Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-10474/USCOURTS-ca9-12-10474-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy Mageno
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NANCY MAGENO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-10474

D.C. No.

2:11-cr-00048-

JCM-CWH-7

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 10, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed August 11, 2014

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Raymond C. Fisher,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon;

Dissent by Judge Wallace

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 1 of 58
2 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Reversing a conviction for conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine, the panel held that the prosecutors’

several misstatements of fact during the closing argument

encouraged the jury to convict the defendant on the basis of

evidence not presented at trial, and there was a reasonable

probability that the misstatements affected the outcome.

The panel considered the misstatement issue, even though

the defendant did not raise it before the district court or in her

opening brief, because the government raised the issue in its

answering brief, and the government was not prejudiced.

The panel concluded that there was plain error; the error

affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and the error

seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of the judicial proceedings. The panel reversed the

conviction and remanded the case to the district court.

Dissenting, Judge Wallace wrote that the prosecutorial

misstatement argument was waived and that there was no

plain error.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 2 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 3

COUNSEL

Mace J. Yampolsky (argued), Mace J. Yampolsky, Ltd., Las

Vegas, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.

Adam M. Flake (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Daniel G. Bogden, United States Attorney; Robert L. Ellman,

Appellate Chief, Office of the United States Attorney, Las

Vegas, Nevada, for Appellees.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

NancyMageno’s godson, a leader of a methamphetamine

conspiracy, did not speak English fluently, so Mageno

translated telephone calls for him. As a result, Mageno was

prosecuted for knowingly joining and participating in the

drug conspiracy by fostering communication between its

participants and her godson. In a separate disposition, we

reject Mageno’s argument that the evidence against her was

insufficient to sustain the conviction. Here, we consider

related issues commendably raised by the government itself

on appeal: Did the prosecutors’ several misstatements of fact

during the closing argument encourage the jury to convict

Mageno on the basis of evidence not presented at trial? If so,

is there a reasonable probability that the misstatements

affected the outcome? After determining that we should

reach these questions although Mageno did not raise them, we

answer both questions “yes,” and reverse.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 3 of 58
4 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

I

Mageno’s godson, Jesus Guadalupe Felix Burgos, his

wife, and his young son, lived with Mageno in a twobedroom apartment in Las Vegas, Nevada. While Burgos

lived with her, Mageno served as his informal EnglishSpanish translator. Drug deals were often the topic of the

conversations Mageno translated. When the government

indicted Burgos and eight others for conspiring to distribute

a controlled substance, it indicted Mageno as well. Mageno

was charged with two counts; one alleging that she, Burgos,

and others conspired to distribute more than 50 grams of

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and 846, and the other accusing her of

distributing more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and

18 U.S.C. § 2, on or about October 7, 2010.

The Drug Enforcement Agency began investigating

methamphetamine distribution in the Billings, Montana area

with the aid of an undercover officer, Agent Joseph Kirkland. 

After Kirkland purchased high-grade methamphetamine from

two brothers in the Billings area, he traced the brothers’

supplier to Las Vegas. The supplier, Paco Francisco Flores,

eventually led Kirkland to Burgos, the individual the

government now maintains was at the center of the

distribution operation. Burgos identified himself to Kirkland

as “Virrio,” invited Kirkland to travel to Las Vegas to buy

methamphetamine, and provided Kirkland with a phone

number to contact him.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 4 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 5

To help develop a case against Burgos and his associates,

the government obtained a warrant to tap Burgos’s phone. At

Mageno’s trial, the government introduced a total of five

intercepted calls involving Mageno:

(1) A September 22, 2010, phone call between

an unknown man and Burgos, in which

Mageno acted as a translator. The unknown

man complained that, “[t]he stuff that I just

got is garbage. It’s full of cut . . . . it’s like,

looks like soap. I [cook] this up I look

stupid.” An agent testified that this meant the

drugs were poor quality and could not be

resold. The caller said that he was going to

“take . . . the rock out of it” and wanted a

“return on” the “other stuff.”

(2) An October 1, 2010, phone call between

co-defendant John Asher, Burgos, and

Mageno. Mageno translated for Burgos,

saying to Asher: “He says right now he

doesn’t have anything. What he does have is

not any good . . . . They’re waiting for — the

new shipment to come in.”

(3) An October 7, 2010, phone call between

Kirkland and Burgos, in which Mageno

translated as they arranged a meeting. 

Kirkland called Burgos on that day, the date

of the planned Las Vegas transaction. During

the call, Burgos had trouble communicating

with Kirkland in English so Mageno

translated part of the conversation. The

questions and responses Mageno translated

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 5 of 58
6 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

facilitated the transaction by providing details

about Kirkland’s car, location and clothing. 

Mageno also conveyed a question from

Kirkland as to “price,” although Kirkland

never specified the “price” was for drugs. 

Burgos’s response to the “price” question,

also translated by Mageno, was, “This time

it’s the same price. Next time he can give it

to you cheaper because right now they’re

having a hard time.”

(4) A November 4, 2010, phone call between

an unknown caller and Burgos, with Mageno

translating as they arranged a meeting. 

Mageno translated the unknown caller’s

description of his car.

(5) A November 17, 2010, phone call between

a caller identified as “Paco”1and Mageno, in

which Mageno hints that she is concerned that

the phone might be tapped: When asked what

was happening, Mageno responds that she

“can’t say over the phone.”

The evidence at trial also included testimony that on

November 17, 2010, just before the last intercepted call,

Mageno was driving with Burgos and his family when they

realized they were being followed. Mageno confronted the

agent monitoring Burgos, demanding, “Why are you

following me?” After that encounter, Mageno made Burgos

and his family leave her apartment. But that was not the end

1

It is not clear whether the “Paco” on this phone call was the same Paco

who was involved with the drug distribution conspiracy.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 6 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 7

of her relationship with Burgos. Not long after Burgos

moved out, Mageno traveled with him and two others,

including her son-in-law, to Yakima, Washington, which was

asserted by the government to be a “known drug hub.” She,

Burgos, and the others were detained by drug enforcement

authorities but no drugs were found in their car.

Testifying in her defense, Mageno explained that: she did

not know the conversations she translated contained

references to drugs and “was under the impression that it had

to do with [Burgos’s] work”; she asked Burgos about the

phone calls, and he always said the calls had to do with his

work as a day laborer; Burgos told her the first call was a

complaint about shoddy workmanship in the laying of

cement; she understood that when the caller complained that

he couldn’t “cook” the product, he was referring to mixing

cement in a concrete mixer; Burgos told her the shipment

referred to in the October 1 call was a cement purchase; and

in translating the October 7 Kirkland call, Mageno thought

she was connecting one of Burgos’s workers with an

employer, so that the worker could follow the employer to his

home for a job.

Also, according to Mageno: she did not know Burgos was

dealing drugs until the events of November 17, when Burgos

admitted his involvement when they realized they were being

followed; the reason she was hesitant to speak to Paco later

that day was because she did not know Paco well and he was

her son’s romantic rival, not because she feared the phone

was tapped; and, as to the trip to Yakima, she was told its

purpose was to visit a relative, not to deal drugs.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 7 of 58
8 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

Testifying at Mageno’s trial in her defense, Burgos said

Mageno was “an innocent person,” and “it wouldn’t be fair

for her to be judged by the crimes another person has done.” 

He confirmed that he told Mageno they were going to

Yakima to visit an ill relative, but denied that Mageno asked

him questions about the phone calls she interpreted.

On cross examination, the government questioned Burgos

about a prior, drug-related deportation. After he testified that

he lived with Mageno for about a year in 2007 before being

deported, the government asked whether Mageno knew why

he was deported. Mageno’s attorney objected on the ground

that the answer called for speculation. After a sidebar

discussion,2the government agreed to ask “[j]ust one

question” of Burgos concerning his deportation, and the

prosecutor did so, asking, “Mr. Burgos, going back to . . .

2007, the reason why you were deported was because you

were trafficking in methamphetamine, isn’t that right?” 

Burgos answered in the affirmative, and the government

moved on. But Burgos never said that Mageno knew that he

was deported or why, and neither did Mageno — she was

never asked.

This truncated line of questioning was transformed into a

centerpiece of the closing arguments. The prosecution argued

that Mageno knew that Burgos had been deported for drug

trafficking, and so must have known the calls she translated

related to drug trafficking:

There’s one [version of events] that the

big, bad government has looped Nancy

2 At the sidebar, the district court incorrectly asserted, about Burgos’s

testimony, “He said she knew.”

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 8 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 9

Mageno unfairly into this large, multi-state

drug conspiracy all because she accidentally

got on a couple of phone calls where she

thought she was assisting in cement sales and

pool cleaners and coordinating day laborers

who were having clandestine meetings in

parking lots of In-and-Out Burgers. That’s

one story.

And there’s another one. There’s a second

story and that’s that, like every individual

walking the streets, she had a choice. She had

a choice whether to let her godson who she

already knew had been deported for

distributing methamphetamine move in with

her. She had that choice. She had a choice

whether or not to get on the phone and begin

translating phone calls that dealt with cut and

shipments and coordinating these meetings.

She had these choices and she’s the one

who made the choice to get on those phones. 

She is the one who made the choice to help

her godson, Virrio, the one who had already

b e en de p o rt ed for distri b u ti n g

methamphetamine. That is the second story

line of this case. That is what this case is

about. (Emphasis added.)

