Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01619/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01619-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Merced
Defendant
Law Office of Morse and Pfeiff
Defendant
Angela D. Mayfield
Plaintiff
Merced Defense Associates
Defendant
Cindy Morse
Defendant
Thomas Pfeiff
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGELA D. MAYFIELD,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF MERCED, CINDY MORSE, 

individually, and in her Official Capacity as 

Primary Indigent Defense Contractor 

THOMAS PFEIFF, individually and his Official 

Capacity as Primary Indigent Defense 

Contractor, LAW OFFICE OF MORSE AND 

PFEIFF, a PARTNERSHIP, dba MERCED 

DEFENSE ASSOCIATES,

 Defendants.

1:13-CV-1619-LJO-BAM

ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE 

PORTIONS OF ANSWER (Doc. 76)

I. INTRODUCTION

Angela Mayfield (“Plaintiff”) alleges that the County of Merced, Cindy Morse, Thomas Pfeiff, 

and the Law Office of Morse and Pfeiff, doing business as Merced Defense Associates, (collectively,

“Defendants”) engaged in a longstanding pattern and practice of discrimination against Plaintiff and 

another female attorney due to their race and sex while they were working as contract criminal defense 

attorneys. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. 67 ¶ ¶ 8, 10. Defendants filed an answer consisting

of nineteen affirmative defenses. Doc. 71. Plaintiff now moves to strike eleven of the defenses pled. 

Doc. 76. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is an African-American woman licensed to practice law in the State of California. FAC 

¶ 5. Defendants Morse and Pfeiff jointly own and operate a law firm, Merced Defense Associates. Id at 

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¶¶ 7-8. In March 2003, Merced County contracted with Defendants’ firm to provide indigent defense 

services, similar to those customarily provided by a public defender’s office. Id. In the spring of 2005, 

Defendants hired Plaintiff as a contract attorney. Id. at ¶ 10. After working for Defendants for 

approximately five years, Plaintiff learned that she received a significantly lower salary and a heavier

case load than her Caucasian male co-workers. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff also alleges she was terminated 

“without cause” on September 10, 2012, only a few days after she notified a judge in Defendant Pfieff’s 

presence that her case load was too heavy. Id. at ¶ ¶ 33-34. Upon her termination, Plaintiff decided to 

speak with Merced County executive officer Angelo Lamas from whom she learned that Merced County 

provided enough funding to pay Plaintiff more and to provide Merced Defense Associates with 

additional attorneys. Id. at ¶ ¶ 35-36.

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)

and received a right-to-sue letter on April 30, 2013. Id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the United 

States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and received a right-to-sue letter on 

September 4, 2013. Id. Defendant alleged she was discriminated against due to her race and sex, as she 

received a heavier case load and a lower wage than her Caucasian male colleagues. Id. at ¶ 42.

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint in which she asserted fifteen causes of action against Defendants on 

October 8, 2013. Doc. 1. On July 10, 2014, the Court adopted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge 

Barbara A. McAuliffe and dismissed with prejudice the five claims that arose under the California 

Government Tort Claims Act and common law tort theories. Doc. 50. Plaintiff filed the FAC on October 

24, 2014, alleging Defendants violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 

VII”) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, FEH Cal. Gov't Code § 12940, Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) 29 

U.S.C. § 201 , 29 U.S.C. § 206, California Labor Code § 1197.5, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, California Labor 

Code § 2802. 

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Defendants moved to dismiss the entire FAC. Docs. 54 and 55. On November 10, 2014, the 

Court dismissed all claims against the County of Merced with leave to amend and granted in part but 

denied in part the motion to dismiss as to Defendants Morse, Pfeiff, and Merced Defense Associates. 

