Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-17543/USCOURTS-ca9-09-17543-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
B. A.
Appellant
M. D.
Appellant
N. D.
Appellant
T. F.
Appellant
C. J.
Appellant
C. K.
Appellant
J. K.
Appellant
G. S.
Appellant
State of Hawaii Department of Education
Appellee
A. U.
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

N. D.; A. U.; C. K.; C. J.; M. D.; 

B. A.; G. S.; T. F.; J. K., disabled

minors, through their parents No. 09-17543

acting as guardians ad litem, D.C. No.

Plaintiffs-Appellants,  1:09-cv-00505-

v. AWT-BMK

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF OPINION

EDUCATION,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

A.Wallace Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 10, 2010—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed April 5, 2010

Before: Jerome Farris, Dorothy W. Nelson and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Farris

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COUNSEL

Carl M. Varady, Honolulu Hawaii; Stanley E. Levin and

Susan K. Dorsey, Levin Education Access Project, Honolulu,

Hawaii, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Mark J. Bennett, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Dierdre

Marie-Iha and Holly Shikada, Department of the Attorney

General, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the defendant-appellee.

OPINION

FARRIS, Senior Circuit Judge:

N.D., et al., disabled minors enrolled in the State of

Hawaii’s public school system, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-

1487 (2006), appeal an order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to prevent Hawaii from shutting

down public schools on seventeen Fridays and concurrently

furloughing the teachers. We agree with the district court that

the stay-put provision of the IDEA was not intended to cover

system-wide changes in public schools that affect disabled

and non-disabled children alike, and that such system-wide

changes are not changes in educational placement. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343

(2006). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)

(2006) to hear this interlocutory appeal. We affirm.

I.

The State of Hawaii is currently in the midst of a major fiscal crisis. To help alleviate the fiscal crisis, Hawaii decided to

shut down the public schools for seventeen Fridays in the

2009-2010 school year. School children, disabled and nondisabled alike, would not attend school on those Fridays. The

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elimination of those seventeen Fridays from the school calender constitutes a reduction in instructional days of approximately ten percent. Hawaii reached a negotiated agreement,

covering the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years, with the

Hawaii State Teachers Association, the state teachers union,

to implement furloughs of all public school teachers on the

Fridays when the schools were closed. The first so-called

“furlough Friday” was on October 23, 2009. 

In response to the impending furloughs, N.D. requested a

due process hearing on October 19, 2009 from the State of

Hawaii Department of Education regarding the potential

change in his individual educational program.1 Along with

this request, N.D. invoked the stay-put provisions of the

IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006). Hawaii did not adjust

the furloughs in response to the invocation of the stay-put provision and moved forward with the furloughs. 

N.D. filed suit in district court on October 20, 2009, naming only the State of Hawaii Department of Education as a

defendant. The plaintiffs included nine disabled children

enrolled in five public schools. N.D. alleges that the furlough

of the teachers and concurrent shutdown of the public schools

violated his rights under the IDEA. Specifically, N.D. alleges

that the furloughs constituted a change in his educational

placement, and as part of his request for a due process hearing, he was entitled to remain in his then-current educational

1An individual educational program is a written statement that is developed for each disabled child and includes (1) information on the child’s

present level of academic achievement and functional performance; (2) a

statement of annual goals and how they will be measured; (3) information

on what special education services will be provided to the child; (4) an

explanation of the extent to which the child will not be in class with nondisabled children; (5) statement of any accommodations necessary to measure academic achievement; and (6) the date services are to begin for the

child and the approximate frequency, location, and duration of those services. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006); L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.,

556 F.3d 900, 905 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 90 (2009).

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placement. N.D. moved for a temporary injunction of the furloughs. The temporary injunction was denied by the district

court on October 22, 2009.2

On November 9, 2009, the district court held a hearing on

whether a preliminary injunction should be issued. The

injunctive relief N.D. has sought over the course of the litigation is an end to the school furloughs as they affect the plaintiffs. Prior to the hearing, N.D. submitted evidence as to the

harm suffered by the disabled children as a result of the first

several furlough days. Hawaii submitted evidence that it was

undertaking efforts to provide the disabled children with alternate services consistent with their IEPs.

