Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03088/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03088-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clifton M. Price
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2005 Decided June 3, 2005

No. 03-3088

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CLIFTON M. PRICE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00429-01)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee and Tony W. Miles,

Assistant Federal Public Defenders, entered appearances.

John P. Gidez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the briefs were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON, and TATEL, Circuit

Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

Opinion concurring in part filed by Circuit Judge

HENDERSON.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: Defendant-appellant Clifton

Price entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

(2000). On appeal, Price challenges the District Court’s denial

of his motion to suppress evidence, including the gun found on

his person, which he argues was obtained in violation of his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches

and seizures. In addition, Price raises several challenges to his

sentence. 

We affirm the District Court’s denial of Price’s suppression

motion. A police officer recovered the evidence in question as

a result of a frisk, which was justified by the officer’s reasonable

fear that Price was armed and dangerous. Because the frisk did

not violate the Fourth Amendment, the District Court did not err

in denying Price’s suppression motion. 

Applying the reasonableness standard set forth by the

Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 765-

67 (2005), we conclude that the sentence imposed by the District

Court cannot withstand review. We therefore vacate and

remand the District Court’s sentencing decision. On remand,

the District Court will be required to resentence Price pursuant

to the commands of Booker. 

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from testimony given at

Price’s suppression hearing by Kyle Fulmer, a Special Agent

with the Safe Streets Task Force unit of the Washington Field

Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). Price has

not contested these facts.

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On September 20, 2002, Fulmer was contacted by an

“extremely reliable informant” who told him that a man already

known to Fulmer as “Julio” was driving a silver Cadillac at the

3200 block of 8th Street in Southeast Washington, D.C. See Tr.

of Mots. Hr’g of 1/28/03 at 6, 10, reprinted in Appendix of

Appellant (“App.”). The informant relayed the tag number of

the vehicle and he also told Fulmer that “Julio” possessed at

least a quarter pound of marijuana in the car. See id. at 6-8.

Fulmer told the informant to keep an eye on the vehicle and to

contact him if the vehicle began to move. Id. at 8.

Fulmer then contacted Special Agent Kevin Ashby,

indicating that he needed some assistance in possibly stopping

a vehicle. Id. at 9. Fulmer began to drive toward 8th Street to

locate the silver Cadillac. He contacted the informant again,

who told him that “Julio” had begun driving the vehicle. See id.

Fulmer located the silver Cadillac at the intersection of Alabama

Avenue and Wheeler Road. Id. He was able to corroborate the

vehicle’s tag and he recognized the driver as the man he knew

as “Julio.” See id. at 10-11. Fulmer also soon observed that

there was a passenger in the vehicle, later identified as the

defendant Clifton Price. See id. at 11, 35. 

Fulmer and Ashby, driving separate cars, began following

the Cadillac. After some time, Ashby joined Fulmer in Fulmer’s

vehicle. See id. at 11-13. When the Cadillac pulled into an alley

parallel to Wheeler Road, Fulmer activated his emergency lights

and siren. He and Ashby, wearing FBI vests and displaying

their badges, exited Fulmer’s vehicle and began yelling verbal

commands, identifying themselves as police officers and

instructing the occupants of the Cadillac to raise their hands and

place them outside the car windows. See id. at 13-15, 40-41.

Price does not contest that the stop of the vehicle was lawful. 

 Fulmer and Ashby next began to approach the Cadillac.

Fulmer testified:

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As I was approaching the passenger side, issuing the verbal

commands, the passenger, who we later identified as the

defendant, Mr. Price, was sticking his hands outside the

window, and at that time as I was getting closer, he began

to reach down to his waistband area with his left hand. . . .

Id. at 16. Fulmer believed that Price might be reaching for a

weapon, causing Fulmer to fear for his safety. See id. at 18, 20.

