Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03168/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03168-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andre P. Clark
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 13, 1998 Decided August 3, 1999

No. 97-3168

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Andre P. Clark,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00006-01)

James M. Johnstone, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Sharon A. Sprague, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Thomas C. Black,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Silberman, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: After a jury trial, defendant Andre Clark was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon, unlawful possession of ammunition by a

convicted felon, and attempted bribery of a government official. He was sentenced to 90 months in prison on each count,

to run concurrently. He challenges his convictions on the

following grounds: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to

warrant conviction on any count; (2) that the district court

abused its discretion and failed to protect him from undue

prejudice by permitting the jury to learn of his prior conviction; and (3) that the district court committed a series of

prejudicial trial errors. We reject all of these challenges.

Clark also contends that he should only have been convicted

once rather than twice for unlawfully possessing both a

firearm and the ammunition with which it was loaded. The

government does not contest this point, and we agree that

defendant is correct. Accordingly, we remand for vacation of

one of the two possession convictions, and otherwise affirm

the district court's judgment in all respects.

I

Early on the morning of December 11, 1996, police officers

Otis McGinnis and Daymeion Harris stopped an automobile

that was traveling over 40 miles per hour in a 25 miles per

hour zone. Andre Clark was the driver and sole occupant of

the car. Officer McGinnis approached the driver's side window, while Officer Harris went to the passenger's side.

McGinnis asked Clark for his driver's license and car registration. Clark reached toward the back seat of the car and

the back floorboard. Tr. 97-98. After feeling around on the

back floorboard, he reached to the back seat and retrieved a

document which he handed to the officer. Tr. 111-15. The

document was a cellular phone contract in the name of Paul

Green. When McGinnis realized what he had been given, he

again asked for a license and registration. Tr. 98, 113-14.

Clark returned the contract to the back seat, felt around

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again, and pulled out the same cellular contract. Id. Finally,

Clark produced an expired learner's permit from New York

which also bore the name Paul Green. Officer McGinnis

asked whether defendant had his license, and when Clark said

he did not, McGinnis asked him to step out of the car. Tr.

98-100, 116-17. After a radio check disclosed that defendant

did not have a valid license, he was placed under arrest for

driving without a permit.

Officer McGinnis then began to search the passenger compartment. The first place he looked was under the rear of

the driver's seat, "because that's where I saw defendant

reaching for his registration." Tr. 101. McGinnis found a

loaded .45-caliber handgun on the floor to the rear of the

seat, and immediately told his partner. Upon hearing this,

Clark said to McGinnis: "I can call my girl right now and

give you $5,000." Tr. 126; see id. at 102-04, 106-08, 140-41.

As Officer Harris placed Clark in the squad car, Clark added:

"Come on, man. I know what you all really want, I know

what you all really want. You all could just go ahead and let

me go. I know what you all really want." Tr 142, 167.

Clark also told the officers his name was Paul Green. Tr.

142-43.

Clark was indicted on three counts: (1) unlawful possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(1); (2) unlawful possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, also in violation of section 922(g)(1); and (3)

attempted bribery of a government official in violation of 18

U.S.C. s 201(b)(1)(A), (C). At trial, the government offered

the testimony of the two police officers as well as a stipulation, entered into by both sides, that Clark "had been previously convicted of a criminal offense punishable by a term of

imprisonment exceeding one year." The nature of Clark's

previous conviction was not mentioned. The defense called

Keisha Harling, the mother of Clark's then-6-week-old child

and the owner of the car Clark was driving at the time he was

arrested. Harling testified that, unbeknownst to Clark, she

had purchased the gun from a man in the neighborhood and

had left it under the driver's seat several days prior to the

arrest. The defense also called Kevia Williams, a longtime

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friend of Harling's, who testified that she saw Harling purchase the gun in November 1996 and place it under the

driver's seat in early December. The jury convicted Clark on

all three counts.

II

Clark argues that the government lacked sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on either the possession or

the bribery charges. We review such a challenge de novo,

United States v. Lucas, 67 F.3d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and

must affirm the jury's verdict if " 'any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.' " Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (emphasis in original). In making that

determination, "the prosecution's evidence is to be viewed in

the light most favorable to the government, drawing no

distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, and

giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact."

