Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04042/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04042-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-4042

LARRY JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.

(1:07-cr-00153-RDB-1)

Argued: January 29, 2010

Decided: April 1, 2010

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and

R. Bryan HARWELL, United States District Judge for the

District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Harwell joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Sapna Mirchandani, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for

Appellant. Tonya Kelly Kowitz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

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STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United

States Attorney, Jonathan Biran, Assistant United States

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Larry Johnson appeals on Fourth Amendment grounds

from his conviction on various drug and firearm charges.

Police witnessed Johnson making what appeared to be a series

of hand-to-hand exchanges with multiple people in a known

open-air drug market. By this point, the facts known to the

officers were at least sufficient to support a "reasonable suspicion" that Johnson was dealing drugs, justifying a brief investigatory detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A

police officer then approached Johnson and ordered him to

show his hands. When Johnson responded by attempting in

front of the officer to toss a heroin gelcap out of sight, reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause to arrest. And

when police later learned that Johnson had been back and

forth to a nearby car just before the series of hand-to-hand

contacts, probable cause to arrest in turn ripened into probable

cause to search the car.

Johnson was not detained until police had a basis for a reasonable suspicion, he was not arrested until police had probable cause to arrest, and the car was not searched until police

had probable cause to search it. Since no Fourth Amendment

violation occurred at any point, we affirm the district court’s

rejection of Johnson’s motions to suppress evidence arising

out of these events. That court carefully examined the evidence, heard from the parties, and its considered conclusion

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warrants our respect. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534

U.S. 266, 276 (2002).

I.

On the evening of September 14, 2006, Baltimore City

Police Detective Eric Green was monitoring the 1800 block

of Pennsylvania Avenue in the city of Baltimore by video

camera from a police station about five minutes’ drive away.

The block is reputedly home to a brisk open-air drug trade.

Around 7 o’clock, Detective Green witnessed Johnson standing on the sidewalk of the street. He watched as Johnson, in

rapid succession, made quick hand-to-hand contact with three

different men, after which each of the three men immediately

hurried off. Although he could not see an actual object being

exchanged, it appeared to Green that something small was

being passed between them. Green, who had made thousands

of drug arrests based on observing hand-to-hand exchanges

during his career, concluded that Johnson was dealing drugs.

He immediately dispatched his partner, Officer Joseph Bannerman, and another officer to the scene.

While his colleagues were en route, Detective Green continued to monitor Johnson’s movements. He watched as Johnson milled about on the sidewalk, briefly turned down a side

street, and soon returned to the spot where the previous interactions had taken place. Green then saw two other people

enter the frame, whereupon Johnson headed for a local Chinese carry-out restaurant with the two others appearing to follow. Green suspected Johnson was about to sell them drugs,

since local dealers sometimes conduct their business in legitimate shops in order to elude police cameras.

Green alerted his colleagues that Johnson was taking the

suspected buyers into the Chinese carry-out. Johnson and one

of the suspected buyers entered the eatery as the police officers pulled up, but the second suspected buyer kept walking

up the street after spotting the approaching police. ImmediUNITED STATES v. JOHNSON 3

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ately upon arriving, Officer Bannerman entered the restaurant

and approached Johnson, identified himself as a police officer, and asked to see Johnson’s hands. Johnson, however, did

not comply, instead throwing what Bannerman correctly

believed to be a heroin gelcap over the restaurant counter. A

struggle ensued, but Bannerman eventually gained the upper

hand and Johnson was duly arrested and handcuffed. Bannerman recovered the gelcap and loaded Johnson into his patrol

car. Johnson was found to be carrying $102 in cash.

While this was taking place, Detective Green reviewed a

recording of the earlier surveillance video. In doing so, he

noticed something he had originally overlooked. The video

showed that just before the suspected drug deals, Johnson had

gone to a car parked along the street, opened the passenger

door, shut it, paced back and forth, reached back into the car

and emerged appearing to hold something in his hand. Concluding that Johnson was using the car to store drugs, Green

radioed to Officer Bannerman and instructed him to return to

the scene and secure the car.

Officer Bannerman arrived at the car and looked inside the

passenger side window. On the floor of the car, he saw a plastic bag containing baggies of gelcaps like the one Johnson had

thrown during their tussle. Bannerman also saw a set of keys

on the car seat. He relayed this information to Detective

Green, who told him to bring the car back to the police station. Bannerman then opened the car door and saw that in

addition to the gelcaps the plastic bag contained vials of what

he suspected to be cocaine. Officer Bannerman drove the car

back to the police station, whereupon Detective Green conducted a full search. He found fifty-six heroin gelcaps, thirtynine cocaine vials, a mirror and scale, both of which had what

appeared to be drug residue on them, a razor blade, and a

loaded Rossi .38 Special handgun.

