Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02028/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02028-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Wesley Willie
Appellant

Document Text:

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United Stires C:OUrt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 12 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

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) 

) 

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Consolidated Nos. 

90-2028 and 90-2041 

WESLEY WILLIE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-89-106-01-JB) 

Charles L. Barth, Assistant United States Attorney, Las Cruces, 

New Mexico (William L. Lutz, United States Attorney and Paula G. 

Barnett, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Teresa E. Storch, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico (Wesley Willie, pro se, with her on the briefs) for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON, SETH, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Wesley Willie appeals his conviction in district court of 

four counts of failure to file income tax returns for the years 

1982 to 1985 in violation of 26 u.s.c. § 7203. We affirm. 

Wesley Willie, a Native American, filed personal income tax 

returns in 1975, 1976 and 1977, receiving a refund in each year. 

He did not file in 1978 and filed a zero return in 1980. From 

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 1 
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1982 to 1985, Willie also failed to file although he earned a 

substantial income each year1 working on large commercial 

construction projects at various locations throughout the United 

States, far from his mailing address at the Navajo Nation in New 

Mexico. On his W-4 forms required for employment, Willie claimed 

numerous exemptions to which he was not entitled to avoid the payment of taxes. The IRS mailed a number of notices to Willie's 

address regarding his lack of filing. Subsequently, this action 

was brought in district court and Willie was found guilty by jury 

and convicted on all four counts of willful failure to file tax 

returns. He now appeals that conviction. 

Willie has filed two briefs on appeal, one submitted by 

counsel and one pro se. Through counsel he argues that: (1) he 

was denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) he was denied his 

right to effective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court 

erred in prohibiting the introduction of his exhibits; and, (4) 

the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenge to exclude one 

of two Native American jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. 

In his pro se brief, he argues further that: (1) he lacked sufficient notice of the elements of the offense charged; (2) the 

United States lacks jurisdiction over Native Americans to enforce 

the income tax laws against them; (3) the judge engaged in 

prejudicial misconduct; and, (4) his petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus was illegally suspended. 

1 In 1982, Willie's gross income was $21,579.79; in 1983, it 

was $32,976.61; in 1984, it was $16,926.66; and, in 1985, it was 

$13,963.56. Tr. at 233. 

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I. 

RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL 

Willie claims that he was denied a speedy trial in violation 

of the Speedy Trial Act which requires that a defendant be brought 

to trial within 70 days of his arraignment. 18 u.s.c. 

§ 316l(c)(l) (1985). Willie's trial began 227 days after his 

arraignment. However, certain periods of that time may be 

excluded in computing the allowable delay in commencing trial. 18 

u.s.c. § 3161(h). 

Delay resulting from the submission of any pretrial motion, 

"from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion," shall be 

excluded. 18 u.s.c. § 3161(h)(l)(F). Willie's first motion was 

filed on April 26. R. Docket Sheet, Doc. No. 2. The district 

court ruled on that and several subsequent motions without a hearing on June 7, but reserved consideration of Willie's motion to 

proceed pro .§..§. until it was "satisfied that Defendant fully 

recognizes the heavy duty that he undertakes in representing 

himself and, after being so advised, insists on representing 

himself." R. Vol. I, Tab 11. It is undisputed that the 44 days 

from the filing of Willie's first motion on April 26 to the 

court's disposition of all but the self-representation motion on 

June 7 should be excluded from the speedy trial calculation. The 

central question concerns the excludable time allowed for resolution of the pro se representation issue. 

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Willie argues that, although the court did not state that it 

was taking the motion under advisement on June 7, the motion was, 

in effect, taken under advisement to be ruled on at a later date. 

If under advisement, the maximum excludable delay for the court's 

determination is 30 days. 18 u.s.c. § 3161(h)(l)(J); ~United 

States v. Hines, 728 F.2d 421, 426 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 

U.S. 1246 (1984). We do not find, however, that the motion was 

taken under advisement. 2 Rather, the motion was still pending 

until trial when the district court discussed the difficulties of 

self-representation with Willie and made its final determination 

allowing Willie to proceed prose at trial, with his.appointed 

attorney acting as standby counsel. By that time, the court had 

apparently satisfied itself that Willie understood the difficulties of self-representation and still wished to conduct his 

defense pro se. 

Although it is preferable for the court to hear motions at 

the earliest possible time, the entire time between the filing 

until the conclusion of the hearing is excludable, regardless of 

whether the delay was "reasonably necessary. 113 Henderson v. 

2 Even if we were to determine that the pro se motion had been 

taken under advisement, the 30-day advisement period does not 

begin to run·until all necessary information is before the court. 

Excludable time includes "all time that is consumed in placing the 

trial court in a position to dispose of a motion." Henderson v. 

United States, 476 U.S. 321, 331 (1986); see United States v. 

Santoyo, 890 F.2d 726 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2567 (1990). 

The court clearly needed more information upon which to make its 

ruling. Until the court obtains that information, the advisement 

period does not begin to run. 

3 The judge's discussion with Willie at trial prior to the 

completion of jury selection constitutes a hearing leading to the 

final resolution of Willie's motion. The sufficiency and adequacy 

of that hearing is a separate issue discussed below. 

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United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330 (1986); United States v. 

Gonzales, 897 F.2d 1312, 1316 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 

S.Ct. 683 (1991); United States v. Santoyo, 890 F.2d 726, 728 (5th 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 2567 (1990); United States v. 

Stafford, 697 F.2d 1368, 1373 ns. 4, 5 (11th Cir. 1983). Thus, 

the period from the filing of the first motion on April 26 to the 

court's final hearing and disposition of the representation motion 

at the beginning of trial on November 20 is excluded under 18 

u.s.c. § 3161(h)(1)(F). United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 

1425-26 (10th Cir. 1990); see United States v. Santoyo, 890 F.2d 

at 728; United States v. Stafford, 697 F.2d at 1374. Since only 

19 days elapsed between the arraignment and the April 26 filing, 

Willie was not denied a speedy trial and we need not rule on his 

other speedy trial contentions. 

II. 

RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL 

Willie argues that he did not make a knowing, voluntary and 

intelligent waiver of his right to counsel because he was inadequately informed of the hazards of self-representation. He 

also objects to the court's denial of his request near the close 

of trial for a substitution of his standby counsel without inquiry 

into the reasons for his dissatisfaction. R. Vol. III at 266-68. 

We disagree with both arguments. 

A defendant has a constitutional right to waive his right to 

counsel and to represent himself at criminal trial. Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 

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1577, 1578 (10th Cir. 1990). However, to be valid, the trial 

judge must ensure that the waiver of counsel is "an intentional 

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 

United States v. McConnell, 749 F.2d 1441, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 

1984) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Ideally, the trial judge should conduct a thorough and comprehensive 

formal inquiry of the defendant on the record to demonstrate that 

the defendant is aware of the nature of the charges, the range of 

allowable punishments and possible defenses, and is fully informed 

of the risks of proceeding pro se. Faretta v. California, 422 

U.S. at 835; Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948); 

United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d at 1578; Sanchez v. Mondragon, 

858 F.2d 1462, 1467 (10th Cir. 1988). Regrettably, the district 

court did not fully discuss these issues with Willie on the 

record. However, such deficiencies do not prompt us to 

automatically reverse the conviction where the surrounding facts 

and circumstances, including Willie's background and conduct, 

demonstrate that Willie actually understood his right to counsel 

and the difficulties of pro ~ representation and knowingly and 

intelligently waived his right to counsel. United States v. 

Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 958 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Johnson v. 

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); United States v. McConnell, 749 

F.2d at 1451; United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 164 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980). 

