Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02909/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02909-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Risa Vetri Ferman
Appellee
Reginald A. Roberts
Appellant

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________

No. 15-2909

_____________

REGINALD A. ROBERTS,

 Appellant

v.

RISA VETRI FERMAN; COUNTY OF 

MONTGOMERY; JAMES MATTHEWS; 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, III; BRUCE L. CASTOR, JR.; 

OSCAR P. VANCE, Jr.; SAMUEL GALLEN; 

STEPHEN FORZATO; EDMUND JUSTICE; 

CAROLYN T. CARLUCCIO; MARK BERNSTIEL; 

TONI LUTER, Sued Individually Held Liable Joint and 

Severally

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 2-09-cv-04895

District Judge: The Honorable

Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

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April 13, 2016

Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and KRAUSE,

Circuit Judges

(Filed: June 17, 2016) 

Brian M. Puricelli, Esq.

Law Office of Brian Puricelli

2721 Pickertown Road

Warrington, PA 18976

 Counsel for Appellant

Carol A. VanderWoude, Esq.

Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin

18th Floor

2000 Market Street

Suite 2300

Philadelphia, PA 19103

 Counsel for Appellee 

_____________________

OPINION

_____________________ 

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

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The key question in this case is not an easy one. 

We must determine when dismissal for failure to comply

with Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 

is appropriate. In so doing, we also attempt to provide

more structure to a narrow area of law that has been 

subject to confusion within this Circuit. The specific 

question we are confronted with is whether a district 

court’s decision to dismiss a party’s post-trial motion 

because that party chose not to attempt to recreate the 

trial record, despite being ordered to do so, was an abuse 

of discretion. We hold that it was not. We also hold that 

Appellant’s other claims of error lack merit. We will 

therefore affirm.

I.

Plaintiff Reginald Roberts, a former employee of 

Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, brought suit against 

Montgomery County and a number of its employees1

alleging that he “suffered continual retaliation, 

discrimination and humiliation” at work in violation of 

 1 In addition to the County, Defendants include Risa 

Vetri Ferman; James Matthews; Joseph M. Hoeffel, III; 

Bruce L. Castor, Jr.; Oscar P. Vance, Jr.; Samuel Gallen; 

Stephen Forzato; Edmund Justice; Carolyn T. Carluccio; 

Mark Bernstiel; and Toni Luter (collectively, 

“Defendants”).

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Title VII and his constitutional rights. Pl.’s Am. Compl. 

3, ECF No. 4. The complaint, as amended in January 

2010, contains five counts, two of which, counts II and 

III, allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation 

against Roberts for his allegedly protected speech. 

Specifically, in count II, Roberts alleges that he was 

retaliated against by several County employees for 

seeking heart and lung benefits, filing employment 

discrimination charges, and testifying at a Fact Finding 

Conference before the Pennsylvania Human Relations 

Commission. Count III contains the same allegations but 

seeks to hold the County liable directly, based on Monell 

v. Department of Social Services of City of New York.

436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (“Local governing bodies, 

therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for 

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, 

the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 

implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, 

regulation, or decision officially adopted and 

promulgated by that body’s officers.” (footnote 

omitted)). The case was originally assigned to Judge 

Savage, who granted in part and denied in part 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on February 23, 2010. On 

March 31, 2010, the parties then agreed to have the 

matter referred in its entirety to a magistrate judge. 

After briefing and oral argument, the magistrate 

judge granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment, further limiting the 

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claims that would proceed to trial. Important for 

purposes of this appeal, the magistrate judge denied in 

part and granted in part summary judgment on counts II 

and III of the amended complaint. However, after 

alleging bias on the part of the magistrate judge, Roberts,

on October 6, 2011, moved to revoke his consent to

adjudication by a magistrate. Roberts’ petition to revoke 

consent was granted on January 4, 2012, and his motion 

for recusal based on alleged judicial bias was thus denied 

as moot. This case was then reassigned to Judge Savage, 

who scheduled an initial pre-trial conference and 

prepared the case for trial.

