Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01014/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01014-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Stanislaus
Defendant
Birgit Fladager
Defendant
Douglas Maner
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS MANER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, BIRGIT 

FLADAGER, and DOES 1 through 20, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 1:14-cv-01014-DAD-MJS

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING CLERK OF 

COURT TO CLOSE CASE

(Doc. Nos. 26, 27)

This case was originally filed in Stanislaus County Superior Court on April 10, 2014, and 

was removed here pursuant to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (c) on 

June 26, 2014. (Doc. No. 1.) The complaint alleges two causes of action for First Amendment 

retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants under two separate theories, essentially 

claiming plaintiff was retaliated against both for the exercise of his free speech rights and his 

associational rights. (Id. at 12–13.) The complaint also alleges a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 claiming plaintiff was denied due process because he possessed a property interest in his 

job and was given constitutionally deficient process prior to being demoted or disciplined. (Id. at 

13–14.) The complaint also contains a fourth cause of action based on California Labor Code 

§§ 1101 and 1102. (Id. at 14–15.) On February 24, 2016, each defendant filed a motion for 

summary judgment in their favor as to all of plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. Nos. 26-1, 27-1.) Plaintiff 

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filed an opposition to these motions

1

on March 29, 2016. (Doc. No. 40.) Defendants filed 

replies. (Doc. Nos. 45, 46.) On May 3, 2016, the motion came on for hearing before the court. 

At that hearing attorney Peter Bradley appeared for plaintiff and attorney Morin Jacob appeared

on behalf of the defendants.

BACKGROUND

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges as follows. Plaintiff is a former deputy district attorney 

for Stanislaus County and was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment right to 

support a political candidate for the office of district attorney. Plaintiff alleges that, leading up to 

the June 2006 district attorney’s election in Stanislaus County, he supported Judge Michael 

Cummins against the current district attorney and defendant here, Birgit Fladager, who at the time 

was another prosecutor in the Stanislaus County District Attorney’s Office. According to 

plaintiff, when Fladager was elected district attorney she retaliated against him for his support of 

Cummins, by disciplining him unnecessarily and demoting him, ultimately causing him to quit 

his job.

Most of the facts are not seriously disputed by the parties. Rather, the parties’ dispute 

centers around the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts. Plaintiff began working at 

the Stanislaus County District Attorney’s Office in 1991, and worked there until October 2013. 

During that time, he was a deputy district attorney, and was promoted to the deputy district 

attorney V position, or the highest level of non-management attorney. Despite receiving praise 

and commendations for his trial skills throughout much of his tenure with the office (he was 

regularly given an overall rating of either “exceptional” or “satisfactory” on annual performance 

evaluations), he also received regular complaints concerning his behavior. Initially, most of these 

complaints focused on plaintiff’s treatment of the clerical staff.2 These complaints resulted in 

 

1

 Though filed as two motions, the defendants’ summary judgment motions essentially make the 

same arguments. Because the court need not reach any of the arguments which differ between the 

two motions, they are addressed together below. 

2

 Plaintiff believes the clerical staff was biased against him from the beginning, and as the years 

wore on, more senior clerical staff taught new employees to dislike him as well. Obviously, 

clerical staff bias against plaintiff does not implicate his First Amendment rights.

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numerous instances of plaintiff being counseled about his behavior prior to June 2006. While 

most of these complaints came from clerical staff, not all did, and complaints about plaintiff are 

evident in his personnel file coming from members of the bench, witnesses, the defense bar, and 

law enforcement at various times during his career prior to June 2006.

While the parties dispute various aspects of plaintiff’s involvement in Cummins’s 

campaign prior to the June 2006 election, it is clear plaintiff was to some extent involved in the 

race. Plaintiff wrote a letter to the editor which was published in the Modesto Bee supporting one 

of Cummins’s positions in the election. Plaintiff donated money to Cummins’s campaign and 

was featured on his campaign website. Further, plaintiff has presented evidence in connection 

with the pending motion that numerous members of management at the district attorney’s office, 

including Fladager herself, were aware that he supported Cummins by the time of the election. 

(See Doc. No. 31 at 155–56.)

Following the June 2006 election, an increasing number of complaints were received by 

the district attorney’s office about plaintiff, originating from sources both inside and outside that

office. Between September 2006 and January 2007, complaints were received that, among other 

instances of misconduct, plaintiff had: 1) entered a men’s restroom and urinated near a female 

employee who was painting the room’s interior; 2) abruptly shut the door to a copy room while 

two clerical employees were conversing on either side of the door; 3) refused orders to evacuate 

the office during a fire drill; 4) was rude to a judge on the record; and 5) read another attorney’s 

confidential case notes to a third party.3 Most notably during this period, the District Attorney’s 

Office also received a complaint from the local gang task force with which plaintiff was working 

in conjunction with his assignment prosecuting gang-related cases. Because of this last 

complaint, defendant Fladager and other managerial-level officials in the District Attorney’s 

Office decided to move plaintiff out of his position prosecuting gang-related cases in March 2007, 

and into one in the issuance department, where he would draft criminal complaints. They also 

 

3

 Plaintiff does not generally dispute these complaints were received, though he at times disputes 

either whether the complained of misconduct occurred or whether he believes his behavior was 

actually so bad as to warrant these complaints being made. 

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initiated an administrative investigation into plaintiff’s behavior, ultimately resulting in a 

recommendation from human resources to suspend him for five days, a punishment leveled in 

August 2007. Plaintiff appealed that suspension throughout 2008 and 2009 and it was ultimately 

downgraded to a letter of reprimand in March 2009. 

Following this investigation, from 2007 to 2011, plaintiff was not subjected to any new 

disciplinary proceedings or administrative investigations. In the spring of 2011, plaintiff was 

again the subject of complaints about his behavior from two separate law enforcement officers 

arising from separate incidents. Following an administrative investigation into these complaints, 

plaintiff was issued a letter of reprimand, ordered to write an apology to one of the officers, and 

ordered to attend counseling.

Subsequently, during 2012 and 2013, numerous additional complaints were received by 

the District Attorney’s Office regarding plaintiff. Many of them stemmed from his interactions 

with a crime victim’s next of kin, who felt she was being treated rudely or alternatively was being

ignored. Also included in this spate of complaints were several serious criticisms of plaintiff 

from several judges in the Juvenile Division of the Stanislaus County Superior Court, to which he 

had been assigned in spring 2012. These complaints included allegations that plaintiff was

routinely late to court, had made disparaging comments about a judge in her courtroom, and had

made disparaging comments about a court clerk’s appearance. Again, while plaintiff disputes 

some elements of these complaints, such as whether he was really late to court with any 

frequency and whether the comments he made were taken out of context and/or misunderstood, 

he does not deny the complaints were made.

