Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56644/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56644-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Angela Ebner
Appellant
Fresh, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANGELA EBNER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FRESH, INC., a Delaware

Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-56644

DC No.

8:13 cv-00477 JVS

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 11, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed March 17, 2016

Amended September 27, 2016

Before: Jerome Farris, A. Wallace Tashima,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Tashima

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2 EBNER V. FRESH, INC.

SUMMARY*

California Law

The panel denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied on

behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, withdrew

the opinion filed on March 17, 2016, and filed an amended

opinion affirming the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

dismissal of a plaintiff’s putative consumer class action

alleging that cosmetics and skin care products manufacturer

Fresh, Inc., deceived consumers about the quantity of lip

balm in its Sugar Lip Treatment product line.

The panel held that under California law, plaintiff has not

alleged, and cannot allege, facts to state a plausible claim that

the Sugar label was false, deceptive, or misleading; and thus,

the district court did not err in dismissing the label-based

claims. The panel held that plaintiff’s reliance on Williams

v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008)

(holding that if the defendant commits an act of deception, the

presence of fine print revealing the truth is insufficient to

dispel that deception), was unpersuasive because, unlike in

Williams, here there was no deceptive act to be dispelled.

The panel held that because plaintiff cannot plausibly

allege that Sugar’s design and packaging was deceptive, the

district court did not err in dismissing the packaging-based

claims. The panel further held that the district court correctly

concluded that the First Amended Complaint failed to allege

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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EBNER V. FRESH, INC. 3

a violation of the California Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606(b). 

The panel held that any further amendment of plaintiff’s

complaint would be futile. Finally, the panel held that

because the First Amended Complaint failed to state a claim

under any of the California statutes – the Unfair Competition

Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, the False

Advertising Law, and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,

the unjust enrichment cause of action was mooted.

COUNSEL

HenryAlexander Iliff (argued), Dorsey& WhitneyLLP, New

York, New York; James E. Howard, Dorsey& Whitney LLP,

Seattle, Washington; Adam H. Springel, Springel & Fink

LLP, Irvine, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Stephen R. Smerek (argued), Drew A. Robertson, and Shawn

Rieko Obi, Winston & Strawn LLP, Los Angeles, California,

for Defendant-Appellee.

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4 EBNER V. FRESH, INC.

ORDER

The Opinion filed March 17, 2016, and reported at

818 F.3d 799, is withdrawn and replaced by the Amended

Opinion filed concurrently with this order.

With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny the

petition for panel rehearing. Judge Bybee votes to deny the

petition for rehearing en banc and Judges Farris and Tashima

so recommend. The full court has been advised of the

petition for rehearing en banc and no judge of the court has

requested a vote on en banc rehearing. See Fed. R. App. P.

35(f). The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for

rehearing en banc are denied.

No further petitions for panel rehearing or rehearing en

banc will be entertained.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Angela Ebner (“Plaintiff”) alleges that cosmetics and skin

care products manufacturer Fresh, Inc. (“Fresh”) deceived

consumers about the quantity of lip balm in its Sugar Lip

Treatment (“Sugar”) product line. Although Sugar’s label

accurately indicates the net weight of included lip product,

the tube design uses a screw mechanism that allows only 75%

of the product to advance up the tube. A plastic stop device

prevents the remaining 25% from advancing past the tube

opening. Each Sugar tube contains a weighted metallic

bottom and is wrapped in oversized packaging. Plaintiff

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EBNER V. FRESH, INC. 5

brought a putative consumer class action against Fresh,

alleging that Fresh’s label, tube design, and packaging are

deceptive and misleading. The district court granted Fresh’s

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) with prejudice. We affirm.

I.

We accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in

the complaint. Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp.,

669 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012). According to the FAC,

Sugar is a lip treatment that comes in a variety of flavors and

tints and sells in retail stores and on the internet for

approximately $22.50 to $25.00 per unit. Over the past four

years, Plaintiff, a California resident, has purchased Sugar at

various locations in Southern California.

Sugar comes in an oversized dispenser tube that uses a

screw mechanism to push the lip product to the top of the

tube. The tube is packaged and sold in a large cardboard box. 

