Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07010/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07010-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tammy Lawan Sullivan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

'.-~ .. 

PUBLISH 

PI LBD 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF Aflf.iihlf%t1tei Court of Appeals 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 'I'cntb Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

RUSSELL SULLIVAN; MARY ANN SULLIVAN; ) 

EUGENE LEWIS FISHER; TAMMY LAWAN ) 

SULLIVAN, also known as Tammy Sullivan ) 

Fisher; STEVE BROWN, also known as. ) 

Steve Morgan; JIMMY ROGER WRIGHT, ) 

also .known as Whiskers, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

NOV 16 1990 

:&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 89-7005 

89-7008 

89-7009 

89-7010 

89-7011 

89-7012 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D .C •. No. 88-34-CR) 

D. D. Hayes of Bonds, Matthews, Bonds & Hayes, Muskogee, Oklahoma, 

for Defendants-Appellants Russell Sullivan, Eugene Fisher and 

Jimmy Roger Wright. 

Peter Goldberger, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Alan Ellis, Pamela 

A. Wilk and James H. Feldman, Jr., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 

were with him on the brief), for Defendants-Appella'nts Mary Ann 

Sullivan, Tammy LaWan Sullivan and Steve Brown. 

Sheldon J. Sperling, Assistant United States Attorney, Muskogee, 

Oklahoma (Roger Hilfiger, United States Attorney, Muskogee, 

Oklahoma, was with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, 

VAN BEBBER,* District Judge. 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge. 

* 

TACHA, Circuit Judge, and 

Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, United States District Judge for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 1 
I. 

These consolidated appeals are from convictions and sentences 

following a jury trial of six codefendants for various drug and 

other offenses. The defendants -- members of an extended family, 

and one friend of the family -- were charged in an eight-count 

indictment as follows: 

Count 1 charged a conspiracy among the six defendants between 

September 1985 and May 1986 to manufacture amphetamine, to possess 

and distribute amphetamine, and to use firearms in the commission 

of these offenses, all in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846. Count 2 

charged the six defendants with a separate conspiracy between May 

1988 and July 20, 1988, with the same three objectives. 

Count 3 charged all defendants but Steve Brown with 

attempting to manufacture· amphetamine on July 20, 1988, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846. Count 4 charged all the defendants 

with using or carrying firearms during the second conspiracy, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 924(c). Count 5 charged Russell and Mary 

Sullivan with possessing an unregistered firearm on July 20, 1988, 

in violation of 26 u.s.c. § 586l(d). 

Count 6 charged Russell and Mary Sullivan with cultivating 

approximately 60 marijuana plants, on July 20, 1988, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l). Counts 7 and 8 charged Russell Sullivan 

alone with being a felon in possession of two specified firearms 

on that date, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 922(g). 

Russell Sullivan, Mary Ann Sullivan, Steve Brown, and Eugene 

Lewis Fisher were found guilty on all counts with which they had 

been charged. Tammy LaWan Sullivan Fisher was convicted on Counts 

1 and 2 (the conspiracies), but was acquitted on Counts 3 and 4 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 2 
(attempted manufacture and use of a firearm count). Jimmy Roger 

Wright was acquitted on Count 1, but was convicted on Counts 2, 3, 

and 4. The court sentenced the defendants to te~s of 

imprisonment ranging from thirteen to twenty-five years, and 

imposed $50 special assessments and periods of supervised release. 

The defendants present numerous issues on appeal. We address 

those which are dispositive or are likely to recur. We reverse 

and remand for a new trial and direct the dismissal of some 

charges. 

II. 

The genesis of this case is a 1988 cooperation agreement 

among Melvin Ray Rogers, his wife Evelyn, their son Steve Howell, 

and the government. Melvin Rogers had been convicted four months 

earlier of four drug related felonies, and agreed to cooperate 

with the government in return for the government's promise not to 

prosecute Rogers' wife and son, and to assist Rogers with a Rule 

35 motion in connection with his conviction. 1 

Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Agent Fred 

Means and DEA Agent Doc Shannon extensively interviewed the Rogers 

family regarding their prior drug activities. During those 

interviews, the Rogers implicated members of the Sullivan family 

in six amphetamine "cooks" between September 1985 and May 1986. 

(A "cook" is loosely defined as the synthesis from various 

chemicals of a controlled substance, here amphetamine.) 2 

1 

We reversed Rogers' conviction and remanded for a new trial. 

United States v. Rogers, 881 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1989). 

2 

Where necessary, the factual circumstances of the various 

cooks are described in the body of the opinion. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 3 
The agents decided to investigate the Sullivan family and, in 

May or June 1988, sent Evelyn Rogers to the Sullivan home to "see 

what they were up to." XIII R. at 975. At trial Evelyn Rogers 

testified that when she arrived at the Sullivan house, she saw 

boots by the door that smelled like amphetamine. X R. at 322-23. 

She offered to sell the Sullivans leftover chemicals from their 

earlier cooks, and, according to Evelyn, Mary and Russell Sullivan 

instead expressed an interest in using the chemicals to 

manufacture more amphetamine to make more money. Id. at 323. A 

week or two later, the Sullivans invited Evelyn to return to the 

Sullivan house for a weekend. Evelyn testified that on that 

occasion they discussed setting up a drug lab. Id. at 326-27. 

According to Evelyn, Russell and Mary Sullivan said they needed 

"the whole set up, mantle, jug, condenser . and 55 pounds of 

[phenylacetic acid]." The Sullivans "said they had everything 

else." Id. at 329. Evelyn told them she could get the necessary 

materials. 

Mrs. Rogers obtained the needed materials from the case 

agents and arranged to meet Mary and Russell Sullivan at a motel 

in Antlers, Oklahoma, to discuss delivery. On July 2, 1988, 

Evelyn Rogers delivered the glassware furnished by the government 

agents to the Sullivans' garage. Evelyn testified that she helped 

Russell and Mary Sullivan hide the glassware behind the Sullivans' 

home in the weeds and bushes. The following day, Evelyn called 

Russell Sullivan from a motel in Antlers. She asked if he could 

meet her at the motel room. Russell agreed, and he and Mary drove 

to Antlers where they met with Evelyn Rogers and her son, Steve 

Howell. The conversation between the two codefendants and two 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 4 
informants was recorded. 3 During the conversation the 

participants discussed previous cooks, certain difficulties they 

had had with Eugene Fisher, prospects of getting Melvin Rogers out 

of jail to do a big cook, the events of the previous evening, and 

a prospective location for the cook they were planning. 

Approximately a week later, Russell and Mary Sullivan went to 

Irving, Texas, to meet with Steve Howell and Evelyn Rogers 

concerning their efforts to obtain the phenylacetic acid. 

According to Evelyn, Russell had in his possession a "clip" that 

"he could drop in his AR-15 in just a matter of seconds." X R. at 

375-76. Russell said "it would rock and roll then." Id. 

On July 18, 1988, Agent Means provided Steve Howell with 55 

pounds of phenylacetic acid which Howell then delivered to the 

Sullian home. XIII R. at 989. Howell spent that night with the 

Sullivans at their home. The following morning, Steve Howell and 

Russell Sullivan weighed the phenylacetic acid in the Sullivans' 

garage and then, accompanied by Mary Sullivan, went to Steve 

Brown's house where they examined some "cut" that they planned to 

use to dilute the product. The three men then loaded Steve 

Brown's trailer with clothes and groceries, went to pick up the 

chemicals, and then went to invite Eugene Fisher and Jim Wright to 

participate. 

chemical." 

Wright later arrived with five gallons of "a 

Id. at 545. Meanwhile, Russell Sullivan and Steve 

Howell went to a nearby Wal-Mart to buy duct tape and electrical 

3 

This tape recording was played for the jury, although it is 

inaudible in several places. The United States Attorney's Office 

prepared a proffered transcript of the tape recording, which we 

have reviewed, but which was not admitted in evidence. The trial 

judge did not determine whether the transcript was accurate. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 5 
plugs, and then returned to the Sullivan house. Sullivan and 

Howell made one more trip to Steve Brown's house to pick up the 

glassware and chemicals which they then loaded into Russell 

Sullivan's truck. Steve Howell, Russell Sullivan, and Steve Brown 

then drove to Jack Brown's barn, some eight to ten miles from the 

Sullivans' home, where they then unloaded the truck and began 

setting up the drug laboratory in the barn. 

Howell testified that Eugene Fisher and Jimmy Wright then 

arrived at the lab site with two five-gallon cans. Howell said 

that Russell Sullivan and Steve Brown hooked up the electrical 

panel board in the barn while Fisher and Wright began putting the 

phenylacetic acid into the jugs that were already set up. 

Eugene Fisher and Jimmy Wright both claimed at trial that 

they were tricked into coming to the lab site. Fisher testified 

that on July 19, at dusk, Howell appeared at his home to see if he 

wanted to go riding around. Howell and Fisher then picked up 

Jimmy Wright who testified that Howell asked him to assist him in 

working on a car. Both Fisher and Wright testified that Howell 

then drove the vehicle to the scene of the lab site where, to 

their surprise, Howell advised them that he was going to make 

dope. They testified that Howell supervised and set up the drug 

laboratory and then asked Fisher and Wright if they would stay and 

watch the lab while Howell ran an errand. Fisher and Wright 

testified that they attempted to leave the lab site, but were 

unable to start the car left there by Howell. They testified that 

because they were left without transportation, they spent the 

night in a small trailer near the barn. The following morning, 

the lab site was raided by several law enforcement agents at which 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 6 
time Russell Sullivan, Eugene Fisher, and Jim Wright were 

arrested. Steve Brown had left the night before with Steve 

Howell, and was arrested the following day. Mary Sullivan and 

Tammy Fisher were arrested at the Sullivan home. 

Officers raided the drug lab site and the residences of 

Russell and Mary Sullivan and Steven Brown pursuant to search 

warrants obtained from a state court. An additional warrant for a 

search of the Fishers' residence was secured later that afternoon. 

Substantial evidence was seized as a result of the searches: 

controlled substances, including a number of marihuana plants 

found growing near a pond in the vicinity of the Sullivan home, 

drug manufacturing equipment, motor vehicles, firearms, and a 

large number of records, receipts, documents, and other papers 

said to be related to the drug trafficking enterprise. A pretrial 

motion to suppress evidence was filed for all defendants. The 

trial court denied the motion after a hearing. IR., doc. 20, at 

6. 

The jury trial concluded with the guilty verdicts. 

appeals followed from the judgments on the verdicts. 

III. 

Sufficiency of the Indictment 

A. Count 4 

These 

The defendants contend that Count 4 of the indictment is 

defective for failure to allege an essential element of the 

offense. Count 4 charges that the six defendants "did knowingly 

and unlawfully use or carry firearms during the commission of a 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 7 
felony II in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l). 4 That 

section makes it a crime to use or carry a firearm "during and in 

relation to any drug trafficking crime II 18 u.s.c. 

§ 924(c)(l) (1988) (emphasis added). Defendants argue that Count 

4 is fatally defective for failing to charge that the firearms in 

question were used or carried "in relation to," and not merely 

"during," the charged drug conspiracy. 5 

The recent decision of another panel of this court in United 

States v. Bullock, F. 2d (No. 89-7066, 10th Cir. Sept. 

20, 1990), obliges us to uphold Count 4 of the indictment in the 

instant case against the argument of the defendants here. In 

Bullock, there was a challenge to Count 9 of that indictment. 

4 

5 

Count 4 charged as foll6ws: 

COUNT 4 

(18 USC §924(c)(l) and 18 USC §2) 

From on or about May 1, 1988, through on or about 

July 20, 1988, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, 

RUSSELL SULLIVAN, EUGENE FISHER, JIMMY ROGER WRIGHT, 

MARY ANN SULLIVAN, TAMMY SULLIVAN FISHER, and STEVE 

MORGAN BROWN did knowingly and unlawfully use or carry 

firearms during the commission of a felony which may be 

prosecuted in a court of the United States, to-wit: 

conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine, a Schedule II 

stimulant controlled substance, contrary to the 

provisions of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846. 

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 

Section 924(c)(l) and Title 18, United States Code, 

Section 2. 

Defendants concede that they did not raise this issue before 

or during trial. Appellants' Brief at 31. However, the legal 

sufficiency of an indictment may be challenged at any time, but 

where the objection is not raised before or during trial the 

challenged language will "be construed liberally in favor of 

validity." United States v. Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 304 (10th Cir. 

1987). 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 8 
That Count 9 charged a violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 2 and 924(c) for 

knowingly using or carrying firearms unlawfully "during the 

commission of a drug trafficking [crime]." (Slip op. at 2). The 

Bullock panel held that as to Count 9 and another count challenged 

in that indictment for the first time on appeal, the indictment 

was adequate. (Slip op. at 10). 

Here, Count 4 of the indictment alleged that the defenda~ts 

"did knowingly and unlawfully use or carry firearms during the 

commission of a felony . to-wit: conspiracy to manufacture 

amphetamine II See note 4, supra. We see no reasonable 

basis for distinguishing the wording of the charge in this Count 4 

from the language of Count 9 in the Bullock indictment, which the 

panel there upheld. 

instant indictment. 

Accordingly, we must uphold Count 4 of the 

B. Count 5 

Russell and Mary Sullivan further argue that Count 5 must be 

dismissed because that charge is imprecise and ambiguous. Count 5 

charged that "Russell Sullivan and Mary Ann Sullivan knowingly 

possessed a firearm, that is, an AR-15 Rifle, bearing serial 

number SP207875 with a drop-in auto sear, which had not been 

registered to them in the National Firearms Registration and 

6 Transfer Record," in violation of 26 u.s.c. § 5861(d). 

6 

That section provides in relevant part: 

It shall be unlawful for any person 

(d) To. . possess a firearm which is not 

registered to him in the National Firearms Registration 

and Transfer Record .... 

26 u.s.c. § 5861(d). 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 9 
The term "firearm" is not used in its conventional sense; 

instead it is specifically defined for purposes of the National 

Firearms Act in eight subsections of 26 u.s.c. § 5845(a). The 

specific weapons listed in the eight subparagraphs of subsection 

(a) a·re further defined in greater detail in subsections ( b) - ( f) 

of § 5845. The defendants argue that the several definitions of 

the term "firearm" in § 5845(a)-(e) are distinct and mutually 

exclusive. They therefore say that it is impossible to tell from 

the indictment whether the grand jury charged that the "AR-15 

Rifle .. with a drop-in auto sear" was a "rifle" as defined in 

§ 5845(c), a "machine gun" as defined in § 5845(b), or "other 

weapon" as defined in§ 5845(e). 7 We do not agree. 

Count 5 clearly alleges every element of the offense charged. 

