Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01491/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01491-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dow Chemical Company
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 24, 2001 Decided July 24, 2001

No. 99-1457

Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition, et al.,

Petitioners

v.

Environmental Protection Agency and

Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator,

Respondents

Dow Chemical Company, et al.,

Intervenors

Consolidated with

99-1477, 99-1480, 99-1483, 99-1485, 99-1486,

99-1490, 99-1491, 99-1492, 99-1493, 99-1494,

99-1495, 99-1496, 99-1497, 99-1498

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

---------

James S. Pew argued the cause for petitioner Sierra Club.

With him on the briefs was Howard I. Fox.

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Jeremiah J. Jewett, III, David P. Novello, Ronald A.

Shipley, and Scott H. Segal argued the cause for Industry

Petitioners. With them on the briefs were Richard G. Stoll,

Michael W. Steinberg, Terry J. Satterlee, Alok Ahuja, Karl S.

Bourdeau, David M. Friedland, Aaron H. Goldberg, Lisa M.

Jaeger, David R. Case, Thomas G. Echikson, James N.

Cahan, William M. Bumpers, David A. Smart, and Douglas

H. Green.

David R. Case argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner Environmental Technology Council.

Richard G. Stoll, David P. Novello, Michael W. Steinberg,

Ronald A. Shipley, Karl S. Bourdeau, David M. Friedland,

Aaron H. Goldberg, Scott H. Segal, Lisa M. Jaeger, David R.

Case, William M. Bumpers, and Jeremiah J. Jewett, III were

on the brief for industry intervenors. Joshua D. Sarnoff

entered an appearance.

Lois Godfrey Wye and Norman L. Rave, Jr., Attorneys,

U.S. Department of Justice, and Steven E. Silverman, Attorney, Environmental Protection Agency, argued the cause for

respondents. With them on the brief was Lois J. Schiffer,

Assistant Attorney General at the time the brief was filed,

U.S. Department of Justice. Christopher S. Vaden, Attorney,

U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

James S. Pew and Howard I. Fox were on the brief for

intervenor Sierra Club.

David R. Case was on the brief for intervenor Environmental Technology Council.

Before: Randolph, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.*

Per Curiam: In this case, industry and environmental

petitioners challenge EPA air pollution standards for hazard-

__________

* Judge Tatel wrote Parts I, II, III, IV, and VII; Judge Randolph wrote Parts V and VI.

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ous waste combustors. Because the standards fail to reflect

the emissions achieved in practice by the best-performing

sources as required by the Clean Air Act, we remand to the

Agency for further proceedings. In all other respects, we

deny the petitions for review.

I

Until 1990, the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. ss 7401-

7671q, required the Environmental Protection Agency to set

risk-based air pollution standards that would provide an

"ample margin of safety to protect the public health." Id.

s 7412(b)(1)(B) (1990); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, at

151, 322 (1990). To address problems with the implementation of risk-based regulation, Congress amended the Act in

1990 to require EPA to set the most stringent standards

achievable, 42 U.S.C. s 7412(d)(2), that is, standards "based

on the maximum reduction in emissions which can be

achieved by application of [the] best available control technology." S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 133 (1989).

The 1990 amendments included the provision at issue in

this case--42 U.S.C. s 7412(d)--which directs EPA to set

standards limiting emissions of listed hazardous air pollutants

("HAPs"), id. ss 7412(b), (c)(1)-(2), from major stationary

sources. Section 7412(d)(2) provides that:

Emission standards ... shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air

pollutants subject to this section ... that the Administrator, taking into consideration the cost of achieving such

emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and

environmental impacts and energy requirements, determines is achievable for new or existing sources....

Supplementing this general guidance, Congress imposed minimum stringency requirements--EPA calls them "emission

floors"--which "apply without regard to either costs or the

other factors and methods listed in section 7412(d)(2)." Nat'l

Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

("National Lime II"). For "new sources"--factories or other

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sources on which construction begins after EPA publishes

emission standards, 42 U.S.C. s 7411(a)(2)--"[t]he maximum

degree of reduction in emissions that is deemed achievable

... shall not be less stringent than the emission control that

is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar

source...." Id. s 7412(d)(3). For existing sources, what

EPA deems achievable "shall not be less stringent than[ ] the

average emission limitation achieved by the best performing

12 percent of the existing sources (for which the Administrator has emissions information)...." Id. As we explained in

National Lime II, EPA implements these requirements

through a two-step process: the Agency first sets emission

floors for each pollutant and source category and then determines whether stricter standards, known as "beyond-thefloor" limits, are achievable in light of the factors listed in

section 7412(d)(2). 233 F.3d at 629.

Hazardous waste combustors ("HWCs"), the focus of this

case, are also subject to regulation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. ss 6901-

6992k, which "establishes a comprehensive 'cradle to grave'

regulatory program for the treatment, storage, and disposal

of hazardous waste." Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. Browner,

16 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A pre-1990 risk-based

statute, RCRA directs EPA to set standards for hazardous

waste-burning facilities that "protect human health and the

environment." 42 U.S.C. s 6924(q)(1). Both Congress and

EPA have acknowledged the overlap between RCRA and the

CAA. Indeed, the CAA itself directs the Administrator to

"take into account any regulations of such emissions which

are promulgated under [RCRA] and ... to the maximum

extent practicable ... ensure that the requirements of

[RCRA] and [section 7412] are consistent." Id. s 7412(n)(7).

Hazardous waste combustors must have RCRA permits for

stack air emissions until they can demonstrate compliance

with CAA standards through required tests; once a source

complies with the CAA, it no longer needs a separate RCRA

permit. Final Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for

Hazardous Waste Combustors, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,828, 52,833

(Sept. 30, 1999).

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In 1999, acting pursuant to CAA section 7412(d) and following notice and comment, EPA issued standards limiting emissions from three types of HWCs: incinerators that destroy

hazardous waste; cement kilns that use hazardous waste as

fuel in the cement-manufacturing process; and lightweight

aggregate kilns that use hazardous waste as fuel to produce

lightweight aggregate concrete, a building material used for

structural purposes and thermal insulation. These HWCs

burn approximately 80% of the hazardous waste combusted

each year in the United States, id. at 52,832, emitting more

than 11,000 metric tons of HAPs.