This timely appeal followed the denial of N.D.’s motion for

a preliminary injunction.

II.

The State of Hawaii alleges that N.D. failed to join a necessary party, the HSTA. Hawaii alleges that the HSTA is a necessary party to the litigation because Hawaii negotiated a

contract with the HSTA for the furlough days and a preliminary injunction would void that contract, affecting HSTA’s

contract rights. The district court failed to rule on this issue,

therefore we review it de novo. UOP v. United States, 99 F.3d

344, 347 (9th Cir. 1996).

The HSTA is necessary if complete relief cannot be granted

without it. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(A); Altmann v. Republic

of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d 541 U.S.

677 (2004). In the alternative, we consider whether the HSTA

2District Judge Ezra was the presiding judge for the temporary injunction motion. On November 3, 2009, Senior Circuit Judge Tashima was

designated the United States District Judge temporarily for the District of

Hawaii for this case. Judge Tashima presided at the preliminary injunction

hearing. 

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claims a legally protected interest in the subject of the action

such that a decision without it will (1) impair or impede its

ability to protect that interest; or (2) expose N.D. and the State

of Hawaii to the risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations by

reason of that interest. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B); Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 276

F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002). If the HSTA satisfies either

of these alternative tests, it is necessary to the instant action

and must be joined. Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1155. 

[1] As to the first test, we have held that a “party to a contract is necessary . . . to litigation seeking to decimate that

contract.” Id. at 1157. Hawaii argues that the negotiated

agreement would be voided by the injunctive relief sought by

N.D. because Hawaii would have to order the teachers back

to school, which Hawaii alleges violates the contract. This is

premised on paragraph (3)(c) of the contract which provides

that the furloughs that may be implemented are subject to the

condition that “[a]ll 10 month employees shall be placed on

furloughs for a total of 34 days over the 2009-2011 fiscal

biennium.” (emphasis added). Once the furloughs have been

implemented, then employees are mandatorily furloughed for

34 days over two years. There appears to be no option for

recalling the teachers. Forcing the State to violate the contract

would render the entire contract void because the furlough

provision is the whole purpose of the contract. See Beneficial

Hawaii, Inc. v. Kida, 30 P.3d 895, 917 (Haw. 2001).3

[2] In this case, complete relief can be granted since an

injunction would not render the contract illegal. An injunction

would only require the schools to be open and the IEPs followed. The injunction does not order the State to order the

teachers back to work nor does it declare the furloughs illegal.

The furloughs are a byproduct of shutting the schools down.

3We look at state law to construe contracts. See Island Ins. Co., Ltd. v.

Hawaiian Foliage & Landscape, Inc., 288 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir.

2002). 

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N.D. does not have to prove that the contract is illegal for the

injunction to issue. The question of how Hawaii decides to

staff the schools when they are open and implement the IEPs

is not before us. The State has not shown that an injunction

would necessarily force it to violate the contract.

[3] Turning to the alternate test, the HSTA could be a necessary party if it claims a legally protected interest. The

HSTA does not have a legally protected interest here. The

negotiated agreement provides simply that Hawaii “may [ ]

implement furloughs.” (emphasis added). The furloughs are at

the State’s option, not the teachers’. If Hawaii had decided not

to implement the furloughs then the teachers would have had

to show up for work as usual. The HSTA interest was an ironclad guarantee of no layoffs. This guarantee gave the State the

option to furlough teachers. That interest is not affected

regardless of whether the furloughs were implemented. The

HSTA is not a necessary party and does not have to be joined.

III.

Hawaii also argues that N.D. failed to exhaust all of his

administrative remedies before coming to federal court.

Whether exhaustion is required under the IDEA is a question

of law that is reviewed de novo. Doe v. Arizona Dept. of

Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1997). 

[4] It is undisputed that N.D. has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He has not completed his due process hearing. Judicial review under the IDEA in a particular case is

normally available only if the plaintiff exhausts her administrative remedies. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006); Kutasi v. Las

Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir.