The only question is whether it does so with the requisite 

clarity. An indictment that merely tracks the language of the 

relevant statute is valid only if the statute "fully, directly, 

and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, sets forth 

all the elements necessary to constitute the offense II 

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962) (quoting United 

States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)). Where the statutory 

definition of an offense employs generic terms, it is not 

sufficient to charge the offense in the same terms employed by the 

statute; the indictment must "descend to particulars." Russell, 

369 U.S. at 765 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 

558 (1875)). 

7 

Defendants concede that subsection 5845(d), defining 

"shotgun," has no arguable application to the facts of this case. 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 10 
\ 

In Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973), we 

held that an indictment which alleged that the defendant dld 

"knowingly possess a firearm, that is, a destructive device being 

more particularly described as one homemade incendiary bomb, which 

had not been registered to him in the National Firearms 

Registration and Transfer Record" sufficiently alleged the 

essential facts constituting an offense under the statute and need 

not be accompanied by citation to the section of the statute which 

defines the term "firearm." 476 F.2d at 30. We held that the 

indictment was not vague or indefinite. Id. at 31. 

Here the indictment specifically identified the "firearm" by 

serial number and as an AR-15 Rifle with a drop-in auto sear. We 

think that is sufficient. Although it might have been preferable 

to allege that the AR-15 was a "machine gun" within the meaning of 

26 u.s.c. § 5845(b), 8 and not a "rifle" (§ 5845(c)), we do not 

think the failure to specify which statutory definition applied to 

the AR-15 Rifle impermissibly hindered the defendants' ability to 

prepare their defense or deprived them of their Fifth Amendment 

right to trial on charges made by a grand jury. We hold that 

Count 5 sufficiently charged a violation of 26 u.s.c. § 5861(d). 

IV. 

Improper Use of 404(b) Evidence 

All of the defendants argue that they were denied a fair 

trial because the prosecutor repeatedly elicited evidence of 

8 

At trial, the government's expert witness testified that the 

modified AR-15 was a machine gun capable of fully automatic fire 

with or without the auto sear. XIII R. at 956-57. There is no 

doubt, therefore, that the AR-15 in question is a "machine gun" 

within the meaning of 26 u.s.c. § 5845(b). 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 11 
uncharged crimes, wrongs or other acts in contravention of Federal 

Rules of Evidence 403 .and 404. 9 They make three related 

arguments: first, that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it admitted such evidence; second, that the defendants were 

unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor's impro~er use of such 

evidence after the trial court sustained defendants' objections, 

and the judge's failure to strike it or instruct the jury to 

disregard it; and third, that the prosecutor's repeated attempts 

to use the evidence in disregard of the court's admonitions 

constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 

A. The Disputed Evidence 

Prior to trial, the district court warned the prosecutor 

about the use of evidence of other wrongs. IX R. at 60-62. 

Specifically, the court warned the prosecutor that evidence about 

9 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion or the issues, or 

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404 provides in relevant part: 

(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a 

person's character or a trait of character is not 

admissible for the purpose of proving action in 

conformity therewith on a particular occasion, .... 

* * * * 

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 

other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 

the character of a person in order to show action in 

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 

for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

12 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 12 
"the propensity of some of the defendants to carry pistols and 

automatic weapons" was evidence of other crimes, and as such was 

"not relevant unless you can get around it some way. II Id. 

at 60. The court instructed the prosecutor to "talk with your 

witnesses about that, and about all other 404(b) material they 

might be prone to testify about." Id. at 60-61. Following a noon 

recess, the court again warned the prosecutor about the use of 

Rule 404(b) evidence. Id. at 64.lO 

The prosecution sought to introduce testimony regarding three 

events: (1) Eugene Fisher's alleged participation in an 

amphetamine cook in Mississippi; (2) the investigating agents' 

fear that Jim Wright might be guarding the lab site with a "sniper 

rifle," and the corresponding fact that the arresting officers 

were heavily armed when they raided the lab; and (3) Russell 

Sullivan's alleged possession of a firearm and holster in Irving, 

Texas. In each case, testimony concerning these events reached 

the jury either because the trial court admitted the testimony 

over the defendants' objection or, as was more often the case, 

because the prosecutor elicited improper references to those 

events despite sustained objections to the testimony and in 

disregard of the district court's repeated admonitions to avoid 

10 

The court gave the following admonition: 

And I also want to remind government to comply with 

United States of America v. Louis Anthony Rivera, which 

comes out of this court, and it is law, because of the 

case that emanated, of course, from this court and 

places a heavy duty, a heavy responsibility on the 

government in the event there is any 404 material. 

IX R. at 64. 

13 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 13 
( 

such testimony. In every such instance, the defendants 

unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. 

1. The Mississippi Incident 

The first reference to the alleged Mississippi incident was 

elicited by the prosecutor about half way through the direct 

examination of the prosecution's third witness, informant Steve 

Howell. He was recounting a late night conversation he had with 

Russell and Mary Sullivan when the prosecutor asked whether 

Fisher's Aunt Millie was present during the course of the 

conversation. Defense counsel objected on the ground of 

relevance, which objection was sustained. 

However, the prosecutor persisted: 

IX R. at 528-29. 

Q. Well, did anyone 

conversation, actually 

Russ and Mary? 

A. No. 

else participate in the 

say things other than you and 

Q. Did you talk at all with Millie? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And what did you talk with Millie about? 

Id. at 529. Defense counsel again objected, and the court again 

questioned the relevancy of the testimony. This time, however, 

the court overruled defense counsel's objection on the 

prosecutor's representation that Millie was an unindicted and 

unnamed coconspirator. Id. at 529-30. The prosecutor then asked 

Mr. Howell what he spoke with Millie about. Howell answered, "we 

talked about when Eugene went to Mississippi to cook." Id. at 530 

(emphasis 

mistrial. 

added). Defense counsel immediately moved for a 

14 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 14 
The court expressed amazement at the prosecutor's effort to 

inject such evidence into the case. Id. at 531-532. The court 

twice noted that the evidence was unnecessary to the government's 

case, and again asked the prosecutor why he thought it was 

relevant. The prosecutor answered, "because I think it's part of 

the history of the conspiracy." Id. at 533. The judge ultimately 

ruled in favor of admissibility, but expressed grave doubts as to 

the relevancy of the testimony and refused to give a cautionary 

instruction because the judge believed the damage had been done. 11 

11 

The transcript reads in relevant part: 

THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you this, you have 

made this argument, and I am going to let you put it in. 

But I'll tell you what I think. You're so concerned 

about your position that I think the Circuit Court of 

Appeals ought to consider this, and if they believe that 

it is not relevant and something you're just putting in 

here for no good reason when it's not necessary, I think 

they ought to dismiss the case as against all the 

defendants. So I'm going to let you go ahead. But 

that's my opinion. So you just go ahead with it. 

MR. SPERLING: In view of your opinion, Your Honor, 

I am going to withdraw the question. 

THE COURT: It's too late now, you can't take it 

out of these people's minds, so you go ahead. 

MR. SPERLING: I know I can't, but if they feel 

strongly enough about this to wish the court to admonish 

the jury to disregard it I do not object to that. 

THE COURT: I'm not going to cure it for you. 

And I want the record to be clear. If we went back 

in these cases time after time after time after time, 

you have done ·the same thing. And that's the reason 

that I think it's not relevant and it ought to be 

dismissed. 

Rec. vol. XI, at 533-34 (emphasis added). 

15 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 15 
The court did not expressly rule on defense counsel's motion for a 

mistrial. 

Near the ·end of the trial, the prosecutor returned again to 

the alleged Mississippi cook and referred to amounts of ammunition 

present there. 12 Defense counsel objected. The court sustained 

the objection, but declined to hear defense counsel's motion for a 

mistrial until the jury was excused for the day. Id. at 1846. 

Later, counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the 

prosecutor had again referred to the Mississippi incident, in 

violation of the court's previous order. Id. at 1895-96. The 

12 

During the government's cross-examination of Eugene Fisher, 

the following exchange occurred: 

Q. All right. Incidentally, did Millie own or live in 

a house in Idabel, in the Idabel area? 

A. Yes. 

Q. All right. What happened to that house? 

A. It burnt. 

Q. It burned? How many times did you cook in that 

house? 

A. Never. 

Q. Well, you were in Mississippi, too; weren't you? 

A. No. 

Q. You have never been in Mississippi? 

A. To my knowledge I ain't. 

Q. Isn't it a fact that you went to Mississippi with 

some thousand round of ammunition and shot them all up? 

A. No. 

Q. Millie owns a house in Mississippi; doesn't she? 

A. She used to live in Mississippi. 

XVI R. at 1845-46. 

16 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 16 
prosecutor again argued that the Mississippi incident was part of 

the history of the conspiracy and that defense counsel had opened 

the door by asking the defendant if he knew anything about drugs, 

or if he knew how to manufacture them. Id. at 1896. The court 

rejected the prosecution arguments and again admonished the 

prosecutor to stay away from the events that allegedly occurred in 

Mississippi. XVI R. at 1897-98. 

Despite the admonitions, the prosecutor again referred to the 

alleged Mississippi cook during his closing argument. XVII R. at 

2178. 13 Defense counsel again unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial 

after the prosecutor's closing argument. Id. at 2246-47. 

2. The Sniper Testimony 

Another category of allegedly improper testimony concerns two 

witnesses' references to the possibility that Jim Wright might be 

acting as a sniper in the vicinity of the lab site, and related 

testimony that the arresting officers were heavily armed when they 

made the lab site arrests. The defendants argue, and the district 

court apparently agreed, that the prosecution's repeated 

references to fear of a sniper, despite sustained objections and 

admonitions from the court, unfairly prejudiced the defendants. 

The subject first came up during the prosecutor's direct 

examination of Officer Duncan, one of the arresting officers. 

13 

Purportedly referring to the contents of a tape-recorded 

conversation, the prosecutor argued to the jury as follows: 

And then in a lengthy monologue the use of Millie's 

place for a cook, a fire there, is interesting building 

a safe cooking house. He (referring to Russell 

Sullivan] says, 'That's one time we should have shot 

Dennis (Smith] because, boy, he ripped us off that 

night. 

17 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 17 
Duncan testified that "I planned to go into the situation with a 

full force raid team .. [because] one of the suspects, Mr. 

Wright, was supposed to be in the woods with a sniper rifle." XI 

R. at 710. Defense counsel immediately objected on the basis of 

hearsay. Id. The court sustained the objection and, during a 

bench conference, observed that the evidence was both unnecessary 

and could not have been offered "for any other reason than to try 

to prejudice the defendants," stating the evidence was "just more 

prejudicial than probative." Id. at 710-11 (emphasis added). 14 

Defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, however, was denied. Id. 

at 713. 

After the bench conference, the prosecutor requested 

permission to confer with Officer Duncan, presumably to advise him 

of the court's ruling and admonition. However, during 

cross-examination Duncan again stated that, "We had been told that 

Jimmy Wright was the sniper in this deal, that he was supposed to 

be out in the woods and he would cover from the woods 

periodically." Tr. XII at 863-64. The answer was admittedly 

14 

The prosecutor argued that the evidence was relevant "as to 

the dangerousness [of] the lab." Id. at 711. The district court 

strenuously disagreed. See id. at 711-12. The court ruled as 

follows: 

No. If you can't give me any better reason than 

that, I'll sustain the objection, and stay out of how 

dangerous the lab was, the area, stay out of that area. 

Just don't mess with it. There is no need to go into 

it. If you can't give me any better reason than you 

have so far, it's just more prejudicial than probative. 

And that's true of how many agents went in unless there 

is some reason any particular agent did anything. It's 

just not necessary. It doesn't prove any element of any 

crime that you can show me. 

Id. at 712 (emphasis added). 

18 

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unresponsive, and counsel requested an appropriate admonishment 

from the court. The judge cautioned the witness to merely answer 

the questions, but did not strike the testimony or admonish the 

jury to disregard it. Id. at 864. 

The subject arose again during the prosecution's direct 

examination of Agent Means. The prosecutor had returned to the 

subject of the raid on the drug lab and Agent Means said that 

because he was "fearful that a sniper may be concealed in the 

woods," he sent four or five men into the woods 30 to 40 minutes 

before his main assault team went in. Id. The court sustained 

defense counsel's timely objection on the ground that the 

testimony was cumulative. Id. at 102-03. 

3. The Irving, Texas Incident 

A further claim of the prosecutor's improper use of evidence 

conc~rns testimony that Russell Sullivan was in possession of a 

gun and holster in Irving, Texas, an act not alleged in the 

indictment. The first reference to the incident occurred on the 

first day of trial, during the direct examination of Evelyn 

Rogers. She testified that during a visit by the Sullivans to her 

home in Irving, Texas, Russell Sullivan had carried a firearm. 

X R. at 367-68. The court sustained defense counsel's objection 

on the ground of relevance. Id. at 371. Shortly thereafter, the 

prosecutor showed Mrs. Rogers a holster that had been marked for 

identification, but not yet admitted into evidence. Id. at 382. 

While laying a foundation for the holster's admission, the 

prosecutor asked Mrs. Rogers where she had seen it before. Mrs. 

Rogers responded that she had seen the holster in Russell 

Sullivan's possession at Irving, Texas. Id. at 382-83. Defense 

19 

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counsel requested that her testimony be stricken and that the jury 

be admonished to disregard it. Id. The prosecutor acknowledged 

that counsel's request should be granted in view of the court's 

earlier ruling. Id. at 384. The court sustained the objection, 

but denied defense counsel's request for a mistrial. Instead, the 

court ordered the testimony stricken from the record and cautioned 

the jury to disregard it. Id. at 387. 

The last reference to Russell Sullivan's possession of a gun 

in Irving, Texas, occurred during the government's direct 

examination of informant Steve Howell. The witness identified a 

photograph of a .38 caliber revolver which he said was in Russell 

Sullivan's possession in Irving. XI R. at 581. After. a bench 

conference, the court admitted the evidence over the objection of 

defense counsel on the prosecutor's representation that the 

witness would eventually place the gun at the lab site. Id. at 

584. 15 

Russell Sullivan argues that the prosecutor's repeated 

efforts to elicit testimony concerning his possession of a gun in 

Irving, Texas, constituted prosecutorial misconduct which deprived 

him of a fair trial. The premise of his argument is that the 

evidence was inadmissible because it concerned an event not 

charged in the indictment and which did not occur in the Eastern 

15 

Defense counsel objected on two grounds. First, he relied on 

the grounds of relevancy and undue prejudice along the lines of 

his earlier objections to testimony about this incident. Second, 

he said that Russell Sullivan was charged with carrying a nine 

millimeter pistol and with carrying an AR-15 machine gun, but was 

not charged in the indictment with carrying this .38 caliber 

revolver. See XI R. at 582-83. The court questioned the 

relevance of the witness' testimony that he saw the gun in Irving, 

Texas, but overruled defense counsel's objections on both grounds. 

See id at 584. 

