Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05173/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05173-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maggie Harrel
Appellant
Wal-Mart Group Health Plan
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAGGIE HARREL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

F I L +- • .0 

United Stat.ea Coun of Ap)}OIJ, Tenth -Circuit 

FEB 2 5 199J 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

v. 

WAL-MART GROUP HEALTH PLAN, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 92-5173 

(D.C. No. 91-C-503-E) 

( N. D. Okla . ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

The issue in this c~se is whether the district court properly 

granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart Group Health Plan because it 

was undisputed that Maggie Harrel was not an employee of Wal-Mart 

on January 28, 1991, when she incurred medical expenses for which 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-5173 Document: 010110176477 Date Filed: 02/25/1993 Page: 1 
she now seeks compensation, and she did not elect continuation 

coverage . 

We review an order granting summary judgment by the same 

standards as the trial court. Considine v. Board of County 

Comm'rs, 910 F.2d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1990). If no genuine issue 

of material fact exists, the movant is entitled to summary 

judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 250 (1986). We do not, however, weigh the evidence or 

adjudge credibility on the basis of affidavits. If a dispute as 

to a material fact exists, then summary judgment is inappropriate . 

We conclude the district court was in error that there did 

not exist a material dispute as to Ms. Harrel's employment status 

on January 2 8, 1991, and accordingly reverse the grant of summary 

judgment. 

I 

The district court determined there was no dispute Ms. Harrel 

was terminated from her employment on January 26, 1991, and that 

this was two days prior to the medical operation for which she 

seeks compensation. 

of termination and 

It also determined she received notification 

of her right to continuation coverage on 

February 10, 1991, and that she fa i led to elect continuation 

coverage within the allotted time. Because she was terminated on 

January 26, 1991, and neglected to elect continuation coverage , 

the district court granted Wal-Mart Group Health Plan summary 

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judgment with respect to claims for medical expenses incurred by 

Ms. Harrel on January 28, 1991. 

Ms. Harrel contends the district court was in error that it 

was undisputed she was terminated on January 26, 1991. This fact 

is clearly material as Ms. Harrel is presumably entitled to 

reimbursement of medical expenses incurred while she was an 

employee of Wal-Mart. If she was an employee on January 28, 1991, 

she may be entitled to her medical expenses notwithstanding her 

failure to elect continuation coverage. 

II 

Wal-Mart Group Health Plan's motion for summary judgment 

repeatedly stated that it was an undisputed fact that Ms. Harrel's 

employment "ended" on Saturday, January 26, 1991. The motion had 

attached thereto certain evidentiary material establishing this 

fact including: (1) excerpts of Ms. Harrel's deposition wherein 

she testified that when she applied for unemployment benefits she 

stated her employment e~ded on January 26, and that she submitted 

this application on January 26; (2) a Wal-Mart record entitled 

"Notice of Separation" evidencing that Ms. Harrel was terminated 

on January 26, and that an "exit interview" had been conducted; 

and (3 ) another Wal-Mart record entitled "Associate Exit 

Interview" showing that Ms . Harrel had voluntarily terminated her 

employment on January 26 due to the fact she was dissatisfied with 

her work hours. 

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Ms. Harrel responded to this motion for summary judgment by 

attaching her affidavit and excerpts from a Wal-Mart employee's 

deposition. In her affidavit she recited: "I did not quit my 

employment, nor was I asked to resign . " She also stated that 

several days after January 26 she went in to receive her paycheck 

and was asked to sign a "letter of resignation, " which she refused 

to sign. Ms. Harrel also attached a payroll stub from Wal-Mart 

evidencing the deduction of medical insurance in April 1991. The 

deposition evidence shows that after January 26, and prior to her 

surgery, she requested a "leave of absence" which the Wal-Mart 

employee thought was unusual but permitted her to execute, but did 

not approve. 

Wal-Mart Group Health Plan, as the moving party, met its 

initial burden. The clearly established gist of Wal-Mart Group 

Health Plan's evidentiary materials was that Ms. Harrel's 

employment ended on January 26, 1991, due to her voluntary 

resignation because she was dissatisfied with her working hours. 

As the moving party met ~ts burden, the burden shifted to the 

nonmoving party 

material fact. 

denied she had 

to demonstrate a 

Ms. Harrel met her 

quit. In support 

dispute existed concerning a 

burden. She specifically 

of her denial, she produced 

evidence consistent with her continued employment , i.e., a request 

for a leave of absence and a later request to sign a letter of 

resignation. Ms. Harrel further attached to her response a 

paycheck stub for the pay period April 6, 1991, to April 19, 1991, 

evidencing a deduction for medical insurance. The nonmoving party 

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has the obligation to set forth specific facts showing the genuine 

factual issue. Ordinarily, the mere denial of a fact is not 

sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; however, in 

the case before us Ms. Harrel coupled her denial with additional 

facts including the request for a letter of resignation and a 

subsequent payroll deduction. Wal-Mart Group Health Plan filed a 

reply showing the later payroll deduction was not what it appeared 

to be; however, factual issues are not to be resolved with 

affidavits. 

We therefore conclude and hold that a genuine issue of 

material fact existed as to whether Ms. Harrel's employment was 

ended on January 26, 1991. The judgment of the district court is 

REVERSED and REMANDED to the district court for such other and 

further proceedings as might be just and proper. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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