The prosecutor went on specifically to ask the jury to

infer Mageno’s knowledge of what she was translating from

her supposed knowledge of Burgos’s prior drug-related

deportation. The prosecutor first told the jury that, “Virrio

explained to you she knew because he was living with her,

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 9 of 58
10 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

then he comes back[,]” and later described Mageno’s voice

on the phone as the voice of a person who “already in her

head knew that Virrio, the person she was translating for, has

a history of distributing methamphetamine.” The prosecutor

concluded his closing argument on this same note: The jury

should find Mageno was guilty because Mageno “knew she

was translating for a known methamphetamine dealer.” On

rebuttal, a second prosecutor picked up the theme: “[I]n 2007,

she already knows. Is it past is prologue? He’s been

deported because he was trafficking methamphetamine while

he was living with her. He testified she knew why he was

deported.”

Mageno’s attorney also misstated Burgos’s testimony —

perhaps as a result of hearing the government’s argument —

but not as assuredly:

Now, [Burgos] said on the stand, and I’m not

a hundred percent sure, it’s either one or two

things. He either said, I was deported and she

knew about it, or she knew why I was

deported, but the question is how would he

know she knew why? Did he come up and

say, hey, by the way, I’ve been dealing drugs,

you know, and I’m gone?

In fact, Burgos had testified neither that Mageno knew he was

deported nor that she knew why.

A jury convicted Mageno on the conspiracy charge, count

one, but acquitted her of the other count against her, the

October 7, 2010 methamphetamine distribution. The district

court sentenced Mageno to 87 months in prison, followed by

five years of supervised release.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 10 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 11

II

Mageno’s central argument before us is that the

government did not introduce sufficient evidence to support

the jury’s verdict on the conspiracy charge. The government

maintains that the evidence was sufficient, and we agree.3

But, commendably, the government raises, as a separate error,

the prosecutors’ repeated misstatements during closing

argument that Burgos had testified to Mageno’s knowledge

of Burgos’s deportation for dealing drugs.

Mageno did not object to the government’s misstatement

of Burgos’s testimony at trial, did not raise this argument in

her opening brief, and did not adopt it as a ground for reversal

until oral argument. Should we consider the government’s

error under these circumstances? We conclude that we

should.4

Generally, an issue not raised before the district court may

not be considered for the first time on appeal. See United

States v. Robertson, 52 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1994); see

also Manta v. Chertoff, 518 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2008). 

But there are exceptions, of which one is where “plain error

3 The sufficiency issue is addressed in a memorandum disposition filed

concurrently with this opinion.

4

In a recent case presenting a similar prosecutorial error, the

government also came forward and acknowledged its error, but, unlike

here, it did not do so until the en banc stage and after repeated

questioning. See United States v. Maloney, No. 11–50311, 2014 WL

801450 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2014). We reversed on the basis of the

government’s concession, even though the issue presented to us in the

opening brief was whether the appellant was denied surrebuttal argument

improperly. Id. at *1 n.1.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 11 of 58
12 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

has occurred and an injustice might otherwise result.” United

States v. Flores-Montano, 424 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir.

2005) (per curiam) (quoting Robertson, 52 F.3d at 791); see

also Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir.

1969) (recognizing that courts “have noticed [prosecutorial]

errors where they were not objected to at trial, or even on

appeal”).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that

“[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be

considered even though it was not brought to the court’s

attention.” As laid out in United States v. Olano, “Rule 52(b)

review — so-called ‘plain-error review’ — involves four

steps, or prongs”: (1) “there must be an error or defect . . .

that has not been . . . affirmativelywaived[] by the appellant”;

(2) “the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than

subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) “the error must have

affected the appellant’s substantial rights”; and (4) “if the

above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the

discretion to remedy the error . . . if the error seriously

affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135

(2009) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted; final

alteration in original) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–36

(1993)). As will appear, we conclude that all of these

requisites are met.

Mageno’s failure to raise the governments’ misstatements

in her opening brief on appeal does not, in this unusual

instance, affect our application of the plain error doctrine. 

Generally, an issue not raised in an opening brief will not be

considered. See e.g., McKay v. Ingleson, 558 F.3d 888, 891

n.5 (9th Cir. 2009); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 740 n.5

(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Martini, 31 F.3d 781, 782

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 12 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 13

n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). But that principle admits of

exceptions. We consider an argument not raised in an

opening brief if: (1) there is “good cause shown,” or “failure

to do so would result in manifest injustice”; (2) the issue is

raised in the appellee’s brief; or (3) failure to properly raise

the issue does not prejudice the defense of the opposing party. 

United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the

second and third circumstances exist and justify our reaching

the issue.5

As to the second justification, we consider arguments not

raised in the opening brief when addressed in the appellee’s

response; an appellee’s brief that merely observes that an

appellant failed to raise an issue is insufficient. See Eberle v.

City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1990). The key

inquiry is whether “the discussion of the issue in [the] briefs

is sufficient to permit an informed resolution of the dispute

and its application [to the appellant].” Ullah, 976 F.2d at

514.

The third consideration, lack of prejudice to the opposing

party, is closely related to the second. Where the party

opposing an appeal has “fully addressed the issue” in its

briefing, the appellant’s failure to raise the issue in an

opening brief generally will “not impair the government’s

position on appeal,” and the government will not, therefore,

be prejudiced by the court’s consideration of the issue. Id.

 

5

 Because two of the justifications for addressing an issue not raised in

an opening brief apply, we do not consider whether this is a case involving

“manifest injustice.” Ullah, 976 F.2d at 514 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 13 of 58
14 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

Here, the government raised the prosecutorial

misstatements issue in its answering brief. The government’s

brief cited Burgos’s testimony at length, and acknowledges

that four government statements made in closing misstated

that testimony. The government also argued that the court

should not reverse in spite of this error and cited: (1) the lack

of bad faith by the government; (2) the lack of a

contemporaneous objection; (3) the judge’s general

admonition that comments by lawyers in closing are not

evidence, and that the jury must decide the facts for itself;

and (4) the claim’s failings on plain error review. In all, the

discussion of the issue spans six pages.

Given the government’s ample discussion of its error, the

government sufficiently addressed the issue of the

prosecutors’ misstatements to allow for that issue’s full

exploration on appeal. For the same reason, the government

is not prejudiced by our consideration of the issue on appeal.6

In arguing to the contrary, our dissenting colleague faults

us for “creat[ing]” an alleged “new exception,” pursuant to

which we purportedlyare “considering an argument raised for

the first time . . . by a member of our panel hearing

argument.” Dissent at 30. But the preceding analysis should

make clear that our conclusion that we may reach the

6 Our dissenting colleague maintainsthat the government was prejudiced

because it “did not have the opportunity to brief fully the precise issue

reached by the majority.” Dissent at 37. This is a curious statement,

because the government devotes six pages of its brief to the error and

makes several merits arguments against reversal.

In addition, both parties recited the trial evidence at length for other

purposes, rendering our assessment of the impact of the prosecutorial

misstatements well-informed.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 14 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 15

prosecution’s misstatements despite Mageno’s failure to raise

the issue in her opening brief turns on the government’s

having canvassed the issue at length in its response, and the

lack of prejudice to the government from consideration of the

issue the government itself raised — not on the appellant’s

embrace of the error when questioned at argument. 

Accordingly, have no need to create a new exception, as it is

already well-established that we may consider an issue raised

for the first time by an appellee. Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp.

v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th Cir. 2006).

Considered in this light, the significance of Mageno’s

adoption of the issue at oral argument is that Mageno, not this

court or the government, is the master of her appeal. Mageno

could have purposely argued sufficiency of the evidence and

no other issue for strategic reasons, because she wanted a

reversal only if no retrial would occur. By checking to assure

that that was not the case, we did not circumvent the precept

that we usually consider only issues raised in the briefs. 

Again, the prosecutorial misconduct issue was raised in the

briefing, albeit by the government.

Moreover, even if an issue is not adequately raised in the

briefing, we are not precluded from addressing it. Rule 52(b)

says nothing about issues reviewed for plain error having to

be raised by the parties. And Rule 52(b) applies on appeal, to

errors that became plain only on appeal. Henderson v. United

States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1127 (2013).

Furthermore, Rule 52(b) was meant as a “restatement of

existing law.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) advisory committee’s

note (1944 adoption). The Supreme Court has long

recognized — before Rule 52(b) came into existence — that

“[i]n exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases,

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 15 of 58
16 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own

motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken,

if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160

(1936) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has itself reversed for plain error

where an issue was “not presented to the Court of Appeals

and was not briefed or argued” to the Supreme Court. Silber

v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 717 (1962) (per curiam). To

do so, the Court relied in part on the principle that “the court,

at its option, may notice a plain error not presented”7 — a

principle stated in language markedly similar to the language

of Rule 52(b), which the Court also cited. Id. at 718. Justice

Kennedy has likewise noted that while “[i]n most cases . . .

the party will have raised the alleged error on appeal,”

sometimes “a court notices an error on its own initiative

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).” Olano,

507 U.S. at 741–42 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Silber,

370 U.S. at 718).

In short, when a government representative concedes that

there was a substantial error in the trial court proceedings

involving prosecutorial conduct, and we conclude that the

plain error standards laid out in Olano are otherwise met —

including that “the error seriously affects the fairness,

7

Silber cites Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,

Rule 40(1)(d)(2), 28 U.S.C., which now appears with only slight

modification at Rule 24. 370 U.S. at 718. Noting that Rule 52(b) restates

the existing law, the Advisory Committee Notes from the 1944 Adoption

of Rule 52 in turn reference the same Revised Rule, as well as “[s]imilar

provisions . . . in the rules of several circuit courts of appeals.”

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 16 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 17

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,”

507 U.S. at 736 (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted), we may consider the error and, if otherwise

appropriate, reverse the conviction.8

Counseling in favor of exercising that authority in this

instance are two primary considerations: first, that the issue

was raised, and briefed, by the appellee; and second, that this

is not only a criminal case, see Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160, but

one in which a government representative’s error is at issue. 

