Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01631/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01631-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shaun L.W. Samuels
Appellee
TriVascular, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TRIVASCULAR, INC.,

Appellant

v.

SHAUN L. W. SAMUELS,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1631

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2013-

00493.

______________________ 

Decided: February 5, 2016

______________________ 

DAVID K.S. CORNWELL, Sterne Kessler Goldstein & 

Fox, PLLC, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also 

represented by PAULINE PELLETIER, RICHARD D. COLLER, 

III.

JAMES D. PETRUZZI, Petruzzi Law Firm, Houston, TX, 

argued for appellee. Also represented by EVERETT G.

DIEDERIKS, JR., NICHOLAS SPENCER WHITELAW, Diederiks 

& Whitelaw PC, Woodbridge, VA.

______________________ 

Before MOORE, O’MALLEY, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

Case: 15-1631 Document: 34-2 Page: 1 Filed: 02/05/2016
2 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

TriVascular, Inc. (“TriVascular”) appeals the judgment of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”) 

holding that TriVascular failed to satisfy its burden of 

proving that the challenged claims of U.S. Patent No. 

6,007,575 (“the ’575 patent”) are invalid as obvious. For 

the reasons below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The ’575 patent claims inventions in the field of intraluminal stent technology. One type of intraluminal 

stent is a vascular stent. Vascular stents are used to 

treat medical conditions wherein a vascular wall is unduly constricted, as in the case of vascular stenosis, or 

unduly enlarged, as in the case of aneurysm. Either of 

these medical conditions poses an unacceptable risk of 

insufficient blood flow or vascular rupture. 

The Patent in Suit

The ’575 patent was filed on June 6, 1997, and lists a 

sole inventor, Dr. Shaun L.W. Samuels. The ’575 patent 

generally claims intraluminal stents that can be affixed to 

a vascular wall via the use of “an inflatable and deflatable 

cuff” without penetrating the vessel wall. ’575 patent, 

col. 6 ll. 47-67. These “inflatable and deflatable cuffs” are 

depicted by the number 17 in Figure 1 of the ’575 patent 

below, and can be inflated by introduction of a fluid into 

each of the “circumferential ridges” 25. 

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TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS 3

Id. at fig. 1. 

Claim 1 of the ’575 patent is illustrative and recites:

1. An inflatable intraluminal stent adapted to be 

secured to the interior of a tubular structure within the human body comprising:

a) an inflatable and deflatable cuff of generally 

hollow cylindrical continuation having a collapsible lumen, an inner surface, an inlet, an outlet 

and a friction enhancing outer surface, said friction-enhancing outer surface featuring inflatable 

protrusion(s) including at least one circumferential 

ridge disposed about the inflatable cuff, said friction-enhancing outer surface engaging the interior 

of the tubular structure without penetration to

prevent the cuff from moving in a longitudinal direction with respect to the tubular structure when 

said cuff is in a fully inflated condition;

b) means for injecting an inflation material into 

said cuff to inflate it; and

c) a valve integral with the inflatable cuff for permitting entry of the inflation material from the 

means for injecting and thereafter sealing said 

cuff to prevent deflation.

Id. at col. 6 ll. 47-67 (emphasis added). TriVascular 

disputes the Board’s construction of the claim term “circumferential ridge,” which appears in part (a) of the 

claim.

Procedural Background

In 2013, Dr. Samuels sued TriVascular alleging infringement of the ’575 patent. Samuels v. TriVascular 

Corp., Case No. 3:13-cv-02261 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2013). 

TriVascular filed a petition for inter partes review (“IPR”)

on August 5, 2013. The Board instituted review on February 4, 2014. Joint Appendix (“JA”) 168. In its InstituCase: 15-1631 Document: 34-2 Page: 3 Filed: 02/05/2016
4 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

tion Decision, the Board explained that it was instituting 

IPR on the following two grounds: (1) obviousness over 

Samuel’s U.S. Patent No. 5,423,851 (“Samuels ’851”) and 

U.S. Patent No. 5,423,745 to Todd et al. (“Todd”); and (2) 

