Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02747/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02747-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thurmond Allen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-2747

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

THURMOND ALLEN,

Appellant

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal Action No. 08-cr-00741-1)

District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky

 

Argued April 20, 2010

 

Case: 09-2747 Document: 003110254421 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/17/2010
 Judge Scirica was Chief Judge of the Court at the time this *

appeal was argued. He completed his term as Chief Judge on

May 4, 2010.

 The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Judge of the United **

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by

designation.

2

Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO *

and ALARCON, Circuit Judges **

(filed: August 17, 2010 )

Keith M. Donoghue (argued)

Brett G. Sweitzer

David L. McColgin

Federal Community Defender Office

Suite 540 West – Curtis Center

601 Walnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant

Laurie Magid (argued)

Robert A. Zauzmer

Office of United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

Case: 09-2747 Document: 003110254421 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/17/2010
3

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Thurmond Allen appeals an order of the District Court

denying his motion to suppress evidence seized while he and

others were detained by a police SWAT team during execution

of a search warrant at a bar where Allen worked as a security

guard. The warrant, issued in conjunction with a homicide

investigation unrelated to Allen or to anyone else at the bar,

authorized collection of security videotapes. The District Court

concluded that because the bar was located in a high-crime area,

because firearm-related crimes had been committed there, and

because persons possessing firearms were known to patronize

the bar, it was reasonable for the police to detain persons there

while executing the warrant. Allen contends on appeal that this

detention was an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment,

and thus his statements to police and the evidence obtained as a

result of that detention should have been suppressed.

We examine the limits of the Supreme Court’s decisions

in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), and Los Angeles

County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007) (per curiam). After

considering these cases and precedent of our own, and giving

deference to the District Court’s findings of fact, we conclude

that Allen’s detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Thus we affirm.

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 For example, one of the officers testified that when police 1

collected security videos from Trinkle’s in connection with the

January 2008 homicide, the bar’s owner “became very

uncooperative and angry that we had, in fact, taken that video

equipment.” 

4

I.

The District Court found the following facts after an

evidentiary hearing on Allen’s motion to suppress. On May 10,

2008, an individual named Jimmy Ortiz was murdered in

Allentown, Pennsylvania, and police obtained reliable

information that the persons involved had retreated to a bar

called Trinkle’s Café (“Trinkle’s”). Based on this information,

the police obtained a search warrant at approximately 4:00 p.m.

on Thursday, May 15, 2008, authorizing them to collect any

security videos in the bar that could be used to identify the

murder suspect. No Trinkle’s owner or staff member was

suspected of involvement in the homicide. 

The police were familiar with Trinkle’s and its location.

It was in a high-crime area involving firearms and drugs, and

customers of it often had histories of engaging in violence,

firearm possession, and drug activity. In January 2008, four

months before the Ortiz homicide, someone was shot inside

Trinkle’s, and a few weeks prior to the Ortiz homicide an

individual was arrested for illegally possessing a firearm inside

the bar. In addition, prior to the homicide, the owner and staff

of Trinkle’s were “uncooperative” with police during

investigations of other incidents. Given these facts, the police 1

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5

decided to use the Allentown Emergency Response Team,

known as a SWAT team, to execute the warrant.

They did so at approximately 8:00 p.m., about four hours

after obtaining the warrant, and secured the premises inside and

outside the bar. Five people — including Allen, who was on

duty as a Trinkle’s security guard — were standing directly in

front of the bar. The SWAT team, wearing armor and with guns

drawn, ordered them to lie face down on the sidewalk with their

hands in front of them, and explained that they would be

detained just long enough to ensure the officers’ safety and for

the officers to gather the evidence they were seeking.

Allen was lying next to an individual named Robbie

Trader, who told one of the officers that he had a firearm. The

officer took the firearm, verified that Trader had a permit to

carry it, and returned it to Trader, who was released. Allen then

volunteered to one of the officers that he too had a firearm. The

officer searched him, seized the gun, and inquired if he had a

permit for it. Allen responded that he had an expired, out-ofstate permit. When asked, Allen provided a false name,

Christopher Williams. The police learned Allen’s real name

from someone who worked at the bar, and Allen was arrested.

It was subsequently disclosed that he had a prior felony

conviction.

