Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01080/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01080-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mike Knowles
Respondent
Eddie Charles Spivey
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EDDIE CHARLES SPIVEY, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

MIKE KNOWLES, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Case No. 2:07-cv-01080-MSB

ORDER

Petitioner Eddie Charles Spivey is a California State Prisoner proceeding pro se on a petition

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. #1). Petitioner contends that (1) his

federal due process rights were violated in connection with a 2001 prison disciplinary proceeding

(id. at 3); (2) the Sacramento County Superior Court failed to comply with the California Rules of

Court in denying his challenge to a 2003 decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (id. at 4); and (3)

his due process rights were violated because he did not receive an impartial review of his

administrative appeals of the 2001 discipline (id. at 5). The Court denies the petition for writ of

habeas corpus.

I. Background

On January 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Sacramento County Superior Court challenging a 2003 decision by the California Board of Parole

Hearings (BPH) that Petitioner was not suitable for parole. (Dkt. #18, Ex. 7). Petitioner alleged that

the BPH violated state law “by failing to set his term using the matrix in Title 15 Division 2.” (Id.).

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The Superior Court denied the petition on March 9, 2004, holding that “Petitioner . . . has failed to

show that, under current law, the [BPH] must apply a matrix analysis before denying a parole date.”

(Id.). Rather, the court held, the BPH is required to set a parole date only if it determines that the

prisoner is suitable for parole, and here the BPH determined that Petitioner was not. (Id.). The court

could not “otherwise evaluate petitioner’s hearing because he failed to provide transcripts of the

proceedings or of the denial.” (Id.).

On February 23, 2004, Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition in the Sacramento

County Superior Court challenging the findings of a 2001 disciplinary proceeding and the adequacy

of the prison grievance procedures. (Dkt. #18, Ex. 1). Specifically, in March 2001, Petitioner was

found guilty of attempting to introduce narcotics into the prison and assessed a 180-day credit loss.

(Dkt. #1, Ex. A). That finding of guilt was modified to “possession” in May 2001 and the credit loss

was “disallowed.” (Id.). Petitioner alleged that his federal due process rights were violated because

(1) there was no evidence to support the March 2001 finding of guilt, and (2) the prison grievance

procedures are “deficient” and he did not receive an impartial review of his administrative appeals.

(Dkt. #18, Ex. 1). The Superior Court denied the petition on March 22, 2004, for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and, as to the second claim, for failure to demonstrate “bias against

petitioner or intentional obstruction of the appeals process” or “any consequences from the loss of

the appeal.” (Id.).

Petitioner appealed the denials of his state habeas petitions on April 12, 2004. (Dkt. #18, Ex.

2, 6). In his appeals, Petitioner included a claim that the Superior Court “abused its discretion when

it failed to comply with clearly established Rule 260(a) of the California Rules of Court.” (Id.). The

California Court of Appeal for the Third District summarily denied Petitioner’s appeals on April 22.

(Id.).

On June 21, 2004, Petitioner appealed the California Court of Appeal’s denial of his first

state habeas petition challenging the BPH’s failure to set a parole date and claiming that the Superior

Court abused its discretion by failing to comply with the California Rules of Court. (Dkt. #18, Ex.

5). The California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s habeas petition on June 8, 2005.

(Id.).

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28 The petition does not challenge the BPH’s decision that Petitioner was not suitable 1

for parole.

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Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the

Eastern District of California on November 3, 2005. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Spivey

v. Kernan, No. 2:05-cv-2223 (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 3, 2005). Petitioner alleged (1) that his federal

due process rights were violated in connection with the 2001 disciplinary proceeding and (2) that

the BPH violated state law by failing to set a parole date at his 2003 parole hearing. Id. Petitioner

subsequently moved to voluntarily dismiss his habeas petition, see Spivey, No. 2:05-cv-2223, Dkt.

#10, and the district court dismissed the petition without prejudice on May 21, 2007. See id., Dkt.

#14. 

On April 24, 2007, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court alleging

(1) that his federal due process rights were violated in connection with the 2001 disciplinary

proceeding and (2) that the BPH violated state law by failing to set a parole date at his 2003 parole

hearing. (Dkt. #18, Ex. 3). The California Supreme Court denied the petition on May 16, 2007,

citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (Cal. 1998); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (Cal. 1993); In

re Miller, 17 Cal. 2d 734 (Cal. 1941); and People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (Cal. 1995). (Dkt.

#1, Ex. D). 

