Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_14-cv-00059/USCOURTS-alnd-3_14-cv-00059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chad E. Hammond
Plaintiff
Janice Keeton
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

CHAD E. HAMMOND,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JANICE KEETON,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 3:14-CV-059-CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Chad Hammond, who is proceeding pro se, asserts a claim against

defendant, Janice Keeton, for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“the

Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The case currently is before the court on defendant’s

1

motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Upon 2

consideration of the motion, briefs, and accompanying materials, the court concludes

that more information is necessary before the motion can be decided. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits a party to move to

dismiss a complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint). 

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Doc. no. 9. The motion was styled as a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 2

summary judgment. This court entered an order on March 3, 2014, finding that it was not necessary

to convert the motion to one for summary judgment, even though it was accompanied by evidentiary

material. Accordingly, the motion will be considered as a motion to dismiss. Doc. no. 10. 

FILED

 2014 Apr-11 AM 10:48

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 1 of 12
relief can be granted,” must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires that

a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that pleading standard

does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 544

U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citations omitted). 

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S.,

at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]”

devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at 557

(brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 2 of 12
statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint states

a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis supplied). 

II. ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

A. Alleged Debt Collection Activities

Defendant, Janice Keeton, is an attorney practicing in Lauderdale County,

Alabama. On behalf of her client, RCHP-Florence, LLC d/b/a ECM Hospital, Ms. 3

 Complaint ¶ 4. 3

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 3 of 12
Keeton filed a debt collection lawsuit against plaintiff, Chad E. Hammond, a resident

of Lawrence County, Tennessee, in Small Claims Court in Lauderdale County,

Alabama. The debt collection action was assigned Case No. 2013-900378.00.4

Hammond asserts that he is a “consumer,” and Keeton is a “debt collector,” as those

terms are defined by the Act. Hammond also appeared pro se in the debt collection 5

lawsuit.

In this case, Hammond challenges several of Keeton’s activities in connection

with her representation of RCHP/Florence in the underling debt collection action. 

Hammond asserts that Keeton did not provide him with an “initial communication” in

connection with collection of the alleged debt, as required by the Act. He also asserts 6

that Keeton did not send him a written debt collection notice containing the language

required by the Act. Hammond sent Keeton a written Notice of Dispute of Alleged 7

Id. ¶¶ 2, 8-9. 4

Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. The Act defines a “consumer” as “any natural person obligated or allegedly

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obligated to pay any debt.” 16 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). A “debt collector” is defined as “any person who

uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose

of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or

indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 16 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 

 Complaint ¶ 10. 6

 Complaint ¶ 12. In support of this allegation, Hammond cites 16 U.S.C. § 1692g, which 7

provides, in pertinent part: 

Notice of debt; contents

Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in

connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the

following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 4 of 12
Debt after he received his summons in the debt collection lawsuit, but Keeton never 8

responded to that notice, as allegedly required by the Act. Keeton also did not provide 9

Hammond with the name and address of the original creditor, even though he requested

that information in writing. Keeton neither verified the validity of the alleged debt, 10

nor ceased collection activity after receiving Hammond’s Notice of Dispute of Alleged

Debt. Instead, she proceeded with the debt collection action in Small Claims Court. 11 12

paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing — 

(1) the amount of the debt; 

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of

the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be

assumed to be valid by the debt collector; 

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing

within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt

collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the

consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer

by the debt collector; and 

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day

period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the

original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 

 Complaint ¶ 13. See also id. at Exhibit A (Notice of Dispute of Alleged Debt). 8

 Complaint ¶ 14. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). 9

 Complaint ¶ 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5). 10

Complaint ¶¶ 16-17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (“If the consumer 11

notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this

section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and

address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 5 of 12
Hammond asserts that Keeton’s actions “breached the law and her lawful duty

to [Hammond] by violating his federally protected consumer rights through

noncompliance with [the Act’s] debt collection practices.” That breach of the law 13

“proximately caused [Hammond] to suffer money loss, mental and emotional distress,

embarrassment and humiliation.”14

B. Other Facts Related to the Underlying Debt Collection Lawsuit

Hammond also alleges that Keeton “obtained a default judgment against [him]

in small claims court without verifying the alleged debt,” and that Keeton “was 15

granted an additional $500.00 attorney fee upon her request to the trial court because

[Hammond] raised the federal issue of FDCPA requirements for debt collector

[Keeton.]” The documents submitted by Keeton in support of her motion to dismiss 16

clarify those allegations. A September 4, 2013 order of the Circuit Court of

Lauderdale County in the underlying debt collection lawsuit states:

THIS CAUSE came before the Court for trial. District Judge

Carole Medley having recused herself this cause was assigned to the

portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or

the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name

and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.”).

