Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03008/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03008-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randy LaFaut
Appellant
JoAnn Kay McCoy
Appellee

Document Text:

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

'fenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

SEP 171990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

JOANN KAY MCCOY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. No. 90-3008 

RANDY LAFAUT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D. C. No. 87-1455) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Mr. Lafaut appeals the final judgment rendered against him 

and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The sole issues on 

* 

be 

for 

res 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 1 
appeal revolve around comments made by plaintiff's counsel during 

final jury argument. 

This is a diversity case wherein Ms. McCoy (plaintiff) sued 

Mr. Lafaut (defendant) for injuries received in a motor vehicle 

accident. Liability was admitted and the case proceeded to jury 

trial on the issue of damages. The jury returned its verdict 

establishing the damages at $112,000. Defendant filed his motion 

for new trial based upon plaintiff's alleged improper closing 

argument and defendant's claim that the jury verdict was excessive 

and unsupported by the evidence. The district court denied the 

motion. 

The issues raised on appeal all involve plaintiff's closing 

arguments. For the purposes of discussion, we 

the challenged arguments into three categories: 

have categorized 

(1) arguments in 

contravention of an order in limine; (2) "per diem" and "golden 

rule" arguments, which are asserted to be improper as a matter of 

law; and (2) arguments that went beyond the evidence. We will 

deal with each category separately. 

I 

Arguments in Contravention of the Court's Order 

Prior to trial, defendant requested and received an order in 

limine touching upon two pertinent subjects: (1) defendant's 

incarceration during the trial; and (2) the costs, risks, and 

recovery periods associated with medical treatment that was never 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 2 
recommended by plaintiff's physician. During closing argument, 

plaintiff's counsel stated: "Like I say, there's no question, it 

is time for the defendant to pay for the misery he has 

inflicted .... He has not bothered to show up for his trial. He 

sent the largest law firm in Kansas .... " Later in the argument, 

plaintiff's counsel stated: "Now, where is the evidence ... ? 

The other guy's not here " Still later in the argument, 

plaintiff's counsel stated: "If she went out and spent $50,000 on 

experts here, and possibly they could testify [to] all the surgery 

and injuries she's going to have." 

Defendant has the burden to persuade this court that plain 

error occurred as no objection was made at the time of argument. 

Even though an argument may be improper, we will not reverse the 

judgment unless it clearly appears that the challenged remarks 

influenced the jury. 

We first examine the remarks informing the jury of an evident 

fact, that defendant was not present at trial. A strict and 

literal reading of the oral order in limine directs plaintiff not 

to refer to defendant's incarceration. It is silent on the 

subject of defendant's absence. The trial court also gave an 

instruction telling the jury that the defendant's absence should 

not enter into their deliberations. We note that defendant did 

not believe these remarks were sufficiently prejudicial to object 

to them at the time they were made. Finally, defendant has not 

pointed out to us, nor are we able to find, any evidence that 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 3 
these remarks influenced the decision of the jury. We therefore 

hold that these argument to the jury did not rise to the level of 

plain error, even though arguably they were in violation of the 

trial court's order in limine. 

We next examine the remarks relative to the plaintiff's 

future surgery. Again we note that no objection was made at the 

time this argument was made, thus depriving the trial court of any 

opportunity to correct. We also note the trial court gave to the 

jury the standard instruction that informed the jury that remarks 

of counsel are not evidence. We further note the exact words of 

the argument: "[P]ossibly they [the experts] could testify [to] 

all the surgery and injuries she's going to have." Finally, we 

observe these remarks had at least an arguable basis as can be 

seen from Dr. Prostic's deposition when he referred to the 

possibilities of future operations. Considering all of these 

factors, we are not persuaded that this argument raised to the 

level of plain error even though this comment was arguably in 

violation of the court's order in limine. 

II 

Per Diem and Golden Rule Arguments 

Defendant next complains of plaintiff making "per diem" and 

"golden rule" arguments. We will discuss these separately. 

Concerning the ''per diem" argument, the transcript of the 

closing arguments reveals this statement by plaintiff's counsel: 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 4 
"Well, I'm going to suggest a figure to you to have those 

headaches every day, to wake up still and sore, to be thrown off 

and grouchy, $50 a week." Objection was made by defense counsel 

on the grounds that per diem arguments are improper under Kansas 

case law. The court overruled the objection. Plaintiff's counsel 

continued by arguing for $1,000/year, which is "less than $20 a 

week." A cautionary instruction was neither requested nor given. 

In ruling upon defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial 

court correctly observed that limitation of per diem arguments on 

subjective damages by counsel to the jury is a matter of trial 

procedure within the exclusive control of the federal courts, 

(citing McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593, 595 (10th 

Cir. 1966)). The trial court also found "that the verdict was not 

excessive and that the argument did not unduly influence the jury. 

The trial court conceded that the better practice would be for the 

trial court to give a cautionary instruction sua sponte, even 

though defendant did not request such an instruction. 

In the case before us, the trial court determined that had 

the jury utilized the formulas advocated, the subjective damages 

would have totaled approximately $195,000. In fact, the total 

damages awarded for osubjective damages was $57,500. It therefore 

appears the jury was not influenced by the argument of counsel. 

While defendant did properly object to this line of argument, 

we are not persuaded that the trial court's ruling amounted to 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 5 
reversible error. Given the facts of this case, and the failure 

of the defendant to request a cautionary instruction, we are not 

prepared to rule that the trial court committed reversible error 

in denying the motion for new trial on this basis. 

