Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05056/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05056-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Alan Crooker
Cross-Appellant
United States
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MICHAEL ALAN CROOKER,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-5056, 2015-5060

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:10-cv-00546-EDK, Judge Elaine Kaplan.

______________________ 

Decided: July 12, 2016

______________________ 

JOHN HARDIN YOUNG, Sandler, Reiff, Lamb, Rosenstein & Birkenstock P.C., Washington, DC, argued for 

plaintiff-cross-appellant.

STEVEN MICHAEL MAGER, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. 

Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM; SOPHIA Y. KIL, 

Litigation Division, Office of the Chief Counsel, Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Washington, 

DC.

______________________ 

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2 CROOKER v. US

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Michael Alan Crooker is currently serving a fifteenyear prison sentence imposed after he pled guilty to 

charges of mailing a threatening communication and 

possession of a toxin without registration. He received 

credit toward this sentence for 2,273 days he spent imprisoned on a prior conviction for transportation of a 

firearm in interstate commerce by a convicted felon, a 

conviction that was overturned on appeal. Mr. Crooker 

filed suit against the United States government under the 

Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act (i.e., 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1495, 2513) and sought monetary damages for the time

he spent in prison on the subsequently overturned firearm conviction, despite the sentencing credit he had 

already received for that same period of imprisonment. 

The Court of Federal Claims awarded Mr. Crooker the 

statutory maximum for the first 1,259 of those days, a 

total of $172,465.75.

Each party appeals the court’s judgment. In its appeal, the government argues that Mr. Crooker should 

receive no money damages in view of the sentencing credit

he received. In his cross-appeal, Mr. Crooker argues that 

he is entitled to damages for the full 2,273 days he spent 

imprisoned on the overturned firearm conviction. 

Because the entirety of Mr. Crooker’s “unjust” imprisonment has been applied to a “just” conviction and, as a 

result, Mr. Crooker will spend no more time in prison 

than he is legally required, we reverse the judgment below 

and hold that Mr. Crooker is not entitled to any damages 

under the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Crooker has a long criminal history. The portion 

of Mr. Crooker’s past relevant to this appeal began in 

April 2004. That month, the U.S. Postal Inspection 

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CROOKER v. US 3

Service received a tip that Mr. Crooker was engaged in 

the illegal shipment of hazardous chemicals through the 

mail. As part of its investigation of that tip, the Postal 

Inspection Service confiscated, x-rayed, and ultimately 

opened a package Mr. Crooker delivered to his local post 

office for interstate shipment. The package contained an 

air rifle and a homemade silencer. Investigators concluded that the silencer could be adapted for use with a firearm. As a result, Mr. Crooker was arrested on June 23, 

2004, for transportation of a firearm in interstate commerce by a convicted felon (the Firearm Charge). 

In conjunction with Mr. Crooker’s arrest, government 

officials searched Mr. Crooker’s car and home. Officials 

discovered a suspected explosive device in Mr. Crooker’s 

car. An explosives expert performed a controlled detonation of the device. At Mr. Crooker’s home, officials discovered components for explosive devices and ingredients for 

the toxins ricin and abrin. Officials later found weapons, 

ammunition, and additional evidence of the manufacture 

and possession of ricin during searches of the homes of 

Mr. Crooker’s father and brother.

The government asked the District Court for the District of Massachusetts that Mr. Crooker remain in detention pending trial on the Firearm Charge. The district 

court agreed on August 27, 2004. The magistrate judge 

explained:

Although the charge itself, standing alone, would 

not call for detention, circumstances surrounding 

the charge, together with Defendant’s own threats 

and admissions in a series of letters written to 

this court and others,1 makes clear that Defend-

 

1 In one such letter, Mr. Crooker mailed the U.S. 

Attorney’s office a threat to use ricin against government 

officials.

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4 CROOKER v. US

ant poses a real threat to the community at large, 

if not particular individuals as well. . . .

As if these facts were not enough to demonstrate 

dangerousness, Defendant’s own correspondence

. . . reveals erratic and threatening behavior on 

his part. As examples only, Defendant refers to 

Timothy McVeigh as a “martyr,” makes mention 

of his own threats against the Government, expresses admiration for Osama Bin Laden’s brilliance, and threatens to continue to purposefully 

make weapons at the detention facility at which 

he presently resides.

