Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-36071/USCOURTS-ca9-14-36071-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bob Ferguson
Appellant
Kirk Rishor
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KIRK RISHOR,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

BOB FERGUSON, Attorney General

for the State of Washington,

Respondent-Appellant.

No. 14-36071

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-01492-

MJP

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Marsha J. Pechman, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 11, 2015—Seattle, Washington

Filed May 6, 2016

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins and Richard C. Tallman,

Circuit Judges and Joan Humphrey Lefkow,* Senior

District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Tallman

* The Honorable Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Senior United States District

Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment granting,

on reconsideration, habeas corpus relief to Kirk Rishor –

who, on remand from the Washington Court of Appeals, pled

guilty to second degree assault – and remanded for

reinstatement of the district court’s judgment denying habeas

relief.

The panel held that a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(e) that raises entirely new claims should be construed as

a second or successive habeas petition subject to AEDPA’s

restrictions; and that a Rule 59(e) motion raises a “new

claim” when it seeks to add a ground for relief not articulated

in the original federal habeas petition, presents newly

discovered evidence, or seeks relief based on a subsequent

change in the law. The panel wrote that, in contrast, a timely

Rule 59(e) motion that asks the district court to “correct

manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests”

should not be construed as a second or successive petition.

The panel held that Rishor’s Rule 59(e) motion – which

asked the district court to reconsider whether the state court

violated clearly established federal law (1) by holding that

Rishor had validly waived counsel on remand, and (2) by

holding that the prosecution did not violate double jeopardy

principles on remand – did not raise “new claims,” and that

the district court therefore had jurisdiction to consider the

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 3

post-judgment motion in the first instance without seeking

pre-certification by the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(3)(A).

Applying AEDPA review on the merits, the panel held

that the district court abused its discretion by granting

reconsideration and awarding Rishor habeas relief. As to

Rishor’s waiver of counsel claim, the panel held that the

district court erred by finding that the United States Supreme

Court had authored clearly established law on whether a

defendant, who has validly waived counsel before his first

trial, is entitled to a second Faretta hearing on remand. The

panel could not say that the Washington Supreme Court’s

alternative holding – that Rishor was not prejudiced by the

court’s failure to secure a second waiver of counsel – was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law.

The panel held that the district court also erred in granting

habeas relief on Rishor’s claim that the state improperly refiled first degree assault charges on remand in violation of his

rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The panel could

not say that the Washington Supreme Court’s determination

that Rishor’s guilty plea to second degree assault was “wholly

voluntary” was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence, or was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. The panel explained that the fact that the state

re-charged Rishor with first degree assault does not

undermine the voluntariness of his guilty plea to second

degree assault. The panel concluded that since this court

must defer to the Washington Supreme Court’s decision that

Rishor’s guilty plea was valid, Rishor could not attack his

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4 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

conviction based on a constitutional violation that occurred

prior to his guilty plea.

COUNSEL

Alex Kostin (argued), Assistant AttorneyGeneral; Robert W.

Ferguson, Attorney General, Olympia, Washington, for

Respondent-Appellant.

Todd Maybrown, Allen, Hansen & Maybrown, Seattle,

Washington, for Petitioner-Appellee.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Kirk Rishor waived counsel and represented himself

during his 2004 trial in Washington’s Whatcom County

Superior Court on charges of first degree assault, second

degree assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The

jury convicted him on the unlawful possession charge but

acquitted him on the two charged counts of second degree

assault. The jury, however, impliedly acquitted Rishor on

first degree assault, and convicted him instead of the lesserincluded offense of second degree assault.

Rishor’s conviction was reversed by the Washington

Court of Appeals, and on remand, Rishor pled guilty to

second degree assault. Despite pleading guilty, Rishor

commenced a series of post-judgment motions in superior

court challenging his conviction. After exhausting review of

his conviction in state court, Rishor petitioned the federal

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 5

district court for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

arguing that he did not validly waive counsel and that the

State violated double jeopardy principles on remand. The

district court initially dismissed Rishor’s habeas petition with

prejudice, and Rishor then filed a motion for reconsideration. 

In 2014, nearly a year later, the district court granted Rishor’s

motion for reconsideration, vacated its prior judgment, and

granted habeas relief. We now reverse the district court’s

judgment and remand for reinstatement of the judgment

denying habeas relief.

I

In May 2004, Kirk Rishor proceeded to trial in Whatcom

County Superior Court on charges of first degree assault

(count 1), second degree assault (counts 2 and 3), and first

degree unlawful possession of a firearm (count 4). In a pretrial hearing, Rishor informed Judge Steven J. Mura, the

superior court judge assigned to the trial, that he wished to

proceed pro se. Judge Mura fully advised Rishor of the risks

and responsibilities associated with self-representation and

attempted to dissuade Rishor from waiving counsel. 

Specifically, Judge Mura informed Rishor that he would not

be able to claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal,

that he would be responsible for putting together proposed

jury instructions, and that he would be bound by the same

rules as lawyers—including the rules of evidence and ethics. 

Judge Mura and Rishor also engaged in the following

colloquy:

THE COURT: [I]n my 30 years of being on

both sides of the courtroom as a defense

counsel, prosecutor and now 12 years as a

judge in a criminal case I have never seen

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6 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

anybodywho has ever represented themselves

competently; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: If you represent yourself

incompetently you’re stuck with you and you

suffer the consequences. The consequences if

convicted, the State informs me, is a sentence

of life without possibility of parole.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I fully

understand that.

