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Parties Involved:
Enrique Roberto Trevino
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1534

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Enrique Roberto Trevino

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

____________

 Submitted: February 8, 2016

 Filed: July 14, 2016 

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

A January 2013 superseding indictment charged Enrique Roberto Trevino and

others with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 50

kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The district

court appointed Arturo Hernandez, III, to represent Trevino. In April 2014, Trevino 

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pleaded guilty to the charge without a plea agreement, and the district court1

 accepted

his plea. The July 2014 Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), later updated to

reflect subsequent guidelines amendments, recommended an advisory guidelines

sentencing range of 188-235 months in prison. Trevino filed seven pages of

objections to the PSR findings and recommendations. 

In February 2015, on the eve of the sentencing hearing, Trevino moved to

withdraw his plea, in part because it “was made and entered without meaningful

advice of counsel.” Attorney Hernandez moved to withdraw on the ground that “an

ethical conflict exists” resulting from Trevino’s motion to withdraw the plea. At the

March 2015 motion and sentencing hearing, the district court2

 denied both motions to

withdraw and, after hearing testimony on the remaining PSR objections, determined

Trevino’s advisory sentencing range to be 121-151 months and sentenced him to 120

months in prison. On appeal, Trevino argues the district court erred (1) by denying

his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, (2) by not appointing substitute counsel, and

(3) by incorrectly calculating drug quantity at sentencing. We affirm. 

I. The Plea Withdrawal Issue. 

Before sentencing, a defendant who has pleaded guilty may withdraw the plea

if he “can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(d)(2)(B). We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Cruz, 643 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2011). “The ‘fair and

just’ standard is a liberal standard, but it does not create an automatic right to

1

The Honorable Matt J. Whitworth, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

2

The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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withdraw a plea.” United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1996)

(alterations and quotation omitted). 

The July 2014 PSR made adverse findings that Trevino was responsible for

possessing 667.42 kilograms of marijuana, the marijuana equivalent quantity for his

relevant conduct; operated a stash house in St. Louis; and was an organizer or leader

of the drug conspiracy, based upon information provided by a confidential source,

cooperating witnesses, and conspirators who had pleaded guilty. On February 8,

2015, with objections to those findings pending, attorney Hernandez filed a Motion

To Withdraw the plea on Trevino’s behalf, stating in support:

1. Mr. Trevino’s plea of guilty was made and entered without

meaningful advice of counsel because Mr. Trevino claims that current

counsel failed to explain the consequences of pleading guilty without a

plea agreement. Thus, defendant made the decision to waive his rights

to trial and to defend himself from false allegations of his co-defendants

and witnesses.

2. His plea of guilty was made without full understanding of the nature

of the offense charged and the punishment that might be imposed, in that

these matters were not made known to him clearly by the court.

3. Defendant claims that he was convinced to plead guilty by his

appointed counsel and that he would be allowed to make arguments as

[to] the range of punishment. He claims that his sentencing calculations

have been based on false information provided by witnesses that he has

not been allowed to cross-examine and that his attempt to dispute their

allegations has jeopardized him further.

Trevino submitted no further supporting evidence or argument prior to the March 3,

2015, motion and sentencing hearing. 

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As the district court noted in denying the Motion To Withdraw at the March

2015 hearing, the first two reasons stated in support of the Motion To Withdraw were

plainly contradicted by the Rule 11 colloquy at Trevino’s change-of-plea hearing. At

that April 2014 hearing, the district court explained that the statutory sentencing range

was 0 to 20 years; the sentencing guidelines would apply; the PSR might vary

somewhat from defense counsel’s preliminary estimate of the guidelines range;

Trevino could object to the PSR and the court would rule on his objections; the court

could vary upward or downward from the guidelines range; and Trevino could appeal

the sentence but not withdraw his plea. Trevino stated that no one threatened him to

get him to plead guilty, no one told him what the district court would do at sentencing,

and he was pleading guilty of his own free will. The court then inquired:

THE COURT: [A]re you satisfied with Mr. Hernandez’s

representation of you?

MR. TREVINO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Has he done everything that you’ve asked him to do?

MR. TREVINO: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is there anything that Mr. Hernandez did that you

did not want him to do?

MR. TREVINO: No, sir.

THE COURT: All right. So, you’re satisfied with his -- the way

he’s defended you in this case?

MR. TREVINO: Yes, sir, I am.

