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Parties Involved:
Oscar Beckford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 18, 2016 

Decided March 21, 2016 

Before 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1389 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

OSCAR BECKFORD, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 14 CR 141-1 

Gary Feinerman, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Oscar Beckford, a citizen of Guatemala, was removed from the United States in 

2005 after serving a prison sentence in Illinois for drug possession. He soon reentered the 

country and in 2014 was charged with being in the United States without permission 

after removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The district court denied Beckford’s motion to 

dismiss the charge, and Beckford entered a conditional guilty plea allowing him to 

challenge that ruling. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). He was sentenced to 60 months’ 

imprisonment followed by 3 years’ supervised release. Beckford filed a notice of appeal, 

but his appointed attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw 

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Beckford opposes this motion. See CIR. R. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 15-1389 Page 2 

51(b). Counsel’s brief in support of the motion explains the nature of the case and 

addresses potential issues likely to be seen in an appeal of this kind. The analysis 

appears to be thorough, so we limit our review to the points counsel discusses along 

with Beckford’s additional contentions. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 

2014). 

Beckford came to the United States with his family in the 1970s and became a 

lawful permanent resident in 1990. Twice in 1994 he was sentenced to probation in 

Illinois for possessing a controlled substance (one of those probationary terms later was 

revoked, and Beckford was sentenced to a year in prison). He was convicted a third time 

in 1997 for drug possession and again was sentenced to prison. After his release the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings on the ground 

that Beckford had been convicted of an aggravated felony. All of his drug possessions 

were felonies, but Beckford argued that none should count as an aggravated felony for 

immigration purposes because, he said, simple possession is a misdemeanor under 

federal law. The immigration judge rejected that contention, however, because under 

controlling precedent a second conviction for possession counted as an aggravated 

felony. The immigration judge ordered Beckford removed and added that under 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b he was ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal because the order 

was premised on an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals overturned 

this decision on a procedural ground, but Beckford did not show up for his new hearing 

and in 2002 was ordered removed in absentia. He finally was caught and removed in 

2005, but in less than three months he had returned to the United States. 

Nine years later Beckford was charged by superseding indictment with violating 

§ 1326(a) (additional charges for drug possession and for possessing a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime were dismissed by the government). In his 

unsuccessful motion to dismiss, Beckford sought to invalidate the underlying order of 

removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), on the ground that after his removal the Supreme Court 

held that simple possession is not an aggravated felony unless the conviction would 

have been a felony under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) if prosecuted in federal court. His drug 

convictions did not satisfy this standard, Beckford insisted. And for that reason, 

Beckford continued, the removal proceedings had been fundamentally unfair because 

the immigration judge said he was ineligible for cancellation of removal based on those 

convictions. 

The district court calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 10 to 16 months 

but decided that 60 months was the more appropriate sentence. The court thought it 

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significant that Beckford had disappeared in 2002 after he was ordered removed and 

then, in 2005, when he finally was removed, he had returned immediately only to be 

found years later with more than 3 kilograms of cocaine, more than 300 grams of crack, 

and two loaded firearms. Beckford was not simply in the country illegally, the district 

court reasoned, but was a “significant and significantly-armed drug trafficker.” The 

court ordered, as special conditions of supervised release, that Beckford not reenter the 

United States without consent and not commit another crime. 

In her Anders brief, counsel informs us that Beckford does not wish to challenge 

his guilty plea unless he prevails in challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss. 

Counsel thus properly forgoes discussing the voluntariness of the plea or the adequacy 

of the plea colloquy. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United 

States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Counsel first addresses the denial of Beckford’s motion to dismiss. Even 

assuming that Beckford is correct that under current law his state convictions would not 

qualify as aggravated felonies, we agree that a challenge to the denial of his motion 

would be frivolous. In order to collaterally attack a deportation proceeding, a defendant 

must show that “(1) [he] exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been 

available to seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings at which the 

order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; 

and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see United 

States v. Larios-Buentello, 807 F.3d 176, 176 (7th Cir. 2015). Beckford did not satisfy any of 

these requirements. 

Beckford focused primarily on the third requirement, that the entry of the order of 

removal be fundamentally unfair, meaning that his right to due process was violated 

during the removal proceedings and that he was prejudiced as a result. See United States 

v. De Horta Garcia, 519 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2008). Beckford argued that he satisfied this 

requirement because, he insists, the immigration judge misled him about his eligibility 

for cancellation of removal based on the misconception that he had been convicted of an 

aggravated felony. Even if Beckford could distinguish his case from those in which we 

have said that an alien does not have a due process right to be informed of, or considered 

for, discretionary relief, see, e.g., United States v. Zambrano-Reyes, 724 F.3d 761, 765–66 

(7th Cir. 2013); De Horta Garcia, 519 F.3d at 661, the immigration judge was not wrong 

about Beckford’s status as an aggravated felon, notwithstanding later changes to the 

law, see Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010). Before the immigration judge 

told Beckford that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, the Board of 

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Immigration Appeals had held that any second state conviction for simple possession of 

a controlled substance was an aggravated felony because the second offense could have 

been punished as a felony under federal law. See Matter of L-G-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 89, 95–96 

(BIA 1995), modified by Matter of Yanez-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390 (BIA 2002); 

see also Fernandez v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 862, 874 (7th Cir. 2008) (adopting this approach), 

judgment vacated by Fernandez v. Holder, 561 U.S. 1001 (2010). Beckford’s 1997 conviction 

for possession of a controlled substance was his third, so the immigration judge did not 

misinform him that, under the law at the time, he did have a conviction for an 

aggravated felony and thus was ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(a)(3); United States v. Alegria-Saldana, 750 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that 

law in effect at time of challenged removal is the relevant law for fundamental-fairness 

analysis); United States v. Baptist, 759 F.3d 690, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2014) (same). 

