Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01039/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01039-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Coke and Coal Chemicals Institute
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 4, 2006 Decided July 11, 2006

No. 03-1039

AMERICAN COKE AND COAL CHEMICALS INSTITUTE,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with

No. 05-1334

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Fredric P. Andes argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

Eric G. Hostetler, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent. On the briefs were John C.

Cruden, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Brian H. Lynk,

USCA Case #03-1039 Document #979529 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 1 of 34
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1

 See Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment

Standards, and New Source Performance Standards for the Iron and

Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category (“Final Rule”), 67 Fed.

Reg. 64,216, 64,220 (Oct. 17, 2002) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 420). 

Attorney, and Richard T. Witt, Counsel, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In 2002, the Environmental

Protection Agency promulgated a final rule under the Clean

Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2000), revising

certain nationwide limitations on water pollutant discharges

from sources in the cokemaking subcategory of the iron and

steel industry.1 The American Coke and Coal Chemicals

Institute (“Institute”) challenges four effluent limitations for

existing sources that apply to the recovery of by-products from

cokemaking. The Institute contends that the final limitations

and standards are not a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule

and violate its right to comment under both the CWA and the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)

(2000). The Institute also contends EPA was arbitrary and

capricious. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the

final limitations are a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule,

that EPA’s determinations of the limitations are based on a

reasonable and consistently explained methodology and

supported by the record, and that EPA reasonably determined

that the limitations are achievable. Accordingly, we deny the

petitions for review.

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I. 

The CWA declares a national goal of restoring and

maintaining the chemical, physical and biological integrity of

the nation’s waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, and prohibits all pollutant

discharges except where specifically authorized, id. § 1311(a).

Industries “directly” discharging “toxic” or “non-conventional”

pollutants into navigable waters must treat their wastewater so

as to comply with effluent limitations set with reference to the

capabilities of the “best available technology economically

achievable” to control those discharges (“BAT”). See id. §

1342(a), (b); id. § 1311(b)(2)(A). Industries “indirectly”

discharging such pollutants by discharging wastewater into

sewage systems connected to publicly owned treatment works

(“POTWs”), which treat the wastewater prior to its introduction

into public waterways, are required to reduce the level of

pollutants through treatment prior to such discharge (or

“pretreatment”) in order “to prevent the discharge of any

pollutant through [publically owned] treatment works.” Id. §

1317(b)(1) (italics added); see generally Weyerhaeuser Co. v.

Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1019-20 (D.C. Cir. 1978). EPA is

required to mandate pretreatment when a pollutant “interferes

with, passes through, or otherwise is incompatible with such

works.” 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1). The pretreatment standards for

existing sources (“PSES”) are set with reference to the level of

pollution-control technology available to a given industry. See

id. Although the CWA does not specify which level of control

technology is to be the applicable reference in setting the PSES

standards, EPA has adopted the position that PSES standards are

to be set with reference to technologies analogous to BAT. See

Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 64,210. 

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2

 Coke is “cooked” coal. It is a fuel – used primarily in the

steel industry – created when the “impurities” of bituminous and other

varieties of coal have been driven off by baking raw coal in an airless

oven. 

3 See Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category

Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New

Source Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,258 (May 28, 1982).

4

 Benzo[a]pyrene is an aromatic hydrocarbon that is

mutagenic and highly carcinogenic. Naphthalene, best known as the

primary ingredient of mothballs, is an aromatic crystalline

hydrocarbon that easily converts to gaseous matter at room

temperature without a vacuum (i.e., it “volatizes”) and is classified by

EPA a “toxic” pollutant. See 40 C.F.R. § 401.15. Cyanides are

chemical compounds containing a carbon atom triple-bonded to a

nitrogen atom, and certain cyanides are highly toxic (e.g., hydrogen

cyanide). Ammonia-N (or ammonia as nitrogen) is an inorganic,

The manufacture of coke2 has been subject to regulation

under the CWA since 1982.3 In 1992, EPA entered into a

consent decree arising out of litigation based on a 1987

amendment to the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(m), which requires

that EPA issue biannual plans for the annual review and revision

of existing effluent guidelines and the promulgation of certain

new guidelines. See Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 64,219. EPA

agreed to undertake final action on eleven point-source

categories and on eight categories to be later designated by the

EPA, id. After completing a preliminary study, EPA selected

the iron and steel industry as the subject of a revised effluent

rule. Id.; see EPA Preliminary Study of the Iron and Steel

Category, No. 821-R-95-037 (1995). The most common

technique for manufacturing coke creates numerous byproducts, including the four toxic or non-conventional pollutants

at issue: benzo[a]pyrene, naphthalene, cyanide, and ammoniaN.4

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dissolved form of nitrogen. Depending on other variables, high levels

of ammonia-N are often toxic for aquatic life.

5

 See EPA Development Document for the Proposed Effluent

Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Iron and Steel

Manufacturing Point Source Category (“Proposed Development

Document”) at § 3.2, No. 821-B-00-011 (December 2000). 

6

 See id. at § 3.1; EPA Announcement of Information

Collection Activities: 1997 Iron and Steel Industry Survey, 62 Fed.

Reg. 54,453 (Oct. 20, 1997); see also OMB Responses to EPA

Information Collection Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 74,023, 47,023 (Sept.

3, 1998) (approving EPA’s information collection request). 

7

 See generally EPA Effluent Guidelines Iron & Steelmaking

Rulemaking Process, http://www.epa.gov/ost/ironsteel (last visited

June 19, 2006).

From 1997 to 1999, EPA conducted 67 visits to iron and

steel facilities in the United States and Canada in order to collect

information on each site’s manufacturing operations, wastewater

generation, and wastewater treatment systems.5

 EPA in 1998

also solicited technical and economic information relevant to

promulgation of a revised rule from various participants in the

cokemaking industry through four surveys.6

 On the basis of the

site visits and surveys, EPA selected 16 sites at which to

perform wastewater sampling in order to characterize the

effectiveness of the treatment processes. See Proposed

Development Document at § 3.3. During this period, EPA

conducted a variety of outreach efforts, in which the Institute

participated, id. at § 3.5, including five stakeholders’ meetings

between 1998 and 2000 at which EPA described its preliminary

position on the model technology options and data quality

protocols, and solicited further comment and relevant data. Id.

7

EPA obtained additional information from secondary sources,

including trade journals, industry databases, and studies by

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8

 See Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and

New Source Performance Standards for the Iron and Steel

Manufacturing Point Source Category (“NOPR”), 65 Fed. Reg.

81,964, 81,978-79 (Dec. 27, 2000). The Proposed Development

Document described how EPA would derive its effluent limitations.

