Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02420/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02420-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Schelia A. Clark
Respondent
Veronica Rivera
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERONICA RIVERA,

Petitioner,

 v.

SCHELIA A. CLARK, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 07-2420 CW

ORDER GRANTING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Veronica Rivera brings this action seeking a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent Schelia A.

Clark opposes the petition. The matter was taken under submission

on the papers. Having considered all of the papers submitted by

the parties, the Court grants the petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently serving a term of twenty-four months

of imprisonment on a conviction for conspiracy to commit honest

services mail fraud. She is incarcerated at the Federal Prison

Camp in Dublin, California, where Respondent is warden. She filed

this petition challenging a federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)

regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 570.21, that denies inmates placement in a

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RRCs are commonly known as halfway houses. The term,

“community corrections center” (CCC) is also used by other courts

to refer to the same type of institutional setting.

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residential reentry center (RRC)1 until the last ten percent or six

months of their sentence, whichever is shorter. Petitioner claims

that this policy is contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which governs

the placement of inmates in BOP custody.

Pursuant to the challenged regulation, Petitioner has been

scheduled for transfer to an RRC on March 25, 2008, the beginning

of the last ten percent of her sentence. Petitioner challenged the

BOP’s placement decision by filing a request for an administrative

remedy. In this request, she argued that a consideration of the

factors set forth in § 3621(b) militates in favor of her transfer

to an RRC at the earliest possible date. Respondent denied

Petitioner’s request, stating, “Our procedures indicate that the

length of placement requested for a Residential Re-entry Center is

limited to the last 10 percent of the inmate’s term to be served or

six months, whichever is less.” Burke Decl. Ex. 1.

Petitioner appealed Respondent’s decision to the BOP Regional

Office. The Regional Director denied the appeal, stating:

Federal Regulation 28 CFR § 570.20 outlines the Bureau’s

authority to designate inmates to community confinement. 

If eligible, the Bureau may designate inmates to

community confinement during their last ten percent of

the prison sentence being served, not to exceed six

months. In addition, a review of your request was

conducted without consideration of any time limitation,

and the Unit Team determined that based on your ability

to secure employment and reestablish family and community

ties, a 60 day RRC placement was appropriate to assist

with your prerelease needs.

Id.

Petitioner appealed this intermediate-level decision to the

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BOP’s Central Office. The Central Office denied the appeal,

stating:

Recommending [RRC] placement and the length involves the

review of several factors, including an inmate’s current

offense, institutional adjustment, individual needs,

public safety, and existing community resources. 

Ordinarily, inmates with shorter sentences do not require

maximum RRC placement due to reduced transition needs.

. . . All available information in your case was reviewed

and records indicate that you have been approved for RRC

placement on March 25, 2008. We concur with this

decision, find it appropriate, and in compliance with

policy.

Id.

Petitioner now challenges the BOP’s decision, seeking an order

requiring Respondent to consider her appropriateness for transfer

to an RRC in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b),

notwithstanding the time limits imposed by 28 C.F.R. § 570.21.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), a two-pronged framework exists

for judicial review of an administrative agency’s interpretation of

the statutes and regulations that it administers:

If congressional intent is clear, both the court and the

agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress. If, however, Congress has not

directly addressed the exact issue in question, a

reviewing court must defer to the agency’s construction

of the statute so long as it is reasonable. In other

words, unless an agency’s statutory interpretation is

arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the

statute, the agency is accorded Chevron deference, and

the court must adopt the agency’s view.

Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1011-1012 (9th Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) provides in relevant part:

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The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the

prisoner’s imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any

available penal or correctional facility . . . that the

Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable,

considering--

(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;

(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;

(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;

(4) any statement by the court that imposed the

sentence--

(A) concerning the purposes for which the

sentence to imprisonment was determined to be

warranted; or

(B) recommending a type of penal or

correctional facility as appropriate; and

(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the

Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2)

of title 28.

