Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05114/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05114-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Ramon Brooks
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

F !LED 

United St1m:s Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

IN THE UNITED STATES .COURT OF APPEALS AUG 2 1991 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) No. 90-5114 

v. ) 

) 

ERIC RAMON BROOKS ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D. C. No. 89-CR-90-C) 

Thomas D. McCormick, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellant Brooks. 

Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, James L. Swartz, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, on the 

briefs for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BRIGHT", Senior Circuit Judge"', and 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Submitted on the briefs. 

*Honorable Myron H. Bright, United states Senior .Circuit Judge for 

the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-5114 Document: 01019630340 Date Filed: 08/02/1991 Page: 1 
Eric Ramon Brooks appeals his conviction and felony sentence 

for possession of cocaine base under 21 u.s.c. § 844(a) (1988) 

(amended 1990). Brooks disputes the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction and the propriety of certain 

prosecutorial questions and comments. He also contends that the 

court erred in sentencing him for a felony. We affirm Brooks' 

conviction, but reverse his felony sentence and remand with 

instructions that Brooks be resentenced for a misdemeanor. 

I. 

The Government indicted Brooks for three drug trafficking 

offenses. In substance, the indictment charged that on March 10-

11, 1989, Brooks and three others conspired to acquire and sell 

three ounces of crack ·cocaine in violation of 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 841(a) (1), 846 (1988). The indictment further charged that the 

group used firearms to protect their operation in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 924(c) (1988) (amended 1990). 

At trial, the Government relied heavily on the testimony of 

Bernard Saunders, an unindicted cooperating witness. Saunders 

worked for a California drug operator who wished to expand 

operations to Tulsa, Oklahoma. The operator sent Saunders to 

Tulsa, where Saunders rented an apartment for use as a drug "safe 

house" and set up a local cocaine distribution ring. Saunders 

maintained that all four alleged conspirators belonged to this drug 

ring. 

In March 1989, the police raided the apartment. During the 

raid, Brooks hid in a closet and, upon discovery, gave a false 

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Appellate Case: 90-5114 Document: 01019630340 Date Filed: 08/02/1991 Page: 2 
name. The police found no cocaine on Brooks, but confiscated 

roughly three ounces of cocaine base from other locations in the 

apartment. The amounts recovered ranged from small chips of 

cocaine base on the kitchen counter to a black nylon bag containing 

thirty-two grams. 

Brooks testified in his own defense. He maintained that he 

met Saunders for the first time while visiting family in Tulsa. 

Brooks claimed that fear motivated his evasive behavior during the 

raid; he denied any involvement with drugs, guns and the other 

defendants. 

At the close of trial, defense counsel requested an 

instruction on the lesser-included offense of simple possession. 

See 21 u.s.c. § 844(a). The court's instruction on simple 

possession contained no mention of drug quantity. The verdict form 

submitted to the jury also lacked any reference to the amount of 

drugs alleged. 

The jury acquitted Brooks of the drug trafficking and firearms 

counts and returned only a general guilty verdict on the lesserincluded offense of simple possession. At senteneing, the court 

determined that Brooks possessed five or more grams of cocaine base 

and therefore imposed the mandatory statutory minimum sentence of 

five years. See 18 u.s.c. § 844(a). 

This appeal followed. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5114 Document: 01019630340 Date Filed: 08/02/1991 Page: 3 
II. 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Brooks first contends that the evidence fails to establish 

his constructive possession of the cocaine in the apartment. To 

constructively possess contraband, a person must knowingly hold 

the power and ability to exert control over it. United States v. 

Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987). Constructive 

possession can be established by circumstantial evidence and may 

be joint among several individuals. Id. at 882. 

We cannot agree with Brooks that the evidence demonstrates 

only his misfortune to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. 

Although a permissible view, the facts also reveal that the 

apartment contained openly visible cocaine and that Brooks 

attempted to conceal both his presence and identity from police. 

Additionally, the jury heard Saunders' testimony that Brooks 

participated in prior acts of cocaine distribution. In our view, 

these factors entitled the jury to draw the less favorable 

inference that Brooks constructively possessed the cocaine found 

in the apartment. 

