Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01292/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01292-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Home Assurance Company
Appellant
United States
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

UNITED STATES,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2014-1292, 2014-1355

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 10-cv-00185, Senior Judge Richard W. 

Goldberg.

______________________ 

Decided: June 17, 2015

______________________ 

EDWARD FRANCIS KENNY, International Trade Field 

Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, New York, NY, 

argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant. Also represented by 

STUART F. DELERY, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, AMY M. RUBIN. 

HERBERT C. SHELLEY, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by MARK FREDERICK HORNING, JEFFREY M.

THEODORE. 

______________________ 

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2 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

Before MOORE, SCHALL, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

SCHALL, Circuit Judge. 

American Home Assurance Company (“AHAC”) appeals, and the government cross-appeals, the final decision of the United States Court of International Trade in 

United States v. American Home Assurance Co., 964 F.

Supp. 2d 1342 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014) (“American Home”). 

In its decision, the Court of International Trade made 

three rulings on summary judgment. First, the court held 

that AHAC was liable to the government under the continuous bond that it had issued to secure the payment of 

antidumping duties owed by JCOF (USA) International, 

Inc. (“JCOF”). Specifically, the court ruled that AHAC 

was liable under the bond for antidumping duties in 

connection with two entries of freshwater crawfish tail 

meat from China. Id. at 1347–49. Second, the court held 

that the government was not entitled to statutory prejudgment interest under 19 U.S.C. § 580 on the amount 

due under the bond. Id. at 1351–54. Third, the court 

held that AHAC was liable to the government for equitable prejudgment interest on the amount due under the 

bond. Id. at 1354–57. AHAC appeals the court’s rulings 

on liability and equitable prejudgment interest; the 

government cross-appeals its ruling on statutory prejudgment interest.

For the reasons set forth below, we (1) affirm the 

Court of International Trade’s ruling that AHAC is liable 

to the government under its bond; (2) reverse the court’s 

ruling that the government is not entitled to statutory 

prejudgment interest on the amount due; and (3) vacate

the court’s ruling that AHAC is liable to the government 

for equitable prejudgment interest on the amount due. 

The case is remanded to the Court of International Trade

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 3

BACKGROUND

The facts of the case are generally undisputed and are 

set forth in the Court of International Trade’s decision. 

See Am. Home, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1345–46. We recite

here the facts pertinent to the issues before us.

I.

Following a 1996 investigation, the U.S. Department 

of Commerce (“Commerce”) determined that freshwater 

crawfish tail meat imported from China was being sold in 

the United States at less than fair market value. See

Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the People’s Republic 

of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,347 (Aug. 1, 1997). As a result, 

Commerce ordered that entries of freshwater crawfish tail 

meat from China be subject to antidumping duties upon 

entry into the United States.1 

II.

JCOF is an importer based in New York. In 2001, it 

arranged to import into the United States shipments of 

freshwater crawfish tail meat from a Chinese exporter, 

Yangzhou Lakebest Foods Company, Ltd. (“Yangzhou”). 

Yangzhou did not export freshwater crawfish tail meat to 

1 Dumping occurs when foreign-produced goods are 

sold in the United States at a price below the sales price 

in the country of origin. E.g., Dongbu Steel Co. v. United 

States, 635 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011). If domestic 

companies believe they are being injured by dumping 

activity, they can lodge complaints with Commerce requesting the imposition of antidumping duties. Id. 

Commerce then conducts an investigation based on the 

complaints to determine whether, and to what extent, 

dumping is occurring. It orders antidumping duties if a 

domestic industry is being injured by less-than-fairmarket prices. Id. 

 

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4 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

the United States during the period of Commerce’s 1996 

investigation. For that reason, for purposes of exporting 

freshwater crawfish tail meat to the United States in 

2001, it qualified as a “new exporter” of merchandise 

under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B). Yangzhou’s “new exporter” status gave JCOF options for how it could post the 

security necessary for the Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection (“Customs”) to release the imported goods from 

its custody. It had the option of “posting, until the completion of the [administrative] review [of the new exporter], . . . a bond or security in lieu of a cash deposit.” 19 

U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii). 

Exercising that option, JCOF chose to use a surety 

company to post the required security. In April 2001, it 

contracted with AHAC, a New York-based surety, for the 

issuance of a one-year, continuous bond in the amount of 

$600,000.2 The bond became effective on May 4, 2001, 

and provided Customs with security for future duties 

owed on entries of freshwater crawfish tail meat from 

Yangzhou. [J.A. 23] Under the terms of the bond, AHAC 

and JCOF were jointly and severally obligated, and had a 

liability cap of $600,000. Am. Home, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 

1345.

During the period covered by the bond, JCOF made 

two entries of crawfish tail meat from Yangzhou at the 

Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach. Id. The entries occurred 

on November 1, and 2, 2001, and were identified as M42–

1164064–2 and M42–1164065–9, respectively. At the 

time of entry, JCOF declared a 0% ad valorem antidump2 A “continuous bond,” as compared to a “single 

transaction bond,” covers “liabilities resulting from multiple import transactions over a period of time, such as one 

year.” Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 465 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1302 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 2006); see also 19 C.F.R. § 113.12.

 

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ing duty rate, which was the deposit rate then in effect for

shipments by Yangzhou. Id. Based on JCOF’s bond, 

Customs allowed the freshwater crawfish tail meat to be 

released from its custody and to enter the stream of 

commerce in the United States. 

Shortly thereafter, Commerce conducted an administrative review of freshwater crawfish tail meat entries 

during the period of September 1, 2001, through August 

31, 2002.3 During the review, liquidation of JCOF’s two 

entries was suspended while Yangzhou’s final antidumping duty rate was determined.4 When Commerce eventually published the final results of its administrative 

review in February 2004, it assigned Yangzhou a 223.01% 

ad valorem antidumping duty rate. See Freshwater 

Crawfish Tail Meat from the People’s Republic of China, 

69 Fed. Reg. 7,193, 7,194 (Feb. 13, 2004). 

On May 12, 2004, Commerce issued instructions directing Customs to liquidate JCOF’s November 2001 

entries at the new rate assigned to Yangzhou. Customs

thereafter liquidated the entries on June 25, 2004, and 

billed JCOF for duties owed. Am. Home, 964 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1346. Following JCOF’s failure to pay the duties, 

3 An interested party may request Commerce to 

conduct an “administrative review” of an outstanding 

antidumping order. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675. The final 

results of such a review “shall be the basis for the assessment of countervailing or antidumping duties on entries 

of merchandise covered by the determination and for 

deposits of estimated duties.” Id. at § 1675(a)(2)(C).

