Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02049/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02049-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
AstraZeneca LP
Defendant
Katherine Cozad
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHERINE COZAD,

Plaintiff,

v.

ASTRAZENECA LP, and DOES 1 through 

50, inclusive,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:14-cv-02049-SKO

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 30)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Katherine Cozad (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against AstraZeneca, LP

(“Defendant”), alleging that Defendant failed to take necessary and reasonable precautions to 

protect Plaintiff from the sexual assault by a physician with whom she was in contact due to her 

employment by Defendant. (See generally Doc. 1, Exh. A (Complaint).) On July 15, 2016, 

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 30 (Motion).) On August 3, 2016, 

Plaintiff filed her opposition, and on August 10, 2016, Defendant filed its reply. (Docs. 39

(Opposition); 48 (Reply).) Having reviewed the parties’ papers and all supporting material1, the 

 

1

 This Court has reviewed and considered the record, including all evidence, arguments, points and authorities, 

declarations, testimony, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, objections, and other papers filed by the 

parties. Omission of reference to evidence, an argument, document, objection or paper is not to be construed to the 

effect that this Court did not consider the evidence, argument, document, objection or paper. Although this Court has 

also reviewed, considered and applied the evidence it deemed admissible and material, it does not rule on objections 

in a summary judgment context, unless otherwise noted.

Case 1:14-cv-02049-SKO Document 53 Filed 08/30/16 Page 1 of 15
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matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), and 

the hearing was vacated.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED 

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a Pharmaceutical Sales Specialist (“PSS”)

assigned to make sales calls in the Fresno, California area. (Compl., ¶ 9; Doc. 30-1 (Joint 

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“JUMF”)), ¶¶ 5-6.) In October 2013, Plaintiff made a 

routine sales call to a family practice physician (“Physician”) at his office. (Compl., ¶10; JUMF, 

¶ 52.) Plaintiff alleges that during this sales visit, Physician sexually assaulted Plaintiff by 

grabbing her face and forcibly kissing her, and by rubbing himself against her body and genitals. 

(Id.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the assault. 

(Compl., ¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges that her experience with Physician had devastating effects on her 

personal and professional life and ultimately led to the termination of her employment with 

Defendant. (Id., ¶¶ 38, 43.)

On November 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, after having requested 

and obtained an immediate Right-to-Sue notice2from the Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing (“DFEH”) on or about August 2, 2014. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant 

unlawfully discriminated against her based on gender, failed to take reasonable steps to prevent 

Plaintiff’s assault by Physician, and did not reasonably accommodate her resultant medical 

condition. (Id., ¶¶ 37, 44, 49.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, declaratory relief, 

exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s alleged acts and 

omissions. (Id., 12:2-14.)

//

 

2

 Employees who believe they have been discriminated against generally have 180 days in which to file an 

administrative complaint with the DFEH, the agency charged with administering the California Fair Employment and 

Housing Act. The DFEH is obligated to investigate each complaint and decide whether to file an accusation or a 

“right-to-sue notice” which enables the complaining employee to pursue charges on his or her own behalf. This

administrative process is a prerequisite to filing suit for a charge of discrimination. 

Case 1:14-cv-02049-SKO Document 53 Filed 08/30/16 Page 2 of 15
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On July 15, 2016, Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment, contending that it is 

“absolutely” not liable for the undeniable wrongful acts of Physician, who is a third-party. (Mot.) 

Plaintiff filed her opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on August 3, 2016. 

(Oppo.) Plaintiff asserts that material facts are in dispute as to her four causes of action and that 

summary judgment is inappropriate. (Id.) 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and 

any affidavits provided establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one 

that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The exact nature of this 

responsibility, however, varies depending on whether the issue on which summary judgment is 

sought is one in which the movant or the nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof. 

See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007); Cecala v. Newman, 532 

F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132 (D. Ariz. 2007). 

If the movant will have the burden of proof at trial, it must demonstrate, with affirmative 

evidence, that “no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Soremekun, 

509 F.3d at 984. In contrast, if the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, “the 

movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party’s case.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323); see also James River Ins. Co. v. 

Schenk, P.C., 519 F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); Nissan Fire & Marine Is. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 

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F.3d 1099, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2000). 

