Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03257/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03257-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mike Hill
Appellee
Robert T. Stephan
Appellee
J. C. Woodall
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 4 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN R. KENNON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

MIKE HILL, Sheriff, of Sedgwick 

County, Kansas; ATTORNEY GENERAL 

THE STATE OF KANSAS, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

OF) 

) 

) 

) 

) ________________________________ ) 

J. C. WOODALL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MIKE HILL, Sheriff of Sedgwick ) 

County, Kansas; ROBERT T. STEPHAN, ) 

Attorney General of the State of ) 

Kansas, ) 

Respondents-Appellees. 

) 

) 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-3252 

No. 93-3257 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. Nos. 92-3216-DES and 93-CV-3002) 

Charles D. Dedmon, Assistant Federal Public Defender for the 

District of Kansas, Wichita, Kansas (Charles D. Anderson, Federal 

Public Defender for the District of Kansas, with him on the 

briefs), for Petitioner-Appellant John R. Kennon in 93-3252. 

Roger L. Falk of Law Office of Roger L. Falk, P.A., Wichita, 

Kansas, for Petitioner-Appellant J. C. Woodall in 93-3257. 

Debra s. Peterson, Assistant District Attorney, Wichita, Kansas 

(Debra S. Byrd, Assistant District Attorney, and Nola Foulston, 

District Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, on the brief) for RespondentsAppellees. 

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 1 
Before EBEL, McKAY, and REAVLEY,* Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

The petitioners, J. C. Woodall and John R. Kennon, have filed 

for habeas corpus relief, seeking to avoid extradition to Alabama 

without some assurances that they will not be subjected to the 

death penalty in Alabama. Because they present some identical 

issues, their petitions have been consolidated for appeal. 

The pertinent facts alleged by the State of Alabama may be 

summarized as follows. Mr. Woodall approached Mr. Kennon in 

Kansas and attempted to hire him to kill Mr. Woodall's mother in 

Alabama. Mr. Kennon refused to perform the killing himself, but 

introduced Mr. Woodall to Freddie Glenn Pope, who subsequently 

carried out the murder of Mrs. Woodall, also wounding Mr. 

Woodall's brother in the process. All of the contacts between Mr. 

Kennon, Mr. Woodall and Mr. Pope took place in Kansas. 

A grand jury in Alabama indicted both Mr. Woodall and Mr. 

Kennon with two counts of capital murder and one count each of 

capital murder and felony assault. Under Alabama law, the offense 

* Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, United States Circuit Judge for 

the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 2 
of capital murder is punishable by death. Ala. Code § 

13A-55-39(1) (1982); Ala. Code§ 13A-5-40 (1991 Supp.). 

Mr. Woodall and Mr. Kennon were arrested in July of 1989 in 

Kansas. Governor Hunt of Alabama sought extradition of both men 

as fugitives from justice. Governor Mike Hayden signed extradition warrants for each. Both men sought habeas corpus, and these 

warrants were ultimately quashed when it was determined that the 

men were not fugitives from justice because they had personally 

conducted no criminal activities in the State of Alabama. 

Governor Hunt then made a second request for extradition on the 

basis that the men's activities in Kansas had caused crimes in 

Alabama. The new Governor of Kansas, Joan Finney, signed new 

nonfugitive extradition warrants in June of 1991. 

Messrs. Kennon and Woodall again filed petitions for habeas 

corpus, alleging several grounds for relief. These petitions were 

denied by the Kansas district court. The denials were affirmed by 

the Kansas Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of Kansas 

declined to review these decisions. Messrs. Kennon and Woodall 

then sought further habeas corpus relief in the United States 

District Court in Kansas, which also denied them relief. They· 

then appealed. 

The primary common basis for these petitions is the fact that 

Governor Finney placed the following language on each of the 

extradition warrants: 

-3-

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 3 
Whereas, as Governor of Kansas, I am acceding to the 

request of the State of Alabama upon condition that 

[petitioner], in the event of conviction of the aforesaid crimes. shall not receive the death penalty. 

This attempt by Governor Finney to condition the extradition 

of these two nonfugitives is apparently unprecedented in American 

history and raises issues of first impression in this court. 

However, the validity of the condition is not at issue in this 

proceeding. The Kansas Court of Appeals held that Governor Finney 

had the authority to attach the condition on the extradition 

warrant: "Appellant cites no authority for the position that the 

governor may not attach a condition to a discretionary grant, and 

we have found none." Kennon v. Hill, Memorandum Opinion of the 

Court of Appeals of the State of Kansas, No. 66,868, at 3 

(April 10, 1992). (Kennon Mem. Op.) The Kansas court apparently 

reasoned that because the Governor has the discretion to grant or 

deny extradition in nonfugitive cases, the lesser included power 

to grant extradition with an attached condition could be implied. 