As soon as Price moved his hands toward his waistband,

Fulmer reiterated his verbal commands for Price to put his hands

outside the window. Id. at 19. Price complied and Fulmer

opened the car door and removed Price from the vehicle, placing

him on the ground. Fulmer then rolled Price onto his side and

frisked Price’s left waistband and pocket area, where he found

a small handgun. See id. at 19-21.

* * * * * 

On October 17, 2002, a federal grand jury indicted Price for

violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which forbids persons who have

been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment

exceeding one year “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign

commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or

ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has

been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

On November 26, 2002, at the first status conference regarding

Price’s case, defense counsel informed the District Court that

Price wished to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained in

connection with the frisk. Price’s counsel made it clear,

however, that his client would likely plead guilty if the

suppression motion was denied. See Tr. of Status Conference of

11/26/02 at 3, reprinted in App. On January 28, 2003, the

District Court held a hearing on Price’s suppression motion.

Following the hearing, the trial judge denied Price’s motion in

an oral ruling. Price’s counsel then informed the District Court

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that it was not necessary to set a trial date, because Price was

likely to plead guilty. Tr. of 1/28/03 at 81-82. 

On March 25, 2003, at another status hearing, the

prosecutor informed the District Court that the parties were

working out the final language of a conditional guilty plea, in

which Price would plead guilty to the offense but reserve his

right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his suppression

motion. See Tr. of Status Hr’g of 3/25/03 at 2, reprinted in App.

One week later, Price indicated an interest in retaining a new

attorney. See Tr. of Status Conference of 4/1/02 at 2-5,

reprinted in App. Price subsequently agreed to proceed with his

appointed counsel and he pleaded guilty on April 22, 2003,

reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression

motion. See Tr. of Status Call of 4/22/03 at 9-10, reprinted in

App. It is undisputed that, as a result of Price’s indication that

he was likely to plead guilty and his ultimate guilty plea, the

Government was spared the burdens of preparing for trial. See

Recording of Oral Argument at 17:45-18:02.

On May 28, 2003, a United States probation officer

prepared Price’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”).

Using the 2001 version of the Sentencing Guidelines, the

probation officer found that Price’s total offense level was 18

and that his criminal history score was 8 and, thus, his criminal

history category was IV. This offense level and criminal history

category resulted in a sentencing range of 41-51 months. These

calculations included a two-point reduction in Price’s offense

level under § 3E1.1(a) of the Guidelines, because Price accepted

responsibility for his conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) (2001).

However, the probation officer recommended denying an

additional one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b)(2). The

additional reduction is available to defendants who qualify for

the two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a), if the defendant’s

offense level prior to this two-level reduction is 16 or greater

and the defendant has given timely notice of an intent to plead

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guilty so that the Government is spared the burden of preparing

for trial and the district court may allocate its resources

efficiently. Id. § 3E1.1(b)(2). In determining Price’s criminal

history score, the probation officer included two Maryland

convictions that Price allegedly received in 1999 and 2000. 

Price’s counsel filed written objections to the PSR, arguing

that Price was entitled to an additional one-level reduction in his

offense level under § 3E1.1(b)(2) and that the PSR’s use of the

two alleged prior Maryland convictions to increase Price’s

criminal history score was erroneous. According to Price’s

counsel, under the proper calculations of Price’s offense level

and criminal history score, the applicable sentencing range was

30-37 months. See Letter from Tony W. Miles, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, to United States Probation Officer of

6/5/03, reprinted in App. at 41, 41-42. The probation officer

rejected both of these objections in a revised PSR. The only

sources cited by the probation officer to support the existence of

either of the alleged Maryland convictions were unspecified

“documents” and “documentation” in the Maryland court

system. The probation officer did not give any indication of the

nature or reliability of these documents. 

At a July 17, 2003 sentencing hearing before the District

Court, Price’s counsel again raised objections on the issues of

the third-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and the

asserted improper use of two Maryland convictions in

calculating Price’s criminal history category. The District Court

granted Price the two-level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility under § 3E1.1(a), but the court rejected Price’s

argument that he was entitled to a third-level reduction under

§ 3E1.1(b)(2). The District Court did not find that Price’s

notification of his intention to plead guilty was untimely, that

the Government expended any resources preparing for trial, or

that the court was not able to allocate its resources efficiently.

