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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jason L. White
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13Ȭ2943ȱȱ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PlaintiffȬAppellee,

v.

JASON L. WHITE,

DefendantȬAppellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:12ȬcrȬ30022ȬDRHȬ1 — David R. Herndon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JULY 8, 2014 — DECIDED MARCH 25, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. While defendantȬappellant JaȬ

son White was on parole from an Illinois state prison senȬ

tence, police suspected that he was involved in a shooting

and had a warrant to arrest him. Before the police found

White, they located his gym bag that he had left in his

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cousin’s car. Without a search warrant, but relying on a conȬ

dition of his parole that required White to agree to searches

of his property, the police opened the bag and found a gun.

White was convicted of being a felon in possession of a fireȬ

arm. He moved to suppress evidence of the gun on the

ground that neither he nor his cousin had consented to the

search of the bag. The district court denied his motion, and

White challenges that decision on appeal. We affirm. The

search of the property of a suspected parole violator who

had agreed in writing to consent to property searches and

whom the police could not locate was reasonable.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Illinois Department of Corrections issued a warrant

on March 29, 2011 to arrest White for violating his parole.

The warrant was based on two discoveries. First, one of two

victims from a shooting a week earlier had identified White

as the shooter. Second, earlier that month a parole officer

had found in White’s bedroom the packaging for a Glock .40

caliber magazine. Two days after the warrant was issued, the

police received a tip that White was driving a green sport

utility vehicle.

That tip led the officers to the home of White=s cousin,

Tawana Williams. They knew she drove such a car. Williams

told the police that she and White had been together earlier

that day and that White had placed his gym bag in her car.

The police searched White’s bag and found a .40 caliber

Glock handgun loaded with 10 rounds of ammunition.

White was later arrested and charged with possessing a fireȬ

arm and ammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.

' 922(g)(1).

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No. 13Ȭ2943 3

White moved to suppress the evidence seized from his

gym bag in his cousin’s car, arguing that the warrantless

search of his bag violated the Fourth Amendment. He arȬ

gued that, even though he was a parolee and had left his bag

with Williams, he enjoyed a legitimate expectation of privacy

in the contents of his bag and that Williams had neither acȬ

tual nor apparent authority to consent to the bag=s search.

The government countered that White=s status as a parolee

extinguished any expectation of privacy. It explained that

when White began his term of supervisory release from an

Illinois prison (where he served a sentence for unlawful posȬ

session of a firearm), he agreed in writing as a condition of

release: “You shall consent to a search of your person, propȬ

erty, or residence under your control.” The government also

argued that the search was valid because the police suspectȬ

ed White of a shooting, feared he was dangerous, and were

in hot pursuit to arrest him.

In a hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties disȬ

puted whether White’s cousin Williams had actually conȬ

sented to the search of the bag. She testified that the morning

of the search, she had met briefly with White and he asked

her to store his bag in her car. White did not tell her what

was inside the bag, nor did she look inside. Later that day,

Williams said, about 20 officers arrived at her home. One

demanded that she let them search her car and threatened

that if she did not, they would get a warrant and arrest her

for any contraband found in it. Acquiescing, she allowed the

officers to search the car. In her hearing testimony she charȬ

acterized the officers as threatening. On crossȬexamination,

though, she acknowledged that in a recorded interview at

the police station on the day of the search, she had said that

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she had allowed the police to search the car and had not

claimed that they had threatened her.

Next to testify was Officer Thomas Woods, who particiȬ

pated in the search. He testified that before the search, the

police had learned that a shooting victim had identified

White as the shooter and that the police believed he was

armed and dangerous. Woods also testified that Williams

told him that White had left bags in her car and that she volȬ

unteered, “You can have ’em.” With her permission, he enȬ

tered the car, retrieved and opened White=s bag, and found

the gun inside. Officer Woods explained that Williams had

been cooperative, that he never threatened her, and that he

searched the car only after she volunteered the information

that White had stored a bag inside and allowed him access to

it.

