Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00645/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00645-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Chertoff
Defendant
Robert Cowan
Defendant
Alberto Gonzales
Defendant
Emilio T. Gonzalez
Defendant
Robert S. Mueller
Defendant
David N. Still
Defendant
Yasser Usman Toor
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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1 Named defendants are David N. Still, District

Director, USCIS, San Francisco District Office, Emilio T.

Gonzalez, Director, USCIS, Robert Cowan, Director, USCIS

National Benefits Center, Robert S. Mueller, Director, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, Michael Chertoff, Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security, Alberto Gonzales, Attorney

General, Department of Justice.

2 All parties have consented to my jurisdiction,

including entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c) for all proceedings.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YASSER USMAN TOOR,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

DAVID N. STILL, District

Director, USCIS, San

Francisco District Office,

et al., 

Defendant(s).

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No. C07-0645 BZ

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Before me is defendants’1 motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

(6).2

 For the following reasons, defendants’ motion is

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3 The I-130 visa petition was approved May 13, 2004. 

Yuen Decl. ¶ 17.

2

DENIED.

On October 15, 2003 plaintiff, a native of Pakistan,

applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence

under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 with the San Francisco District Office

of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 

Complaint ¶ 17. His application included both an immediate

relative visa petition (Form I-130) under 8 CFR § 204.1 and an

application for permanent residence (Form I-485) under 8 CFR §

245.1. Id. On December 31, 2003, the USCIS requested that

the FBI conduct a “name check” of plaintiff and provide the

results. Cannon Decl. ¶ 22. The FBI name check is one of

several security checks utilized by the USCIS to investigate

the background of applicants. Yuen Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff and

his wife were interviewed at the USCIS District Office in San

Francisco on May 13, 2004.3 Complaint ¶ 19. Plaintiff’s I485 application, however, remains pending. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23;

Yuen Decl. ¶ 17. Defendants assert that the USCIS is unable

to complete plaintiff’s application because it has yet to

receive the results of the FBI name check. Yuen Decl. ¶ 17;

Cannon Decl. ¶ 22.

Plaintiff, his wife, and his attorney made numerous

inquiries into the status of his I-485 application to no

avail. Complaint ¶¶ 13, 23. As a result, plaintiff filed

this action, styled as a complaint for mandamus, on January

31, 2007. At the time, the USCIS District Office in San

Francisco was processing I-485 applications filed as of July

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4 The burden of establishing subject matter

jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),

the court may review any evidence, such as affidavits and

testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence

of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560

(9th Cir. 1988). In contrast, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

required only if plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth facts

sufficient to establish a plausible right of recovery. See

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

The court must accept as true all material allegations in the

complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788

(9th Cir. 2002); Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Metro.

Water Dist. of S. Cal., 159 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1998). 

3

17, 2006. Id. at ¶ 21. As of the filing of defendants’

motion to dismiss, May 14, 2007, plaintiff’s application has

remained pending for approximately three-and-a-half years. 

The complaint invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1361 (the Mandamus Act), 5 U.S.C. § 702, et seq. (the

Administrative Procedures Act, “APA”), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

Plaintiff seeks an order directing the FBI to complete his

name check within thirty days, and directing defendants to

adjudicate his I-485 application promptly upon receipt of the

results. He is not seeking an order directing defendants to

grant his application. Defendants assert that the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter because the

adjudication of an I-485 application is left to the discretion

of the USCIS.4 I disagree.

I have previously held that the USCIS owes an asylee a

non-discretionary duty to adjudicate his I-485 application,

and that the APA requires that the adjudication occur within a

reasonable time. See Aboushaban v. Mueller, 2006 WL 3041086,

at *1-*2 (N.D. Cal.). Since my ruling, a number of my

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5 An asylee files his I-485 application pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1159 and 8 C.F.R. § 209.2, whereas an alien files his

application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255 and 8 C.F.R § 245.2. 

Cf. Aboushaban, 2006 WL 3041086, at *1 (considering an asylee’s

application for adjustment of status) with Wu v. Chertoff, 2007

WL 1223858, at *3 (considering an alien’s application for

adjustment of status). The applicable provisions, however, are

practically identical. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 209.2(f) (“The applicant

shall be notified of the decision, and if the application is

denied, of the reasons for denial.”) with 8 C.F.R §

245.2(a)(5)(I) (“The applicant shall be notified of the

decision of the director and, if the application is denied, the

reasons for the denial.”). 

6 Many other courts agree. See Quan, 2007 WL 1655601,

at *2 (stating that a “majority” of courts outside the Northern

District agree that subject matter jurisdiction exists over

such claims, and citing cases in support); Guoping Ma v.

Gonzales, 2007 WL 1655188, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (citing

cases); see also Salehian v. Novak, 2006 WL 3041109 (D. Conn.);

Haidari v. Frazier, 2006 WL 3544922 (D. Minn.); Duan v.