4 “Liquidation” means the final computation or ascertainment of the duties accruing on an entry. 19 C.F.R. 

§ 159.1. Under Commerce’s accounting system, and as a 

result of suspended liquidations, the actual liquidation of 

entries subject to an antidumping order may occur years 

after the date of importation. 

 

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Customs sought payment from AHAC, as JCOF’s surety. 

In November 2004, AHAC denied liability and responded

to Customs’ demand for payment under the bond by filing

Protest No. 2704-04-102655 (the “102655 protest”). 

At about the same time, Shanghai Taoen International Trading Co., Ltd. (“Shanghai Taoen”), one of the other 

exporters of freshwater crawfish tail meat subject to 

Commerce’s 2004 administrative review, filed suit in the 

Court of International Trade challenging the results of 

the review. Id. Shanghai Taoen’s suit precipitated a 

preliminary injunction enjoining liquidation of the entries 

of crawfish tail meat exported by it. Id. Yangzhou was 

not named in the injunction, however, as it was not a 

party to the pending litigation. Id. Subsequently, in 

February 2005, the Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s final results. Shanghai Taoen Int’l 

Trading Co., Ltd. v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 

1348 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005). The court’s affirmance dissolved the outstanding injunction, and Customs was 

instructed to liquidate Shanghai Taoen’s entries at the 

applicable rate. 

Following dissolution of the Shanghai Taoen injunction, and even though the injunction had not applied to 

shipments from Yangzhou, Customs reliquidated JCOF’s 

two November 2001 entries on June 3, 2005, believing 

that the original liquidations in June 2004 may have been 

in violation of the Shanghai Taoen injunction. See Joint 

Appendix (“J.A.”) 109–112.5 As a result of those mistaken

5 In an August 7, 2007, letter to JCOF and AHAC, 

Customs wrote that it believed the preliminary injunction 

issued by the Court of International Trade in Shanghai 

Taoen covered JCOF’s entries. As a result, Customs said 

it had thought it should “unset” its original June 2004 

liquidations as being in violation of the court’s order. J.A. 

110. Reliquidation of JCOF’s entries in June 2005 fol-

 

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reliquidations, Customs voided its prior bills for duties 

owed and issued new bills to JCOF. When JCOF failed to 

pay the duties, Customs again sought payment from 

AHAC. Several weeks later, in July 2005, apparently not 

appreciating the effect of its reliquidation action, Customs 

denied the 102655 protest. That protest had remained 

unresolved following the original June 2004 liquidations. 

In September 2005, Customs issued a second demand to 

AHAC for payment of duties on the entries reliquidated in 

June 2005. 

AHAC did not appeal the denial of the 102655 protest 

by filing suit in the Court of International Trade. Instead, in December 2005, it filed a second protest, Protest 

No. 2704-05-102579 (the “102579 protest”), contesting

Customs’ further demand for payment under the continulowed the court’s February 2005 opinion in Shanghai 

Taoen sustaining the findings of Commerce’s administrative review and lifting the injunction. Customs stated in 

its 2007 letter that, when it reliquidated, it believed it 

had authority to do so under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) because 

the June 2005 reliquidations were being made within six 

months of the court’s February 2005 order, which it 

mistakenly perceived as removing a suspension of liquidation covering JCOF’s entries. It is now undisputed that 

the Shanghai Taoen preliminary injunction never applied 

to JCOF’s entries and that 19 U.S.C. § 1501 therefore 

provided the proper timeframe within which Customs 

could have reliquidated the entries: “within ninety days 

from the date on which notice of the original liquidation is 

given or transmitted to the importer.” That is, in this 

case, within ninety days of notice of the June 2004 liquidations, Customs could have reliquidated. It is undisputed that Customs’ June 2005 reliquidations fell outside of 

the § 1501 timeframe and were thus erroneous, in addition to being unnecessary.

 

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ous bond following the erroneous reliquidations. In July

2006, Customs denied AHAC’s protest. AHAC did not file

an action in the Court of International Trade contesting 

the denial. 

On February 9, 2007, Customs sent a third demand 

letter to AHAC. In it, Customs sought a total payment of 

$1,157,898.22 for unpaid duties and interest in connection 

with JCOF’s two November 2001 freshwater crawfish tail 

meat entries. Am. Home, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1346. AHAC 

denied liability and refused to make payment under the 

bond. 

III.

On June 21, 2010, the government filed suit in the 

Court of International Trade to recover from AHAC, as 

JCOF’s surety, the duties and interest allegedly owed on 

the November 2001 entries. The parties, in due course, 

cross-moved for summary judgment on various issues. 

Seeking summary judgment on the merits, AHAC asserted that the government’s collection action was moot due 

to the 2005 reliquidations. It argued that the erroneous 

reliquidations voided the previous timely liquidations of 

June 2004, resulting in a scenario where no valid liquidation or reliquidation occurred. According to AHAC, since 

no valid liquidation was on record, the entries at issue 

should have been deemed liquidated by operation of law 

under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) at the initially-declared 0% rate

six months after the suspension of liquidation was removed in February 2004. 

The government moved for summary judgment on entitlement to prejudgment statutory interest under 19 

U.S.C. § 580. Section 580 provides that “[u]pon all bonds, 

on which suits are brought for the recovery of duties, 

interest shall be allowed . . . from the time when said 

bonds became due.” The government argued that the 

statute’s plain language mandated that it be awarded 

interest for AHAC’s delayed payment under the continuCase: 14-1292 Document: 54-2 Page: 8 Filed: 06/17/2015
US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 9

ous bond. The government also claimed entitlement to 

equitable prejudgment interest. 

In the decision now on appeal, the Court of International Trade ruled on the summary judgment motions. 

The court first determined that AHAC was legally obligated to pay under its continuous bond. Am. Home, 964 

F. Supp. 2d at 1347. It agreed with AHAC that the 2005 

reliquidations superseded and voided the original liquidations. It ruled, however, that AHAC was required to

preserve its rights by timely protesting the reliquidations 

by instituting litigation. Id. at 1347, 1349. The court 

concluded that, under our decision in Juice Farms, Inc. v. 

