Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-03698/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-03698-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Newrez LLC dba Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
Plaintiff
Kimberly Ussery
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEWREZ LLC DBA SHELLPOINT 

MORTGAGE SERVICING,

Plaintiff,

v.

KIMBERLY USSERY,

Defendant.

No. 2:24-cv-03698-TLN-CSK

SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Kimberly Ussery’s (“Defendant”) 

Notice of Removal and Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) For the reasons 

set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as 

moot, and the Court hereby REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of California, County of 

San Joaquin, due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:24-cv-03698-TLN-CSK Document 3 Filed 01/10/25 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 26, 2024, Defendant filed a pro se Notice of Removal removing to the 

instant Court what appears to be an unlawful detainer action from the San Joaquin County 

Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant did not attach a state court complaint (“Complaint’) to

the Notice of Removal or indicate the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1-1.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is 

proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 

filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 

improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 

v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 

U.S. 974 (2005). 

Federal question jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The 

“presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 

rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 

the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. Federal 

question jurisdiction therefore cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim raising a federal question. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter 

v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009).

III. ANALYSIS

Although Defendant did not indicate the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, the Court 

presumes Defendant believes the basis to be federal question jurisdiction as the U.S. Government 

is not a party to this action and Defendant indicates she and Plaintiff are citizens of California 

Case 2:24-cv-03698-TLN-CSK Document 3 Filed 01/10/25 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

such that there is no diversity between the parties. (ECF No. 1-1.) However, to the extent 

Defendant believes the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction to be federal question, the Court cannot 

determine whether the action arises under federal law without the underlying Complaint. See 

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386 (“[F]ederal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”). Defendant refers to the 

state court action as being an unlawful detainer action. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Generally, 

such actions are grounded solely in state law. To the extent Defendant is arguing some aspect of 

that action is unconstitutional, such an argument likely relates to an affirmative defense or 

potential counterclaim, which cannot be considered in evaluating whether a federal question 

appears on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60–62. In any event, 

Defendant bears the burden of showing removal is proper. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. By failing 

to attach the Complaint, Defendant has not met her burden. 

As there are no apparent grounds for federal jurisdiction, it is appropriate to remand this 

case, sua sponte, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. 

v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (“the district court ha[s] a duty to 

establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action sua sponte, whether the parties 

raised the issue or not.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 

2) is DENIED as moot, and the Court hereby REMANDS this action to the San Joaquin County 

Superior Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 8, 2025

___________________________________

TROY L. NUNLEY

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:24-cv-03698-TLN-CSK Document 3 Filed 01/10/25 Page 3 of 3