On February 21, 2012, Judge Savage held a final 

pre-trial conference at which he expressed concern about 

whether Roberts would be able to make out a proper 

Monell claim against the County based on the facts as 

then clearly presented. He also questioned whether the 

County could legally be held liable under Monell in light

of a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision

regarding the division of authority between the County 

and the Commonwealth. With that in mind, Judge 

Savage asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing 

on the effect of the recent change in Pennsylvania law. 

As Roberts’ attorney noted, “[i]f the law is changed, that 

would be a reason for reconsideration.” Tr. of Final 

Pretrial Conference at 236, Roberts v. Ferman, No. 09-

4895 (February 21, 2012).

At the final pre-trial hearing held the morning 

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before voir dire, Judge Savage re-raised this issue and 

entertained the parties’ arguments. Ultimately, after 

considering the supplemental briefing, both sides’ oral 

arguments, and the magistrate judge’s opinion, Judge 

Savage granted summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants on both counts II and III, reversing the earlier 

denial by the magistrate judge. The case proceeded to 

trial on the remaining claims. Six days later, the jury 

rendered a verdict in favor of Defendants on all counts. 

Roberts then filed a timely motion for a new trial 

or in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict. In this motion, Roberts made several general 

allegations of error, focusing primarily on the conduct of 

the trial judge. For example, Roberts claimed that “[t]he 

Judge was not clear, consistent and/or fair when making 

rulings. The Judge’s conduct towards the Plaintiff 

showed contempt for the Plaintiff and disfavor toward 

Plaintiff’s counsel.” Pl.’s Post Trial Mot. for New Trial 

3, ECF No. 228. In addition, because Roberts again 

raised allegations of bias—this time by Judge Savage—

the case was reassigned to Judge Quiñones. It was then

also discovered that four of the six days of the trial 

transcript had unfortunately been lost.2

 2 Roberts on appeal notes that he was told by the Clerk’s 

Office that the court reporter had become ill and this 

caused what was at first believed to be just a delay in 

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Upon learning that the trial record was incomplete, 

Judge Quiñones granted Roberts’ motion for 

extraordinary relief and ordered the court reporting

company to produce the transcript for this case. Even 

this order, however, ultimately failed to secure the 

transcripts. Several months later, and after several more 

unsuccessful attempts to obtain the trial transcripts, Judge 

Quiñones denied Roberts’ second, nearly identical, 

motion for extraordinary relief that again sought to force 

the court reporting company to turn over the transcript.

In a footnote, Judge Quiñones concluded that granting 

another such motion would be futile, as the court had 

made numerous failed attempts to obtain the complete 

trial transcript.

Judge Quiñones instead ordered the parties to 

recreate the record in compliance with Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 10(c) so that she could rule on 

Roberts’ post-trial motion. Roberts, however, chose not 

to comply with this order, arguing that any attempt to do 

so would be useless, as the parties would not be able to 

agree on the contents of a 10(c) statement. Thus, over 

nine months after ordering the parties to comply with 

Rule 10(c), Judge Quiñones was still without a record 

with which she could assess the merits of Roberts’ posttrial motion. Concluding, therefore, that Roberts’ failure 

 

obtaining the transcripts. Why the transcripts were never 

ultimately obtained remains unclear.

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to comply with Rule 10(c) constituted a failure to 

prosecute, Judge Quiñones dismissed his motion. 

Roberts appealed. 3

II.

Before addressing the substance of Roberts’ 

arguments, we must address an argument raised by 

Defendants. They note that Roberts failed to include

even the available portions of the trial and pre-trial 

transcripts in the record on appeal. This, Defendants 

argue, demonstrates a “remarkable lack of diligence” by 

Roberts and suggests that under Lehman Brothers 

 3 We have jurisdiction here under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as 

denial of Roberts’ post-judgment motion “ends the 

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 

do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 

324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). It is thus immediately 

appealable. In addition, because interlocutory orders 

such as partial grants of summary judgment merge with 

the final judgment, they can be challenged on appeal. 

Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 

244 (3d Cir. 2013). Finally, “[w]e review dismissal of a 

post-trial motion as a sanction for abuse of discretion,” 

Knoll v. City of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 

2013), and give plenary review to grants of summary 

judgment, Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 

F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2010).

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Holdings, Inc. v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage

Services, L.P., 785 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2015), Roberts has 

forfeited his claims by failing to abide by Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 10(b). We disagree and take this 

opportunity to clarify when forfeiture for failure to 

comply with Rule 10 is appropriate.

In Lehman Brothers, appellant Gateway Funding 

argued that the district court had erred by concluding that 

it waived an argument in a telephonic oral argument 

before the court. Gateway Funding then claimed that no 

record of this proceeding existed, a statement which 

turned out to be false. We went on to hold that 

Gateway’s argument regarding the allegedly erroneous 

finding of waiver had been forfeited under Rule 10(b).4

 

Because that case has been the subject of much

confusion, it merits some discussion here.

We begin by noting that in Lehman Brothers we

did not cavalierly hold that any failure to comply with 

Rule 10(b) would result in forfeiture. Instead, we 

 4 Rule 10(b) states in relevant part that “[i]f the appellant 

intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 

unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the 

evidence, the appellant must include in the record a 

transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or 

conclusion.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2).

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carefully considered a host of factors, including “whether 

the defaulting party’s action is willful or merely 

inadvertent, whether a lesser sanction can bring about 

compliance and the degree of prejudice the opposing 

party has suffered because of the default.” Id. at 101. In 

so doing, we noted first that Gateway specifically argued 

on appeal that no record existed of the district court’s 

telephonic oral argument. This contention was proven 

wrong. We thus expressed our concern that Gateway’s 

failure to provide a transcript of the telephonic oral 

argument, a clear violation of Rule 10(b), “at best shows 

a remarkable lack of diligence and at worst indicates an 

intent to deceive this Court.” Id. We were also 

unimpressed by Gateway’s “weak post hoc justification” 

for its failure to comply with Rule 10(b). Id. We next

took pains to emphasize throughout that this sanction was 

“not favored,” “unusual,” and “should be sparingly

used.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). Finally, we explained that even if we 

considered Gateway’s argument on the merits, we were 

unlikely to overturn the district court’s ruling both 

because we were reviewing for abuse of discretion and 

because the transcript did not support Gateway’s 

contentions. Id. at 101 n.2.

The takeaway, then, from Lehman Brothers should 

be clear: Gateway made an affirmative and serious

misstatement in its brief before this Court when it stated 

that no record of the telephonic oral argument existed. 

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This, we concluded, evinced either an intent to deceive 

the Court or a “remarkable lack of diligence.” Id. at 101. 

Even so, that alone was insufficient to warrant forfeiture, 

because we went on to consider Gateway’s post hoc 

explanation for its failure. Only upon finding Gateway’s 

explanation lacking did we conclude that forfeiture was 

an appropriate sanction.

We are not confronted with such a situation here. 

There is no allegation that Roberts misrepresented the 

existence or non-existence of the trial transcript or that 

the explanation for his omission was a disingenuous post 

hoc rationalization. Thus, the argument that Roberts

showed a “remarkable lack of diligence” here, just as 

Gateway did in Lehman Brothers, is misplaced. Roberts 

was derelict in preparing the record for appeal—he 

certainly should have included the parts of the trial and 

pre-trial transcripts that were a part of the record—but 

this failure is simply not comparable to the serious 

concerns we raised in Lehman Brothers. We therefore 

conclude that Roberts’ failure to comply with Rule 10(b) 

does not warrant forfeiture of his claims on appeal.

III.

We next address whether it was an abuse of 

discretion for the District Court to dismiss Roberts’ posttrial motion because it concluded that he failed to 

prosecute his case. As we have held on multiple 

occasions, dismissal for failure to prosecute “must be a 

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sanction of last, not first, resort.” Knoll v. City of 

Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2013). That being 

said, we are also well aware that “[t]he power to dismiss 

for failure to prosecute . . . rests in the discretion of the 

trial court and is part of its inherent authority to prevent 

undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to 

avoid congestion in its docket.” Hewlett v. Davis, 844 

F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1988). To that end, where a 

plaintiff’s actions amount to the willful refusal to 

prosecute or blatant failure to comply with a district court 

order, dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate. 

See Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 

1994); Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 

1990).5

 

Turning to the facts of this case, the District Court 

on September 29, 2014, ordered the parties to recreate a 

trial record according to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 10(c) because the trial transcripts had not and 

 5 Normally, before a district court may sua sponte

dismiss a motion for failure to prosecute, it must consider 

the six factors outlined in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and 

Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), but the 

Poulis factors do not apply to post-trial motions. Knoll, 

707 F.3d at 409-10 (“[A] district court need not engage in 

a Poulis analysis when it dismisses a post-trial motion for 

noncompliance with procedural rules or court orders.”).

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could not be recovered.

6

 As laid out in Rule 10(c), “[i]f

the transcript of a hearing or trial is unavailable, the 

appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 

proceedings from the best available means, including the 

appellant’s recollection.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(c). This 

statement is then to be “served on the appellee, who may 

serve objections or proposed amendments within 14 days 

after being served.” Id. Finally, in the event of any 

disagreement, the statement and objections or 

amendments “must then be submitted to the district court 

for settlement and approval.” Id.

Nine months after being ordered to comply with 

Rule 10(c), Roberts had not submitted a proposed 

statement to Defendants. Indeed, Roberts’ only response

when he was ordered to explain his failure to comply 

with Rule 10(c) was that “it was agreed by counsel for 

the Parties . . . that neither side would agree [to] the 

other’s recreation of the trial events, so the effort [to 

comply with Rule 10(c)] would be futile.” Pl.’s Opp’n 

Resp. to Def.’s Notice to Dismiss 4, ECF No. 264. 

Defendants vigorously contest this alleged “agreement.” 

Roberts then goes on to assert that there is “no such court 

rule” that allowed the District Court to order the parties 

 6 Recreating the record was particularly important here 

because Judge Quiñones had not presided over the trial 

and thus could not otherwise have meaningfully 

considered the merits of Roberts’ post-trial motion. 

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to attempt to recreate the record, and further suggests that 

Judge Quiñones was biased7 against him because “the 

defendants were also ordered to present a recreated 

record and they also did not present a recreated record, 

yet nothing is said of this by the district court.” 

Appellant’s Br. 16 n.1.

Roberts’ counsel should take the time to read Rule 

10(c). He would then discover “such [a] court rule.” 

Indeed, it both provides a specific mechanism by which 

the parties can have their dispute over the contents of the 

trial court record resolved, and clearly places the 

responsibility for initially creating the record on the 

appellant. As a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 

10(c) is typically invoked for creating a record for meaningful 

review on appeal, but district courts have used Rule 10(c) as a 

guide when, as here, the district court itself needs a 

reconstructed record in order to rule on the dispute before it. 

E.g., Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 21 F. 

Supp. 3d 381, 382 n.1 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 606 F. App’x 669 

(3d Cir. 2015).

This brings us to the heart of the dispute: whether 

 7 Given that Roberts ultimately alleged or suggested bias 

on the part of three different and very able Judges in a 

single case, we are wary about giving any credit to these 

allegations. That said, there is no need to assess these 

claims for the reasons discussed infra.

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the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing 

Roberts’ post-trial motion for failure to prosecute, which 

was a direct result of his failure to comply with the 

District Court’s directive to file a reconstructed record 

per the process outlined in Rule 10(c). Roberts’ blatant 

refusal to comply with the District Court’s September 29, 

2014, Order amounts to a willful refusal to move his own 

post-trial motion forward, which, per Spain and Guyer, 

places the District Court’s decision to dismiss for failure 

to prosecute well within its discretion. We will thus 

affirm the District Court on that basis.8

 8 We have also consistently affirmed dismissals for 

failure to prosecute when a plaintiff fails to comply with 

a Local Rule requiring him to supply the district court 

with the relevant record. See, e.g., Knoll, 707 F.3d at 

410-11; Hewlett, 844 F.2d at 114-15; see also E.D. Pa. 

