Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00298/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00298-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul A. Harper
Plaintiff
Ronald M. Whyte
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL A. HARPER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

RONALD M. WHYTE,

Defendant. /

No. C 08-00298 SI

ORDER GRANTING IFP APPLICATION

AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

Now before the Court is plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), filed on

January 16, 2008. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s IFP

application and DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Paul Harper has filed a complaint against Judge Ronald Whyte of the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiff appears to be suing Judge Whyte for

violating state and federal law while presiding over the cases of Harper v. Trumbull, No. 07-4191, and

Harper v. Weiking, No. 06-6320. Plaintiff’s complaint mentions the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 4(b), 4(c), and 4(m), and California Code of Civil

Procedure §§ 412.10, 413.10, and 1209(4). It is unclear what plaintiff’s complaint alleges, other than

that plaintiff takes issue with Judge Whyte’s handling of plaintiff’s prior lawsuits against Magistrate

Judge Patricia Trumbull and Clerk of the Court Richard Weiking, in particular something having to do

with service of process.

Case 3:08-cv-00298-SI Document 4 Filed 01/23/08 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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LEGAL STANDARD

IFP applications are reviewed under a two-part analysis under 28 U.S. C. § 1915. This analysis

looks first to whether a plaintiff meets the requisite financial status to be permitted to proceed in federal

court without first paying a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The second stage of the analysis

examines a plaintiff’s complaint to ensure that it states cognizable, non-frivolous claims. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The Court may, “at any time,” dismiss an IFP claim if it determines that “the

allegation of poverty is untrue,” or the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Cato v. United States, 70 F. 3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995)

(noting that a court may dismiss an action under § 1915 if the “complaint neither identifies any

constitutional or statutory right that was violated nor asserts any basis for federal subject matter

jurisdiction . . .”). 

Courts treat the second prong of the analysis similarly to a motion to dismiss filed by a

defendant. If it is “clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the [ plaintiff’s] allegations,” then it is proper to dismiss an IFP. See Ascon Properties,

Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying standard of review for motions to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). Also similar to a motion to dismiss, all

material allegations in an IFP complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. See NL Ind., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). A pro se litigant bringing

an IFP suit is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome any deficiency

unless it is clear that no amendment could cure the defect. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1106. 

DISCUSSION 

 The first stage of IFP analysis requires that a plaintiff file an affidavit describing the totality of

the plaintiff’s assets and stating that the plaintiff is unable to pay the required fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff has filed such an affidavit, indicating that he has no assets and is unemployed.

Assuming that plaintiff is being truthful in his IFP application, plaintiff is within the parameters 

Case 3:08-cv-00298-SI Document 4 Filed 01/23/08 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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necessary to grant an IFP application. Accordingly, his application to proceed without the payment of

a filing fee is GRANTED. 

The Court’s grant of plaintiff’s IFP application does not mean, however, that he may continue

to prosecute his complaint. The Court may review “at any time” plaintiff’s complaint to determine

whether it states a cognizable cause of action against the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and is frivolous. It

appears plaintiff’s concern in this complaint is that Judge Whyte somehow violated his due process

rights and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the way the court handled the service of plaintiff’s

complaint. The Court assumes this relates to Judge Whyte’s denial of plaintiff’s IFP applications in two

prior orders, see August 28, 2007 Order, Harper v. Trumbull, No. 07-4191; February 22, 2007 Order,

Harper v. Weiking, No. 06-6320, the denial of which did not entitle plaintiff to have the Court serve the

complaint for him. As plaintiff has already been informed by Judge Whyte, see August 28, 2007 Order,

Harper v. Trumbull, No. 07-4191, a federal judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for acts

performed in his judicial capacity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967); Moore v. Brewster,

96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Judge Whyte violated

plaintiff’s rights by issuing certain orders, and thus alleges liability based on acts performed by Judge

Whyte in his capacity as a judge. Moreover, to the extent plaintiff’s complaint is also a complaint

against court clerks, judicial immunity also applies to complaints brought against them. Mullis v. United

States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987); Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 39-40 (2d

Cir. 1988). For these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, and his complaint is DISMISSED. 

Although the Court might normally grant leave to amend the complaint, the Court does not

believe leave to amend is appropriate in these circumstances. First, this is at least the third complaint

plaintiff has filed in federal court against judges or court clerks, all of which have been denied on

judicial immunity grounds. See August 28, 2007 Order, Harper v. Trumbull, No. 07-4191, and February

22, 2007 Order, Harper v. Weiking, No. 06-6320. More importantly, given the gravamen of plaintiff’s

charges against Judge Whyte, it is clear that there is no amendment which could cure the defects in the

complaint.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND and plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP is GRANTED [Docket No. 3].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2008 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00298-SI Document 4 Filed 01/23/08 Page 4 of 4