Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06621/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06621-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ben Curry
Respondent
Diego Ramirez
Petitioner

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 The action was filed initially in the Central District; it subsequently was

transferred to the Northern District, and was received herein on October 24, 2006. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIEGO RAMIREZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 06-6621 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

On August 7, 2006, petitioner Diego Ramirez, a California state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the above-titled petition for a writ

of habeas corpus.1

 For the reasons stated herein, the petition is hereby DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In 1987, petitioner shot and killed the victim, Juan Cruz (“Cruz”), outside a bar in

Long Beach, California. (Ans. Ex. 7 at 1.) A jury convicted petitioner of second degree

murder, and found true an allegation that petitioner personally used a firearm in the

commission of the murder. The trial court sentenced petitioner to seventeen years to life

in prison, and he was received at the California Department of Corrections on April 5,

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2

 In lieu of reciting these facts directly into the record, the presiding commissioner

incorporated the above-quoted statement of facts by reference. (Ans. Ex. 3 at 7; Ex. 6 at

2.) 

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 Petitioner has no record of criminal activity prior to the commitment offense. 

(Ans. Ex. 3 at 55.) 

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1988. (Id. Ex. 3 at 1.) In December 2003, the Board found petitioner unsuitable for

parole, on grounds that he “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a

threat to public safety if released from prison at [that] time.” (Id. Ex. 3 at 53.) 

In reaching its decision, the Board accepted the following facts taken from the

state appellate court’s decision on petitioner’s direct appeal:

[Petitioner], while armed with a handgun which he carried in his waistband,

visited a bar in Long Beach. Later, upon leaving, he was followed by the

victim. As [petitioner] reached the door, he suddenly turned and fired two

shots at the victim killing him. When the victim’s brother, who was in the

bar, started toward where the victim was lying, [petitioner] stated: “Don’t

get involved or I’ll kill you too.”

[Petitioner], at trial, essentially claimed to have acted in self defense. He

testified that the victim menaced him with a six-inch long knife and

demanded money. According to [petitioner] he produced the gun in

response to an attack upon him with the knife although he claimed that he

did not intend to fire the gun. Apparently, no one else saw the victim

menace [petitioner] in any way. 

(People v. Ramirez, 264 Cal. Rptr. 161, 162–63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).2

 

At the parole hearing, the Board reviewed petitioner’s record, including the

circumstances of his commitment offense and his behavior in prison.3

 With respect to the

commitment offense, the Board found the offense was carried out in a manner that was

“especially [ ] vicious and brutal,” “dispassionate,” and “which demonstrates [an]

exceptionally insensitive disregard for human sufferings.” (Ans. Ex. 3 at 53, 54.) The

Board described to petitioner the facts on which this determination was based: 

[Y]ou had been drinking for most of the day and as noted you were

intoxicated and this happened around 10:30 in the evening. You were at a

bar together with Mr. Cruz. You were exiting the bar, you pulled a gun

from your waistband and for no real provocation that we can find you shot

this man twice, shot him twice, causing his demise . . . You confronted the

victim’s brother, telling him that you would shoot him as well. 

(Id. at 53–54.) The Board further found that the “[m]otivation for the crime was

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inexplicable or very trivial, had to do with alcoholism, possibly drugs, supposedly owing

the gentleman money, poor impulse control.” (Id. at 54.) 

The Board also examined petitioner’s institutional record. The Board noted that

petitioner “has failed to develop a marketable skill.” (Id. at 55.) Nor, the Board stated,

has petitioner “sufficiently participated in beneficial self help and therapy programming,”

as evidenced by the fact that petitioner had been “in AA for over 10 years and yet he

doesn’t’ know the steps.” (Id. at 55; see also id. at 21.) Also on petitioner’s record were

two serious disciplinary infractions, as well as six minor infractions. (Id.) The Board

acknowledged that petitioner’s latest psychological report was “adequate.” (Id.) In

particular, although the report found that petitioner posed a low to moderate degree of

threat if released from prison (id. at 25; Ex. 7 at 3), the Board observed that petitioner’s

“gains [were] recent,” (id. at 57). In the Board’s opinion, petitioner needed to

demonstrate the ability to maintain these gains over an extended period of time. (Id.) 

After a full hearing, during which all of the above evidence was considered, the

Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole. (Id. at 53.) In response to the Board’s

decision, petitioner filed state habeas petitions, later denied, in the Los Angeles Superior

Court, California Court of Appeal, and California Supreme Court. (Pet. at 4.) 

In 2006, petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition, alleging that the Board

violated a federally protected liberty interest in release on parole by denying him parole

based on the circumstances of the commitment offense. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence

on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state

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 The record includes two opinions by the state superior court addressing

petitioner’s claims arising from the Board’s December 2003 decision. In the first of said

opinions, the superior court found the Board’s decision void because it relied entirely on

the circumstances of the commitment offense “without regard to the public safety

implications of [p]etitioner’s offense as it compares with other similar offenses and in

light of the terms prescribed by the legislature for such offenses.” (Ans. Ex. 17 at 2.) The

state court stayed execution of its order, however, pending the California Supreme

Court’s decision in In re Dannenberg, 125 Cal.Rptr. 2d 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). After

the California Supreme Court issued its decision in that action, the superior court denied

the petition, concluding that the Board is not required to use the sentencing matrix until it

has concluded that an inmate is suitable for parole. (Ans. Ex. 18.) 

