Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01317/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01317-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anlin Industries, Inc.
Counter Defendant
Paul Burgess
Counter Claimant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANLIN INDUSTRIES, INC., a California )

corporation )

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

PAUL BURGESS, )

)

)

)

Defendant. )

 )

1:05cv1317 REC DLB

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO STRIKE PORTION OF ANSWER AND

COUNTERCLAIM

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT LEAVE

TO FILE AMENDED ANSWER AND

COUNTERCLAIM

(Document 18)

On February 22, 2006, Plaintiff Anlin Industries, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant motion

to strike certain portions of the Answer and Counterclaim filed by Defendant and Counter

complainant Paul Burgess (“Defendant”). A hearing on the motion was held on May 5, 2006,

before the Honorable Dennis L. Beck, United States Magistrate Judge. Michele Engnath

appeared on behalf of Plaintiff and Defendant appeared pro se. 

BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant alleging violations of

the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, infringements of federally registered

trademarks in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), unfair competition in violation of Section 43(a)

of the Langham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and trademark infringement and unfair competition

Case 1:05-cv-01317-DLB Document 34 Filed 05/08/06 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 “45. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 45. Defendant and Plaintiffs’ vice president Eric 1

Vidar, had a contingent oral agreement for the Plaintiff to purchase the Defendants’ www.anlinwindows.com domain

name for the amount of one-hundred thousand dollars. This agreement was subject to Plaintiffs’ attorney’s approval. 

Plaintiff’s attorney advised Eric Vidar, not to acquire Defendant’s website for one-hundred thousand dollars. 

Plaintiff’s attorney then spoke with the defendant once again whereas, she continued making threats and finally made

an offer to the Defendant in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars. The Plaintiff’s attorney explained the offer

by saying that, “she would earn twenty-five thousand dollars in legal fees,” therefore; she offered that amount to the

Defendant for resolution. The Defendant did not accept Plaintiff’s attorney’s offer, because the Defendant earned a

little over ninety-two thousand dollars the prior year as a traveling sales representative marketing Plaintiff’s windows

to consumers in Northern and Southern California.” See Doc.13, at 8-9.

 “51. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 51. Defendant and Plaintiff’s vice president Eric 2

Vidar had a contingent oral agreement for Plaintiff to acquire Defendant’s website for one-hundred thousand dollars. 

This agreement was subject to Plaintiff’s attorney’s approval. Plaintiff’s attorney advised Eric Vidar, not to acquire

Defendant’s website for one-hundred thousand dollars. Plaintiff’s attorney then spoke with defendant once again

2

under California law. These allegations are based on Defendant’s registration and use of domain

names alleged to be identical or confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s federally registered and

unregistered trademarks and trade names. 

On January 12, 2006, Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim where he alleges that

(1) Plaintiff gave him its “blessing” for success with his website, (2) that Defendant registered

www.anlinwindows.com prior to when Plaintiff’s federal trademark registration was issued; (3)

that Plaintiff contacted the authorized dealer whose contractor’s license was posted on

Defendant’s www.anlinwindows.com website and improperly demanded that the dealer forbid

Defendant from using its license number and stop taking sale referrals from that website. If the

dealer did not comply, Plaintiff would discontinue shipment of windows to the dealer.

The Defendant’s Counterclaim sets forth the following six counts: negligence, tortuous

interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional

interference with the right to pursue a lawful business, intentional infliction of emotion distress

and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

On February 22, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike from Defendant’s Answer and

Counterclaim the following:

(1) paragraphs 19 through 22 of the Counterclaim in their entirety,

(2) the portion of paragraph 24 of the Counterclaim beginning at line 12 on page

23 to its end, 

(3) the portion of paragraph 45 of the Answer beginning at line 27 on page 8 to 1

its end, and 

(4) the portion of paragraph 51 of the Answer beginning at line 6 on page 10 to 2

Case 1:05-cv-01317-DLB Document 34 Filed 05/08/06 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

whereas, she continued to make threats and finally made an offer to the Defendant in the amount of twenty-five

thousand dollars. The Plaintiffs’ attorney explained that she would earn twenty-five thousand dollars in legal fees;

therefore, she office red that amount to Defendant for resolution. The Defendant did not accept Plaintiffs’ attorney’s

officer, because the Defendant earned approximately ninety-two thousand dollars the prior year as a traveling sales

representative marketing Plaintiffs’ windows to consumers in Northern and Southern California.” See Doc. 13, at

10.

3

its end.

Plaintiff argues the language in these paragraphs is immaterial and/or impertinent

information which is prejudicial to Plaintiff because the matters describe pre-litigation settlement

discussions, offers and conduct.

Defendant does not oppose striking the referenced paragraphs from the Counterclaim but

argues the language in paragraphs 45 and 51 of the Answer are necessary to respond to

paragraphs 45 and 51 of the Complaint alleging that, 

Plaintiff registered, trafficked in and/or used each of the 2004 Domain Names

with a bad faith intent to profit from the sale of the 2004 Domain Names by

selling such Domain names to Plaintiff or authorized dealers or distributors of

Plaintiff.

Complaint at ¶ 45. Defendant argues the disputed language in his Answer is necessary due to the

“negative way in which Plaintiff words paragraph 45 [and 51 of Plaintiff’s complaint].” 

Defendant contends that if paragraphs 45 and 51 are stricken from the Answer he will suffer

prejudice. 

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (f) provides:

Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading

or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a

party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the

court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading

any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.

Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 408 states, in part, that:

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or

offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or

attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or

amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its

amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is

likewise not admissible.

Case 1:05-cv-01317-DLB Document 34 Filed 05/08/06 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The statements in paragraphs 45 and 51 of Defendant’s Answer describe settlement

discussions, evidence of which is inadmissable under Rule 408. The addition of these statements

in the Answer improperly places the settlement discussions at issue and therefore should be

stricken from the pleading pursuant to Rule 12(f). 

The statements are also unnecessary to deny Plaintiff’s allegations. At the pleading stage,

a general denial of the allegation is all that is required to controvert the material allegations of the

complaint. The answer must simply, “in short and plain terms” admit or deny each of the

material allegations raised in the complaint and set forth all affirmative defenses to the claims

asserted. See Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 8(b). Defendant has denied the allegations of paragraphs 45 and

51 of the Complaint and therefore the additional description of the settlement discussions is

unnecessary. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to strike paragraphs 45 and 51 of the Answer is HEREBY

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to strike paragraphs 19-22 and 24 of the Counterclaim is also

granted. Defendant is granted 20 days from the date of service of this order in which to file an

Amended Answer and Counterclaim consistent with this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 8, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-01317-DLB Document 34 Filed 05/08/06 Page 4 of 4