Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-40927/USCOURTS-ca5-15-40927-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymond Antonio McMillon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-40927

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

RAYMOND ANTONIO MCMILLON, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:14-CR-576-2

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Border Patrol agents at an immigration checkpoint discovered ten 

undocumented aliens hidden in a tractor-trailer in which Defendant-Appellant 

Raymond McMillon (“McMillon”) was a passenger. McMillon was 

subsequently convicted of several alien transportation offenses and sentenced 

to a total of 41 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals, challenging the denial 

of his motion to suppress evidence seized from the checkpoint stop, the denial 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 20, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

of his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, the sufficiency 

of the evidence on each of his convictions, and the denial of his request for a 

mitigated role adjustment at sentencing. Finding no error in the district 

court’s proceedings, we AFFIRM.

I.

We view the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing and discussed 

herein in the light most favorable to the Government as the prevailing party

in the district court. See United States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir.

2012). Similarly, all relevant evidence produced at trial and discussed herein

is taken in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. See, e.g., United States 

v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 734–35 (5th Cir. 2015). 

A. Background

McMillon’s run-in with the law arises from his travels through Texas 

with his co-defendant Zeba Williams (“Williams”). The pair first traveled from 

Houston to San Antonio in a rental car “to do a construction job.” Once in San 

Antonio, Williams asked McMillon to accompany him in a tractor-trailer to 

Laredo to pick up a piece of commercial equipment. Specifically, McMillon 

testified that Williams asked him to ride along and “to maybe help . . . drive 

back.” McMillon did not drive the tractor-trailer at any point on the way to 

Laredo but “guessed” that he would have driven on the way back. 

At approximately 4:14:25 a.m. on June 12, 2014, McMillon and Williams 

arrived in the tractor-trailer at an immigration checkpoint near Freer, Texas. 

Williams was driving and McMillon was in the passenger seat. As the tractortrailer entered the checkpoint’s primary inspection lane, Border Patrol Agent 

Luis Pena (“Agent Pena”) approached the driver-side door and Border Patrol 

Agent Manuel Hernandez (“Agent Hernandez”) prepared to have his canine, 

Aroxa, perform a sniff of the tractor-trailer’s exterior. Agent Pena identified 

himself and asked Williams if he minded opening the door so that they could 

2

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

hear each other over the engine noise. Williams obliged, and at approximately 

4:14:35 a.m., Agent Pena climbed onto the steps of the tractor below the 

driver’s door, placing him at eye level with Williams.

Agent Pena began to question Williams and McMillon as Agent 

Hernandez was “working his dog.” Agent Pena asked the pair if they were 

United States citizens, and each confirmed that they were. Agent Pena then 

questioned the pair about their travel plans. At approximately 4:15:07 a.m., 

as Williams responded to the travel question, Agent Hernandez told Agent 

Pena to “check the back.” Agent Pena understood this to mean that Aroxa had 

alerted to the presence of contraband in the tractor. 

As a courtesy, Agent Pena asked Williams for consent to search the 

tractor’s sleeper area, and Williams obliged. From where he was standing on 

the tractor’s exterior steps, Agent Pena peeked into the tractor’s rear sleeper 

area and saw a fold-up bed cracked open at an odd angle. He asked McMillon 

to pull the bed down; McMillon got up from his seat and attempted to do so, 

but stated that the bed was stuck. Agent Pena then entered the tractor and 

attempted to lower the bed himself, at which time he saw a person’s face hidden 

between the bed and the tractor’s wall. At approximately 4:16:09 a.m., Agent 

Pena exited the tractor and informed Agent Hernandez that “it was going to 

be positive for aliens [sic] smuggling.” 

The agents placed Williams and McMillon under arrest. During a 

subsequent search, agents discovered a total of ten undocumented aliens 

hidden in the tractor’s closets and beds. 

B. Proceedings Below

On July 8, 2014, McMillon and Williams were charged by indictment 

with one count of conspiracy to transport aliens within the United States for 

commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(I); and two substantive counts of transporting aliens 

3

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

within the United States for commercial advantage or private financial gain, 

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(II). Counts Two and Three 

specifically alleged that McMillon had transported aliens Ramon De La Cruz 

(“De La Cruz”) and Jorge Miguel Hernandez-Gomez (“Hernandez-Gomez”)—

both of whom were discovered hidden in the tractor’s sleeper area—within the 

United States. 

