Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-02159/USCOURTS-ca10-07-02159-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Las Cruces
Appellee
Nathan Krause
Appellee
Cindy McCants
Appellee
John Vondrak
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

August 5, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JOHN VONDRAK,

Plaintiff-Appellee/CrossAppellant,

v. Nos. 07-2148 and 07-2159

CITY OF LAS CRUCES; CINDY

McCANTS and NATHAN KRAUSE,

individuals and employees of the Las

Cruces Police Department, 

Defendants-Appellants/CrossAppellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

(D.C. No. CIV-05-172-JB/LFG)

David P. Lutz (William L. Lutz with him on the briefs), Martin, Lutz, Roggow,

Hosford & Eubanks, P.C., Las Cruces, NM, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Barry J. Byrnes, Las Cruces, NM, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Before TACHA, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.

This is an action brought by plaintiff John Vondrak under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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against Officer Cindy McCants, Officer Nathan Krause, and the City of Las

Cruces, New Mexico (collectively, “Defendants”). Vondrak has alleged claims

against McCants and Krause for illegal arrest, excessive force, and inadequate

medical attention, and Vondrak has included similar claims against the City for its

failure to train its police officers adequately. The district court granted summary

judgment to all Defendants on the inadequate medical attention claim, and to

Krause on the illegal arrest claim. The district court denied summary judgment to

Defendants on Vondrak’s other claims, holding that McCants was not entitled to

qualified immunity on either the illegal arrest or the excessive force claim, and

Krause was not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. All

Defendants appeal, and Vondrak has filed a cross-appeal. We have jurisdiction

over McCants’ appeal and Krause’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

reverse the denial of qualified immunity on the illegal arrest claim and affirm the

denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. We dismiss the City’s

appeal and Vondrak’s cross-appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

I.

On August 18, 2003, the Las Cruces Police Department established a

sobriety checkpoint at the corner of Valley Drive and Hayner Avenue in Las

Cruces, New Mexico. At approximately 10:10 p.m., John Vondrak approached

the checkpoint in his 1994 Mercury Cougar, and an unidentified police officer

asked Vondrak if he had consumed any alcohol that evening. Vondrak responded

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 The transcript of their conversation has been prepared from a tape in

Officer McCants’ belt recorder, which she activated shortly after her encounter

with Vondrak began. It is unclear what, if anything, transpired between Vondrak

and McCants before she turned on her belt recorder. 

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that he bought a beer about three or four hours earlier, and consumed

approximately one-third of it. The officer directed Vondrak to pull his car over to

the side of the road. 

Officer McCants approached Vondrak’s car and asked, “You’ve admitted to

drinking today?” Transcript, Def. ROA, at 56.1

Vondrak responded, “I had one beer three hours ago.” Id.

McCants explained to Vondrak that she was going to conduct field sobriety

tests:

Officer McCants: Since you have admitted to drinking, we’re going

to give you a field sobriety test, okay?

(Indiscernible radio traffic.)

Dr. Vondrak: I can handle that.

Officer McCants: Do you want to take the test?

Dr. Vondrak: Absolutely.

Officer McCants: Okay. Let’s go over here where it’s flat. Go

ahead and stand right here facing me. Do you

have any physical ailments that cause you any

problems in walking, standing?

Dr. Vondrak: I have no problems.

Officer McCants: You’re in fairly good health?

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 As the district court noted, the police report states that Officer McCants

“could smell a strong [sic] of an alcoholic beverage.” Police Report, Def. ROA,

at 53. The district court declined to consider this statement because it “was not

included in the parties’ briefing, in either parties’ statement of facts, or at oral

argument.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 3 n.2. Because the district court did not consider this

fact, we may not now consider it:

Individual defendants . . . may interlocutorily appeal the denial of

qualified immunity. However, [Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 312-

13 (1995),] provides that the scope of such appeals is limited to

“purely legal” challenges to the district court’s ruling on whether a

plaintiff’s legal rights were clearly established, and cannot include

attacks on the court’s “evidence sufficiency” determinations about

whether there are genuine disputes of fact. That is, we can only

review whether the district court “mistakenly identified clearly

established law . . . given [ ] the facts that the district court assumed

when it denied summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason.” Id.

at 319.

Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 700 (10th Cir. 1995) (some citations

omitted). For similar reasons, we will also refrain from considering the

deposition testimony of Sergeant Kerry Clements that Defendants reference in

their brief.

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Dr. Vondrak: I’m in excellent health.

Id. at 56-57.2

McCants first described the “one-legged stand test” to Vondrak, which

required him to lift one of his legs six inches above the ground, point his toe, and

count to thirty. Vondrak responded that he “probably couldn’t even do that if

[he’d] never had a drink.” Transcript, Def. ROA, at 57. McCants believed that

Vondrak’s statement was a preemptive attempt to justify failing the test. During

the test, Vondrak swayed and put his foot down several times. McCants

concluded that Vondrak had failed the test.

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McCants next described the “walk and turn test” to Vondrak, which

required him to walk nine steps, heel to toe, down an imaginary line, and then

turn around and walk nine steps back. Vondrak had trouble with the test, and

McCants concluded that he had failed it. Vondrak claims that he did not

understand McCants’ instructions. 

Finally, McCants administered the “horizontal gaze nystagmus test,” which

required Vondrak to follow a pen with his eyes without moving his head. 

McCants concluded that Vondrak had failed this test as well. 

Because Vondrak had admitted consuming alcohol and had failed the field

sobriety tests, McCants believed that Vondrak had committed the crime of

Driving While Under the Influence. McCants placed him under arrest and

handcuffed him. Pursuant to police department policy, McCants double-locked

the handcuffs.

Officer Nathan Krause observed McCants administer the field sobriety

tests. After McCants placed Vondrak in handcuffs, Krause performed a pat-down

search of Vondrak and inventoried Vondrak’s car. Vondrak requested that the

officers take him to a hospital immediately, so that he could “take . . . an alcohol

test.” Transcript, Def. ROA, at 62. 

According to McCants, Vondrak did not complain about the handcuffs

when she first placed them on him. McCants also claims that “[n]othing that

occurred over the course of the evening would have led me to believe that Dr.

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 The transcript covers this time period, but it does not clarify whether

Vondrak complained about the handcuffs.

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Vondrak would suffer injury from the handcuffs.” McCants Aff., Def. ROA, at

51, ¶ 11. Likewise, Krause claims that Vondrak never complained about the

handcuffs during the pat-down search or while Krause was on the scene. Vondrak

claims, in contrast, that he told the officers “[a] half dozen times” that the

handcuffs were too tight and that his wrists were hurting and going numb. 

Vondrak Dep., Pl. ROA, at 57. He claims that, although he did not “cry out,” he

told McCants “that [his] wrists hurt immediately when she put [the handcuffs] on

. . . , when she clamped down hard on both of them.” Id. at 58-59.3

 He also

claims that he told McCants in the patrol car on the way to the police station that

“the handcuffs were too tight, and that they . . . felt like . . . they were bleeding,

that they were too tight, cutting into my wrists.” Id. at 58. 

McCants drove Vondrak to the police station. After they arrived, McCants

administered two IR-5000 tests on Vondrak, both of which produced a bloodalcohol content reading of 0.00. She then asked another officer to perform an

RBT test, which produced a blood-alcohol content reading of 0.00. After the

officers tested Vondrak, they held him for another one-and-a-half hours. During

this time, Vondrak made several requests for someone to loosen his handcuffs

because his wrists were hurting; all requests were ignored. At some point, a

police department employee photographed Vondrak’s wrists. In the photographs,

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Vondrak’s wrists appear red, but they do not appear cut or scraped. Eventually,

the officers charged Vondrak with Driving While Under the Influence to the

Slightest Degree, and they released him on his own recognizance. The charge

against Vondrak was later dropped. 

Following his release, Vondrak went to the emergency room at Mountain

View Regional Medical Center. According to a toxicology screening report,

Vondrak tested negative for drugs or alcohol. Dr. Scot Martin, who treated

Vondrak, observed “multiple superficial abrasions and ecchymosis” on both

wrists. Martin Diagnosis, Def. ROA, at 143. He diagnosed Vondrak with

neurapraxia in both wrists, and a soft tissue sprain of the right wrist.

