Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-01010/USCOURTS-caDC-09-01010-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Lake Carriers' Association
Petitioner
Nutech 03, Inc.
Amicus Curiae for Petitioner
State of Michigan
Amicus Curiae for Respondent
State of New York
Amicus Curiae for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2011 Decided July 22, 2011

No. 09-1001

LAKE CARRIERS' ASSOCIATION,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 09-1010, 09-1076, 09-1115

On Petitions for Review of a Final Action

of the Environmental Protection Agency

Barry M. Hartman argued the cause for petitioners. With

him on the briefs were Christopher R. Nestor and Shaun M.

Gehan. David E. Frulla entered an appearance.

Joel C. Mandelman was on the brief for amicus curiae

Nutech 03, Inc. in support of petitioners.

USCA Case #09-1010 Document #1320085 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 1 of 20
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Martin F. McDermott, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents.

Deborah A. Sivas, Allison LaPlante, Daniel P. Mensher,

and Thomas Cmar were on the brief for intervenors Northwest

Environmental Advocates, et al. in support of respondents.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the State of New York, Barbara D.

Underwood, Solicitor General, Monica B. Wagner, Assistant

Solicitor General, Lisa Burianek, Deputy Bureau Chief, Michael

Myers, Section Chief, Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the State of Michigan, John J. Bursch,

Solicitor General, and Robert P. Reichel, Assistant Attorney

General, were on the brief for amici curiae States of New York

and Michigan. 

Before: GARLAND and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

PER CURIAM: Trade associations representing commercial

ship owners and operators petition for review of a nationwide

permit issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

for the discharge of pollutants incidental to the normal operation

of vessels. The petitioners raise a number of procedural

challenges, all related to EPA’s decision to incorporate into the

permit conditions that states submitted to protect their own

water quality. Because we find that the petitioners have not

shown that the additional procedures they request would have

had any effect on the final permit, we deny the petition for

review.

USCA Case #09-1010 Document #1320085 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 2 of 20
3

I

Section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits

“the discharge of any pollutant by any person” into the waters of

the United States, except in compliance with the terms of the

Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Section 402(a) provides one way in

which such discharges may take place without violating the

CWA. Under that section, EPA may issue a National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit “for the

discharge of any pollutant . . . , notwithstanding section [301(a)]

. . . , upon condition that such discharge will meet . . . all

applicable requirements . . . of [the CWA].” Id. § 1342(a)(1). 

EPA regulations explain that permits may be individual

(covering discharges from a single source, 40 C.F.R. § 122.21),

or general (covering “one or more categories or subcategories of

discharges . . . within a geographic area,” id. § 122.28(a)). Each

permit must set out the specific conditions necessary to ensure

that the permit holder’s discharge of pollution will comply with

the water standards mandated by the CWA. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(a)(2). 

In conjunction with the permitting process, the CWA gives

states an express role in approving or barring discharges into

their navigable waters, and in setting out the conditions under

which such discharges may occur. Section 401 of the CWA

states that any applicant for a federal permit to conduct any

activity that “may result in any discharge into the navigable

waters, shall provide the . . . permitting agency a certification

from the State in which the discharge originates or will

originate . . . that any such discharge will comply with” national

and EPA-approved state water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1341(a). The state must also set forth in its certification “any

effluent limitations and other limitations . . . necessary to

assure” that the permit holder “will comply” with CWA

standards “and with any other appropriate requirement of State

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law.” Id. § 1341(d). These limitations “shall become a

condition” on any federal permit, id., and no “permit shall be

granted if certification has been denied,” id. § 1341(a).

 The CWA defines “discharge of a pollutant” as, inter alia,

“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any

point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). A “point source” includes

a “vessel or floating craft,” id. § 1362(14), and “pollutant” is

defined to include “sewage from vessels,” id. § 1362(6). Thus,

discharges from vessels are regulated by the permitting and

certification scheme set out above. 

Shortly after the CWA was enacted, EPA promulgated a

regulation exempting incidental vessel discharges from the

permitting (and therefore the certification) requirements of the

Act. Exempted discharges included “sewage from vessels,

effluent from properly functioning marine engines, laundry,

shower, and galley sink wastes, or any other discharge incidental

to the normal operation of a vessel.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a). The

regulation was in force for more than thirty years. Then, in

2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision

vacating the regulation, finding that EPA lacked authority to

exempt incidental vessel discharges. Northwest Envtl.

Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008). After a stay

to allow EPA time to implement a means of issuing permits for

vessel discharges, the regulation was finally vacated on

February 6, 2009. 

In response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, EPA developed

a general permit, pursuant to section 402 of the CWA, to cover

the incidental vessel discharges previously exempted by the

regulation. See Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (NPDES) General Permit for Discharges Incidental to

the Normal Operation of a Vessel, 73 Fed. Reg. 79,473 (Dec. 29,

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2008).1

 The agency estimated that the Vessel General Permit

(VGP) would cover discharges from approximately 61,000

domestic-flagged commercial vessels and 8,000 foreign-flagged

vessels. Id. at 79,481. And unlike the majority of permits

issued under section 402, which cover discharges originating in

only a single state, the VGP would cover discharges in

waterways throughout the United States. 

EPA published a draft VGP on June 17, 2008, and

established a 45-day comment period. Draft NPDES General

Permits for Discharges Incidental to the Normal Operation of a

Vessel, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,296 (June 17, 2008). The draft permit

set out all of the general EPA-mandated conditions for vessel

discharges, and indicated that the agency was seeking

certifications from each of the states pursuant to section 401. 

U.S.EPA, PROPOSED GENERAL PERMIT (2008),at 53 (J.A. 286);

see Draft NPDES General Permits, 73 Fed. Reg. at 34,302. The

draft permit did not, however, include any of the certification

conditions to be imposed by the states pursuant to section 401. 

73 Fed. Reg. at 34,302. 

EPA received more than 170 comments on the draft permit. 

Many suggested that, because state water standards differ, the

state certifications might result in conflicting conditions being

attached to the permit, thus unduly hindering vessels seeking to

remain in compliance as they move between the waters of

1

Also in response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Congress

passed two acts that exempted small boats and recreational and

commercial fishing vessels from the CWA’s permitting requirements. 

See Clean Boating Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-288, 122 Stat. 2650

(exempting recreational vessels); Permits for Discharges from Certain

Vessels, Pub. L. No. 110-299, 122 Stat. 2995 (2008) (granting a twoyear exemption for vessels less than 79 feet long and all commercial

fishing vessels). 

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different states. Some comments suggested that a single

uniform standard was necessary to minimize the burden on

interstate commerce. EPA acknowledged these comments, but

responded that the statute required certifications by the states in

which the discharges would originate and mandated that EPA

attach to the permit any conditions the states deemed necessary

to meet their specific water quality standards. Therefore, EPA

concluded, it could neither evade the certification process nor

alter certification conditions imposed by the states. EPA

Response to Comments, at 14 (J.A. 1052-91). 

Twenty five states, two tribes, and one territory certified the

draft VGP and attached state-specific conditions. (The other

states, with the exception of Alaska and Hawaii, either certified

without conditions or waived their right to certify.) On

December 19, 2008, EPA’s final VGP became effective. Final

NPDES General Permit, 73 Fed. Reg. at 79,474. Part VI of the

permit, which was not included in the draft VGP, is composed

of approximately 100 state certification conditions. U.S. EPA,

VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT (VGP) (2008), at 62-104 (J.A. 825-

67). Vessels covered by the permit are required to adhere to the

general provisions of the VGP with respect to all discharges, and

are further required to adhere to any Part VI certification

condition imposed by a state into the waters of which the vessel

is discharging pollutants.

In 2009, Lake Carriers’ Association, Canadian Shipowners

Association, and American Waterways Operators filed petitions

for review of the final VGP. The petitions were consolidated

into the single suit now before us. The trade associations raise

three challenges. First, they contend that EPA erred in failing to

provide notice and an opportunity for comment on the final

VGP, which contained the state certification conditions. 

Second, they charge that it was arbitrary and capricious for EPA

to issue the permit without considering the possible ill-effects of

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the state certification conditions. Finally, they allege that EPA

failed to consider the costs of compliance with state conditions

in assessing the impact of the permit on small businesses, as

required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C.

§ 601 et seq.

2

 The standard of review for these challenges is

governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), pursuant

to which we determine whether the agency’s actions were

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and whether the

permit was promulgated “without observance of procedure

required by law,” id. § 706(2)(D). See Owner-Operator

Independent Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety

Admin., 494 F.3d 188, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

II

The petitioners’ primary contention is that EPA failed to

provide notice and an opportunity for comment before

promulgating the final permit, as required by the APA, 5 U.S.C.

