Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-11008/USCOURTS-ca11-15-11008-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Dean Partin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-11008

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-00188-MHT-SRW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CHARLES DEAN PARTIN,

 Defendant – Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________

(December 16, 2015)

Before HULL, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Charles Partin appeals his convictions and 292-month sentence for one count 

of transportation of a stolen vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312, and two 

counts of transportation of a minor with the intent to engage in criminal sexual 

activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Mr. Partin raises four issues on 

appeal. First, he argues that the district court erred by admitting his pre-Miranda 

statements made to park rangers. Second, he asserts that the district court abused 

its discretion by admitting DNA evidence that showed he was the father of the 

child of the victim A.L. Third, he contends that the district court incorrectly 

denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. And finally, he claims that the district 

court erred by applying a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. After 

a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.

I

A

On September 3, 2012, at around 5:00 p.m., Officer Jeremy Morrison, a park 

ranger in Hamilton County, Tennessee, received a report from a park employee of 

what he believed to be a minor female performing oral sex on an adult male in a 

vehicle at a remote campsite area. Officer Morrison, along with Officer 

Christopher Baxter and Shannon McDonald, went out to locate the vehicle and 

campsite identified by the employee.

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Upon arriving at the campsite, Officer Morrison found Mr. Partin and A.L., 

the victim, sitting in the vehicle described by the employee, watching a movie. 

Officer Morrison approached the vehicle, identified himself, explained why he had 

come to their campsite, and asked for their identification and A.L.’s age. Both Mr. 

Partin and A.L. responded that they had not been engaging in oral sex, and Mr. 

Partin stated, “[S]he doesn’t do that. I can’t get her to do that.” D.E. 106 at 6. Mr. 

Partin gave Officer Morrison his identification. Both Mr. Partin and A.L. said that 

she was 18, but A.L. did not have any identification. 

Officer Morrison asked A.L. to step out of the vehicle and walk up the hill 

with him so that he could get her information to verify her identity. While Officer 

Morrison took A.L. up to the patrol car where Officer McDonald was waiting, 

Officer Baxter stayed with Mr. Partin. At first, A.L. gave Officer Morrison a false 

date of birth, and he was unable to verify her identity. Eventually, however, she 

admitted that she was only 15 years old and that Mr. Partin was her step-father. 

When Officer Morrison returned to the vehicle, Mr. Partin maintained that A.L. 

was 18, that she was a friend of the family and his babysitter, and that they were at 

the park on vacation.

Officer Morrison went back to A.L. and asked her for her legal guardian. 

A.L. provided her mother’s name but said that she did not have her phone number. 

She told Officer Morrison that he would have to contact another person, whose 

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number was in Mr. Partin’s phone, to get in touch with her mother. While 

speaking with A.L., Officer Morrison learned that she was pregnant and that she 

and Mr. Partin had come to the park because they were running from the Alabama 

Department of Human Resources.

Once Officer Morrison learned how to reach A.L.’s mother, he returned to 

the vehicle and told Mr. Partin that A.L.’s legal guardian would need to be 

contacted. Mr. Partin asked why A.L.’s legal guardian would need to be contacted 

if A.L. was 18, but ultimately agreed to give Officer Morrison his phone. After 

Officer Morrison retrieved the contact information, he placed the phone on the 

hood of Mr. Partin’s car, where Mr. Partin was sitting. Mr. Partin, up to this point, 

was not restrained. 

Officer Morrison asked Mr. Partin for consent to search the vehicle and the 

two tents next to the vehicle at the campsite. Mr. Partin signed a consent to search 

form. In one tent, Officer Morrison found a laundry hamper, and in the second tent 

he found male and female clothing, a bed made out of blankets, and wet towels. 

Officer Morrison did not remove any of the items from the tent. In Mr. Partin’s 

vehicle, Officer Morrison found a sex toy in a flute case. Mr. Partin claimed that it 

belonged to A.L. and was not his. 

Shortly after Officer Morrison began the search, Mr. Partin became upset, 

and began to collect the items from his campsite as if he was getting ready to leave. 

