Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01392/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01392-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
AT&T Mobility LLC
Appellee
EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

AT&T MOBILITY LLC,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1392

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:13-cv-00910-RGA, Judge 

Richard G. Andrews.

--------------------------------------------------

EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

FLO TV INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee

MOBITV INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

U.S. CELLULAR CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee

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2 EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC

SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION, HTC AMERICA 

INC., QUALCOMM, INC., SIMPLEXITY, LLC, D/B/A 

WIREFLY, MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC,

Defendants-Appellees

LETSTALK.COM INC.,

Defendant

______________________ 

2014-1393

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:10-cv-00812-RGA, Judge 

Richard G. Andrews.

______________________ 

Decided: May 6, 2015

______________________ 

JOHN L. HENDRICKS, Reed & Scardino LLP, Austin, 

TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

DANIEL ROBINSON SCARDINO, JOHN MATTHEW MURRELL. 

DIANA SANGALLI, Duane Morris LLP, Houston, TX, 

argued for defendant-appellee AT&T Mobility LLC. Also 

represented by THOMAS W. SANKEY; JOSEPH POWERS, 

Philadelphia, PA; KRISTINA CAGGIANO KELLY, Washington, DC; JACK B. BLUMENFELD, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & 

Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, DE. 

HARRISON J. FRAHN, IV, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, 

LLP, Palo Alto, CA, argued for all defendants-appellees in 

2014-1393. Defendants-appellees FLO TV Incorporated, 

Qualcomm, Inc. also represented by JEFFREY ERIC 

OSTROW, JEFFREY E. DANLEY, PATRICK E. KING; VICTOR 

COLE, New York, NY. 

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EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC 3

DARALYN JEANNINE DURIE, Durie Tangri LLP, San 

Francisco, CA, for defendant-appellee MobiTV Inc. Also 

represented by LAURA MILLER. 

RICHARD JOHN O'BRIEN, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, 

IL, for defendant-appellee U.S. Cellular Corporation. Also 

represented by ROBERT D. LEIGHTON; RYAN C. MORRIS, 

Washington, DC.

KAREN ANN JACOBS, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell 

LLP, Wilmington, DE, for defendants-appellees Sprint 

Nextel Corporation, Simplexity, LLC, d/b/a Wirefly. 

Sprint Nextel Corporation also represented by MEGAN E.

DELLINGER, JENNIFER YING. 

HEIDI LYN KEEFE, Cooley LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for defendant-appellee HTC America Inc. Also represented by 

LAM K. NGUYEN, MARK R. WEINSTEIN, KYLE DAKAI CHEN. 

STEVEN MOORE, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton 

LLP, San Francisco, CA, for defendant-appellee Motorola 

Mobility LLC. Also represented by FREDERICK LEE 

WHITMER, New York, NY; CHRISTOPHER SCHENCK, Seattle, WA; CARL ELLIOTT SANDERS, Winston-Salem, NC.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and BRYSON, Circuit 

Judges.

PROST, Chief Judge. 

In these consolidated cases, EON Corp. IP Holdings 

LLC (“EON”) asserts U.S. Patent No. 5,663,757 (“’757 

patent”) against a number of defendants. The district 

court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding all claims of the ’757 patent invalid as 

indefinite. In particular, the district court found that the 

specification failed to disclose an algorithm to provide 

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structure for various computer-implemented means-plusfunction elements. On appeal, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The asserted ’757 patent, which issued on September 

2, 1997, is directed to software embodied in a “local subscriber data processing station” that operates in tandem 

with a television to interconnect various interactive 

features of the television. The software allows actions 

such as “impulse purchase transactions with immediate 

payment,” audience participation voting, and sorting 

television programs by theme. ’757 patent col. 2 l. 65. 

EON alleges that “the modern iteration of the ’757 Patent’s local subscriber data processing station is a 

smartphone with certain capabilities.” Appellant’s Br. 5–

6.

Consequently, on September 23, 2010, EON filed an 

action against seventeen defendants, including 

smartphone manufacturers, cellular network providers, 

and smartphone content providers (“the FLO TV case”). 

Nine months later, on June 14, 2011, EON sued several 

other defendants in a separate action (“the AT&T case”). 

The two cases were consolidated through claim construction.

