Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16254/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16254-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arizona Green Party
Appellant
Arizona Libertarian Party
Appellant
Ken Bennett
Appellee
Steve Lackey
Appellant
James March
Appellant
Michele Reagan
Appellee
Kent Solberg
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY;

ARIZONA GREEN PARTY; JAMES

MARCH; KENT SOLBERG; STEVE

LACKEY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MICHELE REAGAN, Secretary of

State,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-16254

DC No.

4:11 cv-0856

CKJ

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 29, 2015—University of Arizona, James E. Rogers

College of Law, Tucson, Arizona

Filed April 24, 2015

Amended August 7, 2015

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Tashima;

Concurrence by Judge McKeown

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2 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in an action brought by the Arizona Green Party, the Arizona

Libertarian Party, and three of their members alleging that

Arizona’s voter registration form violates their First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature enacted a law requiring

the voter registration form distributed by the Arizona

Secretary of State to list the two largest parties (as measured

by number of registered voters) on the form, as well as

provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” See Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 16-152(A)(5). Prior to the 2011 amendment,

Arizona law required only that voter registration forms

include a blank space for the registrant’s party preference.

The panel first determined that plaintiffs failed to adduce

evidence that the revised registration form actually

discourages or prevents voters from registering with minor

parties. The panel held that at most, § 16-152(A)(5) imposes

a de minimis burden on plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. The panel then concluded that plaintiffs

failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that § 16-

152(A)(5) is not rationally related to a legitimate state

interest. The panel held that § 16-152(A)(5) helps to ensure

that election officials will easily be able to determine the

preferred party for most of Arizona’s voters in a manner that

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 3

the State has deemed to be cost efficient and less prone to

clerical error.

Concurring, Judge McKeown agreed that Arizona’s voter

registration form passes constitutional muster. She wrote

separately because she believes the rational basis review and

burden-shifting standards articulated in Libertarian Party of

Washington v. Munro, 31 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 1994), and

applied by the panel in this case, are inconsistent with the

Supreme Court’s approach to analyzing voting rights

challenges.

COUNSEL

David T. Hardy, Tucson, Arizona, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General of Arizona, Robert L.

Ellman, Deputy Attorney General (argued), Michele L.

Forney and Todd M. Allison, Assistant Attorneys General,

Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

The opinion filed April 24, 2015, and reported at 784 F.3d

611, is amended by adding at the end of the carryover

paragraph from page 16, slip op. at 17, 784 F.3d at 621, lefthand column, end of carryover paragraph from page 620, a

new footnote 12, as follows:

12 We apply Munro because it is binding on us

and addresses situations, like this one, in

which the burden, if it exists at all, is

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4 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

vanishingly small. We note, however, that

Munro’s statements that we may consider

hypothetical rationales for a state’s election

law, and that the plaintiff alleging a de

minimis burden must demonstrate the lack of

a rationale basis, are in tension with some of

our other cases and Supreme Court precedent. 

See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Dudum,

640 F.3d at 1106, 1113–14. We need not

resolve that tension, however, because even

under the balancing of interests and burdens

analysis, we would nonetheless reject this

challenge. First, as noted above, Plaintiffs

failed to adduce evidence of any burden at all;

absent any burden, there is no reason to call

on the State to justify its practice. At most,

Plaintiffs established a burden on those

wishing to register with a third party, limited

to writing a word rather than checking a box

– assuredly not an infringement of

constitutional dimension. Second, the State’s

rationale, which we below hold justifies this

law, is not hypothetical or manufactured by

the court, having been specifically articulated

in its brief on appeal. Third, even if the State

bears the ultimate burden of persuasion with

regard to the justification of this law, we are

persuaded, given the very slight burden

involved, that it survives constitutional

scrutiny.

The footnotes following new footnote 12 are accordingly

renumbered.

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 5

The amended opinion and the amended concurrence are

filed concurrently with this order.

With the above amendments, Judges McKeown and

Berzon vote to deny the petition for rehearing en banc and

Judge Tashima so recommends. The full court has been

advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no judge of

the court has requested a vote on en banc rehearing. See Fed.

