Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01778/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01778-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephen Mayberg
Respondent
Leon M. Seymour
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEON M. SEYMOUR,

Petitioner,

 vs.

STEPHEN MAYBERG, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 03-1778 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a former state prisoner who has been civilly committed under the

Sexually Violent Predator’s Act (“SVPA”), has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered Respondent to show cause

why the writ should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum

of points and authorities in support thereof, and has lodged exhibits with the court. 

Petitioner has filed a traverse to Respondent’s answer. The matter is submitted. After a

review of the claims raised in the petition on the merits, Petitioner’s application for a writ

of habeas corpus is DENIED.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Leon M. Seymour has filed this habeas petition to challenge a judgment rendered on

January 31, 2002, finding him to be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) under the SVPA, as

defined by California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600 et. seq., and committing him to the

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1

 This case is not moot because it is capable of repetition yet evading review. See

Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 2004). 

2

custody of the Director of Mental Health for the State of California for two years.1 

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found to be a SVP and the trial court ordered him civilly

committed. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s

order of civil commitment. Petitioner subsequently filed a habeas petition in San Mateo County

Superior Court alleging the claims raised herein, which was denied on July 23, 2002. The

California Supreme Court denied a subsequent petition filed there on procedural grounds.

In Re Seymour, No. S109094 slip op. (Cal.) (Petitioner’s Exh. D). The instant petition

was filed on April 23, 2003.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Standard of Review of State Court Decisions

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence

on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state

court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions

of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

407-09 (2001), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, it falls

under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially

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indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is

an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second

clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ

“simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at

411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the

writ. Id. at 409. 

Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary. Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1041. This presumption is

not altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than

by a state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza,

242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner

must present clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of

correctness; conclusory assertions will not do. Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state

court decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the statecourt proceeding.” Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1041; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d

1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or an reasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the

highest state court to address the merits of petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. 

LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). 

II. Civil Commitment

States may enact statutes that provide for the "forcible civil detainment of people

who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public

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health and safety." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997). The

constitutionality of state civil commitment proceedings may be challenged in federal

habeas corpus once state remedies have been exhausted. See Nelson v. Sandritter, 351

F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1965). 

Commitment to a mental hospital produces a massive curtailment of liberty and

consequently requires due process protection. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92

(1980). This is true even where the petitioner is already a prisoner in custody of the state

or federal government. See id. at 493-94. Because a commitment hearing is a civil

matter, the constitutional rights to which a defendant in a criminal trial is entitled do not

adhere to a respondent in a commitment hearing. See United States v. Budell, 187 F.3d

1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that procedural

due process guarantees certain protections to those individuals facing civil commitment. 

See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491-94. 

The Supreme Court has upheld involuntary commitment statutes in the sex

offender context, when “(1) the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures

and evidentiary standards, (2) there is a finding of dangerousness either to one’s self or

to others, and (3) proof of dangerousness is coupled with the proof of some additional

factor, such as a mental illness or mental abnormality.” Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,

409-10 (2002) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). The legal definitions of

"mental illness" or "mental abnormality" used in a civil commitment statute need not

mirror those advanced by the medical profession. See id.; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359. 

The Supreme Court has held that under Hendricks there is no requirement of

“total or complete lack of control,” but nevertheless “there must be proof of serious

difficulty in controlling behavior . . . [in order] to distinguish the dangerous sexual

offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil

commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal

case.” Crane, 534 U.S. at 411-13 (emphasis in original). The Court has so far not

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distinguished between impairments that are “volitional” (“‘an [in]ability to control . . .

behavior’”) and “emotional” (a “‘defective understanding or appreciation . . . of

behavior’”), or decided whether confinement based solely on the latter (emotional)

abnormality would be constitutional. Id. at 870-71 (quoting American Psychiatric

Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 681, 685 (1983)).

California's Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA") is codified at California

Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 6600-6609.3. A judgment committing an individual

under the SVPA is subject to review under the AEDPA standards in 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). See Carty v. Nelson, 426 F.3d 1064, 1072-73 (9th Cir.), amended, 431 F.3d

1185 (9th Cir. 2005).

Since the filing of the instant petition, the Ninth Circuit has issued several

decisions regarding constitutional challenges to civil commitments under California’s

SVPA. Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 779-80 (9th Cir. 2004); Rose v. Mayberg, 454

F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of instructional error under AEDPA). The

Ninth Circuit has held that allowing civil commitment pursuant to California’s Sexually

Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), not based on the offender’s complete inability to control

his behavior, but rather based on a “mental disorder” that “affected his emotional or

volitional capacity” and “predisposes” him to commit further sexual crimes, is an

objectively reasonable application of Crane and Hendricks. Rose, 454 F.3d at 963. 

