Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03032/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03032-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Government Printing Office
Respondent
Raymond Muller
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RAYMOND MULLER,

Petitioner

v.

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3032

______________________ 

Petition for review of an arbitrator’s decision in Case

No. 14-54839 by Arbitrator Marvin J. Feldman.

______________________ 

Decided: January 15, 2016

______________________ 

JOHNNIE ALLEN LANDON, JR., Johnnie Landon, Esquire, Washington, DC, argued for petitioner.

MELISSA M. DEVINE, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented 

by EMMA BOND, BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRCHMAN, JR., REGINALD T. BLADES, JR. 

______________________ 

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2 MULLER v. GPO

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Concurring opinion filed by Chief Judge PROST. 

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Raymond Muller filed a grievance against his employer, the Government Printing Office, which was referred to 

an arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator dismissed the grievance as “not 

arbitrable,” on the ground that a four-month deadline for 

holding a hearing, required by the agreement, had passed. 

We conclude that the arbitrator erred; the contractual 

provision does not require dismissal of the grievance in 

the event of noncompliance with the four-month deadline. 

The deadline is merely a nonbinding housekeeping rule to 

encourage timely arbitration, one that is addressed to the 

arbitrator as well as the parties. There is no past practice 

requiring dismissal under the circumstances of this case. 

We accordingly reverse and remand with instructions to 

address Mr. Muller’s grievance on the merits. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Muller is an employee of the U.S. Government 

Printing Office (“GPO” or “agency”) and a member of the

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 713-S 

union (“union”), which belongs to the Joint Council of 

Unions. The Joint Council of Unions and GPO are signatories to a collective bargaining agreement, a multi-party 

Master Labor Management Agreement (“master agreement”), which creates a negotiated grievance procedure 

for GPO employees to contest adverse employment actions 

as an alternative to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”). The master agreement specifies 

that resolution of adverse employment actions under the 

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MULLER v. GPO 3

negotiated procedure can proceed to arbitration if not 

resolved at the agency level. 

Article VII of the master agreement sets forth various 

rules for the arbitration process. Section 10.d.(1) of the 

master agreement stipulates that, “[i]f the grievance is 

not resolved [at the agency level] . . . the union may 

inform the Director, Labor and Employee Relations 

Service of its decision to proceed to arbitration.” J.A. 42. 

Arbitration must be invoked within 30 days: “This written 

statement must be submitted to the Director within 30 

days after the decision of the Joint Grievance Committee” 

of agency and union officials. J.A. 42. Sections 10.d.(2) 

and (3) establish the rules of arbitrator selection, including the possibility that either the union or the agency may 

begin the arbitrator selection process and that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (“FMCS”) can step 

in if the process stalls. J.A. 42–43. Section 10.d.(4) states 

that “[t]he arbitration hearing will take place within 4 

months after filing of the notice of decision to proceed to 

arbitration, unless the parties mutually agree to an 

extension of the time limit.” J.A. 43. Section 11.e specifies that “[a]n arbitrator will render his decision as quickly as possible, but not later than 30 calendar days after 

the close of the record.” J.A. 43. 

Mr. Muller was reassigned between divisions of the 

GPO, resulting in demotion to a lower grade and a reduction in pay, an adverse employment action under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7512. Mr. Muller elected to challenge his reassignment 

through the negotiated grievance procedure, and, after 

proceeding through the steps of review required by the 

master agreement, the agency issued a decision denying 

the grievance. The union timely invoked arbitration on 

February 19, 2014, and requested and received a list of 

arbitrators from the FMCS on April 2, 2014. The union 

and the GPO jointly selected Marvin Feldman as arbitrator, and Mr. Feldman was notified of his selection on May 

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4 MULLER v. GPO

29, 2014. The arbitrator thus received the case approximately three weeks prior to June 19, 2014, the date on 

which the four-month deadline expired. The arbitrator

wrote the union and the agency on June 9, 2014, to suggest the hearing be held July 23 or August 6, 2014. 

On June 19, 2014, four months to the day from the 

date that arbitration had been invoked, the GPO wrote to 

the union and the arbitrator to ask that the arbitration be 

closed for failure to comply with the four-month deadline. 

