Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-72551/USCOURTS-ca9-12-72551-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Felix Flores Rios
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FELIX FLORES RIOS, AKA Alex

Miguel Reyes, AKA Alex Rios,

AKA Miguel Rios, AKA Miguel

Flores Rios,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-72551

Agency No.

A200-244-399

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 23, 2015*

Filed December 1, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and Michael Daly

Hawkins and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 FLORES-RIOS V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

Concluding that the Board of Immigration Appeals erred

by failing to consider petitioner’s claim for withholding of

removal based on his family’s opposition to a Guatemalan

gang, the panel denied in part and granted in part the petition

for review, and remanded for further consideration.

The panel held that substantial evidence supported the

Board’s determination that because petitioner had never been

threatened or harmed due to his religious affiliation and did

not engage in proselytizing efforts, there was little likelihood

that he would be persecuted as a result of his religious beliefs.

Applying the revised framework for social group

membership espoused by the Board in Matter of M-E-V-G-,

26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014), the panel stated that

membership in a particular social group must now show that

the group is (1) composed of members who share a common

immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and

(3) socially distinct within the society in question. The panel

explained that the new social distinction prong of the social

group analysis refers to social recognition and requires that a

group be perceived as a group by society, in contrast to the en

banc majority’s focus on the perception of the persecutor in

Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir.

2013) (en banc). The panel stated that even under this revised

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FLORES-RIOS V. LYNCH 3

framework, the family remains the quintessential particular

social group.

The panel held that the Board erred by failing to address

petitioner’s claim that he is a member of a social group made

up of his family and that he risks persecution by a gang

because of its vendetta against his family. The panel

remanded for further proceedings.

COUNSEL

Mardy M. Sproule, Law Offices of Mardy M. Sproule,

Commerce, California, for Petitioner.

Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil

Division; Jennifer L. Lightbody, Senior Litigation Counsel;

Robbin K. Blaya, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration

Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C., for Respondent.

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OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to consider the meaning of

“membership in a particular social group” in the context of

withholding of removal proceedings under the immigration

laws. Providing a precise definition for this inherently

flexible term, which is not defined in the legislation, has long

bedeviled those tasked with adjudicating asylum and

withholding claims. In recognition of these semantic

difficulties, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board” or

“BIA”) recently clarified the criteria for assessing social

group claims. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227

(B.I.A. 2014). Under the Board’s refined test, to establish

eligibility for withholding on the basis of “membership in a

particular social group,” a petitioner must show that the group

is (1) comprised of individuals who “share a common

immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and

(3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Id. at 237.

Felix Flores-Rios made such a claim. Before the BIA, he

argued that he faced persecution in his native Guatemala both

because of a gang vendetta targeting his family—a cognizable

“particular social group”—and because of his Evangelical

Christian faith. Focusing exclusively on Flores-Rios’s

religious claims, the BIA rejected the appeal.

BACKGROUND

Flores-Rios petitions for review of the BIA decision

affirming the denial of his application for asylum,

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FLORES-RIOS V. LYNCH 5

withholding of removal and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”).1

Flores-Rios entered the United States without inspection

on September 10, 2007. On June 15, 2009, gang members

killed his father outside of his father’s Evangelical Christian

church in Guatemala. Flores-Rios’s cousin, Karine Faviola

Flores-Aguillar, witnessed the murder and agreed to testify

against the perpetrators. She was murdered the day before the

hearing. Flores-Rios asserts that she was killed in retaliation

for her willingness to cooperate with the authorities and to

prevent her appearance as a witness against the gang

members who killed his father. In the wake of FloresAguillar’s death, Flores-Rios’s sister began receiving threats,

even though she had neither witnessed the attack on her father

nor agreed to testify against the gang members responsible. 

Due to these threats, she felt compelled to flee to the United

States.

Before the IJ, Flores-Rios argued that he and his family

were persecuted for their Evangelical faith and that he feared

persecution in Guatemala on the basis of his religion. FloresRios also claimed that his cousin was murdered and his

family threatened in part because of their refusal to “declare

the innocence” of those responsible for his father’s murder. 

1 The BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) determination that

Flores-Rios’s asylum claim was time-barred because he failed to either

apply within one year of his arrival or meet any of the exceptions to the

one-year rule pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). On appeal to this

court, Flores-Rios abandoned his claims for asylum and CAT protection

by not addressing them with any specificity in his briefs. See AguilarRamos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 703 n.1(9th Cir. 2010) (citing MartinezSerrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a

brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”)).

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The IJ rejected Flores-Rios’s religious claims, referencing a

newspaper article introduced byFlores-Rios, which described

his father’s murderers as members of a local gang “dedicated

to killing and collecting a tax from local businesses.” The IJ

found that violence and witness intimidation—not religious

persecution—led to the murders of Flores-Rios’s relatives. 

