Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-01822/USCOURTS-ca4-09-01822-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Boothe
Appellee
Gregory Parsons
Appellee
Power Mountain Coal Company
Appellant
United Mine Workers of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY PARSONS; DAVID BOOTHE; 

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF

AMERICA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,  No. 09-1822

v.

POWER MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.

David A. Faber, Senior District Judge.

(2:07-cv-00719)

Argued: March 24, 2010

Decided: May 5, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON

and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the

opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Duncan

joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: John R. Woodrum, OGLETREE, DEAKINS,

NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, PC, Washington, D.C., for

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Appellant. Bradley James Pyles, PYLES & TURNER, LLP,

Logan, West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: W. Gregory Mott, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &

STEWART, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

This case involves a claim by two former coal miners,

Gregory Parsons and David Boothe, to collect retirement

health benefits allegedly owed to them by Power Mountain

Coal Company ("Power Mountain"), a coal operator in West

Virginia. Under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement to which Power Mountain was a signatory, a coal operator is responsible for the health benefits of certain miners

"whose last signatory classified employment was with such

Employer." Power Mountain asserted that it was not their last

signatory employer, but the designated arbitrators under the

collective bargaining scheme disagreed. The district court

upheld the arbitrators’ decisions, and we affirm. Lest we risk

the disruption of the carefully negotiated rules governing

labor-management relations within the coal industry, we

decline to second-guess the judgment of arbitrators interpreting a complicated collective bargaining scheme comprised of

interwoven agreements.

I.

A.

Parsons and Boothe are UMWA members who worked for

many years as coal miners for Pehem Industries ("Pehem"), a

company that at one time operated a coal preparation plant in

West Virginia. In 1997, Parsons and Boothe were laid off

from their jobs with Pehem. 

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Later that same year, Power Mountain purchased the plant

where Parsons and Boothe had previously worked. As a result

of its purchase, Power Mountain became subject to two labor

contracts between the UMWA and numerous coal operators.

Specifically, Power Mountain assumed its predecessor’s obligations under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement

of 1993 ("1993 NBCWA") and also became a direct signatory

to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1998

("1998 NBCWA"). Power Mountain also inherited a duty to

honor the "panel rights" of Pehem’s laid-off employees.

Under the panel system, laid-off employees were placed on a

panel and given the opportunity to be recalled back to

employment, in order of seniority, for any work falling within

the scope of the 1998 NBCWA’s work jurisdiction clause. 

While the 1998 NBCWA was in effect, however, Power

Mountain hired non-union contractors for work allegedly falling under the 1998 NBCWA’s work jurisdiction clause. As a

result, a number of UMWA members, including several panel

members, filed grievances against Power Mountain, seeking

to collect pay for the work they claimed they were contractually entitled to perform. Without admitting liability, Power

Mountain settled the grievances for a total of almost $43,000

in two separate settlement agreements, one in 2002 and one

in 2003. Both settlements were short and included brief disclaimers, reciting that the agreements would not set a precedent for future cases. 

Neither agreement specified how the monies were to be

distributed. As a practical matter, Power Mountain simply

paid the bulk sum to the local union, which in turn distributed

the proceeds in equal shares to those union members who

likely would have been hired if not for the alleged violation.

Specifically, the local union determined that if Power Mountain had not hired the non-union contractors, then Parsons and

Boothe, given their relative seniority on the panel, would have

been recalled to employment for Power Mountain. Parsons

and Boothe therefore received a proportionate share of the

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2002 and 2003 settlement proceeds. Power Mountain claims

it had no knowledge of who might or did receive such distributions. 

B.

The settlement payments received by Parsons and Boothe

gave rise to the claim for health benefits in this case. The central purpose of the 1998 NBCWA is to provide lifetime health

benefits to retired, laid-off, and disabled UMWA members

and their dependents. The 1998 NBCWA places the burden

for these lifetime benefits on a miner’s last signatory

employer, and, if the last signatory employer is out of business, on the 1993 Benefit Plan. 

