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Parties Involved:
United States
Appellee
Ricardo Urbina-Robles
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 14-1530 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

RICARDO URBINA-ROBLES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Thompson and Barron, Circuit Judges. 

Kendys Pimentel Soto, with whom Kendys Pimentel Soto Law 

Office was on brief, for appellant. 

 Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, Assistant United States 

Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States 

Attorney, and Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellant. 

April 1, 2016 

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BARRON, Circuit Judge. Ricardo Urbina-Robles ("Urbina") 

pled guilty to carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and carrying a firearm 

during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

The District Court sentenced him to a total of 360 months in 

prison. Urbina appealed. Finding no error that warrants the 

reversal of Urbina's conviction or sentence, we affirm. 

I. 

This case arises from a harrowing crime.1 Early in the 

morning on February 4, 2013, Urbina and two accomplices broke into 

the victims' home in Puerto Nuevo, Puerto Rico. All three burglars 

wore masks and carried firearms. Once inside the home, the 

burglars tormented the victims, a father and son, both physically 

and mentally. They also stole several items, including a car. 

The robbers then drove away in the father's car, and the father 

called the police. 

A grand jury indicted Urbina for carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2119, and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime 

of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Urbina initially pled not guilty. 

On November 14, 2013, however, Urbina moved to change his plea. 

At a hearing on November 27, 2013, he pled guilty to both counts 

of the indictment. Urbina entered a "straight plea," meaning that 

 1 We take the facts from the factual descriptions in Urbina's 

pre-sentence report, which Urbina did not object to and does not 

dispute. See United States v. Isom, 580 F.3d 43, 45 n.2 (1st Cir. 

2009). 

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he pled guilty without entering into a plea agreement. On April 

2, 2014, the District Court sentenced Urbina to a total of 360 

months of incarceration. 

II. 

On appeal, Urbina first asks this Court to vacate his 

guilty plea to Count I of the indictment, which charges Urbina 

with committing carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. That 

statute prohibits the taking of a motor vehicle that has been 

shipped in interstate commerce "from the person or presence of 

another by force and violence or by intimidation," if done "with 

the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Id. (emphasis 

added). 

 The indictment does not refer to the words "the person 

or presence." Instead, the indictment simply charges Urbina with 

taking a motor vehicle "from N.D.R. [(the victim)], by force, 

violence, and intimidation" (emphasis added). Urbina contends 

that charging a defendant with taking a car "from" someone is not 

the same, legally, as charging a defendant with taking a car "from 

the person or presence" of someone. The former formulation of the 

crime, Urbina argues, does not require the same showing of the 

car's proximity to the person from whom it has been taken as does 

the latter formulation, which is the one that the carjacking 

statute uses. See United States v. Savarese, 385 F.3d 15, 18-19 

(1st Cir. 2004) (discussing the proximity required by the 

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carjacking statute). He thus argues that the indictment omitted 

an element of the crime for which he was charged. 

The Supreme Court has held, however, that defects in 

indictments are not jurisdictional and thus are subject to waiver. 

See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) ("[D]efects 

in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate 

a case."); see also United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 

311 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that an indictment's omission of an 

element is subject to plain error review). Accordingly, Urbina 

waived his right to bring this non-jurisdictional challenge when 

he pled guilty to the crime. See United States v. Díaz-Doncel, 

811 F.3d 517, 518 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that, absent exceptions 

not applicable here, an unconditional guilty plea waives 

nonjurisdictional challenges to a conviction). 

Nevertheless, Urbina does retain the right to challenge 

the validity of his plea. See United States v. Castro-Vazquez, 

802 F.3d 28, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2015). And he challenges his plea on 

a number of grounds, including one that relies in part on the same 

contention about the indictment's misstatement of the "from the 

person of presence of" element. We now turn to those challenges. 

III.

To argue that his guilty plea should be vacated, Urbina 

points to what he contends were the District Court's violations of 

various Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requirements at his 

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plea colloquy. Urbina concedes that our review of the alleged 

violations is for plain error, because he did not raise them below. 