The arbitrator requested briefs from both sides on the 

question of arbitrability and ultimately issued a decision 

on September 15, 2014, dismissing Mr. Muller’s grievance 

as “not arbitrable,” J.A. 7, because the master agreement 

“requires that the arbitration hearing take place within 

four months after filing of the notice of decision to proceed 

to arbitration, unless the parties mutually agree to an 

extension of that time limit,” J.A. 5. The arbitrator 

concluded that noncompliance with the four-month hearing deadline automatically terminated the grievance but, 

at the same time, found that the union was primarily 

responsible for the delay. “[T]here is ample evidence in 

the record, although none is required contractually, that 

the union, not FMCS, was the direct and primary cause 

for the failure of the parties to meet the four-month 

requirement.” J.A. 6. 

Mr. Muller petitions for review, arguing that the arbitrator’s decision to close arbitration and dismiss the

grievance was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 

discretion, and was not supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Muller requests that the arbitrator’s decision 

be set aside. We have jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 7121(f) and 7703(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

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MULLER v. GPO 5

DISCUSSION

I 

Under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(1), part of the Civil Service 

Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), a federal employee seeking 

to challenge disciplinary action by his employing agency 

may appeal his claim to the MSPB or, alternatively, take 

his claim to an independent arbitrator under a negotiated 

grievance procedure created by collective bargaining 

agreement. The arbitrator’s decision is reviewed by this 

court under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f). Section 7121(f) establishes 

that arbitrations of such grievances are reviewed under 

the same standard of review that applies to appeals from 

decisions of the MSPB. The statute provides that, “[i]n 

matters covered under sections 4303 and 7512 of this title 

which have been raised under the negotiated grievance

procedure in accordance with this section, section 7703 of 

this title . . . shall apply to the award of an arbitrator in 

the same manner and under the same conditions as if the 

matter had been decided by the Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f); 

see also Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 661 n.16 (1985);

Newman v. Corrado, 897 F.2d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 

Mr. Muller’s claim arises under § 7512, as it concerns a 

reduction in grade and a reduction in pay, so § 7703

applies here. 5 U.S.C. § 7512(3), (4). 

Section 7703(c) requires this court to set aside “any 

agency action, findings, or conclusions found to be (1) 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see also Appleberry v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 793 F.3d 1291, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The 

standard of review under § 7703 differs from the standard 

that applies to arbitrations conducted under the Federal 

Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., where an arbitrator’s 

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6 MULLER v. GPO

decision can be set aside only under narrow circumstances, such as corruption or misconduct on the part of the 

arbitrator. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a); see also Hall Street Assocs., 

L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584–85 (2008); First 

Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). 

This difference, with substantially less deference granted 

to arbitrations of the grievances of federal employees, is 

consistent with the purpose of the CSRA, which created 

arbitration defined by collective bargaining agreement as 

a parallel alternative to dispute resolution at the MSPB. 

“Congress clearly intended that an arbitrator would apply 

the same substantive rules as the Board does in reviewing 

an agency disciplinary decision.” Cornelius, 472 U.S. at

660. 

The CSRA makes clear that employees and their unions are obliged to invoke arbitration promptly, or their 

claims are forfeited. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(1) (“An 

employee shall be deemed to have exercised his option 

under this subsection to raise a matter . . . under the 

negotiated grievance procedure at such time as the employee . . . timely files a grievance in writing in accordance 

with the provisions of the parties’ negotiated grievance 

procedure . . . .”) (emphasis added). As the government 

points out, failure to comply with the deadline for invoking arbitration can result in dismissal of an employee’s 

grievance. In Appleberry, we upheld an arbitrator’s 

dismissal of a federal employee’s claim because it “was not 

properly ‘raised under the negotiated grievance procedure’ 

in the first place,” 793 F.3d at 1297, the employee having 

failed to invoke arbitration within 30 days of the agency’s 

denial of her grievance, as required by the controlling 

collective bargaining agreement, id. at 1294. 

