Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01722/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01722-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rodney Harrison
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1722

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Nebraska.

Rodney Harrison, *

* 

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: October 18, 2004

Filed: January 5, 2005

___________

Before COLLOTON, LAY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Rodney L. Harrison appeals his sentence for two offenses: possession with

intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and criminal forfeiture, 21 U.S.C.

§ 853. The district court1

 sentenced Harrison to 168 months' imprisonment, based

on the 2003 Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing on March 1,

2004. Harrison argues that he should have been sentenced under the 2002 Guidelines

in effect when he committed the crimes on May 7, 2003. Jurisdiction being proper

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

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For the first time on appeal, Harrison raises the argument that retroactive

application of the 2003 Guidelines violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. U.S. Const.

art. I, § 9, cl. 3. He seeks plain error review. See United States v. Comstock, 154

F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). The government contends

that Harrison waived the ex post facto argument in the district court and cannot raise

it in this court.

"Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver

is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'" United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464

(1938). Waiver extinguishes a potential "error" under Rule 52(b). Id. The result is:

"The plain error standard only applies when a defendant inadvertently fails to raise

an objection in the district court." United States v. Thompson, 289 F.3d 524, 526

(8th Cir. 2002).

The record here shows a waiver, not a forfeiture. Harrison's presentence report

states, "The 2003 edition of the Guidelines Manual, incorporating amendments

effective November, 5, 2003, has been used in assessing this case." At the sentencing

hearing, the judge asks defense counsel, "And Mr. Hall, I don't find any express

objection to the PSR. I take it that there is no objection; is that correct?" Defense

counsel answers, "That's correct, Your Honor."

In his Brief in Support of Motion for Downward Departure, defense counsel

says, "Mr. Harrison submits that the proper sentencing range for this offense should

be 168 months (Class V)." The Brief relies on United States v. Senior, 935 F.2d 149

(8th Cir. 1991).

On the first day of sentencing, February 24, the judge cites and discusses

United States v. Senior, 935 F.2d 149, and United States v. Greger, 339 F.3d 666 (8th

Cir. 2003). The judge outlines that these cases allow downward departures to both

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offense level and criminal history in order to compensate for overrepresentation of

criminal history due to career offender status.

Later on the first day of sentencing, defense counsel requests a departure from

category VI to V in criminal history. Defense counsel emphasizes that the

government does not oppose the departure based on the totality of circumstances, and

that it is justified based on Senior and Greger.

Concluding the first day of the sentencing hearing, the judge notes that he has

discretion to depart downward. He questions why he is bound to a one-category

criminal history departure instead of departure to the pre-career-offender range. The

judge says that this would authorize a sentence of 92 to 115 months. He asks counsel

for insight. The hearing was continued to March 1.

On February 26, Harrison filed Defendant's Amended Motion for Downward

Departure and Request for Oral Argument. Three times, the Motion requests

departure "downward one category level from category VI to category V." 

Reconvening the sentencing hearing, the judge announces that he determined

that a downward departure was warranted, but restates the open issue of how far he

can depart. The government states that the departure is limited to one level, and that

Greger is trumped by the new sentencing guideline. Defense counsel responds:

"Your Honor, I believe that the government is correct that in fact it was probably a

response that was—came about in November of 2003." Defense counsel continues:

"And that was my reading of—." The judge then explicitly raises the ex post facto

argument in open court: 

[A]nybody ever given any consideration to ex post facto considerations?

I mean, before we came in with 4A1.3 we could do all this maneuvering,

according to Judge Smith Camp, and I'm going to say in Gregor. And

I might have the case mistaken, but it was that one that says there can be

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both lateral, that is vertical, and—and horizontal movement. That's what

existed before we came up on—in October of last year with the new

4A1.3. Oh, well.

After the government objects that ex post facto analysis does not apply to the

sentencing guidelines, the judge says, "Well, it hasn't been—it hasn't been raised. But

I toss it out for those that are intellectually hungry." After citing United States v.

Frank, 354 F.3d 910, the judge states, "Government may want to take a look at that.

I—or at least the defense may want to take a look at it sometime." The judge

immediately adds: "Because they do apply the concept of ex post facto to sentencing

guidelines, not just statutes." The Assistant U.S. Attorney concedes: "Well, then I

stand corrected on the application of the clause. But we're not dealing with guideline

ranges, I guess is my point. We're dealing with discretionary motions." Defense

counsel does not respond during this discussion, but later during allocution argues

that sentencing at the low end of the guidelines is appropriate. The judge then

sentences Harrison to 168 months, "being the low end of the sentencing guideline."

