Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00715/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00715-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gaile Edwards
Counter Claimant
Mayflower Transit, LLC
Cross Defendant
United Van Lines, LLC
Counter Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED VAN LINES, LLC and 

MAYFLOWER TRANSIT, LLC, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

GAILE EDWARDS, as an individual 

and DOES 1-10, 

 Defendants. 

_____________________________/ 

No. Civ. S-07-715 RRB DAD 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

United Van Lines, LLC and Mayflower Transit, LLC 

(“collectively Plaintiffs”) filed a breach of contract action 

against Gaile Edwards (“Edwards”) seeking to recover for 

services rendered in transporting Edwards’ household goods from 

California to Montana. Edwards filed a cross-complaint alleging 

breach of contract and failure to exercise due care. Plaintiffs 

now seek dismissal of the cross-complaint pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) on the ground that the claims alleged therein are preempted by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 

49 U.S.C. § 14706 (“Carmack Amendment”). Alternatively, 

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Plaintiffs seek dismissal on the ground that the cross-complaint 

is untimely. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS the 

motion in part and DENIES it in part.1

I. BACKGROUND 

 Mayflower Transit, LLC (“Mayflower”) and United Van Lines, 

LLC (“United”) are motor carriers of household goods and 

personal property. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 3; Compl. 

¶ 3. Edwards is a former resident of California who currently 

resides in Montana. FAC ¶ 4. In October 2005, Edwards entered 

into a contract with Mayflower to transport her household goods 

from California to Montana. FAC ¶ 8. On or about October 12, 

2005, Edwards tendered her household goods to Mayflower, which 

were subsequently delivered to Montana in accordance with the 

Bill of Lading at a cost of $8,068.25. FAC ¶¶ 10-16. Edwards 

accepted delivery of her household goods but refused to pay 

Mayflower for its services after discovering that some of her 

household goods had been damaged and stolen. FAC ¶¶ 15, 20; 

Answer/Cross-Compl. at 4. 

 

1 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

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On or about August 26, 2006, after repeated attempts to 

secure payment for its services, Mayflower sent a letter to 

Edwards requesting payment. Id. ¶ 21. Edwards refused to pay 

or respond to the letter. Id. ¶ 22. On April 13, 2007, United 

filed a breach of contract action against Edwards seeking to 

recover for its services in transporting Edwards’ household 

goods from California to Montana. Compl. at 1-7. On May 1, 

2007, the complaint was amended to add Mayflower as a named 

party. FAC 1-6. On July 19, 2007, Edwards responded to the FAC 

by filing an answer and a cross-complaint. Answer/Cross-Compl. 

at 1-6. The cross-complaint alleges that United breached the 

parties’ contract and their duty of care by failing to safely 

deliver Edwards’ household goods from California to Montana. 

Id. at 4. The cross-complaint seeks $10,000 in damages. Id. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Rule 12(b)(6) 

 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion the complaint is read 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Odom v. 

Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 2007) 

“Allegations in the complaint, together with reasonable 

inferences therefrom, are assumed to be true for purposes of the 

motion,” id., but conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. 

Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004). “A 

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dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 12(b)(6) 

should not be granted ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitle him to relief.’” Odom, 486 F.3d at 545; 

Adams, 355 F.3d at 1183. 

B. Carmack Amendment 

 Plaintiffs argue that dismissal of the cross-complaint is 

appropriate because the claims alleged therein are pre-empted by 

the Carmack Amendment. 

The Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, provides “‘a 

uniform national liability policy for interstate carriers’ ” and 

“is the exclusive cause of action for interstate-shipping 

contract claims alleging loss or damage to property.” Hall v. 

North American Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 687-88 (9th Cir. 

2007). Accordingly, because Edwards’ cross-complaint alleges a 

claim for breach of an interstate-shipping contract based on 

loss and damage to household goods, and does not allege that this 

claim is brought pursuant to the Carmack Amendment, it is 

dismissed with leave to amend. A claim under the Carmack 

Amendment is the exclusive remedy for breach of an interstateshipping contract. 

Additionally, to the extent that the cross-complaint seeks 

to allege a negligence claim, this claim is pre-empted by the 

Carmack Amendment and therefore is dismissed with prejudice. 

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See Hall, 476 F.3d at 688 (the Carmack Amendment is a complete 

defense to common law claims and requires dismissal of a common 

law negligence claim against a carrier); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 

North American Van Lines, Inc., 970 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 

1992). 

For these reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

Edwards has thirty-days to amend her cross-complaint to allege a 

claim under the Carmack Amendment. 

C. Timeliness of Cross-Complaint 

 Plaintiffs argue that dismissal of the cross-complaint is 

appropriate because it is untimely. The court disagrees. 

 Rule 13(a) provides, in relevant part, that: “[a] pleading 

shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of 

serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, 

if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 

subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not 

require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of 

whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” “The test for 

determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory is whether a 

logical relationship exists between the claim and the 

counterclaim and whether the essential facts of the claims are 

so logically connected that considerations of judicial economy 

and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one 

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lawsuit.” Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1991) 

(quotation marks omitted). 

 In the instant case, Edwards responded to the FAC by filing 

an answer and a cross-complaint alleging a breach of contract 

claim. Therefore, because this claim arises out of the same 

transaction as Plaintiffs’ claim, it is a proper and timely 

counter-claim. See Valley Disposal Inc. v. Central Vermont 

Solid Waste Management Dist., 113 F.3d 357, 364-65 (2d Cir. 

1997) (observing that compulsory counterclaims are claims 

arising out of the same occurrence or transaction as the claim 

asserted by the plaintiff and are generally asserted in the 

answer if such claims are acquired by the time of the original 

answer). 

 For this reason, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS the motion 

to dismiss in part and DENIES it in part. Edwards has thirtydays to amend her cross-complaint to allege a claim under the 

Carmack Amendment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2007. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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