20 

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District of Oklahoma. Sullivan argues that the prosecutor's 

repeated efforts to elicit such testimony was improper in light of 

the trial court's admonition to the prosecutor not to bring up 

evidence of other crimes, including testimony about the propensity 

of some of the defendants to carry firearms. See IX R. at 60. 

At trial, the prosecutor argued that the evidence was 

admissible because it tended to prove an essential element of the 

offense charged in Count 4 of the indictment, namely possession of 

a firearm during and in relation to the 1988 conspiracy. In its 

brief, however, the government simply asserts that the evidence is 

admissible under Rules 403 and 404 "for all the same reasons [as] 

the Mississippi incident," and that "none of the defendants has 

shown prejudice which could negate a finding of harmless error." 

Appellee' s Joint Brief at 67-. 

B. Analysis 

Defendants argue that the prejudicial references to the 

unrelated wrongs or acts were inadmissible under Rules 403 and 404 

of the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the district court 

abused its discretion to the extent that it admitted such 

evidence; that to the extent the court sustained objections to the 

evidence and admonished the prosecutor not to use such evidence, 

the prosecutor's repeated use of the prohibited evidence despite 

the court's warnings deprived the defendants of a fair trial. We 

must agree, except with respect to the government's inquiries 

regarding the Irving, Texas incident, which we believe were 

permissible and are discussed later. See infra at 24-25. 

Rule 404(b) "generally prohibits the introduction of evidence 

of extrinsic acts that might adversely reflect on the actor's 

21 

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character, unless that evidence bears upon a relevant issue in the 

case such as motive, opportunity or knowledge." Huddleston v. 

United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988); see also United States v. 

Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1523 (10th Cir. 1989). Because "[e]vidence 

of prior criminal acts is almost always prejudicial to the 

defendant," United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 513 (10th 

Cir. 1984), the use of such evidence must be carefully 

circumscribed to protect the defendant from unfair prejudice. In 

Huddleston the Court stated: 

the protection against such unfair prejudice emanates not 

from a requirement of a preliminary [Rule 104(a)] finding by 

the trial court, but rather from four other sources: first, 

from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be 

offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy 

requirement of Rule 402 · ... ; third, from the assessment the 

trial court must make under Rule 403 to determine whether the 

probative value of the -similar acts evidence is substantially 

outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. .; and 

fourth, from [Rule] 105, which provides that the trial court 

shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the similar acts 

evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for 

which it was admitted. 

Id. at 691 (citations omitted). 

The improper interjection of prejudicial evidence concerning 

the "Mississippi cook" and sniper testimony compels us to remand 

for a new trial. The testimony referring to a "Mississippi cook" 

was clearly remote and not offered for a proper purpose. After 

the trial judge sustained two objections to the prosecution's 

effort to elicit Howell's testimony about the Mississippi 

incident, the prosecutor replied that the evidence was relevant 

because "it's part of the history of the conspiracy." XI R. at 

533. Such a general assertion as a basis for introducing evidence 

of prior wrongs or conduct is not sufficient for purposes of Rules 

403 or 404(b). See United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d at 1523. In 

22 

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some conspiracy cases we have upheld the admission of evidence to 

establish identity, intent, motive, or plan as relevant and 

proper. See,~, United States v. Mora, 845 F.2d 233, 237 (10th 

Cir.) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995 (1988); United States v. Davis, 

780 F.2d 838, 847 (10th Cir. 1985). When specifically relevant in 

such circumstances, particular history of a conspiracy may be 

probative. Here, however, the prosecutor made no effort to 

explain a probative purpose or connection of the earlier conduct 

in Mississippi 

found that the 

prejudicial. 

to this case. 

evidence was 

At various points, the trial judge 

unnecessary, irrelevant and 

We likewise are convinced that the evidence concerning the 

supposition of a sniper being in the area of the lab site was 

inadmissible and prejudicial. The testimony elicited from Officer 

Duncan referred to using an armed team because defendant Wright 

was supposed to be in the woods with a sniper rifle. XI R. at 

710. Although the court sustained objections to questions about 

the sniper, the trial court did not strike the testimony or 

admonish the jury to disregard it, XII R. at 864, and denied a 

motion for a mistrial. 

We are convinced that the repeated interjection of such 

prejudicial evidence violated Rule 404(a). The evidence of other 

wrongs did not tend to establish a consequential fact at issue, 

and instead tended to prove only criminal disposition. The rule 

clearly prohibits the introduction of evidence of a person's 

character or trait merely to prove action in conformity with such 

character. United States v. Temple, 862 F.2d 821, 824 (10th Cir. 

1988). The "Mississippi cook" evidence was of this type and it 

23 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 23 
was emphasized to the prejudice of the defendants. Id. at 824; 

see also United States v. Hogue, 827 F.2d 660, 663 (10th Cir. 

1987); United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 1986); 

United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 512-13 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Likewise, we are persuaded that there was a violation of Rule 

403, which calls for a weighing of the danger of unfair prejudice 

against the probative value of the evidence. Indeed, the trial 

judge made strong statements that the sniper evidence was more 

prejudicial than probative and could not have been introduced for 

any other reason "than to try to prejudice the defendants." XI R. 

at 710-11. The judge made a similar statement concerning the 

"Mississippi cook" evidence and clearly announced his view that it 

was not relevant. ~ at 534. Moreover, the court declined to 

give a cautionary instruction despite the prosecutor's offer to 

withdraw the question, because "you can't take it out of these 

people's minds .... " Id. We are convinced that any probative 

value of "such precarious evidence is substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice" and therefore the evidence should 

have been excluded under Rule 403. United States v. Temple, 862 

F.2d at 824; United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919, 925-926 

(10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1319 

(10th Cir. 1983). 

However, with respect to the evidence concerning Russell 

Sullivan's possession of a gun and holster in Irving, Texas, we 

find no reversible error. We agree with the government's 

contention at trial that the evidence was probative of charges 

made in the indictment concerning firearms. The trial judge has 

broad discretion to determine whether such evidence is relevant, 

24 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 24 
and whether the probative value is outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice. We do not believe the judge abused his 

discretion in his rulings concerning this evidence. 

We are convinced that the violations of the rules with 

respect to the "Mississippi cook" evidence and that concerning the 

sniper matter were clearly prejudicial, requiring remand for a new 

trial. 

A. 

V. 

Jury Instructions 

Entrapment Instruction 

All of the defendants except Russell Sullivan and Tammy 

Fisher argue that the district court erred in refusing to give an 

entrapment instruction as to Counts 2 through 5. 16 The defendants 

requested an entrapment instruction prior to the close of the 

evidence, and again after the closing arguments .. See XVII R. at 

2153. 17 The district judge did not articulate his reason for 

refusing to give the requested instruction, but he had earlier 

expressed the view that the defendants were not entitled to an 

entrapment instruction unless they admitted all the essential 

elements of the crimes charged. See XI R. at 745-46. 

Although that was formerly the law in the Tenth Circuit,.§..§.§., 

~, United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671, 688 (10th Cir.), cert. 

16 

The district court instructed the jury on the law of 

entrapment with respect to Russell Sullivan as to Counts 2 and 3 

of the indictment. Russell Sullivan does not argue on appeal that 

he was entitled to an entrapment instruction with respect to any 

other counts. 

17 

Defense counsel's request omitted naming defendant Steve 

Brown, but the omission appears to have been an oversight. 

25 

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denied, 484 U.S. 874 (1987), the Supreme Court has clearly held to 

the contrary in Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988). 

In Mathews the Court held that a defendant is entitled to an 

entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could find entrapment even if the 

defendant denies one or more elements of the crime. 485 U.S. at 

62. The only issue before us, therefore, is whether the evidence 

warranted such an instruction. Although we must reverse on 

grounds already discussed, we consider the issue because of its 

likely significance on retrial. 

The defense of entrapment has two elements: "First, 

government agents must have induced the defendant to commit the 

offense; and, second, the defendant must not have been otherwise 

predisposed to commit the offense, given the opportunity." United 

States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1988); Mathews, 

485 U.S. at 63. Inducement is "government conduct which creates a 

substantial risk that an undisposed person or otherwise lawabiding citizen would commit the offense." United States v. 

Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986). "[It) may take the 

form of 'persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive 

tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, 

sympathy or friendship.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Burkley, 

591 F.2d 903, 913 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 u.s. 

966 (1979)). Predisposition is the "defendant's inclination to 

engage in the illegal acitivity for which he has been charged," 

Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165, and "may be inferred from a defendant's 

history of involvement in the type of criminal activity for which 

he has been charged, combined with his ready response to the 

26 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 26 
inducement offer." Id. The defendants must point to evidence of 

both inducement and lack of predisposition to establish a genuine 

issue concerning the origin of criminal intent. Id. 18 Although 

we have variously described the degree of proof required to submit 

an.entrapment defense to a jury, "the test is whether the 

evidence, regardless of amount, creates a factual issue." Fadel, 

844 F.2d at 1430. If the evidence on the question of entrapment 

is conflicting, therefore, the question should be submitted to the 

jury. 

We believe the evidentiary record in this case warranted a 

jury instruction on entrapment with respect to Counts 2, 3 and 

4. 19 These four defendants argue that they have no prior felony 

convictions and that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that 

any one of them was predisposed to commit the crimes charged. All 

of the defendants testified and they each denied any prior 

involvement in the manufacture of amphetamines or any related 

illegal drug trafficking activity. Although there was evidence 

from which a jury might conclude otherwise and infer 

d ' . t . th . ' t f t 1 d · t pre isposi 2 O ion, is poin was a ac ua ispu e. 

18 

Once the defense is raised, however, and the defendants have 

shown that the evidence amounts to a triable issue, then the 

burden shifts to the government to prove predisposition beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165 (citing United States 

v. Smegal, 772 F.2d 659, 660 (10th Cir. 1985)); see also United 

States v. Gurule, 522 F.2d 20, 25 (10th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 

425 U.S. 976 (1976); Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 812 

(10th Cir. 1967). 

19 

Only Russell and Mary Sullivan were charged in Count 5 

(possession of an unregistered firearm) and neither defendant 

points to any evidence of entrapment with respect to that count. 

20 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

27 

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Furthermore, all of the defendants testified that they were 

induced in one way or another by the government informants to 

participate in the 1988 drug manufacturing effort. The defendants 

were first approached by Evelyn Rogers at the direction of Agent 

Means. Mary Sullivan testified that Mrs. Rogers repeatedly 

entreated her to assist in the venture to help alleviate Mrs. 

Rogers' supposedly desperate situation. XVII R. at 2062-65, 2067, 

2069-70. 21 She further testified that she only reluctantly agreed 

to go to the Antlers motel and participate in the discussion there 

with her husband, Mrs. Rogers and Steve Howell. Id. at 1076-77. 

Jimmy Wright and Eugene Fisher both testified that they were 

tricked into going to the lab site. 22 Finally, it is undisputed 

(Footnote continued): 

In particular, the government informants testified that the 

defendants had been actively involved in the manufacture of 

amphetamine in 1985-86. The defendants, of course, denied any 

participation in those alleged "cooks." Furthermore, there is no 

evidence in the record suggesting that they were involved in like 

criminal activity during the intervening two years. The evidence 

of predisposition was thus in conflict. 

21 

Mrs. Rogers spoke of her husband in jail, her tremendous need 

for money, and her inclination toward suicide. XVII R. at 2062-

65. According to Mary Sullivan, Mrs. Rogers asked Mary and 

Russell to help persuade her son, Steve Howell, to help Evelyn set 

up an amphetamine "cook" in order to make money. Id. 

22 

They each testified that on the night the lab was set up, 

Steve Howell appeared at each of their homes and asked them to 

accompany him to work on a car, XVI R. at 1855, or simply to go 

for a ride and do some shooting. Id. at 1796. They testified 

that, pursuant to that request, they left with Howell and drove to 

the nearby farm owned by Jack Brown, a mechanic. Id. at 1857. 

According to both defendants, Howell first informed them that 

"he was going to make dope" after they had arrived at the lab 

site. Id. at 1800, 1859. Fisher testified that Howell then 

unboxed the lab equipment and assembled it. Id. at 1801-02. Both 

defendants testified that Howell asked them to stay and watch the 

operation while Howell was temporarily gone from the scene. Id. 

at 1801, 1878. 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

28 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 28 
that the government provided the defendants with most of the 

necessary glassware for the drug lab, and 55 pounds of 

phenolacetic acid. "Of course evidence that government agents 

merely afforded an opportunity as facilities for the commission of 

the crime would be insufficient to warrant [an entrapment] 

instruction." Mathews, 485 U.S. at 66. Nevertheless the evidence 

here was relevant and tended to support the defendant's version of 

the facts. 

We are persuaded that there was sufficient evidence to go to 

the jury on entrapment and that the instruction should have been 

given on Counts 2, 3 and 4 for defendants Mary Sullivan, Eugene 

Fisher, Jimmy Wright and Steve Brown, as well as for Russell 

Sullivan for whom an entrapment instruction was given. On 

retrial, if a similar record is made, we feel the charge should be 

. 23 given. 

B. Defendants' Claim of Error Due to Lack 

of "Balanced" Credibility Instruction 

Defendants argue that the instructions of the trial judge 

improperly pointed to defendants and their interest in the result 

of the trial, that there was no proper balancing instruction by 

(Footnote continued): 

Wright testified that he reluctantly stayed at the lab site, 

id. at 1881-82; that later he and Eugene Fisher attempted to 

leave, but were unable to start the car left at the scene by 

Howell. Id. at 1833. Fisher also testified that he and the 

co-defendants attempted to leave, but were unable to start the car 

left by Howell. Id. at 1807. 

23 

We note that in the entrapment instruction given as to 

Russell Sullivan, the charge stated in part that "[o]ne raising 

the defense of entrapment does not deny the commission of the acts 

involved, but he should not be convicted if he is entrapped." The 

language saying the one raising the entrapment defense does not 

deny commission of the acts should not be used, so as to avoid 

conflict with Mathews, 485 U.S. at 62, 65-66. 

29 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 29 
informing the jury of the defendants' "equal competence as 

witnesses," and that under decisions, such as United States v. 

Matias, 836 F.2d 744, 749-50 (2d Cir. 1988), inter alia, the 

prejudicial charge requires reversal. 

Joint Brief at 42-44. 

See, ~, Appellants' 

We do not agree. The instructions given by the trial judge 

in no way amounted to an undue emphasis on the "deep personal 

interest which every defendant has in the result of his case" and 

other portions of the charge stressed in Matias, 836 F.2d at 

749-50. We have examined the entire charge given here and are not 

persuaded by the defendants' arguments. The judge properly 

cautioned the jury as to the testimony of inform~nts with a 

self-interest being considered with caution and weighed with great 

care, and he likewise properly instructed that accomplice 

testimony is to be received with caution and weighed with great 

care. Tr. 2232-33. And the judge gave the customary instruction 

that the jurors were the judges of the facts, the weight of the 

evidence, and credibility of the witnesses, and that they might 

consider the interest, if any, which a witness may have in the 

result of the trial, inter alia. Tr. at 2235. 

