Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-03023/USCOURTS-caDC-02-03023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alonzo Gibson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 7, 2003 Decided December 30, 2003

No. 02-3023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ALONZO GIBSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00193–02)

Jonathan L. Katz, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Alonzo Gibson was on the pro se brief for appellant.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-3023 Document #793757 Filed: 12/30/2003 Page 1 of 13
2

McLeese, III, and Martin D. Carpenter, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Alonzo Gibson appeals his conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, see 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A)(ii) (2003), and conspiracy to

possess cocaine with intent to distribute, see id. § 846, on the

ground that the imposition of his sentence over seven years

after the jury returned a guilty verdict violated his right to

speedy sentencing under the Sixth Amendment. Assuming

that such a right exists, we hold that it was not violated. The

delay was extraordinarily long, but Gibson, far from being

prejudiced, actively contributed to it and never requested

prompt sentencing. With the exception of a 35–month institutional delay due to the loss of Gibson’s pro se motions in

chambers, the remaining delay was caused by Gibson, who

filed multiple motions and requests for continuances and

repeatedly resisted sentencing by the district court. These

circumstances defeat his attempt to shift course on appeal.

Gibson’s other sentencing challenge, under Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), is identical to a claim that was

rejected in United States v. Graham, 317 F.3d 262, 273–74

(D.C. Cir. 2003). Because Gibson’s remaining challenges to

his conviction are without merit, we affirm the judgment of

conviction.

I.

The evidence, which we must view in the light most favorable to the government, see United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d

732, 736–37 (D.C. Cir. 1998), shows that Gibson was involved

in arranging for Federal Express to ship from Los Angeles

two boxes containing cocaine, one to an apartment in Silver

Spring, Maryland and one to an address in the District of

Columbia. The government’s evidence showed that three

men, who claimed not to be together although they conversed

together, entered a Federal Express office in Los Angeles on

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April 14, 1994. Two of the men each carried a box, and the

third man leaned on the counter. Gonzaver Braziel, a Federal Express employee who processed one of the packages,

identified Gibson in a photo array as possibly being the third

man and at trial identified Gibson as that man. After the

three men left, Federal Express employees, whose suspicions

were aroused by the behavior of the three men and certain

details of the shipments, notified security personnel, who

determined, upon x-raying the boxes, that they appeared to

contain drugs. Federal Express employees opened one box

and found a white powdery substance. The box was resealed,

and both boxes were shipped to Federal Express headquarters in Memphis, Tennessee, and then to the District of

Columbia, where Federal Express delivered the two boxes to

United States Drug Enforcement Administration (‘‘DEA’’)

agents.

After searching the boxes pursuant to search warrants,

DEA agents found that the powdery substance field-tested

positive for cocaine: the box addressed to Maryland contained 2.994kg of 86% pure cocaine hydrochloride, and the

box addressed to the District of Columbia contained 3.007kg

of 90% pure cocaine. DEA agents, dressed as Federal Express employees, delivered the Maryland box, which indicated

the sender was ‘‘Greg Smith’’ and the addressee was ‘‘Larry

Davis,’’ to the Maryland address, which turned out to be an

apartment rented by Fatoumata Doumbia, Gibson’s girlfriend. A few minutes after delivery, DEA agents executed a

search warrant for the apartment. They found Gibson in a

bedroom bending over the box that had just been delivered;

with him were two pink sender’s receipts, one for each of the

boxes sent from Los Angeles. Also in the bedroom were two

identification cards that bore Gibson’s photograph, one showing the name ‘‘Greg Smith’’ and the other ‘‘Larry Davis.’’

Gibson told agents that the box belonged to him and that he

had been instructed to call an answering service upon delivery and say that ‘‘Snoop–Doggie–Dog’’ had called, and someone would call back and tell him where to deliver it. Gibson

also told agents that the box contained marijuana. At trial,

Doumbia testified about Gibson obtaining the fake identificaUSCA Case #02-3023 Document #793757 Filed: 12/30/2003 Page 3 of 13
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tion cards and confirmed that Gibson had gone to Los Angeles twice in April 1994, calling her on April 15, 1994, to pick

him up at the airport. She also testified that she gave the

box to Gibson because he had told her he was expecting it.

