Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02706/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02706-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Angel Velazquez
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2706/2754

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Cross-Appellant/Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Angel Velazquez, * 

* 

Cross-Appellee/Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: February 16, 2005

Filed: June 8, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, RILEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Angel Velazquez was sentenced to life imprisonment by the district court1

after

a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession of

methamphetamine, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Velazquez appeals,

arguing that the jury had insufficient evidence to convict and that the court erred by

Appellate Case: 04-2706 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/08/2005 Entry ID: 1912911
2

The government cross-appealed the district court's post-judgment verdict

dismissing count two. While we agree that the district court erred in dismissing this

count, because we are affirming Velazquez's life sentence, the court's error is

harmless. We must emphasize that our decision is for the sake of judicial economy

and is restricted to the facts of this particular case. 

3

The grand jury later issued a seven-count superseding indictment charging

Velazquez with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (count one),

possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(c)(1)(B)(1) (count two), felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (count three), and possession with intent to

distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)

and 841(c) (counts four through seven ). A second superseding indictment was later

issued, mirroring the first superseding indictment, but expanding the period of the

conspiracy by two years. 

-2-

overruling his motion in limine, and by enhancing his sentence based on prior

convictions.2

 We affirm. 

I. Background

Police Narcotics investigator Douglas Molczyk made three controlled

methamphetamine buys from Velazquez through informant Cindy Peralta at

Velazquez's residence. Peralta purchased a total of 24.56 grams of methamphetamine.

Molczyk executed a search warrant at Velazquez's residence. Police arrested

Velazquez and Jodene Callahan, who was also present in the home at the time of the

search. Callahan was in possession of 2.74 grams of methamphetamine that she had

just purchased from Velazquez. The officers seized another 13.67 grams from

Velazquez's residence. Velazquez was subsequently indicted by the grand jury.3

Prior to trial, Velazquez filed three motions in limine seeking to: (1) suppress

certain statements he made when arrested; (2) preclude the introduction of any

evidence relating to the reason Velazquez possessed a firearm; and (3) prevent the

Appellate Case: 04-2706 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/08/2005 Entry ID: 1912911
4

21U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) states:

No person who stands convicted of an offense under this

part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason

of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or

before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney

files an information with the court (and serves a copy of

such information on the person or counsel for the person)

stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied

upon.

-3-

government and the court from referring to Velazquez's prior convictions. The district

court denied Velazquez's motion regarding the firearm, but granted his two other

motions. Three days prior to trial, the government filed an information pursuant to 21

U.S.C. § 851 to establish Velazquez's prior convictions.4

At trial, Velazquez's co-conspirators testified for the government. At no time,

however, did the government promise that they would receive favorable treatment.

The primary evidence against Velazquez consisted of the testimony of Callahan,

Kevin Glazer, Susan Miller, Gregg Hergott, and Jose Karakatsanis. Callahan

indicated that she had purchased "eight-balls" of methamphetamine (3.5 grams)

"maybe twenty, thirty" times from Velazquez. Glazer stated that he sold Velazquez

1.5 pounds of methamphetamine in one day for $6,900. Miller confirmed that in the

course of her relationship with Velazquez, she purchased about 40 pounds of

methamphetamine from him. Hergott testified that he knew Velazquez through a

mutual acquaintance and purchased 339.6 grams of methamphetamine from

Velazquez and sold Velazquez several grams. 

According to Hergott, in addition to the drug sales, Velazquez talked with him

about killing Molczyk. Velazquez told Hergott that "something need[ed] to be done

about Mr. Molczyk." Velazquez then stated that Molczyk needed to be killed. Hergott

discussed this with Velazquez a second time when the two were in jail. During that

Appellate Case: 04-2706 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/08/2005 Entry ID: 1912911
5

In this appeal, Velazquez requested appointment of new counsel and requested

to file a pro se reply brief. We denied Velazquez's request for new counsel, but

permitted him to file a pro se supplemental brief. In his pro se brief, Velazquez raised

two issues—a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and a defectively signed arrest

warrant. Neither issue contains sufficient merit to warrant separate discussion and we

summarily affirm the district court on both issues. See 8th Circ. R. 47B.

