Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01284/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01284-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Respondent
James L. White
Petitioner
Jeff Wrigley
Respondent

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28 This information was derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

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U.S. District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES L. WHITE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JEFF WRIGLEY, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-01284 OWW LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 2241

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO SERVE FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an application for a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at Taft Correctional

Institution located in Taft, California, pursuant to a judgment of the United States District Court for

the Central District of California. Petitioner was sentenced to serve eighteen (18) months

imprisonment on December 2, 2005; he has a projected release date of April 23, 2007.

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On September 18, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus

in this Court. Petitioner claims the BOP is unlawfully denying him consideration for placement into

a Residential Re-entry Center (“RRC”) for the last six months of his eighteen month sentence. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United

States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Writ of habeas corpus relief is available if a federal prisoner can show

he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3). Petitioner’s claims are proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and not 28 U.S.C. § 2255

because they concern the manner, location, or conditions of the execution of petitioner’s sentence

and not the fact of petitioner’s conviction or sentence. Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 331 (9th

Cir.1990) (stating that a challenge to the execution of a sentence is "maintainable only in a petition

for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241"); Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d

548, 549 (9th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (allowing a federal prisoner to use § 2241 to challenge the

BOP's restitution policies).

Further, Petitioner is challenging the execution of his sentence at TCI which is within the

Fresno Division of the Eastern District of California; therefore, the Court has jurisdiction over this

petition. See Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

A petitioner who is in federal custody and wishes to seek habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 must first exhaust available administrative and judicial remedies. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d

533, 535 (9th Cir.1990); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir.1984). It is

only after a petitioner has fully exhausted his administrative remedies that he becomes entitled to

present his claims to the federal court. See United States v. Mathis, 689 F.2d 1364, 1365 (11th

Cir.1982). In Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit

explained why a petitioner must first exhaust his administrative remedies before filing for habeas

relief: "The requirement of exhaustion of remedies will aid judicial review by allowing the

appropriate development of a factual record in an expert forum; conserve the court's time because of

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the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level; and allow the

administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors occurring in the course of administrative

proceedings. See also Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1313.

However, the exhaustion requirement was judicially created; it is not a statutory requirement. 

Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1313; Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d 250, 252 (9th Cir.1978).

Because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not jurisdictional. Morrison Knudsen Co., Inc. v.

CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 935 (1988);

Montgomery, 572 F.2d at 252. "Where exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional,

the district court must determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits, or

require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court." Brown, 895

F.2d at 535. 

The Bureau of Prisons has established an administrative remedy procedure governing

prisoner complaints. The procedure is set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et. seq. First, an inmate must

attempt to resolve the issue informally by presenting it to staff before submitting a Request for

Administrative Remedy. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13 (1999). If dissatisfied with the response, the prisoner

may proceed with the formal filing of an Administrative Remedy Request. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14

(1999). Upon denial by the institution, the prisoner may appeal the decision by filing a complaint

with the Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15 (1999). The Regional

Director’s decision may be appealed to the General Counsel in Washington, D.C. Id. Appeal to the

General Counsel is the final step in the administrative remedy process. Id.

Petitioner does not state whether he has exhausted the administrative remedies with respect

to the claims raised in the instant petition. Even if Petitioner has not exhausted the administrative

remedies with respect to the claims in the instant petition, exhaustion in this instance would

nonetheless be futile. Futility is an exception to the exhaustion requirement. Laing v. Ashcroft, 370

F.3d 994, 1000-01 (9 Cir. 2004), citing S.E.C. v. G.C. George Sec., Inc., 637 F.2d 685, 688 n.4 (9 th th

Cir. 1981) (“exceptions to the general rule requiring exhaustion cover situations such as where

administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would

be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.”) 

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Even had Petitioner filed a grievance at every level of the administrative review process, they would

most likely have been rejected based upon the official BOP policy which prohibits consideration of

any inmate release to an RRC until the inmate has served at least 90% of his sentence. As such,

exhaustion of such a claim would be futile. Further, due to the time sensitivity of Petitioner’s claim

and the fact that he is scheduled to be released to an RRC in the near future, he would likely be

released prior to the finality of the administrative process. Thus, the Court will excuse exhaustion

and reach the merits of the petition. 

C. BOP Regulations Contradict United States Code Statutes

As previously stated, Petitioner contends that BOP regulations which prevent him from being

considering for release to RRC until after he has served nine-tenths of his sentence violate Title 18,

Section 3621(b), of the United States Code. See Petition at 1-2. Petitioner states that pursuant to the

BOP regulations, he has received only 45 days of placement in an RRC even though an assessment

under § 3621(b) would allow for up to six months placement. Id. at 2. 

