Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_19-cv-00096/USCOURTS-akd-3_19-cv-00096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Allen Rogers
Plaintiff
The Estate of Joe C. Ashlock
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

DAVID ALLEN ROGERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE ESTATE OF JOE C. 

ASHLOCK, 

Defendant.

Case No. 3:19-cv-00096-SLG

ORDER RE MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court at Docket 18 is Defendant The Estate of Joe C. Ashlock’s

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed on March 5, 2020.1 Plaintiff David 

Allen Rogers did not file a response within the 21-day deadline imposed by Local 

Civil Rule 7.2(b)(1). The Court therefore considers Defendant’s motion ripe as of 

March 26, 2020.

2

 Oral argument was not requested and was not necessary to the 

Court’s decision.3

1 Defendant’s memorandum in support is at Docket 19.

2 Unlike a non-dispositive motion, Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is not subject 

to a summary ruling due to Plaintiff’s failure to respond. See Loc. R. Civ. P. 7.1(h).

3 Due to the coronavirus pandemic, by Miscellaneous General Order 20-11, the District of Alaska 

imposed a stay on all civil matters for 30 days, effective March 30, 2020. The District of Alaska 

recently extended that stay until June 1, 2020. See Miscellaneous General Order 20-13. The 

undersigned judge, presiding in this matter, hereby lifts the stay in this case. See Miscellaneous 

General Order 20-13 at 5–6. However, the parties may by stipulation or motion seek extensions 

of time.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a Seaman’s Complaint for Unseaworthiness, Negligence, 

Maintenance and Cure, Punitive Damages, With Jury Trial Demanded

(“Complaint”) to initiate this action on April 5, 2019.4 In it, Plaintiff alleges that he 

was injured in June 2015 while “acting within the course and scope of his 

employment” as a seaman aboard the vessel P/V DUTCH HARBOR, owned by 

Defendant.

5 Plaintiff asserts that a “refrigerator/freezer” fell on him while he was 

bringing it on board, whereupon “he immediately felt a ‘ripping sensation’ to this 

left his [sic] groin area and believes he received a hernia.”6 According to the 

Complaint, Plaintiff “requested financial assistance to obtain medical attention from 

his employer” but was refused.7 Plaintiff alleges that as he continued with his 

duties aboard the DUTCH HARBOR, “his hernia injury would have ‘flair-ups,’” and 

that management for Defendant eventually “promised to pay for [Plaintiff’s] medical 

4 Docket 1.

5 Docket 1 at 1–2, ¶¶ 1–5. Defendant disputes that Plaintiff was a seaman under the Jones Act, 

46 U.S.C. § 30104, but states that “that question is not addressed in [the motion for partial 

summary judgment].” Docket 19 at 1–2; see also Docket 14 at 1, 3, 4, ¶¶ 1, 8, 22 (Answer denying 

that Plaintiff was a seaman under the Jones Act).

6 Docket 1 at 2, ¶¶ 6–7.

7 Docket 1 at 2–3, ¶ 9.

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needs so long as he kept working.”8 However, Plaintiff asserts that “they never 

paid for any medical treatment and maintenance.”9

Plaintiff alleges that he “further reinjur[ed] his hernia” on January 6, 2018, 

when he fell on the deck of the DUTCH HARBOR “while trying to install a safety 

raft.”10 According to the Complaint, Plaintiff “had to refrain from work aboard the 

vessel” as a result of his injuries, “thereby limiting his income to the point of 

becoming destitute and selling what few hard assets he owned to survive at a 

poverty level.”11 Plaintiff alleges that he “sought medical help” on February 2, 

2018, “because his hernia was diagnosed and . . . had developed to the size of a 

softball,” and that “he subsequently had surgery,” after which he “suffered severe 

infections as a result of the hernia.”12 The Complaint states that “[n]otwithstanding 

the severity of [Plaintiff’s] injuries, the Defendant failed and refused to provide 

insurance for his acute medical needs and refused to provide maintenance and 

cure when they had a duty to do so thereby causing pain, suffering and damage 

to [Plaintiff].”13

8 Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 10.

9 Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 10.

10 Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 11.

11 Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 12.

12 Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 13.

13 Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 14.

