Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03111/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03111-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Henry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 11, 2014 Decided July 22, 2014 

No. 12-3111 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

ROBERT HENRY, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:12-cr-00180-1) 

Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was 

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

Katherine M. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, 

Chrisellen R. Kolb, and Julieanne Himelstein, Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys. 

Before: KAVANAUGH and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

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PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Robert Henry was arrested and 

charged with two sex offenses. In exchange for his guilty 

plea on both counts, the government promised that the 

prosecutor would inform the Departure Guideline Committee 

of the United States Attorney’s Office about the nature and 

extent of Henry’s cooperation, and, if the Committee 

approved a downward departure motion, that the prosecutor 

would file such a motion with the district court. Henry had in 

fact promptly cooperated with authorities, and as a result of 

his cooperation, two other men were investigated and 

prosecuted for child pornography offenses. The prosecutor so 

informed the Departure Committee, but the Committee 

nonetheless declined to authorize a motion requesting that the 

district court depart from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

based on substantial assistance under Guideline section 

5K1.1. 

At his sentencing hearing and now on appeal, Henry 

asserts that the government breached the plea agreement by 

failing to tell the Departure Committee the complete “nature 

and extent” of his cooperation. In the alternative, Henry 

argues that the district court failed to explore adequately the 

government’s reasons for declining to file a departure motion. 

Because Henry identifies no difference between the 

information he concedes the prosecutor provided to the 

Departure Committee and what he believes the prosecutor 

should have provided, and because the prosecutor 

summarized for the district court both the information that the 

prosecutor presented to the Committee and the Committee’s 

basis for declining to approve the departure motion, we 

affirm. 

 

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I 

Henry was arrested in May 2012 and charged with one 

count of persuading or coercing an individual to travel to 

engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged 

with a criminal offense, and one count of possession of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(a) and 

2252A(a)(5)(B), respectively. As Henry’s counsel described, 

those charges stemmed “from Mr. Henry’s use of the internet 

to engage in conversations with a person (an undercover 

police officer) purporting to have sex with his twelve year old 

daughter.” Def.’s Sentencing Mem. at 1 (Nov. 29, 2012). 

Specifically, “[f]or approximately three weeks, Mr. Henry and 

the undercover officer engaged in conversations and Mr. 

Henry ultimately agreed to meet the [undercover officer] and 

his daughter” with the purpose of allowing Henry to have 

sexual relations with her. Id. Henry was arrested when he 

went to meet the undercover officer and the officer’s 

purported daughter. He admitted to the police that he had 

videos of child pornography on his cell phone, a search of 

which recovered a number of such videos. 

In early September 2012, Henry executed an agreement 

with the government, pleading guilty to both counts charged. 

As relevant here, the government undertook the following 

obligations in the plea agreement: 

This Office will inform the Departure Guideline 

Committee of the United States Attorney’s Office for 

the District of Columbia about the nature and extent of 

your client’s cooperation.[1] If the Departure 

 

1

 In the District of Columbia, a committee at the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office, rather than the individual prosecutor in charge of a case, 

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Guideline Committee of the United States Attorney’s 

Office for the District of Columbia, after evaluating 

the full nature and extent of your client’s cooperation, 

determines that your client has provided substantial 

assistance, then this Office will file a departure motion 

pursuant to Section 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 

In the event this Office, in its sole discretion, decides 

to file a departure motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 

and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), your client will be afforded 

an opportunity to persuade the Court that he should be 

sentenced to a lesser period of incarceration than 

otherwise required by either the Sentencing Guidelines 

or any applicable mandatory minimum sentence 

established by statute. However, notwithstanding a 

determination by the Departure Guideline Committee 

of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District 

of Columbia that your client has provided substantial 

assistance, in the event your client should fail to 

specifically perform and fulfill completely each and 

every one of your client’s obligations under this plea 

agreement, then, the Government will be free from its 

obligations under the agreement, including but not 

limited to its obligations to file a departure motion 

pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing 

Guidelines and/or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 

Plea Agreement at 12 (Sept. 7, 2012). 

Henry had promptly cooperated with authorities, and, as 

a result of his cooperation, two other men were investigated 

and prosecuted for child pornography offenses. Before 

sentencing, the government filed a proffer with the district 

 

decides whether to file a substantial assistance motion. See In re 

Sealed Case, 244 F.3d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

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court outlining Henry’s cooperation. It stated that “[a]lmost 

immediately” Henry assisted authorities by going online to 

talk with targets from whom Henry had received child 

pornography. Cooperation Proffer at 1 (Dec. 5, 2012). Henry 

introduced one named target to an undercover officer. That 

target sent child pornography to the officer, was arrested, and 

pled guilty to one count of distribution of child pornography 

in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 

1-2. The proffer also stated that Henry had facilitated the 

identification and investigation of a second target, who had a 

prior conviction for child pornography, was a registered sex 

offender, and was “being prosecuted” but that “[a]t the time 

of this writing . . . it is unknown what disposition of that case, 

if any, has occurred.” Id. at 1. 

