Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00770/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00770-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of San Joaquin
Defendant
Stephanie Evans
Defendant
Victor Rodriguez
Plaintiff
Lynn K. Saga-Matsumoto
Defendant
San Joaquin County Human Services Agency
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN by and 

through the SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY 

HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY; 

STEPHANIE EVANS, an individual; 

LYNN K. SAGA-MATSUMOTO, an 

individual, and DOES 1 through 9,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-00770-TLN-JDP

ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendants

County of San Joaquin through San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (“HSA”), Stephanie 

Evans (“Evans”), and Lynn K. Saga-Matsumoto (“Saga-Matsumoto”) (collectively, 

“Defendants”). (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff Victor Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. (ECF 

No. 17.) Defendants have filed a reply. (ECF No. 20.) Having carefully considered the briefing 

filed by both parties and for the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 

No. 13) is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

///

///

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claims arise from the investigation, court hearings, and resolution of a juvenile 

dependency proceeding for minor, A.R. (ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 14–30.) Plaintiff asserts A.R. is his 

biological daughter. (Id.) When A.R. was born in 2012, she possessed the physical 

characteristics of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. (Id. at ¶ 16.) A.R. first came to Defendants’ attention 

when A.R.’s mother, E.J., was arrested for child cruelty and public intoxication. (Id. at ¶ 15.) 

E.J. had a long history of alcohol abuse and had lost her four older children due to her alcohol 

dependency. (Id. at ¶ 16.) When HSA employees interviewed E.J. about A.R.’s biological father, 

she informed them that another man, K.R., had signed a declaration of paternity and was listed on 

A.R.’s birth certificate, and A.R.’s “acting father” was E.J.’s current boyfriend, R.S. (Id. at ¶¶

16–17.) K.R. confirmed he was listed on A.R.’s birth certificate but had taken a DNA test which 

proved he was not A.R.’s biological father and “was working on having his name removed from 

her birth certificate[.]” (Id. at ¶ 16.) 

On April 2, 2013, HSA filed a petition on behalf of A.R. to institute juvenile dependency 

proceedings. (See id. at ¶¶ 18–19.) Defendants submitted numerous reports to the juvenile 

dependency court which detailed E.J.’s extensive criminal history involving alcohol abuse, child 

endangerment, and her history with child protective services. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Included in the 

petition was a police report, which detailed an altercation that occurred on July 26, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 

20.) The police report indicated E.J. had been drinking with Plaintiff when an altercation ensued

and E.J. attacked Plaintiff. (Id.) Witness statements from both Plaintiff and E.J. acknowledge 

that E.J. was five-months pregnant with Plaintiff’s child. (Id.) In addition, the jurisdiction report 

submitted by Defendants identified Plaintiff as a potential witness for the juvenile dependency 

proceedings. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that, despite the information in this police report, Defendants 

represented to the juvenile dependency court that the identity and location of A.R.’s father were 

unknown. (Id. at ¶ 21.) 

At a detention hearing on April 3, 2013, K.R. appeared and told the juvenile dependency 

court he was not A.R.’s true father. (Id. at ¶ 22.) HSA obtained a copy of A.R.’s birth certificate 

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and found there was no father listed. (Id.) K.R. never appeared in the juvenile dependency 

hearings again. (Id.) 

At the jurisdiction hearing on April 15, 2013, the juvenile dependency court proceeded in 

K.R.’s absence and relied upon the signed Declaration of Paternity to declare K.R. to be A.R.’s 

presumed father. (See id. at ¶¶ 22–23.) 

At the disposition hearing on February 6, 2014, the juvenile dependency court scheduled a 

hearing pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 366.26 (“§ 366.26”) for June 4, 

2014.1 (ECF No. 8 ¶ 24.) In preparation for this hearing, Evans prepared a declaration stating 

she attempted to determine the unknown identity of A.R.’s father but was unsuccessful. (Id. at ¶ 

25.) The court gave Evans permission to publish a citation in the local newspaper, The Record, to 

provide notice to A.R.’s unknown father to appear for the hearing. (Id.) The newspaper 

published the notice for four consecutive weeks, but no father came forward. (See id. at ¶¶ 25, 

27, 29.) 

After multiple continuances, the § 366.26 hearing was held on February 6, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 

29.) On June 15, 2015, the juvenile dependency court terminated the parental rights of all

unknown fathers. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants never attempted to contact him prior to 

the § 366.26 hearing, despite having the July 2012 police report with Plaintiff and E.J.’s 

statements that Plaintiff was A.R.’s biological father. (See id. at ¶¶ 20, 29.) He further alleges 

Defendants withheld this information from the juvenile dependency court and Evans instead 

misrepresented to the court that K.R. was A.R.’s biological father. (See id. at ¶¶ 20, 33; see also 

id. at ¶ 27 (Evans requested to provide notice of the § 366.26 hearing to K.R. through his

attorney).) As a result, Plaintiff contends he did not receive proper notice for any hearings related 

to A.R.’s juvenile dependency proceedings. (Id. at ¶ 34.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, throughout this time period, he continuously sought out E.J. and 

A.R. by contacting known relatives but was unsuccessful. (Id. at ¶ 31.) Plaintiff contacted HSA 

in 2013 and sought out the social worker on the case — Evans. (Id.) He informed Defendants he 

1 A § 366.26 hearing is a hearing to terminate the “parental rights or establish guardianship 

of children adjudged dependent children of court.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26.

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was the witness “V.R.” from the July 2012 police report that was identified as A.R.’s biological 

father. (Id.) He also requested a DNA test to prove his relationship to A.R., but the Defendants 

declined to make A.R. available for the testing. (Id. at ¶ 32.) 

On July 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed a petition with the juvenile dependency court and 

requested the court vacate all orders made regarding A.R.’s father. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Defendants 

opposed the petition on the basis that the rights of any potential fathers had been terminated. (Id.) 

