Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02075/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02075-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincent J. Tenuto
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2075

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VINCENT J. TENUTO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 06 CR 0484—William J. Hibbler, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2009—DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2010

Before CUDAHY, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Vincent Tenuto pleaded guilty

to transporting child pornography in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1). At sentencing he unsuccessfully

challenged two guideline enhancements for use of a

computer and distribution of material that involved the

sexual exploitation of a minor. On appeal he argues

that the enhancements constitute double counting

because the behavior they are based on was already

Case: 09-2075 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2010 Pages: 8
2 No. 09-2075

accounted for in his conviction. In this context, double

counting occurs when the underlying offense itself necessarily includes the same conduct as the enhancements.

Because Tenuto’s conduct that gave rise to the enhancement went beyond what was needed to satisfy the

statute he pleaded guilty to violating, no double

counting occurred. We affirm.

I.

Tenuto pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly transporting in interstate commerce an image of child pornography, namely by sending an email with the illicit

image attached. This was not simply a one-time deal.

When Tenuto was arrested, over 1200 images of child

pornography were on his computer, including some

that featured sadistic images of children. At sentencing,

many enhancements applied to his conduct, and he

agreed to all but two of them. He objected to a twolevel enhancement for distribution and a two-level enhancement for using a computer to carry out his crime.

Tenuto argued that the application of these enhancements constituted impermissible double counting; the

district court overruled his objections, noting that based

on the factual circumstances of Tenuto’s case these enhancements were appropriate. With these enhancements,

his guideline range was 151-188 months; without them

his guideline range would have been 97-121 months. After

consulting the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the district

court sentenced Tenuto to 96 months’ incarceration.

He appeals the two enhancements.

Case: 09-2075 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2010 Pages: 8
No. 09-2075 3

II.

We review de novo whether the district court

impermissibly double counted Tenuto’s conduct when

it applied the two enhancements. United States v. Haynes,

582 F.3d 686, 708 (7th Cir. 2009). Tenuto’s first argument

is that the fact that he distributed child pornography is

accounted for in his base offense level and that

applying the distribution enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) to his guideline range punished him

twice for that same conduct.

There are two forms of double counting and both are

prohibited. The most common is when a district court

calculates a defendant’s offense level and applies “two

or more upward adjustments . . . when both are

premised on the same conduct.” Haynes, 582 F.3d at 710

(quotation omitted). The other form of double counting,

and the one at issue here, is when a district court relies on

conduct that was necessary to satisfy an element of the

defendant’s conviction yet uses that same conduct to

enhance the defendant’s guideline range. United States v.

Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 716 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The bar on

double counting comes into play only if the offense

itself necessarily includes the same conduct as the enhancement.” (quotation omitted)). This second bar is

rooted in the fact that the conduct that satisfied an

element of the underlying offense is already part of the

base offense level. Thus, if that same conduct also

enhances the sentence, the defendant is being punished

twice for the same act. E.g., United States v. Podhorn, 549

F.3d 552, 560 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Jackson,

103 F.3d 561, 569 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Case: 09-2075 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2010 Pages: 8
4 No. 09-2075

By prosecuting (and obtaining a guilty plea) for transporting 1

child pornography, Tenuto’s distribution of the material

remained available for the two-level enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). See United States v. Malik, 385 F.3d

758, 760 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When the same acts violate

multiple laws, the prosecutor is free to choose the one with

the highest sentence.”).

In this case, that did not occur. Tenuto was convicted

of transporting child pornography, a distinct offense

from distributing child pornography. They are, in fact,

separate crimes. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (proscribing transportation of child pornography), with 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(2)(A)-(B) (proscribing receipt or distribution

of child pornography). The two crimes are similar

because a person who has distributed child pornography

has likely transported it, and a person who transports it

is likely to eventually distribute it. Although closely

connected, they are still separate crimes. 

1

Tenuto’s charged offense was satisfied by knowingly

transporting by any means child pornography. Any

subsequent distribution of the child pornography is

immaterial in determining whether he can be convicted

under § 2252A(a)(1). He simply needed to transport the

child pornography. It was inconsequential whether he

was transporting it for himself or for others. Either way,

he violated the statute. See United States v. McCaffery,

437 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2006); cf. United States v.

