Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07077/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Doe
Appellee
Darlene C. Robinson
Appellant
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 2014 Decided December 19, 2014

No. 13-7077

DARLENE C. ROBINSON,

APPELLANT

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00723)

Charles C. Parsons argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant. 

Kathleen A. Carey argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellees. Mark F. Sullivan entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, SRINIVASAN, Circuit

Judge, and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

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2

GARLAND, Chief Judge: A bus driver, one Mr. Bumpass,

hits the brakes as he approaches a stop sign. The plaintiff, a

passenger on the bus, falls backward and breaks her leg. The

question on appeal is whether, in light of the evidence presented

at trial, a reasonable jury could find the bus company liable for

the plaintiff’s injury. Applying the common law of the District

of Columbia, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that a

reasonable jury could not. 

I

On the morning of April 16, 2008, Darlene Robinson

boarded a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(WMATA) bus at the Gallatin and 11th Street stop in Northeast

Washington, D.C. She paid her fare and proceeded past bus

driver Ronald Bumpass. Robinson continued down the aisle,

gripping the seat-back handrails as she went. Bumpass closed

the doors and began driving away from the stop. Shortly

thereafter, Bumpass hit the brakes as he approached a stop sign

on Gallatin Street. As the bus decelerated, Robinson -- who was

still standing, facing the back of the bus -- lost her grip on a

handrail, fell in a twisting motion, “landed on [her] . . .

backside,” and broke her left leg. J.A. 514 (Robinson

Testimony).

Robinson sued WMATA, alleging that Bumpass’ negligent

operation of the bus caused her injury and that WMATA was

responsible.1

 At trial, Robinson sought to prove Bumpass’

negligence on two theories. First, she sought to show that he

1

Robinson’s complaint named WMATA and “Bus Driver John

Doe” as defendants. J.A. 37. Although Robinson reserved the right

to amend her complaint when she learned the driver’s identity, she did

not do so. The parties have proceeded on the understanding that

WMATA is the sole defendant, and so do we.

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violated WMATA’s standard operating procedures (SOPs). 

Second, she sought to show that the “jerk” caused by Bumpass’

application of the brakes was of such extraordinary force that 

his negligence could be inferred.

In support of her claim that Bumpass was negligent because

he violated WMATA’s SOPs, Robinson presented the expert

testimony of Dr. Carl Berkowitz, a public transportation safety

engineer. Dr. Berkowitz testified that the National Academy of

Sciences and the U.S. Department of Transportation fund

research studies to address transportation safety issues, and that

the results and recommendations from those studies “emanate[]”

and “filter[] down” to “all the major transit agencies.” J.A. 270-

71. According to Berkowitz, those results and recommendations

have led to nationally agreed-upon safety standards that all

major cities in the United States, including the District of

Columbia, have implemented. 

Dr. Berkowitz then identified two WMATA SOPs relevant

to this case, and stated that each reflected the national standard

of care for city bus travel. First, a WMATA bus driver is

required to check his or her rearview mirror before departing

from a stop to confirm that all passengers are “secure” and

“prepared for vehicle movement.” J.A. 938, 941. Second, a

WMATA bus driver is instructed to start the bus “gradually” and

stop the bus “smoothly.” J.A. 942-43. 

Counsel for WMATA asked Dr. Berkowitz where and when

these national standards for safe bus travel were articulated. 

Berkowitz replied that they were “developed from research,

which actually dates back to Hammurabi -- the Hammurabi

Code -- I guess [that] would be 3,500 years ago.” J.A. 458. He

also said that the “first major research in this area[] was in the

book of Deuteronomy.” Id.

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To establish that Bumpass violated the SOPs identified by

Dr. Berkowitz, Robinson called Bumpass himself to the stand. 

Bumpass admitted that he did not check his mirror before

leaving the stop that morning. He knew there were several open

seats up front, he said, and he assumed Robinson had sat down

by the time he closed the doors and started driving. J.A. 667-68.

In support of her alternative theory -- that Bumpass’

negligence was shown by the fact that his braking had caused

the bus to jerk with extraordinary force -- Robinson took the

stand to testify that the bus was going “fast, faster than normal

buses,” J.A. 513, and that it “was jerking and then [there] was an

abrupt stop,” J.A. 528. The abrupt stop, she testified, caused her

to lose her grip on the handrail and fall. J.A. 528-29. 