United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the 2005 

reliquidations became final, “whether legal or not,” once 

AHAC failed to challenge them in court. Am. Home, 964 

F. Supp. 2d at 1347 (quoting Juice Farms, 68 F.3d at 

1346). The court held that since AHAC failed to timely 

challenge the reliquidations in court, it had failed to 

preserve its rights and was thus liable under the continuous bond. Id. at 1349. 

Having found AHAC liable, the Court of International 

Trade next held that the government was not entitled to 

statutory prejudgment interest under § 580. Id. at 1350–

55. In the court’s view, the historical context of the statute did not allow the word “duties” to encompass antidumping duties. The court determined that, “in the 

period since the statute’s enactment over 200 years ago, 

Congress, courts, and the Government itself have counseled that antidumping duties are not comparable to 

normal customs duties in function, purpose, and character.” Id. at 1352. In reaching its decision, the court relied 

on Dynacraft Industries v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 2d 

1286 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000), and Wheatland Tube Co. v. 

United States, 495 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The court

stated that, in Dynacraft, it had previously interpreted 

“duties” in an interest statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1505, as encompassing only “ordinary” customs duties. Am. Home, 

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10 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

964 F. Supp. 2d at 1353 (citing Dynacraft, 118 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1292). Citing our decision in Wheatland Tube, the 

court noted that the government itself had previously 

advocated for the interpretation of “duties” adopted in

Dynacraft. Id. (citing Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1361–

63).

The Court of International Trade did rule, though, 

that the government was entitled to equitable prejudgment interest (in excess of the $600,000 bond limit) for 

AHAC’s use of the money owed after payment had become

due. Id. at 1354–57. The court determined that both 

equity and fairness weighed in favor of awarding equitable interest to the government. Id. at 1356–57.

AHAC timely appealed the Court of International 

Trade’s decision on liability and equitable interest; the 

government timely cross-appealed the court’s denial of

§ 580 interest. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

In the Court of International Trade, summary judgment is available when “the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” U.S. Ct. 

Int’l Trade R. 56(a). We review the Court of International 

Trade’s grant or denial of summary judgment “for correctness as a matter of law, deciding de novo the proper 

interpretation of the governing statute and regulations as 

well as whether genuine issues of material fact exist.” St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 763, 

767 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Esso Standard Oil Co. (PR) 

v. United States, 559 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009). As 

noted, in this case the material facts are not in dispute.

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I.

A.

AHAC argues that the Court of International Trade

erred in finding it liable under the continuous bond for 

antidumping duties. It contends that, despite being 

unnecessary and erroneous, the June 2005 reliquidations 

were valid for purposes of superseding and voiding the 

timely June 2004 liquidations. In the same breath, 

though, it urges that because the reliquidations occurred 

more than ninety days after the June 2004 liquidations,

they were nevertheless invalid under 19 U.S.C. § 1501 for 

purposes of conferring liability. AHAC states that § 1501 

requires that reliquidations not occurring “within ninety 

days from the date on which notice of the original liquidation is given” are considered void.6 Id. Thus, in AHAC’s 

view, no valid liquidation or reliquidation occurred, and, 

consequently, the “deemed liquidation” provisions of 19 

U.S.C. § 1504(d) must therefore apply. 

Subsection 1504(d), titled “Removal of suspension,” 

provides a timeframe within which, following the removal 

of a suspension of liquidation, Customs must properly 

liquidate an entry or otherwise accept the rate initially 

declared by the importer. It states that the “Customs 

Service shall liquidate the entry, unless liquidation is 

6 The first sentence of § 1501 provides, in full: “A 

liquidation made in accordance with section 1500 or 1504 

of this title or any reliquidation thereof made in accordance with this section may be reliquidated in any respect 

by the Customs Service, notwithstanding the filing of a 

protest, within ninety days from the date on which notice 

of the original liquidation is given or transmitted to the 

importer, his consignee or agent.” It is undisputed that 

the June 2005 reliquidations occurred outside of that 

statutory timeframe. 

 

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12 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

extended under subsection (b) of this section, within 6 

months after receiving notice of the removal from the 

Department of Commerce, other agency, or a court with 

jurisdiction over the entry.” Continuing, it provides: “Any 

entry . . . not liquidated by the Customs Service within 6 

months after receiving . . . notice [of the removal of a 

suspension order] shall be treated as having been liquidated at the rate of duty . . . asserted at the time of entry 

by the importer of record.” According to AHAC, the two 

shipments of freshwater crawfish tail meat imported by 

JCOF in November 2001 were “deemed liquidated” in 

August 2004 at the 0% rate declared at the time of entry, 

because there was no valid liquidation of the entries 

within six months of the removal of the suspension order 

in February 2004. 

AHAC also argues that it was not required to challenge in court the “legally void” 2005 reliquidations in 

order to preserve its contention that the reliquidations 

were invalid for purposes of conferring liability. AHAC

contends that the Court of International Trade erred in 

finding that its failure to appeal the denied 102579 protest resulted in the reliquidations being “final and conclusive” because the entries were deemed liquidated before 

that time. It relies on United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc. in support of its position that, if entries are 

deemed liquidated, a subsequent reliquidation need not 

be protested in order to preserve defenses to future collection actions. 112 F.3d 1550, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 

The government responds by arguing that no “deemed 

liquidation” occurred. It contends that the original June

2004 liquidations were timely made under § 1504(d) 

because they took place within six months of the removal 

of the suspension of liquidation that was in place during 

Commerce’s 2004 administrative review. It asserts that 

AHAC prevented those liquidations from becoming final 

and conclusive by filing the 102655 protest in November 

2004, and that the government reliquidated the entries in 

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June 2005 before the pending protest was denied. Although AHAC protested the later, mistaken 2005 reliquidations in the 102579 protest in December 2005, the 

government argues that AHAC’s failure to contest the 

denial of the 102579 protest at the Court of International 

Trade allowed those reliquidations to become final and 

conclusive pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) and relevant 

case law.7 

B.