For each type of HWC, i.e., each "source category," EPA

set standards for the following HAPs: dioxins; mercury; the

semi-volatile metals lead and cadmium; the low-volatility

metals chromium, arsenic, and beryllium; particulate matter;

chlorine; carbon monoxide; and hydrocarbons. All of these

HAPs can have serious health effects. Dioxin, mercury, and

semi-volatile metal emissions are of particular concern; exposure can cause effects such as cancer, neurological and organ

damage, and impaired child development. See id. at 53,002-

03.

To set these standards, EPA, acting pursuant to section

7412(d)(3), began by setting emission floors for new and

existing sources--EPA calls them "MACT (maximum achievable control technology) floors." After assembling a database

of sources and their emission levels recorded primarily during

RCRA compliance tests, the Agency went through the following steps for each HAP in each source category. For existing

sources, EPA identified the best-performing 12 percent of

sources, creating what it calls the "MACT pool." EPA then

identified the primary emission control technology used by

sources in the MACT pool with emission levels equivalent to

or lower than the pool's median. It labeled that technology

the "MACT control." For some HAPs, EPA chose end-ofstack pollution control technology as the MACT control; for

other HAPs, the Agency chose the technique of "feedrate"--

the rate at which source operators feed hazardous waste into

combustors. EPA next expanded the MACT pool to include

all sources using the MACT control (provided the control was

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well-designed and properly operated) and set the MACT floor

at the worst emission level achieved by any source in that

expanded pool. For new sources, EPA used the same methodology but chose as the MACT control the technology used

by the best-performing source for which it had information.

After setting forty-nine floors, EPA considered, as required

by section 7412(d)(2), whether stricter limits--"beyond-thefloor" standards--would be achievable. Taking into account

cost, energy requirements, and certain non-air quality health

and environmental impacts, EPA ultimately set five beyondthe-floor standards.

Environmental and industry petitioners now challenge the

HWC emission standards. The Sierra Club argues that:

(1) the MACT approach results in emission standards that

violate section 7412(d)(3) because they fail to reflect the

emissions achieved in practice by the best-performing

sources; (2) the Agency violated the Act by basing standards

on RCRA test data, which are generated under worst-case

conditions; and (3) in making beyond-the-floor determinations, the Agency failed to consider certain "non-air quality

health and environmental impacts" as required by section

7412(d)(2) and arbitrarily and capriciously refused to consider

tougher standards based on additional controls for some

HAPs. Industry petitioners contend that EPA violated section 7412(d)(3)(A) by basing existing-source floors on actual

emissions data rather than on existing regulatory requirements, such as RCRA permit limits. Industry petitioners

also challenge as arbitrary and capricious many individual

emission standards, as well as several monitoring and implementation regulations. One industry petitioner, Continental

Cement, argues that EPA violated the Regulatory Flexibility

Act, 5 U.S.C. ss 601-612. Another petitioner, the Environmental Technology Council, challenges EPA's adoption of

procedures that permit sources to petition the Agency for

alternative requirements if they cannot meet MACT standards due to raw material contributions to emissions. See 40

C.F.R. ss 63.1206(b)(9) & (10).

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II

We begin with industry petitioners' argument that EPA

violated CAA section 7412(d)(3)(A) by basing existing-source

standards on emissions data rather than RCRA or other

permit limits. Section 7412(d)(3)(A) provides that "[e]mission

standards promulgated ... for existing sources ... shall not

be less stringent ... than[ ] the average emission limitation

achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the existing

sources (for which the Administrator has emissions information)...." 42 U.S.C. s 7412(d)(3)(A). Focusing on the

phrase "emission limitation," petitioners point out that CAA

section 7602(k) defines that term as "a requirement established by the State or the Administrator which limits the

quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air pollutants...." Id. s 7602(k). According to petitioners, section

7412(d)(3)(A) must therefore be read as follows: "[e]mission

standards promulgated ... for existing sources ... shall not

be less stringent ... than the average state or federal requirement limiting emissions of a pollutant achieved in

practice by the best performing 12 percent of the existing

sources." Indus. Petitioners' Opening Br. at 8.

Although EPA disputes this reading of the statute--it

contends that CAA section 7412(d)(3)(A)'s use of the word

"achieved" indicates that standards must be based on actual

emissions data--the Agency argues that we may not even

consider petitioners' argument because they failed to present

it to the Agency during the rulemaking. See 42 U.S.C.

s 7607(d)(7)(B) ("Only an objection to a rule or procedure

which was raised with reasonable specificity during the period

for public comment ... may be raised during judicial review."). Having reviewed each page of the record petitioners

cite to demonstrate that they presented their interpretation

of section 7412(d)(3)(A) during the rulemaking, we agree with

EPA. The first cited comment argued only that the Agency

should set the standard for particulate matter emissions from

lightweight aggregate kilns at the same level as existing New

Source Performance Standards ("NSPS"), to which EPA responded that "[w]e rejected the NSPS as the basis for the

floor emission level because our MACT analysis of data from

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existing sources indicates that a particulate matter floor level

lower than the NSPS is currently being achieved in practice...." Final Response to Comments to the Proposed

HWC MACT Standards, Vol. I: Standards ("1 Final Response to Comments"): LWAK Standards, at 13-14 (July

1999). The second cited comment stated only that "[t]he

MACT floor should be set based on projections of Tier I

allowable mercury feedrate limits," to which EPA responded,

"[w]e agree that BIF Tier I feedrate limits could be considered as a floor control option. We conclude, however, that

those allowable feedrate limits are much higher than actual

feedrate levels ... and thus do not represent MACT." Id.

