Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-06-50694/USCOURTS-ca9-06-50694-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Luis Manuel Rodriguez-Martinez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-50553

v.  D.C. No.

MARIO MANUEL VASQUEZ-RAMOS, CR-05-00581-SJO

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-50694

v. D.C. No.  CR-05-00579-SJO LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZMARTINEZ, also known as Luis ORDER AND

Manuel Hernandez-Rodriguez, OPINION

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 5, 2008—Pasadena, California

Filed June 27, 2008

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Mary M. Schroeder, and

Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

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COUNSEL

Robison D. Harley, Jr., Santa Ana, California, for appellant

Mario Manuel Vasquez-Ramos.

Marilyn E. Bednarski, Kay, McLane & Bednarski, LLP, Pasadena, California, for appellant Luis Manuel RodriguezMartinez.

Robert J. Lundman, Environment & Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the

appellee.

ORDER

The opinion published April 10, 2008, and appearing at 522

F.3d 914, is hereby withdrawn. Due to a printer’s error, the

published opinion does not reflect the opinion as filed by

panel. The opinion filed concurrently with this order reflects

the opinion actually filed by the panel with the clerk and

should be published by the printer as the panel’s opinion

forthwith. 

Defendant-Appellant Mario Vasquez-Ramos’s Motion for

Joinder in Co-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is GRANTED. 

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The panel has voted to deny the Defendants-Appellants’

joint petition for panel rehearing. Judges Schroeder and Tallman vote to deny the petition for rehearing en banc and Judge

Goodwin so recommends. 

The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing

en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to

rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. 

The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc as to both cases is DENIED. No further petitions

for rehearing or rehearing en banc shall be entertained.

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Mario Manuel Vasquez-Ramos and Luis Manuel

Rodriguez-Martinez (Defendants) were charged by information for possessing feathers and talons of bald and golden

eagles and other migratory birds without a permit in violation

of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), 16

U.S.C. §§ 668—668d, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act

(MBTA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703—712. They moved to dismiss the

information claiming that prosecuting their possession of the

feathers and talons violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4. In

United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003),

under nearly identical facts, we held that there was no RFRA

violation. Antoine remains binding law in our circuit, and we

affirm the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion

to dismiss. 

I

A

BGEPA makes it illegal to possess bald or golden eagles or

parts of bald or golden eagles without a permit. 16 U.S.C.

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§ 668. Congress and the United States Department of the Interior have crafted a permitting system and parts repository to

regulate the possession and distribution of eagles and parts of

eagles in a manner that “is compatible with the preservation

of” the bald and golden eagle. 16 U.S.C. § 668a; 50 C.F.R.

§ 22.22. Permits authorizing acquisition and possession of

whole or parts of eagles may be issued “for the religious purposes of Indian tribes.” 16 U.S.C. § 668a. However, only

members of federally-recognized Indian tribes may apply for

and receive permits. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22. Unless received

through inheritance or gift, see 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(1),

permit-eligible tribal members may obtain eagles and parts of

eagles only through the National Eagle Repository in Colorado, see 16 U.S.C. § 668(a); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,

Questions and Answers About the National Eagle Repository,

http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/law/eagle/ (last visited

Apr. 3, 2008). 

The Repository is the main collection point for salvaged

bald and golden eagle carcasses, parts, and feathers. Requests

for eagle carcasses or parts are received by the Repository and

are generally filled on a first-come, first-served basis. The

time it takes for a request to be filled varies between three and

a half years for a whole bird and ninety days for twenty

lower-quality feathers. Although there has been an increase in

the number of eagle carcasses being recovered in the wild and

sent to the Repository, the number of requests has also

increased, extending the wait.

The Repository and permitting systems operate in recognition of the fact that demand exceeds supply and that wait

times are excessive. Supply and demand have also given rise

to black market trading in illegally taken eagles or parts of

eagles. See S. Rep. No. 71-180, at 2 (1930) (noting the “considerable traffic in eagle quills and plumage” and the corresponding need to criminalize not only killing and capture of

eagles, but also possession, sale, and transport of eagles and

their feathers); United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1377

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(9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (where the defendants claimed

that they shot bald and golden eagles because of the “difficulty of obtaining eagles or eagle parts administratively”). 

The MBTA also makes it illegal to possess any migratory

birds, including bald and golden eagles. 16 U.S.C. § 703. Permits may be issued for falconry, propagation, scientific collection, rehabilitation, depredation, and taxidermy, among

other purposes. 16 U.S.C. § 704; 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.21—.31.