On November 24, 2014, Defendants filed their answer to the FAC in which they assert the 

following affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a cause of action; (2) statute of limitations; (3) failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies; (4) good faith conduct; (5) consent; (6) reasonable conduct; (7) res 

judicata and collateral estoppel; (8) failure to mitigate damages; (9) comparative negligence; (10) 

assumption of risk; (11) several liability for non-economic damages; (12) negligence of third persons; 

(13) after-acquired evidence; (14) exclusive remedy of worker’s compensation; (15) workers’ 

compensation set-off; (16) justification and privilege; (17) unclean hands; (18) estoppel, waiver and 

laches; (19) reservation of defenses and immunities. Doc. 71 at ¶ ¶ 1-19. Plaintiff then filed a motion to 

strike, asserting that Defendants’ affirmative defenses are insufficiently pled or legally insufficient. Doc. 

76. Defendants replied and Plaintiff responded. Docs. 84 and 86. The matter was taken under 

submission on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). Doc. 85. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Affirmative defenses plead matters extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie case and operate to

deny plaintiff’s right to recover, even if plaintiff’s allegations are true. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Main 

Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Cal. 1987). Affirmative defenses are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(c), which provides, in pertinent part, that “a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or 

affirmative defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he key to determining the 

sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” 

Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (1979) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48, 

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(1957)). Fair notice generally requires that the defendant identify the nature and grounds for the 

affirmative defense, rather than plead a detailed statement of the facts upon which the defense is based. 

Dodson v. Strategic Restaurants Acquisition Co. II, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 595, 599 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citation 

omitted). While a plaintiff does not need to provide detailed factual allegations, Bell Atlantic v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), requires plaintiffs to establish grounds for entitlement to relief 

beyond mere recitation of elements of a cause of action. Wine Group LLC v. L. & R. Wine Co., No. 10-

CV-02204 MCE-KJN, 2011 WL 130236 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court 

expanded on this idea, stating:

The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but 

it demands more than an unadorned...accusation. A pleading that offers labels and 

conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor 

does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement.

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The Eastern District of California has affirmed that the Iqbal’s “heightened” pleading standard 

applies to affirmative defenses. Wine Group LLC, 2011 WL 130236 at *2. Courts in this district have

held that “to the extent that the heightened pleading standard announced by these cases is based on the 

wording of Rule 8, a sufficient textual basis lies in Rule 8(b)(1) for extending their holdings to the 

pleading of affirmative defenses.” Dodson, 289 F.R.D at 601. Applying this heightened standard will 

“serve to weed out the boilerplate listing of affirmative defenses which is commonplace in most 

defendants’ pleading where many of the defenses alleged are irrelevant to the claims asserted.” Barnes 

v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 

1. Legal Insufficiency

Legal sufficiency of an affirmative defense is determined in light of the related claims. Thus, an 

affirmative defense is legally insufficient only if it lacks merit under any set of facts a defendant might 

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allege. McArdle v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d on other 

grounds, 474 Fed. Appx. 515 (9th Cir. 2012). When determining the legal sufficiency of an affirmative 

defense on a motion to strike, the court “may not resolve disputed and substantial factual or legal issues 

in deciding” a motion to strike. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F. 3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 

2010).

2. Pleading Insufficiency

An affirmative defense is insufficiently pled if it fails to give the plaintiff fair notice of the nature 

of the defense. Barnes, 718 F. Supp 2d at 1170. “Because the defendant bears the burden of proof on 

affirmative defenses, the defendant must plead “at least some valid factual basis” in support of its 

affirmative defense. Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp., P.C. No. 11-CV-03323-LHK, 2012 WL 

1029425 at * 7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a district court “may strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

“Whether to grant a motion to strike lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Neilson v. 

Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The grounds for a motion to 

strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack. When ruling on a motion to strike, the Court 

must view the pleading under attack in the light most favorable to the pleader. Amini Innovation Corp. v.

McFerran Home Furnishings, Inc., No. CV-13-6496-RSWL, 2014 WL 360048 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 

2014). 

An affirmative defense may be stricken as insufficient either as a matter of law or as a matter of 

pleading. Kohler v. Islands Restaurants, LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 564 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff seeks to strike eleven of the affirmative offenses that Defendants assert in its answer and 

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request this Court strike each such defense as insufficient as pled or as a matter of law.