§ 553. EPA did provide for notice and comment regarding the

draft VGP, but the petitioners argue that this was insufficient

because the draft contained only the general EPA-mandated

conditions for vessel discharges; it contained none of the more

than 100 state certification conditions that were appended to the

final permit. The petitioners allege that they were therefore

deprived of the opportunity to comment regarding the potential

conflicts and burdens created by the cumulative effects of the

state conditions. 

2

The petitioners satisfy the requirements for associational

standing because at least one member of each association would have

standing to sue in its own right; the interests they seek to protect are

germane to their purpose; and neither the claim asserted nor the relief

requested requires that an individual member participate in this suit. 

Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

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A

EPA’s first response to this contention is that section 401(a)

of the CWA excuses it from providing an additional round of

notice and comment regarding state certification conditions. 

Section 401(a) requires that a certifying state “shall establish

procedures for public notice . . . and, to the extent it deems

appropriate, procedures for public hearings” in connection with

certification applications. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). EPA maintains

that this statute-specific state review procedure supplants the

APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. 

This argument is unpersuasive. The APA instructs that a

“[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify

[the APA’s requirements] . . . except to the extent that it does so

expressly.” 5 U.S.C. § 559. Accordingly, although an agency

is excused from § 553’s mandate when a subsequent statute

“plainly expresses a congressional intent to depart from normal

APA procedures.” Asiana Airlines v. FAA, 134 F.3d 393, 398

(D.C. Cir. 1998), “[w]e have looked askance at agencies’

attempts to avoid the standard notice and comment procedures,

holding that exceptions under § 553 must be ‘narrowly

construed and only reluctantly countenanced,’” id. at 396

(quoting New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.3d 1038, 1045 (D.C. Cir.

1980)). We doubt that section 401’s requirement that states

provide for notice and comment regarding proposed conditions

constitutes the requisite “plain express[ion]” of congressional

intent to supersede the APA’s requirements.3

3

EPA also contends that the APA’s notice-and-comment

requirements do not apply to the Vessel General Permit because it is

not a rule. As the agency recognizes, this contention runs headlong

into our decision in National Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, in which we held that a nationwide permit issued

under a different provision of the CWA was a rule within the meaning

USCA Case #09-1010 Document #1320085 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 8 of 20
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B

We do find persuasive, however, EPA’s argument that the

petitioners have failed to show that EPA has power to amend or

reject the state certifications at issue in this case, and have thus

failed to establish that additional opportunity for comment

would have served any purpose. Notably, the petitioners never

argued that the certifications failed to “compl[y] with the terms

of section 40l,” City of Tacoma v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53, 67 (D.C.

Cir. 2006), by overstepping the traditional bounds of state

authority to regulate interstate commerce. We therefore need

not consider whether EPA has authority to reject state conditions

under such circumstances. Instead, the petitioners contend that

providing for notice and comment would not be purposeless in

this case on two other grounds, neither of which is availing. 

1. First, they maintain that “[t]he plain language of sections

401 and 502 of the CWA instruct[s] that a section 401

certification” for a permit covering mobile point sources with

discharges in multiple states must be made by the Administrator

of EPA instead of by the states. Reply Br. 13. For such a

permit, they contend, the Administrator may accept input from

affected states but is not bound to include state-specific

certification conditions. Pet’rs Br. 38. In support, the

petitioners cite a sentence in section 401(a)(1) that provides: “In

any case where a State or interstate agency has no authority to

give such a certification, such certification shall be from the

Administrator.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). They also note that

section 401 repeatedly uses the terms “state” and “certification”

in the singular. And they further cite section 401(a)(2), which,

although it establishes a procedure for dealing with cases in

of the APA. 417 F.3d 1272, 1284-85 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In light of the

conclusion we reach in the following paragraphs, we need not address

EPA’s efforts to distinguish that decision.

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which “a discharge” originating in the waters of one state

“affect[s] . . . the quality of the waters of” another, does not give

section 401 certification authority to the affected state. Id. at

§ 1341(a)(2); see Pet’rs Br. 36-37. 

