Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00407/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00407-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Placer, California
Defendant
Federal Transit Administration
Defendant
Tahoe Tavern Property Owners Association
Plaintiff
Tavern Shores Owners Association
Plaintiff
United States Forest Service
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAHOE TAVERN PROPERTY OWNERS

ASSOCIATION; and TAVERN SHORES

OWNERS ASSOCIATION,

NO. CIV. S-06-407 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE;

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION;

and COUNTY OF PLACER, CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs challenge a proposed transportation project over

a parcel of land located near Lake Tahoe. Plaintiffs maintain that

the project violates the Department of Transportation Act because

it uses public recreational lands, and that defendants violated

either the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) or the

California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”). Pending before the

court are cross-motions for summary judgment. The court resolves

the matter on the parties’ papers and after oral argument. For the

reasons set forth below, the court concludes that defendants

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violated NEPA, but that an injunction to remedy the violation is

not appropriate. 

I. Facts1

This case concerns a proposed transportation project over a

parcel of land known as the “64 Acres,” which is located in Tahoe

City, California, on the south shore of Lake Tahoe and the banks

of the Truckee River. Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Fact

(hereinafter, “PSUF”) ¶ 2. Plaintiffs own condominiums that are

located directly south of the eastern segment of the 64 Acres

(Tahoe Tavern condominiums) and directly north of the eastern

segment (Tavern Shores condominiums). PSUF ¶¶ 3-4. If

constructed, the transportation project would include an intermodal

transit center that supports transit, bicycling, and walking. 2

AR 860. The transit center would include space for up to six buses

at one time, seating/waiting areas, and 130 parking spaces. 1 AR

188.

A. Management Prior to 1984

The federal government first acquired the 64 Acres in 1904.

PSUF ¶ 5. From 1904 until 1984, the U.S. Department of the

Interior (“USDI”) Bureau of Reclamation (“BR”) managed the land.

PSUF ¶ 6. In 1984, BR turned over management of the 64 Acres to

the Truckee Carson Irrigation District (“TCID”). Federal Defs.’

SUF (“DSUF”) ¶ 4. USDI required that it approve any proposed

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 Plaintiffs dispute this statement, but the cited portion of 2

the record plainly indicates that USDI had such a requirement.

 In light of the no trespassing signs, it is difficult to 3

know precisely what the acknowledgment means.

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leases of project land. DSUF ¶ 5. 2

Despite this apparent requirement, TCID began negotiating

leases on the 64 Acres, without first obtaining approval. DSUF ¶

6. Specifically, TCID leased the Lakeside portion of the 64 Acres,

which is bounded by Highway 89 on the west, to two then-new private

condominiums owned by plaintiffs. DSUF ¶ 7. Under the

unauthorized lease by TCID, plaintiffs claimed possession of the

entire Lakeside portion of the 64 Acres and restricted access by

members of the public, posted signs against “trespassing,” and

illegally paved roads and lawns. DSUF ¶¶ 8-9. BR acknowledged,

however, that “[w]hile the Associations have posted the areas

against trespassing to maintain the right to control undesirable

uses, no effort [was] made to prevent public uses for picnicking

or bathing.” 7 AR 3095.3

In the 1960s, BR and the Forest Service (“FS”) began

discussing the possibility of transferring the site from BR to FS.

PSUF ¶ 8. In 1978, BR and FS signed a Memorandum of Agreement

(“MOA”) stating that FS “has determined that there is a public need

for the 64-acre tract for recreation purposes, and [BR] agrees with

Service’s proposed use of the 64-acre tract.” PSUF ¶ 9. The MOA

provided for its termination upon the transfer of the land to FS.

DSUF ¶ 19. Meanwhile, though, lessees under unauthorized leases

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 Again, plaintiffs dispute whether the locations indicated 4

in the map mirror the currently proposed locations.

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by TCID were developing the Riverside portion of the parcel, which

is bounded by Highway 89 on the east. DSUF ¶ 14. These

developments included a restaurant converted into a liquor store

and a trailer park with over 300 tenants. DSUF ¶ 14.

In 1981, BR prepared an environmental assessment (“EA”) for

the proposed transfer. PSUF ¶ 10. That environmental assessment

stated: "the Forest Service plans to develop recreation and visitor

information facilities on the tract for use by the general public."

PSUF ¶ 10. Under another section, the EA also stated that “a

visitor’s center and transit stop are proposed.” 7 AR 3081. FS

also sent a letter to BR in 1981 describing its plans for the 64

Acres. PSUF ¶ 11. The letter included a map, which envisioned

“public transit” and “commercial area parking,” with its footprint

at least partially within the 64 Acres, although the parties

dispute whether the locations indicated in the map mirror the

currently proposed locations. PSUF ¶ 11.

BR also prepared an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) in

1983, which included a tentative development plan that envisioned

“a public parking lot and bus station.” 7 AR 2815. The EIS also 4

noted that the transfer provides for “a public parking lot and bus

station,” DSUF ¶ 28, which were “compatible with recreation and

visitor use,” DSUF 98. The EIS explained that the transfer to FS

would be under the authority of the Federal Water Project

Recreation Act of 1965. PSUF ¶ 12. That act allows BR to transfer

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 Plaintiffs again point out that the transit center was 5

envisioned to be north of the Truckee river, rather than the

currently proposed location south of the river.

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lands to FS “for recreation and other national forest system

purposes.” PSUF ¶ 13. Finally, in 1984, BR transferred

responsibility for management of the 64 Acres to the Secretary of

Agriculture under this statutory provision. DSUF ¶ 36.

