Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03035/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03035-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lorenzo J. Baylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 4, 1996 Decided October 4, 1996

No. 95-3035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LORENZO J. BAYLOR,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

95-3039

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00251-02)

(No. 94cr00251-03)

Michael T. Lempres argued the causesfor appellants and filed the briefsfor appellant WalterJ. Smith.

Lauren S. Kahn, appointed by the court, was on the brief for appellant Lorenzo J. Baylor.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom

Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, and Linda O.

McKinney, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: WALD, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Opinion concurring specially filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In these appeals from their convictions by a jury of conspiracy to

distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 846, distribution of cocaine base, id. § 841, and distribution of

cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of id. § 860(a), appellants Lorenzo J. Baylor

and Walter Jamal Smith raise separate and joint challenges. Smith contends that the district court

abused its discretion in curtailing cross-examination of a key government witness on the subject of

a prior conviction. Smith also contests the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for

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1 Appellants have waived any challenge to the constitutionality of the "schoolyard statute," 21

U.S.C. § 860(a), because they failed to raise this issue in the district court. United States v.

Baucum, 66 F.3d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 8, 1996) (No. 96-5101). 

drug distribution within 1,000 feet of a school.

1 Both appellants challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence to support their convictions for conspiracy. Baylor further contends that the district court

clearly erred by increasing his base offense level to reflect his managerialrole in the drug transactions,

by failing to consider a downward departure based on a Sentencing Commission Report on cocaine

sentencing policy, and by including as relevant conduct for purposes of calculating his base offense

level drug amounts involved in counts of which he was acquitted. We affirm the judgments of

conviction but, in view of the merger of the distribution counts with the "schoolyard statute" drug

possession counts, we remand the case to the district court.

I.

The government's evidence showed that in 1994 appellants Baylor and Smith, and indicted

co-conspirator Douglas Coates, worked together to complete a series of transactions involving the

distribution of cocaine base. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United

States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), the evidence established that Baylor supplied the drugs to Coates,

who then provided them to Smith for retail sale. On April 4, 1994, Coates introduced Smith to an

undercover police officer at an apartment house located at 704 3rd Street, N.W., which was 534 feet

from the Georgetown Law Center. Smith, the officer, and another man went to a small apartment

located in the basement level of the building, where Smith produced a gym bag containing a large

quantity of white rock substance. Smith then sold 10.21 grams of cocaine base to the officer for

$500.

Following two other sales in April 1994 by Coates to the undercover officer, and after

reporting that his supplier had just ordered a price increase to $1,200 for an ounce of crack, Coates

introduced the officer to "his man" Baylor on May 19, 1994. After the officer gave Coates the

money, Coates and Baylor entered a barbershop located in the one thousand block of U Street, N.W.

When Coates returned he handed the officer a bag containing 21.431 grams of cocaine base. Coates

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stated that the quality of the cocaine was identical to that purchased by the officer on the three prior

occasions. The May 19th sale occurred within 302 feet of Garnett Patterson Junior High School.

Prior to trial, Coates pled guilty to the distribution of 50 grams or more of cocaine base and

agreed to testify for the government. Coates described his relationship with Baylor and Smith as

having commenced in March 1993 whenBaylor began to "front" between half an ounce and an eighth

of a kilogram of cocaine base to Coates two or three times a week. Coates either sold the drugs

himself or supplied other sellers, and paid Baylor only once the drugs were sold. Baylor determined

where the two men would meet, the price of the cocaine sold, and whether Coates would be

compensated in cash or cocaine. It was during this same period that Smith first approached Coates

to ask whether he could procure drugs for him. In March and April 1993, Coates twice supplied

Smith with one to two ounces of cocaine base that had been provided to him byBaylor. Monies paid

by Smith to Coates were remitted to Baylor who, in turn, paid Coates a commission in the form of

either money or cocaine. Smith informed Coates that he was selling the drugs at a homeless shelter

located at 2nd and D Streets, N.W., and later at 704 3rd Street, N.W., and that he had two or three

other persons working for him. Although the two lost contact during the summer of 1993, Smith

approached Coatesin October of that year to ask ifCoates could still "work the dealsfor him." From

November 1993 through March 1994, Coates sold Smith an eighth of a kilogram of cocaine base on

six separate occasions. Each delivery was made with cocaine that had been provided to Coates by

Baylor.