We conclude that despite Mageno’s failure to raise the

 

8 Our dissenting colleague is of course correct that circumstances such

as these do not present themselves very often. But, they are not so rare as

the dissent insists. See, e.g., United States v. Sum of $185,336.07 U.S.

Currency, 731 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (vacating and remanding

forfeiture order even though appellant “did not raise this argument in the

District Court or on appeal”); United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325,

347 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Musquiz, 445 F.2d 963, 966

(5th Cir. 1971) (reversing a conviction for insufficient evidence on a basis

not advanced in the district court or on appeal)); United States v.

Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2001) (vacating sentence for plain

Apprendi error not raised by the defendant, but raised by the government

“in the interest of candor”); United States v. Granados, 168 F.3d 343, 346

(8th Cir. 1999) (reversing and remanding sentence although defendant

“failed to raise these arguments in the district court or before this court”);

United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 105 (5th Cir. 1992)

(vacating co-defendant’s sentence even though he did not “raise[ ] the

issue in the trial court or on appeal,” and holding that “[f]airness as well

as judicial economy dictate that we address now this issue that would

doubtless otherwise be raised in a subsequent habeas proceeding”); United

States v. Murphy, 762 F.2d 1151, 1155 (1st Cir. 1985) (reversing

conviction where error not raised before trial court and not raised on

appeal until oral argument); United States v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381, 383

(9thCir. 1983) (holding defendant’srights under the ConfrontationClause

were violated and reversing the judgment even though “[t]he sixth

amendment issue was not raised in the district court and was neither

briefed nor argued in this court”).

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 17 of 58
18 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

prosecutorial misstatements in her briefs as a ground for

reversal, this case is one in which we may reverse for plain

error if the Olano standards are met.9

III

Addressing the Olano factors, we conclude that all the

factors are met.

First, for us to reverse the jury verdict in this case, there

must be error that is plain. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732–34.

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right “not to be

convicted except on the basis of evidence adduced at trial.” 

United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Accordingly, it has long been the rule in this circuit that

prosecutors “must refrain from introducing evidence not in

the record.” United States v. Artus, 591 F.2d 526, 528 (9th

Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Indeed, in light of their status and

stature as representatives of the government, prosecutors have

an affirmative “obligation . . . to avoid making statements of

9 Our dissenting colleague insists that even if we may review for plain

error now, we should exercise our discretion not to, because Mageno

could raise the issue — actually, an ineffective assistance of counsel

variant of it — in habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We

need not now decide whether punting an otherwise ripe issue from a direct

appeal to habeas corpus review is ever justified. In this case, where the

government has conceded its error, the issue is briefed, and the record

complete, the greater injustice is to require a defendant to wait in prison

one, two, three or more years longer to get to the same result. Nor is such

a circuitous method necessarily desirable from the government’s

perspective, as the inevitable retrial is only pushed back further, and the

difficulty of finding witnesses with fresh recollections compounded.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 18 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 19

fact to the jury not supported by proper evidence introduced

during trial.” Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1079.

Prosecutors are free in argument to suggest that the jury

make “reasonable inferences” from the evidence presented at

trial. United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th

Cir. 1997). But even in circumstances where it would be

reasonable for a prosecutor to argue and for the jury to make

a certain inference from the evidence presented, prosecutors

must not during closing argument flatlymisstate testimony so

as to make it appear that the permissible inference was

affirmatively stated by a witness. See United States v. Gray,

876 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Small,

74 F.3d 1276, 1280–82 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We have thus made

plain that when a prosecutor “ma[kes] unsupported factual

claims . . . . [it] is definitely improper.” United States v.

Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1321 (9th Cir. 1993).

The prosecutors’ statements at the close of Mageno’s trial

misstated important evidence and did so repeatedly. The

clearest instance of the government’s error came on rebuttal,

when the second prosecutor told the jury: “[Burgos] testified

[Mageno] knew why he was deported.” Burgos had not

testified to this fact. Although the prosecutor asked if

Mageno knew why he was deported, he never answered that

question, nor did he testify that Mageno knew that he was

deported.

The first prosecutor, in several other statements, referred

to Mageno’s knowledge of Burgos’s criminal past. He did

not ask the jury to so infer. He did not use an “introductory

phrase,” such as “Isubmit,” to “alert[] the jurors that defense

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 19 of 58
20 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

counsel was not stating a fact, but asking them to use their

common sense in drawing an inference.” Id. at 1321. 

Instead, as the second prosecutor’s later direct misstatement

of Burgos’s testimony would have confirmed to the jury, the

earlier references sounded like, and were likely to be taken as,

assertions of fact based on direct testimony.

10

Up to this point, the government agrees. The government

recognizes that the following statements made in the initial

closing argument, as well as the already identified statement

made in rebuttal, amount to error: “[Mageno] . . . let her

godson who she already knew had been deported for

distributing methamphetamine move in with her”; “[Burgos]

was arrested and deported for distributing methamphetamine. 

This is something [Burgos] explained to you she knew

because he was living with her”; and, “That’s the voice on

the phone that already in her head knew that the person she

was translating for, has a history of distributing

methamphetamine.” To this list, we add one more: The

government’s statement that Mageno “knew she was

translating for a known methamphetamine dealer.”11

10 Any inference would have been fairly weak from the actual evidence,

which did not even directly establish that Mageno knew of the

deportation. Mageno’s knowledge of Burgos’s deportation could have

been inferred from her closeness to Burgos, but establishing knowledge

of the reason for the deportation would then require an inference from an

inference.

11 Our dissenting colleague accepts, as he must, that the prosecution

made one misstatement, but protests that the first four times the

prosecution made the same point less explicitly, the statements were just

requests for inferences from other facts of record. Dissent at 49. The

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 20 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 21

That the prosecutors’ statements during closing argument

were improper is therefore plain.

Second, as we are conducting plain error review, we must

ask if the errors affected Mageno’s “substantial rights,” i.e.,

whether they were sufficiently prejudicial that there exists a

“a reasonable probability that the error[s] affected the

outcome of the trial.” Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262. We may

reverse on plain error review “only if the prosecutor[s’]

improper conduct . . . tainted the verdict and deprived

[Mageno] of a fair trial.” United States v. Sanchez, 659 F.3d

1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)). We consider the statements in the context

of the entire trial, including curative instructions given to the

jury and the weight of the evidence against the defendant, to

government did not in its own review of the record see the statements that

way. It recognized in its brief that there were several “incorrect

statements” (emphasis added) and cited to three of the statements that our

dissenting colleague insists were proper. Moreover, the dissent’s view is

belied by the statements themselves, which do not request that the jury

infer the facts stated but recite them as having been affirmatively

established. While the government could have “invite[d],” Kojayan,

8 F.3d at 1321, the jury to infer that Mageno knew about Burgos’s

deportation and provided argument concerning the facts favoring such an

inference, id., it did not do so.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 21 of 58
22 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

ascertain the statements’ likely effect.12Id.; United States v.

Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2005).

The comments at closing clearly misstated evidence, by

explicitly and implicitly stating, five times in all, that Burgos

testified that Mageno knew he was previously deported for

drug trafficking. Misstating the evidence from trial is a

particularly prejudicial form of misconduct, because it

distorts the information the jury is to rely on in reaching a

verdict. Cf. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181–82

(1986). By doing so, it also usurps the jury’s prerogative of

drawing, or not drawing, otherwise permissible inferences.

In addition, the trial judge did not admonish the jury to

disregard these misstatements. Although the judge gave the

standard instructions that statements from lawyers are not

evidence, and that the jury is to rely on its own recollection

of the evidence at trial, these instructions were never

expressly tied to the misstatements. See United States v.

Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 575 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.

Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he standard

12 Our dissenting colleague distorts this analysis by applying the Jackson

v. Virginia standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to an

analysis of prosecutorial misstatements during closing argument. 

443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979). Our “presum[ption] . . . that the trier of fact

resolved . . . conflict[ing inferences] in favor of the prosecution,” Dissent

at 48 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326), applies in the sufficiency-of-theevidence context, not the prejudicial error context. When we review the

effect that an error had on the outcome of a criminal jury trial, we “must

consider the probable effect the prosecutor’s response would have on the

jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Young, 470

U.S. 1, 12 (1985). In doing that, we do not presume that the jury took the

view of the evidence most favorable to the government, as it may well not

have done so. See, e.g., Dixon v. Williams, 750 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir.

2014) (per curiam).

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 22 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 23

judicial caution that the jury’s recollection controls” is not a

“cure-all,” Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1079, especially where, as

here, repeated misstatements of fact went uncorrected. 

Because Mageno’s attorney did not catch the government’s

error, the jury likely accepted the government’s

characterization of the evidence as a given. And if the jury’s

own recollection of Burgos’s testimony differed from the

prosecutors’ recitation, the jury likely would have speculated

that the prosecutors’ misstatements had at least some factual

basis — that is, that the prosecutors knew the statement was

so, even if there was no such testimony.

13

Moreover, the erroneous comments featured prominently

in both government closing arguments, including the last plea

the members of the jury heard in the primary closing

argument. An error that is “emphasized . . . during [a] trial”

is more likely to influence a jury. See Roger J. Traynor, The

Riddle of Harmless Error 75 (1970). Here, in his very last

statement to the jury, the first prosecutor tied that erroneous

fact directly to the central issue in the case, telling the jury

that Mageno was guilty because she “knew she was

translating for a knownmethamphetamine dealer.” (Emphasis

added.) The second prosecutor reiterated the erroneous

statement by Burgos, this time explicitly, during rebuttal. 

The prominence the government afforded its description of

the nonexistent testimony in its closing arguments reflects the

critical role the point was meant to play in convincing the

jury that Mageno knew Burgos had been involved in drug

activity when she translated his calls.

