Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-19-03003/USCOURTS-caDC-19-03003-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tai Tan Nguyen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 19-3003 September Term, 2019

FILED ON: March 20, 2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TAI TAN NGUYEN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:17-cr-00238-1)

Before: GRIFFITH and RAO, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

J U D G M E N T

This case was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District 

of Columbia and the briefs of the parties. The Court has accorded the issues full consideration and 

has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the 

reasons set out below, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the decision of the district court be AFFIRMED.

Federal law requires persons who leave the United States with more than $10,000 in cash 

to file a customs form. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316. Tai Tan Nguyen, an employee of the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), flew from Hawaii to Thailand carrying $82,000 without submitting the 

required form. When DHS agents interviewed Nguyen about his trip, he said that an associate

carried the money into Thailand. Later in the interview, Nguyen admitted that he carried the cash 

into Thailand himself. A federal grand jury indicted Nguyen for failure to file a currency report, 

bulk cash smuggling, and making a false statement to DHS agents. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(c)(1), 

5332(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). After a three-day trial, a jury convicted him of making a false 

statement but acquitted him of the other two counts.

At sentencing, the district court found that the conduct underlying Nguyen’s conviction

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constituted obstruction of justice and applied the higher Sentencing Guidelines range for that 

crime, rather than the range for crimes of deceit in general. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(c)(3) (stating 

that if a “defendant [is] convicted under a statute proscribing false, fictitious, or fraudulent 

statements or representations generally” and “the conduct set forth in the count of conviction 

establishes an offense specifically covered by another guideline,” the court should apply the more 

specific Guideline). The district court also said that circuit precedent allowed it to consider 

acquitted conduct when imposing a sentence. It found that Nguyen had failed to file a currency 

report and had engaged in bulk cash smuggling, notwithstanding his acquittal on those two counts. 

The court sentenced Nguyen to fifteen months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the Guidelines range 

for obstruction of justice. Nguyen appeals that sentence.

Nguyen says that the sentencing court’s consideration of acquitted conduct violated his 

Fifth Amendment due process right to a presumption of innocence and his Sixth Amendment right 

to a jury trial. Our precedent forecloses that argument. We have held that a defendant’s Fifth 

Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial do not bar the use of 

acquitted conduct at sentencing. See United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 371-72 (D.C. Cir. 

2006); see also United States v. Settles, 530 F.3d 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2008). If a defendant’s Fifth 

Amendment right to due process permits the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing, his more 

specific due process right to a presumption of innocence cannot bar the same.

Nguyen also argues that the district court misread United States v. Hawkins, 185 F. Supp. 

3d 114 (D.D.C. 2016), another case applying the obstruction of justice Guideline to a defendant 

convicted of making a false statement. He says that Hawkins “makes it abundantly clear that 

acquitted conduct cannot be considered by the court to establish an enhanced offense” under the 

Guidelines. Nguyen Br. 38 n.6. But Hawkins says no such thing, because the defendant in that case 

wasn’t acquitted of anything. See 185 F. Supp. 3d at 116 (stating that Hawkins pleaded guilty). In 

any event, Nguyen fails to explain how the sentencing court’s alleged misreading of Hawkins, a 

district court decision with no precedential effect, could constitute reversible error.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment imposing a sentence of 

fifteen months’ imprisonment.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely 

petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41(a)(1).

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk

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