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At that point, Officer Morrison was worried that Mr. Partin was moving and 

potentially destroying evidence, and explained to Mr. Partin that he was going to 

be detained. At 7:04 p.m., almost two hours after Officer Morrison arrived at the 

campsite, Mr. Partin was patted down and handcuffed. While Mr. Partin was 

detained, no investigatory actions were taken. Officer Morrison contacted the 

Sherriff’s Office, and Detective Greg Carson, a child abuse detective, responded to 

the scene. At this time Detective Carson read Mr. Partin his Miranda rights and 

took off Mr. Partin’s handcuffs.

Officer Morrison heard Detective Carson go over the Miranda rights with 

Mr. Partin, saw Mr. Partin sign a waiver of rights form, and heard Mr. Partin

indicate that he understood his rights. At no point did Officer Morrison hear Mr. 

Partin request an attorney or state that he did not want to answer any questions. 

Mr. Partin was handcuffed again and transported to the police station. 

After her return to Alabama, A.L. was taken to a medical center by an 

Alabama Department of Human Resources official for an ultrasound. While she 

was filling out paperwork, Mr. Partin approached A.L., ordered her to leave with 

him, grabbed her by the wrist, and pulled her down the stairs. A.L. left with Mr. 

Partin, got in a van that her mother was driving, and subsequently switched into a 

second van. Mr. Partin told A.L. that he and A.L.’s mother had stolen the second 

van from an auto dealership. They retrieved A.L.’s siblings and began driving 

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towards Mexico to avoid the Amber Alert that they believed would go out when it 

was discovered A.L. was gone. On the drive to Mexico, Mr. Partin and A.L. had 

sexual intercourse several times, and she performed oral sex on Mr. Partin.

Eventually, Mr. Partin and A.L.’s mother decided not to continue on to 

Mexico, and instead drove to Ohio. While in Ohio, Mr. Partin had sexual 

intercourse and oral sex with A.L. before the FBI eventually found them and 

arrested Mr. Partin. 

B

Prior to trial, Mr. Partin filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to 

the park rangers before he was read his Miranda rights. The magistrate judge 

recommended denying the motion to suppress and concluded that Mr. Partin was 

not the subject of a Terry stop, but rather a consensual police-citizen encounter. 

The magistrate judge alternatively found that even if Mr. Partin were deemed to be 

the subject of a Terry stop, the officers had “a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting criminal activity, both at the time the rangers initially approached the 

vehicle and afterward.” D.E. 146 at 10.

The magistrate judge also concluded that Mr. Partin was not effectively in 

custody during the encounter with the officers. As a result, the officers were not 

required to give him Miranda warnings. 

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First, the magistrate judge found that there was no restraint to the degree 

associated with formal arrest because there was no evidence that the officers 

blocked the campsite to prevent Mr. Partin from leaving, that they threatened or 

touched him, or indicated that he was forced to comply. The magistrate judge 

found that the tone of the encounter was generally calm and cooperative and that

Mr. Partin freely consented to searches and willingly answered questions. In the 

magistrate judge’s view, this was not the highly intrusive coercive atmosphere that 

would require Miranda warnings.

Second, the scope of the investigatory stop was not exceeded, and thus, did 

not mature into an arrest requiring probable cause as well as Miranda warnings 

prior to questioning. In applying a four-factor test, the magistrate judge concluded 

that (1) that the officers’ investigative techniques were quick, with minimum 

interference; (2) nothing in the record indicated that the officers were less than 

prompt in carrying out their investigation; (3) an officer’s instruction to Mr. Partin 

that he remain by his car was not overly intrusive, but rather was reasonable in 

light of the circumstances; and (4) although two hours is longer than the average 

Terry stop, in this scenerio the officers were diligent and the total amount was 

reasonable in relation to the purpose of the stop and the necessary scope of the 

investigation.

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The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and denied Mr. 

Partin’s motion to suppress. 

C

Before trial, the government filed a motion in limine stating that it would 

seek to introduce evidence of Mr. Partin’s motive and intent, including testimony 

of analysts who would testify as to two matters: the results of the DNA analysis 

performed on A.L.’s underwear found at the campsite (which contained Mr. 