obviousness over U.S. Patent No. 5,693,088 to Lazarus et 

al. (“Lazarus”) and Todd. JA 184. In its Institution 

Decision, the Board construed the phrase “circumferential 

ridge disposed about the inflatable cuff” to mean “raised 

strip disposed circumferentially about the outer surface of 

the inflatable cuff.” JA 175-76. Applying its claim construction, the Board then found that “on the present 

record,” Samuels had not demonstrated that the Samuels 

’851 reference teaches away from the substitution of the 

penetrating anchoring barbs taught in the reference, nor 

did Samuels establish that removing the barbs would 

destroy the objective of the reference. JA 183. Accordingly, the Board explained that TriVascular had established 

a reasonable likelihood of success on two potential 

grounds.

The parties subsequently introduced their respective 

expert reports regarding the instituted grounds. The IPR 

proceeded to trial, and the Board issued a final decision 

on December 13, 2014, holding that TriVascular failed to 

meet its burden of demonstrating that the challenged 

claims were unpatentable over the applied art. JA 24. In 

its Final Written Decision, the Board adopted Samuels’ 

construction of “inflatable protrusions,” as “protrusions 

that are themselves inflatable, i.e., expandable by being 

filled with fluid.” JA 10. The Board found that, inter alia, 

the ’575 patent’s “inflatable protrusions” were not disclosed by the prior art, nor would a skilled artisan have 

been motivated to combine the prior art in a manner that 

would read on the claims of the ’575 patent. The Board 

also found that the prior art did not teach the “circumferential ridges” taught in the ’575 patent at issue, based on 

its claim construction at institution, which did not permit 

the “circumferential ridges” to be made up of a series of 

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TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS 5

discontinuous inflatable protrusions formed circumferentially about the cuff. JA 18-19. 

After issuance of the Final Written Decision, TriVascular filed a petition for rehearing, which the Board 

denied. JA 34.

TriVascular timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). 

DISCUSSION

TriVascular argues that the Board erred in its construction of the term “circumferential ridges,” and in its 

holding that TriVascular failed to demonstrate that the 

challenged claims of the ’575 patent are invalid as obvious. Because we find no reversible error in the Board’s 

holdings, we affirm.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing claim construction by the Board, 

“[w]e review underlying factual determinations concerning extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence and the 

ultimate construction of the claim de novo.” In re Cuozzo 

Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 

cert. granted sub nom., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 

No. 15-446, 2016 WL 205946 (U.S. January 15, 2015). 

Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying 

facts. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 

2000). The Board’s legal conclusion of obviousness is 

reviewed de novo; its factual findings concerning extrinsic 

evidence are reviewed for substantial evidence. Cuozzo, 

793 F.3d at 1280.

Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 

a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938); see In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 109 (Fed. Cir. 

2002). 

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6 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

B. Claim Construction

TriVascular argues that the Board erred in its claim 

construction requiring the term “circumferential ridges” 

to mean a “raised strip disposed circumferentially about 

the outer surface of the inflatable cuff.” Instead, TriVascular contends that the Board should have construed 

the term to mean “an elevated part of the outer surface 

disposed about the inflatable cuff that can be either continuous or discontinuous.” Appellant’s Br. 3 (emphasis 

added). TriVascular argues that the Board’s construction 

is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the term “circumferential ridges.” TriVascular further contends that 

the Board erred in failing to apply prosecution history 

disclaimer to bar Samuels from arguing for a narrower 

construction. 

Samuels responds that the Board correctly interpreted “circumferential ridges” because the plain language 

and specification support the construction of continuous 

raised ridges disposed radially around the inflatable cuff. 

Samuels further asserts that the Board did not err in 

rejecting TriVascular’s interpretation of the prosecution 

history in construing the term. For the reasons below, we 

agree with Samuels.

1. Broadest Reasonable Interpretation Standard

In construing claim terms, the Board must determine 

the scope of the claims by giving them their broadest 

reasonable construction in light of the specification as 

they would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the 

art. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279-80; compare Phillips v. 

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 

banc). Under a broadest reasonable interpretation, words 

of the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless 

such meaning is inconsistent with the specification and 

prosecution history. Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet 

EU S.R.O., 806 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

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TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS 7

While the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is broad, it does not give the Board an unfettered 

license to interpret the words in a claim without regard 

for the full claim language and the written description. 