B. Management After 1984

Upon assuming responsibility of the 64 Acres, FS began

restoration and improvement efforts. DSUF ¶ 37. In 1986, FS

prepared an environmental assessment and Decision Notice/Finding

of No Significant Impact entitled, “A Plan for the Sixty-four

Acres” (“1986 plan”). DSUF ¶ 38. This was undisputedly FS’ “first

formal management plan for the site.” PSUF ¶ 22. The 1986 plan

describes the national forest as “a source for . . . land for

numerous . . . uses that support the community.” DSUF ¶ 95. 

According to the 1986 plan, FS considered transportation to

be an essential component of the recreational use of the 64 Acres:

“The crux of a successful plan will be in how it handles the

movement of people and cars through the area.” DSUF ¶ 100.

Accordingly, as with the pre-1984 documents (e.g., 1981 EA & 1983

EIS), the 1986 plan acknowledged a transit terminal on the 64

Acres. DSUF ¶ 40. FS planned the site for both recreational and 5

public transit use. DSUF ¶ 101. The 1986 plan indicated that

regional transit improvements would complement visitor enjoyment

of recreational development such as rafting, bike trails, and a

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 Plaintiffs dispute that the referenced regional transit 6

improvements refer to a transit center on the 64 Acres.

 Plaintiffs note that the transit terminal was listed as a 7

“potential” use.

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public beach. DSUF ¶ 101. 6

The 1986 plan also highlighted the problems associated with

parking, and noted that more parking -- including parking for

employees in the area -- could be constructed. See 7 AR 2761 (map

showing plot of land marked for several purposes, including “longer

term parking” as well as “employee/skier shuttle to ski areas”);

7 AR 2763 (listing “parking” as part of plan).

In 1988, FS prepared another EA and decision notice entitled

“Public Access for the Sixty-Four Acres,” DSUF ¶ 42, which

“tier[ed] off” the 1986 plan, PSUF ¶ 26. The 1988 EA identified

locations on the tract for, among other things, a 79-space parking

lot. DSUF ¶ 42. It also described a “possible” community parking

lot. PSUF ¶ 29. The EA expressed that the 64 Acres “should be

developed into a public recreation area consistent with the overall

design plan for Tahoe City.” PSUF ¶ 30.

Also in 1988, FS promulgated the Lake Tahoe Basin Management

Unit (“LTBMU”) Land and Resource Management Plan. This plan

identified specific uses for the 64 Acres, including facilities

that had been planned or developed (e.g., parking, bike trails,

raft launch), as well as anticipated future uses (e.g.,

interpretive center, transit terminal, community parking, and

Highway 89 realignment). DSUF ¶ 43. The goal of the plan was to 7

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“[p]rovide a transportation system that accesses national forest

resources and links well with the basinwide transportation,” and

to reduce by 10% the vehicle miles traveled in the basin. 18 AR

7361. Measures to achieve this reduction included “public

transportation terminal . . . centers.” Id. 

In 1998, FS and Placer County, among others, began

environmental review for a transit center on the Riverside portion

of the 64 Acres (west of Highway 89). PSUF ¶ 42. The transit

center is slated to be on the northern part of the Riverside

portion of the 64 Acres. PSUF ¶ 42. The parties dispute whether

this portion would be over a meadow as opposed to forest and

grassland. The transit center would provide multiple-use parking,

and one of those uses is projected to be by employees of businesses

in downtown Tahoe City, because of the shortage of parking in that

area. PSUF ¶ 45.

In 2000, Placer County, FS, and the Tahoe Regional Planning

Agency published a final EIS/EIR. PSUF ¶ 49. The EIS/EIR stated

that the project would not result in any significant impacts to

recreational resources, PSUF ¶ 54, or to visual resources, PSUF ¶

55. The EIS/EIR also did not identify any conflict between the

project and state or federal environmental laws, although the

argued conflict with the Federal Transportation Act was discussed

in an appended July 2000 FTA findings letter. 2 AR 942-44. 

In October and August of 2000, respectively, FS and Placer

County approved the project. PSUF ¶¶ 58-59. Thereafter,

plaintiffs appealed. PSUF ¶ 60. FS rejected the appeal and

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affirmed its record of decision, PSUF ¶ 61, whereas Placer County

continued plaintiffs’ appeal and elected to perform an additional

environmental review. PSUF ¶ 63. The purpose of that review was

to consider alternative locations, including off-site locations,

for the project. PSUF ¶ 64. At a public hearing, a Placer County

staff person described the original EIS/EIR as “a cursory, very

general review of some sites.” PSUF ¶ 64. The product of Placer

County’s additional review was a final EIR, issued September 2005,

PSUF ¶ 74, that ultimately rejected the alternative locations.

Placer County certified a Recirculated Final EIR in 2006. DSUF ¶

183.

II. Standard

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

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dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id.

at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat'l

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Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.

1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of

Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-

49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see

also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No.

20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1093

(9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County

of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

B. Federal Law Claims

Neither NEPA nor the applicable provision of the Federal

Transportation Act provides for an independent cause of action or

its own standard of review; accordingly, plaintiffs' federal law

claims are brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”). Under the APA, "the standard of judicial review is

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 Despite the presence of the CEQA claim, there is no bar 8

under Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89

(1984). The claim is brought against Placer County, and counties

are not “arms of the state” for Eleventh Amendment purposes, and

they cannot claim immunity on this basis. See Mt. Healthy City

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (“The

bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to

States and state officials in appropriate circumstances . . . but

does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.”);

Beentjles v. Placer County Air Pollution Control Dist., 397 F.3d

775, 782 n.7 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[C]ities and counties do not enjoy

Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).

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whether the Secretary's decision was 'arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

While [agency] decisions are entitled to a presumption of

regularity, that presumption does not 'shield [agency] actions from

a thorough, probing, in-depth review.'" Stop H-3 Assoc. v. Dole,

740 F.2d 1442, 1449 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)

and Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971)). 

