Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-71696/USCOURTS-ca9-14-71696-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terry Lamell Ezell
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERRY LAMELL EZELL,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

No. 14-71696

OPINION

Application to File Second or Successive

Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

Submitted December 11, 2014*

Seattle, Washington

Filed January 23, 2015

Before: M. Margaret Mckeown, Richard C. Tallman, and

John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman

 

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 EZELL V. UNITED STATES

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel denied a motion for certification to file a

second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to set aside a

sentence imposed under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The panel held that when a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(h) to file a second or successive petition presents a

complex issue, this court may exceed the thirty-day time limit

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) for granting or denying

the authorization.

The panel held that the Supreme Court did not announce

a new rule of constitutional law in Descamps v. United States,

133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), but rather clarified – as a matter of

statutory interpretation – application of the ACCA in light of

existing precedent.

COUNSEL

Howard Lee Phillips, Esq., Phillips Law LLC, Seattle,

Washington; Jonathan D. Libby, Esq., Deputy Federal Public

Defender, Los Angeles, California, for Petitioner.

Carl Andrew Colasurdo, Assistant United States Attorney,

Seattle, Washington; Michael Symington Morgan, Assistant

United States Attorney, Seattle, Washington, for Respondent.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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EZELL V. UNITED STATES 3

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Terry L. Ezell asks us to certify his filing of a second or

successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition in the Western District

of Washington, where he was convicted in 2008 of being a

felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced

Ezell under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”),

18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Ezell argues that his second or

successive petition is warranted because in Descamps v.

United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), the Supreme Court

announced a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2), and under

which the district court could abrogate his ACCA sentence. 

We disagree. We hold that the Supreme Court did not

announce a new rule of constitutional law in Descamps. 

Rather, it clarified—as a matter of statutory interpretation—

application of the ACCA in light of existing precedent. For

that reason, we deny Ezell’s motion for certification to file

another habeas corpus petition.

I

Terry Ezell was convicted in 2008 of being a felon in

possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and for

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, see 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii). Am. Mem. & Decision 11–12,

Case No. CR05-273RSM, ECF No. 113 (W.D. Wash. Mar.

26, 2008). For the felon in possession charge, the district

court sentenced Ezell to 262 months’ imprisonment under the

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4 EZELL V. UNITED STATES

ACCA.1See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (“In the case of a person

who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous

convictions . . . for a violent felony . . . , such person shall be

fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen

years . . . .”). It based this enhancement, in part, on Ezell’s

two prior Washington state burglary convictions. Because

Washington’s burglary statute is broader than the generic

federal definition, the district court—in keeping with thenNinth Circuit precedent—applied the modified categorical

approach. After considering underlying charging documents,

the district court determined that both burglaries qualified as

violent felonies and could therefore serve as predicates to

impose § 924(e)’s mandatory minimum.

Ezell exhausted his direct appeal in 2010. See United

States v. Ezell, 337 F. App’x 623, 624 (9th Cir. 2009)

(affirming district court). He filed an unsuccessful § 2255

petition later that year. See Ezell v. United States, Nos. C10-

467RSM, CR05-273RSM, 2011 WL 1900155 (W.D. Wash.

May 18, 2011). Two years later, he asked us for

authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 petition. 

Finding that Ezell’s motion did not satisfy § 2255(h), we

summarily denied it. Ezell v. United States, No. 12-73464

(9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (order denying motion).

The Supreme Court decided Descamps on June 20, 2013. 

The Court held that the modified categorical approach applies

only to statutes that are divisible. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at

2282–83 (abrogating United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca,

655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam)). Ezell

1 The district court also sentenced Ezell to a concurrent 262-month

sentence for the drug possession charge under the career offender

guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.

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EZELL V. UNITED STATES 5

filed the § 2255(h)(2) motion currently before us less than

one year later. He argues that we should permit him to file a

second or successive § 2255 petition in the district court

because Descampsis a “new rule of constitutional law” under

which the court could abrogate his 262-month sentence. 

Section 2255(h) gives us original jurisdiction over the

motion.

II

Before considering whether Ezell’s petition presents “a

new rule of constitutional law,” we address whether a

statutory time bar prevents us from ruling on Ezell’s motion. 

