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Parties Involved:
James Guy Gish
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FI LED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FEB 2 8 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

JAMES GUY GISH, JAMES MICHAEL ) 

WAGGONER, and DANIEL R. MARTIN, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

Nos. 89-3006, 89-3007, 

and 89-3008 

(D.C. Nos. 88-40015-02, 

88-40015-03 and 88-40015-04) 

(D. Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Circuit Judge, and SEYMOUR and MOORE, 

Circuit Judges. 

This appeal arises out of the joint trial of four defendants, 

three of whom have joined forces here. All were convicted of 

conspiring to possess, with intent to distribute, 500 pounds of 

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 84l(a)(l) and 18 

U.S.C. § 2. Defendants raise three issues on appeal: (1) denial 

of an opportunity to testify outside the presence of the jury on 

the issue of the existence of a conspiracy; (2) improper joinder; 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-3006 Document: 01019964963 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 1 
and, (3) the existence of "multiple conspiracies." We conclude 

there is no merit to any of the contentions, and we affirm. 

In early April 1988, Drug Task Force Agent, Robert Benton, 

was introduced to Don Evans, a codefendant not included with the 

defendants in this appeal, by a paid informant, Joe Meder. Mr. 

Meder had told Agent Benton that Mr. Evans knew people who wanted 

to buy marijuana in large quantities. 

On April 13, 1988, Agent Benton, Agent James Woods, and Mr. 

Evans met to discuss the purchase of 500 pounds of marijuana. A 

surreptitious tape recording made of that conversation was 

introduced into evidence. During that conversation, Mr. Evans 

referred to two persons who would be participating in any 

purchase. One, not identified by name, was described as the 

"money man." The second individual, identified as "Jim," was to 

examine the merchandise offered by the agents and make a 

recommendation to the "money man" whether the purchase should be 

made. A considerable amount of conversation revolving around the 

purported decision-making authority of "Jim'' ensued, but nothing 

else of substance took place. Mr. Evans was told, however, when 

his contacts were ready to pursue the deal, that Mr. Evans was to 

telephone Mr. Meder. 

Six days later, Agent Benton and Mr. Evans conferred by 

telephone and agreed to meet the following day so that the task 

force agents could display their merchandise to the emissary of 

the prospective buyer. On April 20, 1988, Agents Benton and Woods 

and Mr. Meder met with Mr. Evans, defendant James Gish, and 

defendant Daniel Martin at the "Holidome" in Manhattan, Kansas. 

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Mr. Evans arrived at the meeting alone, and Mr. Gish and Mr. 

Martin, traveling together, arrived about twenty minutes later. 

The entire party then left for a room the agents had rented in 

another hotel. 

Once there, Mr. Evans and Mr. Martin went with the agents and 

Mr. Meder to the room, leaving Mr. Gish outside in his car. A 

videotape of the meeting in the room was secretly made and 

subsequently received in evidence. The tape shows Mr. Martin and 

Mr. Evans examining a 5 pound brick of marijuana displayed by the 

agents, smoking a cigarette made from the brick, and discussing 

the purchase of 500 pounds of marijuana, of which the brick was 

supposed to be a sample. 

Mr. Martin stated he wanted to make the purchase, as the 

pri ce of $300 per pound was right and the quality of the substance 

was high, but he had to contact his "people" who would supply the 

money. In vague terms, he talked about a "man in New York" and 

another in Texas, stating either or both would wish to consummate 

the transaction. The meeting broke up when Mr. Martin stated he 

wanted to go to a pay telephone to make "a few calls" to line up 

the funds for the purchase. 

The videotape also shows a subsequent meeting in the same 

room between the agents and Mr. Evans which apparently took place 

a short time later. Mr. Evans told the agents Mr. Martin had 

contacted the man in New York, and the latter wanted to make the 

purchase. He also stated the man in Texas was interested as well. 

