Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01209/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01209-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adrian Ruiz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-1209

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ADRIAN RUIZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:11-cr-00421-1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 23, 2015 — DECIDED MAY 8, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and TINDER, Circuit 

Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. Law enforcement officers approached Adrian Ruiz’s car after they witnessed Ruiz engage in what they deemed to be suspicious behavior, including actions consistent with operating a “trap”—a concealed, 

non-factory compartment in a vehicle often used to hide 

drugs. Ruiz consented to the search of his car and then followed the officers to a nearby police station where he 

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2 No. 13-1209

showed the officers two traps in his car loaded with heroin. 

Ruiz eventually pleaded guilty to possession with intent to 

distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, see 21 U.S.C. § 

841(a)(1), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress all evidence derived from his encounter 

with the officers. Ruiz appeals, contending: the officers did 

not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; the stop 

exceeded its lawful purpose and ripened into a de facto arrest; the encounter with the officers was custodial, requiring 

the suppression of all statements he made prior to receiving 

Miranda warnings; and he did not consent voluntarily to go 

to the police station and open the traps.

I. BACKGROUND

During the afternoon of October 26, 2010, Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) Special Agent Keith Bakewell and 

DEA Task Force Officer Jay Tapia (collectively, the “officers”)—driving separate, unmarked cars but in radio communication—were surveilling a storefront in Gurnee, Illinois. Based upon a prior drug seizure and information from 

confidential informants, the officers believed that the store 

was being used by drug dealers to ply their trade. The officers saw Michael Coleman, who they knew had prior drugtrafficking convictions, exit the rear of the store and get into 

a blue Pontiac. Agent Bakewell followed Coleman as he 

drove into a residential neighborhood. Bakewell, who entered the neighborhood approximately a minute after Coleman, saw Coleman’s Pontiac parked in the middle of the 

street beside a black Cadillac Escalade that was registered to 

the primary target of the officers’ drug-trafficking investigation. Soon after Bakewell came into view, the two cars drove 

away from each other. Bakewell followed the black Escalade 

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No. 13-1209 3

to a strip-mall parking lot, where the black Escalade parked 

next to a silver Escalade that was registered to another target 

of the investigation. It appeared to Bakewell that the occupants of the two Escalades were engaged in a conversation. 

The officers then followed the silver Escalade as it left the 

strip-mall parking lot and drove to the parking lot of another 

mall, the Gurnee Mills Outlet Mall (“Gurnee Mall”). Officer 

Tapia testified that, based upon his training and experience, 

narcotics transactions often occur in mall parking lots because the high volume of pedestrian and vehicle traffic can 

mask drug-dealing activity. 

The silver Escalade parked in the Gurnee Mall parking 

lot, but nobody exited the vehicle. Agent Bakewell then saw, 

for the first time, the person he would later identify as Defendant Ruiz walking toward the front passenger-side of the 

silver Escalade. It appeared to Agent Bakewell that Ruiz was 

directed to walk to the other side of the car, and Ruiz eventually entered the Escalade through the rear, driver-side 

door. Two or three minutes later, Ruiz exited the Escalade, 

walked in one direction, turned around, and then walked in 

the opposite direction towards an unoccupied Honda Accord parked nearby. Ruiz entered the Accord through the 

driver’s door. Agent Bakewell next saw the Accord’s rear 

brake lights activate and Ruiz began manipulating “some of 

the ... driver controls” in the vehicle, such as those controlling the air conditioner, the windshield wipers, and the windows. Bakewell then saw Ruiz reach behind the driver’s seat 

and appear to “put something in the rear passenger” area of 

the vehicle. Bakewell testified that, based upon his experience and training with the DEA, the Chicago Police Department, and the Illinois State Police, trap compartments can 

exist “[a]nywhere there is a natural void” in a vehicle and 

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can be opened by manipulating the controls of a vehicle in 

the manner done by Ruiz.

Ruiz then started the Accord and pulled out of the mall 

parking lot, with the officers covertly following. At this time, 

Ruiz was driving in what Agent Bakewell described as a 

“normal, everyday manner,” such as going “a couple of 

miles an hour over the speed limit” and “signaling when he 

[got] to the intersection, not before.” Officer Tapia phoned a 

Gurnee Police Department (“Gurnee PD”) officer and asked 

her to attempt to “develop independent probable cause for a 

stop” of Ruiz’s Accord, in an effort to make Ruiz believe it 

was a random traffic stop with no involvement by the DEA. 

