Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06509/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06509-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Frazier
Plaintiff
Steve Johnson
Defendant
UPS
Defendant

Document Text:

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1 Both parties are admonished that the legal research and

writing exhibited in their briefs is less than satisfactory. 

Both parties make numerous “legal” arguments that are wholly

unsupported by legal authority. Particularly troubling is

Plaintiff’s opposition, which is littered with conclusory

assertions that are supported only by references to an attached

statement of fact. The referenced statements of fact then direct

the reader’s attention to large excerpts from Plaintiff’s

deposition transcript. The law is unambiguous, no court is

required to search a record when a party has failed to adequately

reference matter that is pertinent. Carmen v. San Francisco

Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001)(“The

District Court need not examine the entire file for evidence

establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not

set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that

it could conveniently be found.”).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS FRAZIER, 

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 

Defendant.

1:02-CV-6509 OWW DLB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(DOC. 48)

I. INTRODUCTION

This wrongful termination/employment discrimination lawsuit

was removed from state court on December 7, 2002. Before the

court for decision is Defendant United Parcel Service’s (“UPS”)

motion for summary judgment. Doc. 48, filed Feb. 10, 2005. 

Plaintiff opposes this motion. Doc. 59, filed Feb. 25, 2005.1

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2 The original complaint named as defendants UPS, John

Acha (the Sequoia Division Package Division Manager), and Steve

Johnson (the East Bay District Feeder Division Manager). Frazier

never served defendant Acha, and dismissed the claims against

Acha voluntarily on September 23, 2002. On July 18, 2003,

Frazier voluntarily dismissed his claims against defendant

Johnson with prejudice. UPS is the only remaining defendant. 

2

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff’s complaint, initially filed in state court, is

not a picture of clarity. Frazier’s first claim, entitled

“Tortious Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy”

appears to allege that UPS’s decision to terminate Frazier

constituted: (a) unlawful retaliation in response to Frazier’s

refusal to work under unsafe conditions; (b) discrimination on

the basis of Frazier’s race; and (c) unlawful retaliation against

Plaintiff for complaining about racial discrimination. 

Plaintiffs second claim alleges that UPS defamed him by

publishing statements concerning Plaintiff’s insubordination and

termination for job abandonment. Finally, Plaintiff’s third

claim, entitled “race discrimination and harassment” appears to

allege that UPS committed a number of discriminatory acts

unrelated to Plaintiff’s termination.2 Plaintiff’s seeks

punitive damages. Id. at 12. 

UPS removed the case to federal court on December 7, 2002. 

Doc. 1. Plaintiff moved to remand. Doc. 7, filed Jan. 3, 2003.

UPS opposed remand on the grounds that Plaintiff’s defamation

claim is preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Doc. 16, filed Jan. 30, 2003.

Magistrate Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill ruled that the defamation

claim is preempted by LMRA § 301, and denied Frazier’s motion to

remand. Doc. 25, filed Apr. 16, 2003.

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3

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Thomas Frazier is an African American male. He began

working for UPS in 1987 as a “loader/unloader,” a non-driving

position. Frazier became a “package car driver” in 1989 or 1990,

which required him to drive a UPS delivery vehicle. He later

became a “relief feeder driver,” transporting packages between

distribution centers in large 18-wheel tractor-trailers, a

position he held until his formal termination on March 29, 2001. 

A. Frazier’s Employment Contract with UPS

Once Frazier began driving large tractor-trailers for UPS,

his employment was governed by the terms of a collective

bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between UPS and the International

Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Teamsters”). (UPS is a “Union Shop”

and Frazier was a union member.) Among other things, the CBA

governs the reporting of safety concerns to UPS and the process

drivers must follow if they believe UPS has not adequately

responded to their concerns. 

The Employer shall not require employees to take out on

the street or highways any vehicle that is not in a

safe operating condition or not equipped with the

safety appliances prescribed by law. It shall not be a

violation of the Agreement where employees refuse to

operate such equipment unless such refusal is

unjustified. All equipment which is refused because not

mechanically sound or not properly equipped, shall be

appropriately tagged so that it cannot be used by other

drivers until automotive maintenance department has

adjusted the complaint.

* * *

Employees shall immediately, or at the end of their

shifts, report all defects of equipment on a suitable

form furnished by the Employer. The Employer shall not

ask or require any employee to take out equipment that

has been reported by any other employee as being in an

unsafe operating condition until same has been approved

as being safe by the automotive maintenance department.

(NCSA, Art. 11, § 2)

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4

It shall not be a violation of this Agreement, or cause

for disciplinary action, where employees refuse to

operate equipment or a vehicle when such operation

constitutes a violation of any state or federal rules,

regulations, standards or orders applicable to

commercial motor vehicle safety or health, or because

of the employee’s reasonable apprehension of serious

injury to himself/herself or the public due to the

unsafe conditions as set out in any state or federal

rules, regulations, standards or orders applicable to

commercial motor vehicle safety or health to include

Part 392.14 of the Federal Motor Carrier Regulations.

(NMUPSA, Art. 18, § 1)

The CBA also controls the process by which a covered

employee may be terminated for just cause, the procedures for

disciplinary action, and the manner in which grievances are

handled:

An employee may be discharged or suspended for just

cause subject to the provisions and procedures

contained in Art. 7. (NCSA, Art. 4)

In all cases, except theft, intoxication, use, sale, or

possession of illegal narcotics and gross

insubordination, each having occurred on the job, an

employee to be discharged shall be allowed to remain on

the job, without loss of pay, unless and until the

discharge is sustained under the grievance procedure.

In suspension cases, the employee shall be allowed to

remain on the job, without loss of pay, unless and

until the suspension is sustained under the grievance

procedure. (NCSA, Art. 7, § 4(b).) 

Within 5 days of the occurrence of the alleged cause

for discharge or suspension, the Employer shall give

written notice by certified mail to the employee and to

the Local Union of its decision to discharge or suspend

the employee and such notice shall set forth the

reasons for the discharge or suspension. If the

Employer fails to give such written notice within the

specified five (5) day period, the right to discharge

or suspend for that particular reason shall be waived.

(NCSA, Art. 7, § 4(c))

In order to terminate an employee covered by the CBA, UPS

must first issue a written notice of discharge or suspension. 

Except for certain offenses, the employee must be permitted to

continue work during the grievance process. The union may then

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file a grievance on behalf of the employee, triggering a “local

review” in which the employee, a union representative, and UPS

managers discuss the proposed disciplinary action. If the matter

is not resolved during local review, the dispute is referred to

the UPS Labor Management Committee (“LMC”), a panel made up of

representatives from UPS and the Teamsters. The LMC reviews the

disciplinary decision and votes on any proposed resolution. If

deadlocked, the parties may refer the dispute to arbitration. 

B. Plaintiff’s Employment History

Since 1989, UPS issued a total of nine (9) warning letters,

three (3) suspension letters, and fifteen (15) discharge letters

to Frazier for undependability (including absenteeism and

tardiness), failure to follow instructions, insubordination,

inappropriate conduct (including the use of extremely offensive

profanity), and job abandonment. The first thirteen discharge

letters resulted in “working discharges” and were either reduced

to warnings or suspensions during the local review process. The

final two discharge letters, for insubordination and then job

abandonment, were upheld by the LMC. 

