Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00165/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00165-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Peg Borman
Defendant
Fruit Growers Supply Co.
Defendant
Hancock Timber Resource Group
Defendant
Hearst Corp
Defendant
Robert Raffaelly
Plaintiff
Roseburg Forest Products Co.
Defendant
Charles Schnepp
Plaintiff
Sierra Pacific Industries
Defendant
Siskiyou County Board of Supervisors
Defendant
Timber Products Co.
Defendant

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT RAFFAELLY and No. CIV.S-06-0165 FCD DAD PS 

CHARLES SCHNEPP,

Plaintiffs,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SISKIYOU COUNTY BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

This matter came before the court on June 16, 2006, for

hearing on defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The following

three groups of defendants have moved for dismissal: (1) defendant

County of Siskiyou; (2) defendant Sierra Pacific Industries; and (3)

defendants Fruit Growers Supply Company, The Hearst Corporation,

Roseburg Forest Products Co., and Timber Products Company. Defendant

Hancock Timber Resource Group has joined in the motion brought by

County of Siskiyou.

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 The undersigned denied plaintiffs’ request at the hearing that 1

the court require an appearance on behalf of Ms. Borman and continue

the hearing on the motions for that purpose. As explained below,

these findings and recommendation concern the moving defendants only,

and Ms. Borman is not a moving defendant at this time. Further, as

noted at the hearing, while Ms. Borman has not joined in the instant

motions, through counsel she has filed her own motion to dismiss,

noticing that motion for hearing on July 21, 2006.

 In light of this recommendation, the undersigned does not 2

reach defendants’ alternative motions for a more definite statement.

2

At the hearing on the motion, Philip B. Price appeared on

behalf of defendant County of Siskiyou. David E. Martinek appeared

on behalf of defendant Sierra Pacific Industries. Daniel S. Frost

appeared for defendants Fruit Growers Supply Company, The Hearst

Corporation, Roseburg Forest Products Co., and Timber Products

Company. Sean Hungerford appeared on behalf of defendant Hancock

Timber Resource Group. There was no appearance on behalf of the only

other named defendant, Peg Borman, an employee of the United States

Department of Agriculture Forest Service who has been sued in her

official capacity as the Forest Supervisor of the Klamath National

Forest.1

Plaintiffs Robert Raffaelly and Charles Schnepp, proceeding

pro se, appeared at the hearing on their own behalf. Plaintiffs also

have filed opposition to each of the pending motions.

Having considered all written materials filed in connection

with the motions, and after hearing oral argument, for the reasons

discussed more fully on the record during the hearing, the

undersigned will recommend that the motions to dismiss be granted and

the moving defendants be dismissed from this action with prejudice.2

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LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of the

complaint. North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578,

581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within

it, “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1990). See also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d

530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). On a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) a complaint, or portion thereof, should only be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle

plaintiff to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept

as true the allegations of the complaint. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex

Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). Furthermore, the court

must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. See

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). In a case where the

plaintiff is pro se, the court has an obligation to construe the

pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th

Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal interpretation of

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 The FTRA was later amended by the California Timberland 3

Productivity Act of 1982 (“TPA”). See Cal. Gov’t Code § 51100. 

Therefore, today the provisions appearing at California Government

Code §§ 51100 et seq. are normally referred to as the TPA, rather

than the FTRA. See, e.g., Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San

Mateo, 31 Cal. App. 4th 418, 422 (1995).

4

a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of a claim that

are not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471

(9th Cir. 1982).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing their complaint

on January 25, 2006. Liberally construed, the lengthy complaint

concerns land zoned in the County of Siskiyou for commercial timber

production pursuant to the Forest Taxation Reform Act (“FTRA”) of

1976, California Government Code §§ 51100 et seq. The complaint 3

alleges that the moving defendants own thousands of acres of such

Timber Production Zone (“TPZ”) land and that the FTRA and related

laws entitle plaintiffs access to the TPZ land for “educational,

environmental, ecological, recreational and related ‘compatible’ uses

....” (Compl. ¶ 1.) According to the complaint, the moving

defendants have deprived plaintiffs of such access by constructing

fencing and gates at entrances to the land.