In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 

2010); see In re Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 

1148-50 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding the Patent Office’s 

construction unreasonably broad because it was “unreasonable and inconsistent with the language of the claims 

and the specification”). Construing individual words of a 

claim without considering the context in which those 

words appear is simply not “reasonable.” Instead, it is the 

“use of the words in the context of the written description 

and customarily by those of skill in the relevant art that 

accurately reflects both the ‘ordinary’ and ‘customary’ 

meaning of the terms in the claims.” Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys., 

LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

2. The Board’s Claim Construction

The Board determined that the plain meaning of “circumferential ridges” under the broadest reasonable 

interpretation standard does not encompass discontinuous points arranged in a circular pattern on the surface of 

a stent. The Board found support for its construction in 

the written description, noting that it described a circumferential ridge as a raised strip “disposed about [the] 

circumference of outer surface 23 of inflatable cuff 17.” 

JA 175-76 (citing ’575 patent, fig. 1). The Board also 

relied on a general purpose dictionary, finding the definition of “ridge” as “a raised strip (as of plowed ground)” to 

be in accord with the specification’s description of a raised 

strip. JA 176. Finally, the Board found that TriVascular’s proposed construction of “circumferential” that would 

encompass discontinuous raised sections “does not inform 

the meaning of the term ‘circumferential ridge.’” JA 30. 

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8 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

TriVascular alleges that the Board’s construction is 

contrary to the plain meaning of the claim term. In 

support of its argument, TriVascular asserts that the

Board’s construction is unreasonably narrow in light of 

the common definition of a topological “ridge.” TriVascular points to the Blue Ridge Mountains in the Appalachian Mountain Range, which TriVascular alleges constitute 

“discontinuous” protrusions that collectively form the 

mountain ridge. Appellant’s Br. 31-32. We find TriVascular’s arguments to be unpersuasive. First, we note 

that TriVascular does not explain why the Board should 

have resorted to a topological or cartographical definition 

of “ridge,” over a general dictionary definition that is 

consistent with both the specification’s teachings and the 

remaining claim limitations. And, even resorting to the 

topological definition of ridge, TriVascular has failed to 

explain why such a topological definition would encompass discontinuous peaks in a mountain range, when 

mountain ranges typically consist of adjacent, continuous 

mountain peaks.1 To adopt TriVascular’s definition and 

construe “circumferential” to include discontinuous points 

would be to adopt an unreasonably broad construction. 

 

1 TriVascular’s utilization of the Blue Ridge Mountains as an exemplary mountain ridge is particularly 

unsupportive of their position. In fact, the National Park 

Service has noted that the Blue Ridge Mountains were so 

named because “hydrocarbons released into the atmosphere by the forest contribute to the characteristic haze 

on these mountains and to their distinctive color.” National Park Service, Blue Ridge Mountains, Frequently 

Asked Questions, at http://www.nps.gov/blri/faqs.htm

(last visited January 8, 2016). The eponymous blue haze 

of the mountain range constitutes a continuous ridge 

bridging the range’s mountain peaks. Thus the word 

“Blue” modifies the term “Ridge”; the term “Ridge” is not 

intended to modify the word “Mountains.”

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TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS 9

See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 

1300 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that the Board’s construction of key claim terms was unreasonably broad in light of 

the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, and on 

that basis vacating and remanding the Board’s finding of 

unpatentability). We find the Board’s reliance on the 

dictionary definition of ridge when considered in the 

context of the written description and plain language of 

the claims was proper.2 

3. Prosecution History Disclaimer

TriVascular’s other alleged basis of error was that the 

Board should have applied prosecution history disclaimer 

to prohibit a construction of “circumferential ridges” that 

is limited to continuous ridges. Appellant’s Br. 33. 

The same general tenets that apply to prosecution 

history estoppel apply to prosecution history disclaimer. 