At trial, the government presented expert evidence concerning the typical features of drug

conspiracies in the District of Columbia. According to the expert, drug distribution chains are

frequently structured so that wholesalers and retailers have no direct contact with one another and

instead work entirely through intermediaries.

In their defense, both appellants sought to impeach Coates' testimony. In addition to

presenting other witnesses, Baylor testified that he had never had an agreement with Coates to sell

drugs, and Smith denied that he ever bought cocaine from Coates. Following the government's

rebuttal, the jury found Smith guilty ofthe April 4, 1994, distribution count, Baylor guilty of the May

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19, 1994, distribution count, and both defendants guilty of conspiracy. Baylor was acquitted on

counts relating to the distributions on April 4, 13, and 20, 1994.

II.

Appellant Smith contends that the district court erred in restricting his cross-examination of

Coates on the subject of Coates' prior conviction under the BailReform Act. On direct examination,

Coates admitted his prior convictions for drug distribution, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and

violation of the Bail Reform Act. On cross-examination, Coates stated that the Bail Reform Act

conviction had resulted not from his failure to perform under the conditions of his bail, but because

he missed a court date. When asked by defense counsel why he had missed it, Coates explained that

he had been incarcerated at the time. He then admitted to having been sentenced for the violation.

At this point, the prosecutor objected that the inquirywent wellbeyond proper impeachment. Smith's

counsel argued that he was entitled to inquire whether Coates had violated the conditions of his

release in order to test his trustworthiness. In sustaining the objection, the district court ruled that

"[Y]ou cannot go into the details of the conviction."

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), when evidence of a prior conviction is admitted for

purposes of impeachment, cross-examination is usually limited to the essential facts rather than the

surrounding details of the conviction. United States v. Castro, 788 F.2d 1240, 1246 (7th Cir. 1986).

Courts have recognized, however, that under certain circumstances details concerning a conviction

may be elicited, and the district court's determination as to the nature and extent of the inquiry is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. See e.g., United States v. Swanson, 9 F.3d 1354, 1357 (8th Cir.

1993). On appeal the government maintains that once the nature and date of Coates' Bail Reform Act

conviction were established, Smith had no right to probe the underlying facts. Citing United States

v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124, 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 871 (1991), however, the

government acknowledges that a witness may "open the door" to more extensive cross-examination

by attempting to minimize the conduct for which he was convicted.

Without knowing the facts underlying Coates' Bail Reform Act conviction, Coates' answers

on cross-examination might well have been interpreted by a reasonable juror as an attempt to explain

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away the conviction. Certainly, Coates' testimony implied that he thought his incarceration was a

defense to the BailReform Act charge. Consequently, Smith contends that the district court abused

its discretion by cutting off cross-examination of a key government witness without allowing the

defense an opportunity to ensure that the jurywould understand the nature of Coates' conviction and

could evaluate whether his explanation was credible.

Although we agree with the government that Coates' testimony sufficed to explain to the jury

the basic nature of a Bail Reform Act violation, see D.C. Code § 23-1327, Coates' claim that he was

incarcerated at the time could reasonably have been interpreted bythe juryto suggest that Coates was

unfairly convicted. Given the centrality of Coates' testimony and the efforts made by the defense to

cast doubt on his credibility, the district court might well have afforded counsel some additional

leeway in order to clarify the circumstances of the conviction. See United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d

1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977). The usual reason for caution with respect to the scope of

cross-examination concerning a witness' prior conviction, namely, the need to protect from undue

prejudice a defendant who takes the stand, is not at issue where, as here, the witness is not on trial.

See United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644, 647 (3rd Cir. 1970); FED.R.EVID. 609(a) (referencing

FederalRule ofEvidence 403). Still, absent some indication that additional cross-examination would

have a measurable and independent impeachment value, the district court could reasonably want to

avoid a mini-trial on Coates' Bail Reform Act conviction. On balance, the district court may simply

have concluded that the jury had heard enough and appellants had nothing more to gain.

In any event, because the jurywas aware ofCoates' other convictions and learned that his plea

agreement created an incentive for him to give testimony that would be viewed favorably by the

government when he was later sentenced, any error in barring further impeachment was harmless.

See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946). Any incremental inquiry regarding the

Bail Reform Act conviction would have had little impeachment value, particularly since the

undercover officer'stestimonywassufficient to support the conviction for the April4, 1994,sale, and

his testimony about the May 19, 1994, sale corroborated Coates' general account of the workings of

the conspiracy.

