Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04755/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04755-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Oscar Ramos Velasquez
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 07-4577

EDGAR ALBERTO AYALA, a/k/a

Pony,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 07-4755

OSCAR RAMOS VELASQUEZ, a/k/a

Casper,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.

(8:05-cr-00393-DKC-4; 8:05-cr-00393-DKC-18)

Argued: January 29, 2010

Decided: April 8, 2010

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and R.

Bryan HARWELL, United States District Judge for the

District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

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Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Harwell joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Gary Allen Ticknor, Elkridge, Maryland, for

Appellants. Sandra Wilkinson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Richard C. Bittner, Glen Burnie, Maryland, for

Appellant Oscar Ramos Velasquez. Rod J. Rosenstein, United

States Attorney, James M. Trusty, Assistant United States

Attorney, Laura Gwinn, Trial Attorney, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

This case concerns the prosecution of members of the violent street gang La Mara Salvatrucha under various statutes,

including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, and the Violent Crimes

in Aid of Racketeering ("VICAR") statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959.

On appeal, the defendants raise numerous claims, some individually and others collectively. After careful consideration,

we reject the defendants’ various claims, affirm the judgment

of the district court, and commend that court for its conscientious conduct of this six-week trial. 

I.

A.

La Mara Salvatrucha, otherwise known as MS-13, is one of

the largest and most violent street gangs in the United States.

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The gang originated in Los Angeles, California in the 1980s.

Since then, it has spread across the country and into foreign

countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico. Today,

it has a large presence in the eastern United States, including

parts of Maryland and Virginia. 

Violence defines MS-13’s mission. The gang initiates its

members through violence: existing members beat up the new

members for a period of thirteen seconds. This ritual is meant

to signify the beginning of a new, more brutal lifestyle. Once

initiated, MS-13 members commit violent acts to defend the

gang’s territory against its rivals and to spread fear so that citizens do not report the gang’s activities to the police. In fact,

gang members are required to attack and, if possible, kill rival

gang members whenever they see them. MS-13 members gain

status within the gang through their willingness and ability to

commit such violent acts. 

The gang maintains internal discipline through the use of

violence as well. Members who do not follow the rules are

routinely beaten, and those who cooperate with the police face

penalty of death. The violent nature of MS-13 is captured by

one of its mottos: "mata, viola, controla" which means "kill,

rape, control."

MS-13 is organized into local cliques. Each clique has two

leaders: a "first word" and a "second word." The first word is

responsible for running the clique’s meetings, and the second

word does so in his absence. At clique meetings, MS-13

members report on their violent activities which often include

murders and robberies. The gang also discusses ongoing

police investigations and devises ways to prevent others from

cooperating with the police. In addition, members pay dues at

meetings, which the clique uses to buy weapons, make loans

to members, and support members who are in jail. 

Leaders of the various cliques frequently communicate and

coordinate with one another to achieve the gang’s objectives.

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They provide each other with material support, often in the

form of guns or places to hide from the police. 

B.

This case primarily involves two MS-13 cliques that operate in Prince George’s County and Montgomery County,

Maryland: the Sailors Locos Salvatruchos Westside

("Sailors") and the Teclas Locos Salvatruchos ("Teclas"). A

taskforce composed of federal and state agents conducted an

extensive investigation into the activities of these cliques. The

investigation was aided substantially by an informant within

the ranks of the Sailors clique known as Noe Cruz. Cruz regularly provided the police with information about the gang’s

violent activities from December 2003 until August 2005. At

that point, the police executed numerous search warrants and

arrested many suspected gang members. 

Among those arrested were the defendants here, Edgar

Alberto Ayala and Oscar Ramos Velasquez. The facts relevant to their involvement in MS-13 are as follows. 

1.

At some point prior to February 2002, Ayala became a

member of the Sailors clique of MS-13. Ayala attended meetings, paid dues, and even collected dues on behalf of the

clique. He eventually became a leader in the clique, obtaining

the rank of second word. During his time in MS-13, Ayala

knew about or participated in several of the clique’s violent

activities. 

One of these was the murder of Randy Calderon who was

a member of the Sailors clique. In the early morning hours of

November 22, 2003, Calderon and another MS-13 member

stabbed a rival gang member to death, wrapped his body in

bed sheets, and tossed it in a dumpster. They did so at the

apartment of fellow gang member Juan Moriera, without first

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obtaining Moriera’s permission. Concerned that Calderon

would confess the murder to the police and implicate him in

the crime, Moriera shot and killed Calderon that same morning with the help of other MS-13 members. 

Ayala was well aware of the circumstances surrounding

Calderon’s death. Shortly after the murder, Ayala told a fellow gang member that it was necessary to kill Calderon to

keep him from confessing the murder to the police. Ayala also

attended a clique meeting where the murder was discussed.

Moriera explained the details of the murder to the clique.

Then Moriera and the clique’s first word, Israel Cruz,

announced a new rule: anyone who did not do as they were

supposed to do would face the same fate as Calderon did. 

