Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01601/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01601-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alonzo F. Ellerman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1601

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Alonzo F. Ellerman, * 

* 

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: October 29, 2004

Filed: June 20, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MORRIS S. ARNOLD, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Alonzo F. Ellerman was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or

more of methamphetamine (count one) and being a felon in possession of a firearm

(count two). He was sentenced1

 to 360 months on count one and 120 months on count

two, with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, Ellerman raises five

arguments challenging his conviction on count one and his sentence. Specifically, he

avers that the district court erred in: (1) failing to dismiss the indictment or suppress

evidence of his cooperation; (2) refusing Ellerman's proffered jury instruction "A";

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Combined Ozarks Multi-Jurisdictional Enforcement Team.

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(3) refusing Ellerman's proffered jury instruction "B"; (4) concluding Ellerman was

a career offender; and (5) in applying a two-level upward adjustment to Ellerman's

sentence for obstruction of justice. We find no error and affirm Ellerman's conviction

and sentence.

I. Background

Narcotics and drug paraphernalia were found in Ellerman's Branson, Missouri,

residence. Ellerman admitted owning and using the drugs and pleaded guilty to a state

narcotics possession charge. In January 2002, Ellerman then began cooperating with

police in an investigation of his acquaintances suspected of dealing in narcotics.

Howard Neustel and Michael R. Burns were believed to be sellers and manufacturers

of methamphetamine. Ellerman met with Officer Britton of the COMET2

 Drug Task

Force. Ellerman told Britton that Burns was his drug supplier. Ellerman admitted

purchasing 1⁄2 to 11⁄2 ounces of methamphetamine from Burns which he would resell

in 1ounce to 1 gram quantities. Ellerman also admitted receiving methamphetamine

from Neustel. 

To document his cooperation, Ellerman signed a COMET Informant

Memorandum. Pursuant to the agreement, Ellerman was to cooperate fully, truthfully,

and honestly with law enforcement, not to possess or use drugs during this period, not

to commit future crimes, and to report to Britton in a timely manner when required.

In exchange, the police agreed to inform the prosecutor of Ellerman's cooperation on

a case by case basis. On January 25, 2002, with instructions from Britton, Ellerman

purchased c ounce of methamphetamine from Neustel. He also arranged a buy

between Britton and Neustel where Britton purchased 31⁄2 grams of

methamphetamine. Britton made a third purchase without Ellerman's involvement.

Neustel was subsequently arrested. Britton had no contact with Ellerman after

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A search warrant was served on Burns in April of 1998. In a search of his

house, officers seized a small amount of methamphetamine, scales, four vials,

snorting devices, a scanner, surveillance equipment, hundreds of baggies, eight

firearms, and an address book with the name "Lonzo." In August 1999, Burns's

vehicle was searched by California highway patrol. Officers found a jar with 340.61

grams of methamphetamine. 

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January 31, 2002. Police terminated Ellerman's informant status in the spring 2002

after a search of his home uncovered narcotics, and because Ellerman was suspected

of having disclosed Britton's identity as an undercover narcotics officer. 

After Neustel's arrest, he also began cooperating with police and implicated

Burns as the head of their drug operation. Neustel helped the police make a controlled

purchase from Burns leading to Burns's arrest and his indictment on a charge of

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Burns sold Britton one ounce of

methamphetamine and fronted him a second ounce. Burns talked freely with Britton

about his drug activities. 

Neustel's account of the development of the conspiracy implicated Ellerman

as an actual participant in methamphetamine distribution and not merely as a user.

Neustel told how he received small quantities of methamphetamine from Burns for

resale. Burns introduced Neustel to Ellerman in the summer of 1998.3

 Neustel

observed Burns distribute methamphetamine to Ellerman and eventually Neustel

himself distributed methamphetamine to Ellerman. 

Neustel, as a sort of bookkeeper, kept a drug ledger that recorded the

organization's drug sales. The drug ledger listed the person who purchased

methamphetamine, payments received, new purchases, and an ending balance. The

ledger also tracked purchases from Burns. Ellerman's name appeared in the ledger

approximately eighteen times. Neustel distributed about 3421⁄4 grams of

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methamphetamine and received $20,580.00, plus several guns from Ellerman as

payment. 

Before trial, Ellerman filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to

suppress the evidence obtained as the result of his cooperation. The district court

denied the motion and found that Ellerman's Informant Agreement with COMET was

not binding on the government, that Ellerman had breached his agreement with

COMET by possessing methamphetamine, and that evidence showed Ellerman

disclosed Britton's identity to Burns.

