Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02263/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02263-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marlin Hawk Wing
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2263

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of South Dakota.

Marlin Hawk Wing, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 15, 2005

Filed: January 6, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Marlin Hawk Wing pleaded guilty to larceny in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 661

and 1153. The district court1

 sentenced Hawk Wing to 18 months in prison, 2 years

of supervised release, $1,747.36 in restitution, and a $100 assessment to the Victims'

Assistance Fund. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. 

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The five convictions for which Hawk Wing received criminal history points

were: carrying a concealed weapon, attempted burglary, two convictions for petty

theft, and possession of marijuana. 

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I. Background

Hawk Wing pleaded guilty to stealing construction equipment from the Oglala

Sioux Tribal Authority. After his plea, a presentence report ("PSR") was prepared that

assigned Hawk Wing six criminal history points based upon five prior offenses.2

Although the PSR recommended no "Chapter Four Enhancements," the "Aggravating

and/or Mitigating Circumstances," section stated that "[t]he defendant has an

extensive criminal history for which no criminal history points were assigned." Hawk

Wing accepted responsibility resulting in an adjusted offense level of four. Hawk

Wing's Guidelines range calculation was zero to six months. Pending sentencing,

Hawk Wing was incarcerated at the Pennington and Meade County jails. Hawk Wing

committed two rule infractions during his time at those facilities.

At sentencing, the government, consistent with the plea agreement,

recommended that the district court reduce Hawk Wing's offense level by two levels

and that the district court sentence him at the low end of the appropriate Guidelines

range. The district court, however, denied Hawk Wing the two-level downward

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility based on his two rule infractions at the

Pennington and Meade County jails. The district court then proceeded to consider the

adequacy of Hawk Wing's criminal history and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

The district court determined that Hawk Wing's criminal history score did not

adequately reflect his record because the PSR did not assign any criminal history

points for Hawk Wing's juvenile adjudications, seven additional adult criminal

convictions, and "other criminal conduct." "Other criminal conduct" included Hawk

Wing's arrest for having an open container for which he pleaded guilty; his arrest for

consuming alcohol in a public place for which he pleaded guilty; his four active

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warrants for failing to appear stemming from three arrests; his arrest for tampering

with a motor vehicle for which court information is unknown; and his arrest for thirddegree burglary for which the charge against him was later dismissed. Based on Hawk

Wing's conduct for which the PSR assigned no criminal history points, the district

court increased his criminal history points from six to seven, which placed him in a

Category IV and correlated to a sentence of six to twelve months of incarceration. 

The district court then addressed whether an upward departure would be

reasonable. The district court stated, "[w]hile the Court recognizes that the guidelines

are not mandatory, the Court addresses the issue of a departure upward which would

be evaluated from the standpoint of reasonableness." The district court recognized

that United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2005), outlines the procedure

district courts should follow in determining a proper sentence. Applying the

procedure in Haack, the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors, stating its

basis for its upward departure as follows:

The Court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed shall

consider, one, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant. In that connection, the Court

notes that the charge, which in this case was larceny, involved

essentially the theft of various tools and personal property, not high in

value but approximately $1,700 in value. The Court has set forth

specifically the history and characteristics of this defendant and that

history and characteristic[s] speak for itself. 

In considering the need for the sentence imposed under [§] 3553(a)(2),

the Court considers the seriousness of the offense to promote respect for

the law and to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. The Court is of the abiding

feeling that the defendant, by reason of his past history, cannot be

deterred from further criminal conduct. By the defendant's own

admission he is an alcoholic and incarceration is reflected by the Court's

sentence and will assist with providing him with needed education or

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Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states the following:

Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range on a

ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in

a party's prehearing submission, the court must give the parties

reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure. The notice

must specify any ground on which the court is contemplating a

departure. 

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vocational training, medical care, or other corrections treatment in the

most effective manner. 

The district court then sentenced Hawk Wing to a "non-guideline" sentence of 18

months' imprisonment. Hawk Wing filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II. Analysis 

Hawk Wing raises five arguments on appeal: (1) that the district court failed

to provide him with reasonable notice of the upward departure; (2) that the district

court erroneously relied on Hawk Wing's prior arrests in determining whether to

depart upwards; (3) that the district court utilized incarceration to provide

rehabilitative services; (4) that the district court's finding that Hawk Wing's criminal

history required placement in a criminal history Category IV rather than a Category

III precluded any further upward departure based upon the inadequacy of his criminal

history; and (5) that the district court failed to impose a reasonable sentence. 