Ayala was also aware of a murder that took place in Suitland, Maryland. On May 21, 2004, three MS-13 members,

including Ayala’s brother Alexis, beat a rival gang member to

death and left his body at a cemetery. At a Sailors meeting

soon thereafter, Alexis described the murder in detail. Ayala

and Israel Cruz then advised Alexis to leave town to avoid the

police. Ayala later attempted to cover up this murder by telling a Maryland grand jury that he had not spoken about it

with his brother. 

Ayala participated in a gang-related shooting at an apartment complex in Alexandria, Virginia. On January 21, 2005,

a group of Sailors, including Ayala, Noe Cruz, and Moriera,

drove from Maryland to Virginia to look for rival gang members. As they drove by an apartment complex, they spotted

some adolescents socializing on a stoop. Moriera suspected

that these teenagers were members of a rival gang. The group

then drove to a convenience store, where they met up with

another MS-13 member who brought two handguns. Shortly

thereafter, four MS-13 members, including Ayala, drove off

in Ayala’s vehicle to find the teenagers they had spotted earlier.

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According to the teenagers, two men approached them, and

one opened fire with a pistol. The teenagers attempted to flee

into the apartment building, but three of them were caught in

the line of fire. A fifteen-year-old boy died in the attack, and

two other teenagers were injured. One girl at the scene later

identified Moriera as the shooter. Although no eyewitnesses

reported seeing a second gun, police found bullets from two

different guns at the scene. 

Lastly, Ayala and other MS-13 members attempted to commit a murder in the Baltimore, Maryland area. On February

23, 2005, Ayala, Israel Cruz, and Noe Cruz drove to Baltimore, met up with MS-13 members from another clique, and

went to the home of an individual with whom the gang had

a dispute. Their plan was that one MS-13 member would lure

the individual from his home, while Ayala and Israel Cruz

waited outside to shoot him with a handgun. The plan was

ultimately unsuccessful, however, because their intended victim spotted one of his would-be assassins. 

At various points that day, Noe Cruz called the police on

his cellular phone to inform them of the gang’s plan.

Although the police were unable to find the gang members

before they attempted the murder, the police later located

Ayala’s vehicle, pulled it over, and discovered the handgun.

Ayala was arrested and pled guilty in state court to transporting a firearm. 

2.

At some point prior to November 2002, Velasquez became

a member of the Teclas clique of MS-13. Velasquez attended

meetings, paid dues, and even climbed the ranks to become

first word for the clique. Like Ayala, Velasquez was aware of

and participated in his clique’s violent activities. 

One of these was a gang rape or, as MS-13 members call

it, a "train." On the morning of May 12, 2003, Velasquez

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picked three teenage girls up from a high school under the

pretense of taking them to a party. He took them to an apartment, where a few MS-13 members were waiting. At some

point thereafter, ten to fifteen more gang members arrived.

After realizing that one of the teenage girls was the sister of

an MS-13 member, one of the men took the girl outside of the

apartment to talk. The gang members remaining inside then

forced the two other girls into separate bedrooms and formed

lines outside each room. One by one, they entered the rooms

to rape the girls, each man being allotted five minutes at a

time. 

According to one of the girls, Velasquez took her into a

bedroom and tried to have sex with her. When she refused his

advances, he called two other men into the room. One of these

men choked her, while the other held her arms down on the

bed. After she started to scream, Velasquez pointed a gun at

her head and told her to stay quiet. Ten or so men then took

turns entering the room, and all but two of them raped her. At

various points, she could see Velasquez standing by the door.

Velasquez even entered the room at one point and told her she

would have to shower after the men were finished with her.

The other girl provided a similar account. One of the men

made sexual advances toward her in the kitchen of the apartment. When she refused, he forced her into one of the bedrooms with the help of other gang members. Approximately

thirteen men raped her in that room, and one of them was

Velasquez. He entered the room with a gun in his hand,

threatened to kill her, and forced her to have intercourse. 

Eventually, the third girl reentered the apartment and saw

the lines outside the bedrooms. As she started to scream, the

gang members dispersed and fled the apartment. The girls

then ran outside and called the police. 

Velasquez was also involved in the stabbing of a rival gang

member. During the early morning hours of September 18,

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2004, Velasquez and several other MS-13 members confronted a smaller group of members from a rival gang in the

parking lot of a nightclub called the Coco Cabana. They surrounded an individual named Jhony Diaz and proceeded to

attack him. During the ensuing melee, Diaz was stabbed ten

times. The fight broke up when the police arrived on the

scene. The MS-13 members quickly fled, leaving Diaz bleeding on the ground. 

C.

On August 23, 2005, a grand jury in the District of Maryland returned an indictment against Ayala, Velasquez, and

several others for crimes arising out of their involvement in

MS-13. The district court severed the case and scheduled the

first trial against Ayala and Velasquez. On September 18,

2006, the grand jury returned a second superseding indictment, naming only these two defendants. 

