Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01026/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01026-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michaol Macleacy
Defendant
Larry E. Tombs
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY E. TOMBS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAOL MACLEACY,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-1026 LKK KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action 

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order filed August 30, 2013, plaintiff’s complaint was 

dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint. After receiving an extension of time, plaintiff 

has now filed an amended complaint.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

Case 2:13-cv-01026-LKK-KJN Document 18 Filed 10/11/13 Page 1 of 6
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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 

contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 

factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 

550 U.S. at 555. However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only 

“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’””

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, in turn 

quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, 

the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, id., and 

construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 

232, 236 (1974).

In his amended complaint, plaintiff states that he is not challenging his conviction, but is 

challenging defendant’s role in the robbery of, and damage to, plaintiff’s property. (ECF No. 17 

at 3.) Plaintiff contends that defendant gave plaintiff permission to stay on defendant’s property, 

and that defendant allowed plaintiff’s girlfriend to enter plaintiff’s home while plaintiff was in 

jail, despite plaintiff having told defendant that the girlfriend did not live with plaintiff, and the 

girlfriend unlawfully took plaintiff’s belongings, including plaintiff’s vehicle. (ECF No. 17 at 2.) 

In addition, while plaintiff was in jail, defendant had plaintiff’s trailer towed from the property, 

and had it destroyed. (Id.) Plaintiff now contends that defendant had plaintiff put in jail to get 

plaintiff off defendant’s property. Plaintiff argues defendant violated plaintiff’s due process 

rights.

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However, plaintiff does not allege that defendant’s acts were authorized. As plaintiff was 

previously informed, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee 

does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Thus, where the state provides a meaningful 

postdeprivation remedy, only authorized, intentional deprivations constitute actionable violations 

of the Due Process Clause. An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established 

state procedures, regulations, or statutes. Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 

1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, 

plaintiff contends defendant allowed plaintiff to use defendant’s property, yet took plaintiff’s 

trailer off the property and had it destroyed without plaintiff’s permission. Plaintiff does not state 

that defendant acted according to established state procedures, statutes, or regulations, and fails to 

demonstrate defendant acted under color of state law.

Moreover, to the extent plaintiff seeks relief for alleged criminal acts, such as burglary or 

robbery, such claims are unavailing. The decision to charge an individual with criminal 

violations is solely within the discretion of the district attorney. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 

U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution 

or nonprosecution of another.”); Satler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988) (neither 

member of public at large nor victim has right to have another criminally prosecuted). “It is well 

settled that a private citizen may not use the courts as a means of forcing a criminal prosecution,” 

Johnson v. Wennes, 2009 WL 1228500, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) (citing United States v. 

Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 (1974)), and thus “an individual may not bring criminal charges against 

someone by filing a complaint in this Court,” Wennes, at *4 (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) (private 

individuals lack standing to assert criminal statutes). As no amendment could remedy these 

fundamental flaws, all claims based on the alleged criminal activity of defendant should be 

dismissed with prejudice. See Johnson, 2009 WL 1228500, at *4 (dismissing with prejudice 

private individual's attempt to state criminal claims).

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To the extent that plaintiff now suggests that his arrest was unlawful, in that defendant 

allegedly arrested plaintiff solely for the purpose of getting plaintiff off defendant’s property, it is 

likely that such a claim is barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In 

Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a suit for damages on a civil rights claim 

concerning an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment cannot be maintained absent 

proof that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive 

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck, 512 

U.S. at 486. Under Heck, the court is required to determine whether a judgment in plaintiff’s 

favor in this case would necessarily invalidate his conviction or sentence. Id. If it would, the 

complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction or sentence has 

been invalidated. Here, it appears plaintiff was convicted, and plaintiff includes no allegations 

suggesting that his conviction has been expunged or invalidated. 

Although it does not appear that plaintiff can amend his complaint to state a cognizable 

civil rights claim, in light of plaintiff’s recent release from prison, and his pro se status, the court 

will grant plaintiff one final opportunity to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff should not 

renew his claims concerning defendant’s alleged criminal acts, and should only amend his 

complaint if he can allege facts demonstrating a violation of his civil rights. Thus, plaintiff is not 

obligated to amend the complaint, but may ask the court to voluntarily dismiss his action.

If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how 

the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the second amended complaint must 

allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s 

actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 

F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore,

vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. 

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the 

original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed. 

2. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended 

complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended 

Complaint”; failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order may result 

in the dismissal of this action.

Dated: October 11, 2013

/tomb1026.14am

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY E. TOMBS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAOL MACLEACY,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-1026 LKK KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order

filed______________.

_____________ Second Amended Complaint

or

_____________ Voluntarily dismisses this action.

DATED: 

_____________________________________

___________________________________

Plaintiff

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