Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00591/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00591-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Hanford
Defendant
Randy Deshazier
Plaintiff
Russell Hilyard
Defendant
Mitch Smith
Defendant
Dale Williams
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDY DeSHAZIER, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. )

 )

HANFORD POLICE OFFICER DALE )

WILLIAMS, BADGE No. 121; )

HANFORD POLICE OFFICER MITCH )

SMITH, BADGE No. 39; POLICE )

SERGEANT RUSSELL HILYAND; and )

CITY OF HANFORD, CALIFORNIA, )

 )

Defendants. )

____________________________________ )

CV F 06-0591 AWI SMS 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS THE COMPLAINT.

[Doc. # 15]

INTRODUCTION

This is an action for violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights pursuant to 42

U.S.C., section 1983 by plaintiff Randy DeShazier (“Plaintiff”) against defendants Officers

Dale Williams, Mitch Smith, and Russell Hilyard, all of the Hanford Police Department (the

“individual Defendants”), and the city of Hanford, California (collectively “Defendants”). 

The action arises out of a traffic stop executed by the individual Defendants wherein Plaintiff

alleges he was subject to unlawful detention, pat-down search and arrest. In the instant

motion, Defendants seek dismissal of all claims for relief alleged in the complaint. Federal

subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C., section 1331. Supplemental

jurisdiction over California state law claims exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C., section 1367. 

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Venue is proper in this court.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on May 15, 2006. The complaint alleges Plaintiff, an

African-American male and formerly a parole officer for the California Department of

Corrections, was driving his vehicle on a Hanford street when he noticed a police car parked

at the corner of an intersection Plaintiff was approaching. Plaintiff made a left-hand turn and

the police car activated its lights and effected a traffic stop. Defendant Williams, the police

officer effectuating the stop indicated Plaintiff was being stopped because he was traveling

36 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone. The complaint alleges “Plaintiff contests this

allegation [that he was traveling at excess speed] and believes his traffic stop was at least in

part motivated by invidious discrimination and was the result of profiling, in violation of

state and federal law.” Complaint at 2:28 - 3:2. There is no further clarification as to

whether there is a dispute as to the allegation of the speed at which Plaintiff was driving or

whether there is a dispute as to whether Plaintiff’s unlawful speed was the reason for the

stop.

The complaint alleges Plaintiff indicated to defendant Williams that, in Plaintiff’s

view, Plaintiff should be allowed to continue on without issuance of a citation. At this point,

defendant Williams was joined by defendants Smith and Hilyard. The complaint alleges the

individual Defendants took offense to Plaintiff’s comments about not being cited, and

requested permission to search his car for weapons in retaliation. Permission for the search

was given. No weapons were found during the search. Plaintiff was then “frisked.” The

complaint alleges that when Plaintiff questioned the appropriateness of the search and “frisk,”

defendant Williams responded by asking Plaintiff if he wanted to go to jail and by placing

Plaintiff in handcuffs. The complaint alleges Plaintiff was then placed in a patrol car and

informed he was being arrested for resisting arrest and impersonating a peace officer. 

Plaintiff was cited and subsequently released at the scene. The complaint is

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somewhat ambiguous with respect to the charge or charges Plaintiff was cited for. The

complaint alleges “Plaintiff was not prosecuted on the false charges for which he was

prosecuted.” The complaint does not clearly state what the charges on the citation were.

The complaint, which was filed on May 15, 2006, alleges four claims for relief. The

first claim for relief, although not specifically labeled as such, appears to be a claim pursuant

to 42 U.S.C., section 1983 for violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendments resulting from Plaintiff’s detention, “frisk,” and arrest. Plaintiff’s

second claim for relief is for declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C., section 2201. The third

claim for relief alleges violation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution pursuant to

California Civil Code, section 52.1. Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief alleges “False

Detention, Frisk and Arrest” without reference to any state or federal statute. Rather, the

fourth claim alleges violations “under California law.” Plaintiff also alleges “Fresno County

is vicariously liable for the acts of the individual [D]efendants.”

The instant motion to dismiss was filed by Defendants on June 15, 2006. Plaintiff

filed his opposition on July 10, 2006. Defendants’ reply was filed July 17, 2006. On July 20,

2006, the court issued an order vacating the hearing date of July 24, 2006, and taking the

matter under submission.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

the claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal can be based on

the failure to allege a cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient facts under a

cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th

Cir.1984). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

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the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,

and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g

denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts do not "assume the

truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations."

