Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55525/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55525-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alejandro Barrios
Appellant
Command Security Corporation
Appellee
Marlene Herrera
Appellant
Edward Lopez
Appellant
Service Employees International Union, United Healthcare Workers-West
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARLENE HERRERA; EDWARD 

LOPEZ; SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED 

HEALTHCARE WORKERS-WEST, 

United Service Workers West; 

ALEJANDRO BARRIOS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COMMAND SECURITY CORPORATION, 

DBA Aviation Safeguards, a New 

York Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-55525

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-10968-

SVW-RZ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 11, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed September 14, 2016

Before: Harry Pregerson, Richard A. Paez,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

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2 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

SUMMARY*

Labor Law

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment 

in favor of an employer in an action brought under the 

Railway Labor Act by a union representing employees at 

Los Angeles International Airport.

The employer sought to remove the union as its 

employees’ designated representative.

The panel held that equitable tolling principles applied to 

the union’s unlawful interference and coercion claim under 

45 U.S.C. § 152, Third and Fourth. The panel held that this 

claim was not time-barred because the employer had notice 

of the union’s claims, and the union acted reasonably when 

it attempted to use the extensive remedies afforded by the 

Act. The panel also held that the employer violated § 152, 

Third and Fourth, when it solicited union removal petition 

signatures, bypassed the union to solicit employees directly, 

and refused to recognize and negotiate with the union. The 

panel remanded and directed the district court to grant 

summary judgment in favor of the union on this claim.

The panel held that the district court erred in concluding 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the union’s 

status quo claim under §§ 152, Seventh; 155; and 156. The 

union alleged that the employer unilaterally altered the 

parties’ collective bargaining agreement. The panel held 

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY 3

that this claim was a major dispute, relating to employer 

interference and status quo violations, rather than a 

representation dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of 

the National Mediation Board. The panel remanded the 

status quo claim for the district court to determine whether it 

was timely, and, if so, to grant summary judgment in favor 

of the union.

The panel also directed the district court to grant summary 

judgment in favor of the union on a failure to mediate claim 

under § 152, First.

COUNSEL

David P. Dean (argued) and Darin M. Dalmat, James & 

Hoffman P.C., Washington, D.C.; Antonio Ruiz, Weinberg 

Roger & Rosenfeld PC, Alameda, California; for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Mark S. Spring (argued), Carothers Disante & 

Freudenberger LLP, Sacramento, California; Alfredo Ortega 

and Steven M. Schneider, Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp 

LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

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4 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

OPINION

PREGERSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from a dispute between a union and an 

employer who wished to remove the union as its employees’ 

designated representative. The employer is Command 

Security Corporation d/b/a Aviation Safeguards (“Aviation 

Safeguards”). The union is the United Service Workers West 

of the Service Employees International Union (“the Union”). 

The Union sued Aviation Safeguards for violations of the 

Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–165. 

Aviation Safeguards moved for summary judgment, and the 

Union filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The 

District Court granted Aviation Safeguards’s motion for 

summary judgment and denied the Union’s cross-motion for

summary judgment.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Aviation 

Safeguards.

We hold that equitable tolling principles apply to the 

Union’s unlawful interference and coercion claim under the 

RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third and Fourth. We remand and 

direct the District Court to grant summary judgment in favor 

of the Union on its claim for unlawful interference and 

coercion under the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third and Fourth.

We also hold that the District Court erred in finding that 

it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Union’s status 

quo claim under the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, Seventh; 155; 

and 156. We remand this claim for the limited purpose of 

determining whether this claim is timely and, if the claim is 

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HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY 5

timely, we direct the District Court to grant summary 

judgment in favor of the Union on its status quo claim under 

RLA §§ 152, Seventh; 155; and 156.

We remand and direct the District Court to grant 

summary judgment in favor of the Union on its failure to 

mediate claim under the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Aviation Safeguards employs workers at Los Angeles 

International Airport (“LAX”). In 2007, a majority of 

Aviation Safeguards’s LAX employees signed authorization 

cards, designating the Union as their representative. The 

Union sought voluntary recognition from Aviation 

Safeguards by presenting the signed authorization cards to 

Aviation Safeguards. Aviation Safeguards agreed to 

recognize the Union as the employees’ designated 

representative. In November 2008, Aviation Safeguards and 

the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement set 

to expire in September 2010. In December 2009, before the 

expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties 

negotiated a second agreement, set to expire in November 

2012.

