Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30189/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30189-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Justin Curtis Werle
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN CURTIS WERLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-30189

D.C. No. 

2:14-CR-0041-

JLQ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Justin L. Quackenbush, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

October 13, 2015—Seattle, Washington

Filed March 3, 2016

Before: William A. Fletcher and Raymond C. Fisher,

Circuit Judges, and Claudia Wilken, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Wilken

* The Honorable Claudia Wilken, United States Senior District Judge for

the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. WERLE

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a sentence and remanded for

resentencing in a case in which the district court concluded

that the defendant was subject to a 15-year mandatory

minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The panel held that a conviction for felony riot under

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.84.010 is not a “violent felony” for

purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act because

§ 9A.84.010 is overinclusive and indivisible with respect to

the term “force.”

COUNSEL

Matthew Campbell (argued), Federal Defenders of Eastern

Washington & Idaho, Spokane, Washington, for DefendantAppellant.

Michael C. Ormsby, United States Attorney, Timothy J.

Ohms (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, United

States Attorneys’ Office, Spokane, Washington, for PlaintiffAppellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. WERLE 3

OPINION

WILKEN, Senior District Judge:

Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a

defendant with three prior “violent felony” convictions faces

a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum sentence if convicted of

violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). In this

case, we consider whether a conviction for felony riot under

a Washington state statute is a violent felony for purposes of

the ACCA sentencing enhancement. We hold that it is not,

because it is overinclusive and indivisible with respect to the

term “force.” Accordingly, we reverse and remand for

resentencing.

1

 

I. Background

On March 4, 2014, a federal grand jury returned an

indictment against Appellant, charging one count of

possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of possession of an

1

 Appellant also appeals his conviction, arguing that the district court

erred when it denied his motion to suppress. However, “[a]n officer may

stop and question an individual suspected of wrongdoing if the officer can

point to ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” United

States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Here, the officers had reasonable suspicion

based on information provided by Appellant’s brother and mother as well

as information obtained from government records and their own

observations of Appellant. To the extent there was a frisk, it was justified

by a reasonable suspicion that Appellant was armed and that the officers

and the people on the scene were in danger. United States v. Hartz, 458

F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). 

Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s conviction.

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4 UNITED STATES V. WERLE

unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). 

After the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence

discovered at the time of his arrest, Appellant entered a

conditional guilty plea to both counts of the indictment,

pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement provided

that the United States would argue that Appellant had

multiple violent felonyconvictions for purposes of the ACCA

sentence enhancement. The Presentence Report (PSR)

concluded that Appellant was subject to a fifteen-year

mandatory-minimum sentence under the ACCA based on a

2008 conviction for harassment, a 2012 conviction for four

counts of felony riot, a 2012 conviction for harassment, and

a 2013 conviction for felony riot. Without any of the riot

convictions, Appellant would not have had three predicate

convictions for purposes of the ACCA sentencing

enhancement. 

Appellant filed objections to the PSR’s conclusion that he

had three or more qualifying convictions pursuant to the

ACCA, arguing that the riot statute is overinclusive for

multiple reasons and indivisible. Applying the categorical

approach, the district court agreed that the riot statute is

overinclusive because it criminalizes certain acts either

against a person or merely against property. Relying on

previous unpublished opinions of this court that held that the

statute is overinclusive in that way, but is divisible, the

district court likewise found the statute divisible. 

Accordingly, the district court applied the modified

categorical approach. The district court looked to the

charging documents, the plea agreements and the police

reports incorporated by the plea agreements for each of

Appellant’s five riot convictions and found that the riot

convictions were predicate offenses for purposes of the

ACCA sentencing enhancement based on the specific facts of

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UNITED STATES V. WERLE 5

those offenses. The district court did not address Appellant’s

arguments with respect to the other bases of

overinclusiveness.

Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. We have

jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

we review de novo a district court’s finding that a prior

conviction is a predicate offense under the ACCA. United

States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 2011). 

II. Discussion

A. The ACCA and the Categorical Approach

Under the ACCA, “violent felony” is defined, in relevant

part, as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year . . . that has as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another.”218 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). To determine

whether a prior conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” for

purposes of the ACCA, the sentencing court and this court

“apply the three-step process set forth in Descamps v. United

2

“Violent felony” is also defined as an offense that is “burglary, arson,

or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § (e)(2)(B)(ii). 

The felony riot convictions at issue in this case are not any of these

enumerated offenses. Further, the residual clause of the ACCA, which

includes in the definition of “violent felony” an offense that “otherwise

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another” was recently struck down by the Supreme Court in Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (“We hold that imposing an

increased sentence under the residual clause ofthe ArmedCareer Criminal

Act violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”). Accordingly,

the felony riot convictions in this case cannot qualify as violent felonies

under the residual clause.