Both defendants were charged with conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1962(d). Among other things, the indictment alleged that

MS-13 was an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering

activities, including murder, kidnapping, robbery, obstruction

of justice, witness tampering, and interference with commerce

by threats of violence. Both defendants were also charged

with a VICAR offense, conspiring to commit assaults with

dangerous weapons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6)

and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

In addition, Ayala was charged with another VICAR

offense, conspiring to commit murder, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 in connection with the

shooting in Alexandria, Virginia. He also faced a charge for

using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime

of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2 in connection with his trip to Baltimore, Maryland. 

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Velasquez was also charged with another VICAR offense,

assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1959(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 and with using or carrying a

firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 in connection

with the gang rape. He was also charged with one last VICAR

offense, assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 for his participation in

the stabbing of Jhony Diaz. 

Both defendants pled not guilty, and a jury convicted them

on all counts. The district court subsequently sentenced Ayala

to 420 months of imprisonment, five years of supervised

release, and a $300 assessment. It sentenced Velasquez to 444

months of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and

a $400 assessment. 

On appeal, the defendants raise a number of issues, some

individually and some collectively. We address the individual

claims first, setting forth additional facts as they become necessary. 

II.

First, Ayala challenges his conviction for conspiring to

commit murder in violation of the VICAR statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1959(a)(5). He argues that this murder conspiracy was part

of the same course of conduct that constituted the larger racketeering conspiracy for which he was convicted under RICO,

18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Thus, he contends that he was punished

multiple times for the same offense in violation of the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person shall "be

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life

or limb." In the context of a single criminal prosecution, the

clause "protects against multiple punishments for the same

offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717

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(1969). This guarantee simply prevents "the sentencing court

from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature

intended." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983);

United States v. Martin, 523 F.3d 281, 290 (4th Cir. 2008). It

does not, however, prohibit the legislature from punishing the

same act or course of conduct under different statutes.

Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981). 

Thus, when a defendant violates more than one statute in

a single course of conduct, a court may impose multiple punishments without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause if the

legislature authorizes it to do so. United States v. Terry, 86

F.3d 353, 355 (4th Cir. 1996). Ultimately, our "only task is to

determine whether Congress intended to impose multiple punishments." United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 372 (4th

Cir. 2008). For "the power to define criminal offenses and to

prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found

guilty of them[ ] resides wholly with the Congress." Whalen

v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980).

To make that determination, we are guided by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.

299 (1932). "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes

a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be

applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only

one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which

the other does not." Id. at 304. When applying this test in multiple punishment cases, our "exclusive focus" is "upon the elements of the statutory provisions in question," not the

particular facts of the underlying case. United States v. Allen,

13 F.3d 105, 109 n.4 (4th Cir. 1993). If each provision

requires proof of a distinct element, "then multiple punishments are presumed to be authorized absent a clear showing

of contrary Congressional intent." Terry, 86 F.3d at 356 (citing Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340).

Applying Blockburger here, we conclude that Congress

intended murder conspiracy under § 1959(a)(5) and racketeer10 UNITED STATES v. AYALA

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ing conspiracy under § 1962(d) to be distinct offenses. Establishing a murder conspiracy under § 1959(a)(5) requires proof

that the defendant conspired "for the purpose of gaining

entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity" or as consideration for

"anything of pecuniary value" from such an enterprise. There

is simply no such requirement to prove a racketeering conspiracy under § 1962(d). Moreover, establishing a murder

conspiracy under § 1959(a)(5) requires proof of a specific

conspiracy to "commit murder," a fact which is not a necessary element of a racketeering conspiracy under § 1962(d).

Conversely, establishing a racketeering conspiracy under

§ 1962(d) requires proof of a conspiracy to conduct an enterprise through "a pattern of racketeering activity," which the

RICO statute defines as "at least two acts." 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961(5). Section 1959(a)(5), by contrast, only requires

proof of a conspiracy to commit a single act. 

Thus, each offense requires proof of at least one fact that

the other does not. That is, a jury could find a defendant guilty

of one offense without necessarily finding him guilty of the

other and vice-versa. Accordingly, "we presume that Congress authorized multiple punishments." Chandia, 514 F.3d at

372.

The burden then shifts to Ayala to make a clear showing of

contrary legislative intent. Terry, 86 F.3d at 356. Ayala has

not met that burden, however. If anything, we think that the

available evidence suggests that Congress did indeed intend

to impose multiple punishments. For one thing, it placed the

two offenses in different chapters and provided each with its

own penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1)-(6) (penalties for

VICAR violations); § 1963(a)-(m) (penalties for RICO violations). For another, Congress was clearly aware of the RICO

statute when it enacted the VICAR statute, given that the latter defines "racketeering activity" by reference to a provision

of RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(1) (referencing "section

1961 of this title"). Had it wanted to impose a single punishUNITED STATES v. AYALA 11

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ment when a defendant violated both statutes during the same

course of conduct, Congress easily could have said so, yet

Ayala points us to no such indication in the text or legislative

history of the statutes. 

Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that these statutes

are directed at two different but related problems. See

Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343. While the RICO statute addresses

participation in racketeering enterprises generally, the VICAR

statute addresses the particular danger posed by those, like

Ayala, who are willing to commit violent crimes in order to

bolster their positions within such enterprises. In this sense,

the VICAR statute "complements" the RICO act by allowing

the government to address these interrelated problems. United

States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992). 

We find additional support in the case law of other circuits.

The Second Circuit, for instance, has held that a defendant

may be punished in a single prosecution for substantive violations of both the RICO and VICAR statutes. United States v.

Polanco, 145 F.3d 536, 542 (2d Cir. 1998). Likewise, the

First Circuit has held that a defendant may be punished for

both a VICAR conspiracy and a substantive RICO offense.

United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 39 (1st Cir. 2002);

United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 48 (1st Cir. 2007)

(same). In the related context of successive prosecutions, the

Third Circuit has rejected a double jeopardy challenge where

the first prosecution included a RICO conspiracy charge and

the second included a VICAR conspiracy charge. United

States v. Merlino, 310 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2002). It

observed that "[b]ecause that VICAR offense requires proof

of an element that the RICO offense does not, and vice-versa,

they are different offenses for the purposes of the Double

Jeopardy Clause." Id. While the exact scenarios in these cases

differ, the consensus is that the VICAR and RICO statutes

create separate punishable offenses. 

Thus, we conclude that there is no Double Jeopardy bar to

punishing a defendant for both a murder conspiracy under

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§ 1959(a)(5) and a racketeering conspiracy under § 1962(d)

when the offenses arise out of the same course of conduct. 

III.

Next, Ayala challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation

to a crime of violence on August 23, 2005. The government’s

theory was that the crime of violence in question was the

RICO conspiracy for which Ayala was also convicted in this

case. At trial, Ayala moved for judgment of acquittal on the

§ 924(c) charge, arguing that the RICO conspiracy was not a

crime of violence. The district court denied the motion, however, reasoning that the conspiracy qualified as a crime of violence because the predicate acts alleged in the indictment

were themselves violent. 

On appeal, Ayala renews his argument that the RICO conspiracy was not a crime of violence under § 924(c). He notes

that many RICO predicate acts are not violent crimes, and he

faults the government for not specifying in the indictment

which predicate act he intended to commit on the day he possessed the firearm. He further contends that we may not look

to the particular facts of the case to determine whether he was

involved in a violent crime that day. 

Ayala’s argument is misplaced. We have recognized that a

conspiracy can itself be "a separate crime of violence providing its own predicate for § 924(c)(1) liability." United States

v. Phan, 121 F.3d 149, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1997). It is therefore

immaterial that the government did not specify which predicate act was intended on the day at issue. The question is simply whether the RICO conspiracy itself was a crime of

violence under § 924(c). 

Section 924(c) defines a crime of violence as, among other

things, a felony "that by its nature, involves a substantial risk

that physical force against the person or property of another

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may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). Under this definition, a conspiracy "is

itself a crime of violence when its objectives are violent

crimes." United States v. Elder, 88 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir.

1996). This is because "[w]hen conspirators have formed a

partnership in crime to achieve a violent objective, . . . they

have substantially increased the risk that their actions will

result in serious physical harm to others." United States v.

White, 571 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 2009) (making this observation when interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). 

To determine whether the objectives of this conspiracy

were violent crimes, we need not delve into the particular

facts of the case as Ayala contends. Instead, the question is

intrinsic to the indictment itself. Here, the indictment charges

a pattern of violent racketeering activities, including murder,

kidnapping, and robbery. It is hard to imagine a conspiracy

which, by its nature, poses more of a risk that physical force

will be used against persons or property. Other courts have

held that RICO conspiracies that surely posed less risk qualified as crimes of violence under similarly worded statutes.

See, e.g., United States v. Ciccone, 312 F.3d 535, 541-42 (2d

Cir. 2002) (holding that a RICO conspiracy to commit extortion was a crime of violence under the Bail Reform Act);

United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir.

1997) (holding that a RICO conspiracy to commit robberies

affecting interstate commerce was a crime of violence under

the Juvenile Delinquency Act). Thus, we have no difficulty in

concluding that a RICO conspiracy to commit crimes including murder, kidnapping, and robbery is by its nature a crime

of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B). Accordingly, we find no

error in the district court’s ruling and affirm Ayala’s conviction under that section. 

IV.

Next, Ayala raises several evidentiary claims, which we

address in turn. First, Ayala challenges the admission of state14 UNITED STATES v. AYALA

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ments under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Ayala contends that the district court permitted MS-13 members to testify about discussions that took place at clique meetings without attributing

statements to particular declarants. In Ayala’s view, this was

in error because the declarant of these statements may have

been Noe Cruz, who was a government informant and thus

not a member of the conspiracy. We review a district court’s

decision to admit coconspirator statements for abuse of discretion, United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1255 (4th

Cir. 1992), and find no such abuse here.

For a statement to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E),

there "must be evidence [1] that there was a conspiracy

involving the declarant and the nonoffering party, and [2] that

the statement was made ‘during the course and in furtherance

of the conspiracy.’" Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,

175 (1987). Regarding the first requirement, it is not necessary for the offering party to identify the declarant by name.

