Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02299/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02299-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Teresita A. Canuto
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TERESITA A. CANUTO,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2299

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:16-cv-00414-NBF, Senior Judge Nancy B. 

Firestone. 

______________________ 

Decided: December 12, 2016

______________________ 

TERESITA A. CANUTO, Northridge, CA, pro se.

KRISTIN MCGRORY, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., 

DEBORAH A. BYNUM. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, CLEVENGER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

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2 CANUTO v. US

PER CURIAM. 

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Teresita Canuto’s claims for lack of subject of matter jurisdiction. We 

affirm the dismissal, along with the Court of Federal 

Claims’ denial of Ms. Canuto’s motion to amend her 

complaint as moot.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Canuto brings this suit against the United States. 

She alleges that, on numerous occasions, members of the 

U.S. military broke into her apartment, released sleeping 

gas to incapacitate her and her family, and sexually 

assaulted her. Ms. Canuto alleges that the perpetrators 

were acting under orders from the Office of the President. 

She seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the 

alleged assaults. 

This is the third suit Ms. Canuto has filed in the 

Court of Federal Claims making largely the same allegations of assault. In both prior cases, the Court of Federal 

Claims dismissed Ms. Canuto’s complaints for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, and this court affirmed each of 

those dismissals. See Canuto v. United States, 651 F. 

App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Canuto v. United States, 615 

F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Ms. Canuto filed her complaint in the present case on 

April 1, 2016. She filed a motion to amend her complaint 

to include additional allegations of abuse on April 15, 

2016. The Court of Federal Claims sua sponte dismissed 

Ms. Canuto’s claims on May 4, 2016, finding a lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Federal Claims 

also denied Ms. Canuto’s motion to amend as moot. Ms. 

Canuto appeals the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal. 

We have jurisdiction to review the Court of Federal 

Claims’ rulings under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

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CANUTO v. US 3

DISCUSSION

A 

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), “confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal Claims over the specified categories of actions brought against the United 

States.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc portion). The categories are 

those “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of 

Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or 

upon any express or implied contract with the United 

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases 

not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). 

The Tucker Act does not, however, create a substantive cause of action. “[A] plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to 

money damages.” Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172. “That source 

must be ‘money-mandating.’ ” Metz v. United States, 466 

F.3d 991, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Fisher, 402 F.3d at 

1172 (en banc portion)). 

Ms. Canuto’s complaint cites to a several sources of 

law as supporting her claims: the Posse Comitatus Act, 18

U.S.C. § 1385; the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 

1970, 29 U.S.C § 651; 10 U.S.C. § 375 (relating to regulations for preventing the use of the military for domestic 

law enforcement); the Telephone Records and Privacy 

Protection Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 1039; the Privacy Act 

of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2679; 10 U.S.C. § 939 (relating to procedures for 

addressing property damage claims under Uniform Code 

of Military Justice); the Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C.

§ 2733; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and various 

sections of Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution. 

The Court of Federal Claims found that none of the 

cited sources of law fit within the Tucker Act’s jurisdictional grant. Without addressing whether Ms. Canuto 

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4 CANUTO v. US

satisfactorily alleged facts to state a claim under these 

various regulations, we agree that the Court of Federal 

Claims may not hear her claims. 

First, Ms. Canuto’s claims seeking damages for “repeated assault . . . and battery,” are, at their core, tort 

claims. See Complaint at 1. The Tucker Act specifically 

excludes claims “sounding in tort” from the Court of 

Federal Claims’ jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). 

Second, Congress has conferred to the district courts 

exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the 

Federal Tort Claims Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); 

Robleto v. United States, 634 F. App’x 306, 308 (Fed. Cir. 

2015), and the Civil Rights Act, see Cunningham v. United States, 479 F. App’x 974, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The 

Court of Federal Claims properly refused to hear Ms. 

Canuto’s claims rooted in these statutes.

Finally, Ms. Canuto fails to establish that any of the 

remaining sources of law are money-mandating. “Not 

every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, 

or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker 

Act. . . . [T]he claimant must demonstrate that the source 

of substantive law he relies upon can fairly be interpreted 

as mandating compensation by the Federal Government 

for the damages sustained.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 

U.S. 206, 216–17 (1983) (quotation marks omitted). Even 

pro se claimants must meet this burden of proving the 

Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction. Sanders v. United 

States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Ms. Canuto 

has not done so. 

We agree with the Court of Federal Claims, for the 

reasons stated in the thorough opinion below, that the 

other cited statutes and Constitutional provisions are not 

money-mandating. Most of them do not contemplate or 

provide for private causes of action, let alone require the 

payment of damages. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 

556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009) (“The . . . source of law need not 

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CANUTO v. US 5

explicitly provide that the right or duty it creates is enforceable through a suit for damages, but it triggers 

liability only if it can fairly be interpreted as mandating 

compensation by the Federal Government.” (quotation 

marks omitted)).

In her appeal briefs, Ms. Canuto also argues that the 

Declaration of Independence serves as protection order 

against violence, threats, and harassment, thereby 

providing the basis for the Court of Federal Claims’ 

jurisdiction. Ms. Canuto waived this argument by not 

first raising it before the Court of Federal Claims. See 

San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 

1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Also, the Declaration of Independence is not a money-mandating source of law. 

We have considered Ms. Canuto’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Thus, for the reasons 

stated above, the Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed Ms. Canuto’s complaint for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B 

Prior to dismissal, Ms. Canuto moved to amend her 

complaint to allege additional instances of assault. The 

Court of Federal Claims denied the motion as moot after 

dismissing the case. 

The denial of Ms. Canuto’s motion to amend was not 

an abuse of discretion. See Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United 

States, 550 F.3d 1135, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Ms. Canuto’s amended allegations did not identify additional or 

alternative legal bases on which the Court of Federal 

Claims could exercise jurisdiction. As such, the motion 

was futile and properly denied. See Foman v. Davis, 371 

U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (identifying “futility of amendment” 

as a basis for denying leave to amend). 

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6 CANUTO v. US

CONCLUSION

We affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of 

Ms. Canuto’s complaint and denial of the motion to 

amend as moot.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs.

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