As part of the collective bargaining agreement, Aviation 

Safeguards made monthly contributions to a health care trust 

fund. These payments rose annually: in 2009, Aviation 

Safeguards paid $585 per month for each employee; in 2010, 

$620; and in 2011, $674. When the 2011 increases took 

place, Aviation Safeguards’s LAX General Manager Joe 

Conlon wrote a letter to the Union President, saying that they 

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6 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

had reached a “crossroad.”1 Conlon refused the Union 

President’s request to discuss Aviation Safeguards’s 

concerns. Instead, Aviation Safeguards conducted a survey 

to assess the likelihood that its employees would revoke the 

Union’s status as representative. In an August 15, 2011, 

email to its managers, Aviation Safeguards Human 

Resources Manager Jon Natividad wrote, “We are trying to 

get an initial estimate of the numbers we have and the 

individuals we will need to actively convince to come over 

to our side and sign to de-certify.”2

At the start of September 2011, Aviation Safeguards 

began holding anti-union meetings with employees. 

Aviation Safeguards drafted a Union Removal Petition, 

which it encouraged employees to sign. The Union claims 

that shortly thereafter, a group of employees delivered to the 

LAX main office a Pro-Union Petition signed by a majority 

of the employees. Allegedly, this Pro-Union Petition 

included 39 signatures of employees who had previously 

signed the Union Removal Petition.3

 1 In September 2011, Aviation Safeguards executives calculated that 

they could save around $800,000 in 2012 if they got rid of the Union.

2 At the time of Aviation Safeguards’s removal efforts, there were 

452 employees at LAX who were covered by the collective bargaining 

agreement. To decertify or remove the Union, Aviation Safeguards 

required signatures from a majority of the employees, at least 227.

3 As the Union points out, these 39 employees who signed the Union 

Removal Petition and then later signed the Pro-Union Petition should be 

considered pro-union. By signing the Pro-Union Petition, they 

effectively revoked their previous signatures in support of the Union 

Removal Petition.

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HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY 7

By October 12, 2011, Aviation Safeguards had failed to 

obtain a majority of employees’ signatures on the Union 

Removal Petition. On October 13, 2011, Aviation 

Safeguards hired Cruz & Associates, a self-proclaimed 

union avoidance firm, to assist its union removal efforts.

With the Cruz & Associates team, Aviation Safeguards held 

ostensibly mandatory meetings with its employees, during 

working hours, to foment anti-union sentiment and obtain 

Union Removal Petition signatures. Aviation Safeguards hid 

the true purpose of these meetings from employees.4 At 

these meetings, Cruz & Associates team members and 

Aviation Safeguards representatives told employees that 

their wages would increase if they got rid of the Union.

On December 2, 2011, Aviation Safeguards was 23 

employee signatures short of majority (227) support, so 

Aviation Safeguards hired new employees who were 

immediately solicited for Union Removal Petition 

signatures. By the end of December, Aviation Safeguards 

claimed that it obtained 246 Union Removal Petition 

signatures, which allegedly included the 39 signatures of 

employees who later signed the Pro-Union Petition.5

On December 30, 2011, Aviation Safeguards announced 

that it would no longer recognize the Union and planned to 

 4 Kathleen McManus, Aviation Safeguards Office Manager, sent an 

email to Aviation Safeguards’s management stating in detail the 

schedule and strategy for its upcoming anti-union meetings. The email 

cautions Aviation Safeguards’s management: “[P]lease do not tell [the 

employees] the reason for the meeting. Just simply say it is a 

management meeting.”

5 The Union also notes that the Union Removal Petition included 

signatures from several managers, whom the Union would not represent.

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8 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

change its employees’ health benefits and wages starting 

February 1, 2012.

The Union applied to the National Mediation Board (“the 

Mediation Board”) for mediation services on January 3, 

2012. The Mediation Board conducted a pre-docketing 

investigation that lasted nearly six months to determine 

whether to mediate the dispute.

Aviation Safeguards asserted that it began enrolling 

employees in non-union health insurance at the end of 

January 2012, but that it had not completed the process by 

the start of February 2012. In the meantime, in January 2012, 

the Union claimed that a majority of employees (258) had 

signed the Pro-Union Petition.

On February 6, 2012, former L.A. City Councilmember 

Bill Rosendahl publicly counted the number of Aviation 

Safeguards employee signatures and confirmed that a 

majority of the employees supported the Union.6 By May 31, 

2012, the Union also stated that it obtained 240 signed 

authorization cards from Aviation Safeguards employees 

reaffirming and reauthorizing the Union as their designated 

representative. Notably, 139 of the employees that allegedly 

signed either the Pro-Union Petition or an authorization card 

had previously signed the Union Removal Petition and 

thereby revoked their prior anti-union support.

