Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-20-01057/USCOURTS-ca13-20-01057-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Morgan Joseph Langan
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

MORGAN JOSEPH LANGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2020-1057

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:18-cv-01603-LKG, Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby.

______________________

Decided: May 6, 2020

______________________

MORGAN JOSEPH LANGAN, Cornville, AZ, pro se. 

 ANTHONY F. SCHIAVETTI, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN,

JR., LOREN MISHA PREHEIM. 

 ______________________

Before CHEN, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

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2 LANGAN v. UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-Appellant Morgan Joseph Langan appeals 

from a judgment from the Court of Federal Claims (Claims 

Court) dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Langan v. United States, No. 18-cv-01603, 

2019 WL 3857044 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 16, 2019). For the reasons 

explained below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Langan filed suit in the Claims Court against the 

United States, the State of Arizona, and Yavapai County, 

Arizona, alleging that certain banks operating in Arizona 

and certain state and local county government officials in 

Yavapai County improperly foreclosed upon and 

confiscated his house and land. SAppx 27, 30–31.1 Mr. 

Langan alleged that he “was deprived of [his] land, home, 

estate and property under operation of State non-judicial 

foreclosure laws that impaired the obligations required by 

[certain] contracts between the parties.” SAppx 29. His 

complaint also appeared to assert claims against the 

United States based upon the First, Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments and Article 1 § 10 of the United States 

Constitution. SAppx 28. As relief, Mr. Langan sought to 

recover $1,398,838.05 in damages from the United States 

and certain equitable relief. SAppx 38–39. 

The Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim pursuant 

to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of 

Federal Claims. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, No. 18-cv-01603

(Fed. Cl. Dec. 10, 2018), ECF No. 7 at 1–2. In response to 

the Government’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Langan raised a 

breach of contract claim against the United States and

1 Mr. Langan and the Government submitted their 

own appendices, which will be referred to with the prefixes 

“Appx” and “SAppx,” respectively.

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LANGAN v. UNITED STATES 3

asserted a violation of an alleged federal land patent. Pl.’s 

Resp. Mot. Dismiss, No. 18-cv-01603 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 11, 

2019), ECF No. 18 at 1. Mr. Langan also identified 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(1), 1493, 1498, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983

as the jurisdictional bases for his claims and cause of action 

against the United States. Id. at 4.

The Claims Court granted the Government’s motion to 

dismiss, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. 

Langan’s claims on various grounds. Langan, 2019 WL 

3857044, at *8. The court explained that it lacked

jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Langan’s complaint because 

he asserted claims against parties other than the United 

States, did not establish the existence of a contract with the 

United States, and pleaded various other claims outside 

the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *5–7. The 

court later denied Mr. Langan’s motion for reconsideration. 

Langan v. United States, No. 18-cv-01603, 2019 WL 

4643746, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 24, 2019).

Mr. Langan appealed. We have jurisdiction over the 

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the Claims Court’s legal conclusion 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Stephens v. 

United States, 884 F.3d 1151, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing 

Coast Prof’l, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.3d 1349, 1354 

(Fed. Cir. 2016)). As the plaintiff, Mr. Langan “bears the 

burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Estes Exp. Lines v. United 

States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Reynolds 

v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed.

Cir. 1988)). When reviewing a Claims Court’s decision on 

a “motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

[we] accept[] as true all uncontroverted factual allegations 

in the complaint, and construe[] them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Cedars–Sinai Med. 

Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).

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4 LANGAN v. UNITED STATES

The Claims Court was correct to dismiss Mr. Langan’s

complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Tucker 

Act, the Claims Court has jurisdiction over “any claim 

against the United States founded either upon the 

Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of 

an executive department, or upon any express or implied 

contract with the United States, or for liquidated or 

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Claims Court’s jurisdiction under 

the Tucker Act “is confined to the rendition of money 

judgments in suits brought for that relief against the 

United States,” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 

588 (1941), and Mr. Langan’s complaint does not allege any

claim within the court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.

Under the Tucker Act, the Claims Court only has 

jurisdiction to hear “claim[s] against the United States.” 

§ 1491(a)(1); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588. “[I]f the relief 

sought is against others than the United States[,] the suit 

as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of 

the court.” Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588. The essence of Mr. 

Langan’s complaint appears to relate to actions by banks 

and certain state and local government officials in Arizona. 

SAppx 27, 30–31. To the extent the complaint sought relief 

against defendants other than the United States, including

private parties and state and county entities, the Claims 

Court correctly dismissed those claims. See Sherwood, 312 

U.S. at 588 (The Claims Court is “without jurisdiction of 

any suit brought against private parties.”); Conner v. 

United States, 407 F. App’x 428, 430 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (The

Claims Court “does not have jurisdiction [over] claims 

against Virginia, its entities, or its employees.”). 

Further, the Tucker Act is “only a jurisdictional 

statute.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). 

That means it “does not create a substantive cause of 

action,” but instead requires the plaintiff to identify a 

“money-mandating” source of law, i.e., “a separate source 

of substantive law that creates the right to money 

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LANGAN v. UNITED STATES 5

damages.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to 

invoke the court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction must identify an 

independent source of a substantive cause of action for 

money damages from the United States arising out of a 

contract, statute, regulation, or constitutional provision. 

Id.; Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 

525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In this case, the 

Claims Court correctly concluded that Mr. Langan’s 

complaint was not based upon a money-mandating 

provision of law, or a contract with the United States. 

