Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01404/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01404-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Vineyards, Inc.
Defendant
Eugenio Antonio-Cruz
Plaintiff
Garza Contracting, Inc.
Defendant
Sebastiana Martinez-Sanchez
Plaintiff
Sycamore Labor, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEBASTIANA MARTINEZ-SANCHEZ,

an individual, and EUGENIO ANTONIOCRUZ, an individual, on behalf of 

themselves and all other persons similarly 

situated, the State of California and current 

and former aggrieved employees, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

ANTHONY VINEYARDS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:19-cv-01404-DAD-JLT

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 

ANYTHONY VINEYARDS, INC.’S AND 

DEFENDANT SYCAMORE LABOR, INC.’S 

MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

(Doc. No. 10)

This matter is before the court on a motion to stay filed by defendants Anthony Vineyards, 

Inc. and Sycamore Labor, Inc. (“defendants”) on December 23, 2019. (Doc. No. 10.) 

Defendants’ motion came before the court for hearing on January 22, 2020. Attorney Kaleb Judy

appeared telephonically on behalf of defendants, and attorneys Eric Trabucco and Dawson 

Morton appeared telephonically on behalf of plaintiffs and the putative class. The motion was 

taken under submission following oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to

stay will be denied. 

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BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2019, plaintiffs Sebastiana Martinez-Sanchez and Eugenio Antonio-Cruz 

(“plaintiffs”) filed this putative class action against defendants. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 12, 

2019, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) to clarify some of their factual 

allegations and to add Garza Contracting Inc. as a named defendant.1 (Doc. No. 6.) Defendants 

Anthony Vineyards, Inc. and Sycamore Labor, Inc. (“defendants”) timely answered the FAC on 

December 23, 2019. (Doc. No. 7.) 

Plaintiffs and the putative class are non-exempt agricultural employees who performed 

field and vineyard work in the production of table grapes at defendant Anthony Vineyards in 

California. (Doc. No. 6 at ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs assert the following ten causes of action in their FAC: 

(1) Violation of the Agricultural and Migrant Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 1801 et seq.; (2) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1194.2, 1197 & 

Wage Orders; (3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods or Pay Premium Wages in Lieu Thereof, Cal. 

Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512 & Wage Orders; (4) Failure to Provide Rest Breaks or Pay Premium 

Wages in Lieu Thereof, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.2, 226.7, 1198 & Wage Orders; (5) Failure to 

Reimburse Business Expenses, Cal. Lab. Code § 2802; (6) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized 

Wage Statements, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226, 226.2 & Wage Orders; (7) Failure to Permit Inspection 

or Copying of Records, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226 & 1198.5; (8) Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages 

at Resignation or Termination, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203 & Wage Orders; (9) Unfair 

Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; and (10) Private Attorneys 

General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698 et seq. (Doc. No. 6.)

Before plaintiffs filed the present action, a different employee of defendants brought a 

similar putative class action lawsuit against defendants in the Riverside County Superior Court, 

Jose Luis Villanueva Ceja v. Anthony Vineyards, Inc., et al., Case No. RIC1901905 (“the 

 

1

 Garza Contracting, Inc. has not yet answered the FAC or otherwise appeared in this action. 

Plaintiffs have not filed a proof of service or an executed waiver of service with respect to Garza 

Contracting, Inc. In support of defendants’ motion to stay, defendants’ counsel T. Scott Belden 

declared that Garza [Contracting,] Inc. “does not exist anymore because it went bankrupt . . .” 

(Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 4, n. 1.) In any event, Garza Contracting, Inc. is not a movant in the present 

motion to stay.

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Villanueva action”). Defendants’ counsel is representing the defendants in both actions and has 

declared that the parties in the Villanueva action are engaged in discovery and have carried out 

the Belaire West notice process. (Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 8.) The complaint in the Villanueva action 

was filed on March 15, 2019 and asserted the following nine causes of action: (1) Failure to pay 

wages for all time worked at minimum wage, Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1197; (2) Failure to pay 

proper overtime wages, Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, and 1198; (3) Failure to authorize or permit 

meal periods, Labor Code §§ 521 and 226.7; (4) Failure to authorize or permit rest periods, Labor 

Code § 226.7; (5) Failure to provide drinking water, Labor Code § 2441; (6) Failure to indemnify 

employees for required expenditures, Labor Code § 2802; (7) Failure to provide complete and 

accurate wage statements, Labor Code § 226; (8) Failure to timely pay all earned wages and final 

paychecks due a time of separation of employment, Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 203; (9) Unfair 

business practices, Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (Doc. No. 14 at 42–43.) 

