Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-07-01019/USCOURTS-ca3-07-01019-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Thomas Weatherly
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 07-1019

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 v.

THOMAS WEATHERLY,

 Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(District Court No. 06-CR-00258)

District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 14, 2008

Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: March 31, 2008)

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Thomas Weatherly appeals from the judgment of conviction and

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2

sentence entered by the District Court for the District of New Jersey on December 20,

2006. For the following reasons, this Court will affirm. 

I.

We need only address those facts necessary to our opinion.

At approximately noon on August 31, 2005, Officer John Ryel observed Thomas

Weatherly sitting in Zelley Alley in Trenton, New Jersey. App. at 144. As Officer Ryel

approached Weatherly, he realized that Weatherly was drinking alcohol in public in

violation of a city ordinance. Id. at 144-45. When requested by Officer Ryel, Weatherly

provided his name and identification, and Officer Ryel radioed this information into a

police dispatch in order to conduct a warrant check. Id. at 146-47. During this encounter,

Weatherly made no attempt to resist arrest or otherwise flee. Id. at 173.

Upon hearing back from the police dispatch, Officer Ryel learned that Weatherly

had an active warrant out for his arrest. App. at 149. A few minutes prior to receiving the

call about the active warrant, in response to a call to radio dispatch by Officer Ryel,

Detective Luis Medina arrived at the scene. Id. at 210A-11, 148-49. Both Officer Ryel

and Detective Medina stated that as they were helping Weatherly to his feet in order to

arrest him for the active warrant, they observed a handgun protruding out of the

waistband in the rear of his pants. Id. at 149, 211-12. Upon seeing the weapon, Detective

Medina seized the gun and the officers handcuffed and arrested Weatherly. Id. at 150,

212.

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Weatherly was also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), which provides 1

for a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for a felon-in-possession convicted

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) who also has sustained three or more convictions for violent

felonies or serious drug offenses. 

It is not entirely clear that Officer Ryel stated that Weatherly was seated 2

throughout the entire encounter, only that he was seated when Officer Ryel first observed

him and was seated when advised of the active warrant.

Weatherly argues that this discrepancy is important, because if Weatherly was 3

standing at some point prior to the arrest for the active warrant, Officer Ryel and

Detective Medina should have been able to see the gun. Def. Br. at 7.

3

Weatherly was charged in an indictment with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as a

prior convicted felon in possession of a firearm. App. at 14. Weatherly’s defense at trial 1

“was that the officers found the firearm in question in the alley near Mr. Weatherly,

assumed it was his, and embellished their story to strengthen their case against him.” 

Defendant’s Brief (“Def. Br.”) at 7; see also App. at 297. In support of this theory,

Weatherly introduced the following evidence at trial. 

First, Weatherly described a discrepancy in the testimony of the officers as to

whether Weatherly was sitting throughout the entirety of the encounter. Def. Br. at 7. 

Officer Ryel’s testimony seems to indicate that Weatherly was seated throughout the

encounter. App. at 149, 172. However, Detective Medina stated that Weatherly was 2

standing at some point during the encounter, and was told to sit while Officer Ryel and

Detective Medina waited for a response about the warrant check. Id. at 211-12. 3

In addition, Weatherly offered evidence to attempt to prove that it was common to

find abandoned guns in Zelley’s Alley. Detective Jerome James Commiso testified that

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Despite testifying that he played baseball “five days out of a week” during the 4

summer, Peagler was unable to remember what position he played and admitted that he

did not know the positions in baseball. App. at 261-63.

4

152 abandoned guns were found in Trenton, New Jersey during 2005. App. at 233. 

However, on cross examination, Detective Commiso stated that no abandoned guns were

recovered in Zelley Alley (or the immediately surrounding area) during 2005. Id. at 242. 

Weatherly also introduced the testimony of Carniell Peagler, a 20-year-old ex-convict

who testified that while playing pickup baseball in a field adjacent to Zelley Alley, he 4

observed gang members stashing or discarding guns in Zelley Alley. Id. at 257.

