Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-06-02228/USCOURTS-ca10-06-02228-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Javier Avalos
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

October 23, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAVIER AVALOS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 06-2228

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

(D. Ct. No. 04-CR-1456 JH)

Arnold J. Hanuman, Broomfield, Colorado, appearing for Defendant-Appellant.

James R.W. Braun, Assistant United States Attorney (Larry Gomez, Acting

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States

Attorney for the District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, appearing

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Javier Avalos of distribution of five

grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(B). The District Court sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment. He

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appeals both his conviction and his sentence. We exercise jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM. 

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2004, Special Agent James Harley of the Drug Enforcement

Administration was working with a cooperating defendant, Elmer Hayes. Based

on information provided by Mr. Hayes, Agent Harley instructed him to make

contact with Mr. Avalos to arrange a drug transaction. On March 10, while at

New Mexico State Police Headquarters, and while in the presence of Agent

Harley, Mr. Hayes purportedly placed a call to Mr. Avalos’s pager. Mr. Hayes

received a return call, and he arranged to buy an ounce of methamphetamine for

$1250 from the caller. They agreed to meet at a 7-11 in Farmington, New

Mexico, to complete the transaction. 

Just prior to the scheduled deal, Agent Harley drove to the 7-11 with

another officer, Agent Shane Skinner, to set up surveillance. When they arrived,

Agent Harley observed a man wearing a white bandana and leaning up against the

door of a white Oldsmobile. Agent Skinner testified that he recognized the man

and told Agent Harley that it was Javier Avalos. 

Later, Mr. Hayes, who had previously been searched for money and drugs,

arrived at the 7-11 wearing a transmitting device that was being monitored by

Agents Harley and Skinner. He was accompanied by Agent Gary Chavez posing

as his friend. Mr. Hayes approached the white Oldsmobile while Agent Chavez

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remained in the car about fifteen feet away. Agent Chavez testified that, at that

time, the person in the Oldsmobile was sitting low in the driver’s seat and that

Agent Chavez could not see him. Mr. Hayes exchanged $1250 for a plastic bag

containing methamphetamine through the driver’s side window. Agent Chavez

testified that, when the exchange took place, the man rose up in his seat and

Agent Chavez was able to identify the man as Mr. Avalos. 

Mr. Avalos was arrested on June 28, 2004. After he was advised of his

Miranda rights, he waived those rights and agreed to speak with Agent Harley. 

He admitted that he had sold drugs in Farmington, but said he could not

remember the specific deal on March 10, 2004. 

On July 27, 2004, a grand jury indicted Mr. Avalos on one count of

distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). At trial, Agents Skinner and Chavez, as well as Mr.

Hayes, identified Mr. Avalos as the person in the Oldsmobile. Mr. Avalos,

however, put on an alibi defense. Jessica Chavez, with whom Mr. Avalos had an

intimate relationship during the relevant time period, testified in his behalf. She

testified that she was with Mr. Avalos on March 10 and that he did not go to the

7-11 that day. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court sentenced

Mr. Avalos to 262 months’ imprisonment after concluding that he was a “career

offender” as that term is used in § 4B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”). 

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Mr. Avalos timely appeals both his conviction and his sentence. He argues

that (1) the District Court erred in admitting into evidence Mr. Avalos’s statement

regarding his prior drug trafficking activities; (2) the District Court committed

reversible error when it failed to sequester witnesses after Mr. Avalos made a

proper request; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (4)

the District Court erred in adopting facts contained in the presentence report

(“PSR”) without first holding an evidentiary hearing; and (5) the District Court

erred in applying the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Admissibility of Mr. Avalos’s Statement Regarding Prior Drug Deals

Prior to trial, the Government notified Mr. Avalos by letter that it intended

to introduce his statement to Agent Harley that he had sold drugs in Farmington,

but could not remember the specific deal on March 10, 2004. The Government

considered the statement “part of the res gestae of, and . . . inextricably

intertwined with, the charged offense.” The Government also explained,

however, that if the District Court considered the statement other-act evidence

under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), the letter would serve as notice of the Government’s

intent to introduce the statement under that rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)

(requiring the prosecution to provide advance notice of intent to introduce

statements under the rule). After a brief hearing on the matter, the District Court

ruled that the statement was admissible under Rule 404(b), but did not indicate

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The Government also suggests that no Rule 404(b) analysis is necessary 1

because Mr. Avalos’s statement is an admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and that

we can affirm on this basis. To the contrary, an admission that falls within the

scope of Rule 404(b) must be separately analyzed under that rule. See United

States v. Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1418 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Although the statements

are party admissions under Rule 801(d) and thus not hearsay, they must

nevertheless also be analyzed for admissibility under Rule 404(b) because they

reveal or suggest prior criminal conduct.”); United States v. Maden, 114 F.3d 155,

156 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that defendant’s admission must be analyzed under

both Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and Rule 404(b)); see also United States v. Simpson, 479

F.3d 492, 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (same, citing Oberle). 