When the marked Gurnee PD squad car neared the Accord, 

Ruiz began driving in a “very cautious” manner, driving 

five miles an hour below the speed limit and signaling well 

in advance of turns. Bakewell noted that the Accord had 

Wisconsin plates but drove past the on-ramp for the interstate that led toward the Illinois-Wisconsin border.

Ruiz eventually turned into a residential driveway with a 

“for rent” sign in the yard. The squad car drove past the 

parked Accord and continued along the residential street. 

Once the marked squad car was out of sight, Agent Bakewell—who had pulled his unmarked vehicle into a nearby 

driveway—saw the Accord’s brake lights activate and then 

Ruiz manipulated the driver controls and reached around to 

the rear of the vehicle in the same manner as he had done in 

the Gurnee Mall parking lot. Ruiz next put the Accord in reverse and began backing out of the driveway. The Accord 

had moved only a few feet backward when the marked 

squad car drove back into view; Ruiz then stopped his car 

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No. 13-1209 5

and deactivated the brake lights, apparently shifting into 

park. 

The squad car parked on the street two houses south of 

Ruiz’s Accord, and the Gurnee PD officer stayed in her car. 

Agent Bakewell and Officer Tapia pulled their unmarked 

vehicles into curbside parking spaces to the north and south 

of the driveway where Ruiz sat. Bakewell and Tapia, both in 

plainclothes and not displaying weapons, approached the 

driver’s window of the Accord on foot and identified themselves as law enforcement officers. In response to Tapia’s 

questions, Ruiz said he was interested in the house advertised as being for rent and he had previously been at the 

Gurnee Mall visiting a furniture store.1 Tapia asked Ruiz to 

get out of the car, and Ruiz did so. Upon request, Ruiz provided the officers with his driver’s license, which listed his 

address as a city in southern Texas that Tapia characterized 

as “a source city for narcotics.” The Accord was registered to 

an address in Kenosha, Wisconsin. 

In response to Tapia’s questions, Ruiz denied having 

drugs or hidden compartments in the car. Tapia asked if he 

could search the car, and Ruiz consented. A ten-minute 

search turned up nothing, save for two cell phones. The interior of the car was “spotless” and had no other personal effects, which the officers believed was suggestive of the car 

being a “trap car” used for drug trafficking.2 Tapia called for 

1 Ruiz had parked his car near a Sears and a Sports Authority in the 

Gurnee Mall parking lot. However, there was a furniture store elsewhere 

in the mall.

2 The officers testified that there is a perception among drug dealers that 

a car containing many personal items invites closer scrutiny by law enforcement.

 

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a canine unit to come to their location to sniff Ruiz’s car, but 

none was available. Tapia then asked Ruiz if he would drive 

to the nearby Waukegan police station, because Tapia (who 

was a member of the Waukegan Police Department) believed he could access a canine unit there. Ruiz agreed to 

drive to the station. The encounter between Ruiz and the officers in the driveway lasted a total of approximately 30 

minutes.

Because neither Ruiz nor Bakewell knew how to get to 

the station, Tapia led the way in his unmarked car, followed 

by Ruiz in the Accord and Bakewell in his unmarked car. 

Neither officer activated his emergency lights during the 

drive (or at any other time during the encounter). Ruiz maintained possession of his driver’s license and cell phones. The 

Gurnee PD squad car did not join the procession; instead it 

drove off in a different direction. At the station, Ruiz parked 

in a public parking lot and exited his vehicle. While Tapia 

called for a canine unit, Bakewell spoke with Ruiz. Bakewell 

told Ruiz that he thought he had seen Ruiz operating a trap 

in the Gurnee Mall parking lot. Ruiz responded that he was 

engaged to be married and was “worried about going home 

that night.” Bakewell told Ruiz if he cooperated by opening 

the trap, the prosecutor would view this “act of good faith” 

with favor. Ruiz initially denied that the Accord had a trap, 

but after overhearing Bakewell and Tapia discuss the request 

for a canine unit, Ruiz conceded the car had two traps and 

agreed to open them for the officers. Approximately 10 to 15 

minutes after parking in the station lot, Ruiz went through 

the process of manipulating the controls and opening the 

traps in the Accord, revealing heroin inside each. After following police procedures for retrieving and storing the 

drugs, the officers escorted Ruiz into the station. Ruiz signed 

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No. 13-1209 7

a written waiver of his Miranda rights and then made incriminating statements. Thereafter, Ruiz was allowed to leave the 

station.

