Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01003/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01003-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Harold Ed Burnett
Appellant
Larry D. Kerr
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

HAROLD EO BURNETT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

·renth Circuit 

JAN 04 19SS 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 87-1003 

LARRY D. KERR and 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal ·from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 86-C-611-E) 

Art Fleak of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Susan W. Pennington, Assistant United States Attorney (Ben Baker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, SETH, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 1 
Harold Ed Burnett was convicted of first-degree murder and 

sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on 

appeal. United States v. Burnett, 777 F.2d 593 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

Burnett then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the 

basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court 

denied the petition, and we affirm. 

I. 

On April 15, 1982, Harold Ed Burnett, Michael Simpson, and 

Dale Jackson shot and killed Labcn Marchmont Miles. Burnett and 

Miles were both Indians, and the snooting took place in Miles' 

home, a restricted Osage homestead allotment. The United States 

therefore had exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of Burnett, 

id. at 594-97, and Burnett was tried with Simpson in the District 

Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. Burnett argued that 

he killed Miles in self-defense, and testified to that effect. 

After a four day jury trial, he was convicted of first degree 

murder. 

During the course of the trial, the prosecutor questioned 

Burnett on cross-examination about his presence at the scene of a 

homicide comrnited by Miles. Miles had "stomped" a woman to death. 

Burnett was present at the time, and later testified against Miles 

at Miles' felony trial. Miles subsequently made death threats 

against Burnett and his family. After questioning Burnett about 

-2-

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 2 
this incident, the prosecutor asked Burnett whether he had ever 

been present at any other homicide scene. Burnett answered ••Yes." 

His attorney immediately moved for a mistrial and dismissal with 

prejudice. 

The court reserved its ruling on the motion and admonished 

the jury to ignore the question and answer. Testimony continued. 

The following morning the court gave thorough consideration to the 

motion, and granted a mistrial. When the court announced that the 

new trial would commence the following Monday, Burnett•s attorney 

asked to confer with his client. He then stated that if the court 

refused to dismiss the case with prejudice instead of granting a 

mistrial without prejudice, Burnett preferred to continue with the 

existing jury panel. After the court questioned Burnett to ensure 

that this was in fact Burnett•s choice, the trial continued. On 

appeal, we held that Burnett•s due process rights were not denied 

by permitting the trial to proceed under these circumstances. Id. 

at 597. 

Before closing arguments, a jury instruction conference took 

place. Burnett•s attorney objected to the court•s proposed 

instruction on self-defense on the ground that it was an incorrect 

statement of the applicable law. He renewed an oral request made 

three days earlier that a different instruction be given. The 

court denied his request because he had not submitted a written 

instruction. On appeal, we held that the instruction given by the 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 3 
district court was a correct statement of law, id. at 597, and 

that the district court did not err in rejecting the oral instruction offered by Burnett's attorney, id. at 598. 

II. 

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 1 

This provision has been interpreted to mean not only that the 

government may not prevent a defendant from being represented by 

counsel, but also that the government has the affirmative obligation to provide counsel for those criminal defendants who cannot 

afford such services themselves. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 u.s. 

335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1963). This 

right to counsel is not merely the right to have a person who is a 

lawyer at one's side during trial; it is the right to effective 

assistance of counsel at all substantial phases of the criminal 

justice process. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 u.s. 668, 686 

(1984); Cronic v. United States, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984); 

McMann v. Richardson, 397 u.s. 759, 771 n.l4 (1970}. 

To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Burnett must make two showings. First, he must prove that his 

counsel was so incompetent that he did not provide the "Assistance 

1 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 

right •.. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 

u.s. Const. amend. VI. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 4 
of Counsel 11 guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 446 

u.s. at 687. "The proper measure of attorney performance remains 

simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. 

at 688. Second, Burnett must prove that counsel's errors fatally 

prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687. He thus must show "that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's 

unprofessional errors the result of [his trial] would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome ... Id. at 694. 

Because appellate courts enjoy the benefits of hindsight, and 

because competent attorneys must often choose from a broad range 

of possible strategies, courts must adopt a strong presumption 

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance. Id. at 689. The ultimate focus of our 

inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding; 

specifically, we must consider whether the adversary process upon 

which we rely to achieve justice broke down in such a way that we 

nor longer have confidence that the result of the trial is 

correct. Id. at 696. 

Burnett, now represented by new counsel, argues that his 

appointed trial counsel was ineffective under this standard. He 

lists three instances of counsel's alleged ineffectiveness: 

"A. Counsel was inadequate when he: 1) failed to 

advise appellant of his Fifth Amendment right not 

-5-

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 5 
to testify, and 2) instead advised him that he had 

to take the stand and give testimony, thus incriminating himself. 

"B. Counsel was inadequate when he: 1) moved for a 

mistrial, and 2) obtained the Trial Court's 

favorable ruling, then 3) decided he did not want 

to try the case again, and 4) withdrew his Mistrial 

Mot ion. · 

"C. Counsel was inadequate when he failed to request, 

in writing, an adequate instruction on selfdefense." 

Brief of Appellant at iii. 

