Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03956/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03956-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Ashton Oslund
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3956

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Richard Ashton Oslund,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

District of Minnesota.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: October 12, 2005

 Filed: July 14, 2006

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Before RILEY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Richard Ashton Oslund (Oslund) appeals his convictions for robbery affecting

interstate commerce, murder with a firearm during a robbery affecting interstate

commerce, and felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1);

924(c)(1)(A), (e)(1), (j)(1); 1951 (1998). After a two-week trial, Oslund was

convicted by a jury for the robbery and murder of a Brinks security guard who was

making a delivery and pickup at a Target store in Minnesota. After the verdict, the

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The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota.

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district court1 sentenced Oslund to two consecutive life terms, a concurrent twenty

year term, and $278,745.00 in restitution. Oslund appeals his convictions and

sentences on seven grounds. We affirm.

I.

William Strelow (Strelow) and Mike Frost (Frost), both employees of Brinks

Security, traveled in an armored vehicle to the Target store in Bloomington,

Minnesota, on November 22, 1998, to deliver and to retrieve money. Strelow was

working as the messenger, the person who transferred the money to and from the

vehicle. Frost was the driver and stayed in the vehicle while Strelow made the

deliveries. Upon arriving at Target, Strelow loaded a dolly with several boxes of

coins and entered the store. He transferred the coins to a store employee who then

gave Strelow two bags, one containing checks and the other containing $59,750 in

cash.

While Strelow was in the store, Frost monitored the area around the entrance.

He noticed a man standing near the back of the truck, and as a cautionary measure

notified Strelow of the man via two-way radio. Soon after, Strelow exited the store

and went to the rear of the truck. At that time, the man who had been standing near

the truck walked up to Strelow, shot him three times, grabbed the bag containing the

cash, and ran. Strelow later died from his wounds. 

The Bloomington Police Department and the FBI conducted a joint

investigation into the murder and robbery. There were 39 witnesses who had been

in the parking lot at the time the crime was committed. Three witnesses met with a

sketch artist and three different drawings were produced, one of which was widely

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distributed. Over 500 tips were received through a tip hotline. Numerous possible

suspects were identified and investigated, and in early 1999, Oslund was identified

as a suspect after the FBI received a tip from an attorney representing Zachary

Koehler.

Koehler first met Oslund in 1992, and they later served time together in several

Minnesota prisons and became good friends. Koehler was in Stillwater State Prison

when the Target robbery occurred, and shortly thereafter, Oslund was also

incarcerated at Stillwater for a parole violation. Koehler sought out Oslund and

spoke to him briefly, noticing a new, large tattoo on Oslund's neck. He asked Oslund

about it and Oslund replied that he "had to do it after the Target." (Trial Tr. at 471-

72). Koehler knew about the Brinks robbery and to what Oslund was referring. He

then asked Oslund what happened and Oslund replied that "things got out of control

and I had to blast him." (Id. at 476). Koehler had recently received $1,000 from

Oslund, and asked him if the money came from the Brinks robbery, to which Oslund

replied that it had. After this conversation, Koehler called his attorney to pass the

information along to the FBI. 

The FBI taped two conversations between Oslund and Koehler, on June 16 and

June 21, 1999, after arranging to have Koehler transferred to a different prison in

which Oslund was then incarcerated. The June 21 conversation was admitted at trial,

and it reveals that Oslund was suspicious about Koehler's transfer and Koehler's

specific questions about certain crimes, including the robbery of an armored vehicle.

While Oslund referred only to hypothetical situations, he did discuss how he would

recommend committing such a robbery and his suggestions were practically identical

to the details of the Target robbery. 

Soon after these conversations, FBI Agent James Walden approached one of

Oslund's close friends and former roommates, Thomas Russell, who agreed to

cooperate in the investigation and tape conversations between Oslund and him.

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Taping did not begin until August 28, 2000, though, due to difficulty in finding a time

when neither Russell nor Oslund was in custody. Hundreds of hours of conversations

between Russell and Oslund were recorded by the FBI between August 28, 2000, and

March 17, 2001. 

Oslund was reluctant at first to discuss the robbery but eventually began

discussing the Target robbery after Russell told him he wanted to rob an armored car

and was looking for some advice about how to do it. There were both inculpatory

statements, some confessional in nature, and exculpatory statements on the tapes.

