Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10580/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10580-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lloyd Myers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LLOYD MYERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10580

D.C. No.

5:09-cr-01195-EJD-2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 11, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed September 14, 2015

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Mary H. Murguia,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Murguia

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2 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a criminal judgment in a case in which

the defendant and the government reached a plea deal during

a settlement conference conducted by a magistrate judge.

The panel agreed with the defendant that United States v.

Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139 (2013), makes clear that Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(c)(1) imposes a categorical bar on judicial

participation in plea negotiations, even when the judicial

participation is both requested by the defendant and

sanctioned by the district court’s local rules.

The panel held that Rule 11(c)(1) is waivable by the

defendant, but could not say on this record that the defendant

knowingly waived Rule 11(c)(1). Because the defendant

failed to object at the time to judicial participation, the panel

reviewed the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the

settlement procedure violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 for plain

error. The panel held that the defendant failed to establish the

alleged error affected his substantial rights because the record

is bereft of evidence indicating that he suffered any prejudice

due to the magistrate judge’s participation in the settlement

conference. The panel observed that the settlement

conference helped the defendant reach a plea deal with the

government—something the defendant vigorously pursued

during the nearly three years of pretrial proceedings—which

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 3

resulted in the defendant receiving a below-Guidelines

sentence.

COUNSEL

Michael K. Hinckley (argued), Law Offices of Michael

Hinckley, Berkeley, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Owen P. Martikan, Assistant United StatesAttorney(argued),

Melinda Haag, United States Attorney, United States

Attorney’s Office, San Francisco, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge:

Lloyd Myers was indicted on ten fraud-related charges

stemming from his involvement in a Ponzi scheme he

operated with his brother-in-law. After nearly three years of

pretrial proceedings, Myers requested a judge-led criminal

settlement conference in accordance with the Northern

District of California’s Criminal Local Rule 11-1. The

prosecutor, initially opposed to the procedure due to the

rapidly approaching trial date, ultimately acquiesced to

Myers’s request. The district court referred the matter to a

magistrate judge to conduct a settlement conference. During

the proceeding, Myers and the government reached a plea

deal that was subsequently memorialized in a written plea

agreement between the parties. Myers later pled guilty to one

count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of

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4 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

18 U.S.C. § 1349 and was sentenced to a below-Guidelines

sentence of eighteen months’ imprisonment.

Myers does not dispute that he voluntarily participated in

the settlement conference. Rather, he argues the procedure

violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which

prohibits “[t]he court” from “participat[ing] in [plea]

discussions.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). Specifically, Myers

argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.

Davila, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S. Ct. 2139 (2013), sets forth a

categorical rule prohibiting any judicial involvement in plea

negotiation, even, as is at issue here, when the judicial

participation is both requested by the defendant and

sanctioned by the district court’s local rules.

We agree that Davila makes clear that Rule 11(c)(1)

imposes a categorical bar on judicial participation in plea

negotiations. Because Myers failed to object at the time to

judicial participation, however, we review his unpreserved

Rule 11 claim for plain error, and we affirm. Myers has

failed to establish the alleged error affected his substantial

rights because the record is bereft of evidence indicating that

he suffered any prejudice due to the magistrate judge’s

participation in the settlement conference. Rather, the

settlement conference helped Myers reach a plea deal with

the government—something Myers vigorously pursued

during the nearly three years of pretrial proceedings—which

resulted in Myers receiving a below-Guidelines sentence.

I

In 2003, Myers and his brother-in-law, Rodney Hatfield,

created Landmark Trading Company, LLC, to solicit

investments and conduct financial transactions in the foreign

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 5

currency exchange markets (“Forex” transactions). Myers

and Hatfield had very little, if any, training or experience with

Forex trading. Between 2003 and 2006, Hatfield recruited

approximately forty investors, many of whom were fellow

congregation members from Myers’s and Hatfield’s place of

worship. Once funded, Hatfield transferred the money to a

Forex trading account, which Myers controlled and operated. 