Prior to trial, McMillon moved to suppress all evidence seized from the 

checkpoint stop, challenging both the duration of the stop and the ensuing 

search of the tractor. After a two-day suppression hearing, the district court 

denied the motion, concluding that neither the duration of the stop nor the 

search of the tractor violated McMillon’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

Shortly thereafter, McMillon filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on 

speedy trial grounds, arguing that 104 non-excludable days had elapsed since 

the date of his indictment. The district court also denied that motion, 

reasoning that less than seventy non-excludable days had elapsed since 

McMillon’s indictment. 

On January 20, 2015, a one-day jury trial commenced, at which the 

Government proffered testimony from, inter alia, Agent Pena, Agent 

Hernandez, De La Cruz, and Hernandez-Gomez. At the close of the 

Government’s case-in-chief and at the close of evidence, McMillon moved for a 

Rule 29 judgment of acquittal on each offense alleged in the indictment. The 

court denied the motion on both occasions. After approximately ninety 

minutes of deliberations, the jury convicted McMillon of all three offenses and 

entered special findings that McMillon had committed each offense “for the 

purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” As to the two 

substantive transportation counts, the jury also entered special findings that 

McMillon had acted as a principal rather than as an aider-and-abettor. 

4

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

The case proceeded to sentencing. Based on a total offense level of 15 

and a criminal history category of VI, McMillon’s Presentence Investigation 

Report (“PSR”) calculated a Guidelines-sentencing range of 41 to 51 months’ 

imprisonment. McMillon objected and requested a two-point mitigated role 

adjustment to his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The district court 

denied McMillon’s request and sentenced him to 41 months’ imprisonment on

each offense, to run concurrently. 

McMillon timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

McMillon raises a host of issues on appeal. He first challenges the 

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from the 

checkpoint stop. He next asserts that the court erred in denying his motion to 

dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. Finally, he challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence on each of his convictions as well as the district 

court’s denial of a mitigating role adjustment at sentencing. We address each 

issue in turn.

I. Motion to Suppress

McMillon challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, 

arguing that both the duration of the checkpoint stop and the ensuing search 

of the tractor were impermissible. This challenge raises a number of discrete 

sub-issues as discussed herein. 

A.

McMillon first argues that Agent Pena’s immigration questions 

unlawfully extended the duration of the checkpoint stop. We disagree. 

1.

The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement applies equally 

to checkpoint stops. See United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 433 

(5th Cir. 2001). However, the Supreme Court has recognized the 

5

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

constitutionality of “suspicionless,” routine vehicle stops at immigration 

checkpoints for the limited purpose of ascertaining occupants’ citizenship. See 

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976); see also MachucaBarrera, 261 F.3d at 433. We have thus held that the permissible duration of 

such a stop is “the time reasonably necessary to determine the citizenship 

status of the persons stopped,” which would include, for example, “the time 

necessary to ascertain the number and identity of the occupants of the vehicle, 

inquire about citizenship status, request identification or other proof of 

citizenship, and request consent to extend the detention.” Machuca-Barrera, 

261 F.3d at 433. We avoid scrutinizing the particular questions a Border 

Patrol agent asks during this brief period of time “as long as in sum they 

generally relate to determining citizenship status.” Id. Instead, we ask only 

whether the duration of the stop was objectively reasonable. See, e.g., United 

States v. Jaime, 473 F.3d 178, 183–88 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2006); Machuca-Barrera, 

261 F.3d at 433–34 & n.26. 

If an agent requests consent to extend the duration of a checkpoint stop, 

or if probable cause arises, then the stop’s countable duration is measured only 

up until the time of consent or probable cause. See Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 

at 434 (“Of course, a Border Patrol agent may extend a stop based upon 

sufficient individualized suspicion. For extended detentions or for searches, 

Martinez-Fuerte requires consent or probable cause.” (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 

428 U.S. at 567)). Absent consent or probable cause, “when officers detain 

travelers after the legitimate justification for a stop has ended, the continued 

detention is unreasonable.” Rynearson v. United States, 601 F. App’x 302, 305 

(5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 

647, 654 (5th Cir. 2002)), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1448 (2016).

In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review 

the court’s factual findings (including credibility choices) for clear error and 

6

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

legal conclusions de novo. See Cavazos, 668 F.3d at 193; see also United States 

v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2015). “A factual finding is not 

clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” 

United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001). As mentioned 

supra, we view the evidence in favor of the Government as the prevailing party 

at the suppression hearing. See Cavazos, 668 F.3d at 193. 

2.

