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Parties Involved:
Darvis Orlando Dingle
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 18, 1997 Decided June 13, 1997 

No. 95-3168

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DARVIS ORLANDO DINGLE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cr00466-02)

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal 

Public Defender, was on the briefs.

Jeanne M. Hauch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. 

Attorney, John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant 

U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

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Before: WALD, GINSBURG and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Darvis Orlando Dingle 

appeals his conviction by a jury of possession of cocaine base 

with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), on the principal 

ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 

either possessed any drugs, or aided and abetted his codefendant in possessing drugs. He also challenges the district court's failure sua sponte to instruct on the lesser 

included offense of possession and its drug-quantity attribution at sentencing. We hold that the evidence was sufficient 

to convict Dingle as an aider and abettor, and that his 

challenges to the instructions and his sentence are meritless; 

accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Dingle was arrested after the police executed a search 

warrant for an apartment at 1435 Sheridan Street in Northwest Washington. Dingle, who did not own or live in the 

apartment, was found there along with his co-defendant, 

Gregory Boykin, and a small quantity of drugs. During the 

search, the police observed Boykin throwing a larger quantity 

of drugs out the window of the apartment. At the first trial, 

the jury convicted Boykin, but was unable to reach a verdict 

as to Dingle and the district court declared a mistrial. On 

retrial, a second jury convicted Dingle, and the district court 

sentenced him to 100 months' imprisonment.

The government's evidence at the second trial established 

that a team of officers led by Detective Milton Norris went to 

the door of the apartment, where Norris knocked and announced, "Police, search warrant." At that point, Norris 

heard footsteps inside that sounded as though a person were 

running toward the rear of the apartment. Norris tried to 

open the door, but it was locked. At that point, he instructed 

another officer to force the door open with a sledgehammer. 

The officer struck the door once, and a voice inside the 

apartment said, "Wait a minute, wait a minute," or words to 

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that effect. According to Norris, the voice was fading away, 

as though the speaker were moving away from the door. At 

about the same time, officers outside the building observed a 

man, later identified as Boykin, tossing something out of the 

apartment window.

The officers forced the door open with the sledgehammer. 

When they entered the apartment, which was well-kept and 

lightly furnished, Dingle was standing near the doorway next 

to a small bar, and Boykin was coming out of the back 

bedroom. Scattered on the floor of the living room, in the 

hallway between the living room and the bedroom, and on a 

window ledge in the bedroom, were several ziplock bags 

containing small amounts of cocaine base. The police also 

found a plastic wrapping containing 3.5 grams of cocaine base 

on the bed in the bedroom, and a number of empty ziplock 

bags in a dresser drawer in the bedroom. Outside the 

bedroom window, the police found a plastic wrapping containing 43.04 grams of cocaine base and smaller quantities of 

cocaine base in ziplock bags. In addition, a razor blade and 

plate, both coated with cocaine residue, were on the bar next 

to Dingle. The police also recovered a pager and $645 on 

Dingle's person.

The government's narcotics expert testified that crack cocaine is typically packaged in small ziplock bags for streetlevel distribution. He explained that drug dealers typically 

break cocaine down into individual dosage units using a razor 

blade or other cutting implement, and that experienced drug 

dealers typically do not need a scale to separate cocaine into 

individual doses. Prior to being packaged in individual doses, 

crack cocaine is often stored in "bulk" form in a larger plastic 

bag or container. The expert further explained that drug 

dealers will pay others to use their residences to perform this 

packaging process. Finally, he explained that it is common 

for drug buyers and sellers to contact one another using a 

pager. In the expert's opinion, the evidence found in the 

apartment was consistent with a drug distribution operation, 

based on the quantity of drugs found and the manner of 

packaging.

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Dingle testified that he went to the apartment to visit some 

friends, Donald Stewart and Brenda Kellogg, and their oneand-a-half-year-old daughter, who lived in the apartment. He 

described Stewart and Kellogg as "real good friends," whom 

he had known for five years and visited two to three times a 

week. When he arrived, both the front door of the apartment 

building and the door to the apartment were unlocked. The 

apartment lights were on, and the radio was playing, so 

Dingle went inside. He decided to "play a game on Mr. 