Both the defense and the prosecution used excerpts from the tapes at trial. 

On the two-year anniversary of the crime, the FBI installed video and audio

recording equipment in a car and had Russell drive Oslund to the Bloomington Target

store. Oslund and Russell again discussed the robbery and how Oslund had carried

it out. Oslund also made inculpatory statements about the crime to others, who in

turn testified to them at trial. Thomas Nelson testified that in 1999, Oslund described

parts of the robbery and murder in several conversations between them, sometimes

with others present. He added that Oslund even acted out how things had happened.

Several other people who were with Oslund at various times also testified to his

statements and admissions regarding the crime. 

Two of the witnesses who were in the Target parking lot made positive

identifications of Oslund. One, Melissa Downey, had made direct eye contact with

Oslund for a short time before ducking behind a car when he pointed the gun at her.

She met with Agent Walden on April 12, 2001, to view a multipicture photographic

lineup. Ms. Downey identified Oslund's photograph as the person who had

committed the crime, and she later identified him at trial.

The other witness who identified Oslund was Ryan McDonald, a teenager at

the time of the robbery and murder. McDonald was walking towards the store and

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saw a man standing by the rear of the armored truck. As he continued towards the

store, he saw the man pull a gun. At this time, McDonald dove in front of the Brinks

truck, heard three gunshots, and then heard a car pull out of the parking lot, tires

squealing. McDonald met with Agent Walden on December 12, 2002, to review a

multipicture photographic lineup. McDonald identified Oslund's photograph as the

man he saw, and he also identified Oslund at trial. 

Oslund offered an alibi, contending that he could not have committed the crime

because he was at home and on the phone at the time. He used phone records to show

that a collect call was placed from the Lino Lakes prison to the apartment where

Oslund was then living at 2:59 p.m. on November 22, 1998. The call lasted fifteen

minutes. David Heil, an inmate at Lino Lakes at that time who has a lengthy criminal

record with more than ten prior felonies, testified that he had placed the call and

spoke with Oslund. Heil even recalled the telephone conversation he had had with

Oslund some six years prior. Upon cross-examination, Heil admitted that his memory

of the conversation had been refreshed by a defense investigator prior to trial and that

he was a good friend of Oslund's and would help him out if asked. 

Oslund was indicted on May 5, 2003, and trial began on October 12, 2004. The

case went to the jury on October 25, 2004, and a guilty verdict was returned the next

day on all three counts. The district court sentenced Oslund to the statutory

maximum of twenty years for the robbery (Count 1), life imprisonment on the murder

conviction (Count 2), and life imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a

firearm (Count 3). Oslund was also ordered to pay $278,745 in restitution. Oslund

challenges his convictions and sentences on seven grounds: (1) the government failed

to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the taped conversations between

Russell and Oslund; (2) undue delay in the indictment caused prejudice to Oslund;

(3) the government committed improper vouching; (4) the government improperly

attacked the defense counsel during closing arguments; (5) the evidence was

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United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

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insufficient to sustain the convictions; (6) the judge committed a Booker2 error at

sentencing; and (7) it was error for the court to order restitution for future lost wages.

II.

A. Improper Admission of Evidence

Oslund first challenges the admission of the taped conversations, alleging that

no proper foundation for their admission had been made. Specifically, he challenges

the authenticity of the tapes and claims that the tapes were the result of unlawful

inducement. "The admission of tape recordings is 'within the sound discretion of the

trial court and will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of that discretion.'"

United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1064 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States

v. Martinez, 951 F.2d 887, 888 (8th Cir. 1991) (internal marks omitted)). 

Several nonexclusive factors should be considered when determining the

admissibility of tape-recorded conversations. United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d

101, 104 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975). They include

(1) That the recording device was capable of taking the conversation

now offered in evidence. (2) That the operator of the device was

competent to operate the device. (3) That the recording is authentic and

correct. (4) That changes, additions or deletions have not been made in

the recording. (5) That the recording has been preserved in a manner that

is shown to the court. (6) That the speakers are identified. (7) That the

conversation elicited was made voluntarily and in good faith, without

any kind of inducement.

Id.

