Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_13-cr-00288/USCOURTS-almd-3_13-cr-00288-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delfino Perez-Gomez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

) CRIMINAL ACTION NO.

 v. ) 3:13cr288-MHT

) (WO)

DELFINO PEREZ-GOMEZ )

OPINION

Defendant Delfino Perez-Gomez moved to dismiss the

one-count indictment against him for unlawful reentry 

of a removed alien, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), on the 

ground that his original removal proceeding was 

fundamentally unfair and deprived him of the right to 

judicial review. The magistrate judge entered a

recommendation that the dismissal motion be denied, and 

Perez-Gomez objected to that recommendation. After an 

independent and de novo review of the record, the court 

entered an order last week, on November 21, 2014, 

overruling Perez-Gomez’s objection, adopting the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation, and denying 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 1 of 65
2

Perez-Gomez’s dismissal motion. This opinion explains 

the basis for that order.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Perez-Gomez is a native and citizen of Guatemala, 

and he is not a citizen of the United States. He first 

entered this country without authorization or 

inspection in December 2006. In January 2012, he was 

arrested in Lee County, Alabama for failing to pay 

several traffic tickets. At the county jail, he 

encountered federal immigration officials who 

discovered that he had entered the country without 

inspection, and they took him to an immigration 

detention facility.

A few days later, Perez-Gomez received a hearing 

before an immigration judge. The hearing was conducted 

by video teleconference. The immigration judge began 

by addressing a group of detained aliens. The judge 

determined that all of the aliens spoke either English 

or Spanish. He went on to discuss the nature of the 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 2 of 65
3

hearing and of the aliens’ procedural rights in the 

hearing. With regard to immigration relief, the 

immigration judge said:

“[I]f the court finds that you are 

subject to removal we will determine 

whether or not you are eligible for 

any sort of relief. That relief that 

might allow you to remain in the 

United States. If any such relief is 

available, we will discuss it and I 

will give you an opportunity to apply 

for it.”

Transcript of Imm. Hearing, Def.’s Ex. 5 (Doc. No. 

47-1) at 2 (repetitions by Spanish interpreter 

omitted). With regard to the aliens’ right to appeal, 

the immigration judge said:

“At the end of the case I will make a 

decision. You have a right to accept 

my decision or if you disagree with my 

decision you can appeal it to a higher 

court of law called the Board of 

Immigration of Appeals. If you accept 

my decision and the government

attorney accepts it, the decision 

becomes final and the case will be 

over. Accepting my decision also 

means you do not wish to appeal. If 

you do wish to appeal, I will tell you 

how to do that. I’ll give you the 

forms, tell you where they should be 

sent, and etc. You have also been 

given a document that explains your 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 3 of 65
4

appeal rights. Those are your rights 

in this deportation hearing.”

Id. at 3.1

Before he reached Perez-Gomez, the immigration 

judge engaged into a colloquy with another of the 

detainees, as follows:

“Respondent/Interpreter: Uh, yes, I 

have a question ... that about having 

money, what is that for?

“Judge: That would be for voluntary 

departure. But that’s the first thing 

you need, you need to have the money 

to pay your ticket back to Mexico. And 

you told me you didn’t have it. Okay?”

Id. at 18.

Some time later, the immigration judge addressed 

Perez-Gomez individually. The judge first engaged in a 

 

1. Perez-Gomez denies that he received the 

appeals-rights document. However, there is affidavit 

testimony from an ICE agent that the agency provided 

him with the document describing his appellate rights 

when he was processed. Gov. Ex. 5 (Doc. No. 57-2) at 1. 

Since, as described below, Perez-Gomez’s waiver of 

administrative and judicial review was not deficient 

regardless of his knowledge of appeal rights and 

procedures, the court need not make a finding about 

whether he actually received the document, during 

processing or during the hearing.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 4 of 65
5

colloquy about Perez-Gomez’s understanding of his 

rights:

“Judge: You were present when I 

explained your rights?

“[Perez-Gomez]: Yes.

“Judge: Do you understand your rights?

“[Perez-Gomez]: Yes.

“Judge: Would you like time to find an 

attorney?

“[Perez-Gomez]: No.”

Id. at 25. The judge determined that Perez-Gomez was 

removable after he admitted that he was not a citizen 

or national of the United States and had come to the 

United States “without papers.” Id. at 25-26. 

The immigration judge next asked Perez-Gomez four 

questions, presumably to determine whether he was 

eligible for any form of relief: “Do you have fear of 

returning to Guatemala?”; “Do you have family in the 

United States?”; “Has anyone ever filed papers for you 

to get legal residence in the United States?”; and “Do 

you have the money immediately available to depart the 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 5 of 65
6

United States?” Perez-Gomez answered “No” to each 

question. Id. at 27-28. At that point, the judge 

stated: “So the court finds that the government has a 

right to deport you because you’re in the United States 

illegally. So I must order that you be removed from 

the United States to Guatemala. You accept that 

decision?” Id. at 27. Perez-Gomez responded 

affirmatively.

Perez-Gomez was removed from the United States 15 

days later. He subsequently reentered the country, was 

apprehended by Alabama state troopers for driving under 

the influence, and was transferred to federal custody. 

The United States brought the pending criminal 

prosecution against him for reentering the United 

States after being removed.

II. DISCUSSION

Federal immigration law makes it a crime for an 

alien to be found in the United States after he “has 

been ... deported, or removed or has departed the 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 6 of 65
7

United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, 

or removal is outstanding,” unless he receives advance 

permission from the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a)(1). Perez-Gomez argues that, in light of 

certain procedural defects in his 2012 removal hearing, 

it would violate his due-process rights for this 

previous order of removal to satisfy the removal 

element of the crime. Specifically, Perez-Gomez argues 

that the hearing was flawed because he was misled into 

believing that he was ineligible for two forms of 

relief: voluntary departure prior to completion of 

removal proceedings and voluntary departure at the 

conclusion of removal proceedings. If he had received 

either form of relief, he would not have been guilty of 

the crime of illegal reentry.

As discussed below, the court finds that in this 

case, the failure to notify Perez-Gomez of his 

eligibility for the two forms of voluntary departure 

did not render the underlying removal proceeding 

overall fundamentally unfair and thus did not violate 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 7 of 65
8

his Fifth Amendment due-process rights. However, the 

court will address all factors should there be an 

appeal.

A. Vehicle for Relief

Based upon this court’s reading of applicable case 

law, a motion to dismiss does not appear to be the 

proper vehicle to raise the issue before the court:

whether the prior removal proceedings can be relied 

upon as the basis for the present felony charge. 

Rather, although Perez-Gomez filed this as a motion to 

dismiss, the motion should be construed as a motion in 

limine. 

Admittedly, other district courts have granted 

defense motions to dismiss illegal reentry prosecutions 

where the motions challenged the deportation element of 

the offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). See, e.g., 

United States v. Copeland, 228 F. Supp. 2d 267, 272 

(E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 376 F.3d 61 

(2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 181 F. 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 8 of 65
9

Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (D.N.M. 2002), reversed on other 

grounds, 353 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004). Indeed, the 

Supreme Court itself affirmed a court order granting a 

defense motion to dismiss United States v. 

Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 842 (1987). 

