Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01096/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
MicroStrategy, Inc.
Not party
Oracle Corporation
Not party
Tibco Software, Inc.
Appellee
Vasudevan Software, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MICROSTRATEGY, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

TIBCO SOFTWARE, INC.,

Third Party Defendant

______________________ 

2014-1094

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 3:11-cv-06637-RS, 

Judge Richard Seeborg.

--------------------------------------------------------------------

VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

TIBCO SOFTWARE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee 

MICROSTRATEGY, INC., ORACLE CORPORATION, 

Third Party Defendants

_______________________ 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 1 Filed: 04/03/2015
2 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

2014-1096

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 3:11-cv-06638-RS, 

Judge Richard Seeborg.

_____________________ 

Decided: April 3, 2015

______________________ 

LESLIE V. PAYNE, Heim, Payne & Chorush, LLP, Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant in 2014-1094 and 

2014-1096. Also represented by ERIC J. ENGER, MICHAEL 

F. HEIM; BROOKE ASHLEY MAY TAYLOR, JORDAN CONNORS, 

Susman Godfrey L.L.P., Seattle, WA. 

SEAN S. PAK, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, 

LLP, San Francisco, CA, argued for defendant-appellee 

MicroStrategy, Inc. in 2014-1094. Also represented by 

KEVIN ALEXANDER SMITH, JENNIFER A. KASH. 

 

ROBERT ALAN APPLEBY, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New 

York, NY, argued for defendant-appellee TIBCO Software, Inc. in 2014-1096. Also represented by JOSEPH 

ALLEN LOY; JOHN C. O’QUINN, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Before CHEN, LINN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

LINN, Circuit Judge. 

Vasudevan Software, Inc. (“VSi”) appeals the district 

court’s clarification order, Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. 

MicroStrategy Inc., No. 11-cv-06637 RS and No. 11-cv06638 RS, available at 2013 WL 5288267 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 

19, 2013) (“Clarification Order”), of its prior claim construction order, Vasudevan, No. 11-cv-06637 RS and No. 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 2 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 3

11-cv-06638 RS, available at 2012 WL 4120501 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 19, 2012) (“Initial Order”), pursuant to which VSi

stipulated that MicroStrategy, Inc. (“MicroStrategy”) and 

TIBCO Software, Inc. (“TIBCO”) (collectively “defendants”) did not infringe any of the asserted claims of VSi’s 

U.S. Patents No. 6,877,006 (the “’006 patent”), No. 

7,167,864 (the “’864 patent”), No. 7,720,861 (the “’861 

patent”) and No. 8,082,268 (the “’268 patent”) (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”). VSi also appeals the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment that all claims of the 

patents-in-suit asserted against MicroStrategy are invalid 

for lack of enablement. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. 

MicroStrategy Inc., No. 11-cv-06637 RS (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 

2013) (the “MicroStrategy” suit). Finally, VSi appeals the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment that all claims 

of the patents-in-suit asserted against TIBCO are invalid 

for lack of enablement and written description. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. TIBCO Software, Inc., No. 11-cv06638 RS (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2013) (the “TIBCO” suit).

We affirm the district court’s claim construction and, 

accordingly, the judgment of non-infringement predicated 

thereon. However, because there are genuine issues of 

material fact regarding whether the asserted claims are 

enabled and have sufficient written description support, 

we reverse the district court’s grants of summary judgment of invalidity and remand. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Patents-In-Suit

The patents-in-suit1 are directed to different features 

of an online analytical processing (“OLAP”) cube capable 

of collecting and processing “live” data from multiple

1 The patents-in-suit share a common specification. 

References to the specifications of the patents-in-suit will 

be based on the specification of the ’006 patent.

 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 3 Filed: 04/03/2015
4 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

incompatible databases. According to the patents-in-suit, 

prior to the invention, data from different databases had 

to be converted into a compatible format and stored in a 

data warehouse before the data could be analyzed. Prior 

art systems were thus analyzing “stale” data. The inventions of the patents-in-suit sought to overcome that problem by creating an OLAP cube capable of collecting and 

processing information from incompatible databases at 

run-time without going through an intermediate warehouse repository of “stale” data. The claims of 

the ’006, ’864 and ’861 patents all recite a system that 

accesses “disparate . . . databases.”2 The claims of 

the ’268 patent use the expression “incompatible databases of different types,” rather than the term “disparate 

databases.”

