Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05089/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05089-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Appellee
Benny Lee Hodge
Appellant
United States Department of Justice
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 19, 2012 Decided January 4, 2013

No. 11-5089

BENNY LEE HODGE,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-00403)

Elizabeth Anne Cassady argued the cause for appellant. 

On the brief were Margaret K. Pfeiffer and Mary-Louise M. 

Huth.

Jeremy S. Simon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney.

Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge 

KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Benny Lee Hodge was 

convicted in Kentucky state court of three murders, and he 

was sentenced to death. The murders occurred during the 

summer of 1985. Hodge’s conviction and sentence have been 

affirmed on appeal in state court and in state and federal 

habeas proceedings. See Hodge v. Commonwealth, 2011 WL 

3805960 (2011) (unpublished opinion); Hodge v. Haeberlin, 

579 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2009); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 

S.W.3d 463 (Ky. 2003); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 

824 (Ky. 2000); Epperson v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 835 

(Ky. 1990).

The FBI participated in the initial investigation because 

Hodge had impersonated an FBI agent during one of the 

murders and Hodge had fled across state lines with $1.9 

million stolen from one victim. In 2002, while on death row 

in Kentucky, Hodge submitted a FOIA request to the FBI 

seeking “a complete and thorough search of all filing systems 

and locations for all records” that the FBI had created during 

its investigation of him. J.A. 28-29. In response, the FBI 

initially gathered and reviewed 569 pages of potentially 

responsive documents. The FBI released 361 pages of 

documents to Hodge and claimed exemptions over the 

remaining documents.

Dissatisfied with the FBI’s production, Hodge filed suit.

After suit was filed, the FBI conducted additional searches. 

In sum, it found more than 6,000 pages of potentially 

responsive material, and it ultimately released 1,762 pages of 

additional documents to Hodge. As relevant here, the FBI 

asserted FOIA Exemptions 3, 7(C), and 7(D) with respect to

the remaining documents. 

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The District Court granted the FBI summary judgment, 

ruling that the FBI had released all non-exempt documents as 

required by FOIA; that the FBI performed an adequate search; 

and that the FBI correctly applied FOIA Exemptions 3, 7(C), 

and 7(D). We review the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. See Juarez v. Dept. of Justice, 518 F.3d 

54, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2008). We affirm.

* * *

First, Hodge claims that the FBI improperly withheld 

certain documents that the FBI had released in a separate 

FOIA matter to one of his murder accomplices. According to 

Hodge, the FBI’s release of 125 unredacted pages to his 

accomplice proves that the FBI did not give him all of the 

documents to which he was entitled. The fundamental flaw in 

Hodge’s chain of reasoning is the premise: In fact, Hodge’s 

accomplice did not receive those documents under FOIA. 

There may have been a genuine dispute on this point at a 

previous stage of the litigation, but while this appeal was 

pending, Hodge learned of 450 pages of redacted documents 

released to his accomplice under FOIA. This strongly 

suggests, as Hodge himself acknowledged, that the original 

125-page release was made pursuant to criminal discovery, 

not a FOIA request. Therefore, we reject the argument that 

the FBI improperly withheld the 125 pages.1 

 1

 Hodge’s counsel stated at oral argument that Hodge was not 

“entirely conceding” that the 125-page report was not a FOIA 

release. Oral Arg. Tr. 4. But Hodge’s briefs acknowledge that the 

information he has received since the grant of summary judgment 

suggests that the FBI’s characterization of that report was correct. 

See Appellant Br. 7. We interpret Hodge’s position to be an 

effective concession that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

as to the nature of these documents, so we treat the issue as waived.

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Second, Hodge argues that the FBI’s search for 

responsive documents was inadequate. Hodge points out that

the FBI found additional responsive documents when it 

conducted new searches after this suit was filed. According 

to Hodge, the FBI therefore cannot meet its burden of 

“show[ing] beyond material doubt . . . that it has conducted a 

search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant 

documents.” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 

2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In general, the adequacy of a search is “determined not 

by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of [its] 

methods.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d 

311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To be sure, we 

have acknowledged that the “discovery of additional 

documents is more probative that the search was not thorough 

than if no other documents were found to exist.” Goland v. 

CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 370 (D.C. 1979) (per curiam); see 

Krikorian v. Dept. of State, 984 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir. 

1993). But by the time a court considers the matter, it does 

not matter that an agency’s initial search failed to uncover 

certain responsive documents so long as subsequent searches 

captured them. After all, a requester’s argument about the 

alleged inadequacy of a search is necessarily an argument for 

forward-looking relief. Therefore, what matters once the 

agency has fulfilled its burden under FOIA of conducting 

“reasonably calculated” searches is whether the requester can 

identify any additional searches that must be conducted.

Here, because the sworn declarations from the FBI 

indicate that it conducted “reasonably calculated” searches, 

the burden is on Hodge to identify specific additional places 

the agency should now search. Compare Iturralde, 315 F.3d 

at 315 (ruling for agency because requester did not claim 

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agency failed to search particular offices or files), with

Valencia-Lucena v. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326-27 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999) (ruling against agency because the agency failed to 

search another location that would likely have contained 

responsive documents). But Hodge has not identified any 

specific additional searches that he believes the FBI should 

have conducted. Hodge asserts that the FBI may possess

additional responsive documents, but he offers no basis for 

concluding that those documents might exist. As we have 

said before, “[m]ere speculation that as yet uncovered 

documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the 

agency conducted a reasonable search.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. 

v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Therefore, we 

reject Hodge’s complaint about the alleged inadequacy of the 

search.

Third, Hodge contends that the FBI improperly asserted 

Exemption 3, Exemption 7(C), and Exemption 7(D) to 

withhold various documents. 

Exemption 3 covers information that is protected from 

disclosure by another statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). In 

this case, the FBI withheld information that was related to 

grand jury proceedings and protected by Rule 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 6(e) applies if the 

disclosed material would “tend to reveal some secret aspect of 

the grand jury’s investigation,” including “the identities of 

witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony, the strategy or 

direction of the investigation,” or “the deliberations or 

questions of jurors.” Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto 

Rico v. Dept. of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the 

FBI explained that the relevant material “documents the 

identities of individuals who were either the recipients of a 

Federal Grand Jury Subpoena and/or testified before a Federal 

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Grand Jury.” J.A. 46. Hodge does not contest the accuracy of 

this claim. Because the FBI’s explanation shows that the 

material is covered by Rule 6(e), the material is in turn 

covered by FOIA Exemption 3. 

Exemption 7(C) applies to “records or information 

compiled for law enforcement purposes,” if disclosure “could 

reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion 

of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). In this case,

the FBI asserted Exemption 7(C) to protect private 

information of various investigators, witnesses, informants, 

and suspects. Individuals who fall into these groups have a 

cognizable privacy interest under the exemption. See 

Schrecker v. Dept. of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). Moreover, we have recognized that private citizens –

such as witnesses, informants, and suspects – have 

particularly strong privacy interests. Martin v. Dept. of 

Justice, 488 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As the Supreme 

Court has explained, the “disclosure of records regarding 

private citizens, identifiable by name, is not what the framers 

of the FOIA had in mind.” Dept. of Justice v. Reporters 

Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 765 

(1989). 

In response, Hodge claims that there is a public interest in 

disclosure of this material because it could reveal government 

misconduct. To establish such a public interest and thereby 

trigger the Exemption 7(C) balancing of public and private 

interests, the requester “must produce evidence that would 

warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged 

Government impropriety might have occurred.” National 

Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174

(2004). Hodge has not offered such evidence, however, so we 

uphold the FBI’s assertion of Exemption 7(C). 

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Exemption 7(D) protects records compiled by law 

enforcement during the course of an investigation if 

“producing the records ‘could reasonably be expected to 

disclose the identity of a confidential source’ or ‘information 

furnished’ by such a source.” Roth v. Dept. of Justice, 642 

F.3d 1161, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D)). The FBI is not entitled to a blanket

presumption that all witnesses in a criminal investigation

provided information with an implicit understanding of 

confidentiality. Instead, the FBI must point to “more 

narrowly defined circumstances” suggesting that a witness’s 

identity was expected to be kept confidential. Dept. of Justice 

v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 179 (1993). 