Nevertheless, a motion to dismiss the indictment is 

not the appropriate vehicle for mounting a collateral 

attack on a deportation under § 1326(d). As a 

threshold matter, the holdings of other district courts 

have no precedential weight in this jurisdiction and 

are therefore persuasive authority only. And, even as 

persuasive authority, none of them addresses this 

issue. Second, and more importantly, this aspect of 

the Mendoza-Lopez decision is distinguishable. The 

Supreme Court did not determine the proper vehicle for 

raising a challenge to a deportation used as an element 

in an illegal reentry prosecution; instead, the Court 

focused on the constitutionality of prosecution for 

illegal reentry when the defendant’s due-process rights 

had been violated in the deportation proceeding. At 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 9 of 65
10

the trial-court level, the defendants, Jose 

Mendoza-Lopez and Angel Landeros-Quinones, had moved to 

suppress the evidence of their deportation, and the 

district court granted the motion and dismissed the 

case. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 781 F. 2d 

111, 112 (8th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 481 U.S. 828 (1987). 

It is unclear when, procedurally, this dismissal 

occurred. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 

the dismissal, but it did not discuss the propriety of 

the procedure used in the court below. 

Regardless of how the Eighth Circuit handled the 

question, case law from the Eleventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals is clear: a motion challenging the sufficiency 

of an indictment must be analyzed without looking to 

the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court 

has stated: “The sufficiency of a criminal indictment 

is determined from its face. The indictment is 

sufficient if it charges in the language of the 

statute.” United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307 

(11th Cir. 1992). Once a defendant is properly 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 10 of 65
11

indicted, “the government is entitled to present its 

evidence at trial and have its sufficiency tested by a 

motion for acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 29.” United States v. Salman, 378 

F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004). This is because the 

rules do not “provide for a pre-trial determination of 

the sufficiency of the evidence.” Critzer, 951 F.2d at 

307. 

Here, the indictment is sufficient. The indictment 

asserts that Perez-Gomez “did, being an alien, 

knowingly re-enter, and was found in, the United States 

after having been deported, without obtaining the 

permission of the Secretary of Homeland Security or the 

Attorney General of the United States ....” By way of 

comparison, the language of the statute states, “any 

alien who ... has been ... deported ... and thereafter 

enters ... the United States, unless prior to his 

reembarkation at a place outside the United States of 

his application for admission from foreign contiguous 

territory, the Attorney General has expressly consented 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 11 of 65
12

to such alien’s reapplying for admission ....” 8 

U.S.C. § 1326(a). The language of the indictment thus 

clearly tracks the language of the statute, meaning 

that a motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle for 

Perez-Gomez’s challenge. 

Instead, the court construed Perez-Gomez’s motion 

to dismiss as a pretrial evidentiary motion to exclude 

evidence of his prior deportation, i.e., as a motion in 

limine.2 Regardless, however, of how it is construed, 

the court reaches the same conclusion.

 

2. This is as opposed to a motion to suppress. 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a motion in limine as a 

“pretrial request that certain inadmissible evidence 

not be referred to or offered at trial.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Black’s defines a motion to 

suppress as a “request that the court prohibit the 

introduction of illegally obtained evidence at a 

criminal trial.” Id. Here, it would not be accurate 

to say that the evidence was illegally obtained, in the 

sense of a violation of the Searches and Seizures 

Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. United States v. 

Wilk, 572 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2009) (treating a 

“motion to suppress” as “a motion in limine to exclude 

[evidence] as privileged under Federal Rule of Evidence 

501” “[b]ecause Wilk did not address this issue in a 

Fourth Amendment context ...”).

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 12 of 65
13

B. Voluntary Departure

The Immigration and Nationality Act allows for a 

form of relief called ‘voluntary departure,’ either 

prior to the completion of proceedings (and sometimes 

in lieu of any proceedings), see 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a), 

or at the completion of proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229c(b). Perez-Gomez was clearly eligible for 

pre-completion voluntary departure. He may also have 

been eligible for post-completion voluntary departure.

Voluntary departure can be a beneficial “quid pro 

quo” for both the government and an alien subject to 

deportation. Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 11 (2008). 

The Supreme Court has explained:

“From the Government's standpoint, the 

alien's agreement to leave voluntarily 

expedites the departure process and 

avoids the expense of 

deportation--including procuring 

necessary documents and detaining the 

alien pending deportation. The 

Government also eliminates some of the 

costs and burdens associated with 

litigation over the departure ....

Benefits to the alien from voluntary 

departure are evident as well. He or 

she avoids extended detention pending 

completion of travel arrangements; is 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 13 of 65
14

allowed to choose when to depart 

(subject to certain constraints); and 

can select the country of destination. 

And, of great importance, by departing 

voluntarily the alien facilitates the 

possibility of readmission.” 

Id. Voluntary departure facilitates readmission 

because it allows an alien to avoid some of the 

penalties attendant to deportation. Alvarado v. U.S. 

Atty. Gen., 610 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 2010). An 

alien who has voluntarily departed may be eligible for 

readmission immediately if they have been here for only

a short period of time, or within 3 years if they have 

been here for less than a year. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). By contrast, an alien who has been 

deported will not be eligible for readmission for at 

least five years and, depending on circumstances, may 

not be eligible for readmission for ten years, 20 

years, or life. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A). One of the 

penalties that voluntary departure allows an alien to 

avoid is a deportation order that could serve as an 

element of a § 1326 reentry offense. 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 14 of 65
15

Before Perez-Gomez’s hearing, the Board of 

Immigration Appeals had held that immigration judges 

are required to notify aliens of their eligibility for 

voluntary departure. See In re Cordova, 22 I&N Dec. 

966, 971 (BIA 1999) (en banc) (“In order to accord full 

due process to all aliens who may be eligible for 

voluntary departure under section 240B(a) of the Act [8 

U.S.C. § 1229c(a)], the Immigration Judge must notify 

all aliens who are apparently eligible of the 

availability of voluntary departure under 

[§ 1229c(a)].”). An immigration judge’s discretionary 

denial of voluntary departure is appealable to the 

Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.1(b)(3). When an immigration judge does not 

notify an alien who is apparently eligible for 

voluntary departure of his eligibility, it is 

appropriate to remand the case to the immigration judge 

so a determination can be made. Cordova, 22 I & N Dec. 

at 972.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 15 of 65
16

In order to be eligible for pre-completion 

departure, an alien must:

“(A) Make[] such request prior to or 

at the master calendar hearing at 

which the case is initially calendared 

for a merits hearing;

“(B) Make[] no additional requests for 

relief (or if such requests have been 

made, such requests are withdrawn 

prior to any grant of voluntary 

departure pursuant to this section);

“(C) Concede[] removability;

“(D) Waive[] appeal of all issues; and

“(E) Ha[ve] not been convicted of a 

crime described in section 101(a)(43) 

of the Act [aggravated felony] and is 

not deportable under section 237(a)(4) 

[national security].”

8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(1)(i). Contrary to what the 

immigration judge said to Perez-Gomez, having the 

immediate means to fund one’s own departure is not a 

prerequisite for consideration for pre-completion 

voluntary departure, although the alien is required to 

leave within 120 days after the grant of voluntary 

departure, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A), and the 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 16 of 65
17

immigration judge may require the alien to leave more 

quickly, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(e).3

 

3. The immigration judge’s colloquy on this point

(“Do you have the money immediately available to depart 

the United States?” “No.”) may derive from an older 

regulation governing eligibility for voluntary 

departure in which having “immediate means” was a 

prerequisite to obtaining voluntary departure. See 8 

C.F.R. § 244.1 (1996) (“[I]f the alien establishes that 

he/she is willing and has the immediate means with 

which to depart promptly from the United States, an 

immigration judge may authorize the alien to depart 

voluntarily from the United States in lieu of 

deportation within such time as may be specified by the 

immigration judge when first authorizing voluntary 

departure....”); see also Matter of Thomas, 21 I. & N. 