Seven of the nine causes of action asserted in the Villanueva action are also brought by 

plaintiffs in the present federal action.2 But unlike the Villanueva action, in which violations of 

only California law are alleged, plaintiffs in this action have asserted that defendants violated a 

federal law, AWPA. Plaintiffs here have also asserted a PAGA claim, a claim not brought in the 

Villanueva action. The class definition in the Villanueva action—“all current and former nonexempt employees employed by Defendants in California at any time within the four years prior 

to [March 15, 2019] and through the date notice is mailed to a certified class” (Doc. No. 14 at 52–

54)—encompasses the proposed class as defined in the present action:

All non-exempt agricultural employees who performed field or 

vineyard work in the production of table grapes—including, but not 

limited to, tasks such as weeding, pruning, de-leafing, tipping, 

harvesting, picking, and packing—at Anthony Vineyards in 

California during the period four (4) years prior to [October 4, 

2019] through the date of this action’s final disposition.

(Doc. No. 6 at ¶ 79.)

/////

 

2

 Plaintiffs in the action before this court do not assert claims for failure to pay overtime wages or 

failure to provide drinking water.

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On December 23, 2019, defendants filed the present motion to stay this federal action 

pending the resolution of the Villanueva action under the Colorado River abstention doctrine. 

(Doc. No. 10.) On January 8, 2020, plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendants’ motion to stay. 

(Doc. No. 19.) On January 15, 2020, defendants filed their reply to plaintiffs’ opposition. (Doc. 

No. 21.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” 

Seneca Ins. Co., Inc. v. Strange Land, Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2017). Given that federal 

courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them,” staying 

proceedings due to the existence of a similar state court action is appropriate “‘only in the 

exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly 

serve an important countervailing interest.’” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 

States, 424 U.S. 800, at 817–18 (1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 

U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959)); see also Smith v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 418 F.3d 1028, 

1033 (9th Cir. 2005) (Circumstances warranting a stay under the Colorado River doctrine are 

“exceedingly rare.”); Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 867 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the Colorado River

doctrine is a narrow exception”). “Generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that 

‘the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter 

in the [f]ederal court having jurisdiction . . . .’” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting 

McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)); see also Seneca Ins., 862 F.3d at 841.

Nonetheless, “[f]ederal courts are authorized to dismiss or stay an action ‘due to the 

presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration.’” Moses H. 

Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (quoting Colorado River, 

424 U.S. at 818). In considering whether to do so, the court’s “task is to ascertain whether there 

exist ‘exceptional’ circumstances, the ‘clearest of justifications,’ . . . to justify the surrender of 

[federal] jurisdiction.” Id. at 25–26 (emphasis in original); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced 

Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Only exceptional circumstances justify 

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such a stay, and whether these circumstances exist is determined by weighing a complex of 

factors.”). 

In the Ninth Circuit, eight factors are to be considered in determining the appropriateness 

of a dismissal or stay under Colorado River:

(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at 

stake; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to 

avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums 

obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether federal law or state law provides 

the rule of decision on the merits; (6) whether the state court 

proceedings can adequately protect the rights of the federal 

litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and (8) whether 

the state court proceedings will resolve all issues before the federal 

court.

R.R. Street & Co. Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 978–79 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Holder, 

305 F.3d at 870).3 “These factors are to be applied in a pragmatic and flexible way, as part of a 

balancing process rather than as a ‘mechanical checklist.’” Am. Int’l Underwriters (Philippines), 

Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1988). “No one factor is necessarily 

determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise 

jurisdiction and the combination of factors counselling against that exercise is required.” 

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818–19. 

As noted in the eighth factor above, “[i]n this Circuit, the narrow Colorado River doctrine 

requires that the pending state court proceeding resolve all issues in the federal suit.” Holder, 305 

F.3d at 859; see also Seneca Ins., 862 F.3d at 842. Indeed, if “there exists a substantial doubt as 

to whether the state court proceeding will resolve all of the disputed issues in [the federal] case, it 

is unnecessary for [the court] to weigh the other factors included in the Colorado River analysis.” 

