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Parties Involved:
General Motors Corporation
Appellee
Allen Payne
Appellant

Document Text:

' 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ALLEN PAYNE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FIL E D 

United States Court of Ap;)ee. 1 :1 

Tent~ Circuit 

SC:? 0 3 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 90-3201 

) (D.C. No. 88-2482-0) 

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) ( D. Kan.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, District Judge, 

District Court for the District of Colorado, 

designation. 

United States 

sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3201 Document: 010110084249 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment entered by the 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas on his 

civil rights and tort claim brought against his employer. The 

district court directed a verdict for defendant on Payne's 

42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1988) claim for -racially discriminatory denial 

of promotion; the jury rendered a verdict for General Motors Corp. 

(GMC) on Payne's claim for negligent infliction of emotional 

distress; and the district court found in favor of GMC on Payne's 

general claim for racial discrimination in employment under Title 

VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). 

On appeal, Payne contends the district court erred: 

(1) in excluding evidence regarding a consent decree entered 

in another employment discrimination action involving 

GMC; 

(2) by directing a verdict on the section 1981 claim; 

(3) in excluding testimony by Payne's psychiatric expert on 

the issue of causation as a sanction for noncompliance 

with a discovery order; and 

(4) by modifying certain jury instructions at GMC's request. 

We address these issues in turn, discussing the facts pertinent to 

each in the course of our analysis. 

I. 

During Payne's examination of Timothy Danahy, the personnel 

director at the GMC plant where he worked, Payne attempted to 

interject the matter of GMC's settlement of an unrelated class 

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Appellate Case: 90-3201 Document: 010110084249 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 2 
action challenging its performance appraisal system on the basis 

of its disparate effect on black salaried employees in Michigan, 

Indiana, and Ohio. See Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 128 

F.R.D. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1989)(approving consent decree), aff'd, 925 

F.2d 1464 (6th Cir. -1991). - GMC contends that evidence concerning 

the settlement was properly excluded under the principles 

expressed in Fed. R. Evid. 408 (restricting admissibility of 

settlements and settlement offers), Rule 407 (restricting 

admissibility of subsequent remedial measures), and Rule 404(b) 

(excluding evidence of other acts to prove character of party in 

order to show action in conformity therewith). Payne counters 

that the evidence should have been permitted for the limited 

purposes of (1) establishing GMC's notice of minority 

dissatisfaction with its performance appraisal system, and 

(2) generally providing the "true context" of Payne's personal 

discrimination and negligence claims. 

Rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence are 

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, United States v. 

Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988), and the "district 

court is granted broad discretion in ruling on the relevancy of 

evidence," id. We conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in excluding evidence of GMC's settlement. The 

settlement was reached long after the events involved in the 

instant cases and involved separate litigation over the effect of 

GMC's performance appraisal system on a class of employees from 

other facilities in different states. What relevance, if any, 

such evidence may have had in this case on the matter of notice 

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Appellate Case: 90-3201 Document: 010110084249 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 3 
was clearly outweighed by the unfairly prejudicial effect it 

plainly would have had in erroneously, but effectively, suggesting 

to the factfinder that GMC had admitted its appraisal system was 

in fact discriminatory. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. As for 

providing a broader context for the . factfinder's evaluation of 

Payne's individualized claims of discrimination and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, that is simply a more neutral 

description of the unfair prejudice warranting exclusion of the 

Huguley decree. 

II. 

Payne's section 1981 claim is based on the fact that as a 

black male employed as a level five associate reliability 

engineer, he was denied a promotion to level six, while Brian 

Bitter, a white male, was given such a promotion. The district 

court granted GMC's motion for directed verdict on this claim 

because, even assuming the sufficiency of Payne's prima facie 

case, a matter over which the court expressed substantial doubt, 

GMC articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 

actions that was not rebutted by Payne. See R. Vol. VI at 456; 

District Court's Memorandum and Order filed March 28, 1990, R. 

Vol. II, Tab 75 at 7, 11; District Court's Memorandum and Order 

filed May 30, 1990, R. Vol. II, Tab 79 at 5. 

GMC contends that a number of the factors leading to the 

proficiency promotion given Bitter serve to distinguish his 

situation from that of Payne's. Bitter had a bachelor's degree in 

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Appellate Case: 90-3201 Document: 010110084249 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 4 
automotive technology. He was one of a few employees hired under 

the "salaried executive in training" (SEIT) program designed to 

bring in and provide intensified training for qualified people 

identified as having a great deal of potential for promotion, and 

he received a "superior" rating on the performance appraisal 

preceding his promotion. Payne, on the other hand, held only an 

associate's degree, had no special training comparable to 

Bitter's, and received a lower, "highly effective," rating on his 

performance appraisals at the time. 

We agree with the district court that Payne failed to present 

evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of discrimination as 

to the promotion issue. Payne contends that he exposed the 

education factor as a pretext because of testimony that a college 

degree is not a "condition of employment" at the job levels in 

question. See Brief of Appellant at 25-26. The issue, however, 

is only whether education was a legitimate factor in the decision 

to promote. On this point, GMC's director of personnel testified 

that during the time frame in question, GMC was trying to increase 

the education level of its salaried work force to meet anticipated 

needs, and that in fact, the SEIT promotion program that brought 

Bitter to the plant was a part of that process. See R. Vol. IV at 

310-12. Similarly, GMC's EEO supervisor testified that 

educational background was also one of the factors relied on in 

assessing candidates for the pre-supervisory training program 

Payne had previously failed to qualify for. 1 See R., V. Vat 430. 

