Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01269/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01269-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ITT Hartford Life & Annuity Insurance Company
Defendant
Nida Souphasith
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NIDA SOUPHASITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

ITT HARTFORD LIFE & ANNUITY 

INSURANCE COMPANY and DOES 1-50,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S EX 

PARTE APPLICATION AND 

MODIFYING THE SCHEDULING 

ORDER TO EXTEND NON-EXPERT 

DISCOVERY DEADLINE

(Docket No. 13)

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 14, 2016, Plaintiff Nida Souphasith (“Plaintiff”) filed an ex parte application to 

modify the Court’s scheduling order and extend the non-expert discovery deadline to 

accommodate the production of documents by a third party, The Prudential Insurance Company of 

America (“Prudential”), after entry of a protective order. (Doc. 13.) On July 19, 2016, Defendant

ITT Hartford Life & Annuity Insurance Company (“Defendant”) filed an opposition. (Doc. 15.)

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s ex parte application is GRANTED and the 

scheduling order shall be modified to extend the non-expert discovery deadline by thirty (30) days 

to August 15, 2016, limited only to the production of documents by Third Party Prudential.

//

//

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background of Case1

In November 1994, Koth Khamphasouk obtained a “flexible premium adjustable” life 

insurance policy from Defendant, naming Plaintiff, her granddaughter, as beneficiary (the 

“Policy”). Ms. Khamphasouk died on November 17, 2012. Plaintiff alleges that under the Policy, 

Defendant was obligated to pay Plaintiff the face value of the Policy, or $50,000.00, at the time of 

the death of Ms. Khamphasouk. In addition to paying the death benefit, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant was obligated under the Policy to pay interest to Plaintiff from the date of Ms. 

Khamphasouk’s death until the death benefits were paid. (Doc. 1, p. 9.) Plaintiff alleges that she 

timely tendered notice of Ms. Khamphasouk’s death to Defendant and cooperated with Defendant 

in connection with her attempt to collect benefits under the Policy, but that Defendant failed to 

conduct a complete and unbiased investigation, disregarded information, and ultimately 

improperly denied benefits to Plaintiff under the Policy. (Doc. 1, p. 10.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff’s complaint was filed in the Fresno County Superior Court on November 19, 

2014, and removed to this Court on August 18, 2015. (Doc. 1.) On November 30, 2015, the 

Court issued a scheduling order requiring the parties to complete all non-expert discovery on or 

before July 15, 2016. (Doc. 9, 3:4-5.) The scheduling order set forth the following requirements 

regarding extensions of deadlines contained in the order:

If the parties determine at any time that the schedule outlined in this order cannot 

be met, counsel are ordered to notify the Court immediately of that fact so that 

adjustments may be made, either by stipulation or by subsequent status 

conference.

Stipulations extending the deadlines contained herein will not be considered 

unless they are accompanied by affidavits or declarations, and where appropriate 

attached exhibits, which establish good cause for granting the relief requested. 

The parties are advised that due to the impacted nature of civil cases on the 

district judges in the Eastern District of California, Fresno Division, that 

stipulations to continue set dates are disfavored and will not be granted absent 

good cause.

 

1 The factual background summarizes Plaintiff’s allegations as set forth in the Complaint. (Doc. 1, Compl.)

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(Doc. 9, 8:20-9:2.)

On July 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application to modify the Court’s scheduling 

order and extend the non-expert discovery deadline, which Defendant opposed on July 19, 2016. 

(Docs. 13, 15.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Relevant Facts

1. The Prudential Documents

Plaintiff propounded Request for Production of Documents, Set One, to Defendant on 

October 16, 2015. (Doc. 13-2, Declaration of Quentin Cedar In Support of Ex Parte Application 

(“Cedar Decl.”), ¶ 3.) On October 30, 2015, Defendant’s counsel sent a letter to Plaintiff’s 

counsel in reference to their upcoming telephone conference “to discuss Rule 26(f) issues.” 

(Doc. 15-1, Cynthia Liu’s Declaration in Support of Defendant’s Opposition (“Liu Decl.”), ¶ 2; 

Doc. 15-2, Ex. A.) In that letter, defense counsel wrote:

Like you, I anticipate that discovery will proceed smoothly and see no reason to 

deviate from the normal pretrial procedures for this relatively straightforward 

case. The one caveat, which I mentioned in our last call, is that [Defendant] sold 

its life business to Prudential in 2013, and the witnesses and documents pertaining 

to that business are no longer under [Defendant’s] control. As a result, our 

client’s ability to produce documents and witnesses relevant to the subject policy 

and claim is quite limited.