The pain and discomfort in Vondrak’s wrists did not subside, and it

interfered with his ability to practice as an orthodontist and play golf. Dr. Pawan

Jain, a neurologist, diagnosed Vondrak with a permanent radial nerve injury in his

wrists, and Dr. Jain concluded that the “handcuffing was the competent producing

cause of his right radial and bilateral median nerve injuries.” Jain Diagnosis, Def.

ROA, at 146. Dr. Wayne Lindsey, an orthopedist, concluded that Vondrak had

“[s]uperficial radial nerve palsy” in his right wrist, and “[b]ilateral mild carpal

tunnel syndrome.” Lindsey Diagnosis, Def. ROA, at 160. Dr. Lindsey stated that

Vondrak had “reached maximum medical improvement” and had “sustained

permanent impairment” with regard to these injuries. Id. He concluded that the

injuries “seem to be the direct result of constriction of the superficial radial nerve

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and median nerve of the wrists secondary to prolonged constriction by handcuffs

placed during [the arrest].” Id. 

In his complaint filed in this action, Vondrak alleged that McCants and

Krause were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for illegal arrest, excessive force, and

inadequate medical attention. He alleged that the City was liable under § 1983

because of its failure to train its police officers adequately. Vondrak also alleged

claims under New Mexico law for intentional tort and negligence, which are not

at issue on appeal.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They argued, inter alia,

that (1) qualified immunity protected McCants and Krause on all of Vondrak’s

federal claims; (2) alternatively, Krause was not liable because he neither arrested

Vondrak nor applied the handcuffs; and (3) because McCants and Krause were

entitled to qualified immunity, the City could not be liable.

The district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. The district court first explained that, “because the initial

stop at the checkpoint was legal and because the failure of three field-sobriety

tests would give an arresting officer probable cause to arrest an individual for

DUI, whether Vondrak’s arrest was illegal hinges on whether McCants possessed

reasonable suspicion to administer field-sobriety tests to Vondrak.” Dist. Ct. Op.

at 23. The district court then held that Vondrak’s statement—“I had one beer

three hours ago”—was not, by itself, “enough to provide McCants, as a matter of

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law, with an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that Vondrak had

driven or was driving under the influence of alcohol.” Id. at 25. The district

court also held that the question of whether McCants had “arguable reasonable

suspicion”—such that she would be entitled to qualified immunity—was

“factual,” thus precluding summary judgment in her favor. Id. at 26.

Next, the district court held that, assuming Vondrak supplied adequately

authenticated medical records, “Vondrak ha[d] established that his constitutional

right to be free from excessive force was violated—he was handcuffed in a

manner that caused an actual, non-deminimis [sic] injury—and that the right to be

free from excessive force under objective reasonableness standards was clearly

established at the time of the alleged incident . . . .” Id. at 29. McCants,

therefore, was “not entitled to qualified immunity on Vondrak’s excessive use of

force claim.” Id. On the other hand, McCants was entitled to qualified immunity

on Vondrak’s inadequate medical attention claim, because Vondrak had failed to

present facts demonstrating that McCants was deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs.

The district court granted Krause summary judgment on both the illegal

arrest and inadequate medical attention claims. The court reasoned that, on the

illegal arrest claim, “Krause did not begin to observe the McCants/Vondrak

encounter until after McCants had determined that she had reasonable suspicion

to conduct field-sobriety tests,” so Krause lacked “the capability to intercede to

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 The City is listed as an appellant, but Defendants spend only one sentence

in their brief on appeal, in a footnote, discussing the City’s liability. This is

insufficient to invoke appellate review. See Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244,

1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (“On appeal, however, parties must do more than offer

vague and unexplained complaints of error. Perfunctory complaints that fail to

frame and develop an issue are not sufficient to invoke appellate review.”

(citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

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prevent the harm that Vondrak may have suffered as a result of McCants’

actions.” Id. at 32. Vondrak’s inadequate medical attention claim against Krause

failed for the same reasons as his claim against McCants. The district court

denied Krause summary judgment on the excessive force claim, however, holding

that a reasonable jury could conclude that Krause could have effectively

intervened to prevent the use of excessive force on Vondrak. 

