Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cr-01823/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cr-01823-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffery Allen Stout
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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A transcript of the hearing was ordered and prepared (Doc. 45). The transcript of the October 31,

2012 proceedings is identified herein as “Tr.”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, )

) No. CR-11-1823-TUC-DCB (JR)

Plaintiff, )

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

v. )

)

Jeffery Allen Stout, )

)

Defendant. ) )

Pending before the Court is a Petition to Revoke Supervised Release (Doc. 32) filed

on February 14, 2012. Defendant's Evidentiary Hearing occurred before Magistrate Judge

Rateau on October 31, 2012.1

 Defendant was present and assisted by counsel. The

Government presented three witnesses and admitted eight exhibits into evidence. (Tr. 33

(admission of exhibits).) The Defendant also testified. For the reasons explained below, the

Court recommends that the District Court find that the Defendant did not violate the terms

of his supervised release.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 17, 2011, Defendant pled guilty to one count of Bank Fraud in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Doc. 18). On September 26, 2011, the District Court sentenced

Defendant to 12 months in prison, with credit for time served, followed by 3 years of

supervised release (Doc. 25). His term of supervised release began to run on January 20,

2012, when he was released from prison, and was set to expire on January 19, 2015 (Doc.

32).

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At the time he was sentenced on the federal charge, Defendant also had a charge

pending against him in Pima County Superior Court for Second Degree Burglary, in violation

of A.R.S. § 13-1507. (Tr. 31-32; Exhibit 4.) While in federal custody, the Defendant pled

guilty in that case and, on November 17, 2011, was sentenced to three years intensive

probation. (Tr. 5-6, 46; Exhibit 4 (Sentencing Minute Entry).) Judge Leonardo ordered that

the sentence run concurrent to the Defendant’s federal sentence and specifically noted that:

the defendant’s actual supervision on IPS in this matter will

occur only if the defendant’s Federal matter has been completed,

the remaining balance, if any, of this sentence will then

commence and the defendant will be placed on IPS probation at

that time.

(Exhibit 4 (sentencing Minute Entry), p. 2.)

After his release from federal custody, the Defendant did not report to a Residential

Reentry Center, left Arizona and went to Indiana. On February 14, 2012, Defendant’s

Probation Officer filed a Petition to Revoke Supervised Release alleging violations of the

following conditions: 

Standard Condition No. 2: You shall not leave the judicial district or other

specified geographic area without the permission of the Court or probation

officer.

Special Condition No. 7: You shall reside and participate in a Residential Reentry Center for up to 180 days, unless discharged earlier by the probation

officer.

On August 6, 2012, the Defendant was arrested in Indiana and returned to Arizona. (Doc.

34.) 

II. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

In mid-January 2012, the Defendant was serving his sentence on the federal Bank

Fraud conviction when he asked a correction officer when he would be released. He was told

that his scheduled release date was April 20, 2012. (Tr. 47.) However, a few days later on

Friday, January 20, 2012, the Defendant was told to pack his belongings because he was

being released. (Id.) After sitting in the holding area of the prison, he was released at 5:00

p.m. (Id.) Wearing the clothes he had been arrested in, even though he had gained 70

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pounds in prison, and shower shoes, and without any money, the Defendant was released out

the door and walked toward the road while being followed by a truck driven by a security

guard. (Tr. 47-48.) Once in Florence, the Defendant called his mother collect from a

Chevron gas station. (Tr. 48.) He suggested that they get him a motel room and he went to

the Blue Mist Hotel and arranged for his mother to fax them her credit card information.

(Id.)

The Defendant’s mother paid for three nights lodging and then the Defendant asked

his sister to pay for a fourth, Monday night, because he could not contact his probation

officer until Monday, January 23, 2012. (Tr. 49.) On Monday morning, the defendant found

somebody to loan him a cell phone, and he called his probation officer, Kathleen Nunez. He

told her that he had been released from CCA without any money or a place to go, and that

his mother was paying for him to stay at the Blue Mist Hotel in Florence, Arizona. (Tr. 24-

25, 49-50.) Officer Nunez sought to assist the Defendant in finding someplace to stay and

later called him back in his hotel room and told him that he could be placed in a halfway

house but first she would need him to execute a Waiver and Order. (Tr. 25, 51.) Officer

Nunez explained that the Waiver and Order was necessary because she needed “judicial

approval to place him in a halfway house setting” and that the Defendant would need to

“agree to have an extra special condition imposed so that [she] could facilitate his

placement.” (Tr. 27; 33.) 