Dec. 20 (BIA 1995) (citing this requirement). 

The statute and regulations governing voluntary 

departure were overhauled with the passage of the 

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 

Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 

3009-546 (IIRIRA), creating the bifurcated pre- and

post-completion voluntary departure procedure that was

available to Perez-Gomez. See IIRIRA 308(b)(7), 110 

Stat. 3009-615 (1996) (repealing INA § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. 

1254(e)); IIRIRA 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-596 (1996) 

(codifying INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c). 

The current pre-completion voluntary departure 

regulations do not contain an “immediate means”

provision. Instead, as discussed above and below, the 

statutory cap provides for a departure period of 120 

days for aliens granted relief prior to the completion 

of proceedings. Establishing that the alien has the 

means to depart at all is now a regulatory prerequisite 

(continued...)

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 17 of 65
18

Perez-Gomez was eligible for this form of voluntary 

departure regardless of his immediate ability to pay to 

leave the country. He had not committed an aggravated 

felony and was not deportable for national-security 

reasons. He was willing to concede removability and 

waive appeal and made no other requests for relief. 

The video-conferenced hearing was his first contact 

with an immigration judge.

The prerequisites for post-hearing voluntary 

departure are:

“(i) The alien has been physically 

present in the United States for 

period of at least one year preceding 

the date the Notice to Appear was 

 

only for post-completion voluntary departure. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1240.26(c)(1). When post-completion voluntary 

departure is granted, a bond must be posted within 5 

business days of the immigration judge’s order granting 

voluntary departure. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3)(i).

The court finds it disconcerting that this 

particular immigration judge misrepresented the 

eligibility requirements for voluntary departure so 

long after the regulation had changed. This 

immigration judge’s misunderstanding of the law, and 

his affirmative misstatements to that effect, may have 

likewise prejudiced the deportation proceedings of 

thousands of aliens.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 18 of 65
19

served under section 239(a) of the 

Act;

(ii) The alien is, and has been, a 

person of good moral character for at 

least five years immediately preceding 

the application;

(iii) The alien has not been convicted

of a crime described in section 

101(a)(43) of the Act [aggravated 

felony] and is not deportable 

under section 237(a)(4) [national 

security]); and

(iv) The alien has established by 

clear and convincing evidence that the 

alien has the means to depart the 

United States and has the intention to 

do so.”

8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(1). The government has a 

stronger argument that Perez-Gomez did not satisfy the 

prerequisites for this form of voluntary departure, 

based on his statement that he did not have funds 

immediately available to leave the country. However, 

the court need not reach that issue, because 

Perez-Gomez was undoubtedly eligible for pre-completion 

voluntary departure.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 19 of 65
20

C. History of Mendoza-Lopez and § 1326(d)

Subsection (d) of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 sets out three 

prerequisites for an alien to attack collaterally his 

removal order during a criminal prosecution for illegal 

reentry:

“In a criminal proceeding under this 

section, an alien may not challenge 

the validity of the deportation order 

described in subsection (a)(1) of this 

section... unless the alien 

demonstrates that–

(1) the alien exhausted any 

administrative remedies that may have 

been available to seek relief against 

the order;

(2) the deportation proceedings at 

which the order was issued improperly 

deprived the alien of the opportunity 

for judicial review; and

(3) the entry of the order was 

fundamentally unfair.”

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). In order to understand accurately

this subsection, it is necessary to understand the 

history behind its addition to the statute.

When Congress passed § 1326, there was no explicit 

provision for an alien to attack collaterally an 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 20 of 65
21

underlying deportation order, although earlier statutes 

had contained such provisions. See Mendoza-Lopez, 481 

U.S. at 835. Nonetheless, some courts of appeals read 

an implied right of collateral attack, holding that a 

deportation could be an element of the illegal-reentry 

crime only if it was “lawful”; other appellate courts

read the text of the statute strictly and refused to 

consider such collateral attacks. See id. at 833 n.6, 

834 n.9 (collecting cases). In order to resolve the 

dispute among the courts of appeals, the Supreme Court 

took up the case of Jose Mendoza-Lopez and Angel 

Landeros-Quinones.

Mendoza-Lopez and Landeros-Quinones were Mexican 

nationals who were in the United States without 

authorization. They were arrested by agents of the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service in Nebraska and 

transported to a detention center where an immigration 

judge conducted a group deportation hearing for which 

neither man had counsel. Both men met the 

prerequisites to be eligible for a form of 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 21 of 65
22

discretionary immigration relief called ‘suspension of 

deportation,’ and this form of relief was discussed in 

the group deportation hearing. However, as later found 

by the district court:

“[T]he Immigration Judge did not 

answer a question from one of the 

respondents regarding application for 

suspension of deportation; ... the 

Immigration Judge addressed the wrong 

respondent while discussing 

eligibility for the remedy; ... the 

Immigration Judge did not make clear 

how much time he would allow 

respondents to apply for suspension; 

and... Landeros-Quinones asked a 

question which demonstrated that he 

did not understand the concept of

suspension of deportation, but... the 

Immigration Judge failed to explain 

further.”

Id. at 831 n.4. The two men declined to pursue 

suspension of deportation and each waived his right to 

appeal. They were deported and were later arrested in 

Nebraska again. After this second arrest, the two men 

were criminally prosecuted for illegal reentry. 

Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court first 

rejected the argument that there was an implicit 

collateral-attack provision in the former § 1326. See

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 22 of 65
23

id. at 837. Nonetheless, the Court held that Fifth 

Amendment due process requires that collateral attacks 

be available in certain situations: “Our cases 

establish that where a determination made in an 

administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in 

the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction, there 

must be some meaningful review of the administrative 

proceeding.” Id. at 837-38. Therefore, the Court 

continued, “at the very least ... where the defects in 

an administrative proceeding foreclose judicial review 

of that proceeding, an alternative means of obtaining 

judicial review must be made available before the 

administrative order may be used to establish 

conclusively an element of a criminal offense.” Id. at 

838. 

The Court held that procedural defects at the two 

men’s hearing had deprived them of judicial review. 

“The Immigration Judge permitted waivers of the right 

to appeal that were not the result of considered 

judgments by respondents.” Id. at 840. There had not 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 23 of 65
24

been considered judgment on the part of the defendants 

because the immigration judge “failed to advise 

respondents properly of their eligibility to apply for 

suspension of deportation.” Id. “Because the waivers 

of their rights to appeal were not considered or 

intelligent,” the Court held that the defendants “were 

deprived of judicial review of their deportation 

proceeding.” Id.

4 Therefore, the previous deportations 

could not be used to support the criminal prosecution 

for illegal reentry.

However, because the government had stipulated that 

the two men’s hearing had been “fundamentally unfair,” 

the Court did not reach the question of which

procedural defects render a removal order unfit to 

satisfy an element of illegal reentry. Id. at 839-40; 

 

4. The Court also explicitly distinguished between 

immigration-court proceedings and state-court 

proceedings. While a federal court should not look 

behind a state-court conviction that constitutes an 

element of a federal crime, administrative 

determinations do not merit the same respect absent an 

opportunity for judicial review. See Mendoza-Lopez, 

481 U.S. at 840-42.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 24 of 65
25

n.17. However, after noting that the challenge there 

was collateral, as opposed to direct, the Court, 

drawing on a comparison with what it considered 

“analogous abuses” in the criminal proceedings. 

emphasized the limited application of the phrase 

“fundamental” error,” id. at 839, n.17: “We have 

previously recognized... in the context of criminal 

proceedings, that some errors necessarily render a 

trial fundamentally unfair, Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 

570, 577 (1986) (use of coerced confession, 

adjudication by biased judge); see also Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 543-544 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 

(mob violence, knowing use of perjured testimony). 

