Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00989/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00989-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ledbetter
Defendant
Aaron D. Seymour
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON D. SEYMOUR,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEDBETTER,

Defendant.

Case No.: 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB (PC)

ORDER VACATING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS 

CLAIM THREE IN PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT

(Doc. 11)

FIRST SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Aaron D. Seymour is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 24, 2023, this Court issued Findings and Recommendations to Dismiss Claim 

Three in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 11.) Upon further consideration, this Court will vacate the 

Findings and Recommendations and issue its First Screening Order, granting Plaintiff leave to 

amend Claim Three in his original complaint should he elect to do so. 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 

Case 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB Document 13 Filed 05/16/23 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 

it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 

theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 

“a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 

quotation marks & citation omitted). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 

conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 

any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 

liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 

theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 

of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 

pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 

quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 

sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

Case 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB Document 13 Filed 05/16/23 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 

B. Linkage and Causation

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 

rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 

section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 

743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint 

Plaintiff names Correctional Lieutenant G.A. Ledbetter at Wasco State Prison as the sole 

Defendant in this action. (Doc. 1 at 1-2.) He asserts three separate claims. (Id. at 4-6.) Plaintiff 

seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages totaling $450,000. (Id. at 7.)

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff has provided separate supporting facts as to each claim. Therefore, the Court will 

address each claim in order, summarizing the facts relevant to that claim before performing its 

analysis.

Claim One

The Facts Alleged

Plaintiff contends that on February 10, 2022, during a rules violation hearing conducted 

by Defendant Ledbetter, Plaintiff informed Ledbetter he intended to pursue judicial review of 

Ledbetter’s biased ruling. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff shared a court document to show Ledbetter “how 

this happened before” and advised Ledbetter he had “an open civil suit on his constituents about 

the carcinogenic water” at Wasco State Prison, identifying Ledbetter, “H. Shirley, I. Cronjager & 

S. Degough” as administrators. (Id.) Plaintiff contends Ledbetter scoffed and stated nothing 

Case 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB Document 13 Filed 05/16/23 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

would come of the suit. (Id.) Plaintiff walked away, but Ledbetter called him back. (Id.) Plaintiff 

contends Ledbetter also then called Plaintiff’s “witness to the rules violation hearing, which was 

already over” despite Plaintiff stating he did not need a witness because the hearing had 

concluded. (Id.) Plaintiff’s witness, Markeith Davis, was present when Ledbetter “told another 

inmate in front of other race inmates” and a correctional officer that Plaintiff was “a jail house 

snitch” and that Davis “had numerous contraband cellphones for sale & was operating an illegal 

business.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Ledbetter’s comments put his life at risk “in clear retaliation” for 

Plaintiff filing suit against Ledbetter’s “constituents.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends inmates approached 

him afterwards and made threatening gestures and sent a threatening letter. (Id.) Plaintiff states he 

“documented all of this w/the prison litigation.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges “[f]uture injury is a big 

possibility as the target [Ledbetter] put on [his] back is real.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends he suffered 

physical ailments “from the poison water,” that Ledbetter “is impeding” on his ability to get a 

remedy, and he has suffered “emotional stress fear of pertinant [sic] danger.” (Id.) 

Legal Standards and Analysis

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances and retaliation against 

prisoners for exercising this right is a constitutional violation. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

566 (9th Cir. 2005). A claim for First Amendment retaliation in the prison context requires: (1) 

that a state actor took some adverse action against the plaintiff (2) because of (3) the plaintiff’s 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights, and (5) “the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Id. at 567-

68. To prove the second element, retaliatory motive, plaintiff must show that his protected 

activities were a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant’s challenged conduct. 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff must provide direct or 

circumstantial evidence of defendant’s alleged retaliatory motive; mere speculation is not 

sufficient. See McCollum v. CDCR, 647 F.3d 870, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2011). In addition to 

demonstrating defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s protected conduct, circumstantial evidence of 

motive may include: (1) proximity in time between the protected conduct and the alleged 

retaliation; (2) defendant’s expressed opposition to the protected conduct; and (3) other evidence 

Case 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB Document 13 Filed 05/16/23 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

showing that defendant’s reasons for the challenged action were false or pretextual. Id. at 882.

Here, liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly stated a First 

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Ledbetter by asserting Ledbetter took adverse 

action against him in the form of publicly identifying Plaintiff as a snitch for having filed a 

lawsuit concerning Wasco State Prison and its administrators, where such an action chilled 

Plaintiff’s ability to exercise his First Amendment rights and did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68.

Claim Two

The Facts Alleged

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Ledbetter’s identifying him as a snitch threatens his 

safety. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff asserts Ledbetter’s “20 plus years” experience indicates Ledbetter 

“knows that to get an inmate hurt, stabbed & killed you use tactics labeling him a snitch or a child 

molester or a rapist.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends Ledbetter used this “dirty trick” to “erase [his] 

existence because of the civil suit.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Ledbetter “conspired within that split 

second to galvanize the rowdy inmate’s violent gang behavior in a plot to have [him] killed.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends the inmates that approached him made it clear that Ledbetter had advised them 

of Plaintiff’s “snitching.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he knows Ledbetter meant what he said “as his 

words wreaked of venom & vengeance, his facial expression was of a tight grimace & his face & 

ears turned a turnip red,” indicating anger. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that anger is a sign of 

Ledbetter’s intent to have him attacked and that the inmates “acted out on his words & lies” 

concerning Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Ledbetter’s actions are “a clear violation, as these types 

of allegations are long lasting within the Prison community & danger still & forever will loom.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff’s injuries include emotional trauma and stress and inmates grabbing his arms 

aggressively and interrogating him fiercely. (Id.) 