J.A. 127–29.

A jury convicted Mr. Crooker on the Firearm Charge 

on July 11, 2006. Mr. Crooker was subsequently sentenced to 262 months in prison. Mr. Crooker received full 

credit toward his sentence for the over two years he spent 

in pre-trial detention.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit overturned 

Mr. Crooker’s conviction on June 18, 2010. United States 

v. Crooker, 608 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2010). The court held 

that federal law prohibits the interstate transfer of a 

silencer only where the possessor intends to use the 

silencer with a firearm or where the possessor intends to 

pass the silencer to someone he knows will use the silencer with a firearm. Id. at 99. The court found no evidence 

that Mr. Crooker intended that the silencer be used with 

anything other than an air rifle. Id. The court thus 

explained that while Mr. Crooker “deliberately skated 

close to the edge of the law and took his chances with a 

prosecution that the government was entitled to attempt,” 

he could not be found guilty of the offense. Id. at 100. 

Mr. Crooker was released from prison on September 13,

2010. He had been imprisoned for 2,273 days.

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CROOKER v. US 5

Upon Mr. Crooker’s release from prison, he was immediately arrested on charges contained in an indictment 

dated December 4, 2007. The nine-count indictment 

stemmed from the government’s investigation into the

toxins discovered in Mr. Crooker’s home and the homes of 

his family members and the threats Mr. Crooker made to 

the U.S. Attorney (the Toxin and Threat Charge). 

Mr. Crooker pled guilty to two of the nine counts included 

in the indictment, namely, mailing a threatening communication and possession of a toxin without registration. 

As part of the plea agreement, the government and 

Mr. Crooker agreed “that the time [Mr. Crooker] spent in 

federal detention [on the Firearm Charge] should be 

credited against his sentence in this case.” J.A. 166. 

Mr. Crooker was sentenced to 180 months in prison. He 

received a credit of 2,553 days toward this sentence, 

which consisted largely of the 2,273 days he was imprisoned on the Firearm Charge.

On August 12, 2010, Mr. Crooker filed suit against 

the government in the Court of Federal Claims under the 

Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act. He claimed 

that he was entitled to damages for the full period he was 

imprisoned on the Firearm Charge. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment on the issue of 

Mr. Crooker’s entitlement to damages. On December 18, 

2014, the court ruled in favor of Mr. Crooker in part and 

in favor of the government in part. Crooker v. United 

States, 119 Fed. Cl. 641, 644 (2014) (CFC Decision). It 

awarded Mr. Crooker $172,465.75 in damages. Id. at 658. 

The amount is equal to the statutory maximum for the 

1,259 days Mr. Crooker spent in prison from the date of

his arrest on the Firearm Charge (i.e., June 23, 2004) 

until the date he was indicted on the Toxin and Threat 

Charge (i.e., December 4, 2007). Id. The court held that 

Mr. Crooker was not entitled to damages beyond the date 

of the indictment on the Toxin and Threat Charge because, on that date, the indictment—not the conviction on 

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6 CROOKER v. US

the Firearm Charge—became the but-for cause of 

Mr. Crooker’s imprisonment. Id. at 656–57. 

The government filed a timely appeal of the court’s 

judgment and argues that Mr. Crooker should receive no 

damages in view of the sentencing credit he received for 

time served on the Firearm Charge. Mr. Crooker filed a 

timely cross-appeal and argues that he should receive 

damages for the entire term of his imprisonment on the 

Firearm Charge. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of 

summary judgment de novo. Yant v. United States, 588 

F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “Summary judgment is 

appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Id. “When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all of the nonmovant’s evidence is to be 

credited, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in 

the nonmovant’s favor.” Id.

The government offers two reasons why Mr. Crooker 

is not entitled to any damages in this case. First, it 

argues that Mr. Crooker received full credit toward his 

lawful sentence on the Toxin and Threat Charge for every 

day he spent imprisoned on the Firearm Charge; as such, 

the government argues, Mr. Crooker is not entitled to 

monetary damages for this same prison term. Second, the 

government maintains that it had probable cause to 

detain Mr. Crooker on the Toxin and Threat Charge prior 

to (or soon after) his arrest on the Firearm Charge and 

this probable cause served as an alternative (just) justification for his imprisonment. In the alternative, the 

government argues that the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act does not permit damages for pre-trial 

detention and, thus, the damages awarded to Mr. Crooker 

should be reduced to exclude the two-plus years 

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CROOKER v. US 7

Mr. Crooker spent in prison prior to his conviction on the 

Firearm Charge.

