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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Paul Washington
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 21, 1997 Decided June 6, 1997 

No. 96-3057

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

PAUL WASHINGTON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cr00355-01)

Santha Sonenberg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Eric H. 

Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney.

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1He also argues that the district court should have departed 

downwards because the Sentencing Commission's "Special Report 

to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy" (Feb. 

1995), although not altering the Guidelines' much greater severity 

for crack than for cocaine, made arguments to Congress tending to 

undermine the wisdom of so great a disparity. He recognizes, 

however, that we rejected the theory in United States v. Anderson, 

82 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 375 (1996), and 

raises the issue only to preserve it for purposes of a possible 

petition for certiorari. 

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and WILLIAMS, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Paul Washington was 

charged with three counts of unlawful distribution of five 

grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), and one count of possession 

with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). He 

pleaded guilty to one of the distribution counts and agreed 

that the amounts involved in the other counts would constitute "relevant conduct" for purposes of calculating his base 

offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 1B1.3 (Nov. 

1995); United States v. Salmon, 948 F.2d 776, 778 (D.C. Cir. 

1991) (noting relation of dismissed counts to "relevant conduct"). The presentence report concluded that the relevant 

conduct included a total of 379.94 grams of cocaine base, and 

calculated a sentencing range of 151-188 months. (Inexplicably, the presentence report omitted the 24.85 grams involved 

in the count of conviction, but the omission had no effect on 

Washington's base offense level.) After a hearing at which 

the government requested the court to follow the recommendations of the presentence report but the court itself made no 

explicit reference to the report, the court sentenced Washington to 160 months in prison.

On appeal, Washington challenges only his sentence.1 He 

argues that the government failed to prove that the 379.94 

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grams of cocaine base were specifically crack cocaine, the 

only form of cocaine base to carry higher sentences than 

cocaine under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), Note 

D to Drug Quantity Table (Nov. 1995). Acknowledging that 

he failed to raise the issue before the trial court, he asserts 

there was plain error. Because there was no clear or obvious 

error, we affirm without addressing the remaining requirements of plain error, i.e., whether there was prejudice to the 

defendant and whether the error "seriously affect[s] the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Johnson v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 4305, 4307 

(U.S. May 12, 1997) (citations and quotations omitted).

* * *

The burden is on the government to prove facts in support 

of a sentence enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989). Once the presentence report has been prepared, 

however, the court may generally, unless the defendant contests the report's factual assertions, assume they are correct 

without conducting its own inquiry. Indeed, a general objection, in the form of a claim that the report does not satisfy the 

government's burden of proof, is not enough to draw the facts 

into question. United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 437 

(D.C. Cir. 1995). Whether the sentencing court explicitly 

refers to the presentence report is of no consequence if it 

follows the report's recommendations.

In confronting the plain error standard, Washington notes 

that in United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we 

approved a slightly relaxed idea of the prejudice necessary 

for plain error. Id. at 286-88. He quotes Saro: " 'Plain 

error' is found in the sentencing context whenever there is a 

'reasonable likelihood that the sentencing court's obvious 

errors affected [the defendant's] sentence.' " Appellant's 

Brief at 6, quoting Saro, 24 F.3d at 288. But it should be 

recalled that Saro in no way relaxed the requirement that the 

error be obvious. In dealing with a defendant's failure to 

object to specific fact findings of the presentence report, we 

said that factual errors are obvious if "those findings are 

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internally contradictory, wildly implausible, or in direct conflict with the evidence that the sentencing court heard at 

trial." Id. at 291. Thus, even for sentencing, "obvious" 

means obvious; the district court is not required to have 

second sight. It is true that post-Saro cases have affirmatively required the sentencing judge to make an individualized finding in one narrow areathe attribution to a defendant of drugs sold by others in a conspiracy. See United 

States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see 

also United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 352-53 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994); cf. United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1103-

05 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But outside that context, where the 

controlling standards are exceptionally elusive, "obvious" continues to mean obvious.

Here, far from obvious error, there was only a very remote 

possibility of verbal confusion. Although there may previously have been uncertainty whether "cocaine base" for Guidelines purposes included a broader set of drugs than just 

"crack," the Guidelines were amended to make that limitation 

clear well before Washington's sentencing. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(c), Note D to Drug Quantity Table (Nov. 1995); see 

also U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 487 (amendment effective November 1, 1993). Other forms of what is evidently cocaine 

base chemically, such as coca paste, did not and do not qualify 

as cocaine base. Id. In the absence of a clue to the contrary, 

it seems reasonable to assume that when the probation officer 

drafted the report, a document in which the Guidelines are 

applied to the facts of an individual case, he used the term 

"cocaine base" in its Guidelines sense. Writers in a trade or 

subculture typically follow its usages; when a computer manual speaks of "bugs," it does not conjure up mosquitos. Cf. 2 

Joseph H. Beale, The Conflict of Laws § 346.2, at 1203-04 

(1935) (meaning of trade words in contracts generally governed by usage of place of contracting).

