Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01363/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01363-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Keishan Herbert Enix
Petitioner
Andre Matevousian
Respondent

Document Text:

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on September 4, 2015. The petition indicates that on 

October 29, 2013, Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 

Florida, of the brandishing a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. (Doc. 1, p. 4). 

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 168 months. The petition is challenging his sentence on the 

grounds that the charge of felon in possession of a firearm, as part of his guilty plea, was inconsistent 

with his plea of guilty to the charge of brandishing a firearm. (Id.). On August 13, 2014, Petitioner’s 

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed in the sentencing 

court, was denied. (Id.). The sentencing court indicated that dismissal of the felon in possession 

KEISHAN HERBERT ENIX,

 Petitioner,

v.

ANDRE MATEVOUSIAN,

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

) 

)

Case No.: 1:15-cv-01363-JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

ORDER REQUIRING THAT OBJECTIONS BE 

FILED WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO CASE

Case 1:15-cv-01363-AWI-JLT Document 7 Filed 09/21/15 Page 1 of 8
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

charge does not mean that Petitioner did not brandish a firearm during the commission of the robbery, 

and that the dismissal of that charge took place after Petitioner had entered his guilty plea on the 

substantive charge. (Id., p. 5). 

Petitioner now brings this habeas petition, in which he raises three challenges to his sentence: 

(1) violation of due process in applying the definition of “violent felony” under the career offender 

guidelines; (2) the state criminal conduct used to enhance his sentence is unconstitutionally vague; and 

(3) the federal court cannot use a state conviction as a qualifying offense for a career offender 

enhancement in federal court. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8). 

As discussed more fully below, because the Court has determined that Petitioner’s claim 

challenges his original sentence, and therefore should have been brought in the trial court as a motion 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the Court will recommend that the instant petition be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. Hernandez v. 

Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity 

or constitutionality of his conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or 

correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988); 

Thompson v. Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir.1983); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3rd 1997); 

Broussard v. Lippman, 643 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir.1981). In such cases, only the sentencing court 

has jurisdiction. Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163. A prisoner may not collaterally attack a federal conviction 

or sentence by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Grady v. 

United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162; see also United States v. 

Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir.1980). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) provides as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for 

relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant 

has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court 

has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or 

ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).

In contrast, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that sentence's 

Case 1:15-cv-01363-AWI-JLT Document 7 Filed 09/21/15 Page 2 of 8
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Capaldi v. Pontesso, 

135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tubwell, 37 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1994); 

Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 

893-94 (6th Cir. 1991); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3rd Cir. 1991); Brown v. United 

States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Petitioner’s allegations in his petition, summarized supra, are clearly a challenge to the sentence 

imposed, not to the administration of that sentence. Thus, the proper vehicle for challenging such a 

mistake is a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not a 

habeas corpus petition. 

Nevertheless, a federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 may seek relief under § 

2241 only if he can show that the remedy available under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the 

validity of his detention." Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-5 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. 

Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting § 2255). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that this is a 

very narrow exception. Id; Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003) (a petitioner must show 

actual innocence and that he never had the opportunity to raise it by motion to demonstrate that § 2255 

is inadequate or ineffective); Holland v. Pontesso, 234 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 2255 not inadequate 

or ineffective because Petitioner misses statute of limitations); Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (a 

court’s denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate); Lorentsen v. Hood, 

223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.1988) (a petitioner's 

fears of bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 petition inadequate); Williams v. Heritage, 

250 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1956); see United States v. 

Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2001) (procedural requirements of § 2255 may not be 

circumvented by invoking the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651). The burden is on the petitioner to 

show that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 

1963). If the petitioner fails to meet that burden, the sec. 2241 petition will be dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003),

In Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that the remedy under 

a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” if a petitioner is actually innocent, but 

Case 1:15-cv-01363-AWI-JLT Document 7 Filed 09/21/15 Page 3 of 8
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

procedurally barred from filing a second or successive motion under § 2255. Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060-

1061. That is, relief pursuant to § 2241 is available when the petitioner’s claim satisfies the following 

two-pronged test: “(1) [the petitioner is] factually innocent of the crime for which he has been 

convicted and, (2) [the petitioner] has never had an ‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at presenting this 

claim.” Id. at 1060. 

“In determining whether a petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot to pursue his claim, 

we ask whether petitioner’s claim ‘did not become available’ until after a federal court decision.” 

Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 254 (2008). 

“In other words, we consider: (1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s claim ‘did not arise until after 

he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion;’ and (2) whether the law changed ‘in any 

way relevant’ to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Id., citing Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060-61. 

In Ivy, petitioner, who was convicted in 1993 in Missouri district court of engaging in a 

continuing criminal enterprise, contended in a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to § 2241 in the 

District of Arizona, where he was confined, that he was actually innocent because the indictment did 

not charge him with the requisite three offenses to sustain a conviction for a continuing criminal 

enterprise. Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1058. After an unsuccessful appeal, Ivy filed motions pursuant to § 2255 

in 1995, 1997, and 1999. Id. The original motion was denied on its merits, while the second and third 

motions were denied as second and successive motions. Id. In 2000, Ivy filed his federal habeas 

petition in the Arizona district court. Id. The district court, however, dismissed the petition because 

Ivy had not shown that § 2255 was either inadequate or ineffective. Id. 

In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the Ninth Circuit employed the two-part test 

discussed above, i.e., that petitioner must show he is factually innocent of the crime for which he had 

been convicted and that he has never had an “unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting this claim. 

Id. at 1059. In explaining that standard, the Ninth Circuit stated:

In other words, it is not enough that the petitioner is presently barred from raising his 

claim of innocence by motion under 2255. He must never have had the opportunity to 

raise it by motion.