C. Plaintiff’s Duties Concerning Safety

Plaintiff’s other duties as a UPS driver required him to

inspect his vehicle and identify safety problems. Feeder

drivers, for example, must perform a pre-trip inspection and must

document the condition of the vehicle in a log. If the driver

identifies any safety problems or concerns, he must immediately

report the problem to a UPS mechanic, who must sign off on any

documented problem before that vehicle is permitted on the road.

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3 The timing of Frazier’s discovery of the jake brake

problem is not clearly set forth in the record. He may have

discovered the problem as he approached Los Angeles area on his

way from Fresno to San Fernando, Frazier Depo., at 67, or just

after Frazier left San Fernando to return to Fresno, id. at 36. 

6

D. The Days Leading up to Frazier’s March 29, 2001

Discharge

Over a three day period in late March 2001, Plaintiff was

assigned to drive a feeder truck (consisting of a tractor, in

which the driver sits, and a trailer, which holds the cargo) from

Fresno to San Fernando and back. His shift began at 8:00 p.m.

and ended the following morning. On the evening of March 27,

Frazier reported for work, picked up his assigned tractor (No.

204166) and performed the required pre-trip inspection of his

equipment. He did not report any problems with the equipment

before he left Fresno. 

 At some point,3 Frazier noticed that the “jake brake” on

tractor 204166 was not working properly. Shortly after Frazier

left San Fernando to return to Fresno, he decided to return to

San Fernando to address the problem. In his deposition, Frazier

explained the problem with the jake brake as follows:

Q: What problems were you having that caused you to turn

around and go back.

A: First, I noticed the Jake brake wasn’t working. And

then as I went on down further down the road...they

held and then the truck made a loud noise and they kind

of went – slid. The brakes released and went down

almost to the floor. And from that period... I kept

the truck in low gear and got it off the highway and

turned around and brought it back to UPS. 

Q: Did the brakes fail to work? 

A: What they did was the didn’t hold. When I slowed the

truck down, the brakes – they made a loud noise and the

whole steering wheel just shook and then the pedal just

went to the floor and I didn’t have – the Jake brake

was not working at this time either. So that was – the

pedal brake was the only way I had of stopping.

***

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Q: Did the brakes – pedal brakes slow the car – the truck

down at this point?

A: It slowed it down, but I had already had it in a gear

to where the point where I was only going like 20 miles

per hour. 

Frazier Depo., at 33-34. Frazier returned to San Fernando and

reported to problem to a UPS mechanic, Tom Wright. Wright

inspected the brake and reported back to Frazier that he found no

mechanical problem. Wright asked Frazier for more information

and then drove tractor 204166 around UPS’s property at Frazier’s

request. Wright then told Frazier to drive another truck back to

Fresno (the “loaner truck”). 

The next night, Frazier again reported for work in Fresno

and returned to San Fernando in the loaner truck. In San

Fernando, Frazier took his original tractor (204166) for a test

drive and still believed there was something wrong with the jake

brake. Frazier also thought there was a problem with another

part of the braking system:

The pedal brakes, they were -- you can’t drive around

the yard too fast so they would work [there]. The

handle did not hold. When I pulled the handle, the

test brake handle, the truck still rolled. 

Id. at 73. Frazier then had a conversation with Tom Wright who

told Frazier that he had not personally fixed the tractor but

that the day mechanics might have done so. Frazier told Wright

“the Jake brake is [still] not working and I don’t know if this

tractor is going to be – you said it was repaired, so I don’t

feel safe in this tractor, so I’d rather return in the one I came

in.” Id. at 70. Frazier was permitted to drive another loaner

truck back to Fresno. 

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On March 29, 2001, Don McWilliams, an automotive supervisor

in San Fernando, personally inspected the brakes on tractor

204166 and performed a road test. McWilliams found nothing

mechanically wrong with the brake but did find that the switch on

the jake brake worked intermittently. McWilliams ordered

mechanics to repair the switch. After the repair, McWilliams

determined that tractor 204166 was roadworthy. 

When Frazier reported to work in Fresno on the night of

March 29, a supervisor, Jim Wood, informed Frazier that his

tractor 204166 had been repaired and was safe to drive. Wood

instructed Frazier to return the loaner truck to San Fernando and

drive tractor 204166 back to Fresno. Frazier told Wood that he

would do so as long as 204166 passed his pre-trip safety

inspection. According to Frazier, Wood then instructed Frazier

to bring the truck back regardless of the result of Frazier’s

safety inspection. Frazier requested a union representative to

join the discussion with Wood. Wood apparently repeated his

instructions. Frazier again refused, apparently unwilling to

give up his right to perform a safety check. Wood then informed

Frazier that he would be discharged for insubordination. 

On March 30, 2001, UPS issued a discharge letter to Frazier

confirming his termination for insubordination. That night,

another driver picked up Frazier’s truck and drove it back to

Fresno. According to that driver’s report, the truck “was fine”

and had “no problems.” (According to Frazier, the driver also

reported that the Jake brake and spring brake were not working

properly.) 

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E. The Days Following Frazier’s Discharge

Frazier was instructed by his union representative to wait

for a phone call from UPS. On April 5, 2001, Wood attempted to

contact Frazier by telephone to inform him that he should report

to work during his “working discharge’ while the union grieved

his termination. According to Wood, no one answered, so Wood

left a message on Frazier’s answering machine. (Frazier claims

that he did not even own an answering machine.) Wood informed

Pete Nunez, Frazier’s shop steward, of the termination. Nunez

told Wood he would attempt to contact Frazier. Frazier did not

report to work. 

After twelve days without any contact from Frazier, UPS

issued another discharge letter to Frazier, dated April 17, 2001,

for job abandonment. Frazier received the letter, but did not

contact anyone at UPS. 

F. Outcome of the Grievance Process

After his discharge, the Teamsters filed a grievance on

Plaintiff’s behalf. A local review was convened, but Frazier

never showed up. On October 3, 2001, the LMC held a hearing

regarding Frazier’s discharge. Frazier was informed of the

hearing and expressed his intention to attend, but again did not

show up. The LMC upheld the legitimacy of the discharge. 

G. Other Alleged Acts of Discrimination

Plaintiff believes he was disciplined on many occasions

while non-African American UPS employees were not punished for

similar conduct. Frazier’s only evidence of this alleged

discrimination is his own deposition testimony. Frazier’s

allegations of can be summarized as follows.

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When asked to recall “every instance in which you believe

Mr. Wood harassed you because of your race,” Frazier spoke of one

instance when he “was sitting at the back of the building doing

the same things that my Caucasian counterparts was doing, except

that they were in the front sitting with Jim Wood most of the

time or Larry McElhenie, and I was waiting for my doors.” On

that day, Frazier received a disciplinary letter for failure to

follow instructions. Apparently, Frazier failed to hook his

tractor up to a trailer and failed to have the equipment ready in

front of the loading dock. When Frazier told Wood and another

manager that he thought this was discrimination, Wood allegedly

said “he didn’t want to hear anything [Frazier] had to say.” 

Frazier Depo., at 267-69. Frazier recalled that his Caucasian

counterparts were often congregating in groups to “just stand

there and talk” when they “couldn’t” possibly have hooked up

their tractor and trailer. Id. at 273 (emphasis added). Frazier

does not argue that he had personal knowledge that his Caucasian

counterparts actually did fail to follow instructions, he only

assumed that they could not have done so. 

Frazier described an incident in which he received a day

suspension for using foul language over the phone even though he

was not “on the clock.” Id. at 268. Frazier implied that other,

Caucasian, employees used similar language but were never

disciplined. Frazier, however, provides no specific examples. 

