Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03088/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03088-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Douma
Appellee
Gregory Jean-Paul
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-3088

GREGORY JEAN-PAUL,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY DOUMA,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 12-C-697 — Patricia J. Gorence, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 18, 2015 — DECIDED DECEMBER 31, 2015

____________________

Before POSNER, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Gregory Jean-Paul, a Wisconsin prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 arguing that he did not knowingly and 

intelligently waive his right to counsel on his direct criminal 

appeal in state court. The district court denied relief. We 

affirm the judgment because the state appellate court reasonably concluded that his waiver was knowing and intelligent.

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I. Background

Jean-Paul was convicted in 2007 of state drug crimes and 

sentenced to 13 years’ confinement and 12 years’ extended 

supervision. He appealed, but vacillated on whether he 

wanted to represent himself on appeal. In January 2008 he 

talked with his appointed counsel, Patrick Donnelly. 

Donnelly told his client that he intended to file a “no-merit 

report,” see WIS. STAT. § 809.32, unless Jean-Paul wanted to 

proceed pro se, in which case Donnelly would simply ask to 

withdraw. Jean-Paul replied that he wanted to proceed 

pro se. To confirm, Donnelly wrote to Jean-Paul, advising 

him that if he signed and returned a “Statement of Decision 

to Proceed Pro Se,” Donnelly would withdraw from JeanPaul’s appeal. Donnelly noted that “[t]he deadline for taking 

action in your case is currently March 14, 2008.” 

Two days later, Jean-Paul reconsidered. He told Donnelly 

that instead of proceeding pro se, he wanted all “documents 

concerning my case” sent to him so that he could “fully and 

thoroughly respond to the No Merit report.” Donnelly 

acknowledged Jean-Paul’s change of heart and promised to 

submit the no-merit report. Donnelly also advised Jean-Paul 

that the deadline for the no-merit was not on March 14, but

rather 180 days from when the last transcript from the trial 

had been released. See § 809.32(2)(a). The transcript was 

released on November 13, 2007, which meant that the report 

wasn’t due until May 2008.

By March 14, 2008, however, Jean-Paul was looking for 

the no-merit report. He asked Donnelly and the court clerk if 

it had been filed. Donnelly responded that the no-merit 

report was due by May 9, and he would file it before then. 

The clerk answered that the report was due May 12.

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No. 14-3088 3

In April Jean-Paul changed his mind again, so Donnelly 

asked the appellate court for permission to withdraw from 

the case. With his motion Donnelly submitted a “Statement 

of Decision to Proceed Pro Se” signed by Jean-Paul. The 

statement, dated April 4, read as follows: 

I, Gregory Jean-Paul declare that I have decided to proceed pro se with my appeal. I understand that pro se means that I will represent 

myself in this matter without the assistance of 

an attorney. I have made my decision to appeal 

pro se after talking with my appointed counsel, 

Patrick M. Donnelly, Assistant State Public Defender, and I understand that the ramifications 

of my decision to be as follows:

1. I understand that by deciding to represent myself I am giving up my right to be represented on appeal by Mr. Donnelly, who was 

appointed to represent me by the Office of the 

State Public Defender. I understand that this 

appeal is my one appeal of right from my conviction and that no other attorney will be appointed by the Office of the State Public Defender to represent me in this case in the future.

2. I understand that there are dangers and 

disadvantages in representing myself and advantages in having an attorney represent me 

because an attorney familiar with the law may 

be in a better position to discover factual information or legal arguments which could assist me in seeking postconviction relief. I also 

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understand that even though I am not an attorney, I will be expected to follow the statutes, 

rules, and procedures for filing postconviction 

motions, appeals and subsequent briefing in 

the court of appeals. I understand that I will be 

personally responsible for all aspects of my 

appeal, including the obligation to file postconviction motions or a notice of appeal by the 

current dead-line, March 14, 2008, unless I personally seek and obtain an additional extension 

of time from the court of appeals.

I have discussed with my attorney my right 

to a no-merit report and I have decided to proceed pro se. This decision is entirely voluntary 

on my part and is not the result of any threats 

or promises from anyone.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals accepted Jean-Paul’s waiver and granted Donnelly’s motion to withdraw.

Proceeding pro se, Jean-Paul filed several challenges to 

his conviction. First, he voluntarily dismissed his appeal and 

brought a state postconviction motion, which in Wisconsin 

precedes a direct appeal. See WIS. STAT. § 974.02; Morales v. 

