Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01292/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01292-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric E. Davison
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1292

___________________________

United States of America

llllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Eric E. Davison

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: September 25, 2015

 Filed: December 8, 2015

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Before LOKEN, BEAM, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Kansas City, Missouri, Police Officer Chad Pickens discovered a loaded

firearm during a stop and frisk of Eric Davison. Charged with being a felon in

possession of a firearm, Davison conditionally pleaded guilty and now appeals the

denial of his motion to suppress. He argues police violated his Fourth Amendment

rights in seizing the firearm because Officer Pickens lacked reasonable suspicion to

make an investigative stop and to conduct a protective frisk for weapons. We affirm. 

Appellate Case: 15-1292 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Entry ID: 4343860 
I. Background.

We recite the facts as found by the district court after a suppression hearing

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at which only Officer Pickens testified. At about 1:00 p.m. on November 25, 2013,

the owners of a store located at Ninth Street and Tracy Avenue reported to police that

two occupants of a pickup truck had been doing “donuts” in their parking lot, then

parked the truck in their lot and walked north on Tracy. Police dispatch discovered

the truck had been reported stolen and relayed thisinformation to officers in the area. 

Officer Pickens and his partner were in the area investigating a homicide.

Pickens drove to the lot where the stolen truck was parked to see if the two

occupants would return and called the store owners to gather more information. The

ownersreported that the occupants of the truck were a white female in a dark coat and

a white or Hispanic male. After a few minutes of surveillance from a nearby alley,

Pickens decided to drive around the neighborhood to look for individuals fitting this

description. Turning north on Tracy, Pickens saw two individuals walking south who

matched the store owners’ description, later identified as Davison and Kelly Hall. 

Davison and Hall saw the police car, avoided eye contact with the officers, and

changed their route, walking west on Eighth Street. Suspicious, but having only a

limited description, Pickens decided to canvass the area, looking for others who

matched the description. He drove past a nearby soup kitchen where a large crowd

of people had gathered; none matched the store owners’ description.

Officer Pickens then turned south on the street one block east of Tracy, where

he again observed the suspects, now walking north. He considered stopping the pair

to ask why they were walking in a circle but decided to observe further behavior. 

The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable

Robert E. Larsen, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of

Missouri.

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Appellate Case: 15-1292 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Entry ID: 4343860 
Driving around the block twice more, Pickens became certain the suspects knew they

were being watched by police -- they never broke stride, repeatedly glanced at the

officers before quicklyaverting their eyes, and appeared “deflated” because theywere

about to be stopped. When Pickens saw the suspects walk through the yard of a

residence he knew was a “drug house,” he decided to stop and question them about

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the stolen vehicle and what they were doing in a high-crime area. 

Davison and Hall cooperated when stopped, but Officer Pickens immediately

frisked Davison for weapons, and his partner frisked Hall, before questioning the pair. 

Pickens felt an object consistent with a firearmin the right breast pocket of Davison’s

coat. When Davison said, “I’m so stupid,” Pickens asked if Davison was a felon. He

admitted a prior conviction and release from prison four months earlier. Pickens

arrested Davison and conducted a search incident to the arrest which revealed a

loaded .22 caliber revolver, a box of .22 caliber ammunition, a small amount of

methamphetamine, and a syringe containing a clear liquid. 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Pickens testified that he was a thirteen-year

veteran of the Kansas City Police Department who had performed numerous

investigations and surveillances in high-crime areas. He was aware of shootings in

the area near Ninth and Tracy in the prior few months, one of which had targeted

police. Pickens testified he decided to stop Davison and Hall because: 

they’re walking in circles, attempting to avoid contact with police,

cutting across a private residence, limitedly matched the description of

the two people that exited the stolen auto. So, we’re going to stop them. 

We’re going to see what their business is in the area and . . . begin an

investigation on what they’re doing there. 

Officer Pickens had previously arrested the owner of the house for possession 2

of methamphetamine. He also knew other officers had conducted a warrant search

after a controlled buy at the house.

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Appellate Case: 15-1292 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Entry ID: 4343860 
Pickens testified it was “absolutely necessary” to frisk Davison and Hall for weapons

given the past high-crime in the neighborhood and narcotics activity at the private

residence, the recent shooting at police, and the suspects’ evasive behavior. He

testified that he frisked Davison before questioning the pair because, “if I feel like

I’ve generated enough reasonable suspicion to execute a frisk, then I’m going to

generally do that before [questioning] because the whole premise of the frisk is to

make sure that we’re in a safe environment to conduct . . . the investigation.” 