Prior to submission to the jury, the district judge refused Ellerman's requested

jury instructions on his theory of defense (jury instruction "A") and on his being a

user or possessor of methamphetamine as opposed to a dealer (jury instruction "B").

The jury found Ellerman guilty of conspiracy to distribute and being a felon in

possession. At sentencing, the court determined Ellerman was a career offender under

the United States Sentencing Guidelines and gave him a two-level enhancement for

obstruction of justice.

II. Discussion

A. Dismissal of the Indictment and Suppression of Evidence

Ellerman first argues that the government acted in bad faith by charging him

with conspiracy after he cooperated with local police and by using evidence gained

from his cooperation and not requesting a downward departure. Ellerman contends

that the district court erred in refusing to dismiss the indictment or suppress the

evidence obtained from his cooperation. Critical to this argument, is Ellerman's

allegation that he had a cooperation agreement with the government. The only

agreement that Ellerman signed was with COMET, a non-federal entity. United States

v. Glauning, 211 F.3d 1085, 1087 (8th Cir. 2000) (state and local government

officials have no power to bind the federal government). Assuming arguendo that

COMET could have bound the government, Ellerman's lack of full cooperation would

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Ellerman neglected to object to the government's decision not to move for a

downward departure as instructed by the district judge. Consequently, the

government's action must be reviewed as plain error. United States v. Pirani, No. 03-

2871, slip op., 6 (8th Cir. Apr 29, 2005). We find no plain error. 

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excuse any non-performance on the government's part. The COMET agreement

specified:

I understand that if it becomes apparent, for whatever reason or from

whatever source, that I have not fully cooperated as required by this

agreement, this agreement will become null and void and law

enforcement authorities may immediately present evidence, including

information provided by me pursuant to this agreement, to a federal

and/or state prosecuting authority for charge(s) on all known violations

of the law.

The benefits under this agreement were contingent upon Ellerman's full cooperation.

Part of that cooperation required that Ellerman refrain from drug use. Ellerman does

not dispute that he illegally used drugs at the time that he was cooperating with

COMET. COMET officers, during their investigation, not the government during its

prosecution, terminated the agreement with Ellerman for his misconduct. Because the

government had no agreement with Ellerman, there is no basis for suppressing

evidence.4

B. Jury Instruction "A"

Ellerman contends that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to

give his offered instruction "A" regarding multiple conspiracies. According to

Ellerman, if the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

involved in a conspiracy that lasted from April 1998 through July 2002, the jury must

acquit. Ellerman maintains that the actual conspiracy began at the earliest in 2000 and

with only few "isolated" events to 2002. We review for abuse of discretion an

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accused's challenge to a court's refusal to give a specifically worded theory of defense

instruction. United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir. 1996). 

Ellerman argues for the existence of two separate conspiracies—one conspiracy

to distribute methamphetamine from 1998 to 1999 and another to distribute larger

amounts of methamphetamine from 2000 to 2002. Ellerman cites United States v.

England, 966 F.2d 403, 406 (8th Cir. 1992) for support. But England only indicates

that the existence of multiple conspiracies is a fact question for the jury. The critical

issue is, can a reasonable jury conclude a single conspiracy existed? 

Ellerman is entitled to a theory of defense instruction "if a timely request is

made, the evidence supports the proffered instruction, and the instruction correctly

states the law." United States v. Risch, 87 F.3d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing United

States v. Cheatham, 899 F.2d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 1990)). The district court evaluates

"the adequacy of instructions by reviewing them as a whole." United States v.

McQuarry, 726 F.2d 401, 402 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 

According to the evidence, during a search of Burns's residence in 1998, police

found an address book with the name Lonzo and a phone number. Neustel was

introduced to Ellerman in the summer of 1998. Sometime later, Neustel began

observing methamphetamine transactions between Burns and Ellerman. Neustel

supplied Ellerman and Ellerman had a long-standing relationship with Burns to move

a large quantities of methamphetamine for Burns. In exchange, Ellerman received a

lower price for methamphetamine supplies. While the evidence is somewhat unclear

as to the dates of Ellerman's involvement, we must consider the totality of the

circumstances, "including the nature of the activities involved, the location where the

alleged events of the conspiracy took place, the identity of the conspirators involved,

and the time frame in which the acts occurred." United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d

1562, 1571 (8th Cir. 1996). Given the evidence before the trial court, we cannot say

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there was an abuse of discretion for not giving a multiple conspiracy instruction. No

reasonable jury would conclude that two conspiracies existed. 