Mr. Crooker responds that he is entitled to damages 

for every day he spent imprisoned on the Firearm Charge 

under the plain language of the Unjust Conviction and 

Imprisonment Act. He argues that nothing in that statute—or the statute related to sentencing credits—allows a 

court to award damages for anything less than the full 

term of an unjust imprisonment.

We begin our analysis with the text of the Unjust 

Conviction and Imprisonment Act. See Timex V.I., Inc. v. 

United States, 157 F.3d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (referring to the statutory text as the “first and foremost ‘tool’” 

of statutory interpretation). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1495:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall 

have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any 

claim for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and imprisoned.

The measure of damages flows from a separate statutory 

provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e):

The amount of damages awarded shall not exceed 

$100,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration for any plaintiff who was unjustly sentenced 

to death and $50,000 for each 12-month period of 

incarceration for any other plaintiff.

At least as it relates to the contours of the “period of 

incarceration” for which a successful plaintiff may receive 

damages, the provision is not self-defining. It does not 

specifically address whether the “period of incarceration” 

includes pre-trial detention (nor does any other statutory 

provision we have found). Likewise, no statutory provision specifically addresses whether the “period of incarceration” should exclude those periods credited to another, 

lawful sentence.

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8 CROOKER v. US

Each party suggests we turn to the sentencing credit 

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3585, to resolve these issues—though 

the parties differ as to the overall impact of the statute on 

the case. Section 3585(b) reads as follows:

Credit for Prior Custody.—A defendant shall be 

given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official 

detention prior to the date the sentence commences— 

(1) as a result of the offense for which the 

sentence was imposed; or

(2) as a result of any other charge for 

which the defendant was arrested after 

the commission of the offense for which 

the sentence was imposed;

that has not been credited against another sentence. 

Mr. Crooker argues that because § 3585(b)(1) links his 

pre-trial detainment for the Firearm Charge to his unjust 

conviction, he is likewise entitled to damages for this 

period of incarceration. Cross-Appellant’s Opening Br. 37 

(“By providing a credit against a defendant’s sentence, 

section 3585 would allow for the compensation of pre-trial 

detention that was credited to the sentence for an unjust 

conviction.”). The government does not disagree with Mr. 

Crooker’s reading of this portion of the statute. Appellant’s Opening Br. 34 (“We have consistently maintained 

that section 3585 must be applied to this case, and section 

3585 provides a clear and simple mechanism for the 

recovery of pretrial damages for most plaintiffs that 

would seek compensation (though not Mr. Crooker).”). 

But the government then goes further and argues that 

equal effect must be given to § 3585(b)(2). According to

the government, the sentencing credit given to Mr. Crooker under § 3585(b)(2) in effect transferred the entirety of 

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CROOKER v. US 9

his time served on the Firearm Charge to the Toxin and 

Threat Charge. Id. at 14 (“Here, because Mr. Crooker 

received a full credit for every day he spent incarcerated 

(pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)) against his toxin/threat 

conviction, the time he spent imprisoned is connected to 

the toxin/threat conviction, and not the firearms conviction, and cannot serve as the basis for damages.” (emphasis in original)). Under this interpretation, no portion of 

Mr. Crooker’s imprisonment remains linked to his “unjust” conviction on the Firearm Charge and no damages 

award is appropriate. Id.

We agree with the parties that § 3585 is applicable to 

the damages owed a successful plaintiff under the Unjust 

Conviction and Imprisonment Act. Contra CFC Decision, 

119 Fed. Cl. at 655 (“[T]he operation of the sentencing 

credit statute has no bearing on the extent to which a 

plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the unjust 

conviction statute.”). The Act expressly awards damages 

to a wrongly convicted individual based on the length of 

his “period of incarceration” for that unjust conviction. 28 

U.S.C. § 2513(e). A sentence provides the link between

the “period of incarceration” and the unjust conviction. 