13 For that reason, assuring the jury that facts not in evidence support the

government’s case, in addition to constituting trial error, can violate a

defendant’s right to due process. See Combs, 379 F.3d at 574.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 23 of 58
24 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

In short, this is not a situation in which the “potential

prejudice of the prosecution’s comments was mitigated”

because “the comment did not pervade the proceedings and

was not emphasized.” Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 916

(9th Cir. 2010).

The misstatement of the evidence was also important in

its effect on Mageno’s defense, and in its connection to the

other evidence before the jury. The defense conceded that

there was a conspiracy to distribute narcotics in the amount

alleged by the government, putting its eggs instead in the

“knowledge” basket. Mageno insisted that she was Burgos’s

dupe — she was used to translate purposely opaque

conversations and was lied to about their content. Consistent

with that defense, Mageno’s counsel during closing argument

characterized the central question in the case as, “What did

she know[,] and when did she know it?” And again: “[D]id

she know what was happening and was it her intention to

further this conspiracy?” Defense counsel repeatedly argued

in closing that (1) Mageno did not know that the coded

conversations she translated were about drug activity; (2) that

at the time she translated the conversations she believed that

they “had to do with cement”; and (3) that Mageno first

learned Burgos was involved in drug trafficking on

November 17, when Burgos and Mageno were being

followed (Mageno wanted to know why they were followed,

and Burgos told her why).

To buy Mageno’s explanation, the jury had to believe that

Mageno would not have known or suspected her godson’s

involvement in the drug trade. If she knew or suspected that

involvement, her insistence that she believed the discussions

were about day laborers and cooking cement would be

decidedly less credible. And for Mageno, who testified in her

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 24 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 25

own behalf, her credibility was critical. By misstating

Burgos’s testimony to include the assertion that Mageno

knew of Burgos’s prior drug trafficking— methamphetamine

trafficking in particular — the prosecutors vastly decreased

any likelihood that the jury would believe her.

The prosecutors’ misstatements may have also confused

defense counsel. There was no break between the

government’s initial closing argument and the defense

argument. Defense counsel followed the government’s lead

in misstating Burgos’s testimony, although with the caveat

that he was not sure Burgos did say that Mageno knew the

reason for the deportation. Then, feeling that he had to poke

holes in the foundational basis for Burgos’s non-existent

testimony, defense counsel launched a weak counterattack,

arguing: “[T]he question is how would he know she knew

why? Did he come up [to her] and say, hey, by the way, I’ve

been dealing drugs, you know, and I’m gone?” Defense

counsel thereby challenged the credibility of its own key

witness, Burgos, who had stated that Mageno was “an

innocent person.” To attack Burgos’s credibility on the basis

of something he did not say likely damaged the defense

overall, by undermining Burgos’s general corroboration of

Mageno’s version of events.14

14 Our dissenting colleague thinks we should hold Mageno’s attorney’s

feet to the fire for failing to object to the prosecution’s misstatements and

then echoing the prosecution’s errors in his closing. Dissent at 56. But

the dissent’s contention that Mageno’s attorney “introduced” the error,

Dissent at 32, misconstrues the record: The government acknowledges it

misstated Burgos’s testimony three times before Mageno’s attorney

approached the lectern. And Mageno’s attorney never committed himself

to the most incriminating statement from the prosecution — that Mageno

knew why Burgos was deported.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 25 of 58
26 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

Lacking any direct evidence, the government’s case

against Mageno relied solely on circumstantial evidence —

principally, the content of the phone calls Mageno translated

and the trip to Yakima — and argued that the jury should

infer that she had to know the topics discussed in the phone

calls were illicit. Aside from the misstated testimony, there

was no direct evidence of Mageno’s knowledge of drug

trading, let alone involvement in it. As her lawyer pointed

out in closing: “Mageno never bought drugs, never brought

drugs, never sought drugs. She never sold drugs. . . . She

never even had drugs. No witness testified that she had any

drugs because she didn’t.” That summary is accurate: The

government presented no evidence that Mageno was ever in

the presence of drugs. And drugs were never explicitly

mentioned in the phone calls Mageno translated, not once. In

a case based entirely on inference, the government’s bald

assertion that Burgos “testified [Mageno] knew” that he was

deported for methamphetamine trafficking stands alone as

powerful, direct evidence that Mageno knew about Burgos’s

history of involvement in the drug trade, and so must have

known what was going on in the phone calls. “Is . . . the past

. . . prologue?” the prosecution asked in its rebuttal argument,

driving home this theme in its final presentation to the jury.

Furthermore, had the statement about Mageno’s

knowledge been made, it would almost surely have been

believed. Burgos was testifying in Mageno’s defense,

presumably would want to help his godmother’s case, and so

had no motive to lie about what she knew concerning his

prior drug trafficking history.

Weighing all the above factors, we conclude that the

government’s misstatements likelyprejudiced the outcome of

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 26 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 27

Mageno’s trial. The plain error substantial rights requirement

was therefore met.

Finally, we consider whether “the error seriously

affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262. “An error

may ‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings’ independent of the

defendant’s innocence”; “[c]onversely, a plain error affecting

substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy [this]

standard.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736–37. We have already

observed that the likelihood that the error in this case affected

the outcome is high. We further conclude that the type of

error that occurred is the something “more” that satisfies the

fourth prong of the plain error analysis: By repeatedly stating

that a key witness gave damaging testimony that he did not in

fact give, the prosecution encouraged the jury to convict

Mageno on the basis of the prosecution’s own statements,

rather than on evidence adduced during trial. This error

seriously impeded the jury’s ability to function as an

impartial fact-finder, thereby affecting the fairness and

integrity of judicial proceedings.

The government and our dissenting colleague suggest that

the fourth prong of plain error review is not met, because the

prosecution did not intentionallymisstate the evidence during

closing argument. We reject this contention for two reasons.

First, our “warrant” to address prosecutorial error “arises

from the defendant’s broad right to a ‘fair trial’ guaranteed by

the Due Process Clause[,]” Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1152

(Trott, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), and “the

touchstone of due process analysis . . . is the fairness of the

trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips,

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 27 of 58
28 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). Prosecutorial misstatements can

constitute error “even where . . . they were apparently made

in good faith.” Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1079; see Bennett L.

Gershman, MentalCulpability andProsecutorial Misconduct,

26 Am. J. Crim. L. 121, 122–25 (1998) (observing, after

surveying the case law, that courts generally apply an

objective approach to claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and

“do not consider a prosecutor’s intent to violate a trial rule”). 

For example, we have held a prosecutor’s invocation of

personal knowledge “unquestionably improper,” even while

“recogniz[ing] the difficulty in identifying errors absent an

objection,” and even while “commend[ing] the United States

Attorney” for “conced[ing] . . . the error” on appeal. United

States v. Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir.

2014). And, as already stated, such misstatements are a type

of error that where possibly determinative can affect the

fairness and integrity of a jury trial, regardless of a

prosecutor’s subjective intent.

Second, while the misstatements here do not rise to the

level of intentional misconduct, they were exceedingly

reckless, and paid too short shrift to the prosecutors’

“obligation” to seek a conviction only on the basis of facts in

the record. Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1079. If the prosecutors

were unsure about what Burgos actually testified to, they

should have qualified their statements accordingly —

especially on rebuttal, after defense counsel questioned

whether Burgos did testify that Mageno knew the reason he

was deported.

The prosecutor in United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046,

1050 (9th Cir. 1994), for example, misstated a fact on which

the defense placed much significance. But the prosecutor

prefaced his misstatement by saying, “I may be wrong, and

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 28 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 29

your recollection controls, but I thought . . . ,” and followed

the misstatement by reminding the jury that, “[a]gain, your

recollection controls.” Id. Here, in contrast to Carrillo, the

prosecutors chose to rely heavily on their own recollection of

the testimony of a witness whom they had not themselves

used in their case in chief. By doing so, they took the risk

that their recollection of the evidence would prove erroneous

— as it did. And then the second prosecutor exacerbated the

problem by relying on the mistake in rebuttal — “He testified

she knew why he was deported.”

“Evidence matters; closing argument matters; statements

from the prosecutor matter a great deal.” Kojayan, 8 F.3d at

1323. Although there is no evidence that the prosecutors’

misstatements were intentional, we nonetheless conclude that

the error seriously affected the fairness of Mageno’s trial.15

In sum, based on our review of the case against Mageno,

we find it reasonably probable that she was convicted based

on the prosecutors’ false account of Burgos’s testimony. We

commend the government for bringing the missteps in this

case to our attention. While it could be said that our decision

to reverse is proof of the old adage that “no good deed goes

unpunished,” we do not see it that way. “[L]awyers

representing the government in criminal cases serve truth and

justice first.” Id. Prosecutors have a special responsibility to

provide “those accused of crime a fair trial.” Id. (quoting

15

 By pointing out that the government was reckless, we do not suggest

that recklessness or any other level of prosecutorial culpability is a

prerequisite to a determination that the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, relevant though it

may be. See Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262. However, such culpability can

justify dismissal of an indictment as a sanction, a remedy we find

unnecessary here. See Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1325.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 29 of 58
30 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (1974)

(Douglas J., dissenting)). By acknowledging its error on

appeal, the government has performed this function

admirably. But the government also created the problem, and

we will, therefore, reverse Mageno’s conviction so that she

may have an untainted shot at maintaining her innocence

without the prosecution’s damaging misstatements.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. Mageno did not object to the

alleged prosecutorial misstatements at trial, and did not argue

that the statements prejudiced her in her appellate briefs.

Mageno’s appeal meets none of our exceptions for

consideration of waived arguments. Instead of following our

precedent and deeming the argument waived, the majority

creates a new exception, considering an argument raised for

the first time not by the appellant at trial, nor in appellate

briefs, but by a member of our panel hearing argument.

