Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00584/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00584-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Michelle Hodge
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Michelle Hodge, by her attorneys, Dellert Baird Law Offices, PLLC, seeks 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 

denying her application for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social 

Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) (the “Act”). The matter is currently before the Court on the 

parties’ cross-briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sandra M. 

Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge. Following a review of the complete record and 

applicable law, this Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based on proper legal standards. 

I. Background

A. Procedural History

On February 26, 2011, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff alleged 

an onset of disability date of November 18, 2009. The Commissioner initially denied the claims on 

August 24, 2011, and upon reconsideration again denied the claims on February 6, 2012. On May 

MICHELLE HODGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-584-SMS 

ORDER AFFIRMING AGENCY’S 

DENIAL OF BENEFITS AND ORDERING 

JUDGMENT FOR COMMISSIONER

(Docs. 17, 20)

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20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing.

On September 4, 2012, and represented by counsel, Plaintiff appeared and testified at a

hearing presided over by Daniel Heely, Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”). See 20 C.F.R. 

404.929 et seq. An impartial vocational expert, David M. Dettmer (“the VE”), also appeared and 

testified. 

On September 26, 2012, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. The Appeals Council 

denied review on February 25, 2014. The ALJ’s decision thus became the Commissioner’s final 

decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). On April 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking this 

Court’s review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was thirty-seven years old. She had graduated high 

school and could communicate in English. She lived with her spouse, who did not work due to 

disability, in Oakdale, California. Plaintiff worked for three years as a housekeeper, but she quit 

because of mental problems.

Plaintiff testified that going out and dealing with people made her nervous or upset. She 

was being seen by a doctor and took medications according to the doctor’s orders. One of the 

medications had a negative side effect of seeing spots so she stopped taking it and began taking 

something else. At the time of the hearing she did not have negative side effects from medication. 

She did not receive one-on-one counseling from a psychiatrist because her insurance, Medi-Cal, 

did not provide it. She desired regular mental health appointments, and would “absolutely” go if 

she had insurance that covered them. 

In addition, Plaintiff had severe herniated discs which caused lower back pain, but did not 

need surgery. She had tried to lose weight to alleviate the pain. At one point she lost 130 pounds. 

She was a smoker for fifteen years but quit about two weeks before the hearing.

Plaintiff testified that on a normal day she might do light housework, but she had trouble 

with completing tasks such as cooking and laundry. She would also watch TV for about three or 

four hours. She did not drive because she did not have a license and did not take public 

transportation. She relied on her husband for transportation. Plaintiff did not use a computer or go 

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on the internet. She also visited her mother about once a month. Her mother would pick her up and

take her to her home in Turlock, California, where they would read the Bible and watch TV. 

Plaintiff testified that she had problems keeping a schedule and remembering her appointments. 

C. Relevant Medical Record

Oak Valley Hospital District

Plaintiff’s medical records reveal ongoing treatment at Oak Valley Hospital District for 

back and shoulder pain, for which she received medication, as well as irregular periods, and dental 

pain. However, because her physical impairments are not at issue on this appeal, they will not be 

summarized here. 

Plaintiff did not receive any one-on-one counseling for mental impairments. She did not

see a psychiatrist and it is not clear which. Her records show that she had been prescribed Xanax 

and Lexapro also from Oak Valley Hospital District, with notes indicating depression-bipolar and 

anxiety. 

Medical records from April and July 2009 do not mention mental impairments. In 

November 2009 Plaintiff was prescribed Xanax. She had been off psychiatric medication for about 

four years and had been cutting herself. Wellbutrin and Prozac had not been effective previously. 

She felt anxious about her marriage. A few weeks later she was doing well on Xanax and was 

prescribed Zoloft. The medical notes indicate that she had been to the Stanislaus Behavioral 

Center. In January 2010 she stopped Zoloft because of negative side effects and was prescribed 

Lexapro. She had been cutting. In June 2010, Plaintiff had stopped Lexapro because it did not 

help, but she continued with Xanax which helped anxiety. Also around June 2010, she had lost a 

hundred pounds and was feeling better. In October 2010, Plaintiff stated that she was off of 

Lexapro and Xanax for a month and had begun to hit herself again but was not cutting herself. In 

February 2011, she reported that she has not needed Xanax much. She reported in May 2011 that 

she felt Lexapro was working well. In September 2011, she was doing well on Xanax but stopped 

Lexapro. In October 2011, Plaintiff had been out of Lexapro for several months and felt depressed 

and had increased anxiety and mood swings. In January 2012, the medical notes say that Lexapro, 

Zoloft, and Paxil had not helped, but Xanax helped when she was in a rage, and rage was often. 

