Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03188/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03188-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Respondent
Timothy Reddick
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TIMOTHY REDDICK,

Petitioner

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3188

______________________ 

Petition for review of arbitration decision by Robert 

M. Hirsch No. H13-024.

______________________ 

Decided: January 8, 2016

______________________ 

PARAS NARESH SHAH, National Treasury Employees 

Union, Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. Also 

represented by GREGORY O’DUDEN, JULIE M. WILSON,

LARRY JOSEPH ADKINS.

 

JAMES R. SWEET, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by

CLAUDIA BURKE, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., JOYCE R.

BRANDA. 

______________________ 

Case: 14-3188 Document: 37-2 Page: 1 Filed: 01/08/2016
2 REDDICK V. FDIC

Before REYNA, SCHALL, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge. 

Timothy Reddick served in a term appointment with 

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The FDIC 

offered to extend the term appointment, which 

Mr. Reddick accepted. Prior to the start of the extended 

portion of the term appointment, the FDIC revoked the 

already-accepted offer. The issue is whether the revocation constituted a “removal” under 5 U.S.C. § 7512. An

arbitrator ruled in favor of the FDIC. We agree and 

dismiss the appeal. We hold that the extension offer was 

still revocable by the FDIC even after acceptance by 

Mr. Reddick. Therefore, the offer of extension never 

matured into an effective extension, so Mr. Reddick was 

not “removed” from that prospective extension.

I 

Mr. Reddick was employed as an “Investigation Specialist” with the FDIC in an initial two-year term appointment. The initial term began in September 2010 

and was set to expire in September 2012. 

Before the expiration of the initial term, the FDIC offered Mr. Reddick an extension of the initial term for an 

additional two years. This extension term was set to 

begin in September 2012. The extension offer stated that 

the “extended employment” would be “effective [September], 2012” and that the “extended appointment is subject 

to the conditions of employment [included in the initial 

appointment offer] and subject to your continued successful performance.” J.A. 31. The extension offer was made 

in April 2012, and Mr. Reddick accepted it several days 

after receipt.

For reasons not germane to this appeal, the FDIC revoked the extension offer in August 2012. As is evident, 

but nonetheless highlighted here for its significance, this 

Case: 14-3188 Document: 37-2 Page: 2 Filed: 01/08/2016
REDDICK V. FDIC 3

revocation occurred after acceptance of the extension offer 

but prior to the beginning of the extension term. As a 

result, Mr. Reddick’s employment with the FDIC ended 

when the initial term expired in September 2012.

Mr. Reddick filed a grievance with the FDIC on the 

theory that the revocation of the extension offer was an 

adverse action under 5 U.S.C. § 7512. If Mr. Reddick’s 

allegation were true, then he would have been entitled to 

the procedural protections of 5 U.S.C. § 7513, which the 

FDIC did not provide him. But the FDIC disagreed with 

Mr. Reddick, and the matter was referred to arbitration 

under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 

The arbitrator found the revocation justified and entered disposition for the FDIC. The arbitrator found the 

extension offer to be conditional in nature, namely, conditioned on Mr. Reddick’s “satisfactory work performance.” 

J.A. 18–19. And, the arbitrator found Mr. Reddick’s 

allegedly improper conduct—which led to the revocation 

but is not at issue in this appeal—to be “highly questionable behavior” and sufficient justification for the FDIC’s 

decision to end its relationship with Mr. Reddick. Id. at 

19–20. Because the extension offer was conditioned on 

satisfactory performance and Mr. Reddick had not so 

performed, the arbitrator found the revocation justified 

and thereby denied Mr. Reddick’s grievance. 

Mr. Reddick appeals to this court.

II

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 provides a comprehensive personnel system with extensive prescriptions 

for the protections and remedies available to federal 

employees. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443

(1988); Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 

773–74 (1985). For the typical nonpreference eligible

federal employee, independent administrative and judicial 

review is only available for major adverse actions as 

Case: 14-3188 Document: 37-2 Page: 3 Filed: 01/08/2016
4 REDDICK V. FDIC

defined in 5 U.S.C. § 7512, first to the Merit Systems 

Protection Board and subsequently to this court. For 

minor adverse actions not covered by § 7512, an employee 

generally can only seek whatever internal remedies are 

available in the employing agency.1

For employees who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, like Mr. Reddick, additional remedies 

may be afforded by the collective bargaining agreement. 

For instance, an employee may be able to file a grievance 

and submit a dispute to an arbitrator. The matters 

subject to such a grievance-resolution procedure and 

arbitration are defined by the collective bargaining 

agreement and are not necessarily limited to only those 

adverse actions covered by § 7512. However, judicial 

review of an arbitrator’s decision by this court is still 

limited to only those adverse actions covered by § 7512. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f); see also Schafer v. Dep’t of Interior, 

88 F.3d 981, 984–85 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, while 

Mr. Reddick may have been able to submit his dispute 

over the cancellation of his term extension to the arbitrator under his collective bargaining agreement, we only 

possess jurisdiction if Mr. Reddick was removed from his 

position within the meaning of § 7512.