Instead, the District Court stated: 

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It’s a choice that [Price] has to make. He was not accepting

responsibility if he was able to convince the court that he

had been the victim of a constitutional violation. That’s not

a frank and candid acknowledgment of guilt. 

Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g of 7/17/02 at 2-3, reprinted in App.

With regard to the two Maryland convictions, Price’s counsel

argued that “we still have not been presented with evidence that

we believe is sufficient enough to prove that the two prior

convictions exist that we challenged.” Id. at 7. The court

responded: “I don’t know what you need in the way of

evidence. The Probation Officer has investigated and found –

presumably has investigated and found that these are a matter of

record among the Maryland court documents.” Id. The District

Court sentenced Price to 51 months’ imprisonment, as well as

three years of supervised release and a $100 special assessment.

Id. at 12-13. 

Because Price was sentenced in July 2003, more than a year

before the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,

125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the District Court applied the Sentencing

Guidelines as if they were mandatory. This was error under

Booker. The Court in Booker “sever[ed] and excise[d]” two

provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended,

18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 991 et seq. Booker, 125

S. Ct. at 764. These provisions are 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1),

which mandated judicial use of the Sentencing Guidelines, and

section 3742(e), which “set[] forth standards of review on

appeal.” Id. The Court replaced section 3742(e) with “a

practical standard of review already familiar to appellate courts:

review for ‘unreasonable[ness].’” Id. at 765 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§3742(e)(3) (1994)). The Court also instructed that its holdings

should be applied “to all cases on direct review.” Id. at 769. 

Price challenges both the District Court’s denial of his

suppression motion and the length of his sentence. We affirm

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in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further

proceedings. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Denial of Price’s Suppression Motion 

Price argues that Special Agent Fulmer violated the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and

seizures by forcing Price from the car and patting him down.

The Government responds that a reasonable officer in Special

Agent Fulmer’s position would have been warranted in the

belief that his safety was in danger, and therefore Fulmer’s

actions were justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

We agree with the Government. 

As we have explained, “[i]n Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme

Court held that a police officer needs neither probable cause nor

a warrant to conduct a brief investigatory stop of an individual

if [the officer] has a reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity

may be afoot.’” United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1164

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). Moreover, the

officer “may conduct a protective search of the outer layers of

the suspect’s clothing if [the officer] has a ‘reasonable fear’ that

the suspect is armed and dangerous.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392

U.S. at 30). 

In reviewing such [protective] searches, we apply an

objective test based on the facts available to the officer at

the time of the search: “The officer need not be absolutely

certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a

reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be

warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was

in danger.” He must be able to point to “specific and

articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that

intrusion.” 

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United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295-96 (D.C. Cir.

1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 27). We apply this

standard de novo to determine whether an officer in Special

Agent Fulmer’s position reasonably would fear that Price was

armed and dangerous, thus justifying a frisk of Price. See

Brown, 334 F.3d at 1164 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517

U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).

Price does not dispute the lawfulness of the stop of the

vehicle in which he was a passenger. Therefore, the stop

preceding the Terry frisk is not an issue. There are two factors

in this case, which, taken together, demonstrate that an officer

in Special Agent Fulmer’s position reasonably would fear that

Price was armed and dangerous. First, a reliable informant told

Fulmer that the driver of the vehicle was transporting a stash of

illicit drugs. Second, after Fulmer and Ashby approached the

car and issued verbal commands to the vehicle’s occupants to

place their hands outside the windows, Price reached back inside

the car toward his waistband.

We do not mean to suggest that a Terry frisk would have

been justified absent the totality of these circumstances. On this

record, however, we find that Agent Fulmer acted reasonably.