If the movant satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 

allegations in its pleadings to “show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative 

evidence from which a jury could find in [its] favor.” FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th 

Cir. 2009). In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the court does not make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. That remains the 

province of the jury or fact finder. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Instead, “[t]he evidence of the 

[nonmoving party] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” 

Id. Inferences are not, however, drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to 

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Juell v. Forest Pharms., 

Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2006); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp.

2d 993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2004).

“A genuine issue of material fact does not spring into being simply because a litigant 

claims that one exists or promises to produce admissible evidence at trial.” Del Carmen 

Guadalupe v. Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 

F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007); Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th 

Cir. 2002). “[B]ald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence” will not suffice. Stefanchik, 559 

F.3d at 929; see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 

(1986) (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”). 

A “motion for summary judgment may not be defeated . . . by evidence that is ‘merely 

colorable’ or ‘is not significantly probative.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Hardage v. CBS 

Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court has the discretion in appropriate 

circumstances to consider materials that are not properly brought to its attention, but is not 

required to examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact where 

the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references. See Southern Cal. 

Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified 

Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). If the nonmoving party fails to produce evidence 

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sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary 

judgment. See Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION3

Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination, failure to 

prevent harassment, failure to accommodate, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

(Mot.) Plaintiff contends summary judgment is inappropriate because material facts remain in 

dispute as to all four causes of action. (Oppo.) 

A. Discrimination

Plaintiff alleges Defendant unlawfully discriminated against its female PSSs “by 

deliberately assigning attractive female representatives to call upon male doctors who were known 

to make inappropriate sexual comments and advances toward female representatives . . . and then 

require them to visit those doctors unaccompanied.” (Compl., ¶¶ 26-27.) Due to Defendant’s 

practice, Plaintiff “was regularly subjected to harassment and unwelcome sexual advances by 

doctors” and was “[u]ltimately [ ] sexually assaulted by a doctor and [ ] consequently diagnosed 

with post-traumatic stress disorder.” (Id., ¶ 29.) 

Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination on the basis of 

sex, contending that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant treats its 

female and male employees differently. (Mot.) Plaintiff contends there remains a disputed 

material fact as to where Defendant “deliberately assign[s] female PSSs to call on male medical 

professionals that make inappropriate sexual comments or advances toward female 

representatives.” (Doc. 41 (Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Facts (“PDMF”)), ¶ 7.) Plaintiff 

contends that the options presented to a female PSS who feels uncomfortable calling on a 

physician, to either request the physician be taken off their call list or call on the physician in pairs 

 

3

 As discussed in the Court’s order on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, filed concurrently herewith:

. . . because the amount paid to Plaintiff under the Settlement Agreement with Physician is 

undifferentiated between economic and noneconomic damages, the Court cannot determine 

Defendant’s entitlement to offset under section 877, if any, until after it receives the jury’s verdict. 

[Citation.] Defendant may or may not be entitled to offset a judgment against it by some amount 

of the settlement between Physician and Plaintiff, depending on how the jury allocates the award. 

At any rate, the Court is unable to make such determination at this stage of the proceedings.

(See Doc. 52, pp. 8-9.) Therefore, the Court will not address herein Defendant’s arguments regarding the offset issue. 

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with another PSS, unfairly “burden and disadvantage female employees versus male employees in 

a sales environment.” (Oppo., pp. 9-10.) Defendant responds that Plaintiff fails to explain how 

these options disparately impact female PSSs, and that such options are in any event irrelevant to 

Plaintiff’s discrimination claim because Plaintiff does not assert discrimination based on 

Defendant’s preventative measures. (Reply, p. 2.) Plaintiff accuses Defendant of “blatant victim 

blaming,” which she contends is illustrative of Defendant’s pattern and practice. (Oppo., p. 11.) 

Plaintiff’s hyperbole notwithstanding, Plaintiff has offered no evidence to demonstrate the 

existence of any material fact as to whether Defendant treated its employees differently on the 

basis of sex. 

1. Legal Standard

FEHA makes it unlawful for “an employer, because of . . . sex . . . to discharge the person 

from employment . . . or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). To make a prima facie 

showing of sex discrimination, a plaintiff must:

. . . provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was 

qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position 

he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, 

demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests 

discriminatory motive.

Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (2000); Nielsen v. Trofholz Techs., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 

2d 1157, 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 470 F. App’x 647 (9th Cir. 2012). The standard for 

determining whether an employee has been subjected to an “adverse employment action” is 

whether the employment action materially affected the “terms and conditions of employment,” 

with that term being liberally construed to afford employees “appropriate protection against 

employment discrimination.” Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12940(a) and (h); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, 

Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1054 (2005). California courts have held that termination, dissemination of 

a negative employment reference, and issuance of a negative performance evaluation constitute 

adverse employment actions. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Further, “[w]hat matters [ ] is not whether the two sexes are treated differently in the workplace, 

but whether one of the sex is treated adversely to the other sex in the workplace because of their 

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sex.” Kelley v. Conco Companies, 196 Cal. App. 4th 191, 207 (2011) (citing Oncale v. 

Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998), Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 

38 Cal. 4th 264, 279-80 (2006)). 

2. Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Claim for 

Discrimination 

Though Plaintiff “disputes” whether Defendant “deliberately assigns female PSSs to call 

on male medical professionals that make inappropriate sexual comments or advances toward 

female representatives,” Plaintiff identifies no evidence or testimony contradicting that fact. 

Rather, it is undisputed that “Defendant does not treat female PSSs differently from male PSSs by 

disproportionately assigning female PSSs to call on male medical professionals” and that 

“[n]either the sex/gender of the PSS nor the sex/gender of the medical professional are factors 

considered by Defendant when making call plans for PSSs.” (Compare Doc. 30-2 (Defendant’s 

Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts (“DSUMF”)), ¶ 6 with Doc. 40 (Plaintiff’s Response to 

Defendant’s Separate Statement of Material Facts (“PSUMF”)), ¶ 6 (facts are “undisputed”); see 

also Doc. 30-3 (Declaration of Karen Belknap in Support of Defendant’s Motion), ¶ 34.) 

It is also undisputed that “Defendant does not factor ‘attractiveness’ when making call 

plans for PSSs” (Compare DSUMF, ¶ 8 with PSUMF, ¶8 (undisputed); see also Belknap Decl., 

¶ 36;), that call assignments are based on geographical territories, not sex or gender, and that “the 

PSSs assigned to the territory decide amongst themselves which of the members of their group 

will call on each particular physician” (Doc. 42 (Plaintiff’s Declaration in Opposition to 

Defendant’s Motion), ¶¶ 5-6). Further, two of the four PSSs that shared the territory with Plaintiff 

were male. (JUMF, ¶ 13.) 

Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendant’s affirmative evidence that female PSSs were treated 

the same as male PSSs. Plaintiff’s contention that “[a] jury should be allowed to consider 

Defendant’s offensive arguments blaming the victim for the sexual assault she endured and its 

inequitable treatment of its female employees” does not demonstrate the existence of a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant’s female PSSs were “disproportionately” 

adversely effected by Defendant’s universal practice: all PSSs – male or female – had the options 

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of either removing problematic physicians from their call lists or visiting such physicians in pairs. 

In sum, summary judgment is warranted on this cause of action. 

B. Failure to Prevent Harassment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to prevent harassment by: (1) failing to provide 

Plaintiff with employment where she could work free from unlawful harassment, (2) failing to 

take appropriate action when it knew or should have known of the unlawful harassment against 

Plaintiff, (3) failing to adopt, disseminate, adhere to, or enforce effective policies with respect to 

its duty to prevent unlawful harassment, and (4) aiding and abetting unlawful harassment. 

(Compl., ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendant’s failure to take reasonable steps to 

prevent the harassment of its PSSs by Physician, Plaintiff was “sexually assaulted and harassed” 

by Physician, leading to a “debilitating struggle with post-traumatic stress disorder, which 

prevented Plaintiff from performing the duties of her job.” (Id., ¶ 37-38.) 

Defendant contends it took all reasonable steps to prevent the harassment from occurring, 

and that even if it failed to take such reasonable steps, its failure to do so was not a substantial 

factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. (Mot., pp. 13-14.) Plaintiff contends Defendant failed to take 

“all reasonable steps” to prevent harassment because (1) it did not distribute anti-harassment 

policies to physicians called on by its PSSs even when those physicians were known to have 

engaged in harassing conduct and (2) Defendant did not investigate or admonish Physician despite 

two earlier reports of sexual harassment or attempted sexual harassment. (Oppo., p. 12.) Plaintiff 

further contends that by failing to meaningfully address Physician’s harassing behavior, Physician 

became emboldened and escalated his behavior, so that “a reasonable jury could conclude that 

Defendant actually contributed to Plaintiff’s assault, in addition to failing to prevent it.” (Id.) 

