Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cr-00265/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cr-00265-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Justin Paul Gladding
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JUSTIN PAUL GLADDING,

Defendant,

and

PATRICIA ROBB,

Surety.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cr-00265-OWW-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DECLARATION OF

FORFEITURE AND SET-ASIDE OF BOND,

AND REMISSION OF FULL AMOUNT OF

BOND TO SURETY

(Doc. 46)

Plaintiff United States of America (the “government”) has moved for an order declaring

forfeiture of Defendant Justin Gladding’s $100,000 bond. Contending that justice does not

require the bond’s forfeiture, Defendant counters that the forfeiture should be set aside and

remitted under F.R.Crim.P. 46(f)(2) and (f)(4). Surety Patricia Robb has not separately appeared.

This Court heard the motions on Wednesday, August 4, 2010. United States Attorney

Deanna Martinez appeared on behalf of the government; Marc Days, Assistant Public Defender,

on behalf of Defendant. Surety did not appear. Having fully considered the applicable facts and

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law, the undersigned recommends that the bond be declared forfeited, that the forfeiture be set

aside, and that the full amount of the bond be remitted to Surety.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Defendant is awaiting trial on criminal charges set forth in an indictment filed July 16,

2009 (Doc. 3). Defendant was arraigned and remanded to custody on August 27, 2009 (Doc. 7). 

On September 1, 2009, the Court ordered Defendant released from custody on a $100,000 bond,

secured by real property located at 92 South Main, Wallingford, Vermont (Doc. 10). The real

property is owned by a third party, Surety Patricia Robb, who is Defendant’s mother.

An order setting conditions of release was signed and filed on September 21, 2009 (Doc.

14). Among other conditions of release, Plaintiff agreed not to use or possess a computer or

access the internet by computer or other device unless approved by the Pretrial Services Officer

(Doc. 14). On October 30, 2009, the Court entered a pretrial release violation petition following

Defendant’s alleged unauthorized use of a computer (Doc. 16). Following a contested hearing on

November 16, 2009, this Court found no clear and convincing evidence that Defendant violated

the conditions of release and entered an amended order setting conditions of release in which

Defendant agreed not to possess alcohol (Docs. 21, 22).

On December 15, 2009, the Court entered a pretrial release violation petition following

Defendant’s failure to report for a drug test on December 4, 2009 (Doc. 26). On December 22,

2009, Defendant admitted the violation, and the Court amended the curfew condition of release

to require home detention, with Plaintiff to be responsible for the additional monitoring costs

(Doc. 29, 30). As an additional condition of release, Defendant agreed to attend counseling for

alcohol dependency, drug dependency, and/or depression (Doc. 30).

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On January 11, 2010, after Defendant failed a drug test, the Court entered a third pretrial

release violation petition (Doc. 32). An arrest warrant issued and bail was revoked (Doc. 33). 

Following Defendant’s initial appearance on January 13, 2010, the Court ordered Defendant

detained until further order (Doc. 34). On June 22, 2010, the government moved for forfeiture of

bond (Doc. 46). Following bail review on June 23, 2010, the Court denied Defendant’s release

on bond (Docs. 47, 49).

II. Discussion

“Federal courts are authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 ([f])(1) to order

forfeiture of a bail bond upon a breach of a condition of release.” United States v. Vaccaro, 51

F.3d 189, 191 (9 Cir. 1995). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 provides, in pertinent part: th

(f) Bail Forfeiture.

 (1) Declaration. The court must declare the bail forfeited if a

condition of the bond is breached.

 (2) Setting Aside. The court may set aside in whole or in part a

bail forfeiture upon any condition the court may impose if:

 (A) the surety later surrenders into custody the

person released on the surety’s appearance bond; or

 (B) it appears that justice does not require bail

forfeiture.

 (3) Enforcement.

 (A) Default Judgment and Execution. If it does

not set aside a bail forfeiture, the court must, upon

the government’s motion, enter into a default

judgment.

(B) Jurisdiction and Service. By entering into a

bond, each surety submits to the district court’s

jurisdiction and irrevocably appoints the district

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clerk its agent to receive service of any filings

affecting its liability. 

(C) Motion to Enforce. The court may, upon the

government’s motion, enforce the surety’s liability

without an independent action. The government

must serve any motion, and notice as the court

prescribes, on the district clerk. If so served, the

clerk must promptly mail a copy to the surety at its

last known address.

 (4) Remission. After entering a judgment under Rule 46(f)(3),

the court may remit in whole or in part the judgment under the

same conditions specified in Rule 46(f)(2). 

