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Parties Involved:
Roper Corporation
Appellant
Sears Roebuck and Company
Appellant
Samuel Joseph Tafoya
Appellee

Document Text:

·FI L"E D 

Uaiced States Coon.of Appeals · •f" ,.ent h c·· .rr'.'.'l.m · 

SAMUEL JOSEPH TAFOYAv 

' 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO. 

and ROPER CORPORATION, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

)' 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No.· 85-1818 

' . ("(' ., 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STAriit!s DISTRICT.: COUR'l' 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 83-F-1773) 

. -----. 

r· ,=-, ·,. 

Julia M. Duffy (Mary A. Wells with her on tti~,, brief) ,,pf -~~iler, 

Friedrich, Hickisch, Hazlitt & Ward, ·Di~ver, Colorado for 

Defendants-Appellants \ ·,n; :· 

,J 

Stephen N. Berkowitz (Leigh M. Lutz, with him on th~ b~-fef1/ o:z'er r ... 

Lutz and Berkowitz, Denver, Colorado, a~qc.Richard )<raIJ.zler, Wheat . . L~ • .·: 

Ridge, Colorado, was also on the brief) for Plaintiff-App~llee · ~ ~: 1 ,~ ~ '#'5 __ ... 

· ·· · · ;,,. ··· ).;,,·,,, :, ;wk 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMou·~ and BALDOCK, Ci rcuit::··Judge·s 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

.,, .. 1 ,.,~.} .. · .. , . · ··-··· · .• t .. ~-.~~- , 

Plaintiff Tafoya Is left hanct and wrist were· S~·~i~u,,~ty::___:i.nJured 

when his hand was caught :in the rotating: til"ad~·~ ·;~ a ,riding. 

' i . • d ·-'' 1,, /w /j i·c :. ,. ·,f·' 

tradtor/lawnmower which had tutrlidJ over. Th~ ju~y returne~ ~~ .. . ; I:;:~ . . ~ i,;{:,·~· ~4 -;i~·/J;; ~ .. :-. ~~! ;, 

verdict of $150,000.00 fo[\/iirifoy:a bas~d'. ;en ~\t:lt:f~,: li99jlity 1 in·'-'- 0 - · .,_I..'.~ 1.i~.(.,.J, Qtif:A·'f' ,,._;·.,.- ·-'.I. 

',f ....... f ~lf ;!-~i:: }·t:.: (; ·~ 4. :I 

: d :. 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 1 
to.rt,. holding . Tafoya ··--50%· at .. fault, ,.·.-.the.-:· -manufac.tur.er . Roper 

.\·':··,·. -:,,. 

Corporation (Roper) 30% at fault·, and the seller Sears Roebuck and 

Company (Sears)· 20% at fault, thus reducing 

$75,000. . \",".'" .. . <:· .:,,, .• 

I ':'R.·· 58. _Roper and Sears appeal the 

entered after the trial court's denial of 

judgment n. o. v. and a new trial. We affirm. 

1 

Tafoya's award to 

adverse judgment 

their motions for 

Factual Background & Procedural Posture 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Tafoya, 

who prevailed on the jury verdict, the record shows the following: 

In 1979 Tafoya purchased a used tractor/lawnmower which had 

two previous owners. The mower was manufactured by Roper in 1968 

and sold by Sears in 1969. Tafoya had just finished mowing weeds 

on his neighbor's property in June, 1983 when the riding tractor/ 

lawnmower tipped over. 1 The weeds surrounded trees which were 

adjacent to a drop-off of approximately 30 feet. IV n. 162. The 

mower is 50 inches wide and the trees were 54 inches from the 

drop-off and were approximately six feet apart. VI R. 52-53, 55. 

Tafoya had returned to mow a patch of weeds which had been missed, 

just up the hill above the two trees. He made the cut and then 

drove between the trees toward the drop-off. Staying as close to 

the tree on the left as he could without scarring it, he began 

turning to the left, along the edge of the drop-off. As he 

turned, with the nose of the mower just past the tree on the left, 

the mower tipped, rolled over the drop-off, and lodged upside down 

in some chokecherry bushes, approximately six feet down from the 

1 

The tractor/lawnmower which Tafoya owned is pictured in the 

Appendix to this opinion. 

2 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 2 
edge.· 

'. . :'-~1.:~i:/?~i ;{ . 

·By. this .t.ime.,-:. -he, had.m0w(2d .the·:·area· .. by:.the drop-of'fff:,i(:{~r , . , r\ t' \. ·~J'_,_c, - · ·. -• ' , 

least,16 times . 

1 i -- , _''r. 

IV R. 9 0 , 9 4 , 101 . ,~ . ;i· ,., 

Tafoya testified thit the mower tipped while still 

on the edge of the property. He said that as the mower tipped to 

the right, he jumped off to the left toward the trees, and th~~ 

slid down over the edge of the drop-off. IV R. 94, 95, 100:2 

Tafoya said that as he slid over the edge of the drop-off, he 

reached out to push off the mower's deck, but that his hand 

slipped off the rim of the deck and into the spinning blades. IV 

R. 100-102. 3 Tafoya's hand was severely injured. A physician 

testified there was "a near amputation" of his thumb, which was 

lacerated and fractured in several pl?ces. His wrist and ring 

finger were also fractured and several bones were exposed. II R. 

41-42. . .: ; ~/' 

At the time Roper manufactured the mower in 1968 it conformed 

to all industry safety standards. VI R. 10-24. When Sears sold 

the mower in 1969, two separate manuals were provided to 

2 

There is a conflict in the testimony regarding how and where 

the mower tipped. Mr. Clarke, the engineer who designed the mower 

for Roper and reconstructed the accident, testified that the 

minimum outside turning radius of the mower was six feet and that 

there was not enough space for the plaintiff to turn the mower 

. around the tree without going over the edge of the drop-off. VI 

R. 56, 58. Viewing the evidence in Tafoya's favor, the jury was 

entitled to find that the mower tipped while still on the edge of 

the slope. · 

3 

There is conflict in the testimony at this point as well. 