The second box listed the sender as ‘‘Denise Jones’’ and

was addressed to ‘‘Twanna Jones’’ at an apartment in the

District of Columbia. Vi–Ki Dennis Taylor, Gibson’s codefendant, met the agent outside of the apartment and offered to accept delivery for Twanna Jones, whom he claimed

was his sister. The agent refused, left, and later returned

and delivered the box to Twanna Jones, who said the package

was for Taylor. Before DEA agents could execute a search

warrant, Twanna Jones and Taylor drove off with the box in a

car registered to Antoine Jones, Twanna’s brother, who had

told her to expect a package for Taylor to be sent to her.

Taylor was later arrested at his own apartment in Maryland,

and DEA agents found the empty box nearby. The DEA

agents also found 992.4 grams of 88% pure cocaine hydrochloride in the trunk of the car Taylor had been driving, along

with a notebook containing addresses for ‘‘Greg Smith’’ and

‘‘Larry Davis,’’ the names on Gibson’s false identifications,

one of which was the Maryland address at which Gibson had

been arrested. A search of Antoine Jones’ apartment in

Virginia later uncovered supermarket and insurance cards in

Gibson’s name, as well as a yellow sticker and a napkin each

bearing the Maryland address where Gibson had been arrested.

Gibson and Taylor were indicted on two counts: possession

of with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) &

(b)(1)(A)(ii), and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, see id. § 846, more than five kilograms of cocaine.

Pursuant to then-prevailing precedent in this circuit, the jury

was not instructed to determine the relevant drug quantity

beyond a reasonable doubt, only whether Gibson possessed or

conspired to possess ‘‘a detectable or measurable amount of

cocaine.’’ The jury returned its verdict on November 9, 1994,

finding Gibson guilty of both counts. On February 8, 2002,

the district court sentenced Gibson to concurrent terms of 240

months imprisonment, to be followed by concurrent threeUSCA Case #02-3023 Document #793757 Filed: 12/30/2003 Page 4 of 13
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year terms of supervised release, and imposed a special

assessment of $50 on each count.

II.

Of the multiple challenges by Gibson to his conviction, only

five require discussion. Part II discusses three trial-related

claims, and Parts III and IV address the two challenges to his

sentence.

First, it is clear that Gibson’s contention that his conviction

rested on insufficient evidence fails. The court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, see United

States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in order

to determine whether ‘‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt,’’ Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). That standard is met here.

Gibson was arrested with the Maryland box in his possession,1

 and the jury heard testimony both that he had been

expecting the box and that he intended to deliver it to a third

party. Moreover, he had sender’s receipts from both the

Maryland and District of Columbia boxes, and the jury heard

testimony that he had traveled to Los Angeles around the

time they were shipped. He was found with false identifications matching the names of the shipper and addressee of the

Maryland box. The recipients of the District of Columbia box

were also found with a notebook containing the names on

Gibson’s false identifications and an insurance card and a

supermarket card issued in Gibson’s own name as well as a

napkin matching the address to which the Maryland box was

delivered.2

 A reasonable jury could conclude beyond a rea1 In his pro se brief, Gibson contends that the search warrant

was issued ex post facto. Other than the fact that the warrant does

not list the specific time at which it was signed, only a date, which is

not improper under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, Gibson presents no

evidence to support this contention.

2 To the extent that Gibson pro se challenges the search of

Jones’ apartment as well, he fails to articulate how his, as opposed

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sonable doubt, on the evidence presented, that Gibson possessed and conspired to possess cocaine with the intent to

distribute it.

Second, Gibson contends that the district court abused its

discretion by admitting the identification by Braziel, the

Federal Express employee in Los Angeles. According to the

testifying agent, Braziel had stated during a photo array that

the man in Gibson’s photograph seemed familiar and may

have been one of the people that actually shipped the boxes

from the Federal Express office in Los Angeles. As Braziel’s

identifications at the lineup and at trial were the most direct

evidence placing Gibson in Los Angeles on the day the two

boxes were shipped, Gibson contends that admission of the

identifications was more prejudicial than probative because of

Braziel’s lack of certainty at the initial photo lineup. See

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Absent constitutional error, the erroneous admission of

evidence is harmless so long as it did not have a ‘‘substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’’ Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946); see also United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 45–48

(D.C. Cir. 2003). In light of the strength of the government’s

other evidence connecting Gibson to the conspiracy, any error

was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 319 F.3d

514, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The conclusion that Gibson possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute was supported by

the evidence of his involvement on the East Coast end of the

alleged conspiracy, and does not require him to have been

present in Los Angeles when the packages were shipped.