To achieve its overarching goal of lifetime benefits, the

1998 NBCWA works in tandem with a set of separate plans

and trusts, which establish a comprehensive, albeit complicated, scheme specifying who is eligible for what benefits and

from whom. One such plan is the 1974 Pension Plan. All

questions of pension eligibility are determined under the

detailed rules of the 1974 Pension Plan, as adjudicated by the

plan’s trustees ("1974 Trustees"). As explained by Article

VIII(A), "[t]he Trustees . . . shall have full and final determination as to all issues concerning eligibility for benefits." 

In the instant case, the 1974 Trustees determined that as a

result of the settlement payments, Power Mountain was

required to pay retirement health benefits to Parsons and

Boothe under Article XX(c)(3)(i) of the 1998 NBCWA,

which requires an employer to provide certain health benefits

to "pensioners under the 1974 Pension Plan and Trust whose

last signatory classified employment was with such

Employer." See also 1998 NBCWA, Art. XX(h). The Trustees’ conclusion that Power Mountain was obligated to pay

health benefits under this section rested on two findings.

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The 1974 Trustees first determined that Parsons and Boothe

were "pensioners under the 1974 Pension Plan and Trust"

because they were eligible for a "Special Permanent Layoff

Pension." To receive such a pension, a retired miner must

have worked a minimum of twenty years of signatory service,

with 1000 hours of "credited service" per year. In calculating

the number of hours of "credited service," the 1974 Pension

Plan treats hours actually worked and hours constructively

worked virtually the same. In this sense, and consistent with

the 1974 Trustees’ past practice, settlement agreements may

lead to awards of "credited service" if the settlement payments are "back pay" representing compensation for hours

that the employee ought to have worked but did not. The basis

for this general rule is Article I(A)(12), which provides that

"back pay," which is "agreed to by an Employer [and]

intended to compensate an Employee for periods which the

Employee would have been engaged in a performance of

duties for the Employer," yields "credited service" for "hours

worked." Using this provision, the 1974 Trustees interpreted

the 2002 and 2003 settlement payments as "back pay," and

the resulting adjustment to "credited service" for "hours

worked" meant that Parsons and Boothe met the threshold for

a "Special Permanent Layoff Pension."1

Second, the 1974 Trustees concluded that the settlement

payments made Power Mountain Parsons and Boothe’s last

signatory employer. An employee’s last signatory employer is

the employer on his last day of "credited service." Here,

because Parsons and Boothe’s last day of "credited service"

derived from settlement payments made by Power Mountain,

it was attributable to Power Mountain. In other words, the

1974 Trustees found that the settlement agreements represented constructive employment and that Power Mountain’s

constructive employment of plaintiffs (paying them for hours

1Although Parsons and Boothe received payments under both the 2002

and the 2003 settlement agreements, Boothe received "credited service" on

the basis of the 2002 agreement alone. 

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they did not work, but should have worked) was sufficient to

make it their last signatory employer. 

When Parsons and Boothe attempted to enroll in its health

benefits plan, however, Power Mountain denied their claims,

insisting that it was not their last signatory employer. In

response, the UMWA invoked the Resolution of Dispute

("ROD") procedure under Article XX(e)(5) of the 1998

NBCWA. Under this provision, contested issues of health

benefits are adjudicated by the Trustees of the 1993 Benefit

Plan ("1993 Trustees"). After evaluating a disputed matter,

the 1993 Trustees typically issue an opinion, commonly

referred to as a "ROD," which "shall be final and binding on

the parties." In RODs for both Parsons and Boothe, the 1993

Trustees informed Power Mountain that the subsidiary question of Parsons and Boothe’s last signatory employer would

be addressed by the 1974 Trustees through the procedure

authorized by Article XX(g) of the 1998 NBCWA. Under this

provision, the 1974 Trustees were authorized to "promptly

investigate and determine the eligibility or ineligibility of any

beneficiary whose right to receive benefits from the Trusts

has been challenged by . . . any Employer." 

As to both Parsons and Boothe, the 1974 Trustees reaffirmed their earlier conclusion that Power Mountain was

properly named as the last signatory employer and informed

the 1993 Trustees of this determination in a thoroughly reasoned letter. The 1993 Trustees issued ROD opinions in Parsons’s case on January 20, 2007, and in Boothe’s case on

October 24, 2007. In both rulings, the 1993 Trustees not only

adopted the 1974 Trustees’ decision on the issue of last signatory employer but also confirmed the existence of additional

facts crucial to a determination of eligibility. The Trustees

concluded Power Mountain was required to provide health

benefits to Parsons and Boothe.