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6 UNITED STATES V. WERLE

States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).”3 Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch,

809 F.3d 515, 521 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 

The sentencing court must first apply the “categorical

approach” set out in Taylor v. United States, looking “only to

the fact of conviction” and “the statutory definitions of the

prior offense, and not to the particular facts underlying those

convictions.” 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990); see United

States v. Ladwig, 432 F.3d 1001, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2005)

(applying the categorical approach to determine whether an

offense is a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). Here, courts “compare the elements of the

statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with

the elements of the ‘generic’ crime–i.e., the offense as

commonly understood. The prior conviction qualifies as an

ACCA predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same

as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.” 

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281. 

A statute that criminalizes both conduct that does and

conduct that does not qualify as a violent felony is an

overinclusive statute. When considering a conviction under

an overinclusive statute, the sentencing court looks to

whether the statute is overinclusive because it defines a

3

In Almanza-Arenas, this court addressed whether a conviction under

a state statute qualified as a crime of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The modified categorical analysis is the same for

determining whether convictions constitute predicate offenses for

purposes of collateral immigration consequences as for purposes of the

ACCA enhancement. Cf. Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1083 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2014) (“Although Descamps discussed the issue of divisibility in the

context of a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act

(ACCA), we have applied Descamps in the context of collateral

immigration consequences.”). 

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UNITED STATES V. WERLE 7

necessary term or element more broadly than does the generic

offense, or because it provides an alternative list of means or

elements, some of which would and some of which would not

match the generic offense. If the statute of conviction defines

the offense “not alternatively, but only more broadly than the

generic offense,” it is indivisible and the court’s inquiry ends. 

Id. at 2283. If the statute offers a list of alternative means or

elements, the court must determine if the statute is divisible. 

In a “narrow range of cases,” when the state statute is

divisible, that is, it “lists alternative sets of elements, in

essence ‘several different crimes’” and “at least one, but not

all of those crimes matches the generic version, a court needs

a way to find out which the defendant was convicted of.” 

Ramirez v. Lynch, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 901, at *6 (9th Cir.

Jan. 20, 2016). Only in such a case may the sentencing court

review the conviction using the modified categorical

approach. Id. at *6–*7. “[T]he modified categorical

approach permits sentencing courts to consult a limited class

of documents, such as indictments and jury instructions, to

determine which alternative formed the basis of the

defendant’s prior conviction.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281. 

The limited scope of the inquiry under the categorical

approach and the even more limited application of the

modified categorical approach are rooted in the ACCA’s

statutory language, the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that

facts that increase a defendant’s maximum penalty be proven

to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and practical concerns. 

The ACCA specifically provides that its sentencing

enhancement applies to a defendant who “has three ‘previous

convictions’ for a violent felony–not a defendant who has

thrice committed such a crime.” Id. at 2287 (quoting 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). The Supreme Court has interpreted this

statutory language to show that “Congress intended the

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8 UNITED STATES V. WERLE

sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant

had been convicted of crimes falling within certain

categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior

convictions.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600. Accordingly, the

categorical approach limits its inquiry to the statutory

language, rather than the facts of conviction. Moreover, the

Sixth Amendment requires that “[o]ther than the fact of a

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Because

the ACCA sentencing enhancement increases the mandatory

minimum beyond the ordinary ten-year maximum penalty for

§ 922(g), Sixth Amendment principles “counsel against

allowing a sentencing court to ‘make a disputed’

determination ‘about what the defendant and state judge must

have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea,’ or what

the jury in a prior trial must have accepted as the theory of the

crime.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2288 (quoting Shepard v.

United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25 (2005) (plurality opinion)). 

Finally, application of the modified categorical approach to

indivisible statutes would present “‘daunting’ difficulties and

inequities” because it would require sentencing courts 

to expend resources examining (often aged)

documents for evidence that a defendant

admitted in a plea colloquy, or a prosecutor

showed at trial, facts that, although

unnecessaryto the crime of conviction, satisfy

an element of the relevant generic offense. 

The meaning of those documents will often be

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UNITED STATES V. WERLE 9

uncertain. And the statements of fact in them

may be downright wrong.

Id. at 2289 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601–02).

Limiting the application of the modified categorical

approach to divisible statutes “retains the categorical

approach’s central feature: a focus on the elements, rather

than the facts, of a crime” because a “prosecutor charging a

violation of a divisible statute must generally select the

relevant element from its list of alternatives. And the jury, as

instructions in the case will make clear, must then find that

element. . . .” Id. at 2285, 2290 (internal citations omitted). 