In light of these principles, it is clear that Agent Pena did not extend the 

checkpoint stop beyond its permissible duration. The district court’s factual 

findings, which are amply supported by the suppression testimony and thus 

not clearly erroneous, indicate that the countable duration of the stop—i.e., the 

time just before Agent Pena made contact with Williams and McMillon at 

approximately 4:14:35 a.m. until Williams consented to a search at 

approximately 4:15:07 a.m.—lasted about thirty or forty seconds. See 

Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 435 (“We note initially that our inquiry 

considers only [Agent’s] questioning of [Defendant] up to the point at which 

[Defendant] consented to a search of his car. After [Defendant] consented to a 

search, [Agent] needed no justification to prolong the encounter.”). During this 

time, citizenship and travel plans questions were asked and answered, and 

Agent Pena requested and received consent to a search. A checkpoint stop 

lasting approximately thirty to forty seconds to allow border patrol agents to 

ask citizenship and travel questions and to request consent for a search is of a 

sufficiently limited duration under our precedent. See, e.g., Machuca-Barrera, 

261 F.3d at 429, 435 (approving a checkpoint stop lasting “no more than a 

couple of minutes” during which Border Patrol agents questioned occupants as 

to citizenship and travel plans and requested consent for a search); see also 

United States v. Hinojosa-Echavarria, 250 F. App’x 109, 113 (5th Cir. 2007)

(per curiam) (holding that a stop “last[ing] no longer than one to one and one 

7

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

half minutes” was “within the time approved in Machuca-Barrera” and thus 

“did not exceed the permissible duration of an immigration stop”); Jaime, 473 

F.3d at 186 (citing, inter alia, Machuca-Barrera and holding constitutional a 

checkpoint stop that lasted “clearly less than half a minute”).

Citing our decision in Portillo-Aguirre, McMillon argues that the 

permissible length of the checkpoint stop ended once Agent Pena was 

subjectively satisfied that Williams and McMillon were United States citizens, 

i.e., after Agent Pena inquired about the pairs’ citizenship but before Agent 

Pena inquired about the pairs’ travel plans. See 311 F.3d at 656 

(distinguishing Machuca-Barrera and holding a checkpoint stop 

unconstitutional where a Border Patrol Agent “had completed his inspection 

before he turned his attention to drug interdiction,” which “extended the stop 

for an additional three to five minutes”). However, notwithstanding the 

different factual scenarios between Portillo-Aguirre and this case, we have 

explicitly rejected the legal argument that Portillo-Aguirre created a 

“subjective motivation test” that supplanted the objective duration test 

articulated in Machuca-Barrera. See Jaime, 473 F.3d at 180, 185–88 (reading 

Machuca-Barrera as holding “that so long as the primary programmatic 

purpose of the checkpoint was the detection of illegal immigrants, the 

permissible duration of a suspicionless detention there would be determined 

by objective factors, not by the subjective motivation or state of mind of the 

specific individual officers conducting the stop and related examination or 

questioning on the particular occasion at issue”). Rather, as discussed supra, 

Machuca-Barrera dictates that we ask only whether the duration of the stop 

was objectively reasonable. See id. (discussing Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 

433–34). Because thirty to forty seconds was an objectively reasonable 

duration, Agent Pena’s questions did not impermissibly extend the stop. 

8

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

B. 

McMillon next challenges the ensuing search of the tractor that led to 

the discovery of the aliens, asserting three reasons why Williams’ consent was 

insufficient to justify the search: (1) Agent Pena had already prolonged the 

checkpoint stop beyond a permissible duration before Williams consented; (2) 

the video of the checkpoint stop played at the suppression hearing shows that 

Agent Pena initiated the search before Williams consented; and (3) Agent 

Pena’s actions rendered Williams’ consent involuntary. 

1.

Before addressing McMillon’s arguments, we must consider a threshold 

question: whether McMillon, as a mere passenger in the tractor, has Fourth 

Amendment standing to challenge its search. We have consistently 

“recognized that ‘passengers who assert neither a property nor a possessory 

interest in the automobile that was searched . . . have no legitimate expectation 

of privacy entitling them to the protection of the Fourth Amendment.” United 

States v. Iraheta, 764 F.3d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 2014) (alterations omitted) 

(quoting United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1093 (5th Cir. 1991)). 

McMillon argues that his agreement to help Williams drive the tractor-trailer 

“with a commercial purpose in mind” gave him a possessory interest in the 

tractor-trailer sufficient to confer standing. We need not reach this novel 

argument. Even assuming arguendo that McMillon has standing, each of his 

challenges to the search clearly fail.

2.

McMillon’s first argument that Williams’ consent was invalid because 

Agent Pena prolonged the checkpoint stop fails for the reasons discussed supra. 

