Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02464/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02464-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Shannon Renee Hagan
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHANNON RENEE HAGAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-2464-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are pending. For the 

reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion is granted, the Commissioner’s motion is denied, and 

the matter is remanded for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB and SSI, alleging that she had 

been disabled since July 27, 1989. Administrative Record (“AR”) 242-255. Plaintiff’s 

applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 159-162, 164-168. On 

November 8, 2012, a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Peter F. Belli. Id. 

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at 33-98. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which she, a third-party witness, 

and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. Id. 

On January 18, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled 

under sections 216(i), 223(d) and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 14-27. The ALJ made the 

following specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

June 30, 2012. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2009 (20 CFR 

404.1571 et seq., 416.971 et seq.). 

* * * 

 1

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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3. The claimant has the following severe combination of impairments: borderline intellectual 

functioning (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but 

with the following nonexertional limitations” the claimant is able to receive, understand, 

and remember simple instructions. She can make simple work place judgments. She can 

make adjustments to normal changes in the workplace. The claimant can interact 

appropriately with supervisors, and have frequent interaction with co-workers and the 

public. 

* * * 

6. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965) 

* * * 

7. The claimant was born on July 27, 1989, and is now 23 years old, which is defined as a 

younger individual age 18-49 (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963). 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to able to communicate in 

English (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.964). 

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past 

relevant work (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant number in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)). 

 

* * * 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

April 1, 2009, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

Id. at 16-26. 

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on August 21, 2014, leaving the 

ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-5. 

///// 

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that her impairments did not satisfy Listing 

12.05. ECF No. 14 at 12-20. At step three of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 

determines whether a claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or equals one 

of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Where a claimant’s 

impairment or impairments meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1, the claimant is per 

se disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). “Once a per se disability is established, the ALJ has no 

discretion; he must award benefits.” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 Listing 12.05—intellectual disability—“refers to significantly subaverage general 

intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the 

developmental period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before 

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age 22.” The listing can be met by demonstrating “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ 

test of 59 or less; [or]... [a] valid, verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a 

physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related 

limitation of function.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.05(B)-(C). Where the 

plaintiff’s verbal, performance, and full scale IQs differ, “the lowest of these [is used] in 

conjunction with 12.05.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(D)(6)(c). Thus, plaintiff 

meets the listing if (1) she has a valid IQ score of 59 or less and (2) the evidence demonstrates or 

supports onset of the impairment before age 22; or, if (1) she has a valid IQ score between 60 and 

70, (2) the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22, and (3) she 

has a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related 

limitation of function. 

 A. Listing 12.05(B) 

 At the third step of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ considered whether 

plaintiff’s impairment’s satisfied Listing 12.05. He first considered 12.05(B), and concluded that 

plaintiff did not have a valid IQ score of 59 or less. AR 17. The ALJ acknowledged that the 

record contained an IQ score of 55. However, the ALJ found that the score was not valid because 

it “was obtained using abbreviated testing and the examiner noted that this score is for research 

purposes only and are not to be used for clinical evaluation.” Id. The ALJ also found the score 

invalid because the testing was not conducted by a licensed qualified specialist. Id. 

 The ALJ’s 12.05(B) discussion referenced an IQ score from March 2010, when plaintiff 

participated in a Psychopathology in Chromosome 22q11.2 Deletion Syndrome Study at the 

University of U.C. Davis M.I.N.D. Institute. AR 750. During the study, plaintiff completed a 

Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (“WASI”), which resulted in a full scale IQ score of 

69, verbal score of 90, and a performance score of 55. Id. The report detailing the test results 

was signed by a certified clinical research professional and noted that the “results are not to be 

used for clinical interpretation or educational placement.” Id. 

 Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s finding that this IQ score was invalid. ECF No. 14 at 

15 (“The ALJ may be justified in rejecting this report based on the fact that the evaluator is not a 

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psychologist and the evaluator reported that the results are not to be used for clinical 

interpretation. However, use of the abbreviated Wechsler testing is not a valid basis to reject an 

IQ score.”). Plaintiff argues, however, that the she satisfies listing 12.05(B) based on testing 

conducted in September 2007, when she was 18 years old. Id. at 

 Plaintiff underwent a psychological assessment on September 6, 2007, which was 

performed by James McCray, Psy.D. AR 764-774. As part of the assessment Dr. McCray 

performed a WASI, which resulted in a full scale IQ score of 69, verbal score of 83, and a 

performance score of 57. Id. at 770. Dr. McCray’s report explained that plaintiff was 

administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (“WAIS-III “) approximately 9 

months earlier, and that “[i]deally, a person is not administered the same intelligence test within 

12 to 18 months because a person may recall the questions/answers or the recent practice may 

artificially inflate their score.” To avoid this issue, he specifically administered the WASI, 

“which includes the same type of Wechsler subtests but has different questions/challenges.” Id. 

 The WASI test completed by Dr. McCray satisfies Listing 12.05(B). Plaintiff’s 

performance score was 57, and the test was administered when plaintiff was 18 years old, 

demonstrating an onset of impaired intellectual functioning prior to the age of 22. Yet the ALJ 

failed to address it. His discussion of 12.05(B) addresses only plaintiff’s IQ score of 55 from 

March 2010, which he rejected as invalid. The WASI performance score from the test of 

September 6, 2007 is simply ignored. An ALJ must, in some way, explain why an IQ score is 

disregarded. Gomez v. Astrue, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1057 (C.D. Cal.2010) (citing Thresher v. 

Astrue, 283 F. App’x. 473, 475 & n. 5). As the ALJ failed to discuss plaintiff September 2007 

performance IQ score, the court cannot sustain his step-three finding. 

 Without acknowledging the ALJ’s failure to address this score, the Commissioner argues 

that the results from the September 2007 WASI test are not valid. ECF No. 19 at 12-13. First, 

the Commissioner argues that the score was invalid because Dr. McCray administered the WASI 

prematurely. Id. The Commissioner observes that plaintiff completed a WAIS-III in January 

2007, and scored performance IQ of 70—significantly higher than the results obtained in 

September 2007—and attributes the decline in plaintiff’s performance score to the proximity 

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between the tests. Id.; see AR 768. Dr. McCray, however, accounted for the relatively short time 

between the two tests. After noting that plaintiff completed the WAIS-III in January, the report 

states: “Ideally, a person is not administered the same intelligence test within 12 to 18 months 

because a person may recall the questions/answers or the recent practice may artificially inflate 

their score. To avoid this, the examiner administered the [WASI], which includes the same type 

of Wechsler subtest but has different questions/challenges.” AR 770. Thus, Dr. McCray 

administered a different intelligence specifically to limit the prior test’s influence on his 

assessment of plaintiff.2 Accordingly, there is no basis for the Commissioner’s conclusion that 

testing administered by Dr. McCray was premature. 

 The Commissioner also argues that the September 2007 IQ score is invalid based on a 

January 2011 neuropsychological evaluation conducted by Catherine Broomand, Ph.D. ECF No. 

19 at 12-13. Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Broomand in January 2011 because of a reported 15 

point drop in her intellectual functioning. AR 755. Dr. Broomand observed that plaintiff’s 

performance IQ scores were 68 and 70 in 2001 and 2007, respectively, but that plaintiff scored a 

55 in 2010. Id. During her evaluation, Dr. Broomand administered the WAIS-IV and obtained a 

full scale IQ score of 70. Id. at 757. She concluded that plaintiff’s performance was consistent 

with her performance in 2001 and 2007, and that “[t]here is no evidence for a decline as 

suggested by the testing in 2010.” Id. at 757. She further stated that plaintiff’s medication, which 

had been discontinued prior to January 2011, “was suspected to have contributed to the decline.” 

Id. at 755. 

 The Commissioner contends that this “report strongly implies Plaintiff maintained a 

performance IQ score between 68-70. ECF No. 19 at 13. Dr. Broomand’s report, however, fails 

to identify plaintiff’s performance score. Instead, the report only provided plaintiff’s full scale 

score of 70, which was only one point higher than the full scale score assessed by Dr. McCray. 

///// 

 2

 In any event, the risk as to validity is that the score might be artificially inflated, not 

lowered. Even if artificially high due to the proximity in time to an earlier test, the score of 57 

plainly satisfies Listing 12.05(B). 

