Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07316/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07316-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derral G. Adams
Respondent
Ken Clark
Defendant
Troy Anthony Rhodes
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 A federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed on the date the prisoner submits it to

prison authorities for filing, rather than the date it is received by the courts. Saffold v. Newland, 250

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY ANTHONY RHODES,

Petitioner,

v.

DERRAL G. ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent. __________________________________________

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No. C 06-7316 SBA (PR)

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AS

UNTIMELY AND SETTING

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

(Docket no. 11)

Petitioner Troy Anthony Rhodes filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss the instant

petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) -- the statute of

limitations set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Petitioner

opposes the motion. Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES

Respondent's motion to dismiss without prejudice to renewing the motion as directed in this Order.

BACKGROUND

In 2000, an Alameda County jury found Petitioner guilty of attempted murder, attempted

voluntary manslaughter and rape. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifty-nine years to life in

state prison. On May 31, 2002, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial

court. (Resp't Ex. A.) On August 21, 2002, the California Supreme Court denied his petition for

review. (Resp't Ex. B.)

On October 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Alameda County Superior

Court, which was denied on October 23, 2003. (Resp't Ex. C.) On January 2, 2004, Petitioner filed

a state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on January 7, 2004. 

(Resp't Ex. D.) On December 30, 2005, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme

Court, which was denied on September 20, 2006, citing to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780

(1998). (Resp't Ex. E.)

On November 17, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition.1

Case 4:06-cv-07316-SBA Document 13 Filed 03/24/08 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 122 S.

Ct. 2134 (2002). This is known as "the mailbox rule." Id. The Court applies the "mailbox rule" to

deem the petition filed on November 17, 2006, the date it was signed. 

2

 DISCUSSION

The AEDPA, which became law on April 24, 1996, imposed a statute of limitations on

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging

non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on

which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for

seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state

action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right

asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

A state prisoner with a conviction finalized after April 24, 1996, such as Petitioner,

ordinarily must file his federal habeas petition within one year of the date his process of direct

review came to an end. See Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

The one-year period generally will run from "the date on which the judgment became final

by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). "Direct review" includes the ninety-day period during which a criminal appellant

can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether he actually

files such a petition or not. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Here, the judgment became final for purposes of state direct appeal when the California

Supreme Court denied review on August 21, 2002. See Cal. Rule of Court 29.4(b)(2)(A)

(subsequently renumbered as Cal. Rule of Court 8.532(b)(2)(A)). The judgment became final for

purposes of the statute of limitations ninety days later, on November 19, 2002. See Bowen, 188

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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F.3d at 1159. The one-year limitations period, therefore, began to run on that date. Accordingly,

Petitioner had until November 19, 2003 to file the instant petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Therefore, the instant federal habeas petition filed on November 17, 2006 -- almost three years after

the limitations period had expired -- is untimely absent tolling.

I. Statutory Tolling

The petition may nonetheless be timely if the limitations period was tolled under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2) for a substantial period of time. AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled under

§ 2244(d)(2) for the "'time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review [with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim] is pending.'" Dictado v.

Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)). In Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the limitations period is also tolled

during the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher

state court. In California, where prisoners generally use the State's "'original writ' system," this

means that the limitations period remains tolled during the intervals between a state court's

disposition of an original state habeas petition and the filing of a further original state habeas

petition in a higher court, provided the prisoner did not delay unreasonably in seeking review in the

higher court. See id. at 220-25.

The Court notes that 330 days passed between November 19, 2002, when the limitations

period began running, and October 15, 2003, when Petitioner filed his state habeas petition in

superior court. Pursuant to Carey, Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period

for the entire time he was pursuing state collateral relief. However, Respondent's position is that the

seventy-one-day gap between the superior court's ruling and Petitioner's filing a petition in the

California Court of Appeal as well as the eleven-month gap between the Court of Appeal's ruling

and Petitioner's filing a petition in the California Supreme Court were periods of "unreasonable

delay" and thus that the limitations period was not tolled for those periods. (Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4.) 

Respondent also argues against statutory tolling due to the fact that Petitioner's state court petitions

were not "properly filed" because they were denied as untimely by the state courts. (Id. at 3 (citing

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

 There is no dispute that the California Supreme Court's denial of Petitioner's state habeas

petition was final on December 30, 2005. The Court notes that in 2002, the Ninth Circuit held that

tolling under § 2244(d)(2) ended thirty days after the California Supreme Court's denial of the final

habeas petition was filed because that was when the denial became "final" under former California

Rule of Court 24. Allen v. Lewis, 295 F.3d 1046, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (reaffirming

Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001)). However, the rationale of Allen only

applies to denials the California Supreme Court filed before January 1, 2003. On January 1, 2003,

the California Supreme Court made clear that its orders denying petitions for a writ of habeas corpus

within its original jurisdiction are final on filing. Cal. Rule of Court 8.532(b)(2)(C). Accordingly,

the denial of Petitioner's state habeas petition within the California Supreme Court's original

jurisdiction was final on the date of its filing, December 30, 2005.