The juvenile dependency court denied Plaintiff’s petition.2 (ECF No. 14 at 5–6.) Plaintiff 

appealed the decision, but the appellate court affirmed the denial. (Id. at 4–8.) 

Plaintiff initiated this action on April 14, 2016, but never served Defendants. (ECF No. 1; 

ECF No. 13 at 3.) On January 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), and 

served Defendants seven months later, on July 19, 2017. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) The operative FAC 

asserts seven causes of action against Defendants, for violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) and violations of state law: (1) First Amendment Interference 

with Familial Relations and (2) 14th Amendment Due Process against Evans and SagaMatsumoto; (3) Monell Liability against HSA; (4) Negligence against all Defendants; (5) 

Negligent Hiring, Retaining, and Training against HSA; and (6) Intentional Infliction of 

Emotional Distress and (7) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against Evans and SagaMatsumoto. (ECF No. 8 at 1.)

On September 6, 2017, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 13.) Defendants move to dismiss all counts 

arguing that:(1) Plaintiff failed to timely serve Defendants under F.R.C.P. Rule 4(m); (2) 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6); (3) Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff’s claims against HSA fail to allege an unconstitutional 

policy or practice to show the County of San Joaquin is responsible for Plaintiff’s harm. (Id.)

2 Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the order issued by the Third District 

Court of Appeal (San Joaquin) regarding Plaintiff’s petition, which was filed in the case In re 

A.R., No. C080588 (Aug. 10, 2016). (ECF No. 14.) Defendants’ request, which Plaintiff does 

not oppose, is hereby GRANTED. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 

801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (a court may take judicial notice of court records). 

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II. STANDARD OF LAW

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)

Rule 4(m) requires the plaintiff to serve a defendant “within 90 days after the complaint is 

filed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). If the defendant is not served within 90 days, the court “must 

dismiss the action without prejudice against the defendant,” unless the plaintiff “shows good 

cause for the failure.” Id. Rule 4(m) requires a “two-step analysis” for determining relief. In re 

Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). First, the district court “must extend the time 

period” for service upon a showing of good cause. Id. When determining whether the good 

cause requirement has been satisfied, the court must consider whether: “(a) the party to be served 

personally received actual notice of the lawsuit; (b) the defendant would suffer no prejudice; and 

(c) plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if his complaint were dismissed.” Boudette v. Barnette, 

923 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Hart v. United States, 817 F.2d 78, 80–81 (9th Cir. 

1987)). 

Second, if good cause is not established, “the court has the discretion to dismiss without 

prejudice or to extend the time period.” Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 512. On its face, “Rule 4(m) does 

not tie the hands of the district court after the 120–day period has expired.” Efaw v. Williams, 

473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Rather, “Rule 4(m) explicitly permits a 

district court to grant an extension of time to serve the complaint after the 120–day period.” Id.

In making this decision, courts may consider factors such as “a statute of limitations bar, 

prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of a lawsuit, and eventual service.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 

(2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice 

of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

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544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on 

liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to 

dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every 

reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 

“‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 

relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 

Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 

factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 

1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 

unadorned, the defendant–unlawfully–harmed–me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove 

facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 

U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has failed to “nudge[] [his] claims . . . across 

the line from conceivable to plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While 

the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a 

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context–specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. at 679. 

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “[a] district court should grant leave to 

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see 

also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 

denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 

freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 

deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint.” 

Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

III. ANALYSIS

The Court will first address Defendants’ argument that the case should be dismissed due 

to Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve Defendants under Rule 4(m). (ECF No. 13 at 9.) Next, the 

Court will address Plaintiff’s claims as asserted against each Defendant. 

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)

Defendants argue this action should be dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to serve 

Defendants within the 90 days required under Rule 4(m). (ECF No. 13 at 9.) In fact, Plaintiff 

served Defendants for the first time approximately seven months after filing his FAC. (Id.) 

Plaintiff concedes he served Defendants after the 90-day period allowed by Rule 4(m). (ECF No. 

17 at 14.) However, he attributes the delay to numerous internal issues within his counsel’s law 

firm and argues these issues amount to good cause. (Id.) 

Applying the two-step analysis for determining relief under Rule 4(m), the Court first 

considers whether good cause exists to extend the time period. Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 512; 

Boudette, 923 F.2d at 755–56. As discussed, the good cause determination is based on whether 

the party to be served personally received actual notice of the lawsuit and consideration of the 

prejudice that would result to the parties. Boudette, 923 F.2d at 756. 

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Here, Plaintiff claims Defendants received actual notice of the lawsuit in October 2015,

when Plaintiff served a claim for damages under the California Tort Claims Act. (ECF No. 17 at 

15.) This claim provided a “written summary of the factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims and intent 

to file a lawsuit.” (Id.) The Court therefore finds the first factor weighs in favor of good cause. 

As to the second factor, Defendants argue they will suffer prejudice if the Court extends the 

service time because Evans has retired and no longer has access to her old files. (ECF No. 20 at 

5.) Thus, Defendants will face difficulties in preparing for her defense. (Id.) The Court finds 

this factor weighs against good cause. As to the third factor, however, the Court finds Plaintiff 

will be significantly prejudiced if he is ordered to refile his lawsuit because he will likely be 

barred by the statute of limitations for his claims. (ECF No. 17 at 15); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 

F.3d 945, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2004) (California statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is two years). 

Therefore, on balance, the Court finds the factors weigh in favor of finding good cause exists to 

extend the time period for service under Rule 4(m). Boudette, 923 F.2d at 756. 

Further, even absent a finding of good cause, the Court exercises its discretion to extend 

the time period in this case, Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 512, based on the finding that the statute of 

limitations would cause Plaintiff to be severely prejudiced if the case is dismissed. See Lemoge v. 

