Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00457/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00457-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald Ray Bailey
Petitioner
Bernie Ellis
Respondent

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28 This information is derived from the petition of writ of habeas corpus, filed by Petitioner. 1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD RAY BAILEY,

Petitioner,

v.

BERNIE ELLIS, Warden

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-0457 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in custody of the Bureau of Prisons at the United States

Penitentiary located in Taft, California, pursuant to a judgment of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Iowa entered on November 15, 1999, following Petitioner’s

guilty plea of various drug related offenses. (Petition, at 3-4.) 

Petitioner indicates that he was sentenced to a total term of 540 months. One of the

charges of which Petitioner pled guilty was a violation of Title 21 of the United States Code

section 841(a)(1), which states, “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally -

(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or

dispense, a controlled substance.” Petitioner indicates that at the time of his sentence, the

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amount of the controlled substance involved in the offense was considered a sentencing factor,

and not an element of the crime, thereby allowing the sentencing court to base its finding on a

preponderance of the evidence standard. (Petition, at 5-6.) 

It appears that Petitioner has filed a direct appeal and motion to vacate, set aside or

correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court and said motion was

denied. 

On April 20, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. Petitioner claims that “First, petitioner has been found guilty and sentenced to

imprisonment under a statute [841(b)(1)(A)] for which he was not charged; and second, that

because of the subsequent interpretation of 841(b) by the circuit court’s, petitioner’s charged

conduct does not meet the elements of the aggravated offense of 841(b), making him actually

innocent of the conviction and sentence under 841(b)(1)(A).” (Petition, at 2.) 

JURISDICTION

A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his

conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988); Thompson v.

Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir.1983); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3rd 1997);

Broussard v. Lippman, 643 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir.1981). In such cases, only the sentencing

court has jurisdiction. Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163. A prisoner may not collaterally attack a federal

conviction or sentence by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2241. Grady v. United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162; see

also United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir.1980). 

In contrast, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that

sentence's execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990); Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122,

1123 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tubwell, 37 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1994); Kingsley v.

Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889,

893-94 (6th Cir. 1991); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States

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v. Hutchings, 835 F.2d 185, 186-87 (8th Cir. 1987). 

In this case, Petitioner is challenging the validity and constitutionality of his sentence

rather than an error in the administration of his sentence. Therefore, the appropriate procedure

would be to file a motion pursuant to § 2255 and not a habeas petition pursuant to § 2241. 

Petitioner concedes this fact. Petitioner admits bringing this petition as a § 2241 petition instead

of a § 2255, because he has already sought relief by way of § 2255. However, a petition

contending Petitioner's sentence is invalid is still a § 2255 petition regardless of what Petitioner

calls the petition. See Brown, 610 F.2d at 677.

In rare situations, a federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 may seek relief

under § 2241 if he can show the remedy available under § 2255 to be "inadequate or ineffective

to test the validity of his detention." United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir.1997)

(quoting § 2255). Although there is little guidance from any court on when § 2255 is an

inadequate or ineffective remedy, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that it is a very narrow

exception. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9 Cir.2003); Pirro, 104 F.3d at 299; Aronson th

v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (a court’s denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render §

2255 inadequate.); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.1988) (a petitioner's fears of bias or

unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 petition inadequate); Williams v. Heritage, 250 F.2d

390 (9th Cir.1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1956). The Ninth Circuit has

provided little guidance on what constitutes “inadequate and ineffective” in relation to the

savings clause. It has acknowledged that “[other] circuits, however, have held that § 2255

provides an "inadequate or ineffective" remedy (and thus that the petitioner may proceed under §

2241) when the petitioner claims to be: (1) factually innocent of the crime for which he has been

convicted; and, (2) has never had an "unobstructed procedural shot" at presenting this claim.”

Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1059-60, citing, Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 954 (9 Cir.2000) (internal

th

citations omitted). The burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or

ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). 

Section 2255 states:

A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section

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2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the

evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the

offense; or

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

Petitioner has not demonstrated that § 2255 provides an "inadequate or ineffective"

remedy. Petitioner’s contention that he has not had an unobstructed chance to raise the instant

challenge because the law was issued subsequent to his prior section 2255 motion, is without

merit. Petitioner has not stated whether he has sought permission from the Eighth Circuit Court

of Appeals to file a successive § 2255 motion. It is possible that the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals would grant such a motion in which case Petitioner would have yet another opportunity

to present his claim in the proper forum. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that he did not have an

“unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting his challenges to the applicable Circuit Court of

Appeals. 

Petitioner’s claim that he is actually innocent of the underlying offense in light of the

Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi, is also without merit. "To establish actual innocence,

petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)

(quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995)). "Actual innocence"

means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. Id. Apprendi relates only to the

applicability of an increased statutory maximum. The Supreme Court in Apprendi held that “any

fact [other than a the fact of a prior conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 506 U.S. 466, 488-490 (2000). Thus, even assuming Apprendi

is applicable to Petitioner’s case, it is insufficient to demonstrate that Petitioner is “actually

innocent” of the crime for which he was convicted. Petitioner’s reliance on Apprendi

demonstrates only that he challenges a legal insufficiency in his conviction. Bousley, 523 U.S. at

623, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (actual innocence requires a showing of factual innocence, not mere legal

insufficiency).

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In any event, even if the petition was allowed to pass through the savings clause, it would

be without merit because Apprendi does not apply to cases on collateral review. Reynolds v.

Cambra, 290 F.3d 1029, 1030 (9 Cir. 2002). Therefore, the petition should be dismissed. th

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DISMISSED because the petition does not allege grounds that would entitle petitioner to relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District

of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)©. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 23, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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