Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00011/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00011-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Banuelos
Plaintiff
Sandra Garcia
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT BANUELOS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANDRA GARCIA,

Defendant.

15-cv-00011-LJO-GSA

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Robert Banuelos (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se, filed a Complaint (the 

“Complaint”) on January 5, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Sandra Garcia (the “Defendant”). Id. The Court has screened 

the Complaint and recommends that it be dismissed without leave to amend.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct a review of a complaint to 

determine whether it “state[s] a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or 

malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If 

the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. Leave to 

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amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by 

amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). Plaintiff must set 

forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim that is plausible on its face.‟” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 

are accepted as true, legal conclusion are not. Id. at 678.

In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the 

allegations in the complaint as true, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. 

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff‟s favor. Jenkins 

v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 

Iqbal). 

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS1

The Complaint revolves around Plaintiff‟s attempts to enter various California state 

offices. Plaintiff appears to have been involved in a dispute between the California Labor 

 

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Plaintiff has simultaneously filed a complaint in a different case, Banuelos v. Martinez, Case No. 1:15-cv-00010-

AWI-GSA, with factual allegations that appear to overlap with those in the current case. Both complaints are rife 

with vague, disorganized, and incomplete allegations and appear to include language that was copied and pasted 

between the two; however, the Court has endeavored here to piece Plaintiff‟s allegations together reviewing both 

complaints, as necessary. These two complaints also follow a complaint filed by Plaintiff in Banuelos v. Sandoval, 

Case No. 1:14-cv-01923-MCE-SAB, which was dismissed on April 16, 2015.

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Commissioner and FNF, Inc., a company whose relationship to Plaintiff is not discernible from 

the Complaint. While that dispute was pending, Plaintiff visited the office of State Assemblyman 

Henry T. Perea in Fresno, presumably to seek assistance with respect to the FNF, Inc. case. While 

there, Plaintiff met with Defendant, an employee of the Assemblyman‟s office. Defendant told 

Plaintiff that she would look into the matter. Defendant appears to have kept in contact with 

Plaintiff for some period of time after this and Plaintiff appears to have furnished Defendant with 

documents and/or information. 

At some point, Plaintiff visited the offices of State Assemblyman Jim Patterson and was 

escorted out of the Assemblyman‟s offices by California Highway Patrol officers. He also visited 

the Fresno office of the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement and was escorted out of the 

building by the California Highway Patrol. Assemblyman Patterson and the DLSE occupy 

different buildings at different addresses than Assemblyman Perea.

In August 2014, Assemblyman Perea informed Plaintiff via letter that his office had no 

further action that they could take in Plaintiff‟s case and asked Plaintiff to cease contact with his 

office. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “for some reason was manipulating the situation” and 

concludes that his civil rights have been violated because he was denied “rights to enter a state 

building.” (Complaint 4:27.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

a. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

To establish a claim under section 1981, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a 

racial minority; “(2) the defendant had an intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the 

discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute (i.e., the making 

and enforcing of a contract).” Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Section 1981 can only be violated by purposeful discrimination. General Bld. Contractor’s Ass’n, 

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Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). A “claim brought under § 1981, therefore, must 

initially identify an impaired „contractual relationship,‟ § 1981(b), under which the plaintiff has 

rights.” Domino’s Pizza v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) (“Absent the requirement that 

the plaintiff himself must have rights under the contractual relationship, § 1981 would become a 

strange remedial provision designed to fight racial animus in all of its noxious forms, but only if 

the animus and the hurt it produced were somehow connected to somebody’s contract. We have 

never read the statute in this unbounded—or rather, peculiarly bounded—way”).

Plaintiff describes his race as “German, Cherokee Indian, Mexican, Spaniard,” but does 

not allege any facts suggesting that: (1) he suffered any discrimination; (2) Defendant had any 

intent to discriminate on the basis of his race; or (3) any alleged discrimination was encompassed 

by the prohibited activities listed in § 1981. Indeed, the allegations in the Complaint do not even 

describe any basis for liability on the part of Defendant; based on the allegations in the 

Complaint, defendant does not appear to have played any role in preventing him from entering 

any building or taken any other action to cause him harm. It is thus entirely unclear why she is the 

target of this litigation—in the Complaint‟s allegations, defendant appears to be the only 

individual who did not eject Plaintiff from a state building. Even had she been the actor who 

removed Plaintiff from the Assemblyman‟s offices, Defendant had no existing contractual 

relationship with Plaintiff, precluding the possibility of a claim under § 1981. Plaintiff‟s claim is 

thus facially invalid and should be dismissed. 

Nor is leave to amend appropriate here. The issue is not that Plaintiff has plead inadequate 

facts—it is that his current allegations leave no room for the possibility that: (1) Defendant was 

the party who removed Plaintiff from the state building; or (2) Defendant had some contractual 

relationship under which he had rights. Plaintiff has already indicated that other parties were the 

culpable parties (and, in fact, he has simultaneously filed a separate lawsuit against one of them). 