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These factors are useful to determine if a "tape's 'substance and the

circumstances under which it was obtained [provide] sufficient proof of its

reliability.'" Webster, 84 F.3d at 1064 (quoting United States v. Roach, 28 F.3d 729,

733 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994)). "These requirements do not, however, exist in vacuo; they

become meaningful only when viewed in light of the facts of a specific case." Durns

v. United States, 562 F.2d 542, 547 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977). Not

only do we look to the specific facts of a case, but it is worth noting that the

technology related to recording devices has greatly advanced since McMillan was

decided, a fact that supports the premise that the McMillan factors are guidelines to

be viewed in light of specific circumstances, not a rigid set of tests to be satisfied.

See Webster, 84 F.3d at 1064 (the McMillan factors are general guidelines for a

district court to use in evaluating if the Government has met its burden); see also

United States v. Clark, 986 F.2d 65, 68 (4th Cir. 1993) (government not required to

meet every McMillan factor; the "factors, while helpful, merely 'provide guidance to

the district court when called upon to make rulings on authentication issues.'")

(quoting United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1372 (4th Cir. 1992)). In this light,

we turn to the district court's admission of the tapes. 

Oslund made a pretrial motion to suppress the tapes. After a hearing that

included testimony from Russell, Agent Walden, and a St. Paul police officer, the

district court denied Oslund's motion. Russell had been called by the defense to

testify and was in custody at the time of the pretrial hearing before the magistrate

judge. Oslund then challenged the admissibility of the tapes at trial on different

grounds, claiming they lacked proper foundation. The district court initially sustained

the objection and invited briefing on the matter. After further briefing and testimony,

the court reversed itself, held that the tapes were admissible, and that the foundational

elements of McMillan were satisfied. The government chose not to call Russell to

testify at trial, as he was in custody in Wisconsin at the time, and instead made its

case for admission through the testimony of Agent Walden. 

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Oslund contends that because Russell did not testify at trial, the government

failed to properly authenticate the tapes and that Agent Walden's testimony was not

sufficient to do so. While it may have been better for Russell to have testified about

the recordings at trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the

government met its burden under McMillan. See United States v. Buchanan, 985

F.2d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding tapes admissible between defendant and

informant even though informant did not testify at trial; McMillan factors were

satisfied through testimony of officer), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994). Agent

Walden testified that Russell would contact him prior to meeting with Oslund, that

he would then provide Russell with a digital recorder, that Agent Walden would turn

the recorder on and then turn it off after receiving it back, and that it was not possible

for Russell to turn the recorder off. In addition, Agent Walden was able to identify

each speaker in the recordings and thus authenticate the identity of the participants.

See United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 849 (8th Cir.) (testimony of federal drug

agent that he was familiar with voices through work on wiretap provided sufficient

foundation to identify participants in recorded conversation), cert. denied, 535 U.S.

1107, 536 U.S. 931, & 537 U.S. 911 (2002); United States v. Cerone, 830 F.2d 938,

949 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Any person may identify a speaker's voice if he has heard the

voice at any time."), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).

Oslund also contends that Russell's testimony is required to explain the

existence of various "gaps" in the recordings. The "gaps" are periods of the

recordings when no voices or conversation can be heard, as when the recording

occurred in a bar and ambient or background noise is all that is discernable at times.

Oslund argues that these "gaps" could show alterations or modifications or reflect

times when Russell had moved the recorder to a location to avoid memorializing

exculpatory statements by Oslund that could cause an inaccurate perception of the

recorded conversation. However, this court has held that gaps in an audiotape affect

"the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility." United States v. Byrne, 83 F.3d

984, 990 (8th Cir. 1996). See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.

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2001) (gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording

untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant

into making incriminating statements), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980 (2002); cf. Webster,

84 F.3d at 1065 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape

where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being

recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the "infirmities are not so

pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy"). The "gaps" themselves,

whether or not Russell testified at the trial, are not enough to render the recordings

inadmissible and instead go to the weight a jury should assign the recordings. 

Oslund also argues that the seventh element of McMillan was not met for two

reasons: (1) that he was induced to speak to Russell and (2) that Russell was induced

to cooperate with the government and to orchestrate the conversations because he

wanted to collect part of the $115,000 reward money offered in this case. According

to Oslund, this potential for a financial reward induced Russell to manipulate the

conversations in order to get certain statements from Oslund. Oslund argues that

because Agent Walden was not simultaneously monitoring the conversations as they

occurred, and because Agent Walden cannot speak as to Russell's state of mind, that

only Russell's testimony would satisfy this McMillan factor. We respectfully

disagree.

