Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-50299/USCOURTS-ca5-14-50299-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Michael Hornyak
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50299

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL HORNYAK, also known as Christopher Hornyak,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:13-CR-485

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Christopher Michael Hornyak appeals from his conviction of possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon. He contends that his conviction of evading 

arrest or detention using a motor vehicle under section 38.04 of the Texas 

Penal Code did not qualify as a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career 

Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). He further contends that the residual 

clause of the ACCA, which provides that an offense qualifies as a violent felony 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 29, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-50299

if it “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 

to another,” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague and should be found 

void for vagueness. Hornyak concedes that his arguments are foreclosed, but 

he raises them to preserve them for further review, and he requests 

reexamination of United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009), in 

which we held that a conviction under § 38.04 qualifies as a violent felony, in 

light of Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). The Government moves 

for summary affirmance of Hornyak’s conviction, as all of his contentions are 

foreclosed.

In Harrimon, we held that a § 38.04(b)(1) offense is a violent felony under 

the ACCA because “fleeing by vehicle poses a serious risk of injury to others.” 

Harrimon, 568 F.3d at 532-33, 536 (considering substantively identical version 

of § 38.04 to that at issue in this case). We have held in several unpublished 

opinions that Sykes validated our decision in Harrimon. See United States v. 

Spann, 562 F. App’x 237, 238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 220 (2014); 

United States v. Hoover, 548 F. App’x 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 

S. Ct. 1804 (2014); United States v. Standberry, 546 F. App’x 381, 382 (5th Cir. 

2013); United States v. McCullough, 475 F. App’x 983, 983 (5th Cir. 2012); 

United States v. Williams, 466 F. App’x 390, 391 (5th Cir. 2012); United States 

v. Tubbs, 446 F. App’x 705, 706 (5th Cir. 2011). We also have rejected the 

arguments that the Texas statute for evading arrest with a vehicle is not a 

violent felony because it can be committed by fleeing in any vehicle, not just a 

motor vehicle, and that Sykes overruled Harrimon because it emphasized the 

use of a motor vehicle. See Spann, 562 F. App’x at 238; Standberry, 546 F. 

App’x at 382. Moreover, we have rejected the argument that the Texas offense 

of evading arrest might not constitute a violent felony because Texas law 

imposes different penalties based on the degree of risk posed by a defendant’s 

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No. 14-50299

conduct. See United States v. Holston, 471 F. App’x 308, 309 (5th Cir. 2012); 

United States v. Whitfield, 451 F. App’x 415, 416 (5th Cir. 2011). Finally, the 

Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the residual clause of the ACCA 

is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Gore, 636 F.3d 728, 742 (5th Cir. 

2011) (citing James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 210 n.6 (2007)).

“It is a firm rule of this circuit that in the absence of an intervening 

contrary or superseding decision by this court sitting en banc or by the United 

States Supreme Court, a panel cannot overrule a prior panel’s decision.” Burge 

v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999). Hornyak’s 

contentions thus are foreclosed. 

AFFIRMED. Motion for summary affirmance GRANTED. Motion for 

extension of time to file a brief DENIED.

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