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2 The government does not contend that Smith failed to preserve this issue by raising it in the

district court, and we express no opinion on the nature of a sufficient objection. 

III.

More problematic is appellant Smith's contention that the government failed to offersufficient

evidence to show that on April 4, 1994, Smith sold drugs within 1,000 feet of a school. Specifically,

he contendsthat the government failed to prove that the basement apartment at 704 3rd Street, N.W.,

was less than 1,000 feet from the Georgetown University Law Center.2 While the government

introduced evidence that the distance between the Law Center and the "building line" of the

apartment building at 704 3rd Street was 534 feet, it did not present a measurement reflecting the

location of the actual apartment in which the April 4th drug sale occurred.

Under the "schoolyard statute," 21 U.S.C. § 806(a), which provides for enhancements for

drug offenses, the government must prove that the possession of drugs occurred within 1,000 feet

of a school. In United States v. Johnson, 46 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the court stated that,

irrespective of actual pedestrian travel routes, a straight line measurement can suffice to meet the

requirements of the statute. Id. at 1169-70. The court in Johnson reversed the conviction, however,

because the pedestrian route measurement of 994 feet only went up to the steps of the house and did

not include the distance to the actual point within where the drug possession had occurred. Id. at

1170. The court observed that the government could not meet its burden of proof simply by asserting

that a straight line distance would necessarilyhave been considerablyshorterthanthe pedestrianroute

that formed the basis of the measurement offered in evidence. Id. In contrast to United States v.

Watson, 887 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1989) where evidence included a map that enabled the jury to

approximate the distance omitted from the government's measurement, id. at 981, the court noted

that the jury in Johnson had no such evidence upon which it could have based a similar conclusion.

Johnson, 46 F.3d at 1170.

Consequently, in the instant case, the question is whether a measurement of 534 feet from the

Law Center to the apartment building combined with the other evidence concerning the location of

the relevant buildings and streets suffices to meet the government's burden of proof. A government

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evidence technician explained that, to arrive at the 534-foot measurement between the Law Center

and the apartment building, he measured from the "building line" at 704 3rd Street to the wall of the

freeway that separates 3rd Street from the Law Center, and then went north to Massachusetts

Avenue, which crosses the freeway, and then measured across 2nd Street to the Law Center library.

No direct evidence wasintroduced concerning the location ofthe basement apartment where the drug

transaction took place, or the distance between the apartment and the exterior wall of the apartment

building where the measurement wastaken. The government did introduce into evidence a schematic

map designed to show the spatial relationship between the apartment building and the Law Center,

as well as three photographs that depicted the front of 704 3rd Street, N.W., the view of the

apartment building from the Law Center, and the view of the Law Center from the apartment

building.

The government maintains that the evidence was sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to

conclude that the apartment building does not occupy the entire block bounded by 3rd, G, 4th, and

H Streets, N.W. Thus, it contends, it would have been impossible for the basement apartment to have

been as distant from the Law Center as the far northwest corner of the block depicted in the

schematic map. Further, even if the building did occupy the entire block and the apartment were at

the opposite corner of the block from the point where the measurement was taken, the map

demonstratesthat the length ofthe G Street block would not have pushed the totalmeasurement over

1,000 feet. The government points out that because the distance between the Law Center and the

eastern wall ofthe apartment buildingencompassing the width of 3rd Street, the block between 3rd

Street and the freeway, the freeway itself, the block between the freeway and 2nd Street, and 2nd

Streetequals only 534 feet, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the width of the apartment

building itself and the distance down to the basement could approach 466 feet.

Although the map was not introduced bythe government for purposes ofillustrating the 1,000

foot measurement and was never established as having been drawn to scale, it wasin evidence before

the jury as accurately depicting the location of the apartment building at 704 3rd Street and the

surrounding area. The diagram showed that the building was located at the corner of 3rd and G

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streets. We conclude that when considered in combination, the 534-foot measurement, map, and

photographs were sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to conclude that the distance from the