R. App. P. 35(f). The petition for rehearing en banc is

denied. No further petitions for rehearing/rehearing en banc

will be entertained.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature enacted a law requiring

the voter registration form distributed by the Arizona

Secretary of State to list the two largest parties (as measured

by number of registered voters) on the form, as well as

provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” The

Arizona Green Party, Arizona Libertarian Party, and three of

their members (together, “Plaintiffs”) brought this action,

alleging that the new voter registration form violated their

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court

concluded that the amended voter registration form survived

constitutional scrutiny and granted the State’s motion for

summary judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

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6 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

I.

A. Section 16-152(A)(5) and the Registration Form

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature amended the statute that

dictates the content of the voter registration form provided by

the State (the “Registration Form”). See 2011 Ariz. Legis.

Serv. Ch. 339 § 1 (West) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

152(A)). The amended statute provides, in relevant part:

A. The form used for registration of electors

shall contain:

. . .

5. The registrant’s partypreference. The two

largest political parties that are entitled to

continued representation on the ballot shall be

listed on the form in the order determined by

calculating which party has the highest

number of registered voters at the close of

registration for the most recent general

election for governor, then the second highest.

The form shall allow the registrant to circle,

check or otherwise mark the party preference

and shall include a blank line for other party

preference options.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-152(A)(5). Prior to the 2011

amendment, Arizona law required only that voter registration

forms include a blank space for “[t]he registrant’s party

preference.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-152(A)(5) (2010). As

of January 1, 2011, the two parties with the highest number

of registered voters in Arizona were the Republican Party,

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 7

with approximately 35.8 percent, and the Democratic Party,

with approximately 31.6 percent. The next largest party was

the Libertarian Party, with approximately 0.78 percent of

registered voters.1

In response to the amendment, the Arizona Secretary of

State revised box 14 on the Registration Form. In its current

form, box 14 appears as follows:

The blank line under the “Other” checkbox is approximately

0.9 inch long. The Registration Form also provides the

following instructions regarding box 14:

Fill in your political party preference in box

14. If you leave this box blank as a first time

registrant in your county, your party

preference will be “Party Not Designated.” If

you leave this box blank and you are already

registered in the county, your current party

1 Although the exact percentage of voters registered with each party has

fluctuated slightly since January 1, 2011, the Republican and Democratic

Parties have remained the two parties with the highest number of

registered voters.

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8 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

preference will be retained. Please write full

name of party preference in box.

B. Arizona’s Voter Registration Scheme

Under Arizona law, qualified electors2 may register to

vote in one of three ways:

1. They may obtain, fill out, and mail in the Registration

Form, which can be downloaded from the Secretary

of State’s website or picked up from either the

Secretary of State’s office or any local county

recorder’s office, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-151;

2. They may submit an online voter registration

application using the “EZ Voter Registration”

process, available at the Arizona Department of

Transportation’s service website, see Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 16-112(B)(4); see also Ariz. Dep’t of Transp.

Motor Vehicle Div., Service Arizona,

http://www.servicearizona.com (last visited Jan. 7,

2015);3 or,

3. Theymay register in person at Arizona Motor Vehicle

Division offices by filling out a section provided on

2 Arizona law sets forth certain criteria that make a resident of the state

a “qualified elector.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-101, 16-121.

3 We may take judicial notice of “official information posted on a

governmental website, the accuracy of which [is] undisputed.” Dudum v.

Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1101 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Daniels-Hall v.

Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010)).

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 9

the form for a driver’s license or renewal for

individuals who want to register to vote.

Section 16-152(A)(5) applies only to the first of these three

options – that is, only the Secretary of State is required to

provide checkboxes for the two largest parties on the

Registration Form. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-152(E)

(providing that the content regulations set forth in § 16-

152(A) “do[] not apply to registrations received from the

department of transportation”). Like the Secretary of State’s

form before the amendment to § 16-152(A)(5), the second

and third options allow a registrant to indicate party

preference by entering any party’s name, including a major

party.

4

C. Arizona’s Ballot Access Laws

Under Arizona law, there are two ways for a party to get

its preferred candidate on the ballot.5 First, a “new political

party” becomes “eligible for recognition” upon filing a

petition with the Secretary of State signed by a number of

qualified electors equal to one and one-third (1a) percent “of

4

In addition, “[t]he National Voter Registration Act requires States to

‘accept and use’ a uniform federal form to register voters in federal

elections. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247,

2251 (2013). The federal form, like the second and third Arizona options

described above, permits a voter to indicate a political party of choice, but

does not include checkboxes for the two largest political parties. See U.S.

