Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10484/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10484-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alberto Garcia-Jimenez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALBERTO GARCIA-JIMENEZ, AKA

Nelih Alexis Miranda,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10484

D.C. No.

4:14-cr-00973-

CKJ-DTF-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 15, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed November 19, 2015

Before: William A. Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

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2 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a sentence for illegal reentry into the

United States, and remanded for resentencing, in a case in

which the district court increased the defendant’s base offense

level on the ground that his prior New Jersey aggravated

assault conviction constituted a categorical “crime of

violence”under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.

The panel held that the provision of the New Jersey

statute under which the defendant was convicted, N.J. Stat.

Ann. § 2C:12-1(b)(1), does not qualify as a federal generic

aggravated assault, and therefore is not a “crime of violence,”

both because (1) § 2C:12-1(b)(1) punishes conduct

committed with only extreme indifference recklessness and

is therefore broader than the general federal offense; and

(2) New Jersey’s definition of “attempt” is broader than the

federal generic definition in that New Jersey, which

criminalizes attempts comprised of solely preparatory acts,

has specifically rejected the prevalent “probable desistance”

test.

The panel concluded that the error was not harmless.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 3

COUNSEL

Davina T. Chen (argued), Glendale, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Lawrence C. Lee (argued) and Lauren G. Labuff, Assistant

United States Attorneys, John S. Leonardo, United States

Attorney, Robert L. Miskell, Appellate Chief, United States

Attorney’s Office, District of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Alberto Garcia-Jimenez pled guilty to illegal reentry into

the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. At

sentencing, the district court increased Garcia-Jimenez’s base

offense level because of a prior aggravated assault conviction

in New Jersey. The court concluded that the conviction

constituted a categorical “crime of violence” under U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines section 2L1.2. Increasing the base

offense level for illegal reentry by 16 levels pursuant to

section 2L1.2 increased the Guidelines range from 10-to-16

months to 46-to-57 months. The court sentenced GarciaJimenez to serve 46 months, but stated, with no further

explanation, that, even if the aggravated assault conviction

was not a crime of violence, it would impose the same

sentence.

On appeal, Garcia-Jimenez argues that his prior

conviction is not a crime of violence because: (1) contrary to

the New Jersey statute, the generic federal offense of

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4 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

aggravated assault requires a mens rea greater than

recklessness under circumstances manifesting extreme

indifference to the value of human life (“extreme indifference

recklessness”); and (2) New Jersey’s definition of “attempt,”

an element alternatively incorporated into the statute of

conviction, is broader than the federal generic definition of

“attempt.”

We hold that, for both reasons, the provision of the New

Jersey statute under which Garcia-Jimenez was convicted

does not qualify as federal generic aggravated assault and

therefore is not a “crime of violence.” Because the district

court’s Guidelines error was not harmless, we vacate the

sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

I.

Garcia-Jimenez is a citizen of Honduras. In 2009, he was

arrested in New Jersey and indicted on several counts arising

from an incident in which, after getting into an argument

while drunk during a card game, he stabbed another card

player. He pled guilty to aggravated assault, count one of the

indictment, which charged that he “attempt[ed] to cause

serious bodily injury . . . and/or [] purposely or knowingly

cause[d]serious bodily injury . . . and/or under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,

[] recklessly cause[d]serious bodily injury to [another.]” The

language of the indictment closely tracked the New Jersey

aggravated assault statute, which reads: “A person is guilty of

aggravated assault if he: . . . [i] Attempts to cause serious

bodily injury to another, or [ii] causes such injury purposely

or knowingly or [iii] under circumstances manifesting

extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly

causes such injury . . . .” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1(b)(1). 

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 5

Documents from the New Jersey proceedings do not specify

which of the three prongs of the New Jersey statute GarciaJimenez was convicted of violating.

Garcia-Jimenez was sentenced for the aggravated assault

conviction and served time in prison, after which, in

September 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

deported him. He was found in Arizona in May 2014 and

charged with illegal reentry in violation of section 1326(a), as

enhanced by subsection (b)(2).1

After Garcia-Jimenez pled guilty, and in anticipation of

sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a pre-sentence

report (“PSR”). The PSR recommended that the district court

depart upward from the Guidelines sentence because GarciaJimenez’s prior conviction understated the seriousness of the

offense for which he had been convicted. Garcia-Jimenez

 

1

 Section 1326(a) provides, in relevant part, that:

[s]ubject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien

who–

(1) has been . . . deported . . . while an order of

exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding,

and thereafter

(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found

in, the United States . . .

shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more

than 2 years, or both.