"building line" to the basement apartment did not exceed 466 feet. Spatial relationships are hardly

intuitive, and photographs can distort distances. Nevertheless, given the evidence regarding the vast

area represented by the 534-foot measurement, the jury could have concluded that the physical

configuration that would have been required for the unmeasured area between the "building line" and

the basement apartment to be 466 feet or more wasfundamentally inconsistent with the photographs

of the apartment building and the adjacent streets as well as the schematic map. Smith's speculation

that the basement apartment might have been several floors below ground is contradicted by the

undercover officer's testimony that the apartment was on "the lower level" (emphasis added). In

contrast to both Johnson and United States v. Applewhite, 72 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 1864 (1996), on which Smith relies, where the government faced the difficulty of

showing that its evidence precluded a finding that an unmeasured leg could have been more than 80

feet long, here the government had far more spatial leeway, and needed only to show, through the

photographs and map, that the missing distance was 466 feet or less. Obviously, the government

should not undermine its own case by offering incomplete measurements. Under the circumstances,

however, with substantial room to spare before reaching the 1,000 foot limit, the government's

measurement, when combined with the map and the photographs of the buildings and the freeway,

was sufficient to show that the April 4 sale occurred within 1,000 feet of a school.

IV.

Neither appellant's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

for conspiracy is persuasive. See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80. The evidence showed an agreement

between two or more persons to distribute cocaine and that appellants were knowing participants in

the agreement. See United States v. Thorne, 997 F.2d 1504, 1512 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S.

999 (1993); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,

506 U.S. 901 (1992). In the face of overwhelming evidence of Baylor's complicity in a series of drug

transactions, his acquittal on charges of aiding and abetting transactionsthat took place in April 1993

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is irrelevant. See United States v. Morris, 836 F.2d 1371, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Notwithstanding

Baylor's attempts to discredit Coates' testimony, he did not introduce evidence that contradicted

Coates' basic description of the dealings between himself and Baylor. As the government points out

in its brief, that the jury might have been unwilling to rely exclusively on Coates' testimony to convict

Baylor of transactions of which he was not specifically aware does not mean that the jury rejected

Coates' testimony entirely.

Although appellant Smith argues that the evidence showed nothing more than a buyer-seller

relationship between himself and Coates, there wastestimony that Coatesintroduced the undercover

officer to Smith and that Smith advised the officer that he could be contacted through Coates. The

evidence also showed that Smith originally approached Coates to determine if he would procure

wholesale quantities of drugs for him, thus recognizing that Coates would act as a middleman

between Smith and a supplier who would turn out to be Baylor. That Smith never met Baylor is

irrelevant. United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.

Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1392 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988); see also United

States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 709-10 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 825 (1996). The

size of the orders that Coates was able to fill provided an additional basis upon which a jury could

conclude that Smith knew he had tapped into an established drug operation. From this evidence a

reasonable jury could find that Smith and Coates were working together in an ongoing, cooperative

purchaser-middleman relationship where theywere dependent upon one anotherfor drugs and profits

respectively. See United States v. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 825 (1990); United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.

949 (1992).

V.

Finally, Baylor'ssentencing challengesfail. His challenge to the district court's increase of his

base level by two points to reflect his managerialrole under the United States Sentencing Guidelines

("U.S.S.G.") § 3B1.1(c) (1994) is meritless. The district court had sufficient evidence on which to

conclude that Baylor exercised control over and organized the activities of at least one other person

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involved in distributing the drugs. See United States v. Hazelett, 80 F.3d 280, 284 (8th Cir. 1996).

Relying upon the evidence concerning Baylor's role in the May 19, 1994, transaction and Coates'

testimony about Baylor's decision-making authority, we find no clear error. See United States v.

Sutera, 933 F.2d 641, 649 (8th Cir. 1991).

Nor has Baylor shown that a remand is warranted to enable the district court to consider a

downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. His reliance on the Sentencing Commission's Special

Report of February 1995 criticizing the present 100:1 ratio for weighing cocaine base and cocaine

powder is unavailing in light of United States v. Anderson, 82 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Although,

for reasons set forth in the opinion of Judge Wald, concurring specially, infra, Baylor's challenge to

the district court's treatment as relevant conduct of drug amounts involved in the counts for which

he was acquitted is not without persuasive force, United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 635-36 (D.C.

Cir. 1992), is controlling in this circuit.

