Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-20560/USCOURTS-ca5-15-20560-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Buentello Wrecker Service
Appellee
City of Fulshear
Appellant
Integrity Collision Center
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-20560

INTEGRITY COLLISION CENTER; BUENTELLO WRECKER SERVICE,

 Plaintiffs–Appellees,

versus

CITY OF FULSHEAR, 

 Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

Before KING, SMITH, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

The City of Fulshear, Texas, appeals an order sought by Integrity Collision Center (“Integrity”) and Buentello Wrecker Service (“Buentello”) requiring it to include them on the city’s “non-consent tow list” and to develop neutral 

criteria for that list. We reverse and render judgment in favor of the city. 

I.

After withdrawing from Fort Bend County’s program in April 2012, the 

city established its own non-consent tow list of private companies it calls upon 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 20, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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to tow vehicles that are to be impounded. The police chief included only two 

companies, Riverside Collision and A&M Automotive, thus excluding Integrity 

and Buentello, which are towing companies operating in the county. There 

was no formal process for reaching that decision.

In May 2012, Integrity and Buentello began requesting information on 

the requirements for being added to the list, and in January 2014 they received 

a response detailing the police department’s requirements. To be included, the 

police chief required towing companies to have outside and secure inside storage facilities within ten miles of the city, a million dollars in insurance coverage, a heavy-duty wrecker, so-called “rollback-capable wreckers,” the ability to 

handle hazardous materials, a thirty-minute response time in the city, and 

background checks on their drivers. Integrity and Buentello claimed to have 

met all of those criteria except for the ten-mile limit, but the chief refused to 

include them on the list. 

Discovery revealed that the chief’s actual requirements for inclusion

were more amorphous. The ten-mile limit was only a generalized proximity 

requirement, and A&M Automotive was outside that range. The chief believed 

a more important factor was the ability of the companies on the list to “support 

each other.” He explained that “the two wreckers that are satisfying the needs 

of what I have and what―what I need out of wrecker companies.” But he also

said that he “probably” would have included a third company if it had met his 

requirements.

II.

Integrity and Buentello sued the city in state court in July 2014, alleging 

that its refusal to include them on the non-consent tow list violated the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The city removed to federal 

court, and Integrity and Buentello amended the complaint to clarify that the 

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claim was brought as a class-of-one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Integrity and 

Buentello contended that the city had no rational basis for excluding them

despite being similarly situated to companies on the list. The city maintained 

that the plaintiffs had no legal claim (because creating the list was a discretionary decision that was not subject to a class-of-one equal protection claim) 

and that there was a sufficient rational basis. 

On August 28, 2015, the district court issued an “Opinion on Summary 

Judgment,” directing, inter alia, that “[t]he City of Fulshear must include 

Integrity and Buentello in its towing rotation” and granting summary judgment for them, holding that there was no rational basis for the refusal to 

include them on the list. Seven days later, the court entered an Initial Order 

on Remedy,” reading, in its entirely, as follows:

1. By 12:00 p.m. on September 9, 2015, the City of Fulshear must 

include Integrity Collision Center and Buentello Wrecker Service in the 

City’s towing rotation.

2. By October 23, 2015, the City of Fulshear must publish rational, 

specific, and neutral criteria for other companies’ admission into the 

towing rotation. The published criteria must be the sole consideration 

for admission into the towing program―enforced consistently for all 

applicants.

On September 28, the city filed a notice of appeal “from the Opinion on Summary Judgment entered in this action on August 28, 2015 and the Initial Order 

on Remedy entered September 4, 2015.”1

 

1 On October 5, 2015, the district court denied the city’s motion for stay pending 

appeal, and on October 22, a motions panel of this court denied a motion for stay for a lack of 

a showing of irreparable harm but explained that “[t]his denial implies no position on the 

[city’s] likelihood of success on the merits.”

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III.

The parties disagree on whether we have appellate jurisdiction. There 

is no doubt, however, that “we have jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction.” Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2006). 

In its opening brief, the city asserts that “[t]his is not an appeal from a 

final order or judgment [but] is an appeal of a preliminary injunction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a),” which gives the courts of appeals “jurisdiction of appeals 

from: (1) interlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting, continuing, 

modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions . . . .” In their brief, Integrity and 

Buentello “contend that no basis for appellate jurisdiction exists in this appeal,” reasoning that neither the Opinion on Summary Judgment nor the Initial Order on Remedy is a preliminary injunction. 

Regarding their claim that nothing issued by the district court is presently appealable, Integrity and Buentello clarified, at oral argument, that they 

liken the Initial Order on Remedy to a discovery order, which normally would 

not be immediately appealable. We disagree with that explanation. “A district 

court ‘grant[s]’ an injunction when an action it takes is “directed to a party, 

enforceable by contempt, and designed to accord or protect some or all of the 

substantive relief sought in the complaint in more than a temporary fashion.” 