See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 80 (2004). 

And so Urbina concedes that he must show as to each one "(1) an 

error, (2) that is clear or obvious, (3) which affects his 

substantial rights . . . and which (4) seriously impugns the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding." 

United States v. Hernández-Maldonado, 793 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 

2015) (quoting United States v. Correa–Osorio, 784 F.3d 11, 18 

(1st Cir.2015)). Because we are dealing here with a conviction 

resulting from a guilty plea, to meet the third prong, Urbina must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the 

error, he might not have pled guilty. See United States v. GandiaMaysonet, 227 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2000). 

But while Urbina argues that he satisfies this standard 

as to each Rule 11 violation, he does not in fact meet it as to 

any. We start with the one that is closely tied to the omission 

of the "person or presence" language of § 2119 from Count I of the 

indictment. We then consider the others. 

A. 

During Urbina's plea colloquy, the District Court told 

Urbina that he was charged with taking the vehicle "from the 

possession of [the victim] by force, violence, and intimidation." 

The District Court did not use the statutory language, "from the 

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person or presence" of the victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Urbina 

thus argues that his plea should be vacated because the District 

Court violated Rule 11(b)(1)(G), which required the District Court 

to "inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant 

understands . . . the nature of each charge to which the defendant 

is pleading." 

Our prior decisions in Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, and 

United States v. Delgado-Hernandez, 420 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2005), 

provide the framework for assessing this challenge. As we 

explained in Gandia-Maysonet, "because a guilty plea is a shortcut 

around the fact-finding process, reviewing courts have been 

willing to intervene when an error in the guilty plea process 

arguably affects a 'core concern' of Rule 11." 227 F.3d at 3 

(quoting United States v. Hernandez-Wilson, 186 F.3d 1, 5 (1st 

Cir. 1999)). And one such core concern is "ensuring that the 

defendant understands the elements of the charges that the 

prosecution would have to prove at trial." Id.; see also DelgadoHernandez, 420 F.3d at 19 ("In order to be constitutionally valid, 

a guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent." (citing Bousley 

v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998))). 

The government's sole contention is that there was no 

clear or obvious error in the colloquy because the difference 

between "from the possession of" and "from the person or presence 

of" is not material. But the government is wrong. For while every 

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auto theft entails taking a car from the possession of the car's 

owner -- regardless of how proximate the car is to the victim when 

it is taken -- not every auto theft entails taking the car from 

"the person or presence" of the owner. It is only those thefts 

that involve taking a car that is proximate to the victim in this 

specific way, however, that Congress saw fit to criminalize under 

the carjacking statute. Cf. Savarese, 385 F.3d at 18-19. 

In some cases, the indictment or the plea agreement may 

properly describe the same element that is misstated in the plea 

colloquy. See Delgado-Hernandez, 420 F.3d at 26. In such cases, 

the error thus might not undermine the Rule 11 requirement's "core 

concern": ensuring that "the defendant understands the elements of 

the charges that the prosecution would have to prove at trial." 

Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d at 3. 

 But here, as we have noted, the indictment itself 

misstated the element that the car be taken "from the person or 

presence" of the victim. In fact, the indictment did not even 

include the words "the possession of" that the government contends 

(wrongly) were an adequate substitute for the words Congress used 

to establish the element. Instead, the indictment simply stated 

that Urbina was charged with taking the vehicle "from" the victim 

"by force, violence, and intimidation." Nor was there a plea 

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agreement that might have provided Urbina with the requisite notice 

of the element in question.2

Notwithstanding the significance of the misstatement in 

the colloquy, Urbina still does need to show that there is a 

reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty had the 

Rule 11 colloquy been conducted without this error. See GandiaMaysonet, 227 F.3d at 4-5. But, in his initial briefing, as well 

as in the supplemental briefing this panel ordered on this very 

issue, Urbina merely asserts that he might not have so pled. On 

this record, that contention is not enough. 

The discovery materials Urbina received prior to his 

guilty plea clearly suggested that, at trial, the government would 

have little trouble proving the "person or presence" element. 

