Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-06024/USCOURTS-ca8-15-06024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Sioux City
Appellee
Civic Partners Sioux City, LLC
Appellant
Main Street Theatres, Inc.
Appellee
Main Street-Sioux City, Inc.
Appellee
Northwest Bank
Appellee
Steven Semingson
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-6024

___________________________

In re: Civic Partners Sioux City, LLC

lllllllllllllllllllllDebtor

------------------------------

Civic Partners Sioux City, LLC

lllllllllllllllllllllDebtor - Appellant

v.

Main Street Theatres, Inc.; Main Street-Sioux City, Inc.; Steven Semingson;

Northwest Bank, successor by merger with First National Bank; City of Sioux City

lllllllllllllllllllllObjectors - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States Bankruptcy Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City

____________

 Submitted: May 19, 2016

 Filed: July 19, 2016

____________

Before KRESSEL, SCHERMER, and NAIL, Bankruptcy Judges.

____________

NAIL, Bankruptcy Judge.

Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
Civic Partners Sioux City, LLC appeals the July 8, 2015 order of the

bankruptcy court dismissing its chapter 11 bankruptcy case. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Civic Partners Sioux City, LLC ("Civic Partners") owns commercialreal estate,

known as the Promenade, in the Historic Fourth Street Redevelopment District of

Sioux City, Iowa ("City"). Northwest Bank ("Bank") holds a mortgage against the

Promenade and an assignment of rentsto secure a promissory note executed by Civic

Partners. City also holds a mortgage against the Promenade to secure a promissory

note executed by Civic Partners. Main Street Theatres, Inc. ("Main Street") leases

and occupies the majority of the space in the Promenade.

Soon after entering into the lease with Civic Partners in 2004, Main Street fell

behind on its lease payments. This in turn caused Civic Partners to fall behind on its

loan payments to Bank and to City. In 2009, Civic Partners, Main Street, Bank, and

City mediated their various disputes. The mediation sessions led to a tentative

1

resolution ofthe parties' disputes, which wasmemorialized in a settlement agreement. 

The settlement agreement was subject to ratification by the city council.

In the settlement agreement, Bank agreed to restructure Civic Partners' loan,

City agreed to reduce the Promenade's tax assessment value, and City further agreed

to address certain construction defects in public works adjacent to the Promenade. 

In return, Civic Partners agreed to enter into an amended lease with Main Street that

would lower Main Street's annual rent and forgive the back rent owed by Main Street.

Another party, Liberty National Bank, also participated in the mediation. 

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However, neither its dispute with Civic Partners nor the resolution of that dispute is

directly implicated by this appeal.

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
In November 2009, Civic Partners and Main Street entered into the amended

lease contemplated bythe settlement agreement. Civic Partners' obligations under the

amended lease were conditioned on Civic Partners' formalizing the agreements with

Bank and City described in the settlement agreement on or before January 15, 2010. 

In the event Civic Partners was unable to do so, the amended lease gave Civic

Partners the right to declare the amended lease null and void on or before January 31,

2010.

That same month, Civic Partners was able to formalize the agreement with

Bank. Bank's obligations under the parties' restructure agreement were conditioned

on, inter alia, Civic Partners' formalizing the agreement with City and entering into

the amended lease with Main Street described in the settlement agreement on or

before December 31, 2009. In the event Civic Partners was unable to do so, the

restructure agreement provided the loan modification would be void and without

effect.

Civic Partners was not able to formalize the agreement with City: In December

2009, the city council declined to ratify the settlement agreement. Civic Partners and

Main Street nevertheless agreed to several extensions of the January 31, 2010

deadline for Civic Partners to declare the amended lease null and void. The last such

extension pushed the deadline to March 31, 2011. 

In the meantime, in December 2010, Bank commenced a state court lawsuit

against Civic Partners. In January 2011, City followed suit.

On March 30, 2011, Civic Partners notified Main Street it was terminating the

amended lease. Fifteen days later, Civic Partners filed a petition for relief under

chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code.

