Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-95-02171/USCOURTS-ca8-95-02171-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Zachary Marshall
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

U.S. v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723 (1996)

45 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 761

 © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

95 F.3d 723

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.

Jerome WILLIAMS, Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.

Zachary MARSHALL, Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.

Darryl PRICE, Appellant.

Nos. 95–2170, 95–2171, 95–2173.

|

Submitted April 9, 1996.

|

Decided Sept. 13, 1996.

|

Rehearing Denied Oct. 17, 1996.

Synopsis

Defendants were convicted under Federal Kidnapping Act

of kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Jean

C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, and defendants appealed. The

Court of Appeals, John R. Gibson, Circuit Judge, held

that: (1) federal law enforcement agent's testimony did

not support admission of results of polygraph examination

of government's chief witness; (2) polygraph results were

properly excluded as more prejudicial than probative;

(3) prosecutor's tardy disclosure of fact that witness had

undergone polygraph testing did not warrant dismissal of case

where district court granted continuance; (4) government's

offer of witness's testimony was not ethical violation; (5)

admission of evidence that defendants killed victim, that

one defendant possessed guns purchased by government's

witness, and that one defendant was apprehended with drugs

was not improper admission of prior bad acts evidence; (6)

evidence sustained one defendant's conspiracy conviction;

and (7) severance of trials was not warranted.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (19)

[1] Criminal Law Experiments and Tests; 

 Scientific and Survey Evidence

Under Daubert standard for admission of

scientific evidence, district courts must make

preliminary assessment of whether evidence

is scientific; court ordinarily needs to know

whether theory or technique in question can be

tested, whether it has been subjected to peer

review and publication, whether it has become

accepted in scientific community, and what is

rate of error.

[2] Criminal Law Lie Detector or Polygraph

Tests and Procedures

Testimony of federal law enforcement agent,

who was qualified as polygraph examiner and

administered polygraph test to government's

chief witness in kidnapping prosecution, did

not support admission of results of polygraph

examination of witness under Daubert standard

for admission of scientific evidence, as agent

could not testify to reliability of polygraph

testing or to field of polygraph testing in general.

7 Cases that cite this headnote

[3] Criminal Law Necessity and sufficiency

It is burden of party offering expert testimony to

lay foundation for its admission.

8 Cases that cite this headnote

[4] Criminal Law Relevance

Court of Appeals reviews district court's rulings

under rule permitting exclusion of relevant

evidence that is more prejudicial than probative

for abuse of discretion. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 403,

28 U.S.C.A.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Appellate Case: 95-2171 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/13/1996 Entry ID: 756081
U.S. v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723 (1996)

45 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 761

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[5] Criminal Law Lie Detector or Polygraph

Tests and Procedures

Witnesses Competency of impeaching

evidence in general

Evidence that government's chief witness

in kidnapping prosecution failed polygraph

examination was properly excluded as more

prejudicial than probative, where test explored

only peripheral details of crime, not critical

facts, defendants refused government's offer to

administer second polygraph test addressing

more critical facts, and witness was found to

be dishonest regardless of what questions were

asked. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 403, 28 U.S.C.A.

6 Cases that cite this headnote

[6] Criminal Law Sanctions for failure to

disclose

Kidnapping defendants were not entitled to

dismissal of case based on prosecutor's alleged

misconduct in failing to inform defendant's

counsel, until three days before case was

set for trial, that government's chief witness

had undergone polygraph testing; rather, twoweek continuance granted by district court was

sufficient to give defendants opportunity to react

to tardy revelation of polygraph examination.

Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 16(d)(2), 18 U.S.C.A.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[7] Criminal Law Use of False or Perjured

Testimony

Prosecutor did not commit ethical violation

by offering testimony of witness who had

failed polygraph examination, where polygraph

results were not admissible, and questions

asked of witness during examination were about

peripheral issues and would not prevent witness

from testifying as to crucial facts establishing

defendants' guilt.