Stewart" by locking the door to "teach[ ] him a lesson." 

After a time, Boykin knocked on the door, and Dingle, who 

recognized Boykin as a friend of Kellogg, let him inside the 

apartment. Boykin went back toward the bedroom, and 

Dingle sat down on a bar stool in the living room. Dingle 

then heard the police knock at the door, and said, "Who is it?" 

The officers identified themselves, and he said, "Wait a 

minute," and unlatched the door. Once the door was unlatched, the officers knocked it open.

Dingle also claimed that he was planning to pay the $645 to 

his wife, to whom he owed about $700 in child support. He 

testified that he had borrowed $300 from his father, and 

earned the rest doing "side jobs" cleaning carpets. He 

claimed that he had the pager so that his family and his 

employers could contact him.

In rebuttal, Officer Gerard Burke testified that the police 

did not find a baby's crib, toys, furniture, or clothes, or any 

women's clothes in the apartment. While the police did find a 

bill with Donald Stewart's name in the apartment, they were 

unable to locate Stewart himself; Burke had unsuccessfully 

attempted to contact Stewart both at the time of Dingle's 

arrest and during the trial. He also testified that the door to 

the apartment building had been left open by undercover 

officers so that the police could execute the search warrant.

II.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court views 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 

drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. See, e.g., 

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United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

Our inquiry is limited to the question of whether "any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Where a defendant presents evidence in 

his defense, the jury is entitled to consider all of the evidence, 

and on appeal the court does likewise, looking to the entire 

record, and not simply to the evidence in the government's 

case-in-chief. United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1082, 1085 

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc).

Dingle contends that there was insufficient evidence to 

convict him of possession with intent to distribute cocaine 

base because the government showed merely that he was 

present with Boykin in a small apartment where drugs were 

found. The government responds that there was sufficient 

evidence to convict Dingle of either constructively possessing 

the drugs in the apartment jointly with Boykin, or aiding and 

abetting Boykin in possessing the drugs. Of course, the 

"[m]ere presence of the accused on the premises, or simply 

his proximity to the drug," United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 

878, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1978), is alone insufficient to establish 

either constructive possession or aiding and abetting. United 

States v. Thorne, 997 F.2d 1504, 1510 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 999 (1993); United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 95 

(D.C. Cir. 1990). To establish constructive possession, the 

government had to show not only that Dingle knew of the 

drugs, but that he was in a position to exercise dominion and 

control over them. United States v. Lucas, 67 F.3d 956, 959 

(D.C. Cir. 1995). "There must be some action, some word, or 

some conduct that links the individual to the narcotics and 

indicates that he had some stake in them, some power over 

them." United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 549 (D.C. Cir. 

1980). To establish aiding and abetting, the government had 

to prove both that Boykin was guilty as a principal and that 

Dingle had "sufficient knowledge and participation to indicate 

that [he] knowingly and willfully participated in the offense in 

a manner that indicated that he intended to make it succeed." 

United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

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The evidence is clearly sufficient to establish that Dingle 

knew of the drugs since several ziplock bags containing 

cocaine base were in plain view on the living room floor near 

where he was standing. The only question is whether there 

was sufficient evidence that Dingle took any action that would 

indicate either an ability to exercise dominion and control 

over the drugs, or an effort to assist Boykin in possessing the 

drugs. The court has considered a defendant's ownership of 

or residence in premises where drugs are found in plain view 

to be sufficient evidence of dominion and control to establish 

constructive possession. See, e.g., Walker, 99 F.3d at 441; 

United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 

1991). Evidence suggesting that a defendant has regular 

access to the premises, such as possession of a key, may also 

be sufficient to establish constructive possession. See United 

States v. Lindsey, 47 F.3d 440, 445 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on 

other grounds sub nom. Robinson v. United States, 116 

S. Ct. 665 (1995). Here there was no evidence that Dingle 

owned or resided in the apartment, or that he had regular 

access to it. Nor is Dingle's case like United States v. Dunn,

846 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1988), on which the government relies, 

where the defendant was observed pitching things into a 

nearby room where drugs and a gun were found. Id. at 764. 

The police did not observe any actions by Dingle that suggest 

such physical control over the drugs.