United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

A

Clark's felon-in-possession charges were based on the theory that he was in constructive possession of the weapon found

under his seat. See United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617,

619-20 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This "requires [evidence] that the

defendant knew of, and was in a position to exercise dominion

and control over" the weapon, but does not require that it be

on his person. United States v. Byfield, 928 F.2d 1163, 1166

(D.C. Cir. 1991). Constructive possession may be inferred

from circumstantial evidence, see United States v. Raper, 676

F.2d 841, 847-48 (D.C. Cir. 1982), but neither knowledge nor

proximity alone is sufficient to permit a jury to infer possession. See, e.g., Morris, 977 F.2d at 619-20. "There must be

some action, some word, or some conduct that links the

individual to the [contraband] and indicates that he had some

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stake in [it], some power over [it]." United States v. Pardo,

636 F.2d 535, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

Although the case for constructive possession is relatively

close, contrary to Clark's characterization this is not simply a

case in which the defendant was found in a car that happened

to contain a gun. Nor does the fact that the officers never

saw Clark look under the seat establish, as defendant claims,

that he did not know it was there. Officer McGinnis testified

that Clark felt around on the back floorboard behind his seat,

that this made McGinnis suspicious enough to cause him to

search that area first, and that when he did he immediately

found the gun "where I saw him reaching." Tr. 101, 115.

Clark's reaching actions are sufficient to link him to the gun

and to indicate that "he had some stake" in it--and the fact

that it was located directly under his seat further indicates

that he had "some power over [it]." Pardo, 636 F.2d at 549.

As we said in United States v. Hernandez with respect to a

very similar fact pattern: "[I]f proximity is coupled with a

gesture toward the contraband, suggesting an ability to control the item in question, constructive possession may be

inferred. An occupant of a car therefore need merely signify

control of a particular space in the car to give rise to an

inference of constructive possession of contraband later found

in that space." 780 F.2d 113, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal

citations omitted). Accordingly, in Hernandez we held there

was sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict where the

defendant "ben[t] over and ma[d]e a motion in front of his

[car] seat," and the officer subsequently found a loaded

weapon on the floorboard "where he had seen [defendant]

bend down." 780 F.2d at 115. See Morris, 977 F.2d at 620

(holding that "proximity coupled with 'evidence of some other

factor--including ... a gesture implying control ...' is

enough to sustain a guilty verdict" for constructive possession) (quoting United States v. Gibbs, 904 F.2d 52, 56 (D.C.

Cir. 1990)); see also Unites States v. (John) Richardson, 161

F.3d 728, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Based on this case law, the officers' testimony is sufficient

to sustain a verdict on the prosecution's theory: that Clark's

purported effort to reach behind his seat for his license and

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registration was only a ruse to permit him to push the gun

farther out of the officers' view. This theory is further

bolstered by the fact that, as he finally conceded to the

officers, Clark had neither document. It is also supported by

the fact that the location in which Clark ostensibly searched

for the documents, the car's rear floorboard, would have been

an unusual place to store them--even if he had had them.

It is true that there are some inconsistencies between

McGinnis' testimony and that of his partner. McGinnis testified that Clark first reached to the floorboard, and then

grabbed the cellular contract from the back seat. Tr. 98.

Harris testified that the events occurred in the reverse order.

Tr. 137-38. Both, however, were clear that Clark felt around

on the floorboard behind the seat. Tr. 115, 138. A more

important inconsistency arises from McGinnis' testimony that

Clark ultimately found the expired learner's permit on the

front seat, as compared to Harris' (somewhat unclear) testimony that it was on the rear floorboard. Tr. 98, 138. The

significance of these inconsistencies, however, was for the

jury to assess. Although a reasonable jury might have found

the inconsistencies reason to doubt the officers' credibility, it

might also have found them the product of honest differences

in recollection, and proof that the officers did not conspire to

create a consistent story. See Gibbs, 904 F.2d at 57 ("While a

jury might have doubted this testimony regarding the defendant's alleged attempt to bend down and hide the drugs, ...

