Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06226/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06226-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Debra L. Blair
Appellee
Red Eagle Resources Corporation
Appellant
Loree J. Stockard
Appellee

Document Text:

I 

. FILED 

Uf11red Scares ,. .. ~ . f 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

v.1~tc O Appeals Tenth Circuir 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JUL 2 7 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

LOREE J. STOCKARD, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

and ) 

) Nos. 90-6393 

DEBRA L. BLAIR, ) & 

) 91-6226 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) (D.C. No. CIV-89-2166) 

) (W. D. Okla.) 

v. ) 

) 

RED EAGLE RESOURCES CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before EBEL and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** Senior 

District Judge. 

**Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior 

States District Court for the District of 

designation. 

District Judge, United 

Colorado, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-6226 Document: 010110270476 Date Filed: 07/27/1992 Page: 1
assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

In appeal No. 90-6393, Defendant Red Eagle Resources Corp. 

appeals the entry of judgment in the amount of $21,080.00 in favor 

of Plaintiff Debra Blair on her Title VII claim. Defendant 

contends that the court erroneously concluded as a matter of law 

that an employer can never discharge an employee for excessive 

absenteeism if the employee's absences are caused by her 

pregnancy, and that the court erroneously failed to cut off 

Defendant's liability for back pay when Plaintiff accepted 

part-time employment and stopped searching for full-time 

employment. In appeal No. 91-6226, Defendant appeals the amount 

of attorney's fees the district court awarded to Plaintiff on her 

successful claims. We affirm. 

I. Liability (No. 90-6393). 

Title VII declares that 

[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 

employer ... to fail to refuse to hire or to discharge 

any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). In 1978, Congress added a definitional 

section to Title VII, known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 

which provides in part that "[t]he terms 'because of sex' or 'on 

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the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or 

on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 

conditions." Id.§ 2000e(k). 

As with other Title VII claims, a plaintiff alleging 

discrimination on the basis of pregnancy may proceed under either 

a disparate impact or a disparate treatment theory. Scherr v. 

Woodland Sch. Community Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974, 979 

(7th Cir. 1988). If she proceeds under a disparate treatment 

theory, like Ms. Blair, the plaintiff may prove her disparate 

treatment theory by using either direct or indirect evidence. 

Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 153 

See 

(1st 

Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff uses indirect evidence, the court 

will apply the familiar burden-shifting analysis set forth in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), and 

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 

252-56 (1981). Under that analysis, if the plaintiff meets her 

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of 

discrimination, the burden of production then shifts to the 

defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 

the challenged employment action. The burden of persuasion 

ultimately rests with the plaintiff, however, who must prove that 

the defendant intentionally discriminated against her. Bell v. 

AT&T, 946 F.2d 1507, 1509-10 (10th Cir. 1991). "A plaintiff may 

succeed in a Title VII action 'either directly by persuading the 

court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 

employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered 

explanation is unworthy of credence.' It is firmly established 

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that this evidence may 'take a variety of forms.'" Luna v. City & 

County of Denver, 948 F.2d 1144, 1148 (10th Cir. 199l)(citations 

omitted). 

Defendant apparently concedes that Ms. Blair met her initial 

burden of establishing a prima facie case, but argues that it 

articulated a legitimate reason for discharging Ms. Blair--

excessive absenteeism. Defendant contends that the district court 

determined as a matter of law, however, that Ms. Blair's 

absenteeism could not be a legitimate reason for her discharge 

because it was caused by her pregnancy. We disagree. 

The district court found that Ms. Blair's position "was one 

with periodic deadlines which made dependability and timely 

performance of assigned tasks essential job qualifications," and 

that her absenteeism because of morning sickness during the two 

months prior to her discharge was a factor in her discharge. 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appellant's App. at 62. 