(Doc. 15-2, Ex. A.) Defendant served its responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production on 

November 19, 2015, in which it took the position that documents pertaining to Defendant’s 

handling and adjustment of insurance claims were not within Defendant’s possession, custody, or 

control. (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 3 and Ex. 1.)

On February 5, 2016, Defendant’s counsel wrote Plaintiff’s counsel regarding “two 

discovery issues,” including the information Defendant contended was within Prudential’s 

exclusive possession, custody, and control:

We have now had the opportunity to follow up further with [Defendant] regarding 

the two discovery issues we discussed on Wednesday. Without waiving any 

previously-stated objections or agreeing that plaintiff is entitled to further 

responses, we propose the following:

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

[. . .]

[Defendant] has searched for records of other California lawsuits alleging bad 

faith in the handling of a claim for death benefits under individual life insurance 

policies from 2010 through the present.

As a starting point, the relevant window for claims-handling purposes is 2010 

through 2012, since Prudential took over all claims-handling responsibility when 

it purchased [Defendant’s] life business effective January 1, 2013. [Defendant] 

made no claims-handling decisions after that point.

[Defendant] is willing to serve an amended response to plaintiff’s Interrogatory 

No. 5 stating that it has no records of receiving any suit in California since 2010 

alleging bad faith in the pre-transfer (to Prudential) handling of a claim for death 

benefits under an individual life insurance policy.

(Doc. 15-1, Liu Decl., ¶ 3; Doc. 15-2, Ex. B).

Five days after receiving defense counsel’s letter, on February 10, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel 

served Prudential with a subpoena seeking documents relating to Prudential’s handling and 

adjustment of claims on Defendant’s behalf, among other documents. (Doc. 15-1, Liu Decl., ¶5; 

Doc. 15-2, Ex. C.) On May 18, 2016, Prudential responded to Plaintiff’s subpoena, but “objected 

to and withheld the production of the claims handling materials which were being sought.” 

(Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶4.) Following the receipt of Prudential’s responses and after meeting 

and conferring, Prudential’s counsel agreed to produce the claims handling materials subject to a 

protective order. (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 5.)

2. The Protective Order

On June 15, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a proposed protective order to Defendant’s 

counsel. (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶6 and Ex. 2.) Defendant’s counsel sent marked revisions to 

the protective order to Plaintiff’s counsel on June 20, 2016. (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 8 and 

Ex. 3.) On July 12, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a revised version of the protective order that 

purported to incorporate Defendant’s counsel’s comments. (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 9 and 

Ex. 4.) That same day, Defendant counsel sent an email to Plaintiff’s counsel, pointing out that 

the revised version of the protective order did “not address most of our comments/edits sent on 

June 20, 2016.” (Doc. 13-2, Ex. 5.) The email continued: “Accordingly, [Defendant] cannot 

agree to this stipulation. Once all of our prior comments/edits have been address, we can review 

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

the document again.” (Id.) Defense counsel attached a copy of her June 20, 2016 correspondence 

identifying Defendant’s revisions to the protective order to her July 12 email. (Id.)

The next day, on July 13, 2016, the parties convened for a deposition in the case. Before 

the deposition began, Plaintiff’s counsel inquired as to the status of the protective order. (Doc. 13-

2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 12; Doc. 15-1, Liu Decl, ¶ 9.) Defendant’s counsel told Plaintiff’s counsel that 

she had received the revised protective order and had responded to his email the day before. (Id.) 

During that conversation, Defendant’s counsel did not mention whether Defendant had rejected 

the revised draft. (Id.) Later that day, Plaintiff’s counsel read Defendant’s counsel’s July 12 

email correspondence rejecting the revised protective order and placed a call to Defendant’s 

counsel to discuss. (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 11.) Because Defendant’s counsel was unavailable, 

Plaintiff’s counsel left a message requesting that his call be returned. (Id.) 

Defense counsel returned Plaintiff’s counsel’s call to discuss the revised protective order 

that next day. Although the parties disagree on what transpired during that telephone call, they do 

agree that Defendant’s counsel ultimately requested that any further communications regarding the 

protective order be made in writing. (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶13; Doc. 15-1, Liu Decl, ¶10.) 