Weatherly also offered evidence in an attempt to demonstrate that he was not in

possession of a weapon shortly before the arrest. Bernadette Humphrey, Weatherly’s

wife’s adult daughter, testified that when Weatherly left the house at approximately 11:20

a.m., she never saw “the handle of a handgun sticking out of his pants” or “any bulges in

his waistband area.” App. at 307. Longino Martinez, who worked at the liquor store

where Weatherly (a regular customer) allegedly bought his alcohol, stated that during

August 2005 he never observed a customer with a gun and would have called the police if

he had. Id. at 284-85. However, on cross examination, Mr. Martinez testified that he did

not recall August 31, 2005 in great detail, and he further testified that he does not pay a

lot of attention to Weatherly when he is in the store. Id. at 288-89.

Before trial began, Weatherly submitted the following proposed “mere presence”

jury instruction in order to explain to the jury the legal justification for his defense theory:

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5

“Mere presence in the area of any contraband, including a firearm, or awareness of its

location is not sufficient to establish possession.” App. at 63. After the judge declined to

include the “mere presence” instruction in her proposed jury charge on the issue of

possession, Weatherly objected and explained that the “mere presence” instruction went

to the very heart of his defense. Id. at 297-298. The District Court, however, stated in

response to the request to include the “mere presence” instruction, “I don’t think it’s

relevant.” Id. at 298.

Instead, the District Court gave the following instructions to the jury regarding the

issue of “possession”:

In order to sustain its burden of proof for the crime of possessing a

firearm as charged in the indictment, the Government must prove . . . that the

defendant knowingly possessed the firearm described in the indictment.

* * * 

To possess meansto have something within your control. This does not

necessarily mean that you must hold it physically, that is to have actual

possession of it. As long as the firearm is within your control, you would

possess it.

Proof of ownership is not required. The Government is not required to

prove that at the time of possession the defendant knew he was breaking the

law. It is sufficient if you find that the defendant knowingly possessed the

firearm charged.

Knowingly is defined as knowledge, voluntarily and intentionally, and

not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. 

* * *

Now, to possess meansto have it within the person’s control. That does

not mean, and I said earlier, it doesn’t have to be held physically. It doesn’t

even have to be on the person. But in this case, the proofs and the allegations

are that the defendant had it on his person [and] had actual possession of it.

In other words, you can be in possession of a weapon in your car and you can

be 25-50 feet from the car. But that’s not this case. That’s all I’m saying.

This case, the allegation is that the defendant had possession of it, actual

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6

possession on his person.

To satisfy the possession element, you must find that the defendant

knowingly possessed – we said that earlier.

App. at 343-46.

In summation, Weatherly conceded that he was only contesting the issue of

whether he “possessed” the gun. App. at 364. Weatherly argued that his guilt hinged

upon the credibility of Officer Ryel and Detective Medina, id., and he asserted that Ryel

and Medina lied in their testimony. Id. at 370-72. In rebuttal, the Government argued

that Weatherly failed to show any reasons why Ryel and Medina would lie. Id. at 384. 

Towards the end of his rebuttal, the Government posed this rhetorical question: “Why

would Officer Ryel and Detective Medina risk their 32-34 years of experience on the

police force over this case?” Id. at 396. Weatherly’s attorney objected to this statement

as “vouching for the witnesses,” but the District Court never ruled on the objection. Id. at

396-397.

On September 8, 2006, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Weatherly. App.

at 2. At the sentencing hearing on December 15, 2006, Weatherly argued that the

application of the Armed Career Criminal Act, and particularly 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1),

violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 409-10. However, the District

Court disagreed, and sentenced Weatherly to 200 months’ imprisonment, to be followed

by five years’ supervised release. Id. at 418-19. Weatherly filed a timely notice of appeal

on January 4, 2007. Id. at 1.

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7

II.

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This

Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the defendant’s appeal of his conviction and

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

Because a different standard of review applies to each of Weatherly’s three issues,

these standards will be addressed individually with respect to each issue in the analysis

section.

III.

A. Jury Instructions

The District Court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 2006). “A

defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case where the record contains

evidentiary support for it.” United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 1999). “A

court errs in refusing a requested instruction only if the omitted instruction is correct, is

not substantially covered by other instructions, and is so important that its omission

prejudiced the defendant.” Id. Because the actual instructions substantially covered

Weatherly’s requested “mere presence” instruction and because Weatherly was not

prejudiced by the District Court’s refusal to give the “mere presence” instruction, the

District Court did not err in refusing to include Weatherly’s proposed instruction in her

actual jury instructions.

