Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03004/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tony Angelo Mason
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 13, 2000 Decided December 15, 2000

No. 00-3004

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Tony Angelo Mason,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cr00162-01)

Edward H. Rippey, appointed by the court, argued the

cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Mark H.

Lynch.

Kenneth W. Cowgill, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Mary-Patrice Brown

and John D. Crabb, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Williams and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Tony Angelo Mason appeals his

conviction under 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1) (1994). During his

trial, Mason testified that he found a gun in a paper bag near

a school while he was working as a delivery truck driver. He

claimed that he took possession of the gun only to keep it out

of the reach of the young children at the school, fully intending to give the weapon to a police officer whom he expected to

see later that day on his truck delivery route. A law enforcement officer discovered the gun in Mason's possession, however, before Mason acted on his own to relinquish possession.

Mason was then arrested and subsequently indicted for a

violation of s 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for any

person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a

firearm or ammunition.

At the conclusion of his trial, Mason asked the District

Court to instruct the jury that "innocent possession" was a

defense to the crime charged under s 922(g)(1). The trial

judge denied the request, instructing the jury instead that

"well meaning possession" was not a defense to the

s 922(g)(1) charge. The trial judge instructed the jury that,

so long as he "knowingly possessed" the gun, it did not

matter why Mason had the weapon in his possession. The

jury then returned a verdict of guilty and Mason was subsequently sentenced to 77 months in federal prison.

Mason's principal argument on appeal is that the District

Court erred in refusing to give an "innocent possession"

instruction. The Government concedes that, in certain circumstances, innocent possession may be a defense to a

charge under s 922(g)(1). The Government argues, however,

that such a defense could not succeed on the record in this

case.

We agree that, in appropriate circumstances, a defense of

innocent possession may be asserted in a criminal prosecuUSCA Case #00-3004 Document #563033 Filed: 12/15/2000 Page 2 of 11
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tion that rests on a charged violation of s 922(g)(1). We also

find that, in the instant case, the District Court erred in

refusing to give an innocent possession instruction. Accordingly, we hereby reverse the judgment of the District Court

and remand the case for a new trial.

I. Background

On April 13, 1999, the day of his arrest, Mason was driving

a truck and delivering drinking water for his employer, Snow

Valley. Mason testified that, after making a delivery to a

housing development at 69 L Place, N.W., Washington, D.C.,

and as he was returning to his truck, he came upon a brown

paper bag on the ground and found a gun with ammunition in

it. Trial Transcript at 19 (Aug. 27, 1999) [hereinafter "Tr.

8/27"]. He picked up the bag and took it with him to his

truck. He then took the gun out of the bag, tucked the

weapon into the side of his weight belt, and put the ammunition in his pocket. Tr. 8/27 at 19. Mason testified further

that he picked up the gun "because it was in an area where

there is the school there and there were a lot of children

outside." Tr. 8/27 at 20. According to Mason, he proceeded

to the Library of Congress, which was his next water delivery

stop, where he intended to turn over the gun to a Library of

Congress police officer he knew. Tr. 8/27 at 20-21.

Bobby Henson, a uniformed Library of Congress police

officer, was stationed at the entrance gate adjoining a loading

dock in the Library of Congress building when Mason drove

his Snow Valley truck into the loading dock area. Having

seen Mason before, but not being able to recall Mason's

name, Officer Henson testified that he motioned for Mason to

stop so that he could record his name in the log. Trial

Transcript at 10 (Aug. 26, 1999) [hereinafter "Tr. 8/26"].

Mason testified that he thought the officer was waving him

on, so he did not stop. Tr. 8/27 at 22. After parking his

truck and unloading several bottles of water, Mason continued on towards the dock master's desk, where he signed in

before entering the Library of Congress. Tr. 8/27 at 25.

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Officer Patrick J. Curtis, Jr., who was stationed at a metal

detector approximately ten to fifteen feet away from the dock

master's desk, testified that Mason walked by him on his way

to the dock master's desk. Tr. 8/26 at 27-28, 31. When

Mason leaned over the desk to sign in, Officer Curtis observed what he believed to be the butt of a handgun protruding from Mason's waistband. Tr. 8/26 at 32. Officer Curtis

then approached Mason, visually confirmed that Mason was

carrying a gun, and then ordered Mason to put his hands on

the table in front of him. Officer Curtis detained Mason at

gun point and removed the gun from Mason's waistband. Tr.