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She was prescribed Buspar.

Stanislaus Behavioral Health & Recovery Services

In May 2012 and June 2012, Plaintiff was seen by the Brief Crisis Intervention Program at 

the Stanislaus Behavioral Health & Recovery Services. AR 312. The record does not contain 

details regarding these visits. 

Consultative Examination by Tania Shertock, PhD.

On August 7, 2011, psychologist Tania Shertock, PhD., performed a comprehensive 

mental status examination and report. AR 255. Dr. Shertock observed that Plaintiff arrived on 

time, was generally cooperative throughout the session, and appeared to be a reliable historian. 

Plaintiff reported that she was diagnosed with a panic disorder thirteen years prior, and diagnosed 

with bipolar disorder about two years prior. Dr. Shertock noted that Plaintiff saw a psychiatrist 

who prescribed Xanax and Lexapro, but Plaintiff could not remember the name of her psychiatrist. 

Dr. Shertock observed that Plaintiff was in no obvious distress. She was jumpy and 

nervous. Her speech, perception, thought content, thought process, sensorium, memory, 

calculations, abstractions, insight/judgment, general knowledge, and reliability were all normal. 

Dr. Shertock noted significant impairments in social functioning. Plaintiff described relations with 

supervisors as generally okay, but poor with coworkers and others. Considering Plaintiff’s 

paranoia, Dr. Shertock predicted that she would have difficulties interacting with others.

Dr. Shertock concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to maintain concentration, 

persistence, and pace due to severe anxiety and moderately impaired concentration, persistence, 

and pace. She further concluded that Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive tasks but not on a 

consistent basis, and could not perform detailed and complex tasks. Plaintiff would have difficulty 

maintaining a schedule consistently, and may have difficulty adapting to work stress and changes. 

Plaintiff reported adequately handling some responsibilities of daily living, including keeping 

appointments.

State Agency Medical Consultants

On August 30, 2011, psychologist Deborah Hartley, PhD., reviewed Plaintiff’s record and 

assessed her functional limitations AR 273. She reviewed Dr. Shertock’s evaluation and agreed 

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that Plaintiff had mild limitations performing activities of daily living and moderate limitations in 

concentration, but found only moderate limitations in maintaining social interaction. Dr. Hartley 

completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment. AR 277-279. She found that Plaintiff 

was markedly limited in the ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions, 

and in the ability to interact appropriately with the general public. She found that Plaintiff was not 

significantly limited in any other way. Dr. Hartley specified that Plaintiff could perform simple 

tasks with routine supervision, could relate to supervisors and peers on a superficial work basis, 

could not relate to the general public, and could adapt to a work situation. 

On January 28, 2012, psychologist D. B. Johnson reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and 

affirmed Dr. Hartley’s opinion on reconsideration. 

Consultative Examination by Robert L. Morgan, PhD.

On August 6, 2012, psychologist Robert L. Morgan, PhD., performed a comprehensive 

psychological evaluation. AR 314. Dr. Morgan observed that Plaintiff arrived on time for her 

evaluation. Plaintiff appeared to be a reliable historian. Dr. Morgan noted that Plaintiff had been in 

ongoing office appointments with psychiatrist Charles Edwards, M.D., from Stanislaus County 

Department of Behavioral Health & Recovery Resources for approximately two years, but no 

records were provided from Dr. Edwards. Plaintiff reported that she had been prescribed a variety 

of medications by Dr. Edwards and her primary care physician, but was only taking Xanax at the 

time of the evaluation. 

