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Parties Involved:
Electric Insurance Company
Appellee
Yudi Hernandez
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

YUDI HERNANDEZ, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ELECTRIC INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 15-3317 

(D.C. No. 6:15-CV-01170-JTMJPO) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BACHARACH and MORITZ, Circuit 

Judges. 

_________________________________ 

This appeal involves interpretation of a liability insurance policy’s 

limit. The policy limits the insured’s liability to $100,000 “for all 

damages, including damages for care, loss of services or death, arising out 

of ‘bodily injury’ sustained by any one person in any one auto accident.” 

 

* The parties have not asked for oral argument, and we conclude that 

oral argument would not materially aid our consideration of the appeal. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the 

appeal based on the briefs. 

Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent, except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 

32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

September 7, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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Appellant’s App’x at 54. We must decide whether the $100,000 limit 

applies separately to multiple claimants incurring damages because of the 

same person’s injuries. We answer “no.” 

1. Yudi Hernandez is injured in a car accident, and she and her 

father incur damages. 

Ms. Yudi Hernandez, a minor, was injured in a car accident. Because 

Yudi was a minor, her father was responsible for paying her medical 

expenses, which exceeded $350,000. Yudi and her father settled with the 

driver’s insurer, Electric Insurance Company. Electric agreed to pay 

Mr. Hernandez $100,000 and allow Yudi to file a declaratory judgment 

action to determine whether Electric was liable for another $100,000 “per 

person” limit to Yudi. Electric agreed to pay Yudi $100,000 if she 

prevailed in the declaratory judgment action. 

In light of this agreement, Yudi filed a declaratory judgment action, 

claiming that the per-person limit separately applies to each person who 

incurs damage. Electric disagrees, stating that the liability limit covers all 

claims growing out of injuries to one person in the auto. The district court 

granted summary judgment to Electric, and Yudi appeals. 

2. We engage in de novo review and interpret the policy under 

Kansas law. 

 We review de novo the district court’s ruling on summary judgment, 

using the same standard applicable in district court. Red Panther Chem. 

Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 43 F.3d 514, 517 (10th Cir. 1994). Applying this 

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standard, we determine whether a genuine issue exists on any material fact, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Yudi. Id. Through this 

view of the evidence, we engage in de novo review of the district court’s 

interpretation of the insurance policy. See Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Am. 

Fence Co., 115 F.3d 805, 806 (10th Cir. 1997) (“When the relevant facts 

are undisputed, we review the district court’s interpretation of an insurance 

contract de novo.”). 

 To interpret the policy, we apply state law. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. 

Burlington N. R.R. Co., 53 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 1995). The parties 

agree that Kansas law governs. Thus, we follow Kansas law when 

interpreting the policy. See Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nanodetex Corp., 

733 F.3d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying the state law that both 

parties agreed was applicable). Kansas law requires us to ascertain the 

parties’ intent. Liggatt v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 46 P.3d 1120, 1125 (Kan. 

2002). “If the terms of the contract are clear, there is no room for rules of 

construction, and the intent of the parties is determined from the contract 

itself.” Id.

We interpret the insurance policy from the perspective of a 

“reasonably prudent insured.” Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkins, 

179 P.3d 1104, 1110 (Kan. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

policy is ambiguous only if reasonably prudent insureds could interpret the 

language in different ways. Id. at 1109-10. If the policy language is 

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ambiguous, we adopt the construction most favorable to the insured. Id. at 

1110. 

3. The policy unambiguously limits Electric’s liability to $100,000 

for the damages Ms. Hernandez and her father sustained. 

The insurance policy provides: 

The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for each person 

for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for 

all damages, including damages for care, loss of services or 

death, arising out of “bodily injury” sustained by any one 

person in any one auto accident. 

Appellant’s App’x at 54. The declarations page of the policy shows a 

liability limit of $100,000 per person. Thus, the policy caps coverage at 

$100,000 for all damages sustained by any one person in a car accident. 

The policy limit on damages is broad: It covers all damages, including 

damages arising out of bodily injury to a single person. So, on its face, the 

policy caps the payout to $100,000 for everyone incurring damages arising 

out of a single person’s bodily injury. Yudi and her father both sustained 

damages arising out of Yudi’s bodily injuries. As a result, the claims by 

Yudi and her father must come out of the $100,000 limit. 

