Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05063/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Malcom Derome McGee
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

MALCOM DEROME MCGEE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 15-5063 

(D.C. Nos. 4:15-CV-00293-CVE-FHM & 

4:00-CR-00105-CVE-1) 

(N.D. Okla.)

 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

 

Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Malcom Derome McGee, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks to appeal 

the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or 

correct his sentence. The court dismissed McGee’s motion for lack of jurisdiction, 

construing it as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion. We deny a 

certificate of appealability (“COA”) and dismiss this proceeding. 

I. Background 

 A jury found McGee guilty on three counts: Count 1, conspiring to possess 

PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; Count 2, causing another person to unlawfully 

 

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

September 8, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-5063 Document: 01019486721 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 1 
- 2 - 

possess with intent to distribute PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A)(iv), and 18 U.S.C. § 2(b); and Count 3, using a communication facility to 

facilitate the commission of a felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). See United 

States v. McGee, 245 F. App’x 857, 858 (10th Cir. 2007). The district court granted 

McGee’s motion to arrest judgment as to Count 1. See id. The court ultimately 

sentenced him to life imprisonment on Count 2 and 96 months’ imprisonment on 

Count 3.1

 See id. at 858-59. 

McGee filed a § 2255 motion in 2003. The district court denied relief, and this 

court denied his application for a COA and dismissed his appeal. See id. at 858. In 

2013, McGee filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d) motion in his criminal case. The district 

court construed that motion as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion 

and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. 

McGee filed another § 2255 motion in 2015. He argued that motion was not a 

second or successive § 2255 motion under this court’s reasoning in In re Weathersby, 

717 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). The district court construed the motion 

as second or successive and unauthorized and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. 

The court also denied McGee’s motion for reconsideration. McGee filed a notice of 

appeal. He has also filed in this court a Motion for Summary Reversal and Remand 

and a Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal Without Prepayment of Costs or Fees. 

 

1

 On direct appeal, we reversed McGee’s original 56-year sentence on Count 3, 

and the district court imposed the 96-month sentence on remand. See McGee, 245 F. 

App’x at 859. 

Appellate Case: 15-5063 Document: 01019486721 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 2 
- 3 - 

II. Discussion 

 A. Standard of Review 

McGee must obtain a COA to pursue an appeal. See United States v. Harper, 

545 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Because the 

district court’s ruling rests on procedural grounds, he must show both “that jurists of 

reason would find it debatable whether the [motion] states a valid claim of the denial 

of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000) (emphasis added). 

In his opening brief, which is captioned Combined Opening Brief and 

Application for a Certificate of Appealability, McGee fails to acknowledge the 

necessity of obtaining a COA before this court can consider the merits of his appeal. 

He argues instead that, because his motion is not a second or successive § 2255 

motion, we should summarily reverse the dismissal and remand to the district court. 

But we explained in Harper, “[T]he district court’s dismissal of an unauthorized 

§ 2255 motion is a ‘final order in a proceeding under section 2255’ such that § 2253 

requires petitioner to obtain a COA before he or she may appeal.” 545 F.3d at 1233 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)). 

We will nonetheless liberally construe McGee’s pro se opening brief as 

seeking a COA. See Hall v. Scott, 292 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002). We 

conclude that McGee satisfies one, but not both, parts of the Slack test. 

Appellate Case: 15-5063 Document: 01019486721 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 3 
- 4 - 

B. McGee’s § 2255 Claim

McGee alleged in his most recent § 2255 motion that his life sentence on 

Count 2 was based on two prior state-court convictions for felony drug offenses. 

Under 21 U.S.C. § 841, if a person violates subsection (a) “after two or more prior 

convictions for a felony drug offense have become final, such person shall be 

sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release.” 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A). McGee claimed that, after his original § 2255 proceedings became 

final in 2007, the state court in 2015 amended nunc pro tunc the judgment in one of 

his prior drug convictions, reducing that conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. 

See R. at 53-54. He maintained that, without this second felony drug conviction, a 

life sentence under § 841 was no longer mandatory. 

 McGee noted that, under Johnson v. United States, “a defendant given a 

sentence enhanced for a prior conviction is entitled to a reduction if the earlier 

conviction is vacated,” 544 U.S. 295, 303 (2005). Johnson held “that a prisoner 

could proceed under § 2255 after successful review of the prior state conviction on 

federal habeas under § 2254 or favorable resort to any postconviction process 

available under state law.” Id. at 304; see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 

497 (1994) (recognizing that a defendant who has successfully attacked state 

sentences either in state court or in federal habeas review could “then apply for 

reopening of any federal sentence enhanced by the state sentences”); United States v. 

Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 339 (10th Cir. 1996) (“If a defendant successfully attacks state 

Appellate Case: 15-5063 Document: 01019486721 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 4 
- 5 - 

sentences, he may then apply for reopening of any federal sentence enhanced by the 

state sentences.”). 

McGee argued further that relief in the form of a sentence reduction was not 

available to him until the state court amended his felony drug conviction, reducing it 

to a misdemeanor. Citing In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d at 1110-11, McGee contended 

that his § 2255 motion was not second or successive, and he therefore did not need 

this court’s authorization to file that motion.

