Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03134/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Patrick Ross
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

PUBLISH Tenth circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 1 0 1990 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN PATRICK ROSS 1 also known 

as JON P. ROSS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-3134 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE·DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. NO. 89-10066-01) 

Clerk 

Geary N. Gorup, Law Office of Leslie F. Hulnick, P.A., Wichita, 

Kansas, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant. 

Lee Thompson, United States Attorney (Lanny D. Welch and Robin 

Fowler, Assistant u.s. Attorneys, with him on the brief), Wichita, 

Kansas, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

John Patrick Ross, a/k/a Jon P. Ross, was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l), 

and two counts of carrying a firearm in relation to a drug 

trafficking crime, 18 u.s.c. S 924(c). Ross appeals his convictions and sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

Appellate Case: 90-3134 Document: 01019656372 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 1 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In April, 1989, a confidential informant told Sedgwick County 

Sheriff's Detective Robert Benton that an individual named "Jon" 

was distributing large amounts of cocaine in Wichita, Kansas. The 

informant told Benton that Jon sold cocaine from his home and at 

work. Jon worked at Honeywell Aerospace, and made sales in the 

parking lot there, from his 1986 silver Honda Accord. The informant had witn~ssed and participated in drug sales at Jon's home and 

in Honeywell's parking lot. Finally, the informant had seen Jon 

carry a briefcase containing several small boxes with varying 

amounts of prepackaged cocaine. Through further investigation, 

Benton discovered that a Jon P. Ross resided in Wichita, worked at 

Honeywell, and drove a 1986 silver Honda Accord. 

In June, 1989, Benton was introduced, through another confidential informant, to Elizabeth Pierce and Paula Belew~ and purchased cocaine from them. Pierce told Benton that her supplier's 

name was Jon. 1 On July 6, Benton contacted Pierce to purchase 

some cocaine. Pierce told Benton she would go to her supplier for 

the cocaine. Benton and another detective set up surveillance of 

the Honeywell parking lot. They observed Pierce drive into the 

lot, and Ross exit the Honeywell building and go to his 1986 

silver Honda Accord. Ross reached into the passenger side of his 

car, and then walked to Pierce's car and leaned inside. Pierce 

left the parking lot, and, approximately ten minutes later, met 

with Benton and sold him cocaine. 

1 Benton believed that Jon also supplied Belew because the 

cocaine she sold him was similar to Pierce's in its packaging, quality, and texture. 

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Benton attempted a similar purchase a week later. Pierce 

told Benton she had spoken with Jon and would go pick up some 

cocaine. En route, Pierce detected that she was being followed 

and pulled over and made a telephone call. She returned to the 

meeting place with Benton, told him she was being followed and had 

called Jon and could not pick up the cocaine. 

On July 19, Benton again set up surveillance of the Honeywell 

parking lot. On four occasions that day Benton observed cars 

enter the parking lot and stop at Ross's Honda. Each time, Ross 

exited the building, went first to his car, and then briefly to 

the other person's car. 

Two days later, on the basis of affidavits by Benton, a judge 

issued search warrants for Ross's car and his house. That afternoon, as officers went to Ross's house to execute the warrants, 

they encountered Ross in his car and a high-speed chase ensued. 

At one point, Ross jumped from his car and fled on foot. An 

officer apprehended Ross in a nearby field and placed him under 

arrest. Ross was carrying a brown paper sack. Ross and the sack 

were searched incident to the arrest and the officers found four 

checkbook boxes containing packets of cocaine, $1,769.00, two 

address books with names, dates, quantities and dollar figures, 

$132.00 worth of food stamps, and twelve personal checks. Inside 

the Honda, officers found another address book, and in the trunk 

they found a pocket scale and a loaded Smith & Wesson .38 caliber 

revolver. 

In searching Ross's house officers found, among other items, 

drug paraphernalia, more cocaine, and two more guns--an Uzi .9 mm 

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pistol and a loaded Ruger .9 rnm semi-automatic pistol. The 

combined net weight of all the cocaine seized from Ross was 

approximately 328 grams. 