This case is controlled by two decisions of this court. In Thompson, counsel

withdrew all objections and asked for sentencing at the low end of the guideline

range. Thompson, 289 F.3d at 526. Finding a waiver, this Circuit held, "On appeal,

Thompson cannot complain that the district court gave him exactly what his lawyer

asked." Id. See also United States v. Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995) ("A

defendant who explicitly and voluntarily exposes himself to a specific sentence may

not challenge that punishment on appeal."); United States v. Fritsch, 891 F.2d 667,

668 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Pratt, 657 F.2d 218, 219-21 (8th Cir.

1981) (double jeopardy argument waived where defendant pleaded guilty with

knowledge of the argument and the sentence to which he was exposed). See

generally United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 532

U.S. 1057 (2001) (when a judge asks at sentencing whether there is an objection to

an enhancement, and the lawyer does not object, the argument is barred from

consideration on appeal).

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2

The dissent argues that our decision in Wilson conflicts with United States v.

Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 1998). Michelsen, however, involved a

defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal an issue that was contested in the district

court, while Wilson, Thompson, Nguyen, Fritsch, and Pratt concern claims that were

themselves waived in the district court. Moreover, to the extent our cases on waiver

of the right to appeal are relevant here, our more recent en banc decision in United

States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), holds that a sentence

within the statutory range of punishment (as Harrison’s surely was) is not an “illegal

sentence” for purposes of enforcing an appeal waiver.

-5-

In the other controlling decision by this court, the defendant's attorney, at

sentencing, told the judge that the Presentence Investigation Report recommended the

correct offense level and criminal history category, and stated "no objection" to the

sentence. United States v. Wilson, 184 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 1999). On appeal,

this court rejected plain error review of Wilson's argument that the district court

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause in applying a later version of the Guidelines. Id.

at 800. This court held that Wilson waived the ex post facto argument. Id. at 801.2

Here, the judge repeatedly identified the issues, and defense counsel took no

action other than to request the sentence given. On this record, defense counsel did

not inadvertently fail to object. See Thompson, 289 F.3d at 526. For purposes of this

appeal, Harrison waived the ex post facto argument. This waiver extinguishes any

potential error under Rule 52(b) as to Harrison's sentence. See Olano, 507 U.S. at

733.

The sentence is affirmed.

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3

Although the sentencing transcript shows that the government agreed to

Harrison’s request for a departure of one criminal history category, we do not know

from this record whether the parties specifically had negotiated a one-category

departure, such that an effort by Harrison to gain a greater departure might have

jeopardized the government’s agreement to any departure at all. 

-6-

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in Judge Benton’s opinion for the court, which I believe comports with

our court’s governing precedent concerning waiver. Even were Harrison’s claim

subject to review for plain error, however, I do not believe the district court’s

imposition of sentence “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation

of judicial proceedings,” as required before a court of appeals should exercise its

discretion to correct a plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). See also United States v. Young, 470 U.S.

1, 15 (1985) (holding that discretion to correct plain error should be employed “solely

in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”)

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

On review of the governing law and the record in this case, I respectfully

disagree with the dissent’s assertion that Harrison “will serve roughly five to ten

additional years than he would have served under the prior sentencing scheme.” Post

at 16. Harrison had no entitlement to a downward departure of any degree, and

despite some preliminary discussion concerning the degree to which the court was

authorized to depart from the guideline range under appropriate circumstances, the

record ultimately does not establish that the district court thought the sentence

imposed was inappropriate. The district court recognized that the Ex Post Facto

Clause applied to changes in the sentencing guidelines, (S. Tr. 22-23), and the court

of course had authority to consider a downward departure greater than either party

sought. See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991).3

 The court explained to

Harrison that it had departed downward from the applicable sentencing guideline

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4

The presentence report reflects that four convictions were for sale of cocaine

and five convictions were for possession of cocaine. Based on the sentences

associated with each conviction, it appears that all of the offenses were punishable

by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

-7-

range, but that it “also had to consider the need to punish you and deter you from any

other criminal conduct.” (S. Tr. 29). The court concluded: “So it’s my belief that

this 168 months, being the low end of the sentencing guideline, is appropriate in your

case.” (Id.).