Local R. Civ. P. 7.1(e) (“Within fourteen (14) days after 

filing any post-trial motion, the movant shall either (a) 

order a transcript of the trial by a writing delivered to the 

Court Reporter Supervisor, or (b) file a verified motion 

showing good cause to be excused from this requirement. 

Unless a transcript is thus ordered, or the movant excused 

from ordering a transcript, the post-trial motion may be 

dismissed for lack of prosecution.”). Here, two-thirds of 

the transcripts were missing, making these past cases 

hinging on the Local Rule not directly on point, but the 

lesson from those cases remains instructive and 

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IV.

Because we conclude the District Court did not err 

in dismissing Roberts’ post-trial motion on account of his

failing to even attempt to comply with the District 

Court’s directive to provide a recreated trial transcript, 

we need not determine whether a new trial is actually 

warranted. Even if we were to entertain that question, 

however, Roberts’ failure to recreate the record pursuant 

to Rule 10(c) would also foreclose review of the merits 

of his appeal by our Court. 

Courts of appeals have consistently held that when 

an appellant chooses not to avail him or herself of the 

procedure available in Rule 10(c) for recreating the trial 

record, he or she cannot then claim on appeal that the 

loss of the trial records, without more, necessitates a new 

trial. This is so primarily because the appellant is 

responsible for ensuring that the record is sufficiently 

complete on appeal. Thus, in asking us to grant him a 

new trial, Roberts must have at least attempted to 

recreate the record in compliance with Rule 10(c)—an 

 

buttresses our conclusion that the District Court’s 

insistence on a Rule 10(c) record was appropriate: when 

a plaintiff fails to provide the district court with the 

materials necessary to resolve the case, dismissal for 

failure to prosecute is an appropriate exercise of the 

district court’s discretion.

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effort he has failed to undertake in the slightest. See, 

e.g., United States v. Sierra, 981 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 

1992) (“[Appellants] could have sought to reconstruct the 

record in that respect by conference with trial counsel for 

submission to the district court. In the absence of that 

minimal effort . . . we see no reason to direct a remand 

for the purpose of reconstruction of the unrecorded 

portions of the record.”); United States v. Kelly, 535 F.3d 

1229, 1243 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Furthermore, even if Mr. 

Kelly were able to articulate an adequate claim of 

prejudice from the purported omissions in the record, that 

claim would be significantly undermined (if not defeated) 

by Mr. Kelly’s failure to avail himself of established 

procedures—specifically, the procedures of Fed. R. App. 

P. 10(c)—for reconstructing the gaps in the record.”);

Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 24 F.3d 814, 821 (6th Cir. 

1994) (“[P]laintiffs cannot justify their failure to invoke 

Rule 10(c) merely by asserting that to do so would have 

led to disputes with opposing counsel.”); United States v. 

Nolan, 910 F.2d 1553, 1560 (7th Cir. 1990) (“We 

recognize that sometimes trial participants’ recollections 

may be too vague, and notes and other trial materials too 

sketchy, to make Rule 10(c) an adequate device for 

reconstructing a record. . . . Still, given Rule 10(c), we 

agree with the Sixth Circuit that it is not appropriate to 

reverse a district court for failing to [record the court 

proceedings,] ‘[a]bsent a showing by counsel on appeal 

of a reasonable but unsuccessful effort to determine the 

substance of the off-the-record remarks.’” (internal 

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citation omitted)); Herndon v. City of Massillon, 638 

F.2d 963, 965 (6th Cir. 1981) (“The clear lesson of these 

cases is that a party may not seek a new trial simply 

because matters occurring in the district court are not 

reflected in the transcript. Rather, that party must at least 

attempt to cure the defect by reconstructing the record as 

provided by Fed. R. App. Pro. 10(c).”); Murphy v. St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 30, 31-32 (5th 

Cir. 1963) (“The appellants have not availed themselves 

of the provisions of [an analogue to Rule 10(c)], a 

procedure which might well have enabled them to bring a 

sufficient record before us. In the absence of compliance 

with the Rules, the charges urged to be erroneous are not 

in the record and not before us.”). We therefore hold that 

it was not an abuse of discretion for Judge Quiñones to 

deny Roberts’ post-trial motion. By refusing to even 

attempt to comply with Judge Quiñones order, Roberts

essentially prevented any meaningful review of his 

claims.