Myers and Hatfield received over $3,000,000 from investors,

but because Myers’s Forex trades were wildly unsuccessful,

Landmark never turned a profit. However, this was not the

information Myers and Hatfield represented to investors. 

Rather, investors were told the company was flush with cash

and its investments consistently achieved monthly profits of

up to three percent. To disguise the company’s losses, Myers

and Hatfield used new investors’ funds to pay off other

investors. By early 2007, the scheme had reached a breaking

point: Myers and Hatfield reported to investors the value of

Landmark’s investment account was approximately

$2,154,415, when the account actually contained a meager

$4,615.

In December 2009, Myers and Hatfield were indicted in

the Northern District of California for one count of

conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1349, and nine counts of wire fraud, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1343. Following numerous delays, trial was set

for March 2013. Leading up to the trial date, Myers and

Hatfield actively sought to reach a plea deal with the

government. For example, in August 2012, the parties

stipulated to a hearing continuance “to allow time for

defendants’ counsel to continue to work toward a resolution

of the case with the government.” The district court granted

the motion and set a status conference hearing for November

5, 2012.

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6 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

During the November 5 status conference,1after a brief

discussion about the progress of pretrial discovery, the district

court asked whether the parties wished to advance the trial

date. Myers’s counsel responded:

Well, you know, Ithink the Court’s intentions

are to keep the ball rolling, and our idea is to

have our feet to the fire . . . rather than having

them in the fire. I think what we have been

discussing, Your Honor, is possibly setting a

[Criminal Local Rule 11-1] settlement

conference prior to the Thanksgiving holiday.

Under the Northern District of California’s Criminal

Local Rule 11-1, titled “Voluntary Settlement Conference,”

the government and a criminal defendant “acting jointly” may

request that the district court refer the case to another judge

or magistrate judge to conduct a settlement conference. N.D.

Cal. Crim. R. 11-1(a). The “role of the settlement Judge is to

assist the parties in exploring a voluntary settlement in a

criminal case.”2 N.D. Cal. Crim. R. 11-1(c). The rule

1 Myers, who was living out of state at the time, waived appearing in

person at the November 5 hearing.

2 The district’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Local Rule 7-1 describes

the role of the judge presiding over the settlement conference. The rule

states:

In a settlement conference, a judicial officer, usually a

Magistrate Judge, facilitates the parties’ efforts to

negotiate a settlement. Some settlement Judges use

mediation techniques in the settlement conference to

improve communication among the parties, probe

barriers to settlement, and assist in formulating

resolutions. A settlement Judge might articulate views

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 7

expresslyprovides: “[a]nypartymayunilaterallywithdraw its

request for a settlement conference at any time.” N.D. Cal.

Crim. R. 11-1(d).

The government initially resisted Myers’s request for a

settlement conference. The prosecutor acknowledged that

Myers had made “good efforts in trying to resolve the matter

up until today,” but stated “the government’s ability to

resolve [the case without trial] would be rapidly diminishing”

given the approaching trial date. However, the government

ultimately agreed to Myers’s request and the district court

referred the matter to a magistrate judge to oversee the

settlement conference.

On December 14, 2012, the parties took part in a fivehour settlement conference with the magistrate judge, where

Myers agreed, among other things, to plead guilty to one

count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. A few weeks later,

Myers and the government entered into a written plea

agreement in which Myers agreed, among other things, to

“give up [his] right to appeal [his] conviction, the judgment,

and orders of the Court.”

The district court held a change of plea hearing in

February 2013. There, Myers acknowledged that he had

waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, and he

affirmed that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. 

Myers expressed satisfaction with the quality of his

representation and confirmed that he was pleading guilty

about the merits of the case or the relative strengths and

weaknesses of the parties’ legal positions.

N.D. Cal. ADR R. 7-1.

