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Parties Involved:
Milton Jeffrey Burrell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-15250

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cr-00035-CAR-CHW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MILTON JEFFREY BURRELL,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(October 13, 2016)

Before HULL, MARCUS and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Milton Jeffrey Burrell appeals his 30-month sentence, after pleading guilty 

to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g), 924(a)(2). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 2011, the Northeast Regional Drug Task Force (“NRDTF”) 

received a tip Burrell was involved in the distribution of anabolic steroids at local 

gyms and fitness centers in Athens-Clarke County, Georgia. A year later, a 

confidential informant relayed similar information to NRDTF and subsequently 

made controlled purchases of anabolic steroids from Burrell. The informant 

introduced Burrell to an undercover agent, who also purchased steroids from

Burrell. All of the transactions took place in public locations.

On July 3, 2012, Burrell drove to South Carolina to obtain steroids. Upon 

his return to Georgia, state troopers conducted a traffic stop of Burrell’s vehicle

and recovered several boxes of steroids. Following the traffic stop, officers 

searched Burrell’s apartment. They recovered three firearms, ammunition, 

syringes, and steroids from Burrell’s bedroom and a fourth firearm and additional 

ammunition in a second bedroom.

A grand jury initially indicted Burrell on (1) three counts of distribution of 

anabolic steroids, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(E); (2) one count of 

possession with intent to distribute anabolic steroids, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

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§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(E) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) one count of possession of a 

firearm during a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1), 2. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Burrell later pled guilty to a superseding 

information, which charged him with the sole count of being a felon in possession 

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2).

Prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence 

investigation report (“PSI”). In computing Burrell’s offense level, the probation 

officer first applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, the Sentencing Guideline applicable to 

violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Under § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A), Burrell’s base-offense 

level was 14. He received a two-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) for 

possession of four firearms. He also received a four-level enhancement under 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), because he had possessed the firearms in connection with 

another felony, and his initial-adjusted-offense level was 20.

Pursuant to the cross-reference in § 2K2.1(c)(1), the probation officer 

explained, if the defendant had used or possessed a firearm in connection with 

another crime, the Guidelines directed § 2X1.1 be applied to the other crime, if the 

resulting offense level is greater than that determined under § 2K2.1. Because 

Burrell had possessed four firearms in connection with a drug crime, the probation 

officer concluded § 2X1.1 applied; consequently, Burrell’s offense level should be 

determined under § 2D1.1, the Guideline applicable to drug crimes under 21 

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U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Under § 2D1.1(a)(5) and (c)(10), Burrell’s base-offense level 

was 20, because he was accountable for the equivalent of 50.09 kilograms of 

marijuana. The probation officer then applied a two-level enhancement under 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) for Burrell’s possession of four firearms, resulting in his adjustedoffense level under the drug Guidelines of 22. Because it was the greater adjustedoffense level, the probation officer used that offense level in determining Burrell’s 

offense level of 22. Burrell also was assigned a criminal-history category of I. 

With an offense level of 22 and a criminal-history category of I, Burrell’s 

Sentencing Guidelines range was 41 to 51 months of imprisonment. Regarding 

Burrell’s physical condition, the PSI noted Burrell had suffered a skydiving 

accident in June 2011, which caused multiple pelvic fractures. Burrell underwent 

surgery to repair his pelvis, but he continues to suffer from chronic pelvic pain 

from those injuries.

Burrell objected to the probation officer’s failure to award him a reduction 

for his acceptance of responsibility. He also objected to the four-level 

enhancement in the probation officer’s calculations under the firearms Guideline,

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), because there was insufficient evidence he had possessed the 

firearms in connection with the steroid-trafficking crimes. Burrell further objected 

to the probation officer’s calculation of his offense level using the cross-reference 

in § 2K2.1(c)(1) to § 2X1.1, because he had not possessed the firearms in 

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connection with the steroid crimes; consequently, application of the crossreference was inappropriate.

At the sentencing hearing, the district judge sustained Burrell’s objection 

regarding his acceptance of responsibility and applied a three-level reduction, 

which resulted in an offense level of 19 and a Sentencing Guidelines imprisonment 

range of 30 to 37 months. Concerning the connection between the firearms and 

Burrell’s drug crimes, Burrell first noted there were no firearms in the car when he 

was stopped. He acknowledged there were drugs in his house where the firearms 

where found, but he argued there was no nexus between the drugs and the firearms. 

Burrell explained none of the firearms had been easily accessible to him and could

not have been used in furtherance of the steroid-distribution crimes. Two of the 

firearms were on an upper shelf in his closet out of his reach, because he was in a 

wheelchair; one firearm was under his bed; and the other was under his son’s bed. 

The district judge overruled Burrell’s objection, because “the courts have 

acknowledged that guns and violence go hand-in-hand with illegal drug 

operations,” and it was clear Burrell was in the business of selling steroids. 

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 9-10. The judge then sentenced Burrell to 30 months of

imprisonment, at the bottom of his Sentencing Guidelines range.