Boatwright, 580 F.3d 653, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2009). He argued 

that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to listen 

to certain audiotapes. This motion was rejected. Jean-Paul 

then refiled his direct appeal, and the state appellate court 

affirmed his conviction.

Next, Jean-Paul filed a petition for habeas corpus in the 

state appellate court challenging the validity of his waiver of 

counsel on direct appeal. He argued that he was not compeCase: 14-3088 Document: 40 Filed: 12/31/2015 Pages: 11
No. 14-3088 5

tent to waive his right to counsel and had not done so knowingly or intelligently. In addition to the correspondence with 

his counsel recounted above, Jean-Paul submitted an affidavit stating, without more, that “I Jean-Paul, Gregory, swear 

that I can not read or write.” An affidavit of another prisoner 

repeats that Jean-Paul is illiterate and asserts that he, the 

fellow prisoner, had prepared Jean-Paul’s legal filings. Based 

on this evidence, Jean-Paul argued that he had misunderstood the April 4 statement he signed. He argued that he 

thought it was a requirement for his lawyer to file a no-merit 

report, not that it was a waiver of his right to counsel on 

appeal. 

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied relief. The court

explained that Jean-Paul may now regret “his choice to 

proceed with the assistance of a jail-house lawyer,” but that 

this did “not undermine the validity of his initial, knowing 

and voluntary decision to represent himself” on appeal.

Other unrelated postconviction petitions and appeals were

unsuccessful.

Moving next to federal court, Jean-Paul filed a petition 

for habeas relief under § 2254. He renewed his claim that he 

had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 

appellate counsel. The district judge denied relief, holding 

that the state appellate court had applied the right standard

and reached a reasonable result. At most, the judge explained, Jean-Paul had “demonstrated that [his waiver of 

appellate counsel] is a decision he has come to regret, which 

does not make it unknowing or unintelligent.” 

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We granted a certificate of appealability on the question 

whether Jean-Paul was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 

appellate counsel.1

II. Analysis

Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel on a direct appeal taken as of right. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 

353, 356–57 (1963). To waive that right, a defendant must be 

competent to waive and must do so knowingly and intelligently. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993). Whether a defendant is competent to waive counsel turns on 

“whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings.” 

Id. at 401 n.12. “[T]he ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry, by 

contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does

understand the significance and consequences of a particular 

decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” Id.

As an initial matter, the State argues procedural default, 

contending that Jean-Paul did not “fairly present” to the 

state courts the argument he now pursues—that his waiver 

was not knowing and intelligent. See Lewis v. Sternes, 

390 F.3d 1019, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2004); Perruquet v. Briley, 

390 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2004). We disagree. Jean-Paul’s 

state habeas petition stated several times that a waiver of his

right to counsel must be made “knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily.” True, he emphasized that he was not “competent to proceed pro se.” But he also argued that he misun-

 1 We recruited pro bono counsel to assist Jean-Paul on appeal and thank 

E. King Poor and Matthew T. Ingersoll of Quarles & Brady LLC for 

accepting the appointment and ably discharging their duties.

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No. 14-3088 7

derstood the waiver form and thought it was required for 

his attorney to file a no-merit report. Jean-Paul thus “framed 

the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific 

constitutional right.” See Perruquet, 390 F.3d at 519–20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The State also maintains that Jean-Paul forfeited this 

claim by failing to raise it in the district court. Again, the 

State is incorrect. Jean-Paul’s § 2254 petition specifically 

alleges that he “didn’t have the required information ... to 

warn a defendant of the risk of counsel withdraw or a 

defendant disadvantage proceeding pro se [sic].” This 

language recalls the warnings a defendant must receive 

before waiving his right to trial counsel, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), and the district court appropriately treated the petition as questioning whether Jean-Paul’s 

waiver of appellate counsel was “knowing and voluntary.”

Turning to the merits of the claim, Jean-Paul faces a stiff 

burden. He must show that the state appellate court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or 

(2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Carter v. Douma, 796 F.3d 726, 

733 (7th Cir. 2015). The state court’s ruling must be “so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Carter, 796 F.3d at 733 

(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).

The state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable application of clearly established law. The Supreme 

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Court has held that waiver of the right to counsel must be 

knowing and intelligent, and has also explained that such a 

determination is case specific. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 

88 (2004); Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401–02; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; 

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). But as this court 

recognized in Speights v. Frank, 361 F.3d 962, 964–65 (7th Cir. 