Although the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the

facts, it may not substitute its own judgment for that of the

agency. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. Generally, judicial review

is limited to the administrative record. Id. As to a NEPA claim,

“[w]e evaluate the EIS simply to determine whether it ‘contains a

reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the

probable environmental consequences of a challenged action.’” 

National Parks and Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 222

F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). If the agency

has taken a “hard look” at the environmental consequences, the

court’s review is at an end. Id.

C. State Law Claims8

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 The court dismisses the claims that plaintiffs have either 9

abandoned or waived. See Defs.’ Reply at 16-17. 

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The standard of review for a CEQA claim is analogous to that

of the APA. The court must determine "whether there was a

prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is

established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required

by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by

substantial evidence." Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21168.5. However,

“a reviewing court must adjust its scrutiny to the nature of the

alleged defect, depending on whether the claim is predominantly one

of improper procedure or a dispute over the facts.” Vineyard Area

Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova,

40 Cal. 4th 412 (2007). Thus, for example, if the claim is that

an agency failed to include certain information mandated by CEQA,

the court will apply greater scrutiny than if the claim concerns

whether adverse effects could have been better mitigated. Id.

III. Analysis

Pending before the court are cross-motions for summary

judgment. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to summary

judgment on three claims, Section 4(f) of the Department of

Transportation Act, NEPA, and CEQA. As set forth below, the court

finds that the 64 Acres was jointly planned for both transportation

and recreation uses. Accordingly, Section 4(f) does not apply.

In addition, the court finds that plaintiffs have established a

NEPA violation, but concludes that injunctive relief is not

appropriate.9

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 “[T]he Secretary may approve a transportation program or 10

project . . . requiring the use of publicly owned land of a public

park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of

national, State, or local significance, or land of an historic site

of national, State, or local significance (as determined by the

Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction over the

park, area, refuge, or site) only if (1) there is no prudent and

feasible alternative to using that land; and (2) the program or

project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the

park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic

site resulting from the use.” 49 U.S.C. § 303(c). 

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A. Section 4(f) Claim

First, plaintiffs argue that the proposed transit center

violates Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act. 49

U.S.C. § 303(c). That provision prohibits the Secretary of

Transportation from approving of a transportation project that uses

a public park unless there is no prudent and feasible alternative

and the project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to

the park. It was enacted by Congress in response to “[t]he 10

growing public concern about the quality of our natural

environment.” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 404. Although the Federal

Transit Administration makes the Section 4(f) determination, the

law directs the Secretary of Transportation to “cooperate and

consult” with the Secretary of Agriculture, among others. 49

U.S.C. § 303(b).

The protections afforded by Section 4(f) are subject to three

exceptions. Section 4(f) does not apply if (1) both transportation

and recreational uses were jointly planned (the “joint planning

exception”), (2) the recreational use is only temporary (the

“temporary use exception”), or (3) the property is subject to

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Accordingly, the court need not resolve whether the 11

multiple use exception or temporary use exception would apply.

 Although Sierra Club addressed the joint planning exception 12

in the context of constructive use, rather than actual use, of

land, there is no principled basis for distinguishing between the

two. The joint planning exception was created to (1) ensure

productive use of the land (i.e., recreation plus transportation,

as opposed to only transportation) and (2) avoid the perverse

incentives that make protection of recreational lands so costly

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multiple uses and was not officially designated as Section 4(f)

property (the “multiple use exception”). As explained below, the

joint planning exception applies to the 64 Acres.11

1. Joint Planning Exception

Under the joint planning exception, Section 4(f) does not

apply to property subject to joint planning for both transportation

and recreational uses. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(5)(v)(A) (exempting

property designated “for the specific purpose of such concurrent

development by the entity with jurisdiction or ownership of the

property for both the potential transportation project and the

section 4(f) resource”). The Ninth Circuit has explained why the

law does not apply to jointly planned land use. It said that

“Section 4(f) is not meant to force upon a community, wishing to

establish a less than pristine park affected by a road, the choice

between a pristine park and a road. A community faced with this

choice might not choose to establish any park.” Sierra Club v.

Department of Transportation, 948 F.2d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 1991).

A contrary rule, it argued, would create “perverse incentives,”

id., and therefore frustrate the law’s goal of preserving the

natural beauty of the countryside.12

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that communities forego recreation altogether. Furthermore,

transportation uses, if planned in advance, would not “abruptly

change the community consensus about the appropriate use of the

land,” 948 F.2d at 575. These reasons, to the extent they reflect

reality, apply equally to actual use as opposed to merely

constructive use of land.

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Here, it is plain that from the start of its planning process,

FS contemplated that the 64 Acres would be used for transportation

and recreation, not only recreation. In its first public planning

document “A Plan for the 64 Acres (Oct. 1986),” 7 AR 2741 (or

simply, the “1986 plan”), FS stated, under a section titled

“Transportation and Parking,” that “[t]he crux of a successful plan

will be in how it handles the movement of people and cars through

the area.” 7 AR 2764. The 1986 plan acknowledged that traffic

congestion and parking were serious problems, 7 AR 2746, and noted

various proposals that would address these problems. 7 AR 2762

(transit terminal); 7 AR 2757 (map showing transit center); 7 AR

2764 (bike paths and public transit); 7 AR 2764 (highway bypass).

Notably, this planning occurred prior to any recreational use on

the land.

Furthermore, documents preceding and postdating the 1986 plan

similarly envisioned a mix of on-site recreation and transit. See,

e.g., 7 AR 2816 (BR’s 1983 EIS, listing public transit as part of

FS’ plan); 18 AR 7338 (1987 Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Plan

Area Statement 174 listing as permissible use transit stations and

terminals); 18 AR 7385 (1988 LTBMU Land and Resources Management

Plan, listing transit terminal and community parking as part of

potential site improvements); 18 AR 7348 (1994 Tahoe City Community

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overruled. See In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

(noting that administrative agencies are not bound by traditional

rules of evidence). The reliance on the document also demonstrates

the agency’s reasoning process, independent of the actual contents.

