Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06209/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06209-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jari Askins
Appellee
Carolyn Crump
Appellee
Marzee Douglas
Appellee
Carl B. Hamm
Appellee
Farrell Hatch
Appellee
Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board
Appellee
Isa Abdullah Ramadan Shabazz
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED sTATEs coURT oF APPEALS un1JsJ.~~Appea1, Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ISA ABDULLAH RAMADAN SHABAZZ-, ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

JARI ASKINS, CAROLYN CRUMP, 

MARZEE DOUGLAS, CARL B. HAMM, 

FARRELL HATCH, and OKLAHOMA 

PARDON AND PAROLE BOARD, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

NOV 9 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-6209 

(D.C. No. CIV-91-457-W) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Plaintiff Isa Abdullah Ramadan Shabazz appeals the district 

court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. In the district 

court, Plaintiff alleged that the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole 

Board's failure to recommend parole was in retaliation for 

Plaintiff's previous religious discrimination lawsuits against 

prison officials and that it was the Parole Board's custom, 

policy, and practice to retaliate against plaintiffs like him who 

choose to exercise their civil rights. The district court 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

-1-

Appellate Case: 92-6209 Document: 010110145715 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 1 
dismissed Plaintiff's civil rights claim as frivolous under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(d). This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C . 

§ 1291. We review for abuse of discretion, Denton v. Hernandez, 

112 s. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992), and we reverse. 

Plaintiff was convicted of forgery and sentenced to twenty 

years in prison. While serving this sentence, Plaintiff legally 

changed his name for religious reasons from Jimmy Phillips to Isa 

Abdullah Ramadan Shabazz. Plaintiff filed a number of lawsuits 

against the Department of Corrections, including several religious 

discrimination suits seeking recognition under his newly-adopted 

religious name. See,~, Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 985 (1981); Shabazz v. Johnson, No. 

CIV-90-429-W (W.D. Okla. 1991), vacated, 945 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 

1991) (unpublished disposition); Shabazz v. Kaiser, No. 76,018 

(Okla. 1990); Phillips v. Williams, 583 P.2d 488 (Okla. 1978), 

vacated, 442 U.S. 926 (1979); Shabazz v. Bellmen, No. H-91-258 

(Okla. Cr. App. 1991). 

On March 22, 1991, the Parole Board denied Plaintiff parole. 

On April 4, 1991, Plaintiff filed the present action 

(No. 91-CIV-457-W) in district court, requesting leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis and claiming that the Board's parole denial was 

in retaliation for his previous religious discrimination lawsuits. 

On April 12, 1991, the district court permitted Plaintiff to 

proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that 

the Plaintiff had another action pending before the Tenth Circuit 

(No. 91-CIV-429-W) raising parallel issues. In an unpublished 

disposition, we granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, found 

-2-

Appellate Case: 92-6209 Document: 010110145715 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 2 
.,.J 

that the present action (No. 91-CIV-457-W) was different from 

Plaintiff's earlier action (No. 91-CIV-429-W), and remanded the 

present case to the district court with instructions to consider 

the claim on the merits. See Shabazz v. Askins, 945 F.2d 411 

(10th Cir. 1991) (unpublished disposition). 

On remand, the magistrate properly requested that the Parole 

Board file a Martinez report so that the court could ascertain 

whether Plaintiff's retaliation claim had a factual basis. 

Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 318-19 (10th Cir. 1978). 