While the procedures required in an administrative 

proceeding are less stringent than those demanded in a 

criminal trial, analogous abuses could operate, under 

some circumstances, to deny effective judicial review 

of administrative determinations (internal quotation 

marks omitted).” Id. In short, that there was error 

does not mean that that error was fundamental.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 25 of 65
26

At its most narrow, the Mendoza-Lopez Court held

that, where judicial review has been foreclosed through 

a waiver that was not knowing and intelligent, a 

removal order entered through a fundamentally unfair 

proceeding cannot satisfy an element of a subsequent 

criminal conviction. Specifically, it held that a 

waiver is not knowing and intelligent when it is made 

by an alien who is removable but eligible for some form 

of discretionary relief, if the alien is unaware of or 

confused about his eligibility for such relief. 

Mendoza-Lopez and Landeros-Quinones appeared without 

counsel, and, based on the immigration court’s 

colloquy, they had no reason to believe that they were 

eligible for any relief from deportation. Therefore, 

in their minds, there would have been no argument to 

raise on appeal, even if an appellate panel were 

sympathetic. Mendoza-Lopez held that an appeal waiver 

grounded in such a misunderstanding, if it renders the 

proceedings fundamentally unfair, is not valid.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 26 of 65
27

Before Congress enacted the current statutory 

framework for collateral challenges to removal orders 

during illegal-reentry proceedings, courts adjudicated 

such collateral attacks based on the constitutionally

required Mendoza-Lopez framework. In 1996, in the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Congress 

added the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) to codify the 

holding of Mendoza-Lopez. See United States v. Lopez, 

445 F.3d 90, 94 (2nd. Cir. 2006) (explaining that “this 

provision [8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)] effectively codified the 

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Mendoza 

Lopez”); United States v. Wilson, 316 F.3d 506, 514 n.1 

(4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment);

see also 140 Cong. Rec. S 14544 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 

1994) (statement of Sen. Smith) (the language of 

§ 1326(d), as included in a previous version of the 

bill, “is taken directly from the U.S. Supreme Court 

case of United States v. Mendoza-Lopez”); 139 Cong. 

Rec. E750 (Extensions of Remarks March 24, 1993) 

(statement of Rep. Bill McCollum) (same).

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 27 of 65
28

In sum, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) must allow for a 

defendant similarly situated to Mendoza-Lopez to attack 

collaterally his removal order for two reasons: first, 

because Congress’s intent in enacting the provision was 

to codify Mendoza-Lopez; and, second, because the 

alternative would violate the Constitution. With this 

in mind, this court will now apply the § 1326(d) 

requirements to Perez-Gomez’s case.

D. Applying the § 1326(d) Requirements

1. Administrative Exhaustion

The first requirement for a collateral attack under 

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) is that “the alien exhausted any 

administrative remedies that may have been available to 

seek relief against the order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1). 

There are two possible interpretations of this statute, 

but, under Mendoza-Lopez, only one passes 

constitutional muster. An impermissible reading of 

this provision would require an alien to exhaust even 

those administrative remedies that are not functionally

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 28 of 65
29

available to him–-that is, even if he had been told by 

an immigration judge that no such remedy existed. 

Instead, the due-process holding of Mendoza-Lopez

requires that, before collaterally challenging an 

underlying deportation order in a reentry case, an 

alien must exhaust only those remedies that are 

effectively available.

Noting that Perez-Gomez had been instructed 

generally as to the availability of an 

administrative-appeal process and that he had not 

pursued such an appeal, the magistrate judge found that 

this first prerequisite was not satisfied and that 

Perez-Gomez’s collateral attack must fail. To reach 

this conclusion, the magistrate judge relied on two 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases. Neither case 

dictates strict adherence to the 

administrative-exhaustion requirement in a case such as 

this one. 

In Sundar v. I.N.S., 328 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 

2003), the Eleventh Circuit discussed the 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 29 of 65
30

administrative-exhaustion requirement for removal 

orders on direct review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(d)(1). In the direct review context, the court 

noted, exhaustion promotes “respect for administrative 

agencies” and allows the Board of Immigration Appeals

to “discover and correct their own errors.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit 

then reasoned that the requirement applies with equal 

force for petitioners seeking habeas review of a final 

removal order in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 proceedings, because, 

as it explained, the interests of protecting agency 

authority and promoting judicial efficiency are the 

same in both contexts. Without an exhaustion rule, 

“unnecessary petitions” might “undermine agency 

functions and clog the courts.” Id. 

Following Sundar, the Eleventh Circuit, in an 

unpublished opinion, held that the exhaustion 

requirement also applies when an immigration judge 

erroneously informs an alien that he is not eligible 

for discretionary relief. United States v. Valentin 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 30 of 65
31

Morales, 131 Fed. Appx. 159, 160-61 (11th Cir. 2005). 

To reach this conclusion, the court of appeals 

summarily adopted the reasoning of Sundar--requiring 

exhaustion prior to bringing a habeas-corpus 

challenge--for the reentry collateral-challenge 

context, without reconciling key differences between 

these two types of challenges. This court finds that

this opinion, which is not binding, is unpersuasive5 and 

inapposite6 here, and that Sundar is distinguishable.

 

5. “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding 

precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive 

authority,” 11th Cir. R. 36-2; United States v. 

Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2000).

6. In support of its application of a strict 

administrative-exhaustion requirement in this context, 

the Eleventh Circuit explained that an alien who had 

not exhausted administrative remedies prior to 

deportation could still seek rescission of the 

deportation order after removal. Valentin Morales, 131 

Fed. Appx. at 160-61.

However, under current immigration regulations, 

Perez-Gomez could not file a motion to reopen or 

reconsider his removal order once he was removed from 

the country, and filing a motion to reopen or 

reconsider would not stay his removal. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.23(b)(1) (Reopening or reconsideration before 

the Immigration Court: “A motion to reopen or to 

(continued...)

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 31 of 65
32

First, and most importantly, the requirements of 

due process are different in the context of a 

collateral attack during a prosecution under § 1326

from those in other contexts; this difference is at the 

center of this dispute. Congress is authorized to 

regulate access to the courts generally, see Kokkonen 

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 

(1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited 

jurisdiction”), and the requirement that a habeas 

petitioner exhaust state remedies before seeking 

federal remedies predates the statutory structure for 

habeas corpus. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 

 

reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a 

person who is the subject of removal, deportation, or 

exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her 

departure from the United States.”); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(d) (same for BIA appeals); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.23(b)(1)(v) (“Except in cases involving 

abstentia orders, the filing of a motion to reopen or a 

motion to reconsider shall not stay the execution of 

any decision made in the case.”); but see Jian Le Lin 

v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 681 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(holding that the immigration regulation denying the 

right to file a motion to reopen before the Board of 

Immigration Appeals after departure impermissibly 

conflicts the with statutory right to file one motion 

to reopen). 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 32 of 65
33

n.4 (1996) (discussing the history of the exhaustion 

requirement). In contrast, the Mendoza-Lopez court 

held that due process required the ability to 

collaterally attack the result of an administrative 

proceeding used as a predicate in a criminal 

prosecution, in a case in which the defendant had been 

precluded from exhausting his administrative remedies. 

For this reason, Valentin Morales is fatally flawed. 

The strict administrative-exhaustion requirement 

articulated in Valentin Morales would have barred 

Mendoza-Lopez’s collateral attack for the same reason 

it barred Valentin Morales’s, and for the same reason 

that the government argues it should bar Perez-Gomez’s. 