In 1999, Frazier was involved in an accident. UPS

determined that he was at fault and discharged him. Id. at 157-

58. The police report of the accident concluded that Frazier was

not at fault. Id. According to Frazier, a “non-African-American

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employee [] had an accident around the same time...and he never

received a suspension or anything.” Id. at 165. 

On another occasion, a new manager, Mr. Dugan, refused to

allow Frazier to “float” (i.e., to help out on regular UPS

delivery routes as necessary). Dugan told Frazier that “he did

not have a problem with [Frazier” but that Frazier had a “red

flag” associated with his employment record. Dugan, however,

made no comments about Frazier’s race. Frazier Depo., at 292-

294. Frazier also alleged that Dugan had “harassed him” but

Frazier asserted that this “harassment” was retaliation against

him for the accident Frazier had been in, implying that it had

nothing to do with his race.

Frazier alleges that a supervisor at UPS’s Logan Park

Center, Mr. Barsarian, at one time stated that he did not like

Oakland “because there’s too many guys like you there.” Id. at

186. Frazier contends that this is (at least impliedly) a

racially derogatory comment. 

Finally, Frazier claims that he was given more work than one

of his Caucasian counterparts, but does not provide any details

with which to compare his workload to that of his counterpart. 

Id. at 317. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

Cal. v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore,

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to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party

must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists and (2) that

this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine issue of fact

exists when the non-moving party produces evidence on which a

reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor viewing the

record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law

places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co.,

68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are “material”

if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

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evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996).

V. ANALYSIS

A. Preemption by Section 301 of the LMRA

In the April 16, 2003 order denying Plaintiff’s motion to

remand this case to state court, Magistrate Judge O’Neill

concluded that Plaintiff’s defamation claim was preempted by

Section 301 of the LMRA, creating a valid basis for federal

jurisdiction over the remainder of this suit. Defendants now

argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims, including the defamation

claim, should be dismissed because they are preempted by § 301. 

Section 301 of the LMRA provides that:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization representing employees in an

industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any

district court of the United States having jurisdiction

of the parties....

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In a series of cases, the United States

Supreme Court determined that this provision preempts state law

claims that are substantially dependent upon analysis of the

terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers Corp.

v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985). “In enacting § 301 Congress

intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over

inconsistent local rules." Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369

U.S. 95, 104 (1962).

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[T]he subject matter of § 301(a) is peculiarly one that

calls for uniform law. The possibility that individual

contract terms might have different meanings under

state and federal law would inevitably exert a

disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and

administration of collective agreements. Because

neither party could be certain of the rights which it

had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an

agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by

the necessity of trying to formulate contract

provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning

under two or more systems of law which might someday be

invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective

bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting

substantive interpretation under competing legal

systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as

to its interpretation ... [and] might substantially

impede the parties' willingness to agree to contract

terms providing for final arbitral or judicial

resolution of disputes. 

Id. at 103-104 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

1. Preemption of the Defamation Claim

The question of whether Plaintiff’s defamation claim is

preempted was resolved by Magistrate O’Neill’s April 16, 2003

order. No review of that order was sought. The order

acknowledged that “LMRA section 301 does not preempt every

dispute concerning employment or tangentially involving

collective bargaining agreement, and for instance, state rules

proscribing conduct or establishing rights and obligations

independent of a labor contract are not permitted.” Doc. 25 at

9. However, where a defamation claim is “based on facts

inextricably intertwined with the grievance machinery of the

collective bargaining agreement” such a claim is preempted by 

§ 301. Id. at 11. Magistrate O’Neill then correctly concluded

that Plaintiff’s complaint in this case “arises from the March 30

and April 17 discharge letters which the CBA required UPS to

issue. Resolution of whether Plaintiff was insubordinate when he

refused to drive his vehicle requires review and interpretation

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of the CBA, which addresses when an employee may refuse to drive

an allegedly unsafe vehicle. The facts presented by Plaintiff to

date are linked to the CBA....” Id. 

Plaintiff did not move for reconsideration of this finding

and, to the extent that he attempts to do so now, his objections

are untimely. See L.R. 72-303(b)(“Rulings by Magistrate Judges

shall be final if no reconsideration thereof is sought from the

Court within ten (10) court days calculated from the date of

service of the ruling on the parties.”). The April 16, 2003

order is the law of this case. Although “[t]he law of the case

doctrine is not an absolute bar to reconsideration of matters

previously decided,” a court may only reconsider “previously

decided questions in cases in which there has been an intervening

change of controlling authority, new evidence has surfaced, or

the previous disposition was clearly erroneous and would work a

manifest injustice.” Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d

1388, 1393 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff has made no such showing

in this case. To the contrary, Plaintiff appears to concede that

this claim is preempted. See Doc. 59 at 5-6. 

Finding a claim preempted does not necessarily end the

claim. When a state claim is preempted by LMRA 

§ 301, “that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim...or

dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.” AllisChalmers, 471 U.S. at 220-221. A claim “treated as a § 301

claim” must nevertheless be dismissed if the plaintiff failed to

“make use of the grievance procedure established in the

collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. 

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Defendant suggests, without clearly articulating facts to

support its assertion, that Plaintiff failed to follow the

grievance procedures set forth in the CBA between UPS and the

Teamsters union. It is not disputed that the CBA sets forth a

grievance process for employees on “working discharges.” Once

the union files a grievance on behalf of the employee, the

employee, a union representative, and UPS managers meet in a

“local review” to discuss the discipline. If the matter is not

resolved, it is referred to the LMC for a hearing. It is not

disputed that Plaintiff did not attend either the local review or

the LMC hearing regarding his discharge. 

UPS is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

defamation claim. Under the law of the case, the claim is

preempted. If treated as a § 301 claim, it is legally barred

because Plaintiff failed to follow the dispute resolution

procedures established in the CBA. Even absent preemption, the

allegedly defamatory statement concerned Plaintiff’s performance

on the job. UPS had a duty to comment on that subject under the

CBA and its comments are privileged. Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c). 

2. Preemption of Plaintiff’s Other Claims

Although Section 301's preemptive reach extends beyond

contract claims to state tort actions, such as defamation, e.g.,

Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 220 (state tort action for bad

faith handling of insurance claim preempted by LMRA), certain

state law discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy claims are not necessarily preempted. 

See Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 748

(9th Cir. 1993). This is because “[i]n the typical case a state

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tribunal could resolve either a discriminatory or retaliatory

discharge claim without interpreting the ‘just cause’ language of

a collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of

Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 412-413 (1988). A state-law

claim is preempted, however, "if the resolution of a state-law

claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining

agreement." Id. at 405-406 (emphasis added). 

In the Ninth Circuit, “state-law causes of action are

preempted [by § 301] if they are either based upon a

collective-bargaining agreement or dependent upon an

interpretation of the agreement,” while “[c]auses of action that

only tangentially involve a provision of a collective-bargaining

agreement are not preempted....[n]or are causes of action which

assert nonnegotiable state-law rights independent of any right

established by contract.” Ramirez, 998 F.2d at 748. One example

of a nonnegotiable state-law right that is independent of any

contractual right is the right to be free from discrimination on

the basis of race. See Id. 

