Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cr-00447/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cr-00447-14/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hubert Rotteveel
Defendant
Nolan Solano
Movant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

HUBERT ROTTEVEEL, 

Defendant. 

CR. NO. 2:11-447 WBS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTIONS FOR AQUITTAL AND TO 

DISMISS 

----oo0oo----

I. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

The Court denied defendant’s motion for judgment of 

acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) on Count 

Two without prejudice. (May 15, 2014 Tr. at 3:18-22 (Docket No. 

139).) Pursuant to Rule 29(c)(a), defendant had to renew his 

motion for judgment of acquittal “within 14 days after a guilty 

verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is 

later.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). Although the court 

discharged the jury on May 20, 2014, (Docket No. 101), defendant 

did not renew his Rule 29 motion until eighty-six days later, on 

Case 2:11-cr-00447-WBS Document 147 Filed 08/26/14 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

August 15, 2014, (Docket No. 125). As Rule 45(b) provides, the 

“court on its own may extend the time” for defendant to have 

filed his Rule 29 motion if defendant failed to act because of 

“excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)(1)(B).1

Defense counsel’s only explanation for the untimeliness 

of his renewed motion is that he was waiting to receive the 

transcript. Defendant could have sought an extension under Rule 

45(b)(1)(A) or filed a timely motion and requested an extension 

of time to submit additional briefing once the transcript was 

completed. Moreover, defendant made no showing that he needed a 

transcript to file his motion and, as defense counsel was present 

for the entire trial, he could have relied on his own memory. 

Sitting on one’s hands while waiting for a transcript is not 

excusable neglect. 

Nonetheless, even if defendant’s motion was timely, he 

is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal on Count Two. Rule 

29(a) provides that “the court on the defendant’s motion must 

enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 29(a). “A motion for Judgment of Acquittal is reviewed on a 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.” United States v. Graf, 

610 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 

Stoddard, 150 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Under that 

standard, evidence supports a conviction, if, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the government, it would allow any rational 

 

1 Until 2005, Rule 45 foreclosed a court from granting an 

extension of time to file a Rule 29 motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

45 (Advisory Comm. Notes); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 

416, 420 (1996). 

Case 2:11-cr-00447-WBS Document 147 Filed 08/26/14 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Stoddard, 150 F.3d at 1144). 

“In ruling on a Rule 29(c) motion, a district court must bear in 

mind that ‘it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine 

the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and 

draw reasonable inferences from proven facts.’” United States v. 

Rojas, 554 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States 

v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969)). 

One of the misrepresentations in the loan application 

for the McCarthy Court property was the alleged overstatement of 

the rent proceeds Manuel Romero received from the Valley Glen 

property.2 With the exception of the Nantucket property, (May 7, 

2014 Tr. at 32:3-17 (Docket No. 109)), Romero testified at trial 

that he did not know the amount of the rent proceeds he received 

on the properties he owned and that defendant collected the rents

for those properties. (Id. at 24:17-21, 27:2-4; see also id. at

33:19-20:2 (limited to the Austin property).) Romero also 

testified that he did not provide Nolan Solano with any receipts 

for rents at the properties defendant managed. (May 14, 2014 Tr. 

at 26:21-27:1 (Docket No. 113).)

When asked how he obtained the rent proceeds identified 

on Romero’s loan applications, Solano stated, “Well, I would 

normally ask the borrower if he knew how much each property was 

getting rents for. If he didn’t know--I think in this case 

[Romero] had a number of properties managed by Mr. Rotteveel’s 

 

2 Although the McCarthy Court property loan application 

identified rental income for other properties, the government did 

not put forth evidence showing whether the rental income for 

those properties was overstated. 

Case 2:11-cr-00447-WBS Document 147 Filed 08/26/14 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

property management, I would ask Mr. Rotteveel for information on 

those.” (Id. at 131:18-132:4.) 

When viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, a rational trier of fact could find that, for the 

McCarthy Court loan application, Solano obtained the rent 

proceeds Romero received for the Valley Glen property from 

defendant. Furthermore, the loan application for McCarthy Court 

states that Romero received rent in the amount of $2,250.00 per 

month for Valley Glen, (Gov’t’s Ex. 13-A-1 at 6), which 

contradicts Monica McGuire’s testimony that rental checks 

deposited with defendant’s company for the Valley Glen property 

ranged from only $645 to $760 per month, (May 14, 2014 Tr. at 

31:9-15). McGuire recognized that there were some rental checks 

deposited with defendant’s company that did not sufficiently 

identify the rental property. (Id. at 47:3-17.) In light of the 

fact that certain checks identified Valley Glen as the rental 

property, the jury was not required to speculate that defendant

collected a second check each month for Valley Glen for 

approximately $1,500. Taken in the light most favorable to the 

government, a rational jury could thus find that the rental 

amount defendant identified for Valley Glen was false. 

Although aspects of the purchase of the McCarthy Court

property may have varied from other transactions and defendant 

received a standard commission for the sale, that evidence would 

not preclude a rational trier of fact from concluding that 

defendant knowingly participated in a scheme to obtain a purchase 

mortgage by intentionally misrepresenting material information to 

the lender. While the government may not have put forth the 

Case 2:11-cr-00447-WBS Document 147 Filed 08/26/14 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

strongest case on Count Two, it was sufficient for the jury’s 

consideration under the lenient standard governing Rule 29 

motions. Accordingly, because the government presented 

sufficient evidence at trial to sustain a conviction on Count 

Two, the court will deny defendant’s Rule 29(c) motion on that 

count. 

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss the Indictment under Rule 

12(b)(3) on the ground that he suffered prejudice as a result of 

the government’s preindictment delay. Law enforcement initially 

interviewed defendant approximately thirteen months before the 

government filed the Indictment on October 31, 2011. Several of 

the anticipated exhibits at trial include appraisals created in 

conjunction with the purchase of properties that were part of the

alleged scheme to defraud lenders.3 All of the appraisals were 

drafted by Phyllis E. Rhinehart, who died less than one month 

before the Indictment was filed in this case. As a threshold 

matter, given that Rhinehart died only two weeks before the 

government filed the Indictment, any suggestion that the case 

would have proceeded to trial before her death if the government 

had indicted defendant sooner relies on an impractical and 

unrealistic understanding of the criminal practice in this court. 

“The Fifth Amendment guarantees that defendants will 

not be denied due process as a result of excessive preindictment 

delay.” United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 

 

3 To the extent defendant challenges the admissibility or 

relevance of the appraisals, any such objections will be resolved 

at trial. 

Case 2:11-cr-00447-WBS Document 147 Filed 08/26/14 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

1989). To merit dismissal based on preindictment delay, a 

defendant must prove (1) he “suffered actual, non-speculative 

prejudice from the delay,” and (2) “that the delay, when balanced 

against the prosecution’s reasons for it, offends those 

‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our 

civil and political institutions.’” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)). “‘The defendant has a 

heavy burden to prove that a preindictment delay caused actual 

prejudice: the proof must be definite and not speculative, and 

the defendant must demonstrate how the loss of a witness and/or 

evidence is prejudicial to his case.’” Sherlock, 962 F.2d at

1354 (quoting United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir.

1985)).

Here, defendant contends he suffered prejudice as a 

result of Rhinehart’s passing because “every witness who worked 

with [him] . . . denied that they acted with criminal intent” and 

thus “[i]t is not a stretch to assume that [Rhinehart] would say 

the same thing.” (Def.’s Reply at 3:1-5.) Not only would 

Rhinehart’s denial of acting with a “criminal intent” lack 

significant probative value as to defendant’s guilt or innocence, 

the purported prejudice from her passing is based on pure 

conjecture. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected 

“generalized speculation as to what lost or deceased witnesses 

would have said,” pointing out that the defendant usually must 

offer “affidavits []or any non-speculative proof as to how he was 

prejudiced by the loss of his witnesses.” United States v. 

Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007); see also

United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1995) 

Case 2:11-cr-00447-WBS Document 147 Filed 08/26/14 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

(“Generalized assertions of the loss of memory, witnesses, or 

evidence are insufficient to establish actual prejudice.”). 

Accordingly, because defendant has failed to show that 

he suffered actual, non-speculative prejudice as a result of any 

preindictment delay, the court must deny his motion to dismiss 

the Indictment. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s Rule 29(c) 

motion for judgment of acquittal be, and the same hereby is, 

DENIED; and defendant’s Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss the 

Indictment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

Dated: August 26, 2014

Case 2:11-cr-00447-WBS Document 147 Filed 08/26/14 Page 7 of 7