The long answer to this argument would require an analysis

of the statutory language. EPA argues that the cited sentence

from section 401(a)(1) gives the Administrator power to certify

a permit when a state lacks authority to do so under its own law,

not where no single state can certify for multistate discharges.4

In any event, the agency continues, no single state does certify

for multistate discharges under the VGP. Each state’s

certification applies only to discharges in its own waters, and a

state does not lose authority to certify such a discharge simply

because a vessel moves and then discharges in another state as

well. Nor, the agency maintains, is the fact that section 401 is

written in the singular persuasive: The Dictionary Act states

that, “unless the context indicates otherwise -- words importing

the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or

things.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. Finally, EPA notes, section 401(a)(2) is

not relevant to this question: It applies when a single point of

discharge in one state may affect the waters of another state

(when, for example, a pollutant is carried downstream across

4

Cf. United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96, 99-

101 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting a claim that section 401(a)’s

certification requirement “applies only to individual permits, not

to general [nationwide] permits,” and holding that a Corps of

Engineers nationwide permit was inapplicable to discharges in

Massachusetts because the state had denied the requisite

certification); id. at 99-100 (finding that “Congress intended to

give the states veto power over the grant of federal permit

authority for activities potentially affecting a state’s water

quality”).

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state lines), not when a vessel makes repeated discharges into

the waters of several states. 

But there is a short answer to the petitioners’ textual

argument: they did not make it before the agency, and they have

therefore waived it. The petitioners’ comments on the draft

VGP did not contain any of the textual arguments they now

raise. Although the petitioners are correct that “[m]any

commenters requested that EPA avoid the practical issues posed

by numerous state conditions through a single promulgation,”

Reply Br. 25, none offered an interpretation of section 401 that

would have permitted EPA to issue the certification in place of

the states. And as we said in Natural Resources Defense

Council v. EPA:

We have previously held that failure to raise a

particular question of statutory construction before an

agency constitutes waiver of the argument in court. 

See, e.g., Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1528 (D.C. Cir.

1993); Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d

1299, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In those cases, the parties

were not saved by the fact that they had made other

“technical, policy, or legal” arguments before the

agency.

25 F.3d 1063, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see Orion Reserves Ltd.

Partnership v. Salazar, 553 F.3d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2009);

Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2006);

Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 874 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). 

2. The petitioners also argue that providing notice and an

opportunity for comment would not have been “pointless”

because “there are at least two ways that the state conditions,

when considered together, create significant constitutional issues

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that EPA failed to consider prior to issuing the VGP.” Reply Br.

9, 11. “First, the VGP appears to require that some regulated

entities violate one provision of the permit in order to comply

with another, a conundrum prohibited by fundamental principles

of due process.” Pet’rs Br. 46. Second, the petitioners contend

that the VGP may raise a problem under the “dormant

Commerce Clause[,] [which] prohibits states from adopting laws

that unduly burden interstate commerce.” Id. at 47 (citing

Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 678 (1981)).

We are uncertain about exactly what the petitioners are

arguing here. They do not contend that the CWA itself is

unconstitutional, even as EPA construes it. Nor do they argue

on this appeal that the VGP is unconstitutional, even as EPA has

promulgated it.5

5

We recognize that the petitioners are attempting to chart a

difficult course on this appeal, which may account for the

awkwardness of some of their arguments. As they explain in their

brief, once the Ninth Circuit vacated the exemption for discharges

incidental to the normal operation of vessels, such discharges “became

subject to the discharge prohibition of section 301(a) of the CWA, 33

U.S.C. § 1311(a), unless covered under an NPDES permit.” Pet’rs Br.

7. If EPA had “chose[n] not to create a permit system at all, these

discharges, some of which inevitably occur . . . , would be illegal in

their entirety under the CWA[,] . . .[and] shipping and other marine

transportation would have come to a complete halt.” Id. at 7-8. To

avert such an outcome, “EPA decided to propose a nationwide general

NPDES permit program for incidental vessel discharges,” rather than

utilizing vessel-by-vessel or state-by-state permits. Id. at 8. The

advantage of a nationwide permit for companies that operate in

multiple states is obvious, and may explain why the “[p]etitioners are

not at this time challenging EPA’s use of a CWA nationwide general

permit,” but instead “focus on the procedure followed by EPA in

issuing the VGP.” Id. at 34 n.14.