. . . The Bureau may at any time, having regard for the

same matters, direct the transfer of a prisoner from one

penal or correctional facility to another.

18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).

Section 3624(c), in turn, provides:

The Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable,

assure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment

spends a reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of

the last 10 per centum of the term to be served under

conditions that will afford the prisoner a reasonable

opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner’s

re-entry into the community.

18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).

Prior to December, 2002, the BOP had a longstanding policy of

allowing inmates to spend the last six months of their

incarceration in an RRC, regardless of the portion of their

sentence this six-month period constituted. Elwood v. Jeter, 386

F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 2004). In December, 2002, however, the

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Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel issued a memo opining

that § 3624(c) limits the BOP’s authority to place an inmate in an

RRC. The memo concluded that an inmate’s residence in an RRC may

not exceed the lesser of ten percent of the total sentence or six

months. Id. at 844-45; Goldings v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17, 19-20 (1st

Cir. 2004). The BOP adopted this interpretation of its statutory

authority and changed its policy accordingly. Goldings, 383 F.3d

at 20.

The new BOP policy was challenged in court, where it was

invalidated by the First and Eighth Circuits. These courts held

that § 3621(b) granted the BOP the discretion to transfer an inmate

to an RRC at any time during the inmate’s sentence, even prior to

the last six months or ten percent of the sentence. Goldings, 383

F.3d at 28-29; Jeter, 386 F.3d at 847.

In response to these court decisions, in 2005, the BOP

promulgated regulations interpreting the above statutes. In doing

so, the BOP stated that it was in engaging in what it characterized

as a “categorical exercise of [the] discretion” given to it by

§ 3621(b). 28 C.F.R. § 570.20(a). It relied on this discretion to

impose an across-the-board limit on the time inmates may spend in

an RRC:

(a) The Bureau will designate inmates to community

confinement only as part of pre-release custody and

programming, during the last ten percent of the prison

sentence being served, not to exceed six months.

(b) We may exceed these time-frames only when specific

Bureau programs allow greater periods of community

confinement, as provided by separate statutory authority

(for example, residential substance abuse treatment

program (18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(A)), or shock incarceration

program (18 U.S.C. 4046(c)).

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28 C.F.R. § 570.21. 

Petitioner claims that this regulation is contrary to

§ 3621(b) because it does not provide for an individualized

evaluation of each inmate’s suitability for placement in an RRC

prior to the last ten percent or six months of his or her sentence. 

Petitioner maintains that, rather than limiting the BOP’s

discretion to place inmates in an RRC prior to the last ten percent

of their sentence, § 3624(c) imposes minimum requirements on the

BOP with respect to RRC placements. Respondent counters that the

BOP regulation is a valid interpretation of § 3624(c) considered in

conjunction with § 3621(b), and thus should be accorded Chevron

deference.

The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the validity of 28

C.F.R. § 570.21. However, all four of the courts of appeals that

have addressed the issue have held that the regulation is contrary

to the plain meaning of the statutes. Wedelstedt v. Wiley, 477

F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007); Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.

2006); Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2006); Woodall v.

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005). The Court

agrees with these decisions and adopts their reasoning.

Section 3621(b) gives the BOP wide discretion to assign an

inmate to any “appropriate and suitable” facility, but directs the

agency to consider five enumerated factors when making its

determination. Because several of these factors refer to

information that is particular to each inmate, the statute clearly

contemplates individualized placement determinations. The statute

permits the BOP to transfer an inmate to any facility, including an

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See Levine, 455 F.3d at 80-82, and Woodall, 432 F.3d at 245-

46, for a more thorough analysis of the text of § 3621(b).