On June 6, 2007, Petitioner this petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Dkt. #1). Petitioner

contends that (1) his federal due process rights were violated because there was no evidence to

support the March 2001 finding of guilt with regard to the disciplinary proceeding (id. at 3); (2) the

Sacramento County Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to comply with the California

Rules of Court in denying Petitioner’s challenge to the BPH’s 2003 decision that he was not suitable

for parole (id. at 4); and (3) the prison grievance procedures are “deficient” and Petitioner did not 1

receive an impartial review of his administrative appeals (id. at 5). Respondent filed an Answer on

December 24, 2008, admitting that Petitioner’s first and second claims for relief are exhausted but

arguing that they are untimely, and arguing that Petitioner’s third claim is both unexhausted and

untimely. (Dkt. #18 at 3–4, ¶¶ 20–21, 23–24, 26–27). In the alternative, Respondent argues that

Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review and fail on the merits. (Id. at 3-4,

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¶¶ 22, 25, 28–30). Petitioner did not file a Reply, although he was informed by the Court he could

do so. (Dkt. #14).

III. Discussion

A. Claims 1 & 3 – 2001 Prison Disciplinary Proceeding

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a one-year statute of

limitations on federal habeas petitions challenging prison administrative decisions. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1); see Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004); Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

1077, 1081–83 (9th Cir. 2003). A properly filed state habeas petition tolls AEDPA’s one-year

limitations period, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), but a federal petition does not, Duncan v. Walker, 533

U.S. 167, 172 (2001).

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period for habeas petitions challenging administrative

decisions begins to run when the petitioner receives timely notice of the denial of his administrative

appeal. Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066. Respondent argues that “the limitations period [for Petitioner’s

due process challenges to the 2001 disciplinary procedure and grievance process] were triggered in

February 2001, when the disciplinary hearing that [he] is challenging was held. Alternatively, it

began to run no later than March 3, 2003, the last date [Petitioner] purportedly pursued his

administrative remedies.” (Dkt. #18 at 7). Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that he did not

receive notice of the denial of his administrative appeal; he contends that his Third Level of Review

appeal, which he allegedly filed on March 15, 2002, was either “misplaced” by prison officials or

they “deliberately discarded” it, preventing him from exhausting his claim through the prison

grievance process.

The prison disciplinary proceeding at issue took place in February 2001. (Dkt. #1, Ex. A).

Petitioner was found guilty of “Attempting to Introduce Narcotics into The Institution” in violation

of California Code of Regulations § 3016(c) and “[a]ssessed 180 days Credit Forfeiture under a

Dvision ‘A-2’ offense” in a Serious CDC-115, Rules Violation Report (RVR), on March 12, 2001.

(Id.). Petitioner’s administrative appeal was denied at the Second Level Review on April 12, 2001.

(Id., Ex. B). On May 2, 2001, Petitioner’s disciplinary charge was reduced to a possession and the

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Because the credit loss associated with the disciplinary proceeding was vacated, it 2

is not clear that this matter is within the province of habeas corpus. See Muhammad v. Close,

540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars

affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus[.]”). As the claim is barred by the

statute of limitations even if habeas is an appropriate vehicle for the reasons discussed in the

text, however, the Court does not decide whether habeas is indeed an available remedy for

the claim.

Petitioner does not allege he was unable to file the appeal within the prescribed time 3

limits. Thus, the limitations period may have begun to run on April 28, 2001, the day after the

administrative decision at the Second Level of Review became final, and expired one year later, on

April 28, 2002.

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credit loss was vacated. (Id., Ex. A). Petitioner alleges that he submitted an appeal to the Third 2

Level of Review (or Director’s Level of Review) on March 15, 2002, but never received a response.

(Id. at 6). On December 9, 2002, Petitioner wrote a letter inquiring into the status of his appeal.

(Id., Exh. 1). On December 30, 2002, the Inmate Appeals Branch of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) informed Petitioner that there was “no record that [his]

appeal ha[d] been accepted for a Director’s Level of Review.” (Id., Ex. C). Petitioner wrote to an

attorney on January 23 and March 22, 2003, seeking assistance in locating his Third Level of

Review appeal. (Id.). Petitioner filed hisstate habeas petition on February 23, 2004. (Dkt. #18, Ex.

1).

It is undisputed that Petitioner’s appeal was denied at the Second Level of Review on April

12, 2001. Petitioner had 15 days thereafter to file an appeal with the Third Level of Review. See

15 Cal Code Regs. § 3084.6(c). According to Petitioner, however, he did not submit his appeal to

the Third Level of Review until March 15, 2002, almost one year later. His appeal was thus

untimely. See id. at §3084.3(c)(6). The CDCR Inmate Appeals Branch did not deny Petitioner’s 3

appeal as untimely, however. Instead, on December 30, 2002, after Petitioner inquired into the

status of his appeal, the Inmate Appeals Branch informed Petitioner that there was no record that

his March 15, 2002 appeal had ever been accepted for a Third Level of Review. Thus, the

limitations period began to run at the latest on December 31, 2002, the day after the Inmate Appeals

Branch informed Petitioner that no appeal from the previous decision was available, and expired one

year later on December 31, 2003. See Redd, 343 at 1084 (“[T]he date of the factual predicate for

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[Petitioner’s] claim under § 2244(d)(1)(D) is not determined by asking when [Petitioner] satisfied

AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement; rather it is determined independently of the exhaustion

requirement by inquiring when [Petitioner] could have learned of the factual basis for his claim

through the exercise of due diligence.”). Petitioner did not file this habeas petition until June 6,

2007, more than three years after the limitations period expired. Petitioner’s claims regarding the

2001 disciplinary proceeding are therefore time-barred unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or

equitable tolling.