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.1981). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has alleged claims for relief that combine in single claims multiple legal

theories for granting relief and allege claims against multiple defendants. While this style of

pleading presents some analytical challenges, it is, as discussed infra, consistent with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court will break the discussion on Defendants’ motion

to dismiss into three parts. First, the court will discuss Plaintiff’s claims of infringement of

constitutional rights as to the individual Defendants as alleged in the first, second and third

claims for relief. Second, the court will discuss Plaintiff’s claims of infringement of

constitutional rights as to City of Hanford. Third, the court will discuss Plaintiff’s claims for

false arrest, frisk and detention under “California law” with respect to all Defendants.

I. Claims Alleging Constitutional Violation by Individual Defendants

The bulk of Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s allegations of violation of

constitutional rights with respect to the individual Defendants rests on a single premise. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts sufficient to allow the conclusion

Plaintiff was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit and that probable cause therefore

existed to effectuate the detention and the subsequent pat-down search. Defendants contend

that, because probable cause existed to effectuate the traffic stop and pat-down search, and

because Plaintiff consented to the search of his vehicle, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts

sufficient to support his claims of infringement of rights under the First, Fourth or Fourteenth

Amendments. 

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In opposition, Plaintiff points to the above quoted portion of the complaint wherein

Plaintiff “contests this allegation [that he was traveling at excess speed] and believes his

traffic stop was at least in part motivated by invidious discrimination and was the result of

profiling, in violation of state and federal law.” This statement, Plaintiff contends, clearly

establishes Plaintiff’s contention that he was not traveling at a speed that was unlawful under

the California Vehicle Code.

In reply, Defendants point to two statements by Plaintiff from which Defendants

contend it may be inferred that Plaintiff admits he was driving in excess of the posted speed

limit. First, Plaintiff states in his complaint that he told Williams and possibly the other

individual Defendants at the scene that Plaintiff argued with the officers that a citation should

not be issued because the issuance of a citation under the circumstances was not mandatory. 

Defendants contend that if there had been no violation, the proper argument to the officers

would have been that a citation was not warranted. From this allegation, Defendants contend

the court may infer that Plaintiff has admitted there was a violation of the California Vehicle

Code. Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegation that the traffic stop was “at

least in part motivated by invidious discrimination” implies there was another reason for the

stop that was proper. 

The problem with Defendants’ argument is that this is a motion for dismissal pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6). Under the applicable standard, the court must make any inference in favor

of the non-moving party. In this context, the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff, accepting the complaint's allegations as true.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393

F.3d 1068, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). The court, in other words, may not draw any inferences in

the moving party’s favor if it is at all reasonable to draw the contrary inference in favor of the

non-moving party. 

Here, the court must infer that Plaintiff’s ambiguous reference to a disputation of an

allegation made at line 28 of page 2 of the complaint refers to the previous sentence where

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Williams states he is going to issue a citation for driving 36 mph in a 25 mph zone. The

court may not infer in Defendants’ favor that the argument Plaintiff allegedly offered to the

individual Defendants at the time of the traffic stop admits violation of the speed law or

precludes any subsequent claim that he was not, in fact, in violation of any provisions of the

Vehicle Code. In short, Plaintiff is not duty bound to offer his best argument to the officers

at the time of the traffic stop or else waive that argument before the court. The court must

interpret Plaintiff’s allegation at ¶ 7 of the complaint to be a general disputation as to

Williams determination that Plaintiff was driving at a speed in excess of the speed limit. 

Since the court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, the court must accept

for purposes of this motion that Plaintiff was traveling within the posted speed limit.

Similarly, the court must not infer from the facts set forth in the complaint that

Plaintiff’s allegation that the stop was motivated by impermissible bias or racial profiling that

there is an admission of an alleged lawful underlying reason for the traffic stop. It is not

logically inconsistent to allege racial motivation for the stop and, at the same time, to deny a

factual basis for any probable cause for the stop.

At least as to the individual Defendants, plaintiff has alleged legal theories to support

claims for violation of constitutional rights that are cognizable before the court. Because the

court cannot infer that Plaintiff has admitted that he was in violation of the vehicle code, the

court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff cannot prove that probable cause for a

traffic stop, detention, and for the subsequent pat-down search was absent. Since

Defendants’ legal argument with respect to Plaintiff’s allegations against the individual

defendants with respect to the first, second, and third claims for relief are predicated on

finding an admission that there was a violation of the Vehicle Code, and therefore probable

cause for the traffic stop, Defendants’ motion to dismiss must be denied with respect to those

claims and those Defendants.

