Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-17-01046/USCOURTS-ca10-17-01046-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lou Archuleta
Appellee
Cynthia Coffman
Appellee
Joseph Saul Newland
Appellant
Travis Trani
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JOSEPH SAUL NEWLAND, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

TRAVIS TRANI; LOU ARCHULETA; 

CYNTHIA COFFMAN, Attorney General 

of the State of Colorado, 

 Respondents - Appellees. 

No. 17-1046 

(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-02642-LTB) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Joseph Newland seeks a certificate of appealability to challenge the district 

court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 motion as time-barred. Because Newland 

fails to demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 

court was correct in its procedural ruling,” we deny Newland’s request for a COA 

and dismiss the appeal. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

On August 21, 2007, a Colorado jury convicted Newland of one count of firstdegree murder. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Newland’s conviction on 

direct appeal, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied Newland’s petition for writ of 

 *

 This order isn’t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

March 16, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 17-1046 Document: 01019780291 Date Filed: 03/16/2017 Page: 1 
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certiorari on March 21, 2011. Because Newland didn’t seek review by the United 

States Supreme Court, his conviction became final on June 20, 2011. See Locke v. 

Saffle, 237 F.3d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 30.1. 

Newland then filed two state postconviction motions: one on July 7, 2011, and 

the other on October 20, 2011. The state district court denied both on November 16, 

2011. Newland didn’t appeal. Instead, on December 30, 2011, Newland filed his first 

motion for federal postconviction relief under § 2254. The federal district court 

dismissed that motion for failure to exhaust state remedies. Newland then filed a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States Supreme Court, which denied 

the petition. 

On May 18, 2015, Newland filed another motion for state postconviction 

relief. The state district court denied the motion on June 1, 2015. Again, Newland 

didn’t appeal. Instead, on June 29, 2015, he filed a motion under Rule 35 of the 

Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure. The state district court denied Newland’s 

Rule 35 motion on July 22, 2015, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed on 

August 11, 2016. 

Finally, on October 24, 2016, Newland filed the instant § 2254 motion. There, 

Newland raised a single claim: he alleged that his conviction violates both the United 

States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution because Colorado initiated the 

criminal proceedings against him via a complaint and information, rather than by 

empaneling a grand jury and obtaining an indictment. 

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Without addressing the merits of this constitutional claim, the district court 

dismissed Newland’s § 2254 motion as time-barred. Specifically, the court concluded 

that (1) 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)’s one-year time period for filing a § 2254 motion 

began to run when Newland’s conviction became final on June 20, 2011; (2) the 16 

days that elapsed between June 20, 2011, and July 7, 2011, counted against the oneyear time period; (3) under § 2244(d)(2), Newland’s July 7, 2011 motion for state 

postconviction relief tolled the one-year time period until January 3, 2012—the date 

on which Newland’s time for appealing the district court’s November 16, 2011 order 

denying his July 7 motion expired; (4) when the one-year time period began to run 

again on January 3, 2012, only 349 days remained for filing; (5) none of Newland’s 

other state or federal postconviction motions tolled the one-year time period; (6) the 

one-year time period therefore expired in December 2012; and (7) Newland wasn’t 

entitled to equitable tolling, thus rendering untimely the § 2254 motion he filed on 

October 24, 2016. Finally, the district court refused to issue a COA and denied 

Newland’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal. 

We may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district court 

denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a petitioner seeking a COA must 

demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states 

a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would 

find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” 

Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. 

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In requesting a COA, Newland doesn’t take issue with the district court’s 

conclusion that he isn’t entitled to equitable tolling. Instead, Newland asserts only 

that the district court’s statutory-tolling ruling is debatable or wrong. In support, he 

advances three arguments. 

First, Newland argues that he timely filed his June 29, 2015 Rule 35 motion, 

and that the district court therefore erred in failing to toll the one-year time period 

while his Rule 35 motion was pending. See § 2244(d)(2) (stating that “time during 

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review 

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” doesn’t count toward 

§ 2244(d)(1)’s one-year time period). 

But as the district court pointed out below, Newland didn’t file his Rule 35 

motion until June 2015. And by then, § 2244(d)(1)’s one-year time period had long 

since expired. Thus, even assuming Newland timely filed his Rule 35 motion, that 

motion didn’t trigger § 2244(d)(2)’s tolling provision. See Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 

F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Only state petitions for post-conviction relief filed 

within the one year . . . will toll the statute of limitations.”). 

Next, Newland asserts that his first § 2254 motion, which he filed on 

December 30, 2011, tolled the one-year time period. But as the district court noted, 

“an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State postconviction or other collateral review’ within the meaning of” § 2244(d)(2). R. vol. 1, 

239 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001)). Accordingly, 

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§ 2244(d)(2) didn’t “toll the limitation period during the pendency of [Newland’s] 

first federal habeas petition.” Walker, 533 U.S. at 181-82. 

Finally, Newland complains that the district court impermissibly 

“sidestep[ped]” the underlying constitutional question by dismissing his motion on 

procedural grounds. Aplt. Br. 4. But Slack explicitly contemplates this option. See 

529 U.S. at 484 (“Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is 

correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude 

either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner 

should be allowed to proceed further.”). And because we likewise conclude that we 

can “dispose of” Newland’s request for a COA “in a fair and prompt manner” on the 

same procedural grounds, we too decline to analyze the merits of Newland’s 

underlying constitutional claim. See id. at 484-85. 

Newland fails to demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct” in dismissing his § 2254 motion as timebarred. Id. at 484. Accordingly, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. As a final 

matter, we grant Newland’s motion to proceed IFP. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

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