Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16857/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16857-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Byron Chapman
Appellee
Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BYRON CHAPMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PIER 1 IMPORTS (U.S.) INC., DBA

PIER 1 IMPORTS #1132,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-16857

D.C. No.

2:04-cv-01339-

LKK-DAD

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 19, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed March 5, 2015

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Elaine E. Bucklo, Senior District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Berzon

* The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS

SUMMARY**

Americans with Disabilities Act

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an

action under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The district court held that the obstructions in shopping

aisles and on a sales counter that the plaintiff encountered on

numerous visits to a Pier 1 store violated his rights under the

ADA, and entered a permanent injunction against Pier 1.

Affirming in part, the panel held that the obstructed aisles

the plaintiff encountered were not permissible “isolated or

temporary interruptions in . . . access” under the ADA

Accessibility Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(b), because the

evidence demonstrated that Pier 1 repeatedly failed to

maintain accessible routes in its store.

The panel reversed, however, the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim as to an accessible

sales counter. The panel remanded to the district court to

modify the injunction consistent with its opinion.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 3

COUNSEL

Minh N. Vu (argued), Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Washington, D.C.;

Eden Anderson, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, San Francisco,

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Scottlyn J Hubbard IV, Law Offices of Lynn Hubbard, Chico,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Byron Chapman, a wheelchair user, challenged numerous

alleged barriers to access at Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc.’s store

in Vacaville, California (the “Store”) in a suit first filed in

2004. Chapman claimed that the alleged barriers denied him

“full and equal” access to the Store in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA” or “the Act”). 

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Seven years later, after an appeal to

this Court, the district court held that the obstructions in

shopping aisles and on sales counters Chapman encountered

on numerous visits to the Store violated his rights under Title

III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. Having so

concluded, the court granted Chapman’s motion for summary

judgment and enjoined Pier 1 from obstructing its aisles and

counters in the future.

Pier 1 appeals, arguing that the alleged obstructions are

“temporary” barriers to access under the ADA’s

implementing regulations and so do not violate Chapman’s

rights under the Act. 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(b). We affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand.

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4 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS

I. Background

This appeal is another chapter in this case’s lengthy

history. Byron Chapman is disabled by a spinal cord injury

and requires the use of a motorized wheelchair when

traveling in public. In July 2004, Chapman sued Pier 1 under

the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., the Disabled Persons

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 54 et seq., and the Unruh Civil Rights

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq.

1 Chapman’s 2004 Complaint

requested injunctive relief requiring the Store to remove

numerous barriers. Some of those barriers Chapman had

personally encountered during his visits to the Store; others

he had not, but, he alleged, they might impede his access

during future visits. The challenged barriers — both those he

had encountered and those he had not — were listed in an

“Accessibility Survey” attached to the Complaint.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

Chapman’s motion appended a new and separate list of

unencountered barriers identified by his accessibility expert,

Joe Card. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc.,

631 F.3d 939, 943–44 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The district

court granted summary judgment for Pier 1 as to many of the

challenged barriers, but ruled for Chapman as to seven

barriers listed in the Card Report, none of which Chapman

had personally encountered at the Store. See id. at 944.

1 Chapman’s state claims are entirely dependent on his ADA claim. He

does not allege any conduct beyond that alleged to violate the ADA. See,

e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f) (“A violation of the right of any individual

under the [ADA] shall also constitute a violation of this section”); Cal.

Civ. Code § 54(c) (“A violation of the right of any individual under the

[ADA] also constitutes a violation of this section”).

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CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 5

Pier 1’s position on appeal was that Chapman did not

have Article III standing to challenge unencountered alleged

barriers. Sitting en banc, we “clarif[ied] that when an ADA

plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact by encountering a

barrier that deprives him of full and equal enjoyment of the

facility due to his particular disability, he has standing to sue

for injunctive relief as to that barrier and other barriers related

to his disability, even if he is not deterred from returning to

the public accommodation at issue.” Id. at 944. But, we

held, Chapman still lacked standing under this standard to

litigate his ADA claim. His complaint, we explained, did not

allege “which, if any, of the alleged violations deprived him

of the same full and equal access that a person who is not

wheelchair bound would enjoy . . . [or] identify how any of

the alleged violations threatens to deprive him of full and

equal access due to his disability if he were to return to the

Store, or how any of them deter him from visiting the Store

due to his disability.” Id. at 955. We therefore vacated the

grant of summary judgment and remanded to the district

court.

