Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03154/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03154-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abdur R. Mahdi
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 7, 2009 Decided March 30, 2010

No. 03-3154

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ABDUR R. MAHDI, ALSO KNOWN AS CHIEF,

 ALSO KNOWN AS BIG CHIEF,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00396-01)

Robert S. Becker, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for the appellant.

Stephanie Goldstein Brooker, Assistant United States

Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Roy W. McLeese III

and Mary B. McCord, Assistant United States Attorneys, were

on brief.

Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Abdur Mahdi

was charged with operating a narcotics distribution enterprise in

northwest Washington, D.C. and was convicted of 48 criminal

counts involving possessing/distributing narcotics, racketeering,

firearms use and possession, assault, murder, perjury and

obstruction of justice. See 3d Re-typed Indictment, United

States v. Mahdi, Crim. No. 01-396-1 (July 14, 2003)

(Indictment). The district court sentenced Mahdi to ten life

sentences (concurrent with each other and with lesser terms of

incarceration) followed by one 7-year and five 25-year

consecutive sentences. Judgment, id. (Dec. 22, 2003). Mahdi

challenges both his convictions and his sentences on various

grounds. We affirm his convictions and sentences with a single

exception: we vacate his conviction on two counts of

distribution of a controlled substance (cocaine base) and four

counts of possessing with intent to distribute (PWID) a

controlled substance (cocaine, cocaine base and marijuana),

which together merge into six corresponding counts of

distribution and PWID within 1,000 feet of a school, and remand

for resentencing.

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, see

United States v. Lloyd, 515 F.3d 1297, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir.

2008), the evidence establishes the following facts. Mahdi

purchased narcotics from a man known as “Radar” and

distributed them on the street either himself or through others.

Initially, Mahdi purchased “crack” cocaine in bulk to resell in

the street sales but later began to purchase cocaine powder and

“cook” the crack himself, stretching the amounts with baking

soda. In the course of his drug distribution operation, Mahdi

conspired to commit or did commit more than twelve violent

crimes.

The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department

(MPD) investigated Mahdi over several years, using undercover

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1

This RICO provision makes it unlawful to conspire to participate

in a pattern of racketeering activity as prohibited under section

1962(a), (b) or (c).

2

VICAR, quoted in relevant part infra p. 8, sets out specific

punishments for anyone who perpetrates specifically enumerated

violent crimes in connection with racketeering activity.

3

Section 924(c) prescribes minimum sentences for anyone

convicted of carrying or using a firearm “during and in relation to any

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime” or possessing a gun “in

furtherance of any such crime.”

operatives, observation posts, video surveillance, wiretaps and

search warrants. Particularly effective were undercover drug

purchases conducted or overseen by MPD Officer Cynthia

Lovely in March 2000, which formed the basis for various

distribution counts and for warrants to search Mahdi’s house

and his automobiles (where he “stashed” drugs) which MPD

executed in December 1999, August 2000, December 2000 and

November 2001. The searches yielded, inter alia, over 600

grams of cocaine base as well as five firearms and

corresponding ammunition.

Mahdi was arrested on November 15, 2001 after a grand

jury returned a 324-count indictment against him and 15 others

on November 8, 2001. After all of Mahdi’s co-defendants

entered guilty pleas, the indictment was filed in its final form

(“[r]e-typed”), naming Mahdi alone as defendant and charging

him with forty-nine counts involving drugs, firearms and acts of

violence, including violations of the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d),1

 the

Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (VICAR), 18

U.S.C. § 1959,2 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).3 See Indictment,

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4

The 49-count indictment charges the following offenses: 1 count

of conspiracy to distribute and PWID cocaine, cocaine base and

marijuana (Count 1); 1 count of RICO conspiracy (Count 2); 2 counts

of carrying a pistol without a license (Counts 3, 18); 1 count of armed

robbery (Count 4); 2 counts of assault with a dangerous weapon

(Counts 5, 21); 10 counts of VICAR (Counts 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17,

22, 24, 26); 1 count of first degree murder while armed (Count 12); 1

count of perjury (Count 19); 1 count of obstruction of justice (Count

20); 6 counts of assault with intent to murder while armed (Counts 8,

10, 14, 16, 23, 25); 6 counts of use of a firearm in a violent crime

(Counts 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32); 5 counts of possessing a firearm

during a crime of violence (Counts 33, 34, 35, 36, 37); 2 counts of

distributing cocaine base (Counts 38, 39); 4 counts of PWID cocaine,

cocaine base or marijuana (Counts 40, 41, 42, 43); and 6 counts of

distribution or PWID of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a

protected place (a school) (Counts 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49). 

5

The jury failed to reach a verdict on Count 4 (armed robbery)

and the court declared a mistrial thereon.

Appellant’s App. 201.4 Mahdi’s trial began on April 14, 2003

and, on July 31, 2003, the jury returned a verdict convicting

Mahdi of 48 counts.5 On December 4, 2003, the district court

sentenced Mahdi to various concurrent prison terms, including

ten life sentences followed by one 7- and five 25-year

consecutive terms. Mahdi filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

Mahdi contests his convictions and sentence on various

grounds. We address each ground seriatim.

