Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02144/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02144-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Janko Branko Jankovic
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2144

JANKO BRANKO JANKOVIC,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A079-929-194

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 9, 2015 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and 

PALLMEYER, District Judge.

*

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Janko Jankovic, a citizen of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, was admitted to the United States 

as a refugee in 2003 but has been ordered removed on the 

ground that he obtained that status by fraud. He had re-

 * Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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ceived permanent-residence status in 2005, but the fraud 

(which Jankovic concedes committing) authorized his removal. See 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(C)(i). He sought a waiver on 

the ground that his removal would cause extreme hardship 

for his wife Dragana, who was admitted with him in 2003 

and became a U.S. citizen in 2009. See 8 U.S.C. §1182(i).

An Immigration Judge rejected that request on two

grounds: that Dragana would not suffer extreme hardship; 

and that, even if his wife would suffer hardship, his history 

of lying to immigration officials (the fraud used to obtain entry is just part of a pattern) leads to the exercise of discretion 

against relief. The IJ also discussed a third issue—whether

Jankovic had committed war crimes during the Bosnian conflict by assisting in the persecution of ethnic minorities, rendering him inadmissible under a proviso to 8 U.S.C. 

§1101(a)(42); see also Presidential Proclamation No. 8697 

§1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 49277 (Aug. 4, 2011)—but stated that he 

did not need to reach a final conclusion on that subject. The 

Board of Immigration Appeals approved this decision.

Jankovic cannot prevail in this court without upsetting 

both of the IJ’s grounds, for either of them is adequate to 

support removal. Yet his brief ignores the second ground, 

and what’s more we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s 

discretionary decisions, which puts both rationales off limits. 

8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(i)(2), 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See, e.g., Jiménez Viracacha v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2008); LeguizamoMedina v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2007).

Nonetheless, Jankovic maintains that we should review 

the issue that the IJ did not decide: whether he committed 

war crimes. Admissibility usually is a legal issue, and 

§1252(a)(2)(D) permits courts to review the agency’s legal 

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No. 15-2144 3

conclusions. For that kind of review to be permissible, however, the legal conclusion must make a difference, as otherwise the court would be rendering an advisory opinion. Legal issues cannot be reviewed when there is only one judgment, and a discretionary decision supports that judgment 

no matter the answer to the legal contentions. See Powerex 

Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 235–36 

(2007). Given the IJ’s two rationales, the admissibility question does not matter to the outcome. Jankovic’s contention 

that something special about immigration law requires a 

court to review all legal issues, even when a non-reviewable 

discretionary judgment controls the outcome, is incompatible with INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976), which held 

that a court or agency need not resolve a legal contention 

that does not affect the outcome.

Jankovic presents a second line of argument that he says 

is within our authority under §1252(a)(2)(D). He contends 

that the IJ erred by receiving the expert testimony of Michael 

MacQueen even though the agency had not furnished him, 

before the hearing, with a written narrative describing 

MacQueen’s conclusions. Jankovic appears to contend that 

MacQueen’s testimony affected all of the IJ’s rationales, 

which if so would avoid any risk of the court’s rendering an 

advisory opinion, but as far as we can tell MacQueen’s testimony concerned only the agency’s contention that Jankovic 

committed war crimes. MacQueen testified as an expert on 

the Bosnian War and, in particular, on the activities of the 

brigade in which Jankovic was a sergeant. MacQueen’s testimony does not concern how Jankovic’s removal would affect his wife or whether his habit of lying affects his suitability for favorable treatment. This means that any error in reCase: 15-2144 Document: 31 Filed: 02/03/2016 Pages: 5
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ceiving MacQueen’s testimony did not matter to the outcome.

Let us assume that this is wrong, however. Still Jankovic 

cannot prevail, because he does not identify any statute, 

rule, or decision by the BIA that requires a pre-hearing written summary of proposed expert testimony. The Constitution does not compel pretrial discovery even in criminal litigation. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). Federal 

rules do require summaries of expert testimony in both civil 

and criminal litigation, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2); Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G), but those rules do not apply to administrative hearings.

Although no rule with legal effect requires pre-hearing 

disclosures, the Immigration Court Practice Manual §3.3(g) 

urges litigants to include written summaries with witness 

lists, in order to reduce risk that the IJ will need to grant a 

continuance to allow additional preparation. The agency’s 

counsel listed MacQueen as a potential witness, with this 

description: “Mr. Macqueen is expected to testify regarding 

the respondent’s service in the Republika Srpska Special Police Brigade.” Jankovic thinks this inadequate. More than a 

year before the hearing, Jankovic’s lawyer asked the IJ to exclude MacQueen’s proposed testimony and for permission 

to present a rebuttal expert. The IJ denied the former motion 

but granted him leave to present a rebuttal expert. Shortly

before the hearing, the agency’s lawyer orally described 

MacQueen’s planned testimony, and Jankovic said on the 

record that this proffer satisfied his concerns. After 

MacQueen testified, Jankovic did not put on a rebuttal witness or request a continuance to allow additional time for 

that purpose. That failure, coupled with his concession that 

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No. 15-2144 5

the oral description sufficed, likely waives his current line of 

argument, see Skorusa v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 939, 942 (7th Cir. 

2007), but even if it doesn’t we’ve explained why the argument does not carry the day.

The petition for review is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

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