Consideration of the issue in these circumstances is

inconsistent with our case law and the purposes behind our

rules about preserving issues for appeal.

Not only does the majority improperly reach the

prosecutorial statements despite Mageno’s waiver, the

majority also incorrectly concludes that the prosecutors’

statements constituted plain error. Only one of the statements

was improper. There was so much evidence submitted by the

government at trial that Mageno would have been convicted

regardless of the statements. Some of the prejudice Mageno

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 30 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 31

may have suffered was mitigated by the district court’s

curative instructions, and any misstatements were

unintentional.

Finally, the majority’s language implies that the district

court judge and the government committed serious errors in

Mageno’s trial. In fact, it was Mageno’s own attorney who

committed the most troubling errors in her trial.

I.

The government admits that at one point in its closing

arguments to the jury, a prosecutor erroneously stated that

NancyMageno’s godson, Jesus Guadalupe Felix Burgos, had

testified that she knew he had been previously convicted and

deported for a drug-related offense. In fact, Burgos had

testified about his close relationship with Mageno and that he

had been previously convicted and deported for that drug

offense, but he had not specifically testified that Mageno

knew why he had been deported. But Mageno’s attorney did

not object to the government’s misleading statement.

In an abundance of caution, the government also asserted

in its appellate brief that three other statements made in its

closing argument were improper, a position with which the

majority now agrees. In my view, these statements were not

erroneous because Mageno’s knowledge could be properly

inferred from the evidence submitted to the jury about the

close relationship between Burgos and Mageno. Regardless,

Mageno’s attorney objected to none of these allegedly

misleading statements.

To recap, the government prosecutor first argued in

closing statements that Mageno “had a choice whether to let

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 31 of 58
32 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

her godson who she already knew had been deported for

distributing methamphetamine move in with her,” and that

Mageno “made the choice to help her godson, Virrio, the one

who had already been deported for distributing

methamphetamine.” Mageno’s attorney did not object that

there was no direct evidence that Mageno knew Burgos had

been deported for distributing methamphetamine.

A few minutes later, the government stated that Burgos

“explained to you she knew [about his deportation] because

he was living with her, then he comes back,” and that

Mageno “already in her head knew that [Burgos], the person

she was translating for, has a history of distributing

methamphetamine.” Mageno’s attorney did not object.

The government concluded its argument on a similar note:

the jury should convict Mageno because she “knew she was

translating for a known methamphetamine dealer.” Mageno’s

attorney did not object. Thus far, in my view, the

government’s statements were proper, based upon the

inference that Mageno knew those facts, and also knew why

Burgos had been deported, on the basis of the evidence

submitted to the jury regarding their relationship.

In the defense argument, Mageno’s attorney stated,

without “a hundred percent” confidence, that Burgos had in

fact testified that Mageno “knew about” why he had been

deported, or that “she knew why I was deported.” This is

when the actual error was first introduced: when Mageno’s

own attorney suggested that Burgos had testified that Mageno

knew why he was deported.

On rebuttal, the government followed Mageno’s attorney

and stated that Mageno knew that Burgos had “been deported

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 32 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 33

because he was trafficking methamphetamine while he was

living with her. He testified she knew why he was deported.”

Mageno’s attorney did not object. While there was sufficient

indirect evidence in the record that Mageno knew the reason

for Burgos’s deportation, Burgos had not testified that

Mageno knew. Both the defense argument and the

government’s closing rebuttal arguments were in error.

Based upon the evidence at trial, including four telephone

calls obtained through lawful wiretaps between Mageno and

drug customers or federal agents posing as drug customers,

where Mageno translated certain suspicious words on behalf

of Burgos, Mageno was convicted of conspiracy to distribute

a controlled substance. Mageno did not file a post-conviction

motion to vacate the judgment and grant a new trial based on

the government’s statements during closing arguments. See

FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. Instead, Mageno filed this appeal on a

single ground: that there was insufficient evidence to support

her conviction. She never raised any of the government’s

statements regarding her knowledge of why Burgos had been

deported. In its appellate brief, the government “admirably,”

in the majority’s words, acknowledged the prosecutors’

possibly misleading statements. Majority Op. at 30. In its

brief, the government argued that the statements nonetheless

did not warrant reversal of Mageno’s conviction, because the

prosecutors had not made the statements in bad faith, Mageno

was not deprived of a fair trial, the district court instructed the

jury that arguments by attorneys are not evidence, and

Mageno would have been convicted even if the government

had not made the statements. Mageno was thus indisputably

on notice of the prosecutors’ statements. However, she did

not submit any reply brief to adopt the statements as a basis

for reversal in her appeal.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 33 of 58
34 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

At the first part of oral argument before this court,

Mageno’s attorney did not affirmatively raise the argument

that the government committed reversible error. More than

four minutes of his allotted ten minutes passed before a

member of the panel of this court asked Mageno’s attorney

about the government’s statements. After further discussion

by the judge, Mageno’s attorney responded to the judge’s

assertion of Mageno’s position by stating that the statements

were “a valid argument” to support reversal. Even then,

Mageno’s attorney spent his subsequent time explaining why

he had made the misleading statement in his closing argument

instead of arguing that the government’s statements

prejudiced Mageno. Near the end of his allotted argument

time, Mageno’s attorney offhandedly stated “I don’t believe

[the government’s statements were] harmless error.”1 At the

very end of argument, Mageno’s attorney returned to the

point in passing, still not clearly arguing that Mageno had

suffered any prejudice from the government’s statements.

II.

The majority errs first by even considering whether to

reverse Mageno’s conviction based on the government’s

statements. Mageno did not object to the government’s

statements at trial. She did not argue in either her opening or

reply brief on appeal that her conviction should be reversed

based on the statements. In fact, her lawyer only commented

on the unraised issue when questioned about it during oral

 

1

 Mageno’s lawyer was so indifferent to the argument, he did not even

state the correct legal standard for our review of the government’s

statements. Mageno did not object to the statements at trial, so we only

reverse if the government’s statements constituted “plain error,” rather

than if the statements were “harmless error.” Majority Op. at 12.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 34 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 35

argument. When an appellant does not present an argument

for review in any brief, we usually would consider that

argument for reversal waived. We recognize some exceptions

to that rule. But, contrary to the majority, none of the

exceptions apply here, because the government did not fully

brief the issues addressed in the majority’s disposition. We

should refuse to review the government’s alleged

misstatements, because Mageno has waived any argument

that the statements constituted “plain error.”

The majority’s review of the government’s statements is

wrong for at least two other reasons. The majority asserts it

considers the prosecutorial comments “in the context of the

entire trial.” Majority Op. at 21. But such review is

impossible without adversarial briefing. Instead, the majority

repeatedly assumes the effect of the prosecutorial statements

from the cold record and its speculation about trial practice.

Whatever review the majority performs, it is not review “in

the context of the entire trial.”

Finally, the majority considers the prosecutorial

statements because Mageno’s attorney did “adopt[] the issue

at oral argument” before this court, so review of the

statements allows Mageno to remain the “master of her

appeal.” Majority Op. at 15. But Mageno’s attorney’s

indifferent responses to questions from a member of this

panel do not constitute “adoption” of an argument for

purposes of our review.

A.

A convicted criminal who fails to object to a prosecutorial

or judicial error at trial can still seek relief on appeal if the

mistake is “a plain error that affects substantial rights.”

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 35 of 58
36 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010), quoting

FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The “burden of establishing

entitlement to relief for plain error is on the defendant

claiming it, and for several reasons . . . that burden should not

be too easy for defendants.” United States v. Dominguez

Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004).

Separately, when an appellant fails to argue, specifically

and distinctly, an issue in his opening brief on appeal, we

usually hold that the appellant has waived his right of

appellate review of that issue, even in criminal cases. United

States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir.

2005).

Mageno did not object to any of the government’s

statements at trial, and did not argue that the statements

merited reversal of her conviction in her opening or reply

briefs on appeal. The government repeatedly argued that

because “Mageno has not argued that the prosecutors’

statements warrant reversal,” she “has therefore forfeited

such a claim.” Thus, under our normal practice, we would not

consider the statements in this appeal.

B.

Irecognize that our court sometimes considers arguments

not raised in an opening brief. Our precedent makes clear that

the circumstances are limited to three well-established

exceptions. “First, we will review an issue not present in an

opening brief for good cause shown, or if a failure to do so

would result in manifest injustice. Second, we have discretion

to review an issue not raised by appellant when it is raised in

the appellee’s brief. Third, we may review an issue if the

failure to raise the issue properly did not prejudice the

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 36 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 37

defense of the opposing party.” United States v. Ullah,

976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Contrary to the majority’s

conclusion, none of the exceptions apply here. Further,

consideration of an issue so thoroughlywaived is inconsistent

with the purposes of our rules about preserving issues for

appeal.

1.

The majority asserts that we may consider the

prosecutorial statements because the government addressed

the statements in its appellate brief, and thus is not

prejudiced, so both the “second and third circumstances [from

Ullah] exist [to] justify our reaching the issue.” Majority Op.

at 13. While the government did notify us of its possibly

misleading statements in the closing argument, the

government did not have the opportunity to brief fully two of

the issues reached by the majority, and thus is prejudiced by

the majority’s reversal on that basis.

The government has never had the opportunity to rebut

the legal sources the majority now offers to reverse Mageno’s

conviction. Majority Op. at 18–30. Had Mageno adopted the

argument in her optional reply brief, as the government likely

assumed, the government would have then had the

opportunity to file a supplemental brief or respond to her

analysis in oral argument. But Mageno did not file any reply

brief. Because of that failure, the government never had the

opportunity to explain (as I do later) the incorrect reasoning

used to reverse Mageno’s conviction.