Partin’s semen); and the analysis performed regarding the paternity of A.L.’s baby

(which showed that Mr. Partin was the father). Mr. Partin argued that the 

government should be prohibited from introducing any evidence concerning his 

sexual relationship with A.L. before the events alleged in the indictment, as well as 

any evidence concerning the paternity of A.L.’s baby. Mr. Partin argued that the 

evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and 404. Mr. 

Partin further argued that it was not until the paternity test results were revealed, 

which was after the indictment was issued, that he learned he was likely the father 

of the child. He alleged that he believed a person named “Eric” was the father of 

the child. Therefore, he continued, at the time of the trip to Tennessee and the 

subsequent trip to Ohio, the paternity test results were irrelevant because the 

elements of the charge were his intent and motive at the time of the trip. 

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The district court ruled that evidence as to prior sexual encounters between 

A.L. and Mr. Partin was admissible, but reserved ruling on the admissibility of the 

paternity test results until after A.L. testified. The district court instructed the 

government to not go into the DNA evidence during opening statements or during 

direct examination. 

At trial, after the government had presented A.L.’s testimony on direct

examination—during which A.L. testified that she and Mr. Partin had sex in 

Tennessee and Ohio—Mr. Partin claimed that the government “ha[d] opened the 

door” on the matter of A.L’s past sexual partners and the possible paternity of her 

child. Accordingly, Mr. Partin argued that cross-examination in this area was 

appropriate. The district court warned Mr. Partin that if his intention was to show 

that there existed a person named “Eric” that could have been the father of the 

child, then “the DNA probably definitely comes in to show that Eric is not the 

father of this child.” D.E. 297 at 54. During cross-examination, Mr. Partin 

questioned A.L. about Eric. Subsequently, the district court ruled that the DNA

paternity evidence was admissible: “[T]he probative value is pretty overwhelming 

for two reasons. Number one is it refutes your implied contention that she’s lying. 

Secondly, the DNA test shows that in fact he was the father, so there’s no prejudice 

at all.” Id. at 69.

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At the close of the government’s case and at the conclusion of trial, Mr. 

Partin moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government failed to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of counts two and three. Mr. 

Partin conceded that A.L. was transported in interstate commerce and that she was 

a minor, but he denied that he transported her across state lines with the intent to 

engage in unlawful sexual activity. The district court denied each of the motions.

The jury found Mr. Partin guilty of all three charges in the indictment.

At sentencing, Mr. Partin objected to the PSI, which recommended a twolevel enhancement for obstruction of justice. The district court overruled the 

objection, finding that Mr. Partin obstructed justice by lying on two occasions

during his testimony at trial. The district court stated:

First of all, when he denied taking A.L. out of Alabama to have sex. 

It’s clear that his intent was to have sex with A.L. in Tennessee as 

well as in Ohio, and, in fact, he did [and] . . . independently and 

separately . . . [Mr. Partin] clearly perjured himself and obstructed 

justice when he claimed that he had sex with A.L., his step-daughter, 

because she sneaked into his bed and he mistook her for an older 

woman.

D.E. 329 at 10 (alterations added).

Mr. Partin raises four issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court 

erred by denying his motion to suppress his pre-Miranda statements to officers 

because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, and even if they had 

reasonable suspicion, the stop matured into a custodial detention before he was 

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given his Miranda warnings. Second, Mr. Partin contends that the district court 

abused its discretion by admitting DNA evidence demonstrating that he was the 

father of A.L.’s child because the evidence was not relevant and because its 

prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Third, Mr. Partin asserts that the 

district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the 

government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he transported A.L. out 

of state with the intent to engage in unlawful activity with her. Finally, Mr. Partin 

claims that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for 

obstruction of justice. 

II

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, legal rulings are subject to 

de novo review and factual findings are reviewable for clear error. See United 

States v. Watkins, 760 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014). We consider the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the government, which prevailed below. See id. We 

are not restricted to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and may 

consider the record as a whole. See United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1185 

(11th Cir. 2011). Additionally, we afford substantial deference to the district 

court’s credibility determinations, both explicit and implicit. See United States v. 

Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012).

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The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s right to be secure against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. Not all interactions 

between law enforcement and citizens, however, implicate the Fourth Amendment. 

