Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05371/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05371-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Archibald Cox
Appellant
Federal Election Commission
Appellee
Scott Harshbarger
Appellant
Fred Wertheimer
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 2001 Decided October 26, 2001

No. 00-5371

Fred Wertheimer, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Federal Election Commission,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(00cv02203)

Paul A. Engelmayer argued the cause for appellants.

With him on the briefs were Roger M. Witten, Daniel H.

Squire, and Joshua D. Weinberg.

Richard B. Bader, Associate General Counsel, Federal

Election Commission, argued the cause for appellee. With

him on the brief was Vivien Clair, Attorney. Lawrence M.

Noble, General Counsel, entered an appearance.

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Before: Garland, Circuit Judge; Silberman and

Williams,* Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Silberman.

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit Judge

Garland.

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge: Fred Wertheimer, Scott

Harshbarger, and Archibald Cox appeal from the district

court's dismissal of their suit for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. They sued under section 9011(b) of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act1 seeking construction of

the terms "contribution" and "expenditure" within the meaning of that Act. We affirm on grounds that appellants lack

standing.

I.

Fred Wertheimer is the current president of Democracy 21

and a former president of Common Cause, two organizations

whose purpose is the modification of campaign financing.

Scott Harshbarger is the current president of Common

Cause. Archibald Cox is chairman emeritus of Common

Cause. They voted in the 1996 presidential election and, at

the time this suit was filed, intended to vote in the 2000

presidential election. Their allegations are that, notwithstanding the Fund Act's prohibition on presidential candidates accepting contributions from private sources, during the

1996 and 2000 presidential campaigns the two major political

parties were funding campaign advertisements furthering the

election of their respective presidential nominees in close

coordination with those candidates. Essentially their suit

seeks a declaration that expenditures by political parties that

further the election of their respective presidential candidates, and that are coordinated with those presidential candidates, constitute contributions to and expenditures by such

__________

* Senior Judge Williams was in regular active service at the time

of oral argument.

1 26 U.S.C. s 9001 et seq. (2000).

presidential candidates within the meaning of the Fund Act,

and as a corollary, major party candidates who have chosen

public funds may not coordinate with their respective political

parties on party expenditures that further that candidate's

election.

In order to understand appellants' claim--and their alleged

standing--one has to carefully consider the interrelationship

between the Fund Act and the Federal Election Campaign

Act of 1971, as amended (FECA).2 The Fund Act also passed

in 1971 established a voluntary program of public financing of

the general election campaigns of eligible major and minor

party nominees for the office of President of the United

States.3 It established the Presidential Election Campaign

Fund, the size of which is determined by a tax checkoff option

through which each individual taxpayer may designate on his

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federal income tax return that three dollars be transferred to

the Fund. Appellants allege that at least one of them designated on his federal income tax return that three dollars be

transferred to the Fund. To receive a specified amount of

public funding for use in their general election campaigns,

participating major party presidential nominees must be certified as eligible by the Federal Election Commission (FEC)

and must agree not to accept private campaign contributions

for the general election campaign, except to the extent that

the Fund is insufficient to provide the statutorily specified

amount to each candidate. Such a candidate must also agree

not to incur "qualified campaign expenses" in excess of his

public entitlement. These expenses include those incurred by

the candidate of a political party for the office of President to

further his election and those by his authorized committee to

further his election. An expense shall be considered as

incurred by a candidate if it is incurred by an authorized

person. Participating candidates must also agree that they

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2 2 U.S.C. ss 431-455 (2000).

3 Congress also enacted the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. ss 9031-9042, which establishes a

voluntary system of public financing for major and minor party

primary elections.

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and their authorized committees will submit their campaign

accounts for a post-election Commission audit of qualified

campaign expenses and pay any amounts required to be

repaid pursuant to statute. The Act does not, however,

require candidates to publicly disclose their campaign finances.

We are authorized to review Commission action under the

Fund Act. It also authorizes individuals eligible to vote for

President to institute "such actions, including actions for

declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, as may be appropriate to implement or contrue [sic] any provision of this

chapter." (Emphasis added). A three-judge panel hears

lawsuits brought under section 9011(b), with direct appeal to

the Supreme Court. But an individual district court judge

may consider threshold jurisdictional challenges prior to convening a three-judge panel. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Emp.

Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974); Ruess v. Balles, 584 F.2d

461, 464 n.8 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).

