Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00381/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00381-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alabama Department of Corrections
Defendant
Atmore Work Center
Defendant
Carlton Russell Gossett
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CARLTON RUSSELL GOSSETT, 

AIS #222667, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-381-WS-C

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF :

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

 :

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se, filed a complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the undersigned for appropriate action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R). It is recommended 

that this action be dismissed without prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) as frivolous.

I. Nature of Proceedings.

Plaintiff initially filed this action in the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Alabama on its complaint form for a § 1983 action. (Doc. 1). 

Subsequently, this action was transferred to this Court for the Southern District of 

Alabama due to Atmore Work Center being named as a defendant. (Doc. 2 at 1, Doc. 

3). According to the Clerk’s Offices in the Southern and Northern Districts, plaintiff did 

not pay the $400 filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis when he filed his 

action, nor did he do so afterwards. 

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In the complaint, the plaintiff names as defendants, the Alabama Department of 

Corrections (“ADOC”) and Atmore Work Center. (Doc. 1 at 3). The Court notes that

plaintiff does not directly say that he was at Atmore Work Center. That deduction can 

be made by plaintiff naming Atmore Work Center as a defendant, complaining that he 

was transferred to a more restrictive custody (from a level 2 facility to a level 4 facility), 

and mentioning that a doctor at nearby Fountain Correctional Facility in Atmore

referred him to a hospital1 for a procedure. (Id.). 

On April 30, 2015, plaintiff complains that he was given a urinalysis, which was 

approximately thirty-six hours after he had been sedated at the hospital. (Id.). The drug 

that he was given caused him to fail the urinalysis the next day. (Id.). The medical 

personnel were not aware of this future issue. (Id.). As a result of the urinalysis, 

plaintiff was given a disciplinary for “dirty urine.” (Id.). Then, he was transported 

from a level 2 facility to a level 4 facility, which he contends creates a liberty interest.2 

(Id.). In addition, plaintiff alleges that the disciplinary creates “a potential problem with 

the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles,” as it could cause him not to make parole. 

(Id.). For relief, plaintiff wants to be “restored to [his] latter housing location” and to 

have his disciplinary “expunged from his institutional file” so it “would not affect [his]

parole hearing this year.” (Id.).

 1 The Court cannot decipher plaintiff’s handwriting with respect to the name of 

the hospital. A Google search did not find a “Biemonett” Hospital, (though it did locate 

a Piedmont Hospital in Piedmont, Alabama.) However, the city of Bay Minnette, 

Alabama, which has a hospital, is close to Atmore, Alabama. 

2 The Alabama Department of Corrections Male Inmate Handbook on the ADOC’s 

website, published August 1, 2013, indicates that “Level II is the security level for 

community work centers and is where most inmates in Minimum-Out are housed” and 

“Level IV is the security level for the major institutions and houses inmates in Medium 

and Minimum custody levels.” (Id. at 7-8, http://www.doc.state.al.us (last visited 

March 8, 2016)).

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II. Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

The Court is screening plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

This section provides:

(a) Screening.--The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible 

or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint 

in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental 

entity.

(b) Grounds for dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify 

cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the 

complaint, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune f

rom such relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)&(b). This section provides a screening process for an action filed 

by a prisoner and does not distinguish between a prisoner who pays the filing fee or 

who proceeds in forma pauperis. Thompson v. Hicks, 213 F. App’x 939, 942 (11th Cir.),3

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994 (2007). Under § 1915A(a), “the district court immediately ha[s]

jurisdiction to review the complaint to decide whether it was required to dismiss it[.]” 

Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, DEA, 2006 WL 637817, at *2 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(unpublished) (rejecting the prisoner’s argument that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction because he had not filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, which 

the local rule allowed and then provided for the action’s dismissal if the application 

was not filed within thirty days).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), a claim may be dismissed as “frivolous where it 

lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 

 3 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be 

cited as persuasive authority.” 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 (2005).

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1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).4 A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, 

inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit, id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, or the claim 

seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist. Id.