A claim is not preempted by § 301 if it simply demands

reference to the provisions of a CBA; only when the resolution of

a claim requires interpretation of the CBA is the claim

preempted. See Beals v. Kiewit Pac. Co., Inc., 114 F.3d 892, 895

(9th Cir. 1997)(where “none of the terms of the CBA relevant to

[plaintiff’s] claim is subject to conflicting meanings,

resolution of that claim will not contravene the policy behind 

§ 301 preemption to ‘ensure uniform interpretation of

collective-bargaining agreements’.”); Associated Builders &

Contractors, Inc. v. Local 302 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 109

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F.3d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1997)(“To effectuate the goals of § 301

[preemption] it should be applied only to state laws purporting

to determine questions relating to what the parties to a labor

agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to

flow from breaches of that agreement, and to tort suits which

allege breaches of duties assumed in collective bargaining

agreements.”). 

In Jimeno v. Mobile Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514, 1524, 1527 (9th

Cir. 1995), state regulations required employers to accommodate

disabled employees; the CBA did not address the issue at all. 

Similarly, in Ramirez, the terms of the CBA were not in dispute

because the plaintiff claimed that the provisions of the CBA were

being applied in a discriminatory manner. 998 F.2d at 749. 

However, in Audette v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Warehousemen’s

Union, Local 24, 195 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999) plaintiffs

alleged that a labor union defendant breached the terms of a

settlement agreement by denying them the opportunity to register

as members of a particular class of workers under the union’s

CBA. This claim was preempted by § 301 because (1) the

settlement provided that registration could be denied if the

union had a legitimate business purpose for doing so (2) and

determining whether there was any legitimate reason for refusing

registration would require interpretation of terms in the CBA

“such as provisions for the expansion of the Voluntary Travel

provision under the CBA...the policy of transferring workers from

Limited Work Opportunity ports, and the authority [] under the

CBA to limit the number of workers in each category to conform to

the volume of available work.” Id. at 1112. Consequently, the

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breach of settlement agreement claim was found to be preempted. 

The Audette plaintiffs also claimed that the union’s actions

constituted sex discrimination in violation of Washington law. 

The court concluded that this claim was also preempted because: 

The instant [claim] does not involve a free-standing

claim of discrimination. Rather, the claim turns on

whether defendants' alleged failure to perform the

settlement agreement was motivated by retaliation or

discrimination. Under Washington discrimination law, an

employer or union can refute a prima facie case of

discrimination by offering a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for their employment decision.

Here, resolution of the discrimination and retaliation

claim turns on defendants' offer of a "legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason" requiring interpretation of

the collective bargaining agreement....Accordingly,

this claim is preempted.

Id. at 1113. 

Similarly, in Madison v. Motion Picture Set Painters and

Sign Writers Local 729, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1254-55 (C.D. Cal.

2000), the plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the manner

by which the union handled his grievance was discriminatory, in

part because the grievance was not filed according to standard

procedure. The court found this claim was preempted because its

resolution would require an inquiry into “whether the Union

followed the procedures set forth in the CBA for filing such a

grievance and whether, under the provisions of the CBA, the

grievance had merit.” Id. at 1255

Here, UPS makes several arguments the resolution of which

might depend upon the meaning and application of the

collective-bargaining agreement. For example, UPS argues that

Frazier did not suffer an “adverse employment action” (a prima

facie element of Plaintiff’s termination-related claims) because

under the CBA he was entitled to return to work during the

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grievance process. Also UPS offers a nondiscriminatory reason

for Plaintiff’s termination, the evaluation of which in fact

depends upon the interpretation of the CBA and its application to

the grievance procedure. Because resolving the preemption issue

requires some inquiry into the merits of each claim and because

UPS argues in the alternative that it is entitled to judgment on

the merits of all of Plaintiff’s claims, whether each claim is

preempted by § 301 of the LMRA is discussed with an analysis of

the merits. 

B. Discharge in Violation of Public Policy on Worker

Safety

1. Prima Facie Case and California Public Policy

Concerning Worker Safety.

In Tameney v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167 (1980),

the California Supreme Court established a cause of action for

wrongful terminations that violate public policy. In order to

establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge in

violation of public policy, Plaintiff must show that (1) he

engaged in a protected activity, (2) that his employer subjected

him to adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal

link between the protected activity and the employer's action. 

Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 476 (1992)

In order to support a wrongful termination claim, a “public

policy” must be “(1) delineated in either constitutional or

statutory provisions; (2) public in the sense that it inures to

the benefit of the public rather than serving merely the

interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of

discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental.” City of

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Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1159

(1998)(internal citations omitted). 

Two provisions of the California Labor Code, found within a

Division of the Code concerning “Occupational Safety and Health,”

are relevant to the issues here. Section 6310(a)(1), entitled

“Retaliation for filing a complaint prohibited,” provides:

No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate

against any employee because the employee has...[m]ade

any oral or written complaint to the division, other

governmental agencies having statutory responsibility

for or assisting the division with reference to

employee safety or health, his or her employer, or his

or her representative.

(emphasis added). Section 6311, entitled “Retaliation for

refusing to work in violation of health and safety standards”

provides: 

No employee shall be laid off or discharged for

refusing to perform work in the performance of which

this code, including Section 6400, any occupational

safety or health standard or any safety order of the

division or standards board will be violated, where the

violation would create a real and apparent hazard to

the employee or his or her fellow employees....

2. Unraveling Plaintiff’s Claim

The contours of Frazier’s public policy wrongful discharge

claim are not entirely clear. Plaintiff appears to set forth two

bases for liability. First, Plaintiff asserts that he was fired

because he refused to give up the right to perform a pre-trip

inspection of his truck. Second, Plaintiff asserts that he

“engaged in the protected activity of protesting an unreasonable

order to engage in work which [he] reasonab[y] believed involved

a risk of serious injury or death to himself and the public by

use of an unsafe vehicle on public highways.” Doc. 59 at 13. 

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3. Plaintiff’s claim based on his alleged right to

perform a pre-trip inspection of his tractor is

preempted.

Plaintiff’s first ground for liability -- that he was fired

because he refused to give up his right to perform a pre-trip

safety inspection -- is not a right that is grounded in a “public

policy.” Plaintiff points to no statute, regulation, or rule

that requires pre-trip inspection of vehicles by an driver as a

matter of right. Rather, the right has its origins in the CBA

and nowhere else. It is therefore subject to preemption because

it is “based on the collective bargaining agreement.” Ramirez,

998 F.2d at 748. Because Plaintiff did not pursue the remedies

available to him under the CBA, he may not advance this claim as

one brought under § 301. UPS’s motion for summary adjudication

as to Plaintiff’s allegation that he was terminated in violation

of public policy for refusing to give up his “right” to perform a 

pre-trip inspection is GRANTED.

4. Plaintiff’s claim based on his right to refuse to

work under allegedly unsafe conditions.

Plaintiff’s second ground for liability is that he was

discharged because he refused to work under unsafe conditions.

UPS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim

because: (1) Frazier never engaged in any conduct protected by

the public policy of California; (2) UPS took no adverse action

against Frazier; and (3) the claim is preempted by § 301. 