Robinson also presented the expert testimony of Dr. Jamie

Williams, a biomedical engineer, to explain how the force of the

bus’ movements caused her to lose her grip on the handrail and

fall down. Dr. Williams testified that a torsional force on

Robinson’s left lower leg, brought about by the deceleration of

the bus, caused her leg to break. Williams estimated that, based

on the maximum grip strength of a woman of similar age and

weight as Robinson, the “deceleration that would have

destabilized her” would have been roughly “.38 times gravity.” 

J.A. 207. When asked on cross-examination if she had any

information relating to the actual strength of Robinson’s grip

that day, Dr. Williams acknowledged that she did not. She

testified that her conclusions were premised on the assumption

that Robinson had been holding onto the handrail as tightly as

she possibly could. J.A. 227-28.

At the close of Robinson’s case and again at the conclusion

of all of the evidence, WMATA moved for judgment as a matter

of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The district

court reserved ruling on those motions and submitted the case to

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the jury, which returned a verdict for Robinson and awarded her

$404,713.28 in damages. Thereafter, the court granted

WMATA’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law

under Rule 50(b). Robinson v. WMATA, 941 F. Supp. 2d. 61

(D.D.C. 2013). 

In granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of

WMATA, the court rejected Robinson’s effort to prove

negligence through the violation of WMATA’s standard

operating procedures. The court concluded that Dr. Berkowitz

had failed to show that either of the two SOPs reflected national

standards of care; that there was no evidence of “a causal

connection between the driver’s failure to check the internal

center mirror and [Robinson’s] injury,” id. at 69 n.5; and that the

“start gradually and stop smoothly” SOP could not serve as a

negligence standard because to treat it as such “would be

inconsistent with District of Columbia law,” id. at 71. The court

also rejected Robinson’s theory that Bumpass’ negligence could

be inferred from the bus’ jerk, concluding that the evidence was

insufficient to show that the jerk was of an extraordinary nature. 

Robinson filed a timely appeal, and that appeal is now

before us. 

II

We must affirm a Rule 50(b) judgment as a matter of law

“if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences, it is

clear that a reasonable jury could only have found for the

moving party.” Johnson v. WMATA, No. 90-7027, 1991 WL

214174, at *2 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see Conseil Alain Aboudaram,

S.A. v. de Groote, 460 F.3d 46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Federal

jurisdiction over this lawsuit arises under the WMATA

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Compact. See D.C. Code § 9-1107.01(81).2

 The Compact

provides that WMATA shall be liable for the torts of its

employees “in accordance with the law of the applicable

signatory,” id. § 9-1107.01(80), which in this case is the District

of Columbia.3

 The tort law of the District of Columbia therefore

controls our disposition, Briggs v. WMATA, 481 F.3d 839, 843

(D.C. Cir. 2007), and we must aim “to achieve the same

outcome [that] would result if the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals considered this case,” id. (quoting Novak v. Capital

Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).

In Johnson v. WMATA, we suggested that there are (at least)

two theories under which a plaintiff may recover in a bus

negligence case against WMATA. 1991 WL 214174, at *1. 

First, a plaintiff may present direct evidence of negligence. For

example, evidence that a bus driver let himself be distracted

while driving can be sufficient to recover. See Sibert-Dean v.

WMATA, 721 F.3d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (affirming a

finding of negligence where the driver turned to look at teenage

girls). Evidence that a driver violated an applicable standard of

care can likewise be sufficient. See WMATA v. O’Neill, 633

A.2d 834, 841 (D.C. 1993). Second, a plaintiff may offer

circumstantial evidence of negligence by showing that the driver

caused a jerk “so violent or extraordinary that it could not have

been consistent with safe operation of the bus.” Johnson, 1991

2

The Compact -- an interstate agreement among the District of

Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia -- created WMATA. See Pub. L.

No. 89-774, 80 Stat. 1324 (1966) (codified as amended at D.C. Code

§ 9-1107.01 et seq.). Section 81 of the Compact provides that federal

district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the state

courts of the three signatories, “of all actions brought by or against”

WMATA. D.C. Code § 9-1107.01(81).

3

WMATA does not dispute that it is liable for Robinson’s injury

if Bumpass was negligent and if that negligence caused the injury.

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WL 214174, at *2 (citing Boyko v. WMATA, 468 A.2d 582, 584

(D.C. 1983)). 

The question on this appeal is whether Robinson presented

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find negligence

under either theory. We address the direct evidence theory in

Part III and the circumstantial evidence theory in Part IV.

