Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15631/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15631-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carson McWilliams
Appellee
Charles L. Ryan
Appellee
Pedro Imperial Vega
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PEDRO IMPERIAL VEGA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN; CARSON

MCWILLIAMS,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 12-15631

D.C. No.

4:09-cv-00473-

CKJ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 12, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed November 13, 2013

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit

Judges, and Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Beistline

* The Honorable Ralph R. Beistline, United States District Judge for the

District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

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2 VEGA V. RYAN

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a

28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition based on ineffective

assistance in counsel’s failure to familiarize himself with the

file and call witnesses who could provide exculpatory

testimony.

After petitioner’s conviction of contributing to the

delinquency of a minor, child molestation, and sexual abuse,

his trial lawyer learned that the victim had recanted her

allegations to her priest. The panel held that counsel’s failure

to familiarize himself with petitioner’s file led to a failure to

present a key witness to the jury, and that a reasonable lawyer

would not have made such an “inexplicable” decision. The

panel also held that counsel’s deficient performance was

prejudicial, because the priest’s testimony about the victim’s

recantation was not merely cumulative of her own testimony

admitting the recantation to her mother, but could have tipped

the scales in petitioner’s favor.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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VEGA V. RYAN 3

COUNSEL

Patricia A. Taylor (argued), Law Office of Patricia A. Taylor,

Tucson, Arizona, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General, Kent Cattani, Division

Chief Counsel, Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel,

David A. Sullivan and Nicholas Klingerman (argued),

Assistant Attorneys General, Tucson, Arizona, for

Respondents-Appellees.

OPINION

BEISTLINE, Chief District Judge:

Petitioner, Pedro Imperial Vega, stands convicted of

contributing to the delinquency of a minor, child molestation,

and three counts of sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, based on

events that occurred between 1996 and 1999. The Arizona

state courts rejected Petitioner’s direct and collateral

challenges to his conviction. Petitioner then filed a federal

habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that he had

received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an

evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition. We

reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Between 1996 and 2002, Vega was represented by three

different lawyers in connection with the underlying charges

against him. The first lawyer represented him on federal

charges, which were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 

The second lawyer represented him on state charges, which

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4 VEGA V. RYAN

the prosecutor ultimately chose not to pursue. State charges

were brought for a third time following a new set of

allegations by the victim, and yet a third lawyer represented

Vega at trial. After two mistrials, one of which was caused

by the third lawyer’s absence, Vega was convicted in 2002. 

He was sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison.

After Vega’s conviction, his trial lawyer learned that the

victim had recanted her allegations to her priest (“Father

Dan”). Counsel then filed a motion to vacate, and during an

evidentiary hearing Father Dan’s testimony was presented to

the trial judge for the first time. Because Vega himself, as

well as his two prior counsel were aware of the Father Dan

recantation, the trial judge concluded that Father Dan’s

testimony was not “newly discovered evidence” pursuant to

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.2(a)(2), and, therefore, the trial judge

denied the motion to vacate.

On direct appeal, Vega argued that the trial court had

erred by denying both his motion for judgment of acquittal

and his motion for a new trial. The Arizona Court of Appeals

denied Vega’s direct appeal on the merits, finding that the

recantation to the priest was not “newly discovered

evidence,” and that there was not a “reasonable probability”

that the priest’s testimony would have changed the outcome

of the case. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied

review.

Appellant then sought state post-conviction relief on the

grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a

two-day evidentiary hearing in 2008, the trial court denied

post-conviction relief because Vega knew about the victim’s

recantation to Father Dan but had failed to tell his lawyer, and

because the victim had admitted recanting her allegations to

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VEGA V. RYAN 5

her mother during her trial testimony. The trial judge found

this admission rendered evidence of other recantations

cumulative. The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review,

but “[s]eeing no reason to repeat the trial court’s analysis

here,” it adopted the trial court’s decision and denied relief. 

The Arizona Supreme Court again summarily denied review.

Having exhausted all other possible remedies, Vega

initiated the instant federal habeas proceedings, seeking relief

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In a report and

recommendation, a magistrate judge recommended denying

the petition on the merits and dismissing it with prejudice.

The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s report,

noting specifically that “[i]n light of the victim’s testimony

[that she had recanted], the additional instances of

recantations would have been ‘largely cumulative in their

basic effect.’” The district court then concluded that “given

the reasons the Arizona courts stated for not granting relief,

this Court does not find that the state courts’ decision

involved an unreasonable application of federal law.” 

However, the district court granted a certificate of

appealability on Vega’s claim about trial counsel’s

investigation and presentation of evidence of the victim’s

recantations.

Vega claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to familiarize himself with the file and, accordingly,

failing to call witnesses* who could provide exculpatory

testimony. He further claims that the state court

* Vega claimed that counsel failed to call several witnesses. Because we

find counsel’s failure to call Father Dan dispositive, we do not address

Vega’s other claims of error.

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unreasonably applied clearly established federal law

regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s denial of habeas

relief. McMurtrey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir.

2008). Because Petitioner filed this petition after April 24,

1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA) of 1996 governs review of his claims. Estrella v.

Ollison, 668 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2011). AEDPA imposes

a “highly deferential” standard of review and “demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam). 

Review of ineffective assistance claims under § 2254(d)(1) is

“doubly deferential.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,

112 (2009).