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As to the due process contention, the petitioners are careful

throughout to say only that it “might be impossible to comply

with one [state’s] condition without violating another,” Pet’rs

Br. 18 (emphasis added), not that it is impossible.6 But without

an inconsistency that makes it literally impossible to adhere to

one state’s requirements without breaching another’s, it is hard

to detect a due process violation on the face of the VGP.7

Indeed, it is hard to imagine how an inconsistency of such

magnitude could ever arise, given that “the state-specific

conditions” in the VGP only “apply in the waters of the state

that provided the conditions.” EPA Response to Comments, at

14-2 (J.A.1053).

As to the dormant Commerce Clause, the petitioners claim

only that “[a]llowing the specter of multiple states imposing

differing requirements on vessels that move through their

respective waters creates a . . . potentially impermissible[]

burden on commerce.” Pet’rs Br. 22 (emphasis added). We

note that even the italicized caveat is understated. Dormant

Commerce Clause doctrine applies only to burdens created by

state law. See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 678. At issue here is a

federal statute, the CWA, and a federal regulation, the VGP. It

is true, as the petitioners observe, that Wyoming v. Oklahoma

6

See also Pet’rs Br. 18 (asserting that the “requirements added to

the final VGP contain potentially conflicting requirements” (emphasis

added)); id. at 45 (stating that the final VGP requirements are

“potentially inconsistent” (emphasis added)); id. at 46 (observing that

“the VGP appears to require that some regulated entities violate one

provision of the permit in order to comply with another” (emphasis

added)). 

7

EPA, the intervenors, and the state amici vigorously dispute the

claim that Part VI of the VGP contains any such “‘impossible’

compliance dilemmas.” EPA Br. 43; see Intervenors’ Br. 37-38;

States of New York and Michigan Amicus Br. 27-30. 

USCA Case #09-1010 Document #1320085 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 13 of 20
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held that it takes an “unambiguous” expression of intent for

Congress to authorize a state to burden interstate commerce in

a way that would otherwise transgress the dormant Commerce

Clause. 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992). But in Wyoming it was a

state law that was challenged, and the question was whether a

federal statute had authorized it. Here, it is a federal regulation

that is at issue.8

 The CWA does not merely authorize state

certifications; it incorporates those certifications into federal

law. See Reply Br. 12 (acknowledging that, when the conditions

attached by each state “are aggregated in the final VGP[,] [they]

become federal requirements”); cf. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503

U.S. 91, 110 (1992).

Some passages in the petitioners’ brief suggest that they

may be making a “constitutional avoidance” argument,

contending that EPA must “construe and apply section 401 in a

manner” that avoids “creat[ing] significant constitutional

issues.” Pet’rs Br. 45-46 (citing, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo v.

Fl. GulfCoast Bldg. Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-

75 (1988)). But that canon comes into play only when a

contrary construction would raise “grave and doubtful

constitutional questions.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-

8

In addition, the state statute at issue in Wyoming violated the

dormant Commerce Clause not simply by unduly burdening interstate

commerce, as is claimed here, but by discriminating against it. 502

U.S. at 458. The Supreme Court scrutinizes statutes of the latter kind

far more strictly than those of the former, id. at 454-55 & n.12, and

there are suggestions in Wyoming that the “unambiguous” expression

test was only intended for the latter, see id. (declaring that “Oklahoma

has not met its burden of demonstrating a clear and unambiguous

intent on behalf of Congress to permit the discrimination against

interstate commerce occurring here,” and that “Congress must

manifest its unambiguous intent before a federal statute will be read

to permit . . . such a violation of the Commerce Clause as Oklahoma

here seeks to justify” (emphases added)). 

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91 (1991). It has no applicability in a case like this one, in

which “there is nothing to avoid” from a constitutional

perspective. Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, No. 10-1062, 2011

WL 2277217, at *11 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2011).

Perhaps the petitioners mean only to argue that EPA should

have construed section 401 so as to avoid creating

inconsistencies and burdens, even if such problems do not rise

to the constitutional level. But if that is what the petitioners

mean, they do not say so. More important, they do not point to

any text that could be construed to this end. The only text to

which they advert in this portion of their brief is section 101 of

the CWA, which states that the policy of the statute is to

“recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities

and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.” 