III

Under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff seeking to prove

her case through direct evidence of negligence has the burden of

establishing three elements: (1) “the applicable standard of

care”; (2) “a deviation from that standard by the defendant”; and

(3) “a causal relationship” between the deviation and the injury

she suffered. Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 265

(D.C. 2006). To prove her case on this theory, Robinson argued

that WMATA’s check-your-mirror and “start gradually, stop

smoothly” SOPs constituted applicable standards of care; that

Bumpass deviated from those standards; and that her injury was

the consequence of those deviations. On appeal, she challenges

the district court’s conclusion that she failed to establish that

either of the SOPs constituted an applicable standard of care

and, moreover, that she failed to show that the deviation from

the check-your-mirror SOP caused her injury. We address the

district court’s analysis of each SOP below.

A

Under the check-your-mirror SOP, a WMATA bus driver

is expected to check his rearview mirror and “[m]ake sure all

passengers are secure before moving the bus.” J.A. 938. 

According to Robinson’s expert, Dr. Berkowitz, “secure” means

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that the passengers “are holding on to something.” J.A. 442.4

The district court concluded both that Berkowitz’s testimony

was insufficient to show that this SOP constituted a national

standard of care in the public transportation industry, and that

Robinson failed to show that violation of the SOP caused her

injury.

Ordinarily, the applicable standard of care is the traditional

reasonable person standard, which the “jury can

ascertain . . . without the aid of expert testimony.” Godfrey v.

Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2009). But where “the

subject in question is so distinctly related to some science,

profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average

layperson,” the plaintiff must proffer expert testimony to

establish the applicable standard of care. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted); accord Varner, 891 A.2d at 265. Put

differently, an expert is necessary unless the subject matter is

“within the realm of common knowledge and everyday

experience” of average jurors. Godfrey, 559 F.3d at 572

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

When an expert witness is required, the expert must “clearly

articulate and reference a standard of care by which the

defendant’s actions can be measured.” Varner, 891 A.2d at 269

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Especially in

cases involving safety standards, the expert must also show that

4

Dr. Berkowitz had initially tried to testify that the national

standard of care required passengers to be seated before a bus driver

started driving. But the district court barred that testimony on the

ground that WMATA has an express policy permitting passengers to

stand while riding a bus, and that this policy constitutes a

“discretionary decision” that is “shielded from suit” under § 80 of the

WMATA Compact. Robinson v. WMATA, 858 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37

(D.D.C. 2012). Robinson does not appeal that ruling.

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the particular practice at issue reflects a national standard of

care. See, e.g., Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 570 F.3d

305, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Briggs, 481 F.3d at 846-47; Clark v.

District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 635 (D.C. 1997). An

expert’s personal opinions or “unsupported assertion[s] as to the

national standard of care” are insufficient. Clark, 708 A.2d at

635. Further, although internal agency manuals such as

WMATA’s standard operating procedures may provide evidence

bearing on the standard of care, they do not, on their own,

establish the national standard. Briggs, 481 F.3d at 848; Varner,

891 A.2d at 269. Rather, the expert must show that the practices

to which the agency has committed reflect “the national standard

of care and not a higher, more demanding one.” Clark, 708

A.2d at 636. 

Robinson argues, first, that the district court improperly

required her to establish the standard of care via an expert

witness. Indeed, we seriously doubt that determining whether

it is reasonable to start a motor vehicle without checking to

make sure one’s passengers are secure is outside “the realm of

common knowledge and everyday experience” of average

jurors. Godfrey, 559 F.3d at 572; see, e.g., O’Neill, 633 A.2d at

841 & n.14 (holding that an expert was not required to establish

that a WMATA bus driver should have alerted the police when

two drunk men loudly threatened and later assaulted another

passenger aboard a Metrobus); WMATA v. Young, 731 A.2d 389,

396 (D.C. 1999) (holding that whether a bicyclist “was able to

avoid colliding with” a city bus is not “beyond the ken of the

average layperson”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. BOB

DYLAN, Subterranean Homesick Blues, on BRINGING IT ALL

BACK HOME (Columbia Records 1965) (“You don’t need a

weatherman to know which way the wind blows.”).

The problem is that Robinson forfeited this argument. The

district court’s first opinion in this case, denying WMATA’s

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motion for summary judgment, indicated that an expert was

required to establish the standard of care because the subject was

“beyond the ken of the average layperson.” Robinson v.

