Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00018/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00018-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Diantay M. Powell
Petitioner
Stu Sherman
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANTAY M. POWELL,

Petitioner,

v.

STU SHERMAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 19-cv-00018-EMC 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Diantay M. Powell, a prisoner currently incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison in Ione, 

filed this pro se action for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has 

filed an answer and Mr. Powell has filed a traverse. Mr. Powell’s petition is now before the Court 

for review on the merits. For the reasons discussed below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus 

will be denied. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Crime

The California Court of Appeal described the crime as follows:

In the early morning hours of November 25, 2012, 18–year–old [Mr. 

Powell] was socializing with his cousin Antonio Edwards and their 

16–year–old friend, Quincy Carter. They had consumed cough 

syrup, Valium and cocaine during the day and [Mr. Powell] may 

have snorted heroin or cocaine. At some point in the evening, [Mr. 

Powell] showed Carter a nine millimeter Beretta with a 30–round 

magazine attached.

Edwards borrowed a Nissan from Albert Rich and at 5:00 a.m., they 

picked up 16–year old Bobbie Sartain and 15–year–old Raquel 

Gerstel at a Union 76 gas station in Oakland. The girls sat in the 

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back seat with Carter while [Mr. Powell] sat in the front passenger 

seat. Edwards drove the group to Brookdale Park and parked on a 

residential street.

[Mr. Powell] received a phone call and told Sartain and Gerstel to 

get out of the car because he needed to go pick up his girlfriend. 

The girls refused. After a heated verbal argument, [Mr. Powell] got 

out of the car, opened the rear door on the driver's side, and pulled 

Sartain out of the car. Sartain punched or slapped [Mr. Powell] and 

he knocked her to the ground. Sartain said she was going to call the 

police.

Gerstel got out of the car and confronted [Mr. Powell], saying, “Did 

you just hit my cousin?” [Mr. Powell] responded, “Bitch, I'll knock 

you out too.” [Mr. Powell] got his gun from the passenger seat and 

shot Gerstel in the head; she also suffered grazing wounds to the 

shoulder and buttock and a gunshot wound to the hip. Sartain began 

to run away, pleading with [Mr. Powell] that she would not tell 

anyone. [Mr. Powell] shot her at least a dozen times, emptying the 

clip of his gun. Both Gerstel and Sartain died of their wounds.

[Mr. Powell] got back inside the car and Edwards drove to West 

Oakland. When they returned the car to Rich, Edwards asked Rich 

if he had seen the news and [Mr. Powell] told Rich he had “domed a 

bitch,” meaning he had shot a woman in the head. 

. . . . 

At trial, the defense did not dispute that Mr. Powell had shot Sartain 

and Gerstel, but sought to show that the killings were second degree 

murder or manslaughter rather than first degree murder. 

People v. Powell, 2017 WL 6397814, *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15. 2017).

B. Procedural History

On May 12, 2016, a jury found Mr. Powell guilty of the first degree murder of Bobbie 

Sartain and the second degree murder of Raquel Gerstel, with enhancements on each count for 

personally inflicting great bodily injury, personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, and 

proximately causing great bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 189, 12022.5(a), 12022.53(b)-

(d), (g), 12022.7(a)). CT 523-25. The jury also found a multiple murder special circumstance

allegation to be true (Cal. Penal Code § 190(a)(3)). Id. at 526. The court sentenced Mr. Powell to 

an aggregate term of life in prison without the possibility of parole, consecutive to a term of sixtyfive years to life in prison. CT 670.

Mr. Powell appealed. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal remanded Mr. Powell’s 

case to give the trial court the opportunity to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm 

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enhancements under then-new legislation, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. See Powell, 2017 

WL 6397814. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review. Docket No. 19-5 at 351. 

Mr. Powell then filed this federal habeas petition. 

The petition for writ of habeas corpus in this action alleges the following claims: (1) the 

trial court’s failure to provide “instructions relating intoxication to heat of passion” violated Mr. 

Powell’s right to a fair trial, Pet., Docket No. 1 at 21; (2) trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel by not requesting such instructions, id.; (3) the trial court’s instruction that 

the jury could not consider the fact that witnesses Carter and Rich were in state custody for 

purposes of evaluating their credibility violated Mr. Powell’s constitutional rights to due process, 

to present a defense, and to have the jury determine every material issue presented, see id. at 40, 

44. 

