Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03959/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03959-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Lindsey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri. 

2

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

3

The jury also convicted Lindsey of possession with intent to distribute cocaine

base, cocaine, and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a), and 851(a),

but Lindsey does not challenge these convictions on appeal.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3959

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Robert Lindsey, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: November 12, 2007

Filed: November 16, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

___________

PER CURIAM.

Robert Lindsey (Lindsey) appeals (1) the district court’s1

 denial of his Batson2

challenge to the government’s peremptory strike of a prospective juror, and (2) the

district court’s denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal after a jury found

Lindsey guilty of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).3

 We affirm.

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-2-

During the jury selection process, Lindsey challenged, under Batson, the

government’s strike of an African-American potential juror. The government

explained it struck the juror in question because she (1) did not have strong ties to the

community; (2) had an unstable job record; (3) was a substitute teacher; and (4) had

a brother who served two consecutive terms in prison for burglary, robbery, and

murder. Lindsey argued the government did not strike other similarly situated

Caucasian potential jurors. Satisfied with the government’s explanation, the district

court denied Lindsey’s Batson challenge explaining, “[i]nitially, I was persuaded that

the reasons were pretextual. However, based upon the total of all of the reasons stated

by [the government], I’m persuaded that the reasons stated are race neutral and the

total of those explanations satisfy the Batson test.” We review for clear error. See

United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484, 485 (8th Cir. 1990) (standard of review); see

also United States v. Atkins, 25 F.3d 1401, 1406 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating “the

government can strike a venireperson who lacks attachment or commitment to

community”); United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting

“sporadic employment history as a teacher . . . [was] sufficient to constitute a raceneutral motive for striking a venireperson.”); United States v. Maxwell, 473 F.3d 868,

872 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding “[t]he inference that a juror’s employment [as a

teacher] might make the juror more sympathetic to a criminal defendant is a valid,

race-neutral reason for striking a juror.”); United States v. Boyd, 168 F.3d 1077, 1077-

78 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (finding incarceration of a family member is a “valid

race-neutral reason[] for the juror’s dismissal.”). The record does not show any of the

Caucasian venire members had all of the challenged factors the stricken venire

member possessed. The trial judge must assess the credibility of the lawyer asserting

reasons for a strike, as well as the reasons themselves. Our general practice is not to

second guess a trial judge’s credibility determination. We find no clear error here. 

Lindsey also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence introduced at trial with

respect to his conviction of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking

crime. We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based upon

sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving the

government the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See United States v. Maxwell,

363 F.3d 815, 817 (8th Cir. 2004). “We will reverse only if no construction of the

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4

Expressing dissatisfaction with counsel’s performance, Lindsey filed a motion

to compel his attorney to submit a reply brief in this matter. The motion is denied.

Complaints regarding counsel’s performance should be presented, if at all, in a 28

U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding where the record can be properly developed. United States

v. Harris, 310 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 2002).

-3-

evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 818 (quoting United States v.

Cunningham, 83 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1996)). To convict Lindsey of possessing a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, the government had to prove a

nexus between Lindsey’s possession of the firearm and the drug crime. United States

v. Rolon-Ramos, 2007 WL 2820288 at *6 (8th Cir. 2007). At trial, a detective

testified (1) when he approached Lindsey’s vehicle, Lindsey was sitting in the driver’s

seat with the window rolled down; (2) he could see Lindsey holding several clear

plastic bags of what appeared to contain, and was later verified to be, crack cocaine;

and (3) after placing Lindsey under arrest, he later searched Lindsey’s vehicle and

found a firearm beneath the seat where Lindsey was sitting. Expert testimony at trial

explained drug dealers use firearms to protect themselves, their drugs, and their

money. Our court has often recognized the role of firearms in drug dealing. See

United States v. Espinosa, 300 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002). We conclude this

evidence was sufficient to prove a nexus between Lindsey’s possession of the firearm

and a drug crime, and thereby to support Lindsey’s conviction of possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.4

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