We have repeatedly upheld the denial of motions to withdraw a plea based on

ineffective assistance of counsel where the “claim directly contradicts statements

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[defendant] made under oath at his guilty plea hearing . . . that he was totally satisfied

with his attorney’s legal assistance.” United States v. Gomez, 326 F.3d 971, 974 (8th

Cir. 2003). The failure to assert objections to counsel’s performance at the change-ofplea hearing refutes any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for

withdrawing the plea. See United States v. Norvell, 729 F.3d 788, 796 (8th Cir.

2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1342 (2014); United States v. Murphy, 572 F.3d 563,

569 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1057 (2009); United States v. Goodson, 569 F.3d

379, 382-83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1098 (2009). “In these circumstances,

the ineffective assistance claim is untimely because it was first raised in a motion to

withdraw the plea.” United States v. Payton, 260 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2001), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1170 (2002).

The third reason stated in Trevino’s Motion To Withdraw was addressed at the

ex parte portion of the March 2015 hearing. The court asked Trevino, “What are your

concerns with your attorney?” He responded:

My concern was from the very beginning, as I wrote Magistrate

Judge Whitworth about a year and a half ago, a [question] that my

attorney failed to answer was [whether I may] take my case to court and

challenge the offense level, not my innocence or guilt of the matter, but

. . . the amounts of drugs I’m being charged with . . . . That would be my

best option because . . . I’m charged with what I believe is amounts of

drugs that are not verifiable. They were not able to be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt in a court of law, which would be to my advantage. 

Now at my sentencing, I have the burden of . . . proving that the

allegations are false. 

The court replied:

Well, No. 1, that’s incorrect. The government still has the burden

of proof at the sentencing hearing. The burden of proof has changed, but

it remains with the government. You have absolutely no burden of

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proof. And I will tell you that your attorney has preserved your right to

challenge pretty much all aspects of the [PSR].

The above-quoted colloquies at the change-of-plea and the March 2015

hearings establish that Trevino presented no fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty

plea. Trevino argues the court committed an error of law when it stated at the March

2015 hearing, “any ineffective assistance of counsel claims need to be brought up in

[an 18 U.S.C.§] 2255 motion. This is not the appropriate time to raise those issues,

and it is not a basis for Mr. Trevino to withdraw his guilty plea.” We agree that

ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process “can serve as the requisite

‘fair and just reason’ for withdrawal [but] only if [defendant] demonstrates both that

his attorney’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by it.” United

States v. McMullen, 86 F.3d 135, 137 (8th Cir. 1996). Thus, the court spoke too

categorically, but in the absence of an objection, we conclude there was no error of

law. When a defendant develops no factual record to support his assertions of

ineffective assistance, as in this case, “such claims ordinarily are best reviewed in

collateral proceedings.” United States v. Mugan, 441 F.3d 622, 631 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 549 U.S. 890 (2006); see United States v. Payton, 168 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2

(8th Cir. 1999).

Trevino further argues that, instead of denying his Motion To Withdraw, the

district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing. However, a district court

“need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the allegations in the motion are inherently

unreliable, are not supported by specific facts or are not grounds for withdrawal even

if true.” United States v. Morrison, 967 F.2d 264, 267-68 (8th Cir. 1992) (quotation

omitted). Here, Trevino’s motion failed to put forth a fair and just reason to withdraw

the plea, provided no specific facts supporting a claim of ineffective assistance, and

was directly contradicted by his statements under oath at the change-of-plea hearing. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Motion To Withdraw.

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II. Counsel’s Motion To Withdraw.

At the March 2015 motion hearing, the court explained to Trevino that the

government would have the burden of proof at sentencing regarding his objections to

the PSR. The court then observed that attorney Hernandez had preserved Trevino’s

right to challenge the PSR, and that Trevino and Hernandez had obviously been

communicating, though not as extensively as Trevino wanted prior to the upcoming

sentencing. The court offered Trevino additional time to talk to Hernandez before the

sentencing hearing. Trevino stated that “[j]ust an hour would suffice,” which the court

granted. The court concluded: “I do not have a basis in front of me to permit Mr.

Hernandez to withdraw and to give you a new attorney. So that motion is going to be

denied.” On appeal, Trevino argues that the district court abused its discretion when

it declined to appoint substitute counsel because the record established that a probable

conflict of interest and complete breakdown in communication arose when Trevino

filed the Motion To Withdraw his guilty plea. 

To warrant substitute counsel, Trevino must show “justifiable dissatisfaction”

with defense counsel, “which can arise from irreconcilable conflict, a complete

breakdown in communication, or any other factor interfering significantly with an

attorney’s ability to provide zealous representation.” United States v. Taylor, 652

F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). Justifiable dissatisfaction requires

more than “frustration with appointed counsel’s performance or disagreement with

counsel’s tactical decisions . . . . The proper focus in evaluating claims of

dissatisfaction with counsel is on the quality of advocacy.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

“Last-minute requests to substitute counsel such as occurred here remain disfavored.” 

