Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01702/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01702-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kathy Mendoza-Powers
Respondent
Franz Roland Ray
Petitioner

Document Text:

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANZ ROLAND RAY, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-1702 LKK KJM P

vs.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

Warden, Avenal State Prison,

Respondent. ORDER

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding with counsel with a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his 1996 Solano County

convictions for attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, forcible oral copulation and

false imprisonment. 

On February 21, 2007, counsel filed an untitled document, signed by counsel and

petitioner, purporting to substitute petitioner to represent himself. This notice did not comply

with Local Rule 83-182(g). Accordingly, counsel remains counsel of record.

The habeas petition raises three issues: (1) the state suppressed Officer Worel’s

report in which Karen Matthews said an unknown man had stabbed her, which contradicted her

testimony that petitioner had stabbed her and forced her to copulate him orally; (2) the prosecutor

failed to correct Karen Matthews’ false testimony that she had never been arrested for a felony,

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that she had only a single arrest for prostitution, but had never been charged, and that she had not

spoken to Officer Worel; and (3) the cumulative impact of the errors denied petitioner a fair trial. 

Only a portion of the second issue is exhausted: a habeas petition heard in conjunction with

petitioner’s direct appeal challenged the prosecutor’s failure to correct Matthews’ false and

misleading testimony about her criminal record. Pet., Ex. B at 27-30 (Court of Appeal opinion). 

On August 3, 2006, counsel filed a request for an order staying the instant petition

to permit him to exhaust state remedies as to the remaining issues. He avers that these issues are

already being pursued in the state Supreme Court, in a petition filed on July 12, 2006. In re Ray,

S144968. In his declaration, counsel states that on February 9, 2006, an investigator employed

by his office to re-investigate petitioner’s case discovered the Worel police report, containing

Matthews’ initial statement about the stabbing, a statement which did not implicate petitioner. 

Pet., Ex. N (Declaration of Cliff Gardner). On April 28, 2006, petitioner’s trial counsel executed

a declaration averring he had not seen this report before. Pet., Ex. J (Declaration of Carl

Spieckerman). 

Respondent has opposed the request for a stay.

In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the Supreme Court recognized that a

district court has the discretion to stay a “mixed” petition containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims in order to allow a petitioner to exhaust state court remedies:

[I]t likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to

deny a stay. . . if the petitioner had good cause for his failure to

exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and

there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally

dilatory litigation tactics.

Id. at 278. 

In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a

habeas petition rejected by the state courts as untimely was not “properly filed” and thus could

not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. The Court acknowledged petitioner’s complaint that

this rule might cause a petitioner to lose his opportunity to pursue his claims in federal court after

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attempting to exhaust his state remedies, “only to find out at the end that he was never properly

filed and thus that his federal habeas petition is time barred.” Id. at 416 (internal quotations

omitted). The Court said:

A prisoner seeking state postconviction relief might avoid this

predicament, however, by filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal

court and asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal

habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted. A

petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing

would be timely will ordinarily constitute “good cause” for him to

file in federal court.

Id.

Respondent concedes that the instant petition is mixed, but urges that the single

exhausted claim is not timely. Although she does not argue this explicitly, respondent suggests

that this single exhausted claim, which is itself subject to dismissal if the timeliness of the claims

are evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis, cannot be a proper “anchor” to allow exhaustion of the

remaining claims, even if they are timely. She presents no authority for this proposition.

In Dolis v. Chambers, 454 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2006), the Court of Appeal

remanded a completely unexhausted petition so the district court could consider whether a stay

was appropriate under the Rhines factors. The appellate court’s determination was based, in part,

on its recognition that a dismissal of Dolis’s unexhausted petition “would effectively end any

chance at federal habeas review.” Id.; see also Akins v. Kenney, 410 F.3d 451, 456 n.1 (8th Cir.

2005) (remanding so the district court could consider a stay even though Court of Appeal was not

convinced any of the claims were exhausted). As the Seventh Circuit recognized, 

[I]t would be wise for a petitioner to file in both state and federal

court simultaneously, particularly where there is some procedural

uncertainty about the state court post-conviction proceeding, and

then ask the district court to stay the federal case until the state case

concludes to ensure that she does not miss the one-year deadline.

Dolis, 454 F.3d at 725. In this case, such a procedure is appropriate, if petitioner meets the

Rhines showing, because of the “procedural uncertainty” about the case. This determination is in

no way based on an evaluation as to whether any or all of the claims of the petition are timely or

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26 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 1

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untimely, when or if the statute of limitations began to run after the discovery of the suppressed

police report or on some other date, or even if the determination of timeliness must be made on a

claim-by-claim basis or on the application as a whole.

Under Rhines, this “procedural uncertainty” is good cause for petitioner’s failure

to exhaust his claims before filing his federal petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at 416; Rhines v. Weber,

408 F.Supp.2d 844, 848 (D.S.D. 2005) (petitioner who was reasonably confused about

exhaustion of his claims demonstrates good cause). Petitioner has reason to fear that a state

petition might be denied as untimely after the statute of limitations has run, if indeed it began to

run on February 9, 2006, which would in turn block a federal petition. This is a sufficient

showing of good cause.

Petitioner has made a sufficient showing of potential merit to the claim: he has

provided a copy of a police report that contradicts the testimony of one of two complaining

witnesses along with the declaration of trial counsel, who says he does not recall receiving the

report in discovery. This is enough of a showing of a Brady claim to justify the stay. 

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Petitioner does not appear to have engaged in dilatory litigation. As noted above,

counsel declares that his investigator found the report on February 9, 2006, that he consulted with

trial counsel and completed his investigation, and that he filed the state petition in July 2006. 

Nothing in this scenario suggests unnecessary delay.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s August 2, 2006 motion for a stay is granted. 

2. Within ninety days of the date of this order, petitioner shall file a status report

on the progress of the state exhaustion petition.

/////

/////

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3. If the state exhaustion proceeding is not completed within one hundred eighty

days of the date of this order, petitioner shall file a second status report, and further reports at

ninety day intervals until the exhaustion process is completed.

4. Within thirty days of the California Supreme Court’s resolution of the state

action, petitioner shall file a motion to lift the stay. 

5. Failure to file status reports may be grounds for lifting the stay.

6. Nothing in this order should be construed as a ruling on the timeliness of any

or all of the claims in this petition or read as foreclosing an appropriate motion on these grounds. 

DATED: March 28, 2007. 

2

ray1702.sty

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