United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Exercise of discretion to extend time to 

complete service is appropriate when, for example, a statute-of-limitations bar would operate to 

prevent re-filing of the action.”). The Court additionally accepts Plaintiff’s explanations for the 

delay in service. (See ECF No. 17 at 14–15; ECF No. 18 (declaration of counsel).) 

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

4(m). 

B. Defendant Saga-Matsumoto

Defendants move to dismiss Saga-Matsumoto from the lawsuit because Plaintiff did not 

allege any factual allegations against her. (ECF No. 13 at 11.) Plaintiff does not object to SagaMatsumoto’s dismissal but requests the dismissal be without prejudice to adding SagaMatsumoto if discovery later reveals her involvement in this action. (ECF No. 17 at 8.) If 

Plaintiff wishes to bring claims against Saga-Matsumoto at a later date, he may file a motion to 

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do so pursuant to Rule 15. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all 

claims asserted against Saga-Matsumoto and DISMISSES Saga-Matsumoto from this action

without prejudice. 

C. Federal Claims 

Plaintiff asserts three federal claims under § 1983: (1) First Amendment interference with 

familial relations against Evans (Claim 1); (2) Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive 

due process violations against Evans (Claim 2); and (3) Monell Liability against HSA (Claim 3). 

(ECF No. 8 at 13–16.) Defendants move to dismiss the individual constitutional claims on the 

basis that Evans is entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 13 at 12.) They seek dismissal of 

the Monell claim for failure to state a claim, namely failure to establish deprivation of a 

constitutional right. (Id. at 19–20.) The Court will address each claim in turn. 

i. Section 1983 

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. See Long v. Cty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 

1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely 

provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. 

Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 393–94 (1989)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it 

may be inferred (1) he was deprived of a federal right, and (2) a person or entity who committed 

the alleged violation acted under color of state law. Long, 442 F.3d at 1185. A plaintiff must 

show a causal connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation 

alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373–75 (1976). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional 

right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 

affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) 

(citation omitted). 

///

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ii. Qualified Immunity

In § 1983 actions, qualified immunity “protects government officials from civil liability 

where ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.’” Cunningham v. Kramer, 178 F. Supp. 3d 999, 

1003 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). The doctrine 

“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments” and 

“protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. 

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense; the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant. 

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1998) (citation omitted). 

A qualified immunity analysis requires determining: (1) whether facts alleged, taken in the 

light most favorable to the injured party, show the defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional 

right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established. Smith v. City of Chandler, 667 F. App’x 

648, 649 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by 

Pearson, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). Courts may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of 

the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 

circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. However, if the Court 

initially addresses the first prong and finds that no constitutional right was violated under the 

alleged facts, the inquiry ends, and the defendants prevail. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

In deciding the second prong, the Court considers whether the contours of the right were 

sufficiently clear at the time that the action occurred so that “a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). 

“The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly 

established.” Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis 

in original) (internal quotations omitted). This question must be answered “not as a broad general 

proposition,” but with reference to the facts of specific cases. Id. (citing Mullenix v. Luna, 577 

U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). To determine whether a right is clearly established, a court “looks for cases of 

controlling authority in the plaintiff’s jurisdiction at the time or a consensus of cases of persuasive 

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authority[.]” Kramer v. Cullinan, 878 F.3d 1156, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 

The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the right at issue was clearly established. Id. at 

1164. 

iii. First Amendment Interference with Familial Relations

Plaintiff claims Evans violated his constitutional right to familial association by “refusing 

to acknowledge the clear evidence that Plaintiff was in fact the biological father of minor A.R., 

withholding the informal communications between Plaintiff and Defendants from the dependency 

court, and opposing any attempts by Plaintiff to prove that he was and is in fact A.R.’s biological 

father.” (ECF No. 8 ¶ 40.) Defendants argue Plaintiff lacks standing under this claim because he 

“failed to establish a legal parental right to A.R.” and as a result, he cannot allege a violation of a 

“non-existent right to familial association.” (ECF No. 13 at 15–16.) The Court finds Defendants 

have the better argument. 

The flaw in Plaintiff’s argument is that he has not established Evans violated any clearly 

established right. “[T]he First Amendment protects those relationships, including family 

relationships, that presuppose ‘deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other 

individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and 

beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.’” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 

685 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bd. of Dir. v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)) (citation 

omitted). Thus, the Constitution protects “the parent-child relationship from unwanted 

interference by the state.” Kirkpatrick v. Cty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 2016). 

However, “parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent 

and child.” Id. at 789 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983)). Rather, 

[i]t is when an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the 

responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the 

rearing of his child, that his interest in personal contact with his child 

acquires substantial [constitutional protection]. Until then, a person 

with only potential parental rights enjoys a liberty interest in the 

companionship, care, and custody of his children that is 

unambiguously lesser in magnitude. 

Id. at 789 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “[T]he mere existence of a biological link

does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. Thus, a person who 

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brings a familial association claim requires a “more enduring” relationship “which reflect[s] some 

assumption of parental responsibility.” Kirkpatrick, 843 F.3d at 788–89 (holding father could not 

challenge the seizure of a child because he had failed to establish his parental rights as of the date 

of the seizure). 

