Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02980/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02980-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dagoberto Servero Cedano-Medina
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2980

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Nebraska.

Dagoberto Servero Cedano-Medina, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 10, 2004

Filed: April 30, 2004

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

While driving across Nebraska, Dagoberto Cedano-Medina was pulled over by

Nebraska State Patrol Trooper Jeffrey Roby for driving onto the shoulder of the

highway. The two men talked for several minutes, culminating in a minute-long

interchange in which Trooper Roby repeatedly asked Mr. Cedano-Medina if he could

search his truck. After receiving a number of varying responses, Trooper Roby

searched the truck and discovered seventeen pounds of cocaine hidden in the dash

area. Mr. Cedano-Medina's primary language is Spanish. He spoke broken English

throughout his encounter with Trooper Roby, and the two men had difficulty

communicating and understanding each other during part of their discussion.

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The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the District of Nebraska, adopting the recommendation of the Honorable David L.

Piester, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Nebraska.

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Mr. Cedano-Medina was indicted for possessing cocaine with the intent to

distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the

cocaine that was found in his truck, contending that Trooper Roby did not obtain his

voluntary consent before conducting the search. In denying the suppression motion,

the district court1

 found that the government had proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that it was reasonable to believe that Mr. Cedano-Medina knowingly and

voluntarily consented to the search of his truck. Mr. Cedano-Medina conditionally

pleaded guilty to the drug charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his

motion to suppress. Reviewing the district court's finding for clear error, see United

States v. Carrate, 122 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 1997), we affirm.

I.

Under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, searches conducted without a

warrant issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable, subject to a few

specifically established exceptions. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57

(1967). A search that is consented to is one of those exceptions. Thus, "[a]

warrantless search is valid if conducted pursuant to the knowing and voluntary

consent of the person subject to a search." United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984, 987

(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985). The government has the burden

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a subject's alleged consent to a

search was legally sufficient to warrant admitting the fruits of the search into

evidence. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974). This burden " 'is

not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.' " United

States v. $404,905 in U. S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 649 n.3 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion)). Rather, the

government must show that a reasonable person would have believed, see United

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States v. Sanchez, 156 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1998), that the subject of a search gave

consent that was "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice,"

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973), and that the subject

comprehended the choice that he or she was making.

In other words, a person can render a search legal by behaving in a way that

would cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she has knowingly and

voluntarily consented, whether or not the person actually intends to consent. Thus,

"the Fourth Amendment requires only that the police reasonably believe the search

to be consensual." Sanchez, 156 F.3d at 878 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.

177, 185-86 (1990)). Consequently, Mr. Cedano-Medina's actual subjective state of

mind at the time that he allegedly gave his consent is not determinative; our focus,

rather, is on how a reasonable person could have perceived his state of mind at that

time. We must determine whether it was reasonable to believe that Mr. CedanoMedina understood what Trooper Roby was asking and gave him permission to

search the truck and, if so, whether it was reasonable to believe that that consent was

voluntary.

II.

The entirety of the encounter between Trooper Roby and Mr. Cedano-Medina

leading up to the search was videotaped by a camera in Trooper Roby's cruiser, with

audio provided by a microphone attached to Trooper Roby's body. This videotape

was the central piece of evidence that the district court relied on in denying the

motion to suppress, and we have examined it carefully. In evaluating Trooper Roby's

conclusion that Mr. Cedano-Medina knowingly and voluntarily consented to the

search of his vehicle, we rehearse the discernable dialogue and events on the

videotape in some detail.

After Trooper Roby stopped Mr. Cedano-Medina's vehicle, Mr. CedanoMedina provided his driver's license and vehicle registration upon request, the two

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men talked for a while about Mr. Cedano-Medina's travel itinerary, and Trooper Roby

wrote Mr. Cedano-Medina a warning citation for careless driving. Trooper Roby then

asked Mr. Cedano-Medina if he could ask him a couple of questions, to which

Mr. Cedano-Medina responded, "No, yeah," and then asked Trooper Roby questions

about where to get dog food (Mr. Cedano-Medina was traveling with a dog that he

told Trooper Roby was "free" and a gift for his brother, whom he was on his way to

visit in "Rock-a-ford," Illinois.). Trooper Roby then said, "Out here, people have –

uh, the stop's over and everything, you can go if you want, but – a lot of times people

carry weapons. Do you have any pistols, any pistolas?" Mr. Cedano-Medina

answered, "No." Trooper Roby also asked if there were any knives or marijuana in

the vehicle, and Mr. Cedano-Medina responded "No" to both inquiries. Trooper

Roby then inquired whether Mr. Cedano-Medina had ever been arrested or "in

trouble with the cops," and Mr. Cedano-Medina answered "No" to both of these

questions.