The Valentin Morales court did not attempt to reconcile 

its decision with Mendoza-Lopez; its silence is 

unpersuasive.

Second, and relatedly, the scope of collateral 

review in this context is significantly narrower from 

what would be available under habeas corpus. Habeas 

review attacks the deportation order itself, and a 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 33 of 65
34

successful petition could have the effect of vacating a 

constitutionally defective order. Yet the due-process 

right recognized in Mendoza-Lopez and codified in 

§ 1326(d) concerns only whether a removal order is 

sufficient to constitute an element of a subsequent 

criminal offense. The collateral attack does not alter 

the effect of the removal order in other arenas, such 

as if Perez-Gomez sought permission to enter the United 

States lawfully.

Next, the judicial values of protecting agency 

authority and promoting judicial efficiency do not 

operate in a § 1326(d) collateral attack in the same 

way as in direct review and habeas proceedings. When 

the Board of Immigration Appeals can provide a remedy 

to an alien’s claim, “the exhaustion requirement 

applies with full force.” Sundar, 328 F.3d at 1325. 

Perez-Gomez, however, was incorrectly left with the 

impression that he could not have asked the Board of 

Immigration Appeals to reconsider his deportation, 

because the immigration judge’s statements eliminated 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 34 of 65
35

any basis on which Perez-Gomez could have filed an 

appeal. Having been incorrectly informed by the 

immigration judge’s colloquy that he was ineligible for 

any form of immigration relief, Perez-Gomez was under 

the mistaken belief that he had no claim.7 Within his 

universe of available remedies, there would be no error 

or denial of discretionary relief on which he could 

base an appeal for reconsideration to the reviewing 

administrative agency. Indeed, requiring Perez-Gomez 

to pursue an appeal in this context--where he believed 

he had no chance for relief--would directly undermine 

 

7. As cited above, the group colloquy on relief by 

the immigration judge began as follows: “[I]f the court 

finds that you are subject to removal we will determine 

whether or not you are eligible for any sort of relief. 

That relief might allow you to remain in the United 

States. If any such relief is available, we will 

discuss it and I will give you an opportunity to apply 

for it.” Transcript of Imm. Hearing, Def.’s Ex. 5 

(Doc. No. 47-1) at 2 (repetitions by Spanish 

interpreter omitted). 

Once the immigration judge reached Perez-Gomez 

individually, he asked him four questions, presumably 

to determine his eligibility for various forms of 

relief, and Perez-Gomez responded negatively to each 

question. Id. at 26-27. The court then ordered him 

removed. Id. at 27.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 35 of 65
36

judicial efficiency interests, as it would encourage 

the filing of meritless petitions that petitioners 

themselves have reasonable cause to believe are 

baseless.

Finally, unlike a habeas petitioner, an alien 

challenging his deportation under § 1326 is not back in 

court voluntarily. The alien did not decide to bring 

his case to federal court; that decision was made by 

the United States in its decision to prosecute him. 

Moreover, illegal-reentry prosecution ordinarily occurs 

after any opportunity for administrative exhaustion has 

passed. Therefore, judicial-efficiency concerns 

regarding clogging the courts or short-circuiting 

administrative processes that motivated the Eleventh 

Circuit in Sundar simply do not apply here.8 

 

8. Moreover, Perez-Gomez is not seeking a “futility 

exception,” as suggested by the magistrate judge and 

the government. Sundar explains that petitioners may 

not seek an exception to administrative exhaustion due 

to its perceived “futility.” There, the court held that 

a petitioner subject to an administrative-exhaustion 

requirement for habeas-corpus review of final order 

“may not bypass the Board simply because he thinks it 

(continued...)

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 36 of 65
37

Therefore, this court will not apply an 

administrative-exhaustion requirement to Perez-Gomez’s 

case when to do so would violate the constitutional 

holding of Mendoza-Lopez: “Depriving an alien of the 

right to have the disposition in a deportation hearing 

reviewed in a judicial forum requires, at a minimum, 

 

will be unsympathetic to his claim, because the Board 

of Immigration Appeals may decide, upon reflection, 

that the contention is valid.” Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d 

1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003). See also Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (refusing to make 

a futility exception to the administrative-exhaustion 

requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act); Engle 

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982) (same for 

habeas-corpus review of state criminal convictions 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254).

Perez-Gomez does not make a futility argument. He 

was made to believe that he was categorically 

ineligible for any form of immigration relief. He had 

no argument to raise for reconsideration in the first 

place, regardless of his perception of the sympathies 

of the forum. A mistaken belief that no relief exists 

is not a conscious decision to forgo an appeal because 

of its perceived futility. This is like the difference 

between failing to file a claim under a belief that the 

court might not be persuaded by the argument, and 

failing to file a claim under a belief that a court 

does not have jurisdiction to entertain it. While 

courts may have reason to dissuade futile filings, they 

certainly do not have reason to perpetuate 

misconceptions regarding the power of the courts.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 37 of 65
38

that review be made available in any subsequent 

proceeding in which the result of the deportation 

proceeding is used to establish an element of a 

criminal offense.” Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839. In 

other words, when procedural defects in a deportation 

proceeding deprive an alien of judicial review and 

result in a fundamentally unfair deportation order--the 

second and third prong of § 1326(d)--it would violate 

the Constitution to reject the challenge on the basis 

that the alien did not exhaust administrative remedies 

that were effectively unavailable.

The government attempts to square this circle by 

arguing that the constitutional cases decided before 

§ 1326(d) was added to the illegal-reentry statute were 

somehow abrogated by that provision. That position 

makes no sense. The Mendoza-Lopez Court held that 

collateral attack was required based on the due-process 

rights of criminal defendants. Congress cannot 

abrogate a constitutional holding through legislation. 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 38 of 65
39

Therefore, the court will interpret the statute 

consistently with the constitutional holding of 

Mendoza-Lopez. “The doctrine of constitutional 

avoidance directs that ‘when deciding which of two 

plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court 

must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. 

If one of them would raise a multitude of 

constitutional problems, the other should prevail.’” 

Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 

(2005)). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has found 

that a consistent interpretation is possible, and this 

court finds their reasoning to be persuasive. See

United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2004)9

(“Because Section 1326(d) was intended as a response 

to, and codification of, Mendoza-Lopez, its 

 

9. It worth noting here that the author of Sosa, 

Judge Ralph K. Winter, was also the author of the only 

reported Eleventh Circuit case interpreting § 1326(d), 

Zelaya, 293 F.3d 1294, which he wrote while sitting by 

designation.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 39 of 65
40

administrative exhaustion requirement must be subject 

to at least one significant exception to render it 

consistent with that decision.”).10

At the very least, when an uncounseled alien 

forgoes his administrative remedies through a waiver 

that was not knowing and intelligent, including by 

virtue of his lack of understanding that there was 

relief for which he was eligible, those administrative 

remedies cannot be interpreted as having been 

“available” to him. See Sosa, 387 F.3d at 136 (“A 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies bars 

collateral review of a deportation proceeding under 

Section 1326(d)(1), therefore, only where the alien’s 

 

10. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 

developed a more extensive set of circumstances in 

which it will “excuse” the administrative-exhaustion 

requirement, and Perez-Gomez argues for the application 

of those exceptions here. See United States v. 

Gonzalez-Villalobos, 724 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2013) (describing three categories of cases in which 

the administrative-exhaustion requirement is excused). 