The NOPR and the development document identified: (1) the

pollutants that would be the subject of the limitations, how those

pollutants would be measured, id. at 82,016; Proposed Development

Document at §§ 4, 11; (2) the pollutants considered to “pass-through”

POTWs, thus requiring pretreatment, see 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1), and

EPA’s pass-through analysis, Proposed Development Document at §§

11.9, 11.10; (3) the control technologies considered as the BAT or

BAT-equivalent models, id. at §§ 12.2.1, 14, the sources of

information on the operation of the model technologies, id. at §§ 3,

12.2, and the data-selection criteria, id. at § 12.1; and, (4) how EPA

would derive discharge limitations expressed in terms of an allowable

weight of discharged pollutant per ton of coke production, id. at § 12.

governmental and private entities. See id. at § 3.4-5. Because

the operation of POTWs would be relevant to any PSES

standards, EPA solicited information from the state and local

entities responsible for POTW treatment of the indirect

discharges from the industry. Id. at § 3.6. In general, any

information that EPA collected that was not subject to protection

from disclosure as confidential business information was made

part of the public record. See id. at §§ 3.2, 3.5-6.

EPA published proposed revisions to the effluent limitations

for the iron and steelmaking industry in December 2002,

including the limitations applicable to the “by-product recovery”

segment of the cokemaking subcategory.8

 With regard to the

pollutants regulated through PSES standards, EPA stated that it

contemplated using its “traditional” pass-through analysis to

determine which pollutants would be subject to pretreatment

limitations pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1). See NOPR, 65

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9

 Under this methodology, a pollutant is deemed to pass

through a POTW when the median percentage of the pollutant

removed by well-operated POTWs is less than the median percentage

removed by direct dischargers using BAT technologies to remove the

same pollutant, see NOPR, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,011. The NOPR

identified a study of the effectiveness of POTWs dating from 1982 and

covering the survey years 1977 though 1980, see EPA Fate of Priority

Pollutants in Publicly Owned Treatment Works (“POTW Study”), No.

440/1-82/303 (Sept. 1982), as EPA’s “primary source” of data on the

operation of benchmark “well-operated POTWs.” See NOPR, 65 Fed.

Reg. at 82,011; see also Proposed Development Document at § 3.6.

Fed. Reg. at 82,011.9 EPA planned to compensate for gaps in the

data, due to the impossibility of measuring certain pollutants

found in very low concentration levels, by making certain

assumptions about the value of “non-detect” datapoints. See

NOPR, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,012. EPA planned to use only a

subset of the data on POTW performance in the 1982 POTW

Study to estimate the effectiveness of the “well-operated

POTW.” As relevant, EPA would estimate the percentages of

pollutant removed by POTW treatment based upon data from

POTWs that treated influent containing pollutants at a

concentration of ten times the minimum level that could be

detected. Id. Given that the treatment technologies generally

reduced the concentration of pollutants by at least 90%, id., the

“ten times minimum level” criteria was designed to ensure that

EPA’s estimation of the removal percentages would be

“meaningful” because it would be based upon the comparison of

two measured concentration readings (before and after

treatment). Id. Where there remained datapoints indicating that

a pollutant’s concentration was below a detectable level, EPA

substituted the minimum detectable level of concentration. Id.

In electing these data-editing criteria, EPA understood that both

might lead to biases in favor of finding that POTW treatment

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10 The “ten times minimum level” criteria potentially could

lead to an over-estimation of the amount of pollutant removed by

POTWs, because treatment technologies tend to be more effective

when they treat higher concentrations of pollutant. NOPR, 65 Fed.

Reg. at 82,013. On the other hand, the choice to assign the minimum

detectable concentration level to non-detect datapoints could lead to

an under-estimation of the effectiveness of the treatment. Id. at

82,012.

was either more or less effective than it actually was.10

EPA evaluated four treatment technologies as possible BAT

models for the direct discharge standards and two technological

options as the models for the PSES standard. Id. at 82,016-17.

In the NOPR, EPA identified one of the four direct discharge

treatment technologies — referred to a BAT-3 — as the model

for its proposed direct discharge standard. Id. at 82,016. EPA

“co-propos[ed]” two model treatment technologies — PSES-1

and PSES-3 — as the basis for the PSES standards. Id. at 82,

017. The Proposed Development Document identified, as the

second of EPA’s general data-selection “criteria,” that data

would be accepted as representative of the technological model

only if the “facility had . . . demonstrate[d] good operation of the

treatment component, as indicated by pollutant removals across

the treatment system and treatment system effluent quality,”

with “good operation” being determined based on such things as

site visits, survey responses, and direct measurement of the

reduction of pollutants. Proposed Development Document at §

12.1. The Proposed Development Document also stated that

“EPA intends to further review and possibly revise the data

selection methodology.” Id.

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11 EPA extended the initial 60-day comment period (until

April 2001) and held additional meetings with stakeholders, including

the Institute, which in February 2001 made presentations on the

economic effects of the proposed effluent limitations. 66 Fed. Reg.

17,842; see Final Development Document at § 3.6. The Institute also

submitted written comments on the proposed rule, many of which

EPA directly addressed in the EPA Comment Response Document at

20-20 through 20-45, 20-47 though 20-50, 20-61 through 20-62 (EPA

Contract No. 68-C6-0044, Work Assignment 5-01 (April 30, 2002)).

EPA also considered late-received comments. See id. at 26-1.

12 See supra note 1; EPA Development Document for Final

Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Iron and Steel

Manufacturing Point Source Category (“Final Development

Document”), No. 821-R-02-004 (April 2002). Various other

accompanying documents explain specific decisions, such as the

exclusion of particular data-points.

13 See Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 64,233. 

14 Compare Final Development Document at § 12.2.2-3, with

Proposed Development Document at 11.9-10; id. at Table 10-2.

15 Compare generally Final Development Document at § 14,

with Proposed Development Document at § 12. These procedures may

be divided into two principal stages. First, EPA derived limits on the

After an extended comment period,11 EPA promulgated the

final rule in October 2002.12 Benzo(a)pyrene and cyanide were

subjected to direct discharge limitations. Naphthalene, cyanide

and ammonia-N were subject to indirect discharge limitations.13

EPA’s pass-through analysis for naphthalene remained

substantially unchanged.14 The procedures used to derive the

direct- and indirect-discharge effluent limitations also did not

change.15 However, the Final Rule departed from the NOPR in

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permissible daily and monthly concentrations of specific pollutants in

effluent wastewater from data from facilities with well-designed and

operated model treatment technologies. Second, EPA converted these

limits into limitations expressed in terms of the maximum weight of

pollutant allowed per ton of coke production. Greatly simplified, EPA

derived the maximum allowed concentration by first selecting the

sampling episodes from facilities operating either BAT-1 or PSES-1

technologies and then calculating an average performance level for

each episode (the “episode-specific” long term average or “LTA”)

using either the arithmetic average or modified delta-lognormal

distribution. Then, EPA adopted the median of the episode-specific

LTAs as the “option-specific LTA” for that treatment technology.