A. Notice of Departure

Hawk Wing first argues that the district court failed to give the parties

reasonable advance notice of its intention to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines

pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(h).3

 Hawk Wing supports his

contention based on the PSR's failure to explicitly recommend a departure or identify

any Guidelines provision for a departure and specifically concluded there were no

"Chapter Four Enhancements." In response, the government asserts that the district

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court gave Hawk Wing reasonable notice of departure because the PSR stated, under

the heading "Aggravating or Mitigating Circumstances," that "the defendant has an

extensive criminal history for which no criminal history points were assigned."

Because Hawk Wing failed to raise his lack of notice argument during the sentencing

hearing, we must review the adequacy of notice issue for plain error. United States

v. Sample, 213 F.3d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 2000). 

A district court must give notice to the parties of its intent to make a sua sponte

departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129

(1991). In Burns, the PSR specifically stated that there were "no factors that would

warrant a departure from the guideline sentence." Id. at 131. Nevertheless, the district

court announced at the end of sentencing that it was departing from the Sentencing

Guidelines range without previously giving the parties advance notice of its intent to

depart. Id. In reversing the court of appeal's affirmance of the district court's

departure, the Court held that Rule 32 required that the district court "give the parties

reasonable notice that it is contemplating [a departure]" before it can "depart upward

on a ground not identified as a ground for upward departure either in the

presentence report or in a prehearing submission by the Government." Id. at 138–39

(emphasis added). 

In cases following Burns, we have addressed when the district court must

provide formal notice to the parties of its intent to depart upward. In United States v.

Andrews, 948 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1991), the PSR "identified two factors that might

warrant an upward departure." Id. at 449. Recognizing that the PSR "expressly noted

the presence of factors which might warrant departure," this court held that the

district court did not have to give formal notice of its intent to depart. Id. In addition

to Andrews, this court has found that grounds for a departure existed where the PSR

included a section entitled "Factors That May Warrant Departure," which listed

specific factors that could justify an upward departure. United States v. Beatty, 9 F.3d

686, 688 (8th Cir. 1993). Similarly, when a PSR indicates that the defendant's

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convictions could support an upward departure, this court has held that "[n]o other

form of notice is required if the grounds for an upward departure are identified in the

PSR." United States v. Drapeau, 110 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Sample, 213

F.3d at 1029 (involving a PSR that indicated an upward departure may be warranted).

Thus, when notice of departure is "sufficiently provided" in the PSR, the

district court is not required to give the parties notice of upward departure. United

States v. Hill, 951 F.2d 867, 867 (8th Cir. 1991). Even if the PSR does not

affirmatively recommend an upward departure, if it includes "specific grounds that

may form the basis for an upward departure," then Rule 32's notice requirement is

satisfied. Sample, 213 F.3d at 1031–32 (holding that because the "district court's

departure decision directly correlate[d] with the PSIR's plain language," the defendant

received adequate notice). Only when the "ground for upward departure is not

identified in 'the presentence report or in a prehearing submission by the

government'" must the district court itself provide advance notice. Id. (quoting Burns,

501 U.S. at 138). When the district court is required to give notice, it must give such

notice before the sentencing hearing. United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 280

(8th Cir. 1996). 

In contrast to the preceding cases, we have held that where a PSR "explicitly

stated" that there were no factors warranting an upward departure, the defendant

failed to receive proper notice. United States v. Johnson, 121 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th

Cir. 1997). In Johnson, because the PSR did not give the defendant proper notice of

the potential upward departure, the district court itself should have provided the

defendant with notice that it was considering departure. Id. 