See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1185. Only when an officer, by means of physical force or 

show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen, may a court 

conclude that a seizure has occurred. See id. 

There are three broad categories of police-citizen encounters for purposes of 

our Fourth Amendment analysis: (1) police-citizen exchanges involving no 

coercion or detention; (2) brief seizures or investigatory detentions; and (3) fullscale arrests. See United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006). With 

regard to the second category of police-citizen encounters, the Fourth Amendment 

does not prohibit a police officer in appropriate circumstances and in an 

appropriate manner from approaching a person for purposes of investigating 

possible criminal behavior, even though there is no probable cause to make an 

arrest. See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186. 

Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), law enforcement officers may 

seize a suspect for a brief, investigatory stop. Such a stop, known generally as a 

Terry stop, and can be conducted where the officer has reasonable suspicion that 

the subject was involved in, or is about to be involved in, criminal activity, and the 

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stop “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 

interference in the first place.” Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186. 

Reasonable suspicion requires more than just a hunch; it demands that the 

totality of the circumstances create, at least, some minimal level of objective 

justification for the belief that the person was or is engaged in unlawful activity. 

See United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1995). The Supreme 

Court has firmly rejected the argument that a reasonable cause for an investigative 

stop can only be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on 

information supplied by another person. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 

1683, 1688 (2014). In fact, where the information received can be corroborated by 

officers, it is sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity. See id. Additionally, police may also draw on their own experience and 

specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative 

information available to them. See United States v. Lindsay, 482 F.3d 1285, 1290–

91 (11th Cir. 2007). Whether reasonable suspicion exists is determined by 

considering the totality of the circumstances. See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.

We agree with the district court’s alternative finding that Mr. Partin was the 

subject of a Terry stop and there was reasonable suspicion for the officers to stop 

him. The officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop based on the report 

they had received from a park employee regarding possible criminal activity and 

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their own initial observations at the scene. We disagree with Mr. Partin’s 

argument that the stop matured into a custodial detention for which Miranda 

warnings were required. The stop did not exceed its scope, and Mr. Partin was not 

subjected to the same type of inherently coercive environment as a stationhouse 

interrogation. 

Miranda warnings are required only when a defendant is “in custody,” 

meaning that there has been either a formal arrest or a restraint on the defendant’s 

freedom of movement that is of the degree associated with a formal arrest. See 

United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006). Whether a person is 

in custody “depends on whether under the totality of the circumstances, a 

reasonable man in his position would feel a restraint on his freedom of movement 

to such extent that he would not feel free to leave.” United States v. Brown, 441 

F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Relevant factors include the 

location and duration of the questioning, the statements made during the interview, 

whether the defendant was physically restrained, and whether the defendant was 

released after questioning. See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). 

Not all restraints on a person’s freedom of movement constitute custody for 

purposes of Miranda. Courts must determine “whether the relevant environment 

present[ed] the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house 

questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. at 1190. In making that determination, we 

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have considered whether the circumstances were such that a reasonable person 

would have “believe[d] that he was utterly at the mercy of the police, away from 

the protection of any public scrutiny, and had better confess or else.” United States 

v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1150 (11th Cir. 2004). . Because the custody standard is 

objective, the subjective beliefs of the defendant and the officer as to whether the 

defendant was free to leave are irrelevant. See Brown, 441 F.3d at 1347.

In distinguishing between a Terry stop and an arrest, we consider four 

nonexclusive factors: “(1) the law enforcement purpose served by the detention; 

(2) the diligence with which the officers pursued the investigation; (3) the scope 

and intrusiveness of the investigation; and (4) the duration of the detention.” 

Street, 472 F.3d at 1306. In balancing these factors, we focus on “whether the 

police diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their 

suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” 

Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

First, in analyzing the law enforcement purposes served by the detention, the 

most important consideration is whether the police quickly and with minimum 

interference pursued a method of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 

their suspicions. See Acosta, 363 F.3d at 1146. Here, Officer Morrison 

approached the vehicle and asked for identification to confirm the ages of the 

passengers. Given that the park employee’s report was that the female passenger 

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was young and possibly a minor, asking for identification to determine age was the 

quickest method to confirm or dispel the suspicion that A.L. might be a minor.

