Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00773/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00773-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Autovest LLC
Defendant
Christopher Black
Plaintiff
Fulton Friedman & Gullace LLP
Defendant

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Christopher Black, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Autovest LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00773-PHX-JZB

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (Docs. 21-1, 

28) and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docs. 21, 28). For the reasons below, 

the Court will grant Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice and deny their Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings. 

I. Background 

Plaintiff alleges that in February 2008, he purchased a vehicle from, and entered 

into a Retail Installment Sales Contract and Purchase Money Security Agreement (the 

Agreement) with, Bill Heard Chevrolet. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 14, 15.) Bill Heard Chevrolet 

subsequently assigned the Agreement to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Id. ¶ 16.) After 

Plaintiff fell behind on payments owed under the Agreement, Wells Fargo repossessed 

the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 17.) Wells Fargo sold the vehicle in 2009, applied the funds from the 

sale to the balance owed under the Agreement, and subsequently asserted Plaintiff owed a 

“deficiency balance” under the Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) 

Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Autovest claimed that it purchased the 

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Agreement “sometime after default.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff asserts Defendant Autovest 

hired Defendant Fulton Friedman & Gullace to “assist it in collecting” the deficiency on 

the balance from Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 21.) On May 2, 2014, Defendant Autovest sued 

Plaintiff in state court in order to collect the balance owed under the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 

22; Doc. 21-1.) Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants represented to him that the state 

court law suit was filed within the applicable statute of limitations and, therefore, timely. 

(Doc. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff claims, however, that Defendants knowingly filed and litigated the 

state court action beyond the applicable statute of limitations, ultimately obtaining a 

default judgment of $30, 221.56 against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.) 

On April 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims against Defendants 

under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Arizona common law for 

unreasonable debt collection and invasion of privacy. (Id. ¶¶ 31-36.) On August 12, 

2013, Defendant Autovest filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 21) and a 

Request for Judicial Notice in Support of its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 

21-1). On September 8, 2015, Defendant Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP filed a 

Joinder in both Motions. (Doc. 28.) Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment 

on all of Plaintiff’s claims because the claims are (1) barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine,1

 and (2) were compulsory counter-claims required to have been brought in the 

previous state court action. (Doc. 21 at 3-4.) Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to 

the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on September 11, 2015.2

 (Doc. 33.) 

Defendant Autovest filed a Reply on September 21, 2015. (Doc. 34.) On October 28, 

2015, Plaintiff filed a Notice of New Opinion Addressing the Same Legal Issues in 

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, providing the Court with Notice and a 

 

1 See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 

2

 In his Response, Plaintiff states that he withdraws his state law claim for 

invasion of privacy. (Doc. 33 at 14.) The Court construes Plaintiff’s statement as a 

request to voluntarily dismiss that claim under Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Defendants do not object to Plaintiff’s request. Therefore, the Court will 

dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claim for invasion of privacy. 

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copy of a recent decision by United States Senior District Judge Roslyn O. Silver in a 

similar case pending against Autovest and another Defendant. (Doc. 36.) 

II. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice 

 Defendants request that this Court take judicial notice of (1) a copy of the 

Complaint filed on May 2, 2014 in the state court action, (2) a copy of the filed 

Declaration of Service of Summons, Complaint, Affidavit of Account, Certificate of 

Compulsory Arbitration in the state court action, and (3) a copy of the judgment entered 

on December 11, 2014 in the state court action. (Doc. 21-1.) 

 Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may take judicial notice 

of “matters of public record.” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Further, a trial court must take judicial notice of facts “if requested by a party and 

supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). A fact is appropriate for 

judicial notice only if it “is not subject to reasonable dispute” in that it is (1) generally 

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or (2) capable of accurate and 

ready determination by resort to “sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

 Here, Defendants have provided the Court with the necessary information 

regarding these public documents and the documents are not subject to reasonable 

dispute. Plaintiff does not contend otherwise. Therefore, the Court will grant 

Defendants’ request for judicial notice. 

III. Legal Standard Applicable to Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings 

Under Rule 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the 

pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A 

motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is 

“functionally identical” to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; thus “the same standard of 

review applies to motions brought under either rule.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. 

Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

omitted). To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, a complaint must meet the requirements of 

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Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint must also 

contain sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is 

“plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009). “[L]abels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court must accept all factual allegations in the 

Complaint as true. Coal for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 

501 (9th Cir. 2009). 

IV. Discussion 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine and are compulsory counterclaims that must have been brought in the previous 

state court action. (Doc. 21.) For the reasons below, the Court disagrees. 

a. Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

 Under Rooker–Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court. See Rooker,

263 U.S. at 415–16; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482. As the Ninth Circuit Court further 

explained: 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids a losing party in state court from filing suit in federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a state court judgment, and seeking federal court review and rejection of that judgment. Skinner v. Switzer, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297, 179 L. Ed. 