B. Prosecutorial Comments 

Brooks contends that the prosecutor improperly made and 

elicited comments about his post-arrest silence. The dispute 

arises from the prosecutor's attempt to discredit Brooks' testimony 

that during the raid, Officer Chris Witt took Brooks into a back 

room and beat him. The prosecutor asked Brooks whether he had 

reported the beating to anyone, including the police. The 

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Appellate Case: 90-5114 Document: 01019630340 Date Filed: 08/02/1991 Page: 4 
prosecutor then asked four police officers whether Brooks had ever 

mentioned the beating to them. Finally, the prosecutor argued to 

the jury in closing: 

Not one of [the police officers) took any evidence or 

statements from [Brooks] afterwards that anybody had laid 

a hand on him and more than that, ladies and gentlemen, 

Chris Witt wasn't in there by himself doing this, Officer 

Davis was in there with him, he said, the whole time when 

this defendant was advised of his rights and he never saw 

Chris Witt lay a hand on him. 

Tr. at 388. 

Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's closing 

remarks and objected to the prosecutor's line of questioning only 

once. On .that occasion, the court responded by instructing the 

jury to totally disregard any statements about Brooks' post-arrest 

silence. The court further explained that Brooks had a right to 

refuse to talk with the police and that no negative inferences 

could be drawn from his exercise of such privilege. 

We deem it unnecessary to determine whether the prosecutor's 

questions or closing remarks were intended, or would be understood, 

as a comment on Brooks' right to remain silent. See United States 

v. Morales-Ouinones, 812 F.2d 604, 613 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting 

United States v. Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1984)). 

Rather, we think that various factors rendered any potential 

prejudice harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States 

v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982). Most 

significantly, the court gave a prompt curative instruction upon 

defense counsel's objection. This instruction both told the jury 

to disregard objectionable statements and informed the jury that, 

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Appellate Case: 90-5114 Document: 01019630340 Date Filed: 08/02/1991 Page: 5 
as a rule, post-arrest silence could not be considered. Moreover, 

the prosecutor's inquiry focused not on Brooks' silence in regard 

to the charges against him, but on the collateral issue of police 

conduct following arrest. Cf. United States v. Kaye, 779 F.2d 

1461, 1463-65 (10th Cir. 1985) (prosecutor may point out 

defendant's lack of cooperation to rebut allegation that government 

agent mishandled investigation), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 

(1986). Thus, under the circumstances, we remain confident that 

the jury did not consider Brooks' post-arrest silence as probative 

on the issue of guilt or innocence. 

c. vouching for Witnesses 

The alleged beating also gives rise to Brooks' contention that 

the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the 

Government's witnesses. See United states v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 

1498 (10th Cir. 1990). The prosecutor argued in closing to the 

jury that, with respect to the allegations of violence, "I wouldn't 

sponsor a witness like that, who would do that to a defendant." 

Tr. at 389. 

We agree that the statement constituted improper vouching. 

Nevertheless, our review remains limited to plain error because 

Brooks failed to object at trial. See Bowie, 892 F.2d at 1498. 

We see no manifest need for reversal here, given the collateral 

nature of the police misconduct issue. 

D. Sentencing Consideration 

Brooks contends that the jury, not the court, must determine 

the amount of cocaine he possessed. We agree. The facts of this 

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case are identical to those in United States v. Puryear, No. 90-

5115, filed contemporaneously with this opinion. 1 In Puryear, we 

held that drug quantity constitutes an essential element of simple 

possession under section 844(a). Slip op. at 3-6. Here, the jury 

received no instruction on the necessity of determining drug 

quantity. Moreover, the jury acquitted Brooks of the indictment 

charges which arguably specified a three ounce quantity. 2 

Consequently, the Government failed to prove that the jury resolved 

the drug quantity element in its favor. Absent such proof, Brooks 

stands convicted only of a misdemeanor and must be sentenced 

accordingly. Id. at 6. 

III. 

We affirm Brooks' conviction for possession of cocaine base, 

but reverse his felony sentence and remand with instructions that 

Brooks be resentenced for a misdemeanor. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Indeed, Brooks and Puryear were co-defendants in the instant 

case. 

2 

In contrast to simple possession, drug trafficking offenses 

treat drug quantity as a sentencing consideration, not an element 

for the jury. See United States v. Jenkins, 866 F.2d 331, 333-35 

(10th cir. 1989). Thus, in a drug trafficking case, the jury can 

convict upon finding an intent to distribute any discernable amount 

of controlled substance. See id. at 334. Because the indictment 

here charged only drug trafficking, and not simple possession, no 

inference can be drawn that the jury considered Brooks guilty of 

possessing the quantities charged by the indictment. 

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