Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-01264/USCOURTS-ca10-16-01264-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hector Hinojosa Gonzalez
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

In re: HECTOR HINOJOSA 

GONZALEZ, 

 Movant.

No. 16-1264

(D.C. Nos. 1:04-CV-02430-MSK & 

1:99-CR-00300-MSK-2)

(D. Colo.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before KELLY, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Hector Hinojosa Gonzalez, proceeding pro se, seeks authorization to file a second 

or successive § 2255 motion to set aside, vacate, or correct his sentence. For the 

following reasons, we deny authorization.

Mr. Gonzalez was convicted of a number of drug trafficking crimes and sentenced 

to 612 months in prison. We affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. 

See United States v. Hinojosa Gonzalez, 68 F. App’x 918, 920 (10th Cir. 2003). He 

subsequently filed a § 2255 motion, which the district court denied. He did not appeal 

from the denial. He now seeks authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 

motion.

We may authorize the filing of a second or successive § 2255 motion only if the 

movant makes a prima facie showing that his motion satisfies the statutory requirements 

for authorization. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). Mr. Gonzalez must therefore show that his 

proposed claims rely on either:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

November 7, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

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(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the 

evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] 

guilty of the offense; or

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 

Mr. Gonzalez seeks to bring two new claims. In his first new claim, he alleges 

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his appeal rights with respect 

to a sentencing challenge. He alleges that counsel knew that Mr. Gonzalez had 

meritorious “Blakely/Apprendi1 claims,” but failed to properly preserve them. Mot. for 

Auth. at 2. His alleged new evidence is a copy of a docketing statement that was filed in 

this court on September 17, 2001, which shows that his counsel intended to raise an 

Apprendi issue on appeal. See id., Ex. 2 at 4. 

Mr. Gonzalez asserts that counsel did not forward this document to him in a timely 

fashion, although he does not state when he received it. His claim is somewhat 

confusing, but he appears to be arguing that the docketing statement shows that his 

counsel knew he had an Apprendi claim, but then his counsel abandoned the claim and 

did not argue it on appeal. See id., Ex. 1 at 4. Mr. Gonzalez’s citation to the docketing 

statement as new evidence, however, does not meet the requirements for authorization in 

§ 2255(h)(1). The docketing statement is arguably not “new” as it was available on a 

public docket fifteen years ago. But, more importantly, there is nothing in the docketing 

 1 Mr. Gonzalez is referring to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

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statement that would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable 

factfinder would have found Mr. Gonzalez guilty of the charged offenses, as required by 

§ 2255(h)(1). 

For his second claim, Mr. Gonzalez asserts that the government “never proved the 

requisite ownership or acceptance of exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.” Mot. for 

Auth. at 2. He does not cite to any new rule of law or newly discovered evidence—as 

required by § 2255(h)—to support his claim. Instead, he contends that “jurisdictional 

challenges may be raised at any time.” Mot. for Auth. at 2. While a jurisdictional 

challenge may be raised for the first time in an initial § 2255 motion, see United States v. 

Cook, 997 F.2d 1312, 1320 (10th Cir. 1993), such a challenge remains subject to the 

authorization requirements in § 2255(h). See In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 

2008) (denying authorization for jurisdictional claim in successive § 2255 motion where 

movant failed to demonstrate that the claim satisfied statutory requirements); see also 

Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012, 1014-15 (10th Cir. 1996), (explaining in the context of 

a successive § 2254 habeas petition that “lack of jurisdiction is not an [independently] 

authorized ground upon which a second or successive habeas petition may be filed under 

the 1996 Act.”), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. United States, 254 F.3d 1180 

(10th Cir. 2001).

Mr. Gonzalez has failed to make a prima facie showing that he can satisfy the 

requirements for authorization in § 2255(h). Accordingly, we deny his motion. This 

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denial of authorization “shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition 

for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

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