See United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 564 (4th Cir.

2000) (admitting an unsigned document under Rule

801(d)(2)(E) "notwithstanding the government’s inability to

identify the declarants"). Instead, the offering party need only

"show that the unknown declarant was more likely than not

a conspirator." United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306, 1313

(8th Cir. 1985). 

Here, Ayala’s concern appears to be that an unattributed

statement may have been made by Cruz, rather than by a

member of the conspiracy. But it is not clear which statements

Ayala is complaining about. Although he frames his argument

in broad terms, he admits that it is "hard to find" any examples where Cruz’s statements may actually have come into

evidence. Br. of Appellants at 22.

In fact, Ayala produces only one possible example from the

entire record. MS-13 member Emilia Masaya testified about

a meeting where she learned from an unidentified declarant

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that Ayala was arrested after going to Baltimore, Maryland to

commit a murder. Ayala contends that this statement must

have come from Cruz, but the record does not back up this

claim. To be sure, it was later revealed at trial that Cruz

attended the meeting in question, but there is no indication

either way about whether he was the one who brought up the

matter. He certainly knew about the arrest prior to the meeting, but the record indicates that other gang members did as

well. And given that Masaya was repeating a comment from

a meeting where all but one of the attendees were coconspirators, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the statement. In any event, we find that

the statement was harmless under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 52(a) in light of the substantial other evidence at

trial about Ayala’s arrest and the events leading up to it. 

In his brief, Ayala also cites a number of instances where

Noe Cruz testified about statements made by other MS-13

members at clique meetings and gatherings. For example,

Cruz recalled a meeting where Moriera told the Sailors clique

that he had murdered Calderon and then cautioned the members not to act as Calderon had. To the extent that Ayala is

challenging these statements, we find that they were clearly

admissible under the coconspirator exception. The fact that

Cruz was not a member of the conspiracy at the time he heard

these remarks is simply irrelevant to their admissibility under

Rule 801(d)(2)(E). All that is required is that a statement be

made by one of the defendant’s coconspirators, not to a

coconspirator, in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500,

1519 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition

Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1199 (2d Cir. 1989). 

Indeed, this court has previously recognized that statements

"made by a co-conspirator to a third party who is not then a

member of the conspiracy" are admissible when made in the

course and furtherance thereof. United States v. Shores, 33

F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, that a comment

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was made to or in the presence of a government informant

does not, without more, render it inadmissible under Rule

801(d)(2)(E). See, e.g., United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890,

901 (7th Cir. 1988). Here, the statements were made by

Ayala’s coconspirators and they regarded the gang’s criminal

activities and efforts to maintain discipline. Thus, the statements were plainly admissible under the coconspirator exception, notwithstanding the fact that Cruz was an informant at

the time he heard them. 

V.

Second, Ayala argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence of a guilty plea he made in state court. The facts

relevant to this claim are as follows. 

A.

As discussed above, Ayala was arrested on February 23,

2005 and charged in state court with transporting a firearm.

Laura Gwinn, an assistant state’s attorney, handled his case.

At the time, Gwinn was aware that there was an ongoing

investigation into the activities of MS-13 that could lead to

federal RICO charges. In fact, she would later be designated

as a special assistant prosecutor in the resulting federal case.

She was not, however, a federal prosecutor at the time she

handled Ayala’s state case. 

At some point prior to July 2005, Gwinn contacted Ayala’s

counsel to discuss the possibility of a plea agreement for the

firearms charge. Gwinn proposed that Ayala enter a guilty

plea in return for a sentence of nine months of imprisonment

and three years of probation. Ayala’s counsel then proposed

that the nine months be served as home detention. Gwinn

agreed, and Ayala entered a guilty plea pursuant to these

terms on July 18, 2005. At no point did Gwinn disclose the

existence of the ongoing investigation. 

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Ayala was released on home detention on August 5, 2005.

Then on August 23, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted him

for crimes arising out of his involvement in MS-13, which led

to the instant prosecution. At trial in this case, the government

sought to introduce Ayala’s guilty plea as evidence that he

possessed a firearm on February 23, 2005. Ayala objected,

arguing that his plea was involuntary because he was not

informed that the plea might be used against him in a subsequent federal prosecution. After careful consideration, the district court rejected the argument and admitted evidence of the

guilty plea under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) as an

admission by a party-opponent. 

B.

On appeal, Ayala argues that his state court plea was constitutionally invalid and thus inadmissible because he was not

informed that it might be used as evidence against him in a

future federal prosecution. 

So far as we are aware, Ayala has never raised any objection to the validity of his state plea before this time, and a

strong presumption of validity attaches to a plea that has

never been questioned and no court has found infirm. As the

First Circuit has noted, there is a question about whether this

is even the appropriate venue to be litigating the plea’s validity. "Ordinarily, it is inappropriate for a federal court to

review such a claim without allowing the state courts a prior

opportunity to do so." United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d

1506, 1511 (1st Cir. 1989). Even apart from the fact that

Ayala has never sought before this moment to withdraw the

plea, the district court’s decision to admit it was sound. 