Second, the government has never had the opportunity to

rebut the majority’s nearly unprecedented relief of reversing

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 37 of 58
38 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

a conviction based on an error in these factual circumstances,

when not objected to at trial or raised in either an opening or

reply brief. The majority cites to no binding authority from

the past thirty years where this court or the Supreme Court

has reversed a conviction when a defendant did not object to

an alleged government error at trial, did not raise the alleged

error in her opening brief, and did not raise or even refer to

the alleged error in her optional reply brief. Even in United

States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936), where the Supreme

Court first recognized that “[i]n exceptional circumstances,

especially in criminal cases, appellate courts . . . may, of their

own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been

taken,” the Court held that “no such case is presented here,”

and affirmed the conviction because “the error assigned was

not made the subject of appropriate exception or request to

charge upon the trial.” Id. at 160.

If Mageno had raised the argument in her reply brief, the

government could have prepared to argue specifically about

the statements at oral argument. But Mageno never did so.

The government thus has not had the opportunity to explain

why this case does not implicate the drastic remedy offered

by the Supreme Court in Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717

(1962) (per curiam).

2 The majority’s reversal in this posture

2 The majority engages in a serious and impressive analysis of our

theoretical power to correct plain errors not presented to us. Majority Op.

at 15–18. But that power is discretionary. United States v. Jeffery,

473 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (9th Cir. 1973). Using that discretion, we have

cabined our authority to review unraised plain errors under Silber and

Rule 52(b) to the three circumstances described in Ullah. See United

States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “we

will not apply an exception [besides the three from Ullah] on our own

accord”).

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 38 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 39

thus prejudices the government. Contrary to the majority,

neither the second nor third exceptions from Ullah apply

here.

2.

We also consider an argument not raised in an opening

brief when there is “good cause shown” or “failure to do so

would result in manifest injustice.” Ullah, 976 F.2d at 514.

Mageno has not shown good cause for her failure to raise the

prosecutorial misstatements in her opening brief. In fact, she

has shown absolutely nothing because she failed to file any

reply brief, and there is nothing in the record to show she was

unable to raise the issue, at the latest, in a reply brief. See,

e.g., Rosenbaum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 484 F.3d

1142, 1150 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering an argument not

The majority recognizes that “circumstances such as these do not

present themselves very often.” Majority Op. at 17 n.8. The majority then

suggests that such circumstances do arise in other circuits with some

frequency. But those far-flung results do not trump our decisions in Kama

and Ullah.

The only decision of ours that the majority cites, United States v.

McKinney, 707 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1983), is at odds not only with Kama

but also with Rule 52(b) itself, because there we incorrectly reviewed

whether the Confrontation Clause violation not objected to at trial was

“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 384–85, rather than under the

correct standard of whether the alleged error was “plain.” See Silber,

370 U.S. at 718; United States v. Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir.

2013) (subjecting alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause not

objected to at trial to plain error review); McKinney, 707 F.2d at 385

(Belloni, J., dissenting) (recognizing thatthe majority applied the incorrect

legal standard). Thus, our application ofthe waiver rules in McKinney was

wrongly decided at the time and is also inconsistent with our later

precedent.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 39 of 58
40 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

raised in an opening brief because appellants explained in

their reply brief why they had not done so).

Nor would Mageno suffer a manifest injustice if we did

not consider the prosecutorial statements. If Mageno did

suffer any prejudice from the government’s statements, she

could still have her conviction vacated, despite her waiver

before this court, by filing a habeas petition based on

ineffective assistance of counsel. She could then properly

raise for judicial review the government’s statements and her

attorney’s failure to object to, or brief, those statements. This

is the approach taken by some of our sister circuits. United

States v. Evans, 131 F.3d 1192, 1193 (7th Cir. 1997)

(refusing to address an issue raised by defendant for the first

time in a reply brief, because the defendant “may present this

contention under 28 U.S.C. § 2255”); see also United States

v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290–92 (11th Cir. 2003)

(Fullam, J., concurring) (appellants cannot be afforded relief

on direct appeal “but must await collateral attack via a § 2255

motion” because they did not object to the error at trial or

raise the issue on appeal even though “neither appellant

received a fundamentally fair trial”).

Requiring Mageno to raise the ineffectiveness of her

counsel in a collateral proceeding is particularly necessary

here, because Mageno still employs the same counsel who

acted deficiently at trial and on appeal. I have found no case

where a court has held counsel to be ineffective when the

lawyer still represents the defendant. Mageno’s attorney is

still acting as her agent, so she is responsible for any

negligent acts he may have committed. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–54 (1991); accord Walls v.

Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 1998) (viewing

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 40 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 41

“counsel’s pronouncements regarding his [own ineffective]

performance with extreme skepticism”).

Because the majority wrongly concludes that the second

and third Ullah exceptions apply, it “do[es] not consider

whether this is a case involving ‘manifest injustice.’”

Majority Op. at 13 n.5. Regardless, it criticizes my view that

Mageno should raise the government’s statements in a

collateral proceeding after firing her attorney because this

would be a “greater injustice,” and states that “[w]e need not

now decide whether punting an otherwise ripe issue from a

direct appeal to habeas corpus review is ever justified.” Id. at

18 n.9. But that argument misses the point. As I explain

above, the ineffective-assistance issue is not ripe, because

Mageno has not fired her attorney or raised the issue, and the

record about Mageno’s attorney’s strategic decisionmaking

(or lack thereof) is not complete. While the majority suggests

it would be an injustice to require Mageno “to wait in prison

one, two, three or more years longer to get to the same result”

of release from prison, that is precisely what the Supreme

Court requires: even when a defendant has a meritorious

claim for ineffective assistance, the defendant often must

wait, in prison, to file a collateral attack instead of having a

court decide the issue on direct appeal. Massaro v. United

States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (“in most cases a motion

brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for

deciding claims of ineffective assistance”).

3.

I understand that our rules about preserving issues can

sometimes seem academic and formalistic, rather than

practical. As a result, we often see serious disagreements

regarding whether to apply the rules in face of an alleged

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 41 of 58
42 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

“manifest injustice.” See, e.g., Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d

1042, 1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2012); id. at 1053–54 (Wallace, J.,

dissenting); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059,

1070–72 (9th Cir. 2012); id. at 1077–78 (Ikuta, J.,

dissenting).

There are indeed important “formal” reasons for holding

that a party waives an issue if he fails specifically and

distinctly to provide argument about the issue at trial or in

appellate briefs. Because judges “are not like pigs, hunting

for truffles buried in briefs,” we require parties to preserve

valid issues to assist our review. Greenwood v. F.A.A.,

28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994), citing United States v.

Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). As a general

matter, we have an adversarial court system, where “appellate

courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and

research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions

presented and argued by the parties before them.” Nat’l

Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756

n.10 (2011); Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local

1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2298 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,

concurring in the judgment); see also Diarmuid F.

O’Scannlain, The Role of the Federal Judge Under the

Constitution: Some Perspectives from the Ninth Circuit, 33

HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 975–78 (2010). We should

also encourage parties to raise issues before district judges,

who have greater competence to find facts, which allows us

to rule on a complete record. Joan E. Steinman, Appellate

Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and

Propriety of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First

Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1521, 1602–04 (2012).

Further, we do not have the resources to be able to examine

minutely every trial record without assistance from the

litigants to determine if a defendant’s constitutional rights

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 42 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 43

have been violated. Sarah M. R. Cravens, Involved Appellate

Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 272–73 (2004).

Regardless of our personal views on our law about

waiver, we, as a three-judge panel, have no power to create a

new exception beyond the three from Ullah. See Kama,

394 F.3d at 1238 (“we will not apply an exception [besides

the three from Ullah] on our own accord”). We are bound by

a prior decision about a procedural rule like appellate waiver

no less than a decision about a substantive rule. Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Because

this case does not meet any of the exceptions from Ullah, we

should not consider the prosecutorial statements at all.

C.

The majority’s decision to consider the prosecutorial

statements is not only inconsistent with our case law and the

formal bases for our waiver rules. There are also important

practical reasons for our rules, which are well-illustrated by

this appeal.

As the majority describes, we can only reverse Mageno’s

conviction if the government’s alleged misstatements

“affected Mageno’s ‘substantial rights’” in that “they were

sufficiently prejudicial.” Majority Op. at 21. The majority

carefully reviews the record to determine the prejudice

Mageno may have suffered. But it may have missed a

statement by the government or the district court judge that

further mitigated any prejudice that Mageno suffered from

the comments. The majority may have incorrectly assessed

the extent of the evidence submitted to the jury against

Mageno. Because Mageno failed to raise the issue in opening

or reply brief, the government has not been afforded the

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 43 of 58
44 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

opportunity to submit reference to evidence or argument

regarding the tone or inflection used by the prosecutors when

making the statements, considerations which we recognize

are important in reviewing whether an attorney argument is

improper. Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101, 1114–15

(9th Cir. 2005). All the majority has is the cold record and six

pages of the government’s appellate brief as its basis for

deciding to reverse Mageno’s conviction.

Indeed, as the majority correctly states, we must consider

the government’s statements “in the context of the entire

trial.” Majority Op. at 21. But there is no way to examine the

context of this trial without adversarial briefing. Instead, the

majority cites to generalities from other cases and its own

speculation and understanding of trial practice: “[m]isstating

the evidence from trial is a particularly prejudicial form of

misconduct,” id. at 22; “the jury likely accepted the

government’s characterization” and “likely would have

speculated that the prosecutors’ misstatements had at least

some factual basis,” id. at 23; “[a]n error that is ‘emphasized

. . . during [a] trial’ is more likely to influence a jury,” id.