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the reason why. On appeal, Mr. Avalos argues that the evidence was admitted in

error for two reasons: first, he maintains that it was improper propensity evidence

under Rule 404(b); second, he contends that it was inadmissible because the court

did not first hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he validly waived

his Miranda rights before making the statement.

1. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)

The Government first argues that, even though the District Court admitted

the statement as other-act evidence under Rule 404(b), we can affirm on the

ground that the statement constitutes direct evidence of the crime charged. See

United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 831 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Direct evidence or

intrinsic evidence of the crime charged does not fall within the ambit of the

rule.”). In the alternative, the Government contends that the statement was

admissible as other-act evidence because it falls within one of the exceptions

specified in Rule 404(b). For his part, Mr. Avalos contends that the statement 1

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was not admissible under any reading of the Rules of Evidence. 

 We conclude that, even if the District Court erred in admitting the

statement, such error was harmless given the weight of the Government’s case

against Mr. Avalos. See United States v. Bornfield, 145 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th

Cir. 1998) (“An erroneous admission of evidence is harmless unless it had a

substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it

had such effect.” (quotation marks omitted)). Three witnesses testified that it

was Mr. Avalos who distributed the methamphetamine. Agent Skinner could

identify Mr. Avalos because he knew Mr. Avalos before the events giving rise to

the instant offense. Agent Chavez observed the transaction and identified Mr.

Avalos as the perpetrator in court. Finally, Mr. Hayes testified that he had known

Mr. Avalos since middle school. He further testified that, when he began

cooperating with the police, he contacted Mr. Avalos to set up a drug deal, and it

was Mr. Avalos who arrived at the 7-11 and sold him the drugs. 

In contrast, Mr. Avalos presented one witness, Jessica Chavez, to testify as

to his whereabouts on March 10. Jessica Chavez was Mr. Avalos’s girlfriend on

March 10, 2004. She testified that Mr. Avalos was with her that day and that they

never went to the 7-11. She further testified that she first learned about the nature

of the charge against Mr. Avalos approximately one month before trial, in

December 2005, when a defense investigator contacted her to ask about her

relationship with Mr. Avalos. When defense counsel asked her how she could

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remember where she was on a specific day more than a year and a half earlier, she

responded: 

Because it happened – well, I do remember the incident or whatever

because, well, I remember – let’s see, how can I tell you? I

remember because, well, I was with him at that time and I, I just, I

know – Can you like rephrase your question or ask me a more

specific question?

When defense counsel asked the question again, she responded that she

remembered it was March 10, 2004, because Mr. Avalos had wired money in Ms.

Chavez’s name and she went with him to pick it up. In light of the substantial

evidence establishing Mr. Avalos’s identity as the perpetrator, and in light of the

dubious credibility of Mr. Avalos’s alibi witness, we are convinced that any

erroneously admitted testimony did not have a substantial effect on the outcome

of the trial.

2. Evidentiary hearing on waiver of Miranda rights

Mr. Avalos also seeks a reversal of his conviction because the District

Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Mr. Avalos

validly waived his Miranda rights before making the statement. Mr. Avalos did

not raise this Miranda issue before the District Court and did not request an

evidentiary hearing on the matter. Because Mr. Avalos did not raise the issue

below, he has waived it. See United States v. Miller, 987 F.2d 1462, 1464 (10th

Cir. 1993) (failure to bring a pretrial motion to suppress a confession as

involuntary waives the issue; the district court is under no duty to hold an

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In some cases, rather than declining to consider the issue altogether, we 2

have applied plain-error review to unraised suppression claims. See Brooks, 438

F.3d at 1240 n.4 (citing United States v. Meraz-Peru, 24 F.3d 1197, 1198 (10th

Cir.1994) and United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir.1991)). But

Mr. Avalos alleges no facts that would lead us to conclude the District Court

plainly erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.

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evidentiary hearing when the issue is not timely raised); see also United States v.

Brooks, 438 F.3d 1231, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to address on appeal

defendant’s contention that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment should have been suppressed when issue was not raised below);

United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1005 (6th Cir. 1994) (declining to address

on appeal defendant’s contention that his confession was involuntary when issue

was not raised below).2

B. Sequestration of Witnesses

Federal Rule of Evidence 615 provides:

At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so

that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may

make the order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize

exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or

employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its

representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is

shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's

cause, or (4) a person authorized by statute to be present.

