Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00041/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00041-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Julia Blackwell
Plaintiff
Wendy Kelley
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

JULIA BLACKWELL PETITIONER 

v. NO. 5:18-cv-00041 DPM/PSH 

WENDY KELLEY, Director of the RESPONDENT 

Arkansas Department of Correction 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

INSTRUCTIONS 

 The following proposed Recommendation has been sent to United States District 

Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. You may file written objections to all or part of this 

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the 

factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this 

Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may 

waive the right to appeal questions of fact. 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 1 of 26
2 

DISPOSITION 

 STATE AND FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS. The record reflects that a vehicle 

driven by petitioner Julia Blackwell (“Blackwell”) stuck a pedestrian as he walked along 

a sidewalk. Blackwell was taken into police custody and transported to a local hospital 

where a sample of her urine was taken. She was then transported to a local jail where 

a second sample of her urine was taken. Testing of one of the samples revealed the 

presence of, inter alia, amphetamine. When the pedestrian died from his injuries, 

Blackwell was charged with felony negligent homicide. Blackwell was also charged with 

third-degree battery after she injured a first responder. 

 Prior to trial, Blackwell filed a motion to suppress the urine samples. She 

maintained that the taking of the samples violated, inter alia, her Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel. She so maintained because her requests for counsel were ignored. The 

state trial court denied the motion. 

The prosecution subsequently amended the charges against Blackwell to include 

a charge of manslaughter. It was alleged that Blackwell recklessly caused the 

pedestrian’s death. Blackwell filed a motion to dismiss the charge because it was barred 

by the state statute of limitations, but the state trial court denied the motion. 

A Pulaski County Circuit Court jury convicted Blackwell of felony negligent 

homicide, third-degree battery, and manslaughter. She was sentenced to a term of ten 

years imprisonment for felony negligent homicide and fined five hundred dollars for 

third-degree battery. She received no punishment for manslaughter, though, after the 

state trial court elected to not instruct the jury on the offense during the penalty phase 

of the trial. 

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Blackwell appealed and raised the following claims: “the [state trial court] erred 

when it denied her motion to suppress the urine samples and her motion to dismiss the 

manslaughter charge.” See Blackwell v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 96, 455 S.W.3d 848, 853 

(2015). With respect to her first claim, she alleged that the taking of the samples 

violated, inter alia, her Sixth Amendment right to counsel because her requests for 

counsel were ignored. With respect to her second claim, she alleged that the 

manslaughter charge was barred by the state statute of limitations. 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals found no reversible error and affirmed Blackwell’s 

conviction. See Id. In doing so, the state court observed that her sentence for 

manslaughter was illegal on its face because the conviction required a minimum 

sentence, and her conviction of both felony negligent homicide and manslaughter “may 

violate double jeopardy.” See Id., 455 S.W.3d at 855, n.5. The state court declined to 

decide those issues, though, because they were not raised on appeal. 

 Blackwell then filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Arkansas 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 (“Rule 37 petition”). She did so with the assistance of 

counsel. In the petition, Blackwell alleged the following: 

... trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) move to dismiss either 

the felony negligent-homicide charge or the manslaughter charge; (2) 

object to the use of nonpattern jury instructions; (3) cross-examine 

former police officer Natasha Sims about her termination from the Little 

Rock Police Department; (4) protect her right to trial by an impartial jury; 

(5) object to the prosecutor’s improper acquisition of her sealed medical 

records; and (6) object or move for a mistrial after the prosecutor made 

personal attacks on her trial counsel during closing arguments. 

See Blackwell v. State, 2017 Ark.App. 246, 520 S.W.3d 294, 297 (2017). The state trial 

court conducted a hearing on the Rule 37 petition, after which it was denied. 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 3 of 26
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Blackwell appealed the denial of her Rule 37 petition. The state Court of Appeals 

found no reversible error and affirmed the denial of the petition. In a footnote, the 

state court observed the following: “... Blackwell ... claims that her convictions violate 

double jeopardy because this court found that her convictions violate double jeopardy. 

She is mistaken. This court did not find that her convictions violate double jeopardy. 

...” See Id., 520 S.W.3d at 302, n.1. 

 Blackwell began the case at bar by filing a pro se petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, which she later amended. See Docket Entry 30.1 The 

amended petition was not a model of brevity. It was seventy-nine pages long, raised 

forty-five claims, and was accompanied by approximately 1400 pages of exhibits. 

Respondent Wendy Kelley (“Kelley”) thereafter filed a response. See Docket 

Entry 36. She maintained that the amended petition should be dismissed because the 

claims raised in it are procedurally barred, without merit, or otherwise not cognizable. 

Blackwell was accorded an opportunity to file a reply to Kelley’s response. 

Blackwell took advantage of that opportunity by filing a voluminous reply and several 

supplements. See Docket Entry 45, 46, 47, 48. 

PROCEDURAL BAR. Kelley first maintains that thirty-eight of Blackwell’s fortyfive claims in the amended petition are procedurally barred from federal court review. 