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
In July 2012, on Civic Partners' motion to determine whether the original lease

or the amended lease controlled, the bankruptcy court concluded the amended lease

was still in effect and controlled Civic Partners' relationship with Main Street. The

bankruptcy court held Iowa rescission law prevented Civic Partnersfromterminating

the amended lease without returning a $200,000.00 "restructuring payment" it had

received from Main Street. Alternatively, the bankruptcy court held Civic Partners

could not terminate the amended lease without Bank's consent.

In January 2013, on Civic Partners' motion to reconsider its earlier ruling, the

bankruptcy court again held the amended lease wasstill in effect and controlled Civic

Partners' relationship with Main Street. Civic Partners appealed both orders. 

Because the bankruptcy court's orders were interlocutory, we dismissed the appeal in

early February 2013.

2

In the meantime, in September 2012–after the bankruptcy court first held the

amended lease was still in effect, but before it reiterated its holding–Civic Partners

filed a "Second Amended and Substituted Plan of Reorganization (Dated September

26, 2012)." While Civic Partners continued to argue the amended lease had been 3

terminated, the plan was predicated on the amended lease, in compliance with the

bankruptcy court's earlier rulings. In earlyOctober 2013, the bankruptcy court denied

confirmation of the plan, in large part because the bankruptcy court determined it was

not feasible.

While Civic Partners' appeal was pending, the bankruptcy court entered an 2

"Amended Ruling on [Civic Partners'] Motion to Reconsider Withdrawing and

Superseding the Court's Opinion/Order Ruling on Motion to Reconsider."

Two earlier versions of Civic Partners' plan had not been confirmed. With

3

certain exceptions, the proponent of a plan may modify its plan at any time either

before or after confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1127. In some jurisdictions, such modified

plans are referred to as amended plans.

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
Four days later, Bank filed a motion to dismiss Civic Partners' bankruptcy case. 

The matter was held in abeyance while Civic Partners again appealed several of the

bankruptcy court's orders, including its orders regarding the amended lease and its

order denying confirmation of Civic Partners' plan. Because the bankruptcy court's

orders were interlocutory, we dismissed the appeals in late October 2013. On Civic

Partners' further appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did likewise in March

2015.

After the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Civic Partners' motion for

rehearing and for rehearing en banc in April 2015, the bankruptcy court held a

continued hearing on Bank's motion to dismiss. The bankruptcy court took the matter

under advisement and on July 8, 2015, entered an order dismissing Civic Partners'

bankruptcy case. Civic Partners timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for clear error the bankruptcy court's findings of fact; we review de

novo its legal conclusions. Islamov v. Ungar (In re Ungar), 633 F.3d 675, 678-79

(8th Cir. 2011). We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court's decision

to dismiss a chapter 11 case. Cedar Shore Resort, Inc. v. Mueller (In re Cedar Shore

Resort, Inc.), 235 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 2000). 

A court abuses its discretion when a relevant factor that

should have been given significant weight is not

considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is

considered and given significant weight; or when all proper

factors and no improper ones are considered, but the court

commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those

factors.

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, 702 F.3d 1147, 1152

(8th Cir. 2013).

Our review necessarily includes a review of the bankruptcy court's

interpretation of the amended lease, one of the rulings that led to its decision to

dismiss Civic Partners' chapter 11 case. In the absence of any suggestion that the

4

amended lease was ambiguous, we review de novo the bankruptcy court's

interpretation of it. Arvest Bank v. Cook (In re Cook), 504 B.R. 496, 502 (B.A.P. 8th

Cir. 2014).

DISCUSSION

Under Iowa law, our analysis of the amended lease begins and ends with the

5

language of the amended lease.

The following propositions are deemed so well established

that authorities need not be cited in support of them:

 . . .

n. In the construction of written contracts, the cardinal

principle is that the intent of the parties must control, and

except in cases of ambiguity, thisis determined by what the

contract itself says.

Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3).

Our jurisdiction extends to "the events and rulings leading to a final order." 4

Zahn v. Fink (In re Zahn), 526 F.3d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir. 2008).

Pursuant to ¶ 30.5 of the amended lease, "The laws of the State of Iowa shall

5

govern the validity, construction, performance[,] and enforcement of this Lease."