However, the CSRA does not itself create any statutory timing requirements that apply after arbitration has 

been invoked. Instead, arbitration of grievances is allowed to proceed under a timetable and procedural rules 

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MULLER v. GPO 7

set by the governing collective bargaining agreement. We 

have noted that “[c]ourts should be careful not to ‘judicialize’ the arbitration process. Arbitration normally envisions that each case be decided on its own under the 

controlling contract . . . .” Gonce v. Veterans Admin., 

872 F.2d 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1989). “The collective bargaining agreement is the primary tool used in the arbitration process.” Gunn v. Veterans Admin., 892 F.2d 1036,

1038 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It is therefore up to the negotiating

parties to impose any internal deadlines on the arbitration process. 

II

The government notes, correctly, that “collective bargaining agreements are . . . contracts governed by the 

rules of contract interpretation.” Respondent’s Brief at 12 

(quoting Muniz v. Newman, 972 F.2d 1304, 1320 (Fed. 

Cir. 1992)). “Interpretation of a collective-bargaining 

agreement is a question of law we review de novo.” Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 780 F.3d 1145, 1147 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015); see also Huey v. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs., 782 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“It is well 

settled that the interpretation of a[] [collective bargaining] agreement is for the court.”). We conclude that 

noncompliance with the four-month deadline in Section 10.d.(4) of Article VII of the master agreement does 

not require dismissal of the arbitration. 

First, Section 10.d.(4) is not directed specifically to the 

union; it is not within the union’s power to ensure compliance with the four-month deadline; and the provision does 

not specify dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply 

with the deadline. As an initial matter, the master 

agreement does establish at least one deadline that is 

clearly directed to, and binding on, the union. Consistent 

with 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(1), the master agreement creates 

a 30-day deadline for invoking arbitration via written 

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8 MULLER v. GPO

notice. Section 10.d.(1) of Article VII of the agreement 

specifies,

If the grievance is not resolved at Step 3 or there 

is no response in the time limit set forth above, 

the union may inform the Director, Labor and 

Employee Relations Service of its decision to proceed to arbitration. This written statement must 

be submitted to the Director within 30 days after 

the decision of the Joint Grievance Committee.

J.A. 42. 

However, subsequent arbitration steps recited in the 

master agreement either impose no deadlines or the 

deadlines (as with the four-month deadline) are not 

directed to the union alone. Sections 10.d.(2) and (3) of 

Article VII of the agreement, which follow Section 10.d.(1), establish the rules for selecting an arbitrator

but do not include any time limits. J.A. 42–43. Section 10.d.(4) of Article VII next provides that, once an 

arbitrator has been selected, “[t]he arbitration hearing 

will take place within 4 months after filing of the notice of 

decision to proceed to arbitration, unless the parties 

mutually agree to an extension of the time limit.” J.A. 43. 

This deadline is not directed solely to the union but to the 

parties collectively as well as to the arbitrator. Section 11.e of Article VII later provides that “[a]n arbitrator 

will render his decision as quickly as possible, but not 

later than 30 calendar days after the close of the record,” 

a deadline directed to the arbitrator alone. J.A. 43. 

The arbitrator found, and the government now argues, that the four-month hearing deadline of Section 10.d.(4) binds the union. However, the four-month 

deadline, which immediately follows the provisions of the 

master agreement concerning selection of the arbitrator, 

is clearly addressed to all three actors, not to the union 

alone. Section 10.d.(4) indicates that once an arbitrator 

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MULLER v. GPO 9

has been selected, pursuant to Section 10.d.(3), the arbitrator, union, and agency should work together to schedule a hearing. Unlike the 30-day deadline for invoking 

arbitration, compliance with which is entirely within the 

union’s control, the union cannot unilaterally ensure that 

a hearing is held within four months. Indeed, under the 

arbitrator’s approach, even delay occasioned entirely by 

the government would result in dismissal of an employee’s grievance. 

Both the four-month hearing deadline of Section 10.d.(4) and the 30-day arbitration decision deadline 

of Section 11.e are, on their face, provisions to encourage 

prompt handling of the grievance. Neither contractual 

provision stipulates any consequences for the union or the 

agency in the event of noncompliance with these deadlines, and indeed Section 10.d.(4) expressly contemplates 

the possibility of the parties’ agreeing to extend the fourmonth deadline. 