THE COURT: And that as a practical matter

if you represent yourself—and this is just me

talking up here.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: As a practical matter the court

might as well sign an order sending you to

prison without possibility of parole right now

because you’re going to screw your case up;

do you understand that?

Despite these warnings, Rishor confirmed his desire to

proceed pro se, Judge Mura approved the request, and Rishor

(assisted by standby counsel) ably represented himself

throughout his jury trial.

Ultimately, the jury acquitted Rishor on the two charged

counts of second degree assault (counts 2 and 3) and

convicted him on the charge of unlawful possession of a

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 7

firearm (count 4). The jury, however, impliedly acquitted

Rishor on the greater charge of first degree assault (count 1)1

and convicted Rishor of the lesser-included offense of second

degree assault. The jury also made a special finding that

Rishor was armed with a firearm at the time of the assault. 

Rishor was sentenced to 115 months confinement on the

assault charge, which included 36 months for the weapon

enhancement, and 102 months on the unlawful possession

charge. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

On direct review, the Washington Court of Appeals

reversed Rishor’s second degree assault conviction due to

erroneous jury instructions and remanded the case back to the

superior court for a new trial on that charge. On November

2, 2006, the parties again met with Judge Mura, the same

judge who had presided over Rishor’s first trial, to “reiterate

[Rishor’s] request to proceed in a pro se basis.” At this initial

hearing on remand, Rishor requested that Thomas Fryer be

appointed as his standby counsel to assist him with filing

motions from jail because incarceration made it difficult for

Rishor to do so. Judge Mura instructed Rishor to draft an

order appointing Fryer as standby counsel, which Rishor

subsequently prepared and filed with the court several days

later.

On remand, the State initially filed a first amended

information charging Rishor with one count of first degree

1 Here, the jury failed to reach a verdict on first degree assault and,

instead, convicted Rishor of the lesser charge of second degree assault. 

This amounts to an implied acquittal under our decision in Brazzel v.

Washington, which held that “when a jury convicts on a lesser alternate

charge and fails to reach a verdict on the greater charge . . . the jury’s

silence on the second charge is an implied acquittal.” 491 F.3d 976, 978

(9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

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8 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

assault while armed with a deadly weapon, the same conduct

for which the jury impliedly acquitted Rishor at his first trial. 

On January 8, 2007, the State filed a second amended

information charging Rishor with second degree assault

without a firearm allegation, and that same day Rishor

entered a guilty plea to that unenhanced charge. At his plea

hearing, Rishor explained that he was pleading guilty “freely

and voluntarily.” He acknowledged that the plea agreement

allowed him to avoid the weapon enhancement. He also

stated that he wanted to take the plea so that his daughter,

who was about to start college, would not have to come back

for a second trial. The court imposed an 84-month sentence

on the second degree assault charge, which was ordered to

run concurrently with Rishor’s 102-month unlawful

possession conviction.

Rishor then, through counsel, appealed his new sentence

to the Washington Court of Appeals, arguing that the

prosecutor breached the plea agreement by urging the trial

court to impose a higher sentence on the unlawful possession

charge.2 The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed Rishor’s

judgment and sentence, and Rishor did not seek further

review from the Washington Supreme Court.

On January 10, 2008, Rishor filed a motion to withdraw

his guilty plea and a state habeas petition in Whatcom County

Superior Court. In his post-judgment motion and state habeas

petition, Rishor argued that he was not formally arraigned on

2 At his second sentencing hearing, Rishor asked the court to impose an

84-month sentence on the unlawful possession charge and the State

recommended a new sentence of 115 months. The court rejected both

recommendations and imposed the same concurrent sentence of 102

months as it had done previously.

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 9

remand, he was coerced into pleading guilty, and he did not

adequately waive his right to counsel following remand. 

Rishor’s post-judgment motion and petition were eventually

transferred to the Washington Court of Appeals for

consideration as a collateral state habeas petition, called a

“personal restraint petition” (PRP), which was dismissed on

March 8, 2010.

On September 9, 2010, the Washington Supreme Court

denied Rishor’s motion for discretionary review. Relevant to

this appeal, the Washington Supreme Court found that Rishor

had validly waived his right to counsel before his original

trial and that Rishor was “more than ready to proceed pro se”

on remand. The court also found that Rishor’s standby

counsel had waived Rishor’s right to first appearance and

formal arraignment on remand. Finally, the court rejected

Rishor’s claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty and

found that Rishor’s plea was “wholly voluntary.”

Next, Rishor filed a federal habeas corpus petition under

28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington. Rishor alleged that he was

entitled to relief on three grounds stemming from his remand

proceedings: (1) he did not receive notice of the charges

against him, (2) he was not arraigned, and (3) he did not

validly waive counsel. Rishor also filed a supplemental brief

in connection with his habeas petition that argued that the

prosecution violated double jeopardyprinciples on remand by

initially recharging him with first degree assault, conduct on

which the jury had acquitted him during his first trial.3 On

3 The parties contest whether Rishor fairly presented his double jeopardy

claim in state court. However, Rishor’s appeal does not require us to

decide this issue for the reasons explained in Part V of this opinion.

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10 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

October 28, 2013, United States Magistrate Judge James P.

Donohue issued a Report and Recommendation, concluding

that the district court should deny the habeas petition with

prejudice. Chief United States District Judge Marsha J.

Pechman adopted the Report and Recommendation,

dismissed the habeas petition with prejudice, and entered

judgment against Rishor.

Rishor then filed a motion for reconsideration—the

subject of this appeal. Rishor asked the district court to

reconsider whether he was entitled to habeas relief on the

ground that he did not validly waive counsel on remand. 

