Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00436/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00436-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delfino Gordillo-Porras
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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Because Gordillo-Porras did not file a direct appeal, he had no appellate counsel.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Delfino Gordillo-Porras, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CR 04-0436-PHX-SRB

CIV 04-2284-PHX-SRB (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Delfino Gordillo-Porras filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on February 28, 2005 (Doc. #23). He raises five grounds in his

motion: 1) that counsel was ineffective by failing to raise claims under Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) , and United

States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005); 2) that counsel was ineffective due to a

conflict of interest because he had too many clients; 3) that counsel was ineffective by failing

to claim that Gordillo-Porras' sentence was disparate in comparison with twenty others in his

group who received sentences of six or eight months; 4) that appellate counsel was

ineffective by failing to raise the foregoing issues;1

 and 5) that the Court should stay the

assessment because Gordillo-Porras is unable to pay $5.25 each month. The Government

contends that 1) Gordillo-Porras expressly waived his right to challenge his sentence in his

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plea agreement; 2) he has failed to establish ineffective assistance; and 3) his fifth claim is

precluded by his failure to raise it on direct appeal. Because the Court finds that GordilloPorras has waived his right to collaterally attack the length of his sentence, and the

ineffective assistance claims made in his motion do not implicate either the voluntariness of

the plea or the voluntariness of the waiver of the right to collaterally attack his sentence, it

recommends that Gordillo-Porras' motion be denied.

On April 27, 2004, Gordillo-Porras pleaded guilty to Re-entry after Deportation, a

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), enhanced by 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). On July 26, 2004, he

was sentenced to a term of 30 months, followed by two years of supervised release, and

ordered to pay a special assessment of $100. Because Gordillo-Porras' criminal history

included a conviction for drug trafficking for which the sentence exceeded thirteen months,

his offense level was 24, and a Category III criminal history. However, pursuant to the plea

agreement, the sentencing judge subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility and

four levels under the early disposition program, for an offense level of 17 with a criminal

history category of III, with a sentencing range of between 24 and 63 months (Doc. #14 at

3). The district court sentenced Gordillo-Porras to a 30-month term, at the lower end of the

sentencing range. As part of the plea agreement, Gordillo-Porras waived inter alia "any right

to collaterally attack [his] conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States Code,

Section 2255, or any other collateral attack," provided that the sentence imposed was

consistent with the agreement (Id. at 5).

The Government argues that Gordillo-Porras expressly waived his right to file a §

2255 petition as part of his plea agreement. Courts will generally enforce the plain language

of a plea agreement if it is clear and unambiguous on its face, United States v. Nunez, 223

F.3 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000), and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. United

States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). However, "a plea agreement does not

waive the right to bring a § 2255 motion unless it does so expressly." United States v. Pruitt,

32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, the Government concedes that the Ninth Circuit

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The Ninth Circuit recently held that other circuits' reasoning regarding the

unenforceability of § 2255 waivers with respect to an IAC claim that challenges the validity

of the waiver itself applies "with equal force" to § 2254 cases. See Washington v. Lampert,

 F.3d , 2005 WL 2126606 (9th Cir., September 6, 2005).

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has expressed doubt that a defendant, by entering into a plea agreement, could waive certain

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought pursuant to a § 2255 motion,

notwithstanding an express plea waiver that covered all of a defendant's waivable statutory

rights to file a petition pursuant to § 2255 challenging his conviction or sentence. However,

those claims which are not waivable are limited to ones either challenging the knowing and

voluntary nature of the plea agreement, or the voluntariness of the waiver itself. See United

States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156-57 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005), citing United States v. Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433.2

 None of Gordillo-Porras' ineffective assistance claims implicate either the

voluntariness of his waiver or of the agreement itself. Therefore, the Court recommends that

the unambiguous terms of the agreement be enforced and that Gordillo-Porras' motion be

denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Delfino Gordillo-Porras' Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence be DENIED (Doc. #23).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72,

6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

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determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

DATED this 12th day of September, 2005.

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