Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07041/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07041-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Appellee
John Stanton
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 2, 1997 Decided October 17, 1997

No. 96-7041

JOHN STANTON,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv01952)

John Stanton, appearing pro se, argued the cause and filed 

the briefs for appellant.

Richard M. Wyner argued the cause for appellee. With 

him on the brief were Jo Anne Robinson, Interim Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel.

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Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: This case is the latest episode in 

a serial dispute between appellant John Stanton and the 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals ("DCCA"). Having 

been suspended from the bar under rules that did not automatically restore him on the lapse of his suspension, Stanton 

has thrice petitioned the DCCA for reinstatement. While the 

third petition was pending with that court, he filed suit in 

federal court posing constitutional challenges both to the 

substantive provisions of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct (with which an applicant for reinstatement must be 

ready to comply in order to show fitness to practice), and to 

the procedures governing reinstatement.

The district court dismissed the claim on grounds of abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971), 

because of the pending proceeding in the D.C. judicial system. But the Younger abstention has now been mooted by 

the end of that proceeding, In re Stanton, 682 A.2d 655 (D.C. 

1996), cert. den., 66 U.S.L.W. 3221-22 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1997) (No. 

96-1947). So we would ordinarily vacate the district court's 

abstention disposition and remand the case. See Wood v. 

Several Unknown Metropolitan Police Officers, 835 F.2d 340, 

342-44 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Before doing so, however, we first 

inquire whether there are alternate grounds for affirming the 

dismissal. Id. at 343 (evaluating res judicata effect of concluded D.C. proceeding on appeal from Younger abstention). 

Cf. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (holding 

that "if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, 

although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave 

a wrong reason"). Here the DCCA argues that we should 

affirm either because the district court lacked jurisdiction by 

virtue of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's proscription of inferior federal court review of state judgments, or because 

Stanton's claims were barred by issue or claim preclusion. 

We find that Rooker-Feldman is indeed fatal to Stanton's 

substantive claim, but that neither it nor any preclusion 

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doctrine disposes of the procedural claims. Accordingly we 

affirm in part and reverse in part.

* * *

On November 30, 1983 the DCCA issued two orders suspending Stanton from the practice of law. In both cases it 

found Stanton guilty of "neglect of a legal matter entrusted to 

him," in violation of then-applicable Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 

6-101(A)(3), and "intentional failure to seek a client's lawful 

objectives," in violation of DR 7-101(A)(1). The DCCA ordered concurrent suspensions of a year and a day, In re 

Stanton, 470 A.2d 272 (D.C. 1983) ("Stanton I"), and of 60 

days, In re Stanton, 470 A.2d 281 (D.C. 1983) ("Stanton II"). 

The details of the incidents leading to the suspensions are set 

out in the reports of the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, published with the suspension orders. The deficiencies recounted include failure to seek bond reviews at the 

request of clients (evidently extending the clients' pre-trial 

time in jail), failure to talk with clients about their cases, 

failure to investigate clients' cases, and finally, failure to 

assist clients who wished to plead guilty in their efforts to do 

so. The extra day of Stanton's year-and-a-day suspension is 

critical. Under rules then prevailing and continuing to govern attorneys suspended at that time, attorneys suspended 

for more than one year are not automatically restored to the 

bar on the lapse of their suspensions, but are required to file 

a petition for reinstatement; if denied reinstatement they 

may file their next petition no sooner than a year after the 

denial.1 Stanton's reinstatement petitions having been uniformly denied, see In re Stanton, 532 A.2d 95 (D.C. 1987) 

("Stanton III"); In re Stanton, 589 A.2d 425 (D.C. 1991) 

("Stanton IV"); In re Stanton, 682 A.2d 655 (D.C. 1996) 

("Stanton V"), he remains under suspension.

__________

1 Current D.C. Bar Rule XI § 16(c) provides that reinstatement 

of attorneys suspended for more than one year prior to September 

1, 1989 is governed by the requirements in effect at the time of the 

suspension. Accordingly, Stanton's case is governed by Rule XI 

§ 21 of the prior rules.

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Since the original year-and-a-day suspension, Stanton has 

filed many actions in local and federal courts, all so far 

unavailing. In the present case, he asserts three claims. 

First, he argues that certain of D.C.'s Rules of Professional 

Conduct, successors of the rules he was originally found to 

have violated, deprive D.C. bar members of rights of free 

expression protected by the First Amendment. He specifically attacks Rule 1.2(a), insofar as it requires that in "a criminal 

case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after 

consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered," and 

Rule 1.3(a), which requires that a "lawyer shall represent a 

client zealously and diligently within the bounds of the law." 