Here, even accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations that he is A.R.’s biological father,3

Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing he had the type of parent-child relationship that is accorded 

constitutional protection. See Kirkpatrick, 843 F.3d at 788–89. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges no facts 

showing he has ever spent time with A.R. since she was born or even attempted to cultivate such 

a relationship with her. On this basis alone, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate he is entitled to the First 

Amendment protections related to familial relations. 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues his right to “obtain status as a de facto or presumed parent 

was foreclosed” when Evans told the juvenile court that she had no knowledge of and had not 

located any of A.R.’s potential fathers. (ECF No. 17 at 19.) But this argument is premised on the 

contention that a de facto parent’s rights under California law are equated with the rights of a 

legal parent for purposes of constitutional rights. They are not. See e.g., Olvera v. Cty. of 

Sacramento, 932 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Miller v. Cal. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 355 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004)) (holding, on Fourteenth Amendment claim, being de 

facto parents merely conferred the right to appear in juvenile court proceedings and “no other, or 

weightier interest of constitutional dimension”). Nor has Plaintiff identified any legal authority to 

support the contention that he had a fundamental right to obtain status as a de facto parent. 

Further, to the extent Plaintiff suggests Defendants prevented him from establishing the 

3 Defendants dispute this contention on the bases that: (1) Plaintiff admits there is no DNA 

proof of this contention; (2) Plaintiff and E.J.’s witness statements included in the 2012 police 

report similarly assert this belief with no other evidence (see ECF No. 8 ¶ 20); (3) E.J. did not 

identify A.R. as a potential father to the juvenile court or Defendants; (4) neither of the two men 

E.J. did identify submitted any evidence to Defendants or the juvenile court that he was not 

A.R.’s biological father (see id. at ¶¶ 16–17, 22); (5) the legally-binding declaration of paternity 

signed by K.R. indicates he is A.R.’s biological father (id. at ¶¶ 16–17); and (6) Plaintiff alleges 

no facts showing he pursued any of the legal remedies under California law (as set forth under 

Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7500 et seq.) to establish legal parental rights (see generally id.). (See ECF 

No. 13 at 4–6, 16.) 

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requisite parent-child relationship, Plaintiff’s contention is belied by his own allegations. 

Notably, despite knowing he was A.R.’s father in July 2012 and learning of the dependency case 

in 2013 when he contacted HSA and Evans (see ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 20, 31), Plaintiff nevertheless did 

not appear or seek to appear at any of the juvenile dependency proceedings, and he did not file his 

§ 388 petition in the juvenile dependency court until July 29, 2015, nearly three years after A.R. 

was born.

4

 (See ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 22–24, 29 (dependency proceedings on April 3, 2013, April 15, 

2013, February 6, 2014, and February 6, 2015); id. at ¶ 34 (petition).) 

In sum, because Plaintiff cannot establish entitlement to First Amendment familial 

association protections as a matter of law, his claim for violations of that right necessarily fail. 

This deficiency cannot be cured by amendment. Gardner, 563 F.3d at 990. In addition, Plaintiff 

has identified no legal authority that identifies any clearly established right of a biological parent 

with no prior interactions with his child — or a de facto parent — to First Amendment familial 

association protections.

5

 Consequently, no reasonable social worker in Evans’s position would 

have known that her specific actions violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, Evans is 

entitled to qualified immunity under both prongs of the Saucier analysis. Saucier, 533 U.S. at

///

4 Plaintiff additionally alleges he was unable to attend the dependency hearings because 

Defendants caused him not to receive proper notice of any of the hearing dates. (See ECF No. 8 ¶ 

34.) But this assertion is refuted by the fact that the § 366.26 hearing was noticed by publication 

for four weeks — which the juvenile dependency court deemed proper (see id. at ¶¶ 25, 27) —

yet Plaintiff also failed to attend this hearing. If Plaintiff seeks to dispute the sufficiency of the 

notice by publication ruling, he likely runs afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which divests 

federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction where civil claims “are inextricably intertwined with 

the state court’s decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state 

ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules.” 

See Tali v. Liao, No. 18-CV-00330-LHK, 2018 WL 5816171, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2018)

(citing Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008)). Therefore, the Court 

assumes without determining that the notice publication itself was proper and sufficient to 

provide Plaintiff notice of — at a minimum — the § 366.26 proceeding. 

5 Plaintiff cites to several cases in support of his contention that he has a clearly established 

right to familial association. (ECF No. 17 at 18.) However, as Defendants correctly note, these 

cases are inapposite and therefore unavailing because they pertain to the rights of a foster parent

contesting removal of a child already in his/her care. (ECF No. 20 at 5–6.) Plaintiff is neither a 

foster parent, nor did he have any prior relationship with A.R. 

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201. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to this claim without leave to 

amend. 

iv. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 

The FAC asserts a claim for procedural and substantive due process violations under the 

Fourteenth Amendment against Evans. (ECF No. 8 at 14–15.) As an initial matter, the Court 

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim because Plaintiff only opposes Defendants’ 

Motion as to the substantive due process claim and does not oppose dismissal of the procedural 

due process claim. (See ECF No. 17 at 20–22.) Next, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s substantive 

due process claim. 

To establish a “substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must . . . show a government 

deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 

1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 1010) (quoting Nunez v. City of L.A., 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

However, “before turning to the question of whether [Plaintiff’s] due process rights were violated, 

[the Court] must first determine whether there has been a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” 

Id. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions deprived him of “a full and fair opportunity to 

seek unification of his daughter.” (ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 44, 49.) Plaintiff claims Defendants caused this 

deprivation when they: (1) failed to comply with unspecified provisions of the California Welfare 

and Institutions Code and internal HSA policies; (2) affirmatively withheld from the juvenile 

dependency court information that Defendants were communicating with Plaintiff about his 

potential status as A.R.’s biological father; and (3) misrepresented to the juvenile dependency 

court that the biological father was “unknown,” despite knowledge that Plaintiff was A.R.’s 

biological father. (Id. at ¶¶ 45–46, 48.) 