The government focuses on the fact that Dingle, by his own 

admission, shouted "wait a minute, wait a minute," when the 

police started to break down the door. The government 

characterizes this as an attempt by Dingle to stall the police 

to give Boykin the opportunity to dispose of the drugs. Cf. 

United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1136-37 (D.C. 

Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 828 (1994). As Dingle contends, 

standing alone this evidence would be insufficient to establish 

his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because any occupant of 

an apartment might respond in a similar manner to an 

attempt by the police to break down the door. However, 

Dingle's testimony provided further evidence that he was 

actively assisting Boykin in the possession of drugs. Dingle 

acknowledged that upon entering the apartment, he locked 

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1 While many people possess pagers or cash for legitimate 

reasons, see United States v. Brown, 16 F.3d 423, 431 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 900 (1994), in this circuit possession of such 

items is probative evidence of both possession and intent to distribute. United States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(en banc), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997). 

the door behind him, thus indicating some measure of control 

over the apartment and its contents. He later opened the 

door to admit Boykin, and then relocked it. Because the 

expert's testimony made clear that the apartment bore all the 

hallmarks of a drug packaging and distribution center, the 

jury could reasonably have concluded that Dingle was actively 

trying to assist Boykin. Dingle's possession of a large quantity of cash and a pager, which the expert described as a tool of 

the drug distribution trade, were also suggestive of his involvement.1 Washington, 12 F.3d at 1137; Thorne, 997 F.2d 

at 1512. Taking all of these circumstances into account, the 

jury could reasonably conclude that Dingle's statement, "wait 

a minute, wait a minute," at the same time that Boykin was 

attempting to dispose of the drugs, was an attempt to stall 

the police.

Dingle's reliance on United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d 845 

(D.C. Cir. 1993), is misplaced. There the police searched an 

apartment that had previously been divided into two units, 

and found in one of the units cocaine, a gun, $740 in cash, and 

a razor blade in a locked briefcase inside a locked laundry 

room. Id. at 846. Zeigler resided in the other unit, and the 

government presented no evidence that she ever entered the 

laundry room or had the combination to the locks on the door 

or the briefcase. Id. at 848. The court rejected the government's constructive possession theory, holding the evidence 

insufficient to establish either knowledge of the drugs, or 

dominion or control over them. Id. As noted, Dingle's 

knowledge of the drugs, which were in plain view throughout 

the apartment, is clear, and based on Dingle's description of 

his activities, the jury could conclude that he knew of Boykin's drug possession and sought to assist him.

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The evidence against Dingle is comparable to the evidence 

in Washington. Washington was riding in the front passenger seat of a car as it attempted to elude police. 12 F.3d at 

1131. A co-defendant who was sitting in the back seat 

jumped out of the car, and then ran alongside it for about a 

block before throwing a bag of drugs into the car through the 

driver's side window. Id. Washington acknowledged in his 

testimony that he had pulled the bag through the window. 

Id. at 1137. The court held that his admission, combined with 

Washington's possession of $586 and a pager purchased by 

the driver of the car, was sufficient to establish aiding and 

abetting. Id. Here, as in Washington, the defendant's testimony as to his actions, in conjunction with his presence on 

the scene and his possession of cash and a pager, is sufficient 

to establish aiding and abetting.

Furthermore, the jury was entitled to take into account the 

government's rebuttal evidence in assessing Dingle's claim of 

innocent presence. See Foster, 783 F.2d at 1085. Dingle 

testified that he went to the apartment to visit his friends, 

Stewart and Kellogg, and their one-and-a-half-year-old 

daughter. He claimed that Stewart and Kellogg were good 

friends whom he visited several times a week. Yet when the 

police searched the apartment, they found no evidence suggesting that either a baby or an adult woman resided in the 

apartment. Indeed, the only evidence to suggest that either 

Stewart or Kellogg had ever resided in the apartment was a 

single bill in Stewart's name. Officer Burke also testified 

that he repeatedly attempted to contact Stewart at a telephone number Dingle had provided under oath in front of the 

jury during the second trial, but was unable to reach him or 

determine a corresponding address. Based on the expert 

testimony, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the 

apartment was being used for drug packaging operations, and 

that Officer Burke's rebuttal testimony eviscerated Dingle's 

explanation that he was merely in the apartment for a 

friendly social visit.