In this case, neither party disputes that the district court itself did not provide

advance notice of its intent to depart from the Guidelines to the parties; therefore, the

issue is whether the PSR put Hawk Wing on notice that the district court might

consider an upward departure. Unlike the PSR in Burns and Johnson, Hawk Wing's

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PSR did not expressly state that no factors existed to warrant a departure. While the

PSR did not affirmatively recommend an upward departure like the PSR in Andrews

and Beatty, it did include a section entitled "Aggravating and Mitigating

Circumstances," which informed Hawk Wing that he had an extensive criminal

history for which the PSR assigned no criminal history points. Because the PSR

included a specific ground that could form the basis for an upward departure—a

criminal history for which no criminal history points were assigned—the notice

requirement of Rule 32 was satisfied. 

B. Prior Arrests

Hawk Wing also challenges the district court's reliance, in part, on prior arrests

in determining whether to depart upwards. The government responds that even

without considering the prior arrests, the district court had ample information before

it to justify the upward departure.

 A district court is prohibited from considering a prior arrest record itself "for

purposes of an upward departure." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(3); United States v.

Cammisano, 917 F.2d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 1990). However, § 4A1.3(a)(1) of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines provides that "[i]f reliable information indicates

that the defendant's criminal history category substantially under-represents the

seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant

will commit other crimes, an upward departure may be warranted." Thus, a sentencing

court may consider prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in conviction;

prior similar civilly-adjudicated misconduct; and prior sentences, but, a prior arrest

record standing alone cannot be considered. United States v. Joshua, 40 F.3d 948,

952–53 (8th Cir. 1994). 

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United States v. Dixon, 318 F.3d 585, 591 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the

facts provided in the PSR—which the defendant failed to contest—went beyond a

mere record of arrest so as to not violate § 4A1.3(a)(3)); United States v. Hernandez,

160 F.3d 661, 670 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that because the PSR failed to recount

the facts underlying the dismissed counts, the court abused its discretion by imposing

an upward departure "based on a mere list of arrests"); United States v. Ruffin, 997

F.2d 343, 346 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that the district court could not rely on a PSR

in imposing an upward departure because while the report described the charges, it

was silent as to the facts underlying the charges); United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d

1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that the PSR was "far more in depth than mere

arrest records" because it provided a summary of the facts surrounding the arrests);

United States v. Cantu-Dominguez, 898 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that

when a court is left with nothing but an arrest record that did not result in convictions,

such information is not "reliable information" that justifies an upward departure). 

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When the PSR includes the defendant's arrest record, we and other circuits4

have held that the PSR must also provide specific facts underlying the arrests in order

for the arrest record to justify an upward departure; otherwise, the district court may

not rely on a mere record of arrest. Id. at 953 (holding that because the district court

considered a record of arrest when it departed, the case must be remanded for

reconsideration of the sentence). In United States v. Morse, 983 F.2d 851, 854 (8th

Cir. 1993), the district court departed upward from the Guidelines based on "previous

convictions not counted in Morse's score, pending charges, and the failure of the

previous sentences to deter Morse." With regard to the district court's consideration

of the previous convictions that were not counted in Morse's criminal history score,

we concluded that such reliance on the previous convictions was not error. Id. at 854.

In addressing the district court's reliance on Morse's pending charges in imposing an

upward departure, this court noted that "[o]ther circuits have recognized that courts

may consider pending charges or uncharged conduct in its determination of a

defendant's accurate criminal history." Id. This court explained, however, that "[e]ven

without considering the two pending charges against Morse, the district court had

adequate grounds to depart under § 4A1.3." Id. Thus, the court concluded that while

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"unproven charges are not a solid basis for enhancement . . . such unproven charges

are, under the circumstances of this case, including the defendant's background, more

than ample to warrant the departure taken." Id. at 854–55. 

We hold the district court did not err in considering Hawk Wing's guilty pleas.

Just as the district court in Morse could properly rely on previous convictions not

counted in the defendant's criminal history score, so too could the district court in this

case rely on prior charges for which Hawk Wing pleaded guilty. Because Hawk Wing

failed to object to the inclusion of the guilty pleas in the PSR, we deem those facts

admitted. United States v. Paz, 411 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2005). 

However, the district court could not properly rely on the four active warrants

against Hawk Wing stemming from four prior arrests because the PSR did not set

forth the factual details underlying the charges. Therefore, under Morse, we must

determine whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not

relied upon the pending charges. Unlike the district court in Joshua, the district court

did not solely rely on Hawk Wing's prior arrests in departing upward; instead, it also

cited Hawk Wing's juvenile adjudications and seven additional adult convictions to

justify the upward departure. Thus, we conclude that the district court had adequate

grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which

the PSR did not set forth the factual details. 