A. Multiplicitous Indictment

When an indictment charges the same offense in more than

one count, it often creates “a problem known as ‘multiplicity,’ ”

United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

(quoting 1A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure

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§§ 142, 145, at 7-8 (3d ed.1999)), because “the Double

Jeopardy Clause protects not only against ‘a second prosecution

for the same offense’ after acquittal or conviction, but also

against ‘multiple punishments for the same offense,’ ” id.

(quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).

“Whether defendant has in fact been punished twice for the

same offense, however, depends upon what ‘the legislature

intended.’ ” Id. (quoting Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381

(1989)). Mahdi argues that eight of the VICAR counts, three of

the “sub-conspiracies” in the RICO count and five of the section

924(c) counts were also charged as violations of D.C. law,

which means the latter are multiplicitous lesser included

offenses of the VICAR, RICO and section 924(c) counts for

which he may not be punished a second time. The government

counters that Mahdi waived the multiplicity objection because

he did not raise it until this appeal. See Weathers, 186 F.3d at

952 (“According to Circuit precedent, multiplicity claims of the

kind presented here are defenses based on ‘defects in the

indictment’ within the meaning of Rule 12(b)(2), and hence are

waived under Rule 12(f) if not raised prior to trial.”); see Fed.

R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3) (formerly 12(b)(2)); id. R. 12(e) (formerly

12(f)). Mahdi asserts, in turn, he can show “good cause” for his

failure to raise an objection below so as to excuse the waiver.

See id. (“For good cause, the court may grant relief from the

waiver.”); Weathers, 186 F.3d at 952-53. We need not resolve

the parties’ waiver dispute. Because Mahdi did not object in the

district court to the alleged multiplicity, we review his

arguments for plain error. See United States v. Kelly, 552 F.3d

824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We apply plain error review to the

double jeopardy issue because [the defendant] ‘allow[ed][the]

alleged error to pass without objection’ below.” (quoting In re

Sealed Case, 283 F.3d 349, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2002))) (alteration in

original); see also Appellant’s Br. 8 (seeking plain error

review). Under the plain error standard, “ ‘we will correct a

district court’s error only if (1) there is in fact an error to

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correct; (2) the error is “plain”; (3) it “affects substantial

rights”; and (4) it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” ’ ” United States v.

Walker, 545 F.3d 1081, 1086-87 (D.C. Cir. 2008 (quoting

United States v. Taylor, 497 F.3d 673, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67

(1997))). Applying this standard, we conclude that the district

court did not plainly err in failing to strike the alleged lesser

included offenses from the indictment.

Mahdi contends the indictment is multiplicitous in three

respects. His primary contention is that eight of the VICAR

assault and murder counts (Counts 6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 24, 26)

are multiplicitous of the analogous D.C. criminal counts of

assault with a dangerous weapon (Count 5), assault with intent

to murder while armed (Counts 8, 10, 14, 16, 23, 25) and first

degree murder while armed (Count 12). The court did not

plainly err in failing sua sponte to strike the D.C. or federal

counts as multiplicitous. To determine multiplicity vel non,

courts generally apply the Blockburger test: “ ‘[W]here the

same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct

statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether

there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision

requires proof of a fact which the other does not,’ ” i.e., whether

either is a lesser included offense of the other. Weathers, 186

F.3d at 951 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.

299, 304 (1932)). The Blockburger test, however, provides only

a canon of construction, not a “conclusive presumption of law.”

Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985); see United

States v. McLaughlin, 164 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“As a tool

of statutory construction, the Blockburger test is not absolutely

controlling.” (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333,

340 (1981))). “ ‘There is nothing in the Constitution which

prevents Congress from punishing separately each step leading

to the consummation of a transaction which it has power to

prohibit and punishing also the completed transaction.’ ”

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Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779 (quoting Albrecht v. United States,

273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927)) (emphasis in Garrett). Thus, “the

Blockburger presumption must of course yield to a plainly

expressed contrary view on the part of Congress,” that is, “when

the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the

legislative history.” Id. (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.

359, 368 (1983); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340; Whalen v. United

States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92, (1980)); McLaughlin, 164 F.3d at

8-9 (“Several cases illustrate that where there is clear evidence

of legislative intent, multiple sentences are possible even though

a Blockburger analysis would indicate otherwise.”); United

States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Even if

one crime is a lesser included offense of another, punishments

may be imposed for both ‘if Congress intended that they be

imposed.’ ” (quoting United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1494

(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1097 (1996))).

Accordingly, the Court in Garrett concluded that, “logic

supports the conclusion, also indicated by the legislative

history,” that in enacting the “Continuing Criminal Enterprise”

statute (CCE), the Congress “intended separate punishments for

the underlying substantive predicates and for the CCE offense.”