Dr. Morgan discussed Plaintiff’s medical records including Dr. Shertock’s examination 

and Dr. Hartley’s review. Dr. Morgan stated, “Even with report of ongoing psychiatric care and 

utilization of various psychotropic medications over the course of the last two years Mrs. Hodge 

reports that her emotional functioning remains unmodulated.” AR 316. Plaintiff reported that she 

was home all day with constant stress, insomnia, and anxiety. She reported strained family and 

social relationships because she was embarrassed and would “fly off the handle” easily. 

Dr. Morgan found that Plaintiff presented with a marked impairments in her ability to 

maintain activities of daily living, in her ability to maintain social functioning, in concentration, 

persistence, and pace, in her ability to perform activities without interruptions and maintain 

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regular attendance, in her ability to complete a normal work day and work week and perform 

consistently, and in her ability to interact with coworkers and the public and withstand the stress of 

a routine workday and deal with changes in the work setting. He noted an episode of emotional 

deterioration in her last employment and opined that there was a high likelihood that she would 

emotionally deteriorate in a work setting. 

D. Vocational Expert Testimony

At the administrative hearing, the VE classified Plaintiff’s past work as hospital cleaner 

(DOT # 323.687-010, medium, SVP 2). The ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical person of 

the same age, education, and work history as Plaintiff, but who could sit, stand, and walk less than 

two hours a day; lift and carry less than ten pounds even occasionally; never climb, balance, stoop, 

kneel, crouch, or crawl; would not have sufficient concentration for simple, routine tasks; and 

could have less than occasional public contact. The VE opined that there were no fulltime jobs to 

be found with that profile.

The ALJ then directed the VE to assume a hypothetical person of the same age, education, 

and work history as Plaintiff, and could perform simple, repetitive tasks; could have occasional 

public contact; could sit, stand, and walk, six hours in an eight-hour day with normal breaks; lift 

and/or carry fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently; and could never climb 

ladders, ropes or scaffolds; but could occasionally climb ramps or stairs. The VE opined that the 

hypothetical person could perform the hospital cleaner job. The VE further opined that such an 

individual could perform other unskilled, medium work including hand packager (DOT # 

920.587-018, medium, SVP 2) and kitchen helper (DOT #318.687-010, medium, SVP 2). The VE 

testified that there were a significant number of available jobs nationwide and in California. 

E. Disability Determination

After considering the evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability. He found that Plaintiff had the following 

severe impairments –mood disorder, anxiety disorder, disorder of the back, and obesity– which 

significantly limited her ability to perform basic work activities. The ALJ found that Plaintiff did 

not have an impairment that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment. He 

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found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform “medium work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. 416.967(c). 

He found that Plaintiff had the RFC to sit, stand, and walk six hours each out of an eight-hour day 

with normal breaks, light and carry fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently. 

He limited Plaintiff to never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but occasionally climb ramps or 

stairs. He further limited Plaintiff to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and occasional public contact. 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as a hospital 

cleaner and that there were other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that 

Plaintiff could perform. Hence, he determined that Plaintiff was “not disabled.” 

II. Legal Standard

A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if she is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a) 

(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment(s) must result from

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically 

accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity that the 

claimant is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering her age, education, 

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that exists in the 

national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D). 

To encourage uniformity in decision making, the Commissioner has promulgated 

regulations prescribing a five-step sequential process for evaluating an alleged disability. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f); 416.920 (a)-(f). In the five-step sequential review process, the burden 

of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, but shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Id. at 

1098–99; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

In the first step of the analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently 

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engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, in the 

second step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a 

combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. Id. 

§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the third step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the requirements of 

the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If 

not, in the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC, despite 

the impairment or various limitations to perform his past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If 

not, in step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform 

other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 

416.920(g).

B. Standard of Review

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny benefits under the Act. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper 

legal standards. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). If an ALJ 

applied the proper legal standards and the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, 

this Court must uphold the ALJ’s determination that the claimant is not disabled. See, e.g., Ukolov 

v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 104 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial 

evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Ryan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1998 (9th Cir. 2008). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 

2005). Where the evidence as a whole can support either outcome, the Court may not substitute its 

judgment for the ALJ’s, rather, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. Id. 

III. Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of consultative examining 

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psychologists Dr. Tania Shertock and Dr. Robert Morgan. Plaintiff argues that she would have 

been found disabled if the ALJ had given proper weight to their opinions. In his RFC analysis, the 

ALJ gave reduced weight to Dr. Shertock and Dr. Morgan’s opinions and gave significant weight 

to the State agency mental consultants. 

A. Applicable Law

Physicians render two types of opinions in disability cases: (1) medical, clinical opinions 

regarding the nature of the claimant’s impairments and (2) opinions on the claimant’s ability to 

perform work. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). An ALJ is “not bound by 

an expert medical opinion on the ultimate question of disability.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); S.S.R. 96-5p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 2. The ALJ is responsible for 

resolving ambiguities and conflicts in the medical evidence. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 

(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Three types of physicians may offer opinions in social security cases: “(1) those who 

treat[ed] the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine[d] but d[id] not treat the 

claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine[d] nor treat[ed] the claimant 

(nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). A treating 

physician’s opinion is generally entitled to more weight than the opinion of a doctor who 

examined but did not treat the claimant, and an examining physician's opinion is generally entitled 

to more weight than that of a non-examining physician. Id. The Social Security Administration 

favors the opinion of a treating physician over that of nontreating physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). A treating physician is employed to 

cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 

1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, a treating physician’s opinion is not conclusive as to 

either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

751 (9th Cir. 1989).

Once a court has considered the source of a medical opinion, it considers whether the 

Commissioner properly rejected a medical opinion by assessing whether (1) contradictory 

opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The ALJ may reject the 

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uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical physician only for clear and convincing 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. The controverted 

opinion of a treating or examining physician can only be rejected for specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 

(9th Cir. 1995). “Although the contrary opinion of a non-examining medical expert does not alone 

constitute a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting a treating or examining physician’s opinion, it 

may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other independent evidence in the 

record.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d 

at 752. The ALJ must set forth a detailed and thorough factual summary, address conflicting 

clinical evidence, interpret the evidence and make a finding. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751-55. The 

ALJ need not give weight to a conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. Meanel 

v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The ALJ must tie the 

objective factors or the record as a whole to the opinions and findings that he or she rejects. 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988).

B. Consultative Examining Psychologist Tania Shertock, PhD.

The ALJ gave Dr. Shertock’s opinion reduced weight because it was not supported by the 

objective evidence, including Dr. Shertock’s examination. Because Dr. Shertock’s examining 

opinion is contradicted by Dr. Hartley’s, the ALJ was required to give specific and legitimate 

reasons to reject it. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not meet this burden. 

The ALJ discussed how Dr. Shertock’s objective findings did not support her highly 

restrictive functional assessment. First, the ALJ mentioned that Dr. Shertock found that Plaintiff 

had moderately impaired concentration, persistence, and pace, but there was no objective evidence 

of problems in this area. Indeed, Dr. Shertock found that Plaintiff’s attention and concentration 

were fair, and Plaintiff had no problems with immediate recall or short-term memory. Plaintiff had

put forth adequate effort in the exam, was cooperative, and was a reliable historian. Her ability to 

calculate was normal. Her memory was grossly intact. Her thought process was logical, organized, 

and coherent, without loosening of associations, circumstantiality, or tangentiality. These normal 

objective findings do not support a functional finding of moderate impairment in concentration, 

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persistence, and pace. 

Dr. Shertock was not sure if Plaintiff could conform to a typical work schedule even 

though, objectively, Plaintiff was on time to her appointment and reported that she was able to 

adequately keep appointments. Plaintiff was also on time to her appointment with Dr. Morgan. Dr. 

Shertock’s opinion that plaintiff could not perform simple repetitive tasks on a consistent basis 

also seems to be unsupported by the objective evidence. Dr. Shertock’s evaluation does not 

indicate any impairment in memory and Plaintiff reported to Dr. Shertock that she was able to 

adequately handle hygiene and grooming and household duties. Dr. Shertock noted that Plaintiff 

was jumpy and nervous, and described her own mood as depressed and sometimes manic. 

However, these observations do not support Dr. Shertock’s findings of significant functional 

limitations. 