We next consider the "golden rule" argument. During his 

closing argument, plaintiff's counsel stated: 

You're going to have to put yourselves in a reasonable 

person evaluating what it's like to have a back pain. 

And who is going to sell their health for the rest of 

their life for even $75,000 or sell their spine for 

something like that? You know, if it's us, our wife, we 

can consider it's a serious injury. 

You know, it's like if somebody came up to you 

and said, I'm going to skip 10 years of your life and 

give you a premature old body, and how much would you 

take for someone to do that to you? How much would you 

take to sell? I think we're talking about significant 

compensation. 

We note that defendant made no objection to these arguments 

at trial and we also note that defendant failed to raise this 

issue to the trial court in his motion for new trial. Due to the 

fact that this issue was not raised before the trial court, we 

must review under the plain error standard. We are not persuaded 

that the arguments given in this case amount to plain error, 

particularly in light of the jury's verdict. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 6 
III 

Subjects Outside the Evidence 

Defendant next complains that plaintiff's counsel made 

specific references to subjects outside the evidence. The only 

specific argument meriting discussion is that plaintiff's counsel 

improperly referred to the possibility of future surgery, even 

though plaintiff's doctor could not testify that plaintiff might 

need surgery. We note at the outset of our discussion that no 

objections were made to this argument. Again, this places us in 

the position of reviewing this asserted error under the plain 

error standard. 

Defendant argues that the maximum award the evidence could 

possibly sustain was approximately $40,000. The jury awarded 

$53,000. Therefore, defendant contends that the excess is clearly 

attributable to the jury's speculation as to the costs of future 

surgery and this is proof that the jury was susceptible to 

plaintiff's improper argument. 

We must first examine the challenged remarks. During closing 

argument, plaintiff's counsel stated: "If she [plaintiff] went 

out and spent $50,000 on experts here, and possibly they could 

testify [to] all the surgery and injuries she's going to have." 

There are two factors that are significant in connection with this 

argument. First, no objection was made. Counsel for defendant 

apparently did not feel this argument was improper when made, 

otherwise an objection would have been rendered. The failure to 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 7 
object also operated to deny the trial court the opportunity to 

correct any error. Second, the trial court gave the standard 

instruction to the jury informing them that statements of counsel 

are not evidence. We are not persuaded that this argument would 

rise to the level of plain error under the facts of this case. To 

hold otherwise would simply place too great a burden upon trial 

courts. 

Even assuming the argument was improper, we still could not 

reverse absent a showing that the challenged remarks influenced 

the verdict. The trial court, in reviewing defendant's motion for 

a new trial in a light most favorable to plaintiff, found that 

defendant had significantly understated the maximum verdict the 

evidence could support. The trial court looked at the cost of 

anti-inflammatory medicines; the cost of cortisone injections into 

the cubital tunnel; the cost of cortisone injections into the 

epidural space; and the cost of physical therapy, and concluded 

that the jury award of $53,000 was supported by the evidence. 

At this point we should turn our attention to the evidence in 

the record. As to the necessity of future surgery, we find a 

videotape deposition of Dr. Prostic. The trial court ruled that 

references to future treatment are inadmissible and the court 

proceeded to specify which portion of the video would not be shown 

to the jury. This was done. We then find plaintiff requesting 

that certain portions of Dr. Prostic's original deposition be 

read. Defense counsel objected and subsequently withdrew her 

-8-

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 8 
objection. The subject portion of the video and of the deposition 

contained the following: 

Q. Did you recommend any of these operations for Mrs. 

McCoy? 

A. I recommended the medication and exercises first; 

and if, after three months of those, she was not having 

adequate relief, then operations can be discussed. 

Thus, this testimony concerning surgery was twice presented to the 

jury without objection. We also note that defendant failed to 

request the deletion of this reference from the videotape. 

In reviewing the evidence concerning damages, we must do so 

in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and must give to the 

plaintiff the benefit of all inferences. We also note that the 

evidence offered must form an adequate basis for a reasoned 

judgment. Future medical expenses are not required to be proven 

with mathematical certainty; however, there must be some 

reasonable basis on which to estimate damages. 

We commence this review by accepting the evidence offered as 

the maximum by defendant and the defendant's maximum amount of 

$40,320. We then note that defendant's projected maximum cost of 

physical therapy is $1,200. This is based upon Dr. Prostic's 

testimony of a cost of up to $200 per week and his statement that 

he would discontinue the physical therapy within six weeks if it 

was not working. However, in Dr. Prostic's letter of October 8, 

1987, he states that physical therapy costs of up to $50 per day 

would be reasonable in periods of three to six weeks each time. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 9 
. . 

This amount alone could provide the necessary support for the 

jury's verdict. 

Finally, defendant complains of plaintiff's argument: "Do 

you know, there's something I didn't even mention. That's the 

emotional suffering .•.. I didn't ask you for that It The 

trial court refused to instruct the jury on its claim as plaintiff 

failed to include it in his pretrial order. Again, defendant 

failed to object to this argument, and defendant has failed to 

persuade us that this challenged argument rises to the level of 

plain error. 

We AFFIRM the decision of the district court. ~he mandate 

s.hall i .s.sue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

-10-

Appellate Case: 90-3008 Document: 010110042166 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 10