Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01000/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01000-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald Carrigan
Defendant
Timothy Cooper
Defendant
Harold Anthony Funk
Plaintiff
Robert Pickering
Defendant
Town of Paradise
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD ANTHONY FUNK,

Plaintiff,

v.

TOWN OF PARADISE, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:09-cv-01000-MCE-CKD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Harold Anthony Funk’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 

New Trial (“Motion”) (ECF No. 114), which Defendants Town of Paradise, Police Chief 

Gerald Carrigan, and Officers Robert Pickering and Timothy Cooper (“Defendants”)

timely opposed. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants alleging causes of action for 

excessive force, supervisory liability, conspiracy to commit civil rights violations, and 

various violations of California law. 

 1 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

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According to Plaintiff, he was detained without probable cause for resisting arrest in 

violation of California Penal Code § 148 and he suffered injuries as a result of the 

officers’ use of excessive force. No pretrial motions were filed and thus, at the time of 

the final pretrial conference, all causes of action remained to be tried. Over the course 

of this litigation, the parties have estimated they would require three to five days to try 

those claims. See ECF No. 11 at 5. However, in the parties’ Joint Final Pretrial 

Statement, Defendants advised the Court of their intent to move for bifurcation of the 

Fourth Amendment issue at the upcoming conference and estimated it should take no 

more than two days to try that claim by itself. ECF No. 79 at 22-23. In that statement, 

the parties also stipulated that certain facts, including the fact that Plaintiff had been 

acquitted in state court, were undisputed. Id. at 2-5. The parties’ expressly disagreed, 

however, about the relevance of those facts. Id. at 2. 

At the final pretrial conference, Defendants argued that the bulk of the causes of 

action in the complaint were essentially derivative of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim 

against Officers Pickering and Cooper. See ECF No. 84 at 5. Given the derivative 

nature of those claims, along with time limitations imposed by the Court’s highly 

impacted trial calendar, the Court bifurcated the case so that only Plaintiff’s Fourth 

Amendment claim was to be litigated during an initial first phase trial that would take no 

more than three days. Id. at 41. At this time, the Court also ordered further briefing on 

the question of whether evidence of Plaintiff’s state court acquittal should be admitted on 

the issue of Plaintiff’s damages. Id. at 19-21. 

The parties timely submitted their additional briefing, and trial commenced on 

October 21, 2013. Prior to selecting the jury, the Court issued its ruling that evidence 

that Plaintiff had been acquitted in state court would be excluded unless Plaintiff could 

rebut the presumption that the prosecutor had acted independently in filing criminal 

charges. 

Plaintiff proceeded to put on his case and, on the second day of trial, called to 

testify his purported expert, Mr. Thomas Streed. 

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During the course of Defendants’ voir dire of Mr. Streed, the following exchange 

occurred: 

Q. Okay. And did you review Mr. Funk's testimony?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I don't see that listed on the report that you reviewed 

Mr. Funk's testimony. When did you review his testimony? 

Was it after you prepared this report?

A. It probably was.

Q. So you've done additional work since you've prepared this 

report?

A. That's correct. This report was written about three years 

ago.

ECF No. 108 at 21. Given the witness’s admission that he had performed additional 

work since preparing his report, defense counsel argued at sidebar that, among other 

things, his cross-examination would be “faulted or flawed” since Mr. Streed had reviewed 

additional information subsequent to disclosing his report. Id. at 22. Plaintiff’s counsel 

conceded that his expert had reviewed additional materials but argued that the pertinent 

inquiry was whether those materials had changed Mr. Streed’s testimony. Id. The Court 

made clear to Plaintiff’s counsel that he was “not following the rules.” Id. The Court then 

ordered Defendant’s counsel to continue his voir dire in open court: 

Q. Mr. Streed, other than reviewing Mr. Funk's testimony, 

have you reviewed anything else that's not listed on your 

report?

