Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cr-00080/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cr-00080-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Ramon Gauna-Mendoza
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jose Ramon Gauna-Mendoza, 

Defendant. 

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No. CR02-0080-PHX-SRB

 CV05-2126-PHX-SRB

ORDER

Defendant filed his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 on July 18, 2005. He raised two issues in his motion. First, Defendant

argued that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment because he did

not admit and the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that his prior conviction was

an aggravated felony. Second, Defendant argued that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act

were violated by the issuance of a superseding indictment four months after the original

indictment. In response to the motion, the Government argued that Defendant has

procedurally defaulted on his first claim and has presented no authority for his claim of a

Speedy Trial Act violation.

The Magistrate Judge issued his Report and Recommendation on October 11, 2005,

recommending that the motion be denied, finding that even if there was no procedural

default on Defendant's first claim, that the law is clear in the Ninth Circuit that the

Case 2:02-cr-00080-SRB Document 156 Filed 12/08/05 Page 1 of 2
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Government need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a defendant's prior

conviction in a prosecution brought pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). The Magistrate Judge

also found no speedy trial violation.

Defendant filed his objections on October 27, 2005. In those objections, he continued

to argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),

requires that his prior felony conviction be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before

it can be used to enhance his sentence and that the superseding indictment that was returned

in this case four months after his original indictment is a violation of the Speedy Trial Act.

The Government responded to the objections on November 2, 2005.

IT IS ORDERED overruling Defendant's objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation. Even in the absence of the argument for procedural default, the case

law is clear that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and its progeny do not require

a jury finding with respect to proof of a prior felony conviction and there is no exception

from this general rule for claims of violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (b). The Court also agrees

that there is no authority to suggest that a superseding indictment must be returned within 30

days of the filing of the original complaint.

The Court is in agreement with the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge and adopts that Report and Recommendation as the order of this Court.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence

is denied. (Doc. 152).

DATED this 7th day of December, 2005.

Case 2:02-cr-00080-SRB Document 156 Filed 12/08/05 Page 2 of 2