At the same time, the ’757 patent went through two 

reexaminations. The claims were amended in the first 

reexamination, and all claims as amended were confirmed 

in the second reexamination. However, on November 1, 

2013, the defendants in the FLO TV action moved for 

summary judgment of invalidity for indefiniteness. To 

resolve the motion, the district court held a claim construction hearing on January 8, 2014, a summary judgment hearing on January 9, 2014, and a hearing to

receive expert testimony on February 5, 2014. Soon after 

the hearings, the district court granted summary judgment to the FLO TV defendants, finding that all claims of 

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the ’757 patent were invalid as indefinite. The eight 

terms that were held to be indefinite are the following:

1. “means under control of said replaceable software 

means for indicating acknowledging shipment of an 

order from a remote station” (Claim 7);

2. “means controlled by replaceable software means 

operable with said operation control system for . . . 

reconfiguring the operating modes by adding or 

changing features and introducing new menus” 

(Claims 1-6, 8-10);

3. “means responsive to said self contained software 

for establishing a mode of operations for selection of 

one of a plurality of authorized television program 

channels” (Claim 8);

4. “means establishing a first menu directed to different interactively selectable program theme subsets 

available from said authorized television program 

channels” (Claim 8);

5. “means for causing selected themes to automatically display a second menu” (Claim 8);

6. “means controlled by replaceable software means 

operable with said operation control system for establishing and controlling a mode of operation that 

records historical operating data of the local subscriber’s data processing station” (Claim 9);

7. “means controlled by replaceable software means 

operable with said operat[ion] control system for 

establishing and controlling fiscal transactions 

with a further local station” (Claim 10); and

8. “means for establishing an accounting mode of operation for maintaining and reporting fiscal transactions incurred in the operation of the local 

subscriber’s data processing station” (Claim 10).

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Following its summary judgment order, the district 

court entered final judgment of invalidity on March 5, 

2014 in the FLO TV case. The parties in the AT&T case 

then entered into a joint stipulation to final judgment of 

invalidity, which the district court granted on March 18, 

2014. EON appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

We review the grant of summary judgment of indefiniteness de novo, applying the same standard used by the 

district court. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Summary 

judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). We review the district court’s 

ultimate conclusion of indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112 de novo. Eidos Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 

779 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In this case, the 

district court made numerous detailed findings of fact. 

Because the indefiniteness inquiry here is intertwined 

with claim construction, see Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage 

Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A]

court’s determination of the structure that corresponds to 

a particular means-plus function limitation is indeed a 

matter of claim construction.”), we review these subsidiary factual determinations for clear error. Teva Pharm. 

USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015); see 

also Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., No. 2012-

1289, slip op. at 5 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact . . . must not be set aside unless 

clearly erroneous . . . .”).

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The parties agree that the claim terms at issue are all 

means-plus-function terms governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 

¶ 6.1 Section 112, paragraph 6 states that:

An element in a claim for a combination may be 

expressed as a means or step for performing a 

specified function without the recital of structure, 

material, or acts in support thereof, and such 

claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the 

specification and equivalents thereof.

Means-plus-function claim limitations under § 112 ¶ 6 

must satisfy the definiteness requirement of § 112 ¶ 2. S3 

Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 

2001). 

The parties also agree that the functions claimed in 

the terms at issue are all performed by computer software. It is well-established that the corresponding structure for a function performed by a software algorithm is 

the algorithm itself. See WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game 

Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Accordingly, “[i]n cases involving a computer-implemented 

invention in which the inventor has invoked means-plusfunction claiming, this court has consistently required 

that the structure disclosed in the specification be more 

than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor.” Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 

521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

1 Paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was replaced with 

newly designated § 112(f) when § 4(c) of the America 

Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, took effect on 

September 16, 2012. Because the applications resulting 

in the patents at issue in this case were filed before that 

date, we will refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112.

 

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A. The Katz Exception

In this case, EON does not dispute that the ’757 patent discloses no algorithms. It is uncontested that the 

only structure disclosed in the ’757 patent is a microprocessor. For this reason, EON relies on an exception to the 

algorithm rule created in In re Katz Interactive Call 

Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 

2011). Katz held that a standard microprocessor can 

serve as sufficient structure for “functions [that] can be 

achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming.” Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316. In Katz, 

claim terms involving basic “processing,” “receiving,” and 

“storing” functions were not necessarily indefinite because 

a general purpose computer need not “be specially programmed to perform the recited function.” Id. However, 

other claim terms involving conditionally coupling calls 

were indefinite because those functions required special 

programming and no algorithm was disclosed. Id. at 

1315.

This court has since analyzed the “narrow” Katz exception once, finding that it did not apply. See Ergo 

Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 

1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A representative example of one of 

the means-plus-function terms at issue in Ergo follows:

programmable control means coupled with said 

adjusting means for controlling said adjusting 

means, said programmable control means having 

data fields describing metering properties of individual fluid flows.