When Power Mountain refused to comply with the ROD

decisions, the UMWA, Parsons, and Boothe sued in the

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Southern District of West Virginia, seeking, in part, enforcement of the RODs as arbitration awards. The parties filed

cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court

subsequently granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s. Parsons v. Power Mountain

Coal Co., 2009 WL 899457 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2009). The

district court held that eligibility issues, including the lastsignatory-employer issue, were subject to arbitration under

the 1998 NBCWA, and that the RODs were thus subject to

the deferential standard of review afforded to arbitration

awards. Id. at *9. As the court explained, courts must enforce

an arbitrator’s decision on a matter properly submitted to arbitration so long as the decision "draws its essence from the

agreement." Id. at *10 (citing United Steelworkers v. Enter.

Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). The court

found that the RODs in this case satisfied this "circumscribed

level of review" and that enforcement was therefore warranted. Id.

II.

This court has previously recognized that ROD opinions,

issued under the authority of the NBCWAs, are arbitration

awards. See, e.g., Upshur Coals Corp. v. UMWA, Dist. 31,

933 F.2d 225, 227-28 (4th Cir. 1991). And arbitration awards

are entitled to considerable deference. United Paperworkers

Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). As the

Supreme Court has instructed: "Collective-bargaining agreements commonly provide grievance procedures to settle disputes between union and employer with respect to the

interpretation and application of the agreement and require

binding arbitration for unsettled grievances. In such cases, . . .

courts play only a limited role [in] review[ing] the decision of

an arbitrator." Id.

Under this standard, we must uphold a ROD so long as it

"draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement"

and is not merely the arbitrator’s "own brand of industrial jusPARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL 7

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tice." Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.

593, 597 (1960). "[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably

construing or applying the contract and acting within the

scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed

serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Misco,

484 U.S. at 38; see also Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem.

& Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir.

1996). 

Power Mountain contends, however, that the RODs must

be overturned, either because they do not deserve the usual

deferential review or because they do not survive it. In

appealing the district court’s ruling, Power Mountain asserts

several grounds of error. We address each in turn. 

A.

Power Mountain begins by arguing that the standard of

review generally applicable to arbitration awards does not

apply here, at least not to the precise question of whether

Power Mountain was plaintiffs’ last signatory employer. As to

this issue, Power Mountain contends there was an impermissible delegation. According to Power Mountain, the 1993 Trustees had an arbitral duty to decide the last-signatory-employer

issue, and their referral of the issue to the 1974 Trustees therefore constituted an abdication of their authority as arbitrators.

Under these circumstances, Power Mountain suggests that the

last-signatory-employer designation is entitled to "no deference."2

2Power Mountain also appears to argue that even if the 1993 Trustees

were permitted to consult the 1974 Trustees on the last-signatoryemployer issue, their decision to do so removed the issue from the context

of arbitration altogether—and hence from the standard of review applicable to arbitration decisions. But the ROD process fully contemplates the

1974 Trustees deciding the issue of last signatory employer. The 1974

Trustees’ ruling and the 1993 Trustees’ decision to adopt it are themselves

part of the arbitration decision to which we must defer. 

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We find this argument unpersuasive. Reviewing questions

of a labor arbitrator’s authority de novo, Mountaineer, 76 F.3d

at 608, we see nothing improper about the 1993 Trustees’

choice to request and accept the 1974 Trustees’ decision on

the singular issue of whether Power Mountain was plaintiffs’

last signatory employer. 

"The parties bargained for arbitration . . . and were free to

set the procedural rules for arbitrators to follow if they chose."

Misco, 484 U.S. at 39. Here, by signing the 1998 NBCWA,

Power Mountain opted to give the 1993 Trustees considerable

leeway as arbitrators. Article XX(e)(5) of the 1998 NBCWA

imbues the 1993 Trustees with complete authority to resolve

disputes in "final and binding" decisions and further permits

them, without limitations, to "develop procedures for the resolution of such disputes." Nothing in the agreement constrains

their ability to consult the 1974 Trustees. 

