Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02956/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02956-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Glyn Richards
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

The Honorable Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for *

the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

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NON PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-2956

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

GLYN RICHARDS,

 Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

District Court No. 1-08-CR-00442-001

District Judge: The Honorable Renee M. Bumb

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

March 8, 2010

Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and MICHEL, Circuit Judges*

(Filed: March 15, 2010)

 

 OPINION

 

Case: 09-2956 Document: 003110058767 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/15/2010
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has 1

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Glyn Richards pled guilty to one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and

one count of money-laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). The District Court

determined his Sentencing Guidelines range to be 262 to 327 months. After explaining its

consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court

concluded that an upward variance was warranted and sentenced Richards to 360 months

imprisonment. Richards appeals that sentence. We will affirm the judgment of the District

Court.

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We review Richards’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Our

review for abuse of discretion “proceeds in two stages.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. First, we

ensure that “the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to

calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,

failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen

sentence[.]” Id. Second, if a district court’s procedure was correct, we consider the sentence’s

substantive reasonableness. Id. Our review for substantive reasonableness is highly deferential. 

Id. at 568. We will affirm the sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have

imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court

provided.” Id.

I.

Richards argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the District Court

Case: 09-2956 Document: 003110058767 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/15/2010
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relied almost exclusively on the need for deterrence and the seriousness of the offense, while

failing to give meaningful consideration to other § 3553(a) factors. Specifically, Richards argues

that the District Court paid only “lip service” to the evidence he presented to support a downward

variance: the length of time that had passed since his prior felony convictions; his family ties; his

substantial good faith efforts to cooperate with the government in the investigation and

prosecution of his case; and the sufficiency of a sentence at the low end of the Guideline range in

deterring him from future criminal conduct. We disagree.

The District Court’s analysis of the sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a) was

informed and adequate. See United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2009). “A

sentencing court does not have to discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if

the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at

568 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Throughout the course of the

hearing, including when it elicited victim impact testimony and the parties’ arguments regarding

the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the District Court was presented with considerable information

regarding Richards’s personal history and characteristics, much of it being highly negative. 

Before imposing sentence on Richards, the District Court stated that it had “taken into

consideration all of the factors” in § 3553(a), and while explaining his sentence, the District

Court made extensive references to several of those factors, including Richards’s personal history

and characteristics. That the District Court weighed the § 3553(a) factors differently than

Richards does not imply that it failed to give meaningful consideration to those factors. See

United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, we conclude that the District

Court committed no procedural error in sentencing Richards. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.

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II.

To the extent that Richards argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, we

reject that contention as well. During sentencing, the District Court articulated several valid

reasons for the severity of the sentence. It noted the seriousness of the crime, referring to his

having cheated and lied to family and friends who trusted him, and characterizing the offense as

“one of the most despicable crimes imaginable,” short of a crime of violence. Also noting

Richards’s continuous disrespect for the law, the District Court sentenced Richards in the hope of

fostering in him a “proper respect” for the law. In addition, the District Court reasoned that the

sentence would serve as an effective deterrent to Richards and others who might otherwise

commit similar crimes. In light of the District Court’s stated reasons, it cannot be said that no

reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on Richards. Tomko, 562

F.3d at 567. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Case: 09-2956 Document: 003110058767 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/15/2010