That same day, Officer Nunez contacted Aaron Smith, the assistant program director

at Behavioral Systems Southwest (“BSSW”), a federal reentry center, or “halfway house,”

located in Florence, Arizona that offers drug and alcohol classes, job search and housing

assistance. (Tr. 12.) Officer Nunez told Mr. Smith she had “a tough situation,” and

explained that the Defendant, who had then been released from custody from the nearby

CCA facility on January 20, 2012, was “basically homeless” and staying at the Blue Mist

Hotel in Florence. (Tr. 12-13; 20.) Officer Nunez asked Mr. Smith if there was available

bed space at BSSW and if they would be willing to accept Defendant on such short

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notice.(Tr. 12.) Mr. Smith told Officer Nunez that BSSW would have a bed available on

January 25 (the following Wednesday). Then, using emergency (or “second chance”) funds,

Officer Nunez secured an extra night’s lodging for the Defendant at the Blue Mist Hotel.

(Tr. 13, 25-26; Exhibit 1 (Second Chance Act request).) However, the Defendant was not

aware that Officer Nunez paid for an additional night. (Tr. 52-53.)

At Officer Nunez’s request, Mr. Smith from BSSW went to meet the Defendant at the

Blue Mist Hotel and had him sign the waiver portion of the Waiver and Order in which he

waived his right to a hearing and agreed to the modification of his conditions of supervised

release to add Special Condition 7, the requirement that he reside in a residential reentry

center for 180 days. (Tr. 13-14; Tr. 26; Doc. 31 (Waiver and Order).) When Mr. Smith met

the Defendant at the hotel, he explained that the waiver and order meant that:

Basically, that he would be with us at our facility for 180 days,

could be discharged earlier based on several factors that his

probation officer would determine. I told him we’d help him get

an ID, social security card, employment. He’d have housing and

– and meals provided to him . . . . 

(Tr. 16.) The Defendant signed the Waiver and Order and Mr. Smith told him to report to

the BSSW facility the following day, January 24, 2012, and told him how to get there. (Tr.

16-17.) 

The following morning, on January 24, 2012, the Defendant talked to his mother

about returning to his home state of Indiana. (Tr. 53.) She told him he had a home, children

and a job there, and offered to buy him a ticket home. (Id.) The Defendant, not having eaten

since his release on January 20 and not knowing where he was going to stay that night,

decided to leave Florence and return home to Indiana. (Tr. 38-39, 50, 52.) That same day,

Officer Nunez received a voice message from the Defendant indicating that he was going to

Indiana. (Tr. 28.) She then called BSSW and confirmed that the Defendant had not reported

to the facility. (Tr. 27.) 

The Defendant then set-out hitchhiking toward Tucson. (Tr. 54.) However, while on

the highway near Casa Grande, a police officer pulled over to tell him that he could not

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hitchhike on the highway. (Tr. 54-55.) The officer ran his Arizona license and then drove

the Defendant to the Greyhound bus station in Casa Grande. (Tr. 55.) He contacted his

mother from the bus station and she purchased him a ticket to Indiana. (Id.) During this

time, between January 28 and 30, 2012, the Defendant called Officer Nunez and left

messages telling her that he was going to Indiana to live with family in Star City, Indiana.

(Tr. 28, 53-54.) 

Upon arriving in Indiana on January 30, 2012, the Defendant learned that Officer

Nunez was trying to contact him and had left her cell phone number. (Tr. 55-56.) He

returned her call and Officer Nunez told him that she could charge him with absconding, but

that she understood his situation and would attempt to get his supervision transferred to

Indiana. (Tr. 28-29, 56.) In the meantime, Officer Nunez requested that the Defendant call

and leave a message at her office number with his current address and phone number, which

he did. (Tr. 56.) The Defendant then started working in Indiana as a welder. (Tr. 57.)

During that period, he recalls his father telling him about a conversation with the Defendant’s

parole officer indicating that they were trying to get his supervision transferred to Indiana.

(Id.) However, after another month or so, the Defendant phoned Officer Nunez and left a

message letting her know that he was doing well and inquiring about the supervision transfer.

(Id.) He did not hear back from her, and a short time later, after living in Indiana for

approximately 8 months and being gainfully employed, the Defendant was pulled over for

a burned out headlight and arrested on a warrant issued because he left Arizona without the

necessary permission. (Tr. 58.)