Those materials included: photos which show that the house had a 

driveway and a garage, where the car could have been; a statement 

Urbina made to the police that "he acted alone, that he walked by 

the house[,] saw the car, and took it;" the report from a photo 

array, in which the victim identified Urbina "as one of the 

 2 To be sure, the colloquy did reference the carjacking 

statute, as did the indictment. But those references do not 

suffice to cure the problem, given the misstatements in both the 

colloquy and the indictment itself of the element contained in 

that statute. Cf. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d at 309 ("[A] statutory 

citation standing alone in an indictment does not excuse the 

government's failure to set forth each of the elements of an 

offense."); Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d at 4-5 (finding plain error 

when the indictment correctly stated the element at issue but the 

District Court misstated it during the plea colloquy). 

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assailants who did the home invasion/carjacking at his residence" 

and the affidavit attached to the search warrant, which alleged 

that two of the home-invaders "opened the front door of the . . . 

residence and began to load items" into the car. The discovery 

materials also included surveillance video of Urbina leaving the 

victim's subdivision in the victim's car on the night of the crime. 

Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence that, if this 

was a carjacking, Urbina was the culprit. As proof of Urbina's 

involvement in the crime, the government had: an eyewitness 

identification of Urbina by the victim of the crime, the 

surveillance video mentioned above, and the fact that the victim's 

car keys and a bottle of champagne stolen from the victim were 

both found in Urbina's residence. 

Given this record, Urbina's bare contention that there 

is a reasonable probability that he might have pled differently if 

the colloquy had properly described the element that the indictment 

misstated is not enough. And our conclusion that he has not made 

the requisite showing is reinforced by the lengthy sentence Urbina 

faced and the substantial benefit he received by pleading guilty. 

Thus, Urbina's unpreserved challenge to this Rule 11 violation -- 

clear though the violation is -- fails. See Gandia-Maysonet, 227 

F.3d at 5; see also Delgado-Hernandez, 420 F.3d at 27.3 

 3 Urbina also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the 

District Court's misunderstanding of the person or presence 

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B.

We now consider Urbina's other Rule 11 challenges. Each 

of them also fails, either because there was no error at all,4 or 

because Urbina cannot show prejudice.

1. 

The first of these challenges concerns Rule 11(b)(1)(H), 

which required the District Court to inform Urbina of "any maximum 

possible penalty, including . . . supervised release." The 

District Court correctly told Urbina that he was subject to a 

minimum prison sentence of seven years and a maximum prison 

 

element caused the District Court to violate Rule 11(b)(3), which 

required the District Court to "determine that there is a factual 

basis for the plea." Urbina argues that, because of the 

misstatement of the crime, the District Court had no "factual 

basis" for the plea to Count I, because Urbina never admitted to 

violating the "person or presence" element. But this challenge, 

too, fails on prongs three and four of plain error review, in light 

of what we have described above about what the record shows 

regarding Urbina's involvement in the crime and the location of 

the car. See Delgado-Hernandez, 420 F.3d at 32. ("Because the 

record as a whole contains 'a rational basis in facts' to support 

[defendant]'s guilty plea, [defendant] fails to establish 

prejudice resulting from the court's inability to evaluate the 

factual basis proffered by the government during the proceedings 

below." (quoting Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d at 6)(internal citation 

omitted)). 

4 Urbina alleges that the District Court violated Rule 11 by 

not examining him under oath and not advising him that the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines would provide what Urbina calls a 

"minimum term" because Urbina was a career offender. Neither was 

error. Rule 11(b)(1) did not require the District Court to place 

Urbina under oath. See Charles A. Wright and Andrew D. Leipold, 

1A Federal Practice & Procedure § 177, at 218 (4th ed. 2008). 

Similarly, the District Court had no obligation to advise Urbina 

about particular provisions from the sentencing guidelines. See 

United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 383 (1st Cir. 2015). 

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sentence of life. But, the District Court told Urbina only that 

he would be sentenced to a minimum of five years of supervised 

release, without stating what the maximum term of supervised 

release would be. And even this statement was erroneous, as the 

minimum term of supervised release was actually three years; five 

years was the maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1), (2); see also 

id. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 2119, 3559(a). 