We have considered the defendants' several related complaints 

concerning the instructions and believe they are without merit 

except, as noted, with respect to submitting an entrapment 

instruction. 

A. 

VI. 

Other Evidentiary Rulings 

Evidence of Multiple Firearms 

Defendants contend that the trial court erred when it 

30 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 30 
admitted in evidence a .22 caliber rifle seized from a trailer 

approximately 100 yards from the lab site and photographs of 

approximately 20 weapons seized from the Sullivan and Fisher 

residences. 24 They say the firearms were not relevant since there 

was no credible evidence linking the firearms to any of the crimes 

charged. Defendants also argue that to the extent the evidence 

was relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice. The prosecution contends that the 

firearms, or photographs of them, were admissible as evidence of 

the crimes charged under a "tools of the trade" theory, 25 and that 

any error as to the admissibility of the firearms was harmless 

since there was other substantial and direct evidence to support 

the defendants' convictions. 

As a general rule, evidence that the defendants possessed 

weapons or other paraphernalia that may have been used in 

committing the crimes for which they are charged is relevant. See 

1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 1 401[10],_ at 

401-70 & n.14 (a collection of cases). In United States v. 

Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982), we upheld the admission of 

24 

Defendants did not object to the admissibility of the three 

handguns seized at the lab site. 

25 

In its brief, the prosecution argues that because Russell 

Sullivan was charged with being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, all of the firearms found at his residence are admissible 

under Rule 404(b) to show his criminal intent to engage in the 

crimes charged, and as proof of his knowledge, motive, or absence 

of mistake or accident. In that connection, the prosecution 

argues that because the remaining defendants did not request a 

limiting instruction from the trial court, any error with regard 

to the admissibility of the firearms as to them is not reversible. 

See Gov't Br. at 70. Because we conclude on.other grounds that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

evidence, we need not address this argument. 

31 

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two revolvers seized from a van in which the defendants were 

transporting marijuana because "[t)he firearms may have been part 

of the circumstantial evidence of an intent to distribute the 

marijuana." 692 F.2d at 705. Although the instant case is not on 

all fours with Romero, 26 that court's reasoning is applicable 

here. In this prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture 

amphetamine, and attempted manufacture of amphetamine, the 

firearms seized from the Sullivan and Fisher homes were introduced 

for a proper probative purpose. We hold that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in permitting the introduction of the 

photographs of various weapons in evidence at trial. 

Several courts have held that firearms are generally 

admissible in a drug conspiracy trial because they are "tools of 

the trade" for those engaged in illegal drug activity. See, g.g., 

United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 

1987); United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 554 (1st Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 108 Sup. Ct. 2033 (1988); United States v. Martinez, 

808 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032 (1987); 

United States v. · Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1985). 

Without accepting this broad proposition as a substitute for a 

more detailed case-by-case analysis under Federal Rules of 

Evidence 401 and 403, we are persuaded that there was sufficient 

independent evidence to tie the weapons found at the Sullivan and 

Fisher residences to the crimes charged so that their admission in 

evidence was not error. 

26 

In particular, the 

defendants' homes some 

Further, unlike Romero, 

prosecution's use of the 

firearms here were seized from the 

eight or ten miles from the lab site. 

the defendants here objected to the 

firearms at trial. 

32 

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Furthermore, although the large number of weapons involved 

here creates some risk of undue prejudice, we are persuaded that 

any undue prejudice was outweighed by the probative value of the 

evidence. Before the weapons were admitted, several witnesses 

testified that the defendants routinely carried firearms, both for 

legal and illegal purposes. Moreover, the defendants testified 

that it was their general practice to possess and carry firearms 

for recreational purposes and that most of the persons in the 

community possessed guns. ~-, XIV R. at 1332, 1338; XV R. at 

1558. Finally, the government did not attempt to parade the 

weapons before the jury; instead, it relied on photographs of the 

weapons found at the Sullivan and Fisher residences. This use of 

the evidence was proper. 

In sum, we feel there was ample evidence in this case from 

which a jury could infer that the defendants' access to firearms ( 

not only facilitated their drug manufacturing efforts, but also 

provided the type of protection the defendants believed they 

needed for their operation. Admission of the evidence was not 

error. 

B. Exclusion of Evidence of Russell Sullivan's Mental Condition 

Defendants argue that the trial judge erred in excluding 

expert testimony concerning Russell Sullivan's mental condition. 

Defendants' attorney offered proof that Dr. Bohn from the 

Springfield, Missouri, Medical Facility would testify that 

Sullivan would have the resistance of a five to nine-year-old, and 

that this, coupled with the rest of his physical and mental 

condition, would make him extremely susceptible to being persuaded 

to commit an illegal act to commit an illegal act. 

33 

XV R. at 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 33 
1467-68. The trial judge excluded the testimony, ruling that 

timely notice pursuant to Rule 12.2(b), Fed. R. Crim. P., had not 

been given. The judge further denied a motion for leave to file 

the notice at the time of trial. XI R. at 744-45; XV R. at 

1589-90 ("I am going to tell you that my ruling still stands as to 

anything under 12.2."). 

Because we reverse and remand for a new trial for reasons 

stated elsewhere, we express no opinion on the defendants' 

argument that the trial judge abused his discretion in so ruling. 

This issue is likely to arise again on retrial, given the 

strenuous arguments on appeal that the evidence should be admitted 

on the entrapment defense. However, because the circumstances at 

the time of the retrial will be considerably different from those 

which were before the judge at the earlier trial, we decline to 

express any view as to the ruling that should be made at a 

subsequent trial. 

We do feel it proper to address one question because it too 

is likely to be presented again. We must decide whether Rule 

12.2(b), concerning "expert testimony relating to a mental disease 

or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing 

upon the issue of his guilt," applies to testimony going to the 

defendant's susceptibility to entrapment. In United States v. 

Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 518 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit held 

that Rule 12.2(b) does not apply in such circumstances, "given the 

lack of a clear indication that Rule 12.2(b) will apply to an 

entrapment defense, we find it an insufficient basis to exclude 

the proffered testimony in this case." 655 F.2d at 518. See also 

United States v. Webb, 625 F.2d 709, 710-711 (5th Cir. 1980) (rule 

34 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 34 
inapplicable where expert testimony was offered to show lack of 

propensity to commit a violent act); cf. United States v. 

Ellsworth, 738 F.2d 333, 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 

1042 (1984) (ruling 12.2(b) inapplicable to proffered psychiatric 

testimony that taxpayer had a good faith belief income tax was 

voluntary). 

We are persuaded by the dissent of Judge Rosenn in Hill. 

Rule 12.2(b) requires notice under Rule 12.2(a) with respect to a 

broad range of expert testimony -- that "relating to a mental 

disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant 

bearing upon the issue of his guilt .. 

that: 

II The dissent reasons 

The purpose in requiring notice of mental condition 

evidence is as compelling in an entrapment defense as it 

is in an insanity defense. In either case, the 

government must prepare for a psychiatric defense and it 

should have the requisite notice to avoid trial delay 

and provide adequate preparation." 

655 F.2d at 520. See also United States v. Edwards, 90 F.R.D. 

391, 397-98 (E.D. Va. 1981) (Rule 12.2(b) applies to testimony of 

diminished intellectual capacity or stupidity affecting mental 

state required for the income tax offense); United States v. 

Hearst, 412 F.Supp. 863, 870 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (Rule 12.2(b) 

applies to proffered testimony on mental and psychological 

brainwashing pressure). 

In sum, we feel the notice requirements of Rule 12.2 apply to 

testimony such as that involved here. However, the application of 

the rule and discretionary rulings as to whether leave should be 

granted to file. such notice on remand are matters on which we 

express no opinion. The circumstances are obviously far different 

now with the passage of time. The trial judge can reassess the 

35 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 35 
matter on remand. 

c. Claim of erroneous denial of suppression of evidence 

All the defendants except Jimmy Wright contend that the 

district court erroneously allowed the introduction of illegally 

seized evidence. 27 They challenge an allegedly warrantless search 

of the residence of Tammy and Eugene Fisher, an allegedly faulty 

affidavit to support the issuance of the search warrants, and they 

claim that there were overly broad searches conducted by the state 

officers under the search warrants. 

1. Search of the Fishers' mobile home 

On the morning of the July 20, 1988 raids, officers searched 

the suspected lab sites and the residences of Russell and Mary 

Sullivan and Steve Brown pursuant to search warrants issued by the 

District Judge of McCurtain County. The warrants authorized the 

seizure of specified contraband, lab equipment, and other 

described personal property. At about the same time, the officers 

also searched the mobile home of Tammy and Eugene Fisher, located 

approximately 50 yards from the Sullivan's residence. 

The law enforcement officers characterized their search of 

the Fisher's mobile home as a "protective sweep," intended to 

assure their safety. IX R. at 19. Later that day the state 

officers obtained a further search warrant for the Fisher's 

residence and returned to carry out a comprehensive search of 

27 

These defendants filed a joint motion to suppress. The 

district court denied the motion by a written order before trial. 

The defendants' motion to reconsider the court's ruling was denied 

by the district court at trial. IX R. at 62-63. The issue was 

raised a third time by a further motion to reconsider which was 

denied by the district court in a minute order. 

36 

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't 28 J. • The defendants contend that the initial search of the 

Fisher's mobile home was unlawful and that it tainted the seizure 

later that afternoon of evidence introduced at trial and used 

against defendant Eugene Fisher. 

On this appeal, the government responds to the claims of 

error in the admission of evidence from the Fisher's mobile home 

and of alleged error in denial of suppression, arguing also the 

protective sweep theory. On examination of the affidavit and 

search warrant, we are persuaded that the protective sweep theory 

need not be reached. The trial judge was correct in his denial of 

suppression because, we conclude, the initial search warrant was 

supported by probable cause clearly shown by the affidavit of 

Officer Means. Moreover, the initial warrant adequately described 

the mobile home and authorized its search. 29 The property 

description specifically covers a "white mobile home" and says it 

is one facing west with a redwood deck. It is true that in the 

concluding portion of the- search warrant authorizing search there 

is a provision for "search of said person, vehicle and/or house, 

building and premises, the curtilage thereof . II Despite 

28 

The tangible evidence seized pursuant to the warrant included 

an unfiled income tax return, firearms, and a truck. 

29 

The search warrant describes the property to be searched as 

containing 

two residences at said location, one of which is a wood 

frame house which faces west with brown composition 

shingles and outer walls which are mostly covered in 

gray rock; the second residence is a white mobile home 

which is located to the northeast of the first residence 

ap. [sic] 100 ft. which mobile home faces west and has a 

redwood deck on the west side and is fully skirted 

37 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 37 
this singular reference to "house," we feel the warrant should be 

read in a practical sense and as a whole. Doing so, we hold that 

the warrant and authorization were intended to cover the mobile 

home. The phrase last quoted would appear to be a standard form 

of language of a boilerplate sort, and this should be read with 

the particular description of the property in the earlier part of 

the warrant. 

In sum, we are convinced that the trial judge properly denied 

suppression of the unfiled or draft income tax return, firearms 

and truck seized at the Fisher's mobile home. 

2. The affidavits. 

Defendants contend that all of the search warrants were 

invalid because they were "saturated with false information" and 

argue that at the suppression hearing, Mr. Means admitted 

information in the affidavit was false, although he denied that 

the information was intentionally false. Brief in Chief of 

Appellant Eugene Fisher at 20-21. 

After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial judge 

entered a written order with findings adverse to the defendants 

and denied the motion. IR., Item 20 at 6-9. The order found 

that the affidavit of probable cause, which was attached to the 

affidavits for the search warrants, relied on information from 

"previously reliable informants, the affiant's personal 

observations and confirmations of the informants' information, and 

the affiant's experience and expertise as a narcotic agent." Id. 

at 6. Under the totality of the circumstances standard of 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983), the search 

warrants were upheld. The trial judge noted that the task of the 

38 

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issuing magistrate under Gates was simply to make a practical, 

common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set 

forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and 

"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, 

there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 

crime would be found in a particular place. 

The trial judge rejected the contention that there was 

knowingly false information furnished in the affidavits. The 

judge noted that the affiant admitted at the hearing on the motion 

to suppress that the allegation of the actual presence of a drug. 

lab at more than one of the locations was an error, since the same 

affidavit was used for all four locations. However, the trial 

judge found this was an inadvertent error and that there was 

sufficient probable cause without that allegation in the other 

three affidavits for the magistrate to find probable cause. The 

judge found there was a substantial basis for the issuing 

magistrate to find probable cause for the issuance of all four 

warrants under Gates and United States v. Martinez, 764 F.2d at 

744 (10th Cir. 1985). IR., doc. 20, at 7. 

We are satisfied that the findings of the trial judge were 

not clearly erroneous. The affidavit here in question did contain 

errors. The drug agent in charge of the raids admitted an 

erroneous identification of the drug locations. 30 The trial judge 

30 

At the suppression hearing, the following interrogation of 

the drug agent occurred: 

Q. (Defense Counsel) Now, the attached affidavit 

paragraph 2, on Exhibit Number 109, is the residence of 

the Sullivan family; is that correct? 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

39 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 39 
accepted the credibility of the drug agent in his statement that 

the mistakes were inadvertent. The defendants have not 

demonstrated that the findings of the judge were clearly 

erroneous. Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978), it 

was the burden of the movants to demonstrate deliberate falsity or 

reckless disregard for the truth by the affiant. We hold that the 

findings underlying the judge's order were not clearly erroneous 

and the denial of suppression was not error. 

3. The claim of lack of particularity in the search warrants' 

descriptions 

Lastly, the defendants say the warrant was overly broad and 

(Footnote continued): 

A. That's correct. 

Q. And on paragraph -- and on Exhibit Number 110, it's 

identical and it's a residence of the, I believe, Morgan 

family? 

A. That's correct. 

Q. And then on 111 it's the residence of the Fisher 

family; is that correct? 

A. That's correct. 

Q. So, in each instance 

advised the magistrate 

laboratory set up at each 

not? 

in your affidavit you have 

that there is a clandestine 

of these residence; have you 

A. Yeah. I may have done that inadvertently. 

Q. Now, you have done that and that's a false 

statement; isn't it, Mr. Means. 

A. No. I think that -- I had no intention to make a 

false statement, Mr. Hayes. 

Q. Well, we're not just leaving your intentions 

aside, the statement you made in the affidavit regarding 

clandestine laboratories located at the residences is 

false? 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

40 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 40 
/ 

constitutionally deficient, because it merely directed the 

officers to seize a "laundry list" of personal papers likely to be 

found in any Oklahoma home, as well as drugs and drug 

paraphernalia and equipment. Brief in Chief of Appellant Eugene 

Fisher at 26. 