WMATA, 858 F. Supp. 2d 33, 39 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Robinson did not demur. When

WMATA moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of

Robinson’s case,5

 the court again opined that “there has to be

expert testimony about the national standard of care,” J.A. 603-

04, and Robinson did not disagree. In accordance with its

expressed view, the court then instructed the jury that, “You can

only determine the standard of care required of WMATA from

the testimony of the expert witnesses regarding that standard.” 

Jury Instructions 36, § 9.08. Again, Robinson did not object. 

Finally, when WMATA filed a renewed motion for judgment as

a matter of law after the verdict, maintaining that an expert was

required because the question was “beyond the ken of the

average layperson,” J.A. 796, Robinson did not object on that

ground. 

A “fundamental principle of appellate review generally bars

a party who failed to preserve an argument in a lower tribunal

from raising it on appeal absent plain error or exceptional

circumstances.” Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C.

Cir. 2014) (en banc); see Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of

Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2010). We detect no

exceptional circumstances here. And because District of

Columbia courts have required expert testimony in many cases

that, “on first blush, appear to be within the realm of common

knowledge,” Briggs, 481 F.3d at 845, we cannot find that it was

plain error to require expert testimony to establish the standard

of care in this case. See id. (citing decisions requiring experts in

cases involving the maintenance of leaning trees, the tightness

5

WMATA renewed that motion, by incorporation, at the

conclusion of all of the evidence.

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of handcuffs, the maintenance of street lights, and the choice

between a crosswalk and a stop sign); Burke, 685 F.3d at 1106

n.2 (same). 

Robinson argues, second, that her expert’s testimony was in

any event sufficient to establish that WMATA’s check-yourmirror SOP reflected a national standard. We admit to being

tempted to delve more deeply into the question of whether this

SOP really “developed from research, which actually dates back

to Hammurabi” and “the book of Deuteronomy.” J.A. 458.6

 But

we need not resolve that question either. Whether or not Dr.

Berkowitz successfully showed that the check-your-mirror SOP

reflected a national standard, this negligence theory suffers from

an independent ailment: lack of causation. 

As the district court correctly found, “Robinson did not

introduce any evidence supporting a causal connection between

the driver’s failure to check the internal center mirror and her

injury.” Robinson, 941 F. Supp. 2d. at 69 n.5. If Bumpass had

looked in the mirror, what would he have seen? According to

Robinson’s testimony, he would have seen that she was holding

onto a handrail, J.A. 512 -- exactly what Dr. Berkowitz testified

the standard of care required him to confirm before moving the

bus, see J.A. 442. Accordingly, had Bumpass followed the SOP,

he would have done just what he did do -- move the bus -- and

hence any deviation from the standard could not have caused

Robinson’s injury.

At oral argument, Robinson’s counsel attempted to remedy

this fatal shortcoming by asserting that Robinson was not

6

Cf. CODE OF HAMMURABI § 197 (L.W. King. trans. 1915) (c.

1780 B.C.), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/

hamcode.asp (“If he break another man’s bone, his bone shall be

broken.”).

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actually secure because she was only holding onto a seat-back

handrail, as opposed to one of the bus’ vertical poles. Oral Arg.

Recording at 16:49-17:26. But Dr. Berkowitz never testified

that a passenger would not be considered “secure” unless she

were holding on to a vertical pole (as opposed to a handrail). To

the contrary, his testimony indicated that a passenger holding

onto a handrail would be considered secure. J.A. 442 (stating

that “we want to make sure that [passengers] are holding on to

something”) (emphasis added). Therefore, Robinson failed to

establish “a causal relationship between [Bumpass’] deviation

and [her] injury.” Varner, 891 A.2d at 265.7

B

Robinson’s effort to prove negligence by establishing a

violation of the “start gradually, stop smoothly” SOP fares no

better.

First, Robinson’s argument that an expert was not required

to establish this SOP as the standard of care fails for the same

reason we identified above: She did not object to the jury

instruction that required expert testimony to show that a

WMATA operating procedure evidenced a national standard of

7

There is a second causation problem as well. The SOP in

question says that a driver should check the mirror before moving the

bus; it says nothing about checking before stopping the bus. But

Robinson did not fall when the bus first began moving; she fell only

as it came to a stop. Robinson argues that Bumpass’ start and

subsequent stop were “packed into just seven seconds,” Robinson Br.

