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Parties Involved:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Appellant
Fulbright & Jaworski
Appellee
Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P.
Appellee
Johnson, Bromberg & Leeds
Not Party
Keith McGlamery
Appellee
Penny Parker
Not Party

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,* ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

KEITH McGLAMERY; FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI, ) 

a Partnership; FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI, L.L.P., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

PENNY PARKER; JOHNSON, BROMBERG & LEEDS, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

FILED 

lJIIIted States eo.rt o1 Appcah Tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 3 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-2150 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-292) 

Daniel H. Kurtenbach, FDIC Legal Division, Washington, D.C. (Bruce 

H. DeBoskey and Jay s. Jester, Silver & DeBoskey, Denver, co, 

Harold D. Stratton, Jr., Stratton & Cavin, Albuquerque, NM, and 

Gerald Rome, Resolution Trust Corporation, Denver, co, with him on 

the briefs) for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

John R. Cooney (Charles A. Armgardt and R. Alfred Walker, Modrall, 

Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, with him on 

the brief) for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before KELLY and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BROWN** District Judge. 

BROWN, District Judge. 

* As successor to the Resolution Trust Corporation. 

** The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States Senior District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-2150 Document: 01019287505 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) appeals the 

district court • s order transferring RTC • s claims against 

defendants-appellees to the u. s. District Court for the Northern 

District of Texas. We conclude that the district court's order is 

not an appealable collateral order within the meaning of Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 u.s. 541 (1949); we therefore 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

The RTC, receiver for a federally insured bank in Roswell, New 

Mexico, filed this action in the U. s. District Court in New 

Mexico. Subject matter jurisdiction was proper because the claims 

arose under federal law. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1331 and 1345; 12 u.s.c. § 

1441a(11). The complaint included claims alleging that defendantsappellees -- a Texas law firm and one of its partners -- failed to 

properly advise the bank • s board of directors concerning loan 

regulations, causing the bank to suffer loss when loans relating to 

certain properties in Texas were defaulted upon. The defendantsappellees moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that New Mexico did 

not have personal jurisdiction over them. They simultaneously 

filed motions to dismiss for improper venue or to transfer the 

action to Texas. 

The district court found that appellees• contacts with New 

Mexico were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction there. 

After noting that jurisdiction would be proper in Texas and that 

Texas would be a more convenient forum, the district court ordered 

the transfer of the claims to the Northern District of Texas 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1631. Section 1631 permits a district 

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Appellate Case: 94-2150 Document: 01019287505 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 2 
court to transfer an action to any other court in which the action 

could have been brought if the court finds there is a want of 

jurisdiction and if the transfer is in the interest of justice. In 

Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School. Inc., 822 F.2d 1524, 1527 

(lOth Cir. 1987), we found that this section authorized transfer 

based on the transferor court's lack of personal jurisdiction over 

a party. Cf. Nose v. Rementer, 610 F.Supp. 191 (D.Del. 

1985) (concluding that the legislative history suggests § 1631 

applies only to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.) In support 

of its ruling, the district court observed that outright dismissal 

would effectively bar RTC from refiling in Texas because of the 

statute of limitations. On June 24, 1994, the RTC filed a notice 

of appeal in the u. s. District Court in New Mexico directing an 

appeal to this court. 1 The RTC did not seek certification for 

appeal of an interlocutory order under 28 u.s.c. § 1292(b). RTC 

now argues that the district court erred in finding that New Mexico 

lacks personal jurisdiction and asks us to reverse the transfer 

order. 

At the outset, we note that the incomplete record before us 

raises a number of questions. The record does not contain the 

1 On June 8, 1994, two weeks after entry of the order, the 

original pleadings were shipped to the clerk in the Northern 

District of Texas, who acknowledged receipt and docketed the case 

in that district on June 15, 1994. In light of our conclusion that 

the ruling below does not meet the collateral order test, we need 

not decide whether this court was divested of jurisdiction when the 

file was sent to a district court in another circuit. See Chrysler 

Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler. Inc., 928 F.2d 1509 (lOth cir. 

199l){Appellate jurisdiction in the .transferor circuit is 

terminated when the papers are docketed in the transferee court.) 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-2150 Document: 01019287505 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 3 
motions to transfer or RTC's responses to the motions. It does 

contain RTC's opposition to the motions to dismiss, however, in 

which RTC urged the district court to transfer the action to Texas 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1406(a) if it concluded New Mexico lacked 

personal jurisdiction. Aplt. Exh. In Opposition to Aple. •s Mot. to 

Dismiss, Doc. 4 at 24, n.16, and Doc. 5 at 23, n.15. In light of 

this suggestion, there could be some question as to whether RTC has 

preserved a right to challenge the transfer order on the asserted 

basis that it is prejudicial to RTC. 2 Because we dismiss the 

appeal based on lack of jurisdiction, however, we do not decide 

that issue. 