B. Application of the Categorical Approach to the 

Washington Riot Statute

When Appellant was convicted, Washington state’s riot

statute provided,

A person is guilty of the crime of riot if,

acting with three or more other persons, he or

she knowingly and unlawfully uses or

threatens to use force, or in any way

participates in the use of such force, against

any other person or against property.

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.84.010.4 The crime is a felony only

“if the actor is armed with a deadly weapon.” Id.

4 The riot statute was amended effective January 1, 2014. The

substantive offense is the same, but the name “riot” was replaced with

“criminal mischief.”

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The district court found, and the parties agree, that

because a defendant can be convicted of a felony under the

Washington riot statute for conduct involving a person or

merely property, it is overinclusive and therefore not a violent

felony under the categorical approach. The parties also agree

that the statute is divisible as to whether the offense was

against a person or property. Accordingly, if the statute was

not overinclusive in any other way, the court could look to the

limited documents permitted to be considered under the

modified categorical approach to determine whether

Appellant was convicted of the offense against a person or the

offense against property.

In its decision, the district court relied on two prior

unpublished decisions from this court, which are not

controlling precedent, to find that the statute was

overinclusive and divisible and the modified categorical

approach was applicable. Both of those cases, United States

v. Franetich, 344 F. App’x 416 (9th Cir. 2009), and United

States v. Lopez-Salas, 254 F. App’x 621 (9th Cir. 2007),

addressed the divisibility of the statute after finding that it is

overinclusive because it covers acts committed against

property. However, Appellant argues, as he did in the district

court, that the statute is overinclusive in two other ways. The

district court did not address whether the statute was

overinclusive in these ways. As discussed below, we

conclude that the riot statute is also overinclusive and

indivisible because it applies even if the defendant used only

the minimal amount of force considered “force” under

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UNITED STATES V. WERLE 11

Washington state law, which would not be included in the

definition of “physical force” under the ACCA.5

That the riot statute is overinclusive but divisible as to

whether the offense involves an act against a person or

against property reveals nothing as to whether it is divisible

with respect to its overinclusive definition of force. If a

statute is overinclusive and indivisible as to any required

element, the modified categorical approach cannot be applied

to that statute. The Sixth Amendment underpinnings of the

categorical approach support our conclusion that the

divisibility of one statutory requirement does not allow the

application of the modified categorical approach to all

elements. The fact that a statute is divisible as to one

requirement does nothing to ensure that a jury has found, or

that a defendant has pled guilty to, any other requirement of

a predicate offense.

Accordingly, even if the earlier unpublished decisions of

this court were binding precedent, they would not establish

that the modified categorical approach applies to all statutory

requirements under the Washington riot statute. Thus, we

5 Appellant also argues that the riot statute is overinclusive and

indivisible with respect to the requirement of use, threat of use, or

participation in any way in the use of force. We agree that the inclusion

of the “participation” prong renders the statute overinclusive as to this

requirement. Whether the statute is divisible as to that prong may rest on

unsettled law. See United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1075 n.6 (8th

Cir. 2015), cert. granted 2016 U.S. LEXIS 710 (discussing the circuit split

regarding divisibility analysis). However, the question of divisibility as

to the use, threat of use, or participation in any way in the use of force is

a moot point. Because, as we hold below, the riot statute defines force

more broadly than the ACCA, a conviction under the statute can never

qualify as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA sentencing

enhancement. 

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12 UNITED STATES V. WERLE

must address whether the Washington riot statute is

overinclusive as to the level of force required for conviction.

The ACCA enhancement requires an offense including

“physical force,” which is defined as “violent force–that is,

force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another

person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)

(emphasis in original). The Washington riot statute refers

only to “force” and does not specify that it must be physical,

or capable of causing any pain or injury. While there are no

cases interpreting the term “force” in the context of the riot

statute, Washington state law defines force much more

broadly in other contexts. See, e.g., City of Pasco v. Ross,

649 P.2d 37, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (“The terms

‘violence’ and ‘force’ are synonymous when used in relation

to assault, and include any application of force, even though

it entails no pain, bodily harm, or serious injury.”). There is

nothing to suggest that force would be defined more narrowly

for purposes of the riot statute. Accordingly, the riot statute

is overinclusive because it defines force more broadly than

physical force as defined by Johnson. 

The United States concedes that the Washington riot

statute does not require the level of force required by Johnson

as a necessary element of the offense. Nevertheless, the

United States argues that felony riot is categorically a violent

felony under Johnson because it requires that the defendant

was an “actor” armed with a deadly weapon.

However, the fact that an individual is armed does not

necessarily mean that he or she has used the weapon in any

way. Again, there are no cases interpreting the definition of

“armed” within the context of the riot statute. However, there

are many cases interpreting the term for purposes of a

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UNITED STATES V. WERLE 13

Washington state sentencing enhancement. See Wash. Rev.

