Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00007/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00007-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
Anthony West
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

SHEA J. KENNY

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

ANTHONY WEST,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-00007 MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER

DATE: May 7, 2020

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

This case is set for status on May 7, 2020. On April 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 

617, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before

June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after June 1. This and 

previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

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Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice 

continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless 

“the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial 

continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 7, 2020. Subsequently, the 

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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Court on its own motion continued the May 7 status to June 4, 2020, pursuant to General Orders 611 and 

617. Dkt. No. 34.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 4, 

2020, and to exclude time between May 7, 2020, and June 4, 2020, under Local Code T4. The parties 

further request that this Stipulation and Order supersede the Court’s minute order filed on April 22, 2020 

(Dkt. No. 34), continuing that status conference. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) On December 13, 2019, the defendant’s previous attorney was relieved as counsel 

following a hearing before the Honorable Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Dkt. 23.

b) On December 16, 2019, Todd Leras was appointed as counsel for the defendant. 

Dkt. 25. Mr. Leras received the case file from defendant’s previous counsel in January 2020.

c) On March 23, 2020, the Court set a status hearing for May 7, 2020, and excluded 

time through that date, pursuant to the parties’ filed stipulation. Dkt. 33.

d) On April 22, 2020, the Court on its own motion reset the May 7, 2020 status 

conference to June 4, 2020, and excluded time through June 4, 2020 under General Orders 611 

and 617. Dkt. No. 34.

e) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes approximately 110 pages of investigative reports, search warrant applications and 

affidavits, and the defendant’s criminal history information. In addition to these documents, the 

discovery also includes approximately 138 photographs from the execution of the search warrant 

in relation to this case, as well as several hours of video footage of interviews with the defendant.

All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for 

inspection and copying.

f) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the discovery that has 

been produced or made available, to review the case, to conduct investigation related to the 

charges, to conduct legal research regarding the charges and potential sentencing factors, to 

consult with his client regarding the case and potential resolutions, and to otherwise prepare for 

trial.

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g) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

h) The government does not object to the continuance.

i) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 617, and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because the defendant is in custody and defense counsel requires additional time to 

confer with his client regarding the above-described discovery, the government’s plea offer, and 

general case strategy. Defense counsel’s ability to do so is limited by the COVID-19 pandemic.

j) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

k) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 7, 2020 to June 4, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 27, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ SHEA J. KENNY

SHEA J. KENNY

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: April 27, 2020 /s/ TODD LERAS

TODD LERAS

Counsel for Defendant 

ANTHONY WEST

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2020

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