McMillon’s second argument that Agent Pena began the search before 

Williams consented fails in light of the district court’s factual findings and our 

clear error standard of review. See United States v. Tedford, 875 F.2d 446, 451 

9

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

(5th Cir. 1989) (“A trial court’s finding of consent will not be overturned unless 

clearly erroneous.”). McMillon renews the same argument that he made in the 

district court, i.e., that a “white shadow” in the tractor’s windshield at 

approximately 4:14:48 a.m. on the checkpoint video shows McMillon moving 

from the passenger seat to the sleeper area of the tractor at Agent Pena’s 

request, which means that Agent Pena must have initiated the search before 

Agent Hernandez told him “to check the back” at approximately 4:15:07 a.m. 

and Williams consented shortly thereafter. The district court, after hearing 

conflicting testimony and viewing the checkpoint video numerous times at the 

suppression hearing, found that both Agent Pena and Agent Hernandez had 

credibly testified that Williams consented before the search occurred and that 

the “grainy” checkpoint video lent no clear answer either way. Our review of 

the checkpoint video is consistent with the district court’s finding—it is indeed 

grainy and unclear; it has no sound; and, although something certainly flashes 

in the tractor’s windshield between 4:14:48 a.m. and 4:14:50 a.m., we cannot 

say with certainty whether that flash was McMillon moving at Agent Pena’s 

request or some other reflection. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Government and giving due deference to the district 

court’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the district court’s 

crediting of the Agents’ testimony as opposed to an unclear video was not 

clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 435–46 (5th 

Cir. 2002) (noting that a district court’s credibility choices as to the 

voluntariness of consent are reviewed for clear error and that this standard is 

“particularly strong” where findings are based on the “oral testimony at a 

suppression hearing”). 

McMillon’s third argument that Agent Pena’s actions rendered Williams’ 

consent involuntary similarly fails. Consent to a search must be knowing and 

voluntary “under the totality of the circumstances.” Tedford, 875 F.2d at 451–

10

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

52 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have articulated six 

primary factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of consent: 

“(1) the voluntariness of the defendant’s custodial status; (2) the presence of 

coercive police procedure; (3) the extent and level of the defendant’s 

cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant’s awareness of his right to refuse 

consent; (5) the defendant’s education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant’s 

belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.” Id. at 451. No single 

factor is dispositive. See id. at 451–52.

Applying the Tedford factors, the district court found, inter alia, that

Williams was stopped at the time he consented but was not physically 

restrained or coerced;1 Williams was fully cooperative with Agent Pena during 

the encounter; and Williams “appeared quite articulate on the stand,” which 

“strongly indicate[d] that he possessed sufficient intelligence to consent 

voluntarily.” Viewing these findings with due regard to the district court’s 

opportunity to judge Williams’ credibility at the suppression hearing, we 

conclude that the district court’s finding that Williams voluntarily consented 

to the search was not clearly erroneous. See Solis, 299 F.3d at 436. 

C.

Having considered McMillon’s arguments, we conclude that the 

checkpoint stop and ensuing search of the tractor did not violate McMillon’s 

Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial 

of his motion to suppress.

1 McMillon emphasizes that “Agent Pena required Williams to open the door from the 

inception and he secured a position on the steps next to Williams . . . [as] a show of authority 

that assured Williams and McMillon could not leave until Agent Pena closed the door.” 

McMillon’s attack on the voluntariness of Williams’ consent is belied by Williams’ own 

suppression testimony that Agent Pena asked—not ordered—him to open the door and that 

he knew he could refuse to do so if he wished. 

11

 

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

II. Motion to Dismiss

McMillon next challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to 

dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, arguing that more than 

seventy days elapsed between his indictment and trial such that mandatory 

dismissal was required. We disagree. 

A.

“The Speedy Trial Act is designed to ensure a federal defendant’s Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial . . . .” United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d 

940, 942 (5th Cir. 1994). To achieve this end, “the Act requires that a 

defendant be tried within seventy non-excludable days of indictment. If more 

than seventy non-excludable days pass between the indictment and the trial, 

the ‘indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant.’” Id. (quoting 

18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)). Recognizing that there can be valid reasons to delay a 

criminal trial, “the Act includes a long and detailed list of periods of delay that 

are excluded in computing the time within which trial must start.” Zedner v. 

United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497 (2006). Several of these exclusions are at play 

in this appeal. 

First, the Act excludes periods of “delay resulting from any pretrial 

motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, 

or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). We 

have held that this particular “exclusion implicitly extends to ‘that time after 

a hearing needed to allow the trial court to assemble all papers reasonably 

necessary to dispose of the motion, e.g., the submission of post-hearing briefs.’” 

