Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02687/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02687-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Julia Ngoc Nguyen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2687

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Julia Ngoc Nguyen, also known as Loan Nguyen

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

____________

 Submitted: March 17, 2016

 Filed: July 18, 2016

____________

Before MURPHY, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Julia Ngoc Nguyen of multiple offenses relating to

immigration fraud and government-benefits fraud. At sentencing, the district court,

over Nguyen’s objection, applied a two-level sentencing guidelines enhancement

based on the number of victims affected by Nguyen’s crimes. The court then

sentenced Nguyen to a total of 87 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised

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release. Nguyen now appeals, raising multiple challenges to her convictions and

sentence. We affirm the convictions, except for count 18. We affirm Nguyen’s

sentence, except that we direct the district court to vacate the $100 special assessment

associated with count 18.

I.

After a lengthy investigation by state and federal law enforcement, a federal

grand jury indicted Nguyen on twenty-two counts, including attempted naturalization

fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a); theft of government funds, 18 U.S.C. § 641; socialsecurity fraud, 42 U.S.C. § 1383a(a)(3); false use of a social security number,

42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B); aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1); false

statements to a government agency, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1); health-care fraud,

18 U.S.C. § 1347; and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. During the four-day trial, the

Government presented the testimony of twenty-four witnesses describing the events

that gave rise to these charges.

Regarding the attempted naturalization fraud, the Government called three

witnesses. The first, an immigration officer, discussed the process of applying for

naturalization in the United States. He informed the jury that a successful applicant

must pass an English-proficiency and literacy test and a civics examination

addressing the applicant’s understanding of United States history and government. 

He also explained that an applicant is excused from completing these tests if she has

a mental or physical disability and if she submits an N-648 form on which a doctor

certifies that this condition prevents her from learning or demonstrating language

abilities or knowledge of United States history and civics. The Government then

called N.B. and T.B., two immigrantsto the United States. Both women testified that

they paid Nguyen to assist them in obtaining citizenship. N.B. previously failed the

English-proficiency and civicstests before she contacted Nguyen. T.B. also struggled

with this requirement, and she failed the tests even after consulting with Nguyen. 

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Unbeknownst to these witnesses, Nguyen convinced a physician, Dr. S., to complete

N-648 forms for T.B. and N.B. with falsified medical information, even though

neither woman had a qualifying disability that would excuse her from the Englishproficiency or civics exams. These falsified N-648 forms were then submitted on

T.B.’s and N.B.’s behalf and filed with their applications for naturalization.

To prove the theft-of-government-funds and social-security-fraud counts, the

Government focused on Nguyen’s unlawful receipt of Social Security Income

(“SSI”). The Government presented evidence of bank records and testimony from

bankers and special agents to show that Nguyen received SSI payments intended for

herself and three different individuals—Q.N., C.P., and T.N.—from approximately

2007 through 2014. All of these payments either were mailed to a post-office box

associated with Nguyen or directly deposited into a bank account controlled by

Nguyen. Special agents from the Department of Homeland Security and the Social

Security Administration (“SSA”) testified that C.P. and Q.N. were not present in the

United States during much of the time the government paid benefits intended for

them. Indeed, Q.N. permanently departed the country in December 2008 on a

commercial airplane on which Nguyen also was a passenger. T.N. also left the

country for more than thirty days on multiple occasions without notifying the SSA,

and the government thus incorrectly continued to issue benefits to her. In total,

Nguyen received $33,350.00 of SSI benefits intended for Q.N., $7,115.60 of SSI

benefits intended for C.P., and $33,052.00 of SSI benefits intended for T.N.

As the recipient of these three income streams, Nguyen was required to report

the additional income to the SSA to determine her eligibility for SSI. A claims

representative from the SSA testified that Nguyen reported no income when she

initially applied for SSI benefits and again when she completed the benefit-renewal

statement. In addition, SSA special agents testified that Nguyen submitted a written

statement that contained an admission that she knew she was receiving benefits

illegally.

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With respect to the counts of false statements to a government agency, the

Government presented evidence that, from 2010 through 2012, Nguyen received

subsidized housing from the United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development (“HUD”); however, she failed to disclose her actual income, including

the SSI payments intended for Q.N., C.P., and T.N. Regarding the counts for false

use of a socialsecurity number and aggravated identity theft, a witnessfrom the Iowa

Department ofRevenue testified that, from2011 through 2012, after Q.N. had left the

United States permanently, someone fraudulently used Q.N.’s socialsecurity number

and name to apply for and receive two $999 payments from the Iowa Rental

Reimbursement Program. These payments were delivered to an address in Des

Moines. Nguyen admitted to SSA agents thatshe filled out the application on Q.N.’s

behalf and that she “got [Q.N.’s] check.” Similar rebate payments for T.N. and C.P.

were delivered to Nguyen’s post-office box and deposited in Nguyen’s account while

the intended recipients were out of the country.