Section 1915A(b) also provides that a complaint may be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 

(11th Cir. 1997). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, the allegations must show plausibility. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations 

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must be a 

“plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1966 (second brackets in 

original). 

When considering a pro se litigant’s allegations, a court gives them a liberal 

construction holding them to a more lenient standard than those of an attorney. Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). The court, 

however, does not have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro 

se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 

 4

 Neitzke’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is applied to § 1915(d)’s 

superseding statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Bilal v. Driver, 

251 F.3d 1346,1348-49 (11th Cir.) (§ 1915(e)(2)(B)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1044 (2001); Miller 

v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (§ 1915A); Gardner v. Riska, 444 F. App’x 

353, at **2 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (§ 1915A).

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F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 

701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010) (relying on Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937). Furthermore, the 

court treats as true factual allegations, but it does not treat as true conclusory assertions 

or a recitation of a cause of action’s elements. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. In 

addition, a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court including the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989).

III. Analysis.

A. Defendants Are Not “Persons.”

The disposition of this action is determined by the entities that plaintiff named as 

defendants, ADOC and Atmore Work Center. (Doc. 1 at 1). “A successful section 1983 

action requires a showing that the conduct complained of (1) was committed by a person

acting under color of state law and (2) deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Harvey v. Harvey,

949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). The State and its arms, however, 

are not “persons” for the purpose of a § 1983 action. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Haywood v. Drown, 556 

U.S. 729, 734 n.4, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 2113 n.4, 173 L.Ed.2d 920 (2009) (affirming the Will

decision). The defendant ADOC is an arm of the State of Alabama and, therefore, is not 

a “person” that may be sued under § 1983. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S.Ct. 

3057, 3057-58, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (the Alabama Board of Corrections is a part of the 

State); see ALA. CODE § 14-1-1.1 (ADOC is the successor to the Board of Corrections). 

Furthermore, defendant ADOC cannot be sued in federal court because it has not 

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782, 98 S.Ct. at 3057-58 

(finding that the State of Alabama and the Board of Corrections were entitled to 

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Eleventh Amendment immunity). The Eleventh Amendment’s immunity “prohibits 

federal courts from entertaining suits by private parties against States and their 

agencies” in the absence of a state’s consent. Id. at 781, 98 S.Ct. at 3057. The two 

exceptions to this immunity are if the state has waived its immunity by legislative 

enactment or if Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity. Carr v. City of Florence, 

Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782, 98 S.Ct. at 3057-58 (finding Article I, § 14, 

of the Alabama Constitution prohibits Alabama from giving its consent and therefore 

the State of Alabama was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Lancaster v. 

Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding Alabama has not 

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity); Hill v. Hale, ___ F. App’x ___, 2016 WL 

556293, at *1 (11th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (same). Nor has Congress in § 1983 cases 

abrogated a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Carr, 916 F.2d at 1525 (citing 

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)); Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846, 849 (11th

Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (same).

Inasmuch as ADOC is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action, defendant 

Atmore Work Release is also not a proper defendant. Atmore Work Release is 

identified as Atmore Community Work Center on a list of ADOC facilities. See 

http://www.doc.state.al.us (last visited March 8, 2016). Because ADOC is one of the 

State’s arms and is not considered a “person” under § 1983, then one of the institutions 

it operates is likewise not a “person” for § 1983 purposes. Will, 491 U.S. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 

at 2312. That is, “a prison facility[] does not enjoy legal status separate from the DOC 

itself[.]” Arps v. Eddie Warrior Corr. Ctr., No. CIV-05-892-C, 2006 WL 1451245, at *4 

(W.D. Okla. May 18, 2006) (unpublished); see Scott v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., Civil Action 

No. 09-0590-WS-C, 2010 WL 500429, at *2 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (unpublished) (holding that 

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ADOC’s Fountain Correctional Center does not have a legal existence apart from 

ADOC and is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983); Ansley v. Franks, No. 