Cement Kilns Mercury, at 7. As the Agency points out, these

comments "merely argued that EPA could permissibly consider RCRA permit limitations in establishing floors," Respondent's Br. at 51, not (as petitioners now argue) that

section 7412(d)(3)(A) requires existing-source floors to be

based on permit limits. And the final page petitioners cite

says nothing at all about existing regulatory limits. See Final

Technical Support Document for HWC MACT Standards,

Vol. III: Selection of MACT Standards and Technologies, at

2-2 (July 1999) ("3 Final TSD").

In considering the extent to which a statutory interpretation must have been presented to an agency before a petitioner can raise it here, we have said that:

[w]hile there are surely limits on the level of congruity

required between a party's arguments before an administrative agency and the court, respect for agencies' proper

role in the Chevron framework requires that the court be

particularly careful to ensure that challenges to an agency's interpretation of its governing statute are first

raised in the administrative forum.

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1074

(D.C. Cir. 1994). Though we have recognized that "precisely

the same argument that was made before the agency [need

not] be rehearsed again, word for word, on judicial review,"

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 818 (D.C. Cir.

1998), petitioners point us to nothing in the record even

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hinting that the phrase "emission limitation" must be defined

by reference to section 7602(k). EPA (as opposed to its

appellate counsel) has not had "the first opportunity to bring

its expertise to bear on the resolution" of this question. Id.

III

The Sierra Club also challenges EPA's interpretation of

CAA section 7412(d)(3), but on different grounds. The Sierra

Club argues that section 7412(d)(3) requires floors to reflect

emissions actually "achieved" by the best-performing sources,

and that EPA violated the statute by setting floors the

Agency considered achievable by all sources using MACT

technology. See, e.g., 1 Final Response to Comments: MACT

Floor Approaches, at 54-55 ("[W]e do not agree that the

proper interpretation of the CAA would require that the

MACT standards be based solely on an analysis of the

emissions levels being achieved by the best performing 12%

of sources.... MACT standard[s] must be achievable by all

sources judged to be using MACT or MACT equivalent

technology."). According to the Sierra Club, the contrast

between the language of section 7412(d)(2), which requires

the maximum degree of reduction "achievable," and section

7412(d)(3), which establishes that what EPA deems achievable

"shall not be less stringent" than what certain sources actually "achieve[ ]," demonstrates that "Congress was well aware

of the difference between what EPA believes to be 'achievable' through the use of a particular technology and what the

relevant sources actually 'achieved.' " Sierra Club's Opening

Br. at 20. "EPA's insistence that [section 7412] floors must

reflect what the agency determines to be achievable through

the use of a particular technology," the Sierra Club concludes,

"boils down to an attempt to nullify the objective limits that

Congress deliberately placed on EPA's standard setting discretion by enacting [section 7412]'s mandatory floor provisions in the 1990 Amendments." Id. at 21-22.

Defending its achievability rationale, EPA argues that section 7412(d)(3)'s floor provision "is a gloss" on section

7412(d)(2), which establishes the achievability requirement.

Respondent's Br. at 23. According to the Agency, section

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7412(d)(3) incorporates section 7412(d)(2)'s achievability standard. For this reason, EPA explains, it designed the MACT

approach to produce achievable standards.

We agree with the Sierra Club. Though section 7412(d)(2)

does direct EPA to require the "maximum emission reduction" that it determines to be achievable, section 7412(d)(3)

provides that "the maximum degree of reduction in emissions

that is deemed achievable ... shall not be less stringent

than" what the best-performing sources "achieve[ ]." Section

7412(d)(3) therefore limits the scope of the word "achievable"

in section 7412(d)(2). While standards achievable by all

sources using the MACT control might also ultimately reflect

what the statutorily relevant sources achieve in practice, EPA

may not deviate from section 7412(d)(3)'s requirement that

floors reflect what the best performers actually achieve by

claiming that floors must be achievable by all sources using

MACT technology. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that if

Congress has spoken directly to the disputed issue of statutory construction, "that is the end of the matter; for the court,

as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress").

This interpretation is required by our decisions in Sierra

Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and National

Lime II, 233 F.3d 625. In Sierra Club, we held that CAA

section 7429(a)(2), which (in language virtually identical to the

terms of section 7412(d)(3)) directs EPA to set emission floors

for medical waste incinerators, requires EPA "to make a

reasonable estimate of the performance of the top 12 percent

of units." 167 F.3d at 662 (interpreting 42 U.S.C.

s 7429(a)(2), which requires that "[t]he degree of reduction in

emissions that is deemed achievable for new units in a

category shall not be less stringent than the emissions control

that is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar

unit," and that "[e]missions standards for existing units in a

category ... shall not be less stringent than the average

emissions limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of units in the category"). While acknowledging that

EPA has authority to devise the means of deriving this

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estimate, we made clear that the method the Agency selects

must "allow[ ] a reasonable inference as to the performance of

the top 12 percent of units." Id. at 663. We emphasized that

EPA must show not only that it believes its methodology

provides an accurate picture of the relevant sources' actual

performance, but also why its methodology yields the required estimate. Id. In evaluating EPA's new-source floors

in particular, which the Agency based on emission levels

achieved by the worst-performing sources using a given control technology, we concluded that EPA had not explained

"why the phrase 'best controlled similar unit' encompasses all

units using the same technology as the unit with the best

observed performance, rather than just that unit itself, as the

use of the singular in the statutory language suggests." Id.

at 665. In National Lime II, we addressed a Sierra Club

petition challenging emission standards set under section

7412(d) for non-hazardous waste-burning portland cement

kilns. In evaluating EPA's standards, we reiterated Sierra

Club's central holding that "to comply with the statute, EPA's

method of setting emission floors must reasonably estimate

the performance of the relevant best performing plants." 233

F.3d at 632 (citing Sierra Club, 167 F.3d at 665).

We thus turn to EPA's alternative argument: that the

MACT approach does in fact measure what the bestperforming sources actually achieve. According to EPA,

Sierra Club requires standards to reflect "the worst reasonably foreseeable performance of the best unit[s]," 167 F.3d at

665. EPA argues that to meet this requirement, as well as to

account for "inherent process variability in pollution control

devices," the Agency set the floors at the worst emission level

experienced by any source using the MACT control. Respondent's Br. at 28. Indeed, EPA claims, Sierra Club actually

suggests that considering data from all sources using a

common control approach is a reasonable means of estimating

the performance of the best sources under the worst foreseeable circumstances.