Title 18, of the United States Code, Section 3621(b) states:

(b) Place of imprisonment - - The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the

prisoner’s imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional

facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau,

whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without

the judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be

appropriate and suitable, considering -- 

(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;

(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;

(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;

(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence - -

 (A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was

determined to be warranted; or

 (B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and

(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to

section 994(a)(2) of title 28.

In designating the place of imprisonment or making transfers under this subsection, 

there shall be no favoritism given to prisoners of high social or economic status. The Bureau

may at any time, having regard for the same matters, direct the transfer of a prisoner from one

penal or correctional facility to another. The Bureau shall make available appropriate

substance abuse treatment for each prisoner the Bureau determines has a treatable condition

of substance addiction or abuse. 

Section 3624(c) states:

(c) Pre-release custody - - the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, assure 

that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a reasonable part, not to exceed six

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The Court hereby takes judicial notice of Arcediano v. Wrigley, Case No. 1:06-CV-00780 AWI DLB HC. This 2

Court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971

F.2d 244 (9 Cir.1992); see also MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9 Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, th th

631 F.2d 118, 119 (9 cir. 1980) Arcediano is factually congruent with the instant case. Therefore, the Court’s opinion in th

this case will take into account the legal arguments presented and developed in Arcediano.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

months, of the last 10 per centum of the term to be served under conditions that will afford

the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner’s re-entry into

the community. The authority provided by this subsection may be used to place a prisoner in

home confinement. The United States Probation System shall, to the extent practicable, offer

assistance to a prisoner during such pre-release custody.

The relevant BOP regulations state the following:

(a) This subpart provides the Bureau of Prisons’ (Bureau) categorical exercise of 

discretion for designating inmates to community confinement. The Bureau designates

inmates to community confinement only as part of pre-release custody and programming

which will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for re-entry

into the community.

See 28 C.F.R. § 570.20(a). 

Section 570.21 states:

(a) The Bureau will designate inmates to community confinement only as part of 

pre-release custody and programming, during the last ten percent of the prison sentence being

served, not to exceed six months.

(b) We may exceed these time-frames only when specific Bureau programs allow

greater periods of community confinement, as provided by separate statutory authority (for

example, residential substance abuse treatment program (18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(A)), or shock

incarceration program (18 U.S.C. 4046(c)).

Prior to December 13, 2002, the BOP would occasionally allow prisoners to serve all or part

of their imprisonment in an RRC. Then, on December 13, 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel of the 2

Department of Justice (“OLC”) issued a legal opinion interpreting the interplay between §§ 3621(b)

and 3624(c) of Title 18. The opinion held that § 3621(b) did not authorize the BOP to place an

inmate in an RRC for the entire term of his sentence because community confinement did not

constitute imprisonment. Id. The BOP consequently changed its procedure and limited RRC

placements for prisoners to the final 10% of their sentences or six months, whichever was shorter. 

However, in 2004, two Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 2002 BOP policy change was unlawful

given that the plain language of § 3621(b) gave the BOP discretion to transfer an inmate to an RRC

at any time. Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842 (8 Cir. 2004); Goldings v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17 (1 Cir. th st

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 In the April 21, 2006, order, Judge Wanger directed Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be 3

granted, and directed Respondent to immediately consider whether Petitioner should be transferred to a CCC, without

reference to the BOP’s 2002 and 2005 policies, including 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20-21. Respondent filed a response to the order

to show cause on May 9, 2006, arguing that the Court’s holding is contrary to the reasoning in United States v. Latimer, 991

F.2d 1509 (9 Cir. 1993). The Court has not yet issued a ruling on Respondent’s response to the order to show cause. 

th

U.S. District Court

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2004). In light of the opinions of Elwood and Goldings, on August 18, 2004, the BOP proposed new

regulations “announcing its categorical exercise of discretion for designating inmates to community

confinement when serving terms of imprisonment.” 69 Fed. Reg. 51, 213 (Aug. 18, 2004). Although

the 2005 regulations acknowledged the BOP’s general discretion to place an inmate at an RRC at

any time, it limited such placement to the lesser of 10% of a prisoner’s total sentence or six months,

absent application of special statutory circumstances. 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20, 570.21. The final rules

were published on January 10, 2005, and became effective on February 14, 2005. 

The question to be resolved here is whether the BOP’s 2005 regulations are contrary to, or a

permissible construction of, Section 3621(b). 

Three Circuit Court of Appeals and several District Courts, including this Court, have found

the 2005 regulations to be contrary to Section 3621(b). Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432

F.3d 235, (3 Cir. 2005); Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088 (8 Cir. 2006); Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d rd th

71 (2d Cir. 2006); Horn v. Ellis, No. 06 CV-F-0006 OWW TAG HC; 2006 WL 1071959 (E.D. Cal.

