Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03200/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03200-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Lawrence, Kansas
Appellee
Jack Cross
Appellee
David Davis
Appellee
Frank Diehl
Appellee
Mike Hall
Appellee
James Haller
Appellee
Kevin Harmon
Appellee
Dave Hubbell
Appellee
Catherine Kelley
Appellee
John L. Lewis
Appellee
Jim Miller
Appellee
Ron Olin
Appellee
Craig Shanks
Appellee
Ward A. Thompson
Appellant
Ray Urbanek
Appellee
Dan Ward
Appellee
Jerry Wells
Appellee
Bob Williams
Appellee
Matilda Woody
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

UDited States Court or Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 0 5 i995 

TENTH CIRCUIT ___________ PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

WARD A. THOMPSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

CITY OF LAWRENCE, KANSAS; RON OLIN, 

Chief of Police; JERRY WELLS, District 

Attorney; FRANK DIEHL, DAVID DAVIS, 

KEVIN HARMON, MIKE HALL, RAY URBANEK, 

JIM MILLER, BOB WILLIAMS, CRAIG 

SHANKS, JOHN LEWIS, JACK CROSS, 

CATHERINE KELLEY, DAN WARD, JAMES 

HALLER, DAVE HUBBELL AND MATILDA 

WOODY, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

FRANCES S. WISDOM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

CITY OF LAWRENCE, KANSAS; RON OLIN, 

Chief of Police; DAVID DAVIS, MIKE 

HALL, JIM MILLER, BOB WILLIAMS, CRAIG 

SHANKS, JOHN L. LEWIS, JACK CROSS, 

KEVIN HARMON, CATHERINE KELLEY, DAN 

WARD AND JAMES HALLER, Jr., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 94-3200 

No. 94-3203 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

{D.C. Nos. 93-CV-2253, 93-CV-2310} 

Patrick S. Levy, Lawrence, Kansas, for Plaintiffs-Appellant~. 

Gerald L. Cooley of Allen, Coo~ey & Allen, Lawrence, Kansas, for 

Defendants-Appellees City of Lawrence, Ron Olin, Kevin Harmon, 

Mike Hall, Ray Urbanek, Jim Miller, Craig Shanks, John Lewis-, Jack 

Cross, Catherine Kelley, Dan Ward, and James Haller, Jr. 

Appellate Case: 94-3200 Document: 01019276544 Date Filed: 07/05/1995 Page: 1 
Donald ~atterson of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, Topeka, 

Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee David Davis. 

Thomas D. Haney of Porter, Fairchild, Wachter & Haney, Topeka, 

Kansas, for Defendants-Appellees Wells and Diehl. 

Before KELLY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and OWEN, District 

Judge.t 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs-Appellants Ward A. Thompson and Frances S. Wisdom 

appeal from the district court's order denying their motion for 

reconsideration and granting Defendants-Appellees' motion fo~ 

summary judgment. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

and we affirm. 

Background 

In December 1991, Theodore Bratton was serving a one-year 

jail term for misdemeanor theft and was concurrently on parole for 

a prior burglary conviction. While on work release, Bratton 

visited Plaintiff Thompson at A.J.'s Bonding in order to discuss a 

$ 1300 debt which Bratton owed to Thompson for past ba.il bonds. 

Thompson had obtained a judgment on the bonds against Bratton and 

his mother, who co-signed the bonds. During the meeting, Thompson 

told Bratton that he was interested in obtaining a riding lawn 

mower and that if Bratton procured a mower for Thompson, the debt 

would be satisfied. Previously, Bratton had mentioned that his 

uncle possessed a riding mower and that Bratton could obtain such 

tHonorable Richard Owen, Senior United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3200 Document: 01019276544 Date Filed: 07/05/1995 Page: 2 
a mower for Thompson. 

When Bratton returned to jail, he telephoned Defendant 

Officer Davis of the Lawrence Police Department ("LPD") to see if 

Davis might be interested in his information regarding Thompson. 

The following day, Davis and Defendant LPD Officer Lewis met with 

Bratton and devised a plan to conceal a recording device on 

Bratton and have him engage Thompson in a conversation regarding 

riding mowers. That same day, Davis received permission for 

Bratton to serve as an informant from the court services officer 

in charge of work and school release. 