U.S. Patent No. 5,507,412 claim 1 (filed June 14, 1998). 

The Ergo court explained that “[i]t is only in the rare 

circumstances where any general-purpose computer 

without any special programming can perform the function that an algorithm need not be disclosed.” Id. at 1365. 

The court found that an algorithm was needed to lend 

sufficient structure to the terms at issue because “[t]he 

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‘control means’ at issue in this case cannot be performed 

by a general-purpose computer without any special programming. The function of ‘controlling the adjusting 

means’ requires more than merely plugging in a generalpurpose computer.” Id.

EON asserts that the functions claimed in the ’757 

patent do not involve “special programming”—and thus 

fall within the Katz exception—because they are relatively simple to implement. However, the Katz exception is 

not so broad. As we stated in Katz, a microprocessor can 

serve as structure for a computer-implemented function 

only where the claimed function is “coextensive” with a 

microprocessor itself. Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316. Examples 

of such coextensive functions are “receiving” data, “storing” data, and “processing” data—the only three functions 

on which the Katz court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for the district court to determine 

whether disclosure of a microprocessor was sufficient.

Katz’s “special programming” language has its origins

in WMS Gaming. As mentioned above, WMS Gaming

held that the corresponding structure for a software 

algorithm is the algorithm. In WMS Gaming, disclosure 

of a general purpose computer was insufficient because 

“[a] general purpose computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm creates ‘a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect 

becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to 

instructions from program software.’” WMS Gaming, 184 

F.3d at 1348 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 

(Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 

F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom.

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010))). As the foregoing 

citation demonstrates, WMS Gaming borrows language 

from Alappat. Alappat, which was predominantly a § 101 

case, held that the recited algorithm claimed patenteligible subject matter because its combination with a 

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general purpose computer created a new “machine” for 

the purposes of § 101. 33 F.3d at 1545. Specifically, 

Alappat reasoned that “a general purpose computer in 

effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is 

programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to 

instructions from program software.”2 Id. The Alappat

court used this explanation to justify an expansive view of 

§ 101 under which nearly any algorithm was patentable 

so long as the claim was written to a computer loaded 

with the software. Id. (“[A] computer . . . is apparatus not 

mathematics.”). 

By way of WMS Gaming, the “special programming” 

language in Katz derives from Alappat’s legacy. After 

WMS Gaming, a number of cases held means-plusfunction claims indefinite for failure to disclose a sufficient algorithm. See, e.g., Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Net 

MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., 523 F.3d 1323, 

1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1338. 

For the “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing” claim 

terms, Katz distinguished those cases using WMS Gaming’s vocabulary, which culminated in Katz’s “special 

programming” phrase: 

Those cases involved specific functions that would 

need to be implemented by programming a general purpose computer to convert it into a special 

purpose computer capable of performing those 

2 Building on Alappat, WMS Gaming reasoned that 

“[t]he instructions of the software program that carry out 

the algorithm electrically change the general purpose 

computer by creating electrical paths within the device. 

These electrical paths create a special purpose machine 

for carrying out the particular algorithm.” WMS Gaming, 

184 F.3d at 1348.

 

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specified functions. See, e.g., Aristocrat, 521 F.3d 

at 1333–34; Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 

F.3d 1241, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005); WMS Gaming, 

184 F.3d at 1349. By contrast, in the seven claims 

identified above, Katz has not claimed a specific 

function performed by a special purpose computer, 

but has simply recited the claimed functions of 

“processing,” “receiving,” and “storing.” Absent a 

possible narrower construction of the terms “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing,” discussed below, those functions can be achieved by any 

general purpose computer without special programming.

Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316.

Taken in context, then, “special programming” does 

not denote a level of complexity. On this point, the district court erred in holding that “special programming” 

does not encompass commercially available off-the-shelf 

software. To the contrary, and as originally described in 

Katz, “special programming” includes any functionality 

that is not “coextensive” with a microprocessor or general 

purpose computer. Id. In other words—to use the language of Alappat—the general purpose computer becomes 

a special purpose computer when loaded with the special 

programming, so a general purpose computer or microprocessor no longer lends sufficient structure to the claim. 

Therefore, as is plain from this review, the Katz exception 

is a necessary corollary to the general rule stated in WMS 

Gaming and further elaborated in Aristocrat and other 

later cases. A microprocessor or general purpose computer lends sufficient structure only to basic functions of a 

microprocessor. All other computer-implemented functions require disclosure of an algorithm.