United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 429 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson, 29 

F.3d at 943). Second, once such papers are assembled, “the court has taken 

the motion ‘under advisement’ and thus has thirty excludable days in which to 

rule under another one of the statutory exclusions.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(1)(H)). “The clock begins to tick again at the end of that thirty-day 

12

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

period, regardless of whether the court has ruled on the motion.” Id. (quoting 

United States v. Stephens, 489 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 2007)). 

Third, the Act excludes “[a]ny period of delay resulting from a 

continuance granted by any judge . . . if the judge granted such continuance on 

the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action 

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The Act explicitly requires that a district court make 

such “ends-of-justice” findings on the record. See id. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (“No such 

period of delay . . . shall be exclud[ed] . . . unless the court sets forth, in the 

record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best

interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.”). 

In reviewing a district court’s speedy trial determinations, we review the 

court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See, e.g.,

United States v. Tannehill, 49 F.3d 1049, 1051 (5th Cir. 1995). 

B.

Applying these statutory exceptions and our case law, we hold that the 

district court correctly concluded that less than seventy non-excludable days 

elapsed between McMillon’s indictment and trial. McMillon’s speedy trial 

clock began on July 8, 2014, the date of his indictment. Seventeen nonexcludable days then elapsed until McMillon filed his first motion to continue 

on July 25, which tolled the speedy trial clock pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). On July 28, the court granted McMillon’s motion and 

extended the time for pretrial motions until August 11—the speedy trial clock 

remained tolled during this continuance period pursuant to § 3161(h)(7)(A). 

On August 11, McMillon filed a second motion to continue, which again tolled 

the clock pursuant to § 3161(h)(1)(D). On August 12, the court granted 

McMillon’s second motion and extended the time for pretrial motions until 

13

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

August 18—the speedy trial clock remained tolled during this continuance 

period pursuant to § 3161(h)(7)(A). 

On August 18, events began transpiring that kept McMillon’s speedy 

trial clock tolled for a substantial period of time. That day, McMillon filed a 

motion to suppress and a motion for discovery of, inter alia, canine records. On 

September 17, he filed amended versions of the same motions. On September

22, the court held a hearing on the motions, at which McMillon challenged the 

checkpoint stop and search and argued that the canine records were necessary 

to cross-examine Agents Pena and Hernandez regarding suppression. On 

September 24, the court sua sponte reconvened the suppression hearing to 

explore further McMillon’s arguments and allowed the parties to file posthearing briefs. On October 15, the court entered a discovery order, requiring 

the Government to produce the canine records for in camera inspection by 

October 22. Though the Government produced the records on the deadline, the 

court was unable to “fully read and understand” them; thus, the court 

requested additional information on December 11, which the Government 

provided on December 17. McMillon’s speedy trial clock remained tolled 

during this entire period pursuant to § 3161(h)(1)(D), as per his request, the 

court gathered the papers necessary to gauge the checkpoint stop and the 

search so as to then adjudicate the suppression motion. See Harris, 566 F.3d 

at 429 (noting that § 3161(h)(1)(D)’s exclusion period “implicitly extends to that 

time after a hearing needed to allow the trial court to assemble all papers 

reasonably necessary to dispose of the motion” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

Once the court received the December 17 submissions, the suppression 

matter was considered “under advisement,” and the thirty-day exclusion 

period in § 3161(h)(1)(H) began to run. This excluded the days between 

December 17, 2014, and January 5, 2015, the date on which the court denied 

14

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

McMillon’s motion to suppress. Six non-excludable days then elapsed until 

January 12, the date on which McMillon filed his motion to dismiss the 

indictment. This again tolled the speedy trial clock pursuant to 

§ 3161(h)(1)(D). 

On January 20, the court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss, at 

which it clarified why it had granted the earlier continuances:

[B]efore the Court hears argument on the Motion to Dismiss, 

I have to address some prior continuances that this Court granted.

The first continuance was granted on July 28th . . . then a 

subsequent one on August 12th. They are noted on the record as 

Docket entries Numbers 35 . . . [and] 39 . . . . All of these different 

orders that the Court entered were motions to continue that were 

requested by the Defendants, whereby the Defendants requested 

. . . some more time to file pretrial motions in this case.

