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Parties Involved:
Thomas Jeffrey Morrison
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

ORIG'"AL 

FOR PUBLICATION 

.A~JNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 96-501E Plai 4 ntiff-Appellee, 

D.C. No. 

V. CR-95-00708-1-IEG 

THOMAS JEFFREY MORRISON, OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

TT 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of California 

Irma E. Gonzalez, District Judge, Presiding 

Argued and Submitted 

February 6, 1997—Pasadena, California 

Filed May 9, 1997 

Before: Robert Boochever, Alex Kozinski and 

John T. Noonan, Circuit Judges. 

1 

Opinion by Judge Kozinski 

SUMMARY 

Criminal Law and Procedure/Sentencing 

PRINTED FOR 

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS 

BY BARCLAYS / ELECTROGRAPHIC—SAN FRANCISCO—(800) 888-3600 

The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted 

© 1997 by Barclays Law Publishers. 

The court of appeals affirmed a judgment of conviction. 

The court held that a defendant cannot challenge the "strike" 

status of a prior robbery conviction based on his guilty plea 

that included use of a firearm. 

In 1995, appellant Thomas Morrison was convicted of bank 

robbery. Due to two prior state robbery convictions, Morri5515 

Case: 96-50164, 05/09/1997, ID: 3226600, DktEntry: 24, Page 1 of 4
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16 UNITED STATES V. MORRISON 

s{oon's 1995 offenses triggered the recently enacted "three 

strikes" law requiring a life sentence for any defendant cony icted in federal court of a third "serious violent felony." 

At sentencing, Morrison sought to disqualify his 1990 robgery conviction as a "strike," as provided by the federal statute, which permits a defendant to disqualify prior robbery 

convictions as predicate offenses by proving, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that he did not use a firearm and that no 

One died or suffered serious bodily injury. 

The government showed that Morrison pled guilty to robry and the use of a gun. Morrison presented the victim of 

e 1990 robbery, who testified that he did not recall seeing 

weapon. 

The district court found that Morrison had failed to establ[sh by clear and convincing evidence that he had not used a 

gun and sentenced him to life in prison. 

Morrison appealed, contending the statute's standard of 

j,roof provisions are unconstitutional because the government 

can ~,jualify a predicate felony by a mere preponderance of the 

evidence, while the defendant must produce clear and convincing proof to disqualify the same offense. 

[1] A guilty plea comprehends all of the factual and legal 

elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of 

uilt. [2] Morrison's conviction for the 1990 robbery rested 

n a guilty plea that included use of a firearm and was thereore res judicata. The three strikes law permits a defendant to 

ove that he did not use a gun or cause death or serious body injury when a prior conviction does not conclusively settle 

e question. However, a defendant does not have the right to 

but the facts necessarily adjudicated by the earlier judgent. Morrison's 1990 robbery therefore qualified as a prediate offense and the district court lawfully imposed his life 

UNITED STATES V. MORRISON 5521 

robbery th r ore qualifies as a predicate offense; his life sen 

tence was 1a 'fully imposed.' 

7Morrison I4o argues that the district judge abused her discretion 

relying on ia4Ijiissihle hearsay. Hearsay admissible at sentencing m 

have some nnal indicia of reliability. United States v. Huckins, 53 F. 

276, 279 (9t ir. 1995). Morrison claims that statements made by Sn~ 

den to the p0 4 immediately after the robbery lacked the requisite indi 

of reliability nce Morrison's guilty plea is conclusive, for the reasc 

stated in the t, we need not consider this claim. 

Case: 96-50164, 05/09/1997, ID: 3226600, DktEntry: 24, Page 2 of 4
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Case: 96-50164, 05/09/1997, ID: 3226600, DktEntry: 24, Page 3 of 4
18 UNITED STATES V. MORRISON 

t

At issue is whether Morrison's 1990 robbery qualifies as a 

"strike." The government met its initial burden by providing 

an abstract of judgment and a transcript of the 1990 hearing 

during which Morrison pleaded guilty to robbery and the use 

of a gun. As the district judge interpreted the statute, the burdon then shifted to Morrison to disqualify the "strike." Morrispn called Michael Snedden, the victim of the 1990 robbery, 

v ho testified that he did not recall seeing a weapon. In 

response, the government introduced Morrison's 1990 "judgnent and commitment"; police reports indicating that, on the 

night of the robbery, Snedden told police that Morrison had 

a gun; and the testimony of officers called to the scene. The 

district judge found that Morrison had failed to establish by 

ear and convincing evidence that he had not used a gun; she 

sentenced him to life in prison.2 

On appeal, Morrison argues that the burden-shifting and 

$ dard of proof provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3)(A) are 

u constitutional on their face and as applied. He claims the 

$ tute violates due process because the government can qualiify a predicate felony for purposes of the three strikes law by 

a mere preponderance of the evidence, while the defendant 

Must produce clear and convincing proof to disqualify the 

same offense. Morrison argues that if the burden is to be 

shifted to the defendant at all, due process requires that he be 

saddled with a burden of proof no heavier than the prosecuton's. Presumably, this could be achieved by raising the govepmment's burden, lowering the defendant's, or both. 

Generally, the preponderance of the evidence standard is 

fficient to satisfy due process at sentencing, United States 

Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 637 (1997) (per curiam), although 

,re may be an exception "when a sentencing factor has an 

tremely disproportionate effect on the sentence relative to 

'Morrison does not contest that his earlier robbery conviction qualifies. 

2Absent the three strikes law, Morrison would have faced a maximum 

-year sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). 

UNITED STATES V. MORRISON 5519 

the offense Iconviction." United States v. Restrepo, 946 

F.2d 654, 6 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane). Morrison argues that 

a statute as i aconian in its penal provisions as this one carries the p bility of such disproportion. However, it is 

unnecess reach this issue. Because Morrison pleaded 

guilty to fir rn use,3 he was precluded from contending that 

he did not, i fact, use a gun. The government's burden of 

proof is the C ore irrelevant 

[1] Und r United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 

(1989), a 4t ty plea "comprehend[s] all of the factual and 

legal eleme necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment 

of guilt andi lawful sentence." Any attempt to contradict the 

factual bass of a valid plea must fail. United States v. 

Mathews, 8 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In Math t , the defendant sought to avoid his sentence on 

the ground 1 t the evidence did not support an essential element of th dictment to which he had pleaded guilty. We 

held that "[ pleading guilty to the indictment ... Mathews 

conclusivel dmitted the allegation." Id. We further noted 

that the de ant's attempt to contradict the plea was tantamount to c lenging the validity of the plea. Id. 

[2] Mo n's conviction for the 1990 robbery — the 

"strike" he i w seeks to disqualify — rested on a guilty plea 

3The provi i to which Morrison pleaded guilty — California Penal 

Code § 1202. a)(1) — provides: 

[A]ny pe who personally uses a firearm in the commission or 

attempte mmission of a felony shall, upon conviction of that 

felony o tempted felony, in addition and consecutive to the 

punishm prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of 

which he o she has been convicted, be punished by an additional 

term of i i isonment in the state prison for 3, 4, or 10 years ... . 

4Morrison' ial challenge to the statute must fail if there is any set 

of circumsta under which the law could be constitutionally applied. 

See Roulette rtv of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Case: 96-50164, 05/09/1997, ID: 3226600, DktEntry: 24, Page 4 of 4