Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17603/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17603-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
P. D. Brazelton
Appellant
Miguel Galindo Sifuentes
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIGUEL GALINDO SIFUENTES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

P. D. BRAZELTON,

Respondent-Appellant.

No. 13-17603

D.C. No.

4:09-cv-02902-PJH

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 12, 2015

Submission Vacated June 24, 2015

Resubmitted February 10, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed February 18, 2016

Amended June 9, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Sandra S. Ikuta,

Circuit Judges and James A. Teilborg,

*

 Senior District

Judge.

 

* The Honorable James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

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2 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

Order;

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel filed (1) an order amending its opinion and

denying a petition for rehearing en banc and (2) an amended

opinion reversing the district court’s judgment granting a

habeas corpus petition that challenged the prosecutor’s

decision to excuse nine black prospective jurors in the

petitioner’s trial for first degree murder of a police officer.

Applying the doubly deferential standard for reviewing a

determination under Batson v. Kentucky, the panel held that

the California Court of Appeal’s decision that the petitioner

had not carried his burden of showing the prosecutor acted in

a purposefully discriminatory way was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. The panel also held

that the trial court’s decision to preclude the petitioner from

responding to the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for

his strikes was harmless.

The panel remanded with instructions to dismiss the

petition.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 3

COUNSEL

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Dane R.

Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peggy S. Ruffra,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, John H. Deist

(argued), Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco,

California, for Respondent-Appellant.

Denis P. Riordan, Donald M. Horgan (argued), Riordan &

Horgan, San Francisco, California, for Petitioner-Appellee.

ORDER

The opinion filed on February 18, 2016, and published at

815 F.3d 490, is hereby amended as follows:

On page 511, in the first full paragraph, remove the

following sentence: <Even when a prosecutor relies on one

impermissible reason for striking a juror, there is no Batson

violation if “[t]he prosecutor provided a number of other

permissible and plausible race-neutral reasons.” Collins,

546 U.S. at 340–41.>.

With these amendments, the petition for rehearing en

banc is DENIED. Judge O’Scannlain and Judge Ikuta voted

to deny the petition for rehearing en banc and Judge Teilborg

so recommended. The petition for rehearing en banc was

circulated to the judges of the court, and no judge requested

a vote for en banc consideration.

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4 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. No

further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc will be

entertained.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises the question whether the California

Court of Appeal made an unreasonable determination of the

facts in affirming the trial court’s application of Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). On trial for first degree

murder of a police officer, Miguel Sifuentes challenged the

prosecutor’s decision to excuse nine black prospective jurors. 

The trial court concluded that Sifuentes had not carried his

burden of showing the prosecutor acted in a purposefully

discriminatory way, and the California Court of Appeal

affirmed. Applying the doubly deferential standard for

reviewing a Batson determination, see Briggs v. Grounds,

682 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), we conclude that the

California Court of Appeal’s decision was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). We also conclude that the trial court’s decision to

preclude Sifuentes from responding to the prosecutor’s raceneutral explanation for his strikes was harmless. We

therefore reverse the district court’s grant of habeas relief.

I

On December 11, 1998, Sifuentes, Ruben Vasquez, and

Hai Minh Le robbed an Outback Steakhouse in Dublin,

California. Sifuentes entered the restaurant by himself, and

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 5

asked for a table. He told the server he was waiting for

friends and ordered a soda. About a half hour later, when

Sifuentes declined to place an order, he was presented with a

bill. He told the server that he needed to get some money

from his car, and headed for the exit.

As soon as Sifuentes approached the door, Vasquez and

Le entered. Le pulled out a pellet gun and forced a departing

customer to return to the restaurant. Sifuentes was also

armed with a pellet gun. Brandishing their weapons,

Vasquez, Sifuentes and Le spread out through the restaurant

and forced the customers and employees into the kitchen. In

the kitchen, Vasquez demanded money and fired his nine

millimeter semiautomatic pistol into a fryer. The manager

led Vasquez into his office, where Vasquez stuffed his

pockets with money from the cash drawer. An employee

managed to call 911, but had to hang up before reporting the

robbery. When the restaurant phone rang, Vasquez ordered

the manager to tell the police that everything was OK, or

Vasquez would shoot him. The manager did as ordered. 