(g) Exoneration. The court must exonerate the surety and release any bail when a

bond condition has been satisfied or when the court has set aside or remitted the

forfeiture. The court must exonerate a surety who deposits cash in the amount of

the bond or timely surrenders the defendant into custody.

A. Forfeiture

The principal purpose of a bail bond is to ensure the accused’s appearance at the appointed

time. United States v. Toro, 981 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9 Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, forfeiture is not th

limited to an accused’s failure to appear in court, but applies equally to an accused’s violations of

other conditions of his or her release. Vaccaro, 51 F.3d at 192. See also United States v. Terrell,

983 F.2d 653, 656 (5 Cir. 1993); United States v. Santiago, 826 F.2d 499, 505 (7 Cir. 1987); th th

United States v. Dunn, 781 F.2d ___, 451-52; United States v. Stanley, 601 F.2d 380, 382 (9 Cir. th

1979)(per curiam); United States v. Nolan, 564 F.2d 376, 378 (10 Cir. 1977). Because an order

th

setting the conditions of release acts as a contract between the court and the accused, the court

may order forfeiture upon the accused’s breach of any of its conditions. Vaccaro, 51 F.3d at 193. 

Defendant has repeatedly breached the conditions of his release in their original form and as

amended. Accordingly, forfeiture of his bond is required by F.R.Crim.P. 46(f)(1).

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B. Setting Aside

A court is required to declare forfeiture of bond when a bailee breaches the conditions of

his or her release. United States v. Abernathy, 757 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9 Cir. 1985). Nonetheless, th

F.R.Crim.P. 46 (f)(2) and (f)(4) authorize the court to set aside or remit all or part of the bond if it

appears that enforcing the forfeiture will not serve the interests of justice. Id. The district court

has broad discretion in determining whether or not to provide relief from forfeiture. Stanley, 601

F.2d at 382. “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or capriciously.” 

United States v. Frias-Ramirez, 670 F.2d 849, 852 (9 Cir. 1982). th

The Ninth Circuit has set forth six factors for consideration in determining whether to set

aside a forfeiture:

1. The bailee’s willfulness in breaching release conditions;

2. The surety’s participation in apprehending the bailee;

3. The cost, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the government as a

result of the bailee’s breach; 

4. Mitigating factors or explanations offered by the bailee;

5. Whether the surety is a professional or a member of the family or a friend;

and

6. The appropriateness of the amount of the bond.

United States v. Nguyen, 279 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9 Cir. 2002), quoting United th

States v. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 601, 602 (9 Cir. 1995). th

A district court may enforce forfeiture even if it does not resolve all factors in favor of the

government. Abernathy, 757 F.2d at 1015. See also Stanley, 601 F.2d at 382 (enforcing forfeiture

despite no showing of costs or prejudice to the government). “These are merely non-exclusive

factors for consideration, and ‘[n]ot all of the factors need to be resolved in the government’s

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favor.’” United States v. Sar-Avi, 255 F.3d 1163,1167 (9 Cir. 2001), quoting Amwest, 54 F.3d at

th

603. Indeed, strict weighing of the facts would be produce an anomalous result because of the

overlapping of the factors, particularly cost/inconvenience/prejudice with the propriety of the

bond amount, and of mitigating factors, Surety’s participation, and Surety’s status.

Willfulness. On December 22, 2009, Defendant admitted the second breach, failing to

report for a drug test, and agreed to secure counseling and treatment of his substance abuse

problem. Thereafter, he was confined to his home.. On January 4, 2010, Defendant failed to

report for a scheduled drug test. On January 5, 2010, his urine tested positive for

methamphetamine or amphetamines. Following his arrest for this violation and consultation with

his attorney, Defendant admitted both offenses.

In United States v. LaJocies, the sureties argued that drug abuse arising from the

defendant’s addiction should not be treated as a willful violation, but the court did not reach the

issue, resolving the motion on other factors. 2007 WL 869692 (E.D.Cal. March 21, 2007)(No. Cr

S-02-306 DFL DAD). This court need not address the addiction question either since Defendant

had earlier agreed to seek counseling for his drug abuse problem. Defendant’s failure to take the

steps toward counseling, as he had agreed to do in the conditions of release, constituted a willful

violation. Accordingly, this factor weighs against set-aside and remission.

Surety’s Participation. When a defendant has breached the conditions of release in a

manner other than failing to appear for court proceedings, how a surety could have participated is

often unclear. Accordingly, this factor is often irrelevant or of little weight in determining

whether forfeiture of bond posted by a third-party is appropriate.