(citations omitted); “[t]he prominence the government

afforded . . . reflects the critical role the point was meant to

play in convincing the jury that Mageno knew Burgos had

been involved in drug activity,” id.; “[t]he prosecutors’

misstatements may have also confused defense counsel,” and

that the defense attorney “fe[lt] that he had to poke holes in

the foundational basis for Burgos’s non-existent testimony,”

id. at 25; Mageno’s attorney’s statement “likely damaged the

defense overall,” id.; and “had the statement about Mageno’s

knowledge been made, it would almost surely have been

believed,” id. at 26. These are generalizations, speculations,

and assumptions about the jury’s response, the government’s

intent, and Mageno’s attorney’s actions. They are not

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 44 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 45

grounded in the record, and are not necessarily true of the

actual trial we are reviewing.

If we refused to review the statements, Mageno could file

a habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

That would allow her to provide specific record evidence

about the actual trial we are reviewing. But the majority’s

premature consideration fails to review the comments in the

context of the entire trial.

D.

Finally, the majority suggests that its review honors the

principle that Mageno is the “master of her appeal,” and that

it only reviews the comments because Mageno’s attorney

adopted the issue at oral argument. Majority Op. at 15.

But Mageno’s attorney did not adopt the argument. He

merely agreed with a member of this court that it was “a valid

argument.” He never made a coherent argument for why we

should reverse, instead misstating the legal standard for our

review. His passing responses do not constitute adoption of

an argument. See Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 980 n.6

(9th Cir. 2000) (refusing to consider an argument suggested

by a habeas petitioner when stated with “cryptic” and

“passing” references, because “we [do not] see how wholly

crafting an argument on [the petitioner’s] behalf could be

anything but prejudicial to the Warden”); accord Swipies v.

Kofka, 419 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) (refusing to review

an argument when the habeas petitioner did not object at trial

or raise the argument in his appellate briefs, in light of his

“inaction” and “relative indifference” to the argument).

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 45 of 58
46 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

E.

Under our usual rules requiring an appellant to raise an

issue in its briefs, Mageno has waived review of the

government’s allegedly improper statements. This appeal

does not meet any of the exceptions we have recognized to

overcome such a waiver. Instead, the majority makes up a

new exception out of whole cloth, at odds with the nature of

the American adversarial system and inappropriate in this

posture. There is no basis for the majority’s misguided

consideration of the government’s alleged misstatements in

Mageno’s trial. When a judge asks a question or makes a

statement that, as the record proves here, was not adopted by

defense counsel, the statement or question is not the

appellant’s issue on appeal.

III.

Even if we were to consider the government’s statements,

the majority errs in reversing Mageno’s conviction. Mageno

did not object to the statements, so we review for plain error.

We should only reverse if “(1) there is an error; (2) the error

is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute;

(3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which

in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the

district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262 (citations and

alterations omitted).

No plain error exists here. The jury could have inferred

from the indirect evidence that Mageno knew why Burgos

had been deported, which means that the government made

only one misstatement. Even if we accept that all of the

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 46 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 47

prosecutors’ statements at issue were erroneous, there is still

no basis to reverse the conviction because the statements did

not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). The evidence against

Mageno was so strong that the jury would have reached the

same verdict without the statements, some of the prejudice

she suffered was mitigated by the district court’s curative jury

instructions, and any misstatements were inadvertent.

A.

In his testimony, Burgos stated that he had been living

with Mageno in 2007, and that he was deported because he

was trafficking methamphetamine. After he returned to the

United States in March 2010, he moved back in with Mageno.

Because of an objection, Burgos never answered the

government’s flat question of whether Mageno knew why

Burgos was deported.

In rebuttal argument, a prosecutor stated that Burgos

“testified she knew why he was deported.” This statement

was incorrect. But the other statements made by the

government in closing argument are not clearly false. Burgos

testified that he had been living with Mageno (his

godmother), was deported for drug trafficking, and then

moved back in with her. The jury could infer both that

Mageno knew Burgos had been deported and why he had

been deported. Prosecutors are free to argue reasonable

inferences from the record. United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d

1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989). Each of the other supposed

misstatements the government made in closing was based on

the reasonable inference that Mageno knew why Burgos had

been deported, insofar as Mageno and Burgos were close and

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 47 of 58
48 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

Burgos left Mageno’s house for three years and then,

mysteriously, returned.

Contrary to the majority, we do not review whether that

inference was “fairly weak,” Majority Op. at 20 n.10, or even

whether the government “request[ed] that the jury infer the

facts stated.” Id. at 21 n.11, citing United States v. Kojayan,

8 F.3d 1315, 1321 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding the government

did not commit misconduct when it “invite[d] the jury to infer

things from the evidence,” but not holding the inverse, that a

failure to invite the jury to reach a reasonable inference would

necessarilybe improper). Instead, we review onlywhether the

inference was “reasonable.” Gray, 876 F.2d at 1411; see also

United States v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276, 1281, 1284 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (in an out-of-circuit case cited by the majority, the

court held that a statement was an unreasonable inference

from the evidence because there was “no evidence” to

support the statement, but nonetheless affirmed the

conviction). Here, the inference was reasonable because there

was indeed some evidence to support the inference that

Mageno knew why Burgos had been deported. Additionally,

when we review a conviction on appeal we “must

presume–even if it does not affirmatively appear in the

record–that the trier of fact resolved any such conflict[ing

inferences] in favor of the prosecution.” Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979).3

3 The majority disputes the relevance of Jackson. Majority Op. at 22

n.12. But it is actually the majority’s citation to Dixon v. Williams,

750 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2014) that is irrelevant. Here, Mageno had not

submitted “considerable evidence” that she did not know whyBurgos was

deported. Id. at 1036. The only evidence submitted was that Mageno and

Burgos were close, which supports the reasonable inference that Mageno

knew why Burgos was deported. In such a case, we should presume that

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 48 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 49

At most, then, I believe the government made one, rather

than five, erroneous statements in closing arguments: namely,

that Burgos had testified that Mageno knew why her godson

was deported.4

B.

But even if I agreed that all of the government’s

statements were based on unreasonable inferences from the

evidence and thus erroneous, there was sufficient evidence at

trial that it is improbable the jury would have reached a

different verdict if the government had not made them.

Majority Op. at 3, 11 (agreeing with the government that the

evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict); United

States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir. 1987)

(reversal of conviction based on prosecutorial misstatements

only justified when “it is more probable than not that the

misconduct materially affected the verdict”).

Jurors heard four telephone calls from lawfully obtained

wiretaps between Mageno and drug customers or federal

agents posing as drug customers. In those calls, Mageno

the jury followed that reasonable inference. Also, Dixon was decided

under the “harmless,” rather than “plain,” error standard. Id. at 1034–36.

4 The government, in an abundance of caution, suggested in its brief that

three of the other statements were improper. But the government also

argued that “[t]he jury could have reasonably found that [Mageno] would

have likely known the circumstances that surrounded [Burgos’s]

deportation,” which would mean that only one of the statements was

erroneous. See Gray, 876 F.2d at 1417. The majority latches on to the

government’s suggestion that the three additional statements were

improper, but fails to analyze the government’s later, and correct,

argument that those three statements were proper. Majority Op. at 21 n.11.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 49 of 58
50 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

translated conversations for Burgos. A law enforcement agent

testified that the conversations included code words for

narcotics and narcotics sales.

After Mageno confronted an undercover agent who was

following her, and Burgos told her that he was involved in

drug activities, she refused to mention Burgos’s location to a

caller “over the phone,” because “things are also happening

here.” An agent with knowledge of this conversation testified

at trial that Mageno intended for the caller to call Burgos on

a different number in case a law enforcement offer was

listening. After Mageno indisputably knew of Burgos’s drug

activities, she traveled with him to Yakima, Washington.

This evidence shows that regardless of whether the

prosecutors had made the statements, the jurywould still have

convicted Mageno. Although “there was no direct evidence

of Mageno’s knowledge of drug trading,” Majority Op. at 26,

the testimony at trial demonstrated that Mageno continued to

interact with Burgos at least twice after she indisputably

knew that he was dealing drugs, when she was evasive

towards the telephone caller, and on the trip to Yakima. Her

continued interaction with Burgos after she certainly knew he

was involved in narcotics provides strong circumstantial

evidence that she knew of his involvement all along.

C.

Even if the government’s statements were in error, most

of the prejudice Mageno may have suffered was mitigated by

the district court’s jury instructions. First, before opening

statements, the judge stated that “the questions of the lawyers

and their arguments are not evidence. What the witnesses say

is evidence. . . so it’s the statements of the witnesses, the

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 50 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 51

testimony of the witnesses, that’s important.” During jury

instructions, before closing arguments, the district court

instructed the jury that:

In reaching your verdict, you may consider

only the testimony and exhibits received in

evidence. The following things are not

evidence and you may not consider them in

deciding what the facts are: Number one,

questions, statements, objections, and

arguments by the - - let me start that again.

Number one, questions, statements,

objections, and arguments by the lawyers are

not evidence. The lawyers are not witnesses.

Although you may consider a lawyer’s

questions to understand the answers of a

witness, the lawyer’s questions are not

evidence. Similarly, what the lawyers have

said in their opening statements, what they

will say at their closing arguments, and at

other times, is intended to help you interpret

the evidence, but it is not evidence. If the facts

as you remember them differ from the way the

lawyers state them, your memory of them

controls.

Finally, the judge repeated one more time: “The arguments

and statements of the attorneys are not evidence. If you

remember the facts differently from the way the attorneys

have stated them, you should base your decision on what you

remember.”

Because juries are presumed to follow instructions given

to them, the district judge’s curative statements mitigated the

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 51 of 58
52 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

prejudice Mageno may have suffered from the misstatements.

See United States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1431 (9th Cir.

1995) (even if the prosecutorial statement was improper, the

district court’s caution to the jury that “‘[q]uestions,

objections, statements, and arguments of counsel are not

evidence in the case.’ . . . neutralized any prejudicial effect

the prosecutor’s statement may have had”).