There is no specific exemption for Native American religious

use, but “the United States has adopted a policy under which

members of federally-recognized Indian tribes may possess

migratory bird parts, while non-members may not and may be

prosecuted for such possession.” See United States v. Eagleboy, 200 F.3d 1137, 1138 (8th Cir. 1999). 

B

In 2002, law enforcement officers acting in conjunction

with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, which was

investigating the killing of bald eagles in captivity at the Santa

Barbara Zoo, executed search warrants and found parts and

feathers of eagles and other migratory birds in Defendants’

residences. Defendants claim to have received the feathers

during Native American religious ceremonies and to have

used them for religious worship. Defendants did not have and

could not obtain permits to possess the parts and feathers

because they are not members of federally-recognized Indian

tribes.

The United States filed a two-count information against

each Defendant. Count One charged Defendants with knowingly possessing feathers and talons of bald and golden eagles

without a permit in violation of BGEPA. Count Two charged

Defendants with wilfully possessing feathers and talons of

bald and golden eagles and red-tailed hawks without a permit

in violation of MBTA.

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Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the information,

claiming that their prosecution impermissibly burdened their

religious practice under RFRA. The government responded

that the burden on Defendants’ religious practice was the least

restrictive means of advancing the government’s compelling

interest in protecting eagles. The district court agreed. It

found the result to be controlled by our holding in United

States v. Antoine and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Defendants entered conditional guilty pleas and filed this

timely appeal.

II

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to

dismiss an information based on the interpretation of a federal

statute. See United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1110

(9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Sandia, 188 F.3d 1215, 1217

(10th Cir. 1999) (“The district court’s decision to deny the

motion to dismiss based on defendant’s religious rights under

RFRA is a question of law that we review de novo.”).

Whether application of a federal law violates RFRA is a question of statutory construction for the court, not a question of

fact. See Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1379. 

III

[1] Under RFRA the government cannot “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results

from a rule of general applicability” unless it demonstrates

that “the burden to the person . . . (1) is in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). The district court found,

and the government concedes, that Defendants’ sincere religious beliefs are substantially burdened by BGEPA and

MBTA’s permit requirements. The government must demonstrate that criminalizing Defendants’ possession of eagle parts

and feathers is the least restrictive means of achieving a com7594 UNITED STATES v. VASQUEZ-RAMOS

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pelling interest. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 

[2] We faced the same issue in United States v. Antoine,

318 F.3d at 920. There, the defendant was charged with violating BGEPA after he brought feathers and eagle parts from

Canada into the United States and then swapped them for

money and other goods as part of the native trading custom

of “potlatch.” Id. The defendant moved to dismiss his prosecution, claiming that he was exempt from BGEPA under

RFRA. Id. We rejected his claim, holding that “[t]he government has a compelling interest in eagle protection that justifies limiting supply to eagles that pass through the repository,

even though religious demand exceeds supply as a result. Any

allocation of the ensuing religious burdens is least restrictive

because reconfiguration would necessarily restrict someone’s

free exercise.” Id. at 924. 

We are bound by circuit precedent unless there has been a

substantial change in relevant circumstances, see id. at 922, or

a subsequent en banc or Supreme Court decision that is

clearly irreconcilable with our prior holding, see Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Neither

circumstance is present here. 

A

[3] In July 2007, the Department of the Interior removed

the bald eagle from the Endangered Species List. See Removing the Bald Eagle from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346 (July 9, 2007). Defendants

urge us to conclude that given the current census estimates of

pairs of nesting eagles in the continental United States there

has been sufficient recovery of eagle populations such that the

government’s interest in eagle protection is no longer compelling. But Congress passed BGEPA recognizing that “the bald

eagle is [not] a mere bird of biological interest but a symbol

of the American ideals of freedom.” Public Laws June 8,

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1940, ch. 278, pmbl., 54 Stat. 250 (1940). As the Tenth Circuit has recognized, “The bald eagle would remain our

national symbol whether there were 100 eagles or 100,000

eagles. The government’s interest in preserving the species

remains compelling in either situation.” United States v.

Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 

[4] When the Department of the Interior issued the final

rule removing the bald eagle from the list of endangered or

threatened species, it repeatedly emphasized the continuing

protection afforded by BGEPA and MBTA to reduce the

threat to bald eagles and “prevent the likelihood of endangerment for the bald eagle in the lower 48 States.” 72 Fed. Reg.

