Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03016/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03016-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Becton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 11, 2010 Decided April 16, 2010

No. 09-3016

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JAMES BECTON, ALSO KNOWN AS FUNK, ALSO KNOWN AS P,

ALSO KNOWN AS PUMPKIN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cr-00131-JR-1)

Stephen C. Leckar, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

SuzAnne C. Nyland, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roy W. McLeese

III, John P. Mannarino, Arvind K. Lal, and Matthew P. Cohen,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant James Becton

was sentenced to 300 months in prison after a jury convicted

him of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”), five

kilograms or more of cocaine, and cannabis, along with ten

counts of unlawful use of a communication facility to facilitate

the conspiracy. In this appeal, Becton challenges (1) the District

Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from

a series of wiretaps placed on his and his charged coconspirators’ cell phones; (2) the District Court’s refusal to hold

a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56

(1978), regarding the prosecution’s alleged failure to disclose

certain information bearing on the credibility of two confidential

sources that it relied on in affidavits supporting the wiretap

applications; and (3) the District Court’s denial of his motion for

a new trial. In the new trial motion, Becton argued that the

District Court improperly admitted testimony pertaining to his

activities while incarcerated from 2003 to 2005 on an unrelated

charge and that it improperly allowed the Government to inform

the jury in its rebuttal closing argument that Becton had also

been in prison between 1995 and 2000. The District Court

rejected both arguments, and Becton now raises them again

before this court.

We affirm the District Court’s rulings. First, we hold that

the District Court did not abuse its discretion in approving the

prosecution’s use of wiretaps to uncover the “full nature and

scope” of the conspiracy. See United States v. Sobamowo, 892

F.2d 90, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, we find that the trial court did not err in failing to hold

a Franks v. Delaware hearing, since the information appellant

asserts was omitted from the affidavits was not material.

Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the motion for a new trial, because it properly admitted the

testimony pertaining to Becton’s incarceration from 2003 to

2005 as direct evidence of the charged offense, see United States

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v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and correctly

determined that Becton did not suffer “substantial prejudice”

from the prosecutor’s improper remark in rebuttal closing

argument, see United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 715 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2001, the FBI began investigating drug trafficking on the

4200 and 4300 blocks of Fourth Street, S.E., in Washington,

D.C. According to the Government, appellant James Becton and

his brother Willie Best led a “violent, narcotics trafficking

organization,” Counts Aff. ¶ 15 (Oct. 2005), reprinted in 1

Appendix to Brief of Appellant Becton (“A.A.”) 327 (“Counts

Oct. Aff.”), supplying large quantities of drugs (primarily

cocaine, crack, and marijuana) to their underlings and

overseeing the drug sales that occurred in this area. Although

the Government’s investigation slowed due to “staffing and

resource changes at the FBI” after the last of a series of

controlled purchases occurred in June 2002, the investigation

“resumed in earnest in 2004.” Government’s Omnibus Resp. to

Def. James Becton’s Pretrial Mots. at 5-6 (May 30, 2008),

reprinted in 1 A.A. 152-53. Among other endeavors, the

Government seized crack cocaine from a car parked by Best and

an associate in Washington, D.C.; obtained a pen register for the

cellular telephone of Fred Mercer, a member of Becton and

Best’s organization; executed a controlled buy using an

informant; and recorded several telephone conversations

between Mercer and the informant. 

On September 27, 2005, the FBI sought and obtained

authorization to wiretap Mercer’s cellular telephone. Agent

Mary Counts submitted a 49-page affidavit seeking to intercept

wire communications to and from this telephone by a number of

purported conspirators, including Becton. See Counts Aff.

(Sept. 2005), reprinted in 1 A.A. 260-308 (“Counts Sept. Aff.”).

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Counts’ affidavit provided detailed information about Best and

Becton’s operation as revealed by three confidential informants,

identified as S-1, S-2, and S-3 to protect the sources from

retribution. Two of these informants were incarcerated at the

time Counts applied for the wiretap. Counts additionally

described several seizures and undercover operations that took

place in 2003 and 2005 and set forth data obtained pursuant to

a pen register for the targeted telephone. 