29, suggesting that his failure to look in the mirror at the start had an

effect that continued through the stop. In light of the causation

problem identified in the text, we need not consider whether this

argument is sufficient to bridge the gap between the start and the stop.

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care. And as we said, that instruction did not constitute plain

error.

Second, as the district court found, WMATA cannot be

liable for violations of the “start gradually and stop smoothly”

SOP because that “would be inconsistent with District of

Columbia law.” Robinson, 941 F. Supp. 2d. at 71. As we

discuss in Part IV, WMATA is not liable under District law for

the normal jerks and jolts commonly associated with bus travel. 

Johnson, 1991 WL 214174, at *2; Fells, 357 A.2d at 395; see

Connor v. Wash. Ry. & Elec. Co., 43 App. D.C. 329, 333-34

(D.C. 1915). Much more is required than merely failing to start

gradually or stop smoothly. Rather, the common law of the

District requires evidence that a jerk was of “extraordinary”

force before an abrupt stop may be taken as proof of negligence. 

See Johnson, 1991 WL 214174, at *2; Fells v. WMATA, 357

A.2d 395, 395 (D.C. 1976). Accordingly, whether or not the

“start gradually, stop smoothly” SOP reflects a nationally

accepted practice, it cannot be the standard of care for purposes

of a negligence action governed by District of Columbia tort

law. Robinson cannot recover against WMATA merely by

showing that Bumpass did not achieve a gradual start or a

smooth stop. 

IV

What remains is Robinson’s alternative argument that she

provided circumstantial evidence of negligence by showing that

the bus driver caused a jerk “so violent or extraordinary that it

could not have been consistent with safe operation of the bus.” 

Johnson, 1991 WL 214174, at *2 (citing Boyko, 468 A.2d at

584; Fells, 357 A.2d at 395-96). A plaintiff may pursue

damages under this theory of liability without introducing expert

testimony regarding the standard of care. See, e.g., Brighthaupt

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v. WMATA, No. 97-7217, 1998 WL 794814, at *1 (D.C. Cir.

1998).

As we have just noted, WMATA is not liable for the normal

“jerks or jars” that occur during city bus rides. Fells, 357 A.2d

at 395 (quoting D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Perry, 337 A.2d

224, 225 (D.C. 1975)). “Because ‘jerks’ occur often in the

normal operation of a bus, evidence of a jerk that resulted in

injury is not usually enough for a jury to infer negligence. If it

were, WMATA could be held liable for many common

accidents that are no fault of the driver.” Johnson, 1991 WL

214174, at *2. Instead, a plaintiff may “recover against the bus

company only by showing ‘that the “jerk” or “sudden start” was

of such unusual and extraordinary force that it could not

reasonably be said to have happened in the ordinary operation

of the vehicle.’” Boyko, 468 A.2d at 583-84 (quoting Wiggins

v. Capital Transit Co., 122 A.2d 117, 118 (D.C. 1956)); see

Brighthaupt, 1998 WL 794814, at *1. 

Such “‘unusual and extraordinary force,’” the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals has said, “cannot be inferred from

‘mere descriptive adjectives and conclusions’ alone.” Boyko,

468 A.2d at 584 (quoting Wiggins, 122 A.2d at 118). Rather,

reviewing courts must focus on “the substance of the testimony,

not on its grammatical form.” Id. The critical question “is

whether the testimony, in whatever form it is offered, describes

movement that is ‘consistent with proper operation of the bus.’” 

Id. (quoting WMATA v. Jones, 443 A.2d 45, 50 (D.C. 1982) (en

banc)).

In Boyko, for example, the plaintiff testified that the bus’

jerk was “‘abrupt,’” “‘violent,’” and “unlike what she had come

to expect in her fifty years of riding buses.” 468 A.2d at 584-85. 

Her treating physician further testified that “her injury was one

that ‘takes a considerable amount of violence.’” Id. at 583. 

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Finally, the bus driver admitted that, “when she pulled away

from the stop, she knew that the floor was wet and that appellant

had not yet reached a seat.” Id. Taken together, this testimony

was sufficient to send the case to a jury. Id. at 585. In Johnson,

by contrast, a witness’ statement that a bus’ jerk “wasn’t

normal” was insufficient. 1991 WL 214174, at *2. Likewise

insufficient was the testimony of Johnson’s doctor, who “did not

testify that the injury could only have been caused by a violent

motion of the bus.” Id.