The Sierra Club disagrees, arguing that EPA has failed to

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ed that its floors based on the worst performers' emissions

reflect a reasonable estimate of the emissions achieved in

practice by the best-performing sources. As to new-source

floors, the Sierra Club contends that Sierra Club, by questioning whether EPA can represent "the performance of the

best performing source in the category with the performance

of the worst performing source that uses the same technology[,].... casts serious doubt" on the legitimacy of the MACT

approach as a means of implementing section 7412(d)(3).

Sierra Club's Opening Br. at 27-28. Indeed, according to the

Sierra Club, "common use of one control technology provides

little or no reason to believe that the performance of the

worst performing source that was using that technology is in

any way representative of the best source's performance."

Id. at 29-30. The Sierra Club points to other factors, such as

the use of additional control techniques or of newer and

better versions of MACT technology, better training of operators, and better design and operation of the source itself, that

could all contribute to the best-performing source's level of

emissions. By failing to consider these factors, the Sierra

Club claims, EPA set floors that fail to reflect the estimates

required by CAA section 7412 and Sierra Club.

Applying the principles set forth in Sierra Club and National Lime II, we again agree with the Sierra Club. To

begin with, Sierra Club permits EPA to account for variability by setting floors at a level that reasonably estimates "the

performance of the 'best controlled similar unit' under the

worst reasonably foreseeable circumstances," 167 F.3d at 665,

not the worst foreseeable circumstances faced by any unit in

a given source category. Moreover, although Sierra Club

also notes that "[p]erhaps considering all units with the same

technology is justifiable because the best way to predict the

worst reasonably foreseeable performance of the best unit

with available data is to look at other units' performance," id.,

we explained in National Lime II that such an approach

would satisfy the statute "if pollution control technology were

the only factor determining emission levels of that HAP," 233

F.3d at 633 (emphasis added). Moreover, using language

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especially relevant to this case, National Lime II observed

that:

it became clear [at oral argument] that the Sierra Club

believes that EPA's MACT approach would not accurately estimate emission levels of the best performing twelve

percent of plants if the best performing plants achieved

their emission levels not just by using technology, but

also by selecting cleaner manufacturing inputs. For

example, the best performing twelve percent of plants

might perform well because, in comparison to other

plants having the same technology, they use lesspolluting fuels or purer raw materials. Such plants

would have predictably lower emissions than plants using

MACT floor technology alone.

Id. at 632-33. National Lime II goes on to note that

although "this argument may well have merit," id. at 633, the

argument could not be considered because the Sierra Club

failed to present it in its opening brief, thus failing to explain

"why the emissions standards EPA set might not accurately

estimate the performance of the best performing twelve

percent of plants," id. at 632.

Here, unlike in National Lime II, the Sierra Club has

argued that factors other than MACT technology influence

emissions: "The best source may use other control techniques

that the worst source does not, may use a newer and better

version of the chosen technology, may train its operators

more rigorously, or may simply be better designed and

operated." Sierra Club's Opening Br. at 29. The statute

itself, the Sierra Club points out, directs EPA to consider

factors such as "process changes, substitution of materials or

other modifications ... design, equipment, work practice, or

operational standards ... [or] a combination of above," 42

U.S.C. ss 7412(d)(2)(A)-(E), suggesting that "Congress itself

recognized that many factors ... affect sources' emissions,"

Sierra Club's Opening Br. at 29. In addition, the Sierra Club

points to record evidence that other factors contribute to

emissions. For example, although EPA's particulate matter

floors for incinerators reflect what the Agency thought was

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achievable with just one control technology--either a fabric

filter, an electrostatic precipitator, or an ionizing wet scrubber, 64 Fed. Reg. at 52,864--record evidence suggests that

some incinerators use these devices in combination with other

control devices, see 3 Final TSD, at 4-2. As the Sierra Club

also observes, EPA has acknowledged that different models

of the same technology vary significantly in their performance. See id. at 4-3 ("Fabric filters with conventional

woven fiberglass bags have demonstrated emissions control

levels on [incinerators].... With improved fiberglass or

Nomex felt and tri-loft fabrics, levels lower than 0.005 gr/dscf

have been demonstrated. High performance membrane fabrics ... have demonstrated levels below 0.0010 gr/dscf over

long term operation.").

The record contains still more indications that variables

other than the MACT control affect HWC emissions. For

example, in a 1996 technical support document, EPA observed that "[t]he MACT [expanded pool] contains conditions

with a large range of [dioxin/furan] levels, from 0.005 to 38.5

TEQ ng/dscm. This indicates that the air pollution control

device system type ... may not be the only important

consideration[ ] affecting [dioxin/furan] control; other factors

such as combustion quality and waste composition ... may

also be of importance." Draft Technical Support Document

for HWC MACT Standards, Vol. III: Selection of MACT

Standards and Technologies, at 3-3 (Feb. 1996) ("3 Draft

TSD"). In a 1999 technical support document detailing its

strategy for estimating variability, EPA noted that "[t]he

MACT [expanded pools] typically contain data from a wide

variety of different sources within each HAP and source

category combination, thus capturing the potential range in

emissions due to differences in equipment operations, design,

waste type, etc." 3 Final TSD, at 2-17 to 2-18; see also 64

Fed. Reg. at 52,857. Commenters also brought to the Agency's attention factors other than the MACT control. One

commenter noted that:

[t]he data in the expanded MACT pools ... do not

provide meaningful information because many factors,

other than the type of control device, significantly affect

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HWCs' emissions. Obvious examples of such factors

include feedrates, various operating parameters, operator

training and behavior, and variations between similar

(but not identical) control devices.... Because many

variables significantly influence emission rates, identifying the emissions rates associated with a particular type

of control device indicates very little about the actual

capability of that type of control device.