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Although Weatherly objected to the District Court’s rejection of his proposed 5

“mere presence” instruction, Weatherly failed to object to the District Court’s instructions

defining “possession” and “knowingly.” App. at 296-98. Therefore, we review any

alleged error in the actual jury instructions for plain error, and we conclude that

Weatherly’s arguments fail under this standard. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949

F.2d 677, 681 (3d Cir. 1991).

8

Weatherly argues that because the actual instructions fail to include the

explanation that the defendant had to “intend to exercise dominion and control” over the 5

firearm, the actual instructions do not substantially cover his requested instruction. Def.

Br. at 15. As a result, Weatherly argues that the jury could find him guilty even if they

believed his defense, because the actual instructions defined possession to include the

situation where the firearm was simply near him or susceptible to his control. Id.

However, this is an incorrect interpretation of the actual jury instructions. 

At two different points during the jury instructions, once at the beginning and once

at the end, the District Court clearly indicated that the government must prove that

Weatherly “knowingly possessed” the firearm in order to find him guilty. App. at 343,

346. The District Court stated that “[k]nowingly is defined as knowledge, voluntarily and

intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.” Id. at

344-45. The District Court defined “possession” to mean “to have something within your

control.” Id. at 344. Putting those two definitions together, the District Court’s jury

instructions defined the “possession” element of the felon-in-possession statute to mean

“to voluntarily and intentionally have [a firearm] within your control.” Id. at 343-46. 

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“But in this case, the proofs and the allegations are that the defendant had it on 6

his person [and] had actual possession of it. In other words, you can be in possession of a

weapon in your car and you can be 25-50 feet from the car. But that’s not this case. 

That’s all I’m saying. This case, the allegation is that the defendant had possession of it,

actual possession on his person.” App. at 345-46. 

9

Therefore, the actual jury instructions covered Weatherly’s proposed “mere presence”

instruction, because the jury could not find that Weatherly knowingly possessed the

firearm under the actual jury instructions due simply to his “[m]ere presence in the area of

any contraband, including a firearm, or awareness of its location.” Id. at 63, 343-46.

Alternatively, even if the actual jury instructions did not substantially cover

Weatherly’s proposed jury instruction, the District Court did not err because the “mere

presence” instruction was not “so important that its omission prejudiced the defendant.” 

See Davis, 183 F.3d at 250. At trial, the Government’s theory was that Weatherly

actually possessed the firearm. See App. at 355 (Government’s closing statement). In

addition, the District Court’s jury instructions made it clear at several points that this was

a case of actual possession, not constructive possession. The “mere presence” defense is 6

clearly not relevant or applicable to a case where the Government’s allegations and the

District Court’s instructions limit the theory of “possession” to actual possession. See,

e.g., United States v. Meads, 479 F.3d 598, 601-02 (8th Cir. 2007). Because the “mere

presence” instruction is not relevant to this actual possession case, Weatherly was not

prejudiced by the omission of his proposed jury instruction; therefore, the District Court

did not err in refusing to give the proposed instruction. 

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 In United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1125 (3d Cir. 1990), this Court 7

determined that the prosecutor’s vouching was improper where “there was no evidence

backing the prosecutor’s comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers

could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without

violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers.” However, the Pungitore

case dealt with a situation where the prosecutor invoked his own oath of office to defend

the credibility of government witnesses, a situation that greatly concerned this Court and

one which is not before us today. Id.

This Court also notes that we look favorably upon the comments of Judge McKee,

who responded as follows to a similar argument by the prosecutor in the case before him:

“That argument [that the government agent would not risk his career to lie] was forceful,

responsive, and absolutely proper. The Assistant U.S. Attorney was asking the jury to

reach a common sense conclusion that the agent had too much to lose to commit perjury

merely to convict this defendant. It was the kind of effective and logical response to an

attack on an agent’s credibility that has been made in countless numbers of closing

10

B. Vouching

In order for vouching to be improper, the prosecutor’s assurance of a witness’s

credibility must be “‘based on either the prosecutor’s personal knowledge, or other

information not contained in the record.’” United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 512 (3d

Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998)). 