the assertions and credibility of the witness describing an

attempt to 'bend down as if doing something with their hands'

were for the jury to consider."). Similarly, while crediting

Harris' recollection might have given the jury an innocent

explanation for why Clark was reaching to the rear floorboard, a reasonable jury might also have believed that

McGinnis--who alone questioned Clark, stood right beside

him, and had "a good focus on [him]," Tr. 110--had the better

recollection. McGinnis' testimony was plainly "the more favorable to the government," and we are bound to view the

prosecution's evidence in that light. Foster, 783 F.2d at 1088.

The prosecution's theory of the case is further supported

by the testimony of both police officers that, when Clark

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heard McGinnis had found the gun, he immediately offered

McGinnis a bribe. Like the fact that Clark gave the police

the alias Paul Green, see United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d

1398, 1408 (10th Cir. 1997), the bribery attempt is evidence of

Clark's "consciousness of guilt" with respect to the gun

offense, see United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79

(6th Cir. 1986). It may be, as Clark's appellate counsel

argues, that a rational jury could have viewed the bribe as

nothing more than an attempt to avoid an unfair conviction

for possessing a gun of which he had no knowledge. But it

was also justifiable for a jury to reach the prosecutor's

conclusion, and we are required to give "full play to the right

of the jury" to "draw justifiable inferences of fact." Foster,

783 F.2d at 1088. In any event, appellate counsel's argument

was never made to the jury, since defendant's contention was

that he never offered the bribe in the first place. See Tr.

295-96.

Finally, there was the testimony of Keisha Harling, the

mother of Clark's child, and the partially corroborating testimony of Kevia Williams, Harling's longtime friend. Harling

testified that she had purchased the gun, forgotten it under

the driver's seat several days prior to the arrest, and never

told Clark about it. Once again, the assessment of witness

credibility is a job for the jury rather than this court. See

Foster, 783 F.2d at 1088. And a reasonable juror could

surely have discerned bias in these witnesses, or simply

disbelieved their claim that Harling left a loaded gun (assertedly bought for her protection) unattended in a car for

several days and never told Clark about it.

In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the government, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to

sustain Clark's conviction for constructive possession of the

gun and its ammunition.

B

Clark also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted bribery. Both McGinnis

and Harris testified that Clark made the $5,000 offer to

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McGinnis as soon as he found the gun. Harris further

testified that Clark made a similar offer to him as he placed

Clark in the squad car. Clark did not testify himself, and

there was no other contrary testimony. Nor does Clark

contend that the offers were too ambiguous to constitute

attempted bribes.

Clark does correctly note that the officers did not record

the bribery attempt in their incident reports. He asks us to

adopt a per se rule that no prosecution for attempted bribery

can reach a jury when the only evidence is the testimony of

police officers uncorroborated by contemporaneous reports.

As counsel conceded at oral argument, however, there is no

authority for such a rule. Although the officers' failure to

record the incident may call the credibility of their testimony

into question, that credibility is for the jury to assess. See

Foster, 783 F.2d at 1088. Here, two officers testified to the

bribe, while the discovery of the gun provided evidence of

motive. Defendant was afforded a full opportunity to crossexamine the officers about their failure to report the offer.

Under these circumstances, we cannot say that no reasonable

juror could have found Clark guilty of attempted bribery.

III

An element of the offense of unlawful possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon is that the defendant be previously convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1). In this

case, that element was proven by a stipulation that mirrored

the words of the statute, with no mention made of the

particular crime involved. Clark contends that the district

court abused its discretion and failed to protect him from

undue prejudice by permitting the jury to learn of the fact

(although not the nature) of his prior conviction through the

stipulation. Before trial, Clark moved to sever the felon-inpossession counts from the attempted bribery count, relying

on United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and

Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 (court may order separate trials of counts

if defendant is prejudiced by joinder). In the alternative, he

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moved for "bifurcation," which he described as "a split trial in

which the jury would initially hear only the evidence bearing

on the bribery attempt and the possession elements of the

gun charges. Only if and after the jury found these charges

established would evidence of defendant's felon status be

introduced." Def. Br. at 25. Clark also offered, as another

alternative, to stipulate that he was a "prohibited person"

under the unlawful possession statute.