Finally, the district court held that the City was entitled to summary

judgment on the inadequate medical attention claim because Vondrak had not

established that anyone violated his right to adequate medical attention. The

district court denied the City’s motion on the illegal arrest and excessive force

claims, though, because Vondrak had introduced evidence showing constitutional

violations on these claims, and the City had not contested “any of the other

elements necessary to hold a municipality liable.” Id. at 33.

Defendants argue that the district court erred in (1) denying qualified

immunity to McCants on Vondrak’s illegal arrest claim, and (2) denying qualified

immunity to McCants and Krause on Vondrak’s excessive force claim.4

 Vondrak

has filed a cross-appeal, contending that the district court erred in (1) dismissing

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his illegal arrest claim against Krause, (2) dismissing his inadequate medical

attention claim against all Defendants, and (3) concluding that the sobriety

checkpoint satisfied the Fourth Amendment.

II.

Recently, we explained our standard of review for an appeal from a denial

of qualified immunity:

“Because of the underlying purposes of qualified immunity, we

review summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity

questions differently from other summary judgment decisions.” 

Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001). When a

defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to

the plaintiff, who must first establish that the defendant violated a

constitutional right. Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1030 (10th

Cir. 2004). “If no constitutional right would have been violated were

the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). If, on the other hand, a violation has been shown, the

plaintiff must then show that the constitutional right was clearly

established. See id. “This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition . . . .” Id. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would

be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation . . . .” Id. at 202. Summary judgment based on qualified

immunity is appropriate if the law did not put the officer on notice

that his conduct would be clearly unlawful. Id. (citing Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

We have held that, for a right to be clearly established, “there must

be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly

established weight of authority from other courts must have found

the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Medina v. City of Denver,

960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court has

explained that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct

violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope

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v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).

The district court’s denial of qualified immunity is a question of law

which we review de novo. Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096, 1099 (10th

Cir. 1994). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id. at 1100. Summary judgment is appropriate

only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c) (2007).

Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Before

we reach the merits of the individual claims, however, we must first determine the

extent of our appellate jurisdiction.

Appellate jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final

decisions of the district courts of the United States.” As this statutory limitation

indicates, “interlocutory appeals are the exception and not the rule.” Myers v.

Okla. County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 80 F.3d 421, 424 (10th Cir. 1996). “One

well recognized exception allows public officials asserting a defense of qualified

immunity to appeal a district court’s denial of summary judgment on that defense

if the issue on appeal is whether the constitutional right that was allegedly

violated was ‘clearly established.’” Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,

530 (1985)); see also Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1112. Under this exception, we have

appellate jurisdiction over McCants’ appeal and Krause’s appeal from the district

court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. 

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Our appellate jurisdiction does not extend to Vondrak’s cross-appeal. 

“[T]his court has discretion to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over

nonappealable issues once we have asserted jurisdiction over other appealable

issues in the same case.” Roska ex rel. Roska v. Sneddon, 437 F.3d 964, 970

(10th Cir. 2006). Our exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction, though, “is

generally disfavored,” and is only appropriate “where the otherwise

nonappealable decision is inextricably intertwined with the appealable decision,

or where review of the nonappealable decision is necessary to ensure meaningful

review of the appealable one.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). “[A] pendent appellate claim can be regarded as inextricably

intertwined with a properly reviewable claim on collateral appeal only if the

pendent claim is coterminous with, or subsumed in, the claim before the court on

interlocutory appeal—that is, when the appellate resolution of the collateral

appeal necessarily resolves the pendent claim as well.” Moore v. City of

Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 930 (10th Cir. 1995). 

Resolution of the properly appealable issues will not necessarily resolve the

issues in Vondrak’s cross-appeal. Krause was not present when McCants decided

to subject Vondrak to the field sobriety tests, and, as a result, Vondrak’s illegal

arrest claim against Krause is not “inextricably intertwined” with Vondrak’s

claim against McCants. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423-24 (10th Cir.

1997). Similarly, our resolution of the excessive force claim will not necessarily

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resolve the inadequate medical attention claim. We analyze claims for excessive

force under an objective reasonableness standard, without regard to the officer’s

state of mind, see Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2005),

whereas claims for inadequate medical attention have both an objective and a

subjective component, see Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005). 