In United States v. Brown, we held that the seventh factor in McMillan referred

to the statements of the defendant in a recorded conversation, and as such, the

defendant's statement must be made in good faith, without inducement, and

voluntarily. 604 F.2d 557, 560 (8th Cir. 1979). We are presented with no evidence

that Oslund did not voluntarily enter into these conversations with Russell or that he

was somehow induced to do so, and as such, this argument fails. Id.; see also United

States v. Riskin, 788 F.2d 1361, 1370 (8th Cir.) (no inducement when defendant

voluntarily enters into conversation with informant), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923

(1986). 

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Oslund alleges that Russell was induced into participating in the conversations

and in choosing particular topics of discussion. This argument attacks the

voluntariness of Russell's consent to participating in the recordings. Oslund argues

that Russell, described as a lifelong criminal, agreed to participate for his own gain,

whether that be the potential of reward money or the hope that he would receive

assistance from law enforcement on future or pending criminal charges. Russell

signed many consent forms throughout the time the tapes were made, and both he and

various law enforcement officers testified that Russell was not promised leniency for

his cooperation and was warned against committing other crimes while working with

them because the government would not offer him assistance. "An individual's

decision to allow the police to record a . . . conversation . . . is not necessarily

involuntary just because the individual's motives were self-seeking, or because he

harbored expectations of personal benefit." United States v. Kelly, 708 F.2d 121, 125

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983). See also United States v. Janis, 831 F.2d

773, 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1987) (district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

tape recording of drug transaction that was made by paid informant), cert. denied, 484

U.S. 1073 (1988); United States v. Wallace, 597 F.2d 641, 642 (8th Cir.) (per curiam)

(conversation was voluntarily recorded even though informant did so after promise

that his assistance would be made known to prosecutor handling pending felony

charge), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 856 (1979); United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980, 985

(8th Cir. 1975) (informant voluntarily gave consent to recording even though he did

so in exchange for promise of immunity), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 907 (1976);

McMillan, 508 F.2d at 104 n.2 (after considering totality of circumstances, it was

clear that consent was given by informant, even though she was a paid government

informant). This court addressed generally the issue of informant inducement in

Buchanan, but while the court referred to the seventh McMillan factor, it did so by

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In Buchanan, the appellant argued that the government failed to produce

evidence satisfying the seventh McMillan factor. The government offered proof

through law enforcement agent testimony that the informant had consented to the

recordings. The court held that this was enough to satisfy the seventh factor and that

while the appellant argued that the informant had been induced, "he fail[ed] to

produce any evidence whatsoever to that effect or to refute the evidence presented by

the government." Buchanan, 985 F.2d at 1379. 

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considering the informant's consent to the recording.3 Based on the record before us,

we do not find any improper inducement.

Even if we were to find that there was not a total lack of inducement in the

creation of the taped conversations, that would not automatically render the tapes

inadmissible. The McMillan factors are a guide for the court to use, and if the totality

of the circumstances surrounding the recordings satisfies the court as to their

reliability, even if not every factor is explicitly and completely met, admission is

proper. See Webster, 84 F.3d at 1064. Looking at the totality of the circumstances

here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the

admission of the taped conversations between Oslund and Russell.

B. Preindictment Delay 

Oslund next argues that the preindictment delay of five years was prejudicial

to his case and caused a key piece of evidence to be destroyed that would have

supported his alibi. Oslund's alibi throughout the trial was that at the time of the

crime, he was on the phone with David Heil, an inmate at the Lino Lakes prison.

Phone records supported the alibi in that they confirmed that a call was placed

between the prison and Oslund's residence that lasted fifteen minutes and occurred

during the time of the robbery. Heil testified that he placed the call himself and

talked with Oslund, thus providing corroborating testimony for Oslund's alibi.

However, to whom Heil talked that day could not be verified because even though

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Oslund complains about the following line of questioning to Koehler. On

cross-examination by the defense: 

Q. Richard Oslund is a bragger, isn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. He wants everybody to know what a dangerous guy he is; right?