5 Cases that cite this headnote

[8] Criminal Law Other offenses

Court of Appeals reviews district court's rulings

under rule governing admission of prior bad

acts evidence for abuse of discretion. Fed.Rules

Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

[9] Criminal Law Kidnapping and false

imprisonment

Admission of evidence that defendants killed

victim, when they were only charged with

kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap victim, did

not violate rule governing admission of prior

bad acts evidence, as evidence was needed to

present coherent picture of facts of crime in issue,

and killing of victim was directly probative of

kidnapping offense. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404(b),

28 U.S.C.A.

7 Cases that cite this headnote

[10] Criminal Law Showing bad character or

criminal propensity in general

Criminal Law Other Misconduct

Inseparable from Crime Charged

Rule governing admission of prior bad acts

evidence only forbids introduction of extrinsic

bad acts whose only relevance is to prove

character, not bad acts that form factual setting of

crime in issue. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404(b), 28

U.S.C.A.

14 Cases that cite this headnote

[11] Criminal Law Kidnapping and false

imprisonment

Evidence of series of gun purchases by third

party for defendants charged with kidnapping

and one defendant's subsequent possession of

three guns bought by third party did not violate

rule governing admission of prior bad acts

evidence, as weapons used to kill kidnapping

victim matched weapons purchased by third

party, and defendants' participation in gun

purchases were relevant to their involvement

in kidnapping in view of evidence that third

party was involved in kidnapping. Fed.Rules

Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

Appellate Case: 95-2171 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/13/1996 Entry ID: 756081
U.S. v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723 (1996)

45 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 761

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1 Cases that cite this headnote

[12] Conspiracy Particular Subjects of

Conspiracy

Evidence of third party's gun purchases for

defendants prior to date that alleged conspiracy

to kidnap victim commenced, according to

indictment, was not improper amendment or

variance expanding scope of conspiracy; gun

purchases were relevant not to show that guns

were purchased as part of conspiracy, but to

establish identity of people who kidnapped and

shot victim. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404(b), 28

U.S.C.A.

[13] Criminal Law Kidnapping and false

imprisonment

Evidence that kidnapping defendant was

apprehended with drugs was not impermissible

prior bad acts evidence, as evidence was relevant

to prove government's theory of motive for

kidnapping, namely, that victim was rival drug

dealer; evidence of other bad acts may be

admissible to prove motive. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule

404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[14] Criminal Law Construction in favor of

government, state, or prosecution

On review of sufficiency of evidence to sustain

conviction, Court of Appeals must view evidence

in light most favorable to government.

[15] Conspiracy Kidnapping and false

imprisonment

Conspiracy Kidnapping and false

imprisonment

To convict defendant of conspiracy to kidnap

victim, government had to present evidence that

defendant entered agreement with one or more

other persons to commit kidnapping; agreement

did not have to be proved by direct evidence,

but could be shown wholly by circumstantial

evidence and inference.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[16] Conspiracy Weight and Sufficiency of

Evidence

Once conspiracy between others was established,

only minimal evidence was required to connect

defendant with that conspiracy.

[17] Conspiracy Kidnapping and false

imprisonment

Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to kidnap

victim was sustained by evidence that victim

was kidnapped to protect defendant from

victim's alleged plan to avenge shooting of

victim's cousin, that defendant accompanied

codefendants to meet third party and victim, that

defendant drove vehicle away from crime scene

after victim was shot, and that, after getting away

from crime scene, third party met defendant and

codefendant, who paid third party $2,000 he had

been promised and gave third party instructions

about disguising vehicle used in crime.

[18] Criminal Law Preliminary proceedings

District court's refusal to grant severance will

not be reversed, absent abuse of discretion that

prejudiced defendant's rights.

[19] Criminal Law Conspiracy cases

District court was not required to sever

defendant's trial from that of codefendants,

where all defendants were charged with

same crimes, including conspiracy, which had

to be proved by same evidence. Fed.Rules

Cr.Proc.Rule 8(b), 18 U.S.C.A.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Appellate Case: 95-2171 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/13/1996 Entry ID: 756081
U.S. v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723 (1996)

45 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 761

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Attorneys and Law Firms

*725 Paul J. Passanante, St. Louis, MO, argued, for

appellant Jerome Williams.

Barry A. Short, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Zachary

Marshall.