8/26 at 34. Mason was subsequently arrested.

On May 13, 1999, a federal grand jury indicted Mason on

one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition

by a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(1). See Indictment, United States v. Mason, Crim.

No. 99-0162 (D.D.C. May 13, 1999), reprinted in Appellant's

Appendix ("App.") at 4. A superceding indictment was filed

on August 24, 1999. See Superceding Indictment, Mason,

Crim. No. 99-0162 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1999), reprinted in App.

at 10.

During Mason's trial on the s 922(g)(1) charge, the prosecutor asked the trial judge to preclude the defense from

trying to introduce evidence that Mason was justified in

possessing the gun. Tr. 8/26 at 116. The prosecutor argued

that, pursuant to authorities such as United States v. Perrin,

45 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1995), the so-called "justification" defense to a felon-in-possession charge under s 922(g)(1) is

available only when (1) the felon or someone else was under

an unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily

injury; (2) the felon did not recklessly place himself in the

situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal

conduct; (3) the felon had no reasonable legal alternative that

would avoid both the criminal conduct and the threatened

death or injury; and (4) there was a direct causal relationship

between the criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened

harm. Id. at 873-74. Defense counsel objected on two

grounds: first, counsel argued that the Government's motion

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was premature, because Mason had yet to present any evidence; second, counsel asserted that Mason intended to rely

on an "innocent possession" defense, not the "justification"

defense. Tr. 8/26 at 116-17. In asserting the innocent

possession defense, Mason's counsel directed the District

Court's attention to Criminal Jury Instructions, District of

Columbia, No. 4.71(B) (4th ed. 1993) ("Redbook"), and to D.C.

Court of Appeals decisions, such as Carey v. United States,

377 A.2d 40, 42-44 (D.C. 1977), and Hines v. United States,

326 A.2d 247, 248 (D.C. 1974), and unspecified federal circuit

opinions, purporting to apply the innocent possession standard. Tr. 8/26 at 117, 119-20.

The District Court denied the Government's motion to

preclude the "justification" defense, finding the motion premature. Tr. 8/26 at 122. On the following day of trial,

Mason then testified, as noted above, that he possessed the

weapon with innocent and good purpose. At the conclusion of

the trial, Mason's counsel made an oral and a written request

for an instruction on the defense of innocent possession. The

proposed instruction was as follows:

Mr. Mason would be not guilty of the offense charged

here if he lacked any criminal purpose in possessing the

weapon and/or ammunition and he possessed the weapon

in an affirmative effort to aid social policy for example:

1) to protect the finder or others from harm, 2) to turn it

over to the police, or 3) to otherwise secure it.

Mr. Mason's Additional Proposed Jury Instructions, reprinted

in App. at 48. The District Court rejected the innocent

possession instruction. Instead, over the objection of defense

counsel, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows:

If you find that the defendant knowingly possessed the

gun or ammunition, then the reason the defendant may

have had for possessing them is not relevant to your

consideration of the evidence. Well meaning possession

is not a defense to the charge in this case.

Tr. 8/27 at 103.

The jury returned a guilty verdict against Mason. The

District Court then sentenced Mason to 77 months in federal

prison, followed by three years of supervised release. See

Judgment, Mason, Crim. No. 99-0162 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 1999),

reprinted in App. at 52-53. Mason's sentence represented a

two-level reduction in the adjusted offense level pursuant to

United States Sentencing Guideline s 5K2.0.

See United States v. Mason, 90

F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 1999).

Mason now appeals his conviction, challenging the District

Court's failure to give an innocent possession instruction to

the jury. He seeks reversal of the District Court's judgment

and remand for a new trial.

II. Analysis

Both the Government and the defendant agree that there is

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a "justification" defense to a felon's possession of a gun in

violation of s 922(g)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Dodd, 225

F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d

1292 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2724 (2000); United

States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 1996); Perrin, 45 F.3d

869. The present case, however, does not implicate the

justification defense, because there was no evidence of an

imminent threat of death or bodily injury to Mason or others.