We agree with the Court of International Trade that 

AHAC is liable to the government under the continuous 

bond. Contrary to AHAC’s protestations, no “deemed 

liquidation” occurred here. Under § 1504(d), an entry is 

only deemed to be liquidated by operation of law when it 

is “not liquidated by the Customs Service within 6 months 

after receiving [a notice of removal of a suspension of 

liquidation]” from Commerce. We have explained that, 

under § 1504(d), three elements are required in order for 

a deemed liquidation to occur: “(1) the suspension of 

liquidation that was in place must have been removed; (2) 

Customs must have received notice of the removal of the 

suspension; and (3) Customs must not liquidate the entry 

at issue within six months of receiving such notice.” 

Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 

1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

The liquidation of JCOF’s November 2001 entries was 

suspended pending the conclusion of Commerce’s admin7 In relevant part, 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) provides that 

liquidation and reliquidations “shall be final and conclusive upon all persons (including the United States and 

any officer thereof) unless a protest is filed in accordance 

with this section, or unless a civil action contesting the 

denial of a protest, in whole or in part, is commenced in 

the United States Court of International Trade.”

 

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istrative review. See Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from 

the People’s Republic of China, 69 Fed. Reg. 7,193, 7,194 

(Feb. 13, 2004). Thereafter, following completion of the 

administrative review, and publication thereof in the 

Federal Register on February 13, 2004, id., Commerce 

instructed Customs, on May 12, 2004, to proceed with 

liquidating the entries. Customs did not delay liquidation 

for over “six months after receiving notice.” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1504(d). Instead, it timely liquidated both entries 

within five months, on June 25, 2004. Thus, the third 

element required for a “deemed liquidation” to occur is 

clearly absent. See Fujitsu Gen. Am., 283 F.3d at 1376 

(“Customs must not liquidate the entry at issue within six 

months of receiving such notice.”). 

To avoid this straightforward result, AHAC contends 

that the 2005 reliquidations superseded and voided the 

original timely liquidations, with the result that it is as if 

Customs’ prior actions never took place. In other words, 

AHAC asks us to hold that the 2005 reliquidations retroactively created a void in the chain of events, producing

the possibility that a final and conclusive deemed liquidation occurred before the reliquidations. We are unable to 

accept the invitation. By liquidating in June 2004, Customs did take the action required under the statute to 

avoid liquidation by operation of law. Moreover, at the 

time of Customs’ mistaken reliquidations, the 102655 

protest, filed by AHAC in November 2004, was pending. 

See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (providing that liquidations 

become final “unless a protest is filed”). Thus, at the time 

of the June 2005 reliquidations, Customs had acted to 

liquidate the entries and the original liquidations were 

not yet final. In short, nothing had triggered the operation of the “deemed liquidation” provision of § 1504(d). 

AHAC’s theory of “retroactive deemed liquidation” 

would create a universe where a reliquidation made by 

Customs could be simultaneously valid for purposes of 

retroactively vacating an earlier liquidation, thereby 

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giving rise to a “deemed liquidation” under § 1504(d), but 

invalid for purposes of conferring liability. AHAC’s theory, and the rule it creates, would subvert the purpose 

behind § 1504(d). As we explained in Cherry Hill, “[t]he 

‘deemed liquidated’ provision . . . was added to the customs laws in 1978 to place a limit on the period within 

which importers and sureties would be subject to the 

prospect of liability for a customs entry.” 112 F.3d at 

1559. If Customs takes action within that “period,” 

importers are timely aware of their liability. Here, Customs’ original, timely liquidation placed the “prospect of 

liability” clearly and fairly upon AHAC. Id. Indeed, the 

June 2005 reliquidations were calculated under the same 

223.01% ad valorem antidumping duty rate as the original June 2004 liquidations. AHAC knew full well of its 

liability; it faced none of the concerns that § 1504(d) aims

to alleviate. 

Cherry Hill, upon which AHAC relies, does not in fact 

support its position. In Cherry Hill, Customs failed to 

make an original liquidation for over thirteen months 

after September 18, 1987, when the goods at issue were 

entered as duty free. Id. at 1551. Eventually, on October 

28, 1988, Customs liquidated the entry as dutiable in the 

amount of $12,220.62. Id. The government gave notice of 

the liquidation to Cherry Hill and subsequently demanded payment from Cherry Hill’s surety, International 

Cargo & Surety Insurance Co. (“IC&S”), under the bond it 

had given. IC&S refused to make payment. It did not, 

however, protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 either the liquidation or the demand for payment. Id. After the passage 

of the ninety-day period within which a protest could be 

filed, the government filed an enforcement action in the 

Court of International Trade seeking recovery of the 

assessed duties. The court granted summary judgment to 

the government for the full amount of its claim for duties, 

plus interest. Id.

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On appeal, IC&S contended that summary judgment 

should not have been granted in favor of the government 

because the entry at issue was “deemed liquidated” duty 

free by operation of law when Customs failed to liquidate 

it within the one-year period required by 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1504(a). We agreed with IC&S that it was not required 

to protest the October 1988 liquidation in order to defend 

against Customs’ enforcement action by arguing that 

Customs was legally foreclosed from liquidating the entry

anew after the entry had been deemed liquidated. Id. at 

1558, 1560. We held that a “‘deemed liquidation’ defense 

did not have to be raised through a protest, and that the 

trial court should have considered that issue on the 

merits.” Id. at 1558. Relying on United States v. Sherman & Sons Co., 237 U.S. 146 (1915), we created a narrow exception to the usual timely protest requirement set 

forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1514. Cherry Hill, 112 F.3d at 1558–

59. We explained that an exception was necessary to 

prevent Customs from “purport[ing] to liquidate an entry 

anew, years after the first liquidation had become final, 

and thereby impos[ing] liability on the importer or surety 

if the importer or surety were not vigilant in watching for 

notice of such untimely liquidations or if it were no longer 

able to undertake the burden of filing and pursuing a 

protest.” Id. at 1560. 

However, the entry in Cherry Hill, unlike the entries 

here, “was deemed liquidated . . . one year after the entry” 

because the government took no action at all within the 

statutory period set forth in § 1504(a). Id. at 1559. 

Rather, Customs purported to make a new liquidation a 

month later, outside the one-year period from entry, and 

attempted to treat that new liquidation as the operative 

liquidation. We held that Customs lost its opportunity to 

do so because the “deemed liquidation” was already final 

and conclusive. Id. at 1560 (“In cases in which a liquidation has become final, the government cannot seek to 

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US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 17

tion of the original entry.”). Unlike in Cherry Hill, where 

a deemed liquidation occurred pursuant to § 1504(a), in 

this case there was no deemed liquidation under 

§ 1504(d). The reason is that the original liquidations of 

June 2004 were timely (because they were made within 

six months of the notice of removal of the suspension of 

liquidation). Moreover, they were not final at the time of 

the reliquidations (because of AHAC’s pending protest). 