The court further found, however, that Ms. Blair "was an able and 

competent employee[;] [a]lthough deadlines existed, no deadlines 

were missed." Id. at 63. The court ultimately determined that 

Ms. "Blair's pregnancy as manifested through the related medical 

condition which caused her to be absent from work was the 

determinative and motivating factor in Plaintiff Blair's 

termination." Id. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the court did not 

reject Defendant's articulated business reason as a matter of law. 

Rather, the court apparently found that the articulated reason was 

a pretext for discrimination because it found that Defendant 

discharged Ms. Blair because of her pregnancy. 

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We disagree with Red Eagle Resources that the district court 

concluded as a matter of law that absenteeism can never be a 

legitimate reason for discharge if the absenteeism is caused by an 

employee's pregnancy. The district court found that Ms. Blair's 

pregnancy was the determinative and motivating factor in her 

discharge, and the evidence of record supports this determination. 

Even if the district court erred in considering evidence of how 

Red Eagle Resources treated Cliff Baggett in comparison to how it 

treated Ms. Blair, there was other evidence in the record to 

support the district court's ultimate finding of discrimination. 

II. Damages (No. 90-6393). 

Defendant contends that the district court erred in awarding 

Ms. Blair back pay in the amount of $20,800.00. While Defendant 

acknowledges that Ms. Blair was entitled to some back pay, it 

argues that her right to receive back pay should have ended when 

she accepted part-time work and stopped looking for full-time 

employment. 

The amount 

Title VII suit is 

of back pay to award a successful plaintiff in a 

committed to the trial court's discretion. 

Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). "Absent an abuse of that discretion, 

the appellate court will not disturb the trial court's 

determination. " Id. 

"Unquestionably, wrongfully discharged claimants have an 

obligation to use reasonable efforts to mitigate their damages." 

EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir. 1980). "A 

claimant is required to make only reasonable exertions to mitigate 

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damages, [however,] and is not held to the highest standards of 

diligence." United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 

F.2d 918, 938 (10th Cir. 1979). 

success in finding alternate 

exertion to mitigate damages." 

(citation omitted). 

"Further, mitigation requires not 

employment, but only a reasonable 

Whatley, 707 F.2d at 1138 

The employer bears the burden of showing that the employee 

did not exercise reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. Lee Way 

Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d at 937 . We have held that to 

satisfy its burden, the employer must establish "'(l) that the 

damage suffered by plaintiff could have been avoided, i.e. that 

there were suitable positions available which plaintiff could have 

discovered and for which he was qualified; and (2) that plaintiff 

failed to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking such a 

position.'" Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d at 627 (quoting Sias v. City 

Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

Defendant made the same argument on the limitation of back 

pay to the district court that it makes here. Although the 

district court did not make an express finding that Ms. Blair 

acted reasonably in mitigating her damages, we can imply such a 

finding from the district court's finding that Ms. Blair was 

entitled to the full amount of back pay she requested. The 

court's back pay determination is fully supported by the record. 

The evidence showed that after she was discharged, Ms. Blair 

applied for unemployment compensation and continued to look for 

full-time employment, without success, until she gave birth to her 

child in early December. Sometime in January of 1989, Ms. Blair 

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spoke with her father-in-law, who indicated that a part-time 

secretarial position in his architectural firm would be opening 

soon. Ms. Blair then stopped looking for full-time employment. 

Ms. Blair took the part-time job in her father-in-law's company in 

April, working from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. In June, Ms. Blair acquired 

two more part-time jobs, doing bookkeeping for her father-in-law's 

firm and cleaning an office building. 

Defendant argues that Ms. Blair voluntarily accepted 

part-time work and stopped looking for full-time employment 

because part-time employment better suited her child care 

arrangements. The evidence simply does not support this argument. 

While Ms. Blair was able to make arrangements for her child that 

allowed her to work three part-time jobs, the evidence did not 

suggest that she chose part-time employment over full-time 

employment to suit her child care arrangements. Furthermore, Ms. 