The record indicates that Willie did understand his right to 

counsel and effectively waived that right. At the arraignment, 

Willie was notified of the charges against him and of the 

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potential penalties involved. R. Arraignment Tr. at 6. He then 

asserted in a subsequent petition "that he will not accept any 

court-appointed attorney and objects to any attempt by the judge 

to violate that right." R. Vol. I, Tab 6. In addition, Willie 

submitted at least ten pretrial pro se petitions to the court, 

including amended pleadings, a motion to deny the government's 

request for reciprocal discovery, a Petition in Abatement, two 

Motions to Dismiss, and two sets of jury instructions. Before the 

completion of jury selection at trial, the judge urged Willie to 

consult with his standby counsel given the difficulties of pro se 

litigation and the complexity of the legal process. 4 At that 

4 

THE COURT: Let me tell you something, Mr. Willie. 

Mr. Willie, I know that it's your right to represent 

yourself. We have a lot of rules in Court that might 

not make too much sense to people, but it's the way the 

system works. 

And I'm not intruding on your ability to represent 

yourself, that is your right, but I would encourage you 

to make as much use of Ms. Storch as you can. Ms. 

Storch is a highly competent lawyer. 

However, she's not permitted to help you unless you 

ask her for help. Because if she volunteers help, then 

it's possible that on appeal that might -- as I said 

before, that by a lawyer volunteering assistance without 

the defendant seeking it, that that can be a deprivation 

of your right to self-representation. 

But I would encourage you to make as much use of 

Ms. Storch as you can, and do not be shy about it, and I 

just recommend that to you, okay? 

MR. WILLIE: I did ask her to go ahead and sit at 

the table and help with the paperwork. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

MR. WILLIE: But other than that --

[footnote continued) 

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hearing, the court allowed Willie to represent himself, having 

apparently satisfied itself after observing Willie's conduct and 

reviewing his numerous petitions throughout the preceding months 

that Willie understood the difficulties of pro .§..§. representation 

and still insisted on representing himself. See R. Vol I, Tab 11 

(court refused to rule on motion to represent himself until satisfied that Willie understood the difficulties of such representation). Upon review of the record, we do not find that decision to 

be erroneous. 

This case is similar to United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 

163 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980), where a 

tax protester chose to represent himself after multiple urgings 

and pleas by the district court to retain counsel. On the day of 

trial, Weninger stated that he would retain counsel, but he needed 

a 120-day continuance to do so. The trial court denied the 

request as unreasonable. The next day, Weninger told the court 

that he had engaged counsel. For unknown reasons, the lawyer was 

never retained and Weninger continued to represent himself. This 

court found that Weninger "had no intention of hiring a lawyer 

unless the lawyer agreed with his views about the invalidity of 

tax laws." Id. at 166. 

[footnote continued) 

THE COURT: Well, fine. 

MR. WILLIE: we'll go from there. 

THE COURT: And if anything occurs -- and throughout the proceedings, if you decide that maybe you want 

to use her active participation, I surely would encourage that. And now you can consult with Ms. Storch if 

you wish to do so. 

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The record as a whole indicates that, although 

Weninger was made "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation," he strategically chose to 

appear pro se. However, after the jury refused to 

uphold his patriotic protest against the federal income 

tax, Weninger retained counsel to contend on appeal that 

the conduct of his trial was constitutionally impermissible. We refuse to permit this type of game to be 

played with the courts. We hold that Weninger's stubborn failure to hire an attorney constituted a knowing 

and intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of 

counsel. 

Id. at 167 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).5 

Similarly, Willie's repeated and unequivocal assertions of 

his right to self-representation, his continuous stubborn refusal 

to accept the services of admittedly competent and available 

counsel, his numerous pro se petitions and his clear expression 

that he could only work with an attorney who shared his views on 

taxation, Tr. at 269, constitute a valid implied waiver of his 

right to counsel. See United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 109 

(4th Cir.) (refusal to proceed with able appointed counsel without 

good cause is a voluntary waiver), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211 

(1988); United States v. Sarsoun, 834 F.2d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 

1987) (failure to cooperate with court implied waiver of right to 

counsel); United States v. Grosshans, 821 F.2d 1247, 1251 (6th 

Cir.) (defendant knowingly waived right to counsel where she 

refused to obtain an attorney, intended to represent herself and 

where she was aware of disadvantages of self-representation as 

evidenced by numerous motions filed prose), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 987 (1987); Johnstone v. Kelly, 808 F.2d 214, 216 (2d Cir. 

1986) (persistent requests to represent self was knowing, 

5 Of course, if the defendant cannot afford a lawyer, counsel 

will be appointed for him. 

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voluntary and unequivocal waiver of right to counsel); United 

States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538 (5th Cir.) (persistent, unreasonable 

demand for appointment of new counsel is functional equivalent of 

knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 

859 (1983); United States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1982) 

(defendant's delaying tactics of unreasonably refusing competent 

counsel could constitute waiver of counsel), cert. denied, 459 

U.S. 1216 (1983); see also Richardson v. Lucase, 741 F.2d 753, 757 

(5th Cir. 1984) (numerous motions submitted pro se indicated 

defendant's familiarity with the legal system); Wilks v. Israel, 

627 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1980) (defendant's unequivocal request 

to proceed prose must be honored), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086 

(1981). 

Willie argues that United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577 

(10th Cir. 1990), a recent tax evasion case, controls his situation. This court held in Allen that the trial court's failure to 

conduct a searching pretrial inquiry of the defendant to ensure 

that his waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made 

denied the defendant his right to counsel. However, unlike 

Willie, the defendant in Allen did not unequivocally assert his 

right to self-representation. Rather, he stated that he wished to 

obtain counsel and the trial court erroneously determined that his 

failure to retain an attorney by the commencement of trial was a 

voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. Allen did not actively 

attempt to represent himself as Willie has done. Rather, he 

submitted only a pro se motion for a continuance to permit him to 

retain an attorney and refused to put on a defense or participate 

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at trial. In addition, even in that case, this court recognized 

that the defendant cannot use his right to counsel "to play a 'cat 

and mouse' game with the court, or by ruse or stratagem 

fraudulently seek to have the trial judge placed in a position 

where, in moving along the business of the court, the judge appears to be arbitrarily depriving the defendant of counsel." 

United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d at 1578 (quoting United States v. 

McMann, 386 F.2d 611, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1968)). Such is the case 

here. 

It appears that [the defendant], by his own deliberate 

and intentional actions, seeks to insert built-in error 

in these proceedings, so as to postpone a final inquiry 

into his failure to comply with the tax laws of this 

country. . . [H]e was following the scenario used by 

other tax protesters in discharging appointed counsel 

[in this case, declining to accept appointed counsel] 

and then contending unknowing waiver of counsel. See 

United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978). 

United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981). 

"[T]here must be some limit to the defendant's ability to 

manipulate the judicial system." United States v. Gallop, 838 

F.2d at 111. Thus, even though the district court failed to make 

a comprehensive and probing formal inquiry into the knowingness 

and intelligence of Goddard's waiver, looking at the circumstances 

as a whole, the facts on the record are sufficient in this case to 

establish that Willie intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily 

waived his right to counsel. 