Election Assistance Commission, National Mail Voter Registration Form,

http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/Federal%20Voter%20

Registration_6-25-14_ENG.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).

5 Arizona law also permits individuals who are not members of political

parties to qualify for the ballot if they comply with certain criteria. See

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-341.

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10 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

the total votes cast for governor at the last preceding general

election at which a governor was elected.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 16-801(A). Recognition entitles a new political party to be

“represented by an official party ballot at the primary election

and accorded a ballot column at the succeeding general

election” through at least “the next two regularly scheduled

general elections for federal office immediately following

recognition of the political party.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

801(B).

After these first two federal election cycles, a party may

continue to be represented by an official party ballot during

a primary election and accorded a ballot column in the

succeeding general election (that is, the party is entitled to

“continuing ballot access”) in one of two ways. First, a party

is entitled to continuing ballot access if its candidate receives

“not less than five per cent of the total votes cast for governor

or presidential electors” at the “last preceding general

election” for certain specified offices. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

804(A). Second, a party is entitled to continuing ballot access

if, on certain dates prescribed by statute, the party “has

registered electors in the party equal to at least two-thirds of

one per cent of the total registered electors in such

jurisdiction.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-804(B). A party that loses

continuing ballot access may get it back the same way a new

party would gain access to the ballot: it must submit another

petition signed by a number of qualified electors equal to one

and one-third (1a) percent of the total votes cast for governor

at the last preceding general election at which a governor was

elected. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-801(B).

When Plaintiffs filed their complaint, five parties had

continuing ballot access: Republican, Democratic, Green,

Libertarian, and Americans Elect. During the pendency of

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 11

this appeal, the Arizona Green Party lost its continuing ballot

access.6

D. Procedural History

Plaintiffs’ complaint,filed against defendantKen Bennett,

as Arizona Secretary of State, alleges that § 16-152(A)(5)

violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiffs sought an order from the district court enjoining the

State from issuing voter registration forms that failed to “treat

equally the four parties with Statewide continuing ballot

access.” On the parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment, the district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion and

granted the State’s motion. Plaintiffs timely appeal.

II.

This Court reviews the constitutionality of a statute de

novo. See Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir.

2013).

III.

A. The Framework for Resolving Constitutional

Challenges to State Election Laws

“Restrictions on voting can burden equal protection rights

as well as ‘interwoven strands of liberty’ protected by the

First and Fourteenth Amendments—namely, the ‘right of

individuals to associate for the advancement of political

6 At oral argument counsel for appellants informed the court that the

Green Party has again qualified for continuing ballot access by submitting

a petition with a sufficient number of signatures.

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12 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their

political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.’” Dudum,

640 F.3d at 1105–06 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze,

460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (some internal quotation marks

omitted)).7 As the Supreme Court has recognized, these

rights are generally guaranteed by ensuring that political

parties, including those that are new to the political scene, are

given the opportunity to place their candidate on the ballot. 

See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,

440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (“The freedom to associate as a

political party . . . has diminished practical value if the party

can be kept off the ballot.”). Indeed, because “an election

campaign is an effective platform for the expression of views

on the issues of the day, and a candidate serves as a rallyingpoint for like-minded citizens,” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788,

“the right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast

only for one of two parties at a time when other parties are

clamoring for a place on the ballot.” Williams v. Rhodes,

393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).

“At the same time,” however, “‘States retain the power to

regulate their own elections.’” Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1106

(quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)). 

“Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the

conclusion that government must play an active role in

structuring elections.” Id. at 1103 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S

at 433). The Constitution itself “provides that States may

prescribe ‘the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections

for Senators and Representatives.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433

7 Although Plaintiffs assert both First and Fourteenth Amendment

claims, “[t]he Supreme Court has addressed such claims collectively using

a single analytic framework.” Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1106 n.15. Plaintiffs

agree that this “single analytic framework” applies here.

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 13

(quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (brackets omitted)). 