Then Vasquez, Sifuentes, and Le began forcing the

employees and customers into the restaurant’s walk-in

refrigerator. Before being shut into the refrigerator, an

employee activated a security device.

Deputy Sheriff Angela Schwab responded to the 911 call

and went into the restaurant to confirm the manager’s

statement that there was no problem at the restaurant. Once

she entered, she was surprised by Vasquez, who pointed his

gun at her, hit her in the face, and took her gun. Le put a gun

to her back, and he and Sifuentes walked her to the back of

the restaurant. Sheriff Deputy John Monego arrived at the

scene shortly thereafter. As he entered the restaurant,

Vasquez shot him. Monego fell to the ground, and Vasquez

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6 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

shot him multiple times where he lay, killing him. Vasquez,

Sifuentes, and Le fled the scene and were apprehended

shortly afterwards.

The three defendants were tried jointly. The prosecutor

charged Sifuentes and Le with first degree felony murder. 

Cal. Penal Code § 189 (felony murder includes a murder that

is committed by the defendant or an accomplice during the

commission of a specified dangerous felony). During voir

dire, the prosecutor focused on the potential jurors’ views on

the death penalty, and specifically whether they felt they

could sentence a defendant to death if the defendant did not

“actually commit the shooting.” The prosecutor used

peremptory strikes to remove thirty-three jurors, nine of

whom were black. The empaneled jury included one black

juror and one black alternate. The prosecutor stated for the

record that he would have accepted a black female juror

excused by the defense, as well as a black male juror, but that

juror had failed to appear in court.

Sifuentes and his co-defendants made three objections

during jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

(1986), and the analogous California case, People v. Wheeler,

22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978), based on the prosecutor’s use of

peremptory challenges to remove nine black jurors.1 After

each Batson motion, the trial judge determined that the

defendant had made a prima facie case of discrimination, and

1 We refer to the motions as being made under Batson, although the

defendants also relied on the analogous California case, People v.

Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978). Because it is the procedural equivalent

of a Batson objection, a Wheeler motion serves as an implicit objection

under Batson. McDaniels v. Kirkland, — F.3d —, 2015 WL 9461515, at

*1 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 2015) (en banc).

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 7

asked the prosecutor for an explanation. As explained in

more detail below, after Sifuentes’s first Batson motion,

challenging the prosecutor’s strike of Jackson, Norman, and

Jasper, and second Batson motion, challenging the

prosecutor’s strike of Webster and Massey, the trial court did

not permit defense counsel to respond to the prosecutor’s

explanation. The trial court did permit rebuttal for the third

Batson motion, duringwhichThompson, Gibson, Barnes, and

Skruggs were excluded. After each challenge, the court

determined that the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing each

juror were race neutral and not discriminatory.

Sifuentes and his two co-defendants were each convicted

of first degree murder, and Sifuentes was sentenced to 26

years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal

affirmed his conviction in January 2006, and the California

Supreme Court summarily denied review in May 2006. In

2007, Sifuentes petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in

federal court on several grounds, including that the state court

unreasonably determined the facts in rejecting his Batson

challenge to nine prospective jurors, and that the state court

unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in precluding

him from rebutting the prosecutor’s explanation for his

strikes. After a number of stays and refilings, the district

court granted Sifuentes relief on his claim as to two jurors,

Thompson and Gibson, and denied Sifuentes’s other claims. 

The state timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.

II

On appeal, the state claims that the district court erred in

its analysis of Sifuentes’s Batson claim with respect to jurors

Thompson and Gibson. Sifuentes argues that the district

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8 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

court did not err, and that, even if it did, the habeas petition

should be granted because the peremptory strikes of six other

jurors involved purposeful racial discrimination. 

Alternatively, Sifuentes argues that we can affirm the district

court because the state court violated Batson in preventing

himfromrebutting the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations. 