Section 1326(b)(2) provides that in the case of any alien “whose

removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated

felony, such alien shall be fined under [Title 18], imprisoned not more

than 20 years, or both.”

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6 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

objected to the PSR, arguing that, in proposing the aboveGuidelines sentence, the probation officer improperly relied

on statements from the police report describing the incident. 

The Probation Office then revised the PSR, dropping the

understated-offense enhancement and instead recommending

a 16-level crime-of-violence enhancement under Guidelines

section 2L1.2. That section provides: “If the defendant

previously was deported . . . after . . . a conviction for a

felony that is . . . a crime of violence . . . increase [the base

offense level] by 16 levels . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). 

The comment to that section enumerates “aggravated assault”

as a crime of violence. See id. cmt. n.1(B)(iii).2

The PSR acknowledged that under the categorical

approach, the aggravated assault conviction probablywas not

a categorical crime of violence. But it nonetheless

recommended the court apply the enhancement using the

2 The comment provides, in full: “‘Crime of violence’ means any of the

following offenses under federal, state, or local law: Murder,

manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses

(including where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid,

such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or

coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson,

extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any

other offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person

of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii).

Although the United States quoted the “use of physical force” catchall

portion of the comment in their brief on appeal, it made no argument that

Garcia-Jimenez’s prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence under

the use-of-physical-force clause. Accordingly, we treat the issue as

waived and do not address whether an aggravated assault conviction under

the New Jersey statute qualifies as a crime of violence under the use-ofphysical-force clause. See United States v. Castillo-Marin, 684 F.3d 914,

919 (9th Cir. 2012).

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 7

contents of judicially noticeable documents from the New

Jersey conviction. Garcia-Jimenez objected to the crime-ofviolence enhancement. At sentencing, the United States

agreed with the PSR that the 16-level enhancement was

warranted, but specificallyurged that, underEsparza-Herrera

v. United States, 557 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam),

Garcia-Jimenez’s conviction does categorically qualify as a

crime of violence.

The district court considered the PSR as well as judicially

noticeable documents submitted by the United States. 

Relying on that information, and on the parties’ arguments,

the court added 16 levels to the base offense level for GarciaJimenez’s reentry offense, thereby exposing him to a

Guidelines range of 46-to-57 months. In support of that

range, the district court stated, citing Esparza-Herrera, that

“possibly categorically [the New Jerseyconviction]is a crime

of violence. We don’t even have to do the modified

categorical approach.”3 Further explaining the sentence it

would impose, the court reasoned that the 46-to-57-month

range was “reasonable . . . to satisfy all of the statutory

factors of sentencing, including [Garcia-Jimenez’s] history

and characteristics.”

Ultimately, the court sentenced Garcia-Jimenez to 46

months’ imprisonment, the low end of the recommended

range. The court explained, “the purpose of this sentence is

3 There was some discussion before the district court and in GarciaJimenez’s briefing on appeal regarding application of the modified

categorical approach. On appeal, however, the United States does not

argue that the modified categorical approach applies here and expressly

abjured reliance on that approach at oral argument. We therefore do not

address the modified categorical approach.

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8 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

to address safety to the community, public safety, and also to

send a very clear message to [Garcia-Jimenez], that [he]

should not return here ever until [he has] legal permission to

travel here.”

Without the enhancement, Garcia-Jimenez’s adjusted base

offense level would have resulted in a Guidelines range of 10-

to-16 months. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing,

the court, without specifically noting the range applicable if

the conviction were not a crime of violence, stated:

And I also should make a record that in the

event that the Court incorrectly calculated the

guidelines and the 16 level enhancement, if

for some reason that was – that is incorrect

and it’s actually treated differently or less

seriously under the guidelines, the Court in its

discretion would sentence the defendant

outside of the advisory guidelines because I

think that . . . 46 months is a reasonable

sentence no matter . . . whether the aggravated

assault is a crime of violence under the

advisory guidelines. So the Court would treat

it that way in any event and sentence the

defendant outside of the guidelines if, in fact,

the Court were unable to reach the guideline

range of 46 to 57 months due to the nature –

due to how the criminal history is treated

under the advisory guidelines.