Following the receipts of these latter complaints, another administrative investigation was 

conducted, and Fladager and the other managers of the office sought to terminate defendant. 

During a June 2013 Skelly conference4about this investigation and proposed discipline and at 

 

4

 A “Skelly conference” or “Skelly hearing” derives its name from a California Supreme Court 

decision holding that permanent employees of the state of California have a property interest in 

the continuation of their employment of which they cannot be deprived without due process. See

Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal. 3d 194, 206 (1975); see also Merino v. El Dorado Hills 

Cty. Water Dist., No. CIV. S-10-2152-LKK-DAD, 2011 WL 5118604, at * 5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 

2011). In Skelly, the California Supreme Court held that minimal procedural due process 

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which Fladager served as the Skelly officer, plaintiff raised for the first time his concern that he 

was being retaliated against for his support of Cummins in the 2006 election for the office of 

District Attorney. This Skelly conference was therefore postponed, and a separate Skelly

conference was conducted later by Sheriff Adam Christianson. Sheriff Christianson reduced 

plaintiff’s termination to a thirty-day suspension, a written reprimand, and an order to be placed 

on a performance improvement plan. While plaintiff was serving his thirty-day suspension, he 

learned he would be transferred upon his return to a position doing “collateral support,” work 

which he contends is non-legal. After learning of this, plaintiff voluntarily withdrew the appeal 

of his suspension, submitted a letter of resignation, opened his own law firm, and filed this suit.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a).

In summary judgment practice, the moving party “initially bears the burden of proving the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party 

may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or 

other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the 

fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at 

trial, “the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.). See 

 

requirements necessitate an individual receiving “notice of the proposed action, the reasons 

therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to 

respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.” 15 Cal. 3d at 

215. The required hearing need not be a full-scale evidentiary hearing. Id. (“It is clear that due 

process does not require the state to provide the employee with a full trial-type evidentiary 

hearing prior to the initial taking of punitive action.”).

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also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate 

time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 

bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof 

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts 

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as 

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary 

judgment . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 

764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment.”). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in 

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. 

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is 

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted).

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“In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact,” the 

court draws “all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving 

party.” Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). It is 

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), 

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing 

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation 

omitted).

ANALYSIS

1. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Since both of plaintiff’s First Amendment theories rely on essentially the same legal 

principle—i.e., that he was retaliated against by his employer for engaging in protected First 

Amendment conduct—they will be analyzed together.

When analyzing a claim of First Amendment retaliation against an employee, the Ninth 

Circuit has said a plaintiff must initially show the following: “(1) he was subjected to an adverse 

employment action . . . , (2) he engaged in speech that was constitutionally protected because it 

touched on a matter of public concern and (3) the protected expression was a substantial 

motivating factor for the adverse action.” Ulrich v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 

976 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000)). If this 

initial showing is made, the burden then switches to defendant to demonstrate either of the 

following: (1) under the balancing test established by Pickering v. Board of Education of 

Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), defendant’s legitimate administrative 

analysis outweighed plaintiff’s First Amendment rights; or (2) under the mixed motive analysis in 

Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), defendant 

would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the plaintiff’s protected conduct. 

Id. at 976–77. The most recent formulation of this test by the Ninth Circuit has been stated as

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follows:

First, we consider whether the plaintiff has engaged in protected 

speech activities, which requires the plaintiff to show that the 

plaintiff: (1) spoke on a matter of public concern; and (2) spoke as 

a private citizen and not within the scope of her official duties as a 

public employee. If the plaintiff makes these two showings, we ask 

whether the plaintiff has further shown that she (3) suffered an 

adverse employment action, for which the plaintiff’s protected 

speech was a substantial or motivating factor. If the plaintiff meets 

her burden on these first three steps, thereby stating a prima facie

claim of First Amendment retaliation, then the burden shifts to the 

government to escape liability by establishing either that: (4) the 

state’s legitimate administrative interests outweigh the employee’s 

First Amendment rights; or (5) the state would have taken the 

adverse employment action even absent the protected speech.

Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012). 

a. Plaintiff Engaged in Protected Speech

The First Amendment protects government employees against their employer’s retaliation 

when they discuss matters which can be “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 

social, or other concern to the community.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). The 

employee must be speaking both as a citizen and on a matter of public concern in order to state a 

First Amendment retaliation cause of action. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 

Concerning whether a government employee speaks as a citizen or in their official capacity, what 

is dispositive is whether the speech at issue was made in part because it was what the employee 

“was employed to do.” Id. at 421–22 (“When he went to work and performed the tasks he was 

paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government employee.”). If the speech in question is part of 

how the employee routinely discharges her job duties, then there is no protection for the speech 

under the First Amendment. Id. 

Second, in determining whether the employee is discussing a matter of public concern, the 

Supreme Court has stated courts must look at “the content, form, and context of a given 

statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. See also Rankin v. 

McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85 (1987). “Public employee speech is ‘of public concern’ if it 

helps citizens ‘to make informed decisions about the operation of their government.’” Roe v. City 

& Cty. of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting McKinley v. City of Eloy, 

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705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983)). See also Eng v. Colley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 

2009) (“Speech involves a matter of public concern when it can fairly be considered to relate to 

any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.” ) Certain subjects are seen as 

inherently being of public concern. See Roth v. Veteran’s Admin. of Gov’t of U.S., 856 F.2d 

1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting the Supreme Court in Connick characterized allegations of 

racial discrimination as a “matter inherently of public concern”) overruled on other grounds as 

stated in Blantz v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 727 F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2013). The court is 

to look toward “the point of the speech” in assessing whether it addresses a matter of public 

concern. Id. at 1405–06. “An employee’s motivation and the audience chosen for the speech also 

are relevant to the public-concern inquiry.” Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 866 

(9th Cir. 1999). Ultimately, “the content of the communication must be of broader societal 

concern,” and the court’s “focus must be upon whether the public or community is likely to be 

truly interested in the particular expression, or whether it is more properly viewed as essentially a 

private grievance.” Roe, 109 F.3d at 585 (citing Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 999 (4th Cir. 

1985)). See also Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 713–16 (9th Cir. 2009). It 

is plaintiff’s burden to show the speech addressed an issue of public concern, and this inquiry is a 

matter of law, not fact. Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 713–16 (9th Cir. 

2009).

Defendants assert that any speech plaintiff engaged in was not conducted as a private 

citizen, did not relate to a matter of public concern, and therefore does not fall under the 

protection of the First Amendment. Plaintiff primarily relies on one explicit act of speech, a 2006 

letter to the editor published in the Modesto Bee, and his known association with a political 

candidate, Judge Michael Cummins, as the basis for the alleged retaliation.