Aviation Safeguards did not stop remitting Union dues 

until February 2012. It is unclear, however, when Aviation 

Safeguards stopped collecting Union dues. Aviation 

 6 Aviation Safeguards disputes the validity of the public count 

because it claims that any Pro-Union Petition signatures were never 

validated.

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HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY 9

Safeguards argues that it stopped collecting Union dues in 

December 2011, and that Union dues collected in December 

were merely remitted the following month, in January 2012. 

But, if Union dues were remitted into February, as the Union 

states, then Union dues were likely still being collected in 

January.

The Mediation Board finished its nearly six-month predocketing investigation and docketed the case on June 26, 

2012. Two days later, Aviation Safeguards informed the 

Mediation Board that it would not participate in mediation.

The Union filed suit against Aviation Safeguards in 

Federal District Court on July 31, 2012. The Union claimed 

coercion and interference with Union representation under 

the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third and Fourth; failure to 

mediate under the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First; and status 

quo violations under the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 156.

Aviation Safeguards moved for summary judgment, 

arguing that the Union’s claims were barred by the RLA’s 

statute of limitations and that the allegations constituted a 

representation dispute under the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, 

Ninth, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mediation 

Board. The Union filed a cross-motion for summary 

judgment.

The District Court granted Aviation Safeguards’s motion 

for summary judgment and denied the Union’s cross-motion 

for summary judgment. The Union appeals the grant of 

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10 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

summary judgment and the denial of its cross-motion for 

summary judgment.7

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 

658 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2011). Additionally, when the 

facts are not in dispute, statute of limitations accrual 

decisions are reviewed de novo. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 

793 F.2d 1502, 1508 (9th Cir. 1986). Where, as here, the 

parties have both filed summary judgment motions, this 

court “consider[s] each party’s evidence to evaluate whether 

summary judgment was appropriate.” Johnson, 658 F.3d at 

960.

Where the record has been sufficiently developed 

through the parties’ cross-motions and briefs on appeal, we 

may direct the District Court to grant an appellant’s crossmotion for summary judgment. Keystone Land & Dev. Co. 

 7 There is a related case between the parties to this appeal, California 

Service Employees Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Command Security 

Corp., 12-cv-10967 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2014), which was recently 

decided in the District Court by the same judge and has been appealed to 

this court. That case was brought by the health care trust fund that 

received payments from Aviation Safeguards as part of the Union’s 

collective bargaining agreement. Id. The District Court’s ruling in the 

Welfare Trust Fund case relied on its decision presently before this court. 

Id. at 5–7. In the case now before us, the District Court found that 

Aviation Safeguards had no obligation to deal with an uncertified union, 

and that it lawfully withdrew recognition. Consequently, Aviation 

Safeguards was not obligated to continue making healthcare benefit 

payments to the Welfare Trust. Id. Because we reverse the District Court 

with respect to its ruling that Aviation Safeguards lawfully withdrew the 

Union’s recognition, our decision may have some bearing on the appeal 

of the Welfare Trust Fund case.

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HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY 11

v. Xerox Corp., 353 F.3d 1070, 1076–77, 1076 n.7 (9th Cir. 

2003).

DISCUSSION

I. The District Court Erred in Granting Aviation 

Safeguards Summary Judgment on the Union’s 

§ 152, Third and Fourth Claim for Unlawful 

Interference and Coercion

The Union alleges that Aviation Safeguards solicited and 

coerced Union Removal Petition signatures, bypassed the 

Union to solicit employees directly, and refused to recognize 

and negotiate with the Union, and thus violated the RLA’s 

unlawful interference and coercion provisions. § 152, Third 

and Fourth. Aviation Safeguards argues, and the District

Court held, that the Union’s § 152, Third and Fourth claim 

is time-barred under the RLA’s six-month limitation period. 

We disagree. We hold that the Union’s § 152, Third and 

Fourth claim is not time-barred. Further, we hold that

Aviation Safeguards violated § 152, Third and Fourth. 

Accordingly, we remand the Union’s § 152, Third and 

Fourth claim and direct the District Court to grant summary 

judgment in favor of the Union on this claim.

