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Parties Involved:
Peter John Lovato
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

. FIL.e Umted St~s ·eou I) 

Tenth Ci::ur: Ap~Is 

AUG 2 4 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECK£ 

Clerk R 

PETER JOHN LOVATO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 89-2175 

(D.C. No. 88-470JP) 

(Dist. of New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, MCWILLIAMS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Peter John Lovato appeals an order o_f the district court 

denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his automobile 

at a Border Patrol checkpoint. Lovato was indicted and charged 

with one count of possession with intent to distribute less than 

50 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 u.s.c. SS 841(a)(l), 

841(b)(l)(D), ~nd 18 u.s.c. S 2. After his motion to suppress was 

denied, he entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right 

to appeal the suppression ruling. On July 31, 1989, Lovato was 

sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment with three years of 

supervised release. On appeal, he challenges the reasonableness 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2175 Document: 010110041549 Date Filed: 08/24/1990 Page: 1 
and, therefore, the lawfulness of the secondary investigative 

detention subsequent to his primary detention at the border 

checkpoint. He also challenges the voluntariness of his consent 

to a search of his trunk. We affirm. 

On the night of October 30, 1988, U.S. Border Patrol Agents 

Kevin Thatcher and Dale Jones were on duty at the United States 

Border Patrol Checkpoint on Interstate Highway 10, located 

approximately 19 miles west of Las Cruces, New Mexico. At 

approximately 9:45 p.m. Agent Thatcher stopped a maroon 1980 Buick 

driven by Lovato. Lovato's brother Donaciano ("Don") was a 

passenger in the vehicle. The following facts, provided by 

Thatcher at the suppression hearing, were largely uncontested. 

Thatcher asked the brothers if they were American citizens, and 

Lovato answered first, in the affirmative. As Don answered yes, 

Thatcher noticed that Don was holding a wet, blood-soaked towel to 

his face, was bleeding profusely from his face, and appeared to 

have been severely beaten. Thatcher asked if Don needed medical 

attention, and Lovato said "No. I think we're just going to go to 

Tucson." R. Vol II at 9. 1 Thatcher proceeded to question Lovato 

as to where they had come from and where they lived. Lovato 

replied that they were coming from El Paso and lived in the 

Albuquerque area. During this conversation Thatcher observed that 

Lovato's hands were shaking, his right hand was swollen~ and one 

knuckle was cut. Thatcher told Lovato that Las Cruces had a 

1 Lovato denies making this statement and any other statement 

about declining medical help in Las Cruces. He testified that he 

did not discuss Don's need for medical attention until he was 

being questioned by Agent Jones, at which time he actively sought 

medical help for his brother. 

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doctor and a hospital, and Lovato replied that he might take Don 

to a doctor when they arrived in Tucson. Upon inquiry, Lovato 

explained that he and his brother had been fist-fighting at a 

location short of the checkpoint and that Lovato had broken his 

brother's nose. After questioning the two brothers, Thatcher 

noticed that the car carried Texas license plates. He had 

previously observed that the backseat contained luggage that could 

have easily fit into the trunk. At this point he referred the 

vehicle and its occupants to the secondary inspection area. 

Thatcher stated that he referred them to see if Don needed 

immediate medical attention and to try to ascertain whether a 

crime such as robbery, car theft, or murder had taken place. He 

believed that they were American citizens but stated that he was 

bothered by Lovato's reluctance to return to Las Cruces and by the 

fact that Lovato was doing most of the talking for both himself 

and Don. 

At the secondary inspection area Agent Dale Jones continued 

the investigation after being told by Thatcher (1) about Don's 

· · physical condition and Lovato's nervousness, (2) about his 

suspicions that something was wrong, (3) that the car had Texas 

plates, and (4) that the men claimed to be from Albuquerque and 

were en route to Arizona. Jones testimony, some of which was 

contested, continued as follows. 

and Lovato's jittery movements. 

He noticed Don's facial injuries 

He also observed two large bags 

or suitcases in the back seat. Moreover, he noticed that Lovato 

was much smaller in size than the brother whom he had supposedly 

just beaten up. Jones asked for and received identification (a 

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New Mexico driver's license) from Lovato and then asked about the 