The Government also presented evidence that Nguyen fraudulently obtained

payments for health-care services from the Consumer-Directed Attendant Care

(“CDAC”) programadministered by the state ofIowa. A CDAC income-management

specialist testified that a benefits applicant must submit a doctor-certified Medicaid

level-of-care form indicating that the applicant has a qualifying medical condition. 

If the applicant qualifies, Iowa Medicaid funds the cost of her care. Witnesses

testified that Nguyen submitted a form on which she falsely claimed that she used a

cane and required assistance for tasks such as bathing and dressing. As a result of

these misrepresentations, Nguyen received CDAC benefits from July 2012 until

March 2013.

Finally, the Government addressed the mail-fraud counts by examining the

mailings that had been sent to Nguyen’s post-office box regarding Q.N.’s foodassistance benefits. Because neither Q.N. nor Nguyen reported Q.N.’s permanent

departure from the United States, food-assistance benefits, in the form of an

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electronic benefits card (“EBT”), continued to be mailed to the post-office box

controlled by Nguyen. From 2009 through 2013, the Iowa Department of Human

Servicesmailed several decision notices and two replacement EBT cards, all of which

were intended for Q.N., to Nguyen’s post-office box. The Government also presented

video footage from a local Walmart showing that a woman matching Nguyen’s

description used these benefits to make purchases while Q.N. was in Vietnam. 

At the close of evidence, Nguyen moved for judgment of acquittal on all

counts. The district court denied the motion. Nguyen also objected to the jury

instructions for the attempted naturalization-fraud counts. She maintained that the

court should have instructed the jury that the Government had to prove that N.B. and

T.B., the applicants, were ineligible for naturalization. Nguyen also objected to the

instruction’s definition of “material” as it related to the counts of attempted

naturalization fraud. The district court overruled both objections. Ultimately, the

jury convicted Nguyen on all counts. After the trial, Nguyen renewed her motion for

judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied.

At sentencing, the district court, over Nguyen’s objection, applied a two-level

sentencing guidelines enhancement because Nguyen’s fraud offenses involved ten or

more victims. The district court sentenced Nguyen to concurrent terms of 63 months’

imprisonment for the naturalization-fraud, theft-of-government-funds, health-carefraud, and mail-fraud counts. The court also imposed a term of 60 months’

imprisonment, to run concurrently with the first 63-month sentence, for the counts

related to social-security fraud, false use of a social security number, and false

statements to a government agency. Finally, the court imposed a consecutive

sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment for the aggravated identity-theft counts. 

Together, her sentences amounted to 87 months’ imprisonment, plus three years of

supervised release. This sentence fell at the bottom of her advisory guidelines range

of 87-92 months’ imprisonment. The court assessed a $100 special assessment for

each count.

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II.

On appeal, Nguyen raises several challenges. She renews her argument that

the district court’s jury instructions on the naturalization-fraud charges were

improper. She also argues that the court erred by denying her motion for judgment

of acquittal on all counts. Third, she contends that the district court improperly

applied a two-level sentencing guidelines enhancement because the Government did

not show that her conduct affected ten or more victims. Finally, she argues that the

court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.

A.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to

procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or other

evidence of naturalization or of citizenship” has committed naturalization fraud. At

trial, the court instructed the jury that the substantive crime of naturalization fraud has

four elements: (1) the defendant provided false information in the naturalization

process, (2) the false information related to a material matter, (3) the defendant acted

knowingly, and (4) naturalization was attempted as a result of the false information.

The court then gave instructions to the jury regarding attempt, noting that the jury

could convict Nguyen of attempted naturalized fraud “if she knowingly intended to

provide false information related to a materialmatter in the naturalization process and

voluntarily and intentionally carried out some act which was a substantial step toward

procuring naturalization.” Nguyen assertsthat the court abused its discretion because

it failed to instruct the jury that the Government had to prove that the applicants

actually were ineligible for naturalization, and she argues that the women were not

ineligible because both later passed the English-proficiency and civicstests. She also

contends that the court erred by instructing the jury that whether a misrepresentation

is material “does not depend on whether [a] person or agency was actually deceived

or misled.”

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We review jury instructions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Farish,

535 F.3d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 2008). In doing so, “[w]e recognize that district courts

are entitled to ‘broad discretion in formulating the jury instructions.’” Id. (quoting

United States v. Hayes, 518 F.3d 989, 994 (8th Cir. 2008)). “We review the

instructions given as a whole and affirm if they fairly and adequately submitted the

issues to the jury.” Id. (quoting Hayes, 518 F.3d at 994).

As authority for her proposed jury instructions, Nguyen relies on Kungys v.

