Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04374/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04374-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Price
Respondent
Joseph D. Turner
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH D. TURNER,

Petitioner,

v.

J. PRICE, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-04374-JST (PR) 

ORDER ON INITIAL REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Joseph D. Turner, a prisoner at Deuel Vocational Institution, filed a pro se petition for writ 

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His petition is now before the Court for review 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. He has paid 

the $5.00 filing fee.

BACKGROUND

Turner's petition discloses that he was convicted in Contra Costa County Superior Court of 

first degree robbery, first degree burglary, false imprisonment, and criminal threats. He was 

sentenced to seven years in state prison. He appealed; his conviction was affirmed by the 

California Court of Appeal and his petition for review was denied by the California Supreme 

Court in 2014. Turner reports that he did not file any state habeas petitions before filing this 

action.

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DISCUSSION

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A 

district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall "award the writ or issue 

an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it 

appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28 

U.S.C. § 2243. Summary dismissal is appropriate only where the allegations in the petition are 

vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently frivolous or false. See Hendricks v. 

Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Turner asserts the following claims in his petition: (1) the trial court erroneously denied his 

motion to represent himself brought pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 896 (1975); (2) he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations; (3) the prosecutor committed 

discovery violations; (4) the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that one of the victims had 

been granted immunity in exchange for his testimony; (5) the trial court erroneously allowed a late 

amendment to the information; and (6) judicial bias violated petitioner's rights to a fair trial and 

due process. 

There is an exhaustion problem which requires Turner's further attention before the Court 

can determine whether to order a response from respondent. Turner admits that some of his 

claims have not been presented to any other court. (Petition at 5, 10.) Therefore, Turner's petition 

contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims and is what is referred to as a "mixed" petition. 

See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). The court cannot adjudicate the merits of a 

habeas petition containing any claim as to which state remedies have not been exhausted, such as a 

mixed petition. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).

Although petitioner does not specifically identify which claims are unexhausted, it appears 

that Claim 6 has not been presented to any other court. The Court has compared the opinion of the 

California Court of Appeal on direct review with the petition to determine whether all the claims 

in the latter were included in the former. Turner did not assert a judicial bias claim in the state 

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court.

It also appears that Claim 2, regarding alleged ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC"), 

was not fully exhausted. Turner admits that he only presented an IAC claim in conjunction with 

his claim regarding the amended information. (Petition at 10.) Specifically, petitioner asserted in 

the state appellate court that his right to counsel was abridged by the late amendment to the extent 

that it rendered counsel ineffective during plea negotiation. See People v. Turner, No. A134275, 

2013 WL 6858128 *13 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2013). The other subparts of the IAC claim appear 

unexhausted.1

Finally, it appears that Claim 3, regarding discovery violations, was not fully exhausted. 

Turner presented to the California Court of Appeal only part of this claim, i.e., that the prosecutor 

failed to produce discovery indicating that one if the victims had identified petitioner prior to the 

show-up. In his petition, petitioner also asserts that the prosecutor concealed discovery evidence 

that the victims were under federal investigation. This latter claim appears unexhausted. 

The Court clarifies that Claim 6 and the parts of Claims 2 and 3 discussed above appear to 

be unexhausted (rather than determines that they are unexhausted) because the record before the 

Court does not show whether petitioner raised the additional claims in his petition for review filed 

in the California Supreme Court. If the additional claims were not presented to the California 

Supreme Court, they are unexhausted, and petitioner should follow the instructions below 

regarding unexhausted claims.

Due to a critical one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas petitions 

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d), the Court is reluctant to dismiss the mixed petition (and possibly cause a later-filed 

petition to be time-barred) without giving Turner the opportunity to elect whether to proceed with 

just his exhausted claims, or to try to exhaust the unexhausted claims before having this court 

consider all his claims. Accordingly, instead of an outright dismissal of the action, the Court will 

 

1

In Claim 2 of the petition, Turner contends that the alleged ineffective assistance "spanned 

various phases" of the plea bargain process. (Petition at 10.)

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allow Turner to choose whether he wants to:

(1) dismiss the unexhausted claims and go forward in this action with only the 

exhausted claims, or 

(2) dismiss this action and return to state court to exhaust all claims before filing a 

new federal petition presenting all of his claims, or 

(3) file a motion for a stay of these proceedings while he exhausts his unexhausted 

claims in the California Supreme Court. 