Whatever the district court believed, I conclude that the absence of a greater

reduction in sentence did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings. It is questionable whether Harrison deserved a

downward departure at all, given his record of nine prior drug convictions based on

at least six separate incidents between 1989 and 1991 when he was 29 to 31 years old,

(PSR ¶¶ 34-39)4

, a violation of probation adjudicated in 1992, (PSR ¶¶ 34-37), a

shoplifting conviction in 2001, (PSR ¶ 40), and his instant conviction at age 44 for

possession with intent to distribute 1.49 kilograms of cocaine. (PSR ¶ 21). Cf.

United States v. Hutman, 339 F.3d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding after a

survey of precedent that “a downward departure from career offender status may be

appropriate for a relatively young defendant with a brief criminal career”). But

accepting that the parties agreed to a downward departure, I think a departure of more

than one criminal history category would have been “unreasonable” under the

circumstances of this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3). Accordingly, even were the

matter before us on plain error review, I do not believe appellant has demonstrated

that the district court’s decision to limit the reduction to 20 months, thus resulting in

a term of imprisonment of 168 months for this career offender, constituted a

miscarriage of justice warranting relief under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

52(b).

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-8-

LAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The majority has invoked a legal technicality in order

to affirm an illegal and unjustifiedly severe sentence. The majority’s reliance on

waiver totally ignores the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725 (1993). In addition, the district court and this court lack the authority to

impose an illegal sentence. 

I. Illegality of the Sentence

The majority holds that Harrison waived his right to object to his sentence,

which was imposed under the retroactive application of a 2003 Guideline in violation

of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The majority concludes Harrison is therefore barred

from pursuing such an argument on appeal. However, the constitutional directive

contained in the Ex Post Facto Clause cannot be waived. The Constitution orders

Congress (and the states) that “[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be

passed.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also id. at § 10, cl. 1. Accordingly, the U.S.

Sentencing Commission, which crafted the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to

Congress’ delegated authority, created U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11. This Guideline tells the

federal courts to

use the guidelines manual in effect on the date that the defendant is

sentenced, unless the court determines that this would violate the ex post

facto clause of the United States Constitution, in which case it is to use

the manual in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was

committed. Because an amendment to a Sentencing Guideline has the

potential to increase a defendant’s punishment for a crime committed

prior to the amendment, the ex post facto clause is violated if a

defendant is sentenced under the Guidelines in effect at the time of

sentencing when those Guidelines produce a sentence harsher than one

permitted under the Guidelines in effect at the time the crime is

committed.

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-9-

United States v. Frank, 354 F.3d 910, 926 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 1A1.1 (identifying the statutory

authority for creation of the Guidelines); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435-36

(1987) (wherein a unanimous Supreme Court held that a revised state sentencing

guideline was void as applied to the defendant, whose offense occurred before the

revised law’s effective date).

The Ex Post Facto Clause enshrines a constitutional mandate that is binding

upon Congress and, by extension, the Sentencing Commission and all courts

attempting to implement the Guidelines. It is not a mere “procedural” right that can

be shed carelessly. See United States v. Groves, 369 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir.

2004) (reversing and remanding a defendant’s sentence under the Guidelines on ex

post facto grounds because a “sentencing court is not authorized to impose an

unconstitutional sentence – such as a sentence that violates the Ex Post Facto Clause

– and such a sentence is therefore illegal”); see also United States v. Lightsey, 886

F.2d 304, 305 (11th Cir. 1989) (same). 

While it is well-settled that an individual can waive his or her appellate rights

in exchange for the benefits of a plea agreement, see, e.g., United States v. Garrido,

995 F.2d 808, 814 (8th Cir. 1993), a court never possesses the authority to impose an

illegal sentence that violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, even where a defendant agrees

to the illegal sentence in the plea agreement. See United States v. Michelsen, 141

F.3d 867, 872 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that, notwithstanding a voluntary

and knowing waiver of appellate rights, a defendant implicitly preserves his or her

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5

United States v. Wilson, 184 F.3d 798, 800-01 (8th Cir. 1999), appears to state

the contrary. I am not confident that Wilson rests on sound reasoning. Wilson states

correctly that even a constitutionally guaranteed “procedural” right to appeal may be

waived by a criminal defendant. Id. at 800. Yet, the Wilson court refused to consider

Wilson’s substantive ex post facto argument on appeal, citing the general rule that a

defendant who explicitly and voluntarily exposes himself or herself to a sentence may

not challenge that punishment on appeal. Id. at 801. The majority makes an identical

mistake. See supra majority opinion at 4-5 (citing United States v. Thompson, 289

F.3d 524, 527 (8th Cir. 2002); Wilson, 184 F.3d at 800-01; and United States v.

Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995)). This general rule has no bearing on, and

cannot trump, the special review procedure articulated in Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

Second, while the generic, procedural right to appeal can be waived, the substantive

right prohibiting ex post facto laws cannot. As Michelsen states, the right to appeal

a sentence on grounds of illegality survives a knowing and voluntary waiver of

appellate rights. See 141 F.3d at 872. To the extent that Wilson and Michelsen create

a conflict within our own circuit, this issue warrants further appeal or rehearing.

At any rate, Wilson is factually distinct from the instant case. In Wilson, the

defendant’s attorney stated at the sentencing hearing that he or she had reviewed the

Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR) and “believed it [was] correct and accurate

in all matters.” 184 F.3d at 799-800. Here, Harrison’s attorney made no such

concession at the sentencing hearings. Indeed, ever since the PSIR in this case was

released, Harrison and his attorney have argued that the PSIR’s recommendation of

“career offender” status seriously overrepresented Harrison’s criminal history.

Moreover, Harrison’s plea agreement does not contain a provision stating that he

waived his appellate rights.

6

Because courts are required to approve plea agreements, the obligation to

ensure that plea agreements do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause probably rests

with the court, and may be the type of constitutional issue that any court should be

allowed to raise sua sponte.

-10-

right to appeal a sentence on grounds of illegality).5

 If this were not true, then parties

could agree to illegal contracts.6

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7

See infra Part II.B. at 7-9 (conducting a harshness analysis). 

-11-

If the sentencing court applied the wrong Guideline resulting in a harsher

sentence than the correct Guideline would have imposed,7

 then Harrison’s sentence

violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and is illegal, and the sentencing court lacked the

authority to impose the sentence. 

Accordingly, I would vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing pursuant

to the Guidelines that were in effect at the time Harrison committed the offense. 

II. Analysis Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)

The majority opinion holds that Harrison waived the ex post facto argument.

This is clearly wrong. The majority in so holding contradicts the principles of Olano.

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), a court of appeals has the power to address errors

to which a party did not object in district court. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731. This

power is limited; an appellate court may only correct the alleged error that occurred

below if that error (a) is plain, (b) affects substantial rights, and (c) was inadvertently

forfeited. Id. at 732. 

A. Forfeiture Versus Waiver

As the Olano court explained, “forfeiture is the failure to make the timely

assertion of a right,” whereas “waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right.’” Id. at 733 (citations omitted). Olano states clearly

that waiver must be the product of intent. Id. Yet, in response to the Government’s

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-12-

comment that the Ex Post Facto Clause is inapplicable to the Guidelines, the district

court itself stated on the record, “Well, it hasn’t been – it hasn’t been raised. But I

toss it out for those who are intellectually hungry.” Tr. at 21 (emphasis added). This

statement from the district court judge is definitive. The majority reasons that

because the “judge . . . explicitly raises the ex post facto argument in open court,” see

supra majority opinion at 3, then it can ignore the judge’s subsequent statement that

the Ex Post Facto issue “hasn’t been – it hasn’t been raised.” Tr. at 21. This makes

no sense. The fact that the sentencing court and counsel for the Government

pontificated about the issue at the sentencing hearing on March 1 – while defense

counsel remained silent – does not change the legal status of this issue. 

The majority’s attempt to reconstruct the facts of this case so as to appear that

defense counsel consciously waived an objection on ex post facto grounds is clearly

erroneous. Harrison did not waive his rights intentionally. Although, on the first day

of sentencing, the district judge was hinting at the potential ex post facto issue,

defense counsel was clearly unaware of the implications of the judge’s questions. At

most, this is inadvertent forfeiture, not waiver. 