Two aspects of the policy would lead any reasonably prudent insured 

to conclude that the $100,000 limit applies to everyone asserting a claim 

arising out of Yudi’s injuries: 

1. The liability limit expressly includes damages relating to the 

care for someone injured in an accident. 

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2. The policy acknowledges that the limit applies even if there are 

multiple claims. 

First, the policy states that the liability limit applies to all damages 

for each person. The policy does not define damages, but makes clear that 

they can be sustained by persons not involved in the auto accident. For 

example, the policy states that the damages include those incurred in 

caring for another and the loss of services for those involved in the 

accident. Thus, the per-person limit applies to damages sustained by the 

father, as well as Yudi; the damages to both individuals are included in the 

per-person limit. 

Second, the policy acknowledges the possibility of multiple claims, 

but states that the per-person limit is the most that Electric will pay 

“regardless of the number of [c]laims made.” Id. In this way, the policy 

clarifies that the $100,000 limit applies even when more than one person 

submits a claim arising from bodily injuries sustained by someone involved 

in the accident.1

The Kansas Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in Farmers 

Insurance Co. v. Rosen ex rel. Rosen, 839 P.2d 71 (Kan. App. 1992). 

There, the insured’s liability limit was $100,000 per person. 839 P.2d at 

72. The issue—like ours—was whether a separate liability limit applied for 

 

1

 We need not address Ms. Hernandez’s assertion that the district court 

erred in characterizing her father’s claim as a derivative claim akin to one 

for lack of consortium. That characterization has no bearing on our 

disposition. 

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parents who incurred damages (loss of consortium and medical expenses) 

because of their relationship to someone involved in an auto accident. Id.

at 72, 74. 

In addressing that issue, the Kansas Court of Appeals turned to the 

policy: “‘The bodily injury liability limit . . . for “each person” is the 

maximum for bodily injury sustained by one person in any occurrence.’” 

Id. at 74 (quoting policy). 

There is little difference between that policy language and the policy 

language here. Perhaps the only difference is that 

 Electric’s per-person limit broadly covers all damages arising 

out of bodily injury, while 

 the Rosen policy was narrower, covering “bodily injury” rather 

than all damages “arising out of” bodily injury. 

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Thus, Electric’s per-person limit casts a broader net than the policy 

language in Rosen. Electric’s per-person limit includes the father’s 

damages as long as they arise out of Yudi’s bodily injury; the Rosen

language covered the parents’ claims only if they were for their child’s 

bodily injury. In Rosen, the Kansas Court of Appeals concluded that this 

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narrower language unambiguously covered the parents’ claims. It stands to 

reason that Electric’s more inclusive per-person limit is also broad enough 

to cover the father’s claims. 

Yudi tries to distinguish Rosen on the ground that the Rosen policy 

narrowly defined “damages” as “the cost of compensating those who suffer 

bodily injury from an accident.” Id. at 73 (ellipsis omitted). According to 

Yudi, the Rosen policy’s narrow definition shows that individuals enjoyed 

coverage only if they suffered bodily injuries from the accident, whereas 

Electric’s policy did not include any definition of “damages.” This is a 

distinction without a difference. Though Electric’s policy does not define 

“damages,” the policy effectively restricts coverage to the bodily harm 

suffered by someone in an auto accident. Appellant’s App’x at 52. In turn, 

“[b]odily injury” is defined as “bodily harm, sickness or disease.” Id. at 

51. As a result, the Electric policy restricts damages to Yudi’s bodily 

harm. That is precisely how Yudi describes the effect of the policy 

language in Rosen. 

Rosen is persuasive as to how the Kansas Supreme Court would 

interpret this policy. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 

F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that a decision of the state’s 

intermediate appellate court is persuasive, but is not dispositive of how the 

state supreme court would decide the issue). Together with Rosen, our own 

reading of the policy convinces us that under Kansas law, the policy 

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provided a $100,000 limit for all claims submitted by Yudi and her father. 

As a result, we affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment to 

Electric. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Robert E. Bacharach 

 Circuit Judge 

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