Approximately eight months later, a criminal complaint 

was filed charging Ruiz with possession with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin in violation of 

§ 841(a)(1). Ruiz filed a motion to suppress, and the district 

court conducted an evidentiary hearing with Tapia and 

Bakewell as the only witnesses. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the judge announced that the motion was denied 

because he found that the officers’ testimony (from which 

the above-recounted facts were derived) was credible; the 

officers had reasonable suspicion for a stop pursuant to Terry 

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); the officers would have let Ruiz go 

if he had asked to leave; and Ruiz voluntarily consented to 

the search of his car, to drive to the police station, and to 

open the traps. 

On September 21, 2012, Ruiz entered a conditional guilty 

plea pursuant to a written plea agreement, preserving his 

right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. The 

agreement states that, during October 2010, Ruiz completed 

two transactions, whereby Ruiz sold a total of nearly 600 

grams of heroin to a buyer for a total of $36,000. The buyer 

subsequently complained to Ruiz about the quality of 285.9 

grams of the heroin and asked for a refund of $18,000. Ruiz 

agreed to the refund—perhaps because he was committed to 

providing good customer service, or perhaps because he 

feared the dissatisfied buyer might do something more drastic than simply complain.3 On October 26, 2010, after retriev3 Given that the buyer was suspected of being a member of an organization known as the “Maniac Latin Disciples,” the latter seems more likely. 

 

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ing the heroin from the buyer’s vehicle in the parking lot of 

the Gurnee Mall, Ruiz returned to his car and placed the 

bags of heroin inside two traps. Ruiz then left the parking lot 

and drove toward Wisconsin with the intent to distribute the 

heroin to another—perhaps less-discerning—individual.

The district court thereafter imposed upon Ruiz a belowGuidelines sentence of three years of imprisonment and four 

years of supervised release. 

II. DISCUSSION

When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to 

suppress, we review findings of historical fact for clear error 

and conclusions of law (as well as mixed questions of law 

and fact, such as determinations of reasonable suspicion) de 

novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United 

States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Ruiz challenges the district court’s factual finding that his consent was 

voluntary, which is addressed below; otherwise, Ruiz does 

not mount a serious challenge to the factual findings of the 

district court, and we do not find them to be clearly erroneous. See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 

2011) (“Under clear error review, we will not overturn the 

district court’s factual findings unless left with a definite and 

firm conviction that the district court was mistaken. We give 

special deference to the district court’s credibility determinations.”) (quotation omitted). Ruiz instead contends that, 

even accepting the officers’ testimony as truthful, his motion 

to suppress should have been granted. 

Ruiz first argues that his motion should have been granted because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 

approach and detain his vehicle in the residential driveway. 

“An investigatory stop complies with the Fourth AmendCase: 13-1209 Document: 48 Filed: 05/08/2015 Pages: 20
No. 13-1209 9

ment if the brief detention is based on reasonable suspicion 

that the detained individual has committed or is about to 

commit a crime.” Uribe, 709 F.3d at 649–50 (citing, inter alia, 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22). The officers initiating the investigatory stop must be able to point to “specific and articulable 

facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 

those facts,” suggest criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 

“[I]narticulate hunches” will not suffice. Id. at 22. However, 

“[r]easonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable 

cause” and “considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1012 (quotations omitted). “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can 

be established with information that is different in quantity 

or content than that required to establish probable cause, but 

also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show 

probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 

This is an objective standard, based upon the facts available 

to the officers at the moment of the seizure. Terry, 392 U.S. at 

21–22. 