See Deleveaux, 205 F.3d at 1297. The parties do not disagree

over this point. Rather, the issue here is whether there is a

distinct innocent possession defense, i.e., apart from the

justification defense, to a felon-in-possession charge under

s 922(g)(1), and, if so, how it should be defined.

At oral argument, Government counsel forthrightly conceded that, although narrow, there must be an innocent

possession defense to a s 922(g)(1) charge. We agree. Indeed, we cannot imagine otherwise. It is true that some

courts have emphasized that no criminal intent is required to

establish guilt under s 922(g)(1). See, e.g., Deleveaux, 205

F.3d at 1298 (stating that under s 922(g)(1) "[t]he prosecution

need show only that the defendant consciously possessed

what he knew to be a firearm"). Nonetheless, as the Government here recognized, to completely reject the possibility of

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an innocent possession defense is to say that a felon-inpossession always will be guilty once he knowingly possesses

a weapon, without regard to how or why he came into

possession or for how long possession was retained. Thus,

for example, if Mason did indeed innocently pick up a bag

containing a gun (not knowing what was in the bag), he would

be guilty the moment he was seen holding the bag knowing of

its contents, even if he had every intention of relinquishing

possession immediately. There is nothing to indicate that

Congress intended such a harsh and absurd result and Government counsel acknowledged that s 922(g)(1) should not be

read this broadly.

The real problem in this case is not whether there is an

innocent possession defense, but, rather, how to define it.

This is no mean feat. Although Congress may not have

meant to produce absurd results in enacting s 922(g)(1),

there is no doubt that the criminal proscription is strict.

Nonetheless, as both parties here agree, certain carefully

confined extenuating circumstances may preclude a conviction

under s 922(g)(1) based on mere knowing possession.

Some of our sister circuits appear to have recognized an

innocent possession defense; however, we can find no case in

which a circuit has squarely applied the innocent possession

defense to a s 922(g)(1) charge, where the elements of a

justification defense are not present. See United States v.

Ali, 63 F.3d 710, 716 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995) (declining to address

whether the defense was available because defense counsel

failed to seek a proper instruction on the innocent possession

theory, but noting that its case law did not foreclose such a

defense); United States v. Elder, 16 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir.

1994) (concluding that although the innocent possession defense presented a "novel issue," it need not decide the issue

because the evidence did not support the defense); cf. United

States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing an "innocent possession defense," though the defense in

that case is more properly considered a "justification defense"

as life and limb were arguably at stake).

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There are reported state court judgments, however, that

have allowed an innocent possession defense to a weapons

possession charge. See, e.g., Bieder v. United States, 707

A.2d 781, 783-84 (D.C. 1998) (acknowledging innocent possession defense to charge of carrying a pistol without a license);

People v. Hurtado, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 853, 858 (1996) (stating

that the momentary possession for disposal defense, initially

established for the possession of controlled substances, extends to possession of a firearm by a felon offenses); People

v. Williams, 409 N.E.2d 1372, 1373 (N.Y. 1980) (recognizing

innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons

possession). See also Redbook, Instruction No. 4.71(B) (4th

ed. 1993) ("The defendant would be not guilty of the offense

charged here if s/he lacked any criminal purpose in carrying

or possessing the weapon [ammunition] and s/he [intended to

take it as soon and as directly as possible to law enforcement]."); Criminal Jury Instructions, New York, No. 9.65

(1983) ("A person who recently finds a weapon and thus

possesses it temporarily, with no intention to retain it, but

with the intention of promptly turning it over to a lawful

authority, is not guilty of unlawful possession. Such possession, if temporary, is lawful."). Some of the statutes at issue

in the state court decisions are not felon-in-possession statutes. Nevertheless, the rationale underlying these decisions

seems to apply equally to s 922(g)(1).

There are two general requirements that must be satisfied

in order for a defendant to successfully invoke the innocent

possession defense. The record must reveal that (1) the

firearm was attained innocently and held with no illicit purpose and (2) possession of the firearm was transitory--i.e., in

light of the circumstances presented, there is a good basis to

find that the defendant took adequate measures to rid himself

of possession of the firearm as promptly as reasonably possible. In particular, "a defendant's actions must demonstrate

both that he had the intent to turn the weapon over to the

police and that he was pursuing such an intent with immediacy and through a reasonable course of conduct." Logan v.

