Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01356/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01356-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benito Aguilar
Plaintiff
T. Bingamon
Defendant
Kim Holland
Defendant
A. Joaquin
Defendant
Khan Lee
Defendant
S. Shiesha
Defendant
Harold Tate
Defendant
L.D. Zamora
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Background

Plaintiff Benito Aguilar (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his complaint on

August 26, 2013. On April 23, 2014, the Court screened the complaint and dismissed it with leave 

to amend. On May 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. On October 2, 2014, 

Plaintiff moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, and the Court granted Plaintiff’s 

motion on October 15, 2014. On September 16, 2015, the Court screened the Second Amended 

Complaint and struck it for failing to comply with the Court’s screening order. Plaintiff was 

granted leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). On October 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed a 

TAC which is currently pending before this Court. 

BENITO AGUILAR

Plaintiff,

v.

KIM HOLLAND, et al., 

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:13-cv-01356-LJO-DLB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S THIRD

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 

PREJUDICE

 [ECF No. 26]

 THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Id.

II. Discussion

A. Facts

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Folsom State Prison. He brings claims concerning 

events which occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at California Correction Institution (“CCI”) 

in Tehachapi, California. Plaintiff names as Defendants: Warden Kim Holland, Dr. Harold Tate, 

Dr. Khan Lee, Dr. T. Bingamon, Dr. A. Joaquin, Dr. S. Shiesha, Chief California Correctional 

Healthcare Services Officer L.D. Zamora, Deputy Director of Policy and Risk Management 

Services of California Correctional Healthcare Services J. Lewis, CCI Chief Executive Officer D. 

Longcrier, CCI Chief Physician and Surgeon U. Baniga, Healthcare Services Appeals Coordinator 

L. Ledford, CCI Appeals Coordinator J. Wood, Dr. R. Allen, Dr. Mehul Taylor, and Dr. Young N. 

Paik.

Plaintiff states that on March 12, 2008, he was the victim of a serious physical assault and 

battery. He sustained various serious injuries including: dislocated left elbow, left arm fracture, 

ligament and nerve damage from the left hand to the left shoulder, left shoulder dislocation, rotator 

cuff tear, and left arm biceps tear. Plaintiff experiences numbness extending down his left upper 

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extremities; pain to his left shoulder blade, tailbone, lower back, jaw, neck, head, right leg, and 

right ankle; and dizziness. Plaintiff continues to complain of pain, discomfort, suffering, and 

emotional distress as a result of these injuries.

Plaintiff has sought and continues to seek medical attention for his pain and suffering. He 

has filed grievances on numerous occasions through the assigned nurses and doctors, and has 

presented personally recommended medical documents to the CCI medical personnel, the medical 

Authorization Review Committee, appeals coordinators, and administration in order to be seen by 

a physician or orthopedist but his requests have been denied or delayed.

Plaintiff underwent surgery on July 10, 2013. Plaintiff complains that prior to and 

following the surgery, he was not given a comprehensive accommodation chrono for special 

handcuffing to accommodate his pain, discomfort, suffering and straining to his left shoulder, arm 

and elbow. He was given an assistive device and sling for post-surgery by Dr. K. Lee or Dr. H. 

Tate, but he was not given an accommodation post-surgery for special handcuffing. Plaintiff 

complains his post-operative care was handled in an unprofessional manner inconsistent with 

CDCR policies. As a result, Plaintiff continues to go through significant discomfort, pain, 

suffering, and emotional distress.

Plaintiff informed Dr. H. Tate that Dr. Mehul Taylor had recommended an MRI of his left 

shoulder to evaluate and follow up post-surgery. Plaintiff claims the follow-up appointments were 

handled in an unprofessional manner inconsistent with CDCR policies. Specialty clinic personnel 

neglected to adhere to follow-up appointments which further delayed medical treatment. In 

addition, Joseph L. McQuirter, D.D.S., recommended that Plaintiff be evaluated by a neurologist 

and orthopedic surgeon for his shoulder but it was handled in an unprofessional manner 

inconsistent with CDCR policies.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive and nominal damages against all Defendants.

B. Linkage

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must link the named defendants to the participation in the 

violation at issue. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009); 

Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of 

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Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). Liability may not be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior, and some causal 

connection between the conduct of each named defendant and the violation at issue must exist. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-

75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to link Defendants Holland, Bingamon, Joaquin, Shiesha, Zamora, 

Lewis, Longcrier, Baniga, Ledford, Wood, Allen, Taylor, and Paik to any specific conduct. 