In Dockery, we overturned a district court's decision not to

sever a felon-in-possession count from others in the indictment. 955 F.2d at 53. In so doing, however, we noted that

there is no "per se rule" requiring severance of a felon-inpossession charge from other counts. Id. Instead, we proceed on a case-by-case basis, requiring that " 'sufficiently

scrupulous regard' ... be shown to protect the defendant

from any undue prejudice resulting from joinder." Id. at 50

(quoting United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C.

Cir. 1985)); see United States v. Bowie, 142 F.3d 1301, 1306

(D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. (Opio) Moore, 104 F.3d

377, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1997). We review a district court's

decision whether to sever a trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14

"only for abuse of discretion." Bowie, 142 F.3d at 1306; see

Dockery, 955 F.2d at 54.

The most important difference between Dockery and this

case is that in Dockery the evidence of the felon-in-possession

count would have been inadmissible in a trial limited to the

other counts. See Dockery, 955 F.2d at 50. Here, by contrast, Clark's violation of section 922(g)(1) (including, as discussed infra, its prior-felony element) was admissible as

evidence of his motive for the attempted bribery--namely, to

avoid arrest for that violation. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (other

crimes admissible to show motive). And, as we noted above,

the bribery was in turn admissible as evidence that Clark had

knowledge of the gun. Hence, severance would have accomplished little in this case, since proof of each crime would have

been admissible in the separate trials. See United States v.

(Corey) Moore, 97 F.3d 561, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Joined

offenses need not be severed ... if the evidence of each crime

would be admissible in a separate trial for the other.").

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Perhaps for this reason, on appeal Clark does not assert that

the failure to sever was itself an abuse of discretion under

Rule 14. See Def. Br. at 24.

Of course, even where severance is not required, courts still

must " 'proceed with caution' to avoid undue prejudice" to a

defendant. Dockery, 955 F.2d at 53 (quoting Daniels, 770

F.2d at 1118). But in that respect, too, this case is different

from Dockery. There, the government rejected defendant's

offer of a stipulation, and insisted on proving the fact of

defendant's prior conviction through the testimony of his

probation officer. Dockery, 955 F.2d at 52, 54. There, too,

the government repeatedly and unnecessarily referred to the

defendant's prior conviction during the trial, a point we

regarded as "[p]erhaps most significant[ ]" in assessing the

prejudice involved. Id. at 56. In Clark's case, by contrast,

the government proved the fact of the prior felony solely

through the stipulation, and referred to it no more than was

permissible to show the jury it had established an essential

element of the offense.

There remains the question of whether it was an abuse of

discretion to reject defendant's suggested alternatives of: (1)

bifurcating the trial in a way that would delay the jury's

hearing about his prior felony until after it found him guilty

of possessing the gun; or (2) removing the issue from the

trial altogether through a stipulation that Clark was a "prohibited person" who was not permitted to possess a weapon.

In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the

Supreme Court found a district court had abused its discretion by refusing defendant's request to limit the evidence of

the prior-conviction element of section 922(g)(1) to a stipulation that he had "been convicted of a crime punishable by

imprisonment exceeding one (1) year." Id. at 174-75. Old

Chief had been charged with assault with a dangerous weapon, use of a firearm in a crime of violence, and being a felonin-possession. The Court held that "whenever the official

record offered by the government would be arresting enough

to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning,"

evidence of the name or nature of a defendant's prior offense

would be substantially more prejudicial than probative and

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hence barred under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Id. at 185. "Where a

prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other

charges in a pending case," as was Old Chief's prior conviction for assault, "the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious." Id.