Howard B. Eisenberg, Milwaukee, WI, argued, for appellant

Darryl Price.

Dean Hoag, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, MO, argued, for

appellee.

Before FAGG, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BOWMAN, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Zachary Marshall, Darryl Price, and Jerome Williams appeal

their convictions under the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18

U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1994), for kidnapping Richard Harris

and conspiracy to kidnap him. All three defendants claim

that the district court 1 erred in excluding evidence of a

polygraph test conducted on the government's chief witness,

Michael Campbell. They also claim that the court erred in

admitting evidence *726 of their possession of guns before

and after the conspiracy. Williams makes a similar argument

regarding evidence of his possession of drugs. Price argues

that there was insufficient evidence that he was a member

of the conspiracy or participated in the kidnapping, and that

the district court erred in refusing to sever his case from the

others. We affirm the convictions.

On June 17, 1990, Richard Harris was abducted in St.

Louis, Missouri and taken by car to East St. Louis, Illinois,

where he was shot to death and abandoned. The government

proved that Williams, Marshall, and Price arranged to have a

volunteer policeman kidnap Harris. They met the policeman

and traveled with him to East St. Louis, where Marshall and

Williams killed Harris.

Earlier that June, Harris's cousin, Vernon Henderson, was

shot in the Vaughn Housing Project in St. Louis. Harris

visited Henderson in the hospital, then returned to the Vaughn

Housing Project armed with a rifle and two handguns. Harris

went around the Project “sticking [a] gun up to people's faces

and asking who shot his cousin.” Harris told his girlfriend,

who was at the Project with him, that he was going to

kill the person who shot his cousin. The girlfriend testified

that sometime after that night at the Project, Harris got the

information that “Little Dickie” had shot Henderson. She and

Harris knew Darryl Price by the name “Little Dickie.”

The government's witness, Michael Campbell, was a

volunteer officer of the Beverly Hills, Missouri Auxiliary

Police Reserve. He was an acquaintance of Zachary Marshall,

Jerome Williams, and Darryl Price. Beginning on May 16,

1990, Campbell made a series of gun purchases in which he

used his police identification to get gun permits, took money

from Marshall and Williams, and bought guns for their use.

On May 16 Campbell bought a Taurus nine millimeter pistol;

he testified, “I purchased this weapon ... for the protection

of [Williams] and his drug trade....” On May 31, 1990, he

bought three more guns: a .45 caliber Uzi, a Desert Eagle .44

magnum, and a .357 magnum. Marshall gave Campbell

$2,200 in cash to buy the guns, and Marshall and Williams

accompanied him to the gun shop to tell him which guns to

get. On June 15, 1990, Campbell got more permits. This time

all three defendants accompanied Campbell to the gun shop.

He bought two ten millimeter Smith & Wesson pistols; two

nine millimeter Beretta pistols; one AK47; and one Ruger

rifle with a scope, all for $3,779 in cash provided by Marshall.

He turned the weapons over to Marshall and Williams.

On the same day as the last gun purchase, June 15, Campbell

went with the three defendants to buy a used Chevrolet

Celebrity. Various witnesses testified that the Celebrity

looked like a St. Louis police car. Marshall supplied the

$2,800 in cash to buy the car, but Campbell actually made the

purchase.

The next day, June 16, Marshall paged Campbell and asked

him to come to a nightclub to meet him. Outside the club,

Campbell met Williams and Marshall. They had mounted

an antenna on the top of the Chevrolet Celebrity. Marshall

told Campbell that someone had been pulling a pistol on

thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds in the Vaughn Projects and

that Marshall wanted Campbell to pull that person over.

Campbell volunteered to use his “police abilities” to pull the

person over. Marshall gave Campbell a description of a person

they called “Ricky Beers”. Williams said he wanted to “pop”

Ricky, meaning to shoot him. They offered Campbell $2,000

for his help.

Early the next morning, June 17, Marshall and Williams

took Campbell to the area in south St. Louis where Harris

Appellate Case: 95-2171 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/13/1996 Entry ID: 756081
U.S. v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723 (1996)

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lived and showed him Harris's apartment and car. Campbell

began surveilling Harris's apartment, sitting in the Chevrolet

Celebrity. Marshall gave Campbell a mobile phone to

maintain communication with him.