Rishor also asked the district court to reconsider whether he

was entitled to habeas relief on the ground that the

prosecution had violated due process and double jeopardy

principles by failing to re-arraign him and re-charging him

with first degree assault in order to secure a plea bargain.4

On December 3, 2014, the district court granted Rishor’s

motion to reconsider and vacated its prior judgment. The

court held that the Washington Supreme Court’s decision was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law and that Rishor was entitled to habeas

relief on both his waiver of counsel and double jeopardy

claims. The State timely appealed.

II

Our review in this case is guided in part by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). The

4

In its order denying Rishor’s habeas petition, the district court did not

discuss Rishor’s double jeopardy claim.

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 11

provisions of AEDPA “create an independent, high standard

to be met before a federal court may issue a writ of habeas

corpus to set aside state-court rulings.” Uttecht v. Brown,

551 U.S. 1, 10 (2007). As the Supreme Court has made clear,

“‘[t]his is a ‘difficult to meet,’ and ‘highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (quoting

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)).

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner’s habeas petition shall not

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication

of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Finally, before we proceed to apply AEDPA’s standards

in this case, we must identify the state court decision that is

appropriate for our review. “When more than one state court

has adjudicated a claim, we analyze the last reasoned

decision.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir.

2005). Here, the last reasoned state court decision is the

Washington Supreme Court’s denial of discretionary review

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12 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

of Rishor’s personal restraint petition dismissal. See id. at

1091–92 (holding that a seven-page order from the

Washington Supreme Court denying review of a PRP was the

last reasoned state court decision).

III

As an initial matter, we must determine whether the

district court had jurisdiction to rule on Rishor’s motion for

reconsideration, and whether we, in turn, have jurisdiction to

review it on appeal. The district court properly construed

Rishor’s post-judgment motion for reconsideration,5filed

within twenty-eight days of entry of judgment, as a motion to

alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e). See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N.

Am. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2001);

11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2810.1 (2012) (“Rule 59(e) does, however,

include motions for reconsideration.”). The question

presented, therefore, is whether Rishor’s Rule 59(e) motion

is subject to the additional restrictions that apply to “second

or successive” habeas corpus petitions under the provisions

of AEDPA. Whether Rishor’s motion should be construed as

a second or successive habeas petition is a conclusion of law

that we review de novo. Riordan v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins., 589 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009).

5 Rishor’s post-judgment motion was filed pursuant to Western District

of Washington Local Rule 7(h), which provides that motions for

reconsideration “shall be filed within fourteen days after the order to

which it relates is filed.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(h)(2).

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 13

A

AEDPA’s restrictions on second or successive habeas

petitions prevent “the repeated filing of habeas petitions that

attack the prisoner’s underlying conviction.” Leal Garcia v.

Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, AEDPA instructs us to dismiss any claim

“presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application” that the petitioner “presented in a prior

application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). If a petitioner presents

a new claim in a second or successive habeas corpus

application, we must also dismiss that claim unless one of

two exceptions applies:

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies

on a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the

Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could

not have been discovered previously through

the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven

and viewed in light of the evidence as a

whole, would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that, but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B)(ii). “Before a second or successive

application permitted by this section is filed in the district

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14 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of

appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider

the application.” Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A petitioner’s failure

to seek such authorization from the appropriate appellate

court before filing a second or successive habeas petition acts

as a jurisdictional bar. United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773,

774 (5th Cir. 2000).

B

Our discussion of this issue begins with the Supreme

Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). 

There, the Supreme Court addressed when a federal court

should construe a petitioner’s Rule 60(b)6 motion as a second

or successive habeas petition subject to the restrictions of

AEDPA. Id. at 526. Although Gonzalez limited its holding

to Rule 60(b) motions, our sister circuits have split on

whether Gonzalez’s holding extends to Rule 59(e) motions,

such as Rishor’s post-judgment motion for reconsideration. 

See id. at 529 n.3 (“In this case we consider only the extent to

which Rule 60(b) applies to habeas proceedings under

28 U.S.C. § 2254, which governs federal habeas relief for

prisoners convicted in state court.”).

Gonzalez explained that the Rules of Civil Procedure

apply “in habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

only to the extent” that they are “not inconsistent” with the

“statutory provisions and rules” of AEDPA. Id. at 529. The

Court also noted that “[a]s a textual matter, § 2244(b) applies

6

“Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and

request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances

including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence.” Gonzalez,

545 U.S. at 528.

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 15

only where the court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s

‘application’ for a writ of habeas corpus,” and that “an

‘application’ for habeas relief is a filing that contains one or

more ‘claims.’” Id. at 530.

Accordingly, Gonzalez held that a Rule 60(b) motion is

subject to AEDPA’s restrictions when the motion advances

one or more claims, such as a motion that: seeks to present

newly discovered evidence, seeks to add a new ground for

relief, attacks the resolution of a claim on the merits, or seeks

to vacate the judgment because of a subsequent change in

substantive law. Id. at 531. “A habeas petitioner’s filing that

seeks vindication of such a claim is, if not in substance a

‘habeas corpus application,’ at least similar enough that

failing to subject it to the same requirements would be

‘inconsistent with’ the statute.” Id. This is so because

[u]sing Rule 60(b) to present new claims for

relief from a state court’s judgment of

conviction—even claims couched in the

language of a true Rule 60(b) motion—

circumvents AEDPA’s requirement that a new

claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a

new rule of constitutional law or newly

discovered facts.