Burrell did not appeal his sentence directly. He subsequently filed a 

counseled 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. Burrell asserted (1) the 

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district judge had engaged in double counting by twice assessing a two-level 

enhancement for his possession of four firearms; (2) the four-level enhancement 

for possession of the firearms in connection with his steroid-trafficking crimes was 

erroneous; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the double 

counting at sentencing; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective in refusing to file an 

appeal regarding the firearms enhancements, despite Burrell’s request that an 

appeal be filed. The government filed its own motion to vacate and asserted the 

district judge should vacate the judgment and reimpose an identical final judgment 

to allow Burrell the opportunity to appeal. 

A magistrate judge recommended granting the government’s motion to 

vacate and dismissing Burrell’s § 2255 motion without prejudice. The district 

judge adopted the recommendation, granted the government’s motion to vacate, 

vacated Burrell’s original judgment of conviction, and reinstated an identical 

judgment of conviction. The judge noted Burrell would have the opportunity to 

file a notice of appeal regarding the reinstated judgment under Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(b) and dismissed his § 2255 motion without prejudice.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Possession of Firearms in Connection with Another Crime

On appeal, Burrell argues the district judge erred in concluding he possessed 

firearms in connection with his steroid trafficking. Burrell notes the firearms were 

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found in his residence, which was not the site of his steroid trafficking, because the 

steroid transactions primarily took place in or around gyms. He also contends the 

firearms were located on an upper shelf in his closet, when he was in a wheelchair 

at the time. The government produced no evidence to show Burrell had possessed 

a firearm during any of the steroid transactions. Under these circumstances, 

Burrell argues the government failed to prove he had possessed the firearms in 

connection with his steroid trafficking.

We review de novo a district judge’s interpretation of the Sentencing 

Guidelines and findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Barrington, 648 

F.3d 1178, 1194-95 (11th Cir. 2011). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, 

upon review of the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a 

mistake has been made. Id. at 1195. The government bears the burden of 

establishing the facts necessary to support a sentencing enhancement by a 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 

(11th Cir. 2007). Under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the trier of 

fact must believe the existence of a fact is more probable than not. United States v. 

Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012).

Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a four-level 

enhancement to a defendant’s base-offense level, if the defendant possessed a 

firearm in connection with another felony. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). If a 

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defendant possessed a firearm in connection with another crime, § 2X1.1

“(Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy)” should be applied “in respect to that other 

offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined” under 

§ 2K2.1. Id. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). For purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and (c)(1), a 

firearm is possessed in connection with another felony, when it facilitates or has 

the potential of facilitating that crime. Id. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.14(A). Application of 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) or (c)(1) is warranted for a drug-trafficking crime, when the 

firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug 

paraphernalia, because the presence of the firearm has the potential of facilitating 

the drug-trafficking crime. Id., cmt. n.14(B); see also United States v. CarilloAyala, 713 F.3d 82, 92 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A firearm found in close proximity to 

drugs or drug-related items simply ‘has’—without any requirement for additional 

evidence—the potential to facilitate the drug offense.”).

A judge’s determination a firearm was possessed “in connection with” 

another felony is a factual finding we review for clear error. See United States v. 

Whitfield, 50 F.3d 947, 949 & n.8 (11th Cir. 1995). The phrase “in connection 

with” should be given its ordinary meaning; we have refused to construe it more 

narrowly. United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690, 695 (11th Cir. 2002). In Rhind, 

we held unloaded and inoperable firearms located in a vehicle used in carrying out 

a counterfeiting scheme were possessed “in connection with” the counterfeiting 

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scheme in part, because “it would be reasonable to conclude that the presence of 

the firearms protected the counterfeit money from theft during the execution of the 

felony.” Id.

The judge did not clearly err in concluding Burrell possessed the firearms in 

connection with his steroid-trafficking activities. As part of his plea agreement, 

Burrell stipulated he had been involved in the trafficking of anabolic steroids, and

officers had recovered both steroids and firearms during a search of his apartment. 

Burrell did not dispute the PSI statement three of the firearms were found in his

bedroom, alongside steroids and syringes. Undisputed facts in the record show the 

firearms were found in close proximity to drugs and drug paraphernalia. Under 

both the Sentencing Guidelines and our precedent, such proximity alone is 

sufficient to establish Burrell possessed the firearms in connection with his steroid

trafficking. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.14(B); Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 92.

Burrell nevertheless contends the government failed to show a connection 

between the firearms and steroid trafficking, because none of the transactions took 

place at his apartment; there was no evidence he carried any of the firearms during 

his steroid trafficking. The government was not required to make such a showing, 

because the mere presence of firearms in the same bedroom where Burrell stored 

drugs and drug paraphernalia had the potential of facilitating his steroid trafficking. 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.14(B); Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 92; Rhind, 289 F.3d at 

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695. Burrell’s contention the firearms were inaccessible to him, because he was in 

a wheelchair at the time of the crime, so they could not have been used to facilitate 

his steroid trafficking, also fails. The PSI shows Burrell suffered multiple-pelvic 

fractures in a skydiving accident in June 2011 that continue to cause chronic-pelvic 

pain, but it did not show Burrell suffered any paralysis or limited mobility because

of his injuries. Although Burrell may have been using a wheelchair at the time of 

his crime, there is no evidence he was confined permanently to the wheelchair. 