Needless to say, Clark's proposals for dealing with his prior

conviction go beyond anything required by Old Chief. Indeed, in this case the trial court did exactly what Old Chief

commanded: it accepted the defendant's stipulation and kept

from the jury the name and nature of his prior offense. Old

Chief did not, and does not, require more. The Court did not

even mandate use of a stipulation for every prior offense, but

only where "the prior conviction is for an offense likely to

support conviction on some improper ground," id. at 191, such

as "a gun crime or one similar to other charges in [the]

pending case," id. at 185. Here, the nature of Clark's prior

conviction was completely sanitized, and there was nothing

about the stipulation that would "lure a jury into a sequence

of bad character reasoning." Id.

Moreover, while the district court's approach in this case

was not unduly prejudicial to defendant, defendant's alternatives might well have deprived the prosecution of its rightful

opportunity, recognized in Old Chief, "to convince the jurors

that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable." Id. at

188. The effect of those alternatives would have been to keep

from the jury the fact that the reason it was unlawful for

Clark to possess a gun was that he was an ex-felon. As we

noted in United States v. Mangum, when a jury is not "told

all the elements of the crime, it may, justifiably, question

whether what the accused did was a crime.... Possession of

a firearm by most people is not a crime.... Doubt as to the

criminality of [the defendant's] conduct may influence the

jury when it considers the possession element." 100 F.3d

164, 171 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v.

Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989)). For that reason,

we rejected defendant Mangum's contention that the district

court should have "bifurcate[d] the ex-felon element and the

other elements" of section 922(g)(1). Id. at 171. For the

same reason, we reject Clark's suggestion that bifurcation

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was required here, as well as his alternative proposition that

the court should simply have told the jury that he was a

"prohibited person." As to the latter, we are doubtful that

labeling defendant in that way would have materially reduced

whatever prejudice he suffered from the stipulation; indeed,

it seems equally possible that such a label would have generated even worse speculation as to the reason for the prohibition.

United States v. Bowie, provides further support for our

conclusion. In Bowie, the defendant contended that the

district court had abused its discretion by failing either to

sever his felon-in-possession counts from the other charges,

or to bifurcate the felon-in-possession counts so that the jury

would decide only the element of possession. We rejected

defendant's challenge, finding that the steps the court had

taken to minimize prejudice resulting from mention of the

prior conviction "demonstrated sufficiently scrupulous regard

for [defendant's] right to a fair trial." Bowie, 142 F.3d at

1303. The district court had required the prosecution to

prove the prior conviction by stipulation alone and without

reference to the nature of the underlying crime; the stipulation had stated only that defendant "had previously been

convicted of an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment

exceeding one year"; and the court had ensured that the only

references made to the prior conviction were those necessary

to explain the charge to the jury. Id. at 1304. In all these

respects, Bowie's case is the same as Clark's.

The only additional step the trial court took in Bowie, but

did not take here, was to admonish the jury not to consider

the fact of the defendant's prior conviction for anything other

than that element of the felon-in-possession counts. Although

the absence of such an instruction is not unimportant, we note

that Clark did not request one,1 and that Bowie emphasized

__________

1 While the court does have "a continuing obligation to assure a

fair trial," and "appropriate instructions are one way" to do so, "the

trial court bears no burden to offer cautionary instructions sua

sponte each time prior crimes evidence is introduced." Dockery,

955 F.2d at 56.

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there is no "per se rule regarding what steps a district court

must take to minimize the prejudice of other crimes evidence." Bowie, 142 F.3d at 1306 (citing Daniels, 770 F.2d at

1118). Indeed, more important than the absence of the

instruction here is the presence of the factor mentioned at the

start of this analysis--that in Clark's case, unlike Bowie's,

proof of the felon-in-possession offenses would have been

admissible even in a separate trial of the remaining offense.

Accordingly, we reject the defendant's efforts to distinguish

Bowie, and conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion either by refusing to sever the section 922(g)(1)

charges, or by permitting proof of Clark's prior conviction

through the parties' stipulation.

IV

Clark alleges that the district court committed a series of

other trial errors that prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

With one exception, which we discuss in Part V, these arguments are without merit and demand only brief attention to

their core allegations.

First, citing United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir.