I. 

Ross contends the district court improperly denied his motion 

to suppress the evidence obtained from his house and car. He 

specifically argues that the court should have held an evidentiary 

hearing to determine the factual truthfulness of the affidavits 

supporting the search warrants. 2 

"When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the district court's factual findings unless they 

are clearly erroneous." United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 

444 (lOth Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Berryhill, 880 F.2d 

275, 280 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 853 (1990)). 

"The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the fourth 

amendment ••• is a question of law which we review de novo." 

United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d at 444 (citing United States v. 

McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 672 (lOth Cir. 1989)). 

The legal standard for determining if a defendant is entitled 

to an evidentiary hearing to examine the factual truthfulness of 

an affidavit was set forth in Franks v. Deleware, 438 u.s. 154 

(1978). 

There is, of course, a presumption of validity with 

respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant. 

2 The parties submit 

assert Fourth Amendment 

considered Ross's claim 

so do we. 

arguments regarding Ross's standing to 

rights. However, the trial court 

on the merits, see R. Vol. III at 25, and 

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To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's 

attack must be more than conclusory and must be 

supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. 

There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of 

reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations 

must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should 

point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be 

accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of 

witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. Allegations of negligence or 

innocent mistake are insufficient. The deliberate 

falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is 

permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of any 

nongovernmental informant. Finally, if these requirements are met, and if, when material that is subject of 

the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one 

side, there remains sufficient content in the warrant 

affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no 

hearing is required. 

Id. at 171-172. 

Ross alleged in his Motion to Suppress that Benton's 

affidavits deliberately or recklessly contained false statements. 

See R. Vol. I at Tab 12. The motion specifically alleged that 

Benton's affidavit supporting the first search warrant3 (for 

Ross's car) was false in three ways. First, it falsely stated 

that the first confidential informant told Benton "that a Jon was 

distributing large amounts of cocaine from his residence and from 

his 1986 Honda Accord, silver in color bearing Kansas .registration 

tag CXZ 363 with VIN JHMBA5429GC003999." Ross argues that no 

informant would possess or recite this sort of detailed information, especially the vehicle identification number (VIN). Second, 

the affidavit similarly misquoted the informant by stating 

"[a]ffiant was told Ross carried a briefcase .•• " Ross argues 

3 Ross made no specific allegations of falsity in the affidavit 

supporting the second warrant (for Ross's house). 

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that since the informant did not know "Jon"'s last name, the 

informant could not have said "Ross" carried a briefcase. Third, 

the issuing magistrate was further misled because he was not 

informed that the confidential informants had admitted guilt and 

were under threat of prosecution when they provided their 

information. 

These allegations do not meet the preliminary showing of 

material falsity required by Franks. Ross submits no affidavits 

and no witnesses (besides asking to cross-examine Benton). The 

two false statements Ross identifies are more consistent with 

negligent inaccuracies than deliberate or reckless misrepresentations. See United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 933-34 

(lOth Cir. 1990). Moreover, neither of them is material. 

Excising the informant's mention of the license plate and VIN of 

Ross's car, and the reference to any last name in the description 

of how "Jon" carried a briefcase, the affidavit still contains a 

wealth of information supporting probable cause. See United 

States v. Barrera, 843 F.2d 1576, 1580-81 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 488 u.s. 859 (1988). The critical aspects of the first 

informant•s4 account were corroborated by Benton's personal 

surveillance: a man named "Jon" did work at Honeywell and did 

appear to be selling drugs from a silver 1986 Honda Accord. That 

man was Jon Ross, and the car's VIN was JHMBA5429GC003999. 

Ross's third alleged falsehood is pure innuendo. The record 

contains no evidence revealing the identity of the confidential 

4 The sole contribution of the second 11 informant" was to 

introduce Benton to Pierce and Belew. 