As we shall see, these claims appear to be comprehensibleif 

at allonly in the context of Stanton's personal quarrel with 

the DCCA over the lawyer's role in the plea process.

In the procedural counts of his complaint, Stanton claims 

that the composition and procedures of the D.C. Board on 

Professional Responsibility violate the due process clause. 

(Stanton does not say, but he presumably means the due 

process clause of the Fifth Amendment, as it is that which 

applies to D.C.) On all three claims Stanton seeks declaratory relief.

* * *

Because it is jurisdictional, we first consider the RookerFeldman doctrine, set forth in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine is 

drawn from 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which channels directly to the 

Supreme Court all federal review of judicial decisions of state 

(and D.C.) courts of last resort. By making clear that the 

inferior federal courts lack jurisdiction over such decisions, 

Rooker-Feldman ensures that the Court's appellate jurisdiction is exclusive. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482. That 

Stanton's now-completed third reinstatement proceeding was 

judicial in nature is clear and undisputed. See, e.g., Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 

1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see generally Feldman, 460 U.S. at 

476-81.

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In promulgating rather than applying bar rules, however, 

the DCCA acts in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity. 

Accordingly, a district court confronted with a simple challenge to the validity of such rules "is not reviewing a statecourt judicial decision" and thus has subject matter jurisdiction. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. Applying Rooker-Feldman

requires us to draw a line between permissible general challenges to rules and impermissible attempts to review judgments. And Feldman also tells us that even a constitutional 

claim pled as a general attack may be so "inextricably intertwined" with a state court decision that "the district court is 

in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision." Id. at 483-84 n.16; see also id. at 486-87.

How to detect the fatal "intertwining"? In Feldman itself 

plaintiffs attacked both a general rule of the DCCA and the 

refusal of that court to grant plaintiffs a waiver. The Court 

found the attack on the rule independent enough, noting that 

the rule did not even contemplate the waiver procedure that 

plaintiffs claimed had been applied unevenly. Id. at 487-88 & 

n.18. Thus, as we said in Richardson, "the core of plaintiffs' 

generalized challenge was independent of the specific decision 

to deny a waiver." 83 F.3d at 1515 (emphasis added). Cf. 

Levin v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of 

the Supreme Court of Ill., 74 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 1996) 

(distinguishing "between plaintiffs who claim their injuries 

are directly attributable to an erroneous state court decision 

and plaintiffs who claim injury independent of any state court 

judgment"); see also GASH Associates v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993); David P. Currie, "Res 

Judicata: The Neglected Defense," 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 

324-25 (1977).

None of Stanton's three claims lends itself to easy classification. The First Amendment count's assertion that Rules 

1.2(a) and 1.3(a) "restrict and curtail expression and practice 

of the dissident," Complaint ¶ 22, seems to pose a general 

challenge. And Stanton's request for a declaration that the 

rules are "in violation of the federal right to freedom of 

expression," id. p. 6, bespeaks a claim independent of his 

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personal situation. Cf. Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1429 

(3rd Cir. 1989) (noting plaintiff's quest for declaratory relief as 

well as generalized character of the injunction sought). But 

the Complaint stresses that the Board on Professional Responsibilitywhich initially handles petitions for reinstatement and forwards its findings and recommendations to the 

DCCAwas at the time of Stanton's federal complaint recommending denial of reinstatement "because of [plaintiff's] 

strongly-held philosophical opinions and beliefs regarding 

guilty pleas in criminal prosecutions." Complaint ¶ 21. Stanton's "belief," which he thinks these rules unconstitutionally 

trammel, appears to be that a lawyer's advocacy of a guilty 

plea somehow denies the accused his rights "to freedom from 

involuntary self-incrimination and to assistance of counsel." 

Id. The only intelligible reading of Stanton's complaint is as 

a claim that the Board's negative recommendation grew out 

of the challenged rules. (The Board's findings and recommendations have not been filed in this case.) Partly because 

Stanton's pleading and briefing leave us somewhat baffled at 

how any facial First Amendment attack on the two rules 

might be framed, we conclude that there is no substance to 

Stanton's First Amendment claim other than his challenge to 

the DCCA's application of the disciplinary rules in his case. 

Thus the "core" of the claim cannot be considered independent of the DCCA's adoption of the Board's specific recommendation. See Stanton V, 682 A.2d at 656-68; see also 

Richardson, 83 F.3d at 1515. Because the First Amendment 

claim is inextricably intertwined with that judgment, we hold 

that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 

this count of the complaint and affirm its dismissal.