By mistake, Campbell stopped the wrong man, Kenneth

Draper. Campbell flashed a red light and identified himself

as a police officer. He told Draper to get in the back seat

of the car, gave him handcuffs, and told him to handcuff

himself. Draper testified at trial that Campbell called him

“Ricky” and was talking to someone on a portable phone.

Campbell took Draper downtown. There, they met Williams,

who told Campbell he had *727 the wrong man. Campbell

crossed the Mississippi and let Draper out of the car in East St.

Louis. He returned to St. Louis to continue surveilling Harris's

apartment.

Campbell soon apprehended Harris, who was in a car with

his family. Campbell followed the same procedure he had

used with Draper, stopping Harris by using a flashing light,

and having Harris get in the back seat of the Celebrity

and handcuff himself. Using the portable phone, Campbell

telephoned Marshall and told him that he had Harris;

Marshall said to bring him downtown. Campbell again drove

downtown, where he met Williams, Marshall, and Price, who

were in another Chevrolet Celebrity. At Williams's direction,

Campbell then drove over the bridge to East St. Louis, with

the other Celebrity following. Campbell stopped in East

St. Louis and walked back to talk to the others. He said,

“Whatever you want to do, let's do it right here....” The others

told him to keep driving. He got back in the car and continued

driving. Campbell was looking for a rural area, but when he

pulled into Church Lane, the second car bumped Campbell's

car from behind. Harris looked back at the second car and

said: “That's Dickie” or “That's Dickie and Zac and them”

and “They gonna kill me.” Harris jumped out of the car and

ran. Marshall got out of the second car and shot Harris twice.

Harris fell. Williams then got out of the car. He and Marshall

both shot Harris repeatedly.

Price moved to the driver's seat in the second car. Marshall

and Williams got back in the car, and both cars sped away.

About an hour or hour and a half later, Williams paged

Campbell and arranged a meeting. Price also attended the

meeting. Price and Williams paid Campbell his $2,000.

Williams told him to have the Celebrity he had used in the

kidnapping painted and to get rid of the license plates and

antenna, which he did. Williams also warned him not to

talk about what had happened or he would get “knocked.”

Campbell asked what had become of the guns used to shoot

Harris, and Williams said they had thrown them into a field.

On June 20, St. Louis police arrested Williams for brandishing

a handgun. The handgun turned out to be the Desert Eagle .44

magnum Campbell had bought for Williams and Marshall.

Marshall paged Campbell to warn him that a gun registered to

him had been seized. He advised Campbell to report the other

guns as stolen. Accordingly, Campbell filed a false police

report with the Hazelwood police department, saying several

guns had been stolen from his car.

Later that same day, June 20, Williams paged Campbell. They

met and discussed Williams's arrest. Williams told Campbell

that Harris had been a drug rival and that Harris was going to

kill Marshall and Price because Price had “shot a guy” in the

projects. Campbell retrieved from Williams two of the guns

he had bought for the group.

Campbell's report of the stolen guns came to the attention

of the Beverly Hills police chief, Joe Collins. Chief Collins

knew Campbell had financial problems and was surprised

that Campbell would own so many expensive guns. He called

Campbell in to ask him about it. After talking to Campbell,

Chief Collins concluded the theft report was false and told

Campbell to bring the guns in. Chief Collins took Campbell's

badge and police identification card and placed him on

suspension. Chief Collins told Campbell to bring the guns in

to the station. When Campbell returned to the police station

with two of the guns, he was arrested.

On August 3, Williams was again arrested, this time with two

pistols in his waistband. The serial numbers had been drilled

off, but a specialist in firearms identification was able to raise

part of the serial number on each gun. His results indicated the

serial numbers on these guns were consistent with the serial

numbers for two of the pistols Campbell had bought for the

group.

Ballistics evidence indicated that all the bullets recovered

from Harris's body, except one, were fired from the same .45

caliber gun. The ballistics expert could not identify the caliber

gun from which the other bullet was fired, although it could

have been a nine millimeter. Police recovered .45 caliber and

9 millimeter shell casings from the scene of *728 the murder.