United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988), a Supreme Court decision that interpreted the

civil denaturalization statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). This statute provides for the

revocation of a citizen’s naturalization if the “order and certificate of naturalization”

were “illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by

willful misrepresentation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). Interpreting thisstatute,Kungys held

“that the test of whether [the defendant’s] concealments or misrepresentations were

material is whether they had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service.” 485 U.S. at 772. The Court then

considered the “procured by” requirement of § 1451(a). The Court clarified that the

Government need not prove “but for” causation—that is, the Government need not

show that naturalization would have been denied if the misrepresentations or

concealments had not occurred. Id. at 776-77. However, the Court said that the

“procured by” requirement did require the Government to prove more than the mere

fact that a misrepresentation had been made. Id. at 777. The Court stated that proof

of a material misrepresentation creates a rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for

citizenship—a presumption that arises whenever “theGovernment produces evidence

sufficient to raise a fair inference that a statutory disqualifying fact actually existed.”

Id. at 783 (Brennan, J., concurring); see United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1304

(9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that this concurrence provides the controlling standard

in 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) prosecutions for unlawful procurement of citizenship). Under

this rebuttable-presumption framework, the Government satisfies the “procured by”

requirement if it produces evidence making it fair to infer the existence of some

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disqualifying fact. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 776-77. A naturalized citizen may overcome

the presumption if he orshe shows “through a preponderance of the evidence, that the

statutory requirement as to which the misrepresentation had a natural tendency to

produce a favorable decision was in fact met.” Id. at 777; see also United States v.

Pirela Pirela, 809 F.3d 1195, 1200 (11th Cir. 2015).

Our court has not yet addressed whether Kungys dictates what the Government

must prove in criminal naturalization-fraud proceedings under § 1425(a). Although

several courts have concluded that Kungys applies in criminal prosecutions under

§ 1425(a), see, e.g., United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009), at

least one court has determined that the elements of the civil and criminal

naturalization-fraud statutes are different, see United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d

675, 683 (6th Cir. 2016). Here, we need not answer this unsettled question because

even if we accept Nguyen’s position and assume that Kungys guides the

determination of what the Government must prove in a criminal case under § 1425(a),

we find that Nguyen’s argument lacks merit.

Regarding the materiality issue, the district court instructed the jury that the

Government had to prove that Nguyen presented “false information related to a

material matter in the naturalization process.” The court then instructed the jury that

a statement or representation is “material” if it “has a natural tendency to influence,

or is capable of influencing, the decision of a reasonable person in deciding whether

to engage in a particular transaction.” This language tracks closely with the language

used by the Supreme Court when describing the materiality requirement in Kungys. 

485 U.S. at 770. There, the Court stated that “a misrepresentation is material if it has

‘a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of’ the

decisionmaking body to which it was addressed,” i.e., the agency determining

whether an individual qualifies for naturalization. Id. at 770-71. Contrary to

Nguyen’s argument, Kungysset forth no requirement that the Government prove that

an agency actually be deceived or misled. Indeed, the Court stated: “It has never

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been the test of materiality that the misrepresentation or concealment would more

likely than not have produced an erroneous decision, or even that it would more likely

than not have triggered an investigation.” Id. at 771. Accordingly, assuming Kungys 1

applies, we conclude that the court’s instruction fairly and adequately submitted the

“materiality” issue to the jury.

We find equally unavailing Nguyen’s argument that the court’s instructions did

not adequately explain the “procured by” requirement outlined in Kungys. By

arguing that the Government had to present evidence showing T.B. and N.B. were

ineligible for citizenship, Nguyen overlooks a significant difference between Kungys

and the present offense. Kungys examined a civil denaturalization statute applicable

only after an applicant actually obtained naturalization. In contrast, the criminal

statute at issue in Nguyen’s proceeding applies not only when the applicant actually

obtains naturalization but also when she attempts to do so. In attempt cases, a

defendant may be convicted regardless of whether the attempt is successful. See

United States v. Bauer, 626 F.3d 1004, 1007 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[A] defendant’s

success in attaining his criminal objective is not necessary for an attempt

conviction.”). Thus, the fact that T.B. and N.B. possibly could have passed the tests

and procured naturalization without the material misrepresentation is no more

relevant to the attempt charge or conviction than the fact that Nguyen ultimately was

unsuccessful in procuring naturalization for these women. See United States v.

When discussing the “materiality” requirement of the civil denaturalization

1

statute in Kungys, the Supreme Court explained that the term has the same meaning

as “materiality” under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 770 (“While we have

before us here a statute revoking citizenship rather than imposing criminal fine or

imprisonment, neither the evident objective sought to be achieved by the materiality

requirement, nor the gravity of the consequences that follow from its being met, is so

different as to justify adoption of a different standard.”). In interpreting materiality

under § 1001, our court previously has applied a consistent definition, noting that

materiality “does not require proof that the government actually relied on the

statement.” United States v. Mitchell, 388 F.3d 1139, 1143 (8th Cir. 2004).

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Rehak, 589 F.3d 965, 971 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that factual impossibility is not a

defense to inchoate offenses such as attempt). When an individual is charged with

attempt, it is enough for the Government to show: (1) the defendant intended to

commit the substantive offense, and (2) the defendant took a substantial step toward

doing so. See United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2010) (defining the

elements of attempt). And here, the instructions described these requirements clearly. 