It is well-established that the failure to appoint is not 

an adverse action. See Prewitt v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 133 

F.3d 885, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Likewise, the expiration of 

a term appointment or a non-renewal of a term appointment at the term’s expiration is also not an adverse 

action. See Mittapalli v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 479, 

1 In some circumstances, inapplicable here, an employee can pursue remedies for actions not covered by 5 

U.S.C. § 7512 under the provisions established by the 

Whistleblower Protection Act. See generally 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8); see also Fields v. Dep’t of Justice, 452 F.3d 

1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

 

Case: 14-3188 Document: 37-2 Page: 4 Filed: 01/08/2016
REDDICK V. FDIC 5

481 (1981). However, the removal of an employee during 

a term appointment may qualify as a removal under 

§ 7512. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 

86 M.S.P.R. 519, 523 (2000); Youngs v. Dep’t of the Army, 

73 M.S.P.R. 551, 559 (1997).

Our jurisdiction in this case therefore depends on 

whether Mr. Reddick’s employment was terminated at the 

end of his term appointment, as the FDIC contends, or 

during his extended term, as he argues. And the answer 

to that question depends on the narrow issue of whether, 

under the facts of this case, Mr. Reddick’s term appointment was irrevocably extended by his acceptance of the 

FDIC’s offer, or whether the FDIC could revoke that offer 

prior to the effective date.

We conclude that the FDIC could revoke the extension 

offer notwithstanding Mr. Reddick’s acceptance thereof. 

First, the terms of the extension offer suggest that it 

was not intended to become irrevocably effective upon 

acceptance by Mr. Reddick. The extension offer refers to

“extended employment under a Term Appointment with 

the [FDIC] for an additional period of 24 months, effective 

[September] 2012.” In other words, the “extended employment” would become effective in September 2012, i.e., 

not immediately upon acceptance by Mr. Reddick. The 

effective date language reasonably suggests that the 

extension term would be effective, entitling Mr. Reddick

to the benefits of that position, upon the specified date in 

September 2012. As such, the stated effective date 

weighs in favor of finding that the FDIC could revoke the 

extension offer prior to Mr. Reddick beginning the extension term in September 2012. 

Second, the lack of execution of formal documentation 

of the term extension, i.e., the SF-52/50, supports the 

conclusion that the term extension had not yet become 

effective when revoked by the FDIC. The SF-52, “Request 

for Personnel Action,” and SF-50, “Notification of PersonCase: 14-3188 Document: 37-2 Page: 5 Filed: 01/08/2016
6 REDDICK V. FDIC

nel Action,” constitute the standard forms for the federal 

government to initiate and document personnel actions, 

respectively. Our court’s predecessor held that the execution of the SF-52 “is the sine qua non to plaintiff’s appointment.” Goutos v. United States, 552 F.2d 922, 924 

(Ct. Cl. 1976). In Goutos, the court held that the effectuating act in appointing the individual to the contested 

position would have been the signing of the SF-52 by the 

appropriate manager in the Department of the Army. See 

id. at 924–25. Because the SF-52 was never signed despite repeated requests and over two years of service in 

the contested position, the court held that no appointment 

had been made. See id. at 923–25. In Monaco, this court 

similarly held that the last act needed to effectuate the 

appointment was signing of the SF-52 by the appropriate 

manager within the IRS. See Monaco v. United States, 66 

F.3d 346 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished opinion). In

Skalafuris, our predecessor court looked to the SF-52 and 

SF-50 as the primary evidence of when the employee’s 

appointment became effective. See Skalafuris v. United 

States, 683 F.2d 383, 385–87 (Ct. Cl. 1982). 

An SF-52/50 may not be necessary in every circumstance to conclude that an appointment has occurred. 

See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Reagan, 663 F.2d 

239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But given the importance that

precedent places on the significance of the SF-52 and SF50 in the appointment process, see Goutos, 552 F.2d at 

924, see also Vukonich v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 589 F.2d 

494, 496 (10th Cir. 1978), we find the lack of an SF-52 or 

SF-50 to have considerable weight in determining whether the FDIC actually did extend Mr. Reddick’s appointment. 

Here, the FDIC did not execute an SF-52 and 

Mr. Reddick did not receive an SF-50 for the term extension. The FDIC explains that it was the practice of the 

agency to issue an SF-50 for an extension term only after 

the initial term had expired. Given the FDIC’s practice of 

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REDDICK V. FDIC 7

issuing the SF-50 only after completion of the initial term, 

and given the effective date provision included in the 

extension offer, it is reasonable to interpret the extension 

offer as establishing the plan for an extension term, which 

would only become effective upon execution of the SF-52 

or issuance of the SF-50.

Based on the language of the extension offer and the 

lack of the SF-52/50, we find that the extension offered to 

Mr. Reddick and accepted by him had not become effective when the FDIC revoked the extension offer in August 

2012. As a result, the FDIC’s revocation did not constitute a “removal” of Mr. Reddick from the extension term 

within the meaning of § 7512.

To the extent that Mr. Reddick argues that the revocation of the extension offer itself constitutes a removal, 

that argument lacks merit. It would be conceptually no 

different from a withdrawn offer of employment prior to 

appointment, which we have held is not an appealable 

adverse action, see Miller v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 794 F.2d 

660, 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

III

We conclude that the revocation of the extension offer 

by the FDIC did not constitute a “removal” under § 7512. 

Thus, this court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Reddick’s 

appeal. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed.

DISMISSED

No costs.

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