Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-21-03267/USCOURTS-ca7-21-03267-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Merrick B. Garland
Respondent
Beata Zarzecki
Petitioner

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-3267 

BEATA ZARZECKI, 

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

of the United States, 

Respondent. 

____________________ 

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A089-783-701

____________________ 

SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 4, 2024 — DECIDED JANUARY 3, 2025 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Beata Zarzecki unsuccessfully petitioned the Attorney General, through the immigration courts 

of the Department of Homeland Security, to use his discretion 

to adjust her status from “removeable” to “lawful permanent 

resident,” and now asks for our review. Appellate courts are 

accustomed to evaluating decisions from lower courts using 

either a de novo standard of review, or some form of review 

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2 No. 21-3267 

that grants deference to the decisions of those courts—such as 

clear error or abuse of discretion. In the field of immigration 

law, however, Congress has opted to place discretionary decision-making regarding adjustment of status in the hands of 

the immigration courts alone. Consequently, the Immigration 

and Nationality Act strips jurisdiction from this court to review any discretionary determination that the immigration 

courts make regarding whether or not to grant adjustment of 

status. There is, however, an exception: this court can review 

the decisions of the immigration judge and Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) for legal error, including constitutional 

error. Zarzecki argues that the Board erred legally when it denied her adjustment of status, but we find otherwise. We 

therefore must dismiss her petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.

I.

Zarzecki, a Polish national, entered the United States on 

April 28, 1989, on a six-month tourist visa, but has remained 

in this country ever since. In 1998, she married her husband, 

Janusz Zarzecki, who is now a United States citizen, as is their 

daughter, Katarzyna, who was born in 1996. Zarzecki also has 

a son from a previous marriage who remained in Poland 

when Zarzecki left and was raised by Zarzecki’s parents. On 

February 28, 2013, the government began removal proceedings against Zarzecki who then applied for adjustment of status based on an immigrant visa petition filed by her citizen 

spouse, Janusz.

Zarzecki’s actions leading up to, and conviction following, 

a fatal drunk driving accident took center stage at her adjustment of status hearing held in October 2013. At that hearing, 

the following facts emerged: On July 26, 2005, Zarzecki began 

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No. 21-3267 3

drinking at the house where she worked as a caregiver. She 

called her husband to pick her up, but then decided to drive 

home after she tired of waiting for him. On her way home, 

while driving an estimated 80 miles per hour in a 55 mile per 

hour zone, she struck a car from behind, killing Charlotte Rymark and severely injuring her husband, Robert. Toxicology 

testing revealed that Zarzecki had a blood alcohol serum level 

of 254 mg/dl (0.254 BAC. The legal limit for intoxication is 80 

mg/dl or .08 BAC). In a negotiated plea deal, Zarzecki pled 

guilty to “felony aggravated driving under the influence” and 

was sentenced to nine years in prison, of which she served 

eight years and three months. 

The immigration judge also considered two other contacts 

with law enforcement. In 2003, police arrested and charged 

Zarzecki with aggravated assault following an argument with 

her husband which occurred when he arrived home from 

work to find her drinking. The charges were later dropped. 

And in 2004, Zarzecki was charged (but not convicted) of 

driving without insurance. 

Although the fatal accident laid the heaviest weight on the 

scale against adjustment of status, Zarzecki hoped that evidence about her mental health treatment would be one of the 

mitigating factors favoring adjustment. At her hearing before 

the immigration judge, Zarzecki testified about her mental 

health. She stated that she was first diagnosed with depression at the age of seventeen in Poland, but she did not receive 

any treatment until 1996, when she was in the United States 

and a medical provider prescribed Prozac. She testified that 

sometimes, because she felt better, she would stop taking the 

medication for two to three months at a time, and then would 

use alcohol to help her cope with the symptoms of depression 

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as they arose because it “worked faster.” R. 122. According to 

Zarzecki, approximately a year and a half after she was released from prison, she started having suicidal thoughts and 

admitted herself to a hospital for two weeks. She submitted 

no documents or other evidence regarding that hospitalization.