In short, this is not a case where Customs “purport[ed] to 

liquidate an entry anew, years after the first liquidation 

had become final.” Id. 

Because we conclude that no “deemed liquidation” occurred, AHAC’s theory of zero liability must fail. This 

case is governed, not by Cherry Hill, but by the ordinary 

timely protest requirements. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). In 

Juice Farms, we directly addressed whether the time 

limit for protests set forth in § 1514(a) “applies to allegedly illegal liquidations,” such as Customs’ 2005 reliquidations of JCOF’s entries. 68 F.3d at 1345. We held that 

“all liquidations, whether legal or not, are subject to the 

timely protest requirement” and that “[w]ithout a timely 

protest, all liquidations become final and conclusive under 

19 U.S.C. § 1514.” Id. at 1346.

In sum, even though it is undisputed that Customs’ 

2005 reliquidations were erroneous, AHAC’s failure to 

challenge those reliquidations in the Court of International Trade resulted in those liquidations becoming final 

and conclusive. Id.; see also Cherry Hill, 112 F.3d at 1559

(“this court does not recognize a distinction between ‘void’ 

and ‘voidable’ liquidations for purposes of determining the 

applicability of the protest requirement”); Omni U.S.A.,

Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

(same); United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 593 F.2d 

1015, 1020 (CCPA 1979) (same). We therefore affirm the 

Court of International Trade’s decision that AHAC is 

legally obligated to pay under its continuous bond. 

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18 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

II.

We turn now to the government’s cross-appeal, addressing the issue of whether statutory prejudgment 

interest under 19 U.S.C. § 580 applies to antidumping 

duties. As noted, § 580, titled “Interest in suits on bonds 

for recovery of duties,” provides that “[u]pon all bonds, on 

which suits are brought for the recovery of duties, interest 

shall be allowed . . . from the time when said bonds became due.” The Court of International Trade held that 

§ 580 does not apply to bonds that secure antidumping 

duties. On appeal, we review the court’s statutory interpretation de novo.8 Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United 

States, 397 F.3d 1358, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

A.

The government contends that the Court of International Trade erred in holding that AHAC is not liable for 

§ 580 interest on the delayed payment of the antidumping 

duties owed under the continuous bond. In particular, the 

government argues that the court erred in finding that 

“duties” in § 580 refers only to traditional customs duties, 

and not to “special” duties, such as antidumping duties. 

It argues that the court mistakenly focused its inquiry on 

the types of “duties” instead of on the fact that the statute 

provides for interest on “all bonds.” In the government’s

view, the statute is broad enough on its face to cover all 

customs bonds, not simply bonds relating to traditional 

8 Because neither Customs nor any other agency 

has been charged with administering § 580, we, like the 

Court of International Trade, construe the statute without deference. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (requiring 

Chevron deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation only in the case of “construction of a statutory scheme 

it is entrusted to administer”).

 

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customs duties. The government argues that, when § 580 

was enacted, Congress understood and intended “duties” 

to include protectionist elements similar to modern day 

antidumping statutes. It argues that § 580 furthers the 

goals of those shared protectionist principles and motivates sureties to timely pay under issued bonds. It further argues that, even if “duties” was once meant to

include only traditional customs duties, the scope of a 

statute can expand over time to include circumstances 

that did not exist when it was first enacted. 

AHAC, for its part, agrees with the Court of International Trade that § 580 is limited to bonds securing traditional customs duties, and does not cover bonds securing

antidumping duties. It asserts that the original act, 

codified in 1799, was for the purpose of regulating the 

“collection of duties on imports and tonnage.” Act of 

March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 627. According to 

AHAC, this means the act was directed to traditional, 

revenue-raising duties. Citing Canadian Wheat Board v. 

United States, AHAC contends that antidumping duties 

are not considered revenue-raising duties and fall outside 

of § 580’s scope. 641 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 

(“Antidumping duty orders are imposed ‘for reasons other 

than the raising of revenue.’ They are imposed to protect 

American industries against unfair trade practices by 

foreign entities who sell in the American market.”). 

AHAC also points out that the “recovery of duties” language in the modern version of § 580 was not altered 

when § 580 was recodified four years after the antidumping statutes were first enacted in 1921. According to 

AHAC, this suggests that § 580 exists separate and apart 

from the antidumping scheme. 

AHAC further contends that the Court of International Trade’s interpretation of § 580 is supported by the 

positions taken by the government in prior cases. For 

example, AHAC notes that, in Wheatland Tube, the 

government argued that antidumping duties should be 

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20 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

distinguished from “normal,” or “general,” customs duties

and therefore should be treated differently. 495 F.3d at 

1361–62; see also Dynacraft, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. 

And, it asserts that we have recognized the government’s

recent change of position regarding whether § 580 applies 

to bonds securing the payment of special duties, as well as

to bonds securing the payment of traditional duties. It 

points out that, in United States v. Great American Insurance Co. of New York, we noted that the government “only 

recently . . . beg[an] to invoke section 580 in cases involving antidumping . . . duties,” which we characterized as “a 

seemingly major change in the government’s asserted 

position on the scope and relationship of old laws.” 738 

F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2013). AHAC contends that 

our decision in Great American suggests the correctness of 

the Court of International Trade’s decision in this case. 

In addition, AHAC argues that the separate treatment of traditional and special duties reflects their different underlying roles. It argues that antidumping duties, 

while serving some protectionist purposes, are primarily 

remedial in nature. It posits that Customs has long 

viewed antidumping duties as “different from normal 

customs duties because they implement a trade remedy.” 

Stainless Steel Wire Rod from the Republic of Korea, 69 

Fed. Reg. 19,153, 19,159 n.22 (April 12, 2004). It states

that we have said that “[a]ntidumping duties aim to 

remedy sales by a foreign exporter in the U.S. market at 

less than fair value. . . . Normal customs duties, [by] 

contrast, have no remedial purpose.” Wheatland Tube, 

495 F.3d at 1362.

B.

We hold, as a matter of law, that 19 U.S.C. § 580 provides for interest on bonds securing both traditional 

customs duties and antidumping duties. We therefore

reverse the contrary holding of the Court of International 

Trade. 