1 Final Response to Comments: MACT Floor Approaches, at

51. EPA responded to this comment not by explaining why

these factors are insignificant to estimating emissions of the

best-performers, but rather by claiming (as it does here) that

floors must be achievable by all sources using MACT technology. See id. at 53-55.

We think this record evidence supports the Sierra Club's

claim that because factors other than MACT technology

affect emissions, emissions of the worst-performing MACT

source may not reflect what the best-performers actually

achieve. EPA's responses are unpersuasive.

The Agency argues that "there is no question as to the type

of control device each source uses." Respondent's Br. at 38-

39. But as the Sierra Club points out, this claim is nonresponsive: just because EPA can identify which sources use

the MACT control does not mean that factors other than the

MACT control have no effect on emissions. The Agency also

emphasizes that it "considered only the variability consistent

with proper design and operation of MACT control." Id. at

39. Again, this claim misses the point: whether variability in

the MACT control accurately estimates variability associated

with the best-performing sources depends on whether factors

other than the MACT control contribute to emissions. In

other words, if factors other than MACT technology do

indeed influence a source's performance, it is not sufficient

that EPA considered sources using only well-designed and

properly operated MACT controls.

EPA next claims that even though the performance of the

MACT controls themselves vary, "effort[s] at further specification [of the MACT control] failed because the myriad

factors that create operating variability proved impossible to

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reliably quantify." Id. (citing 3 Draft TSD, at 2-6, which

notes that instead of setting the MACT control as any fabric

filter, the Agency could have differentiated among different

fabric filter units according to parameters such as "cloth type,

fabric age, cleaning practices, and pressure drop," but declined to do so "due to lack of information" on specific

facilities' fabric filters). In a similar vein, the Agency claimed

in a 1996 technical support document (though not in this

court) that, at least in the case of the dioxin/furan standards,

factors other than technology that affect emissions, "such as

combustion quality and waste composition[,] ... are difficult

to quantify for the definition of MACT." 3 Draft TSD, at

3-3. Even accepting the proposition that factors affecting

source performance--either design features of the control

itself (such as the type of fabric used) or non-MACT variables

(such as waste composition or use of additional controls)--are

difficult to quantify when defining the MACT control, nothing

in the statute requires the Agency to use the MACT approach. Section 7412(d)(3) requires only that EPA set floors

at the emission level achieved by the best-performing sources.

If EPA cannot meet this requirement using the MACT

methodology, it must devise a different approach capable of

producing floors that satisfy the Clean Air Act. Indeed, the

very fact that EPA recognizes both design differences in

MACT technology and non-MACT factors as causes of wideranging variations in performance suggests that the emissions

achieved by the worst-performing MACT source do not, as

the CAA requires, represent a reasonable estimate of emissions achieved by the best-performing sources.

Finally, we are unpersuaded by EPA's claim that to account for the best-performing sources' operational variability,

it had to base the floors on the worst performers' emissions.

While we have recognized that a given control can experience

operational variability, see Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d

416, 424-25, 436, 439-41 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (recognizing variability in the performance of emission controls such as baghouses, ESPs, scrubbers, feed materials, and types of fuel), the

relevant question here is not whether control technologies

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rienced by the best-performing sources can be estimated by

relying on emissions data from the worst-performing sources

using the MACT control. In this case, the evidence EPA

cites to support the MACT approach as a means of accounting for operational variability fails to demonstrate the relevant relationship. Some of the Agency's citations to the

record merely contain assertions that "[the] approach ...

fully accounts for normal process variability." 1 Final Response to Comments: MACT Floor Approaches, at 59; see

also 64 Fed. Reg. at 52,923 (noting that HWCs are particularly susceptible to variability). The actual variability data EPA

cites suggest only that emissions from sources using a given

control vary over a wide range, not that the high emission

levels achieved by sources at one end of that range reflect

levels achieved by sources at the other end, nor that the bestperforming sources ever experience a wide range of variability at all. See, e.g., 3 Draft TSD, at 3-3 to 3-12, 4-2 to 4-8;

see also Final Technical Support Document for HWC MACT

Standards, Vol. IV: Compliance with the HWC MACT Standards, at 4-7 (July 1999) (explaining the operating parameters of various control technologies). Indeed, throughout the

rulemaking, EPA defended its reliance on the worstperforming MACT source as a means of setting achievable

floors, not as a way of determining the operational variability

experienced by the best-performing sources. See, e.g., 64

Fed. Reg. at 52,859 & n.77 (explaining that its decision to

base the floors "on the highest test condition average for

sources in the expanded MACT pool" was designed to ensure

that all sources using the MACT control could achieve the

standard).

What is more, statements in the record actually cast doubt

on the possibility that the emissions of the worst-performing

sources estimate the variability experienced by the best performers. For example, in the introduction to the proposed

rule, EPA acknowledged that it considered a "12 percent

approach," according to which it would have set the floors

based on the statistical average of the 12 percent MACT pool

and then added the "average within-test condition variability

within the expanded MACT pool." Revised Standards for

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Hazardous Waste Combustors, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,358, 17,367

(Apr. 19, 1996). EPA chose not even to propose this approach, however, concluding that "it could not be demonstrated that sources within the expanded MACT pool using MACT

floor controls could achieve the floor levels" that resulted

from the Agency's calculations. Id. The fact that EPA

calculated the variability experienced by the top 12 percent of

sources, but then declined to use those results to set the

floors because they would not be achievable by all MACT

sources, strongly suggests a real difference between emissions achieved by the worst-performing sources and the variability experienced by the best performers. Similarly, EPA's

use of worst-case emissions data from RCRA compliance

tests, during which sources routinely spike their feed--a

practice we discuss in more detail in Part IV--further undermines the Agency's claim that to account for the variability

experienced by the best-performing sources, it had to set

floors based on the worst-performers' emissions: if, as the

Agency claims, RCRA data reflect sources' performance under the worst foreseeable circumstances, why is the use of

worst-case data, on its own, insufficient to account for the

variability in emissions experienced by the best-performing

sources?

