Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01185/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01185-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Melvin Luis Velazquez-Rivera
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-1185

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Melvin Luis Velazquez-Rivera, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 15, 2003

 Filed: April 27, 2004

___________

Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Melvin Luis Velazquez-Rivera appeals from his conviction for conspiracy to

distribute 500 grams of cocaine and possession of one kilogram of cocaine with intent

to distribute it. He argues that police lacked probable cause to arrest him and

therefore the district court1

 should have suppressed evidence seized from a Ford

pickup truck that was impounded upon Velazquez's arrest. He also contends that the

prosecution practiced race discrimination in using a peremptory strike on a

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Because of the similarity of names between Montesino-Rivera and VelazquezRivera, we will refer to them as Montesino and Velazquez.

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veniremember with a Hispanic surname. Finally, he contends that the district court

erred in admitting evidence that the reason police were surveilling a certain address

was that they had a tip from a confidential informant that there would be a drug

delivery at the address. We affirm the convictions.

The probable cause issue was decided after a suppression hearing, and we take

the facts from that hearing, as well as the fuller version given at trial. See United

States v. Corona-Chavez, 328 F.3d 974, 979 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) ("This court

considers the entire record, including trial testimony, in reviewing denial of a motion

to suppress.") On March 25, 2002, Minneapolis police received a tip from a

confidential informant that a blue Ford pickup truck would deliver a load of cocaine

from Chicago to 3308 19th Avenue South in Minneapolis. One of the officers was

familiar with the address because he had participated in an undercover narcotics

transaction there. The police set up surveillance at the address. At 2:55 p.m. on

March 25, they saw a blue Ford pickup with Minnesota plates pull up behind the

apartment building at that address, with just one person in it. The driver, Miguel

Angel Montesino-Rivera,2

 got out, walked up to the apartment building, and went

inside. Just then, police received a phone call from the confidential informant saying

that the truck had a large amount of cocaine in it. Montesino and Velazquez came out

of the building, drove the pickup to a McDonald's to eat, and returned to the

apartment at 19th Avenue South. Another man came out of the building, got in the

pickup, and left with Montesino and Velazquez. The police followed. The pickup

drove to 2323 16th Avenue South, where the third man went inside for a while; when

he came back, Velazquez and Montesino dropped him off at 3308 19th Avenue South

before going on their way. As police followed behind them, Velazquez turned around

and looked straight at the unmarked police car; after that, Montesino appeared to

realize that he was being followed and began driving faster and making sharp turns.

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Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan of the District of Minnesota. 

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They drove to 5717 31st Avenue South, another apartment complex, parked in back,

and walked quickly to the building, with the police behind them yelling, "Police,

Narcotics, Stop." Montesino and Velazquez quickly unlocked the door and ran

inside. When police gained access to the building, they found Velazquez and

Montesino in the hallway, where Velazquez was doing something to his cell phone.

They later found a discarded memory chip from the cell phone in the hallway. Police

noticed that Velazquez had changed his shirt, and they found the old shirt discarded

in the hallway. They also found Montesino trying to throw the keys to apartment 201

under the door of apartment 215. 

Police arrested Montesino and Velazquez. They then impounded the pickup

and conducted an inventory search, finding more than a kilogram of cocaine inside.

They obtained a warrant to search apartment 201, where they found cocaine and drug

paraphernalia. 

Velazquez moved to suppress the evidence found in the truck and the

apartment, contending that those searches resulted from his arrest, for which police

did not have probable cause. The magistrate judge3

 to whom the motion was referred

concluded that there was probable cause to arrest Velazquez consisting of the

following: the tip from the informant that a truck loaded with cocaine would arrive

at the 19th Avenue South location, which was corroborated when the truck arrived

as predicted and the informant called at the same time to say the truck was arriving;

Montesino's evasive driving maneuvers after he and Velazquez appeared to realize

they were being followed by the police car; and Velazquez's discarding his black tshirt while the police were trying to get into the building at 31st Street. The district

court conducted a de novo review of the magistrate's report and accepted the

recommendation to deny the motion to suppress. 

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I.