In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d 479, 491 (5th Cir. 2015). The district court 

ordered the city to include Integrity and Buentello on its non-consent tow list 

and to develop neutral, exclusive, published criteria for that list as the remedy 

for its judgment of liability against the city. That order is directed at the city, 

is subject to enforcement by the district court, and provides substantive relief 

for Integrity and Buentello. It is therefore an injunction, appealable under 

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Section 1292(a)(1), so we have appellate jurisdiction.2 

IV.

The city questions the ruling that the exclusion of Integrity and Buentello from its non-consent tow list violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. The city contends that class-of-one equal-protection

claims do not apply to the decision to exclude a company from a non-consent 

tow list and, if they do, the city has provided a sufficient rational basis for the 

exclusion. We agree.

A class-of-one equal-protection claim lies “where the plaintiff alleges that

[it] has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated 

and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of 

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). “Typically, a class of one involves a discrete group of people, who do not themselves qualify as a suspect 

class, alleging the government has singled them out for differential treatment 

absent a rational basis.” Wood v. Collier, No. 16-20556, --- F.3d ---, 2016 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 16693, at *12 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016). Such a theory of recovery

includes “forms of state action . . . which by their nature involve discretionary 

decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.” Id. (quoting Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603

(2008)).

In Engquist, the Court held that class-of-one equal-protection claims are 

inapposite in the context of discretionary public-employment decisions. To 

that effect, in Chavers v. Morrow, 449 F. App’x 411 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), 

 

2 Having found jurisdiction to review the September 4 order as an injunction, we need 

not address whether either that order or the August 28 order awarding summary judgment 

is a final judgment appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in the absence of a judgment entered

as a “separate document” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a). 

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we summarily affirmed a holding that a class-of-one equal-protection claim “is 

unavailable in a ‘public employment context.’” Chavers v. Morrow, 2010 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 89432, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2010) (citing Engquist, 553 U.S. 

at 594). That conclusion logically applies as well to a local government’s discretionary decision to include or not include a company on a non-consent tow 

list, where “allowing equal protection claims on such grounds ‘would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in the challenged action.’” Wood, 2016 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 16693, at *13 (quoting Engquist, 553 U.S. at 604). Alternatively, 

Integrity and Buentello’s class-of-one equal-protection claim fails because they 

have not shown that the city had a discriminatory intent and because the city 

has a rational basis for excluding them.

A.

Class-of-one equal-protection claims are “an application of [the] principle” that the seemingly arbitrary classification of a group or individual by a 

governmental unit requires a rational basis. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602. Such 

a potential theory of recovery is available where there is “a clear standard 

against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed.” 

Id. In Olech, 528 U.S. at 565, the Court recognized an equal-protection claim

where a municipality demanded more than double the easement onto the plaintiff’s property, to connect her to the water supply, than for any other property. 

The physical space required for a water-line connection was measurable and 

allowed the Court reasonably to evaluate the municipality’s decision to demand the use of more land in that single instance. “There was no indication 

in Olech that the zoning board was exercising discretionary authority based on 

subjective, individualized determinations . . . however typical such determinations may be as a general zoning matter.” Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602–03.

Discretionary decisions about whom to hire as an employee or a service 

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provider do not yield the same “clear standard” by which an equal-protection 

claim can be evaluated. In Engquist, id. at 603, the Court held that employment decisions

by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast 

array of subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases the rule 

that people should be “treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions” is not violated when one person is treated differently from 

others, because treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted. In such situations, allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a particular person would 

undermine the very discretion that such state officials are entrusted to 

exercise.

The same type of “subjective, individualized assessments” go into a city’s decision to purchase services from private companies for its non-consent tows.3

There are measurable factors, such as proximity, insurance coverage amounts,

and types of equipment, to be sure. There are also equally important factors

that are not reasonably measurable, such as reputation, personal experience, 

and the particularities of how the city wishes to operate its non-consent tow 

program. 

The police chief’s considerations as he drew up the non-consent tow list 

demonstrate this well. As part of the selection process, he considered previous

experience working with the chosen companies on non-consent tows. He

thought it important that the towing companies be able to “work together” and 

“support each other” in completing towing assignments. He concluded that two 

companies were enough to satisfy the city’s non-consent needs. Those considerations are a reasonable part of a purchasing decision, and the exclusion of 

 

3 A city is a consumer of towing companies’ services when it contracts for non-consent 

tows. Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, Tex., 180 F.3d 686, 697 (5th 

Cir. 1999). 

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some companies is an inevitable result.4 Municipalities are not compelled by 

the Equal Protection Clause, as Integrity and Buentello claim, to develop a 

formal process with constitutionally measurable criteria for determining from 

whom they will purchase towing services. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 606. In 

this regard, the decision is not different from the process of selecting other 

outside services, such as a janitorial or pest-control service. 