In March 2007, Johnson was charged by a federal grand

jury with distribution and possession of cocaine and heroin

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with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841, possession of

a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18

U.S.C. § 924(c), and being a felon in possession of a firearm

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Prior to trial, Johnson filed two

motions to suppress evidence. The court held a hearing on the

issue, at which it viewed the surveillance footage and heard

testimony from Detective Green, Officer Bannerman, and the

officer who had accompanied Bannerman, as well as from

Johnson. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied

Johnson’s suppression motions. Following a three-day jury

trial, Johnson was convicted of all three charges and thereafter

sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals

from the denial of his suppression motions. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the two firearms

charges and raises a Sixth Amendment objection to a portion

of his sentence.

II.

At the suppression hearing, Detective Green explained that

Johnson’s conduct appeared to him like drug-dealing "based

on hundreds of observations in that area and hundreds of

arrests." Johnson contends that Detective Green’s experience

counts for little, if anything. He argues that although Green’s

background and experience "certainly affected his perception

of events, that experience simply could not transform Mr.

Johnson’s outwardly lawful behavior into a criminal offense."

Appellant’s Br. at 29.

Johnson’s insistence that Green’s training and experience

count for little runs headlong into the teachings of the

Supreme Court. As the Court has explained, "[a] trial judge

views the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive

features and events of the community; likewise, a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience

and expertise. The background facts provide a context for the

historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences that

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deserve deference." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,

699 (1996).

The Fourth Amendment requires such an approach. It is

more practical than theoretical. Both the language of the

Amendment, which prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures," and the decisions of the Court interpreting it are purposely imprecise. They reflect a preference for case-by-case

analysis, informed judgment, and an examination of the entire

factual picture over any "neat set of legal rules." Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).

The reason for this is plain enough. The task the police perform requires them to translate the law’s abstractions into

actual practice in the unpredictable circumstances of the

streets. This is at once a vital and a difficult mission. It is vital

because errors in either direction—toward excessive intrusion

or toward impotent enforcement—can be costly. It is difficult

because the contexts are varying and, quite often, the time for

deciding is short.

Getting the balance right is never guaranteed, but the

chances of doing so are improved if officers, through training,

knowledge, and experience in confronting criminality, are

uniquely capable both of recognizing its signatures, and by

the same token, of not reading suspicion into perfectly innocent and natural acts. In this way, experience leads not just to

proper action but to prudent restraint. "Reasonableness" is a

matter of probabilities, and probability in turn is best assessed

when one has encountered variations on a given scenario

many times before. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,

418 (1981).

Johnson simply fails to explain why the experience we

extol in other walks of life should suddenly be devalued in the

field of law enforcement. An experienced repairman may pick

up on a problem the rest of us might overlook. The same is

true of law enforcement officers, who may "draw on their

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own experience and specialized training to make inferences

from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person."

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (internal quotations omitted). The

Court’s insistence on this point has been nothing less than

overwhelming. See id.; Ornelas, 617 U.S. at 700; Minnesota

v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993); United States v.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989); United States v. Sharpe, 470

U.S. 675, 682 n.3 (1985); Cortez, 449 U.S. at 414, 421-22;

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2, (1979); United States v.

Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S., at 885 (1975); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

But while officers have the advantage of experience, they

do not necessarily have the advantage of neutrality, and that

is where district courts come in. Johnson, however, would discount their vantage point as well. At no point in his arguments

to reverse its rulings does Johnson recognize the advantages

of the district court’s ability to consider the evidence firsthand. The only time Johnson so much as acknowledges the

district court’s fact-finding efforts is when he attacks its conclusion that he was seen on video handing something to the

men with whom he made hand-to-hand contact. Johnson

claims the "key distinction" between touching hands and

exchanging an object "was lost on the district court"—as if

the district court after hearing the evidence was forbidden to

make a reasoned inference that something was being

exchanged. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.

This whole view essentially implies that the consideration

expended in suppression hearings counts for naught. The district court, which sat in the city of Baltimore, considered the

evidence fully. The suppression hearing it conducted spanned

two days, and the transcript of the proceedings runs to well

over 150 pages. The court heard from Johnson and the three

police officers involved in his arrest. Both Green and Bannerman were subjected to cross-examination and re-cross. When

Johnson questioned Bannerman’s credibility, the court specifUNITED STATES v. JOHNSON 7

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ically found that Bannerman was "perfectly credible" adding

that "there’s no doubt in my mind that this officer is truthful."

The court also viewed the surveillance video.

District courts offer an unbiased forum to test the conclusions of police, and they possess a perspective that appellate

forums cannot match. In examining evidence directly, those

courts assess inflections and demeanor, the human dimensions

and the practical demands in the situations before them. Here

too the Supreme Court has called attention to a "district

court’s superior access to the evidence and the wellrecognized inability of reviewing courts to reconstruct what

happened in the courtroom." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276; see also

Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699.