After remand, Chapman filed a Second Amended

Complaint, alleging that on numerous visits to the Store he

had encountered two specific barriers violative of his rights

under the ADA. First, he alleged, the Store’s “customer

service counter for disabled patrons” was cluttered by

merchandise, a condition which prevented customers with

disabilities from easily purchasing items. Second, he

claimed, the Store did not maintain accessible routes for

wheelchair users, as the Store’s aisles were often obstructed

with merchandise and other items. According to Chapman,

these barriers interfered with his ability to “use and enjoy the

goods, services, privileges, and accommodations offered at

the store,” and denied him “full and equal access.” 

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6 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS

Moreover, he alleged, Pier 1 “knew that these elements and

areas of the stores were inaccessible, violate state and federal

law, and interfere with (or deny) access to the physically

disabled.”

Pier 1 once again filed a motion for summary judgment,

this time contending that any obstructions of the sales counter

or the store aisles were “temporary,” and so not violations of

the ADA. More specifically, Pier 1 argued that the

obstructions at the Store fell within the scope of DOJ

regulations providing that “isolated or temporary”

obstructions to accessibility do not violate the ADA. In

support of its motion for summaryjudgment, Pier 1 submitted

declarations by Kim R. Blackseth, Pier 1’s disability

accessibility expert, and Tracy Snow, the Store’s manager

since November 2004.

Blackseth stated in his expert report that (1) on the date of

his inspection, the Store’s customer service counter was

“clear of goods”; (2) the “aisles throughout the store were the

required minimum 36” wide and clear of goods”; and (3) he

was “able to navigate the aisles in [his] electric Invacare

wheelchair.” The report contained photographs from the

November 2011 inspection, depicting three aisles clear of

obstructions.

According to Snow’s declaration, she had “been a part of

Pier 1 [sic] efforts to assist its mobility-impaired customers

and to ensure the stores aisles are 36 inches wide, pursuant to

Pier 1’s policy.” Snow explained that the Store’s monthly

merchandise plans directing employees on how to place

merchandise for display “always include an instruction to

maintain an aisle-width of at least 36 inches for the shopping

aisles.” She went on to report that because customers

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CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 7

commonly move merchandise around the Store, and because

Store employees must move merchandise for customers or for

stocking purposes, the Store “ha[d] adopted a number of

strategies for ensuring the Store’s shopping aisles” remained

accessible — for example, directing that employees regularly

walk around the Store with a yard stick to measure the width

of Store aisles. Moreover, Snow stated, she and two other

managers had personally measured all the shopping aisles at

the Store, finding each to be at least 36 inches wide.

Chapman opposed Pier 1’s motion and filed a crossmotion for summary judgment. He explained that on each of

his eleven visits to the Store in 2011 and 2012, aisles were

obstructed by merchandise or other items, such that “there

were times that [he] could not reach or get to certain items,

height or not, due to the aisles being blocked.” Additionally,

on at least on two occasions, the store’s accessible sales

counter, designed to be used by Pier 1 customers using

wheelchairs, was cluttered with objects.

Chapman enlisted expert Joe Card once again to support

his position. Card inspected the Store’s aisles and accessible

counter and reported numerous obstructions. Relying upon

a number of photographs he had taken of alleged barriers, as

well as his wife’s declaration and the Card report, Chapman

argued that there is no genuine dispute of material fact

concerning whether merchandise blocked accessible routes

and counters during his eleven visits to the store. He

contended that these barriers were “not temporary, isolated

occurrences . . . but, rather, a systematic pattern of abuse

against the disabled.”

The district court denied Pier 1’s motion for summary

judgment and granted summary judgment to Chapman. First,

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8 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS

the district court rejected Pier 1’s argument that the ADA

does not apply to movable obstructions, because Chapman

himself, or store employees upon request, could clear the

items.2“DOJ commentaries — and the ADA itself — refer

to an obligation that defendant bears,” the court observed, and

the ADA was intended “to eliminate the stereotype of the

helpless disabled person completely reliant on the assistance

of able-bodied persons to come to their rescue.” Therefore,

the court ruled, accessible facilities “must be maintained in a

condition that allows a disabled person to actually use them.”

