Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03311/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03311-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hal Harkrader
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3311

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Hal Harkrader

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

____________

 Submitted: November 16, 2015

 Filed: January 13, 2016

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SMITH, BYE, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Hal Harkrader was convicted of receipt of child pornography in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). The district court1

 sentenced Harkrader to 144 months of

1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Iowa.

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imprisonment. Harkrader appeals contending the district court erred by denying

counsel's motion to withdraw. We affirm.

I

Harkrader was indicted for receipt of child pornography and the lesser included

offense of possession of child pornography. Without the benefit of a plea agreement,

Harkrader pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography. During the change-of-plea

hearing,2

 Harkrader explained his learning disability and expressed that no one made

any threats or promises in order to get him to plead guilty. Before the factual basis for

the plea was established, Harkrader and his attorney spoke privately; after that

conversation, Harkrader acknowledged he downloaded pornographic images of

minors. When asked to plead "guilty" or "not guilty," Harkrader responded "[d]on't

got a choice. It's guilty." The court reminded Harkrader he did have a choice and

could proceed to trial, but Harkrader confirmed he wished to plead guilty.

At sentencing, Harkrader's attorney asked for a sentence significantly below the

guidelines, in part because Harkrader has cognitive problems dating back to childhood

and because Harkrader sometimes had difficulty understanding the legal proceedings.

Harkrader exercised his right to allocution, wherein he acknowledged his guilt

of possession of child pornography, but initially denied his guilt of receipt of child

pornography. Harkrader acknowledged he picked up the computer, which contained

the child pornography, from the curb. Harkrader also expressed his frustration with

the government failing to offer him a plea deal for the lesser included offense of

possession of child pornography. The following exchange then occurred:

2

Harkrader consented to pleading guilty in front of a magistrate judge. 

Magistrate Judge Celeste F. Bremer conducted the change-of-plea hearing and issued

a report and recommendation recommending the guilty plea be accepted. The district

court adopted the report and recommendation.

-2-

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THE COURT: Well, did you do it or didn't you?

THE DEFENDANT: No. That's what I've been trying to tell people, but

because it was in my possession, things have snowballed and gone

downhill for me, you know.

THE COURT: Well, why did you admit to downloading child

pornography then?

THE DEFENDANT: I wasn't given a choice. Go to trial and get more

time or plead guilty to the charges.

THE COURT: So you lied at the time you entered your guilty plea here?

THE DEFENDANT: I didn't lie. I did what I was told to.

THE COURT: By whom?

THE DEFENDANT: I was told by [my attorney]. He said, you know,

you go to trial and get more time or plead guilty to the charges.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Perhaps, Your Honor, we should continue the

sentencing and I should withdraw as counsel and new counsel should be

appointed to represent Mr. Harkrader at this point.

THE COURT: Thank you. No.

Sent. Transcript 6-7. After the government argued, Harkrader's attorney renewed his

motion to withdraw as counsel. The district court again denied the motion and

explained it did not believe Harkrader's claims, and did not view Harkrader's position

as adverse to his attorney's. After the district court imposed the sentence, Harkrader's

attorney renewed his motion to withdraw, and the district court granted the motion. 

New counsel was appointed.

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Harkrader timely appealed, raising the sole issue of whether the district court

abused its discretion in refusing to allow Harkrader's counsel to withdraw during

sentencing because of the potential attorney-client conflict.

II

"Whether to grant a continuance and substitution of counsel is a matter

committed to the sound discretion of the district court." United States v. Redd, 318

F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 499

(8th Cir. 1992)). We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision to deny

counsel's request to withdraw. United States v. Carlson, 613 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir.

2010).

"Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases

hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of

interest." Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). When appointment of

replacement counsel is requested, a district court is required to appoint new counsel

"only when the defendant demonstrates justifiable dissatisfaction with his appointed

attorney." United States v. Kelley, 774 F.3d 434, 438 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Justifiable dissatisfaction warranting replacement of

counsel includes a conflict of interest. Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th

Cir. 1991). If the defendant raises "a seemingly substantial complaint" then the

district court must "inquire thoroughly into the factual basis of the defendant's

dissatisfaction." Id.

Harkrader argues the district court abused its discretion in failing to inquire

thoroughly into the factual basis of his dissatisfaction with his attorney and the

potential conflict of interest. When a defendant raises a seemingly substantial

complaint, our cases contemplate trial courts "must make the kind of inquiry that

might ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern." Smith, 923 F.3d at

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1320. The district court's on-the-record inquiry, although brief, sufficiently addressed

Harkrader's complaints. See United States v. Rodriguez, 612 F.3d 1049, 1054 (8th

Cir. 2010) ("[T]he nature of the factual inquiry into potential conflicts is case-specific

and . . . in some instances[] the court would have the relevant facts without engaging

in an intensive inquiry."); United States v. Jones, 795 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 2015)

(finding that, even when no inquiry was made, the district court “had all the

information necessary to make a ruling”). Harkrader’s claim here occurred at

sentencing—more than five months after he pleaded guilty. See Kelley, 774 F.3d at

438 (acknowledging district courts must balance many factors when faced with a

motion to appoint substitute counsel, including “the need to thwart abusive delay

tactics”). The district court made a credibility determination during the sentencing

hearing, and did not believe Harkrader's claims of innocence or coercion. See United

States v. Battle, 774 F.3d 504, 517 (8th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1881 (2015)

("Credibility determinations are squarely within the discretion of the district court and

are given special deference." (internal quotation marks omitted)) The district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel’s substitution motion.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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