The government recovered five of the eight pistols Campbell

bought for the group, but not the .45 caliber Uzi or the second

Appellate Case: 95-2171 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/13/1996 Entry ID: 756081
U.S. v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723 (1996)

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9 millimeter Beretta. The police never recovered the murder

weapons.

Williams, Marshall, and Price were indicted for conspiracy

to kidnap Harris and for kidnapping him. Williams and

Marshall were also charged with kidnapping Draper. All were

convicted on both counts pertaining to Harris and sentenced

to life imprisonment. Williams and Marshall were acquitted

of kidnapping Draper.

I.

Williams, Price, and Marshall contend that the district court

erred in excluding evidence of a polygraph test the FBI

conducted on Michael Campbell, which he failed. In an in

limine hearing on the government's motion to exclude, the

appellants tried to lay a foundation for the polygraph evidence

based on the principles enunciated in Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786,

125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The only expert they called was the

FBI agent who administered the test, Agent Napier. Agent

Napier was unable to answer questions about the literature in

the field of polygraphy and did not recognize the name of the

polygraphy expert defense counsel asked him about. Napier

was qualified as a polygraph examiner, but did not pretend

to any expertise about the reliability of polygraph testing.

He stated: “I'm an FBI street agent who has been trained in

polygraph and has done a number of tests. I don't, I don't write

articles.”

The test Napier administered to Campbell consisted of nine

questions:

Q. Is your last name Campbell?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you born in Missouri?

A. Yes.

Q. When you gave the weapons to those three men, did you

know they planned to kill Rickey?

A. No.

Q. Did you live in St. Louis?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time Rickey was shot, did you ever get out of

your car?

A. No.

Q. Before 1988, besides those two times, did you ever lie

about yourself to look more impressive?

A. No.

Q. Are you more than 21 years old?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Rickey ever in the trunk of that Celebrity?

A. No.

Q. Prior to 1988, did you ever lie about something

important to family members?

A. No.

The examiner did not break down the test results to show

whether Campbell was deemed deceptive on particular

questions, but simply assigned a “deception” result to

Campbell's entire performance. The government offered to

administer a new test, asking Campbell the questions at the

heart of the case: if he shot Harris; if he saw Marshall and

Williams shoot Harris; and if he saw Darryl Price drive the

getaway car. The government offered to dismiss the case if

Campbell failed the retest. Williams and Marshall refused the

proposal. The parties' briefs state that Price agreed, but that

he and the government never reached a stipulation. There is

nothing in the record indicating that Price sought to avail

himself of the government's proposal.

The district court excluded the polygraph evidence on the

ground that the defendants had failed to present expert

evidence on the reliability of polygraphy. The court stated:

The Court finds that the evidence presented this morning

has failed to demonstrate that Special Agent Napier

qualifies by training and experience as an expert in the

field of polygraphy, in terms, in particular, of being able to

discuss the field in general, its theory and its reliability. He

is, however, qualified as a polygraph examiner.

So the record before this Court provides no expert

testimony as to the elements identified in the Daubert

decision....

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U.S. v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723 (1996)

45 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 761

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*729 The court went on to question the relevance and

probative value of the particular examination:

I also question very seriously whether the type of evidence

I heard today would assist the trier of fact even to determine

the credibility of Mr. Campbell.

Assuming, however, that this is relevant evidence, I find

that it should not be admitted pursuant to [Fed.R.Evid.]

403 because any probative value that it might have is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues and misleading the jury on this

particular evidence.

The defendants devote much of their briefs to arguing that

the district court should have applied the Daubert standard

for admission of scientific evidence, rather than the standard

used in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923).

This argument has no merit, since the district court expressly

applied the Daubert standard and found the defendants had

not made the required showing.

[1] [2] Price argues that Agent Napier's testimony was

sufficient to establish reliability under Daubert. Daubert

instructs that district courts must make a preliminary

assessment of whether evidence is scientific. 509 U.S. at

592–95, 113 S.Ct. at 2796–98. The court ordinarily needs

to know whether the theory or technique in question can

be tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and

publication, whether it has become accepted in the scientific

community, and what the rate of error is. Id. at 593–94,

113 S.Ct. at 2796–97. Agent Napier did not pretend to be able

to opine about these questions. For instance, as to reliability

Agent Napier said:

Q: Are there ways, Agent, to beat the polygraph

examination?