The district court then turned to Pier 1’s defense that the

barriers were only “temporary,” and so did not violate the

ADA. Noting that the applicable ADA regulations exempt

liability for “isolated or temporary” interruptions in the

availability of accessible features, the district court explained

that applicable interpretive authorities indicate that

“‘[t]emporary,’ as used in this context, is closer to

‘transitory,’ that is, an object that is unavoidably placed in the

aisle, but with the intention of removing it as soon as

possible.” For instance, Pier 1’s defense would be applicable

where “boxes [were] temporarily placed in an accessible

route while being moved from, say, ‘the hall to the storage

room.’” The district court found that Chapman’s declaration

and his expert report sufficiently established that the barriers

Chapman encountered at the Store were not “transitory” in

this sense.

2 Pier 1 argued in the district court that “movable obstructions” do not

violate the ADA. It does not appeal, however, the district court’s

conclusion that “nothing in the [DOJ’s] commentaries or its technical

assistance materials — nor in the ADA itself, its implementing regulations

or the ADA Accessibility Guidelines . . . state or imply that ‘movable

obstructions’ cannot violate the ADA.”

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CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 9

After determining that Pier 1 failed to establish any other

defense or genuine dispute of fact, the district court granted

summary judgment to Chapman on his ADA claim and the

dependent state law claims. The district court accordingly

issued a permanent injunction enjoining Pier 1 from

(1) blocking its aisles with merchandise or other items,

“except for the unavoidable transitory blockages caused by

re-stocking and similar activities”; and (2) cluttering its

accessible sales counter with materials other than the

“unavoidable transitory clutter resulting from the current use

of that counter to check-out merchandise.” Pier 1 timely

appealed.

II. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions

The ADA “provide[s] a clear and comprehensive national

mandate for the elimination of discrimination against

individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Title

III of the Act, at issue here, “prohibits discrimination against

the disabled in the full and equal enjoyment of public

accommodations.” Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,

545 U.S. 119, 128 (2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). 

Retail stores, like Pier 1, are public accommodations. 

42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). The general anti-discrimination

prohibitions of Title III, id. § 1282(b)(1), are supplemented

by various, specific prohibitions, including requirements that

entities providing public accommodations must (1) make

“reasonable modifications in polices, practices, or procedures,

when such modifications are necessary” to provide persons

with disabilities full and equal enjoyment, id.

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); (2) “remove architectural barriers . . . in

existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily

achievable,” id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); and (3) “design and

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10 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS

construct facilities . . . that are readily accessible to and

usable by individuals with disabilities,” id. § 12183(a)(1).

The regulations implementing ADA Title III, see id.

§12186(b), require that a public accommodation “maintain in

operable working condition those features of facilities and

equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and

usable by persons with disabilities by the Act or this part.” 

28 C.F.R. § 36.211(a). “Whether a facility is ‘readily

accessible’ is defined, in part, by the ADA Accessibility

Guidelines (‘ADAAG’),” which “lay out the technical

structural requirements of places of public accommodation.” 

Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945 (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted); see 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A (1991 ADAAG

Standards).3 “The ADAAG’s requirements are as precise as

they are thorough, and the difference between compliance

and noncompliance with the standard of full and equal

enjoyment established by the ADA is often a matter of

inches.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945–46. “We have held that

‘obedience to the spirit of the ADA’ does not excuse

noncompliance with the ADAAG’s requirements.” Id. at 945

(quoting Long v. Coast Resorts, Inc., 267 F.3d 918, 923 (9th

Cir. 2001)).

Three regulatory requirements underlie the current

dispute. The ADAAG provide that “[t]he minimum clear

width of an accessible route shall be 36 in[ches].” 28 C.F.R.

pt. 36, app. A, § 4.3.3. The ADAAG also specify that, “[i]n

department stores and miscellaneous retail stores where

counters have cash registers and are provided for sales or

distribution of goods or services to the public, at least one of

3 Available at http://www.ada.gov/1991standards/adastd94-archive.pdf

(last visited on February 24, 2015).