A. The Union’s § 152, Third and Fourth Claim for 

Unlawful Interference and Coercion Is Not TimeBarred

Claims under the RLA must be brought within six 

months after their accrual date. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 

Aerospace Workers v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 790 F.2d 727, 

735 (9th Cir. 1986) (articulating a six-month statute of 

limitations period for RLA claims). However, “[i]t is 

hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily 

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12 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

subject to equitable tolling, unless tolling would be 

inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute.” Young v. 

United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Equitable tolling may apply where it effectuates 

Congress’s intent in enacting the RLA. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. 

R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965); Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. 

Greyhound Corp., 616 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1980). “[T]o 

determine congressional intent, we must examine the 

purposes and policies underlying the limitation provision, 

the Act itself, and the remedial scheme developed for the 

enforcement of the rights given by the Act.” Burnett, 

380 U.S. at 427.

Statutes of limitations are meant to ensure fairness to 

defendants by giving them timely notice of the claims 

against them. Mt. Hood, 616 F.2d at 400. However, this 

policy “is frequently outweighed . . . where the interests of 

justice require vindication of the plaintiff’s rights.” Burnett, 

380 U.S. at 428. Equitable tolling may pause the running of 

the statute of limitations where a plaintiff has diligently 

pursued her claim but circumstances out of the plaintiff’s 

control prevented her from timely filing. Lozano v. Montoya 

Alvarez, –– U.S. ––, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1231–32 (2014); Wong 

v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc),

aff’d and remanded on other grounds sub nom. United States 

v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015).8

 8 In Aloha Airlines, Inc., we commented that “the application of the 

tolling doctrine to future actions of this type will be extremely limited.” 

790 F.2d at 738 n.4. The facts of this case fairly place it among the class 

of cases for which such tolling is appropriate.

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HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY 13

Here, Aviation Safeguards likely had notice of the 

Union’s disputes as early as September 2011, when the 

Union submitted a Pro-Union Petition notifying Aviation 

Safeguards that the Union did not agree with its attempts to 

remove the Union.9 Additionally, the Union diligently 

pursued its claims by resorting to RLA mediation 

procedures. After Aviation Safeguards announced on 

December 30, 2011, that it would no longer recognize the 

Union, the Union promptly applied to the Mediation Board 

for mediation services on January 3, 2012, the next business 

day.

Further, the Union’s delay in filing its federal claims 

reasonably resulted from its reliance on the remedies set 

forth in the RLA. The Mediation Board’s pre-docketing 

investigation lasted nearly six months. At no point during 

that time did Aviation Safeguards indicate a refusal to 

mediate. Aviation Safeguards waited until after the 

Mediation Board finished its nearly six-month pre-docketing 

investigation before informing the Union that it would not 

participate in mediation.10 The Union should not be 

punished for the Mediation Board’s or Aviation 

Safeguards’s delays.

 9 Aviation Safeguards may have had notice even earlier in 2011, 

when the Union attempted to discuss Aviation Safeguards’s concerns, 

but Aviation Safeguards refused.

10 Aviation Safeguards notified the Union of its refusal to mediate 

on Thursday, June 28, 2012. Assuming Aviation Safeguards’s asserted 

accrual date of December 30, 2011, Aviation Safeguards’s notice left the 

Union with just one remaining business day (a Friday) to file within the 

six-month limitations window.

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14 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

Congress’s purpose in enacting the RLA was “to 

encourage collective bargaining . . . to prevent, if possible, 

wasteful strikes and interruptions of interstate commerce.” 

Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp. 

Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148 (1969). To accomplish this, 

Congress created an “elaborate” remedial scheme under the 

RLA that requires the parties to make “every reasonable 

effort” to settle disputes. 45 U.S.C. § 152, First; Detroit & 

Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co., 396 U.S. at 148–49.11

“[E]xhaustion of the [RLA’s] remedies [is] an almost 

interminable process,” with procedures that are “purposely 

long and drawn out” in the hopes that parties will eventually 

reach an agreement. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co., 

396 U.S. at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This court has recognized that equitable tolling may 

effectuate the policies underlying the RLA. See Albano v. 

Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 538 (9th Cir. 2011) 

 11 In Conley v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 

Local 639, 810 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1987), we held that “[e]quitable 

tolling is most appropriate when the plaintiff is required to avail himself 

of an alternate course of action as a precondition to filing suit.” Thus, 

where an “NLRB action was merely optional,” allowing tolling “would 

frustrate the national policy of prompt resolution of labor disputes.” Id. 

at 916. While it is debatable whether the Union was required to bring its 

dispute before the Mediation Board, the purpose of the RLA is to avoid 

“any interruption to commerce.” Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ 

Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 310 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

RLA’s purpose stands in contrast to the NLRB’s purpose of securing a 

“prompt resolution of labor disputes.” Conley, 810 F.2d at 916. Because

mediation, rather than litigation, prevents “interruption to commerce,” 

the RLA’s purpose arguably supports tolling while parties utilize the 

Mediation Board to seek resolution of their claims. Further, filing a claim 

with the NLRB is itself an adversarial action, whereas mediation is a tool 

generally used to prevent litigation. Thus, requiring the Union to file suit 

while mediation is pending is nonsensical.

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HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY 15

(citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 

Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944)). Tolling the statute of limitations 

promotes the use of the RLA’s “virtually endless” mediation 

mechanisms, thereby preventing interruptions in commerce. 

See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 

299, 311 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Aviation Safeguards had notice of the Union’s claims, 

and the Union acted reasonably when it attempted to use the 

extensive remedies afforded by the RLA. Under these 

circumstances, the Union’s claim should not be time-barred. 

We therefore conclude that the District Court erred in failing 

to toll the statute of limitations for the Union’s unlawful 

interference and coercion claim.

B. Aviation Safeguards Violated § 152, Third and 

Fourth for Unlawful Interference and Coercion

Section 152, Third of the RLA prevents an employer 

from interfering with, influencing, or coercing employees’ 

designation of a representative. § 152, Third. Along the same 

lines, § 152, Fourth prevents an employer from interfering 

with a union’s operations and specifically forbids influence 

or coercion as part of “an effort to induce [employees] to join 

or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor 

organization.” § 152, Fourth; see also Tex. & New Orleans 

R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568 

(1930) (describing unlawful influence over employees’ selforganization and designation of representatives).

The Union alleges that Aviation Safeguards violated 

these two provisions when it solicited Union Removal 

Petition signatures, bypassed the Union to solicit employees 

directly, and refused to recognize and negotiate with the 

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16 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

Union.12 Concluding that the Union’s claims were timebarred, the District Court did not address the merits of this 

claim. Likewise, Aviation Safeguards asserts only that the 

Union’s interference and coercion claims are time-barred.

Federal courts have prudently drawn analogies to the 

National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–

169, in many RLA cases. See, e.g., Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. 

Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377, 383 (1969). 

This court has looked to the NLRA when analyzing an 

unlawful coercion claim under the RLA. See Barthelemy v. 

Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 

1990) (stating that NLRA § 158(a)(2) provides an “apt 

analog[y]” to RLA § 152, Fourth, and that, like the RLA, the 

relevant section of the NLRA “is intended to secure for 

employees the right of free choice”).13

Although this court has not analogized explicitly to 

NLRA § 158(a)(1) in analyzing interference or coercion 

under RLA § 152, Third and Fourth, we find that an apt 

analogy exists. Section 158(a)(1) of the NLRA states that it 

is unlawful for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or 

coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 

section 157 of this title”—namely, the right to “selforganization” and to “bargain collectively through 

 12 The Union’s direct dealing claim alleges the same behavior as its 

solicitation claim, and to the extent that such dealing was coercive, we 

address it in our discussion of Aviation Safeguards’s solicitation of the 

Union Removal Petition. In addition, Aviation Safeguards’s refusal to 

recognize the Union was a result of the unlawful solicitation of Union 

Removal Petition signatures.

13 NLRA § 158(a)(2) states that it is an unfair employer practice “to 

dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor 

organization or contribute financial or other support to it.”

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HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY 17

representatives of their own choosing.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 

158(a)(1). As articulated in Barthelemy, the NLRA guides 

this court’s protection of employees’ rights of free choice in 

designating their representatives. 897 F.2d at 1016.

Analogizing to NLRA § 158(a)(1), we conclude that 

Aviation Safeguards unlawfully interfered with the Union’s 

activities and coerced employees to remove the Union. As 

this court has stated, “[a]lthough it is not an unfair labor 

practice for an employer to inform employees that they have 

a right to revoke their union support, it is an unfair labor 

practice to actively solicit revocations in an otherwise 

coercive atmosphere. It is also an unfair labor practice for an 

employer to directly aid employees in revoking their union 

authorization.” L’Eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 

1346 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal citation omitted) (discussing 

NLRA interference under § 158(a)(1)); accord Virgin Atl. 

Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1252 

(2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Union asserts that Virgin discharged 

employees who were engaged in a strike designed to enforce 

the [Mediation Board] certification and solicited employees 

to sign a prepared statement repudiating the Union. These 

actions, if proven, constitute interference by the carrier with 

the employees’ selection of a representative.”).

Aviation Safeguards did not just “directly aid employees 

in revoking their union authorization,” it initiated and 

orchestrated the entire removal effort. See L’Eggs, 619 F.2d 

at 1346. Aviation Safeguards actively solicited employees’ 

signatures for a Union Removal Petition that it drafted. It 

held employee meetings with representatives from Cruz & 

Associates, the union avoidance firm, in which its 

representatives told employees that wages would increase if 

they got rid of the Union. Moreover, it held these anti-union 

meetings during normal working hours, hid the true purpose 

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18 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

of the meetings, and made attendance at the meetings appear 

mandatory. When it was still short of Union Removal 

Petition signatures in December 2011, Aviation Safeguards 

actively targeted its new hires for signatures as soon as their 

employment became official.

Aviation Safeguards therefore unlawfully coerced and 

interfered with its employees’ rights to designate their 

representative, violating § 152, Third and Fourth. We 

remand this claim, directing the District Court to grant 

summary judgment in favor of the Union on this claim, and 

to conduct further proceedings to determine the issue of 

damages and other relief.

II. The District Court Had Jurisdiction Over the 

Union’s Major Dispute Claim for Status Quo 

Violations

The Union alleges that Aviation Safeguards unilaterally 

altered the collective bargaining agreement, and thus 

violated the RLA’s status quo provisions. Aviation 

Safeguards argues, and the District Court held, that the court 

lacked jurisdiction over this claim because it constitutes a 

representation dispute. We agree with the Union. We hold 

that the dispute is a major dispute, relating to employer 

interference and status quo violations. Because the District 

Court had jurisdiction over this major dispute, we remand 

the claim.

A. The District Court Erred in Finding That the 

Union’s Claim Constitutes a Representation 

Dispute

The District Court held that the Union’s claim constitutes 

a representation dispute under § 152, Ninth. Representation 

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disputes are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 

Mediation Board. The District Court therefore dismissed the 

claim for lack of jurisdiction.

We have described major, minor, and representation 

disputes as follows:

Major disputes comprise a class of disputes 

concerning rates of pay, rules or working 

conditions, and relate to the formation of 

collective bargaining agreements or efforts to 

secure them. The second class of disputes, 

known as minor disputes, grow out of 

grievances. These involve controversies over 

the meaning of an existing collective 

bargaining agreement in a particular fact 

situation. Therefore, under Congress’s 

scheme, major disputes seek to create 

contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce 

them. Finally, representation disputes 

involve defining the bargaining unit and 

determining the employee representative for 

collective bargaining.

Aircraft Serv. Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 779 F.3d 

1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (internal citations, 

quotation marks, and alterations omitted). As the District 

Court properly noted, a major dispute includes “attempts by 

. . . management to impose new obligations or create new 

rights.” Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. Mesa Air Grp., Inc., 

567 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). When an employer 

seeks to change a term in a collective bargaining agreement, 

a major dispute arises. See Consol. Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 

302; Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 869 F.2d 

1518, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[I]f a party announces an 

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20 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

intent to repudiate the [collective bargaining] agreement by 

adopting a unilateral change in the terms, it triggers a major 

dispute.”).

A representation dispute, on the other hand, arises when 

there is bona fide confusion about who is the employees’ 

representative. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Airlines 

Div. v. Allegiant Air, LLC, 788 F.3d 1080, 1087–89 (9th Cir. 

2015) (discussing representation disputes).

While the boundaries are not always clear-cut, this court 

has maintained that a major dispute exists when an employer 

acts to undermine a union’s representative status. Air Line 

Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc., 817 F.2d 

510, 515 (9th Cir. 1987). In Transamerica, the union alleged 

that the employer created a subsidiary company, to which it 

transferred the union employees’ existing business in an 

effort to take work from the union. Id. We reversed the 

District Court’s finding that a representation dispute existed 

and instead held that the union alleged a major dispute within 

the federal court’s jurisdiction. Id. Based on the employer’s 

actions, we also held that the union stated a claim under RLA 

§ 152, Third and Fourth and under the RLA’s status quo 

provision. Id. at 516.