B. History of the Proceedings

VSi sued MicroStrategy for infringing claim 2 of 

the ’006 patent; claims 26, 33, 36, 41, 43, 45, 46, 48 and 50 

of the ’864 patent; claims 3 and 4 of the ’861 patent; and 

claims 1, 2, 6–10, 14 and 15 of the ’268 patent. In a 

separate suit, VSi sued TIBCO for infringing claims 26, 

33, 36, 39, 41, 45, 46, 48 and 50 of the ’864 patent.

The district court did not consolidate the MicroStrategy and TIBCO suits, but nonetheless considered the claim 

construction issues together. A key dispute in both suits 

was over the proper construction of the expression “disparate databases.” While there was little debate over the 

fact that “disparate” means incompatible, the parties 

differed over how extensive that incompatibility must be. 

VSi claimed that “disparate databases” meant “incompatible databases having different schemas,” while defendants contended it meant “databases having an absence of 

2 For the remainder of this opinion, the ellipsis between “disparate” and “databases” is omitted for clarity.

 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 4 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 5

compatible keys or record identifier (ID) columns of 

similar value or format in the schemas or structures of 

the database that would otherwise enable linking data 

within the constituent databases.” Initial Order at *3.

The district court agreed with defendants. It ruled 

that the applicant defined “disparate databases” when he 

stated during prosecution: 

“The disparate nature of the above databases refers to [an] absence of compatible keys or record 

identifier (ID) columns of similar value or format 

in the schemas or structures of the database that 

would otherwise enable linking data within the 

constituent databases.”

Id. at *4 (quoting ’006 patent Prosecution History, Applicant’s Amendments and Remarks of Oct. 30, 2003) (emphasis omitted). The district court ruled that the abovequoted statement was “clear” and “unmistakable.” Id. at 

*5. Accordingly, it construed “disparate databases” to 

mean: “databases having an absence of compatible keys or 

record identifier columns of similar value or format in the 

schemas or structures that would otherwise enable linking data.” Id. The district court noted that in a prior 

litigation IBM and Oracle stipulated to VSi’s proposed 

claim construction, but ruled that “[w]hile perhaps of 

some import,” VSi “conceded” that the earlier stipulation 

could not bind defendants “without violating their due 

process rights.” Id. at *3 n.6. 

In its Clarification Order, the district court explained 

that a database would only be disparate if it had: (1) an 

absence of compatible keys; and (2) an absence of record 

ID columns of similar value; and (3) an absence of record 

ID columns of similar format in the schemas or structures 

that would otherwise enable linking data. See Clarification Order at *5.

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 5 Filed: 04/03/2015
6 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

The district court further held that because VSi had 

previously prevailed in its argument that “incompatible 

databases of different types” should be equated with 

“disparate databases,” VSi was now “estopped” from 

claiming that the two phrases had different meanings. 

Id. at *1 n.3. In view of the Clarification Order, the 

parties stipulated to non-infringement.

The district court, finding no genuine issue of material fact, next granted a motion filed by TIBCO for summary judgment of invalidity of all the claims VSi asserted 

against it, contending that the specification lacked written description support of and failed to enable the “disparate databases” limitation. See TIBCO at 25–31. The 

district court likewise granted a similar motion filed by 

MicroStrategy for summary judgment of invalidity of all 

the claims VSi asserted against it for lack of enablement. 

See MicroStrategy at 15–19.

VSi appeals the district court’s claim construction and 

invalidity determinations. We have jurisdiction pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

We review de novo the ultimate question of the proper 

construction of patent claims and the evidence intrinsic to 

the patent. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.

Ct. 831, 841 (2015). On the other hand, in considering 

extrinsic evidence, we review the subsidiary factual 

findings underlying the district court’s claim construction 

for clear error. Id. at 840. Here, the district court essentially limited its review to intrinsic evidence, although it 

noted that IBM and Oracle in another litigation involving 

the ’006, ’864 and ’861 patents stipulated to VSi’s proposed construction of “disparate databases.” The fact of 

the existence of that stipulation is undisputed, but we 

evaluate its import de novo. See id. at 841 (“The district 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 6 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 7

judge, after deciding the factual dispute, will then interpret the patent claim in light of the facts as he has found 

them. This ultimate interpretation is a legal conclusion. 