Id. In contrast, a Rule 60(b) motion that “attacks, not the

substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the

merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas

proceedings,” should not be construed as a second or

successive habeas petition. Id. at 532.

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16 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

C

Our sister circuits disagree over the application of

Gonzalez and second-or-successive principles to Rule 59(e)

motions. The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourth Circuits have

concluded that a Rule 59(e) motion that advances a “claim”

as defined by Gonzalez should be construed as a second or

successive habeas petition. See Williams v. Thaler, 602 F.3d

291, 303–05 (5th Cir. 2010); Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925,

935 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Pedraza, 466 F.3d 932,

934 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 132 Fed. App’x

450, 451 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).7 The Third, Sixth,

and Seventh Circuits have held that a Rule 59(e) motion

should never be construed as a second or successive habeas

petition, whether or not it advances a Gonzalez claim. 

Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011); Howard

v. United States, 533 F.3d 472, 475–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Curry

v. United States, 307 F.3d 664, 665 (7th Cir. 2002).

Today we address this issue for the first time. We have

previously held that altering or amending a judgment under

Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy” usually available

only when (1) the court committed manifest errors of law or

fact, (2) the court is presented with newly discovered or

previously unavailable evidence, (3) the decision was

manifestly unjust, or (4) there is an intervening change in the

controlling law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101,

1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d

1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). We have also held

that a Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to “raise arguments

7

See also United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 203 n.1 (4th Cir.

2003) (treating all motions for reconsideration, whether filed under Rule

59 or Rule 60, as subject to AEDPA’s successive petition rule).

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 17

or present evidence for the first time when they could

reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id.

(citing Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877,

890 (9th Cir. 2000)).

We now hold that a Rule 59(e) motion that raises entirely

new claims should be construed as a second or successive

habeas petition subject to AEDPA’s restrictions. A Rule

59(e) motion raises a “new claim” when the motion seeks to

add a ground for relief not articulated in the original federal

habeas petition, presents newly discovered evidence, or seeks

relief based on a subsequent change in the law. In contrast,

a timely Rule 59(e) motion that asks the district court to

“correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the

judgment rests” should not be construed as a second or

successive habeas petition.

Accordingly, a district court presented with a motion for

reconsideration in a habeas case must first determine whether

the motion should be construed as a second or successive

habeas petition: that is whether it seeks to raise an argument

or ground for relief that was not raised in the initial habeas

petition.8If so, the district court should dismiss the motion

without prejudice to allow the applicant to move in the Court

of Appeals for an order authorizing the district court to

consider the second habeas application. However, the district

8 We note that in other contexts a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted to

allow a movant to present newly discovered evidence or an intervening

change in controlling law. In the context of habeas proceedings, however,

a Rule 59(e) motion raising such grounds for relief is in “substance” a

second habeas petition subject to § 2244(b)’s additional restrictions. A

habeas petitioner may certainly still bring these arguments in a second

petition if the additional and more restrictive requirements of § 2244(b)

are met.

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18 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

court may proceed to consider the merits of a Rule 59(e)

motion that is filed within twenty-eight days of judgment and

asks the court to correct errors of fact or law. As always, the

district court will “enjoy[] considerable discretion in granting

or denying the motion.” Id. (citing McDowell, 197 F.3d at

1255 n.1).

The approach we adopt today is, in essence, a hybrid of

the approaches adopted by our sister circuits thus far. The

Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourth Circuits apply Gonzalez to

Rule 59(e) motions that raise both previously adjudicated

claims and new claims. We decline to adopt this approach,

as it “attribute[s] to Congress the unlikely intent to preclude

broadly the reconsideration of just-entered judgments.” 

Howard, 533 F.3d at 475; see id. (“If the holding of Gonzalez

applied to Rule 59(e) motions, it would almost always be

effectively impossible for a district court to correct flaws in

its reasoning, even when the problems were immediately

pointed out and could easily be fixed by that court.”). We see

no sign that Congress intended AEDPA to vitiate the district

court’s power to “rectify its own mistakes in the period

immediately following the entry of judgment,” obviating the

time and expense of unnecessary appellate proceedings. 

White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982).

We similarly decline to adopt the approach of the Third,

Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which never applies Gonzalez or

AEDPA to Rule 59(e) motions. While this bright-line

approach may be easy to apply, it allows district courts to

improperly entertain Rule 59(e) motions that are “in

substance” second habeas petitions. See, e.g., Howard,

533 F.3d at 473 (errors in sentencing raised for the first time

in a Rule 59(e) motion); see also Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 19

(instructing courts to focus on the “substance” rather than the

label of the post-judgment motion).

For these reasons, we depart from our sister circuits and

hold that Gonzalez and § 2244(b) apply to Rule 59(e) motions

only when the motion raises entirely new claims. We believe

this approach properly recognizes the key distinctions

between post-judgment motions under Rules 59 and 60. A

motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) suspends the

finality of the judgment and tolls the time for appeal until the

motion is resolved.9

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A);

Blystone, 664 F.3d at 414. Accordingly, a timely Rule 59(e)

motion is “neither a collateral attack on the initial habeas

judgment, nor a new collateral attack on the underlying

criminal judgment—rather it is part and parcel of the

petitioner’s one full opportunity to seek collateral review.” 

Blystone, 664 F.3d at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A Rule 60(b) motion, in contrast, only comes into play after

the time to appeal has expired, the judgment has become

final, and the petitioner has “expended the one full

opportunity to seek collateral review that AEDPA ensures.” 