Garrett, 471 U.S. at 795. We have similarly concluded that

“RICO is intended to supplement, rather than replace, existing

criminal provisions” and that therefore “although the drug

conspiracy is a lesser included offense of the RICO conspiracy,

cumulative punishments are authorized,” noting that “the

circuits that have held drug conspiracies to be lesser included

offenses of RICO conspiracies or have not resolved the issue

nevertheless allow cumulative sentences to stand on the ground

that the Congress ‘intended to permit, and perhaps sought to

encourage, the imposition of cumulative sentences for RICO

offenses and the underlying crimes.’ ” White, 116 F.3d at 932

(quoting United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 864 (8th Cir.

1987)). 

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The VICAR statute’s language supports the same sort of

Congressional intent. It sets out specific punishments for

anyone who “murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a

dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily

injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence against

any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United

States, or attempts or conspires so to do” in return for “anything

of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged in racketeering

activity, or for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining

or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering

activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (emphasis added). The quoted

language at least suggests that the Congress intended to impose

for a VICAR violation a cumulative penalty separate from and

in addition to what is authorized by a particular “law[] of a[]

State or the United States,” as it did in enacting RICO and the

CCE statute, based upon the showing of an additional statutory

element —in the case of VICAR, that the underlying violent

offense bears a certain relationship to racketeering activity. At

least this is a reasonable construction, particularly in light of the

close relationship between VICAR and RICO, the latter of

which, as already noted, we have held to authorize separate

sentences for both RICO and a lesser included offense. See 18

U.S.C. § 1959(b)(1) (VICAR “ ‘racketeering activity’ has the

meaning set forth in [RICO] section 1961”). Thus, “ ‘absent

precedent from either the Supreme Court or this court’ ” that

VICAR does not authorize cumulative punishments, the

“ ‘asserted error . . . falls far short of plain error.’ ” United

States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 893 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting

United States v. Vizcaino, 202 F.3d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

Second, Mahdi asserts that the RICO conspiracy count

(Count 2) “subsumes . . . three subsidiary D.C. murder

conspiracies” contained in it. Appellant’s Br. 10. The D.C.

murder conspiracies identified, however, were not charged as

separate counts but merely as racketeering acts within the RICO

count. Indictment 23-29. Thus, there is no multiplicity. See

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6

In any event, as already noted, RICO authorizes cumulative

sentences notwithstanding the charging of lesser included offenses.

See White, 116 F.3d at 931-32.

Weathers, 186 F.3d at 951 (multiplicity occurs if “indictment

charged the same offense in more than one count”) (emphasis

added).6

Finally, Mahdi contends that five of the counts charging

use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime or crime of

violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) (Counts 28-32) are multiplicitous

with the D.C. counts charging possession of a firearm during a

crime of violence (D.C. Code § 22-4504(b)) (PFCV) (Counts

33- 37). This argument fails under Blockburger because “ ‘each

provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not,’ ”

Weathers, 186 F.3d at 951 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at

304 )—that is, neither is a lesser included offense of the other.

When analyzing compound offenses such as the two at issue

here, we look to the predicate offenses charged, McLaughlin,

164 F.3d at 13—in this case VICAR (for section 924(c)) and

first degree murder and assault with intent to murder (for

section 22-4504(b)). VICAR requires a showing of

participation in a racketeering activity which the D.C. murder

and assault charges do not; the D.C. charges, in turn, require

proof of either premeditation or specific intent, see United

States v. Sumler, 136 F.3d 188, 190 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Hardy

v. United States, 2010 WL 374113, at *3 (D.C. Feb. 4, 2010),

which VICAR does not. Because a VICAR violation is not the

“same offense” under the Blockburger test as either of the D.C.

crimes, we conclude that the section 924(c) and the PFCV

counts “each required an element that the other did not” and

“[t]herefore, the Blockburger test is satisfied.” McLaughlin,

164 F.3d at 13; see also United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 101

(2d Cir. 1999) (“Murder under either [RICO or VICAR] . . . is

not simply a federalized version of the state crime. Rather, it is

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a distinct substantive offense that requires proof of its own

particular elements.”); cf. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11,

39 (1st Cir. 2002) (VICAR not lesser included offense of RICO

count naming VICAR as predicate offense). In so concluding,

we reject Mahdi’s contention that “the indictment incorporated

the definitions of those D.C. offenses as an element of the

VICAR offense.” Reply Br. 5; see Diaz, 176 F.3d at 96 (“[T]he

reference to violating state law in the VICAR count is only

meant to indicate unlawful conduct that constitutes a predicate

offense for a VICAR charge under § 1959(a)(6).”). 