//

//

//

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a. Protected Conduct

The right to refuse to work under unsafe conditions is

arguably a right protected by California public policy. Frazier

does not claim he was terminated for “complaining” about safety

to anyone at UPS or elsewhere, rendering California Labor Code 

§ 6210 inapplicable. Rather, Frazier alleges that he was

terminated for refusing to perform his duties because he believed

Tractor 204166 posed a safety hazard. Based on Plaintiff’s

alleged facts, Section 6311 of the California Labor Code,

concerning retaliation for refusing to work appears most

relevant: 

No employee shall be laid off or discharged for

refusing to perform work in the performance of which

this code, including Section 6400, any occupational

safety or health standard or any safety order of the

division or standards board will be violated, where the

violation would create a real and apparent hazard to

the employee or his or her fellow employees.

Cal. Lab. Code § 6311. UPS argues that Frazier has failed to

prove that the alleged safety problems with Tractor 204166

violated any safety standard or that the problems “create a real

and apparent hazard.” In response, Plaintiff points to Hentzel

v. Singer, 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 299-300 (1982) and Freund v.

Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 758-759 (9th Cir. 2003). Both of

these cases held that § 6310 not only prohibits retaliation

against those who report actual dangers but also those who in

“good faith” report working conditions they “reasonably believe”

to be unsafe. But Hentzel strongly suggests that § 6311 should

be interpreted differently, because § 6311 “protects the more

drastic conduct of refusing to work only where some occupational

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safety or health standard or any safety order of the division of

standards board will be violated.” 138 Cal. App. 3d at 399. 

UPS witnesses acknowledge that the jake brake is a safety

device, but insist that it is a not necessary and is not required

by the Department of Transportation (“DOT”). Wood Depo., at

92:16-19. Michael Hoffrage, the driver who eventually returned

tractor 204116 to Fresno, reported that “the jake brake didn’t

work properly on the highest setting,” but added that the jake

brake was a “luxury item” and that tractors are designed to “do

without the jake brake.” Hoffrage Depo., at 34. Plaintiff does

not contradict these assertion. If the jake brake was the only

potential safety problem with Tractor 204166, this claim might

fail. But Frazier also claims problems with the “spring brake”

on Tractor 204166, Frazier Depo., at 73, a problem that was

confirmed by Hoffrage. Hoffrage Depo., at 51, 53. It is not

disputed that a “spring brake” is required safety equipment. 

Johnson Depo., 97. Although it is a close call, a trier of fact

could reasonably conclude that a malfunctioning spring brake

(either alone or in conjunction with a malfunctioning jake brake)

violated a safety standard and created a real and apparent

hazard. 

UPS also argues that Plaintiff cannot establish the

“protected conduct” element of a prima facie case “because safety

inspections were part of his job.” UPS cites McKenzie v.

Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486-87 (10th Cir. 1996) to support

this contention. In McKenzie, a personnel director did not

engage in protected activity when she brought potential

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4 UPS also cites Roberston v. Bell Helicopter Textron,

Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 952 (5th Cir. 1994), which is not on point, as

it interprets the meaning of “protected activity” under the False

Claims Act.

25

violations of employment law to the attention of her employer,

because it was her job to identify such risks.4 The Tenth

Circuit reasoned:

[Plaintiff] never crossed the line from being an

employee merely performing her job as personnel

director to an employee lodging a personal complaint

about the wage and hour practices of her employer and

asserting a right adverse to the company. 

Id. at 1486. Frazier admits that one of his job duties was to

perform safety inspections on his vehicle and identify potential

safety problems. UPS argues that Frazier, like the plaintiff in

McKenzie, was merely doing his job, not engaging in protected

conduct. But Frazier did assert a right adverse to the company –

he refused to obey an order because he was concerned about the

safety of his vehicle. Frazier engaged in protected conduct.

b. Adverse Action

UPS argues that it took no adverse action against Frazier;

rather, Frazier failed to show up for work during his “working

discharge.” The discharge letter issued to Frazier after he

refused to return Tractor 204166 from San Fernando to Fresno

states:

//

//

//

//

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March 30, 2001.

Thomas Frazier

[Address]

Dear Thomas:

This is a discharge letter for insubordination, issued

to Thomas Frazier, who is presently employed as a

service provider in our Logan Park Center

On March 27, 2001, you had a breakdown in L.A. The

tractor was repaired and I instructed you to exchange

the tractor out. You refused to drive tractor # 204166

saying it was unsafe to drive. You went to get an

hourly to be a witness. I informed you that refusing

to exchange the vehicle was gross insubordination and

grounds of [sic] termination and asked if you

understood this to which you replied yes, and still

refused to drive the tractor. I then proceeded to

terminate you in the presence of the witness. 

Therefore, it is my decision to discharge you, per

Article 7, Section 4, of the Northern California

Package Rider. 

Respectfully, 

John Acha

Sequoia Division Manager

cc: Mr Pete Nunez, Teamsters Local 431

Human Resources Department 

Even without referencing the CBA, this letter is, on its face, an

adverse employment action. The referenced provision of the CBA

(Article 7) provides:

Except in cases involving cardinal infractions under

the applicable Supplement, Rider or Addendum, an

employee to be discharged or suspended shall be allowed

to remain on the job, without loss of pay unless and

until the discharge or suspension is sustained under

the grievance procedure. 

Doc. 17, filed Jan. 30, 2003, Ex. 1 Art. 7. According to this

language, Frazier was permitted to remain on the job so that he

could continue receiving pay as the grievance process progressed. 

There is no language in the CBA that calls into question the

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effect of a discharge letter: termination pending the completion

of the grievance process. The letter operated as an adverse

employment action.

 

c. Preemption

Although the CBA does address safety and safety inspections,

the critical question is whether UPS violated California Labor

Code § 6311. This question can be resolved without interpreting

the terms of the CBA. To the extent that UPS impliedly argues

that Frazier’s termination was justified under the CBA for

insubordination and job abandonment, the meaning of the operative

terms of the CBA are not in dispute. Moreover, although the

first termination letter sent to Frazier makes reference to the

CBA, it is not necessary to interpret the CBA to conclud that the

letter constitutes an adverse action. 

In sum, because Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim is

grounded in California public policy and the resolution of the

claim does not demand interpretation of the CBA’s terms, the

claim is not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Plaintiff’s

wrongful discharge discrimination claim survives, and UPS’s

arguments to the contrary are rejected. Accordingly, UPS’s

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge

claim is DENIED. 

C. Discriminatory Discharge Claim

Frazier also alleges that UPS discharged him because of his

race. This claim is brought under California’s Fair Employment

and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, which provides:

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It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless

based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or,

except where based upon applicable security regulations

established by the United States or the State of

California:

(a) For an employer, because of the race, religious

creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical

disability, mental disability, medical condition,

marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation of any

person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to

refuse to select the person for a training program

leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge the

person from employment or from a training program

leading to employment, or to discriminate against the

person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment.

In FEHA claims, California courts apply the familiar burden

shifting approach established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc.,

24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000) (“Because of the similarity between

state and federal employment discrimination laws, California

courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own

statutes.”). Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, Plaintiff

must first establish a prima facie claim. 

This step is designed to eliminate at the outset the

most patently meritless claims, as where the plaintiff

is not a member of the protected class or was clearly

unqualified, or where the job he sought was withdrawn

and never filled. While the plaintiff's prima facie

burden is not onerous, he must at least show actions

taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such

actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than

not that such actions were based on a prohibited

discriminatory criterion. 

Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 354 (internal citations and quotations

omitted). The specific elements of a prima facie case vary,

depending on the particular facts and circumstances:

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5 Defendant suggests the adoption of an ADA-like prima

facie standard that would require Plaintiff to show he (1) is a

member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse

employment action, and (3) he was qualified for the job. But,

the more general standard articulated in Guz is the law. 