Thus the role of courts of appeal is comparatively circumscribed. While it is true we examine legal determinations by

district courts de novo, it is "a peculiar sort of de novo

review." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 278 (Scalia, J., concurring). We

must not only accept factual determinations unless they are

clearly in error, we must also "give due weight to inferences

drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law

enforcement officers"—an acknowledgement that satellite

imagery often cannot replicate community insights and onthe-ground intelligence. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699. Standards

of review are formulated not out of some abstract fondness for

legal terminology but to encapsulate insights about institutional vantage points. Courts of appeal have a comparative

advantage born of collegial deliberations over matters of law

while trial courts have a distinct edge when it comes to making context-sensitive judgments. The Fourth Amendment

often implicates the latter more than the former, and the standard of review that governs in these cases is accordingly

designed to ensure they are resolved concretely, not simply

abstractly.

Johnson’s invitation to reverse would move us in the wrong

direction. His case is quintessentially one in which the offi8 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

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cers involved and the district court that heard the evidence

were better positioned than we to consider the merits of his

claim. Does an officer’s long experience end the inquiry? Of

course not. But in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment

calculus, it matters. Do a district court’s superior eyes and

ears end the inquiry? Of course not. But in the Supreme

Court’s Fourth Amendment calculus, they matter. So we shall

keep them much in mind as we proceed.

III.

In the case before us, Johnson argues that he was unreasonably seized by Officer Bannerman and that the district court

should therefore have suppressed any evidence discovered as

a result of the seizure. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371

U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655

(1961). Specifically, Johnson objects to the district court’s

having allowed evidence concerning the gelcap he threw, the

cash found on his person, and the drugs, drug paraphernalia,

and handgun discovered in the car. We review these claims in

turn.

A.

We begin with the gelcap Johnson attempted to dispose of

when Officer Bannerman arrived. In Johnson’s view, he was

subjected to an unreasonable seizure when Bannerman

entered the Chinese restaurant and ordered him to show his

hands. This claim is mistaken.

Even assuming this initial encounter was a Fourth Amendment seizure, it was in no sense unreasonable. The Supreme

Court has identified two kinds of personal seizures: (1) brief

investigatory stops of the sort identified in Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968) and (2) arrests. See United States v. Brown, 401

F.3d 588, 592 (4th Cir. 2005). A so-called Terry stop allows

a police officer whose observations lead him to suspect that

a particular person has committed or is about to commit a

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crime to detain the person briefly in order to "investigate the

circumstances that provoke suspicion." Brignoni-Ponce, 422

U.S. at 881; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-

46 (1972). So long as a temporary detention is for this limited

purpose, it does not cross the line into a full-blown arrest. See

United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109 (4th Cir. 1995).

In this case, Officer Bannerman’s conduct was entirely consistent with simply trying to ascertain who Johnson was and

what he was doing. Prior to his formal arrest of Johnson,

therefore, Officer Bannerman can be said at most to have subjected Johnson to a Terry stop.

A Terry stop satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the

Fourth Amendment if there exists "a reasonable, articulable

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlow,

528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). This requires only "some objective

manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be,

engaged in criminal activity." Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. But the

officer’s suspicions must also be more than an "inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion or hunch." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

In this case, Officer Bannerman had an objective basis to

think that Johnson was selling drugs. Johnson’s conduct was

entirely consistent with drug dealing. He was observed making similar hand-to-hand contact with multiple people and

appeared to be waiting to meet them. The hasty, even furtive,

nature of this series of encounters was much in keeping with

an illicit handoff. Moreover, it is hard to imagine what else

Johnson could have been doing. The only innocent explanation Johnson offers is that he could have been greeting the

men he touched. But his conduct was hardly consistent with

a social interaction. The other men did not linger or engage

in conversation. They approached quickly and just as quickly

quit the scene.

These observations, however, are only the beginning. The

fact that this activity was taking place in a location well

known for street-side drug-dealing alters the landscape of rea10 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

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sonable inferences. The Supreme Court has held that the combination of presence in an area known for heavy narcotics

trafficking and unprovoked flight upon seeing police arrive

was enough to support a reasonable suspicion under Terry.

See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Here we have a stronger case

than that, for Johnson appeared to have been caught in the

very act of drug-dealing for which the area was renowned. On

top of that, one of the two suspected buyers who seemed to

be following Johnson into the Chinese restaurant veered off

at the sight of the police.

For all these reasons, Johnson’s suggestion that upholding

the denial of his suppression motions means that the police

will be permitted to detain any person who is seen touching

hands with someone else in a high crime area is well off the

mark. There is nothing to suggest that the series of contacts

in question were in any way social and much to suggest that

they were instances of illegal drug dealing. Where there is a

plausible claim to be made that a suspect has been caught in

flagrante delicto, Terry standards are most often satisfied.