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Plan, listing transit terminal); 5 AR 1680 (1997 Lake of the Sky 13

(LOTS) map showing transit terminal and community parking site).

It was FS’ intent that the transit center complement recreational

development such as bike trails, river access for rafting, a public

beach, and a trailhead. 7 AR 2764, 2773.

As FS recognized in its 2000 EIS, “development of . . . a

transit center and parking lot has been recommended, in whole or

in part, in every land use plan considered since the 1983 EIS.”

3 AR 1072. These references to a transit center and parking may

not have been exhaustive or detailed, but, as they appeared in

formal planning documents, at the very least they designated that

part of the 64 Acres be used for transit-related purposes.

a. Scope of Exception

Plaintiffs respond in several ways. First, they argue that

the joint planning exception only applies where an agency has

committed itself to an “official plan” to use the land for

transportation. I cannot agree. By definition, “planning” is a

process: it involves the delineation of a problem, the generation

of potential solutions, an evaluation of those solutions, and the

recommendation of a course of action. Given this reality, the

joint planning exception, properly understood, merely requires that

the agency’s transportation planning be documented

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The FTA letter probably does not rise to the level of an 14

“opinion letter,” given that it merely solicited more information

from FS, but even if it did, it is well-settled that such letters

lack the force of law and are not entitled to Chevron deference.

See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)

(“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters . . . do not

warrant Chevron-style deference.”); Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d

550, 553 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).

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contemporaneously with its recreation planning; it does not require

FS to produce a plan with a particular level of detail or

specificity.

Plaintiffs argue that an EIS that envisioned the transit

center in the mid-1980s would be required in order for the joint

planning exception to apply. The basis of this argument is an FTA

letter, sent in response to a request by FS for guidance on the

applicability of Section 4(f) to the 64 Acres. In that letter, FTA

advised FS “to provide FTA with documentation that a transit center

comparable to the one now being advanced has been planned at the

64 Acres . . . and that [FS] officially adopted those plans by

signing . . . [an EIS].” 11 AR 4345. The letter, however, was

written in the posture of giving advice -- not in the posture of

legal interpretation -- and FTA’s advice required more than what

the law ultimately requires.14

Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the law (i.e., demanding an EIS)

would be impractical and significantly circumscribe the scope of

the joint planning exception. First, “[i]t would be impractical

to require all joint planning to occur before the park is actually

acquired.” Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transportation, 1994 WL 387860,

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Club elsewhere refer to the Ninth Circuit decision, not the

district court opinion.

 Although the 1983 EIS discussed the potential transit 16

center, 7 AR 2816, it did not analyze the environmental

consequences of such an action. Thus, under plaintiffs’

interpretation of the law, the fact that the EIS mentioned the

transit center would not be sufficient to invoke the joint planning

exception.

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at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Here, the formal planning and 15

deliberation process involved various interested entities,

including the state parks, Tahoe City Public Utility District,

CalTrans, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, and Placer County.

Requiring an EIS as a condition to the joint planning exception

risks upsetting the balance struck by Sierra Club.

Furthermore, NEPA obligates FS to evaluate a number of

alternatives and their environmental impacts before committing to

the precise scope or location of any proposed land use -- whether

it be for transportation or recreation use. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et 16

seq.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(f) (“Agencies shall not commit

resources prejudicing selection of alternatives before making a

final decision.”). But planning in this context, as the court has

defined it, can occur short of an EIS. Accordingly, plaintiffs’

interpretation of the law would inappropriately narrow the scope

of the joint planning exception.

b. Contemplated versus Actual Transportation Use

Next, plaintiffs maintain that the contemplated transportation

uses must mirror the actual transportation uses for the joint

planning exception to apply. There is some support for this

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 The policy paper, developed by FTA’s sister agency within 17

DOT, the Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”), provides guidance

on Section 4(f) and the joint FTA/FHWA regulations implementing

Section 4(f). Although the paper refers to highway projects, its

principles would appear to apply equally to transit projects.

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form that they were originally conceived, there would be an

incentive for overreaching (e.g., planning for a 4 acre transit

center rather than a 2 acre transit center), for fear that the

contents for the first planning document will control a project’s

fate. Alternately, the creation of recreational land itself might

be discouraged in the first instance, if the joint planning

exception were perceived as so rigid as to be essentially

worthless. 

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position. The Section 4(f) Policy Paper states that Section 4(f)

requirements “do not apply to subsequent highway construction on

the reserved right-of-way as previously planned.” 15 AR 6538. 17

Here, plaintiffs note that the current transportation plans do not

resemble what they contend were FS’ prior transportation plans, in

both size (previously, a bus stop and parking lot versus now, a

transit center) and location (previously, developed land north of

the Truckee River versus now, undeveloped land south of the river).

7 AR 2874.

The argument is not without substance. An agency’s

contemplated transportation plans must be the same in kind as those

ultimately implemented. Nonetheless, the joint planning exception

is not so rigid as to prohibit any change whatsoever. Rather,

courts allow for the possibility that transportation plans will

evolve over time. In Sierra Club, for instance, the Ninth 18

Circuit found that the joint planning exception applied, even

though the routing plan for a highway had changed from its original

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of the intermodal facility are being sized in accordance with

today’s transportation needs but are not significantly different

from the historic plans for the transportation facilities.” 2 AR

944. The proposed facility would occupy 2.5 acres of the 64 Acres.

16 AR 6656.

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conception. 948 F.2d at 570. See also Sierra Club, 1994 WL 387860

(district court, on remand, recognizing the need for flexibility).

