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Parties Involved:
Bennie Wren Bolton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

P U B L I S H 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILE-D 

Uoired States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci!'cuit 

MAY 3 0 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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NOS. 88-1946 and 89-5057 

BENNIE WREN BOLTON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-0l-E) 

Gordon B. Cecil, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. Graham, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief) Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appel lee. 

Susan L. Foreman, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief) Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

MOORE and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and KANE, Senior District Judge* 

KANE, Senior District Judge 

*Honorable John L. Kane, Jr. United States Senior District Judge 

for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-5057 Document: 010110555291 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 1
The defendant, Bennie Wren Bolton, was found guilty on charges 

of receiving and possessing a firearm after peing convicted of a 

felony and possessing a firearm not registered in the National 

Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. He received a fortyyear sentence on the first charge and a ten-year sentence on the 

second, to run concurrently. Bolton now appeals his conviction and 

sentence on six grounds. He contends that (1) the trial court 

erred in refusing to disqualify the assistant prosecutor who had 

earlier represented him, (2) his trial violated the Speedy Trial 

Act, (3) he was entitled to a jury instruction on the term 

"firearm," (4) there was insufficient evidence that he possessed 

the firearm, (5) his sentence was improperly enhanced due to prior 

convictions, and (6) he was prejudiced by the ineffective 

assistance of counsel. We affirm. 

I. Facts. 

On October 14, 1987, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer 

Wilson of the Tulsa Police Department noticed a car travelling in 

the opposite direction with its bright lights on. Officer Wilson 

flashed his lights several times, but the driver of the car, 

defendant Bolton, did not dim his. Wilson became suspicious that 

Bolton was driving under the influence, so he turned his car around 

and activated the siren and lights. Bolton failed to stop. 

Officer Wilson then broadcast on his radio for assistance. He was 

joined by Officers Yelton, Groves, and Williams. 

During the pursuit, Bolton's car went off the road, hit a fire 

hydrant, and came to rest with its front approximately two feet off 

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the ground. Bolton got out of the car and ran toward the nearby 

woods, where he was arrested by Groves and Wilson. As Bolton was 

exiting the car, Officer Wilson noticed an object falling to the 

ground. When Officer Yelton approached the car approximately 

twenty seconds later, he found the sawed-off shotgun that had 

fallen. 

Bolton claimed at trial he did not know that the gun was in 

the car before he entered it. He testified that the night he was 

arrested, he borrowed the car from a friend to purchase some drugs 

for him. After he purchased the drugs, Bolton stated he noticed 

a women's rabbit coat on the seat. He picked it up and saw the 

shotgun beneath it. He further testified he did not touch or move 

the gun. 

II. Issues. 

A. Failure to Disqualify Prosecutor. 

Bolton's first contention is that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to disqualify Assistant U.S. Attorney Ron 

Wallace, who acted as 

throughout the trial. 

trial, but otherwise 

assistant prosecutor for the government 

Wallace gave the closing argument at the 

did not speak during the proceedings. 

Bolton's motion was based on Wallace's representation of Bolton 

approximately five years earlier on an unrelated armed robbery 

charge while working for the Tulsa County Public Defender's Office. 

At several points during the trial, the court inquired about 

the extent of Wallace's earlier representation of Bolton. At no 

time was there the slightest indication that Wallace had obtained 

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Appellate Case: 89-5057 Document: 010110555291 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 3
sensitive information during his earlier representation of Bolton 

which could have been used against him in the instant proceeding. 

On this basis, the district court denied the motion for 

disqualification. 

On a post-trial motion challenging Wallace's participation, 

the court again addressed the issue. The court was clearly 

concerned with the appearance of impropriety presented by Wallace's 

participation in the proceedings, notwithstanding there was little 

similarity between the current charges and Wallace's earlier 

representation of Bolton: 

This Court is greatly troubled by the gravity of the 

issues presented herein; ... It would seem to be the 

incredulity of observers who witness a former defense 

attorney, privy at one time to the thoughts and 

motivations of a defendant, turned prosecutor and accuser 

of the same defendant. Argument has been made to this 

Court that it took a rare step of belief in the legal 

system for Defendant Bolton to take the witness stand in 

his own behalf, as such behavior was uncharacteristic of 

him during his previous trials. Yet while on the stand, 

he looked into the eyes of his former confidant and 

observed him whispering and conferring with the other 

government counsel. It does not take much of an 

inferential leap to envision that the presence of a 

former defense confidant at the opposing table could 

inhibit other defendants from choosing to take the 

witness stand, although Mr. Bolton was not so deterred. 