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informants, and Ross does not attempt to prove his assertion. In 

his brief on appeal, Ross claims that the confidential informants 

were Elizabeth Pierce and Paula Belew. The government denies, and 

demonstrates the absurdity of, this claim: the second 

confidential informant introduced Benton to Pierce and Belew. 

Ross also argues that the informants' statements in both 

affidavits are conclusory, and should (along with any deliberately 

or recklessly false statements) be excised from the affidavits in 

determining whether they established probable cause. This argument misunderstands the relevant inquiry. First, a Franks 

challenge goes to false, not conclusory statements. 5 Second, the 

"deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is 

permitted • . . is only that of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant." United States v. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. 

The district court correctly concluded that it did not need 

to conduct a Franks evidentiary hearing into the integrity of 

Benton's affidavits. 

5 Interpreted liberally, Ross's argument challenges the 

sufficiency, not the integrity, of the affidavits. We review 

magistrates' findings of probable cause, however, with "great 

deference." United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1508 (lOth Cir. 

1988) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 u.s. 213, 236, reh'g denied, 

463 U.S. 1237 (1983)). "A 'fair probability' or a 'substantial 

basis' for believing evidence of a crime will be found at a 

certain location constitutes probable cause." Id. (quoting 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 238). In this case, Benton's 

direct experience alone was sufficient to support probable cause 

to search Ross's car, and arguably his house. Moreover, the first 

confidential informant specifically reported buying drugs at 

Ross's house. This is neither conclusory, nor, given the substantial corroboration of the rest of the informant's story, 

insufficient to support probable cause to search the house. 

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II. 

Ross next challenges the jury instructions. He specifically 

argues that the trial court erred in fai ling to submit three of 

his proposed instructions to the jury. 

"Although a criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction 

regarding his theory of the case, a trial judge is given substantial latitude and discretion in tailoring and formulating the 

instructions so long as they are correct statements of law and 

fairly and adequately cover the issues presented." United States 

v. Bryant, 892 F.2d 1466, 1468 (lOth Cir. 1989) (quoting United 

States v. Pack, 773 F.2d 261, 267 (lOth Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 

110 s.ct. 3220 (1990). 

A party has no vested ·interest in any particular form of 

instructions. The language of the instructions is for 

the court to determine. Challenges which merely pertain 

to the trial judge's language or formulation of the 

charge are reversible only for an abuse of discretion. 

Richards v. Attorneys' Title Guar. Fund, Inc., 866 F.2d 1570, 1573 

(lOth Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. d e nied, 109 S.Ct. 3189 

(1989). 

Ross first alleges that, in regard to the two firearm counts, 

the trial court failed to instruct upon the requisite relation 

between the firearm and the underlying drug offense. 6 Ross 

6 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(1) provides: 

"Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or 

drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug 

trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced punishment if 

committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) 

for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, 

uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment 

provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be 

sentenced to imprisonment for five years .•.. " 

-8-

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argues: 

Instruction No. 14 is nothing less than a slanted, 

biased and prosecution-oriented instruction. In 

Instruction No. 14 the jury is given many various manners by which guilt may be proven, but nothing that 

would distinguish the innocent, inadvertent or coincidental possession of a firearm while committing a 

totally unrelated crime involving drug trafficking. 

Pursuant to No. 14 the jury could convict if they found 

that the "firearm was carried in the vehicle within such 

proximity to make it immediately available for use" even 

if the Defendant had no intent to carry or use such 

weapon in relation to the drug trafficking offense. 

Appellant's Brief at 31. 

This allegation is meritless. In defining "use" and 

"carry,"7 Instruction No. 14 required the jury to find that "the 

firearm was an integral part of [the] criminal undertaking which 

is charged in count one, and the availability of the firearm 

increased the likelihood that this criminal undertaking would 

succeed." R. Vol. II at Tab 29. This accurately states the law. 

See United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 675 (lOth Cir. 

1989). We cannot say the trial court's description of 

§ 924(c)(l)'s nexus requirement was an abuse of discretion. 