1 In 1984, Payne was one of a group of candidates for another, 

"pre-supervisory training" program intended to prepare 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-3201 Document: 010110084249 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 5 
As for the matter of Bitter's special training itself, Payne 

presented no evidence, and has evidently never maintained, that 

Bitter's opportunity to participate in the SEIT program was 

related in any way to race discrimination. 

More persuasive, at least at first blush, is Payne's argument 

that the performance evaluation process was substantially 

subjective. This court has held that "the use of subjective 

factors supports an inference of pretext when an employer 

justifies rejection of a minority candidate on the basis of such 

factors even though the minority is objectively better qualified 

than the non-minority chosen." Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 

395, 401 (10th Cir. 1983). In light of what we have said above, 

however, we conclude that Payne failed to establish he was 

objectively better qualified than Bitter and, therefore, the 

inference of pretext discussed in Mohammed has no application 

here. 

In addition to his unsuccessful attempt to expose GMC's 

proffered rationale as pretextual, Payne could have tried to meet 

his ultimate burden on the section 1981 claim directly, by showing 

that racial discrimination actually motivated GMC with respect to 

its challenged promotional decision. See Drake v. City of Fort 

Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991). The standard of 

review in ruling on a motion for directed verdict is the same in 

the district court and on appeal. See Guilfoyle ex rel. Wild v. 

(continued from previous page) 

nonsupervisory employees for promotion, but he failed to qualify 

through the applicable assessment process. Payne did not present 

any evidence to show that the selection process for the program 

discriminated against him in any way based on race. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3201 Document: 010110084249 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 6 
Missouri, Kan. & Tex. R.R., 812 F.2d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Under this standard, we are required "to determine whether, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, the evidence and inference to be drawn from it are so clear 

that reasonable minds could not differ." Id. After reviewing the 

record, we concur in the district court's decision to direct a 

verdict in favor of defendant on plaintiff's section 1981 claim. 

III. 

Prior to trial, the magistrate judge issued a report and 

recommendation, R. Vol. I, Tab 31, in which he concluded, for 

procedural reasons discussed at some length, that the trial 

testimony of Dr. Fred Fayne, Payne's treating physician and 

psychiatric expert witness, should be limited to those matters 

expressed in Dr. Fayne's statement of February 2, 1988, see 

Appellant's Addendum at 119. The district court adopted and 

enforced that recommendation at trial, in particular precluding 

Dr. Fayne from expressing an opinion identifying the alleged 

discriminatory conditions of Payne's employment as a proximate 

cause of his psychological problems, see R. Vol. III at 4-8; 

R. Vol. IV at 244-48. 

We review the district court's enforcement of the sanction 

against Payne only for an abuse of discretion. See Ikerd v. Lacy, 

852 F.2d 1256, 1258 (10th Cir. 1988)(sanction for failure to 

follow scheduling or pretrial order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)); 

Gates v. United States, 752 F.2d 516, 517 (10th Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3201 Document: 010110084249 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 7 
1985)(sanction for discovery abuse under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37). In 

light of the facts recited in the magistrate judge's report and 

recommendation, which have not been disputed by Payne, the 

limitation of Dr. Fayne's testimony to his prior statement was 

appropriate. The district court properly applied the limitation 

in excluding proximate cause testimony, as no opinion regarding 

the issue was expressed in the statement. Accordingly, we hold 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding 

Dr. Fayne from testifying regarding the cause of Payne's disabling 

psychological condition. 

IV. 

Finally, Payne challenges two of the jury instructions given 

at trial, both of which were prepared by the district court and 

subsequently modified at GMC's request. As we read the record, 

see R. Vol. VI at 460-64, 500, Payne failed to raise and explain 

adequately to the district court the particular grounds for his 

objections to GMC's requested modifications. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

51 (to preserve instructional error, party must "stat[e] 

distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the 

objection"); see also Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing 

Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1984)(counsel must "make 

abundantly clear to the trial court the objecting party's 

position"), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985). Consequently, we will not 

disturb the result reached below on this basis unless the 

challenged instructions are "patently plainly erroneous and 

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Appellate Case: 90-3201 Document: 010110084249 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 8 
prejudicial." Zimmerman v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 

1047, 1054 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Payne's challenge to instruction No. 5 focuses on the 

district court's alteration of its original statement, "defendant 

.•• denies it was negligent and discriminated against 

plaintiff," so as to read, "defendant ... denies that it 

negligently discriminated against plaintiff." In light of Payne's 

theory of the case, i.e., that through GMC's negligence Payne 

suffered emotional distress as a result of discrimination in 

connection with his employment, see instructions Nos. 8 and 9, the 

revised version of instruction No. 5 did not materially alter the 

sense of the original. No reversible error was committed under 

these circumstances. 

Payne also challenges a revision of instruction No. 11 on 

punitive damages. We agree with GMC that because the jury 

rejected Payne's case on liability, this issue is moot. 

V. 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Payne has failed to 

establish any reversible error in connection with these 

proceedings. Accordingly, the determination reached by the 

district court and jury must stand. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3201 Document: 010110084249 Date Filed: 09/03/1991 Page: 9 
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. Pending procedural motions are 

DENIED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

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