Other than her own testimony, the only evidence about 

her mental health treatment came from a few sources, with 

superficial information. First, Zarzecki submitted a three-sentence letter, dated September 11, 2018, from Dr. Bindu 

Gandhiraj which stated, “To Whom It May Concern: This is 

to notify you that I have been seeing Beata Zarzecki at the 

VNA since 08/08/2016 for treatment of depression and anxiety. She has been very compliant with her treatment and follows all the recommendations. Please contact our office if you 

have any questions.” R. 203. Zarzecki submitted three other 

cursory pieces of evidence regarding treatment for mental 

health issues. The first was a “Treatment Note” from the Illinois Department of Corrections dated April 7, 2009, reflecting 

a diagnosis for depression disorder, and noting that Zarzecki 

wished to stop taking her medication for depression. R. 399. 

The second was a notice addressed to the Immigration and 

Naturalization Office from the Alcohol Drug Safety Intervention Inc. and Polish American Family Services, dated March 

13, 2013, shortly after her release from prison. That note 

stated, “Mr. Janusz Zarzecki, husband of Beata Zarzecki contacted our program to arrange treatment relating to her 2005 

DUI arrest. Mrs. Zarzecki will attend and participate in the 

PROGRAM FOR PROBLEMATIC USE OF ALCOHOL at our 

clinic as soon as she will be released.” R. 374. Zarzecki provided no certificate of completion or any evidence that she attended the program at all. Finally, the record contains a single 

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email from Dr. Poprawski of the First Chicago Neuroscience 

clinic to Janusz Zarzecki confirming his wife’s appointment 

on March 12, 2013. R. 376. Again, Zarzecki submitted no evidence about the nature of the appointment or whether she attended it.

Zarzecki testified that she did not attend group counseling 

and did not seek any counseling at all until a year and a half 

after her release from prison, explaining that once she got 

home from prison, she “thought [she] would feel better” and 

“didn’t want to hear about seeing any doctors.” R. 125. Zarzecki alleged, without external evidence, that she had been 

diagnosed with agoraphobia and did not want to leave the 

house.

When asked whether she had attended any drug and alcohol treatment programs, she testified that “while in jail” she 

“tried to attend this kind of meeting[]” and “also once [she] 

got back home, there was a facility close by” but “they made 

[her] feel horrible,” she “couldn’t stand being there,” and they 

were “more troublesome than they should be.” R. 118–19. On 

redirect examination, Zarzecki elucidated that she prefers 

one-on-one therapy to “meetings with other people” because 

she can “talk about [her] stuff” and she does not “like listen[ing to] other people[’s] problems ... they complain very 

much, you know,” and this makes her feel “depressed.” 

R. 127–28. She explained that alcohol treatment would inconvenience her husband or daughter who would have to drive 

her to the meetings, although she also testified that she has 

taken an Uber to treatment. 

The immigration judge also considered Zarzecki’s testimony that if she were removed to Poland, she would have no 

social network, nowhere to live, would have trouble finding 

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work there, and that her husband and daughter would not 

accompany her, as they too would have trouble finding employment in Poland. He also considered the hardship it 

would create for her daughter, Katarzyna, who had already 

endured almost nine years of her childhood motherless.

Despite the sympathetic factors, the immigration judge 

found that Zarzecki had not adequately addressed her mental 

health issues nor demonstrated an attempt to atone for the 

devastating loss of another life. In addition to noting the serious nature of the offense of driving while intoxicated, he also 

noted her failure to take her medication, her use of alcohol in 

lieu of the prescribed medication, her decision to drive while 

intoxicated despite the offer from her husband to drive her 

home, and her lack of effort to address her mental health issues following her release from prison. He thus denied her 

application for adjustment of status and ordered her removed 

to Poland.

Upon the Board’s de novo review, it concluded that the 

extremely egregious circumstances surrounding the drunk 

driving accident were not outweighed by any countervailing 

factors, including Zarzecki’s family ties, her long residence in 

the United States, and familial and financial difficulties that 

would result from her removal. The Board concluded that, despite Zarzecki’s arguments to the contrary, the immigration 

judge did indeed consider her mental health issues. The 

Board concluded that Zarzecki’s brief did “not refer to any 

particular testimony or documentary evidence relating to her 

mental health that the Immigration Judge disregarded.” R. 4. 