For a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, a defendant

must be informed of the "direct" but not the "collateral" consequences of the plea. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475

F.2d 1364, 1365 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Brady v. United

States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). This distinction "turns on

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whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely

automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment."

Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366. While this distinction may be elusive in some cases, it is not so here. 

Whether a guilty plea in state court might be used in a subsequent federal prosecution is plainly a collateral consequence. In our system of dual sovereigns, state and federal

courts run on separate tracks; thus, a guilty plea in one does

not automatically lead to consequences in the other. As the

Seventh Circuit has explained, "the state court has no direct

role in federal prosecutions. The state and federal systems are

separate and distinct, and the defendant need only be

informed of the direct consequences he may face within the

particular system." United States v. Long, 852 F.2d 975, 979

(7th Cir. 1988); accord United States v. Williams, 104 F.3d

213, 216 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Maestas, 941 F.2d

273, 279 (5th Cir. 1991); Bouthot, 878 F.2d at 1511. 

This analysis holds even where, as here, state officials are

aware of a pending federal investigation in which the defendant’s guilty plea might be used. Bouthot, 878 F.2d at 1511-

12; United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1317 (7th Cir.

1989). In these circumstances, federal prosecution is not automatic. Instead, it turns on whether federal officials elect to

bring a charge, a choice over which state officials have no

control. See Jordan, 870 F.2d at 1317 ("[F]ederal prosecution

was only a possibility over which the State’s Attorney had no

control . . . ."). As the district court observed in this case, after

Ayala pled guilty in state court, federal prosecutors still had

to decide "what charges they would seek to bring and

whether, indeed, Mr. Ayala would even be involved." Thus,

we conclude that Ayala’s plea was not invalid simply because

he was not informed of the possibility that it might be used

against him in a subsequent federal prosecution. Indeed, this

possibility is obvious and exists in almost every case, particularly cases that involve firearms. 

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Ayala also alleges that the state prosecutor somehow misled him into entering the plea agreement. He argues that

Gwinn’s failure to disclose the possibility of a federal prosecution was tantamount to misrepresentation because it left

him with the impression that he would be able to serve out his

state sentence without interruption. 

This misrepresentation claim is little more than a repackaging of the one above. We reject it as well. The district court

concluded that Gwinn never "said anything that [was] misleading," nor did she make a "promise to Mr. Ayala that he

would not be prosecuted in Federal Court for crimes arising

out of the event that was the subject of his guilty plea." Ayala

does not contest those findings, and we decline to equate a

prosecutor’s silence about collateral consequences with misrepresentation. The cases simply prohibit prosecutors from

making false statements or breaking promises. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). They most

certainly do not "place an affirmative duty on the prosecution

to discuss all possible ramifications of a defendant’s guilty

plea." Jordan, 870 F.2d at 1316. 

Accordingly, Gwinn did not engage in misrepresentation by

remaining silent about the federal investigation. If anything,

Gwinn may well have had an obligation not to discuss it. It

appears that Gwinn knew about the federal grand jury, in

which case she likely was barred from disclosing its existence

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). But at a minimum, she risked seriously jeopardizing that investigation had

she disclosed its existence to a known member of MS-13. 

For these reasons, we find no error in the district court’s

decision to admit evidence of Ayala’s guilty plea.1

1Ayala also claims that Gwinn offered him the plea as a ruse to place

him on home detention to provide the justification for the search of his

residence weeks later. This claim fails for numerous reasons, namely that

Ayala voluntarily opted for the benefit of home detention as opposed to

imprisonment, that he violated a court order by his continuing contact with

MS-13 members while in the home, and that irrespective of his home

detention, the address was one long associated with him and likely would

have been the subject of a search in any event. 

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VI.

Third, Ayala challenges the admission of statements that he

and his fellow MS-13 members made before a state grand

jury. The relevant facts are as follows.

A.

In July 2004, three members of the Sailors clique—Noe

Cruz, Israel Cruz, and Santos Garcia—were subpoenaed to

testify before a state grand jury. The grand jury was investigating a gang-related murder committed by Ayala’s brother

and two other MS-13 members in Suitland, Maryland. Ayala

and Emilia Masaya had not been subpoenaed but decided to

accompany the others to the courthouse on the day in question. Prior to entering the courthouse, all five MS-13 members

met at a nearby restaurant, where they agreed to deny their

knowledge of the murder. 

After the group arrived at the courthouse, an investigator

approached Ayala about the possibility of testifying before the

grand jury. He informed Ayala that he would be subpoenaed

at a later date and gave him the option to go ahead and testify

that day. He also advised Ayala that he had the right to an

attorney. 

Ayala elected to testify that day. After Ayala was sworn in,

the state’s attorney informed him that he had a right against

self-incrimination and the right to an attorney. Ayala stated

that he understood those rights and did not wish to be represented. He then proceeded to testify, falsely denying that his

brother had spoken with him about the murder. 