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Our analysis begins with the language of § 580. E.g., 

Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“The 

starting point in discerning congressional intent is the 

existing statutory text . . . .”); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 

519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (“Our first step in interpreting a 

statute is to determine whether the language at issue has 

a plain and unambiguous meaning . . . .”). When the 

statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according 

to its terms. E.g., Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 

359 (2005); Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534. “In reviewing the 

statute’s text, we give the words ‘their “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,” absent an indication Congress 

intended them to bear some different import.’” Indian 

Harbor Ins. Co. v. United States, 704 F.3d 949, 954 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 

(2000)). 

Section 580 is a short, free-standing statute within 

the Administrative Provisions section of Chapter 3 in

Title 19. It does not cross-reference other statutory 

provisions and provides, in full: “Upon all bonds, on which 

suits are brought for the recovery of duties, interest shall 

be allowed at the rate of 6 per centum a year, from the 

time when said bonds became due.” 19 U.S.C. § 580 

(emphases added). The language—“all bonds” on which 

the government sues for “the recovery of duties”—is clear 

and unqualified. As written, the term “duties” does not 

modify the type of “bonds” on which interest shall be 

allowed. Instead, the statute calls for interest on “all

bonds.” The term “duties” reflects only the requisite res 

litigiosae—i.e., the general nature of the disputed property in the government’s legal action against the surety. 

Thus, by the statute’s plain terms, it covers, among other 

things, bonds securing the payment of antidumping 

duties when the government sues for payment under 

those bonds. See Camargo Correa Metais, S.A. v. United 

States, 200 F.3d 771, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“If the words 

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22 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

are unambiguous, no further inquiry is usually required.”). 

The fact that Congress first enacted § 580 in 1799 and 

the fact that the statute at that time applied only to bonds 

securing payment of then-existing customs duties do not 

alter the plain-meaning analysis. As the Court of International Trade recognized, statutory scope can and does

expand over time to encompass circumstances that did 

not exist at the date of enactment. Am. Home, 964 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1351; see also West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 

218 (1999) (“Words in statutes can enlarge or contract 

their scope as other changes, in law or in the world, 

require their application to new instances . . . .”). It is 

well established that, even though a “statute is presumed 

to speak from the time of its enactment,” a statute later 

“embraces all such persons or things as subsequently fall 

within its scope, and ceases to apply to such as thereafter 

fall without its scope.” De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 

197 (1901); see also Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 

(1945) (“[I]f Congress has made a choice of language 

which fairly brings a given situation within a statute, it is 

unimportant that the particular application may not have 

been contemplated by the legislators.”); Newman v. Arthur, 109 U.S. 132, 138 (1883) (statutes apply to latercreated circumstances if the “language fairly and clearly 

includes them”). Thus, the creation of the current system 

of levying antidumping duties in 1921, more than a 

hundred years after enactment of what is now § 580, see

Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67–10, 42 Stat. 11, 

is not an obstacle to concluding that the plain terms of 

§ 580 encompass bonds for securing the payment of such

duties. 

Moreover, since § 580 was enacted in 1799, there have 

been only minimal changes to the statutory language. 

The original act, which was titled “An Act to regulate the 

collection of duties on imports and tonnage,” provided: 

“And on all bonds upon which suits shall be commenced, 

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an interest shall be allowed at the rate of six per cent. per 

annum, from the time when said bonds become due, until 

the payment thereof.” Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 65, 

1 Stat. 627, 677. The current version of the statute was 

adopted in 1873. At that time, Congress retained the 

phrase “all bonds” and incorporated the word “duties”

from the title of the original act into the phrase “for the 

recovery of duties,” which is now in the body of the statute.9 Compare id. at 627 (titled “An Act to regulate the 

collection of duties on imports and tonnage”), with 1 Rev. 

Stat. 181, § 963 (1875), and 19 U.S.C. § 580 (2012). Thus, 

there have been no changes in the statutory language 

which, on their face, would serve to move bonds for securing antidumping duties outside the scope of the statute. 

Congress, for instance, did not alter the language or the 

scope of § 580 following the enactment of the Antidumping Act of 1921 or following § 580’s incorporation into 

Title 19 from Title 28 in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 

646, § 1, 62 Stat. 869; see also Am. Home, 964 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1350 (explaining that “Congress has not substantially 

updated § 580 or otherwise signaled whether the statute 

applies to antidumping duties”).

There is also no legislative history surrounding § 580 

to suggest a reading that deviates from the plain language of the statute. Neither party contends that any 

legislative history is instructive as to whether the “all 

9 The 1873 version of the statute appeared in the 

1875 Revised Statutes with other provisions governing 

“The Judiciary.” It first entered the United States Code 

in Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, see 28 

U.S.C. § 787 (1926), fifty-one years later. In 1948, Congress revised Title 28, and § 580 was moved without 

change from Title 28 to its current location in Title 19, 

which is now titled Customs Duties. See Act of June 25, 

1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 869.

 

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bonds” language was intended to mean only bonds securing traditional, revenue-raising duties, to the exclusion of

antidumping duties. At the same time, the limited number of interpretations of § 580 suggests a broad and 

independent purpose for § 580 that is consistent with its 

plain language. In 1983, for example, Customs expressed 

the view that § 580 is “not an interest charge for the use 

of funds, but an exaction aimed at motivating apparently 

recalcitrant debtor sureties to pay rather than force the 

Government to sue to collect.” Proposed Customs Regulations Amendments To Establish Interest Charges on 

Certain Delinquent Accounts, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,077, 10,078 

(Mar. 10, 1983) (emphasis added); see also Act of March 2, 

1799, ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 627, 676 (providing § 580 interest for the situation “where any bond for the payment of 

duties shall not be satisfied on the day it may become 

due”). That purpose—which applies equally to “all 

bonds,” whether securing traditional duties or antidumping duties—is echoed by our decision in United States v. 

Federal Insurance Co., 857 F.2d 1457, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 

1988). In Federal Insurance, we suggested no limitation 

as to the types of customs bonds covered by § 580, but 

stated simply that “whenever a court awards unpaid 

import duties in a suit upon a bond, interest must be 

attached pursuant to section 580.” Id. Neither AHAC nor 

the Court of International Trade have pointed us to an 

interpretation of the language of § 580 that teaches 

something other than the statute’s ordinary meaning. 

