Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05981/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05981-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Crown Express, LLC
Plaintiff
Ozark Trucking, INC
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CROWN EXPRESS, LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

OZARK TRUCKING, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1: 04-CV-5981-SMS

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 21)

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301.

I. Background

On July 16, 2004, Defendant Ozark Trucking, Inc., filed a

notice of removal of this action from the Superior Court of

Fresno County. The action concerns allegedly damaged goods

transported from Henderson, Nevada and delivered to Sacramento,

California by Defendant, and thus proceeds pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, and more particularly 49 U.S.C. § 14706(d)(1) and (2),

which permits a civil action against a delivering carrier, or a

carrier alleged to have been responsible for a loss, to be

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

brought in a district court and removed to the district in which

the loss or damage is alleged to have occurred. 

The action was commenced on April 5, 2004, and Defendant was

served in June 2004. Contrary to Defendant’s representation in

the notice of removal, no copy of the complaint was filed in this

court as an exhibit to the notice of removal. However, a copy

does appear as an exhibit to the declaration of Ward, the chief

financial officer of Defendant. The first claim is for breach of

a written contract in the form of refusal to reimburse Plaintiff

for a loss associated with a spoiled, refrigerated load of food

that Defendant hauled and that was refused by Sam’s, for which

Plaintiff had to pay for in its entirety. The second claim is for

an account stated within the last four years for goods and

merchandise that Defendant promised to deliver but failed to

deliver in good and marketable condition. It appears from the

answer that the alleged written contract was exhibit A to the

complaint (Ans. at 2), but the complaint is not attached as an

exhibit to the declaration.

Defendant answered on August 3, 2004, admitting that the

complaint was four pages with attachments and exhibits, the state

action was filed in Fresno County Superior Court (action number

04CECG01141), and Defendant Ozark did not honor Plaintiff’s

claim; denying that the contract was entered into in Fresno

County, that Exhibit A to the complaint was the contract, that

any damage or injury to Plaintiff occurred, that an account was

stated, or that there was an indebtedness; and asserting

affirmative defenses, including lack of causation, statute of

limitations (both Cal. Civ Proc. Code § 339 and 49 U.S.C. §

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

14706), assumption of the risk, unspecified defenses, limitation

of damages to agreed or released rate, comparative fault, failure

to mitigate, unclean hands, unjust enrichment, estoppel, waiver,

laches, failure of consideration, and release.

The case was scheduled on November 17, 2004, and the order

indicates that the major claim is for breach of contract between

Crown and Ozark. Plaintiff Crown, a refrigerated trucking

company, had a contract with P&O Cold Logistics (P&O), and used

Defendant Ozark as a subhauler. On June 4 or 5, 2000, Plaintiff

asked Defendant to haul a load of refrigerated food from P&O’s

Henderson, Nevada, facility to Sam’s Club in Sacramento; upon

delivery to Sam’s, Sam’s refused the load because of unacceptable

food damage due to faulty temperature control. Plaintiff contends

that it paid P&O $52,306.75 for the load, but Defendant has

refused reimbursement. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to

maintain food temperature; Defendant maintains that the load,

which was loaded into the truck and fitted with a bulkhead to

separate refrigerated and frozen foods and sealed by P&O, was

properly maintained by it and thus not damaged by its conduct;

rather, the rejected refrigerated products were possibly loaded

in a warm condition by P&O. Defendant contends that the

temperature records of its refrigeration unit show that the

temperature was properly maintained by it. P&O is not a party to

this action.

Pursuant to the amended scheduling order filed on January

21, 2005, the Plaintiff timely filed a motion for summary

judgment, supporting memorandum, statement of undisputed facts,

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Court has received a courtesy copy of the exhibits to the Ward declaration, but it is not clear that

paper copies were actually filed with the clerk, although a notice of inability to file electronically was filed with the

clerk.

4

and declarations of Gary Todd and Michael Ward on June 10, 2005.1

There has been no response to the motion. Although the matter was

set for hearing on July 14, 2004, by separate order the Court has

vacated the hearing, and the matter has been submitted for

decision.

Counsel for both parties filed consent to Magistrate Judge

jurisdiction to conduct all proceedings, including trial and

judgment, on January 21, 2005, and Judge Coyle ordered the case

assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge on January 27, 2005.

II. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any," which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the

moving party’s burden to establish that there exists no genuine

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co.,

585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978).

Where a party with the ultimate burden of persuasion at

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

trial as to a matter moves for summary judgment, it must

demonstrate affirmatively by evidence each essential element of

its claim or affirmative defense and must establish that there is

no triable issue of fact as to each essential element such that a

rational trier of fact could render a judgment in its favor.

Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,

888 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this

factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials

of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. In the endeavor to establish

the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It

is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to

require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing

versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at

630. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the

pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there

is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963

amendments). The evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita,

475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S.

654, 655 (1962)(per curiam)). 