2007). As we have recognized previously, the exhaustion

requirement:

[R]ecognizes the traditionally strong state and local

interest in education, allows for the exercise of disN. D. v. STATE OF HAWAII 5175

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cretion and educational expertise by state agencies,

affords full exploration of technical educational

issues, furthers development of a factual record and

promotes judicial efficiency by giving state and local

agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings.

Kutasi, 494 F.3d at 1167. However, exhaustion is not required

if “it would be futile or offer inadequate relief, or if the

agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general

applicability that is contrary to the law.” Doe, 111 F.3d at 681

(quotation marks and citations omitted); see Kutasi, 494 F.3d

at 1167-68.

[5] We have not yet addressed the issue of whether

exhaustion is required in the context of a suit alleging violations of § 1415(j). All of our previous cases regarding exhaustion under the IDEA have dealt with requests for damages and

not with the stay-put provision. See Kutasi, 494 F.3d at 1169;

Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 420 F.3d 918, 919 (9th Cir.

2005); Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. #403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1048

(9th Cir. 2002); Witte v. Clarke County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d

1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the Second Circuit

addressed this precise point in Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch.

Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2002). In Murphy,

the plaintiff sued for a violation of § 1415(j) and requested

funding to keep the disabled child in his current educational

placement. Id. at 198-99. There, the court ruled that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required because of

the time-sensitive nature of the right § 1415(j) was designed

to protect — i.e., the right to remain in the current educational

placement. Id. at 199-200. 

[6] We find the Second Circuit’s reasoning persuasive and

adopt it here. Hawaii argues that the administrative process

can provide adequate relief and points to all the steps it has

taken amidst the furloughs to reschedule IEP services. This

argument is a non-sequitur. Hawaii’s argument presupposes

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that the steps it has taken will be effective and provide a comparable setting to N.D.’s current educational placement. However, the problem complained of in the suit is that the

administrative agency refused to apply the stay-put provision

pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). The claimed right is the right

to maintain the disabled student’s current educational placement while the judicial proceeding is ongoing to determine if

the new placement is appropriate. The relief requested in the

preliminary injunction is essentially the same relief provided

by the stay-put provision. Exhausting the administrative process would be inadequate because the stay-put provision (and

therefore the preliminary injunction) is designed precisely to

prevent harm while the proceeding is ongoing. Murphy, 297

F.3d at 199-200. The stay-put provision recognizes the need

for the child to keep her current educational placement as the

administrative process tries to sort out alternatives. If the child

is moved from the current placement during the process, then

the deprivation of the right has occurred. The completion of

the administrative process cannot remedy the harm. Id; see

also Cole v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 954 F. Supp. 1214,

1221 (M.D. Tenn. 1997). Access to the preliminary injunction

is essential to vindicate this particular IDEA right. Murphy,

297 F.3d at 200.

IV.

The substantive issue is whether the district court erred in

denying the preliminary injunction.4 We review the denial of

the preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Earth

Island Institute v. United States Forest Service, 351 F.3d

1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the newly articulated abuse

of discretion standard, we “determine de novo whether the

trial court identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief

requested.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262

(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). A district court that applied the

incorrect legal standard necessarily abused its discretion. Id.

4

Judge Tashima ruled from the bench and issued only an oral opinion.

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at 1262. If the correct legal standard is applied then we

reverse only when the district court reaches a result that is

illogical, implausible, or without support in the inferences that

may be drawn from the record. Id.

As set forth by the Supreme Court: 

plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction must

establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the

merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm

in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance

of equities tips in their favor; and (4) a preliminary

injunction is in the public interest.

Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir.

2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129

S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008)).

N.D. alleges several errors in the district court’s ruling.

N.D. argues, first, that the district court applied the wrong

standard and should have applied the stay-put provision’s

automatic injunction standard rather than the preliminary

injunction standard. N.D. further argues that even if the district court did apply the correct standard, it abused its discretion in evaluating the factors. Finally, N.D. argues that the

district court erred in finding that he was not likely to succeed

on the merits because the furloughs did not create a change

in his educational placement and therefore the stay-put provisions did not apply.

A.