Velazquez contends that the motion to suppress should have been granted

because there was not probable cause to arrest him and the searches followed from

the arrest. On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the

district court's findings of fact under the clear error standard and we conduct de novo

review of its conclusions of law. United States v. Corona-Chavez, 328 F.3d 974, 978

(8th Cir. 2003). The existence of probable cause is a mixed question of fact and law

reviewed de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-99 (1996). Probable

cause to make a warrantless arrest exists when, considering all the circumstances,

police have trustworthy information that would lead a prudent person to believe that

the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. United States v. Hartje, 251 F.3d

771, 775 (8th Cir. 2001).

The facts that support a conclusion of probable cause include those cited by the

magistrate judge: the tip from the confidential informant that was corroborated before

the police officers' eyes when the truck pulled up where the informant said it would

and the informant called simultaneously to confirm that fact, see United States v.

Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 347 (8th Cir. 1994) (informant's tip was factor supporting

probable cause where tip corroborated by police investigation); Montesino and

Velazquez's apparent attempts to elude the police by evasive driving; and Velazquez's

discarding of his t-shirt in an apparent attempt to disguise himself. Added to this list

are the facts that one officer had personal knowledge that drugs were being traded at

the South 16th address; Velazquez and Montesino hurried into the 31st Street

apartment with the police yelling for them to stop; Velazquez removed and threw

away the memory chip from his cell phone; and Montesino threw the keys to

apartment 201 under the door of apartment 215 as the police were forcing their way

into the building. Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (flight is factor

that, together with other factors, supports conclusion of reasonable suspicion); United

States v. Schaafsma, 318 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2003) (flight contributed to probable

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cause); United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 510-12 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); United

States v. Dotson, 49 F.3d 227, 231 (6th Cir. 1995) (same).

As a counterweight to all these facts, Velazquez argues that the confidential

informant was not shown to be reliable because the informant indicated that the truck

would be blue, whereas one police report stated that the truck that actually pulled up

to the apartment was green; the informant did not give the license plate of the truck;

and the truck had Minnesota plates, whereas the informant said the cocaine was from

Illinois. None of these discrepancies is material. The truck was apparently a color

that could be called blue, since the witnesses at trial described it as blue, even as they

were viewing a photograph of the truck. A license plate number is not necessary for

the informant's tip to be considered reliable, especially in light of other corroboration

of the tip. Finally, a truck with Minnesota plates could have come from Illinois, so

the final discrepancy is no discrepancy at all.

Velazquez also argues that his presence as a passenger in a truck that was

believed to be hauling cocaine does not create probable cause that he possessed or

conspired to possess or distribute the cocaine, citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.

581 (1948). In Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795, 802 (2003), the Supreme Court

held that presence as a passenger in a car carrying drugs and $763 established

probable cause to arrest the passenger, where no one in the car offered any

information about the ownership of the drugs or money; the Court distinguished Di

Re on the ground that in Di Re the government had information linking one of the

other passengers in the car to the contraband, whereas in Pringle there was no

information as to who among the three passengers owned the contraband. 124 S.Ct.

at 801. In this case, no one clarified who owned the drugs in the truck because both

occupants fled from the truck to the house without stopping to talk to the police.

Thus, Velazquez's presence in a truck police reasonably (and accurately) suspected

was carrying commercial quantities of cocaine was an important factor in giving the

police probable cause to arrest him. 

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Moreover, other facts in addition to presence in the truck combined to create

probable cause to arrest Velazquez. One officer had personal knowledge that the

South 16th address was being used for drug transactions. Velazquez appeared to be

actively involved in eluding police, both while in the truck, and then while fleeing

into the apartment while police were shouting and chasing him. Velazquez tried to

disguise himself by changing out of the black t-shirt, he tried to dispose of the

memory chip in his cell phone, and his companion Montesino threw the keys to

apartment 201 under someone else's door. This evidence is sufficient to show that

police had probable cause to arrest Velazquez.

II.

Velazquez contends that the district court failed to conduct a proper Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), inquiry into the prosecution's peremptory strike of

venirewoman Vickie Ramirez. Velazquez contends that the district court did not

allow him to prove that the nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the prosecution for

its decision to strike Ms. Ramirez were pretextual and that the district court failed to

make a finding on this issue. Our review of the record disproves both of these

contentions. 