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8 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

because he was, in fact, guilty. The district court accepted

Myers’s guilty plea.

The district court sentenced Myers on October 15, 2013. 

The district court imposed a sentence of 18 months’

imprisonment, below the 24-month sentence recommended

by Probation.

II

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 prohibits “[t]he

court” from participating in plea discussions. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(c)(1). The Federal Rules broadly define “[c]ourt” to

“mean[] a federal judge performing functions authorized by

law,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(b)(2), a definition which expressly

includes “a magistrate judge” executing his or her legal duty,

Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(b)(3)(B). While Rule 11(c)(1) appears to

prohibit any form of judicial participation in the plea

bargaining process, our “court previously approved the

participation by a settlement judge in plea negotiations.” 

United States v. Scolari, 72 F.3d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1995); see

United States v. Torres, 999 F.2d 376, 377–78 (9th Cir. 1993)

(per curiam) (holding that no Rule 11 violation occurred

when “[t]he parties . . . hammered out their agreement with

the assistance of [a settlement judge]” in accordance with the

then-existing criminal case settlement procedures for the

Southern District of California). Torres and Scolari did not

address, much less resolve, the conflict between the plain

language of Rule 11(c)(1)—which categorically prohibits

“[t]he court” from participating in plea negotiations—and the

local rule’s allowance of judge-led criminal settlement

conferences. Rather, these decisions appear to distinguish

criminal settlement conferences from the scope of Rule

11(c)(1) on the basis that “the sentencing judge . . . did not

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 9

participate in any plea bargaining.” Scolari, 72 F.3d at 753

(emphasis added); see Torres, 999 F.2d at 378. The Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Davila, 133 S. Ct. at 2139, is

irreconcilable with this reasoning.

In Davila, the defendant, dissatisfied with his

court-appointed attorney, sent a letter to the district court

requesting that a new attorney be appointed to represent him. 

According to Davila, his lawyer advised him to plead guilty

and therefore “offered no defensive strategy.” 133 S. Ct. at

2143. The request for new counsel was referred to a

magistrate judge who, during an in camera hearing, made a

number of inappropriate comments urging Davila to plead

guilty and cooperate with the government.3Id. at 2143–44. 

Davila pled guilty about three months later. He then

appealed, arguing that the magistrate judge’s comments

 

3

 For example, the magistrate judge instructed Davila that “it might be

a good idea” to accept responsibility and plead guilty because “the

Government . . . [has] all of the marbles in this situation and they can file

that . . . motion for [a] downward departure . . . if they want to.” Davila,

133 S. Ct. at 2144. Davila’s Sentencing Guidelines range, the judge

informed him, would “probably [be] pretty bad because [Davila’s]

criminal history score would be so high.” Id. The magistrate judge

further suggested that Davila could reduce his sentencing exposure by

“cooperat[ing] with the Government in this or in other cases,” stating:

You’ve got to go [to the cross] and you’ve got to tell it

all, Brother, and convince that probation officer that

you are being as open and honest with him as you can

possibly be because then he will go to the [D]istrict

[J]udge and he will say, you know, that Davila guy,

he’s got a long criminal history but when we were in

there talking about this case he gave it all up so give

him the two-level, give him the three-level reduction.

Id. (alterations in original).

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10 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

violated Rule 11. Id. at 2144–45. The Eleventh Circuit

agreed and vacated Davila’s guilty plea consistent with the

circuit’s then-existing rule requiring automatic vacatur for

Rule 11(c)(1) violations. Id. at 2145.

The government conceded that the magistrate judge’s

comments violated Rule 11(c)(1). The Supreme Court

acknowledged the concession, stating: “there is no room for

doubt on that score. The Magistrate Judge’s repeated

exhortations to Davila to ‘tell it all’ in order to obtain a more

favorable sentence . . . were indeed beyond the pale.” Id. at

2148. Having resolved the question of error, the Court next

addressed the issue presented in Davila: whether “the

violation of Rule 11(c)(1) by the Magistrate Judge warranted

automatic vacatur of Davila’s guilty plea,” as the Eleventh

Circuit had ruled. Id. at 2143, 2148.

