Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00217/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00217-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Centex Homes
Counter Claimant
Centex Real Estate Corporation
Counter Claimant
Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America
Counter Defendant
Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut
Counter Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF 

CONNECTICUT, et al.,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CENTEX HOMES, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:14-cv-217-LJO-GSA

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. 29) 

OF MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER (Doc. 26)

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut and Travelers Casualty Insurance 

Company of America (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this suit against Defendants Centex Homes and 

Centex Real Estate Corporation (collectively, “Centex”) on February 18, 2014. Doc. 1. On April 3, 

2014, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (“the FAC”) in which they alleged three causes of action 

for (1) declaratory relief, (2) breach of contract, and (3) equitable reimbursement. Doc. 8. 

On May 15, 2014, the Court granted with leave to amend Centex’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

third claim for equitable reimbursement. Doc. 16 at 10. The Court found that Plaintiffs’ equitable 

reimbursement claim failed because the underlying state court lawsuit between the parties—the basis for 

the claim—was still pending in state court. Id. at 9-10. The Court did not address Centex’s other 

arguments as to why Plaintiffs’ claim failed. Specifically, the Court did not address Centex’s argument 

that Plaintiffs’ equitable reimbursement claim failed because the FAC did not allege facts demonstrating 

that Plaintiffs “immediately” agreed to defend Centex in the underlying state court action. See Doc. 11 at 

19-20.

Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (“the SAC”) on June 4, 2014. Doc. 17, Second 

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Amended Complaint (“SAC”). On June 30, 2014, Centex moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ equitable 

reimbursement claim. Doc. 22 at 3. Centex argued that the claim should be dismissed for multiple 

reasons, including the fact that the SAC did not allege facts demonstrating that Plaintiffs “immediately” 

agreed to defend Centex in the underlying state court action. Id. at 3, 9-10. Plaintiffs did not address this 

argument in their opposition to Centex’s motion to dismiss. See Doc. 24 at 2.

On July 30, 2014, the Court granted without leave to amend Plaintiffs’ claim for equitable 

reimbursement. Doc. 26 (“the July 30, 2014 order”) at 6-7. The Court acknowledged that it erred in 

holding that Plaintiffs’ equitable reimbursement claim failed as a matter of law because the state court 

lawsuit between the parties was ongoing at the time Plaintiffs filed this case. See id. at 5, n.2. The Court 

found that Plaintiffs’ equitable reimbursement claim nonetheless failed because the SAC failed to allege 

facts demonstrating that Plaintiffs “immediately” agreed to defend Centex in the underlying state court 

lawsuit after Centex tendered the case to Plaintiffs. Id. at 6. The Court therefore granted without leave to 

amend Centex’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third claim for equitable reimbursement. Id. at 7.

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the July 30, 2014 

order. Doc. 29.1For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion. 

II. STANDARD OF DECISION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the district 

court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on grounds of: 

“(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud ... of an adverse party, ... or (6) any 

other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The motion for 

reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time, in any event “not more than one year after the 

judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin 

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en 

 

1 The Court construes Plaintiffs motion to have been brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

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banc ). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court 

to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern–Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 

665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and 

‘must be read as being exclusive of the preceding clauses.’” Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 

(9th Cir. 1981); accord LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th 

Cir. 1986). 

Reconsideration of a court’s order is an “extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the 

interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of 

Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 

59.30 [4] (3d ed. 2000)). “[T]he major grounds that justify reconsideration involve an intervening 

change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent 

manifest injustice.’” Pyramid Lake Palute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n. 5 (9th Cir.

1989) (quoting United States v. Desert Gold Mining Co., 433 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 1970)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs request that the Court reconsider the July 30, 2014 order to the extent that it did not 

grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their third cause of action for equitable reimbursement. Doc. 29 at 6. 

Plaintiffs acknowledge that the SAC did not allege the date on which Centex tendered the underlying 

state court action or the date on which Plaintiffs agreed to defend Centex in that case. Id. at 7.

Plaintiffs argue, however, that the documents submitted in support of their opposition to 

Centex’s second motion to dismiss demonstrate that they immediately agreed to defend Centex. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the declaration of Antony Vandermoore provides the date on which 

Centex tendered the underlying state court action to Plaintiffs (February 12-13, 2014) and the date on 

which Plaintiffs agreed to defend that action (February 19, 2014). Doc. 29 at 2 (citing Doc. 24-1). 

Attached to Mr. Vandermoore’s declaration is correspondence between the parties that corroborates his 

testimony. See Doc. 24-1 at 6, 12 (letter stating Plaintiffs agreed to defend Centex in underlying state 

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court action on February 19, 2014). 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their third cause of action for 

equitable reimbursement because amendment appears possible. See United Union of Roofers, 

Waterproofers, and Allied Trades No. 40 v. Ins. Corp. of America, 919 F.2d 1298, 1402 (9th Cir. 1990)

(holding that denying leave to amend “is proper only when amendment would be clearly frivolous, 

unduly prejudicial, cause undue delay or a finding of bad faith is made”). This justifies relief from the 

Court’s prior order dismissing the claim without leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (Doc. 29). 

The July 30, 2014 order (Doc. 26) is AMENDED to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. Any amended 

complaint shall be filed on or before August 29, 2014.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 18, 2014 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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