Id. at 413 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

a Rule 60(b) motion that raises a Gonzalez claim marks the

start of a second round of habeas litigation, triggering

AEDPA’s additional restrictions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

While we recognize that motions for reconsideration

pursuant to Rule 59(e) can be consistent with AEDPA, we

9 Rule 60(b) motions filed within twenty-eight days of entry of judgment

also toll the time to appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), but such

motions are treated as Rule 59 motions. See Am. Ironworks, 248 F.3d at

898–99; see also Fed. R. App. P. 4 advisory committee’s note to the 1993

amendment.

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20 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

cannot say that Rule 59(e) motions should never be construed

as second habeas petitions. Experience has taught us that

habeas petitioners sometimes use Rule 59(e) improperly—to

raise entirely new claims. See, e.g., Howard, 533 F.3d at 473

(errors in sentencing raised for the first time in Rule 59(e)

motion). Such a post-judgment motion, although “labeled”

a Rule 59(e) motion, is in substance a second habeas petition

that clearly “require[s] Court of Appeals permission to be

filed and considered.” Id. at 476 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 

Accordingly, when faced with such a post-judgment motion,

district courts should follow Gonzalez’s teaching and

preclude a petitioner from improperly using Rule 59(e) to

“circumvent[] AEDPA’s requirement that a new claim be

dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of

constitutional law or newly discovered facts.” Gonzalez,

545 U.S. at 531.

In sum, we hold that a motion for reconsideration filed

within twenty-eight days of judgment that raises a new claim,

including one based on newly discovered evidence or an

intervening change in substantive law, is subject to AEDPA’s

second-or-successive petition bar. However, a timelymotion

for reconsideration that asks the district court to reconsider a

previously adjudicated claim on grounds already raised

should not be construed as a second or successive habeas

petition subject to AEDPA’s additional restrictions. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b).

D

We now turn to Rishor’s motion for reconsideration to

determine whether it raised any “new claims” such that it

should be construed as a second or successive habeas petition. 

We conclude that it did not.

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 21

Rishor’s Rule 59(e) motion asked the court to reconsider

two issues: (1) whether the state court violated clearly

established federal law when it held that Rishor had validly

waived counsel on remand, and (2) whether the state court

violated clearly established federal law by holding that the

prosecution did not violate double jeopardy principles on

remand.10 Rishor’s habeas petition argued that he did not

validly waive counsel on remand, in violation of the Sixth

Amendment. Accordingly, Rishor did not raise his waiver of

counsel claim for the first time in his motion for

reconsideration.

Nor can we say that Rishor raised his double jeopardy

argument for the first time in his post-judgment motion. 

Rishor’s handwritten habeas “form” petition alleged that he

was not arraigned on remand and did not receive notice of the

charges filed against him. Neither of these claims implicate

double jeopardy principles on their face. However, the

standard form Rishor used to fill out his habeas petition

instructed him not to argue or cite law. And, just seven days

later, Rishor filed a supplemental brief and argued:

The state had no legal authority to re-file first

degree assault charges against the petitioner.

10 Rishor’s motion for reconsideration also asked the district court to

reconsider whether his due process rights were violated when he was not

re-arraigned or given notice of the charges filed against him on remand. 

The district court, however, only granted reconsideration on Rishor’s

double jeopardy claim. Rishor does not argue this his due process rights

were violated on appeal. We therefore decline to consider this issue. See

Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1109 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Nonetheless, these issues are still relevant as to whether Rishor’s guilty

plea was knowing and voluntary. This issue is discussed in Section V.A

of this opinion.

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22 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

State v. ahluwalia, 143 Wn. 2. 527, 540. . .41,

22 p. 3d. 1254 (2001) [sic] as demonstrated by

the discussion in ahluwalia and arraignment is

required afther [sic] a reversal, especially

when an amended information is filled [sic]

and there is a basis to be confused about the

charges . . . .

In State v. Ahluwalia, 143 Wash. 2d 527, 529 (Wash. 2001),

the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether federal

and state constitutional double jeopardy principles were

violated when Ahluwalia was retried for second degree

murder after his first trial ended in a mistrial because the jury

was unable to reach a verdict on that charge. The Ahluwalia

court held that constitutional double jeopardy principles bar

a defendant’s retrial only on charges for which a defendant

was definitively convicted or acquitted in a previous trial. Id.

at 536–39. Ultimately, the Washington Supreme Court held

that Ahluwalia’s retrial for second degree murder did not

violate double jeopardy principles because Ahluwalia was

neither acquitted nor convicted of that charge at his first trial;

rather, the jury had merely been unable to reach a verdict. Id.

at 541.

Although Ahluwalia’s facts are distinguishable from

Rishor’s case, Ahluwalia discussed double jeopardy

principles at length. In addition, Rishor unequivocally stated

in his supplemental briefing that “[t]he state had no legal

authority to re-file first degree assault charges.” On the other

hand, it is unclear from Rishor’s arguments whether he

understood that a court’s failure to re-arraign a defendant and

give him notice of the charges against him is a separate and

distinct argument from whether double jeopardy principles

were violated. Rishor failed to make these arguments

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 23

separately and distinctly. Nonetheless, we give Rishor’s

arguments the “benefit of liberal construction,” and conclude

that he adequately raised his double jeopardy claim in his

initial habeas filings. Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958

(9th Cir. 2010); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed.”).

In sum, we hold that Rishor’s motion for reconsideration

properly asked the district court to reconsider the merits of

two claims that were raised in Rishor’s initial habeas petition. 

