Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03220/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03220-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald A. Kopp
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED - Uaited States Coart tl~ 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cinuil 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JAN 2 3 1995 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. No. 94-3220 

RONALD A. KOPP, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 93-20096-04) 

Larry c. Pace, Kansas City, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Robin D. Fowler, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Kansas (Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney 

Patton, Assistant United States Attorney, District of 

him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

District of 

and Leon J. 

Kansas, with 

Before BRORBY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BURCIAGA,* 

Senior District Judge. 

*Honorable Juan C. Burciaga, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by 

designation. 

BURCIAGA, Senior District Judge. 

Defendant appeals from the decision of the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas denying his motion to 

suppress certain evidence seized during a traffic stop. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and we affirm. 

on December 14, 1993, Defendant Ronald Kopp was driving a red 

Appellate Case: 94-3220 Document: 01019290354 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 1 
pickup truck bearing California plates and pulling a U-Haul trailer 

on Interstate 70 about four miles west of Columbia, Missouri. 

Thomas Downey rode in the truck as a passenger. At about 3:45 

p.m., Missouri Highway Patrol Sergeant McGrail determined that 

Defendant was driving approximately 74 miles per hour in a 65 mileper-hour zone. Sergeant McGrail signalled Defendant to pull over 

and Defendant complied. Approaching the truck, Sergeant McGrail 

observed a very worn sofa through the camper shell of the pickup. 

Defendant exited the vehicle and McGrail informed him that he was 

speeding and asked to see his driver's license. Defendant gave 

McGrail a California driver's license which McGrail determined had 

been suspended due to a DWI conviction. 

While waiting for the information regarding Defendant's 

driver's license, McGrail asked Defendant some questions. 

Defendant hesitated when answering the questions, was shaking and 

fidgeting, and evaded making eye contact. When asked where he was 

going, Defendant indicated that he was taking some furniture to a 

friend in Shreveport. McGrail inquired whether Defendant meant 

Shreveport, Louisiana, whereupon Defendant indicated that he 

thought they were going to North Carolina but he did not know 

exactly where in that state. Defendant stated that he intended to 

stay in North Carolina until after Christmas. 

After McGrail issued Defendant a warning for speeding and a 

citation for driving without a valid license, he approached Downey 

to determine whether Downey had a valid driver's license and could 

drive the truck. McGrail asked Downey to sit in the patrol car 

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while he checked Downey's Missouri driver's license. At about 4:05 

p.m., McGrail determined the license to be valid. During this 

time, McGrail asked Downey the same questions he had asked 

Defendant. Downey told McGrail that he and Defendant were going to 

North Carolina to take some furniture to some friends near 

Charlotte, and that Downey might look for work while there. 

However, Downey indicated that if he did not find a job, he and 

Defendant would only stay in North Carolina two or three days and 

would return to California before Christmas. Downey first stated 

that he had known Defendant for about six months and had lived in 

California for four or five months. He later told McGrail that he 

had known Defendant for longer than six months and had been in 

California for two years. 

Downey subsequently produced a rental agreement in his name 

for the U-Haul trailer. McGrail asked Downey for permission to 

search the U-Haul and Downey declined. McGrail then called for 

another highway patrol officer to bring a drug dog to the scene. 

McGrail informed Defendant and Downey that he had called for a drug 

dog and that the dog would arrive after a short delay. He did not 

advise them that they were free to go, and in fact testified that 

he believed they were not free to go because he had a reasonable 

suspicion upon which to detain them. 

4:37 p.m. and alerted to the U-Haul. 

to the trailer and McGrail opened it. 

The drug dog arrived at about 

Downey gave McGrail the key 

The trailer smelled strongly 

of marijuana and contained, inter alia, a black bale-shaped garbage 

bag. McGrail closed the U-Haul, placed Defendant and Downey under 

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arrest, and transported Defendant to the Columbia police station 

while Downey followed in the truck. An inventory search revealed 

about 450 pounds of marijuana in the U-Haul. 

Defendant moved the trial court to suppress the marijuana 

seized from the U-Haul on the grounds that McGrail's continued 

detention of Defendant and Downey after he determined that Downey 

had a valid driver's license was without reasonable suspicion and 

violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The trial court denied Defendant's motion 

to suppress in a detailed opinion filed April 14, 1994. Defendant 

pled guilty to violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 u.s.c. § 

2, conditionally upon appeal of the trial court's denial of his 

motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a) (2). Defendant was 

sentenced to 70 months' imprisonment on July 5, 1994 and timely 

filed a notice of appeal on July 8, 1994. 

Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his 

motion to suppress the marijuana seized from the U-Haul trailer. 

