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Parties Involved:
Vimla Saksenasingh
Appellant
Secretary of Education
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 1997 Decided October 21, 1997

No. 96-5116

VIMLA SAKSENASINGH,

APPELLANT

v.

SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv02216)

Stephen Z. Chertkof argued the cause for appellant, with 

whom James H. Heller was on the briefs.

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. 

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Diane M. 

Sullivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on the brief.

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Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and GARLAND, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Appellant Vimla Saksenasingh applied for employment at the Department of Education ("Department"). After an interview at which she was asked about 

her religion and national origin, she did not receive a position. 

Saksenasingh filed an administrative complaint with the Department alleging proscribed discrimination. She subsequently signed a settlement agreement with Department 

officials that gave her a one-year position at the Department 

and guaranteed she would be considered for a permanent 

position at the year's end. When the year had passed, 

Appellant once again was denied a position. She then 

brought suit against the Department under Title VII, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. for (1) the original denial of employment, (2) retaliation against her during her employment, and 

(3) retaliation in failing to consider her for a permanent 

position.

The Department asserted that the settlement agreement 

barred the suit. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Department on the grounds that Saksenasingh 

was barred by the settlement agreement from litigating the 

original denial of employment and that she could not sue for 

the Department's failure to hire her at the end of her oneyear term because she had not exhausted her administrative 

remedies by appealing to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Saksenasingh v. Riley, No. 

94-2216, slip op. at 5-7 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1996), reprinted in

Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 8-10. The District Court also dismissed Saksenasingh's remaining retaliation claims for lack of 

jurisdiction. Id. at 11-12.

We reverse the grant of summary judgment and the dismissal of Saksenasingh's retaliation claims. The settlement 

agreement did not, as the District Court believed, grant the 

Department the unilateral right to decide whether it had 

breached the terms of settlement. Rather, the agreement 

specified that "[i]f the Agency fails to carry out this agreeUSCA Case #96-5116 Document #303862 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 2 of 9
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ment ... the complaint may be reinstated." Memorandum of 

Agreement, J.A. 125. This provision entitled Appellant to a 

decision by the District Court judge or jury on the threshold 

question whether the Department had breached the agreement. If it were found that the Department had breached 

the agreement, then Saksenasingh's law suit on her original 

claim should have proceeded. She had exhausted her administrative remedies regarding her original claim before the 

employing agency. When the settlement agreement took 

effect, more than 180 days had passed without final Department action on her claim. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408(b). On the 

record at hand, there is no doubt that Saksenasingh was not 

required to appeal to the EEOC as the District Court held.

Finally, because the District Court had jurisdiction over 

her original claim even if it were found that the settlement 

agreement barred the claim, the District Court had discretion 

to exercise jurisdiction over her retaliation claims. Dismissal 

of the retaliation claims for want of jurisdiction was error. 28 

U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).

I. BACKGROUND

Saksenasingh applied for a position as an Institutional 

Review Specialist with the Department. Following an interview in which she was asked about her religion and national 

origin, the Department informed her that she had not been 

selected. On February 22, 1991, she filed an administrative 

complaint with the Department, alleging unlawful discrimination. J.A. 92. Before the Department had formally completed its investigation, Saksenasingh and the Department entered into a settlement agreement. The agreement, dated 

January 11, 1993, required the Department to offer Saksenasingh a one-year appointment and to consider hiring her for a 

permanent position at the end of the year. It also stated:

If the Agency fails to carry out this Agreement, in whole 

or in part, the complaint may be reinstated, upon the 

written request of the Complainant, at the point processing ceased.

J.A. 125. After signing the agreement, the Department tried 

to convince Saksenasingh to amend the agreement to omit the 

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promise to consider her for a permanent post. J.A. 137-38. 

Saksenasingh declined to amend the agreement.

