Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04821/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04821-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel Cofield
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4821

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SAMUEL COFIELD,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

District Judge. (7:07-cr-00128-D-2)

Submitted: June 3, 2010 Decided: July 1, 2010

Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Deborrah L. Newton, NEWTON LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Samuel Cofield pled guilty to conspiring to knowingly 

and intentionally possess with intent to distribute and to 

distributing five kilograms of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled 

substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). The 

district court sentenced Cofield to 213 months’ imprisonment,

and Cofield timely appealed. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which counsel 

concluded that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. 

Cofield did not file a pro se supplemental brief, despite 

receiving notice of his right to do so. The Government elected 

not to file an answering brief, nor did it move to dismiss the 

appeal based on the waiver provision in Cofield’s plea 

agreement.*

The purpose of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy is to 

ensure that the defendant enters the plea of guilty knowingly 

and voluntarily. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 

(2002). Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must 

inform the defendant of, and determine that he understands, the 

nature of the charges to which the plea is offered, any 

mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he

 

 * Because the Government has not moved to dismiss the 

appeal, we decline to enforce the waiver. See United States v. 

Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).

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faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by pleading 

guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The court also must determine 

whether there is a factual basis for the plea. Id.; United 

States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).

There is a strong presumption that a defendant’s 

guilty plea is binding and voluntary if the Rule 11 hearing was 

adequate. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th 

Cir. 1995). Additionally, in the absence of a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea in the district court, we review for 

plain error the adequacy of the guilty plea proceeding under 

Rule 11. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 

2002). “To establish plain error, [Cofield] must show that an 

error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error 

affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad, 

478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Cofield satisfies 

these requirements, “correction of the error remains within [the 

court’s] discretion, which [the court] should not exercise . . . 

unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Cofield has not presented any evidence or argument to 

demonstrate plain error. Indeed, the record reveals that the 

district court fully complied with the Rule 11 requirements 

during the plea colloquy, ensuring that Cofield’s plea was 

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knowing and voluntary, that he understood the rights he was 

giving up by pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that 

he committed the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. 

Cofield also attested during the hearing that he fully 

understood the ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one 

made promises to him outside those made by the Government in his 

plea agreement. We conclude that Cofield’s plea was knowing, 

voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis. 

Accordingly, we affirm Cofield’s conviction.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an 

abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 

335 (4th Cir. 2009). In addition, this court presumes a 

sentence within a properly determined advisory Guidelines range 

is substantively reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 

U.S. 338 (2007); United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th 

Cir. 2007). 

We conclude that Cofield’s sentence is both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court 

properly calculated Cofield’s Guidelines range, treated the 

Guidelines as advisory, and considered the applicable 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006) factors. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 

468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). Moreover, the district court based 

its sentence on its “individualized assessment” of the facts of 

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the case. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 

2009). Last, Cofield has not rebutted the presumption that his 

within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable. Thus,

the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the 

chosen sentence.

Having reviewed the record in this case and finding no 

meritorious issues for review, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Cofield in 

writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United 

States for further review. If Cofield requests that a petition 

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Cofield. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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