The Court signed all of these proposed orders in each 

instance; however, I did not articulate specific findings regarding 

whether the ends of justice would have been met by granting those 

continuances that were requested by the Defendants. But the 

Court is going to make it abundantly clear, and I am clarifying that 

after I consider all the factors that are set forth in 18 USC 

3161(h)(7)B [sic], each one of these continuances . . . was granted 

because the Court found that although this case is not unusual or 

complex that it was unreasonable to expect adequate preparation 

in the time allotted for by the Speedy Trial Act, the failure to grant 

those continuances would have affected the Defendant’s ability to 

adequately prepare for this case and would have denied all three 

of these Defendants reasonable time necessary for effective 

preparation. 

In each instance, counsel for the respective Defendants 

articulated reasons why despite their respective due diligence they 

were unable to adequately prepare to file pretrial motions by the 

deadlines the Court had set. And the Court accepted those reasons 

that were given by the Defendants in whole. Thus the Court found 

that the ends of justice served by continuing the pretrial motions 

deadline for the specified period outweighed the best interest of the 

public and Defendants in a speedy trial in each case.

After hearing arguments from the parties, the court orally denied the motion 

to dismiss, and McMillon’s trial began later the same day. 

15

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

Although the computation is convoluted, we are convinced that only 

twenty-three non-excludable days elapsed from the date on which McMillon 

was indicted to the date on which his trial began—seventeen non-excludable 

days from indictment to first continuance motion and six additional nonexcludable days from the denial of the motion to suppress to the filing of the

motion to dismiss. Twenty-three non-excludable days between indictment and 

trial does not violate the Speedy Trial Act. See Johnson, 29 F.3d at 942. 

McMillon makes two arguments to the contrary. He first argues that 

periods of delay related to his continuance motions cannot be excluded because 

the district court granted those motions without contemporaneously entering 

ends-of-justice findings. We have rejected a reading of § 3161(h)(7)(A) as 

requiring contemporaneous ends-of-justice findings. See United States v. 

Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 283 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the argument that 

the Speedy Trial Act requires contemporaneous ends-of-justice findings). 

Rather, the Act “merely requires that a district court enter on the record, at 

some point (presumably prior to trial), the necessary findings to support an 

ends-of-justice continuance;” that the findings “indicate when the motion was 

granted;” and “that the reasons stated be and can be fairly understood as being 

those that actually motivated the court at the time it granted the continuance.” 

Bieganowski, 313 F.3d at 283. Here, the court’s oral explanation at the 

January 20 hearing satisfied these conditions—the court entered the necessary 

ends-of-justice findings before denying McMillon’s motion to dismiss and 

before trial, identified by date and docket number the motions granted, and 

fairly explained the factors that motivated the court when it granted the 

motions. Under Bieganowski, this is all that the Speedy Trial Act requires. 

See 313 F.3d at 283. Accordingly, McMillon’s first argument fails. 

Second, McMillon argues that delay attributable to certain matters that 

occurred “off the record”—i.e., events that indisputably occurred but that were 

16

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

not formally noted on the district court’s docket—cannot be excluded. While 

not completely clear, he appears to argue that § 3161(h)(1)(H)’s 30-day 

advisement period should have started on October 22, 2014—the date on which 

the court received the first set of canine records for in camera inspection

pursuant to its October 15 docket order—rather than December 17—the date

on which the court received the second set of canine submissions for in camera 

inspection without memorializing its receipt or request with a formal docket 

entry. 

McMillon’s argument is unconvincing and without merit. McMillon 

directs our attention to no authority suggesting that we must exclude matters 

that occurred “off the record” for speedy trial purposes. Indeed, under the 

circumstances here, it would make little sense for such events—which 

indisputably occurred at McMillon’s request and solely for his benefit—to be 

ignored merely because the district court failed to make a formal notation on 

the docket. 

However, even generously assuming arguendo that we should exclude 

the “off the record” period identified by McMillon, there would still be no speedy 

trial violation. Assuming that the 30-day advisement period began upon the 

court’s October 22 receipt of the first set of canine records, then it would have 

ended on November 20. Forty-five non-excludable days then elapsed between

November 20 and January 5, the date on which the court ruled on McMillon’s 

motion to suppress. Added to the seventeen non-excludable days and six nonexcludable days discussed supra, this means that only sixty-eight nonexcludable days would have elapsed. Because sixty-eight non-excludable days 

between indictment and trial complies with the Speedy Trial Act, see Johnson, 

29 F.3d at 942, McMillon’s argument still fails. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s denial of McMillon’s motion to dismiss.