B. Uncharged Conduct

Next, Mahdi contends the district court erred in not

requiring that the government notify Mahdi of “intrinsic”

evidence of uncharged conduct and in admitting such evidence

despite the undue prejudice its “cumulation” caused him. See

Appellant’s Br. 17-23. Mahdi points to only two instances

where the government elicited evidence of uncharged acts: (1)

the testimony of Sherrilyn Lee, one of Mahdi’s sellers, that on

one occasion Mahdi put a knife to her back (although he did not

use force or break the skin but was “playing”), Trial Transcript,

United States v. Mahdi, Crim. No. 01-396-1, at 13-14 (a.m. May

13, 2003) (hereinafter cited in format: 5/5am Tr. 13-14); and (2)

the testimony of drug purchaser and co-conspirator James

Hamilton that, during an argument over the keys to Hamilton’s

van, Mahdi “lunged at [him] with a knife and struck” him in the

shoulder, “just br[eaking] the skin” but leaving no scar, 5/7pm

Tr. 71-76; 5/8pm Tr. 62-70. We see no ground for reversal.

We first address the lack of notice claim. Noting that “Rule

404(b) . . . requires the government to give notice of its intent

to use [propensity] evidence to ‘reduce surprise and promote

early resolution on the issue of admissibility,’ ” Mahdi contends

that, by denying his request for a “bill of particulars,” the

district court deprived him of his “ability ‘to [be] inform[ed of]

. . . the charge against him in sufficient detail [to] prepare a

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Mahdi acknowledges the district court directed the government

to inform it before eliciting evidence that “falls outside the scope of

the conspiracy evidence, or it is the kind of act of violence that would

be what [the court] define[d] as shootings, stabbings, and robberies,

killings.” 3/6am Tr. 32. 

defense and to minimize surprise at trial.’ ” Appellant’s Br. 18,

20 (quoting United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1172 (5th

Cir. 1986)).7 The government was not required, however, to

provide notice of the intrinsic evidence to which Mahdi refers.

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) authorizes admission of

“[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” provided it is

offered not “to prove the character of a person in order to show

action in conformity therewith” but rather “for other purposes,

such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Rule

404(b) further requires “that upon request by the accused, the

prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice

. . . of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to

introduce at trial.” No such notice is required, however, for

evidence of an “intrinsic act,” that is, an act that is “part of the

crime charged.” United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting one consequence of labeling evidence

‘intrinsic’ is “to relieve the prosecution of Rule 404(b)’s notice

requirement” (citing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory committee’s

note to 1991 amendments)). And Mahdi has correctly labeled

the two cited incidents as “intrinsic acts” because the testimony

about them was offered “not as circumstantial evidence

requiring an inference regarding the character of the accused”

but “as direct evidence of a fact in issue,” which “ ‘will, by

definition, always satisfy Rule 404(b).’ ” United States v.

Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 125-26 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(quoting Bowie, 232 F.3d at 927). The testimony was offered,

and admitted, to show “how [Mahdi] ke[pt] the worker-bees in

line,” 5/5am Tr. 15 (Lee incident) and “the kind of

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8

On appeal, Mahdi argues—for the first time—that the lack of

notice of the two incidents (and of a shooting revealed during Mahdi’s

cross-examination of government witness Joseph Hooker) deprived

Mahdi of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. Because

the argument was not raised before the trial court, we review it for

plain error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. Given the established rule

that the government need not provide notice of intrinsic evidence and

the dearth of authority to support Mahdi’s contrary position—from

this court or the Supreme Court—the “asserted error falls far short of

plain error.” Perry, 479 F.3d at 894 n.8 (internal quotation omitted).

In any event, because Mahdi has not demonstrated any unfair

prejudice from Lee’s and Hamilton’s testimony, as we next conclude,

the failure to provide notice of the testimony did not “affect[]

[Mahdi’s] substantial rights,” the third plain error prerequisite. See

United States v. Smith, 232 F.3d 236, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(“ ‘substantial rights’ inquiry of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

52(b) mirrors Rule 52(a)’s ‘harmless error’ inquiry, except that the

burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice”

(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (1993))); United States v. Baugham,

449 F.3d 167, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (third Olano element requires that

appellant “ ‘make a specific showing of prejudice,’ i.e., show that the

error ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings’ ”

(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35)). With regard to the shooting

testimony Mahdi’s counsel elicited from Hooker on crossexamination, Mahdi offers no authority that a defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right is violated when his own counsel elicits on crossexamination his bad acts. Cf. United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120,

1154 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he fact that cross-examination is fraught

with the peril of bringing out other facts detrimental to a defendant

organizational control” he exercised, 5/7am Tr. 13

(Hamilton)—facts placed in issue by Mahdi’s defense that there

was no organized enterprise at all and that “to the extent that a

narcotics conspiracy existed it was made up of equals,” of

which he was but one. Appellant’s Br. 4. Accordingly, the

court did not err in failing to require that the government

provide notice of the cited testimony.8

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does not amount to a denial of [his Sixth Amendment] right.”). In the

absence of such authority, we do not find the district court plainly

erred. See Perry, 479 F.3d at 894 n.8. We note, in this regard, that the

court repeatedly warned Mahdi’s counsel that he (or she) should tread

carefully on cross-examination given the many violent acts Mahdi had

committed that might be unearthed, see, e.g., 5/5am Tr. 11-12, 28,

and, in particular, that Hooker knew of “serious acts of violence” that

were “directly related” to Mahdi—to which defense counsel

responded he “understood” what the court meant and would “stay

away from that,” 5/5pm Tr. 132-34. Nonetheless, Mahdi’s counsel

asked Hooker on cross-examination whether Hooker or Mahdi had

shot Hooker’s brother, Derrick, and Hooker responded it was Mahdi.

