Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02630/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02630-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Anthony Joseph White
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTHONY JOSEPH WHITE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-02630-AC 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff, born May 19, 1988, applied on September 23, 2010 for DIB and SSI, alleging 

disability beginning January 1, 2009. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 177, 179. Plaintiff 

alleged he was unable to work due to Ehlers Danlos Syndrome and problems with his legs, back, 

cartilage and tendons. AT 204. In a decision dated October 4, 2012, the ALJ determined that 

plaintiff was not disabled. AT 37–38. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 

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C.F.R. omitted): 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through September 30, 2010. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since January 1, 2009, the alleged onset date. 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: EhlersDanlos Syndrome with leg, back, ligament and cartilage problems; 

anxiety and depression.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed 

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant had the residual functional capacity to lift 

and carry less than 10 pounds frequently and 10 pounds 

occasionally; he can stand and walk up to 4 hours out of an 8-hour 

day and he can sit up to 6 hours out of an 8-hour day; he can 

frequently push and pull with the bilateral upper extremities; he can 

occasionally climb stairs and ramps but should never climb ladders, 

ropes or scaffolds; he can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, 

crouch and crawl; he can frequently handle and finger bilaterally; 

he can frequently reach in all directions; he should avoid exposure 

to vibrations and hazards such as unprotected heights and moving 

machinery; he is limited to performing simple routine tasks. 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work. 

7. The claimant was born on May 19, 1988 and was 20 years old, 

which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged 

disability onset date. 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English. 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform. 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from January 1, 2009, through the date of this 

decision. 

AT 24–37. 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Born on May 19, 1988, plaintiff was 20 years old on the alleged onset date of disability 

and 24 at the hearing before the ALJ. AT 46, 179. Plaintiff has a high school diploma. AT 52. 

In the past, he worked as a shipping and receiving clerk, a box packer and a machine operator. 

AT 228. 

III. ISSUES PRESENTED 

 Plaintiff’s contentions can be summed as follows: (1) the ALJ improperly evaluated the 

medical opinions in the record; (2) the ALJ improperly assessed plaintiff’s RFC; (3) the ALJ 

posed an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert; (4) the ALJ improperly discredited 

plaintiff; and (5) the ALJ improperly discredited the testimony of third-party lay witnesses. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

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or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229–30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 

V. ANALYSIS 

A. Medical Opinions 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of plaintiff’s treating 

physician, Dr. Matthew Symkowick. There are three types of physicians relevant to disability 

determinations: treating physicians, examining physicians, and nonexamining physicians. “If a 

treating doctor's opinion is not contradicted by another doctor (i.e., there are no other opinions 

from examining or nonexamining sources), it may be rejected only for ‘clear and convincing’ 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.” See Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“If the ALJ rejects a treating or examining physician's opinion that is contradicted by another 

doctor, he must provide specific, legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record.” 

Valentine v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009); Ryan, 528 F.3d at 

1198. 

“[T]he medical opinions of a claimant's treating physicians are entitled to special weight.” 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). If the ALJ disregards a treating physician's 

opinion, the ALJ must “set[ ] out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Id. (quoting Cotton v. 

Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir.1986)). Moreover, “[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion 

of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and 

inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 

2002). “To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions.” Esposito v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1027601, CIV S10-2862-EFB at *3 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 

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A nonexamining physician’s function is to read medical evidence in a claimant’s case 

records, decide whether or not the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the Listings, and 

determine the claimant’s Residual Functional Capacities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(1)(i). Because 

nonexamining physicians do not have the benefit of hearing the claimant’s complaints of pain, 

their opinions as to claimant’s pain are of “very limited value.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 

957 (9th Cir. 1993). 

On December 9, 2011, Dr. Matthew Symkowick, plaintiff’s primary care physician, 

completed a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) questionnaire for plaintiff. AT 680–83. He 

reported plaintiff’s diagnoses of chronic pain, posttraumatic stress disorder and anxiety. AT 680. 