This, however, is not to say that when a party’s 

attempted compliance with Rule 10(c) yields an 

insufficient record, post-trial or appellate review is 

limited to that insufficient record. As we have noted

before, a recreated trial record “can be satisfactory” 

because “‘often, the reconstructed record will enable the 

appellate court effectively to review the relevant issues.’” 

United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 171 (3d Cir. 

2013) (quoting Sierra, 981 F.2d at 126). But in Sussman, 

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we specifically left the door open for an appellant to 

argue that the recreated record was insufficient to provide 

meaningful review. We explained that, after recreating 

the record according to Rule 10(c), in order “[t]o qualify 

for a new trial, . . . Sussman must make ‘a specific 

showing of prejudice’ from the absence of the 

transcripts.” Id. at 170 (quoting Sierra, 981 F.2d at 125 

(“[T]he mere absence of the sidebar transcripts does not 

signify prejudice.”)); see also United States v. Renton, 

700 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[A]ppellant must 

show that failure to record and preserve the specific 

portion of the trial proceedings visits a hardship upon 

him and prejudices his appeal.”). Without any recreated 

trial record, however, we cannot even begin to assess 

whether the requisite prejudice existed here to warrant 

granting Roberts a new trial.

We are thus satisfied that our holding in this case 

leaves open avenues for appellants to seek appropriate 

relief if they can show that they were prejudiced by the 

loss of part or all of the record below. Such an appellant 

must comply with the dictates of Rule 10(c) and then

present specific reasons why his or her attempt to recreate the record was insufficient. This would allow us 

on appeal (or the district court when considering a posttrial motion) to properly assess whether we could in fact 

grant meaningful review of the appellant’s claims

without the actual trial transcript available to us. See, 

e.g., Bergerco, U.S.A. v. Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd., 

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896 F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that despite 

compliance with Rule 10(c), because “we cannot 

meaningfully review the district court’s findings [without 

the benefit of the missing trial transcripts,] . . . [t]his is 

one of the rare cases where a retrial is appropriate”). 

Roberts has failed to provide us with the tools to make 

such an assessment and thus cannot prevail in his quest to 

overturn the District Court’s dismissal of his post-trial 

motion and obtain a new trial.

V.

We next turn to the second issue Roberts raises on 

appeal: whether Judge Savage erred in granting summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants on counts II and III.

9

 

Roberts raises two claims of error, neither of which has

merit. First, Roberts claims that it was error for Judge 

Savage to “reconsider” both counts because the 

 9 Because the District Court’s denial of Roberts’ posttrial motion was a final decision within the meaning of 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, “[u]nder the ‘merger rule,’ prior

interlocutory orders . . . merge with the final judgment in 

a case, and the interlocutory orders (to the extent that 

they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on 

appeal from the final order.” Camesi, 729 F.3d at 244-45

(quoting In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 

(3d Cir. 1996)).

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magistrate judge had already entertained a summary 

judgment motion and denied summary judgment on the 

same counts. This argument fails for multiple reasons, 

not the least of which is that Roberts sought to revoke his

consent to have the case heard by the magistrate judge on 

October 6, 2011, and his request was granted on January 

4, 2012. Thus, allegations that Judge Savage overstepped 

his authority are baseless.

In addition, the bald claim that once a motion for 

summary judgment has been ruled on, the District Court 

loses the “statutory authority” to later grant summary 

judgment is simply erroneous. Appellant’s Br. 27. As 

we have consistently held, when “(1) new evidence is 

available; (2) a supervening new law has been 

announced; or (3) the earlier decision was clearly 

erroneous and would create manifest injustice,” the law 

of the case doctrine does not apply and the court is free to 

reconsider an earlier denial of summary judgment. Pub. 