The issue implicates the Fourth Amendment mandate that 

warrants not issue without "particularly describing the place to 

be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," inter alia. 

The trial judge considered the affidavits and warrants and their 

descriptions of the property which constituted evidence of 

criminal conduct. 31 The descriptions of the property as 

(Footnote continued): 

A. It's not an accurate statement. 

VI R. at 68-69. 

31 

The trial judge quoted the description of property in his 

ordering denying suppression: 

Certain dangerous substances, the same being narcotics, 

marijuana, hallucinogens, barbiturates, amphetamines and 

meth-amphetamines, listed in the schedules of the 

Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance Act of the State 

of Oklahoma; 

equipment and paraphernalia used in the manufacture, 

distribution, administration, utilization, or 

consumption of said controlled dangerous substances, 

with the unlawful intent to possess, use and distribute 

said substances in violation of the laws of the State of 

Oklahoma including flasks, heating mantles, hoses, 

glassware, chemical compounds, to wit: phenyl-acetic 

acid, phenyl acetone, Formamide, formic acid, acetic 

anhydride, acetone, hydrogen chloride gas, sodium 

acetate, and ether; 

personal property consisting of records, receipts, 

papers, instrumentalities, and documents related to an 

on-going suspected criminal enterprise in the 

trafficking of and conspiracy to distribute, controlled 

dangerous substances, including but not limited to, 

phone records and bills, utility bills and/or receipts, 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

41 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 41 
constituting evidence of criminal conduct were broad. We agree 

with the trial judge, however, that the language of the warrant 

was sufficiently specific in detail to avoid the evils of a 

general search. In United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474, 476 

(10th Cir. 1986), we upheld a description against such a claim 

when it included records of a physician constituting insurance 

billings, a record book of payments from insurance companies, 

checkbook stubs for two years, financial records and any other 

property that constitutes evidence of commission of the criminal 

offense. In light of the on-going drug activities described in 

the affidavits, and the nature of the operations, we feel the 

descriptions were sufficient to be valid under the constitutional 

standard. 

VII. 

Prosecutorial Misconduct 

The defendants argue that they were denied a fair trial 

because, in his closing argument, the prosecutor improperly 

commented that the trial judge had already passed on the 

sufficiency of the evidence and improperly referred to matters 

outside the record. Although we reverse and remand for a new 

trial on other grounds, we address these arguments because of 

their importance and possible recurrence on retrial. 

A. Comment on the Sufficiency of the Evidence 

During the prosecutor's final argument to the jury, he 

(Footnote continued): 

address books, records, photographs as well as 

undeveloped film and negatives, documents and receipts 

of travel, diaries, all monies, receipts, records and 

documents which show unusual, or suspect monetary 

transactions and receipts or keys to safety deposit 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

42 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 42 
insinuated that the trial judge had already determined that there 

was sufficient evidence to convict the defendants. The prosecutor 

stated: 

And don't believe this defense lawyer when he says 

that all we have to do is decide to prosecute and that's 

the end of the story. It's not. There's always a judge 

involved. And you can be assured, based on the conduct 

of this trial, that this judge isn't going to put up 

with any Mickey Mouse about the government trying to 

railroad somebody into a conviction if the evidence does 

not substantiate it. 

XVII R. at 2204. At the conclusion of the argument, defense 

counsel moved for a mistrial, which motion was overruled. Id. at 

2247. The trial court acknowledged that the prosecutor's comment 

was "uncalled for," but ruled that the misconduct was "not 

sufficiently egregious" to warrant a mistrial. Id. 

We think the prosecutor's comment was highly improper. See 

United States v. Gambert, 410 F.2d 383, 384-85 (4th Cir. 1969). 

The clear implication of the prosecutor's comment was that if the 

evidence was insufficient to convict the defendants, the trial 

judge would have dismissed the charges. Such comments denigrate 

the role of the jury and should not be tolerated. Not too unlike 

the misleading portrayal of the jury's role at issue in Caldwell 

v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985), the prosecutor's 

argument "create[s] an intolerable danger that the jury will 

choose to minimize the importance of its role." 

In Gambert, the prosecutor made the following statement in 

his closing argument: 

(Footnote continued): 

boxes. 

IR., Item 20 at 8. 

43 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 43 
You all are the ones to decide whether I have 

proved the facts under the law. But legally, I have 

satisfied the court that it can go to the jury for your 

determination. 

410 F.2d at 384. The Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that "the 

jury may well have been left with the impression that the trial 

judge had been persuaded by the prosecution's case," id., and 

stating further: 

In arguing a close case before the jury, it is 

manifestly unfair for the prosecutor to throw into the 

scales the weight of the judge's influence by 

intimating, even mildly, that the judge thinks the 

defendant guilty. 

Id. at 385. Because we must reverse on other grounds, we need not 

decide whether in the context of this trial this comment, standing 

alone, would warrant reversal. We nevertheless emphasize that 

such comment was clearly improper and should not occur on retrial. 

B. Reference to Matters Outside the Record 

During trial and during his closing argument, the prosecutor 

read several times from a purported transcript of the tape 

recording which had been played for the jury at the close of the 

government's case. See,~, XVI R. at 1830-32; XVII R. at 

2040-42, 2173-76. The transcript itself was never admitted in 

evidence as an exhibit, and it was never determined to be 

accurate. Defendants argue that because the recording was 

substantially inaudible, it was improper for the prosecutor to 

read passages from the purported transcript, thereby reinforcing 

his version of selected portions of the conversation that the jury 

may or may not have heard. 

We have heard the entire recording and, although we do not 

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting 

the playing of the tape, see United States v. McIntyre, 836 F.2d 

44 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 44 
467, 469-70 (10th Cir. 1987), the tape is of an extremely poor 

quality, inaudible in numerous places, and difficult to understand 

because of a persistent echo due to the use of more than one 

microphone. Even if the jury was able to discern a damaging 

statement here and there, we cannot fairly say that the jury could 

hear and would have found that the statements from the purported 

t~anscript were made as the prosecutor quoted in his closing 

argument. Although the court admonished the jury to rely on its 

own recollection of the evidence, the prosecutor should not have 

read from the purported transcript, the accuracy of which was not 

determined and which was not in evidence. 32 

VIII. 

The Brady Claim 

The defendants argue that they were deprived of due process 

because the government destroyed handwritten notes made during 

Agent Means' investigative interviews with the three government 

informants. The issue arose at trial when defense counsel's cross 

examination of Melvin and Evelyn Rogers disclosed that Means had 

conducted as many as thirty-two interviews with the informants, 

whereas the government provided interview notes for only five of 

32 

The trial court acknowledged that the prosecutor's repeated 

and deliberate efforts to emphasize what the jury may or may not 

have heard was improper, see XVI R. at 1831, and properly 

cautioned the jury to consider only those portions of the tape 

that it heard and and could understand. See, ~, XIV R. at 

1245-46, 1251; XVII R. at 2042, 2165-66. We are persuaded, 

however, that despite the court's efforts to cure the effect of 

the prosecutor's improper use of the transcript, the damage had 

already been done. Significantly, the court did not give any 

limiting instruction after the prosecutor quoted extensively from 

the transcript during his closing argument. The court overruled 

defense counsel's objection and motion for mistrial without 

comment. XVII R. at 2247. 

45 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 45 
( 

th t . 33 ose mee 1.ngs. In some but not all cases the government 

apparently provided defense counsel with a typewritten report of 

the interview in lieu of the agent's handwritten notes. According 

to the defendants' briefs, when defense counsel confronted the 

prosecutor with this information, he was informed that Means had 

"shredded" the notes pursuant to "departmental policy." See 

Wright Br. at 17; Sullivan Br. at 7. Thereafter, defense counsel 

filed a motion to dismiss for suppression of evidentiary material 

in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial 

court denied the motion by minute order. 34 

The government acknowledges that some "handwritten drafts [of 

final reports] based on field notes and recollection" were 

destroyed, along with a note written on a napkin, but otherwise 

disputes defendants' factual allegations. Brief of United States 

at 26. The government further alleges that "handwritten draft 

field notes were produced to defendants," and that the substance 

.of the "shredded" notes was embodied in reports also furnished to 

33 

Melvin Rogers testified that he had as many as six meetings 

with Agent Means and that Means took notes at all but one meeting. 

X R. at 249. Defense counsel, however, was provided with copies 

of interview notes for only one meeting with Melvin Rogers. 

Similarly, Means' own chronology of events reveals that he had 

meetings, either in person or by telephone, with Evelyn Rogers 16 

times between May 9, 1988, and July 21, 1988. Defense counsel was 

furnished with Means' handwritten notes for only four of those 

meetings. Finally, Means' chronology reveals that he had 12 

meetings, either in person or by telephone, with the informant 

Steve Howell between May 22 and July 21, 1988. Defense counsel, 

however, was not provided with any notes. or reports of interviews 

with Steve Howell. 

34 

Defense counsel raised the matter again at trial,~ XI R. 

at 467-68, 556, and the court again denied defendant's motion to 

dismiss. Id. at 594-95. Because the defendants request that the 

case be dismissed, and not merely reversed and remanded for a new 

trial, this issue is not moot. 

46 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 46 
the defendants. Id. The government characterizes the defendants' 

claim as "speculative" and argues that in any case the defendants 

have not demonstrated that the missing evidence had any 

exculpatory value or that it was destroyed in bad faith, id. at 

25-26, citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 

In Youngblood, the Court held that "unless a criminal 

defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to 

preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial 

of due process of law." 488 U.S. at 58. The Court distinguished 

the government's failure to preserve only "potentially useful 

evidence" from its obligation to disclose "material exculpatory 

evidence" under Brady as follows: 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

as interpreted in Brady, makes the good or bad faith of 

the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to 

the defendant material exculpatory evidence. But we 

think the Due Process Clause requires a different result 

when we deal with the failure of the state to preserve 

evidentiary material of which no more can be said than 

that it •.. might have exonerated the defendant. 

Id.; see also California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 491 (1984) 

(in the absence of a showing of bad faith or official animus, "the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require 

that law enforcement agencies preserve (potentially exculpatory] 

breath samples in order to introduce the results of breath 

analysis tests at trial."). 

As is clear from Youngblood, however, if the interview notes 

are Brady material, then the good or bad faith of the government 

is irrelevant. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 63; Brady, 373 U.S. at 

87. Here the defendants argue that the agent's notes would have 

revealed inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the trial testimony 

of key prosecution witnesses and therefore would have been useful 

47 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 47 
to impeach the credibility of those witnesses. "Impeachment 

evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within 

the Brady rule." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 

(1985) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)); 

see United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 

1989). The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[s]uch 

evidence is 'evidence favorable to an accused,' so that, if 

disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between 

conviction and acquittal." Bagley 473 U.S. at 676 (quoting Brady, 

373 U.S. at 87); TM Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 

Where, as here, "the 'reliability of a given witness may well be 

determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence 

affecting credibility falls within this general rule." Giglio, 

405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 269). Thus, to the 

extent the defendants' allegations are true, and assuming the lost 

evidence was also "material" under Brady (see Giglio, 405 U.S. at 

154), the government's failure to preserve the evidence would 

constitute a denial of due process regardless of the good or bad 

faith of the government. 35 

Unfortunately, on this record we are unable to determine the 

merits of the parties' respective claims. The trial court denied 

defendants' motion to dismiss without conducting an evidentiary 

35 

The defendants argue in the alternative that even if the 

interview notes were not Brady material, the defendants were 

deprived of due process because Agent Means destroyed the evidence 

in. bad faith. See Br. of Russell Sullivan at 7-11. 

48 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 48 
hearing or making any findings of fact. 36 The court did not 

determine whether the lost evidence would be material, see Bagley, 

473 U.S. at 682, or if not, whether the government nevertheless 

destroyed the evidence in bad faith. 37 Because either or both 

factual conclusions could be determinative on this issue, on 

remand a hearing should be held on these questions. 38 

36 

When the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss from the 

bench, it did not express its reasons for doing so. See XI R. at 

595. 

37 

This case is strikingly similar to the pre-Brady case of 

Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961). In Killian, the 

government relied in its case in chief on an investigatory report 

prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Prior to trial, 

however, the FBI Agents who prepared that report destroyed the 

preliminary notes they had made while interviewing witnesses. The 

petitioner argued that these notes would have been helpful to his 

defense and that the agents ·had violated the Due Process Clause by 

destroying this exculpatory evidence. 

The Solicitor General, however, represented that the agents' 

notes were made only for the purpose of transferring the data 

thereon to the required receipts, and that, having served that 

purpose, they were destroyed by the agents irt good faith and in 

accord with their normal practices. See 368 U.S. at 242. The 

Court acknowledged that the notes might have contributed to the 

petitioner's defense, but held that if the Solicitor General's 

factual representations were true, the destruction of the notes 

would not "constitute an impermissible destruction of evidence nor 

deprive petitioner of any right." Id. The Court remanded the 

case to the district court for a hearing to determine whether the 

Solicitor General's representations were true, and if not, for a 

new trial. Id. at 244. 

38 

We are mindful of the difficulty of this task. As the 

Supreme Court observed in Trombetta, "[w)henever potentially 

exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the 

treacherous task of defining the import of materials whose 

contents are unknown and, very often, disputed." 467 U.S. at 486. 

Nevertheless, findings following the evidentiary hearing will 

afford the best resolution of the constitutional claim. 

Finally, we note that on the present record we cannot 

conclude as a matter of law that the interview notes were 

immaterial, or that their likely impeachment value would be 

insubstantial. See generally United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 

at 1443-44. 

49 

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IX. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

All of the defendants except Jim Wright and Eugene Fisher 

claim that the evidence is insufficient to support their 

convictions for one or more of the counts charged in the 

indictment. We address these claims because if they have merit, a 

retrial would be prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Burke 

v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978). 

A. The Conspiracy Counts 

Tammy Fisher argues that the evidence presented at trial 

failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly 

participated in either of the two charged conspiracies. Indeed, 

as to the 1988 conspiracy charged in Count 2, she argues that the 

evidence failed to establish any participation in the conspiracy 

at all, much less that she knowingly and voluntarily became a part 

of it. 

1. Count 1. 

The evidence of Tammy Fisher's participation in the 

amphetamine "cooks" in 1985-86 may be briefly· stated. The 

government's informant Melvin Rogers testified that at one of the 

first cooks, Tammy prepared and served food and washed clothes for 

the four men who were manufacturing drugs in an outbuilding on her 

property and was present when they discussed the lab's progress. 