33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). From this they infer that “section 401’s

certification process is designed to preserve state authority, not

to expand it.” Pet’rs Br. 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Whatever the validity of that inference, it still does not explain

how the text of section 401 might be read to permit EPA to alter

state certifications. Cf. Am. Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 600 F.3d

624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting a challenge to EPA’s

approval of California vehicle standards because the petitioners

were “seeking improperly to engraft a type of constitutional

Commerce Clause analysis onto EPA’s . . . decision[] that is

neither present in nor authorized by the statute” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).9

9

In a footnote to their reply brief, the petitioners observe that

section 103 of the CWA tasks EPA to “‘encourage the enactment of

improved and, so far as practicable, uniform State laws relating to the

prevention, reduction and elimination of pollution.’” Reply Br. 13 n.5

(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1253). The petitioners acknowledge that they

did not mention this provision in their comments during the

rulemaking, Oral Arg. Recording at 47:37, and, in any event,

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Before concluding this Subpart, we note that EPA’s

resolution of this matter does not leave the petitioners without

recourse. If they believe that the certification conditions

imposed by any particular state pose an inordinate burden on

their operations, they may challenge those conditions in that

state’s courts. See Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v.

EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that “the

courts have consistently agreed . . . that the proper forum to

review the appropriateness of a state’s certification is the state

court”); see also City of Tacoma, 460 F.3d at 67. If they believe

that a particular state’s law imposes an unconstitutional burden

on interstate commerce, they may challenge that law in federal

(or state) court. See Am. Trucking Ass’n, 600 F.3d at 628 n.1. 

And if neither of these avenues proves adequate, they are free to

ask Congress to amend the CWA, perhaps by reimposing the

exemption for incidental vessel discharges. See supra note 1

(noting that, in response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision vacating

the exemption, Congress passed two acts that exempted small

boats and recreational and commercial fishing vessels from the

CWA’s permitting requirements). 

C

In sum, given the case law and the arguments that EPA had

before it, the agency correctly concluded that it did “not have the

ability to amend or reject conditions in a [state’s] CWA 401

certification.” EPA Response to Comments, at 14-11 to 14-12

(J.A. 1062-63) (citing Am. Rivers, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99,

107, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1997)). Under those circumstances,

providing notice and an opportunity for comment on the state

arguments not raised until the reply brief are waived, see United States

v. $6,976,934.65, Plus Interest, 554 F.3d 123, 133 n.4 (D.C. Cir.

2009).

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certifications would have served no purpose, and we decline to

remand to require EPA to do a futile thing.10

III

The petitioners’ remaining arguments fail for the same

reason that their notice-and-comment argument fails. 

1. The petitioners maintain that EPA acted arbitrarily and

capriciously by not properly considering comments it received

regarding the draft permit. It is true that an agency acts

arbitrarily and capriciously when it “fail[s] to consider an

important aspect of the problem.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). And it

is also true that “the opportunity to comment is meaningless

10See Hispanic Info. & Telecomm. Network, Inc. v. FCC, 865 F.2d

1289, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (declining to require additional

administrative procedures when “it would be a pointless formality in

which the result was preordained”); Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d

1282, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (refusing to require notice-and-comment

review of “nondiscretionary acts,” as such review “was ‘unnecessary,’

and . . . a futile gesture”); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659-60 (2007) (declining to

remand where the alleged error “could have had no effect on the

underlying agency action”); PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d

786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[i]f the agency’s mistake did

not affect the outcome, . . . it would be senseless to vacate and remand

for reconsideration”); City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 246

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that, “[t]he APA requires petitioners to show

prejudice from an agency procedural violation,” and that “[i]n making

such a showing in the context of a violation of notice-and-comment

requirements, petitioners may be required to demonstrate that, had

proper notice been provided, they would have submitted additional,

different comments that could have invalidated the rationale” for the

rule).

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unless the agency responds to significant points raised by the

public.” Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C.

Cir. 1977). 