The SVPA was upheld against a due process challenge in Hubbart, 

379 F.3d at 780. The Ninth Circuit considered the SVPA's procedural safeguards, which

include requirements that the accused receive diagnoses from two psychiatrists or

psychologists, assistance of counsel, and a trial by jury on proof beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. at 781. The Ninth Circuit has determined that the SVPA is similar in relevant

respects to Kansas's civil commitment statute upheld in Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 

Hubbart, 379 F.3d at 781. 

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DISCUSSION 

On August 6, 2003, this Court issued an order to show cause regarding

Petitioner’s claims that he was entitled to habeas relief on the grounds that: (1) he could

not be civilly committed based upon evidence of a mental disorder established by his

prior criminal conduct for which he had previously been found criminally responsible;

and, (2) counsel on Petitioner’s underlying criminal cases was ineffective for failing to

challenge Petitioner’s criminal liability for the underlying sex crimes based on the mental

disorder he has been found to have in the SVPA hearing. 

In response to this Court’s order, Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s claim that

counsel on his underlying criminal convictions was ineffective cannot be granted because

it is an improper and untimely challenge to Petitioner’s prior convictions. Respondent

also argues that Petitioner’s other claim fails to state a federal claim for relief. 

Respondent further argues that Petitioner’s commitment does not violate the federal

Constitution; that Petitioner’s civil commitment and his underlying criminal convictions

are not inconsistent; and that the civil commitment under the SVPA was supported by

substantial evidence. 

I. Petitioner’s Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on his Prior

Convictions is Barred 

In this case, Petitioner seeks to challenge the ineffective assistance of counsel he

received on the multiple underlying sex offense convictions that were used as evidence

against him in civil commitment hearing under the SVPA. Petitioner argues that because

he was adjudged a sexually violent predator in 2002 based in part on his criminal

convictions, counsel on those cases (that predated the SVP determination by as much as

thirty years), should have raised either an insanity defense at trial or evidence of his

mental disorder in mitigation at sentencing.

As Respondent notes, however, the Supreme Court has strictly limited the

circumstances under which Petitioner may challenge the collateral consequences of a

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2While this Court does not address Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim on the

merits, the petition also fails to include any evidence establishing that counsel should

have known that Petitioner suffered from a mental disorder in the 1970s, or that such a

mental disorder would have established that Petitioner was thereby rendered not

criminally responsible for the crimes. As such, Petitioner has also failed to establish

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prior conviction through a habeas petition. The Supreme Court has held that a petitioner

generally may not attack the constitutionality of a prior conviction used to enhance a

later sentence, 

[O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in

its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while

they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the

conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is

later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not

challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the

ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. 

Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001) (citation

omitted); see also United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 295 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir.

2002) (bar against collateral attacks on prior convictions also applies where sentencing

court declined to reduce sentence based on circumstances of prior conviction). The only

exception to the rule barring challenges to prior convictions used to enhance current

sentences is that a petitioner may challenge a prior conviction on the ground that there

was a complete failure to appoint counsel in that case in violation of the Sixth

Amendment. Coss, 532 U.S. at 404. 

While Coss involved a constitutional challenge to a prior conviction used as a

basis for a sentencing enhancement on a later conviction, rather than as evidence in a

civil commitment proceeding, its reasoning is applicable here. Petitioner has not alleged

a Sixth Amendment violation involving the complete denial of counsel under Gideon v.

Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Instead, Petitioner challenges counsel’s ineffectiveness

in failing to raise an insanity defense and to use evidence of a mental disorder in

mitigation.2 In Coss, the Court based its determination largely on the need for finality

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either deficient performance or prejudice under either prong of the test set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). See Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d

741, 743 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 960 (1990); see also Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d

796, 813 n.23 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting two ineffective assistance of counsel claims

based on petitioner's failure to produce evidence of prejudice).

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and the difficulties inherent in administration of constitutional challenges to criminal

convictions from many years in the past. Coss, 532 U.S. at 402-03. The difficulties

inherent in such a challenge are especially noteworthy here, where Petitioner alleges that

counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue defenses based on his mental condition many

years ago. As such, this Court finds that Petitioner’s challenge to the convictions

underlying his civil commitment on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred

under Coss and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claim. 

II. Civil Commitment for Mental Disorder does not Violate Due Process

Respondent next argues that Petitioner’s claims don’t present a federal claim for

relief. However, this Court has construed Petitioner’s claim as a due process challenge to

his civil commitment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly found that civil commitment

proceedings under a statute such as the SVPA must comport with due process. 

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. 