When a law enforcement agent provides express

assurances of confidentiality to a witness, the issue is simple 

enough: The agency must present “probative evidence that 

the source . . . receive[d] an express grant of confidentiality.” 

Campbell v. Dept. of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the FBI 

explained in a sworn declaration referencing witness 

interview documents marked “protect” or “protect identity”

that two of the witnesses at issue were expressly promised 

confidentiality. J.A. 63; see Billington v. Dept. of Justice, 233 

F.3d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The FBI has readily satisfied 

Exemption 7(D) for those two witnesses.

For a few other witnesses at issue in this case, the FBI 

argues that there were implicit indications of confidentiality. 

The Supreme Court has recognized several factors as relevant 

in determining whether a witness provided information under 

an implicit assurance of confidentiality, including the 

“character of the crime at issue.” Landano, 508 U.S. at 179. 

Following Landano, we have recognized that the character of 

the crime may support an inference that a witness provided 

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information on a confidential basis, particularly if the criminal 

activity involved is “of a type inclined toward violent 

retaliation.” Mays v. DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 

2000). 

In this case, the FBI has explained, again in a sworn 

declaration, how disclosing the identities of the witnesses in 

question “could have disastrous consequences” and could 

“subject them to violent reprisals.” J.A. 60. Given the

vicious nature of the crimes and the explanation offered in the 

FBI’s affidavits, we conclude that the witnesses who provided 

the relevant information about Hodge’s involvement in the 

murders would have expected that their identities remain 

confidential. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, 

we sustain the FBI’s assertion of Exemption 7(D).

Although the FBI has properly applied Exemption 3, 

Exemption 7(C), and Exemption 7(D), that does not yet end 

the matter. Hodge contends that the District Court should 

have reviewed the withheld documents in camera to review 

the claimed exempt material. But our case law has rejected 

the argument that district courts are required to conduct in 

camera review in FOIA cases. See Stolt-Nielsen 

Transportation Group, Ltd. v. United States, 534 F.3d 728, 

734-35 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (district courts have discretion to rely 

on affidavits or conduct in camera review to decide whether 

government has released all reasonably segregable, nonexempt material); Krikorian, 984 F.2d at 466-67 (same). 

Hodge relatedly argues that the FBI failed to provide him with 

all information that is “reasonably segregable” from exempted

material. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). An “agency cannot justify 

withholding an entire document simply by showing that it 

contains some exempt material.” Stolt-Nielsen 

Transportation Group., 534 F.3d at 734 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the FBI

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has met this obligation, it is “entitled to a presumption that [it]

complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably 

segregable material.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Service, 494 

F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Hodge has not presented 

sufficient evidence to rebut that presumption. He identifies 

three documents that were released to him as part of the FBI’s 

initial response to his search and then released to him a 

second time as the FBI continued to process his search. The 

documents contained fewer redactions when released to him a 

second time; according to Hodge, that fact demonstrates that 

the FBI is improperly withholding material. We disagree. As 

is the case with searches, what matters is that, in the end, 

Hodge received the material to which he was entitled and has 

not shown a basis to question the remaining redactions. 

Hodge identifies an additional document that he claims 

contained excessive redactions. The District Court compared 

the document, including the FBI’s annotations specifying 

which exemptions the FBI was applying, to the FBI’s sworn 

declarations explaining why the FBI’s claimed exemptions 

were applied. We agree with the District Court that the 

redactions are consistent with the FBI’s application of the 

claimed exemptions. As the District Court explained, it is 

unsurprising that certain documents would be heavily 

redacted given the sensitive nature of the investigative reports 

at issue and the multiple exemptions that apply. We therefore 

conclude that the FBI has released all reasonably segregable, 

non-exempt material to Hodge.

* * *

We have considered all of Hodge’s arguments. We 

affirm the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

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