17

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 17 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

III. Sufficiency Challenges

Aside from the denial of his pretrial motions, McMillon also challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence on all three of his convictions. Because he timely 

moved for acquittal as to each conviction, we review McMillon’s sufficiency 

challenges de novo, and ask “whether, viewing all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found that the evidence 

established the elements of the offense[s] beyond a reasonable doubt.” United 

States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). We draw all reasonable inferences and make all 

credibility determinations “in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). 

1.

McMillon first argues that the trial evidence was insufficient to show 

that he conspired to transport aliens within the United States for commercial 

advantage or private financial gain as alleged in Count One of the indictment. 

To prove the conspiracy conviction, “the Government had to establish beyond 

a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement between [McMillon] and at 

least one other person to violate the law by transporting illegal aliens within 

the United States and that [McMillon] had knowledge of the agreement and 

voluntarily joined in it.” United States v. Espinoza-Diaz, 582 F. App’x 398, 399 

(5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing, inter alia, United States v. AvilaDominguez, 610 F.2d 1266, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1493 

(2015). “Association or presence can be sufficient to prove knowing 

participation in the agreement if combined with other supporting 

circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Martinez, 190 F.3d 673, 676 (5th 

Cir. 1999). The agreement itself “does not have to be explicit or formal; a tacit 

agreement is sufficient.” United States v. Chon, 713 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 

2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

18

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

At trial, De La Cruz and Hernandez-Gomez—two of the unlawful aliens 

discovered hidden in the tractor—testified that they entered the United States 

with smugglers before they were eventually taken to an empty parking lot 

where they were picked up by a tractor-trailer. Both testified that, when the 

tractor-trailer arrived, a man wearing a blinking cellular Bluetooth Device and 

white clothing motioned for them to hide in the tractor, and both identified 

McMillon (sitting at the defense table) as this person. To complement the 

aliens’ testimony and in-court identification, the Government showed the jury 

a photograph of McMillon wearing white on the night of the incident and called 

Agent Pena and Agent Hernandez to narrate the checkpoint stop for the jury. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence suggested that 

McMillon rode with Williams in a tractor-trailer, stopped at an empty parking 

lot where aliens were waiting, and motioned for the aliens to hide in the tractor

before attempting to transport them through an immigration checkpoint. A 

reasonable jury could have relied upon this evidence to find that McMillon 

agreed with Williams to transport aliens and that McMillon had knowledge of 

this arrangement and voluntarily participated in it. See, e.g., Espinoza-Diaz, 

582 F. App’x at 399. 

McMillon argues that even if there was evidence of an agreement with 

Williams, there was no evidence that the pair agreed to transport aliens for 

commercial advantage or private financial gain. This argument fails. To 

sustain the conspiracy conviction, the Government was not required to “prove 

that the offense was committed for commercial advantage or private financial 

gain.” See United States v. Hill, 454 F. App’x 330, 333 (5th Cir. 2011) (rejecting 

the argument that a § 1324 jury instruction was flawed because it omitted a 

pecuniary purpose element). Rather, the language of the statute indicates that 

pecuniary purpose is a finding that increases the offense’s statutory maximum. 

See id.; compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii) (providing a statutory maximum 

19

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

of five years’ imprisonment for the offense of conspiracy to transport aliens), 

with id. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) (increasing the statutory maximum to ten years’ 

imprisonment if the offense “was done for the purpose of commercial advantage 

or private financial gain”). And, here, consistent with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 

the pecuniary-purpose enhancement was charged in the indictment, put to and 

found by the jury, and amply supported by the trial evidence. See 530 U.S. 

466, 476 (2000) (“[A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the 

maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to 

a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Both De La Cruz and 

Hernandez-Gomez testified that they had arranged to pay thousands of dollars 

to be smuggled into the United States, and Border Patrol Agent Eric Camacho 

testified as to how aliens or their families commonly pay smugglers indirectly. 

See United States v. Allende-Garcia, 407 F. App’x 829, 833–34 (5th Cir. 2011) 

(collecting cases from this circuit and others for the proposition that “financialpurpose” evidence “was sufficient when there was evidence that the defendant 

was working with a smuggling network and that someone in the network had 

received or would receive money”). This was sufficient to support the jury’s 

pecuniary purpose special finding, even though, contrary to McMillon’s 

argument, pecuniary purpose is not an essential element of his conspiracy 

conviction. See Hill, 454 F. App’x at 333. 