The showings must consist of admissible evidence,

Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324,

1335 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980), or pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits or declarations, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). Affidavits shall be based on personal

knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to

testify to the matters stated therein. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred

to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.

Id. Declarations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 may be used with

the same force and effect as affidavits. Pollock v. Pollock, 154

F.3d 601, 611, n.20 (6th Cir. 1998). Personal knowledge may be

inferred from declarations themselves, such as from facts

concerning a declarant’s position and participation, Barthelemy

v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 1990);

however, a court cannot draw an inference about facts not

specifically put in the record by a party, and a court will not

assume that general averments embrace specific facts needed to

sustain a complaint, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497

U.S. 871, 887 (1990). An admission in a pleading, including a

defendant’s failure to deny an allegation in a complaint,

constitutes an admission. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d); Lockwood v Wolf.

Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 611 (9th Cir. 1980). Unauthenticated

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

documents cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542,

1550 (9th Cir. 1990). Legal memoranda and oral argument are not

evidence and do not create issues of fact capable of defeating an

otherwise valid motion for summary judgment. British Airways Bd.

v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978).

The Court is not obligated to consider matters that are in

the record but are not specifically brought to its attention; the

parties must designate and refer to specific triable facts. Even

in the absence of a local rule, for evidence to be considered,

the party seeking to rely on it must specify the fact by

indicating what the evidence is or says and must indicate where

it is located in the file. Although the Court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other material, it has no

duty to search the record for evidence establishing a material

fact. Carmen v. San Francisco United School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1029 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. Undisputed Facts

A. Delivery, Claim, Denial, and Filing Suit

The declaration of Gary Todd, the driver who delivered the 

load of freight to Sam’s Club in Sacramento on or about June 5,

2000, establishes that he delivered the load on that date, and

the dock manager refused to accept the load because it was too

warm; however, Todd’s declaration indicates that during the time

he had the load on the truck, the temperature alarm did not

sound, and thus he observed the temperatures to be acceptable.

The declaration of Michael Ward, chief financial officer of

Defendant, establishes that he had personal knowledge of the

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

facts which he related, and further establishes the following: 1)

that on July 30, 2001, Roger Houston, Defendant’s president, 

received a letter from Plaintiff’s attorney, William L. Cowin,

dated July 27, 2001, demanding payment of $52,306.75 for the

load, (Decl. of Ward at 2, Ex. B); 2) on or about August 8, 2001,

Houston replied and denied the claim, (id., Ex. C); 3) on or

about September 10, 2001, counsel for Defendant wrote to Crown’s

counsel and denied the claim, (id. at 2, Ex. D); and 4) on or

about June 26, 2004, Defendant was served with this action, which

was filed on April 5, 2004, more than two years and one month

after the claim was disallowed, (id., Ex. E.) 

B. Bill of Lading

The Ward’s declaration states that Ozark, pursuant to its

custom and practice, treated the bill of lading for the freight

as a contract of carriage between Plaintiff and Defendant. In

2000 it was Ozark’s custom and practice of carry loads under a

Uniform Straight Bill of Lading (Decl. at 2), that such a bill of

lading required written claims for loss or damage to be filed

with the carrier within nine months after delivery of the

property, (id., Ex. A, § 3(b)), and that such a bill of lading

required that suits for loss, damage, injury, or delay should be

instituted against any carrier no later than two years and one

day from the day when written notice is given by the carrier to

the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim, (id., §

3(c)).

The declarations do not establish, however, the terms of the

bill of lading governing the shipment in question.

///

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

III. Analysis

A. Governing Law and Application

The Carmack Amendment (here 49 U.S.C. § 14706) established a

uniform national liability policy for interstate carriers and

preempts state remedies for the liability for loss or injury to

property subject to it. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. North American Van

Lines, 970 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a state

negligence action for damage to goods carried interstate was

preempted where carrier conducted itself pursuant to contract);

Pietro Culotta Grapes Ltd. v. Southern Pacific Transport Company,

917 F.Supp. 713, 715-17 (E.D.Cal. 1996) (determining that state

contract and tort claims were preempted, citing authorities, and

noting the preemptive scope and intent of the amendment [then

codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11707, 10730, and 10103, and later

recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 14706]). 

The amendment applies, inter alia, to transportation by a

motor carrier of property or passengers between a place in a

state and a place in another state. 49 U.S.C. § 13501(1)(a). A

“motor carrier” includes a person providing motor vehicle

transportation for compensation, and “transportation” includes a

vehicle, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the

movement of passengers or property, or both, regardless of

ownership or an agreement concerning use. 49 U.S.C. § 13102 (12),

(19). Under the statute, the essential basis for liability is the

bill of lading, and the liability is for the actual loss or

injury to property caused by the receiving or delivering carrier.

49 U.S.C. § 14706(a).

It thus appears that the statute applies to the transaction

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

in question in the case before the Court, and that it preempts

the state law claims based on the transportation of the load in

question.