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Plaintiff pleads three claims against Defendant in the Complaint: (1) Jones 

Act Negligence,14 alleging that Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligence of 

Defendant, “its personal representative(s), its agents, ship’s master, servants, 

officers and/or employees,” who breached several duties, including “[t]he duty to 

provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work”;15 (2) 

unseaworthiness, alleging that “[t]he injuries and damages which were sustained 

by Plaintiff . . . were also caused by the DUTCH HARBOR’s unseaworthy 

condition”;16 and (3) failure to provide maintenance and cure, alleging that “Plaintiff 

is entitled to maintenance and cure until such time as he achieves maximum 

medical cure.”17 Plaintiff seeks damages “in an amount according to proof at trial” 

to compensate for his emotional distress, injuries, medical care, and lost wages 

and earning capacity.18 Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages under both the 

Jones Act and general maritime law.19

14 See 46 U.S.C. § 30104.

15 Docket 1 at 4–5, ¶¶ 15–17

16 Docket 1 at 5, ¶¶ 18–20.

17 Docket 1 at 6, ¶¶ 21–25.

18 Docket 1 at 6–7, ¶¶ 26–27.

19 Docket 1 at 6–7, ¶¶ 25, 28–29.

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Defendant filed its Answer on July 3, 2019, in which it denied the majority of 

the allegations in the Complaint.20 Defendant filed the instant motion for partial 

summary judgment on March 5, 2020.21

JURISDICTION

Plaintiff’s claims arise under the Jones Act and general maritime law and 

are thus within the Court’s federal question jurisdiction.22

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to grant summary 

judgment if the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”23 When considering 

a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”24 To reach the 

level of a genuine dispute, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”25 If the evidence provided by the 

20 See generally Docket 14.

21 Docket 18.

22 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to 

all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .”).

23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

24 Moldex-Metric, Inc. v. McKeon Prods., Inc., 891 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2018) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

25 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

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nonmoving party is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” summary 

judgment is appropriate.26 

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial burden of 

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial.”27 However, “[w]hen 

the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only 

point out ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 

case.’”

28 Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party 

“may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading,”

but must provide evidence that “set[s] forth specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.”

29 In determining whether to grant or deny summary 

judgment, a court need not “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable 

fact.”30 A court is entitled to “rely on the nonmoving party to identify with 

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.”31

26 Id. at 249–50.

27 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001).

28 Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). 

29 Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (amended 2010)). Rule 56 has been amended several times 

since Devereaux was decided, but these amendments have not changed the standard for granting 

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s notes to 2007 and 2010 

amendments.

30 Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v. Combined Ins. Co., 55 

F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)). 

31 Id. (quoting Richards, 55 F.3d at 251). 

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DISCUSSION

Defendant makes two arguments in its motion for partial summary judgment. 

It first contends that all of Plaintiff’s claims arising from the 2015 incident on the 

P/V DUTCH HARBOR are time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for 

maritime tort claims.

32

 Second, defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims for punitive 

damages “are not allowed under the Jones Act or general maritime law.”33 The 

Court will address these arguments in turn.

I. Statute of Limitations

Defendant contends that “Plaintiff’s claims for injury in June 2015 must be 

dismissed pursuant to the Statute of Limitations.”34 46 U.S.C. § 30106 provides 

that “a civil action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of a maritime 

tort must be brought within 3 years after the cause of action arose.”35 Defendant 

contends that the statute of limitations for any claims related to Plaintiff’s June 

32 Docket 19 at 3–7.

33 Docket 19 at 7.

34 Docket 19 at 3.

35 This provision was previously codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a, where it contained slightly 

different language. See Pub. L. No. 96-382, § 1, 94 Stat. 1525 (1980) (“Unless otherwise 

specified by law, a suit for recovery of damages for personal injury or death, or both, arising out 

of a maritime tort, shall not be maintained unless commenced within three years from the date of 

the cause of action accrued.”). Congress reorganized Title 46 of the U.S. Code in 2006, stating: 

“In the codification of laws by this Act, the intent is to conform to the understood policy, intent, and 

purpose of the Congress in the original enactments . . . .” See Pub. L. No. 109-304, 120 Stat. 

1511 (2006). The Court therefore considers the body of case law interpreting § 763a as applicable 

to § 30106.

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2015 injury had run in June 2018, “long before he filed his Complaint in [April] 

2019.”36 

As a threshold issue, the Court must determine whether the claims at issue 

are subject to 46 U.S.C. § 30106. Defendant “seeks an Order dismissing any and 

all claims related to [P]laintiff’s alleged June 2015 injury based on the passage of 

the statute of limitations.”37 Plaintiff does not bring separate claims premised on 

the 2015 and 2018 incidents. Instead, the Complaint characterizes the two events 

as a cycle of injury and reinjury, and Plaintiff’s claims for Jones Act negligence, 

unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure each appear to relate equally to both 

events.38

The Ninth Circuit has applied the three-year statute of limitations for 

maritime torts to unseaworthiness claims, which arise under general maritime law, 

in addition to claims brought directly under the Jones Act.