5

 The parties do not 

dispute the text of plaintiff’s letter to the Modesto Bee. (Doc. No. 26-4 at ¶ 4.) Defendants, 

 

5

 The court notes that there is also evidence plaintiff donated money to Cummins’s campaign, 

which is itself an act of speech. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republ. Fed. Campaign 

Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440 (2001) (“Spending for political ends and contributing to political 

candidates both fall within the First Amendment’s protection of speech and political 

association.”). 

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however, note the letter’s byline identifies plaintiff as a prosecutor from Oakdale (a city within 

Stanislaus County), and state the letter “addresses highly-technical, inner-workings of a DA’s 

office and contains information only an employee of the DA’s office would know.” (Doc. No. 

27-1 at 20.) According to defendants, this “necessarily indicates he [plaintiff] is writing as a 

prosecutor for County [sic], not as a private citizen.” (Doc. No. 26-1 at 27; Doc. No. 27-1 at 20.) 

According to plaintiff, his letter to the newspaper editor “concerned a topic discussed by the 

Modesto Bee and which was the key issue in the DA election,” and is therefore a matter of public 

concern. (Doc. No. 40 at 32.)

Defendants’ initial argument that plaintiff was not speaking as a private citizen but rather 

pursuant to his employment with Stanislaus County is unpersuasive. Defendants rely on the 

undisputed fact that plaintiff’s letter identified him as a “prosecutor” from Oakdale. Under 

Garcetti, however, the crucial inquiry is about whether the speech at issue was part of plaintiff’s

routine employment duties. No evidence is before the court suggesting that part of plaintiff’s job 

duties in his position in 2006 involved writing letters to the editor of the local newspaper. 

Plaintiff was a line prosecutor and there is no evidence suggesting that he was involved in mediarelations for the District Attorney’s Office. Defendants do not suggest otherwise. Even if 

plaintiff were to have been occasionally authorized to give press statements on particular cases—

something the court merely surmises is possible, as there is no evidence of it—plaintiff’s letter to 

the editor here concerned a specific office practice which was indisputably at issue in the 2006 

election for District Attorney, and particularly Judge Cummins’s categorization of that practice. 

There is no indication this type of commentary was required of plaintiff in his regular job duties. 

Without such evidence, defendants cannot persuasively claim, in light of the decision in Garcetti, 

that plaintiff’s speech was not that of a private citizen.

This does not end the inquiry, however, as the court must still look to the entire record to 

ascertain whether the speech in question was on a matter of “public concern.” Plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing this is the case and he has satisfied that burden here. As Cummins testified 

in his deposition, the election race between himself and Fladager was contentious. (Doc. No. 31 

at 100.) A particular issue of dispute was the murder conviction rate in the District Attorney’s 

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Office, and Cummins had asserted the “true” conviction rate was only fifty-five percent. (Doc. 

No. 31 at 103–04.) Cummins also testified the Modesto Bee had sided with Fladager in the race, 

and published an article suggesting that his claims about the true conviction rate for murders were 

deceptive. (Doc. No. 31 at 108–10.) Fladager similarly acknowledged the controversy in her 

deposition, describing the issue of the “true” conviction rate as Cummins’s only issue in the race

for the office of District Attorney. (Doc. No. 31 at 151–52.) Plaintiff also testified that his 

purpose behind writing the letter was both to praise Cummins in connection with the race and to 

explain away the Modesto Bee’s assertion that Cummins was being deceptive about the Stanislaus 

County District Attorney’s Office murder conviction rate. (Doc. No. 31 at 340–45.) It is clear 

plaintiff’s letter to the editor was related to a matter of public concern since it addressed a 

contentious issue in a local political election.

b. Adverse Employment Action was Taken Against Plaintiff

Further, the evidence before the court on summary judgment makes it clear that adverse 

employment actions were taken against plaintiff. Defendants argue plaintiff’s claims are based 

on a theory of constructive discharge, since he was not ultimately fired but rather resigned instead 

of returning from his suspension. Defendants argue that in order to establish constructive 

discharge, plaintiff must demonstrate “his working conditions at the time of his resignation were 

so intolerable that a reasonable person in his position would have been compelled to resign.” 

(Doc. No. 27-1 at 22.) However, the decisions defendants cite for this proposition were rendered 

based on statutory labor law or state common law, not in the context of alleged violations of the 

First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2007); Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996); King v. AC & R 

Advert., 65 F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 1995); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1461 

(9th Cir. 1994); London-Marable v. Boeing Co., 357 Fed. App’x 61, 63 (9th Cir. 2009); Metzger 

v. Martinez, 48 Fed. App’x 660, 665 (9th Cir. 2002).6 

 

6

 Alternately, defendants claim an employment action is not adverse if it is not yet final, citing 

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000). Again, Brooks did not arise in 

the context of an action alleging First Amendment retaliation claims. 

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Defendants point to the decision in Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 

2000) in support of their argument. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffemployee had “failed to introduce evidence demonstrating a nexus between his statements to 

Gallo and any adverse employment action he may have suffered.” Id. at 899. In addressing the 

§ 1983 claim before it the court in Huskey did apply the “constructive discharge” analysis, but did

so in the context of an alleged due process violation—i.e., that the employee was deprived of a 

property interest in his job without due process of law. Because of the differing nature of the 

constitutional claims at issue, the court concludes that the decision in Huskey is not dispositive of 

the issue presented in this case. This is especially true in light of the decisions discussed below. 

As plaintiff argues, where First Amendment violations are alleged, an adverse 

employment action need not require much adversity in order to be actionable. As the Supreme 

Court has stated:

Since the government however, may not seek to achieve an 

unlawful end either directly or indirectly, the inducement afforded 

by placing conditions on a benefit need not be particularly great in 

order to find that rights have been violated. Rights are infringed 

both where the government fines a person a penny for being a 

Republican and where it withholds the grant of a penny for the 

same reason.

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13 (1976). See also Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 

497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990) (overturning a holding that only an employment decision that was the 

“substantial equivalent of a dismissal” would violate a public employee’s rights under the First 

Amendment). “The denial of even a ‘trivial’ benefit may form the basis for a First Amendment 

claim where the aim is to punish protected speech.” Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 977. The Ninth Circuit 

has adopted a “reasonably likely to deter” test concerning whether an employer’s action was 

adverse. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 975–76 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To constitute an 

adverse employment action, a government act of retaliation need not be severe and it need not be 

of a certain kind. Nor does it matter whether an act of retaliation is in the form of the removal of 

a benefit or the imposition of a burden.”); see also Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 

1061 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a deprivation of a five percent increase in salary for a period of 

approximately three months was sufficient adverse action).

