Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-03882/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-03882-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Director of Corrections
Respondent
Darius Swain
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARIUS SWAIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-03882-EMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Docket No. 10-1

I. INTRODUCTION

Darius Swain, an inmate at the California State Prison in Lancaster, commenced this pro se 

prisoner’s civil action by filing a “writ of replevin complaint.” Docket No. 1. The Court 

dismissed the complaint with leave to amend because the complaint (a) failed to allege facts 

establishing jurisdiction (e.g., diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction); (b) had too 

many conclusory allegations and failed to allege a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that Mr. Swain was entitled to relief; (c) failed to link defendants to the claims; and (d) could not 

assert claims that would call into question his conviction or sentence. 

Mr. Swain then filed an “writ of replevin first amended complaint.” Docket No. 10-1. 

That first amended complaint is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

II. DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). 

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Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Like the original complaint, the first amended complaint borrows concepts from the 

Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in an attempt to secure Mr. Swain’s release from prison. The 

first amended complaint makes little sense, but alleges the following: Mr. Swain is the secured 

party creditor, the authorized representative of the debtor, and the debt itself, as he holds a secured 

interest in himself in the amount of $100,000. Docket No. 10-1 at 3. He incurred a “debt to the 

State of California” (apparently referring to his conviction and prison sentence) that he “did not 

have the opportunity to accept the charges and return them for full value.” Id. As a result, “an 

unlawful lien” (apparently, his prison sentence) was placed against his “property” (i.e., Mr. Swain) 

that is now in the possession of the California Department of Corrections. Id. His first amended 

complaint is “presentment acceptance for value” which, in turn, should secure the lien on his 

“property” (i.e., himself) and result in “closure of case number H26381 and release of lien [on his] 

personal property” (i.e., himself) from state prison. Id. at 5-6. He alleges that the failure to grant 

him relief on his “presentment acceptance for value” violates due process. Id. at 5. Among the 

exhibits attach to the first amended complaint are a U.C.C. Financing Statement1signed by Mr. 

Swain that purports to cover, among other things, his birth certificate and variations on his name,

id. at 8; a “non-negotiable bill of exchange” regarding a “‘chargeback’ of personal U.C.C. contract 

trust account” signed by Mr. Swain, id. at 11; and a “conditional acceptance – request for proof of 

claim as to the status of monetary conditions within the state of California to pay debts at law” 

signed by Mr. Swain, id. at 14-19.

The allegation of a due process violation gives the Court jurisdiction over the action, as it 

raises a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Mr. Swain’s due process claim, like 

the rest of his first amended complaint, is legally meritless.

There appear to be several sorts of abuses of the U.C.C. favored by prisoners, who try to 

 

1 A U.C.C.-1 Financing Statement “is a standardized legal form filed by a creditor giving notice of 

an interest in the personal property of a debtor.” United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 649 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 20015). 

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take advantage of the fact that the U.C.C. “grants little authority to filing offices to refuse to accept 

fraudulent or invalid filings.” United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 653 (9th Cir. 2015).

2 One sort 

of abuse is the use of liens and encumbrances against the real or personal property of government 

officials to harass them. Such efforts can lead to criminal convictions. See, e.g., Neal, 776 F.3d at 

655 (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1521, which prohibits the filing, attempt to file, or 

conspiracy to file a false document of the sort regularly used to create liens or encumbrances 

against the real or personal property of a federal officer or employee)). Another sort of abuse is 

the use of U.C.C. documents to pursue the “Redemptionist” theory (or other similar theory) to try 

to obtain release from custody.

[T]he “Redemptionist” theory . . . propounds that a person has a split 

personality: a real person and a fictional person called the 

“strawman.” The “strawman” purportedly came into being when the 

United States went off the gold standard in 1993, and, instead, 

pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's 

national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only 

over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. 

Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, 

thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, the real 

person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of 

money to use the strawman's name or, in the case of prisoners, to 

keep him in custody. If government officials refuse, inmates are 

encouraged to file liens against correctional officers and other prison 

officials in order to extort their release from prison. Adherents of 

this scheme also advocate that inmates copyright their names to 

justify filing liens against officials using their names in public 

records such as indictments or court papers.

Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008).

Mr. Swain’s first amended complaint and attachments thereto appear to be an effort to 

pursue the Redemptionist theory to support his release from custody. The theory that he has a 

right to release as a result of the U.C.C. documents he prepared and filed is legally meritless. Cf.

 

2 The seriousness of the problem of prisoners filings illegitimate liens has led to a number of 

prison systems imposing outright bans on the possession of U.C.C. materials. See, e.g., Torres v. 

Florida Dept. of Corr., 742 F. App’x 403, 406-07 (11th Cir. 2018) (rejecting First Amendment 

challenge to rule permitting confiscation of prisoner’s U.C.C. forms because it was reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interest in preventing prisoners from filing fraudulent U.C.C. 

liens); Edmonds v. Sobina, 296 F. App’x 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding prison’s policy of 

restricting inmates possession of U.C.C.-related materials); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198 (3rd 

Cir. 2008) (rejecting First Amendment and Due Process challenges to confiscation of U.C.C. 

materials). 

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Carter v. Wands, 431 F. App’x 628, 629 (10th Cir. 2011) (the U.C.C. does not “provide a basis to 

challenge the conditions of [plaintiff’s] imprisonment under 28 U.S.C. § 2241”); United States v. 

Nero, 2013 WL 12156673, *2 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2013) (defendant’s arguments that his criminal 

judgment is void due to his U.C.C. filings as a “secured party creditor” are among the “claims in 

his various filings [that] have no basis in law and are patently frivolous and/or malicious”); id.

(collecting cases that have rejected inmate efforts to file unsubstantiated liens and U.C.C.

financing statements in connection with their incarceration). The U.C.C. does not apply to the 

facts alleged in the first amended complaint. Mr. Swain offers no legal authority for his 

outlandish idea that a prison sentence or a conviction is a secured or unsecured debt under the 

U.C.C. And he offers no legal authority for his equally absurd proposition that a prisoner or the 

state gains a secured interest under the U.C.C. in the prisoner by virtue of the prisoner’s conviction 

or prison sentence. In a nutshell, nothing in the U.C.C. will unlock the prison gate for Mr. Swain.

Attaching a due process label to the minimal facts alleged in the first amended complaint 

does not help Mr. Swain because the due process theory, like the underlying U.C.C. theory, is 

legally meritless. Mr. Swain had no due process right to release from custody upon his 

presentation of his “presentment acceptance for value,” Docket No. 10-1 at 5, to this Court or to 

prison officials. 

Moreover, as the Court previously explained, a plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action 

for damages or equitable relief for a wrongful conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm 

caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that 

conviction or sentence already has been determined to be wrongful. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477, 486-87 (1994). A conviction or sentence may be determined to be wrongful by, for example, 

being reversed on appeal or being set aside when a state or federal court issues a writ of habeas 

corpus. See id. The Heck rule also prevents a person from bringing an action that -- even if it 

does not directly challenge the conviction or sentence -- would imply that the conviction or 

sentence was invalid. The practical importance of this rule is that a plaintiff cannot attack his

conviction or sentence in a civil rights action for damages or declaratory relief; the conviction or 

sentence must have been successfully attacked before the civil rights action for damages is filed. 

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If Mr. Swain wants to challenge the lawfulness of his current custody, the exclusive method by 

which he may do so in federal court is by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. 

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

The first amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Further leave to amend will not be granted because it would be futile. The Court already 

explained in the order of dismissal with leave to amend what Mr. Swain needed to do to state a 

claim for relief, but he was unwilling or unable to do so in his first amended complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

This action is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The 

Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 20, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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