The appellate court can still review the district court’s 

ultimate construction of the claim de novo.”).

We review summary judgment decisions according to 

the law of the regional circuit, here the Ninth Circuit, 

which reviews them de novo. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse 

Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing 

Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th 

Cir. 2010)). Accordingly, we reapply the standard applied 

by the district court. See Bos. Scientific Corp. v. Johnson 

& Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In the 

Ninth Circuit, summary judgment is appropriate when,

even “draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

non-moving party,” there is no “genuine issue of material 

fact.” Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of 

Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 250, 255 (1986)).

B. Claim Construction

“Claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meanings to one of skill in the art when read in 

the context of the specification and prosecution history.” 

Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d 1362, 

1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 

F.3d 1303, 1315–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). However, 

patentees can act as their own lexicographers if they 

“‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term’ 

other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” Thorner v. 

Sony Computer Entm’t Am., LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick 

Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 7 Filed: 04/03/2015
8 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

1. “Disparate Databases” 

All of the asserted claims of the ’006, ’861 and ’864 patents contain a limitation calling for “disparate databases.” The district court examined the intrinsic record 

and, finding the prosecution history compelling, construed 

the phrase to mean databases having: (1) an absence of 

compatible keys; and (2) an absence of record ID columns 

of similar value; and (3) an absence of record ID columns 

of similar format in the schemas or structures that would 

otherwise enable linking data. Clarification Order at *5.

VSi argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of 

“disparate databases” is simply “incompatible databases 

having different schemas.” It claims that both intrinsic 

and extrinsic evidence equates “disparate databases” with 

“incompatible databases.” VSi then relies on its expert’s 

testimony to show that incompatible databases are simply 

those with different schemas. VSi also contends that its 

position is consistent with and fully supported by a stipulation it entered into with IBM and Oracle in a prior 

litigation involving these same patents, in which the 

parties agreed that “disparate databases” meant “incompatible databases having different schemas.” VSi additionally claims that defendants’ own internal marketing

documents support VSi’s proposed construction. Finally, 

VSi contends that nothing in the prosecution history 

amounts to such a clear disavowal or definition as to 

warrant the more narrow construction made by the district court.

The defendants counter with the argument that the 

phrase “disparate databases” is of indeterminate scope, 

and, thus, has no plain and ordinary meaning. Defendants also take issue with VSi’s argument that defendants’ 

own internal documents reflect VSi’s proposed construction and further contend that whatever their internal 

documents say, both they and the prior stipulation should 

carry little weight. Additionally, defendants argue that 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 8 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 9

the prosecution history evinces a clear intent to define 

“disparate databases” in the way the district court construed the term. Finally, TIBCO denies that the phrase 

“incompatible databases” is equivalent to “disparate 

databases.” TIBCO Resp. Br. at 33.

Addressing first VSi’s argument that the plain and 

ordinary meaning of “disparate databases” is “incompatible databases having different schemas,” we conclude that

while “disparate databases” may be considered “incompatible databases,” the plain and ordinary meaning leaves 

open the question of how “disparate” or “incompatible” the 

databases may be. VSi points to the Summary of the 

Invention, which describes the invention in terms of its 

ability to access “a plurality of incompatible source databases.” ’006 patent col.2 ll.38–42 (emphases added). VSi 

continues by citing passages of the specification that refer 

to incompatible databases as being of different types and 

having different data. Id. col.3 ll.1–3, ll.11–16. But 

nowhere in the specification is there any description of 

what is meant by “disparate databases” in terms of how 

disparate or incompatible the databases must be.

VSi argues in this appeal that its expert, Dr. McLeod, 

stated that databases may be incompatible if they merely 

have different schemas. The district court did not rely on 

this testimony. But, more importantly, Dr. McLeod did 

not claim that this was the only way databases could be 

disparate. Indeed, at deposition, he conceded that the 

meaning of “disparate databases” depends on the “context” and does not have a “consistent use.” J.A. 5655; J.A. 

5581; see also Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp., 754 F.3d 1364, 

1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (confirming that a claim term has no 

plain and ordinary meaning from the testimony of people

skilled in the art).