VI.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction. All parties agree, however, that the

convictions for the April 4 and May 19 distribution counts, 21 U.S.C. § 841, merge with the

convictions under the "schoolyard statute," 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). See Blockburger v. United States,

284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116

S. Ct. 1769 (1996). At the time appellants were sentenced, courts in this circuit followed the practice

of imposing sentences on all counts of which a defendant was convicted, leaving vacation of any

lesser count until completion of the appeal. See e.g., United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 859 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1030 (1993). See also United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 634 (2d

Cir. 1985); United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S.

948 (1991). Most recently, in Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996), the Supreme Court

clarified Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985), in which the Court had stated that, when a

defendant isfound guilty of both lesser and greater offenses, the district court should enter judgment

on only one of the counts. Id. at 865. The Rutledge Court rejected the use of multiple convictions

to provide a "back up" conviction in order to ensure that a defendant who successfully challenges a

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1U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) provides that, in determining an offender's base offense level, a

sentencing judge must consider:

solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would require

grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions [committed by the offender or

foreseeably resulting from a jointly undertaken criminal activity] that were part of

the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of

conviction[.]

greater offense does not escape punishment. 470 U.S. at 1249. "[W]hen a conviction for a greater

offense isreversed on groundsthat affect only the greater offense," the Court explained, the appellate

court "may direct the entry of judgment for a lesser included offense." Id. at 1250. Thus, the Court

indicated that the district court should instruct the jury "not to return a verdict on a lesser included

offense once it has found the defendant guilty of the greater offense." Id. at 1250 n.16.

While the government seeks remand only for vacation of the judgments on the § 841 counts,

appellants contend that resentencing is warranted in light of the sentencing range available to the

district court under the Sentencing Guidelines. Because the district court made a sufficient record

of its intentions at trial, indicating that its awareness of the merger issue and its concern about the

government's duplicative charging practices would cause it to impose only concurrent sentences if

appellants were convicted on both the greater and lesser counts, a remand for resentencing would

appear unnecessary. See United States v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States

v. Wimbush, 475 F.2d 347, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United States v. McKnight, 17 F.3d 1139,

1147 (8th Cir. 1994) (Magill and Hansen, JJ., concurring), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 275 (1994).

Given the absence of clear circuit precedent on point since the enactment of the Sentencing

Guidelines, cf. United States v. Fennell, 77 F.3d 510, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam), we

remand the cases so that the district court can vacate each appellants' judgment of conviction for the

distribution counts, without prejudice to appellants' right to seek resentencing in light of vacation of

one of their convictions.

WALD, Circuit Judge, concurring specially: Although the jury convicted Baylor only on the

charges of conspiracy and the two distribution charges based on the May 19 transaction, the

sentencing court,following the mandate ofUnited States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.3(a)(2),1ruled

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U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) requires grouping of multiple counts: 

When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount of

harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of

aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and

the offense guideline is written to cover such behavior. 

2

See, e.g., United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 392-94 (2d Cir. 1994) (Oakes, J., concurring)

("This is jurisprudence reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland. As the Queen of Hearts might say,

"Acquittal first, sentence afterwards.' "); United States v. Hunter, 19 F.3d 895, 897-98 (4th Cir.

1994) (Hall, J., concurring) ("[A]s regards charges on which the jury has acquitted the defendant,

["pricing' these charges at the same level of severity as convicted conduct for sentencing

purposes] is just wrong."); United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 395-96 (2nd Cir. 1994)

that Baylor's participation in the April transactions of which the jury acquitted him had been shown

by a preponderance of the evidence, and accordingly adjusted Baylor's offense level under §

2D1.1(c)(2) to reflect the quantity of drugs involved in these transactions as well. As a result,

Baylor's base offense level and his ultimate sentence were exactly the same as they would have been

had the jury found himguilty, instead of acquitting him, on the April transactions. There is something

fundamentally wrong with such a result.

Guideline "law," I am well aware, runs overwhelmingly against Baylor's claim that a

sentencing court should not use the core conduct underlying an acquittal to increase an offender's

base offense level for the crimes of which he was convicted. This circuit has gone along with most

other circuitsin ruling that the guidelines and the law authorizing their creation permit such use, and

that this practice is constitutional. See United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 635-36 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (citing cases from all circuits except the Ninth). Only the Ninth Circuit has held to the

contrary, claiming that "[w]e would pervert our system of justice if we allowed a defendant to suffer

punishment for a criminal charge for which he or she was acquitted." United States v. Brady, 928

F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991).