-4-

meeting, Velazquez claimed that he and another man had arranged for a hit, but had

"hired the wrong guy, they [Velazquez and the other man] got an undercover, they

had given him $180 down and a gun." 

 Karakatsanis testified that Velazquez asked him if "he knew somebody that

could commit a murder for him." Velazquez identified the person he wanted murdered

as "the person that had arrested him." Karakatsanis, who had worked for Molczyk as

a confidential informant in the past subsequently contacted Molczyk. According to

Karakatsanis's testimony, he and undercover officer Rafael Rayos met Velazquez

while he was out of jail on bond. Velazquez gave them money, showed them

Molczyk's house, and told them to "kill him or whoever came out." Velazquez

clarified this to mean "only him or his wife." Velazquez left and returned in a red

Cadillac. Velazquez instructed Karakatsanis to take the pipe containing a sawed-off

shotgun from the trunk of the Cadillac. Karakatsanis complied.

Following the close of the government's case, Velazquez made a motion for

acquittal. The district court took the motion under advisement. The jury returned a

guilty verdict on all seven counts. Velazquez filed a motion for a new trial, or in the

alternative for acquittal. At an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied

Velazquez's motion for a new trial, but granted his motion of acquittal with respect

to count two—possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime.

Velazquez was sentenced to life imprisonment as a repeat offender on the basis of the

felonies contained in the information.5

 

Appellate Case: 04-2706 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/08/2005 Entry ID: 1912911
-5-

II. Discussion

A. Evidence to Support the Jury Verdict

We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict in the

light most favorable to the verdict, accepting all reasonable inferences tending to

support the verdict as established. United States v. Bascope-Zurita, 68 F.3d 1057,

1060 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1062 (1996). We will only reverse if no

reasonable jury could have found Velazquez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1990).

Velazquez argues that the government adduced insufficient evidence to enable

a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a drug conspiracy involving

more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. Velazquez bases this argument on the

alleged unreliability of the government's witnesses, all of whom had made plea

agreements prior to testifying. Velazquez believes that all of the government's

witnesses exaggerated the quantities of methamphetamine that they purchased from,

or sold to, Velazquez and were too indefinite in their accounts to be believed. This

argument lacks merit under the precedent of this circuit.

"To prove that [Velazquez] was a member of a conspiracy to manufacture or

to distribute illegal drugs, the government must demonstrate (1) that there was a

conspiracy, i.e. an agreement to manufacture or to distribute, (2) that [Velazquez]

knew of the conspiracy, and (3) that [Velazquez] intentionally joined the conspiracy."

United States v. Hester, 140 F.3d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 1998); see also United States v.

Jones, 101 F.3d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1346 (1997). "If

the record contains evidence from which the jury can find one overall agreement to

commit an illegal act, the evidence establishes a single conspiracy." United States v.

Regan, 940 F.2d 1134, 1135 (8th Cir. 1991). We believe that the evidence was

sufficient for the jury to find that there was a conspiracy, of which Velazquez had

knowledge, and intentionally joined.

Appellate Case: 04-2706 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/08/2005 Entry ID: 1912911
-6-

We will not "pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given

their testimony." United States v. Marshall, 92 F.3d 758, 760 (8th Cir. 1996). The

government's four main witnesses all testified that they purchased methamphetamine

from Velazquez. Peralta purchased methamphetamine on three separate occasions

totaling 24.56 grams, Callahan purchased 2.74 grams, Hergott testified that he

purchased 339.6 grams, Glazer testified that he purchased 1.5 pounds, Miller testified

she purchased at least 40 pounds, and police recovered 13.67 grams during a search

of Velazquez's residence. 

Velazquez's counsel cross-examined the government's witnesses and the jury

heard unfavorable information about them. The jury was also made aware that no

promises had been made to the witnesses regarding reduced sentences. But, even if

such promises had been made, we have held that the promise of a reduced sentence

does not affect testimonial reliability or the jury's acceptance of the testimony as

valid. See United States v. Baker, 367 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2004) ("The fact that

these witnesses testified in exchange for the possibility of reduced sentences does not

categorically make their testimony infirm or require that their testimony be

corroborated in order to support a conviction."); see also United States v. Maggard,

156 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The jury's choice to credit the testimony of those

witnesses was within its province, and we will uphold the conviction if substantial

evidence supports it."); United States v. Martinez, 958 F.2d 217, 218 (8th Cir. 1992)

("The jury was aware of [the witness's] cooperation with the government, of the

potential for a reduction of his sentence in exchange for his assistance, and of his

extensive criminal record . . . . It is the sole province of the jury to weigh the

credibility of a witness."). Here, the jury found the government's witnesses to be

credible and accepted their testimony. The testimony of these witnesses established

a sufficient factual basis for a jury to find that Velazquez committed the offenses

charged by the government.