The court instructed the jury that the charge of attempted naturalization fraud required

the Government to prove that Nguyen “knowingly intended to provide false

information related to a material matter in the naturalization process and voluntarily

and intentionally carried out some act which was a substantial step toward procuring

naturalization.” The court likewise instructed the jury that the underlying substantive

offense required the Government to prove more than just the fact that naturalization

was attempted; indeed, the court stated that the Government had to prove that

“naturalization was attempted as a result of the false information.” We conclude that

the instructions adequately reflect Kungys’s treatment of the “procured by”

requirement as it applies to the crime of attempted naturalization fraud. Assuming

Kungys applies, we find that the instructions fairly submitted the issue to the jury. 

We therefore reject Nguyen’s arguments related to the jury instructions.

B.

We next consider Nguyen’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to

support the jury’s verdict. “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict rendered and accept

all reasonable inferences which tend to support the jury verdict.” United States v.

Ramirez, 362 F.3d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 2004). Although “the evidence need not

preclude every outcome other than guilty, we consider whether it would be sufficient

to convince a reasonable jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We will reverse for

insufficient evidence only if no reasonable jury “could have found the essential

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elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Inman, 558 F.3d

742, 747 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

To convict Nguyen on the attempted naturalization-fraud counts, the

Government had to prove that Nguyen “knowingly procure[d] or attempt[ed] to

procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or other

evidence of naturalization or of citizenship.” 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). Once again

accepting Nguyen’s starting premise and assuming that the proof requirements

identified by the Supreme Court in Kungys apply to criminal proceedings under

§ 1425(a), we conclude that the Government presented sufficient evidence.

First, the evidence clearly established that Nguyen made misrepresentations in

the naturalization-application process and that her misrepresentations were willful. 

See United States v. Hirani, No. 15-1583, 2016 WL 3064743, at *4 (8th Cir. May 31,

2016) (noting that Kungys requires the Government to prove these two elements in

civil denaturalization proceedings in addition to proving materiality and “procured

by” causation). The relevant misrepresentations were the marks on the N-648 forms

indicating that T.B. and N.B. suffered fromailmentsthat would excuse themfromthe

English-proficiency and civics exams. Thesemisrepresentations were willful because

Nguyen convinced Dr. S. to sign N-648 forms attributing fabricated medical ailments

to each woman after Nguyen had been paid to assist them in obtaining naturalization. 

In addition, the evidence showed that the misrepresentations were material. As the

immigration officer explained, the falsified medical information had a natural

tendency to influence a naturalization official by leading the official to conclude that

N.B. and T.B. should be exempted from the English-proficiency and civics-test

requirements. Finally, ample evidence supported the jury’s inference that Nguyen

attempted to procure naturalization through these misrepresentations because she

believed N.B. and T.B. would fail these tests. N.B. failed the tests on her first attempt

to obtain citizenship. T.B. failed the civics and English-proficiency tests even after

consulting with Nguyen. That Nguyen specifically sought a means to bypass the

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language and civics tests after meeting these women and accepting their payment

bolstersthe inference that T.B. and N.B., at least in Nguyen’s view, lacked the ability

to pass the required tests. In order to obtain an exemption for these women, Nguyen

concocted a scheme in which she would facilitate the submission offraudulent N-648

forms. Thus, naturalization was attempted through the misrepresentations. Viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a reasonable

jury could have found that Nguyen knowingly intended to provide false information

related to a material matter in the naturalization process and that she voluntarily and

intentionally carried out a substantial step toward procuring naturalization for N.B.

and T.B. Therefore, we reject Nguyen’s challenge to the attempted naturalizationfraud counts.

We next turn to Nguyen’s challenge to her conviction on the counts for false

use of a social security number and aggravated identity theft. In order to convict

Nguyen on these counts, the Government had to prove that Nguyen (1) for any

purpose, (2) with the intent to deceive, (3) represented a particular social security

account number—here, a number ending in 3138—to be hers, (4) which

representation is false. See United States v. McKnight, 17 F.3d 1139, 1143 (8th Cir.

1994). Nguyen contends that the Government’s proof failed on the third element

because the evidence showed that she never represented that Q.N.’s social security

number, the social security number ending in 3138, was assigned to her or was

otherwise connected to her name. We find this argument unavailing. The focus of

the inquiry is not whether Nguyen stated that the number ending in 3138 was

connected to her name. Instead, the focus is whether she falsely represented herself

as the person who had been assigned number 3138 for some purpose and with an

intent to deceive. See id.; accord United States v. Barel, 939 F.2d 26, 34 (3d Cir.

1991) (affirming conviction where the defendant used a false name and social

security number to open bank accounts); United States v. Holland, 880 F.2d 1091,

1095 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming conviction for use of false socialsecurity numbers to

obtain illegitimate paychecks); United States v. Darrell, 828 F.2d 644, 647-48 (10th

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Cir. 1987) (affirming conviction where the defendant used a false name and social

security number to obtain a loan and gave police false identification).