1. Legal Standard

It is an unlawful employment practice under FEHA “for an employer . . . to fail to take all 

reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring” in the 

workplace. Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(k). When a plaintiff seeks to recover damages based on a 

claim of failure to prevent discrimination or harassment she must show three essential elements: 

1) plaintiff was subjected to discrimination, harassment or retaliation; 2) defendant failed to take 

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all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment or retaliation; and 3) this failure caused 

plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm. Ortiz v. Georgia Pac., 973 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1185 

(E.D. Cal. 2013); Lelaind v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 

2008) (citing California Civil Jury Instructions (BAJI) 12.11).

An employer may raise an affirmative defense to a charge of failure to prevent harassment 

by demonstrating (1) “‘that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 

promptly any sexually harassing behavior’” and (2) “‘that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take 

advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 

otherwise.’” Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). Whether the employer has a stated 

anti-harassment policy is relevant to the first element of the defense. Id. And an employee’s 

failure to use a complaint procedure provided by the employer “will normally suffice to satisfy the 

employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.” Id. 

2. Summary Judgment Is Inappropriate on Plaintiff’s Second Claim for Failure 

to Prevent Harassment

It is undisputed that Defendant required new employees, including Plaintiff, to receive 

three weeks of orientation and training that included training on Defendant’s sexual harassment 

and discrimination prevention and reporting policies. (JUMF, ¶¶ 7-12.) These policies provided 

multiple avenues for employees to report harassment, and ensured confidentiality and nonretaliation. (JUMF, ¶¶ 17-31; PSUMF, ¶¶ 2-4; see also PDMF, ¶¶ 2-4 (conceding such policies 

exist but disputing insofar as Plaintiff contends Defendant “consistently failed to follow its own 

written anti-harassment policies on several occasion”).) Defendant also allowed its PSSs to stop 

calling on physicians who acted inappropriately, without requiring further explanation or 

justification, (JUMF, ¶¶ 32-36; PSUMF, ¶ 5; see also Doc. 30-4 (Declaration of Bren K. Thomas 

in Support of Defendant’s Motion), Exh. A (Deposition of Plaintiff), 42:1-43:14 (stating that she 

was free to stop calling on a physician if she wanted)), or to call on physicians in pairs (JSUMF, 

¶ 37).

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Defendant has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate it “exercised reasonable care to 

prevent” sexually harassing behavior. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 877 (employer’s prevention steps 

are reasonable if it includes policies, training, reporting procedures and discipline). However, as 

noted above, Defendant must show that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 

promptly any sexually harassing behavior.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (italics added). 

Defendant has shown that it acted to prevent sexual harassment generally, but not that it 

acted to promptly correct the alleged harassment. During all relevant time periods, Defendant 

provided mandatory sexual harassment training for all of its employees and had a written antiharassment policy that: (1) defined sexual harassment; (2) set forth a reporting procedure; (3) 

stated that employees who violate the policy will be disciplined; and (4) assured employees that no 

reprisals would be made against them for making a complaint of sexual harassment. (JUMF, 

¶¶ 7-12, 17-31.) See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 878; Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir.

1999) (finding a similar policy sufficient to support, in part, an affirmative defense). 

The Court is unpersuaded that Defendant has adequately demonstrated it took any

affirmative, reasonable steps to “end the harassment.” In this circuit, as in others, “remedies [for 

sexual harassment] should be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’” Ellison, 924 F.2d at 

882 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)). The reasonableness of the remedy 

depends on its ability to: (1) “stop harassment by the person who engaged in harassment;” and 

(2) “persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct.” Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. 

When the employer undertakes no remedy, or where the remedy does not end the current 

harassment and deter future harassment, liability attaches for both the past harassment and any 

future harassment. Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, even assuming Defendant first learned of Physician’s “propensity to engage in 

inappropriate behavior” after he assaulted Plaintiff in October 2013, there remains a genuine 

dispute as to whether Defendant took any action to correct the sexually harassing behavior. 

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Following Plaintiff’s report of the incident, her supervisor reported the 

incident to human resources and advised Plaintiff she would not be required to call on Physician 

again. (JUMF, ¶ 68-75.) However, “[t]his solution did not remedy the harassment that had 

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already occurred, and was not adequate to deter future harassment.” Nichols, 256 F.3d at 876. 

After the incident, Defendant did not question Physician, did not instruct him to change his 

behavior, continued to do business with Physician, and continued to send PSSs to call on him. 