Our analysis of these arguments requires an understanding of

both the applicable Batson framework and the framework for

evaluating a habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A

We begin with the applicable Batson framework. As

Batson explains, “the State’s privilege to strike individual

jurors through peremptory challenges . . . is subject to the

commands of the Equal Protection Clause,” which “forbids

the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account

of their race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; see also Davis v.

Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015). “[A]s in any case

alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,” the key

question is “whether the defendant had met his burden of

proving purposeful discrimination on the part of the State.” 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 90.

To answer that question, Batson adopted a burden-shifting

approach similar to that used in other civil rights cases. Id. at

94 & n.18. First, the defendant must “make out a prima facie

case of purposeful discrimination” by providing some

evidence, such as the disproportionate exclusion of jurors of

a certain race, that a peremptory challenge has been exercised

on the basis of race. Id. at 93–94. “Once the defendant

makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to

come forward with a neutral explanation” for striking the

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 9

juror. Id. at 97. “Third, in light of the parties’ submissions,

the trial court must determine whether the defendant has

shown purposeful discrimination” on the part of the

prosecutor. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328–29

(2003) (Miller-El I) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). “The

opponent of the strike bears the burden of persuasion

regarding racial motivation.” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199.

The trial court’s determination whether the prosecutor has

intentionally discriminated “turn[s] on evaluation of

credibility.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. This type of

credibilitydetermination relies on the trial court’s “evaluation

of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and

credibility,” and is a “pure issue of fact” that lies “peculiarly

within a trial judge’s province.” Hernandez v. New York,

500 U.S. 352, 364–65 (1991). Recognizing that “peremptory

challenges are often the subjects of instinct, and that

race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke

a juror’s demeanor,” the Court has explained that “[a] trial

court is best situated to evaluate both the words and the

demeanor of jurors who are peremptorily challenged, as well

as the credibility of the prosecutor who exercised those

strikes.” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2201 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Determining “whether a peremptory

challenge is based on an impermissible factor” is difficult,

because peremptory challenges “are often based on subtle

impressions and intangible factors.” Id. at 2208. “[T]hese

determinations of credibility and demeanor lie peculiarly

within a trial judge’s province,” id. at 2201, because “a

reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from

voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make

credibility determinations.” Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 339; see

also Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2201 (“Appellate judges cannot on

the basis of a cold record easily second-guess a trial judge’s

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10 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

decision about likelymotivation.” (citing Rice v. Collins, 546

U.S. 333, 343 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring))). On direct

appeal, therefore, the reviewing court must uphold the trial

court’s credibility determination “unless it is clearly

erroneous,” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011),

meaning that the trial court’s decision leaves the reviewing

court with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed,” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370 (quoting

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

On direct appeal, a reviewing court may evaluate the trial

court’s credibility finding by considering evidence indicating

that the prosecutor’s rationale was pretextual. An inference

of pretext may arise when the prosecutor’s reasons are not

supported by the record, such as when a prosecutor

“mischaracterizes a juror’s testimony in a manner completely

contrary to the juror’s stated beliefs,” Aleman v. Uribe,

723 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2013), or when the reasons given

by the prosecutor are implausible or fantastic, Purkett v.

Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). In Miller-El v. Dretke

(Miller-El II), the Court noted that when a prosecutor gives

a race-neutral reason for striking a proposed juror, but has

allowed jurors with similar characteristics to be empaneled,

such inconsistent conduct raises the inference that the raceneutral reason is pretextual. 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005). 

Under this comparative juror analysis, “[i]f a prosecutor’s

proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as

well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to

serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful

discrimination.” Id.

The Supreme Court has not created any bright line rule

holding that Batson is necessarily violated when “prospective

jurors of different races provide similar responses and one is

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 11

excused while the other is not.” See Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d

1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather, the Court recognized that

“a retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold

appellate record may be very misleading when alleged

similarities were not raised at trial.” Snyder v. Louisiana,

552 U.S. 472, 483 (2008). A trial court can reasonably

conclude that the prosecutor had excused a prospective juror

based on the prosecutor’s assessment of that person’s

credibility “tak[ing] into account tone, demeanor, facial

expression, emphasis—all those factors that make the words

uttered by the prospective juror convincing or not.” Burks,

27 F.3d at 1429. Similarly, a trial court can reasonably credit

a prosecutor’s reasons when there is some evidence of

sincerity, such as that the prosecutor “did not know which

jurors were Latinos,” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369–70, or that

“the prosecutor did accept minorities on the jury,” Burks, 27

F.3d at 1429. In short, “[w]here there are two permissible

views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them

cannot be clearly erroneous.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369

(quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574

(1985)).