2d 233 (2011). To determine whether the Rooker-Feldman bar is 

applicable, a district court first must determine whether the action contains 

a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 

1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). A de facto appeal exists when “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Id. at 1164. In contrast, if “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does 

not bar jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, even if a plaintiff seeks relief from a state 

court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also alleges a legal error by the state court. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2004); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 

1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] plaintiff must seek not only to set aside a state court judgment; he or she must also allege a legal error by the state 

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court as the basis for that relief.”). 

If “a federal plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden de facto appeal, . . . that 

federal plaintiff may not seek to litigate an issue that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden 

de facto appeal is brought.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. 

Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) (footnote omitted). Importantly, 

analysis of the second step of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—whether the issue in federal 

court is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment—does not occur unless the 

plaintiff’s federal litigation is a de facto appeal of the state court judgment. Id. (“The 

‘inextricably intertwined’ language from Feldman is not a test to determine whether a 

claim is a de facto appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman

analysis. . . . Should the action not contain a forbidden de facto appeal, the RookerFeldman inquiry ends.”); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The 

premise for the operation of the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test in Feldman is that the 

federal plaintiff is seeking to bring a forbidden de facto appeal. The federal suit is not a 

forbidden de facto appeal because it is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with something. Rather, 

it is simply a forbidden de facto appeal. Only when there is already a forbidden de facto 

appeal in federal court does the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test come into play.”). See also

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (citing Noel

with approval); Cooper v. Ramons, 704 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Our circuit has 

emphasized that ‘[o]nly when there is already a forbidden de facto appeal in federal court 

does the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test come into play’”) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 

1158). 

 Applying the two-step process here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not 

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As Plaintiff notes, Judge Silver recently issued a 

ruling in a separate action on a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Autovest 

regarding the same issues—whether a plaintiff’s FDCPA claims based on the defendant’s 

filing of an untimely state court action were barred by Rooker-Feldman, and whether 

those claims were compulsory counterclaims required to have been brought in the 

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previous state court litigation. See Garduno v. Autovest LLC, No. CV-15-1016, Doc. 28, 

2015 WL 6955404 (D. Ariz. Oct. 27, 2015). The Court agrees with Judge Silver’s 

analysis. Like the plaintiffs in Garduno, Plaintiff here is not challenging the state court 

judgment in this federal litigation. Rather, he challenges Defendants’ representations at 

the time Autovest filed the state court action. (Doc. 33 at 9-10.) Plaintiff asserts that 

regardless of the outcome of this litigation, the state court judgment will remain in effect. 

(Id.) Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s claims in this 

action. See Vacation Village, Inc. v. Clark County, Nev, 497 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 

2007) (Rooker-Feldman “applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury 

legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court 

judgment.”). 

 Other courts addressing similar issues and claims have also come to the same 

conclusion. See, e.g., McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan PC, NO. CV-14-0869-PHX-DGC, 

2014 WL 4209248, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 26, 2014) (finding that the plaintiff’s FDCPA 

claims regarding the defendant’s actions in the underlying state court action were not 

barred by Rooker-Feldman); Riding v. Cach LLC, 992 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994-95 (C.D. Cal. 

2014) (finding that the plaintiff’s FDCPA claims premised on him being found not liable 

for the state court judgment—claims based on the plaintiff’s contention he was not liable 

for the debt at issue in the state court action—were barred by Rooker-Feldman, but that 

the plaintiff’s claims based on the defendants’ allegedly improper collection methods 

were not barred); Naranjo v. Universal Sur. Of Am., 679 F. Supp. 2d 787, 795 (S.D. Tex. 

2010) (citing cases holding that FDCPA claims based on a defendant’s conduct during a 

previous state court collection action are not subject to Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 

Plaintiff’s claims here do not challenge the state court judgment, nor are they premised 

on Plaintiff being found not liable in the state court action. Rather, Plaintiff challenges 

Defendants’ representations in filing and litigating the state court action. Accordingly, 

the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s claims. 

 Defendants rely primarily on two cases to support their argument that Plaintiffs’ 

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claims are “inextricably interviewed” with the state court judgment and, therefore, seek to 

“undercut” the state court judgment and are barred by Rooker-Feldman: (1) Reusser v. 

Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008); and (2) Howard v RJF 

Financial, LLC, No. CV-11-1213-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 170904 (D. Ariz. Jan. 20, 2012). 

 In Reusser, the Ninth Circuit Court found that the plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman. 515 F.3d at 860. However, the court in Reusser

noted that the same issues presented in the federal litigation were “separately litigated 

before and rejected by an Oregon state court.” Id. Here, in contrast, Plaintiff’s claims 

regarding the manner in which Defendants sought to collect the debt from Plaintiff—

filing a time-barred state court complaint to collect a debt from Plaintiff—were not 

addressed by and are separate from the state court judgment. Further, even if Reusser

offers a broader interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court will follow the 

Ninth Circuit Court’s two-step analysis in Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158, because it is an earlier 

Ninth Circuit case that has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Exxon, 544 

U.S. at 293. See Garduno, 2015 WL 6955404, at *2 (“The analysis by the Supreme 

Court in Exxon appears to be premised on the type of two-step analysis set forth in Noel. . 