However, the Ninth Circuit’s approach relies on an 

extensive body of case law surrounding the due-process 

rights of aliens in removal proceedings which differ 

from Eleventh Circuit approaches. Therefore, the court 

does not adopt the Ninth Circuit’s approach.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 40 of 65
41

waiver of administrative review was knowing and 

intelligent.”).

Perez-Gomez waived administrative review of his 

removal order, but he did so having been misled, by the 

immigration judge, into believing that there was no 

basis for an appeal. To be consistent with the holding 

of Mendoza-Lopez, Perez-Gomez’s challenge cannot fail

on the basis of his failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies that were not functionally available.11

 

11. Procedural defects such as these are 

exacerbated by a situation, such as this one, in which 

the alien is uncounseled. An uncounseled alien is not 

likely to have independent access to legal advice, and 

the representations of the immigration judge define his 

universe of available legal remedies. See generally

United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 

2004) (explaining that “a ruling by an [immigration 

judge] that misleads an alien into believing that no 

relief exists falls into a different category [from 

non-fundamental errors] because of the special duties 

of an [immigration judge] to aliens. The [immigration 

judge], unlike an Article III judge, is not merely the 

factfinder and adjudicator but also has an obligation 

to establish the record.”) (internal citations 

omitted). 

By contrast, because a counseled alien may turn to 

his attorney for support in interpreting and deciding 

his legal strategy, the Eleventh Circuit has often 

(continued...)

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 41 of 65
42

2. Improper Deprivation of Opportunity 

for Judicial Review

The second requirement of § 1326(d) is that “the 

deportation proceedings at which the order was issued 

improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for 

judicial review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(2). 

Perez-Gomez’s hearing improperly denied him both the 

right to judicial review and the basis for review by 

misrepresenting his eligibility for discretionary 

relief and soliciting a waiver of appeal that was not 

knowing and intelligent.

 

cited the assistance of counsel in immigration cases as 

a presumptive indicator of procedural sufficiency. See, 

e.g., Hyacinthe v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 215 Fed. Appx. 856, 

861 (11th Cir. 2007) (describing how certain “shorthand 

expressions” used by immigration judges, such as 

“whether they accept a decision as ‘final,’” is 

presumed to be understood by “aliens represented by 

attorneys,” so that a counseled alien “may effectively 

waive appeal in response to this simple question”); 

Rodas-Alfaro v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 372 Fed. Appx. 974, 

976 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that an alien’s waiver 

was “knowing and intelligent because he made the 

decision after consulting with counsel and affirmed 

under oath that he understood that he was giving up his 

right to appeal by accepting voluntary departure”).

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 42 of 65
43

Perez-Gomez appeared at his removal hearing without 

the assistance of counsel. The immigration judge 

stated at the beginning of his hearing that, “If any 

such relief is available, we will discuss it and I will 

give you an opportunity to apply for it.” Hearing 

Transcript (Doc. No. 47-1) at 2-3. Then, in his 

colloquy with another detainee, the immigration judge 

stated that the ability to fund a trip back to one’s 

home country was “the first thing you need” in order to 

qualify for voluntary-departure relief. Id. at 18. 

Finally, in his colloquy with Perez-Gomez, the 

immigration judge asked him, “Do you have the money 

immediately available to depart the United States?,” to 

which Perez-Gomez responded, “No.” Id. at 27. The 

immigration judge asked no follow-up questions and made 

no explicit reference to voluntary departure when

speaking with Perez-Gomez. 

As discussed above, the immigration judge’s answer 

to the other detainee misstates the law: the ability to 

fund one’s return at the hearing itself is not a 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 43 of 65
44

prerequisite for pre-completion voluntary departure. 

Furthermore, despite Perez-Gomez’s eligibility for 

pre-completion voluntary departure, the immigration 

judge did not discuss with him or with the group as a 

whole the nature of the relief, how to apply for it, or 

what factors he would consider in deciding whether to 

grant it. This omission violated immigration 

regulations as interpreted by the Board of Immigration 

Appeals. In Re Cordova, 22 I. & N. 966, 971 (BIA 1999) 

(“In order to insure that [voluntary departure under 8 

U.S.C. § 1229c(a)] is used fairly, it is critical that 

respondents be informed of the requirements for relief, 

as well as their apparent eligibility, and that they be 

given the opportunity to apply for such relief in a 

timely manner.”); see 8 C.F.R. 1240.11(a)(2). That the 

regulations impose this duty to inform has also been 

recognized by the Eleventh Circuit. See Lewis v. U.S. 

Atty. Gen., 512 Fed. Appx. 963, 969 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(explaining that the Board of Immigration Appeals has 

held that immigration judges have a “duty to inform 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 44 of 65
45

aliens of potential forms of relief for which they are 

apparently eligible,” including pre-completion 

voluntary departure).

Perez-Gomez therefore had even less information 

about a form of relief for which he was eligible than 

the similarly uncounseled defendants in Mendoza-Lopez

did. In that case, the immigration judge actually 

discussed the applicable form of relief, suspension of 

deportation, with the aliens as a group and answered 

questions about the form of relief. However, the 

immigration judge mistakenly addressed the wrong alien 

at one point and failed to continue the colloquy when 

another alien was clearly confused. The Supreme Court 

upheld the finding that these deficiencies “fail[ed] to 

overcome these defendants’ lack of understanding about 

the proceedings” and was therefore inadequate for their 

waivers of appeal rights to be knowing and intelligent. 

Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 832. If waivers cannot be 

knowing and intelligent after a hearing that failed to 

overcome a lack of understanding despite the 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 45 of 65
46

immigration judge’s efforts, they certainly could not 

be knowing and intelligent after a hearing in which the 

immigration judge misrepresents eligibility

requirements and utterly fails to discuss the nature 

the relief in the first place.

The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed waiver of 

appeal rights in the immigration context in a published 

decision.

12 However, it has recognized that, under 

Mendoza-Lopez, a waiver of the right to appeal that is 

not considered or intelligent amounts to a complete 

deprivation of judicial review when, in addition to 

failing to inform an alien of his rights to appeal to 

federal court, the immigration judge also fails to 

explain adequately an alien’s right to discretionary 

 

12. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized, without 

deciding the question, that the appellate courts are 

split as to whether immigration officials must inform 

aliens in removal proceedings of their right to 

judicial review in federal court. See United States v. 

Vasquez-Montalban, 263 Fed. Appx. 822 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(leaving question open); United States v. Lopez-Solis, 

503 Fed. Appx. 942 (11th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging the 

split and holding that, in ordinary cases, the receipt 

of a final order will be sufficient to put an alien on 

notice). 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 46 of 65
47

relief and, as a result, the alien does not understand 

that he is eligible to apply for that relief. LopezSolis, 503 Fed. Appx. at 945. In other words, when an 

alien is not given notice of his right to appeal and he 

lacks understanding about his eligibility for the sole 

basis on which he could appeal, that alien has been 

improperly deprived of his right to judicial review.

When, as here, the immigration judge neglects to 

discuss discretionary relief with an uncounseled alien 

who is eligible for it and affirmatively misstates the 

requirements for the sole basis of relief for which an 

alien is eligible, this court cannot find that the 

alien made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his 

right to seek review in a higher court. See RodasAlfaro v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 372 Fed. Appx. 974, 976 

(11th Cir. 2010) (analogizing a waiver of appeal in the 

criminal context to the immigration context, and 

concluding that to be valid, an alien’s waiver “must 

have been made with a full awareness of both the nature 

of the right being abandoned and the consequences of 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 47 of 65
48

the decision to abandon it”). Because Perez-Gomez had 

no other basis on which to file an appeal, this court 

finds that he was improperly deprived of the 

opportunity for judicial review and that he meets the 

second prong of § 1326(d).

