Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03089/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03089-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Obafemi Orenuga
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 2005 Decided December 2, 2005

No. 04-3083

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

OBAFEMI ORENUGA,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

04-3089

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00464-01)

Edward C. Sussman, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Suzanne G. Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. On the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S.

Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney at the

time the brief was filed, Julieanne Himelstein, Lisa O. Monaco,

and Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

USCA Case #04-3089 Document #935059 Filed: 12/02/2005 Page 1 of 14
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*

 Senior Circuit Judge Edwards was in regular active service

at the time of oral argument.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

*

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Defendant-appellant

Obafemi Orenuga, a former tax auditor in the District of

Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue (“OTR”), was convicted

after a five-day jury trial on two counts of receipt of a bribe by

a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) (2000).

On appeal, appellant seeks reversal and a remand for a new trial,

asserting that the District Court erred when it (1) denied him the

right to question prospective jurors on the entrapment defense in

violation of the Sixth Amendment, (2) admitted a prejudicial

portion of a videotape used as evidence by the Government, and

(3) found that conviction for bribery under 18 U.S.C. §

201(b)(2)(A) requires acceptance of the bribe, but not

performance of the illegal promise. We find no merit in

appellant’s claims. We therefore affirm the judgment of the

District Court.

I. BACKGROUND

Orenuga was employed as a tax auditor for OTR and its

predecessor, the Department of Finance and Revenue, from

1995 to 2003. He was principally responsible for auditing

businesses that were believed to have either failed to pay or

underpaid sales taxes owed to the District of Columbia. This

case arises out of Orenuga’s assignment to audit Bestway

Liquors (“Bestway”) in 2001. During this audit, Orenuga was

recorded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) on

audio and video tapes accepting money as part of an agreement

to unlawfully reduce the tax liability of two local businesses. 

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The parties’ accounts of the events leading to the unlawful

relationship differ, although not in ways that materially affect

our analysis. Broadly, Orenuga testified that after being

assigned the Bestway audit, he received only limited

cooperation from Bestway’s owner, Fikerte Yemane, and her

independent representatives, Mohammed Mobaidin and Connie

Meyers. According to Orenuga, compliance with his document

requests was not forthcoming until after he sent Yemane a

$70,000 “jeopardy assessment” – an assessment based on

incomplete information designed to get the auditee’s attention.

Following the jeopardy assessment, Mobaidin served as the

main contact for Bestway and submitted most of the requested

information. Orenuga claimed to be uncomfortable working

with Mobaidin, however, as Mobaidin allegedly hounded

Orenuga about his personal and family interests and repeatedly

chastised him for acting “like a cop.” Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) at

114-18 (4/7/04). Orenuga testified that Mobaidin eventually

offered him an illicit payment if he would lower Bestway’s tax

liability. 

The Government’s case was presented largely through the

testimony of Mobaidin, who assisted the FBI with its

investigation. Mobaidin suggested that he and Meyers initially

shared the audit responsibilities and promptly responded to each

of Orenuga’s information requests. He also testified that, in his

first few meetings with Orenuga, he was surprised by how little

attention Orenuga gave to the information that was provided on

behalf of Bestway. In June 2002, after Meyers stopped working

on the Bestway account, Orenuga allegedly informed Mobaidin

that Bestway owed $70,000 in taxes, but remarked, “If you take

care of me, I take care of [Yemane].” Tr. at 70 (4/6/04).

According to Mobaidin, Orenuga then wrote down on a piece of

paper that he wanted $8,000 for himself and $12,000 for OTR

(the latter to avoid the appearance of impropriety). This offer is

allegedly what led Mobaidin to contact FBI Special Agent Mary

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Jo Ervin, for whom Mobaidin had previously served as an

informant. 