Compare Final Development Document at § 14.8.1, with Proposed

Development Document at § 12.7.1. In order to allow for the

predictable variation in the amount of pollutant removed by the

technological option or model, the option-specific LTAs would be

multiplied by both a daily and a monthly “variability factor.” Thus,

EPA would derive two limits expressed in terms of maximum

concentration: a maximum daily limit, which was calculated as the

product of the option-specific LTA and the daily variability factor; and

a maximum monthly average limit, which was calculated as the

product of the option-specific LTA and the monthly variability factor.

In order to derive the two variability factors, EPA first calculated daily

and monthly episode-specific variability using the modified deltalognormal distribution and then adopted the mean of the daily and

monthly episode-specific variability factors as the daily and monthly

option-specific variability factors. Compare Final Development

Document at § 14.8.2, with Proposed Development Document at

12.7.4. Where the variability factors could not be calculated for

specific pollutants, EPA borrowed the variability factors from a

different pollutant treated by the same technological option. This was

the case with benzo(a)pyrene. Compare Final Development

Document at § 14.8.3, with Proposed Development Document at §

12.7.5. To calculate the concentration-based limits for

benzo(a)pyrene, EPA borrowed the variability factors calculated for

naphthalene treated under BAT-1, a decision it justified because

benzo(a)pyrene and naphthalene were “chemically similar” and BATUSCA Case #03-1039 Document #979529 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 10 of 34
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1 effectiveness in treating these chemicals would exhibit comparable

variability. Final Development Document at § 14.8.3.

Having calculated the maximum daily and the monthly

average concentration limits for each pollutant, EPA then converted

these limits into daily and monthly average limits based on the weight

of pollutant allowed per ton of coke produced. This stage involved

multiplying the concentration-based limits by a “production

normalized flow rate,” by which EPA sought to capture the amount of

water typically discharged per ton of coke production, and certain

conversion factors, which would handle the translation between units.

See Final Development Document at §§ 13.2 & 14.9.1. By

multiplying the concentration limits by an amount of water

discharged, EPA could make the jump from limits expressed in terms

of average maximum concentrations to limits expressed in terms of

pounds of allowable pollutant per ton of production. See generally

Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 571-73 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(per curiam).

16 BAT-1 was the technological model of the previous direct

discharge effluent limitations. See NOPR, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,986. As

relevant, BAT-1 involves two chief water treatment processes: “free

and fixed ammonia stripping” and “biological treatment with

clarification.” See Final Development Document at § 9.1.1. PSES-1

is equivalent to BAT-1 but dispenses with the biological treatment

four ways that are relevant to this appeal: 

(1) EPA rejected BAT-3 as the technological model for

the direct-discharge limitations, because it was “not

economically achievable” by industry, in favor of the less

costly (and less effective) BAT-1. See Final Rule, 67 Fed.

Reg. at 64,233. 

(2) EPA adopted PSES-1 as the technological model

for the PSES standards, the less costly and less effective of

the two co-proposed options.16 Id. at 64,234. EPA

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processes; PSES-3, in contrast, was identical to BAT-1. See id.

17 See EPA Memorandum from Yu-Ting L. Guilaran, re.

Selection of BAT Facilities for Cokemaking Subcategory for Final

predicted that setting the pretreatment limit based upon

PSES-3 would result in plant closures and job losses. Id.

It concluded that PSES-1 represented “the most

appropriate” basis for pretreatment standards because, in

combination with treatment occurring at the POTWs,

PSES-1-based limitations will “substantially reduce the

levels of all cokemaking pollutants of concern” and that

compliance would be “economically achievable.” Id.

(3) EPA increased the production-normalized flow rate

from the proposed 158 gallons per ton of production (“gpt”)

to 163 gpt. See Final Development Document at § 13.3.1;

Proposed Development Document at § 7.3. Because the

final effluent limitation was calculated as the product of the

concentration-based limits and the production-normalized

flow rate, this increase in the flow rate had the effect (all

else remaining the same) of increasing the amount of

pollutant allowed per ton of production. 

(4) EPA elected to base its evaluation of PSES-1

treatment of naphthalene upon different data than was used

in the NOPR to evaluate PSES-1. As proposed, the

reduction of naphthalene by PSES-1 treatment was

evaluated based upon a single EPA-administered sampling

episode, identified as ESE03. See Proposed Development

Document at § 12.7.4. However, in the interim, EPA

learned that the facility from which the ESE03 data derived

had a history of CWA violations, and for this reason EPA

no longer considered this episode representative of PSES-1

naphthalene treatment.17 Instead, EPA evaluated PSES-1

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Rule, DCN IS10816 (April 29, 2002) (memorandum contained in

section 14.10 of the record); see also Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at

64,234.

18 See Final Development Document at § 14.10. 

naphthalene treatment based upon two EPA-administered

sampling episodes, ESE01 and ESE02, and one industry

self-monitoring episode, identified as ISM54.18 The

substitution of these datasets resulted in an increased

calculation of naphthalene reduction by well-operated

facilities using PSES-1 technology, which in turn resulted

in a more stringent requirement for naphthalene reduction

in pretreatment. See Final Development Document at §

14.10.

The Institute and certain affected companies petitioned the

court to vacate the Final Rule and then sought reconsideration

by EPA while its petition was stayed. The Institute argued

before EPA that the mandated level of benzo(a)pyrene reduction

could not be achieved by BAT-1, naphthalene does not “pass

through” well-operated POTWs, and the mandated level of

naphthalene reduction could not be achieved by PSES-1. In

support of the first ground, the Institute submitted new data from

two cokemaking facilities — United States Steel Company’s

Gary Works and Clairton plants — which the Institute

represented as demonstrating the required benzo(a)pyrene

reductions using BAT-1 or technologies that go “beyond BAT[-

1]” were not achievable. In support of the second and third

grounds, the Institute challenged the methodology of EPA’s

pass-through analysis (in particular, the mathematical interplay

between the “ten times minimum level” data-selection criteria

and the assignment of 10 μg/L values to non-detect datapoints

in the POTW Study) and submitted new data purporting to

demonstrate that naphthalene did not pass through well-operated

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19 EPA Decision on Petition for Reconsideration or, in the

Alternative, Petition to Revise the Effluent Limitations Guidelines,

Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards for

the Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Categories

(“Reconsideration”) (April 29, 2005). 