Regents of Univ. of Minnesota v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 

F.3d 929, 942 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (drawing a parallel between 

prosecution history estoppel barring an equivalence 

argument under the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history disclaimer barring a position on claim construction under § 112, ¶ 6 that is inconsistent with one 

taken before the PTO, and noting that “prosecution histo-

 

2 Because TriVascular argues for a broader construction than the one the Board employed rather than a 

narrower one, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari to 

consider the propriety of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in IPRs will not impact our decision to 

affirm the Board’s claim construction and nonobviousness conclusion here. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1268, cert. 

granted, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446, 

2016 WL 205946 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016). Accordingly, we 

need not delay deciding this case pending the Supreme 

Court decision in Cuozzo. 

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10 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

ry disclaimer may limit the range of equivalent structures 

that fall within the scope of a means-plus-function limitation.”). Both doctrines require that the claims of a patent 

be interpreted in light of the proceedings in the PTO 

during the application process. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 

(2002). As applied to a disclaimer analysis, “the prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim 

language by demonstrating how the inventor understood 

the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “Any explanation, elaboration, or qualification presented by the inventor during patent examination is relevant, for the role of 

claim construction is to ‘capture the scope of the actual 

invention’ that is disclosed, described, and patented.” 

Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1323 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, 

Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 

Accordingly, disclaimer “ensures that claims are interpreted by reference to those ‘that have been cancelled or 

rejected.’” Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 733 (citing SchriberSchroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 220 

(1940)). The party seeking to invoke prosecution history 

disclaimer bears the burden of proving the existence of a 

“clear and unmistakable” disclaimer that would have been 

evident to one skilled in the art. See Elbex Video, Ltd. v. 

Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). 

TriVascular’s argument on prosecution history disclaimer proceeds in several steps. First, TriVascular 

notes that the examiner initially rejected the claims at 

issue by interpreting Samuels ’851 as having “inflatable 

protrusions” that form a “circumferential ridge.” Appellant’s Br. 34. Second, TriVascular observes that Samuels 

responded to this rejection by (a) stating that Samuels 

’851 did not disclose “continuous” circumferential ridges 

and (b) introducing an “Amendment B” adding the word 

“continuously” to the claim phrase “at least one circumCase: 15-1631 Document: 34-2 Page: 10 Filed: 02/05/2016
TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS 11

ferential ridge continuously disposed about said inflatable 

cuff.” JA 707. Third and finally, TriVascular notes that 

Samuels did not expressly include the term “continuous” 

in the final issued claims. TriVascular argues that this 

series of events triggers prosecution history disclaimer

that bars Samuels from now arguing for a construction 

limited to “continuous” circumferential ridges, which was 

not claimed in the final issued claims. Appellant’s Br. 34. 

The Board rejected TriVascular’s prosecution history 

disclaimer argument, explaining in relevant part as 

follows:

TriVascular’s arguments focus on the patent applicant’s “Amendment B” in isolation, and are unpersuasive in view of the subsequent prosecution 

history, which shows that the positions of the Examiner and the patent applicant changed following a telephone interview. . . . Ultimately, an 

Examiner’s Amendment was entered deleting 

claim 26 [introduced in Amendment B] and substituting a new claim (which issued as patent 

claim 23) and included the limitation “at least one 

circumferential ridge disposed about the inflatable 

cuff” and omitted the “continuously” language of 

Amendment B.

JA 30-31. The Board found it significant that other 

amendments were made to the relevant claim, which 

apparently convinced the examiner of the patentability of 

the claimed invention over the prior art, without regard to 

the proposed addition of the word “continuously” to the 

claims.

We find no error in the Board’s conclusion that TriVascular has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating 

the existence of a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer 

that would have been evident to one skilled in the 

art. Elbex Video, 508 F.3d at 1371. Though Samuels 

offered the “continuously circumferential ridges” limitaCase: 15-1631 Document: 34-2 Page: 11 Filed: 02/05/2016
12 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

tion as one of several possible bases for distinguishing the 

prior art, the Examiner never adopted Samuels’ proposed 

amendment as a reason for allowing the claims over the 

prior art. Since the Examiner ultimately allowed the 

claims over the prior art without the proposed amendment, it is difficult to see how a skilled artisan could 

interpret the proposed amendment as a disclaimer required for patentability. Indeed, Samuels offered several 

other amendments as possible bases for distinguishing 

the prior art: (1) a requirement that the stent use “inflatable protrusion(s) without rigid components”; (2) a requirement that the cuff of the stent have “a collapsible 

lumen”; and (3) a requirement that the cuff contain a 

friction-enhancing outer surface preventing “movement of 

the cuff in a longitudinal direction with respect to the 

tubular structure.” JA 707-08 (italics added to show 

proposed amendments to claims). 

