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Parties Involved:
Antwain L. Dykes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 10, 2004 Decided May 6, 2005

No. 03-3122

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Antwain L. Dykes,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00431-01)

Billy L. Ponds argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

SuzAnne C. Nyland, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W.

McLeese, III, Steven B. Snyder, and John P. Gidez, Assistant

U.S. Attorneys.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: After a trial by jury, Antwain

Dykes was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute

cocaine base, possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking

offense, and possession of marijuana. He challenges his

convictions on two grounds. First, Dykes appeals the district

court’s denial of his motion to suppress drugs and a firearm that

the police found on his person in the course of a Terry stop.

Second, Dykes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conviction for possession of marijuana that the

police found in a subsequent search of his apartment. We reject

both arguments and affirm the convictions.

I

On the evening of July 30, 2002, three unmarked cars of the

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) pulled into a parking lot

at 2408 Elvans Road, S.E., Washington, D.C., in response to

complaints of illegal drug trafficking in the area. Several people

were standing nearby, among them Dykes and Theodore

Duncan, who were next to each other. When the police entered

the parking lot, Duncan threw an object -- later determined to be

narcotics -- to the ground and ran away. As Duncan fled, Dykes

began to walk away from the police cars.

The police then got out of their cars. Each officer wore

multiple items of identification -- either MPD raid jackets and

medallions, or badges and orange MPD emblems. Upon looking

back and seeing the officers leave their vehicles, Dykes began

to run away at a fast pace. After Dykes had run twenty to thirty

feet, Investigator Jeff Folts forced him to the ground.

Once on the ground, Dykes immediately lay on his stomach

with his hands positioned underneath him, near his waistband.

Concerned that Dykes might have a weapon, Officer Eric

Schuler repeatedly ordered him to show his hands, but he did not

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comply. Officers pulled on Dykes’ arms to remove his hands

from beneath his body. After thirty to forty seconds, the officers

succeeded in extracting Dykes’ hands, at which point they

handcuffed him. When the officers rolled Dykes over and sat

him up, they immediately saw a pistol in his waistband. They

seized the pistol, placed Dykes under arrest, and searched his

person. In his pockets were a ziplock bag of marijuana and

thirteen ziplock bags of cocaine base. Dykes admitted to the

police that he had been smoking marijuana when they arrived,

and that he had had the gun for years.

On August 8, 2002, MPD officers executed a search warrant

at Dykes’ apartment, close to the parking lot that had been the

site of his arrest. Dykes’ mother and several of his brothers

were present, but Dykes was not. The police later testified that

Dykes’ mother told them that the first bedroom was Dykes’ and

that no one else lived in it. 5/15/03 Tr. at 149. According to the

police, she further said that “he doesn’t like anyone in his room

when he’s not there, so nobody else stays in the room but him,”

and that “if anything was in there, . . . it was his.” Id. At trial,

however, Dykes’ mother testified that Dykes shared the

bedroom with two of his brothers, and that she had told this to

the police at the time of the search. Dykes’ girlfriend likewise

testified that Dykes shared the bedroom with his brothers.

On the floor of the bedroom, the police found a shoe box

containing cocaine base and a digital scale with cocaine residue.

In the bedroom closet was a tin can containing marijuana. Also

in the bedroom were a shotgun shell and small-caliber

ammunition. Inside a bedroom cabinet, the police found

personal papers bearing Dykes’ name and address, including

court papers dated July 31, 2002. 

Dykes was indicted on four counts of violating federal law.

For the drugs and pistol found on his person on July 30, 2002,

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Dykes was charged with unlawful possession with intent to

distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking

offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). For the drugs

found in the bedroom on August 8, 2002, Dykes was charged

with unlawful possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or

more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(A)(iii), and possession of marijuana, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 844(a).

Dykes filed a motion to suppress the drugs and gun found

on his person, which the district court denied. Thereafter, a jury

found Dykes guilty on all counts except the charge relating to

the cocaine base found in the bedroom. On appeal, he

challenges both the denial of his motion to suppress, and the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for

possession of the marijuana found in the bedroom.

II

Dykes contends that the police violated the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures

when they forced him to the ground and handcuffed him. The

stop was unconstitutional, Dykes argues, because at the time it

was made, the police lacked probable cause to believe that he

had committed a crime. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),

however, the Supreme Court held that “the police can stop and

briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer

has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that

criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks

probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). The Court further held that,

incident to such a stop, the police may conduct a “protective

search for weapons” if they “possess[] an articulable suspicion

that an individual is armed and dangerous.” Michigan v. Long,

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463 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1983) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). We

decide de novo whether the police had reasonable suspicion; we

review the district court’s “findings of historical fact only for

clear error” and give “due weight to inferences drawn from

those facts” and to the court’s determinations of witness

credibility. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700

(1996); see United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1164 (D.C.