When Plaintiff’s counsel requested to continue the discussion over the phone against Defendant’s 

counsel’s wishes, Defendant’s counsel put Plaintiff’s counsel “on hold” to seek advice from a 

colleague. (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 14; Doc. 15-1, Liu Decl., ¶ 10.) After determining that 

Defendant’s counsel did not intend to return to the call, Plaintiff’s counsel hung up. (Id.)

Shortly after that phone call, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote Defendant’s counsel “regarding 

[Defendant’s] proposed changes to the protective order for the document production by Prudential 

and my request that [Defendant] stipulate to extend the discovery cutoff 30 days as it relates to this 

issue: Prudential’s production of documents subject to a protective order. This email is to reiterate 

and confirm that request.” (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶14 and Ex. 6.) Plaintiff’s counsel requested 

a response to his request for an extension of the discovery cutoff by the close of business that day, 

July 14, 2016. Plaintiff’s counsel advised that if Defendant was unwilling to agree to such a 

stipulation Plaintiff “will be forced to seek the Court’s assistance in this matter.” (Id.) 

Defendant’s counsel responded to Plaintiff’s counsel via email and reiterated Defendant’s view 

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

that the revised protective order did “not address most the redline comments/edits” that 

Defendant’s counsel sent on June 20, 2016. (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., Ex. 9.) Regarding 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s request for an extension of time of the discovery deadline, Defendant’s 

counsel stated that “we will reach out to our client and, as soon as we hear back, we will let you 

know.” (Id.)

Later on July 14, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel circulated a second revised version of the 

protected order to Defendant’s counsel, which defense counsel responded she would review “as

soon as possible.” (Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 15 and Exs. 7 and 8.) At 5:52 p.m. on July 14, 

Plaintiff filed the instant ex parte application to modify the Court’s scheduling order and extend 

the non-expert discovery deadline. (Doc. 13.) At 6:32 p.m., Defendant’s counsel informed 

Plaintiff’s counsel via email that Defendant did not agree to the requested extension. (Doc. 15-1, 

Liu Decl, ¶¶ 12, 13; Doc. 15-2, Ex. J.) 

The next day, July 15, 2016 (the non-expert discovery deadline), Defendant’s counsel 

provided a proposed revised protective order. (Doc. 15-1, Liu Decl, ¶¶ 12, 13; Doc. 15-2, Ex. J.)

B. Legal Standard

“Ex parte applications are a form of emergency relief that will only be granted upon an 

adequate showing of good cause or irreparable injury to the party seeking relief.” Moore v. Chase, 

Inc., No. 1:14-CV-01178-SKO, 2015 WL 4393031, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (quoting Clark 

v. Time Warner Cable, No. CV-07-1797-VBF(RCx), 2007 WL 1334965, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 

2007)). See also Mission Power Eng’g Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 883 F. Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Cal.

1995)). The moving party must be “without fault” in creating the need for ex parte relief or 

establish that the “crisis [necessitating the ex parte application] occurred as a result of excusable 

neglect.” Moore, 2015 WL 4393031, at *4 (quoting Clark, 2007 WL 1334965, at *1). An ex 

parte application seeks to bypass the regular noticed motion procedure; consequently, the party 

requesting ex parte relief must establish a basis for giving the application preference. See id.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s requested extension of the non-expert discovery deadline would 

require the Court to modify the current scheduling order, which can be done “only for good cause 

and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The “good cause” requirement of Rule 

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

16 primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992). “The district court may modify the pretrial 

schedule if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

C. Plaintiff Will Be Irreparably Harmed Without Ex Parte Relief

“To show irreparable prejudice, it will usually be necessary to refer to the merits of the 

accompanying proposed motion, because if it is meritless, failure to hear it cannot be prejudicial.” 

Mission Power Eng’g Co., 883 F. Supp. 488 at 492. Plaintiff argues that she will be irreparably 

harmed if her underlying request to extend the non-expert deadline to receive Prudential’s 

document production is heard according to the Court’s regular noticed motion procedures because 

the non-expert discovery deadline will have passed and she will therefore be deprived of the use of 

Prudential’s documents in prosecuting her case. (Doc. 13-1, 7:10-13.) Defendant counters that 

Plaintiff cannot establish irreparable prejudice because she was not diligent both in seeking 

documents from Prudential and a stipulation for a protective order from Defendant. (Doc. 15, 

6:13-25.) Defendant argues further that Plaintiff has not shown that the documents she seeks from 

Prudential are relevant, thereby negating her claim of irreparable prejudice. (Doc. 15, 6:26-7:13.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has shown the irreparable prejudice required to support ex parte 

relief.