Where a police officer conducts a lawful traffic stop and has

been told by a reliable informant that the driver of the stopped

vehicle is transporting a stash of illegal drugs, the officer has a

reasonable fear that a passenger in the vehicle is armed and

dangerous if that passenger disobeys the officer’s command to

keep his hands in plain view and instead reaches back toward his

waistband in a motion that is consistent with an attempt to

retrieve a weapon. See United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55,

60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven though a single factor might not

itself be sufficiently probative of wrongdoing to give rise to a

reasonable suspicion [justifying a Terry stop], the combination

of several factors – especially when viewed through the eyes of

an experienced officer – may.”); see also id. at 61-62

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(recognizing that furtive gestures undertaken in response to

police presence can serve as a factor in establishing reasonable

suspicion). Therefore, the District Court properly denied Price’s

motion to suppress evidence.

B. Sentencing 

Price argues that the District Court also erred in its

application of the Sentencing Guidelines to his case. Under

Booker, we review the District Court’s sentence to ensure that

it is reasonable in light of the sentencing factors that Congress

specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765-

67. As the Court explained in Booker: “Section 3553(a)

remains in effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide

sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as

they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is

unreasonable.” Id. at 766. These factors include, among others,

the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history, the need for

the sentence to promote adequate deterrence and to provide the

defendant with needed educational or vocational training, any

pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

disparities among similarly situated defendants, and the need to

provide restitution to any victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

(2000) (amended 2003). 

In deciding whether a sentence is reasonable, we must also

consider whether the District Court committed legal error. “[A]

sentence would not be ‘reasonable,’ regardless of length, if legal

errors, properly to be considered on appeal, led to its

imposition.” United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114 (2d

Cir. 2005). A failure to follow the strictures of the Sentencing

Guidelines is among the errors that might cause a sentence to be

overturned on appeal. We do not mean to suggest that the

District Court is required to adhere to the Sentencing Guidelines.

Under Booker, the Guidelines are now advisory, i.e., one among

a number of factors to be weighed by the District Court in

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sentencing. Rather, what we do hold here is that when the

District Court purports to apply the Guidelines it must do so

without error. 

On the record in this case, we hold that the District Court

committed error by: (1) denying Price’s request for a third-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility when, under the plain

language of the Guidelines, Price was entitled to such a

reduction; and (2) including one of the two Maryland

convictions in the calculation of Price’s criminal history score,

when Price clearly disputed that conviction and the Government

did not sustain its burden of proof in establishing the conviction.

Because we remand the case in light of errors made by the

District Court in applying the Sentencing Guidelines, we need

not decide whether a remand is required under United States v.

Coles, 403 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (setting forth

principles governing the application of plain-error doctrine to

appeals of pre-Booker sentences). 

1. Acceptance of Responsibility

Under the Guidelines, Price was entitled to a third-level

reduction in his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(2)

(2001) if he “timely notif[ied] authorities of his intention to

enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to

avoid preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its

resources efficiently.” Price clearly satisfied this standard here.

In November 2002, at the very first status conference in this

case, Price’s counsel indicated that, if Price lost his motion to

suppress, he was likely to plead guilty. Once Price’s motion to

suppress was denied, his counsel immediately informed the trial

court that it was not necessary to set a trial date because a guilty

plea was likely. And Price did indeed plead guilty in April

2003. Moreover, the Government does not dispute that, as a

result of Price’s timely notification of his intent to plead guilty,

the Government was spared the burden of preparing for trial.

See Recording of Oral Argument at 17:45-18:02 (statement of

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Assistant United States Attorney that, while the Government

does not believe that Price was entitled to a third-level

reduction: “We’re certainly not relying on any possible trial

preparation by the Government. Indeed, we don’t contend that

the trial prosecutor in this case did anything more than perhaps

mentally anticipate that he might have to go to trial.”). And it is

evident that the District Court was able to allocate its resources

more efficiently, because the District Court never set a date for

trial. Thus, applying the plain language of § 3E1.1(b)(2), we

hold that Price was entitled to a third-point reduction in his

offense level under the Guidelines. 