The Court of International Trade’s opinion and 

AHAC’s arguments on appeal are based largely on the 

fact that, in certain other instances, “duties” has been 

separated into “regular” and “special” duties. Am. Home, 

964 F. Supp. 2d at 1352–53; Defendant-Appellant Resp. & 

Repl. Br. 25–27. For example, both AHAC and the court

cite to Dynacraft, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1286. In that case, the 

Court of International Trade determined that “regular 

duties” included customs duties and that “special duties” 

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US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 25

included antidumping duties. Id. at 1291. After reviewing the use of the word “duties” in the pre- and postUruguay Rounds Agreement Act statutory schemes, the 

court held that “antidumping and countervailing duties 

were never intended to be regular or general duties.” Id.

at 1292. The Court of International Trade in this case

found that logic to be persuasive against the approach of

interpreting the “open-ended word ‘duties’” in § 580 “to 

include all types of duties.” Am. Home, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 

1354.

In Dynacraft, however, the court was not confronted 

with the question of whether there is a difference between, on the one hand, bonds securing the payment of 

“regular” duties and, on the other, bonds securing the 

payment of “special” duties. Instead, the court addressed 

the rather narrow and technical issue of whether overpayment of estimated antidumping duty cash deposits 

made pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(1)(B) constituted

“duties” under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1505(b) and (c), so that the 

party making the overpayment became entitled to interest on “excess moneys.”10 118 F. Supp. 2d at 1291–92. 

The plaintiff in that case, Dynacraft Industries, Inc. 

(“Dynacraft”), argued that it was entitled to interest 

under § 1505(c) on the cash deposits it had posted pursuant to § 1673b(d)(1)(B) before an antidumping duty order 

was published. The Court of International Trade agreed 

with the government, however, that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673f 

and 1677g, which are part of the antidumping laws, 

10 Subsection 1505(b), addressing “refunds of duties,” provides, in relevant part, that “[r]efunds of excess 

moneys deposited, together with interest thereon, shall be 

paid within 30 days of liquidation or reliquidation.” 

Subsection 1505(c) provides interest on “excess moneys” 

“from the date the importer of record deposits estimated 

duties, fees, and interest.”

 

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governed the payment of interest in the case. Sections

1673f and 1677g, respectively, cover the treatment of 

estimated and final duties under antidumping duty 

orders and provide for interest on overpayments. Those 

provisions, the court stated, “prohibit the payment of 

interest for security posted before the publication of an 

antidumping order.” Id. at 1287. Rejecting Dynacraft’s 

arguments, the court determined that § 1505(b) did not 

control, but it did not decide the case based on the ground 

that the word “duties” in § 1505(b) excludes antidumping 

duties. Id. at 1292. It explicitly based its decision on four 

other grounds related to the interplay between 19 U.S.C. 

§§ 1505, 1673f, and 1677g. See id. It left open the question of “whether or not for some purposes 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1505(b) and (c) include antidumping duties among the 

‘[d]uties, fees, and interest determined to be due upon 

liquidation or reliquidation.’” Id.

Neither does Wheatland Tube support the result 

urged by AHAC. Wheatland Tube was cited by the Court 

of International Trade and is relied upon by AHAC. In 

Wheatland Tube, the issue was whether “§ 201 safeguard 

duties” are “United States import duties” under 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677a(c)(2)(A), which covers the determination of export 

price for antidumping purposes. See 495 F.3d at 1357.11 

The government took the position that § 201 duties are 

“special antidumping duties” because they are “more 

like . . . [antidumping duties] in purpose and function 

than they are like ordinary customs duties.” Id. at 1362

(alterations in original). Ultimately, we determined that 

“Commerce’s interpretation that ‘United States import 

11 Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 

§ 2251, authorizes the President to impose “safeguard 

duties” if merchandise is imported to the United States in 

such large quantities that it injures domestic industry. 

Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1357. 

 

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duties’ does not include § 201 safeguard duties for the 

purposes of determining the [export price] and calculating 

. . . dumping margin is reasonable.” Id. at 1363. Wheatland Tube did not address surety bonds or distinctions 

between bonds that secure the payment of various types 

of duties owed. Rather, it focused on a different statutory 

scheme; it addressed whether “safeguard duties” paid 

under § 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251,

are considered “United States import duties” under 19 

U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) for purposes of calculating dumping margins. Nothing in Wheatland Tube justifies deviating from the plain language of § 580 in this case. 

As AHAC points out, in Great American we did state

that the government’s decision “to invoke section 580 in 

cases involving antidumping (or, apparently, countervailing) duties” seemed like a “major change in the government’s asserted position on the scope and relationship of 

old laws.” 738 F.3d at 1327. We did not, however, take 

the position that § 580 is not applicable to bonds securing 

the payment of antidumping duties. Rather, we said that 

“[t]he characterization [of § 580 interest as a penalty] 

leaves, rather than disposes of, questions about whether 

section 580 applies to antidumping duties at all and 

whether, if so, case-specific equitable considerations are 

relevant to its application, as is common under other, 

variously worded authorizations to apply penalties.” Id.

(footnote omitted). We determined in Great American

that the prejudgment interest issue needed further development at the trial level “because the government’s 

request . . . raise[d] significant questions about, for example, the equitable considerations attending equitable 

interest and/or section 580 interest, the novelty of application of section 580 to antidumping duties, and the 

soundness of the theory that both types of interest should 

be awarded.” Id. at 1328. In this case, unlike Great 

American, development of the necessary legal and factual 

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28 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

issues relating to the application of § 580 interest has 

taken place.

In sum, nothing before us overcomes the clear language of 19 U.S.C. § 580. We, accordingly, reverse the 

decision of the Court of International Trade and hold that

the government is entitled to statutory prejudgment 

interest under § 580. On remand, the Court of International Trade will calculate the precise amount of such 

interest owed. 

III. 

We address next the issue of whether the government 

is entitled to equitable prejudgment interest, in view of 

our holding that it is entitled to statutory prejudgment 

interest under 19 U.S.C. § 580. 

A.