The district court denied White=s motion to suppress eviȬ

dence of the gun. Based on the videotaped interview of WilȬ

liams, the court found as a fact that she freely consented to

the police search of her car. The court also concluded that

White=s privacy rights were so diminished by his parole staȬ

tus and his promise to consent to searches that the search of

the bag was reasonable. White then went to trial. A jury

found him guilty of the firearm charge. The district court

sentenced him to 360 months in prison, consistent with

White’s status as a career offender.

II. Analysisȱ ȱ

On appeal White argues only that the search of his gym

bag violated his right under the Fourth Amendment to be

free from unreasonable searches. He insists that, despite the

conditions of his parole, he had a protectable privacy interest

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No. 13Ȭ2943 5

in the closed gym bag in which the police found the gun,

and that he did not relinquish that interest by placing it in

Williams= car. He also argues that Williams did not have acȬ

tual or apparent authority to give thirdȬparty consent to the

warrantless search of the bag. The government counters that

neither her consent nor a warrant was required because of

White’s diminished privacy expectations as a parolee subject

to the terms of his parole agreement requiring consent to

searches of his property. The government argues in the alȬ

ternative that the search was reasonable because the police

were in hot pursuit of an armed and dangerous felony susȬ

pect. We find that the search of the bag was reasonable based

on White’s sharply diminished privacy expectations as a paȬ

rolee who was required to consent to searches of his properȬ

ty. We do not reach the government’s exigent circumstances

argument.

A preliminary question concerns the first step of searchȬ

ing Williams’ car. The district court made a factual finding

that Williams consented to the search of her car. We find no

basis to disturb that finding, which is not clearly erroneous.

See United States v. Terry, 572 F.3d 430, 434–35 (7th Cir. 2009).

Without reaching any question about whether White is a

proper party to object to that first step, therefore, Williams’

consent to the search of her car made it permissible under

the Fourth Amendment. That lawful search led to the disȬ

covery of White=s bag.

The central issue is whether the search of White’s bag

was lawful. The district court determined that it was beȬ

cause, in its view, White had consented based on the condiȬ

tion of his release requiring that he “shall consent to a search

of your ... property.” The district court and we apply federal

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Fourth Amendment law to decide whether the search was

reasonable. Because that question turns in large part on the

extent of White’s legitimate expectations of privacy, see, e.g.,

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013), our

analysis is shaped by the state law that governed White’s

terms of parole. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843

(2006) (suspicionless, warrantless search of parolee did not

violate Fourth Amendment where state law authorized

search as condition of parole); United States v. Knights, 534

U.S. 112 (2001) (warrantless search of probationer based on

reasonable suspicion did not violate Fourth Amendment

where state law authorized search as condition of probaȬ

tion).

Based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Samson and

Knights, one might conclude quickly that the condition of

White’s parole requiring consent to warrantless searches of

his property easily resolves this case in favor of the governȬ

ment. Our path to that destination is a little less direct,

though, because of some intricacies of Illinois law. We trace

the key cases briefly:

In People v. Lampitok, 798 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. 2003), the defendȬ

ant was sharing a motel room with his fiancée, who was on

probation at the time. One condition of her probation reȬ

quired her to “submit to a search of her person, residence, or

automobile at any time as directed by her Probation Officer.”

Police conducted a warrantless search of the motel room and

found drugs and weapons used to convict Lampitok of sevȬ

eral crimes. The Illinois court interpreted Knights to require

at least reasonable suspicion of a probation violation to justiȬ

fy the search. It also held there was no reasonable suspicion

to justify a search of the motel room for drugs or weapons.

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No. 13Ȭ2943 7

798 N.E.2d at 109. On the issue of consent, the Illinois court

parsed the language of the parole conditions very finely, notȬ

ing that they did not actually authorize a warrantless search

itself but required only that the probationer “submit” to

such a search. The court concluded that the condition of

probation gave the probationer a choice: either “submit”

(i.e., consent) to a search or face a possible probation revocaȬ

tion for refusal to consent. The condition itself, though, did

not actually authorize warrantless searches. Id. at 110. Since

no consent had been given, the court ruled in Lampitok, the

evidence seized in the warrantless search was properly supȬ

pressed.