What transpired from this point forward is largely

undisputed. Upon learning from Mobaidin about Orenuga’s

alleged proposal, Special Agent Ervin sought Mobaidin’s

continued cooperation. Mobaidin was provided with equipment

to record his future meetings and phone calls with Orenuga. In

exchange for Mobaidin’s assistance, Special Agent Ervin aided

him in his pending Immigration and Naturalization Service

deportation proceedings. 

Over the course of the first two audio recorded meetings on

June 13 and 17, 2002, Orenuga and Mobaidin settled on a

“reduced” $12,000 tax assessment for Bestway in exchange for

an illicit payment of $8,000 to Orenuga. During a videotaped

meeting in his office on June 20, 2002, Mobaidin made an initial

payment of $3,000. At Special Agent Ervin’s suggestion,

Mobaidin requested, and Orenuga agreed to give him, $2,000 of

the $8,000 for his role in the deception. This move was

designed to show that the $8,000 was, in fact, for Orenuga, and

not OTR. 

A week later, on June 27, the FBI videotaped another

meeting at Mobaidin’s office where Orenuga received the

remaining $3,000. During this meeting, the two men weighed

the possibility of a similar deal with one of Mobaidin’s other

clients. Orenuga proposed that he could conduct fictitious

audits, and then Mobaidin would tell his clients that they could

reduce their tax liability through a clandestine payment to

Orenuga. At one point, when strategizing about the identity of

their next target, Orenuga instructed Mobaidin to steer clear of

“Jew[s],” “black American[s],” or “white m[e]n,” ostensibly to

focus on people more susceptible to coercion. See Tr. of

Recorded Conversation Between Obafemi Orenuga and FBI

Cooperating Witness at 6-7 (June 27, 2002) (“June 27

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Transcript”), reprinted in Record Material for Appellee

(“R.M.”) tab 5.

The FBI subsequently arranged for a local restauranteur to

assist in the investigation by posing as one of Mobaidin’s

clients. Through a series of recorded conversations, Orenuga

planned to fabricate a $40,000 to $50,000 tax deficiency for the

restaurant and then “agree” to reduce it to zero for a $20,000

payment ($8,000 of which he would keep for himself). On

March 6, 2003, Orenuga was videotaped accepting $13,000 from

Mobaidin in exchange for the “clean” audit. Orenuga was then

arrested on August 25, 2003. 

At trial, faced with the irrefutable audio and video

recordings of his illicit dealings with Mobaidin, Orenuga relied

on a defense of entrapment. He asserted that Mobaidin

relentlessly badgered him to look the other way on the Bestway

audit, and eventually the “pressure was so much” that he

capitulated. See Tr. at 114-23 (4/7/04). Given the centrality of

the entrapment defense to Orenuga’s case, he requested that the

District Court question the venire about their “knowledge and

attitude towards” its application. The trial court denied

Orenuga’s request on the grounds that it would inject

“complications” into the voir dire and was “not necessary in

order to get a fair and impartial jury.” Tr. at 3 (4/5/04). In

response to Orenuga’s suggestion that entrapment was a “novel”

defense that might be unfamiliar to many jurors, the District

Court judge replied that, while entrapment may not be as

familiar as the defenses of self-defense or insanity, the court was

not persuaded that it would “be an issue.” Id. at 4.

Orenuga also objected to the admission of a portion of the

videotape evidence. He asserted that his comments regarding

Jews, black Americans, and white men during the June 27, 2002

meeting were “inflammatory” and added “little, if anything, to

the Government’s case.” See Tr. at 3 (4/6/04). After weighing

the issue, the District Court permitted the Government to play

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the tape in its entirety, ruling that the contested segment

provided “context that is relevant, and not only to the

Government’s burden in proving its case but also with respect

to the defense of entrapment.” Id. at 88.