We have explained that, “[i]n the absence of a statute 

governing the award of prejudgment interest, ‘the question [of prejudgment interest] is governed by traditional 

judge-made principles.’” Princess Cruises, 397 F.3d at 

1367 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat’l 

Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995)). In that situation, 

we have viewed the award of prejudgment interest as an 

equitable determination to be exercised at the discretion 

of the trial judge. United States v. Reul, 959 F.2d 1572, 

1577 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Although no statute authorizes the 

award of prejudgment interest in this case, the Court of 

International Trade in exercising its equitable powers 

may in its sound discretion award prejudgment interest.”); United States v. Imperial Food Imports, 834 F.2d 

1013, 1016 (Fed. Cir 1987) (“[I]n cases such as this in 

which no statute specifically authorizes an award of 

prejudgment interest, such an award lies within the 

discretion of the court as part of its equitable powers.”). 

Relatedly, while we have stated that “[t]he degree to 

which the trial court is to balance equitable factors to 

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determine whether to award prejudgment interest is not 

easy to discern from the case law,” there is no doubt that 

equitable considerations are central to such an award. 

Princess Cruises, 397 F.3d at 1368; see also Imperial 

Foods, 834 F.2d at 1016 (prejudgment interest is “a 

matter of equity and fairness”). Prejudgment interest

typically “compensate[s] for the loss of use of money due 

as damages from the time the claim accrues until judgment is entered, thereby achieving full compensation for 

the injury those damages are intended to redress.” West 

Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 n.2 (1987). 

Finally, the Supreme Court has cautioned against an 

overly mechanical application of equitable prejudgment 

interest. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962)

(“interest is not recovered according to a rigid theory of 

compensation for money withheld, but is given in response to considerations of fairness”). In National Gypsum, the Court stated that equitable prejudgment interest 

is not “automatic,” but “depends upon the circumstances 

of each case, and rests very much in the discretion of the 

tribunal.” 515 U.S. at 196. In Kansas v. Colorado, the 

Court was “unable to conclude with sufficient certainty 

that Colorado was on notice that such interest would be 

imposed as a matter of course” and found that the “Special Master acted properly in carefully analyzing the facts 

of the case and in only awarding as much prejudgment 

interest as was required by a balancing of the equities.” 

533 U.S. 1, 14 (2001). 

In the context of bonds securing antidumping duties, 

we have recently explained that there are “equitable 

considerations that affect equitable prejudgment interest.” Great Am., 738 F.3d at 1326. We noted in Great 

American that “prejudgment interest ‘traditionally has 

been considered part of the compensation due plaintiff.’” 

Id. (quoting Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 

175 (1989)). And, in Great American, we listed certain 

factors that may be considered in determining an award

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30 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

of equitable prejudgment interest: “[1] the degree of 

personal wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, [2] the 

availability of alternative investment opportunities to the 

plaintiff, [3] whether the plaintiff delayed in bringing or 

prosecuting the action, and [4] other fundamental considerations of fairness.” Id. (quoting Osterneck, 489 U.S. at 

176). 

Some of the factors discussed in Great American were 

considered by the Court of International Trade in this 

case. Am. Home, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1356. For example, 

in exercising its discretion to award equitable prejudgment interest, the court considered “delay[] in bringing 

suit,” “good faith defenses to liability,” and “Customs’ 

erroneous reliquidations.” Id. In addition, the court 

noted that “[a]lthough case law diverges on what equitable factors the Court should consider in awarding prejudgment interest, it is clear that full compensation 

should be the court’s overriding concern.” Id. The court

explained that it thought its award “str[uck] a fair balance between the parties” and that “equity favor[ed] 

awarding the [g]overnment interest in this action.” Id. at 

1357. 

B. 

For the reasons set forth in Part II.B above, we have 

held that the government is entitled to statutory prejudgment interest under 19 U.S.C. § 580. That holding 

has altered the landscape of the case. The Court of International Trade’s award of equitable prejudgment interest 

was made without the court having the opportunity to 

consider the effect of an award of § 580 interest and 

whether dual sources of interest are proper. See, e.g., 

Great Am., 738 F.3d at 1327 (requiring further factual 

development as to whether § 580 “applies in addition to 

equitable prejudgment interest”); Great Am., No. 09-

00187, 2012 WL 1229132, at *3 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 11, 

2012) (“The Government’s contention that it is entitled to 

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both statutory and equitable interest is incorrect because 

it is in the absence of a statute that provides for interest 

that a court may exercise its equitable powers to award 

prejudgment interest.”). 

Under the circumstances, we think that the best approach is to vacate the Court of International Trade’s 

award of equitable prejudgment interest and remand the 

case to the court so that it, in the first instance, may 

determine the issue of the government’s entitlement to 

equitable prejudgment interest. We therefore vacate the 

court’s award of equitable prejudgment interest.12 On 

remand, the court will be in a position to entertain and 

consider all relevant arguments of the parties on the 

question of equitable prejudgment interest.13

12 The court’s ultimate ruling may alter its standing

award of equitable postjudgment interest to the extent 

that its ruling on such interest might continue to be 

“based on the same considerations of equity and fairness” 

as the award of equitable prejudgment interest. Am. 

Home, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1357 (quoting United States v. 

C.H. Robinson Co., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1348 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 2012)). 

13 Among other things, AHAC has argued on appeal 

that the government is not entitled to equitable prejudgment interest because such an award would create an 

inappropriate windfall to the government because any 

recovery of such interest may ultimately end up in a 

separate, non-interest-bearing account for the benefit of 

domestic producers under the Continued Dumping and 

Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (“CDSOA”), Pub. L. No. 106–

387, §§ 1001–03, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A–72 to –75 (Oct. 

28, 2000), repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub 

L. No. 109–171, § 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154 (Feb. 8, 2006) 

(effective Oct. 1, 2007). The government has responded 

that AHAC waived its CDSOA argument and that, in any 

 

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32 US v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm-in-part, reversein-part, and vacate-in-part the decision of the Court of 

International Trade. The case is remanded for further 

proceedings on (1) the amount of prejudgment interest to 

which the government is entitled under 19 U.S.C. § 580 

and (2) the issue of whether the government is entitled to 

equitable prejudgment interest in addition to statutory 

prejudgment interest under § 580. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, 

VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

event, the argument lacks merit. On remand, should it 

wish to do so, AHAC is free to raise its CDSOA argument. 

Needless to say, we express no views on the merits of the 

argument, or on the merits of any other argument AHAC 

or the government may wish to assert in the Court of 

International Trade. 

 

Case: 14-1292 Document: 54-2 Page: 32 Filed: 06/17/2015