Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00947/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00947-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Bonnet
Defendant
Edward Chavez
Defendant
Meadors
Defendant
Steve Perry
Defendant
Jeffrey Thornhill
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY THORNHILL, No. 2:04-CV-0947-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

OFFICER STEVE PERRY

individually and in his

capacity as a Stockton Police

Officer; OFFICER PAUL BONNET

individually and in his

capacity as a Stockton Police

Officer; SGT. MEADORS

individually and in his

capacity as a Sergeant of the

Stockton Police Department;

EDWARD CHAVEZ individually and

in his capacity as Stockton

Chief of Police; Does 1-50,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Jeffrey Thornhill

(“Thornhill”) claims that Defendants Paul Bonnet, Steve Perry,

Sergeant Meadors and Edward Chavez, individually and in their

capacities as members of the Stockton Police, violated his civil

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

rights during the course of effecting his arrest. Presently 1

before the Court are three separate but related issues as

follows: 1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Admissions; 2)

Plaintiff’s Dismissal of All Parties Except Paul Bonnet; 3)

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative

Motion for Summary Adjudication; and 4) Supplemental Jurisdiction

over State Law Claims. Each shall be considered in turn below.

BACKGROUND

On March 7, 2003, Plaintiff alleges he was using his

father’s truck to transport a friend, Erica McCleary, to a nearby

hospital emergency room. Upon arrival at the hospital, McClearly

alerted staff she had been battered by Plaintiff and that he was

in possession of a firearm in the parking lot. Officers Perry

and Bonnett were dispatched to the scene and immediately

identified Plaintiff sitting in his vehicle. As the officers

approached Plaintiff, they instructed him to raise his hands and

exit the vehicle. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff engaged the

vehicle in reverse and quickly backed out of the stall. 

Plaintiff then stopped the vehicle and began to move forward

toward the exit of the parking lot. As he lurched forward, his

vehicle grazed Officer Bonnet. Officer Bonnett then discharged

his weapon twice into the rear of Thornhill’s truck striking

Plaintiff once in the shoulder.

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3

Plaintiff nonetheless proceeded from the parking lot at a high

rate of speed and was later apprehended by other officers. 

Plaintiff pled guilty to felony assault with a deadly weapon,

resisting a peace officer causing serious bodily injury and

possession of a firearm with priors. The present action ensued.

STANDARD

A. WITHDRAWAL OF ADMISSIONS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) provides that “[e]ach

matter of which an admission is requested...is admitted unless,

within 30 days after service of the request, or within such

shorter or longer time as the court may allow or as the parties

may agree to in writing...” The Court may, at its discretion,

allow the withdrawal or amendment of admissions per Rule 36(b). 

The court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the

presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved

thereby, and the party who obtained the admission fails to

satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice

that party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits. 

Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007). This

rule is permissive, rather than mandatory. Id.

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4

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323(quoting Rule 56(c)).

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5

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)).

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As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has

carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts .... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 

C. ANALYSIS

1. Motion to Withdraw Admissions

 

On October 20, 2006, Defendants sought admissions from

Plaintiff regarding the facts giving rise to this action. 

Plaintiff received those requests for admissions, but failed to

reply. Long after the deadline under Rule 36 and the deadline

for discovery under the Court’s Pretrial Scheduling Order,

Plaintiff made the present Motion to Withdraw his earlier

admissions.

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As noted above, pursuant to Rule 36, “[e]ach matter of which an

admission is requested...is admitted unless, within 30 days after

service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as

the court may allow or as the parties may agree to in

writing....”

In his Motion to Withdraw, Plaintiff alleges he simply did

not understand the import of failing to respond to Defendants’

requests for admissions. Plaintiff attributes his lack of

understanding to both his status as a pro se litigant as well as

his allegation that Defendants offered him an “open extension” of

time to respond. Conversely, Defendants allege Plaintiff was

clearly aware of the discovery cut-off and that no such extension

was offered. Defendants further allege potential hardship in the

event the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion.

As an initial matter, Defendants’ requests for admissions

have gone unanswered well past the period provided for by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 36(a) and the period provided for in the Court’s Pretrial

Scheduling Order. That fact alone is sufficient for the Court to

deny Plaintiff’s Motion. In addition, however, to the extent

Plaintiff argues there was an extension of those deadlines

granted by Defendants, the Court finds such an extension improper

and invalid. Specifically, any extension of the Court’s

discovery deadline would require compliance with the Local Rules

and this Court’s Order granting such an extension. Clearly, no

such Order has been granted. Lastly, while denying Plaintiff’s

Motion would practically eliminate presentment of the merits of

his case, granting Plaintiff’s Motion would irreparably prejudice

Defendants. Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622.

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8

Defendants have relied upon the admissions through the discovery

cut-off dates, even going so far as to rely on those admissions

to prepare the present Motion for Summary Judgment. In the event

the Court were to grant Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendants would be

forced to rely upon potentially unavailable witnesses for an

incident that occurred more than four years ago. Accordingly,

this Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion for Withdrawal of

Admissions is properly DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s Dismissal of All Parties Except Paul Bonnet

In Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities opposing

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states that he

wishes to “...dismiss all defendant’s [sic] except Officer

Bonnet[.]” In addition, Plaintiff’s attached Declaration in

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment again clarifies he

wishes to voluntarily dismiss all Defendants save Officer

Bonnett.