Neither man, according to Mr. Evans, was willing to commit 

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Appellate Case: 89-3006 Document: 01019964963 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 3 
himself, but Mr. Martin would know the following morning whether 

either man would come to Kansas to consummate the transaction. 

Additional telephone conversations between Mr. Evans and 

Agent Benton were tape-recorded over the following two weeks. 

During these conversations, the recordings of which were admitted 

into evidence, Mr. Evans made representations indicating he and 

his associates were about to conclude the purchase. In a 

conversation which took place on May 10, 1988, Mr. Evans stated 

another man, "Larry," was now interested in purchasing 500 pounds 

and that Larry would have the cash on May 12. "Larry" was later 

identified as defendant, James Waggoner. 

On May 12, Agent Benton met with defendants Evans, Waggoner, 

and Gish in a restaurant in Topeka, Kansas. A tape recording of 

the conversation between the parties was made and introduced into 

evidence. After talking briefly inside the restaurant, Mr. 

Waggoner, Mr. Evans, and Agent Benton entered Mr. Waggoner's 

pickup truck in the parking lot, leaving Mr. Gish outside to act 

as a lookout. Mr. Waggoner gave Agent Benton a blue duffel bag 

containing two separate packages. The tape recording of the 

conversation that ensued indicates Agent Benton counted $58,000 in 

one package and $60,000 in another. As Mr. Waggoner was saying he 

had "another buddy in town that's got another 50," Mr. Evans 

interrupted to say, "It's like I was telling Rob. [Agent Benton] 

It's time to collect. Time to get everything rounded up." Mr. 

Waggoner responded, "Yeah." The conversation briefly continued, 

and then Agent Benton stated: "DEA partners." Defendants 

Waggoner, Evans, and Gish were placed under arrest. 

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Prior to trial, defendants filed pleadings seeking a pretrial 

determination of the existence of a conspiracy as a predicate to 

the possible introduction of the statements made during the 

conversation between various defendants and the agents. The trial 

court, in reliance upon United States v. Hernandez, 829 F.2d 988 

(10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1013 (1988), and the 

government's representation that it would establish the existence 

of the conspiracy at trial before the introduction of any 

conversation, denied a pretrial hearing. 

At trial, the prosecution introduced the testimony of Agent 

Benton describing his observations of the various contacts between 

himself and the defendants. The government then indicated it 

wanted to take up the issue of the various statements of the 

defendants. The jury was discharged, and the court heard the 

arguments of counsel for both sides at length. Defense counsel's 

arguments stressed the government's failure to establish, as one 

phrased it, "the conspiratorial agreement to distribute 

marijuana." (Vol. II at 99). Counsel for defendant Martin argued 

that no agreement was consummated during the meeting in Manhattan, 

so Mr. Martin could not be linked to any conspiracy. He further 

argued the meeting in Topeka was only for the purpose of 

displaying money, and that no agreement was reached at that time. 

Counsel for Mr. Waggoner joined in the arguments of other counsel 

and then stated his client would be adversely affected without a 

further hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine 

"what statements may be in furtherance of the conspiracy, what may 

be in the course of any conspiracy, if in fact there is a 

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conspiracy II (Vol II at 104). He further argued that the 

government failed to prove the existence of an agreement. At no 

time did any defense counsel suggest that his client wanted to 

take the stand to testify, or that any defendant believed himself 

torn between the need to testify about the existence of a 

conspiracy and his right not to incriminate himself. 

98-106). 