He does not contend that McGrail's initial stop violated his 

constitutional rights. However, he does allege that McGrail's 

continued detention of himself and Downey after approximately 4:05 

p.m., when McGrail determined that Downey had a valid driver's 

license, was unsupported by reasonable suspicion 

Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable 

and violated 

searches and 

seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Defendant asserts that the 

marijuana McGrail discovered was the fruit of the illegal detention 

and must be suppressed on that ground, and further argues that 

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neither he nor Downey voluntarily consented to the search of the UHaul so as to purge the taint from the illegal detention. 

In reviewing Defendant's Fourth Amendment suppression claim, 

we will uphold the factual findings of the trial court unless they 

are clearly erroneous. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 

876 (lOth Cir. 1994). However, the ultimate determination of the 

reasonableness of a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is 

a question of law which we review de novo. Id. 

I. 

We first consider whether Defendant has standing under the 

Fourth Amendment to contest the search of the U-Haul trailer where 

the marijuana was found. In this context, "the [standing] inquiry 

focuses on whether there has been a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment rights of the particular defendant who is seeking to 

exclude the evidence." United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 76 

(lOth Cir. 1994) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128, 140 

(1978)). To persuade us that his Fourth Amendment rights have been 

violated, Defendant must demonstrate, first, that he has manifested 

a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched, and 

second, that his expectation is one that society would recognize as 

objectively reasonable. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 

735, 740 (1979)). 

We need not consider whether Defendant manifested a subjective 

expectation of privacy in the U-Haul trailer because we find that 

even if Defendant had such an expectation, it is not one that 

society would recognize as objectively reasonable. First, we 

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consider Defendant's privacy interests in the U-Haul separately 

from his interests in the pickup truck to which the U-Haul was 

attached on the authority of United States v. Abreu, 935 F.2d 1130 

(lOth Cir. 1991). In Abreu, this Court found that the defendant 

had no privacy interest in the trailer searched, despite the fact 

that the trailer was attached to a tractor the defendant owned. 

Id. at 1133. Neither the defendant nor his company owned or 

leased the trailer. Id. The Court stated that it was not required 

to consider the tractor and trailer as one unit despite "their 

physical linkage and alleged functional inseparability. Although 

the linkage is one factor tending to support a legitimate 

expectation of privacy, it is insufficient when we examine, as we 

must, all the facts and circumstances in this case." Id. 

Next, while Defendant did own the pickup truck, he did not own 

the U-Haul trailer in which the marijuana was found, nor did he 

rent it. Rather, passenger Downey rented the U-Haul, carried the 

key to it, and gave the key to McGrail when asked. Inasmuch as 

Defendant neither owned, rented, nor controlled access to the uHaul, his relationship to the trailer is analogous to a passenger's 

relationship to the car that another has rented, and this Court has 

held that such a person has no privacy interest in the rented car. 

United States v. Lewis, 24 F.3d 79, 81 (lOth Cir. 1994); United 

States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 887-888 (lOth Cir. 1990). We 

therefore find that Defendant does not have standing under the 

Fourth Amendment to contest the search of the U-Haul from which the 

police seized the marijuana he seeks to suppress. 

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Nevertheless, Defendant, as owner and driver of the pickup 

truck, unquestionably has standing to contest the stop of the truck 

and the continued detention of the truck and of his person. 

Betancur, 24 F.3d at 77; United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 

(lOth Cir. 1989). If the continued detention of Defendant's person 

and truck was "unlawful, the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine 

might dictate exclusion of the evidence discovered during the 

search." Erwin, 875 F.2d at 272. Thus, we must now consider 

whether the continued detention of Defendant's person and truck 

constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 

II. 

As noted above, Defendant does not contend that McGrail's 

initial stop of the truck was unreasonable. Rather, Defendant 

asserts that the seizure became unlawful when McGrail continued to 

detain Defendant's person and truck beyond the time necessary to 

issue a citation to Defendant and to ascertain that Downey could 

legally drive the truck. The parties do not dispute that the 

continued detention was in the nature of a Terry stop, a brief, 

investigative detention that must be justified by "specific, 

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion. " United 

States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (lOth Cir. 1990) (quoting 

United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1263 (lOth Cir. 1989) 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 21 (1968))). However, the 

parties vigorously contest whether reasonable suspicion of illegal 

activity justified the continued detention. 

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Defendant calls our attention to two cases in which this Court 

found that reasonable suspicion did not justify the seizure in 

question. See Fernandez, 18 F.Jd at 874; United States v. Guzman, 

864 F.2d 1512 (lOth Cir. 1988). In Fernandez, the Court found that 

the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the 

defendant, where the defendant pulled into the emergency lane when 

the officer moved beside and paced him, where the defendant was 

unusually nervous, and where his passenger was startled and stiff 

when he awoke and saw the officer. 18 F.Jd at 878-880. The Court 

found significant that the defendant and his passenger gave "a 

consistent and very plausible explanation of their travel," and 

that the defendant had a valid driver's license and registration in 

his own name. Id. at 878. 