Ross next contends that the trial court failed to adequately 

caution the jurors to consider the evidence of the three counts 

independently. He argues this failure "allowed the jury to 

consider the fact that the Defendant had a gun in the trunk of his 

car at the time of his arrest in deciding whether the other 

weapons at the Defendant's home were carried 'in relation to' the 

drug trafficking offense." Appellant's Brief at 33. 

7 A separate instruction on the meaning of "in relation to" is 

not necessary to describe the essential elements of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 924(c)(l). See United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 

(lOth Cir. 1990). 

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This contention ignores Instruction No. 17, which states: 

You are instructed to consider each and every count in 

the indictment as if it were a separate offense charged 

in a separate indictment. Before you can convict the 

defendant on any count of the indictment, you must find 

that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 

each and every element of the offense charged in that 

count. 

R. Vol. II at Tab 29. The instruction Ross desired was given to 

the jury. He has no legal right to his particular wording. 

Finally, Ross challenges the trial court's failure to submit 

his proposed instruction regarding specific intent. He argues 

that the "instruction given by the Court fails to identify for the 

jury the specific intent involved, and allows the jury to speculate as to what. specific intent is alleged in each of the three 

counts • . II Appellant's Brief at 34. 

Again, this argument mischaracterizes the instructions. In 

describing the elements of Count I, Instruction No. 10 states that 

the government must "prove , beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

defendant had in his possession what he knew was cocaine and that 

he intended to deliver it to someone else." R. Vol. II at Tab 29. 

Instruction No. 10 also requires the jury to find, as an element 

of Count I, "[t]hat the acts of defendant were done knowingly and 

intentionally." Id. As for Counts II and III, Instruction No. 13 

requires the jury to find that "defendant knowingly used or was 

carrying a firearm," id., and Instruction No. 14 clarifies that 

"[a)n act is done knowingly if done purposely and voluntarily, as 

opposed to mistakenly or accidentally." Id. Moreover, Instructions 15 and 16 further define and explain specific intent at 

length. 

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Ross's challenges of the jury instructions are wholly without 

merit. The trial court was well within its discretion in submitting the jury instructions that it did. 

III. 

Ross next asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction on the two firearm counts. Since we vacate 

Ross's conviction on Count III on other grounds, ~ section V 

below, we consider only the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the conviction on Count II. 

"Evidence is sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found 

the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United 

States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 1430 (lOth Cir. 1990) (citing 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 890 

(1979)); see also United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 475 u.s. 1128 (1986). The evidence 

"must be substantial; that is, it must do more than raise a mere 

suspicion of guilt." United States v. Brandon, 847 F.2d 625, 630 

(lOth Cir.) (quoting United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 

1455 (lOth Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 488 u.s. 973 (1988). The 

evidence may, however, be wholly circumstantial. United States v. 

Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1529. And it may be consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. ~ at 1530. It is only necessary 

that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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Ross argues that insufficient evidence supports his conviction on Count II because the Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver 

was locked in the trunk, and he did not use it during his encounter with the police. He further argues there was no evidence 

at trial that he brandished or displayed the revolver in connection with his distribution of drugs. 

However, "the cases are unanimous in holding that a defendant 

can 'use' a firearm within the meaning of§ 924(c)(l) without firing, brandishing, or displaying it." United States v. McKinnell, 

888 F.2d at 674-77 (quoting United States v . Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 

29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 166 (1989)). "[T].he 'uses' 

element of section 924(c)(1) is met when the defendant has 'ready 

access' to the firearm and the firearm 'was an integral part of 

his criminal undertaking and its availability increased the 

likelihood that the criminal undertaking would succeed." United 

States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d at 675 (quoting United States v. 

Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir. 1988)). Moreover, "when a 

motor vehicle is used, 'carrying a weapon' takes on a less 

restrictive meaning than carrying on the person. The means of 

carrying is the vehicle, itself, rather than the defendant's hands 

orpocket .... " United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 

1535-36 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 109 s.ct. 3197 (1989). 