Legal Standards and Analysis

Prison officials have a duty “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of 

inmates, which has been interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners.” Labatad v. 

Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 

Case 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB Document 13 Filed 05/16/23 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) & Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005)). To 

establish a violation of this duty, a prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate 

indifference to threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate.” Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160 (citing 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)).

A failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment requires a showing that “the 

official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate ... safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

837. “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of 

fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, 

... and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very 

fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842 (citations omitted). The duty to protect a prisoner from 

serious harm requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety and 

well-being of the prisoner. Id. at 832-33; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). As 

“only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment,” plaintiff 

must allege facts showing the defendant acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal quotations marks, emphasis & citations omitted). 

Here, liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an Eighth 

Amendment threat to safety/failure to protect claim against Ledbetter by asserting Ledbetter knew 

his act of identifying Plaintiff as a snitch would place Plaintiff at substantial risk or serious risk of 

harm and that Ledbetter disregarded the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33, 837. 

Claim Three

Plaintiff’s third claim for relief is entitled “Slander of character & moral debilitation.” 

(Doc. 1 at 6.) 

The Facts Alleged

Plaintiff contends Defendant Ledbetter “told an untruth” about him and his character. 

(Doc. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff asserts he “strive[s] hard everyday in college & amongst [his] prison 

community to uplift & empower those that society has thrown away.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends 

Ledbetter makes Plaintiff “seem to be untrustworthy in an attempt to help cover-up the fact this 

prison has carcinogenic water” the inmates drink and that is killing Plaintiff and causing others 

Case 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB Document 13 Filed 05/16/23 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

“extreme bodily harm.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he has uncovered the truth about misallocated 

federal funds to fix the “toxic water & by slandering” Plaintiff’s character, Ledbetter’s “lies & 

defamatory titles” discredit Plaintiff’s discovery. (Id.) He concludes that he “pray[s] this Court 

sees this for what it is. A Hit on my life by G.A. Lt. Ledbetter.” (Id.) Plaintiff states his character 

is now damaged and “an untruth hangs over” his head and his “mental illness has dropped.” (Id.) 

Legal Standards and Analysis

Plaintiff’s third cause of action appears to allege state law claims for slander and/or 

defamation. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original 

jurisdiction, the “district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are 

so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same 

case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” except as provided in 

subsections (b) and (c). The Supreme Court has stated that “if the federal claims are dismissed 

before trial, ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff 

must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Here, as noted 

above, Plaintiff has stated two cognizable claims for relief under federal law. Significantly 

however, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has complied with the Government Torts Claim Act. 

Before the Court can consider the validity of Plaintiff's state claims against any defendant, 

Plaintiff must allege compliance with the California’s Government Tort Claims Act. The Act 

requires would-be tort plaintiffs to present their claims against public entities to the California 

Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, no more than six months after the cause of 

action accrues. See Cal. Govt. Code, §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2. Presentation of a 

written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim, are prerequisites to filing suit. State v. 

Superior Court of Kings Cnty. (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004); Mabe v. San 

Bernardino Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 111 (9th Cir. 2001). If Plaintiff has 

failed to comply with the Government Torts Claims Act, he may not bring any state law tort 

Case 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB Document 13 Filed 05/16/23 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

claims in this action, regardless of the merits of those claims. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles 

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Notably, too, the prison’s grievance process does 

not satisfy California’s Government Torts Claims Act. See, e.g., Flores v. Soto, No. 1:14-cv01899-SKO (PC), 2015 WL 6555096, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2015). 

In sum, Plaintiff has not specifically alleged compliance with the Government Torts Claim 

Act by asserting he has exhausted his claim with the California Victim Compensation and 

Government Claims Board. Because Plaintiff may be able to cure this deficiency by amending his 

complaint, assuming he can do so in good faith, Plaintiff will be afforded such an opportunity. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the above, the Court finds Plaintiff has stated cognizable First Amendment 

retaliation and Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendant Ledbetter. 

However, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any other cognizable claim against any other 

defendant. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his complaint to cure the identified 

deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. 

If Plaintiff does not wish to file a first amended complaint and he is agreeable to 

proceeding only on the cognizable claims identified herein by the Court, he may file a notice 

informing the Court that he does not intend to amend, and he is willing to proceed only on his 

cognizable claims. 

If Plaintiff wishes to file a first amended complaint, any such amended complaint should 

be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as 

true, the “[f]actual allegation must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level ....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Further, the amended complaint shall be 

no longer than a total of 25 pages, including the text and any exhibits. 

Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 

“buckshot” complaints). 

Case 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB Document 13 Filed 05/16/23 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, any first amended 

complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” 

Local Rule 220.

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations issued April 24, 2023 (Doc. 11) are 

VACATED;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and,

3. Within 21 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

(a) Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a first amended 

complaint and he is willing to proceed only on the First Amendment retaliation and 

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendant Ledbetter; the 

remaining claims against any defendant to be dismissed; or 

(b) File a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order; or 

(c) in the alternative, file a notice of voluntary dismissal (Fed. R. Civ. P. 

41(a)(1)(i)); and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this 

action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and 

for failure to prosecute. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2023 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:22-cv-00989-JLT-CDB Document 13 Filed 05/16/23 Page 9 of 9