As the Supreme Court has explained, this is the standard

on direct review; on federal habeas review, the standard is

even more deferential. Felkner, 562 U.S. at 598; see also

Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (“Under AEDPA, even more must

be shown.”).

B

Because we are not reviewing the California Court of

Appeal’s decision directly, but through the lens of collateral

review, we now turn to our standard for reviewing state court

decisions under AEDPA, which “imposes a highlydeferential

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12 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Felkner, 562 U.S. at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We first delineate the standard of review for this collateral

challenge to the state court’s decision. Because the district

court’s determination whether the prosecutor’s strikes were

purposefully discriminatory is a “pure issue of fact,” AEDPA

§ 2254(d)(2) applies.2 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365–66. That

section precludes a federal court from granting habeas relief

to “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court . . . with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings” unless that state-court

adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). In considering a state court’s Batson

determination, “[a] federal habeas court must accept a state

court finding unless it was based on an unreasonable

 

2

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) states:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 13

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2)). As we have explained this standard, “a federal

court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding

process unless, after review of the state-court record, it

determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but

actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999

(9th Cir. 2004); see also Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 340 (“[A]

decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based

on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding,

§ 2254(d)(2).”). And “[s]tate-court factual findings,

moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden

of rebutting the presumption by ‘clear and convincing

evidence.’” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199–2200 (quoting Collins,

546 U.S. at 338–39, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).3“The

3

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) states that, in a habeas proceeding, “a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed

to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” In the context of deciding Batson claims, the Supreme Court

has noted that “[f]actual determinations by state courts are presumed

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,” Miller-El

I, 537 U.S. at 340. The Supreme Court’s most recent word on this subject,

Davis v. Ayala, affirms the applicability of the presumption in § 2254(e). 

235 S. Ct. at 2199–2200. The Court has previously indicated, however,

that it is an open question whether this presumption is applicable, see

Collins, 546 U.S. at 339; see also Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 300–01

(2010). In an abundance of caution, and “because our view of the

reasonableness of the state court’s factual determination in this case does

not turn on any interpretive difference regarding the relationship between

these provisions,” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. at 300, we review the state

court’s findings under the standard established in § 2254(d)(2).

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upshot is that even if reasonable minds reviewing the record

might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, on habeas

review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s

credibility determination.” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2201 (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing Collins,

546 U.S. at 341–42).

When we apply this deferential AEDPA standard in the

Batson context, we end up with a standard of review that is

“doubly deferential,” Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1170, because the

federal court defers to the state reviewing court’s

determination of the facts, and the reviewing court defers to

the trial court’s determination of the prosecutor’s credibility. 

This doubly deferential standard means that “unless the state

appellate court was objectively unreasonable in concluding

that a trial court’s credibility determination was supported by

substantial evidence, we must uphold it.” Id. at 1170.

We apply this doubly deferential standard in two steps. 

Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013). 

First, because § 2254(d)(2) ultimately requires us to

determine whether the state court’s decision was “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence” in the record, we must review the relevant portions

of the record and use ordinary analytic tools to evaluate the

prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations. Mitleider v. Hall,

391 F.3d 1039, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2004). We consider

whether a prosecutor’s justifications are contrary to the

evidence in the record, such as being “implausible or

fantastic,” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, based on

mischaracterizations of a prospective juror’s testimony,

Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 244, or belied by a comparative juror

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 15

analysis.4 Conversely, we consider whether evidence in the

record shows that at least some of the prosecutor’s reasons

were “permissible and plausible.” Collins, 546 U.S. at 341.