According to the records of Tafoya's physician, Tafoya was injured 

when the mower fell on top of him. II R. 74. While this is 

consistent with Mr. Clarke's testimony that Tafoya could not have 

turned around the tree without driving off the edge of the dropoff~ the jury was entitled to credit Tafoya's version of the 

accident. See Brown v. McGraw-Edison Company, 736 F.2d 609, 615 

(10th Cir. 1984). 

3 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 3 
... ·-.~.-purRJ}ase·rs:, .. ,. setting forth .. instr.uctions .and warnings. Defendants' \ ~ .. 

Exhs.. G, H. Although Tafoya was aware of the manuals, he never 

asked the previous owners for them, nor did he request them from 

Sears. IV R. 154, 157. 

There was conflicting testimony as to whether the mower 

conformed to the state of the art in 1968. Tafoya's expert Sevart 

testified that deadman devices were state of the art in 1968 and 

that the riding tractor/lawnmower could have feasibly been 

equipped with one. III R. 71 4 Roper's expert testified that the 

mower conformed to the state of the art in 1968. VI R. 46-47. 

Tafoya withdrew all but his strict liability claims before 

trial. The jury was instructep on the elements of strict 

liability and on the defenses of assumption of the risk and 

misuse. The jury was also instructed to consider Tafoya's fault. 

IX R. 18. The jury found Tafoya 50% at fault, Roper 30% at fault, 

and Sears 20% at fault. 

Sears and Roper filed a motion for judgment n. o. v., ox in 

the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied their 

motions in a brief order. IR. 87. On appeal they argue that: 

(1) Sears cannot be held strictly liable because it is a seller 

and not a manufacturer; (2) Colorado's statutory rebuttable 

presumption of non-defectiveness must be rebutted by clear and 

4 

A "deadman" device is a mechanism which stops a mower's 

rotating blades in the absence of intentional conduct by the 

operator to keep the blades running. III R. 39. There was expert 

testimony that various types of deadman devices were available in 

1968. These included devices· which would "kill the engine any 

time the operator left the machine for any reason," devices which 

would kill the engine "if the operator left the machine with the 

blades running'' and devices which would stop the machine "if a 

certain angle was exceeded." III R. 40. 

4 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 4 
.. convincing· ··,ev.idence .. and-not. a mere -preponderance.,of the .evidence, 

as the jury was instructed; (3) the crashworthiness or second 

collision doctrine does not apply to riding lawnmowers and that, 

assuming it does, the evidence was insufficient to show 

enhancement of Tafoya's injuries; (4) because an ordinary consumer 

would have appreciated the risk of harm (from the rotating 

blades), the lawnmower was not unreasonably dangerous; and (5) 

Tafoya voluntarily assumed the risk of injury. 

II 

Analysis 

A. 

Denial of the Motion for 

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 

In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment n. o. v., we 

employ the same standard as the trial court. Brown v. McGrawEdison Company, 736 F.2d 609, 613 .(10th Cir. ·1984). "Judgment 

n.o.v. is proper only when the evidence so strongly supports an 

issue that reasonable minds could not differ." Ryder v. City of 

Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Delano v. 

Kitch, 663 F.2d 990, 1002 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 

946 (1982)). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence. Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 

F.2d 1453, 1456 (10th Cir. 1987). We do not consider the 

credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or substitute our 

judgment for that of the jury. Brown, 736 F.2d at 615. And if 

there is conflicting or insufficient evidence to warrant a one-way 

conclusion, judgment n. o. v. is inappropriate. Ryder, 814 F.2d 

at 1418. A judgment "notwithstanding the verdict should be 

5 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 5 
~cautiously-. and -sparingly .gr:anted. 11 .- ... Bruno v. ·. Western Electric 

Company, 829 F.2d 957, 962 (10th Cir. 1987). 

i. 

Sears' Strict Liability as a 

Seller Under Colo. Rev. Stat. S 13-21-401 

It is undisputed that the riding tractor/lawnmower was 

manufactured by Roper and sold by Sears. The jury found Sears 20% 

at fault. Sears argues that as the seller it cannot be held 

strictly liable. Colorado statutes expressly limit strict product 

liability actions to manufacturers, unless jurisdiction cannot be 

obtained over a particular manufacturer, in which case that 

manufacturer's principal distributor or seller is deemed the 

manufacturer. 5 

Tafoya does not contend that Sears actually manufactured the 

riding lawnmower, but rather that Colo. Rey: Stat. § 13-21-401 

5 

Colorado Rev. Stat. § 13-21-402 (1987), identical to the 

statute in effect at the time of the injury, states: 

Strict liability. (1) No product liability 

action based on the doctrine of strict liability in 

tort shall be commenced or maintained against any 

seller of a product which is alleged to contain or 

possess a defective condition unreasonably 

dangerous to the buyer, user, or consumer unless 

said seller is also the manufacturer of said 

product or the manufacturer of the part thereof 

claimed to be defective. Nothing in this part 4 

shall be construed to limit any other action from 

being brought against any seller of a product. 

(2) If jurisdiction cannot be obtained over a 

particular manufacturer of a product or a part of a 

product alleged to be defective, then that 

manufacturer's principal distributor or seller over 

whom jurisdiction can be obtained shall be deemed, 

for the purposes of this section, the manufacturer 

of the product. 

