Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02337/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02337-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald R. Davis
Appellant
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DONALD R. DAVIS,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2337

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 16-854, Judge Mary J. Schoelen.

______________________ 

Decided: November 4, 2016

______________________ 

DONALD R. DAVIS, Abilene, TX, pro se.

P. DAVIS OLIVER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

ELIZABETH M. HOSFORD; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, JONATHAN 

KRISCH, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Case: 16-2337 Document: 19-2 Page: 1 Filed: 11/04/2016
2 DAVIS v. MCDONALD

Before NEWMAN, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Donald R. Davis appeals from a decision of the United 

States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans 

Court) denying his petition for extraordinary relief in the 

nature of a writ of mandamus. Davis v. McDonald, No. 

16-0854, 2016 WL 1083124 (Vet. App. Mar. 18, 2016), 

adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 2016 WL 2621086 

(Vet. App. May 9, 2016). Because Mr. Davis’ arguments 

fail to raise a non-frivolous legal question and challenge 

only the Veterans Court’s findings of fact and application 

of law to fact, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Davis contends that the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA) improperly denied him educational benefits 

he is owed pursuant to the Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP). Mr. Davis appealed the VA’s 

denial of benefits to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals 

(Board) and was informed on February 13, 2015 that his 

appeal was “formally placed on the Board’s docket.” On 

February 1, 2016, Mr. Davis wrote a letter to the Board 

inquiring about the status of his appeal. Mr. Davis noted 

in his correspondence that it had been nearly a year since 

his appeal was docketed and still no action was taken by 

the Board. Therefore, Mr. Davis concluded that his 

appeal must have lost its place for consideration and 

decision in regular order according to its place upon the 

docket in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 7107(a). Mr. Davis then 

asked if there was any reason why his appeal was not 

being reviewed. He informed the Board that if no response was received within thirty days, he would seek a 

writ of mandamus with the Veterans Court. 

Receiving no response from the Board, Mr. Davis filed 

a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of 

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DAVIS v. MCDONALD 3

mandamus with the Veterans Court on March 1, 2016,

requesting that the Board be compelled to act in a timely 

manner and decide his appeal pursuant to its place on the 

docket. The Veterans Court denied Mr. Davis’ petition on 

March 18, 2016. The court noted the known backlog at 

the Board and acknowledged that an appeal in the VA 

system can be a lengthy process. The court also noted

that the remedy of mandamus is reserved for “extraordinary situations” and delay alone is not a valid basis to 

justify the drastic remedy of an extraordinary writ. The 

Veterans Court found that Mr. Davis failed to demonstrate that the complained-of delay in processing his 

appeal was so extraordinary that it amounted to an 

arbitrary refusal to act. As such, the Veterans Court 

concluded that Mr. Davis did not establish a clear and 

indisputable right to a writ. 

Mr. Davis timely filed a motion for reconsideration or, 

in the alternative, a motion for panel decision. On May 9, 

2016, the panel denied the motion for reconsideration and 

ordered that the March 18, 2016 order would remain the 

decision of the Veterans Court. Mr. Davis then filed a 

motion for full-Court review, which was denied on June 

20, 2016. Mr. Davis now appeals to this court the March 

18, 2016 decision of the Veterans Court denying his 

petition, seeking to invoke our jurisdiction under 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(a). 

DISCUSSION

A 

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Guillory v. Shinseki, 603 F.3d 

981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction over “all 

relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). 

We lack jurisdiction over any “challenge to a factual 

determination” or “challenge to a law or regulation as 

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4 DAVIS v. MCDONALD

applied to the facts of a particular case” absent a constitutional issue. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

This limited jurisdiction extends to our review of the 

Veterans Court’s dismissal of a petition for a writ of 

mandamus. See Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 1154, 1158 

(Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Lamb v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 

1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Specifically, we have jurisdiction “to review the [Veterans Court’s] decision whether to 

grant a mandamus petition that raises a non-frivolous

legal question,” but we cannot “review the factual merits 

of the veteran’s claim.” Beasley, 709 F.3d at 1158 (emphasis added); see also Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 

1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile we can review questions of 

law, we cannot review applications of law to fact.”).

The Veterans Court has the authority to issue extraordinary writs in aid of its jurisdiction pursuant to the 

All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). To obtain mandamus, 

the petitioner must show (1) a clear legal right to relief, 

(2) that there are no adequate alternative legal channels 

through which the petitioner may obtain that relief, and 

(3) that the grant of mandamus relief is appropriate 

under the circumstances. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 

542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004); Hargrove v. Shinseki, 629 

F.3d 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011). But “[t]he remedy of 

mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.” Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 

402 (1976) (citations omitted). The issuance of a writ of

mandamus is “in large part a matter of discretion with 

the court to which the petition is addressed.” Id. at 403. 

B 

On appeal, Mr. Davis contends that the Veterans

Court abused its discretion in denying his petition. 

According to Mr. Davis, the court refused to address, 

interpret, or even identify 38 U.S.C. § 7107(a), which 

requires that the Board consider and decide each case it 

receives “in regular order according to its place upon the 

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DAVIS v. MCDONALD 5

docket.” Mr. Davis does not allege that the Veterans 

Court applied the incorrect legal standard for evaluating 

his petition for a writ of mandamus. Rather, the essence 

of Mr. Davis’ argument is that he has shown a clear legal 

right to relief because his appeal has not been considered 

and decided in regular order according to its place upon 

the docket. In other words, he contends only that the 

application of section 7107(a) to the facts of his case 

establish his entitlement to the writ. But this raises only 

questions of fact and the application of law to facts. 

Resolution of Mr. Davis’ argument does not require 

the interpretation of a statute or regulation. An interpretation of a statute or regulation occurs when its meaning 

is elaborated upon by the court. Graves v. Principi, 294 

F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Forshey v. 

Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) 

(superseded on other grounds by statute, Pub. L. No. 107–

330, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 2820, 2832 (2002))). The Veterans 

Court below did not elaborate on the meaning of any 

statute or regulation, or make a decision on a rule of law. 

Although Mr. Davis argues that the Veterans Court 

somehow misevaluated the law by not considering section 

7107(a) in its analysis, that argument does not raise a 

non-frivolous legal question. There is no evidence that 

the Veterans Court failed to consider section 7107(a) in 

concluding that Mr. Davis failed to establish a clear legal 

right to relief. In any event, consideration of section 

7107(a) was unnecessary because Mr. Davis did not put 

forth any evidence or credible explanation supporting his 

belief that his appeal is not being processed according to 

its place on the docket. Thus, the mere invocation of 

section 7107(a) does not raise a non-frivolous legal question sufficient to establish this court’s jurisdiction. See 

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (explaining that “federal courts are without power to entertain 

claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so 

attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid 

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6 DAVIS v. MCDONALD

of merit, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, plainly 

unsubstantial, or no longer open to discussion”) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED

COSTS

No costs.

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