Second, having reviewed the prosecutor’s explanations in

light of the evidence in the record, we turn to the state

appellate court’s decision. The pertinent question is not

whether the prosecutor was credible, or even whether the trial

court’s conclusion to that effect was clearly erroneous. 

Rather, the pertinent question is whether the state appellate

court was objectively unreasonable in upholding the trial

court’s determination. Even if we would have reached a

different conclusion regarding the prosecutor’s credibility, we

must give the state appellate court the benefit of the doubt,

Felkner, 562 U.S. at 598, and may not grant the habeas

petition unless the state court’s decision was “not merely

wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999.

III

We now applythese principles in determiningwhether the

California Court of Appeal’s affirmance of the trial court’s

determination that the prosecutor’s justifications were not

purposefully discriminatory was objectively unreasonable. 

As noted above, the district court granted Sifuentes relief with

respect to Thompson and Gibson, but not as to the other six

jurors.

4 We must conduct a comparative juror analysis in the first instance if

the state reviewing court has not done so. Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1225.

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A

We begin by reviewing the relevant portions of the record

as to Thompson. Thompson stated in his juror questionnaire

that he was active in the Baptist faith, but that his religious

beliefs would not interfere with his ability to serve as a juror. 

He stated that he volunteered in his church’s food programs

weekly. Where the questionnaire asked whether he could

follow the law, Thompson answered “yes,” explaining that

“[t]he laws [were] made to govern the land. Our job is to

obey those laws.” When it asked for his general feelings

about the death penalty, he stated “[i]t’s there as a tool . . .

[b]ut not to be exploited.” When it asked him to rank his

views of the death penalty on a five-step scale from “strongly

in favor” to “strongly against,” he chose “moderately in

favor.” He also stated that his views about the penalty had

not changed in the last few years, and that he would vote to

retain the death penalty if it were on the ballot in California.

At voir dire, the trial judge asked Thompson to state

whether he was able to impose the death penalty as “a

philosophical question.” He responded:

I guess you could say it’s a gray-line answer

there. I’ve always been taught to obey the

laws of the land, and because this is the land

that I live in, yes, I would have to, I guess,

obey at that particular time. But I guess, yes,

depending on the circumstances.

The trial judge followed up on this inquiry, asking whether

Thompson could ever vote to execute somebody “if [he] felt

it was appropriate.” Thompson responded, “Yeah, I could.”

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The prosecutor’s first question targeted Thompson’s

response that he was “taught to obey the laws of the land,”

asking: “You said to the judge that you were taught to follow

the law. Could you elaborate a little bit about what kind of

upbringing you had that led you to that?” Thompson

responded:

Well, I am a minister, I am faith based, I am a

Christian, and in some religious aspects, they

try to tell you that you are not supposed to

judge anyone, that we don’t have the right to

judge anyone, but at the same time, you are

also taught to obey the laws of the land. So

basically I can’t hold judgment on anyone, but

at the same time I do have to hold to account

what the laws of the land are.

Following up on Thompson’s explanation of his faith, the

prosecutor asked whether he heard correctly that Thompson

was a minister in his religion, and Thompson replied that he

was. The prosecutor then confirmed Thompson’s statement

“that your religious beliefs teach you to not judge other

people,” and Thompson responded: “Right. But at the same

time, it also teaches us to obey the laws of the land. What I

mean by not judge people, the Bible says that you are not to

judge one another, but at the same time it tells you in there to

obey the laws of the land.” The prosecutor asked whether

Thompson’s religious beliefs would make this case a difficult

problem for him, and Thompson responded that it would not. 

The prosecutor then asked: “Why not? If your religious

beliefs tell you not to judge people and you’re going to be

placed in a moral position to make a judgment about

somebody, I’m trying to reconcile those two.” Thompson

responded:

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18 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

Well, the reconciliation is the fact that it’s my

job to carry out the laws of the land. Okay?

No, I can’t per se condemn someone, because

everyone has shortfalls, everyone has things

they have done in their past or whatever. I

can’t just say you’re a bad person just because

you did this, that, that. What I’m saying is

that even after everything is taken into

account, the laws of the land still prevail.

