Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-73510/USCOURTS-ca9-14-73510-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Antonio Reyes
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTONIO REYES,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 14-73510

Agency No.

A075-512-042

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 8, 2016*

Pasadena, California

Filed August 25, 2016

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kleinfeld

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

34(a)(2).

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2 REYES V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied Antonio Reyes’s petition for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision finding him

ineligible for adjustment of status or cancellation of removal

because he had been convicted of violating a controlled

substance law.

The panel held that a state conviction expunged under

state law is still a conviction for purposes of eligibility for

adjustment and cancellation. The panel wrote that an alien

may be considered convicted of a state crime under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(48) when there is no formal judgment of guilt if

two conditions are met, and found that Reyes’s case involved

the second condition, whether probation was “some form of

punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty.”

The panel held that although Reyes’s conviction was

subsequently expunged, the terms of his probation, including

a fine and multiple limitations on his freedom, satisfied the

second condition and thus fulfilled the federal definition of a

conviction.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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REYES V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

Michael A. Younge, Law Office of Michael A. Younge,

Anaheim Hills, California, for Petitioner.

Jason Wisecup, Trial Attorney; John W. Blakeley, Assistant

Director; Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge:

Reyes is a citizen of Mexico. He first entered the United

States without inspection in 1988. Reyes was convicted of

driving under the influence in 2003. In the same year, he was

detained by immigration officials, but was granted voluntary

departure. Reyes pleaded nolo contendere, and was found

guilty, of being “under the influence of a controlled

substance, methamphetamine,” in violation of California

Health and Safety Code § 11550(a) in 2008. The judgment

in that case suspended imposition of sentence and Reyes was

placed on “formal probation for a period of 36 months.” 

During his three years of probation, he was subject to these

limitations on his liberty, among others:

• “Submit person and property to a search at any time of

the day or night by any law enforcement officer or

probation officer with or without a warrant or probable

cause.”

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4 REYES V. LYNCH

• “Submit to periodic anti-narcotic tests/alcohol tests as

directed by the probation officer and treatment provider.”

• “Register as a convicted narcotics offender, carry proof of

registration at all times, display registration to any law

enforcement officer upon request.”

• “[Do] not associate with persons believed to be or known

to be narcotic or drug users, sellers or buyers, except in an

authorized drug counseling program.”

• “Do not own, use or possess any dangerous or deadly

weapons, including any firearms, knives or other

weapons.”

• “Do not drink or possess any alcoholic beverage and stay

out of places where they are the chief item of sale.”

He was also fined $289.38, including $100 in restitution.

Upon successful completion of his three years of

probation, the California Superior Court set aside Reyes’s

nolo contendere plea, dismissed the criminal case against

him, and terminated his probation.

In 2014, Reyes was charged with being removable from

the United States by the Department of Homeland Security. 

The basis for removing him was that he had no right to be in

the United States at all, having entered without inspection and

having not been admitted or paroled into the United States.

What led to the case before us is that Reyes applied for

adjustment of status as a lawfully admitted immigrant based

on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, and sought cancellation of

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REYES V. LYNCH 5

removal.1 The immigration judge ruled that he was ineligible

for adjustment or cancellation under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) because he had been convicted of

violating a controlled substance law. Reyes argues that his

conviction did not render him ineligible for relief because the

California state judge did not order “some form of

punishment, penalty or restraint on [his] liberty to be

imposed.”2

States have varying procedures for letting people with

relatively minor convictions start over with a clean slate, if

they can stay out of trouble long enough. California allows

those convicted of nonviolent drug-possession offenses to

have “the conviction on which the probation was based [to]

be set aside” if they successfully “complet[e] drug treatment,

and substantiallycompl[y] with the conditions of probation.”3

In California, the dismissal of these charges is not a dismissal

for all purposes, as the “nonviolent drug-possession offense

may be recorded by the Department of Justice, may be

disclosed in response to law enforcement inquiry, and must

be disclosed by the defendant in connection with specified

matters.”4

Immigration law provides that, although the slate may be

clean for various state purposes, that is not necessarily so for

 

1

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1229b.

 

2

 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(ii).

 

3

 Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1(e)(1).

4 People v. Delong, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 293, 300 (Ct. App. 2002)

(emphasis omitted).

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6 REYES V. LYNCH

purposes of removal of an illegal alien, such as Reyes.5 For

purposes of federal immigration law, the statute defines

conviction to include cases where “adjudication of guilt has

been withheld,” which is what “suspended imposition of

sentence” ordinarily means.6 Traditionally in criminal law,

the judgment includes the sentence, and is in the form of

“defendant has been convicted of such and such crime, and is

sentenced to such and such.”7 The federal definition of

conviction where adjudication of guilt has been withheld

includes aliens who have entered pleas of nolo contendere

and “the judge has ordered some form of punishment,

penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.”8

In our en banc decision in Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646

F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2011), we overruled LujanArmendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000), which had

held that expungement of a state conviction for simple

possession had to be treated the same way as expungement of

a federal conviction for simple possession under the Federal

First Offender Act. In Nunez-Reyes, we held the Equal

Protection Clause did not require treating expunged state

convictions the same as federal drug convictions expunged

under the Federal First Offender Act.9 Our en banc decision

 

5

 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(i)–(ii).

