Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00378/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00378-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Gricelda Flores
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRICELDA FLORES,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00378-CDB (SS)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ON STIPULATED MOTION FOR AWARD 

OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO THE 

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, 28 

U.S.C. § 2412(d)

(Docs. 20, 22)

Clerk of Court to Assign District Judge

Pending before the Court is the stipulated request of Plaintiff Gricelda Flores (“Plaintiff”) 

for the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d), in the amount of $8,500.00 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) to counsel for Plaintiff, 

Josephine M. Gerrard, filed on December 27, 2024. (Doc. 22); see (Doc. 20). 

After Plaintiff filed her Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees on December 9, 2024 

(Doc. 20), the parties represent in the instant stipulation that they engaged in good faith 

negotiations. (Doc. 22 at 1). The parties stipulate and request that Plaintiff be awarded attorney 

fees and expenses in the amount described above subject to remaining terms of Plaintiff’s 

Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees. (Id.); see (Doc. 20 at 6) (“Plaintiff assigned her rights 

to the EAJA fee to her attorney, Josephine M. Gerrard, Gerrard Law Offices. Plaintiff’s counsel 

requests if the Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, 

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then the Government shall [have] the award to be made directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, pursuant 

to the assignment executed by Plaintiff and the Federal Contract.”).

On September 18, 2024, the Court entered an order on the parties’ stipulation to grant 

voluntary remand and remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings 

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 18). Judgment was entered the same day. 

(Doc. 19). On December 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees. 

(Doc. 20). On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed the pending stipulation for attorney fees as a 

prevailing party. (Doc. 22); see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993) (concluding

that a party who prevails in a sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing 

party). Plaintiff’s request is timely. Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2007). The 

Commissioner does not oppose the requested relief and has stipulated and agreed with Plaintiff 

to amend the award to $8,500.00 under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), that is subject to the 

remaining terms of Plaintiff’s Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. 17).

The EAJA provides for an award of attorney fees to private litigants who both prevail in 

civil actions (other than tort) against the United States and timely file a petition for fees. 28 

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing 

party unless it finds the government’s position was “substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make such an award unjust.” (Id.). To be “substantially justified,” the 

government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action must have a “reasonable basis 

both in law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); Ibrahim v. DHS, 912 

F.3d 1147, 1167 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). A determination that an ALJ’s decision “was 

unsupported by substantial evidence is therefore a strong indication that the ‘position of the 

United States’...was not substantially justified.” Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 874 

(9th Cir. 2005). Because “substantial evidence” is a “deferential...standard of review” and refers 

to “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion,” a finding that substantial evidence is lacking usually means “the government’s 

underlying action was not substantially justified.” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 

2013). Here, the government did not show its position was substantially justified and the Court 

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finds that there are not special circumstances that would make an award unjust. Moreover, the

government does not oppose Plaintiff’s request. See Sanchez v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv-01081-

SKO, 2018 WL 509817, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) (finding position of the government was 

not substantially justified in view of the Commissioner’s assent to remand); Knyazhina v. Colvin, 

No. 2:12–cv–2726 DAD, 2014 WL 5324302, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014) (same).

Plaintiff requests an award of $8,500.00. (Doc. 22 at 1). The Ninth Circuit maintains a list 

of the statutory maximum hourly rates authorized by the EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost 

of living, on its website. See Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Even assuming Plaintiff’s counsel seeks the most recent published maximum rate,

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the requested 

award would amount to approximately 35 hours of attorney time (not accounting for any 

paralegal time expended). The Court has reviewed the docket and finds this reasonable and 

commensurate with the number of hours an attorney reasonably would need to have spent

reviewing the certified administrative record in this case (approximately 630 pages; Doc. 11) and 

preparing a motion for summary judgment raising four issues for review throughout 10 pages of 

argument. (Doc. 12). With respect to the results obtained, Plaintiff’s counsel obtained a 

favorable judgment remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. (Docs. 18, 19).

EAJA fees, expenses, and costs are subject to any offsets allowed under the Treasury Offset 

Program (“TOP”), as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). If the Commissioner 

determines upon effectuation of this order that Plaintiff’s EAJA fees are not subject to any offset 

allowed under the TOP, the fees shall be delivered or otherwise transmitted to Plaintiff’s counsel.

Remainder of This Page Intentionally Left Blank

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Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice, available at

https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited December 27, 

2024).

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Conclusion, Order and Findings & Recommendations

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to assign a district judge to this action.

And the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS:

1. Plaintiff’s stipulated request for the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to EAJA

(Docs. 20, 22) be GRANTED; and

2. The Commissioner be directed to pay to Plaintiff as the prevailing party attorney

fees in the amount of $8,500.00. Fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff, but if the

Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt,

then the government shall cause the payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be

made directly to Plaintiff’s counsel as set forth in the stipulation.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days of 

being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 30, 2024 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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