Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01229/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01229-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leroy Buhl
Not Party
John Dignam
Appellee
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Appellee
Debra Payne
Appellee
Jeremy Vaughn Pinson
Appellant
Mikeal G. Stine
Appellant
U.S. Dept. of Justice
Appellee
T. Vialpando
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JEREMY VAUGHN PINSON; MIKEAL 

G. STINE, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

and 

LEROY BUHL, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE; FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF PRISONS; JOHN 

DIGNAM; T. VIALPANDO; DEBRA 

PAYNE, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-1229 

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-01179-GPG) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, GORSUCH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

We raise sua sponte the question of whether this court has jurisdiction to consider 

this appeal from an order entered by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 

transferring the underlying matter to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406(a). 

Federal prisoners Jeremy Pinson and Mikeal Stine are under filing restrictions in 

the District of Colorado. They are also subject to the so-called “three strikes” provision 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 1, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-1229 Document: 01019453371 Date Filed: 07/01/2015 Page: 1 
2 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Pinson, Stine and fellow inmate Leroy Buhl filed the underlying 

prisoner civil rights suit in the District of Columbia. That court denied a motion for leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis (ifp) based on § 1915(g) and dismissed the complaint, but 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. It concluded that 

the allegations in the complaint satisfied the “imminent danger” exception in § 1915(g) 

and remanded the case for the district court to file and consider the complaint as to all 

three plaintiffs. On remand, the District of Columbia determined it was in the interest of 

justice to transfer the matter to the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 

and 1406(a), where the District of Colorado promptly dismissed Pinson and Stine as 

plaintiffs for failure to comply with their filing restrictions and directed Buhl to cure 

deficiencies in the complaint and ifp motion. 

Pinson and Stine mailed their notice of appeal from the transfer order to the 

District of Columbia. That court sent it back to the District of Colorado, resulting in the 

appeal now before us. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 

1509, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The date the papers in the transferred case are docketed in 

the transferee court also forms the effective date that appellate jurisdiction in the 

transferor circuit is terminated . . . .”). 

Except in certain limited circumstances, this court’s appellate jurisdiction is 

limited to review of final decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court has not 

yet resolved Buhl’s claims, the district court has not yet entered a final decision in this 

matter. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (describing a final 

decision as one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 

Appellate Case: 15-1229 Document: 01019453371 Date Filed: 07/01/2015 Page: 2 
3 

do but execute the judgment”). An order transferring a case pursuant to §§ 1404 and 

1406(a) is not otherwise immediately appealable. Chrysler Credit Corp., 928 F.2d at 

1517 n.7 (noting that a transfer order is not immediately appealable). Accordingly, we 

lack jurisdiction to consider this matter. 

Appeal dismissed. 

Entered for the Court 

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk 

by: Jane K. Castro 

 Counsel to the Clerk 

Appellate Case: 15-1229 Document: 01019453371 Date Filed: 07/01/2015 Page: 3