United States v. Rodriguez, 612 F.3d 1049, 1054 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 988

(2010); see United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 1024 (2002). 

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The claim of conflict of interest is without merit. Trevino expressed complete

satisfaction with Attorney Hernandez’s representation at the change-of-plea hearing. 

When the PSR proposed adverse sentencing determinations based on information

provided by Trevino’s former conspirators and other cooperating witnesses,

Hernandez filed extensive objections to the PSR and a Motion To Withdraw on

Trevino’s behalf. When the district court ruled that there were no ineffective

assistance issues warranting withdrawal of the plea or appointment of new counsel,

Hernandez continued in his vigorous representation of Trevino before and at the

sentencing hearing. Justifiable dissatisfaction does not include a defendant’s

frustration with counsel who “continues to provide zealous representation.” Barrow,

287 F.3d at 738.

Trevino did not develop support for his conclusory allegation that Hernandez

convinced or coerced him to plead guilty, nor did his statements to the court support

that allegation. The fact that Trevino did not understand the process for challenging

the PSR did not reflect a complete breakdown in communication. In response to

Trevino’s complaint that Hernandez failed to answer all his questions and had not met

with Trevino prior to the sentencing hearing, the court gave Trevino additional time

to meet with Hernandez to prepare what Trevino referred to as “a battle plan for

sentencing.” The court’s inquiry and response to Trevino’s complaints satisfied its

burden to inquire into Trevino’s issues with counsel. See Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at

1053-55. 

III. The Sentencing Issue.

Trevino filed extensive objections to the PSR findings that he was responsible

for possessing 667.42 marijuana equivalent kilograms, operated a stash house, and

was an organizer or leader of the conspiracy. At the March 2015 ex parte motion

hearing, after denying the motions to withdraw and granting Trevino additional time

to confer with Hernandez before the sentencing hearing, the district court stated:

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[C]urrently the [PSR] does not give you any credit for acceptance of

responsibility . . . . primarily because of the extensive objections that

have been made to the [PSR]. And I want both of you to know that if I

do find these objections to be frivolous, specifically the objections with

respect to the elements of this offense and the relevant conduct, I am

going to follow the recommendation of the [PSR] writer and not give

you any type of reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

After the requested continuance to discuss strategy, Trevino and Hernandez

withdrew all objections to the drug-quantity calculation, but not objections to the stash

house and leader/organizer enhancements. The district court asked whether Trevino

agreed with the decision to limit his objections. He responded, “Yes, ma’am, 100

percent.” The court then proceeded with the evidentiary portion of the sentencing

hearing. Conspirator Richard Kitchen testified and was cross-examined by attorney

Hernandez. Based on that testimony, the court overruled Trevino’s objections to the

two enhancements and adopted the PSR’s uncontested drug quantity finding. The

court granted Trevino a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

On appeal, Trevino argues the district court erred in adopting the PSR’s drug

quantity calculation because the PSR double counted two witnesses’ cocaine

estimates; double counted $16,812 in cash seized, because the money was proceeds

from sales of the marijuana already counted; and failed to reduce the estimated

cocaine quantity by 17%, as it reduced the marijuana estimate. “A fact in a PSR to

which the defendant has not specifically objected is a fact admitted by the defendant.” 

United States v. Abrica-Sanchez, 808 F.3d 330, 334 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation

omitted). Thus, it cannot be error, plain or otherwise, for the district court to adopt

facts in the PSR to which the defendant has not objected, and the defendant “is

precluded from arguing [withdrawn] objections on appeal.” United States v.

Thompson, 289 F.3d 524, 527 (8th Cir. 2002). Trevino argues these authorities

should not apply because “the district court threatened to deny him credit for

accepting responsibility if he persisted” with his objections to the PSR, and therefore

we should treat his withdrawn objections as preserved. 

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Trevino cites no authority supporting this contention, nor have we found any. 

But in any event, the contention is factually flawed. The district court did not

“threaten” Trevino; the court accurately warned Trevino of the consequence of

pursuing frivolous guidelines objections. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1) (“[A]

defendant who . . . frivolously contests[] relevant conduct that the court determines

to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.”);

United States v. Johnson, 906 F.2d 1285, 1291 (8th Cir. 1990) (“We grant the

sentencing court great deference when reviewing its evaluation of a defendant’s

acceptance of responsibility.”). The court did not improperly coerce Trevino into

withdrawing his objections to the PSR’s drug quantity findings, and did not err in

adopting the PSR’s drug quantity calculation. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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