Under Batson, a party who opposes a peremptory strike may make a prima

facie case of discrimination by showing that the circumstances support an inference

that a peremptory challenge was based on race discrimination. U.S. Xpress Enters.,

Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 320 F.3d 809, 812-13 (8th Cir. 2003). If the objecting

party makes a prima facie case, the proponent of the strike must give a

nondiscriminatory explanation for the strike. Id. The district court then must decide

the ultimate question of whether there was purposeful discrimination. Elmahdi v.

Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 339 F.3d 645, 651 (8th Cir. 2003); Hall v. Luebbers, 341

F.3d 706, 713 (8th Cir. 2003). Since the district court's findings will largely turn on

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credibility, we should give those findings "great deference." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98

n. 21; Elmahdi, 339 F.3d at 651 (reviewing district court's findings for clear error).

The record shows every step was observed in due order. Velazquez's counsel

objected to the striking of Ms. Ramirez, stating that although counsel did not know

if Ms. Ramirez was of Hispanic origin, she had a Hispanic surname. The prosecutor

expressed doubt as to whether striking someone with a Hispanic surname established

a prima facie case under Batson, but he nevertheless proceeded to the second step.

He stated that he struck Ms. Ramirez because she was a nurse and he followed a rule

of striking teachers and nurses; that she was highly educated and therefore might

dominate the jury; and that she appeared particularly kind and sympathetic, qualities

he considered undesirable in a juror. He also mentioned that he had also stricken a

nursing assistant who did not fall into a protected category under Batson. The court

asked Velazquez's counsel, "Anything else, Mr. Gray?" and counsel replied, "Her

name is Ramirez and she got struck." The court ruled:

Well, I'm going to overrule the objection on the Baton [sic] challenge.

I don't think you made a showing that the striking was for other than

legitimate reasons, and I'm satisfied with the Government's explanation

for the strike is sufficient to take it out from under Baton [sic]. 

Assuming without deciding that Velazquez made a prima facie case of Batson

discrimination, the record establishes that Velazquez was given the opportunity to

develop the record and the district court made findings that the government's

proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were genuine. The district court's findings were

not clearly erroneous. The Batson argument has no merit.

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III.

Velazquez contends that the district court erred in admitting testimony that the

police set up surveillance at 3308 19th Avenue South because they had an informant's

tip that drugs were about to be delivered there. 

We review the district court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Brown, 110 F.3d 605, 609 (8th Cir. 1997). Even if the district court

erred in admitting the evidence, we will not reverse if the admission of the evidence

was harmless. Id.

An out-of-court statement used to explain why police took a certain action in

their investigation is not hearsay. United States v. Beck, 122 F.3d 676, 682 (8th Cir.

1997); United States v. King, 36 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir 1994). The testimony

explaining how the police came to be surveilling the 19th Avenue address is therefore

not hearsay.

Velazquez's brief essentially concedes as much, but contends that the district

court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction. We review for abuse of discretion

the district court's decision about whether to give a limiting instruction, United States

v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 286 (8th Cir. 2003), and we will not reverse if the denial of

the instruction was harmless, see King, 36 F.3d at 732-33.

 

The testimony did not name or describe Velazquez. Velazquez was not the

driver of the truck the informant predicted would arrive at 19th Avenue. The

informant's statement, even if taken for its truth, would only establish that the truck

had drugs in it, a fact which was established at trial far more directly by the evidence

that police found cocaine inside the truck. Although it is desirable to give a limiting

instruction when testimony is admitted for a limited purpose, see United States v.

Chapman, 345 F.3d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, No. 03-8948, 2004 WL

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322686 (March 22, 2004), in light of the strong evidence that a truck carrying drugs

did indeed arrive at the 19th Avenue address and the fact that the informant's

statement did not inculpate Velazquez, we perceive neither an abuse of discretion nor

harm from the failure to give a limiting instruction.

We affirm Velazquez's convictions.

______________________________

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