Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02535/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02535-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amador County
Defendant
Amador District Attorney
Defendant
Amador Sheriff
Defendant
Amador Superior Court House
Defendant
Isabel Vela
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISABEL VELA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AMADOR COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-02535-DJC-CKD (PS)

ORDER

Plaintiff, Pastor Isabel Vela, proceeds without counsel1 and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. Plaintiff requests to proceed in forma pauperis and makes the showing required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

Plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint fails to 

state a claim and must be dismissed. However, plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended 

complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 

proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

1 Because plaintiff proceeds without counsel, this action is referred to the undersigned by Local 

Rule 302(c)(21) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.

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immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 

(2000). In performing this screening, the court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings. 

See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice[.]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences[.]” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any 

doubt resolved in their favor, Eldridge, 832 F.2d at 1137, but a plaintiff’s claims must be facially 

plausible to survive screening. Facial plausibility for a claim requires sufficient factual detail to 

allow the court to reasonably infer that a named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

II. ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is the lessee of the property commonly known as 19841 Markely Mine Rd, 

Fiddletown, CA. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Defendants are Amador County, Amador Superior Court 

House, Amador Sheriff, and Amador District Attorney. (Id. at 2.)

Under the complaint’s general allegations, the defendants interfered with prayer circles 

and peaceful assembly. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) The Sheriff interrupted a prayer and falsified 

information to the district attorney. (Id. at 8, 13.) The district attorney failed to prosecute two 

Caucasian individuals who trespassed. (Id.) Proper reports were not filed for property that was 

defaced, broken, and removed. (Id. at 10.)

The city obtained an abatement hearing with falsified information and images obtained 

without a warrant. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) At the abatement hearing, plaintiff was informed “we cannot 

gather to pray unless we have a special permit to so.” (Id.) Special permission is being required 

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for using a canopy outside at prayer gatherings to protect against the elements. (Id. at 9, 13.)

The defendants “discriminated against us for being Hispanic and for being Christ 

believers and followers.” (ECF No. 1 at 11.) “Mr. Brian from the County stated, ‘maybe if you 

approached things in a different manner[...]’” (Id.) This statement led plaintiff to believe “that if 

we do stop our prayers and worship, if we do not go after trespassers using the law and the courts, 

we would be fine and not having to endure the harassment.” (Id.)

An Order for Administrative Abatement of Violations attached to the complaint indicates 

the Amador County Administrative Abatement Hearing Board determined the “unpermitted shed, 

unpermitted structure and events held on property” were a nuisance following a public hearing 

held on August 13, 2024. (ECF No. 1 at 33.) The shed was boarded up and ordered to be used 

only for storage purposes until abatement of the nuisance. (Id. at 34.)

On August 30, 2024, in Amador County Small Claims case David Garcia v. Kelline 

Pearson, Case No. 23CV13352, the superior court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting 

several matters from occurring on the property plaintiff leases, including “overburdening Markley 

Mine Road by prohibiting them from making use of Parcel 2 for gatherings or church use or 

camping more than once per year without complying with all applicable Amador County 

Ordinances and state laws.” (ECF No. 1 at 45.) Under the complaint’s allegations, the Superior 

Court denied plaintiff’s request to continue the hearing and “awarded in favor of the respondents 

for us not being present.” (Id. at 11.)

The complaint cites the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, 18 

U.S.C. § 274, 18 U.S.C. § 241, and “RFRA of 1993.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) The complaint appears to 

seek injunctive relief only (see id. at 8), and does not explicitly seek monetary damages.

III. DISCUSSION

The complaint contains many generalized statements and legal arguments but is short on 

necessary factual allegations describing which defendants did what, and when, to violate 

plaintiff’s rights. In general, listing laws and setting forth legal standards does not assist a plaintiff 

to state a claim because the pleading standard requires enough factual allegations to give fair 

notice of the claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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A. Criminal Statutes do not provide a Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s complaint references several criminal statutes which do not provide a private 

civil cause of action. (See ECF No. 1 at 4-6 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 247, 241, 242); see also Aldabe 

v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980) (“[18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242] provide no basis for 

civil liability.”); Monet v. United States, No. 97-00281-DAE, 1997 WL 1038149, at *2 (D. Haw. 

Sept. 15, 1997) (“[18 U.S.C. § 247] provides no private right of action.”). Accordingly, plaintiff 

fails to state a claim under any criminal statute cited.