VSi also argues that its construction is supported by 

its stipulation with IBM and Oracle, but the fact that a 

claim construction was agreed to in the context of a differCase: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 9 Filed: 04/03/2015
10 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

ent litigation is of little relevance or probative value here. 

IBM and Oracle’s accused products may have functioned 

in a manner for which the precise scope of the “disparate 

databases” limitation was immaterial. Moreover, because 

defendants “were not parties” to the IBM and Oracle 

stipulation, “they are not bound by it.” Fuji Photo Film 

Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1095, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 

2004). 

Finally, VSi looks to defendants’ marketing materials

as informing the plain and ordinary meaning of the term 

“disparate databases.” But that evidence, which again 

was not relied on by the district court, is of scant import. 

Language used in marketing materials directed to potential customers can mean something quite different from 

the language used in a patent directed to persons skilled 

in the art. See Scantibodies Lab., Inc. v. Immutopics, Inc., 

374 F. App’x 968, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Moreover, the 

marketing materials referenced by VSi are not contemporaneous with the patents-in-suit.

Because the specification, the stipulation and the referenced marketing materials leave uncertain the full 

scope and meaning of the term “disparate databases,” we 

turn next to the prosecution history, which was central to 

the district court’s claim construction.

In responding to a rejection during prosecution, applicant made the following statement: 

The disparate nature of the above databases refers to an absence of compatible keys or record 

identifier (ID) columns of similar value or format 

in the schemas or structures of the database that 

would otherwise enable linking data within the 

constituent databases. An example of such a 

common key value is a social security number that 

would enable linking or relational databases “join 

operations” on an individual’s personnel data with 

his or her insurance plan. In embodiments of ApCase: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 10 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 11

plicant’s invention, such a common key value is 

not necessary. This disparate nature extends, for 

example, to the type of database (e.g. Oracle, IBM 

DB2, Microsoft SQL Server or Object Databases) 

and the structure, schema, and nature of the databases (i.e. type of data fields in various tables of 

the constituent databases).

’006 patent Prosecution History, Applicant’s Amendments 

and Remarks of Oct. 30, 2003, at 19 (emphasis in original).

The district court determined that this statement was 

a “clear” and “unmistakable” definition of “disparate 

databases.” Initial Order at *5. In its Clarification Order, the district court ruled that this statement limits 

disparate databases to ones that have an absence of 

compatible keys; and an absence of record ID columns of 

similar value; and an absence of record ID columns of 

similar format in the schemas.

On appeal, VSi asserts that the applicant in this

statement was not defining “disparate databases,” and 

was instead listing examples of “disparate databases.” 

Additionally, VSi claims that the applicant did not rely on 

the statement in the prosecution history to distinguish 

the prior art. VSi further argues that even were this 

statement definitional, the district court misconstrued it: 

the prosecution history only meant that two databases 

were disparate if they had an absence of compatible keys; 

or an absence of record ID columns of similar value; or an 

absence of record ID columns of similar format. Finally, 

VSi argues that it certainly is not “clear” that the applicant intended to define “disparate databases” in the way 

the district court construed it.

Defendants respond that the above statement was 

definitional and the applicant relied on this definition in

distinguishing the prior art. They further argue that the 

interpretation of the prosecution history adopted in the 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 11 Filed: 04/03/2015
12 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

district court’s Clarification Order is, in the context of the 

prosecution history, the only reasonable one. Finally, 

defendants argue that, because “disparate databases” has 

no plain and ordinary meaning, the prosecution history 

does not need to be clear in order to be limiting.

We are not persuaded by VSi’s argument. First, we 

disagree with VSi’s position that the statement in the 

prosecution history was not definitional. There, applicant 

stated that the disparate nature “refers to” an absence of 

common keys or record ID columns of similar value or 

format. An applicant’s use of the phrase “refers to” generally indicates an intention to define a term. See, e.g., In 

re Imes, 778 F.3d 1250, 1252–53 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Microsoft Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 731 F.3d 1354, 1360 

(Fed. Cir. 2013); Linear Tech. Corp. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1049, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Abbott 

Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 1354–

55 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cited by VSi, is the exception that 

proves the rule. In Abbott, the specification provided “two 

alternative definitions” for a claim term, both of which 

were introduced by the word “refers.” 334 F.3d at 1354. 