See 

The 

magistrate reviewed the report and considered two allegations made 

by Plaintiff in support of his retaliation claim. Plaintiff's 

first allegation was that the Board refused to recognize him by 

his "Nubian Islaamic [sic] Hebrew name," and this refusal 

indicated that the Board considered Plaintiff's previous name 

recognition lawsuits in its parole denial. The magistrate looked 

to the Martinez report and made a factual finding that 11 [t]he 

reference to the prior name was an innocuous reference for record 

identification purposes only and the declination of parole was 

based on non-retaliatory circumstances stated in the 

recommendation . " 

Plaintiff's second allegation supporting his claim of 

retaliatory treatment was that other similarly situated inmates, 

appearing at the March 22, 1991 parole hearings, were paroled and 

he was not. In response to this allegation, the magistrate found 

that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed as frivolous because 

"the fact that other inmates that appeared at the March, 1991, 

docket before the Pardon and Parole Board and were paroled does 

-3-

Appellate Case: 92-6209 Document: 010110145715 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 3 
• 

J 

not even suggest retaliation by the [Board] against the Plaintiff 

on equal protection grounds." The magistrate stated that 

Plaintiff lacked a basis for a retaliation claim because Plaintiff 

did not "show that the decisionmaker [sic] singled out a 

particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course 

of action at least in part, for the purpose of causing its adverse 

effects on the identifiable group." The district court adopted 

these two findings and dismissed Plaintiff's claims as frivolous 

under§ 1915(d), stating that Plaintiff "fail[ed] to identify and/ 

or establish any discriminatory or retaliatory action by [the 

Parole Board] ... that would give rise to the relief requested 

by the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." 

Section 1915(d) gives the district court "the unusual power 

to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and 

dismiss [as frivolous] those claims whose factual contentions are 

clearly baseless." Neitske v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); 

Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991). Clearly 

baseless factual allegations are those that are "fantastic or 

delusional." Neitske, 490 U.S. at 327-28. Although a district 

court can review the factual allegations to determine whether they 

are clearly baseless, the court cannot address the merits of a 

claim in dismissing it under§ 1915(d) as frivolous. Denton, 112 

S. Ct. at 1734. A court may consider the Martinez report in 

making its clearly baseless determination, but "it cannot resolve 

material disputed factual findings when they are in conflict with 

the pleadings or affidavits." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109 (citations 

omitted). "A bona fide factual dispute exists even when the 

-4-

Appellate Case: 92-6209 Document: 010110145715 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 4 
plaintiff's factual allegations that are in conflict with the 

Martinez report are less specific or well-documented than those 

contained in the report." Id. "[A] plausible factual allegation, 

even if it lacks evidentiary support, is not 'frivolous' as 

contemplated by§ 1915(d), even though it may not survive a motion 

for summary judgment." Id. at 1109. 

The district court, in its§ 1915(d) dismissal of Plaintiff's 

retaliation claim, weighed the facts, which it should not do. See 

Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1733; Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109. Plaintiff's 

first allegation was that the Parole Board purposefully refused to 

recognize him by his "Nubian Islaamic [sic] Hebrew name." The 

magistrate resolved this factual dispute by relying on the parole 

hearing transcript, which was part of the Martinez report. 

Plaintiff also alleged that three similarly situated inmates were 

granted parole on the same day he was denied parole. The 

magistrate weighed the facts in concluding that Plaintiff failed 

to show disparate treatment by the Parole Board. The district 

court adopted both of these factual findings made by the 

magistrate. In adopting the magistrate's report, which weighed 

disputed facts, the district court abused its discretion. See 

Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1733; Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109. 

The government's reliance on Serio v. Members of La. State 

Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1987), to support the 

district court's§ 1915(d) dismissal is unpersuasive. The 

government points to language in Serio distinguishing it from 

Hilliard v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 759 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 

1985). Citing Hilliard, the Serio court stated that a plaintiff, 

-5-

Appellate Case: 92-6209 Document: 010110145715 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 5 
• 

in order to sustain his claim of intentional Parole Board 

retaliation, must point to "hearing-record statements or other 

facts establishing that his allegation was founded on anything 

more than his own assumption." Serio, 821 F.2d at 1114. The 

government's reliance on Serio's construction of Hilliard is 

misplaced because the dismissal in Hilliard was made pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), see Hilliard, 759 F.2d at 1191, which 

requires application of a different standard than§ 1915(d). 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

-6-

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-6209 Document: 010110145715 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 6