Nonetheless, Urbina does not explain how the District 

Court's overstatement of the potential period of supervised 

release could have affected his plea decision, given that he knew 

he was facing a lengthy prison term. Indeed, Urbina's straight 

plea yielded him a three-level reduction in his offense level under 

the sentencing guidelines. Without that reduction, Urbina's 

guidelines sentencing range would have been 360 months to life, 

instead of 272 months to 319 months. See USSG § 4B1.1(c)(2)-(3). 

Urbina offers no account -- nor is one apparent to us -- as to why 

he might have given up that significant benefit, and proceeded to 

trial, if the District Court did not commit this Rule 11 error. 

See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 84-85. 

2. 

Urbina's next challenge concerns Rule 11(b)(1)(K), which 

required the District Court to advise Urbina of "the court's 

authority to order restitution," and Rule 11(b)(1)(L), which 

required the District Court to tell Urbina about "the court's 

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obligation to impose a special assessment." The District Court 

did neither. Nevertheless, once again, Urbina does not explain 

how the errors prejudiced him, and we do not see how, on this 

record, he could. It is implausible that his knowledge that he 

might have to pay restitution and a $200 special assessment would 

have affected his plea decision concerning a crime for which, as 

the District Court told him, he faced a maximum sentence of life 

in prison and a minimum sentence of seven years in prison, and for 

which the guidelines sentence was significantly reduced because of 

his plea.5

3. 

Finally, Urbina points to the District Court's violation 

of Rule 11(b)(1)(M), which required the District Court to advise 

Urbina that, in determining his sentence, it would be obliged to 

"calculate the applicable sentencing-guideline range, and to 

consider that range, possible departures under the Sentencing 

Guidelines, and other sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 

 5 Urbina, citing United States v. Padin-Torres, 988 F.2d 280, 

284 (1st Cir. 1993), and United States v. Harrington, 354 F.3d 178 

(2d Cir. 2004), argues categorically that "when a defendant is not 

advised as to a potential fine or restitution, a restitution order 

cannot stand at sentencing." But Harrington was not a plain-error 

case -- the defendant in Harrington had moved to withdraw his plea 

in the district court. See 354 F.3d at 181-83. And although 

Padin-Torres did find a District Court's failure to inform a 

defendant about the possibility that the District Court would 

impose restitution and fines harmful, Padin-Torres expressly 

declined "to lay down a general rule," 988 F.2d at 284, and Urbina 

makes no argument as to why this error was harmful in this case. 

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§ 3553(a)." Despite this requirement, the District Court failed 

even to mention the sentencing guidelines or to say anything about 

how Urbina's sentence would be determined. 

Once again, though, Urbina cannot show prejudice. The 

District Court's failure to mention the sentencing guidelines was 

not comparable to the significant misstatements of possible 

consequences that were present in the cases on which Urbina relies. 

See United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d 16, 19-21 (1st 

Cir. 2009); United States v. Santo, 225 F.3d 92, 99-100 (1st Cir. 

2000). In Santo, the District Court misinformed the defendant of 

the possible statutory minimum and maximum prison terms he faced. 

225 F.3d at 99-100. In Rivera-Maldonado, the District Court told 

the defendant that he faced a three-year maximum term of supervised 

release, when in fact he faced a maximum life term. 560 F.3d at 

19-21. Urbina develops no argument as to how the District Court's 

error "dramatically altered the sentencing stakes for" him, given 

how substantial even the minimum sentence he faced was. Id. at 

21. Nor does he give any account as to why, but for the District 

Court's error, he might have given up the substantial benefit that 

he received by pleading guilty. Thus, as concerning as this error 

is, we do not think it suffices to vacate Urbina's plea on plain 

error review. 

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C. 