To sum up, the possibility we acknowledged in National

Lime II--that the "best performing plants achieve[ ] their

emission levels not just by using technology," 233 F.3d at

633--appears to have been borne out in this case. Because

record evidence suggests that factors other than the MACT

control influence emissions, EPA has not demonstrated, in

Sierra Club's words, that floors based on the worstperforming MACT sources' emissions represent "a reasonable

estimate of the performance of the [best-performing] units."

167 F.3d at 662. To be sure, it is not our place to dictate to

the Agency how to account for variables other than the

MACT control. If in the case of a particular source category

or HAP, the Agency can demonstrate with substantial evidence--not mere assertions--that MACT technology significantly controls emissions, or that factors other than the

control have a negligible effect, the MACT approach could be

a reasonable means of satisfying the statute's requirements.

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See Nat'l Lime II, 233 F.3d at 633. But even if, as EPA

claims, accounting for non-MACT factors is difficult, the

Agency may not use a proxy for the best performers that it

has considerable reason to believe falls short of section

7412(d)(3)'s requirements.

IV

As part of its challenge to the MACT approach, the Sierra

Club contends that EPA violated the Clean Air Act by relying

on "worst-case data" to derive the HWC standards. In

setting the floors, EPA relied on emissions data generated

during incinerator trial burn tests and RCRA compliance

testing of cement and lightweight aggregate kilns. During

such testing, sources often operate under worst-case conditions by

spiking metals and chlorine in the waste feed [and]

detuning the emissions control equipment.... [T]hese

sources conduct tests in a manner that will establish a

wide envelope for their operating parameter limits in

order to accommodate the expected variability ... [in]

types of wastes, combustion system parameters, and

emission control parameters.

64 Fed. Reg. at 52,858. The Sierra Club argues that because

compliance data reflect abnormally bad performance, they

"do not represent any source's actual performance." Sierra

Club's Opening Br. at 23. Indeed, "sources' emissions during

normal operations tend to be less than one half of their

'worst-case' emissions." Id.

Defending its use of RCRA compliance data, EPA argues

that such data are in fact actual test results and therefore

reflect actual source performance. The fact that RCRA data

measure worst-case conditions, the Agency explains,

merely confirms that standards based on the data reflect

the most adverse conditions that can reasonably be expected to recur.... Because these test conditions are

specifically designed to help account for operating variability, they are more helpful than normal operating data

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would be in estimating performance under a variety of

conditions and thus in helping to assure that properly

designed and operated sources can achieve the standard.

Respondent's Br. at 33 (internal quotation omitted). According to EPA, because the statute permits it to use available

information to identify the best-performing sources, and because RCRA data are available information, it reasonably

relied on RCRA test results.

Section 7412(d)(3) requires EPA to set emission floors

based on "the average emission limitation achieved by the

best performing 12 percent of the existing sources (for which

the Administrator has emissions information)." 42 U.S.C.

s 7412(d)(3)(A) (emphasis added). We think it not at all

unreasonable for the Agency to read this language as permitting it to rely on "information" in its database--i.e., the

RCRA data. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 ("[A] court may

not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for

a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an

agency."). And as we pointed out in Sierra Club, "EPA

typically has wide latitude in determining the extent of datagathering necessary to solve a problem. We generally defer

to an agency's decision to proceed on the basis of imperfect

scientific information, rather than to invest the resources to

conduct the perfect study." 167 F.3d at 662 (internal quotation omitted). Although sources do spike their feed during

RCRA compliance tests, the Sierra Club has offered us no

basis for concluding that using RCRA data would prevent

EPA from identifying the best-performers and predicting

their emissions under the "worst reasonably foreseeable circumstances." Id. at 665. In other words, the Sierra Club

has failed to demonstrate that EPA's model "bears no rational relationship to the reality it purports to represent," Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 923 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (internal quotation omitted).

V

Industry petitioner Continental Cement claims that EPA

failed to meet its obligations under the Regulatory Flexibility

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Act ("RFA"), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 ("SBREFA"). Pub. L.

No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1165-70 (1980), codified at 5 U.S.C.

ss 601-612, as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat.

864 (1996). Failure to comply with the RFA "may be, but

does not have to be, grounds for overturning a rule." Small

Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506,

538 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Under the RFA, agencies promulgating a rule that will

have a "significant impact" on "small entities" are required to

"prepare and make available for public comment an initial

regulatory flexibility analysis ... [that] describe[s] the impact

of the proposed rule" on those entities, and to publish a "final

regulatory analysis" with the final rule. 5 U.S.C. ss 605, 603,

604. Small entities include small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions. Id. s 601(6).

The regulatory analysis forces the agency to consider various

factors set forth in the statute, including "a description of the

steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact [of the rule] on small entities." Id. s 604(a)

(final regulatory flexibility analysis); see also id. ss 603(b) &

(c) (initial regulatory flexibility analysis).

This procedure is intended to evoke commentary from

small businesses about the effect of the rule on their activities, and to require agencies to consider the effect of a

regulation on those entities. An agency may dispense with

the regulatory analysis if it certifies "that the rule will not, if

promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." Id. s 605(b). EPA relied

on the s 605(b) exception.

In seeking to determine whether its regulations would have

"significant economic impact" on a "substantial number of

small entities," 64 Fed. Reg. at 53,023-24, EPA examined the

entities that would be "directly impacted"--hazardous waste

combustion facilities. EPA concluded that only six of the

HWC facilities met the definition of a "small business" and

that only two of these would experience compliance costs in

excess of one percent of annual sales. Id. at 53,024. EPA

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therefore certified that there would be no significant impact

on a substantial number of small business HWC facilities.

Id. EPA then considered the economic effects of the new

rule on small businesses that generate and blend the hazardous waste consumed in the HWCs. Id. EPA did not believe

the statute required it to conduct this inquiry, but it decided

to do so in the "spirit" of the RFA because some portion of

the burden of compliance might pass through to the generators and blenders of hazardous waste. Id. at 53,023-24. As

to these entities, EPA did not certify that there would be no

"significant impact" on a "substantial number" of small businesses. Id.