Kelley so maintains because the thirty-eight claims were not raised, or not properly 

raised, in the state courts of Arkansas. It is Kelley’s position that federal court review 

is limited to seven of the claims and only to the extent they implicated a federal right. 

                                                            

1

   28 U.S.C. 2254(a) provides that a petition shall be entertained in behalf of a person “in custody.” 

Blackwell was incarcerated when she began this case. She has since been released from custody. 

Respondent Wendy Kelley does not maintain that Blackwell is no longer “in custody,” and the undersigned 

knows of no reason why Blackwell does not satisfy the custodial requirement of 28 U.S.C. 2254(a). 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 4 of 26
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Generally, the federal courts will not consider a claim if the petitioner failed to 

first present it to the state courts in accordance with the state’s procedural rules. See 

Wallace v. Lockhart, 12 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 1994). A claim not properly presented to the 

state courts can nevertheless be considered if the petitioner can show cause for her 

procedural default and actual prejudice or, alternatively, show that the failure to 

consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Anderson v. 

Kelley, --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2017 WL 1160583 (E.D.Ark. 2017) (Marshall, J.). 

Blackwell raised forty-five claims in her amended petition. Of the forty-five 

claims, six of the claims were raised in her Rule 37 petition and are therefore not 

subject to a procedural bar analysis. The six claims are as follows: 

(1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss either the felony 

negligent homicide charge or the manslaughter charge, alleged as claim five in the 

amended petition; 

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of nonpattern 

jury instructions and verdict forms, alleged as claim six in the amended petition; 

(3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine former police officer 

Natasha Sims about her termination from the Little Rock Police Department, alleged as 

claim ten in the amended petition; 

(4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to protect Blackwell’s right to trial by 

an impartial jury, alleged as claim seven in the amended petition; 

(5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper 

acquisition of Blackwell’s sealed medical records, alleged as claim eight in the amended 

petition; and 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 5 of 26
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(6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or move for a mistrial after 

the prosecutor made personal attacks on Blackwell’s trial counsel during closing 

arguments, alleged as claim nine in the amended petition. 

Of the remaining thirty-nine claims, the factual bases for two of the claims were 

raised by Blackwell in the state courts of Arkansas. As her first claim on direct appeal, 

she maintained that the taking of the urine samples violated, inter alia, her Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel because her requests for counsel were ignored. As the first 

claim in her amended petition, she offers similar facts but offers a different legal 

theory: counsel was ineffective because of the manner in which she argued the issue. 

Kelley maintains that the first claim in the amended petition is subject to a 

procedural bar analysis. She so maintains because the claim was never presented to the 

state courts of Arkansas as a challenge to counsel’s ineffectiveness. 

Blackwell’s first claim on direct appeal and the first claim in her amended 

petition both implicate the Sixth Amendment. The claims, though, are built upon 

different legal theories, and it is axiomatic that “the petitioner must present the same 

facts and legal theories to the state court that [she] later presents to the federal 

courts.” See Jones v. Jerrison, 20 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1994). Because Blackwell did 

not fairly present the first claim in her amended petition to the state courts of Arkansas, 

the claim is subject to a procedural bar analysis. 

As Blackwell’s second claim on direct appeal, she maintained that the 

manslaughter charge was barred by the state statute of limitations. As the second claim 

in her amended petition, she offers similar facts but offers a different legal theory: 

counsel was ineffective because of the manner in which she argued the issue. 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 6 of 26
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Kelley does not maintain that the second claim in the amended petition is subject 

to a procedural bar analysis. Instead, she maintains that “[w]hether there was a 

violation of Arkansas’s statute of limitations was purely a matter of state law that does 

not present a federal constitutional issue.” See Docket Entry 36 at CM/ECF 15. 

Alternatively, Kelley maintains that Blackwell cannot show that trial counsel’s handling 

of the state statute of limitations claim was constitutionally inadequate. 

Blackwell’s second claim on direct appeal and her second claim in the amended 

petition do not appear to be the same claim because they do not rest on the same legal 

theory. In light of Kelley’s representations, though, Blackwell’s second claim in her 

amended petition will not be subject to a procedural bar analysis. 

The remaining claims in Blackwell’s amended petition were not fairly presented 

to the state courts of Arkansas. Thus, thirty-eight claims, i.e., the claims other than 

claims two, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten of the amended petition, are subject 

to a procedural bar analysis. The thirty-eight claims are barred from federal court 

review unless Blackwell can show cause for her procedural default and actual prejudice 

or, alternatively, show that the failure to consider one or more claims will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

As cause, Blackwell offers her trial, appellate, and post-conviction attorneys’ 

ineffectiveness, one consequence of which was that some of her claims were not 

discovered until recently. The circumstance in which ineffective assistance of counsel 

may serve as cause is quite limited. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the United 

States Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may 

excuse the default of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 7 of 26
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... To establish cause in this manner, the petitioner must show that postconviction counsel’s assistance was ineffective under the standards of 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ... (1984), and further demonstrate 

that [the petitioner’s] underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel is a “substantial” one, that is, that the claim has some merit. 

Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14 ... If the State demonstrates that the underlying 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is unsubstantial or nonmeritorious, the petitioner cannot establish that post-conviction counsel 

was ineffective and thus cannot show cause for default of the underlying 

claim. Id. at 15-16 ... Likewise, if post-conviction counsel did not perform 

below constitutional standards, no cause is shown for default. Id. 

See Deck v. Steele, 249 F.Supp.3d 991, 1024 (E.D.Mo. 2017). The Martinez exception 

cannot excuse the default of any other type of claim. See Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 

809 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., Dansby v. Kelley, --- U.S. ---, 136 S.Ct. 297, 

193 L.Ed.2d 46 (2015) (Martinez cannot excuse default of claim of ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel).2

Blackwell’s invocation of the Martinez exception as cause for her procedural 

default of the thirty-eight claims in her amended petition is unavailing for three 

reasons. First, the Martinez exception provides that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel may excuse the default of a substantial claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel at trial. The exception does not excuse any other type of claim. 

To the extent Blackwell alleges non-ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in her 

amended petition, the Martinez exception cannot excuse the default of those claims.3

                                                            

2

   See also Lane v. Kelley, 2017 WL 5473925 (E.D.Ark. 2017) (Ray, M.J.), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 6542748 (E.D.Ark. 2017) (Marshall, J.) (Martinez cannot excuse 

default of claims of trial error or ineffective assistance of direct-appeal counsel); Robinson v. Kelley, 

2015 WL 4944130 (E.D.Ark. 2015) (Ray, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 4943588 

(E.D.Ark. 2015) (Miller, J.) (Martinez cannot excuse default of claims of prosecutorial misconduct or trial 

court error). 

3

 Blackwell combines virtually all of her non-ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims with 

claims challenging the effectiveness of her trial attorney’s representation.

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 8 of 26
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Second, the Martinez exception applies only if post-conviction counsel’s 

assistance was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984).4 Blackwell has failed to show that post-conviction counsel’s assistance was 

ineffective under the standards of Strickland. Post-conviction counsel challenged trial 

counsel’s representation and did so, in part, on the bases of what appear to be 

Blackwell’s two strongest claims, i.e., the double jeopardy issue and verdict form issue. 

See Docket Entry 36, Exhibit 5 at CM/ECF 19-23 (double jeopardy issue); Docket Entry 

36, Exhibit 5 at CM/ECF 9-13 (verdict form issue). After the state trial court rejected 

the claims, post-conviction counsel raised them on appeal. See Docket Entry 36, Exhibit 

6 at CM/ECF 19-23 (double jeopardy issue); Docket Entry 36, Exhibit 6 at CM/ECF 4-12 

(verdict form issue). The claims were rejected by the state Court of Appeals, and postconviction counsel cannot be faulted because the claims proved unsuccessful. As to the 

other allegations of post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, the undersigned is not 

persuaded that they satisfy the Strickland standard. 

Third, assuming Blackwell could show that post-conviction counsel performed 

below constitutional standards, Blackwell has not come forward with a substantial claim 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Her two strongest claims of alleged ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel were raised in the state courts of Arkansas and are not 

subject to a procedural bar analysis. With respect to the other allegations of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, the undersigned is not convinced that they are substantial. 

                                                            

4

   Strickland requires a two-part showing. First, the petitioner must show that with respect to each 

instance of alleged ineffectiveness, counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Ford v. United States, 917 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 

2019). The petitioner must also show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See 

Id. 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 9 of 26
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Blackwell alternatively maintains that the failure to consider the thirty-eight 

claims in her amended petition—the claims other than claims two, five, six, seven, 

eight, nine, and ten—will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. “To fit within 

the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, a petitioner must make a showing of 

actual innocence.” See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342, 1350 (8th Cir. 1997). 

... [T]o establish a claim of actual innocence, the petitioner must 

show factual innocence, not simply legal insufficiency of the evidence to 

support a conviction. McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 

2001). Furthermore, [the petitioner] must establish: (1) new and reliable

evidence that was not presented to the state courts, and (2) in light of the 

new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted [the petitioner]. ... 

See Briggs v. Kelley, 2018 WL 6497888, 3 (E.D.Ark. 2018) (Volpe, M.J.), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 6492599 (E.D.Ark. 2018) (Wilson, J.) (italics in 

original). 

Here, Blackwell has failed to make the requisite showing. She admits to having 

“no knowledge or memory of striking [the] pedestrian.” See Docket Entry 30 at CM/ECF 

18. She alleges that through her own investigation, primarily as a result of discovery in 

a related civil proceeding, she learned of such matters as a dog tampering with 

evidence at the scene of the accident, police and prosecutorial misconduct, fabricated 

and misleading reports, and prosecution witnesses visiting with a plaintiffs’ attorney in 

the related civil proceeding. Although this evidence might be new, it does not 

affirmatively demonstrate that she is innocent of the crimes for which she was 

convicted. See Abdi v. Hatch, 450 F.3d 334 (2006). Instead, the evidence invites the 

undersigned to engage in nothing more than speculation and conjecture. 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 10 of 26
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Blackwell cannot show cause and prejudice or that the failure to consider thirtyeight of the forty-five claims in her amended petition will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Save claims two, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten of her 

amended petition, her claims are barred from federal court review. 

