Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01960/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01960-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D.A.L.D.
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

2

 Appellant was sixteen years old at the time of the offense and at sentencing.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1960

___________

United States of America, * 

*

Plaintiff - Appellee *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota

D.A.L.D., Juvenile, *

* 

Defendant - Appellant *

___________

Submitted: October 18, 2006

Filed: November 9, 2006

___________

Before MELLOY, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

The district court1

 found D.A.L.D., a juvenile, delinquent for committing assault

resulting in serious bodily injury, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6), 1153, 5032, and assault

with a dangerous weapon, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3), 1153, 5032. The district court

sentenced appellant to twenty-four months’ imprisonment to be followed by a term

of juvenile supervision until appellant’s twenty-first birthday.2

 On appeal, D.A.L.D.

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challenges the district court’s sentence as unreasonable. Finding that the sentence is

reasonable, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

In the early morning of July 20, 2005, appellant and the victim, L.J.E., were

among a group of juveniles gathered in an open space among the houses of the

Manderson Housing Area in Manderson, South Dakota. L.J.E. and several of the

individuals in the group were identified at trial as members of the Eastside gang.

Despite his denials, appellant was identified at trial as a member of the rival Cold Crip

gang, and the government introduced into evidence two items taken from his

possession, a baseball cap with the words “Cold Crip” written inside it and a blue

bandana, worn by Crip members, to further establish his gang membership.

After a brief verbal altercation, L.J.E. challenged appellant to a “one-on-one”

fight. L.J.E. struck appellant in the face and began to walk away. After L.J.E. had

walked about three feet, appellant stabbed him in the back with a knife. Appellant

then fled to his grandmother’s house, where he stashed the knife in a vent. The knife

was later recovered by a special agent from the Bureau of Indian Affairs and

introduced into evidence at trial. 

Appellant was charged by information, alleging juvenile delinquency in

connection with the assault. At the conclusion of a one-day trial, the district court

adjudicated appellant delinquent. 

Both appellant and the government agreed that appellant’s offense level was

twenty-three and that the resulting advisory guideline range for his offense, had he

been an adult, was forty-six to fifty-seven months. However, as a juvenile, appellant’s

term of detention could extend only until his twenty-first birthday. The district court

accepted the guideline conclusions and imposed a dispositional sentence below the

low end of the adult range. The district court sentenced appellant to twenty-four

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months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, followed by juvenile

delinquent supervision until his twenty-first birthday. This appeal followed.

II.

Appellant asserts a two-pronged challenge to the reasonableness of his

sentence, arguing that the district court erred by (1) not specifically applying the facts

of his case to the section 3553(a) sentencing factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), thereby

failing to create an adequate record to allow this Court to conduct a reasonableness

review, and (2) placing undue weight on its concern over the proliferation of gang

violence in Indian country.

When the district court has correctly determined the Sentencing Guidelines

range, as in this case, we review the resulting sentence for reasonableness. See United

States v. Gatewood, 438 F.3d 894, 896 (8th Cir. 2006). “This standard is akin to our

traditional review for abuse of discretion.” Id. 

A.

Appellant contends that by not specifically applying the facts of his case to the

section 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court did not create an adequate record

to allow us to conduct a meaningful reasonableness review. Appellant relies on

United States v. Rivera, 439 F.3d 446 (8th Cir. 2006), where we reversed and

remanded because the district court, in sentencing the defendant to a term below the

Sentencing Guidelines range, stated only, “Well, I think the mandatory minimum is

sufficient penalty under the circumstances that have been placed here in the record.”

Id. at 447. In Rivera, we stated, “[I]n this post-Booker era of sentencing we feel

something more is required of district courts.” Id. at 448.

A district court must, at the time of sentencing, state in open court the reasons

for its imposition of the particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). “At a minimum the

court should indicate which arguments are being adopted, state why they are relevant,

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and offer some explanation as to how the adopted factors affect the sentence.” Rivera,

439 F.3d at 448. However, a district court is not required “to categorically rehearse”

each of the section 3553(a) factors on the record as long as it is clear that they were

considered, United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2006), nor is it

required to make a “robotic incantation” about each statutory factor considered.

United States v. Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States

v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2005)). 

Appellant’s reliance on Rivera is misplaced. In the instant case, during the

sentencing hearing, the district court considered several of the sentencing factors in

section 3553(a). The court stated, 

In pronouncing this sentence, the Court has considered the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the need for the sentence to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide

just punishment, and to [afford] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B). Here, the district court cited only

the section 3553(a) factors it deemed relevant, avoiding a “robotic incantation.” See

Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d at 756; see also United States v. Lewis, 436 F.3d 939, 946 (8th

Cir. 2006). The court also made specific mention of the gang problem on Indian

lands, stating that its sentence was “imposed to reflect the Court’s concern about the

continued proliferation of gang violence in Indian country.” Accordingly, we find that

the district court created an adequate record to allow us to conduct a reasonableness

review. 

B.

Appellant further contends that the district court abused its discretion by

“giving exclusive focus and undue weight” to a general concern regarding the

proliferation of gang violence in Indian country, to the exclusion of factors that were

specific to appellant. Appellant contends that the district court gave insufficient

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weight to his efforts, since his arrest, to better himself, and to the victim’s role as the

initial aggressor in the altercation.

A discretionary sentencing ruling may be unreasonable if a sentencing court

fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the

appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at

a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.

United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005). “In the context of

reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, a proper or relevant factor is one listed under

section 3553(a).” United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2005).

Appellant mischaracterizes as general the district court’s concern regarding

gang violence. Instead, the district court referred to appellant’s “association with gang

members,” which it then considered in the broader context of gang violence in Indian

country. Thus, appellant’s gang affiliation was properly considered by the district

court as part of his “history and characteristics.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); see also

United States v. Melgar-Galvez, 161 F.3d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 2006); United States

v. Pride, No. 95-1530, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32313, at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 1995)

(per curiam). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering

appellant’s gang affiliation as a component of the section 3553(a) review. 

Further, the sentencing record demonstrates that the district court heard

appellant’s plea for leniency based on factors such as his successful completion of

drug and alcohol counseling, participation in cultural activities, and improvement in

school. Accordingly, the district court considered these factors and did not give

exclusive focus to its concerns regarding the proliferation of gang violence in Indian

country. We further note that the court showed leniency to appellant by imposing a

dispositional sentence below the low end of the adult range. In this case, the court

considered the full range of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors as applied to

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appellant and did not abuse its discretion. See Long Soldier, 431 F.3d at 1123 (stating

that the relevant inquiry is whether the district court considered the section 3553(a)

factors and whether they support the reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing

decision).

III.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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