Second, “we ask whether the police were diligent in pursuing their 

investigation, that is, whether the methods the police used were carried out without 

unnecessary delay.” Id. The record indicates that the officers were diligent and 

that the methods they used did not create unnecessary delay. Although separating 

A.L. and Mr. Partin created some delay because Officer Morrison had to walk up 

and down the hill to communicate with each of them, this was necessary under the 

circumstances. Separation, and any extra time spent corroborating their stories,

was reasonable to get the truth from A.L. about her identity and age without any 

pressure from Mr. Partin for her to lie.

Third, “we ask whether the scope and intrusiveness of the detention 

exceeded the amount reasonably needed by police to ensure their personal safety.” 

Id. “While restriction on freedom of movement is a factor to be taken into account 

in determining whether a person is under arrest, it alone is not sufficient to 

transform a Terry stop into a de facto arrest.” Id. at 1147 (citation omitted). Until 

Mr. Partin was handcuffed, his freedom of movement was only restricted with 

regards to going up the hill to speak with A.L. Other than that, he was free to walk 

around within the vicinity of his vehicle and smoke. Restricting Mr. Partin from 

A.L. was necessary to ensure that officers could determine her age without Mr. 

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Partin’s insistence that she was 18. Additionally, Mr. Partin was in possession of

his car keys and his cellphone the entire time. The only brief exception was when 

Officer Morrison used the phone to write down the contact information of the 

person who could be reached to find A.L.’s legal guardian. 

The “final factor is whether the duration of the detention was reasonable.” 

Id. From our discussion of the third factor, it is clear that the amount of time was 

reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Although two hours may be 

longer than a typical Terry stop, it was reasonably necessary in this case. 

In summary, the stop did not evolve into a custodial detention for which 

Miranda warnings were required because it did not exceed its scope. The district 

court did not err in denying Mr. Partin’s motion to suppress his pre-Miranda

statements.

III

Next we turn to Mr. Partin’s challenge to the admission of the DNA

paternity evidence. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1123 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Even if the district court’s ruling constitutes abuse of discretion, however, we will 

reverse only if the error was not harmless. See id. An evidentiary error is harmless 

unless, in light of the record as a whole, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 

error had a substantial influence on the outcome of the proceeding. See id. 

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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that although “[e]vidence of a 

crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order 

to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 

character,” such “evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake, or lack of accident.” Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if (1) the 

evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character; (2) there is 

sufficient proof to enable a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendant committed the act(s) in question; and (3) the probative value of the 

evidence cannot be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice, and the evidence 

must satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 

1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Such evidence may be independently admissible if it arose out of the same 

transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, is necessary to 

complete the story of the crime, or is inextricably intertwined with the evidence 

regarding the charged offense. See id. Whether offered under Rule 404(b) or as 

intrinsic evidence, the district court must find that the probative value of the 

proffered evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and that it 

meets the other requirements of Rule 403. See id. In reviewing a district court’s 

decision not to exclude evidence under Rule 403, we “view the evidence in the 

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light most favorable to admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing 

its undue prejudicial impact.” United States v. Bradberry, 466 F.3d 1249, 1253 

(11th Cir. 2006).

The district court did not err in admitting the DNA evidence establishing Mr. 

Partin as the father of A.L.’s child because it was relevant for a number of reasons. 

First, it was relevant to Mr. Partin’s motive and intent for taking A.L. to 

Tennessee. It also provided context as to why Mr. Partin took A.L. from her 

medical appointment while she was in the custody of the DHR, and why he 

attempted to flee to Mexico. Further, as the district court noted, the evidence was 

relevant to refute Mr. Partin’s implied contention that A.L. was lying about her 

relationship with him and the implication that Eric was the father of her child. 

Finally, the probative value of the paternity test was not substantially 

outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice because there was other evidence in the 

record, to which Mr. Partin did not object, from which the jury could have found

that Mr. Partin had a sexual relationship with his stepdaughter and inferred that he 

was the father of her child. Even assuming the district court had erred in admitting 

the paternity evidence, Mr. Partin has not demonstrated that the evidence had a 

substantial prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial. 