This court thus found that the specification could not have 

meant for both to be binding and, therefore, lacked the 

clarity necessary to overcome the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the term. See id. Here, by contrast, the 

prosecution history only provides one definition and this 

meaning does not conflict with the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the term. 

Additionally, the prosecution history confirms that 

the applicant was defining “disparate databases” when he 

said “[t]he disparate nature of the above databases refers 

to an absence of compatible keys or record identifier (ID) 

columns of similar value or format . . .” as he later relied 

on this definition in distinguishing the prior art. The 

Examiner originally rejected the pending claims over U.S. 

Patent No. 6,516,324 (“Jones”). In response, the applicant 

amended all the independent claims to recite “disparate 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 12 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 13

databases.” ’006 patent Prosecution History, Amendments and Remarks of Oct. 30, 2003, at 2–17. In the 

associated remarks, the applicant set out three sections: 

“A. Applicant’s Invention”; “B. Jones et al.”; and “C. 

Applicant’s Claimed Invention Is Not Obvious Over Jones 

et al.” Id. at 19–21. In section A, the applicant noted that 

the “disparate nature” of the claimed invention “refers to 

an absence of compatible keys” etc. Id. at 19. He further 

noted that “[i]n embodiments of Applicant’s invention, 

such a common key value is not necessary.” Id. (emphasis 

in original). Then, in section B, he explained that Jones 

“rel[ied] on common keys.” Id. at 20. Finally, in section 

C, the applicant explained that Jones “does not disclose, 

teach, or suggest embodiments of Applicant’s invention” 

because Jones does not disclose “accessing a plurality of 

disparate digital databases (see A and B above).” Id. at 

21. Taken in its entirety, the prosecution history is clear 

that the applicant was relying on the provided definition 

of “disparate databases,” which required an absence of, 

inter alia, common keys, and distinguished his invention 

over Jones based on Jones’s reliance on common keys. 

Though it is true that the applicant distinguished Jones 

on other grounds as well, this does not prevent us from 

using this particular distinction over Jones to construe 

the phrase “disparate databases.” See Andersen Corp. v. 

Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). Thus, we conclude that the district court properly 

found that the statement in the prosecution history was 

definitional.

We also reject VSi’s claim that the district court misconstrued the prosecution history. The statement in the 

prosecution history that “disparate databases” refers to 

an absence of compatible keys or record ID columns of 

similar value or format can, theoretically, be interpreted 

in two ways: that the absence of any one of these characteristics makes databases disparate (the “disjunctive 

interpretation”) or that only the absence of all of these 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 13 Filed: 04/03/2015
14 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

characteristics makes them disparate (the “conjunctive 

interpretation”). We conclude that the manner in which 

the applicant distinguished Jones dictates the conjunctive 

interpretation. After noting that “[i]n embodiments of 

Applicant’s invention . . . a common key value is not 

necessary,” the applicant explained that the databases 

accessed by Jones relied on common keys. The applicant 

said nothing about the databases in Jones lacking record 

ID columns of similar value or format. The context indicates that the applicant was distinguishing Jones based 

on the fact that Jones utilized common keys, whereas the 

claimed invention does not. This indicates that the presence of common keys, alone, sufficed to make the databases in Jones distinguishable from the claimed 

“disparate databases.” This is only consistent with the

conjunctive interpretation. According to the disjunctive 

interpretation, the presence of common keys, alone, would 

not necessarily preclude two databases from being disparate: they could still be disparate so long as they lacked 

record ID columns of similar value or format. 

The conjunctive interpretation is also consistent with

proper grammar, where the phrase “‘not A, B, or C’ means 

‘not A, not B, and not c.’” A. Scalia &. B. Garner, Reading 

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 119 (2012) (citing 

DeMorgan’s theorem). Thus, proper grammar supports 

the district court’s conclusion that disparate databases—

which, as explained in the prosecution history, means an 

“absence of [A] compatible keys or [B] record identifier 

(ID) columns of similar value or [C] format”—should be 

understood as [A] an absence of compatible keys; and [B] 

an absence of record ID columns of similar value; and [C] 

an absence of record ID columns of similar format.

