. Specifically, he pointed out that the

PSR acknowledged that the definition of RCW § 9A.44.079 is overly broad, so that it does

not fit the categorical definition of “statutory rape” or “sexual abuse of a minor,”

enumerated crimes of violence in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, n.1.B.iii. He argues that the statute

at issue here does not meet the generic definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” under either

framework identified in Ninth Circuit law, nor does it meet the definition for “statutory

rape” set forth in Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)

for two reasons: (1) it lacks the mens rea element of “knowingly engaged,” and (2) it is

broader than the generic offense with respect to the age of the minor because the statute

applies to persons between fourteen and sixteen years of age. As a result, he contends that

the conduct proscribed in RCW § 9A.44.079 exceeds the generic offense. He also argues

that, because the statute lacks the mens rea and age difference requirements, and any

element of “abuse,” a modified categorical approach also does not apply.

The prosecution counters that RCW § 9A.44.079 does fall squarely within the

generic description of “statutory rape” in the Ninth Circuit, that is, it is an offense

involving sexual intercourse with an individual under the age of 16. The prosecution

points out that the decision in Estrada-Espinoza did not discuss the definition of “statutory

rape” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, but for purposes of determination of an

aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Thus, the

prosecution contends that, for purposes of a “statutory rape” offense within the meaning

of § 2L1.2, there is no mens rea requirement. In the alternative, the prosecution argues

that the Washington statute at issue here defines a “forcible sex offense” crime of violence

within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, as “forcible sex offenses” were more broadly

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defined in an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines effective November 1, 2008,

because the victim was incapable of legally valid consent.

The probation officer rejected Zamorano-Ponce’s objection, reasoning that, under

a modified categorical approach, which allows analysis of available judicially-noticeable

documents, Zamorano-Ponce’s prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 as a “statutory rape” conviction. The probation officer noted that the

enhancement was not premised on a prior conviction for “sexual abuse of a minor.”

Specifically, the probation officer pointed out that Model Penal Code § 213(1)(a) defines

“statutory rape” as “[a] male [having] sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, or any

person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse or causes another to engage in deviate

sexual intercourse, . . . if: (a) the other person is less than [16] years old and the actor is

at least [four] years older than the other person . . .” Similarly, RCW § 9A.44.079

defines “rape of a child in the third degree” as a person having sexual intercourse with

another who is at least 14 years old but less than 16 years old, not married to the

perpetrator, and where the perpetrator is at least 48 months older than the victim. The

probation officer points out that available judicially-noticeable documents, that is, the plea

agreement, show that, in Zamorano-Ponce’s prior offense, the victim was 15 years old,

Zamorano-Ponce had sexual intercourse with her, he and the victim were not married, the

victim did not consent, and Zamorano-Ponce was 24 years old at the time of the offense.

Therefore, the probation officer did not change the PSR.

Zamorano-Ponce came on for sentencing before me on September 12, 2011, while

I was serving as a visiting judge in the District of Arizona. After hearing initial arguments

of the parties, I continued the hearing until September 15, 2011, so that I could consider

the matter further. The parties additional arguments on September 15, 2011, were spirited

and informative.

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On September 13, 2011, I received by e-mail the defendant’s Points In Support Of

Sentencing Argument. In his Points, the defendant reiterated his contention that, pursuant

to Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), the federal

generic definition of “statutory rape” has four essential elements: (1) a mens rea level of

knowingly; (2) a sexual act; (3) with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16; and (4) an

age difference of at least four years between the defendant and the minor, and reiterating

his argument that the offense defined by RCW § 9A.44.079 lacks the required mens rea

element. Under these circumstances, he reiterates that the state offense is not “statutory

rape” under the “categorical approach” and that the “modified categorical approach” is

inapplicable. Moreover, he asserts that he did not admit in any judicially-noticeable

documents any of the elements of the federal generic offense of “statutory rape,” and

clearly could not have admitted the first, because it is not an element of the state offense.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The Applicable Guideline