 

6

Id.

7

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(k)(1) (“In the judgment of conviction, the

court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the

adjudication, and the sentence.”).

 

8

 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i)–(ii).

 

9

 646 F.3d at 690.

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REYES V. LYNCH 7

in Nunez-Reyes focused on the equal protection issue, and

“we assume[d], without deciding, that the statutory term

‘conviction’ includes expunged state convictions.”10

Under § 1101(a)(48), if there has been a “formal

judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court,” the alien

has been convicted of a crime, even if the alien suffers no

punishment. When there is no formal judgment of guilt, an

alien may be still considered convicted of a relevant state

crime, if two conditions in the statute are met. The first

condition is that a relevant fact finder found the alien guilty,

or that the “alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo

contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a

finding of guilt.”11 Since Reyes pleaded nolo contendere, that

element of a conviction is plainly satisfied. Accordingly, the

issue here turns on the second condition, whether his

probation was “some form of punishment, penalty, or

restraint on the alien’s liberty.”12

We now decide what we assumed without deciding in

Nunez-Reyes. California treats defendants who are in a

similar position to Reyes as though “both the arrest and the

conviction . . . never . . . occurred,” for most purposes.13

Congress, however, is entitled to take a different position, and

did. This is because California cannot “dictate how the term

 

10 Id. at 689 n.2.

 

11 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i).

 

12 Id. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(ii).

 

13 Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1.

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‘conviction’ is to be construed under federal law.”14If a

person is treated as convicted for federal immigration

purposes even where an adjudication of guilt has never been

made, then a fortiori Congress can treat proceedings as a

conviction where an adjudication of guilt has been

subsequently expunged. Our sister circuits all hold an

expunged state conviction is a conviction for immigration

purposes,15 and we see no reason to create a circuit split.

Reyes argues that since the terms of his probation were

intended to be entirely rehabilitative, and he served them

satisfactorily, he did not satisfy the element of the federal

definition of conviction, that “some form of punishment,

penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty” was imposed.16

Reyes would have us extend Retuta v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1181

(9th Cir. 2010), to his circumstances and hold that because of

the nature of his probation, he does not fit within the federal

definition of conviction.

Retuta, though, is distinguishable. In Retuta, the alien

was sentenced only to a fine of $100, which was stayed and

did not have to be paid.17 There were no terms of probation. 

Retuta was entitled to leave court with no restraints on his

liberty beyond those applicable to persons who had never

 

14 Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2003).

15 See Wellington v. Holder, 623 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2010); ResendizAlcaraz v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004); Acosta,

341 F.3d at 224; Vasquez-Velezmoro v. INS, 281 F.3d 693, 698 (8th Cir.

2002); Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 2000).

 

16 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i).

 

17 591 F.3d at 1185.

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REYES V. LYNCH 9

been convicted of anything, and he did not have to pay the

$100 fine, because it was stayed. There was no restraint on

Retuta’s liberty, no fine, no punishment at all.18 There were

no conditions he had to meet regarding the stay of his $100

fine. We held that the federal definition of conviction “does

not include criminal judgments whose only consequence is a

suspended non-incarceratory sanction.”19 There has to be

“some punitive aspect” ordered by the court for there to be a

conviction.20

The California Superior Court in Reyes’s case did indeed

order “some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the

alien’s liberty,” unlike the state judge in Retuta. Reyes was

fined $289.38. Unlike the alien in Retuta, Reyes’s fine was

not suspended. If he did not pay it, his probation could be

revoked. During his probation, he suffered multiple restraints

on his liberty. He had to attend Alcoholics Anonymous

meetings daily and keep his probation officer advised of

where he lived. He was not allowed to own firearms, and he

was not allowed to associate with drug users or be where they

congregate. Those of us who have not been convicted of a

crime are not required to attend Alcoholics Anonymous

meetings or keep some probation office advised of our

address, we may own firearms if we choose, and we can go

to a restaurant even if we know that servers or other

customers may be drug users.

 

18 Id. at 1188.

 

19 Id.

 

20 Id.

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Though the word “probation” may not necessarily prove

a restraint on liberty, here it clearly did. A sentence of

probation, even with no incarceration, satisfies the

requirements of § 1101(a)(48)(A) so long as “the judge has

ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the

alien’s liberty to be imposed.” In this case both the fine and

the limitations on Reyes’s freedom to associate with whom he

likes, own guns, and so forth, all satisfied this definition.21

Thus we conclude that a state conviction expunged under

state law is still a conviction for purposes of eligibility for

cancellation of removal and adjustment of status. And even

though incarceration is not required, the federal definition of

conviction is satisfied regardless of the rehabilitative purpose

of probation, where the alien was punished or his liberty was

restrained by the terms of his probation. Because Reyes

suffered such a qualifying conviction for a crime relating to

a controlled substance under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), he is

disqualified from seeking cancellation of removal and

adjustment of status. We deny his petition.

PETITION DENIED.

21 See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 640 n.11 (1988)

(“[A] fixed term of probation is itself a punishment that is criminal in

nature.”); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1006 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that

being required to “report to a probation officer every month of the term of

his community supervision . . . was a punishment and a restraint on his

liberty.”).

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