We are bound by that determination. 

Since the Kansas courts have held that the Governor had the 

power to place the condition on the warrant, the next question is: 

What rights, if any, does the condition create in the defendants? 

And if any rights have been created, are they currently enforceable, or are they rights which can only arise in the future? 

Perhaps the most useful way to look at the condition is to 

use contract terminology. The appellants would have us read the 

condition as a condition precedent. Under this interpretation, 

-4-

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 4 
the warrant could not be executed without an explicit promise from 

Alabama that they would comply with the condition because Kansas 

would have retained the right to withhold delivery of the petitioners pending satisfaction of the condition. The main basis for 

these habeas corpus petitions is that Alabama has not made such an 

explicit promise. Thus, the petitioners argue that Kansas should 

not be allowed to hold them for eventual transfer to the Alabama 

authorities. 

In contrast, the Kansas authorities argue that the condition 

is a covenant or condition subsequent. Under this reading, the 

contract rights of Mr. Woodall and Mr. Kennon would not vest until 

they are in the hands of the Alabama authorities. By assuming 

custody of the petitioners on the basis of the conditional warrant, Alabama would implicitly promise to abide by the condition. 

A subsequent failure to uphold this implicit agreement would then 

give rise to a ripe claim. At this time, however, no explicit 

promise is necessary because acceptance of the prisoners would, in 

itself, be an implicit promise. 

The Kansas Court of Appeals has apparently taken the latter 

view. Although the opinions do contain some contradictory language, when read together it is clear that they have rejected Mr. 

Woodall's and Mr. Kennon's views. In Mr. Kennon's case they 

stated: 

The governor's warrant is presumed valid and regular in 

all respects. . . . The receiving governor's warrant 

does not require any promise by Alabama to comply with 

the condition before rendition. Petitioner has not 

-5-

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 5 
sustained the burden of showing that Alabama will not 

comply with Governor Finney's condition. If it does 

not, petitioner may have a cause of action of a contract 

nature in some other court at some other time, but this 

cannot prevent his rendition to Alabama authorities by 

Kansas. 

(Kennon Mem. Op. at 4). In response to Mr. Woodall's petition, 

the Kansas court made a similar statement: "The warrant does not 

condition extradition upon receipt of an explicit promise from 

Alabama authorities that Woodall will not receive the death penalty." Woodall v. Hill, Memorandum Opinion of the Court of 

Appeals of the State of Kansas, No. 67,121, at 16 (Oct. 23, 1992) 

(Woodall Mem. Op.). Again, the court opined, "Woodall may have a 

cause of action or potentially a federal habeas corpus action" if 

Alabama does not comply. Id. 

Absent an error of constitutional magnitude, we are bound by 

the Kansas court's interpretation of Kansas state law, including 

the meaning of the Governor's extradition warrant. See Clemons v. 

Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 747 (1990). Mr. Woodall and Mr. Kennon 

contend that the conditional language has been rendered meaningless under the Kansas courts' interpretation. They suggest that 

the condition has given them a liberty interest, and that the 

failure to give current meaning to their rights amounts to a 

-6-

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 6 
denial of due process of law.1 Although we might have interpreted Governor Finney's condition differently, we do not find the 

Kansas court's interpretation to be so arbitrary and irrational as 

1 Mr. Woodall and Mr. Kennon argue that the adverse implications of Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (reaffirmed in 

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992)), will 

forestall their attempt to base a pseudo-contractual or due process claim upon the governor's condition. Frisbie held that "the 

power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the 

fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by 

reason of a 'forcible abduction'." Id. at 522. Messrs. Woodall 

and Kennon argue, with some force, that, if a defendant kidnapped 

by a state cannot base a claim upon the crimes committed against 

him by the state, they will be likewise unable to assert their due 

process claims against Alabama for simply breaching a contract to 

which they are third-party beneficiaries. Messrs. Woodall and 

Kennon contend that, in order to ensure that Alabama does not 

completely ignore the condition, they are entitled to some 

assurances of compliance from the Alabama authorities before being 

delivered into their care. 

If we agreed that Alabama would be free to elide the Governor's condition, Messrs. Woodall and Kennon might well be able to 

frame a ripe claim alleging a deprivation of a valid liberty 

interest without due process of law. The facts support the 

conclusion that the Governor of Kansas created a liberty interest 

by imposing the condition upon the extradition warrant. "[A] 

State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive 

limitations on official discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 

238, 249 (1983). These limitations must be "explicitly mandatory" 

and must create "substantive predicates" that guide discretion. 

Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 u.s. 454, 460-63 

(1989). A Kansas court has determined that the Governor of Kansas 

validly conditioned the extradition warrant, and we are bound by 

that decision. Nothing in the record suggests that the condition 

was precatory. Thus, it appears that "substantive limitations"--

albeit limitations that operate as conditions subsequent--have 

been placed upon "official discretion." If Frisbie in fact were 

to preclude Messrs. Kennon and Woodall from attempting to enforce 

their rights in Alabama, then the Kansas court's interpretation of 

the condition as a condition subsequent enforceable only at a 

later date would effectively bar Messrs. Kennon and Woodall from 

relief. This would create a procedural deprivation counter to 

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-42 

(1985), which held that a state may not take away with one hand 

what it gives with the other. 

However, we conclude that Frisbie would not allow Alabama to 

abrogate with impunity the condition expressed in the extradition 

warrant. The facts of Frisbie are devoid of the pseudo-contrac-

-7-

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 7 
to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Thus, we are 

unable to discern any basis to provide relief to Mr. Kennon and 

Mr. Woodall at this time. 

The Kansas court also stated that "[Mr. Kennon] has not 

sustained the burden of showing that Alabama will not comply with 

Governor Finney's condition." (Kennon Mem. Op., at 4) . Mr. 

Kennon argues that placing this burden of proof on him violated 

due process because under the circumstances (his incarceration in 

Kansas), it was impossible for him to make such a showing. We 

disagree. Rather than proving a due process violation, 

Mr. Kennon's inability to make such a showing merely demonstrates 

that his claim is too speculative at this juncture. Alabama has 

not even tried Mr. Kennon, much less sought capital punishment. 

And even if he is eventually convicted and Alabama asks for a 

death sentence, there is no guarantee that it will be imposed, 

which is the only action that Governor Finney's condition seeks to 

prevent. It is not a violation of due process for the Kansas 

court to presume, absent convincing evidence to the contrary, that 

another state will comply with a condition on a facially valid 

extradition warrant, issued at the discretion of the Kansas Governor upon the request of a sister state's governor. 

tual elements of bargain and implicit agreement that are 

present here. A Kansas court has held that the· governor's condition is a valid condition subsequent, and we do not think that 

Alabama can simply disregard the implications of its acceptance of 

Messrs. Woodall and Kennon under the conditioned warrant. As we 

find that Frisbie does not control the unique facts of this case, 

Messrs. Woodall and Kennon have yet to be deprived of their (as 

yet unvested) liberty interests. Their due process claims are 

entirely conjectural, and therefore unripe. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 8 
Mr. Woodall also makes an independent due process claim. As 

noted earlier, the warrant that is the subject of this case was 

not the first extradition warrant issued for Mr. Woodall. The 

first warrant was invalidated because it identified Mr. Woodall as 

a fugitive, when in fact he had not committed criminal acts within 

the State of Alabama. Mr. Woodall claims that his right to due 

process was violated because, when the second warrant was issued, 

he was not afforded the full process mandated by the Kansas 

statute governing nonfugitive extraditions. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-

2710. This statute requires that a person held pursuant to an 

extradition warrant shall have an immediate hearing in a state 

court where he shall be informed of the charges against him and of 

his right to counsel. It is conceded by Kansas that this procedure was not fully complied with in Mr. Woodall's case. However, 

the Attorney General argues that Mr. Woodall was not prejudiced by 

this lapse because he had previously received such a hearing under 

the warrant signed by Governor Hayden, and henceforth has been 

represented by counsel and has been fully aware of the charges 

against him. All three courts that have reviewed this claim have 

agreed that Mr. Woodall was not prejudiced. We find no error in 

this conclusion. 

Mr. Woodall has also raised questions concerning the validity 

of his extradition documents. The Supreme Court of the United 

States has held: 

-9-

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 9 
Once the governor has granted extradition, a court 

considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than 

decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their 

face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been 

charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether 

the petitioner is the person named in the request for 

extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. 

Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978). 

Although Doran was decided in the fugitive extradition context, the Kansas Court of Appeals has determined that the holding 

should also apply in the nonfugitive context (Woodall Mem. Op., at 

14-15), based on a previous Kansas Supreme Court opinion involving 

Mr. Kennon. Kennon v. State, 809 P.2d 546 (Kan. 1991). 

Mr. Woodall has raised two issues based on the Doran factors. 

First, Mr. Woodall claims his extradition documents on their face 

are not in order. Mr. Woodall also contends that he is not the 

person named in the documents. Both of these claims were thoroughly reviewed and rejected by the district court. We have also 

reviewed these claims and find no error in the district court's 

opinion. 

The denials of the petitions for writs of habeas corpus are 

AFFIRMED. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 93-3257 Document: 01019290351 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 10