Cir. 2003).

There is no question but that the officers had reasonable

suspicion to stop Dykes. In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119

(2000), the Supreme Court found reasonable suspicion to

conduct a Terry stop where a person fled without provocation

upon seeing police enter an area “known for heavy narcotics

trafficking.” Id. at 124-25. The situation here is nearly

identical. Officer Schuler’s uncontradicted testimony at the

suppression hearing established that Dykes was stopped in an

area “known for the sales of cocaine and marijuana,”

Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 16, that the police had entered the area

“due to numerous complaints of illegal narcotics sales,” id. at 6,

and that Dykes fled immediately upon seeing the officers leave

their cars. If anything, there was even greater reason for

suspicion in this case than in Wardlow, because Duncan, the

person standing next to Dykes, also fled (and threw down an

object) upon seeing the police.

Dykes protests that, even if the officers had reasonable

suspicion, the nature of the seizure -- in which he was forced to

the ground and ultimately handcuffed -- went beyond the

permissible scope of a Terry stop. The Supreme Court has

“recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop

necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of

physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). In deciding what degree of

force is permissible, courts must look to “the facts and

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1Although there was conflicting testimony as to whether

Investigator Folts tackled Dykes or merely collided with him, the

district court concluded that it was the former. Suppression Hr’g Tr.

at 57. Because that conclusion was not clearly erroneous, we proceed

upon it here.

2See also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir.

2004) (upholding Terry stop effectuated by a tackle); United States v.

Franklin, 323 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (same); United States

v. Jackson, 175 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v.

Weaver, 8 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1993) (same).

circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of

the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

Id. The test is one of reasonableness. Id.

Here, the officers used force in two ways, each of which

was reasonable. First, because Dykes was in full flight from

officers who were justified in stopping him, tackling him1 was

a reasonable method of effectuating the stop. See United States

v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 283, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that

it was reasonable for police to force to the floor a suspect who

began running upon seeing them).2 Second, once they had

brought him to the ground, it was also reasonable for the officers

to remove Dykes’ hands from underneath his body and to place

him in handcuffs. Dykes had kept his hands near his waistband,

resisting both the officers’ commands and their physical efforts

to move his hands into plain view. Under these circumstances,

it was reasonable for the officers to fear that Dykes had a

weapon in his waistband, and to take the necessary steps to

ensure that he could not use it. As the Supreme Court said in

Terry:

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3See also Laing, 889 F.2d at 283, 286 (holding that, during a

Terry stop, it was reasonable for the police to force a suspect’s hand

from his pants); United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (holding that a “Terry stop does not turn into a full arrest merely

because the officers use handcuffs and force the suspect to lie down

to prevent flight, so long as the police conduct is reasonable”).

When an officer is justified in believing that the

individual whose suspicious behavior he is

investigating at close range is armed and presently

dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to

be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power

to take necessary measures to determine whether the

person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize

the threat of physical harm.

392 U.S. at 24. And as this court said in Laing, the “amount of

force used to carry out the stop and search must be reasonable,

but may include using handcuffs or forcing the detainee to lie

down to prevent flight.” 889 F.2d at 285.3

III

Dykes’ remaining challenge is to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction for possession of the

marijuana found in the search of the bedroom. Our review here

is limited: We must accept the jury’s guilty verdict if we

conclude that “any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In

making this determination, “the prosecution’s evidence is to be

viewed in the light most favorable to the government, drawing

no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, and

giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility,

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weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact.”

United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(internal citation and quotation omitted).

As we explained in United States v. Morris, a case

remarkably similar to this one, possession “can be either actual

or constructive.” 977 F.2d 617, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see

United States v. Hernandez, 780 F.2d 113, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Constructive possession “requires evidence supporting the

conclusion that the defendant had the ability to exercise

knowing ‘dominion and control’ over the items in question.”

Morris, 977 F.2d at 619 (quoting Hernandez, 780 F.2d at 116).

And a “jury is entitled to infer that a person exercises

constructive possession over items found in his home.” Id. at

620; see United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1179 (D.C.

Cir. 1991).