 

3

 In determining whether to stay proceedings under the Colorado River doctrine, courts also 

consider the degree to which the state and federal actions are “‘substantially similar.’” Travelers 

Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Nakash v. Marciano, 

882 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that “[i]t is enough if the two proceedings [be] 

‘substantially similar’” and that “exact parallelism . . . is not required”)). Thus, it has been 

concluded that “application of the Colorado River doctrine does not require an exact duplication 

of the parties involved or the claims asserted.” AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Am. Truck & Trailer 

Body Co., No. 2:12-cv-01044-KJM-JFM, 2013 WL 211196, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013) 

(quoting Sabbag v. Cinnamon, No. 5:10-cv-02735-JF-HRL, 2010 WL 8470477, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Dec. 10, 2010)).

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Intel Corp., 12 F.3d at 913 n.7. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit has explained:

Under the rules governing the Colorado River doctrine, the 

existence of a substantial doubt as to whether the state proceeding 

will resolve the federal action precludes the granting of a stay. . . . 

“When a district court decides to . . . stay under Colorado River, it 

presumably concludes that the parallel state-court litigation will be 

an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the 

issues between the parties. If there is any substantial doubt as to 

this, it would be a serious abuse of discretion to grant the stay or 

dismissal at all. . . . Thus, the decision to invoke Colorado River

necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have nothing 

further to do in resolving any substantive part of the case, whether it 

stays or dismisses.”

Id. at 913; see also Smith, 418 F.3d at 1033. On the other hand, courts should be “particularly 

reluctant to find that the actions are not parallel when the federal action is but a ‘spin-off’ of more 

comprehensive state litigation.” Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989).

ANALYSIS

A. Requests for Judicial Notice

Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of the class action complaint filed in 

the Villanueva action. (Doc. No. 13.) Pursuant to the Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a court 

may “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally 

known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b). A court may therefore take judicial notice of documents filed in related state court 

actions. See Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 

(9th Cir. 1998) (taking judicial notice of court filings in a state court case where the same plaintiff 

asserted similar and related claims); see also U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. 

Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (taking judicial notice of proceedings in other 

courts where those proceedings have a “direct relation to matters at issue”). Accordingly, the 

court grants defendants’ request for judicial notice, but only for the purposes of noticing the 

existence of the Villanueva action and the causes of action presented there.

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Plaintiffs request the court take judicial notice of facts contained in certain public records, 

including public agency documents and filings. (Doc. No. 20.) Specifically, plaintiffs request

that the court take judicial notice of administrative records and public filings filed with the 

California Secretary of State, including defendants’ corporate filings, and a public record from the 

California Department of Industrial Relations’ Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) Case 

Search. (Id. at 2–4.) Public records are properly the subject of judicial notice because the 

contents of such documents contain facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute, and the facts 

therein “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 

499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). The exhibits offered by plaintiffs are matters of public 

record, made available on the websites of a governmental entity, and are properly subject to 

judicial notice. See Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), 

overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991); 

see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, the accuracy of the source 

of the records—the websites of the California Secretary of State and the California Department of 

Industrial Relations—cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Accordingly, 

plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is granted.

B. Whether this Court Should Abstain under Colorado River

As explained in more detail below, the court concludes that there is substantial doubt as to 

whether the state proceedings in the Villanueva action will resolve all the issues presented in this 

federal action. First, the plaintiffs in the Villanueva action did not allege violations of the AWPA. 

Second, the plaintiffs in the Villanueva action did not assert PAGA claims, which have distinct 

remedies and procedural limitations. Third, the plaintiffs in this action have presented a “client 

employer” theory of liability under California Labor Code § 2810.3, which has not been raised in 

the Villanueva action.

1. Plaintiffs’ Federal AWPA Claim 

The federal Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”) was 

passed by Congress for the stated purpose, in part, of “assur[ing] necessary protections for 

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migrant and seasonal agricultural workers, agricultural associations, and agricultural employers.” 

29 U.S.C. § 1801. The AWPA authorizes statutory damages and provides for a private right of 

action, stating that any person aggrieved by a violation of the AWPA “may file suit in any district 

court of the United States . . ..” 29 U.S.C. § 1854.4 

Plaintiffs allege defendants violated the AWPA by: (i) providing false and misleading 

information regarding the terms and conditions of employment, (i) violating the terms of the 

working arrangement, (iii) failing to pay wages, and (iv) failing to provide workers with accurate, 

itemized written statements. (Doc. No. 6 at 19.) Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ AWPA claims 

are “purely derivative of the Labor Code claims already at issue in the state court action,” and 

cannot point to any significant factual disputes that would remain unresolved by the Villanueva

action (Doc. No. 21 at 2–3). Defendants assert that a stay is appropriate because the factual 

issues would be resolved in the Villanueva action. (Doc. No. 21 at 3.) As noted above, however, 

courts addressing motions to stay under Colorado River evaluate whether there is a substantial 

doubt that the state court proceedings will “resolve all issues,” not just factual issues. While 

many of the disputed factual issues in the two actions overlap and may be resolved in the 

Villanueva action, defendants concede that “some discrete remedies presented [here] might be 

unresolved by the resolution of [the Villanueva action].” (Doc. No. 21 at 3.) Moreover, at the 

January 22, 2020 hearing on the pending motion, defendants’ counsel conceded that the legal 

issues posed by plaintiffs’ AWPA claim will not be resolved by the Villanueva action.