But this consensualsurface is eroded by a growing body of resistance to what commentators

and scholarsrecognize as a blatant injustice. Despite the near unanimity of the circuit holdings, many

individual judges have expressed in concurrences and dissents the strongest concerns, bordering on

outrage, about the compatibility ofsuch a practice with the basic principles underlying our system of

criminal justice.2

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(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of a request for rehearing in banc) ("In some way, the law

must be modified. A just system of criminal sentencing cannot fail to distinguish between an

allegation of conduct resulting in a conviction and an allegation of conduct resulting in an

acquittal."); Boney, 977 F.2d at 637-47 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., dissenting in part and

concurring in part) ("My analysis, and my colleagues' ... rests somewhat uneasily with the "special

weight' the Supreme Court has accorded acquittals in its Double Jeopardy jurisprudence."); 

United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 436-44 (8th Cir. 1992) (Bright, J., dissenting) ("If the

former Soviet Union or a third world country had permitted [the practice of punishing people for

conduct that had not been the subject of indictment or trial] human rights observers would

condemn those countries."); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 664-79 (9th Cir. 1991)

(Norris, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "preponderance of the evidence' standard for counting

conduct underlying acquitted charges in sentencNote 2Continued ing should be rejected)

("Circuit has followed circuit without, in some cases, even a vestige of independent analysis. ... 

There are signs, however, that the dam is finally cracking, signs of an emerging awareness of the

truly profound implications of the changes the Guidelines have wrought." (citing Brady)); United

States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1990) ("This [twelve-fold increase in the

sentence] is perhaps the most dramatic example imaginable of a sentencing hearing that functions

as "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.' (Quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania,

477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)). In this extreme context, we believe, a court cannot reflexively apply the

truncated procedures that are perfectly adequate for all of the more mundane, familiar sentencing

determinations.").

A parallel body of work condemning sentencing based on acquitted conduct has been

growing in the academic community. See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of

Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523 (1993); David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and

Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV.

403 (1993); Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179 (1993); Daniel

J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion

of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Michael Tonry, Salvaging the Sentencing Guidelines

in Seven Easy Steps, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 355, 356-57 (1992); Gerald W. Heaney, The

Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 208-20

(1991); United States v. Jones, 863 F. Supp. 575, 578 (N.D. Ohio 1994) ("The right to a trial by

jury means little if a sentencing judge can effectively veto the jury's acquittal on one charge and

sentence the defendant as though he had been convicted of that charge." (citing Brady)); United

States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Can the guarantees of a

jury trial to determine the substantive predicates of criminality be shortcircuited by characterizing

a critical element of great significance in deciding punishment as one for the judge to determine in

fixing sentencea sentence predetermined under fixed guidelines, not one imposed under a

discretionary regime? ... Congress could not have intended such a bizarre and dangerous result

when it adopted guideline sentences"). 

Although I fully recognize that Boney requires affirmance on this issue, to my mind the use

of acquitted conduct in an identical fashion with convicted conduct in computing an offender's

sentence leaves such a jagged scar on our constitutional complexion that periodically its presence

must be highlighted and reevaluated in the hopes that someone will eventually pay attention, either

through a grant of certiorari to resolve the circuit split, or a revision of the guidelines by the

Sentencing Commission, or legislation to bar such a result; in Chief Judge Newman's words "the law

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3Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 396 (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of a petition for

rehearing). 

4

See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 181-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 844 (1990). 

5

See, e.g., Jones, supra note 2. 

6

See Lear, supra note 2, at 1229-33. 

7

See, e.g., Restrepo, supra note 2, at 664-79 (Norris, J., dissenting). 

8

In his separate concurring opinion, Judge Randolph recognized that "this conceptual nicety

might be lost on a person who ... breathes a sigh of relief when the not guilty verdict is announced

without realizing that his term of imprisonment may nevertheless be "increased' if, at sentencing,

the court finds him responsible for the same misconduct. That the Double Jeopardy Clause

protects him from reprosecution on the acquitted count, or that his acquittal means that his

maximum potential sentence will be determined solely on the basis of the count on which he was

convicted is doubtless of little comfort." Boney, 977 F.2d at 647 (Randolph, J., dissenting in part

and concurring in part). 

9

See supra note 8. 

must be modified."3 Time and experience show us increasingly that the assumptions underlying the

decisions upholding the use of acquitted conduct to enhance sentencing are not sound.