In the September 2005 affidavit, Counts stated her belief

that “the interception of wire communications” was the “only

available investigative technique . . . to establish the full scope

and nature” of the conspiracy. Counts Sept. Aff. ¶ 68, 1 A.A.

296. She averred that “[n]ormal investigative procedures” had

been tried and “failed, appear[ed] reasonably unlikely to succeed

if tried or continued, or [were] too dangerous to employ.” Id.

¶ 69, 1 A.A. 296. Although the FBI had employed surveillance,

undercover officers, confidential sources, interviews and pen

registers, made controlled purchases through cooperating

witnesses, and reviewed calling data and public records, Counts

averred that these investigative techniques had failed to

establish, inter alia, the identities of the persons who supplied

the cocaine and crack cocaine, the identities of the persons who

transported drugs into the District of Columbia for distribution

by the identified co-conspirators, the identities of other persons

who assisted with the distribution of the drugs, the manner and

frequency with which the co-conspirators transported drugs into

D.C., and the locations where they stored their contraband. Id.

¶ 69, 1 A.A. 296-97. Counts explained in detail the

conventional investigative techniques employed, the evidence

(or lack thereof) revealed by each method, and why further use

of each technique would not reveal the identity of all members

of the conspiracy, the manner in which the co-conspirators

distributed drugs, or the manner in which they distributed the

proceeds of their operation. For example, three previous search

warrants yielded “limited to no evidence,” as sources later

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revealed that Best and Becton had been forewarned that law

enforcement action would take place at certain locations and

moved their contraband. Id. ¶ 76, 1 A.A. 301-02.

From the September 2005 wiretap of Mercer’s phone, the

FBI identified a cellular telephone number for Becton and

obtained authorization to wiretap this phone from October 27,

2005 to November 25, 2005. After a second wiretap of Mercer’s

phone revealed a telephone number for Willie Best, the FBI

applied for and received authorization in January 2006 to

wiretap Best’s phone for 30 days, later reauthorized for a second

30-day period. In the January 2006 application for a wiretap on

Best’s phone, Counts’ affidavit described six confidential

sources. See Counts Aff. ¶¶ 21-59 (Jan. 2006), reprinted in 1

A.A. 199-210 (“Counts Jan. Aff.”). The three confidential

sources that had not appeared in previous wiretap applications

were stated to have begun their cooperation with the FBI in

March 2005 (S-4), November 1996 (S-5), and April 2002 (S-6),

and were thus working with the FBI at the time it applied for the

first wiretap in September 2005. However, all three sources

were incarcerated at the time the initial wiretap application was

made. After obtaining these six wiretap authorizations, the FBI

executed a series of search warrants on May 22, 2006 and May

23, 2007, the latter being the date of the case “take down.”

Government’s Notice of Intrinsic Evidence at 4 (Apr. 18, 2008),

reprinted in 1 A.A. 91.

A grand jury charged Becton and ten others with conspiracy

to unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally distribute and

possess with intent to distribute (1) fifty grams or more of crack;

(2) five kilograms or more of cocaine; and (3) cannabis. Becton

was also charged with numerous counts relating to the unlawful

use of a telephone to facilitate the conspiracy in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Charged co-conspirator

Willie Best moved to suppress evidence obtained from the six

30-day periods of wiretap surveillance authorized on September

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27, 2005 (Mercer’s phone); October 27, 2005 (Becton’s phone);

December 16, 2005 (second wiretap of Mercer’s phone);

January 27, 2006 (Best’s phone); February 24, 2006 (second

wiretap of Best’s phone); and April 4, 2006 (three additional

phones used by Becton). Among other arguments, Best claimed

that the Government’s wiretap applications had not satisfied the

necessity threshold of 18 U.S.C. § 2518, and asked for a Franks

v. Delaware hearing, see 438 U.S. at 155-56. Appellant filed a

supplemental memorandum in support of Best’s motion to

suppress electronic surveillance, adopting Best’s arguments and

elaborating on the necessity argument. The District Court heard

argument on the motion to suppress in July 2008 and orally

denied the motion. Tr. of Hearing (July 23, 2008) at 17, 2 A.A.