CLAIM TWO. Blackwell’s second claim in her amended petition is a challenge to 

her trial attorney’s effectiveness. Blackwell specifically maintains the following: 

Manslaughter was amended 9/10/13 to charge of Negligent Homicide. 

Petitioner was convicted of both counts. Trial counsel objected to [and] 

appealed [the] Manslaughter amendment [because it] violated [the] 

statute of limitations, being subject to 3 years (fatality occurring June 8, 

2010). Omitting double jeopardy, unfair surprise/due process violations, 

insufficient evidence of Manslaughter [and] ineffectively presenting 

insufficient evidence of reckless conduct. Petitioner does not disagree 

[with Court of Appeals’] affirmation, but disagrees [with] trial/appellate 

counsel’s presentation of [the statute of limitations defense]. 

See Docket Entry 30 at CM/ECF 6. 

 Blackwell’s claim is governed by Strickland. Blackwell must show that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and must show 

prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the 

trial would have been different. See White v. Dingle, 757 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2014). 

 Blackwell cannot show that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective under the 

standards of Strickland for two reasons. First, ignoring the fact that the underlying 

question is one of state law, counsel raised the state statute of limitations claim at trial 

and on direct appeal. The fact that the claim proved unsuccessful does not mean 

counsel’s performance was deficient. Second, Blackwell has not identified the 

arguments counsel failed to make and how they would have produced a different result. 

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 CLAIM FIVE. The portion of Blackwell’s fifth claim that was fairly presented to 

the state courts of Arkansas involves a challenge to her trial attorney’s representation. 

Blackwell maintains that counsel was ineffective when she did not move to dismiss the 

felony negligent homicide charge or manslaughter charge on double jeopardy grounds. 

Blackwell’s claim is governed by Strickland. Because the claim was addressed by 

the state Court of Appeals, the claim is also governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).5 Taken 

together, Strickland and 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) establish a doubly deferential standard of 

review. See Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2012). 

                                                            

5 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) requires a two-part inquiry. First, it requires an inquiry into whether the state 

Court of Appeals’ adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme 

Court. In White v. Kelley, 824 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2016), the Court of Appeals provided the following 

explanation of that portion of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d): 

... A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the ‘contrary to’ clause if the state 

court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, 

or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 ... (2002). “The court may grant 

relief under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause if the state court correctly identifies 

the governing legal principle ... but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular 

case.” Id. A court “may not grant relief simply because it concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly,” rather the application “must also be unreasonable.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 ... (2000). This court is bound by the facts as found 

by the state courts, absent clear and convincing evidence those findings were incorrect. 

Buchheit, 459 F.3d at 852 ...” 

The federal court must give the state court “the benefit of the doubt” unless the petitioner can show 

that the state court’s ruling “was so lacking in justification that there [is] an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” See Fenstermaker 

v. Halvorson, --- F.3d ---, 2019 WL 1461060, 2 (8th Cir. 2019) [quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 

103 (2011)]. 

 Second, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) requires an inquiry into whether the adjudication resulted in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. An 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented occurs “only if it is shown by 

clear and convincing evidence that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy 

support in the record.” See White v. Dingle, 757 F.3d 750, 755-756 (8th Cir. 2014) [quoting Whitehead v. 

Dormire, 340 F.3d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 2003) and citing 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2), 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1)]. The 

petitioner must also demonstrate that “the state court’s determination of the facts was unreasonable. 

See Id. at 756 [citing Whitehead v. Dormire, 340 F.3d at 539 and citing 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2)]. 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 12 of 26
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Blackwell was charged with felony negligent homicide and manslaughter for the 

same conduct. Trial counsel did not move to dismiss one of the charges on double 

jeopardy grounds because she did not believe the argument had merit. See Docket Entry 

36, Exhibit 5 at CM/ECF 78-87, 89-92. After Blackwell was convicted of both offenses, 

but only sentenced for one, she challenged counsel’s failure to move to dismiss one of 

the charges on double jeopardy grounds. The state Court of Appeals applied Strickland 

and rejected the challenge for the following two reasons: (1) Blackwell offered no 

authority to support her assertion that counsel should have moved to dismiss one of the 

charges on double jeopardy grounds, and (2) Blackwell’s convictions do not violate 

double jeopardy because felony negligent homicide requires the element of 

intoxication, which is not included in the definition of manslaughter. 