Likewise, because the court may not infer at this point that there existed probable

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cause for the traffic stop, search of the car, pat-down search or arrest, the court may not

dismiss as inadequately plead Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation in violation of First

Amendment privileges or claims of invidious racial discrimination in violation of Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection claims.

It is worth noting that the court would be required to deny defendants’ motion to

dismiss the claims of constitutional violation as to the individual defendants even if the court

was to make those inferences in Defendants’ favor that Defendant urges. This is because

Plaintiff has chosen to plead multiple theories of recovery as to the first, second and third

claims for relief and Defendant has failed to address one of those theories. Specifically, as to

each of the aforementioned claims for relief, Plaintiff has set forth the allegation he suffered

infringement of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when he was

arrested without probable cause. 

An arrest occurs when a reasonable person would not believe that he or she is not free

to leave. Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 840 (9th Cir. 2003). The facts

alleged in the complaint allege plaintiff was handcuffed, placed in the police patrol vehicle

and told he was being arrested for resisting arrest and impersonation of a police officer. These

allegations, if true, are certainly sufficient to establish that Plaintiff was placed under arrest as

of the time he was placed in the police patrol car. Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges, albeit in

a minimalist style, that probable cause for the arrest was lacking. Defendants’ motion for

dismissal fails to address at all Plaintiff’s arrest or Plaintiff’s claim that the arrest violated his

rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Likewise, Defendants’ motion fails to

address at all Plaintiff’s allegation that the arrest was motivated by invidious discrimination

or in retaliation in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

 Rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:

A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense

alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate

counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative

and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is

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note made insufficient by the insufficiency of the one or more of the

alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or

defenses as the party has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal,

equitable, or maritime grounds.

While it might be more convenient for the court and the opposing party if the

complaint set forth each legal theory supporting relief in a separate claim, each claim being

supported by a crystalline and unambiguous statement of alleged facts, such is not the

requirement. Even if the court were to conclude that Plaintiff had admitted speeding, the fact

would remain that the plaintiff has not admitted facts that, by themselves, would be sufficient

to sustain a finding of probable cause for an arrest. Thus, given that the first, second, and

third claims for relief set forth facts sufficient to support claims of unlawful arrest against the

individual Defendants, as well as claims for discriminatory and retaliatory motivation for the

arrest, those claims would not be subject to dismissal as to the individual Defendants because

allegations of constitutional violation within the claims are not dismissed. Since Plaintiff has

pled facts that, if true, would support claims for relief for claims for constitutional violations

under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as a result of his arrest without probable

cause, the court may not dismiss those claims as to the individual Defendants.

II. Claims of Constitutional Violation as to City of Hanford 

Plaintiff’s first claim for relief alleges: “The City of Hanford is responsible under

applicable law for the policy promulgated that led to the ratification of the individual

[D]efendants’ unlawful conduct.” The complaint makes no other factual allegations as to the

City of Hanford, except to allege that it is “a governmental entity that is liable for the actions

of the individual defendants, as alleged herein and consistent with federal law, based on its

relevant customs and policies. These policies will be specified at a later point in this

proceeding, as permitted by applicable law.”

Defendants have challenged Plaintiff’s claim for relief, first on the ground Plaintiff

has failed to allege facts sufficient to show he suffered any constitutional depravation as a

result of the acts of the individual Defendants, and second on the ground the claim against

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Hanford fails to allege the existence of any policy leading to any unconstitutional act or of

any ratification of an unconstitutional act by any official. Plaintiff, in his opposition to the

motion to dismiss, contends that it is sufficient under notice pleading standards to merely

plead a municipal liability claim generally, without reference to any specific policy.

 Plaintiff correctly contends the complaint need conform only to the notice pleading

standard set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; there is no requirement

that claims for relief be plead with particularity where municipal liability is alleged. 

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

(1993); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). “To

survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint

generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule

8(a)(2) requires only that the complaint include ‘a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).” Porter v. Jones, 319

F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). Likewise, there is no requirement that the plaintiff in a civil

rights action plead facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). However, “[w]hile is not required to plead detailed facts,

she must plead some facts.” Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 339 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1088 (E.D.

Cal. 2004.) Mere conclusory statements of law do not, without more, establish the factual

foundation for the asserted legal conclusion. Western Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624.

The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations with regard to the City of Hanford and

finds those allegations are not sufficient to satisfy even the bare minimum required by Rule 8. 