A. That's true.

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inmate phone calls are recorded, Lino Lakes retains the tapes only for two years. By

the time Oslund was indicted in May 2003, the tape of the phone call from November

22, 1998, had been erased. Oslund claims that this almost five year delay prejudiced

him by preventing his access to this tape, which he contends would have exonerated

him.

In order to succeed on this claim, Oslund must show that the government

deliberately delayed his indictment in order to gain some kind of advantage and that

this delay caused him actual prejudice in presenting his case. United States v. Grap,

368 F.3d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 2004). However, Oslund raises this issue for the first

time on appeal. We have held that "it is reasonable to interpret 'defects in

indictments' as including delays in bringing indictments," and as such, any such

motion claiming a defect in the indictment must be brought prior to trial. United

States v. Farmer, 312 F.3d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Crim. P.

12(b)(3) (requiring that "a motion alleging a defect in the indictment" be brought

prior to the start of trial). Because Oslund did not bring this motion prior to trial, the

remedy he seeks is barred, and even plain error analysis on appeal can provide no

relief. United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 804 (8th Cir. 2006).

C. Improper Vouching

Oslund contends that the government committed improper vouching during its

redirect examination of Koehler, when in response to a question about Oslund's

statements about the Target robbery, Koehler stated, "I don't believe he made it up."4

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Q. And when he first told you that he had done the Target job, you didn't know

if he was telling the truth or not; right?

A. That's true.

Q. In fact, given Richard Oslund's reputation, you knew it was possible he was

just making it up; right?

A. No, I never thought that.

(Trial Tr. at 493-94).

On redirect examination by the prosecution:

Q. And based on your experience, could you characterize his bragging?

A. He, he just, he likes to, umm, talk about things that he's done to make

himself, umm, I don't know, just to make people look up to him kinda. But he very

often brags about things that he's done, things that he's gotten away with.

Q. And so based on your experience, it is things that he's actually done?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think Mr. Richman asked you whether it's possible he made that up,

about the, ah, the Target armored car; do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. Based on the context of the conversation at the time, what was your belief

as to whether or not he had made it up?

A. I don't believe he made it up.

(Id. at 530).

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(Trial Tr. at 530). Vouching occurs "when the government: (1) refers to facts outside

the record or implies that the veracity of a witness is supported by outside facts that

are unavailable to the jury; (2) implies a guarantee of truthfulness; or (3) expresses

a personal opinion about the credibility of a witness." United States v. BenitezMeraz, 161 F.3d 1163, 1167 (8th Cir. 1998). Oslund's reliance on government

vouching appears misplaced in this context, as the government did not make any

statements regarding or implying the truthfulness of its witness, Koehler. Instead, the

objection Oslund makes is more akin to improper lay witness opinion testimony, and

Oslund's brief in fact cites to several cases involving this alternative argument. 

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The statement at issue here is not one made by government counsel, but one by

a witness regarding his opinion of statements made by Oslund. Rule 701 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence states that if the witness testifying is not doing so as an

expert, then any testimony expressing the witness's opinion or inferences is limited

to those that "are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful

to a clear understanding of the witness' [sic] testimony or the determination of a fact

in issue." Fed. R. Evid. 701 (1998). "Personal knowledge or perceptions based on

experience is a sufficient foundation for such testimony." In re Air Crash At Little

Rock Ark., 291 F.3d 503, 515 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 974 (2002). If an

analysis of the events being discussed is needed in the form of an opinion, then lay

opinion testimony is admissible. Id. at 515-16. "A district court's decision to admit

or exclude lay opinion testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion." United States

v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2001). Because Oslund did not object to the

redirect testimony at trial, we review for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 732-36 (1993). The statements in question were made on redirect in response

to the defendant's cross-examination on the same subject which had also solicited

Koehler's opinion, and were based on the witness's personal perceptions as a

participant in the conversation. As such, we find no error in the district court

allowing Koehler's testimony.