The IJ further noted a then-pending Ninth Circuit en banc

decision, Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, which related to

whether witnesses against gangs could qualify as members of

a particular social group for purposes of establishing

withholding eligibility.

2 The IJ concluded that, regardless of

the outcome of the en banc decision, Henriquez-Rivas would

be inapplicable because Flores-Rios did not witness the

murders and thus would not be called to testify against the

culpable parties.

On appeal to the BIA, Flores-Rios reiterated his religious

persecution argument and also claimed that he feared

persecution based on his family’s opposition to the

Guatemalan gang that killed his father and cousin. 

Specifically, he argued that the gang had threatened members

of his family in order to dissuade them from supporting the

prosecution of the murderers and that he was at risk because

of his familial affiliation. The BIA dismissed the appeal,

agreeing with the IJ that Flores-Rios had established neither

a link between his father’s murder and his father’s faith nor

a “clear probability of persecution on account of his religion.” 

The BIA did not address Flores-Rios’s contention that he

would be persecuted in Guatemala as a result of his family’s

opposition to the gang.

2 Henriquez-Rivas was decided one year after the IJ denied Flores-Rios’s

application. 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

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FLORES-RIOS V. LYNCH 7

ANALYSIS

This case turns on whether Flores-Rios established a

likelihood of persecution either because of his religion or his

membership in a cognizable particular social group. Because

the BIA erred in failing to address his claims of persecution

due to his family’s opposition to a local gang, we remand for

consideration of Flores-Rios’s social group claim.

Flores-Rios tied his claims of religious persecution to the

threats and abuse allegedly suffered by his family due to their

Evangelical Christianity. The BIA concurred in the IJ’s

analysis that Flores-Rios failed to establish a sufficient nexus

between the murders of his relatives and their religious

beliefs. The BIA also agreed with the IJ’s conclusion that,

because Flores-Rios had never been threatened or harmed due

to his religious affiliation and did not engage in proselytizing

efforts, there was little likelihood that he would be persecuted

as a result of his religious beliefs. Substantial evidence

supports the BIA’s conclusions. See Cordoba v. Holder,

726 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2013) (The BIA’s “purely

factual determinations” are reviewed only for “substantial

evidence.”).

However, our analysis does not end there. The crux of this

appeal is Flores-Rios’s claim for withholding of removal due

to persecution on the basis of his membership in a particular

social group—his family. Despite the government’s argument

to the contrary, Flores-Rios raised this claim in his brief to

the Board. In so doing, he properly exhausted his

administrative remedies. See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d

713, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that to exhaust an

asylum claim, an applicant must put the BIA on notice by

raising any issues in the notice of appeal or in the briefs).

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Before the IJ, Flores-Rios claimed that his cousin had

agreed to testify against his father’s killers, but was murdered

a day before the hearing. After his cousin’s murder, FloresRios’s sister began receiving threats, even though she had not

witnessed the murders and was not cooperating in the

prosecution of the murderers. The IJ made no adverse

finding as to Flores-Rios’s credibility and expressly

acknowledged that the murders were apparentlymotivated by

gang violence and witness intimidation. The IJ went on to

note that Flores-Rios could not establish a claim based on

membership in a social group comprised of witnesses against

gangs, because he had not witnessed the murders and thus

could not testify.

The IJ’s characterization misapprehended Flores-Rios’s

complaint—he does not claim to be a member of a social

group comprised of witnesses against gangs. Rather, he

asserts that he is a member of a social group made up of his

family and that he risks persecution by the gang because of its

vendetta against his family. The BIA did not address this

social group claim—a failure that constitutes error and

requires remand. See Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035,

1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (The BIA is “not free to ignore

arguments raised by a petitioner.”). A short history of the

evolving definition of the term “particular social group” is

useful at this stage of the proceedings, particularly in light of

the risk that Flores-Rios’s social group claim might once

again be misconstrued on remand.

“Membership in a particular social group” is an enigmatic

and difficult-to-define term. Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d

1206, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2009). In the seminal case

addressing the phrase, the BIA determined that a cognizable

“particular social group” must consist of “persons all of

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FLORES-RIOS V. LYNCH 9

whom share a common, immutable characteristic,” including

innate qualities “such as sex, color, or kinship ties . . . .”

Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985),

overruled on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. &

N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).

Over time, the flexible nature of the common, immutable

characteristic test created “confusion and a lack of

consistency” among the judges tasked with adjudicating

asylum and withholding claims. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. &

N. Dec. 227, 231 (B.I.A. 2014). In 2006, responding to calls

from the circuit courts for greater clarity regarding the

framework for determining the existence of a “particular

social group,” the BIA adopted the “social visibility”

requirement. Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A.