6 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 6 
~: .... -deems-;:·.certa·in-... sel·l~er:.s-·-.manuf.aQtur.ers~. P ··~ Tafoya. ·a-r".gues · that .Sears is 

a manufacturer within the meaning of§ 13-21-401 because it owned 

Roper in whole or significant part and/or because it exercised 

some significant control over all or a part of Roper's 

6 

Colorado Rev. Stat. § 13-21-401 (1987), identical to the 

statute in effect at the time of injury, provides in part: 

Definitions. As used in this part 4, unless the 

context otherwise requires: 

(1) "Manufacturer" means a person or entity 

who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, 

constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or a 

component part of a product prior to the sale of 

the product to a user or consumer. The term 

includes any seller who has actual knowledge of a 

defect in a product or a seller of a product who 

creates and furnishes a manufacturer with 

specifications relevant to the alleged defect for 

producing the product or who otherwise exercises 

some significant control over all or a portion of 

the manufacturing process or who alters or modifies 

a product in any significant manner after the 

product comes into his possession and before it is 

sold to the ultimate user or. consumer. The term 

also includes any seller of a product who is owned 

in whole or significant part by the manufacturer or 

who owns, in whole or significant part, the 

manufacturer. A seller not otherwise a 

manufacturer shall not be deemed to be a 

manufacturer merely because he places or has placed 

a private label on a product if he did not 

otherwise specify how the product shall be produced 

or control, in some significant manner, the 

manufacturing process of the product and the seller 

discloses who the actual manufacturer is. 

(3) "Seller" means any individual or entity, 

including a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, 

or retai1er, who is engaged in the business of 

selling or leasing any product for resale, use, or 

consumption. 

7 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 7 
.. ·, rnanufac.buring· process~ 7 If,, viewed-~in the light---most favorable to 

the plaintiff, see Trujillo, 825 F.2d at 1456, the evidence 

supports either of these contentions, then the jury was entitled 

to deem Sears a manufacturer for purposes of the statute. 

Tafoya's expert witness, Mr. Kitzes, testified that since the 

mid-1960's, Sears had "a substantial stock ownership of Roper •... " 

V R. 50. Kitzes was employed from 1974 through 1981 by the 

Consumer Product Safety Commission. V R. 20. He was employed to 

develop and publish a standard for power mowers, in order to 

prevent unreasonable risks of injury. In completing this 

assignment Kitzes obtained the Consumer Product Safety Commission 

file an power mowers and reviewed all the material that had been 

collected, dating from the mid-1950's through 1977. V R. 22. His 

review of these files revealed Sears' interest in Roper. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to Tafoya, the· evidence 

supported~ finding that Sears owned Roper in whole or significant 

part. Sears does not point to any evidence which would tend to 

show that it did not own such an interest .in Roper. While Sears 

7 

Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-401(1), the court 

correctly instructed the jury in instruction 23 that: 

The plaintiff alleged that the Defendant Sears 

should be held liable for his injuries, for casting into 

the stream of commerce a tractor/mower which was 

defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous. 

The mower was manufactured by Roper Corporation, 

and offered for sale to the public by Sears. The law in 

this state says that a seller of the defectively 

designed product may be held liable for damages caused 

by that product if the seller has actual knowledge of a 

defect in the product. The seller may also be held 

liable if it owns, in whole or in significant part, the 

manufacturer. 

See IX R. 14. 

8 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 8 
-a~gues~bhat Kitzes~~testimony doe~ not -~sufficiently explain the 

phrase "substantial stock ownership," the admissibility of 

evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, see Unites 

States v. Turner, 799 F.2d 627, 630 (10th Cir. 1986), and we do 

not weigh the evidence in reviewing a trial court's denial of a 

motion for judgment n.o.v. Brown, 736 F.2d at 615. Because there 

was competent evidence that Sears owned Roper in substantial part, 

the jury was entitled to deem that Sears was a manufacturer within 

the meaning of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-401(1). 

Section 401(1) is phrased in the disjunctive so that Sears' 

partial ownership of Roper alone satisfied the requirement. 

However, in addition Tafoya argued that Sears exercised 

significant control over the manufacturing process and we note 

that there was evidence upon which the jury could reach that 

conclusion. 8 Thus, the finding of liability as to Sears was not 

error. 

ii. 

The Rebuttable Presumption of Non-Defectiveness 

Colorado Revised Statute 13-21-403(l)(a) & (3) creates a 

rebuttable presumption that any product that conformed to the 

state of the art prior to its sale, or caused injury ten years 

8' 

Mr. Clarke testified that Sears had input in the design of 

the riding tractor/mower, the extent of testing, and 

merchandising. VI R. 68-69. He said that Sears visited the test 

sites and did test work on products which were being designed. VI 

R. 147. Clarke testified that if Sears had asked he would have 

incorporated a deadman device in the riding tractor/lawnmower. VI 

R. 96. This evidence is sufficient for the jury to conclude that 

Sears had significant control over a portion of the manufacturing 

process, within the meaning of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-401(1). 

9 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 9 
after ;.Lt - ·was , sold ~- for· .---~s.e- · or,,.consumption, ,. is not defective. 9 

There is no dispute that the lawnmower in this case was first sold 

to the public more than ten years prior to Tafoya's injury on June 

12, 1983, see Patterson v. Magna American Corp., 754 P.2d 1385, 

1387 (Colo. App. 1988) (the statutory language refers to the time 

when a product line of a particular design was first sold), and 

that the presumption applies. 10 The dispute here is whether the 

presumption has to be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, 

as the trial court instructed the jury, 11 or by clear and 

9 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(l)(a) & (3) (1987), identical to 

the statute in effect at the time of the injury, provides in part: 

10 

Presumptions. (1) In any product liability 

action, it shall be rebuttably presumed that the 

product which caused the injury, death, or property 

damage was not defective and that the manufacturer 

or sell~r thereof was not negligent if the product: 

(a) Prior to sale by the m~nufacturer, 

conformed to the st~te -0f the art, as di~tinguished 

from industry standards, applicable to such product 

in existence at the time of sale; or 

(3) Ten years after a product is first sold 

for use or consumption, it shall be rebuttably 

presumed that the product was not defective and 

that the manufacturer or seller thereof was not 

negligent and that all warnings and instructions 

were proper and adequate. 