39

 However, courts are 

divided as to whether this statute of limitations, rather than the doctrine of laches,

36 Docket 19 at 3–4.

37 Docket 18 at 1.

38 See Docket 1 at 2–6, ¶¶ 4–25 (alleging facts and claims).

39 See Huseman v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 471 F.3d 1116, 1120–24 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 

plaintiff’s unseaworthiness claim was barred by three-year statute of limitations because doctrines 

of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel did not apply); see also Usher v. M/V Ocean Wave, 27 

F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a applies to “all suits on maritime 

torts,” including in rem personal injury proceedings).

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applies to claims for maintenance and cure.40 Although the Ninth Circuit has not 

directly addressed the issue, it stated in Huseman v. Icicle Seafoods that “[l]aches 

is an equitable affirmative defense available for actions that do not have a specific 

applicable statute of limitations such as [appellant’s] maintenance and cure 

claim.”41 Though dicta, the Court considers this statement instructive; moreover, 

it is consistent with the reasoning of other courts, which have held that 

maintenance and cure claims are quasi-contractual and not governed by 46 U.S.C. 

§ 30106, which expressly applies to claims for personal injury and death.

42

 In light 

40 See Ferris v. Veco Inc., 896 F. Supp. 966 n.1 (D. Alaska 1995) (“There is a split of authority on 

whether 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a covers maintenance and cure claims or whether the equitable 

doctrine of laches applies.”); see also Rowe v. Hornblower Fleet, No. C-11-4979 JCS, 2012 WL 

5833541, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012) (collecting cases).

41 Huseman, 471 F.3d at 1125. In that case, the district court had “recognized that there is a 

dispute as to whether laches or the statute of limitations determined the timeliness of the 

[maintenance and cure] claim” and applied a laches analysis without deciding the issue. Id. at 

1119–20.

42 See, e.g., Reed v. American S.S. Co., 682 F. Supp. 333, 336–38 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (“The plain 

language of [46 U.S.C. app.] § 763a states that a three year limitation period applies to suits for 

the recovery of damages for personal injury or death. Claims for personal injury or death damages 

are clearly distinct from claims for maintenance and cure.”); Lightfoot v. F/V ARCTIC STORM, No. 

C93-1125WD, 1994 WL 615113, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 2, 1994) (“An action in tort on this claim 

is barred by the statute of limitations . . . . An action in contract is not. Laches, not the tort statute 

of limitations, may be asserted against the claim for unpaid maintenance and cure.”); cf.

Cunningham v. Interlake S.S. Co., 567 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to decide the issue 

but noting that “a number of federal courts have applied the doctrine of laches in determining the 

timeliness of claims for maintenance and cure” and collecting cases); cf. also Huseman, 471 F.3d 

at 1128 n.1 (Reinhardt, J, dissenting) (“Because maintenance and cure is an equitable remedy, 

the doctrine of laches governs, rather than a statute of limitations.”). But see McKinney v. 

Waterman S.S. Corp., 739 F. Supp. 678, 680–82 (D. Mass. 1990) (disagreeing with Reed and 

holding that maintenance and cure claim was subject to three-year statute of limitations). The 

district court in Reed explained that “[c]laims for maintenance and cure . . . do not fall within the 

traditional categories of either contracts or torts”; it quoted a “leading treatise on admiralty law” as 

saying that “[m]aintenance and cure is contractual in nature and a continuing obligation[, but] the 

failure to furnish cure is a personal injury which gives rise to a tort remedy and therefore is subject 

to the three year limitation period.” 682 F. Supp. at 336–37 (quoting Norris, The Law of Seamen, 

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of this, the Court concludes that 46 U.S.C. § 30106’s three-year statute of 

limitations does not apply to Plaintiff’s claim for maintenance and cure and denies

Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on that claim.43

The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s claims for Jones Act negligence and 

unseaworthiness, which are subject to the statute of limitations imposed by 46 

U.S.C. § 30106. A cause of action arises for the purposes of that statute “when 

the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury and its cause.”44 Defendant 

maintains that there is no material dispute as to whether Plaintiff was aware of his 

injury in June 2015.