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Here, the parties do not dispute numerous facts indicative of adverse employment actions 

taken against plaintiff. The parties do not dispute plaintiff was transferred out of more desirable 

positions and into less desirable assignments; that he was suspended without pay; that he was 

compelled to write letters of apology; that he was moved into a less desirable office; and that he 

received both oral and written reprimands. While some of these—such as being moved to a less 

desirable office—may not have been reasonably likely to deter First Amendment activity, 

suspensions and work assignment transfers are certainly adverse employment actions that a jury 

could find were reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity.

c. Insufficient Evidence Establishing the Adverse Employment Actions were 

Substantially Motivated by the Protected Conduct 

Having shown that he was the subject of adverse employment actions and engaged in 

protected First Amendment activity sufficiently to resist summary judgment, plaintiff also bears 

the burden of demonstrating these adverse employment actions were substantially motivated by 

his protected speech. Karl, 678 F.3d at 1068. Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on this issue at 

trial. Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor because 

plaintiff is unable to meet that burden. Defendants argue there is “no evidence that conclusively 

shows”7defendant Fladager knew of plaintiff’s association with or speech in support of 

Cummins, and that only Chief Deputy District Attorney Gerald Begen knew that plaintiff 

supported Cummins for District Attorney in 2006. (Doc. Nos. 26-1 at 29; 27-1 at 28.) According 

 

7

 As noted at the outset, when the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the 

moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 

party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.). See also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for 

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before 

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment . . . is satisfied.” 

Id. at 323. On the other hand, defendants’ use of the word “conclusively” is not accurate. 

Plaintiff need not “conclusively” establish any material fact at this stage, or even at trial for that 

matter since establishing the facts by a preponderance of the evidence will suffice. See Thomas v. 

Cty. of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014). 

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to defendants, plaintiff “relies only on his own speculation to establish this key element.” (Doc. 

Nos. 26-1 at 29; 27-1 at 28.) Defendants also assert that even if plaintiff had evidence of such 

knowledge on the part of defendant Fladager, that would be insufficient because he has no direct 

evidence by which to prove her motive and proving motive is part of his affirmative case. (Doc. 

Nos. 26-1 at 30; 27-1 at 28–29.) Finally, defendants argue all plaintiff can muster on summary 

judgment is circumstantial evidence of the temporal relationship between the adverse 

employment actions taken against him and his speech at issue, and this is insufficient as a matter 

of law. (Doc. Nos. 26-1 at 31–32; 27-1 at 29–30.)

Plaintiff’s papers and his argument at hearing make clear he is relying primarily on 

several sources of circumstantial evidence which, when considered collectively he contends, 

demonstrate that a jury must determine whether defendant Fladager acted against him in 

retaliation for his engagement in protected speech.

8

 In this regard, plaintiff points to the 

following: 1) evidence he sought to meet with Fladager after the election and she treated him 

with distrust and did not reassure him she did not hold a grudge against him; 2) plaintiff’s 

removal from the gang prosecution unit shortly after Fladager took office, which Assistant 

District Attorney Carol Shipley apparently told him was “punishment”; 3) the fact that, despite 

having tried many cases prior to Fladager’s election, he tried only one case thereafter; 4) the 

disparate treatment he received compared to other Deputy District Attorneys who had allegedly 

spoken critically of judges; 5) the disparate treatment he received after Fladager’s election 

compared to the treatment he received before the election; 6) the disparate treatment received by 

alleged Cummins supporter Wallace McKenzie, who was supposedly passed over for promotion 

despite his superior qualifications; 7) the disparate overall evaluation ratings plaintiff before and 

after Fladager’s election; and 8) the “paper trail” created about plaintiff, i.e. that complaints about 

other attorneys were not commemorated in the same manner as those made against plaintiff. 

Even taking the collective weight of this evidence into consideration, however, it is clear that no 

 

8

 Of course, a mere laundry list of protected speech on the one hand and arguably retaliatory acts 

over time on the other is insufficient to establish a wrongful retaliation claim absent some 

evidence showing that the retaliatory conduct was motivated by the protected speech.

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reasonable factfinder could conclude the adverse actions taken against plaintiff were substantially 

motivated by his protected First Amendment context. 

First, concerning knowledge of plaintiff’s support of Cummins, it is not seriously 

disputed that plaintiff’s support of Cummins was unknown. Cummins acknowledged being 

aware plaintiff supported his campaign and had donated money to it, though he could think of no 

other members of the District Attorney’s Office who supported his campaign, either publicly or 

privately. (Doc. No. 31 at 121–22.) Cummins testified plaintiff was the only member of the 

District Attorney’s Office who told Cummins he was supporting him. (Doc. No. 31 at 124.) 

Begen—plaintiff’s supervisor at various points in his tenure at the District Attorney’s Office, 

including from 2007 to 2012 (see Doc. No. 31 at 51–52)—also was aware plaintiff was 

supporting Cummins in the election, though he believed Deputy District Attorneys McKenzie and 

Mike Houston were also supporting Cummins. (Doc. No. 31 at 85.) Plaintiff testified at his 

deposition that it was “public knowledge” he was supporting Cummins in the election, based on 

his letter to the editor, his public donation to Cummins’s campaign, his attendance at Cummins’s 

fundraisers, and his name being posted on Cummins’s campaign website. (Doc. No. 31 at 333–

34.) According to plaintiff, during the race he had two lunches with an investigator who was 

supporting Fladager’s campaign, during which they discussed Fladager and plaintiff’s support of 

her opponent. (Doc. No. 31 at 273–76.) Plaintiff also testified Fladager talked to attorneys in the 

office in an attempt to obtain their support, but did not talk to him. (Doc. No. 31 at 280–81.) 

According to plaintiff, Fladager arranged a campaign photograph for herself and her supporters 

outside the office, and did not invite plaintiff (Doc. No. 31 at 276–78), suggesting her subjective 

awareness of plaintiff’s support of Cummins. Even Fladager herself believes she became aware 

of plaintiff’s letter to the editor “at some point towards the end of the campaign” or around the 

time of the election. (Doc. No. 31 at 155–56.) Therefore, defendants’ assertion that plaintiff has

come forward with insufficient evidence of Fladager’s knowledge of his support for Cummins 

during the race is belied by the evidence presented on summary judgment. 

Of course, mere knowledge that plaintiff supported her opponent is not, in and of itself, 

sufficient to show Fladager held a retaliatory motive in taking the subsequent adverse 

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employment actions against plaintiff. Because plaintiff lacks any direct evidence of retaliatory 

motive, the court turns to the circumstantial evidence provided by plaintiff on summary judgment. 