In Zeigler, the court held that any negative inferences that 

a jury may draw from the demeanor of a defendant who 

testifies should not ordinarily be considered in a sufficiency 

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analysis. 994 F.2d at 849-50; see also Thorne, 997 F.2d at 

1511. The court reasoned that "[t]here is no principled way 

of deciding when the government's proof, less than enough to 

sustain the conviction, is nevertheless enough to allow adding 

negative inferences from the defendant's testimony to fill the 

gaps." Zeigler, 994 F.2d at 850. Contrary to Dingle's contention, this rule poses no obstacle to appellate consideration 

of the government's rebuttal evidence. The Zeigler rule does 

not apply where "the defendant's testimony, on its face, [is] 

utterly inconsistent, incoherent, contradictory, or implausible." Id. at 849. While Dingle's testimony was not internally 

inconsistent, the government's rebuttal evidence made it extremely implausible. A jury viewing the government's evidence could reasonably find that Dingle's account was false, 

regardless of his demeanor, and that he was in the apartment 

for illicit purposes.

With or without considering the implausibility of Dingle's 

explanation for his presence in the apartment, the jury could 

reasonably conclude that he aided and abetted Boykin in the 

possession of drugs with the intent to distribute them. Thus, 

because we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support 

Dingle's conviction on that basis, the court need not consider 

whether the jury could also have reasonably found that 

Dingle had constructive possession of the drugs. Griffin v. 

United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991); Walker, 99 F.3d at 

442.

III.

Dingle's remaining contentions do not require extensive 

discussion. His contention that the district court erred by 

failing sua sponte to give an instruction on the lesser included 

offense of simple possession is meritless. Because Dingle 

neither asked for such an instruction nor objected to the 

district court's failure to give one, our review is for plain 

error, and we find none. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30, 52; United 

States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see 

also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993). It 

has long been the rule in this circuit that "[i]n general, the 

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trial judge should withhold charging on [a] lesser included 

offense unless one of the parties requests it, since that charge 

is not inevitably required in our trials, but is an issue best 

resolved, in our adversary system, by permitting counsel to 

decide on tactics." Walker v. United States, 418 F.2d 1116, 

1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In deciding whether to request such 

an instruction, defense counsel must make a strategic choice: 

giving the instruction may decrease the chance that the jury 

will convict for the greater offense, but it also may decrease 

the chance of an outright acquittal. Here, defense counsel 

adverted to precisely such a choice during a colloquy with the 

district court about the verdict form; defense counsel maintained that the government could not show, as the indictment 

charged, that Dingle possessed with intent to distribute 50 

grams, and that a special verdict form on drug quantity was 

therefore appropriate. Although the district court rejected 

the special verdict form request, defense counsel did not seek 

an instruction on simple possession, possibly because Dingle 

had testified that he did not use cocaine and that he had 

simply come to the apartment to visit his friends. Defense 

counsel then chose to argue to the jury that the government's 

evidence was insufficient and Dingle was simply in the wrong 

place at the wrong time. In view of that strategic decision, 

Dingle has not demonstrated that it was plain error for the 

district court not to give a lesser included offense instruction.

Finally, Dingle's contention that the district court erred in 

attributing to him, for purposes of sentencing, the entire 

quantity of drugs that Boykin threw out the window, in 

addition to the much smaller quantities found on the living 

room floor, is meritless. The evidence was sufficient to 

establish that Dingle aided and abetted Boykin; he is therefore responsible for the same quantity of drugs that Boykin 

possessed. 18 U.S.C. § 2; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.3, 2X2.1 (1995); see also United States v. Nieto,

60 F.3d 1464, 1469 n.4 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 

793 (1996); United States v. Pierson, 53 F.3d 62, 64-65 (4th 

Cir. 1995). Because the district court's finding that Boykin 

and Dingle jointly possessed all of the cocaine in the apartment, except for the rock found on the bed in the bedroom, is 

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not clearly erroneous, see United States v. Lam-Kwong Wah,

966 F.2d 682, 688-89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 901 

(1992), the district court properly sentenced both defendants 

in the guidelines range appropriate for possession of 35 to 50 

grams of cocaine base.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

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