The district court denied Davison’s motion to suppress, concluding that “[t]he

totality of these circumstances constitute reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop,” and

that Pickens had reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective frisk for weapons

because he suspected Davison had stolen a truck, and Davison avoided eye contact

with police when encountered in a high-crime area. 

II. Discussion. 

A police officer may briefly stop an individual to make reasonable inquiries

when the officer “has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” 

United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2008), citing Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In conducting a Terry stop, the officer may make a protective

pat-down search “if he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person may be

armed and presently dangerous.” United States v. Roggeman, 279 F.3d 573, 577 (8th

Cir. 2002), citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Davison argues that his Fourth Amendment

rights were violated because Officer Pickens lacked reasonable suspicion to make an

investigatory stop and to frisk Davison for weapons; therefore, all evidence obtained

from the illegal stop and frisk must be suppressed. We review determinations of

reasonable suspicion de novo, “tak[ing] care both to review findings of historical fact

only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by

resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 517

U.S. 690, 699 (1996). 

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Appellate Case: 15-1292 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Entry ID: 4343860 
A. The Stop. The government concedes that Officer Pickens conducted a

Terry stop of Davison and Hall; it was not merely a consensual encounter to which

Fourth Amendment protections typically do not apply. See United States v. Jones,

606 F.3d 964, 965 (8th Cir. 2010). To justify a Terry stop, a “police officer must be

able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferencesfromthose facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 

A reviewing court must look at the totality of the circumstances, allowing “officers

to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferencesfromand

deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude

an untrained person.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). Innocent

actions can give rise to reasonable suspicion when considered as part of the totality

of the circumstances. United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1124 (8th Cir. 1995).

Officer Pickens was dispatched to investigate persons seen operating a stolen

truck. Davison argues that, when stopped, he “was merely walking around a city

block, on the public sidewalk, with a companion,” which is completely innocuous

behavior. Therefore, Pickens should have used less-intrusive investigative methods,

such as continued observation or a consensual encounter. However, Pickens did

conduct substantial surveillance before deciding to stop and question the only

suspects he saw walking nearby, including canvassing the area to see if other people

matched the store owners’ description. We agree with the district court that, when

he made the Terry stop, Pickens had a sufficient basis to reasonably suspect Davison

and Hall of criminal activity because (1) theymatched the description of persons who

had recently operated a stolen truck; (2) they appeared to be walking in a circle near

the stolen truck in a high-crime neighborhood, aware police were watching but

avoiding eye contact, actionssuggesting they were trying to avoid police contact; and

(3) their evasive path had taken them through the yard of a known drug house. 

Pickens provided specific and articulable facts, together with rational inferences he

made from those facts, that gave him reasonable suspicion to stop Davison and Hall

to question them about the stolen truck.

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Appellate Case: 15-1292 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Entry ID: 4343860 
B. The Frisk. Officer Pickens testified that he frisked Davison before

questioning the suspects for reasons of officer safety. “In the case of the selfprotective search for weapons, [an officer] must be able to point to particular facts

from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.” 

Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968). The “sole justification” for frisking a

suspect is the protection and safety of the officers and others. Roggeman, 279 F.3d

at 577, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. Again, the totality of the circumstances is the

touchstone of our analysis -- facts such as the time of day, the suspects’ location, and

their behavior when they become aware of the officer’s presence, considered together

with the inferences and deductions made by the officer. See, e.g., United States v.

Bailey, 417 F.3d 873, 877 (8th Cir. 2005).

Officer Pickens testified that he believed it was “absolutely necessary” to frisk

Davison before questioning Davison and Hall. We agree with the district court that

the particular facts of this case gave Pickens reasonable suspicion that Davison was

armed and dangerous. First and foremost, Pickens reasonably suspected that Davison

had stolen a truck. “[W]hen officers encounter suspected car thieves, they also may

reasonably suspect that such individuals ‘might possess weapons.’” United States v.

Hanlon, 401 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2005), quoting United States v. Rowland, 341

F.3d 774, 784 (8th Cir. 2003). In addition, Pickens stopped Davison and Hall after

observing them walk through the yard of a known drug house in a high-crime area

where recent shootings had occurred, including one that targeted police officers. 

Given the totality of the circumstances present in this record, the district court

did not err in concluding that Officer Pickens had reasonable suspicion to conduct the

stop and frisk and therefore denying Davison’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

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Appellate Case: 15-1292 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Entry ID: 4343860