Garcia-Jimenez timely appealed his sentence.

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 9

II.

This court reviews de novo the district court’s

determination that Garcia-Jimenez’s prior conviction

constitutes a crime of violence under Guidelines section

2L1.2. United States v. Marcia-Acosta, 780 F.3d 1244, 1248

(9th Cir. 2015). As we explained in Marcia-Acosta, a case,

like this one, involving application of the 16-level section

2L1.2 crime-of-violence enhancement:

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines generally

apply a 16-level sentencing enhancement to a

defendant convicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326

when that defendant previously was deported

after a conviction for a crime of violence. 

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The definition

of “crime of violence” includes the crime of

“aggravated assault” under state law. See

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1 (B)(iii). We use

the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v.

United States, 495 U.S. [575, 602 (1990)] to

determine whether a defendant’s prior

conviction constitutes a “crime of violence”

for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). 

When the statute of conviction sweeps more

broadly than the generic crime, a conviction

under that law cannot categorically count as a

qualifying predicate, even if the defendant

actually committed the offense in its generic

form.

Id. (some internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations

omitted).

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10 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

Here, comparing the elements of the New Jersey

provision under which Garcia-Jimenez was convicted with

the elements of the federal generic definition of aggravated

assault, we conclude, for two independent reasons, that the

two are not a categorical match. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.

A.

New Jersey law punishes an individual for aggravated

assault if he “[a]ttempts to cause serious bodily injury to

another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the

value of human life recklessly causes such injury . . . .” N.J.

Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1(b)(1). Garcia-Jimenez maintains that

this provision is broader than the federal generic definition of

aggravated assault, because it punishes conduct committed

with a mental state of extreme-indifference recklessness

whereas the federal generic definition of aggravated assault

requires the defendant to have acted with a more culpable

mental state—with knowledge, purpose, or intent, for

example.

Esparza-Herrera resolved a closely related, yet distinct,

issue. See 557 F.3d 1019. In that case, the defendant was

being sentenced for illegal reentry and had previously been

convicted of aggravated assault under Arizona law. See id. at

1021. The statute under which the defendant was convicted

did not match the federal generic definition of aggravated

assault, Esparza-Herrera held, because Arizona law punishes

as aggravated assault offenses committed with a mens rea of

simple recklessness. Id. at 1024. Relying principally on the

Model Penal Code, Esparza-Herrera explained that the

federal generic definition of “aggravated assault requires a

mens rea of at least recklessness ‘under circumstances

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 11

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.’” 

Id. at 1025 (quoting Model Penal Code §§ 2.02, 2.11.1(a))

(emphasis added). Esparza-Herrera did not hold that

extreme-indifference recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the

federal generic definition of aggravated assault; that question

was not presented to the court, and the court did not resolve

it.

The United States hangs its hat on Esparza-Herrera,

contending that the case at least implicitly decided that

extreme-indifference recklessness is sufficient to make out

federal generic aggravated assault. But that is just not so. As

noted, the facts of the case did not present the question

whether extreme-indifference recklessness is sufficient, and

the careful “at least” language confirms that the question was

not decided.

Moreover, Esparza-Herrera did not conduct the analysis

that would have been required to answer the question now

before us. A court applying categorical analysis ordinarily

surveys a number of sources—including state statutes, the

Model Penal Code, federal law, and criminal law

treatises—to establish the federal generic definition of a

crime. See United States v. Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528,

534 (9th Cir. 2014). Most often, “[t]he generic definition of

an offense ‘roughly corresponds to the definitions of the

offense in a majority of the States’ criminal codes.’” Id.

(quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 589) (internal alterations

omitted). Yet Esparza-Herrera did not survey state

aggravated assault statutes to decide whether extremeindifference recklessness suffices for federal generic

aggravated assault. Rather, the survey conducted in that case

differentiated only between aggravated assault statutes that

require simple recklessness and those that require any greater

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12 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

level of mens rea. See 557 F.3d at 1024–25. We cannot

assume that Esparza-Herrera implicitly decided a question

that was not presented and as to which it did not conduct the

appropriate analysis.4

After conducting the proper analysis, we conclude that a

mens rea of extreme indifference recklessness is not

sufficient to meet the federal generic definition of aggravated

assault. Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia do

not punish as aggravated assaults offenses committed with

4 Subsequent case law has confirmed Esparza-Herrera’s holding,

without extending it to aggravated assaults committed with extreme

indifference recklessness. See Marcia-Acosta, 780 F.3d at 1249; CastilloMarin, 684 F.3d at 925; United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d

1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d

1317, 1331–32, 1334 n.14 (11th Cir. 2010).

One of our cases injects some potentially confusing language on this

point. After repeating, citing Esparza-Herrera, that federal generic

aggravated assault requires “at least” extreme indifference recklessness,

Gomez-Hernandez states: “Generic aggravated assault requires only a

heightened extreme indifference form of recklessness.” 680 F.3d at 1177

(emphasis added). This paraphrase of the earlier opinion was not material

to the outcome in Gomez-Hernandez, nor did the case present or analyze

the distinction Garcia-Jimenez makes here. (The predicate offense in

Gomez-Hernandez, attempted aggravated assault under Arizona law,

requires intent, id. at 1176, a mens rea that indisputably satisfies the

federal generic definition.) Gomez-Hernandeztherefore had no reason to

do more than refer to Esparza-Herrera as part of a background narrative;

an inaccurate paraphrase included while doing so—after an accurate

quotation—is certainly not a binding holding. Cf. Pac. Operators

Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 688 (2012) (declining to

ascribe the weight of a precedential holding to an “ambiguous comment

[] made without analysis in dicta”).

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 13

only extreme indifference recklessness.5, 6In addition, the 

5 A few notes on this survey: First, aggravated assault statutes vary in

name, form, and substance, so we have selected the statutes or specific

provisions that most closely mirror the aggravated assault provision under

which Garcia-Jimenez was convicted. Second, some state statutes do not

explicitly identify the mens rea required to commit the crime, but state

case law clarifies the mens rea element. See, e.g., State v. Hutchings,

285 P.3d 1183, 1187 (Utah 2012) (explaining that intent is an element of

aggravated assault under Utah law). Third, two states criminalize

“wanton” conduct. See State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 788 (R.I. 1980),

overruled on other grounds as recognized in State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d

969, 980 (R.I. 2008); Commonwealth v. Pease, 731 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Mass.

App. Ct. 2000). Because the U.S. Supreme Court equates recklessness

with wantonness, Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 39 n.8 (1983), this survey

categorizes Rhode Island as a state that punishes reckless aggravated

assaults; Rhode Island’s case law does not define “wanton” to mean

something more than recklessness. By contrast, Massachusetts case law

states that an aggravated assault can be committed by “[w]anton and

reckless conduct,” but equates “wanton and reckless” with “intentional.” 

See Commonwealth v. McCann, 178 N.E. 633, 634 (Mass. 1931); Pease,

731 N.E.2d at 94. For that reason, Massachusetts is grouped as a state that

requires more than extreme indifference recklessness to make out

aggravated assault. Finally, where a statute permits conviction for

reckless conduct, but only within a provision that incorporates a further

narrowing element, such as the use of a deadly weapon—so that the

provision does not punish the reckless causing of serious bodily injury,

without more—the statute is treated as requiring a mens rea of more than

extreme indifference recklessness. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.41.200

(punishing the reckless use of a dangerous instrument, thereby causing

serious physical injury to another, or the reckless causing of serious

physical injury to another as a result of repeated assaults using a

dangerous instrument, but otherwise punishing only the intentional or

knowing causing ofserious physical injury); see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 631.1; Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.175. We note, however, that even looking

at just the mens rea element of state statutes, without considering the

existence of a further narrowing element, the majority ofstate statutes still

do not punish aggravated assaults committed with only extreme

indifference recklessness.

