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Parties Involved:
Bethlehem Steel Corporation
Appellee
Lloyd T. Solon
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PILED 

United States Court of Appeal 

Tenth Circuit 5 

LLOYD T. SOLON, an individual,) 

) 

APR 12 1991 

.ROBERT L. HOErtrh 

CJrk ~R 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, ) 

a Delaware corporation, ) 

No. 89-8062 

(D.C. No. C88-1041-K) 

(D. Wyo.) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and BRETT, District 

Judge.** 

Appellant Lloyd Solon appeals the district court's grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Appellee Bethlehem Steel Corporation. 

Appellant sued Bethlehem for wrongful termination, alleging breach 

of contract, malicious conspiracy and interference with employment, breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 

negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 

promissory estoppel. The district court found these claims 

unavailing because Appellant was an at-will employee, and the 

* 

not 

for 

res 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** The Honorable Thomas R. Brett, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-8062 Document: 010110034175 Date Filed: 04/12/1991 Page: 1 
Wyoming courts do not recognize any of these theories in the atwill employment context. We affirm for substantially the reasons 

given by the district court. 

We review the district court's summary judgment decision de 

nova. Osgood Y..!.. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 

(10th Cir. 1988). "We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if 

it is clear from the record that there are no genuine issues of 

material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law." Wilner Y..!.. Budig, 848 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (10th 

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031 (1989). The movant must 

show beyond a reasonable doubt that she is entitled to summary 

judgment, and we review the record in the light most favorable to 

the opposing party. Ewing Y..!.. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 

(10th Cir. 1987). 

There is no dispute that Appellant was hired for an 

indefinite term. Under Wyoming law, employees hired for an 

indefinite term are terminable at will. Rompf Y..!.. John~ Hammons 

Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 27 (Wyo. 1984). At-will employees may 

be terminated at any time without cause. Id. 

Appellant contends that his initial status as an at-will 

employee was altered by one or more circumstances. First, he 

argues that a clause in Appellee's operations manual established a 

requirement of cause for termination. We disagree. The language 

in the manual does not convert his at-will status to "for cause." 

The language merely states that when an employee is discharged, 

the manager of sales should be consulted unless there is "a very 

good reason" not to consult the manager. We recognize that some 

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Appellate Case: 89-8062 Document: 010110034175 Date Filed: 04/12/1991 Page: 2 
language in employment handbooks can convert at-will employment to 

"for cause" employment. See,~, McDonald~ Mobil Coal 

Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 870 (Wyo. 1990); Leithead ~ 

American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Wyo. 1986). This 

1 language unequivocally does not. 

Second, Appellant asserts his termination constituted a 

violation by Appellee of a putative covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing. Appellant notes the Wyoming Supreme Court has 

reserved a decision on whether a covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing should be implied in at-will employment contracts. See, 

~, Nelson v. Crimson Enters., Inc., 777 P.2d 73, 76 n.3 (Wyo. 

1989). The Nelson court cited cases that recognized such a 

covenant where, for example, discharge was motivated by a desire 

to prevent an at-will employee from profit-sharing or collecting 

commissions to which she was entitled by contract. Id. (citing, 

inter alia, Mitford~ de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); 

Fortune Y...!.. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 

1977)). 

Such considerations are absent here. Construing Appellant's 

pleadings liberally in his favor, we find no allegations that 

remove this case from the class of at-will terminations in which 

the Wyoming Supreme Court has refused to imply a covenant of good 

1 Citing Alexander Y...!.. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 

1985), Appellant argues that Appellee's attempts to articulate a 

cause for Solon's discharge suggest that he could only be 

discharged for cause. The Alexander court stated that an 

employer's attempts to establish cause for termination "may be 

considered in interpretation of ambiguous handbook language." Id. 

at 1389. Because the language in Appellee's manual is unambiguous, 

however, Alexander is inapposite. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-8062 Document: 010110034175 Date Filed: 04/12/1991 Page: 3 
faith. See,~, McDonald, 789 P.2d 866; Mobil Coal Producing, 

Inc. Y..!.. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985); cf. McCullough Y..!.. Golden 

Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1990) (recognizing covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts because they 

are a "special class[]" of contract). Moreover, the Wyoming 

Supreme Court more recently stated: "In an at-will employment 

situation, either party may terminate the relationship for any 

reason at any time without incurring liability and without violating any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 

McDonald, 789 P.2d at 869 (citing, inter alia, Nelson, 777 P.2d 

73). We are thus convinced this covenant is not recognized under 

Wyoming law and the Wyoming Supreme Court would not extend the law 

in this case. 

Finally, Appellant contends "appellee is promissorily 

estopped." This contention is based in part on Appellee's alleged 

failure to follow certain provisions relating to substance abuse 

in the manual. We hold, however, that the drug policy announced 

in the manual does not support Appellant's promissory estoppal 

theory. 

The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that where a manual 

promises certain procedures prior to termination and an employee 

relies on the availability of these procedures, the presence of 

the procedures can convert at-will employment to "for cause" 

employment. See McDonald, 789 P.2d at 869-70; Mobil Coal, 704 

P.2d at 707. The McDonald court formulated a three-part test: 

[A]n employee is entitled to enforce a representation in 

an employee handbook if he can demonstrate that: (1) The 

employer should have reasonably expected the employee to 

consider the representation as a commitment from the 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-8062 Document: 010110034175 Date Filed: 04/12/1991 Page: 4 
employer; (2) the employee reasonably relied upon the 

representation to his detriment; and (3) injustice can 

only be avoided by enforcement of [the] representation. 

789 P.2d at 870. 

Here, the manual stated Bethlehem would accord employees 

desiring treatment for drug problems "confidentiality," "fair 

treatment," and "appropriate corrective action." Appellant states 

no factual allegation showing either his reliance on these promises 

or even a breach of these promises. Appellant denies he had a drug 

abuse problem; therefore, he cannot invoke procedures for treatment 

of drug abuse problems as a basis for a promissory estoppel theory. 

Moreover, the handbook does not promise at-will employees would not 

be required to take drug tests. Indeed, the handbook clearly 

enunciates a strong policy of maintaining a drug-free workplace. 

Hence, Appellant might reasonably have anticipated measures to 

detect workplace drug use, and Appellant cites no facts indicating 

he was unfairly singled out to be tested. In sum, Appellant cannot 

rely on promises of "appropriate corrective action" if he denies 

the need for such action, and he cannot argue these promises in any 

way rendered him a permanent employee. 

The district court also addressed Appellant's promissory 

estoppel theory relating to conversion of his status from at-will 

to "for cause" based on Appellee's alleged oral representations 

that Appellant could retain his job as long as he performed well. 

The district court found this promise did not make Appellant a 

permanent employee because it did not promise a definite term of 

employment. We agree. The statements Appellant cites do not rise 

to the level of promises from which anyone could reasonably infer a 

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Appellate Case: 89-8062 Document: 010110034175 Date Filed: 04/12/1991 Page: 5 
. ~ 

promise of permanent employment. Even by their own terms, these 

avowals did not intimate a definite term of employment and thus did 

not alter Appellant's at-will status. 

Because Appellant's termination was not wrongful, his remaining claims involving wrongful interference with employment and 

infliction of emotional distress must also fail. Finding Appellee 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we AFFIRM. 

6 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-8062 Document: 010110034175 Date Filed: 04/12/1991 Page: 6