ownership of the car. Lovato told Jones that it belonged to his 

girlfriend in El Paso2 and that he had borrowed it, although he 

could not produce written permission. The car registration 

indicated that the owner was a woman who lived in El Paso. Jones 

asked Lovato what was in the trunk. Lovato stated "Let me show 

you," and then attempted to open the trunk with what he said was a 

bent key that did not work very well. 3 Jones observed that it 

resembled a GM ignition key. According to Jones, Lovato was 

extremely fidgety during this time and kept saying that he thought 

he should get his brother to a hospital. When Lovato could not 

open the trunk, Jones tried to do so, noting that the key was not 

bent and clearly did not fit the lock. When the trunk failed to 

open, Jones asked Don to exit the passenger side of the Buick and 

produce identification, which he did. Jones then searched the 

front of the car with a flashlight and noticed a key on the 

floorboard on the driver's side of the vehicle. It appeared to be 

the trunk key. Jones instructed the two brothers to walk to a 

point approximately twenty feet from the car. Jones stated that 

because of the obvious signs of a struggle, presence of luggage in 

the back seat, likelihood that Lovato had intentionally lied about 

the trunk key being bent, and the fact that the car did not belong 

2 Lovato contends that he never said this. 

the keys to the car were given to him by a man 

said that the car belonged to his girlfriend. 

He testified that 

named Manuel, who 

3 Lovato testified that Jones never asked and he never gave his 

consent to search the trunk but that Jones ordered him and his 

brother to wait twenty feet from the car while Jones proceeded to 

search under and through the car and then open the trunk with a 

key he found in the car. 

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to either occupant, he decided to try to open the trunk with the 

newly discovered key, thinking that there might be a body in the 

trunk. He proceeded to open the trunk in full view of Lovato, who 

did not express any objection to Jones' possession or use of the 

second key. Jones· saw several large bundles wrapped in cellophane 

and smelled the odor of raw marijuana. At that point the two 

brothers were placed under arrest. 4 

Lovato does not challenge the legitimacy of the initial 

border checkpoint stop. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 

U. S. 543 (1976)(detention for brief questioning without 

particularized suspicion is constitutional at reasonably located 

border checkpoints). He argues instead that his detention in 

secondary was no longer a routine border stop but a so-called 

"Terry stop," i.e., an investigatory detention requiring 

reasonable suspicion at its inception and a reasonable 

relationship between the scope of the detention and the reason for 

its initiation in the first place. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1968). He concedes the validity under Tenth Circuit law of 

limited detention and interrogation at border checkpoints for 

particularized suspicion of drug possession, United States v. 

Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986), but argues that no such 

suspicion of drugs was present in his case. He asserts that the 

scope of the initial stop was limited to interrogation relating to 

possible violations of the immigration laws, and contends that the 

border patrol agents lacked reasonable suspicion of either 

4 Charges against Don Lovato were dismissed by the United 

States in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding with Peter 

Lovato. See brief of appellee at 8 n.1. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2175 Document: 010110041549 Date Filed: 08/24/1990 Page: 5 
immigration or drug violations and could not detain him for 

questioning about possible state offenses. If his detention was 

unlawful, then so was the evidence obtained as the fruit of an 

unlawful detention. Alternatively, he argues that neither 

probable cause nor voluntary consent existed to justify a search 

of the trunk of the Buick. 

I 

The standards of review are clear. The district court's 

findings of fact supporting its denial of Lovato's motion to 

suppress will be upheld on appeal unless they are clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir. 

1985); United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984); United States v. Pappas, 735 

F.2d 1232 ·(10th Cir. 1984). In . effect, the evidence is viewed in 

the light most favorable to upholding the lower court's ruling. 

Lopez, 777 F.2d at 548; United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 

1376 (10th Cir. 1984). Legal rulings, on the other hand, are 

subject to de nova review. 

The threshold issue is whether Lovato's detention and 

questioning in secondary was a "Terry stop" or merely part of the 

routine search and detention at permanent border checkpoints where 

reasonable suspicion of particularized wrongdoing is not required 

for brief interrogation. · In Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563, the 

Supreme Court stated: 

"[I]t is constitutional to refer motorists selectively 

to the secondary inspection area .•• on the basis of 

criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. 

[Roving patrol stops require reasonable suspicion under 

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)]. 

As the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no 

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particularized reason need exist to justify it, we think 

it follows that the Border Patrol officers must have 

wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be 

diverted for the brief questioning involved." 

This language occurred in the context of routine questioning and 

visual inspection by border patrol agents with respect to 

residence status. Id. at 560. It suggests that selective 

referral to secondary does not require reasonable suspicion so 

long as the continuing intrusion is minimal and consists merely of 

routine, limited questioning relating to citizenship or residence 

status. 

In this case the referral to secondary was made because of 

actual suspicion that criminal wrongdoing had . taken place. At 

this point the detention was no longer concerned merely with 

checking on residence ·status but in our view had become a "Terry 

stop.I' The district court implicitly treated it as such. We, 

therefore, proceed to analyze whether the district court's 

findings of reasonable suspicion can be affirmed. 