1. Plaintiff Has Demonstrated Diligence in Conducting Discovery and 

Good Cause to Continue the Discovery Deadline

The Court finds that Plaintiff has been diligent in seeking discovery from Prudential. On 

February 5, 2016, Defendant informed Plaintiff that “Prudential took over all claims-handling 

responsibility when it purchased [Defendant’s] life business effective January 1, 2013, and 

[Defendant] made no claims-handling decisions after that point.” On February 10, 2016, Plaintiff 

sought documents from Prudential. (Doc. 15-1, Liu Decl., ¶ 3; Doc. 15-2, Ex. B).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff “has known since October 2015 that Prudential (not 

[Defendant]) possesses most of the documents relevant to Defendant’s former life insurance 

business, and did essentially nothing to ensure production of the requested documents until 

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

literally days before the close of discovery.” (Doc. 15, 6:18-21.) While Defendant is correct that 

Defendant informed Plaintiff on October 30, 2015, that Defendant “sold its life business to 

Prudential in 2013, and the witnesses and documents pertaining to that business are no longer 

under [Defendant’s] control” (Doc. 15-2, Ex. A.), it was not until February 5, 2016, after meeting 

and conferring on the issue, that Defendant informed Plaintiff that the “relevant window” for 

documents pertaining to Defendant’s “claims-handling purposes” was 2010-2012, because 

Prudential “took over all claims-handling responsibility . . . effective January 1, 2013,” and that 

Defendant “made no claims-handling decisions after [January 1, 2013].” (Doc. 15-1, Liu Decl., 

¶ 3; Doc. 15-2, Ex. B). Defendant’s representation prior to February 5, 2016, was not that 

Defendant could not produce claims handling documents, but rather that its ability to produce such 

documents was “quite limited.” (Doc. 15-2, Ex. A; emphasis added.) Once Plaintiff was apprised 

that the claims handling documents in Defendant’s possession, custody, and control were limited 

to 2010-2012, and that all claims-handling documents after January 1, 2013, were in the 

possession of Prudential, it promptly subpoenaed those documents from Prudential five days later.

Plaintiff was also diligent in seeking a stipulation for a protective order from Defendant. 

Prudential served objections to Plaintiff’s subpoena on May 18, 2016. After meeting and 

conferring, Prudential’s counsel agreed to produce the claims handling documents subject to a 

protective order. Less than a month after receiving Prudential’s objections, on June 15, 2016, 

Plaintiff provided a proposed protective order to Defendant. On June 20, 2016, Defendant 

responded to Plaintiff and provided marked revisions to the document. Plaintiff sent a revised 

version of the protective order that purported to incorporate Defendant’s revisions to Defendant on 

July 12, 2016. Defendant argues that Plaintiff was dilatory in waiting until July 12 – three days 

before the close of non-expert discovery – to respond to Defendant’s proposed revisions to the 

protective order. Although Defendant is correct that Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why 

counsel waited three weeks to revise and return the protective order to Defendant, Defendant’s 

requested revisions to the protective order were not insubstantial, requesting that Plaintiff “revise 

all references to California statutes to the corresponding federal rules,” among other requests. 

(Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 8 and Ex. 3; Doc. 15:3:8-4:3.) That it took Plaintiff three weeks to 

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

incorporate Defendant’s substantive revisions into the protective order and return it to Defendant 

does not negate a finding of good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) -- especially given Plaintiff’s 

diligence in seeking documents from Prudential and in seeking discovery generally, e.g., serving 

its first set of requests for production over one month before the Court’s enter of the scheduling 

order.2 Finally, Defendant does not contend-- nor could it -- that Plaintiff did not act diligently 

between July 12, 2016, and the filing of the instant application on July 14, 2016, in seeking 

Defendant’s assent to both the revised protective order and her request to extend the non-expert 

discovery deadline.