Both the tube and the cardboard box have labels indicating

the net weight of the included lip product. For an “original”

size tube, the indicated product weight is “4.3g e 0.15 oz.”;

for the “mini” size, the label reads “2.2.g e 0.08 oz.” The

FAC does not allege that the Sugar tube contains less than the

stated quantity of product. Rather, it alleges that the stated

product quantity is false and misleading because only a

portion of that product is reasonably accessible to the

consumer. Specifically, the tube’s screw mechanism permits

only 75% of the total lip product to advance past the top of

the tube. A plastic stop device prevents the remaining 25%

of the product “from being accessible to the consumer in its

intended manner or any other reasonable manner.” Plaintiff

alleges that the “intended manner” of application is to apply

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6 EBNER V. FRESH, INC.

the product from the tube directly to the lips. By contrast,

other lip balms using a dispenser tube, such as Burt’s Bees,

make “all or more” of the advertised product weight

accessible to the consumer.

Plaintiff alleges that Sugar’s “vastly oversized tubes and

boxes” create the misleading impression that each unit has a

larger quantity of lip product than it actually contains. Each

Sugar tube also contains a 5.35 gram metallic weight that is

concealed at the base of the tube. Collectively, the tube,

cardboard box, weighted bottom, and 4.3 grams of lip product

in an original tube of Sugar weigh approximately 29 grams. 

Plaintiff contends that as a result of Fresh’s labeling, design,

and packaging practices, she was misled as to the amount of

lip product actually accessible in a tube of Sugar and was

deprived of the value of her purchases.

The FAC asserts four state-law causes of action: 

(1) violation of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”),

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq.; (2) violation of the

California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal.

Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.; (3) violation of California’s Unfair

Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

et seq.; and (4) unjust enrichment. Fresh moved to dismiss

the FAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The

district court granted the motion and denied leave to amend. 

This timely appeal followed.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We

review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations

in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most

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EBNER V. FRESH, INC. 7

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Skilstaf, Inc., 669 F.3d at

1014. We may “affirm the district court’s dismissal on any

ground supported by the record.” ASARCO, LLC v. Union

Pac. R.R., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted). Dismissal is appropriate if the plaintiff has not

“allege[d] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Turner v. City & Cty. of S.F., 788 F.3d

1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v.

Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008)). Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

A court’s denial of leave to amend is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 656 F.3d 925,

931 (9th Cir. 2011). “In dismissing for failure to state a

claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if no

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines

that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation

of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th

Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

III.

The district court divided Plaintiff’s claims into two

categories: (1) claims based on Sugar’s labeling; and

(2) claims based on Sugar’s tube design and packaging. In

dismissing the label-based claims, the district court concluded

that both California’s safe harbor doctrine and federal

preemption under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

(“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., were independently fatal

to Plaintiff’s claims. As for the design and packaging claims,

the district court concluded that neither Sugar’s tube design

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8 EBNER V. FRESH, INC.

nor packaging were deceptive or misleading to the reasonable

consumer. Additionally, the district court concluded that the

FAC failed to plead a violation of the California Fair

Packaging and Labeling Act’s (“FPLA”) prohibition of

nonfunctional slack fill, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 12606. We

discuss each of these in turn.

A.

1. California’s Safe Harbor Doctrine

The UCL, CLRA, and FAL, under which Plaintiff’s

deceptive labeling claims are brought, all prohibit unlawful,

unfair, or fraudulent business practices. SeeCal. Bus. & Prof.

Code §§ 17200, 17500; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. In

California, unfair competition claims are subject to the safe

harbor doctrine, which precludes plaintiffs from bringing

claims based on “actions the Legislature permits.” Cel-Tech

Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 542

(Cal. 1999). To fall within the safe harbor, the challenged

conduct must be affirmatively permitted by statute – the

doctrine does not immunize from liability conduct that is

merely not unlawful. As the California Supreme Court

explained:

There is a difference between (1) not making

an activity unlawful, and (2) making that

activity lawful. . . . Acts that the Legislature

has determined to be lawful may not form the

basis for an action under the unfair

competition law, but acts may, if otherwise

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EBNER V. FRESH, INC. 9

unfair, be challenged under the unfair

competition law even if the Legislature failed

to proscribe them in some other provision.

Id. at 541–42.