Plaintiff may meet that standard in a number of ways. For

example he may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory

discharge by showing that (1) he belongs to a protected class;

(2) his job performance was satisfactory; (3) he was discharged

or suffered some other adverse employment action; and (4) others

not in the protected class were treated differently. See Mixon

v. Fair Employment & Hous. Com., 192 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1318

(1987).

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Generally, the plaintiff must provide evidence that 

(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was

qualified for the position he sought or was performing

competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an

adverse employment action, such as termination,

demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some

other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

5

If Plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, the

analysis continues:

Establishment of the prima facie case creates a

rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully

discriminated against the employee. The burden then

shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.

The defendant need not persuade the court that it was

actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is

sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine

issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against

the plaintiff.

Mixon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1318-19 (citing Texas Dept. of Comty.

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). If defendant

provides evidence showing a legitimate non-discriminatory reason

for the termination:

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[T]he presumption raised by the prima facie case is

rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new

level of specificity....Plaintiff now must have the

opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason

was not the true reason for the employment decision. He

may succeed in this either directly by persuading the

court that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that

the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of

credence. This burden now merges with plaintiff's

ultimate burden of persuading the court that he has

been the victim of intentional discrimination. At this

stage, the McDonnell/Burdine presumption "drops from

the case" and the factfinder must decide upon all of

the evidence before it whether defendant intentionally

discriminated against plaintiff. In short the trier of

fact decides whether it believes the employer's

explanation of its actions or the employee's. While a

complainant need not prove that racial animus was the

sole motivation behind the challenged action, he must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was

a "causal connection" between the employee's protected

status and the adverse employment decision.

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

1. Prima Facie Elements

Guz establishes that Plaintiff’s prima facie burden is not

onerous. He must, at a bare minimum, provide evidence that (1)

he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for

the position he sought or was performing competently in the

position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action,

such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and

(4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. It

is not disputed that Plaintiff satisfies the first element

because of his race. 

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2. Qualification/ Satisfactory Performance

UPS asserts Frazier should not be considered “qualified”

because he failed to show up for work during his “working

discharge.” Frazier’s failure to return to work was preceded by

an adverse action -- the issuance by UPS of the March 30, 2001

letter discharging Frazier for insubordination. The relevant

question is, therefore, whether Frazier was performing his job in

a satisfactory manner before the issuance of the discharge

letter. Although Frazier has a long disciplinary history and

could be characterized as a “problem” employee, UPS has not

provided evidence that any of these prior incidents had a bearing

upon Frazier’s performance in March 2001.

3. Adverse action

The March 30, 2001 letter sent by UPS to Frazier is an

adverse action that preceded Frazier’s failure to return to work. 

4. Circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive.

Plaintiff’s evidence of discriminatory motive is entirely

anecdotal. Frazier describes several incidents in which he was

disciplined for certain types of conduct. In Frazier’s opinion,

other Caucasian employees were not disciplined for similar

conduct. For example, Frazier believes he was disciplined for

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failing to hook up his tractor while his Caucasian counterparts

“couldn’t” possibly have completed this task. Frazier Depo., at

273. Frazier contends that he received a day suspension for

using foul language over the phone, while other, Caucasian

employees used similar language but were never disciplined. Id.

at 268. Frazier also alleges that a supervisor at UPS’s Logan

Park Center made a racially derogatory remark by stating that he

did not like Oakland “because there’s too many guys like you

there.” Id. at 186. 

Frazier does provide one more specific example of allegedly

discriminatory treatment. In 1999, Frazier was involved in an

accident. UPS determined that Frazier was at fault and

discharged him, even though a police report concluded that

Frazier was not to blame. Id. at 157-58. According to Frazier,

a “non-African-American employee [] had an accident around the

same time...and he never received a suspension or anything.” Id.

at 165. 

Plaintiff’s evidence of discriminatory motive is sufficient

to raise a disputed issue because "the burden of establishing a

prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous." Guz, 24

Cal. 4th at 354.

//

//

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5. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason for

Termination

Once Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden

then shifts to Defendant. UPS insists that it decided to

terminate Frazier for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons,

namely insubordination and job abandonment, rather than because

of his race. Specifically, UPS asserts that Frazier’s refusal to

drive Tractor 204166 home from San Fernando was willful

insubordination and that his subsequent failure to return to work

during his “working discharge” is grounds for dismissal for job

abandonment.

Frazier admits to many of the relevant facts in his own

deposition. On March 29, 2001, Jim Wood informed Frazier that

Tractor 204166 had been repaired and instructed Frazier to pick

up the tractor from San Fernando and return with it to Fresno. 

Frazier Depo., at 78, 127. Frazier refused this order, and Wood

then terminated him for insubordination. Id. at 110-111. 

Although Frazier insists that his refusal was justified, “the

defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually

motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the

defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether

it discriminated against the plaintiff.” Mixon, 192 Cal. App. 3d

at 1318-1319. Defendant’s showing is adequate at this stage.

//

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6. Plaintiff’s Showing of Pretext

Once defendant provides evidence showing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination:

[Plaintiff] now must have the opportunity to

demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true

reason for the employment decision. [He] may succeed in

this either directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the

employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 

Id. at 1318. Frazier has presented circumstantial evidence that

race motivated UPS’s decision. See supra § V.C.4 (circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory motive). Frazier’s evidence can also

be interpreted to show that UPS’s proffered explanation for

terminating Frazier is “unworthy of credence.” Frazier insists

that he refused to follow Wood’s orders because Tractor 204166

had persistent safety problems that UPS mechanics repeatedly

failed to resolve. Frazier’s safety concerns are documented in

the safety log for Tractor 204166 and confirmed by Mr. Hoffrage,

the driver who did end up returning Tractor 204155 from San

Fernando. 

The Ninth Circuit provides somewhat conflicting guidance on

the quality and quantity of pretext evidence required for a

plaintiff to survive summary judgment. McGinest v. GTE Service

Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) reaffirmed the rule

that: 

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[V]ery little evidence is necessary to raise a genuine

issue of fact regarding an employer's motive; any

indication of discriminatory motive...may suffice to

raise a question that can only be resolved by a

fact-finder. When the evidence, direct or

circumstantial, consists of more than the McDonnell

Douglas presumption, a factual question will almost

always exist with respect to any claim of a

nondiscriminatory reason....Such uncertainty at the

summary judgment stage must be resolved in favor of the

plaintiff. [Where a number of] factors cast doubt upon

[defendant’s] proffered explanation for its failure to

promote [plaintiff], while providing support for his

contention regarding racial discrimination, [plaintiff]

has met his burden of showing a genuine factual issue

with regard to discriminatory intent.

See also Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1113 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“[W]e have held that any indication of discriminatory motive...

may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a

factfinder, and for that reason summary judgment for the

defendant will ordinarily not be appropriate on any ground

relating to the merits because the crux of a Title VII dispute is

the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.”). 

Frazier’s proof in this case amply satisfies the above standard. 

Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir.

2003) delineates a more stringent requirement when a plaintiff’s

proof is largely circumstantial: 

When the plaintiff offers direct evidence of

discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the actual

motivation of the employer is created even if the

evidence is not substantial. In contrast, when direct

evidence is unavailable...and the plaintiff proffers

only circumstantial evidence that the employer's

motives were different from its stated motives, we

require specific and substantial evidence of pretext to

survive summary judgment.