Finally, McMillon points to inconsistencies in the Bluetooth evidence 

identifying him at trial. As McMillon identifies, there was indeed arguably 

conflicting evidence about the Bluetooth at trial—De La Cruz and HernandezGomez both testified that, at the parking lot, a person wearing a Bluetooth 

instructed them to hide in the tractor, and identified McMillon as that person; 

yet, Agent Pena and Agent Camacho both testified that the Bluetooth was 

seized from Williams, not McMillon, after the checkpoint stop. However, 

McMillon pressed these inconsistencies (albeit, to no avail) to the jury in cross20

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 20 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

examinations and in closing argument. And, the aliens’ testimony is not 

factually impossible; rather, it is entirely possible that McMillon was wearing 

the Bluetooth when the aliens were picked up and that Williams was wearing 

it some period of time later during the checkpoint stop. The jury was free to 

choose this reasonable construction of the evidence and to gauge the credibility 

of the testifying witnesses in doing so. It is not our role to second-guess the 

jury’s credibility determinations on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. RubioMendoza, No. 14-41270, ___ F. App’x ___, ___, 2016 WL 825476, at *1 (5th Cir. 

Mar. 2, 2016) (“[J]urors are free to choose among reasonable constructions of 

the evidence, and retain the sole authority . . . to evaluate the credibility of the 

witnesses. In other words, for the latter, it is not our court’s role . . . to secondguess the determinations of the jury as to the credibility of the evidence.” 

(internal alterations and citations omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm 

McMillon’s conspiracy conviction. 

2.

McMillon also argues that the trial evidence was insufficient to support 

his convictions for the substantive alien transportation offenses alleged in 

Counts Two and Three of the indictment. To prove the transportation 

convictions, the Government was required to show “that ‘(1) an alien entered 

or remained in the United States in violation of the law, (2) the defendant 

transported the alien within the United States with intent to further the alien’s 

unlawful presence, and (3) the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the 

fact that the alien was in the country in violation of the law.’” United States v. 

Battle, 368 F. App’x 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2010) (alterations omitted) (quoting 

United States v. Nolasco-Rosas, 286 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2002)). As 

recounted supra, the jury heard ample evidence that De La Cruz and 

Hernandez-Gomez unlawfully entered the United States and that McMillon 

recklessly disregarded their citizenship by picking them up in an empty 

21

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 21 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

parking lot and instructing them to hide in a tractor before attempting to 

transport them through an immigration checkpoint. Also as discussed supra, 

McMillon’s pecuniary purpose argument lacks merit. We thus affirm 

McMillon’s transportation convictions. 

IV. Sentencing

McMillon’s final argument is that the district court erred in denying his 

request for a mitigated role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. We 

review the district court’s denial of a § 3B1.2 adjustment for clear error. See, 

e.g., United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 626 (5th Cir. 2013).

Generally, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 provides for varying reductions to a 

defendant’s offense level if the defendant’s participation in an offense was 

minimal, minor, or somewhere in between. We have noted that such 

adjustments are “generally appropriate only if a defendant is substantially less 

culpable than the average participant.” United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 

F.3d 276, 296 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Flucas, 99 F.3d 177, 180 

(5th Cir. 1996)). The defendant bears the burden of establishing entitlement 

to a § 3B1.2 adjustment. See United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593, 597 (5th 

Cir. 2001). 

At sentencing, the district court clearly articulated that it was denying 

McMillon’s § 3B1.2 request because each of his minor-role arguments were 

contradicted by Williams’ live sentencing testimony that he did not recruit 

McMillon to commit the offenses and that, instead, the pair entered a joint 

partnership to smuggle aliens. This explanation alone was sufficient for the 

court to find that McMillon’s involvement in the offenses was that of an 

average participant and that McMillon was not any less culpable than 

Williams. See Garcia, 242 F.3d at 598 (“[S]ection 3B1.2 asks whether a 

defendant’s involvement is comparable to that of an ‘average participant.’” 

(citation omitted)). In his brief, McMillon makes no attempt to address 

22

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 22 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-40927

Williams’ testimony or the district court’s finding in this regard; instead, he 

merely reiterates, without citing any sentencing or trial evidence, that he was 

merely a passenger in the tractor; that he did not make any arrangements in 

relation to transporting the aliens; and that he possessed no managerial 

responsibilities. We hold that the district court’s reliance on Williams’ 

testimony as opposed to McMillon’s unsupported arguments was not clearly 

erroneous. See Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 626. Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of the § 3B1.2 adjustment. 

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of 

McMillon’s motion to suppress; AFFIRM the court’s denial of McMillon’s 

motion to dismiss; AFFIRM each of McMillon’s convictions; and AFFIRM the 

district court’s denial of a § 3B1.2 adjustment at sentencing. 

23

 Case: 15-40927 Document: 00513601042 Page: 23 Date Filed: 07/20/2016