In fact, the 1993 Trustees’ decision to enlist the advice of

the 1974 Trustees was fully contemplated by the collective

bargaining agreements in place. Several provisions support

this conclusion. As the 1993 Trustees noted in their RODs,

Article XX(g) of the 1998 NBCWA assigns to the 1974 Trustees the task of "promptly investigat[ing] and determin[ing]

the eligibility or ineligibility of any beneficiary whose right to

receive benefits from the Trusts has been challenged by . . .

any Employer." Moreover, Article VIII(B)(13) of the 1974

Pension Plan cloaks the 1974 Trustees with the "further powers contained in" the ROD provision of the 1998 NBCWA,

thereby indicating that the 1974 Trustees’ responsibilities do

not necessarily cease once the ROD process begins. Finally,

and importantly, Article VIII(A) of the 1974 Pension Plan

vests in the 1974 Trustees a "full and final determination"

power as to "all issues concerning eligibility for benefits."

This court has repeatedly recognized that this provision

imparts broad discretionary authority to the 1974 Trustees.

See Sargent v. Holland, 114 F.3d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1997);

Lockhart v. UMWA 1974 Pension Trust, 5 F.3d 74, 77 (4th

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Cir. 1993); Boyd v. Trs. of UMWA Health & Ret. Funds, 873

F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Baker v. UMWA Health

& Ret. Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1991). 

Power Mountain, however, responds that the 1974 Trustees

were given the power only to determine eligibility for pension

benefits, not health benefits. This argument is unavailing.

Whatever allure such a bright-line distinction between pension and health benefits might have in theory, it breaks down

in practice where, as here, issues of pension and health benefits are so intimately related that they are impossible to untangle. In this case, for example, Power Mountain’s liability for

health benefits depended on plaintiffs’ eligibility for pension

benefits. Only if the settlement agreements constituted "back

pay" warranting "credited service" did plaintiffs become entitled to a pension, and only if they were entitled to a pension

could they collect health benefits from their last signatory

employer. In addition, Power Mountain’s status as last signatory employer for health-benefits purposes depended on plaintiffs’ last day of "credited service" for pension eligibility

purposes. 

Moreover, the 1993 Trustees themselves decided the larger

issue of whether Parsons and Boothe were eligible for health

benefits, calling upon the 1974 Trustees’ expertise only as to

a solitary, narrow question. Power Mountain’s status as last

signatory employer was but a small piece of the healthbenefits puzzle. To support its ultimate conclusion that Power

Mountain was responsible for plaintiffs’ health benefits, the

1993 Trustees needed to first establish that plaintiffs were

entitled to health benefits at all. They therefore addressed

whether plaintiffs met the service hours and age requirements,

determined the effective dates of eligibility, and identified the

agreements to which Power Mountain was a signatory. Far

from simply handing over their duties, the 1993 Trustees

retained for themselves several crucial aspects of Parsons and

Boothe’s claims. Thus, because the 1993 Trustees performed

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their arbitral role consistently with the ROD procedure under

the 1998 NBCWA, their ROD opinions warrant deference. 

B.

Power Mountain next argues that the district court erred in

enforcing the RODs because the 1993 Trustees are not neutral

arbitrators. Under the collective bargaining agreements, the

1993 Benefit Plan, which the 1993 Trustees administer, is

obligated to pay the benefits of any retired employees whose

last signatory employer is out of business. If the 1993 Benefit

Plan decided that Pehem rather than Power Mountain was

Parsons and Boothe’s last signatory employer, the 1993 Benefit Plan would have had to pay their benefits, inasmuch as

Pehem was out of business. Power Mountain contends that

this conflict of interest warrants overturning the RODs. In

support, it relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2346

(2008), which held that when an employer administers an

employee benefit plan, both "determin[ing] whether an

employee is eligible for benefits and pay[ing] benefits out of

its own pocket," there is a conflict of interest that "a reviewing court should consider . . . in determining whether the plan

administrator has abused its discretion." See also Firestone

Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). 

Under Glenn, however, a conflict of interest is simply one

factor among many to be weighed, Glenn, 128 S.Ct. at 2351-

52, and by no means compels reversal. We also note that the

conflict in Glenn was weighed in the context of a court’s

abuse of discretion review, id. at 2346, while any potential

conflict in this case would be considered in the context of the

even more forgiving standard of review for arbitration decisions. 