Nor did she explain how her “mental health constitutes an 

equity that weighs in favor of an exercise of discretion.” R. 4. 

The Board concluded that Zarzecki neglected to establish 

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No. 21-3267 7

“equities that outweigh the serious adverse factors present in 

this case” and thus, did not satisfy her burden of proof of 

demonstrating that she merited relief in the exercise of discretion. R. 5. Zarzecki timely filed a petition for review in this 

court, arguing that the Board did not appropriately apply de 

novo review and failed to consider the expert medical evidence.

II.

As a noncitizen who illegally remained in the United 

States longer than permitted, Zarzecki was subject to removal 

under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Congress, however, has given the Attorney General 

(who acts through a delegation of power to the immigration 

judges and the Board) discretion to forgive the illegal activity 

and adjust an eligible noncitizen’s status to protect the noncitizen from removal, as “a matter of grace.” Patel v. Garland, 596 

U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308 

(2001)); 8 U.S.C. §1255(a). That discretionary power, however, 

has been specifically reserved for the Attorney General. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act specifically precludes judicial 

review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1255,” which includes discretionary determinations related to adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. §1252 

(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel, 596 U.S. at 347. Notwithstanding this provision, this court does retain jurisdiction to review claims of legal or constitutional error. See 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(D); Ndlovu 

v. Garland, 99 F.4th 997, 998 (7th Cir. 2024). We have interpreted the phrase “questions of law” in this subparagraph 

narrowly, holding that legal questions are limited to those in 

which the “’Board misinterprets a statute, regulation, constitutional provision, or its own precedent, applies the wrong 

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legal standard, or fails to exercise its discretion at all.’” Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Bachynskyy v. Holder, 668 F.3d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 2011)). 

Zarzecki’s primary complaint is that the Board failed to 

properly consider the expert medical evidence. She is correct 

that the wholesale failure to consider evidence would constitute an error of law—in the sense that it would demonstrate a 

failure to exercise discretion at all. Id. at 978 (citing Iglesias v. 

Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2008)). Thus, Zarzecki’s 

claim that the immigration judge and Board completely ignored expert evidence would be an allegation of legal error. 

Id.; see also Arej v. Sessions, 852 F.3d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 2017) 

(“[T]he Board cannot make a reasoned decision to deny a motion to reopen if it ignores the evidence that a petitioner presents.”); Ward v. Holder, 632 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(whether the Board failed to exercise discretion at all is a legal 

question).

On the other hand, “the [Board] does not commit an ‘error 

of law’ every time an item of evidence is not explicitly considered or is described with imperfect accuracy.” Martinez-Baez, 

986 F.3d at 976 (quoting Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d 

Cir. 2009)). In short, only a wholesale dereliction of duties to 

consider the evidence amounts to a reviewable legal error. 

The immigration judge and Board do not commit legal error 

simply because they do not “’expressly parse or refute on the 

record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered 

by the petitioner.’” Ji Cheng Ni v. Holder, 715 F.3d 620, 625 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.

2008)).

Zarzecki does not argue that the immigration judge and 

Board excluded her expert evidence wholesale. Instead, she 

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No. 21-3267 9

complains that the immigration judge and Board “fail[ed] to 

accord the requisite weight to expert evidence concerning the 

Petitioner’s medical treatment for her mental health conditions.” Zarzecki Brief at 18 (emphasis ours). She also argues 

that the immigration judge and Board did not “fully embrace” 

the medical evidence, give the facts their “due significance,” 

“provide a comprehensive review,” or provide a “meticulous 

factual ... analysis.” Id. at 19–21. These are complaints about 

the depth and weight the agency gave to the evidence and 

testimony. The balancing of evidence, however, is at the very 

core of the discretionary authority of the agency, over which 

we lack jurisdiction. Kiorkis v. Holder, 634 F.3d 924, 928 (7th 

Cir. 2011), as amended (Mar. 10, 2011) (noting that an appellate 

court is prohibited from reviewing the discretionary methods 

the agency uses to weigh various factors). And as we noted, 

although the Board may not disregard relevant evidence, it 

also need not itemize and explain thoroughly each piece of 

evidence offered. Salazar-Marroquin v. Barr, 969 F.3d 814, 818 

(7th Cir. 2020); see also Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland, 114 