Taken on its own, the applicant’s statement that 

“[t]his disparate nature extends, for example, to the type 

of database (e.g. Oracle, IBM DB2, Microsoft SQL Server 

or Object Databases) and the structure, schema, and 

nature of the database . . . ” might be read to suggest that 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 14 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 15

two databases can be disparate based solely on the vendor 

of the database. But those are only cited as examples and 

follow the preceding sentences, which make abundantly 

clear that it is the absence of compatible keys etc., not any 

particular difference among the databases of different 

manufacturers, that is essential. Such a reading also

conflicts with the applicant’s statement during reexamination that “the type of protocol used to connect to one or 

more databases does not imply anything about the disparateness of those databases.” Reexam Control No. 

95/000,698, Patent Owner’s Response of Feb. 11, 2013, at 

32. Finally, it conflicts with the testimony of Dr. Cárdenas, VSi’s expert, that the “key point” of the invention is 

joining disparate databases that are not only disparate 

“because the manufacturers are different,” but also because the data values and data type are different. J.A. 

2970.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s construction of “disparate databases” and its entry of the 

stipulated judgment of non-infringement predicated 

thereon. 

2. “Incompatible Databases of Different Types”

The term “incompatible databases of different types” 

is found only in the claims of the ’268 patent, which were

asserted only against MicroStrategy. The district court 

ruled that VSi was estopped from arguing that “incompatible databases of different types” should be construed 

differently than “disparate databases” because it had 

prevailed in the Initial Order in its argument that the two 

terms should be construed to be the same. Clarification 

Order at *1 n.3.

VSi argues that the requirements for judicial estoppel 

are not met here. MicroStrategy disputes this, but argues 

that, in any event, the intrinsic evidence shows that 

“disparate databases” has the same meaning as “incompatible databases.” MicroStrategy further claims that VSi 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 15 Filed: 04/03/2015
16 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

waived any argument that “incompatible databases” is 

not synonymous with “disparate databases” because VSi 

never articulated a proposed construction of “incompatible 

databases” that might differ from any construction of 

“disparate databases.”

We find no basis to disturb the district court’s ruling. 

At the district court, VSi consistently argued that “disparate databases” meant “incompatible databases.” It 

never offered an independent construction of “incompatible” and it contended that “incompatible databases”

needed no construction, despite the fact that it left unresolved the same question presented by the disparate 

database limitation: how incompatible? The record is 

devoid of any suggestion by VSi that if the district court 

ruled that the “disparate database” term was limited by 

the prosecution history’s definition, the term “incompatible databases” is not similarly limited. Even on appeal, 

VSi admits that “the specification, at times, uses ‘incompatible’ as a substitute for ‘disparate.’” Reply Br. at 23; 

see also id. at 21 n.6 (noting that its evidence “applies 

equally to all parties’ constructions” of “disparate databases”). Accordingly, while more properly characterized 

as waiver, we affirm the district court’s treatment of 

“incompatible databases” as being subject to the same 

construction as “disparate databases.”

C. Summary Judgment of Invalidity

1. Written Description

The district court granted summary judgment that 

the claims of the ’864 patent that VSi asserted against 

TIBCO were invalid for lack of written description support. TIBCO at 27. It held that there was no question of 

material fact that the written description would not 

convey to one of skill in the art that VSi had possession of 

a means of accessing “disparate databases” at the time of 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 16 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 17

filing.3 Though VSi’s expert, Dr. Cárdenas, opined that 

the specification contains written description support, the 

district court dismissed his opinion as “conclusory.” Id. at 

26. 

VSi contends that a genuine issue of material fact 

does exist. It notes that both the specification and originally filed claim 11 describe accessing “incompatible 

databases,” which, VSi claims, is equivalent to disparate 

databases. Relying on its expert, Dr. Cárdenas, VSi

further claims that the specification teaches how to implement a system that can access disparate databases. 