Israel Cruz and Santos Garcia also testified before the

grand jury and denied any knowledge of the murder. In order

to maintain the cover of Noe Cruz, the government informant,

the state’s attorney called him before the grand jury and told

him the questions she had asked the others. After leaving the

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courthouse, the gang members discussed the fact that they had

lied to the grand jury as planned. 

At trial in this case, the government sought to introduce the

grand jury statements of Israel Cruz, Santos Garcia, and

Ayala as evidence that they obstructed justice in furtherance

of the RICO conspiracy. Ayala argued (1) that the testimony

of Cruz and Garcia was inadmissible under the Confrontation

Clause and (2) that his own testimony was inadmissible

because he had not been informed that he had a right to

appointed counsel. The district court rejected both arguments

and admitted the statements. On appeal, Ayala challenges

both rulings. 

B.

Ayala argues that the district court admitted the grand jury

statements of Israel Cruz and Santos Garcia in violation of the

Confrontation Clause. He contends that these statements were

"testimonial" and thus inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), given that he did not have an

opportunity to cross-examine either individual. 

Crawford generally bars the "admission of testimonial

statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he

was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior

opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 53-54. To be sure,

sworn statements before a grand jury are plainly testimonial.

See id. at 51-52 (providing examples of the "core class" of

testimonial statements including "formalized testimonial

materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or

confessions") (internal quotation omitted). But Crawford is

quite explicit that the Confrontation Clause does not eliminate

the use of testimonial statements across the board. As the

Court explained, it "does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the

matter asserted." Id. at 60 n. 9. 

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Here, the district court admitted the statements not for their

truth but merely to prove that Cruz and Santos made certain

denials before the grand jury. "[E]vidence is not hearsay when

it is used only to prove that a prior statement was made and

not to prove the truth of the statement." Anderson v. United

States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 n.8 (1974). As the district court

explained, the statements were the equivalent of a "physical

exhibit that demonstrates that words were spoken." By introducing them, the government was simply laying a foundation

to show that the statements were false and made in furtherance of the conspiracy. It did so by calling at trial witnesses

Noe Cruz and Emilia Masaya, who testified about the group’s

plan to cover up their knowledge of the murder and who, of

course, were subject to cross-examination. Accordingly, the

admission of the grand jury statements did not violate the

Confrontation Clause. 

C.

Next, Ayala argues that his own grand jury testimony was

improperly obtained because he was not informed that he had

a right to appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments. This claim is easily dismissed. It is well established that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "does not

attach until a prosecution is commenced" against a defendant.

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). Commencement refers to "the initiation of adversary judicial criminal

proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary

hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." United

States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (internal quotation omitted). Although Ayala was the subject of an ongoing

investigation, he had not been charged at the time he testified

before the grand jury. Thus, his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel had not yet attached, and we find no error in the district court’s decision to admit his statements. Accord, e.g.

United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 1997);

United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982). 

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VII.

We now turn to Velasquez’s claims. Velasquez argues that

the district court unduly limited his ability to cross-examine

the two teenage victims of the gang rape. Specifically, he

claims that the district court erred by precluding him from

inquiring about the girls’ prior inconsistent statements, their

medical treatment, and their psychiatric treatment. We review

restrictions on cross-examination for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Ambers, 85 F.3d 173, 175 (4th Cir. 1996).

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant an opportunity for effective crossexamination. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16

(1974). The clause does not, however, confer the right to

cross-examine "in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the

defense might wish." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20

(1985) (per curiam). District courts thus "retain wide latitude

insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that

is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). 

Although Velasquez asserts that the district court seriously

hampered his ability to cross-examine the witnesses, the

record reveals an entirely different story. The court permitted

Velasquez’s counsel to question the witnesses on a wide variety of matters including whether they had previously skipped

school, whether they used alcohol, what clothing one of them

wore, and whether they had voluntarily kissed and danced

with some of the men at the apartment. By contrast, the limitations he complains about were minor. 

Velasquez first contends that the district court unduly limited his ability to question the victims about their prior statements. The record shows, however, the court permitted his

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counsel to question the girls at quite some length on discrepancies between statements they gave to police and to medical

examiners. The court merely sustained objections when

Velasquez’s counsel put his questions in improper form by,

among other things, assuming facts not in evidence, calling

for speculation, or asking the witnesses to comment on the

veracity of others. The district court plainly had discretion to

require Velasquez’s counsel to abide by these elementary precepts to ensure that the jury was not misled, and these restrictions did nothing to limit the substance of his questioning. 

Velasquez next complains that he should have been given

more freedom to examine the victims’ medical treatment, but

this claim is meritless as well. In the only example he cites,

one of the girls testified that she had not been on any medication at the time of the gang rape. Velasquez’s counsel then

asked her whether she was currently on any medication, and

the district court sustained the government’s objection after

his counsel failed to proffer any relevant basis for the question. Given this failure by counsel, there was clearly no abuse

of discretion by the district court. 