Dr. Symkowick opined that plaintiff’s symptoms of pain, fatigue and depression are severe 

enough to interfere with his attention and concentration on a frequent basis. AT 680. He also 

opined that plaintiff can walk one-to-two city blocks at a normal pace before needing to rest, he 

can sit for 30 minutes at a time and for a total of at least six hours in an eight-hour workday, he 

can stand for 30 minutes at a time and for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday, he would 

need a three-minute walking break every 45 minutes in an eight-hour workday, required a job 

with a sit-stand option, and would require daily unscheduled breaks. AT 681–82. Dr. 

Symkowick further concluded that plaintiff could rarely lift and carry 10 pounds and occasionally 

lift less than 10 pounds, he could rarely twist, stoop, crouch, climb stairs, climb ladders, and he 

had significant limitations in reaching, handling, and fingering. AT 682. He estimated that 

plaintiff would miss four or more workdays per month as a result of his impairments. AT 683. 

Dr. Symkowick also provided two disability reports on behalf of plaintiff, opining that plaintiff 

was permanently and totally disabled. AT 688, 895. 

The ALJ did not give controlling weight to Dr. Symkowick’s opinions. AT 35. The ALJ 

reasoned that the opinions came in the form of a fill-in-the-blank/check box form with no 

supporting documentation. AT 35. The ALJ also gave specific reasons for rejecting Dr. 

Symkowick’s opinions. In rejecting Dr. Symkowick’s opinion on plaintiff’s psychiatric 

condition, the ALJ reasoned that mental impairments were outside of Dr. Symkowick’s field of 

expertise as he is a family physician. AT 35. In rejecting Dr. Symkowick’s opinion regarding 

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plaintiff’s functional level, the ALJ reasoned that the objective evidence in the record does not 

support that functional level. AT 35. Plaintiff contends these were not clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Symkowick. However, the ALJ needed to state only 

specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Symkowick’s opinions because they were 

controverted by the opinions of Drs. Lewis (AT 618 [plaintiff could stand and walk up to four 

hours, sit for up to six hours, lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, he 

could occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch crawl and reach, would have difficulty 

kneeling and squatting, has poor balance, and should be kept away from heights and heavy 

machinery]), Acinas (AT 622 [plaintiff had the capacity to perform light work]), and Hartman 

(AT 657–58 [agreeing with Dr. Acinas’s assessment]). See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 692; Ryan, 

528 F.3d at 1198. 

As to Dr. Symkowick’s opinion that plaintiff was permanently and completely disabled, 

the ALJ correctly rejected this opinion because a determination that plaintiff is disabled or unable 

to work is an administrative finding and not a medical opinion. As to the ALJ’s second reason for 

rejecting Dr. Symkowick’s opinions—that they lacked supporting documentation—an ALJ may 

reject an opinion that is not supported by the record. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (evidence of an impairment in the form of “check-off reports” may be rejected for lack 

of explanation of the bases for their conclusions). As to the ALJ’s third reason for rejecting the 

opinion, the ALJ concluded that the specialists were better trained and prepared to provide an 

opinion as to plaintiff’s mental state. Unlike Sprague, 812 F.2d 1226, cited by plaintiff, the ALJ 

in this matter did not concluded there was a lack of psychiatric evidence. Rather, the ALJ chose 

to credit the opinion offered by mental health professionals, as opposed to the opinion of a family 

practitioner. Finally, the objective evidence does not support Dr. Symkowick’s opinion. The 

ALJ thoroughly recounted plaintiff’s medical history. AT 27–32. The ALJ also explained that 

plaintiff would have trouble returning to his past work but that he retained normal motor strength 

and coordination, had fair control over his pain, and his cognition and memory were intact, all of 

which allowed plaintiff to perform less strenuous work. AT 35. The ALJ articulated specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Symkowick’s opinion. 

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There was no error in the evaluation of the medical opinions in the record. 

B. RFC Assessment 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. In 

particular, plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to include work-related limitations resulting from his 

Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, such as anxiety and depression. In determining a claimant’s RFC, an 

ALJ must assess all the evidence to determine what capacity the claimant has for work despite her 

impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The court will affirm the ALJ’s 

determination of plaintiff’s RFC if the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and her decision is 

supported by substantial evidence. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). 