Further, Dr. Shertock incorrectly noted that Plaintiff was seeing a psychiatrist who 

prescribed Xanax and Lexapro. At the time of the examination, Plaintiff had not seen a 

psychiatrist, but was prescribed medication by her primary care physician. In addition, the medical 

notes show that she was not taking Lexapro at the time of Dr. Shertock’s examination in spite of 

previously indicating that she was doing well on Lexapro. 

Dr. Shertock’s assessed functional limitations with regards to concentration, potential 

inability to conform to a work schedule, and inability to perform simple, repetitive tasks on a 

consistent basis are not supported by her objective findings, and by the record as a whole. Thus, 

the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record, in 

discounting Dr. Shertock’s opinion. The remainder of Dr. Shertock’s functional assessment is not 

contradictory to the ALJ’s RFC finding. Dr. Shertock said Plaintiff was impaired in social 

functioning. Her relations with supervisors were generally okay, but poor with coworkers and 

others. The ALJ limited Plaintiff’s public contact to occasional. 

C. Consultative Examining Psychologist Robert L. Morgan, PhD.

The ALJ gave Dr. Morgan’s opinion reduced weight because he relied too heavily on 

subjective statements, and the mental status examination did not support the reported level of 

impairment. Plaintiff again argues that the ALJ did not meet his burden to given specific and 

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legitimate reasons to discount Dr. Morgan’s opinion. 

“A physician’s opinion of disability ‘premised to a large extent upon the claimant's own 

accounts of his symptoms and limitations’ may be disregarded where those complaints have been 

‘properly discounted.’” Morgan v. Commissioner of the SSA, 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. Or. 

1999)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Dr. Morgan relied on several statements from Plaintiff which lack credibility. The ALJ 

noted that Plaintiff reported to Dr. Morgan that she had a psychiatrist but there was no evidence of 

this and was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony. Dr. Morgan states more than once in his 

report that Plaintiff was seeing a psychiatrist regularly for two years and with medication, and in 

spite of this ongoing treatment, Plaintiff’s symptoms had not improved. However, Plaintiff 

testified that she has not received treatment from a psychiatrist, and the medical record does not 

contain any records or notes from a psychiatrist. The records from the Stanislaus Behavioral 

Health & Recovery Services, where she was supposedly seeing a psychiatrist, indicate that she 

was seen there in May and June of 2012, a few months before Dr. Morgan’s examination in 

August 2012. Dr. Morgan noted that psychiatric notes were not available to him for review. Dr. 

Morgan’s opinion is therefore based upon a false premise.

Further, Dr. Morgan notes that Plaintiff was taking Xanax, but that is not necessarily the 

case –Plaintiff was receiving Xanax refills from her primary care physician, but her last visit was 

in January 2012 and she only took Xanax as needed. Dr. Morgan implies that Plaintiff’s use of 

psychotropic medication was consistent and taken as prescribed, when her records indicate that 

was not the case. She ran out of medication a few times and stopped taking medication without 

consulting her doctor. 

The ALJ also noted that Dr. Morgan’s report stated that Plaintiff does no domestic 

activities, which are exclusively performed by her husband and children, and has no hobbies. 

Because of these and other things, Dr. Morgan found that she had marked impairment in her 

ability to maintain activities of daily living. However, Plaintiff’s report to Dr. Morgan is 

inconsistent with her testimony at the hearing and other places in the record. Plaintiff stated at the 

hearing in September 2012 that she is able to do light housework and microwaving, but that she 

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would have trouble staying on task with cooking and laundry. She testified that she frequently 

watched TV and she visited her mother with whom she would watch TV and read the Bible. Her 

husband wrote in May 2011 in a function report that his wife cooks simple meals, cleans, and does 

laundry for him and their children, and feeds their dog. He wrote that she does housework and that 

she is always cleaning something because she panics over clutter. He also wrote that she does 

puzzles and reads. At that point she took their son to school regularly, but at the time of the 

hearing their son was able to get to school on his own. Plaintiff also filled out a function report in 

May 2011 and confirmed that she cooks simple meals daily, cleans, and does laundry for her 

family and feeds their dog. She also wrote that she tries to do puzzles every day and that she reads. 