The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim did not result in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The state 

court recognized and reasonably applied clearly established federal law as announced 

in Strickland in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. It likely gives one pause 

that a defendant could be charged with, and convicted of, both felony negligent 

homicide and manslaughter for the same conduct. The state court found, though, that 

felony negligent homicide and manslaughter are not the same offense under Arkansas 

law because “felony negligent homicide requires the element of intoxication, which is 

not included in the definition of manslaughter.” See Blackwell v. State, 520 S.W.3d at 

300. The undersigned defers to the state court’s interpretation of Arkansas law. It is 

also worth observing that the interpretation appears to be consistent with Blockburger 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 13 of 26
14 

v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In short, the interpretation of Arkansas law made 

by the state court is not so lacking in justification that “there [is] an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded 

disagreement.” See Fenstermaker v. Halvorson, --- F.3d ---, 2019 WL 1461060, 2 (8th 

Cir. 2019). The undersigned also defers to the state court’s determination that counsel 

was not ineffective for failing to raise a non-meritorious claim. See Lemaster v. Kelley, 

750 Fed.Appx. 499 (8th Cir. 2018) (federal court defers to determination that claim 

lacks merit so long as fair-minded jurists could disagree on correctness of decision). 

The case at bar is not an instance in which the state court applied a rule different from 

the governing law, decided the case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a 

set of materially indistinguishable facts, or correctly identified the governing law but 

unreasonably applied it to the facts.6

CLAIM SIX. The portion of Blackwell’s sixth claim that was fairly presented to the 

state courts of Arkansas involves another challenge to her trial attorney’s 

representation.7 Blackwell acknowledged that counsel challenged the state trial court’s 

use of what Blackwell characterizes as nonpattern jury instructions and verdict forms. 

Blackwell maintains, though, that counsel was ineffective because of the manner in 

which she presented the challenge to the state trial court and because she failed to 

pursue the issue on direct appeal. 

                                                            

6

   The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s fifth claim was largely a legal 

determination. To the extent the adjudication rested upon a factual determination, it did not result in 

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented.

7

   Blackwell’s sixth claim is governed by Strickland. Because the claim was addressed by the state 

Court of Appeals, the claim is also governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 14 of 26
15 

The record reflects that the state trial court instructed the jury on, inter alia, 

felony negligent homicide, manslaughter, and lesser included offenses. The state trial 

court also provided the jury with verdict forms. Trial counsel objected to two of the 

verdict forms largely because they did not have a place for the jury to indicate “not 

guilty” for felony negligent homicide and manslaughter.8 The objection was overruled. 

Counsel did not appeal the use of the verdict forms because she did not believe the 

issue had merit. See Docket Entry 36, Exhibit 5 at CM/ECF 92-95, 121-131. Blackwell 

challenged counsel’s handling of the verdict form issue. The state Court of Appeals 

applied Strickland and rejected the challenge, finding as follows: 

                                                            

8

   The two verdict forms challenged by Blackwell provided the following: 

COUNT 1 

We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell guilty of Negligent Homicide (intoxication). 

 ____________________________ 

 FOREPERSON 

We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell guilty of Negligent Homicide (negligence). 

 ____________________________ 

 FOREPERSON 

We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell not guilty of Negligent Homicide (negligence). 

 ____________________________ 

 FOREPERSON 

COUNT 2 

We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell guilty of Manslaughter (recklessness). 

 ____________________________ 

 FOREPERSON 

We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell guilty of Negligent Homicide (negligence). 

 ____________________________ 

 FOREPERSON 

We, the jury, find Julia Blackwell not guilty of Negligent Homicide (negligence). 

 ____________________________ 

 FOREPERSON 

See Blackwell v. State, 520 S.W.3d at 298-299.

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 15 of 26
16 

... Blackwell claims the instructions amounted to a fundamental structural 

defect in the trial, like the instructions in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 

275 ... (1993). We disagree. In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court 

held that an erroneous instruction that misstated the State's burden of 

proof was a structural defect in the trial mechanism. Id. The Court 

reasoned that, where the jury convicts a defendant according to an 

erroneous instruction about the State's burden of proof, there has been 

no actual finding of guilty as required by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Here, 

Blackwell has not shown that the instructions misstated the law such that 

there had been no actual finding of guilt. The verdict forms instruct the 

jury to first consider the higher charge, then the lesser charge, and then 

provide the jury with the option to find Blackwell not guilty. ... 

See Blackwell v. State, 520 S.W.3d at 299. 

The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim did not result in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The state 

court recognized and reasonably applied clearly established federal law as announced 

in Strickland in adjudicating the claim. Although the verdict forms were not a model of 

clarity, the state court could reasonably rely upon Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 

(1993), as a part of finding that the jury was properly instructed. The undersigned 

therefore defers to the state court’s finding. The undersigned also defers to the 

determination that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to appeal a nonmeritorious claim. The case at bar is not an instance in which the state court applied 

a rule different from the governing law, decided the case differently than the Supreme 

Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts, or correctly identified the 

governing law but unreasonably applied it to the facts.9

                                                            

9

   The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s sixth claim was largely a legal one. To 

the extent the adjudication rested upon a factual determination, it did not result in a decision that was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

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CLAIM SEVEN. The portion of Blackwell’s seventh claim that was fairly presented 

to the state courts of Arkansas involves a challenge to her trial attorney’s 

representation.10 Blackwell maintains that counsel was ineffective when she failed to 

object to, or otherwise move for a mistrial because of, the participation of a juror who 

was in a photograph with the pedestrian, a photograph that was published to the jury. 