The complaint alleges two discernible federal claims for

relief against the moving defendants. One of the federal claims is a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the defendants have deprived

plaintiffs of their property interest in the subject lands without

due process. The other federal claim is a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

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 In Raffaelly v. Sierra Pacific Industries, et al., No. CIV.S- 4

02-2356 FCD DAD PS, the undersigned recommended dismissal with

prejudice in findings and recommendations filed July 23, 2003. The

assigned district judge adopted that recommendation in full by order

filed August 21, 2003. This case and the first case also have been

related by order filed April 10, 2006. 

5

1985 that defendants conspired in depriving plaintiffs of that

property interest.

As the moving defendants point out, the federal claims

brought against them by plaintiff Raffaelly must be dismissed because

they simply re-state claims that were raised against them and

dismissed with prejudice in Raffaelly v. Sierra Pacific Industries,

et al., No. CIV.S-02-2356 FCD DAD PS, a virtually identical prior

action brought in this district by plaintiff Raffaelly. See Western 4

Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997)

(doctrine of res judicata serves to bar a claim where there is an

identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits, and an identity

or privity between the parties). Just like in this action, in the

first action plaintiff Raffaelly alleged that, pursuant to a strained

reading of the California Constitution, the FTRA and other state

laws, TPZ land comes with a “conservation easement” which entitles

plaintiff (and the general public) to access to the TPZ land. As in

this action, in the first action plaintiff alleged that this

conservation easement concept gave him a property interest, the

denial of which violated plaintiff’s due process rights. The first

complaint also alleged that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),

defendants conspired in maintaining locked gates and denying

plaintiff road access to the property in which he allegedly maintains

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an interest. In short, plaintiff Raffaelly’s federal claims as to

the moving defendants in this action are virtually identical to those

rejected in Raffaelly v. Sierra Pacific Industries, et al., No.

CIV.S-02-2356 FCD DAD PS. Therefore, the undersigned will recommend

that the motions to dismiss be granted and that all of the federal

claims brought by plaintiff Raffaelly be dismissed as to the moving

defendants because they are barred by res judicata.

The court realizes that plaintiff Charles Schnepp was not a

named plaintiff in the first action. Therefore, there is no identity

of parties as to plaintiff Schnepp and res judicata does not bar his

federal claims against the moving defendants. Nonetheless, the

allegations in this action with respect to plaintiff Schnepp and the

moving defendants are virtually indistinguishable from the

allegations in the initial action with respect to plaintiff Raffaelly

and defendants. Thus, for the reasons set forth in the findings and

recommendations filed on July 23, 2003, in Raffaelly v. Sierra

Pacific Industries, et al., No. CIV.S-02-2356 FCD DAD PS, which are

hereby incorporated by reference, the undersigned will further

recommend that plaintiff Schnepp’s § 1983 and § 1985 claims be

dismissed with prejudice as to the moving defendants.

Finally, “[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) a district court

may elect, in its discretion, not to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state claims if it has dismissed the original

jurisdiction federal claims.” Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059,

1066 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000) (citing Fang

v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998) and Voight v.

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 The federal claims alleged against defendant Borman include 5

the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims described above as well as a difficult to

decipher claim under the Administrative Procedures Act.

7

Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1565 (9th Cir. 1995)). Where, as here, all

federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of relevant

factors points toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims. Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t,

40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994); Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac.

Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992). Under these circumstances,

the undersigned will recommend that the district court decline to

exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs’

state law claims against the moving defendants and that those claims

be dismissed without prejudice.

If the recommendation above is adopted, only defendant Peg

Borman, the Forest Supervisor of the Klamath National Forest, will

remain. Ms. Borman, presumably because she is the only named

defendant who was not named in plaintiff Raffaelly’s first action,

has not joined in the instant motions. Nonetheless, as noted above, 5

defendant Borman has filed her own motion to dismiss, noticing the

motion for hearing on July 21, 2006. The status of this action

against defendant Borman will be addressed at that time. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that:

1. Moving defendants’ motions to dismiss be granted;

/////

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2. Plaintiff Raffaelly’s federal claims alleged under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 be dismissed as barred by res judicata as to

defendants County of Siskiyou; Sierra Pacific Industries; Fruit

Growers Supply Company; The Hearst Corporation; Roseburg Forest

Products Co.; Timber Products Company; and Hancock Timber Resource

Group;

3. Plaintiff Schnepp’s federal claims be dismissed as to

the same defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted; and 

4. Plaintiffs’ state law claims as to those defendants be

dismissed without prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within five (5) days after

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 11, 2006.

DAD:th

ddad1\orders.prose\raffaelly0165.f&r

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