Rishor’s motion for reconsideration was, therefore, part and

parcel of his one full opportunity to seek habeas relief and

should not be construed as a second or successive habeas

petition. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court had

jurisdiction to consider Rishor’s post-judgment motion in the

first instance without seeking pre-certification by the Court of

Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).

IV

Having determined that the district court properly

exercised jurisdiction over Rishor’s motion for

reconsideration, we turn to the merits of the district court’s

ruling. On September 9, 2010, the Washington Supreme

Court denied discretionary relief on Rishor’s waiver of

counsel claim and held that “the record indicates that Rishor

was more than ready to proceed pro se with the active

assistance of standby counsel.” On reconsideration, the

district court held that this decision was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court. We review

the district court’s grant of Rishor’s motion for

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24 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Allstate Ins. Co.,

634 F.3d at 1111.

A

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal

prosecutions a defendant shall have the right to the assistance

of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Powell v.

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932). The Sixth Amendment

also guarantees a defendant the right to refuse the assistance

of counsel and to represent himself in criminal proceedings. 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975). While a

defendant’s choice to proceed pro se “must be honored out of

‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the

law,’” id. (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51

(1970)), the Constitution “require[s] that any waiver of the

right to counsel be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,” Iowa

v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004). In other words, a defendant

who requests to proceed pro se “must be warned specifically

of the hazards ahead.” Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89.

There is no doubt that Rishor’s waiver of counsel in 2004

was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. He does not argue

to the contrary. How could he? Before his trial, Rishor

adamantly requested to proceed pro se even after Judge Mura

clearly warned him that he would be bound by all the same

rules as a lawyer, that he would almost certainly “screw up”

his case, and that he had never seen a pro se litigant

effectively represent himself.

Instead, Rishor relies on Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806 (1975), to argue that the Washington trial court’s failure

to conduct a second, formal Faretta hearing violated the Sixth

Amendment. In Faretta, the Supreme Court explained what

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 25

is constitutionally required before a criminal defendant can

validly waive counsel and proceed pro se, stating:

Although a defendant need not himself have

the skill and experience of a lawyer in order

competently and intelligently to choose selfrepresentation, he should be made aware of

the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish

that “he knows what he is doing and his

choice is made with eyes open.”

Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,

317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta, however, is

silent on whether a defendant, who has validly waived

counsel before his first trial, is entitled to a second Faretta

hearing on remand. So is the Supreme Court’s decision in

Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), a case cited by

Rishor for the proposition that waiver of counsel cannot be

implied from the record. And where the holdings of the

Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas

review are lacking, “it cannot be said that the state court

‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.’”

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (quoting

§ 2254(d)(1)). The district court, therefore, erred by finding

that the United States Supreme Court had authored “clearly

established” law on this issue.

Nor can it be said that a “general standard” from the

Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment case law clearly

establishes that Rishor was entitled to a second, formal

Faretta hearing. See Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446,

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26 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

1449 (2013) (“[T]he lack of a Supreme Court decision on

nearly identical facts does not by itself mean that there is no

clearly established federal law, since ‘a general standard’

from this Court’s cases can supply such law.”) (quoting

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). To the

contrary, the bright-line rule suggested by Rishor, and

adopted by the district court, contravenes the Supreme

Court’s adoption of a “pragmatic approach to the waiver

question” in order to determine “the type of warnings and

procedures that should be required before a waiver of that

right will be recognized.” Tovar, 541 U.S. at 90 (citation

omitted). In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly declined

to “prescribe[] any formula or script to be read to a defendant

who states that he elects to proceed without counsel,” as the

information a defendant needs to make an intelligent waiver

depends on “a range of case-specific factors, including the

defendant’s education or sophistication, the complex or easily

grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the

proceeding.” Id. at 88.

ViewingRishor’swaiver argument through a “pragmatic”

lens, it is clear that fairminded jurists could disagree as to

whether Rishor’s original waiver of counsel remained intact

throughout his criminal prosecution. For instance, Rishor, on

remand, had specifically requested to be placed on Judge

Mura’s docket to request that attorney Thomas Fryer be

appointed as his standby counsel. At this initial hearing, the

prosecution informed Judge Mura that the parties were “here

this morning to reiterate [Rishor’s] request to proceed in a pro

se basis.” Rishor gave the court absolutely no indication that

this was not the case or that he no longer wished to proceed

pro se. Instead, Rishor proceeded to tell Judge Mura that he

wanted to get standby counsel appointed so that he could

have assistance filing motions from jail. Rishor’s renewed

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 27

request for standby counsel was approved, and Rishor

personally drafted and filed the appropriate order appointing

Fryer as his standby counsel. Given Rishor’s valid waiver of

counsel before his first trial and his unwavering resolve to

proceed pro se on remand, we cannot say that the Washington

Supreme Court’s decision was “objectively unreasonable.”

See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (finding that

AEDPA creates “a substantially higher threshold for

obtaining relief than de novo review”).

It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine what

rule the Sixth Amendment in fact establishes for post-remand

Faretta colloquies. All this case requires us to observe is

that, in light of Supreme Court precedent, fairminded jurists

could disagree as to whether Rishor’s constitutional rights

were violated on remand. Under AEDPA, this issue is one on

which we must defer to the considered judgment of our

colleagues on the Washington Supreme Court. Rishor’s

argument, accepted by the district court, does not pass muster

under AEDPA review.