It is sensible that as the transportation demands in the region

grew over time, the plans for the transit center would grow as

well. 

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Furthermore, the nature and purpose of the proposed

transportation use remain the same. The overarching goal of both

the transit center and parking lot is to get people out of their

cars and into public transit. The transit center accomplishes this

goal by making buses more readily accessible, and by providing a

place where buses and riders can wait; those basic elements have

not changed.

Again, the only way to harmonize sensibly the strictures of

NEPA, which forbid premature commitments, with the existence of the

joint planning exception is to afford some degree of elasticity

between contemplated and actual transportation uses. This is not

to say, as defendants correctly point out, that a planning agency

could plan a transit center but then choose to build an airport;

it could not. But, here, the distinctions that plaintiffs seize

upon (size and location), while hardly immaterial, are not so great

so as to divorce the original transportation plans from its current

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transportation plans is less than fully convincing. Although there

is no direct guidance on this issue, it appears that the legally

relevant time period for ascertaining FS’ plans is after it

acquires control over the property. See 49 U.S.C. § 303(c)

(Section 4(f) limits application to parks of national, state, or

local significance “as determined by the Federal, State or local

officials having jurisdiction over the [area].”); 15 AR 6537

(Section 4(f) applies to lands “identified in the management plans

of the administering agency as being for . . . recreation . . .

purposes”).

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the extent that planning for the transit center took into account

the class of employee riders. Highway expansions that use Section

4(f) land take into account similar considerations. See, e.g.,

Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 628 (6th Cir. 1997) (project

parkway intended to facilitate commercial and industrial

development).

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shape.20

Plaintiffs point out that the expansion of parking for the

transit center accommodates a new purpose: businesses in downtown

Tahoe City. Specifically, FS and Placer County projected that

these businesses would likely require employees to park in the

transit center parking lot and take a shuttle to work in order to

free up nearby spaces. This is no small matter. Of the transit

center’s 130 spaces, it is estimated that 85 would be utilized by

employees. PSUF ¶ 45. 

Even if one of the main purposes animating the transit center

was to accommodate transit riders accessing recreation, however,

there is some evidence in the record that the transit center would

also accommodate commercial demands. See 7 AR 2761 (map with 21

employee shuttle); 7 AR 2874 (map with commercial parking). That

commercial purpose is no doubt magnified and more pronounced in the

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For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2401 provides for a six-year 22

statute of limitations, which would have already expired on the

1984 event. Furthermore, although the court need not resolve the

issue, it is not clear that transportation -- or at least some form

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current plans, but its genesis can be found in the early planning

documents. As defendants also note, the purpose of the project is

to enhance transit, not parking, with the ultimate goal of

improving the quality of the lake and air. Employees who choose

alternatives to the automobile would be legitimate project users,

much like destination visitors, day-use visitors, and residents.

2 AR 860.

Plaintiffs also maintain that the transfer of the 64 Acres

from BR to FS never could have happened if employee parking were

the intended use of the land. Plaintiffs maintain that while BR

could transfer the land to FS for “recreation and other national

forest system purposes,” 7 AR 2866 (reprinting Federal Water

Project Recreation Act), transportation does not constitute a

national forest system purpose.

Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs are correct, they have not

alleged a reason why this is relevant to the Section 4(f) analysis.

Rather, it appears that plaintiffs’ argument attempts to import an

external limitation on the use of forest land into Section 4(f).

To the extent that plaintiffs are challenging the validity of the

1984 transfer, they have not demonstrated a jurisdictional basis

for judicial review, standing to assert what appear to be the

rights of BR, or that the statute of limitations on any possible

claim has not already expired. In short, even if plaintiffs 22

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of transportation -- is not a “national forest system purpose.”

Other statutes expressly provide for transportation uses on forest

land. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(6) & (7) (Federal Land Policy

and Management Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1608(a) (National Forest

Management Act).

Defendants also note that preventing automotive pollution

serves national forest purposes (e.g., “outdoor recreational,

range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes,” 16

U.S.C. § 528) by protecting the air and water quality in the

region. See 2 AR 741 (“Over and over again, scientific research

has identified automobile emissions as one of the major

contributors to Lake Tahoe’s disturbing clarity loss.”); 2 AR 851

(“The Intermodal Transit Center has been planned in [] large part

to reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled.”); 7 AR 2755 (“The National

Forests are managed principally to insure high water quality . .

. Purely regional or local interests that don’t conflict with

[this] can often be accommodated.”). Furthermore, one of the

causes of congestion mentioned in the 2000 EIS/EIR stems from

people driving around in search of parking. 2 AR 853.

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have a claim, it is the subject of a different lawsuit whose

viability is uncertain.

c. Prior Recreational Commitments

Finally, plaintiffs maintain that FS previously committed the

property for recreational purposes. As evidence, they cite to a

1978 memorandum of understanding between FS and BR, which stated

that “there is a public need for the 64-acre tract for recreation

purposes.” 1 AR 267. Plaintiffs press that an agency cannot first

plan for recreational use -- as plaintiffs contend that FS did by

virtue of this document -- and then later qualify those plans to

allow transit development. 

This is much to hang on a three-page document, memorializing

only the most basic points of understanding between the agencies,

and that terminates, by its own terms, on the date of the

administrative transfer of the 64 Acres to FS. 1 AR 268.

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Moreover, the vast majority of the 64 Acres is still set for

recreational use. The issue is whether the 1978 memorandum, or the

derivative and analogous documents cited by plaintiffs, by stating

the need for recreational land, implied a need for exclusively

recreational land. There is nothing to demonstrate that they did.