Before moving on, we note that Alappat has been superseded by Bilski, 561 U.S. at 605–06, and Alice Corp. v. 

CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Nonetheless, 

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WMS Gaming and Katz remain correctly decided. WMS 

Gaming and Katz are consistent with recent Supreme 

Court precedent, including Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., which warned against “diminish[ing] the 

definiteness requirement’s public-notice function and 

foster[ing] the innovation-discouraging zone of uncertainty against which this Court has warned.” 134 S. Ct. 2120, 

2130 (2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The disclosure of structure under § 112 ¶ 6 

serves the “purpose of limiting the scope of the claim to 

the particular structure disclosed, together with equivalents.” Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1336. A general purpose 

computer is flexible—it can do anything it is programmed 

to do. Id. at 1333. Therefore, the disclosure of a general 

purpose computer or a microprocessor as corresponding 

structure for a software function does nothing to limit the 

scope of the claim and “avoid pure functional claiming.” 

Id. As such, when a patentee invokes means-plusfunction claiming to recite a software function, it accedes 

to the reciprocal obligation of disclosing a sufficient algorithm as corresponding structure.

B. Role of the Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art

EON also argues that a microprocessor can serve as 

sufficient structure for a software function if a person of 

ordinary skill in the art could implement the software 

function. This argument is meritless. In fact, we have

repeatedly and unequivocally rejected this argument: a 

person of ordinary skill in the art plays no role whatsoever in determining whether an algorithm must be disclosed 

as structure for a functional claim element. See Noah 

Sys. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 

Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1385; Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 

1337. 

To elaborate, “our case law regarding special purpose 

computer-implemented means-plus-functions claims is 

divided into two distinct groups: First, cases in which the 

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3

specification discloses no algorithm; and second, cases in 

which the specification does disclose an algorithm but a 

defendant contends that disclosure is inadequate.” Noah, 

675 F.3d at 1313. Where the specification discloses no 

algorithm, the skilled artisan’s knowledge is irrelevant. 

Id. (citing Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337). Where the specification discloses an algorithm that the accused infringer 

contends is inadequate, we judge the disclosure’s sufficiency based on the skilled artisan’s perspective. Id.

(citing Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337; AllVoice Computing 

PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1245 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007)). The parties agree that the ’757 patent’s 

specification discloses no algorithms, so this case falls in 

the first category, in which the skilled artisan’s 

knowledge is irrelevant.

EON’s argument, identical to many we have previously rejected, “conflates the definiteness requirement of 

section 112, paragraphs 2 and 6, and the enablement 

requirement of section 112, paragraph 1.” Blackboard, 

574 F.3d at 1385. “Enablement of a device requires only 

the disclosure of sufficient information so that a person of 

ordinary skill in the art could make and use the device. A 

section 112 paragraph 6 disclosure, however, serves the 

very different purpose of limiting the scope of the claim to 

the particular structure disclosed, together with equivalents.” Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1336. Accordingly, “[t]he 

question before us is whether the specification contains a 

sufficiently precise description of the ‘corresponding 

structure’ to satisfy section 112, paragraph 6, not whether 

a person of skill in the art could devise some means to 

carry out the recited function.” Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 

1385. 

C. Application of the Algorithm Requirement to this Case

In light of the foregoing discussion, resolution of this 

case is straightforward. The district court made explicit 

factual findings, based on expert testimony, that each of 

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14 EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC

the eight claim terms at issue recited complicated, customized computer software. We see no clear error in any 

of the district court’s factual findings, nor any error in the 

district court’s ultimate conclusion of indefiniteness. 

Significantly, EON does not contend on appeal that 

the terms at issue recite functions that are coextensive 

with a microprocessor. EON also does not differentiate 

between any of the claim terms in its argument. In fact, 

EON cites to testimony from its expert that a person 

skilled in the art would need to consult algorithms outside 

the specification to implement the claimed functions. 

Similarly, based on expert testimony, the district court

found that “special code would have to be written in order 

to accomplish the claimed functionality.” EON Corp. IP 

Holdings, LLC v. FLO TV Inc., No. CV 10-812-RGA, 2014 

WL 906182, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2014). As discussed 

above, this finding proves more than is necessary, as the 

defendants must only show by clear and convincing 

evidence that the terms at issue do not recite basic functions of a microprocessor. Therefore, the ’757 patent’s 

disclosure of a microprocessor does not lend sufficient 

structure to the means-plus-function terms at issue, and 

the ’757 patent’s claims are indefinite.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment of invalidity. All claims of the ’757 

patent are invalid for indefiniteness. 

AFFIRMED

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