There is some dispute about whether· the lawnmower conformed 

to the state of the art, but that dispute is immaterial since it 

is undisputed that the injury occurred more than ten years after 

the mower was sold for use. Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403, 

this alone is sufficient to invoke the presumption. 

11 

The trial court 

presumption and the 

part: 

gave two instructions which explain the 

burden of proof. Instruction 22 stated in 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

10 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 10 
convincing-evidence;. as the.defendants.argue. 

We think it clear that the trial court, applying Colorado 

law, correctly instructed the jury that the presumption of non-

(Footnote continued): 

Presumptions are rules based on experience or 

public policy and are established in the law to 

assist the Jury in ascertaining the truth. 

In this case, if you find that, one, prior to 

the manufacture by Roper or the sale by Sears, the 

tractor/mower conformed to the state of the art, as 

distinguished from industry standards, and, two, 

such state of the art was applicable to such 

products as the tractor/mower at the time of such 

sale, then the law presumes the tractor/mower was 

not defective. 

You must consider this presumption together 

with all the other evidence in the case in 

determining whether or not the tra~tor/mower was 

defective. This presumption may be rebutted by a 

preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. 

IX R. 13-14. Instruction number 29 stated: 

29. As I have instructed you, presumptions 

are rules based on experience or public policy and 

are established in the law to assist the jury in 

ascertaining the truth. 

In this case, if you find the tractor/mower 

was sold for the first time for use or consumption 

ten or more years before any claimed injuries were 

incurred by the Plaintiff, then the law presumes 

that the tractor/mower was not defective and that 

all warnings and instructions were proper and 

adequate. 

You must consider this presumption together 

with all the other evidence in the case in 

determining whether or not the tractor/mower was 

defective, and all warnings and instructions were 

proper and adequate. This presumption may be 

rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence to the 

contrary. 

IX R. 16-17.-

11 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 11 
.~defect-iveness .. contai-ned in Colo.-.Rev. Stat.·§·· 1'3-21-403 could. be 

rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. In 

Union Ins. Co. v. RCA Corp., 724 P.2d 80, 83 (Colo. App. 1986), 

the court held that: 

[T]he presumptions established by§ 13-21-403 

are considered to be evidence of non-defectiveness 

of a product. See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood 

Bank,v. Hansen, supra; Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins 

Co., Inc., 595 F.Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984). Thus, 

while the instruction did not alter the plaintiff's 

burden of persuasion regarding the defective 

condition of the TV, it did affect that burden by 

supplementing defendant's burden of going forward. 

Id. at 83 (emphasis added). While noting that the instruction 

regarding a presumption of non-defectiveness did not alter the 

plaintiff's burden of persuasion, the court thus implicitly 

recognized that the presumption could 

preponderance of the evidence. 

be rebutted by a 

In Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 595 F. Supp-. 1290 (D. 

Colo .. 1984), cited approvingly in Union Ins., the court applied 

the· preponderance of the evidence standard when it held that 

"plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to rebut the 

presumption [of non-defectiveness contained in§ 13-21-403] and 

the evidence is sufficient to outweigh the evidence of no defect, 

including the presumption. Id. at 1311 (emphasis added). Union 

Ins. Corp. and Hawkinson clearly support the trial court's 

instructions in this case. We note also that the instructions 

were in accord with CJI-Civ.2d 14:24 14:26 (1980), 12 which 

12 

The trial court correctly looked to the Colorado Jury 

Instructions. "In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a 

presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

12 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 12 
· ,@rovi·des. that ''·+u] nless. and. untiL-the ·pr~s-umption .is outweighed by 

evidence to the contrary which has been proved by a preponderance 

of the evidence, you must consider the presumption with the other 

evidence in arriving at your verdict." 

The defendants cite Fraley v. American Cyanamid Company, 570 

F. Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1983), in support of their argument that 

the plaintiff must produce clear and convincing evidence to rebut 

the presumption of non-defectiveness. In Fraley, it was argued 

that the plaintiff had a greater burden of proof than had been 

carried in a prior action; that therefore collateral estoppel 

should not apply from that prior suit. The district judge in 

Fraley did agree that § 13-21-403(3) would impose a heavier 

burden, although he held that this Colorado statute and its 

presumptions did not apply because the harm in question occurred 

within 10 years from delivery of the product. 

The·reasoning by the judge in Fraley that a heavier burden of 

persuasion is imposed by§ 13-21-403(3) is not persuasive to us. 

It was based on § ll0(B)(l) of the Model Uniform Products 

Liability Act and its express provision that the presumption of 

non-defectiveness "may only be rebutted by clear and convincing 

evidence." The judge in Fraley looked to that language. We are 

(Footnote continued): 

defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision is 

determined in accordance with State law." Fed. R. Evid. 302. In 

Colorado, ·when "instructing the jury in a civil case, the court 

shall use such instructions as are contained in Colorado Jury 

Instructions (CJI) as are applicable to the evidence and the 

prevailing law." Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 

51.l(l)(emphasis added). While the amendments to CJI-Civ. 2d 

14:24 - 14:26 (1980) do not provide that the presumption may be 

rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, there is nothing to 

suggest, either in the supplemental instructions or in the case 

law, that the 1980 Colorado Jury Instructions do not correctly 

state prevailing law. 