[7] First, N.D. argues that the stay-put provision’s automatic injunction should apply instead of the balancing test

required for preliminary injunctions. We find this argument

unpersuasive. The preliminary injunction would order the

DOE to recognize the invocation of the stay-put provisions.

The alleged violation is that Hawaii is not providing the pro5178 N. D. v. STATE OF HAWAII

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tection of the stay-put provision. The claim underlying the

preliminary injunction is that the stay-put provision applies.

In essence, the preliminary injunction is an injunction for an

injunction. While the result would be the same under both

standards if relief is granted — i.e., the schools remain open

and the individual students’ IEPs are implemented — the

legal test is different for each standard. 

[8] N.D. relies on Joshua A v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist.,

559 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2009) to make the argument that the

automatic injunction should apply. Joshua A. does not apply

in this instance. In Joshua A., the party presented its motion

for stay-put directly to the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1037. The

Court was ruling on the substance of the motion itself. Here,

the motion is for a preliminary injunction that affects a stayput invocation, not the stay-put invocation itself. Cf. Johnson

ex rel. Johnson v. Special Educ. Hearing Office, State of California, 287 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)

(finding the automatic provision did not apply when the plaintiff sought an injunction for a claim regarding the validity of

an existing stay-put order). The district court did not err in

considering all factors of the preliminary injunction test.5

B.

We now turn to the four factors of the preliminary injunction test and evaluate them one-by-one.6

 The district court

5Even if we were to hold that the stay-put provision automatic injunction standard is the relevant test, we would still have to determine the initial question of whether or not the stay-put provision even applied. This

determination is the exact same determination as to whether the plaintiff

is likely to succeed on the merits in this case, addressed infra IV.C. 

6Hawaii alleges that the injunction is mandatory and we should apply

the corresponding heightened standard for granting a mandatory injunction. A prohibitory injunction maintains the status quo whereas a mandatory injunction “goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo

pendente lite [and] is particularly disfavored.” Stanley v. Univ. of S. California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The status

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found that there was a high likelihood that plaintiffs would

suffer irreparable harm. This finding was based on declarations submitted by N.D. detailing the injuries their children

had suffered. N.D. demonstrated regression in his behavior,

increased difficulty with activities, and outbursts of frustration

and violence. The other children showed regression in behavior leading to increased aggression. To counter the allegations

of harm, Hawaii submitted numerous declarations outlining

the steps they were taking to minimize the disruption that the

furloughs were causing. This included measures to reschedule

IEP services. Specific steps were taken for the individual children as well. For example, there were proposals to extend

N.D.’s school day by eighty minutes for the four days during

furlough weeks or offer some IEP services in N.D.’s home.

The State’s declarations also indicated that N.D. and the other

children were not exhibiting any changes in behavior.

[9] The declarations from the children documented their

actual behavior following the furloughs, and included observations from the children’s parents and from special education

teachers.7 In contrast, the declarations from the State were all

quo means “the last, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co.,

571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). While at the time the

suit was filed on October 20, 2009 the furlough contracts had been signed

already, no furlough days had been taken yet. Therefore, the injunction

would maintain the status quo of no furlough days and is a prohibitory

injunction — not a mandatory injunction. 

7N.D. submitted additional declarations regarding the harm suffered by

the children on appeal and asked for the Court to take judicial notice of

them. We decline to do so. We view only the district court record on

appeal. Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). Judicial

notice is only appropriate for matters “ ‘generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the [ ] court’ or ‘capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.’ ” Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104,

1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201). The declarations do not fall into either of the above categories. The status of the dis5180 N. D. v. STATE OF HAWAII

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attempted ameliorative steps or were vague. Although the

State submitted numerous declarations, it is hard to see how

the district court abused its discretion. Based on the evidence

presented to the district court, it was reasonable for the court

to conclude that the furloughs would cause irreparable harm.

[10] Proceeding to the balance of the equities, the district

court found that the balance of the equities was a “close question” and could not say that “the equities particularly tip in

favor of the plaintiffs.” The district court considered the

money that would not have to be spent keeping the schools

open, and the layoffs that might need to occur if the State did

not implement the furloughs, against the harm the children

were suffering as a result of the furloughs. In particular the

district court noted that the furloughs were “the least bad of

all the bad choices you can make.” The district court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that the equities were

“fairly balanced.”