Since Officer Bannerman did not violate Johnson’s Fourth

Amendment rights by requiring him to open his hands in the

brief period before he attempted to arrest Johnson, evidence

concerning the gelcap that Johnson threw during that period

was not subject to suppression.

B.

Next, we consider the money found on Johnson’s person.

This evidence was obtained as a result of Johnson’s being

placed under arrest. Because we conclude that the arrest did

not violate the Fourth Amendment, the district court was

again correct in rejecting Johnson’s suppression claim.

Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless arrest is an

unreasonable seizure unless there is probable cause to believe

that a criminal offense has been or is being committed. See

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-424 (1976);

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Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949). The

standard for whether probable cause exists is an objective

one; it exists when, "at the time the arrest occurs, the facts and

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge would warrant

the belief of a prudent person that the arrestee had committed

or was committing an offense." United States v. Manbeck,

744 F.2d 360, 376 (4th Cir. 1984).

Johnson argues against a finding of probable cause, urging

that much of his conduct could be seen as innocent. But as

with the "reasonable suspicion" standard under Terry, "innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing

of probable cause." Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13. And as we

noted earlier, "a police officer may draw inferences based on

his own experience in deciding whether probable cause

exists," Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700, including inferences "that

might well elude an untrained person," Cortez, 449 U.S. at

418.*

At any rate, assuming arguendo that probable cause to

arrest did not already exist when Bannerman entered the Chinese restaurant, it certainly did by the time Bannerman actually attempted to arrest Johnson. The reasonable suspicion

that would have supported an investigatory stop progressed to

probable cause to arrest when Johnson reacted to Officer Ban-

*Johnson cites a handful of cases in which probable cause to arrest may

have been lacking, but none of them presents the kind of circumstance we

confront here, where a suspect is observed in the course of affirmatively

committing a criminal act, as opposed to other behavior incriminating only

by inference, such as flight. See United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663

(D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Wilson, 2 F.3d 226 (7th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Embry, 546 F.2d 552 (3d Cir. 1976). The two cases from

this circuit Johnson cites are likewise inapposite. The only holding in

United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802 (4th Cir. 2004) was that police could

use evidence obtained from a Terry stop. United States v. Sprinkle, 106

F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 1997), meanwhile, held that the Terry standard was not

met where a police officer "could actually see that nothing of a criminal

nature was happening" at the moment he observed the defendant. Id. at

618. In this case, the officer actually observed the opposite. 

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nerman’s commands by flinging what Bannerman believed to

be a heroin gelcap over the restaurant counter. While Bannerman was entitled to conclude that the gelcap contained drugs

simply from its appearance, the fact that Johnson attempted to

discard it precisely when the police appeared provided even

more reason to believe that Johnson had been caught redhanded. Once Johnson was observed in possession of illegal

drugs, the officers certainly had probable cause to believe that

the already suspicious series of hand-to-hand contacts were

exactly what police suspected them of being. Accordingly,

since the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the

district court was correct in allowing evidence obtained as a

result.

C.

Finally, Johnson challenges the district court’s refusal to

suppress evidence concerning the drugs, drug paraphernalia,

and handgun discovered in the car. Once again, we find no

error.

Officers may search a readily mobile automobile if they

have probable cause to believe that their search will uncover

contraband. See United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589-91

(4th Cir. 2010). Here there was ample basis for probable

cause. Officer Bannerman had probable cause to believe that

Johnson had been engaging in drug crimes by the time he

reached the car. Since Johnson was seen on video going to the

car just before the hand-to-hand encounters that were at the

heart of the probable cause to arrest, Bannerman in turn had

probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of those

activities. This was all the more so since when Bannerman

looked into the car’s window, an act that in no way violated

the Fourth Amendment, he saw gelcaps in plain view like the

one he had recovered from Johnson. See Brown, 460 U.S. at

740; United States v. Taylor, 90 F.3d 903, 909 n.4 (4th Cir.

1996).

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IV.

In addition to his Fourth Amendment claims, Johnson challenges aspects of his conviction on two other grounds. First,

Johnson argues his convictions on the two counts relating to

possession of a firearm were not supported by sufficient evidence. Because a sufficiency claim must fail "if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Government, to support" the jury’s verdict, United States v.

Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 390 (4th Cir. 2005), we reject Johnson’s claim. In light of our discussion of the more than ample

reasons for the search of the car, we find no merit to Johnson’s suggestion that there was insufficient evidence for the

jury to conclude that he possessed the items found within it.

Finally, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), Johnson also raises a Sixth Amendment challenge to

his sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the

Armed Career Criminal Act. But since, as he acknowledges,

we have already rejected the very argument he makes, see

United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2005),

this claim too must fail.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is hereby

AFFIRMED

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