The District Court reached a contrary result, apparently in

the belief that a defendant who moves to suppress evidence

cannot be eligible for a third-level reduction under

§ 3E1.1(b)(2). See Tr. of 7/17/03 at 2-3. The District Court’s

conclusion on this point cannot be reconciled with the plain

language of § 3E1.1(b)(2), which states that a defendant is

eligible for a third-level reduction if he timely notifies

“authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby

permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial.”

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(2) (emphasis added). While the

Government did have to prepare for a suppression hearing, the

Government does not dispute that it never had to prepare for

trial. Therefore, under the plain language of U.S.S.G. §

3E1.1(b)(2), Price was entitled to a third-level reduction in his

offense level. Accord, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 337 F.3d

1203, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e hold that where a defendant

has filed a non-frivolous motion to suppress, and there is no

evidence that the government engaged in preparation beyond

that which was required for the motion, a district court may not

rely on the fact that the defendant filed a motion to suppress . . .

to justify a denial of the third level reduction under

§ 3E1.1(b)(2).”); United States v. Kimple, 27 F.3d 1409, 1414-

15 (9th Cir. 1994) (in rejecting the Government’s argument that

a defendant was not entitled to a third-level reduction under

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§ 3E1.1(b)(2), stating that the Government’s mere opposition to

“a suppression motion is not sufficient to constitute trial

preparation”). But see, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 129 F.3d

76, 78, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (taking a contrary

view in a case in which the defendant offered to enter a

conditional guilty plea after the district court denied her motion

to suppress, and where the Government rejected the offer). 

In its brief to this court, the Government suggests that Price

should not be awarded a third-level reduction under

§ 3E1.1(b)(2), because the trial court briefly continued the case

when Price expressed a desire for a new attorney. See Gov’t Br.

at 30. This argument is without merit. It is undisputed that the

Government was spared the burden of preparing for trial,

because Price timely notified authorities of his intention to plead

guilty. Therefore, any brief delay caused by Price’s short-lived

desire to obtain new counsel clearly did not require prosecutors

to expend resources for trial, and thus it provides no basis under

the plain language of § 3E1.1(b)(2) to deny Price’s request for

an additional one-level reduction in his offense level. See

Marquez, 337 F.3d at 1212.

2. Prior Convictions 

Price also argues that the District Court erred in applying

the Guidelines by enhancing his sentence based on two prior

Maryland convictions, because the Government failed to satisfy

its burden of proving the existence of those convictions. Price’s

objection is well taken with respect to one of the two

convictions. 

The Government does not dispute that it carries the burden

of proving any facts that may be relevant in sentencing. We

have held that the Government generally may satisfy this burden

by relying on undisputed facts in a presentence investigation

report, so long as the facts of the report are not internally

contradictory, wildly implausible, or inconsistent with evidence

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from the trial. See United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 437

(D.C. Cir. 1995). However, the Government may not simply

rely on assertions in a presentence report if those assertions are

contested by the defendant. Thus, when the defendant calls into

dispute a presentence report’s description of an alleged prior

conviction, the Government must demonstrate that the

description in the report is based on a sufficiently reliable source

to establish the accuracy of that description. See United States

v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 737-38 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This

burden is triggered whenever a defendant disputes the factual

assertions in the report. The defendant need not produce any

evidence, for the Government carries the burden to prove the

truth of the disputed assertion. See Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 437-38;

Richardson, 161 F.3d at 737-38.

