Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-03940/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-03940-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wayne A. Ritchie
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED 

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE A. RITCHIE,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

No. C 00-3940 MHP

ORDER

On April 27, 2005, defendant moved to vacate the court’s January 5, 2005 order imposing

monetary sanctions on the United States and on Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Patricia

Kenney pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(3). In the alternative, defendant seeks leave to

file a motion for reconsideration of that order pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9(b). 

In the order that defendant now seeks to vacate, the court found that Kenney improperly employed

obstructionist tactics in defending the deposition of Ira Feldman on February 7, 2003. While it concluded

that this misconduct was not sufficiently egregious to warrant the sanctions sought by plaintiff—precluding

defendant from presenting a defense on the issue of liability—the court nevertheless found that a less severe

penalty was appropriate. The court thus imposed monetary sanctions on defendant and on Kenney,

ordering each of them to pay one-half of the attorneys’ fees that plaintiff incurred in taking Feldman’s

February 2003 deposition.

In seeking to vacate that order, defendant argues that the court failed to give adequate notice

before imposing sanctions under Rule 30(d)(3). It is of course true that a court may not sanction a litigant

or an attorney sua sponte without first providing the target of the penalty an opportunity to show cause why

sanctions should not be imposed. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation

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COURT

For the Northern District of California

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omitted), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 941 (2002). However, what due process requires is notice of the

possibility that sanctions may imposed and an opportunity for the litigant or attorney to defend himself or

herself against the allegations of misconduct. See Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Montana Power Co. , 328 F.3d

1145, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2003). While it may be true that plaintiff moved for sanctions pursuant to the

court’s inherent power rather than pursuant to Rule 30(d)(3), plaintiff’s motion and defendant’s opposition

to that motion explicitly addressed the conduct that the court ultimately found to be sanctionable. That the

court decided to impose a less severe penalty than that which was sought by plaintiff hardly prevented

defendant or Kenney from vigorously defending themselves against the allegations of misconduct that were

addressed in the January 2005 order. Accordingly, the court finds that defendant received all the process

that was due prior to the court’s decision to impose sanctions under Rule 30(d)(3). Defendant’s motion to

vacate the order imposing those sanctions must therefore be denied.

Alternatively, defendant requests leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the court’s January

2005 order. This request is premised upon evidence that came to light during the April 2005 trial held in

the instant action, which defendant characterizes as establishing conclusively that plaintiff suffered no

prejudice from Kenney’s misconduct. The court cannot accept this characterization of the trial record. 

Simply put, the prejudicial effect of Kenney’s obdurate behavior cannot be ascertained from the evidence

presented at trial, just as it could not be determined based on the facts in the written record. In any event,

the court has already made clear that its rationale for imposing sanctions was not premised upon the

prejudicial effect of Kenney’s misconduct, but rather upon the ethical impropriety of the conduct itself. 

Accordingly, defendant’s suggestion that the court should reconsider its January 2005 order is not welltaken. Its request for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of that order is therefore denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES defendant’s motion to vacate the court’s 

January 5, 2005 order imposing sanctions upon it and upon AUSA Patricia Kenney and DENIES

defendant’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of that order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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For the Northern District of California

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Dated: June 6, 2005 /s/_____________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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ENDNOTES

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