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
Paragraph 30.24 of the amended lease provides:

[Civic Partners'] obligations under this Lease are

conditioned upon [Civic Partners'] obtaining (each being a

"Condition") definitive agreements: (i) from [City]

restructuring [Civic Partners'] existing indebtedness with

[City] and real estate taxes for the [Promenade] as more

fully described in [the settlement agreement;] (ii) from

[City] to remedy the Outside Construction Defects at

[City's] expense[; and] (iii) from [Bank] restructuring

[Civic Partners'] existing indebtedness with [Bank] for the

[Promenade] as more fully described in [the settlement

agreement] . . . . If [Civic Partners] is unable to satisfy any

one or more of the Conditions on or before January 15,

2010, [Civic Partners] shall have the right (but not the

obligation) until and including January 31, 2010 to declare

this Lease null and void with written notice to [Main

Street]. Upon such declaration by [Civic Partners], the

Original Lease shall be deemed reinstated by the parties as

if this Lease was never entered into and all payments by

[Main Street] under this Lease shall be applied to the

Original Lease.

This provision is clear and unambiguous. Because Civic Partners was not able

to enter into an agreement–definitive or otherwise–with City, Civic Partners had the

right to terminate the amended lease, reinstate the original lease, and apply the

payments Main Street had made under the amended lease to Main Street's obligations

under the original lease.

Civic Partners and Main Street were well within their rights to include such a

provision in the amended lease.

We have here a contract which by its terms is specific. In

retaking the property the appellant was but exercising his

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
rights under the contract, and upon the exercise of which,

by the very terms of the contract, the purchase money

already paid was to be considered as rent for the use of the

property. The parties had a right to so contract. Upon the

exercise of this right in a legal manner, the legal effect isto

terminate the contract. It did not amount to a rescission of

the contract, but amounted to the exercise of rights under

the contract.

Smith v. Russell, 272 N.W. 121, 125-26 (Iowa 1937).

When Civic Partners terminated the amended lease, it was simply exercising

its contractual right to do so. Smith tells us this was not a rescission under Iowa law.

Bank, Main Street, and City nevertheless argue another provision of the

amended lease–specifically, ¶ 30.23–required Civic Partners to return the

$200,000.00 restructuring payment to Main Street before terminating the amended

lease. We disagree.

Paragraph 30.23 of the amended lease provides:

In consideration of [Civic Partners'] entering into this

Lease, [Main Street] shall pay to [Bank], on account of

[Civic Partners], the sum of $200,000 in immediately

available funds (the "Restructuring Payment") as follows: 

(i) $150,000 on the Effective Date[;] and (ii) $50,000 on or

before December 15, 2009. The Restructuring Payment is

an obligation of[Main Street] separate and distinct fromall

other obligations of [Main Street] under this Lease and

shall not be a credit against, or otherwise on account of any

Minimum Annual Rent, Percentage Rent, Additional Rent

or any other sums payable by [Main Street] to [Civic

Partners] pursuant to this Lease.

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
This provision is also clear and unambiguous. Main Street was required to

make the restructuring payment under the amended lease, and the restructuring

payment was not to be applied toward any other payments Main Street made under

the amended lease. Nothing in ¶ 30.23 required Civic Partners to return the

restructuring payment to Main Street before terminating the amended lease. 

Likewise, nothing in ¶ 30.23 prohibited Civic Partners from applying the

restructuring payment–and any other payments Main Street made under the amended

lease–to Main Street's obligations under the original lease.

Bank, Main Street, and City also argueCivicPartners agreed–in the assignment

of rents Civic Partners gave Bank–not to terminate the amended lease without Bank's

written consent, which was not given. Civic Partners countersBank consented–in the

restructure agreement between Civic Partners and Bank–to Civic Partners' including

in the amended lease its right to terminate the amended lease. Bank's consenting to

Civic Partners' having the right to terminate the amended lease, however, is not the

same thing as Bank's consenting in writing to Civic Partners' exercising that right.

Civic Partners' failure to obtain Bank's written consent before terminating the

amended lease may have been a default under the assignment of rents. Bank's

6

remedies for a default under the assignment of rents are described in that document. 

