Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-14628/USCOURTS-ca11-15-14628-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J&J Management Consulting
Appellant
Caterina Johnson
Appellant
Securities and Exchange Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-14628

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:01-cv-07874-DTKH

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

J&J MANAGEMENT CONSULTING, 

a.k.a. 1287769 Ontario Inc.,

and

CATERINA JOHNSON, 

 Defendants - Appellants. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(October 3, 2016)

USCA11 Case: 15-14628 Date Filed: 10/03/2016 Page: 1 of 5
2

Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Caterina Johnson and J&J Management Consulting (J&J), a Canadian 

company wholly-owned by Ms. Johnson, appeal the district court’s denial of their 

motion for relief from default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.

This case stems from a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) action against 

Paul Johnson—Ms. Johnson’s son—and others for the fraudulent offer and sale of 

unregistered securities in Link Express Delivery Solutions, Inc., a company 

founded and run by Paul Johnson. The district court entered default judgments 

over twelve years ago against J&J and Ms. Johnson as “relief defendants,” for 

receiving securities fraud proceeds from Paul Johnson. Ms. Johnson appeals that 

judgment for the second time. She proceeded pro se in the first appeal. This is 

J&J’s first appeal.1

 The relevant facts are set forth in this court’s previous opinion

addressing Ms. Johnson’s first appeal. See S.E.C. v. Johnson, 436 F. App’x 939 

(11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Ms. Johnson and J&J make four arguments as to 

 1 In the original appeal Ms. Johnson was barred from representing J&J Management pro se. 

USCA11 Case: 15-14628 Date Filed: 10/03/2016 Page: 2 of 5
3

why the default judgment should be set aside. We will address each argument in 

turn.2

Appellants first argue that the original court lacked jurisdiction over them 

because the money they received was not from Paul Johnson’s securities fraud but 

from legitimate business transactions. As such, there was no jurisdiction and the 

judgment is void under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). The Supreme 

Court has stated “a void judgment is one so affected by a fundamental infirmity 

that the infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final. The list of 

such infirmities is exceedingly short; otherwise, Rule 60(b)(4)’s exception to 

finality would swallow the rule.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 

U.S. 260, 270, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1377 (2010) (citations omitted). Here, while J&J 

and Ms. Johnson challenge some of Paul Johnson’s proceeds, they both admit they

retained a portion of those proceeds. This admission is enough to reasonably

confer jurisdiction and does not rise to the level of a “fundamental infirmity.” See 

id.

Appellants next argument is that failure to join J&J Business Management, 

Inc., a separate Florida corporation, renders the default judgment void under Rule 

60(b)(4) due to a lack of jurisdiction. This argument is meritless. They do not cite 

 2 A denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, but a denial 

of a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) is reviewed de novo. See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 

(11th Cir. 2001).

USCA11 Case: 15-14628 Date Filed: 10/03/2016 Page: 3 of 5
4

to any authority supporting such a contention. The alleged failure to join a third 

relief defendant does not affect the jurisdiction over either appellant and certainly 

does not rise to the level of a “fundamental infirmity.” See id. 

Appellants third argument is that the district court erred by entering 

judgment against them—relief defendants—before the liability of the wrongdoing 

defendant was adjudicated. This argument was raised by Ms. Johnson in her initial 

appeal and we dismissed the argument. See Johnson, 436 F. App’x at 945–46. We 

dismiss their attempt at the same argument here. 

Appellants finally argue that the judgment is erroneous because it is larger 

than the amount ascribed to Paul Johnson—the wrongdoer defendant.3 In contrast 

to other claims, timeliness is addressed here because the first two arguments were 

made under Rule 60(b)(4), which can be made at any time, whereas this claim is 

unrelated to Rule 60(b)(4). Oakes v. Horizon Financial, S.A., 259 F.3d 1315, 1317 

(11th Cir. 2001). All motions under Rule 60(b) other than those based on Rule 

60(b)(4) must be made within a reasonable time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). The 

district court entered a final judgment in Paul Johnson’s case on June 21, 2007. 

J&J did not file a motion challenging its default judgment (which was entered on 

May 17, 2002) until February 27, 2015. Waiting over 7 years after the issue arose 

 3 We note that the SEC stated in its brief that it will not attempt to recover from Paul Johnson, 

Ms. Johnson, and J&J more than the amount Paul Johnson has been ordered to disgorge—

$1,505,850—despite the fact the default judgments against Ms. Johnson and J&J total $2.84 

million. See SEC Br. 24 fn. 8. 

USCA11 Case: 15-14628 Date Filed: 10/03/2016 Page: 4 of 5
5

and 13 years after default judgment was entered does not constitute a reasonable 

time under the circumstances. And if this is the first time Ms. Johnson raises this 

issue, she similarly did not file within a reasonable time. Alternatively, if she 

raised this issue in her earlier appeal, we are bound by the law-of-the-case doctrine. 

Finding no merit in Appellants arguments, the district court’s ruling is 

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 15-14628 Date Filed: 10/03/2016 Page: 5 of 5