The Court determined that automatic vacatur was not an

appropriate remedy for a violation of Rule 11(c)(1). Id. at

2148. Rather, like all trial errors, Rule 11(c)(1) violations

should be reviewed under either Rule 52(a)’s harmless-error

standard or Rule 52(b)’s plain-error standard, “depending on

when the error was raised.” Id. at 2147, 2150. The Court

explained the harmless-error standard applies to preserved

errors, while “the ‘plain-error rule[]’ [is] applicable when a

defendant fails to object to the error in the trial court.” Id. at

2147. The Supreme Court remanded the case so that the

court of appeals could “reach[] [the] case-specific arguments

raised by the parties” in the first instance, including Davila’s

argument that the “extraordinary circumstances” of his case

warranted a departure from the general rule that the plainerror standard governs the review of unpreserved errors. Id.

at 2150.

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 11

Myers argues that Davila sets forth a bright-line rule that

magistrate judges cannot participate in plea negotiations

under Rule 11(c)(1), even where, as here, the defendant

facilitated judicial involvement by specifically requesting a

judge-led settlement conference. The government conceded

error during oral argument. Although we are not bound by

the government’s legal concession, see United States v. Daas,

198 F.3d 1167, 1178 n.14 (9th Cir. 1999), we agree that

Davila undercuts the analysis upon which our court relied in

Torres and Scolari. The factual circumstances in Davila are

quite distinct from those present in Myers’s case, but

Davila’s interpretation of Rule 11 is clear: “Rule 11(c)(1)’s

prohibition of judicial involvement in plea discussions”

extends to magistrate judges who are neither the sentencing

judge nor the judge presiding over the defendant’s criminal

case. 133 S. Ct. at 2146 (emphasis added). Given this

directive, we cannot ignore that the plain language of Rule

11(c)(1) compels the application of the rule to the

circumstances here. See United States v. Petri, 731 F.3d 833,

839 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Because the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, once effective, have the force and effect of law,

we apply traditional tools of statutory construction to

interpret them.” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

We observe that each decision of this court that has

expressly addressed the scope of Rule 11(c)(1) has similarly

concluded the Rule categorically bars judges from

participating in plea negotiations. See, e.g., United States v.

Kyle, 734 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We take this

opportunity to emphasize that Rule 11(c)(1) is intended to

eliminate all judicial pressure from plea discussions.”);

United States v. Gonzalez-Melchor, 648 F.3d 959, 964 (9th

Cir. 2011) (“We have explained previously that judicial

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12 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

participation in plea negotiations is prohibited[.]”); United

States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting

Rule 11(c)(1) creates a “‘bright-line rule’ . . . bar[ring] a

judge from participating in plea bargaining”); see also United

States v. Baker, 489 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(“[C]ourts have interpreted Rule 11 categorically to mean the

judge’s role is limited to acceptance or rejection of the plea

agreement after a thorough review of the relevant factors; the

judge should not participate in the plea bargaining process.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Benvin,

791 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2015). Consistent with these

decisions, we conclude that Rule 11(c)(1) extends to the

magistrate judge’s participation in the settlement conference

at issue here.

We note that this means Northern District of California

Local Criminal Rule 11-1(a) was and is in conflict with Rule

11(c)(1). The local rule allowed judicial participation only

after Myers himself requested it, see N.D. Cal. Crim. R.

11-1(a), and also permitted Myers to withdraw from the

settlement conference “at any time,” see N.D. Cal. Crim. R.