However, Bank, Main Street, and City have not identified any provision in either the

amended lease or the assignment of rents that, in the event of a default under the

assignment of rents, would render ineffective Civic Partners' termination of the

amended lease.

That is, of course, for the bankruptcy court to determine, if and when called 6

upon to do so.

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
Undaunted, Bank, Main Street, and City argue the bankruptcy court held, in the

alternative, Bank was "more than an incidental beneficiary" of the amended lease. 

Under Iowa law,

in order to have standing to assert a breach of contract, a

party not privy to such contract must be regarded as a

direct beneficiary to the contract, and not as an incidental

beneficiary. That is, he must be regarded as either a donee

beneficiary or a creditor beneficiary, as those terms are

defined in Restatement, Contracts, Section 133, in order to

recover damages flowing from breach of a contract to

which he was not a party. . . .

One is a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of

the promise in light of surrounding circumstances that the

purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or

part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the

beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the

promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed

nor asserted to be due from the promisee to beneficiary. 

One is a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift

appears from the terms of the promise in accompanying

circumstances but performance of the promise will satisfy

an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to

the beneficiary. One is merely an incidental beneficiary

and no rights accrue to him from the contract if he fails to

qualify as either a donee beneficiary or creditor

beneficiary.

Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Util. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376, 392 (S.D. Iowa 1973)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The bankruptcy court's finding that Bank was more than an incidental

beneficiary of the amended lease is not clearly erroneous. The record does not

support a finding that Bank was a donee beneficiary: Nothing in the amended lease

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
or the surrounding circumstances suggests either Civic Partners or Main Street

intended to make a gift to Bank. However, the record does support a finding that

Bank was a creditor beneficiary, at least to the extent of the $200,000.00 restructuring

payment: In ¶ 30.23 of the amended lease, Main Street promised to pay that sum to

Bank on account of Civic Partners. Consequently, we agree Bank was more than an

incidental beneficiary of the amended lease.

Bank's status as a creditor beneficiary of the amended lease would give it

standing to assert a breach of contract and the right to recover damages flowing from

the breach. Id. For example, if Main Street had failed to make the $200,000.00

restructuring payment to Bank on account of Civic Partners, Bank could have sued

Main Street to recover that sum. However, Bank, Main Street, and City have not

identified any way in which Civic Partners breached the amended lease. Terminating

it was not a breach: As previously discussed, the amended lease specifically gave

Civic Partners the contractual right to terminate it.

In deciding to dismiss Civic Partners' chapter 11 case, the bankruptcy court was

primarily concerned with the delay and lack of progress in the case and with Civic

Partners' failure to confirm a plan. However, much of the delay and lack of progress

in the case was directly attributable to Civic Partners' earlier unsuccessful attempts

to appeal the bankruptcy court's rulings regarding the amended lease. Constrained

by those rulings, Civic Partners was unable to propose a plan that was confirmable,

as amply demonstrated by the bankruptcy court's order denying confirmation ofCivic

Partners' most recent plan. Under the circumstances, the only way for Civic Partners

to move the case along was to allow the case to be dismissed and to then seek

appellate review of the bankruptcy court's interlocutory rulings.

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512 
CONCLUSION

Having reviewed de novo the amended lease, we conclude the original lease,

not the amended lease, controls Civic Partners' relationship with Main Street. In

keeping with its earlier rulings, the bankruptcy court did not consider the possibility

that Civic Partners might be able to propose a confirmable plan predicated on the

original lease. This is a relevant factor that should be given significant weight in

determining whether to dismiss Civic Partners' chapter 11 case. We therefore reverse

the bankruptcy court's July 8, 2015 order dismissing Civic Partners' chapter 11

bankruptcy case and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

7

In light of our decision to remand, we do not reach the remaining issuesraised

7

by Civic Partners. We are not expressly or impliedly disposing of those remaining

issues; likewise, we are not explicitly or implicitly adopting any of the bankruptcy

court's rulings regarding them. See Stalnaker v. Allison (In re Tri-State Financial,

LLC), 519 B.R. 759, 765 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2014).

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Appellate Case: 15-6024 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Entry ID: 4427512