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Parties Involved:
Ernest Ray Simmons
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-10313

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:02-cr-14034-KMM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

ERNEST RAY SIMMONS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(January 17, 2020)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Ernest Simmons appeals his 60-month sentence imposed upon revocation of 

his supervised release. He argues his sentence—which is more than twice the high 

end of the guideline range, and the maximum sentence allowed by statute—is both 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Simmons further argues his defense 

counsel’s failure to object to the reasonableness of his sentence constituted 

ineffective assistance because it prejudiced his ability to succeed in the instant 

appeal by limiting our review of those issues. After review, we affirm.

I. Procedural Reasonableness1

Simmons first argues his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the 

district court did not explicitly state it had considered all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors or its reason for imposing an upward variance. Simmons further argues the

upward variance was based on a clearly erroneous interpretation of the facts to the 

extent it was based on his inconsistent statements regarding the ownership of the 

gun found in his home that triggered his revocation proceedings. Specifically, he 

contends the court unduly punished him for lying without legal justification 

1 While we normally review the sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised 

release for reasonableness, where a defendant fails to object to the procedural reasonableness of 

his sentence, we generally review only for plain error. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 

1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). However, Simmons argues we should review the procedural 

reasonableness of his sentence as if the issue had been preserved, rather than for plain error, as 

requiring a post-sentence objection is pro forma. We need not resolve this issue here, as we 

conclude Simmons’s sentence was procedurally reasonable even under the less-deferential 

standard of review. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States 

v. Fuentes-Rivera, 323 F.3d 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2003). 

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because there is no contradiction between the statement he gave when the firearm 

was discovered in his home—“you got me”—and his statement at the revocation 

hearing that the firearm did not belong to him, as it is possible that he knew the 

firearm was there without knowing to whom it belonged. 

A sentence can be procedurally unreasonable if the district court (1) fails to 

calculate or improperly calculates the guideline range, (2) treats the Sentencing 

Guidelines as mandatory, (3) fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, (4) selects a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or (5) fails to adequately explain the 

chosen sentence, including any deviation from the guideline range. United States 

v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1358–59 (11th Cir. 2014). 

First, the district court’s failure to expressly state that it had considered the 

relevant § 3553(a) factors did not render Simmons’s sentence procedurally 

unreasonable because it is clear from the record that the court nevertheless 

considered those factors. See Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1359 (“Nothing requires the 

district court to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors, and an acknowledgment that 

it has considered each will suffice.”); see also United States v. Dorman, 488 

F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming the procedural reasonableness of a 

defendant’s sentence, where the district court failed entirely to state that it had 

considered the § 3553(a) factors, because it was clear from the record that the court 

had done so).

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The court heard lengthy testimony from Simmons’s probation officer

regarding the nature and circumstances of Simmons’s offense, and he testified 

about his personal circumstances following his release from prison, including his 

employment, successful completion of a halfway-house program, efforts to avoid 

getting into legal trouble, and support of his minor daughter. Further, the court 

noted Simmons’s criminal history category and his prior gun violation, which 

shows it considered his criminal history, and the court cited the nature of the 

violation as a factor in its sentencing decision.

Second, the district court adequately explained its reasons for varying 

upward from the guideline range. The court cited to Simmons’s seemingly 

inconsistent statements, his criminal history, his past firearm-possession 

conviction, and the nature of the violation as justifying an upward variance. See 

United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 636 (11th Cir. 2013) (“If the district 

court determines that a sentence outside the guideline range is appropriate, it must 

consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently 

compelling to support the degree of the variance.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

Even if the court could have explained its reasons for varying upward more 

thoroughly, it expressly provided its basis for varying upward.

As to the district court’s finding that Simmons provided inconsistent 

statements concerning the ownership of the gun found in his home, we cannot say 

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this finding was clearly erroneous. Where, as here, there are two or more 

permissible ways of viewing the evidence, the district court’s choice between them 

cannot be clear error. United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1305 (11th Cir. 

2006). According to the testimony of Simmons’s probation officer as well as the 

violation report, Simmons stated, “You got me” when the firearm was found, 

indicating he had the firearm for protection. He did not contest that he made these 

statements, but he nevertheless testified the firearm was not his. Based on the 

circumstances surrounding the discovery of the firearm—which was found in 

Simmons’s bed at the home where he lived alone—and given his statement to the 

probation officers upon discovery of the firearm and admission that he had the 

firearm for protection, the court’s finding that Simmons had provided, at a 

minimum, an inconsistent statement was a reasonable interpretation of the 

evidence that did not constitute clear error. 

Accordingly, Simmons has not shown that the district court procedurally 

erred in sentencing him. 