2006). “Social visibility” focused on whether the group in

question was “easily recognizable and understood by others

to constitute [a] social group[].” Id. Thus, for example, the

BIA concluded that confidential informants against

Colombian drug cartels could not be members of a “particular

social group” because “the very nature of the conduct at issue

is such that it is generally out of the public view,” such

informants necessarily lacked the requisite social visibility.

Id. at 960.

Despite the BIA’s elaboration of “social visibility,” the

illusive nature of the requirement spawned inter-circuit

disagreement. Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th

Cir. 2013) (en banc). In Henriquez-Rivas, we wrote that

social visibility required that members of a proposed group

“be perceived as a group by society.” Id. at 1088–89

(citations omitted). Henriquez-Rivas’s proposed social

group—comprised of individuals who testified in open court

against gangmembers—met the social visibility requirement,

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because an informant who testifies in open court against gang

members is, by definition, “highly visible and recognizable,”

and because Salvadoran society had acknowledged the

“unique vulnerability” of those who testify against gang

members by enacting protective legislation to safeguard those

witnesses. Id. at 1092 (citation omitted).

A majority of the en banc court elaborated that “in the

context of persecution, we believe that the perception of the

persecutors maymatter the most.” Id. at 1089. As noted in the

concurrence, however, “[d]efining social visibility from the

perspective of society [not the perpetrator] better comports

with the case law” and “also makes common sense.” Id. at

1094 (McKeown, J., concurring). In the end, our conclusion

that the persecutor’s perception matters most in determining

whether a claim satisfied the social visibility requirement was

unnecessary to our decision.

In the wake of Henriquez-Rivas, the BIA revisited the

framework for assessing claims based on social group

membership and recast the “social visibility” requirement as

one of “social distinction.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.

Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014). The new “social distinction”

prong of the social group analysis “refers to social

recognition” and requires that a group “be perceived as a

group by society.” Id. The BIA further clarified that

recognition of a particular social group “is determined by the

perception of the society in question, rather than by the

perception of the persecutor.” Id. at 242. This approach

contrasts with the en banc majority’s focus on the perpetrator

in Henriquez-Rivas, and comports with the above-referenced

concurrence. Under the BIA’s revised rubric, an applicant for

withholding on the basis of membership in a particular social

group must now show that the group is “(1) composed of

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FLORES-RIOS V. LYNCH 11

members who share a common immutable characteristic,

(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within

the society in question.” Id. at 237.

Even under this refined framework, the family remains

the quintessential particular social group. See id. at 240, 247

(citing with approval prior decisions finding the family easily

recognizable and perceived by others as a social group). In

Thomas v. Gonzales, we held “that family membership may

constitute membership in a ‘particular social group,’ and thus

confer refugee status on a family member who has been

persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of future

persecution on account of that familial relationship.” 409 F.3d

1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), vacated on other

grounds, Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006). We also

recognized that persecutors are more likely to identify

individual familymembers as part of a particular social group

when familial ties are “linked to race, religion, or political

affiliation.” Id. at 1188. We declined to hold, however, “that

a family can constitute a particular social group only when

the alleged persecution on that ground is intertwined with”

another protected ground. Id.

Our sister circuits similarly recognize the family as a

“particular social group.” See, e.g., Crespin-Valladares v.

Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[E]very circuit

to have considered the question has held that family ties can

provide a basis for asylum.”); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder,

585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[M]embership in the

same family [] is widely recognized by the caselaw.”);

Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There

can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on

common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than that

of the nuclear family.”). The Fourth Circuit’s decision in

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12 FLORES-RIOS V. LYNCH

Crespin-Valladares is illustrative here. In CrespinValladares, the petitioner claimed that family members of

witnesses who agreed to testify against gang members and

who “suffer[ed] persecution on account of their family ties”

constituted a cognizable social group. 632 F.3d at 125. The

court pointed out that the BIA had misconstrued this group as

“those who actively oppose gangs . . . by agreeing to be

prosecutorial witnesses.” Id. Because few groups are more

“readily identifiable than the family,” the BIA’s

determination that the petitioner had not shown membership

in a particular social group “was manifestly contrary to law.” 

Id. at 126.

In the face of Flores-Rios’s social group claim and the

evidence that gang members killed Flores-Rios’s father,

murdered his cousin and threatened his sister, the BIA erred

in not addressing the family aspect of Flores-Rios’s social

group claim.

Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED in part

and GRANTED in part. The BIA’s decision is VACATED

AND REMANDED for further proceedings.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

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