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition 

concerns the conviction and sentence of a person convicted in Alameda County, California, which 

is within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 

to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of 

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

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arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. “A 

federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state 

court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

The state-court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court, if there is a reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). 

When confronted with an unexplained decision from the last state court to have been presented 

with the issue, “the federal court should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related 

state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the 

unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 

(2018). 

V. DISCUSSION

A. CALCRIM 625

Mr. Powell asserts that his right to a fair trial was violated by the trial court’s failure to sua 

sponte provide a jury instruction relating intoxication to heat of passion. Pet., Docket No. 1 at 21. 

He contends that the intoxication instruction that was given, CALCRIM 625, improperly limited 

the jury’s consideration of the intoxication evidence because it effectively instructed jurors they 

could not consider intoxication in assessing heat of passion. Id. at 24-25. He raises this claim 

against his conviction for the second degree murder of Gerstel. Id. at 10, 38.

At trial, defense counsel conceded that Mr. Powell killed both victims, but argued that the 

jury should convict Mr. Powell of two counts of manslaughter because he lacked the mental state 

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necessary for first or second degree murder. RT 693-696. Mr. Powell contends that heat of 

passion was his main defense, there was evidence of voluntary intoxication, and therefore the jury 

should have been instructed to consider voluntary intoxication when assessing his subjective state 

of mind for the heat of passion defense. Pet., Docket No. 1 at 24, 29. 

The trial court gave the following jury instruction, CALCRIM 570, concerning voluntary 

manslaughter and heat of passion: 

A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary 

manslaughter if defendant Diantay Powell killed someone because 

of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. The defendant killed 

someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if: 

1. The defendant was provoked; 2. As a result of the provocation, 

the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense 

emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment; AND 3. The 

provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to 

act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather 

than from judgment. 

Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific 

emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a 

person to act without due deliberation and reflection. 

In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary 

manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and 

immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it. While no 

specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation 

is not sufficient. 

Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long period of 

time. It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The 

defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. In 

deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a 

person of average disposition, in the same situation and knowing the 

same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from 

judgment. 

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant did not kill as a result of a sudden quarrel or in the 

heat of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must

find the defendant not guilty of murder. 

CT 558. 

The trial court then gave CALCRIM 625, the jury instruction concerning voluntary 

intoxication:

You may consider evidence, if any, of defendant Diantay Powell’s 

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voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that 

evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent 

to kill, or the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation. 

A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated 

by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance 

knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly

assuming the risk of that effect. 

You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for any 

other purpose. 

CT 559. 

Mr. Powell argued on appeal that CALCRIM 625 was erroneous to the extent it suggested 

the jury could not consider voluntary intoxication when assessing his subjective state of mind for 

heat of passion and voluntary manslaughter. The California Court of Appeal rejected his claim, 

finding any error harmless. In its order, the state appellate court first reviewed general principles 

of homicide law:

Intoxication or heat of passion may render a killing a second degree 

murder rather than a first degree murder by negating premeditation 

and deliberation. (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306; 

see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 342.)

Even when a defendant has the intent to kill or conscious disregard 

for life, and would otherwise be deemed to have acted with malice 

aforethought, a homicide may be further reduced to voluntary 

manslaughter in limited, explicitly defined circumstances that are 

viewed as negating malice: (1) heat of passion arising from 

provocation that would cause a reasonable person to react with 

deadly passion, or (2) an unreasonable but good faith belief in the 

need to act in self-defense (imperfect self-defense). (People v. Moye

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549 (Moye ); People v. Lasko (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 101, 107–109.) The heat of passion variant of voluntary 

manslaughter (the only one at issue in this case) has both a 

subjective and objective component: (1) the defendant must have 

killed while actually in the heat of passion induced by the 

provocation, and (2) the provocative conduct must be such that a 

reasonable person would have reacted rashly or without due 

deliberation and reflection. (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 549–

550.) With respect to the objective component, the question is 

whether “‘an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or 

she would lose reason and judgment.’” (People v. Manriquez

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 586; see People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 

1230, 1253; People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 73, 83 

(Oropeza).)