Finally, before the jury was given its instructions, Orenuga

objected to the District Court’s proposed description of the

elements required to prove that a public official has committed

bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A). Orenuga asserted that

an indispensable component of bribery is that the public official

must perform a quid pro quo, which would require proof that

Orenuga actually altered the audit figures from what they

otherwise would have been. Because the Government allegedly

failed to show any adjustment of the tax liability figures,

Orenuga argued that the Government’s case did not support a

finding that he violated the statute. The District Court rejected

this reading of the statute, and Orenuga was found guilty on both

counts of bribery. 

On July 1, 2004, the trial judge sentenced Orenuga to 24

months in federal prison on each count, to be served

concurrently, followed by three years’ supervised release. See

Amended Judgment, United States v. Orenuga, Crim. No.

03-464 (D.D.C. July 1, 2004), reprinted in R.M. tab 8. Orenuga

now appeals, and seeks reversal of the District Court’s judgment

and remand for a new trial.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jury Instructions and the Entrapment Defense

Orenuga claims that the District Court violated his Sixth

Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury in rejecting his

proposed voir dire question on the entrapment defense.

According to Orenuga, the court was required to submit his

proposed query to the venire, because its subject was “central to

the case.” Br. of Appellant at 16. Orenuga’s concern is that

some prospective jurors might subscribe to the view that a

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defense of entrapment never should be allowed to negate

criminal responsibility.

“The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial ‘guarantees to the

criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial,

“indifferent” jurors’ . . . .” United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d

1080, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (quoting Irvin v.

Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). This guarantee includes the

right to be tried by jurors who are capable of putting aside their

personal impressions and opinions and rendering a verdict based

solely on the evidence presented in court. See id. Voir dire is

a vehicle for ensuring this right, see Rosales-Lopez v. United

States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981), as it serves to screen out jurors

whose personal views make them incapable of performing this

function. See Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1094.

In conducting voir dire under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 24(a), the trial judge “‘is accorded broad discretion to

mold the manner and mode of [the] examination,’” and there is

“‘no basis for reversal unless he abuses his discretion, and there

is substantial prejudice to the accused.’” Id. at 1095 (quoting

United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).

Specific subjects for voir dire questioning are “constitutionally

compelled” when “the trial court’s failure to ask [a] question[]

. . . render[s] the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair,” but not

where the subjects proposed for questioning may be merely

“helpful.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1991).

The defense always “must be given a full and fair opportunity to

expose bias or prejudice on the part of the veniremen,” United

States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and

“‘the restriction upon inquiries at the request of counsel, [is]

subject to the essential demands of fairness,’” Morgan v.

Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 730 (1992) (quoting Aldridge v. United

States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931)).

Orenuga submits that substantial unfairness occurs when a

trial judge declines to present a party’s question during voir dire

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that touches on a matter “clearly central” to the case. See

Recording of Oral Argument at 10:10. This argument

overreaches and finds no concrete basis in the law. In United

States v. Robinson, the court established that “[t]he possibility

of prejudice is real, and there is consequent need for a searching

voir dire examination, in situations where, for example, the case

carries racial overtones, or involves other matters concerning

which either the local community or the population at large is

commonly known to harbor strong feelings that may stop short

of presumptive bias in law yet significantly skew deliberations

in fact.” 475 F.2d at 381 (footnotes omitted). The court also

noted that voir dire must be allowed on subjects with respect to

which “bias and distorting influence have become evident,

through experience with juries, and have come to be recognized

as a proper subject for the voir dire.” Id. The potential for

jurors to attach undue weight to the testimony of law

enforcement officials during trial is one such example. See id.

(citing Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).

 We have found no case, and the defense cites to none, in

which this circuit or any other circuit has recognized a

“commonly known” bias against the entrapment defense, which

leaves us with no indication that it is within the “recognized

classes” of inflammatory topics that would meet the Robinson

test. Indeed, the only two circuits to confront this question

directly, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, have both held that it is

not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to reject a question

regarding prospective jurors’ attitudes toward the defense of

entrapment. See United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 694 (8th

Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); United

States v. Crawford, 444 F.2d 1404, 1405 (10th Cir. 1971) (per

curiam).