C. Jury Instruction "B"

Ellerman also contends the district court abused its discretion in failing to give

his offered instruction "B," regarding his being a user and addict, but not a dealer or

distributor, of methamphetamine. We review an accused's challenge to a court's

refusal to give a specifically worded theory of defense instruction for abuse of

discretion. Gonzales, 90 F.3d at 1371. 

In denying Ellerman's motion, the district court found that its jury instructions

covered the subject matter in Ellerman's proffered instruction. United States v. Liebo,

923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991) (an accused is not entitled to a particular jury

instruction if its subject matter is adequately and substantially covered by other

instructions). In reviewing the record, the only possible similar instruction given was

Instruction number 20:

You should understand that merely being present at the scene of an

event, or merely acting in the same way as others or merely associating

with others, does not prove that a person has joined in an agreement or

understanding. A person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy but who

happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one, does not

thereby become a member.

Instruction number 20 does not address the subject matter of Ellerman's proposed

instruction. Thus, no other instruction actually covered the subject matter of

Ellerman's proposed instruction. However, that fact alone is insufficient for reversal

if additional evidence does not support the requested instruction. Risch, 87 F.3d at

242. 

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At trial, Burk, a retired Springfield Police Department officer, testified that

Ellerman was a methamphetamine user and not a dealer and that it was not unusual

for a user caught with possession of drugs to inflate his credentials claiming to be

more than a user. He also indicated that informants retaliate against other informants,

and that Ellerman's appearance in the drug ledger was infrequent.

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Providing that a defendant with at least two prior felony convictions of either

a crime of violence or controlled substance offense may be sentenced as a career

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At trial, the evidence established Ellerman was consistently receiving quantities

of methamphetamine from Neustel and Burns for distribution. Neustel's drug ledger

showed Ellerman obtained approximately 3421⁄4 grams of methamphetamine from

Neustel during the conspiracy. Neustel characterized Ellerman as his top salesman

and Ellerman admitted obtaining 1⁄2 to 11⁄2 ounces of methamphetamine from Burns

on a regular basis. 

Ellerman bases his claim on the testimony of his expert witness, former police

officer Rodney Burk.5

 Ellerman's reliance on Burk's testimony is misplaced. Burk had

not worked as a police officer since 1991 and admitted his opinions were based on

reports provided by Ellerman's attorney, not personal interviews. Although Burk

testified Ellerman's name did not frequently appear in Neustel's drug ledger, he later

admitted he was unsure which ledger entries referred to Ellerman. Burk admitted that

if someone purchased an ounce of methamphetamine and then bought another ounce

a week later, as did Ellerman, it was not for personal use. Burk also conceded that

possession of a large amount of unused baggies in close proximity to

methamphetamine could be indicative of distribution. Ellerman has not shown that

the district court abused its discretion in rejecting the proffered instruction. 

D. Ellerman's Booker Claims

The district court concluded Ellerman was part of a criminal conspiracy that

began within 15 years of his release from custody on prior state felony convictions

and therefore sentenced him as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.6

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offender if the sentences were imposed within 15 years of the commission of the

instant offense or the sentences resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during

any part of the 15-year period. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.

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Ellerman was convicted of burglary and stealing on April 9, 1979. He received a

suspended sentence and five years' probation. On March 26, 1982, Ellerman was

convicted of second-degree assault and sentenced to five years. Because of the assault

conviction, Ellerman's probation was revoked and he was sentenced to five years to

run concurrently with the assault conviction. Ellerman was released on parole on

December 13, 1983. He was convicted for second degree burglary on December 3,

2002. The district court held Ellerman to be a career offender based on the 1982 and

2002 convictions.

Ellerman argues that because he was released on parole on December 13, 1983,

the government must prove he joined the conspiracy prior to December 13, 1998—the

15-year period. Ellerman contends the government did not meet its burden of proof

because the only evidence that predates December 13, 1998 is Burns's address book

with the name Lonzo and a phone number, along with Neustel's reference to probably

meeting Ellerman in the summer of 1998, and, that at some unknown date later,

Neustel saw Ellerman receive methamphetamine from Burns. 

Ellerman objected to being sentenced as a career offender. We review de novo

whether the district court correctly applied the Guidelines. United States v. Mashek,

No. 04-2560, slip op., 7-8 (8th Cir. May 10, 2005). In United States v. Kennedy, 32

F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit held, in determining the date of the

instant offense for purposes of calculating the 15-year period, that the district court

should consider all relevant conduct. Id. at 890; U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, Commentary n.8.