TIBCO responds that the specification describes a result, 

but does not show how to achieve the result. Accordingly, 

TIBCO claims, the specification does not show that the 

inventor had possession of the ability to access “disparate 

databases.” TIBCO further claims that Figures 1–22 in 

the ’006 patent are screenshots from software that the 

inventor admitted could not access data from disparate 

databases. Finally, TIBCO claims that the district court 

3 VSi also notes that, in the district court’s separate 

discussion of enablement, it stated that “VSi has raised at 

least a material question of fact as to whether the written 

description of the ‘disparate databases’ limitations are 

sufficient.” TIBCO at 27 (internal brackets omitted). We 

do not ascribe any weight to this statement and consider 

it a scrivener’s error. It is inconsistent with the thrust of 

the district court’s discussion of written description. See

id. at 25–27; id. at 25 (“There is no question of material 

fact as to whether the written description of the databases 

features would reasonably convey to those skilled in the 

art that [the applicant] had possession of that aspect as of 

the filing date of the provisional application. TIBCO’s 

motion for summary judgment on this issue must, therefore, be granted.”).

 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 17 Filed: 04/03/2015
18 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

properly dismissed the testimony of Dr. Cárdenas as 

conclusory.

A specification must “contain a written description of 

the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶1 (2006).4 The test for 

the sufficiency of the written description “is whether the 

disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably 

conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had 

possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing 

date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 

1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The written description requirement is not met if the specification merely describes a “desired result.” Id. at 1349. “Whether a 

patent claim is supported by an adequate written description is a question of fact.” AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & 

Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1297 

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355). A party 

must prove invalidity for lack of written description by 

clear and convincing evidence. See Laryngeal Mask Co. 

Ltd. v. Ambu, 618 F.3d 1367, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

We conclude that, drawing all reasonable inferences 

in favor of VSi as the non-movant, there are genuine 

issues of material fact regarding whether the specification 

shows possession of the claimed invention. The specification of the patents-in-suit describes dynamically “accessing a plurality of incompatible source databases,” ’006 

patent col.2 ll.40–42 (emphasis added), and in originally 

filed claim 11 recited accessing “databases [that] are 

incompatible.” The fact that these portions of the specification do not speak in haec verba of accessing “disparate 

4 Paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was replaced with 

newly designated § 112(a) when § 4(c) of the America 

Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 (“AIA”), took effect on 

September 16, 2012. Because the applications resulting 

in the ’864 patent were filed before that date, this opinion 

refers to the pre-AIA version of § 112.

 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 18 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 19

databases” does not eliminate as a genuine issue of material fact the existence of at least some discussion, and, 

therefore, possession, of the accessing of disparate databases, as claimed. See Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-KeyTech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

The more telling question is whether the specification 

shows possession by the inventor of how accessing disparate databases is achieved. The fact that the inventor 

admitted that the screenshots shown in Figures 1–22 of 

the ’006 patent were screenshots from software that could 

not access “disparate databases simultaneously” does not 

answer the question because the asserted claims do not 

require that the databases be accessed simultaneously. 

Contrary to the district court, however, we do find the 

testimony of Dr. Cárdenas to at least raise a genuine 

issue of material fact on whether the specification shows 

how to achieve the functionality of accessing disparate 

databases. Dr. Cárdenas opined that the specification 

explains that serialized files can be used to correlate 

parameters from two databases. See J.A. 4246–56 (discussing ’006 patent col.7 l.41–col.8 l.25). He further 

opined that those correlation parameters can be used to 

identify data in one database that is correlated to data in 

another. See id. According to Dr. Cárdenas, the correlated data could be displayed together. Id. He thus concluded that the specification shows that the patentee had 

possession of the claimed inventions. See id. While both 

the district court and TIBCO question the sufficiency of 

Dr. Cárdenas’s opinion, we find that his opinion is more 

than merely conclusory, as it points to specific portions of 

the ’006 patent as showing how to access disparate databases. Dr. Cárdenas’s opinion, which was not challenged 

by any contrary expert testimony, at least raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the patentsin-suit disclose how to access disparate databases. Cf.

Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1490 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(“‘As a general rule, summary judgment is inappropriate 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 19 Filed: 04/03/2015
20 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

where an expert’s testimony supports the non-moving 

party’s case.’” (quoting cases)). Accordingly, we reverse 

the district court’s determination of summary judgment 

that the claims asserted against TIBCO are invalid for 

lack of written description support. 