11-1(d). While these facts bear on whether Myers voluntarily

waived Rule 11(c)(1)—which we address later in this

opinion—these procedural protections do not ameliorate the

conflict between the local rule and Rule 11(c)(1)’s categorical

bar on judges participating in plea negotiations. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 57 (“A local rule must be consistent with . . . federal

statutes and rules . . . .”); United States v. Lopez-Cavasos,

915 F.2d 474, 477 (9th Cir. 1990).

III

The parties dispute whether Myers’s appeal waiver

precludes our consideration of the merits of his Rule 11

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 13

claim. Generally, “[a] defendant’s waiver of his appellate

rights is enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver

encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised, and

(2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” United

States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005),

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Castillo,

496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Myers

acknowledges that he waived his right to appeal his

conviction and sentence in his plea agreement, but he

contends the waiver does not preclude our consideration of

his Rule 11 claim. See United States v. Brizan, 709 F.3d 864,

866 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We decline to enforce an appeal waiver

. . . if the district court failed to comply with Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11[.]”). The government concedes that

an appeal waiver is generally not enforceable when the

district court violates Rule 11. However, the government

argues that Myers’s appeal waiver should be enforced

because Myers, by requesting the settlement conference,

invited the error and therefore waived his right to raise the

issue on appeal under the invited error doctrine.

“The doctrine of invited error prevents a defendant from

complaining of an error that was his own fault.” United

States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir.

1992). Under the doctrine, an error is “waived and therefore

unreviewable” when “the defendant has both [1] invited the

error, and [2] relinquished a known right.” United States v.

Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).

Here, with respect to Perez’s first inquiry, there is little

question Myers invited Rule 11 error. During the status

hearing on November 5, 2012, defense counsel requested the

settlement conference as a last-ditch effort to resolve the case

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14 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

before trial. In counsel’s words, Myers wanted “to have [his]

feet to the fire” in a settlement conference “rather than having

them in the fire” at trial. While the government was initially

inclined to proceed to trial, it ultimately agreed to participate

in the settlement conference. The government notified Myers

that its “ability to resolve [the case without trial] would be

rapidly diminishing,” and with this in mind, Myers

participated in the judge-led settlement conference the

following month. Myers could have withdrawn from the

settlement conference at any time, yet he participated in the

process knowing full well the government would take the

case to trial if he preferred that route. Under these

circumstances, we have no trouble concluding that Myers

invited the Rule 11 error.

Because of the limited record before us, the second

showing required under Perez—“whether [Myers]

intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right”—is

less clear. Perez, 116 F.3d at 845 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at

733). As our en banc decision in Perez clarified, the Supreme

Court’s decision in “Olano limits our application of the

invited error doctrine to those rights deemed waived, as

opposed to merely forfeited, that is, ‘known right[s]’ that

have been ‘intentional[ly] relinquish[ed] or abandon[ed].’” 

116 F.3d at 842 (alterations in original) (quoting Olano, 507

U.S. at 733). “Whether a particular right is waivable;

whether the defendant must participate personally in the

waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver;

and whether the defendant’s choice must be particularly

informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.” 

Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. Thus, to find that Myers waived

Rule 11(c)(1), we must find both that (1) a criminal defendant

can, in fact, waive Rule 11(c)(1), and (2) Myers knowingly

did so here.

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 15

As to the first inquiry, we hold that Rule 11(c)(1) is

waivable. In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Supreme Court

explained the provisions of “the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure . . . are presumptively waivable.” 513 U.S. 196,

201 (1995). Rule 11 is no exception. See, e.g., United States

v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012)

(defendant can waive right not to have the statements he

made during proffer discussions used against him (Rule

11(f)); United States v. Reyes, 313 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.

2002) (defendant can waive right to withdraw a plea under

Rule 11(c)(5) if the waiver is knowing and voluntary). We

see no reason to hold Rule 11(c)(1) to a higher standard,

particularly in light of Davila’s reasoning “that violation of

Rule 11(c)(1) is [not] necessarily an error graver than” any

other Rule 11 violation. Davila, 133 S. Ct. at 2148–49. We

therefore hold that Rule 11(c)(1) can be waived by the

defendant.