Vondrak’s cross-appeal is not sufficiently related to the claims properly before us,

and we decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over it.

Reasonable suspicion and the field sobriety tests

The district court erred in denying qualified immunity to McCants on

Vondrak’s illegal arrest claim. On appeal, the sole issue regarding the illegal

arrest claim is whether McCants had reasonable suspicion—or, for qualified

immunity purposes, “arguable reasonable suspicion”—to subject Vondrak to the

field sobriety tests.

In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450-55

(1990), the Supreme Court upheld certain types of sobriety checkpoints as

consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Thus, “[e]ven in the absence of

individualized suspicion, a brief seizure at a checkpoint may be reasonable if

conducted in a neutral manner for the purpose of effectuating important

governmental purposes.” United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d 1217,

1221 (10th Cir. 1998). The situation changes, though, when a police officer

subjects a driver to field sobriety tests, and in such instances, the officer must

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have reasonable suspicion. Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir. 2007)

(“A field sobriety test is a minor intrusion on a driver only requiring a reasonable

suspicion of intoxication and an easy opportunity to end a detention before it

matures into an arrest.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also

Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-51; Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 (D.C. Cir.

1998). As we explained in Galindo-Gonzales: 

Requiring an individualized, reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to

expanding the scope of detentions at fixed checkpoints protects

motorists and passengers from random stops involving the kind of

standardless and unconstrained discretion that is the evil the Court

has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the

discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to

some extent.

Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d at 1221 (citation, alteration, and internal quotation

marks omitted). 

Under the reasonable suspicion standard, a police officer “must have a

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of

criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). A

reasonable suspicion analysis is based upon the “totality of the circumstances,”

and “officers [may] draw on their own experience and specialized training to

make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available

to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United States v. Arvizu, 534

U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Although

an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the

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likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable

cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the

evidence standard.” Id. at 274 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In the context of a § 1983 action, moreover, the officer “is entitled to qualified

immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that [reasonable suspicion]

existed to . . . detain the plaintiff”—i.e., if the officer had “arguable reasonable

suspicion.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1120, 1123.

Vondrak’s statement that he “had one beer three hours ago” provided

McCants with reasonable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety tests, or at the

very least provided her with “arguable reasonable suspicion” entitling her to

qualified immunity. See United States v. Slater, 411 F.3d 1003, 1004, 1006 (8th

Cir. 2005) (“Jones’s admission that he had been drinking [“a couple drinks”]

earlier that evening gave Officer Perry reasonable suspicion to extend the stop

while Jones completed the sobriety tests.”); see also Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d

1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen Officer Harget smelled alcohol coming

from the vehicle Mr. Miller had been driving, he had reasonable suspicion to

detain Mr. Miller in order to investigate.”); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d

753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The detection of alcohol on Neumann’s breath

provided Kayras with a reasonable suspicion to further detain Neumann and

expand the scope of the investigation.”); United States v. Caine, 517 F. Supp. 2d

586, 589 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding reasonable suspicion where the defendant’s

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eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and she had admitted drinking earlier that night);

Griffin v. City of Clanton, 932 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (finding

reasonable suspicion where “Officer Bearden smelled alcohol on Griffin’s breath”

and “Griffin admitted that he had consumed a few drinks”). Admittedly, this is a

close case. McCants’ only factual basis for conducting the field sobriety tests

was Vondrak’s admission to drinking one beer several hours earlier, and the

specificity of Vondrak’s statement makes it less suspicious than in many of the

cases cited above. Nevertheless, given that Vondrak admitted consuming alcohol,

McCants had the reasonable suspicion necessary to perform the field sobriety

tests—or, at the very least, the arguable reasonable suspicion entitling her to

qualified immunity.

