Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01474/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01474-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Defense
Respondent
Veronica Marquand
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

VERONICA MARQUAND,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

Respondent

______________________

2024-1474

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in Nos. PH-0752-14-0636-B-1, PH-0752-14-0636-I-1.

______________________

Decided: December 18, 2024

______________________

VERONICA MARQUAND, Hamden, CT, pro se. 

 STEVEN C. HOUGH, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., BRIAN M. BOYNTON,

PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY. 

 ______________________

Case: 24-1474 Document: 46 Page: 1 Filed: 12/18/2024
2 MARQUAND v. DEFENSE

Before HUGHES, STARK, Circuit Judges, and

SCHROEDER, District Judge.

1

PER CURIAM.

Veronica Marquand appeals the final decision of the

Merit Systems Protection Board sustaining her removal 

from her position at the Defense Contract Management 

Agency. Because the Merit Systems Protection Board’s

decision was in accordance with the law and supported by 

substantial evidence, we affirm.

I

On January 21, 2014, the agency issued a notice to 

Ms. Marquand, which proposed her removal from 

employment as a GS-12 Contract Price/Cost Analyst at the 

Defense Contract Management Agency. S.A. 125–28.2 The 

proposal was based on her “failure to meet a condition of 

employment, specifically, Defense Acquisition Workforce 

Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II Certification.” S.A.

125. Ms. Marquand had not completed two of the core 

training courses needed to achieve Level II Certification 

before the requisite deadline. S.A. 125–26. On March 25,

2014, the deciding official, Mark Saldon, found that 

removal was warranted. S.A. 100–02. Ms. Marquand’s 

removal became effective on March 28, 2014. S.A. 102.

Ms. Marquand appealed her removal to the Board. The 

administrative judge rejected Ms. Marquand’s claim that 

Level II Certification was not a condition of her 

employment and affirmed the agency’s removal action.

Marquand v. Dep’t of Def., PH-0752-14-0636-I-1, 2015 WL 

1 The Honorable Robert W. Schroeder III, District 

Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Texas, sitting by designation.

2 Citations to “S.A.” refer to the Supplemental 

Appendix submitted by the respondent with its briefing.

Case: 24-1474 Document: 46 Page: 2 Filed: 12/18/2024
MARQUAND v. DEFENSE 3

669205 (M.S.P.B. Feb. 9, 2015); S.A. 48–99 (Initial 

Decision). The administrative judge also rejected 

Ms. Marquand’s claims of harmful procedural error due 

process violations. S.A. 71–99. 

Ms. Marquand subsequently petitioned for full Board 

review. The Board sustained the administrative judge’s 

finding that Ms. Marquand had failed to meet a condition 

of employment but found that the administrative judge 

abused her discretion by denying Ms. Marquand’s motion 

to compel discovery related to disciplinary actions imposed 

on employees for similar failures to complete certification.

Marquand v. Dep’t of Def., No. PH-0752-14-0636-I-1, 

2016 WL 3648373 (M.S.P.B. July 7, 2016); S.A. 27–47

(Remand Order). Because such information could be 

relevant to Ms. Marquand’s affirmative defense, the Board 

remanded the case to require the administrative judge to 

permit discovery regarding the discipline of similarly 

positioned DCMA employees in the five years preceding 

Ms. Marquand’s removal. S.A. 46. 

Following supplementary discovery, the administrative 

judge again sustained Ms. Marquand’s removal. 

Marquand v. Dep’t of Def., No. PH-0752-14-0636-B-1, 

2017 WL 2835958 (M.S.P.B. June 29, 2017); S.A. 13–26

(Initial Decision on Remand). The administrative judge 

found that “removal was the most common action taken” in 

similar situations. S.A. 22. The administrative judge also 

rejected Ms. Marquand’s due process argument that the 

deciding official had engaged in ex parte communications

regarding similarly situated employees to form his decision 

to remove her. S.A. 25–26. 

Ms. Marquand again sought review by the Board. The 

Board denied her petition and adopted the Initial Decision 

on Remand as the Board’s final decision. Marquand v. Dep’t 

of Def., No. PH-0752-14-0636-B-1, 2023 WL 8672722 

(M.S.P.B. Dec. 14, 2023); S.A. 1–12 (Final Decision).

Case: 24-1474 Document: 46 Page: 3 Filed: 12/18/2024
4 MARQUAND v. DEFENSE

Ms. Marquand timely petitioned for review of the 

Board’s Final Order in this court. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

II

The scope of our review in an appeal from the Board is 

limited. We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is: 

“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Higgins v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 

955 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “We review the 

Board’s factual findings . . . for substantial evidence.”