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

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Although Stegall sets a higher bar, at least some of

Frazier’s evidence can be described as “specific” and

“substantial.” In particular, Frazier’s testimony regarding the

brake problems and his refusal to drive Tractor 204166. 

Frazier’s version of events, which cannot be found incredible on

summary judgment, calls UPS’s proffered bases for his termination

into doubt. “Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy

of credence is a form of circumstantial evidence that is

probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite

persuasive.” McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1124 (citing Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. at 133, 147 (2000)). 

The Ninth Circuit has found that deviations from an employer’s

regular procedures provide evidence of discrimination powerful

enough to overcome a motion for summary judgment. See Porter v.

Cal. Dept. of Corr., 383 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, Frazier’s description of the events suggests that UPS

refused to allow him to follow regular safety procedures. There

is also a dispute about whether the employer recalled him to

work, as he had no answering machine. Plaintiff’s evidence is

specific and strong enough to show pretext. 

//

//

//

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7. Summary Judgment is Inappropriate on this Claim

Because Plaintiff met his burden of showing pretext “the

McDonnell/Burdine presumption drops from the case and the

factfinder must decide upon all of the evidence before it whether

defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff”:

In short the trier of fact decides whether it believes

the employer's explanation of its actions or the

employee's. While a complainant need not prove that

racial animus was the sole motivation behind the

challenged action, he must prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that there was a "causal connection"

between the employee's protected status and the adverse

employment decision.

Mixon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1318. On summary judgment, this

determination must be left to a jury if there are disputed issues

of material fact. Here, the lawfulness of UPS’s termination

decision turns in part on the legitimacy of Frazier’s refusal to

follow instructions. Whether a “jake brake” is, as Frazier

maintains, an important piece of safety equipment, or, as UPS

insists, a “luxury” item is disputed, as is whether another part

of the braking system did not function. In addition, Frazier’s

anecdotal evidence of discriminatory treatment over time raises

factual issues that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

//

//

//

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8. This claim is not Preempted; Analysis of the

Proffered Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Basis for

Termination Does Not Require Interpretation of the

CBA.

UPS maintains that any inquiry into UPS’s proffered

nondiscriminatory basis for terminating Frazier will demand an

interpretation of the CBA. The CBA provides in pertinent part:

The Employer shall not require employees to take out on

the street or highways any vehicle that is not in a

safe operating condition or not equipped with the

safety appliances prescribed by law. It shall not be a

violation of the Agreement where employees refuse to

operate such equipment unless such refusal is

unjustified....

* * *

Employees shall immediately, or at the end of their

shifts, report all defects of equipment on a suitable

form furnished by the Employer. The Employer shall not

ask or require any employee to take out equipment that

has been reported by any other employee as being in an

unsafe operating condition until same has been approved

as being safe by the automotive maintenance department.

(NCSA, Art. 11, § 2)

(emphasis added).

Although UPS’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for

terminating Frazier could trigger the operation of these sections

of the CBA, there is no suggestion by UPS that the meaning of any

of its terms are in dispute. The CBA plainly states that “[i]t

shall not be a violation of the Agreement where employees refuse

to operate such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.” 

In determining the legitimacy of UPS’s nondiscriminatory basis

for terminating Frazier, one important question will be whether

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6 Lawsuits claiming retaliatory termination in violation

of FEHA are “analogous to federal Title VII claims, and are

evaluated under federal law interpreting Title VII cases.” 

Flait, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 475-76.

39

Frazier’s refusal to drive his tractor was justified under the

circumstances. The CBA gives some guidance as to when an

employee’s refusal would be justified: 

It shall not be a violation of this Agreement, or cause

for disciplinary action, where employees refuse to

operate equipment or a vehicle when such operation

constitutes a violation of any state or federal rules,

regulations, standards or orders applicable to

commercial motor vehicle safety or health, or because

of the employee’s reasonable apprehension of serious

injury to himself/herself or the public due to the

unsafe conditions as set out in any state or federal

rules, regulations, standards or orders applicable to

commercial motor vehicle safety or health to include

Part 392.14 of the Federal Motor Carrier Regulations.

(NMUPSA, Art. 18, § 1)

But, critically, these provisions are clear and in need of no

interpretation. They provide unambiguous standards to which the

facts, as found by the trier of fact, will be applied.

UPS’s motion for summary judgment on Frazier’s

discriminatory termination claim is DENIED. 

D. Retaliation for Complaining about Race Discrimination

Plaintiff also alleges that UPS retaliated against him for

complaining about racial discrimination.6 

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1. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

At the outset, UPS argues that Frazier has failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies with respect to any race-related

retaliation claim because Frazier failed to file an

administrative complaint of retaliation. Frazier’s EEOC

complaint, dated January 3, 2002, states in its entirety:

I was subjected to a hostile atmosphere culminating in

discharge from my position as a Feeder driver. 

Respondent is a delivery service employing more than

500. 

I was subject to undue surveillance and harassment by

supervisors and management which was not imposed on

non-African American co-workers. Management tried to

intimidate me when I objected. 

During the week of March 26, 2001 I experienced a

continuing mechanical problem with a truck that I

repeatedly reported and attempted to have properly

corrected. Management ordered me to drive that

hazardous truck, but I declined. March 29, 2001 I was

discharged. 

I believe I have been discriminated against because of

my race (African American). 

Frazier Depo., Ex. 9 (Gammon Decl., Ex. A) (emphasis added). On

its face, Frazier’s complaint explains that he “was subject to

undue surveillance and harassment by supervisors and management

which was not imposed on non-African American co-workers” and

that “Management tried to intimidate [him] when [he] objected.” 

With these statements, Frazier alleges having previously made

complaints about discriminatory treatment and having been

mistreated because of his complaints. Although Frazier neglected

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to use the legal catch-phrase “retaliation,” “[t]he specific

words of the charge of discrimination need not presage with

literary exactitude the judicial pleadings which may follow.” 

Baker v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 1064

(1989). 

Even assuming the language in Frazier’s complaint did not

spell out a retaliation claim in lay terms, 

The allegations in a judicial complaint filed pursuant

to Title VII may encompass any kind of discrimination

like or related to allegations contained in the

[administrative] charge and growing out of such

allegation during the pendency of the [administrative]

case.... In other words, the scope of the judicial

complaint is limited to the scope of the EEOC

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow

out of the charge of discrimination.

Id. (emphasis added). Here, a claim of retaliation could

reasonably by expected to grow out of Frazier’s complaint that

“Management tried to intimidate” him for having “objected” to

discriminatory treatment.

2. Prima Facie Case of Retaliatory Discharge

In order to make out a prima facie case of retaliatory

discharge, a plaintiff must show “[1] that he engaged in a

protected activity, [2] his employer subjected him to adverse

employment action, and [3] there is a causal link between the

protected activity and the employer's action.” Flait, 3 Cal.

App. 4th at 476. As discussed above, Frazier’s termination

constitutes an adverse employment action. 

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3. Protected activity

UPS denies that Frazier ever formally complained about race

discrimination, while Frazier claims to have told UPS managers on

many occasions that he felt he was being discriminated against

because of his race. Frazier Depo., at 300-301. Frazier alleges

that he made complaints of discrimination to Jim Wood three or

four months before Wood made the decision to terminate Frazier on

March 29, 2001. Frazier Depo., 267-269. Frazier also reported

discriminatory treatment to other managers at UPS. Id. at 300-

302. Finally, although Frazier never filed a formal written

grievance concerning race discrimination, Frazier’s complaints of

race discrimination were discussed at a local review meeting that

took place on March 29, 2001 (the day Frazier was terminated). 