Here, the evidence showed that Nguyen used Q.N.’s social security number in

order to obtain Iowa rent-reimbursement payments. Indeed, an employee of the Iowa

Department of Revenue testified that someone fraudulently used Q.N.’s social

security number and name to apply for payments from the Iowa Rental

Reimbursement Program after Q.N. had departed the country. These payments were

sent to an address in Des Moines belonging to an acquaintance of Nguyen. The jury

also heard a recording of Nguyen’s interview with SSA agents, in which Nguyen

acknowledged thatshe filled out the application for rent reimbursement using Q.N.’s

information and that she “got [Q.N.]’s check.” These admissions and the

2

accompanying evidence were sufficient to show that Nguyen falsely represented

herself as Q.N., the individual with a social security number ending in 3138, in order

to obtain rent-reimbursement benefits.

3

Nguyen contendsthat the admissions made to the SSA agents were “dubious” 2

because Nguyen lacked counsel during the three-hourinterview and because the SSA

agent who translated Nguyen’s statements was not a certified translator. We reject

these contentions in short order. The SSA agents testified that Nguyen made her

statements voluntarily, and Nguyen never raised an objection claiming otherwise at

trial. Although the translating SSA agent conceded on cross-examination that he was

not a certified translator, he also informed the jury that he was a native Vietnamese

speaker, that he had no difficulty understanding Nguyen, and that he was confident

in his translation. See United States v. Perez, 663 F.3d 387, 394 (8th Cir. 2011)

(noting that our court will not second-guess a jury’s decision to credit a translation

where the defendant challenged the translator’s linguistic abilities on

cross-examination and attempted to demonstrate to the jury why itshould have found

the translations untrustworthy).

Nguyen’s only argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for the

3

identity-theft counts is that these convictions required the Government to prove that

she committed the crime of false use of a social security number. Because we find

that the convictions for false use of a social security number were proper, we

necessarily reject this challenge to the identity-theft convictions.

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Nguyen next argues that the evidence wasinsufficient to support her conviction

for fraudulentreceipt of health-care benefits. Conviction on these countsrequired the

Government to prove that Nguyen:

knowingly and willfully executed, or attempted to execute: a scheme or

artifice—(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or(2) to obtain,

by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,

any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or control

of, any health care benefit program in connection with the delivery of or

payment for health care benefits, items, or services.

United States v. Refert, 519 F.3d 752, 758 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.

Boesen, 491 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2007)). Nguyen contendsthat no reasonable jury

could have found her guilty on this count because the evidence did not establish that

she actually submitted the falsified medical form to Iowa’s Department of Human

Services in order to obtain CDAC benefits. She further argues that the jury should

not have credited statements made by Dr. S., Nguyen’s physician, because that

physician admitted fraudulently completing the N-648 forms for T.B. and N.B.

We see no reason to reverse Nguyen’s conviction on these counts. The

evidence at trial allowed the jury to find that Nguyen altered and submitted the

medical-certification form to show that she suffered from qualifying disabilities. An

Iowa Department of Human Servicesincome-maintenance worker testified that Iowa

Medicaid received a level-of-care certification form for Nguyen in April 2012. The

witness further testified that the form came to the office from a service worker who

would have received it from Nguyen. Nguyen contends that the jury should not have

inferred that she falsified the information because the form was signed by Dr. S. 

However, Dr. S. testified that she never indicated on the form that Nguyen used a

cane or required assistance for bathing or dressing. Indeed, Dr. S. stated that

someone changed the form after she completed it. Although Nguyen argues that Dr.

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S. was not credible, we are “‘obliged to defer to the jury’s determination of the

credibility of the witnesses,’ and [we] ‘will not second-guess the jury’s credibility

determination ofthe Government’s witnesses.’” United States v. Sturdivant, 513 F.3d

795, 800 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Shepard, 462 F.3d 847, 867 (8th

Cir. 2006)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find

that a reasonable jury could have convicted Nguyen on these counts.

We next turn to Nguyen’s contention that the evidence was not sufficient to

support her convictions for mail fraud on counts 15, 18, 19, 21, and 22. To establish

mail fraud, the Government had to prove: “(1) a scheme to defraud by means of

material false representations or promises, (2) intent to defraud, (3) reasonable

foreseeability that the mail would be used, and (4) that the mail was used in

furtherance ofsome essential step in the scheme.” United States v. Bennett, 765 F.3d

887, 893 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Cole, 721 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th

Cir. 2013)). “[I]t is not necessary to show that the defendant mailed anything himself,

it issufficient to show that he caused the mailing.” United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d

680, 684 (8th Cir. 1970). One “causes” the mails to be used where he “does an act

with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of

business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually

intended.” Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954).