Under the standard announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1968), an investigative detention must be based upon specific and 

articulable facts and rational inferences drawn therefrom that 

give rise to "reasonable suspicion" that the detained individual 

has committed or was committing a crime. In effe~t, the totality 

of the circumstances are examined in a "Terry stop." See United 

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). In evaluating the 

reasonableness of an investigative stop, courts examine whether 

the official action was justified at its inception and whether it 

continued to be "reasonably related in scope to the justification" 

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for the interference in the first place. See United States v. 

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29). 

Among other things, the district court found it suspicious 

that Don Lovato had been severely beaten and was bleeding 

profusely from the face, that Peter Lovato was much smaller than 

Don, that Peter answered many of the questions addressed to Don, 

that Don refused medical treatment at nearby Las Cruces, that 

Peter indicated that distant Tucson (some five hours away) would 

be close enough for medical treatment, that Peter was driving a 

car with Texas plates when his home state was New Mexico, that 

Peter said that fighting with his brother was a common occurrence 

while driving, that Peter's behavior was not only nervous but 

"bizarre," and that luggage was in the back seat that normally 

would have been .stored in the trunk. Moreover, the court noted 

Peter's statement that he had stopped the car a mile short of the 

checkpoint to continue the fight, which the court linked with 

statements from the agents that in their experience other drivers 

stopped at about that point for reasons involving the commission 

of crimes. 5 These circumstances are more than enough to create 

articulable and particularized suspicion that a crime had been 

committed, justifying the referral to and detention in secondary. 

The court's findings are not clearly erroneous. In turn, and 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district 

court's ruling, the detention and questioning were sufficiently 

5 The court also found that it was reasonable for Thatcher to 

refer the Lovatos to secondary for the purpose of determining 

Don's need for medical attention. 

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limited in time and in manner as to be reasonably related in scope 

to the justification for the selective referral to secondary. 

In a related argument, Lovato contends that the border patrol 

agents exceeded their authority under federal law in questioning 

and detaining him about suspected state offenses. The United 

States, on the other hand, argues that Thatcher and Jones were 

authorized not only to act as agents of the United States 

Immigration and Naturalization Service but to act in the capacity 

of New Mexico peace officers. N.M. Stat. Ann. S 29-1-ll(e) states 

as follows: 

"All persons who are duly commissioned federal law 

enforcement officers employed by the. . immigration 

and naturalization service •.. , who are assigned in 

New Mexico, are recognized and authorized to act as New 

Mexico peace officers and have all the powers of New 

Mexico peace officers to enforce state laws in New 

Mexico, including the power to make arrests for 

violation of state laws (emphasis added)." 

Although Agent Thatcher conceded that usually the border patrol 

agents do not choose to act as New Mexico peace officers and, for 

instance, do not make arrests for drunk driving, R. Vol. II at 45, 

that fact does not preclude them from doing so under the statute, 

nor from attempting to ascertain if someone is a drunk or a car 

thief and detaining them, if necessary, until state police arrive 

to make an arrest. Thatcher stated that the agents call in other 

agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency or the New Mexico 

State Police, when they have something "concrete" to which that 

agency can respond. R. Vol. II at 46. Jones, in turn, testified 

that the border patrol agents have arrest powers and run frequent 

computer checks for stolen cars. 

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In the situation at hand, a battery or an aggravated battery 

was apparent. Had a state police officer at, say, a routine 

sobriety checkpoint noticed an apparent battery, the police 

officer would have been justified in holding the driver and 

passenger in investigative detention. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 

777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1985) (police had right to reasonably 

investigate other crimes if evidence emerged during legitimate 

roadblock set up to check drivers' licenses and car 

registrations); United States v. Pritchard, 645 F.2d 854, 856-57 

(10th Cir.) (police officers had right to take reasonable 

investigative steps and were not required to close their eyes to 

evidence of crimes other than those justifying roadblock), cert. 

denied, 454 U.S. 382 (1981). Under the circumstances that govern 

in this case, we see no reason to treat federal enforcement agents 

differently. The fact that New Mexico gives federal law 

enforcement officers discretion to act as New Mexico peace 

officers does not raise the same kinds of federalism questions as 

would a state statute requiring federal officers to act as New 

Mexico peace officers. 6 

We conclude that Lovato's argument that the border patrol 

agents lacked authority to detain and question him on matters 

raising suspicion of state offenses must fail. In United States 

v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1986), we relied on 

6 The United States also argues that the border patrol agents 

were "under a statutory duty to investigate all criminal 

violations of state laws." Appellee's Brief at 14. We do not 

read such a duty into the New Mexico statute quoted above. 