Blair did not act unreasonably by accepting several part-time jobs 

and stopping her search for full-time employment after she had 

fruitlessly searched for full-time employment for many months. 

See Smith v. American Serv. Co. of Atlanta, Inc., 796 F.2d 1430, 

1432 (11th Cir. 1986)(after searching unsuccessfully for full-time 

employment for seven months, plaintiff acted reasonably in 

enrolling in cosmetology school and accepting part-time 

employment); Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 

1275 (4th Cir. 1985)(after searching unsuccessfully for comparable 

work for one year, plaintiff acted reasonably in accepting lower 

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paying job and ceasing his search 

therefore affirm the district 

Blair's Title VII claim. 

for higher paying job). We 

court's award of back pay on Ms. 

III. Attorney's Fees (No. 91-6226). 

In addition to her Title VII claim, Ms. Blair pursued claims 

against Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 

(FLSA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as 

well as pendent state claims for invasion of privacy and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Loree Stockard, 

Ms. Blair's co-plaintiff, also pursued claims against Defendant 

for wrongful termination based on pregnancy in violation of Title 

VII, and for violations of the FLSA and ERISA, as well as pendent 

state claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. The district court entered summary judgment 

against both Plaintiffs on their state law claims and Plaintiffs 

abandoned their ERISA claims prior to trial. Plaintiffs tried 

their Title VII and FLSA claims to the court. The court entered 

judgment in favor of both Plaintiffs on their FLSA claims, entered 

judgment in favor of Defendant on Ms. Stockard's Title VII claim, 

and entered judgment in favor of Ms. Blair on her Title VII claim. 

Both Plaintiffs originally sought attorney's fees for the 

claims on which they prevailed, but later abandoned their request 

for fees on their FLSA claims. Therefore, the only request for 

fees on which the district court ruled was Ms. Blair's request for 

fees incurred on her Title VII claim. The magistrate judge held 

an evidentiary hearing on the fee request and then issued a 

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Recommendation and Report. After reviewing the Recommendation and 

Report, as well as Defendant's objections to it, the district 

court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and conclusions and 

awarded Ms. Blair the amount of fees recommended. Because the 

district court adopted the findings and conclusions contained in 

the Recommendation and Report, we will refer to them as the 

findings and conclusions of the district court. 

A district court may award attorney's fees to a prevailing 

party in an action brought to enforce federal civil rights laws. 

42 u.s.c. § 1988. We will reverse a district court's award of 

fees to the prevailing party only if it represents an abuse of 

discretion. Igbal v. Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n of Am., 

900 F.2d 227, 228 (10th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, we must accept 

the district court's subsidiary findings of fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous. Id. 

The district court properly found that Ms. Blair was the 

prevailing party on her Title VII claim. Defendant does not 

dispute that Ms. Blair was entitled to a fee award, it merely 

challenges the amount of the award she received. Specifically, 

Defendant argues that when calculating the lodestar amount, the 

district court committed clear error by finding that Ms. Blair's 

counsel adequately separated "raw" time from "billable" time. 

Defendant also argues that the district court's ten percent 

downward adjustment in the lodestar amount was not adequate to 

account for Ms. Blair's limited success on her claims. 

In evaluating the district court's rulings, we are guided by 

the Supreme Court's opinion in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S . 424 

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(1983), which sets forth the proper analysis to follow in 

calculating a reasonable fee under§ 1988. First, the court must 

calculate the lodestar amount, which is comprised of "the number 

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a 

reasonable hourly rate." Id. at 433. Counsel seeking attorney's 

fees must keep sufficient time records for the court to determine 

which hours were reasonably expended on the case. Ramos v. Lamm, 

713 F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir. 1983). "When scrutinizing the actual 

hours reported, the district court should distinguish 'raw' time 

from 'hard' or 'billable' time to determine the number of hours 

reasonably expended." Id. 