Aviation Safeguards claims that the Union lost majority 

support, and that this change in support justified its removal 

of the Union. However, Aviation Safeguards constructed the 

dispute with the Union by creating the Union Removal 

Petition and unlawfully soliciting Aviation Safeguards’s 

employees to sign it. Aviation Safeguards cannot 

manufacture a representation dispute. Moreover, labor 

violations cannot justify revoking a Union’s representative 

status. See, e.g., Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334, 1361 

(9th Cir. 2011) (“[E]mployers may not withdraw recognition 

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in a context of serious unremedied unfair labor practices 

tending to cause employees to become disaffected from the 

union.”) (quoting Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 

333 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 n.1 (2001)) (applying similar 

principles in the NLRA context); Transamerica, 817 F.2d at 

515; In re Virgin Atl. Airways Emps. Ass’n, 24 N.M.B. 575, 

621 (1997) (“By . . . compel[ling] attendance at a meeting at 

which authorization cards were collected, the carrier . . . 

interfered, influenced or coerced employee freedom of 

choice . . . . Cards collected under such circumstances 

cannot be regarded as a true and free expression of the 

employees’ desires with regard to representation.”).

Aviation Safeguards unlawfully interfered with the 

Union’s representation, in violation of § 152, Third and 

Fourth. Purportedly believing that it acted lawfully, Aviation 

Safeguards eliminated the wage and health care terms of the 

Union’s collective bargaining agreement. Because the 

District Court did not consider the Union’s unlawful 

interference and coercion claim, finding that it was timebarred, it did not consider the unlawful behavior at the heart 

of Aviation Safeguards’s claimed representation dispute. 

The District Court erred when it held that the Union’s claim 

constitutes a representation dispute and dismissed the claim 

for lack of jurisdiction.14

 14 Further, we disagree with the District Court’s contention that 

Aviation Safeguards was not obligated to apply to the Mediation Board 

to remove the Union as the designated representative. As we explained 

in Allegiant Air, a union may become a legally designated representative 

through either Mediation Board certification or voluntary recognition. 

788 F.3d at 1090–91. An employer has a duty to “treat with,” i.e., 

negotiate with, a certified union, and that same duty exists once an 

employer decides to voluntarily recognize a union; certification and 

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B. The Union’s Claim Constitutes a Status Quo 

Violation, Which Is a Major Dispute

The RLA imposes upon employees and carriers an 

obligation to maintain existing working conditions until the 

RLA’s internal mechanisms for dispute resolution are 

completed. See, e.g., Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co., 

396 U.S. at 150–51 (describing “three status quo provisions 

in the Act, each covering a different stage of the major 

dispute settlement procedures”). This obligation is imposed 

through several interlocking provisions, see 45 U.S.C. 

§§ 152, Seventh; 155; 156, that “must be read in conjunction 

with the implicit status quo requirement” of § 152, First, 

which imposes a duty on both parties to ‘“exert every 

reasonable effort’ to settle disputes without interruption to 

interstate commerce.” Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co., 

396 U.S. at 151. “The obligation of both parties during a 

period in which any of these status quo provisions is properly 

invoked is to preserve and maintain unchanged those actual, 

objective working conditions and practices, broadly 

conceived, which were in effect prior to the time the pending 

dispute arose and which are involved in or related to that 

dispute.” Id. at 152–53.

 voluntary recognition are two avenues to become a legally designated 

representative. Id. at 1089–92. Aviation Safeguards therefore had the 

same duty to the Union, as a voluntarily recognized representative, as it 

would have had to a certified union, to apply to the Mediation Board to 

seek union removal. See also, e.g., In re Emps. of the Pan Am. Airways, 

Inc., 1 N.M.B. 381, 386 (1945) (“[T]he voluntary representation 

previously established between the Carrier and the various organizations 

and associations representing its employees should be considered as 

effective until changed in accordance with the provision of Section 2, 

Ninth, of the Act.”).

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RLA § 156 provides that employers and representatives 

must give at least thirty-days’ written notice of any intended 

changes to a collective bargaining agreement. 45 U.S.C. 

§ 156. This obligation arises “from the first notice of a 

proposed change in agreements up to and through any 

proceedings before the National Mediation Board.” Detroit 

& Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co., 396 U.S. at 150. In particular, 

§ 156 requires that,

In every case where such notice of intended 

change has been given, or conferences are 

being held with reference thereto, or the 

services of the Mediation Board have been 

requested by either party, . . . rates of pay, 

rules, or working conditions shall not be 

altered by the carrier until the controversy has 

been finally acted upon, as required by 

section 155 of this title, by the Mediation 

Board . . . .