The comments that the petitioners allege the agency ignored

concerned “the prospect that [varying state certification]

requirements would be likely to present serious problems” for

vessel operators moving from state to state. Pet’rs Br. 39. EPA

did not, however, fail to respond to those comments. To the

contrary, it told the commenters the same thing it has told this

court: that under the CWA, “it is not possible to have a ‘single

nationwide system’ that does not accommodate the states’

ability to include state-specific requirements to implement their

own water quality standards and requirements.” EPA Response

to Comments, at 14-5 (J.A. 1056); see also id. at 14-3 to 14-6

(J.A. 1053-57). Because on this record, EPA was correct in its

assertion that it lacked authority to alter or reject certification

conditions even if they presented difficulties for the operators,

see supra Part II, further consideration or response was

unnecessary. Cf. City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 714-15

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that an agency has no obligation to

respond to comments that are “incapable of affecting the final

rule”).11

11The petitioners also argue that “EPA’s failure to consider . . .

the resulting patchwork created by the varying section 401

requirements, run[s] afoul of the uniformity principles of federal

maritime law that trace their roots to Medieval times and the Laws of

Oleron.” Pet’rs Br. 42. But EPA responded to this argument as well,

noting that “it is well established that a federal agency does not have

the ability to amend or reject conditions in a [state’s] CWA 401

certification,” and that CWA § 401 “expressly grants States . . . the

right to add conditions to federally issued NPDES permits as

necessary to assure compliance with state water quality standards.” 

EPA Response to Comments, at 14-11 to 14-12 (J.A. 1062-63). The

chief case upon which the petitioners rely, United States v. Locke, 529

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The petitioners further contend that EPA’s failure to address

the commenters’ concerns was arbitrary in light of “the agency’s

own earlier, express acknowledgment that if such discharges

were subject to the NPDES permit program, ‘every vessel

engaged in interstate commerce would be required to apply for

and obtain a different, and potentially conflicting, NPDES

permit for each of the various State waters through which they

travel.’” Pet’rs Br. 39 (quoting EPA Decision on Petition for

Rulemaking to Repeal 40 C.F.R. 122.3(a), at 12 (Sept. 2, 2003)

(J.A. 179)). But EPA made that earlier acknowledgment in the

course of explaining its 2003 decision to deny a petition to

repeal the exemption for discharges incidental to the normal

operation of a vessel. EPA said it was denying the petition

because it thought -- just as it thinks now -- that “[t]here is no

provision under the CWA that would enable EPA to issue any

type of general permit to establish consistent, nationwide

standards for vessels in State waters.” EPA Decision on Petition

for Rulemaking to Repeal 40 C.F.R. 122.3(a), at 12. As we

discussed in Part I, the Ninth Circuit struck that exemption down

in 2008, and the petitioners do not challenge the Ninth Circuit’s

decision here. 

2. Finally, the petitioners assert that EPA acted arbitrarily

and capriciously with respect to the analysis it conducted

pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. 

To conform with the requirements of that Act, EPA certified that

the VGP “is not likely to have a significant economic impact on

a substantial number of small entities.” 73 Fed. Reg at 79,481;

see 5 U.S.C. § 605. The petitioners contend that EPA’s

regulatory flexibility analysis was arbitrary and capricious in

U.S. 89 (2000), holds only that state laws may be preempted by

comprehensive federal maritime regulation. As EPA pointed out, the

restrictions that the petitioners challenge here are the consequence of

a federal law -- the CWA.

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failing to consider the costs of complying with the state

conditions that the final VGP would impose. 

It is true that EPA’s economic analysis did not consider the

costs of complying with state conditions. See EPA Br. 59-60

(articulating EPA’s understanding that it was not necessary to

consider those costs). But the petitioners did not object to that

omission below, notwithstanding that it was clear from the

analysis that accompanied the draft VGP that EPA did not plan

to consider such costs. Although some comments did urge that

“the Economic and Benefits Analysis upon which EPA relies

contains serious flaws,” the flaws enumerated in those

comments did not include the failure to consider the costs of

state certification conditions. Chamber of Shipping and

INTERTANKO Comments, at 36 (J.A. 687).12 Accordingly,

this objection is waived. See, e.g., Military Toxics Project v.

EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

IV

Because the petitioners have failed to establish that EPA

can alter or reject state certification conditions, the additional

agency procedures they demand would not have afforded them

the relief they seek. The petition for review is therefore

Denied.

12See id. at 24-26 (J.A. 675-77) (articulating defects in EPA’s

analysis of the costs of particular EPA-imposed permit conditions, but

making no mention of state certification requirements); Lake Carriers’

Association Comments, at 5 (J.A. 713) (objecting to EPA’s

determination of the cost of compliance with the Best Management

Practices provision of the draft VGP, but not suggesting that EPA

must factor the costs of state certifications into the analysis). 

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