The record reflects that during the penalty phase of Blackwell’s trial, the 

prosecution published a photograph to the jury of the pedestrian presenting a check to 

a group of individuals representing a local children’s hospital. A juror viewed the 

photograph and happened to notice that she was one of the individuals representing 

the hospital. The juror immediately notified the state trial court that she was in the 

photograph. The state trial court excused the jury and questioned the juror about the 

photograph. The juror explained that she worked for the hospital’s foundation and 

often appeared in photographs when large donations were made. She did not solicit the 

pedestrian’s donation, did not know him, and did not remember the occasion when the 

photograph was taken. The juror estimated that the photograph had been taken at least 

ten years earlier. Trial counsel objected to the juror’s participation, doing so at the 

behest of Blackwell, but the state trial court overruled the objection. Counsel did not 

appeal the state trial court’s refusal to excuse the juror because counsel did not believe 

the issue had merit. See Docket Entry 36, Exhibit 5 at CM/ECF 98-102, 112-114. 

Blackwell challenged counsel’s failure to do so. The state Court of Appeals applied 

Strickland and rejected the challenge, finding as follows: 

                                                            

10   Blackwell’s seventh claim is governed by Strickland. Because the claim was addressed by the 

state Court of Appeals, the claim is also governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 

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In this case, the trial record shows that after the court learned that 

the juror was in the photo, it called a recess and questioned the juror. 

The juror stated that she had been employed at Arkansas Children's 

Hospital for thirteen years, that she had worked with thousands of donors 

and volunteers, that she did not remember the picture, and that she could 

remain fair and impartial. At the evidentiary hearing, Blackwell's trial 

counsel testified that she was satisfied with the juror's response but that 

Blackwell insisted that she object to the juror's remaining on the panel 

and that she did object. However, the trial court overruled the objection. 

Trial counsel further stated that she did not move for a mistrial because 

the juror had no memory of the picture, which was more than ten years 

old. Given this evidence, we hold that the [state trial court] did not clearly 

err in finding that Blackwell's trial counsel was not ineffective for not 

moving for a mistrial based on the juror's presence in the photo. 

See Blackwell v. State, 520 S.W.3d at 301. 

The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim did not result in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The state 

court recognized and reasonably applied clearly established federal law as announced 

in Strickland in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. Although the state court 

did not acknowledge Supreme Court precedent on the underlying question of 

determining juror bias, the state court’s adjudication appears to be consistent with 

federal law on the question of juror bias. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 

(1981); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). The undersigned defers to the 

adjudication of the claim made by the state court. The case at bar is not an instance 

in which the state court applied a rule different from the governing law, decided the 

case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts, or correctly identified the governing law but unreasonably 

applied it to the facts. 

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The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim also did not result 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented. The state court found that the juror had been employed at the 

hospital for approximately thirteen years; had worked with thousands of donors and 

volunteers; and did not remember the photograph being taken, estimating that it had 

been taken more than ten years earlier. She testified that she did not solicit the 

pedestrian’s donation and did not know him. Given those facts, the state court could 

find as it did. Specifically, the state court could find that the juror could continue to 

serve and could find that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to appeal a nonmeritorious claim. 

CLAIM EIGHT. The portion of Blackwell’s eighth claim that was fairly presented 

to the state courts of Arkansas involves a challenge to her trial attorney’s 

representation.11 Blackwell maintains that counsel was ineffective because she did not 

appeal the prosecutor’s improper acquisition of Blackwell’s sealed medical records. 

 The record reflects that prior to trial, the prosecution acquired some of 

Blackwell’s medical records. Trial counsel filed a motion in limine to bar their 

admission. The state trial court took the motion under advisement pending the evidence 

offered at trial. The medical records were not introduced at trial, and counsel did not 

appeal the prosecution’s possession of them. See Docket Entry 36, Exhibit 5 at CM/ECF 

102-105. Blackwell challenged counsel’s handling of the medical records issue. The 

state Court of Appeals applied Strickland and rejected the challenge, finding as follows: 

                                                            

11   Blackwell’s eighth claim is governed by Strickland. Because the claim was addressed by the state 

Court of Appeals, it is also governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 

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Blackwell next argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to appeal the State's acquisition of her sealed medical and 

psychological records filed in a separate, civil case. The [state trial court] 

found that Blackwell had no relief under this claim because her counsel 

objected to the use of the records and the records were not used at trial. 