“[I]n determining whether officers had the requisite particularized suspicion for a Terry stop, we do not consider in 

isolation each variable of the equation that may add up to 

reasonable suspicion. Instead, we consider the sum of all of 

the information known to officers at the time of the stop.” 

Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3720 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2015). In 

other words, “courts examine the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop, including the 

experience of the officer and the behavior and characteristics 

of the suspect.” Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1012 (quotation omitted). 

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Reasonable suspicion can arise from “behavior that may in 

other circumstances be considered innocent; in other words, 

context matters.” Matz, 769 F.3d at 523.

The government presented numerous facts in support of 

its position that reasonable suspicion existed at the time the 

officers approached Ruiz in the driveway. The officers had 

observed a series of suspicious encounters between three different vehicles—one was driven by an individual with drug 

convictions and the other two were registered to the subjects 

of an ongoing drug-trafficking investigation. These encounters culminated with Ruiz entering one of the vehicles in a 

mall parking lot—a type of location favored by drug dealers. 

Prior to entering the car, Ruiz appeared to be redirected 

from the front passenger-side to the rear driver-side. After 

exiting the car, Ruiz appeared to have trouble locating his 

car, perhaps because he simply forgot where he parked or 

perhaps because he was not very familiar with his car. Upon 

entering his car, Ruiz engaged in a series of steps that—

based upon the training and experience of Agent Bakewell—

were consistent with the operation of a trap. The district 

judge specifically credited Bakewell’s experience and training in this regard, which was permissible. See United States v. 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (“This process [of determining whether reasonable suspicion exists] allows officers to 

draw on their own experience and specialized training to 

make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative 

information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”) (quotation omitted).

Once it was clear Ruiz knew a marked squad car was following him, he passed the on-ramp to the interstate which 

would have taken him to Wisconsin (where his car was registered), and instead drove into a residential neighborhood 

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No. 13-1209 11

and pulled into a driveway of a house being advertised for 

rent. After the marked police car drove out of sight, Ruiz repeated the same steps as he had done in the mall parking lot 

consistent with the operation of a trap. Ruiz then began 

backing out of the driveway, which is inconsistent with the 

behavior of a person looking at the house as a potential renter. When the squad car drove back into view, Ruiz immediately stopped and put his car into park, which is consistent 

with the behavior of someone attempting to evade notice by 

the police. 

In isolation, each of Ruiz’s actions might be more susceptible to an innocent explanation than the not-so-innocent explanation ascribed to it by the officers. We doubt that any 

one of Ruiz’s actions, as witnessed by the officers, would 

alone give rise to the suspicion necessary to justify a Terry

stop—including his parking-lot meeting with a suspected 

drug dealer and taking actions consistent with the operation 

of a trap. Cf. United States v. Bohman, 683 F.3d 861, 864 (7th 

Cir. 2012) (holding that “a mere suspicion of illegal activity 

about a place, without more, is not enough to justify stopping everyone emerging from that property”); United States 

v. Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence 

of a vehicle trap in itself is not enough to establish probable 

cause—traps may, of course, be used for legitimate purposes....”). But when all of Ruiz’s actions are viewed in concert 

and through the lens of experienced law enforcement officers, the innocent explanations begin to look less likely and 

the not-so-innocent explanations begin to look more likely. 

See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277–78 (“Undoubtedly, each of these 

factors alone is susceptible of innocent explanation, and 

some factors are more probative than others. Taken together, 

we believe they sufficed to form a particularized and objecCase: 13-1209 Document: 48 Filed: 05/08/2015 Pages: 20
12 No. 13-1209

tive basis for [the officer]’s stopping the vehicle, making the 

stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Riley, 493 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 

2007) (“Although ... all of these taken separately might not 

justify a stop, we do not evaluate the circumstances in isolation. Furthermore, these circumstances must be viewed 

through the lens of [the investigating detective], an experienced officer.”) (citation omitted).