The majority’s strongest evidence of waiver boils down to two statements, both

of which require a gigantic interpretive leap to conclude that either demonstrates an

intentional relinquishment of Harrison’s ex post facto right. First, during the first day

of the sentencing hearing (February 24), and before the judge ever mentioned the

words “ex post facto or the 2002 Guidelines,” the judge asked the attorneys how

much discretion he had to depart downward. Defense counsel requested a one-level

downward departure in criminal history. Without any mention of the differently

worded 2002 Guidelines, defense counsel assumed that the judge’s request was made

pursuant to the (more limiting) 2003 version of the Guidelines. This is not evidence

of an intentional waiver – it is evidence of an inadvertent forfeiture. 

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8

If not taken out of context, the record shows that defense counsel lodged

conflicting and vague requests regarding the extent of departure and relied upon case

law that specifically endorsed the sentencing judge’s authority to depart downward

more than one offense level. See e.g., Def. Brief in Support of Motion for Downward

Departure at 6 (requesting that the court “reduce his sentence as justice and fairness

dictate” but requesting no specific offense level); Def. Am. Motion for Downward

Departure and Request for Oral Argument at 2 (submitted on February 26, and

requesting a departure of “one category level from category VI to category V”); Tr.

at 13 (basing the departure request on the United States v. Greger, 339 F.3d 666, 668,

671 (8th Cir. 2003) – which explicitly allows a sentencing judge to depart both

vertically and horizontally – yet also requesting only a single criminal history

category departure because the ex post facto issue is not yet clear); Tr. at 24 (asking

the court on March 1 to impose a sentence at the low end of the guideline range, but

omitting a specification of the applicable range). 

-13-

Second, the majority points to February 26 when defense counsel filed an

amended motion for downward departure reiterating the request made at the first

hearing. Again, at this point, no one mentioned the 2002 Guidelines or the Ex Post

Facto Clause. Defense counsel obviously repeated the request because he thought the

judge needed clarification on the departure allowed under the 2003 version. Counsel

did not comprehend what the judge was getting at, and that is inadvertent forfeiture,

not intentional relinquishment.8

Conspicuously lacking from the majority opinion is any express statement in

the record made by Harrison or his counsel – at a point in time after the district court

mentioned the Ex Post Facto Clause explicitly – that he relinquished or waived his

right under the Ex Post Facto Clause. It is not surprising that the record should be

devoid of such a statement; a fair reading of the record reveals that defense counsel

remained mute because he simply did not comprehend what was going on at the

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9

Contrary to the Government’s patently incorrect claim in its brief, the

transcript from the sentencing hearing contains no concession by defense counsel

that, in fact, the new 2003 guideline controlled the extent of departure in this case.

Defense counsel merely conceded that the 2003 Guideline amendment “came about

in November of 2003.” Tr. at 20. 

-14-

hearing. Defense counsel’s confused silence cannot be transformed into an express

or intended statement that the Ex Post Facto Clause was inapplicable.9

 

Once the sentencing resumed on March 1, the judge finally mentioned the Ex

Post Facto Clause by name. The Government began to offer an argument to the court

on that issue, but the judge explained clearly that the issue was not before the court.

As this exchange transpired between the judge and prosecutor, defense counsel

remained silent. After the ex post facto issue became explicit, defense counsel never

again specified the precise extent of the departure being sought. 

It is a stretch to rule that waiver of the Ex Post Facto Clauses’ guarantee can

occur where that issue was definitively “not raised” before the court, as the record

states. But it defies reason to engage in a double-charade and further hold, as the

majority does, that such waiver can be achieved by defense counsel’s failure to grasp

an issue at which a judge is graciously hinting. 

Ex post facto arguments simply were not asserted or waived by Harrison’s

counsel, and an inadvertent failure to assert a substantial constitutional right

impacting the fairness and integrity of the penal system is precisely what Fed. R.

Crim. Proc. 52(b) enables a defendant to resurrect on appeal. Olano, 507 U.S. at 731-

32. 

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10Normally, a district court’s decision to deny a downward departure is not

reviewable. An exception to this rule is when “the district judge mistakenly believed

that he or she lacked the authority to make such a departure,” which is the case here.

Frank, 354 F.3d at 926; see also Tr. at 23 (reflecting the judge’s statement that he

departed downward to the degree authorized under the current law).

