Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00623/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00623-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cesar O. Cervantes
Petitioner
Kim Holland
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CESAR O. CERVANTES,

Petitioner,

v.

KIM HOLLAND,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00623 AWI MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 11]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented in this action by Maria 

G. Chan, of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of California. 

I. BACKGROUND

On April 16, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant petition challenging a March 10, 

2012 prison disciplinary proceeding finding Petitioner guilty of indecent exposure with 

masturbation triggering a loss of ninety days of good time credits. (See Mot. to Dismiss, 

Ex. 1, ECF No. 11-1, p. 12-15.) Petitioner challenges the disciplinary violation in the 

instant proceeding claiming that the investigatory officer did not perform his assigned 

duties and that there was insufficient evidence to support finding him guilty of the rule 

violation. (See Pet.) 

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Starting on March 18, 2013, Petitioner filed three collateral challenges with 

respect to the administrative decision in the state courts, all petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus, as follows:

1. Kings County Superior Court

Filed: March 18, 20131; 

Denied: September 3, 2013;

2. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: October 20, 20132;

Denied: January 9, 2014;

3. California Supreme Court

Filed: January 19, 20143; 

Denied: April 23, 2014;

(Mot. to Dismiss, Exs. 1-9.)

On April 16, 20154, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus in this Court. On June 29, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the 

petition for failure to exhaust state judicial remedies, procedural default, and for being 

filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 11.) Over thirty days have passed and Petitioner has not filed an 

opposition to the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the motion stands ready for 

adjudication.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

 

1 Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on the date Petitioner handed a petition 

to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 

1056 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Although the petition 

was filed on March 21, 2013, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the petition filed on March 

18, 2013, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

2

Although the petition was filed on November 8, 2013, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on October 20, 2013, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

3

Although the petition was filed on February 14, 2014, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on January 19, 2014, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

4

Although the petition was filed on April 22, 2015, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on April 16, 2015, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

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dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

n. 12.

For the sake of judicial efficiency, the Court shall review Respondent's motion to 

dismiss based on a violation of the one-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). Because Respondent's claim is similar in procedural standing to a motion to 

dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and 

Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion 

to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on April 16, 2015, and is subject to the 

provisions of AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners 

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As 

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amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The provisions of § 2244(d)(1)(D), rather than § 2244(d)(1)(A), apply to habeas 

corpus actions challenging decisions of administrative bodies. Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 

F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004); Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In such cases, the limitation period begins when the petitioner receives notice of denial 

of the final administrative appeal from the administrative decision at issue. Id.; see also, 

Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2012) (generally, state agency's denial 

of an administrative appeal constitutes the "factual predicate" for habeas claims 

challenging state administrative actions affecting "fact or duration of . . . confinement").

In this case, Petitioner's administrative appeal was denied at the third and final 

level on July 27, 2012. (See Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, ECF No. 11-1, p. 27.) The limitations 

period began to run the following day, on July 28, 2012. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 

F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.2001).

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Petitioner would have one year from July 28, 2012, absent applicable tolling, in 

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed in 

filing the instant petition until April 16, 2015, well after the statute of limitations period 

expired. Absent the later commencement of the statute of limitations or any applicable 

tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held 

the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction 

relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court's disposition of 

a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court 

system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations 

under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was 

timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or 

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the 

requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

Here, the statute of limitations began to run on July 27, 2012, the date Petitioner's 

administrative appeal was denied. Petitioner filed state habeas petitions beginning on 

March 18, 2013, in the Kings County Superior Court. As of March 18, 2013, 233 days of 

the limitations period had elapsed. Respondent does not challenge Petitioner's right to 

tolling during the pendency of Petitioner's state petitions and the interval between the 

filing of the petitions. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to tolling from March 18, 2013, 

until the date the petition filed in the California Supreme Court was denied on April 23, 

2014. As 233 days of the limitations period already elapsed, 132 days remained as of 

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March 18, 2013. 

Accordingly, the statute of limitations expired 132 days later on July 28, 2014.

Petitioner filed the present petition on April 16, 2015, over eight months after the 

expiration of the year statute of limitations period. The instant federal petition is untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010); 

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir.1993). Petitioner has not presented any evidence regarding equitable tolling. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling and his petition 

remains untimely.

E. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Respondent, in her motion to dismiss, asserts alternative grounds for dismissal 

based on failure to exhaust state remedies and the procedural default rule. (See Mot. to 

Dismiss at 4-6.) As the petition is untimely and subject to dismissal, in an exercise of 

judicial efficiency, the Court will not address Respondent's claims regarding failure to 

exhaust and procedural default. 

III. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for habeas corpus 

within the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Furthermore, while 

Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of statutory tolling, the petition remains untimely. 

Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Based on the foregoing, this Court 

recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss for 

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period be 

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GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United 

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) 

and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and 

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The Finding and 

Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). The parties are advised that failure 

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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