Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04018/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chrysler Motors corporation
Appellee
Adrian Niculescu
Appellant

Document Text:

FI LED 

Uaitcd States Court of Appeal£ 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUN 2 0 990 

.&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

ADRIAN NICULESCU, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, ) 

a Delaware corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

No. 90-4018 

(D.C. No. 87-C-770S) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges.** 

Plaintiff-appellant, Adrian Niculescu, appeals from the 

district court's denial of his motion to set aside a settlement 

agreement with defendant-appellee, Chrysler Motors. Although 

Niculescu agreed to the settlement in open court, he now proffers 

a bevy of reasons why he should not be held to his bargain, none 

of which are convincing. Chrysler's counsel read the settlement 

agreement into the record. Appellee's Brief Addendum D, at 2-3. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-4018 Document: 010110036889 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 1 
The court then asked Niculescu whether he understood the 

settlement and accepted it. Niculescu answered affirmatively: 

THE COURT: Mr. Niculescu, let me just ask you three 

questions. One, did you hear what counsel has stated 

regarding this settlement? 

MR. NICULESCU: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: And did you understand what you will receive 

as a settlement? 

MR. NICULESCU: Yes. 

THE COURT: Do you accept that as the settlement? 

MR. NICULESCU: Yes. 

THE COURT: Very well. The settlement is approved by 

the Court. 

Id. at 3-4. Because we find no basis in the record for setting 

aside the settlement agreement between Niculescu and Chrysler 

Motors, we affirm the judgment of the district court substantially 

for the reasons stated in its order of January 12, 1990, a copy of 

which is attached hereto. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-4018 Document: 010110036889 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 2 
: '. , -. T .~: I ,1 - '._ • ~ ;...! ~-: • 

.- .. - ' -· , ,. 

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT;•couR'J:CiFQffi THE 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

ADRIAN NICULESCU, 

Plaintiff, 

DISTl.UCT. ,OF UTAH - - .J.._., .· -' 

1ted•StateiCo~~tofAppeaJ 

Tenth Circuit 

* * -i llN z ,:*19'~CJ* * * * 

JbbRT L. HOE( ,(E re·, -. l ~ . ni,•l 

vs. RULING 

CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, ) 

a Delaware corporation, 

Defendant. Case No. 87-C-0770-S 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

This action is before the court on plaintiff Adrian 

Niculescu' s motion to set aside settlement agreement and the 

motions of defendant Chrysler Motors Corporation (Chrysler) to 

enforce settlement agreement and for Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions. 

1. Facts 

On March 11, 1987 plaintiff Niculescu purchased a 1987 van 

from Hinckley Dodge, Inc. (Hinckley) under a Retail Installment 

Contract and took possession of it two days later. Hinckley 

purchased the van ( for use as a taxi cab) f::::-om Layton Hills 

Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge. Niculescu neither put any money down on 

Appellate Case: 90-4018 Document: 010110036889 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 3 
the van nor paid anything for its purchase or delivery. He alleges 

that immediately after he took possession of the van, he discovered 

the door did not work and the oil leaked in "significant 

quantities." Niculescu further alleges he made several demands on 

Hinckley to repair the van (Hinckley says it first heard from him 

on March 25 or 26) but Hinckley refused even though the van was 

still under a 12,000 mile warranty. On March 31, 1987, only 18 

days after taking the van (during which time he used it as a taxi), 

Niculescu returned the van to Hinckley with 5,000 miles on it. 

Niculescu, a full-time taxi driver since 1983, bought the van only 

after he shopped extensively at other dealerships, comparing 

prices, interest rates and features. He admitted he had no 

evidence to show Chrysler carelessly and negligently manufactured 

the van; however, he claimed his damages were $10,369.00: $80.00 

for installation of the taxi meter; $289 for installation of a car 

phone; and $10,000 for loss of business during 1987. 

The parties settled the action. On the record, counsel for 

Chrysler read the settlement agreement and Niculescu as well as his 

counsel, Tom Blonquist, agreed it accurately reflected the result 

of the settlement negotiations. 

MR. WALDBILLING (Counsel for Chrysler): The 

settlement that has been reached is that Chrysler Motor 

Corporation will pay Adrian Niculescu by check made 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-4018 Document: 010110036889 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 4 
payable to him and his counsel, Tom Blonquist, in the 

amount of $2500 in return for a full and general release 

of Chrysler Motor Corporation, Hinckley Dodge and all of 

their agents and employees, predecessor corporation, et 

cetera, from any and all claims, causes of action or 

anything else arising from the plaintiff's purchase, use 

or anything else arising from his possession of the 1987 

Dodge B 110 van. 

And the case will be dismissed with prejudice and 

on the merits. 

Tr. 3. The following colloquy then ensued: 

THE COURT: That is correct, Mr. Bloomquist [sic]? 

MR. BLOOMQUIST: Even though Hinckley is not a party 

to this lawsuit, Your Honor. 

MR. BLOOMQUIST: It is our understanding that this 

settlement will be inclusive of Hinkley [sic), correct? 