F.4th 883, 893 (7th Cir. 2024) (it is not legal error simply because the immigration judge’s consideration “of the evidence 

could have been more thorough”); Martinez-Baez, 986 F.3d at 

976 (“the [Board] does not commit an ‘error of law’ every time 

an item of evidence is not explicitly considered or is described 

with imperfect accuracy.”); Meza v. Garland, 5 F.4th 732, 737 

(7th Cir. 2021) (The brevity of the judge’s analysis alone does 

not amount to a legal error.).

But there is a more fundamental problem with Zarzecki’s 

argument about the expert testimony. It is not clear to what 

expert testimony she is referring. Despite Zarzecki’s brief stating that she submitted “extensive medical documentation,” 

no expert proffered a report or affidavit or testified on her 

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behalf. Zarzecki Brief at 19. She offered but one medical record with a diagnosis—one page from an Illinois Department 

of Corrections Mental Health Diagnostic and Treatment Note 

which lists a diagnosis of “depression disorder,” but also 

noted her desire to cease medication for depression—the very 

behavior for which the immigration judge faulted her. R. 399. 

She did not present any other medical records regarding her 

diagnosis, specific treatment plans, or prognosis. Her brief includes only the most minimal references to anything that 

could be considered expert evidence. Dr. Gandhiraj wrote a 

letter stating that she had been seen between August 2016 

(three years after her release from prison) and September 2018 

for treatment of depression and anxiety and had been “very 

compliant with her treatment and follows all the recommendations.” R. 203. Zarzecki, however, provided no evidence regarding his qualifications or expertise, what treatment she 

had been receiving, how often she received it, what it meant 

that she was “compliant,” or any other evidence that she was 

on track to remedy the problems that had contributed to the 

fatal accident. The only other reference to any treatment came 

in the form of two attempts by Zarzecki’s husband to make 

appointments for his wife, with no accompanying evidence 

that she attended those appointments. One email dated 

March 12, 2013, addressed to her husband indicated that Zarzecki had an appointment scheduled with a Dr. Poprawski at 

the First Chicago Neuroscience Clinic on March 27, 2013. 

R. 376. Zarzecki submitted no documents indicating that Dr. 

Poprawski ever treated or saw Zarzecki. Likewise, Zarzecki 

produced no documentary evidence indicating that she received any treatment from the Alcohol Drug Safety Intervention Inc. and Polish American Family Services despite the 

March 13, 2013 letter from her husband to the organization 

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No. 21-3267 11

attempting to arrange treatment. R. 374. And it seems unlikely 

that she did, given her testimony that she did not attend any 

therapy for at least a year and a half after her release from 

prison and did not like to attend group therapy. And although Zarzecki’s brief states that she was diagnosed with agoraphobia, she did not submit a single piece of medical evidence reflecting this diagnosis. In short, Zarzecki has appealed because “the Board of Immigration Appeals erred 

when it failed to properly consider the expert medical evidence,” (Zarzecki Brief at 5) but she does not tell us what expert medical evidence in the record the Board failed to consider. 

In an effort to be exceptionally generous to Zarzecki, we 

could interpret her claim that the Board failed to consider expert medical evidence as a claim that the Board failed to consider any of her own self-reports about her mental health and 

treatment.1 But, in fact, both the immigration judge and the 

Board did consider this evidence. The immigration judge considered her unverified evidence that she was hospitalized for 

1 An immigrant’s own testimony indeed can be sufficient to sustain 

an applicant’s burden without corroboration. See 8 U.S.C. §1158 (b)(B)(ii). 

“Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must 

be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot 

reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id. In this case, it would have been reasonable for the immigration judge to expect that Zarzecki would have records of her health diagnoses and treatment because both those things 

would have been recent and they occurred within the United States where 

health records would have been readily obtainable. In any event, the immigration judge and Board considered Zarzecki’s own testimony about 

her mental health, but ultimately concluded nevertheless that she did not 

adequately explain how her “mental health constitut[ed] an equity that 

weigh[ed] in favor of an exercise of discretion.” R. 4.