Such indirect interference with any defendant's right to 

testify on his own behalf should neither be encouraged 

nor tolerated. 

Order on Post-Trial Motions at 25-26 (attachment to Bolton's 

Brief) . Nevertheless, with an admonishment to the parties, the 

court concluded that Bolton was not entitled to a new trial on the 

basis of his former defense counsel having prosecuted him, relying 

primarily on Havens v. Indiana, 793 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 4 79 U.S. 935 ( 1986) (holding that the defendant was not 

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denied a fair trial due to the prosecutor's earlier representation 

of him, even though the prosecutor later filed habitual offender 

charges against him). 

The district court's decision on a motion to disqualify is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. EEOC v. Orson H. Gygi Co., 

749 F.2d 620, 621 (10th Cir. 1984). "The merits of [ a J 

disqualification motion depend on whether a substantial 

relationship exists between the pending suit and the matter in 

which the challenged attorney previously represented the client." 

Smith v. Walcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985). In this 

case, there was no factual relationship between the two actions in 

which Wallace participated. Wallace represented Bolton on an armed 

robbery charge a number of years earli_er and testified to the court l 

that he was aware of no confidential information relating to the 

instant case. 

We agree with the district court that there was an appearance 

of impropriety. We cannot fathom the obdurate persistence of the 

prosecution in keeping Wallace on this case. The decision, in the 

face of objection and the trial court's apt criticism is, to say 

the ·1east, aberrant. The exercise of a modicum of prudence on the 

part of the prosecutor would have made consideration of this issue 

on appeal completely unnecessary. Nevertheless, given the district 

court's careful and detailed consideration of this issue, there has 

been no abuse of discretion, nor would there have been had the 

court granted the motion. 

B. Speedy Trial Violation. 

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Bolton's second contention is that he was tried in violation 

of the Speedy Trial Act. In particular, Bolton argues that the 

period of time covered by the court's granting of a continuance 

relating to the substitution of defense counsel should not be 

excluded under the Act. This argument has no merit. 

The Speedy Trial Act requires that the defendant be brought 

to trial within 70 days of the filing of the indictment. 18 u.s.c. 

§ 316l(c). Certain time periods are excluded from this 

computation, however. 

excludes 

In subsection 316l(h) (8) (A), the Act 

[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance 

granted by any judge on his own motion ... if the judge 

granted such continuance on the basis of his findings 

that the ends of justice served by taking such action 

outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial. 

This subsection further requires the trial court to set forth in 

the record "its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served 

by the granting of the continuance outweigh the best interest of 

the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 

316l(h) (8) (A). The subsection further lists several factors which 

the judge should consider in determining whether to grant a 

continuance, including whether the failure to grant the continuance 

"would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would 

unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of 

counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney 

for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective 

preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence." 

Id. § 316l(h) (8) (B) (iv). 

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In this case, Bolton's own actions precipitated the trial 

court's granting of a continuance. The record reflects that Bolton 

changed his mind several times on whether he wished to be 

represented, who he wished to represent him, and whether he was 

willing to waive his speedy trial rights. Bolton's vacillations 

in attitude on these subjects usually occurred at the last possible 

moment, after matters relating to trial had already been set. In 

the end, the court appointed new counsel for Bolton, with his 

apparent consent, and then felt it necessary to grant the 

continuance to enable counsel to prepare adequately for trial. 1 

Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion 

in granting the continuance, see United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 

1510, 1513 n. 1 {10th Cir. 1986) , and Bolton was not tried in 

violation of the Speedy Trial Act. 

c. Jury Instruction on Firearm. 

Bolton next argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

instruct the jury on the definition of the term "firearm." This 

argument merits no discussion because there was no dispute that the 

sawed-off shotgun recovered in this case was a firearm, Bolton did 

not request such an instruction, and Bolton never objected to the 

instructions that were given. 

D. Sufficiency of Evidence of Possession. 

Bolton's fourth claim is that there was insufficient evidence 

for the jury to have concluded that he possessed the sawed-off 

1 The trial court made the requisite findings on the record 

under § 3161 (h) (8) (A). 