The FAC alleges that, although the Sugar label accurately

states the net weight of lip product in the tube, only 75% of

that product is reasonably accessible. To the extent the FAC

challenges the Sugar label’s accurate net weight statement, 

this claim is barred by the safe harbor doctrine. Both federal

and California law affirmatively require cosmetics

manufacturers to include an accurate statement of the net

weight of included cosmetic product. 21 C.F.R. § 701.13(g)

(“The declaration shall accurately reveal the quantity of

cosmetic in the package exclusive of wrappers and other

material packed therewith[.]”); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 12603(b) (“The net quantity of contents []in terms of weight

or mass . . . shall be separately and accurately stated . . . upon

the principal display panel of that label[.]”). Because Fresh

complied with federal and state law requiring a net weight

statement on Sugar’s label, this conduct cannot form the basis

of an unfair competition claim. Cal-Tech Commc’ns, Inc.,

973 P.2d at 541–42.

Plaintiff’s other label claim is based on Fresh’s omission

of any supplemental or clarifying statement about product

accessibility. This omission, Plaintiff argues, renders the

existing net weight label deceptive and misleading. Unlike a

claim seeking to alter the net weight declaration itself, this

claim does not fall within the safe harbor because there is no

law expressly permitting the omission of supplemental

statements. See Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d

1152, 1167 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]o fall under a safe harbor, the

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10 EBNER V. FRESH, INC.

omission of the annual [fee] disclosure from Defendants’

advertisements must be expressly permitted by some other

provision. It is not enough if [federal law] merely fail[s] to

prohibit such an omission.”). For that matter, federal

regulations governing cosmetic labeling expressly permit

“supplemental statements at locations other than the principal

display panel(s) describing in nondeceptive terms the net

quantity of contents . . . .” 21 C.F.R. § 701.13(q). Likewise,

the FPLA, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12601 et seq., permits

supplemental statements “describing in nondeceptive terms

the net quantity of contents[.]” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 12605. Because the omission of supplemental statements

is not expressly and affirmatively permitted by law,

Plaintiff’s claim that the net weight label is nonetheless

deceptive due to the lack of a supplemental statement

explaining product accessibility is not precluded by the safe

harbor doctrine.

2. Federal Preemption Under the FDCA

As an additional ground for dismissing the label-based

claims, the district court held that Plaintiff’s claim that Fresh

was required to include supplemental statements regarding

product accessibility was preempted by the FDCA. We

disagree.

The relevant FDCA provision states:

[N]o State . . . may establish or continue in

effect any requirement for labeling or

packaging of a cosmetic that is different from

or in addition to, or that is otherwise not

identical with, a requirement specifically

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EBNER V. FRESH, INC. 11

applicable to a particular cosmetic or class of

cosmetics under this chapter.

21 U.S.C. § 379s(a). Importantly, § 379s “does not preempt

state laws that allow consumers to sue cosmetics

manufacturers that label or package their products in

violation of federal standards.” Astiana v. Hain Celestial

Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis

added).

Fresh argues that any state-law claim requiring it to

include supplemental statements about product accessibility

is preempted by the FDCA because federal law does not

impose any such requirement on cosmetics manufacturers. 

This argument misconstrues Plaintiff’s claim. In challenging

Fresh’s omission of supplemental statements about product

weight, Plaintiff seeks to enforce § 111730 of California’s

Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law (“Sherman Law”),

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 109875 et seq. Section 111730

states that “[a]ny cosmetic is misbranded if its labeling is

false or misleading in any particular.” Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 111730. The language in the Sherman Law is

virtually identical to the language in the FDCA, which states

that a “cosmetic shall be deemed to be misbranded if its

labeling is false or misleading in any particular.” 21 U.S.C.

§ 362(a). In other words, both the federal FDCA and

California’s Sherman Law prohibit the false or misleading

labeling of a cosmetic. Viewed in this light, Plaintiff “is not

asking [Fresh] to modify or enhance any aspect of its

cosmetics labels that are required by federal law.” Astiana,

783 F.3d at 758. Rather, the state-law duty that Plaintiff

seeks to enforce under the Sherman Law is identical to

Fresh’s federal duty under the FDCA: the duty to avoid false

or misleading labeling. Whether or not the lack of a

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12 EBNER V. FRESH, INC.

supplemental statement rendered the accurate net weight label

deceptive goes to the merits of the claim, not the question of

federal preemption. See id. at 758 n.3 (“To the extent [the

defendant] claims that no consumer would be deceived . . .

this argument goes to the merits of [plaintiff’s] assertion that

she was deceived by the allegedly false or misleading label,

not the question of federal preemption.”). Because the

Sherman Law does not amount to something “different from

or in addition to” what federal law already requires, under

21 U.S.C. § 379s, preemption does not bar Plaintiff’s claim.

3. Reasonable Consumer Standard

Although we conclude that neither the safe harbor

doctrine nor FDCA preemption bars Plaintiff’s supplemental

statement claim, this label claim ultimately fails on the merits

because Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that the omission of

supplemental disclosures about product weight rendered

Sugar’s label “false or misleading” to the reasonable

consumer. Plaintiff’s claims under the California consumer

protection statutes are governed by the “reasonable

consumer” test. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d

934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). Under this standard, Plaintiff must

“show that ‘members of the public are likely to be

deceived.’” Id. (citation omitted); Freeman v. Time, Inc.,

68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995). This requires more than a

mere possibility that Sugar’s label “might conceivably be

misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an

unreasonable manner.” Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co.,

129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 495 (Ct. App. 2003). Rather, the

reasonable consumer standard requires a probability “that a

significant portion of the general consuming public or of

targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances,

could be misled.” Id.