Stanton's articulation of his procedural theories is also 

multidirectional. On the one hand he notes that the DCCA 

has processed his reinstatement petitions under what he says 

are defective procedures, Complaint ¶ 6, and he devotes a 

good deal of energy to claiming that the operations of the 

Board, presumably as manifested in its proceedings on his 

many petitions, violate D.C. law (evidently believing, contrary 

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to any number of cases,2that a state's violation of its own 

procedures is ipso facto a violation of the federal Constitution), Complaint WW 10-14. But on the other hand much of his 

complaint is framed in very general terms, attacking the 

absence of notice to the public in the process of appointing 

Board members, id. ¶ 9, and challenging what he characterizes as the unduly "limited review" powers of the DCCA over 

the Board, id. ¶ 18. These contentions seem perfectly able to 

stand on their own feet, as would any facial challenge to 

agency rules brought under the relatively relaxed ripeness 

requirements of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 

(1967). Because a discernible core of these claims stands 

independent of the DCCA's past rulings on Stanton's efforts 

at reinstatement, we believe that Rooker-Feldman does not 

deprive the district court of jurisdiction over them.

* * *

We now turn to the DCCA's arguments that the judgments 

in those proceedings bar the current challenges, either on the 

ground that Stanton raised them and lost on the merits (issue 

preclusion), or on the ground that they were part of his 

earlier claims, so that he is barred for failure to raise them 

then (claim preclusion). At the outset Stanton objects that 

the DCCA did not plead res judicata before the trial court 

and hence cannot do so before us. Res judicata is an 

affirmative defense that may be lost if not pleaded in the 

answer; it may not ordinarily be asserted for the first time 

on appeal. See Poulin v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 865, 869 (D.C. Cir. 

1987); Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c).

This case, however, comes to us following the DCCA's 

successful pre-answer motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) 

and 12(b)(6); no answer has yet been filed. Cf. Harris v. 

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 96-5091 (D.C. Cir. 

Oct. 10, 1997) (where answer had been filed without raising a 

Rule 8(c) defense, the defendant could not raise it without 

securing leave to amend answer). It is true, of course, that 

__________

2 See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991); Brandon v. 

District of Columbia Board of Parole, 823 F.2d 644, 649 (D.C. Cir. 

1987); see also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944).

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courts have allowed parties to assert res judicata by dispositive motions under these rules. See, e.g., Westwood Chemical Co., Inc. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1981) 

(citing cases); Riddle v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,

869 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.D.C. 1994) (granting motion to dismiss 

on res judicata grounds); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 599 

F. Supp. 839, 850 (D.D.C. 1984) (granting 12(b)(6) motion on 

res judicata grounds). Thus the DCCA did have an opportunity to make this argument below. Yet if a party that fails to 

assert res judicata in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is sleeping on its 

rights, it is an inconsequential catnap; we know of no case in 

which a court has prevented a party from pleading res 

judicata in its answer simply because it failed to do so in an 

earlier motion to dismiss. Cf. English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 

1090 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that failure to raise qualified 

immunity defense in pre-answer motion does not waive right 

to assert it on post-answer motion). (Indeed, had the DCCA 

asserted res judicata in its motions, the District Court, correctly resolving jurisdictional questions first, would not have 

been able to reach the issue.) If prevented from making its 

res judicata arguments to us on this appeal, the DCCA could 

simply present them in its answer on remand.

We can conceive of no reason for such judicial volleyball. 

Stanton, who argues the question of res judicata forcefully in 

his reply brief, Reply Br. at 6-9, suggests no way in which 

our resolution of the issue on appeal would prejudice him. 

And while res judicata exists in part to shield parties from 

duplicative and vexatious litigation, the interests that courts 

protect are also often their ownor, more precisely, those of 

society. " 'Courts today are having difficulty giving a litigant 

one day in court. To allow that litigant a second day is a 

luxury that cannot be afforded.' " National Treasury Employees Union v. I.R.S., 765 F.2d 1174, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 

(quoting C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 678 (4th ed. 1983)).

As res judicata belongs to courts as well as to litigants, 

even a party's forfeiture of the right to assert itwhich has 

not happened here because the defendant remains free to file 

an answerdoes not destroy a court's ability to consider the 

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issue sua sponte. See Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 

1297 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Henderson, J., concurring); cf. Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1068 (8th Cir. 1997) 

(appellate court may raise res judicata sua sponte to affirm 

district court); Russell v. SunAmerica Securities, Inc., 962 

F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). In the circumstances 

of this case, where there is no prejudice to the plaintiff, no 

forfeiture has yet occurred, the relevant facts stand uncontroverted in the record before us, and denial would only engender delay, we are willing to consider the defense for the first 

time on appeal.