The court finds that substantial doubt exists as to whether the Villanueva action can

resolve plaintiffs’ federal AWPA claim, which weighs against granting a stay of this action.

 

4

 The statute does not expressly preclude a state court from enforcing rights created under the 

AWPA or otherwise establish that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over AWPA claims. 

But plaintiffs assert that Congress intended to provide migrant workers with a federal forum for 

their AWPA claims and forcing those workers to litigate their AWPA claims in state court based 

on abstention principles would contravene Congress’s intent. (Doc. No. 19 at 8.) Defendants do 

not address this argument in their opposition. The court agrees that AWPA does not explicitly 

preclude aggrieved parties from selecting state court forums to resolve their AWPA claims, but 

that issue is not relevant here because the plaintiffs in the Villanueva action did not bring claims 

under AWPA. Moreover, at the January 22, 2020 hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel clarified that they 

do not take the position that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over AWPA claims.

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2. Plaintiffs’ PAGA Claim

The Villanueva action does not include any claims for penalties under PAGA. Defendants

argue that the PAGA claims before this court are completely derivative of the California Labor 

Code claims in the Villanueva action. (Doc. No. 21 at 3) (quoting Amiri v. Cox Commc’ns Cal., 

LLC, 272 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“Recovery under PAGA is predicated on 

Plaintiff first establishing Defendant violated the Labor Code.”)). An overview of PAGA, 

however, is instructive and suggests that the PAGA claims before the court in this action are 

distinct from any claims pending before the state court in the Villanueva action.

Under PAGA, an “aggrieved employee” may bring an action for civil penalties for labor 

code violations on behalf of herself and other current or former employees. Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 2699(a). A plaintiff suing under PAGA “does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law 

enforcement agencies.” Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 985-86 (2009) (PAGA does not 

require plaintiffs to meet state class-certification requirements under California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 382). A judgment in a PAGA action therefore “binds all those, including nonparty 

aggrieved employees, who would be bound by a judgment in an action brought by the 

government.” Id.; see also Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 381 

(2014) (“When a government agency is authorized to bring an action on behalf of an individual or 

in the public interest, and a private person lacks an independent legal right to bring the action, a 

person who is not a party but who is represented by the agency is bound by the judgment as 

though the person were a party.”).

The PAGA statute also imposes a number of limitations on litigants. First, because a 

PAGA action by an aggrieved employee functions as a “substitute” for one brought by the state 

government itself, a plaintiff suing under PAGA is limited to recovery of civil penalties only, 

rather than damages available through direct or class action claims. Id. at 986. Second, to bring 

an action under PAGA, an aggrieved employee must first provide written notice to the Labor & 

Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) as well as to the employer. Cal. Lab. Code § 

2699.3(a)(1); Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 986. Third, any civil penalties recovered must be distributed as 

follows: 75 percent to the LWDA, and the remaining 25 percent to the aggrieved employees. Cal. 

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Lab. Code § 2699(i); Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 986. Finally, a trial court must “review and approve” 

any settlement of PAGA claims. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(l)(2).

Given these remedies as well as procedural limitations accompanying the PAGA claims, 

this court finds substantial doubt as to whether the state case will resolve all of the issues 

presented in this federal action. See Tan v. Grubhub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 

2016) (denying stay when federal action required resolution of labor law violations not addressed 

in the state action complaint and although the state court could have resolved plaintiff’s PAGA 

claims in their entirety the state action could not resolve all the issues before the federal court);

Sciortino v. Pepsico, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 780, 815 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Given the fact of the 

broader remedies sought herein and the fact that certain of Plaintiffs’ claims that are not based 

directly on Proposition 65, the Court concludes that there is substantial doubt that the state 

proceedings will resolve the federal action; this precludes a Colorado River stay.”).

Accordingly, the court finds that substantial doubt exists here as to whether the Villanueva

action can resolve plaintiffs’ PAGA claim, which weighs against granting a stay of this action. 