Weatherly contends that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the

government witnesses by posing the following rhetorical question: “Why would Officer

Ryel and Detective Medina risk their 32-34 years of experience on the police force over

this case?” App. at 396. This Court concludes that the statement made by the prosecutor

in his rebuttal was not improper for two reasons.

 First, although we acknowledge that in some cases statements that a police officer

would be risking his career to lie under oath are improper vouching, the statements by 7

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arguments, and will be made in countless more.” United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d

1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1995) (McKee, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s

conclusion that other improper statements by the prosecutor did not constitute plain

error).

11

the prosecutor in this case were proper because they were based on evidence in the

record. During Officer Ryel’s redirect, the prosecutor asked Ryel what would be taken

into consideration by his superiors in making the decision of whether to promote him

from the position of police patrol officer (an entry level position that Ryel currently held)

to Sergeant (a supervisory position). App. at 184. Ryel testified that in addition to the

result on the written exam and sick time, he stated his superiors would consider

“disciplinary action taken against [him] if [he] had any.” Id. at 185. Although not

actually introduced into evidence, the average juror could easily infer that a police officer

who conspired with another officer to deliberately fabricate evidence and perjured

himself in open court while testifying under oath in an official capacity would risk at least

some sort of disciplinary action. Therefore, the prosecutor’s rhetorical question about

why the police officers would risk their careers to testify falsely against this single

defendant was proper because it called for an inference directly based upon evidence in

the record.

Second, the prosecutor’s statement in this case was not improper vouching because

it was a reasonable response to allegations of perjury by Weatherly’s attorney. When

determining whether a prosecutor’s statements improperly vouched for a witness’s

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The defense counsel told the jury: 8

If they thought the gun was his, does it make sense

that they would decide that the ends would justify the

means? And consider the climate in which they work.

There’s terrible crime in Trenton.

My goodness, you’re hearing that there were 152

found and abandoned guns. . . . [T]hat is a terrible problem

in Trenton. This is the climate in which these officers work.

* * *

These are two officers on the same police force, the

same fraternity if you will. Both trying and struggling with

the crime that’s facing Trenton right now and was facing

Trenton last summer.

So ask yourself whether or not it makes sense whether

these officers are under enormous pressure. They’re under

enormous pressure to attempt to demonstrate that they are

making a difference in the crime that is facing Trenton, that

they’re making a difference by making an arrest. Maybe you

can understand that. Maybe you can understand that

sometimes when we’re under pressure, we feel this

enormous burden and we want to demonstrate that we’re

12

credibility, the statements must be considered in context. United States v. Brennan, 326

F.3d 176, 186 (3d Cir. 2003). In this case, the prosecutor gave his closing argument first,

and there are no statements from that portion of his argument at issue here. App. at 350-

59. Then, Weatherly’s attorney delivered her closing argument, which presented the

defense’s single theory: the police officers found a gun near the defendant, conspired with

each other to lie about the incident, and then proceeded to perjure themselves in court. Id.

at 360-79. Defense counsel speculated at some length that the officers fabricated their

story because they were under “enormous pressure” and wanted to demonstrate that they

were “relevant” because “there’s terrible crime in Trenton.” App. at 371-72. It is

8

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relevant, that we are making a difference.

* * *

It’s been said that how you treat the least of my

brothers is how you treat me.

App. at 371-72.

Although there was evidence that 152 guns were found on the streets of Trenton 9

in 2005, there was no direct evidence that the officers were “under enormous pressure to

attempt to demonstrate that they are making a difference in the crime that is facing

Trenton, that they’re making a difference by making an arrest.” App. at 372. In fact, the

evidence was to the contrary. During redirect, Officer Ryel stated that his superiors were

not focused on foot patrol officers making arrests, but rather were “primarily focused on

quality of life issues,” such as drinking in public. Id. at 185-86.