C. Improper Incarceration

Hawk Wing also argues that the district court's statement that "incarceration

will provide [Hawk Wing] with needed educational and vocational training, medical

care, and other correctional treatment in the most effective manner" was directly

contrary to the statutory prohibition against using imprisonment to promote

rehabilitation as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3582 and 28 U.S.C. § 944(k). We disagree.

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The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) is

only directed to the Federal Sentencing Commission, not the district courts.

Therefore, when reviewing a claim that the district court improperly considered

rehabilitation and correction in determining a defendant's sentence, an appellate court

should review the district court's conduct under § 3582. United States v. Hardy, 101

F.3d 1210, 1212–13 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 561 (9th

Cir. 1994). 

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When determining the appropriate term of imprisonment, courts should

recognize that "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction

and rehabilitation." 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Thus, Congress required the Federal

Sentencing Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness

of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the

defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,

medical care, or other correctional treatment." 28 U.S.C. § 994(k). Because of the

prohibitive language in § 3852 and § 994(k), "other circuits have recognized

. . . when imposing an original sentence to a term of imprisonment, it is inappropriate

for the district court to consider rehabilitation of the defendant as the sole purpose for

imprisonment." United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing

United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000)); United States v.

Jackson, 70 F.3d 847, 879 (6th Cir. 1995).5

While the district court must acknowledge that imprisonment is not an

appropriate means to promote rehabilitation, it must consider, for sentencing

purposes, the need for the sentence imposed to provide the defendant "with needed

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner." United States v. Jasper, 338 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir. 2003)

(comparing § 3852(a) with § 3553(a)(2)); United States v. Holmes, 283 F.3d 966, 968

(8th Cir. 2002) (comparing § 3852(a) with § 3553(a)(2)). See also United States v.

Hardy, 101 F.3d 1210, 1212–13 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that when a district judge is

sentencing a defendant within the Guidelines range, it is instructed by §

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The Second Circuit explained that while Congress wanted to assure that

defendants were not incarcerated in order to put them in a place "where it was hoped

that rehabilitation would occur," Congress "expressed no hostility to rehabilitation

as an objective of sentencing." United States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 946–47 (2d Cir.

1992) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Harris, 990 F.2d 594, 596

(11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Maier, 975 F.2d at 946–47). 

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3553(a)(2)(D) to consider educational, medical, and other correctional needs); United

States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that § 3582(a) refers

district courts to factors set forth in § 3553(a)(2)(D)). 

The Sixth Circuit explained the interplay between § 3852(a) and §

3553(a)(2)(D) as follows: 

For purposes of initial sentencing, a court may not consider

rehabilitative goals in considering whether to impose a sentence of

imprisonment. However, it may consider rehabilitative goals in

determining whether to sentence a defendant within a particular

guideline range. 

Although it is difficult to see a distinction between the imposition of a

sentence of imprisonment and the length of imprisonment, the statutory

scheme does suggest that rehabilitative needs are relevant to the

determination of the length of a sentence. 

Jackson, 70 F.3d at 879–80, 880 n.6 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

Thus, after the district court chooses imprisonment as a proper punishment, it is not

prohibited under § 3582 from considering correction and rehabilitation in determining

the length of the imprisonment. Duran, 37 F.3d at 561 n.3.6

We conclude the district court did not improperly consider rehabilitative goals

in violation § 3852. Neither the parties nor the district court ever discussed the

possibility of Hawk Wing receiving probation instead of a term of imprisonment.

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Instead, the district court had already determined that Hawk Wing's placement in a

criminal history Category IV subjected him to a range of six to twelve months of

incarceration. Only after determining that Hawk Wing would receive a sentence of

imprisonment did the district court consider the § 3553(a)(2)(D) factor of

rehabilitation in deciding the appropriate length of the sentence. At sentencing, the

district court directly quoted § 3553(a)(2)(D) in explaining its reasons for an upward

departure. Because the district court considered § 3553(a)(2)(D) in determining the

length of the sentence of incarceration rather than whether to incarcerate, we find no

error. 