Because Plaintiffs' counsel represented both Plaintiffs on a 

contingency basis, counsel's records did not clearly designate the 

number of hours spent on the respective claims of each Plaintiff. 

Counsel testified, however, that the fee request excluded over 

sixty hours of time that counsel identified as having been spent 

either on Ms. Stockard's claims or on Ms. Blair's unsuccessful 

claims. Defendant argues that counsel nonetheless failed to 

reduce the "raw" hours adequately to account for (1) the 

duplication of effort required when an associate left the firm one 

month before trial and a new associate began assisting lead 

counsel on the case, (2) the new associate's lack of experience, 

and (3) the performance of duties by paralegals that could have 

been performed by secretaries. 

The record contains evidence to support the district court's 

determination that Ms. Blair's counsel adequately reduced their 

"raw" time in calculating their "billable" time. The l ead counsel 

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testified that although the new associate was not as experienced 

in Title VII cases as the one who left, she did have prior 

experience in employment law, and her role in the trial was 

limited. Therefore, the new associate did not have to become well 

versed in employment law or the factual details of the case to 

assist at trial. Furthermore, while the number of hours the new 

associate spent on the case were proportionately greater than 

those spent by the previous associate, the increase was 

attributable to the normal increase of activity associated with 

trial preparation and presentation. Finally, the tasks billed by 

paralegals that Defendant contends should have been performed by 

secretaries and not billed appear to be tasks commonly performed 

by paralegals. 

The district court had before it a copy of counsel's unedited 

billing sheets, as well as the fees request submitted, and 

counsel's testimony on the fee request. Based on the record 

before it, the court found that it could distinguish "raw" time 

from "billable" time adequately. We cannot say that this finding 

was clearly erroneous. 

After determining the lodestar amount, a court must consider 

whether an upward or downward adjustment is appropriate. Hensley, 

461 U.S. at 434. One of the factors to consider is the result the 

moving party obtained on the merits. "This factor is particularly 

crucial where a plaintiff is deemed 'prevailing' even though he 

succeeded on only some of his claims for relief." Id. In 

evaluating whether the lodestar amount should be adjusted when the 

prevailing party obtained only partial success, the court must 

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consider two questions: (1) whether the claims on which the 

plaintiff did not prevail were related to those on which the 

plaintiff did prevail; and (2) whether "the plaintiff achieve[d] a 

level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a 

satisfactory basis for making a fee award." Id. 

If the claims on which the plaintiff did not prevail were 

based on facts and legal theories unrelated to the claims on which 

the plaintiff did prevail, then the court must treat those 

unsuccessful claims as though they were brought in a different 

suit and may not award fees for the time spent pursuing them. Id. 

at 434-35. If the unsuccessful and successful claims were based 

on related facts or legal theories, however, the district court 

should not regard them as discrete claims. Rather, "the district 

court should focus on the significance of the overall relief 

obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably 

expended on the litigation." Id. at 435. 

"Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his 

attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. . If, on 

the other hand, a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited 

success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an 

excessive amount." Id. at 435-36. In determining an appropriate 

reduction in the lodestar amount to account for only partial 

success, a court "may attempt to identify specific hours that 

should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account 

for the limited success. The court necessarily has discretion in 

making this equitable judgment." Id. at 436-37. 

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This court has upheld the use of a percentage reduction in 

fees to account for partial success on the merits. See, e.g., 

Igbal, 900 F.2d at 228. The Supreme Court, however, has cautioned 

that in reducing fees a court should not use a purely mathematical 

approach that simply compares the number of successful claims 

pursued to the number of unsuccessful claims pursued and reduces 

the award accordingly. Hensley, 424 U.S. at 435 n.11. 

Furthermore, this court has held that a court should not reduce 

fees based solely on the amount of money recovered on the 

successful claims. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 557. 