A. The Right to Remain Silent 

Failure by counsel to advise a client of his right to remain 

silent, and a representation by counsel that a client has no 

choice under law but to take the stand would be among the most 

serious instances of attorney error. In this case, however, there 

is no evidence t~ support Burnett's claim. The sole evidence on 

the issue is an affidavit submitted by Burnett's trial counsel at 

the direction of the district court during its considseration of 

the habeas petition. The affidavit reads, in relevant part, as 

follows: 

"I believe that I did inform Petitioner of his 

Fifth Amendment right not to testify. It is entirely 

possible and likely that I told Petitioner that his 

failure to testify might be detriment~! to his defense 

in the eyes of the jury despite an instruction from the 

Judge to the contrary." 

-6-

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 6 
Brief of Appellant at App. A. Burnett submitted no affidavits or 

other evidence to contradict the attorney's statement. While the 

affidavit submitted is not as definite as we would wish, we cannot 

read it as anything other than some evidence that counsel did in 

fact inform Burnett•of his right not to testify. 2 Burnett has 

thus not sustained his burden of proof on this issue. 

B. The Mistrial Motion 

It is clear from the record that the district court was 

surprised when Burnett's attorney informed it that he wished to 

withdraw his motion for a mistrial after the court had granted it. 

The court had given counsel ample opportunity to argue the motion, 

had given the motion serious consideration, and'"after a great 

deal of soul searching as to [Burnett's] rights as an American 

citizen being tried under our justice system ... "rec., vol. 

VI, at 505, had at length decided in favor of granting the motion. 

The court questioned Burnett's attorney closely as to his 

reason for withdrawing his motion. Counsel explained that his 

2 The district court characterized the affidavit as ''somewhat 

ambivalent" and relied instead on its conclusion that Burnett was 

forced to testify because his co-defendant Simpson "had taken the 

stand and effectively convicted his co-defendants. Tactically, 

the only hope Burnett had for exculpating himself was to testify." 

Order, rec., vol. I, doc. 79 at 5. The court.was mistaken, 

however, as to the order of testimony. Burnett testified before 

Simpson, and it was Simpson who was forced to take the stand. 

Rec., vol. VI, at 506-07, 536. This mistake is not crucial given 

our conclusion above. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 7 
request from the beginning had been for a mistrial and dismissal 

with prejudice, on the ground that the fatal question had been 

asked intentionally. He explained further, 

"Your Honor, I have conferred with my client and he 

informs me that he has been through this for two years 

already, sir, and he has been through this for four days 

here and his family has, too. He understands and he is 

willing to take the stand and confer [sic] this to Your 

Honor, too, on the record but he likes this jury panel. 

He has -- we have picked them, he has testified before 

them and he is willing to put his faith in their 

hands .•.• 

" ... He has testified once. 

have opportunity for further using 

resources to try to pick apart his 

go ahead with this panel." 

The government will 

their investigative 

story. He wants to 

Rec., vol. VI, at 503-05. The court then questioned Burnett, 

asking him whether he "waive[d) any objection now and forever more 

in regard to this statement made by [the prosecutor] during your 

cross-examination ... regardless of what this jury may do?" Id. 

at 505. Burnett replied that he did. Id. 

Burnett's attorney thus had conferred with his client and had 

two legitimate reasons for declining the mistrial -- Burnett liked 

the jury panel, and he feared the use the government might make of 

his testimony at a subsequent trial. Burnett was present during 

this discussion and freely waived any objections, on the record. 

Given the broad deference we must accord counsel's judgment, the 

legitimate reasons for the decision, and Burnett's express 

approval, and given that we have already held that Burnett's due 

-8-

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 8 
process rights were not violated by permitting the trial to 

proceed, we hold that Burnett's counsel's decision to withdraw his 

motion for a mistrial did not render his performance constitutionally ineffective. 

C. The Self-Defense Instruction 

Whether or not failing to present jury instructions in 

writing could ever render an attorney's performance unreasonably 

ineffective, Burnett was not prejudiced in this case. This court 

has already held that the instruction actually given by the 

district court was a correct statement of law. Burnett, 777 F.2d 

at 597. We further upheld the power of the court to refuse to 

accept the instruction Burnett•s· attorney offered on the ground 

that it was not properly submitted. Id. at 598. The record 

suggests, moreover, that the district court's refusal was based in 

part on a rejection of the attorney's argument that the court's 

instruction was based on the wrong jurisdiction's law. Rec., vol. 

VI, at 618-25. The failure by Burnett's attorney to submit a more 

favorable instruction in writing thus did no more than provide the 

court with an additional reason for refusing an instruction it was 

not obliged to accept. The result of this failure, under our 

holding in Burnett, was that a correct self-defense instruction 

was given. We fail to see any lack of fundamental fairness to 

Burnett from being convicted under a standard we have already 

upheld as correct. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 9 
In short, in none of the three instances cited to us by 

Burnett on this appeal do we see convincing evidence of ineffectiveness on the part of counsel. 

Affirmed. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 87-1003 Document: 01019290260 Date Filed: 01/04/1988 Page: 10