20 See Proposed Development Document at § 12.2.1. 

POTWs and that the limitations were not achievable by PSES-1

treatment technologies. EPA denied reconsideration,19 the

Institute filed a new petition for review, and the court

consolidated the Institute’s petitions.

II.

The Institute’s central contention is that the Final Rule is

not a logical outgrowth of the NOPR because EPA failed to

provide adequate notice of the derivation of the naphthalene

limitation from three episodes or datasets — ESE01, ESE02,

ISM54 — that were not identified in the NOPR as the proposed

basis for naphthalene PSES limits, and of the exclusion of the

one dataset — ESE03 — that was identified as the source of the

proposed naphthalene limit.20 This change resulted in an

increase in the effectiveness of PSES-1 as expressed in the LTA

for naphthalene, which in turn resulted in more stringent

naphthalene pretreatment limit. See Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at

64,234, 64,263. For the same reasons, the Institute contends it

was denied adequate notice with regard to the naphthalene

variability factors. Because it was deprived a fair opportunity to

comment upon the exclusion of the ESE03 data and employment

of the alternative three episodes, the Institute maintains EPA has

failed to provide adequate notice and opportunity for comment

as required by 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 

Under the APA, “[n]otice requirements are designed (1) to

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ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse

public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, and

(3) to give affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence

in the record to support their objections to the rule and thereby

enhance the quality of judicial review.” Int’l Union, United

Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d

1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Small Refiner Lead

Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir.

1983)). “An agency satisfies the notice requirement, and need

not conduct a further round of public comment, as long as its

final rule is a ‘logical outgrowth’ of the rule it originally

proposed.” Northeast Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358

F.3d 936, 951-52 (D.C. Cir. 2004). If interested parties “should

have anticipated” that the change was possible, and thus

reasonably should have filed their comments on the subject

during the notice-and-comment period, then the rule is deemed

to constitute a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule. See City

of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see

also Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C.

Cir. 2005); First Am. Discount Corp., 222 F.3d 1008, 1015

(D.C. Cir. 2000); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Mine Safety & Heath

Admin., 116 F.3d 520, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A petitioner must

demonstrate that the agency’s violation of the APA’s notice and

comment procedures has resulted in “prejudice,” 5 U.S.C. §

706(2). See generally Chamber of Commerce of the United

States v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 904 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

The flaw in the Institute’s logical outgrowth objection is

that the right to comment under the APA upon a proposed rule

does not extend to a right to comment upon each application of

the agency’s announced rulemaking procedures, even if different

applications may have significant consequences for the

regulated industry, where the agency gave adequate notice of the

procedures it intended to use, the criteria by which it intended to

select data, and the range of alternative sources of data it was

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considering. Here, the NOPR gave notice of each, and the

Institute was afforded an opportunity to comment on each. A

comparison of the rulemaking record shows that EPA made no

relevant changes to the procedures it used to derive the effluent

limitations. See supra note 15. Although the preamble in the

NOPR did not state that EPA intended to reconsider the use of

data from episode ESE03, nor that the ESE03 site would be

reviewed for compliance with the general criteria of “good

operation,” EPA made clear in the Proposed Development

Document accompanying the NOPR that the model facilities

“had to demonstrate good operation of the treatment

component,” Proposed Development Document at § 12.1, and

thus the Institute had notice that data deriving from any plants

that failed to demonstrate “good operation” would not be

considered sources of information on the operation of any

proposed BAT. EPA stated unambiguously that it “might

reconsider the exclusion of the naphthalene sampling data from

sampling episode ESE01 and ESE02 and self-monitoring

episode ISM54.” Id. at 12.2.1. Between 2000 and 2002, EPA

explained, new information indicated that the ESE03 episode

had come from a facility that was emitting pollutant “in excess

of the permit,” see Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 64,234, and thus

that the episode did not meet its announced data criteria and

could not be accepted as coming from a BAT facility. 

The First Circuit, in BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598

F.2d 637, 642-46 (1st Cir. 1979), was similarly confronted with

a CWA rulemaking in which new data submitted during the

comment period showed that treatment technologies for

pesticides were more effective than previously indicated. The

court aptly observed: 

It is perfectly predictable that new data will come in

during the comment period, either submitted by the

public with comments or collected by the agency in a

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17

continuing effort to give the regulations a more

accurate foundation. . . . If data used and disclosed for

the interim regulations presented the issues for

comment, then there is no need to seek new comment

even though significant quantitative differences result.

Id. at 644-45. Although the resulting limit was more stringent

than had been announced, the First Circuit stated “[t]he agency

should be encouraged to use such information in its final

calculations without thereby risking the requirement of a new

comment period.” Id. Similarly, the court rejected the argument

that a new round of notice and comment was required under the

APA when the agency decided in the final rule to merge

subcategories of the pesticide industry after comments argued

that the subcategories in the proposed rule, based on the

different chemical structure of the pollutant, were irrational

because data showed there were no statistically relevant

differences between the treatment of the different chemicals. Id.

at 643. The First Circuit reasoned that although commenters

apparently hoped to persuade EPA to adopt more subcategories,

EPA’s decision to abandon the subcategories altogether was not

an unforeseen consequence of objections that undermined the

premise for using subcategories. Id. Given that the commenters

“had a fair opportunity to present their views on how the

industry ought to be subcategorized” and that the choice to

merge the subcategories was a foreseeable result of the EPA’s

solicitation of comment on rationality of the subcategory

scheme, there was no failure of notice or opportunity to

comment even though parties may not have been able to predict

how the EPA would choose to act upon their comments. See id.

at 644.

We likewise conclude that EPA was not required to provide

a new opportunity for comment upon its decision to exclude the

ESE03 data based upon new information obtained after the

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18

NOPR was issued and, in its place, to use the ESE01, ESE02, &

ISM54 data that it had previously excluded subject to

reconsideration. See Proposed Development Document at §

12.2.1. EPA’s decision to exclude the ESE03 data based upon

its announced “good operation” criteria and the new information

on the ESE03 plant’s non-compliance with its permits is similar

to EPA’s decision in BASF to merge the subcategories based

upon newly submitted data showing a lack of significant

differences in the effectiveness of treatment: each decision was

based upon newly submitted information that was analyzed

under previously announced criteria, and each had the effect of

significantly altering the scope of the database used to derive the

pollutant limitation. Similarly, EPA’s decision in the final rule

to use the three additional episodes expanded the scope of the

relevant database, but in light of EPA’s statement in the

Proposed Development Document that it might reconsider its

exclusion of these other datasets, this possibility was noticed and

made available for possible comment. That these three episodes

indicated that PSES-1 was far more effective than the ESE03

results indicated was a “perfectly predictable” result of the

notice and comment process, BASF, 598 F.2d at 644. None of

the core goals of the notice and comment procedures, see United

Mine Workers of Am., 407 F.3d at 1259, were compromised by

EPA’s decisions with regard to the naphthalene data. Although

the final limitation is more stringent than had been initially

proposed, the limitation is calculated according to the

announced procedure and thus is not “surprisingly distant” from

the limitation presaged in the NOPR, see id. at 1260.