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14 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

common law definition of assault, a general intent offense

that requires a showing of willfulness, has been incorporated

into the federal offense of assault resulting in serious bodily

injury, 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). See United States v. Loera,

923 F.2d 725, 727–28 (9th Cir. 1991).

Seventeen states and the Model Penal Code do punish

aggravated assaults committed with extreme indifference

recklessness (or a lesser level of mens rea).7

That a substantial majority of U.S. jurisdictions require

more than extreme indifference recklessness to commit

6

See Alaska Stat. § 11.41.200; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-204; Cal. Penal

Code § 245; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202; D.C. Code § 22-404.01; Fla.

Stat. §§ 784.011, 784.021; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-5-20, 16-5-21; Haw. Rev.

Stat. § 707-710; Idaho Code §§ 18-901, 18-902; Ill. Comp. Stat. 720 /

§§ 5.12-1, 5.12-2; Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5; Iowa Code §§ 708.1, 708.2;

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5412; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:36, 14:37; Md. Code

Ann., Crim. Law § 3-202; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 13A; Mich.

Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.84; Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, 609.221; Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 565.050; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-202; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-308;

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.471; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631.1; N.M. Stat. Ann.

§ 30-3-2; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-02; Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.12; Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 641, 646; Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 163.175; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-51.2;

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.011; W. Va. Code § 61-2-9; Wis. Stat.

§ 940.19.

7

See Ala. Code § 13A-6-20; Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. §§ 13-1203, 1204;

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 613; Ky. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 508.010; Me. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 208; Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7; N.J.

Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1(b); N.Y. Penal Law § 120.10; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 2702; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-5-2, 11-5-3; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600;

S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-11; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101, 39-13-

102; Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01, 22.02; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1024;

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502; Model Penal Code § 211.1(a).

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 15

aggravated assault is a compelling indication that the federal

generic definition of aggravated assault also requires more

than that mental state. See Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey,

546 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled on

other grounds as recognized by United States v. RiveraConstantino, 798 F.3d 900, 904 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing

35 states as “the vast majority of states” for the purposes of

the Taylor analysis); Esparza-Herrera, 557 F.3d at 1025

(holding that 33 jurisdictions is a sufficient consensus to

establish the federal generic definition of a crime).

The Model Penal Code does point in the opposite

direction—unlike in Estrada-Espinoza andEsparza-Herrera,

where the Model Penal Code and the statutory survey results

were in harmony. But as we have emphasized, the Model

Penal Code, while a helpful tool in the categorical analysis,

does not dictate the federal generic definition of a crime. 

United States v. Velasquez-Bosque, 601 F.3d 955, 961 (9th

Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., United States v. Corona-Sanchez,

291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), abrogated on

other grounds as recognized by Avila v. Holder, 454 F. App’x

618, 620 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to adopt the Model Penal

Code definition of an offense where that definition was

contrary to the meaning of the offense in most states);

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1142 (9th Cir.

2006) (en banc) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (explaining that the

majority adopted a federal generic definition of an offense

that was contrary to the Model Penal Code). We also note

that at least one treatise confirms that assault, in its various

forms, is a general intent crime.8See 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault

8 General intent equates with knowledge. United States v. GracidasUlibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Accordingly,

aggravated assault crimes referred to in this opinion that require general

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16 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

& Battery § 15 (“The requirement of a general intent to do an

act that is inherently dangerous to human life is a general

element of assault and battery. . . . Assault is a general intent

crime.”). The weight of authority—approximately two-thirds

of the states, the common law, federal law, and at least one

treatise, as compared to the Model Penal Code and one-third

of the states—establishes that the federal generic definition of

aggravated assault does not incorporate a mens rea of extreme

indifference recklessness.

Because the New Jersey provision under which GarciaJimenez was convicted punishes conduct committed with

only extreme indifference recklessness, the New Jersey

definition of aggravated assault is broader than the federal

definition. Consequently, the district court should not have

applied the crime-of-violence enhancement to GarciaJimenez’s sentence.

B.

The New Jersey statute of conviction also criminalizes

attempts to cause serious bodily injury as aggravated assaults. 

Thirty-five U.S. jurisdictions do not incorporate attempts

directly into their aggravated assault provisions.9, 10

intent are treated as requiring a mens rea of more than extreme

indifference recklessness.

9 Certain jurisdictions’ statutes only incorporate attempts where those

attempts are coupled with additional narrowing elements, such as the use

of a deadly or dangerous weapon. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

§ 2903.12. Such statutes are not treated here as ones that punish attempts

as aggravated assaults. Louisiana punishes attempted aggravated battery,

which differs only in name from attempted aggravated assault. See La.

Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 36, 37. Accordingly, we treat Louisiana as a

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 17

This survey does not, however, accurately capture the

landscape of aggravated assault offenses as they relate to

attempts to cause serious bodily injury. Many U.S.

jurisdictions have separate attempt statutes that can be

combined with the jurisdiction’s aggravated assault statute to

create attempted aggravated assault. See, e.g., Schnecker v.

State, 739 P.2d 1310, 1310 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (citing

Alaska Stat. §§ 11.31.100, 11.41.200); but see In re James

M., 9 Cal. 3d 517, 520–23 (1973) (declining to recognize the

crime of attempted assault, either simple or aggravated). 

Because we do not take a “hyper-formalistic approach” to the

jurisdiction that punishes attempt within its aggravated assault statute. See

Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1125 (explaining that, in applying the

categorical approach, the court looks behind the statutory title of a state

offense). Finally, the District of Columbia’s aggravated assault statute

identifies, in a subsection separate from the provision defining the crime

of aggravated assault, the sentence for an attempt to commit aggravated

assault. See D.C. Code § 22-404.01(c). The statute does not define

“aggravated assault,” as such, to include attempts to commit serious

bodily injury, and so is included in the group of 33 statutes described

above. Id.

10

See Ala. Code § 13A-6-20; Alaska Stat. § 11.41.200; Ariz. Rev. Stat

Ann. §§ 13-1203, 1204; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-204; Cal. Penal Code

§ 245; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59; Del. Code

Ann. tit. 11, § 613; D.C. Code § 22-404.01; Fla. Stat. §§ 784.011,

784.021; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-710; Ill. Comp. Stat. 720 / §§ 5.12-1,

5.12-2; Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5; Iowa Code §§ 708.1, 708.2; Kan. Stat.

Ann. § 21-5412; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.010; Me. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 208;

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 13A; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.84;

Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, 609.221; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-202; Neb. Rev.

Stat. § 28-308; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631.1; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-2;

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.10; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4; Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 163.175; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-5-2, 11-5-3; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600;

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101, 39-13-102; Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§§ 22.01, 22.02; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-51.2; Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9A.36.011; W. Va. Code § 61-2-9; Wis. Stat. § 940.19.

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18 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

categorical analysis, Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d at 1173;

see id. at 1175–77, and because certain jurisdictions do

punish attempts to cause serious bodily injury by combining

the jurisdiction’s attempt statute with its aggravated assault

statute, the distinction between those jurisdictions that

incorporate attempts directly into their aggravated assault

statutes and those that punish a crime with precisely the same

elements is not one of substance.

We need not, however, further belabor the question

whether an attempt to cause serious bodily injury is part of

the federal generic definition of aggravated assault. Even if

it were, the attempt prong of the New Jersey statute is broader

than any federal generic definition of attempt.

New Jerseylaw criminalizes attempts comprised of solely

preparatory acts and has specifically rejected the prevalent

“probable desistance” test. Federal law does not interpret

generic “attempt” so broadly.

In New Jersey, a person is guilty of attempt if the person

“[p]urposely does or omits to do anything which, under the

circumstances as a reasonable person would believe them to

be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a

course of conduct planned to culminate in [the] commission

of the crime.” State v. Fornino, 539 A.2d 301, 303–04 (N.J.

Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-

1). Fornino, which the parties agree is the controlling

precedent, discussed extensivelythe meaning ofthis language

under New Jersey law. See 539 A.2d 301.

Facially, New Jersey’s substantial-step requirement is

identical to the requirement incorporated into the federal

generic definition of attempt. See United States v. Gonzalez-

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 19

Monterroso, 745 F.3d 1237, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 2014). But

Fornino explains that New Jersey’s attempt statute was

enacted to broaden the usual scope of attempt, eliminating

from the concept of attempt the probable desistance test,

539 A.2d at 304—i.e., any requirement that the “defendant’s

actions unequivocally demonstrate that the crime will take

place unless interrupted by independent circumstances.” 