Id. at 376-79. Frazier also discussed the subject with Pete

Nunez, a union representative. Nunez’ allegedly responded, “Your

always saying somebody is discriminating against you,” id. at

302, inferentially confirming that Frazier had made more than one

complaint. Making an informal complaint can constitute protected

activity. Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prod., Inc.,

212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000). 

4. Causation

UPS argues that Plaintiff cannot show a causal link between

any discrimination complaint and his termination. As explained

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above, Frazier alleges that he complained about racial

discrimination on many occasions to many people at UPS. In

addition Frazier emphasizes that his allegations of race

discrimination were discussed at a local review that convened on

the very day he was terminated by Jim Wood. UPS insists that the

only complaints that are relevant to the causation analysis are

those about which Jim Wood had knowledge. See Raad v. Fairbanks

N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir.

2003)(requiring plaintiff to “make some showing sufficient for a

reasonable trier of fact to infer that the defendant was aware

that the plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.”); Cohen v.

Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Essential

to a causal link is evidence that the employer was aware that the

plaintiff had engaged in the protected activity.”).

Frazier responds that he actually made complaints of race

discrimination directly to Jim Wood “three or four months” prior

to his termination. “[I]n some cases, causation can be inferred

from timing alone where an adverse employment action follows on

the heels of protected activity.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island

Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether this

three to four month lag time triggers an inference of causation

presents a close question of law. Compare Miller v. Fairchild

Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 505 (9th Cir. 1989) (prima facie case of

causation established when discharges occurred forty-two and

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fifty-nine days after plaintiff respectively attended EEOC

hearings and signed agreements with employer); Yartzoff v.

Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987)(causation existed

where adverse action occurred less than three months after

complaint was filed); Flait, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 478 (sufficient

causal link where employee was terminated a “few months” after

engaging in protected conduct) with Clark County Sch. Dist. v.

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001)(timing alone did not support

claim of retaliation where almost two years passed from when the

defendant must have known about plaintiff's protected activity

until alleged adverse employment action); Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at

1065(“nearly 18-month lapse between protected activity and an

adverse employment action is simply too long, by itself, to give

rise to an inference of causation.”). 

Here, a lapse of three to four months occurred. This period

of a few months time arguably gives rise to an inference of

causation under Miller, Yartzoff, and Flait. However, several

cases from outside the Ninth Circuit suggest otherwise. See

Richmond v. ONEOK Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997) (three

month period not sufficiently proximate); Huhges v. Derwinski,

967 F.2d 1168, 1171, 1174 (7th Cir. 1992) (four months between

filing of complaint and receipt of disciplinary letter does not

give rise to an inference of causation). Notably, the Ninth

Circuit cautions that a “specified time period cannot be a

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7 Frazier also argues that Wood “knew or should have

known of the preceding local review involving Mr. Frazier and the

matters discussed,” Doc. 59 at 16, but offers no authority for

the proposition that anything short of actual knowledge is

adequate. Compare Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389 F.3d 708, 715

(7th Cir. 2004) (holding “it is not sufficient that [defendant]

could or even should have known about [plaintiff’s] complaints;

[defendant] must have had actual knowledge of the complaints for

her decisions to be retaliatory.”). Moreover, Frazier offers no

evidence to suggest that Wood should have been aware that the

Local Review was taking place on March 29, 2001 or that Frazier

engaged in any other protected conduct (apart from the complaints

made directly to Wood) in close proximity to the date of his

termination.

45

mechanically applied criterion. A rule that any period over a

certain time is per se too long (or, conversely, a rule that any

period under a certain time is per se short enough) would be

unrealistically simplistic.” Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320

F.3d 968, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The complaints Frazier made to Wood cannot be viewed in a

vacuum. Frazier asserts that he complained about race

discrimination frequently to many individuals at UPS –- so much

so that Pete Nunez exclaimed to Frazier that “You [are] always

saying somebody is discriminating against you.” A reasonable

juror could conclude from this evidence that Frazier’s

discriminatory treatment activity was constant and widely known.7

(Whether Frazier was actually a victim of repeated discriminatory

acts or is not being candid about his treatment is a matter for

the finder of fact to determine.) 

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Frazier has established a prima facie case of retaliatory

termination. The McDonnell Douglass and preemption analysis

performed in the context of Frazier’s discriminatory termination

applies with equal force to this claim. UPS’s motion for summary

judgment on Frazier’s retaliation claim is DENIED. 

E. Other Potential Claims

Frazier’s complaint appears to allege other forms of racial

harassment unrelated to his termination. Frazier concedes in his

opposition that these claims are not independently actionable but

may, instead, provide additional evidence of discriminatory

intent. Doc. 59 at 18. UPS’s motion for summary judgment on any

claim of generalized discrimination unrelated to Frazier’s

employment is GRANTED.

F. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff’s claims are all grounded in California law.

California Civil Code § 3294(b), which governs the availability

of punitive damages in claims brought against a corporate

employer, provides: 

An employer shall not be liable for [punitive] damages

... based upon acts of an employee of the employer,

unless the employer had advance knowledge of the

unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with

a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others

or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for

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which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty

of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a

corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious

disregard, authorization, ratification or act of

oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an

officer, director, or managing agent of the

corporation. 

(emphasis added). Frazier alleges that his termination was

initiated by Jim Wood and then approved by Wood’s supervisors,

Steve Johnson and John Acha. None of these three men are alleged

to be officers or directors of UPS. Frazier suggests, however,

that Johnson and/or Acha are “managing agents” of UPS. In White

v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 563 (1999), the California Supreme

Court held that a manager who was responsible for eight

convenience stores and sixty-five employees was a managing agent

for purposes of § 3294(b). The White court reasoned that section

3294(b) limited corporate punitive damage liability “to those

employees who exercise substantial independent authority and

judgment over decisions that ultimately determine corporate

policy.” Id. at 573. The critical factor “... is the degree of

discretion the employees possess in making decisions that will

ultimately determine corporate policy.” Id. at 573. Frazier has

presented absolutely no evidence that suggests Wood, Johnson, or

Acha possessed the degree of corporate discretion and authority

that would enable them to ultimately determine corporate policy

at UPS. Rather, the evidence undisputably establishes that

Plaintiff was dealt with on a local basis by local supervisors at

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one local terminal. Plaintiff has failed to meet this basic

standard of proof. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication

as to the punitive damages claim is GRANTED.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment/summary adjudication is:

(1) GRANTED as to the defamation claim;

(2) (a) GRANTED as to the claim for wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy based on Frazier’s alleged

right to perform a pre-trip inspection of his

equipment;

(b) DENIED as to the claim for wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy based on Frazier’s right to

refuse to work under allegedly unsafe conditions.

(3) DENIED as to the discriminatory discharge claim;

(4) DENIED as to the retaliatory discharge claim;

(5) GRANTED as to any generalized claim of racial

harassment or discrimination claim unrelated to

Frazier’s employment; and

(6) GRANTED as to the punitive damages request.

SO ORDERED.

 /S/ Oliver W. Wanger 

Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:02-cv-06509-OWW -LJO Document 75 Filed 05/03/05 Page 48 of 48