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II. Substantive Reasonableness2

Simmons next argues the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable 

60-month sentence where the top end of the guideline range was only 27 months’ 

imprisonment. In particular, he argues there were no aggravating factors 

warranting an upward variance, the district court did not consider his personal 

history as a mitigating factor, and the court did not provide an explanation 

sufficient to justify the degree of the variance. He further argues that the guideline 

range already accounted for his criminal history, and the sentence he received is 

greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing.

A district court can abuse its discretion when it “(1) fails to afford 

consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives 

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error 

of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 

1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). A district court commits a 

“clear error of judgment” when it unreasonably considers the proper factors. Id. 

“The party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the 

sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the 

2 We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. 

Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1361. As with his procedural claims, Simmons failed to object to the 

substantive reasonableness of his sentence after it was entered. However, because we have not 

addressed, in a published opinion, whether plain-error review applies in such cases, we review 

the substantive reasonableness of Simmons’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.

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substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 

789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). We will only vacate a sentence if we are 

“left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear 

error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that 

lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” 

Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion here. As noted above, the court 

heard testimony from Simmons’s probation officer regarding the violation and 

heard Simmons’s testimony regarding his personal history and circumstances—

which included the killing of another person. The court also noted Simmons had a 

significant criminal history that included a prior firearm-possession offense, which, 

when coupled his inconsistent statements regarding the ownership of the firearm 

found in his home, warranted an upward variance in the court’s estimation. To the 

extent Simmons argues the district court placed too much weight on his criminal 

history, we generally will not second guess the weight the district court afforded 

any particular § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable in light of the 

all the circumstances. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir.

2008). The fact the guideline range already accounted for Simmons’s criminal 

history does not alter our analysis. See Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1362 (“The district 

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court may consider facts that were taken into account when formulating the 

guideline range for the sake of a variance.”).

Simmons also argues the district court failed to consider various mitigating 

factors, including that he “was doing well with two jobs and living a normal life.” 

But, as we have discussed, the district court heard ample testimony on these 

matters, and the fact that the court did not expressly respond to his mitigating 

testimony or arguments in favor of a sentence at the low end of the guideline range 

does not indicate that the court erroneously ignored or failed to consider them. See 

United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). 

In light of the substantial deference afforded to sentencing courts and the 

totality of the circumstances, Simmons has failed to show that the district court 

abused its discretion in imposing an above-guideline sentence of 60 months’ 

imprisonment.

III. Ineffective Assistance3

Finally, Simmons argues he received ineffective assistance when his counsel 

at sentencing failed to object to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of 

his sentence or otherwise preserve for appellate review all of the issues raised here. 

In most instances, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate is preferable to direct 

3 We review de novo an ineffective-assistance claim, which presents mixed questions of 

law and fact. Caderno v. United States, 256 F.3d 1213, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2001). 

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appeal for deciding ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims because the factual 

basis for such claims is almost never developed before a direct appeal but can be 

established in the district court on collateral review. United States v. Padgett, 917 

F.3d 1312, 1316–18 (11th Cir. 2019). Nevertheless, we will consider an 

ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal where the record is sufficiently 

developed. United States v. Camacho, 40 F.3d 349, 355 (11th Cir. 1994), 

overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 

(11th Cir. 2001). 

We address Simmons’s ineffective-assistance claim here, as the record is 

sufficient for us to reject Simmons’s claim. A defendant raising an 

ineffective-assistance claim must show both that (1) counsel’s performance was 

constitutionally deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Although the record does 

not reveal why counsel failed or declined to object following the imposition of 

Simmons’s sentence, this information is relevant only to whether counsel’s 

performance actually was deficient, an issue we need not address here. Instead, we 

can reject Simmons’s ineffective-assistance claim on the ground he is unable to 

demonstrate prejudice resulting from any deficient performance. 

Trial counsel’s deficient performance is prejudicial where, but for his errors, 

there is a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have 

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been different. Griffith v. United States, 871 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2017). 

As discussed above, even applying the less-deferential standard of review that 

would be applicable had counsel properly preserved all the issues raised in this 

appeal, we would affirm Simmons’s 60-month sentence as procedurally and 

substantively reasonable. Simmons, therefore, cannot show a reasonable 

probability that the result of the proceeding—i.e., the length of his sentence—

would have been different absent counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. In 

other words, Simmons’s inability to show that the district court erred, even under 

the less-deferential standard of review we have applied here, necessarily means he 

was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to object to the reasonableness of 

his sentence, and he is not entitled to relief on his ineffective-assistance claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm Simmons’s 60-month, aboveguideline sentence and reject his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at 

sentencing.

AFFIRMED.

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