Zamberry, 2007 WL 626116 (W.D. Pa.); Tjin-A-Tam v. U.S. Dept.

of Homeland Sec., 2007 WL 781339 (S.D. Fla.); Osunsanya v. U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2007 WL 484864 (D.

Mass.); Elmalky v. Upchurch, 2007 WL 944330 (N.D. Tex.); Song

v. Klapakas, 2007 WL 1101283 (E.D. Pa.); Cho v. Jarina, 2007 WL

1484053 (E.D. La.).

4

colleagues in this district have considered the issue.5 To my

knowledge, all have concluded that the statutory text and the

code regulations, in conjunction with the APA, establish a

non-discretionary duty to adjudicate the I-485 application

within a reasonable time. See Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d

1064 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Gelfer v.Chertoff, 2007 WL 902382 (N.D.

Cal.); Wu v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1223858 (N.D. Cal.); Dmitriev

v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1319533 (N.D. Cal.); Baker v. Still, 2007

WL 1393750 (N.D. Cal.); Fu v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 1455873 (N.D.

Cal.); Razaq v. Poulos, 2007 WL 61884 (N.D. Cal.); Quan v.

Chertoff, 2007 WL 1655601 (N.D. Cal.).6 Defendants, however,

ask me to adopt the reasoning of other courts that have

refused to find a non-discretionary duty and have therefore

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7 Section 1255(a) reads: “The status of an alien . . .

may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and

under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien

lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien

makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is

eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the

United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant

visa is immediately available to him at the time his

application is filed.”

8 “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency

action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action

within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to

judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. “Agency action” is

defined to include a “failure to act.” § 551(13). “With due

regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or

their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency

shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.” § 555(b). 

9 Contrary to defendants’ suggestion, plaintiff does

not rely on the APA as the sole basis for subject matter

jurisdiction. In addition to the Mandamus Act, plaintiff

5

declined to exercise jurisdiction over these claims. See,

e.g., Grinberg v. Swacina, 2007 WL 840109 (S.D. Fla.); Qui v.

Chertoff, 2007 WL 1430207 (D. N.J.); Xiao v. Gonzales, 2007 WL

1303000 (D. N.J.); Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696 (E.D.

Va. 2006).

I find no reason to disavow my holding in Aboushaban or

reject the reasoning adopted by so many other courts. 8

U.S.C. Section 1255(a) grants the Attorney General discretion

over whether to grant or deny an application for adjustment,

not whether to adjudicate the application.7 Code regulations

clearly contemplate that a decision will be made on each I-485

application and that the applicant will be informed thereof. 

See 8 C.F.R § 245.2(a)(5)(i). Insofar as the APA authorizes

the courts to compel an agency to complete a non-discretionary

duty within a reasonable time,8 plaintiff’s claim is on solid

ground.9 See, e.g., Wu, 2007 WL 1223858, at *2-*3. 

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asserts federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

As explained in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977),

the “obvious effect” of the 1976 modifications to section 1331,

“subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes created or

retained by Congress, [was] to confer jurisdiction on federal

courts to review agency action, regardless of whether the APA

of its own force may serve as a jurisdictional predicate.” 

10 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) reads: “Notwithstanding any

other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including

section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision,

and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as

provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the

judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings,

no court shall have jurisdiction to review – (i) any judgment

regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of

this title, or (ii) any other decision or action of the

Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the

authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in

the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of

Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under

section 1158(a) of this title.”

6

Safadi, a case upon which a number of courts have relied

in reaching a different conclusion, is factually

distinguishable. There, all background checks had been

completed. The USCIS was in the process of exercising its

discretion to make its final adjudication. 466 F. Supp. 2d at

697-98. To order “immediate” adjudication, as the applicant

requested, would have stripped the USCIS of its discretion to

make a final determination. No such circumstances exist here. 

To sidestep Aboushaban, defendants raise a new argument -

that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) strips courts of jurisdiction to

hear challenges to the pacing of the adjustment

adjudication.10 See, e.g., Safadi, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 698;

Grinberg, 2007 WL 840109, at *3. The plain language of

section 1252(a)(2)(B) addresses only judgments, decisions or

actions committed to the discretion of defendant - not

inaction or delay. See Iddir v. I.N.S., 301 F.3d 492 (7th

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11 Section 103.2(b)(18), entitled “Withholding

adjudication,” reads in part: “A district director may

authorize withholding adjudication of a visa petition or other

application if the district director determines that an

investigation has been undertaken involving a matter relating

to eligibility or the exercise of discretion . . . and that the

disclosure of information to the applicant or petitioner in

connection with the adjudication of the application or petition

7

Cir. 2002) (considering identical statutory language and

concluding that the section “only bars review of actual

discretionary decisions to grant or deny relief under . . .

section 1255.”); Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 520, 528

(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did

not bar review of a motion to reopen removal proceedings

because the statute authorizing a motion to reopen “neither

grants nor limits the Attorney General’s discretion to deny

motions to reopen . . . .”); Fu, 2007 WL 1455873, at *5

(rejecting the argument that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars

review of inaction on an adjustment of status application). 