In this case, if, during the proceedings below, Price did in

fact dispute the existence of the two Maryland convictions

described in his PSR, it is evident that the Government failed to

meet its burden of demonstrating that the PSR assertions were

based on sufficiently reliable sources. The only sources cited by

the probation officer to establish the existence of either

conviction were “[d]ocumentation from the District Court for

Prince George’s County, Maryland” and “Court documents and

criminal history information from the State of Maryland.” As

Price correctly points out, it is unclear what sort of “documents”

the probation officer reviewed. This reference could be, for

instance, to a docket listing, which would lack the necessary

indicia of reliability for the Government to meet its burden

under Richardson. See 161 F.3d at 738 (explaining that the

District Court erred when its sentencing enhancement was based

on the description of a prior conviction in a presentence report

where “there was simply no way of knowing at sentencing

whether [the] description was obtained from a legitimate and

reliable source, such as a charging document, a plea agreement,

or a previous presentence investigation report adopted by the

state court . . . or whether this description came from an untested

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source, such as an arrest warrant, a police report, or a

prosecutor’s proffer.”). 

Under Pinnick, however, it is clear that the Government’s

Richardson burden is triggered only when the defendant

disputes the factual accuracy of the description of prior

convictions in the presentence report. In this case, Price clearly

contested the factual accuracy of one of the two convictions.

Specifically, after the probation officer prepared Price’s initial

PSR, Price’s counsel wrote a letter to the probation officer,

which objected that “Mr. Price is not associated with Prince

George’s County, Maryland case number [number intentionally

omitted],” a 1999 offense for attempting to elude the police.

Letter from Miles to probation officer of 6/5/03, App. at 41.

This statement plainly disputes the factual accuracy of the PSR

with regard to the 1999 conviction. Therefore, the

Government’s burden under Richardson to prove the existence

of that conviction through a reliable source was indeed

triggered. And, because the Government failed to meet its

burden, the District Court erred by enhancing Price’s sentence

based on that conviction. 

However, with regard to the second disputed Maryland

conviction, an alleged 2000 offense for possession of marijuana

and a handgun, the record is unclear as to whether Price objected

to the accuracy of the PSR’s description. Therefore, we cannot

say that the District committed legal error by enhancing Price’s

sentence based on this conviction. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We affirm the District Court’s denial of Price’s suppression

motion. We vacate the District Court’s sentencing decision and

remand the case for resentencing. On remand, the District Court

will be required to start anew, under the legal regime established

by Booker, which makes it clear that the Sentencing Guidelines

are advisory. 

USCA Case #03-3088 Document #897946 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 15 of 19
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in

part: 

I join the majority opinion but write separately on two points.

First, under the federal sentencing standards regime announced

by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Booker,

125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and on the record in this case, I believe

the sentencing court on remand can reasonably decline to

consider awarding Price any credit for accepting responsibility

and instead resentence him to the term of imprisonment we

vacate today, if not a longer term. Second, I believe that the

majority reads our decision in United States v. Richardson, 161

F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1998), too broadly now that we have entered

the post-Guidelines world. 

Following Booker, a sentencing court is no longer “bound” to

apply the Guidelines but must only “consult those Guidelines

and take them into account when sentencing”; for our part, we

now review a sentencing decision only for “unreasonableness.”

125 S. Ct. at 767. These changes flow from the remedy portion

of the Book er opinion, in which the Court severed two

provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA or Act),

as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 et seq.

It first severed the provision making the Guidelines mandatory,

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), while concluding that the remainder of

the Act “ ‘function[s] independently.’ ” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at

764-65 (quoting & citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480

U.S. 678, 684 (1987)) (alteration in Booker). It also excised the

provision of the SRA that “sets forth standards of review on

appeal,” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), replacing it with “a practical

standard of review already familiar to appellate courts: review

for ‘unreasonable[ness].’ ” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765 (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994 ed.)) (alteration in Booker). With

these two modifications, the Court explained, “[s]ection 3553(a)

remains in effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide

sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as

they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is

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unreasonable.” Id. at 766. The Booker decision applies “to all

cases on direct review,” including this one. Id. at 769. 