Publicly and privately financed candidates for federal office

are also subject to FECA, which imposes limits upon the

amounts that individuals, corporations, political committees,

and political parties can contribute to a candidate for federal

political office. It limits the amount these individuals or

entities can spend in coordination with a candidate, treating

these expenditures as "contributions to" a candidate for purposes of FECA. The Commission refers to these expenditures as "coordinated expenditures" or "441a expenditures."

See 2 U.S.C. s 441a(a)(7)(B)(i); s 441a(d)(2); Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).

"Contributions" and "expenditures" are defined as covering

only those contributions and expenditures that are made "for

the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 2

U.S.C. s 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). As of May 2001, for entities

other than candidates, authorized committees, and political

party committees, any "expenditure for general public political communication that includes a clearly identified candidate

and is coordinated with that candidate, an opposing candidate

or a party committee supporting or opposing that candidate is

both an expenditure under 11 C.F.R. 100.8(a) and an in-kind

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contribution under 11 C.F.R. 100.7(a)(1)(iii)." 11 C.F.R.

100.23 (2001). Prior to promulgating this broader definition,

the Commission deadlocked 3-3 on whether to pursue its

counsel's finding that the 1996 Clinton campaign made illegal

coordinated expenditures and accepted illegal contributions

from the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The Commission has six voting members, no more than three of whom

may be affiliated with the same political party, and any

formal agency action requires the affirmative vote of four

members. The Commissioners disagreed over whether the

political party's expenditures were, in fact, "coordinated expenditures," which seems to have been the impetus for this

lawsuit. On the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in

FEC v. Colorado Republican Campaign Committee, 121

S. Ct. 2351 (2001), the Commission is engaged in rulemaking

to extend this May 2001 regulation of coordinated expenditures to political parties.

All federal candidates and political committees must file

periodic reports with the Commission detailing all their receipts as well as their contributions, expenditures, and other

disbursements. Section 434(b)(2) requires that these reports

disclose contributions from political party committees and, for

an authorized committee of a candidate for the office of

President, certain federal funds. The Commission's implementing regulations require national political party committees to report for public disclosure their "soft money" disbursements and donations received. FECA further requires

political parties to report "the total amount of all disbursements" and to delineate 441a coordinated expenditures. A

candidate is not, however, required to report as contributions

coordinated expenditures by his political party.

The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to

the civil enforcement of FECA. However, a private party

may file a sworn administrative complaint alleging violations

with the Commission. After investigation, the Commission

determines whether there is "probable cause to believe" that

a violation has occurred. If the Commission dismisses an

administrative complaint, petitioners may seek review of the

Commission's determination in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia. Democracy 21 and

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Common Cause have filed an administrative complaint with

the Commission making essentially the same allegations of

illegal coordination, contributions, and expenditures as appellants make in this suit.

In this case, appellants alleged that the Commission's

failure, as yet, to implement and construe the Act to identify

coordinated expenditures by the major political parties to

further the election of their publicly financed nominees as

impermissible "contributions" and "expenditures" injured

them in three distinct ways. First, the FEC's failure deprived them of required information about the source and

amount of candidates' financing. Second, the FEC's failure

prevented them from determining whether publicly financed

candidates were abiding by the law in forgoing private contributions and in refusing to make expenditures in excess of the

public grant. Third, the FEC's inaction interfered with their

right to direct that their $3 income tax return checkoff be

used in a lawful fashion.

The district court dismissed appellants' suit prior to convening a three-judge panel. It held that appellants' second

and third alleged injuries were insufficient to confer Article

III standing and appellants do not rely on those alleged

injuries on appeal. The court concluded that it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction under section 9011(b) to consider appellants' claim that the Commission's failure to implement and

construe the Fund Act deprived them of information about

the source and amount of the presidential candidates' financing because section 9011(b) "only empowers federal district

courts 'to implement or con[s]true' " the Fund Act. And "to

consider Plaintiffs' inadequate disclosure claim, the Court

would have to implement and construe FECA, not the Fund

Act, because FECA is the law that governs the disclosure

requirements about which Plaintiffs complain."

II.

The Commission supports the district court's determination

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because appellants'

claim is not really for an interpretation of the Fund Act, but

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rather for an interpretation of similar but not identical language in FECA, which includes the disclosure requirements.4

Appellants argue that it is likely that the two statutes would

be interpreted in pari materia, which is by no means obvious,

but, in any event, the court's reasoning seems to us to sound

more applicable to cause of action considerations than to

subject matter jurisdiction. The district judge, however,

lacked authority, by herself, to dismiss on cause of action

grounds.

