Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00242/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00242-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian White
Petitioner
Rafael Zuniga
Respondent

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRIAN WHITE, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

M. A. STANSIL, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:15-cv-0242-EFB P (TEMP)

ORDER AND 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner challenges a disciplinary conviction that 

he received on June 28, 2013 for “use of any drug not prescribed for the individual by the medical 

staff.” He seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) prison officials’ actions in 

failing to inform him that his urine had tested positive for Methadone in time for him to obtain a 

second drug test to verify those results denied him the right to present exculpatory evidence at his 

prison disciplinary hearing and violated prison regulations; and (2) prison staff’s delay in serving 

him with an “incident report” after his urine tested positive for Methadone violated prison 

regulations. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, and for the reasons 

that follow, petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief must be denied. 

///// 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 1 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

I. Background

 Petitioner is currently serving a 400-month term of imprisonment following his plea of 

guilty to multiple charges of drug-related offenses and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

ECF No. 13 (Declaration of Board of Prison (BOP) paralegal specialist Jennifer Vickers), at 2. 

On March 23, 2013, petitioner provided a urine sample for purposes of a BOP drug test. ECF No. 

13-2 at 3. The results came back positive for the presence of Methadone. Id. at 4. On March 25, 

2013, after the initial results were subjected to a second drug confirmation test, which also came 

back positive, the BOP sent petitioner’s urine sample to Phamatech Laboratories for testing. Id.

at 3, 4. 

 On April 11, 2013, Phamatech Laboratories sent an email notification to the prison that 

petitioner’s urine sample had tested positive for Methadone. Id. Due to “an administrative 

oversight,” this email was not reviewed by prison staff until May 31, 2013. On that same day, 

after medical staff verified that petitioner was not taking any medication that would cause a 

positive urine test for Methadone, reporting employee N. Boyd prepared an Incident Report 

describing the facts related above. She attached to that report the April 11, 2013 email from 

Phamatech Laboratories and a memorandum explaining why the urine test result from Phamatech 

Laboratories was not discovered until May 31, 2013. Id.; ECF No. 13-3 at 2. Petitioner was 

served with the Incident Report on the same day. ECF No. 13-3 at 2. 

 On June 2, 2013, petitioner filed an “Inmate Request to Staff,” in which he requested a 

blood test to determine whether he had used Methadone. ECF No. 1 at 14. On June 20, 2013, 

petitioner received a response to this request, in which he was informed that: 

A review of this matter reveals you are over the thirty day period 

since the last test indicating the use of any form of methadone. 

Typically, a blood test will not show any traces of methadone a 

month after the use of it; therefore, a blood test is not warranted as a 

result of timeliness. 

Additionally, Health Services has reviewed your medical record 

and there’s no record of any medication before your test that would 

indicate the use of methadone. 

Id.

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 2 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

 The disciplinary hearing on the Incident Report was held on June 28, 2013. ECF No. 13-2 

at 2. Petitioner appeared at the hearing via video conference and stated he was ready to proceed. 

Id. Petitioner was advised of his rights by the disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) and he stated 

that he understood those rights. Id. He also stated that he had received his copy of the Incident 

Report. Id. Petitioner waived his right to a staff representative and to present witnesses. Id. 

Petitioner denied that he had used Methadone. Id. When asked if he wanted to make further 

comment, he stated, “I never took Methadone and anything with it. There must have been 

something wrong with the test.” Id. 

 Petitioner was found guilty of “the prohibited act of Use of any Drug not Prescribed for 

the Individual by the Medical Staff.” Id. at 3. In reaching his verdict, the DHO relied on: (1) the 

BOP Chain of Custody form for petitioner’s urine sample; (2) the lab report issued by Phamatech 

Laboratories; (3) the memorandum from BOP medical staff to the effect that petitioner was not 

taking any medication that would cause a positive urine test for Methadone; (4) the memorandum 

from reporting employee Boyd; and (5) the April 11, 2013, email from Phamatech Laboratories to 

the effect that petitioner’s urine sample had tested positive for Methadone. Id. at 2-4. At the 

hearing, the DHO discussed with petitioner “the reason for the delay” in processing the results of 

the urine test. Specifically, he told petitioner that “due to an administrative oversight on the part 

of [prison] staff,” the email from the lab indicating that petitioner’s urine sample had tested 

positive for Methadone was not opened until more than one month after it was received. Id. at 3. 

The hearing officer “found that this delay did not warrant the expungment of your incident report 

and that it did not harm your ability to prepare or assert a defense.” Id. 

 The DHO took into consideration petitioner’s statement that he had never taken 

Methadone and that the results of the lab test were inaccurate. Id. However, he found that Ms. 