A. Nothing that comes to mind. There may be something, but 

it doesn't strike me immediately.

MR. THORN: Move to exclude Mr. Streed as a witness in the 

case.

THE COURT: Would you ask him specifically more about

what documents? Just keep asking a little bit more.

Q. BY MR. THORN: You reviewed Mr. Funk's deposition

transcript?

A. Yes, as I recall.

Q. And that was after you prepared your report?

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A. Yes.

Q. And that's the reason it's not listed on your report?

A. Correct.

Q. And there may be other documents that you reviewed, but 

you don't recall what they are?

A. That's a possibility.

Id. at 23-24. 

At that point, Defense counsel moved to exclude the witness, but before ruling, 

the Court permitted Plaintiff’s counsel one additional opportunity to question Mr. Streed:

Q. Well, why did you feel the need to look at data after you 

prepared your report that you didn't list in your report?

A. Because I couldn't magically look at it and determine 

whether or not it might have an impact upon my opinions.

Q. Why didn't you think it was important to review the 

plaintiff's testimony before you did a report?

A. I didn't have the plaintiff's testimony. It was provided to me 

subsequent to that.

Q. Did you ask for it?

A. I don't recall. I may have.

Id. at 24-25. At that point, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the witness. 

Plaintiff rested his case during the afternoon of the second day of trial, at which 

time Defendants brought a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law under Rule 50. The 

Court denied that Motion, and Defendants proceeded to put on their defense with Officer 

Pickering taking the stand first. After conferring with counsel, the Court advised the jury 

that the third day of trial would consist of approximately an hour and a half of testimony. 

Officer Pickering’s direct examination carried over into the following day, after 

which Plaintiff’s counsel cross-examined him, eventually concluding, “That’s all I have.” 

ECF No. 112 at 45. Plaintiff was recalled to the stand for a brief period of time, and then 

Defendants called their final witness, Officer Cooper. Officer Cooper’s direct 

examination covered approximately nine pages of the trial transcript. Id. at 55-63. 

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He was then subject to a proportionate cross-examination before the Court terminated 

the proceedings, finding that the probative value of any further questioning was 

substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay and the needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. at 63-69. 

The jury was instructed that afternoon, sent to deliberate, and returned with a 

defense verdict the following morning. Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for New 

Trial. 

STANDARD

Under Rule 59(a), the court may grant a new trial “for any reason for which a new 

trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(a). For example, the Court may grant a new trial if “the verdict is contrary to the clear 

weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or to prevent, in the 

sound discretion of the court, a miscarriage of justice.” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City 

of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 818–819 (9th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). 

However, “[u]nless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding 

evidence--or any other error by the court or a party--is ground for granting a new trial, for 

setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or 

order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. “At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard 

all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.” Id. 

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiff sets forth four arguments in support of his Motion for New Trial. First, he 

argues the Court committed three separate legal errors by impermissibly: (1) limiting 

Plaintiff’s ability to cross-examine Defendants; (2) excluding Plaintiff’s police practices 

expert; and (3) modifying the Pretrial Scheduling Order on the eve of trial to preclude 

evidence of Plaintiff’s state court acquittal. Plaintiff further contends that the jury’s 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence because his detention was not supported 

by the requisite probable cause. Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. 

A. No Legal Error Warrants a New Trial

1. Reasonable Limits on Cross-Examination

Plaintiff’s first argument is that he was “denied the right to full and complete crossexamination of Defendants.” Mot., ECF No. 115 at 2. More specifically, Plaintiff argues 

that the Court limited him to thirty-seven minutes to cross-examine Officer Pickering and 

six minutes to examine Officer Cooper. Id. at 3. Plaintiff’s primary complaint appears to 

be that “[v]irtually no time was allotted for Plaintiff to develop his cross-examination of 

Cooper in order to expose his inconsistent previous testimony.” Id. at 4.