In evaluating the state’s denial of habeas

relief, we must decide whether, considering

only the evidence before the state court, the

determination that Petitioner received

constitutionally sufficient assistance of

counsel was “an unreasonable application of

[ ] clearly established Federal law” or resulted

from an “unreasonable determination of the

facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ**if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from this Court’s decisions but

 

** The original quote states “relief,” not “the writ.”

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VEGA V. RYAN 7

unreasonablyapplies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case.”

Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). 

Cannedy explains that a federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearlyestablished federal law was

objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1158. Even if the state court

arrived at what we think to be an incorrect result, that result

must be upheld “so long as fairminded jurists could disagree

on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at 1157

(citation omitted). Accordingly, “[i]f the state court

reasonably concluded that Petitioner failed to establish either

prong of the Strickland test, then we cannot grant relief.” Id.

Here, the state courts correctly referenced Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), but the courts’

“adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that . . .

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In Strickland, the

Supreme Court articulated the two-prong test for determining

whether counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require

reversal of a conviction: “First, the defendant must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient. . . . Second, the

defendant must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687.

As to the first prong, “[t]he proper measure of attorney

performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms.” Id. at 688. Here, the state courts

rejected Vega’s claim that counsel shirked his professional

duty because “[i]t is illogical and unreasonable to hold

[counsel] responsible for Petitioner’s failure to divulge such

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information [about the Father Dan recantation] to him.” We

disagree.

Strickland allows for a finding of ineffectiveness based on

omissions, not just overt acts of counsel. Id. at 690. So, “[a]

lawyer who fails adequately to investigate, and to introduce

into evidence, records that demonstrate his client’s factual

innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt as to that question to

undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient

performance.” Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir.

1999); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005)

(finding ineffective assistance in a capital case where “[i]fthe

defense lawyers had looked in the file . . . they would have

found a range of mitigation leads”). Additionally, while

Strickland protects “strategic choices made after a thorough

investigation of law and facts[,] . . . counsel has a duty to

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”

466 U.S. at 690–91. A decision not to investigate “must be

directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances,

applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.” Id. at 691. In this case, counsel did not know

about the Father Dan recantation until a week-to-two weeks

after the trial, so there cannot be a suggestion that counsel

made a strategic decision not to call Father Dan. Thomas v.

Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting

that trial counsel’s failure to call a witness could not be

excused as a tactical decision because counsel did not have

sufficient information to make an informed decision).

Moreover, finding ineffective assistance of counsel in a

case in which a petitioner alleged that he was falsely accused

of abusing his step-daughter, we recently explained: “No

competent lawyer would have declined to interview such a

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VEGA V. RYAN 9

potentially favorable witness when that witness had been

clearly identified, the witness was easily accessible and

willing to provide information, and trial counsel faced a

dearth of defense witnesses.” Cannedy, 706 F.3d at 1161. 

See also Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“an attorney’s failure to prepare for and challenge the

testimony of a critical witness may be so unreasonable as to

violate both prongs of the Strickland test.”). We reach a

similar conclusion: counsel’s failure to familiarize himself

with his client’s file—despite this case’s tortured history—led

to a failure to present a key witness to the jury. A reasonable

lawyer would not have made such an inexplicable decision. 

Accordingly, counsel’s performance was deficient.

A defendant must also show that the deficient

performance prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

Vega complains that counsel’s failure to prepare and

investigate his case, including his failure to read the files

prepared by prior counsel, was a critical failure because the

testimony of a priest who heard “what he believed to be a

sincere recantation” could have tipped the scales in Vega’s

favor.

At trial, the victim’s mother testified that her daughter

had recanted to her, and counsel cross-examined the victim

about her recantation to her mother, including whether she

had dreamt the events and whether her allegations were false

and motivated by a desire to manipulate her home

environment. Because it was undisputed that the victim had

recanted, the State argues (and the lower court found) that

evidence of other recantations would have been cumulative. 

We disagree. Evidence of multiple recantations was not

merely cumulative. It also could have impacted the victim’s

credibility, which the appellate court found “was a central

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issue based on evidence of her recantation.” Indeed,

credibility was crucial to Vega’s defense of actual innocence

because the uncorroborated testimony of a victim is enough

to sustain a conviction for child molestation. State v. Munoz,

561 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Ariz. App. 1976). Thus, the possibility

of even one juror finding reasonable doubt in light of multiple

recantations, or because one of those recantations was made

to the victim’s priest, was reasonably likely. Accordingly,

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s

deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have

been different.” Cannedy, 706 F3d. at 1166.

We conclude that the state courts erred by determining

that counsel’s performance did not prejudice Vega. Under

these circumstances, counsel’s failure to read Vega’s client

file is not excused by the failure of the client to inform

counsel of what was in the file. See Johnson v. Baldwin,

114 F.3d 835, 838–40 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The prejudice from

failing to investigate . . . and confer more fully with

[petitioner] is not avoided by the fact that [petitioner]

misinformed his attorney.”). And counsel’s abdication of his

duty to investigate, particularly given the case’s long history

of failed prosecutions, is deficient performance under

Strickland. In this case, the deficient performance was also

prejudicial because the recantations were not merely

cumulative, and proper disclosure to the jury could have

tipped the scales in Vega’s favor. The State’s suggestion to

the contrary is simply not persuasive. Petitioner’s claim

therefore meets the Strickland standard for ineffective

assistance of counsel, and his petition for relief must be

granted.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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