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Parties Involved:
Ames Construction, Inc.
Petitioner
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 5, 2012 Decided April 17, 2012

No. 11-1303

AMES CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

AND SECRETARY OF LABOR,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

Mark N. Savit argued the cause for petitioner. With him 

on the briefs were Caroline A. Davidson-Hood and Gregory 

Louer. 

Robin A. Rosenbluth, Senior Attorney, U.S. Department 

of Labor, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the 

brief was W. Christian Schumann, Counsel. John T. Sullivan, 

Attorney, Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 

entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: This case arises out of 

a tragic accident in which William Kay, an 81-year-old truck 

driver for Bob Orton Trucking Co., was killed by a large pipe 

that fell off of his truck during a delivery of such pipes to the 

Kennecott Utah Copper Mine. Petitioner Ames Construction, 

Inc. is an independent contractor hired by the mine’s owner, 

Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation, to construct a tailings 

dam; it was responsible for receiving deliveries of materials 

such as the pipes in question. It is uncontested that Kay 

himself was negligent and equally uncontested that Ames was 

not his employer. Neither the Secretary nor the Commission 

relies on any finding of negligence on the part of Ames. The

Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) cited 

Ames for a violation of the Federal Mine Safety and Health 

Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified at 30 

U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.).

On review, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 

Commission upheld the citation. It found that Ames, though 

not the principal operator of the mine, “supervised a process, 

the unloading of pipes,” and that as a supervisor of that 

process it could be liable without fault for violations occurring 

in the process. See Secretary of Labor v. Ames Construction, 

Inc., Docket No. WEST 2009-693-M, 2011 WL 3794313, at 

*4-5 (FMSHRC July 25, 2011). Ames challenges that 

conclusion both as a matter of statutory interpretation and on 

the facts. Though the statutory structure invites considerable 

confusion, we find the Commission’s conclusion consistent 

with the act, and we find substantial evidence in support of its

necessary factual findings. 

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* * *

We first summarize the facts and procedural history. On 

October 29, 2008 Kay arrived at the Kennecott Tailings 

Facility to deliver nine large (50-foot long, 3000-pound) pipes 

to be used in the tailings dam that Ames was building. 

Pursuant to Kennecott’s internal policy and an MSHA order 

relating to Kennecott’s use of unbermed roads, Kay and his 

truck were escorted by three Ames employees to an unloading 

location, where he was told to “wait right here” with one of 

the Ames employees (Juan Florez) while the others went to 

get a forklift. A safety document from the pipe manufacturer, 

found in Kay’s truck, warned that the straps on the pipes

should not be loosened or removed until the load had been 

checked for stability. At a point when Florez’s attention was 

on the road, Kay began loosening the straps on the truck; one 

of the pipes fell and crushed him. 

An MSHA inspector investigated the accident and cited 

Ames for violating 30 C.F.R. § 56.9201, which prohibits the 

unloading of supplies in a hazardous manner. MHSA Citation

No. 6328009 (Dec. 11, 2008), J.A. 1. Although the ALJ who 

initially considered Ames’s challenge sustained the citation on 

the theory that Orton (Kay’s employer) was Ames’s 

subcontractor, see Secretary of Labor v. Ames Construction, 

Inc., 32 FMSHRC 347, 350-53 (2010), we need not dwell on 

that theory, as the Secretary repudiated it before the 

Commission. The latter, as we said, affirmed on the view that 

as supervisor of “a process, the unloading of pipes,” Ames 

was liable without regard to fault for violations occurring in 

that process. Ames petitioned this court for review under 30 

U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). 

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* * *

Section 110(a) of the act creates liability for operators of 

coal or other mines: 

The operator of a coal or other mine in which a violation 

occurs of a mandatory health or safety standard or who 

violates any other provision of this chapter, shall be 

assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary. . . . 

30 U.S.C. § 820(a). Section 3(d) of the act defines who is an 

operator: 

“operator” means [1] any owner, lessee, or other person 

who operates, controls, or supervises a coal or other mine 

or [2] any independent contractor performing services or 

construction at such mine. 

30 U.S.C. § 802(d) (bracketed numbers added). In Secretary 

of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 

2006), we adopted a regulatory usage characterizing the first 

set of operators—those who operate, control, or supervise a 

mine—as “production-operators.” Id. at 152; see 30 C.F.R. 

