Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03009/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John W. Bolton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

OCT 1 7 1995 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

vs. 

JOHN 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) No. 95-3009 

) 

W. BOLTON, a/k/a GINO, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 94-10038-01) 

John E. Cowles, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Blair Watson, Assistant United States Attorney (Randall K. 

Rathbun, United States Attorney, and Lanny D. Welch, Assistant 

United States Attorney on the brief), Wichita, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, LOGAN, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant John w. Bolton appeals his convictions for 

interfering with commerce in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 1951; using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 924(c); possessing stolen credit cards, 18 u.s.c. § 1029(a); and 

felon in possession of a firearm, 18 u.s.c. § 922(g) (1). We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1291. We affirm. 

Appellate Case: 95-3009 Document: 01019280702 Date Filed: 10/17/1995 Page: 1 
Facts 

This case arises from a crime spree that resulted in the 

robbery of an individual and four separate businesses in Wichita, 

Kansas. The spree began on February 15, 1994, when Defendant 

robbed a Black Eyed Pea Restaurant of $370. Due to a police 

investigation, the restaurant closed for a time, causing a loss of 

revenue. The restaurant would have used the stolen money to 

purchase supplies from wholesalers in Arlington, Texas, and Kansas 

City, Missouri. 

On February 18, 1994, Defendant robbed the Western Lounge and 

escaped with an amount in excess of $400. At trial, Edward Couch, 

Western's business manager, testified that the stolen money was to 

be used to purchase beer and food. Couch also testified that the 

robbery affected sales because Western was unable to restock its 

liquor supply for three days. 

On February 23, 1994, Defendant robbed an Abe's Club 

restaurant employee of approximately $400. At trial, employees of 

Abe's Club testified that the stolen money was to be used to 

purchase supplies, including food and alcohol. 

Defendant next robbed Billy Henline in a church parking lot 

on March 2, 1994. Defendant obtained Mr. Henline's credit cards, 

including cards issued by Citibank, VISA, American Express, 

Discover, Montgomery Ward, Texaco, and Sears. Defendant sold 

these credit cards for $250. 

Defendant's fifth and final robbery occurred on March 18, 

1994, when he entered Novick's Iron and Metal carrying a firearm, 

and absconded with $2,904. Novick's buys scrap metal from local 

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businesses, processes the metal, and ships it to out-of-state 

recyclers. The money stolen from Novick's was to be used to 

purchase scrap metal. 

Following his arrest, Defendant was indicted on four counts 

of interfering with commerce by robbery under the Hobbs Act, 18 

U.S.C. § 1951; four counts of carrying a firearm during a crime of 

violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); one count of possessing stolen 

credit cards, 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a); and one count of a felon in 

possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). On September 6, 

1994, a jury convicted Defendant on all ten counts. Thereafter, 

Defendant timely filed a motion for judgment of acquittal 

contending, inter alia, that the Hobbs Act constituted an 

unconstitutional extension of federal power under the Commerce 

Clause. The district court denied the motion, and subsequently 

sentenced Defendant to eighty-five years imprisonment. This 

appeal followed. 

I. 

Defendant first contends that his convictions under the Hobbs 

Act should be reversed because the Act represents an 

unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority under the 

Commerce Clause.1 Specifically, Defendant contends the Supreme 

Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 

(1995), invalidated both the Hobbs Act and our precedents 

1 The Commerce Clause provides: "The Congress shall have power 

. [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 

several States, and with the Indian Tribes " U.S. Canst. 

art. I, § 8. 

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requiring that the government need only show a de minimis effect 

on commerce to support a conviction under the Act. Defendant 

argues that Lopez requires the government to show a substantial 

effect on commerce to support a conviction under the Hobbs Act. 

We review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de 

novo. United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 (lOth Cir. 

1995) . 

"The Hobbs Act provides for the punishment of anyone who 'in 

any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the 

movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or 

extortion or attempts or conspires to do so.'" United States v. 

Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486, 489 (lOth Cir.) (emphasis in original) 

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 195l(a)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 517 

(1994). Under the Act, the term "commerce" broadly encompasses 

"all commerce between any point in a State . . . and any point 

outside thereof . . and all other commerce over which the United 

States has jurisdiction." 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b) (3). 

Consistent with this broad statutory language, we held in 

Zeigler that the "jurisdictional predicate of the Hobbs Act can be 

satisfied by a showing of 'any de minimis effect on commerce.'" 

Zeigler, 19 F.3d at 489 (quoting United States v. Boston, 718 F.2d 

1511, 1516 (lOth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984)). 

In order to establish the requisite de minimis effect on commerce, 

the government need only produce evidence establishing that the 

assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce were depleted 

during the commission of the crime. Id. Under the "depletion of 

assets" theory, 

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'commerce is affected when an enterprise, which either 

is actively engaged in interstate commerce or 

customarily purchases items in interstate commerce, has 

its assets depleted. ., thereby curtailing the 

victim's potential as a purchaser of such goods.' 

Id. at 490 (quoting United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020, 1025 

(7th Cir. 1978)). 

After our decision in Zeigler, the Supreme Court decided 

Lopez. In Lopez, the Court addressed a Commerce Clause challenge 

to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibited the 

possession of a firearm "at a place that the individual knows, or 

has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(q). In addressing the constitutionality of§ 922(q), the 

Court enumerated three categories of activity which Congress could 

regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the channels of 

interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate 

commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) 

activities which have "a substantial relation to interstate 

commerce ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect 

interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30. Applying 

these principles, the Court concluded that "[t]he possession of a 

gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity 

that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any 

sort of interstate commerce." Id. at 1634 (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, the Court held that§ 922(q) violated the Commerce 

Clause. 

Lopez did not, however, require the government to show that 

individual instances of the regulated activity substantially 

affect commerce to pass constitutional muster under the Commerce 

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Clause. Rather, the Court recognized that if a statute regulates 

an activity which, through repetition, in aggregate has a 

substantial affect on interstate commerce, id. at 1630, "the de 

minimis character of individual instances arising under that 

statute is of no consequence." Id. at 1629. 

Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude 

that the Hobbs Act regulates activities which in aggregate have a 

substantial effect on interstate commerce. In enacting the Hobbs 

Act, Congress determined that robbery and extortion are activities 

which through repetition may have substantial detrimental effects 

on interstate commerce. See H.R. Rep. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st 

Sess., (1945), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1360, 1370 (" [T]hose 

persons who have been impeding interstate commerce . shall not 

be permitted to continue such practices without a sincere attempt 

on the part of Congress to do its duty of protecting interstate 

commerce."). Unlike possession of a firearm in a school zone, 

therefore, robbery and extortion are activities that through 

repetition can substantially affect interstate commerce. See 

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. Because the Hobbs Act regulates 

activities that in aggregate have a substantial effect on 

interstate commerce, "the de minimis character of individual 

instances arising under that statute is of no consequence." 

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. As a result, our precedent construing 

the Hobbs Act to require only a de minimis effect on interstate 

commerce in individual instances is consistent with Lopez. See 

United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (In 

Lopez, "the Court did not call into question the Hobbs Act 

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which--unlike the school gun ban--is aimed at a type of economic 

activity ... and contains an express jurisdictional element. 

Nor did the Lopez decision undermine this Court's precedents that 

minimal potential effect on commerce is all that need be proven to 

support a conviction."). We therefore conclude the Hobbs Act 

represents a permissible exercise of the authority granted to 

Congress under the Commerce Clause, and that under Lopez, all the 

government need show is a de minimis effect on interstate commerce 

in order to support a conviction under the Act. See United States 

v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (lOth Cir. 1995) (recognizing that 

after Lopez a "minimal effect" on interstate commerce is still 

sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction under the money 

laundering statute) .2 

During trial, the government produced evidence establishing 

that Defendant's robberies depleted the assets of businesses 

engaged in interstate commerce. Specifically, the evidence 

indicated that the money Defendant obtained in each robbery would 

have been used to purchase items in interstate commerce. This 

evidence is sufficient to demonstrate a de minimis effect on 

interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act. See Zeigler, 13 F.3d at 

489-90. We therefore uphold Defendant's Hobbs Act convictions. 