On appeal, Defendant argues that neither Ms. Stockard's 

claims nor Ms. Blair's nonTitle VII claims were closely related to 

Ms. Blair's Title VII claim. The district court, however, found 

that the facts and issues in the other claims that Plaintiffs' 

counsel pursued were closely related to Ms. Blair's Title VII 

claim. The district court also found that Plaintiffs' counsel 

presented evidence that Ms. Blair's Title VII claim was the main 

claim in her case, and her other claims were minor and did not 

require much time to pursue. Based on the record before us, we 

cannot say that the district court's findings were clearly 

erroneous. 

After considering the 

Ramos and noting that 

guidelines outlined in Hensley 

Defendant suggested the court apply 

and 

"an 

across-the-board percentage reduction in the requested fee, due to 

the inability to determine how much inappropriate time is claimed 

in the application," Recommendation and Report, Appellant's App. 

at 272, the district court reduced the amount of fees requested by 

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ten percent. The court found that "[i]n light of the adjustments 

already made by Plaintiff's counsel and in light of the fact that 

the facts and issues are closely related," a ten percent reduction 

in the fees sought "would amply account for any additional time 

spent by Plaintiff's counsel on [Plaintiff] Stockard's claims or 

on the claims on which Plaintiff Blair was not successful and 

which were not necessarily spent in the prosecution of her Title 

VII claim." Id. at 277. Although Defendant argues on appeal that 

"[a] mere ten percent reduction of the lodestar. could not 

possibly account for time spent on all the plaintiffs' unrelated, 

unsuccessful claims," Brief of Appellant at 19, the record before 

us does not establish that the district court's decision to reduce 

the lodestar amount by only ten percent constituted an abuse of 

discretion. 

Ms. Blair's counsel testified that the only time spent on Ms. 

Stockard's claims that was included in the fee request was time 

counsel would have spent anyway, even if counsel had represented 

only Ms. Blair on her Title VII claim. Counsel also testified 

that the fee request did not include any time spent on the summary 

judgment motions relating to the pendent state claims or on the 

ERISA claims. Counsel opined that the pendent state claims, 

though unsuccessful, were closely related to the Title VII claims. 

Defendant presented 

litigating Title VII 

testimony from an 

cases who opined 

attorney experienced in 

that representing one 

instead of two similarly situated plaintiffs in a Title VII action 

required thirty-five percent less time. He also opined that Ms. 

Blair's fee request should be reduced by ten percent based on 

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counsel's inadequate documentation, and should be reduced by an 

additional ten percent to account for time spent on the pendent 

state law claims. The witness admitted on cross-examination, 

however, that all of his numbers were "arbitrary." Hearing 

Transcript, Appellee's Supplemental App. at 85-87. Because the 

district court's ten percent reduction of the lodestar amount to 

account for time spent on unsuccessful claims not otherwise 

eliminated from Ms. Blair's fee request does not appear to be an 

abuse of discretion based on the record before us, we must affirm 

the district court's award of attorney's fees to Ms. Blair. 

Ms. Blair has requested an award of fees for time spent 

prosecuting these appeals. An appellate court may award a 

prevailing plaintiff the costs and fees incurred in successfully 

defending the merits of her action, as well as her fee award, and 

we conclude an award is appropriate here. See Love v. Mayor, City 

of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235, 237 (10th Cir. 1980)(plaintiff who 

prevails on appeal in civil rights action is entitled to 

attorney's fees for work done on appeal); Igbal, 900 F.2d at 

229-30 (attorney's fees may be awarded to prevailing plaintiff in 

appropriate case for time spent litigating entitlement to fee). 

Accordingly, we remand this matter to the district court to 

calculate the costs and fees to be awarded Ms. Blair for her 

counsel's work in these appeals . 

The judgments of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma in Nos. 90-6393 and 91-6226 are 

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AFFIRMED, and the action is REMANDED for a calculation of costs 

and fees to be awarded Ms. Blair for these appeals. 

Entered for the Court 

John L. Kane, Jr. 

Senior District Judge 

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