A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

returned a one-count indictment, charging Allen with unlawful

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress evidence of the

firearm and his statements to the police as fruits of an illegal

seizure. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court

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6

denied the motion in an oral ruling, concluding that pursuant to

Summers a “search warrant implicitly carries with it a limited

authorization to detain occupants of the place of the search and

to minimize the risk of harm to the officers,” and that pursuant

to Rettele the officers “took reasonable actions to secure the

premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the

search.” Moreover, the Court found that Allen voluntarily

revealed to the police that he was armed. Following the denial

of the motion to suppress, Allen pled guilty to the charge in the

indictment, but preserved his right to appeal the District Court’s

ruling on the suppression motion. The Court sentenced Allen to

41 months’ imprisonment, a term of three years’ supervised

release, a fine of $1,000, and a special assessment of $100. He

filed a timely appeal. 

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3231, which grants to district courts “original jurisdiction,

exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the

laws of the United States.” We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

“We review the district court’s denial of [a] motion to

suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise

plenary review as to its legality in light of the court’s properly

found facts.” United States v. Lafferty, 503 F.3d 293, 298 (3d

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458

(3d Cir. 2003)).

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The District Court found also that the “officers had sufficient, 2

specific and articulable facts to believe that persons who

frequented the bar could be armed and dangerous,” and thus

ruled that (1) “it was reasonable for [them] . . . to seize persons

in the area for an investigative stop and then do a limited search

for concealed weapons,” and (2) “it was reasonable to stop, pat

down and investigate these persons . . . .” (App. 322-23

(emphases added).) On this record, we question whether the

police would have been permitted to pat down everyone they

encountered at Trinkle’s. See, e.g., United States v. Ritter, 416

F.3d 256, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “absent a reasonable

belief or suspicion that an individual encountered is armed,” a

person may not be patted down, even when he or she is

“encountered on the premises of property to be searched during

the course of executing a search warrant”) (emphasis added).

However, the District Court made no finding regarding whether

officers patted down the individuals they detained outside

Trinkle’s, and, more importantly, made no finding that Allen

7

III.

Allen argues that his detention outside Trinkle’s violated

his Fourth Amendment rights, and so his statements to police

and the seized firearm should have been suppressed as fruits of

the illegal detention. However, based on the Supreme Court’s

treatment of Summers in its decision in Rettele, the officers were

permitted to detain those outside Trinkle’s during the execution

of the search warrant. Accordingly, given that Allen’s detention

was legal, and given its factual finding that Allen volunteered to

police that he had a firearm before being searched, the Court did

not err when it denied Allen’s motion to suppress.

2

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himself was patted down before volunteering that he had a gun.

In addition, Allen does not argue that he was illegally searched,

only that his detention was illegal. Thus, the issue of whether

the police would be justified in conducting a limited search of

the detained persons for concealed weapons is not before us in

this appeal, and we do not reach it.

8

We begin by noting that Summers itself is largely

distinguishable from our case. There, police officers were about

to execute a warrant to search a house for narcotics when they

encountered Summers descending the front steps. 452 U.S. at

693. The officers requested Summers’s assistance in gaining

entry to the house and then detained him while they searched the

premises. Id. They found drugs in the basement, and after

confirming that Summers owned the house, they arrested him,

searched him, and found in his coat pocket an envelope

containing heroin. Id. Summers was charged with possession

of the heroin, and he sought to suppress the heroin found on him

as the product of an illegal search. Id. at 694.

The Court framed the “dispositive question” as “whether

the initial detention of [Summers] violated his constitutional

right to be secure against an unreasonable seizure,” and

concluded that his detention was constitutionally permissible

because it was not overly intrusive and three law enforcement

interests (noted below) supported the detention. Id. at 694, 701-

04. The detention was not overly intrusive primarily because

the police had obtained a valid warrant to search for contraband,

meaning that a “neutral and detached magistrate had found

probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that

house,” and so “a substantial invasion of the privacy of the

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9

persons who resided there” was already authorized. Id. at 701.

Thus, “[t]he detention of one of the residents while the premises

were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his

liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself.” Id. In

other words, the “articulable facts” of the detention supported its

legality, because a “judicial officer ha[d] determined that police

ha[d] probable cause to believe that someone in the home [was]

committing a crime,” and the connection of Summers to the

home gave the “officer[s] an easily identifiable and certain basis

for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifie[d] a

detention of” Summers. Id. at 703-04.

The three law enforcement interests the Court identified

as supporting the detention were: (1) “preventing flight in the

event that incriminating evidence isfound;” (2) “minimizing the

risk of harm to the officers” (because “the execution of a

warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that

may give rise to sudden violence”); and (3) “the orderly

completion of the search” (because an occupant’s “self-interest

may induce [him] to open locked doors or locked containers to

avoid the use of force” that can be damaging to property). Id. at

702-03. 