Plaintiff also reported to Dr. Shertock in August 2011 that she was able to adequately handle 

household duties, but her husband and sons helped. Again, Dr. Morgan’s opinion, specifically

regarding her impairments regarding activities of daily living, was based on information that is 

inconsistent with multiple sources in the record.

In addition, there are a few other inaccuracies or mischaracterizations in Dr. Morgan’s 

report. He noted that Plaintiffs husband is self-employed, whereas he is on disability.

Plaintiff reported to Dr. Morgan that she did not drive, although she had a driver’s license, because 

it caused too much anxiety. However, she stated at the hearing that she did not have a driver’s 

license which was the reason she did not drive. Dr. Morgan found that Plaintiff’s depressive 

syndrome was characterized by appetite disturbance with a wide fluctuation in weight, referring to 

her weight loss mid-2010 from about 300 pounds to 170, and subsequent weight gain of about 

fifty pounds over the following two years. Plaintiff’s medical records do not indicate her weight 

loss was a result of depression or mental impairment. She testified that she lost weight to address 

her back pain, and medical notes indicate that she felt much better after the weight loss.

The ALJ also found that Dr. Morgan’s opinion was not supported by the mental status 

examination. Specifically, the ALJ found that Dr. Morgan’s finding that Plaintiff is markedly 

impaired in concentration is not supported by his singular test of serial sevens without conducting 

a test at the lower end, which would demonstrate an ability to perform simple tasks. Dr. Morgan 

found normal thought processes, thought content, intellectual functioning, and memory. 

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As a whole, Dr. Morgan’s opinion is not supported by the medical record. Plaintiff told Dr. 

Morgan that she was receiving ongoing treatment from a psychiatrist for two years, a premise 

stressed by Dr. Morgan over and over in his report. Plaintiff told Dr. Morgan that she could do no 

household chores, but she reported in her functional report, examination with Dr. Shertock, and at 

the administrative hearing that she did these things regularly. Dr. Morgan also found that marked 

impairments in concentration with only her inability to engage in serial sevens as objective 

support. The ALJ properly gave reduced weight to Dr. Morgan’s opinion for being based on 

subjective statements which were properly discounted, and for being unsupported by the medical 

record.

D. State Agency Mental Consultants

The ALJ gave reduced weight to consultative examiners Drs. Shertock and Morgan, while 

giving significant weight to state agency mental consultants Dr. Hartley and D. B. Johnson. The 

ALJ properly found that Dr. Hartley’s opinion, affirmed by D. B. Johnson, was supported by the

objective medical evidence. 

The ALJ discussed how objective findings demonstrated difficulty in higher-end cognitive 

tasks, and did not preclude simple tasks. With regards to anxiety, Plaintiff was able to interact with 

examiner and her family without noted problems, as well as with her family members. Plaintiff 

reported good activities of daily living including personal care and caring for her family and pet. 

The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had minimal mental treatment, consisting of only medication, 

with which she was not entirely compliant. Plaintiff did not see a psychiatrist or any psychologist 

or therapist from the date of disability in 2009 until mid-2012, when she may have seen a mental 

health professional at the Stanislaus Behavioral Health & Recovery Services. She received 

psychotropic medications from her doctor, but only saw her doctor approximately once every three 

months, even after she had received a new medication. There was no treating source opinion and 

minimal objective findings. There were objective findings of normal understanding, coherency, 

concentration, speaking, and responding to the examination. Thus, the objective evidence supports 

Dr. Hartley’s opinion that Plaintiff had only mild restriction in activities of daily living and 

moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning and concentration. 

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In sum, the ALJ properly discredited Dr. Shertock’s opinion for lack of support in the 

objective findings and Dr. Morgan’s opinion for relying on Plaintiff’s subjective statements 

demonstrated to be inaccurate. He discredited both Drs. Shertock and Morgan’s opinions in favor 

of the contradicting opinions of Dr. Hartley and D. B. Johnson, which he properly found to be 

supported by the medical evidence. Hence, the ALJ’s decision to give reduced weight to Drs. 

Shertock and Morgan’s opinions is without legal error and supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ applied appropriate legal standards 

and that substantial credible evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not 

disabled. Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter 

judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2015 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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