 First, the Court has great discretion to set reasonable time limits on trial 

proceedings. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 941 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, in this 

case, the parties themselves estimated that a trial on all claims would take three to five

days. The Court bifurcated the case, however, and, even though the trial proceeded on 

only one claim, the Court nonetheless still permitted Plaintiff three days – a timeframe in 

which the parties had stipulated they could try the entire case – to try that one cause of 

action. Plaintiff offers no argument as to why this three-day timeframe was insufficient or 

why he could not have altered his own trial strategy to ensure he would have sufficient 

time to question Defendants. 

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Indeed, Plaintiff could have called Defendants in his case-in-chief, thus permitting 

him more time in which to examine them. Instead, Plaintiff made the strategic decision 

to call other witnesses in lieu of the officers. The decision to call those additional 

witnesses, thereby truncating the amount of time in which Defendants could present 

their case and thus the amount of time available for Plaintiff to conduct his cross, was 

Plaintiff’s alone, and it is one with which he will have to live. 

Regardless, the record is clear that Plaintiff was not forced to terminate his 

examination of Officer Pickering. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s counsel voluntarily 

concluded his examination, acknowledging, “that’s all I have.” ECF No. 112 at 45. 

Plaintiff cannot now complain that he was cut off when his counsel admitted at trial that 

he had no further questions and unilaterally ceased his examination. 

As to Officer Cooper, the Court’s termination of Plaintiff’s cross was necessary to 

“prevent delay or avoid cumulative evidence.” United States v. Gomez, 846 F.2d 557, 

559 (9th Cir. 1988). Contrary to Plaintiff’s current contention, the Court terminated his

cross-examination of Officer Cooper not just because time had run out, but also pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The Court reasoned: 

With respect to terminating the cross-examination, 

terminating all evidence, I'm going to make a finding at this 

point in time that based upon what I've heard this morning, 

I'm going to make a 403 objection on this. And although 

relevant, the evidence may be excluded if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence.

The evidence that was being presented today had been 

asked and answered on many, many occasions on numerous 

times. Furthermore, the questions that were being asked 

were calling for legal conclusions that the witness could not 

ever give. The ultimate conclusions that are going to be 

given are those made by the jury. There's been nothing else 

that's been added to any testimony today in the first hour and 

a half that has not already been presented. It was 

cumulative, and it was wasting time that we do not have. And 

I explained to you yesterday we would be ending at 10:30 this 

morning. So that is all that I'm saying.

ECF No. 112 at 69. 

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The Court acted well within its discretion in determining the additional testimony was 

cumulative and resulting in a waste of resources, and Plaintiff has not shown otherwise. 

To that end, Plaintiff has also failed to show in his instant Motion how his crossexamination of Officer Cooper would have put anything new before the Court. More 

specifically, the instant Motion is rejected because there is nothing before the Court to 

show how, assuming the Court erred in terminating Plaintiff’s cross, such error was 

anything other than harmless. Plaintiff never made an offer of proof as to what 

additional testimony he hoped to elicit from either Officer Cooper or Officer Pickering, 

and, as Defendants point out in their Opposition, the evidence in this case was 

overwhelming. See Opp’n, ECF No. 122 at 9 (noting that Plaintiff knew someone was 

chasing him when he fled the scene and another witness testified Plaintiff was running 

when officers commanded that he stop). This Court stands by its observation that 

I've heard all the evidence that's going to be presented in this 

case. I've heard the arguments for Rule 50. And my 

assessment of looking at the evidence at this point in time is 

that it appears that the officers were properly where they 

should have been at the time. It appears that they did 

everything appropriately, by shining the light, looking for what 

could have been ongoing criminal activity. That a command 

was given to the plaintiff to stop. There was identification by 

the Paradise Police Department. There was clearly running 

involved. There was clearly not a stop by the plaintiff. He 

continued to run or skip, or whatever you want to call it. But 

whatever it is, he didn't comply with a lawful order at the time, 

and he went into the bathroom. And the fact that he did not 

comply with the officers' demands and commands would 

make everything that happened from that point forward to be 

reasonable. That's what happens when you run and you 

resist.