(Vol. II at 

Following these arguments, the trial court ruled. (Vol II at 

106-10). The judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that a conspiracy existed, that the defendants were members of the 

conspiracy, and that the conversations were made during the course 

of the conspiracy. 1 Immediately after the court's ruling, counsel 

for defendants Gish and Martin stated: II [ y] OU have also 

foreclosed the defendant's [sic] right under Rule 103 and 104 to 

take the stand in opposition to the Government's position." The 

court responded: "Well, the court has -- do you want to do that 

now?" Counsel replied, "Now?", and the court responded: 

Yes, or in the morning? I have had -- no one suggested 

to me that you wanted to do that, I have as of now made 

a finding based upon the evidence offered by the 

government, without hearing any of the hearsay 

statements. That is not necessary, that I feel that 

there is ample evidence of a conspiracy. Now, if -- to 

allow the hearsay statements to go ahead. [sic] 

Now, if you are asking for a time to do that in 

which you want to contest the evidence outside of the 

hearing of the jury, the court might be willing to 

consider that, but I have had no request up until now 

that I knew of for that. 

1 It should be noted, 

terms. The context 

other way, however. 

25. 

the trial court did not use those specific 

of the court's remarks could not be taken any 

In particular, see Vol. II at 109, lines 18-

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Counsel seemingly waffled at the offer, stating: 

This has been so heated, we have had to continue it 

by virtue of the fact that of [sic] Billie's back 

problem. But specifically in my renewed motion 

requesting the court to make a pretrial determination of 

the issue, I specifically advised the court as I did in 

July that of course if this comes, if push comes to 

shove, the defendants would like, it is my desire they 

be put in a position to, out of the presence of the 

jury, to testify on the issue. 

THE COURT: That had to do with whether or not the 

court felt a pretrial hearing was necessary. That was 

last Friday, and I held it was not. 

MR. HUMPAGE: Correct. 

THE COURT: Now you are asking, and that is a 

new question as far as the court is concerned now, as to 

whether you should be permitted to come in outside the 

presence of the jury, and contest what has been 

testified here to in regard to the existence of a 

conspiracy .... 

None of the defendants accepted the court's offer to conduct a 

hearing at that time. The court finally agreed to take the matter 

under consideration and rule after the evening recess. Then, 

prior to the recess, counsel for Mr. Waggoner stated: 

Only thing defendant Waggoner would say, if the court 

can independently determine there was a conspiracy from 

the evidence presented so far without the necessity of 

any testimony of Mr. Waggoner, then! guess we wouldn't 

be afforded a · James hearing. If in the court's 

determination if you reconsider your previous decision, 

we would like to present Mr. Waggoner for testimony 

outside the presence of the jury. 

(Vol. II at 114) (emphasis added). Upon convening the next 

morning, the court announced it had reflected on the issue and 

determined it would not permit testimony from the defendants. 

(Vol. II at 115-16). 

We believe two observations flow from the record at this 

point. One, it is fairly inferable that the court believed a 

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prima facie case had been made as required under Hernandez, and 

that the testimony of defendants Waggoner and Martin that no 

agreement had been reached would not change that belief. 2 It is 

notable counsel for Mr. Waggoner made that concession in his 

statement prior to the evening recess. Second, it is equally fair 

to say the trial court was never called upon to deal with the 

alleged constitutional dilemma with which defendants now argue 

they were faced. Not one defendant expressed that argument to the 

trial court, and none stated anything from which that suggestion 

could be inferred. The only contention of which the trial court 

was advised was that conspiracies were not formed because no 

agreement had been consummated. Under these circumstances, we do 

not believe the constitutional dilemma now posited by the 

defendants was preserved for review. 

Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 

fn.3 (10th Cir. 1990). 

F.2d 

Las Vegas Ice and Cold 

1990 WL 1292, p.6, 

We might be inclined to a different posture if any defendant 

had made a showing of what his testimony might be or that his 

testimony would vitiate the government's prima facie case. 

Instead of an offer of proof, the court was presented with 

generalizations. 3 More importantly, none of the defendants made 

2Indeed, in response to counsel's argument regarding 

to consummate an agreement, the court commented the 

determination by the jury with proper instructions. 

109). 

the failure 

issue was for 

(Vol. II at 

3In their brief, defendants refer to a pretrial written "offer of 

proof." That document is a rather prolix litany of the 

inconsistencies in portions of the government's written evidence 

coupled with a brief on the issue of coconspirator testimony. 