Fed. R. Evid. 615.

Agent Harley was the first witness for both the Government and Mr.

Avalos. After he testified in the Government’s case-in-chief, he remained in the

courtroom at the request of counsel for Mr. Avalos, and the Government called

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Agent Skinner to the stand. During Agent Skinner’s testimony, defense counsel

sought to invoke Rule 615. Specifically, counsel for Mr. Avalos approached the

bench and said: “Judge, I wasn’t sure if that gentleman in the back was a witness

or not. If he is, we are invoking the rule.” The Government stated that the

individual was not a witness, but the court invoked the rule anyway by stating: 

“The rul[e] will be invoked. If you all could please keep an eye out for any

witnesses.” The court did not, however, issue an instruction or otherwise order

potential witnesses from the courtroom, which we have held is required:

A failure to instruct the witnesses fully after the Rule is invoked may

cause reversal. The witnesses should be clearly directed, when the

Rule is invoked, that they must all leave the courtroom (with the

exceptions the Rule permits), and that they are not to discuss the case

or what their testimony has been or would be or what occurs in the

courtroom with anyone other than counsel for either side. 

United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 485 (10th Cir. 1986). 

As a result, Agent Harley remained in the courtroom while Agent Skinner

continued to testify about his surveillance of the methamphetamine transaction. 

During this testimony, Agent Skinner said that he told Agent Harley that the

individual they saw on the day in question was Mr. Avalos. Later, Mr. Avalos

called Agent Harley to testify as a rebuttal witness, and Agent Harley confirmed

Agent Skinner’s testimony regarding this statement on cross-examination by the

Government. 

Mr. Avalos now argues that his conviction should be reversed because the

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District Court did not instruct Agent Harley to leave the courtroom after Rule 615

was invoked, thereby impermissibly permitting him to hear Agent Skinner’s

testimony in advance of Agent Harley’s own testimony as a rebuttal witness for

Mr. Avalos. Because Mr. Avalos did not timely object at trial, we review only for

plain error. See United States v. Sinks, 473 F.3d 1315, 1322 (10th Cir. 2007).

Under Rule 615(2), a court need not exclude “an officer or employee of a

party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its

attorney.” Fed. R. Evid. 615(2). Every circuit to confront the issue has held that

the government’s designated case agent in a criminal case falls within this

exception. See United States v. Charles, 456 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir. 2006);

United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Pulley,

922 F.2d 1283, 1285 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129,

1138 (3rd Cir. 1990); United States v. Adamo, 882 F.2d 1218, 1235 (7th Cir.

1989); United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 773 (4th Cir. 1983); United States

v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d

1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980). We now join these circuits and hold that the

government may designate a case agent responsible for an investigation as its

representative under Rule 615(2). Consequently, the court need not instruct the

designated case agent to leave the courtroom, even though that agent may also be

a witness. 

Mr. Avalos does not dispute that a case agent falls within this exception to

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Although the Government did not designate Agent Harley as its Rule 3

615(2) representative on the record, it is clear in this case that the court, as well

as counsel for Mr. Avalos, treated him as such. During Agent Harley’s testimony,

Mr. Avalos’s counsel elicited responses that Agent Harley was “the case agent in

this case” and that he was the “supervisor directing other persons in the case.” 

Furthermore, the record shows that Mr. Avalos’s counsel was concerned not about

Agent Harley’s presence in the courtroom, but about the presence of other

potential witnesses, indicating his understanding of the general rule that a case

agent may serve as the government’s representative under Rule 615(2) and may

remain in the courtroom. Nevertheless, because the Government did not

designate Agent Harley as its representative on the record, the District Court was

under an obligation to instruct him to leave. We so hold in order to speak clearly

on the proper procedure once Rule 615 is invoked. 

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the rule. Rather, he argues that the Government never designated Agent Harley as

its representative, and therefore, the District court erred by allowing him to

remain in the courtroom. Generally, the government must formally designate its

Rule 615(2) representative on the record at the time the defendant moves to

sequester witnesses. Cueto, 611 F.2d at 1061. Because the Government did not

do so, the District Court erred in failing to instruct Agent Harley to leave the

courtroom. But the court’s error in this case does not warrant a reversal of Mr. 3

Avalos’s conviction because it did not affect Mr. Avalos’s substantial rights as

required by the third prong of plain-error review. Sinks, 473 F.3d at 1322. 