Further, because of the very difference in sentencing treatment that Washington asserts caused him prejudice (as applied to these quantities, a difference between offense level 34 

and level 24), the consequences of the writer's language was 

readily apparentthus giving notice that the phrase cocaine 

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base was meant in its technical, Guidelines sense. Yet, 

although Washington responded to the presentence report 

with a number of objections, nowhere did he raise doubts that 

he had been dealing in crack. See Memorandum in Aid of 

Sentencing, No. 94-355-01 (D.D.C. July 25, 1995); Supplemental Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, No. 94-355-01 

(D.D.C. March 18, 1996); Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, 

No. 94-0355 (D.D.C. April 15, 1996).

Nothing at the plea hearing suggested that the parties used 

"cocaine base" to mean anything but crack cocaine. Washington pled guilty to the distribution of "five grams or more 

of cocaine base or crack." Transcript of Sealed Guilty Plea, 

No. 94-0355, at 5 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 1995). A few seconds later, 

if it was not already clear, it became obvious that the judge 

was using "crack" as a modifier of, not as an alternative to, 

cocaine base. The defendant continued to assent:

The Court: Now, you know if this case went to trial they 

would have to prove that you had this crack in your 

possession, that you had the intent, or the purpose, to 

distribute it, sell it, and that it was five grams or more. 

As you understand it, they could prove that?

The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

Id. (emphasis added). The evidence proffered by the government confirmed this. According to the assistant U.S. attorney's representations, Washington sold "four white rock-like 

substances," id. at 8, the form that crack typically takes. See 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), Note D to Drug Quantity Table (Nov. 

1995). Indeed the government tells us without contradiction 

from defendant that it knows "of no rock-like form of cocaine 

base that is not crack." Government's Brief at 16.

The plea colloquy, of course, did not cover Washington's 

relevant conduct, which was the sole basis for the sentence

given the report's omission of the crack involved in the count 

to which he pled. But the parties' use of "cocaine base" in 

the plea colloquy to mean crack supports what one would 

infer from the Guidelines definitionthat the term was being 

used throughout to cover only the form of cocaine base 

qualifying as such for Guidelines purposes. Here it is particUSCA Case #96-3057 Document #276896 Filed: 06/06/1997 Page 5 of 6
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ularly fair to infer that the parties used the same phrase to 

mean the same drugs, even though referring to illegal acts on 

different days, as a portion of the drugs counted as relevant 

conduct was in effect a sample for the substance sold in the 

plea count. When Washington sold one-quarter ounce to an 

undercover agent on July 6 (part of the relevant conduct) he 

told the agent that although he did not have a full ounce at 

the time, he could supply the rest later, and did so on July 8 

(covered by count to which Washington pleaded).

It is, of course, conceivable that there was error here. But 

if so there was nothing obvious about it. A finding to the 

contrary would effectively create a duty for district court 

judges to ferret out, singlehandedly, every possible defect in 

fact or law in the presentence report. In our system that is 

what defense counsel is for.

Appellant relies heavily on United States v. James, 78 F.3d 

851 (3d Cir. 1996). There the court remanded for resentencing on the ground that the government had not proved, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the cocaine base at issue 

was crack. The drugs considered in the sentencing consisted 

exclusively of the quantities to which defendant had pleaded. 

At sentencing the defendant raised the legal issue of the 

scope of "cocaine base" under the Guidelines and evidently 

also claimed that the drug he had sold was not crack. The 

court of appeals saw the factual issue as turning on whether 

the defendant, at the plea colloquy, had waived the claim that 

he was selling something other than crack, id. at 856; it 

found against waiver because the court and the defendant had 

spoken solely in terms of cocaine base and had never used the 

term crackonly the prosecutor had. Thus, not only was the 

plea colloquy less revealing than here, but the James court 

had no occasion to consider the implications of a presentence 

report's uncontested use of a technical term clearly defined in 

the governing rules (the Guidelines). Accordingly, nothing in 

James draws into question our finding that there was no 

obvious error.

The judgment is

Affirmed.

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