Where, as here, the proposed question does not concern a

subject well known to inflame the passions of the community,

the party seeking the inquiry bears the burden of showing that

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the question “is reasonably calculated to discover an actual and

likely source of prejudice, rather than pursue a speculative willo-the-wisp.” Robinson, 475 F.2d at 381; see United States v.

Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1474 (9th Cir. 1991). Orenuga failed to

establish the requisite foundation to support his novel claim that

potential jurors might possess strong feelings about the

entrapment defense that would bias their decisions, nor did he

demonstrate how his question was designed to uncover any such

bias. Indeed, Orenuga concedes that entrapment has a “low[]

public profile,” Br. of Appellant at 15, and asserts that there is

merely a “sense” in the community at large “that people not

inclined to do wrong, don’t do wrong even . . . under influence,”

Recording of Oral Argument at 6:05 -:15. These statements

alone are not sufficient in this circuit to find that a question is

constitutionally compelled. See United States v. Cockerham,

476 F.2d 542, 544 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (noting that

when general bias is evident from case law and academic

literature, and “the examination of jurors is otherwise brief and

limited in scope, or elicits an indication of possible bias against

the defense,” a voir dire question on the subject is appropriate).

Therefore, in the absence of evidence that prejudice against

the entrapment defense was likely to be encountered in the

community from which the jurors were selected, the District

Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask specific

questions on this subject. We have no occasion to decide

whether it would have been an abuse of discretion for the

District Court to permit a question on entrapment. 

B. Admissibility of Videotape Evidence

Orenuga argues that the District Court’s admission of a

portion of the June 27, 2002 videotape of his meeting with

Mobaidin was improper, because it was unfairly prejudicial.

Reprinted below is the transcript of the disputed segment, which

picks up as Orenuga assesses the types of people that he and

Mobaidin should focus on in any future illicit transactions:

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Orenuga: [T]his one was too shrewd, I don’t like it. It’s

like, eh, . . . 

Mobaidin: Well, I never met you before, so it’s the first

time, you know. But, uh, I wish I met you

before. I would be settled [as an] accountant

instead of going [in]to car deal[ing] and real

estate and all of that junk, you know, but.

Orenuga: You have to be able to tell the guy this is it, if

you go [to] this guy. . . . If you don’t know

them, don’t do any of this.

Mobaidin: No, no. I know them for ten years, I’ve been

working with the guy.

Orenuga: If it’s a Jew, I don’t want to deal with him. If

it’s a black American, I don’t want to do that.

Mobaidin: OK. So what do you want to deal with?

Foreigners.

Orenuga: Yeah.

Mobaidin: Yeah, he’s a foreigner.

Orenuga: It’s, eh, it’s too dangerous. Like I said.

White man, I can’t deal with. I just want you

to know that.

Mobaidin: White man, you don’t want?

Orenuga: White man, he will need to agree with you.

All of, most of them will agree and come

back and . . . .

June 27 Transcript at 6-7, supra, reprinted in R.M. tab 5. 

Our analysis of whether the trial court should have excluded

this evidence is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 403,

which states:

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Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading

the jury, or by considerations of . . . needless presentation

of cumulative evidence.

As applied to this case, the Rule consists of two major

components. First, the relevant evidence must be excluded if the

prejudice is “unfair.” The Supreme Court has described “unfair”

prejudice as “speak[ing] to the capacity of some concededly

relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a

ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.”

Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). Second,

any danger of unfair prejudice must substantially outweigh the

probative value of the evidence. Since Orenuga properly

preserved his objection at trial, we review the District Court's

admission of the videotape evidence for abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 983 n.3 (D.C. Cir.

1999). 