D. Improper Remarks

Oslund next argues that the prosecution made improper remarks during closing

arguments that attacked the integrity of defense counsel and were insulting. "'A

failure to object to statements made during closing argument waives such an

objection.'" Zutz v. Case Corp., 422 F.3d 764, 774 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Billingsley v. City of Omaha, 277 F.3d 990, 997 (8th Cir. 2002)). Oslund's counsel

made no objection to the remarks at trial, and as such Oslund's claim now fails unless

we find plain error. See id.; see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-36. After reviewing the

record, while we find the statements troubling, we conclude that the statements in

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The complained of statement occurred during the Government's rebuttal

closing argument. Referring to statements made by defense counsel during his

closing argument, government counsel made the statement, "He is misleading you,

and he himself is throwing smoke" (Trial Tr. at 1322). The defense had alluded to the

fact that Agent Walden had jumped to conclusions and ignored parts of the

investigation because he was so focused on Oslund. In response, the Government

countered the argument that investigators had rushed to judgment with a summary of

the testimony in the case and about the investigation, concluding with the disputed

statement.

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question were not so "plainly unwarranted and clearly injurious" that reversal is

required in order to avoid a "plain miscarriage of justice." Billingsley, 277 F.3d at

997 (internal marks omitted).5

 

E. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Oslund challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.

"'We review de novo the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to support a

conviction.'" United States v. Skinner, 433 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting

United States v. Vazquez-Garcia, 340 F.3d 632, 636 (8th Cir. 2003)). "Only if 'no

interpretation of the evidence . . . would allow a reasonable-minded jury to conclude

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt' will we reverse a jury's verdict on the grounds of

insufficient evidence." Id. (quoting United States v. Morton, 412 F.3d 901, 904 (8th

Cir. 2005)) (some internal marks omitted). 

Oslund specifically attacks the reliability of the two eyewitnesses who

identified him and testified at trial. The use of eyewitness identification testimony

often raises issues concerning the reliability of the claimed identification. See United

States v. Martin, 391 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2004). However, this court has stated

that "[t]he evaluation of eyewitness testimony is for the jury alone." United States v.

Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1141; 520 U.S. 1220

(1997). If there are inconsistencies in a witness's testimony, problems with the

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Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

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identification, a prolonged length of time that would raise concerns, or other similar

issues, the defense has the opportunity to raise those concerns at trial and bring them

out on cross-examination. Id. The jury then can decide how much weight and

credibility to give such identifications. At Oslund's trial, the jury was instructed by

the district court on factors to consider when weighing eyewitness identification, and

the defense had ample opportunity to raise and argue the issue of its reliability to the

jury. It was then up to the jury to determine the weight to give to the identifications,

and we will not second-guess their determination in this matter. 

However, even if the eyewitness identification evidence were excluded, we

would find that there was sufficient inculpatory evidence from which a jury could

reasonably find Oslund guilty. The other evidence included the taped conversations

between Oslund and Russell, taped conversations between Koehler and Oslund,

testimony from several of Oslund's associates regarding confessional statements made

by him, testimony that Oslund had more cash than usual around the time of the crime,

and testimony that Oslund had been seen with a gun similar to that used in the crime

around the time it occurred. In light of this and all the other evidence in the record,

we conclude that Oslund's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without

merit.

F. Sentencing

Oslund was sentenced pre-Booker, but post-Blakely,

6

 and at his sentencing

hearing he objected to the court's use of the Sentencing Guidelines as

unconstitutional. The court disagreed, holding that it was required to apply the

Guidelines as mandatory. Shortly after sentencing, Booker was decided, holding that

the Guidelines can only be applied in an advisory role. 543 U.S. at 245-46. Oslund

"correctly preserved his Booker issue at sentencing, and we therefore review for

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7

In order to avoid a potential ex post facto problem, the district court used the

Sentencing Guidelines in effect on November 22, 1998, the date the crime occurred,

rather than those in effect at the time of the sentencing. Likewise, we note that 18

U.S.C. § 924(c) was amended on November 13, 1998, nine days before this crime was

committed. The amendments created a new mandatory penalty under § 924(c) of a

minimum of ten years of imprisonment when a firearm is discharged. 

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harmless error, with the government bearing the burden of proof." United States v.

Olthoff, 437 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Mendoza-Mesa,

421 F.3d 671, 672-73 (8th Cir. 2005)).

 

On appeal, Oslund argues that because the Guidelines are no longer mandatory,

he should have the opportunity to be resentenced by the district court. He contends

that because the court could have imposed a non-Guidelines sentence, it should now

be given an opportunity to do so in light of Booker. Because no Guidelines

sentencing enhancements were imposed (apart from those involving Oslund's prior

convictions), there was no constitutional Booker error, and the burden is thus on the

government to prove that the non-Constitutional error in applying the Guidelines as

mandatory rather than advisory did not substantially influence the outcome of the

proceedings and was, consequently, harmless. Mendoza-Mesa, 421 F.3d at 673. 