13 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 13 
not convinced-that §:l3-21-:-.403(3)·r ·which has .. no· such provision, 

would likewise impose the heavier "clear and convincing" burden of 

proof. The other cases discussed are more persuasive to us. 

The defendants correctly note that the status and strength of 

a rebuttable presumption vary according to the force of the 

policies which motivate a court or a legislature to create it and 

that there are therefore no universal rules as to the amount of 

· evidence necessary to overcome a rebuttable presumption. Cline v. 

City of Boulder, 532 P.2d 770, 772 (Colo. App. 1975). We are not 

persuaded that the clear and convincing standard, specifically set 

out in llO(B)(l) of the Model Uniform Products Liability Act, 

should be grafted onto§ 13-21-403 .. Rebuttable presumptions . in 

the civil law are normally overcome by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See Rivera v. Minnich, 107 s.ct. 3001, 3003 n.5 (l987); 

McCormick on Evidence, § 344 (3d ed. 1984). 13 If the General 

Assembly had wished td depart from the'normal standard it could 

have done so by including specific language like that of section 

llO(B)(l) of the Model Act. Moreover, we do not agree with the 

13 

The most widely followed theory of presumptions is the 

"bursting bubble" theory. McCormick, § 344. Under this theory 

presumptions are "like bats of the law flitting in the twilight, 

but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts." Id. If 

evidence to the contrary is produced the presumption disappears.· 

McCormick notes that in some cases· social policy requires 

departure from the normal preponderance standard. For example, a 

presumption· of legitimacy is created when a child is born to a 

woman during a time when she is married. It is universally agreed 

upon that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear and 

convincing evidence. See McCormick,§ 343, p. 972. The reason: 

social policy, to avoid the visitation upon the child of the sins 

of the parents and the social stigma of bastardy. Id. See also 

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (the Constitution requires 

clear and convincing evidence before the state may terminate the 

parental relationship). Here there is no indication that the 

legislature, in creating§ 13-21-403, intended to depart from the 

normal preponderance standard. 

14 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 14 
, .... defendants_\.· ar_gument .:that. a1.l.owing:.:bhe presumpt'ion. to be rebutted 

·by a preponderance of the evidence will obliterate the effect of 

the presumption. The presumption is still part of the case. See 

Union Insurance Corp., 724 P.2d at 83. 

· The trial court properly instructed the jury that the 

presumption could be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the lawnmower was defective. 

iii 

Recovery Under The Crashworthiness 

or Enhanced Injury Doctrine 

In Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d 305 (Colo. App. 1978), the 

Colorado Court of Appeals recognized the ''crashworthiness" or 

"second collision" doctrine. Under this doctrine, a manufacturer 

may be liable in negligence or strict liability for injuries 

sustained in an accident where a manufacturing or design defect, 

though not the cause of the accident, caused or enhanced' the 

injuries. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 

3.03[4][f][v] (1987). 14 The doctrine was first recognized in 

Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-503 (8th Cir. 

1968), and is based upon the premise that some products, while 

they are not made for the purpose of undergoing impact, should be 

14 

The doctrine has been adopted in the vast majority of 

jurisdictions which have considered the issue. See 1 R. Goodman, 

Automobile Design Liability§ 1:4 (2d ed. 1983). One commentator 

has persuasively argued that the proper terminology for 

characterizing this doctrine is "enhanced injury," as opposed to 

crashworthiness or second collision. See Harris, Enhanced Injury 

Theory: An Analytical Framework, 62 N.C.L.Rev. 643, 647 

(1984}(hereafter Harris). The terms ''crashworthiness" and "second 

collision" are the products of automobile litigation. While the 

phrase enhanced injury may be the most accurate conceptually, see 

Harris at 648-649, we will use the terms crashworthiness and 

second collision, as those are the terms which the Colorado courts 

have used, as well as enhanced injury. 

15 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 15 
· . reasonably., .. designed · to minimize: .. · the. injury.~,pr.oducing effect of 

impact. 

In Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., LTD., 741 P.2d 1240, 1243 

(Colo. 1987) (en bane), cert. dismissed, 108 S.Ct. 1067 (1988), 

the Colorado Supreme Court held that the doctrine applied to 

motorcycles as well as automobiles. The court reasoned that there 

was no "principled basis to conclude that liability for failure to 

provide reasonable, cost-acceptable safety features to reduce the 

severity of injuries suffered in inevitable accidents should be 

imposed upon automobile manufacturers but not upon motorcycle 

manufacturers" and noted that "motorcyle accidents are just as 

foreseeable as automobile accidents and that motorcycle riders 

face a much greater risk of injury in the event of an accident 

than do occupants of automobiles." Id. at 1243. 

The record and appellate briefs show that the plaintiff's 

primary argument was that the riding tractor/lawnmower was 

defectively designed · because it lacked a deadman device and that 

while this did not cause the accident, it contributed to Tafoya's 

injuries. 15 Colorado has not addressed the question whether the 

crashworthiness or second collision doctrine applies to tractors 

or riding lawnmowers. One court has applied the doctrine to 

riding lawnmowers on a negligent design claim. Harrison v. 

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 381 F.Supp 926 (S.D. Fla. 

15 

The jury was instructed that there were three alleged 

defects: the lack of a deadman device, the failure to.warn 

regarding the lawnmower's instability on a slope, and the· 

insufficient space between the seat and the body of the mower, 

which made it difficult to exit in the event of an emergency. IX 

R. 3. 

16 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 16 
19'.74)-(applying -Flor,ida -law).-. 16. >.Other<-jur-isdictions have concluded 

that it applies to tractors, see Roe v. Deere and Co., Inc., 855 

F.2d 151, 153 (3rd Cir. 1988}(applying the doctrine to an 

agricultural tractor under Pennsylvania law); Wagner v. 

International Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224, 230 (8th Cir. 

1979}(applying doctrine, under Minnesota law, to a small Model 

500C crawler tractor), and we do not see a principled basis under 

Colorado law for concluding that it does not apply to riding 

tractor/lawnmowers. 

While the crashworthiness or enhanced injury doctrine has 

been applied primarily to automobiles, motorcycles, and airplanes, 

see Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer, Seller, or Distributor 

of Motor Vehicle For Defect Which Merely Enhances Injury From 

Accident Otherwise Caused, 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972), and cases cited 

therein, it has also been applied to snowmobiles, front-end 

foaders, pleasure' boats, 17 and as noted earlier, riding lawnmowers 

and tractors. Colorado courts have noted that the doctrine is 

based upon the "pragmatic observation that collisions and 

accidents are natural, foreseeable consequenses of automobile 

16 

We are mindful that the judge and jury rejected the strict 

liability claim. Harrison, 381 F.Supp at 928. Nevertheless, the 

application of the enhancement of injury theory, giving relief on 

the negligent desig'n claim, is persuasive here. 

17 

See e.g. Smith v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 

(1978)(it is foreseeable that snowmobiles will be involved in 

collisions and there is a duty to design in such a way as to 

prevent enhanced injury); Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. 

Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3rd Cir. 198l)(front-end 

loader was defective in failing to provide fire extinguisher, the 

absence of which enhanced plaintiff's injuries); Rubin v. Brutus 

Corporation, 487 So.2d 360 (Fla.App. 1986)(manufacturer had duty 

under crashworthiness doctrine to design boat to prevent enhanced 

injury to passengers), review denied, 500 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1986). 

17 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 17 
use .•.•... " ·May, 583 P.:2d.at.·307 .•.... c.See.also,·,Gamancho, 741 P.2d at 

1243 (motorcylce accidents are just as foreseeable as automobile 

accidents). While the foreseeability of an accident is not to be 

equated with duty, it is important in determining a manufacturer's 

·responsibility, along with considerations of fairness. 

Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 n.9 (4th 

Cir. 1974). See also Harris, at pp. 652-657. 

The record in this case is replete with evidence of injuries 

resulting from contact with the rotating blades of riding 

lawnmowers that have tipped over. See III R. 35-37, 82; V R. 27-

29; VIII R. 4. The risk of severe injury from rotating lawnmower 

blades is obviously great. We are unconvinced by the notion that 

riding lawnmowers, unlike automobiles and motorcycles, are not 

designed for transportation so that the doctrine should not be 

applied in this context. 18 The courts in Pennsylvania Glass 

(front-end loader), Brutus Corp (loader manufacturer), Roe 

(agricultuxal tractor), Wagner (crawler tractor) and Harrison 

(riding lawnmowers) applied the doctrine despite the lack of 

transportation. We do not think that the element of 

transportation is essential for the doctrine to apply. In 

18 

In crashworthiness cases involving automobiles Colorado 

courts have emphasized the fact that automobiles are intended for 

use on roadways and that injury-producing collisions are a 

frequent and foreseeable result of normal.use. See~ May, 583 

P.2d at 307-308. And in Camancho the court recognized that the 

use of "motorcycles for transportation over roadways is just as 

foreseeable as the use of automobiles for such [a] purpose." 

Camancho, 741 P.2d at 1243. But we do not think that this 

language was intended to limit the application of the 

crashworthiness doctrine to products which_ were designed 

,. e.xclusively for transportation. The cases - involving pleasure 

boats, front-end loaders, snowmobiles, riding lawnmowers, and 

tractors demonstrate this. 

18 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 18 
determining> the scope ,;.of· .. · the. ·enhanced, . injur.y · doctrine, the 

Colorado Supreme Court identified the broad "goal of encouraging 

maximum development of reasonable, cost-efficient safety 

features." See Camancho, 741 P.2d at 12-43. There is evidence in 

our record that accidents resulting from riding tractor/lawnmowers 

that have tipped over are foreseeable and we agree with the trial 

judge that riding tractor/lawnmower manufacturers cannot 

rationally or fairly be exempted from the protective policy of the 

doctrine. 

Having concluded that the crashworthiness or enhanced injury 

doctrine applies here, we must now consider whether· there was 

sufficient evidence of enhancement of the plaintiff's injuries. 

As a part of a crashworthiness case, a plaintiff must show that 

his injuries were enhanced by the defect, in this case the absence 

·of a deadman device. Curtis v~ General Motors, 649 F.2d 808, 812-

13· (10th Cir. 1~8l)(applying· Colorado law); Larsen, 391 F.2d at 

501-502. The defendants argue that expert testimony is essential 

to establish enhancement of injuries. We disagree. While in some 

cases expert testimony may be necessary, see Curtis, 649 F.2d at 

812-813 (cause of plaintiff's back injury unknown to expert 

witness and insufficient non-expert witness testimony was 

presented to establish cause), it is not critical when the 

circumstances involve obvious physical dangers within the 

understanding of ordinary observers and lay jurors. 

Viewing this record in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, see 

Trujillo, 825 F.2d at 1456, we hold that there was sufficient 

evidence to establish enhancement of the plaintiff's injuries due 

19 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 19 
to ,the .. -,.lack ·of.~ the,,deadman, device. ·Doc-tor Betson-testified that 

the plaintiff suffered a near amputation of his thumb, with 

lacerations extending from the top of his hand around the base of 

his thumb and into the palm of his hand and open fractures. II R. 

41. He further testified that there were five or six fractures, 

see Ii R. 42, and multiple splinters. II R. 46. These injuries, 

he said, were consistent with the plaintiff's testimony (see IV R. 