None of this is to minimize the District Court's multiple 

failures to follow the requirements of Rule 11. The Rule's 

requirements are mandatory, and the District Court's multiple 

divergences from those requirements are concerning. But Urbina, 

who did not object to any of the Rule 11 errors in the district 

court, has not met his burden on plain error review. And that is 

no less true even if we consider -- as Urbina says we should -- 

all of the Rule 11 violations together, given the substantial 

evidence of Urbina's guilt, the lengthy prison sentence that he 

faced, and the benefit that he received because of his plea. 

IV.

Finally, Urbina challenges his sentence. He contends 

that the District Court committed procedural errors in imposing 

the sentence, and he argues that the sentence also is substantively 

unreasonable. We address each challenge in turn. 

A. 

Urbina contends that the District Court committed 

procedural error in applying three enhancements when calculating 

Urbina's base offense level under the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines. See United States v. Prange, 771 F.3d 17, 33 (1st 

Cir. 2014). Specifically, Urbina contends that (1) no "serious 

bodily injury" resulted from the carjacking offense, see USSG 

§ 2B3.1(b)(3)(B); (2) no actual "loss" of more than $50,000 

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resulted from the carjacking offense, see USSG 

§ 2B3.1(b)(7)(C)(2013); and (3) there was no evidence that Urbina 

"knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a 

vulnerable victim," see USSG § 3A1.1(b). Urbina did not raise any 

of these arguments below, and so we review each for plain error. 

See United States v. Figuereo, 404 F.3d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 2005). 

None has merit. 

1. 

Urbina first challenges the District Court's finding 

that one or more of the victims sustained "serious bodily injury" 

under USSG § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B). This finding resulted in a fourlevel increase to Urbina's offense level. The guidelines define 

"serious bodily injury" as "injury involving extreme physical pain 

or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, 

organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such 

as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation." USSG § 

1B1.1, cmt. 1(L). 

The record indicates that Urbina and his accomplices 

abused the father and son physically and emotionally for over one 

hour. Urbina and his accomplices dragged the son around the 

victims' house while repeatedly hitting him on the head with a 

handgun. They also hit the father on the head multiple times with 

their firearms, held a knife to the son's neck while threatening 

to kill him, tied the father and son up in the bathroom, and 

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threatened to get pliers to pull out the son's fingernails. As a 

result of that conduct, the father had a lesion on his head, and 

he and his son had multiple bruises on their faces and heads. 

Both the father and son also have continued to receive 

psychological and psychiatric treatment since the night of the 

crime. The father has been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, 

panic attacks, and insomnia as a result of the trauma. Immediately 

after the crime, he could sleep only an hour per night. Despite 

psychiatric medication and treatment, a year after the incident he 

was still unable to sleep more than four to five hours each night. 

The father, who is a surgeon, also has been unable to perform 

surgeries as a result of the mental impact of the crime. In 

addition, the father told the District Court at sentencing that 

his son "doesn't want to go back to a patio, doesn't want to ride 

a bike, because [Urbina] and [his] gang might show up." 

On these facts, the District Court did not make a clear 

or obvious error in applying the "serious bodily injury" 

enhancement. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 

523 (5th Cir. 1994), a case Urbina cites, held that a victim's 

"post-traumatic stress syndrome" from a robbery did constitute 

"serious bodily injury" under the sentencing guidelines.6 Id. at 

 6 Two other cases Urbina cites, United States v. Lanzi, 933 

F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1991), and United States v. Sawyer, 115 F.3d 

857 (11th Cir. 1997), are inapposite here. 

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530-31. And we have held that "serious and continuing mental 

trauma," at least where it follows a serious physical assault, can 

constitute a "protracted . . . impairment" of "mental faculty" for 

purposes of the nearly identical definition of "serious bodily 

injury" contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(3). See United States v. 

Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 1998). Given this precedent, we 

cannot say on this record that the District Court "clear[ly] and 

obvious[ly]" erred in applying the serious bodily injury 

enhancement in the absence of any objection from Urbina. 

Hernández-Maldonado, 793 F.3d at 226 (quoting Correa–Osorio, 784 

F.3d at 18). 

2.