Relevant conduct includes "all acts . . . committed [or] aided . . . by the defendant"

and when a conspiracy is involved "all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of

others in furtherance of the [conspiracy]" that occurred "in preparation for that

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offense." Kennedy, 32 F.3d at 890 (emphasis in original); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1).

Activities that occurred before the date identified by the indictment as the starting

date for the offense are included. Kennedy, 32 F.3d at 890. The commentary to

U.S.S.G. 1B1.3 indicates that "'[c]onduct that is not formally charged or is not an

element of the offense of conviction may enter into the [sentencing] determination.'"

Id.; United States v. Strachan, 968 F.2d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 1992) (relevant

conduct includes "conduct which is not formally charged or adjudicated."). 

The instant conspiracy began before December 13,1998, and Ellerman's acts,

even though small, are nonetheless relevant when determining career offender status,

as are those of the other conspirators. Neustel met Burns in spring 1998. Neustel

received small quantities of methamphetamine from Burns for distribution. A search

warrant served on Burns in April 1998 revealed methamphetamine, drug

paraphernalia, and a black address book that identified Ellerman as Lonzo. Neustel

was introduced to Ellerman in summer 1998. Ellerman had a long standing

relationship with Burns. Sometime later, Neustel observed Burns distribute

methamphetamine to Ellerman and eventually also distributed methamphetamine to

Ellerman. By joining the conspiracy, Ellerman participated in, and is liable for, all

prior co-conspirators' actions that furthered the conspiracy. Kennedy, 32 F.3d at 890.

These actions predated winter 1998.

Ellerman also objected to receiving a two-level enhancement for obstruction

of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. We review de novo whether the district court

correctly applied the Guidelines. Mashek, slip op. at 7-8. The enhancement was based

on Ellerman's disclosure of Britton's identity to Burns. Under Britton's direction,

Neustel attempted to arrange a methamphetamine transaction between Britton and

Burns. However, prior to the transaction, Burns contacted Neustel and told Neustel

that he was concerned about dealing with Britton because Ellerman told him Britton

was a police officer. Burns told Neustel that Ellerman stated "they've got [Neustel]

on three counts of selling, three felony counts of selling to an undercover cop." Burns

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"The argument that a Booker error occurred is preserved if the defendant

below argued Apprendi or Blakely error or that the Guidelines were unconstitutional."

United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 76 (1st Cir. 2005); see United States

v. Sayre, 400 F.3d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 2005) (Grunder, J., concurring). Ellerman failed

to argue any of these issues.

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indicated that Ellerman described Britton in detail, including his vehicle and

undercover name. Ellerman denied that he disclosed Britton's identity. The district

court found this testimony convincing and corroborated by Burns's changed demeanor

and later method of transacting business. 

An enhancement for obstruction of justice is appropriate where the misconduct

occurs with knowledge of an investigation or at least the correct belief that an

investigation is underway. United States v. Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 738 (8th Cir.

1997). The government bears the burden of proof that an obstruction enhancement

should apply. United States v. Cox, 985 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1993). Ellerman was

aware that there was an ongoing investigation at the time that Britton's identity was

disclosed because Ellerman believed that he was still operating under an informant

agreement with COMET. Neustel provided adequate proof that Ellerman told Burns

Britton was a police officer. That testimony was reasonably accepted by the district

court. 

We find that in both instances the district court correctly applied the guidelines.

However, our analysis does not stop there because in his supplemental brief, Ellerman

argues that his sentence violates the mandates of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.

738 (2005). Because Ellerman failed to raise a Sixth Amendment Apprendi-type

claim,7

 we review for plain error, Pirani, slip op. at 6, under the four-part test of

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). Under that test

there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects

substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an

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appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a

forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.

Pirani, slip op. at 7 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). In Pirani we resolved that "the

third Olano factor turns on whether [a defendant] has demonstrated a reasonable

probability that he or she would have received a more favorable sentence with the

Booker error eliminated by making the Guidelines advisory." Id. at 10. In reviewing

the record, we find no indication that the district court would have given Ellerman a

more favorable sentence under an advisory Guideline scheme. 

Finally, we must review Ellerman's sentence for reasonableness. Booker, 125

S. Ct. at 765; Mashek, slip op. at 8. In doing so, we find that Ellerman's sentence is

reasonable. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

______________________________

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