Gibson’s possession of the sender’s receipts and false identifications bearing the shipper’s and the addressee’s names, as

well as Doumbia’s testimony that Gibson had gone to Los

to Jones’, Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Coconspirators enjoy no special exemption from the rule that defendants may not invoke the exclusionary rule vicariously. See United

States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 81 (1993); Alderman v. United

States, 394 U.S. 165, 171–76 (1969).

USCA Case #02-3023 Document #793757 Filed: 12/30/2003 Page 6 of 13
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Angeles at the relevant time, independently connected Gibson

to the shipments in any event.

Third, likewise without merit is Gibson’s contention that

reversal of his conviction is required because the district

court abused its discretion in the manner and extent to which

it investigated Gibson’s complaints that a juror was making

facial expressions indicating bias against him. Gibson,

through counsel, twice requested that the juror be removed

because Gibson believed she had already reached a decision in

light of her facial expressions and general demeanor. After

his second request, the district court responded that it had

watched the challenged juror since Gibson’s first complaint

and had seen nothing to suggest the juror had made up her

mind about Gibson’s guilt or innocence. Gibson maintains

that the court erred by failing to question the juror regarding

her fairness.

District courts have wide latitude in choosing appropriate

means of investigating claims of juror bias, and ‘‘[a]mong the

factors [the district court] should consider are the strength

and seriousness of the allegations,’’ United States v. White,

116 F.3d 903, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Interrupting

a trial to question jurors about their fairness carries with it

risks of placing undue emphasis on the challenged conduct,

see United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1187 (10th Cir.

1998), and district courts, having first-hand observation of

jurors and their demeanor, see, e.g., United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1998), are in the best

position to decide whether inappropriate conduct meriting an

investigation has occurred, see White, 116 F.3d at 929. Defense ‘‘counsel’s unsubstantiated suspicion’’ does not, on its

own, require the district court to conduct jury questioning.

United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Gibson relies on United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223 (5th

Cir. 1976), where a district court refused to question a juror

after his responses at voir dire reasonably called his objectivity into question. But Gibson presents no evidence that

anything of the sort happened at his trial. On appeal, he

points to no evidence, for instance, that the juror was making

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inappropriate facial expressions, or that she ceased doing so

during the period she was being watched by the district court.

Absent any proffer to indicate that the district court’s evaluation was inadequate, we have no basis on which to secondguess the decision that observing the juror, rather than

interrogating her, was an appropriate way to investigate so

generalized a claim of bias.3

III.

Challenging the lawfulness of his sentence, Gibson contends

that the lengthy delay between the date the jury returned its

verdict and the date he was sentenced violated his Sixth

Amendment right to speedy sentencing by leaving his life in

limbo and in uncertainty. The plain text of the Sixth Amendment confers only ‘‘the right to a speedy and public trial,’’ and

does not expressly refer to sentencing. The Supreme Court

has yet to hold that there is such a right although some

circuits have done so.4

 In Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S.

354, 361 (1957), however, the Supreme Court ‘‘assume[d]

arguendo that sentence is part of the trial for purposes of the

Sixth Amendment.’’ This court did likewise in United States

3 The remainder of Gibson’s pro se challenges, which we have

carefully reviewed, also fail to demonstrate that his conviction

should be reversed, essentially for reasons stated by the government in its brief. See Appellee’s Br. at 45–54.

4 The Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have held the Sixth

Amendment applicable to sentencing, see United States v. Thomas,

167 F.3d 299, 303–05 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Abou–

Kassem, 78 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1996); Burkett v. Cunningham,

826 F.2d 1208, 1220 (3rd Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit stated in

Tinghitella v. California, 718 F.2d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1983), that the

Sixth Amendment applies to sentencing, but the analysis in the case

treats this statement as an assumption rather than a holding. Id.

at 313. Several other circuits assume such a right exists. See

United States v. Nelson–Rogriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 60 (1st Cir. 2003);

United States v. Rothrock, 20 F.3d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 1994); Perez v.

Sullivan, 793 F.3d 249, 252–57 (10th Cir. 1986); Brady v. Superintendent, Anne Arundel County Detention Ctr., 443 F.2d 1307, 1310

(4th Cir. 1971).