103, 108) that his hand was caught in the rotating blades of the 

lawnmower. II R. 76. Sevart also testified that the injuries 

suffered were caused by contact with the rotating blades. III R. 

48. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there 

was sufficient evidence of enhancement of 

injuries. 19 

iv. 

the plaintiff's 

The Unreasonably Dangerous Condition of the Lawnmower 

In Colorado, a manufacturer may not be held strictly liable 

unless a product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous. 

Union Supply Co. v. P~st, 583 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1978)(en bane). The 

defendants argue that the lawnmower was not unreasonably dangerous 

because the risk of harm from the rotating blades was one which 

19 

The defendants argue that the plaintiff's injuries could just 

as easily .. have been. caused by his fall down the hill as by the 

lawnmower's blades and that there was insufficient evidence for 

the jury to find enhancement of his injuries. They note that the 

lawnmower's seat was torn up during the accident and that the 

plaintiff's hand could similarly have been injured. There was 

clearly· sufficient evidence, however, for the jury to reach the 

enhancement of injuries conclusion. At best, this argument points 

to conflicting evidence and. conflicting evidence on an issue 

compels the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict. Ryder, 814 F.2d at 1418. 

20 

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-· , .. "· ,would, have been .. fully .·.anticipated., by. · the •.:-ordinary consumer. 20 

They rely heavily upon the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in 

Camancho v. Honda Motor Co., LTD., 701 P.2d 628 (Colo.App. 1985), 

rev'd, 741 P.2d 1240 (1987). The Court of Appeals' decision was 

reversed after this appeal was briefed and argued. The Colorado 

Supreme Court's reversal undercuts the defendants' argument. 

In Camancho, the plaintiff claimed that a motorcycle was 

defectively designed because it was not equipped with ''crash bars" 

or other devices to protect the driver's legs in the event of a 

collision. Camancho, 741 P.2d at 1242. In determining whether 

the motorcycle was unreasonably dangerous, the Court of Appeals 

adopted the consumer expectations test contained in comment i to 

the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 21 The court 

20 

The defendants' argument that the lawnmower was not 

unreasonably dangerous is directed to both the design defect and 

failure to warn claims. They argue that designing the lawnmower 

without a deadman device does not render it unreasonably dangerous 

since the danger ot the blades would have been within the 

contemplation of the ordinary consumer. They also argue that 

since the specific harm was fully apparent and would have been 

anticipated, no warning was required. For purposes of our 

analysis, it does not matter that the argument is made in both 

contexts. Colorado recognizes that products may be defective due 

to manufacturing defects, design defects, or for failure to warn. 

Ca~ancho v. Honda Motor Co., LTD., 741 F.2d 1240, 1247 (Colo. 

1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S.Ct. 1067 (1988). 

21 

The Colorado Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of strict 

liability as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A 

(1965). Camancho, 741 P.2d at 1244. Comment i provides that: 

The rule applied in this Section applies only where 

the defective condition of the product makes it 

unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 

The article sold must be dangerous to an extent 

beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

21 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 21 
. reasoned .,that .the··;jury· c0uld ·not· have.::reasonab]:y,., · determined that 

the risk of harm (injury to one's legs during a crash) would not 

have been fully anticipated by the ordinary consumer, 701 P.2d at 

631, and held the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 

In reversing, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the comment 

i consumer expectations test as a method of determining whether a 

product is unreasonably dangerous. Camancho, 741 F.2d at 1245. 

The court noted that the consumer expectations test is 

"substantially similar to the open and obvious standard 

specifically rejected in Pust." Id. at 1245. The primary focus 

of a products liability action must remain on the product and not 

the conduct of the hypothetical ordinary consumer, the court held, 

if the concept of enterprise liability for casting defective 

products into the stream of commerce is to have any effect. Id. 

at 1246. The court focused on whether the degree of inherent 

dangerousness could or should have been reduced and found ''some 

evidence" in. the record that Honda could have provided crash bars 

without impairing the motorcycle's utility or altering its nature. 

Id. at 1248-1249. 

Citing Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414 

(Colo. 1986), the Colorado Court reasoned that whether a product 

design is unreasonably dangerous is a determination which requires 

the balancing of a number of factors. 22 Camancho, 741 P.2d at 

(Footnote continued): 

22 

consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge 

common to the community as to its characteristics. 

Those factors include: 

(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

22 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 22 
· - 3.247-.,, ;·- ·Considering .· these.· factors,--.we·;:n'.hold the.re is sufficient 

evidence to support the inference that the mower was unreasonably 

dangerous. There was evidence, for example, of blade injuries 

resulting from tip-over accidents, see III R. 35-37, 82; V R. 28-

29, and that a deadman device might have prevented Tafoya's 

injuries and could feasibly have been installed. Thus, there is 

ample evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 

V 

Voluntary Assumption of a Known Risk 

The defendants argue that Tafoya voluntarily assumed the risk 

of injury. "In strict liability cases, assumption of the risk is 

defined as: 'voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter 

(Footnote continued): - its utility to the user and to the public as a whole. 

(2) The safety aspects of the product the 

likelihood that it will cause injury and the probable 

seriousness of the injury. 

(3) The availability of a substitute product which 

would meet the same need and not be as unsafe. 

(4) The manufacturer's ability to 

unsafe character the product without 

usefulness or making it too expensive to 

utility. 

eliminate the 

impairing its 

maintain its 

(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the 

exercise of care in the use of the product. 

(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers 

inherent in the product and their avoidability because 

of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of 

the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or 

instructions. 

(7) The feasibility, on the part of the 

manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price 

of the'product or carrying liability insurance. 

Camancho, 741 F.2d at 1247-1248 (citing Ortho, 722 P.2d at 414) 

(relying on Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for 

Products, 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 837-838 (1973)). 