The Court liberally construes the pleadings and efforts of

pro se litigants affording more leeway than it would to a party

represented by counsel. U.S. v. Ten Thousand Dollars, 860 F.2d

1511, 1513 (9th Cir. 1988). While a liberal construction has

been accorded to Plaintiff’s pleadings, the Court nonetheless

finds Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed his claims against

Defendants Steve Perry, Sergeant Meadors and Edward Chavez. 

Accordingly, Perry, Meadors and Chavez are hereby DISMISSED.

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 Plaintiff also seeks relief on state law grounds including 2

assault and battery as well as negligence and failure to

supervise.

 Because this Court finds no violation of Plaintiff’s 3

constitutional rights, an analysis of Defendant’s qualified

immunity is unnecessary.

9

3. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

As noted above, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Paul Bonnet,

individually and in his capacity as a Stockton Police Officer,

violated Plaintiff’s civil rights during the course of arresting

him. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges federal claims under the

Civil Rights Act of 1871 (“Section 1983”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

including violations of equal protection, due process and illegal

search and seizure. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that

police officers may not use deadly force in preventing an

unarmed, non-threatening suspect from escaping. Defendant 2

claims he did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and

to the extent the Court finds otherwise, he is protected by

qualified immunity.3

Excessive force claims arising in the context of an arrest

or investigatory stop are properly characterized as invoking the

protections of the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 394 (1989). These claims are generally to be analyzed under

the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness standard. Id. at

395.

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This standard is not capable of precise definition, and its

application requires careful attention to the facts of each

particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of

the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to escape. Id. at 396. Moreover, the

reasonableness of the use of force in making an arrest must be

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. 

Id. 

In the present action, the admissions obtained by Defendants

operate as controlling facts. Defendant obtained the following

admissions relevant to an excessive force analysis:

1. Plaintiff was in his truck in St. Joseph’s Medical

Center parking lot when he was approached by a

police officer with his gun drawn, pointed at

Plaintiff. Defendants’ Request for Admission

No. 7.

2. Plaintiff was in the parking lot because he had

beat up his girlfriend, who was in the emergency

room receiving medical attention. Defendants’

Request for Admission No. 28.

3. Plaintiff knew the officers were there to speak to

him regarding his girlfriend. Defendants’ Request

for Admission No. 29.

4. At least one police officer advised Plaintiff to

put his hands up. Defendants’ Request for

Admission No. 8.

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5. Instead of raising his hands, Plaintiff started

the engine of his truck and backed out of the

parking stall, nearly hitting a police officer. 

Defendants’ Request for Admission No. 9.

6. Plaintiff was aware the officers wanted to speak

to him. Defendants’ Request for Admission No. 10.

7. Plaintiff attempted to run over at least one of

the officers. Defendants’ Request for Admission

No. 13.

8. An officer shot at Plaintiff as Plaintiff lunged

his truck at the officer. Defendants’ Request for

Admission No. 14.

9. Plaintiff was aware that the officers wanted him

to stop. Defendants’ Request for Admission

No. 17.

10. Prior to exiting the parking lot, Plaintiff

stopped his truck at the end of the driveway and

attempted to back up in order to hit the officers. 

Defendants’ Request for Admission Nos. 20-21.

11. Plaintiff struck Defendant with his truck. 

Defendants’ Request for Admission No. 23.

12. The officers yelled numerous times for Plaintiff

to stop. Defendants’ Request for Admission

No. 26. 

13. Plaintiff attempted to hit the officers so he

could get away. Defendants’ Request for Admission

No. 27.

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14. Plaintiff was willing to do whatever was necessary

to avoid getting arrested, including hurting the

police officers. Defendants’ Request for

Admission No. 30. 

15. Defendant shot Plaintiff in self defense as

Plaintiff was attempting to hit Defendant with his

truck. Defendants’ Request for Admission No. 35.

The foregoing admissions conclusively establish that

Plaintiff was a suspect in a violent crime. Further, these

admissions establish Plaintiff attempted to repeatedly strike

Officers Perry and Bonnett with his truck in order to escape

custody. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.

Where a police officer has probable cause to believe the

suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the

officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to

prevent escape by using deadly force. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543

U.S. 194, 197-98 (2004) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,

11 (1985)). In the instant case, Officer Bonnett had such

probable cause. Given the foregoing findings, the Court

concludes Officer Bonnett’s actions on the Morning of March 7,

2003, did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims in

favor of Defendant Bonnett is proper and hereby GRANTED.

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4. State Law Claims

Plaintiff has alleged several state law causes of action

including assault and battery, negligence and failure to

supervise. The district courts may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state claims if it has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367. As is clearly set forth above, the Court has concluded

that Plaintiffs’ federal causes of action fail. Consequently,

the Court elects not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and,

hereby, dismisses the remaining state law causes of action

without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to

Withdraw Admissions is DENIED; Defendants Perry, Meadors and

Chavez are hereby DISMISSED; Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims is GRANTED; and

Plaintiff’s state claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. 

Dated: July 9, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

 

 

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