Plaintiff testified at deposition he had met with Fladager after the 2006 election to advise 

her that, while he had supported Cummins, he wanted to “clear the air” between them and 

reassure her that he would “do a good job” working for her. (Doc. No. 31 at 264.) Plaintiff noted 

that he had to pursue this meeting with Fladager for several months before she agreed to meet and 

when she did agree, she brought a witness to the meeting. (Id. at 264–65.) According to plaintiff, 

Fladager was “very reserved” at the meeting, “didn’t respond a lot,” and just “listened.” (Id. at 

269.) Plaintiff testified Fladager did not provide him with any verbal reassurance at the meeting 

that she bore no grudge against him. (Id. at 269.) Plaintiff acknowledged that he had “no 

independent recollection” of what he said to Fladager during the meeting, and was attempting to 

“reconstruct it . . . based on what I wanted to accomplish there.” (Id. at 267.) Nevertheless, 

plaintiff testified he believed “the tone was set” and he “had a hint that she might have a grudge.” 

(Id. at 269.) In her declaration submitted in support of defendants’ summary judgment motion, 

Fladager states she does not recall meeting with plaintiff about his work on Cummins’s campaign

during 2006 or at any point thereafter until he raised the retaliation allegations in his penultimate 

Skelly conference. (Doc. No. 27-5 at 51.)

There might be a multiplicity of reasons for not promptly meeting with a subordinate 

immediately after becoming a newly-elected District Attorney. Such evidence does not create a 

reasonable inference of retaliation in response to plaintiff’s engagement in activities protected by 

the First Amendment. Even if a jury construed Fladager’s reserved approach to the meeting as 

evidence that she was distrustful of plaintiff, this meeting did not involve or result in any alleged 

adverse employment action. Simply put, this evidence provides no support for plaintiff’s 

conclusion that the later adverse employment actions—the first of which being plaintiff’s transfer 

out of the gang unit eight months after Fladager took office—were retaliatory. 

Turning to his transfer from the gang unit, plaintiff notes he was moved out of his 

preferred position in that unit and into the issuance department shortly after Fladager took office. 

(See Doc. No. 31 at 320–21, 325.) Plaintiff’s transfer occurred in March 2007, after complaints 

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were received by the District Attorney’s Office in February 2007 regarding an inappropriate and 

critical email plaintiff had sent to members of the gang intelligence task force. (Doc. No. 30-2 at 

24–25.) Plaintiff argues that his transfer was punishment imposed by Fladager and Shipley, 

insofar as it deprived him of the trial work he enjoyed. (Doc. No. 30-2 at 25.) The evidence 

plaintiff cites in support of this contention includes Shipley’s deposition testimony, in which she

stated she discussed the e-mail in question with Fladager, who found it inappropriate and believed 

plaintiff should be removed from the gang unit to show him there would be negative 

consequences for his inappropriate behavior. (Doc. No. 31 at 527.) This testimony, however, 

does not support a conclusion that defendant Fladager retaliated against plaintiff by transferring 

him out of the gang unit. Rather, it supports the opposite conclusion: defendant Fladager sought 

to punish and reassign plaintiff for entirely appropriate and lawful reasons.

Plaintiff also argues that, when other employees of the District Attorney’s Office “had 

personality issues” with law enforcement, they “were never subject to formal discipline, such as a 

written reprimand, suspension or termination.” (Doc. No. 30-2 at 25.) Notably, plaintiff does not 

assert that when other employees were inappropriate and rude to law enforcement officers, they 

were not transferred out of work assignments in which they interacted with those officers. Most 

importantly for resolution of the pending summary judgment motion, he has come forward with 

no evidence that this was the case. Plaintiff also points to the deposition of McKenzie, who 

testified that, though he had disagreements with law enforcement officers which were elevated 

and involved his superiors, he was never disciplined in connection with those disagreements. 

(Doc. No. 31 at 490–94.) However, McKenzie also testified that he was never accused of being 

rude in these disagreements, nor had he ever heard of complaints about other attorneys being rude 

in their interactions with law enforcement. (Doc. No. 31 at 491–95.) Again, the evidence before 

the court on summary judgment establishes that no one else acted as poorly in their professional 

interpersonal relationships as plaintiff allegedly did, not that plaintiff was disproportionately 

punished for the same conduct. 

Plaintiff seeks to find retaliatory motive by comparing the administrative investigation 

which started shortly after Fladager took office and the subsequent discipline he received as a 

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result with the disciplining of other attorneys in the District Attorney’s Office. Specifically, 

plaintiff points to five other attorneys who received formal discipline while Fladager was District 

Attorney. According to plaintiff’s evidence, of these five attorneys, two received suspensions: 

(1) following a DUI, one attorney was given a ten day suspension, reduced from a proposed fortyfive day suspension; and (2) after a different DUI that involved a hit-and-run, an attorney was 

given a twenty day suspension, reduced from a proposed forty-five day suspension. The 

remaining three attorneys received letters of reprimand: (3) one attorney whose house had been 

burglarized contacted a person selling items stolen from him on the internet and falsely 

represented to this individual and later to the police that the district attorney’s office was actively 

investigating the matter; (4) one attorney made a comment about taking their clothes off to a 

colleague; and (5) one attorney failed to document or communicate an agreed-upon plea deal to 

the attorney taking over the case. (Doc. No. 31 at 232–58.) This evidence simply does not give 

rise to any inference that plaintiff was the subject of retaliation. Indeed, this evidence suggests 

plaintiff’s misconduct—which consisted of five separate instances of misconduct and for which 

he ultimately received only one letter of reprimand—was punished in a proportionate manner 

with other misconduct within the District Attorney’s Office. If anything, this evidence too 

supports the conclusion that plaintiff was punished in an entirely reasonable, appropriate and 

constitutional manner.

Retaliatory motive also lurks, according to plaintiff, in the shadows of the fact that no 

other employee was “subjected to discipline for similar grounds.” (Doc. No. 45-3 at 39.) 

However, plaintiff has not come forward with evidence establishing that any other employees 

engaged in similar misconduct. Plaintiff has presented no evidence suggesting other employees 

in the office engaged in similar types of behaviors which could be taken (or mistaken) as rude or 

inappropriate but were not disciplined for it. Nor has he presented evidence that the discipline he 

received was related to his political support for Cummins, rather than due to other appropriate 

reasons, such as his own misconduct. Regardless of whether it was fair for his colleagues and 

others to find him rude, it is plaintiff’s burden to present evidence that this discipline was 

“substantially motivated” by his political speech. Bias against him for other reasons neither 

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creates a cognizable First Amendment claim nor raises a material issue of fact with regard to such 

a claim that must be resolved by a jury.