For example, in evaluating the propriety of remitting a forfeiture to two third-party

sureties, Shaw and Draper, the Fourth Circuit examined the sureties’ position in relation to the

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defendant, who had feigned an auto accident and injury in order to postpone a court hearing

scheduled for the next day. United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747, 751 (4 Cir. 1970). It

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reflected:

It is difficult to conceive what they could have done to obtain Kirkman’s presence

at trial. It does not appear that they knew of and had opportunity to prevent him

from conspiring with others to ‘fake’ an automobile accident and subsequent

hospitalization. Once he had been hospitalized they could scarcely be expected to

drag him to court. The district judge noted in his opinion that Shaw and Draper

‘made no offer to have the defendant physically examined to determine whether his

alleged injuries were real or imaginary, or to otherwise cooperate with the court in

any respect.’ But very soon after his failure to appear Kirkman was placed under

guard in the hospital, and upon being discharged from the hospital, was kept in jail

until he was tried. An examination by an independent medical specialist was

accomplished. It is difficult to see what Shaw and Draper could have done that

would have been helpful to the court.

Id.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that, because the interest of justice did not require

enforcement of the forfeiture as to the two third-party sureties, the district court had abused its

discretion in refusing to set aside the forfeiture of the amounts they had posted. Id. at 752.

Similarly, how Surety could have participated in this case is unclear. In pledging her

property, her sole role was financial; she did not agree to act as Defendant’s custodian. Since

Surety lived in New England, she was unable to monitor Defendant’s behavior on a day-to-day

basis. Finally, since Defendant did not flee and was quickly arrested after he failed his drug test in

January 2010, Surety had no opportunity to participate in Defendant’s arrest. This factor weighs

in favor of set-aside and remission.

Expense, Inconvenience and Prejudice. “The government is not required to prove the

actual cost of defendant’s breach: the bond amount is a form of liquidated damages in the event of

a breach. Sar-Avi, 255 F.3d at 1168. See also United States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440, 442 (5 Cir. th

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1979) (discussing the difficulty of calculating the government’s search expense for the defendant,

who had committed suicide at his ranch). The government need not furnish a bill of costs, and the

Court may not disregard cost and inconvenience simply because they were not substantial. 

Nguyen, 279 F.3d at 1117. Nonetheless, the undersigned does not recommend that much weight

be given to Defendant’s breach of the release condition and prompt arrest.

Defendant’s drug use did not prejudice the government and caused little harm to the

public. See United States v. LaJocies, 2007 WL 869692 (E.D. Cal. March 21, 2007)(No. Cr. S02-306 DFL DAD) (evaluating LaJocies’ use of methamphetamine in violation of the conditions

of his release). Compare this case with Sar-Avi, 255 F.3d at 1168 (in which government incurred

substantial cost and inconvenience over the seven years that Sar-Avi remained in Israel, to which

he had fled in violation of the conditions of his release); Abernathy, 757 F.2d at 1015 (in which

the government incurred substantial expense and inconvenience after the defendants adopted new

aliases and fled over 1500 miles); Castaldo, 667 F.2d at 21 (in which the government incurred

considerable expense in a 170-day search for the defendant); United States v. Knighton, 9

Fed.Appx. 730, 732 (9 Cir. 2001)(in which government apprehended the defendant four months th

after he eloped and returned him Los Angeles, and sentencing was delayed six months).

At least two courts have held that full or partial set-off was appropriate when the

defendant was found or re-apprehended shortly after breaching the conditions of release. United

States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440 (5 Cir. 1979); United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747 (4 Cir. th th

1970). In Parr, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court had abused its discretion in ordering

forfeiture of the defendant’s entire $75,000 cash bond because the defendant “willfully” failed to

appear for sentencing after committing suicide at home. 594 F.2d at 444. Among other factors,

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the appellate court noted that the cost and inconvenience relating to the government’s four-hour

search for the defendant was minimal. Id. at 441-42.

In Kirkman, the defendant’s attempt to mislead the court and delay trial by feigning an

auto accident was foiled almost immediately, and guards posted at the hospital pending his

release. 426 F.2d at 751. Since the government almost immediately recognized and addressed the

defendant’s breach of the conditions of release, the circuit court held that the district court had

abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the forfeiture of bond with regard to the third-party

sureties. Id. at 752.