Likewise, in Guzman the Court found that the police officer 

did not have a reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant where 

the defendant's wife looked sick, seemed apprehensive, was sweating 

heavily, and did not look the officer in the eye, and where the 

defendant and his wife carried $5,000 in cash. 864 F.2d at 1520. 

Regarding the defendant's wife's demeanor, the Court noted that the 

wife was pregnant and sitting in a car with the engine shut off in 

the middle of a desert. Id. The Court characterized the officer's 

belief that the defendant and his wife could not have saved $5,000 

for a vacation in Las Vegas as merely a "hunch." Id. 

We find these cases distinguishable and conclude that 

reasonable suspicion justified McGrail's detention of Defendant 

from the time McGrail determined that Downey had a valid license to 

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the arrival of the drug dog. Several specific, articulable facts, 

taken together with rational inferences from them, reasonably 

supported McGrail's continued detention of Defendant. First, 

McGrail did not find it plausible that Defendant would drive from 

California to North Carolina merely to take a very dilapidated sofa 

to some friends. Second, McGrail found suspicious Defendant's 

reference to "Shreveport" and his uncertainty as to where in North 

Carolina he was going. Third, McGrail noted that Defendant's story 

was not consistent with Downey's, in that Defendant said they 

intended to return to California after Christmas but Downey said 

they intended to return before Christmas, within a few days of 

December 14. Fourth, Downey gave inconsistent responses concerning 

how long he had known Defendant and how long he had been living in 

California. Finally, McGrail noted Defendant's hesitancy in 

answering questions and his unusual nervousness. 

Defendant seems to rely upon Fernandez and Guzman because the 

Court in those cases found no reasonable suspicion despite the fact 

that the defendants or their passengers were nervous, as was 

Defendant in the present matter. However, Defendant overlooks the 

dearth of other factors raising reasonable suspicion in Fernandez 

and Guzman. In Fernandez, the only articulable fact raising 

reasonable suspicion aside from the defendant's and his passenger's 

nervousness was the defendant's improper lane travel. In Guzman, 

the only suspicious fact aside from the defendant's wife's 

nervousness was the couple's possession of $5,000, which they 

claimed they had saved for a trip to Las Vegas. In the present 

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case, however, several factors other than Defendant's nervousness 

to support McGrail's reasonable suspicion. 

Defendant also overlooks the fact that the defendants and 

their passengers in Fernandez and Guzman gave consistent, plausible 

accounts of where they were going and why. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 

878; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1514. Conversely, Defendant's explanation 

of his travel plans and purpose was not plausible, nor was it 

completely consistent with the explanation his passenger gave. In 

addition, his passenger's responses to McGrail's questions were 

internally inconsistent. 

In United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548 (lOth Cir. 1993), a 

more apposite decision, the Court found that reasonable suspicion 

justified the police officer's continued detention of the defendant 

where the defendant could not provide a general address for the 

uncle who had allegedly loaned him the car he was driving, and 

where the defendant appeared "panicky." Id. at 1554. McGrail had 

at least as much reason to suspect Defendant of criminal activity 

as did the officer in Soto. Not only was Defendant very nervous 

and unable to provide even a general address for his destination, 

like the defendant in Soto, but also Defendant's and Downey's 

stories were implausible and inconsistent. Thus, this Court's 

caselaw amply supports our finding that reasonable suspicion 

justified McGrail's continued detention of Defendant and that 

McGrail did not violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 1 See 

We note that McGrail detained Defendant for no longer 

than was necessary to call a drug dog to the scene and to thus 

quickly confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicions. See United 

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also United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 957, 959 (lOth Cir. 1991} 

(reasonable suspicion where defendant claimed to be mechanic but 

had clean, well-manicured hands, expensive clothes, and large CD 

collection, where car was not registered to defendant or passenger, 

and where defendant was increasingly nervous); Pena, 920 F.2d at 

1514 (reasonable suspicion where defendant had Illinois license but 

drove car with California plates, could not provide registration, 

and gave inconsistent answers regarding his destination, and where 

trunk lock was punched out) . 

Thus, because Defendant has no standing to contest the search 

of the U-Haul trailer in which the evidence he seeks to suppress 

was found, and because reasonable suspicion justified the continued 

detention of Defendant's person and truck after McGrail had 

ascertained that passenger Downey could legally drive the truck, we 

find that the district court correctly denied Defendant's motion to 

suppress and we affirm. 

states v. Sharpe, 470 u.s. 675, 686-88 (1985} (upholding 20 minute 

detention where police "diligently pursued a means of investigation 

that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, 

during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."). 

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