Plaintiff points again to the deposition testimony of Wallace McKenzie, who seemed to 

feel plaintiff was being singled out for discipline. McKenzie indicated he was surprised when 

plaintiff told him about complaints received about him from a judge, because Deputy District 

Attorneys were regularly told to support the office’s cases and hold the judge’s “feet to the fire.” 

(Doc. No. 45-3 at 40.) McKenzie also said it was common for attorneys to receive verbal 

reprimands following complaints from the clerical staff, but that he had never heard of other 

attorneys who were formally disciplined because of such complaints. (Doc. No. 45-3 at 41.) 

Though McKenzie testified he believed plaintiff was singled out for disparate treatment, he could 

not identify any particular reason why and did not indicate he believed it was because of 

plaintiff’s support of Cummins during the election. (Doc. No. 31 at 442–51.) 

Plaintiff also believes the failure of McKenzie to be promoted is indicative of retaliatory 

animus on behalf of Fladager against plaintiff. McKenzie was believed to be a Cummins 

supporter, despite his efforts to stay neutral in the election. (Doc. No. 31 at 468–69.) According 

to plaintiff, McKenzie was told by a member of management that others in management did not 

like McKenzie and he should “watch his back” and “needed to be careful in the future,” all of 

which were statements to which McKenzie testified at his deposition. (Id. at 446–51.) McKenzie 

was reportedly passed over for promotion, but believed it was due to his position within the local 

union, not his presumed affiliation with Cummins. (Id. at 454–55.) McKenzie also testified he 

was not promoted following the elections, but that Doug Raynaud, who McKenzie believed to be 

a supporter of Fladager, was promoted instead. (Id. at 477–82.) Raynaud was promoted despite 

having once been convicted of a DUI. (Id. at 218, 391–92, 524–26.) 

Plaintiff’s evidence establishes that at least once following Fladager’s election a supporter 

of hers was promoted and McKenzie was not. Such evidence does not create the inference that 

McKenzie was retaliated against for his purported political beliefs, let alone provide evidence in 

any way relevant to whether plaintiff was unlawfully retaliated against. Even McKenzie testified 

that he did not think he was retaliated against due to his perceived support of Cummins. There is 

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simply no evidence before the court on summary judgment establishing that McKenzie should 

have been promoted and was not. Indeed, McKenzie himself testified only that he thought he had 

more seniority than Raynaud, because Raynaud had started before him but left the office for a 

period of time. (Doc. No. 31 at 480–82.) Moreover, McKenzie did not know whether Raynaud 

or he had more experience trying cases. (Id. at 481.) 

Plaintiff also argues that, following his transfer from the gang unit to the calendar 

department, he was “harassed” by his new supervisor, Dave Harris, who demanded he “engage in 

work that other attorneys in the department were not required to perform.” (Doc. No. 45-3.) In 

actuality, the evidence plaintiff cites to support this contention is his own deposition testimony in 

which he recalled a single instance when Harris asked him to do some extra work because the 

regular work load that day was light, but did not ask plaintiff’s deputy to do additional work as 

well. (Doc. No. 31 at 327–28.) Plaintiff also testified at deposition that he felt singled out by 

Harris because he once received an e-mail saying he should not jaywalk between the District 

Attorney’s Office and the courthouse across the street, which was a common practice. (Doc. No. 

31 at 328–30.) Further, as far as plaintiff was concerned, Harris failed to defend him sufficiently 

in his interactions with others, also leading plaintiff to conclude he was being targeted for 

retaliation. (Id. at 330–32.) Plaintiff claims Harris once denied him the ability to take a vacation 

at his chosen time, because Harris believed plaintiff had not accrued sufficient vacation time. (Id.

at 305–08, 310–13.) During this time, plaintiff also lost an unofficial position he held 

representing the District Attorney’s Office at lifer parole hearings for what plaintiff deemed to be 

a “specious” reason.9 (Id. at 299–305.) Again, none of these conclusory and insignificant 

allegations support plaintiff’s claim of a retaliatory motive on the part of defendants. Rather, they 

suggest only that plaintiff disliked and felt harassed by relatively benign aspects of regular 

employment.

/////

 

9

The “specious” reason referred to by plaintiff appears to be that the District Attorney’s Office 

phased out its attendance at these hearings except in extraordinary situations, due to staffing and 

budget cuts. (Doc. No. 27-5 at 94.)

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Next, plaintiff points to subsequent administrative investigations, his eventual transfer to a 

windowless office, and his transfer to other undesirable assignments, including the juvenile 

division and a newly created position in “collateral support,” all as further evidence of 

defendants’ retaliation. (Doc. No. 45-3 at 51–65.) However, all of these allegedly adverse 

employment actions happened years after the contested election between Fladager and Cummins. 

Moreover these actions took place after an extended period of four years, from 2007 until 2011, 

in which very few or no complaints were leveled about plaintiff and during which he was,

correspondingly, the subject of no investigations or discipline. There is simply no thread of 

evidence drawing a connection between these latter employment actions and plaintiff’s 

engagement in protected conduct. Even the initial adverse action of which plaintiff complains—

his transfer from the gang unit to issuance—occurred in March 2007, approximately eight months 

after Fladager took office. The timing of the adverse actions of which plaintiff complains in 

actuality supports the conclusion that they were taken for legitimate reasons, not retaliatory ones.

The other evidence plaintiff identifies in attempting to create a triable issue of fact on this 

element is similarly unavailing. Contrary to the suggestion that he was treated more harshly after 

the election, plaintiff had long been the subject of complaints, administrative investigations, and 

discipline in the District Attorney’s Office prior to the election. His behavior was complained 

about by clerical staff, witnesses, judges, law enforcement, and other attorneys. In addition, his 

overall performance evaluations did not substantially change following Fladager’s election:

plaintiff was ranked either “exceptional” or “satisfactory” in almost all of his performance 

evaluations both before and after the election. In fact, a fair reading of his annual performance 

reviews reflects that while managers had significant, ongoing concerns about plaintiff’s behavior, 

they valued his contributions to the office, noted his successes, and praised his professional skills.

It bears reiterating that plaintiff has produced no evidence on summary judgment 

suggesting other attorneys in the District Attorney’s Office engaged in the kinds of misconduct he 

engaged in, or were the subject of the same types of complaints that he was. For example, 

plaintiff points to e-mails sent by Alan Cassidy, a Chief Deputy District Attorney, who he asserts 

“disparaged defense attorneys and judges.” (Doc. No. 30-2 at 52.) The e-mails sent by Cassidy, 

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however, were clearly sent by one member of the office to other members of the District 

Attorney’s Office and, therefore, did not damage or jeopardize the relationship of the office with 

local judges, law enforcement officers, and defense attorneys. Notably, plaintiff has come 

forward with no evidence suggesting Cassidy was ever the subject of a complaint by a judge for 

how he spoke to her in her courtroom, as plaintiff was. A reasonable factfinder would not 

conclude, based on the evidence presented on summary judgment, that plaintiff was even treated 

in a disparate fashion, let alone retaliated against for engaging in protected speech multiple years 

prior to many of the adverse actions in question.