IX R. at 111. 39 Government informant Evelyn Rogers also testified 

39 

The relevant portion of the transcript reads as follows: 

Q. Now, during the times that you were at Tammy 

and Eugene's trailer, was Tammy Sullivan there? 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

50 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 50 
that at one of the cooks Tammy allowed the men to "go to her 

trailer, take a shower, [and] eat." X R. at 307. She also 

testified that on one occasion Tammy, together with Evelyn, Melvin 

and Eugene, walked to the lab site to "shut [it] off for some 

reason. I don't know what." Id. at 308. 40 Evelyn also placed 

Tammy at the second cook, id. at 311, but did not elaborate. 

Later, however, she testified that "[a]bout January" Tammy helped 

Eugene Fisher and Steve Howell weigh phenylacetic acid. Id. at 

377-78. Government informant Steve Howell likewise testified that 

on one occasion, in January or February of 1986, Tammy helped 

weigh chemicals. XI R. at 492-93. Fi~ally, Melvin Rogers 

testified that on the same occasion Tammy helped pack "the 

groceries, the bedding, and stuff like that" into a truck when the 

lab site had to be moved from behind Eugene Fisher's house to the 

(Footnote continued): 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Did she do anything with regard to your stay? 

A. Well, she· washed our clothes for us. She 

would cook for us. That's about it. 

Q. 

doing? 

Did you ever discuss with her what you were 

A. Yeah, I mean, you know, we'd talk about how it 

was going. You know, if it was going all right or 

whether we was having any trouble, you know, that kind 

of stuff .. 

IX R. at 111. Accord id. at 113. 

40 

Id. 

Evelyn explained as follows: 

We went back down there to start it up, because Eugene turned 

on the water and it nearly blew everything up, the pressure, 

the air or something. And we went down there that time and 

walked down there. 

51 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 51 
Sullivan's house. IX R. at 121-23. Significantly, he also 

testified that they moved the lab during "early morning" while "it 

was still dark." Id. at 123. 

While the evidence against Tammy Fisher on Count 1 is not 

extensive, we believe it is sufficient to support the jury's 

verdict. The most damaging evidence against Tammy is, of course, 

t.he testimony that she helped weigh chemicals and helped pack 

groceries and bedding into a truck used to move lab equipment to 

another location. A rational jury could reasonably infer from 

those acts that Tammy Fisher knew the essential objectives of the 

conspiracy and knowingly became a part of it. That is sufficient. 

See, ~, United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1296 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

2. Count 2. 

The evidence against Tammy Fisher with respect to Count 2, 

the 1988 conspiracy, is insufficient. There is no evidence in the 

record that Tammy ever participated in the 1988 conspiracy to 

manufacture amphetamines. The government points only to Evelyn 

Rogers' testimony that after she had delivered the glassware to at 

the Sullivan's, Tammy alerted her father to the presence of an 

unfamiliar, slowly moving car outside the Sullivan home. 41 The 

41 

The relevant portion of the transcript reads as follows: 

Q. Did anything out of the ordinary happen then? 

A. 

door, or 

Russ. 

Well, Tammy started home, and she got to the 

outside. And she came back and hollered for 

Q. Now, what did she holler at Russ? 

A. She said, "come here, daddy," or "come to the 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

52 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 52 
government argues that this evidence of Tammy's "countersurveillance" activity is sufficient to connect her to the 

conspiracy. Government's Brief at 34-35. 

We do not agree. It cannot be reasonably inferred from proof 

of Tammy's equivocal act that she knew the existence and scope of 

the 1988 conspiratorial objective, or believed that her actions 

played any role in achieving that objective. Such gossamer 

evidence is not proof sufficient to support a criminal conviction 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Tammy's conviction on Count 

2 is reversed and a judgment of acquittal must be entered on that 

count. Burks, 437 U.S. at 18. 

B. Attempted Manufacture of Amphetamine 

Mary Sullivan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

sustain her conviction on Count 3 of the indictment for attempted 

f t f ht . 42 

manu ac ure o amp e amine. She contends that there is no 

(Footnote continued): 

door, daddy." And he walked outside. 

Q. All right. What did she say then? 

A. I don't know what she said out there. 

Q. All right. And what is the next thing that 

you saw or heard happen? 

A. Russ came back and he was real upset. He said 

that there was two cars had just went over the hill, up 

the road, driving real slow, and he said he felt like it 

might be the feds. So he said I'm going to get my gun 

and go see what I can find out. 

X R. at 336 (emphasis added). 

42 

The government has suggested that we need not reach this 

issue under the concurrent sentence doctrine. See United States 

v. Montoya, 676 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1982). However, the district 

court imposed a $50 special assessment on each count, in addition 

to the concurrent prison and parole terms, pursuant to 18 u.s.c. 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

53 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 53 
evidence that she either participated in the attempt to 

manufacture amphetamine, or that she aided and abetted the 

attempted manufacture of amphetamine. We disagree. 

The crime of attempt requires proof of (1) the requisite 

criminal intent, and (2) an act or omission constituting a 

"substantial step" toward commission of the substantive offense. 

United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1296; see also United 

States v. Remigio, 767 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

474 U.S. 1009 (1985). Viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, there was evidence that Mary Sullivan spoke with 

Evelyn Rogers on the phone concerning the proposed amphetamine 

cook; that she met with Evelyn Rogers in a motel room to arrange 

for the glassware delivery; that she participated in the glassware 

delivery to the Sullivan home, and the concealment of· the 

glassware behind the house; that she traveled to Irving, Texas, 

with her husband to arrange for the delivery of phenoyacetic acid 

by Steve Howell; that she participated in the recorded 

conversation of July 3, 1988, in which she discussed the planned 

amphetamine cook; and that on the day before the lab was set up, 

she told Steve Howell that she had been to the library "studying 

up .•• on cooking procedures." See X R. at 330-36, 343-44, 

367, 375; XI R. at 522-25, 557. 

We are convinced there is sufficient evidence from which a 

rational trier of fact could find Mary Sullivan guilty of 

attempted manufacture of amphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Footnote continued): 

§ 3013 (1988). The concurrent sentence doctrine, therefore, could 

not apply. See Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987). 

54 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 54 
c. 

1. 

Illegal Possession of a Firearm 

Count 5. 

Defendants Russell and Mary Sullivan challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions on Count 

5 for possession of an unregistered firearm, an AR-15 rifle, in 

violation of 26 u.s.c. § 5861(d). They claim the government 

failed to prove the essential element of possession. 43 Russell 

Sullivan challenges on the same basis his conviction on Count 7 

for illegal possession of the same firearm after former conviction 

of a felony in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 922(9). The government 

does not point to any evidence of actual possession, but argues 

that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support an 

43 

The defendants also attack the government's evidence of lack 

of registration on two fronts. First, defendants argue that the 

certificates of non-registration, dated September 12, 1988, are 

not competent proof that the firearm in question was not 

registered to Russell or Mary Sullivan more than two months 

earlier, on July 20, 1988. They contend that a jury could not 

infer from that evidence that the firearm was not registered on 

the date of the alleged violation. Similar arguments were 

considered and rejected in United States v. Allen, 842 F.2d 1265, 

1266 (11th Cir. 1988), and United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 76 

n.10 (2d Cir. 1983). We agree with the reasoning expressed by 

both courts. 

Second, defendants object to the admissibility of the 

certificates on the ground that they were hearsay and that the 

government did not comply with its discovery obligations under 

Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. We disagree. 

Public records are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, 

Fed. R. Evid. 803(8), and the government may prove the absence of 

a record of proper registration with a certified copy of a public 

record, such as the one introduced here, certifying that diligent 

search failed to disclose evidence of the registration in 

question. See Fed. R. of Evid. 803(10), 902(4). Finally, we 

reject the defendant's argument that the government violated Rule 

16 because it furnished defense counsel with a photocopy of each 

certification of non-registration before they were signed by the 

certifying officer or affixed with the requisite seal .. Although 

it would have been preferable to furnish defendants with copies of 

signed certificates bearing the requisite seal, the government's 

failure to do so does not constitute a violation of Rule 16 and 

did not preclude their introduction into evidence. 

55 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 55 
inference of joint constructive possession by Mary and Russell 

Sullivan. We agree. 

It is well settled that the required "possession" for 

purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) includes both actual and 

constructive possession. United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 

1528, 1533 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, __ u.s. __ , 109 s.ct. 3197 

(1989). Constructive possession exists when a person does not 

have actual possession, but "knowingly holds the power to exercise 

dominion and control" over an object. Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1533 

(quoting United States v. Medina-Ramos, 834 F.2d 874, 876 (10th 

Cir. 1987)). Furthermore, possession need not be exclusive; it 

may be joint, and therefore does not require that exercise of 

dominion and control by others be disproved. United States v. 

Rivera, 844 F.2d 916, 926 (2d Cir. 1988). 

The government points to the following evidence in support of 

the jury's verdict. First, Evelyn Rogers testified that when she 

met with Mary and Russell Sullivan in Irving, Texas, Russell 

displayed a "clip" that he could drop into his AR-15 in just a 

matter of seconds that would make it "rock and roll." X R. at 

375-76. Second, Steve Brown (Mary Sullivan's son) testified that 

he purchased the AR-15 in question at a pawn shop and had given it 

to his younger brother, since deceased. XVII R. at 1914. He 

testified that he had taken the AR-15 and several other guns to 

his mother's house after some of his guns were stolen, and that 

after his brother's death, "we moved the gun cabinet and stuff" 

into his mother's bedroom. Id. at 1915. Mary Sullivan admitted 

that the AR-15 belonged to her deceased son and that she kept all 

of his property after his death, including the guns. Id. at 

56 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 56 
2073-74. Finally, the machine gun was found in the master bedroom 

of the Sullivans' home along with a nearby auto sear and 30-shot 

clips. XII R. at 868-69. The government argues, and we agree, 

that this is sufficient evidence to support an inference of joint 

constructive possession. 

F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1985) 

See,~, United States v. McCoy, 781 

The defendants argue that the evidence of dominion and 

control is too tenuous here to amount to proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt. In particular, Mary Sullivan argues that there was no 

evidence, direct or circumstantial, that she slept in or otherwise 

had knowledge of the contents of the room in which the gun was 

found. She relies on United States v. Bonham, 477 F.2d 1137 (3d 

Cir. 1973) (en bane), for the proposition that joint occupancy of 

a bedroom is insufficient evidence on which to base an inference 

of criminal possession. Finally, she correctly asserts that 

"[t]here was no evidence concerning where in the bedroom the gun 

was found, whether it was in plain view or hidden, or anything 

else about the circumstances." Appellee's Brief at 30. Russell 

Sullivan argues that he was eight to ten miles away from his home 

when the AR-15 was seized; that none of his fingerprints were 

found on the AR-15; and that the government did not introduce any 

evidence that he exercised dominion and control over the room in 

which the firearm was found. 

Although we agree that joint occupancy of a bedroom, without 

more, would be insufficient to support this conviction, the 

evidence in this case goes somewhat beyond that. The evidence 

presented at trial shows some connection between each defendant 

and the firearm, and supports the inference that each defendant 

57 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 57 
was aware of the presence of the firearm in the master bedroom. 

The evidence in this case is stronger, for example, than the 

evidence we held sufficient in United States v. Miles, 772 F.2d 

613 (10th Cir. 1985). On balance, we think there is sufficient 

evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that each of the 

Sullivans constructively possessed the unregistered AR-15 rifle. 

2. Count 4. 

Russell and Mary Sullivan, Eugene Fisher, Steve Brown and 

Jimmy Wright also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 

sustain their convictions on Count 4 for "knowingly and unlawfully 

us[ing] or carrying firearms during the commission of a felony 

... , to wit: conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine, .... " 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l). In judging the sufficiency 

of the evidence, we are bound to view the proof presented in the 

light most favorable to the government to ascertain if there is 

sufficient substantial proof, direct and circumstantial, together 

with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, from which a 

jury might find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938, 946 (10th Cir. 1987); 

United States v. Twilligear, 460 F.2d 79, 81-82 (10th Cir. 1972). 

We conclude that the record contains sufficient 

sustain the. convictions of the defendants other 

evidence to 

than Mary 

Sullivan, and hold that her conviction on this count must be set 

aside. 

In United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 

1989), we agreed with other courts that the "uses" element of 

§ 924(c)(l) is satisfied where a defendant has "ready access" to a 

firearm and it "was an integral part of his criminal undertaking 

58 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 58 
and its availability increased the likelihood that the criminal 

undertaking would succeed." United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 

843 (8th Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 

24, 29 (2d Cir. 1989) (five firearms secreted about a defendant's 

apartment). Here there was evidence that there was a substantial 

number of weapons at the Sullivan and Fisher residences, that it 

was a common practice for the male defendants to carry firearms, 

that three of the defendants possessed weapons at the laboratory 

site, and that two defendants took weapons to investigate possible 

trouble with the "feds. 1144 We feel the evidence is sufficient to 

sustain the convictions of Eugene Fisher, Steve Brown, Jimmy 

Wright and Russell Sullivan on Count 4. 

However, we are unable to agree with the government that its 

evidence was sufficient with respect to the conviction of Mary 

Sullivan on Count 4. The government does not cite any specific 

evidence to indicate that she carried or used a firearm. We agree 

that there was sufficient proof that both Mary and Russell 

44 

Donald Wayne Long testified that Jimmy Wright informed him 

that Russell Sullivan and Wright were armed at the laboratory 

site. XVII R. at 2118-20. Steve Howell testified that at the 

laboratory~ Howell asked Eugene Fisher and "Whiskers" (Jimmy 

Wright) if they had guns. Fisher said "yes" and Wright "patted on 

his back pocket." XI R. at 585. 

Evelyn Rogers testified that while she was at the Russell 

Sullivan residence in July of 1988, Sullivan telephoned Steve 

Brown to come up because he thought "there might be trouble." X 

R. at 341-42. Sullivan left to find out if the "feds" were there, 

or just someone else. X R. at 341. Sullivan was armed with a 

rifle and Steve with a small handgun. Id. at 341-44. 

Moreover, during the raid on the laboratory site on July 20, 

1988, Jimmy Wright, Eugene Fisher and Russell Sullivan were 

arrested in the trailer that served as the laboratory. XII R. at 

1006. During that raid, Senior Agent Duncan seized three guns 

from the trailer. XII R. at 780. 

Tammy Sullivan Fisher was not convicted on Count 4 and, 

therefore, there is no question before us concerning the 

sufficiency of the evidence on Count 4 with respect to her. 