Id. at 1060 (emphasis supplied). Applying that standard, the Ninth Circuit rejected Ivy’s claims, 

holding the law regarding continuing criminal enterprises had not changed subsequent to his conviction 

Case 1:15-cv-01363-AWI-JLT Document 7 Filed 09/21/15 Page 4 of 8
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and that he had indeed had an opportunity to raise such a claim in the past. Id. at 1061. 

As mentioned, the burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or 

ineffective. Redfield, 315 F.2d at 83. However, as in Ivy, Petitioner cannot establish any relevant 

intervening change in the law since his conviction that would trigger the savings clause. Moreover, 

Petitioner acknowledges that he filed a prior § 2255 challenge to his sentence that the court denied. 

Petitioner was aware of the issues in the instant petition at the time of filing the § 2255 petition, and he 

could easily have raised those issues in those proceedings. His failure to do so does not give Petitioner 

the authority to raise these claims anew in a § 2241 petition. Clearly, § 2255 was adequate and 

effective notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure to use that procedure or his lack of success in bringing 

other issues before the sentencing court. 

Accordingly, he has failed to establish that § 2255 is either inadequate or ineffective for 

purposes of invoking the savings clause, and the fact that he may now be procedurally barred by the 

AEDPA from obtaining relief does not alter that conclusion. Ivy, 328 F.3d 1059-1061 (§ 2255 not 

inadequate or ineffective because Petitioner misses statute of limitations); Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 

5 (1964) (a court’s denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate); 

Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988) (a petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 petition inadequate); 

Williams v. Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1956); 

see United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2001) (procedural requirements of § 2255 

may not be circumvented by invoking the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651). 

Moreover, Petitioner has failed to show he is actually innocent of the charges against him. “To 

establish actual innocence, petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 

614, 623 (1998) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995)); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 

895, 898 (9th cir. 2008). “[A]ctual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency,” 

and “in cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges in the course of plea bargaining, 

petitioner’s showing of actual innocence must also extend to those charges.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-

624. However, a petitioner’s obligation to demonstrate actual innocence is limited to crimes actually 

Case 1:15-cv-01363-AWI-JLT Document 7 Filed 09/21/15 Page 5 of 8
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

charged or consciously forgone by the Government in the course of plea bargaining. See, e.g., id. at 

624 (rejecting government’s argument that defendant had to demonstrate actual innocence of both 

“using” and “carrying” a firearm where the indictment only charged using a firearm). 

Although the United States Supreme Court has not provided much guidance regarding the 

nature of an “actual innocence” claim, the standards announced by the various circuit courts contain 

two basic features: actual innocence and retroactivity. E.g., Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 

893, 903 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th

Cir. 1998); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2nd Cir. 1997); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922 (6th

Cir. 1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997). 

The “core idea” expressed in these cases is that the petitioner may have been imprisoned for 

conduct that was not prohibited by law. Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903. Such a situation is most 

likely to occur in a case that relies on a Supreme Court decision interpreting the reach of a federal 

statute, where that decision is announced after the petitioner has already filed a § 2255 motion. This is 

so because a second or successive § 2255 motion is available only when newly discovered evidence is 

shown or a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Because § 2255 limits a 

second or successive petition to Supreme Court cases announcing a new rule of constitutional law, it 

provides no avenue through which a petitioner could rely on an intervening Court decision based on the 

substantive reach of a federal statute under which he has been convicted. Id.; see Lorentsen, 223 F.3d 

at 953 (“Congress has determined that second or successive [§ 2255] motions may not contain statutory 

claims.”); Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2000)(“The savings clause has 

most often been used as a vehicle to present an argument that, under a Supreme Court decision 

overruling the circuit courts as to the meaning of a statute, a prisoner is not guilty...The savings clause 

has to be resorted to for [statutory claims] because Congress restricted second or successive petitions to 

constitutional claims.”). Obviously, “decisions of [the Supreme Court] holding that a substantive 

federal criminal statute does not reach certain conduct...necessarily carry a significant risk that a 

defendant stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does not make criminal.’” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620. 

To incarcerate one whose conduct is not criminal “inherently results in a complete miscarriage of 

Case 1:15-cv-01363-AWI-JLT Document 7 Filed 09/21/15 Page 6 of 8
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

justice.” Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S.Ct. 2298 (1974). Here, Petitioner has failed 

even to allege actual innocence, much less establish that fact by competent evidence. Accordingly, the 

Court can only conclude that § 2255 was neither inadequate or ineffective. 

Section 2255 motions must be heard in the sentencing court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Hernandez, 

204 F.3d at 864-865. Because this Court is only the custodial court and construes the petition as a §

2255 motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864-865. Although 

Petitioner indicates that he unsuccessfully brought a motion pursuant to § 2255 in 2003, the denial of a 

prior § 2255 motion, as mentioned above, does not render it inadequate or ineffective. Aronson, 85 

S.Ct. at 5; Lorentsen, 223 F.3d at 953. In sum, should Petitioner wish to pursue his claims in federal 

court, he must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255.1 

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to assign a United States 

District Judge to this case. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be 

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within twenty-one 

(21) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be 

served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the 

Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 

 

1A petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2255 must be filed in the court where petitioner was originally 

sentenced. In this case, Petitioner challenges a sentence adjudicated in the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of Florida. Thus, that court is the proper venue for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2255.

Case 1:15-cv-01363-AWI-JLT Document 7 Filed 09/21/15 Page 7 of 8
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01363-AWI-JLT Document 7 Filed 09/21/15 Page 8 of 8