Finally, the court observes that, despite plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation, many of the 

complaints levied against him that resulted in serious discipline came from outside of the District 

Attorney’s Office, originating from law enforcement personnel, witnesses, court staff, and 

members of the bench. There can be no suggestion that these many individuals from outside the 

office who leveled complaints about plaintiff were working in collusion with defendant Fladager 

to malign plaintiff or to falsify complaints about him. There is no evidence before the court on 

summary judgment that these types of complaints were received against other members of the 

District Attorney’s Office, and certainly no evidence that any such complaints were received with 

such frequency and vigor as the complaints which were made against plaintiff. 

The logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc—literally, “after this, therefore because 

of this”—cannot sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim, contrary to the belief professed by 

plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing on this motion. See Huskey, 204 F.3d at 899–900; see also 

Quiroz v. Horel, 85 F. Supp.3d 1115, 1131-32 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Steshenko v. Gayrard, 70 F. 

Supp.3d 979, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Here, both defendants and plaintiff have presented, and the 

court has reviewed, a large amount of evidence susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation: 

the adverse employment actions in this case were not substantially motivated by plaintiff’s 

engagement in speech protected by the First Amendment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 

475 U.S. at 587 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find 

for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”) (citations and quotations omitted). 

Indeed, though it appears plaintiff was disciplined many times for things he said, and particularly 

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for his inability to articulate himself without offending those around him, there is no evidence 

before the court on summary judgment from which a reasonable inference of retaliation could be 

drawn. See Anthoine v. North Central Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 753 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(where plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to show retaliation, that evidence must be 

specific to defeat the motion for summary judgment); McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 

1103, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming grant of summary judgment for retaliation claim where 

plaintiff had proffered no evidence of a causal link between the protected activity and denial of 

promotion); see also Roseboro v. Gillespie, 791 F. Supp.2d 353, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 

(circumstantial evidence of the temporal proximity of adverse employment action to plaintiff’s 

engagement in protected activity “is insufficient to survive summary judgment”).

Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor as to plaintiff’s 

First Amendment claims.10 

2. Due Process Claim

Defendants also seek summary judgment in their favor with respect to plaintiff’s 

procedural due process claim on the grounds that the evidence establishes plaintiff was not 

deprived of any protected interest because he voluntarily resigned his position. (Doc. No. 27-1 at 

31.) Moreover, defendants argue that even if plaintiff could demonstrate some form of 

constructive discharge, the evidence establishes that he was afforded all the process due to him, 

and therefore this claim must fail. (Doc. No. 27-1 at 32.) In response, plaintiff maintains 

Fladager’s alleged bias prevented him from receiving adequate process, and therefore genuine 

disputes of material fact remain for jury resolution. (Doc. No. 40 at 35–36.)

/////

 

10 Because summary judgment in favor of defendants will be granted on this ground, the court 

need not reach the defendants’ other arguments directed at plaintiff’s retaliation claim, including 

a lack of causation, qualified immunity, the statute of limitations defense, or the same decision 

defense under the decision in Mount Healthy and Karl. However, the court does note that had 

plaintiff made out an adequate prima facie case as to this claim, the same evidence discussed 

above would have been sufficient to establish that the adverse employment action would have 

been taken absent the protected speech. Finally, the court does not reach the various arguments 

raised by defendants regarding the inapplicability of Monell liability’s, since there can be no 

municipal liability for a constitutional violation that did not occur.

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The parties agree plaintiff had a protected property interest in his job. The only real 

question is whether Fladager’s alleged bias deprived plaintiff of the requisite due process under 

the law. While the above discussion indicates there is no evidence of retaliatory animus in 

response to plaintiff’s First Amendment protected conduct, this does not necessarily establish that 

Fladager acted with impartiality toward plaintiff. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed below 

the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants is also warranted with respect to this 

claim.

In at least some contexts, the Supreme Court has required a hearing of some sort prior to

an employee’s termination. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) 

(due process “requires ‘some kind of a hearing’ prior to the discharge of an employee who has a 

constitutionally protected property interest in his employment”) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 

408 U.S. 564, 568–69 (1972)). The hearing “need not be elaborate,” and will generally be less 

than a full evidentiary hearing. Id. at 545. The purpose of such a hearing is to “be an initial 

check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable 

grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed 

action.” Id. at 545–46. The essential requirements for such a hearing “are notice and an 

opportunity to respond.” Id. at 546.

“A biased proceeding is not a procedurally adequate one.” Clements v. Airport Auth. of 

Washoe Cty., 69 F.3d 321, 333 (9th Cir. 1995). This standard has been applied in the context of 

post-termination administrative proceedings, and even subsequent judicial review of the decision 

by an unbiased court does not redeem the tainted hearing. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit also 

noted that pre-termination hearings, which only require notice and an opportunity to respond, are 

not adjudications and therefore need not be conducted by an impartial decisionmaker, “so long as 

an impartial decisionmaker is provided at the post-termination hearing.” Id. at 333 n.15. See also 

Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he failure to provide an 

impartial decisionmaker at the pretermination stage, of itself, does not create [due process] 

liability, so long as the decisionmaker at the post-termination hearing is impartial.”); Trevino v. 

Lassen Mun. Util. Dist., No. CIV. S-07-2106 LKK DAD, 2009 WL 385792, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 

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13, 2009) (noting the same, though holding that minimal process at a pre-termination hearing 

combined with the announced appointment of an apparently biased decisionmaker at a posttermination hearing which never occurred created a jury question about whether plaintiff received 

sufficient procedural protections).

The court will assume arguendo that the same types of due process requirements apply

before any instance of formal discipline and therefore attached prior to plaintiff’s thirty-day 

suspension. However, plaintiff received a pre-disciplinary proceeding prior to the thirty-day 

suspension when a Skelly hearing was conducted by Sheriff Christianson. (Doc. No. 26-4 at 3.) 

As a result of that hearing plaintiff’s intended termination was ultimately reduced to a thirty-day 

suspension. (Id.) Plaintiff had filed an appeal of the suspension. (Id.) He served the suspension 

from August 26, 2013 to October 4, 2013, and was slated to return to work on October 7, 2013. 