Section 1252(a)(2)(B) is inapplicable to plaintiff’s claim.

Moreover, to read section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) as broadly as

defendants “would render ‘toothless all timing restraints,

including those imposed by the APA,’ which would ‘amount to a

grant of permission for inaction.’” Fu, 2007 WL 1455873, at

*5 (quoting Duan v. Zanberry, 2007 WL 626116, at *3 (W.D.

Pa.)). Such an outcome does not find support in the statutory

text and, considering the fact that most applicants will be

physically present in the United States, seems antithetical to

national security interests. 

Nor does 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(18) command a different

conclusion.11 See, e.g., Qui, 2007 WL 1430207, at *6. Since

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would prejudice the ongoing investigation.” The section goes

on to require specified officials to review the withholding

decision in six month increments until completion of

adjudication. 

8

defendants provide no evidence to suggest that plaintiff’s

application is being withheld pursuant to section

103.2(b)(18), its provisions are inapplicable. See Elmalky v.

Upchurch, 2007 WL 944330, at *4 (N.D. Tex.) (rejecting an

argument based on section 103.2(b)(18) where defendants failed

to supply evidence demonstrating adherence to the code

procedures). 

Finally, I reject defendants’ argument that jurisdiction

is inappropriate because “no judicially manageable standards

are available for judging how and when an agency should

exercise its discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,

830 (1985); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (precluding

application of the APA to “agency action . . . committed to

agency discretion by law.”). While the statute does not

provide a specific time frame within which an adjustment of

status application must be processed, “[i]t is the sense of

Congress that the processing of an immigration benefit

application should be completed not later than 180 days after

the initial filing of the application . . . .” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1571(b). I agree with those courts that have taken a caseby-case approach in determining the reasonableness of the

delay. See, e.g. Aboushaban, 2006 WL 3041086, at *2, and

cases cited therein; see also Quan, 2007 WL 1655601, at *4

(explaining that the APA’s reasonableness requirement under

section 555(b) applies where there is a duty but no specified

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12 Neither Heckler v. Chaney nor Norton v. Southern Utah

Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004), requires a different

outcome. Both cases involved plaintiffs seeking to compel

agencies to enforce statutory provisions by particular action. 

Such analysis is inapplicable here, where defendants have a

duty to adjudicate plaintiff’s application within a reasonable

time but yet have discretion over whether to grant or deny it.

13 “A writ of mandamus is appropriate only where: 1) the

plaintiff’s claim is clear and certain; 2) the defendant

official’s duty to act is non-discretionary, ministerial, and

so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt; and 3) no other

adequate remedy is available.” Aboushaban, 2006 WL 3041086, at

*1 (citing Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir.

1994)). 

9

time frame); Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382, at *2 (applying the

section 555(b) reasonableness requirement “while giving wide

berth to an agency’s determination as to what time period is

reasonable.”).12

Defendants additionally argue that plaintiff cannot meet

the strict requirements mandated by the Mandamus Act.13

However, “[r]elief under mandamus and the APA are virtually

equivalent when a petitioner seeks to compel an agency to act

on a nondiscretionary duty.” Id. at *3 (citing Independence

Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Given my conclusions as to jurisdiction under the APA, the

first two elements of mandamus are met. Plaintiff alleges in

his complaint that he attempted unsuccessfully to prod agency

action prior to filing his complaint, and that no other remedy

exists. I can think of no other remedy. Thus, “[t]his Court

has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s complaint under both the

writ of mandamus and the APA.” Wu, 2007 WL 1223858, at *3. 

Plaintiff alleges that his application has remained

pending for over three years, and nothing in the record

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14 Whether the FBI and the Attorney General are proper

defendants is less clear. See, e.g., Li v. Chertoff, 482 F.

Supp. 2d 1172, 1179 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (suggesting that a court

may not have authority to order the FBI to process a security

check); Pool v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 1613272, at *1 n.1 (D. N.J.)

(noting that the authority for adjudicating § 1255(a)

applications has been transferred from the Attorney General to

the Secretary of Homeland Security and the USCIS). The issue,

however, need not presently be reached. Suffice it to say that

this Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims at least as

to some of the defendants. 

15 Defendants accepted my July 6, 2007 Tentative Ruling

and waived argument. Plaintiff agreed to waive argument if I

incorporated a number of specified modifications. I have

incorporated those modifications necessary to clarify or

correct my previous Ruling, but see no need for further

argument.

10

compels the conclusion that such delay is reasonable as a

matter of law. Defendants’ explanation of the FBI name check,

and the necessity thereof, goes to the reasonableness of the

delay - an inquiry premature at this time. See id.

Plaintiff has demonstrated that this Court has

jurisdiction over his claim for mandamus.14 The facts of the

complaint are otherwise sufficient to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. For the foregoing reasons, defendants’

motion is DENIED. The hearing scheduled for July 11, 2007 is

VACATED.15 

Dated: July 10, 2007

Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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