Oslund was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 20 years on Count 1

(robbery), to life imprisonment on Count 2 (murder during a robbery), and to life

imprisonment on Count 3 (felon in possession of a firearm). Counts 1 and 3 were to

be served concurrently, with Count 2 to be served consecutively. The Guidelines

range on Count 3 was life imprisonment, which the district court imposed due to the

then mandatory application of the Guidelines. United States Sentencing Guidelines

Manual (USSG) § 2A1.1 (Nov. 1998). However, as to Count 2 (murder during a

robbery), the statutory range was ten years to life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.

§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); 924(j)(1) (1998).7

 Section 5G1.2(a) of the 1998 Guidelines

provided that for § 924(c) offenses, the statutory range became the Guidelines range.

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Paragraph 81 of the Presentence Investigation Report told the district court that the

Guidelines range on Count 2 was five years to life, not recognizing that the recent

amendments had increased the mandatory minimum from five years to ten years when

a firearm is discharged. The district court therefore had the ability on Count 2, even

under the mandatory Guidelines regime, to sentence Oslund anywhere within that

range of ten years to life but declined to exercise that discretion in Oslund's favor.

Instead, the court imposed the longest sentence available to it. "The fact that a district

court chose not to exercise its discretion to impose a lesser sentence is evidence that

the same sentence would have been imposed under an advisory guidelines regime."

United States v. White, 439 F.3d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.

Davis, 442 F.3d 681, 684 (the defendant could not show a likelihood that he would

have received a lesser sentence under an advisory Guidelines regime because the

district court did not use the discretion available to it in his favor when sentencing

under a mandatory Guidelines regime, and a "sentence at the top of the Guidelines

range completely dissipates any residual doubt . . . about whether [the defendant]

would have received a more lenient sentence" had the Guidelines been treated as

advisory); United States v. Perez-Ramirez, 415 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding

that because the district court did not fully use its discretion to depart from the

Guidelines when determining the proper range or in imposing the term of sentence

(sentence was 2 months above sentencing-range minimum), any Booker error was

harmless). 

The court made specific statements at sentencing that also support the

conclusion that any Booker error committed by application of the Guidelines as

mandatory is harmless, and we are left with little doubt that the court would have

imposed the same sentence on Counts 1 and 3 had the Guidelines been treated as

advisory. During the sentencing hearing, the court stated "[s]hould you ever be

released, and it would be contrary to my recommendation that they do so, it is ordered

by statute that you serve a term of supervised release." (Sent. Tr. at 32.) When

discussing restitution payments, the court made the statement that it was optimistic

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that Oslund would not be released. The court then added that "what you did ought not

to be repeated, and I'm placing you in a position where you may not do so." (Sent.

Tr. at 34-35.) After reviewing the sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we also

find that it is not unreasonable. The court made reference to § 3553(a) when

discussing the reasons for imposing the sentence and stated that the sentence would

satisfy those factors, leading us to believe the district court recognized and considered

them when imposing the sentence. See United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909

(8th Cir. 2006) (district court not required "to categorically rehearse each of the

section 3553(a) factors on the record . . . as long as it is clear that they were

considered). Based on the record before us, we conclude that the court would have

imposed the same sentence on each count had the Guidelines been viewed by the

Court as advisory, and we further find that the sentence imposed on each count is

reasonable when measured by the factors in § 3553(a). 

G. Restitution

Oslund was ordered to pay $278,745 in restitution to Brinks. This amount

included the $59,750 that was stolen in the robbery; $8,380.86 for medical and

counseling expenses for Strelow and his family; $7,500 expended on funeral

expenses; $100,369.50 in lost income already paid by Brinks to Strelow's family; and

$102,744.65 committed by Brinks for future lost income that will be paid to the

victim's estate. Oslund objected to the restitution order on two grounds: (1)

restitution was a question for the jury under Blakely/Booker, and (2) the inclusion of

future earnings is not authorized by statute. 

Oslund's first challenge fails. We have held that neither Blakely nor Booker

affects the determination of restitution or the burden in establishing a proper amount.