Ruiz emphasizes that the officers did not witness any 

drugs change hands or Ruiz carry a bag which might have 

contained drugs. However, a drug dealer who hides his 

merchandise from public view is not thereby rendered immune from a narcotics-based Terry stop. See Bullock, 632 F.3d 

at 1012–14 (holding that, despite seeing nothing change 

hands, police officers had reasonable suspicion to detain a 

suspect based upon an anonymous tip and observations that 

the suspect made several brief visits to residences and hosted several short meetings in his vehicle, which an officer testified was indicative of drug-dealing activity). Instead, considering the totality of the circumstances, we think that, by 

the time the officers approached Ruiz’s car in the driveway, 

the officers could point to “specific and articulable facts

which, taken together with rational inferences from those 

facts,” suggested Ruiz was engaged in illegal activity. Terry, 

392 U.S. at 21; see id. at 22 (holding that reasonable suspicion 

may exist when an officer observes individuals “go through 

a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but 

which taken together warranted further investigation”). The 

district court correctly held that the officers had reasonable 

suspicion to initiate a traffic stop to investigate for the presence of narcotics in the car. 

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No. 13-1209 13

The next issue is whether, as contended by Ruiz, the investigatory stop exceeded its lawful purpose and ripened 

into a de facto arrest. “A Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion can ripen into a de facto arrest that must be based on 

probable cause if it continues too long or becomes unreasonably intrusive.” Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1015. “The investigation 

following a Terry stop must be reasonably related in scope 

and duration to the circumstances that justified the stop in 

the first instance so that it is a minimal intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.” Matz, 769 F.3d at 525

(quotations omitted); see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 

(1983) (“[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and 

last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 

the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed 

should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to 

verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of 

time.”). 

With respect to the duration of the stop, there is no rigid 

time limit placed on Terry stops. Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1015. 

And a defendant’s actions can contribute to a permissible 

extension of the stop. For example, in United States v. Vega, 

72 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 1995), we held that a 62-minute delay 

was reasonable given that the defendant initially consented 

to a search of his garage, but then changed his mind. Id. at 

515–16; see United States v. Goodwin, 449 F.3d 766, 772 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (holding that duration of Terry stop was reasonable when the defendant “was ... the co-author of the prolongation that is the fulcrum of his Fourth Amendment claim”). 

Likewise, assuming reasonable suspicion exists (as it did 

here), a reasonable delay attributable to arranging for a canine unit to conduct a sniff may permissibly extend the duration of a stop. See Vega, 72 F.3d at 516; cf. Rodriguez v. UnitCase: 13-1209 Document: 48 Filed: 05/08/2015 Pages: 20
14 No. 13-1209

ed States, --- S. Ct. ----, No. 13-9972, 2015 WL 1780927, at *6–*7 

(U.S. Apr. 21, 2015) (holding that police may not extend an 

otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct dog sniff).

At the outset of the stop, Ruiz gave answers which increased rather than allayed the officers’ suspicions. Ruiz 

claimed to be parked in the driveway because he was interested in renting the house, but, as the district court noted, his 

“backing out of that driveway [after] the police car passed 

him ... is inconsistent with looking at a house he might want 

to rent.” Also suspicious was Ruiz’s claim that he was at the 

mall to visit a furniture store, when he did not park within 

view of any furniture store and, unbeknownst to Ruiz, the 

officers had witnessed Ruiz meet with the subject of their 

narcotics investigation in the parking lot. The officers’ suspicions were increased further by Ruiz’s Texas driver’s license, 

combined with his car being registered in Wisconsin and 

containing no personal items. In short, the first few minutes 

of the stop only served to increase the officers’ reasonable 

suspicion that Ruiz was operating a trap car, and this justified further investigation by the officers. See United States v. 

Robinson, 30 F.3d 774, 784 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that further investigation was justified based in part upon a defendant’s misleading answers at the outset of a Terry stop). 

The remainder of the time in the driveway was devoted 

to Tapia’s search of Ruiz’s car and the officers’ attempt to 

summon a canine unit for assistance. The district court 

found that Ruiz voluntarily consented to the search of his 

car. This finding is not challenged by Ruiz,4 and the finding 

4 Ruiz only challenges the voluntariness of his subsequent consent to 

drive to the station and open the traps, as discussed infra.

 

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No. 13-1209 15

was not clearly erroneous. In the words of the district court, 

Ruiz’s voluntary consent to the search was “consistent with 

the entire modus operandi ... of the officers ... mak[ing] this 

defendant feel as comfortable as possible while they were 

talking to him.”