In support of her claim that her bus experienced an

extraordinary and violent jerk, Robinson testified that the bus

was going “fast, faster than normal buses,” J.A. 513, and that it

“was jerking and then [there] was an abrupt stop,” J.A. 528. 

When asked how fast the bus was moving, Robinson said: “I

was not facing the driver, so I wasn’t aware of the speed. But I

could see the trees at the park going by swiftly as I was

proceeding to a seat.” J.A. 513. The abrupt stop, she testified,

caused her to lose her grip on the handrail and fall. J.A. 528-29.

As an initial matter, we reject WMATA’s contention that

Robinson’s testimony was insufficient merely because no other

witness corroborated it. It is true that plaintiffs who recover

under this theory often present testimony of non-party witnesses

who can in some manner corroborate the extreme nature of the

bus’ jerk. See, e.g., Boyko, 468 A.2d at 585; Brighthaupt, 1998

WL 794814, at *1. But the District of Columbia cases do not

hold that a plaintiff cannot recover on the basis of her testimony

alone. To the contrary, as the Boyko court observed, if

WMATA is arguing that there is “some fancied defect in . . . the

self-evident interest of a party in the outcome of the case, it is

unpersuasive.” 468 A.2d at 584. 

Nonetheless, we agree with the district court that

Robinson’s testimony “does not give rise to an inference that the

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deceleration was ‘of such unusual and extraordinary force that

it could not reasonably be said to have happened in the ordinary

operation of the vehicle.’” Robinson, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 73

(quoting Boyko, 468 A.2d at 584). The strongest part of her

testimony -- that the bus was traveling “fast, faster than normal

buses” -- is not enough to recover on this theory. See Boyko,

468 A.2d at 584 (distinguishing as insufficient such testimony

in Perry, 337 A.2d at 225, where the plaintiff described the bus’

movement as “unusually fast”). Robinson acknowledged that

she “wasn’t aware of the [bus’] speed,” J.A. 513, and she

provided no context for what she meant by “normal.” Traveling

faster than “normal” does not mean that the movement was

inconsistent with safe or proper operation, let alone that the stop

was. Nor was Robinson’s testimony -- that the bus’ movement

was “jerking” and the stop “abrupt” -- inconsistent with a

description of the jerks and jolts that commonly occur aboard

city buses. See Fells, 357 A.2d at 395. Under District law,

“‘testimony of a sudden stop and resulting injuries does not, by

itself, raise a permissible inference of negligence.’” Boyko, 468

A.2d at 584 (quoting Fells, 357 A.2d at 395-96); cf. Wiggins,

122 A.2d at 118 (noting that “statements that a street car ‘started

violently,’ ‘started with a violent jerk,’ . . . and the like, are not

of themselves sufficient to show negligent operation” (citation

omitted)).

The testimony of Robinson’s biomedical expert, Dr.

Williams, does not rescue her case. Dr. Williams was not

Robinson’s treating physician and never talked to her. J.A. 243. 

Williams did testify that, assuming Robinson was holding the

handrail with the maximum grip strength of a woman of similar

age and weight, the “deceleration that would have destabilized

her” would have been about “.38 times gravity.” J.A. 207. But

assuming that “.38 times gravity” constitutes an extraordinary or

violent force (no evidence was offered on the point), there was

no testimony that Robinson was capable of exerting the

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maximum grip strength of a woman of her age and weight, and

no testimony that she was holding on as tightly as she could. 

Indeed, Dr. Williams acknowledged that she had no information

at all regarding how tightly Robinson was actually holding the

handrail, and agreed that, if Robinson were “not holding onto

the hand hold with everything she’s got, it would take

less . . . deceleration to disrupt her grip.” J.A. 227-28. As a

consequence, Williams’ testimony left the jury unable to do

anything more than speculate about the actual force of the stop. 

And “[s]ufficiency of the evidence to support a claim for relief

may not be established by jury speculation.” Milone v. WMATA,

91 F.3d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

In sum, because Robinson’s testimony was “consistent with

proper operation of the bus,” and because a jury could only infer

from Dr. Williams’ testimony “that it was possible that Ms.

Robinson’s injury resulted from significant force,” Robinson,

941 F. Supp. 2d at 73-74 (internal quotation marks omitted), the

district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law in

favor of WMATA. 

V

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither of the

two negligence theories proffered by the plaintiff was supported

by evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict in her favor. The

judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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