And, “[t]o achieve these necessary objectives, States have

enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election

codes.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. Moreover, every law

regulating elections, “whether it governs the registration and

qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of

candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at

least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his

right to associate with others for political ends.” Id.

Thus, in order to “resolve the tension between a [party’s]

First Amendment rights and the state’s interest in preserving

the fairness and integrity of the voting process,” the

“Supreme Court developed a balancing test.” Rubin v. City

of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002). “In

considering a constitutional challenge to an election law, we

must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury

to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments against the precise interests put forward by the

State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” 

Nader v. Cronin, 620 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, “the severity of the burden the election law

imposes on the plaintiff’s rights dictates the level of scrutiny

applied by the court.” Id. (quoting Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d

1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (“[T]he

rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state

election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged

regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendmentrights.”). 

“An election regulation that imposes a severe burden is

subject to strict scrutiny and will be upheld only if it is

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” 

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14 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

Cronin, 620 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Brewer, 531 F.3d at 1035

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). By

contrast, “[a] state may justify election regulations imposing

a lesser burden by demonstrating the state has ‘important

regulatory interests.’” Id. (quoting Brewer, 531 F.3d at

1035).

B. Section 16-152(A) Imposes a De Minimis Burden on

Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights

In cases “previously examining differing treatments of

minor and major political parties,” we have held that, “in

determining the nature and magnitude of the burden that the

state’s election procedures impose on the minor party, we

must examine the entire scheme regulating ballot access.” 

Cronin, 620 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Libertarian Party of

Wash. v. Munro, 31 F.3d 759, 761–62 (9th Cir. 1994)

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).8 The

8 Plaintiffs urge us to forgo a severity-of-the-burden analysis, arguing

that, because § 16-152(A)(5) differentiates between major and minor

parties on its face, strict scrutiny automatically applies. Plaintiffs’

proposed bright-line rule is at odds with both Supreme Court precedent

and our own. Although the Supreme Court has expressed a generalized

concern about laws that favor major parties over minor parties, see, e.g.,

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 n. 16; Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603

(2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment),

it has only applied strict scrutiny to a state election law after determining

that the law imposed a severe burden on a party’s constitutional rights. 

See, e.g., Williams, 393 U.S. at 25 n.1, 31. Moreover, we have repeatedly

refused to apply strict scrutiny to election laws that differentiate between

major and minor parties, so long as the law at issue did not “severely

burden” a minor party’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., Cronin, 620 F.3d

at 1217–18; Munro, 31 F.3d at 763. Accordingly, we reject Plaintiffs’

contention that strict scrutiny automatically applies to all state election

laws that facially distinguish between major and minor parties.

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 15

relevant inquiry “is whether ‘reasonably diligent’ minor party

candidates can normally gain a place on the ballot, or if

instead they only rarely will succeed.” Munro, 31 F.3d at 762

(quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974)); see also

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–88 (noting that the relevant

inquiry in determining the constitutionality of election

regulations is the ability of voters’ preferred candidates to get

on the ballot). Moreover, the party challenging the law bears

“the initial burden of showing that [the state’s] ballot access

requirements seriously restrict the availability of political

opportunity.” Munro, 31 F.3d at 762.

Plaintiffs have failed to make any such showing. Section

16-152(A)(5) does not directly inhibit the ability of any party

to gain access to the ballot, nor does it articulate different

criteria for major and minor parties who seek to get their

candidates on the ballot. All new political parties (and parties

that have lost continuing ballot access) are required to comply

with the same criteria to get their candidate on the ballot. See

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-801. Moreover, all political parties,

major and minor alike, are entitled to continuing ballot access

if: (1) their candidates garner at least five percent of the

“total votes cast for governor or presidential electors” at the

“last preceding general election” for certain specified offices;

or, (2) they have “registered electors . . . equal to at least twothirds of one per cent of the total registered electors” in the

relevant jurisdiction by a specified date. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 16-804.

Acknowledging that § 16-152(A)(5) does not directly

burden their ability to get their preferred candidate on the

ballot, Plaintiffs instead assert that the statute indirectly

“restrict[s] the availability of political opportunity,” Munro,

31 F.3d at 762, by encouraging voters to register with the two

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16 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

major parties over all others. This encouragement, Plaintiffs

contend, affects their ability to get their preferred candidate

on the ballot, because continuing ballot access is linked (at

least partially) to the number of voters who are registered

with the party.

