Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01130/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01130-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C. Lesinak
Defendant
Quincy Sims
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QUINCY SIMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. LESINAK, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:14-cv-01130-SKO (PC)

SECOND SCREENING ORDER 

DISMISSING ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

UNDER SECTION 1983

(Doc. 9)

Second Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Quincy Sims, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 21, 2014. On April 22, 2015, the Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed an 

amended complaint on May 11, 2015. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court 

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shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated 

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This 

requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere 

possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; 

Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. However, prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still 

entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

II. Discussion

A. Allegations

Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison in Imperial, California, 

brings this action against Lieutenant C. Lesniak and Correctional Officers John Doe 1 and John 

Doe 2. Plaintiff’s claim arises out of the confiscation of his personal property at Kern Valley State 

Prison in Delano, California. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lesniak, Doe 1, and Doe 2

confiscated his personal property on September 18, 2013, as a result of his transfer to 

administrative segregation. On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff was released back to general 

population, where he was again eligible to possess the property that had been confiscated. When 

Plaintiff’s property was reissued to him, CD player, six CDs, an A/C adaptor, Muslim prayer oil, 

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and an RCA jack were missing. Plaintiff alleges that these property items were confiscated 

without due process of law and he seeks their return. 

B. Theft or Loss of Personal Property

Section 1983 claims must be premised on the violation of the Constitution or other federal 

rights. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). The Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects prisoners from being deprived 

of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 

2974 (1974), and prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 

502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However, the Due Process Clause is not violated by a random, 

unauthorized deprivation of property if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 

813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations and exhibits indicate that the

missing property items were either lost or stolen by staff, and as Plaintiff has an adequate postdeprivation remedy under California law, his attempt to pursue a claim under federal law for the 

loss or theft of his personal property items fails as a matter of law. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17 

(citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§810-895). 

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 

section 1983. Plaintiff was previously provided with notice of the deficiencies and an opportunity 

to amend, and based on the nature of the deficiencies, further leave to amend is not warranted. 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th 

Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Accordingly, this action is HEREBY DISMISSED, with prejudice, for failure to state a 

claim under section 1983.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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