B. Statute of Limitations

Section 14706(e) provides:

(e) Minimum period for filing claims.--

(1) In general.--A carrier may not

provide by rule, contract, or otherwise, a

period of less than 9 months for filing a

claim against it under this section and a

period of less than 2 years for bringing a

civil action against it under this section.

The period for bringing a civil action is

computed from the date the carrier gives a

person written notice that the carrier has

disallowed any part of the claim specified in

the notice.

Thus, the statute provides that a carrier may not provide

for a period of less than nine months for filing a claim, or less

than a period of two years for bringing a civil action against it

under this section. Likewise, 49 C.F.R. § 370.3 (2000) requires

that before a carrier pay a claim for loss or damage to cargo, a

claim be filed “within the specific time limits applicable

thereto and as otherwise may be required by law, the terms of the

bill of lading or other contract of carriage....” It also sets

forth minimum filing requirements for a claim that is “filed with

a proper carrier within the time limits specified in the bill of

lading or contract of carriage of transportation....” Id.

In the present case, the actual contract alleged to have

existed and to have been breached is not before the Court;

Defendant did not include a copy of the contract in the notice of

removal of the state court action to this Court or in the

exhibits to the declarations. Likewise, Defendant admits the

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 The Court notes that no discovery motions were filed.

11

following:

Despite numerous requests for Crown to produce the terms

and conditions section of the bill of lading, Crown has

not complied. There is no reason to assume that this

particular load was carried under any other terms and

conditions than those contained in a standard Uniform

Straight Bill of Lading.

(Deft.’s Memo. at 3.) Ward declares that it was Defendant’s

custom to treat a bill of lading as a contract of carriage,

(Decl. at 1), and that it was its custom to carry loads under a

Uniform Straight Bill of Lading.” Defendant also argues that “it

can be assumed that the standard bill of lading terms applied to

carriage of the load in question.” (Deft.’s Memo. at 2.) 

It is clear that neither the bill of lading itself nor the

contract alleged to have been violated is before the Court. There

is no proof before the court sufficient to establish by a

preponderance of evidence the pertinent terms of the bill of

lading or contract relating to the maximum period of time within

which claims could be made and denied and actions could

thereafter be filed.2 Although the statute refers to times that

cannot be shortened, it does not by its terms purport to state a

maximum period of time after which either presenting a claim to

the party, or filing a law suit, is no longer permitted. The

cases cited by Defendant all involve situations in which the bill

of lading stated a specific time within which a claim had to be

made or action had to be filed. Cherkis v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,

59 F.Supp.2d 203, 208 (D.Mass 1999) (nine-month period

established in the bill of lading); Delphax Systems, Inc. v.

Mayflower Transit, Inc. 54 F.Supp.2d 60, 61 (D.Mass 1999) (bill

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

of lading required a claim within nine months of a reasonable

time for delivery). Likewise, Defendant’s citation to Burtman

Iron Works v. Con-Way Transportation Servies, 97 F.Supp.2d 122

(D.Mass 2000) is not helpful; although that case stands for the

principle that when a claim is timely denied, the requisite time

period for filing a lawsuit under the Uniform Straight Bill of

Lading applies, in that case evidence was submitted that such a

uniform bill of lading, requiring a claim within nine months and

a lawsuit within two years of denial of the claim, had issued in

the case, and the terms of the bill were clear. 97 F.Supp.2d at

124, 126. 

Here, the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of

statute of limitations is on the moving Defendant. California

Sansome Co. v. U.S. Gypsum, 55 F.3d 1402, 1406 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Further, all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc.,

369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam)). No basis for concluding

that a Uniform Straight Bill of Lading was actually used is set

forth other than Ward’s statement regarding Defendant’s custom at

the time and that of “other motor carriers,” (Decl. of Ward at

2). However, Defendant did not have the bill of lading; further,

counsel states in the Memorandum (at 3) that the load in question

was carried pursuant to a bill of lading which was apparently

generated by P&O in Nevada. Defendant has not met its burden of

establishing each essential element of a defense of the statute

of limitations.

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Further, no basis is given for a conclusion regarding the

terms of the parties’ contract. Although it is possible that the

parties’s contract and bill of lading provided for claims within

nine months and suit two years thereafter, it is likewise

possible that other provisions were made. Drawing a reasonable

inference in favor of the opposing party, the Court concludes

that Defendant has not established that it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on a statute of limitations defense.

Defendant has not shown that no rational trier of fact could find

for Plaintiff on this issue.

Finally, the Court notes that Defendant has not briefed the

applicability any statute of limitations. It does not appear that

any state or federal statute (such as Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337,

four years, or 28 U.S.C. § 1658, four years) would apply, but

even if it were assumed that it did, Defendant has not

established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

IV. Disposition

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment IS

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05981-SMS Document 31 Filed 07/08/05 Page 13 of 13