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Likewise, the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant is amply laid out—Defendant was a 

staffer in a state assemblyman‟s office looking into a matter for a constituent. No contractual 

relationship was implicated and there can be no § 1981 claim. The Complaint thus precludes the 

possibility that Defendant acted wrongly.

b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

i. First Amendment

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege a violation of a right secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his 

rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 

2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). The complaint must allege 

that every defendant acted with the requisite state of mind to violate underlying constitutional 

provision. OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff asserts that his First Amendment rights were abridged because he was denied 

access to the offices of Assemblyman Perea. It is well-settled, however, that “the First 

Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the 

government.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803 

(1985); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (“The State, no less than a private owner of 

property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 

dedicated”); Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 07-5132 GHK (JC), 2011 WL 6951822, at 

*9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011) (“Citizens are not entitled to exercise their First Amendment rights 

whenever and wherever they wish”). Nor does the First Amendment right to petition “guarantee a 

response to the petition or the right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen‟s 

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views.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, Plaintiff does not appear to have 

suffered any violation of his First Amendment rights—he was not entitled to enter any state 

building merely because it was owned by the government. Nor was he entitled to a favorable 

response to his request for assistance. It also appears that he was, in fact, allowed to enter 

Assemblyman Perea‟s offices and speak with Defendant, even if she was ultimately unable to 

achieve the outcome he desired.2(Complaint ¶ 5.)

Moreover, to survive screening, Plaintiff‟s claims must be facially plausible, which 

requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 

sufficient, and Plaintiff‟s allegations fall far short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Here, Defendant appears not to have played any role in 

preventing Plaintiff from entering any offices. While he was escorted out of the offices of 

Assemblyman Patterson and the Labor Commissioner, he does not appear to have been escorted 

out of, or otherwise prevented from entering, Assemblyman Perea‟s offices. It is thus beyond 

plausibility to suggest that Defendant, who worked for Assemblyman Perea, was orchestrating a 

conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his rights. Plaintiff likewise does not plead any facts suggesting 

that Defendant was responsible.

Nor can leave to amend remedy these deficiencies. The allegations that Plaintiff has 

already made in the Complaint make clear that Defendant did not personally participate in any 

alleged deprivation of rights. More factual allegations will not allow Plaintiff to resolve the 

inconsistencies he has already established in the Complaint. Even if they could, the mere fact that 

Plaintiff was escorted out of a state office does not (and cannot) constitute a violation of his First 

 

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It is unclear whether Plaintiff is alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to petition or right to freedom of 

expression. Neither right is violated here, however.

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Amendment rights. See, e.g., Haas v. Monier, No. NH CA 08-169 MML, 2009 WL 1277740, at 

*9 (D.N.H. April 24, 2009) (removal of plaintiff from courtroom did not violate First Amendment 

rights).

ii. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Defendant further alleges that his due process rights were violated.3 As identified above, 

Plaintiff does not establish that Defendant committed any action that deprived Plaintiff of any 

constitutional right. In addition, a procedural due process claim requires: “(1) a deprivation of a 

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural 

protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff does not allege or 

explain what adequate procedural protections he was denied before his removal from the state 

offices. 

More importantly, it does not appear that Defendant was actually deprived of any liberty 

or property interest. Plaintiff‟s displeasure with the outcome of Defendant‟s efforts on his behalf 

is not enough to state a claim that he was denied a liberty or property interest. Even if Defendant 

had played a role in removing Plaintiff from the state offices (and it does not appear that she did), 

Plaintiff does not enjoy a liberty interest to enter into any state office without restriction. Williams 

v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 76-77 (2d Cir. 2008) (“it would distort the right to free 

travel beyond recognition to construe it as providing a substantive right to cross a particular 

parcel of land, enter a chosen dwelling, or gain admittance to a specific government building”); 

Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2004) (no liberty interest implicated 

where city banned plaintiff from using city‟s public parks for “innocent, recreational purposes”); 

Souders v. Lucero, 196 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (no constitutionally protected interest in 

accessing public university campus without restriction); Chafin v. Stasi, No. 13-cv-02661-WYD-

 

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It is not clear whether Plaintiff is alleging a violation of procedural due process or substantive due process. As 

explained herein, however, the lack of a protected interest renders either claim invalid.

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MEH, 2015 WL 1525542, at *11 (D. Colo. March 31, 2015) (removal of plaintiff from public 

recreation center “does not implicate a liberty interest”). His removal from a state office thus 

cannot constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest and he was not entitled to 

procedural protections.

As with his First Amendment claim, leave to amend does not seem appropriate here. 

Based on the facts as alleged, Defendant appears to have done her best to represent Plaintiff‟s 

interests, but was simply unable to assist Plaintiff to his satisfaction. Although the current 

Complaint does not make clear what aid Defendant was asked to provide, it seems unlikely that 

any amendment could correct the current deficiencies in the Complaint while remaining 

consistent with the current allegations.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, it is recommended that the Complaint be 

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the district judge assigned to 

this case pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings 

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court‟s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

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 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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