Saksenasingh began her one-year term on July 26, 1993, 

and completed the term on July 25, 1994. When her one-year 

appointment was not converted to a permanent position and 

she was passed over for several vacancies, she requested by 

letter dated August 19, 1994, that her administrative complaint be reinstated and supplemented by a claim of retaliation. J.A. 165-66. She simultaneously notified the Department that she intended to file suit unless she was placed in a 

permanent position immediately. Id. The Department acknowledged receipt of this letter. J.A. 168-69. On October 

13, 1994, Saksenasingh filed suit in the District Court. She 

claimed that the Department discriminated against her by 

failing to hire her when she first applied and retaliated 

against her by failing to consider her for a permanent position at the end of the year as required by the settlement 

agreement. On December 7, 1994, the Department issued a 

letter advising Saksenasingh that she must file an administrative complaint with the EEOC in order to pursue her retaliation claim. J.A. 171. In a letter dated December 15, 1994, 

the Department concluded that it had not breached the 

settlement agreement and advised Saksenasingh that she 

must appeal to the EEOC before filing suit in District Court. 

J.A. 174-76.

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 

the Department, reasoning: (1) the settlement agreement 

prevented the court from reaching the underlying discrimination claims; (2) Saksenasingh was required to appeal to the 

EEOC before filing a judicial complaint for breach of the 

settlement agreement and, therefore, she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; and (3) the trial court 

lacked jurisdiction over the retaliation claim because the 

other claims were not properly before it. J.A. 8-12.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Settlement Agreement

We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment 

and dismissal of Appellant's claims de novo. See Tao v. 

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Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (summary judgment); 

National Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1428, 1432 

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). After 

Saksenasingh filed her Title VII law suit, based on the 

original claim of discrimination and subsequent alleged retaliation, the Department raised the settlement agreement as an 

affirmative defense to her suit. The Department argued that 

the agreement barred her suit because it conferred discretion 

upon the Department to permit or refuse reinstatement of the 

original complaint. The District Court endorsed this reading 

of the settlement agreement and held that the agreement 

barred Saksenasingh's suit.

Where a case turns on construction of a contract, the 

District Court may decide the matter on summary judgment 

if the agreement "admits of only one reasonable interpretation." UMWA 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469, 

473 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The settlement agreement here admits 

of only one reasonable interpretation, but not the one adopted 

by the District Court. The agreement provided that:

If the Agency fails to carry out this Agreement, in whole 

or in part, the complaint may be reinstated, upon the 

written request of the Complainant, at the point processing ceased.

J.A. 125. The District Court interpreted this language to 

mean that the Department had the right to decide whether it 

had breached the agreement, and did not have to do anything 

if it found it had not breached the agreement. J.A. 9. On 

this reading, the agreement conferred no right of reinstatement whatsoever on Saksenasingh. In support of its interpretation, the District Court quoted the dictionary to the 

effect that the word "may" has a permissive effect. Id.

However, the permissive nature of the word "may" does 

not lead to the conclusion the District Court reached. The 

agreement does not say that the Department "may" reinstate 

the complaint, which would of course mean that it need not do 

so. Instead, the agreement employs the passive voice, stating 

that the complaint "may be reinstated" upon the occurrence 

of a certain event, namely the written request of the comUSCA Case #96-5116 Document #303862 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 5 of 9
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plainant. It follows that, under the plain meaning of the 

agreement, Saksenasingh had the option of reinstating her 

complaint in case of breach by the Department.

Where a party raises a settlement agreement as a defense, 

the District Court must factually determine the issues surrounding the agreement. See Bowden v. U.S., 106 F.3d 433, 

439 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (District Court resolves factual issues 

regarding Title VII settlement agreement). Faced with Saksenasingh's assertion of her original discrimination complaint 

and the Department's defense that the settlement agreement 

barred the suit, the judge or jury in the District Court, 

depending upon the circumstances, should have determined, 

as a threshold matter, whether in fact the Department had 

breached the settlement agreement. No deference was owed 

to the Department on this question. It was for the judge or 

jury to decide whether the agreement had been breached. 

Because this threshold issue was not decided, we must reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

On remand, if it is found that the Department breached, 

then the settlement agreement cannot bar Saksenasingh's 

original claim. However, if it is found that the Department 

did not breach the agreement, then the settlement will bar 

Saksenasingh from proceeding with her original claim.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As a result of its mistaken interpretation of the settlement 

agreement, the District Court found that Saksenasingh could 

not bring an action based on her original complaint, but only 

a separate action on the alleged breach of agreement. J.A. 