1996), Clark contends that the district court undermined his

defense by directing unjustified criticism at his counsel in the

presence of the jury. Although Donato did hold that criticism from the bench may be so hostile as to prejudice a

defendant's right to a fair trial, id. at 435, 438, we also

emphasized that

a district judge has wide discretion in monitoring the

flow of a criminal trial. It is well within her discretion to

rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court's

instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying behavior. Sharp words spoken by a trial court to

counsel do not by themselves establish impermissible

bias.

Id. at 434.

In this case, a careful examination of the trial record has

not given us any doubt that defendant received a fair trial.

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In most of the exchanges cited by Clark, the court correctly

ruled that defense counsel had failed to properly frame his

questions. Sometimes counsel's questions did not manifest

their relevance; sometimes they were leading; and sometimes they suffered from a little of both. When the court

sustained a relevance objection, counsel would often try to

solve the problem by leading his witness into a show of

relevance. This, in turn, would prompt the court to take

counsel to task for both problems. See, e.g., Tr. 200.

There is no indication that the court was any tougher on

the defense counsel than on the prosecutor with respect to

these matters of trial technique. See, e.g., id. at 99, 133-34,

139, 165-67, 217, 248. Moreover, the court took care to

instruct the jury not to take its rulings on motions or objections by counsel as any indication of its opinion regarding the

facts.2 See United States v. Logan, 998 F.2d 1025, 1029 (D.C.

Cir. 1993). Most important, the court's comments were directed at the attorneys, not at defendant or his witnesses.

See Donato, 99 F.3d at 437-38; United States v. Edmond, 52

F.3d 1080, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The jury heard nothing

to suggest the court was biased against the defendant or

disbelieved his defense.

Clark's second contention is that the district court erred

when it ruled out testimony from Keisha Harling regarding a

quarrel she and defendant had shortly before his arrest. We

agree that the court erred in concluding such testimony would

be irrelevant. While Clark urges the testimony's relevance

on a number of grounds, the argument he stresses, and the

one we find persuasive, is that "evidence of hostility between

defendant and Ms. Harling was relevant to Ms. Harling's

__________

2 In its closing instructions, the court told the jury that "[m]y

actions during the course of this trial in ruling on motions or

objections by counsel, any comments I may have made to counsel,

any questions I may have put to witnesses ... are not to be taken

by you as any indication of my opinion as to how you should

determine the issues of fact. If you believe that I have expressed

or intimated any opinion as to the facts, not only should you

disregard it, I instruct you to totally disregard it." Tr. 308.

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credibility by tending to counter any inference that she was

testifying because of her friendship for defendant." Def. Br.

at 29. Nonetheless, we find the error harmless in that it did

not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict." Kotteakos v. United States,

328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946); see United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d

1379, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Notwithstanding the court's

ruling, Harling still managed to testify (on cross-examination)

both that the quarrel took place and to the aspect of the

quarrel most relevant to her credibility: the fact that Clark's

relationship with her allegedly terminated the night of his

arrest. Tr. 219 ("After we had an argument that night, it was

over, he took my car, and that did it."); see also id. at 187.

We do not see how the additional, comparatively insignificant

details about the quarrel that were excluded could have had a

substantial effect on the jury's assessment of Harling's credibility, let alone on the ultimate verdict.

Third, Clark contends that the court improperly admitted

testimony regarding his use of the alias, Paul Green, and

wrongly refused to strike references to the alias from the

indictment. Defendant contends that because the alias was

"irrelevant for any legitimate purpose," the testimony should

have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 401. Def. Br. at 31.

But Clark's alias was not irrelevant. It is well-settled that

"[a] defendant's use of an alias to conceal his identity from

law enforcement officers is relevant as proof of consciousness

of guilt." Glass, 128 F.3d at 1408; accord Levy v. GozlonPeretz, 865 F.2d 551, 558 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc); United

States v. Kalish, 690 F.2d 1144, 1155 (5th Cir. 1982); see

United States v. Stewart, 104 F.3d 1377, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(holding that use of alias supported jury verdict that defendant knowingly failed to appear as required). Here, the fact

that Clark gave the police an alias was relevant to the

prosecution's charge that he knowingly possessed the gun

found under his seat. Defendant further contends that the

district court should have struck the references to his alias

from the indictment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d) because,

although the government told the court they were necessary

to show identity, in the end they were not. Even if that had

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been the government's sole ground for inclusion of the references in the indictment, Clark's claim would fail because he

has not established any prejudice; the jury properly learned

of defendant's use of the name Paul Green through the

officer's testimony that defendant gave the name when arrested. See, e.g., United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 157

(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Material that can fairly be described as

'surplus' may only be stricken [from an indictment] if it

irrelevant and prejudicial.").