The Union properly sought resolution through the 

Mediation Board when Aviation Safeguards threatened to 

remove the Union. After the Union requested the Mediation 

Board’s services, and before the Mediation Board had even 

docketed the case, and relying on its unlawfully obtained 

Union Removal Petition, Aviation Safeguards altered the 

status quo when it ceased to recognize the Union and thereby 

altered wages, health insurance benefits, and other working 

conditions. Such a change in the working conditions violated 

RLA § 156’s status quo provisions, creating a major dispute. 

45 U.S.C. § 156.

The Union thus stated a major dispute claim under the 

RLA’s status quo provisions set forth in §§ 152, Seventh; 

155; and 156. We remand this major dispute claim for the 

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24 HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY

limited purpose of determining whether this claim is timely 

and, if the claim is timely, we direct the District Court to 

grant summary judgment in favor of the Union on this 

claim.15 

III. Aviation Safeguards Violated § 152, First When 

It Refused to Mediate with the Union16

Under the RLA, employers and unions must “exert every 

reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements” and “to 

settle all disputes” to avoid strikes or other disruptions to 

commerce. 45 U.S.C. § 152, First. As we have determined, 

“[t]he duty to ‘exert every reasonable effort’ to reach an 

agreement is ‘a legal obligation, enforceable by whatever 

appropriate means might be developed on a case-by-case 

basis.’” Ass’n of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air 

Indus., Inc., 976 F.2d 541, 543 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Chi. 

& N. W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 577 

(1971)); see also Am. Train Dispatchers Dep’t v. Fort Smith 

R.R. Co., 121 F.3d 267, 270–71 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming 

 15 The Union alleges that Aviation Safeguards did not stop remitting 

Union dues until February 2012. However, it is unclear when Union dues 

ceased being collected. This disputed fact bears on when the Union’s 

§ 156 status quo violation claim began to accrue. In light of its 

jurisdictional ruling on this claim, the District Court had no reason to 

address the statute of limitations and did not make a factual finding as to 

when this claim began to accrue. This is an issue of fact that should be 

decided in the first instance by the District Court on remand.

16 The District Court did not address the Union’s § 152, First claim, 

likely because it found a representation dispute, which would have 

eliminated the availability of mediation. As the Union correctly argued, 

this claim is not barred by the six-month limitations period starting on 

December 30, 2011, because the claim necessarily accrued when 

Aviation Safeguards refused to participate in mediation.

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HERRERA V. COMMAND SECURITY 25

the District Court’s grant of a permanent injunction, and 

holding that an employer violated § 152, First by refusing to 

attend Mediation Board negotiation sessions).

In Horizon Air, we affirmed a finding that an employer 

violated its § 152, First duty by engaging in “surface 

bargaining” when it offered terms less favorable than the 

status quo. 976 F.2d at 547. We considered the substance of 

negotiations “to determine whether they were of such a 

nature as to indicate an intention not to reach an agreement 

at all” and were merely “go[ing] through the motions with a 

desire not to reach an agreement.” Id. at 544–45 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

This court has held that superficial attempts at 

negotiations violate the duty to “exert every reasonable 

effort.” Id. at 547. Flatly refusing to participate in mediation 

surely violates this duty as well, as it indicates absolutely no 

effort, let alone every reasonable effort, to make or maintain 

an agreement. We therefore remand and direct the District 

Court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Union on 

this claim, and to conduct further proceedings to determine 

the issue of damages and other relief.

CONCLUSION

To summarize: we reverse the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Aviation Safeguards.

1. We hold that equitable tolling principles apply to the 

Union’s unlawful interference and coercion claim against 

Aviation Safeguards. Accordingly, we remand and direct the 

District Court to grant the Union’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment under RLA § 152, Third and Fourth, and 

to conduct further proceedings to determine the issue of 

damages and other relief.

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2. We hold that the District Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over the Union’s status quo claim under RLA 

§§ 152, Seventh; 155; and 156. We emphasize that this claim 

does not constitute a representation dispute under RLA 

§ 152, Ninth. We remand to the District Court for the limited 

purpose of determining whether this claim is timely and, if 

the claim is timely, we direct the District Court to grant the 

Union’s cross-motion for summary judgment under RLA

§§ 152, Seventh; 155; and 156.

3. We hold that Aviation Safeguards unlawfully refused 

to mediate. We remand and direct the District Court to grant 

the Union’s cross-motion for summary judgment under RLA 

§ 152, First, and to conduct further proceedings to determine 

the issue of damages and other relief.

Costs are awarded to Plaintiffs-Appellants.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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