Overwhelming evidence demonstrated Ross used his car as a 

base of operations for drug distribution. He kept drugs in his 

car and sold them from ·his car. Paula Belew testified that Ross 

sometimes got the drugs he sold her from the trunk. R. Vol. IV at 

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357-58. Moreover, the police found drug paraphernalia (pocket 

scales) in the trunk with the gun. And the gun was loaded. 

Considering this evidence, and the applicable legal 

standards, the jury could have reasonably found that Ross carried 

the gun with him in his car during and in relation to his drug 

distribution activities. 

IV. 

Ross's final contention is that the district court inappropriately applied the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 

A. 

Ross first argues that he should have received a two point 

reduction in his base offense level for "acceptance of responsibility."8 We review the acceptance of responsibility determination as a question of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. 

United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707 (lOth Cir. 1990). "The 

sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's 

acceptance or [sic] responsibility. For this reason, the 

8 U.S.S.G. § 3El.l states: 

Acceptance of Responsibility 

(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and 

affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal 

conduct, reduce the offense level by 2 levels. 

(b) A defendant may be given consideration under this section 

without regard to whether his conviction is based upon a guilty 

plea or a finding of guilt by the court or jury or the practical 

certainty of conviction at trial. 

(c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a 

sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of right. 

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determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is without 

foundation. " United States v. Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1040 (lOth 

Cir. 1990) (quoting u.s.s.G. § 3El.l, comment. (n.S)). 

Ross argues that the sentencing scheme , as applied, requires 

him to plead guilty to all of the charges against him in order to 

obtain the benefit of a reduction, and this violates his Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment 

right to a jury trial. In support of his argument, Ross claims he 

clearly accepted responsibility for the drug trafficking charge9 

but was denied the reduction because he did not accept responsibility for the firearms charges as well. Thus, he argues, 

"[u]nder the district court-'s interpretation of the acceptance of 

responsibility portions of the Sentencing Guidelines, the only 

manner by which a criminal defendant is entitl ed to any portion of 

the two-point deduction under this section is to plead guilty to 

all charges brought by the prosecutor." 

We disagree. Even if Ross could substantiate his claim 

factually, 10 we have already rejected the constitutional argument. 

"[T]he denial of a downward adjustment under § 3El.l does not 

constitute a penalty or an enhancement of sentence. There is a 

difference between increasing the severity of a sentence for 

9 Ross points to defense counsel's admission in opening argument that Ross was trafficking in cocaine and only wanted to be 

found n o t guilty of the two firearm counts. R. Vol. III at 52. 

10 He doe s not. There is no indication in the record that the 

trial court determined Ross's acceptance was satisfactory for any 

of the three counts. And the trial court neve r indicated its 

finding was in any way related to Ross' pleas of not guilty. 

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failure to demonstrate remorse and refusing to grant a reduction 

from the prescribed base offense level." United States v. Rogers, 

899 F.2d 917, 924-25 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s.ct. 113 

(1990); ~also United States v. Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456, 1460-61 

(lOth Cir. 1990). 

Ross presents no evidence that the trial court's conclusion 

was clearly erroneous. On the contrary, the record contains ample 

evidence that Ross failed to "clearly demonstrate a recognition 

and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his 

criminal conduct." We will not disturb the trial court's finding 

on appeal. 

B. 

Ross also argues that the trial court erroneously relied on 

speculative evidence in determining, under u.s.s.G. § 201.1, the 

appropriate base offense level for the drug conviction (Count I). 

At trial, Ross was convicted of possessing, with intent to 

distribute, 379.03 grams of cocaine. For purposes of sentencing, 

the district court found that Ross had possessed 2,160 grams of 

cocaine. Under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1's Drug Quantity Table, the two 

amounts represent the difference between base offense levels of 26 

and 28. 

