Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-24-11498/USCOURTS-ca11-24-11498-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Assistant District Attorney of Floyd County, Georgia
Appellee
District Attorney of Floyd County, Georgia
Appellee
Lillie M. Middlebrooks
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11498

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

LILLIE M. MIDDLEBROOKS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus

DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF FLOYD COUNTY, GEORGIA, 

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF FLOYD COUNTY, 

GEORGIA, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11498

D.C. Docket No. 4:24-cv-00102-WMR

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Lillie Middlebrooks entered the property of a nursing facility 

from which she had been banned, and when officers tried to arrest 

her, she resisted. Consequently, she was charged with criminal 

trespass and willful obstruction of law enforcement. The District 

Attorney and the Assistant District Attorney pursued these charges 

against her. Middlebrooks asked the district court to enjoin the 

state prosecution, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied her motion for a 

preliminary injunction. Middlebrooks appealed.

On appeal, Middlebrooks, proceeding pro se, argues that the 

district court abused its discretion in three ways: (1) by ruling that 

she hadn’t shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits

of her retaliation claim; (2) by deciding to abstain, pursuant to

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), from interfering with the state

prosecution; and (3) by failing to grant her an evidentiary hearing 

on her motion for injunctive relief.

We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse 

of discretion. Long v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 924 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th 

Cir. 2019). The abuse-of-discretion standard also applies to a district court’s decision to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction. 

Wexler v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004). “A district 

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24-11498 Opinion of the Court 3

court abuses its discretion if, among other things, ‘it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the 

determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.’” Long, 924 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Grayson v. Warden, Comm’r, 

Ala. DOC, 869 F.3d 1204, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017)).

First, success on the merits. “A district court may grant injunctive relief only if the moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury 

will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Siegel v. LePore, 

234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000). “If [the movant] is unable to 

show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we need not 

consider the other requirements.” Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 

1229 (11th Cir. 2011).

Here, Middlebrooks brings a First Amendment retaliation 

claim under § 1983. She alleges that the DA and the ADA are prosecuting her in retaliation for two federal civil-rights lawsuits that 

she filed. To succeed on her claim, Middlebrooks must show, 

among other things, that “a causal connection exists between the 

[prosecutors’] retaliatory conduct and the adverse effect on [her]

speech and right to petition.” DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 

F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019). Moreover, when, as here, “the 

governmental defendant has utilized the legal system to arrest or 

prosecute the plaintiff,” the plaintiff must “plead and prove an 

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absence of probable cause as to the challenged retaliatory arrest or 

prosecution in order to establish the causation link between the 

defendant’s retaliatory animus and the plaintiff’s injury.” Id.

Middlebrooks cannot establish a causal link between the 

prosecution and any retaliatory animus on the part of the prosecutors. First, by the time when Middlebrooks filed her civil-rights 

lawsuits, the prosecutors had already initiated their case against

her. Second, the prosecutors had probable cause to pursue Middlebrooks’s trespass charge. According to the police report, witnesses

informed officersthat Middlebrooks had trespassed, in spite of Middlebrooks’s assertions to the contrary. Similarly, the prosecutors

had probable cause to pursue Middlebrooks’s obstruction-of-lawenforcement charge. The police report stated that, when officers 

tried to arrest Middlebrooks, she resisted—she pulled her arm 

away, sat on the ground, and said that officers would have to shoot 

her before she would go to jail. The existence of probable cause 

severs any causal link between Middlebrooks’s prosecution and the

retaliatory motive that she alleges. See DeMartini, 942 F.3d at 1289.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Middlebrooks’s request for injunctive relief.

Second, Younger abstention. To determine whether Younger

abstention is warranted, we must consider three conditions: 

whether “(1) there is an ‘ongoing’ state-court proceeding at the 

time of the federal action; (2) the state proceeding implicates an 

important state interest; and (3) the state proceeding affords the 

federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his 

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24-11498 Opinion of the Court 5

or her federal constitutional claims.” Tokyo Gwinnett., LLC v. Gwinnett Cnty., 940 F.3d 1254, 1268 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Middlesex 

Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 

(1982)).

The district court ruled that Middlebrooks’s case meets all 

three conditions. Middlebrooks does not dispute this. Instead, she 

contends that, because the prosecutors were motivated by bad 

faith, the district court should refuse to abstain. “[A] federal court 

should refuse to abstain if . . . there is evidence the state proceedings are motivated by bad faith.” Leonard v. Ala. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 61 F.4th 902, 908 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted

and alterations adopted). Bad faith “in this context generally means 

that a prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 

126 n.6 (1975).

 As explained above, the police report, which documented 

Middlebrooks’s trespass and resistance to arrest, provided the prosecutors with a reasonable expectation that they would obtain a 

valid conviction. Middlebrooks has therefore failed to demonstrate 

that the bad-faith exception applies to her case. Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to abstain from 

exercising its jurisdiction.

Finally, Middlebrooks argues that the district court should 

have granted an evidentiary hearing on her motion for injunctive 

relief. But, where, as here, “material facts are not in dispute,” “district courts generally need not hold an evidentiary hearing.” 

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McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1313 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing 

to grant a hearing.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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