Statutory tolling is available under AEDPA while a “properly-filed” application for

post-conviction or other collateral review is “pending” in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here,

Petitioner did not file his habeas petition challenging the 2001 disciplinary proceeding in state court

until February 24, 2004, almost two months after the one-year limitations period expired on

December 31, 2003. Moreover, even if the limitations period had not run before Petitioner filed his

state habeas petition, because Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme Court the

California Court of Appeal’s decision became final on June 1, 2004, 40 days after the time for

seeking review expired, see Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other

grounds by Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), and the limitations period would not have

been tolled for much longer. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, (2002) (holding that AEDPA’s

state of limitations is not tolled if the petitioner unreasonably delays in filing a habeas petition in

the California Supreme Court); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 201 (2006) (holding that a six-month

delay in filing a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court after denial of a petition by the

California Court of Appeal constitutes unreasonable delay). Petitioner did not file this petition until

June 6, 2007, more than three years after the California Court of Appeal denied his petition. Thus,

despite any statutory tolling possibly available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), Petitioner’s claims are

time-barred.

Equitable tolling is appropriate where a petitioner proves that “‘extraordinary circumstances’

beyond [his] control . . . made it impossible to file a [habeas] petition on time.” Frye v. Hickman,

273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001); see Pace, 544 U.S. at 418 (holding that the petitioner bears the

burden to establish equitable tolling). “The threshold for obtaining equitable tolling is very high,

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To the extent Petitioner contends that the prison grievance procedures are “deficient” 4

(Dkt. #1 at 5), his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review as he does not contend

that the procedures have affected the duration of his confinement. See Muhammad, 540 U.S.

at 750.

Petitioner specifically refers to Rule 260(a) of the California Rules of Court in his 5

petition. Rule 260(a), however, was renumbered as Rule 4.551 in 2002. See Cal. R. Ct.

4.501(a).

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but it applies where a petitioner shows that despite diligently pursuing his rights, some extraordinary

circumstance prevented him from timely filing.” Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1205 (9th

Cir. 2009). 

Here, Petitioner waited until November 3, 2005, more than one year after the California

Court of Appeals’s decision became final, before filing his first federal habeas petition.

Additionally, Petitioner did not file a state habeas petition challenging the 2001 disciplinary

proceeding in the California Supreme Court until April 24, 2007. Petitioner makes no argument that

the failure to rule on his Third Level of Review appeal prevented him from filing these petitions.

Additionally, even if the instant habeas petition could be construed as arguing that the delay was

warranted to re-exhaust Petitioner’s state remedies after the state courts denied his claim for failure

to exhaust available administrative remedies, Petitioner did not renew any effort to exhaust his

administrative remedies. Thus, he did not diligently pursue his rights, and equitable tolling is

unavailable. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims related to the 2001 disciplinary proceeding are timebarred.4

B. Claim 2 – State Court Proceedings

Petitioner claims that the Sacramento County Superior Court abused its discretion by failing

to rule on Petitioner’s state habeas petition within 60 days as required by Rule 4.551(a) of the

California Rules of Court. (Dkt. #1 at 4). Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim is not 5

cognizable in a federal habeas petition and, in the alternative, that the claim is untimely. (Dkt. #18

at 9).

It is well established that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is

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Petitioner’s November 3, 2005 federal habeas petition did not challenge the Superior 6

Court’s alleged failure to comply with the California Rules of Court. Regardless, as previously

stated, a federal habeas petition does not toll AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. See Duncan,

533 U.S. at 172.

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limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Petitioner does not contend that the

Superior Court’s alleged failure to comply with the California Rules of Court violated the

Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States, and his claim is therefore not cognizable on

federal habeas review. Petitioner’s claim is also not cognizable on habeas review because the

Superior Court’s action did not affect the duration of his confinement. See Muhammad, 540 U.S.

at 750. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s claim is time-barred. The California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s habeas petition challenging the Superior Court’s failure to comply with the California

Rules of Court on June 8, 2005. Petitioner did not file this petition untilJune 6, 2007, approximately

two years later. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations.

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Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. #1) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that theClerk of theCourtshall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 3rd day of June, 2010.

/s/ Marsha S. Berzon 

MARSHA S. BERZON

United States Circuit Judge, sitting by designation

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