Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02007/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Highshaw
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 6, 2016

Decided June 1, 2016

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐2007

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL HIGHSHAW,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 14‐CR‐188‐JPS‐3

J. P. Stadtmueller,

Judge.

O R D E R

Michael Highshaw pleaded guilty to a conspiracy involving 500 grams or more of

crack and powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and to being a felon in possession

of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was then sentenced below the guidelines to 180

months’ imprisonment. Although the plea agreement included an appeal waiver,

Highshaw filed a notice of appeal. His lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and

seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel submitted a

brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this

kind might be expected to involve. Highshaw declined our invitation to respond to

counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough,

we limit our review to the subjects that counsel has discussed. See United States v. Bey,

748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐2007    Page 2

Counsel informs us that Highshaw wishes to challenge his guilty plea and

proceeds to discuss the adequacy of the plea colloquy. We agree with counsel—despite

her failure to notice several shortcomings in the colloquy—that any challenge to the plea

would be frivolous. The court neglected to inform Highshaw that forfeiture, restitution,

or a special assessment could be ordered, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(J),(K),(L), that he had a

right to persist in his plea of not guilty, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B), and that he had a

right to be represented by counsel, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(D). But Highshaw never

moved to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, so our review would be limited

to plain error. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 62–63 (2002); United States v.

Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). First, the court’s silence regarding restitution

was inconsequential because the court never ordered restitution. See United States v. Fox,

941 F.2d 480, 484–85 (7th Cir. 1991). Although the court did not mention either forfeiture

or a special assessment, the plea agreement detailed the forfeiture of particular firearms

and ammunition, as well as a $200 special assessment. See United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d

767, 769, 771 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 333–34 (7th Cir. 1997).

The court also did not inform Highshaw of his right to plead not guilty, but he must

have known as much because he already had pleaded not guilty at his arraignment and

the very purpose of the colloquy was to change that plea. See United States v. Knox, 287

F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2002). Finally, the district court’s failure to advise Highshaw of his

right to counsel could not be plain error, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(D), as Highshaw had

counsel throughout the proceedings and does not allege that he was unaware of this

right. See United States v. Lovett, 844 F.2d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1988). The transcript of the

plea colloquy shows that the district court otherwise substantially complied with

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b), see United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349

(7th Cir. 2012), although we would remind the district court to follow the model for

conducting the plea colloquy to avoid these errors in the future, see United States v. Polak,

573 F.3d 428, 432–33 (7th Cir. 2009).   

Highshaw’s appellate lawyer also has evaluated the case for possible sentencing

claims, but correctly concludes that any claim would be foreclosed by his appeal waiver

(“[T]he defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to appeal his sentence in

this case . . .”). An appeal waiver stands or falls with the guilty plea, see United States v.

Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th

Cir. 2011), and counsel has not identified an exception that would apply here, see United

States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634,

637 (7th Cir. 2005). Counsel briefly considers whether the appeal waiver might be

unenforceable on the ground that the district court made a confusing statement about

the scope of the waiver at the change‐of‐plea hearing: “Whether or not [the appeal

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No. 15‐2007    Page 3

waiver is] effective or not is [a] subject for the court of appeals and for that reason this

court doesn’t put a lot of stock in those waivers. But, in any event, it is part of the plea

agreement.” But counsel correctly concludes that this comment could not be the basis for

a non‐frivolous challenge because the court said these words after Highshaw confirmed

that he was waiving his right to appeal, and there is no indication that the court’s

statements confused him. See United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 1999).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.   

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