Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06157/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06157-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Johnny Lee Sanders
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILL D 

--1lniblid States C.ourt of Appeal~ UNITED STATES COURT OF APP'E'JUjS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant/ 

Cross-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHNNY LEE SANDERS, JR., 

Defendant-Appellee/ 

Cross-Appellant. 

APR O:) 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 92-6157 

& 92-6163 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

{D.C. No. CR-91-229-W) 

Leslie M. Kaestner, Assistant U.S. Attorney {Joe Heaton, United 

States Attorney, with her on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for the United States of America. 

Jerome T. Kearney, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Johnny Lee Sanders, Jr. 

Before LOGAN and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER, District 

Judge . * 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-6157 Document: 010110200882 Date Filed: 04/09/1993 Page: 1 
The government appeals defendant Johnny Lee Sanders, Jr.'s 

sentence for drug trafficking and firearms offenses, contending 

that the district court erred in failing to apply the sentence 

enhancement provisions of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S . C. 

§ 924 (e ). Defendant cross-appeals, contending that the district 

court erred in enhancing his sentence for possessing a stolen 

firearm, U.S.S.G . § 2K2.l (b ) (4 ) , and for possessing a firearm in 

connection with another felony, id. § 2K2.l(b) (5 ) . 

I 

Defendant was arrested for reckless driving in November 1991. 

Officers conducting a search of his person found 7 grams of 

cocaine, 33.7 grams of heroin, and $2,832 cash in his pockets. An 

inventory of defendant's car revealed a soft gun case containing 

drug packaging materials on the back seat, and two loaded guns and 

additional drug paraphernalia in the trunk. One of these guns was 

later determined to have been stolen. 

Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to a five count indictment and superseding information charging him with drug possession 

and distribution, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a) (1), and with 

being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g). At his sentencing, the district court found that defendant possessed firearms in connection with his drug trafficking 

and that one of the fireanns was stolen, and it applied the corresponding enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court declined to apply the Armed Career Criminal Act 

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sentence enhancement, finding that " i t was not the intent of Congress t o apply the armed career criminal [act] to the facts and 

circumstances of this case." II R. at 21. 

We review the district court's factual findings under the 

clearly erroneous standard. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). We will not 

reverse "unless the court's finding was without factual support in 

the record, or if after reviewing all the evidence we are left 

wi th the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made . " United States v . Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1182 (10th 

Cir.) , cert. denied, 497 U. S. 1038 (1990). We give due deference 

to the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines 

to the facts, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), but we review legal questions 

de novo, United States v. Goddard, 929 F.2d 546, 548 (10th Cir. 

1991) . 

II 

It is undisputed that on March 31, 1978, defendant was convicted of three armed robberies committed during an eight-day 

period the previous year. The Armed Career Criminal Act requires 

a fifteen year sentence enhancement whenever an offender who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) "has three previous convictions . for 

a violent felony . committed on occasions different from one 

another . ... " Id. § 924(e) (1). This court has very recently 

made clear that this statutory language "plainly does not require 

that the offenses be separated by an intervening conviction." 

United States v. Green, 96 7 F.2d 459, 461 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 113 S. Ct. 435 (1992 ) ; see also United States v . Tisdale, 

921 F. 2d 1095, 109 8- 99 ( 10th Cir. 1990) (burglaries occurring on 

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the same date constituted distinct criminal episodes f o r purposes 

of § 924 (e )) , cert . denied, 112 S. Ct . 59 6 (1991) ; United States 

v. Bolton, 9 05 F .2d 319, 323 (10th Cir. 1990) (simultaneously 

entered convictions counted separately for purposes of§ 924 (e )) , 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 683 (1991 ) . We recognize that at the 

time defendant was sentenced, the district court did no t have the 

benefit of our opinion in Green. However, in light of that decision, there is now no question but that the district court was 

required t o imprison defendant for not less than fifteen years 

under the Armed Career Criminal Act . 

III 

The Sentencing Guidelines require an increase of two offense 

levels "[i]f any firearm was stolen. 11 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.l(b) (4). 

Defendant admits that he had the scienter required for illegal 

possession of firearms, but argues that because the government 

could not maintain a charge against him for receipt of a stolen 

firearm, an increase in his sentence under§ 2K2.l(b) (4 ) violates 

his due process rights. Although this is a matter of first 

impression in this court, several other circuits have decided this 

question, all of them rejecting defendant's position. See United 

States v. Mobley. 95 6 F .2d 450, 459 (3d Cir. 1992 ) ; United States 

v . Singleton, 946 F.2d 23, 26-27 (5th Cir. 1991 ) , cert. denied, 

112 S. Ct. 1231 (1992 ) ; United States v. Taylor, 937 F.2d 676, 682 

(D . C. Cir. 1991 ) ; United States v. Peoples, 904 F .2d 23, 25 (9 th 

Cir. 1990 ) . See also United States v. Anderson, 886 F.2d 215 , 216 

(8th Cir. 1989 ) (upholding enhancement without discussing due process issues) . 

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We understand defendant's generalized due process claim t o be 

an invocation of the rule of lenity and the presumption against 

strict liability in criminal law. We observe, however, as did the 

District of Columbia Circuit, that the rule of lenity applies only 

when the provision to be interpreted is ambiguous; defendant has 

not shown the requisite ambiguity here. See Taylor, 937 F.2d at 

682. The Third Circuit, deciding this same issue recently, 

reviewed extensively the evolution of§ 2K2.l(b) (4) . See Mobley. 

956 F.2d at 452-53. Although an earlier version of§ 2K2.l(b) (4) 

included a blanket scienter requirement, the enhancement currently 

in effect reflects amendments removing such a requirement . These 

changes, as well as the Sentencing Commission's deliberate inclusion of scienter requirements in other sections of the Guidelines, 

indicates the unequivocal meaning of§ 2K2.l(b) (4). The government is not obliged to show that defendant knew the firearm was 

stolen for the enhancement to apply. 