Nothing in that document suggests of an offer of proof. (Vol. I, 

documents 63 and 65). 

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his request for a hearing until after the court ruled, and when 

the court offered an immediate hearing, the offer was not 

accepted. Given all these circumstances, even if the issue were 

before us, we would not conclude the district court erred. 

To the extent defendants contend they had a right to a 

pretrial determination o f the predicate factors for the admission 

of coconspirator statements, we likewise find no error. Even 

though the Court, in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 

(1987), held a trial court must make a preliminary determination 

of the existence of a conspiracy and a defendant's role in that 

conspiracy, the Court did not require that these determinations be 

made at an evidentiary hearing prior to trial. We have left 

determination of the nature of the hearing and order of proof to 

the sound discretion of the trial court. Hernandez, 829 F.2d at 

993-95. As we have already noted, in compliance with the mandates 

of Hernandez, the trial court made a proper determination of the 

predicate facts prior to permitting introduction of the 

statements. We have not been shown, nor can we find, abuse of the 

trial court's discretion. 

Defendants contend that joinder of counts and defendants was 

improper. For proper joinder, there must be a common nexus. 

Where the evidence overlaps, as in this case, and the events 

occurred within a relatively short time span, and the offenses are 

similar, joinder of defendants and offenses is proper. United 

States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 538 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

485 U.S. 908 (1988). 

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Defendants contend because only Mr. Evans was charged with a 

telephone offense, the two counts of the indictment do not have a 

common nexus. This overlooks, of course, the fact that Mr. Evans' 

use of the telephone was to effect the conspiracy charged in the 

remaining count. We think the telephone count was factually and 

temporally related to the conspiracy count so that the Esch test 

has been met. Moreover, Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b), relating to the 

joinder of defendants, must be construed broadly to allow liberal 

joinder; and the defendants bear a heavy burden to show prejudice 

by the joinder. United States v. Hopkinson, 631 F.2d 665, 668 

(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 969 (1981). Defendants 

have not carried this burden. 

Defendants further argue that their motion to sever should 

have been granted because the evidence at trial showed the 

existence of more than one conspiracy. This, of course, is an 

issue for the jury. United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 581 

(10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985). To be sure, 

not all defendants participated in every event which formed the 

overt acts of the conspiracy. Nonetheless, there was a sufficient 

commonality of participation upon which the jury could have rested 

their verdict. 4 Suffice to say, however, we are not persuaded 

that each meeting between the agents and one or more of the 

defendants constituted a separate conspiracy. We need only point 

out that there is evidence present from which the jury could have 

found each defendant played a role in the overall scheme to buy 

4unfortunately, none of the instructions were 

defendants in the record. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3006 Document: 01019964963 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 10 
the marijuana the agents purportedly had for sale. 5 Within this 

framework, the jury could . have found the .existence of a single 

conspiracy. Id. at 582. 

Mr. Martin also argues that a conspiracy requires a completed 

present agreement to commit a criminal act. He urges that the 

only evidence against him indicates he did not reach that 

agreement because his participation in the transaction was 

conditioned upon his obtaining financing. That representation 

overlooks the evidence that Mr. Martin was brought to the meeting 

only to examine the merchandise as an agent for the "money man,'' 

and in that capacity he carried out his role in the conspiracy. 

Under the evidence presented to the jury, it was not expected that 

Mr. Martin was to make the purchase himself, although he did 

indicate in the agent's hotel room that he wanted to make the deal 

and would make a favorable recommendation to the "man in New 

York." In this scenario, Mr. Martin's inability to obtain 

sufficient money in Manhattan is irrelevant to the proof of the 

conspiracy. We need not, therefore, deal further with Mr. 

Martin's argument. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

5we find insignificant the fact that Mr. Waggoner was not present 

at the Manhattan meeting and Mr. Martin was not at the Topeka 

meeting. Both men were linked to Mr. Gish, and Mr. Gish appeared 

in both places. 

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