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RRC or similar facility, “at any time,” provided that the five

factors support such a placement.2

Section 3624(c) places an additional duty on the BOP with

respect to inmate placements. It requires the agency to assure

that, to the extent practicable, a reasonable portion of the last

ten percent of an inmate’s sentence is spent in a setting such as

an RRC. The qualifier, “not to exceed six months” is set off by

commas and modifies only the phrase, “a reasonable portion.” Thus,

the BOP is not required by § 3624(c) to designate a period of RRC

placement exceeding six months, even if the last ten percent of an

inmate’s sentence is greater than six months. Put another way, the

statute defines six months as the upper boundary of the “reasonable

portion” requirement. Accord Elwood, 386 F.3d at 847 (“[Under

§ 3624(c),] the BOP is required to place prisoners in conditions

that will afford them a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and

prepare for the prisoner’s re-entry into the community during a

reasonable part of the last ten percent of the prisoner’s term, to

the extent practicable. This duty shall not extend beyond the last

six months of the prisoner’s sentence.”) (internal quotation marks

and brackets omitted).

Fundamentally, § 3624(c) imposes a requirement on the BOP

independently of § 3621(b). Nothing in § 3624(c) can be

interpreted as limiting the BOP’s discretion under § 3621(b) to

place inmates in an RRC prior to the last ten percent of their

sentence. Accord Wedelstedt, 447 F.3d at 1166 (“Although § 3624(c)

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surely imposes an affirmative obligation on the BOP, whenever

practicable, to place an inmate in a CCC or other form of community

confinement as the inmate’s release date nears, § 3624(c) has no

bearing on whether a CCC may be considered as a place of

imprisonment at some earlier point in a prisoner’s period of

incarceration.”); Woodall, 432 F.3d at 250 (“[Section] 3624 does

not determine when the BOP should consider CCC placement, but when

it must provide it.”); Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir.

2004) (“Under § 3621(b), the BOP may place a prisoner in a CCC for

six months, or more. Under § 3624(c) the BOP must formulate a plan

of pre-release conditions. This plan may include CCC placement,

home confinement, drug or alcohol treatment, or any other plan that

meets the obligation of a plan that addresses the prisoner’s

re-entry into the community.”) (emphasis added). Thus, § 3624(c)

establishes a “floor,” not a “ceiling.” Respondent is simply

incorrect in asserting that § 3624(c) “specifically states that a

prisoner should not spend more than the lesser of 10% of his

sentence or six months in a facility where he can re-enter the

community.” Resp.’s Br. at 7. This interpretation finds no

support in the statute’s text, and therefore is not entitled to

Chevron deference.

Respondent argues that, even if § 3621(b) gives the BOP the

discretion to transfer inmates to an RRC prior to the last ten

percent of their sentence, the agency may categorically exercise

this discretion, considering RRC placement to be appropriate only

during the last ten percent of an inmate’s sentence. In passing 28

C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21, Respondent argues, the BOP validly

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exercised this discretion. However, such an approach to inmate

placement is contrary to the clear language of § 3621(b), which

requires the BOP to conduct an individualized placement assessment

for each inmate. In making this assessment, the agency must

consider specific enumerated factors, some of which are unique to

individual inmates. The BOP is entitled to conclude that,

considering these factors and the needs of a particular inmate, RRC

placement would not be appropriate until that inmate has served a

certain portion of his or her sentence. However, it is contrary to

the directive of § 3621(b) for the BOP to make this decision

categorically, without regard to the circumstances of individual

inmates.

While the BOP may be able to make categorical rules to fill

gaps in the statutes it administers, it may not make such rules

when doing so would be inconsistent with congressional

instructions. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 243-44 (2001). In

other words, the BOP “may not promulgate categorical rules that do

not take account of the categories that are made significant by

Congress.” Levine, 455 F.3d at 85. Here, the BOP regulation pays

no regard to the factors set out in § 3621(b). Instead, it

withdraws eligibility for RRC placement from inmates who have not

yet begun the last ten percent of their sentence, regardless of

whether the factors in § 3621(b) would support such a placement at

an earlier time. Accordingly, the regulation is not a valid

exercise of the agency’s discretion.

Respondent also argues that an RRC is not a “place of

imprisonment,” and thus is excluded from the scope of § 3621(b). 