April 21, 2006) ; Baker v. Willingham, No. 3:04cv1923, 2005 WL 2276040 (D.Conn. Sept. 16, 3

2005); Wiederhorn v. Gonzales, No. 05-360-TC, 2005 WL 1113833 (D.Or. May 9, 2005); United

States v. Paige, 369 F.Supp.2d 1257 (D. Mont. 2005); Drew v. Menifee, No. 04 Civ. 9944, 2005 WL

525449 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2005); Pimentel v. Gonzales, 367 F.Supp.2d 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Cook

v. Gonzales, No. 05-09-AS, 2005 WL 773956 (D.Or. Apr. 5, 2005); Crowley v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 312 F.Supp.2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed

the issue.

In reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute, courts apply the test set forth in Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Court looks first

to the text of the statute to determine whether Congress has spoken directly on the issue. Contract

Management, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 434 F.3d 1145, 1146-47 & n.2 (9 Cir. 2006). If the intent of th

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Congress is clear from the text of the statute, that is the end of the inquiry, the Court must follow the

expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 1146-47, citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If, however, the statute

is silent or ambiguous on the specific issue, the Court must determine whether the agency’s

interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 1147. If so, the Court defers

to the agency’s determination. Id.

As found by the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court finds that the

plain text of the statute, as well as the legislative history do not support the BOP’s regulations to

limit RRC placement to only those inmates serving the last 10% of their sentence. As stated in

§ 3624(c), Congress’s intent to release prisoners to an RRC is to facilitate their re-entry into the

community. Congress has unambiguously set forth five factors for the BOP to consider when

making its determination to release a prisoner. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Specifically, Section 3621(b)

distinguishes between the BOP’s duty to designate a place of imprisonment (“shall designate”) and

its broad discretion in determining the specific place of imprisonment (“may designate any available

penal or correctional facility”). Levine, 455 F.3d at 80. The statute not only provides discretion to

the BOP for placement, but provides a specific list of five factors the BOP must consider prior to

placement. Id. Given the clear text of the statute and Congress’s unequivocal intent for the BOP to

consider all five factors, the current BOP regulation is invalid because “these factors cannot be fully

considered because the amount of time an inmate may spend in a CCC is categorically limited to the

lesser of six months or ten percent of a sentence without regard to individualized circumstances.” 

Woodall, 432 F.3d 235, 245; Levine, 455 F.3d at 80-82; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1091. Further, the

legislative history supports the finding that consideration of the five factors are mandatory, although

non-exclusive. As set forth in Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, the Second Circuit stated:

Accompanying § 3621(b), the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report speaking

directly to the nature of the statutory factors. . . . The report stated that ‘[i]n

determining the availability or suitability of the facility selected, the Bureau [is]

specifically required to consider such factors as [those listed in § 3621(b)],’ and that

‘[a]fter considering these factors,’ the BOP may designate a place of imprisonment or

enact an inmate transfer. S.Rep. No. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3182, 3324-25; see also Woodall, 432 F.3d at 245-46 (quoting same). The report

disavows any restriction on the BOP’s exercise of discretion, but rather states that it

‘intends simply to set forth the appropriate factors that the Bureau should consider in

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making the designations.’ Id. By ‘specifically requir[ing]’ the BOP to consider the

listed factors before it makes placements and expressing intent to ‘set forth the

appropriate factors’ to be considered, the report underscores what the textual language

itself makes clear: that the enumerated factors are mandatory. (footnote omitted).

Levine, at 82. 

Thus, although the BOP has discretion to refuse to place an inmate in a correctional facility,

the exercise of discretion must be based at least in part on the specific factors outlined in § 3621(b),

and the BOP regulations set forth in §§ 570.20 and 570.21 simply ignore those factors. As such, the

regulations contradict, rather than interpret, § 3621(b), and no deference is owed. 

In Arcediano, Respondent argued that the language of § 3624(c) states “unambiguously that

prisoners have no right to be considered for an RRC placement until they have finished 90% of their

sentence.” See Arcediano v. Wrigley, Case No. 1:06-CV-00780 AWI DLB HC. However,

Respondent fails to recognize that by creating a blanket rule against transfer until the inmate has

served 10% of his sentence, the BOP has failed to consider the mandatory factors set forth in

§ 3621(b). Woodall, 432 F.3d at 250. As stated in Woodall, “§ 3624 does not determine when the

BOP should consider CCC placement, but when it must provide it.” Id. (Emphasis in original.) 

“The statute requires the BOP not just to consider, but to actually place an inmate in a CCC or like

facility, during the last ten percent or six months of the sentence, when that is possible.” Id.

(Emphasis in original.)

