Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01436/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01436-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carolyn W. Colvin
Appellee
James Tippe
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-1436

___________________________

James Tippe

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport

____________

 Submitted: September 22, 2016

Filed: October 11, 2016

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

James Tippe applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income in March 2011, alleging a disability onset date of

October 31, 2008. Tippe had a long history of cocaine and alcohol abuse. His

application was denied on initial application and review based on a finding that

“alcoholism or drug addiction would . . . be a contributing factor material to the

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Commissioner’s determination that the [claimant] is disabled.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(2)(C). Tippe requested an administrative hearing. The Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) agreed that substance abuse was material to Tippe’s disabilities and

denied benefits. Tippe appealed, and the Commissioner’s Appeals Council remanded

for consideration of a prior work performance assessment and new evidence. 

After a second hearing, the ALJ again denied benefits in an October 6, 2014

decision. The ALJ concluded that Tippe had severe but not listed impairments

throughout the period at issue -- anxietydisorder, depressive disorder, and personality

disorder. Because Tippe testified that he has been free of substance abuse since July

2011, the ALJ separately considered whether he was disabled with and without

substance abuse. See SSR 13-2p, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,939 (Mar. 22, 2013). The ALJ

found that he was disabled prior to ending substance abuse but was not entitled to

benefits, because the substance abuse was a contributing factor material to his

disability. For the later period, when Tippe was free of substance abuse, the ALJ 1

weighed the extensive record evidence and determined that he retained the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels,

so long as the work is not fast-paced and is limited to simple, routine tasks involving

minimal interaction with others. Based on a vocational expert’s testimony that a

person with this RFC is capable of performing packager and warehouse worker jobs

that exist in significant numbers in the national and local economy, the ALJ found

that Tippe was not disabled. 

It is unclear whether Tippe’s 73-page brief on appeal challenges this 1

determination. If so, the challenge is without merit. Tippe admitted that he lost many

jobs because of missed work during drug relapses. In response to a question by

Tippe’s attorney at the second hearing, the vocational expert testified that a person

with more than two work absences a month is not able to work competitively.

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After the Appeals Council denied review, Tippe commenced this action

seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s adverse decision. The district court affirmed,

2

concluding that the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence on the

administrative record as a whole. Tippe appeals. Applying the same deferential

standard, we affirm. See Welsh v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2014).

On appeal, Tippe first argues the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling or

substantial weight to the medical opinions of two examining psychiatrists at the

University of Iowa Hospitals & Clinics, Dr. Aaron Kauer and Dr. Anvi Vora. Both

doctors completed Medical Source Statement (“MSS”) forms in which they checked

boxes reporting that Tippe’s abilities to function when not using drugs or alcohol

were “markedly” limited. These limitations, if found by the ALJ, would require a

determination that Tippe’s anxiety disorder is disabling. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,

App. 1, § 12.06(B). Dr. Vora completed the MSS form ten days after her treatment

notes reported an interview in which Tippe stated that he “has been working towards

SSI disability” and “will tell his lawyer that we are willing to help with this process.” 

The ALJ gave these assessments “some” or “little” weight because “the statement

regarding a limited ability to work is an issue reserved for the Commissioner,”

answersto formquestionnaires thatsimply check off boxes are entitled to less weight,

the pattern of marking limitations was the same on each form, and both physicians

failed to address the fact that Tippe “does not comply with treatment.”

“A treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight if it is wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and

is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” House v. Astrue, 500 F.3d

741, 744 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). However, treating physician opinions

may receive limited weight if they are “conclusory or inconsistent with the record.”

The HonorableCharlesR. Wolle, United StatesDistrict Judge for the Southern 2

District of Iowa.

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Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1088 (8th Cir. 2016). A treating physician opinion

that fails to address treatment noncompliance and is conclusory, consisting of

“checklist forms, cit[ing] no medical evidence, and provid[ing] little to no

elaboration,” is “properly discounted.” Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 964 (8th

Cir. 2010). Tippe contends that his repeated noncompliance was a justifiable

symptom of his mental impairments, citing Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935 (8th

Cir. 2009). However, Pate-Fires is distinguishable because, asin Wildman, “there is

little or no evidence expressly linking [Tippe’s] mental limitations to [his] repeated

noncompliance.” 596 F.3d at 966. Like the district court, we conclude that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination to discount these opinions.

Tippe further argues that the ALJ erred in finding that his subjective claims

regarding the effects of his mental impairments were not credible to the extent they

conflicted with the ALJ’s RFC determination. In weighing credibility, the ALJ

considered Tippe’s testresultsshowing cognitive abilities within broad normal limits,

repeated noncompliance with recommended courses oftreatment, and “diverse” daily

activities. The ALJ noted that Tippe’s repeated refusal to follow proposed treatment

“suggests that the symptoms may not have been as limiting as the claimant has

alleged in connection with this application apart from substance abuse.” We agree

with the district court that the ALJ appropriately discredited the extent of Tippe’s

subjective complaints “based on a valid assessment” of the factors outlined in Polaski

v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984).

Tippe argues that the ALJ, in evaluating his limitations while sober,

inappropriately relied on statements he made while abusing substances to “discount

evidence of poor functioning” following sobriety. The ALJ noted that Tippe had said

“he was going to ‘milk’ his unemployment for as much as he could,” reported that he

used his unemployment check for drugs and “would lie, steal, and cheat to get money

for more drugs,” and “admits to not trying hard to get work, especially while he had

unemployment benefits.” While most of these statements were made during Tippe’s

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period of substance abuse, they were relevant because (i) Tippe applied for benefits

during that period, and (ii) the statements were relevant to his credibility during the

period he claimed to be free of substance abuse. The ALJ extensively considered the

record evidence of Tippe’s impairments without substance abuse to determine

whether those impairments were disabling. We agree with the district court that the

ALJ adequately evaluated Tippe’s limitations, both with and without substance abuse.

We have carefully considered the additional issues and arguments Tippe raises

on appeal and found them to be without merit. Our review of the extensive

administrative record persuades us that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination that Tippe was not disabled during the period from October 31, 2008

to October 6, 2014. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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