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three weeks for depression, that she had been diagnosed with 

depression at age 17 while in Poland, and that she had been 

prescribed Prozac. He also accepted her unverified and unsupported allegation that she attended group counseling and 

individual therapy. The Board, in turn, considered her claim 

that the immigration judge failed to adequately consider her 

mental health issues. The Board noted that it was stymied in 

any attempt to consider those claims further, as Zarzecki did 

not point to any particular testimony or documentary evidence relating to her mental health that the immigration 

judge disregarded or explain how the respondent’s mental 

health “constitute[d] an equity that weigh[ed] in favor of an 

exercise of discretion.” R. 4.

Zarzecki also claims that the Board failed to review the immigration judge’s decision de novo. Indeed, applying the incorrect standard of review would constitute legal error. 

F.J.A.P. v. Garland, 94 F.4th 620, 638 (7th Cir. 2024). It is hard 

to know, however, with what Zarzecki finds fault. She complains that the Board did not apply de novo review, but in the 

next sentence argues that the Board “substitute[d] its discretion in areas requiring legal and factual precision.” Zarzecki 

Brief at 17. Of course, de novo review means that the Board 

would consider Zarzecki’s case anew—which, in a case about 

discretion, would mean applying its discretion independently. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(d)(3)(ii). Zarzecki does not offer any citations to this court for the appropriate standard of 

review when the Board reviews decisions of the immigration 

judge (and her short appendix is missing the last page of the 

Board’s opinion, making our review more cumbersome still). 

Despite Zarzecki’s claims that the Board should consider 

“both facts and legal interpretations” de novo (Zarzecki Brief 

at 17), the Board reviews factual findings only for clear error 

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and not de novo. F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 638; 8 C.F.R. 

§1003.1(d)(3)(i). This is a highly deferential standard and

means that the Board’s role was to review the immigration 

judge’s findings about Zarzecki’s medical evidence for clear 

error only. The Board reviews all other issues, including 

“questions of law, discretion, and judgment” de novo. 8 

C.F.R. §1003.1(d)(3)(ii). Consequently, “[w]hether an alien is 

entitled to an adjustment of status is a question of discretion 

over which the BIA exercises de novo review.” Wood v. 

Mukasey, 516 F.3d 564, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 U.S.C. 

§1255(a)). It may not, however, engage in fact-finding to do 

so. 

Contrary to Zarzecki’s allegations, the Board not only 

stated the proper standard of review, but also applied it appropriately. The Board addressed the key factual findings 

made by the immigration judge, and then used those findings 

to conduct its own consideration of whether Zarzecki was entitled to discretionary relief. The Board noted the serious nature of Zarzecki’s conviction for aggravated driving under the 

influence of alcohol and noted that the circumstances leading 

to the accident were particularly egregious. The Board then 

weighed the egregiousness of the harm against the countervailing equities in favor of adjustment—such as Zarzecki’s 

“family ties, particularly her United States citizen husband 

and adult daughter as well as her long residence in the United 

States since 1989... [and] separation from her family and financial difficulties that accompany removal to a country she 

had not resided in for over 30 years.” R. 4. After considering 

all of the factors, the Board then concluded that Zarzecki 

“ha[d] not demonstrated unusual or outstanding equities that 

outweigh the adverse factors present here.” Id. 

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The Board “is not required to ‘write an exegesis on every 

contention’ in a particular case, it must nonetheless ‘consider 

the issues raised and announce its decision in terms sufficient 

to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and 

thought and not merely reacted.’” Guerra Rocha v. Barr, 951 

F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mansour v. I.N.S., 230 F.3d 

902, 908 (7th Cir. 2000)). The Board sufficiently met its obligations here and applied the proper standard of review.

In sum, both the immigration judge and Board considered 

and weighed the factors Zarzecki presented in mitigation, 

with the Board applying the proper standard of review. The 

agency did not commit any legal or constitutional error. We 

therefore lack jurisdiction to review such discretionary judgments pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2). 

Accordingly, the petition for review is DISMISSED for 

lack of jurisdiction.

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