Therefore, it was not clearly erroneous for the judge to conclude Burrell could 

have accessed the firearms. See Whitfield, 50 F.3d at 949 & n.8.

B. Double Counting

Burrell also asserts the judge engaged in double counting by imposing twolevel enhancements under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) and § 2D1.1(b)(1) for his possession 

of four firearms. We review an allegation of impermissible double counting de 

novo. United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 647 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 

S. Ct. 192 (2015). “Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part of 

the [Sentencing] Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on 

account of a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by application 

of another part of the Guidelines.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted) (alteration in original). Double counting is permitted, if the Sentencing 

Commission intended the Guidelines sections at issue to apply cumulatively. Id. 

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We presume “the Commission intended to apply separate sections cumulatively 

unless otherwise specified.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 2K2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines applies when a defendant has

been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), felon in possession of a firearm. 

See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. Section 2K2.1(b)(1) provides a two-level enhancement, if 

the crime involved three to seven firearms. Id. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). Under the crossreference contained in § 2K2.1(c)(1), a defendant who possessed a firearm in 

connection with another crime should be sentenced pursuant to § 2X1.1, if the 

resulting offense level for the other crime would be greater than that calculated 

under § 2K2.1. Id. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). Under § 2X1.1, the defendant’s base-offense 

level is the “base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense, plus 

any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be 

established with reasonable certainty.” Id. § 2X1.1(a). Section 2D1.1 is the 

applicable Guideline for drug crimes under 21 U.S.C. § 841. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1. Under § 2D1.1(b)(1), if the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon, 

including a firearm, his base-offense level is increased by two levels. Id.

§ 2D1.1(b)(1).

Burrell argues the judge engaged in impermissible double counting, because 

the PSI included enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) and 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) for his possession of firearms. Although the probation officer 

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calculated Burrell’s offense level under § 2K2.1 and § 2D1.1, she ultimately 

concluded only the calculations under § 2D1.1 applied in Burrell’s case pursuant to 

§ 2K2.1(c)(1), because they produced the greater offense level. Only the 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement actually was “applied to increase [Burrell’s] 

punishment,” so no double counting occurred. Asante, 782 F.3d at 647 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Burrell contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

judge’s double counting and for failing to file a direct appeal regarding the double 

counting and the four-level “in connection with” a drug-trafficking enhancement. 

Burrell asserts he may raise his ineffective-assistance claims in this appeal,

because he is appealing from the dismissal of his § 2255 motion.

We review de novo claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Williams v. 

Allen, 598 F.3d 778, 788 (11th Cir. 2010). Generally, we do not address 

ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, because typically there has not been 

an opportunity to develop the record regarding the merits of those allegations. 

United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578, 580 (11th Cir. 1985). A § 2255 motion is 

the preferred means for deciding these claims, even if there is some indication in 

the record counsel’s performance was deficient. United States v. Patterson, 595 

F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2010).

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When a district judge concludes an out-of-time appeal in a criminal case is 

warranted as the remedy in a § 2255 proceeding, we have established a procedure 

for effecting that remedy: (1) the original judgment of conviction should be 

vacated; (2) the same sentence should be reimposed; and (3) the defendant should 

be advised of his right to appeal and the time for filing a notice of appeal from the 

reimposed sentence. See United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 

2000). The grant of relief “to permit a direct appeal does not render a subsequent 

collateral challenge ‘second or successive’ under the [Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act].” McIver v. United States, 307 F.3d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 

2002).

The judge specifically followed the Phillips procedure to allow Burrell the 

opportunity to pursue a direct appeal of his sentence and did not address the merits 

of Burrell’s ineffective-assistance claims. Phillips, 225 F.3d at 1201. 

Consequently, this case is in the posture of a direct appeal. Although the record 

may contain some information concerning trial counsel’s performance, it has not 

been developed sufficiently to warrant consideration of Burrell’s ineffectiveassistance claims. Patterson, 595 F.3d at 1328-29; Hilliard, 752 F.2d at 580. 

Burrell may renew those claims in a subsequent § 2255 motion, because the judge

dismissed his motion without prejudice; a grant of relief to permit a direct appeal 

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does not render a subsequent § 2255 motion second or successive. McIver, 307 

F.3d at 1330.

III. CONCLUSION

The district judge did not clearly err in concluding Burrell possessed the 

firearms in connection with his steroid-trafficking crime, nor did he engage in 

impermissible double counting in calculating Burrell’s Sentencing Guidelines 

imprisonment range. Because this appeal is in the posture of a direct appeal, rather 

than an appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion, we decline to consider Burrell’s

ineffective-assistance claims.

AFFIRMED.

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