Five years later, after Samson had been decided, the IlliȬ

nois court decided People v. Wilson, 885 N.E.2d 1033 (Ill.

2008), and followed and extended the reasoning of Lampitok

to a defendant subject to the same parole condition that apȬ

plied to White in this case. In Wilson the defendant was on

parole. One condition required him to “consent to a search

of your person, property, or residence under your control.”

Police carried out a search of the defendant’s residence withȬ

out a warrant and without his explicit consent. The state arȬ

gued that the defendant’s agreement to the conditions of paȬ

role amounted to consent. Again parsing the conditions

closely, this time of parole, the Illinois court found there was

no prospective consent because the condition required the

parolee’s consent in the future (and a refusal would be a vioȬ

lation) but did not actually give consent. 885 N.E.2d at 1036.

The court went on to conclude, however, that the U.S. SuȬ

preme Court’s intervening decision in Samson meant that the

defendant’s expectations of privacy were so diminished that

the warrantless search was permissible. Id. at 1038–43.

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Then in People v. Absher, 950 N.E.2d 659 (Ill. 2011), the IlȬ

linois court was asked in effect to overrule Lampitok in light

of Samson and our decision in United States v. Barnett, 415

F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005), in which we held that an Illinois

probationer’s agreement to a suspicionless search condition

amounted to a prospective waiver of his privacy rights. The

court ruled in favor of the state, allowing the suspicionless

search. Absher seems to have limited Lampitok virtually to its

facts without quite overruling it. See 950 N.E.2d at 667–68

(distinguishing and limiting Lampitok). After Absher, an IlliȬ

nois probationer’s agreement to consent to suspicionless

searches is best understood has having the effect of waiving

his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 668.

The Illinois Supreme Court may well extend the reasonȬ

ing of Absher from probation to parolees like White, but we

need not rely on such an extension here. Even if White’s

agreement to the conditions of parole were not deemed a

prospective consent to a warrantless search of his bag, his

status as a parolee is the critical factor showing that the

search was nonetheless reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. To explain that conclusion, we probe more

deeply into the Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v. CaliȬ

fornia, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).

To determine the reasonableness of a search under the

Fourth Amendment, we look at the totality of the circumȬ

stances, balancing the degree to which the search intrudes

on individual liberty and the degree to which it promotes

legitimate governmental interests. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526

U.S. 295, 300 (1999); Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313, 319 (7th

Cir. 2009). Balancing those interests, the Supreme Court in

Samson upheld a warrantless and suspicionless search of a

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No. 13Ȭ2943 9

parolee. There, the Court analyzed a parole condition subȬ

stantively identical to the condition requiring White to “conȬ

sent to a search of your person, property, or residence under

your control.” Compare 730 ILCS 5/3–3–7(10) and People v.

Wilson, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1041–42 (Ill. 2008), with Samson, 547

U.S. at 846.

Without deciding whether that consent led to “a comȬ

plete waiver” of Fourth Amendment rights, see Samson, 547

U.S. at 852 n.3, the Court nonetheless held that, in balancing

the relevant interests, the search was reasonable. It observed

first that the government has an “overwhelming interest” in

supervising parolees because they are more likely to commit

crimes and must be reintegrated into the community. Id. at

853. Given that interest, the Court concluded that a “condiȬ

tion of release can so diminish or eliminate a released prisȬ

oner=s reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless

search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the

Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 847. Thus, under Samson, even if

White did not actually consent to the bag=s search, his signifȬ

icantly diminished expectation of privacy balanced against

the government=s substantial lawȬenforcement interest renȬ

ders the search reasonable and therefore lawful.

To oppose this conclusion, White points out that, unlike

the parolee in Samson, he was not present for the search. He

contends that Samson applies only when a parolee has imȬ

mediate access to the searched property. He offers three reaȬ

sons to distinguish between a search that occurs out of his

presence and one that occurs in his presence, but none is

persuasive.