10. Beginning from this mistaken premise, the District Court 

went on to hold that Saksenasingh could not sue on the 

breach of settlement agreement until exhausting her administrative remedies by appealing to the EEOC. Id. at 10-11. 

This holding was based on 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.401(d), 

1614.408(c), and 1614.504(b), which authorize and regulate 

appeals to the EEOC.

The judgment of the District Court on exhaustion was in 

error. The statute which these regulations interpret, 42 

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U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), permits, but does not require, appeal to 

the EEOC, and has been so understood by this court. We 

have held that under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), a complainant 

may either file suit after the appropriate number of days has 

elapsed since complaining to the agency, or "elect[ ] instead to 

appeal the agency's decision to the EEOC." Wilson v. Pena,

79 F.3d 154, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Likewise, the court has 

explained that Title VII requires a complainant to file "an 

initial charge with the employing agency. Upon exhaustion 

of the administrative proceedings, a complainant is entitled to 

trial de novo." McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 

1494, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). This description neither mentions nor envisions required appeal to the 

EEOC.

The plain language of the regulations cited by the District 

Court similarly does not require appeal to the EEOC, but 

instead simply authorizes appeal to the EEOC as one possible 

avenue for appeal of agency decisions. Under 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.401(d), a complainant "may" appeal alleged noncompliance with a settlement agreement to the EEOC, and 29 

C.F.R. § 1614.408(c) states that a complainant may file suit in 

District Court within ninety days of receiving the EEOC's 

final decision. However, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408(a) and (b) 

allow suit after final agency decision or after 180 days in the 

case of agency inaction. It seems clear that these provisions 

merely offer alternative avenues of redress. Appeal to the 

EEOC is not required.

Finally, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(b) states that after a complainant has notified the agency that it has breached a 

settlement agreement, the complainant "may" appeal to the 

EEOC

35 days after he or she has served the agency with the 

allegations of noncompliance, but must file an appeal 

within 30 days of his or her receipt of an agency's 

determination.

Id. This provision simply means that a complainant can 

appeal to the EEOC any time past thirty-five days after 

notifying the agency with or without waiting for the agency's 

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final determination, but that if the agency does make a final 

determination, the complainant must file within thirty days of 

that determination. The provision does not by its terms 

require a complainant to appeal to the EEOC before bringing 

suit in District Court.

Because Saksenasingh could sue on her original complaint, 

and the breach of settlement claim could be brought as a 

supplemental retaliation claim, she had only to exhaust her 

administrative remedies regarding the original complaint by 

applying to the Department itself and awaiting either final 

agency action, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408(c), or the passage of 180 

days without final agency action, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408(d). 

See Wilson, 79 F.3d at 157, 167. Saksenasingh filed her 

original complaint with the agency on February 22, 1991; she 

filed suit on October 13, 1994. The statutory 180 days had 

elapsed, and exhaustion of administrative remedies had occurred with respect to the original complaint.

C. Retaliation Claims

The District Court held that because the original claims of 

discrimination and breach of settlement were not viable, "the 

retaliation claim fails as well." J.A. 12. This conclusion was 

in error. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which governs supplemental jurisdiction, the District Court may, at its discretion, 

continue to entertain supplemental jurisdiction even after it 

"has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). If the District Court had 

original jurisdiction, but dismissed for non-jurisdictional reasons, then it could maintain supplemental jurisdiction at its 

discretion. If it dismissed the underlying claim on jurisdictional grounds, then it could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Here, the District Court had supplemental jurisdiction over 

Saksenasingh's unexhausted retaliation claims. See Nealon 

v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992); Gupta v. East 

State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). Even if the 

District Court ultimately dismisses the underlying claim on 

the grounds that the Department did not breach the settleUSCA Case #96-5116 Document #303862 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 8 of 9
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ment agreement, it would still have exercised original jurisdiction over that claim. The defense that the settlement 

agreement bars Saksenasingh's suit is substantive, not jurisdictional. Therefore, the District Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction even if it dismisses the underlying suit. 

The decision whether to entertain the unexhausted retaliation 

claims lies within the District Court's discretion.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the decision of the District Court 

is reversed and remanded.

So ordered.

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