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CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 11

each type shall have a portion of the counter which is at least

36 in (915mm) in length with a maximum height of 36 in

(915 mm) above the finish floor.” Id., § 7.2(1). Finally, the

generally applicable regulations explain that the requirement

that public accommodations maintain “readily accessible”

facilities and equipment “does not prohibit isolated or

temporary interruptions in service or access due to

maintenance or repairs.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(b) (emphasis

added). The parties’ disagreement centers on the latter

provision as applied to the aisle clearance width and

accessible counter requirements.

Fleshing out the import of § 36.211(b), the Technical

Assistance Manual (“Manual”)4published by the DOJ

“pursuant to Title III’s directive to provide technical

assistance to covered entities,” Miller v. California Speedway

Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008), provides that

“[w]here a public accommodation must provide an accessible

route, the route must remain accessible and not blocked by

obstacles such as furniture, filing cabinets, or potted plants,”

Manual § III-3.7000.5It also explains that “[a]n isolated

instance of placement of an object on an accessible route

would not be a violation, if the object is promptly removed.” 

Id. DOJ commentaries to the final rule revising Title III’s

implementing regulations similarly note that “a temporary

interruption that blocks an accessible route, such as

restocking of shelves,” is permitted by § 36.211(b). 75 Fed.

4 Available at http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html (last visited Feb. 24,

2015).

5 The Manual, as the DOJ’s interpretation of its own regulations, is

entitled to “substantial deference.” See Miller, 436 F.3d at 1028.

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12 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS

Reg. 56,236, 56,270 (Sept. 15, 2010).6 Like the Manual, the

commentaries recognize that “accessible routes” or “other

feature[s]” cannot be “built in compliance with the ADA,

only to be blocked or changed later so that it is inaccessible,”

73 Fed. Reg. 34,508, 34,523 (June 17, 2008):

A common problem observed by the

Department is that covered facilities do not

maintain accessible routes. For example, the

accessible routes in offices or stores are

commonly obstructed by boxes, potted plants,

display racks, or other items so that the routes

are inaccessible to people who use

wheelchairs. Under the ADA, the accessible

route must be maintained and, therefore, these

items are required to be removed. If the items

are placed there temporarily—for example, if

an office receives multiple boxes of supplies

and is moving them from the hall to the

storage room—then § 36.211(b) excuses such

“isolated or temporary interruptions.”

Id.

Also of some relevance, at least by analogy, is the DOJ’s

guidance with respect to the maintenance of equipment. The

Manual explains that, while mechanical failures in

“equipment such as elevators or automatic doors” are bound

6 The DOJ issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in 2008 proposing

amended regulations designed to adopt updated accessibilitystandards and

otherwise revise existing Title III regulations. See 73 Fed. Reg. 34,508

(June 17, 2008). A final rule adopting these updates and revisions issued

in 2010. See 75 Fed. Reg. 56,236 (Sept. 15, 2010).

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CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 13

to happen, “the obligation to ensure that facilities are readily

accessible to and usable byindividuals with disabilities would

be violated, if repairs are not made promptly or if improper or

inadequate maintenance causes repeated and persistent

failures.” Manual § III-3.7000. Likewise, the DOJ

commentaries to the rule implementing Title III state that,

while “temporary obstructions or isolated instances of

mechanical failure would not be considered violations of the

[ADA],” “allowing obstructions or ‘out ofservice’ equipment

to persist beyond a reasonable period of time would violate

this part, as would repeated mechanical failures due to

improper or inadequate maintenance.” 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544,

35,562 (July 26, 1991) (emphasis added).

III. Analysis

A. Aisles

Applying the interpretive aids just summarized, we

conclude, as did the district court, that the obstructed aisles

Chapman encountered while visiting the Store were not

“isolated or temporary interruptions in . . . access” under

28 C.F.R. § 36.211(b).

Chapman encountered several obstructed and blocked

aisles on each of eleven separate visits to the Store in 2011

and 2012. The photographs Chapman submitted with his

declaration depict a number of aisles that contain

merchandise or other items, resulting in a functional width

measurably less than the 36 inches required under the

ADAAG. Many of the aisles appear inaccessible due to the

presence of large items, such as furniture (armchairs and

tables), or display racks holding merchandise and ladders. 

