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Parties Involved:
Roy L. Jackson
Appellant
Millie Otey
Appellee

Document Text:

ROY L. 

MILLIE 

. P 1 L ---- uo,re,J Srar . . ;, .lit 0 .,. ~ lc:;Q~1tr gf Ap;,,.,.als J. emh C!r~ir .r-· 

IN THE UNITED sTATEs couaT oF APPEALS APR a o 1~;0 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT R.OBERT L. HOECI<ER 

Clerk 

JACKSON, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) No. 89-5104 

v. ) (N.D. Oklahoma) 

) (D.C. No. 88-C-575-E) 

OTEY, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, ANDERSON and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unani~ously that oral argument would not materially 

asiist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. Rw App. P. 

34(a); 10th Ci~. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Roy L. Jackson, appearing prose, appeals the dismissal of 

his 42 u.s.c. S 1983 action against Tulsa Municipal Judge Millie 

Otey. Mr. Jackson alleges that because he lacked funds Judge 

Otey, acting beyond her jurisdiction, ordered him jailed for a 

traffic offense which could only be punished by a fine, all in 

violation of his constitutional rights. Judge Otey's motion to 

dismiss, automatically converted to a motion for summary judgment 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5104 Document: 01019971648 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 1 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 due to reliance upon affidavits and court 

records, was granted by the district court which followed the 

recommendation of the United States Magistrate. On appeal, this 

Court is "free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds 

for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of 

law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court." Griess 

v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Alfaro 

Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987)). We will 

therefore affirm the district court's judgment if it appears from 

the pleadings and the affidavits that no genuine issue exists as 

to any material fact, and that the defendant is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Jackon's complaint sought money damages as well as injunctive 

and declaratory relief against Judge Otey. We affirm the judgment 

of the District Court as to Jackson's claim for damages on the 

ground of absolute judicial immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 

472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 

(1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); Wiggins v. New 

Mexico State Sup. Ct. Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir. 1981), 

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840 (1982); Henrickson v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 

852, 855 (10th Cir. 1981). The records in this case establish 

beyond legitimate dispute that Judge Otey was acting within her 

judicial capacity and did not act in the clear absence of all 

jurisdiction. Okla. Stat. tit. 11, §§ 28-102, 28-104 (1978); 

Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 983 (1986); Okla. R. Crim. App. 8.1-3, 8.6, 

8.8; see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356, 360; Bradley v. 

Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1872). Even though Mr. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5104 Document: 01019971648 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 2 
Jackson's subsequent unfortunate incarceration for almost four 

hours was improper, at the most Judge Otey committed only a 

"'grave procedural error.'" Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 

755, 760 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 

359). 

- We also affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment 

as it relates to Jackson's claim for injunctive and declaratory 

relief. Jackson has not alleged any threat of future injury to 

himself which would warrant injunctive relief, nor has he shown, 

in his pleadings or affidavits, any continuing dispute in relation 

to the proceedings before Judge Otey. See Thournir v. Buchanan, 

710 F.2d 1461, 1463 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[W]here an act sought to be 

enjoined has occurred, an appeal of a district court order denying 

an injunction is moot."); Walling v. Clinchfield, 159 F.2d 395, 

399 (4th Cir. 1946) ("The rule is well settled that the 

extraordinary writ of injunction will not issue for the purpose of 

punishing past offenses, but will issue only in those cases where 

the court is convinced that such relief is necessary to prevent 

future violations."). Jackson effectively terminated Judge Otey's 

involvement in the proceedings when he paid the fine assessed; 

therefore, the judge's activity in connection with the traffic 

violation had ceased more than six months before Jackson's initial 

complaint in this case, and no immediate case or controversy 

remained which could be resolved by declaratory judgment or 

injunctive relief. Absent such a present case or controversy, no 

such relief would be appropriate. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 

U.S. 147, 148 (1975); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 

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Appellate Case: 89-5104 Document: 01019971648 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 3 
(1969); Schepp v. Fremont County, No. 88-1376, slip op. at 6-7 

(10th Cir. March 30, 1990); Rex v. Owens ex rel. Oklahoma, 585 

F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1978). Indeed, Jackson proposes no possible formulation of such injunctive or declaratory relief which 

could address the alleged wrongs in this case where he has already 

paid the entire fine assessed by Judge Otey and where the Oklahoma 

statutes already provide for adequate procedural safeguards in 

cases such as this. The District Court correctly granted summary 

judgment in favor of Judge Otey on Jackson's claims for prospective relief arising from these past occurances. See Northern 

Virginia Women's Med. Center v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045, 1049 (4th 

Cir. 1980) (prospective relief of declaratory judgment would serve 

no purpose toward redressing plaintiffs' past injury; declaratory 

judgment properly denied). 

Mr. Jackson is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 89-5104 Document: 01019971648 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 4