(Doc. 43 (Declaration of S. Brett Sutton in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion), Exhs. 4 

(Deposition of Karen Belknap), 51:14-54:1, 62:7-63:13, 67:24-68:17 76:2-78:25; 5 (Deposition of 

Tina Forrest), 39:6-40:19, 45:3-14, 46:1-50:17.) See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 876; Intlekofer v. 

Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 779-870 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that an oral rebuke, demand that the 

unwelcome conduct cease, and threat of disciplinary action may be sufficient to demonstrate 

defendant’s prompt action to correct the harassment complained of). Indeed, Defendant made no 

argument regarding its efforts to promptly correct the harassment of which Plaintiff complained, 

focusing instead on demonstrating that it took reasonable steps to prevent the harassment. (See 

Mot.; Reply.) 

Because a reasonable factfinder could determine that Defendant failed to undertake any 

remedy whatsoever to end the current harassment and deter future harassment, see Fuller, 47 F.3d 

at 1528-29, summary judgment is inappropriate on Plaintiff’s second cause of action for failure to 

prevent harassment. 

C. Failure to Accommodate

Plaintiff alleges that after the incident, she began suffering from “debilitating anxiety and 

severe panic attacks whenever she called on male doctors” and “began to experience emotional 

breakdowns outside doctors’ offices and could not bring herself to enter enough offices each day 

to meet her sales quotas.” (Compl., ¶ 13.) After informing Defendant that she may be unable to 

continue calling on male doctors, rather than “make reasonable adjustments to Plaintiff’s duties or 

work environment in order to reduce the level of stress she experienced in her job” which “would 

have permitted Plaintiff to continue her work for Defendant,” human resources offered a 

separation package, which Plaintiff accepted. (Id., ¶¶ 14-16.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to 

accommodate her disability or perceived disability. (Id., ¶¶ 43-46, 48-51.)

//

//

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1. Legal Standard

Under subsection 12940(m) of FEHA, it is unlawful for an employer “to fail to make 

reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or 

employee” unless the accommodation would “produce undue hardship.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 12940(m); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(u) (defining “undue hardship”). “The elements of 

a reasonable accommodation cause of action are (1) the employee suffered a disability, (2) the 

employee could perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation, and 

(3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the employee’s disability.” Nealy v. City of 

Santa Monica, 234 Cal. App. 4th 359, 373 (2d Dist. 2015). 

“Although it is the employee’s burden to initiate the process, no magic words are 

necessary, and the obligation arises once the employer becomes aware of the need to consider 

accommodation.” Scotch v. Art Institute of Cal., 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1013 (2009); Wilson v. 

Cnty. of Orange, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1195 (2009). Once the interactive process is initiated, 

the employer has a continuous obligation to engage in the process in good faith. Swanson v. 

Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 232 Cal. App. 4th 954, 971 (2014); Scotch, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 

1013. Once there has been an opportunity to conduct reasonable discovery on the issue, a plaintiff 

“must identify a reasonable accommodation that would have been available at the time the 

interactive process should have occurred.” Nealy, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 379; Scotch, 173 Cal. App.

4th at 1018.

2. Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Claim for Failure 

to Accommodate

The first element in this case is undisputed, as the parties essentially agree Plaintiff 

suffered a disability for purposes of FEHA. As to the second element, sometime in late December 

2013, Plaintiff requested a medical leave of absence and her doctors recommended, in lieu of 

possible job modifications, that Plaintiff be removed from work. (JUMF, ¶¶ 81, 82; Thomas 

Decl., Exh. H.) On May 8, 2014, Plaintiff’s physician Dr. Wadja completed an “attending 

physician’s statement of continued disability form” and, in response to a question seeking 

“examples of accommodations that would allow your patient to engage in social/occupational 

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activities,” Dr. Wadja responded “N/A”. (JUMF, ¶ 83; Thomas Decl., Exh. H.) Dr. Wadja further 

responded that Plaintiff’s “return to work” target date was July 1, 2014. (JUMF, ¶ 85; Thomas 

Decl., Exh. H.) Plaintiff received short-term disability benefits through June 17, 2014. (JUMF, 

¶¶ 86-87; Pl. Dep. 88:12-14, 94:15-21.) Plaintiff did not request any accommodation aside from 

the medical leave of absence, and did not request Defendant engage in the interactive process to 

identify other alternative accommodations. (PSUMF, ¶ 12 (undisputed); Belknap Decl., ¶ 32;) 

Since Defendant provided the only accommodation requested by Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim for failure to accommodate. Scotch, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1013-14; see also Avila v. 