5/27pm Tr. 126-27.

9

Indeed, as Mahdi’s counsel acknowledged, “the indictment itself

is . . . overwhelming with acts of violence.” 5/7am Tr. 13.

Nor did the court abuse its discretion in declining to

exclude Lee’s and Hamilton’s testimony under Rule 403 as

unfairly prejudicial. See United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d

1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (abuse of discretion standard

applicable to Rule 403 rulings). Mahdi contends the

“cumulation of uncharged conduct, of which defense counsel

had no notice and could not counter, was highly prejudicial.”

Appellant’s Br. 20. The cited testimony, however, did not cause

Mahdi undue prejudice, either individually or cumulatively. It

involved two relatively minor incidents which paled alongside

the extreme violence of the acts of which Mahdi was indicted

and convicted: shooting nine people (resulting in the death of

one) and stabbing and cudgeling two others.9

 The prejudice, if

any, to Mahdi from evidence of the two acts (beyond the

testimony’s legitimate probative value) was therefore minimal.

C. Right to Present a Complete Defense 

Next, Mahdi claims he was prevented from mounting an

effective defense by the government’s evidentiary strategies and

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the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Notwithstanding Mahdi’s

characterization of his claims as constitutional, we have held

that when a defendant claims exclusion of testimony “violate[s]

his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth

Amendment right ‘to have compulsory process for obtaining

witnesses in his favor,’ ” the court reviews the exclusion “under

the typical abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings”

and the “statutory harmless error review standard” (i.e., error is

harmless unless it has “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946))—except in the “rare” case “in

which a district court’s application of a rule of evidence is so

erroneous and unfair as to constitute a constitutional violation.”

United States v. Lathern, 488 F.3d 1043, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir.

2007). None of Mahdi’s asserted evidentiary errors presents

that rare case. 

John Floyd

First, Mahdi claims the government deterred John Floyd,

Mahdi’s family’s lawyer, from testifying in Mahdi’s defense by

attempting to put on evidence suggesting Floyd acted as a sort

of “consigliere” to the Mahdis, coaching conspirators to commit

perjury in a 1999 criminal prosecution of Mahdi’s brother and

counseling Mahdi himself to prepare to flee in October 2000.

According to Mahdi, “Floyd would have provided evidence of

wrongdoing by police officers who testified against Mr. Mahdi,

contradicted cooperating witnesses’ testimony, and countered

the claim that [a lawsuit Mahdi filed against the police] was a

weapon to ward off prosecution.” Appellant’s Br. 26. Mahdi

asserted that the government’s actions “prevented [Floyd] from

testifying . . . by raising the possibility that information

provided by cooperators, which had not been disclosed to

defense counsel, would be used to impeach him and might form

the basis for criminal charges or disciplinary action by the Bar.”

Id. The record, however, reveals no attempt by Mahdi to put

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10Hooker was Mahdi’s “shadow,” seen constantly in his company.

6/24am Tr. 76-77. Hooker also purchased crack from Mahdi which

he then resold on the street. 5/14am Tr. 54-56, 61, 65-66.

Floyd on the stand. In short, he identifies no error by the court.

Further, Floyd himself told Mahdi’s counsel he was “not

concerned about any Fifth Amendment claim,” 6/30pm Tr. 93,

belying Mahdi’s suggestion that the government’s conduct

deterred Floyd from testifying.

Osale Gates

Second, Mahdi asserts the court erroneously excluded the

testimony of Osale Gates that government witness AbdulRahim had murdered one Dwayne T. Pate. During crossexamination of Abdul-Rahim, who had testified about an

attempt on his life by Mahdi and Joseph Hooker10 during which

Abdul-Rahim’s companion, Curtis Hattley, was shot and killed,

defense counsel asked if Abdul-Rahim had ever “handled a gun

or saw a gun.” The witness responded: “I saw a gun before.”

Defense counsel followed up: “In whose possession, Mr.

Hattley’s?” and Abdul-Rahim responded “Yes.” 6/23am Tr. 94.

Afterward, defense counsel sought to put Gates on the stand to

testify that Abdul-Rahim had indeed handled a gun when he

shot and killed Pate in order to contradict what defense counsel

claimed was Abdul-Rahim’s denial he had ever handled one.

The district court excluded Gates’s testimony, which ruling

Mahdi now challenges.