In support of the argument that Evans is qualifiedly immune, Defendants’ Motion focuses 

mainly on the reasonableness of Evans’s actions in light of the information available to her at the 

time. Namely, it was reasonable for Evans to rely on the information E.J. gave her about A.R.’s 

potential fathers and K.R.’s signed declaration of paternity, which has “the same force and effect 

as a judgment for paternity issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 13 at 13 

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(citing Cal Fam. Code § 7573).) Further, in light of K.R.’s singular appearance at the April 3,

2013 proceeding to purportedly dispute, without providing supporting evidence, that he was 

A.R.’s biological father, it was reasonable for Evans to seek the juvenile dependency court’s 

approval to publish notice of the § 366.26 hearing to all of A.R.’s potential fathers, in addition to 

providing notice to K.R. specifically. (See id. at 15–16.) Further, Defendants argue Plaintiff has 

not identified any clearly established right to familial association where he failed to establish a 

legal parental right to A.R. before the juvenile dependency court terminated all potential fathers’ 

parental rights. (Id. (citing Kirkpatrick, 843 F.3d at 788).) Defendants again have the better 

argument, as much of the Court’s analysis with respect to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is 

applicable here as well. 

As directed by the Ninth Circuit, the Court must first determine whether there has been a 

deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1110. While Plaintiff alleges he 

was deprived of “a full and fair opportunity to seek unification of his daughter,” the protected 

liberty interest he is clearly invoking is the right to familial association. The Supreme Court has 

recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects the liberty interest “of 

parents in the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65

(2000); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). However, as discussed with 

respect to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, Plaintiff fails to establish he had a protected liberty 

interest in familial association because he did not have the type of parent-child relationship that is 

entitled to such protections. See Kirkpatrick, 843 F.3d at 789–90. Thus, Plaintiff fails to “even 

arrive[] at the substantive due process threshold.” Nunez, 147 F.3d at 874. 

In opposition, Plaintiff additionally argues “[f]alse representations by social workers in 

the context of juvenile dependency proceedings have been repeatedly held as a denial of 

substantive due process as it relates to a plaintiff’s right to familial association.” (ECF No. 17 at 

21 (citing Huk v. County of Santa Barbara, 650 Fed. App’x. 365; Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1101; 

Hardwick v. County of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017)).) But Plaintiff’s statement, while 

technically correct, is incorrectly applied to the instant case. 

In Costanich, for example, the property and liberty interest at issue was the plaintiff’s 

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foster care license. Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1110. The court assumed, without deciding, this was a 

protected property interest because the defendants had waived argument on that issue. See id. at 

1114 n. 13, 1116 n.15. Therefore, the court proceeded to the question of whether the defendants 

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights through their purported misrepresentations. Id.; see 

also Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1120 (explaining Costanich). Here, Defendants have not waived 

argument on the protected property interest issue, so Plaintiff may not bypass that initial due 

process threshold. 

The ruling in Huk is actually fatal to Plaintiff’s claim. In Huk, the Ninth Circuit 

acknowledged there is a clearly established right “not to suffer a deprivation of liberty based on 

fabricated evidence and false representations in child custody proceedings.” Huk, 650 Fed. 

App’x. at 366. However, after this acknowledgement, the court found there was no protected 

liberty interest in the continued custody of a foster child. Id. at 367. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 

rejected the plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process claims, stating “[e]ven if it can be 

established that [the plaintiffs] were deprived of their custody of their foster child through 

allegedly deceptive means and without any opportunity to contest the validity or reason behind 

the removal, they have not and [cannot] demonstrate that their custody of their foster child was a 

liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. 

Huk is analogous to the instant case. Like the plaintiffs in Huk, Plaintiff’s argument is 

focused on the due process protection against false representations in child custody proceedings. 

See id. at 366. However, also like the plaintiffs in Huk, Plaintiff fails to establish that the 

purported misrepresentations resulted in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest, namely, the right to familial association. See id. at 367. Indeed, as the Court previously 

determined, Plaintiff cannot establish a deprivation of that right because he was never entitled to 

its protections. Therefore, as the Ninth Circuit held in Huk, even if Plaintiff established Evans’s 

purported misrepresentations to the juvenile dependency court deprived him of the opportunity to 

participate in those proceedings, Plaintiff has not and cannot establish he was deprived of any

right to familial association. See id. Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on the aforementioned authorities 

is misguided and his argument is unavailing. 

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In short, Plaintiff seeks to bypass the determination of whether the deprivation constituted 

a protected liberty interest and consider only the purported wrongful actions that caused the 

deprivation. But he cannot. In light of the aforementioned controlling legal authority and the 

Court’s prior analysis, Plaintiff fails to allege a violation of his substantive due process rights 

because he has asserted no cognizable property or liberty interest. The Court expresses 

skepticism as to whether Plaintiff can allege additional facts that identify some cognizable 

property or liberty interest in support of his due process claim; however, in an abundance of 

caution at this early pleading stage, the Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. 

v. § 1983 Monell Liability

Plaintiff alleges HSA violated his constitutional right to participate in the juvenile 

dependency matter and reunite with his biological daughter by failing to “properly train, 

supervise, retrain, monitor, or take corrective action with respect to individual employees under 

[its] supervision and control” regarding the “scope and importance of the [Fourteenth]

Amendment based rights of familial association” and the “procedures and appropriate course of 

action in identifying the biological parent. . . .” (See ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 52–56.) Defendants argue 

Plaintiff has not shown any constitutional violation and where “there is no constitutional 

violation, the public entity cannot be liable.” (ECF No. 13 at 19) (quoting Long v. City & Cty. of 

Honolulu, 511 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2007)). Defendants further argue Plaintiff has not 

specified how HSA’s policies and procedures are inappropriate or amount to a constitutional 

violation. (ECF No. 13 at 19–20.) The Court agrees. 

“A municipality may not be sued under § 1983 solely because an injury was inflicted by 

its employees or agents.” Long, 442 F.3d at 1185. “Instead, it is only when execution of a 

government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury that the municipality as an entity is 

responsible.” Id.; Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); see also 

Olvera, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. 