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She bases this argument on United States v. Sullivan, 504 F.3d 969

(9th Cir. 2007). In that case, the defendant had been sentenced in

1998 by a federal court to a term of eighteen months in prison

followed by three years of supervised release. The defendant

served this sentence concurrently with a separate sentence issued

by a Montana state court. In 2001, the defendant was transferred

from a Montana state prison into a Montana state pre-release

center. While the Sullivan decision is not clear on this point,

the defendant presumably had completed his federal term of

imprisonment by the time he was transferred.

The Ninth Circuit found that, for the purposes of crediting

time served toward the defendant’s sentence of federal supervised

release, he began serving this sentence when he was transferred to

the Montana pre-release center. The court held that the

defendant’s time in the pre-release center did not qualify as

“imprisonment” under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which relates to

supervised release and provides, “The term of supervised release

commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment.” 

Id. at 972.

Sullivan’s holding is limited to the set of facts at issue

there. Whatever the meaning of the term, “imprisonment” in

§ 3624(e), § 3624(c) clearly contemplates that when an inmate is

transferred from a federal prison to a federal RRC, he or she

remains “imprisoned” in all respects relevant here -- the statute

provides that an inmate should spend a reasonable portion of the

last ten percent of his or her “term of imprisonment” in a setting

such as an RRC. If a particular inmate was sentenced to a term of

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supervised release in addition to a term of imprisonment, the term

of supervised release would commence after he or she was released

from the RRC. If Sullivan were to compel the conclusion that such

an inmate began his or her term of supervised release upon transfer

to the RRC, the inmate would never complete his or her term of

imprisonment.

Moreover, Sullivan focused on the fact that, while at the

Montana pre-release center, the defendant was not “not subject to

the control of the Bureau of Prisons.” Id. at 971. Here, in

contrast, the BOP would maintain control over Petitioner even after

she was transferred to an RRC; the agency could exercise its

discretion to transfer her back to a traditional prison setting at

any time, assuming it considered the factors in § 3621(b) prior to

making such a transfer. Underlining this point, Kim Beakey, a BOP

official, has submitted a declaration that states, “Moving an

inmate to a RRC is no different than transferring an inmate from

one BOP location to another.” Beakey Dec. ¶ 6. This is contrary

to Respondent’s argument that transfers to an RRC are not

encompassed by § 3621(b).

Finally, Respondent argues that the petition is moot because

the BOP Regional Director reviewed Petitioner’s request for RRC

placement “without consideration of any time limitation.” 

Nonetheless, it is clear that the initial decision to limit

Petitioner’s placement in an RRC to sixty days was based on the

restrictions imposed by the challenged regulation. In affirming

this decision, the Regional Director expressed his view that the

length of Petitioner’s RRC term was limited by the regulation. In

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addition, contrary to the Regional Director’s assertion, there is

no evidence that Petitioner’s unit team, which issued the original

RRC recommendation, considered Petitioner’s “ability to secure

employment and reestablish family and community ties” when making

its decision. See Beakey Decl. Ex. 3. Nor does the administrative

review of Petitioner’s placement decision contain any substantive

discussion of the factors specified in § 3621(b). Accordingly, the

Court cannot conclude that the BOP’s placement decision would

remain undisturbed if the agency did not consider itself bound by

the ten-percent limitation, and the petition thus is not moot.

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent shall consider

the appropriateness of placing Petitioner in an RRC during any

portion of the remainder of her sentence, without regard for the

ten-percent time limit imposed by 18 C.F.R. § 570.21. When making

her decision, Respondent shall take into account Petitioner’s

particularized pre-release needs and the factors set forth in

§ 3621(b). The decision shall issue within fourteen days of this

order. The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. Each

party shall bear her own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/5/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RIVERA et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CLARK et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-02420 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on February 5, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Dennis Matthew Wong

U.S. Attorney’s Office

450 Golden Gate Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94102

Veronica Rivera 97659-011

Federal Prison Camp, Dublin

5675 8th Street

Camp Parks

Dublin, CA 94568

Dated: February 5, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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