Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03066/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03066-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. J. Kramer
Appointed Amicus Curiae for Appellant
Raymond J. Powell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 1998 Decided November 19, 1998

No. 98-3066

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Raymond J. Powell,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cr00173-01)

---------

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause as amicus curiae on behalf of appellant.

With her on the briefs was A. J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender, appointed by the court.

Raymond J. Powell, appearing pro se, was on the briefs for

appellant.

John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief was Wilma A. Lewis,

U.S. Attorney.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Williams and Ginsburg,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: Raymond J. Powell, a federal prisoner, has

requested that this court certify his second or successive

motion under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 to the District Court. After

consideration of Mr. Powell's motion, we have decided to stay

our hand regarding Mr. Powell's request, because it is clear

from the record that there are still issues regarding Mr.

Powell's first s 2255 motion remaining to be addressed by the

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District Court. Since it is clear that Mr. Powell can obtain all

the relief that he is due pursuant to his pending motions, we

will leave it to the District Court to address these claims.

Action by the District Court may make it unnecessary for this

court to consider the issues here on appeal.

On June 18, 1993, Mr. Powell filed his first s 2255 motion.

Subsequently, on September 20, 1993, Mr. Powell filed a

"Traverse to Respondent's Opposition for Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside, or Modify Sentence, Pursuant to 28 USC 2255" as

an addendum to his first s 2255 motion. Although the District Court denied Mr. Powell's first s 2255 motion by order

on January 3, 1994, it has never addressed the claim advanced in the Traverse that, under the holding of United

States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1993), it was

improper to use his state law conviction as a predicate offense

when enhancing his sentence. Thus, Mr. Powell points out

that the Price issue is still pending before the District Court.

Mr. Powell also alleges that, as to the matters other than the

Price issue, he never received the District Court's denial of

his first motion. Moreover, on March 23, 1998, Mr. Powell

filed a "Motion for Extraordinary Relief," seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. ss 1651 and 2241 with the District Court

arguing, inter alia, that his sentence was improper under

Price, because his D.C. conviction was for an inchoate offense,

the attempted distribution of PCP.

In short, there are significant questions pending before the

District Court regarding the application of Price to Mr.

Powell's sentence. Government counsel does not dispute the

pendency of these motions.

In Price, this court held that only offenses specified in 28

U.S.C. s 994(h) could count as predicate offenses. See 990

F.2d at 1369-70. Accordingly, it was improper to apply

career criminal enhancements to defendants convicted of

aiding and abetting, attempting, or conspiring to commit

those crimes. See id. at 1370. After this court's decision in

Price, the Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1

to include inchoate crimes. See U.S.S.G. s 4B1.1, comment.

(backg'd.) (Nov. 1998); United States v. Seals, 130 F.3d 451,

463 (D.C. Cir. 1997). However, because Powell was convicted

before 1995, it is undisputed that his conviction for an inchoate offense should not have been used to qualify him as a

career offender under s 4B1.1.

As was made clear at oral argument in this case, the

defendant is presently serving time beyond what is legally

permissible. Mr. Powell was sentenced to 262 months; yet,

under Price, Mr. Powell should have been sentenced to a

maximum of 78 months. Thus, because Mr. Powell has

served over 100 months in jail, he is now serving time far

beyond that which is lawfully required. Even the Government does not doubt that, under Price, Mr. Powell's position

is compelling. Because Mr. Powell is faced with the possibility of serving at least ten more years in prison, and he has

already served far more time than is legally required, we

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must afford the District Court the opportunity to address his

pending claims.

Finally, the parties acknowledge that Mr. Powell first cited

Price in his Traverse, and there sought relief based only on

one theory related to Price. However, because the District

Court has not yet ruled on the Traverse or on the Motion for

Extraordinary Relief, there is nothing preventing the trial

judge from considering any claims cognizable under Price.

In other words, in order to avoid a potential miscarriage of

justice, the District Court surely is free to allow defendant's

counsel to amplify Mr. Powell's original Price theory.

So ordered.

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