Where a Monell claim is premised on a policy of omission, such as failure to train or 

supervise, a plaintiff must show: (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived;

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(2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 

plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional 

violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 

954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). 

“The custom or policy must be a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made 

from various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with 

respect to the subject matter in question.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1075 

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It must be so 

“persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563

U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Put another way, the practice must have been going on for a sufficient 

amount of time, such that the “frequency and consistency [of] the conduct has become a 

traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); 

see also McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A plaintiff cannot demonstrate 

the existence of a municipal policy or custom based solely on a single occurrence of 

unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee.”)). There also must be a “direct causal 

link” between the policy or custom and the injury. Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070 (citations 

omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the circumstances under which a Monell failure 

to train claim could be asserted: 

The first is a deficient training program, intended to apply over time 

to multiple employees. The continued adherence by policymakers to 

an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent 

tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard 

for the consequences of their action — the “deliberate indifference” 

— necessary to trigger municipal liability. Further, the existence of 

a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may 

tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time 

negligent administration of the program or factors peculiar to the 

officer involved in a particular incident, is the “moving force” behind 

the plaintiff’s injury. 

Long, 442 F.3d at 1186 (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Byran Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407–

08 (1997)). 

Here, despite his broad and sweeping claims that Defendants ignored HSA polices and 

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violated Plaintiff’s rights, Plaintiff does not describe or identify any actual policy that was either 

wrongful or wrongfully ignored by HSA employees. Therefore, the Court cannot discern any 

“direct causal link” between the alleged policy and Plaintiff’s purported deprivation. City of 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Similarly, there are no allegations suggesting Plaintiff’s case amounts 

to anything more than a “single occurrence of unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking 

employee.” McDade, 223 F.3d at 1141; Long, 442 F.3d at 1186. Rather, Plaintiff’s claim 

appears to be based on the one alleged incident that happened to him. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to 

demonstrate his alleged injury resulted from a “permanent and well settled practice.” Id. But 

perhaps most importantly, in light of the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s First Amendment and 

Fourteenth Amendment claims, Plaintiff fails to establish any deprivation of a constitutional right. 

Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070. 

For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails. Nonetheless, to the extent Plaintiff 

was granted leave to amend his due process claim, an opportunity to amend his Monell claim also

appears warranted. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim is 

GRANTED with leave to amend.

D. State Law Claims 

Plaintiff asserts the following state law claims: (1) negligence against Evans and HSA 

(Claim 4); (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against Evans (Claim 6); (3) 

negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) against Evans (Claim 7); and (4) negligent 

hiring, retaining, and training against HSA (Claim 5). (ECF No. 8 at 20–24.) With respect to 

Plaintiff’s negligence, NIED, and IIED claims, Defendants claim Evans is entitled to statutory 

immunity pursuant to California Government Code § 821.6 (“§ 821.6”), and that HSA is immune 

where Evans is immune. (ECF No. 13 at 16–19.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues an exception 

under California Government Code § 820.21 (“§ 820.21”) renders Evans’s § 821.6 immunity

inapplicable. (ECF No. 17 at 22–23.) The Court will address each cause of action separately and 

will addressthe parties’ immunity arguments within its analysis of each claim. Parkes v. County 

of San Diego, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1082–85 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (requiring separate analysis of 

each claim to determine whether any elements of § 820.21 exist). 

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i. California Government Code §§ 821.6 and 820.21

Section 821.6 provides: “A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his 

instituting or prospecting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his 

employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6. 

California courts have held that § 821.6 “provides complete immunity for social workers (and a 

county) for their actions taken to investigate, declare children dependents of the county, and cause 

their removal from parental control.” Ronald S. v. Cty. of San Diego, 16 Cal. App. 4th 887, 899 

(1993). The immunity provided by § 821.6 is broad. See Gabrielle A. v. Cty. of Orange, 10 Cal. 

App. 5th 1268, 1285 (2017), as modified (Apr. 18, 2017) (“Immunity applies even to ‘lousy’ 

decisions in which the worker abuses his or her discretion, including decisions based on ‘woefully 

inadequate information.’”) (citations omitted); see also Masoud v. Cty. of San Joaquin, No. 

CIV.S-06-1170 FCD EFB, 2006 WL 3251797, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006) (“California courts 

have applied these immunities quite expansively to social workers, and the protection afforded by 

these statutes is arguably much broader than the [quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial] federal 

immunity.”). 

Section 820.21, however, provides for an exception to § 821.6 immunity. More 

specifically, § 820.21 abrogates immunity for (1) perjury, (2) fabrication of evidence, (3) failure 

to disclose known exculpatory evidence, or (4) obtaining testimony by duress, fraud, or undue 

influence — if committed with malice. Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.21(a); see Beltran v. Santa Clara 

Cty., 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding social workers “are not entitled to absolute 

immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during an investigation or made false 

statements in a dependency petition affidavit that they signed under penalty of perjury” and 

reversing dismissal of claim where “much of the information” contained in a dependency petition 

signed under penalty of perjury was allegedly fabricated); but see Gabrielle A., 10 Cal. App. 5th 

at 1286 (on summary judgment, granting immunity where allegations were “heavy on speculation 

and light on facts” and therefore insufficient to establish malice). 

Malice is defined as “conduct that is intended by the person described in subdivision (a) to 

cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct that is carried on by the person described in 

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subdivision (a) with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 820.21(b). Thus, not only must the act fall into one of the enumerated categories, 

but it must also be committed with malice. Id. “This is a high bar to clear.” Gabrielle A., 10 Cal. 