MR. NICULESCU: Yes. 

Id. The court approved the settlement after questioning Niculescu 

to ascertain he understood and accepted the terms of the agreement. 

Id. at 3-4. 

Blonquist later signed the General Release and Stipulation of 

Dismissal and sent it to Chrysler in exchange for a check. 

Chrysler requested Mark Besendorfer, Niculescu's new counsel, to 

complete the settlement agreement, but Niculescu refused to sign 

it, saying the terms (identical to those read into the record) were 

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Appellate Case: 90-4018 Document: 010110036889 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 5 
broader than those to which he agreed. Niculescu prepared his own 

"Release" that differs from the settlement agreement only in scope: 

he expressly seeks to (1) limit his release to the breach of the 

warranty and merchantability claims against Chrysler and (2) 

reserve his claims against 

any individuals and entities, agents, principals, 

servants, subsidiary or parent corporation including, but 

not limited to, claims he may have for damage to his 

credit occasioned by Chrysler Cr~dit Corporation, 

Hinckley Dodge, Inc. , or any other parties whether or not 

now known to [him] and all consequent damages, lost 

income, attorney's fees or other damages which may have 

occurred or may occur in the future and all other claims 

of any kind or character. 

Niculescu's Release dated July 28, 1988. Chrysler rejects the 

release as being contrary to the settlement and completely 

unacceptable. 

In his motion to set aside the settlement agreement Niculescu 

claims (1) he told Blonquist he was dissatisfied with the 

settlement agreement almost immediately after it was reached and 

communicated his dissatisfaction to him several times in letters; 

(2) the settlement amount was not correct because the copy of a 

Hinckley service invoice attached to Niculescu's deposition was not 

a true and correct copy of the original document and the differe nce 

b e tween the original document and the purported copy was material 

to Niculescu' s claim; ( 3) Niculescu entered into the agreement 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-4018 Document: 010110036889 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 6 
partly as a result of Blonquist's statement that if an agreement 

was not reached, Blonquist would withdraw from further representation on behalf of Niculescu; (4) Blonquist did not seek timely 

discovery or file affidavits in opposition to Chrysler's motions 

in spite of Niculescu's repeated demands and suggestions to do so; 

and (5) the proposed settlement agreement is inconsistent with the 

oral agreement in court because it provides for a release of all 

claims Niculescu may have against Hinckley, where that was not 

agreed to and where Hinckley was not a party to the action. 

Chrysler argues the settlement agreement should be enforced 

because (1) the settlement was agreed to on the record; (2) the 

court approved the settlement; and (3) counsel for both parties 

signed the General Release and Stipulation of Dismissal. Chrysler 

further argues it is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs under 

Rule 11, because Niculescu's motion to set aside the agreement has 

no basis in law or fact. 

II. Discussion 

The test for determining whether a party has a right to 

challenge a settlement agreement is "voluntariness." The court 

should examine all factors surrounding the acceptance of the 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-4018 Document: 010110036889 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 7 
settlement agreement to determine whether it was entered 

voluntarily or was a result of coercion. Trans-Sterling, Inc. v. 

Bible, 798 F.2d 474 (Em. App. 1986); Willard v. City of Los 

Angeles, 803 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Here, the sole significant difference between the original 

settlement agreement and Niculescu's Release is that the original 

dismissed with prejudice all claims against Chrysler, Hinckley "and 

all of their agents and employees, predecessor corporation, et 

cetera" while Niculescu' s Release would preserve those very claims. 

Clearly Niculescu's Release directly contradicts the parties' 

settlement agreement. Blonquist specifically told the court 

Niculescu agreed to release the claims against Hinckley Dodge, even 

though Hinckley was not a party to the suit, and Niculescu affirmed 

not only that statement, but Chrysler's explanation of the 

settlement agreement. 

Because there is not a scintilla of evidence showing Niculescu 

. * experienced coercion or anything more than settler's remorse, the 

court finds no reason to set aside what is an extremely generous 

*The court rejects as unsubstantiated and insufficient 

Niculescu's assertion he agreed to the settlement only under threat 

Blonquist would withdraw as counsel. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-4018 Document: 010110036889 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 8 
settlement considering Niculescu, without paying Chrysler or 

Hinckley Dodge anything, put 5,000 miles on the van in three weeks 

and he offered only unsupported allegations concerning his claim 

for lost profits. Moreover, the court agrees with Chrysler that 

the nearly unlimited language concerning potential claims against 

Chrysler affiliates violates the core of the settlement agreement 

to which Niculescu gave his unqualified assent in open court. 

Accordingly, the court denies Niculescu's motion to set aside 

and grants Chrysler's motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 

Because Niculescu was acting prose when he filed his motion to set 

aside, the court will not grant Rule 11 sanctions. 

DATED this 

cc: counsel: l/16/90sm 

Mark A. Besendorfer 

Gainer M. Waldbillig, Esq. 

/).,:: day of h , 19~-

BY THE COURT: 

I.LJL • ~ 

DAVID SAM 

U.S. District Judge 

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