§ 45.2(d) (definition of “production-operator”). 

Ames concedes that it is an operator under the second 

part of § 3(d), as an “independent contractor performing 

services.” See Petitioner’s Br. 10. But it contends that 

“[o]perators . . . are not all alike,” id., and that only 

“production-operators” can be cited for violations without 

fault. It is quite true that our cases finding § 110(a) to create 

liability without regard to fault have applied that proposition 

exclusively to production-operators. See, e.g., International 

Union, United Mine Workers of America v. FMSHRC, 840 

F.2d 77, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“UMWA”). Indeed, we said 

recently: “[A]n entity cannot be held liable [under § 110(a)] 

unless it ‘operates, controls, or supervises’ the mine,” 

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Secretary of Labor v. National Cement Co., 573 F.3d 788, 795 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added), incorporating verbatim the 

first part of § 3(d)’s definition. But we need not decide here 

whether liability without fault could ever be assigned to an 

operator satisfying only the second part of § 3(d). The 

Commission concluded, and the Secretary argues here, only 

that independent contractors who exercise supervision or

control—in other words, ones also covered by the productionoperator portion of § 3(d)—are so liable. As long as the 

Secretary’s and Commission’s conclusions as to Ames’s 

exercise of supervision or control are sustainable, Ames’s 

argument is of no avail. 

Putting aside for the moment the purely factual aspect of 

the Commission’s finding, we address Ames’s conceptual 

attack on its liability as one “who operates, controls, or 

supervises a . . . mine” under § 3(d). First, it says that the 

phrase “the operator” in § 110(a) (emphasis added) must refer 

to a single (production-) operator. As a simple matter of 

language it is hard to see why use of the definite pronoun 

necessarily entails a one-mine, one-operator principle. It is 

true that our cases reading the provision to allow joint and 

several liability among multiple operators, see Twentymile 

Coal Co., 456 F.3d at 155;UMWA, 840 F.2d at 83-84, were 

ones where one firm was a production-operator and another 

merely “perform[ed] services or construction.” But the Ninth

Circuit has explicitly rejected the notion that there can be only 

one production-operator at a mine, Blattner v. Secretary of 

Labor, 152 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 1998), and we agree. 

Where supervision or control of a distinct aspect of the mining 

activity is farmed out to a firm different from the principal 

production-operator, refusal to apply the act’s liability without 

fault provision would thwart the act’s purposes. 

We assume that Ames is correct in its argument that nofault liability under § 110(a) would be unreasonably 

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expansive if it made all independent contractors—including 

those who were “operators” solely by virtue of “performing 

services” at a mine—liable for all safety violations, even 

violations completely outside the scope of a given

independent contractor’s work. But the argument doesn’t get 

Ames anywhere, given the Secretary’s resting on the 

proposition, adopted by the Commission, that Ames is liable 

simply for “an unsafe condition that occurred in connection 

with an activity for which it had supervisory responsibility.” 

Ames, 2011 WL 3794313, at *4. 

Ames finally argues that the “Independent Contractor 

Rule” stated in the Secretary’s 1980 enforcement guidelines

supports Ames’s view that independent contractors can only 

be cited for safety violations “committed by them and their 

employees.” See 45 Fed. Reg. 44,494, 44,494-97 (July 1, 

1980). This line of argument is arguably waived, given that 

Ames raises it here for the first time. See 30 U.S.C. 

§ 816(a)(1). In any event we don’t find the language relied on 

by Ames relevant where, as here, an independent contractor 

also meets the definition of production-operator due to its 

supervision or control of part of the mine. See 30 C.F.R. 

§ 45.2(d). 

We therefore conclude that the Secretary’s construction 

of the act is not precluded by its language or otherwise 

unreasonable. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see also 

Secretary of Labor v. Cannelton Industries, 867 F.2d 1432, 

1435 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Chevron deference afforded to 

Secretary’s—as opposed to Commission’s—interpretations of 

law). Her citation of Ames for a safety violation was 

therefore also permissible, as long as Ames did in fact 

supervise or control unloading operations so as to render it a 

production-operator of that part of the mine under § 3(d). We 

now turn to that issue.

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* * *

Ames argues that even if an independent contractor who 

supervises or controls a mine or portion of a mine can be 

liable without fault under § 110(a), the Commission’s finding 

that Ames supervised the unloading of deliveries to the mine 

here was not supported by substantial evidence, see 30 U.S.C. 