2 Defendant also contends that his convictions for use of a 

firearm during a crime of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 

are invalid because each was dependent upon Hobbs Act 

jurisdiction. Because we conclude the Hobbs Act is 

constitutional, we conclude the defendant's § 924(c) convictions 

are valid. 

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II. 

Defendant next contends his conviction as a felon in 

possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), requires reversal 

under Lopez because§ 922(g) merely requires that the firearm 

possession be "in or affecting commerce." Defendant's argument 

again misconstrues Lopez. 

In striking down§ 922(q), the Court noted in Lopez that 

§ 922(q) "contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would 

ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession 

in question affects interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 

1631. In contrast, § 922(g) contains a jurisdictional element. 

Specifically, § 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from 

"possess[ing] in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 

ammunition." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). "Section 922(g) 's requirement 

that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce 

is sufficient to establish its constitutionality under the 

Commerce Clause." United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n.2 

(9th Cir.), amended, F.3d (9th Cir. 1995). Accord United 

States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir. 1995). We, therefore, 

reject Defendant's argument that§ 922(g) violates the Commerce 

Clause. 

III. 

Finally, Defendant contends his conviction for possession of 

stolen credit cards, 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (a) (3), should be reversed 

because the indictment failed to allege any connection to 

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interstate commerce.2 Count nine of the indictment states that 

Defendant--

did knowingly and with intent to defraud possess fifteen 

(15) or more unauthorized access devices (credit cards 

and others) which [he] had stolen from the person of 

Billy R. Henline. 

In violation of Title 18, United States Code 

§ 1029 (a) ( 3) 

Generally, we review the sufficiency of an indictment de 

novo. United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1526 (lOth Cir. 

1995). An indictment need only meet minimal constitutional 

standards, and we determine the sufficiency of an indictment by 

practical rather than technical considerations. United States v. 

Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1400 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. 

Ct. 1575 (1994). An indictment is generally sufficient "if it 

contains the elements of the offense charged, putting the 

defendant on fair notice of the charge against which he must 

defend, and if it enables a defendant to assert an acquittal or 

conviction in order to prevent being placed in jeopardy twice for 

the same offense." United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1530 

(lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1020 (1990). Although a 

challenge to a defective indictment is never waived, we will 

liberally construe an indictment in favor of validity where a 

defendant fails to timely challenge its sufficiency. United 

States v. Edmondson, 962 F.2d 1535, 1542 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

2 Without argument or support, Defendant also tersely asserts 

that the evidence did not establish the credit cards' affect on 

interstate commerce. The large majority of access devices in 

Defendant's possession had out-of-state addresses printed directly 

on them. This is sufficient to establish that Defendant's crime 

affected interstate commerce for purposes of§ 1029(a). United 

States v. Rushdan, 870 F.2d 1509, 1512-14 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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' In this case, Defendant did not challenge count nine's 

validity before the district court. We therefore liberally 

construe the indictment in favor of validity. Id. Construed 

liberally, count nine adequately informed Defendant of the charge 

against him. Notably, Defendant does not claim that he was unable 

to prepare a defense to the count as written, or that he was 

prejudiced by its wording. Rather, Defendant relies on a 

purported technical defect to set aside his conviction on count 

nine. Count nine, however, specifically cited§ 1029(a) (3) which 

requires that the offense "affect[] interstate or foreign 

commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (3). See United States v. Poole, 

929 F.3d 1476, 1479 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("An indictment is not 

insufficient merely because it fails to recite the precise 

language of the statute."). Moreover, the district court properly 

instructed the jury on all the elements of the crime including the 

requirement that the crime affect interstate commerce. Under 

these circumstances, we conclude that count nine was not 

defective. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 

is AFFIRMED. 

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