Mr. Avalos must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the third

prong of plain-error review. See United States v. Atencio, 435 F.3d 1222, 1231

(10th Cir. 2006). This standard requires the defendant to show “a reasonable

probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 818 (10th Cir. 2005)

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Mr. Avalos suggests that there might have been other witnesses in the 4

courtroom besides Agent Harley who were not ordered to leave. But even if the

court erred in not instructing these witnesses to leave, Mr. Avalos has not shown

how this error affected his substantial rights under the third prong of plain-error

review. See Atencio, 435 F.3d at 1231. 

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(quotation omitted). As discussed above, the strength of the Government’s case

against Mr. Avalos was overwhelming. Three witnesses unequivocally testified

that Mr. Avalos was the man who distributed the drugs to Mr. Hayes. The jury

obviously credited this testimony. We conclude that Agent Harley’s testimony

confirming that Agent Skinner told him at the scene that they were looking at Mr.

Avalos had no effect on the outcome of trial. 

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C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d

1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007). “Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction

if . . . a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We will reverse a conviction only if

no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

According to Mr. Avalos, the Government did not meet its burden to prove

that he was the person who sold the methamphetamine to Mr. Hayes. As

discussed above, however, the Government introduced overwhelming evidence of

Mr. Avalos’s guilt at trial.

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Mr. Avalos also suggests that the jury was required to make an explicit

finding as to the quantity of methamphetamine involved. He cites no authority

for such a proposition, and we are aware of none. Rather, the jury instructions

required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Avalos distributed

five or more grams of methamphetamine. At trial, a forensic chemist for the Drug

Enforcement Agency testified that the amount of pure methamphetamine involved

in the transaction was 5.7 grams. This testimony is sufficient to support the

jury’s finding regarding the quantity of the drug. 

D. Sentencing

1. The District Court’s adoption of facts as stated in the PSR

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that the district court rule

on any disputed portion of the PSR or determine that a ruling is not necessary

either because the matter will not affect sentencing or because the district court

will not rely on it. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). The district court may, however,

accept any undisputed portion of the PSR as a finding of fact. Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(i)(3)(A). Mr. Avalos contends that the District Court failed to comply with

Rule 32(i)(3)(B) because it adopted the facts as stated in the PSR without making

any specific factual findings. We review de novo a district court’s compliance

with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Rodriguez-Delma,

456 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2006). 

To invoke the district court’s fact-finding obligation under Rule 32, “the

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defendant is required to make specific allegations of factual inaccuracy.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). In particular, a defendant must “make a showing that

the information in the PSR [is] unreliable and articulate the reasons why the facts

contained therein [are] untrue or inaccurate.” Id. (quotation omitted). Mr. Avalos

did not file any written objections to the PSR. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(1)

(requiring parties to serve written objections to PSR on opponent and probation

officer). At sentencing, the District Court asked Mr. Avalos’s counsel whether

“there [were] objections to the facts contained in the [PSR].” Counsel responded

that “our objections are just to the factual conclusions that lay out his guilt. But

other than that, no.” This generalized objection was not sufficient to satisfy Mr.

Avalos’s affirmative duty to show that a controverted matter exists. See

Rodriguez-Delma, 456 F.3d at 1254 (stating that an “object[ion] to the conclusion

in the PSR is not sufficient to imply that a controverted matter exists”). Because

Mr. Avalos failed to make any allegations of factual inaccuracy, the District

Court’s fact-finding obligation was never triggered. Accordingly, the court did

not err in adopting the facts as stated in the PSR. 

2. Application of the career offender enhancement

Finally, Mr. Avalos contends that the District Court erred in applying the

career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because, he maintains, one

of his predicate felonies—escape from jail—is not a “crime of violence.” To the

contrary, we have repeatedly held that escape is categorically a crime of violence

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because it “always constitutes conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.” See United States v. Patterson, 472 F.3d 767, 783

(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909, 915–16 (10th Cir. 2002)

(“Even though initial circumstances of an escape may be non-violent, there is no

way to predict what an escapee will do when encountered by the authorities.

Every escape is a powder keg, which may or may not explode into violence.”

(quotation omitted)); see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) cmt. n.1 (defining “crime of

violence” to include an offense that involves conduct that “present[s] a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another”). Mr. Avalos concedes in his reply

brief that Circuit precedent forecloses this argument and he seeks merely to

preserve the issue for further review. We acknowledge that he has done so.

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that Mr. Avalos was not prejudiced by any error in failing to

instruct potential witnesses to leave the courtroom. In addition, any error in

admitting evidence was harmless. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr. Avalos’s

conviction. Finally, we conclude that the District Court did not err in adopting

the facts as stated in the PSR and in concluding that Mr. Avalos’s prior

conviction for escape from prison is a “crime of violence.” We therefore

AFFIRM Mr. Avalos’s sentence.

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