The government argues that, in fact, Section 9 of Article VII of the master agreement creates consequences for 

the union if the time limits of Section 10 are not met. 

Section 9 reads, in full, 

Expeditious Handling. The parties agree that they 

will handle grievances in an expeditious manner 

and abide by the time limits set forth in this 

agreement. If these time limits are not met, the 

grievance will move to the next step as provided 

in Section 10 of this Article.

J.A. 42. Section 9 adds precatory language encouraging 

the parties to proceed “in an expeditious manner and 

abide by the time limits,” and states that failure to meet a 

deadline will result in the grievance moving to the next 

step. The only next step after a hearing is the decision by

the arbitrator. It is nonsensical, and the government does 

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10 MULLER v. GPO

not argue, that failure to meet the four-month deadline 

should result in a decision without a hearing. 

The government conceded at oral argument that the 

30-day decision deadline of Section 11.e is merely a goal 

for the arbitrator, triggering no consequences for noncompliance, and that an arbitrator’s delay in issuing a decision would not prejudice an employee’s claim. The 

government, and the arbitrator’s decision, offer no explanation why the four-month hearing deadline should be 

treated any differently. Neither deadline is within the 

union’s unilateral control, and the master agreement 

specifies no consequences for noncompliance with either. 

As the government notes, our court has upheld arbitrators’ dismissals of employee grievances when the 

employee, or his union, failed to comply with internal 

deadlines imposed on him by the collective bargaining 

agreement, but in these cases the relevant contractual 

deadlines were specifically directed to the union. In 

Gonce, we affirmed an arbitrator’s dismissal of two federal employees’ claims because the union failed to comply 

with a requirement in the collective bargaining agreement that “the moving party . . . request the Federal 

Mediation and Conciliation Service to provide a list of 

seven (7) impartial persons to act as an arbitrator.” 

872 F.2d at 996 (alteration in original). The Gonce court 

noted that “it was the union’s responsibility to request the 

panel of arbitrators ‘on or after the date of the notice of 

arbitration’ so as to secure ‘prompt and equitable resolution of grievances,’ but it waited seventeen months before 

it did.” Id. at 999. Gonce noted further that the governing collective bargaining agreement specified “strict time 

limits on earlier steps of the grievance procedure no 

longer than forty-five days.” Id.; see also Gunn, 892 F.2d 

at 1038 (assuming that noncompliance with an arbitrator 

selection deadline directed to the union (as moving party) 

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MULLER v. GPO 11

would have forfeited an employee’s grievance, absent 

waiver by the agency). 

In Herrera v. Department of Homeland Security, we 

upheld the MSPB’s affirmance of an arbitrator’s dismissal 

of an employee’s grievance due to the union’s noncompliance with an “obligation to cooperate promptly with the 

designated arbitrator in setting a date for a hearing” and 

“for failing to proceed with due diligence in setting a 

hearing date pursuant to the [collective bargaining 

agreement].” 498 F. App’x 35, 38 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In 

Herrera, the union asked for and received an extension of 

time to schedule an arbitration hearing date but then 

failed to respond by that extended deadline. Id. Unlike 

the master agreement at issue here, the controlling collective bargaining agreement in Herrera expressly provided 

that noncompliance with the arbitration timetable could 

lead to dismissal of the grievance: “Failure of either party 

to proceed with due diligence in responding to an offer of 

dates may serve as a basis for establishment of a hearing 

date by the arbitrator or dismissal of the grievance.” Id. 

The case at hand is similar to Stevens v. Department 

of the Air Force. 395 F. App’x 679 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In 

Stevens, a collective bargaining agreement governing 

resolution of Air Force employee grievances specified that 

the agency would “strive to effect disciplinary action 

within . . . 45 days of the offense” but defined no consequences for noncompliance. Id. at 681, 682. Our court 

affirmed a finding by the MSPB that the 45-day decision 

deadline merely “articulated a goal, rather than a mandatory time limit.” Id. at 682. We concluded that such a 

deadline is “best read as a housekeeping requirement that 

is not judicially enforceable.” Id. (quoting Timken U.S. 