To the extent the Institute contends that the EPA provided

inadequate notice that the production-normalized flow rate

would be derived from the “best performing mills” instead of the

proposed median flow rates of all relevant facilities, where EPA

indicated that the industry median would be “applicable and

achievable,” Proposed Development Document at § 7.3, its

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19

contention fares no better. Because the flow rate adopted was

higher than the proposed flow rate (thus leading to less stringent

limitations), the Institute seems to maintain that the flow rate

should have been higher still because EPA, in explaining that

the proposed flow rate was based upon the median flow rates of

all relevant facilities, committed itself irrevocably to that

method of deriving the flow rate rather than the method adopted

in the final rule that looked only to the best performing 30% of

the relevant facilities. See Final Development Document at §

13.2. EPA gave notice that it might consider “alternative [flow

rates]” for particular manufacturing operations, and the

Proposed Development Document put parties on notice that

EPA’s flow rate would be based upon “better performing mills,”

id., which put commentators on notice that EPA was considering

an alternative to the “industry median.” See Envtl. Integrity

Project, 425 F.3d at 996; United Mine Workers of Am., 407 F.3d

at 1260. Moreover, the Institute can show no prejudice as the

flow rate in the Final Rule is less stringent than the proposed

flow rate, and this difference (all else being equal) resulted in a

less stringent limitation across the board. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n

v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 202 (5th Cir. 1989).

The Institute’s objection that EPA gave inadequate notice

of the potential for increased compliance costs if the final

limitations were stricter than those proposed in the NOPR fails

to suggest what difference further comment on costs would have

made. The Institute does not object that EPA rejected the more

effective, but also more expensive, technologies originally

proposed (BAT-3 for direct discharge; PSES-3 for

pretreatment/indirect discharge). It presents no persuasive

argument that it could not have anticipated the magnitudes of

increased costs depending on the stringency of the limitations.

The cases cited by the Institute are inapposite. In Weyerhaeuser

Co., 590 F.2d at 1028-29, EPA conceded error in calculating

costs based on new evidence. The Institute does not claim EPA

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20

has made a miscalculation. Although Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950

F.2d 741, 749-50 (D.C. Cir. 1991), involved increased costs

where the scope of a regulation expanded without adequate

notice, the Final Rule here produced no comparable change as

no unexpected pollutants were subjected to effluent limitations.

Moreover, in protesting the “drastic[]” increase of the costs, the

Institute ignores that compliance costs would have been higher

had EPA adopted the more effective BAT-3 and PSES-3

technologies as the BAT and BAT-equivalents, that the Institute

was given a fair opportunity to comment on the potential costs

of these more expensive technological options, and that it was

given notice of the range of costs that it now represents as

surprising. Cf. BASF, 598 F.2d at 642-44; Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n,

870 F.2d at 207.

Finally, the Institute’s contention that it was deprived of its

comment rights under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e); see

Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 502 (2d Cir.

2005), is contradicted by the record evidence of the Institute’s

extensive participation in every stage of the rulemaking. See

supra note 11. 

III.

Turning to the Institute’s contentions that EPA’s

promulgation of the Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious, we

begin by observing the limited nature of the court’s review. An

agency action is “arbitrary and capricious,” 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(A), if it “has relied on factors which Congress has not

intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important

aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision

that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so

implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view

or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,

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21

21 The Institute challenges to EPA’s decision to regulate

naphthalene on the ground that naphthalene does not satisfy EPA’s

criteria as a pollutant of concern. Even if this contention is not waived

because raised only in the reply brief, see, e.g., Charter Oil Co. v. Am.

Employers’ Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1995), there is

no indication that this challenge was raised before EPA, and so it is

waived, see Amgen, Inc. v. Smith, 357 F.3d 103, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2004);

Nat’l Wildlife, 286 F.3d at 562. In any event, the NOPR generally

identified as pollutants of concern “numerous . . . volatile organic

compounds and polynuclear aromatic compounds” that were released

into byproduct wastewater. Naphthalene is a volatile organic and an

aromatic polynuclear compound. 

22 The Institute’s claim that EPA ignored later POTW data is

incorrect. See Proposed Development Document at § 11.9.1; Final

Development Document at § 12.2.2; see also EPA Comment Response

Document at 13-25. 

43 (1983). The court owes particular deference to EPA when its

rulemakings rest upon matters of scientific and statistical

judgment within the agency’s sphere of special competence and

statutory jurisdiction. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d

861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down

Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983);

Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 447-48 (4th Cir. 1985).

The Institute makes two objections to EPA’s conclusion

that naphthalene “passes though” well operated POTWs.21 First,

it maintains that EPA inappropriately relied upon the POTW

Study, which is over twenty years old and characterized by the

Institute as “outdated,” in coming to the conclusion that POTWs

can remove up to 95% of the naphthalene from treated

wastewater. However, EPA explained that because the

technology has not changed since the study was completed, it

remains the best source of POTW data.22 At best, the Institute

claims that later POTW data — especially with respect to

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22

POTW treatment of high-naphthalene concentration influent —

more accurately represents the effectiveness of typical POTW

treatment of naphthalene in cokemaking wastewater. But EPA’s

position that the CWA requires it to consider POTW treatment

capabilities on a nationwide basis, see EPA Comment Response

Document at 13-25, is a permissible interpretation of Section

307 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1), which requires EPA

to promulgate national standards for pretreatment. See Chevron

USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45

(1984). Section 307 refers to POTWs in the most general sense

with no qualifications that would suggest it would be

unreasonable for EPA to understand Congress to intend a

uniform standard based on the average, not exceptionally

effective POTW.

Second, the Institute challenges EPA’s pass-through

analysis. The Institute’s claim that there is no record evidence

that naphthalene actually passes through POTWs into navigable

waters is incorrect. Although naphthalene, as a highly volatile

compound, often escapes from wastewater directly into the air

and the level of naphthalene after POTW treatment is at a nondetectable level, the record indicates naphthalene is sometimes

present even after POTW treatment. Cf. NOPR, 65 Fed. Reg. at

82,012-13; Proposed Development Document at § 11.9.1.