 Complaint ¶ 18. 12

Id.¶ 26 (alterations supplied). 13

Id. ¶ 27 (alteration supplied). See also id. ¶¶ 21-22. 14

Id. ¶ 19 (alteration supplied). 15

Id. ¶ 20 (alterations supplied). 16

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 6 of 12
undersigned Circuit Judge sitting specially as District Judge for

Lauderdale County. 

On May 23, 2013 plaintiff filed a small claim action against

defendant claiming defendant owed plaintiff one thousand thirty-eight

dollars and ninety-five cents ($1,038.95) for services and/or goods

rendered. On June 11, 2013 defendant, acting pro se, filed an answer

denying responsibility and filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction” and “Motion to StrikeShamComplaint” and a “Cross-Claim

Complaint” making bizarre allegations against the attorney for the

plaintiff.

On July 17, 2013 this court denied defendant’s Motion to Strike,

denied defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and granted plaintiff’s Motion to

Dismiss Cross-Complaint.

Thereafter the defendant filed a plethora of motions challenging the

court’s jurisdiction and procedures in a transparent attempt to defeat this

simple collection process. This court denied those spurious attempts and

proceeded to trial. Plaintiff called defendant as [its] first witness. Mr.

Hammond refused to testify and when the court insisted unless he

asserted some constitutional privilege the defendant offered to allow the

court to enter a default judgment against him. This offer was accepted by

the plaintiff and the court. 

Ms. Keeton, attorney for plaintiff, requested a judgment for

attorney fees in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00) in light of

the defendant’s antics. That motion was granted. 

Default judgment, by consent of the defendant, is therefore

rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount

of $1,538.95 for which execution may issue.17

Doc. no. 9, Exhibit A (September 4, 2013 Order of the Circuit Court of Lauderdale 17

County, Alabama in RCHP-Florence, LLC d/b/a ECM Hospital v. Chad Hammond, Case No. SM13-900378), at 1-2 (alteration supplied). 

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 7 of 12
Keeton also submitted a copy of the cross-claim Hammond filed against her on

June 11, 2013 in the underlying collection case. In that cross-claim, Hammond 18

asserted that Keeton was a debt collector under the Act, that Keeton tried to collect 19

an alleged debt from him by filing a complaint in the Small Claims Court for

Lauderdale County, and that Keeton did not provide him with any notice or 20

opportunity to dispute the alleged debt before filing that complaint. Hammond also 21

asserted that he sent Keeton a Notice of Dispute of Alleged Debt after receiving his

summons in the underlying debt collection action, but that Keeton refused to withdraw

the complaint against him in Small Claims Court, or to verify the alleged debt per the

Notice of Dispute of Alleged Debt. Accordingly, Hammond asserted that Keeton 22

“willfully violated all the federally mandated debt collection procedures set forth” in

the Act.23

Based on those allegations, Hammond asserted two cross claims against Keeton. 

In the first cross-claim, Hammond asserted that Keeton had a duty to follow all

Doc. no. 9, at Exhibit B (“Cross-Claim/Complaint” filed on June 11, 2013, in RCHP- 18

Florence, LLC d/b/a ECM Hospital v. Chad Hammond, Case No. SM-13-900378 in the “Small

Claims Court of Lauderdale County, Alabama”).

Id. ¶ 2. 19

Id. ¶ 5. 20

Id. ¶ 6. 21

Id. ¶¶ 8, 11. 22

Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis in original). 23

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 8 of 12
applicable debt collection procedures set forth in the Act, but that she breached that

duty by “skipping all mandated FDCPA collection procedures in regards to

[Hammond’s] alleged debt collection.” Specifically, Keeton sued Hammond without

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giving him any prior notice or an opportunity to dispute the alleged debt, and she

ignored Hammond’s Notice of Dispute of Alleged Debt. As a result of those actions, 25

Hammond asserted that he “suffered loss of time from business and family, money

damages and emotional stress,” and he requested relief in the amount of $5,000.00, 26