Even if pre-transfer negotiations, documents, and statements

were binding on FS’ plans -- which is itself unclear, see supra,

n.20 -- the court would examine the pre-1984 documents as a whole.

In addition to the 1978 memorandum, BR’s 1983 Final EIS

unambiguously referred to the development of a “public transit

station” on the site. 7 AR 2816. That document also envisioned

“a public parking lot and bus station.” 7 AR 2815. As this EIS

is more comprehensive than the 1978 memorandum, even if the court

were to give pre-transfer documents controlling weight, the court

would come to the same conclusion, that exclusive recreational use

was never planned. In addition, looking at the pre-transfer

documents as a whole rebuts the inference that defendants somehow

duped BR into transferring the property for one reason and then

later reneged on that promise.

Accordingly, the court finds that the 64 Acres is not Section

4(f) land. The record is replete with indications that

transportation was a planned use, and plaintiffs’ attempts to

minimize the import of these references is unavailing. As

defendants rightly out point, the transportation uses were no more

“tentative” than the recreational uses. Thus, the court finds that

the land was jointly planned for both transportation and

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 Plaintiffs point out that an agency that fails to disclose 23

significant project impacts has failed to comply with CEQA’s

procedural mandates, and that its ultimate decision must be set

aside, even if supported by substantial evidence. Bakersfield

Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, 124 Cal. App.

4th 1184, 1221 (2004). While plaintiffs maintain that the

potential Section 4(f) violation is such an impact requiring

disclosure (regardless of whether or not it is ultimately found to

exist), the court disagrees, for the reasons explained herein.

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recreational uses.

B. NEPA & CEQA Claims

Plaintiffs’ second claim is that defendants violated NEPA and

CEQA by failing to identify adverse environmental impacts, and to

supplement the EIS/EIR when presented with new information, such

as the abandonment of the Fanny Bridge widening project, and the

off-site alternatives discussed in the Recirculated EIR. The court

disagrees. Plaintiffs also maintain that “the 4(f) violation

infected the NEPA and CEQA analyses.” Pls.’ Mot. at 16. Because

the court has found that the joint planning exception applies, it

need not address the aspects of the NEPA and CEQA claims that rely

upon a Section 4(f) violation.23

1. Impacts

First, plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to acknowledge

the transportation project’s adverse impacts on the 64 Acres as

required under NEPA and CEQA. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (directing

federal agencies to describe “the environmental impacts of the

proposed action” under NEPA); see also Cal. Pub. Res. Code §

21002.1(a) (directing agencies to identify “the significant effects

on the environment of a project” under CEQA). The issue before the

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In their reply, plaintiffs recant their earlier 24

misstatement that the loop trail segment to be realigned is used

by 270 people per hour. Pls.' Reply at 7. That statistic refers

to the entire regional trail network, rather than the on-site

trail.

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court is whether the EIS/EIR contains a reasonably thorough

discussion of potential environmental effects. See Neighbors of

Cuddy Mtn. v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002);

Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (requiring

only that the agency take a “hard look” at the issues). Here,

plaintiffs maintain that neither the Forest Service nor Placer

County acknowledged the significance of (1) the alleged

displacement of the on-site trail loop, (2) the alleged replacement

of a scenic meadow with the transit center, and (3) the threatened

violation of Section 4(f).

a. On-Site Trail Loop

The first of these issues can be dispensed with summarily.

The fact that the project “displaces” a portion of an on-site trail

loop does not mean that the project “replaces” the trail. Rather,

the project will simply realign part of the trail -- an action that

will “not preclude enjoyment of the resource.” 2 AR 1192.

Accordingly, the trail realignment does not result in any

significant recreational impacts. 

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b. Meadow

The second of these issues merits further discussion.

Plaintiffs contend that the transit center would displace an open

meadow based on two documents. First, the 2000 EIS/EIR refers to

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 If the dispute were material, the issue of whether land is 25

a meadow versus a forest is the type of factual question over

which, in the absence of clear evidence, the court would likely

defer to Forest Service’s expertise. 

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“the open meadow on the north side of the 64-Acre Tract” over which

the proposed project would lie. 3 AR 1197. Defendants maintain

that this statement was inaccurate because the source cited for

that proposition in the EIS (TRPA’s 1993 Lake Tahoe Scenic

Resources Evaluation) in fact indicated that the meadow was on the

south side of the 64-Acre Tract. That source places the meadow in

“Segment 3" and “across from Tahoe Tavern.” It appears to the

court that the only piece of land satisfying both these

requirements is, as defendants point out, in the southern part of

the land. This would suggest that the transit center will not be

built on the meadow in the southern region.

However, the second document -- aerial photographs of the 64

Acres from 1995 and 2005, 18 AR 7388 -- is troubling. The area

that defendants maintain is an open meadow appears to contain

closely spaced trees, but the land where the transit center would

be located is described as “a flat area with widely spaced mature

conifer trees.” 3 AR 1197. Regardless of whether or not a meadow

exists in the southern region, as defendants maintain is the case,

it appears that a meadow (possibly a second meadow) might also

exist in the land over which the project would be built.

Ultimately, though, the court need not resolve this factual

dispute definitively, because it is not material to whether

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. NEPA 25

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requires no more documentation than an EIS that sets forth the

pertinent facts for the decision-maker to weigh. See Robertson v.

Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (“If the

adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately

identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA

from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental

costs.”). 

Here, the EIS/EIR discussed the conversion of 2.5 acres of

open space by land coverage. 2 AR 929, 1155. One of the comments

also addressed the loss of “open space, with a lovely mixture of

trees and meadows.” 2 AR 843. The Response to Comments expressly

noted the open space in the location of the transit center and

parking lot would be lost, but also observed that the remaining

portions of the 64 Acres, which facilitate dispersed recreational

opportunities, would remain in their currently restored state until

other planned developments occurred. Id. The EIS/EIR concluded

that the transit center “is designed to give the public greater

access to [recreational] amenities with minimal loss of open

space.” Id. These actions satisfy the required “hard look” that

agencies must take.