Turner is cautioned that the options have risks which he should take into account in 

deciding which option to choose. If he chooses option (1) and goes forward with only his 

exhausted claims, he may face dismissal of any later-filed petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). If 

he chooses option (2), dismissing this action and returning to state court to exhaust all claims 

before filing a new federal petition, his new federal petition might be rejected as time-barred. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). If he chooses option (3), he must file a motion in this court to obtain a stay 

and (if the motion is granted) then must act diligently to file in the California Supreme Court, to 

obtain a decision from the California Supreme Court on his unexhausted claim(s), and to return to 

this court. And under option (3), this action stalls: this Court will do nothing further to resolve the 

case while petitioner is diligently seeking relief in state court. 

In Rhines, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the stay-and-abeyance procedure for mixed 

habeas petitions.2 The Court cautioned district courts against being too liberal in allowing a stay 

 

2

There is an alternate stay procedure for a petitioner who has some unexhausted claims he wants 

to present in his federal habeas action, but it often is unhelpful because statute of limitations 

problems may exist for claims that are not sufficiently related to the claims in the original petition. 

Under the procedure outlined in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) overruled on other

grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007), "(1) a petitioner amends his petition 

to delete any unexhausted claims; (2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully 

exhausted petition, allowing the petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the 

deleted claims; and (3) the petitioner later amends his petition and re-attaches the newly-exhausted 

claims to the original petition." King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kelly, 

315 F.3d at 1070-71). A petitioner seeking to avail himself of the Kelly three-step procedure is 

not required to show good cause as under Rhines, but rather must show that the amendment of any 

newly exhausted claims back into the petition satisfies both Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 

(2005), by sharing a "common core of operative facts" and Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 

(2001), by complying with the statute of limitations. King, 564 F.3d at 1141-43.

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because a stay works against several of the purposes of the AEDPA in that it "frustrates AEDPA's 

objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal 

proceeding" and "undermines AEDPA's goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by 

decreasing a petitioner's incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court prior to filing his federal 

petition." Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. A stay and abeyance "is only appropriate when the district 

court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state 

court," the claims are not meritless, and there are no intentionally dilatory litigation tactics by the 

petitioner. Id. at 277-78. Any stay must be limited in time to avoid indefinite delay. Id. 

Reasonable time limits would be 30 days to get to state court, as long as reasonably necessary in 

state court, and 30 days to get back to federal court after the final rejection of the claims by the 

state court. See id. at 278; Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d at 1071. If Turner moves for a stay, he must 

show that he satisfies the Rhines criteria or must comply with the King/Kelly requirements.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner must file, within thirty (30) days of this order, a notice in which he states 

whether he elects to: (1) dismiss the unexhausted claims and go forward in this action with only

the remaining claims, or (2) dismiss this action and return to state court to exhaust all of his claims 

before returning to federal court to present all of his claims in a new petition, or (3) move for a 

stay of these proceedings while he exhausts his state court remedies for the unexhausted claims. If 

he chooses Option (1) or Option (2), his filing need not be a long document; it is sufficient if he 

files a one-page document entitled "Election By Petitioner" and states simply: "Petitioner elects to 

proceed under Option ___ provided in the court's Order On Initial Review." Petitioner would have 

to insert a number in place of the blank space to indicate which of the first two options he chooses. 

If he chooses Option (3), petitioner must file within thirty (30) days of this order, a motion for a 

stay in which he explains why he failed to exhaust his unexhausted claims in state court before 

presenting them to this court, that his claims are not meritless, and that he is not intentionally 

delaying resolution of his constitutional claims. If he wants to file a motion under King/Kelly to 

amend his petition (to delete the unexhausted claim) and to stay this action while he exhausts state 

court remedies for the unexhausted claims, he must do so within thirty (30) days of this order. If 

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petitioner does not choose one of the three options or file a motion by the deadline, the court will 

dismiss the claims that appear unexhausted. If the court is mistaken and the additional claims 

have already been presented to the California Supreme Court, petitioner must so inform the court 

with the thirty (30) day deadline.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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