Petitioner argues that because he was found criminally responsible for the prior

crimes which were used to establish his status as a SVP, they should not be used as

evidence in the commitment proceeding under the SVPA. Petitioner’s argument seems to

be that he cannot be found to possess a mental disorder and also to have had the requisite

mental culpability to have committed the crimes. However, this assertion is simply a

misunderstanding of the law. 

First of all, while there is certainly a relationship between an individual’s suffering

from a mental disorder “that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others

in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior(,)” Cal.

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3

 Through his repeated argument, it appears that Petitioner believes that if he

committed the offense “willfully,” they were not a result of the mental disorder from

which he suffers. However, Petitioner apparently misunderstands the different roles of

evidence of mental state in a criminal prosecution and a civil commitment. 

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Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1), and their prior sex crimes, the statute does not require

that a person have suffered from the mental disorder at the time they committed the

underlying crimes. In other words, a person may be subject to civil commitment under

the statute as long as the evidence at the hearing establishes that they currently suffered

from a mental disorder rendering them a danger. 

In order to civilly commit an individual under the SVPA, proof is required that the

individual has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes it likely that they will endanger

others in the future by engaging in sexually violent criminal behavior. Id. It is not only

possible, but likely that an individual’s mental state at the time of commitment would

differ greatly from at the time of his criminal convictions when these events are separated

by lengthy time periods, such as the thirty years occurring here. However, neither the

statute, nor due process, requires otherwise. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner is essentially raising a claim of inconsistent

verdicts and cites United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) for the proposition that

jury verdicts are generally insulated from review on this ground. However, because that

doctrine is applicable to circumstances where an individual suffers inconsistent criminal 

verdicts, rather than different outcomes from these vastly different statutory schemes, the

Court finds that no inconsistent verdict claim lies. 

Petitioner appears instead to be arguing that because he was found criminally

responsible for his sex crimes, that his civil commitment violates Crane, because he is the

“dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in the ordinary criminal case,” 534 U.S. at

413, rather than the “dangerous sexual offender” subject to civil commitment.3 However,

Petitioner’s argument then is with the jury’s finding that he was a dangerous sexual

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offender, rather than a typical recidivist, rendering him subject to civil commitment under

the statute. Petitioner has not identified anything constitutionally deficient about the civil

commitment proceedings or the jury’s finding.

While Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s commitment was supported by

sufficient evidence, it does not appear that Petitioner takes issue with the amount of

evidence supporting the commitment. Although he makes an unsupported assertion that

both doctors who testified at his commitment hearing fraudulently omitted “the element,

willfully” from their evaluation, see Petition at 7-13, that argument seems to derive from

Petitioner’s misunderstanding of the vastly different roles that insanity and mental

disorders play in criminal and civil commitment proceedings. As Respondent points out,

a person can suffer from a mental disorder that may potentially subject them to civil

commitment under the SVPA and still “willfully” commit crimes. Answer at 10-11. 

It appears that Petitioner argues that the Constitution is violated by his subjection

to a civil commitment based on criminal convictions for which he was not found insane. 

However, as Respondent points out, Petitioner does not identify under what

constitutional provision his claim lies. Because the civil commitment statute does not

establish criminal proceedings, the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses are not

violated. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359-69; Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267-68

(2001). 

In general, the states are entitled to define the elements of its criminal statutes,

including those relating to an insanity defense, as the state sees fit. Due process does not

require that a state provide a certain insanity defense, or for that matter, provide such a

defense to those suffering from mental disorders who may subject them to civil

commitment in the future. As the Supreme Court recently noted in Clark v. Arizona, 126

S.Ct. 2709, 2722 (2006), “it is clear that no particular formulation [of the insanity

defense] has evolved into a baseline for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the

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conceptualization of criminal offenses, is substantially open to state choice[.]” This

Court finds no constitutional error in the State’s failure to provide an insanity defense to

those afflicted with mental disorders which may subject them to civil commitment in the

future if they present a danger to others. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s commitment comports with due process, in

that it was supported by substantial evidence, including the testimony of two doctors who

had examined Petitioner and his own statements that he would likely get into trouble

again if he was released. Answer at 11 (citations omitted). Other than Petitioner’s

arguments that the doctors who testified at his SVPA hearing were falsely refusing to

consider that Petitioner was found criminally responsible for the crimes which were used

to support the evidence of his status as a sexually violent predator, Petitioner raises no

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence offered against him at the hearing. 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has already found that the statutory scheme set forth

in the SVPA comports with due process as set forth in Hendricks and Crane. Rose, 454

F.3d at 963; Hubbart, 379 F.3d at 781. Petitioner has not established that his civil

commitment under the SVPA based on criminal convictions for which he was found

criminally responsible was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court authority. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2006

_______________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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