453.

Becton’s trial proceeded from September 15, 2008 to

September 30, 2008. The jury found Becton guilty of

conspiracy and ten counts of unlawful use of a telephone to

facilitate the conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and

18 U.S.C. § 2. It acquitted Becton of several other telephone

counts.

Becton moved for a new trial, arguing that the District

Court (1) improperly admitted the prosecution’s evidence of his

actions while he was incarcerated from 2003 to 2005, including

his receipt of drugs and a cell phone while at the correctional

facility, and (2) improperly permitted the prosecution in its

rebuttal closing argument to inform the jury that Becton was

incarcerated between 1995 and 2000. The District Court denied

the motion, finding that Becton’s activities while incarcerated

were “relevant to the existence and/or continuing operation of

the charged conspiracy and probative of Becton’s participation

in it.” United States v. Becton, Crim. No. 07-0131,

Memorandum Order at 6 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2009), reprinted in 1

A.A. 421 (“Mem. Order”). The District Court ruled that “[t]his

was not Rule 404(b) evidence; it was evidence intrinsic of the

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conspiracy,” because the testimony established that even during

his incarceration, Becton exerted significant influence and

control over the drug sales business on Fourth Street S.E., and

established the beginning of a long-term drug-dealing

relationship between Becton and one of the witnesses. Id. The

District Court further found that the probative value of this

evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. Id. at 7, 1 A.A. 422. The District Court found

that it had erred in permitting the Government’s reference to

Becton’s 1995 to 2000 incarceration in rebuttal closing

argument, but held that the error was harmless. Id. at 10-12, 1

A.A. 425-27.

Becton appeals his conviction, challenging the District

Court’s denial of his motion for a new trial as well as its earlier

denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through

wiretaps.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

This court reviews the District Court’s determination that

the Government adequately demonstrated necessity to wiretap

for abuse of discretion. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d at 93.

“The circuits are split on the question whether a district

court’s decision not to hold a Franks hearing is reviewed under

the clearly erroneous or de novo standard of review.” United

States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 843-44 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per

curiam). “We have not definitively resolved the issue in this

circuit,” id., and it is unnecessary for us to do so in this case. A

movant seeking to obtain a Franks hearing “must show that (1)

the affidavit contained false statements; (2) the statements were

material to the issue of probable cause; and (3) the false

statements were made knowingly and intentionally, or with

reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Richardson,

861 F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citing Franks,

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438 U.S. at 155-56). “To mandate an evidentiary hearing,” the

movant’s attack on the affidavit supporting the warrant “must be

more than conclusory.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. On the record

in this case, whether the District Court’s decision not to hold a

Franks hearing is reviewed de novo or under the clearly

erroneous standard, we find no merit in Becton’s challenge.

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse

of discretion. See Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d

1049, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Becton makes two arguments

challenging the denial of the motion for a new trial: (1) the

District Court improperly admitted inadmissible character

evidence pertaining to Becton’s conduct while in prison from

2003 to 2005, and (2) the District Court improperly allowed the

Government to reference a separate period of incarceration in its

rebuttal closing argument. Becton did not forfeit his argument

regarding the admission of the 2003 to 2005 prison evidence and

our review is therefore not for plain error as the Government

suggests. See Government’s Br. at 40-41. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines “[r]elevant evidence”

as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401. District Court determinations on

relevancy are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States

v. Askew, 88 F.3d 1065, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible

to prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for

other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of

mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the

accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide

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reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the

court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the

general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce

at trial.

FED. R. EVID. 404(b). A claim that a district court improperly

admitted evidence under Rule 404(b) is ordinarily reviewed for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Pettiford, 517 F.3d 584,

588 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In this case, the District Court ruled that

the evidence regarding Becton’s activities while in prison was

relevant and “not Rule 404(b) evidence,” because it was intrinsic

to the alleged conspiracy. Mem. Order at 6, 1 A.A. 421.

However, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.

Becton argued to the District Court that the disputed evidence

was prejudicial and should be excluded under Rule 403. We

review for abuse of discretion when a trial judge has admitted

evidence “after having weighed its ‘probative value’ against the

danger it raised of ‘unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or

misleading the jury.’” United States v. Earle, 375 F.3d 1159,

1163 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Long, 328 F.3d

655, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Shea, 159

F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying Rule 401 and 403 analyses

to review the admissibility of evidence that was not Rule 404(b)

evidence but was intrinsic of the charged crime). If a district

court does not abuse its discretion in admitting challenged

evidence, it does not abuse its discretion denying a motion for

a new trial founded upon a challenge to the admissibility of that

evidence. See Morgan, 824 F.2d at 1064.

Finally, “even where challenges to a prosecutor’s closing

argument have been preserved through timely objection, we will

reverse a conviction and require a new trial only if we determine

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that the defendant has suffered substantial prejudice.”

Childress, 58 F.3d at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. The Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained Through

Wiretapping

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act

of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., permits a district court to

approve an application for the interception of certain wire, oral,

or electronic communications. Id. § 2518. On the basis of facts

submitted in the Government’s application to wiretap,

the district court may authorize a wiretap upon finding that

(1) probable cause exists to believe that an individual has

committed or is about to commit one of certain enumerated

offenses; (2) probable cause exists to believe that

“particular communications concerning that offense will be

obtained” through an interception; (3) “normal investigative

procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably

appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried”; and (4) probable

cause exists to believe that the communication facility

sought to be wiretapped “[is] being used, or [is] about to be

used, in connection with the commission of [the] offense.”

United States v. Carter, 449 F.3d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a-d)). An “aggrieved person” –

any “person who was a party to any intercepted wire . . .

communication or a person against whom the interception was

directed,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) – may move to suppress the

contents of the wire communication. Id. § 2518(10)(a). Becton,

an aggrieved person, now appeals the denial of his motion to

suppress evidence obtained through wiretapping.

1. Necessity to Wiretap and Use of the Information

Obtained

Appellant first argues that the District Court abused its

discretion in finding that the Government satisfied the

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“necessity” requirement for wiretapping in its September 2005

application. In particular, he asserts that the Government (1)

failed to exhaust conventional investigative techniques before

seeking authorization to wiretap, and (2) failed to disclose three

informants who were working with the Government when it

submitted its first wiretap application. We find neither

argument persuasive. We therefore hold that the District Court

did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Government met

the necessity requirement of Title III. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(3)(c).

This court has previously held that the District Court may

authorize a wiretap on the phone of a member of a suspect

operation if traditional investigative techniques have proved

inadequate to reveal the operation’s “‘full nature and scope.’”

See, e.g., Carter, 449 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Sobamowo, 892

F.2d at 93)); United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 598 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). As in Carter,

where law enforcement infiltration by normal investigative

techniques was unlikely to succeed because the defendant dealt

with a small circle of street-level drug dealers, 449 F.3d at 1294,

Agent Counts’ affidavit in this case likewise explained that

Becton and Best’s drug redistribution operation was “extremely

close-knit, involving close associates and family, and . . . very

carefully managed, compartmentalized, and operated so as to

minimize [the target’s] contacts with other co-conspirators.”

Counts Sept. Aff. ¶ 71, 1 A.A. 299. Agent Counts also averred

that physical surveillance had been conducted but “yielded little

valuable information . . . other than confirming that some of the

identified members of the conspiracy associate with one

another.” Id. ¶ 74, 1 A.A. 300; see also Carter, 449 F.3d at

1294 (describing the failure of physical surveillance). Although

normal investigative procedures “ha[d] been probative in

proving that an ongoing illegal narcotics business [wa]s

operating,” the FBI had been unable to determine the identities

of other co-conspirators who supplied and transported drugs into

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D.C. and who assisted in local redistribution using these

methods. Counts Sept. Aff. ¶ 69, 1 A.A. 296-97. The FBI

additionally could not determine through normal investigative

procedures the manner and frequency with which coconspirators transported drugs into the District of Columbia, the

quantities and prices of those drugs, and the location where the

contraband was stored, among other information. See id. Like

the affidavit in Brown, Counts’ affidavit demonstrated that

“traditional investigative techniques had yielded some evidence”

against the co-conspirators but did not disclose – and would

likely continue to fail to disclose – “the full nature and extent of

the conspiracy.” Brown, 823 F.2d at 598.