Plaintiffs have failed, however, to adduce any evidence

that § 16-152(A)(5) actually encourages individuals to

register for major parties instead of minor ones. As an initial

matter, Plaintiffs have failed to show how many new voters

actually use the Registration Form to register, as opposed to

using one of the other three alternative means, which do not

require use of the Registration Form. Without some

assessment of how many voters actually use the Registration

Form, we cannot even begin to gauge the impact it may have

had on party registration rolls.

Moreover, even if we were to assume that a significant

number of voters used the Registration Form, Plaintiffs failed

to adduce any evidence – statistical, anecdotal, or otherwise

– that the Registration Form has, in fact, encouraged voters to

register for the major parties over minor ones. Plaintiffs

suggest that the Registration Form discourages voters from

registering with minor parties by sending “a message to the

future voter” that there are only “two [real] political parties

in this State,” and that “[r]egistering for any other party is a

show of eccentricity” that must be “grudgingly tolerate[d].” 

However, Plaintiffs failed to introduce even an iota of

evidence in support of this assertion. The alleged

psychological effects that the Registration Form has on

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 17

registering voters is sheer speculation.

9 Plaintiffs’ other

contention – that voters have been unable to register with the

party of their choosing because the blank line below the word

“Other” in box 14 is “too short to contain even the word

‘Libertarian’” – is similarly unsupported by any evidence in

the record.

In sum, by failing to adduce evidence that the Registration

Form actuallydiscourages or prevents voters from registering

with minor parties, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their “initial

burden of showing that [Arizona’s] ballot access

requirements seriously restrict the availability of political

opportunity.” Munro, 31 F.3d at 762. At most, § 16-

152(A)(5) imposes a de minimis burden on Plaintiffs’ First

and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

C. Section 16-152(A)(5) is Rationally Related to a

Legitimate State Interest

Where, as here, a state election law imposes only a de

minimis burden on a party’s First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights, the State “need demonstrate only that [the statute at

9 Both sides make much of a chart compiled by the State that details the

number of qualified electors registered with the Republican, Democratic,

Green, and Libertarian Parties, as well as an undefined “Other” category,

at various points between January 1, 2011, and March 1, 2012. These raw

data do not, by themselves, allow us to draw reliable conclusions as to

whether the Registration Form actually dissuaded new voters from

registering with minor parties. Party registration may ebb and flow for

myriad reasons, including overall changes in the number of eligible voters,

in voter mobilization activity, or in disaffection with the electoral process. 

Although a study isolating the effects that the Registration Form has had

on party registration might allow a fact-finder reasonably to infer that the

Registration Form has discouraged voters from registering with minor

parties, Plaintiffs have presented no such evidence here.

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18 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

issue] is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” 

Cronin, 620 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Munro, 31 F.3d at 763

(internal quotation marks omitted)).10In evaluating the

constitutionality of such statutes, we may “look to any

conceivable interest promoted by the challenged procedures,

whether or not the state cited that interest in its briefs or in the

district court.” Munro, 31 F.3d at 763; see also Dudum, 640

F.3d at 1116 n.28 (noting that, in sustaining an election law

that did not impose a severe burden on constitutional rights,

the Supreme Court in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New

Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), “expressly relied on a state

interest admittedly not advanced in its briefs, but mentioned

during oral argument”). Furthermore, we need not determine

whether the interests served by § 16-152(A)(5) can be better

served by other means: as we recently concluded, “when a

challenged rule imposes only limited burdens on the right to

vote, there is no requirement that the rule is the only or the

best way to further the proffered interests.” Dudum, 640 F.3d

at 1114.11 Finally, where, as here, the regulation at issue

10 Alternatively, we have stated that, in cases in which an election law

imposes a de minimis burden on constitutional rights, the challenged

procedures “survive review as long as they further a state’s important

regulatory interests.” Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State

Grange, 676 F.3d 784, 793-94 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (emphasis added). In this context, we have used the terms

“legitimate” interests and “important regulatory” interests

interchangeably. See Cronin, 620 F.3d at 1217, 1218; Dudum, 640 F.3d

at 1114, 1116.