We give judgments of other courts the same preclusive 

effect as would the issuing courtin this case, the D.C. Court 

of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873, 877 (1996). The DCCA 

(as litigant before us) suggests that in its adjudication of 

Stanton's reinstatement petitions, it has already declared his 

current constitutional claims barred by res judicata. The 

decisions do not in fact do so.

The DCCA has considered and rejected three of Stanton's 

reinstatement petitions. See Stanton III; Stanton IV; Stanton V. In the first and third of these, Stanton raised constitutional arguments that the court refused to consider on res 

judicata grounds. See Stanton III, 532 A.2d at 96; Stanton 

V, 682 A.2d at 656 n.4. But, although the petitions were for 

reinstatement, the challenges that the DCCA barred under 

res judicata were ones directed at the original suspension

proceeding, proposing by way of relief that the suspension 

order be vacated or rescinded. And each was held precluded 

by Stanton's failure to raise it as a defense at his suspension 

hearing. The claims now before us, by contrast, are directed 

at general aspects of the reinstatement proceedings and seek 

only prospective relief. The DCCA has not considered them. 

We thus conduct our own inquiry into whether D.C. res 

judicata principles preclude them.

First, we note that because the D.C. courts have never 

considered Stanton's due process claims on the merits, there 

is no possibility that issue preclusion would bar them. Issues 

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may be deemed identical even though their factual contexts 

and underlying claims differ. See Restatement (Second) of 

Judgments § 27 comment c (1982) (factors suggesting identity of issues include overlap between evidence and argument 

to be advanced, application of same rule of law, and relation 

between claims involved). Thus Stanton's current attacks on 

the reinstatement procedures could involve the same issues as 

his earlier attacks on the suspension procedures. But the 

decisions in Stanton III and Stanton V rejected the challenges because of Stanton's failure to raise them in the 

suspension proceedings, not because of any prior merits 

rejectioni.e., applying claim preclusion, not issue preclusion. 

Thus, assuming that there was sufficient identity in principle 

between Stanton's due process attacks on D.C.'s suspension 

procedure and those on its reinstatement procedure for issue 

preclusion to be even conceivable, the lack of merits consideration defeats any application of issue preclusion.

The general principle of claim preclusion is that a final, 

valid judgment on the merits precludes any further litigation 

between the same parties on the same cause of action.3

Jurisdictions differ as to its reach largely because they start 

from different understandings of the scope of a "cause of 

action." The District of Columbia, like the majority of jurisdictions, has adopted the Second Restatement's "transactional" approach under which a " 'cause of action,' for purposes of 

claim preclusion, comprises 'all rights of the plaintiff to 

remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part 

of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of 

which the action arose.' " Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 

613 (D.C. 1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 

§ 24(1) (1982)). "What factual grouping constitutes a 'transaction' and what groupings constitute a 'series,' " the Restatement continues, "are to be determined pragmatically," considering "whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or 

motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and 

whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' 

__________

3

"Cause of action" and "claim" alternate throughout the caselaw. 

We use them interchangeably, following the cases discussed.

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expectations or business understanding or usage." Id. at 

§ 24(2).

Admonitions to pragmatism do not decide cases, and this 

standard is obviously far from self-explanatory. Nor have 

the D.C. courts specifically articulated how they would treat a 

plaintiff's general prospective challenge to procedural rules 

that governed prior proceedings in which the plaintiff could 

have raised identical points. We thus look for guidance to 

broader principles of claim preclusion, and here the federal 

courts are instructive.4

Federal law is clear that post-judgment events give rise to 

new claims, so that claim preclusion is no bar. Thus, if the 

plaintiff alleges a combination in restraint of trade, a new 

cause of action accrues each time it operates against him, and 

previous judgments do not bar repeated challenges. Lawlor 

v. Nat'l Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1955) 

(1943 judgment against plaintiff's antitrust claims does not 

bar claims for identical conduct occurring thereafter). See 

also Cellar Door Productions, Inc. v. Kay, 897 F.2d 1375, 

1377-78 (6th Cir. 1990); Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 

820 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But see Peugeot Motors of America, 

Inc. v. Eastern Auto Distributors, Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359 (4th

Cir. 1989) (holding that continued application of policies challenged in prior litigation does not create new cause of action).