Summers itself is largely off point; it relied heavily on the

fact that the warrant authorized a search for contraband, which

meant that there was reason to believe that crimes were taking

place in the home, which in turn allowed the detention of its

resident. Here, a neutral and detached magistrate did not find

probable cause to believe that violations of law were occurring

at Trinkle’s. The magistrate found only that there was probable

cause to believe that evidence, in the form of security videotapes

that might implicate the murder suspects, could be found at the

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10

bar. Allen’s detention thus did not involve contraband that was

likely to implicate him in criminal activity, and his connection

to the bar did not give the officers “an easily identifiable and

certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity

justifie[d]” his detention. Id. at 703-04. Indeed, the Summers

Court specifically stated that “[i]f the evidence that a citizen’s

residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a

judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen’s privacy is

justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen

to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to

search his home.” Id. at 704-05. This reasoning does not apply

here, where the search warrant merely sought evidence of a

crime at a public establishment and that evidence was unrelated

to any of the individuals then present there.

As for the law enforcement interests identified in

Summers, the Government does not argue that preventing flight

in the event that incriminating evidence is found justified

Allen’s detention, and for good reason — the police were at

Trinkle’s simply to collect security videotapes, they had no

reason to believe that Allen had any involvement in the Ortiz

homicide, and they had no reason to believe that Allen would

flee. 

In addition, the detention of Allen did not advance an

orderly completion of the search, as there was no indication that

Allen even knew where the videotapes were located. While the

Government argues that he was an employee “who could

potentially assist the police . . . [and] could have directed the

police to the security equipment” (Appellee’s Br. at 32), there is

no evidence that the police ever attempted to have Allen assist

them in this way. The Government further contends that the

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11

detention of Allen was justified by a “possible concern about the

destruction of evidence given that the bar’s staff had been

hostile and uncooperative when law enforcement had previously

sought to obtain the exact same type of evidence.” (Id. at 31.)

But given the number of officers present at the bar and that they

did not suspect any of the bar’s ownership or staff of playing a

role in the Ortiz homicide, the risk of destruction of evidence

was slight.

The only law enforcement interest relevant to our case,

and indeed the only part of the Summers Court’s reasoning that

is applicable to the facts here, is minimizing the risk of harm to

the officers. Indeed, the District Court relied solely on this

interest in denying Allen’s motion to suppress. We conclude

that it was correct to do so because, per Rettele, in certain

situations safety concerns alone may authorize a brief detention

of the occupants of an establishment during execution of a

search warrant, and the distinction between a search for

contraband and a search for evidence is largely immaterial.

In Rettele, police investigating a fraud and identity-theft

crime ring obtained a search warrant for two houses where they

believed they could find the suspects, four African-American

individuals. The warrant authorized the police to search the

homes and three of the suspects, one of whom was known to

own a registered handgun, for documents and computer files.

550 U.S. at 610. However, one of the homes had been sold, and

when the police arrived to execute the warrant, they found a

Caucasian family at the home. Nonetheless, the police entered

the house with guns drawn, ordered the 17-year-old son they

encountered at the door to lie face down on the ground, and

ordered the couple they found in the bedroom to get out of bed

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12

despite their wearing no clothes. The couple was held at

gunpoint for one to two minutes before being allowed to dress

(and a few minutes thereafter to sit on the couch in the living

room). The police then realized their mistake, apologized, and

left the house. Id. at 611.

A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed, asserting

a violation of Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court

concluded there was no violation, holding that “[w]hen officers

execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect

themselves from harm, . . . the Fourth Amendment is not

violated.” Id. at 616. The Court concluded that “[t]he orders by

the police to the occupants, in the context of this lawful search,

were permissible, and perhaps necessary, to protect the safety of

the deputies,” because “[b]lankets and bedding can conceal a

weapon, and one of the suspects was known to own a firearm.”

Id. at 614. The Court noted that “‘[t]he risk of harm to both the

police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely

exercise unquestioned command of the situation.’” Id. at 615

(quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03). It even concluded that

the discrepancy between the race of the suspects and the persons

in the house was immaterial, because “[t]he presence of some

Caucasians in the residence did not eliminate the possibility that

the suspects lived there as well.” Id. at 613. Moreover, the

Rettele Court ruled this way despite the warrant at issue

authorizing a search for mere evidence, and not contraband. Id.

at 610.