45 Defendant points to the Complaint, which states that Plaintiff 

“immediately felt a ‘ripping sensation’ to this left his [sic] groin area and believes 

§ 26:43 (1985)); see also The Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2279 (2019) 

(explaining that duty to provide maintenance and cure “arises from the contract of employment”

and “does not rest upon negligence or culpability on the part of the owner or master” (quoting 

Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938))).

43 Defendant does not raise a laches defense, and the Court does not decide whether the doctrine 

of laches would bar Plaintiff’s claim for maintenance and cure, to the extent it arises from the June 

2015 incident. The Court notes that Plaintiff anticipated a laches defense to that claim in the 

Complaint. Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 10.

44 White v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997)

(discussing 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a); see also Crisman v. Odeco, Inc., 932 F.2d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 

1991) (“A cause of action under the Jones Act and general maritime law accrues when a plaintiff 

has had a reasonable opportunity to discover his injury, its cause, and the link between the two.”). 

Further, a cause of action accrues under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) when the 

plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury, Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170–71 (1949), 

and the Supreme Court has held that the “Jones Act adopts the entire judicially developed doctrine 

of liability under [FELA].” Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455–56 (1994); accord 46 

U.S.C. § 30104 (“Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, 

a railway employee apply to an action under this section.”).

45 Docket 19 at 4–7.

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he received a hernia,”

46 and to three witness statements, all of which attest that 

Plaintiff complained and showed signs of injury immediately after the June 2015 

incident with the refrigerator/freezer.47 Defendant has therefore met its initial 

burden to show that there is no dispute that Plaintiff knew of his injury in June 2015, 

such that his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims arose on the date of the 

incident.

48

 Plaintiff has provided no evidence to show that a genuine issue remains 

for trial on this point.49 The Court therefore concludes that the three-year statute 

of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims for Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness, 

to the extent they relate to the 2015 incident, ran in June 2018, several months 

before he filed the Complaint in April 2019. The Court grants Defendant’s motion 

for partial summary judgment with respect to these two claims.

II. Punitive Damages

Defendant “further seeks an Order to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for punitive 

damages under general maritime law and/or under the Jones Act . . . as punitive 

46 Docket 1 at 2, ¶ 7.

47 Docket 19 at 4–7; Docket 18-1 (statements of Collin McCarty, Dominick Samuels, and Travis 

Ackerson). Plaintiff produced the statements of three co-workers who observed the 2015 incident 

in his initial disclosures, and Defendant attached these statements as exhibits to his motion for 

partial summary judgment. See Docket 19 at 4–5.

48 See Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001).

49 See id.

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damages are not available to plaintiff under either theory as a matter of law.”50 In 

the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages on each of his three claims.51 

Defendant addresses only the claims for Jones Act negligence and 

unseaworthiness in its memorandum in support of the instant motion, contending 

that punitive damages are not available for either under Supreme Court 

precedent.52 In The Dutra Group v. Batterton, the Supreme Court observed 

that “the Jones Act ‘limits recovery to pecuniary loss,’” and that “the Federal Courts 

of Appeals have uniformly held that punitive damages are not available under the 

Jones Act.”53 The Supreme Court then held that “a plaintiff may not recover 

punitive damages on a claim of unseaworthiness.”54 However, it had earlier held 

in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend “that punitive damages are not categorically 

barred as part of the award on the traditional maritime claim of maintenance and 

cure.”55 The Supreme Court did not disturb this decision in The Dutra Group, and 

50 Docket 18 at 1–2.

51 Docket 1 at 6–7, ¶¶ 25, 28–29.

52 Docket 19 at 7–8.

53 __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2285 (2019) (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 

(1990)).

54 Id. at 2287. 

55 Id. at 2278 (citing 557 U.S. 404, 407 (2009)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that 

“remedies for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure have different origins and 

may on occasion call for application of slightly different principles and procedures” Id. at 2283 

(alteration omitted) (quoting Atlantic Sounding, 557 U.S. at 423).

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instead cited it favorably.

56

 Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion 

with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness but 

deny it with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for maintenance and cure.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

at Docket 18 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

The Court grants summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s claims for 

Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness, to the extent those claims relate to 

the June 2015 incident aboard the P/V DUTCH HARBOR. The Court denies 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for maintenance and cure relating to that 

incident.

The Court grants summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s request for 

punitive damages on his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims. The Court denies 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages on his maintenance 

and cure claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of May, 2020 at Anchorage, Alaska.

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

56 See id. at 2283.

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