Beckford similarly argued that he was deprived of the opportunity to seek 

judicial review because the immigration judge did not tell him about the availability of 

discretionary relief. We do not understand how an alien’s ignorance of avenues for 

cancellation of removal would prevent him from pursuing judicial review, but, again, 

the immigration judge was not required to tell Beckford that he could seek relief that, 

under the law at the time, was unavailable. See Larios-Buentello, 807 F.3d at 177. Finally, 

Beckford did not exhaust his available administrative remedies. Although he was 

ordered removed in absentia, he could have filed a motion to reopen and explained if he 

had a justifiable reason for failing to appear. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C); United States v. 

Arita-Campos, 607 F.3d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2010). In his § 1326(d) motion Beckford did 

not explain why he never moved to reopen or even why he failed to appear at the 

removal hearing. 

Counsel next advises that she reviewed the district court’s application of the 

sentencing guidelines and concluded that the court “correctly adopted” the calculations 

proposed by the probation officer. But one of those calculations, the assessment of 2 

criminal history points on the 1994 drug conviction for which Beckford’s probation was 

revoked, was in error. The revocation occurred in 1997, which led the probation officer 

to conclude that Beckford’s prison term was imposed within 10 years of the 

commencement of his § 1326(a) offense, i.e., when Beckford reentered the country in 

2005. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(2). The prison term was under 13 months, however, so the 

relevant date for this conviction is not when the revocation occurred but the “date of the 

original sentence,” which is 1994. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(K)(2)(C); see United States v. 

Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2006). Thus the conviction should not have been 

counted toward Beckford’s criminal history category under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b). Still, an 

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appellate challenge to this error would be frivolous because in his plea agreement 

Beckford expressly endorsed the court’s guidelines calculations, including the 

assessment of criminal history points. See United States v. Fiore, 178 F.3d 917, 925 (7th Cir. 

1999); United States v. Martinez, 122 F.3d 421, 422–23 (7th Cir. 1997). 

Counsel next rejects as frivolous a possible challenge to the reasonableness of 

Beckford’s 60-month prison term. Above-guidelines sentences are “more likely to be 

reasonable if . . . based on factors sufficiently particularized to the individual 

circumstances of the case rather than factors common to offenders with like crimes.” 

United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 792–93 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). The district court thoroughly discussed its reasons for imposing a 

sentence 44 months above the imprisonment range. The court deemed Beckford’s 

unlawful presence in the United States to be particularly serious because he had failed to 

surrender for removal, had been a fugitive for more than 2 years, and returned to the 

United States only months after being removed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court also 

weighed heavily that Beckford was operating a “large-scale drug operation” for which 

he originally faced statutory minimums totaling 15 years. Because of Beckford’s history 

of drug offenses before his removal and his continued drug activity after his reentry, the 

court also reasoned that Beckford was likely to reoffend. See id. § 3553(a)(B), (C). The 

court acknowledged the “significant upward variance,” but deemed Beckford’s case to 

be an “extraordinary situation.” Because the court adequately justified the sentence, 

counsel is correct that a reasonableness challenge would be frivolous. 

Finally, counsel correctly deems frivolous a potential challenge to the term or 

conditions of supervised release. The district court justified both the imposition of 

supervised release and the two specific conditions imposed. See United States v. Kappes, 

782 F.3d 828, 845 (7th Cir. 2015). Although the Sentencing Commission has concluded 

that supervised release generally is unnecessary for a defendant likely to be removed 

after his release from prison, see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c); United States v. Zamudio, 718 F.3d 

989, 990 (7th Cir. 2013), sentencing courts still should consider imposing supervised 

release if “it would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection,” U.S.S.G. 

§ 5B1.1, cmt. n.5. The district court reasoned that a term of supervised release, combined 

with the conditions that Beckford not reenter the United States without permission or 

commit other crimes should he do so, would provide additional deterrence by subjecting 

Beckford to an additional 2 criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) for 

committing an offense while on supervised release and the possibility of a separate 

charge for violating the conditions of supervised release. See United States v. 

Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that removal does not 

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terminate a term of supervised release); United States v. Akinyemi, 108 F.3d 777, 780 

(7th Cir. 1997) (commenting on advisability of including condition of supervised release 

that defendant who is removed cannot reenter). And added deterrence is necessary, the 

court reasoned, because of the serious criminal conduct Beckford was engaged in when 

he was found in the United States in 2013. 

That leaves only the additional contention in the defendant’s Rule 51(b) 

submission. Beckford contends that the sentencing court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 

530 U.S. 466 (2000), by considering at sentencing the drugs and guns underlying the two 

counts dismissed from the indictment. But Apprendi is not relevant to facts that do not 

increase a statutory penalty, United States v. Faulkner, 793 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 2015); 

United States v. Boos, 329 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 2003), and a sentencing court may rely on 

conduct that did not result in a conviction if proved by a preponderance, United States v. 

Lucas, 670 F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mays, 593 F.3d 603, 609–10 

(7th Cir. 2010). Beckford does not argue that the factual recitation in the presentence 

report, which he left unchallenged, is inadequate to satisfy this standard. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

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