Be that as it may, we think appellants lack standing-which

is, of course, jurisdictional. The Commission disputes all

three elements of appellants' standing claim: injury, causation and redressability. Causation and redressability are

challenged on similar reasoning that led the district court to

dismiss. The Commission argues that an interpretation of

the Fund Act will not necessarily or even likely lead to the

interpretation of similar language in FECA so that redressability is missing. And to reverse the analysis (which normally

follows) causation is defective because the Commission's alleged failure to interpret language in the Fund Act did not

cause the Commission to make any determination with respect to FECA. In other words, whether considering this

problem from the vantage point of causation or redressability

the interpretation of the Fund Act and FECA are independent variables.

As if this were not enough the Commission also asserts

that appellants fail the prudential standing test as well because this is not an "appropriate" action within the meaning

of section 9011(b). If we were to grant appellants relief in

construing the Fund Act, on the theory that the Commission

would be obliged or likely to construe FECA in pari materia,

we would be interfering implicitly with the Commission's

exclusive authority to enforce FECA.

Although recognizing the tenuous nature of appellants'

claimed interrelationship between the two statutes we prefer

to rest our decision on appellants' failure to assert an injury

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4 Compare the use of the term "qualified campaign expense" in

the Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. s 9002(11), with the use of the term

"expenditure" in FECA, 2 U.S.C. s 431(9)(A).

in fact because that is the logical anterior question in any

standing analysis. Appellants rely on FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S.

11 (1998), which holds that a voter suffers cognizable injury

under FECA when it is deprived of information that the Act

requires be disclosed. See also Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731,

735 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc) (comparing cases), vacated and

remanded on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 ("We have recognized in our 'informational injury' cases that a party may be

entitled to sue in federal court to force the government to

provide information to the public (and thereby to it) if the

government's failure to provide or cause others to provide

that particular information specially affects that party."). On

the other hand, as the Commission points out, the government's alleged failure to "disclose" that certain conduct is

illegal by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally cognizable injury. See Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 417

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(D.C. Cir. 1997). "To hold that a plaintiff can establish injury

in fact merely by alleging that he has been deprived of the

knowledge as to whether a violation of the law has occurred

would be tantamount to recognizing a justiciable interest in

the enforcement of the law. This we cannot do." Id. at 418.

Cf. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24.

The Commission contends, and we agree, that, under the

Akins test, appellants have failed to show either that they are

directly being deprived of any information or that the legal

ruling they seek might lead to additional factual information.

To be sure, presidential candidates are subject to FECA's

disclosure and reporting requirements. And FECA requires

political parties to report each disbursement and to label

coordinated expenditures as a discrete category. Yet, appellants' counsel did not dispute that all political parties currently report all disbursements or that each transaction appellants allege is illegal is reported in some form. During oral

argument, counsel for appellants was asked what facts, specifically, were not being disclosed. Counsel responded that the

"fact" of "coordination" was being withheld. But "coordination" appears to us to be a legal conclusion that carries

certain law enforcement consequences.

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It is perhaps conceivable that certain facts are necessarily

implied by the label "coordinated." If they are, appellants

did not make clear what were those facts (nor did they make

this argument to the district court or in their briefs). As far

as we can determine, appellants do not really seek additional

facts but only the legal determination that certain transactions constitute coordinated expenditures. If so, candidates

would be required to report allegedly coordinated expenditures, which currently only political parties disclose, as disbursements.5 But that would mean that appellants only seek

the same information from a different source. Any such

increase in information resulting from the imposition of duplicative reporting requirements seems trivial.

Although both sides' presentation of the current disclosure

and reporting requirements was somewhat confusing, appellants bear the burden of showing their standing, and they

simply failed to establish that the ruling sought would yield

anything more than a legal characterization or duplicative

reporting of information that under existing rules is already

required to be disclosed.

* * * *

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

So ordered.

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5 Appellants' real dispute seems to be with one commissioner who

has stated that he believes a political party's ad is not coordinated

with the candidate unless it expressly urges a vote for the candidate.

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Garland, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: Appellants contend that in the absence of the judicial declaration

they seek, they are deprived of information that a political

party committee has coordinated its expenditures with its

presidential candidate. The FEC responds, and appellants

do not dispute, that political party committees are already

required to report and to identify such coordinated expenditures as s 441a(d) expenditures in their FECA filings. FEC

Br. at 34-35; see 2 U.S.C. s 434(b)(4)(H)(iv), (6)(B)(iv); 2

U.S.C. s 441a(d)(2); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2352, 2371

(2001). Because appellants' briefs fail to articulate how a

judicial declaration would provide them with additional information, they have failed to satisfy their burden of establishing

standing to bring this action. See Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

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