Furthermore, it is impractical for the court to involve itself in reviewing 

these countless discretionary decisions for equal-protection violations. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 608. For example, Integrity and Buentello ask us to resolve 

whether it is plausible that a city has substantially increased the number of 

police officers but still requires only two companies for non-consent tows. Making such a determination is no more practical than second-guessing the merits 

of a given individual employment decision or of a decision not to use additional 

janitorial companies despite an increase in the number of city buildings. The 

quality and number of towing companies the city requires to conduct nonconsent tows is not for us to decide, nor is it something that the Equal Protection Clause informs.5 As with employment, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause 

does not require ‘[t]his displacement of managerial discretion by judicial 

 

4 Texas law imposes no standard for selecting companies for a non-consent tow list. 

Texas police officers have “been given legislative authorization to tow a vehicle, [and] inherent in that authorization is the right to make reasonable decisions about who is permitted to 

do the towing.” Fort Bend Cty. Wrecker Ass’n v. Wright, 39 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. App.―Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Towing companies also have no “entitlement for access to, 

presence upon, or the right to control a county wrecker rotation list” as long as they “still 

have a right to do business with private individuals.” Id. at 427. Integrity and Buentello do 

not claim that they are prohibited from so doing.

5 “Of course, an allegation that speeding tickets are given out on the basis of race or 

sex would state an equal protection claim, because such discriminatory classifications implicate basic equal protection concerns. But allowing an equal protection claim on the ground 

that a ticket was given to one person and not others, even if for no discernable or articulable 

reason, would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in the challenged action.” 

Engquist, 553 U.S. at 604 (quoted in Wood, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16693, at *13 n.33).

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supervision.’” Engquist, 553 U.S. at 608–09 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 

547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006)). 

B.

Even if the Equal Protection Clause were applicable, Integrity and Buentello do not meet the requirements for bringing such a claim.6 They must show 

that the city “treat[ed] similarly situated individuals differently for a discriminatory purpose.”7 Discriminatory intent requires that the city’s decision must 

be made at least in part because of its discriminatory effect on Integrity and 

Buentello rather than mere knowledge that adverse consequences will result.8

In the amended complaint, summary-judgment briefing, and appellate 

briefing, Integrity and Buentello do not allege or offer any evidence of an intent

to discriminate, relying instead solely on the alleged arbitrariness of the 

 

6 Integrity and Buentello also have not satisfied the pleading requirements for a 

municipal-liability claim under Section 1983. Municipal liability for a constitutional violation will lie where that violation results from an “official custom or policy” of the city. Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Integrity and Buentello challenge the single decision to exclude them from the nonconsent tow list. The city can be liable for that decision only if it was made by an official with 

“final policymaking authority” as determined by state law, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 

485 U.S. 112, 123–24 (1988), as distinguished from “final decisionmaking authority,” Bolton 

v. City of Dall., Tex., 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2008). The plaintiffs have made no claim 

nor provided any evidence that the police chief has final policymaking authority. Instead, 

they plead that he was “acting without guidance from city officials or due consideration of 

any applicable statutes, code ordinances, or Constitutional obligations,” and the city is liable 

for that on a respondeat superior theory. Such a theory is not cognizable in a Section 1983 

municipal-liability claim. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126. 

7 Gil Ramirez Grp., L.L.C. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 786 F.3d 400, 419 (5th Cir. 2015); 

see also Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 (“Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims 

brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated 

differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference 

in treatment.”).

8 See Gil Ramirez Grp., 786 F.3d at 419–20 (citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 

442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) (holding that discrimination in favor of others is insufficient, by 

itself, to show that the plaintiff was discriminated against).

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decision. There is also no finding by the district court of discriminatory intent

but only a similar reliance on the ad hoc decisionmaking of the police chief.

Integrity and Buentello also failed to demonstrate that there is no 

rational basis upon which the city could have excluded them from the nonconsent tow list. Because there is no suspect class, the exclusion “must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable 

state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Heller 

v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). “Moreover, the State need not articulate its 

reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather the burden is 

on the challenging party to negative ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts 

that could provide a rational basis.’” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 

U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (quoting Doe, 509 U.S. at 320). 

The plaintiffs have not carried their burden of negating all rational bases 

for the decision to exclude them. That the police chief believes he needs no 

more than two companies to satisfy the city’s non-consent tow requirements is 

sufficient justification to survive rational-basis review.9 

The orders complained of are REVERSED, and a judgment of dismissal

with prejudice is RENDERED for the City of Fulshear.

 

9 Although the chief acknowledged that he “probably” would have added a third towing 

service to the list if any had met his requirements, there is no evidence that he ever did. 

Thus, the explanation that only two towing companies are necessary remains a sufficient

conceivable rational basis, given that the city has never expanded the list.

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