1. Fifth Affirmative Defense: Consent

In its fifth affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff “agreed, consented, and 

welcomed defendants’ conduct.” Doc. 71 at 11. Defendant has cited no legal authority for its position 

that consent is an affirmative defense to Plaintiff's claims for discrimination and retaliation. To the 

contrary, there is authority that suggests consent is not an affirmative defense against discrimination. See 

Richmond v. Mission Bank, No. 1:14-CV-00184-AWI, 2014 WL 2002312, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 

2014). Additionally, Defendant has done no more than state boilerplate language of the affirmative 

defense. Therefore, the fifth affirmative defense is STRICKEN without leave to amend because the 

affirmative defense is inapplicable as a matter of law.

2. Seventh Affirmative Defense: Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

In its seventh affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s action is barred by “the 

doctrine of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.” Doc. 71 at 11. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff 

with fair notice of either the defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Defendants have not plead “at 

least some valid factual basis” for either defense, because they have not provided the details of any prior 

action or suit which would give rise to these affirmative defenses. Perez , P.C. No. 2012 WL 1029425 at 

* 7. Indeed, Defendants did nothing more than state formulaic elements of the defense. Therefore, the 

seventh affirmative defense is STRICKEN.

3. Ninth Affirmative Defense: Comparative Negligence

In its ninth affirmative defense, Defendants allege that any harm that Plaintiff sustained was “the 

direct and proximate result of Plaintiff’s own fault, carelessness, and negligence.” Doc. 71 at 11.

Plaintiff did not bring a claim of negligence against Defendants. Defendants failed to cite any legal 

authority for its position that comparative negligence is an affirmative defense to Plaintiff's claims for 

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discrimination and retaliation. The Court is only aware of cases that do not allow comparative 

negligence to be asserted as an affirmative defense when negligence is not alleged in the complaint.

Ingram v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 12-CV-02777-JST, 2014 WL 295829, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 

2014). Therefore, the ninth affirmative defense is STRICKEN without leave to amend because the 

affirmative defense is inapplicable as a matter of law.

4. Tenth Affirmative Defense: Assumption of Risk

In the tenth affirmative defense, Defendants allege that Plaintiff “had reasonable knowledge and 

belief of the defect or condition alleged in the Complaint and voluntarily assumed the risk that plaintiff 

might be injured and damaged by risk of such defect or condition.” Doc. 71 at 12. The Court is not

aware of any authority that stands for the proposition that assumption of risk applies in the employment 

discrimination context. Furthermore, Defendants have failed to present any facts showing that Plaintiff 

either expressly or impliedly absolved Defendants of any duty owed to Plaintiff. Lane v. Micro-Focus 

(US), Inc., No. C09-1363 MJP, 2010 WL 5018146, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 3, 2010). Therefore, the 

tenth affirmative defense is STRICKEN without leave to amend because the affirmative defense is 

inapplicable as a matter of law.

5. Eleventh Affirmative Defense: Civil Code § 1431.2

In the eleventh affirmative defense, Defendants assert that “under the law of comparative 

negligence and under the provisions of California Civil Code § 1431.2, defendants should be required to 

pay only in proportion with defendant’s own negligence, if any, by way, of any judgment entered 

against defendants in this legal action.” Doc. 71 at 12. California Civil Code § 1431.2, however, is 

limited in its application to “actions for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1431.2. As Plaintiff has not made any claims of personal injury, property damage or wrongful 

death this affirmative defense is legally insufficient. Therefore, the eleventh affirmative defense is 

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STRICKEN without leave to amend because the affirmative defense is inapplicable as a matter of law,

6. Twelfth Affirmative Defense: Negligence of Third Person

In the twelfth affirmative defense, Defendants allege that a third party is at fault for the matters 

referred to in the Complaint. Doc. 71 at 12. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with information 

regarding the identity of the alleged third parties. Indeed, Defendants have again done nothing more than 

provide boilerplate language. For that reason the twelfth affirmative defense is insufficiently pled and 

therefore it is STRICKEN.