§ 816(a)(1), and that Ames’s opportunity to present 

countervailing evidence on this point was deficient. We are 

not persuaded on either score.

Ames’s first theory is that because of presumed error in 

the ALJ’s finding that Orton was Ames’s subcontractor, none 

of her opinion can support the Commission’s holding resting 

on Ames’s supervision of the unloading process.1

These uncontested propositions easily support the 

conclusion that Ames supervised the unloading process. 

But Ames 

does not seriously contest the key facts on which the 

Commission relied. In particular, the record establishes that: 

(1) Kay was escorted to the delivery drop-off location by a 

crew of three Ames employees, as required per an agreement 

with MSHA; (2) Kay was left with Ames employee Juan 

Florez and told to “wait right here” while the other two 

employees went to retrieve a forklift; (3) truck drivers like 

Kay typically loosen the straps on the truck but “the 

remainder of the process is left to the contractor who is in 

charge of the site”; and (4) Ames had the authority to stop 

work that created a danger to employees or property and to 

ensure unsafe conditions were corrected. See Ames, 32 

FMSHRC at 349; Ames, 2011 WL 3794313, at *5.

 1 The Commission reserved the question of whether Ames was 

also liable under § 110(a) due to “controlling” the physical area of 

the mine where the violation occurred. Ames, 2011 WL 3794313, 

at *4 n.5. 

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Ames itself even stipulated that “Orton drivers are instructed 

to follow the policies and procedures of the recipient 

regarding safety and the unloading process. Orton drivers are 

instructed to follow the instructions of the supervisor of the 

unloading process.” Ames, 2011 WL 3794313, at *5. Ames 

argues that it had “no authority to require Mr. Kay to abide by 

their policies or to discipline him if he [did] not.” Petitioner’s 

Br. 32. True enough, but Ames’s conceded authority to stop 

danger-creating work, as well as the specific authority its 

employees actually exercised in this case (e.g., “wait right 

here”), clearly support the conclusion that it had assumed a 

supervisory role. Indeed, Ames said in its post-hearing brief 

before the ALJ that it “was responsible for the unloading 

process,” and “asserted its control of the unloading process 

when [its employee] instructed Mr. Kay to ‘Wait right here. 

We’ll be right back with a forklift to unload you.’” Ames’s 

Post-Hearing ALJ Br. 11, J.A. 152. 

Ames argues that it should have been able to present 

evidence directed at disproving its supervision and control of 

unloading, on the grounds that the trial before the ALJ did not 

focus heavily on the Secretary’s theory of strict liability under 

§ 110(a). But “[n]o objection that has not been urged before 

the Commission shall be considered by the [reviewing circuit] 

court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall 

be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” 30 

U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). The circumstances do not seem 

extraordinary. Ames was on notice that supervision and 

control were at issue no later than when it filed its reply brief 

before the Commission, yet it never argued that it needed an 

opportunity to present evidence focused on those issues. See 

Ames’s FMSHRC Reply Br. 8-10, J.A. 265-67; see also 

Ames’s FMSHRC Br. 15-16, J.A. 225-26 (Ames arguing in 

opening brief to the Commission that it “was not in a 

supervisory position at the time Mr. Kay began unstrapping 

the load”). Moreover, a party applying to a circuit court for 

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leave to adduce additional evidence must “show to the 

satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is

material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure 

to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the 

Commission,” 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1); yet Ames has not even 

attempted to satisfy that standard here. 

Finally, Ames argues that the citation must be vacated 

because subjecting it to the Secretary’s “new policy of 

enforcement against third parties,” violates the Due Process 

Clause of the Constitution, amend. v, cl. 4. See Petitioner’s 

Br. 38; Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health 

Rev. Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[D]ue 

process . . . prevents . . . deference from validating the 

application of a regulation that fails to give fair warning of the 

conduct it prohibits or requires.”); see also General Electric 

Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

(reaffirming fair notice requirement in civil administrative 

context). Given what we have said about the adequacy of 

notice to Ames of the Secretary’s reliance on its supervision 

and control of the unloading process, plus the long-established 

liability of production-operators for violations without regard 

to fault, the claim is without substance. 

* * *

Accordingly, the petition for review is

Denied.

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