Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02865/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02865-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jon R. White
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2865

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern District 

* of Missouri.

Jon R. White, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 9, 2006

 Filed: March 3, 2006 

___________

Before, LOKEN, Chief Judge, HANSEN and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Jon R. White plead guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1

 sentenced White on July 23,

2004, subsequent to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and prior to the Court’s decision in United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). White alleges that his sentence is in violation of

Booker and the Sixth Amendment. We affirm.

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I.

The district court determined White’s sentence under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines to be a total offense level of seventeen consisting of a base

level of twenty minus three levels for acceptance of responsibility. In arriving at a

base level of twenty, the district court relied on the pre-sentence report (PSR) to

determine that White’s prior conviction was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §

2K2.1(a)(4). 

With a criminal history category of III and an offense level of seventeen, the

Guidelines range was thirty to thirty-seven months. The district court sentenced

White to a thirty-six month term of imprisonment to be followed by a two-year term

of supervised release. In response to uncertainty surrounding the status of the

Guidelines after Blakely, the district court issued an alternate, but identical, sentence

to be imposed if the Guidelines were found to be unconstitutional. 

II.

When a defendant preserves an alleged Booker error, the error is subject to

harmless error review. United States v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 2005).

The district court committed an understandable error when it sentenced White under

a mandatory guidelines regime, but it specifically stated that it would impose the

same sentence even if the Guidelines were not mandatory. The imposition of an

alternate sentence can render a Booker error harmless. See, e.g., United States v.

Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing the district court’s

alternative sentence and holding that any Booker error was harmless). However, it

does not necessarily do so. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 417 F.3d 914, 917-18

(8th Cir. 2005) (remanding for resentencing despite the district court’s imposition of

an alternative sentence). 

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This case is distinguishable from Porter, where we remanded for resentencing.

In Porter, the district court said simply that it imposed an identical alternative

sentence “if Blakely would apply.” Id. at 916. With only that vague language to

consider, this Court felt it could not “say that the [district] court contemplated an

advisory guidelines system under which it was required to consider the advisory

guidelines range as one factor among others listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at

917. In contrast, the district court in the present case stated that “[i]t is the opinion

of the Court that the sentence that I have just set out does properly follow the

sentencing objectives of just punishment, general deterrence and incapacitation as

well as the independent judgment of this Court and I levy the sentence for those

reasons.” 

Although the district court’s statement did not expressly refer to § 3553(a), it

paraphrased several elements of that subsection. Section 3553(a)(2)(A) discusses the

need for “just punishment,” § 3553(a)(2)(B) references “deterrence,” and §

3553(a)(2)(B) discusses the “need to protect the public” which is a rationale for

“incapacitation.” Additionally, the sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines

remains a factor for the court to consider under § 3553(a)(4). Here, the sentence

given to White was within the range recommended by the Guidelines. 

This case is similar to United States v. Archuleta, 412 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir.

2005), where we held that the district court’s statements at sentencing demonstrated

sufficient consideration of the § 3553(a) factors to render any alleged Booker error

harmless. In Archuleta, we noted that the district court “chose the bottom of the

sentencing range in the belief that it would ‘serve the purposes of . . . general

deterrence, specific deterrence, and an opportunity for the defendant to participate in

appropriate programs within the Bureau of Prisons.’” Id. at 1006. Like the district

court in Archuleta, the district court here “effectively treated [the Guidelines] as

advisory” when it stated that it would have imposed an identical sentence if the

Guidelines were not binding. Id. “[W]e do not require a district court to categorically

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rehearse each of the section 3553(a) factors on the record when it imposes a sentence

as long as it is clear that they were considered.” United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d

906, 909 (8th Cir. 2006).

Additionally, the district court sentenced White near the top of the Guidelines

range. Thus, even under a mandatory guidelines regime, the district court would have

had the discretion to impose a lesser sentence. The fact that a district court chose not

to exercise its discretion to impose a lesser sentence is evidence that the same

sentence would have been imposed under an advisory guidelines regime. See United

States v. Perez-Ramirez, 415 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2005).

In light of each of these reasons, we find that any Booker error that exists is

harmless. We also find nothing in the record to suggest that the sentence imposed by

the district court was “unreasonable” or an abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Finally, White alleges that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the

district court relied on the PSR in making its factual determination that his prior

conviction was a crime of violence. This argument is foreclosed by AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-47 (1998) (holding that a prior conviction

is not an element of an offense that need be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt). White argues that the reasoning in Almendarez-Torres has been called into

question by subsequent cases, but our recent cases have made it clear that

Almendarez-Torres is still good law in this circuit. See, e.g., United States v.

Levering, 431 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 2005). 

III.

 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.

______________________________

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