A: That depends on your belief in the polygraph. There are

people who think they can, and there are people who have

developed strategies and techniques for doing it. Do they

work? Are they caught in them? I don't know.

Napier's testimony alone is plainly insufficient to enable the

court to undertake a Daubert analysis.

Marshall contends that the defendants showed that

polygraphic evidence was reliable by presenting a notebook

of articles and book chapters on the subject to the district

court. Williams's counsel quoted from and summarized the

writings on the record without any objection from the

government. However, no witness identified or discussed

the writings by live testimony, deposition, or affidavit. The

district court did not refer to the writings except to say that

Agent Napier was “unfamiliar with the literature in the field.”

[3] It is the burden of the party offering the expert testimony

to lay a foundation for its admission. Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.),

(“[T]he party presenting the expert must show that the expert's

findings are based on sound science ....”), cert. denied,

516 U.S. 869, 116 S.Ct. 189, 133 L.Ed.2d 126 (1995);

American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 45 F.3d

135, 139 (6th Cir.1995). Therefore, Marshall must establish

that the record contained the evidence necessary to permit

the court to make a Daubert determination. Marshall does

not address the question of whether learned writings not

introduced in conjunction with testimony of any witness can

supply the factual basis for a Daubert determination that an

expert's testimony is based on scientific knowledge.

However, we need not delve into this unbriefed question,

because the district court's decision was not solely based on

the lack of evidence to support a Daubert determination. The

court's decision also rested on the alternative ground that this

“particular evidence,” i.e., the test Napier administered, was

more prejudicial than probative and should be excluded under

Fed.R.Evid. 403.

[4] We review a district court's rulings under Rule 403 for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Barrett, 937 F.2d

1346, 1348 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 916, 112

S.Ct. 322, 116 L.Ed.2d 263 (1991); *730 United States v.

Bettelyoun, 892 F.2d 744, 747 (8th Cir.1989).

[5] The questions Napier asked Campbell in this test do not

deal with the facts establishing the kidnapping, but have to do

with peripheral details about Harris's murder. The government

proposed to conduct a second test that would have explored

the most critical facts about the murder: whether Campbell

saw Marshall and Williams shoot Harris; whether Campbell

himself shot Harris; and whether Campbell saw Price drive

the get-away car. The defendants rejected the government's

proposal to conduct a second test that would go to the heart

of the matter and ask these questions directly. Introducing

evidence that Campbell failed a polygraph examination on

questions relating to the murder without permitting the jury

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to know whether he could have passed a test asking far more

relevant questions would be unfair and misleading. It is, of

course, relevant that Campbell was found to be dishonest, no

matter what the questions were. 2 Still, in light of the potential

for misleading the jury, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in ruling that evidence of the first test alone would

be more prejudicial than probative. See United States v.

Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 667–68 (2d Cir.1995) (questions in

particular polygraph examination not sufficiently probative

to require admission), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1115, 116 S.Ct.

1343, 134 L.Ed.2d 491 (1996); United States v. Pettigrew,

77 F.3d 1500, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (same); United States

v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216–17 (6th Cir.1995) (excluding

polygraph evidence under Rule 403), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

1082, 116 S.Ct. 795, 133 L.Ed.2d 744 (1996).

[6] Williams argues that the prosecutor committed

misconduct in failing to inform defendant's counsel, until

three days before the case was set for trial, that Campbell

had undergone polygraph testing. The defendants moved to

dismiss the case because of the tardiness of the revelation.

The assistant United States Attorney trying the case stated that

he was not aware of the polygraph report earlier, although he

apparently approved the testing. The case was set for trial on

January 3, 1995. The court denied the defendant's motion to

dismiss, but did continue the case until January 17 to give

the defendants the opportunity to react to the tardy revelation

of the polygraph examination. On January 13 the court

conducted an in limine hearing on the government's motion

to exclude evidence of the polygraph examination. The court

decided to exclude the evidence. The district court acted

within its discretion in granting defendants a continuance,

rather than dismissing the case. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(2);

United States v. Tibesar, 894 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir.) (district

court's sanctions under Rule 16(d)(2) reviewable for abuse

of discretion), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 825, 111 S.Ct. 79, 112

L.Ed.2d 52 (1990).