59 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 59 
Sullivan had joint and constructive possession of the AR-15 rifle 

at their home, but that was in connection with a conviction for 

possession of an unregistered firearm. Count 4, however, is a 

different substantive charge under 18 u.s.c. § 924(c). As to that 

offense, we are 

sufficient to 

required to 

sustain the 

determine whether the proof was 

charge under that section. 45 We are 

persuaded to agree with the Ninth Circuit's construction of the 

statute in United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 

1985) (opinion of Kennedy, J.), that "the evident purpose of 

[§ 924(c)] was to impose more severe sanctions where firearms 

facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, the commission 

of a felony." This results from the inclusion within the 

statutory elements of the language that the using or carrying of 

the firearm must be "during and in relation to" a crime of· 

violence or a drug trafficking crime. With this in mind, we do 

not find sufficient evidence in this record that Mary Sullivan 

carried or used firearms '_'during and in relation to" the 

underlying drug conspiracy offense. The constructive possession 

proof aufficient with respect to the charge concerning possession 

of the unregistered AR-15 rifle is not sufficient to sustain the 

Count 4 conviction within the meaning of§ 924(c)°. A conviction 

must be supported by sufficient substantial evidence, and not mere 

suspicion of guilt. United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 

1455 (10th Cir. 1987). 

In sum, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support 

the convictions of defendants Eugene Fisher, Steve Brown, Jimmy 

45 

We have already held in Part III-A, supra, that as a matter 

of pleading, Count 4 is sufficient due to our Bullock opinion. 

However, as a matter of proof, the evidence is not sufficient as 

to Mary Sullivan. It does not show that the AR-15, or the gun 

collection of Mary Sullivan's son, James Wesley, were within such 

access as to be an "integral part of [her] criminal undertaking 

and [that] its availability increased the likelihood that the 

criminal undertaking would succeed." McKinnell, 888 F.2d at 675. 

60 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 60 
Wright and Russell Sullivan on Count 4. Therefore, their argument 

that retrial of them on this Count 4 charge would be barred by 

Double Jeopardy principles, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 

(1978), is without merit. However, the claim to this effect by 

Mary Sullivan is good, and a judgment of acquittal for her with 

respect to Count 4 will be entered by the district court on 

remand. Id. at 18. 

D. Cultivation of Marijuana 

Finally, defendants Russell and Mary Sullivan claim that the 

evidence does not support their convictions on Count 6 of the 

indictment for manufacturing (cultivating) . . 46 mar1.Juana. The 

defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to show that 

either defendant knowingly manufactured the marijuana. 47 

The government devotes only two very short paragraphs in its 

brief to this issue. It does not cite record evidence except to 

rely exclusively on one short passage from the tape recorded 

conversation of July 3, 1988 in support of its conclusory 

assertion that "[t]he evidence was sufficient to sustain the 

46 

21 u.s.c. § 802(14) defines "manufacture" broadly to include 

"production" which in turn is defined in section 802(21) to 

include "planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting " 

The trial court similarly instructed the jury. XII R. at 2226-27. 

47 

The defendants further argue, relying on United States v. 

Gay, 774 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1985), that the quantity of marijuana 

seized was insufficient to support an inference of intent to 

distribute. That argument is misplaced. Manufacture of marijuana 

and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute are distinct 

offenses. See United States v. Zamora, 784 F.2d 1025, 1029 (10th 

Cir. 1986). The defendants in this case were charged with and 

convicted of only the former offense. IR. doc. 1, at 11; id. 

docs. 38 & 39. Proof of manufacture can be shown without any 

evidence of intent to distribute. United States v. Miller, 870 

F.2d 1067, 1071 (6th Cir. 1989). 

61 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 61 
challenged convictions of appellants." Brief of the United States 

at 57. 

When the search warrants were executed at the ·Sullivan 

residence on July 20, 1988, agent Higbee located 61 live marijuana 

plants growing in pots "behind the pond and down a little ways." 

XIII R. at 1116. Higbee estimated that the location of the 

marijuana was approximately 100 yards from the Sullivan residence, 

id. at 1125, but admitted that he did not know who owned the 

property where the plants were located. Id. at 1124. (The 

government did not introduce any evidence of ownership of the land 

in question.) Higbee also testified that there was a path leading 

from the Sullivan residence in the general direction of the 

marijuana. Id. at 1118. He admitted, however, that the marijuana 

was on the opposite side of. an approximately seven-acre pond, id. 

at 1127, and to get to the marijuana he had to walk "up over a 

dam. II Id. at 1123. The government points to the tape recorded 

conversation of July 3, 1988, involving Russell and Mary Sullivan, 

Steve Howell, and Evelyn Rogers, as evidence of Russell and Mary 

Sullivan's dominion and control of the marijuana. 48 

48 

According to the u. s. Attorney's transcript of the tape 

recording, which was not admitted into evidence, Russell Sullivan 

is quoted as saying: "I don't know if it's ever going to mature, 

but we've got some growing out there in a good place. Because 

that's what we was counting on is a weed crop this year. You 

know, cause we didn't know where Melvin and Evelyn was and we 

didn't know your last name." The tape itself was played for the 

jury over the defendants' objection that it was inaudible. 

We have listened to the tape carefully and do not believe the 

purported language was sufficiently audible to justify the 

conclusion that any incriminating statement was made. Only a few 

words are distinct enough to hear, and those are often unclear. 

r (For example, "weed" is easily confused with "wheat."). 

62 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 62 
We think the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, is 

insufficient to establish the required elements of possession or 

scienter. Higbee's testimony clearly is insufficient to support 

an inference of knowing cultivation as to either Russell or Mary 

Sullivan. There is no substantial evidence that either defendant 

participated in growing the marijuana plants, or that they knew 

the plants existed. The testimony that the plants were growing in 

the area near the Russell's home, without more, is insufficient. 

The sounds on the tape would support only a guess as to guilt. 

Evidence that raises only a suspicion of guilt cannot sustain 

a criminal convicton. Accordingly, Russell and Mary Sullivan's 

convictions on Count 6 are REVERSED with instructions to enter 

judgments of acquittal as to each defendant on that count. 

x. 

Improper Amendment of the Indictment 

Defendants contend that their sentences on Counts 1 and 2 

were improperly based on 21 u.s.c. § 846 when, prior to what they 

charcterize as an impermissible amendment of the indictment by the 

trial court, the indictment could only be read to charge an 

offense under the general conspiracy statute, 18 u.s.c. § 371. 49 

Although defendants style this claim as a challenge to the 

legality of their sentences, the substance of their argument is 

that the trial court improperly amended the indictment. Thus, we 

address defendants' claim because if it has merit, retrial on the 

"amended" indictment would be violative of the Fifth Amendment 

49 

Defendants were given concurrent sentences under 21 u.s.c. 

§ 846 ranging from thirteen to twenty years' imprisonment, 

whereas, 18 u.s.c. § 371 is punishable by no more than five years 

imprisonment. 

63 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 63 
grand jury guarantee. For reasons that follow, we hold that the 

trial court did not impermissibly amend the indictment. 

Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment each charged a conspiracy to 

violate the narcotics laws in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846. 50 

50 

The charging paragraphs of Counts 1 and 2 are reproduced 

below. 

COUNT 1 

(21 USC §846) 

A. Objects of the Conspiracy 

Beginning on or about September 1, 1985, and 

continuing until on or about May 1, 1986, in the Eastern 

District of Oklahoma, and elsewhere, [the defendants], 

did wilfully and knowingly combine, conspire, 

confederate, and agree together and with diverse others 

both known and unknown to the Grand Jury to commit 

offenses against the United States, in violation of 

Title 21, United States. Code, Section 846, as follows: 

(1) To knowingly and 

amphetamine, a Schedule 

substance, contrary to Title 

Section 841(a)(l). 

intentionally manufacture 

II, stimulant controlled 

21, United States Code, 

(2) To knowingly and intentionally possess with 

intent to distribute amphetamine, a Schedule II, 

stimulant controlled substance, contrary to Title 21, 

United States Code, Section 841(a)(l). 

(3) To knowingly and 

amphetamine, a Schedule 

substance, contrary to Title 

Section 84l(a)(l). 

intentionally distribute 

II, stimulant controlled 

21, United States Code, 

(4) To knowingly and intentionally use firearms in 

the commission of the offenses listed above, in 

violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 

924(c). 

COUNT 2 

(21 USC §846) 

A. Objects of the Conspiracy 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

64 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 64 
However, in addition to alleging three violations of 21 u.s.c. 

§ 841(a)(l), as "objects of the conspiracy," each count also 

includes a firearms offense (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) 

as a fourth conspiratorial objective. At trial the court 

recognized that because§ 846 encompasses only those "offense(s) 

defined in this subchapter, 1151 the Title 18 firearms offense was 

(Footnote continued): 

51 

Beginning on or about May 1, 1988, and continuing 

until on or about July 20, 1988, in the Eastern District 

of Oklahoma, and elsewhere, [the defendants), did 

wilfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, 

and agree together and with adv.erse others both known 

and unknown to the Grand Jury to commit offenses against 

the United States, in violation of Title 21, United 

States Code, Section 846, as follows: 

(1) To knowingly and intentionally manufacture 

amphetamine, a Schedule II, stimulant controlled 

substance, contrary to Title 21, United States Code, 

Section 841(a)(l). 

(2) To knowingly and intentionally 

intent to distribute amphetamine, a 

stimulant controlled substance, contrary 

United States Code, Section 841(a)(l). 

possess 

Schedule 

to Title 

with 

II, 

21, 

(3) To knowingly 

amphetamine, a Schedule 

substance, contrary to 

Section 841(a)(l). 

and intentionally distribute 

II, stimulant controlled 

Title 21, United States Code, 

(4) To knowingly and intentionally use firearms in 

the commission of the offenses listed above, in 

violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 

924(c). 

Prior to its amendment on November 18, 1988, § 846 provided: 

Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 

offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by 

imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the 

maximum punishment prescibed for the offense, the 

commission of which was the object of the attempt of 

conspiracy. 

21 u.s.c. § 846 (1982) 

65 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 65 
not a proper objective of the alleged conspiracies. Accordingly, 

the trial court struck the firearms objective from Counts 1 and 2 

of the indictment as surplusage and instructed the jury to 

consider only the Title 21 narcotics objectives. 52 

Defendants now contend that because the firearms offense, 

together with the narcotics offenses, would be a proper objective 

of the general conspiracy statute, 18 u.s.c. § 371, the indictment 

as originally returned by the grand jury can only be read to 

charge a conspiracy under 18 u.s.c. § 371 and not the more 

specific conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws under 21 u.s.c. 

§ 846. Thus, by striking the § 924(c) objective, defendants 

conclude, the trial court impermissibly amended the indictment 

prejudicing the defendants to the extent that their sentences 

exceed the five-year maximum under 18 u.s.c. § 371. We disagree. 

We accept the defendants' premise that a firearms offense 

under Title 18 is not a cognizable objective of a § 846 

52 

It is not clear from the record how this issue arose or on 

whose motion the trial court struck the language in question. The 

trial judge first alluded to the problem on the second day of 

trial in the context of a defense objection to testimony 

concerning the possession of firearms during the 1988 conspiracy. 

The court commented that the potential problem with counts one and 

two had "been brought to my attention," X R. at 385, but the 

record does not disclose a motion by either party to strike the 

language in question. 

After a weekend recess, the court requested briefing on the 

question by both parties. Id. vol. IV., at 35. The defendants' 

brief is in fact a motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of the 

indictment as "duplicitous." Id. vol. I, doc. 25. (This is 

noteworthy because it is inconsistent with their position on 

appeal.) We do not, however, construe that motion as a motion to 

strike the offending language as surplusage, Fed. R. Crim. P. 

7(d), and therefore we cannot hold that defendants have waived 

their improper amendment argument on appeal. 

Ultimately, by minute order dated October 24, 1988, the court 

struck the § 924 firearms objective from Counts I and II as 

surplusage. Rec. vol. I, doc. 29. 

66 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 66 
conspiracy. 53 The statutory language is clear: 21 u.s.c. § 846 

encompasses only those "offenses defined in this subchapter," 

referring to Title II of the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. 

No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified at 21 u.s.c. §§ 801-

904). Thus, a violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c) cannot in law be 

the object of a conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substances 

Act. 54 

The flaw in defendants' argument is their assumption that 

because § 846 is not broad enough to encompass a violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c), the entire conspiracy (i.e., embracing each and 

every alleged conspiratorial objective) must be charged under a 

more general conspiracy statute. It is well-settled that "an 

indictment may charge numerous offenses or the commission of any 

one offense in several ways .. " United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 

130, 136 (1985) "As long as the crime and the elements of the 

offense that sustain the conviction are fully and clearly set out 

in the indictment, the right to a grand jury is not normally 

violated by the fact that the indictment alleges more crimes or 

53 

This is not to say that the defendants cannot, as a factual 

matter, agree in a single conspiracy to commit more than one 

substantive offense. That is precisely why this indictment is not 

duplicitous as originally drafted, for it charged but a single 

agreement, albeit one to violate both the narcotics laws and the 

firearms laws. Cf. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 

(1942) (a conspiratorial agreement is but one offense, no matter 

how diverse the objectives). 

54 

Only two cases are seemingly to the contrary. See United 

States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d 168, 176 (6th Cir. 1988); United 

States v. Quicksey, 525 F.2d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. 

denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976). Both simply assumed without 

discussion that a single conspiracy under§ 846 could embrace both 

a narcotics violation and a Travel Act violation (18 u.s.c. 

§ 1952). 

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other means of committing the same crime." Id. We think those 

principles apply even where, as here, one of the alleged means of 

committing the offense is erroneously pleaded. The validity of a 

conspiracy conviction does not depend on proof of all of the 

alleged objectives of the conspiracy. Newman v. United States, 

817 F.2d 635, 638 (10th cir. 1987). "It is well settled that when 

an indictment charges a conspiracy to violate more than one 

statute, the jury may find the defendant guilty if it believes 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant conspired to violate 

any one of the cited statutes." Id.; see also Miller, 471 U.S. at 

136 ("each offense whose elements are fully set out in an 

indictment can independently sustain a conviction"); Braverman v. 

United States, 317 U.S. 49, 55 (1942). Thus, Counts 1 and 2 need 

not be read as indivisible conspiracy counts embracing each and 

every alleged objective. Any one of the remaining three charged 

objectives would be sufficient, standing alone, to sustain the 

defendants' convictions and sentences. Newman, 817 F.2d at 638. 

We conclude, therefore, that the firearms objective was 

"independent of" and "unnecessary to" the defendants' convictions 

on the§ 846 conspiracy counts and therefore separable from the 

indictment. See Miller, 471 U.S. at 136; Ford v. United States, 

273 U.S. 593, 602 (1927). 

Defendants rely on United States v. Quicksey, 525 F.2d 337 

(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976). In Quicksey, 

the jury found the defendants guilty of a single conspiracy to 

violate both 18 u.s.c. § 1952 and 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l), without 

specifying whether they were guilty of a general conspiracy under 

18 u.s.c. § 371 or a narcotics conspiracy under 21 u.s.c. § 846. 