ECF No. 113 at 7. In sum, especially given the great weight of the evidence supporting 

the jury’s verdict, Plaintiff has failed to show any prejudice as a result of any error by this 

Court in terminating the trial proceedings. His motion for a new trial on this basis is 

DENIED.

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2. Exclusion of Plaintiff’s Expert Witness

Plaintiff also contends the Court erred as a matter of law when it excluded 

Plaintiff’s expert witness, Mr. Sneed. According to Plaintiff, “[t]he District Court sanction 

of totally excluding any testimony by Plaintiff’s highly qualified expert was not due to any 

failure on Plaintiff’s part to comply with Rule 26 or disobedience of any court order.” 

Mot., ECF No. 115 at 4. That is incorrect. 

When Plaintiff disclosed his expert, he was required to provide Defendants with a 

copy of Mr. Sneed’s written report as well. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (“Unless 

otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this disclosure must be accompanied by a 

written report--prepared and signed by the witness--if the witness is one retained or 

specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the 

party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony.”). That report was required 

to contain, among other things, “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will 

express and the basis and reasons for them” and “the facts or data considered by the 

witness in forming them.” Id. If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness 

as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or 

witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was 

substantially justified or is harmless.

In this case, according to the parties, Plaintiff timely provided Defendants with a 

copy of Mr. Sneed’s report. However, subsequent to that disclosure, Plaintiff provided 

Mr. Sneed with additional data, including the transcript of his own deposition, which Mr. 

Sneed then reviewed. Mr. Sneed testified that he may have been provided additional 

information as well. Plaintiff provides no justification for providing additional information 

to his expert post-disclosure, nor does Plaintiff explain how permitting the expert to 

review his deposition testimony after preparation of the report was either substantially 

justified or harmless. As a consequence, the Court did not err in excluding his witness.

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Moreover, even if Plaintiff had sufficiently shown in his current Motion that his 

prior failure to adequately disclose his expert was justified, “[a] new trial is [still] only 

warranted when an erroneous evidentiary ruling ‘substantially prejudiced’ a party.”

Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations 

omitted). Plaintiff has not shown that his inability to call a police practices expert

prejudiced him in the slightest. The scenario presented to the jury was not beyond the 

purview of a lay person. To the contrary, there was substantial evidence that Plaintiff 

was running or jogging away from the officers, that he ignored their commands to stop, 

and that he resisted arrest while inside the bathroom. While Plaintiff argues that the 

jurors could have been “misled by viewing various forms of entertainment depictions of 

police at work in reality shows, made for TV dramas and video games, all of which share 

a common element – excessive force and violence,” that argument is speculative at 

best. Mot., ECF No. 115 at 4. Moreover, the Court is confident that it was not swayed 

by such media and it further finds that the jury was also capable of separating fact from 

faction. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED on this basis as well. 

3. Exclusion of Evidence of Plaintiff’s Acquittal in State Court

Plaintiff next argues that the Court improperly modified the Final Pretrial Order to 

prevent Plaintiff from introducing evidence of his acquittal in the state court criminal 

proceedings when the parties had stipulated to a number of undisputed facts pertaining 

to that case which were incorporated into the Court’s Order. Plaintiff’s theory was that 

Defendants should be liable for damages he sustained as a result of being tried 

criminally (e.g., missing work to attend trial, hiring a lawyer to defend him against the 

state charges, etc.) and that this Court erred as a matter of law by excluding that 

evidence. Each of Plaintiff’s arguments is rejected. 

First and foremost, the Court did not modify the Pretrial Order as to the 

undisputed nature of the stipulated facts. The parties made clear that although the fact, 

for example, that Plaintiff had been acquitted was undisputed, its relevance in this case 

was hotly contested. Accordingly, the Pretrial Order simply reflects a number of facts

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that, if relevant, need not be decided by the jury. It nonetheless remained for the Court 

to determine relevancy. 