Continental Airlines, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1252-53 (2008) (“[t]he employee can’t expect 

the employer to read his mind and know he secretly wanted a particular accommodation and [then] 

sue the employer for not providing it”). Summary judgment is warranted on this cause of action. 

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendant’s conduct, she has suffered severe emotional 

distress. (Compl., ¶¶ 53-56.) 

1. Legal Standard

The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and 

outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless 

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or 

extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 

defendant’s outrageous conduct. Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009); Potter v. 

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993). “‘Severe emotional distress’ means 

emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable person in a 

civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1051; Potter, 6 Cal. 4th 

at 1004. Conduct is “extreme and outrageous” when it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of 

that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Hughes, 46 Cal.4th at 1050; Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 

1001. Evidence that reflects “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or 

other trivialities” is insufficient. Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1051. If properly pled, a claim of sexual 

harassment can establish “the outrageous behavior element of a cause of action for intentional 

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infliction of emotional distress.” Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 

618 (1989). 

With respect to the requirement that the plaintiff show severe emotional distress, California 

courts have set a high bar. “Severe emotional distress means ‘emotional distress of such 

substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be 

expected to endure it.’” Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1004 (internal quotation omitted).

2. Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Claim for 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In evaluating Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court 

must look to Defendant’s conduct, not Physician’s conduct. Looking solely to Defendant’s 

conduct, it is undisputed that Defendant gave all its PSSs three options to avoid dangerous or 

uncomfortable situations: (1) refusing to call upon a particular physician, (2) only calling upon a 

particular physician in pairs, and (3) reporting any incidents of discomfort or harassment and 

initiating an investigation by human resources. (See JUMF, ¶¶ 11, 17-18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 32, 

37; Belknap Decl., Exh. C (copy of Defendant’s code of conduct); Thomas Decl., Exh. B 

(Deposition of Robin Cunningham), 46:6-47:3, 47:16-25, 49:6-11 (testifying she stopped calling 

on a physician due to inappropriate comments he had made, and was never required to provide an 

explanation for her refusal to continue calling on him). It is undisputed that prior incidents 

involving Physician were not reported to Defendant’s human resources department at the time 

they occurred. (JUMF, ¶¶ 43-47, ¶¶ 94-100; Cunningham Dep. 9:19-11:11, 15:3-16:20; Thomas 

Decl., Exh. C (Deposition of Melanie Livesay), 17:25-30:25.) It is further undisputed that when 

Plaintiff reported the incident to her supervisor, Holt, he told Plaintiff she would not have to call 

on Physician again and then immediately reported the incident to Defendant’s human resources

department. (JUMF, ¶¶ 68-72, 75; Pl. Dep. 73:20-78:6.)

Plaintiff contends a reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s conduct was “outrageous 

and in reckless disregard of the probability of causing severe emotional distress” because 

“[n]otwithstanding its knowledge of Physician’s proclivities and of the extremely serious nature 

[of] Physician’s conduct, Defendant outrageously failed to take reasonable steps to prevent female 

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PSSs from calling on Physician.” (Oppo., p. 16.) However, Plaintiff cites no evidence in support 

of her contention. Plaintiff does not identify any discrete act by Defendant intended to cause 

Plaintiff harm. Plaintiff’s statement that Defendant’s policy of allowing PSSs to refuse to call on 

any physician without explanation was “outrageous” does not make it so, and Plaintiff’s 

accusation that Defendant knowingly put Plaintiff in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis Physician is 

belied by the undisputed evidence that both current employee Cunningham and former employee 

Livesay refused to report their respective encounters with Physician to Defendant’s human 

resources department (JUMF, ¶¶ 43-47, ¶¶ 94-100; Cunningham Dep. 9:19-11:11, 15:3-16:20; 

Livesay Dep. 17:25-30:25). 

Plaintiff has put forth no evidence demonstrating Defendant intentionally engaged in 

“extreme and outrageous conduct” sufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1050; Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001. Based upon the 

evidence before the Court, Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of the existence of any material 

fact as to her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Summary judgment is 

warranted on this cause of action. 

V. CONCLUSION

According, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as follows:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action 

for failure to prevent harassment is DENIED; and

2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for 

harassment, third cause of action for failure to accommodate, and fourth cause of 

action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3.

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