Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_07-cv-00080/USCOURTS-ared-5_07-cv-00080-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Johnny Paul Dodson
Plaintiff
Larry Norris
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

JOHNNY PAUL DODSON PETITIONER

vs. Civil Case No. 5:07CV00080 WRW

LARRY NORRIS, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT

CERTIFICATION ORDER

Pursuant to Rule 6-8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the

State of Arkansas, this court certifies to the Supreme Court of

Arkansas a question of law that may be determinative of this case

and as to which it appears there is no controlling precedent in the

decisions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas.

I.

QUESTION OF LAW TO BE ANSWERED

Whether a motion for a belated appeal, as provided for in

Arkansas Criminal Appellate Rule 2(e), of a state circuit court’s

order denying relief under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of

Criminal Procedure is a part of the ordinary appellate review

procedure under Arkansas law.

Case 5:07-cv-00080-BRW Document 26 Filed 11/08/07 Page 1 of 7
1 Petitioner states in his petition that his first direct

appeal was dismissed, but was later reinstated during his first

post-conviction proceedings. This opinion by the Arkansas Supreme

Court is the culmination of the re-instated appeal. 

2

II. 

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Garland County Arkansas

on February 11, 2002, of possession of methamphetamine with intent

to deliver and possession of marijuana. He was sentenced as a

habitual offender to life imprisonment. His convictions and

sentence were affirmed on direct appeal on September 16, 2004,

Dodson v. State, 358 Ark. 372 (2004),1 and rehearing was denied on

October 21, 2004 (Respondent’s Exhibit A). While his direct appeal

was pending, on October 7, 2004, he filed a petition for postconviction relief under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal

Procedure. He filed an amended Rule 37 petition on October 25,

2004, which the trial court denied on January 7, 2005 (See

Respondent’s Exhibit B, p.3). Petitioner’s notice of appeal of the

denial of his Rule 37 motion was filed on February 10, 2005. See

Dodson v. State, 2005 WL 1533576, at *1 (Ark. June 30, 2005). The

Arkansas Supreme Court Clerk refused to accept the record when

tendered because the notice of appeal was untimely. Petitioner

filed a motion for a belated appeal on May 17, 2005 (Respondent’s

Exhibit B), which the Arkansas Supreme Court denied on June 30,

2005. Id. On November 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a state petition

Case 5:07-cv-00080-BRW Document 26 Filed 11/08/07 Page 2 of 7
3

for a writ of habeas corpus, which the state circuit court denied

on January 11, 2006 (Respondent’s Exhibit C). The Arkansas Supreme

Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision on January 11, 2007.

Dodson v. State, 2007 WL 70432 (Ark. January 11, 2007).

Respondent contends the entire petition should be dismissed as

untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which establishes a one-year

limitations period for filing federal habeas corpus petitions under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The relevant triggering date in the present case

is “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “Direct review” includes

review by the United States Supreme Court. Smith v. Bowersox, 159

F.3d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1187

(1999). Thus, a state court judgment becomes final under

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) upon the denial of certiorari or the expiration of

the ninety days allowed for filing such a petition. Nichols v.

Bowersox, 172 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 1999)(en banc). In the

present case, since the petition for rehearing was denied on

October 21, 2004, Petitioner’s conviction became final for

§ 2244(d) purposes on January 19, 2005. 

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the “time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

Case 5:07-cv-00080-BRW Document 26 Filed 11/08/07 Page 3 of 7
4

under this subsection.” However, Petitioner’s entire Rule 37

proceeding in the trial court took place before his conviction

became final, and it had no tolling effect, since the limitations

period does not start to run until a conviction becomes final.

After his convictions became final on January 19, 2005, only a

“properly filed” post-conviction petition could toll the running of

the limitations period. Petitioner argues that his motion for a

belated appeal was a “properly filed” application for postconviction relief or other collateral review, and that it was

sufficient to toll the running of the limitations period, even

though the motion was eventually denied. 

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently recognized that

this issue has appeared in several cases before it, but the court

has not yet addressed it. Lewis v. Norris, 454 F.3d 778, 779 (8th

Cir. 2006). The court has also noted that 

the Supreme Court provided guidance as to how the issue

should be analyzed in Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122

S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002). The Court noted that

“AEDPA's limitations period-with its accompanying tolling

provision ... promotes the exhaustion of state remedies

while respecting the interest in the finality of state

court judgments.” 536 U.S. at ----, 122 S.Ct. at 2138. In

determining whether a particular state appellate

procedure must be exhausted, it is relevant whether “that

review is part of the ordinary appellate review procedure

in the State.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847,

119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). In response to a

question asked at oral argument, the State advises it has

argued that the motion for belated appeal authorized by

Criminal Appellate Rule 2(e) is an appellate procedure

that must be exhausted before seeking federal habeas

relief. But to our knowledge, the Supreme Court of

Arkansas had not declared whether that motion is part of

Case 5:07-cv-00080-BRW Document 26 Filed 11/08/07 Page 4 of 7
5

the “ordinary appellate review procedure” under state

law. Because “it is the State's interests that the

[AEDPA] tolling provision seeks to protect,” Saffold, 536

U.S. at ---- - ----, 122 S.Ct. at 2139-40, it will help

the federal courts in Arkansas apply AEDPA's one-year

statute of limitations in the future if the Supreme Court

of Arkansas further clarifies the role of the Rule 2(e)

motion for belated appeal in Arkansas post-conviction

proceedings.

Wright v. Norris 299 F.3d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 2002). 

If the limitations period was tolled by the filing of the

motion for a belated appeal, the federal habeas corpus petition is

timely. If the limitations period was not tolled, the petition is

not timely. In determining whether or not the limitations period

is tolled, this court must consider the nature of the belated

appeal proceeding under state law. The United States District

Court is therefore presented with an undecided or uncertain

question of Arkansas law that may be determinative of this case.

Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 6-8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court

of the State of Arkansas, this Court certifies the following

question of law to the Arkansas Supreme Court:

Whether a motion for a belated appeal, as provided for in

Arkansas Criminal Appellate Rule 2(e), of a state circuit

court’s order denying relief under Rule 37 of the

Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure is a part of the

ordinary appellate review procedure under Arkansas law.

Case 5:07-cv-00080-BRW Document 26 Filed 11/08/07 Page 5 of 7
6

III.

The United States District Court hereby acknowledges that the

Arkansas Supreme Court, acting as the receiving court, may

reformulate the question presented.

IV.

COUNSEL OF RECORD AND PARTIES

The attorneys of record in the case pending before this court

are as follows:

Attorney for Petitioner, Johnny Paul Dodson

Mr. Jeff Webber

Post Office Box 34111

Little Rock, AR 72203-4111

(501) 607-0262

Attorney for Respondent, Larry Norris

Dustin McDaniel

Attorney General for the State of Arkansas

323 Center Street, Suite 200

Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

(501) 682-2007

Lauren Elizabeth Heil 

Assistant Attorney General for the State of Arkansas

(501) 682-8203

Ark. Bar No. 94-191

V.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to forward this

Order, a copy of the Proposed Findings and Recommendations and the

Case 5:07-cv-00080-BRW Document 26 Filed 11/08/07 Page 6 of 7
7

Order adopting the Proposed Findings and Recommendations to the

Supreme Court of Arkansas under his official seal.

SO ORDERED this 8th day of November, 2007.

 /s/Wm. R. Wilson, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 5:07-cv-00080-BRW Document 26 Filed 11/08/07 Page 7 of 7