The majority tries to distinguish this rule by arguing that

“general” rather than “specific” instructions do not mitigate

the prejudice caused by prosecutorial misstatements of fact.

Majority Op. at 22. But the majority can only do so by

overreading our decisions. Though we have suggested that

general jury instructions do not always fully “neutralize” the

harm of an improper prosecutorial comment, United States v.

Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1992), United States v.

Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 575 (9th Cir. 2004), we have never

held that general instructions are wholly irrelevant to our

determination of prejudice, and in fact have held precisely the

opposite. Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 914–16 (9th Cir.

2010) (“much of the potential prejudice of the prosecution’s

comments was mitigated. The trial court sustained a number

of objections and gave timely cautionary instructions to the

jury, including general instructions about the hortative nature

of summation”); Bracy, 67 F.3d at 1431–32. Where, as here,

the district judge thrice reminded the jury that only the

evidence could be considered in reaching its verdict, our case

law recognizes mitigation of the prejudice Mageno may have

suffered from the improper statements.

D.

Lastly, there is no evidence in the record that the

government’s misstatements were intentional. Though the

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 52 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 53

“touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the

culpability of the prosecutor,” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,

219 (1982), we have repeatedly recognized that “[a]nyone

can make a mistake,” so to “determin[e] the proper remedy”

for prosecutorial misstatements, “we must consider the

government’s willfulness in committing the misconduct and

its willingness to own up to it.” Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1318.

Here, the government has been willing to own up to its

arguable misconduct, pointing out the questionable

statements to us and to Mageno in its appellate brief despite

Mageno’s complete failure to object at trial or raise the issue

in her appellate briefs. This willingness, on the part of the

government, to own up to its possible errors provides yet

another reason that the statements did not affect Mageno’s

substantial rights, meriting reversal of conviction.

Once more, the majority offers little in the face of our

cases recognizing the importance of prosecutorial intent.

Majority Op. at 27–28. From our law, the majority cites only

our decision in United States v. Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d

1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 2014), where we affirmed the appellant’s

conviction because “there’s no reason to believe the jury

would have accepted the version of events posited by [the

appellant]. . . at trial—even absent the prosecutor’s erroneous

[statement]—[the appellant] has failed to demonstrate that the

prosecutorial error in this case affected his substantial rights.”

As I have stated, there is no reason to believe the jury would

have accepted Mageno’s story that she did not know of the

conspiracy given her close relationship with Burgos, and her

continued association with him even after she indisputably

knew he was dealing narcotics. The majority also cites a law

review article that observes that courts “generally” apply an

objective, rather than intent-based, approach to prosecutorial

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 53 of 58
54 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

misconduct. Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and

Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 121 (1998).

Not only is a fifteen-year-old academic survey of out-ofcircuit case law and general perceptions of that law not

binding upon us, the article actually concluded that there are

several instances when a prosecutor’s mental state should be

relevant and suggests that “[c]ourts . . . explicitly identify a

prosecutor’s mental culpability in determining whether the

conduct was improper.” Id. at 164.

The majorityimplies that prosecutorial intent matters only

when the government qualifies the misstatements. Majority

Op. at 28–29, citing United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046,

1050 (9th Cir. 1994). But we have not recognized such a

distinction. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1193

(9th Cir. 1993) (“[w]e do not believe that the [error] rendered

Jeffries’ trial fundamentally unfair. First, the statement was

inadvertent and not a prosecutorial attempt to elicit otherwise

inadmissible evidence”); Gage v. United States, 167 F.2d

122, 125–26 (9th Cir. 1948) (“[i]nsofar as any inaccuracy

existed in the prosecutor’s statement to the jury, it appears to

have been unintentional,” which supported our conclusion

that the “alleged error is not such as could have so seriously

prejudiced the rights of appellant as to require us to take

notice of it in the absence of objection or assignment of

error”).

As most of the government’s statements were based on

reasonable inferences from Burgos’s testimony and the

record, they were not erroneous. Gray, 876 F.2d at 1417.

Mageno faced so much evidence in her trial that there is no

“reasonable probability” that absent any government

misstatements she would have been acquitted. Hein, 601 F.3d

at 914. The district court repeatedly admonished the jury that

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 54 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 55

the statements of the lawyers were not evidence, which

further mitigated any prejudice Mageno may have suffered.

Bracy, 67 F.3d at 1431. The record shows that the

government made anymisstatements inadvertently, and when

it realized the errors, brought them to our attention. Kojayan,

8 F.3d at 1318. Thus, even if Mageno had not waived review

of the prosecutorial statements, the statements did not affect

the outcome of her trial and did not seriously affect the

fairness of judicial proceedings, so there was no plain error

and we should not reverse her conviction.

IV.

Finally, I disagree with the implications of the language

the majority uses. The majority states that the “prosecutors’

statements during closing argument were improper,” Majority

Op. at 21, implies that the prosecutors failed to “serve truth

and justice first,” id. at 29, and states that it was the

prosecutors who “created the problem” here. Id. at 30.5 The

majority also implicitly condemns the district court for not

“expressly t[ying]” the instructions to the prosecutors’

misstatements. Id. at 22. But the truly negligent actor in

Mageno’s trial, her attorney, is mentioned only in passing.

5 The majority compares this appeal to our “recent case presenting a

similar prosecutorial error [where] the government also came forward and

acknowledged its error, but, unlike here, it did not do so until the en banc

stage and after repeated questioning.” Majority Op. at 11 n.4, discussing

United States v. Maloney, No. 11–50311, 2014 WL 801450 (9th Cir. Feb.

28, 2014) (en banc). The comparison is irrelevant and highly misleading:

that case involved intentional and far more troubling prosecutorial

misconduct by the government, by a different United States Attorneys’

Office, and the Assistant United States Attorneys in this case brought the

potentially erroneous statements to our attention in their answering brief,

not after questioning by the panel.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 55 of 58
56 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

Although the majority does not explicitly point out

Mageno’s attorney’s deficient performance, his errors are

obvious even from the majority’s description of the record.

Mageno’s defense “put[] its eggs . . . in the ‘knowledge’

basket.” Id. at 24. Despite this theory of the case, her attorney

failed to object when the government suggested and then

unambiguously stated that Mageno knew why Burgos had

been deported, which eviscerated the supposed defense

strategy. Id. at 10. After he failed to object, he still

maintained focus on Mageno’s knowledge in closing

argument. Id. at 24. Shockingly, he then himself misstated

Burgos’s testimony and, according to the majority,

dramatically undermined his own theory of the case. Id. at 25.

The majority assumes, without any record citation, that the

government’s statements made him “launch[] a weak

counterattack,” and “damaged the defense overall.” Id. Then

he failed to object when the government clearlymisstated the

evidence by arguing that Burgos testified that Mageno knew

why he had been deported. Id. at 26 (which is accurate in only

one of the five statements).

What the majority overlooks in its description of the trial

is that Mageno’s attorney never objected to the government’s

allegedly harmful statements, and he did not file a motion for

a new trial. He did not appeal to this court on the basis of the

government’s statements. Even after the government raised

the potentially erroneous statements in its answering brief, he

did not file a reply brief, as he was entitled to, to adopt the

argument pointed out by the government. Finally, he did not

raise these prosecutors’ statements at oral argument before

this court. Only when a judge of this panel brought up the

statements did Mageno’s attorney state that the judge raised

a good argument. He did not adopt or specifically enunciate

the legal argument.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 56 of 58
UNITED STATES V. MAGENO 57

The majorityreminds us that “[p]rosecutors have a special

responsibility to provide ‘those accused of crime a fair trial.’”

Majority Op. at 29, quoting Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1323. But

“[t]he government is not responsible for, and hence not able

to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a

conviction or sentence.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 693 (1984).6

V.

The majority is simply wrong. We should not review the

government’s statements from the closing arguments. Even

if we did, we should only review one statement: that Burgos

testified that Mageno knew he was deported because of his

involvement in drug activity. The other statements about

Mageno’s knowledge were fair inferences from the record.

Moreover, even if all of the statements were improper, we

6 The majority and I have a factual disagreement over whether Mageno’s

attorney “introduced” the error, based on our disagreement about whether

the government’s first three statements were improper. Majority Op. at 25

n.14. But the majority does not, and cannot, question the other serious

errors performed by Mageno’s counsel independent of his own erroneous

statements, including his failure to object to the government’s statements,

his failure to file a motion for a new trial, his failure to appeal the

statements to this court, his failure to file a reply brief, and his failure to

prepare to discuss the statements at oral argument.

Regardless of Mageno’s counsel’s performance, I would not reverse

Mageno’s conviction, because “the result of the proceeding would [not]

have been different” in the absence of his errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694. Mageno did not suffer sufficient prejudice that we could determine

she would have been acquitted absent the prosecutorial statements, and

thus did not suffer prejudice from her counsel’s deficient performance. It

is the majority that should agree with me, by “hold[ing] Mageno’s

attorney’s feet to the fire,” given its own recitation of the litany of his

errors and its conclusion that Mageno was prejudiced.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 57 of 58
58 UNITED STATES V. MAGENO

still should not reverse because the result of the trial would

have been the same without the statements. “Reversal for

error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages

litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to

ridicule it.” Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error

50 (1970). Additionally, I am concerned that the negligent

actor most responsible for any mistakes at trial, Mageno’s

own attorney, goes unnamed in the majority’s opinion.

On the actual basis of Mageno’s appeal, her argument that

there was insufficient evidence of her involvement in the

conspiracy, we should affirm, because a reasonable jury could

conclude that Mageno knew that Burgos was dealing drugs

and that her conduct facilitated that conspiracy. United States

v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

I dissent.

 Case: 12-10474, 08/11/2014, ID: 9199547, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 58 of 58