D. Criminal History

Lastly, Hawk Wing argues that because the district court established his

criminal history category at Category IV instead of Category III, it was precluded

from any further upward departure based upon an inadequacy of criminal history. In

addition, Hawk Wing argues that the district court's sentence is unreasonable under

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 

Section 4A1.3(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provides that

"[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal history category

substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or

the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure may

be warranted." When imposing an upward departure under § 4A1.3(a)(1), the

sentencing court "first must proceed along the criminal history axis of the sentencing

matrix, comparing the defendant's criminal history with the criminal histories of other

offenders in each higher category." LeCompte, 99 F.3d at 280 (citing United States

v. Day, 998 F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir.1993)). If the court arrives at Category VI, the

highest criminal history category, and determines that the sentencing range remains

inadequate, then it "may impose a reasonable sentence above the Category VI range."

Id. (citing Day, 998 F.2d at 625). While the sentencing court does not have to

mechanically discuss each criminal history category it rejects, the court must

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adequately explain and support the upward departure. Id. (citing Day, 998 F.2d at

625); United States v. Thornberg, 326 F.3d 1023, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing United

States v. Collins, 104 F.3d 143, 145 (8th Cir. 1997)). 

Since United States v. Booker, ___U.S.___, 125 S. Ct. 739, 757 (2005), which

declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory, our circuit has urged

district courts to follow a three-step sentencing approach. Haack, 403 F.3d at 1002

(citing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2005)). First, the

sentencing court must "determine the appropriate guidelines sentencing range, since

that range does remain an important factor to be considered in the imposition of a

sentence." Id. at 1003. When determining the appropriate sentencing range, the

district court should identify potential sentencing ranges, the reason why the court is

not choosing a specific range, and other § 3553(a) factors. Id. The district court

should not "determine the sentence in any manner other than the way the sentence

would have been determined pre-Booker." Id. Second, after determining the

appropriate sentencing range, the district court must decide if a "traditional departure"

is appropriate under Part K or § 4A1.3. Id. at 1003. Finally, after the district court

determines the Guidelines sentence, it must consider "all other factors in § 3553(a)

to determine whether to impose the sentence under the guidelines or a non-guidelines

sentence." Id. When a court of appeals reviews a district court's sentencing

determination for reasonableness, "the correct guidelines range is still 'the critical

starting point for the imposition of a sentence.'" United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d

1080, 1082 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012(8th Cir.

2005)).

If the parties do not dispute the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, then

the appellate court must determine "whether the sentence imposed is a reasonable

'guidelines sentence' and, if not, whether there are other factors under § 3553(a) that

would make the sentence reasonable." Id. "Reasonableness as a constraint on a

district court's discretion to depart . . . infers a limited range of choice." Id. at 1004.

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A district court's discretionary sentencing determination may be unreasonable if it

does not consider "a relevant factor that should have received significant weight,

gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only

appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at

a sentence outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case." Id.

Thus, an appellate court must determine "whether the sentence, as imposed, is a

reasonable 'non-guidelines sentence' applying the . . . § 3553(a) factors." Id. at 1006.

Here, Hawk Wing's argument is not that the district court's criminal history

increase from a Category III to a Category IV violated LeCompte. Instead, Hawk

Wing asserts that once the district court placed him in a Category IV with a

sentencing range of 6 to 12 months, it could not impose an even higher eighteenmonth "non-guideline" sentence because it did not examine whether a sentence under

Category V or Category VI would be appropriate. Hawk Wing, however, ignores the

three-step approach to determining a sentence that this court set forth in Haack. Hawk

Wing fails to assert that the district court selected an inappropriate Guidelines

sentencing range or misapplied "traditional departure" rules to arrive at a Guidelines

sentence of 6 to 12 months under Category IV. 