Powell, at *3. The state appellate court then denied Mr. Powell’s claim, explaining that:

The version of CALCRIM No. 625 given in this case correctly 

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informed the jury that intoxication could negate the mental states of 

premeditation and intent to kill. [Mr. Powell] argues the instruction 

was misleading to the extent it precluded the use of such evidence 

“for any other purpose,” because this suggested intoxication could 

not be used to determine whether he acted in a heat of passion, and 

in fact, intoxication is admissible for this purpose. But assuming 

that a defendant charged with murder may appropriately argue he 

acted in a heat of passion that was fueled by intoxication, this 

subjective heat of passion will only reduce a killing from murder to 

voluntary manslaughter when the provocation is objectively 

sufficient to provoke a reasonable person. (Oropeza, supra, 151 

Cal.App.4th at p. 83.) Such evidence was lacking in this case, and 

renders harmless any defect in CALCRIM No. 625.

Sartain hit or slapped [Mr. Powell] when he yanked her out of the 

car, and Gerstel confronted [Mr. Powell] verbally, but neither did 

anything that would provoke a reasonable person to act out of 

passion. “A provocation of slight and trifling character, such as 

words of reproach, however grievous they may be, or gestures, or an 

assault, or even a blow, is not recognized as sufficient to arouse, in a 

reasonable man, such passion as reduces an unlawful killing with a 

deadly weapon to manslaughter.” (People v. Najera (2006) 138 

Cal.App.4th 212, 226.) A defendant may not “set up his own 

standard of conduct and justify or excuse himself because in fact his 

passions were aroused, unless further the jury believe that the facts 

and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the 

ordinarily reasonable man.” (Oropeza, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

82–83.) Given the weakness of the evidence concerning the 

objective component of heat of passion/provocation, the failure to 

give an instruction explicitly allowing the jury to consider 

intoxication in connection with the subjective component was 

harmless under any standard. (See People v. Thomas (2013) 218 

Cal.App.4th 630, 642 [failure to instruct on heat of passion 

implicates federal constitution and must be evaluated under 

harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. 

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 36]; People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 

Cal.4th 1114, 1134–1135 [failure to adequately instruct on effect of 

intoxication was state law error that did not require reversal unless a 

more favorable result was reasonably probable absent the error, 

pursuant to People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].) Reversal 

is not required.

Powell, at *3-4.

As the last reasoned decision from a state court, the California Court of Appeal’s decision 

is the decision to which § 2254(d) is applied. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Mr. Powell is 

entitled to habeas relief only if the California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law from the U.S. Supreme Court, or was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

To obtain federal habeas relief for an error in the jury instructions, a petitioner must show 

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that the error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). A jury instruction violates due process if it fails to 

give effect to the requirement that “the State must prove every element of the offense.” Middleton 

v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). “A single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial 

isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” Id. (quoting Boyde v. 

California, 494 U.S. 370, 378 (1990)). “Even if there is some ‘ambiguity, inconsistency, or 

deficiency’ in the instruction, such an error does not necessarily constitute a due process 

violation.” Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009) (quoting Middleton, 541 U.S. at

437). 

Where a potentially defective instruction is at issue, the court must inquire whether there is 

a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the 

Constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S at 72 & n.4; Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. Even if there is a 

constitutional error in the instructions, habeas relief is not available unless the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Calderon v. 

Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1998); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 

The California Court of Appeal cited the harmless error standard from Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18, 36 (1998), in reaching its conclusion that any error was harmless under 

any standard. Under Chapman, “before a federal constitutional error can be harmless, the court 

must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 

U.S. at 24. “[H]abeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they 

can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015)

(citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted). When, as here, a state court 

finds an error harmless, that determination is reviewed under the highly deferential AEDPA 

standard. Id. at 2198. This means that habeas relief is not available for the error “unless the 

harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.” Id. at 2199 (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 

112, 119 (2007).

Mr. Powell contends that CALCRIM 625 improperly limited the jury’s consideration of 

the evidence of voluntary intoxication and jurors should have been given an instruction relating 

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voluntary intoxication to heat of passion. Mr. Powell contends the jury should have been 

instructed to consider voluntary intoxication when assessing his subjective state of mind for the 

heat of passion defense. Pet., Docket No. 1 at 27-28. He did not, however, propose an instruction 

that should have been given to rectify the error. He contends that the error was not harmless

because the jury was confused and trying to determine how voluntary intoxication related to heat 

of passion, as evidenced by the following question that the jury posed during deliberations: 

“Regarding instruction 570: If we determine defendant was voluntarily intoxicated, do we 

consider that intoxication when applying the standard of a person of ‘average disposition?’” 1 CT 

516. The trial judge responded by directing the jury to review CALCRIM 570 and 625. Id. Mr. 

Powell contends that this question, along with the length of jury deliberations,

2

show that the error 

was not harmless because the jury must have been struggling with how to apply voluntary 

intoxication to heat of passion. Pet., Docket No. 1 at 36-38. 