Three of the five factors set forth in § 3621(b)- the nature and circumstances of a prisoner’s

offense, the history and characteristics of the prisoner, and any statement by the court that imposed

the sentence, require specific analysis to each individual prisoner. Levine, 455 F.3d at 86; Woodall,

432 F.3d at 247; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1091. Yet, under the 2005 regulations, these considerations

cannot be fully considered. As illustrated by the Court in Woodall, which stated:

Worthy of special mention is the recommendation of the sentencing judge. United 

States District Judges take their sentencing responsibilities very seriously and are familiar 

with the various BOP institutions and programs. Their recommendations as to the execution 

of sentences are carefully thought out and are important to them. The significance of this 

aspect of the sentencing process is highlighted by the acknowledgment of the regional 

counsel of the BOP at oral argument that the BOP follows judicial recommendations in 

approximately 85-90 percent of all cases. Here, however, the requirement that the BOP 

consider a sentencing judge’s recommendation cannot be satisfied without an individualized, 

case-by-case inquiry that is impossible under the regulations.

Woodall, 432 F.3d at 247. In Woodall, the Court recognized that the sentencing court had

recommended the petitioner spend six months at a halfway house placement, but under the current

regulations, that recommendation could not be fully considered. Id. at 248. “In fact, no

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recommendation of a CCC placement exceeding six months or ten percent of a sentence can be

considered.” Id. Although the BOP can consider the amount of time the prisoner has actually served

in making placements, that factor cannot be the single consideration, which is precisely what the

2005 regulations have done. 

In Arcediano, Respondent alleged his view is supported by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509, 1514-15 (9 Cir. 1993). In Latimer, the Ninth Circuit held th

that the language of the Sentencing Guidelines, specifically section 4A1.2(e)(1), did not define

incarceration to include detention solely in a community treatment center or halfway house. Latimer,

991 F.2d at 1514. Respondent argued that the Office of Legal Counsel’s December 13, 2002,

opinion used similar reasoning in determining that the guidelines did not permit the BOP to

substitute confinement in an RRC for a term of imprisonment. In Arcediano, this Court did not find

Respondent’s argument persuasive. As Respondent acknowledged, the case does not involve a

prisoner who was directly placed into an RRC at the outset of his sentence. Thus, the District Court

determined it need not reach Respondent’s argument. 

Respondent further argued that the case is similar to Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001),

which addressed § 3621(e)(2)(B), a different subsection. In Lopez, the Supreme Court analyzed and

upheld a BOP regulation that categorically denied early release to certain inmates after completion of

a drug rehabilitation program, who would have otherwise been released under the terms of the

statute. Lopez, 531 U.S. at 238. The statute at issue there, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), stated that the

BOP may reduce the prison term of an inmate who was convicted of a “nonviolent offense” and had

successfully completed a substance abuse program. Id. at 232. The BOP’s regulation interpreting

that statute categorically denied early release to prisoners who had been convicted of a felony

involving “the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm.” Id., quoting 28 C.F.R. §

550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B)). The Supreme Court held that the BOP had properly exercised its discretion by

furthering Congress’s intent to exclude certain violent inmates from consideration for pre-release. Id. 

Respondent reasoned that “[j]ust as § 3621(e)(2)(B) vests broad discretion in the BOP to

determine which individuals are candidates for early release, so too § 3621(b) gives the BOP broad

discretion in deciding where to designate inmates. The BOP’s decision to restrict RRC placements

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to prisoners serving the last 10% of their sentences is a categorical expression of the BOP’s

discretion that does not differ fundamentally from the BOP’s exercise of the same discretion under

§ 3621(e)(2)(B).” See Arcediano, 1:06-CV-00780 AWI DLB HC. The BOP undoubtedly may

exercise discretion under § 3621(b), however, it is not free to disregard the specific factors set forth

by Congress when doing so. Although Respondent argued that “the categorical exercise of

discretion in Lopez used factors such as sentencing enhancements which were not determinative of

being ‘violent’ under some circuits” and therefore broadened the definition, this argument overlooks

the fact that the statute at issue there did not specifically include a set of factors to be considered by

the BOP in making its determination of whether an offense could be classified as “violent.” In

Lopez, the BOP had simply filled in a statutory gap, whereas here, no such claim can be made

because the BOP has specifically excluded from consideration the very factors that Congress

outlined for consideration. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the BOP regulations contradict, rather than

interpret, Congress’s intent in enacting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b) and 3624(c).

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus

be GRANTED and Respondent be ORDERED to consider the appropriateness of transferring

Petitioner to an RRC in light of the factors set forth in § 3621(b), not excluding any other factors

deemed appropriate by the BOP, without reference to the BOP policy promulgated in December

2002 and without reference to the BOP’s February 14, 2005, amendment to 28 C.F.R. § 570.21. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, pursuant to

the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10) court days (plus three (3) days for

mailing) after being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

"Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 11

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this

Findings and Recommendation on Petitioner and Respondent. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 17, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-01284-OWW -LJO Document 7 Filed 10/18/06 Page 11 of 11