Willie's second argument also fails. He contends that the 

trial court erred in denying his request for replacement counsel 

without inquiring into the reasons for his dissatisfaction thereby 

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failing to ensure that he was not exercising a choice between incompetent counsel and appearing pro se. Appellant's Brief at 20 

(citing United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2593 (1990); Sanchez v. Mondragon, 858 

F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1988)). Since he has waived his right to 

counsel, he cannot now assert that the trial court erred in not 

replacing the attorney whose assistance he has waived. But even 

assuming that Willie had counsel, the trial court properly denied 

his request for replacement without inquiry. "[F]ormal inquiry is 

not essential 'where the defendant otherwise stated his reasons 

for dissatisfaction' on the record." Sanchez v. Mondragon, 858 

F.2d at 1466 (quoting United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d at 956 

n.1). Willie stated on the record that, while he did not question 

the competency or ability of his counsel, she was unacceptable 

because she "stated the goverrunent's position." Tr. at 268-69. A 

defendant does not have a right to counsel who shares his 

political beliefs or who will blindly interpret the law as he 

would like. United States v. Grosshans, 821 F.2d at 1251; United 

States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d at 956; United States v. Weninger, 

624 F.2d at 166. The choice between finishing the trial with 

admittedly competent counsel or proceeding pro se did not deny the 

defendant his right to counsel. United States v. Padilla, 819 

F.2d at 955; United States v. Grosshans, 821 F.2d at 1251. 

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III. 

EXCLUSION OF EXHIBITS 

Willie next contends that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from introducing exhibits to show the basis for his belief 

that he was not required to file tax returns. Willie argues that 

the exhibits were relevant to show the sincerity of his good faith 

belief that he need not file a tax return and thereby were 

relevant to his defense that, because of that belief, he did not 

willfully violate the tax laws. He further argues that Cheek v. 

United States, 111 s.ct. 604 (1991), requires the admission of the 

exhibits for that purpose. 

The exhibits in question include the Constitution, a History 

of Congress dated 1792, pages of the session laws, a Navajo 

Treaty, the Coinage Act of 1965, and letters from the defendant to 

the Departments of Justice and the Treasury setting forth Willie's 

contentions that the tax laws do not apply to him. All were 

denied as irrelevant and improper documents to go to the jury. We 

affirm the trial court's decision to exclude the documents 

because, due to his inadequate offer of proof, Willie has failed 

to preserve the issue for appeal and the court's ruling did not 

constitute plain error. In the alternative, we affirm the 

district court because the documents were unduly confusing to the 

jury. In the further alternative, we affirm the conviction 

because any error in excluding the evidence was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

For the trial judge to correctly assess the value of the 

submitted evidence and for us to then properly review the court's 

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exclusionary ruling, the proffering party must ensure that "the 

substance of the evidence (was) made known to the court by offer 

or (was) apparent from the context . II Fed. R. Evid. 

103(a) (2). In addition, he must "make[) known to the court 

that party's objection to the action of the court and the grounds 

therefor II Fed. R. Crim. P. 51 (emphasis added); see 

Quinones v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1170 

(10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481, 1485 

(10th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Hugh Chalmers 

Chevrolet-Toyota, Inc., 800 F.2d 737, 738 (8th Cir. 1986); United 

States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1010 (1st Cir. 1984); United 

States v. Jackson, 700 F.2d 181, 190 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 

6 U.S. 842 (1983). In the case of documentary evidence and 

exhibits, as here, the substance of the evidence was presented to 

the court and is available for our review. The question we must 

now address is whether the purpose for which the evidence was 

offered was either clear from the context or sufficiently 

explained by Willie. If so, we review the trial court's ruling 

under the abuse of discretion standard. If not, then the issue 

has not been preserved for appeal and we may reverse only for 

plain error. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2), (d). 

The problem with the type of material offered by Willie is 

that it can have both a proper and an improper purpose insofar as 

6 For a discussion of offers of proof in civil cases, see Palys 

v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, -- F.2d -- (10th Cir. 1991); Reese v. 

Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1421 (5th 

Cir. 1986) . 

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it is intended to show the offeror's belief that he need not file 

income tax returns. 11Belief 11 is a mischievous and tricky concept 

in this context. It is not a single-faceted idea, but is better 

defined as having both a normative and descriptive side. A 

normative belief is how Willie wants the law to be interpreted and 

ardently believes it should be interpreted. How he believes the 

law is constitutes a descriptive belief. Thus, while "[tax 

protesters] believe with great fervor [many] preposterous things 

... ," Coleman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 68, 

69 (7th Cir. 1986), belief in their tax-free status, no matter how 

sincerely held, is not necessarily a defense to the government's 

claim of willfulness. Rather, only a belief possessing those 

characteristics that counter the elements of willfulness is a 

valid and relevant defense. 

"Willfulness" is defined as the "voluntary, intentional 

violation of a known legal duty." Cheek v. United States, 111 

s.ct. at 610 (emphasis added). To be a relevant defense to 

willfulness, then, Willie, because of his belief or misunderstanding, must not have known he had a legal duty. Id. at 611 

(defendant must be "ignorant of his duty"). Thus, his belief must 

be descriptive -- he must believe the law does not apply to him. 

A normative belief that the law should not apply to him leaves 

Willie fully aware of his legal obligations and simply amounts to 

a disagreement with his known legal duty and a "studied conclusion 

.•. that [the law is] invalid and unenforceable." Id. at 612-

13. In Cheek, the Supreme Court stated that 11 a defendant's views 

about the validity [or constitutionality] of the tax statutes are 

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irrelevant to the issue of willfulness [and] need not be heard by 

the jury . • • • [I]t makes no difference whether the claims of 

invalidity are frivolous or have substance." Id. at 613. Thus, a 

defendant's good faith belief that he has no legal obligation to 

file and evidence showing the reasonableness of that state of mind 

is relevant. But, proof of the reasonableness of a belief that he 

should not have a duty only proves the reasonableness of the 

defendant's disagreement with the existing law and is, therefore, 

properly excluded as irrelevant. 

It is apparent that it is a delicate task to differentiate 

between a belief that the law should be different and a belief 

that the law is different. The difficulty of discerning the often 

subtle distinctions is magnified by the fact that much of the same 

evidence can be used to prove both types of belief and because the 

word "belief" itself is used loosely in describing both sides of 

the dichotomy. As a result, the precise purpose for which the 

evidence is offered becomes crucial to the trial court's 

determination of admissibility, particularly in cases of this 

nature where the careless admission of evidence supporting both 

relevant and irrelevant types of belief could easily obfuscate the 

relevant issue and tempt the jury to speculate that the mere 

existence of documentary support for the defendant's position 

negates his independent knowledge that he has a legal duty. Cf. 

Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288, 292-93 (10th Cir. 1977) 

(proof showing defective design of main tanks could easily mislead 

or confuse jury regarding relevant issue of defect in auxiliary 

tank). The defendant must, therefore, persuasively show the trial 

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judge that the evidence is being offered for a permissible purpose 

by making a proffer of great specificity regarding the type of 

belief he seeks to prove. A mere statement that the evidence is 

submitted to show sincerity of belief is not enough. Without a 

particularized explanation the trial judge will likely focus on 

the impermissible aspects of the proffered material, and will be 

unaware of the possible limited purpose available to the offering 

party. This places the trial judge in an unfair predicament with 

respect to a ruling. 

The record shows that Willie did not clearly differentiate a 

proper from an improper purpose for the proposed evidence so that 

the court could make an informed ruling. Indeed, the court's 

comments reveal Willie's failure to lay the groundwork for a 

ruling on the only proper ground. Willie offered his first 

exhibit during his testimony as follows: 

MR. WILLIE: . . . [H]ow I come to believe that I am not 

one required to file • 

• . . [W]hen I was in high school, some of my 

teachers would say, well, the constitution says this, 

and these are not taxed, but I was not sure. They tell 

me that you might go to jail for not paying your taxes 

or not filing. 

So those years, the high school years and about a 

year after that, I did file, because I was afraid if I 

was wrong in establishing that -- when I went to school, 

I had -- I read it, that Indians are not taxed. 

Now I have to firmly establish, no [sic], that I'm 

right before I do anything that would put me here, like 

where I'm at right now. 

[I]t's just research that I went through, kind of 

make me believe that I am not one required to file. I'm 

not one that's under the tax laws. 