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shotgun seized from the car. In reviewing this charge, the 

appellate court must determine whether there was evidence upon 

which the jury reasonably could have based a verdict of guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 

1095, 1096 (10th cir. 1989). All the evidence, both direct and 

circumstantial, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Government. Id. 

In United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 109 s. ct. 3197 (1989), a case quite similar on its 

facts, we noted that "possession in fact is not a prerequisite [to 

conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm], constructive 

possession [is] sufficient." There we defined constructive 

possession as when " 'a person knowingly holds the power to exercise 

dominion and control'" over the item. Id. (citations omitted). 

The court in Cardenas concluded there was sufficient evidence that 

the defendant possessed the firearm because Cardenas admitted to 

officers he knew the gun was in his truck and the gun was found 

within reach of his hands. 

Identical factors are present in this case. Bolton admitted 

the sawed off shotgun had been in the car and that he knew it was 

there. The gun was also in close physical proximity to Bolton in 

the car because it fell to the ground when he exited. Finally, 

with the exception of his testimony denying the gun and car 

belonged to him, Bolton presented no evidence at trial to 

substantiate his version of the events. There was sufficient 

evidencs to convict Bolton on the charges against him. 

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E. Improper Sentence Enhancement. 

Bolton additionally contends his sentence was improperly 

enhanced under 18 u~s.c. § 924(e). This statute provides that a 

person violating 18 u.s.c. § 922(g) (firearm possession by a former 

felon) who has three previous violent felonies or serious drug 

offenses is subject to a fine and imprisonment without parole for 

15 years. Bolton contends he did not have three previous felonies 

because his prior convictions were simultaneously entered. His 

argument is unavailing. 

In connection with this case, the government filed an 

Information setting out Bolton's four prior convictions for armed 

robbery. The robberies occurred on separate dates and at separate 

locations. Although Bolton was convicted in a single judicial 

proceeding for these crimes, the conviction was for multiple counts 

arising from separate criminal transactions. Section 924 ( e) ( 1) 

requires only that the felonies be "committed on occasions 

different from one another." See, e.g., United States v. Rush, 840 

F.2d 580, 581 (8th Cir. 1988) (separate convictions not required); 

United States v. Herbert, 860 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied, 109 s. Ct. 2074 (1989) (same). The sentence enhancement 

under§ 924(e) was therefore proper, notwithstanding Bolton's prior 

convictions were simultaneously entered. 

F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 

Bolton's final contention is that he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel. To prevail on this claim, Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984) 

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requires that the defendant show "counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 

defendant by the sixth Amendment," and that his defense was 

prejudiced by these errors. Bolton has not made this showing. 

Bolton's brief on this issue is conclusory. With respect to 

his first counsel, Wesley Gibson (who Bolton asked to withdraw), 

Bolton complains that his right to proceed pro se was not 

adequately protected, that counsel did not object to the 

government's use of the Information for sentence enhancement, and 

that counsel divulged privileged information2 As for his courtappointed trial counsel, Wesley Johnson, Bolton claims that Johnson 

did not adequately prepare for trial or consult with him, that 

Johnson failed to file a motion for new trial, that he failed to 

object to the sentence enhancement, and that he also failed to 

protect Bolton's right to proceed pro se. 3 

In reviewing Bolton's post-trial motion on this basis, the 

district court summarily rejected Bolton's claim, finding that 

Bolton had not met the Strickland standards for ·showing the 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The court stated that 

"(a]lthough neither Attorney Gibson nor Attorney Johnson may have 

uttered the words Defendant Bolton may have wished or have achieved 

2 Bolton does not specify what information was divulged or to 

whom. 

3 Addressing Bolton's complaint that he was denied the ability 

to proceed prose, the district court expressly noted that, ''after 

exhaustive review of every utterance made by or on behalf of Mr. 

Bolton," the court could not find that Bolton had ever 

affirmatively requested the he be allowed to proceed pro se. Order 

on Post-Trial Motions at 14. 

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the result desired, the legal assistance rendered to Defendant 

Bolton cannot be found by this Court to be defective, nor to have 

prejudiced Bolton's defense. " Id. Absent a more competent showing 

by Bolton of how his attorneys were deficient and how these 

deficiencies prejudiced him, this conclusion is inescapable. 

III. Conclusion. 

The judgment of conviction and the sentence are affirmed. 

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