(Doc. No. 26-4 at 3.) Plaintiff voluntarily dropped his appeal of the thirty-day suspension on 

September 26, 2013. (Doc. No. 30-2 at 80.) Instead of returning to work, however, plaintiff 

submitted a letter of resignation on October 7, 2013. (Doc. No. 26-4 at 3.) Plaintiff does not 

allege and presents no evidence that the adjudicator of his appeal, had he continued pursuing the 

available appeal process, was or would have been biased. Nor is there any evidence before the 

court on summary judgment of bias on the part of Sheriff Christianson, who presided over the 

Skelly hearing. Therefore, the evidence on summary judgment establishes that plaintiff received 

an adequate pre-disciplinary proceeding including all the process to which he was due and was 

slated to receive a post-disciplinary proceeding but voluntarily forewent it and resigned. There is 

no constitutional requirement, under Clements or any other authority, that plaintiff receive an 

unbiased hearing prior to being disciplined. Moreover, there is no evidence of bias in the prediscipline hearing conducted by Sheriff Christianson. Finally, plaintiff has come forward with no

evidence suggesting he would have received a biased hearing had he pursued his appeal of his 

suspension. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on 

plaintiff’s due process claim as well. 

/////

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 3. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Must Also Be Dismissed

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged a fourth cause of action based on California Labor Code 

§§ 1101 and 1102. (Doc. No. 1 at 14–15.) Defendants sought summary judgment in their favor 

as to these claims here, in part, because in California “[p]rovisions of the . . . Labor Code do not 

apply to private sector employees unless they are specifically and expressly made applicable to

the public.” (Doc. No. 26-1 at 36 & Doc. No. 27-1 at 35) (citing Johnson v. Arvin-Edison Water 

Storage Dist., 174 Cal. App. 4th 729, 733 (2009)). In his opposition to the pending motion, 

plaintiff concedes this issue. (Doc. No. 40 at 36.) However, plaintiff also states in his opposition 

that he intended to proceed against defendants in this regard under California Government Code 

§§ 3201, et seq., rather than the California Labor Code provisions cited above. (Doc. No. 40 at 

36.) In reply, defendants protest that plaintiff should not be allowed to announce a new theory of 

liability for the first time in an opposition to summary judgment. (Doc. No. 45 at 17; Doc. No. 46 

at 16.) Even if plaintiff were allowed to do so, defendants argue, they are entitled to summary 

judgment with respect to any such new claim on various state statutory immunity grounds. (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues California Government Code §§ 3201, et seq. override the immunity to which 

defendants claim to be entitled. (Doc. No. 40 at 36.)

A complaint may be amended, with leave of court, at virtually any point in the case, 

including during and after trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure generally encourage district courts to freely allow amendments. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2), (b)(1). The Ninth Circuit, however, has suggested that at least in some cases 

amendment should not be allowed at the summary judgment stage, particularly if there will be 

prejudice to the defendants resulting from the lack of discovery. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 

232 F.3d 1271, 1292–94 (9th Cir. 2000). In Coleman, plaintiff employees, who were laid off 

following reductions-in-force, had challenged an adverse employment action under the ADEA, 

claiming disparate treatment. Id. at 1291. Plaintiffs’ ADEA complaint alleged only a disparate 

impact theory. Id. The Ninth Circuit did not indicate plaintiffs must raise both theories in their 

complaint, but held that where plaintiffs failed to indicate the alternate theory of liability either in 

the complaint or during discovery, and discovery had since closed and would therefore result in 

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prejudice to the defendant, plaintiffs were barred from raising the alternative theory for the first 

time in opposition to defendant’s summary judgment motion. Id. at 1292–94; see also Ultimax 

Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1354 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Thus, the 

district court was clearly within its discretion to deny the motion to amend based on undue delay 

and a similarly burdensome need to reopen summary judgment motions.”); Pickern v. Pier 1 

Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968–69 (9th Cir.2006) (refusing to allow the plaintiff to assert 

new specific factual allegations in support of a claim when they were “presented for the first time 

in [the plaintiff's] opposition to summary judgment”); Maples v. SolarWinds, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 

1221, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“On a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s allegations and 

theories of liability are confined to those found in the operative complaint. [citation omitted.]

Since this particular claim is not alleged in the pleadings, it not properly before the Court.”).11

In any event, plaintiff has failed to articulate a cognizable claim under California 

Government Code §§ 3201, et seq. Plaintiff’s complaint specifically quotes California Labor 

Code §§ 1101 and 1102. (Doc. No. 1 at 14–15.) The only factual allegations set forth in the 

complaint in relation to that cause of action are that plaintiff “exercised his right to engage in 

political activities,” was retaliated against for these activities by being subjected to adverse 

employment actions, and suffered damages as a result. (Doc. No. 1 at 15.) While he now asserts 

he intends to proceed under Government Code §§ 3201, et seq. with respect to these factual 

allegations, it is unclear how particularly he intends to do this since no single statutory provision 

is cited by plaintiff. Rather, he merely invokes the subsection in its entirety. There are ten 

separate statutory provisions under this subsection of the California Government Code. Among 

them, they bar any “restriction . . . placed on the political activities of any officer or employee of 

a state or local agency,” California Government Code § 3203, as well as the use of any elected 

office to attempt to influence how an individual will vote, California Government Code § 3204, 

 

11

 It has been noted that the failure to plead the correct statutory basis for liability is not a basis to 

refuse amendment, since Rule 8 requires only a “short and plain statement of the case showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief” and that “a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on 

a claim simply because the plaintiff’s lawyer misconceived the proper legal theory.” Finical v. 

Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1047-48 (D. Ariz. 1999). 

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or to solicit certain political contributions, California Government Code § 3205. None of the 

statutory subsections clearly provides a cause of action for retaliation for the exercise of one’s 

First Amendment rights. It is unclear what statutory theory of liability plaintiff is now suggesting 

he would allege.12 

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s 

state law claims brought under California Labor Code §§ 1101 and 1102, as unopposed. To the 

extent plaintiff’s opposition seeks leave to amend the complaint, leave to amend will be denied as 

futile since plaintiff has failed to articulate how he may state a cognizable retaliation claim under 

the cited California Government Code provisions. See Saul v. United States, 928 F. 2d 829, 843 

(9th Cir. 1991); Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[A] proposed 

amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings 

that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” ). Finally, any amendment to 

attempt to state such a claim at this late stage of this litigation would be untimely. See Coleman, 

232 F.3d at 1292–94; see also Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d at 1354.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motions seeking summary judgment in their 

favor as to all of plaintiff’s claims (Doc. Nos. 26 and 27) are granted. Accordingly, the Clerk of 

the Court is directed to close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

12

 Plaintiff’s counsel did not elucidate the theory of liability under California Government Code 

§§ 3201, et seq. at the hearing on the pending motion.

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