B

The district court concluded that the state court violated

clearly established federal law by putting “the burden on

[Rishor] to demonstrate lack of waiver and [failing] to apply

a presumption against waiver.” The district court relied on

Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 354 (1990), and Brewer

v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 407 (1977)—two cases involving

the right to counsel in police interrogations. Not only do

these cases involve a different factual scenario from this case,

but the district court also overlooked the Supreme Court’s

opinion in Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004). There, the

Court held that “in a collateral attack on an uncounseled

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28 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

conviction, it is the defendant’s burden to prove that he did

not competently and intelligently waive his right to the

assistance of counsel.” Id. at 92. Tovar illustrates that the

strict presumption against waiver of counsel does not last

indefinitely. At the very least, Tovar creates room for

disagreement as to whether Rishor bore the burden of proof

on the waiver of counsel issue.

Finally, the district court also suggested that the

Washington Supreme Court improperly required Rishor to

show that he was prejudiced by his invalid waiver of counsel. 

But, as the district court noted and Rishor concedes on

appeal, the Supreme Court has never held that a court’s

failure to conduct a Faretta waiver is per se prejudicial. 

Accordingly, we cannot say that the Washington Supreme

Court’s alternative holding—that Rishor was not prejudiced

by the court’s failure to secure a second waiver of

counsel—was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law.

“If no Supreme Court precedent creates clearly

established federal law relating to the legal issue the habeas

petitioner raised in state court, the state court’s decision

cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law.” Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d

952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the Washington

Supreme Court’s decision denying review of Rishor’s waiver

of counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as established

by the United States Supreme Court. The district court erred

in concluding otherwise.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its

discretion by granting reconsideration and awarding Rishor

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 29

habeas relief on his waiver of counsel claim. See Koon v.

United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“The abuse-ofdiscretion standard includes review to determine that the

discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.”);

see also Richard S. v. Dep’t of Developmental Servs. of Cal.,

317 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court abuses its

discretion when it bases its ruling on an “inaccurate view of

the law”).

V

Finally, we turn to Rishor’s claim that the State

improperly re-filed first degree assault charges on remand in

violation of Rishor’s rights under the Double Jeopardy

Clause. On remand, Rishor was initially charged with first

degree assault, the same conduct on which his first jury had

impliedly acquitted him after his first trial. Rishor, however,

was not ultimately convicted of that charge on remand. On

January 8, 2007, the State filed a second amended

information changing the charge to second degree assault. 

That same day, Rishor pled guilty to that charge.

Although the district court failed to address Rishor’s

double jeopardy argument in its initial order denying Rishor

habeas relief, the district court granted Rishor’s motion for

reconsideration and granted habeas relief on this claim. The

district court first determined that Rishor had properly

exhausted this claim in the state courts. Citing Green v.

United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957), which held that a

jury’s verdict of acquittal bars a subsequent retrial on those

same offenses under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the district

court held that Rishor was prosecuted in violation of the

Double Jeopardy Clause when he was charged on remand

with first degree assault. The district court then concluded

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30 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

that the state court’s decision on the double jeopardy issue

was “contraryto, or involved an unreasonable application of,”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

The district court went on to consider de novo whether

Rishor’s guilty plea to second degree assault prevented him

from seeking habeas relief based on a double jeopardy

violation that occurred before his plea. The district court

determined that Rishor’s guilty plea was invalid and did not

preclude habeas relief because Rishor had received bad

advice from his standby counsel and because “[t]he filing of

the first degree assault charge placed [him] at a grave

disadvantage in the plea bargaining process.”

We review the district court’s ruling on reconsideration

for an abuse of discretion. Allstate, 634 F.3d at 1111.

A

As an initial matter, we note that the parties contest

whether Rishor exhausted his double jeopardy claim in state

court. However, Rishor’s appeal does not require us to

decide this issue for the reasons below.

Before we can reach the merits of Rishor’s double

jeopardy argument, we must resolve whether Rishor’s guilty

plea to second degree assault forecloses his double jeopardy

claim. This is so because the Supreme Court has held,

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain

of events which has preceded it in the criminal

process. When a criminal defendant has

solemnly admitted in open court that he is in

fact guilty of the offense with which he is

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 31

charged, he may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation

of constitutional rights that occurred prior to

the entry of the guilty plea.

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Therefore,

“when the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has

become final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding,

the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying

plea was both counseled and voluntary.” United States v.

Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). If the underlying guilty

plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, the guilty

plea forecloses a collateral attack on the underlying judgment. 

Id.; see also Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005)

(“A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and

is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,

‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and

likely consequences.’”).

Whether Rishor’s guilty plea to second degree assault

forecloses his double jeopardy claim depends on whether it

was knowing and voluntary. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 574

(finding it to be “well settled” that a “voluntary and

intelligent plea of guilty” may not be collaterally attacked). 

The Washington Supreme Court addressed this very issue in

response to Rishor’s argument that the State “coerced him

into pleading guilty” by initially charging him with first

degree assault on remand. Specifically, the Washington

Supreme Court held that “nothing in the record indicates that

the plea was anything but wholly voluntary. The plea offer

was generous, and Mr. Rishor understandablytook advantage

of it rather than risk another trial.” We give this

determination deference under AEDPA. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2); see also Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301

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32 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

(2010) (“[A] state-court factual determination is not

unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would

have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”).

Our review of the record confirms that the state court’s

decision was not objectively unreasonable. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). In his habeas petition, Rishor asserts that he

was “never given notice, read, or arraigned on any charges

after remand.” However, on November 27, 2006, Rishor’s

standby counsel waived the right to a first appearance and

arraignment, and Rishor provides no evidence that his

standby counsel was acting without his authority. Then, at

his plea hearing, Rishor confirmed that he was pleading guilty

to second degree assault, with an 84-month sentence. 