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court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13

(2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at

issue had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (internal quotation and citation

omitted). 

The state court decision implicated by 2254(d) is the “last reasoned decision” of

the state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991); Barker v.

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). Where there is no reasoned opinion

from the highest state court to have considered the petitioner’s claims, the district court

looks to the last reasoned state court opinion, which, in this instance, is the second

opinion of the Los Angeles Superior Court. (Ans. Ex. 18);4

 see Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at

801–06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims the Board’s continued reliance on the circumstances of the

commitment offense violates his right to due process. (Pet. at 5.) The superior court

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 The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the

commitment offense was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner;” (2) previous record of violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual

offenses; (5) psychological factors such as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems

related to the offense;” and (6) prison misconduct. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The

circumstances tending to show suitability are: (1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social

history; (3) signs of remorse; (4) commitment offense was committed as a result of stress

which built up over time; (5) Battered Woman Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; 

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rejected the claim, finding that the seriousness of petitioner’s crime creates a “bar [that] is

seemingly very high for petitioner in terms of when his sentence will become ‘grossly

disproportionate.’” (Ans. Ex. 18 at 2.) 

A denial of parole complies with due process provided there is “some evidence” to

support the parole board’s decision. A parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due

process if such decision is not supported by “some evidence in the record,” or is

otherwise “arbitrary.” See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1985); Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006). Additionally, the

evidence underlying the parole board’s decision must have “some indicia of reliability.” 

See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, if a parole

board’s determination with respect to parole suitability is to satisfy due process, such

determination must be supported by some evidence having some indicia of reliability. 

Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

Additionally, in assessing whether there is “some evidence” to support the Board’s

denial of parole, this Court must consider the regulations that guide the Board in making

its parole suitability determinations. Pursuant to such regulations, “[t]he panel shall first

determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on parole[;] [r]egardless of the

length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in

the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society

if released from prison.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(a). The regulations enumerate

various circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is suitable for parole. 

Id., § 2402(c)–(d).5

 One circumstance tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability is that

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(7) age is such that it reduces the possibility of recidivism; (8) plans for future including

development of marketable skills; and (9) institutional activities that indicate ability to

function within the law. Id. § 2402(d). 

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the crime was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Id., 

§ 2402(c). Two factors that the parole authority may consider in determining whether

such a circumstance exists are whether “[t]he offense was carried out in a manner that

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” and whether “[t]he

motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id., 

§ 2402(c)(1)(D) & (E). In addition to these factors, the Board is to consider “all relevant,

reliable information available.” Id., § 2402(b). 

It is now established under California law that the task of the Board is to determine

whether the prisoner would be a danger to society if he or she were paroled. See In re

Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181 (2008). Consequently, the constitutional “some evidence”

requirement is that there exists some evidence that the prisoner constitutes such a danger,

not simply that there exists some evidence of one or more of the factors listed in the

regulations as considerations appropriate to the parole determination. Id. at 1205–06. 

In that regard, however, a parole authority’s continued reliance on the

circumstances of the commitment offense as the sole basis for denying parole can, over

time, raise due process concerns. See Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir.

2003). “[I]n some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment

offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due

process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from the relevant California

statutes.” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, the Court cannot find that the state court was unreasonable in concluding

there is some evidence to support the Board’s decision that petitioner would pose a 

danger to society if released. The record contains some evidence to support the Board’s

finding, including the circumstances of the commitment offense, and petitioner’s behavior

in prison. 

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First, evidence exists to support the Board’s determination that the circumstances

of the commitment offense indicated petitioner presented a risk of danger to society if

released. The record contains evidence that the commitment offense was committed in an

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner,” a circumstance tending to show parole

unsuitability, see 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c), in that, as the Board found, the offense

was carried out in a manner that was “especially [ ] vicious and brutal,” “dispassionate,”

and “which demonstrates [an] exceptionally insensitive disregard for human suffering[ ].” 

(Ans. Ex. 3 at 53, 54.) Specifically, petitioner, while inebriated and without apparent

provocation, shot and killed the victim at close range and threatened the victim’s brother

when he endeavored to come to the victim’s aid as he lay dying on the floor. Under these

circumstances, the Board’s description of the offense as “dispassionate” and “especially

[ ] vicious and brutal” is not unreasonable. While at some point, the circumstances of the

commitment offense may cease to have probative value, they constitute, for purposes of

the Board’s determination in December 2003, some evidence of petitioner’s

dangerousness.

Additionally, petitioner’s institutional behavior supplied further evidence of

petitioner’s unsuitability for parole. While in prison, petitioner had committed at least

eight disciplinary infractions. (Ans. Ex. 7.) Also, the record supports the Board’s

determination that petitioner had not adequately participated in self-help programming. 

Because the Board relied on this evidence in addition to the circumstances of the

commitment offense, petitioner’s claim that the Board’s decision violated his right to due

process by relying solely on the unchanging facts of the commitment offense is without

merit. 

CONCLUSION

Because the record contains, at a minimum, some evidence to support the Board’s

determination that petitioner would present an unreasonable risk of danger to society if

released, the Court finds the state court’s determination was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor can the

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Court say it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 11, 2010 MAXINE M. CHESNEY 

 United States District Judge

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