7. Fourteenth Affirmative Defense: Exclusive Remedy of Worker’s Compensation

In the fourteenth affirmative defense, Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s action is barred by Cal.

Labor Code § 3600, which guides liability for compensation, conditions of compensation, credits against 

judgment or settlement when an employee is injured or killed by a third party in the course of 

employment. Doc. 71 at 13. “Negligent response to harassment or discrimination claims because these 

claims are based on accusations of discrimination, which is not a normal risk of the compensation 

bargain.” Scott v. Solano County Health and Social Services Dept., 459 F. Supp. 2d 959, 971 (E.D. Cal. 

2006). As discrimination is not a normal risk of employment this affirmative defense is legally 

insufficient. Therefore, the fourteenth affirmative defense is STRICKEN without leave to amend 

because the affirmative defense is inapplicable as a matter of law.

8. Fifteenth Affirmative Defense: Worker’s Compensation Set-Off

In the fifteenth affirmative defense, Defendants allege that any verdict found for Plaintiff should 

be offset by the workers’ compensation benefits. Doc. 71 at 13. Defendant has cited no legal authority 

for its position that workers’ compensation benefits offset damages in claims for discrimination and 

retaliation. This Court has not located any such authority. Therefore, this affirmative defense is 

STRICKEN without leave to amend because the affirmative defense is inapplicable as a matter of law.

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9. Sixteenth Affirmative Defense: Justification and Privilege

In the sixteenth affirmative defense, Defendants allege that their conduct was justified and 

privileged. Doc. 71 at 13. Defendants have not plead “at least some valid factual basis” for this 

affirmative defense as they have not provided any rationale for their allegedly discriminatory action. 

Perez, 2012 WL 1029425 at * 7. Without such information, Defendant is not providing Plaintiff with 

fair notice. Therefore, this affirmative defense is STRICKEN.

10. Seventeenth Affirmative Defense: Unclean Hands

In the seventeenth affirmative defense, Defendants assert “Plaintiff’s action is barred by the 

equitable doctrine of unclean hands.” Doc. 71 at 13. The doctrine of unclean hands requires that those 

seeking the Court’s protection “have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in 

issue.” Ellenburg v. Broadway, Inc..763 F. 2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985). Again, Defendants have failed 

to provide the Plaintiff with any facts that would put her on fair notice as to the actions which would be 

considered fraudulent or deceptive. For this reason, this affirmative defense is STRICKEN.

11. Eighteenth Affirmative Defense: Estoppel, Waiver, and Laches

In the eighteenth affirmative defense, Defendants assert “Plaintiff’s action is barred by the 

equitable doctrines of estoppel, waiver, and laches.” Doc. 71 at 13. Once again, Defendants have failed 

to provide the Plaintiff with any facts that would put her on fair notice as to the defense alleged. For this 

reason, this affirmative defense is STRICKEN.

The Court notes that Defendants did little more than provide a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of the majority of the affirmative defenses presented. In addition, many of the affirmative 

defenses pled by the Defendants are entirely inapplicable to this case. This is legal work unbecoming of 

an officer of this court. However, as it is not prejudicial to the Plaintiff, the Court grants Defendants

leave to amend those affirmative defenses that are not clearly barred by law. See Wyshak v. City Nat’l 

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Bank, 607 F. 2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Unless it would prejudice the opposing party, courts freely 

grant leave to amend stricken pleadings.”). The Court warns Defendants to plead only those affirmative 

defenses applicable to the case and to provide Plaintiff with fair warning of the factual basis for those

affirmative defenses. Defendants are reminded of their obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(2) to 

plead only those “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions [] warranted by existing law or by a 

nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”

This Court should not be put to the burden of being the hall monitor for obviously deficient pleadings.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reason discussed above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike eleven of 

nineteen of Defendants’ affirmative defenses with leave to amend affirmative defenses seven, twelve, 

sixteen and seventeen, and without leave to amend affirmative defenses five, nine, ten, eleven, fourteen 

and fifteen. Any amended answer shall be filed and served within twenty (20) days of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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