Nguyen argues that the two mailings underlying counts 18 and 22 were not sent

“for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice.” United States v. Leyden, 842

F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1988). These mailings include: (1) an April 13, 2012

notification informing Q.N. that his benefits would be canceled and (2) a June 6, 2012

notice stating that Q.N. could not receive new benefits because he already was

deemed eligible to receive benefits (a notice that was inconsistent with the April 13

notification of cancellation). Nguyen contendsthat these mailings cannot support her

conviction because they did not “actually further[]” her plan. Id. However, the “in

furtherance” requirement of the mail-fraud statute does not require that a mailing

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itself be inherently criminal or serve some essential role in the underlying scheme. 

United States v. Freitag, 768 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1985). Instead, “[m]ailings are

considered to be in execution of a fraudulent scheme if they are ‘sufficiently closely

related,’ or ‘incident to an essential part of the scheme.’” United States v. Boyd, 606

F.2d 792, 794 (8th Cir. 1979) (internal citations omitted).

The “in furtherance” requirement, however, doesserve to exclude mailings that

actually oppose the scheme, such as mailings that “clearly indicate[] that [the

defendant] was committing fraud.” Leyden, 842 F.2d at 1030. The purpose of such

mailings “conflicts with, rather than promotes, the scheme.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Castile, 795 F.2d 1273, 1278 (6th Cir. 1986). Such mailings therefore could

not have formed “part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator

at the time.” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989). We conclude that

the April 13 benefits-cancellation notice underlying count 18 cannot support

Nguyen’s mail-fraud conviction. This notification stated that the government had

learned that Q.N. was out of the country and that, as a result, the government was

canceling Q.N.’s food-assistance benefits. The purpose of this mailing directly

opposed Nguyen’s scheme: it both suggested that the government was growing wise

to some fraudulent activity, and it indicated that Nguyen’s plan to continue receiving

benefits had been foiled. Applying the general rule that such mailings are not

covered under § 1341, we find that this notice could not support Nguyen’s conviction. 

See Leyden, 842 F.2d at 1027, 1030 (holding that an insurance company’s responsive

pleading denying coverage and alleging that the insured had made material

misrepresentations could not support a mail-fraud conviction for a defendant who had

attempted insurance fraud); Castile, 795 F.2d at 1278 (holding that an insurance

company’s investigative letter indicating suspicion of insurance fraud could not

support a mail-fraud conviction).

The Government attempts to escape this conclusion by arguing that the

cancellation notice actually “enabled [Nguyen] to take whatever actions she deemed

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necessary to try and get the benefits restored, to try and avoid detection as the culprit,

or both.” We conclude that this is not enough to satisfy the “in furtherance”

requirement. Were it sufficient, the “in furtherance” requirement would lose

meaning: even those documents directly opposing the scheme would suffice to

support conviction because they inform the fraudster of the need to pursue a new

scheme. This outcome runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s guidance in Schmuck

that “[t]he relevant question at all timesis whether the mailing is part of the execution

of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time, regardless of whether the

mailing later, through hindsight,” may prove to have a different effect. 489 U.S. at

715. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred when it found that the April

13 mailing supported a mail-fraud conviction. However, because the sentence for this

conviction ran fully concurrently with Nguyen’s 63-month sentence on multiple

properly obtained counts of conviction—including seven other mail-fraud

counts—we do not disturb the prison sentence. See United States v. Grimes, 702 F.3d

460, 469 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that a remand for resentencing was unnecessary

because the district court had imposed concurrent sentences for five vacated

convictions and one affirmed conviction); United States v. Easom, 569 F.2d 457, 459

(8th Cir. 1978) (finding resentencing unnecessary after vacating one conviction

because the defendant was properly convicted of another, similar offense, and his

sentences for the valid and invalid convictions ran concurrently); accord United

States v. Hall, 613 F.3d 249, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v. Hernandez, 730

F.2d 895, 899 (2d Cir. 1984). We remand to the district court with instructions to

vacate the conviction on count 18 and the special assessment of $100 associated with

it.

4

Judged under the same “in furtherance” standard,the June 6 mailing underlying

count 22 supports conviction. Although this mailing purported to deny new benefits,

At oral argument, Nguyen’s counsel conceded that resentencing was 4

unnecessary because this limited remand was the proper remedy.

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it did not conflict with Nguyen’s overall scheme to obtain benefits using Q.N.’s

identity. The mailing contradicted the April 13 notice and informed Nguyen that the

state never actually canceled Q.N.’s food assistance and that Nguyen needed to take

no action in order to continue receiving benefits. Because this mailing reassured

Nguyen that her scheme was working, the June 6 notice was incident to Nguyen’s

scheme to defraud the government. See Boyd, 606 F.2d at 794; Freitag, 768 F.2d at

243-44 (evidence was sufficient to support mail-fraud conviction for check-kiting

scheme where bank statements routinely sent by mail allowed the defendants “to

know and keep track of the accounting balances in each account”). Consistent with

this notice, Nguyen received EBT cards intended for Q.N. after June 6. We thus find

that the “in furtherance” requirement poses no barrier to Nguyen’s conviction on

count 22 because the mailing did not oppose the scheme.

