Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-02299/USCOURTS-ca7-19-02299-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sheila Geary
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-2299 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

SHEILA GEARY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. 

No. 2:17-cr-169-2 — Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2020 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2020 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. This case is the culmination of a 

grotesque history of sexual abuse in the Geary household. 

Over a number of years, David Geary—Sheila Geary’s husband—raped, sexually abused, and took pornographic photos of the Gearys’ youngest daughter when she was between 

the ages of 5 and 8. During a period in which the couple 

hoped to “spice up their marriage,” Sheila viewed the 

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pornographic photos that David took of their daughter—

identified as “MF-2”—and also found other images of child 

pornography to share with David. In addition, Sheila kept the 

illicit photos of MF-2 on a thumb drive hidden behind a mirror in their home. She kept them, she said, in case “[s]hit hit 

the fan and [she] needed some proof.” 

Ultimately, David and Sheila were indicted as codefendants, and Sheila pleaded guilty to one count of possession of 

child pornography. She was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release, and she was ordered 

to pay $55,600 in restitution jointly and severally with David. 

On appeal, she argues both that the district court incorrectly 

applied a Sentencing Guidelines provision that enhanced her 

recommended sentencing range and that the district court 

failed to adequately explain her restitution liability. We disagree with both arguments. 

Sheila first argues that the district court erred when it determined her guidelines range. Generally, a defendant’s offense level for possession of child pornography is determined 

under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. But that provision contains a cross reference that provides: “If the offense involved ... permitting ... 

a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose 

of producing a visual depiction of such conduct ... apply 

§ 2G2.1 ... if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined [under this section].” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1). Section 

2G2.1, which applies to various forms of the sexual exploitation of children, starts at a higher base level than § 2G2.2 and 

advises a two-level increase if the defendant was a parent who 

“permitt[ed]” her minor child to engage in sexually explicit 

conduct. Id. § 2G2.1(b)(5). Sheila argues that the district court 

should have calculated her guidelines range under § 2G2.2 

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No. 19-2299 3

rather than § 2G2.1. In other words, she concedes that she possessed the pornographic pictures of MF-2 but denies that she 

permitted David to take them. 

Tragically for MF-2, the record contains ample evidence 

that Sheila “permitted” David to use their daughter for the 

production of child pornography. The facts found by the district court paint a ghastly picture: Sheila not only knew of her 

husband’s interest in child pornography, she shared it—she 

and David would view child pornography together. Indeed, 

Sheila would procure pornographic photos of prepubescent 

girls for David to view. And when David expressed interest 

in pornographic photos of their daughter and asked Sheila if 

she would like pornographic pictures of MF-2, she responded 

affirmatively. Then, when David took photos of MF-2 and 

showed them to Sheila, Sheila’s response was positive. Far 

from stopping David, her reaction further encouraged him. 

She had explicit knowledge that David had taken photos of 

MF-2 and did nothing to prevent him from doing so again. 

Sheila protests that the district court should not have relied on David’s testimony since he had reason to try to get 

back at her for reporting his abuse to the police—not only his 

abuse of MF-2, but also of their other children and Sheila herself. It is certainly true that district courts should tread lightly 

when taking the word of an abusive husband against that of 

his wife. The district court did just that here. It carefully 

parsed the portions of David’s testimony that it viewed as 

credible from those that it discounted as incredible. Moreover, 

the district court did not rely on David’s testimony alone—

much of the evidence that Sheila permitted MF-2 to engage in 

explicit conduct came from Sheila’s own admissions and the 

testimony of MF-2. Indeed, even without David’s statements, 

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there was enough evidence to support the application of 

§ 2G2.2. 

While Sheila minimized her culpability for David’s exploitation of MF-2, the district court determined that her version 

of events was self-interested revisionist history. For example, 

Sheila claimed that she confronted her husband about the 

photos of MF-2, but the district court found Sheila unconvincing on this count. Likewise, while Sheila claimed both a fear 

of her husband and a desire to protect her children, she never 

called the police to report child abuse. Instead, she only called 

the police in her own defense. And while Sheila cites as evidence of her good intentions her decision to turn the photos 

of MF-2 over to the police, she made that decision only after 

word of MF-2’s abuse had already gotten out to Sheila’s eldest 

daughter. Sheila only acted, as the district court put it, once 

“her own involvement would be revealed unless she acted 

first.” In sum, the district court found that Sheila was a butfor cause of MF-2’s abuse, because “[w]ithout her consent, 

MF-2 may have been spared.” We see no clear error in these 

factual findings. United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1031 

(7th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e ... review for clear error the factual determinations underlying the district court’s application of the 

Guidelines.” (citation omitted)). 

Sheila insists that these findings do not justify the application of § 2G2.1 even if we leave them undisturbed. She is 

wrong. Sheila argues that she did not “permit” David to take 

photos of MF-2 because she did not “participate” or “assist” 

in taking the photos. But one need not “participate” or “assist” in an activity to “permit” it. On the contrary, one can permit something by simply “allow[ing]” or “tolerat[ing]” it—as 

Sheila did here. See Permit, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 

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No. 19-2299 5

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1683 (1961). By declining to stop 

David or to take actions that would prevent his conduct, and 

with full knowledge of the results of her failure to act, Sheila 

“permitted” MF-2 to “engage in sexually explicit conduct” for 

the purpose of producing child pornography. And though we 

do not view this case as a close call, application of the crossreference here is consistent with the instruction that 

§ 2G2.2(c)(1) should “be construed broadly.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 

cmt. n.7. 

The district court was rightly cognizant that Sheila’s involvement in David’s exploitation of MF-2 was complicated 

by David’s abuse of Sheila herself. Thus, while it calculated 

Sheila’s guidelines range under § 2G2.1, it granted her a substantial downward departure to account for her secondary 

role in MF-2’s abuse and the fact that she too was a victim. In 

the end, the district court sentenced Sheila to 57 months’ imprisonment. That is the bottom of the advisory range that 

would have applied under § 2G2.2, which is the guideline that 

Sheila is asking for. The district court’s variance from the 

Guidelines reflects its careful assessment of Sheila’s particular 

circumstances. 

Sheila also challenges the district court’s imposition of restitution. Recall that the district court ordered Sheila to pay 

$55,600 in restitution to MF-2, for which she is jointly and severally liable with her husband David. On appeal, Sheila does 

not contend that she should not owe restitution, nor could 

she—the crime to which she pleaded guilty requires payment 

of restitution to any identifiable victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259. 

Instead, Sheila complains that the district court failed to adequately explain its calculation of the restitution amount. 

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But the district court was clear that the source of the 

$55,600 amount was the restitution calculation made in David’s sentencing. That amount is the estimated cost of providing counseling and therapy to MF-2 to mitigate the trauma 

that she experienced at the hands of David and Sheila. The 

district court was entitled to rely on the evidence produced in 

David’s sentencing, as Sheila’s codefendant, so long as Sheila 

was afforded notice and an opportunity to rebut that evidence. See United States v. Harris, 56 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 

1995). The inclusion of the restitution amount in Sheila’s PSR 

was sufficient notice to her that David’s restitution amount 

would be used in her sentencing. See id. She could have challenged the calculation of that amount, but she did not. There 

was no error, then, in relying on the calculation from David’s 

sentencing to determine the amount of restitution that Sheila 

would owe. See United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1243–44 

(11th Cir. 2006). 

AFFIRMED

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