Some of the aisles blocked to wheelchair users would have

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14 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS

been accessible to nondisabled customers, who could have

walked around or along the side of the blockage.

Additionally, Card’s expert report notes that when he

visited the Store — on a different day than Chapman’s visits

— he “witnessed a number of aisles blocked by merchandise

or reduced in width below 36 inches.” The photographs Card

took during his November 3, 2011, inspection confirm that

some of the aisles were blocked to wheelchair users.

To dispute this evidence, Pier 1 submitted, first, an expert

report. The report states that, on two inspections of the Store

in October and November 2011, the “aisles throughout the

store were the required minimum 36” wide and clear of

goods,” and that the expert was “able to navigate the aisles in

[his] electric Invacare wheelchair.” That the Store’s aisles

were clear on two visits by Pier 1’s expert does not create a

triable issue of fact as to the state of the aisles on the eleven

occasions when Chapman visited the Store in 2011 and 2012. 

If those occasions are sufficient to demonstrate noncompliance with the ADA — as we ultimately conclude they

are — it does not matter that there was compliance on two

occasions when Pier 1’s hired expert inspected the Store.

Pier 1’s other factual submission in support of its

summary judgment motion is the Snow Declaration. That

Declaration, Pier 1 maintains, shows that the Store had

“policies and procedures” in place to ensure that the aisles

remained unobstructed bymerchandise, and so “undisputably

established that any items that were in the aisles or on the

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CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 15

accessible check-out counter were ‘transitory’ or ‘in transit’

to their proper location.”7

The existence of policies designed to limit obstructions

does not establish that the obstructions that Chapman

encountered were “temporary.” Instead, Chapman’s evidence

demonstrates that these policies and procedures were either

ineffective in preventing frequent blocking of the aisles or

honored in the breach.

Moreover, as the district court observed, “the Snow

Declaration . . . did not ascribe the aisle blockages to

merchandise stocking,” but to the fact that any obstructions

would be moved on request or in time. The DOJ interpretive

authorities make clear that the presence of items in aisles is

not “temporary” for the purposes of § 36.211(b) just because

the obstructing items in the aisles were placed there by

customers and would have been moved on request or

eventually. The presence of blocking items was fairly

frequent during Chapman’s visits to the Store, not a single or

isolated occurrence. Nor is there any indication that the

interruption of access was “due to maintenance or repairs,”

id.; Manual § III-3.7000, or occurred in the course of moving

the items from one place to another, or during re-stocking, see

75 Fed. Reg. at 56,270; 73 Fed. Reg. at 34,523.

We note in this connection that given its frequency, the

aisle access problem must be viewed systemically, not as a

series of individual barriers to access. Removing one

7

 The district court excluded the Snow Declaration from consideration

on summary judgment. As we would affirm the grant of summary

judgment to Chapman with or without the Snow Declaration, we do not

consider whether the exclusion was an abuse of discretion.

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obstructing object does not assure accessible aisles where it

is likely that soon thereafter another item will be moved and

create a blockage. Thus, the evidence that Chapman

encountered “repeated and persistent failures” in accessing

the aisles, Manual § III-3.7000, confirms that the Store failed

to remedy the problem “promptly,” — that is, within a

“reasonable period of time,” 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,562 —

rendering its maintenance “improper or inadequate.” Manual

§ III-3.7000.

To be sure, the “regulations implementing the ADA do

not contemplate perfect service.” Midgett v. Tri-County

Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 254 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir.

2001). Consequently, “an isolated or temporary hindrance to

access does not give rise to a claim under the ADA.” 

Gilkerson v. Chasewood Bank, 1 F. Supp. 3d 570, 589 (S.D.

Tex. 2014) (citing cases). But the cases so holding have

generallyconcerned truly isolated failures to maintain readily

accessible facilities.

Foley v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 359 F.3d 925 (7th Cir.

2004), for example, addressed a plaintiff’s claim that a train

station’s failure to clear snow from ramps and repair an

elevator after a weekend of significant snowfall violated the

ADA. Noting that the “train station is, in the normal course

of operation, fully accessible to individuals with disabilities,”

Foley determined that the single “weather-related breakdown

of elevator service” at issue was not a violation of the ADA. 