We next turn to Nguyen’s challenges rooted in the foreseeability element of

mail fraud. Nguyen contends that three mailings were not foreseeable and therefore

could not support mail-fraud convictions: (1) an automatically generated letter from

the Department of Human Servicesinforming Q.N. of a change in the law (count 15);

(2) an EBT card sent on July 1, 2012, after Q.N.’s benefits allegedly had been

canceled (count 21); and (3) a second EBT card sent on January 9, 2013, again after

Q.N.’s benefits allegedly had been canceled (count 19). In mail-fraud offenses,

mailings are foreseeable as long as the defendant causes the mailings—i.e., the

defendant “does an act with knowledge that use of the mails will follow in the

ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even

though not actually intended.” United States v. Fuel, 583 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir.

1978) (quoting Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9).

Under this standard, the automatically generated mailing underlying count 15

wasforeseeable. The evidence supported the conclusion that Nguyen caused the state

to send her Q.N.’s benefits. Routine mailings, such as the letter updating Nguyen

regarding Q.N.’s benefit status, would be expected to follow in the ordinary course

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of delivering these benefits. The two mailed EBT cards, underlying counts 19 and

21, likewise were foreseeable. Nguyen argues that she could not foresee these

mailings because the April 13 notification stated that Q.N.’s benefits would be

canceled. However, after Nguyen received the June 6 notice informing Nguyen that

Q.N.’s benefits never were canceled, she reasonably could have foreseen that the

Government once again would use the mail to deliver Q.N.’s benefits. The EBT cards

underlying counts 19 and 21 arrived after this June 6 notice. Therefore, her

foreseeability argument fails.

Finally, we address Nguyen’s argument that the court should have granted her

motion for judgment of acquittal on all remaining counts, including the remaining

mail-fraud counts and the counts oftheft of federal government funds, social-security

fraud, and false statements to HUD. Nguyen contends that her conviction on these

countsrequired proof of her connection to post-office box 8015. And she argues that

the Government never proved that she exercised sole control over this box, thus

rendering it possible that someone else was responsible for the criminal acts.

We conclude that the evidence sufficiently established Nguyen’s connection

to this post-office box. A post-office employee testified that Nguyen’s husband

initially applied for post-office box 8015 and that Nguyen was given individual

authorization to receive mail in the box in October 2008. The jury also heard that

benefit checks for several individuals had been mailed to this box after Nguyen

obtained authorization. Special Agent Fenton of the SSA testified that benefit

payments intended for the same individuals were then deposited into Nguyen’s bank

accounts or into accounts she held jointly with her daughter. As stated earlier, the

evidence need not preclude every outcome other than guilty, and here, based on this

evidence, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that Nguyen committed the charged offenses. See Ramirez, 362 F.3d at 524. 

Accordingly, we reject Nguyen’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the

counts that arose from her use of the post-office box.

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C.

We next turn to Nguyen’s arguments related to sentencing. Nguyen contends

that the court erred by enhancing her sentence under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) because

her offense did not involve at least ten victims. At sentencing, the district court

rejected her challenge, stating that Nguyen’s ten victims included “governmental

victims,” “banks,” and “the persons whose identities were usurped for purposes of

improper financial gain.” Nguyen concedes on appeal that the state of Iowa, the

federal government, an individual named H.L., and U.S. Bank qualify as victims. 

However, she argues that the court erred by finding that her offenses victimized at

least six other individuals or entities. We review the court’s factual finding regarding

the number of victims for clear error. United States v. Cunningham, 593 F.3d 726,

732 (8th Cir. 2010). The court’s finding must be supported by a preponderance of the

evidence. United States v. Miell, 661 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2011).

The Guidelines define the term “victim” as “any person who sustained any part

of the actual loss” resulting from the defendant’s criminal offense. USSG § 2B1.1

cmt. n.1. In cases involving means of identification, a “victim” alternatively is

defined as “any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or

without authority.” USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E). Victims may be “individuals,

corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock

companies.” USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. Applying these definitions, we conclude that

the court did not clearly err when it concluded that there were ten or more victims of

Nguyen’s frauds.

First, the evidence at trial established that Nguyen fraudulently used the

identifying information of Q.N., C.P., and T.N. to receive SSI and other benefits. See

United States v. Adejumo, 772 F.3d 513, 528 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom.

Okeayainneh v. United States, 575 U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 1869 (2015) (considering

evidence presented at trial to determine the number of victims under USSG § 2B1.1). 

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A special agent from the SSA testified that benefit checks had been issued for these

individuals and either sent to the post-office box associated with Nguyen or directly

deposited into Nguyen’s bank accounts. The vast majority of these checks were

issued while the intended recipients were out of the country. Because the evidence

showed that Nguyen unlawfully used the identifying information ofthese individuals,

they qualified as victims under § 2B1.1. See id.