On this record, however, we cannot say that Myers

knowingly waived Rule 11(c)(1). United States v. Abarca,

985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that an

enforceable waiver requires “[a] knowing and voluntary

waiver of a statutory right”). We note that the best practice

for a waiver of Rule 11(c)(1) is for the government to obtain

either a written waiver from the defendant, see Orm Hieng,

679 F.3d at 1138, or for the district court to confirm the

defendant is both aware of and voluntarily waives Rule

11(c)(1)’s prohibition of judicial involvement in plea

negotiations, see, e.g., Reyes, 313 F.3d at 1158–59. Neither

occurred here.

The government nonetheless urges us to conclude that

Myers waived Rule 11(c)(1) because, the government

contends, “[b]y proposing a magistrate judge’s participation

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16 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

in settlement negotiations, Myers used the plea bargaining

process to obtain a favorable [. . .] agreement with the

government.” The government also points out that Myers

does not claim that his request for a settlement conference

was unintentional, or that it resulted from any kind of judicial

pressure. Rather, the government concludes, Myers waived

Rule 11(c)(1)’s protection “for his own tactical reasons,”

reasoning that Myers should not be allowed to “undo that

choice because he has doubts about it now.”

While the government’s arguments explain why Myers

requested the settlement conference, and the explanations

support a finding that Myers suffered no prejudice from the

alleged error, the government’s contentions do not establish

that Myers “intentionally relinquished . . . a known right.” 

Perez, 116 F.3d at 845 (emphasis added). Moreover, Myers

argues the Rule 11 error only came to light after Davila was

decided, which was after Myers had participated in the

settlement conference and pled guilty. Particularly given the

confusion that could have been created by the local rule, and

the then-lack of guidance from Davila, we cannot conclude

on this record that Myers knowingly waived Rule 11.

IV

Generally, “where, as here, the defendant failed to raise

the Rule 11 violation before the trial court,” we review the

alleged error under the plain-error standard. Kyle, 734 F.3d

at 962; United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76

(2004) (“Because the claim of Rule 11 error was not

preserved by timely objection, the plain-error standard of

Rule 52(b) applies.”). While we have recognized certain

exceptions to this general rule, see, e.g., Kyle, 734 F.3d at 962

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 17

(when a timely objection “was either unlikely or futile”),

none apply here.

Myers disagrees. He argues that because he only learned

of the Rule 11 violation after the Supreme Court decided

Davila on June 13, 2013—nearly six months after Myers’s

settlement conference took place—he was deprived of a

“meaningful opportunity to make a contemporaneous

objection” to the procedure. Myers also argues that an

objection to the settlement conference procedure would have

been futile since at the time he requested the procedure, it was

fully compliant with this Circuit’s law. Myers reasons that

the district court “would not have sustained any objection” to

the procedure because the court “clearly did not believe . . .

the settlement conference violated Rule 11(c)(1).”

These arguments are unavailing for a number of reasons. 

First, nothing in the record indicates that Myers’s

participation in the settlement conference was anything but

voluntary—a point Myers’s appellate counsel conceded

during oral argument. Myers requested the procedure and

could have thereafter “unilaterallywithdraw[n his]request for

a settlement conference at any time,” N.D. Cal. Crim. R. 11-

1(d), but he simply failed to do so. This failure supports

reviewing Myers’s alleged error under our plain-error

standard. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002)

(holding that “a silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the

plain-error rule”).

Moreover, the record establishes that Myers’s

participation in the settlement conference was a tactical

decision. Throughout the lengthy pretrial proceedings in this

case, Myers actively sought a plea agreement with the

government. The circumstances surroundingMyers’s request

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18 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

for a settlement conference suggest that he requested—and

participated in—a settlement conference to further this goal. 

Myers’s counsel requested the settlement conference four

months before the trial date only after the district court

inquired whether the parties wished to move up the trial date. 

