Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-08014/USCOURTS-ca8-06-08014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Home Depot U.S.A.
Respondent
David Saab
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-8014

___________

David Saab, on behalf of himself *

and all others similarly situated, *

*

Petitioner, * Petition for Permission to 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., a *

Delaware corporation, *

 *

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: September 26, 2006

Filed: November 22, 2006 

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

David Saab filed a suit against Home Depot in Missouri state court on behalf

of himself and others. Home Depot removed the putative class action to federal

district court1

, showing that the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy

exceeded $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) (traditional diversity jurisdiction), 1441

(describing removal). The district court then denied Saab’s motion to remand his case

Appellate Case: 06-8014 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/22/2006 Entry ID: 2111990
2

Home Depot made no assertion of jurisdiction under CAFA provisions under

§ 1332(d) where the sum in controversy must exceed $5,000,000 excessive of interest

and costs.

-2-

to the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. Saab now petitions this court to

accept an appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1), to review the district court’s

decision. We determine, however, that § 1453(c)(1) does not permit us to accept an

appeal from the denial of a motion to remand when a class action has been removed

to federal court on the basis of traditional diversity jurisdiction, § 1332(a). Because

we lack appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss Saab’s petition.

Our authority to review the denial of a motion to remand is strictly limited. See

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Caterpillar, Inc., v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 74 (1996) (order

denying motion to remand generally not final order subject to review). Saab,

however, attempts to avail himself of the review provisions contained in the Class

Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). CAFA

vests original jurisdiction in the federal district courts if a class action meets several

criteria.2

 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). In order to “develop a body of appellate law

interpreting the legislation without unduly delaying the litigation of class actions,” S.

Rep. No. 109-14, at 49 (2005), the Act permits our court to “accept an appeal from an

order of a district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action.” See

28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1).

Saab urges us to interpret § 1453(c)(1) expansively and to give federal courts

of appeal the jurisdiction to review the grant or denial of a motion to remand any class

action. 

This argument does not differentiate between class actions removed pursuant

to § 1332(a) (traditional diversity jurisdiction) or § 1332(d) (CAFA diversity

jurisdiction). We reject this contention. 

Appellate Case: 06-8014 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/22/2006 Entry ID: 2111990
-3-

CAFA added section § 1453(c), “Review of remand orders,” which applies “to

any removal of a case under this section.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). Saab suggests

that “this section” must refer to § 1453, which, according to petitioner, does not limit

its scope to class actions removed under § 1332(d). Section 1453(a), however, defines

“class”, “class action”, “class certification order”, and “class member” by reference

to § 1332(d)(1), the diversity jurisdiction provision added by CAFA. See § 1453(a).

Thus, we do not interpret “class action” as it is employed in § 1453(c) to

encompass all class actions. Rather, we must limit § 1453(c)’s review provisions to

those class actions brought under CAFA. Our reading is consistent with the

legislative history of CAFA, which includes the observation that, “[n]ew subsection

1453(c) provides discretionary appellate review of remand orders under this

legislation but also imposes time limits.” S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 49 (emphasis added).

 

We therefore hold, joining our sister the Fifth Circuit, see Patterson v. Morris,

448 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2006); Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444

F.3d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 2006), that the review provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) are

limited to class actions brought under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Accordingly, we

dismiss the petition for permission to appeal.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-8014 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/22/2006 Entry ID: 2111990