Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01161/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01161-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald E. Campbell
Appellee
Terence Keijiro Jacobs
Appellant
Joan Kirkpatrick
Appellee

Document Text:

' , 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

TERENCE KEIJIRO JACOBS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Coun of Appeals 

Tenth Cfrcuir 

OCT 11 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 90-1161 

(D.C. No. 90-B-0360) 

(D. Colorado) 

DONALD E. CAMPBELL and 

JOAN KIRKPATRICK, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

This is an appeal from an order of the district court 

dismissing, upon recommendation of the magistrate, a complaint 

filed by Terence Jacobs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Concluding 

plaintiff has failed to state a claim under§ 1983, we affirm. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1161 Document: 010110059558 Date Filed: 10/11/1990 Page: 1 
, 

At the time of the filing of his complaint, Mr. Jacobs was a 

patient at the Colorado State Hospital, having been committed 

there following a determination in a criminal case that he was not 

guilty by reason of insanity. From papers annexed to Mr. Jacobs' 

complaint, it appears he attempted to obtain his release from 

confinement by filing a prose motion in the state court. In 

response to that motion, defendant Joan Kirkpatrick, Clerk of the 

Court, sent Mr. Jacobs a letter enclosing a "prior evaluation" and 

advising him because he was represented by the public defender, 

future papers should be filed through counsel. 

Mr. Jacobs then filed a motion to dismiss counsel and seeking 

leave to proceed prose. In response, defendant District Judge 

Donald Campbell, entered an order denying the motion. 

Judge Campbell's order stated: 

In part, 

Because of his mental illness, the court does not 

find the defendant to be capable of understanding the 

nature of a release hearing, to be able to knowingly 

waive his right to counsel or to effectively represent 

himself at a hearing. Therefore, the defendant's motion 

to represent himself is denied. 

Mr. Jacobs filed a motion for reconsideration of this order, but 

our record does not contain a response to that motion from the 

state court. In the papers filed by Mr. Jacobs in the federal 

action he avers there was no such response. Mr. Jacobs then filed 

a notice of appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals, but the 

record is silent whether that appeal was pursued. Mr. Jacobs 

states in his complaint, however, "[n]o answer or ruling [on the 

notice of appeal] was received by [Mr. Jacobs]. 1 

1 It does appear, however, that the complaint in this action 

filed within one week of the filing of the notice of appeal. 

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was 

Appellate Case: 90-1161 Document: 010110059558 Date Filed: 10/11/1990 Page: 2 
... 

In his § 1983 complaint, Mr. Jacobs sought declaratory and 

injunctive relief coupled with attorney fees and costs. He prayed 

for a declaration that he "has the constitutional right to defend 

in his own name; that [he] was denied this right without due 

process . . . . , that [he] has a constitutional right to access to 

the court [which] includes the right to file prose motions and to 

have access to a superior court to appeal the decisions of the 

lower court." He also sought a temporary and permanent injunction 

"directing defendants to desist and restrain themselves from 

further violations of plaintiff's Federally protected 

Constitutional rights to defend in his own name without due 

process and equal protection of Colorado law and his right to 

access to the Court." 

After review of the papers, the magistrate recommended the 

complaint be dismissed. Construing Mr. Jacobs' pleadings 

liberally, the magistrate concluded the complaint sought the 

interference of the federal court into "state criminal 

proceedings." Consequently, the magistrate recommended dismissal 

on the authority of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and 

Parkhurst v. Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981). Mr. Jacobs 

filed an objection to that recommendation in which he took the 

inconsistent positions that the state release hearing was not a 

criminal proceeding and that "as a criminal defendant" he has the 

right to proceed pro se. 

advocates on appeal. 

That is essentially the position he 

We believe the district court correctly dismissed the 

complaint for a number of reasons. First, it is evident Mr. 

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.... 

Jacobs intends his§ 1983 complaint to serve as a substitute for a 

state appeal. This he cannot do. Mayes v. Honn, 542 F.2d 822, 

824 (10th Cir. 1976). 

Second, as the magistrate correctly held, a federal court 

cannot enjoin a state prosecution except under "extraordinary" or 

"special" circumstances. The case presented by Mr. Jacobs is 

neither extraordinary nor special, particularly in light of his 

failure to pursue his state right of appeal. The issues he sought 

to raise in federal court could have been raised on appeal, and 

the relief he mistakenly sought in his civil rights complaint 

could have been obtained in state court if his legal theory is 

correct. 

Third, contrary to his contention, the release proceedings 

following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity are part 

of the criminal case. The case upon which Mr. Jacobs relies, 

People v. District Court, 192 Colo. 225, 557 P.2d 414 (1976), does 

not hold that a release hearing is not criminal within the Younger 

context as he argues. The issue in that case was whether the 

district attorney could demand discovery under the rules of civil 

procedure to prepare for a release hearing. 

Court held, for the purpose of applying 

The Colorado Supreme 

the rules of civil 

procedure, "[t]he proceeding is not an adversary proceeding in the 

usual sense of a case which is controlled by the rules of civil 

procedure." People v. District Court, 557 P.2d at 416. Moreover, 

the court stated a release hearing was a "special proceeding" 

within the context of Rule Bl(a) of the Colorado Rules of Civil 

Procedure which made the discovery rules inapplicable. Id. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1161 Document: 010110059558 Date Filed: 10/11/1990 Page: 4 
Nevertheless, the court did consider whether the release hearing 

under Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 16-8-115 is a criminal proceeding within 

the context of Younger. 

Indeed, the statute itself makes clear the release hearing is 

criminal in nature. First, § 16-8-115 is part of the state 

criminal code. Second, the context of the statute makes clear the 

court having jurisdiction to hear the issue of release is the 

sentencing court. Third, the release hearing is nothing more than 

a continuation of the procedures commenced by the plea of not 

guilty by reason of insanity. In short, we are convinced for the 

purpose of applying Younger the state release proceeding is part 

of a state criminal prosecution. 

Federal courts do not exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 to review state court action. Whether Judge Campbell's 

conclusion Mr. Jacobs is not sufficiently competent to represent 

himself is correct should be decided in the first instance by the 

state appellate courts. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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