Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03901/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03901-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Davis
Respondent
Lonnie Morris
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONNIE MORRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

RONALD DAVIS,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-03901-JST 

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL; 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison and proceeding pro se, 

has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He has paid the filing fee.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose 

v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

A district court shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show 

cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant 

or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 

B. Petitioner’s Claims

According to the petition, Petitioner is in custody serving a seven-year-to-life sentence 

with possibility of parole following a 1978 conviction for first degree murder, Cal. Penal Code § 

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187.

1

 See Docket No. 1 (“Pet.”) at 1–2 and 10.2 In the instant action, Petitioner challenges the 

2012 decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”) finding him unsuitable for 

parole. Petitioner raises the following claims: (1) the parole denial renders his sentence 

disproportionate to his crime in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) the BPH acted as a biased 

decision-maker in denying parole, in violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights to a fair tribunal; 

and (3) the BPH’s five-year deferral of his next parole hearing violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.

1. Eighth Amendment Proportionality Claim3

This claim must be dismissed for the simple reason that life in prison for a murder by an 

adult does not violate the Eighth Amendment. “The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and 

unusual punishments, contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital 

sentences.’” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 

957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). “[O]utside the 

context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences 

[will be] exceedingly rare.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227, 289–90 (1983) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 

(2003) (“The gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the 

extraordinary case.”). A sentence of life in prison (or seven-years-to-life) for a murder does not 

lead to an inference of gross disproportionality and therefore does not amount to cruel and unusual 

punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. See Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 584–85 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (sentence of life without parole for 15-year-old murderer does not raise inference of 

gross disproportionality); United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 211 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Under 

 

1

Petitioner was also convicted of robbery, Cal. Penal Code § 211; burglary, id. § 459; firearm 

possession by a felon, id. §12021, as well as several weapon enhancements. The court stayed 

sentencing on all counts except the murder conviction. See Pet. at 10. 

2 Because the petition is not consecutively paginated, the references to pages of filed documents 

are to the page numbers that are automatically assigned by the Court’s electronic filing system and 

appear in the upper right-hand corner of the pages of filed documents.

3

To the extent that Petitioner claims that his sentence is disproportionate in violation of California 

law, California statutes, and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, see Pet. at 17–27, 

such state law claims are not cognizable in federal habeas. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 

(2011). Federal habeas relief is only available where a person is “in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

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Harmelin, it is clear that a mandatory life sentence for murder does not constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment”).4 

Moreover, as a general matter, “so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the 

statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth amendment grounds.” United States v. 

McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, Petitioner’s sentence has not exceeded

the statutory maximum. Petitioner’s sentence of seven-years-to-life carries no guaranteed parole 

date, and carries with it the potential that he could serve the entire term. See Pearson v. Muntz, 

639 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Under California law, prisoners [ ] serving indeterminate 

life prison sentences (i.e., those whose life sentences do not include ‘without the possibility of 

parole’) ‘may serve up to life in prison, but become eligible to be considered for parole after 

serving minimum terms of confinement.’”) (citing In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (Cal. 

2005)). Petitioner responds that his term exceeds the statutory minimum because it exceeds the 

base term set forth in section 2403(c) of the California Code of Regulations, title 15. However, 

this section pertains to the base term of confinement utilized by the BPH once an inmate is found 

suitable for parole. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. Because Petitioner has not been found to be 

suitable for parole, section 2403 has no application here. Id.; see also Paddock v. MendozaPowers, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1128–29 (C.D. Cal. 2009) Petitioner’s continued incarceration 

under the terms of his life-maximum sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment under 

applicable case law. This claim is dismissed with prejudice.

2. Due Process Claim

Petitioner argues that the BPH showed clear bias “by having the predetermined judgment 

that Petitioner must first identify his former crime partner before he will be found suitable for 

 

4

The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have upheld life sentences for crimes less serious than 

murder. See, e.g., Cocio v. Bramlett, 872 F.2d 889, 897–98 (9th Cir. 1989) (25-year-to-life 

sentence for manslaughter conviction not unconstitutional); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73-77 (finding 

that recidivist habeas petitioner’s sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for petty 

theft was not contrary to, nor unreasonable application of, Supreme Court’s “gross

disproportionality principle”); Alford v. Rolfs, 867 F.2d 1216, 1220–23 (9th Cir. 1989) (15-yearto-life sentence for a habitual offender convicted for possession of stolen property not 

unconstitutional); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004–05 (life imprisonment without possibility of parole 

for possession of 672 gram of cocaine raises no inference of gross disproportionality) (Kennedy, 

J., concurring).

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parole.” Pet. at 27. A prisoner is entitled to have his release date considered by a parole board 

that is free from bias or prejudice. O’Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1990); see

also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). Liberally construed, this claim is cognizable 

and merits an answer from Respondent.

3. Ex Post Facto Claim

Petitioner argues that the BPH’s five-year deferral of his next parole hearing pursuant to 

Marsy’s Law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing his risk of punishment. He further 

argues that the five-year deferral was intended to punish him for refusing to divulge the name of 

his partner in crime. In support of this argument, Plaintiff notes that he had never had a parole 

hearing deferral that exceeded three years. 