23 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 23 
·· .. ~-a. known danger.·-·. 111 ., Jackson v .. Har.sec· Crop., ,.6.73. P. 2d 363, 366 

(Colo. 1983)(en bane) (quoting comment n, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

TORTS, § 402A (1965)). 23 The defendant must demonstrate that the 

plaintiff had actual knowledge of the specific danger posed by the 

defect and not just general knowledge that the product could be 

dangerous. Id. at 366 (citing Culp v. Rexnord & Booth-Rouse 

Equipment Co., 553 P.2d 844 (Colo. App. 1976)). Voluntary 

assumption of a known risk is distinguishable from ordinary 

contributory negligence, which consists of a failure to exercise 

due care to discover a defect or to guard against its existence. 

Jackson, 673 P.2d a~ 366. The burden of establishing the elements 

of voluntary assumption of a known risk is upon the party 

asserting it. Pust, 583 P.2d at 284. 

The trial court instructed the jury that voluntary assumption 

of a known risk is an affirmative defense which, if established, 

would preclude the plaintiff's recovery. 24 The jury, applying the 

23 

24 

Comment n provides that: 

Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a 

defense when such negligence consists merely in a 

failure to discover the defect in the product, or to 

guard against the possibility of its existence. On the 

other hand the form of contributory negligence which 

consists of voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to 

encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the 

name of assumption of risk, .is a defense under this 

Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the 

user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of 

the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to 

make use of the product and is injured by it, he is 

barred from recovery. · 

'Instruction 21 stated that: 

The voluntary and unreasonable use of a defective 

product with knowledge of the specific danger created by 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

24 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 24 
comparative>:·,·.negligence ... instcr-uct.ion~. r-educed the. plaintiff's award 

by 50% and did not, therefore, find that the plaintiff had 

voluntarily assumed the risk of injury. 25 Viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to Tafoya, see Trujillo, 825 F.2d at 

1456, we agree with the trial court that there is evidence to 

support the jury's conclusion that Tafoya did not voluntarily 

assume the risk of injury. 

There was evidence that Tafoya was aware that the lawnmower's 

blades would continue to turn unless disengaged, see IV R. 159, 

that he had an opportunity to disengage the blades after cutting 

the weeds, but chose not to, see IV R. 168, and that he knew that 

there were feasible alternatives to the tractor mower he selected. 

IV R. 152. But the defendants were required to demonstrate that 

Tafoya had actual knowledge of the specific danger. Pust, 583 

P.2d at 284. The specific dangers were not only that the 

lawnmower's blades would keep turning unless disengaged, but also 

that the lawnmower would tip on the slope. A general awareness 

(Footnote continued): 

25 

a defect is an affirmative defense. 

The Defendants, Sears Roebuck and Company and 

Roper, are not legally responsible to the Plaintiff, Mr. 

Tafoya, on the Plaintiff's claim of damages for sale of 

a defective product if this affirmative defense is 

proved. This affirmative defense is proved if you find 

all of the following: First, ar the time the Plaintiff 

was injured, he had actual knowledge of the specific 

danger created by ·the defect which he claims caused his 

injury. 

Two, the Plaintiff, while having such knowledge, 

voluntarily and unreasonably exposed himself to the risk 

of injury, and, three, the Plaintiff's use of the 

product was a cause of the Plaintiff's claimed injuries. 

There was no challenge to the comparative fault instructions. 

25 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 25 
.that ;One!s -body .... might become· .caught ·,.-,in-·.·the·,. moving parts of 

machinery and suffer injury is not sufficient. Id. at 284 n. 8. 

See also Culp, 553 P.2d at 844. Here, there was some evidence 

that Tafoya was negligent, and indeed, the jury found him 50% at 

fault. But we cannot say that the evidence warrants only the 

conclusion that Tafoya had actual knowledge of the specific 

danger. Ryder, 814 F.2d at 1418. The jury was entitled to find 

that the plaintiff had not voluntarily assumed the risk of injury. 

The trial court correctly denied the defendants' motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 

B. 

Denial of the Motion for a New Trial 

In challenging the denial of their motion for a new trial, 

the defendants assert the same arguments which they make in 

support of their challenge to the trial court's denial of their 

motion for judgment n.o.v. We have upheld the trial court's legal 

determinations. The questions of whether Sears is a manufacturer 

under Colorado strict liability statutes, whether the presumption 

of non-defectiveness was rebutted, whether there was sufficient 

evidence of enhancement of the plaintiff's injuries to support 

recovery under the crashworthiness doctrine, whether the lawnmower 

was unreasonably dangerous, and whether the plaintiff voluntarily 

assumed the risk of injury, are all questions about the weight of 

the evidence. 

"A motion for a new trial made on the ground that the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence normally presents a question 

of fact and not of law and is addressed to the discretion of the 

trial court." Brown v. McGraw Edison Company, 736 F.2d 609, 616 

26 

Appellate Case: 85-1818 Document: 01019896171 Date Filed: 09/01/1989 Page: 26 
.-- ( 10.th Cir •.. 1984) ;, ·.we.do .not: disturb, the deniaL .. of .a ,motion for a 

new trial unless there is a showing of a manifest abuse of 

discretion. Id. See also Trujillo, 825 F.2d at 1461 (a trial 

court's decision not to grant a new trial will not be overturned 

absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion)(quoting Ryder, 

814 F.2d at 1424). The standard we use in making this 

determination is whether the verdict is "clearly, decidedly, or 

overwhelmingly" against the weight of the evidence. Champion Home 

Builders v. Shumate, 388 F.2d 806, 808 (10th Cir 1967). For the 

same reasons discussed in the context of the trial court's denial 

of the defendants' motion for judgment n.o.v., we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion for a new 

trial. 

AFFIRMED. 

27 

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