After much discussion, the district court ultimately

excluded Gates’s testimony on the ground that, assuming

Abdul-Rahim had in fact denied ever using a gun, such a denial

“would not merit contradiction by extrinsic evidence,” 7/15pm

Tr. 14. The court explained it “would not permit [Mahdi] to

bring in a murder to show that [Abdul-Rahim] shot a gun”—not

a “murder not related to any of the murders,” 7/15am Tr. 123-

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11At times the trial court and the parties made reference to Federal

Rule of Evidence 608 as prohibiting impeachment by extrinsic

evidence on a collateral matter. We recently recognized that Rule 608

“ ‘leave[s] the admissibility of extrinsic evidence offered for other

grounds of impeachment[,] such as contradiction, . . . to rules 402 and

403.’ ” United States v. Fonseca, 435 F.3d 369, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 608 advisory committee's notes to 2003

amendments). Thus, “such evidence is admissible provided that it is

‘relevant’ and not otherwise prescribed by law or rule.” Id. (citing

Fed. R. Evid. 402). “And evidence that would contradict [a witness’s]

trial testimony, even on a collateral subject” is relevant under Rule

401 “because it would undermine her credibility as a witness

regarding facts of consequence.” Id. The trial court made clear,

however, that, whether or not Rule 608 applied, it did not view AbdulRahim’s denying he ever used a gun as “merit[ting]” impeachment by

extrinsic evidence of a murder—and an unrelated one at that. See

7/15pm Tr. 14; 7/15am Tr. 123-24. 

24. Mahdi’s counsel indicated he “agree[d],” suggesting that

otherwise they “would be [t]here for nine months on

contradictions,” id. at 124, and does not now challenge this

aspect of the court’s ruling. Mahdi again asserts, however, as

he did below, that the court should have admitted the extrinsic

testimony to show Abdul-Rahim’s testimony was biased in the

government’s favor. 7/15pm Tr. 15.11 See United States v.

Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50-52 (1984). The district court did not err

in rejecting this argument.

Mahdi contends Abdul-Rahim was biased because he

wanted to curry favor with the prosecutors to ward off an

investigation into his involvement in Pate’s murder. The court

reasonably rejected the argument because there was no

“connection between [Abdul-Rahim’s] alleged shooting and the

government” nor any “reason to infer that the government knew

anything about th[e] event or was aware of it at any point in

time prior to defense bringing it up here.” 7/15pm Tr. 15.

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding

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that Gates’s testimony was not admissible to establish bias. Cf.

United States v. Atherton, 936 F.2d 728, 733-34 (2d Cir. 1991)

(no abuse of discretion in excluding “bias” testimony about

government informant’s illegal drug use because “probative

value of such evidence . . . depends in large measure on some

showing that the government was contemplating prosecution, or

at least was aware, of the illegality” and defendant “failed to

connect [informant’s] alleged drug use to the relationship

between [informant] and the government” as “there was no

showing of any government awareness of that use or any danger

to [informant] that he would be prosecuted because of it”);

United States v. Lamp, 779 F.2d 1088, 1095-96 (5th Cir.)

(upholding exclusion of extrinsic “bias” testimony regarding

government witness’s unlawful possession of handgun where

bias was based on “far-fetched” theory witness wanted to curry

favor with prosecutor to avoid prosecution when there was no

indication he believed he was being investigated or law

enforcement was aware of possession before it was raised at

trial), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144 (1986).

Paul Tyler and Omar Washington

Third, Mahdi claims the court erred in excluding the

testimony of Paul Tyler and Omar Washington, which Mahdi

sought to use to attack the credibility of Joseph Hooker, who

testified at length about Mahdi’s drug activities and violent acts.

In particular, Mahdi wished to use their testimony to contradict

Hooker’s assertion that, before he “started hanging out with the

Mahdis” in 1998, he “did not sell drugs or . . . ever shoot

anyone,” 5/27am Tr. 84, and thereby to impeach Hooker’s

credibility. According to Mahdi’s counsel, both Tyler and

Washington could testify that they witnessed Hooker selling

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12Mahdi’s counsel proffered that Tyler would testify that he

observed Hooker “with drugs on him”—cocaine which Tyler

“believed . . . to be crack cocaine”—“in small ziplock bags” and “with

guns, including in school.” 7/14am Tr. 68-69. Mahdi’s counsel was

unable to proffer in any detail what testimony Washington would give

as neither she nor her investigators had personally spoken with

Washington. She was informed by Washington’s brother, however,

that Washington could testify to Hooker selling drugs and possessing

guns while in high school.

drugs and carrying a gun between 1995 and 1997 when the three

were in high school together.12

Tyler invoked his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and the court appropriately excluded his

testimony based thereon, noting his “exposure on more than one

front,” 7/14am Tr. 95—namely, that he faced two pending

criminal prosecutions and a grand jury investigation for his

participation in a drug conspiracy and he appeared in

government videotapes, admitted into evidence, showing him

purchasing crack and marijuana from Hamilton. The court

further declined to require Tyler to testify but “limit the

government’s right of cross-examination in some fashion”—to

accommodate both Mahdi’s Sixth Amendment right and Tyler’s

Fifth Amendment right—because the testimony sought from

Tyler was not exculpatory. 7/14am Tr. 95-96. The court’s

decision was not an abuse of discretion. 