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against these Defendants.

C. Eighth Amendment – Medical Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff raises claims under Section 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary 

infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim does not 

rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the 

prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted 

with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). In order to find 

a prison official liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of 

confinement within a prison, the official must know “that inmates face a substantial risk of serious 

harm and disregard[] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and (2) a 

deliberately indifferent response by defendant. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2006). The deliberate indifference standard is met by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Id.

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The failure to respond to a prisoner’s complaints of pain can be sufficient to support an 

Eighth Amendment claim. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 2012); Clement v. 

Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). However, deliberate indifference must be shown and it 

is a high legal standard. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060 (quotation marks omitted). “Under this 

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the 

inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been 

aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter 

how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 

2002)).

“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner - or between medical 

professionals - concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 

F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744F.3d 

1046 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson 

v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that the course of 

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the 

defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 

681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for medical deliberate indifference against any 

Defendants. The Court recognizes Plaintiff’s continuing pain, however, Plaintiff’s allegations 

against Defendants do not rise to the high legal standard required to constitute deliberate 

indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. Defendants repeatedly examined Plaintiff and treated 

him with pain medication, slings, and assistive devices for his injuries. Although Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendants incorrectly treated Plaintiff’s injuries, which caused him serious pain, medical 

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Taylor recommended a MRI 

of his shoulder but Defendant Tate denied Plaintiff this treatment. However, difference of opinion 

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between a physician and the prisoner or between medical professionals concerning what medical 

care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference. Snow, 681 F.3d at 987. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state any claims for medical deliberate indifference to support an 

Eighth Amendment claim.

D. State Law Claims—Medical Malpractice

California’s Tort Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its 

employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, 

formerly known as the State Board of Control, no more than six months after the cause of action 

accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2. Presentation of a written claim, 

and action on or rejection of the claim, are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Superior Court of 

Kings Cnty. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1245 (2004); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 

F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must 

allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act. State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th at 1245; Mangold, 

67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the Tort Claims Act and therefore fails to state a 

claim for medical malpractice against any defendants.

E. Supervisory Liability

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must link the named defendants to the participation in the 

violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 

609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 

2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Liability may not be imposed on 

supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77, 129 

S.Ct. at 1948-49; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934, 

and as administrators, Defendants may only be held liable if they “participated in or directed the 

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. 

denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler 

II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 

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F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). Some culpable action or inaction must be attributable to 

Defendants and while the creation or enforcement of, or acquiescence in, an unconstitutional 

policy, may support a claim, the policy must have been the moving force behind the violation. 

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205; Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2001); Redman v. Cnty. 

of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th 

Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff lists a number of Defendants who were supervisors or persons in position of 

authority, including Defendants Holland, Joaquin, Shiesha, Zamora, Lewis, Longcrier, Baniga, 

Ledford, and Wood, however, these Defendants were not present for any of the incidents Plaintiff 

alleges. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants participated, directed, or knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated any claims against

Defendants Holland, Joaquin, Shiesha, Zamora, Lewis, Longcrier, Baniga, Ledford, and Wood

under a theory of supervisor liability.

F. Retaliation

“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to 

be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). Also protected by the First 

Amendment is the right to pursue civil rights litigation in federal court without retaliation. Silva v. 

Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of 

First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took 

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and 

that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, Plaintiff fails to show how any Defendants took any adverse action against him 

because of protected conduct, and that such action chilled his First Amendment rights. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of retaliation against any Defendant.

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G. Substantive Due Process

Plaintiff alleges, without elaboration, that Defendants’ actions also violated his due process 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, “[t]o establish a violation of substantive due 

process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required to prove that a challenged government action was 

clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 

morals, or general welfare. Where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of 

constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not 

the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing a 

plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal 

quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845 (1997); County of Sacramento v. 

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations implicate the First and Eighth Amendments, and 

therefore, those Amendments “provide[] [the] explicit textual source of constitutional protection . . 

. .” Patel, 103 F.3d at 874. Plaintiff may not attempt to also pursue a substantive due process 

claim based on his allegations.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 

1983. Plaintiff was previously provided with opportunities to amend and he was unable to cure 

the deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1130. Based on the nature of the deficiencies, further leave to amend is not warranted, and the 

Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed, without leave to amend, for failure to state a 

claim under section 1983;

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment; and

3. The dismissal count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) 

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

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objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2016 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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