[7] Williams argues that it was an ethical violation to offer

Campbell's testimony when he had failed a polygraph test.

This argument is hardly viable after we have affirmed the

district court's decision that the polygraph results were not

admissible. Further, even if we assumed the polygraph results

were conclusive proof Campbell was lying during the test, the

questions Napier asked in the examination were peripheral

and would not prevent Campbell from testifying as to the

crucial facts establishing the defendants' guilt. The questions

asked in the original test were not sufficiently on point

to indicate that the government elicited perjury in calling

Campbell at trial.

II.

[8] The defendants argue that the district court erred in

admitting evidence of their prior bad acts in violation of

Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). We review the district court's Rule

404(b) rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v.

DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 913 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.

980, 106 S.Ct. 382, 88 L.Ed.2d 336 (1985).

[9] [10] First, the defendants contend that the district

court violated Rule 404(b) in admitting evidence that

they killed Harris, *731 when they were only charged

with kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap. Rule 404(b)

only forbids introduction of extrinsic bad acts whose only

relevance is to prove character, not bad acts that form the

factual setting of the crime in issue. United States v. Bass,

794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869,

107 S.Ct. 233, 93 L.Ed.2d 159 (1986); United States v.

Swinton, 75 F.3d 374, 377–78 (8th Cir.1996). As in United

States v. Tate, 821 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1987), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 712, 98 L.Ed.2d 662

(1988), evidence of acts that form an integral part of the

crime charged is not rendered inadmissible merely because

the acts are criminal in their own right but have not been

charged. Otherwise, the government would be handicapped in

presenting a coherent picture of the facts of the crime in issue.

Moreover, the killing was directly probative of the

kidnapping. In Tate, evidence that the defendant shot two state

troopers was admitted in a trial on federal weapons violations.

Id. at 1329. The court stated, “Certainly, the actual use of the

weapons, i.e., the shootings of the state troopers, was relevant

to the question of whether Tate knowingly possessed them.”

Id. at 1332. In this case the evidence at trial was that Harris

got out of the car and started to run away; the defendants

prevented his escape by killing him. This use of force to

prevent escape is extremely relevant to show the defendants

had custody of Harris against his will. Moreover, the fact that

Harris was taken from his family in St. Louis and wound up

dead in East St. Louis is evidence that demonstrates he was

transported across the state line. By the same token, evidence

that the defendants disposed of Harris tends to prove that they

had him in the first place.

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[11] Similarly, we reject the defendants' claim that the

district court erred in allowing proof of the series of gun

purchases and Williams's subsequent possession of three of

the guns Campbell bought. Proof that Campbell bought the

group several 9 millimeter pistols and a .45 caliber Uzi is

certainly relevant, since Harris's body was full of .45 bullets,

and spent .45 and 9 millimeter casings were recovered from

the crime scene. Although the guns the police recovered were

not the murder weapons, Campbell bought the group a .45 and

a 9 millimeter pistol that were never recovered. This shows

the defendants possessed guns of the type used in the crime.

[12] Additionally, proof that all of the defendants

participated in buying guns with Campbell and that Williams

possessed the guns Campbell bought ties the defendants to

Campbell. More particularly, it shows a common pattern of

abusing Campbell's police credentials for illicit purposes.

Since Campbell's involvement in the kidnapping was well

established, evidence linking the defendants with Campbell

tends to prove identity of the other participants in the

kidnapping. 3

[13] Finally, the evidence that Williams was apprehended

with drugs was relevant to prove the government's theory of

the motive for the kidnapping—that Harris was a rival drug

dealer. Campbell testified that Williams told him they killed

Harris because Harris was a rival drug dealer who was going

to kill Marshall and Price. Evidence of other bad acts may be

admissible to prove motive. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b).

