Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-19-03021/USCOURTS-ca3-19-03021-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amro A. Elansari
Appellant
Pamela Ruest
Non-Participating
United States Marine Corps
Not Party

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-3021

___________

AMRO A. ELANSARI

Appellant

v.

PAMELA RUEST; UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2:19-cv-03609)

District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on March 9, 2020

Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 10, 2020)

Case: 19-3021 Document: 36 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/10/2020
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___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Amro Elansari appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his complaint because the defendants were immune from suit. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.1

In his complaint, Elansari alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when the 

U.S. Marine Corps did not allow him to enlist because he was on probation. Elansari stated 

that he then applied for early termination of his probation in Pennsylvania’s Centre County 

Court of Common Pleas for “good behavior.” D.C. Dkt. No. 2, ¶ 3. Elansari alleged that 

Judge Pamela Ruest committed “fraud” when she denied his request. See id. ¶ 15.

The District Court properly dismissed Elansari’s claims against the Marine Corps, as 

federal agencies are shielded by sovereign immunity absent an explicit waiver. See FDIC 

v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). And the District Court’s dismissal of Elansari’s claims 

against Judge Ruest on the basis of judicial immunity was also proper, as Elansari’s claims 

challenged Judge Ruest’s decision to deny his application for early termination of probation; that decision was within her jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–

57 (1978) (“A judge . . . will be subject to liability only when [s]he has acted in the ‘clear 

absence of all jurisdiction.’” (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Case: 19-3021 Document: 36 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/10/2020
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(1872))). Elansari’s conclusory allegation that Judge Ruest used “outside-of-the-courtroom 

procedural tactics to deprive [him] of a fair opportunity to challenge” his conviction, Appellant’s Br. 12, does not defeat that immunity.2

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

2 Because the Defendants were immune from suit, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint without allowing Elansari to amend it. See Grayson v. 

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (indicating that a district court 

should give a plaintiff leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile).

Case: 19-3021 Document: 36 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/10/2020