Appellate Case: 04-2706 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/08/2005 Entry ID: 1912911
-7-

B. Velazquez's Motion in Limine

We review a district court's decision denying a motion in limine for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Whitehead, 176 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 1999). Prior to

trial, Velazquez moved in limine to exclude any testimony that he possessed a

shotgun in order to have Molczyk murdered. Velazquez's motion was denied.

Velazquez contends that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this

evidence. Velazquez argues that the government introduced the sawed-off shotgun

to confuse and inflame the jury, and that the evidence was unnecessary to prove the

allegations in the indictment. He argues that evidence of the gun significantly

influenced the jury. Finally, Velazquez points out that after this evidence was

introduced, the district court granted his motion for acquittal on count two. Velazquez

cites no authority in support of his arguments and we find them to be without merit.

Velazquez's argument depends upon whether evidence that he possessed a gun

to kill Molczyk or his wife had any probative value. The evidence shows that

Velazquez attempted to hire someone to assassinate Molczyk in order to prevent

interference with his drug trafficking conspiracy and that Velazquez possessed a

sawed-off shotgun for that purpose. The government's theory, which the jury

accepted, was that elimination of Molczyk would allow Velazquez to continue with

the drug conspiracy. In denying Velazquez's motion in limine, the district court found

that there was a "reasonable inference" that Velazquez sought Molczyk's murder so

that he could "continue with the conspiracy in which he is charged." Thus, the

evidence was probative to establish that Velasquez conspired to distribute

methamphetamine. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

C. Enhancing Velazquez's Sentence 

Based on His Prior Convictions

Velazquez argues that the information filed by the government pursuant to 21

U.S.C. § 851, alleging that he committed two prior felonies, required the government

to prove those convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt—something the

Appellate Case: 04-2706 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/08/2005 Entry ID: 1912911
-8-

government failed to do. The government was not required to prove Velazquez's prior

convictions to the jury. In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the

Supreme Court affirmed that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is

necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts

established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or

proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 756; see also Shepard v. United

States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005). 

During a § 851 hearing, the government offered certified copies of Velazquez's

convictions for distribution of cocaine. The court asked Velazquez, what convictions

he thought the government had failed to prove. Velazquez argued that it was never

proven that he had been "received" when convicted for distribution of cocaine. The

district court found that the government had sufficiently established the prior felonies.

We agree. Certified copies of prior convictions are acceptable to prove prior

convictions. See United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 824 (1997).

Velazquez also contends that the government's filing of the information on

Friday with trial beginning the next Monday, precluded him from having "ample time

to determine whether he should enter a plea or go to trial, and to plan his trial strategy

with full knowledge of the consequences of a potential guilty verdict." We hold that

Velazquez had adequate time to review the government's information. Velazquez

acknowledged that he received the information, that he understood it, that his

penalties could be enhanced, and that he discussed this with his attorney. Velazquez

was also informed by counsel that he could receive life imprisonment. 

We have held that, "for purposes of section 851, the government must file its

information before jury selection begins, thus allowing the defendant 'ample time to

determine whether he should enter a plea or go to trial, and to plan his trial strategy

with full knowledge of the consequences of a potential guilty verdict.'" United States

Appellate Case: 04-2706 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/08/2005 Entry ID: 1912911
-9-

v. Robinson, 110 F.3d 1320, 1328 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Johnson,

944 F.2d 396, 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1008 (1991). In Robinson, we

indicated that the government complied with § 851 when it filed the information just

minutes before the jury pool was brought in for voir dire. Id. Velazquez had

considerably more time than was found adequate in Robinson. 

We find no error and affirm.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-2706 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/08/2005 Entry ID: 1912911