Notably, during the same hearing, the government informed

the district court it would soon be preparing for trial and as a

result “the government’s ability to resolve [the case without

trial] would be rapidly diminishing.” Thus, Myers

participated in the settlement conference knowing that if the

parties failed to reach a plea deal, the case would likely

proceed to a jury trial on the ten counts charged in the

Indictment.

We reject Myers’s contention that the timing of the

Supreme Court’s decision in Davila meant that he never had

an opportunity to object to the settlement conference

procedure. Myers correctly points out that Davila was

decided six months after he requested the settlement

conference. He fails to note, however, that the Court filed its

Davila decision four months before his sentencing. During

that time, Myers could have moved to withdraw his guilty

plea on the basis of the error he now alleges. He chose not to,

presumably in hope that the district court would impose a

more lenient sentence.

Under these circumstances, we see no reasons to deviate

from our general rule that the plain-error standard governs the

review of unpreserved errors. See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 73

(noting that failure to review unpreserved errors under the

plain-error standard creates a perverse incentive for

defendants to “simply relax and wait to see if the sentence

later struck him [or her] as satisfactory”); see also United

States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Because

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 19

[defendant] neither objected to the judge’s involvement in

plea discussions, nor made an attempt to withdraw his guilty

plea, we consider his appellate argument under the rigorous

plain error standard.”).

V

“Plain error is ‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that

affect[s] substantial rights. . . . If all three conditions are met,

[we] may then exercise [our] discretion to notice a forfeited

error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Kyle,

734 F.3d at 963 (alterations in original) (quoting United

States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (internal citations

and quotations marks omitted)). Indeed, correcting an error

under “Rule 52(b) is permissive, not mandatory” and, as a

result, even “[i]f the forfeited error is ‘plain’ and ‘affect[s]

substantial rights,’ [we] ha[ve] authority to order correction,

but [are] not required to do so.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 735. We

decline the invitation here because Myers fails to establish

either that the alleged error affected his substantial rights or

that it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or reputation

of the judicial proceedings.

“[A] defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after

a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed

plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability

that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” 

Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83. To meet this standard,

Myers bears the burden to establish that, based on the totality

of the circumstances, “the probability of a different result is

‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the

proceeding.” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 694 (1984)). Myers cannot make this showing. As we

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20 UNITED STATES V. MYERS

discuss above, the Northern District’s settlement conference

procedure is not categorically impermissible: while the

procedure violates the plain letter of Rule 11(c)(1), the rule is

waivable at the defendant’s election. The record is devoid of

evidence that Myers’s participation in the settlement was

anything but voluntary, a point Myers’s appellate counsel

conceded during oral argument. Rather, the record indicates

that Myers wanted to avoid going to trial and participated in

the settlement conference to achieve this objective. 

Throughout the pretrial proceedings, Myers actively sought

to reach a plea deal with the government. Even though the

magistrate judge’s participation in the settlement conference

amounts to Rule 11(c)(1) error, the “error” did not cause

Myers to plead guilty; the settlement conference merely

facilitated that result. It resulted in Myers reaching a

favorable plea agreement with the government, avoiding trial,

and receiving a below-Guidelines sentence. Under these

circumstances, Myers has not established a reasonable

probability that he would not have pled guilty in the absence

of the alleged error, nor that he would not have participated

in the settlement conference had he been required to

expressly waive Rule 11(c)(1). See Dominguez Benitez,

542 U.S. at 83.

Moreover, even if Myers could establish that the alleged

error affected his substantial rights, we would not exercise

our discretion to correct the error because Myers’s voluntary

participation in the judge-led settlement conference that he

requested in no way “seriously affect[ed] the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” See

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1997)

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UNITED STATES V. MYERS 21

(“[E]ven assuming that the [alleged error] ‘affec[ted]

substantial rights,’ it does not meet the final requirement of”

the plain-error standard of review).

AFFIRMED.

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