The practice ofsentencing defendants on the basis of crimesfor which the defendant has been

acquitted has been plausibly attacked along many jurisprudential fronts, including double jeopardy,

4

failure to honor the right to a jury trial,5failure to satisfy the "notice" requirement of a grand jury

indictment,

6

and due process.7 The explanation offered to defendants who object that they are being

punished for crimes of which they have not been convicted is invariably that they "misperceive[ ] the

distinction between a sentence and a sentence enhancement," and that by adding the full measure of

punishment specified in the guidelinesfor crimes of which they are not convicted, the court is merely

"enhancing" the penaltyfor the crime ofwhich they are convicted, not imposing liability for a separate

crime. Boney, 977 F.2d at 636 (quoting United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1989)).8

The "enhanced" sentence, after all, still must fall within the statutory range set out for the crime of

conviction. See Boney, 977 F.2d at 636.

Some of our own judges have recognized that this justification could not pass the test of

fairness or even common sense from the vantage point of an ordinary citizen.9 The "law," however,

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10See Michael H. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and Corrections

Act, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1593 (1981). 

11See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1994). 

12See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J.

823, 845 (1988). 

has retreated from that standard into its own black hole of abstractions. The fact remains that when

the conduct which serves as the basis for a sentence "enhancement" is in fact treated by the criminal

statutes and the sentencing guidelines as a discrete crime, separately charged in the indictment, and

subjected to a separate determination of guilt or innocence by a jury, treating it subsequently at the

sentencing stage as just another "factor" to be considered in "enhancing" the sentence for the crime

of conviction introduces an artificiality into the process that violates time honored constitutional

principles designed to protect criminal defendants.

The fact that the ultimate sentence based on both convicted and acquitted conduct falls below

the statutory maximum for the crime of conviction does little, if anything, to counteract the basic

unfairness of counting acquitted conduct. The statutory maxima for many felonies, which can run

as high as 30 or 60 years, were originally set in an era of indeterminate sentencing and parole; the

prevailing ideology of punishment was rehabilitation, and the system was designed to provide that

offenders would remain in prison only until they had been "rehabilitated," meaning prisoners often

would be released after serving as little as one-third of their original sentences.10 The concept of

guideline sentencing, on the other hand, wasmotivated byCongress'determinationthat indeterminate

sentencing and parole discretion resulted in unwarranted sentence disparities, and must be replaced

by more rigid formulas allowing little or no discretion on the part of the judge.11 Thus the escape

valves attached to the long sentences originally prescribed by statute have been slammed shut, and

statutory maxima that were designed to cover the most egregious conceivable manifestations of

particular crimes, and thus to far exceed the appropriate sentence in the average case,12cannot be

relied on to cabin within reasonable limits the cumulative penalties for convicted and acquitted

charges.

Some courts have felt themselves constrained by the Supreme Court's decision in McMillan

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13477 U.S. 79 (1986). 

14See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 455 (3d Cir. 1992). 

15386 U.S. 605 (1967). 

16See id. at 607-08. 

17Id. at 611. 

1842 Pa. C.S.A. § 9712 (1982). 

19See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81-82. 

20397 U.S. 358 (1970). 

v. Pennsylvania13 to respect the "punishment/enhancement" fiction that underlies the authorization

for counting acquitted conduct in § 1B1.3(a)(2).14 A close reading of that opinion, and of the Specht

v. Patterson15 decision to which it refers, however, suggests that even that fiction has boundaries

which this portion of the guidelines has crossed over.

The statute reviewed in Specht authorized a sentencing court to determine that a person

convicted of enumerated sex offenses constituted a threat to the public, or was an habitual offender

and mentally ill, and on this basis to increase the sentence from the term specified in the crime of

conviction to an indeterminate term between one day and life imprisonment.16 The statute made no

provision for notice or hearing preceding this determination. The Court held that the statute was

"deficient in due process" as it provided for "the making of a new charge leading to criminal

punishment" without affording the defendant the safeguards considered essential to a fair trial.17

In McMillan, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to Pennsylvania's Mandatory

Minimum Sentencing Act18 based in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the

jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. The Act provided that anyone convicted of certain

felonies must be sentenced to at least five years' imprisonment if the judge finds by a preponderance

of the evidence that the person "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the offense.19

Individuals subjected to this sentence enhancement argued that the firearm possession was actually

an element of the crime, and thus under In re Winship20 must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,

and in the alternative that due process required that the firearm component be subject to a higher

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21See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83-84. 