An examining physician’s opinion alone constitutes substantial evidence if it rests on that 

physician’s own independent examination. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

The ALJ assessed plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant had the residual functional capacity to lift 

and carry less than 10 pounds frequently and 10 pounds 

occasionally; he can stand and walk up to 4 hours out of an 8-hour 

day and he can sit up to 6 hours out of an 8-hour day; he can 

frequently push and pull with the bilateral upper extremities; he can 

occasionally climb stairs and ramps but should never climb ladders, 

ropes or scaffolds; he can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, 

crouch and craw; he can frequently handle and finger bilaterally; he 

can frequently reach in all directions; he should avoid exposure to 

vibrations and hazards such as unprotected heights and moving 

machinery; he is limited to performing simple routine tasks. 

AT 27. In making this determination, the ALJ took into account those limitations for which there 

was support in the record, including the medical opinions of Drs. Palmer and Lewis. AT 22–31. 

Dr. Richard Palmer performed a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff on 

February 6, 2011. AT 608. Dr. Palmer diagnosed plaintiff with major depressive disorder, 

anxiety disorder, and a Global Assessment Functioning (“GAF”) of 58.1 AT 611. He provided 

 

1

 GAF is a scale reflecting the “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a 

hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental 

Disorders at 34 (4th ed. 2000) (“DSM IV-TR”). A 51 to 60 GAF indicates “[moderate] 

(continued...) 

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plaintiff’s functional assessment as follows: 

The claimant is capable of managing funds as evidenced by history 

of appropriate financial management. 

The claimant is able to adequately perform one or two-step simple 

repetitive tasks and is able to adequately perform complex tasks as 

there are no noted intellectual impairments at this time. 

The claimant has a good ability to accept instructions from 

supervisors and interact with coworkers and the public. There are 

no noted social impairments at this time. 

The claimant is able to perform work activities on a consistent basis 

without special or additional instruction as there are no noted 

intellectual impairments at this time. 

The claimant has a fair ability to maintain regular attendance in the 

workplace as mental health symptoms may impact attendance. 

The claimant has a fair ability to complete a normal workday or 

workweek without interruptions from a psychiatric condition as 

mental health symptoms may impact attendance. 

The claimant has a fair ability to handle normal work related stress 

from a competitive work environment. Mental health symptoms 

may impact the claimant’s ability to handle work related stress. 

AT 611–12. The ALJ assigned great weight to this opinion. AT 36. 

 Dr. Rose Lewis performed a comprehensive internal medicine evaluation of plaintiff on 

February 10, 2011. AT 615. Dr. Lewis diagnosed plaintiff with chronic pain syndrome 

secondary to Ehlers-Danlos 3 syndrome. AT 618. She opined that plaintiff could stand and walk 

up to four hours, sit for up to six hours, lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently, could occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch crawl and reach, would have 

difficulty kneeling and squatting, has poor balance, and should be kept away from heights and 

heavy machinery. AT 618. The ALJ assigned great weight to this opinion as well. AT 36. 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to take into account work-related limitations resulting 

from his Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome. To the contrary, Dr. Lewis diagnosed plaintiff with chronic 

pain syndrome secondary to Ehlers-Danlos 3 syndrome. AT 618. Accordingly, in assigning great 

 

symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate 

difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or 

co-workers).” DSM IV-TR at 34. 

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weight to the opinion of Dr. Lewis, the ALJ accounted for plaintiff’s work-related limitations 

resulting from his Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome. As demonstrated above, the ALJ reasonably 

accounted for the limitations expressed in the opinions of Drs. Palmer and Lewis, assigning those 

opinions great weight. The ALJ’s RFC assessment was thus supported by substantial evidence. 

C. Hypothetical Posed to Vocational Expert 

Hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert must set out all the substantial, 

supported limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 

747, 756 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the ALJ need only include the limitations that he or she finds 

to exist. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). If a hypothetical does not 

reflect all the claimant’s limitations, the expert’s testimony as to jobs in the national economy the 

claimant can perform has no evidentiary value. DeLore v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 

1991). While the ALJ may pose to the expert a range of hypothetical questions, based on 

alternate interpretations of the evidence, the hypothetical that ultimately serves as the basis for the 

ALJ’s determination must be supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 

Embrey, 849 F.2d at 422–23. 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to include all of his limitations in the hypothetical posed 

to the vocational expert. In posing the hypothetical, the ALJ considered all of plaintiff’s 

limitations that were supported by substantial evidence in the record. AT 85–87. The 

hypothetical was consistent with the ALJ’s RFC assessment of plaintiff. AT 27, 85–87. The ALJ 

was not required to include any additional limitations as plaintiff suggests because the ALJ only 

included those limitations which the ALJ found to exist and were supported by substantial 

evidence. Accordingly, the hypothetical reflected all of plaintiff’s limitations. The ALJ did not 

err in posing the hypothetical to the vocational expert. 