However, the Institute also challenges EPA’s assignment of a

substitution value of 10 μg/L to non-detect results when that

assumption, by EPA’s own acknowledgment, could have

resulted in an underestimate of the naphthalene removal

efficiency of POTWs relative to PSES-1, and thus might have

increased the likelihood that EPA would find that naphthalene

“passes-through” POTWs. EPA acknowledged the possibility

of bias as a result of the assignment of the 10 μg/L level to a

non-detect result. However, EPA also recognized that the use

of the “ten times minimum level” criteria may have biased the

calculations the other way. See supra note 10. Given the

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23

limitations of record data on the effectiveness of PSES-1 and

POTWs at removing naphthalene, EPA was confronted with a

situation in which it was not possible, given the current state of

technology, to establish conclusively the relative effectiveness

of POTW and PSES-1 treatment. Nonetheless, the Institute

points to nothing that would indicate that EPA’s decision to

adopt the ten-times minimum level criteria and to assign the 10

μg/L value to nondetect results, and to base its pass-though

analysis upon calculations affected by these choices, was an

unreasonable way to implement the statutory command to

regulate pollutants that pass-through POTWs. See 33 U.S.C. §

1317(b); Chem. Mfrs., 870 F.2d at 244; see also Reynolds

Metals Co. v. EPA, 760 F.2d 549, 553, 567 (4th Cir. 1985).

Such decisions involve expert statistical and scientific

judgments to which this court properly defers. See Penn. Dept.

of Envt’l Prot. v. EPA, 429 F.3d 1125, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 2005);

Int’l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir.

1992).

The Institute also challenges the rationality of the effluent

limits in the Final Rule. These challenges fail.

Benzo(a)pyrene. The Institute’s challenge that the final

limit is arbitrary and capricious because EPA failed to identify

any BAT-1 facility that was capable of meeting this limit is

based solely on Tanners’ Council of America, Inc. v. Train, 540

F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (4th Cir. 1976), which is distinguishable in

one key respect: unlike the instant rulemaking, in Tanners’, EPA

did not develop the limitations based upon data from the

regulated industry, but instead relied upon data from another

industry without an adequate explanation of how the regulated

industry would be able to adopt the treatment technology

identified as the relevant model technology. Id. at 1192. Here,

EPA not only developed the limitation based upon data from

existing BAT-1 facilities treating benzo(a)pyrene in cokemaking

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24

wastewater, but EPA took steps to ensure that its concentrationbased limitations did not result in a limit that overstated the

capabilities of the BAT-1 technology. For example, after

deriving the maximum daily concentration limit for

benzo(a)pyrene, EPA cross-checked the limitation against the

raw data in order to verify that the statistical assumptions

provided a reasonable “fit” with the data. See Final

Development Document at § 14.8.4. EPA thus took reasonable

steps to ensure that the limit represents BAT-1 treatment

capabilities and its choices are not arbitrary or capricious. See

Kennecott, 780 F.2d at 450-51; Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA,

760 F.2d 549, 560 (4th Cir. 1985); cf. Chem. Mfns. Ass’n v.

EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

To the extent the Institute suggests EPA must be able to

point to data from a specific facility showing no instances where

the benzo(a)pyrene limit was ever breached, it cites no authority

for this proposition. Given that the purpose of the CWA is “to

achieve the complete elimination of all discharges of pollutants

into the nation’s waters,” Am. Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539

F.2d 107, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1976), EPA may surely make statistical

choices about how to treat data based on the capabilities of the

model technologies with this goal in mind, cf. Natural Res.

Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 201-202 (D.C. Cir.

1988); Kennecott, 780 F.2d at 450-51; Reynolds Metals, 760

F.2d at 558-59. Although EPA’s decision to develop the daily

and monthly concentration limits by employing the “ten times

minimum level” data-selection criteria, and then to aggregate

data from multiple facilities as either a single mean or median

figure, see supra note 15, could have produced a limit that no

BAT-1 facility actually achieved, the choice of effluent dataediting criteria and statistical methodology falls within EPA’s

special area of expertise. EPA’s determinations do not appear

arbitrary or capricious in light of the technological limitations on

measuring very low concentration levels and EPA’s reasonable

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25

23 The Institute has waived its challenge to EPA’s decision to

adopt the naphthalene variability factors as the benzo(a)pyrene

variability factors because, although the decision was set forth in the

Proposed Development Document at § 12.7.5 (Table 5), the Institute

did not claim during the administrative proceedings that

benzo(a)pyrene has a different variability than naphthalene, or that the

chemical structure of the two pollutants would lead one to expect any

difference in their variability. See Nat’l Wildlife, 286 F.3d at 562;

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir.

2001). 

explanations of its procedures as a means to capture more

accurately the capability of BAT-1 in the general run of

applications to the cokemaking industry. Cf. Kennecott, 780

F.2d at 450-51; Reynolds Metals, 760 F.2d at 558-59.23

Naphthalene. For the reasons previously discussed

regarding benzo(a)pyrene, the Institute’s contention that EPA

failed to identify any PSES-1 facility that was capable of

meeting the indirect discharge limitation fails. The notion that

EPA was capricious by departing from its position that, in

general, it would not regulate volatile pollutants misreads the

NOPR, which did not state that EPA will not regulate volatile

pollutants, such as naphthalene, see 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,010, but

rather generally observed that certain pollutants need not be

monitored because many pollutants may be surrogates for

others. In any event, the NOPR identified naphthalene as a

pollutant in cokemaking wastewater, 65 Fed. Reg at 81,975, that

might be subject to the effluent limitations. 

