Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01738/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01738-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Defendant
Fedex Corporation
Defendant
Douglas Gibson
Plaintiff
Aidan Forrest Gibson
Plaintiff
Emerald Mayann Gibson
Plaintiff
Holly Noel Shortal
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS GIBSON; HOLLY NOEL No. 2:09-cv-01738-MCE-KJM

SHORTAL, EMERALD MAYANN GIBSON, 

and AIDAN FORREST GIBSON, 

minors, by and through their 

Guardian Ad Litem, DOUGLAS 

GIBSON, 

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FEDEX CORPORATION; UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA, DEPARTMENT 

OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through this action, Plaintiffs Douglas Gibson, Holly Noel

Shortal, Emerald Mayann Gibson, and Aiden Forrest Gibson

(“Plaintiffs”) bring suit for allegations of negligence and

violations of federal law relating to the death of Noelle Ann

Gibson. They seek monetary damages from the United States of

America and the Department of Veterans Affairs (“Defendants”) for

claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2817 et seq. (“FTCA”). 

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 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to Rule or 1

Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 230(g). 

 The factual assertions in this section are based on the 3

allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint unless otherwise specified.

2

Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Defendants also move to dismiss for 1

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is denied, and the Motion

to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is granted.2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiffs, spouse and heirs of decedent Noelle Ann Gibson,

bring what amounts to a wrongful death action. According to

Plaintiffs, the Department of Veterans Affairs operated Hines

Consolidated Mail Order Pharmacy (“HCMP”) in 2007. On July 20,

2007, HCMP shipped a prescription for Hydrocodone via FedEx. On

July 23, 2007, this prescription was delivered to, signed for,

and received by decedent. Decedent was not the intended

recipient of the medication, nor was she that recipient’s agent. 

Nearly one month later, on August 18, 2007, the decedent ingested

the Hydrocodone, overdosed, and died. 

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Plaintiffs brought suit against FedEx, the United States,

and the Department of Veterans Affairs for negligence and

“violation of Federal Law” for failing to ensure that the

prescription was delivered solely to its intended recipient. 

FedEx filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), which was granted. The action against FedEx now

terminated, the remaining defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’

complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over

civil actions, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests

upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Lack of subject

matter jurisdiction is never waived and may be raised by either

party or the court at any time. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape

Computer Products, Inc., 93 F.3d. 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the district

court sua sponte: “Nothing is to be more jealously guarded by a

court than its jurisdiction.” In re Mooney, 841 F.2d. 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1988).

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the challenging party may either make

a “facial attack” on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in

the complaint or can instead take issue with subject matter

jurisdiction on a factual basis (“factual attack”). 

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Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). If the motion

constitutes a facial attack, the Court must consider the factual

allegations of the complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker,

645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. 

If the motion constitutes a factual attack, however, “no

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

B. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what

the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). 

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“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Id. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain

something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates

a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”). In

order to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face,” Aschroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570), plaintiff must plead “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. 

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability

requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949 (internal citation

and quotation omitted). 

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C. Leave to Amend

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant,...undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of...the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is

only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction

“Federal sovereign immunity insulates the United States from

suit in the absence of an express waiver of this immunity by

Congress.” Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 280

(1983)) (internal quotations omitted). The FTCA “waives the

United States’ sovereign immunity in a defined category of cases

involving negligence committed by federal employees in the course

of their employment.” Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509

F.3d 1008, 1018 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dolan v. United States

Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 484 (2006)) (internal quotations

omitted). 

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The Act provides that government can be subject to suit “in the

same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under

like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 

Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because the federal government has not waived its

sovereign immunity. They contend that no negligent act or

omission by a federal employee has been alleged in Plaintiffs’

complaint. Plaintiffs, in their opposition, cite to various

provisions of the California Business and Professions Code to

support their claim that a private pharmacy would be liable in

this instance, and that therefore the government is subject to

suit. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that where “the jurisdictional

issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question

of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues

going to the merits, the jurisdictional determination should

await a determination of the relevant facts on either a motion

going to the merits or at trial.” Augustine v. United States,

704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). 

See also Autery v. United States, 424 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir.

2005). “[T]he moving party should prevail only if the material

jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is

entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Augustine, 704 F.2d at

1077. 

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In the case at hand, the parties dispute many of the

“material jurisdictional facts.” Defendants assert that

Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to show that

Defendants are responsible for the alleged misdelivery of the

Hydrocodone prescription. Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’

claims cut to the merits of Plaintiffs’ complaint and are better

addressed through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as discussed below. 

In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied without prejudice. 