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EBNER V. FRESH, INC. 13

Plaintiff’s claim that the reasonable consumer would be

deceived as to the amount of lip product in a tube of Sugar is

not plausible. It is undisputed that the Sugar label discloses

the correct weight of included lip product. Dispenser tubes

that use a screw mechanism to push up a solid bullet of lip

product1are commonplace in the market. The reasonable

consumer understands the general mechanics of these

dispenser tubes and further understands that some product

may be left in the tube to anchor the bullet in place. 

Moreover, the allegations of the FAC make clear that even

after the plastic stop device prevents more product from

advancing up the tube, the consumer can still see the surface

of the remaining bullet. Although the consumer may not

know precisely how much product remains, the consumer’s

knowledge that some additional product lies below the tube’s

opening is sufficient to dispel any deception; at that point, it

is up to the consumer to decide whether it is worth the effort

to extract any remaining product with a finger or a small tool. 

A rational consumer would not simply assume that the tube

contains no further product when he or she can plainly see the

surface of the bullet. And even if “some consumers might

hazard such an assumption,” the Sugar tube is not false and

deceptive merelybecause the remaining product quantitymay

be “‘unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and

unrepresentative segment of the class of persons. . .’” that

may purchase the product. Davis, 691 F.3d at 1162 (quoting

Lavie, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494).

Plaintiff’s reliance on Williams is unpersuasive. In

Williams, parents of small children brought a class action

against Gerber based on the allegedly deceptive packaging of

1 We use the term “bullet of lip product” to describe the cylindrical mass

of lip product that is dispensed from the top of the tube.

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14 EBNER V. FRESH, INC.

its Fruit Juice Snacks, a food product for toddlers. 552 F.3d

at 936. The two most prominent ingredients of Fruit Juice

Snacks were sugar and corn syrup, and the only fruit or juice

content was white grape juice from concentrate. Id.

Nevertheless, the product: (1) was named “Fruit Juice

Snacks”; (2) had images of fruits such as oranges, peaches,

strawberries, and cherries on the box; (3) stated that it was

made with “fruit juice and other natural ingredients”; and

(4) stated that it was “one of a variety of nutritious Gerber

Graduates foods and juices that have been specifically

designed to help toddlers grow up strong and healthy.” Id. at

936, 939. We concluded that these features on the packaging

would lead a reasonable consumer to believe falsely that the

product contained the pictured fruits and that all the

ingredients were natural. Id. In light of such deceptive

packaging, we rejected the use of the ingredient list as a

“shield for liability for the deception[,]” explaining that a

reasonable consumer is not “expected to look beyond

misleading representations on the front of the box to discover

the truth from the ingredient list in small print on the side of

the box.” Id. Stated straightforwardly, Williams stands for

the proposition that if the defendant commits an act of

deception, the presence of fine print revealing the truth is

insufficient to dispel that deception.

But here, unlike in Williams, there is no deceptive act to

be dispelled. As explained above, Sugar’s weight label

complies with both federal and California law. Further, the

weight label does not contradict other representations or

inferences on Sugar’s packaging. Apart from the accurate

weight label, there are no other words, pictures, or diagrams

adorning the packaging, as there were in Williams, from

which any inference could be drawn or on which any

reasonable belief could be based about how much of the total

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EBNER V. FRESH, INC. 15

lip product can be accessed by using the screw mechanism. 

In the absence of any statement or other depiction anywhere

on the package about lip product accessibility, we conclude

that it is not plausible that “a significant portion of the general

consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably

in the circumstances, could be misled” into thinking the entire

lip bullet will clear the tube’s opening. See Lavie, 129 Cal.

Rptr. 2d at 495.

Plaintiff has not alleged, and cannot allege, facts to state

a plausible claim that the Sugar label is false, deceptive, or

misleading. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing

the label-based claims.

B.