Authorization to act as state peace officers is not the equivalent 

of a requirement to do so. 

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United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), in holding 

that a border patrol agent at a fixed checkpoint may not only 

question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and 

immigration status but may ask them "to explain suspicious 

circumstances," adding that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not 

require police officers to close their eyes to suspicious 

circumstances." The suspicious circumstances involved in Espinosa 

were drug-related. In Brignoni-Ponce the Supreme Court said that 

"[t]he [roving border patrol] officer may question the driver and 

passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he 

may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further 

detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause." 

Id. at 881-82. Brignoni-Ponce was concerned with a roving border 

patrol stop, a stop generally acknowledged to be more i?trusive 

than stops at fixed border patrol checkpoints, see, ~, --

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558. Nothing in Brignoni-Ponce 

indicates that detention for an explanation of suspicious 

circumstances could not take place in both the secondary and 

primary areas of a border checkpoint. 

In a more recent case, we did not limit suspicious 

circumstances to drug or immigration offenses. See United States 

v. Johnson, 895 ~.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1990) (secondary detention at 

border patrol checkpoint upheld for reasonable suspicion of car 

theft). And as we noted in United States v. Maynes-Ortega, 857 

F.2d 686, 687 (10th Cir. 1988), the argument that enforcement 

agents must perform their tasks with blinders on "flies in the 

face of conunon sense and public policy." 

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In short, we affirm the district court's ruling that no 

unlawful detention occurred when Lovato was interrogated and held 

in secondary prior to his arrest. Based upon legitimate 

suspicions raised by the circumstances, we conclude that the 

border patrol agents were authorized to detain Lovato for a 

reasonable time to investigate the possibility, among other 

things, of car theft, robbery, murder or some other crime of 

violence, and to seek permission to open the trunk of the car 

while Lovato was detained. 

II 

We next address -the issue of whether the search of Lovato ' s 

car and trunk was conducted absent probable cause or consent. See 

United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 895 (1975) (search, in contrast 

_to inspection, of vehicle at fixed border checkpoint requires 

probable cause or consent)-. The United States conceded that the 

r eason the trunk was searched was to hunt for a body; it also 

concedes that probable cause was lacking to search the trunk for 

such a reason. Therefore, we must ascertain whether consent was 

given. 

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) 

established that "the question whether a consent to search was 

' voluntary' or was a product of duress or coercion, expressed or 

implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality 

of the circumstances. " The government has the burden of proving 

that consent was voluntary. Id. at 222. The standard of review 

of the district court's findings is the clearly erroneous 

standard. United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir. 

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1984). In the absence of findings, as is the case here, we review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's 

ruling. 

This court has established a three-tiered analysis for 

determining when the prosecution sustains its burden of showing 

that consent was voluntary. First, testimony must be clear and 

positive that the consent was unequivocal, specific, and freely 

and intelligently given. Second, the government must establish 

that the consent was not the result of duress or coercion, express 

or implied. Finally, the court indulges every reasonable 

. presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and there 

must be convincing evidence of such waiver • . See United States v. 

Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1150 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 

S.Ct. 315 (1987); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th 

Cir. 1985); United States v. Recalde, 761 .F.2d 1448, 1453 (10th 

Cir. 1985); United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 

1977). 

The testimony in this case with respect to consent is 

conflicting. Where that is the case, the trial court is entitled 

to make credibility determinations. United States v. Obregon, 748 

F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1984), and this court may not substitute its 

view of the credibility determinations made below, United States 

v. Donahue, 441 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1971). Lovato testified that 

he was never asked to give his consent, and never gave it. The 

trial court was entitled to discount this testimony. Jones' 

testimo~y, which was apparently accepted by the district court as 

the correct version of the facts, was that in response to the 

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request to see what was in the trunk, Lovato stated "Let me show 

you" and then proceeded voluntarily to attempt to open the trunk. 

United States v. Maynes-Ortega, 857 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1988) 

is apposite. In Maynes-Ortega, Maynes consented to a search of 

his trunk but claimed that he did not have a key. The border 

patrol agent observed a key lying on the floor of the front seat 

and proceeded to open the trunk with it. We stated that validity 

of consent does not depend on assessment of whether or not the 

defendant thought that his consent could not be acted upon, i.e., 

on a subjective standard. The same logic applies here. Also, 

when -the key to the trunk was located, Lovato made no attempt to 

retract his consent, thereby indicating that he had been willing 

to risk the possibility that his verbal consent would be acted 

upon. See United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 892. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

district court's ruling, we affirm the conclusion that the search 

of the trunk was undertaken pursuant to valid consent and was, 

therefore, lawful. 

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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