At this point, Trooper Roby said, "Okay, would you have a problem – can I

search the vehicle? Can I look through it?" After each of these questions,

Mr. Cedano-Medina said "yeah" (or possibly "huh" or "nah"). The conversation

continued as follows:

Trooper Roby: "Can I look through your vehicle? Can I search it?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: "Do I keep this?"

Trooper Roby: "Yeah. The vehicle? Can I search it?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: "No." (Followed by two unclear syllables).

Trooper Roby: "Can I look through it?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: "No. Oh, the food?"

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Trooper Roby: "Through the, through the truck. Can I look through the

truck?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: "I don't know. I don't understand."

Trooper Roby: "Can I search the truck?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: "The food?"

Trooper Roby: "Can I search the whole truck? On the inside and on the

outside. Can I look through it?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: (Unintelligible except for the words "outside,"

"nothing," and "inside.")

Trooper Roby: "Can I look?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: "Yeah."

Trooper Roby: "I can?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: "Yeah. No." (Followed by an unclear syllable.)

Trooper Roy: "No problem?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: Something about "nothing" and "uh huh."

Trooper Roby: "Okay, there's nothing in there? No problem if I look?"

Mr. Cedano-Medina: "No." (Followed by something about "afraid".)

Trooper Roy: You don't care?

Mr. Cedano-Medina. "Nah."

Trooper Roy: "Is it okay? Can I go ahead?" 

Mr. Cedano-Medina: (Unintelligible.)

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Trooper Roby testified that, at some point toward the end of this exchange,

Mr. Cedano-Medina said, "Sure, go ahead," although we did not hear these specific

words on the tape.

After this, Trooper Roby said, "Okay, let's get your dog out here," and the two

men exited the patrol car. Mr. Cedano-Medina walked ahead to his truck, opened the

door, took his dog out of the truck on a leash, and stood back on the side of the road

while Trooper Roby conducted the search. Mr. Cedano-Medina never made an effort

to stop the search. At one point during the search, Mr. Cedano-Medina came up to

the back of his truck and retrieved some water for his dog.

III.

The difficulty in assessing Mr. Cedano-Medina's alleged consent arises from

the obvious language barrier between him and Trooper Roby and the apparent lapses

in communication that occurred during their conversation. Many of Mr. CedanoMedina's utterances on the videotape are monosyllabic or undecipherable.

Mr. Cedano-Medina argues that it was unreasonable for Trooper Roby to believe that

he had consented to the search based on the ambiguous interaction that they had.

Trooper Roby testified that, after he initially asked for Mr. Cedano-Medina's

permission to search the truck, "his mannerisms and stuff made it clear to me that he

wasn't exactly clear on what I was asking him." Trooper Roby further testified,

though, that by the end of the conversation, he "felt that [Mr. Cedano-Medina]

understood what I wanted to do, was look through the vehicle, search for drugs or

anything illegal in there, and that he had given me permission to search for that."

The magistrate judge who initially evaluated the videotape noticed that

Mr. Cedano-Medina's responses changed during the course of the questioning about

the search from an initial hesitancy, with "a rising inflection indicating uncertainty,"

to a tone of voice indicating "certainty in his mind of what is being asked of him,"

"cordiality," and "eagerness to be cooperative." After watching the tape ourselves,

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we think that this observation is clearly correct. Furthermore, Trooper Roby's

testimony that Mr. Cedano-Medina told him at the end of the questioning that he

could go ahead with the search, which the district court credited, is entitled to

considerable weight. We think that these facts support the conclusion that

Mr. Cedano-Medina believed that he understood Trooper Roby and that he decided

to consent to something, though they perhaps provide only minimal insight into

whether or not he correctly understood what was being asked of him.