[11] We now turn to the public interest. N.D. argues that

the public’s interest is in having the State comply with the

IDEA. While it is obvious that compliance with the law is in

the public interest, the district court looked to many more factors affecting the public interest. The district court noted that

the public certainly did not benefit from a decrease in the

number of instructional days. However, the district court considered this against the potential for increased class sizes if

the State had to layoff teachers. The court noted that the

deprivation of special education to the disabled children did

not outweigh the decrease in educational quality related to

larger class sizes. The district court ultimately concluded that

abled children is not generally known throughout the jurisdiction of the

Ninth Circuit nor are the parents sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855,

858 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008); Turnacliff v. Westly, 546 F.3d 1113, 1120 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2008). 

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the public interest did not particularly favor the plaintiffs

although they did “make out a strong case.” This finding of

fact by the district court is not an abuse of discretion either.

The public interest on both sides is great and as the district

court recognized, it is difficult to quantify the harm on both

sides.

C.

[12] What this case turns on, as the district court recognized, is N.D.’s likelihood of success on the merits of his suit.

The heart of the case is whether the furloughs are a change in

the educational placement of the disabled children such that

the stay-put provisions apply. The question of whether

§ 1415(j) applies is a legal one. If N.D. can prove that he is

likely to succeed on the merits — i.e., that the furloughs are

a change in educational placement — then the district court

arguably abused its discretion and a preliminary injunction

should issue. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-

62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

[13] Under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) provides that

“[d]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency

and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the

then-current educational placement of the child.” See also 34

C.F.R. § 300.518(a) (2006). A parent can request a due process hearing and invoke the stay-put provision when the State

proposes to change the child’s educational placement. 34

C.F.R. § 300.507 (2006); 34 C.F.R § 300.503(a) (2006). 

[14] As we have recognized, the difficulty in determining

whether there has been a change lies with the lack of a definition of “current educational placement” within the IDEA.

L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 902 (9th

Cir. 2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 90 (2009). We have interpreted “current educational placement” to mean “the placement set forth in the child’s last implemented IEP.” Id. We

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have offered no additional guidance on the issue. N.D.’s last

implemented IEP was for the 2009-2010 school year and was

agreed upon before the furloughs were implemented. N.D. has

not been moved from the school identified in his IEP.8

We have addressed changes in educational placement under

the IDEA only on one prior occasion. In Johnson ex rel. Johnson, plaintiff’s parents filed suit on behalf of their autistic

child when he turned three and was to be transferred between

different educational agencies. 287 F.3d at 1181. Plaintiffs

alleged that under “stay-put” their child was entitled to the

“exact same program and vendors” that were provided previously. Id. at 1179. We held that the IDEA does not require the

exact same vendors to provide the services and transfer of the

child was appropriate because the new educational agency

could “meet the requirements of the ‘stay put’ provision by

providing comparable educational placement.” Id. at 1181.

Johnson ex rel. Johnson provides little guidance in this case.

Johnson ex rel. Johnson dealt with an individual child and his

transfer between agencies. Id. This case deals with a state

wide systematic change that affects all school children. Johnson ex rel. Johnson also dealt only with a change in vendors.

Id. In this instance, there is no change in vendors, only a

shortening of the school year.

Without a definition of educational placement in the statute

or any binding precedent, we must “find that interpretation

which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute,

in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and

with the general purposes that Congress manifested.” United

States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied 129 S.

8N.D.’s IEP provided for various services. Some were to be measured

by the amount of instruction (in minutes or hours) per week, month, or

quarter. The only daily services provided were the use of visual aids and

schedules, a sensory diet, and a daily communication log between school

and home for all providers working with N.D. 