The Government contends that the contested evidence has

significant probative value, because Orenuga’s volition is a

crucial element in both proving the bribery charges and

rebutting his entrapment defense. To establish a violation of 18

U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A), the Government must show that Orenuga

acted “corruptly,” which the District Court defined as

“performed voluntarily and deliberately and performed with a

purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or unlawful

result.” Tr. at 15 (4/8/04). A successful entrapment defense

requires evidence that (1) the crime was induced by the

Government, and (2) appellant lacked a “predisposition . . . to

engage in the criminal conduct.” See Mathews v. United States,

485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). The latter inquiry “focuses upon

whether the defendant was an ‘unwary innocent’ or, instead, an

‘unwary criminal’ who readily availed himself of the

opportunity to perpetrate the crime.” Id. (quoting Sherman v.

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United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)). The Government

asserts that the contested comments are integral to its case,

because Orenuga’s statements about future deals, and the types

of people with whom he preferred to deal, help establish that he

was a willful participant in the charged criminal activity. 

Orenuga does not meaningfully rebut the Government’s

claims. Orenuga’s videotaped statements obviously are

prejudicial, but this alone does not make the evidence “unfairly”

prejudicial. The gravamen of unfair prejudice is “‘an undue

tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,

though not necessarily, an emotional one.’” Old Chief, 519 U.S.

at 180 (quoting FED.R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s notes).

Given the relevance of Orenuga’s comments to his participation

in the crime – he was discussing the people who would make the

best targets for his bribery scheme – any prejudice to which he

was subjected was related in no small measure to his culpability.

Orenuga’s videotaped statements were also germane to his

entrapment defense. It is reasonable to believe that a jury would

find Orenuga’s comments on the types of people with whom he

preferred to deal in illicit arrangements highly probative in

assessing whether he acted voluntarily and deliberately and

whether he “was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to

first being approached by Government agents,” Jacobson v.

United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992). The District Court

thus did not abuse its discretion by permitting the entire

videotape to be played at trial. 

C. The Bribery Charge

At the conclusion of the trial, the District Court judge

instructed the jury that “[i]t is not a defense to the crime of

bribery that had there been no bribe, the public official might

have lawfully and properly performed the same act.” Tr. at 16

(4/8/04). Orenuga argues that this is an erroneous construction

of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A), for, in his view, the public official

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must perform a quid pro quo in order to fall within the ambit of

the statute. In the absence of evidence suggesting that he

ultimately altered the businesses’ liability, Orenuga contends

that his crimes were not bribery, but more precisely

“defraud[ing] the two businesses by falsely convincing them that

they were receiving some concession for their money.” Br. of

Appellant at 19.

Whether the District Court properly instructed the jury on

the standard for bribery presents a question of law that we

review de novo. See United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293,

1303 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Our job is to “‘determine

whether, taken as a whole, [the instructions] accurately state the

governing law.’” Id. at 1304 (quoting United States v.

Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam))

(alteration in DeFries). We find here that they do.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A), a “public official”

commits bribery if he or she “directly or indirectly, corruptly

demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept

anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in

return for . . . being influenced in the performance of any official

act.” The Supreme Court has made it clear that the “acceptance

of the bribe is the violation of the statute, not performance of the

illegal promise.” United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526

(1972). In other words, “[t]he illegal conduct is taking or

agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a certain way.”

Id.

Orenuga attempts to avoid Brewster by pointing to United

States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1996), where this

court stated that an essential feature of bribery is that it “implies

a quid pro quo.” Id. at 1522. Contrary to Orenuga’s suggestion,

however, Gatling did not hold that the quid pro quo must be

fully executed for the act to be considered a bribe. Rather, in

distinguishing between a “bribe” and an “illegal gratuity,” the

court noted merely that a bribe is consummated when “the

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defendant accepts money with the specific intent of performing

an official act in return.” Id. (emphasis added). Gatling is

consistent with Brewster, as is the court’s earlier decision in

United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

In sum, we find no support whatsoever for Orenuga’s

reading of the statute. The law unequivocally supports the

District Court’s instruction to the jury, which was therefore not

erroneous.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is affirmed. 

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