At some point before the signing of the plea agreement, 

the prosecutor asked Henry whether he had had any hands-on 

sexual contact with children, which Henry denied. But that 

was unfortunately not the case. In November 2011—before 

he was arrested in this case—Henry, then 22, had traveled 

from the District of Columbia to Prince George’s County, 

Maryland and had sex with a 13-year-old girl he met on 

Facebook. When Maryland officials later interviewed Henry 

about the incident, he confessed that he had had sex with the 

girl, but protested that he thought she was close to 15 years 

old at the time. Maryland officials filed a detainer for second 

degree rape of a minor in mid-July of 2012, after Henry’s 

arrest in this case and the drafting, but not the signing, of the 

plea agreement. 

The government ultimately declined to file a departure 

motion in this case for substantial assistance under section 

5K1.1 of the Guidelines.2

 The prosecutor explained to the 

 

2

 That section provides in relevant part: 

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district court that the government refused to do so because of 

Henry’s false statement about his prior hands-on sexual 

contact with minors. See Gov’t Sentencing Mem. at 3-4 & 

n.4 (Nov. 30, 2012); Sentencing Tr. 38 (Dec. 13, 2012). 

At sentencing, the district court rejected, among other 

things, Henry’s contention that the government had breached 

the plea agreement by failing to give the Departure 

Committee more detailed information about the progress in 

the prosecution of the second defendant. Sentencing Tr. 47-

49. The government did not argue and the court did not hold 

that Henry breached the agreement. The district court 

emphasized Henry’s pattern of sexually dangerous behavior 

towards young girls and sentenced Henry to 135 months’ 

imprisonment on the persuading or coercing to travel count, 

the lowest end of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, 

to run concurrently with 120 months on the possession of 

child pornography count, the statutory maximum. Id. at 54-

63. 

This appeal followed. 

 

 

Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant 

has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or 

prosecution of another person who has committed an 

offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. 

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. 

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II 

It has long been the law that, “when a plea rests in any 

significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement 

or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello 

v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); see also United States 

v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“When a 

prosecutor secures a plea with a promise, the promise must be 

fulfilled.”); United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 361 (D.C. 

Cir. 1991). “In other words, a plea agreement is a contract.” 

Jones, 58 F.3d at 691. 

While “[e]ven in the absence of any contractual 

arrangement, the Government’s decision not to file a section 

5K1.1 motion, like any other prosecutorial decision, is subject 

to constitutional limitations,” plea agreements “provide[] 

additional protection” for defendants. Jones, 58 F.3d at 692. 

The bargained-for promises are bolstered by an implied 

obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Id. Where the 

government breaches a plea agreement, remand for specific 

performance of the agreement or withdrawal of the guilty plea 

may be warranted. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63. 

In interpreting the terms of a plea agreement, we look to 

principles of contract law. United States v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26, 

35 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Jones, 58 F.3d at 691. In evaluating 

whether a plea agreement has been breached, we look to the 

reasonable understanding of the parties and construe any 

ambiguities in the agreement against the government. In re 

Sealed Case, 702 F.3d 59, 63 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United 

States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 1996). We 

interpret the terms of a plea agreement de novo, United States 

v. Gary, 291 F.3d 30, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Jones, 58 F.3d at 

691, and review the district court’s factual determinations for 

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clear error, Ahn, 231 F.3d at 35. As the defendant, Henry 

maintains the burden of proving any breach by the 

government. Id. at 36; United States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 

684 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

Henry contends that the government breached the plea 

agreement by failing to inform the Departure Committee of 

the full “nature and extent” of his cooperation, as required by 

the terms of the plea agreement and the implied obligations of 

good faith and fair dealing. Specifically, he asserts, based on 

the proffer filed with the district court, that the government 

“did not explain that the defendant in Illinois who Mr. Henry 

had helped apprehend was not merely a target, but was 

scheduled for trial, and would possibly plead guilty.” 

Appellant’s Br. 16. Henry reasons that if the prosecution 

informed the Departure Committee of only as much as was 

contained in the proffer, it omitted to tell the Committee “that 

Mr. Henry’s assistance had led to concrete results, and not 

simply speculative possibilities of prosecution” and thereby 

breached the plea agreement. Id. 

The district court evidently concluded that Henry’s false 

statement about the Maryland case mooted any contention 

that the government breached the plea agreement—in essence 

finding that given Henry’s lie, any governmental breach was 

immaterial. Sentencing Tr. 48. We agree with the district 

court’s result, but for a different reason.3

 We conclude that 

the government did not fail to provide the Departure 

Committee with the full nature and extent of Henry’s 

cooperation as required by the agreement. 

 

3

 The government did not rely on the district court’s analysis on 

appeal. See Oral Arg. Rec. 16:25-16:55, 20:40-22:10.