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Okay, so when I started going into all the paperwork and stuff like that, I found out that these laws, 

what's stated on the books, are not -- you cannot just 

take them by their face. They have to go back and find 

out, what did the legislature, how -- what was their 

intention, why did they make that law. 

So after they make it, I guess a lot of people can 

say, well, this is what it says, this is what it says, 

but the original intent, what's behind it, is what I 

went after. 

Because I don't want to be wrong and some day have 

to suffer for it. So I went back into -- well, all the 

way back into the 1500's when they first started 

discovered Indians. Well, and there's documents there, 

but I don't have them with me. 

And anyway, from those I went to the Congressional 

records or the Federal convention during the time they 

were trying to write up the constitution. Okay, and 

there, there was reference to Indians not being taxed or 

not being represented in either house of Congress, or so 

and it was true. 

So I have some documents here that during my 

research I came upon, that re-establish, reaffirm those 

convictions that I had on my being an Indian not taxed. 

[Willie's Exhibit A (referring to the formation of the United 

States) excluded by the trial court as irrelevant in response to 

the prosecution's earlier objection to all of Willie's exhibits.] 

So -- and then that was -- there was -- I guess I can't 

bring it up to you, so they won't let me. Now, on -- at 

that -- in that same period when they were -- we go to 

the same convention wherein -- from the same document, 

what's in this document 

THE COURT: Mr. Willie, I'm not going to permit you to 

persist in this type of narrative. As I said, I am the 

Judge of the law, and what apparently you're trying to 

suggest or trying to tell the jury is that you found 

some law that is going to be different than what I later 

will announce to them. 

So you go on and testify about any matter you wish, 

but you're not going to be able to testify that you 

found some sort of document to support your position. 

MR. WILLIE: This is -- so anything, any discussions 

pertaining to the constitution I can't use? 

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THE COURT: That's right. 

MR. WILLIE: Okay, what about the actual laws itself? 

THE COURT: I will instruct the jury on the law that 

applies in this case. 

MR. WILLIE: Well, can I just bring out where it applies 

to me? 

THE COURT: In what fashion? 

MR. WILLIE: Well, in making me what I am, an Indian not 

taxed. 

THE COURT: I will instruct the jury on all the law applicable to any issue in this case. You go ahead and go 

on and testify as to whatever you wish. 

R. Vol. III at 261-265. Then, upon formal presentation of the 

remainder of his exhibits to the court, Willie stated only that, 

"This is my understanding of myself as an Indian not taxed." R. 

Vol. III at 271. 

As the foregoing excerpts from the record indicate, Willie 

did not clarify whether his exhibits went to prove his understanding of the law as it should be or as he actually perceives it 

to be. Certainly, the context within which Willie submitted his 

exhibits did not clearly establish which belief Willie asserted. 

Thus, there is no ruling directed at the alleged purpose for the 

evidence. Accordingly, we have no ruling to review and Willie has 

failed to preserve his claim for appeal. United States v. 

Martinez, 776 F.2d at 1485-86 ("Unless the context in which 

evidence is offered makes clear the reason for the proffer, error 

cannot be assigned to the exclusion of evidence without an offer 

proof.") (emphasis added); see Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, 

F. 2d at . --' Reese v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 

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793 F.2d 1416, 1421 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Huff v. White Motor 

Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 290 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979)); Mills v. Leyy, 537 

F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1976); cf. Quinones v. Pennsylvania General 

Ins. Co., 804 F.2d at 1170 (court unable to find abuse of discretion without proffer). Therefore, we may reverse only if we find 

plain error. 

In reviewing for plain error, we note that the "failure to 

comply with normal requirements of offers of proof is likely to 

produce a record which simply does not disclose the error." Fed. 

R. Evid. 103 advisory committee note. This case particularly 

highlights that fact. Here, where evidence is admissible for one 

purpose but inadmissible for another, absent a sufficient foundation showing the precise permissible purpose for the evidence or 

egregious circumstances not presented by this case, the judge can 

do no wrong in excluding the evidence. To hold otherwise would 

place an undue burden on the court to seek after the purpose of 

the evidence or to imagine some admissible purpose for it without 

regard to the actual state of mind, motives, and purposes of the 

proponent. Since such circumstances do not create error, they are 

even less likely to create plain error. It is difficult to 

envision manifest injustice where a clearly improper purpose for 

proffered evidence is not ruled out and a foundation showing a 

proper purpose is not laid. Thus, we do not find plain error. 

Willie argues that Cheek v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 604 

(1991), requires the admission of any evidence arguably relating 

to the objective reasonability of his belief. Appellant's 

Supplemental Brief at 5. We disagree. While the Supreme Court 

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acknowledged that the reasonableness of the defendant's belief may 

bear on the jury's determination of sincerity, the issue of admissibility of evidence was not before it. The Court held only that 

the jury should be instructed to determine the defendant's 

subjective beliefs as to the lawfulness of his actions, not that 

the trial judge must admit any and all evidence related to the 

basis of those beliefs. 7 

Willie and the dissent both make essentially a fairness argument that since, under Cheek, the government is "free to present" 

evidence of court decisions and Code provisions "to establish the 

unreasonableness of the defendant's asserted beliefs, .•. the 

defendant should be able to introduce (similar] evidence . to 

support the objective reasonableness of his beliefs .. II . . Dissenting Opinion, slip op. at 4-5. They rely on the following 

language from Cheek: 

the jury would be free to consider any admissible 

evidence . . . . showing that Cheek was aware of his 

duty to file a return • . • , including evidence showing 

his awareness of the relevant provisions of the code or 

regulations, of court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of 

the Internal Revenue Service, or of any contents of the 

personal income tax return forms and accompanying 

instructions that made it plain that wages should be 

returned as income. 

7 With regard to his letters to Treasury and Justice officials, 

Willie further argues that United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275 

(10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037 (1987), required 

their admission into evidence. However, while this court 

recognized in Harrold that the defendant's correspondence with 

senators and congressmen regarding the definition of income may 

have been relevant to the issue of willfulness, we did not 

determine that issue. Rather, our holding was based on our 

determination that, regardless of their relevance, their exclusion 

was harmless. Harrold did not hold that letters from the 

defendant to congressmen regarding his interpretations of the tax 

laws are necessarily relevant and admissible. 

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Cheek v. United States, 111 S.Ct. at 611 (emphasis added). This 

excerpt, however, does not allow the government to present the 

court decisions, regulations or statutes themselves or testimony 

regarding their contents. Rather it only indicates that the jury 

could properly consider otherwise "admis.sible evidence" that the 

defendant was "aware" of those documents and, therefore, "aware" 

of his duty to file. 

Thus, even if Willie had submitted an adequate proffer to the 

judge regarding the relevance of his belief and the evidence may 

have shown the basis for that belief, the admission of the 

exhibits would not be required under Cheek. Rather Cheek, while 

reinforcing this circuit's subjective standard in determining 

willfulness, did not abrogate other existing law regarding the 

admissibility of documentary evidence nor did it alter the trial 

court's traditional discretionary role in ruling on the admissibility of that evidence. See United States v. Hairston, 819 

F.2d 971, 973 (10th Cir. 1987) (direct testimony regarding effect 

of publications on defendant's understanding of tax law filing 

requirements more probative than publications themselves and court 

properly exercised its discretion regarding form of evidence). 

Furthermore, Cheek clearly did not require the admission of 

evidence absent compliance with procedural rules requiring an offer of proof sufficient to inform the trial judge of its purpose. 