Boyd’s incident report was more credible than petitioner’s denial of culpability. He also found 

that Ms. Boyd was clear about what had transpired and that she “had no reason . . . to falsify her 

statement in which she wrote that subsequent to you providing a prior use urine sample, 

laboratory testing revealed that you had Methadone present in your urine, which is indicative of 

your using Methadone in the recent past.” Id. 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 3 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

 The DHO also noted that petitioner’s urine had been subjected to a preliminary drug test 

at the prison, which tested positive, and was also subjected to a confirmation test, which also 

tested positive. Id. at 4. After these tests had been conducted, the urine specimen was sent to 

Phamatech Laboratories for a “confirmation test.” Id. According to the DHO, “the test 

performed by this laboratory is very accurate and is performed at a much higher level of accuracy 

and specificity than the initial drug test cup screening.” Id. The DHO also considered that 

petitioner had a prior prison disciplinary conviction for use of marijuana. Id. Finally, the DHO 

determined “that the greater weight of evidence in this case is given to the report writer, due to 

the greater credibility given to staff, which are impartial and have no reason to provide false or 

inaccurate information.” Id.

 As punishment for his disciplinary conviction, petitioner was assessed 41 days loss of 

time credits and placement in disciplinary segregation for 30 days. He also received various 

restrictions on prison programs and amenities. Id. 

 Petitioner challenged his disciplinary conviction in a “Regional Administrative Remedy 

Appeal.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Petitioner stated that he had “never ever seen Methadone nor opium in 

his life,” and he argued that service of the incident report after such a lengthy delay prevented 

him from obtaining a blood test to demonstrate his innocence. Id. This appeal was denied in a 

reasoned decision, on the grounds that petitioner’s conviction was supported by sufficient 

evidence and that the incident report was timely because it was issued to petitioner on the same 

day staff became aware of the email from Phamatech Laboratories. Id. at 10. Petitioner 

subsequently appealed the decision by the Regional Administrator to the General Counsel in the 

Central Office. Id. at 11. Petitioner provides evidence that the Central Office granted itself 

additional time to respond. Id. at 12. The actual response by the Central Office does not appear 

in the record before this court. However, respondent concedes that petitioner exhausted his 

administrative remedies with respect to the claims before the court. 

///// 

///// 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 4 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review Applicable to Claims Brought Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

 Relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus extends to a prisoner in custody under the 

authority of the United States who shows that his custody violates the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal prisoner who challenges the 

validity or constitutionality of his underlying conviction must file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006). 

On the other hand, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of the 

execution of a sentence, as petitioner does here, must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 

Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2008). 

B. Proper Respondent 

 The previously named respondent was Rafael Zuniga. In a habeas challenge, “the proper 

respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 

542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). See also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 

484, 494-95 (1973) (stating, in a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “The writ of 

habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him 

in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.”). Petitioner is currently an inmate at the Federal 

Correctional Institution in Florence, Colorado (FCI Florence). Accordingly, the court now 

substitutes in the correct respondent, M. A. Stansil, the Warden of FCI Florence. 

C. Venue 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d), a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be brought in 

the district court where the petitioner is confined or in the district where he was convicted and 

sentenced. Venue was proper in the Eastern District of California when this action was filed 

because petitioner was then incarcerated at FCI Herlong, which is in the Eastern District. 

Petitioner has since been transferred to FCI Florence, which is in Colorado. However, this court 

may continue to exercise jurisdiction over this action, notwithstanding petitioner’s transfer. See 

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (“‘[J]urisdiction attaches on the initial filing 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 5 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the 

accompanying custodial change’”) (quoting Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm'n, 754 

F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985)); accord Smith v. Campbell, 450 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1971) 

(“We hold that by reason of the fact that the petitioner and his custodian, his immediate 

commanding officer, were within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court at the time the 

petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed, the district court had jurisdiction to determine the 

merits of the litigation . . . subsequent involuntary removal of the petitioner from the district does 

not defeat that jurisdiction when those having present custody of the petitioner are subject to the 

process of the court”). 

D. Due Process in the Disciplinary Hearing Context

 It is well established that inmates subjected to disciplinary action are entitled to certain 

procedural protections under the Due Process Clause but are not entitled to the full panoply of 

rights afforded to criminal defendants. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); see also 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). The Ninth Circuit has observed that prison 

disciplinary proceedings command the least amount of due process along the prosecution 

continuum. United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1296-99 (9th Cir. 1977). 

 An inmate is entitled to no less than 24 hours advance written notice of the charge against 

him as well as a written statement of the evidence relied upon by prison officials and the reasons 

for any disciplinary action taken. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563. The disciplinary hearing must be 

conducted by a person or body that is “sufficiently impartial to satisfy the Due Process Clause.” 

Id. at 571. An inmate also has a right to a hearing at which he may “call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous 

to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. at 566. 