3. Fundamental Unfairness

Finally, Perez-Gomez must show that “the entry of 

the order was fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(d)(3). It is here that Perez-Gomez trips up.

Though the statute does not define fundamental 

unfairness, this court understands the term as used in 

this statute to mean both a fundamental error in the 

entire proceeding and prejudice resulting from that 

error. See, e.g., United States v. Charleswell, 456 

F.3d 347, 358 (3rd Cir. 2006) (“[B]oth parties agree 

that in order to succeed on a collateral challenge, 

under § 1326(d)(3), an alien must show not only that 

the underlying proceeding suffered some fundamental 

defect, but also that the result of the defect was 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 48 of 65
49

prejudicial.”); United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 

103 n.13 (3rd Cir. 2004) (collecting cases).

A.

In reaching the conclusion that the error in PerezGomez’s removal proceeding was not fundamental, the 

court begins with a number of general observations. 

First, “removal hearings are civil proceedings, not 

criminal; therefore, procedural protections accorded an 

alien in a removal proceeding are less stringent than 

those available to a criminal defendant.” United 

States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 

2002). Regardless, certain procedural protections must 

be met even in administrative proceedings. The Supreme 

Court has held that, at a minimum, an alien in removal 

proceedings must be provided (1) notice of the charges 

against him; (2) an administrative hearing; and (3) an 

opportunity to be heard. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 

344 U.S. 590, 603 (1953).

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 49 of 65
50

Second, the fact that the decision whether an alien 

should be allowed voluntary withdrawal is discretionary 

is not dispositive. Take, for example, § 240A(b) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under this 

provision, an immigrant can seek a discretionary 

cancellation of removal if he has lawfully resided in 

the United States continuously for a certain number of 

years. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Appellate courts have been 

divided on whether giving inaccurate information on the 

ability to seek long-term discretionary relief 

constitutes a violation of an alien’s due process. 

Compare, e.g., Copeland, 376 F.3d at 70 (holding that 

failure to inform alien of right to seek discretionary 

relief can amount to fundamental error) with LopezOrtiz, 313 F.3d at 231 (holding opposite). To this 

court, however, the answer is clear: when an 

immigration judge gives false information about the 

crux of a deportation proceeding--that is, whether the 

person will actually be forced to leave the country or 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 50 of 65
51

may be given long-term relief--they have rendered the 

proceeding fundamentally unfair.13 

Thus, the facts that removal proceedings are civil 

in nature and that whether to allow voluntary departure 

is discretionary are not dispositive.

 

13. The government argues that the Eleventh Circuit 

Court of Appeals has already foreclosed this argument. 

In Oguejiofor v. Attorney General, 277 F.3d 1305, 1309 

(11th Cir. 2002), the appellate court rejected the 

argument that aliens had a constitutionally protected 

right to eligibility for discretionary relief. Id. at 

1309. That case, however, concerned a matter of 

entitlement to the right: the application of a legal 

rule regarding retroactivity that turned out to be 

erroneous. See also Guerrero-Bermudez v. U.S. Attorney 

General, 192 Fed. Appx. 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(holding that an alien’s substantive due process claim 

failed because he has no constitutionally-protected 

right to discretionary relief or to be eligible for 

discretionary relief).

Perez-Gomez, in contrast, makes a procedural due 

process argument. He challenges the denial of his 

right to make a knowing and intelligent decision about 

whether to apply for discretionary relief for which he 

is apparently eligible. This is not the same as a 

challenge asserting a right to be eligible for that 

relief.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 51 of 65
52

B.

The government argues that, even if there was 

fundamental unfairness in Perez-Gomez’s removal 

proceedings, it did not prejudice him.

“[Prejudice] need not rise to the level of showing 

that the defendant would not have been deported, but 

rather that the errors might have affected the outcome 

of the hearing.” United States v. Holland, 876 F.2d 

1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989). On review of the record, 

it is clear that Perez-Gomez was eligible for at least 

pre-completion voluntary departure. He may have also 

had a persuasive argument for post-completion 

departure. Indeed, Perez-Gomez has submitted an 

affidavit that he would have applied for voluntary 

departure if he had been told that he was eligible and 

that he would have been able to pay the required bond 

and travel costs. The decision to grant voluntary 

departure to someone who is eligible falls within the 

discretion of the immigration judge. But given the 

various factors taken into consideration for this 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 52 of 65
53

determination, the court finds that it is reasonably 

probable that Perez-Gomez would have been granted 

voluntary departure. See In Re Arguelles-Campos, 22 I. 

& N. Dec. 811, 817 (BIA 1999) (explaining that factors 

taken into account in granting voluntary departure 

include the nature of the removal proceedings and 

immigration history, additional violations of 

immigration or criminal laws, and evidence of bad 

character or undesirability, and that adverse factors 

can be counterbalanced by long residence here, close 

family ties in the United States, or humanitarian 

needs).

The government argues that Perez-Gomez could not 

have shown prejudice because he could not prove with 

certainty that he would have received voluntary 

departure. Since this approach conflicts with the 

standard for prejudice articulated in Holland, the 

government introduces language from the subsequent case 

of United States v. Zelaya, 293 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 

2002), which seems to support its analysis: “An alien 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 53 of 65
54

characterizing a deportation as fundamentally unfair 

must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the outcome of the 

deportation proceeding would have been different but 

for a particular error.” Id. at 1298 (emphasis added). 

On closer examination, it appears that this statement 

of the prejudice requirement is shorthand for the 

Holland rule, not an alteration of it. The Zelaya

court cites only to Holland for support of its 

articulation. While Holland does use the phrase “would 

have been different” (noting that the alien “has not 

alleged how the result would have been any different”), 

876 F.2d at 1537, it also explains fundamental 

unfairness in terms of the “possibility of prejudice,” 

and whether a defect “could have made a difference.” 

Id. The governing rule was as articulated above: 

fundamental unfairness requires a showing that specific 

errors might have affected the outcome of a hearing.

Indeed, a contrary reading, and one that would hold 

this court to the “but for” language of Zelaya, would 

mean that a challenge to the denial of discretionary 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 54 of 65
55

relief from deportation on the basis of fundamental 

unfairness could never succeed. An immigration judge 

can always deny relief on discretionary grounds, even 

when an alien is categorically eligible. Moreover, 

federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review 

denials of discretionary relief such as voluntary 

departure. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(I); Alvarado v. 

U.S. Attorney Gen., 610 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 

2010). Therefore, a petitioner alleging an 

unconstitutional denial of discretionary relief could 

never prove with certainty that the outcome of the 

proceeding would have been different but for a 

particular error. In Zelaya, the court of appeals did 

not need to confront this logic because, given Zelaya’s 

aggravated-felony conviction, Zelaya was not eligible 

for discretionary relief. In that case, Zelaya could 

show neither that the proceeding would have been 

different but for a particular error, nor that the 

error might have affected the outcome. 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 55 of 65
56

Other courts of appeals that have specified a 

necessary quantum of proof for evaluating prejudice 

have appropriately applied a lower “reasonable 

likelihood” standard. See, e.g., United States v. 

Calderon-Pena, 339 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 2003) 

(requiring that an alien demonstrate a “reasonable 

likelihood that, but for the errors complained of, he 

would not have been deported”); see also U.S. v. 

Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) 

(collecting cases). This standard allows a court to 

assess probability without creating a no-win scenario.