The Government argues that because Weatherly failed to request relief (i.e. 10

mistrial), this Court should only review the vouching issue for plain error. Gov’t Br. at 28

13

permissible for counsel to argue inferences, but an inference must flow logically and

convincingly from the facts in the record. See United States v. Navarro, 145 F.3d 580,

593 (3d Cir. 1998). Defense counsel’s argument in this case crossed the line, urging the

jury to speculate rather than infer. It was only in response to these accusations, in his

rebuttal, that the prosecutor felt the need to address the credibility of the two witnesses

whom the defense attorney painted as not credible. When looked at in context, this Court

concludes that the statement was nothing more than a brief and appropriate response to

the defense attorney’s speculation and attacks on the credibility of the government

witnesses. 

9

Even if we had determined that the prosecutor’s statement was improper vouching,

it would have been harmless error. This Court reviews improper vouching for witness

credibility under the harmless error standard. United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 10

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(citing United States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2001)). Weatherly made

a contemporaneous objection after the prosecutor asked, “Why would Officer Ryel and

Detective Medina risk their 32-34 years of experience on the police force over this case?” 

App. at 396. The District Court never ruled on this motion, and we do not fault Weatherly

for failing to seek relief. Therefore, we review this statement under a harmless error

standard. 

However, all other statements contained in the prosecutor’s closing argument and

rebuttal were not timely objected to, and any arguments regarding improper vouching

related to these other statements would be subject to plain error review. United States v.

Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2006). Under this more stringent standard, we

conclude that none of the other statements warrants reversal.

14

1264 (3d Cir. 1995). “[V]ouching that is aimed at the witness’s credibility and is based

on extra-record evidence is deemed non-constitutional error.” United States v. Dispoz-OPlastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 1999). This Court finds non-constitutional error

harmless when “it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.” 

Id. (quoting Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)). To

determine if the defendant was prejudiced, the Court must consider “the scope of the

comments and their relationship to the proceeding, the extent of any curative instructions,

and the strength of the evidence against defendants.” Dispoz-O-Plastics, 172 F.3d at 286.

Here, even if the rhetorical question posed by the prosecutor is considered

improper vouching, any error stemming from the comment was harmless. First, as stated

above, this comment was made in rebuttal, in response to speculation and an attack by the

defense attorney on the credibility of the government witnesses. As such, it is likely that

the jury simply viewed this statement as a response to the defendant’s accusations. In

addition, this statement was brief and isolated, when it is considered that the prosecutor’s

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The District Court told the jurors that the statements of counsel are meant to 11

persuade, and should be considered as argument, not evidence. App. at 331. Also, the

judge told the jurors that they are the sole judges of credibility, and that the testimony of

law enforcement officers does not deserve any more weight than the testimony of nongovernment employee witnesses. Id. at 338-40

15

rebuttal alone stretches for 18-pages in the transcript. App. at 379-397. Therefore, it is

highly unlikely that this statement had any influence on the jury. Finally, prior to the

closing arguments, the judge thoroughly instructed the jury as to the nature of counsel’s

arguments and credibility issues. These instructions make it highly probable that the 11

alleged improper vouching by the prosecutor did not contribute to the jury finding

Weatherly guilty. See Dispoz-O-Plastics, 172 F.3d at 286. For all of the above reasons,

even if the prosecutor’s statement was improper vouching, this Court concludes that the

improper vouching was harmless because we have a “sure conviction that the error did

not prejudice” Weatherly. See id. 

C. Constitutionality of the Armed Career Criminal Act

This Court reviews challenges to the constitutionality of a statute under a de

novo standard of review. United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir.

2001). Weatherly challenges the constitutionality of the Armed Career Criminal Act,

which imposes a mandatory minimum fifteen-year prison sentence for felons-inpossession convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) who have sustained three (or more)

convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 

Specifically, Weatherly asserts that the statute is unconstitutional because the jury, not the

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Weatherly raises this issue before this Court only to preserve the issue for 12

review.

16

District Court, should determine whether any of his prior convictions qualified as “violent

felonies” or “serious drug offenses” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(g)(1). However, as Weatherly

concedes, this argument was rejected already by this Court in United States v. Coleman,

451 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2006). In light of our decision in Coleman, therefore, we 12

reject Weatherly’s argument that the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutional. 

IV.

We have considered all other arguments made by the parties on appeal, and

conclude that no further discussion is necessary. For the above reasons, the conviction

and sentence of the District Court will be affirmed.

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