Our reasonable suspicion analysis is buttressed by New Mexico law, which

proscribes driving while impaired to the slightest degree. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §

66-8-102(A) (“It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of

intoxicating liquor to drive a vehicle within this state.”); see also State v. Neal,

176 P.3d 330, 336-38 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007). The New Mexico Supreme Court

has explained:

It was the intention of the legislature . . . to prohibit any person

under the influence of intoxicating liquor, however slight, from

operating an automobile on any highway in New Mexico. A person

who has taken a drink of intoxicating liquor is not necessarily under

its influence; but if it affects him so that, to the slightest degree, he is

less able, either mentally or physically or both, to exercise the clear

judgment and steady hand necessary to handle as powerful and

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 In Sisneros, the court was construing § 66-8-102(A)’s predecessor. The

statute provided: “It shall be unlawful . . . for . . . any person who is under the

influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive any vehicle upon a

highway within this state.” State v. Sisneros, 82 P.2d 274, 276 (N.M. 1938)

(quoting N.M. Stat. § 11-802 (1929)).

18

dangerous a mechanism as a modern automobile with safety to

himself and the public, he is under the “influence of intoxicating

liquor” within the meaning of the statute.

State v. Sisneros, 82 P.2d 274, 278 (N.M. 1938) (citation and some internal

quotation marks omitted);5

 see also Neal, 176 P.3d at 338 (“The statute gives

notice, according to the plain meaning of the word ‘influence,’ that the

Legislature intends to criminalize a condition less than intoxication, but

‘influenced’ to any degree by alcohol, no matter how slight.”). The sheer breadth

of § 66-8-102(A)—as compared to, for instance, the statute proscribing a person

from driving with a blood-alcohol content of greater than 0.08, see § 66-8-

102(C)—provides support for McCants’ argument that she had reasonable

suspicion that Vondrak violated New Mexico law. Cf. Blackstone v. Quirino, 309

F. Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D. Me. 2004) (concluding that the officers had reasonable

suspicion, and relying in part on the breadth of a similar statute under Maine

law). McCants was entitled to qualified immunity on the illegal arrest claim, and

the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

The handcuffs and excessive force

The district court was correct in denying qualified immunity to McCants

and Krause on Vondrak’s claim for excessive force. “[T]he right to make an

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19

arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree

of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it,” and “[d]etermining whether the

force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth

Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion

on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)

(citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). Each case “requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances . . . , including the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to

evade arrest by flight.” Id. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” 

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

We have consistently rejected a bright-line rule requiring plaintiffs to

demonstrate physical injury when bringing excessive force claims. See Holland

ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining

that “[p]hysical injury may be the most obvious injury that flows from the use of

excessive force,” but “declin[ing] to adopt a ‘bright-line’ standard dictating that

force cannot be ‘excessive’ unless it leaves visible cuts, bruises, abrasions or

scars”). Nevertheless, when an excessive force claim relies upon unduly tight

handcuffing, we have held that the plaintiff must show “some actual injury”: 

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20

In some circumstances, unduly tight handcuffing can constitute

excessive force where a plaintiff alleges some actual injury from the

handcuffing and alleges that an officer ignored a plaintiff’s timely

complaints (or was otherwise made aware) that the handcuffs were

too tight. . . . We believe that a claim of excessive force requires

some actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional.

Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129.

The district court correctly concluded that McCants and Krause were not

entitled to qualified immunity on Vondrak’s excessive force claim for unduly

tight handcuffing. Although the officers claim to have been unaware that

Vondrak’s handcuffs were tight, Vondrak has presented evidence that the officers

“ignored [his] timely complaints (or [were] otherwise made aware) that the

handcuffs were too tight.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129. For instance, Vondrak

asserts that he told the officers “[a] half dozen times” that the handcuffs were too

tight, and that his wrists were hurting and going numb. Vondrak Dep., Pl. ROA,

at 57. He also claims that he told McCants “that [his] wrists hurt immediately

when she put [the handcuffs] on . . . , when she clamped down hard on both of

them.” Id. at 57-59. He claims that he told McCants on the way to the police

station that “the handcuffs were too tight, and that they . . . felt like . . . they were

bleeding, that they were too tight, cutting into my wrists.” Id. at 58. Finally,

Vondrak asserts that he made several requests at the police station for someone to

loosen his handcuffs because his wrists were hurting, but the officers ignored

him.

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Vondrak has also presented evidence that he suffered a permanent, “actual

injury” as a result of the handcuffing. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129. Vondrak has

stated that the pain in his wrists has not subsided since the arrest. His

neurologist, Dr. Jain, has diagnosed him with permanent nerve injury in his

wrists, and has concluded that the “handcuffing was the competent producing

cause of his right radial and bilateral median nerve injuries.” Jain Diagnosis, Def.