Second or successive § 2255 motions are subject to the

gatekeeping procedures “provided in section 2244.” 28

U.S.C. § 2255(h). Section 2244 states that “[t]he court of

appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second

or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing

of the motion.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D). More than thirty

days have passed since Ezell filed his motion, so whether

§ 2244(b)(3)(D) is mandatory or hortatory is a key threshold

issue. It is also an issue of first impression in the Ninth

Circuit.2

The majority of our sister circuits to have considered

§ 2244(b)(3)(D)’s time limit have held that it is hortatory, not

2 We have cited § 2244(b)(3)(D) only once, and in our discussion we

did not explicitly consider whether the thirty-day time frame is mandatory. 

See Nevius v. McDaniel, 104 F.3d 1120, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 1996). And

although we have not given the issue express consideration, we have

repeatedly ruled on § 2244(b)(3) motions well after the expiration of the

thirty-day period. See, e.g., Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 996 (9th

Cir. 2013) (ruling on the § 2244(b)(3) motion more than three years after

it was filed).

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mandatory. See Word v. Lord, 648 F.3d 129, 129 n.1 (2d Cir.

2011) (per curiam); Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485 F.3d 538, 539 n.1

(10th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Gray-Bey v. United States, 201

F.3d 866, 867–70 (7th Cir. 2000); Rodriguez v.

Superintendent, Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270, 272–73

(1st Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in

Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1999); In re

Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Vial, 115

F.3d 1192, 1194 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); cf. Gray-Bey,

201 F.3d at 871 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that the

thirty-day limit is mandatory and faulting the majority for

ignoring the limit).

But some of our sister circuits have cited this provision as

mandatory. See, e.g., In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151, 1157 n.9

(11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]his Court necessarily must apply

§ 2244(b)(2) under a tight time limit in all cases, since the

statute expressly requires us to resolve this application within

30 days, no matter the case.”).

We agree with the majority of our sister circuits and hold

that when a § 2255(h) motion presents a complex issue, we

may exceed § 2244(b)(3)(D)’s thirty-day time limit. As the

Sixth Circuit noted in In re Siggers, a statutory time period

providing a directive to an agency or public official is not

ordinarily mandatory “unless it both expressly requires [the]

agency or public official to act within a particular time period

and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the

provision.” 132 F.3d at 336 (internal quotation marks

omitted); accord 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:19

(7th ed. 2013) (“[I]f a provision of a statute states a time for

performance of an official duty, without any language

denying performance after a specified time, it is directory.”). 

And because Congress “has failed to specify a consequence

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EZELL V. UNITED STATES 7

for noncompliance with the thirty-day time limit imposed by

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D),” failure to comply with that time

limit “does not deprive this Court of the power to grant or

deny” a motion to file a second or successive petition. In re

Siggers, 132 F.3d at 336.

Because the thirty-day statutory time limit is hortatory,

we reach the merits of Ezell’s motion. 

III

A

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) “imposes significant limitations on the power of

federal courts to award relief to prisoners who file ‘second or

successive’ habeas petitions.” United States v. Lopez, 577

F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009). Under AEDPA, a federal

prisoner may not file a second or successive § 2255 petition

unless he or she makes a prima facie showing to the

appropriate court of appeals that the petition is based on: (1)

“a new rule,” (2) “of constitutional law,” (3) “made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme

Court,” (4) “that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(h)(2);

3 Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S. Ct.

3 The appeals court may also permit a prisoner to file a second or

successive § 2255 petition if it contains “newly discovered evidence that,

if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable

factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(h)(1). We do not consider that section here. Nor do we consider

or foreclose the possibility that someone who was sentenced under an

erroneous interpretation of the ACCA might obtain relief via 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2241 and 2255(e). See Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293,

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8 EZELL V. UNITED STATES

2478, 2482 (2001). Section 2255(h)(2) creates a

jurisdictional bar to the petitioner’s claims: “If the petitioner

does not first obtain our authorization, the district court lacks

jurisdiction to consider the second or successive application.” 

Lopez, 577 F.3d at 1061.

Ezell’s motion fails on the first two prongs of § 2255(h). 

The Supreme Court in Descamps did not announce a new

rule, and even if it did, Descamps is not a constitutional case.4

We therefore deny Ezell’s motion.