Regardless, Plaintiff cannot claim surprise at the exclusion of this evidence 

because, at the final pretrial conference, the Court ordered supplemental briefing by both 

parties on this very issue. The parties were thus on notice that the evidence might not 

be admitted. 

Moreover, exclusion of the fact that Plaintiff was acquitted in state court was 

appropriate under circuit precedent. Evidence that Plaintiff was harmed by being 

subjected to a state court criminal trial is only relevant if he can show that the Defendant 

Officers caused those damages. However, “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that a 

prosecutor exercises independent judgment regarding the existence of probable cause 

in filing a complaint.” Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). “Unless 

overcome . . . the presumption insulates the arresting officers from liability for harm 

suffered after the prosecutor initiated formal prosecution.” Id. “The presumption can be 

overcome, for example, by evidence that the officers knowingly submitted false 

information or pressured the prosecutor to act contrary to her independent judgment.” 

Id. In this case, Plaintiff offered no evidence to overcome the presumption that the 

prosecutor exercised his or her independent judgment. To the contrary, it became clear 

during counsels’ arguments prior to jury selection that the only evidence Plaintiff

intended to offer was his own testimony, which, given his lack of personal knowledge 

regarding the prosecutor’s decision making, would have been entirely speculative. 

Finally, the evidence Plaintiff would have had this Court admit is entirely irrelevant 

because it goes only to the extent of damages. Since the jury in this case determined 

that there was probable cause for officers to have detained Plaintiff, and it consequently 

follows that officers were not liable to Plaintiff for any damages, no further inquiry is 

required. Stated another way, Plaintiff cannot show how he was prejudiced by the 

Court’s decision to limit damages-related evidence when the jury found he was not 

entitled to any damages at all. 

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Because exclusion of the evidence was proper, and because, regardless, Plaintiff cannot 

show how his rights were substantially prejudiced, his Motion is DENIED.

B. The Verdict Was Against the Clear Weight of the Evidence

Plaintiff’s last argument is that the “Defendant officers lacked probable cause to 

sweep Plaintiff into their investigation of taggers.” Mot., ECF No. 115 at 9. This appears 

to be an argument that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 

The court must apply a stringent standard to Plaintiff's argument that the verdict 

reached cannot be reconciled with the weight of the evidence. Digidyne Corp. v. Data 

General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1347 (9th Cir.1984). A motion for new trial may be 

granted on this ground only if the verdict is against the “great weight” of the evidence or 

if “it is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result.” Id.; see also

Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir.1987). It would amount to an abuse 

of discretion on the part of the court to grant a new trial on any lesser showing, and the 

court cannot extend relief simply because it would have arrived at a different verdict. 

Silver Sage Partners, 251 F.3d 814 at 818-19.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented a compelling argument for 

granting the extraordinary remedy sought. In the Court's view, there was sufficient 

evidence from which the jury could have reached its conclusion that Plaintiff’s arrest was 

supported by probable cause. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument in his current Motion, 

Plaintiff was not detained on suspicion of tagging. Rather, he was detained pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), which provides that “[e]very person who willfully 

resists, delays, or obstructs any . . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to 

discharge any duty of his or her office or employment” is subject to criminal liability. As 

the Court stated on the record before the parties, and repeated above, this Court found 

credible all testimony pointing to the fact that Plaintiff ran from officers and failed to heed 

their warnings to stop. That is all that is required to establish the requisite cause for an 

arrest under Section 148. 

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Based on its verdict, the members of the jury agreed with the Court. To this end, the 

jury's determination that Plaintiff’s detention was supported by probable cause is not 

contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED on 

this basis as well.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons just stated, Defendant’s Motion for New Trial (ECF No. 114) is 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 17, 2014

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