Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00197/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00197-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gurpreet Singh Brar
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

JESSICA A. MASSEY

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

GURPREET SINGH BRAR,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00197-DAD-BAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

AND ORDER 

DATE: May 11, 2022

TIME: 1:00pm

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for status conference on May 11, 2022. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspended all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until further 

notice, and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters. Under General Order 618, a judge 

“may exercise his or her authority to continue matters, excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with 

reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 issued on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings 

to support the exclusion in the Judge’s discretion.” General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

In addition, any judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the 

discretion of that Judge or upon the request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of 

the Court to the extent such an order will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 

(E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and other General Orders were entered to address public health 

concerns related to COVID-19 (for example, General Order 614—recently extended by General Order 

649).

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Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofCase 1:20-cr-00197-KJM-BAM Document 30 Filed 04/29/22 Page 2 of 5
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justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 11, 2022. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until 

September 14, 2022, and to exclude time between May 11, 2022, and September 14, 2022, under 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case has 

been provided. The government is aware of its ongoing discovery obligations. 

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to confer with his client about a 

possible resolution, to review discovery, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c) The parties anticipate that they will be ready to select a trial date on or before the 

next status conference date on September 14, 2022.

d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

e) The government does not object to the continuance.

f) In addition to the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and 

declarations of judicial emergency, and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an 

ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in this case because counsel or other relevant individuals 

have been encouraged to telework and minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. 

It will be difficult to avoid personal contact should the hearing proceed.

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 11, 2022 to September 14, 

2022, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 28, 2022

PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

/s/ JESSICA A. MASSEY

JESSICA A. MASSEY

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: April 28, 2022

/s/ YAN SHRAYBERMAN

YAN SHRAYBERMAN

Counsel for Defendant 

GURPREET SINGH BRAR

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ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the status conference is continued from May 11, 2022, to September 

14, 2022, at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded pursuant to 

18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). The Court intends to set a trial date at the next status conference. If the 

parties do not resolve the case in advance of the next status conference, they shall be prepared to set a trial 

date at the status conference hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 29, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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