And this case is also quite different from Glenn. The conflict of interest Glenn envisioned was one in which the plan

administrator had a direct financial stake in eligibility deterPARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL 11

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minations, where "every dollar provided in benefits is a dollar

spent by . . . the employer; and every dollar saved . . . is a dollar in [the employer’s] pocket." Id. at 2348 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Here, by contrast, the 1993 Benefit

Plan suffers no economic hardship when the 1993 Trustees

award additional benefits. It is funded by multiple employers,

who pay a defined contribution regardless of what benefits are

awarded. See 1998 NBCWA, Art. XX(d). If benefits are not

awarded, those funds remain for future claims. And if funds

run out, benefits are simply modified so that the only detriment accrues to the employees who would otherwise receive

greater benefits from the 1993 Benefit Plan. See 1998

NBCWA, General Description. In an analogous situation, this

court held that the trustees of a "fully funded, defined-benefit

plan" had no conflict of interest, even though they made benefits determinations that stood to save or cost the plan "substantial sums." De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1191

(4th Cir. 1989). "That plan administrators’ decisions have had

a favorable impact on the balance sheet of the trust itself . . .

suggests no ‘conflict of interest.’" Id.; see also Manny v. Cent.

States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension & Health & Welfare

Funds, 388 F.3d 241, 242-43 (7th Cir. 2004) (same).

Furthermore, while we acknowledge that a court must

account for a conflict of interest even where a "settlor . . .

approves a trustee’s conflict," see Glenn, 128 S.Ct. at 2349,

we do not think it irrelevant that the 1993 Trustees’ role here,

despite any possible conflict of interest, was approved by,

among others, Power Mountain itself. As a signatory to the

1998 NBCWA, Power Mountain designated the 1993 Trustees as arbitrators, knowing that they would both play a role

in eligibility determinations and act on behalf of a trust

affected by those determinations. As the district court

explained, "it was precisely this framework which defendant

bargained for in entering into the agreement." Parsons v.

Power Mountain Coal Co., 2009 WL 899457, at *10 (S.D.W.

Va. Mar. 31, 2009). 

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C.

Finally, Power Mountain contends that even if the very limited judicial review applicable to arbitration awards were to

apply, the two RODs in this case must be overturned because

they fail to "draw [their] essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.,

363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Its primary argument is that actual

employment is necessary for the purposes of the lastsignatory-employer inquiry. Power Mountain insists it cannot

possibly be plaintiffs’ last signatory employer because it

never employed them to perform any actual work. 

Whatever the intuitive appeal of this claim, it is plainly

unsupported by the language of the various collective bargaining agreements, which make no distinction between constructive and actual employment for purposes of benefits

eligibility. Under Article I(A)(12) of the 1974 Pension Plan,

"credited service" is granted both for hours an employee actually worked and for "back pay" hours an employee should

have worked and been compensated. In addition, such "credited service" is used to determine a miner’s last signatory

employer, regardless of whether that "credited service" arose

from actual or constructive hours.

In case there was any doubt, the 1974 Trustees clarified

these rules in a set of guidelines unambiguously entitled

"Guidelines for Awarding Pension Credit Based on Back Pay

Awards or Settlement Agreements," which were created specifically "to clarify the types of awards or settlements that

may qualify for back pay pension credit." These Guidelines

recognize that settlement agreements may count as "back pay"

awards of "credited service" and, further, that a miner might

be "entitled to back pay because an employer failed to properly hire him off a recall panel." 

In the arbitration context as well, the 1993 Trustees have

previously acknowledged in RODs that settlements may lead

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to "credited service," which may in turn trigger an employer’s

liability for health benefits. See RODs Nos. 81-422; 81-466;

81-632. The 1993 Trustees themselves summarized their precedent as standing for the proposition that "an Employee

awarded backpay from an employer for a particular period

shall be considered to have ‘worked’ for the employer and is

therefore entitled to health benefits coverage on the basis of

such constructive employment." ROD No. 84-588. 

Stated bluntly, it is unremarkable that Power Mountain

could become plaintiffs’ last signatory employer without

employing them to perform actual work. It is charged with

knowledge of the agreements to which it subscribed. As a

sophisticated actor operating in the context of a transparent

contractual scheme, Power Mountain may not now complain

that it was unaware that the settlement agreements could trigger its responsibility to unknown employees for health benefits.