 The decision rendered on a disciplinary charge must be supported by “some evidence” in 

the record. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. A finding of guilt on a prison disciplinary charge cannot be 

“without support” or “arbitrary.” Id. at 457. The “some evidence” standard is “minimally 

stringent,” and a decision must be upheld if there is any reliable evidence in the record that could 

support the conclusion reached by the fact finder. Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 6 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

1994) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 and Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

See also Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1990); Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 

F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). Determining whether this standard is satisfied in a particular case 

does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of 

witnesses, or the weighing of evidence. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir. 

1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Indeed, in 

examining the record, a court is not to make its own assessment of the credibility of witnesses or 

re-weigh the evidence. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. The question is whether there is any reliable 

evidence in the record that could support the decision reached. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105. 

 Where a protected liberty interest exists, the requirements imposed by the Due Process 

Clause are “dependent upon the particular situation being examined.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 

460, 472 (1983). The process due is such procedural protection as may be “necessary to ensure 

that the decision . . . is neither arbitrary nor erroneous.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 

228 (1990). In identifying the safeguards required in the context of disciplinary proceedings, 

courts must remember “the legitimate institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and 

prisoners” and avoid “burdensome administrative requirements that might be susceptible to 

manipulation.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-55. The requirements of due process in the 

prison context involve a balancing of inmate rights and institutional security concerns, with a 

recognition that broad discretion must be accorded to prison officials. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560-63.

III. Petitioner’s Claims 

A. Ground One 

 1. Background 

 In his first ground for relief, petitioner claims that the BOP’s delay in informing him that 

he had a right “to request a blood test that would have exonerated him” violated his right to 

present exculpatory evidence at the disciplinary hearing. ECF No. 1 at 6. Petitioner cites 28 

C.F.R. § 541.5(a), which provides: 

(a) Incident report. The discipline process starts when staff witness 

or reasonably believe that you committed a prohibited act. A staff 

member will issue you an incident report describing the incident 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 7 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

and the prohibited act(s) you are charged with committing. You will 

ordinarily receive the incident report within 24 hours of staff 

becoming aware of your involvement in the incident. 

Petitioner argues that prison staff became aware immediately after March 23, 2013, when his 

urine sample failed a preliminary “cup test” for the presence of contraband, that he may have 

committed a prohibited act. Id. Petitioner also notes that 28 C.F.R. § 550.31(b) provides that if 

institution staff determine that there is no justifiable reason for a positive urine test result, “staff 

shall file an incident report.” Id. He argues that he should have received an incident report 

pursuant to this prison regulation immediately after his urine sample failed the preliminary drug 

test on March 23. Id. at 6-7. Instead, he received no notice that he was under investigation for 

possible use of Methadone until after more than two months had passed, when it was too late to 

verify the results of his urine test. 

 Petitioner also argues that prison staff failed to inform him that he had a right to request 

his own blood test. Id. at 7. He states that this oversight prejudiced him because by the time he 

was advised of the charges against him and the positive urine test, it was too late “for a blood test 

result to be admissible during disciplinary proceedings.” Id. He contends that the drugs 

identified in the urine specimen “did not originate from a sample of his urine” and that, in any 

event, opium and Methadone are “virtually unheard of within BOP facilities.” Id. In 

summarizing his claim, petitioner argues that he was “denied his due process right to present 

available exonerating blood samples, when on March 23, 2013, he was denied his right to timely 

submit a blood sample which would have proven that he is innocent.” Id. at 7-8. Petitioner 

requests that the sanctions imposed on him for his disciplinary conviction “be vacated.” Id. at 8. 

 2. Analysis

 This court finds that the requirements of procedural due process were satisfied with regard 

to petitioner’s disciplinary proceedings. The report of the disciplinary proceedings states, and 

petitioner does not deny, that petitioner received all applicable reports, including the incident 

report, at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing. ECF No. 13-2 at 2. Petitioner was also given 

a written statement of the evidence relied upon by prison officials and the reasons for the 

disciplinary action taken against him. Id. at 5. 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 8 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

There was also “some evidence” supporting petitioner’s disciplinary conviction. As 

described above, the disciplinary hearing officer who found petitioner guilty of this charge relied 

on: (1) the BOP Chain of Custody form for petitioner’s urine sample; (2) the lab report issued by 

Phamatech Laboratories; (3) the memorandum from BOP medical staff to the effect that 

petitioner was not taking any medication that would cause a positive urine test for Methadone; (4) 

the memorandum from reporting employee Boyd; and (5) the April 11, 2013, email from 

Phamatech Laboratories to the effect that petitioner’s urine sample had tested positive for 

Methadone. Id. at 2, 3, 4. This material constitutes “some evidence” to support petitioner’s 

disciplinary conviction. See, e.g., Jones-Heim v. Reed, 241 F. App’x 359, 2007 WL 1748190 at 

*2 (9th Cir. June 6, 2007) (Because petitioner tested positive for drugs in the initial drug test, the 

“some evidence” standard was met under Hill, and his application for habeas corpus was denied); 

White v. Croswell, No. 91-15659, 1992 WL 116292, at *3 (9th Cir. May 29, 1992) (a positive 

urinalysis test proves some evidence of intoxication regardless of the chain of custody; Webb v. 

Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended (Aug. 18, 2000) (same). 

 The essence of petitioner’s due process claim is that he was denied the right to present 

documentary evidence in his defense because he was not given notice of the initial positive urine 

test in time to obtain another test to refute those initial results. As pointed out by respondent, 

however, numerous courts have held that a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to an 

additional drug test to verify the results of an initial positive test. See, e.g., Henson v. U.S. 

Bureau of Prisons, 213 F.3d 897 (5th Cir. 2000) (prisoner did not have a due process right to a 

second test after first urinalysis test came back negative); Harrison v. Dahm, 911 F.2d 37, 41 (8th 

Cir. 1990) (due process does not require prison officials to provide a drug re-test or to provide an 

inmate with the documentary evidence of the results); Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 756 (8th 

Cir. 1986) (although inmates are permitted to present a defense, “[s]tates need not implement all 

possible procedural safeguards against erroneous deprivation of liberty when utilizing results of 

scientific testing devices in accusatory proceedings”); Cato v. Ives, No. CIV. 12-193-GFVT, 2013 

WL 1856101, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2013) (“A prisoner also has no protected due process right 

in obtaining outside scientific or laboratory testing of evidence to be used against him”); 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 9 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

Manfredi v. United States, No. CIV. 12-1905 RMB, 2012 WL 5880343, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 

2012) (no due process right to obtain a second, independent lab test. Accordingly, even if 

petitioner had been notified in a timely manner of the laboratory results, he was not entitled to a 

second drug test to confirm those results. 

 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner had the right to a second drug test, he has failed to 

demonstrate that the BOP’s error in failing to notify him in time to obtain another test resulted in 

prejudice. Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief on this due process claim only if the alleged error 

“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (a 

federal court must assess the prejudicial impact of an error under the Brecht standard in all habeas 

cases). The erroneous denial of the right to present evidence at a disciplinary hearing is subject to 

harmless error review. Knight v. Evans, No. C 05-3670 SBA (PR), 2008 WL 4104279, at *14 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2008) (citing Grossman v. Bruce, 447 F.3d 801, 805 (10th Cir. 2006) (joining 

the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits applying harmless error review to disciplinary 

proceedings in federal prisons). In the absence of evidence that a second drug test would have 

tested negative for the presence of Methadone, this court cannot find that the staff’s failure to 

alert him to the positive test in time to obtain another test had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence on the DHO’s verdict. Petitioner’s unsupported allegations that he is innocent of the 

charges fail to establish that the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient. See Jones v. 

Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (“conclusory allegations which are not supported by a 

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”) Further, any independent testing of the 

urine sample would be of little consequence in a prison disciplinary proceeding. At best, such 

evidence could be used to attack the accuracy of the prison's testing procedures. It would not 

discount the fact that “some” evidence supports the conclusion of the disciplinary board, which is 

all that the constitution requires. 

 For the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his due process claims. 

///// 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 10 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

B. Ground Two

 In his second ground for relief, petitioner claims that “BOP’s staff 69 day delay in serving 

Mr. White the incident report went far beyond what should be reasonable under 28 C.F.R. 

§ 550.31(b).” ECF No. 1 at 8. Petitioner argues that an incident report “should have been issued 

immediately.” Id. He contends that “because the BOP abused its discretion under Section 

550.31(b) by not issuing an incident report on March 23, 2013, the disciplinary sanctions should 

be vacated.” Id. 

 Petitioner’s second claim alleges solely a violation of prison regulations. Petitioner’s 

argument that prison staff violated a prison regulation in failing to issue him an incident report in 

a timely manner is not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Rivera v. Illinois, 

556 U.S. 148, 158 (2009) (“[A] mere error of state law . . . is not a denial of due process”) 

(quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121, n. 21 (1982) and Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 

72-73 (1991)); Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A] prison official's 

failure to follow the prison's own policies, procedures or regulations does not constitute a 

violation of due process, if constitutional minima are nevertheless met”) (citations omitted)). 

Here, petitioner received the incident report at least 24 hours prior to his disciplinary hearing. 

Accordingly, constitutional minima were met. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of 

Court is directed to randomly assign a United States District judge to this action. 

 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 11 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: July 25, 2016.

Case 2:15-cv-00242-GEB-EFB Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 12 of 12