Defendant's strict liability argument is equally unavailing . 

He "was not convicted of a strict liability crime but instead was 

subject to a strict liability sentencing enhancement." Singleton, 

946 F.2d at 26. A finding of guilt in the first instance and a 

determination of an appropriate sentence upon conviction differ in 

a number of ways. These include the need only to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard for sentencing decisions. 

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S . 79, 91 (1986) ( "Sentencing 

courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without 

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any prescribed burden of proo f at all . " ) ; Unit ed States v. He rshberger, 956 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1992 ) ( "standard for 'sentencing evidence' is a preponderance of the evidence" ) . Further, 

"not only crimes that have not been proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt, but crimes that have not even been charged 11 may enter into 

the sentencing calculation. Singleton, 946 F.2d at 26. 

IV 

Finally, defendant challenges the district court's imposition 

of a four level enhancement for possession of a firearm "in connection with another felony offense." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.l(b) (5). 

This court has not yet had occasion to interpret this recently 

amended Guideline language, although we have decided cases arising 

under the earlier and similar cross reference provisions of 

§ 2K2.l and the analogous enhancement for firearm possession in 

connection with drug trafficking under§ 2Dl.l(b) (1). The essence 

of defendant's argument is that the government has not shown, even 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the two loaded guns in 

the trunk were related to his drug trafficking activities. As to 

this, first we note that the Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty that 

defendant signed contained his admission, almost in the same terms 

of this provision, that he "had guns in the trunk of the car in 

connection with this intended drug trafficking." IR. tab 10 at 

7. 

We also reject at the outset defendant's suggestion that we 

apply the standard for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c ) to a 

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-,..., 

§ 2 K2 . 1 { b ) { 5 ) 1 sentence enhancement . This court has already held 

that such a standard "is much higher than that necessary for 

enhancement under the Guidelines." Goddard, 929 F.2d at 549. 

However, we also note that, unlike the analogous enhancement under 

§ 2D1.l(b) (1), there is no commentary accompanying § 2K2.l {b ) (5) 

that sets out a standard for possession "in connection with" 

2 another felony. Despite this explanatory vacuum, we believe that 

the enhancement provision itself, the way in which the Guidelines 

treat the connection between drugs and weapons, and the facts of 

this case all indicate that the district court properly applied 

the§ 2K2.l{b) (5) enhancement. 

The original commentary accompanying§ 2K2 of the Guidelines, 

dealing with offenses relating to firearms, underscored the seriousness of firearm use or possession in connection with other 

felonies. Pre-Guidelines sentences for such offenses were often 

high "because of the true nature of the underlying conduct." 

U. S.S.G . App. C, amend. 374 comment. {backg'd). Enhancements 

under the Guidelines allowed this practice to continue. Similarly, the Guidelines commentary explains the enhancement for wea -

pons possession under§ 2D1.l{b) (1) as reflecting "the increased 

1 18 U.S . C. § 924(c) requires the government to show that the 

offender used or carried a firearm "during and in relation to" a 

drug trafficking crime . The evidence must establish "that defendant had ready access to the firearms and that they played an 

integral r ole in the crimes alleged . " United States v. Cox, 934 

F .2d 1114, 1123 {10th Cir. 1991). Defendant's argument here is 

that because the guns were in the trunk of his car, he did not 

have ready access. 

2 The Guidelines commentary to § 2Dl.1 provides that " [t]he 

adj ustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it 

is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the 

offense . " U.S.S.G. § 2D1 . 1, comment. {n.3). 

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danger of violence when drug traff icke rs p ossess weapons." Id . 

§ 2Dl.l (b ) (1 ) comment . 3 (n. 3 ) • The courts are aware of this real -

ity and have held that inferences may be drawn when guns and drugs 

are in close proximity. See,~, United States v . Wheelwright, 

918 F.2d 226, 227 (1st Cir. 199 0) (related provision of§ 2K2 

applicable because "drug distributors who have loaded guns nearby 

are likely to use the guns in 'committing or attempting' drug 

offenses" ) ; United States v. Bronaugh, 895 F.2d 247, 250 (6th Cir. 

1990 ) (related provision of§ 2K2.l properly applied because court 

could infer that gun purchased for defendant was used to protect 

his drug trafficking activities) . 

We think it appropriate to apply the phrase "in connection 

with" in a straightforward and literal fashion. Defendant was 

arrested for reckless driving, and significant amounts of drugs 

and cash were found on his person. A gun case in the back seat of 

defendant's car contained materials used to package drugs for distribution. Two loaded guns were found in the trunk, along with 

more drug packaging paraphernalia and a cutting agent. The types 

of contraband present and its placement throughout defendant's 

vehicle suggests not only that defendant was trafficking in drugs, 

but also that the guns and drugs were intermingled. The district 

court coul d properly have found by a preponderance of the evidence 

t ha t defendant possessed the guns in connection with his drug 

3 Although§ 2Dl.l (b ) (1 ) adds a weapons enhancement to drug trafficking sentenc es, we believe the same policy principles would 

expl ain an increased sentence for a firearms offender who pos- sesses weapons in connection with drug trafficking activities. On 

the other hand, without explicit guidance from the Commission, we 

dec line t o extend the§ 2Dl.l (b ) (1 ) "clearly improbable" standard 

t o § 2 K2 . 1 ( b ) ( 5 ) . 

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trafficking as he admitted in his written plea statement . The 

enhancement under§ 2K2.l(b) (5 ) was appropriate. 

We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part as set out herein. The 

case is REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

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