Rettele’s treatment of Summers compels the conclusion

that Allen’s detention did not violate his Fourth Amendment

rights. First, the police here were executing a valid search

warrant for evidence at a bar located in a high-crime area, where

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As Allen points out, the risk of harm to the officers here was 3

at least in part created by the decision to execute the warrant at

8:00 p.m. on a Thursday night, when the bar was likely to be

busy. Allen contends that “[i]t would have been far more

reasonable to visit Trinkle’s during off hours, at which time the

only persons present would be ownership, staff, and perhaps [a]

stray patron,” perhaps intimating that an ulterior motive was

behind the timing of the execution of the warrant. (Appellant’s

Br. at 22-23.) We agree with Allen that the timing is puzzling.

However, while the record does not reveal how long the police

had their information before applying for the warrant, they did

execute the warrant only hours after it issued, perhaps to

minimize the chance that the security videotapes would get

recorded over. Regardless, “[w]hether a Fourth Amendment

violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the

officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting him at the time, and not on the officer’s actual state

of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Maryland

v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (internal quotation and

13

patrons were known to carry firearms, and where several

firearm-related crimes had recently been committed, just as the

police in Rettele were executing a search warrant for evidence

at the home of an individual known to own a licensed firearm.

Under these circumstances, the police were justified in “tak[ing]

reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own

safety and the efficacy of the search,” id. at 614, including

detaining those present at gunpoint. Second, several people

were present at Trinkle’s, and so the police were justified in

taking a “moment to secure the [premises] and ensure that other

persons were not close by or did not present a danger.” Id. at 3

Case: 09-2747 Document: 003110254421 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/17/2010
citation omitted). On this evidence, we cannot say that the

police action here was objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances.

While the Leveto Court held that plaintiffs “successfully 4

alleged . . . violations of their Fourth Amendment rights,”

judgment was entered in favor of the defendants because they

“were entitled to qualified immunity due to uncertainty in the

case law.” 258 F.3d at 160.

14

615. Finally, just as the brief duration of the detention in Rettele

was deemed reasonable under the circumstances, the detention

here was just long enough for the police to ensure their safety

and collect the evidence they sought. Moreover, in Rettele,

“[t]here is no accusation that the detention here was prolonged.”

Id.

Allen contends that our decision in Leveto v. Lapina, 258

F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2001), in which we concluded that the

detention at issue was unreasonable, requires us to find a Fourth 4

Amendment violation here. However, without trivializing being

held on the ground at gunpoint, the detention in Leveto was far

more intrusive than Allen’s detention here. There, agents of the

Internal Revenue Service, as part of an investigation into a

doctor’s tax practices, carried out a search warrant at the

doctor’s office, detained him and his wife for almost eight

hours, restricted them from communicating with others for the

entire period, continually interrogated them, subjected the doctor

to “the inconvenience and indignity of a forced ride with IRS

agents to his home and back to his office,” and “prevented [him]

from responding to client needs.” Id. at 160, 169. 

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Allen raises an additional argument in this appeal, that the 5

felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is

unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the facts of this

case. In United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996),

we upheld “the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as a valid

exercise of the commerce power,” id. at 672, and in United

15

Additionally, we ruled in Leveto that “there was no

compelling need to detain Dr. Leveto to protect the safety of the

agents,” because it was not an investigation “into a type of

offense often accompanied by violence.” Id. at 171. But, as

noted above, Rettele, decided after Leveto, counsels that

protecting the safety of the agents alone can justify a reasonable

detention of an individual during execution of a search warrant.

Finally, Allen points out our noting in Leveto that while

an “articulable and individualized suspicion” of criminal activity

can exist “when law enforcement officers have a valid warrant

to search a home for contraband and the detainee is an occupant

of the home . . .[,] the same may not be true if the search warrant

merely seeks evidence.” Id. at 171-72 (citing Summers, 452

U.S. at 703-05 & n.20). However, as explained above, Rettele

rendered the evidence/contraband distinction immaterial where

occupants of a building are detained to ensure the safety of the

officers executing a search warrant. Here again Rettele

supersedes Leveto.

In short, our decision today is not controlled by Leveto.

Following Rettele, we conclude that Allen’s Fourth Amendment

rights were not violated when the police briefly detained him

during execution of the search warrant at Trinkle’s.

5

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States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), we

“reaffirm[ed] our holding in Gateward,” and ruled that “proof

. . . that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, at some

time in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce

element.” Id. at 197, 205. Absent en banc review, we may not

revisit these decisions, and therefore reject Allen’s challenge to

the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). 

16

* * * * *

We hold that Allen’s brief detention during execution of

the search warrant at Trinkle’s did not violate his rights under

the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of

the District Court denying his motion to suppress.

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