As Officer Nunez explains, while the Defendant was in Indiana, she called the federal

probation office for the Southern District of Indiana and requested they take “courtesy

supervision” of Defendant’s case. (Tr. 29.) However, the Indiana office declined because

the Defendant had “pending criminal matters in the District of Arizona and they wanted him

to address those first.” (Id.) As Officer Nunez understood it, the criminal matter of concern

to the Indiana office was the charge against Defendant in Pima County Superior Court for

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A bench warrant for the Defendant’s arrest was issued on September 14, 2012. (Tr. 31;

Exhibit 3.) The warrant was issued for Defendant’s failure to appear on charges of Possession of

Marijuana, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3405(A)(1), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in

violation of A.R.S. § 3415(A), both Class 6 felonies. (Exhibit 3.) Although not entirely clear from

the testimony, it appears that the warrant was issued in error as the Defendant previously pled guilty

to these charges and was sentenced to six months non-reporting probation. (Tr. 60, 78.) Since the

hearing, Defense counsel informed the Court that the Defendant was transported to Pinal County to

address the warrant and was told there were no warrants were outstanding. 

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Second Degree Burglary, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1507. (Tr. 31-32; Exhibit 4.)2

 The

Defendant had pled guilty in that case and, on November 17, 2011, was sentenced to three

years of intensive probation. (Tr. 5-6; Exhibit 4 (Sentencing Minute Entry).) Without

informing the Defendant that the Indiana office declined to accept supervision or that she

intended to obtain a warrant for his arrest, on February 14, 2012, Officer Nunez requested

a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. (Tr. 32, 41.) The Defendant first became aware of the

existence of the warrant on August 6, 2012, when he was arrested in Indiana. (Tr. 58.) 

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A court may revoke a defendant's supervised release if it finds by a preponderance of

the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his supervised release. United States

v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 999, 121 S.C. 498, 148

LED.2d 469 (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not

apply to a revocation hearing. Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)(3); United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d

308, 310-11 (9th Cir.1993). Based on these standards, the Court finds that the government

has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant violated the

conditions of his supervised release.

The revocation petition in this case was born out of a series of events, some based on

good intentions others not, that placed the Defendant in circumstances that were variously

precarious and vague. First, the process and planning for his release by CCA was utterly

ridiculous. The Defendant was informed of his release a mere four hours prior and then was

sent penniless into the streets of Florence, Arizona at 5:00 p.m. on a Friday, wearing shower

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shoes and clothes that were several sizes too small. To his credit, he was able to arrange two

nights lodging through his mother and another through his sister, so he could make it until

Monday when he could contact his probation officer. 

Although he went without food all weekend (Tr. 38-39), he was able to contact

Officer Nunez about his situation on Monday. To her credit, she sought out accommodations

for him and told Mr. Smith from BSSW that the Defendant was in a “tough situation” and

was “basically homeless.” Thus, when Mr. Smith went to the Blue Mist Hotel to meet the

Defendant, he had not eaten and had no prospects for shelter. Not surprisingly given the

circumstances, the Defendant agreed to add an “extra special condition” to his conditions of

supervision that required him to reside an additional 180 days in a halfway house. As the

Defendant stated, he signed the waiver because he “just wanted a place to stay.” (Tr. 75.)

Although Mr. Smith indicated that the Defendant would have been admitted to the

facility on January 24, both the paperwork and Officer Nunez indicated that the space would

only be available on January 25. (Tr. 17, 25, 27.) The Defendant also admits he should have

reported to BSSW. (Tr. 74). But by January 24, he had not eaten in five days and felt he had

“nowhere to go.” (Id.) After being convinced by his mother to leave for Indiana, the

Defendant left several messages telling Officer Nunez of his intentions.

Although the foregoing events largely explain why the Defendant elected to leave, it

was his next conversation with Nunez that is of the greatest legal significance. After he

arrived in Indiana, he called Officer Nunez who told him that she understood his situation

and would attempt to get his supervision transferred to Indiana. Both of the conditions the

Defendant is accused of violating provide for exceptions with the approval of his probation

officer. Under Standard Condition No. 2, the Defendant could leave Arizona with the

permission of Officer Nunez and under Special Condition No. 7, she could also discharge

him from BSSW. “A probation officer’s instructions are relevant to whether a supervised

release condition gives fair warning of prohibited conduct.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d

1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1982)

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(“In addition to the bare words of the probation condition, the probationer may be guided by

the further definition, explanations, or instructions of the district court and the probation

officer.”). Here, given that Officer Nunez did not act or threaten to seek revocation based

on the Defendant’s departure, but instead was seeking a transfer of supervision to Indiana,

the Defendant was understandably under the impression that the conditions he is accused of

violating were waived and that his conduct was no longer prohibited.

