Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02364/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02364-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bryan O. Crane
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BRYAN O. CRANE,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2364

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00435-SGB, Judge Susan G. 

Braden.

______________________ 

Decided: November 7, 2016 

______________________ 

BRYAN O. CRANE, Saint James City, FL, pro se.

COURTNEY D. ENLOW, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellant. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., 

FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

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2 CRANE v. US

PER CURIAM. 

Bryan O. Crane filed suit against the federal government seeking unpaid vacation and sick leave pay, loss of 

investment income from his unpaid pay, and travel expenses under the Federal Tort Claims Act and Maryland 

state law. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Mr. 

Crane’s claims for lack of jurisdiction. Because the Court 

of Federal Claims cannot hear tort and state law claims, 

and because Mr. Crane’s claims are time-barred, we 

affirm. 

I 

Mr. Crane worked for the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, Maryland. On February 12, 2000, Mr. Crane was placed on inactive status 

after a work-related accident. He medically retired from

federal service on July 3, 2006. Between February 12, 

2000 and July 3, 2006, Mr. Crane received workers’ 

compensation and Social Security Disability benefits 

except for one week in February 2003, when he returned

to work. 

When Mr. Crane returned to work on February 3, 

2003, the Defense Financial and Accounting Services 

(DFAS), NAVAIR’s payroll provider, reactivated his 

normal pay. On February 7, 2003, Mr. Crane informed 

NAVAIR that he could not continue working because he 

had not received the agreed upon ergonomic conditions. 

Although Mr. Crane stopped working, DFAS erroneously 

failed to stop paying him his normal salary until April 13, 

2005. DFAS paid Mr. Crane initially through direct 

deposits and later with checks mailed to his home.

The parties agree that, to repay the erroneous wages,

Mr. Crane sent DFAS two personal checks, totaling 

$16,837.06, on February 13, 2004 and January 3, 2006. 

Mr. Crane also returned five government checks totaling 

$7,962.38. Further, DFAS deducted $10,280.00 from 

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CRANE v. US 3

offset amounts allowable by law, such as Mr. Crane’s 

Thrift Savings Plan and retirement funds. 

The parties disagree over whether Mr. Crane returned additional money, and what amount, if any, remained to be paid by him. According to the government,

after all the above payments, Mr. Crane still had an 

outstanding debt of approximately $8,000. When 

Mr. Crane retired from federal service on July 3, 2006, he

was due a lump-sum payment of $9,755.00 for accrued 

annual leave. Since the government’s calculations 

showed that Mr. Crane still owed roughly $8,000, DFAS

did not pay Mr. Crane the lump-sum payment and instead deducted $3,960.53 for Federal and State taxes, 

Social Security, and Medicare, and applied the remaining 

$5,794.47 toward Mr. Crane’s outstanding debt.

Mr. Crane, meanwhile, alleges that he had fully repaid all erroneous payments made by DFAS and that

DFAS improperly took his lump-sum annual leave payment. On March 19, 2008, Mr. Crane appealed DFAS’s 

actions to the Office of Personnel Management. That 

appeal was denied because Mr. Crane had not filed a 

claim with the Department of the Navy before filing his 

OPM claim. 

At the same, Mr. Crane asked United States Senator 

Bill Nelson to intervene on his behalf. On April 24, 2008, 

DFAS responded to Senator Nelson with an audit of 

Mr. Crane’s pay records that showed the government had 

over-collected Mr. Crane’s debt by $1,386.51. The government subsequently returned that amount to him. 

Mr. Crane, however, still alleging that DFAS owed 

him money, filed a claim with the Navy on May 12, 2008, 

which it denied on September 15, 2009. The Navy advised Mr. Crane that its response to Senator Nelson’s 

inquiry on his behalf represented the final agency decision on this matter. 

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4 CRANE v. US

Mr. Crane filed his second claim with OPM on November 17, 2009, which was denied on November 15, 

2012, after OPM found that Mr. Crane had not established that DFAS incorrectly calculated his salary overpayment. 

On April 29, 2015, Mr. Crane filed suit in the Court of 

Federal Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and 

the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, alleging the government owed him compensation for unpaid 

vacation and sick pay, lost investment income from unpaid vacation pay, lost investment income from unpaid 

sick pay, unreimbursed travel expenses, lost investment 

income from unreimbursed travel expenses, and physical 

and mental damages. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Mr. Crane’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 

Mr. Crane appeals only the dismissal of his claims for 

unpaid vacation pay and lost investment income from 

unpaid vacation pay. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

II

We review de novo a dismissal by the Court of Federal 

Claims for lack of jurisdiction. Coast Prof’l, Inc. v. United 

States, 828 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

“The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.” Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 

(Fed. Cir. 1997). The Tucker Act, with only limited exceptions not applicable here, confers jurisdiction on the Court 

of Federal Claims over “any claim against the United 

States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of 

Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or 

upon any express or implied contract with the United 

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases 

not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker 

Act does not create a cause of action, however, and “jurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to 

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CRANE v. US 5

identify a substantive right for money damages against 

the United States separate from the Tucker Act itself.” 

Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 

2004). 

Mr. Crane seeks his unpaid vacation pay and loss of 

investment income under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 

28 U.S.C. § 2672 et seq., and the Maryland Wage Payment 

and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-

507.2(a). We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that 

it lacks jurisdiction over claims brought under these laws. 

Section 1491(a) expressly precludes the Court of Federal 

Claims from hearing cases “sounding in tort.” See also 

Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993) 

(“[T]ort cases are outside the jurisdiction of the Court of 

Federal Claims . . . .”). Further, under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act, jurisdiction over tort claims lies exclusively in 

the United States district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); 

see also Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The Court of Federal Claims is not a 

district court of the United States . . . .”). Finally, “[c]laims 

founded on state law are . . . outside the scope of the 

limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.” 

Souders v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 

1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

Even though the Court of Federal Claims does not 

have jurisdiction over Mr. Crane’s claims as pled, because 

he is proceeding pro se, we construe his complaint liberally to see if he has articulated another basis for jurisdiction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 

curiam) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted).

Here, another basis for jurisdiction over Mr. Crane’s

claims does not exist because his claims are time-barred. 

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6 CRANE v. US

“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal 

Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition 

thereon is filed within six years after such claim first 

accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. “This six-year limitations 

period is jurisdictional and may not be waived or tolled.” 

FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 

(Fed. Cir. 2012). A claim against the government generally accrues “when all the events which fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff 

was or should have been aware of their existence.” San 

Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1350 

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Hopland Band of Pomo Indians 

v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 

“The question whether the pertinent events have occurred 

is determined under an objective standard; a plaintiff 

does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the

relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue.” 

Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 

1995). 

Mr. Crane alleges that when he separated from federal service on July 3, 2006, DFAS failed to pay him a lumpsum payment covering his annual leave. Thus, any cause 

of action Mr. Crane might have had accrued, at the latest, 

by July 3, 2006. Mr. Crane did not file his complaint at 

the Court of Federal Claims until April 29, 2015, almost 

nine years after any claim accrued, and almost three 

years after the six-year limitations period had run. 

Therefore, his claims are time-barred.

Because the Court of Federal Claims does not have 

jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act and Maryland Wage Payment and Collection 

Law, and because Mr. Crane’s claims are time-barred, the 

Court of Federal Claims did not err in dismissing Mr. 

Crane’s complaint.

AFFIRMED

No costs. 

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