Subsequently, the plan to record a conversation between 

Thompson and Bratton was executed. On the recorded tape, Thompson 

told Bratton that he "[didn't] want to know where [the mower] came 

from" but that Bratton should bring the mower to him and he would 

"get rid of it the next day." LPD officers concluded that 

Thompson expected Bratton to procure a stolen mower and give it to 

him. 

As a result of the recording, LPD officers decided to deliver 

a "stolen" riding mower to Thompson. The r,PD borrowed a mower 

from a local farm equipment dealer. Bratton delivered the mower 

to Thompson, engaged him in another recorded conversation, and 

then returned to the Law Enforcement Center. Meanwhile, LPD 

officers stationed around A.J.'s Bonding failed to notice that 

Plaintiff Wisdom and her son had entered the establishment. After 

Bratton left the premises, the armed officers entered A.J.'s 

Bonding. 

Once inside, the officers handcuffed Thompson and Wisdom. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3200 Document: 01019276544 Date Filed: 07/05/1995 Page: 3 
Although Davis gave Thompson Miranda warnings, Thompson waived his 

rights and told Davis that he knew Bratton was going to steal a 

riding lawn mower. Davis then asked for and received Thompson's 

consent to search the premises. While a search of the premises 

ensued, Wisdom and her son were released. Thompson, however, was 

arrested and subsequently charged with solicitation of theft. All 

charges against him were eventually dismissed without prejudice. 

Thompson and Wisdom brought this suit alleging civil rights 

violations and various tort violations under Kansas law. The 

Defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, which the 

district court granted. The Plaintiffs filed two motions for 

reconsideration, both of which the district court denied. Upon 

motion by Defendants, the district court granted summary judgment 

for the remaining claims. Plaint~ffs appeal, arguing that the 

district court erred in 1) overruling Plaintiffs' motions to 

reconsider, 2) analyzing qualified immunity claims in the summary 

judgment context under an improper standard, 3) improperly finding 

that officers could have reasonably believed that warrantless 

search and seizure was lawful, 4) improperly characterizing 

Plaintiff Thompson's claims against Defendants Wells and Diehl, 5) 

improperly dismissing Plaintiff Wisdom's claims for unlawful 

seizure and excessive force, 6) improperly dismissing Plaintiff 

Thompson's claims of municipal liability and conspiracy, and 7) 

improperly dismissing Plaintiffs' state law and punitive damage 

claims. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3200 Document: 01019276544 Date Filed: 07/05/1995 Page: 4 
I. Motion to Reconsider 

We review the district court's denials of the motions for 

reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Hancock v. City of 

Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (lOth Cir. 1988). Under Kansas 

Local Rule 206(g), failure of a party to file a timely response 

constitutes a "waiver" of the right to file a response, "except 

upon a showing of excusable neglect." D. Kan. Civ. R. 206(g). 

Here the Plaintiffs failed to file a response to Defendants' 

motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiffs' counsel 

claims that the response was mailed, however neither the court nor 

opposing counsel (four in number) have any record of receiving the 

document. Moreover, the district court found unbelievable the 

statements of Plaintiffs' counsel regarding the purported mailing. 

Aplt. App. at 117. 

The district court ultimately held that there was no basis to 

believe that Plaintiffs actually responded to Defendants' motion. 

Aplt. App. at 103. We agree. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to 

allege or prove any excusable neglect, mistake, inadvertence, or 

surprise. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1). In light of counsel's 

contumacious behavior, we find no abuse of discretion in the 

district court's denial. Compare Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396 

(holding that because counsel's mistake was unintentional and not 

contumacious in nature, trial judge abused discretion in denying 

motion to reconsider) . 

II~ Standard of Review 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

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Appellate Case: 94-3200 Document: 01019276544 Date Filed: 07/05/1995 Page: 5 
same standard used by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). McDermott v. Midland Management. Inc., 997 F.2d 768, 770 

(lOth Cir. 1993). We review qualified immunity claims in the 

summary judgment context under the framework set out in Woodward 

v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1396-97 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. 

denied, 113 S. Ct. 3038 (1993). See also Hinton v. City of 

Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 779 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

First the defendant must adequately raise the defense of 

qualified immunity. Then the plaintiff must show that the law was 

clearly established when the alleged violation occurred and must 

present facts or allegations sufficient to show that the official 

violated that law. The defendant then has the usual summary 

judgment burden of establishing that there is no genuine 

controversy over a material fact which would defeat his claim for 

qualified immunity and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 

(1986). We view the record in the light most favorable to the 

party opposing summary judgment. McDermott, 997 F.2d at 770. 