App. 5th at 1285. 

ii. Negligence

Plaintiff claims Evans was negligent because she breached her duty to “communicate true 

and accurate information” in her “reports, filings, declarations, and other documents submitted to 

the Juvenile Dependency Court” by “falsely representing that A.R.’s biological father was 

unknown” to her. (ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 63–64.) Plaintiff claims HSA is vicariously liable for Evans’s 

negligence under Government Code § 815.2. (Id. at ¶ 67.) The only argument Defendants 

advance is for § 821.6 immunity. (ECF No. 13 at 16–18.) Defendants argue HSA is immune 

because Evans is also immune. (Id. at 19.) The Court will address Plaintiff’s claims against each 

Defendant separately. 

a) Evans 

As an initial matter, the Court finds § 821.6’s expansive application of immunity applies 

to Evans’s actions with respect to investigating A.R.’s case and presenting information to the 

juvenile dependency court. Gabrielle A., 10 Cal. App. 5th at 1285. Therefore, the Court turns to 

whether Plaintiff has sufficiently established that § 820.21 — the exception to § 821.6 immunity

— applies. 

Plaintiff argues § 821.6 immunity is inapplicable under § 820.21 because Evans 

maliciously committed perjury and/or failed to disclose known exculpatory evidence. (ECF No. 

17 at 22–23.) A review of the non-conclusory, factual allegations asserted in the FAC do not 

appear to support Plaintiff’s argument. For example, in support of his claim that Evans “knew” 

he was A.R.’s biological father, Plaintiff alleges: (1) the witness statements he and E.J. provided 

to the police in 2012 both state Plaintiff was the father of E.J.’s then unborn child (A.R.) (ECF 

No. 8 ¶ 20); (2) K.R. later told the juvenile dependency court at the April 3, 2013 detention 

hearing that he was not A.R.’s true father, and his name was not listed on the birth certificate 

HSA obtained (id. at ¶ 22); and (3) Plaintiff told Defendants that he was A.R.’s biological father

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(id. at ¶ 31). Noticeably absent from Plaintiff’s allegations are facts showing Plaintiff provided 

Evans corroborating evidence of his claim that he was A.R.’s biological father, that Evans was 

present at the April 3, 2013 hearing or otherwise aware of K.R.’s statement, or that K.R.’s 

legally-binding declaration of paternity was revoked. Further, other allegations — for example, 

that E.J. told HSA employees the potential fathers were K.R. and R.S. but did not identify 

Plaintiff, and that K.R. signed the declaration of paternity at A.R.’s birth subsequent to E.J.’s 

prior witness statement — tend to refute Plaintiff’s claim that Evans knew (or should have 

known), with a certainty sufficient to represent under oath to the juvenile dependency court, that 

Plaintiff was A.R.’s biological father. 

With respect to his claim that Evans intentionally withheld the “exculpatory evidence” 

contained in the 2012 police report from the juvenile court, Plaintiff’s claim is directly 

contradicted by his allegation that Defendants attached the 2012 police report — with his and 

E.J.’s witness statements — to the petition they originally submitted to the juvenile court. (Id. at

¶¶ 18–20.) Whether Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to show Evans committed perjury by 

representing to the juvenile dependency court that she did not know who A.R.’s biological father 

was appears to be a closer call. In any event, Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that Evans’s 

purported “misrepresentation” to the court “was intentional, done with malice and with conscious 

disregard for the rights of Plaintiff” (id. at ¶ 36), without more, is insufficient to trigger § 820.21. 

Gabrielle A., 10 Cal. App. 5th at 1286. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff additionally alleges Evans “refused to acknowledge the police 

report,” “falsely represented to the juvenile dependency court that she was unaware of anyone 

else representing themselves to be the biological father of A.R.,” that “Plaintiff had repeatedly 

contacted [HSA] and communicated” to Evans and others that he was A.R.’s biological father, 

and that Evans “purposefully failed to disclose information to the juvenile dependency court 

regarding Plaintiff’s communications so as to make sure that A.R. was adopted out.” (ECF No. 

17 at 23.) None of these allegations, however, are asserted in the FAC, and the Court cannot 

consider new facts provided in an opposition brief. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 

1194, 1197 n.1. 

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Nonetheless, the Court declines to apply absolute immunity at this early stage in the 

litigation, where Plaintiff could possibly cure the identified deficiencies through amendment. 

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

b) HSA

In light of the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Evans, Plaintiff’s 

derivative claim against HSA fails. See Gabrielle A., 10 Cal. App. 5th at 1285 (citing Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 815.2(b) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an 

injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee 

is immune from liability.”)). However, to the extent Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his 

negligence claim as asserted against Evans, leave to amend the claim as asserted against HSA is 

also warranted. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave to 

amend. 

iii. Negligent Hiring, Retaining, and Training

Plaintiff’s negligent hiring, retaining, and training claim against HSA is one of vicarious 

liability. (See ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 69–74.) Essentially, Plaintiff alleges he was harmed by Evans’s 

actions, therefore HSA is responsible. (Id.) Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the basis 

that claims for negligent hiring, retaining, and training may not be asserted against public entities, 

with a single exception not applicable here.6 (ECF No. 13 at 20–21 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 

815).) 

Plaintiff provides no statutory basis for his claim. See Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 

19 Cal. 4th 925, 932 (1998) (“[I]n California, all government tort liability must be based on 

statute.”) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a)). Nor has he opposed Defendants’ Motion, thus 

conceding Defendants’ arguments. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim against 

HSA for negligent hiring, retaining, and training without leave to amend. 

///

6 The only time a negligent hiring, retaining, and training claim may be brought against a 

public entity is in the context of a lawsuit by a student against a school. See C.A. v. William S. 

Hart Union High School, 53 Cal. 4th 861 (2012). 