Continental claims that EPA should have considered each

category of HWCs separately in conducting its "direct impact" analysis. Continental also maintains that EPA had to

certify that there would be no substantial effect on generators

of hazardous waste in order to meet the requirements of the

RFA. In response, EPA argues that it complied with the

requirements of the RFA.

Continental is a "cement manufacturer" under the relevant

Small Business Administration Regulations, and therefore

qualifies as a small business because it has fewer than 750

employees. Small Business Size Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg.

30,836, 30,847 (May 15, 2000). While Continental's petition

did not refer to its status as a hazardous waste generator, we

accept counsel's representation at oral argument that the

company also generates hazardous waste, and therefore is not

bringing this claim solely in its capacity as a hazardous waste

combustor. Accordingly, Continental has standing.

We decline to consider Continental's argument that EPA

should have conducted independent RFA analyses for each

class of HWCs. Continental's opening brief contains only a

single conclusory sentence stating this point, and its reply

brief does nothing to expand on the subject. A litigant does

not properly raise an issue by addressing it in a "cursory

fashion" with only "bare-bones arguments." Wash. Legal

Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 197 F.3d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir.

1997); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996);

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Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Even

if the briefing were sufficient to raise this issue, it certainly is

not persuasive enough to carry Continental's burden of showing that the agency's analysis was arbitrary and capricious.

As to Continental's second claim regarding generators of

hazardous waste, this court has consistently rejected the

contention that the RFA applies to small businesses indirectly

affected by the regulation of other entities. Mich. v. EPA,

213 F.3d 663, 688-89 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Motor & Equip. Mfrs.

Ass'n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Mid-Tex

Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

EPA's rule regulates hazardous waste combustors, not waste

generators. We explained in Mid-Tex that the language of

the statute limits its application to the "small entities which

will be subject to the proposed regulation"--that is, those

"small entities to which the proposed rule will apply." MidTex Elec. Coop., 773 F.2d at 342 (quoting 5 U.S.C. s 603(b)).

Congress "did not intend to require that every agency consider every indirect effect that any regulation might have on

small businesses in any stratum of the national economy."

Id. at 343.

Continental acknowledges these precedents, but seeks to

distinguish this case on the basis that EPA actually intended

to affect the conduct of hazardous waste generators by raising the cost of incineration. This increase in cost would

create an economic incentive to minimize waste production.

As evidence, Continental cites the portion of the preamble to

the rule which states that the rule "fulfills our 1993 and 1994

public commitments to upgrade emissions standards for

HWCs. These commitments are the centerpiece of our Hazardous Waste Minimization and Combustion Strategy." 64

Fed. Reg. at 52,832. Continental also refers us to EPA's

statement that "[a]s today's rule is implemented, the costs of

burning hazardous waste will increase, resulting in market

incentives for greater waste minimization." 64 Fed. Reg. at

53,021.

Contrary to what Continental supposes, application of the

RFA does turn on whether particular entities are the "tarUSCA Case #99-1491 Document #612223 Filed: 07/24/2001 Page 23 of 29
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gets" of a given rule. The statute requires that the agency

conduct the relevant analysis or certify "no impact" for those

small businesses that are "subject to" the regulation, that is,

those to which the regulation "will apply." Mid-Tex Elec.

Coop., 773 F.2d at 342; 5 U.S.C. s 605(b)(3). EPA's rule

applies, by its terms, only to HWCs. The rule will doubtless

have economic impacts in many sectors of the economy. But

to require an agency to assess the impact on all of the

nation's small businesses possibly affected by a rule would be

to convert every rulemaking process into a massive exercise

in economic modeling, an approach we have already rejected.

See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., 773 F.2d at 343.

VI

The Environmental Technology Council, a trade association

representing firms involved in disposal of hazardous wastes,

petitions for review of 40 C.F.R. ss 63.1206(b)(9) & (10).

These provisions create alternative emission standards for

cement kilns and lightweight aggregate kilns. EPA expressed concern that some sources might not be able to meet

some of the MACT standards because of raw material contribution to emissions, and therefore enacted the alternative

standards for SVMs, LVMs, chlorine and mercury. Id.; see

also 64 Fed. Reg. at 52,962-67; Revised Standards for Hazardous Waste Combustors, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,358, 17,395 &

17,405 (Apr. 19, 1996); Final Response to Comments to the

Proposed HWC MACT Standards, Volume II: Compliance:

Equivalency Determination and Alternate Standards, at 7

(July 1999). The Council contends that these provisions violate the language of s 7412, and are arbitrary and capricious.

We refuse to consider these contentions because the Council

lacks prudential standing.

The Council rests its claims of constitutional and prudential

standing on the ground that its members will suffer "economic and competitive injury, most significantly diminished value

of capital investment, if competing facilities are excused from

the MACT standards and thereby avoid the substantial compliance costs." Envtl. Tech. Council's Opening Br. at 7.

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According to the Council, its members have already made

substantial investments in various pollution control technologies and constitute the "best performing sources" to which

the CAA refers in s 7412(d). It alleges that its interests in

ensuring that other HWCs comply with the MACT standards

(which they concede are purely economic), are congruent with

the interests protected by the statute, and that it is therefore

a "suitable challenger" within the zone of interests of the

CAA.

The Council appears to have constitutional standing. It

claims that there are numerous costs associated with meeting

the MACT standards, and that EPA's creation of an alternative standard will save some competitors from those costs.1

Basic economics indicates that a competitor whose costs are

lower will be able to provide services at lower cost--and one

can reasonably expect this to result in lost business to the

Council's members. Accordingly, we think the Council has

met its constitutional obligation to show injury, causation, and

redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560-62 (1992).

The problem for the Council is that we have previously

rejected prudential standing in two nearly identical cases in

which industry groups claimed to be suitable challengers to

regulations directed at competitors. Hazardous Waste

Treatment Council v. EPA, 885 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(HWTC IV); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA,

861 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (HWTC II). To demonstrate

prudential standing, ordinarily a party must show that the

interest it seeks to protect "is arguably within the zone of

__________

1 At oral argument the court pointed out to counsel that the

alternative standards require a facility seeking the exemption to

demonstrate that "even though [it uses] MACT control" technology,

it still cannot meet the standard. 64 Fed. Reg. at 52,965-66. In

light of this, the court inquired what injury the exception might

inflict on the Council's members. The attorney for the Council

explained that the "best performing sources" rely on techniques

other than just technological aids to reduce pollution, and that these

techniques cost money to implement. EPA did not contest this

representation.