Although our holding on inadequate proffer grounds is 

dispositive, we hold alternatively that the exhibits were properly 

excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because they were confusing, 

because the danger of the jury's misuse of the evidence for an 

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improper purpose was great, and because the relevant point was 

provable by other evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 105 advisory 

committee note ("A close relationship exists between this rule and 

Rule 403 which requires exclusion [in certain cases]. The 

wording of the present rule ••. repel[s] any implication that 

limiting or curative instructions are sufficient in all situations.") (emphasis added); Fed. R. Evid. 403. Indeed, it appears 

that the court balanced the value of the evidence against its 

potential for confusion and tendency to detract from the dignity 

of the proceedings. 8 See United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076, 

1083 (5th Cir.) (affirmed district court's exclusion of expert 

testimony as irrelevant because court had sufficiently balanced 

its value under Rule 403),,·cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985). 

Therefore, after thorough review of the record, we defer to the 

court's implicit determination that the legal documents inappropriately argue the law and tended to "make a mockery of th[e] 

courtroom," and affirm, in the alternative, on those grounds. 9 

8 The district court noted that the defendant, in his testimony 

regarding the exhibits, was "apparently ... trying to suggest or 

trying to tell the jury . . . that [he had] found some law that is 

going to be different than what [the judge would] later [] 

announce to them." R. Vol. III at 264; see id. at 265. Furthermore, in discussing the defendant's documents, the judge noted 

that although he would "allow everything within [his] power to 

permit [Willie] to put on a defense," he was "not going to have 

[Willie] make a mockery of this courtroom or of this system. Id. 

at 270. 

9 We may affirm the decision of a lower court on other grounds 

supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district 

court. Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 1988). 

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"[T]he law is given to the jury by the court and not 

introduced as evidence. . • . Obviously, it would be most confusing to a jury to have legal material introduced as evidence and 

then argued as to what the law is or ought to be. 111 ° Cooley v. 

United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1974) (excluded 

portions of Congressional Record, IRS Training Manual and Supreme 

Court opinions) (cited with approval in United States v. Harrold, 

796 F.2d 1275, 1285 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037 

(1987)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975); see United States v. 

Mann, 884 F.2d 532, 538 (10th Cir. 1989) (cases excluded because 

defendant's views more probative than their source); United States 

v. Hairston, 819 F.2d 971, 973 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing with 

approval, United States v. Kraeger, 711 F.2d 6, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1983) 

(excluded federal court decisions)); United States v. Harrold, 796 

10 The dissent attempts to distinguish Cooley v. United States 

by arguing that it was decided at a time when proof of the 

defendant's subjective intent to violate the law was not required 

and "[t]hus, it was much less important in th[at] case[] that the 

jury consider legal documents upon which the defendant purported 

to base his subjective opinion of the law." Dissenting Opinion, 

slip op. at 5-6. However, the trial court in Cooley instructed 

the jury regarding the defendant's "good faith reliance upon his 

interpretation of the law." Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d at 

1254. Furthermore, Cooley was reaffirmed in a number of later 

cases. United States v. Bergman, 813 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 852 (1987); United States v. 

Malguist, 791. F.2d 1399, 1402 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 

954 (1986); United States v. Mueller, 778 F.2d 539, 540 (9th Cir. 

1985); United States v. Kraeger, 711 F.2d 6, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1983). 

Moreover, the claim here is that the excluded documents bear 

on the sincerity of Willie's subjective beliefs because they 

demonstrate the objective reasonability of those beliefs. Thus, 

under this rationale, the admission of such documents would have 

been of equal, if not greater, importance in cases decided under 

an objective standard, where the reasonableness of the defendant's 

belief directly answered the question of willfulness, than in 

cases decided under the subjective standard employed today. 

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F.2d 1275, 1285 (10th Cir. 1986) (excluded Supreme Court 

opinions), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037 (1987); United States v. 

Mueller, 778 F.2d 539, 540 (9th Cir. 1985) (excluded Supreme Court 

opinions); see also Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 810 (10th Cir. 

1988) ("In no instance can a witness be permitted to define the 

law of the case.") (en bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989). 

The law is the singular province of the judge. Juries only decide 

facts, to which they apply the law given to them by the judge. 

See United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d at 1083 ("judge is the jury's 

sole source of information regarding the law"). They may not 

decide what the law is and should not be given the opportunity to 

do so. See Johnson v. Colt Ind. Operating Corp., 797 F.2d 1530, 

1534 (10th Cir. 1986) (high potential that jury will be confused 

as to proper weight to give legal evidence and might assume that 

law presented is entitled to as much weight as the trial court's 

instructions since both emanate from courts). 

The introduction of the Constitution or other historical 

documents as evidence, although facially attractive, argues the 

law as forcefully and is as confusing to a jury as more obviously 

interpretive and argumentative writings from seminars, books and 

cases.

11 When viewed in a vacuum, the Constitution and other 

11 The dissent makes much of the fact that many of the exhibits 

submitted were historical or official legal documents. However, 

that fact does not render them immune to exclusion for relevancy. 

See United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d at 1285 (citing with 

approval, Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d at 1253-54 (court did 

not abuse its discretion in excluding Congressional Record, IRS 

Training Manual and Supreme Court opinions)); United States v. 

Bergman, 813 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir.) (excluded Constitution, 

Declaration of Independence, Internal Revenue Code and cases 

against IRS), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 852 (1987); United States v. 

[footnote continued] 

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historical documents merely set forth broad principles of 

governance -- the law in its raw form. However, "[m]any words [in 

the Constitution] acquire meaning through judicial and administrative construction over the years II Coleman v. Commissioner 

of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d at 71. 12 Presentation of the 

historical language of these documents in the context of a trial 

and as support for the defendant's beliefs fails adequately to 

account for this evolution and tends instead to argue, as law, the 

defendant's own interpretation of the historical documents. 

Willie's letters to government officials more expressly set forth 

and argued his version of the law as formed from reading these 

documents and may be equally confusing to the jury. See Johnson 

v. Colt Ind. Operating Corp. 797 F.2d at 1534 (a finding that 

evidence is relevant "does not validate the form in which that 

evidence was admitted")· 

Furthermore, the admission of legal evidence by one party 

opens the door to refuting evidence by the other. Thus, upon 

admission of the documents to show the reasonableness of Willie's 

belief, the government would then seek to introduce contradictory 

case law and historical documents to prove the unreasonableness 

and insincerity of the defendant's belief. 13 See Specht v. 

[footnote continued] 

Malquist, 791 F.2d 1399, 1402 (9th Cir.) (excluded Constitution, 

Declaration of Independence and federal cases), cert. denied, 479 

u.s. 954 (1986). 

12 Thus, for instance, in a prosecution for crying fire in a 

crowded theatre, the defendant's attempt to introduce the First 

Amendment into evidence would be improper. 

13 The dissent's evenhandedness argument, we assume, applies 

both ways. 

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Jensen, 853 F.2d at 809. "The potential is great that jurors will 

be confused by these differing opinions, and that confusion may be 

compounded by different instructions given by the court." Id. 

We acknowledge that this is a difficult issue because of the 

line-drawing it requires. However, it does not become less so 

under the theory of the dissent. While the dissent argues that 

this evidence should be admitted, it does not provide any meaningful direction in drawing the line further down the slippery slope. 

