Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00337/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00337-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Casillas
Plaintiff
Greenleaf
Defendant
Hitchman
Defendant
L. D. Zamora
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN CASILLAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

L. D. ZAMORA, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:14-cv-00337-SKO (PC)

SECOND SCREENING ORDER 

DISMISSING STATE LAW TORT CLAIMS 

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND 

DISMISSING ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

UNDER SECTION 1983 FOR VIOLATION 

OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

(Doc. 8)

Second Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Juan Casillas, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 10, 2014. On October 9, 2014, the 

Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim under 

section 1983. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 26, 2015. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

Case 1:14-cv-00337-SKO Document 11 Filed 10/26/15 Page 1 of 7
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(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated 

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This 

requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners 

proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and 

to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the 

plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations1

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Golden State Correctional Facility in McFarland, 

California. His claims arise from events which occurred at Avenal State Prison in Avenal, 

California. Plaintiff brings this action against Doctor Greenleaf and S. Hitchman, a Physician 

Assistant, for violating his right to medical care under the Eighth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution. Plaintiff also alleges tort claims under state law.

 

1

Plaintiff refers to the exhibits attached to his original complaint, and the Court will take those exhibits into 

consideration in reviewing Plaintiff’s allegations in his amended complaint.

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In 2001, Plaintiff injured his right knee and lower back when he fell from a scaffold while 

working for a plastering company. Plaintiff had arthroscopic surgery on his right knee, followed 

by physical therapy. Between 2002 and 2003, Plaintiff underwent three right knee surgeries and 

on November 11, 2005, Plaintiff underwent back surgery. Approximately five years later and 

while out of custody, Plaintiff was examined on November 18, 2010, by Philip A. Sobol, M.D., an 

orthopedist, for “low back pain radiating to the bilateral lower extremities” and “bilateral knee 

pain.” (Doc. 1, Comp., Ex. B, court record p. 28.) Dr. Sobol opined that Plaintiff required an 

additional course of treatment, and he provided Plaintiff with an OrthoStim3 unit to treat lower 

back muscle spasms; a right knee brace for support and stabilization; and an LSO brace for 

support and stabilization.2 (Id., p. 33.) Dr. Sobol stated, “Pending the patient’s response to 

treatment, additional treatment recommendations will be made as appropriate.” (Id.) Dr. Sobol 

also recommended that Plaintiff undergo an MRI of his lumbar spine and an ultrasound of his 

right knee, and he opined that Plaintiff was “considered temporarily totally disabled from an 

orthopedic standpoint for a period of four to six weeks.” (Id.) Plaintiff thereafter underwent a 

lumbar spinal MRI on December 4, 2010. (Id., pp. 37-8.)

In June 2013, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal complaining about considerable pain in his 

right knee and lower back with radiating pain down his right leg. Plaintiff also complained about 

his knee locking up in the morning, which caused him severe pain, and loss of balance and normal 

mobility. At the first level of review, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Hitchman, who 

documented his right knee pain, noted Plaintiff’s past surgeries, and noted the absence of objective 

findings consistent with Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 1., Comp., p. 20.) Defendant Hitchman 

documented that Plaintiff was to continue as currently directed regarding his medical management 

and no further recommendation for neurology or surgical intervention was indicated at that time. 

(Id.)

At the second level of review, Plaintiff’s earlier evaluation by Defendant Greenleaf on 

June 19, 2013, was addressed. Defendant Greenleaf documented that Plaintiff “ambulated with no 

 

2 LSO brace is not defined in the complaint or medical report.

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significant limp, signs of pain, or balance problems, and his knee had no effusion or crepitus, a 

negative McMurray test, and essentially a normal exam.” (Id., p. 23.) Defendant Greenleaf 

decided not to review Plaintiff’s Gabapentin, a pain medication, due to noncompliance, but 

Plaintiff remained on Naproxen, 500 mg. twice a day as needed for pain. The second level appeal 

decision also addressed Defendant Hitchman’s determination on July 19, 2013, that Plaintiff did 

not need narcotic pain medication and he “had excellent function and no dysfunction with 

activities of daily living.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s appeal was subsequently denied at the third and final 

level of review on January 14, 2014. (Id., pp. 24-5.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ opinions were contrary to that of Dr. Sobol and he faults 

Defendant Hitchman for merely interviewing him rather than examining him. Plaintiff also 

alleges that Defendant Greenleaf’s examination of him was cursory and it did not address his back 

pain.