Rueter v. Dep’t of Com., 63 F.4th 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 

2023). “The Board’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence ‘if it is supported by such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Warren v. U.S. Postal Serv., 497 F. App’x 22, 

24 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Brewer v. U. S. Postal Serv., 

647 F.2d 1093, 1096 (Ct. Cl. 1981)). For “[p]rocedural 

matters relative to discovery and evidentiary issues” we 

“will not overturn the [B]oard on such matters unless an 

abuse of discretion is clear and is harmful.” Curtin v. Off. 

of Pers. Mgmt., 846 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

III

On appeal, Ms. Marquand repeats her assertion that 

Level II Certification “was never a condition of 

employment.” Pet. Inf. Br. at 1. Substantial evidence 

unequivocally supports the Board’s finding that Level II 

Certification was required, and that Ms. Marquand was on 

notice of this requirement. The agency had the authority to 

require Ms. Marquand to complete Level II Certification 

based on the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement 

Act, codified in 10 U.S.C. § 1723, and agency directives 

including DoD Directive 5000.52, DoD Instruction 5000.66, 

and the DoD Desk Guide. S.A. 51–58. And Ms. Marquand 

Case: 24-1474 Document: 46 Page: 4 Filed: 12/18/2024
MARQUAND v. DEFENSE 5

was given adequate notice of the requirement by the 

announcement for her position, S.A. 136, and by both her 

tentative and final job offers. S.A. 133, S.A. 132 (“DAWIA 

Level II certification is required”).

Ms. Marquand also alleges that the agency violated her 

due process rights because the deciding official issued a 

defective notice that did not inform her of his reasoning for 

removal, engaged in ex parte communications, and failed 

to consider alternatives to removal. Pet. Inf. Br. at 7–8. The 

Board’s findings that Ms. Marquand failed to prove the

factual components of these affirmative defenses is 

supported by substantial evidence.

As to the allegedly defective notice, the Board carefully 

considered whether the agency had satisfied its obligations 

to notify Ms. Marquand of the specific reasons for the 

proposed removal and of her right to review the materials

that the agency relied upon and found that it had. S.A. 86–

90. The notice of proposed removal laid out the factual 

basis regarding Ms. Marquand’s failure to complete 

certification, informed her of her right to reply, and advised 

her that the action was being taken pursuant to 5 C.F.R. 

§ 752, which enumerates the right to request underlying 

materials. S.A. 125–28. Even though the notice did not 

specifically mention the right to request materials, the 

administrative judge found that Ms. Marquand had failed 

to 1) allege how the agency’s failure to specifically advise 

her of this right violated her due process rights, S.A. 91, 

2) “ask[] anyone to review any of the material relied upon 

in support of the agency’s action”, S.A. 90, and 

3) demonstrate that the agency prejudiced her rights by 

failing to provide her with a copy of the deciding official’s 

Douglas factor analysis prepared in support of the notice of 

proposed removal. S.A. 93–94. 

Substantial evidence also supports the Board’s findings

that the deciding official (1) did not engage in ex parte 

communications by discussing her removal with other 

Case: 24-1474 Document: 46 Page: 5 Filed: 12/18/2024
6 MARQUAND v. DEFENSE

agency personnel and (2) that the agency considered 

alternatives to removal. The deciding official testified that 

he conversed with agency advisors, the proposing officer, 

and a labor and employee relations specialist only to 

evaluate the legal arguments raised in Ms. Marquand’s 

own written response, S.A. 25, and that, although he was 

not required to do so, he searched for suitable vacancies 

and explicitly informed Ms. Marquand of the lack of 

alternative positions in the notice of proposed removal. S.A. 

98; see also notice of proposed removal at S.A. 101 (“DCMA 

Sikorsky does not currently have any vacant nonacquisition positions to place you as an alternative to 

removal from Federal service.”).

Finally, Ms. Marquand argues that the Board and the 

agency committed a great variety of other harmful errors

in the handling of her appeal. But she has not established 

reversible error. For example, she alleges that the Board 

erred by not giving her additional discovery, but those 

decisions lie within the sound discretion of the Board, and 

we find no abuse of such discretion. She also claims that 

the agency committed a harmful procedural error in failing 

to either waive her certification requirement or process her 

course fulfillment request (based on work experience). But 

the Board properly found that the agency was not required 

to approve her requests for fulfillment or waiver. S.A. 79–

86. 

We have considered Ms. Marquand’s remaining 

arguments and find them unpersuasive.

IV

Because the Board’s decision was supported by 

substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law, 

we affirm.

AFFIRMED

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MARQUAND v. DEFENSE 7

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 24-1474 Document: 46 Page: 7 Filed: 12/18/2024