Counts’ affidavit stated that further controlled drug

purchases, either by the one confidential informant not

incarcerated or by an undercover officer, would not lead to

sufficient evidence as to (1) the manner by which

co-conspirators redistributed large quantities of illegal drugs in

D.C.; (2) the identities of all members of the organization

assisting Mercer, Becton, and the others; and (3) the manner in

which the co-conspirators disposed of the proceeds of the

operations. Counts Sept. Aff. ¶ 71, 1 A.A. 298-99. Specifically,

the affidavit stated that even if S-1, the unincarcerated

informant, made additional controlled buys, S-1 would not be

able to find out the organization’s source of supply. Id.

We disagree with Becton’s claim that various omissions

from the wiretap affidavits undermined the Government’s

necessity showing. The Government’s omission of information

that a previous search had yielded incriminating information did

not make its affidavit infirm. The affidavit explained in detail

why searches were “inadequate to penetrate [the] conspiracy,”

so the contested information was not material. Carter, 449 F.3d

at 1294; see also Counts Sept. Aff. ¶¶ 76-77, 1 A.A. 301-02.

Furthermore, the omission of this information did “not undercut

the fact that the government had ‘engaged in an adequate range

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of investigative endeavors,’” Carter, 449 F.3d at 1294 (quoting

Sobamowo, 892 F.2d at 93), including at least three previous

searches that yielded “limited to no evidence,” see Counts Sept.

Aff. ¶ 76, 1 A.A. 301-02.

The disputed omission of three cooperating witnesses from

the Government’s first affidavit was not material, because it did

not “undermine the government’s ability to prove the need for

the . . . wiretap.” United States v. Gonzalez, Inc., 412 F.3d 1102,

1111 (9th Cir. 2005). Agent Counts’ affidavit demonstrated that

additional controlled buys were inadequate to reveal the “full

nature and scope” of the conspiracy. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d at 93

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Counts Sept. Aff. ¶¶ 70-

71, 1 A.A. 298. More significantly, the additional informants

could not have made controlled buys, as they were incarcerated

at the time when the FBI submitted the September and October

2005 applications for wiretaps. 

Becton also asserts that the evidence gained from these

wiretaps should have been disregarded for failure to meet the

necessity requirement and that the later affidavits do not support

probable cause without that information. See Appellant’s Br. at

52. For the reasons already explained, the District Court did not

abuse its discretion in authorizing the September and October

wiretaps, so the information from those wiretaps need not have

been disregarded.

Because the Government’s affidavits adequately

demonstrated the failure of normal investigative techniques to

reveal the full nature and scope of the conspiracy, the District

Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Government

had met the necessity requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518.

2. Denial of a Franks Hearing

Becton also argues that the District Court erred when it

refused to grant a Franks hearing with respect to the

Government’s failure to disclose certain information bearing on

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the credibility of two confidential sources, S-4 and S-6, who

were cited in the January and February 2006 affidavits

supporting wiretap applications. See Appellant’s Br. at 52-54.