Similarly, each successive enforcement of a statutesuch 

as each year a taxpayer is subjected to a taxcreates a new 

cause of action. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-

__________

4 The D.C. law of claim preclusion does not differ significantly 

from the federal. D.C. courts articulating the doctrine commonly 

cite federal cases applying federal law. See, e.g., Smith v. Jenkins,

562 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C. 1989) (quoting Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen 

Service, 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955)); Stutsman v. Kaiser Foundation 

Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, 546 A.2d 367, 370 (D.C. 

1988) (citing Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 

1984)). We have said that "we can discern no material differences 

in the District of Columbia's law of res judicata and the federal 

common law of res judicata." U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Blake Construction Co., 765 F.2d 195, 204 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

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99 (1948). And a number of cases hold that a criminal 

conviction under a statute leaves the defendant free not only 

to invoke new constitutional defenses against the statute in a 

subsequent criminal case but also to initiate an action seeking 

declaratory or injunctive relief against future applications of 

the statute. See Brown v. Scott, 462 F. Supp. 518, 520 (N.D. 

Ill. 1978) (holding that guilty plea will not prevent defendant 

from asserting statute's unconstitutionality in suit for declaratory judgment on future prosecutions, and noting that the 

plea would not bar the defense in a trial for a later violation), 

rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub 

nom. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Mustfov v. 

Superintendent of Chicago Police Dep't, 733 

F. Supp. 283, 292 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Maynard v. Wooley, 406 

F. Supp. 1381, 1385 n.6 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); cf. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 710 

(distinguishing between suits requesting prospective and retrospective relief under Younger doctrine).

In civil litigation, too, parties may raise new issues in 

actions seeking to alter the playing field for future litigation, 

despite failure to raise them in past retrospective lawsuits. 

Thus in Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 

86 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit held that claim preclusion did not bar a suit for a declaration that a New York 

statute was unconstitutional, where plaintiff had previously 

been held liable under the statute and could have raised 

unconstitutionality as a defense. Cf. Family Division Trial 

Lawyers of the Superior Court-D.C., Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 

F.2d 695, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (observing that "we might 

hesitate" to apply claim preclusion to constitutional attacks 

that a party "could have brought but did not" in litigation 

over past transactions).

Given these precedents, Stanton's participation in prior 

proceedings in which facial challenges could have been raised 

does not prevent him from raising those challenges now, so 

long as they concern post-judgment events. And in fact they 

do: the procedures that he assails will govern future petitions 

for reinstatement. To put the conclusion into the standard 

"cause of action" language: Litigation of the validity of one 

past course of conduct is not the same "claim" as either (1) 

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litigation over the validity of similar conduct occurring after 

the acts covered by the initial litigation (see Lawlor, 349 U.S. 

at 327-38; Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 597-600); or (2) litigation 

challenging a rule in anticipation of its possible application to 

similar events occurring or expected to occur after the earlier 

lawsuit (see Interoceanica, 107 F.3d at 90-91; Maynard, 406 

F. Supp. at 1385 n.6; Brown, 462 F. Supp. at 520).

We needn't consider here whether claim preclusion ever 

permits two successive facial attacks on a statute. In characterizing the enactment of an ordinance as the "transaction" 

giving rise to a facial challenge, one court has concluded that 

at least the normal result would be a bar. J.B.K., Inc. v. City 

of Kansas City, 641 F. Supp. 893, 900 (W.D. Mo. 1986). 

Assuming the correctness of that view, it may seem anomalous that a party litigating successive applications should be 

afforded greater leeway to discover new theories as time and 

circumstances march on. One answer might be that a party 

raising a facial challenge has enjoyed exceptional freedom to 

select the time (and perhaps forum) of litigation, and should 

reasonably be viewed as seeking a judgment on all future 

applications, except as future facts may vary. By contrast, 

one should perhaps be free to litigate a specific denial without 

the lawsuit's acquiring such an omnivorous (and costly) character. Of course a party who falsely packaged successive 

facial attacks in successive retrospective litigations would run 

the risk of the court's penetrating his cover. Here, however, 

we have the standard case of an initial facial attack following 

prior retrospective litigation, since the portions of Stanton's 

complaint that survive Rooker-Feldman are necessarily free 

of particularized and retrospective elements drawn from his 

special circumstances.

We find that neither Rooker-Feldman nor claim preclusion 

bars Stanton's due process claims. Accordingly, while we 

affirm the district court's dismissal of the First Amendment 

claim, on Rooker-Feldman rather than Younger grounds, we 

reverse the judgment regarding Stanton's procedural claims 

and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

So ordered.

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