At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that when she learned 

that the State had obtained the records, she filed a motion in limine to 

exclude the use of the records. Further, she explained that the records 

were not introduced at trial and that no witnesses testified about the 

records. 

We hold that the [state trial court] did not clearly err in finding 

that Blackwell's counsel was not ineffective for failing to appeal the 

State's acquisition of her medical and psychological records. Once again, 

a petitioner who claims that appellate counsel was ineffective bears the 

burden of making a clear showing that counsel failed to raise some 

meritorious issue on appeal. [Citation omitted]. The petitioner must show 

that there could have been a specific issue raised on appeal that would 

have resulted in the appellate court's declaring reversible error. [Citation 

omitted]. Blackwell has cited no authority showing that the State's 

acquisition of her records would have resulted in a reversible error. 

Accordingly, there is no basis on which to grant postconviction relief on 

this claim. 

See Blackwell v. State, 520 S.W.3d at 301. 

 The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim did not result in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The state 

court recognized and reasonably applied clearly established federal law as announced 

in Strickland in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. Although the state court 

did not acknowledge Supreme Court precedent on the underlying question of the 

prosecutor’s actions, the undersigned defers to the adjudication made by the state 

court. The adjudication is not so lacking in justification that there is an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded 

disagreement. See Fenstermaker v. Halvorson, 2019 WL 1461060, 2. 

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The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim also did not result 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented. The state court found that trial counsel objected to the use of 

the medical records, they were never used at trial, and no witness testified about them. 

Given those facts, the state court could find as it did. Specifically, the state court could 

find that counsel did not err when she did not appeal the prosecution’s acquisition of 

the medical records and find that counsel was not ineffective for failing to appeal a 

non-meritorious claim. 

CLAIM NINE. The portion of Blackwell’s ninth claim that was fairly presented to 

the state courts of Arkansas involves a challenge to her trial attorney’s 

representation.12 Blackwell maintains that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a 

mistrial for the prosecutor’s comments. Specifically, Blackwell alleges the following: 

Throughout counsel’s closing arguments, [the] state made a series 

of objections to counsel’s statements; made inflamed and personally 

biased, unprofessional comments. During [the] state’s second closing 

statement, [the prosecutor] said everything from [trial] counsel was “halftruth” and called her statements “improper” among other inflamed 

assertions. The trial court asked [the prosecutor] if reasons for such 

assertions exist but made no finding of the statements being improper. 

Trial counsel objected to [the prosecutor] attacking credibility but failed 

to ask for [a] mistrial or request any type [of] relief from [the] court. 

See Docket Entry 30 at CM/ECF 19. Blackwell subsequently challenged counsel’s 

handling of the issue. The state Court of Appeals applied Strickland and rejected the 

challenge, finding as follows: 

                                                            

12   Blackwell’s ninth claim is governed by Strickland. Because the claim was addressed by the state 

Court of Appeals, it is also governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).

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22 

Blackwell ... argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to move for a mistrial after the prosecutor made personal attacks on her 

counsel during closing remarks. She points out that the prosecutor made 

comments questioning her counsel's credibility such as that her “whole 

idea ... her whole alternate theory is fantasy.” When it is alleged that 

counsel was ineffective for the failure to make a motion or argument, the 

petitioner must show that the motion or argument would have been 

meritorious because the failure to make an argument that is meritless is 

not ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation omitted]. It is well settled 

that closing remarks that require reversal are rare and require an appeal 

to the jurors' passions. [Citation omitted]. Further, as we have stated, a 

mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy to be resorted to only when 

there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by 

continuing the trial. [Citation omitted]. Blackwell has not shown the 

prosecutor's comments warranted a mistrial. Accordingly, we hold that 

the [state trial court] did not clearly err in finding that Blackwell was not 

entitled to relief under this claim. 

See Blackwell v. State, 520 S.W.3d at 301–302. 

 The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim did not result in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The state 

court recognized and reasonably applied clearly established federal law as announced 

in Strickland in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. Although the state court 

did not acknowledge Supreme Court precedent on the underlying question, the 

adjudication appears to be consistent with federal law on that question. See, e.g., 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 

(1974). The undersigned defers to the adjudication made by the state court. The case 

at bar is not an instance in which the state court applied a rule different from the 

governing law, decided the case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set 

of materially indistinguishable facts, or correctly identified the governing law but 

unreasonably applied it to the facts. 

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The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim also did not result 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented. During closing argument, the prosecutor characterized some 

of trial counsel’s statements and arguments as “fantasy,” “half-truth,” and 

“improper.” Trial counsel objected to the description of her statements and arguments. 

The state court could and did find that such remarks were not so prejudicial or 

inflammatory as to warrant a mistrial. Given that finding, the state court could and did 

also find that trial counsel did not err when she did not appeal the issue and was not 

ineffective for failing to appeal a non-meritorious claim. 