Thus, if a defendant, under the accumulated weight of material 

presented at a two-week seminar, comes to believe that he has no 

duty to file, where would the dissent have us draw a line as to 

that seminar material? Would we admit only the first three days 

of material? Twenty-five percent of all written material? All of 

the argumentative interpretations of speakers? The dissent 

states, "To the extent that [the documents] could be interpreted 

(albeit erroneously) as support for [the defendant's] views, it 

seems to me that they tend to corroborate the sincerity of his 

beliefs," Dissenting Opinion, slip op. at 2, indicating that any 

evidence that goes to show the basis of the defendant's beliefs, 

however "dubious," should be admitted, id. at 4. Under that 

theory, would not the entire two-week seminar be admissible? Yet, 

it is difficult to believe that even the dissent would countenance 

placing an entire tax "education" seminar before the jury. The 

dissent attempts to draw a distinction between "argumentative 

legal tracts" and "documents with official, historic, or 

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precedential status. 1114 Id. at 5 n.2. However, the line between 

the two is not as clear as it first appears since, as discussed 

above, historical or official documents submitted to the jury in 

the trial context are as argumentative and confusing as legal 

briefs. Furthermore, under the dissent's argument, the seminar 

materials would be as relevant and probative of the defendant's 

state of mind as the Constitution. To exclude certain types of 

documents as irrelevant to sincerity of belief but admit others 

for the same purpose seems, at best, inconsistent and, at worst, 

unfair. Since line-drawing has to be done, although difficult, 

the trial judge should be allowed to draw the line designated 

here. We see no principled distinction between the evidence 

offered in this case and other evidence that may be submitted to 

show the defendant's basis for his belief. 

In the end, the admission of exhibits is, and should be, a 

discretionary judgment call by the trial judge as the rules of 

evidence provide. Thus, even if some of the documents here were 

relevant, we would affirm the district court's exclusion because 

the documents were unduly confusing. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

Finally, as a further alternative holding, even were we to 

find that Willie's offer of proof was sufficient and that the 

judge abused his discretion in excluding the evidence, the error, 

if any, was harmless. Willie had ample opportunity to submit the 

substance of his good faith theory to the jury and to prove he was 

14 To support its proposition, the dissent cites to United 

States v. Fingado, -- F.2d -- (10th Cir. 1990). However, Fingado 

does not seem to clarify the line proposed by the dissent since, 

in that case, the district court admitted a packet of seminar 

material but excluded testimony regarding a civil case. 

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unaware of his legal duty to file. He was free to testify about 

his communications with the IRS and other government agencies, 15 

his subjective beliefs in regard to his understanding of the law, 

the extent of his research into the tax laws and the effect of his 

investigation on his beliefs. He was not cut off, in either his 

d . t t t' h' 1 . t. 16 f . irec es imony or is c osing argumen , rom pursuing or arguing his true perceptions as to his personal obligations under the 

15 In arguing for the admissibility of the letters, the dissent 

points out that since the government sought to prove Willie's 

insincerity by showing his prior inconsistent treatment of filing, 

the defendant should, conversely, be allowed to establish his 

sincerity by showing his consistent written assertion of his 

misunderstanding to government agencies. Dissenting Opinion, slip 

op. at 3-4. 

We note first that it is far from clear that the government's 

evidence of prior filing was offered to show Willie's insincerity 

of belief rather than to show his apparent awareness of his duty 

to file, despite his firmly held conviction that he should not. 

But even if offered to show sincerity, Willie had adequate opportunity to establish that he had acted consistently with his 

professed belief in cross-examining the government witnesses about 

his conversations with them and testifying himself regarding his 

conversations and correspondence with the IRS. The trial court 

was not required to admit the letters themselves, particularly 

when the essence of the correspondence could have been presented 

to the jury through testimonial evidence. See United States v. 

Hairston, 819 F.2d at 973. That Willie may not have effectively 

utilized the other methods of proof available to him does not 

render the trial court's decision erroneous. 

16 Willie's direct testimony and exchange with the judge is 

quoted above. His closing argument is as follows: 

MR. WILLIE: 

So I started researching, and all that research has 

been denied into evidence, so now all I have is just the 

small testimony that I gave you, so I have nothing in 

the records to present to you, but just based on that 

testimony I gave you, saying that I am an Indian not 

taxed, as what is a right. 

It's not just something I dreamed up or anything. 

I went through it, I went behind what the intent of 

[footnote continued] 

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tax laws. See United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d at 1284 

(defendant testified in detail about his beliefs and awareness of 

his obligations, how he studied for years and that he looked at 

Supreme Court decisions, not about the contents of the documents); 

Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d at 1254 (defendant allowed to 

testify about conversations with IRS and about his understanding 

of the law). That Willie was unable to embellish upon his 

arguments or present his case to the extent and in the form he 

desired is not prejudicial where, as here, he was not prevented 

from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury. 

IV. 

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE DISQUALIFYING NATIVE AMERICAN JUROR 

Willie argues that the prosecutor improperly exercised one of 

its peremptory challenges to disqualify one of two Native 

Americans on the jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 

79 (1986). He claims that he established a prima facie case of 

[footnote continued] 

those documents were, and what it showed me was that the 

people that came from overseas, they intended to abide 

by a pri.nciple that they established, that my property 

was not to be taken without my consent, period. 

That's what it says. So that's why in those 

statutes that you'll see the words, Indians not taxed. 

Now, that's where I fit, my status, and that's all I 

have to show you. 

And based on that, I think I do have a right to an 

acquittal, so they did not prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that I am one required to file. 

R. Vol. III at 296-97. 

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racial discrimination and that the prosecution inadequately 

explained its reasons for disqualification. We disagree. 

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court 

prohibited the government from using its peremptory challenges to 

remove members of the venire based on race. To prevail under 

Batson, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of 

purposeful discrimination by showing: first, that he is a member 

of a cognizable racial group; second, that the prosecutor has 

exercised peremptory challenges to remove venire members of his 

race; and third, that "these facts and any other relevant 

circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used [his 

peremptory challenges] to exclude the veniremen from the petit 

jury on account of their race. 1117 Id. at 96-97. Only after the 

defendant has established a prima facie case does the burden shift 

to the prosecution to make a "clear and reasonably specific" 

explanation for challenging the minority juror. Id. 

Willie, as a Native American, is a member of a recognizable 

racial group, United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 795 (10th 

Cir. 1990), and Grace White, the potential juror removed by the 

prosecution, is also a Native American. However, Willie has 

pointed to nothing in the record, other than White's removal, from 

which to infer that the government's use of its peremptory challenge was racially motivated. The mere fact that the prosecution 

removed one of two Native American venirepersons does not 

17 "[T]he defendant is entitled to rely on the fact •.. that 

peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that 

permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to 

discriminate.'" United States v. Batson, 479 U.S. at 96 (quoting 

Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). 

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establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. United 

States v. Lewis, 892 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1989). 

In making out a prima facie case, "the defendant must 

point to more than the bare fact of the removal of 

certain venirepersons and the absence of an obvious 

valid reason for the removal. . . . The defendant must 

identify facts and circumstances that support the inference of discrimination, such as a pattern of discriminatory strikes, the prosecutor's statements during voir 

dire suggesting discriminatory purpose, or the fact that 

white persons were chosen for the petit jury who seemed 

to have the same qualities as stricken black 

venirepersons." 

United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531, 1538 (11th Cir.) (quoting 

United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 179 (8th Cir. 1990)), 

reh'g denied, 920 F.2d 13 (1990) (en bane); see also United States 

v. Dawn, 897 F.2d 1444, 1448 (defendant obligated to develop 

record, beyond mere numbers, in support of alleged violation), 

reh'g denied, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 7961 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 

111 S.Ct. 389 (1990). Willie has presented no such facts. 

Indeed, the fact that the prosecution exercised only four of its 

six peremptory challenges undercuts an inference of discrimination 

since the government, if it had chosen, could have excluded Tom 

Nez from the jury as well. United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484, 

486 n.5 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d at 

1537. And the prosecution voluntarily stated that the reason it 

sought to remove White from the jury was on account of her occupation, not her race. 18 Tr. at 20. 

18 While this explanation may not be sufficient to withstand 

scrutiny had Willie established a prima facie case requiring an 

explanation, it lends additional support to our conclusion that 

Willie has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. 

See United States v. Dawn, 897 F.2d at 1449 n.5. 

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Since Willie has not established a prima f acie case of a 

Batson violation, we need not address the adequacy of the 

government's explanation for its use of its peremptory challenge. 

v. 