The state appellate court determined that heat of passion can reduce a killing to voluntary 

manslaughter only “when the provocation is objectively sufficient to provoke a reasonable 

person”; given the “weakness of the evidence concerning that objective component”; any failure to 

instruct the jury on consideration of intoxication “in connection with the subjective component

was harmless under any standard.” That determination was not unreasonable. Powell, at *3-4. 

A witness testified that after being told by Mr. Powell to get out of the car, the victims 

“made a fuss.” RT 211. Mr. Powell pulled one victim (Sartain) out of the car. RT 214. Sartain

then hit Mr. Powell in the face and Mr. Powell responded by hitting her back, knocking her to the 

ground. Id. The other victim (Gerstel) then got out of the car and asked, “Did you just hit my 

 

1 On the same note that jury also asked: “would a victim’s retaliatory reaction (striking defendant) 

to his assault on her be considered provocation? In considering whether the defendant ‘reacted 

from passion’ do we consider the level of reaction?” Id. 

2 The jury deliberated for approximately ten hours following eight days of trial. CT 413, 504-21. 

Here, given that there were two victims, and special findings questions that had to be answered for 

each of them, the 10-hour deliberations period, although not insignificant, does not render the state 

appellate court’s harmless error determination unreasonable. See e.g. United States v. Lopez, 500 

F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007) (jury’s deliberation for 2.5 hours on illegal reentry case suggested any 

error in allowing testimony or commentary on defendant’s post-arrest silence was harmless); 

United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001) (jury deliberations for 4 

days supported inference that impermissible evidence affected deliberations).

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cousin?” RT 216. Mr. Powell responded, “Bitch, I’ll hit you up too,” got his gun from the car, 

and shot Gerstel multiple times. RT 216-20. He then followed Sartain up the street (after their 

physical exchange), shooting her as she ran away from him pleading for her life. Id.; RT 291-92. 

There was no evidence, and certainly no substantial evidence, of sufficient provocation to

satisfy the objective component of heat of passion which requires that the “‘average sober person 

would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment.’” People v. Manriquez, 37 

Cal.4th 547, 586 (2005) (quoting People v. Lee, 20 Cal.4th 47, 60 (1999). Notwithstanding the 

jury’s question as to voluntary intoxication, in light of the weakness of the evidence of 

provocation, the Court of Appeals could reasonably have determined the jury must have found 

there was not sufficient provocation to reach the subjective prong of heat of passion. The 

California Court of Appeal’s harmless error determination was not itself unreasonable. See Davis, 

135 S. Ct. at 2199. Mr. Powell therefore is not entitled to the writ on this claim.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Mr. Powell claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the jury 

instruction discussed above, relating voluntary intoxication to heat of passion. Pet., Docket No. 1 

at 31. He raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. Docket No. 19-5 at 

191. 

The California Court of Appeal, in a footnote, stated that it need not consider Mr. Powell’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Powell, at n.2. This Court assumes that the state court’s 

footnote means that they declined to reach the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. When the 

state court explicitly declines to decide an issue, as opposed to simply not mentioning it, review is 

de novo. See Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel guarantees not only assistance, but effective 

assistance, of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for 

judging any claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just 

result. Id. In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a petitioner 

must establish two things. First, he must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient

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and fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional 

norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Judicial 

scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance. See id., at 689. A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was 

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the alleged 

deficiencies. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697

Mr. Powell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Mr. Powell contends that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to request an unspecified jury instruction relating voluntary 

intoxication to heat of passion. He cites People v. Cameron, 30 Cal.App.4th 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1994), in which the court commented that: “Intoxication is a circumstance from which the jury 

might find that defendant’s act in response to the provocation should be attributed to passion 

rather than judgment.” Id. at 601.

3

 

Even if Mr. Powell could show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, his claim 

fails under Strickland’s prejudice prong. Even applying de novo review, for the reasons stated 

above, there was no objective evidence of provocation sufficient to give rise to a heat of passion 

defense. 