There was ample evidence that Dykes lived in the apartment

that the police searched, and specifically in the bedroom where

they found the marijuana. As to the apartment, Dykes’ name

was on the lease. As to the bedroom, personal papers bearing

his name and address, including court papers dated July 31,

2002, were found inside a bedroom cabinet. See Morris, 977

F.2d at 619-20 (noting that the presence of a birthday card with

the defendant’s name, found inside a dresser drawer, was

evidence that the defendant lived in the apartment). Further, the

police testified that, when they asked which bedroom was

Dykes’, his mother directed them to the bedroom in question.

Hence, because there was sufficient evidence to infer that the

bedroom was his, “the jury could infer that he constructively

possessed the drugs.” Id. at 620.

Dykes counters that there was evidence that he shared the

bedroom with his brothers. We have previously recognized that

“[t]he inference that a person who occupies an apartment has

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4On appeal, Dykes contends that his mother’s testimony was

supported by Investigator Anthony Commodore’s statement that there

was clothing of different sizes in the bedroom closet. But Investigator

Commodore did not so testify. See 5/14/03 Tr. at 140-41. 

5See United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(holding, in a constructive possession case, that “where a defendant is

dominion and control over its contents applies even when that

person shares the premises with others,” although it is plainly

not as strong an inference in that circumstance. Id. at 620; see

United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1993);

Jenkins, 928 F.2d at 1179. In any event, there was sufficient

evidence in this case for a reasonable juror to conclude that

Dykes did not share the bedroom. Officer Anthony Greene

testified that Dykes’ mother told him that Dykes alone occupied

the bedroom, and that all the items in the bedroom were his.

The two officers who searched the bedroom testified that the

room -- which contained only a single bed -- appeared to have

only one occupant. In addition, the only personal papers found

in the room had Dykes’ name on them. And while Dykes’

mother and girlfriend testified that Dykes shared the bedroom

with his brothers,4the jurors may not have believed them,

particularly in light of Officer Greene’s testimony that the

mother had made a contrary statement to him. See Morris, 977

F.2d at 620 (noting that jurors were permitted to credit the

testimony of officers who testified that the defendant had said he

lived in the apartment at issue, despite the defendant’s trial

testimony to the contrary). Thus, there was sufficient “evidence

from which the jury could infer that [Dykes] lived alone in the

[bedroom] and exercised constructive possession over its

contents.” Id. at 620. Moreover, Dykes had been arrested

nearby -- just the week before -- in possession of the same drug,

which was further evidence that he possessed the marijuana in

the bedroom.5

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charged with unlawful possession of something, evidence that he

possessed the same or similar things at other times is often quite

relevant to his knowledge and intent with regard to the crime charged”

(internal quotation mark omitted)); Unites States v. Toms, 136 F.3d

176, 183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that a driver’s conviction for

constructive possession of a gun found in the car was supported by

evidence of prior gun possession).

Finally, Dykes questions how the jury could have acquitted

him on the charge of possessing the cocaine base found in the

bedroom, but convicted him of possessing the marijuana found

in the same room. We do not know what went through the

jurors’ minds. Perhaps they were persuaded by defense

counsel’s argument that the cocaine base found in the bedroom

could not have been Dykes’ because it was of a different purity

than that of the drugs found on his person at the time of his

arrest. Or perhaps the verdicts were simply inconsistent. But

even if the latter were so, a “criminal defendant convicted by a

jury on one count [cannot] attack that conviction because it was

inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal on another

count.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58 (1984);see id.

at 66; Laing, 889 F.2d at 288. As Oliver Wendell Holmes,

quoting Learned Hand, said for the Court in Dunn v. United

States:

The most that can be said in such [a] case[] is that the

verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the

conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions,

but that does not show that they were not convinced of

the defendant’s guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no

more than their assumption of a power which they had

no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed

through lenity.

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284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (quoting Steckler v. United States, 7

F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925)); see Powell, 469 U.S. at 64-65

(quoting Dunn with approval).

The proscription against reviewing the inconsistency of

verdicts does not leave the defendant bereft of “protection

against jury irrationality or error.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 67.

Rather, that protection is afforded “by the independent review

of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and

appellate courts.” Id. We have undertaken such a review, and

for the reasons stated in this Part, we conclude that the evidence

was sufficient to support Dykes’ conviction for possession of the

marijuana found in the bedroom.

IV

The officers’ stop of Dykes and subsequent seizure of

narcotics and a firearm from his person were lawful under the

Fourth Amendment. In addition, the evidence that he possessed

the marijuana found in the bedroom was sufficient to support his

conviction for that crime. Accordingly, the defendant’s

convictions are

Affirmed.

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