. . Accordingly, the conflation of the two steps in Reusser is contrary to both earlier Ninth 

Circuit authority as well as Supreme Court authority.”). Under the analysis in Noel, as 

detailed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims here are not a de facto appeal. 

Therefore, Reusser does not compel application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to 

Plaintiff’s claims. 

 In Howard, a default judgment was entered against the plaintiff and in favor of the 

defendant in a previous state court debt collection action. 2012 WL 170904, at *1. The 

plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing, among other things, that the 

court had no subject-matter jurisdiction and the lawsuit was fraudulent because the 

plaintiff had never done business with the defendant. Id. The state court denied the 

plaintiff’s motion. Id. The plaintiff subsequently filed a suit against the defendant in this 

District Court, claiming that the defendant had violated the FDCPA by attempting to 

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collect a debt that was not owed and filing a time-barred action. Id. Notably, the plaintiff 

brought the federal litigation “to reverse or vacate the judgment of a state court.” Id. at 

*2. The court in Howard found that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine because “the state court was competent to hear Plaintiff’s arguments 

that the suit was time-barred and that it violated FDCPA, but Plaintiff chose not to bring 

those arguments.” Id. at *3. The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the decision on appeal, 

without detailed analysis, because the “action amounted to a forbidden ‘de facto appeal’ 

of a state court judgment.” Howard v. RJF Fin. LLC, 538 F. App’x 824, 825 (9th Cir. 

2013). 

 Defendants argue that under Howard, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims are barred. 

However, Howard is distinguishable in that the plaintiff sought to “reverse or vacate the 

judgment of a state court,” and, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed that the 

plaintiff’s claims were a de facto appeal of the state court judgment. Id.; 2012 WL 

170904, at *2. Here, as stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not a de 

facto appeal of the state court judgment. Therefore, the Court does not reach the second 

step of the Rooker-Feldman analysis, and the doctrine does not apply. See Garduno, 

2015 WL 6955404, at *4 (“. . . given the allegations in Howard, it appears the case 

actually involved a basic application of the two-step Rooker-Feldman inquiry. . . . That 

is, once one of the claims in Howard was determined to be a de facto appeal, all other 

inextricably intertwined claims—such as pursuing the debt after the statute of limitations 

applied—were also barred.”).3

b. Plaintiff’s claims are not compulsory counterclaims. 

 Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s claims are compulsory counterclaims he was 

required to bring in the state court action. (Doc. 21 at 9-11.) As an initial matter, 

 

3

 Plaintiff also cites to a handful of district court decisions and one Seventh Circuit 

Court decision where courts found the plaintiff’s FDCPA claims related to the 

defendant’s conduct during a state court collection action were barred by RookerFeldman. (See Doc. 34 at 6-8.) However, as stated above, other courts have found that 

the same or similar claims as those at issue in this case are not barred by the doctrine and can proceed. See Naranjo, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 795; Garduno, 2015 WL 6955404, at *2-4. 

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Defendant Fulton Friedman & Gullace LLP was not a named party to the state court 

action and, therefore, Plaintiff was not required to assert his claim against that Defendant 

in the state court action. (Doc. 21-1); Mirchandi v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 326 P.3d 

335, 338 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). 

 Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are not 

compulsory counterclaims. Under Arizona law,4

 a counterclaim is compulsory “if it 

arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing 

party’s claim.” Mirchandi, 326 P.3d at 337. “[I]f such claims are not pled in the first 

action, they are waived and barred in any subsequent action under the doctrine of claim 

preclusion.” Id. The standard for determining whether a claim “arises from the same 

transaction or occurrence is . . . flexible” and “is met when a logical relationship exists 

between the current cause of action and the previous one.” Id. at 337-38 (citing 

Technical Air Products, Inc. v. Sheridan–Gray, Inc., 445 P.2d 426, 428 (Ariz. 1968)). 

 Here, Autovest’s claims in the state court litigation related to Plaintiff’s failure to 

pay a debt owed on a car loan. (See Doc. 21-1.) Plaintiff’s claims in this suit relate to the 

methods by which Defendants sought to collect the debt from Plaintiff. The Court finds 

that the required relationship does not exist between the two actions. See Garduno, 2015 

WL 6955404, at *5 (finding the same claims at issue in this action are not compulsory 

counterclaims); Hunt v. 21st Mortgage Corp., No. 2:12-CV-381-RDP, 2012 WL 

3903783, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 7, 2012) (“the manner in which [an FDCPA defendant] 

attempted to collect [a] debt does not concern whether a valid [debt] exist[ed] between 

the parties and, if so, any obligations created by it.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims in this 

action are not barred as compulsory counterclaims. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s state law invasion of privacy claim is dismissed. 

 

4

 Arizona’s rules regarding counterclaims apply here because the Court must give the Arizona judgment “the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under [Arizona] law.” See White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(quotations omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (Doc. 

21-1) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings (Doc. 21) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties’ Joint Motion to Extend Time to 

Engage in Good Faith Settlement Talks (Doc. 38) is granted. The parties shall have until 

30 days from the date of this Order to engage in good faith settlement talks. 

 Dated this 28th day of December, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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