The applicable guideline provision provides as follows:

§2L1.2. Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the

United States

(a) Base Offense Level: 8

(b) Specific Offense Characteristic

(1) Apply the Greatest:

If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully

remained in the United States, after—

(A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug

trafficking offense for which the sentence

imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of

violence; (iii) a firearms offense; (iv) a child

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pornography offense; (v) a national security or

terrorism offense; (vi) a human trafficking

offense; or (vii) an alien smuggling offense,

increase by 16 levels;

(B) a conviction for a felony drug trafficking

offense for which the sentence imposed was 13

months or less, increase by 12 levels;

(C) a conviction for an aggravated felony,

increase by 8 levels;

(D) a conviction for any other felony, increase

by 4 levels; or

(E) three or more convictions for misdemeanors

that are crimes of violence or drug trafficking

offenses, increase by 4 levels.

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (emphasis added). The pertinent application note defines “crime of

violence,” for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), as follows:

(iii) “Crime of violence” means any of the following offenses

under federal, state, or local law: murder, manslaughter,

kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including

where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally

valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary,

incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a

minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of

credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any other offense under

federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another.

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, n.1.b.iii (emphasis added).

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B. Judicial Determinations Of “Crimes Of Violence”

1. The two approaches

In United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2207322 (9th Cir.

June 8, 2011), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the analytical process for

determining whether a state sex offense is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2: 

The overarching principles of law that must be followed

here appear to be well established, although the parties

vigorously contest whether they have been satisfied. “When

an offense is specifically enumerated by the Application Notes

as a ‘crime of violence,’ we have consistently drawn the

conclusion that the offense is a per se crime of violence under

the Guidelines.” United States v. Rodriguez–Guzman, 506

F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). In other

words, we must determine “whether the statutory definition

used by [Arizona] comports with the generic and contemporary

meaning of the offense of statutory rape.” Id. at 743.

This inquiry requires the courts to apply the categorical

approach or test set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.

575, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1990). “‘Under the

categorical approach, we “compare the elements of the

statutory definition of the crime of conviction with a federal

definition of the crime to determine whether conduct

proscribed by the statute is broader than the generic federal

definition.”’” United States v. Valencia–Barragan, 608 F.3d

1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512

F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008)), cert. denied, ––– U.S.

––––, 131 S. Ct. 539, 178 L. Ed. 2d 396 (2010). “[E]ven the

least egregious conduct the statute [of conviction] covers must

qualify.” United States v. Lopez–Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1206

(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1046,

1052 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2006)). Furthermore, the court may

look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition

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of the prior offense. See, e.g., Valencia–Barragan, 608 F.3d

at 1107.

Even if the pure categorical test is not satisfied, the

government may ask the court to turn to the modified

categorical approach. Where the statute of conviction is

overly inclusive, the Supreme Court allows “‘the sentencing

court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction.’”

Rodriguez–Guzman, 506 F.3d at 746 (quoting Taylor, 495

U.S. at 602, 110 S. Ct. 2143). In short, the court may

consider whether otherwise proper documentation and

“‘judicially noticeable facts’” unequivocally demonstrate that

the prior offense does fall under the generic federal definition.

Id. (quoting United States v. Shumate, 329 F.3d 1026, 1029

(9th Cir. 2003), as amended by 341 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2003)).

“[T]he modified categorical approach is appropriate when the

statute of conviction is divisible into several crimes, some of

which fall under the relevant category, and some of which do

not.” Estrada–Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1159–60 (citing Carty v.

Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005)). The

approach does not apply at all when the statute of conviction

lacks an element of the generic crime. See, e.g., id. at 1159.

In the end, a court “can conclude that a conviction

qualifies . . . ‘only if the record of conviction shows the jury

“necessarily” found all of the generic elements, or the

defendant “necessarily” admitted all of the generic elements in

a plea.’” United States v. Espinoza–Morales, 621 F.3d 1141,

1149 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Sandoval–Lua v. Gonzales, 499

F.3d 1121, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007)) (footnote omitted).

Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at *4.

More specifically still, in Gonzalez-Aparicio, the court addressed whether the

defendant’s charge of “sexual conduct with a minor,” in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT.

§ 13-1405, constituted “statutory rape” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The

court noted that its case law seemed to create two categorical definitions of “sexual abuse

of a minor.” Id. at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at *8-*10. However, the court noted that one

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line stemmed from Estrada-Espinoza, on which Zamorano-Ponce relies, but that case

“actually defined the phrase ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ as it is used in the immigration

‘aggravated felony’ context,” not in the context of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Gonzalez-Aparicio,

___ F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 2011 WL 2207322 at *11 (citing Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d

at 1150-60). The effect of this different context, the court explained, was the following:

[T]he Guideline commentary at issue here expressly lists both

“sexual abuse of a minor” as well as “statutory rape” as

“crimes of violence.” In general, courts should attempt to

avoid an interpretation rendering language superfluous. Cf.,

e.g., Medina–Villa, 567 F.3d at 515 (stating that, “if we were

to define ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ in U.S.S.G. § 21:1.2 as

limited to § 2243, we would eliminate the need for the separate

and independent example of ‘statutory rape’ as a ‘crime of

violence.’”). The Estrada–Espinoza opinion also never

discussed or even cited to our prior “statutory rape” decisions

in Gomez–Mendez and Rodriguez–Guzman. We further add

that, even in the limited “sexual abuse of a minor” context, the

en banc ruling and the subsequent line of case law have been

the target of criticism. In a special concurrence in United

States v. Farmer, 627 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2010), pet. for cert.

filed, (Mar. 17, 2011) (No. 10–9620), Judge Bybee, joined by

Judge Noonan, expressed serious doubts about, among other

things, the existence of two definitions for the same offense,

id. at 424–26 (Bybee, J., specially concurring).

Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at *11. The court found that it

did not have to resolve the question of whether or not Estrada-Espinoza was applicable to

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, because its review was only for plain error, and the district court had

not plainly erred in concluding that the Arizona statute defined a “crime of violence.” Id.

Here, I am faced with an objection from the defendant, so that I must perforce

decide whether or not the sexual offense defined by RCW § 9A.44.079 is or is not a

“crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 and, more specifically,

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I need not consider Zamorano-Ponce’s red herring about the generic definition of

“sexual abuse of a minor,” because that is not the enumerated “crime of violence” relied

upon by either the probation officer or the prosecution.

11

whether it defines an enumerated “statutory rape” offense within the meaning of the

guideline, such that it is a per se crime of violence. Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d at ___,

2011 WL 2207322 at *4.2

 To do so, I will first consider the “categorical approach,” if

necessary, the “modified categorical approach,” as each approach is defined in GonzalezAparicio. In doing so, I must decide whether or not Estrada-Espinoza provides the

“generic” federal definition for present purposes. 

2. The categorical approach

Again, the first approach to the question of whether or not a particular offense is

a “crime of violence” within the meaning of § 2L1.2 is the “categorical approach.”

Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at *4. Looking only to the fact

of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense, and comparing the elements

of the statutory crime and the federal definition of the crime, I must decide if the statutory

crime is any broader than the federal definition, recognizing that “[e]ven the least

egregious conduct the statute [of conviction] covers must qualify.” Id. (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

In Gonzalez-Aparicio, the court noted that it had addressed the generic federal

definition of “statutory rape” in prior cases. It noted that, in United States v.