CV410-176, 2010 WL 4007626, at *2, n.2 (S.D. Ga. 2010) (unpublished) (noting a prison 

does not have separate legal existence). In addition, to construe the actual physical 

structure of Atmore Work Release as a defendant would be futile because it is an 

inanimate object incapable of acting or “of accepting service of plaintiff's complaints or 

responding to them,” and is therefore not a suable entity. Maier v. Wood Cnty.

Courthouse, No. 4:14-cv-75-HSM-SKL, 2007 WL 3165825, at *2 (W.D. Wis. 2007)

(unpublished). Inasmuch as the ADOC is an arm of the State of Alabama, it and its 

subpart, defendant Atmore Work Release, are not “persons” that may be sued for § 

1983 purposes. Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Atmore Work Release is therefore, 

frivolous as a matter of law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833 (a claim that seeks 

to enforce a right that clearly does not exist is frivolous because it lacks legal merit and 

is therefore due to be dismissed). 

IV. Conclusion.

Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this action be 

dismissed without prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1).5

 5 The Court notes that an alternate basis exists to dismiss this action. Instead of 

using one of the statutes that were specifically designed to address prisoner litigation, 

the Court could have reviewed this action to determine if its subject matter jurisdiction 

was lacking because the complaint is insubstantial. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1010, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (“[W]hen the 

claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or 

otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy,” dismissal 

for want of subject-matter jurisdiction is proper.) (quotation marks omitted). The 

present complaint was so lacking in merit not only due to the entities named as 

defendants, as set out above, but also on account of the underlying substantive claims. 

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P.

 

Plaintiff was not deprived of a liberty interest when he was transferred from 

work release and returned to an institution; therefore, due process did not attach. The 

decision in Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995),

changed the landscape of liberty interests in the prison setting. A liberty interest “will 

be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence 

in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of 

its own force, . . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate 

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300. Sandin

compels the courts to examine the conditions to where an inmate is moved. Ragland v. 

Watson, Civil Action No. 2:05cv251-MEF[WO], 2007 WL 1651107, at *5 (M.D. Ala.),

adopted and modified, 2007 WL 1651103 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (unpublished). “An inmate 

removed from a work-release program . . . and transferred to . . . prison does not 

possess a protected liberty interest in remaining in work release, because confinement 

within the prison walls constitutes an ordinary incident of prison life. It is not atypical.” 

Ford v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:12-CV-657-TMH, 2014 WL 1338501, at *4 (M.D. Ala. 

2014) (unpublished) (quotation marks omitted); Ragland, 2007 WL 1651107, at *5 (an 

Alabama inmate’s removal from work release and return to an institution did not 

impose “an atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life”). Thus, plaintiff’s removal from work release and return to an 

institution did not violation the Constitution. 

Moreover, the transfer of an inmate to another institution even to an institution 

with more disagreeable conditions does not violate the Constitution. Meachum v. Fano, 

427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). “As long as the conditions 

or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence 

imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution,” no violation of 

the Constitution has occurred. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 

2547, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976). See Ivory v. Mullins, No. 2:11cv-953-WHA-SRW, 2014 WL 

960989, at *5 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (same), aff’d, Ivory v. Warden, Governor of Ala., 600 F. App’x 

670 (11th Cir. 2015). In addition, an Alabama inmate has no liberty interest in parole as 

Alabama’s parole system is completely discretionary. Villar v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 

No. 207-CV-134WKW, 2007 WL 1196493, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (unpublished); see

Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 488-89 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding Alabama’s parole statute 

was couched in discretionary terms). Whether a disciplinary affects eligibility for 

parole is far “too attenuated to infer a liberty interest.” Villar, 2007 WL 1196493, at *2; 

see Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487, 115 S.Ct. at 2302 (same).

Accordingly, and alternatively, plaintiff’s allegations do not establish that he has 

a substantive claim to support this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

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72(b); S.D. Ala. Gen.LR 72(c). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 

3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based 

on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence 

of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if 

necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an 

objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s 

report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific. 

DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of March, 2016. 

s/ WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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