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Ct. 237 (2008). Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, we

have recognized that the purpose of the stay-put provision

was to “strip schools of the ‘unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students . . . from

school’ and to protect children from any retaliatory action by

the agency.” Johnson ex rel. Johnson, 287 F.3d at 1181 (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988)). The Supreme

Court has also found that another purpose of the stay-put provision was to “prevent school officials from removing a child

from the regular public school classroom over the parents’

objection” which resulted from Congress’s concern “about the

apparently widespread practice of relegating handicapped

children to private institutions or warehousing them in special

classes.” Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v.

Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 373 (1985). Congress

was concerned with the “total exclusion” of disabled children.

Honig, 484 U.S. at 325 n.8.

We also look to Congress’s overall expressed intent in the

statute. Congress has been very clear about stating its overarching goals in relation to the IDEA. Part of Congress’s concern was that “children were excluded entirely from the

public school system and from being educated with their

peers.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(B) (2006). To alleviate that,

disabled children were to have “access to the general education curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum

extent possible.” § 1400(c)(5)(A). We extract from the statute

that the overarching goal of the IDEA is to prevent the isolation and exclusion of disabled children, and provide them

with a classroom setting as similar to non-disabled children as

possible.

The agency’s implementation of the statute provides further

insights and supports the idea that placement relates to the

classroom setting. The “continuum of alternative placements”

includes “instruction in regular classes, special classes, special schools, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and

institutions.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.115(b)(1) (2006). The main

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concern with placement is “mainstreaming” disabled children

and the regulations provide that disabled children are to be

educated “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate . . . with children who are nondisabled.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(I)

(2006). This reasonable agency interpretation of the IDEA is

entitled to deference. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).

Other Circuits have also attempted to divine the meaning of

“current educational placement.” The leading case is Concerned Parents & Citizens for Continuing Educ. at Malcolm

X (PS 79) v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751 (2d

Cir. 1980). In Concerned Parents, the Second Circuit was

faced with the shut down of one public school and the transfer

of all handicapped children at that school to another school.

Id. at 752. The court considered the stay-put provision of the

IDEA’s predecessor. The court considered the way the statute

used the term “educational placement,” the legislative history,

and the implementing regulations. Id. at 754. The court held

that “educational placement” referred only to “the general

educational program in which the handicapped child is

placed.” Id. at 756. The children’s placements were not

changed because they “remain[ed] in the same classification,

the same school district, and the same type of educational program special classes.” Id. As an example, the court indicated

that a transfer of a disabled child from a special class in a regular school to a special school would be a change in educational placement. Id. at 754.

The Fourth Circuit has also performed a more recent extensive analysis of the meaning of current educational placement

under the IDEA. A.W. ex rel Wilson v. Fairfax County Sch.

Bd., 372 F.3d 675 (4th Cir. 2004). After looking at Supreme

Court cases, the statute, implementing regulations, and other

Circuits’ cases, the court concluded that educational placement meant “the overall instructional setting in which the student receives his education.” Id. at 683. A.W. ex rel Wilson

also dealt with the transfer of an individual student between

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“materially identical settings.” Id. Based on its definition of

current educational placement, the Fourth Circuit found that

the disabled child’s transfer did not violate the stay-put provisions. Id. at 683-84. 

Other circuit courts have adopted similar definitions to the

Second and Fourth Circuits’ definitions using similar reasoning. See, e.g., DeLeon v. Susquehanna Cmty. Sch. Dist., 747

F.2d 149, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that the stay-put provision “does not entitle parents to the right to demand a hearing before a minor decision alters the school day of their

children” and finding that a change in transportation services

was not a change in placement); White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 2003)

(placement does not mean a “particular school,” and instead

means “a setting”); Tilton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,

705 F.2d 800, 803-04 (6th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing Concerned Parents in finding a change in placement when students were transferred from a year-round school to a 180-day

program); Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 218,

Cook County, Ill. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 545, 549

(7th Cir. 1996) (applying a fact-driven approach and finding

that expulsion was a change in educational placement but

when fiscal concerns cause a student to be transferred, the

focus is on the child’s general educational program); Hale ex

rel. Hale v. Poplar Bluff R-I Sch. Dist., 280 F.3d 831, 833-34

(8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (change from home to school was

a change in placement); Lunceford v. Dist. of Columbia Bd.

of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1582-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (change in

feeding treatment not a change in placement).