In United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

we held in similar circumstances that in order to warrant

requiring a witness to testify notwithstanding invocation of his

Fifth Amendment right, the testimony sought must have the

potential to be “ ‘exculpatory testimony exonerating some of

the alleged participants’ ” and not be testimony such as the

defendant sought that simply “provided limited contradiction of

testimony” by a government witness. 52 F.3d at 1110

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(emphasis in original). Here, as in Edmond, the testimony

sought is merely contradictory, undercutting Hooker’s claim he

was law-abiding before meeting Mahdi; it did not have the

potential to exonerate Mahdi as is required under Edmond. 

As for Washington, at the time of the trial he was an inmate

at the Federal Correctional Institution in Estill, S.C. On July 10,

2003, Mahdi’s counsel, suspecting Tyler might not be available

to testify, sought a writ to transport Washington to testify at the

trial. The court was advised by the U.S. Marshals Service that

it would take 30 days to procure his presence and the court

denied Mahdi’s motion to continue the trial until then. The

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to continue the

trial for a full month so near to the lengthy trial’s close—on the

chance Washington would provide non-exonerating testimony

of so little probative value. See supra note 12; United States v.

Gantt, 140 F.3d 249, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (continuance ruling

reviewed only to determine whether judge “clearly abused his

discretion” in weighing various factors, including length of

requested delay and whether denying continuance will “result

in identifiable prejudice to defendant’s case, and if so, whether

this prejudice is of a material or substantial nature”) (internal

quotation omitted).

Curtis Reed

Fourth, Mahdi asserts the court erroneously “refused to

delay the trial” to secure the attendance of Curtis Reed to

testify. Appellant’s Br. 35. Mahdi sought Reed’s testimony to

contradict Hooker’s assertion that after one of the charged

shootings, Mahdi told Hooker he had hidden the murder weapon

in Reed’s house. According to Mahdi’s counsel, Reed would

testify he had never seen Mahdi with a gun and would not allow

anyone to bring a gun into his house and no one had ever done

so. 7/15am Tr. 10-11. Because Reed was attending school in

Tennessee, the court issued a subpoena which the Marshals

Service attempted unsuccessfully to serve at the Tennessee

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address Mahdi’s counsel had provided. The Marshals Service

so informed the court and the defense said nothing further on

the matter. We cannot say the court abused its discretion when

it failed sua sponte to order a continuance Mahdi’s counsel did

not request.

Finally, we note that the testimony of Gates, Tyler,

Washington and Reed would at best have contradicted minor

points made by two government witnesses. Given the

overwhelming unimpeached evidence of Mahdi’s guilt provided

by numerous witnesses, wiretaps and videotapes, exclusion of

these four witnesses’ impeachment testimony was, if error at all,

harmless under Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.

D. VICAR Counts

Next, Mahdi challenges the VICAR prosecution on three

grounds. We find none of them persuasive. 

First, Mahdi asserts that VICAR is facially unconstitutional

as it violates the Commerce Clause. We have already rejected

this argument in United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). As we explained there:

[I]t is impossible to see how a statute regulating

conduct within the District of Columbia could exceed

congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.

As in the U.S. Territories, Congress has plenary

authority in the District of Columbia. See U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 17; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see

also, e.g., Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 491,

24 S.Ct. 816, 48 L.Ed. 1087 (1904). Within the

District, Congress did not need to rely on its

Commerce Clause authority. Even if there were some

doubt about § 1959’s constitutionality outside the

District of Columbia, “we need not find the language

of [§ 1959] constitutional in all its possible

applications in order to uphold its facial

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constitutionality.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.

88, 104, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971).

Carson, 455 F.3d at 368 (footnote omitted). Our analysis in

Carson remains both correct and controlling. See Nat’l Inst. of

Military Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 512 F.3d 677, 682 (D.C.

Cir. 2008) (“We are, of course, bound to follow circuit

precedent absent contrary authority from an en banc court or the

Supreme Court.”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

Second, Mahdi contends VICAR is unconstitutional as

applied because “[e]ven if some criminal acts, such as murder

for hire, may substantially affect interstate commerce and could

be prosecuted under VICAR, the violent crimes at issue here are

unrelated to interstate commercial activity.” Appellant’s Br. 42

(citing United States v. Garcia, 68 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Mich.

1999)). As we just explained, however, under Carson, the

Commerce Clause is simply irrelevant to the VICAR statute as

applied in the District. 