Mr. Cedano-Medina's widely varying answers to Trooper Roby's questions

(including his apparent misunderstanding that some of the attempts to obtain his

consent were questions about dog food), and Trooper Roby's failure to use a Spanish

language consent-to-search form (he testified that he carried such forms with him, but

that he chose to not use one), might give us pause if we were considering this matter

as an original proposition. We must, however, give appropriate deference to the

district court's finding that it was reasonable for Trooper Roby to believe that

Mr. Cedano-Medina consented to a search, and we are unable to conclude that it

clearly erred in making this finding.

Mr. Cedano-Medina and Trooper Roby were evidently conversing without

difficulty for a very substantial portion of their conversation (e.g., Mr. CedanoMedina provided his license and registration upon request, and he successfully

answered questions about the details of his trip). It was therefore not necessarily

unreasonable for Trooper Roby to conclude that Mr. Cedano-Medina eventually came

around to understanding his questions about searching the truck. Mr. CedanoMedina's seemingly nonchalant attitude during the search (he readily got his dog out

of the truck, stood quietly at the side of the road, and got water for his dog) lends

further credence to Trooper Roby's conclusion that he consented. Given the apparent

confusion during their conversation arising from Mr. Cedano-Medina's limited

English proficiency, the use of a Spanish consent form here would certainly have

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been desirable, but there is no bright-line rule requiring the use of such forms in

situations like this. See Carrate, 122 F.3d at 670.

We note also that there was testimony from an investigator that, while being

interviewed at the police station after the cocaine had been discovered, Mr. CedanoMedina was asked if he had given permission to search the vehicle to Trooper Roby,

and he replied, "yeah, go ahead, you bet." The government contends that this was an

admission that he had consented to Trooper Roby's search. Mr. Cedano-Medina

argues that he was actually giving permission to the investigator to "go ahead" with

a second search rather than explaining what he had told Trooper Roby. We think that

Mr. Cedano-Medina's statement to the investigator, though ambiguous, provides some

support for the government's contention that Mr. Cedano-Medina consented to

Trooper Roby's search. In any event, it is certainly not inconsistent with the theory

that he consented to that search.

IV.

Having concluded that the district court did not clearly err by finding that it

was reasonable to believe that Mr. Cedano-Medina consented to the search of his

truck, we ask next whether it clearly erred by finding that a reasonable officer would

have found that Mr. Cedano-Medina's consent was voluntary. Mr. Cedano-Medina

argues that Trooper Roby made up his mind to conduct the search before receiving

the alleged consent, and that the repeated questions about searching the truck were

intended to browbeat him into acquiescing to the assertion of authority. Thus, he

maintains, it was not reasonable for Trooper Roby to believe that the consent given

was voluntary.

We do not think that it would have been reasonable to believe that Mr. CedanoMedina understood that he was free to leave the scene instead of entertaining Trooper

Roby's questions about searching the truck. Trooper Roby testified, in fact, that he

did not know whether Mr. Cedano-Medina understood that he was free to go. The

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government, however, was not required to demonstrate that Mr. Cedano-Medina

knew of his right to refuse the request to search as a prerequisite to establishing a

voluntary consent. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49. It only needed to prove that

it was reasonable to believe that the consent was not the result of "duress or coercion,

express or implied," id. at 248, and we conclude that the district court did not clearly

err in finding that the government had made this showing.

Trooper Roby's requests for permission to search the truck were relentless, but

"[t]here is certainly no legal rule that asking more than once for permission to search

renders a suspect's consent involuntary, particularly where the suspect's initial

response is ambiguous," United States v. Jones, 254 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2001)

(internal citation omitted). While Trooper Roby's repetitive attempts to obtain

consent might reasonably be perceived as badgering, they could also be reasonably

interpreted as legitimate attempts to achieve effective communication in the face of

the language barrier. Relatedly, while Mr. Cedano-Medina's initial responses to

Trooper Roby's attempts to obtain consent might be perceived as evidence of a

hesitancy to allow the search, and his later responses as mere submission to Trooper

Roby's pressure, we think that his earlier answers can reasonably be interpreted as

reflective of his confusion about Trooper Roby's inquiries, and his later consent a

result of his eventual understanding of what Trooper Roby was asking.

V.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court's denial of Mr. CedanoMedina's motion to suppress the cocaine.

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