Mr. Langan’s complaint appeared to allege violations of 

his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments and Article 1 § 10 of the United States 

Constitution. SAppx 28. As the Claims Court correctly 

noted, the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Article 

1 § 10 cannot support jurisdiction under the Tucker Act 

because none of these constitutional provisions are moneymandating. United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 

(Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment, standing 

alone, cannot be so interpreted to command the payment of 

money.”); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 

(Fed. Cir. 1995) (The Fourteenth Amendment is not “a 

sufficient basis for jurisdiction because [it] do[es] not 

mandate payment of money by the government.”); Olajide 

v. United States, No. 16-01594, 2017 WL 3225048, at *4 

(Fed. Cl. July 31, 2017) (Article I § 10 is “not moneymandating and do[es] not create a duty for the government 

to pay.”). While the Claims Court may consider takings 

claims based upon the Fifth Amendment, the complaint 

asserted no factual predicate for the conclusion that the 

banks or state and local government officials acted on 

behalf of the United States in connection with the 

foreclosure of Mr. Langan’s property. Therefore, the 

Claims Court correctly concluded that Mr. Langan failed to 

identify a cognizable property interest that had been taken 

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6 LANGAN v. UNITED STATES

by the United States. See Langan, 2019 WL 3857044, at 

*6. 

The Claims Court also correctly dismissed Mr. Langan’s 

breach of contract claim against the United States for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Langan failed to 

plausibly establish the existence of an express or implied 

contract with the United States. See Langan, 2019 WL 

3857044, at *5–6 (citing Crewzers Fire Crew Transp., Inc. 

v. United States, 741 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“To 

invoke the Court of Federal Claims’[] jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act, a [plaintiff] must first show that its claims 

arose out of a valid contract with the United States.”)). As 

the plaintiff, Mr. Langan bears the burden of proving the 

existence of a valid contract with the United States. KamAlmaz v. United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). “The party alleging a contract must show a mutual 

intent to contract including an offer, an acceptance, and 

consideration.” Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 

F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “A contract with the 

United States also requires that the Government 

representative who entered or ratified the agreement had 

actual authority to bind the United States.” Id. As the 

Claims Court correctly concluded, Mr. Langan failed to 

point to any evidence to plausibly establish these elements 

of a contract with the United States. 

Mr. Langan referred to an alleged federal land patent. 

But, as the Claims Court correctly noted, see Langan, 2019 

WL 3857044, at *6, “[h]olding a land patent, like any 

ownership interest in property, . . . is not sufficient on its 

own to give rise to a cause of action,” Daniels v. United 

States, No. 17-01598, 2018 WL 1664476, at *8 (Fed. Cl. 

Apr. 6, 2018); see also Ioane v. United States, 4 F. App’x 

762, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A] Federal Land Patent is a 

deed and gives . . . no rights against the United States.”). 

Mr. Langan has not identified any independent moneymandating provision of law basis for his land patent claim, 

as is required to invoke the Claims Court’s jurisdiction 

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LANGAN v. UNITED STATES 7

under the Tucker Act. Nor does Mr. Langan identify any 

adverse action taken by the United States in regard to his 

land patent.

Next, the Claims Court correctly concluded it lacked

jurisdiction to consider Mr. Langan’s statutory claims 

because the statutes relied upon were either outside the 

court’s jurisdiction or inapplicable to his claims. See

Langan, 2019 WL 3857044, at *7. Mr. Langan identified 

the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), as the jurisdictional 

basis for his case, but as previously discussed, this is “only 

a jurisdictional statute” and “does not create any 

substantive right enforceable against the United States for 

money damages.” Testan, 424 U.S. at 398. He also relied 

on 28 U.S.C. § 1493, but that statute was repealed in 1953. 

Also, as the Claims Court correctly noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 

is inapplicable to Mr. Langan’s claims because it addresses 

the court’s jurisdiction regarding invention patents, not

land patents. See Langan, 2019 WL 3857044, at *7; see 

also Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 

LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1376 n.3 (2018) (“Modern invention 

patents . . . are meaningfully different from land patents.”). 

Mr. Langan further identified 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a 

substantive cause of action, but the Claims Court does not 

possess jurisdiction to hear claims for violations of this 

statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (providing that exclusive 

jurisdiction to hear civil rights claims resides in the federal 

district courts); Kennedy v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 611, 

618 (2018) (“[O]nly federal district courts possess 

jurisdiction to entertain claims alleging civil rights 

violations” such as claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983.), appeal dismissed, 748 F. App’x 335 (Fed. Cir. 

2019). 

Finally, the remainder of Mr. Langan’s demands, 

which are for equitable relief, are also outside the 

jurisdiction of the Claims Court. The complaint sought, 

among other things, that the Claims Court “decree a fair 

and equitable process to command specific performance for 

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8 LANGAN v. UNITED STATES

officers of the government including Yavapai County and 

the State of Arizona.” SAppx 39. Mr. Langan also asserted

a “right to redeem [his land] in equity” based on “unjust 

enrichment.” Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 18 at 2. 

The Claims Court lacks general equity jurisdiction and can 

only award equitable relief “incident of and collateral to” a 

money judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2); Roth v. 

United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he 

Court of Federal Claims does not possess general equity 

jurisdiction.”); Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 

1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (same). Further, Mr. Langan’s unjust 

enrichment claim, as an equitable cause of action, is 

beyond the jurisdiction of the Claims Court. 8x8, Inc. v. 

United States, 854 F.3d 1376, 1383 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 

CONCLUSION

We have considered Mr. Langan’s remaining 

arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing 

reasons, the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. 

Langan’s claims, and properly dismissed the complaint.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 20-1057 Document: 33 Page: 8 Filed: 05/06/2020