United States, 402 A.2d 822, 827 (D.C. 1979). When these

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requirements are met, possession is "excused and justified as

stemming from an affirmative effort to aid and enhance social

policy underlying law enforcement." Hines v. United States,

326 A.2d 247, 248 (D.C. 1974).

The innocent possession defense may arise in a range of

factual scenarios, including cases like the instant one in which

the defendant's claims of innocent possession, lack of illicit

purpose, and transitory possession are plausible, albeit debatable. Such cases are for the jury to decide. There are some

easy cases on either end of the spectrum, however.

For example, suppose there was undisputed and credible

evidence that a defendant left his truck locked to make a

delivery and, upon returning, found that the truck had been

broken into and a gun left on the driver's seat. Suppose

further that, surprised by his discovery, the defendant picks

up the gun, removes the ammunition, and then immediately

calls "911" to seek police assistance. When the police arrive,

the defendant is found holding the gun and ammunition,

which he turns over to the officers. Surely, with such a

record, a judgment of acquittal would be in order.

On the other hand, suppose that, upon finding the firearm,

the hypothetical defendant promptly hides the gun and ammunition in his truck. Assume further that the defendant

finishes his deliveries and says nothing to anyone about the

gun or ammunition. Then, at the end of his work day, the

defendant puts the gun and ammunition in his jacket pocket

and takes them to his home, purportedly to consider what to

do with them. The gun and ammunition remain in the

defendant's possession overnight. The firearm is accidentally

discovered the next day when a police officer sees the gun fall

out of the defendant's jacket pocket. In such a case, there

would be no plausible innocent possession defense, because

the defendant could not show transitory possession. In other

words, there would be no basis whatsoever to find that the

defendant took adequate measures to rid himself of possession of the firearm as promptly as reasonably possible. In

such a case, a trial judge should reject a request for an

innocent possession instruction.

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The innocent possession defense to a s 922(g)(1) charge is

necessarily narrow. Thus, it does not offend the statute's

goal of keeping guns out of the hands of convicted felons.

See Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (noting

that the purpose behind the statute is to "keep firearms away

from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous"). On this score, it is important to recall

that "it is the retention of [a firearm], rather than the brief

possession for disposal ... , which poses the danger which is

criminalized" by felon-in-possession statutes. Hurtado, 54

Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858. With this in mind, it is easy to

understand why the innocent possession defense--which focuses precisely on how the defendant came into possession of

the gun, the length of time of possession, and the manner in

which the defendant acts to rid himself of possession--is fully

consistent with the legislative purpose underlying s 922(g)(1).

The instant case presents a close call. The asserted facts

indicate that Mason's possession of the gun and ammunition

was innocent and that he harbored no illicit purpose; there is

a question, however, as to whether Mason took the necessary

steps to dispose of the gun with immediacy and through a

reasonable course of conduct. On balance, we find that

Mason established an adequate record to warrant submission

of an innocent possession instruction to the jury. See Joy v.

Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 556 (D.C. Cir.

1993) ("It is well established that '[a] defendant is entitled to

an instruction on a defense theory if it has a basis in the law

and in the record.' ") (quoting Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842

F.2d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 496 U.S. 543 (1990)).

The testimony reflects that, once Mason found the weapon,

he drove directly to deliver the weapon to an officer he knew

who was only 10 minutes away; and he apparently made no

attempt to hide the gun, which was seen sticking out of his

belt. The Government, however, argues that Mason "did not

embark upon a course of conduct reasonably calculated to

result in the surrender of the pistol to police with immediacy," see Appellee's Brief at 30, because Mason (1) did not call

the police, even though he had a cellular telephone, and (2)

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did not surrender the weapon to the first police officer that he

saw. This is precisely the kind of dispute that should be

submitted to a jury. On remand, following a new trial, it will

be up to the jury to assess the evidence and to determine

whether, in light of the circumstances presented, Mason took

adequate measures to rid himself of possession of the firearm

as promptly as reasonably possible.

III. Conclusion

Because the District Court erred as a matter of law in not

instructing the jury on Mason's innocent possession defense,

Mason's conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for a

new trial.

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