11 Although we have noted that there may be “instances where a burden

is not severe enough to warrantstrict scrutiny review but is serious enough

to require an assessment of whether alternative methods would advance

the proffered governmental interests,” Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1114 n.27, for

the reasons set forth above, it is clear that § 16-152(A)(5) does not impose

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 19

imposes only a slight burden on a party’s constitutional

rights, that party “bear[s] the burden of demonstrating that the

regulations [it] attack[s] have no legitimate rational basis.” 

Munro, 31 F.3d at 763.12

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden. Section 16-

152(A)(5) is rationallyrelated to Arizona’s legitimate interest

in ensuring that election official correctly register voters as

members of parties of their choosing. By providing

checkboxes for the two largest political parties, the

Registration Form reduces the potential that an election

official will incorrectlyregister a voter who wishes to affiliate

with one of the state’s two most prominent parties. Because

a serious enough burden on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to mandate this

kind of comparative analysis.

12 We apply Munro because it is binding on us and addresses situations,

like this one, in which the burden, if it exists at all, is vanishingly small. 

We note, however, that Munro’s statements that we may consider

hypothetical rationales for a state’s election law, and that the plaintiff

alleging a de minimis burden must demonstrate the lack of a rational basis,

are in tension with some of our other cases and Supreme Court precedent. 

See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1106, 1113–14. 

We need not resolve that tension, however, because even under the

balancing of interests and burdens analysis, we would nonetheless reject

this challenge. First, as noted above, Plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence

of any burden at all; absent any burden, there is no reason to call on the

State to justify its practice. At most, Plaintiffs established a burden on

those wishing to register with a third party, limited to writing a word

rather than checking a box – assuredly not an infringement of

constitutional dimension. Second, the State’s rationale, which we below

hold justifies this law, is not hypothetical or manufactured by the court,

having been specifically articulated in its brief on appeal. Third, even if

the State bears the ultimate burden of persuasion with regard to the

justification of this law, we are persuaded, given the very slight burden

involved, that it survives constitutional scrutiny.

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20 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

the overwhelming majority of Arizona voters are registered

with one of the two major parties, the checkbox method

ensures that most voters will be able to participate in the

primary election of their choosing. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

467 (providing that, in primary elections, voters who are

registered as a member of a political party shall be given “one

ballot only of the party with which the voter is affiliated”). 

Ensuring that voters are able to participate in their preferred

party’s primary election is, at the very least, a legitimate state

interest. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973)

(“Under our political system, a basic function of a political

party is to select the candidates for public office to be offered

to the voters at general elections. A prime objective of most

voters in associating themselves with a particular party must

surely be to gain a voice in that selection process.”).

Although election officials also have an interest in

correctly registering applicants who wish to associate with

smaller political parties, there are, as the State notes,

countervailing concerns about providing checkboxes for

smaller political parties that are not present with the two

largest parties. For example, smaller political parties lose

their status as recognized political parties under Arizona law

much more frequently than the major parties do. If Arizona

was required to provide checkboxes for all political parties

entitled to continuing ballot access, as Plaintiffs suggest, the

State would be required to change, and reprint, the 

Registration Form each time a party lost, or gained,

continuing ballot access.13 Thus, § 16-152(A)(5) helps to

13

Indeed, just during the pendency of this appeal, the State would have

had to alter and replace such a Registration Form when the Green Party

lost its continuing ballot access, and change it again when the Green Party

regained access.

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 21

ensure that election officials will easily be able to determine

the preferred party for most of Arizona’s voters in a manner

that the State has deemed to be cost efficient and less prone

to clerical error. This cost-benefit analysis is the kind of

judgment that the Legislature was entitled to make. See

Munro, 31 F.3d at 764 (“[B]ecause the current scheme poses

only a minuscule burden for minor party candidacies, the

Constitution does not require [the state] to adopt a system that

is the most efficient possible; it need only adopt a system that

is rationally related to achieving its goals.”); Lemons v.

Bradbury, 538 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding

Oregon’s system for verifying that individuals who signed a

referendum because it reduced the state’s administrative

burden); Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.

2003) (concluding that a state has a legitimate interest in

saving money).14

IV.