Corp. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 

2005)). 

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12 MULLER v. GPO

Here, as in Stevens, the deadline is a goal, not a requirement, and the master agreement specifies no consequence for failure to observe the four-month deadline. 

The provision is thus merely a housekeeping rule. Of 

course, the parties are free to contract into binding deadlines that guarantee prompt dispute resolution, if they so 

desire. But they did not. Here there is nothing in the text 

of the master agreement to indicate that the GPO or the 

union intended noncompliance with the four-month 

hearing deadline to lead to automatic dismissal of

Mr. Muller’s grievance.1 

1 The government suggests that without an automatic dismissal rule, there would be no way to prevent 

the union from unduly delaying the proceeding. However, 

other provisions of the master agreement operate to 

ensure diligence. First, as noted above, the union must 

invoke arbitration within 30 days of a decision by the 

Joint Grievance Committee or forfeit the grievance. 

Second, if the union were to invoke arbitration on time 

but fail to initiate arbitrator selection, the agreement 

specifies that the agency has the authority to do so. J.A. 

42 (Section 10.d.(2)). Third, if the union were to fail to 

participate in the strike process for arbitrator selection, 

“the FMCS will be empowered to select” an arbitrator. 

J.A. 43 (Section 10.d.(3)). The FMCS has that power “[i]f 

either party refuses to take part in selecting an arbitrator.” Id.

Moreover, an arbitrator, once selected, has inherent 

authority to create a timetable for arbitration and consequences for noncompliance therewith (limited, of course, 

by the precise terms of the controlling collective bargaining agreement). See, e.g., Uliano v. Ctrs. for Medicare & 

Medicaid Servs., 185 F. App’x 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 

(affirming an arbitrator’s dismissal of an agency employ-

 

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MULLER v. GPO 13

There is therefore no basis in the text of the master 

agreement to support the arbitrator’s conclusion that 

noncompliance with the four-month hearing deadline 

automatically invalidated Mr. Muller’s claim. The arbitrator was wrong to conclude that “the plain language of 

the contractual provision” obliged him to terminate the 

arbitration. J.A. 7. 

III

Second, there is no past practice between the parties 

suggesting that the agreement should be interpreted to 

require dismissal for failure to comply with the deadline 

when the matter was submitted to the arbitrator in time 

for a hearing to be held within the four-month period. 

The arbitrator found, and the government now argues, 

that past practice of the GPO should lead to an interpretation of the master agreement under which failure to 

comply with the four-month deadline requires dismissal. 

It is true that past practices can supplement a collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court has 

noted that “[t]he labor arbitrator’s source of law is not 

confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the 

industrial common law—the practices of the industry and 

the shop—is equally a part of the collective bargaining 

ee’s grievance in view of the employee’s failure to appear 

at an arbitration hearing and noting that “[t]he Supreme 

Court has recognized the inherent power of a decision 

maker to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute”) (citing 

Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991)); Forsythe 

Int’l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1023 n.8 

(5th Cir. 1990) (“Arbitrators may, for example, devise 

appropriate sanctions for abuse of the arbitration process.”); cf. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(b) (granting the MSPB 

authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to prosecute). 

 

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14 MULLER v. GPO

agreement although not expressed in it.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 

363 U.S. 574, 581–82 (1960); see also Cruz-Martinez v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 410 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). In Cruz-Martinez we upheld an arbitrator’s dismissal of an employee grievance because his union waited 

longer than a year after invoking arbitration to request 

an arbitrator and schedule a hearing, in violation of an 

established practice of the parties. 410 F.3d at 1367, 

1372. We found that the past practice there created a 

binding, consequential deadline even in the absence of 

express language in the collective bargaining agreement. 

Id. at 1370. “Clear and long-standing practices of the 

parties—in other words, ‘past practices’—can establish 

terms of the agreement that are as binding as any specific 

written provision.” Id. “The arbitrator’s reliance on the 

sixteen years of the union’s acquiescence in the past 

practice is substantial evidence supporting the arbitrator’s decision” to dismiss the employee’s claim. Id. 