37,346; 37,366; 37,372. We conclude, despite the fact that the

bald eagle is no longer considered endangered or threatened,1

the United States continues to have a compelling interest in

protecting eagles by enforcing BGEPA and MBTA. See

Antoine, 318 F.3d at 924. 

B

Defendants also argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,

“constitutes a significant shift in the legal terrain surrounding

the appropriate application of . . . RFRA,” which undermines

our holding in Antoine. We disagree. 

O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal is a 130-

member religious group with its roots in the Amazon rainforest that drinks a sacramental tea, hoasca, containing a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances Act. O

1When we decided Antoine the Department of the Interior had proposed

removing the bald eagle from the list of threatened species, but had not

then finalized the delisting proposal. See 318 F.3d at 921. We suggested

that a future final rule might “transform a compelling interest into a less

than compelling one, or render a well-tailored statute misproportioned.”

Id. Our review of the record satisfies us, however, that such “transformation” has not occurred. 

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Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 425. When the government

threatened prosecution, the group filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that applying the Controlled

Substances Act to its use of hoasca violated RFRA. Id. at

425-26. The government “conceded that the challenged application of the Controlled Substances Act would substantially

burden a sincere exercise of religion by the [group],” but

claimed that this burden did not violate RFRA. Id. at 426. 

[5] The Supreme Court rejected the government’s primary

contention on appeal—“that [the government] has a compelling interest in the uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act, such that no exception to the ban on the use of

the hallucinogen can be made to accommodate the sect’s sincere religious practice.” Id. at 423. The Court held that

“RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law . . . [to the] particular claimant whose sincere

exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” Id. at

430-31. The Court explained that RFRA requires courts to

“look[ ] beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the

general applicability of government mandates and scrutinize[

] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.” Id. at 431. 

[6] We agree with the district court that O Centro Espirita

and Antoine are not clearly irreconcilable. See Miller, 335

F.3d at 900 (holding that circuit precedent is binding unless

“the relevant court of last resort [has] undercut the [prior

cases’s] theory or reasoning”). First, in Antoine we considered

whether application of BGEPA to the particular defendant, a

member of a non-federally-recognized tribe, violated RFRA

and thus engaged in the type of “focused inquiry” required by

O Centro Espirita. See Antoine, 318 F.3d at 922-23. 

[7] Additionally, O Centro Espirita dealt with the pursuit

of a secular interest, drug prohibition, in a manner that burdened religion; granting an exemption to the Controlled SubUNITED STATES v. VASQUEZ-RAMOS 7597

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stances Act for the 130-member group did not have any effect

on other people’s religion. See 546 U.S. at 432-33. But we

recognized in Antoine, because there is a fixed supply of

eagles that exceeds demand from religious adherents, “the

burden on religion is inescapable.” 318 F.3d at 923. Granting

an exemption for Defendants would alleviate the burden on

Defendants’ religion but would place additional burdens on

members of federally-recognized tribes in the exercise of their

religious practices. Nothing in O Centro Espirita undercuts

the ruling in Antoine that this redistribution of burdens does

not raise a valid RFRA claim. See id. Congress and the

Department of the Interior have chosen a means of allocating

scarce eagle parts that is “least restrictive” while still protecting our important national symbol. 

C

[8] Finally, Defendants contend that Antoine was decided

on the incorrect premise that the demand for eagle parts

exceeds a fixed supply. They argue that the government could

remedy the problem of a demand that outstrips supply by

increased diligence in salvage and recovery of eagle carcasses. Even if this were true, RFRA does not require the government to make the practice of religion easier. The burden on

religion prohibited by RFRA, like the First Amendment’s prohibition on limiting free exercise, “is written in terms of what

the government cannot do to an individual, not in terms of

what the individual can exact from the government.” See

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J concurring). Because the government is not obligated to increase

the supply of available carcasses, Defendants cannot be heard

to complain that their rights under RFRA are violated by the

government’s refusal to expand its collection and distribution

practices. 

V

[9] In Antoine we held that individuals like Defendants who

are not members of federally-recognized tribes did not have

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valid claims that their prosecutions under BGEPA violate

RFRA. 318 F.3d at 924. Neither removal of bald eagles from

the Endangered or Threatened Species List, the Supreme

Court’s decision in O Centro Espirita, nor the government’s

eagle recovery methods undermine this holding. The district

court correctly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

information in reliance on the continued viability of Antoine.

AFFIRMED. 

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