-15-

B. Plain Error Affecting Substantial Rights

In the present case, it cannot be disputed that the district court committed plain

error that affected a substantial constitutional guarantee contained in the Ex Post

Facto Clause – i.e., the unequivocal command that the Government shall not dole out

punishment that imposes a harsher sentence than the one permitted by law at the time

the crime was committed. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl.3; Frank, 354 F.3d at 926.10

If one compares the sentence Harrison received under the 2003 version of the

Guidelines with the sentence he likely would have received under the 2002 version,

it appears that he would have received a lesser sentence under the earlier version. It

is undisputed that the policy statement contained in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (2003) limits

the downward departures for career offenders to one criminal history category. 

Given Harrison’s total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of V (after

application of a single downward departure), the resulting sentencing range was 168-

210 months (14-17.5 years). 

Even the Government concedes that “[p]rior to November 5, 2003, no such

restriction existed allowing the Court to depart horizontally (criminal history

category) and vertically (offense level) from the applicable career offender guideline

range.” Government’s Brief at 8-9 (citing Greger, 339 F.3d at 668 (8th Cir. 2003)).

Although the district court did not state definitively what sentence it would have

issued to Harrison had it been able to exercise greater discretion, the record reveals

that the district court wanted to drop Harrison’s offense level to 23, but leave his

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11See Tr. at 8 (reflecting the judge’s belief that if the district court opted to

grant Harrison’s request for downward departure on the ground that his “career

offender” status overrepresented the severity of his criminal history, the court could

sentence within the guideline range that would have applied absent the career

offender status in its entirety – i.e., the base offense level minus any adjustments); see

also United States v. Senior, 935 F.2d 149, 151 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming sentence

based on the guideline range that would have applied absent the career offender

status). 

12The Government argues that the 2003 amendment to U.S.S.G. §4A1.3 did not

technically increase the penalty for the crime and therefore did not increase the

harshness of Harrison’s sentence. Rather, the Government reasons, the amendment

merely restricted the sentencing court’s discretionary authority to depart more than

one criminal history level. This argument is disingenuous. When a judge’s discretion

to grant downward departures is restricted, the harshness of a sentence necessarily

increases. The Supreme Court has already rejected the argument that downward

departures or other types of penalty credits bear no relation to the severity of a

sentence because they are “not ‘in some technical sense part of the sentence.’” Lynce,

519 U.S. at 445-47. 

[R]etroactive alteration of parole or early release provisions, like the

retroactive application of provisions that govern initial sentencing,

implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such credits are one

-16-

criminal history category at VI, which would have produced a sentencing range of 92-

115 months (roughly 7.6-9.5 years).11

In light of this analysis, it is clear that the application of the 2003 Guideline

imposed a harsher sentence than the prior version. Harrison will serve roughly five

to ten additional years than he would have served under the prior sentencing scheme.

Moreover, this error encroaches upon a fundamental liberty interest protected by the

Ex Post Facto Clause. “The presumption against the retroactive application of new

laws is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the

individual citizen.” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439 (1997). In both a temporal

and substantive sense, this error affects “substantial rights.”12 

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determinant of petitioner’s prison term . . . and . . . [the petitioner’s]

effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed. . . . [T]he

removal of such provisions can constitute an increase in punishment,

because a prisoner’s eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant

factor entering into both the defendant’s decision to plea bargain and the

judge’s calculation of the sentence to be imposed.

Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted); see also Weaver v.

Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33-34 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Cal. Dep’t Corr.

v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995) (holding that a revised Florida statute,

which reduced the availability of monthly “gain-time” credits that could operate to

reduce a sentence, was retroactively and unconstitutionally applied to defendant in

violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause). Thus, it is well-settled that, even though a

downward departure under § 4A1.3 is a product of judicial discretion to which a

defendant is not necessarily entitled, this does not bar the ex post facto claim. In light

of Lynce and Weaver, the Government’s attempt to recycle this argument is ill-taken.

-17-

Since the district court applied the 2003 version of the Guidelines and imposed

a harsher sentence than it would have under the prior version, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 was

violated. This type of deviation from a Guideline binding upon courts is “plain error”

within the meaning of Rule 52(b). “If a legal rule was violated during the district

court proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule, then there has been an

‘error’ within the meaning of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely objection.”

Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34. 

In short, the district court committed plain error affecting substantial rights, and

Harrison did not waive appeal of this error. This case cries out for reversal.

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