2. The Prudential Documents Are Relevant

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show irreparable prejudice sufficient to support the 

granting of ex parte relief because she has not shown that documents pertaining to Prudential’s 

claims handling procedures are relevant. In support of its argument, Defendant characterizes the 

“core dispute” in the action as “whether [Defendant] properly cancelled her grandmother’s life 

insurance policy when its cash value became insufficient to cover the cost of the premiums,” citing 

Plaintiff’s ex parte application. (Doc. 15, 7:5-7.) Far from the “core dispute,” Plaintiff does not

bring a claim against Defendant relating to or arising out of the cancellation of the Policy. In fact, 

neither the term “cancel” nor “cancellation” appears anywhere in Plaintiff’s complaint or her ex 

parte application.3

Instead, Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that, following the death of the named insured in 

November 2012, Defendant breached the Policy and its implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing by “fail[ing] to conduct a proper, complete and unbiased investigation of the facts and 

circumstances regarding [Plaintiff’s] claim for benefits” under the Policy and “continually and 

 

2 While Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s revised protective order of July 12 “failed to address most of its revisions 

and comments sent on June 20” (Doc. 15, 3:8-9), the July 12 protective order did incorporate many of Defendant’s 

requested changes, including all but one of the references to California statutes. (See Doc. 13-2, Cedar Decl., ¶ 9 and 

Ex. 4.) 

3

Setting aside Defendant’s misapprehension as to the nature of Plaintiff’s claims, it is unclear as to why Defendant is 

“deeply skeptical” of the relevance of the Prudential documents, as it was Defendant’s counsel who, on two occasions, 

identified Prudential as potentially possessing documents responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. (See Doc. 15-2, 

Exhs. A and B.) 

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

unreasonably den[ying] [Plaintiff’s] claims” for benefits. (Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 11, 14, 18, 24.) 

Plaintiff’s subpoena to Prudential seeks documents relating to Prudential’s handling and 

adjustment of claims on Defendant’s behalf. (Doc. 15-1, Liu Decl., ¶ 5; Doc. 15-2, Ex. C.). Such 

documents are discoverable, as they are clearly relevant to Plaintiff’s claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 

party's claim or defense. . . .”).

In sum, Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause under Fed. R. Civ. 16(b)(4) to extend the 

non-expert discovery deadline to accommodate the production of documents by Prudential after 

entry of a protective order. Plaintiff has further shown that such extension should be permitted on 

an ex parte basis, given the irreparable harm that would result if Plaintiff were deprived of 

Prudential’s documents because the non-expert discovery deadline had passed.

D. Plaintiff is Without Fault in Creating the Crisis that Requires Ex Parte Relief

To show that the moving party is without fault, he or she must show “that it used the entire 

discovery period efficiently and could not have, with due diligence, sought to obtain the discovery 

earlier in the discovery period.” Mission Power Eng'g Co., 883 F. Supp. at 493. For the reasons 

set forth above, the Court finds that the Plaintiff acted diligently both in seeking documents from 

Prudential and a stipulation for a protective order from Defendant, and is therefore without fault in 

“creating the crisis” necessitating the extension of the non-expert discovery by ex parte application 

to accommodate the production of documents by Prudential after entry of a protective order.

4

//

//

//

 

4 The Court also notes that Plaintiff was diligent in seeking an extension of the non-expert discovery deadline once the 

she reasonably knew that she could not comply with the scheduling order. Plaintiff filed her ex parte application on 

July 14, 2016, prior to the expiration of non-expert discovery, and shortly after it became apparent that the parties 

would be unable to agree to the terms of a protective order or an extension of time in advance of that deadline. It 

appears that the parties were ultimately able to agree on the terms of a protective order after the filing of the instant ex 

parte application, as reflected in Defendant’s counsel’s July 15, 2016 email. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. J.) The parties are 

encouraged to meet and confer and work together to attempt to resolve any disputes that arise regarding the 

production of documents by Prudential. The Court finds it perplexing that the parties were unable to reach a 

stipulation that resolved the issues raised in the instant ex parte application prior to its filing.

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s ex parte application to modify the pretrial scheduling order to extend the 

non-expert discovery deadline by thirty (30) days is GRANTED; and

2. The deadline for non-expert discovery set forth in the Scheduling Order (Doc. 9) 

shall be extended to August 15, 2016, limited only to Third Party The Prudential 

Insurance Company of America’s production of documents.

This modification does not change any other existing scheduling deadlines, including the 

pretrial conference and trial dates.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01269-DAD-SKO Document 16 Filed 07/26/16 Page 11 of 11