Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00083/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00083-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtis Howard
Petitioner
Scott Kernan
Respondent

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS HOWARD, )

)

Petitioner, ) No. 2:04-cv-0083-JKS-KJM

)

vs. )

)

SCOTT KERNAN, Warden, ) DECISION

)

Respondent. )

)

______________________________)

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to the Honorable Kimberly

J. Mueller, United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local

General Order No. 262.

On March 14, 2007 , the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations herein

which were served on all parties and which contained notice to all parties that any objections to

the findings and recommendations were to be filed within twenty days. Both parties filed

objections to the findings and recommendations.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and local Rule 72-304, this

Court has conducted a de novo review of the record and exercised its independent judgment. 

Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court finds the findings and recommendations to be

supported by the record and in the result in conformity with controlling law. The Court therefore

adopts the findings and accepts the recommendations. A few additional comments are in order.

Case 2:04-cv-00083-JKS-KJM Document 33 Filed 09/28/07 Page 1 of 7
 The convictions of all three were affirmed on appeal and each has sought habeas corpus 1

in this court. Forstein’s petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Hollows, who recommended

denial, (Forstein v. Henry, 2005 WL 1398475 ( E.D. Cal. June 10, 2005), which was adopted by

Judge Damrell. Id. 2005 WL 2304256 (E.D. Cal. Sep 20, 2005). Forstein appealed and the

dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Forstein v. Henry, 185 Fed.Appx. 656 (9th Cir. (Cal.) June 19,

2007), cert denied 127 S.Ct. 3015 (2006). Stringer’s petition was referred to Magistrate Judge

Kellison, who recommended denial, Stringer v. Harrison, 2007 WL 763224 (E.D. CA March 9,

2007); Stringer raised the same confrontation issues regarding out of court statements, including

recorded statements, of Cheri Forstein that are presented here. Judge Karlton adopted the

findings and recommendations on March 30, 2007. Stringer v. Harrison, 2007 WL 987375 (E.D.

Cal. March 30, 2007).

2

 Howard and two co-defendants--his former wife Cheri Forstein and a co-worker James

Stringer--were convicted of murder. Howard’s defense was self defense. He raises two issues 1

which were exhausted. The Court will address those issues in reverse order. Howard contends

that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it permitted the jury to view a photograph of

the victim-decedent a few months before his confrontation with Howard. Since the relative size

and girth of Howard and the victim were relevant to Howard’s claim of self defense, his claim is

that admission of the photograph violated the California equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence

403, California Evidence Code § 352, because its probative value was outweighed by the risk

that it would mislead the jury. The California court found that the photograph was admissible,

but even if it wasn’t that there was so much evidence in the record regarding the relative size of

the victim and Howard that any error was harmless. Assuming without deciding that this is an

issue cognizable in a § 2254 proceeding, the California decision did not contravene any decision

of the United States Supreme Court. Consequently, this Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s

resolution of this issue without further comment.

The second issue is more troubling. Howard argues that the admission of telephone calls

that he recorded on his answering machine from his co-defendant former wife, Cherie Lee

Case 2:04-cv-00083-JKS-KJM Document 33 Filed 09/28/07 Page 2 of 7
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Forstein, violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution

made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. During the calls Forstein rants on

about difficulties she is having with her neighbors who she contends are bothering their son

Chad. Forstein threatens the neighbors and Howard with violence and makes racially derogatory

comments about the neighbors and about Howard. Her threats to Howard appear an attempt to

collect money from him and to persuade him to aid her and Chad in their difficulties with the

neighbors. The relevance was to show a motive for Howard and a friend and second codefendant, James Springer, to show up in the neighborhood brandishing firearms at the time the

victim was shot. The state trial court applied Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), and Ohio v.

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and allowed some of the comments in to show Forstein’s state of

mind. He excised any accusations Forstein made against Howard regarding Howard’s past bad

acts except, perhaps, a lack of fatherly feeling.

The parties briefed this issue under the then controlling law Lilly and Roberts. While this

case was pending in this Court, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which overruled Roberts and held that testimonial statements of

witnesses absent from trial are admissible only where the declarant is unavailable and the

defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. In Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d

1010 as amended 408 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2005) the Ninth Circuit held Crawford applicable to

cases brought seeking collateral review of final judgments. The Magistrate Judge relied upon

Crawford and concluded that Forstein was unavailable and her ranting to Howard on the phone

was not testimonial. These conclusions seem correct. A co-defendant who is tried together with

the defendant and has invoked her Fifth Amendment rights and declines to testify at the

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 In Davis the court was dealing with responses to forms of interrogation. Even the 911 2

calls involves questions by the person answering the call to clarify the notification. The court

was not addressing the entire scope of hearsay that was not testimonial.

4

defendant’s trial is unavailable. Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1204-05 (9th Cir.