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The trial court had refused the defendants' motion to require the 

government to elect which statute it was relying on, and had 

instructed the jury that it could find guilt if it believed the 

defendants conspired to violate the Travel Act. See 525 F.2d at 

340-41. The court held the resulting ambiguity fatal: "[I]n the 

absence of a special verdict, it is not possible to ascertain 

whether the jury intended to find the defendants guilty of 

conspriacy to violate the Travel Act or the Drug Act, or both 

Acts." Id. at 341. Here, by contrast, there was no possible 

ambiguity in the jury's verdict precisely because the trial court 

struck the extraneous language from the indictment and instructed 

the jury solely under 21 u.s.c. § 846. Thus, Quicksey is 

distinguishable. 

The trial court, of course, may not amend an indictment so as 

to add an offense or otherwise broaden the possible bases for 

conviction. ~, Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 

(1960). The Fifth Amendment grand jury clause permits substantive 

amendment of an indictment only by resubmission to the grand jury. 

Id. at 215-16; ~ also Russell v United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 

(1962). The court may, however, strike from an indictment 

allegations which are both independent of and unnecessary to the 

offense on which a conviction ultimately rests, provided nothing 

is thereby added to the indictment. Miller, 471 U.S. at 136-37; 

Ford, 273 U.S. at 602; Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 

548-49 (1926). This distinction is fundamental, of course, 

because "a conviction cannot stand if based on an offense that is 

different from that alleged in the grand jury's indictment." 

Miller, 471 U.S. at 142. In Stirone, for example, "the offense 

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proved at trial was not fully contained in the indictment, for 

trial evidence had 'amended' the indictment by broadening the 

possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in the 

indictment." Miller, 471 U.S. at 138 (emphasis in original). 

Here, there is no doubt that by striking the firearms 

objective from Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, the court cured 

any potential defect without adding any new offenses. See 

Salinger, 272 U.S. at 548-49 (withdrawal from the jury's 

consideration of one or more methods of committing the charged 

offense did not impermissibly amend the indictment). The 

defendants' conspiracy convictions may stand on proof of any one 

of the alleged objectives, Newman, 817 F.2d at 638, and it follows 

that the withdrawal of one of those objectives from the jury's 

consideration narrowed the possible bases for conviction and 

correspondingly limited the scope of the evidence which could be 

used at tria1. 55 Thus, defendants were tried on charges fully 

contained within the indictment; their Fifth Amendment guarantee 

to a trial only on charges returned by the grand jury was 

therefore adequately protected. 

Moreover, the defendants do not assert, nor is there any 

showing, that they have suffered any actual prejudice. As we have 

already concluded, defendants' convictions under§ 846 are based 

on proof which corresponds to an offense that was clearly and 

completely set out in the indictment. Defendants do not contend 

55 

It is significant that it was precisely this benefit which 

motivated much of defense counsel's argument to the judge at 

trial. ~, X R. at 401 ("Your Honor, we have contended that the 

firearms should not have been a part of the evidence on Count 1 

(or Count 2] •... The only time it should have come up. 

[is] in the specific counts of firearms."). 

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that they were unable to prepare their defense or were in any way 

misled by the erroneous inclusion of the firearms objective in 

Counts 1 and 2. Indeed, the record discloses just the opposite. 

Defense counsel repeatedly stated that, based on the indictment 

and the prosecutor's representations at the arraignment, defense 

counsel believed that "there was nothing in Counts 1 and 2 but a 

drug conspiracy." IV R. at 12; see also id. at 13. 56 This 

understanding was clearly borne out at trial. 

In sum, we hold that defendants were subject to being 

sentenced under § 846 as charged. The indictment in this case 

expressly charged conspiracies to violate 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l), a 

provision of the Controlled Substances Act. Section 846 of that 

Title provides that conspiracy to commit an offense defined in 

that Act is punishable to the same extent as the offense which is 

the object of the conspiracy. Thus, the indictment clearly put 

defendants on notice of the sentencing provisions applicable to 21 

56 

The following statements of counsel are particularly 

instructive. In response the the court's query why he had not 

brought the allegedly defective indictment to the court's 

attention earlier, defense counsel stated: 

[A]s soon as evidence was offered on the .•. gun 

violation in Count 1, we did approach the bench, we did 

object. I didn't see it, is about all I can tell you, 

pretrial. I just didn't see it. I didn't understand 

it. We felt like we were led by the Government, for the 

reasons I've cited above, to believe that Count 1 and 

Count 2 were only drug conspiracies. We feel like -- I 

thought, if I saw it at all prior to trial, I thought it 

was surplusage or scribner's error. And I feel like 

••. -- that our position does indicate that there is 

good cause for relief under Rule 12(f). 

IV R. at 13. The reference to Rule 12(f) is interesting because 

it suggests that, if given the opportunity, defense counsel would 

have moved to strike the offending language, thereby obviating 

this problem entirely. 

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u.s.c. § 846. And, as we have already held, the narcotics 

conspiracies proved at trial were fully contained within the 

indictment. By contrast, there was no reference in the indictment 

to 18 u.s.c. § 371 and the defendants have never asserted that 

they understood the indictment to charge a violation of that 

section. Cf. United States v. Kennington, 650 F.2d 544, 546 (5th 

Cir. 1981). The defendants have suffered no prejudice as a result 

of the 

by the 

inclusion of the firearms objective in Counts 1 and 2, or 

trial court's deletion of those objectives from the 

indictment. 

XI. 

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences of 

all the defendants must be reversed and the cause is remanded for 

further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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Nos. 89-7005,-7008,-7009,-7010,-7011,-7012, United States v. 

Sullivan 

TACHA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent from the majority on Part IX.C.2 

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

conviction of Mary Sullivan under Count 4 of the indictment, which 

charges "knowingly and unlawfully us[ing] or carr[ying] firearms 

during the commission of a felony" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(l). Evaluated in the light most favorable to the 

government, the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury 

to conclude Mary Sullivan is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 

violating section 924(c)(l). 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on which the 

jury conviction rests, we must evaluate the evidence -- both 

direct and circumstantial -- in the light most favorable to the 

government. United States~ Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th 

Cir. 1987); United States~ Hook, 780 F.2d 1526, 1529 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986). All reasonable 

inferences and credibility choices must be made in favor of the 

jury verdict. United States~ Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th 

Cir. 1982). The evidence need not exclude every reasonable 

hypothesis other than guilt; it simply must be sufficient for a 

reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Culpepper, 834 F.2d at 881. 

Our legal standard for determining whether a criminal 

defendant 11 uses 11 a firearm "during and in relation to 11 a drug 

trafficking offense is set forth in United States~ McKinnell, 

888 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1989). There, we explained section 

Appellate Case: 89-7010 Document: 01019955883 Date Filed: 11/16/1990 Page: 73 
924(c)(l) is satisfied when: (1) the defendant has "ready access" 

to the firearm, and (2) the firearm "was an integral part of his 

criminal undertaking and its availability increased the likelihood 

that the criminal undertaking would succeed." Id. at 675 (quoting 

United States Y.!.. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir. 1988)). 

In McKinnell, we discussed with approval the decisions of 

other circuits interpreting the "use" element of section 

924(c)(l). 888 F.2d at 674. One of these cases, United States Y.!.. 

Robinson, 857 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1988), is almost identical to 

our present case. In Robinson, the officers found a total of 

seven firearms in Robinson's house. Id. at 1010. They even found 

one pistol hidden in a boot in the laundry room. Id. at 1007. In 

response to Robinson's claim he did not own these weapons, the 

court emphasized that "ownership is not essential to possession, 

which in certain circumstances can constitute use within the 

meaning of 924(c)(l)." Id. at 1010. The court held the evidence 

of the weapons found in the house was sufficient to sustain the 

conviction because a jury could reasonably conclude that 

Robinson's possession of firearms was an integral part of the 

felony and Robinson "used" at least one weapon as a means of 

safeguarding and facilitating the illegal transactions. Id. 

In United States Y.!.. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir.), cert. 

denied sub~ United States Y.!.. Bradley, 110 S. Ct. 166 (1989), 

another case we approved in McKinnell, the police found five 

firearms in various places throughout defendant Bradley's 

apartment. Bradley admitted the weapons were his, but he claimed 

they were part of a "gun collection." Id. at 26. In holding the 

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evidence.was sufficient, the circuit court noted a jury could 

reasonably conclude the weapons in the apartment were on hand to 

protect that apartment as a storage and processing point for the 

narcotics. Id. at 29. The court held the evidence was sufficient 

even though Bradley was not at home when the police raid occurred. 

Id. at 25, 29. The court considered the jury's conclusion 

reasonable based on the evidence, holding it did not matter that 

the weapons were in Bradley's apartment and not at the scene of 

distribution where he was arrested. Id. at 29. 

Finally, in United States Y.!.. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 839 (8th 

Cir. 1988), officers found eight weapons on both the first and 

second floors of the house where Matra was arrested. One 

submachine gun was stashed under a waterbed in the center upstairs 

bedroom, which was locked when the police arrived. Id. Although 

none of the weapons were in Matra's actual possession, the 

district court ruled the machine gun was present and available to 

Matra because he possessed a key to the center bedroom. Id. at 

842-43. The district court also found the weapons were kept ready 

to protect a drug house, thereby safeguarding and facilitating the 

illegal operation. Id. at 842. The circuit court upheld the 

factual findings of the district court, holding the evidence in 

the record was sufficient to support the district court's 

determination that Matra "used" the machine gun as section 

924(c)(l) requires. Id, at 843. The court noted that "[i]n these 

circumstances, it would defy both logic and common sense to 

conclude that Matra did not 'use' the machine gun within the 

meaning of§ 924(c)." Id. 

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There are numerous other cases we did not include in our 

opinion in McKinnell that convince me it would "defy both logic 

and common sense" to conclude Mary Sullivan did not 11 use 11 at least 

one of the many firearms found in her house. For example, in 

United States Y..!.. LaGuardia, 774 F.2d 317, 318 (8th Cir. 1985), the 

officers found two pistols in LaGuardia's house and one in the 

trunk of his car parked outside. Noting that "[w]eapons can be 

used for protection or intimidation and therefore facilitation of 

illegal transactions," the court held this evidence was sufficient 

for a reasonable jury to convict the defendant. Id. at 321 

(citing United States Y..!.. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1271 (9th Cir. 

1981)). As the court explained, the weapons had "undoubted 

utility in protection of the· valuable supply [of cocaine] on 

hand." LaGuardia, 774 F.2d at 321. Further, it stated the 

"presence and availablity in light of the evident need 

demonstrates the use of the firearm to commit the felony." Id. 

Another recent example of a case in which the evidence of 

firearms was sufficient to satisfy the "use" element of section 

924(c)(l) is United States Y..!.. Boyd, 885 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 

1989). In Boyd the court held the evidence of a shotgun in a 

warehouse office was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude 

section 924(c)(l) was satisfied even though the gun was broken 

open and could not be used until it was closed. Id. at 250. The 

court in Boyd noted, "[i]t is enough that the firearm was present 

at the drug-trafficking scene, that the weapon could have been 

used to protect or facilitate the operation, and that the presence 

of the weapon was in some way connected with the drug-

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,,, 

,, 

trafficking." Id. (citing Robinson, 857 F.2d at 375). Similarly, 

in United States~ Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 654 (2d Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1114 (1990), the court held three guns 

found in various locations in Alvarado's apartment were sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to convict her of three counts of 

violating section 924(c)(l). The court also found the discovery 

of two other guns was "ample" evidence to uphold two further 

counts even though those two guns were locked in a safe in a walkin closet. Id. 

Turning to the evidence of firearms discovered in the present 

case, the record shows Mary Sullivan "used" a firearm within the 

meaning of section 924(c)(l). McKinnell first requires the 

defendant have "ready access-" to a firearm. 888 F. 2d at 675. I 

am convinced there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 

conclude Mary Sullivan had ready access to a firearm. At trial 

Steve Howell testified he took his mother's gun from his father's 

Blazer, carried it into Mary Sullivan's house, and left it there. 

XI at 600-01. Mary Sullivan herself testified that Howell gave 

this gun to her son, Steve Brown. XVII at 2086. She also 

testified her son placed this gun on her piano. Id. Howell 

testified an AR-15 with a sears clip attached was sitting on the 

kitchen table in Mary Sullivan's house on Monday night, the night 

before she was arrested. XI at 601-03; XVII at 2087. Mary 

Sullivan testified the arresting officers entered while she was 

shelling peas in the kitchen, and they confiscated all the weapons 

in the house. Id. at 2088. With a gun sitting on her piano, 

another on the kitchen table, and all the other firearms in the 

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house, Mary Sullivan clearly had ready access to a firearm. Her 

\ ready access to a firearm is even more certain when the position 

of these weapons in relation to Mary is compared with the 

situations discussed above. 

McKinnell also requires the evidence be sufficient for a jury 

to reasonably conclude the firearm was an 11 integral part 11 of the 

criminal undertaking and its availability increased the likelihood 

that the criminal undertaking would succeed. 888 F.2d at 675. I 

am convinced of the reasonableness of the jury's determination 

that the use of firearms contributed to the drug trafficking 

operation. Mary Sullivan knew the guns were present in the house. 

XVII at 2088. She also was home when Russell Sullivan 

demonstrated how the sears clip fit on the AR-15. Id. at 2086~88; 

XI at 601-03. The weapons could have been used for protection or 

intimidation, thereby facilitating the drug conspiracy operating 

from her house. The weapons had undoubted utility in safeguarding 

the operation. I cannot conclude there was insufficient evidence 

of a connection between the firearms and the drug offenses. Based 

on the testimony of Steve Howell and Mary Sullivan, I would hold 

the evidence of 11 use 11 of the firearms was sufficient to sustain 

Mary Sullivan's conviction under section 924(c)(l). 

In my view, Mary Sullivan's statement that all the guns the 

officers found in her house were part of a 11 gun collection11 

belonging to her son James Wesley is immaterial to our review. I 

fail to understand why her claim that these firearms belong to her 

son -- if at all true -- is relevant to determining the 

reasonableness of a finding she 11 used 11 the guns. The test for 

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"use" in McKinnell is an inquiry about availability, not 

ownership, of firearms. See Robinson, 857 F.2d at 1010. The 

evidence supporting a possession of firearms charge may include a 

showing of indicia of ownership. A charge of using firearms, 

however, is fact-specific. It requires an inquiry into facts 

about the availability of the guns and their possible use for 

protection and intimidation. Ready access is clearly a factual 

determination, not a legal standard. We merely review the record 

to determine whether there is some evidence to support factual 

determinations already made by the jury. 

The jury apparently rejected the credibility of Mary 

Sullivan's testimony on the gun collection point by convicting her 

of one count of firearm "use·" under section 924(c) (1). See 

Meggett, 875 F.2d at 26, 29. Rather than reevaluating the 

credibility of Mary Sullivan's testimony, we must consider the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and resolve 

all credibility choices in the government's favor. Applying this 

standard of review, I would hold the evidence is sufficient for a 

jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mary Sullivan 

"used" a firearm within the meaning of section 924(c)(l). 

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