Following the proposed amendment, Samuels and the 

Examiner engaged in an interview. Subsequently, Samuels submitted new claims “[i]n accordance with the Examiner’s instructions provided during [the] telephone 

interview,” and further noted that “the appropriate claims 

have been canceled to omit redundancy.” JA 721. The 

examiner then allowed the final submitted claims to 

issue, over the prior art, without the “continuously circumferential ridges” limitation. JA 722. During the IPR, 

the Board found that this subsequent prosecution history 

“shows that the positions of the Examiner and the patent 

applicant changed following a telephone interview,” 

regarding the allowability of the claims without the 

“continuously” limitation. We find no error in the Board’s 

finding that the examiner was convinced by these alternate claim amendments rather than the “continuously” 

circumferential ridges amendment. This finding is supported in the record, which shows that the Examiner 

entered the alternate amendments, while omitting the 

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TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS 13

“continuously” amendment. JA 721-22. Thus, the Board

did not err in finding that no disclaimer applied. 

TriVascular nonetheless argues that there must be 

“written evidence” to contradict an applicant’s concessions 

made in an amendment, and that “[w]here the record is 

devoid of any written documentation, no inferences can be 

made as to what the examiner relied upon or understood.” 

Appellant’s Br. 36. TriVascular contends that this proposition flows from three cases, Litton Systems, Inc. v. 

Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984), Genzyme 

Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094 

(Fed. Cir. 2003), and Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983). TriVascular’s 

reliance on these cases is misplaced. 

First, TriVascular argues that this court explained in 

Litton that failure to document the results of an interview 

with the examiner estopped the applicant from later 

contending that the “prosecution record is not true.” 

Appellant’s Br. 37 (citing Litton, 728 F.2d at 1439). Litton

involved a case where an applicant elected to continue 

prosecution by filing a continuation application. Litton 

then had an examiner interview, the results of which 

were not documented. After the examiner interview, 

Litton filed an amendment clarifying that the continuation application was a continuation in part (“CIP”). 

Subsequently in litigation, Litton attempted to argue 

that, in the undocumented examiner interview, the examiner accepted Litton’s explanation that the continuation 

application did not contain new matter, and therefore 

should be entitled to the continuation application’s filing

date. A review of the prosecution history in each case is 

necessarily context-specific. Unlike the present case, the 

examiner in Litton accepted Litton’s written filing, which 

characterized the application as a CIP. Furthermore, this 

court considered the prosecution history as a whole to find 

that Litton should be estopped from arguing that the 

record was “not true.” In contrast, here the examiner 

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14 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

never required the claim amendment upon which TriVascular hinges its prosecution history disclaimer argument. Accordingly, Litton does not control the facts of 

this case.

Genzyme is similarly distinguishable. In Genzyme, 

the issue was whether an applicant’s attempted lastminute amendment could omit a limitation that had been 

repeatedly emphasized throughout the prosecution history. In particular, “the deposit requirement, the specification, the applicant’s arguments to distinguish prior art, 

the examiner’s responses, and [applicant’s expert’s] 

declaration repeatedly stressed that the invention envisioned” inclusion of the claim limitation at issue. Genzyme, 346 F.3d at 1103. This court held that “[a] 

clarifying amendment at the last moment could not 

negate th[e] extensive public record” in which the applicant had repeatedly argued that a limitation was necessary to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior 

art. Id. Similarly, Genzyme supports the Board’s rejection of prosecution history disclaimer in the present case, 

in which the Board considered the proper claim construction in view of “the complete prosecution history.” JA 31. 

Finally, unlike the present case, Rohm involved a 

claim of inequitable conduct based on a patent applicant’s

intentional misrepresentations in certain affidavits. 

Rohm, 722 F.2d at 1557. The central issue was whether 

the applicant was able to show that it had “cured” its 

prior misrepresentations during an examiner interview. 