First, White contends that his privacy interest in his bag

did not vanish just because he put it in Williams= car, out of

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his immediate control. But his parolee status coupled with

his supervisoryȬrelease agreement diminished any legitimate

privacy interest before he left his bag in Williams= car.

“[P]arolees are on the ‘continuum’ of stateȬimposed punishȬ

ments” and thus have fewer expectations of privacy in genȬ

eral. Samson, 547 U.S. at 850; see United States v. Huart, 735

F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sullivan, 753 F.3d

845, 855 (9th Cir. 2014). Those reduced expectations are diȬ

minished further where, as here, a condition of parole reȬ

quires the parolee to submit—unconditionally—to searches

of his person, property, and residence. See Samson, 547 U.S.

at 852; see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114, 119–

20 (2001) (assessing similar search condition for California

probation). If White had been present for the search and reȬ

fused to consent to it, the search would nonetheless have

been reasonable in light of his minimal expectation of privaȬ

cy. The bag=s relocation to the car cannot have affected those

alreadyȬdiminished privacy expectations. If we adopted

White’s reasoning, we would have to conclude that a parolee

acquired greater privacy rights in property by separating

himself from the property and eluding police than he would

have had by retaining physical possession of it and being

stopped by the police. We see no good reason to reach that

odd result.

Second, White believes that because he was not near his

bag, the police had ample time to seek and obtain a search

warrant. There was no reason to suspect that he could deȬ

stroy its contents or that the bag would connect him to a

crime that was occurring as the police might have sought a

warrant. But the Samson holding that a parolee has substanȬ

tially reduced expectations of privacy that allow a warrantȬ

less search did not depend on the impracticality of securing

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No. 13Ȭ2943 11

a warrant, the presence of suspected criminal activity, or the

risk that evidence might be lost. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850–

55. Moreover, the police here did have reason to suspect that

White=s bag might contain incriminating evidence. White

was suspected of the serious crime of shooting two people,

and his parole officer had found in White=s bedroom packagȬ

ing for a magazine for the same kind of ammunition used in

the shooting. Mere possession of such ammunition would

have been a serious federal crime for White because of his

criminal record. Given this reasonable suspicion and his

sharply diminished privacy expectations, the warrantless

search of his bag to see if it contained further evidence of a

crime was reasonable.

Third, White relies on two Illinois appellate decisions

that emphasize that searches of parolees must be reasonable.

Neither case shows why this search might have been unreaȬ

sonable. In People v. Coleman, 2 N.E.3d 1221, 1224–25

(Ill. App. 2014), the court concluded that a search of a parolȬ

ee without a warrant or consent was unreasonable. But that

conclusion was based on the fact that, at the time of the

search, the officer was not aware that the suspect was on paȬ

role. Here, the officers knew that White was a parolee: they

were attempting to execute a warrant to arrest him for parole

violations.

In People v. LeFlore, 996 N.E.2d 678, 688, 690–91 (Ill. App.

2013), the court concluded that a parolee who had consented

to searches as a condition of release was nonetheless protectȬ

ed by the holding of United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. —, 132

S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). Jones held that the government violated

the Fourth Amendment by attaching a GPS device to a car,

without a warrant, for the purpose of tracking the target’s

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12 No. 13Ȭ2943

movement, at least over an extended period of time. But beȬ

cause GPS tracking involves “continuous, surreptitious, and

potentially indefinite” detection of ongoing activities,

LeFlore, 996 N.E.2d at 690, it can be more invasive than the

oneȬtime physical search of White=s bag to locate evidence of

a crime that had already occurred. In fact, the majority in

LeFlore distinguished People v. Wilson on exactly this basis.

See id. at 690–91 (also noting that parole condition expressly

consenting to electronic monitoring had expired). Moreover,

unlike a GPS search, the search of White’s gym bag fell

squarely within the terms of the conditions of his parole. For

these reasons, neither Illinois case alters our conclusion that

the search here was reasonable under federal constitutional

standards.

Because the search of the bag that White left in his

cousin=s car was reasonable given his status as a parolee, we

need not address the parties= remaining arguments about

other justifications for the search.

AFFIRMED.

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