Because Hawk Wing only challenges what the district court referred to as a

"non-guideline sentence" of 18 months, this court must determine whether the "nonguideline" sentence was reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors. The district

court, in calculating Hawk Wing's sentence, followed our procedure in Haack by

considering the § 3553(a) factors. First, the district court considered "the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant"

under § 3553(a)(1) by "not[ing] that the charge . . . involved essentially the theft of

various tools and personal property, not high in value but approximately $1,700 in

value." In addition, the district court stated that it "has set forth specifically the

history and characteristics of [Hawk Wing] and that history and characteristic[s]

speak for itself." Second, the district court considered the need for the defendant's

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sentence to "reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and

to provide just punishment for the offense" under § 3553(a)(2)(A) and the need for

the sentence "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct" under §

3553(a)(2)(B). The district court was "of the abiding feeling that the defendant, by

reason of his past history, cannot be deterred from further criminal conduct." Finally,

the district court considered whether the sentence imposed would "provide the

defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other

correctional treatment in the most effective manner" under § 3553(a)(2)(D).

Regarding this factor, the district court stated, "[b]y the defendant's own admission

he is an alcoholic and incarceration is reflected by the Court's sentence and will assist

with providing him with needed education or vocational training, medical care, or

other corrections treatment in the most effective manner."

Based on the district court's thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors in

determining Hawk Wing's sentence and our review of that analysis, we cannot say

that the sentence imposed is unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.

LOKEN, Chief Judge, concurring.

I concur but write separately to note my partial disagreement with the court’s

analysis of guidelines departure issues after United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court’s remedial opinion stripped the guidelines of

their mandatory effect but held that federal sentencing courts must still “consult [the]

Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” 125 S. Ct. at 767. The

Court also left intact 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1), which provides that an appellate court

“shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings” if it determines that a

sentence was “imposed as a result of an incorrect application” of the guidelines.

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Finally, the Court instructed courts to review all sentences -- whether within or

outside the advisory guidelines range -- for reasonableness as measured against the

sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 125 S. Ct. at 765-66.

I agree with our panels that have interpreted Booker as requiring a two step

process in imposing and reviewing sentences under the new advisory guidelines.

“We first ask whether the district court correctly applied the guidelines in determining

a guidelines sentencing range. If the guidelines were correctly applied, we then

consider whether the sentence chosen by the district court was reasonable in light of

all the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1082 (8th Cir.

2005). My concern grows out of dicta in United States v. Haack that inserted an

intermediate step in this process: after determining the correct sentencing range, “the

court should then decide if a traditional departure is appropriate under Part K and/or

§ 4A1.3” of the guidelines. 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

276 (2005). In this case, applying that dicta, the court analyzes a number of

“traditional departure” issues under pre-Booker mandatory guidelines authorities. 

In my view, this approach unduly complicates our appellate task and may

compel a significant number of essentially meaningless remands. In reviewing postBooker sentences outside the guidelines range imposed by a district court that

correctly determined that range, I would instead adopt the approach of the Seventh

Circuit: “after Booker what is at stake is the reasonableness of the sentence, not the

correctness of the ‘departures’ as measured against pre-Booker decisions that cabined

the discretion of sentencing courts to depart from guidelines that were then

mandatory.” United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005). 

By this approach, I do not suggest that district courts should ignore altogether

the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements in § 4A1.3 and Part 5K of the nowAppellate Case: 05-2263 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/06/2006 Entry ID: 1993978
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advisory guidelines. The district court must give reasons for sentencing outside a

properly determined guidelines range. Explaining whether those reasons are

consistent with prior limitations on the court’s departure authority under the

mandatory guidelines will obviously assist this court in determining on appeal

whether the sentence is reasonable, and may well be essential when, as in Haack, the

government has filed a substantial assistance motion. However, many departure rules

under the mandatory guidelines have little or no practical impact on sentencing under

the post-Booker advisory guidelines. In determining whether to remand under

§ 3742(f)(1) because of “an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines,” I

would deem any such violations of those rules to be harmless error.

In this case, for example, I consider the alleged departure notice error to be

harmless because, after Booker, every defendant is aware that the court may sentence

outside the guidelines range based on the § 3553(a) factors. I also consider the

district court’s alleged errors in relying on prior arrests and in departing upward from

criminal history category IV to be harmless because they are not reversible error

under Booker, so long as the sentence is reasonable. Because the court determines,

correctly in my view, that Hawk Wing’s sentence is reasonable, a remand on either

or both of these grounds would not result in a different sentence.

Subject to these caveats, I concur and join in the opinion of the court. 

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Appellate Case: 05-2263 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/06/2006 Entry ID: 1993978