2000). In Crawford the Supreme Court did not definitively define “testimony,” though the court

did expand on the meaning of the term in the later case Davis v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 126

S.Ct. 2266 (2006). From these cases a rule can be derived. The paradigm testimonial statement

is one given in response to questions intended to produce answers describing past events

potentially relevant to later criminal prosecutions, i.e. recorded or written out statements,

affidavits or depositions as well as testimony at various pre-trial and administrative hearings. 126

S.Ct. at 2273-74. The Davis court cautioned that interrogation was not always necessary since

volunteered statements or answers to open ended questions might violate the confrontation

clause. Id. n.1 at 2274. The court noted that not all hearsay is testimonial, and that it is the

testimonial nature of a statement which separates it from other hearsay which while subject to

traditional limitations on hearsay evidence is not subject to the confrontation clause. Id at 2273.2

In this case Forstein’s telephone call to Howard did not contain statements about past crimes of

Howard in anticipation of his future prosecution for those crimes. The telephone calls occurred

on September 7, 8 and 9. The murder had not yet occurred. It occurred on September 22. To

the extent Forstein attributed past bad acts to Howard, they were excised except perhaps her

contention that he was a bad father which was not offered for the truth of the matter but to show

that it was communicated to Howard and might have supplied a motive for his later actions.

Subsequent to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations the United States Supreme Court

held that Crawford was not to be applied retroactively. Whorton v. Bockting, ___ U.S. ___ 127

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 This creates some confusion. As we have seen applying Crawford Forstein’s 3

statements to Howard were not testimonial and hence not affected by the confrontation clause. 

But as Justice Alito observes in Whorton, statements that pass muster under Crawford because

they are not testimonial might run a foul of Roberts because they were hearsay which did not

satisfy a well rooted exception to the hearsay rule and were not otherwise trustworthy. “Under

Roberts, an out-of-court non-testimonial statement not subject to prior cross-examination could

not be admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliability. Under Crawford, on the

other hand, the confrontation clause has no application to such statements and therefore permits

their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.” 127 S.Ct. at 1183-84. Common sense

suggests that before returning to an evaluation of whether admission of hearsay violates Roberts

the court must at the threshold determine whether it is testimonial because unless it is it can’t

violate the confrontation clause under current law and current law would be applied at any retrial. 

See Miller v. Fleming, 225 Fed.Appx. 606 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished, reserving judgment on

this argument).

5

S.Ct. 1173 (2007). It seems that where cases had already reached final judgment when Crawford

was decided would be decided under the prior Roberts rule. 

3

In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the court held that admission of any hearsay

statement against the defendant, testimonial or not, would violate the confrontation clause unless

1) it fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception; or 2) had other particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness, i.e. indicia of reliability. Whether a statement falls within a firmly rooted

hearsay exception is decided under federal not state law. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116,

125-26 (1999); Winzer v. Hall, 494 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2007). The state trial court admitted the

statements on the theory that they fell within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. As

we shall see the state of mind exception as expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 803(3)

is firmly rooted. But its application here is problematical. See, e.g., Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d

964, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the state of mind exception as not permitting admission

of declarant’s beliefs in order to prove the truth of those beliefs); United States v. Fontenot, 14

F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994) (same-state of mind exception limited to statements of condition not to

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 The state of mind exception as captured in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) is a firmly 4

rooted exception to the hearsay rule and would permit admission of Forstein’s future plans and

intentions against her and against her co-defendants. See Coy v. Renico, 414 F.Supp.2d 744 (E.D.

Mich. 2006) (citing and discussing the leading federal case Mutual Life Ins. Co. Of N.Y. v.

Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424 (9th Cir.1988); United

States v. Astorga-Torres, 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); United

States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom Inciso v. United States, 429

U.S. 1099 (1977).

 While not the point expressly made by the trial judge, it appears that this evidence was 5

relevant as to Howard’s state of mind.

6

statements of belief). Forstein’s messages extend beyond her present condition and future

intentions and cover her beliefs about Howard and the neighbors.4

On the other hand as to Howard they were not introduced for their truth but to show that

Forstein’s demands and threats were communicated to him as circumstantial evidence of his

motive. The fact that she made these complaints to Howard is relevant even if they were not 5

true so long as a jury could infer that they might prompt him to action. In any event, even if there

was a confrontation clause violation, it was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. Forstein’s

attitude toward the neighbors was a matter of common knowledge. Howard’s receipt of the

phone calls is not disputed. He recorded them at the suggestion of his attorney for his future use.

CONCLUSION

The California Courts did not violate clearly established federal law in admitting the

photograph and Forstein’s recorded messages. Forstein’s recorded messages to Howard were not

hearsay as to him. If they were hearsay, they were not testimonial. If they were, nevertheless,

inadmissible under Roberts their admission was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).

Case 2:04-cv-00083-JKS-KJM Document 33 Filed 09/28/07 Page 6 of 7
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. The findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, except as modified in this

Order, are adopted; 

2. Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

3. The clerk shall enter final judgment dismissing this petition with prejudice; and

4. The Court will issue a certificate of appealability only as to the confrontation clause

issue since the continuing vitality of Roberts in cases like this is in doubt. The photograph issue

does not warrant a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) and (2).

Dated: September 28, 2007.

____/s/James K. Singleton, Jr.

James K. Singleton, Jr. 

United States District Judge

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