We agree with Becton that his claim was raised and preserved

when he requested a Franks hearing as part of the motion to

suppress and the District Court denied that motion without

holding such a hearing. However, because Becton failed to

demonstrate that the omitted information was material, we hold

that the District Court did not err in failing to hold a Franks

hearing. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72; see also Richardson,

861 F.2d at 293, 294. 

The inclusion of additional information bearing on the

credibility of S-4 and S-6 would not have “defeat[ed] probable

cause” for the wiretap. See United States v. Spencer, 530 F.3d

1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Agent Counts had already disclosed that these sources had

extensive criminal histories, so the District Court was aware of

information undercutting their credibility when it approved the

wiretaps. Furthermore, even if the omitted information

concerning S-4 and S-6 completely undermined their credibility

such that the information relating to them was deemed

unreliable and struck entirely from the affidavit, Becton does not

show that probable cause would have been defeated. See

Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. Counts’ January 2006 affidavit

contained information from four other confidential informants

and described undercover operations involving consensually

recorded conversations and controlled purchases, all of which

demonstrated probable cause that the targeted individuals were

involved in a drug-trafficking conspiracy.

On this record, we hold that the District Court did not err

when it refused to grant a Franks hearing.

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C. The Motion for a New Trial

Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Becton’s motion for a new trial. Becton argues that

testimony pertaining to his conduct while incarcerated from

2003 to 2005 on an unrelated offense should have been excluded

as inadmissible character evidence under Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b). We disagree. The District Court correctly

held that this “was not Rule 404(b) evidence.” See Mem. Order

at 6, 1 A.A. 421. Rather, the evidence that Becton continued to

manage the drug operation on Fourth Street S.E. while

incarcerated constitutes direct evidence of his continuing

participation in the charged conspiracy and is therefore

“properly considered intrinsic” evidence outside the scope of

Rule 404(b). See Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929; see also United States

v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

The District Court additionally did not abuse its discretion

in determining that “the danger of unfair prejudice” did not

“substantially outweigh[]” the probative value of the disputed

evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403; see Mem. Order at 7, 1 A.A. 422.

Both the prosecution and the defense at other points in the trial

had mentioned without objection that Becton had been

previously incarcerated. Mem. Order at 7, 1 A.A. 422. Because

the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this

testimony, it did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion

for a new trial. 

Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying

the motion for a new trial after Becton challenged the

prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument reference to Becton’s

incarceration from 1995 to 2000. The challenged remark was

error, as the District Court found, see Mem. Order at 10, 1 A.A.

425, because “it constituted a statement of fact to the jury not

supported by proper evidence introduced during trial,” United

States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). However, we

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agree with the District Court that the error was harmless. See

United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“In

order to warrant reversal, an improper prosecutorial remark must

cause substantial prejudice to the defendant.”); Childress, 58

F.3d at 715 (“substantial prejudice” standard applicable even

where challenges to prosecutor’s closing argument have been

preserved through timely objection). 

The District Court properly applied the three factors used to

determine whether improper remarks by the prosecutor

sufficiently prejudice a defendant so as to warrant reversal: (1)

the closeness of the case; (2) the centrality of the issue affected

by the error; and (3) the steps taken to mitigate the error’s

effects. See Childress, 58 F.3d at 715; see also id. at 715-16

(alternately describing factors as the severity of the misconduct,

the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty

of conviction absent the improper remarks). The brief remark

from the prosecutor regarding a prior period of incarceration

obviously caused some prejudice to Becton, particularly when

the jury had already heard in great detail about at least one other

prior period of incarceration. However, as the District Court

found, Becton’s activities from 1995 to 2000 were not “central

issues because the prosecution’s evidence and argument focused

almost exclusively on events that occurred after he was

released.” Mem. Order at 11, 1 A.A. 426. The District Court

permitted the remark, albeit erroneously, only in response to

Becton’s counsel’s closing argument reference to the

Government’s lack of evidence between 1995 and 2001. And,

contrary to appellant’s assertion, the District Court did adopt

measures to cure the misconduct, instructing the jury that the

arguments and statements of the lawyers were not in evidence.

See id. at 11-12, 1 A.A. 426-27. Finally, this case was not close:

Appellant’s participation in the conspiracy was established by

numerous witnesses and by intercepted conversations in which

the jury heard appellant himself repeatedly directing the supply

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and distribution of narcotics. In light of these considerations, we

agree with the District Court that the error was harmless.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is affirmed.

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