Fourth, Clark argues that he was prejudiced by the court's

improper handling of the fact that a documentary about the

jury process was broadcast on CBS television the night after

the jury began its deliberations. The next day, defense

counsel advised the court of the broadcast, asserted that

"there was a definition of reasonable doubt given in that

program which is inconsistent with the federal court definition," and requested that the court voir dire the jurors about

the program. Tr. 356. The court declined to conduct a voir

dire at that time. Instead, it instructed the jury to disregard

anything they might have seen on the program, and then

reinstructed them on the proper definition of reasonable

doubt.3 After the jury delivered its verdict, the court conducted a voir dire. Although several jurors had seen at least

a part of the broadcast or heard it discussed, all assured the

court to its satisfaction that the program had had no impact

on their deliberations. Tr. 373-91.

We need not discuss this challenge in detail because defendant has failed, both in the district court and here, to satisfy

__________

3 The court said: "I'm informed by counsel that there may have

been some television show last night on the question of reasonable

doubt. If there were, and if you saw it ... you must totally

disregard it, because it has nothing whatever to do with this case. I

am instructing you as to the law as it applies to this case, the case

you heard. So, if any of you did happen to see any such program,

please totally disregard it, because it has nothing to do with the law

that you are to follow in this case." Tr. 358-59. The court then

repeated the standard federal jury instruction regarding the meaning of "reasonable doubt." Tr. 359-60. See Instruction 2.09, Criminal Jury Instructions, Young Lawyers Section, The Bar Association

of the District of Columbia (4th ed. 1993).

the threshold requirement for such a claim of improper media

exposure: that he show a "likelihood of prejudice." United

States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Defense counsel told the district court that he had not himself

seen the program, and had only heard about it from others.

He did not (because he could not) tell the court what was said

on the program concerning reasonable doubt, nor in what way

it was "inconsistent" with the federal definition. Tr. 390-91.

Despite the court's express invitation that he file a post-trial

motion, defendant never submitted either a transcript or

videotape of the broadcast. Nor has defendant's state of

knowledge improved on appeal. On this record, therefore, we

are unable to say either that there was anything prejudicial in

the broadcast, or that the corrective measures taken by the

trial court were inadequate.

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Fifth, Clark argues that the district court "manipulated the

jury selection process" by first seating those members of the

venire who had been assigned even numbers by the Jury

Office's computer, and thereafter seating odd-numbered

members until the complete jury was chosen. Defendant

contends that the court's procedure "infringed his constitutionally guaranteed rights to counsel, due process and equal

protection,"4 although he concedes there is no authority "approving or disapproving the trial judge's unusual practice."

Def. Br. at 35 & n.16. We do not understand why the court

adopted the selection procedure it did, but defendant has

been unable to demonstrate how that procedure interfered

with his constitutional rights. Although the procedure is

unusual, it is not necessarily less random than alternating

even- and odd-numbered jurors. Without any evidence to

suggest there were relevant differences in the people assigned even and odd numbers, or that the court used the

procedure as a mechanism for intentional discrimination,

there is no basis for defendant's claim of a constitutional

__________

4 Defendant does not challenge the procedure under the Jury

Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. s 1861, noting that his failure

to raise the issue below renders such a challenge untimely under 28

U.S.C. s 1867(a). Def. Br. at 35 n.16.

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violation. See generally United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d

1092, 1104-05 (6th Cir. 1998).