Urbina next asserts that the District Court erred when 

it applied a two-level increase to the carjacking offense under 

USSG § 2B3.1(b)(7)(C)(2013), after finding that the offense 

involved a "loss" of over $50,000. Urbina contends that the 

presentence report states that the loss from the offense was only 

$40,000, and that the District Court overestimated the amount lost. 

Urbina is wrong. The presentence report -- which Urbina 

does not contest -- does state that Urbina took $40,000 in cash 

from the victim's safe. But the presentence report reveals that 

Urbina and his accomplices also took "other valuables such as Ipads 

[sic], video games, bottles of wine, jewelry, [and the victim's] 

car, among other things." Moreover, the presentence report states 

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that the victim filed an insurance claim for $80,000 as a result 

of the crime. Thus, the District Court did not err in finding 

that the crime caused a loss of more than $50,000, and applying 

the two-level enhancement for that reason. 

3. 

Third, and finally, Urbina argues that the District 

Court was wrong to apply a two-level enhancement because Urbina 

"knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a 

vulnerable victim." USSG § 3A1.1(b)(1). A "vulnerable victim" is 

one "who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental 

condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the 

criminal conduct." Id. cmt. 2. 

Urbina does not dispute that the son -- who was a 

minor -- qualifies as a "vulnerable victim" under the guideline. 

See United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 233 (1st Cir. 2011) 

("Minors are often regarded as especially vulnerable victims."). 

Urbina argues instead that the son just "happened to be a minor," 

and that Urbina "had no prior knowledge, or reason to know, the 

age of any of [the] victims." 

Implicit in the District Court's ruling, however, was a 

finding that Urbina knew or should have known that the son was a 

minor and thus a vulnerable victim. See United States v. Melendez, 

279 F.3d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that district courts 

may make implicit findings in imposing sentences). And the 

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District Court did not plainly err in so finding. The son was 

only twelve years old at the time of the crime, and the details of 

the crime were such that it would be reasonable to conclude that 

Urbina would have been aware of the son's youth.7

B. 

Finally, Urbina argues briefly that his 360-month 

sentence is substantively unreasonable. Our review is for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Trinidad-Acosta, 773 F.3d 298, 

308 (1st Cir. 2014). 

Urbina's sentence exceeded the top of the guidelines 

range by forty-one months. Urbina points out that the range in 

this case had already been enhanced as a result of Urbina's 

criminal history and the characteristics of the offense. Urbina 

contends that a sentence as long as his was therefore 

unjustifiable. It was not. 

 7 At oral argument and in supplemental briefing, Urbina 

contended that the District Court had erred by failing to inquire 

into the elements of burglary under Puerto Rico law before applying 

§ 4B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. Urbina argues that this 

challenge is not waived because it relies on changes in law -- the 

Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

2551 (2015), and our decision in United States v. Castro-Vazquez, 

802 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2015) -- that occurred after the initial 

briefing of this appeal was completed. That is not so. His 

contention relies squarely on the Supreme Court's decision in 

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), which was 

decided long before Urbina filed his opening brief. This challenge 

is therefore waived. See HSBC Realty Credit Corp. (USA) v. 

O'Neill, 745 F.3d 564, 577 (1st Cir. 2014). 

Case: 14-1530 Document: 00116980469 Page: 19 Date Filed: 04/01/2016 Entry ID: 5989087
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"The linchpin of a reasonable sentence is a plausible 

sentencing rationale and a defensible result." Id. (quoting United 

States v. Ramos, 763 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir. 2014)). The record 

demonstrates that the District Court considered Urbina's long 

criminal history, which included a series of armed burglaries and 

carjackings similar to this one. The District Court also found 

Urbina's conduct in this case to have been what it was: "unusually 

heinous . . . cruel, [and] brutal," including "torture of the 

victims, gratuitous infliction of injury, and prolonged pain, 

suffering, and humiliation of the victims." We therefore reject 

Urbina's substantive reasonableness challenge. 

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Urbina's conviction 

and sentence. 

Case: 14-1530 Document: 00116980469 Page: 20 Date Filed: 04/01/2016 Entry ID: 5989087