Gonzalez-Monterroso, 745 F.3d at 1243 (internal quotation

marks and alteration omitted); see also id. at 1244; United

States v. Saavedra-Velazquez, 578 F.3d 1103, 1107–08, 1109

n.5 (9th Cir. 2009). The probable desistance test is, however,

incorporated into the federal generic definition of attempt. 

See Gonzalez-Monterroso, 745 F.3d at 1243, 1244; SaavedraVelasquez, 578 F.3d at 1107–08, 1109 n.5.11

Because New Jersey has explicitly eliminated the

probable desistance test, New Jersey’s definition of attempt

is broader than the federal definition. On this ground, too, the

New Jersey statute of conviction is not a categorical match

for the federal generic definition.

Accordingly, we hold that the New Jersey aggravated

assault provision pursuant to which Garcia-Jimenez was

convicted sweeps more broadly than the federal generic

definition, with regard to both the mens rea and attempt

elements. The district court therefore committed procedural

error when it concluded that Garcia-Jimenez’s prior

11 Relatedly, Fornino explicitly interprets “attempt” to include some

merely preparatory acts, so long as they are not “very remote preparatory

acts.” 539 A.2d at 306. This interpretation appears contrary to the federal

generic definition of attempt, which does not include the “[m]ere

preparation to commit a crime.” Gonzalez-Monterroso, 745 F.3d at 1243,

1244.

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20 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

conviction is a “crime of violence,” subjecting him to the 16-

level sentencing enhancement under Guidelines section

2L1.2. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991, 993

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

III.

The United States maintains that even if the New Jersey

statute is overbroad, the district court’s procedural error in

calculating the base offense level is harmless in light of the

district court’s statement that it would have imposed the same

sentence even if the Guidelines’ 16-level enhancement was

inapplicable. The United States has the burden of proving the

error harmless. United States v. Acosta-Chavez, 727 F.3d

903, 909 (9th Cir. 2013).

Ordinarily, “[a] failure to [calculate the Guidelines range]

correctly is reversible error.” Saavedra-Velazquez, 578 F.3d

at 1105 n.1. Further, “a district judge’s ‘mere statement that

it would impose the same above-Guidelines sentence no

matter what the correct calculation cannot, without more,

insulate the sentence from remand . . . .’ ‘[T]he court must

explain, among other things, the reason for the extent of [a]

variance.’” Acosta-Chavez, 727 F.3d at 910 (quoting United

States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.

2011) (per curiam)).

Here, the proper range is 10-to-16 months, not 46-to-57

months. So the district court imposed a sentence that was

nearly three times the top of the proper Guidelines range. 

The explanation requirement has special force when the

deviation is as large as it is here.

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ 21

The district court provided no explanation for this

extremely large—albeit hypothetical—deviation from the

proper Guidelines range. The United States asserts that the

district court did state that it would impose the 46-month

sentence even without the enhancement because of GarciaJimenez’s criminal history. But the passage the United States

cites for this proposition almost surely did not mean what the

United States would have it mean. Instead, the district court’s

reference to criminal history was part of its explanation

regarding why the Guidelines may treat Garcia-Jimenez’s

criminal history differently than the court did—that is, that

his prior conviction may not be (as we hold it is not) a crime

of violence:

So the Court would treat [Garcia-Jimenez’s

sentence the same] way in any event and

sentence the defendant outside of the

guidelines if, in fact, the Court were unable to

reach the guideline range of 46 to 57 months

due to the nature – due to how the criminal

history is treated under the advisory

guidelines.

(Emphasis added).

In sum, the district court’s assurance that it would have

imposed a sentence three times the proper Guidelines range

if its Guidelines calculation turned out to be wrong cannot,

without more, cure the prejudice resulting from its incorrect

Guidelines calculation. See Acosta-Chavez, 727 F.3d at

909–10; Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d at 1030–31. 

Accordingly, we find that the district court committed

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22 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-JIMENEZ

reversible procedural error at sentencing, see Carty, 520 F.3d

at 991, 993, and we must remand for resentencing.

12

V A C A TE D A N D R E MA N D E D FO R

RESENTENCING.

12 Because Garcia-Jimenez’s sentence is vacated on the basis of the

erroneous application of the sentencing enhancement, we do not address

his constitutional challenges to his sentence. See Lee v. Walters, 433 F.3d

672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005).

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