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v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531, 535–39 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 1195 (2000). As have other circuits, see

supra n.4, the court in Yelverton reviewed the defendant’s

speedy-sentencing claim under the four-part test of Barker v.

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), which looks to the ‘‘[l]ength

of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant,’’ id. We do

so again. Assuming therefore without deciding that the

guarantee of a ‘‘speedy and public trial,’’ U.S. CONST. amend.

VI, also provides a defendant a right to be promptly sentenced, accord Yelverton, 197 F.3d at 535, we hold that

Gibson has failed to make the showing under Barker necessary to obtain relief.

As to length, the jury returned its verdict on November 9,

1994, and the district court imposed sentence more than

seven years later, on February 8, 2002. In the pre-trial

context, delays exceeding a year are sufficient to invoke

judicial scrutiny, see Yelverton, 197 F.3d at 537 n.8; United

States v. Lindsey, 47 F.3d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated

on other grounds, Robinson v. United States, 516 U.S. 1023

(1995). Even assuming that the different nature of the

possible prejudice faced by defendants in the sentencing

context might call for a more permissive standard before the

delay can be considered ‘‘presumptively prejudicial,’’ cf. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, seven years clearly suffices to trigger

judicial scrutiny under the first prong of Barker. The district

court’s discretion with regard to the time of sentencing is not

without constraint, for Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b) instructs that

‘‘[t]he court must impose sentence without unnecessary delay,’’ see Yelverton, 197 F.3d at 535; United States v. Campisi, 583 F.2d 692, 693 (3rd Cir. 1978); United States v.

Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159, 167–71 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); United

States v. DeLuca, 529 F. Supp. 351, 354–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

Gibson does not invoke the rule on appeal.

The reasons for the delay are mixed. Beginning in March

1995, Gibson filed several post-conviction motions attacking

various aspects of his trial. After the district court ruled the

motions untimely, Gibson’s counsel requested multiple continuances to prepare for sentencing. Six months after the

verdict date, the district court set a July 1996 sentencing

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date, but at that point, because Gibson was dissatisfied with

his attorney, the district court granted a continuance for

Gibson to file his motions pro se. Gibson filed pro se motions

in October 1996 and again in July 1997. Then, following staff

turnover in the district court’s chambers, an intern’s work on

Gibson’s motions was lost, resulting in a 35–month delay.

When, in June 2000, the district court resumed consideration

of the case, it appointed new counsel for Gibson. In November 2000, six years after the verdict date, Gibson renewed his

motions for a new trial. The district court ruled in February

2001 that the motions were untimely, and set an August 2001

sentencing date. This date passed without any action by the

district court.

Gibson never asserted in the district court that he had a

right to speedy sentencing. Instead, in October 2001, the

district court sua sponte raised the question of whether

Gibson’s Sixth Amendment rights had been compromised and

found no violation. The court pointed to Gibson’s role in

perpetuating the delay, the inadvertent nature of the delay

attributable to the court itself, and the lack of prejudice to

Gibson. The district court denied Gibson’s renewed motions

for a new trial, indicating that the court would move forward

to sentencing. Even at this point, Gibson insisted that he

was still interested in locating transcripts of the hearing at

which he claimed the district court had granted him an

extension of time to file his initial post-trial motions. The

court granted the continuance to search for the transcripts,

and ultimately imposed sentence on Gibson on February 8,

2002.

The only prejudice Gibson claims is having his life kept in

‘‘limbo and uncertainty.’’ In Barker, the Supreme Court

acknowledged that in the pre-trial context there is some

prejudice from living under a ‘‘cloud of suspicion and anxiety,’’ but that it is ‘‘minimal.’’ 407 U.S. at 534. Similarly in a

post-verdict, presentence context, ‘‘mere generalized anxiety’’

is not enough to show prejudice, Yelverton, 197 F.3d at 538

n.9, particularly where a defendant, as here, is serving a

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment while awaiting

sentencing. Although Gibson was incarcerated in a District

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of Columbia facility throughout the presentencing period

rather than in a federal correctional institution, Gibson makes

no claim that the delay in sentencing deprived him of programmatic and other rehabilitative benefits for which he

would be eligible as a federal prisoner in the custody of the

Federal Bureau of Prisons. Moreover, as the United States

advised during oral argument, Gibson’s incarceration in the

District of Columbia, rather than in a federal correctional

institution, allowed him to be near his family.

