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Parties Involved:
David Kissi
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided August 12, 2011

No. 09-5277

IN RE: DAVID KISSI,

PETITIONER

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

No. 09-7067

IN RE: DAVID KISSI,

PETITIONER

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

David Kissi, appearing pro se, was on the petitions for writ

of mandamus, the supplements thereto, the memorandum of law

and fact in support of the petitions, and the motions to proceed

in forma pauperis.

Before: GINSBURG, ROGERS, and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: This court recently held that the filing fee

provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b), applies to a prisoner who files a petition for

writ of mandamus in connection with an underlying civil case. 

In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The

question now before the court is whether the PLRA’s threestrikes provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), likewise applies to a

mandamus petition in an underlying civil case. For the

following reasons, we hold that it does.

I.

David Kissi was incarcerated when he petitioned this court

for writs of mandamus to prevent the district court from

transferring two of his civil cases to the United States District

Court for the District of Maryland. See Kissi v. Simmons, No.

09cv1452 (D.D.C. July 31, 2009) (complaint seeking $1 billion

in damages for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

criminal statutes); Kissi v. Mead, No. 08cv2031 (D.D.C. June

10, 2009) (complaint seeking $10 million in damages for alleged

“conspiracy and racketeering”). In both mandamus proceedings,

Kissi moved this court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Consideration of the petitions for writ of mandamus and the

motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis were held in

abeyance pending the court’s decision in Grant.

In Grant, the court held that a prisoner must pay the

appellate filing fee for a mandamus petition related to an

underlying civil case pending in the district court. Generally, to

comply with the PLRA’s filing fee provision, a prisoner must

submit a trust account statement and consent to collection of

filing fees, pay an initial partial fee assessed by the court, and

continue to make installment payments from his trust account. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2). Section 1915(g), however, renders

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certain prisoners ineligible to pay the filing fee in installments,

for it provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or

appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under

this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the

United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Consequently, a prisoner who has filed at

least three civil actions or appeals meeting these criteria is

ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis and must pay in full the

appellate docketing and filing fees before the court will entertain

any other civil action or appeal, unless the prisoner qualifies for

the “imminent danger” exception, see Ibrahim v. District of

Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

Because it appeared that Kissi had filed at least three civil

actions meeting the criteria of section 1915(g) (such actions are

known as “strikes”), the court, citing Grant, ordered him to

show cause why he should not be required to pay in full the

appellate fees before the court would consider his mandamus

petitions. See Order to Show Cause, In re Kissi, No. 09-5277

(D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 2011); Order to Show Cause, In re Kissi, No.

09-7067 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 2011). The Orders cited: Kissi v.

Pramco II, LLC, No. 1:08cv553 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2008)

(dismissing complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) “as frivolous and malicious, and for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”); Kissi

v. Clement, No. 4:08-1784, 2008 WL 7526326 (N.D. Ohio Oct.

3, 2008) (dismissing action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and

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enjoining Kissi from filing any new lawsuits without leave of

court because of his pattern of filing “patently frivolous and

vexatious” complaints); Kissi v. Ammendale Trust, No.

2:08cv3574, 2009 WL 485179 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2009)

(dismissing complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). Kissi, proceeding pro se,

has filed a response in each of the instant cases; the responses

are essentially the same and, for the most part, they do not

address the question whether section 1915(g) should be applied

to civil mandamus petitions. 

II.

Although Grant did not concern the PLRA’s three-strikes

provision, its analysisis consistent with a broader reasoning that

section 1915(g) applies to mandamus petitions filed in

connection with underlying civil cases. The court reasoned in

Grant that the mandamus petition — which, as in this case,

began as a notice of appeal of a transfer order that this court

treated as a mandamus petition — was “‘realistically a form of

interlocutory appeal.’” 635 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Martin v.

United States, 96 F.3d 853, 854 (7th Cir. 1996)). Alternatively,

the court continued, if the mandamus petition were to be treated

as initiating a separate proceeding, the proceeding would be

deemed a “civil action.” Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena

Duces Tecum, 775 F.2d 499, 503 (2d Cir. 1985)). Regardless of

whether the mandamus petition was viewed as an appeal or a

civil action, the court concluded that PLRA’s filing fee

provision would apply. Id. at 1230–31. Similarly, because

Kissi’s mandamus petitions are either the functional equivalent

of appeals of the transfer orders or new civil actions, they fall

within section 1915(g)’s restrictions on a “civil action or appeal”

brought by a prisoner who has “three strikes.” 

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The circuits to address this issue have accepted as selfevident that if the PLRA’s filing-fee provision applies to

mandamus petitions that are essentially interlocutory appeals in

civil actions, then the three-strikes provision does as well. See

In re Crittenden, 143 F.3d 919 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Tyler, 110

F.3d 528, 529 (8thCir. 1997); Green v.Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415

(10th Cir. 1996); cf. 4TH CIR. R. 21(c)(2) (applying “three

strikes” rule for prisoners seeking writs of mandamus,

prohibition, or other extraordinary relief). Neither petitioner nor

the court has identified any contrary authority.

Applying the three-strikes provision to a mandamus petition

in an underlying civil case is as faithful to the PLRA’s purpose

as applying the filing-fee provision. As the court explained in

Grant, the PLRA was designed to deter prisoners from filing

frivolous lawsuits, which waste judicial resources and

compromise “‘the quality of justice enjoyed by the law-abiding

population.’” 635 F.3d at 1230–31 (quoting 114 CONG. REC.

14,571 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole)). Frivolous mandamus

petitions have the same effects on the courts as frivolous appeals

and therefore should subject prisoners filing such petitions to the

same economic costs. Kissi has not distinguished Grant in any

meaningful way and his assertions that he was the victim of

“U.S. judicial officers’ theft” and bias are irrelevant to the

question whether a three-striker filing a mandamus petition

should be treated any differently from a three-striker filing a

civil appeal. 

Accordingly, we hold that Kissi’s mandamus petitions are

subject to the PLRA’s “three strikes” provision, 18 U.S.C

§ 1915(g), and, consequently, he is barred from proceeding in

forma pauperis. The underlying actions, which the district court

ordered transferred to Maryland, are civil in nature. Because

Kissi was incarcerated when he filed the instant mandamus

petitions, the PLRA applies. See In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247,

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1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Also while incarcerated, Kissi received

at least “three strikes” prior to filing the mandamus petitions. 

Kissi has not alleged that he is in imminent danger of serious

physical injury, so that exception under section 1915(g) is

inapplicable. Although Kissi appears to assert that his cases

involving the mortgage lender Pramco II, LLC, should not be

counted as “strikes” because he has newly discovered evidence

indicating that the judgments in those cases are “now

reversible,” he has not shown that the judgments in those cases

have been reversed. We therefore deny the motions for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis and order Kissi to pay the full fee in

each case before the court will consider his petitions.

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