We have previously held that “the relevant focus in determining whether the seizure [in the form of a traffic stop] 

was reasonable in duration is the time between its initiation 

and the [defendant’s] consent [to search the vehicle].” United 

States v. Taylor, 596 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 2010); see United 

States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 725 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The ... appropriate focus ... is the time that elapsed between the initial 

stop and [the defendant]’s consent to search; consent renders 

a search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless 

given involuntarily....”). The officers detained Ruiz for less 

than 20 minutes prior to obtaining his consent to search the 

car, which is a reasonable duration, given that there is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers acted less than 

diligently. See Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1015 (holding that 30-40 

minute detention while police executed search warrant was 

reasonable when there was no indication the officers unnecessarily prolonged the search).

Tapia’s ten-minute search of Ruiz’s car came up empty, 

which is not surprising given that traps are designed to 

elude an officer making a quick search. Accordingly, it was 

reasonable for the officers to attempt to arrange for a dog 

sniff of the car. Upon learning that a mobile canine unit was 

not readily available, Tapia asked Ruiz if he would drive to 

the nearby Waukegan police station. Tapia was a member of 

the Waukegan Police Department, not the Gurnee police 

force. It was reasonable for Tapia to believe that he could arCase: 13-1209 Document: 48 Filed: 05/08/2015 Pages: 20
16 No. 13-1209

range for a canine unit quicker while at his home station 

than at a residential driveway in the neighboring town of 

Gurnee. Had Ruiz refused the request to go to the station, 

we would be presented with a different case. But Ruiz consented to go (whether his consent was voluntary is an issue 

we will address below). His consent to the initial search and 

to go to the station, as well as the diligence of the officers, 

made the otherwise lengthy encounter—30 minutes in the 

driveway, 15 minutes to drive to the station, and 10-15 

minutes at the station—fall within the bounds of what is acceptable for a Terry stop. See Vega, 72 F.3d at 515–16. We find 

that the officers’ investigative detention of Ruiz lasted “no 

longer than [was] necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 

stop,” and the investigative methods employed by the officers were “the least intrusive means reasonably available to 

verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of 

time.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.

Ruiz next contends that his encounter with the officers 

was custodial, requiring the suppression of all statements he 

made prior to receiving Miranda warnings at the station. 

Law enforcement officers must advise suspects of their constitutional right to remain silent and to have counsel present 

before subjecting them to custodial interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471–72 (1966). To determine 

whether an interrogation was custodial, we ask whether, 

“given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person 

would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 

leave.” United States v. Littledale, 652 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 

2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004)). 

This “inquiry is objective, and relevant factors include 

whether the encounter occurred in a public place; whether 

the [individual] consented to speak with the officers; whethCase: 13-1209 Document: 48 Filed: 05/08/2015 Pages: 20
No. 13-1209 17

er the officers informed the individual that he was not under 

arrest and was free to leave; whether the individual was 

moved to another area; whether there was a threatening 

presence of several officers and a display of weapons or 

physical force; and whether the officers’ tone of voice was 

such that their requests were likely to be obeyed.” Id.

On the “custodial” side of the ledger, the officers failed to 

inform Ruiz that he was not under arrest and was free to 

leave. Also, the manner in which the officers’ vehicles—

unmarked though they may have been—flanked Ruiz’s car 

in the driveway and during the drive to the station subtly 

undermined the message that Ruiz was free to leave. Ruiz 

was asked to move from the driveway to the police station, 

although any custodial aspect of this was mitigated by the 

fact that Ruiz consented to the relocation (whether this consent was voluntary will be discussed below), and was permitted to drive his own car.

On the “non-custodial” side of the ledger, the entire encounter took place in public view. The district court found 

that the officers spoke to Ruiz in a calm, courteous manner 

throughout the encounter, which was designed to make 

Ruiz feel at ease. The officers were in plainclothes, with no 

display of weapons or force. The officers’ unmarked vehicles 

did not block the driveway, and the marked squad car was 

parked across the street, two houses away. The Gurnee police officer in the squad car did not approach the driveway at 

any time, and she drove away in a different direction when 

Ruiz and the officers left the area. As the district court noted, 

the fact that the officers let Ruiz drive his own car to the station and retain possession of his driver’s license and phones 

is a strong indicator that Ruiz was not in custody. When he 

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18 No. 13-1209

arrived at the police station, Ruiz parked in a public lot rather than a secure lot. The subsequent conversation between 

Bakewell and Ruiz occurred beside Ruiz’s car in the public 

lot. 