NOTICE OF OFFENSE CHARGED 

Willie claims in his supplemental, pro se brief, that he was 

not sufficiently informed of the elements of his offense. We disagree. An information need only plead those facts and elements of 

the offense charged sufficient to inform the defendant of the 

charges against him to enable him to prepare a defense and to 

safeguard him from double jeopardy. Hamling v. United States, 418 

U.S. 87, 117, reh'g deniedj 419 U.S. 885 (1974)~ United States v. 

Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 790 (10th Cir. 1990). Willie does not 

argue that he was surprised or unduly prejudiced by the alleged 

deficiency of the information. Apparently, he just disagrees with 

the government's definition of the terms "income" and "required." 

The definition of these "legal term[s] of art" are sufficiently 

definite in legal meaning to give notice of the charge to the 

defendant. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 118. Since 

the information complied with legal standards, Willie's mere 

disagreement with the meaning of its terms does not render it 

defective. 

VI. 

JURISDICTION OVER NATIVE AMERICANS 

Willie also seems to contend, pro se, that the federal courts 

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do not have jurisdiction to prosecute Native Americans for failure 

to pay income taxes. Willie claims that federal income tax laws 

cannot apply to Native Americans, relying on a quote from the 

United States Constitution stating, "Indians not taxed." However, 

he misinterprets this phrase. It relates solely to state taxation 

and does not restrict the federal government's ability to levy 

income tax. Dillon v. United States, 792 F.2d 849, 852 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (citing Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956)), cert. 

denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987). It has long been established that 

"Indians are citizens and that in ordinary affairs of life, not 

governed by treaties or remedial legislation, they are subject to 

the payment of income taxes as are other citizens." Squire v. 

Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956); see Hoptowit v. Commissioner, 709 

F.2d 564, 565 (9th Cir. 1983). "To be tax exempt, the income must 

have been derived 'directly' from the [tax-exempt] land." 

Saunooke v. United States, 806 F.2d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 

see Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. at 9; Hoptowit v. Commissioner, 

709 F.2d 564; United States v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 

1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981). The income earned by 

Willie during the years in question was earned by way of employment in places far from the Indian Reservation and was not derived 

in any way from Indian trust lands. Nor has Willie claimed this 

exemption. Thus, his income is subject to taxation and he may be 

prosecuted by federal courts. 

We have carefully reviewed the remaining claims brought pro 

se by Willie and reject them as frivolous and without support in 

the record. 

Based on the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 34 
90-2028 & 90-2041, U.S.A. v. Willie 

EBEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

Although in all other respects I join the majority opinion in 

this case, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's 

conclusions in Section III -- EXCLUSION OF EXHIBITS. My 

disagreement with the majority is not so much with the general 

legal principles which are set forth there with admirable clarity 

as it is with the application of the law to these facts. However, 

because I believe the district court erred in excluding many of 

the exhibits tendered by the defendant, and because I further 

believe that the government has not established that such error 

was harmless, I would reverse the judgment below and remand for a 

new trial. 

The excluded documents consist of copies of the Constitution, 

session laws, legislative history, and Indian treaties, as well as 

letters from defendant to the Treasury Department and the 

Department of Justice which apparently pre-dated the criminal 

prosecution and in which the defendant set forth his understanding 

of his tax obligations. The documents seem to be directed toward 

three themes: 1) paper money is not legal tender, 2) private 

wages are not taxable income, and 3) Indians (such as defendant) 

are not taxed. However, defendant tendered the exhibits only in 

support of his argument that Indians are not taxed. Exhibits A, 

B, E, G, H, J, and M are documents he apparently reviewed and 

relied upon in reaching his conclusion that as an Indian he is not 

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 35 
subject to taxation. 1 To the extent that these particular 

documents could be interpreted (albeit erroneously) as support for 

his views, it seems to me that they tend to corroborate the 

sincerity of his beliefs. The defendant's three letters to the 

Treasury Department and Justice Department (Exhibits N, O, and Q) 

tend to corroborate the sincerity of his beliefs because he relied 

upon the argument that he could not be taxed as an Indian in his 

communications with the enforcement authorities before the 

criminal prosecution ever began. 

In Cheek v. United States, ~- U.S. ~-' 111 S. Ct. 604 

(1990), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant 

cannot be convicted of willfully failing to file a tax return 

under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 except upon proof that (1) the defendant 

knew of his duty to file a return covering the income in question 

and (2) he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. Id. 

at 611. The Court stressed the subjective nature of the test when 

it concluded: 

1 

[I]f [defendant] asserted that he truly 

believed that the Internal Revenue Code did 

not purport to treat wages as income, and the 

jury believed him, the government would not 

have carried its burden to prove willfulness, 

however unreasonable a court might deem such a 

belief. 

Exhibit K appears to relate only to Cherokee Indians, and it 

was properly excluded on grounds of irrelevancy. Exhibit L is an 

unidentified document, and it was properly excluded for lack of 

identification and foundation. Exhibits C, F, and I appear not to 

relate to his argument that Indians are not taxed, and 

consequently they were also properly excluded as irrelevant. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 36 
Of course, subjective intent is rarely proved by direct 

evidence. Rather, it must almost always be established by 

indirect or circumstantial evidence. Thus, in attempting to 

discern the defendant's subjective intent, a fact-finder will 

often be required to look to the following: (1) the consistency 

of defendant's past conduct and positions taken, (United States v. 

Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 1986)); (2) the research 

and information upon which the defendant has predicated his 

opinion, (United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 876 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980) ("reliance on advice of counsel 

in tax evasion cases is not a complete defense, but only a 

circumstance indicating good faith which the trier of fact is 

allowed to consider on the ·issue of willfulness")); and (3) the 

objective reasonableness of defendant's beliefs (United States v. 

Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 622 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States 

v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532, 537 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989) ("Although not 

itself the standard by which to evaluate good faith, the 

reasonableness of a good-faith defense is a factor which the jury 

may properly consider in determining whether a defendant's 

asserted beliefs are genuinely held.")). 

In this case, the government asserted the lack of consistency 

on the defendant's part as proof of his lack of sincerity in 

believing the tax laws do not apply to him. Specifically, the 

government argued that defendant's previous filing of tax returns 

and numerous bogus exemptions tended to disprove defendant's claim 

that he believed the tax laws did not apply to him. The 

corollary, it seems to me, should be equally valid. To the extent 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 37 
that the defendant has previously asserted to the taxing 

authorities that the tax laws do not apply to him and has advanced 

the same arguments he is now relying upon, that prior public 

profession of his belief is evidence of the sincerity of that 

point of view. Thus, his three letters to the Justice Department 

and Treasury Department seem to me to be relevant evidence. 

Similarly, the government introduced evidence that it had 

previously advised Willie of his filing obligations as the 

government has construed the law. Once again, the corollary, it 

seems to me, is that if there is evidence in the Constitution, 

statutes, legislative history, or the like, of which this 

defendant was historically aware and upon which he claims to have 

relied in formulating his tax views, such material would also seem 

relevant to the sincerity of defendant's views. Although many of 

the exhibits tendered are of dubious support for defendant's 

views, I can see a nexus, and defendant should have been allowed 

the opportunity to establish that nexus with the jury. 

Finally, as the Court noted in Cheek, the government was free 

to present to the jury evidence of "relevant provisions of the 

Code or regulations, of court decisions rejecting [a defendant's] 

interpretations of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of the 

Internal Revenue Service, or of any contents of the personal 

income tax return forms and accompanying instructions" to 

establish the unreasonableness of the defendant's asserted beliefs 

as a basis for evaluating the defendant's subjective beliefs. 