The district court’s duty to consult the Guidelines is, however,

quite different from the previous duty to apply them

mandatorily. Now, in setting a particular sentence, the district

court must “take account of the Guidelines together with other

sentencing goals.” Id. at 764. This means that the district court

must consider the criteria set forth in section 3553(a), including

the Guidelines sentencing range established for “the applicable

category of offense committed by the applicable category of

defendant” as well as policy statements of the Sentencing

Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(5); see Booker, 125 S. Ct.

at 764. The district court must also continue, the Supreme Court

tells us, “to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the

offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment,

afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and effectively

provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational

training and medical care.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765 (citing 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)). What the practical difference between the

duty to consult the Guidelines and the duty to apply them means

under the “reasonableness” standard of review will emerge only

on a case-by-case basis. But it is clear that the duty to consult

the Guidelines neither reduces them to “a body of casual advice,

to be consulted or overlooked at the whim of a sentencing

judge,” United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir.

2005), nor maintains de facto the mandatory sentencing regime

declared unconstitutional in Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750, 756, 767.

Under the new sentencing regime, and on this record, I believe

it would be reasonable for the sentencing court on remand to

decline to consider awarding Price any credit for accepting

responsibility and to re-impose, if not increase, the sentence

vacated herein. To say that Price is no stranger to the criminal

justice system is an understatement. At the time of the offense

on which he is to be resentenced, i.e., felon in possession of a

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1

In determining Price’s sentence on remand, the sentencing court

must consider both “the history and characteristics of the defendant,”

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and “the need . . . to protect the public from

further crimes of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).

firearm and ammunition, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he was on

double-probation in the District of Columbia, where he has

twice been convicted of crimes: one time for domestic violence,

the other for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See

Appellee’s Record Material at Tab 10, p.2. And if the

government adequately establishes the information in the presentence investigation report regarding the two Maryland

offenses, the sentencing court can add those two offenses to his

conviction tally. Up to now, Price’s criminal life has been

charmed; the sentencing authorities have imposed suspended

sentences and probation for his four convictions. This plainly

has served neither Price nor the community well. As the

original sentencing court observed, Price “just does not seem to

learn. He does not learn.” Sentencing Tr. of 7/17/03 at 8; see id.

at 10 (“If he[] were a novice I might feel differently but the fact

that two other courts have given him a break and he didn’t learn

from those prior experiences does not encourage me to think that

he is serious about changing his life style.”). Given that Price’s

public criminal record reveals a man determined to burnish his

criminal credentials and at society’s expense—two factors

appropriate for consideration on resentencing, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1) & (2)(C)1—I believe the sentencing court could

reasonably decline to lessen his punishment in any way,

including by considering his alleged acceptance of

responsibility. 

As to the two Maryland convictions, I do not agree that, on

remand, the government must “meet its burden under

Richardson.” Maj. Op. at 14. In Richardson, we held that,

under the Guidelines, the sentencing court could not “turn to

potentially unreliable second-hand information in designating a

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prior offense as a crime of violence.” 161 F.3d at 738. We

explained that the description of the defendant’s prior conviction

in the pre-sentence report failed to “reliably indicate the precise

crime to which appellant pled guilty” because “there was simply

no way of knowing at sentencing whether this description was

obtained from a legitimate and reliable source, such as a

charging document, a plea agreement, or a previous presentence

investigation report adopted by the state court.” Id. at 737-38

(emphasis added). The reason such pin-point accuracy was

necessary, however, was that the prior conviction had to

constitute a “crime of violence” in order to be used in computing

the defendant’s offense level. Id. at 737. But “offense levels,”

“adjustments,” “departures” and all of the other Guidelines argot

has been jettisoned by Booker. We now operate in a “back to

the future” sentencing world when, pre-Guidelines, all that our

Circuit required of the government in this regard was that it

submit “some verification,”—that is, any “evidence of a

sufficiently reliable caliber”—to support the information that it

supplied the sentencing court and that the defendant challenged.

See United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 934, 942 (D.C. Cir.

1983); United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 121 (D.C. Cir.

1976). In my view, that is all that is required once again. 

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