“together with such other and further relief as the Court may deem reasonable and just

under the circumstances.” The second cross-claim is virtually identical to the first. 27 28

III. DISCUSSION

In her motion to dismiss, Keeton asserted three conclusory arguments to support

the dismissal of Hammond’s claims against her: i.e., (1) that she is not a “debt

collector” as defined by the Act; (2) that Hammond “asked for a default judgment[,] 29

thereby negating any claim he may have in this regard”; and (3) that Hammond’s 30

 Cross-Claim/Complaint in Case No. Sm-13-900378, at ¶¶ 13-15 (alteration supplied). 24

Id. ¶¶ 16-17. 25

Id. ¶ 18. 26

Id. (“WHEREFORE” clause). 

27

Id. ¶¶ 19-25. 28

 Doc. no. 9 ¶ 2. 29

Id. ¶ 3 (alteration supplied). 30

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 9 of 12
claims are barred by res judicata. After being ordered to file a brief more fully 31

developing her arguments and supporting them with legal authority, Keeton filed a 32

three-page brief, though separate counsel, asserting only the res judicata argument.33

Accordingly, Keeton’s other arguments will be deemed abandoned, and the court will

focus solely on res judicata. 

When a federal court is “‘asked to give res judicata effect to a state court

judgment, [it] must apply the res judicata principles of the law of the state whose

decision is set up as a bar to further litigation.’” Kizzire v. Baptist Health System, Inc.,

441 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration supplied) (quoting Amey, Inc. v. Gulf

Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1509 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

Under Alabama law, “the essential elements of res judicata are (1) a prior

judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction,

(3) with substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the same cause of

action presented in both actions.” Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723

So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala. 1998). If all four elements are met, any claim that

was, or could have been, adjudicated in the prior action is barred from

future litigation. Id.

Kizzire, 441 F.3d at 1308-09. See also Chapman Nursing Home, Inc. v. McDonald,

985 So. 2d 914, 919 (Ala. 2007) (same).

Id. ¶ 4. 31

See doc. no. 10, at 3 n.7 (“Defendant’s motion [to dismiss] contains one page of 32

conclusory, underdeveloped assertions. Those assertions must be more fully developed and

supported by legal authority.”) (alteration supplied). 

Doc. no. 13. The brief actually contains only two pages of legal argument. The other page 33

is taken up by the heading, signature block, and certificate of service. 

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 10 of 12
Keeton’s briefing on the res judicata issue is confused. Keeton asserts that 34

Hammond’s claims against her in this case are barred by the judgment entered by the

state court on the cross-claim Hammond asserted against her in the underlying

collection action. While that may ultimately be a successful legal argument, Keeton

has not provided a proper foundation to support it. Keeton states that the cross-claim

Hammond filed in state court was dismissed on September 4, 2013, after Hammond

refused to testify at trial and had a default judgment entered against him. That is not

correct. As is apparent from the state court documents submitted by Keeton in support

of her motion to dismiss, the underlying collection action asserted by Keeton’s client,

RCHP-Florence, LLC, against Hammond, was dismissed on September 4, 2013, when

default judgment was entered against Hammond. But that particular “judgment on 35

the merits” is not the one that is relevant to the res judicata issue raised here. Instead,

Hammond’s state court cross-claim is the relevant pleading because it contained Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act allegations that are similar to the ones asserted in this

case. By the time judgment was entered in the underlying state court collection action

on September 4, 2013, the cross-claim had already been dismissed on July 17, 2013.

36

That confusion is both surprising and frustrating, considering that Keeton is herself an 34

attorney, and she is also represented by a different attorney with regard to the claims asserted against

her in this case. 

See doc. no. 9, at Exhibit A. 35

Id. at 1. 36

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Case 3:14-cv-00059-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/11/14 Page 11 of 12
There is no copy of the July 17, 2013 order dismissing the cross-claim in this court’s

record. Thus, there is no way to determine whether it was a judgment on the merits,

or whether the state court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant Janice Keeton is ORDERED to file a copy of the state court’s July

17, 2013 order dismissing Hammond’s cross-claim, together with copies of any motion

to dismiss the cross-claim, and any briefs that were filed in support, or in opposition

to, such a motion, on or before April 15, 2014. If Keeton fails to fully comply with this

order, or to provide the court with all information necessary in order to rule on her

motion to dismiss, the motion will be denied. 

DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of April, 2014. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

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