Third, Mahdi argues the VICAR prosecution in this case

violates the Department of Justice VICAR prosecution manual

which states:

In deciding whether to approve a prosecution under

Section 1959, the Organized Crime and Racketeering

Section will analyze the prosecution memorandum and

proposed indictment to determine whether there is a

legitimate reason the offense cannot or should not be

prosecuted by state or local authorities. For example,

federal prosecution may be appropriate where local

authorities do not have the resources to prosecute,

where local authorities are reasonably believed to be

corrupt, where local authorities have requested federal

participation, or where the offense is closely related to

a federal investigation or prosecution. A prosecution

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will not be authorized over the objection of local

authorities in the absence of a compelling reason.

Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering–18 U.S.C. § 1959: A

Manual for Federal Prosecutors at 3-4 (Dec. 2006). The gist of

Mahdi’s argument is that because the U.S. Attorney prosecutes

all crimes in the District, there is no distinction between federal

and local authorities to justify prosecuting under VICAR rather

than under other federal or D.C. statutes. The manual itself,

however, specifically provides that its “policies and procedures”

are “internal Department of Justice policies and guidance only”

and “are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to,

create any right, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law

by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are any

limitations [t]hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative

prerogatives of the Department of Justice.” Id at i.

Accordingly, Mahdi’s argument is foreclosed. See In re Grand

Jury Subpoena (Judith Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1152-53 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (upholding reservation in U.S. Attorney’s Manual

guidelines which “expressly state[s] that they do ‘not create or

recognize any legally enforceable right in any person’ ”

(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(n)). 

E. Sentence

 Finally, Mahdi contends that, if his convictions are

affirmed, his sentence should be remanded for two reasons: (1)

many of the D.C. counts merge with the corresponding federal

counts; and (2) under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

(2005), the district court erroneously made factual findings

exclusively within the jury’s province and applied the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory. We address his two

grounds in reverse order.

First, as to his Booker argument, the government concedes

that there is “no indication that the court”—sentencing preBooker—“treated the Guidelines as anything but mandatory.”

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13In Carson, we, “like the Second Circuit, reach[ed] the common

sense conclusion that the VICAR statute does not permit a fine to be

levied in lieu of imprisonment or death.” 455 F.3d at 385 n.44 (citing

United States v. James, 239 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2000)). We note

that, even without the VICAR murder conviction, Mahdi would face

a mandatory statutory minimum sentence of 132 years for his six

firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (C)(i).

Appellee’s Br. 74. Nonetheless, “[b]ecause [Mahdi] did not

preserve [his] challenge to this error before the trial court, we

review the district court’s decision under the plain error

standard set forth in [United States v. ]Coles,” 403 F.3d 764

(D.C. Cir. 2005). Carson, 455 F.3d at 383. “Applying this

standard, we must determine whether the district court’s error

affected the defendant’s ‘substantial rights in a material way,’ ”

that is, “ ‘whether there would have been a materially different

result, more favorable to the defendant, had the sentence been

imposed in accordance with the post-Booker sentencing

regime.’ ” Id. (quoting Coles, 403 F.3d at 767) (footnote

omitted). The answer is no and this case is counted among

those in which we can “ ‘be confident that [the] defendant has

suffered no prejudice’ ” and therefore “affirm the sentence.” Id.

(quoting Coles, 403 F.3d at 769). 

As in Carson, “[n]o remand is needed . . . because

[VICAR], 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), and not the Guidelines,

mandates that [Mahdi] receive[] a life sentence for [his VICAR]

conviction[],” id. at 384—in this case, VICAR requires a

minimum sentence of life for the murder of Curtis Hattley

(Count 12). See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (defendant “shall be

punished—(1) for murder, by death or life imprisonment, or a

fine under this title, or both.”).13 In addition, the consecutive 7-

and 25-year sentences imposed for Counts 27-32 are mandatory

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Accordingly a remand would not

benefit Mahdi. 

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Second, we need not decide Mahdi’s merger argument here

because even if there is a merger, his D.C. convictions will

merge into the federal counts and his federal mandatory

statutory sentences will not change. See United States v. Dale,

991 F.2d 819, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United States

v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 954-55 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The proper

remedy for convictions on both greater and lesser included

offenses is to vacate the conviction and the sentence of the

lesser included offense.”). In any event, as we concluded supra

Part II.A, Mahdi failed to establish that any of the counts of

conviction is multiplicitous and he adds no new arguments here.

Finally, the government concedes that a limited

resentencing remand is appropriate because six convictions for

simple distribution of, or PWID, drugs (Counts 38-43) merge

into the analogous convictions for distribution of, or PWID,

drugs within 1,000 feet of a school (Counts 44-49). 

For the foregoing reasons, Mahdi’s convictions and

sentences are affirmed except that we vacate Counts 38-43 and

remand for limited resentencing to reflect the merger of Counts

38-43 into Counts 44-49. See United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d

956, 959-60 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[U]nless the court of appeals

expressly directs otherwise, the district court may consider only

such new arguments or new facts as are made newly relevant by

the court of appeals' decision—whether by the reasoning or by

the result.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119 (1998).

So ordered.

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