Next, Plaintiff alleges that Sugar’s oversized and weighty

packaging and tube design are unfair, deceptive, and

misleading under the FAL, CLRA, and UCL. As part of her

UCL claim, Plaintiff also alleges unlawful acts in violation of

the Sherman Law, which proscribes “misleading” cosmetics

containers, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111750, and the

FPLA, which provides that no container shall have a false

bottom that “facilitate[s] the perpetration of deception or

fraud,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606(a).

Like the label-based claims, Plaintiff’s design and

packaging claims under these statutes are governed by the

reasonable consumer test.2 Williams, 552 F.3d at 938 (citing

2 Having dismissed Plaintiff’s label-based FAL claim on safe harbor and

preemption grounds, the district court dismissed any remaining part of the

FAL claim on the ground that Sugar’s packaging does not constitute an

untrue or misleading “statement” prohibited by the FAL. This ruling was

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16 EBNER V. FRESH, INC.

Freeman, 68 F.3d at 289). Plaintiff alleges that the tube’s

screw mechanism, the 5.35 gram metallic bottom, and the

oversized tube and cardboard packaging all contribute to the

misleading impression of a larger quantity of lip product than

is actually included. These claims fail for largely the same

reasons that the label-based claims fail. As explained above,

an accurate net weight label is affixed to every Sugar tube

and its accompanying cardboard box. Just as the reasonable

consumer understands that additional product may remain in

the dispenser tube after the screw mechanism prevents further

advancement of the lip bullet, the reasonable consumer also

understands that some additional weight at the bottom of the

tube – not consisting of product – may be required to keep the

tube upright.

Sugar sells for approximately $22.50 to $25.00 a unit. 

When viewed in the proper context of the high-end cosmetics

market, Sugar’s elaborate packaging and the weighty feel of

the tube is commonplace and even expected by a significant

portion of Fresh’s “targeted consumers.” Lavie, 129 Cal.

Rptr. 2d at 495. Because of the widespread nature of this

practice, no reasonable consumer expects the weight or

overall size of the packaging to reflect directly the quantity of

product contained therein. Because Plaintiff cannot plausibly

allege that Sugar’s design and packaging is deceptive, the

in error. The FAL prohibits unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading

advertising, and this Court has previously concluded that a product’s

packaging may form the basis of an FAL claim. See Williams, 552 F.3d

at 938–40 (reversing district court’s dismissal of an FAL claim where

defendant’s packaging for its fruit juice snack product included pictures

of different fruits “potentially suggesting (falsely) that those fruits or their

juices are contained in the product”). However, as explained below, the

FAL claim ultimately fails because Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible

claim for relief.

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EBNER V. FRESH, INC. 17

district court did not err in dismissing the packaging-based

claims.

C.

Finally, Plaintiff claims that the Sugar tube violates

§ 12606(b) of the FPLA, which deems a container

misleading if it contains nonfunctional slack fill. Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 12606(b). Slack fill is defined as “the difference

between the actual capacity of a container and the volume of

product contained therein.” Id. “Nonfunctional slack fill is

the empty space in a package that is filled to substantially less

than its capacity for reasons other than” one or more of the 15

enumerated reasons listed in the statute. Id.

The FAC alleges that “the significant portion of product

falling below the mechanical stop device constitutes

nonfunctional slack fill.” This cannot constitute “slack fill”

because under the plain language of the statute, slack fill

means the portion of the container without product, i.e.,

empty space. Thus, the lip product falling below the stop

device does not meet the definition of actionable slack fill. 

The district court correctly concluded that the FAC fails to

allege a violation of § 12606(b).

IV.

Plaintiff also contends that she should have been given

leave to amend her FAC. Although, under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), leave to amend should be “freely”

given, that liberality does not apply when amendment would

be futile. See Doe, 58 F.3d at 497 (leave to amend should be

freely given, “unless [the court] determines that the pleading

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”). 

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18 EBNER V. FRESH, INC.

Such is the case here. As the above analysis in Part III

demonstrates, any further amendment would be futile.

Finally, Plaintiff also pleads a cause of action for unjust

enrichment. The FAC recognizes, however, that “[u]njust

enrichment is a component of recovery under the statutes

[UCL, CLRA, FAL, and FPLA] cited above.” Thus, here,

unjust enrichment is asserted as a remedy for the statutory

violations alleged in the FAC. Because we have concluded

that the FAC fails to state a claim under any of these statutes,

the unjust enrichment cause of action has been mooted.

• ! •

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

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