Cheek, 111 s. Ct. at 611-12. It therefore seems clear that the 

defendant should be able to introduce evidence of statutory 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 38 
provisions, legislative history, and similar official documents to 

support the objective reasonableness of his beliefs as evidence 

that such beliefs are sincerely held. It hardly seems to comport 

with due process and square-corner turning to allow the government 

to introduce such legal documents when it aids in securing a 

conviction but to deny the defendant use of similar documents when 

they might be helpful to the defense. See Collins, 920 F.2d at 

622; Mann, 884 F.2d at 537 n.3. 

The government advances several cases for the proposition 

that the trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to 

admit treatises, tracts, briefs and opinions of laymen regarding 

matters of law. United States v. Afflerbach, 547 F.2d 522, 524 

(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977); Cooley v. 

United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. 

denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975). See also United States v. Hairston, 

819 F.2d 971, 973 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Harrold, 796 

F.2d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037 

(1987). Aside from the fact that that proposition is not 

applicable to most of the exhibits excluded, 2 in my opinion, none 

of those cases stand for that absolute proposition. In Afflerbach 

2 Only exhibit L appears to be a legal tract, brief or treatise, 

and I would affirm the exclusion of that exhibit on grounds of 

lack of foundation. The other "legal" documents are statutes, 

constitutional provisions, treaties, legislative history and 

similar legal documents of historic or official significance. I 

would draw a distinction between argumentative legal tracts and 

material advocating a particular legal point of view, which may be 

little more than legal briefs that would not ordinarily be 

submitted to a jury, and documents with official, historic, or 

precedential status such as constitutional provisions, statutes, 

and legislative histories. Compare the exhibits that the district 

court received with those rejected in United States v. Fingado, 

No. 89-2318 (10th Cir. 1991). 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 39 
and Cooley, the prevailing law at the time did not require the 

government to prove that the defendant had a subjective intent to 

violate the law. Thus, it was much less important in those cases 

that the jury consider legal documents upon which the defendant 

purported to base his subjective opinion of the law. In Hairston, 

the court approved the exclusion of the tendered documents because 

extensive oral testimony about those documents was sufficient. In 

Harrold, the Tenth Circuit actually found that it was error to 

exclude letters the defendant had previously written to the taxing 

authorities, but it affirmed the conviction on the ground of 

harmless error. 

Here I do not think the government has carried its burden of 

establishing that any error in excluding these documents should be 

regarded as harmless error. Contrary to the situation in 

Hairston, this is not a case where the defendant was able to get 

in through his own testimony the substance of all the excluded 

documents. The defendant took the stand and began to testify 

about his evolving belief that he is not subject to tax because he 

is an Indian. He indicated that he had begun by researching early 

Congressional and Constitutional records, and at that point he 

began to turn to his various tendered exhibits to show what it was 

that he reviewed and to establish how that research reaffirmed his 

beliefs. 3 When he attempted to introduce Exhibit A as the first 

3 In his opening statement, defendant stated: 

All these years I've been trying to find out [whether 

Indians are taxed]. I did not hide from the Internal 

Revenue Service. I wrote letters to them, I appeared at 

their offices .... And further, because I wasn't 

[Footnote can't . ] 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 40 
of those documents, the court rejected that Exhibit on the ground 

of relevancy. The defendant then apparently attempted to resort 

to narrative testimony to explain the content of his research, but 

the court cut him off from that effort as well. The court stated: 

Mr. Willie, I am not going to permit you 

to persist in this type of narrative. As I 

said, I am the judge of the law, and what 

[ ... footnote can't) 

getting answers from them, I went to the Justice 

Department. 

R. Vol. II at 40-41. Similarly, on direct examination defendant 

set about presenting "how I came to believe that I am not one 

required to file." R. Vol. III at 261. Referring to the exhibits 

cited above, defendant stated: 

So, I have some documents here that during my research I 

came upon, that re-establish, reaffirm those convictions 

that I had on my being an Indian not taxed. 

R. Vol. III, p. 273. In introducing his exhibits to the trial 

court, defendant stated: "I'm going to submit these. This is my 

understanding of myself as an Indian not taxed •.•. " R. Vol. 

III at 271. In his closing argument, defendant again asserted his 

good-faith defense: 

So I started researching, and all that research has been 

denied into evidence, so now all I have is just the 

small testimony that I gave you . . . saying that I am 

an Indian not taxed .... It's not just something I 

dreamed up or anything. I went through it, I went 

behind what the intent of those documents were . . . . So that's why in those statutes you'll see the words, 

"Indians not taxed." Now, that's where I fit, my 

status, and that's all I have to show you. 

R. Vol. III at 297. Defendant's proposed jury instruction, which 

was rejected by the court, also demonstrated defendant's assertion 

of the good-faith defense: 

You are instructed that if you find from all the 

evidence the defendant acted in good faith and believed 

that he was not required to file returns . . . because 

of his belief that he is an Indian not taxed pursuant to 

the Constitution of the United States . . . [you must 

find defendant not guilty.) 

[Footnote can't ... ] 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 41 
apparently you're trying to suggest, or trying 

to tell the jury, is that you found some law 

that is going to be different than what I 

later will announce to them. 

So you go on and testify about any matter 

you wish, but you're not going to be able to 

testify that you found some sort of document 

to support your position. 

The fair reading of the court's ruling is that the court was 

not going to allow the defendant to engage in any discussions 

pertaining to the Constitution or the actual laws or legislative 

history upon which he relied. See R. Vol. III at 268, 270-271. 

This is confirmed by the court's ruling, immediately thereafter, 

that none of .the exhibits could be introduced because they were 

irrelevant. Thus, this case should be contrasted with Harrold and 

Mann, where the defendant was able to testify about the substance 

of the excluded exhibits. 

The government has the burden of proving that error is 

harmless. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 n.4 (10th 

Cir. 1990) ("Except possibly for minor technical errors for which 

there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict could have 

been affected, the government ordinarily has the burden of proving 

that a non-constitutional error was harmless."). See also United 

States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1255 n.15 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Here, the nature of the defendant's subjective intent was hotly 

contested; indeed, it was about the only contested factual issue 

in the case. When the defendant sought to bolster the sincerity 

of his asserted subjective beliefs by showing that he had 

[ •.. footnote can't] 

R. Vol. III at 281. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 42 
previously and publicly asserted those views to the taxing 

authorities and by showing the objective research and historic 

legal authorities upon which he had relied in formulating his 

subjective views, the court rejected that evidence. 4 Thus, the 

defendant was left with little more than his naked and conclusory 

statements that he had researched the law and that research had 

lead him to a belief that he was not subject to the tax laws of 

the United States because he was an Indian. Generalities are 

seldom a match for specifics, and thus I cannot conclude that it 

was harmless error to deny the jury access to the specific 

evidence tendered by the defendant to corroborate the sincerity of 

his views. 

Although the defendant is, in fact, wrong in his view that 

Indians are exempt from all federal income taxes, it is far from 

clear on this record that he did not hold his beliefs sincerely. 

On this record, I cannot conclude that the jury would not have 

come out differently if it had been able to consider these 

exhibits to corroborate the sincerity of the defendant's proffered 

views. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 

[ ... footnote con't] 

4 To the extent that the district court worried that the 

documents might confuse the jury about the law, that problem seems 

overstated and, in any event, easily cured. The government made 

it abundantly clear that it interprets those legal authorities 

differently from the defendant and that it would therefore be up 

to the court to instruct the jury as to how the law should, in 

fact, be interpreted. In any event, it would have been relatively 

simple for the judge to instruct the jury that these exhibits 

could be considered only on the issue of sincerity and genuineness 

[Footnote con't •.• ] 

-9-

Appellate Case: 90-2028 Document: 01019667161 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 43 
( •.. footnote can't] 

of defendant's subjective beliefs and not as accurate statements 

of the law. 

-10-

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