Id. at 1572-73. In Rohm, the applicant provided “lengthy 

interview summaries” of the examiner interview, but the 

summaries failed to note whether the applicant informed 

the PTO “that any misrepresentations had been made or 

precisely where they had been made.” Id. We held that 

“[s]uch express disclosure was necessary to meet [the 

applicant]’s duty, and would have alerted the PTO to the 

necessity of reconsidering rejections which had been 

withdrawn as a result of those submissions.” Id. Rohm

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TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS 15

clearly does not control or even inform the question of 

prosecution history disclaimer we consider in this case. 

For the above reasons, we find no error in the Board’s 

construction of the “circumferential ridges” claim limitation requiring the ridges to be continuous.

C. Obviousness

TriVascular next argues that the Board should have 

found the ’575 patent’s claims invalid under the instituted 

ground of obviousness over Samuels ’851 in view of Todd. 

As explained above, we find no error in the Board’s claim 

construction of “circumferential ridges.” For the reasons 

below, the Board did not err in finding that TriVascular 

failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the challenged 

claims of the ’575 patent are invalid as obvious. 

A patent is invalid “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 

such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 

obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 

having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 

matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012); see generally 

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). 

Thus, a patent may be found invalid as obvious if “there 

are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, 

[and] a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue 

the known options within his or her technical grasp.” 

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). 

Although the KSR test is flexible, the Board “must still be 

careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references 

. . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.” Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 

F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphases added) (internal quotations omitted). 

The prior art forming the ground of the Board’s decision being appealed are Samuels ’851 in view of Todd, two 

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16 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

references directed at stent technology. Samuels ’851 

taught the use of inflatable protrusions containing penetrating spikes capable of securing the stent within the 

vessel wall. Figures 3 and 4 of Samuels ’851 show the 

disclosed protrusions in both inflated and deflated form:

JA 512, Samuels ’851, figs. 3 & 4. 

Todd taught the use of non-penetrating “gripping protuberances” on the outer surface of the stent. The “gripping protuberances” disclosed in Todd are solid, however, 

in contrast to the hollow inflatable ridges taught in the 

’575 patent at issue.

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TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS 17

JA 581, Todd, fig. 7.

Thus, a key point of distinction between the ’575 patent and the prior art is that the ’575 patent teaches the 

use of inflatable, circumferential ridges that do not penetrate the vessel wall.

TriVascular argues that the Board’s conclusion on 

nonobviousness was erroneous because the Board improperly required the references to be physically “bodily incorporated” into each other, and because the Board ignored 

the state of the art and its predictability. TriVascular 

also argues that, contrary to the Board’s findings, a 

skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine 

Samuels ’851 and Todd by replacing the barbs of Samuels 

’851 with the gripping protuberances of Todd to obtain the 

desirable result of non-penetrating stent fixation. Thus, 

TriVascular argues, it would have been obvious for a 

skilled artisan to substitute the inflatable, penetrating 

barbs of Samuels ’851 with the noninflatable, nonpenetrating protuberances of Todd. Appellant’s Br. 45. 

Samuels responds that the Board did not err in concluding that TriVascular failed to carry its burden of 

proving invalidity based on the combination of Samuels 

’851 and Todd. Samuels contends that TriVascular’s 

arguments on obviousness are misguided because the 

Board did not require that TriVascular explain how Todd 

must be bodily incorporated into Samuels ’851. Samuels 

further notes that the Board’s findings that a skilled 

artisan would neither have had the motivation to combine 

nor a reasonable likelihood of success in combining Samuels ’851 with Todd further supports the Board’s conclusion 

on nonobviousness. We agree with Samuels that the 

Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

We find no error in the Board’s rejection of TriVascular’s argument that it would have been obvious to substitute the recessed barbs of Samuels ’851 with the 

protuberances of Todd, since TriVascular’s proposed

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18 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

substitution would destroy the basic objective of the 

barbs, which is to penetrate surrounding tissue. See JA 18 

(Board finding that the “recesses 12 of Samuels ’851

function to project barbs 18 into surrounding tissue when 

inflatable balloon cuff 10 is filled fully with fluid.”). 