 Marsy’s Law was approved by California voters in 2008 and, in relevant part, modified 

the availability and frequency of parole hearings and was codified in section 3041.5 of the 

California Penal Code. Prior to the enactment of Marsy’s Law, the BPH heard each case annually 

unless it deferred the next hearing for two or five years. See Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2) 

(2008). Marsy’s Law provides that the BPH will hear each case every fifteen years unless it opts 

to schedule the next hearing in three, five, seven, or ten years. See Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(3) 

(2010). 

The Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.” U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 10. For purposes of this case, an “ex post facto” law is one “‘that changes the 

punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 

committed.’” Peugh v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (2013) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 

390 (1798)). The controlling inquiry in examining a change to a parole law is “whether 

retroactive application of the change . . . create[s] ‘a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of 

punishment attached to the covered crimes.’” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000) (quoting 

Cal. Dept. of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995)). A “speculative, attenuated risk” of 

prolonging incarceration does not establish a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Morales, 514 

U.S. at 509–10. 

Morales and Garner comprise the “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

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Supreme Court,” for § 2254(d) purposes. Both those cases upheld amendments that decreased the 

frequency of parole hearings. 

In Morales, the statutory amendment “introduced the possibility” that the parole authority 

would not have to hold annual parole hearings, Morales, 514 U.S. at 507, if the prisoner has been 

convicted of “more than one offense which involves the taking of a life” and if the Board “finds 

that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing during the following 

years and states the bases for the finding.” Id. at 503 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2) 

(1982)). However, the amendment did not increase the statutory punishment for the offense; did 

not change the substantive formula for securing a reduction of the sentence; did not change the 

standards for fixing the prisoner’s minimum eligible parole date; and did not change the standards 

for determining his suitability for parole or for setting his release date. Id. The parole board also 

retained the authority to allow a parole hearing earlier than the next regularly scheduled hearing 

date, i.e., an expedited hearing might be held upon the request of a prisoner. See id. at 512. The 

Morales Court held that the amendment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the 

amendment “create[d] only the most speculative and attenuated risk of increasing the measure of 

punishment attached to the covered crimes.” Id. at 514. 

In Garner, the Court considered a Georgia amendment that allowed the parole board to 

schedule a parole hearing for a life prisoner as infrequently as once every eight years, whereas the 

law in place at the time of the prisoner’s crime required a parole hearing every three years. See

Garner, 529 U.S. at 247. Although the amendment in Garner was harsher than that in Morales – it 

permitted a lengthier delay between parole hearings, applied to all life prisoners, and afforded 

fewer procedural safeguards — the Supreme Court found that these differences were “not 

dispositive.” See id at 251. The Garner Court found that the statute did not, on its face, show a 

sufficient risk of an increased measure of punishment because the amendment vested the parole 

board with discretion as to how often to set the parole hearings, with eight years for the maximum, 

and because the parole authority’s policies allowed for expedited parole review in the event of a 

change in the prisoner’s circumstances or parole suitability. Id. at 254–55. 

In Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit considered 

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an ex post facto challenge to Marsy’s Law. Applying the reasoning set forth in Morales and

Garner, the Ninth Circuit found that even if the extensive changes to the frequency of parole 

hearings required by Marsy’s Law appeared to create a significant risk of prolonging plaintiffs’

incarceration, the availability of advance hearings precluded federal injunctive relief because such 

availability sufficiently reduced the risk of increased punishment for prisoners. See Gilman, 638 

F.3d at 1108–11 (also noting that the Board may decide sua sponte to hold an advance hearing or 

do so at the request of a prisoner, and that the Board’s decision to deny a prisoner's request for an 

advance hearing is subject to judicial review). Furthermore, as in Morales and Garner, the changes 

brought about by Marsy’s Law did not substantively change parole for existing prisoners. Marsy’s 

Law “did not increase the statutory punishment for any particular offense, did not change the date 

of inmates' initial parole hearings, and did not change the standard by which the Board determined 

whether inmates were suitable for parole.” Id. at 1107. Accordingly, this Court finds that 

Petitioner’s Ex Post Facto claim fails to state a claim for habeas relief.

CONCLUSION

1. The Clerk shall mail a copy of this order and the petition, with all attachments, to 

the respondent and the Respondent’s attorney, the Attorney General of the State of California. 

The Clerk shall also serve a copy of this order on Petitioner. 

2. Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on Petitioner, within ninety-one

(91) days of the issuance of this order, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted 

based on the due process claim found cognizable herein. Respondent shall file with the answer 

and serve on Petitioner a copy of all portions of the state parole record that have been transcribed 

previously and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition. If 

Petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a traverse with the Court and 

serving it on Respondent within twenty-eight (28) days of the date the answer is filed.

3. Respondent may file, within ninety-one (91) days, a motion to dismiss on 

procedural grounds in lieu of an answer, as set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 of 

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If Respondent files such a motion, Petitioner shall file 

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with the Court and serve on Respondent an opposition or statement of non-opposition within 

twenty-eight (28) days of the date the motion is filed, and Respondent shall file with the Court 

and serve on Petitioner a reply within fourteen (14) days of the date any opposition is filed.

4. Petitioner is reminded that all communications with the Court must be served on 

respondent by mailing a true copy of the document to Respondent’s counsel. Petitioner must keep 

the Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 

1997) (Rule 41(b) applicable in habeas cases). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 29, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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