ROA, at 146-47. Likewise, Vondrak’s orthopedist, Dr. Lindsey, has concluded

that Vondrak now suffers from “[s]uperficial radial nerve palsy” in his right wrist,

and “[b]ilateral mild carpal tunnel syndrome.” Lindsey Diagnosis, Def. ROA, at

160. According to Dr. Lindsey, these injuries are permanent, and they are “the

direct result of constriction of the superficial radial nerve and median nerve of the

wrists secondary to prolonged constriction by handcuffs placed during [the

arrest].” Id. 

Further, at the time of Vondrak’s arrest, the right to be free from unduly

tight handcuffing was “clearly established”—as were the contours of the right. 

See Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129 (citing cases and implying that this framework was

“clearly established” for claims in which plaintiffs allege that “unduly tight

handcuffing . . . constitute[s] excessive force”); see also Lyons v. City of Xenia,

417 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2005); Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003,

1008 (8th Cir. 2003); Herzog v. Village of Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1043-44

(7th Cir. 2002); Bastien v. Goddard, 279 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2002); Palmer v.

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6

 Although Lyons and Cortez were decided after Vondrak’s arrest, both

cases suggest—either explicitly or implicitly—that the standard for unduly tight

handcuffing was already “clearly established.” See Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575; cf.

Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129.

In addition, although McCants and Krause rely heavily on the Eastern

District of Michigan’s analysis in Nemeckay v. Rule, 894 F. Supp. 310, 314-18

(E.D. Mich. 1995), Nemeckay no longer appears to state the “clearly established”

law with regard to unduly tight handcuffing claims in the Sixth Circuit. See

Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575.

22

Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993); cf. Hannula v. City of Lakewood,

907 F.2d 129, 132 (10th Cir. 1990) (analyzing the excessive force claim under the

due process clause and concluding that “[t]he cases do not ‘clearly establish’ that

handcuffing a detainee too tightly constitutes excessive force, at least in the

absence of apparent physical damage to the plaintiff’s wrists”), abrogated in part

by Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95.6

Lastly, given Krause’s close proximity to the initial handcuffing, and his

presence immediately thereafter, the district court was correct in denying

qualified immunity to Krause on the excessive force claim. It is “clearly

established”

that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to

intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from

infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence. An

officer who fails to intercede is liable for the preventable harm

caused by the actions of the other officers where that officer observes

or has reason to know: (1) that excessive force is being used, (2) that

a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) that any constitutional

violation has been committed by a law enforcement official. In order

for liability to attach, there must have been a realistic opportunity to

intervene to prevent the harm from occurring. Whether an officer

had sufficient time to intercede or was capable of preventing the

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harm being caused by another officer is an issue of fact for the jury

unless, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could not

possibly conclude otherwise.

Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also

Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1996). Neither McCants nor

Krause was entitled to qualified immunity on Vondrak’s excessive force claim.

III.

We REVERSE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on

Vondrak’s illegal arrest claim against McCants, and AFFIRM the denial of

qualified immunity on Vondrak’s excessive force claim against McCants and

Krause. We DISMISS the City’s appeal and Vondrak’s cross-appeal for lack of

appellate jurisdiction. The case is REMANDED to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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07-2148 - Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, et al.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part:

I join all of the majority opinion except that I would affirm the denial of

qualified immunity on the illegal-arrest claim against McCants. As the majority

opinion states, Vondrak told McCants that he had “bought a beer about three or

four hours earlier, and consumed approximately one-third of it.” Op. at 2. I do

not think that Vondrak’s statement in itself (and there is nothing else to support

McCants) gave McCants reasonable suspicion, or even arguable reasonable

suspicion, to believe that Vondrak was violating the law. Perhaps McCants,

through training or experience, had come to learn (1) that a driver could be

impaired by the drinking described by Vondrak or, more likely, (2) that someone

who admitted to the drinking described by Vondrak (yet, like him, displayed no

sign of intoxication, such as alcohol on the breath or erratic driving) had likely

imbibed more than described and was impaired in driving. But there was no such

evidence in this case. 

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