D. Plaintiff’s Credibility 

Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons for discrediting 

his subjective complaints. The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the 

court defers to the ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper 

reasons. See, e.g., Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the 

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ALJ must make an explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873–74 (9th 

Cir. 1990); Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility 

finding to be supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”). 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273,1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR 55406-

01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third-party testimony about nature, severity and 

effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. 

Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek treatment for an 

allegedly debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ in determining 

whether or not the alleged associated pain constitutes a significant nonexertional impairment. See 

Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may 

rely, in part, on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 

(9th Cir. 1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 

177 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, 

the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” 

Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Plaintiff reported that he was unable to work due to his Ehlers Danlos Syndrome and 

problems with his legs, back, cartilage and tendons. AT 204. The ALJ found plaintiff’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of plaintiff’s symptoms 

partially credible for several reasons. AT 32. The ALJ considered that plaintiff’s daily activities 

and allegations of disabling pain were disproportionate to the record (AT 377 [plaintiff reported 

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inability to use wrists however his hand strength and sensation were normal]) and that plaintiff 

had poor compliance with psychiatric treatment (AT 852 [physician noting plaintiff has a history 

of noncompliance with therapy and other psychiatric programs available to him]; 892 [plaintiff 

was terminated from the Psychiatric Intensive Outpatient Program for lack of attendance]). AT 

33. The factors considered by the ALJ in partially discrediting plaintiff are valid and supported 

by the record. 

E. Third-Party Reports 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate third party reports from Donald 

White, plaintiff’s father, Mary Ann Bea, plaintiff’s grandmother, and Andrea White, plaintiff’s 

sister. “[L]ay witness testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects 

ability to work is competent evidence, and therefore cannot be disregarded without comment.” 

Nyguen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 

918–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (friends and family members in a position to observe a plaintiff’s 

symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify to condition). “If the ALJ wishes to 

discount the testimony of the lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each 

witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919; see also Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 

1056 (9th Cir. 2006) (where ALJ fails to properly discuss competent lay testimony favorable to 

plaintiff, court cannot consider error to be harmless unless it can confidently conclude no 

reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting testimony, could have reached different disability 

determination). “If the ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness, the 

ALJ need only point to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a different witness.” 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694). 

Ms. White indicated that she saw plaintiff a few times every month. AT 300. She 

reported that plaintiff spends time with his grandmother, feeds and cleans up after his dog, has 

trouble sleeping at night, does not normally prepare his own meals, can perform house work, and 

is antisocial. AT 300–04. Ms. Bea indicated that she lives with plaintiff. AT 293. She reported 

that plaintiff feeds and cleans up after his dog, as well as takes his dog for short walks. AT 294. 

Ms. Bea further stated that plaintiff can heat his own food, take out the garbage, shop for 

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incidentals, and becomes depressed and irritable due to his condition. AT 295–97. Mr. White 

reported that he spend approximately eight hours per week with plaintiff. AT 286. He further 

reported that plaintiff feeds and cleans up after his dog, can shop for groceries, and experiences 

depression. AT 287–97. 

The ALJ found these third-party statements partially credible. With respect to Ms. White, 

the ALJ found her statements partially credible because she did not have frequent contact with 

plaintiff and was relying on claimant’s description of his activities. AT 34. With regard to Ms. 

Bea and Mr. White, the ALJ gave little credibility to their allegations of debilitation because both 

reported that plaintiff could microwave food, take short walks, feed his dog, clean up after his 

dog, and shop, actions inconsistent with the level of disability alleged. AT 34. The ALJ 

considered the third-party statements and in partially rejecting them, gave reasons germane to 

each witness. There was no error in considering the third-party statements. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is denied; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner. 

DATED: March 6, 2015 

Case 2:13-cv-02630-AC Document 25 Filed 03/09/15 Page 12 of 12