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Pace v. DiGugliemo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005).) Even if the Court determined that Petitioner was

entitled to statutory tolling for the entire time he was pursuing state collateral relief, the petition

would still be untimely because Petitioner waited too long to file his federal petition. After

Petitioner pursued state collateral relief, the limitations period would have then started to run again

after December 30, 2005.2

 However, because Petitioner only had thirty-five days (365 days minus

330 days) left, the statute of limitations expired on February 3, 2006. Therefore, Petitioner's federal

habeas petition filed on November 17, 2006 is untimely by more than nine months unless Petitioner

is entitled to equitable tolling.

II. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute of

limitations and not a jurisdictional bar. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. "When external forces, rather than

a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because extensions of time should be granted

only if "extraordinary circumstances beyond [a] prisoner's control make it impossible to file a

petition on time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

prisoner must show that "the 'extraordinary circumstances' were the cause of his untimeliness." 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has said

that the petitioner "bears the burden of showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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him." Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether equitable tolling is in order

turns on an examination of detailed facts. Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner claims that the untimeliness in filing his habeas petitions in state and federal court

was "due to circumstances beyond his control, i.e., the failure of the prison library to properly

maintain legal materials required by the AEDPA." (Opp'n at 2.) In support of his claim, Petitioner

relies on Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2002). In Whalem/Hunt, the Ninth Circuit

held that a prisoner's inability to learn about AEDPA's limitation period because there were no

AEDPA materials available in the prison library may be grounds for equitable tolling. See 233 F.3d

at 1148; see also Roy, 455 F.3d at 954-55 (pro se petitioners' inability to access information about

AEDPA's limitation period deadline, when combined with their lack of knowledge of the deadline,

constitutes an "extraordinary circumstance" that warrants equitable tolling, provided petitioners

acted with due diligence). Although directed to do so, Respondent did not file a reply to Petitioner's

opposition. As such, Respondent has not addresses whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Respondent's motion to dismiss without prejudice to renewing the

motion and addressing the issues of equitable tolling raised in Petitioner's opposition.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (docket no. 11) is DENIED

without prejudice to renewing the motion and addressing the issues set forth above no later that sixty

(60) days of the date of this Order. If Respondent chooses to file a renewed motion, Petitioner shall

file with the Court and serve on Respondent an opposition no later than forty-five (45) days of his

receipt of the renewed motion, and Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on Petitioner a

reply no later than fifteen (15) days of receipt of any opposition.

2. Should Respondent choose not to file a renewed motion to dismiss within the sixtyday time frame, Respondent is directed to SHOW CAUSE why the petition should not be granted

and the parties shall abide by the scheduling order below: 

a. Respondent shall file with this Court and serve upon Petitioner, no later than

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P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.06\Rhodes7316.denyMTD(sol).frm 6

sixty (60) days of the date of this Order, an Answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. 

Respondent shall file with the Answer a copy of all portions of the state trial record that have been

transcribed previously and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition. 

b. If Petitioner wishes to respond to the Answer, he shall do so by filing a

Traverse with the Court and serving it on Respondent no later than forty-five (45) days of his

receipt of the Answer. Should Petitioner fail to do so, the petition will be deemed submitted and

ready for decision forty-five (45) days after the date Petitioner is served with Respondent's Answer. 

3. It is Petitioner's responsibility to prosecute this case. Petitioner must keep the court

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk of the Court headed

"NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS," and comply with any orders of the Court within the time

allowed or ask for an extension of that time. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this

action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Martinez v.

Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1997) (Rule 41(b) applicable in habeas cases). 

4. Petitioner is reminded that all communications with the Court, whether by way of

formal legal motions or informal letters, must be served on Respondent by mailing a true copy of the

document to Respondent's counsel. 

5. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

However, the party making a motion for an extension of time is not relieved from his or her duty to

comply with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having made a motion for an extension of

time. The party making the motion must still meet the deadlines set by the Court until an order

addressing the motion for an extension of time is issued. Any motion for an extension of time must

be filed no later than fifteen (15) days prior to the deadline sought to be extended.

 6. This Order terminates Docket no. 11.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/20/08 _______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.06\Rhodes7316.denyMTD(sol).frm 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY A RHODES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KEN CLARK et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-07316 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on March 24, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Troy Anthony Rhodes

SATF

Prisoner #:P-86788/1-D-141L

California State Prison-Corcoran

P.O. Box 5242

Corcoran, CA 93212

Dated: March 24, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-07316-SBA Document 13 Filed 03/24/08 Page 7 of 7