In determining the base offense level for a drug offense 

under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing judge is directed 

to aggregate the quantities of drugs "that were part of the same 

course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 

conviction." u.s.s.G. § 1B1.3(a) (2); ~ § 3D1.2(d). The 

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defendant need not have been convicted of trafficking the 

additional quantities. United States v. Boyd, 901 F.2d 842, 844 

(lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1562 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s.ct. 88 (1990). The defendant 

need not even be indicted for trafficking the additional 

quantities. United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 778 (lOth Cir. 

1990) (citing United States v. Ware, 897 F.2d 1538, 1542-43 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 2629 (1990)). 

The prosecution must prove, and connect to the convicted 

offense, the additional quantities by a preponderance of the 

evidence. United States v. Boyd, 901 F.2d at 845; United States 

v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162, 1164 (lOth Cir. 1990). We review the 

district court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous 

standard. United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d at 778. 

Testimony at trial indicated that when Ross was arrested, 

agents found, among other things, two notebooks in the brown paper 

sack Ross was carrying. At trial, and again at the sentencing 

hearing, Detective Benton testified concerning the contents of the 

notebooks. The notebooks had entries in a ledger format; each 

entry began with a name, followed by dates and two sets of successive numbers. The first was a series of fractions such as "oneeighth, one-eighth, one-sixteenth," R. Vol. III at 95, and the 

second set was a running total such as "minus 150, minus 40, minus 

100." Id. at 94. Occasionally there was an additional entry such 

as the word "paid," id. at 97, or the amount "$2,705." Id. at 95. 

At the sentencing hearing, Benton testified he was convinced that 

the entries recorded cocaine sales; the fractions represented 

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portions of grams of cocaine sold to the listed person on the 

listed date. 

Ross points out that the notebooks never indicate that the 

listed fractions represent grams, let alone grams of cocaine. 

Ross charges that Benton's interpretation of the entries is too 

"speculative and conjectural" to meet the prosecution's burden of 

proof. 

We disagree. Benton also testified at the sentencing hearing 

that, with the assistance of an address book found in Ross's·car, 

Benton had contacted over a dozen of ·the entries in the notebook 

and corroborated his theory about the entries. According to 

Benton, nearly a dozen people had admitted that they had purchased 

from Ross the listed amount of cocaine on approximately ~he listed 

date. 

Ross rejoins that, according to Benton's testimony, several 

people in the notebook denied having purchased cocaine, and that 

the entrie s that cannot be proved should not be included in the 

2,160 grams total. 11 But Benton's testimony serves as corroboration not conclusive proof. 12 The government need only show, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that Ross's notebooks are records 

of his cocaine sales. Given the extensive corroborative evidence 

11 Lisa Wiley, for example, is listed as purchasing a total 

419.25 grams. R. Vol. Vat 563. When contacted by Benton, she 

did not admit to purchasing cocaine from Ross. Excluding her 

amount, the resulting total would fall well below 2 kilograms and 

result in a base offense level of 26, instead of 28. See u.s.s.G. 

§ 2D1.1(c) (Drug Quantity Table). 

12 It is more surprising that so many people admitted to 

purchasing the respective amounts of cocaine than that several 

denied ma king the purchases. 

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that they are, we cannot say the district court's finding was 

clearly erroneous. 

v. 

In its brief, the government directs our attention to our 

recent decision in United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). We stated in Henning that "where a defendant has been 

convicted of a single drug trafficking offense and more than one 

firearm was involved, a single violation of§ 924(c)(l) occurs 

.... " 906 F.2d at 1399 (emphasis added); see also United 

States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1317 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. 

denied, 488 u.s. 983 (1988); United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 

943 (6th Cir. 1989). Ross was convicted of a single underlying 

drug offense, and two separate violations of§ 924(c)(l). As both 

parties agree, this is improper. 

We accordingly VACATE the conviction and sentence on count 

III, and REMAND for resentencing. For the reasons stated above, 

we AFFIRM all other aspects of Ross's convictions and sentence. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3134 Document: 01019656372 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 18