Gomez–Mendez, 486 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2007), it had affirmed the enhancement based on

a purported “statutory rape” offense defined by California Penal Code § 261.5(d):

[W]e stated, inter alia, that “[t]he term ‘statutory rape’ is

ordinarily, contemporarily, and commonly understood to mean

the unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of

consent specified by state statute.” [Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d]

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at 603 (footnote omitted). In support of this definition, we

specifically quoted the definitions of “statutory rape” in

Black’s Law Dictionary, id. at 603 n.7 (quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1288 (8th ed.2004)), as well as in an ALR

annotation, id. (quoting Susan M. Kole, Annotation, Statute

Protecting Minors in a Specified Age Range from Rape or

Other Sexual Activity as Applicable to Defendant Minor

Within Protected Age Group, 18 A.L.R. 5th 856, § 2[a]

(1994)). It must be noted that none of these definitions contain

any age difference requirement. Id.

Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at *8. The court noted that it had

subsequently suggested that Gomez-Mendez had not answered the question of what is the

ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the term “minor,” in the context of

“statutory rape” law relied on for a sentencing enhancement, but did answer that question

in United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2007). Id.

The Rodriguez–Guzman panel majority, based on an

examination of the Model Penal Code, federal criminal law

(specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (“Sexual abuse of a minor or

ward”)), and the approach of the overwhelming majority of the

states to the age of consent issue (as addressed in Judge

Thomas’s concurring opinion in the subsequently vacated panel

ruling in Estrada–Espinoza v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 933 (9th

Cir. 2007)), concluded that “the term ‘minor’ in the context of

a statutory rape law means a person under sixteen years of

age.” 506 F.3d at 745 (footnote omitted). We specifically

observe that both the Model Penal Code and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2243(a), as quoted in Rodriguez–Guzman, require that the

victim be younger than 16 and that there be at least a 4–year

age difference between the perpetrator and the victim. Id. In

any case, this Court further explained that the prior ruling

“is . . . not in conflict with our decision here” because the

statutory provision addressed in Gomez–Mendez only

criminalizes sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of

16. Id. at 745 n.6.

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Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at *8. The court in RodriguezGuzman concluded that the offense at issue in that case was not “statutory rape” within the

meaning of § 2K1.2, because it was “overbroad,” as it prohibited sexual activity with

persons under the age of 18, not just under the age of 16, and the available documentation

was insufficient for purposes of a “modified categorical” analysis. Rodriguez-Guzman,

506 F.3d at 746-47.

I conclude that I need not consider any other definition of “statutory rape,” for

example, the one provided in Estrada-Espinoza, which adds, inter alia, a mens rea element

to “statutory rape.” As noted in Gonzalez-Aparicio, the decision in Estrada-Espinoza did

not address “statutory rape” as a “crime of violence” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2,

or any other guideline, but “sexual abuse of a minor” as it is used in the immigration

“aggravated felony” context of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has not yet considered whether and how Estrada-Espinoza should be applied in defining

the generic crime of “statutory rape” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii),” and the court

has twice avoided doing so. Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at

*10-*11; see also Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d at 741-42 (noting that “crime of violence”

within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) “is materially different from the definition

of ‘crime of violence’ in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)” and, consequently, that statute “does not

independently define or categorize offenses of purposes of imposing sentencing

enhancements under the Guidelines”). I must conclude that Estrada-Espinoza simply does

not relate to the definition of “statutory rape” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.

Thus, the elements of the generic federal offense of “statutory rape” are (1) sexual

intercourse (2) with a minor under the age of 16 (3) who is not the perpetrator’s wife.

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Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d at 745-46. The state statute at issue here, RCW

§ 9A.44.079, defines a sexual offense as follows:

9A.44.079. Rape of a child in the third degree

(1) A person is guilty of rape of a child in the third degree

when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at

least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old and not

married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least

forty-eight months older than the victim.

(2) Rape of a child in the third degree is a class C felony.

RCW § 9A.44.079. Thus, the elements of the state offense are (1) sexual intercourse

(2) with a minor at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old (4) who is not

the perpetrator’s wife and (4) where the perpetrator is at least 48 months older than the

victim.