Additionally, despite knowing where the Defendant was and, based on previous

contacts, that he was fully cooperative, Officer Nunez never told the Defendant that Indiana

was not going to accept the transfer of his supervision or that it was necessary for him to

return to Arizona. (Tr. 58.) Even Officer Nunez admits that the Defendant may have been

under the impression that she was still trying to get him transferred. (Tr. 41). Due process

requires that a defendant be given fair warning before he is subjected to a forfeiture of his

liberty for engaging in non-criminal activities. United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 844 (9th

Cir. 1977). While the written conditions of his release would typically suffice in giving

notice to the Defendant that he was in violation of the terms of his release, see United States

v. Ortega-Brita, 311 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002), Officer Nunez apparent acquiescence

to his departure rendered that notice ambiguous. Once she allowed him to stay in Indiana

and indicated that she would work to get his supervision transferred, fair warning required

that she also inform the Defendant that she intended to violate him and petition for revocation

of his supervised release. The undisputed facts establish, however, that the first time the

Defendant became aware of the alleged violations was when he was pulled-over in Indiana

for a minor traffic infraction. Again, had he the notice and opportunity to voluntarily address

the alleged violations, the evidence suggests he would have.

The Government also suggests that the Defendant left Arizona in violation of the state

court probation. (Tr. 31-32.) If he did, it would be significant because it would provide an

additional basis for limiting his travel outside Arizona and it would provide a legitimate basis

for Indiana’s refusal to accept the transfer of supervision. However, a review of the state

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court record supports the Defendant’s understanding of his state court sentence and indicates

that the Indiana probation office was wrong about the Defendant’s status in Arizona. 

The Defendant explained his understanding of his state sentence as follows:

the stipulation which my lawyer made sure he stated with Judge

Leonardo was that I would go under the guidelines for the

federal probation, that they would just – they being would –

what they – the way they made it sound to me was they were

putting my probation on the federal because I had already gotten

three years of federal probation. I was already sentenced to

three years federal probation. And they basically stated that

being that I was already on three years supervised release, that

I would go under the terms of the supervised release of the

federal government. 

(Tr. 61-62.) Although the Government disagrees, the Defendant’s understanding of the

sentence is entirely consistent with the state court record. In sentencing the Defendant in

state court, Superior Court Judge Leonardo expressly stated that the Defendant’s state

supervision would commence “only if the defendant’s Federal matter has been completed,”

and only if there was a “remaining balance.” (Exhibit 4, p. 2.) Although more eloquently

put, that is precisely how the Defendant understood the sentence. Under the court’s order,

the Defendant was to follow the requirements of the Federal release and commence state

supervision only if there was a remaining balance of state time after the Federal supervision

ended. Nothing in the record indicates that he violated these requirements.

The Supreme Court has noted that the revocation of parole is the “last resort” when

treatment has failed or is about to fail. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973). Here,

by all accounts, the Defendant was succeeding on parole while in Indiana. Were it not for

the confusion associated with the state court proceedings, which led to Indiana’s refusal to

accept transfer of his supervision, he very well could be continuing in his success.

Alternatively, if he had been warned of the intention of the parole officer to petition for

revocation, there is no indication that he would not have cooperated by returning to Arizona.

Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the Defendant did not violate

the terms of his supervised release. 

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IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR DISPOSITION BY THE DISTRICT COURT

JUDGE

Based on the foregoing and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b) and Local Rule 1.7(d)(2),

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court, District of Arizona, the Magistrate

Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court, after an independent review of the record,

find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant did not violate Standard

Condition No. 2 (Allegation A) or Special Condition No. 7 (Allegation B) of the conditions

of supervised release.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections with

the District Court within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If the objections are not timely filed they may be deemed waived. If any

objections are filed, this action should be designated with the following case number CR 11-

1823 - TUC - DCB.

DATED this 13th day of November, 2012.

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