"Federal appellate jurisdiction generally depends on the 

existence of a decision by the District Court that 'ends the 

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but 

execute the judgment. • " Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 4 3 7 U. s. 4 6 3, 

2 On appeal, RTC emphasizes that it could suffer prejudice 

because Texas law will likely apply to the transferred action, and 

RTC's claims might be barred under the Texas statute of limitations 

but would not be barred under New Mexico's. Although it is clear 

that RTC argued in the district court that New Mexico had 

jurisdiction and that the transfer was therefore inappropriate 

under § 1631, it is not clear whether RTC raised the statute of 

limitations problem in the district court. The district court did 

not determine which state's law would govern if the action were 

transferred, observing only that "Texas law possibly could govern 

the litigation." 

RTC has requested leave to file a supplemental pleading to 

address what it contends is a change of position by appellees 

concerning the applicability of the Texas statute of limitations. 

Having reviewed the materials submitted by the parties, we conclude 

that RTC' s motion is based on a misunderstanding of appellees • 

argument that the statute of limitations in this case did not run 

"because of the transfer." That argument is not inconsistent with 

appellees• assertion that the Texas statute of limitations bars 

RTC's claims. We therefore deny RTC's request for leave to file a 

supplemental pleading. 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-2150 Document: 01019287505 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 4 
467 (1978); 28 u.s.c. § 1291. The finality requirement in§ 1291 

evinces a legislative judgment that restricting appellate review to 

final decisions prevents the debilitating effect on judicial 

administration caused by piecemeal appeal disposition of what is, 

in practical consequence, but a single controversy. Id. at 471. 

Because the district court 1 s transfer order did not end the 

litigation, it is appealable only if it falls within a recognized 

exception to the final-judgment rule. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 

u.s. at 467. RTC contends the ruling falls within the "collateral 

order" exception of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corn., 337 u.s. 

541 (1949). To meet that exception, an order must "conclusively 

determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue 

completely separate from the merits of the action, and be 

effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers 

& Lybrand, 437 u.s. at 468. 

The courts have almost universally agreed that transfer orders 

fall outside the scope of the collateral order exception. See In Re 

Dalton, 733 F.2d 710, 715 (lOth Cir. 1984). In Jesko v. United 

States, 713 F.2d 565, 568 (lOth Cir. 1983) and Raines v. Block, 798 

F.2d 377, 379 (lOth Cir. 1986), we concluded that transfer orders 

based on the transferor court 1 s finding that it lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction did not satisfy the Cohen requirements. Raines 

involved a transfer under § 1631, while Jesko dealt with the former 

§ 1406(c), a forerunner of§ 1631. Jesko, 713 F.2d at 566. Other 

courts have come to the same conclusion with respect to § 1631 

transfers. Ukiah Adventist Hosp. v. F.T.C., 981 F.2d 543, 546 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-2150 Document: 01019287505 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 5 
(D.C. Cir. 1982): Persyn v. United States, 935 F.2d 69, 72 (5th 

Cir. 1991): Middlebrooks v. Smith, 735 F.2d 431, 433 (11th Cir. 

1984). No distinction has been made by the courts with respect to 

transfers based on the transferor court's lack of personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant. See Carteret Savings Bank v. 

Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 230 (3rd Cir. 1990) (transfer under§ 1406(a) 

for lack of personal jurisdiction was not immediately appealable 

under Cohen). 

Even assuming the first two Cohen requirements are satisfied 

here, the RTC has failed to show that the district court's order is 

"effectively unreviewable" on appeal from a final judgment. As RTC 

concedes, the Texas District Court and the Fifth Circuit . can 

indirectly review the transfer order if the RTC moves in those 

courts for retransfer of the case. See Aplt.Br. In Oppos. to Aple. 

Mot. at 7. The RTC argues that such review would be ineffective 

because those courts would be constrained by the "law of the case" 

doctrine on a motion to retransfer. (Citing Christianson v. Colt 

Indus. Operating Corp., 486 u.s. 800, 816 (1988) (Transferee court 

should consider as "law of the case" transferor court's 

determination that it lacked jurisdiction.)). Christianson makes 

clear, however, that the "law of the case" does not deprive a court 

of the power to correct erroneous decisions. Christianson, 486 u.s. 

at 816-17. We thus cannot agree that the district court's order is 

effectively unreviewable by virtue of the law of the case doctrine. 