Also without merit is the Institute’s contention that EPA

acted capriciously in promulgating the naphthalene limitation

because it had previously justified its decision to regulate

naphthalene as an indicator of the effectiveness of biological

treatment, which was a component of the co-proposed PSES-3

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26

24 The Institute claimed that nothing in the record indicated

that PSES-1 technology was capable of reducing naphthalene, and

thus EPA would be capricious in promulgating a rule requiring

naphthalene reductions modeled upon a BAT that had no effect upon

naphthalene. However, as clarified during oral argument and in

supplemental filings in response to the court’s order, the record shows

EPA had data that unambiguously indicated that PSES-1 reduced

naphthalene. For example, a 1992 study in the rulemaking record, but

not initially in the record filed in this court, indicates that ammonia

stripping was extremely effective in reducing naphthalene in

cokemaking wastewater.

model. According to the Institute, because EPA decided in the

Final Rule to model indirect discharge limits upon PSES-1

technology, which does not employ a biological treatment

component, its justification for the regulation of naphthalene

was obviated. By this argument, the Institute would suggest that

by originally justifying regulation of naphthalene as an indicator

of the effectiveness of biological treatment, EPA had forever

committed itself to this justification as the sole legally sufficient

basis for its action. This is incorrect. The NOPR gave notice

naphthalene was potentially subject to PSES limitations. The

record evidence supports EPA’s conclusion that the employment

of the PSES-1 treatment technology could significantly reduce

naphthalene discharge into POTWs. Hence, EPA did not act

capriciously by promulgating its naphthalene limitations even

though it had originally justified its choice to regulate

naphthalene on other grounds.24

Cyanide. The Institute repeats its incapability challenge by

arguing that the model BAT-1 facilities used by EPA were not

able to achieve the cyanide reduction required by the Final Rule.

The Institute relies on Tanners’, 540 F.2d at 1193, and points to

data from the model facility from which the two relevant

episodes (ESE01 & ISM50) were drawn — United States Steel

Company’s Clairton Works plant — showing the facility was

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27

not able “consistently” to avoid exceeding the maximum

cyanide limit. Many of these objections fail because they are

predicated either upon data that was never submitted to EPA or

that does not accord with the data that before EPA; with regard

to the data that remains, EPA reasonably explained that certain

anomalous information need not be the basis for the final

cyanide limitation. 

It is well established that “the focal point for judicial

review” under the 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) “should be the

administrative record already in existence, not some new record

made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.

138, 142 (1973). After excluding from consideration data not

before EPA, only one Clairton self-monitoring episode (ISM50)

is at issue. EPA points out that although the ISM50 episode

indicates that 7 out of 265 days recorded indicate that the

Clairton facility exceeded the daily cyanide concentration limit,

four of the data-points coincide with the failure of the plant’s

gas handling and chemical recovery system. The remaining

three samples represent only 1.15% of the relevant dataset.

Given that the maximum daily limit was intended by the EPA to

reflect the 99th percentile distributional basis of the actual

results of a well-operated plant employing BAT-1, see Final

Development Document at § 14.6.2, EPA reasonably concluded

that these three ISM50 data-points cannot be taken to indicate

that Clairton is not capable of achieving the cyanide limitations

at all times. Similarly, according to EPA, because the maximum

monthly average limitation was intended to represent the 95th

percentile distribution, and the three instances in which the

monthly average fall outside of this distribution, the monthly

average data fails to indicate that Clairton is incapable of

achieving the cyanide limitations.

The court will not second-guess EPA’s expertise with

regard to what the maximum effluent limits represent. See Nat’l

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28

25 The Institute also maintains that, when calculated according

to the weight rather than the concentration of the pollutant discharged,

there are actually nine instances where Clairton exceeded the cyanide

limitations in the ISM50 dataset; see Grey Appendix D.1 & D.2]; such

a difference is of little moment. The Institute appears implicitly to

assume that at the time the daily samples were taken the Clairton

facility was operating at a particular flow rate. The data does not

appear to suggest anything of the sort, and the calculation of the

“nine” instances in which Clairton may have exceeded the daily mass

limitations is founded upon the application of flow rates that are,

presumably, either averages for Clairton or else averages for similar

facilities. In either event, the Institute fails to explain sufficiently and

substantiate its objections on this score.

Wildlife, 286 F.3d at 571-73. As EPA explains in the Final

Development Document, the daily and monthly average effluent

limitations are not promulgated with the expectation that a plant

will operate with an eye toward barely achieving the limitations.

 Final Development Document at § 14.6.2. Should a plant do so,

it could be expected to exceed these limits frequently because of

the foreseeable variation in treatment effectiveness. Rather, the

effluent limitations are promulgated with the expectation that

plants will be operated with an eye towards achieving the

equivalent of the LTA for the BAT-1 model technology. Id.

However, even operated with the goal of achieving the BAT-1

LTA, a plant’s actual results will vary. EPA’s maximum daily

limitations are designed to be forgiving enough to cover the

operations of a well-operated model facility 99% of the time,

while its maximum monthly average limitations are designed to

be forgiving enough to accommodate the operations of a welloperated model facility 95% of the time. See id. EPA’s choice

of percentile distribution represented by its maximum effluent

limitation under the CWA represents an expert policy judgment

that is not arbitrary or capricious. See Nat’l Wildlife, 286 F.3d

at 573; Kennecott, 780 F.2d at 449.25

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Ammonia-N. The Institute also contends that the ammoniaN PSES limitations are not achievable by PSES-1 technology.

Citing both Tanners’, 540 F.2d at 1193, which is inapposite, and

Chemical Manufacturers, 28 F.3d at 1265-66, the Institute

contends that EPA promulgated the ammonia-N pretreatment

limit on the basis of an industry data, ISM54, that demonstrated

the ammonia-N limit being breached multiple times. In

Chemical Manufacturers, the court reviewed an EPA model for

determining an exposure level above which a hazardous air

pollutant may be said to pose a high risk. Id. at 1264.

Observing that “the normal criterion by which to evaluate a

model is not the accuracy of the assumptions from which it

proceeds but the utility of the results it produces,” id. at 1265,

the court noted that EPA “need not justify the model on an ad

hoc basis for every chemical to which the model is applied, even

when faced with data indicating that it is not a perfect fit,” id.

The court will “reverse the agency’s application of the generic

air dispersion model as arbitrary and capricious if there is

simply no rational relationship between the model and the

known behavior of the hazardous air pollutant to which it is

applied.” Id. (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). In that case,

the court found no rational relationship between the data and the

air dispersion model when EPA was faced with “specific

scientific evidence” demonstrating that the model fundamentally

failed to represent the physical properties of the chemical at

issue, and where EPA sought to explain away any discrepancies

with unsubstantiated speculation and conclusory assertions of

fact. 