Moreover, to the extent that the two cases do 

conflict, the Holland statement of the law is prior 

precedent and is therefore the correct standard to 

apply. United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 

(11th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (explaining that “[u]nder 

our prior precedent rule, a panel cannot overrule a 

prior one’s holding”). Finally, the government argues 

that Holland, like Mendoza-Lopez, was superseded by the 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 56 of 65
57

addition of subsection (d) to § 1326. For the reasons 

discussed previously, that argument must fail.

Thus, the court finds that Perez-Gomez would have 

established prejudice.

C.

However, while Perez-Gomez was prejudiced by the 

immigration judge’s actions, the judge’s action did not 

render the proceedings fundamentally unfair, such that

the prejudicial procedural deficiency is subject to a 

successful collateral challenge under § 1326.

Admittedly, as explained earlier, in Mendoza-Lopez, 

the Supreme Court did not provide guidance on how far 

an immigration judge must deviate from the correct 

procedures to where it amounts to a fundamental error 

that deprives an alien of due process, such that the 

administrative proceeding cannot be used as a predicate 

for a subsequent criminal prosecution. However, after 

noting that the challenge there was collateral, as 

opposed to direct and relying on a comparison with what 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 57 of 65
58

it considered “analogous abuses” in criminal 

proceedings, the Court emphasized the limited 

application of the phrase “fundamental” error,” 481 U. 

at 839, n.17: “We have previously recognized ... in the 

context of criminal proceedings, that some errors 

necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair, Rose 

v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (use of coerced 

confession, adjudication by biased judge); see also

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-544 (1982) (Stevens, 

J., dissenting) (mob violence, knowing use of perjured 

testimony). While the procedures required in an 

administrative proceeding are less stringent than those 

demanded in a criminal trial, analogous abuses could 

operate, under some circumstances, to deny effective 

judicial review of administrative determinations.” Id. 

at 839, n.17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, it is not sufficient that there be error, but 

rather the “procedural deficiencies [must be] so core 

to the fairness of a proceeding that their deprivation, 

if prejudicial, will render the proceeding 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 58 of 65
59

fundamentally unfair.” United States v. Charleswell, 

456 F.3d 347, 360 (3d Cir. 2006); see also id. (“[A]n 

alien's right to counsel in an immigration hearing 

before an [immigration judge] is so fundamental to the 

proceeding's fairness that a denial of that right could 

rise to the level of fundamental unfairness. ... The 

ability to build an administrative record before an 

[immigration judge] during his deportation hearing is 

likewise so fundamental such that a denial, if 

prejudicial, may also render the proceeding 

fundamentally unfair.”); id. (“Here, we must conclude 

that the INS's failure to inform Charleswell of his 

statutorily prescribed right to seek an appeal of his 

reinstatement order, combined with the misleading 

language contained in the reinstatement Notice of 

Intent form, is a fundamental defect of the nature 

that, if prejudicial, renders the proceeding 

fundamentally unfair.”). 

Following this guidance, this court concludes that 

the immigration judge’s misinforming Perez-Gomez about 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 59 of 65
60

his eligibility for voluntary departure was not a 

fundamental error. First, it must be emphasized that 

the challenge here to the removal proceeding is 

collateral and not direct. Error that is redressable 

in a direct appeal is not necessarily redressable in a 

collateral challenge. The collaterally challenged 

error must be on a par with fundamental errors in a 

criminal proceeding, such as use of a forced confession 

or adjudication by biased judge, or on a par with sofar recognized fundamental errors in immigration 

proceedings, such as denial of counsel or the ability 

to build an administrative record or the failure to 

inform an alien of his right to appeal at all.

Second, to be sure, voluntary departure provides a 

number of benefits for aliens who receive it: “He or 

she avoids extended detention pending completion of 

travel arrangements; is allowed to choose when to 

depart (subject to certain constraints); and can select 

the country of destination. And, of great importance, 

by departing voluntarily the alien facilitates the 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 60 of 65
61

possibility of readmission.” Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 

1, 11 (2008). Additionally, aliens receiving voluntary 

departure will not face prosecution for the felony of 

illegal reentry should they unlawfully return to the 

United States. United States v. Garcia, 2008 WL 

3890167, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Ross, J.). 

However, these benefits of voluntary departure do

not go to the core of the removal proceeding. First, 

and most importantly, that Perez-Gomez may have been 

eligible to depart voluntarily does not alter the core 

result of the proceeding: that he would have been 

forced to leave the country. In this sense, voluntary 

departure is critically different from § 240A(b) 

relief, which allows for discretionary cancellation of 

the removal itself and thus goes to the issue of 

whether the alien will be forced to leave at all. 

Section 240A(b) goes to the ultimate question of 

whether the alien should be required to leave, while 

voluntary departure goes to the question of the manner

in which he should leave.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 61 of 65
62

Second, it appears that Perez-Gomez may have faced

the same bar to illegal reentry regardless of whether 

he was given voluntary departure. Under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(9), an unlawful alien present in the United 

States for more than one year, who receives voluntary 

departure, must wait ten years to seek admission to the 

United States. Likewise, an alien who is deported for 

the first time faces the same ten-year bar to legal 

reentry. 

Moreover, voluntary departure is merely a 

beneficial “quid pro quo” between the government and an 

alien that allows for a more expedited, less expensive, 

and more convenient deportation process, but requires 

that the alien leave nonetheless. Dada v. Mukasey, 554 

U.S. 1, 11 (2008). In other words, while voluntary 

departure may be more beneficial for the alien, it does 

not go to the core issue of the deportation proceeding

(whether the alien has to leave) or to the process by 

which that core issue is determined.

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 62 of 65
63

Therefore, while the lack of an opportunity to seek 

voluntary departure might be redressable on a direct 

appeal, it is not sufficiently core to the removal 

proceeding that it should be redressable in a 

collateral proceeding. 

Perez-Gomez also bases his fundamental unfairness 

argument on being subject to future criminal 

prosecution for reentry. While the court recognizes 

the real and severe collateral consequences of 

deportation, the possibility of heavier penalties in 

subsequent criminal convictions is not enough, in this 

case, to establish that the removal proceeding itself 

was fundamentally unfair. Cf. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 

U.S. 1, 15 (1998) (explaining that a claim contingent 

upon respondents’ violating the law, getting caught, 

and being convicted is not sufficient to establish a 

constitutional injury for standing purposes); but see

Garcia, 2008 WL 3890167, at *8 (finding fundamental 

error where immigration judge did not correctly inform 

alien of voluntary departure in part because of 

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 63 of 65
64

potential future prosecution for illegal reentry). 

Within the facts of this case, Perez-Gomez cannot base 

his claim to fundamental unfairness of the removal 

order on his future criminal penalties. 

Perez-Gomez further argues that the availability of 

voluntary departure implicates his liberty, for he 

could have made bond and enjoyed freedom during the 15 

days it took to deport him as well as during the time 

he would have had if he been allowed to depart 

voluntarily. However, while this is true, again this 

does not go to, or in any way undermine, the core 

determination that he had to leave this country. As 

the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: “Some 

procedural defects ... are not so fundamental that they 

could render the underlying proceeding fundamentally 

unfair. For example, the right to be told of the 

possibility of being free on bond pending appeal, while 

a procedural defect, is not fatal to the entire 

proceeding.” Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 360 (emphasis 

added).

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 64 of 65
***

For the above reasons, this court denied 

Perez-Gomez’s motion to dismiss the one-count 

indictment against him for unlawful reentry.

DONE, this the 26th day of November, 2014.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:13-cr-00288-MHT-TFM Document 84 Filed 11/26/14 Page 65 of 65