Because the government incurred little expense, inconvenience, or prejudice in arresting

Defendant after he failed the drug test required as a condition of his release, forfeiture of his

$100,000 bond appears grossly disproportionate and therefore, not required in the interest of

justice. As Judge Kleinfeld opined in Nguyen:

The $100,000 in security was probably designed to cover the expense of fetching

Nguyen if he fled to a foreign country or otherwise put the government to great

expense. But all Nguyen did was fail to show up at the marshal’s office, and put

the government to the minimal burden of telephoning and driving around town to

get him. A hundred thousand dollars is a lot of money for doing nothing more than

looking around town for less than three weeks before picking Nguyen up at his

place of business and giving him a ride in a government car.

279 F.3d at 1118.

Here, the government’s expense and inconvenience was even less than in Nguyen. 

Defendant failed his drug test, an arrest warrant issued, and Defendant was promptly arrested at

his home. Forfeiture of the $100,000 bond is grossly disproportionate to the government’s

minimal cost and inconvenience.

Mitigating Factors. Mitigating factors include the Defendant’s remaining on house

arrest, and Surety’s status as a nonprofessional and a family member, as well as Surety’s lack of

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complicity in Defendant’s violations. See Nguyen, 279 F.3d at 1117. These weigh in favor of setaside and remission.

Surety’s Status. A court must take into account whether the surety was a professional or

a family member. Frias-Ramirez, 670 F.2d at 852. Precedent sets forth no clear rule regarding

the treatment of family members acting as sureties. In Nguyen, the majority declined to adopt the 

“loving relative” exception, as it categorized the policy articulated by Judge Kleinfeld in his

dissent. 279 F.3d at 1117 n. 2. Given the complicity of Nguyen’s surety/family members,

particularly the sister-in-law serving as both attorney and surety, in his scheme to avoid selfsurrendering as agreed, however, the majority appropriately refused to conclude that the district

court had abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the forfeiture of Nguyen’s bond. 

See id. at 1116-17. Nonetheless, Judge Kleinfeld aptly summarized the argument for a district

court’s indulgence of innocent family members who have posted bond for a loved one:

It is tragic when people post bail for a family member in trouble, only to be ruined

for their kindness when their kin jumps bail. Today’s decision may affect a lot of

common situations, as when people’s children are arrested for drug crimes or their

husbands or wives for drunk driving, embezzlement, or tax offenses. If bail is set

high enough to catch an international fugitive, but all that happens is that the

criminal fails to show up . . . and is easily and locally caught, there is no good

reason to forfeit so large an amount. 

The district court has the discretion to set aside the forfeiture or remit judgment on

the forfeiture “in whole or in part” “if it otherwise appears that justice does not

require the forfeiture.” What “justice requires” depends on the purpose of bail

bonds. The purpose of bail bonds is to make sure defendants show up in court, not

to punish them or their families if they don’t. Here, the record supports the district

court’s determination that Nguyen willfully failed to appear, but that does not

answer the question of whether it was an abuse of discretion not to remit the

forfeiture in part.

Nguyen, 279 F.3d at 1118 (footnotes omitted).

///

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In LaJocies, one surety was also the defendant’s third-party custodian who failed to

discharge his duty to supervise LaJocies. LaJocies, 2007 WL 869892 at *1. The other sureties

had recklessly assured the court that they knew the defendant and had confidence in him,

although, in truth, they barely knew him. Id. at *2. Accordingly, the court found that only partial

remission of bond was appropriate.

“The purpose of a bail bond is not punitive. Its object is not to enrich the government or

punish the defendant.” United States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440, 444 (5 Cir. 1979). A forfeiture th

should not be motivated by frustration or vindictiveness. Id. 

Amount of bond. “The hallmark of a liquidated damages provision is reasonableness at

the time the agreement is made rather than a calculation of actual provable losses when the breach

occurs.” Amwest, 54 F.3d at 604. Accordingly, the propriety of the bond amount considers

whether the amount of the bond was properly determined at its inception. Amwest, 54 F.3d at

604. A court must determine whether the amount of the defendant’s bail was appropriate in light

of the offense(s) charged. Frias-Ramirez, 670 F.2d at 853. Here, Defendant’s bail appears

appropriate to ensure his appearance to answer to the serious charges against him. Accordingly,

this factor weighs against set-off and release. Because Defendant breached a term of release other

than reappearance in court, however, this factor is entitled to relatively little weight.

III. Recommendation

In accordance with the foregoing facts and analysis, the undersigned recommends that

Defendant’s bail be ordered forfeited, but that the forfeiture be set aside and the full amount of the

bond be remitted to Surety. The undersigned further recommends that remission of the bond be

conditioned upon Defendant’s payment in full of all amounts due to the government for expenses

incident to monitoring his period of home detention.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the Honorable Oliver W.

Wanger, the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and

Recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are

advised that, by failing to file objections within the specified time, a party may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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