CLAIM TEN. Blackwell’s final claim involves a challenge to her trial attorney’s 

representation.13 Blackwell maintains that counsel was ineffective for failing to crossexamine Natasha Sims (“Sims”) about her termination from the Little Rock Police 

Department (“LRPD”). Blackwell maintains that counsel was also ineffective for failing 

to appeal the state trial court’s refusal to allow testimony about Sims’ termination. 

The record reflects that Sims took the urine samples from Blackwell. Sims was 

later terminated from her job with the LRPD. During a suppression hearing, trial counsel 

attempted to cross-examine Sims about her termination. The state trial court 

prevented counsel from doing so because Sims was appealing her termination. At trial, 

Sims admitted that she had been terminated but testified that she was appealing her 

termination. See Docket Entry 36, Exhibit 1.3 at CM/ECF 289. Trial counsel crossexamined Sims extensively but did not cross-examine her about the circumstances 

                                                            

13   Blackwell’s tenth claim is governed by Strickland. Because the claim was addressed by the state 

Court of Appeals, it is also governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 

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surrounding her termination. Counsel did not raise the issue on direct appeal. Counsel 

testified during the Rule 37 proceeding that Sims was not cross-examined about her 

termination because the termination was on appeal and counsel had other grounds for 

challenging Sims’ credibility. See Docket Entry 36, Exhibit 5 at CM/ECF 95-98, 114-116.

Blackwell challenged counsel’s handling of the termination issue. The state Court of 

Appeals applied Strickland and rejected the challenge, finding as follows: 

Blackwell next argues that the [state trial court] erred in finding 

that her trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to cross-examine 

former police officer Natasha Sims concerning her termination from the 

Little Rock Police Department based on allegations of dishonesty. She 

points out that crucial pieces of evidence at trial were her urine samples, 

which Sims took. She recognizes that her counsel attempted to question 

Sims about the allegations at a suppression hearing and that the [state 

trial court] instructed her not to question Sims about the allegations 

because Sims had appealed her termination. However, Blackwell claims 

that her trial counsel should have raised the issue at trial because, during 

questioning at trial, the State asked Sims why she had been terminated 

and Sims stated that she had appealed the termination. The [state trial 

court] found that Blackwell was not entitled to relief under this ground 

because Blackwell's trial counsel made a strategic decision not to crossexamine Sims about her termination. 

When a decision by counsel was a matter of trial tactics or strategy, 

and that decision is supported by reasonable professional judgment, then 

counsel's decision is not a basis for relief under Rule 37.1. [Citation 

omitted]. Counsel is allowed great leeway in making strategic and tactical 

decisions. [Citation omitted]. In this case, counsel testified at the 

evidentiary hearing that she “wrestled” with the decision whether to 

impeach Sims about her termination but decided not to cross-examine her 

because the trial court had already stated that it would exclude that 

testimony. She further testified that she had researched the status of 

Sims's appeal and determined that it was ongoing. Given this testimony, 

we cannot say that the [state trial court] clearly erred in finding that 

counsel made a reasonable and professional decision not to question Sims 

about her termination. 

See Blackwell v. State, 520 S.W.3d at 299–300. 

Case 5:18-cv-00041-DPM Document 49 Filed 04/16/19 Page 24 of 26
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 The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim did not result in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The state 

court recognized and reasonably applied clearly established federal law as announced 

in Strickland in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. Although the state court 

did not acknowledge Supreme Court precedent on the underlying question of the 

admissibility of testimony, the undersigned defers to the state court’s adjudication. 

The state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Blackwell’s claim also did not result 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented. The state court found that during a suppression hearing, trial 

counsel attempted to question Sims about her termination from the LRPD. The state 

trial court instructed counsel not to question Sims about her termination because it was 

on appeal. At trial, the prosecutor asked Sims about her termination, and she testified 

that it was on appeal. Counsel eventually decided against attempting to cross-examine 

Sims about her termination because the trial court had already stated that it would 

exclude such testimony and was likely correct in the ruling. Moreover, counsel believed 

she had other grounds for challenging Sims’ credibility. Given those facts, the state 

court could find as it did, particularly since a trial court is afforded wide latitude in 

determining whether to admit evidence. Thus, the state court could find that counsel 

did not err when she did not attempt to cross-examine Sims about her termination. The 

state court could also find that counsel was also not ineffective for failing to appeal 

the issue as Blackwell cannot show the issue had merit. 

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RECOMMENDATION. With respect to thirty-eight of Blackwell’s forty-five claims, 

she cannot show cause and prejudice or that the failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Save claims two, five, six, seven, eight, 

nine, and ten, her claims are barred from federal court review. With respect to claims 

two, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten, the undersigned finds that they were 

reasonably adjudicated by the state Court of Appeals or otherwise warrant no relief. It 

is therefore recommended that Blackwell’s petition be dismissed, all requested relief 

be denied, and judgment be entered for Kelley. In accordance with Rule 11(a) of the 

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, a certificate of 

appealability should also be denied. The undersigned is not persuaded that Kelley can 

make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. 

2253(c)(2). 

DATED this 16th day of April, 2019. 

 ________________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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