In sum, we conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to meet

their burden of demonstrating that § 16-152(A)(5) is not

rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Accordingly,

the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

14 The State also argues that § 16-152(A)(5) serves its interest of

“maintaining the stability of Arizona’s political system through a healthy

two-party system.” In light of our conclusion that § 16-152(A)(5) is

rationally related to the State’s legitimate interest in efficiently and

accurately determining most voters’ registration preference, we do not

address this assertion.

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22 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

Judge McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the panel’s judgment: Arizona’s voter

registration form passes constitutional muster. I write

separately because I believe the rational basis review and

burden-shifting standards articulated in Libertarian Party of

Washington v. Munro, 31 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 1994), and

applied by the panel in this case, are inconsistent with the

Supreme Court’s approach to analyzing voting rights

challenges.

The majority opinion discusses at length how political

parties in Arizona gain access to the ballot and states that

“[t]he relevant inquiry ‘is whether “reasonably diligent”

minor party candidates can normally gain a place on the

ballot . . . .’” Maj. Op. at 14–15 (quoting Munro, 31 F.3d at

762). But this is not a ballot access case. This case focuses

instead on the state’s voter registration process, specifically

the form that lists only the two major political parties and

simply leaves a blank for a prospective voter to identify any

other party. This is, of course, a change from the prior voter

registration form that identified no specific parties and simply

provided a write-in line for party preference. The essence of

the minority parties’ claim is that they are burdened because

the revised form advantages the major parties. By not being

listed, the minority parties claim they are unable to compete

for voter registrations on an equal footing.

1

1

In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized

that state “schemes . . . govern[ing] the registration and qualification of

voters” can burden “the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate

with others for political ends.” 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). For example,

it would surely be unconstitutional for a state to sponsor voter registration

drives at Republican Party events, while refusing to do so at comparable

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 23

The starting point for analyzing an election law challenge

is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Burdick v. Takushi,

504 U.S. 428 (1992). The Court succinctly stated the

applicable standard: “A court considering a challenge to a

state election law must weigh the character and magnitude of

the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and

Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate

against the precise interests put forward by the State as

justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into

consideration the extent to which those interests make it

necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Id. at 434 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Munro, we summarized Burdick as follows: “If the

burden is severe, the challenged procedures will pass muster

only if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling

state interest. If the burden is slight, the procedures will

survive review as long as they have a rational basis.” 31 F.3d

at 761 (citing, but not quoting, Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434). 

According to Munro, in the event plaintiffs can only

demonstrate a “slight” or “de minimis” impairment of their

rights, they then bear “the burden of demonstrating that the

regulations they attack have no legitimate rational basis.” Id.

at 763. The panel recognizes that the standard articulated in

Munro is in tension with Supreme Court precedent, but

applies it nonetheless. Maj. Op. at 18–19 & n.12.

Neither rational basis review nor the burden-shifting

framework articulated in Munro is found in Burdick, nor in

any other Supreme Court voting rights decision since. The

Supreme Court has consistently employed language that

Democratic gatherings. The tacit encouragement alleged by the minority

parties here is of the same character, but of a different magnitude.

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24 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

rejects traditional rational basis review. In Crawford v.

Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), for

example, the Court wrote that there is no “litmus test for

measuring the severity of a burden that a state law imposes on

a political party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of

voters. However slight that burden may appear . . . it must be

justified byrelevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently

weighty to justify the limitation.’” Id. at 191 (quoting

Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)).

This understanding of the Supreme Court’s approach to

analyzing voting rights cases is faithfully reflected in our

recent decision in Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir.

2011). There, we concluded that San Francisco’s instant

runoff voting system imposed an “extremely limited

burden[]” on the plaintiffs. Id. at 1117. We nonetheless

evaluated whether the government’s purported interests were

“substantial enough to justify” that minimal burden. Id. at

1114–17. This language can be read as a variation on the

“sufficiently weighty” requirement. Other cases have

likewise eschewed resort to traditional rational basis analysis

when evaluating the constitutionality of laws that impose

“nonsevere burdens” on voting rights. See, e.g., Lemons v.