What saves this court from confronting a difficult decision,

including defining an appropriate remedy for a violation of a

Sixth Amendment sentencing right, is Gibson’s conduct

throughout the period between verdict and sentencing and his

failure to show any prejudice as a result of the delay. While

the first Barker factor weighs heavily in Gibson’s favor and

the second factor weighs in his favor to the extent of the

institutional delay, although less so as to the remaining delay,

the other two factors weigh overwhelmingly against him.

Gibson never asserted a right to speedy sentencing in the

district court. Rather, he continually filed motions attacking

his trial in order, effectively, to delay the imposition of

sentence. Even when the district court set sentencing dates,

Gibson persisted in seeking further delays. Nor does Gibson

contend on appeal that the institutional delay of almost three

years was the product of any abuse by the district court or

the prosecutor’s office. As the court stated in Barker, 407

U.S. at 531, delay caused by mere ‘‘negligence or crowded

courts TTT should be considered,’’ but ‘‘weighted less heavily’’

than ‘‘a deliberate attempt to delay TTT in order to hamper

the defense.’’ Finally, and importantly, Gibson shows no

prejudice as a result of the delay, cf. Yelverton, 197 F.3d at

538, articulating no way in which he has been harmed by

being sentenced seven years into a twenty-year sentence for

an offense that carried a mandatory 10–year minimum, see 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(1) (2003).

An overview of the record reveals, therefore, that the extraordinary delay was exactly what Gibson wanted and continuously sought. Under the circumstances, Gibson fails to show a

miscarriage of justice warranting relief.

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IV.

Gibson also contends that under Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), his sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A) was unconstitutional because the district court,

rather than the jury, determined the quantity of drugs for

which he was responsible, which, in turn, affected the length

of his sentence. This contention was rejected in United

States v. Graham, 317 F.3d 262, 273–74 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 841, maximum and minimum sentences

vary based both on the quantity and type of drug involved.

In United States v. Fields, 242 F.3d 393, 395–96 (D.C. Cir.

2001), the court explained that Apprendi prohibits the sentencing judge from being the finder of fact with regard to the

relevant drug quantity under 21 U.S.C. § 841 where the

result is a higher sentence than would have been possible

under the jury’s findings. Specifically, where a jury has only

found that a defendant possessed a ‘‘detectable amount’’ of

drugs, as here, it is clear error for the district court to make a

quantity finding on its own that leads to the imposition of a

sentence higher than the maximum permitted under the

jury’s findings. Id. On rehearing, the court explained that

‘‘Apprendi does not apply to sentencing findings that elevate

a defendant’s sentence within the applicable statutory limits.’’

United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

(emphasis in original). In United States v. Webb, 255 F.3d

890, 896–99 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the court recognized that because § 841 is a tripartite statute that establishes separate

offenses based on drug quantity, drug quantity is an element

of the offense under § 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) and must be

submitted to the jury. Failure to do so, however, is not plain

error so long as the defendant is sentenced within the range

authorized by § 841(b)(1)(C), id. at 898, and is harmless

under those circumstances, see Graham, 317 F.3d at 273–74.

This is precisely what happened to Gibson.

At sentencing, the district court recognized, in light of the

cases decided since the jury’s verdict, that, although it determined that the quantity of cocaine involved was 6.9 kilograms,

its discretion to sentence Gibson under § 841(b)(1)(A) was

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limited. Even though the relevant sentencing guidelines

made Gibson eligible for a punishment range between 210 and

262 months under § 841(b)(1)(A), the jury, whose verdict was

issued prior to Fields and Webb, was not instructed to make a

quantity finding and found only that Gibson had possessed a

‘‘detectable or measurable amount of cocaine’’ with the intent

to distribute. Apprendi, also decided subsequent to the

jury’s verdict, thus prohibited the imposition of any sentence

greater than 240 months, the maximum statutory penalty to

which Gibson could have been sentenced under

§ 841(b)(1)(C). On February 8, 2002, the district court therefore imposed the statutory maximum of 240 months on both

the possession and conspiracy counts, running concurrently.

This was a permissible approach under Graham, 317 F.3d at

273–74.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

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