Chemical Manufacturers is apposite because the cumulative

effect of the data editing criteria, the assignment of a 10 μg/l

level to nondetect results, and the various statistical choices

made in the Final Rule may be treated as analogous to the

generic air dispersion model examined in that case; in both

instances, there is a risk that the conceptual tools used to predict

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the behavior of a range of physical processes might, in a

particular instance, fail so significantly that the conceptual tools

must be revised in the face of reality. Here, EPA recognized as

much by specifically incorporating a cross-check of the

concentration limits against the data used to derive those limits,

see Final Development Document at § 14.8.4. As the court had

observed, a “perfect fit” is not required, see Chemical

Manufacturers, 28 F.3d at 1265, and deference to EPA’s

judgment is appropriate where minor differences between the

record data and the agency’s representation of that data may be

explained as matters of judgment as to the statistical relevancy

of apparently anomalous information, see Nat’l Wildlife, 286

F.3d at 573; Kennecott, 780 F.2d at 450-51; Reynolds Metals,

760 F.2d at 559.

The Institute does not question whether EPA’s analysis of

the ISM54 ammonia-N data bears a rational relationship to the

data before the agency. Again, the Institute relies solely upon

the argument that — calculated according to weight of

ammonia-N discharged — the ISM54 data indicate three

instances where samples exceeded the daily maximum and six

instances in which the maximum monthly average limitation

would have been breached. As explained supra note 24, there

is no reason the court would take on faith the Institute’s

calculation of the weight of ammonia-N discharged based upon

data in the record indicating only the concentration of ammoniaN in cokemaking effluent, where such a calculation rests upon

unexplained and unsubstantiated assumptions about flow rates.

Unlike the situation in Chemical Manufacturers, 28 F.3d at

1266, it is not the agency but the Institute that relies upon

unsubstantiated speculation in order to make the record data fit

its perception of reality. EPA indicated as part of the

rulemaking record that the concentration of ammonia-N never

exceeded the maximum daily limit in the relevant ISM54 data,

and the monthly limit was exceeded only once out of the twelve

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31

monthly averages represented in the dataset. The single monthly

average above the maximum limitations represents 8.33% of the

monthly average data. Thus, the limit might be said to represent

the 92d percentile distributional basis of the ISM54 data.

Although the maximum monthly limit does not quite represent

the 95th percentile distributional that was EPA’s goal in

establishing this limit, see Final Development Document at §

14.6.2, the maximum average monthly limitation “fits” the

ISM54 data, see Chemical Manufacturers, 28 F.3d at 1264; the

small deviation between the distribution of the data and EPA’s

distributional goal is insufficient to cause the court to secondguess EPA’s expert judgment as to the relevancy of a single

potentially anomalous instance.

IV.

Finally, the Institute contends that, in light of the additional

information it submitted after the rulemaking record closed

relevant to the benzo(a)pyrene and naphthalene limitations, EPA

erred in denying reconsideration. Given EPA’s decision on

reconsideration to address the Institute’s claims on the merits,

we review the Institute’s contentions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(A); see Prof’l Pilots Fed’n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 763

(D.C. Cir. 1997), and find them lacking.

Benzo(a)pyrene. The Institute challenged the

benzo(a)pyrene limitation on the basis of new data from United

States Steel Company’s Gary Works, a facility employing

technologies very similar to BAT-1, and Clairton plants. EPA

pointed out that Gary Works does not use BAT-1 technology

and therefore the data from this facility is irrelevant to

limitations in the Final Rule based on BAT-1 technology. EPA

described differences between Gary Works’ system and BAT-1

systems, such as Gary Works’ biological treatment, which

combines into one “unit” or piece of equipment the biological

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32

treatment and clarification stages, where in BAT-1 these stages

are accomplished in separate units. Nonetheless, the Institute

maintains that because both BAT-1 and Gary Works use an

“activated sludge treatment” followed by aerobic nitrification

(no matter how these steps are technically accomplished) the

Gary Works data is decisive evidence that BAT-1 cannot

achieve the benzo(a)pyrene limitations. This challenge fails in

light of EPA’s plausible distinction between the BAT-1 and

Gary Works systems. 

As to the few times when Clairton exceeded the daily and

monthly concentration-based limits in two three-month periods

in 1999 and 2001, EPA explained that the high 1999 numbers

resulted from unusually high rainfall in Pittsburgh and surmised

that similar causes lay at the root of the high summer 2001

numbers. By contrast, the self-monitoring data from the

following three years (fall 2001 to fall 2004) established that

Clairton consistently met the limitations. With regard to other

instances where the Clairton facility occasionally exceeded the

benzo(a)pyrene limits, EPA reasonably maintains that these

instances would fall into the 99th percentile distribution and do

not of themselves upset the limit established. Cf. Nat’l Wildlife,

286 F.3d at 572.

The Institute also contends that the EPA arbitrarily and

capriciously refused to reconsider its benzo(a)pyrene limitation

in light of the newly-submitted self-monitoring data from Gary

Works and Clairton that, when combined with existing record

data, would have allowed EPA to calculate a benzo(a)pyrene

variability factor directly and avoid borrowing the naphthalene

variability factor for the benzo(a)pyrene analysis. Assuming the

Institute’s additional data would have allowed a direct

calculation of the benzo(a)pyrene variability factor, the Institute

could show “prejudicial error,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); see Chamber

of Commerce, 443 F.3d at 904, only if it could plausibly show

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33

26 See EPA Comment Response Document at 13-3; Effluent

Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source

Performance Standards for the Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point

Source Category, Extension of Comment Period, 66 Fed. Reg. 10,253,

10,257 (Feb. 21 2001).

that a directly calculated benzo(a)pyrene variability factor would

be higher than the naphthalene variability factor; only a higher

variability factor would result in a less stringent benzo(a)pyrene

limitation. The Institute makes no such showing and EPA

concluded that the extra-record evidence indicated that

benzo(a)pyrene’s variability might be lower.

Naphthalene. The Institute’s renewed challenge to EPA’s

pass-through analysis fails because it is based on data from a

facility that does not employ the PSES-1 technology, and thus

can be reasonably excluded from consideration by EPA. While

the Institute maintains that EPA’s pass-through analysis was

illegitimate because there was no statistically significant

difference between the removal of naphthalene in well-operated

POTWs and naphthalene removal by PSES-1 facilities, given

that high naphthalene levels were treated by the PSES-1

facilities and relatively low naphthalene levels were treated by

POTWs, EPA points to various errors in the Institute’s

arguments and, regardless, this dispute involves EPA’s expert

judgments about statistical relevance to which the court properly

defers. Similarly, whether the median value of a set of averages

may be treated as representative of the set is a choice that falls

squarely within EPA’s area of expertise. The Institute’s focus

on EPA’s decision not to regulate phenol, which also passes into

POTWs is, at best, weakly relevant where other cost factors and

technological capabilities would weigh in EPA’s evaluation.

EPA has taken the reasonable position that, unlike naphthalene,

phenols are easily biodegraded and hence are more readily

treated by POTWs (which use biological treatment processes).26

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See Chem. Mfrs., 870 F.2d at 247.

Accordingly, we deny the petitions for review.

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