2. Enablement

The district court ruled that the patents-in-suit do not 

enable accessing “disparate databases.” MicroStrategy at 

19.5 The district court relied on the following facts: at the 

time of filing the inventor did not have a working example 

of the “disparate databases” feature; it took the inventor 

three calendar years from the time of filing to build a 

functioning embodiment of the invention; the specification 

shows screenshots from the Jasmine software, and the 

inventor was unable to practice the claimed invention on 

that software; the specification lacks a working example; 

the problem solved by the patent had confounded inventors for 20 years; others had failed to practice the alleged 

invention; and the claim scope was broad. Id. at 15–19. 

Of all the factors, the district court focused most on the 

time it took the inventor to reduce the invention to practice. See, e.g., id. at 16 (“This extended period of experimentation weighs heavily in favor of a finding of 

invalidity.”). The district court did acknowledge that the 

relative skill in the art and the predictability of the art 

were high, id. at 18, but found that other factors provided 

clear and convincing evidence that the claims were not 

enabled. 

VSi argues that many of the district court’s factual 

findings are genuinely disputed. Defendants, on the other 

hand, contend that the district court’s findings were 

either conceded or are beyond reasonable dispute.

5 For the sake of brevity, parallel citations to the 

TIBCO opinion are omitted.

 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 20 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 21

A specification must “enable” a person of skill in the 

art to make and use the claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112 ¶1 (2006). Enablement is a legal question based on 

underlying factual determinations. See Transocean 

Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, 

Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A claim is 

sufficiently enabled even if “a considerable amount of 

experimentation” is necessary, so long as the experimentation “is merely routine, or if the specification in question 

provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect to 

the direction in which the experimentation should proceed.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 

On the other hand, if “undue experimentation” is needed, 

the claims are invalid. Id. In determining whether 

experimentation is undue, Wands lists a number of factors to consider: “They include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or 

guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state 

of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) 

the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) 

the breadth of the claims.” Id. (citing Ex parte Forman, 

230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547 (B.P.A.I. 1986)). A party must 

prove invalidity for lack of enablement by clear and 

convincing evidence. See MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global 

Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

We conclude that there are genuine issues of material 

fact relating to several of the Wands factors, which, taken 

together, preclude summary judgment of non-enablement. 

First, we find that the effort it took the inventor to reduce 

the invention to practice does not conclusively show a lack 

of enablement. The inventor testified that he developed a 

“commercial-grade software product.” J.A. 2559. “Title 

35 does not require that a patent disclosure enable one of 

ordinary skill in the art to make and use a perfected, 

commercially viable embodiment,” CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp

Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003), so the 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 21 Filed: 04/03/2015
22 VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 

time it took to make a commercial-grade embodiment is 

not, itself, determinative of non-enablement. VSi claims 

that the inventor could have developed a functional 

prototype with far less experimentation. This is buttressed by Dr. Cárdenas’ opinion that the inventor’s one 

man-year experimentation was not undue. And, as with 

written description, neither defendant provided contrary 

expert testimony.

Second, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 

VSi, we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact 

whether the ’006 patent specification provides a reasonable amount of guidance. Crediting Dr. Cárdenas’ testimony, discussed above at 19–20, the ’006 specification 

shows how to access disparate databases using correlation 

parameters. Nonetheless, the district court found that 

the ’006 patent “teaches away” from a working embodiment because the specification describes a preferred 

database as “an object database, such as Jasmine,” ’006 

patent col.6 l.32, but the inventor “could not implement 

the invention using that particular database.” MicroStrategy at 17. The inventor, however, explained that 

his problems getting the claimed functionality to work 

stemmed from a different product, Jasmine ii, which is 

never mentioned in the specification. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of VSi, there is a genuine issue 

of material fact whether the Jasmine software could be 

used to make a working embodiment. 

The district court addressed other Wands factors as 

well, finding some in favor of enablement and some 

against, but concluding that overall the Wands factors 

weigh heavily in favor of invalidity. While the question 

may be close, the existence of at least the above-noted 

genuine issues of material facts is sufficient to defeat 

summary judgment of invalidity. Accordingly, we reverse 

the district court’s grants of summary judgment that the 

asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement.

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 22 Filed: 04/03/2015
VASUDEVAN SOFTWARE, INC. v. MICROSTRATEGY, INC. 23

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s claim construction and judgment of noninfringement but reverse the district court’s grants of 

summary judgments of invalidity and remand. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART AND 

REMANDED

IV. COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

Case: 14-1096 Document: 66-2 Page: 23 Filed: 04/03/2015