Furthermore, the EIS discussed the visual impacts of the new

transit building, 3 AR 1203-04, and the visual impacts of the

parking lot, 3 AR 1204-05. These potential impacts were determined

to be significant, but not once mitigation measures (e.g., avoiding

unnecessary tree removal, landscape screening, etc.) were in place.

Accordingly, the court finds that the EIS/EIR adequately addressed

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the environmental impacts caused by a loss of open space.

c. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27

Third, plaintiffs argue that defendants violated NEPA by

failing to address a threatened Section 4(f) violation in the EIS.

Under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1, EISs should “provide full and fair

discussion of significant environmental impacts.” Plaintiffs point

out that 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 further defines “significantly” as

including “[w]hether the action threatens a violation of Federal,

State, or local law or requirements imposed for the protection of

the environment.” Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that because there

was a potential Section 4(f) violation, defendants were obligated

to discuss it in the EIS, which they allegedly did not do.

As an initial matter, defendants have identified various

environmental and decisional records in which the threat of a

Section 4(f) violation was disclosed. See, e.g., 2 AR 942-44 (July

2000 FTA findings letter in FS August 2000 Transit EIS); 11 AR

4309-10 (July 2000 FTA findings letter); 1 AR 204-206 (FS’ October

2000 Transit ROD); 1 AR 170-71 (FTA’s August 2001 ROD). Plaintiffs

fail to respond to these cited portions of the record. In

addition, the portions of the EIS that discuss the planned

transportation uses of the 64 Acres also rebut the potential

Section 4(f) violation, even if not expressly.

In any event, even if defendants were under an obligation to

disclose the Section 4(f) issue as significant in the EIS, any

failure to do so would, in light of the court’s foregoing analysis,

be moot.

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2. Alternatives

Second, plaintiffs maintain that defendants failed to engage

in a sufficient alternatives analysis. The alternatives analysis

allows both decision-makers and the public to determine whether

there are better ways of accomplishing a project's goals. 40

C.F.R. § 1502.14 (regulatory section on alternatives which has been

described as "the heart of the environmental impact statement");

14 Cal. Code Regs. § 15126.6. See also Kings County Farm Bureau

v. City of Hanford, 221 Cal. App. 3d 692, 733 (1990) (noting that

an EIS/EIR "which does not produce adequate information regarding

alternatives cannot . . . enable the reviewing agency to make an

informed decision and to make the [] reasoning accessible to the

public.").

The range of alternatives that must be analyzed is determined

by the project's purpose and need. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power

Corp. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978);

Northwest Environmental Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117

F.3d 1520, 1538 (9th Cir. 1997). An agency, however, need not

consider alternatives that are unfeasible, ineffective, or

inconsistent with the policy objectives for the management of the

area. Headwaters, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 914 F.2d

1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 1990).

Here, the EIS/EIR examined three alternatives, a proposed

action, an alternative site design, and a no action alternative.

3 AR 1061-62. While it may be true that there are circumstances

under which three alternatives will satisfy defendants' NEPA

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to analyze alternatives under CEQA when it studied 13 alternatives

in the Recirculated EIR. 1 AR 421-31, 513-59.

 The federal defendants eliminated seven alternative 27

proposals from detailed analysis. These included (1) removing the

LOTS project, (2) moving the transit center and parking lot to a

different location on the 64 Acres, (3) developing a new access

road to the transit center from the north, (4) waiting until

Highway 89 was realigned, (5) constructing overhead or underground

crossings to reduce pedestrian crossings of Highway 89, (6) moving

the project off the 64 Acres, and (7) locating the parking lot

outside the Lake Tahoe Basin and eliminating the transit center.

The federal defendants maintain that many would not satisfy

the purpose of the project, would not be accomplishable in a

reasonable period of time, or would not be technologically

feasible. 3 AR 1055-61. The off-site locations that plaintiffs

argue should have been considered also allegedly possessed problems

of parcel assembly and razing. 3 AR 1059; 1 AR 524-25. 

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obligations, see, e.g., Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of

Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1994), here, it appears fairly

certain that the original EIR/EIR's analysis of alternatives was,

as a Placer County staff person described them, "a cursory, very

general review of some sites." PSUF ¶ 64. 26

Plaintiffs contend that Placer County's analysis of additional

off-site alternatives proves that the federal defendants'

alternatives analysis was insufficient. NEPA is, of course, 27

essentially a procedural statute. Thus, the question is whether

the initial failure to consider more off-site alternatives so

undermines the process as to require that FS undertake a new

evaluation. For the reasons set forth below, the court concludes

that it does not. 

The critical point appears to be that Placer County's analysis

came to the same conclusion as the original 2000 EIS/EIR, and the

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violated its duty to supplement where “[t]here [was] no evidence

in the record that, before the inception of this action, the Forest

service ever considered whether” the new information was

sufficiently significant to require a supplemental EIS. Friends

of Clearwater, 222 F.3d at 558. Here, however, the record reveals

that FS decided in 2005 that the EIS did not need to be

recirculated because of Placer County’s Recirculated EIR. 1 AR

360.

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federal defendants appear to be entitled to rely on this analysis.

See 1 AR 360 ("staff from the USFS determined that the original EIS

would not require further recirculation with the Draft Recirculated

EIR"); 8 AR 3114 (acknowledging Recirculated EIR and finding that

"the 2000 Transit Center ROD is consistent with County plans");

Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 884 F.2d 395, 401 (9th Cir.