Under the undisputed facts regarding Ms. Sartain and Ms. Gerstel’s interaction with Mr. 

 

3

In Cameron, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, because the 

jury received CALJIC former No. 4.20 (voluntary intoxication does not render an act less 

criminal, and voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general criminal intent). The court found 

this instruction misleading because it implied that the jury should disregard evidence of voluntary 

intoxication “for purposes of determining whether the defendant acted with actual knowledge of 

life endangerment and conscious disregard for life.” Relying on People v. Whitfield, 7 Cal.4th 437 

(1994), the court held that because second degree murder with implied malice is a specific intent 

crime within the meaning of (former) Cal. Penal Code section 22(b)), voluntary intoxication was 

material to a finding of implied malice, where that is an element of second degree murder. Id. at 

599-600. In 1995, section 22 was amended to permit evidence of voluntary intoxication as to 

express malice, but not implied malice, in murder cases, specifically to overrule Whitfield. See 

People v. Soto, 4 Cal.5th 968, 976-977 (2018). 

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Powell, no jury could reasonably conclude that the “‘average sober person would be so inflamed 

that he or she would lose reason and judgment.’” Manriquez, 37 Cal.4th at 586. Accordingly, Mr. 

Powell has not shown that that there was a “reasonable probability” that the “result of the 

proceeding would have been different” had counsel requested the extra instruction. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. 

Mr. Powell also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury 

instruction concerning how provocation may reduce a murder charge from first to second degree, 

as well as instructions on second degree murder and manslaughter. Docket No. 23, at 1-3. But 

the jury did receive each of these instructions. CT 555-58. He also argues that defense counsel 

should have requested to have the charges changed, Docket No. 23 at 3. He does not, however, 

show that this was something defense counsel had the legal ability to do. Cf. United States v. 

Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (subject to constitutional constraints, the decision whether to 

prosecute and what charges to bring generally rests entirely with the prosecutor’s discretion).

Accordingly, Mr. Powell has not shown that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel. He is not entitled to the writ on this claim.

C. CALCRIM 337

Mr. Powell claims that the use of the CALCRIM 337 jury instruction violated his 

constitutional right to due process, to present a defense, and to have the jury determine every 

material issue presented because the instruction prevented the jury from considering how the 

custody status of two witnesses impacted their credibility. Pet., Docket No. 21 at 40, 44. 

“Quincy Carter was a friend of [Mr. Powell’s] who was called as a prosecution witness and 

testified about the events leading up to and including the shooting. Albert Rich was called by the 

prosecution and testified about incriminating statements made by [Mr. Powell] after the shooting. 

Both Carter and Rich were taken into custody to secure their presence at trial, and both testified to 

this fact.” Powell, at *4. Mr. Powell argues that because they were in state custody, both 

witnesses had an incentive to support the state’s theory of the case, even though Carter’s 

testimony tended to support the defense and Rich’s testimony tended to support the prosecution. 

Mr. Powell therefore contends that the fact that Carter was in custody made him more credible and 

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the fact that Rich was in custody made him less credible, but that CALCRIM 337 prevented the 

jury from considering how both witnesses’ custody status impacted their credibility. Id. at 44. 

At trial the judge gave the CALCRIM 337 jury instruction: “When Albert Rich and Quincy 

Carter testified, they were in custody. The fact that a witness is in custody does not by itself make 

the witness more or less believable. Evaluate the witness's testimony according to the instructions 

I have given you.” CT 549. The judge also gave the jury CALCRIM 226, a general instruction 

about evaluating the credibility of a witness. This instruction told the jury that in evaluating a 

witness’s testimony, “you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove the 

truth or accuracy of that testimony.” CT 537. CALCRIM 226 then gave a list of twelve factors 

that jurors may consider, including: how well the witness could see or hear the things about which 

the witness testified, the witness’s behavior while testifying, whether the witness’s testimony was 

influenced by a factor such as a personal relationship with someone involved in the case or a 

personal interest in how the case is decided, and whether the witness had a felony conviction. Id. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Powell’s challenge to the giving of 

CALCRIM 337:

The jurors knew why Carter and Rich were in custody—to secure 

their testimony—and were not told they could not discuss their 

custody status. (See People v. Mackey (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 32, 

114 [CALCRIM No. 337 did not preclude jury from considering 

prosecution witness's felony convictions or status as an accomplice, 

pursuant to other instructions].) Rather, the jurors were told the 

mere fact the witnesses were in custody did not, in and of itself, 

make them more or less believable, and that credibility 

determinations should be made in accordance with other jury 

instructions. The court gave CALCRIM No. 226, regarding the 

factors to consider when evaluating witness credibility.