On balance, we think that Ruiz was not in custody prior 

to being Mirandized at the station. See id. at 701–02 (holding 

that suspect was not in custody at the time of his confession 

at a police station even though the questioning officers did 

not tell the suspect that he was free to leave, because the 

suspect consented to be interviewed, there was no display of 

force or physical touching, the officers used a monotone tone 

of voice, and the suspect was told he was not under arrest); 

United States v. Thompson, 496 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2007)

(same, when officers calmly questioned suspect in his home 

for a few hours prior to his confession, telling him that defendants who cooperated received lighter punishments); 

United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 536–37 (7th Cir. 1999)

(same, when suspect voluntarily accompanied officers to area outside bar and then to police station despite patdown 

search and questioning; the suspect was uncuffed and there 

was no other show of force by the officers).

Ruiz’s final argument is that his consent to drive to the 

station and then open the traps was not voluntary. The district court found that Ruiz’s consent was voluntary, and 

therefore this portion of the encounter “doesn’t really implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Ruiz challenges this finding, 

contending that “any reasonable person in [his] circumstances would have been incapable of rendering voluntary 

consent.”

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No. 13-1209 19

Whether an individual’s consent is voluntary is a factual 

determination, which we review for clear error.5 United 

States v. Richards, 741 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2014). To determine whether consent was provided voluntarily, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including Ruiz’s age, education, and intelligence; whether he was advised of his constitutional rights; how long he was detained prior to consent; 

whether he consented immediately or after police made several requests; whether the police used physical coercion; and 

whether he was in custody. Id. at 848; see Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226–27 (1973). We review these factors in light of the information known to the officers at the 

time, and “[o]ur determination does not depend on a single 

controlling factor, but carefully considers ‘all of the surrounding circumstances.’” Richards, 741 F.3d at 848 (quoting 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226).

Ruiz was 10 days shy of his 20th birthday on the day of 

the encounter; his responses to the officers demonstrated 

him to be reasonably intelligent and educated. The officers 

did not inform Ruiz of his constitutional rights until after he 

opened the traps. Ruiz was with the officers in the driveway 

approximately 30 minutes prior to agreeing to go to the station, and then approximately 10-15 minutes at the station 

prior to opening the traps. Ruiz consented immediately 

when asked to go to the station, although he initially denied 

having traps in the car and only agreed to open them after 

5 The government contends that Ruiz forfeited the argument that his 

consent was not voluntary by not raising it before the district court, and 

therefore we should review the district court’s finding for plain error 

rather than clear error. Because we find no clear error, see infra, we need 

not consider whether Ruiz forfeited the argument.

 

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20 No. 13-1209

overhearing the officers discuss the request for a canine unit. 

The officers used no physical coercion, displayed no weapons, and spoke to Ruiz in a calm, conversational manner. Finally, as discussed above, we have decided that Ruiz was 

not in custody during the encounter—although our decision 

assumed that Ruiz’s consent to go to the station was voluntary, so we assign little-to-no weight to this factor. 

As with the determination of whether Ruiz was in custody, there are some factors tending to show his consent was 

involuntary, most notably, the failure to inform Ruiz of his 

constitutional rights and the questioning of Ruiz about the 

presence of a trap after he had denied that his car contained 

one. There are other factors tending to show Ruiz’s consent 

was voluntary, such as the fact that the officers used no 

physical coercion, they spoke to him in a calm, conversational manner, and Ruiz readily agreed to go to the station. 

This is a factual determination, see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 

227, which the district court resolved by finding that Ruiz’s 

consent to go to the station and open the traps was voluntary. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we are 

not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been committed,” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 

U.S. 564, 573 (1985), and we therefore hold that this finding 

was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Strache, 202 

F.3d 980, 986–87 (7th Cir. 2000).

The district court did not err in denying Ruiz’s motion to 

suppress. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED.

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