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Whether the government violated its plea commitment 

turns on what information it gave to the Departure 

Committee. Because the government has not provided a full 

accounting—to Henry, the district court, or this court—of 

what it in fact provided to the Departure Committee, we have 

but a slim record on which to rely, as the government 

acknowledged at argument. Oral Arg. Rec. 12:20-12:35. We 

have previously expressed concern over the government’s 

lack of transparency in similar circumstances, explaining: 

Because a defendant is not privy to the deliberations 

and actions of the U.S. Attorney’s Office . . . a 

defendant will face enormous difficulty in supporting 

[an allegation that the government acted in bad faith in 

carrying out its obligations under a plea agreement]. 

To ameliorate this problem and to provide both the 

trial judge and a reviewing court with information that 

might help them weigh an allegation of bad faith, we 

suggest that prosecutors who enter into agreements 

like the one before us, but subsequently fail to file a 

section 5K1.1 motion, summarize for the district court 

what information they provided the Departure 

Committee, while at the same time safeguarding 

information that could compromise an ongoing 

investigation or endanger the defendant or others, 

together with any explanation, similarly 

circumscribed, that the Committee may have offered 

for finding the defendant’s assistance to be 

insubstantial. 

Jones, 58 F.3d at 692. It is unclear how meaningful judicial 

review can occur where the government fails to adhere to 

such procedures. See Oral Arg. Rec. 22:25-24:00 

(government attorney acknowledging that, were the 

prosecution not to be guided by Jones, “at a practical level, it 

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may be quite difficult” for a defendant to bring a claim of 

breach, raising a “perplexing problem” regarding judicial 

review). But because the parties here agree that the 

government provided the Departure Committee with at least 

the information that was included in the cooperation proffer 

later filed with the district court, we assume as much. 

With regard to the Illinois defendant, the proffer stated: 

Almost immediately, under the supervision of the 

[undercover officer], the defendant agreed to go online to talk to targets [from] whom the defendant had 

received child pornography. During the course of 

those sessions and other sessions where the 

[undercover officer] took over the defendant’s 

identity, the target sent several images of child 

pornography to D.C. Further investigation revealed 

that this defendant had a prior conviction for child 

pornography, and was a registered sex offender. The 

[undercover officer] sent a “lead” to the state where 

the defendant sent the [child pornography], and 

according to the [undercover officer] that target is 

being prosecuted. At the time of this writing; 

however, it is unknown what disposition of that case, 

if any, has occurred. 

Cooperation Proffer at 1. 

Henry’s argument is subtle. He does not contend that the 

prosecutor omitted any particular cooperative action that he 

took, such as testifying at another defendant’s trial or 

identifying an additional offender. Nor does he point to any 

concrete event in the criminal investigation or proceeding in 

Illinois—such as a trial, plea, or the identification of further 

evidence or testimony stemming from Henry’s cooperation—

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that might conceivably influence the Departure Committee’s 

evaluation of Henry’s cooperation and the fruits thereof. And 

Henry does not argue that the fact that the second target was 

being tried in Illinois, the only additional fact he identifies 

that was not in the proffer, could conceivably bear on the 

Committee’s evaluation of his cooperation. Instead, in his 

view, the Committee should have been informed that the 

second defendant was “pending trial” and “likely to plead.” 

Sentencing Tr. 45. But the proffer’s description of the results 

of Henry’s cooperation—that the target is a registered sex 

offender with a prior child pornography conviction who was 

“being prosecuted”—means the same thing. Henry has not 

shown in this case that “pending trial,” or even being “likely 

to plead,” is meaningfully different from “being prosecuted.” 

Because we see no daylight between the information 

contained in the proffer and what Henry argues should have 

been disclosed, we conclude that the government did not 

breach its plea obligations. 

In the alternative, relying on Jones, Henry asserts that the 

district court failed to explore adequately the government’s 

reasons for declining to file a departure motion. In Jones, we 

stated that “prosecutors who enter into agreements like the 

one before us, but subsequently fail to file a section 5K1.1 

motion, [should] summarize for the district court what 

information they provided the Departure Committee,” 

“together with any explanation” the Committee offered for 

declining to approve a departure motion. Jones, 58 F.3d at 

692; see also In re Sealed Case, 244 F.3d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 

2001). Whether that statement is a mandate or a suggestion, 

the government satisfied Jones’s procedures here. As Henry 

concedes, the government filed a cooperation proffer with the 

district court that summarized the information the prosecutor 

provided to the Committee. At sentencing, the prosecutor 

explained to the district court the Departure Committee’s 

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basis for declining to approve the departure motion: Henry’s 

untruthfulness about his past sexual contact with minors. 

Sentencing Tr. 38-39. The prosecutor thus provided both a 

summary of the information she provided to the Committee 

and the explanation the Committee offered for declining to 

approve the departure motion. Jones requires no more. 

We therefore affirm. 

So Ordered. 

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