Bradbury, 538 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir.2008) (upholding

regulation imposing a “minimal burden on plaintiffs’ rights”

with respect to signature verification in the referendum

process); Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008, 1017

(9th Cir. 2002) (weighing the government’s “important

regulatory interest in predictable and administrable election

rules” against challenge to regulation on how candidates are

identified on the ballot). Indeed, neither party in this case

argued that rational basis review was the appropriate standard

for analyzing the minority parties’ claims.

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 25

Munro, like the majority opinion, suffers another

deficiency—it places the burden on the plaintiffs vis-a-vis the

state’s purported interests. In a situation where there is only

a slight burden on a party’s constitutional rights, Munro

instructs that that party “bear[s] the burden of demonstrating

that the regulations [it] attack[s] have no legitimate rational

basis.” 31 F.3d at 763. This turns Burdick’s balancing

standard on its head and relieves the state of its burden of

putting forward “interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the

limitation.’” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (quoting Norman,

502 U.S. at 288–89). It is no accident that in introducing the

balancing standard, the Court counseled lower courts that

they “must weigh the character and magnitude” of plaintiffs’

asserted injury “against the precise interests put forward by

the State.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

It may well be that the semantic distinction between the

balancing test and the rational basis standard articulated in

Munro makes little difference in many cases. See Christopher

S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral

Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. Pa. L.

Rev. 313, 330 (2007) (“For now, suffice it to say that the

Supreme Court typically applies something like rational basis

review in [voting rights cases where the burden is nonsevere],

but that the rationality standard may not be quite so lax as the

one applied to ordinary economic and social legislation.”). 

However, it is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court’s

articulation of the balancing standard represents anything

other than a deliberate choice to eschew traditional rational

basis review. The balancing standard instructs courts to be

vigilant in their review of rules and regulations that

disadvantage minority viewpoints. See Anderson, 460 U.S.

at 793 (1983) (“[I]t is especially difficult for the State to

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26 ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN

justify a restriction that limits political participation by an

identifiable political group whose members share a particular

viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.”). 

The balancing principle also recognizes that voting laws that

at first glance appear to be inconsequential may unfairly

distort election outcomes. See, e.g., Gould v. Grubb,

536 P.2d 1337, 1346 (Cal. 1975) (holding that it is

unconstitutional for a ballot to list candidates in alphabetical

order because it “reserves advantageous ballot positions for

candidates whose names begin with letters occurring early in

the alphabet”).

Any effort to apply the balancing standard to this case is

hamstrung by a lack of evidence. It is remarkable that both

parties rely principally on generalizations, i.e. a claimed

burden, or platitudes, i.e. efficiency, rather than evidence. 

Other than the registration form itself and statistics that show

an ambiguous decline in voter registrations across all political

parties, the minority parties have not presented any evidence

that demonstrates the burden on their rights.2 Likewise, the

state has not even attempted to document the administrative

benefits of its voter registration form. Without any evidence

regarding the practical consequences of the voter registration

2 The majority states not only that the burden imposed by the voter

registration form is “de minimis,” but also that it is “assuredly not an

infringement of constitutional dimension.” Maj. Op. at 19 n.12. I

disagree. In the ballot context, the Supreme Court has specifically

recognized the burden imposed by requiring voters to write a word rather

than to check a box. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 719 n.5. (“The

realities of the electoral process, however, strongly suggest that ‘access’

via write-in votes falls far short of access in terms of having the name of

the candidate on the ballot.”). It would be more accurate to state that any

burden is slight, not that it lacks a “constitutional dimension.”

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ARIZONA LIBERTARIAN PARTY V. REAGAN 27

form, we find ourselves in the position of Lady Justice:

blindfolded and stuck holding empty scales.

In light of the poorly developed record in this case, I

conclude that the voter registration form passes constitutional

muster. The form is constitutional, however, not because the

minority parties have “failed to meet their burden” of

demonstrating it “ha[s] no legitimate rational basis,” Maj. Op.

at 19. Rather, the voter registration form is constitutional

because, even on the thin record we have before us, the

state’s asserted interests in reducing printing costs and easing

administrative efficiency are “sufficiently weighty to justify”

the speculative burden on the plaintiffs’ rights. See

Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191.

Irecognize that Munro has never been officiallyoverruled

or abrogated. However, in my view, to the extent Munro

prescribes a different standard than what the Supreme Court

articulated in Burdick and reiterated in Crawford, we should

fix it.

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