III. Warrantless Arrest in a Public Place 

Warrantless arrest is permissible if there is probable cause 

to believe that a person has committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 

U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Under a § 1983 claim of unlawful arrest, 

Defendant police officers lose their shield of qualified immunity 

only if they could not have believed that Thompson's arrest was 

based on probable cause. Jones v. City and County of Denver, 854 

F.2d 1206, 1210 (lOth Cir. 1988). Probable cause exists if the 

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Appellate Case: 94-3200 Document: 01019276544 Date Filed: 07/05/1995 Page: 6 
arresting officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances which 

are reasonably trustworthy and sufficient to lead a prudent person 

to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an 

offense. Id. Under Kansas law, the determination of probable 

cause at a preliminary hearing is prima facie evidence of probable 

cause, which may by overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Swanson v. Fields, 814 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (D. Kan), aff'd, 13 

F.3d 407 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

The state district court judge made a finding of probable 

cause at Thompson's preliminary hearing following his arrest. 

Thompson has failed to overcome this finding by a preponderance of 

the evidence. Moreover, the LPD possessed recorded conversations 

between Bratton and Thompson regarding the unlawful acquisition of 

the riding mower and knew that Thompson had accepted the 

purportedly stolen mower. In light of these factors, we find the 

existence of probable cause. 

The potential unreliability of Bratton was compensated for by 

the recorded conversations and does not defeat the existence of 

probable cause. Similarly, our finding of probable cause is not 

affected by the failure of the LPD to obtain permission from 

Bratton's parole officer to use him as a confidential informant. 

Thompson's argument that his arrest was unlawful because the 

LPD entered A.J.'s Bonding without a warrant fails. Warrantless 

arrest based upon probable cause may take place in a public place. 

See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976); see also 

United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). "The necessary 

inquiry . . . [is] not whether there was a warrant or whether 

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Appellate Case: 94-3200 Document: 01019276544 Date Filed: 07/05/1995 Page: 7 
there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause 

for the arrest." Watson, 423 U.S. at 417. We have already 

established that probable cause existed. Moreover, A.J.'s Bonding 

was open to the public and there is no evidence that customers 

needed permission to enter the business. Consequently, we hold 

that A.J.'s bonding was a public place for purposes of the arrest. 

See Dailey v. Lyles, 785 F. Supp. 812, 820 (W.D. Mo. 1992), aff'd, 

993 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1993). 

Thompson further argues that the warrantless search of A.J.'s 

Bonding was per se unreasonable. A search may be conducted 

without a warrant following voluntary consent by someone with 

authority over the place searched. United States v. RodriguezGarcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1567 (lOth Cir. 1993). Defendant police 

officers maintain their shield of qualified immunity from 

liability for warrantless searches as long as a reasonable officer 

could have believed that the warrantless search was lawful. 

Jones, 854 F.2d at 1208 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 

635, 641 (1987)). 

Thompson gave consent to search within earshot of at least 

three officers, after he was read his Miranda rights. Aplee. 

Davis App. at 281, 303, 329. He admits that he did not place any 

restrictions on the search of the premises. Aplt. App. at 501 n. 

13. Moreover, we find no evidence of coercion or duress. The 

fact that Thompson was in police custody did not render him 

incapable of giving voluntary consent to a search. RodriguezGarcia, 983 F.2d at 1567. Thompson has failed to present evidence 

sufficient to show that his consent was not freely given, thus we 

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Appellate Case: 94-3200 Document: 01019276544 Date Filed: 07/05/1995 Page: 8 
hold that the search was lawful. Moreover, we find no evidence 

which leads us to believe that the arrest and search were merely a 

pretext to look for drugs. 

IV. Excessive Force Claim of Thompson 

We analyze Thompson's claim of excessive force by determining 

whether the officers' actions were objectively reasonable in light 

of the facts and circumstances surrounding them. Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Thompson argues that the 

officers used excessive force by entering the premises carrying 

weapons, making Thompson lay face down on the floor, handcuffing 

his hands behind his back, and "yanking" his wrists in order to 

raise him to his feet despite his protestations of an injured 

shoulder. Aplt. Brief at 23. 