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Furthermore, Dr. Broomand stated that “plaintiff continues to perform in the extremely low range 

overall and has a relative strength in verbal abilities over nonverbal abilities.” Id. at 762. This 

suggests that plaintiff’s verbal IQ score was higher than her performance score, which is 

consistent with her prior test results, including the results from Dr. McCray. More significantly, 

Dr. Broomand’s report makes no mention of the IQ scores from Dr. McCray’s assessment, and 

does not provide any opinion as to the validity of the results from his testing.3 Accordingly, Dr. 

Broomand’s assessment does not justify ignoring the IQ scores assessed by Dr. McCray. 

 Further, the court reviews the decision and analysis of the ALJ in determining whether the 

ALJ applied the appropriate standard at step three and the requirements of Listing 12.05(B). The 

post-hoc rationalizations advanced by the Commissioner cannot justify the ALJ’s tacit rejection 

of plaintiff’s September 2007 performance IQ score. “An ALJ must evaluate the relevant 

evidence before concluding that a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a listed 

impairment.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). “A reviewing court can evaluate 

an agency’s decision only on the grounds articulated by the agency.” Ceguerra v. Sec’y of Health 

& Human Servs., 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, the ALJ’s decision makes no 

reference of plaintiff’s September 2007 IQ score, let alone explains a justification for rejecting it. 

The decision therefore fails to articulate any basis for questioning the test score’s validity. 

Accordingly, the ALJ failed to properly consider whether plaintiff satisfies the requirements for 

Listing 12.05(B). See Thresher, 283 F. App’x. at 474 (remanding the case where the ALJ failed 

to address, among other things, the validity of the plaintiff’s IQ score). 

 B. Listing 12.05(C) 

 Plaintiff also argues that the evidence of record establishes that she meets the 

requirements for 12.05(C). The Commissioner concedes that plaintiff consistently scored full 

scale IQ scores 60 through 70. ECF No. 19 at 14. The Commissioner also does not dispute that 

the onset of plaintiff’s mental impairments was prior to obtaining age 22. Id. Accordingly, the 

 3

 The 2007 scores—which included verbal score of 89, performance score of 70, and full 

scale score of 78—discussed by Dr. Broomand were from the evaluation conducted in January 

2007. See AR 757, 768. 

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court need only decide whether plaintiff has a physical or other mental impairment that imposes 

an additional and significant work-related limitations. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 

§12.05(C). 

 “[A]n impairment imposes a significant work-related limitation of function when its effect 

on a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities is more than slight or minimal.” Fanning 

v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, a plaintiff satisfies the third requirement of 

12.05(C) if she has an additional impairment that is “severe.” See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., 

App. 1 § 12.00(A) (noting that for Listing 12.05(C), “we will assess the degree of functional 

limitation the additional impairment(s) imposes to determine if it significantly limits your 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, i.e., is a ‘severe’ impairment(s), as defined 

in §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)”). “An impairment or combination of impairments may be 

found ‘not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a 

minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.’” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686-87 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–3p (1996)). 

 Plaintiff argues that her scoliosis, a condition not considered by the ALJ, imposes an 

additional work-related impairment. ECF No. 14 at 19. The record contains two opinions from 

non-examining physicians. Dr. C. Eskander assessed plaintiff’s functional limitations and 

concluded that she was limited to light work. AR 116-120. Dr. Eskander’s assessment noted 

“evidence of scoliosis on x-ray.” Id. Plaintiff’s medical records were also reviewed by Dr. C.R. 

Dann, who opined that plaintiff was restricted to light work due to her scoliosis. AR 148-152. 

Specifically, he stated that X-rays “noted mild scoliosis curves . . . that would reasonably support 

[a] restriction to light exertion” with occasional postural restrictions. Id. at 148. 

 The ALJ rejected Dr. Dann’s opinion that plaintiff’s scoliosis limited her to light work. 

The ALJ provided the following explanation: 

[A]s delineated above, the record does not contain any objective 

findings that support this assessment. In addition, this nonexamining opinion appears to be inconsistent with the claimant’s 

demonstrated ability to work and attend school. Moreover, 

evidence submitted subsequent to this opinion does not contain any 

 

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findings that support these additional restrictions. Therefore, the 

Administrative Law Judge gives this non-examining opinion little 

weight.” 