Code. § 9.94A.825 (Deadly weapon special verdict –

Definition). The Washington Supreme Court has held that an

individual is “armed” for purposes of the sentencing

enhancement “if a weapon is easily accessible and readily

available for use, either for offensive or defensive purposes.” 

State v. Gurske, 118 P.3d 333, 335 (Wash. 2005) (quoting

State v. Schelin, 55 P.3d 632, 635 (Wash. 2002)); see also

State v. Sabala, 723 P.2d 5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (defendant

was armed when a gun was under his seat in the car he was

in, within reach, and thus easily accessible). The United

States correctly points out that Washington courts have held

that, for the sentencing enhancement to apply, there must be

a “nexus between the defendant, the crime, and the weapon.” 

Gurske, 118 P.3d at 335. However, the sentencing

enhancement simply requires some “willingness to use” the

weapon, not actual use of the weapon. State v. Brown, 173

P.3d 245, 249 (Wash. 2007). Moreover, the Washington

Supreme Court has held that, to apply the sentencing

enhancement, “the connection between the defendant, the

weapon, and the crime is not an element the State must

explicitly plead and prove.” State v. Easterlin, 149 P.3d 366,

369 (Wash. 2006). Therefore, as Appellant argues, a

defendant could be convicted of felony riot if there was a

knife in his pocket or a gun within his reach but he did not

use or threaten to use physical force. This would not qualify

as a crime of violence under the ACCA. 

The United States also argues that the riot statute is saved

from overinclusiveness because the defendant must have been

an “actor.” This argument also fails because the statute

criminalizes the acts of use, threat of use, or participation in

any way in the use of force. When analyzing an earlier

version of the riot statute, the Washington Supreme Court

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held that a defendant’s “conduct does not have to be turbulent

nor his language violent to constitute him a rioter.” State v.

Moe, 24 P.2d 638, 639 (Wash. 1933). Instead, to be

convicted, a defendant must only give “some word or gesture

indicating at least a willingness to assist the rioters.” Id. 

Therefore, a defendant could be convicted of riot if he acted

to verbally encourage others who were using non-physical

force. This would not qualify as a crime of violence under

the ACCA. 

Combining the requirement that a defendant was an

“actor” with the requirement that the defendant was armed

does not transform the statute into a categorical violent

felony. A defendant could be convicted of felony riot if there

was a knife in his pocket or a gun within his reach and he did

no more than verbally encourage others who were using nonphysical force. This likewise would not qualify as a crime of

violence for purposes of the ACCA enhancement.

In order for a statute to be overinclusive there must be a

“realistic probability,” not merely a “theoretical possibility,”

that the State would apply its statute to conduct outside the

federal generic definition. See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez,

549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). That standard is met here. As we

have explained, the United States concedes that the

Washington felony riot statute could be applied to a

defendant who did not use the level of “violent force”

required by the federal statute. The United States argues only

that a defendant who has not used such force but is an actor

who is armed with a deadly weapon has “per se” committed

a violent felony. However, the Washington cases cited above

distinguish between being armed with a deadly weapon and

actually using or threatening to use that weapon. Washington

case law also makes clear that a defendant need not act

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UNITED STATES V. WERLE 15

violently to be convicted under the riot statute. The

Washington riot statute does not require the use or threatened

use of a deadly weapon for the crime to be considered a

felony. It requires only that the defendant “in any way

participate[]” in the use of force while “armed” with such a

weapon. Therefore, the “state statute’s greater breadth is

evident from its text” and Appellant “need not point to an

actual case applying the statute of conviction in a nongeneric

manner.” See Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004, 1010

(9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc)).

Accordingly, the Washington riot statute is overinclusive

as to the type of force used because it does not require the use

of “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another

person” as required by Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. As in

Descamps, this overinclusiveness “does not concern any list

of alternative elements.” 133 S. Ct. at 2285. Instead, “it

involves a simple discrepancy” between the “physical force”

required by the ACCA and the definition of “force” under

Washington state law. Id. Therefore, the modified

categorical approach “has no role to play in this case,” id.,

and the Sixth Amendment requires that we “presume that the

conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts

criminalized under the state statute.” Mellouli v. Lynch, 135

S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We hold that the Washington riot statute does not qualify

as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA sentencing

enhancement. Therefore, Appellant’s convictions under that

statute are not predicate offenses supporting the application

of the enhancement. Accordingly, we VACATE the sentence

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16 UNITED STATES V. WERLE

and REMAND to the district court for resentencing without

applying the ACCA enhancement. 

VACATED and REMANDED.

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