It is well established that the right to arrest an individual 

carries with it the right to use some physical coercion to effect 

the arrest. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. We hold that it was not 

unreasonable for the officers to carry weapons when they entered 

the premises of Thompson, a suspected felon with a reputation for 

possessing firearms. See Aplee. Davis App. at 315, 372. We 

further hold that it was not unreasonable for the officers to take 

control of a potentially dangerous situation by ordering Thompson 

to lay on the floor and handcuffing him. Moreover, the record 

does not support Thompson's contention that he was "yank[ed]" to 

his feet. Rather, in deposition testimony, Thompson stated that 

he was "lifted" or "raised" from the floor and that he did not 

think that he cried out in any way during the process. Aplee. 

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Davis App. at 393-94. We hold that the officers' actions were not 

unreasonable given the totality of the circumstances. 

V. Prosecutorial Claims 

Thompson alleges that Defendants Wells and Diehl are liable 

for their involvement in the reverse sting operation targeting 

him. Thompson, however, fails to articulate a legal theory 

providing a basis for the alleged liability. He faults the 

district court for construing his claim as one of malicious 

prosecution, but does not advance any alternative theories which 

might constitute a violation of his rights. In the face of such 

vague allegations, we cannot fault the district court for its 

judgment. Moreover, since Thompson has failed to show that Wells 

and Diehl have disturbed his rights, we need not address the issue 

of their possible immunity. 

VI. Excessive Force and Unreasonable Seizure Claims of Wisdom 

Wisdom alleges that her seizure by officers was unreasonable. 

Wisdom was at A.J.'s Bonding when officers entered the 

establishment, and was handcuffed and detained by police for a 

short period of time. The determination of reasonableness of a 

seizure involves the balancing of the individual's Fourth 

Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental 

interest at stake. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). 

When the officers entered A.J.'s Bonding, they were unaware 

that Wisdom would be present and were equally unaware of the 

nature of her relationship to Thompson. We have already 

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established that the officers had probable cause to arrest 

Thompson based on a suspected crime. The governmental interest in 

securing the area around Thompson and protecting officers from 

potential danger is sufficient to justify the temporary detention 

of Wisdom. See United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 

(lOth Cir. 1993) ("A law enforcement agent, faced with the 

possibility of danger, has a right to take reasonable steps to 

protect himself .... " (citations omitted)). 

Wisdom further alleges that the officers' actions in 

"shov[ing]" her to the floor, drawing a weapon on her, and 

handcuffing her, constituted excessive force. Aplt. Brief at 25. 

Given the volatility of the situation, we hold that it was 

objectively reasonable for the officers to temporarily restrain 

Wisdom, whose relationship to Thompson and possible reaction to 

the situation were unknown. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

VII. Municipal and Conspiracy Claims 

Thompson alleges that the City of Lawrence ("City") is liable 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the acts of Defendant Ron Olin, the 

chief of the LPD. The City may not be held liable under this 

theory, however, if there are no underlying constitutional 

violations by its officers. Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 

774, 782 (lOth Cir. 1993) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 

475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). Because we have already determined 

that Thompson has failed to show that he was deprived of any of 

his constitutional rights, this claim fails. 

Thompson also claims that Chief Ron Olin is liable for his 

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Appellate Case: 94-3200 Document: 01019276544 Date Filed: 07/05/1995 Page: 11 
alleged failure to train and supervise the LPD officers. A suit 

against a city official in his official capacity is no different 

from a suit against the City itself. See Will v. Michigan Dept. 

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus the rationale which 

defeated the claim against the City also defeats the claim against 

Olin. See Hinton, 997 F.2d at 783. 

Thompson further alleges that Defendant police officers are 

liable under a § 1983 conspiracy theory. In order to succeed on 

this claim, Thompson must prove both the existence of a conspiracy 

and the deprivation of a constitutional right. Dixon v. City of 

Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (lOth Cir. 1990). We have already 

determined, however, that Thompson has failed to establish the 

existence of any constitutional violations. Since an essential 

element of the conspiracy claim is absent, the allegation fails. 

VIII. State Law and Punitive Damages Claims 

Plaintiffs' contention that the dismissal of their state law 

and punitive damages claims should be reversed is supported solely 

by the argument that reversal of the dismissal of Plaintiffs' 

constitutional claims requires reversal of these claims as well. 

Consequently, because we affirm the lower court's dismissal of 

Plaintiffs' constitutional claims, we also affirm the dismissal of 

Plaintiffs' state law and punitive damages claims. 

AFFIRMED. 

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