Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00675/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00675-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M. Castro
Defendant
Michael Gonzales
Plaintiff
R. Juarez
Defendant
B. S. Vikjord
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL GONZALES,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. S. VIKJORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-00675-OWW-DLB (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT AND REQUIRING PLAINTIFF

TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Michael Gonzales (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

May 4, 2007. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious;” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) &

(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.

A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on

the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’”

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin,

262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to

a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were

not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff is an inmate currently housed at the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation State Prison in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff names as defendants: Correction

Officers B. Vikjord, and M. Castro; Sergeant R. Juarez; and “Medical Staff John Doe.” Plaintiff

is seeking compensatory and punitive damages, and injunctive relief.

Because plaintiff sets forth all of his complaint narrative form, without specifying his

claims for relief, some difficulty in ascertaining the precise claims plaintiff is alleging results. 

Plaintiff appears to allege that he was assaulted by Vikjord, was subsequently denied

medical care, and that the grievances he filed on the incident(s) were mishandled.

 C. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

Based on the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, he may be able to plead some claims for

relief under section 1983, that are not yet cognizable to the court. However, a number of the

events complained of by plaintiff, as plead, do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. 

The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint that

complies with Rule 8(a) and sets forth for each defendant’s name, what action that defendant

took or failed to take, and why (e.g., to retaliate against plaintiff for filing inmate grievances). In

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

the subsections that follow, the court will provide plaintiff with the legal standards that, based on

plaintiff’s allegations, appear to be applicable. Plaintiff should utilize the legal standards

provided in this order for guidance when filing his amended complaint. 

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

In order to proceed under section 1983, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a

claim that each defendant named in the complaint either acted or failed to act in a manner that

was adverse to plaintiff and that the defendant(s) did so in retaliation against plaintiff for either

litigating in court or filing inmate grievances. Plaintiff is cautioned that in his amended

complaint, he must clearly identify what actions or omissions led to the violation of his rights and

which defendants were responsible for the acts or omissions. 

In his complaint, plaintiff names Castro as a defendant both in the captions and on page 3

of the court’s form. However, plaintiff fails to allege any facts to substantiate any claims of

wrongdoing by Castro within the statement of facts of his complaint. Therefore, since plaintiff

failed to allege any wrongdoing by Castro, he is dismissed. 

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

2. Excessive Force

It appears that Plaintiff alleges two incidents of use of excessive force.

 “What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis

injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause

of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided

that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal

quotations marks and citations omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation

of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth

Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id. 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution

or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). An officer

can be held liable for failing to intercede only if he had a “realistic opportunity” to intercede. 

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff alleges that: (1) on September 6, 2006, while escorted back from getting a

haircut, Vikjord squeezed and jerked his arm, and banged plaintiff into the wall causing

plaintiff’s brow to bruise and swell; and (2) on February 21, 2007, again while escorting plaintiff,

Vikjord verbally barraged plaintiff such that, after being placed in the holding cage on the yard,

plaintiff let saliva fall as if slobbering, Sergeant Juarez opened the door, Vikjord entered, grabbed

plaintiff, spun him around, grabbed his hair and smashed his head into the asphalt, “the other

officer” smashed the left side of plaintiff’s head into the “floor” [sic], smashed his head into the

asphalt, kneed him, twisted his arms, and Vikjord hit plaintiff’s right brow with the end of a

flashlight. 

Thus, plaintiff has stated a prima facie claim for use of excessive force by Vikjord. 

However, it is unclear to the court as to the name of “the other officer” who entered and smashed

the left side of plaintiff’s head into the floor. Plaintiff might have intended “the other officer” to

implicate Juarez, but the court is unable to make that leap, since plaintiff previously identified

Juarez as being a sergeant, not an officer. Therefore, plaintiff must properly name and/or identify

all actors whom he feels used excessive force against him. 

3. Medical Needs

Plaintiff alleges that after the incident on February 21, 2007, he was escorted back to the

rotunda where the MTA or nurse (who refused to give his name to plaintiff) denied plaintiff’s

request for stitches and an x-ray, while opening and closing the cut, laughing and joking about

plaintiff’s injury, and telling plaintiff not to go to sleep or he might not wake up. 

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of

deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally denying or

delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving

medical treatment, the prisoner must allege that the delay led to further injury. McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs, Inc. v.

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997); Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs,

766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The court finds that, as stated, plaintiff’s contentions against the MTA or nurse do not

satisfy the requirements for showing deliberate indifference which caused a delay so as to lead to

further injury. Plaintiff also failed to show that any delay in treatment led to further injury. 

Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for violation of his

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

constitutional rights for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 

4. Due Process - Property

Plaintiff alleges that on September 6, 2006 “Vikjord, et al. went to [his] cell and trashed

it.” Doc. 1, pg. 5.

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due

process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners have a protected

interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However,

while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process

Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), neither

negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a state employee “constitute a

violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

The court is unable to tell whether plaintiff is alleging that any of his personal property

was destroyed in this incident. In the sentence immediately prior to that quoted herein above,

plaintiff named officers B. Vikjord, K. Frescura, and Price. However, plaintiff did not name

Frescura and Price in the captions of his complaint, nor did he name them as defendants on pages

one or three of the court’s form. Thus, the court is unable to ascertain whether plaintiff is

making claims against Frescura and Price, or if his claims regarding his cell being “trashed”

attach only to Vikjord. 

Plaintiff has also not alleged sufficient facts for the court to determine whether the

deprivation was authorized or unauthorized. Further, in the event that the destruction was

authorized and therefore actionable under section 1983, plaintiff has not alleged any facts

suggesting that he was deprived of due process. As long as plaintiff was provided with process,

prison officials may deprive him of his property.

5. Interference with Plaintiff’s use of the Prison Grievance System

To the extent plaintiff attempts to state a claim relating to the processing of his use of the

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

grievance system within the prison, plaintiff is advised that, “[a prison] grievance procedure is a

procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v.

Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.

Ill. 1982)); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (Liberty interests created by state law are

generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850,

860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a

specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence

of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); see also Mann v. Adams, 855

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). The

failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional violation, and a prison official’s

involvement and actions in reviewing a prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis

for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. There is no constitutionally

protected right to an appeals process and there is no constitutionally protected right to a particular

outcome. Even if interference with plaintiff’s use of the prison grievance occurred so as to cause

his claims to be dismissed as untimely, defendants’ actions in interference with and/or reviewing

and issuing decisions on the appeals do not provide a basis upon which to impose liability under

section 1983. Therefore, any claims plaintiff is attempting to assert, regarding the interference

with his use of the prison grievance system do not rise to the level of a protected constitutional

right.

6. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a § 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th

Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file

a prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). Adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary

firmness” from engaging in that activity. Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770

(9th Cir. 2006); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Jacks, 486

F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Bennett v.

Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2005); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George

Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir.

2004); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Both litigation in court and filing

inmate grievances are protected activities and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate

against inmates for engaging in these activities. However, not every allegedly adverse action will

be sufficient to support a claim under section 1983 for retaliation. In the prison context, cases in

this Circuit addressing First Amendment retaliation claims involve situations where the action

taken by the defendant was clearly adverse to the plaintiff. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary

confiscation and destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation

for filing grievances); Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 (retaliatory placement in administrative

segregation for filing grievances); Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (retaliatory validation as a gang

member for filing grievances); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267(9th Cir. 1997) (retaliatory

issuance of false rules violation and subsequent finding of guilt); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (retaliatory

prison transfer and double-cell status); Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138 (inmate labeled a snitch

and approached by other inmates and threatened with harm as a result); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530-

32 (retaliatory reassignment out of vocational class and transfer to a different prison). 

Plaintiff is clearly concerned about retaliation activities as his prayer for relief requests

“[a] preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants, their successors in office,

their agents, or other employees aiding or abetting him from harassing, threatening, assaulting,

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

retaliating, or writing false reports against the plaintiff for filing this suit.” However, the court is

unable to ascertain whether plaintiff is alleging that any of the facts stated in his complaint

allegedly occurred in retaliation for plaintiff’s use of the grievance system. As phrased, plaintiff

has failed to allege sufficient facts against any defendant actors to rise to the level of a violation

of plaintiff’s constitutional right to freedom from retaliation. 

7. Supervisory Liability Claim

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To

state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some

facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’

and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646

(9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims

under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

(1993). 

Although plaintiff names Sergeant Juarez as a defendant, plaintiff has not alleged any

facts as to actions attributable to Sergeant Juarez that give rise to a claim for relief under section

1983 against him. Plaintiff merely states that Sergeant Juarez opened the door to the holding cell

and told plaintiff to turn around. These actions in and of themselves fail to implicate Sergeant

Juarez: for personally participating in the constitutional violations; for knowing of the violations

and failing to act to prevent them; or for promulgating or “implement[ing] a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, the complaint is devoid of

allegations upon which a supervisory liability claim may be based against Sergeant Juarez 

II. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to file an

amended complaint within thirty days. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of have

resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227

(9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court

in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only on the claims identified by the court

as viable/cognizable in this order; and

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

4. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 25, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00675-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 12 of 12