Id. at 928–30. In so holding, the Seventh Circuit explained

that “given the conditions, [the elevator] was repaired

promptly,” and that “there was no evidence from which a

reasonable inference could be drawn that other disabled

persons were denied access because of frequent elevator

breakdowns.” Id. at 930; see also Tanner v. Wal-Mart Stores,

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CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 17

Inc., No. 99-44-JD, 2000 WL 620425, at *6 (D.N.H. Feb. 8,

2000) (holding that a store’s single “failure to remove

shopping carts and failure to properly remove ice and snow

from [a] handicapped parking space does not constitute a

Title III violation”). Likewise, Sharp v. Capitol City Brewing

Co., LLC, 680 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2010), denied the

plaintiff’s ADA claim based on an empty ADA-compliant

toilet paper dispenser encountered on a single visit to the

defendant restaurant. The court held that the plaintiff “failed

to show that this one instance of the dispenser being empty

was anything more than an ‘isolated or temporary

interruption[ ] in . . . access.’” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(b)).

Here, in contrast, the evidence demonstrates that Pier 1

repeatedly failed to maintain accessible routes in its Store. 

Furthermore, while the defendant did not cause the

obstruction of access in Foley, at least some of the

obstructions here appear to have resulted from the affirmative

actions of Pier 1 and its employees. For example, the large

step ladders obstructing the aisles on Chapman’s visits, were

almost surely placed there by the Store’s staff rather than by

customers. See also Madden v. Del Taco, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr.

3d 313, 320 (2007) (holding that a restaurant’s placement of

a concrete trash container on entrance ramp, which

“appear[ed] to be a result of the affirmative conduct of

[defendant],” was not exempted under § 36.211(b)).

In sum, Chapman’s evidence establishes that the barriers

he repeatedly encountered in the Store’s aisles were not

“temporary” within the meaning of § 36.211(b). We

therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment to Chapman

on his claim that the Store failed to maintain readily-

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18 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS

accessible aisles, and affirm the denial of summary judgment

to Pier 1.

B. Sales Counter

We reverse, however, the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on Chapman’s ADA claim as to the

accessible sales counter.

Chapman offersinsufficient evidence that the obstructions

on the counter violated his rights under Title III of the ADA. 

In contrast to the items blocking the aisles for wheelchair

users, the items on the otherwise properly accessible sales

counter depicted in Chapman’s photographs were not a

barrier to the use of the counter by persons with disabilities.

For example, the asserted “clutter[],” on the sales counter

detailed in Chapman’s expert report consisted of “a display

of books in a basket, three coffee cups, and a movable store

telephone.”8 There is no evidence that the presence of these

various small items on the otherwise accessible sales counter

deprived wheelchair users of “full and equal” access to the

use of the counters for their intended use — placing items for

purchase and transacting sales. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

Additionally, the record indicates that the clutter

Chapman encountered at the accessible sales counter caused,

at most, “temporary or isolated interruptions in . . . access”

under § 36.211(b). Notably, unlike the shopping aisles,

which were non-ADA-compliant for wheelchair users on all

 

8

 Snow stated in her declaration that she was present when Chapman’s

expert made a purchase, and that the items on the counter “did not

interfere” with customers placing or purchasing merchandise.

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CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 19

eleven visits Chapman made to the Store in 2011 and 2012,

there were items on the sales counter on only two or three

visits. Moreover, on those occasions, Chapman was

“eventually” able to put the merchandise he wished to

purchase on the counter, after the Pier 1 employee behind the

counter moved the obstructing items. Thus, unlike the aisle

situation, Pier 1 did “promptly remove[]” the obstructing

items from the sales counter, Manual § III-3.7000, so the

difficulty did not “persist beyond a reasonable period of

time,” 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,562.

In sum, Chapman was not entitled to summary judgment

on his ADA claim concerning the accessible sales counter.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

on Chapman’s claim that the Store’s failure to maintain

accessible aisles violated his rights under the ADA. We also

affirm the grant of summary judgment on Chapman’s state

law claims, which, as noted above, are entirely dependent on

establishing an ADA violation. We reverse the grant of

summary judgment as to Chapman’s claim concerning the

Store’s accessible sales counter, and remand to the district

court to modify the injunction consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

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