Lastly, Velasquez challenges the district court’s decision

not to allow him to ask one girl whether she was under the

care of any counselor, psychotherapist, or psychiatrist. We

have previously cautioned that permitting a defendant to

cross-examine an adverse witness on such matters tends to be

"unnecessarily demeaning" and will "generally introduce into

the case a collateral issue, leading to a large amount of testimony substantially extraneous to the essential facts and issues

of the controversy being tried." United States v. Lopez, 611

F.2d 44, 45 (4th Cir. 1979). Thus, district courts should

"weigh the potential unfairness of a free wheeling inquiry

intended to stigmatize the witness against whatever materiality the evidence might have." Id. at 46 (internal quotation

omitted). Here, it is not clear what relevance, if any, this

information had because Velasquez’s counsel did not explain

his reasons for asking the question. Moreover, the district

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court was rightly concerned about the danger of demeaning a

witness who had already endured one horrific and humiliating

experience. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion here.2

VIII.

We now turn to the defendants’ collective claims. Both

defendants challenge the district court’s decision not to

instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt. But

"the well-established rule of this Circuit is that although the

district court may define reasonable doubt to a jury . . . the

district court is not required to do so." United States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694, 696-97 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). As we

have observed, "attempting to explain the words ‘beyond a

reasonable doubt’ is more dangerous than leaving a jury to

wrestle with only the words themselves." Id. at 698. Accordingly, the district court did not err in declining to issue such

an instruction. 

IX.

Lastly, the defendants contend that the district court admitted the testimony of three expert witnesses in violation of the

2Velasquez also challenges the district court’s exclusion of love letters

and family photographs that he ostensibly submitted to show that he did

not write or dress like a typical MS-13 member. The district court found

the letters irrelevant because the government had not put on evidence that

gang members always wrote in a particular fashion. It likewise found the

photographs irrelevant because they were either taken before he entered

the gang or simply did not show him wearing clothes that were inconsistent with gang membership. We find no error in these rulings. 

Lastly, Velasquez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

his convictions for RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d),

use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and assault with a dangerous

weapon in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) and

18 U.S.C. § 2. After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on each of these counts.

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Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), because the experts relied in part on

interviews with unnamed declarants. The facts relevant to this

claim are as follows. 

A.

At trial, the government called three experts on the history,

structure, and practices of MS-13 to the stand. First, Detective

Frank Flores of the Los Angeles Police Department provided

a general overview of the gang’s history, structure, and operations. Second, a police officer from El Salvador, appearing

under a pseudonym for his own protection, testified about the

gang’s structure and its activities in El Salvador. Third, Sergeant George Norris of the Prince George’s County Police

Department testified that some items seized during the investigation, such as membership rolls and dues sheets, were

likely associated with MS-13. 

Each expert based his opinion on extensive experience

investigating MS-13. Sergeant Norris, for instance, explained

that he had conducted surveillance of the gang on many occasions and had participated in the execution of over fifty search

warrants related to the gang. Each expert stated that much of

his knowledge about the gang resulted from interviews with

gang members, the families of gang members, and the gang’s

victims. Detective Flores, for example, remarked he had personally "contacted or interviewed well over 500" MS-13

members over the last seven and a half years. 

B.

In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the "admission of testimonial statements of

a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity

for cross-examination." 541 U.S. at 53-54. "[F]or a statement

to be testimonial," we have explained, "the declarant must

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have had a reasonable expectation that his statement would be

used prosecutorially." United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d

260, 269 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Here, the defendants acknowledge that the experts’ testimony was proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which

permits experts to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence if

"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular

field." But they contend that Crawford silently invalidated

Rule 703 insofar as it permits experts to rely on statements,

such as the interviews here, that happen to be testimonial. 

We have previously rejected this very argument. While

"Crawford forbids the introduction of testimonial hearsay as

evidence in itself," it does not "prevent[ ] expert witnesses

from offering their independent judgments merely because

those judgments were in some part informed by their exposure to otherwise inadmissible evidence." United States v.

Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009). In Johnson, we

recognized the danger, however, that an expert might be "used

as little more than a conduit or transmitter for testimonial

hearsay." Id. Accordingly, we held that the question when

applying Crawford to expert testimony is "whether the expert

is, in essence, giving an independent judgment or merely acting as a transmitter for testimonial hearsay." Id.

Applying that test here, we find no Crawford violation. As

an initial matter, it is unclear whether the interviews these

experts relied on were even testimonial, given that the record

is rather bare about the circumstances in which they were conducted. But even if we assume that each expert did rely on

testimonial statements, that fact alone does not offend the

Confrontation Clause because the experts did not act as mere

transmitters and in fact did not repeat statements of particular

declarants to the jury. Instead, they offered their independent

judgments, most of which related to the gang’s general nature

as a violent organization and were not about the defendants in

particular. These judgments resulted from many years of

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observing the gang, studying its methods, and speaking with

its members. Given that each expert was subject to crossexamination about his judgment, we find no error in the

admission of their testimony. 

X.

For the reasons above, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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