In addition, the Government presented evidence showing that Nguyen

unlawfully used the identities of two other individuals—C.N. (Nguyen’s sister-inlaw) and N.P.—to obtain food assistance. C.N. stated in an interview with an SSA

agent that she never had applied for or received food assistance. However, the agent

determined that the state of Iowa had paid food-assistance benefits intended for C.N.

using a Des Moines address associated with Nguyen. Benefits also were paid to N.P.

at the same Des Moines address associated with Nguyen, even though N.P. was not

in the country at the time. Such evidence supportsthe court’s conclusion that Nguyen

used the means of identification of these two individuals unlawfully to obtain

benefits. Thus, they also qualified as victims. 5

Finally, the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) listed six other

individuals—N.D., S.N., P.P., T.L., T. D., and H.T.—named as payees on the checks

deposited into an account maintained by Nguyen. Nguyen objected to the inclusion

of these individuals as victims, and she alleges that the court clearly erred by

overruling her objection because the evidence did not show that they “lost money at

the hands of [] Nguyen.” We find this contention unavailing. As an initial matter,

this objection relies on an improperly limited definition of “victim.” In cases

involving means of identification, “victims” include not only those who suffered

Under the relevant Guidelines provision, “means of identification” refers to 5

any name or number used to identify a specific, non-fictitious individual, including

the individual’s name, date of birth, or official identification number. USSG § 2B1.1.

cmt. n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)).

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financial losses but also those whose means of identification were used unlawfully. 

USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E). We find that a preponderance of the evidence supports

the district court’s conclusion that Nguyen used these individuals’ means of

identification unlawfully. During trial, a bank employee testified that checks

intended for these individuals were deposited into an account maintained by Nguyen. 

The employee specifically noted that, on several occasions, the individuals named as

payees on the checks were not authorized to make transactions on the account. This

fact undermines Nguyen’s suggestion that the named payees made the deposits

themselves. Because Nguyen maintained the account, the court fairly could conclude

that Nguyen unlawfully used the identities of these individuals listed in the PSR to

obtain funds as part of her scheme. In light of the evidence, we see no clear error in

the court’s decision to include these individuals as victims. Having found no clear

error for the above-named individuals, we uphold the two-level enhancement. We

thus need not address Nguyen’s contention that any other individuals or entities

identified by the court failed to qualify for the purpose of USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A).

We conclude by addressing Nguyen’s challenge to the substantive

reasonableness of her sentence. We review for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8thCir. 2009) (en banc). In substantive-reasonableness

review, we “take into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A sentence is substantively unreasonable ‘if

the district court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received

significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or

considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in

weighing those factors.’” United States v. Boelter, 806 F.3d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir.

2015) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Lozoya, 623 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir.

2010)). “A sentence within the Guidelines range is accorded a presumption of

substantive reasonableness on appeal.” United States v. Vaughn, 519 F.3d 802, 805

(8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir.

2008)).

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Nguyen contendsthat her sentence wassubstantively unreasonable because the

court did not adequately weigh the mitigating factors discussed in her PSR. However,

the record contradicts this assertion. At sentencing, the district court explained that

it considered the PSR, the mitigating factors presented by Nguyen, and the statutory

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. See United States v. Townsend, 617 F.3d 991, 994

(8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Although a district court is required to consider each

of the § 3553(a) factors in determining the proper sentence to impose, it need not

‘categorically rehearse each of the [§] 3553(a) factors on the record when it imposes

a sentence as long as it is clear that they were considered.’” (quoting United States

v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original))). Although the

court acknowledged Nguyen’s possible mental and physical impairments and her

claims that she lacked understanding of the criminal nature of her conduct, the court

weighed heavily the “very serious” nature of Nguyen’s offenses, which involved

fraud committed in “a very large number of means and ways” that occurred

“repeatedly over a long period of time.” The court also expressed a desire to protect

the public from Nguyen, noting that she engaged in additional criminal activity even

while on release following her conviction. The court stated its aim to deter such

criminal conduct in the future.

We afford the district court wide latitude to consider these and other relevant

factors and to assign some factors greater weight than others. United States v.

Deering, 762 F.3d 783, 787 (8th Cir. 2014). A district court does not abuse its

discretion “[s]imply because [it] weigh[s] the relevant factors more heavily than [the

defendant] would prefer.” United States v. Richart, 662 F.3d 1037, 1054 (8th Cir.

2011). Indeed, “it will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court

sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as

substantively unreasonable.” Id. at 1053 (quoting Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464). Based

on the record, we conclude that Nguyen has not rebutted the presumption of

reasonableness accorded her sentence of 87 month’s imprisonment, a sentence at the

bottom of her advisory guidelines range. The court did not abuse its discretion.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we direct the district court to vacate Nguyen’s

conviction on count 18, including the associated $100 special assessment. We

otherwise affirm Nguyen’s convictions and sentence.

______________________________

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