V

Clark's final argument is that he may not be convicted of

more than one violation of section 922(g)(1) for possessing

both a firearm and the ammunition it contained, and that the

district court therefore erred in denying his pretrial motion to

compel the government to elect between the two possession

counts. Although the government did not respond to this

argument, we note that it has conceded the point in at least

three other cases. See United States v. Pittman, 172 F.3d

922 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (table case), available at 1998 WL 939519,

at *1; United States v. (John) Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 730

n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 402

(11th Cir. 1996).

Because "[t]he legislature remains free under the Double

Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments,"

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977), the validity of

Clark's claim turns on whether Congress intended the possession of a loaded firearm to constitute one or two "units of

prosecution" under 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1). See Bell v. United

States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955). Section 922(g)(1) states: "It shall

be unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any

court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year ... [to] possess in or affecting commerce,

any firearm or ammunition." 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). It would not be unreasonable to read the phrase

"any firearm or ammunition" as permitting separate charges

for each. Such a reading would be consistent with a congressional intent to permit greater punishment for more dangerous acts, the possession of a gun loaded with ammunition

being more dangerous than the possession of either alone.

On the other hand, an affirmative intention to permit two

separate charges for a gun and its ammunition is not clear on

the face of the statute. Indeed, if the statute were read that

way, it might just as readily permit fourteen charges against

Clark, one for the gun and one for each of its thirteen bullets.

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In Bell v. United States, the Supreme Court instructed that

"if Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense

clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against

turning a single transaction into multiple offenses." 349 U.S.

at 84 (holding that interstate transportation of two women on

same trip in same vehicle constitutes single violation of Mann

Act, 18 U.S.C. s 2421); see United States v. Anderson, 59

F.3d 1323, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). The question of

whether section 922(g)(1) is ambiguous has already been

decided in this circuit by United States v. Cunningham, 145

F.3d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1998), which considered the propriety of

multiple section 922(g)(1) charges for the possession of multiple weapons. Cunningham concluded that the word "any" in

the phrase "any firearm or ammunition" creates ambiguity as

to the unit of prosecution intended by Congress, and that as a

consequence, "[w]hen a felon possesses multiple weapons,

only one offense is committed, unless the weapons are stored

or acquired at different times or places." Id. at 1398.5

Because the phrase is no less ambiguous for charges based on

weapons and ammunition than for charges based on multiple

weapons, Cunningham compels the conclusion that possession of a loaded weapon constitutes a single offense as well.

In so holding, we join every other circuit that has considered

the issue.6

Upon finding that a defendant has been convicted of two

charges for a single offense, the usual remedy is to hold that

the convictions have merged and order that one be vacated.

Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985); see Cunningham, 145 F.3d at 1399; United States v. (Billy) Richardson,

__________

5 Accord United States v. Szalkiewicz, 944 F.2d 653, 654 (9th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 294 (10th Cir.

1983); United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir.

1982); United States v. Powers, 572 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir. 1978).

6 See United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir.

1998); United States v. Keen, 104 F.3d 1111, 1119-20 (9th Cir.

1996); United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 402 (11th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Berry, 977 F.2d 915, 919-20 (5th Cir. 1992);

United States v. Throneburg, 921 F.2d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 1990);

United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d 161, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1983);

United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 232-33 (7th Cir. 1982).

167 F.3d 621, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Clark, however, contends

that it was "possibly prejudicial" for the court to have "allow[ed] the government to charge and try both offenses," and

implies that we should therefore vacate both. Def. Br. at 32

n.13. We detect no prejudice, since the evidence that Clark

possessed the gun and that he possessed the ammunition was

identical, and since the jury would have learned of both

regardless which separate charge was brought. Accordingly,

the only remedy that is necessary is to "vacate one of the

underlying convictions." Ball, 470 U.S. at 864; see id. at

859-60 & n.8; United States v. Berry, 977 F.2d 915, 920 (5th

Cir. 1992).

VI

The judgment of the district court is affirmed with the

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exception of defendant's separate convictions for unlawfully

possessing both a gun and the ammunition with which it was

loaded. As to those, the case is remanded with instructions

that the district court vacate one of the convictions and

resentence the defendant.

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