AR 25. 

 Contrary to the ALJ’s finding, Dr. Dann’s assessment is supported by objective findings. 

The record contains X-ray evidence demonstrating that plaintiff has thoracic and lumbar scoliosis. 

Id. at 689. Dr. Dann specifically referenced the x-ray findings to support the opinion that plaintiff 

was limited to light work. Id. The ALJ’s decision, however, makes no reference to plaintiff’s xrays, nor does it mention plaintiff’s diagnosis of scoliosis. 

 The only other justification for disregarding Dr. Dann’s assessment was that “it appears to 

be inconsistent with the claimant’s demonstrated ability to work and attend school.”4 Id. at 25. 

There is nothing inherently inconsistent about Dr. Dann’s opinion and plaintiff’s ability to attend 

college and work at a day care center. Attending classes is not a rigorous activity requiring more 

than the ability to perform light work. Further, plaintiff’s part-time work at a day care center only 

required minimal exertion. Plaintiff testified that her duties at the day care center primarily 

involved working with babies. AR 42. Plaintiff would play with babies, get them ready for 

lunch, sit them in their chairs and put bibs on them. Id. at 42. Plaintiff also prepared the 

children’s bottles, fed them, and put them down for naps. Id. There is nothing in this job 

description that is inconsistent with Dr. Dann’s opinion that plaintiff was limited to light work 

due to her scoliosis. 

 Furthermore, the ALJ completely failed to address the opinion of Dr. Eskander, who 

similarly concluded that plaintiff’s scoliosis justified a limitation to light work. Thus, the ALJ 

 4

 The ALJ relies on plaintiff’s enrollment at a community college and ability to work part 

time at a day care center in rejecting Dr. Dann’s opinion. The ALJ’s entire decision rests heavily 

on plaintiff’s performance of these activities. However, conspicuously missing from the decision 

is a detailed description of how plaintiff performs these activities. Throughout the decision, the 

ALJ appears to rely on his own personal belief of how these activities are performed, without 

consideration of the specifics facts of plaintiff’s case. For instance, the ALJ cites to plaintiff’s 

enrollment at a community college to demonstrate that she is not as mentally limited as alleged, 

but omits any acknowledgment that, rather than attending classes at an academic level leading to 

a bachelor’s degree, plaintiff testimony shows that at the time of the hearing her college courses 

consisted of yoga and English labs for vocabulary and spelling. 

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erred by failing to consider all the relevant evidence of record in determining that plaintiff did not 

satisfy Listing 12.05(C). Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d at 512 (“An ALJ must evaluate the relevant 

evidence before concluding that a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a listed 

impairment.”). 

 C. Remand for Further Proceedings 

 “A district court may reverse the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or 

without remanding the cause for a rehearing, but the proper course, except in rare circumstances, 

is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 

F.3d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotes and citations omitted). “Unless the district court 

concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not 

remand with a direction to provide benefits.” Id. 

 Although plaintiff adamantly contends that there are no outstanding issues and that 

remand for payment of benefits is appropriate, see ECF No. 14 at 20-21, the court disagrees. 

Here, the September 2007 IQ score relied upon by plaintiff to establish disability under Listing 

12.05(B) was not addressed by the ALJ. Furthermore, that performance score was significantly 

lower than other IQ scores in the record, calling into question the validity of the score. Thus, 

remand for further consideration of the validity of this score is warranted. See Thresher, 283 F. 

App’x. at 474 (remanding the case where the ALJ failed to address, among other things, the 

validity of the plaintiff’s IQ score). 

 Similarly, the ALJ’s decision indicates a failure to consider the impact of plaintiff’s 

scoliosis on plaintiff’s ability to work. Although two non-examining physicians opined that this 

impairment justified limiting plaintiff to light work, the court cannot ignore the fact that plaintiff 

did not testify to experiencing limitations due to her scoliosis. Thus, it is not entirely clear from 

the record what impact, if any, plaintiff’s scoliosis has on plaintiff’s ability to work. Accordingly, 

remand for further proceedings is appropriate. 

///// 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

 The ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it is hereby 

ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 3. The matter is remanded for further consideration consistent with this order; and 

 4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor. 

DATED: March 23, 2016. 

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