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interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in

question." Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,

397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Under this "zone of interests" test,

the "essential inquiry is whether Congress 'intended for [a

particular] class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon to challenge

agency disregard of the law.' " Clarke v. Securities Indus.

Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) (quoting Block v. Cmty.

Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347 (1984)). While the "zone of

interests" test is not meant to be "especially demanding," it

will deny standing to one claiming to be a "suitable challenger" when "plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or

inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it

cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to

permit the suit." Id.

In HWTC II we considered the claim of an industry group

similar to the Council that challenged EPA regulations under

RCRA and sought tighter controls on competitors.2 861 F.2d

at 282. Petitioner there claimed prudential standing because

"tightening of environmental standards will generally foster

not only a cleaner environment but also expand the member

companies' profits, as it will expand the market for their

services." Id. Petitioner argued that its interests were "in

sync" with those served by RCRA. We rejected this argument. The "consumers of the environmental purity afforded

by RCRA seem highly suitable champions of enforcement."

Id. at 284. Petitioner's interest was not in environmental

purity, but in increasing the regulatory burden on its competitors. To hold that this satisfied prudential standing would

be to create "a considerable potential for judicial intervention

that would distort the regulatory process." Id. at 285. We

followed the same analysis in HWTC IV. 885 F.2d at 922-26.

The case before us is identical to HWTC II and IV, except

that the relevant statute is the CAA, not RCRA. The

__________

2 EPA contends that the Council is actually the same organization

as the HWTC, with a different name. The Council does not contest

this representation. Whether the two organizations are the same

does not matter here, however, as it is clear that their positions and

arguments are identical.

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Council thinks this makes all the difference--that by adopting

a technology-based approach to emissions standards, Congress aligned the interests of competitors and environmentalists in such a way as to bring the former into the zone of

interests. We disagree. The Council has identified nothing

to indicate that Congress' shift to a technology-based approach was anything more than a determination that this

would provide a more workable basis for promulgating standards. The statute's language indicates that, contrary to the

Council's contention, Congress' "evident purpose" was not to

"compel[ ] those sources with less-than-best pollution control

to invest in upgraded equipment." Neither the statute nor

the rules actually require HWCs to use the same methods of

emission control used by the best performing sources; they

must only meet the standards of those that do. See 42 U.S.C.

s 7412(d)(2); 64 Fed. Reg. at 52,963 n.255. As in the HWTC

cases, the Council's interest lies only in increasing the regulatory burden on others. See HWTC IV, 885 F.2d at 924-25;

HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 285. The Council therefore lacks

prudential standing.

VII

We remand the HWC floors to EPA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In so doing, we emphasize

that we do not expect the impossible of the Agency. Floors

need not be perfect mirrors of the best performers' emissions.

But whether EPA chooses end-of-stack technology or feedrate as the MACT control, or abandons the MACT approach

altogether, CAA section 7412(d)(3), as interpreted by this

court in Sierra Club and National Lime II, requires that

floors reflect a reasonable estimate of the emissions

"achieved" in practice by the best-performing sources. See

Nat'l Lime II, 233 F.3d at 632.

Because EPA will have to set new floors, we need not

address the Sierra Club's additional arguments that in deciding whether to set beyond-the-floor standards pursuant to

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ters claimed result from HWC emissions, as well as whether

stricter standards based on additional controls would be

achievable. See id. at 634 (declining to address beyond-thefloor arguments regarding two HAPs because the floors for

those HAPs were being remanded). Nor, for the same

reason, need we consider industry petitioners' challenges to

specific standards.

Finally, the Sierra Club requests that we leave the current

regulations in place during remand in order to "avoid serious

adverse implications for public health and the environment

that would result from vacating the regulations (and thus

allowing hazardous waste combustors to emit even more

HAPs than allowed by the regulation[s] ... )." Sierra Club's

Opening Br. at 36. Though we granted similar requests in

Sierra Club, 167 F.3d at 664, and National Lime II, 233 F.3d

at 635, we think this case is different: in Sierra Club, there

were no industry petitioners, and in National Lime II, we

considered and rejected industry claims. Here, in contrast,

we have chosen not to reach the bulk of industry petitioners'

claims, and leaving the regulations in place during remand

would ignore petitioners' potentially meritorious challenges.

For example, industry petitioners may be correct that EPA

should have exempted HWCs from regulatory limits during

periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction, permitting

sources to return to compliance by following the steps of a

startup, shutdown, and malfunction plan filed with the Agency. We have similar doubts about EPA's decision to require

sources to comply with standards even during openings of

emergency safety valves caused by events beyond the

sources' control. It is also possible that some of the emission

standards themselves would not have withstood arbitrary and

capricious analysis: when setting the beyond-the-floor standard for dioxin emissions from lightweight aggregate kilns,

EPA may have relied inappropriately on data from cement

kilns (a method it had previously rejected) to demonstrate

that the standard was achievable; in setting the beyond-thefloor standard for semi-volatile metal emissions from cement

kilns, EPA may have exceeded its statutory mandate by

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relying on policy objectives other than those enumerated in

section 7412(d).

In light of these circumstances, we think the better course

of action is to vacate the challenged regulations. Because

this decision leaves EPA without standards regulating HWC

emissions, EPA (or any of the parties to this proceeding) may

file a motion to delay issuance of the mandate to request

either that the current standards remain in place or that EPA

be allowed reasonable time to develop interim standards. See

Columbia Falls, 139 F.3d at 924 ("If EPA wishes to promulgate an interim treatment standard, the Agency may file a

motion in this court to delay issuance of this mandate in order

to allow it a reasonable time to develop such a standard.").

So 

ordered.

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