1989) ("ordinary notions of efficiency suggest a federal

environmental review should not duplicate competently performed

state environmental analysis"); Wetlands Action Network v. U.S.

Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting

that a project had already been subject to extensive state

environmental review). The Recirculated EIR thus satisfies the

required "hard look" that the agencies take.

Plaintiffs respond that an agency (i.e., FS) cannot wait to

explain its decisions until litigation commences and then

supplement the record with post hoc rationalizations. See Overton

Park, 401 U.S. at 419 (finding litigation affidavits

impermissible); Friends of Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 558

(9th Cir. 2000). 

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Placer County's Recirculated EIR, the documents produced by FS

after the commencement of litigation, 8 AR 3112-16, 18 AR 7401-06,

are nevertheless appropriately before the court. It has been held

that where plaintiffs seek to compel an agency to prepare a

supplemental EIS, "review is not limited to the record as it

existed at any single point in time, because there is no final

agency action to demarcate the limits of the record." Id. at 560.

Accordingly, an injunction against agency action is said to be

inappropriate where the agency has "rectified a NEPA violation."

Id.

To the extent that FS was independently obligated to analyze

more alternatives -- even without the prompting of Placer County's

subsequent analysis -- it would make no sense to require an agency

to prepare a Recirculated EIS, when, in effect, the violation has

been remedied. "Federal courts are not obligated to grant an

injunction for every violation of the law." National Wildlife

Federation v. Burlington Northern R.R., Inc., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511

(9th Cir. 1994). Although "absent unusual circumstances, an

injunction is the appropriate remedy for a violation of NEPA's

procedural requirements," Forest Conservation Council v. U.S.

Forest Service, 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal

quotation marks omitted), the court must examine the totality of

the circumstances in deciding whether to issue an injunction based

on its equitable powers. Here, although the court concludes that

analysis of more alternatives was appropriate, no injunction is

warranted in light of Placer County's Recirculated EIR. 

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3. Supplementation

Third, plaintiffs claim that the federal defendants violated

NEPA by failing to supplement the 2000 EIS/EIR in light of the

abandonment of the Fanny Bridge widening. An agency has “a

continuing duty to gather and evaluate new information relevant to

the environmental impact of its actions.” Warm Springs Dam Task

Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1980). “When new

information comes to light the agency must consider it, evaluate

it, and make a reasoned determination whether it is of such

significance as to require an SEIS.” Friends of Clearwater v.

Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 558 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Warm Springs

Dam Task Force, 621 F.2d at 1024). However, “[a] supplemental EA

is not required in response to every design change.” Price Road

Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 113 F.3d 1505,

1512 (9th Cir. 1997).

In August 2006, FS prepared a Supplemental Information Report

(“SIR”). In it, FS detailed the findings of the Recirculated EIR,

8 AR 3113-14, and noted that the widening of Fanny Bridge was still

10 years away from implementation, 8 AR 3115. The SIR did not find

that a supplemental EIS was required in light of this information.

Additionally, in December 2006, a supplement to the SIR was

prepared. 18 AR 7401-06. The supplement explained in greater

detail FS’ conclusion that the County’s proposed mitigation

measures in place of the Fanny Bridge widening did not constitute

new information.

The abandonment of the Fanny Bridge widening project does not

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constitute significant new information, because other mitigation

measures were adopted in its place. These other measures included

contributing to a Highway 89 crossing guard program and providing

enhanced summer transit services; indeed, these were deemed more

appropriate for the scale of the transit project. 1 AR 464-65,

481-82. Although Fanny Bridge would not be widened, the

Recirculated EIR concluded that there would less-than-significant

impacts because of the replacement mitigation measures.

In light of Placer County’s analysis, the federal defendants

were not obligated to supplement its own report. See Sylvester,

884 F.2d at 401; Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1117. FS was

only obligated to supplement if there remained major federal action

to occur, and “the new information [was] sufficient to show that

the remaining action will affect the quality of the human

environment in a significant manner or to a significant extent not

already considered.” Marsh v. ONRC, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989).

Here, the Recirculated EIS was already considered by FS. 1 AR 360.

Nevertheless, assuming, arguendo, that the federal defendants

were obligated to assess whether a supplemental EIS was warranted

in light of the abandonment of the Fanny Bridge widening project,

they satisfied this obligation with the December 2006 supplement.29

18 AR 7401-06; see Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Alexander, 222

F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir. 2000) (approving of SIR to determine

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create an additional 16 vehicles crossing Fanny Bridge during peakhour traffic. 18 AR 7401. With the widening of Fanny Bridge, the

potential impact was determined not to be significant. 18 AR 7402.

Based on more current information, however, the December 2006

supplement found that the unmitigated impacts for the project were

less than previously contemplated, with a total of 5 additional

vehicles each hour. 18 AR 7403. Furthermore, the supplement found

that because the proposed mitigation measures would reduce the

impact to below no-project levels, there was no new significant

information triggering a duty to revise the EIS.

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whether a supplemental EA or EIS was necessary); Marsh, 490 U.S.

at 378. That document explains the reasons why the County’s

proposed mitigation measures are consistent with the original

transit center decision and do not constitute significant new

information warranting supplementation of the EIS. 18 AR 7401- 30

06. 

To summarize, the court finds that defendants adequately

satisfied their obligations under NEPA and CEQA to give the

required "hard look" at the impacts of the proposed action.

Furthermore, while the original EIS/EIR should have considered

additional alternatives, no injunction would be appropriate in

light of Placer County's subsequent, competently performed

analysis. Finally, the court finds that any duty to supplement in

light of the abandonment of the Fanny Bridge widening project was

discharged.

IV. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

2. Defendant Forest Service and Federal Transit

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Administration’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED, except as noted.

3. Defendant Placer County’s motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED.

4. No injunction shall issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 30, 2007.

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