IV

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We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on 

sufficiency of the evidence grounds. See United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 

1290 (11th Cir. 2011). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable 

inferences and credibility choices in the government’s favor. See id. at 1290–91. 

The evidence is sufficient if a reasonable trier of fact could find that it established 

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Beckles, 565 

F.3d 832, 840 (11th Cir. 2009).

Federal law prohibits the knowing transportation, in interstate commerce, of 

an individual under the age of 18 with the intent to engage in criminal sexual 

activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). To prove that Mr. Partin violated § 2423(a), the 

government had to prove that he (1) knowingly transported A.L. in interstate 

commerce; (2) A.L. was under the age of 18; and (3) Mr. Partin intended to engage 

in criminal sexual activity with A.L. See id. 

As to the element of intent, we have often noted the difficulty in establishing 

a defendant’s state of mind. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1279 

(11th Cir. 2003). Given this difficulty, intent most often is inferred from 

circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Manoocher Nosrati-Shamloo, 255 

F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, where there is some corroborative 

evidence of the defendant’s guilt and the defendant testifies in his own defense, his 

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testimony may by itself establish elements of the charged offense. See United 

States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008). This is especially true of 

subjective elements such as the defendant’s intent. See id. We have also noted 

that the jury is allowed to disbelieve the defendant and to infer that the opposite of 

his testimony is true. See United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1211 (11th 

Cir. 2002).

Here, the government presented evidence that Mr. Partin took A.L. across 

state lines, had intercourse with her, and had her perform oral sex on him. Mr. 

Partin claimed in his trial testimony that the intention of his traveling from 

Alabama to Tennessee was for the purpose of starting a new life with his family 

and that the trip to Ohio was to allow A.L. to live with the family again and not 

with child services. But the jury was free to reject his testimony and conclude that 

it was not true. Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Mr. Partin 

acted with the requisite intent for violating § 2423(a), and the district court did not 

err in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. 

V

Mr. Partin’s last argument concerns the district court’s sentencing 

enhancement for obstruction. The government bears the burden of establishing the 

facts necessary to support a sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir. 2007). 

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We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the advisory 

sentencing guidelines to the facts de novo, and review its findings of fact for clear 

error. See United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2011). 

A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, upon review of the evidence, we are 

left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See id. at

1195. Additionally, we give substantial deference to the district court’s implicit 

and explicit credibility determinations concerning witness testimony. See Lewis, 

674 F.3d at 1303. 

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement if the

defendant willfully obstructs or attempts to obstruct the administration of justice 

with regard to the prosecution of his offense of conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 

Obstruction of justice includes perjury. See id., comment. (n.4(B)). In the context 

of § 3C1.1, we have defined perjury as “false testimony concerning a material 

matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of 

confusion, mistake or faulty memory.” United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 981 

(11th Cir. 2015). See also U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.2). 

Mr. Partin argues that the application of § 3C1.1 constituted error. We 

disagree. 

In finding that the obstruction of justice enhancement applies, a district court 

should clearly and separately address each element of its perjury finding. See 

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United States v. Equanazi, 752 F.3d 912, 938 (11th Cir. 2014). We may, however, 

“affirm a district court’s enhancement even absent particularized findings 

regarding the defendant’s perjury so long as the district court found in general that 

the defendant’s testimony was perjurious as to material matters and the record 

supports that finding.” United States v. Hatney, 80 F.3d 458, 463 (11th Cir. 1996)

(citing United States v. Dobbs, 11 F.3d 152, 155 (11th Cir. 1994)). 

The district court did not err in finding that Mr. Partin perjured himself on 

material matters when he denied taking A.L. out of Alabama with the intent to 

engage in criminal sexual activity. We give substantial deference to the district 

court’s decision to credit A.L.’s testimony over Mr. Partin’s regarding the sexual 

activity that occurred on the two trips, and other evidence presented at trial 

supports the district court’s finding. As such, the district court did not err in 

applying the obstruction of justice enhancement. 

VI

For the reasons stated above, we affirm Mr. Partin’s convictions and 

sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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