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3581(a) (“A defendant who has been 

found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment.”). Therefore, it is wholly appropriate to 

consult federal sentencing law when determining the 

proper damages award under the Unjust Conviction and 

Imprisonment Act.

Applying federal sentencing law—specifically 

§ 3585(b)(2)—to this case makes clear that Mr. Crooker is 

entitled to no damages. The statute required that

Mr. Crooker receive full credit toward his sentence on the 

Toxin and Threat Charge for each day he served for his 

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10 CROOKER v. US

conviction on the Firearm Charge.2 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3585(b)(2). There is no dispute that Mr. Crooker indeed 

received this benefit. Pursuant to the sentencing credit, 

each day Mr. Crooker spent imprisoned on the Firearm 

Charge transferred to his conviction on the Toxin and 

Threat Charge. As a result, there remains no “period of 

incarceration” associated with the Firearm Charge and no 

damages are appropriate. See Oral Argument Tr. 19:04–

20:24 (counsel for Mr. Crooker conceding that at present 

no portion of Mr. Crooker’s sentence is associated with his 

“unjust” conviction on the Firearm Charge). 

This result is consistent with the intent of the Unjust 

Conviction and Imprisonment Act. Timex, 157 F.3d at 

882 (describing the importance of “thoroughly investigat[ing] whether Congress had an intent on the matter” 

when interpreting a statute). The Act “has the beneficent 

purpose of attempting to compensate, as well as money 

can compensate such an injury, the plaintiff for loss of his 

liberty through an error on the part of his government.” 

United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (M.D. 

Fla. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Osborn v. United 

States, 322 F.2d 835, 839 (5th Cir. 1963)). Mr. Crooker 

suffered no loss of liberty for his unjust conviction. Each 

of the 2,273 days he spent imprisoned on the Firearm 

Charge has been credited to his lawful sentence for the 

Toxin and Threat Charge. He will not spend a single day 

in prison longer than he is lawfully required. That the 

precise dates of Mr. Crooker’s incarceration may have 

 

2 Mr. Crooker confirmed he would receive the sentencing credit under § 3585 as part of his plea agreement 

on the Toxin and Threat Charge. J.A. 166 (“The parties 

agree, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(2), that the time 

Defendant spent in federal detention [for his conviction on 

the Firearm Charge] should be credited against his sentence in this case.”).

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CROOKER v. US 11

occurred sooner in time than they otherwise would have 

does not entitle him to monetary damages under the 

statute. 

Our decision to deny Mr. Crooker monetary damages 

in this case is likewise consistent with traditional rules 

against double recovery. “[I]t goes without saying that 

the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an 

individual.” E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 

297 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Mr. Crooker had the entirety of his imprisonment on the Firearm Charge credited to his sentence on 

the Toxin and Threat Charge. He thus already received 

compensation for his otherwise “unjust” imprisonment. 

He is not entitled to monetary damages on top of this 

compensation. 

For these reasons, we reject Mr. Crooker’s argument 

that “[s]entence credits provided under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3585(b)(2) have nothing to do with compensation to 

redress a prior wrongful imprisonment.” CrossAppellant’s Opening Br. 25. We also note that 

Mr. Crooker undercuts his own argument by simultaneously advocating for application of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(1) 

to award him damages for his pre-trial detention. Id. at 

37 (“By providing a credit against a defendant’s sentence, 

section 3585 would allow for the compensation of pre-trial 

detention that was credited to the sentence for an unjust 

conviction.”). There is no logical reason to apply the 

consecutive provisions of § 3585(b) in such an inconsistent 

manner.

Because we find that there is no “period of incarceration” attributable to Mr. Crooker’s “unjust” conviction on 

the Firearm Charge, we hold that Mr. Crooker is entitled 

to no damages under the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act. As such, we need not address the parties’ 

additional arguments regarding whether certain portions 

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12 CROOKER v. US

of Mr. Crooker’s imprisonment are compensable. 

Mr. Crooker’s cross-appeal is therefore moot. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of 

Federal Claims’ judgment in favor of Mr. Crooker and 

hold that Mr. Crooker is not entitled to any damages 

under the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act.

REVERSED

COSTS

No costs.

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