See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 u.s. 368, 376 

(1981) (an order is effectively unreviewable on appeal after final 

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Appellate Case: 94-2150 Document: 01019287505 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 6 
• judgment only "where denial of immediate review would render 

impossible any review whatsoever."). 

The RTC also urges us to recognize a "concurrent jurisdiction" 

rule and permit immediate appeal when the transferor and transferee 

courts share subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. (Citing 

Goble v. Marsh, 684 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and Gower v. Lehman, 

799 F.2d 925, 927 (4th Cir. 1986)). We see no authority for such 

a rule. Initially, we note that Congress has resolved the problem 

raised by Goble and Gower concerning the subject matter 

jurisdiction of the Federal Claims Court. Section 1292 (d) (4) (A) of 

Title 28 now gives the Federal Circuit jurisdiction of an appeal 

from an interlocutory order granting or denying a motion to 

transfer an action to the Court of Federal Claims under § 1631. 

Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court (see§ 1292(e)), however, 

has provided for appeal of interlocutory orders granting transfer 

between United states District Courts for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Nor has RTC shown that a special rule is warranted 

when the transfer is based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, 

notwithstanding its contention that it could be prejudiced by the 

transfer in this case. Cf. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 u.s. 517, 

529 (1988) ("In fashioning a rule of appealability under § 1291, 

• • • we look to categories of cases, not to particular 

injustices. 11 ). The cases that we have cited denying immediate 

appeal "reflect the common sense view that section 1631 transfers 

are interlocutory for the same reason that venue transfers are: 

the very purpose of transfer provisions is to allow the case to 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-2150 Document: 01019287505 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 7 
• continue, rather than terminating it." Ukiah Adventist Hasp., 981 

F.2d at 546. In terms of the effectiveness of review after final 

judgment, a transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction provides no 

less opportunity for review than a transfer for improper venue 

under§ 1406(a). Indirect review of such orders can be obtained by 

bringing a motion to retransfer in the transferee court. See 

Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler. Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 

1516-18 (lOth Cir. 1991) (Nothing precludes the transferee circuit 

from reviewing whether the transferee district court correctly 

applied the law of the case.) We thus cannot accept RTC's argument 

that the order in this case will be effectively unreviewable on 

appeal from final judgment. For similar reasons, we reject RTC's 

suggestion that we take jurisdiction of the appeal under the 

subjective "pragmatic finality" doctrine. See Boughton v. Cotter 

Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 751-52 (lOth Cir. 1993). RTC has not shown 

that this case involves the type of "unique" or "exceptional" 

circumstances necessary to invoke that doctrine. Id. 

RTC's final contention is that the district court's order is 

invalid because it purported to transfer some, but not all, of 

RTC 1 s claims in the action. RTC points out that in Chrysler 

Credit, supra, we stated that § 1404's authorization for transfer 

of "any civil action" did not allow a district court to transfer a 

portion of the action in the absence of a severance under Rule 21. 

Chrysler Credit, 928 F.2d at 1519-20. Although logically the same 

rule would apply to transfer of "a civil action" under § 1631, this 

case is distinguishable from Chrysler Credit because the district 

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Appellate Case: 94-2150 Document: 01019287505 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 8 
.. court's order is properly construed as a severance of the claims 

under Rule 21. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 ("Any claim against a party may 

be severed and proceeded with separately.") The transfer order 

clearly indicates that the district court intended to create two 

separate actions. Cf. Cheysler Credit, 928 F.2d at 1519 ("The 

district court's order of transfer simply cannot be construed as a 

Rule 21 severance; nowhere in the order does the court refer to 

Rule 21 or imply that two separate actions are being created.") 

Request for Sanctions. Defendants-appellees ask us to impose 

sanctions on RTC for filing a frivolous appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 

38. An appeal is considered frivolous when "the result is obvious, 

or the appellant's arguments of error are wholly without merit." 

Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 (lOth Cir. 1987) (internal 

quotation omitted). Sanctions are not warranted here. Although we 

have rejected RTC's suggested application of the collateral order 

doctrine, we do not consider its position to be wholly without 

merit, nor do we consider the result of the appeal to have been so 

obvious as to render RTC's position frivolous. 

Conclusion. 

Appellant's motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading 

is DENIED, as is appellees• request for sanctions. The appeal is 

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 

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