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

1. Negligence Cause of Action

Plaintiffs allege in their first claim that Defendants

negligently caused to be shipped a prescription of Hydrocodone to

decedent, who was not the intended recipient, thereby causing

decedent’s death. Wrongful death is a statutorily created cause

of action for pecuniary loss brought by heirs against a person

who causes the death of another by a negligent or wrongful act. 

Jacoves v. United Merch. Corp., 9 Cal. App. 4th 88, 105 (1992). 

Negligence involves the violation of a legal duty--imposed by

statute, contract, or otherwise--by the defendant to the person

injured, e.g., the deceased in a wrongful death action. Nally v.

Grace Cmty. Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 292 (1988). 

In any action for wrongful death resulting from negligence,

the complaint must contain allegations as to all the elements of

actionable negligence. Potter v. Richards, 132 Cal. App. 2d 380,

385 (1955). 

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 In their opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, 4

Plaintiffs cite to California Business and Professions Code

§§ 4120, 4112, and 4059.5(b), which regulate nonresident

pharmacies and the delivery of prescription drugs. Because these

provisions of California law were not included in the operative

complaint, the Court shall not address them here.

9

A plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant had a legal duty to

use due care; (2) the defendant breached such legal duty; (3) the

defendant’s breach was the proximate or legal cause of the

resulting injury; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. Ladd v.

County of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917 (1996). The existence

of a legal duty on the part of the defendant is a question of law

to be determined by the court. Kentucky Fried Chicken of

California, Inc. v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th 814, 819 (1997);

Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 124 (1985). 

When not provided by statute, the existence of such a duty

depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and a weighing of

policy considerations for and against the imposition of

liability. Jacoves, 9 Cal. App. 4th at 107. 

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “owed plaintiff and

plaintiffs’ decedent a duty not to engage in any conduct that

would cause an injury to another.” (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs

have not cited in their complaint to a statute creating either a

duty or a special relationship that would give rise to a duty

between a pharmacy and a third party. Thus, in order for such a 4

duty to exist, Plaintiffs must allege that an act on the part of

Defendants created a foreseeable risk of harm to decedent. 

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Plaintiffs do not allege any behavior on the part of

Defendants that would indicate the creation of a foreseeable

risk. Plaintiffs do not name the intended patient or specify to

whom the package of Hydrocodone was addressed. Plaintiffs do not

claim that an employee of Defendants misaddressed the package or

in any way contributed to its misdelivery to decedent. 

Plaintiffs fail to allege how a pharmacy, whose employees are not

present at the time of the delivery, owes a duty to a third party

for the misdelivery of a package containing prescription drugs. 

There is also no factual allegation that Defendants knew or

should have known that a third party would open the package and

misuse its contents. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim for negligence is dismissed

with leave to amend.

 

2. Violation of Federal Law

Plaintiffs’ second claim alleges that Defendants violated an

unspecified federal law prohibiting “the delivery of a controlled

substance, such as Hydrocodone, to a person other than the

intended patient for whom the prescription was issued.” (Compl.

¶ 21.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants “violated said

Federal Law by, among others, failing to insure [sic] that the

prescription shipped was delivered solely and only to the

intended patient[], and, in fact, by delivering said prescription

to plaintiffs’ decedent.” (Compl. ¶ 22.)

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While a complaint need not identify the statutory or

constitutional source of the claim raised in order to survive a

motion to dismiss, the facts alleged must provide “fair notice”

of the claim. Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.

2008). The factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570. 

Because Plaintiffs have failed to identify the specific

provision of federal law that was allegedly violated, Defendants

have not been put on sufficient notice of the claims against

them. Even after accepting all well-pled accusations as true,

Plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief can be

granted. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of federal law

is dismissed with leave to amend. 

C. Motion to Dismiss Improper Party Defendant

Defendants argue that federal agencies cannot be sued in

tort, and that therefore the claims against the Department of

Veteran’s Affairs must be dismissed. The FTCA provides that once

it has been determined that a defendant employee was acting in an

official capacity when the claim arose, “any civil action or

proceeding commenced upon such a claim in a United States

district court shall be deemed an action against the United

States..., and the United States shall be substituted as the

party defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). 

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In light of the foregoing, the Department of Veteran’s Affairs is

an improper defendant in this action. Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Improper Party Defendant is unopposed and is granted. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(Docket No. 24) is DENIED as to Rule 12(b)(1) and is GRANTED with

leave to amend as to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Improper Party Defendant is GRANTED. The Clerk is

directed to terminate Defendant Department of Veteran’s Affairs. 

The United States of America remains as the proper Defendant,

pending the filing of an amended complaint. 

Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint not later than

twenty (20) days after this Memorandum and Order is filed

electronically. If no amended complaint is filed within said

twenty (20)-day period, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims

without further notice and without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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