Thus, each of the types of evidence the defendants claim to

have violated Rule 404(b) was legitimately probative of the

kidnapping and conspiracy charged. The district court did not

abuse its discretion in so determining or in concluding that

the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial

effect.

*732 III.

[14] Price contends that there was insufficient evidence

to convict him of conspiracy to kidnap. On review of a

conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government. United States v. Smith, 32 F.3d

1291, 1293 (8th Cir.1994).

[15] [16] To convict Price of conspiracy, the government

had to present evidence that Price entered an agreement

with one or more other persons to commit the kidnapping.

Id.; United States v. Foote, 898 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938, 111 S.Ct. 342, 112 L.Ed.2d 307

(1990). The agreement need not be proved by direct evidence,

but can be shown wholly by circumstantial evidence and

inference. Smith, 32 F.3d at 1293. Once the conspiracy

between Marshall, Williams, and Campbell was established,

“only minimal evidence was required to connect [Price] with

it.” Id.

[17] There was evidence at trial that the purpose of the

kidnapping was to protect Price from Harris's plan to avenge

his cousin. Campbell telephoned Marshall once he had

kidnapped Harris, and Marshall told Campbell where to take

Harris; at this rendezvous spot, Campbell met Marshall, in the

same car with Williams and Price. From these facts indicating

that Price was in the car as Marshall was giving Campbell

directions, the jury could infer that Price knew he was on his

way to a kidnapping being conducted for his benefit and that

he came along to help. After the two cars passed into East St.

Louis, Campbell stopped his car and suggested that they do

whatever they were going to do there. However, the others

said to keep driving, which manifests a continuing agreement

to keep custody of Harris. Once Williams and Marshall shot

Harris, Price moved into the driver's seat and sped away

from the crime scene. The fact that Price took charge of the

conspirators' escape from the scene of the crime adds to the

weight of the evidence that he participated in the conspiracy.

See Smith, 32 F.3d at 1294 (defendant's evasive measures

as he drove drug dealer away from scene of transaction

were properly considered in assessing the sufficiency of the

evidence of conspiracy). Finally, Campbell testified that after

getting away from the scene of the crime, he met Williams

and Price, who paid him the $2,000 he had been promised and

gave him instructions about disguising the Celebrity.

We conclude that the evidence of Price's affirmative actions is

adequate to prove that he “knowingly contribute[d] his efforts

to the conspiracy's objectives.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Duckworth, 945 F.2d 1052, 1053 (8th Cir.1991)).

Price argues that there is insufficient evidence to convict him

of kidnapping without co-conspirator hearsay. Since we have

concluded that there is sufficient evidence that he formed a

part of the conspiracy, this argument fails.

IV.

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[18] [19] Price also contends that the district court erred in

denying his request for a severance. A district court's refusal

to grant a severance will not be reversed, absent an abuse of

discretion that prejudiced the defendant's rights. United States

v. Akers, 987 F.2d 507, 512 (8th Cir.1993). Here, Price and his

co-defendants were charged with the same crimes, including

conspiracy, which had to be proved by the same evidence.

Joint trial is generally favored in such cases. Fed.R.Crim.P.

8(b); Akers, 987 F.2d at 512; DeLuna, 763 F.2d at

919. Price has made no showing of abuse of discretion or of

prejudice.

We affirm the convictions.

All Citations

95 F.3d 723, 45 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 761

Footnotes

1 The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

2 Though relevant, evidence that Campbell was not always truthful was cumulative in the context of the trial

as a whole.

3 Price argues that proof of the gun purchases before the date of conspiracy stated in the indictment was an

amendment or variance to expand the scope of the conspiracy. This argument misses the mark because

the gun purchases were relevant, not to show the guns were purchased as part of the conspiracy, but to

establish identity of the people who kidnapped and shot Harris. In ruling to permit this evidence, the district

court stated that the gun purchases showed “opportunity”, in other words, that the defendants had the right

kind of guns to have been the murderers. The court adopted the word “opportunity” from the government

attorney's argument that the gun purchases “go to the means and opportunity to commit the crime [and] also

go to the identification of the defendants.”

End of Document © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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