Moreover, in order to meet the claimed limitations, not 

only the barbs but also the underlying recesses in Samuels ’851 would need to be replaced with inflatable nonpenetrating protrusions. And, it would not have been 

obvious to substitute the inflatable barbed recesses with 

the non-penetrating protuberances of Todd because the 

protuberances taught in Todd were not inflatable, as 

recited in the asserted claims. JA 15-17 (“TriVascular, 

however, has not provided a declaration, or any other 

evidence, to establish that a person of ordinary skill in the 

art would understand Todd to disclose protuberances that 

are hollow, and themselves inflatable.”). Thus, the 

Board’s findings regarding the lack of a motivation to 

combine are supported by substantial evidence.

TriVascular next contends that the Board’s conclusion 

of nonobviousness is inconsistent with the Board’s findings in its Institution Decision, since the Board found that 

TriVascular had initially demonstrated a reasonable 

expectation of success in demonstrating obviousness. 

TriVascular argues that the Board should not have 

changed its view of the patent’s validity without clearly 

explaining why it had done so. In fact, this misguided 

theme pervades TriVascular’s briefs. Contrary to TriVascular’s assertions, the Board is not bound by any 

findings made in its Institution Decision. At that point, 

the Board is considering the matter preliminarily without 

the benefit of a full record. The Board is free to change its 

view of the merits after further development of the record, 

and should do so if convinced its initial inclinations were 

wrong. To conclude otherwise would collapse these two 

very different analyses into one, which we decline to do. 

If those determinations were somehow binding with 

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TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS 19

respect to the Board’s final decision, as TriVascular urges, 

the patentee’s appeal rights as to that second determination would be close to illusory. TriVascular’s argument 

also fails to appreciate that there is a significant difference between a petitioner’s burden to establish a “reasonable likelihood of success” at institution, and actually 

proving invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence at 

trial. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (standard for institution of inter partes review), with 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (burden of proving invalidity during inter partes review). The 

Board’s findings in its Final Written Decision were thus 

not inconsistent with those in its Institution Decision; 

they were made under a qualitatively different standard. 

After considering Samuels’ expert’s testimony, the 

Board found that, while a skilled artisan might have had 

a reasonable expectation of success in replacing the entire 

recesses of Samuels ’851 with the protuberances of Todd, 

there was an insufficient motivation to substitute just the 

barbs of Samuels ’851 with the protuberances of Todd. 

The Board’s reasoning is supported by the teachings of 

Samuels ’851 and Todd regarding the underlying purposes of the inventions claimed in each reference. First, 

Samuels ’851 taught away from substituting only the 

barbs, since the barbs were the primary objective of the 

reference, allowing the stent to be anchored to the vessel. 

Second, replacing just the barbs of Samuels ’851 would 

not have satisfied the “circumferential ridge” limitation, 

since the barbs were individual, discontinuous points, 

rather than a continuous circumferential ridge. Third, 

the gripping protuberances of Todd, even if substituted, 

would not satisfy the “inflatable protrusions” limitations 

of the challenged claims. JA 19-20. TriVascular has not 

met its burden of showing that the Board’s findings are 

not supported by substantial evidence. 

Though TriVascular asserts that the Board required it

to prove how the references could be physically “bodily 

incorporated” within each other, we see no evidence 

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20 TRIVASCULAR, INC. v. SAMUELS

supporting TriVascular’s assertion. Instead, the Board 

merely requested that TriVascular explain why it would 

have been obvious to replace just the barbs of Samuels 

’851 with the circumferential ridges of Todd, in view of 

the Board’s findings regarding the stated purposes of each 

prior art reference. JA 440-41, Trial Transcript. Accordingly, we find TriVascular’s assertions to be without 

merit.

As discussed above, the Board’s findings regarding 

the lack of a sufficient motivation to combine and the lack 

of a reasonable expectation of success in combining the 

prior art are supported by substantial evidence. In view 

of these findings, we see no error in the Board’s conclusion 

that TriVascular failed to satisfy its burden of proving 

that the challenged claims are invalid. 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we find no error in the Board’s 

claim construction or its judgment that TriVascular has 

failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the asserted claims are invalid as obvious. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

AFFIRMED

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