2004), the Court has also held that the inquiry into the 

validity of a waiver depends on the stage of the proceedings 

at which the waiver occurs. See Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 

1446, 1450 (2013) (explaining that a circuit court may “look 

to circuit precedent to ascertain whether it has already held 

that the particular point in issue is clearly established by 

Supreme Court precedent”). A waiver of counsel before trial 

may require a “give-and-take between the accused and 

someone trying to educate him about counsel’s benefits.” 

Speights, 361 F.3d at 964–65 (citing Tovar, 541 U.S. at 90). But 

a waiver of counsel on appeal need not be accompanied by 

this kind of colloquy because “the major complexities, 

choices, and risks are past.” Id. at 965. Instead, “straightforward assent” is enough to waive the right to counsel on 

appeal. Id.

Applying this standard, the state appellate court reasonably concluded that Jean-Paul validly waived his right to 

counsel on appeal. After he told his lawyer that he wanted to 

proceed pro se, his lawyer gave him a waiver form that 

notified him of the perils of doing so, see Halbert, 545 U.S. at 

621, and he later signed it. 

Jean-Paul raises two arguments in response. First, he contends that the form he signed is insufficient as a matter of 

law. Although it listed the risks of proceeding pro se, it did 

not explain that if his lawyer filed a no-merit report, the 

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No. 14-3088 9

appellate court must assess it before deciding whether to 

release counsel. Jean-Paul relies on Betts v. Litscher, 241 F.3d 

594, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2001), where this court found that a 

letter from counsel to the appellate court stating only that 

the defendant had “declined an opportunity to have a nomerit report filed by [his attorney] and elected to proceed 

pro se with an appeal” was “scant evidence” of waiver. The 

defendant in that case did not sign counsel’s letter, however, 

and no evidence showed that he understood that if his 

counsel filed a no-merit report, the state court had to assess 

that report before permitting his attorney to withdraw. Id. at 

596. 

Here, in contrast, not only did Jean-Paul sign the waiver

form, the record supports a finding that he understood that 

the state appellate court would evaluate any no-merit report. 

In the signed waiver form, Jean-Paul states that he had

“discussed with my attorney my right to a no-merit report.” 

And in his correspondence with Donnelly, Jean-Paul asked 

for all court papers so he could “fully and thoroughly respond to the No Merit report.” This evidence shows that 

Jean-Paul understood that the appellate court would decide 

whether to accept Donnelly’s no-merit report. This case is 

thus distinguishable from Betts.

Jean-Paul also argues that the state appellate court made 

an “unreasonable determination of the facts” in finding that 

his waiver of appellate counsel was knowing and voluntary. 

He admits that a signed waiver form ordinarily can establish 

that a defendant has validly waived his right to counsel on 

appeal. But he argues that his signed waiver is vitiated by 

other evidence—namely, his correspondence with counsel, 

which shows “confusion” about deadlines and “vacillation” 

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about whether to proceed pro se, and the affidavits asserting 

his inability to read or write. He argues that the state appellate court unreasonably evaluated this evidence when 

deciding that his signed assent established that his waiver

was knowing and voluntary. 

A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable only if it 

“ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence.” 

Taylor v. Grounds, 721 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the evidence 

reasonably supports the state appellate court’s factual 

findings. First, the “vacillation” reflected in the letters shows 

only that Jean-Paul reconsidered whether to proceed pro se. 

Jean-Paul points to no case suggesting that when a defendant is initially uncertain about waiving appellate counsel, a 

later-signed waiver is presumptively suspect. 

Second, the confusion about deadlines is irrelevant. It 

may suggest uncertainty about when he needed to sign a 

waiver, but not whether to do so. Finally, the state appellate 

court reasonably discounted the evidence that Jean-Paul 

cannot read or write. His inability to read (assuming that’s 

true) does not necessarily imply an inability to understand 

what is read to him, and Jean-Paul hasn’t claimed that the 

waiver wasn’t read to him or that he did not understand it.

He argues that he thought it had something vaguely to do 

with the no-merit report, but his affidavit doesn’t say that. 

Although the affidavits could support a finding that he was 

confused about the waiver, the weight of the evidence is not 

clearly and convincingly in his favor. Accordingly, the state 

appellate court’s factual finding that Jean-Paul validly 

waived counsel survives habeas review. See Brumfield v. 

Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (explaining that “state-court 

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No. 14-3088 11

factual determinations” are not “unreasonable merely 

because we would have reached a different conclusion in the 

first instance” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and 

citation omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

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