B

A new rule is a rule that “breaks new ground,” “imposes

a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government,”

or is otherwise “not dictated by precedent existing at the time

the defendant’s conviction became final.” Teague v. Lane,

489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1070 (1989) (plurality

opinion). A case also announces a new rule if it “expressly

overrules a prior decision.” Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 843

(9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.

denied, 134 S. Ct. 503.

1305–15 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (discussing the potential availability

ofsuch writs); see also Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1194–95 (9th Cir.

2012) (declining to address whether a petitioner may obtain relief via

§§ 2241 and 2255(e) if “he received a sentence for which he was

statutorily ineligible”). But any further attempts by Ezell to challenge his

ACCA sentence would be futile, as he was also sentenced to 262 months’

imprisonment for his drug conviction, which is unrelated to the validity of

his ACCA sentence.

4 Because Ezell’s motion fails to meet § 2255(h)’s first two prongs, we

do not consider whether Descamps announced a rule “made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable.” 18 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). 

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EZELL V. UNITED STATES 9

The Supreme Court did not announce a new rule in

Descamps. Descamps did not impose a new obligation nor

did it break new ground. Rather, as both the Supreme Court

and we have recognized, Descamps clarified application of

the modified categorical approach in light of existing

precedent. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283 (“Our caselaw

explaining the categorical approach and its ‘modified’

counterpart all but resolves this case.”); United States v.

Quintero-Junco, 754 F.3d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 2014) (“As the

Supreme Court recently clarified in Descamps, courts may

employ the modified categorical approach only when the

statute of conviction is ‘divisible . . . .’” (emphasis added));

accord United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir.

2014) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court in Descamps

explained that it was not announcing a new rule, but was

simply reaffirming” its prior interpretation of the ACCA).

But even if the Supreme Court did announce a new rule

in Descamps, that rule is not constitutional. Descamps is a

statutory interpretation case: It clarifies when certain crimes

qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA, a congressional

enactment. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281 (framing the

issue as one arising under the ACCA); Shepard v. United

States, 544 U.S. 13, 16–17, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1257 (2005)

(clarifying application of the modified categorical approach

under the ACCA and framing the issue as one of statutory

interpretation).

Although Descamps discusses the Sixth Amendment, the

discussion does not make the decision “constitutional” within

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). Descamps explains

that the modified categorical approach applies only to

divisible statutes in part because a broader application may

raise Sixth Amendment issues under Apprendi v. New Jersey. 

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10 EZELL V. UNITED STATES

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2288 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362–63 (2000)). But

this discussion does not make Descamps “constitutional”: 

“Under the statute, it is the ‘new rule’ itself that must be one

‘of constitutional law,’ not the effect of failing to apply that

rule to successive petitions.” In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245,

248 (3d Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Reyes, 358 F.3d

1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that

Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S. Ct. 1707

(1999), is a statutory interpretation case even though it

discusses constitutional issues).

The Court’s decision in Shepard confirms that Taylor v.

United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990), and its

progeny—including Descamps—are statutory interpretation

cases. A majority of the Justices in Shepard concluded that

a broad application of the modified categorical approach may

implicate the Sixth Amendment. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24

(plurality opinion) (noting that it would raise Sixth

Amendment concerns to permit sentencing courts to examine

documents outside of charging papers, plea agreements, or

other similar documents); id. at 28 (Thomas, J., concurring)

(“[T]he factfinding procedure the Court rejects gives rise to

constitutional error, not doubt . . . .”). Nevertheless, circuit

courts to consider the issue consistently hold that Shepard is

a statutory interpretation case. See United States v.

Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1147 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Shepard

was not a constitutional decision. Shepard decided an issue

of statutory interpretation.”); see also United States v.

Christensen, 456 F.3d 1205, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006) (same). 

Shepard itself confirms this: “We are, after all, dealing with

an issue of statutory interpretation.” 544 U.S. at 23. That

conclusion applies with equal force to Descamps,

notwithstanding the Court’s Sixth Amendment discussion.

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EZELL V. UNITED STATES 11

IV

In sum, Descamps did not announce a new rule, and even

if it did, that rule is not constitutional. Ezell has therefore

failed to make a prima facie showing that he meets

§ 2255(h)(2)’s first two prongs. His § 2255(h)(2) motion is

thus

DENIED.

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