22See id. at 86, 91-93. 

23See id. at 86. 

24Id. at 87. 

25Id. at 88. 

26See id. at 89. 

27See id. at 89-90. 

standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence.21

The Court found merit in neither claim, holding that Pennsylvania's "chosen course in the area

of defining crimes and prescribing penalties" did not violate the standard articulated in Specht.22 The

Court noted that it had "never attempted to define preciselythe constitutionallimits noted in [Specht],

i.e., the extent to which due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in

criminal cases," and declined now to proffer any such definition, in light of other factors making it

unnecessary to reach this issue.23 The Court noted, first, that the Pennsylvania Act created no

presumptions of guilt and did not relieve the government of its burden of proving guilt, but rather

became applicable only "after a defendant has been duly convicted of the crime for which he is to be

punished."24 Next, the Court observed that the Act enumerated felonies carrying maximum sentences

of ten or twenty years, "upp[ing] the ante" for these felonies only insofar as the minimum sentence

could not fall below five years; the Court concluded that the statute gave "no impression of having

been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the

substantive offense."25 The Court rejected the petitioners' invocation of Specht, noting that the

statute struck down in Specht subjected the defendant to a " "radically different situation' from the

usual sentencing proceeding," whereas the Act merely raised the minimum sentence that may be

imposed by the trial court.26 Finally, the Court rejected the petitioners' warning that States would use

any leeway the Court allowed them to restructure existing crimes in such a way as to evade the due

process requirements announced in Winship, observing that Pennsylvania's legislature had not

changed the definition of any existing offense.27

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28337 U.S. 241 (1949). 

29McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91-92. 

30See supra note 2. 

31See Tonry, supra note 2, at 356-57 (noting that the Federal Sentencing Commission is the

only sentencing commission in the nation to reject the "charge offense" model, whereby sentences

are based solely on crimes for which a defendant has been convicted, in favor of the "real offense"

model, which allows sentencing courts to consider unconvicted and even acquitted crimes in

setting the sentence). 

TheCourt then turned to the petitioners' "subsidiary" claimthat visible possession of a firearm

should be subjected to a higher standard of proof than "preponderance of the evidence." Citing to

the 1949 decision in Williams v. New York,28 the Court quickly dispensed with this argument on the

basis of that decision's holding that due processis not violated by the sentencing court's "traditional[

]" practice of hearing evidence and finding facts "without any prescribed burden of proof at all."29

In addressing both sets of arguments pressed by the petitioners, the McMillan Court not only

affirmed the continued vitality of Specht, but also used language that limited its holding regarding the

inapplicability of Specht to situations in which the sentence "enhancement" relates to the particular

event on which the conviction is based. The Court held that the Act did not fall under Specht because

it "only bec[ame] applicable after a defendant has been duly convicted of the crime for which he is

to be punished." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added). Rejecting the claim that a higher

burden of proof should apply, the Court noted that "[s]entencing courts necessarily consider the

circumstances of an offense in selecting the appropriate punishment, and we have consistently

approved sentencing schemes that mandate consideration of facts related to the crime, without

suggesting that those facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 92 (emphases added).

The Court's apparent assumption that punishment willrelate to the crime of conviction, rather

than to crimes for which the defendant has been acquitted, reflects a commonality of understanding

about fundamental fairness shared by scores of judges and academics,30 as well as every nonfederal

jurisdiction in the nation that has implemented guideline sentencing.31 The Federal Guidelines stand

alone in perpetuating their anomalous treatment of acquittals in sentencing.

In sum, I do not believe the Supreme Court has yet sanctioned the intolerable notion that the

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32JONATHON GREEN, THE CYNIC'S LEXICON 46 (1984). 

same sentence can or must be levied on a person convicted of one crime, and acquitted of three

"related" crimes, as can be imposed on his counterpart convicted of all four crimes. The result of

such a systemissubtly but surely to eviscerate the right to a jury trial or to proof beyond a reasonable

doubt for many defendants. Yet we appear to have relentlessly, even mindlessly progressed down

the path. It is time to turn back. The British novelist G.K. Chesterton once said: "[W]hen two great

political parties agree about something, it is generally wrong."32 I am afraid the same can be said in

this one instance about great circuit courts.

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