Interest Research Grp. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium 

Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997). We 

also have held that “the law of the case doctrine does not 

limit the power of trial judges to reconsider their prior 

decisions,” but have noted that when a court does so, it 

must explain on the record why it is doing so and “take 

appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by 

reliance on the prior ruling.” Williams v. Runyon, 130 

F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Krueger Assocs., 

Inc. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co. of Pa., 247 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 

Case: 15-2909 Document: 003112328952 Page: 21 Date Filed: 06/17/2016
22

2001) (“Under the law of the case doctrine the district 

court’s denial of ADT’s initial summary judgment 

motion did not create any bar to the court’s later 

reconsideration of the renewed motion.”); Preaseau v. 

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 591 F.2d 74, 79-80 (9th Cir. 

1979) (“This practice reflects the rule that an order 

denying a motion for summary judgment is generally 

interlocutory and subject to reconsideration by the court 

at any time.” (internal citations omitted)).

In this case, we conclude that Judge Savage did not 

err in reconsidering the magistrate judge’s prior denial of 

summary judgment. Not only were the magistrate 

judge’s prior rulings in this case likely void,

10 but the 

record also makes it clear that in both instances Judge 

Savage was presented with changed circumstances that 

the magistrate judge was unaware of at the time he ruled 

on Roberts’ claims. Regarding both counts, the 

 10 See United States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 330 

(5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that lack of consent to 

disposition by a magistrate judge would strip the 

magistrate judge of jurisdiction over the case); 32 Am. 

Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 140 (“Once the magistrate judge 

allows the withdrawal of consent, it is as if the consent 

had never been given, and, accordingly, the magistrate 

judge lacks the power to try the case and enter a 

judgment in it.”).

Case: 15-2909 Document: 003112328952 Page: 22 Date Filed: 06/17/2016
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magistrate judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 

564 U.S. 379 (2011), since it was decided within days of 

the denial of summary judgment. This case, Judge 

Savage concluded, “absolutely . . . control[led]” both of 

Roberts’ First Amendment retaliation claims. Tr. of Trial 

– Day 1 at 17, Roberts v. Ferman, No. 09-4895 (February 

29, 2012). Thus, reconsideration was not procedurally 

erroneous. In addition, an intervening decision from the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court cast further doubt on the 

viability of count III, specifically calling into doubt 

Roberts’ ability to hold the County liable for the actions 

of certain Defendants since their employment status was 

now unclear. For this reason, Judge Savage ordered the 

parties to submit supplemental briefing on the effect of 

this case. As Roberts’ attorney noted, “[i]f the law is 

changed, that would be a reason for reconsideration.” Tr. 

of Final Pretrial Conference at 236, Roberts v. Ferman, 

No. 09-4895 (February 21, 2012). Accordingly, Judge 

Savage’s reconsideration of summary judgment on both

counts was procedurally proper. Roberts’ procedural 

objection that Judge Savage simply could not reconsider 

the magistrate judge’s partial denial of summary 

judgment is, therefore, without merit.

Finally, we also reject Roberts’ claim that Judge 

Savage could not “sua sponte” grant summary judgment

since there was no motion filed by Defendants. As we 

have held, “authority has developed to allow a court to 

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24

grant summary judgment to a non-moving party” so long 

as the court gives “notice that [it] is considering a sua 

sponte summary judgment motion” and “provide[s] the 

party with an opportunity to present relevant evidence in 

opposition to that motion.” Chambers Dev. Co. v. 

Passaic Cty. Utils. Auth., 62 F.3d 582, 584 n.5 (3d Cir. 

1995); see also DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 

506 F.3d 209, 223 (3d Cir. 2007) (“District courts may 

grant summary judgment sua sponte in appropriate 

circumstances.”). Here, both of the above requirements 

were met prior to the grant of summary judgment.

VI.

For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm 

Judge Quiñones’ order denying Roberts’ post-trial 

motion.

Case: 15-2909 Document: 003112328952 Page: 24 Date Filed: 06/17/2016