Alternatively, Power Mountain makes the argument that

even if constructive employment may suffice in some cases,

there was no constructive employment in this particular case.

In Power Mountain’s view, the settlement agreements here

are inadequate to justify an award of "credited service"

because they do not contain the words "back pay," which are

necessary to signal Power Mountain’s intention to compensate plaintiffs for constructive employment.

To be sure, a settlement agreement generally counts as

"back pay" only if the parties intend it to, and including the

terms "back pay" within the agreement’s text may be the surest way to manifest that intention. See Francis v. Rodman

Local Union 201 Pension Fund, 367 F.3d 937 (D.C. Cir.

2004); ROD No. 84-588. These magic words, however, are

not the exclusive method for conveying such an intent. As the

1974 Trustees’ Guidelines make explicit, "[i]t is preferred that

the words ‘back pay’ be included in the award or [settlement]

agreement, but it is not mandatory." Rather, what is important

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is simply that it be "clear from the text of the agreement that

the intent is to provide an individual with payment for lost

wages."

We cannot say that the RODs here must be reversed merely

because they permitted the 2002 and 2003 settlement agreements to constitute "back pay" in the absence of that exact

phrase. Under the deferential standard of review applicable to

arbitration awards, we cannot perform so probing an inquiry

into the RODs’ merits as to scrutinize factual evidence of the

parties’ intent dating back to 2002 and 2003. It is more than

enough to observe that a finding of such intent is not implausible here. For one thing, the language of the 2003 settlement

agreement expressly acknowledges that the settlement sum is

intended "to pay 300 hours of back wages . . . for the bargaining unit performed by contractors/supervisors." In context,

"back wages" seems to hold an identical meaning to the term

of art "back pay": compensation for hours that a miner ought

to have worked. Moreover, the genesis of the grievances, and

indeed the whole reason for the settlement agreement, was a

claim by the miners that they were entitled to hourly pay for

the work performed by the non-union contractors. The RODs

in this case thus survive the requisite circumscribed review.

D.

The "reasons for insulating arbitral decisions from judicial

review are grounded in the federal statutes regulating labormanagement relations," which "reflect a decided preference

for private settlement of labor disputes." Misco, 484 U.S. at

37 (citing the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29

U.S.C. § 173(d)). As this court has recognized, "[b]y submitting a dispute to arbitration, labor and management can secure

a decisive resolution of their differences without the delay

inherent in litigation or the disruption of a strike or lockout,"

and "arbitration can succeed in achieving these goals only to

the extent it is accorded finality by the judiciary." Richmond,

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Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transp. Commc’ns

Int’l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992). 

Among other things, by enforcing arbitration decisions as

a presumptive matter, courts promote consistency in the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. See Sargent v.

Holland, 114 F.3d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1997). The 1998 NBCWA

must be interpreted consistently with federal statutes regulating the coal industry and with the industry trusts and

employer plans that function under it. Determining benefits

eligibility under these interlocking provisions puts a premium

on the experience gained by trustees who deal with the plans

day-in and day-out. See id. Of course, there remains the ultimate check of judicial review, but its purpose is to support,

not to supplant, reasonable arbitration decisions. By casually

replacing the 1993 Trustees’ judgment with our own, we risk

making a complete hash of a collective bargaining scheme

that profoundly affects the coal industry and all who depend

upon it.3 Accordingly, we decline to overturn the RODs in this

case and affirm the judgment of the district court. 

AFFIRMED

3Power Mountain also argues that the disclaimer in the 2002 settlement

agreement, which states that the agreement is not to be used as a precedent

for future cases, prohibits use of the agreement for purposes of establishing responsibility for plaintiffs’ health benefits. Power Mountain, however, failed to raise this objection in the ROD process, and the argument

is therefore waived. In any event, Power Mountain’s argument is foreclosed by Dist. 29, United Mine Workers of America v. New River Co.,

842 F.2d 734 (4th Cir. 1988). As compared to the comprehensive release

in the settlement agreement there, id. at 735, the settlement here was, as

the district court noted, "absolutely perfunctory." Parsons v. Power Mountain Coal Co., 2009 WL 899457, at *11 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2009).

Additionally, unlike the employees in New River, Parsons and Boothe did

not sign the agreement in this case or even know about its existence at the

time it was signed. 

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