Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03736/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03736-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph D. Andrews
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3736

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of South Dakota.

Joseph D. Andrews, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 1, 2004

Filed: June 1, 2005

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

We rarely review a criminal sentence three times, but Joseph D. Andrews gets

such review today. For a complete recitation of the relevant facts surrounding the

conviction and sentencing of Andrews and his co-defendants, see United States v.

Bradford, 246 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Andrews, 339 F.3d 754

(8th Cir. 2003). Today we review Andrews' sentence in light of United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), which made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, and

United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), which elucidated the

proper plain error analysis. Based on these cases, we vacate Andrews' sentence once

again and remand for resentencing.

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Section 5G1.2(d) states: 

If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory

maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed

on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to

the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total

punishment. In all other respects, sentences on all counts shall run

concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law. 

-2-

In 1999, the district court imposed a sentence of 396 months' imprisonment for

Andrews. Because Apprendi, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), was

handed down during the pendency of Andrews' first appeal, we affirmed Andrews'

conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for reconsideration in light of

Apprendi. Bradford, 246 F.3d at 1115. 

At Andrews' second sentencing in 2001, the district court imposed a 276-month

sentence, applying section 5G1.2(d) of the Guidelines and our corresponding

guidance in Bradford, 246 F.3d at 1114-15.1

 Both parties appealed from that 2001

sentence challenging the application of the Sentencing Guidelines, and Andrews

additionally challenged the Guidelines' constitutionality. While the second appeal

was pending, we overruled Bradford to the extent that Bradford held that section

5G1.2(d) provides sentencing discretion. United States v. Diaz, 296 F.3d 680 (8th

Cir. 2002) (en banc). Thus, we vacated Andrews' sentence a second time and

remanded for sentencing in order for the district court to reinstate Andrews' original

396-month sentence. Andrews, 339 F.3d at 759. 

At Andrews' third sentencing in 2003, the district court heard evidence

regarding Andrews' post-conviction rehabilitative efforts but ultimately ruled that it

was prohibited from considering such efforts under this court's decision and mandate.

Thus, the 2003 sentencing was in essence a "reinstatement" of Andrews' initial

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sentence. Andrews appeals, arguing that the district court erred in not exercising its

discretion at the 2003 sentencing. 

As luck may have it, and true to form given the history of this case, the

apparently ever-changing landscape of criminal sentencing affects our analysis today.

Under Pirani, we must determine whether Andrews preserved Booker error for our

review. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 549. We review this case for harmless error because

Andrews raised Apprendi and questioned the constitutionality of the Guidelines

before the district court after his first appeal, which was the first time Apprendi was

an issue before the district court. Id. at 550. Thus, the government bears the burden

of proving that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). This burden is only met where it is clear

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the sentence. United States

v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2005).

Here, the district court initially sentenced Andrews under a mandatory

guidelines system based upon a drug quantity that was not charged in the indictment

nor presented to the jury. That finding violated Andrews' Sixth Amendment rights.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. We must disregard this error, though, if the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a), Haidley, 400 F.3d at

644-45. The government has not proven that the error did not affect the outcome of

the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. 

Under Booker jurisprudence, the district court has greater discretion than it did

in 1999, 2001, and 2003 when it sentenced Andrews and it will now be able to apply

that discretion when it sentences Andrews a fourth time. We do not suggest,

however, that a lesser sentence is required in this case. "[W]hile not bound to apply

the Guidelines, [the district court] must consult those Guidelines and take them into

account when sentencing." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767. 

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Accordingly, we vacate and remand yet again for the district court to

resentence Andrews.

______________________________

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