Plaintiff’s allegation that “Hanford is responsible under applicable law for the policy

promulgated that led to the ratification of the individual [D]efendants’ unlawful conduct” is

an excellent example of an attempt to bootstrap a legal conclusion into a set of factual

allegations. The complaint contains no factual allegation that ratification occurred, either

before or after the unlawful conduct alleged. Likewise the complaint does not allege the

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actual existence of a policy that directly caused the unlawful conduct; the complaint only

states that if such a document exists, it will be specified at a later time. “Conclusory

allegations in a complaint, if they stand alone, are a danger sign that the plaintiff is engaged

in a fishing expedition.” DM Research, Inc. v. College of American Pathologists, 170 F.3d

53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999). Here Plaintiff’s pleading makes it clear he intends to merely allege the

hypothetical existence of a policy that ratifies officers’ violations of motorists constitutional

rights and then, having alleged it, he intends to go fishing. “The price of entry , even to

discovery, is for plaintiff to allege a factual predicate concrete enough to warrant further

proceedings, which may be costly and burdensome.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege

facts sufficient to warrant further proceedings as to City of Hanford. City of Hanford will

therefore be dismissed as to the first and second claims for relief. Because it is possible a set

of facts could be pled that could support a claim against City of Hanford, the dismissal will

be without prejudice.

III. Plaintiff’s Claims California Civil Code, Section 52.1

In order to state a claim for relief under California Civil Code, section 52.1 (the “Bane

Act”), a plaintiff “must allege that the plaintiff who claims interference of his or her rights

also allege that this interference was due to his or her ‘race, color, religion, ancestry, national

[or] origin. . . .’” Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach, 29 Cal.App.4th 1797, 1809 (2nd Dist.

1994). As discussed above, the complaint sets forth, albeit in minimalist fashion, the

minimum of at least one constitutional violation; arrest without probable cause in violation of

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Since at least one constitutional violation is

adequately alleged, the court cannot find that Plaintiff has failed as a matter of law to allege a

claim for relief under California Civil Code section 52.1 upon which relief can be granted.

IV. Plaintiff’s Claims for Relief Under California Law

Defendants’ main contention with respect to Plaintiff’s third and fourth claims for

relief is that, in the absence of a federal constitutional violation, the court is without subject

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matter jurisdiction and, since the parties are not diverse, the court is without diversity

jurisdiction as well. As the court explained with regard to Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim for relief under the Bane Act, the court has found that Plaintiff has set forth a

claim for relief based on an allegation of violation of the federal Constitution that is sufficient

to withstand Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Since the court rejects Defendants’ argument

that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief with respect to any violation of federal law,

the court must likewise reject Defendant’s motion to dismiss the fourth claim for relief on the

same ground. 

Defendants’ arguments regarding Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief rely exclusively on

the court finding there has been no violation of federal law. Consequently, court does not

have occasion to address other grounds for dismissal Defendants might have raised, but did

not. The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief and finds it problematic

because it fails to state a legal basis for relief with enough particularity to permit a response

to the claim. Are plaintiff’s additional claims pursuant to California law common law or are

they statutory claims? While the court is aware of a California common law cause of action

for false arrest, see Miller v. Glass, 44 Cal.2d 359 (1955); Cal. Jury Instr. – Civ. 7.60,

Plaintiff has not alleged the elements of false arrest or any other common law claim. The

court is not aware of any common law basis for claims for “false frisk” or “false detention.” 

If there is a statutory basis for the claims, minimum notice pleading standards require the

complaint so state.

The court directs Plaintiff to restate his fourth claim for relief with greater

particularity in any future amendment to the complaint or risk that the court may strike the

claim as to all Defendants on its own or opposing parties’ motion. 

Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s claim of liability against Fresno County on a

theory of vicarious liability under California law. Since there is no challenge to Plaintiff’s

claim, the court will make no findings with respect to any claim against County of Fresno.

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The court notes Plaintiff has clarified his complaint in that he disavows any claim of

punitive damages against City of Hanford. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

for punitive damages against City of Hanford will therefore be granted to the extent the

complaint can be construed to assert such claims.

THEREFORE, in accordance with the foregoing discussion it is hereby ORDERED

that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss all counts of the complaint as to the individual

Defendants is hereby DENIED.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as to Defendant City of Hanford is

hereby GRANTED with leave to amend.

3. To the extent the complaint may be construed to state a claim or claims for punitive

damages against City of Hanford, such claim or claims are hereby DISMISSED with

prejudice.

4. Plaintiff is directed to restate his fourth claim for relief to include a short plain

statement of the legal basis for relief in any further amendment of the complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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