Rishor’s plea deal was generous, as it allowed him to avoid

a weapon enhancement that may have added 36 additional

months to his sentence. At his plea hearing, Rishor

acknowledged this fact and explained that he was pleading

guilty to avoid the weapon enhancement charge.

Rishor also stated that he was taking the plea deal to

avoid making his daughter come back for a second trial and

to avoid a trial altogether. Specifically, he stated,

That’s the only reason I’m taking the guilty

plea is because I don’t want to have to put my

daughter coming here and I have enough

problems and I’ll take this deal. I just wanted

to make sure I plead guilty to the 84 months

for the assault minus the weapon

enhancement, okay, fine to get around the

trial.

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 33

And later, he stated: “Yes. I went through [the plea deal] with

Mr. Fryer now. I don’t want to bring my daughter back for

another trial. She just started school . . . . She’s going to be

a lawyer.” Finally, Rishor confirmed that he had reviewed

the plea deal with his standby counsel, that he understood the

rights he was giving up, that he was not being threatened or

coerced into pleading guilty, and that he was doing so “freely

and voluntarily.”

That the State initially re-chargedRishor with first degree

assault does not undermine the voluntariness of Rishor’s

guilty plea to second degree assault. Rishor never mentioned

that he was pleading to a lesser charge to avoid a first degree

assault conviction; instead, Rishor unequivocally explained

that he was pleading guilty to avoid a weapon enhancement

and because he wanted to avoid a trial altogether. Rishor

confirmed this fact less than a month later at his sentencing

on January 30, 2007 when he stated,

Your Honor, you’re familiar with the case that

happened. I took a guilty plea on the assault

two mostly because I didn’t want to bring my

daughter back from college and put her

through all of this was the main reason.

It was entirely reasonable for Rishor to

choose to avoid a second trial, especially

when a jury had already convicted him of the

charged offense plus an added weapon

enhancement. The record does not suggest

that Rishor’s decision to plead guilty was

motivated by a fear of a potential first degree

assault conviction. Rather, Rishor’s

admissions made upon entry of his guilty plea

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34 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

show that he understood the nature of the

charges against him and that his guilty plea

was not driven in any part from the State’s

initial filing of first degree assault. The

record evidence is certainly sufficient for the

Washington Court to have concluded that

Rishor’s plea was knowing and voluntary.

Finally, Rishor’s standby counsel’s alleged failure to

advise Rishor that the State’s re-filing of first degree assault

potentially violated the Double Jeopardy Clause does not

render Rishor’s guilty plea invalid.11 There is no clearly

established constitutional right to effective assistance of

standby counsel; nor is there a clearly established right to

receive correct advice from standby counsel in the plea

bargaining process. See Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403,

407–08 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the right to advisory

counsel is “not of constitutional dimension”); United States

v. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding

that a district court has discretion in deciding whether to

appoint standby counsel).

Rishor had the opportunity to challenge the first amended

information and attempt to show the existence of a double

jeopardy violation. He did not. Morever, Rishor knowingly

assumed the risk that he would not understand the law well

enough to defend himself competently when he decided to

waive his right to counsel. Rishor was specifically warned

11 Standby counsel Fryer, submitted an affidavit that stated:

“presumptively the information I provided him as to the consequences of

being convicted of assault in the first degree in contrast to the

consequences of pleading guilty to assault in the second degree factored

into [Rishor’s] decision to plead guilty to the amended charge.”

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RISHOR V. FERGUSON 35

that he might fail to make a motion to dismiss the indictment

because he did not know the law. Judge Mura told Rishor,

There might be a good motion somewhere for

you to make, a legal motion to dismiss, let’s

say, or for some other relief, and if you don’t

know what the law is you won’t even know

what motions to make. Do you understand

that?

Accordingly, we cannot say that the state court’s

decision—finding that Rishor’s guilty plea was “wholly

voluntary”—resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence or in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). Since we must defer to the

Washington Supreme Court’s decision that Rishor’s guilty

plea was valid, Rishor could not, under Tollett, attack his

conviction based on a constitutional violation that occurred

prior to his guilty plea. Therefore, double jeopardy was not

a valid basis for granting habeas relief.

B

In determining whether Rishor was entitled to collateral

relief based on his double jeopardy argument, the district

court was required to first decide whether Rishor’s guilty plea

was knowing and voluntary. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 574. The

district court erred by skipping this initial step and first

addressing the merits of Rishor’s double jeopardy claim. 

After finding that the prosecution violated double jeopardy

principles on remand, the district court proceeded to conduct

a de novo review as to whether Rishor’s guilty plea was valid

 Case: 14-36071, 05/06/2016, ID: 9966721, DktEntry: 22-1, Page 35 of 36
36 RISHOR V. FERGUSON

and precluded his double jeopardy argument. The district

court legally erred by failing to give AEDPA deference to the

Washington state court’s determination that Rishor’s guilty

plea was knowing and voluntary.

In sum, the district court erred by granting Rishor habeas

relief on his double jeopardy claim. We therefore reverse the

district court on this issue as well and hold that Rishor is not

entitled to habeas relief on his double jeopardy claim.

VI

The Washington Supreme Court’s decision that Rishor

was not entitled to habeas relief on his waiver of counsel and

double jeopardy claims was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court. Due to its

legal errors, the district court abused its discretion by

concluding otherwise. Rishor’s motion for reconsideration

should have been denied.

REVERSED, VACATED, and REMANDED with

instructions to reinstate the judgment denying habeas

relief.

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