[15] Based on Supreme Court case law, Congress’s

express intent in the statute, the agency’s implementing regulations, and sister circuits’ decisions, we hold that “educational placement” means the general educational program of

the student. More specifically we conclude that under the

IDEA a change in educational placement relates to whether

the student is moved from one type of program — i.e., regular

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class — to another type — i.e., home instruction. A change

in the educational placement can also result when there is a

significant change in the student’s program even if the student

remains in the same setting. This determination is made in

light of Congress’s intent to prevent the singling out of disabled children and to “mainstream” them with non-disabled

children.

[16] Following this definition, Hawaii’s teacher furloughs

and concurrent shut down of public schools is not a change

in the educational placement of disabled children. Similar to

the children in Concerned Parents, the children here stay in

the same classification, same school district, and same educational program. The children have not been reclassified with

different handicaps. The children continue to attend the same

school, have the same teachers, and stay in the same classes.

The educational setting of the disabled children remains the

same post-furloughs.

When Congress enacted the IDEA, Congress did not intend

for the IDEA to apply to system wide administrative decisions. Hawaii’s furloughs affect all public schools and all students, disabled and non-disabled alike. An across the board

reduction of school days such as the one here does not conflict with Congress’s intent of protecting disabled children

from being singled out. In comparison to cases in which a

child is singled out in relation to her peers, the furlough days

do not remove the plaintiffs from the regular classroom setting anymore than they do the other children. Disabled children are not singled out for furlough days. To the extent

possible under the new school calender, the disabled children

are still “mainstreamed” with regular children at school. To

allow the stay-put provisions to apply in this instance would

be essentially to give the parents of disabled children veto

power over a state’s decisions regarding the management of

its schools. The IDEA did not intend to strip administrative

powers away from local school boards and give them to parents of individual children, and we do not read it as doing so.

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Two cases could be construed as providing contrary authority to the above conclusion. In Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial

Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 865 (3d Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit

indicated that a cut off of public funds “amount[s] to a unilateral change in placement.” However, Drinker actually supports our conclusion because the funding cut-off

contemplated there is a complete cut-off of funding for private placement, effectively eliminating private placement as

an alternative setting. Id. Here there is no such complete cutoff. The State continues to finance the educational placement,

it just does so with slightly fewer school days.

In Tilton, disabled children were transferred from a yearround school to 180-day programs. 705 F.2d at 804. The court

ruled that such a change constituted a change in educational

placement. Id. This case is different, as the Sixth Circuit recognized, because year-round school versus the 180-day school

reflects two completely different educational programs. The

two programs were not comparable. Here, however, the cut in

the number of days does not change the model of education,

and the educational setting and program pre- and postfurlough are comparable.9

Finally, plaintiffs argue that because their current IEPs are

their current educational placement and assume a five day

school week, the reduction of the school week constitutes a

change in the general educational program of the student.

While they certainly assume some five day weeks, the IEPs

also assume that there are some four day weeks when there

are federal and state holidays. Those four day weeks are not

mentioned explicitly in the IEPs. The four day weeks created

by the furloughs are no different and do not constitute

changes in N.D.’s educational program.

9Tilton suggests that there is an exception to the IDEA for changes in

educational placement that are a result of fiscal policy. Tilton, 705 F.2d

at 804. We do not reach this question because we conclude that there has

not been a change in educational placement. 

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Our conclusion does not mean, however, that States and

school boards can make any administrative change, in terms

of cutting school days, without triggering the stay-put provisions. Our holding is that under the facts of this case § 1415(j)

is not triggered. Nor does our conclusion leave the parents of

disabled children with no means of redress. N.D.’s claim is

more properly characterized as a “material failure to implement the IEP.” Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d

811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007). A school district’s failure to provide

the number of minutes and type of instruction guaranteed in

an IEP could support a claim of material failure to implement

an IEP. The agency is required to address such a claim with

a due process hearing, and full judicial review is available.

However, a material failure claim does not trigger the stay-put

provisions. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006).

[17] We affirm the order of the district court denying

plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

AFFIRMED.

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