B. RFRA

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) provides a private cause of action, but 

only federal officers can be sued under RFRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; Gonzales v. O 

Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (“Under RFRA, the 

Federal Government may not, as a statutory matter, substantially burden a person’s exercise of 

religion, “even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Plaintiff does not allege any action by the federal government or a federal actor

and does not state a claim under RFRA.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity, 

including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court 

considers below whether plaintiff has alleged a violation of rights under the First Amendment or 

Fourth Amendment and concludes no claim is stated.

1. First Amendment

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides “Congress shall make no law 

... prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. CONST., amend. I. Only those beliefs that are 

sincerely held and religious in nature are entitled to constitutional protection. See Shakur v. 

Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff must show that the activity is both 

“sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief”). Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional. 

See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 533 (2021) (neutral and generally applicable 

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laws are subject to rational basis scrutiny); id. at 541 (laws that are not neutral and generally 

applicable must survive strict scrutiny review by advancing “interests of the highest order” and 

being narrowly tailored to achieve those interests).

Plaintiff’s claims under the First Amendment rest on unclear, vague, and conclusory 

allegations regarding enforcement of nuisance abatement proceedings that infringed on plaintiff’s

group worship on the property plaintiff leases. The court construes the complaint liberally to infer 

that plaintiff’s participation in group worship is based on a sincerely held religious belief. 

However, plaintiff does not adequately allege that any specific person burdened the practice of 

plaintiff’s religion.

Instead, the present complaint sues only entity defendants. To bring a claim under section 

1983 against a local government entity, plaintiff must allege facts showing the execution of an 

official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The complaint, as pleaded, does not contain allegations that plausibly 

suggest a county policy or practice inflicted the injury. Instead, plaintiff appears to allege her 

church or group was singled out for discrimination. Plaintiff does not adequately allege a person 

or entity burdened the practice of plaintiff’s religion, and therefore fails to state a claim for a 

violation of her Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment.

2. Fourth Amendment

To prevail on a section 1983 claim based on the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show 

the state actor’s conduct was an unreasonable search or seizure. Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 

897 F.3d 1067, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2018). “A Fourth Amendment search occurs when a 

government agent obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected 

area... or infringes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy[.]” Whalen v. McMullen, 907 F.3d 

1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Fourth 

Amendment’s requirements apply to entries onto private land to search for and abate suspected 

nuisances. Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487, 1490 (9th Cir. 1990). In addition, the 

removal of personal property can be a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See 

e.g. Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005).

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The complaint fails state a claim for an unreasonable search or seizure. Plaintiff alleges 

unidentified individuals trespassed, abatement proceedings were based on images obtained 

without a warrant, and proper reports were not filed for property that was defaced, broken, and 

removed. These allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a claim under the Fourth 

Amendment. Moreover, plaintiff does not identify any specific person who took the abovedescribed actions.

As set forth above, the complaint names only entity defendants. Plaintiff does not allege 

any facts suggesting that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted a Fourth 

Amendment injury on plaintiff, and therefore fails to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment 

against any entity defendant. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

D. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Separately, and in addition to the defects described above, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

“prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de 

facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

applies to federal constitutional challenges to state court decisions, including claims under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

Doe & Assocs. Law Offs. v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001)).

A federal court action constitutes a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman

when the plaintiff complains of a legal injury caused by a state court judgment, based on an 

allegedly erroneous legal ruling, in a case in which the federal plaintiff was one of the litigants. 

Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). “Once a federal plaintiff seeks to bring a 

forbidden de facto appeal, ... that federal plaintiff may not seek to litigate an issue that is 

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto 

appeal is brought.” Id. at 1158; see Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff does not expressly seek relief from a specific order or judgment of the state 

court. However, to the extent plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are based on a theory that the 

state court’s rulings violated plaintiff’s rights, and to the extent plaintiff seeks injunctive relief 

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from this court to remedy an alleged injury flowing from a state court judgment, this court lacks 

jurisdiction over the claims. See Doe, 252 F.3d at 1030; Cooper, 704 F.3d at 782.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The complaint must be dismissed, although it is not clear plaintiff could not allege 

additional facts to remedy the defects described above and state a claim. However, plaintiff is 

granted leave to file an amended complaint. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect... a pro se litigant 

is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal 

of the action.”).

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, it should be titled “First Amended 

Complaint” and must make clear which defendants are being sued for which alleged violations of 

plaintiff’s rights. The amended complaint must be complete by itself without reference to any 

prior pleading. See Local Rule 220.

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend.

3. Plaintiff is granted 30 days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and the Local Rules of Practice; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance 

with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

Dated: October 30, 2024

8, vela24cv2535.scrn

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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