C. Jurists of Reason Would Debate the Correctness of the District 

Court’s Procedural Ruling

 Addressing the second part of the Slack test, we conclude that jurists of reason 

would debate the correctness of the district court’s procedural ruling in this case. 

Having already filed a first § 2255 motion, McGee ordinarily must obtain this court’s 

authorization to file a second or successive motion. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h), 

2244(b)(3). But here, it is debatable whether McGee required our authorization to 

file his latest § 2255 motion. 

In In re Weathersby, the defendant sought this court’s authorization to file a 

second or successive § 2255 motion. 717 F.3d at 1109. He alleged that, after he 

filed his first § 2255 motion, six state convictions used in calculating his federal 

sentence had been expunged. Id. We dismissed Weathersby’s motion for 

authorization as unnecessary, holding that the § 2255 motion he sought to file was 

not second or successive under § 2255(h). Id. We reasoned that “relief under § 2255 

is not available until the state conviction used to enhance the federal sentence is 

Appellate Case: 15-5063 Document: 01019486721 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 5 
- 6 - 

vacated,” because “[i]t is the fact of the state court vacatur that gives rise to the 

federal claim.” Id. at 1110. Therefore, if the prisoner’s state convictions were 

vacated after the proceedings on his first § 2255 motion became final, then a claim to 

reopen a federal sentence based on the vacatur is not second or successive and does 

not require this court’s prior authorization. Id. at 1111. 

McGee’s sentence-reduction claim in his most recent § 2255 motion is based 

on a state-court amended judgment entered in 2015 that did not exist until after his 

original § 2255 proceedings became final. Therefore, whatever the merits of his 

claim,2

 it was not ripe at the time he filed his first § 2255 motion. See id. Thus, it is 

debatable whether the district court was correct in dismissing McGee’s § 2255 

motion as an unauthorized second or successive motion.3

 

 

2

 In concluding that the claim in In re Weathersby was not a second or 

successive § 2255 claim, we expressed no opinion on whether it was timely or had 

any merit. 717 F.3d at 1111. 

3

 Courts must liberally construe pro se § 2255 motions. See United States v. Lee 

Vang Lor, 706 F.3d 1252, 1256 (10th Cir. 2013) (construing pro se § 2255 motion 

liberally). Here, McGee’s § 2255 motion alleged a sentence-reduction claim based 

on a state-court judgment that was amended in 2015. In his Motion to Entertain his 

Accompanying Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255, McGee argued that his § 2255 motion was not second or 

successive under In re Weathersby. But in its order dismissing the motion for lack of 

jurisdiction, the district court did not address that contention. In his motion for 

reconsideration, McGee argued that the district court had overlooked his contention 

that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain his § 2255 motion under the 

reasoning in In re Weathersby. The district court denied that motion, once again 

failing to discuss McGee’s contention. 

Appellate Case: 15-5063 Document: 01019486721 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 6 
- 7 - 

D. Jurists of Reason Would Not Debate That McGee’s § 2255 Motion 

Fails to State a Valid Claim of the Denial of a Constitutional Right 

 To obtain a COA, McGee must also establish that jurists of reason would find 

it debatable whether his § 2255 motion states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. On this issue, “our review is 

limited. We will only take a ‘quick’ look at the [§ 2255 motion] to determine 

whether [McGee] has facially alleged the denial of a constitutional right.” Gibson v. 

Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and brackets 

omitted). We may not issue a COA if McGee alleges only a violation of federal law. 

See United States v. Gordon, 172 F.3d 753, 754 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding court could 

not issue COA on defendant’s non-constitutional federal claims). While a 

non-constitutional sentencing issue may be a proper basis for relief in the district 

court, such a claim does not support issuance of a COA, because it fails to assert the 

denial of a constitutional right. See id. (noting statute “differentiate[s] between the 

type of [motion] that can be filed and the type that can be appealed”). 

McGee does not contend that his claim to reopen his federal sentence rests on 

the denial of a constitutional right. We conclude that his § 2255 motion alleges only 

a non-constitutional sentencing issue. McGee asserted that a successful state voter 

initiative reclassified offenses involving possession of small amounts of certain 

controlled substances as misdemeanors rather than felonies. See R. at 47 (citing 

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11350 (amended eff. Nov. 5, 2014)). He claimed that 

the same voter initiative enacted a statute under which he successfully petitioned to 

Appellate Case: 15-5063 Document: 01019486721 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 7 
- 8 - 

reduce his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. See id. (citing Cal. Penal 

Code § 1170.18(f)). McGee’s § 2255 motion further asserted that, as a result of his 

amended state-court judgment, he does not have two predicate felony drug 

convictions requiring a mandatory life sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841. See R. at 47. 

His claim is therefore based on the construction and application of § 841 and 

consequently does not satisfy the second prong of the Slack test. See Gordon, 

172 F.3d at 754 (recognizing “that [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c)(2) does not permit a COA 

to issue on a purely statutory claim”). 

III. Conclusion 

We conclude that jurists of reason would not debate that McGee’s § 2255 

motion fails to state a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, 

we deny his application for a COA and dismiss the appeal. We deny McGee’s 

Motion for Summary Reversal and Remand, but grant his Motion for Leave to 

Proceed on Appeal Without Prepayment of Costs or Fees. 

Entered for the Court 

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk 

Appellate Case: 15-5063 Document: 01019486721 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 8