The past practice evidence in the record here consists 

of eight letters from the GPO to the union dismissing 

grievances because no arbitration hearing had been held 

within four months of invocation of arbitration. In each of 

the letters, the agency sought to dismiss a grievance 

because the union had failed to select an arbitrator within 

the four-month window. The letters therefore evidence an 

established practice of closing arbitration when the union 

was not diligent in selecting an arbitrator before the fourmonth deadline. 

Mr. Muller’s situation is different. Even if the union 

were dilatory up to the point that the arbitrator was 

selected, there is no question that Mr. Muller’s grievance 

was submitted to the arbitrator in sufficient time to 

schedule and conduct a hearing within four months. The 

GPO and the union jointly selected Mr. Feldman as

arbitrator in April of 2014, and the union informed FMCS 

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MULLER v. GPO 15

of the selection on May 9. FMCS notified the arbitrator of 

his selection on May 29, three weeks prior to the fourmonth deadline of June 19, 2014. At oral argument, 

Mr. Muller’s counsel indicated that the hearing would 

likely have taken a few days, and the government conceded that the hearing could have been held within the three 

week period. Unlike the eight letters cited by the government, here the union succeeded in getting the grievance into the arbitrator’s hands within the four-month 

limit. At that point, under the terms of Section 10.d.(4), 

the duty to proceed diligently to hearing was not the 

union’s alone but was instead shared among the arbitrator, the agency, and the union. 

As the government conceded at argument, there is no

evidence in the record of past practice germane to the 

situation here, where an arbitrator was timely selected 

and the case was in his hands comfortably before the fourmonth deadline. There is accordingly no basis in past

practice to support dismissal of Mr. Muller’s claim. 

IV 

In view of the plain language of the master agreement

and the absence of any pertinent past practice evidence, 

we find that the arbitrator’s dismissal of Mr. Muller’s 

claim was contrary to the collective bargaining agreement. The case is remanded for a determination of the 

merits of Mr. Muller’s grievance. Given that Mr. Feldman 

has withdrawn from the case for medical reasons, the 

parties must select a new arbitrator under the terms of 

their agreement. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

COSTS

Costs to petitioner. 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RAYMOND MULLER,

Petitioner

v.

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3032

______________________ 

Petition for review of an arbitrator's decision in No. 

14-54839 by Marvin J. Feldman.

______________________ 

PROST, Chief Judge, concurring. 

I join the majority opinion in the result based on the 

facts and circumstances of this case and in its reasoning 

with respect to Part III. I respectfully disagree, however, 

that in all circumstances, the provisions of the Master 

Labor Management Agreement (“master agreement”) at 

issue should be construed as having no consequences for

the parties here. I agree that in the absence of clear past 

practice, we must look to the text of the master agreement

and surrounding circumstances to determine the consequences for failure to comply with the deadlines imposed 

by the master agreement. 

As the majority notes, the master agreement does not 

explicitly provide that non-compliance with the deadlines 

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2 MULLER v. GPO

imposed in Section 10 could lead to the dismissal of the 

grievance. However, I respectfully disagree that in the 

absence of an established prior course of conduct, the lack 

of an explicit consequence for noncompliance requires that 

the deadline is a mere “housekeeping rule.” Majority Op. 

at 12. Rather, we should look to the facts and circumstances surrounding the delay and the party or parties 

who may control compliance with the stated deadlines.

Here, the union was not the sole cause of delay. The 

grievance was submitted to the arbitrator in sufficient 

time to complete the hearing before the four month deadline in the master agreement. From the time the matter 

was submitted, scheduling was jointly controlled by the 

arbitrator, the agency, and the union. Because the union 

could not unilaterally ensure that the hearing took place 

in time under these circumstances, it should also not be 

penalized for the failure. However, in cases where the 

delay can be solely attributed to a single party, then it 

would be appropriate to enforce the deadlines present in 

the master agreement against the party responsible.

Accordingly, like the majority, I would reverse the arbitrator’s decision and remand the case to address the 

merits, but on the basis that the union was not the sole 

cause for the delay.

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