See United States v. May, 413 F.3d 841, 849 (8th Cir.) (finding "persuasive" the view

of other circuits that have determined that Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker do not

affect the determination of restitution amounts), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 672 (2005);

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see also United States v. Miller, 419 F.3d 791, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 1379 (2006). 

The second objection, to the inclusion of future lost income in a restitution

order, raises an issue of first impression for this court. The district court's factfinding as to the amount of restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act

(MVRA) is reviewed for clear error. Miller, 419 F.3d at 792. The burden is on the

government to prove the amount of restitution owed based on a preponderance of the

evidence, id., and "the court has wide discretion in ordering restitution," United States

v. Reichow, 416 F.3d 802, 804-05 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 784 (2005). 

Restitution in this case was mandatory under the MVRA. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.

"We review . . . the district court's application of the restitution statute de novo."

Reichow, 416 F.3d at 804. When the MVRA was enacted in 1996, it expanded upon

the permissive restitution statute that was already in place—18 U.S.C. § 3663—and

made it mandatory to order restitution in certain cases, particularly crimes of violence

and theft crimes with identifiable victims who "suffered a physical injury or

pecuniary loss." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1). When an offense causes bodily harm to

a victim, restitution must be ordered for medical or psychological treatment, costs of

therapy and rehabilitation, and "income lost by such victim as a result of such

offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(2). If the victim dies, funeral and related expenses

are also included. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(3). When the crime causes the death of a

victim, the representative of that victim's estate or a family member may assume the

victim's rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2).

Because this is an issue of first impression, we must determine if the MVRA

authorizes an award of future lost income. "When determining the meaning of a

statute, our starting point must be the plain language of the statute," and our goal "is

to give effect to the intent of Congress." Watson v. Ray, 192 F.3d 1153, 1155-56 (8th

Cir. 1999) (internal marks omitted). If the statute itself does not define a word, then

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the common sense meaning of the word is used and considered binding, absent

congressional intent to the contrary. Id. at 1156. The MVRA does not define

"income" or distinguish between past or future income. However, the statute plainly

states that a victim can recover income that is lost due to a crime causing bodily

injury, and if that victim dies, then the estate can recover in the victim's place.

Because future income is income that is lost to the victim as a direct result of the

crime, the plain language of the statute leads to the conclusion that lost future income

can be included in a restitution order.

However, that does not mean that it is always proper for lost future income to

be awarded in a restitution order. The MVRA also states that restitution does not

need to be awarded if the district court finds that "determining complex issues of fact

related to the cause or amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong the

sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution . . . is outweighed

by the burden on the sentencing process." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(B). If the

amount of future income is contested by a defendant and the district court finds that

determining the proper amount would be unduly burdensome and time-consuming,

the court has the discretion to decline to award future income in the restitution order.

Not every case will be overly burdensome though, such as cases where the amount

is not in dispute or where it is easily determined. In those situations, the MVRA does

not prevent the district court from using its abundant discretion in crafting restitution

orders to include the lost future income of a victim.

While Oslund relies heavily on United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 802

(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1124 (1986), to support his position that future

wages are not to be included in restitution orders, his reliance is somewhat misplaced.

Fountain involved a restitution order under the Victim and Witness Protection Act

(VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, which since its amendment in 1996 is very similar to the

MVRA (with the exception that the MVRA is mandatory and the VWPA is

discretionary). Our holding today parallels to a large extent the reasoning of the

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Seventh Circuit, which held in Fountain that restitution orders that require a court to

calculate lost future earnings are unduly burdensome and complicated and as such are

not authorized by the VWPA, unless the amount in question requires no calculation,

such as when it is uncontested. Fountain, 768 F.2d at 802. We agree with the

Seventh Circuit that a burdensome, complicated, or speculative calculation provides

a good reason for the district court to decline to exercise its discretion in favor of

including future lost income in a restitution order. However, an award of lost future

income is not precluded by the MVRA, subject to the burden on the sentencing court.

Oslund does not challenge the amount of the future income awarded by the

district court, only its award in general. As such, the actual amount was uncontested

and there was no need for the district court to do any sort of calculation. We also

believe the employer would not have agreed to pay an amount that was not justified

by the circumstances of its employment relationship with the victim. Because there

was not an undue burden cast upon the court in this case, it was not improper for lost

future income to be included in the restitution order.

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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