Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-xr-90225/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-xr-90225-19/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Fainaru-Wada
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Lance Williams
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS TO

MARK FAINARU-WADA and LANCE

WILLIAMS

 /

No. CR 06-90225 JSW

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

CLARIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion for clarification

filed by Mark Fainaru-Wada (“Fainaru-Wada”) and Lance Williams (“Williams”) (collectively

“Movants”). Movants incorporate by reference the arguments raised by the San Francisco

Chronicle in its motion to quash a grand jury subpoena, filed on the same date Movants filed the

instant motion. Having considered the parties’ pleadings, relevant legal authority, and having

had the benefit of oral argument, the Court DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

The factual background underlying this dispute is set out in the Court’s August 15, 2006

Order denying Movants’ motion to quash subpoenas issued by the grand jury and shall not be 

repeated here. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, 438

F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113-14 (N.D. Cal. 2006). However, Movants’ reply brief necessitates

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further elaboration on the terms of the Stipulated Protective Order (“Protective Order”) issued

by Judge Illston in United States v. Conte, et al., CR-04-44-SI (the “BALCO litigation”).

The Protective Order defined “Sealed Material” to include “[a]ll transcripts of grand jury

proceedings.” (Id. at 2:16-17.) The parties agreed that “Sealed Material” would be 

furnished, at this time, to no one other than: (1) counsel for defendants

Conte, Valente, Anderson, and Korchemny; (2) defendants Conte, Valente,

Anderson, and Korchemny; and (3) the staff supporting counsel for

defendants Conte, Valente, Anderson, and Korchemny in the abovecaptioned case, such as investigators, paralegal assistants, secretarial,

stenographic, and clerical employees who are working on this case under

the direction of counsel for defendants Conte, Valente, Anderson and

Korchemny and to whom it is necessary that the materials be disclosed for

purposes of the defense of this case. All such material shall be used solely

for the purposes of conducting pretrial, trial, and appellate proceedings in

this case and for no other purpose whatsoever, and shall not be

disseminated to the press or used for economic benefit by counsel for

defendants Conte, Valente, Anderson, or Korchemny the defendants

themselves, or the support staff of defense counsel. 

(Id. at 2:21-3:7 (emphasis in bold as in original, emphasis in italics added).) 

The Government and “attorneys for the U.S. government authorized by federal rules and

regulations to have access to the material; (2) law enforcement agents authorized by the federal

rules and regulations to have access to the material; and (3) the staff supporting the prosecution

in the above captioned case ....” were subject to these same requirements. (Id. at 3:8-18). The

Protective Order also provided that “[t]he United States and defendants Conte, Valente,

Anderson and Korchemny and their counsel in the above-captioned case may not disclose

Sealed Material to any other person without prior Court approval and notice to opposing counsel

in advance of any additional disclosure.” (Id. at 3:23-26 (emphasis added).) 

The terms of the Protective Order further provide that “[n]othing herein shall prevent

either the United States or the defendants Conte, Valente, Anderson and Korchemny and their

counsel from using the Sealed Material or from referring to or reciting from any information

contained in such Sealed Material in connection with pleadings or motions filed in this case,

provided that the Sealed Material itself is only filed under seal and/or submitted to the Court for

in camera inspection. The use of Sealed Material at trial or pre-trail or post-trial hearing will be

resolved at or before the time of trial or hearing.” (Id. at 4:1-6.) Finally, the parties agreed that

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a violation of the Protective Order “may be punishable by contempt of court, whatever other

sanction the Court deems just, and/or any other sanctions which are legally available.” (Id. at

4:7-9.)

ANALYSIS

“[A] grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable,

and the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the recipient who seeks to avoid

compliance.” United States v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991). 

Movants contend that the Government, with respect to the subpoena issued to the

Chronicle, now interprets paragraph 6 of the subpoena in an overly broad manner. That

paragraph requests 

[a]ny information in your possession regarding the identity of the

individual or individuals who provided the Chronicle a copy of any grand

jury transcript pertaining to Grand Jury Investigation Number

2002R01596, or who disclosed information about the content of any such

witness’ grand jury testimony.

(See Affidavit of Mark Fainaru-Wada in Support of Motion to Quash, Ex. A; Affidavit of

Lance Williams in Support of Motion to Quash, Ex. A.) It is the latter clause that forms the

basis of the instant dispute. Movants seek clarification of the Court’s August 15, 2006 Order,

and their obligations thereunder, because they are concerned the Government will interpret all

three subpoenas in the same manner.

The Movants argument is premised on a contention that the information sought by the

Government is not relevant to the grand jury investigation and that the overly broad scope of

the information requested renders the subpoenas unreasonable and oppressive. When a party

challenges a grand jury subpoena “on relevancy grounds, [a] motion to quash must be denied

unless the district court determines that there is no reasonable probability that the category of

materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the

grand jury’s investigation.” Id. at 301. 

The grand jury 

is an investigatory body charged with the responsibility of determining

whether or not a crime has been committed. Unlike this Court, whose

jurisdiction is predicated on a specific case or controversy, the grand jury

“can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or

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even just because it wants assurance that it is not.” The function of the

grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possibly bear on

its investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself

that none has occurred. As a necessary consequence of its investigatory

function, the grand jury paints with a broad brush. “A grand jury

investigation ‘is not fully carried out until every available clue has been

run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a

crime has been committed.’” 

R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). While the grand jury’s investigatory powers

are broad in scope, the Court recognizes that they are not unlimited. “Grand juries are not

licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions, nor may they select targets of investigation

out of malice or an intent to harass.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Movants urge the Court to find the subpoena unreasonable and oppressive and lacking

relevance to the grand jury investigation based upon a distinction between disclosure of the

“content” of grand jury testimony and disclosure of the physical transcripts. The grand jury in

this case is investigating whether or not a person or persons: (1) violated the terms of Judge

Illston’s Protective Order; (2) committed perjury; (3) obstructed justice; (4) or violated Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). In light of the scope of that investigation, and considering the

terms of the Protective Order and the concerns raised by Judge Illston during the course of the

BALCO litigation, this Court can find no meaningful distinction between disclosure of the

physical grand jury transcripts and disclosure of the content of those transcripts. Accordingly,

it concludes that Movants have not met their burden to show that the subpoenas, as drafted, are

unreasonable or oppressive or that there is no reasonable probability that the category of

materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the

grand jury’s investigation. 

However, the Government has agreed to limit the scope of paragraph 6 of the

subpoenas. The Court shall hold the Government to its representation. Thus, although the

Court DENIES the motion for clarification, it does so subject to the issuance of a protective

order.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion for clarification is DENIED, subject to the

protective order outlined below. Under the Court’s August 15, 2006 Order denying their

motion to quash, Movants were required to appear before the grand jury at a date and time to be

determined by the Government to answer questions posed to them and to produce all

documents or objects requested in the subpoenas. 

The Court HEREBY ORDERS that Movants’ obligations with respect paragraph 6 are

expressly limited to providing information regarding the identity of: (1) those individuals who

worked for the United States Attorney’s Office or the government agencies that worked with it

on United States v. Conte, et al., CR-04-44-SI; (2) those individuals who were counsel or

parties in United States v. Conte, et al., CR-04-44-SI; or (3) those individuals who submitted a

declaration in response to the Honorable Susan Illston’s order requiring such declarations in the

BALCO litigation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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