B. Eighth Amendment Claim

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 

2012) ), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 

2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that 

failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain 

or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 

(citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which 

entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

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Chronic conditions which cause pain or otherwise require treatment may constitute serious 

medical needs. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014); accord Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). At the pleading stage, 

Plaintiff’s allegation that he has chronic back and knee problems which cause him considerable 

pain suffices to satisfy the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim. Wilhelm, 680 F.3d 

at 1122; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. 

However, Plaintiff’s allegations do not suffice to satisfy the subjective element. Wilhelm, 

680 F.3d at 1122. Plaintiff’s mere disagreement with the medical opinions of Defendants 

Hitchman and Greenleaf does not give rise to a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment, and 

while Plaintiff attempts to frame his claim as one arising from Defendants’ disregard of his 

specialist’s recommendation, there are two problems with this theory. First, “[a] difference of 

opinion between a physician and the prisoner - or between medical professionals - concerning 

what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Snow, 681 F.3d at

987 (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23 

(citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Thus, any mere disagreement 

between Defendants and Dr. Sobol does not support a claim for relief. 

Second, Plaintiff’s allegations and exhibits do not support a reasonable inference that 

Defendants’ opinions were in fact contradictory to Dr. Sobol’s recommendations. Defendants 

interviewed and examined Plaintiff for his appeal approximately two and a half years after he was 

treated by Dr. Sobol. In addition, Defendants’ determinations regarding Plaintiff’s medical 

condition in June and July 2013 were not contradictory to Dr. Sobol’s recommendation in 2010. 

Dr. Sobol recommended an additional course of treatment, he prescribed that additional course of 

treatment, he ordered an MRI, and he stated that additional treatment recommendations would be 

made as appropriate. (Doc. 1, Comp., p. 33.) Thus, notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Sobol’s 

evaluation was remote temporally from Plaintiff’s evaluation by Defendants, his report provides 

no basis for a plausible claim that Defendants’ determinations were “medically unacceptable under 

the circumstances” and chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 

681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, 

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the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Hitchman and Greenleaf do not 

support a claim for relief under section 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment.

C. State Law Claims

In addition to his Eighth Amendment medical care claim, Plaintiff alleges three separate 

claims under state law, under theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. The “plain language” of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) “makes clear that supplemental jurisdiction 

may only be invoked when the district court has the hook of original jurisdiction on which to hang 

it.” Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001). Because 

Plaintiff has not alleged a viable claim under the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Hitchman 

and Greenleaf, the Court lacks jurisdiction over his state law tort claims and they must be 

dismissed, without prejudice.3

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 

section 1983. Plaintiff was previously provided with the opportunity to amend and he was unable 

to cure the deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1130. Based on the nature of the deficiencies, further leave to amend is not warranted, and the 

Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s state law tort claims are dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of 

jurisdiction;

2. This action is dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 

1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment; and

///

 

3

Plaintiff also fails to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act, which requires that a tort claim against a 

public entity or its employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board no 

more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950, 950.2. 

Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent to suit. Shirk v. Vista 

Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 208-09 (Cal. 2007); State v. Superior Court of Kings Cnty. (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 

1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004); Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2001); Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a 

public employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. Shirk, 42 Cal.4th at 209; 

Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1239; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 

(9th Cir. 1988).

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3. This dismissal counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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