3. Plaintiffs’ “Client Employer” Theory of Liability

The plaintiffs in the Villanueva action did not raise the “client employer” theory of 

liability under California Labor Code § 2810.3 that plaintiffs have raised in this federal action. 

California Labor Code Section 2810.3 states in relevant part “[a] client employer shall share with 

a labor contractor all civil legal responsibility and civil liability for all workers supplied by that 

labor contractor for . . . the payment of wages.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2810.3(b). “Client employer” 

is defined as “a business entity, regardless of its form, that obtains or is provided workers to 

perform labor within its usual course of business from a labor contractor.” Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 2810.3(a)(1)(A). There is limited authority on the “client employer” theory of liability under 

this statute. See Bravo v. On Delivery Servs., LLC, No. 18-CV-01913-EMC, 2019 WL 493809, at 

*2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2019) (noting limited authority exists and that “‘joint employer’ under 

California law is more expansive than that under federal law and that California law has a ‘client 

employer’ theory that does not appear to be available under federal law”).

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Plaintiffs contend that their theory of liability involves additional elements of proof that 

differ from the joint-employer theory of liability asserted in the Villanueva action. (Doc. No. 19 

at 8.) Defendants assert that because plaintiffs allege civil liability is shared by the defendants 

and the defendants do not dispute that defendant Anthony Vineyards is a client of defendant 

Sycamore, that the Villanueva action would dispose of this issue. (Doc. No. 21 at 3.) But, 

whether defendant Anthony Vineyards “operated as a client employer” is not at issue in the 

Villanueva action, and thus this court is not convinced that issue would be resolved in those 

proceedings, which also weighs against granting a stay. 

4. The Remaining Colorado River Factors

Because the court doubts that the Villanueva action “will resolve all of the disputed 

issues” in this federal action, “it is unnecessary for [the court] to weigh the other factors included 

in the Colorado River analysis.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 913 

n.7 (9th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, consideration of the other recognized factors also does not 

weigh in favor of granting the requested stay. Neither this court nor the state court has assumed 

jurisdiction over property. State law provides the rule of decision on the merits for the state law 

claims, but not the federal AWPA claim. It is true that jurisdiction was first obtained in state 

court. However, there has been no showing that this federal forum is inconvenient for the parties 

or that the exercising of jurisdiction by this court would promote forum shopping.5 As noted, 

because not all the issues in the two actions are the same, there exists a legitimate concern 

whether the state court proceedings are adequate to protect the rights of the litigants in this action. 

Finally, while avoiding piecemeal litigation is certainly a desirable goal, there has been no 

compelling showing that it will not be achieved if this court proceeds in this action.

Relying upon the decision In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 

1160, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2008), defendants argue that the Colorado River doctrine authorizes courts

to issue partial stays. Defendants are correct that “[d]istrict courts in the Ninth Circuit have 

 

5

 Indeed, the court notes that the plaintiffs in this federal action submitted their PAGA Notice of 

Claims to defendants and the State of California on March 5, 2019, ten days before the Villanueva

action was filed. (Doc. No. 19 at 10, n.5.)

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repeatedly found partial [Colorado River] stays permissible [ ] where some, but not all, of a 

federal plaintiff’s claims are pending in a parallel state action.” ScripsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge 

Global LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2014). But, the circumstances in In re 

Countrywide, which led that court to determine that a partial stay was warranted under the 

Colorado River factors, are not present here. There, the court concluded:

On balance, the realities of these cases present the requisite 

“exceptional circumstances” to merit a Colorado River stay in favor 

of the Delaware Chancery Court action. The Court agrees with 

Defendants that a stay would “divide the litigation neatly and 

without overlap” because this Court would address pre-merger 

derivative claims, which stem in part from federal law, while the 

Delaware Chancery Court would address the merger-related class 

claims, which arise under Delaware law.

In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 

Defendants do not address how a partial stay of only the duplicative Labor Code claims would be 

the kind of neat division of litigation without overlap that the court ordered In re Countrywide. 

Indeed, when pressed on this question at the January 22, 2020 hearing, in the court’s view 

defendants’ counsel failed to present persuasive reasons supporting a partial stay of this action. 

In short, after considering all of the relevant factors, this court is not persuaded that 

exceptional circumstances and the clearest of justifications have been established justifying the 

granting of a stay.

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to stay (Doc. No. 10) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:19-cv-01404-ADA-CDB Document 25 Filed 01/29/20 Page 12 of 12