Powell, at *4.

The California Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Powell’s challenge to CALCRIM 337 on the 

merits, finding that it was an accurate statement of state law. Id. The California Court of Appeal 

did not discuss Mr. Powell’s federal constitutional claim. “When a federal claim has been 

presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state 

court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural 

principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 526 U.S. 86, 99 (2011); see also Johnson v. 

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Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 300-301 (2013) (when a state court rejects a federal claim without 

expressly addressing it, federal habeas courts must presume the federal claim was adjudicated on 

the merits and review it deferentially).

Because the state court denied the federal constitutional claim on the merits without 

explanation, this Court “must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have 

supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fair-minded jurists 

could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the U.S. Supreme] Court.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. Mr. Powell is entitled to 

habeas relief only if the California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law from the U.S. Supreme Court, or was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

To obtain federal habeas relief for an error in the jury instructions, a petitioner must show 

that the error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. A jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to the 

requirement that “the State must prove every element of the offense.” Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437. 

“A single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the 

context of the overall charge.” Id. (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378). “Even if there is some 

‘ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency’ in the instruction, such an error does not necessarily 

constitute a due process violation.” Waddington, 555 U.S. at 190 (quoting Middleton, 541 U.S. at

437). Where a potentially defective instruction is at issue, the court must inquire whether there is 

a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the 

Constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S at 72 & n.4; Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. Even if there is a 

constitutional error in the instructions, habeas relief is not available unless the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Calderon, 525 U.S. 

at 146-47; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

Mr. Powell argues that giving the jury CALCRIM 337 precluded it from fully considering 

the facts motivating Carter and Rich’s testimony, and that this was akin to the trial court

precluding defense counsel from examining either Carter or Rich about being in custody, which 

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was recognized as a constitutional error in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). However, Davis 

v. Alaska is distinguishable. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner was 

denied his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment when the state trial 

court prohibited the defense from questioning a key prosecution witness about the witness’s 

juvenile record and probation status. Id. at 318. Here, in contrast, the jury knew that Carter and 

Rich were in custody to secure their testimony. The trial judge did not preclude questioning about 

their custody status, nor did the judge tell the jury that it could not consider their custody status. 

The judge merely gave an instruction telling the jury that custody status alone was not 

determinative of credibility.

The California Court of Appeal reasonably could have concluded that there was no 

reasonable likelihood that the jury applied CALCRIM 337 in a way that violated the Constitution. 

As the state appellate court noted, the instruction did not preclude the jury from discussing or 

considering Carter and Rich’s custody status; rather, it simply cautioned that their custody status

alone did not make them more or less believable, and that the jury should make its credibility 

determination in accordance with other jury instructions. The jury was also given CALCRIM 226, 

a general instruction about evaluating the credibility of a witness. This instruction told the jury 

that in evaluating a witness’s testimony, “you may consider anything that reasonably tends to 

prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony.” CT 537. The jury is presumed to have 

followed these instructions. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985) (“The Court 

presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language 

of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and 

follow the instructions given them”); Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(“The law presumes that the jury follows the instructions given.”) (abrogated on other grounds by

Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307 (2011)). Mr. Powell provides no reason for this Court to depart 

from the presumption that the jurors followed their instructions. Following the instructions, the 

jury would have been free to consider how the custody status of Carter and Rich, and other factors,

could affect their credibility.

Mr. Powell has not shown that giving CALCRIM 337 “so infected the entire trial that the 

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resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. The instruction, which merely

cautioned the jury that custody status alone did not make a witness more or less credible, did not 

relieve the prosecutor of proving every element of the charged offense. Nor did it infect the entire 

trial. It was therefore not unreasonable for the state appellate court to reject Mr. Powell’s

challenge to CALCRIM 337. He is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

1. No Certificate Of Appealability

A certificate of appealability will not issue because reasonable jurists “would not find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is denied.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

Mr. Powell’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel, filed months after he filed his 

traverse, is DENIED. Docket No. 28. There is no need to appoint counsel in this action which is 

now being closed. The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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