Olander, 572 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting “receipt

of child pornography, with or without an intent to distribCase: 09-2075 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2010 Pages: 8
No. 09-2075 5

ute, is a crime.”). The fact that Tenuto also distributed the

material that he transported is conduct separate and

distinct from what is required to convict him of transporting under § 2252A(a)(1). Put another way, a conviction

for transporting child pornography does not necessarily

entail distribution or an intent to distribute. Accordingly,

it is not double counting when in addition to transporting child pornography a defendant also receives an

enhancement for distributing the material. Thus, the

district court did not err in applying to Tenuto’s offense

conduct the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2(b)(3)(F)

for distribution of child pornography.

Tenuto’s second argument poses a slightly different

issue. The language of § 2252A makes it a crime to knowingly mail, transport, or ship “by any means, including by

computer, any child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)

(emphasis added). The Guidelines provide a two-level

enhancement for a defendant who uses a computer to

commit an offense involving the sexual exploitation of a

minor. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6) (“If the offense involved

the use of a computer . . . for the possession, transmission,

receipt, or distribution of the material.”). Tenuto makes

two arguments for why application of this enhancement constitutes double counting. First, he contends

that transporting, the offense he pleaded guilty to committing, included the element of using a computer.

Second, he maintains that because the means he employed to transport the pornography was by a computer,

enhancing his sentence for using a computer constituted

double counting.

Case: 09-2075 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2010 Pages: 8
6 No. 09-2075

Tenuto’s arguments misapprehend the nature of

double counting. Tenuto transported child pornography

through interstate commerce—that was his offense.

To violate the statute, it was not necessary that he use a

computer. Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 715. He could have

chosen to mail or fax the material; he could have carried

it on a train or simply walked it across state lines. It would

not matter for purposes of violating § 2252A(a)(1):

the statute broadly proscribes transportation of child

pornography by using the phrase “any means” affecting

interstate commerce. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S.

52, 56 (noting that “affecting commerce” is a “[term] of

art that ordinarily signal[s] the broadest permissible

exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.”); cf. United

States v. Ye, 588 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting the

use of “any means” language places no limit on the

conduct that can satisfy the statute).

The fact that the statute goes on to specifically articulate

one of those means, “by use of a computer,” does not mean

that use of a computer is an element of the crime. At trial,

the government must prove that the offense was committed “knowingly.” It must prove that the offensive

material was “child pornography,” as that term is

defined in § 2256(8). And it must prove that the material

was mailed, transported, or shipped “using any means

or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or

affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(1). The fact that the statute specifically articulates one of those means, “by use of a computer,”

does not mean that the use of a computer is an element

of the crime.

Case: 09-2075 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2010 Pages: 8
No. 09-2075 7

Using a computer is not an element of the offense, it is

just one of many ways that a defendant can satisfy the

third element. Indeed, it is not necessary for a violation

of the statute that a defendant use a computer to

transport the material; it is merely a sufficient method

(and likely the most efficient method). Because a

defendant need not use a computer to violate the

statute, the fact that Tenuto used a computer becomes

one of the offense characteristics that apply to his conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (a defendant’s relevant conduct includes all acts that “occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction.”). Thus, it does not

constitute double counting to use that fact to enhance

his guidelines.

Here, it is undisputed that Tenuto used a computer in

the commission of his offense: he possessed the material

through use of a computer; he transmitted it through

use of a computer; he distributed it through use of a

computer. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(6) (the enhancement applies “[i]f

the offense involved the use of a computer . . . for the

possession, transmission, receipt, or distribution of

the material”). The computer enhancement provided

a complete overlay to his “offense conduct.” Id.

§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Therefore, the district court properly

applied the enhancement for use of a computer under

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6) to Tenuto’s guideline range.

III. 

The district court did not engage in “double counting”

when it applied the two enhancements to Tenuto’s guideCase: 09-2075 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2010 Pages: 8
8 No. 09-2075

line range. The enhancement for distributing material

that involved the sexual exploitation of a minor was not

based on the same factual predicate as the offense of

transporting child pornography under § 2252A(a)(1), to

which Tenuto pleaded guilty. And the use of a computer

is not an element of § 2252A(a)(1). Thus, the application

of the enhancements to Tenuto’s offense level was appropriate. We AFFIRM.

2-3-10

Case: 09-2075 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2010 Pages: 8