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iv. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

A claim for IIED under California law requires the plaintiff to establish “extreme and 

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard [for] the 

probability of causing, emotional distress.” Nunes v. Cty. of Stanislaus, No. 1:17-cv-00633-

DAD-SAB, 2017 WL 3670926, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) (quoting Ravel v. HewlettPackard Enter., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2017)). To amount to extreme and 

outrageous conduct, the actions “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds that are usually 

tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. (quoting Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th 488, 494 

(1998)); see Hamilton v. Prudential Fin., No. 2:07-cv-00944-MCE-DAD, 2007 WL 2827792, at 

*3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007) (“On the spectrum of offensiveness, outrageous conduct is the most 

extreme or severe form of offensiveness, and anything less is without legal recourse.”) (citation 

omitted). 

Plaintiff claims Evans is liable for IIED because she intended to cause Plaintiff’s 

emotional distress through her “outrageous conduct” and “Plaintiff must now live without any 

legal right to associate with, contact, or otherwise interact with his daughter.” (ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 76–

78.) This claim appears to be based on the same allegations that supported Plaintiff’s negligence 

claim. Defendants again assert immunity under § 821.6, which Plaintiff disputes based on § 

820.21. (ECF No. 13 at 16–18; ECF No. 17 at 22–23.) Defendants additionally argue the 

allegations are insufficient to state an IIED claim, which Plaintiff does not substantively address. 

(ECF No. 13 at 21; see also ECF No. 17 at 8 (in the introduction of his opposition, Plaintiff only 

states he has properly asserted his “related state law claims.”).) 

For the same reasons discussed with respect to Plaintiff’s negligence claim, § 821.6 

applies and the allegations do not support an application of § 820.21. On the merits, the same 

lack of factual allegations that preclude a finding of “malice” under § 820.21 are also fatal to the 

intent element of Plaintiff’s IIED claim. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded Plaintiff has 

established the causation or extreme and outrageous elements of the claim based on the 

///

///

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aforementioned factual allegations.7 See Schlauch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 146 Cal.

App. 3d 926 (1983) (in bad-faith claim against insurer who delayed payment of policy limits for 

third-party claim with undisputed liability for 2.5 years, finding mere assertion that defendant 

“acted outrageously and with intent to inflict emotional distress” by failing to accept settlement 

offer and violating statutory duties under Cal. Ins. Code “does not in itself constitute the type of 

outrageous conduct which will support” an IIED claim). 

However, for the same reasons previously discussed, permitting Plaintiff an opportunity to 

cure the identified deficiencies through amendment appears warranted. Therefore, Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

v. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff argues Evans’s negligence in misrepresenting information related to A.R.’s 

biological father caused Plaintiff to suffer “severe emotional distress, anxiety[,] and general 

damage to [his] psyche.” (ECF No. 8 ¶ 82.) This claim appears to be based on the same 

allegations that supported Plaintiff’s negligence and IIED claims. 

Defendants again assert immunity under § 821.6, which Plaintiff disputes based on § 

820.21. (ECF No. 13 at 16–18; ECF No. 17 at 22–23.) Defendants additionally argue Plaintiff’s 

NIED claim is inapplicable as a matter of law, which Plaintiff does not dispute. (ECF No. 13 at 

21.) Plaintiff again fails to rebut a finding of § 821.6 immunity through § 820.21, for the reasons 

previously discussed. Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for NIED as a matter of law. 

“Where there is a claim for the ‘negligent infliction of emotional distress,’ the plaintiff 

must be either a ‘direct victim’ of the wrongful conduct, or, with certain qualifications, a 

bystander[] (i.e., ‘percipient witness to the injury of another’).” Smith v. Pust, 19 Cal. App. 4th 

263, 273 (1993) (citations omitted). As Defendants discuss in their Motion, a “direct victim” 

claim arises only in three scenarios: (1) mishandling of corpses, (2) misdiagnosis of a disease, and 

7 However, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the “severe or extreme emotional distress” element 

of the claim based on his allegation that he suffered “severe emotional distress, anxiety and 

general damage to his psyche, to such an extent as to cause physical manifestations of pain” from 

his inability to connect with his biological daughter. (ECF No. 8 ¶ 35); see Hamilton, 2007 WL 

2827792, at *4. 

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(3) breach of a duty from a preexisting relationship. (ECF No. 13 at 21 (citing Christensen v. 

Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 879 (1991); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923 

(1980); Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1076 (1992)).) Plaintiff does not allege any 

of these scenarios in his FAC, so by default, the Court presumes he is raising a bystander claim. 

A bystander claim requires that the bystander: “(1) is closely related to the injury victim; 

(2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that 

it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress — a 

reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an 

abnormal response to the circumstances.” Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 667–68 (1989). 

Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second prong of the test because he was not present at the 

injury-producing event. Namely, he never attended or participated in any of the court 

proceedings that resulted in the termination of his potential parental rights. Id. Plaintiff does not 

propose any facts he could allege to cure this defect, nor can the Court imagine any. Nor does 

Plaintiff address Defendants’ argument in his opposition. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES

Plaintiff’s NIED claim without leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) as follows:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the action based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

4(m) is DENIED;

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Saga-Matsumoto is 

GRANTED and Saga-Matsumoto is DISMISSED without prejudice;

3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for First Amendment interference 

with familial association (Claim 1) is GRANTED without leave to amend;

4. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for violations of procedural and 

substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Claim 2) is GRANTED 

with leave to amend; 

5. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for § 1983 Monell liability (Claim 3)

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is GRANTED with leave to amend;

6. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim (Claim 4) is GRANTED 

with leave to amend as asserted against both Evans and HSA;

7. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring, retaining, and 

training (Claim 5) is GRANTED without leave to amend;

8. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (Claim 6) is GRANTED with leave to amend; and 

9. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional 

distress (Claim 7) is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint not later than 30 days from the date of electronic 

filing of this Order. Defendants’ responsive pleading is due 21 days after Plaintiff files an 

amended complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 31, 2021

Troy L. Nunley

United States District Judge

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