I am somewhat mystified by the probation officer’s assertion that the state statutory

offense is “overly broad.” The probation officer does not identify either the elements of

the generic federal offense or the specific element that the state statute defines more

broadly or does not require. The “victim’s age” element in the state statute is narrower,

as it applies only to children fourteen or fifteen years old, not just to all children under

sixteen; certainly, any child who fits the statutory crime also fits the federal generic crime.

The only additional element in the state offenses is the “age difference” element, which

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted is not mentioned as a requirement in GomezMendez, Black’s Law Dictionary, or the ALR, Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d at ___, 2011

WL 2207322 at *8, and is noted as a requirement of the Model Penal Code in RodriguezGuzman, but not then expressly adopted as part of the generic federal definition of

“statutory rape” in that decision. Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d at 746-57. I also

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specifically reject Zamorano-Ponce’s assertion that the state statute does not define a

“statutory rape” offense within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, on the ground that there

is no missing mens rea element, because none is required under the federal generic

definition, and the “age of victim” element is not broader, but narrower than the federal

generic definition requires. In short, even the least egregious conduct defined by the state

statute fits the federal generic definition of “statutory rape.” Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d

at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at *4 (“Even the least egregious conduct the statute [of

conviction] covers must qualify.”(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

Thus, I hold that an offense under RCW § 9A.44.079 is a crime of “statutory rape,”

as enumerated in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, n.1.B.iii. As such, it is a per se crime of violence.

Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at *4. Thus, using a “categorical

approach,” Zamorano-Ponce is subject to the 16-level enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2

for a prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” in this case, “statutory rape,” based on

his conviction for violation of RCW § 9A.44.079.

3. Modified categorical approach

Out of an abundance of caution, I will also consider whether RCW § 9A.44.079

defines a “statutory rape” offense within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 under a

“modified categorical approach.” To do so, I must assume, as the probation officer

apparently did, that the statute is somehow “overly inclusive,” Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___

F.3d at ___, 2011 WL 2207322 at *4, although it is simply not clear to me in what way

it is “overly inclusive”; rather, I readily see where it is “under inclusive.”

As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, the modified categorical approach

turns on whether the record of conviction, consisting of proper documentation and

judicially-noticeable facts, shows that the jury “necessarily” found all of the generic

elements, or the defendant “necessarily” admitted all of the generic elements in a plea.

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I find it unnecessary to address the prosecution’s alternative argument that

Zamorano-Ponce’s prior conviction constituted a “forcible sex offense” as an enumerated

“crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.

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Id. “Proper documentation” and “judicially-noticeable facts” do not include statements

or admissions by the defendant’s counsel at the sentencing hearing, or a narrative

description of underlying facts of the prior conviction in the PSR, but may include facts

in the PSR that are quoted or drawn from state court documentation. Id. at *13. Contrary

to Zamorano-Ponce’s contentions, the modified categorical approach is applicable here,

because it is not being used to supply an otherwise absent element. Id. If anything, it is

simply being used to clarify that this conviction did, indeed, involve all of the generic

elements. Id. at *4. It is clear from proper documentation and judicially-noticeable facts,

primarily from the plea agreement, that this defendant’s specific offense involved a victim

under 16, not his wife, with whom he had sexual intercourse, when he was 24 years old,

i.e., more than four years older. From these facts, jurors would necessarily find that

Zamorano-Ponce committed the federal generic offense of “statutory rape.” Id.

Again, using the “modified categorical approach,” Zamorano-Ponce is subject to

the 16-level enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 for a prior conviction for a “crime of

violence,” in this case, “statutory rape,” based on his conviction for violation of RCW

§ 9A.44.079.3

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I find that Zamorano-Ponce is subject to the 16-level

enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 for a prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” in this

case, “statutory rape,” based on his conviction for violation of RCW § 9A.44.079. His

objections to such an enhancement are overruled. However, recognizing that this is an

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issue of first impression and that I have found applicable Ninth Circuit law somewhat

murky, I strongly encourage the defendant to appeal this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 15th day of September, 2011.

__________________________________

MARK W. BENNETT

U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

VISITING JUDGE

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