The trial judge then observed that this seemed like a situation

that the Bible describes as “render unto Caesar that which is

Caesar’s, render unto God that which is God’s,” with this

being a case where Caesar’s rules applied, and Thompson

replied, “Exactly.”

Next, the prosecutor questioned Thompson on his views

regarding the felony murder rule, describing the facts of this

case and asking how Thompson felt about two of the

defendants being charged with murder for their participation

in a robbery in which someone was killed, even though they

did not kill anyone. Thompson responded: “That’s just the

law. That’s being an accessory to a crime. I mean, I might

not have robbed a bank, as an example, but I was with

someone who did rob a bank, so I’m just as guilty as that

individual.” The prosecutor asked more specifically: “How

do you feel about that principle, just as a person? Not as

a—as something that’s part of the law, but just you as a

person and knowing your background as a minister in your

religion, that sort of thing.” Thompson answered:

Well, the principle in itself, I mean, should I

be held accountable, should I be—how should

I put it?—lumped in or grouped with someone

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 19

who does something wrong. Well, if I know

the individual, I’m caught, I’m caught. I

mean, the principle is basically what it is. It’s

really not how I feel about it. It’s not like it’s

either right or either wrong. The fact is I was

somewhere where I shouldn’t have been.

The prosecutor tried again, explaining the felony murder rule

and asking:

Q. Knowing who you are based on your

philosophical beliefs, your religious beliefs,

your ethical beliefs, do you think that the

death penalty is a viable option for somebody

who actually didn’t do any killing?

A. It depends on the preponderance of the

evidence, it depends on the special

circumstances at the time, it depends on the

evidence that’s presented. Right now, just

saying that one person shot another individual

and the other two people were in another area

of the restaurant or whatever, it’s hard to say

that those individuals would be eligible for it,

but at that particular time, after listening to all

the evidence, they may all three be eligible for

it. It all depends on what actually was going

on in the restaurant.

THE COURT: You haven’t eliminated the

death penalty with respect to the guys that

didn’t kill anybody.

A: Right.

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20 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

The prosecutor attempted one final confirmation:

Q. The special circumstance that you

would have found as to those two defendants

would have made them eligible for the death

penalty or life in prison without the possibility

of parole because theywere major participants

and they were involved in reckless

indifference to human life during the course

of that crime. Okay?

A. Um-hum.

Q. They don’t have to have an intent to

kill anybody. In fact, as the factual scenario

indicates, they didn’t kill anybody.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Knowing that, do you think it’s

reasonable that—or is the death penalty still

on the table in terms of a realistic option for

two of these defendants who didn’t kill

anybody, who actually did not fire the gun?

A. Yes, because it was accessory to a

crime.

The defense asked no questions, and the court found

Thompson qualified to serve. The judge later denied a

challenge for cause.

Sifuentes brought a Batson challenge after Thompson and

three other black jurors (Gibson, Barnes and Skruggs) were

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 21

excused. The trial court held that Sifuentes had made a prima

facie case, and thus the burden shifted to the prosecutor to

justify the strikes of those four jurors.

The prosecutor provided two reasons for striking

Thompson: his views of the death penalty and his religious

beliefs. The prosecutor explained his reasoning:

[Thompson] was the one who was active

in his Baptist church, involved in church

programs weekly, and he expressed extreme

reservations about the death penalty.

There was a question asked: “Could you

do something like that?” Page 7386: “I guess

you could say it’s a gray-line answer there. 

I’ve always been taught to obey the law.”

And then he says he’s equivocal. He was

talking about his duty. He understands his

duty. And I think he was confusing duty with

how he felt about these penalties: “Well,

because it’s the law, I can do my duty.” But

that didn’t mean he could impose the death

penalty.

He also said at 7397 that he was a

minister, and he said, “So basically I can’t

hold judgment on anyone. But I do have to

hold account to the laws of the land.”

So he said because of his religious beliefs,

he wasn’t in a position to make a judgment on

anybody, and he repeated that several times.

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22 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

THE COURT: How about the next one?

MR. GOODFELLOW: At 7398, he also

said, “I can’t say you’re a bad person.” And

then the judge: “Okay.”

I asked him a lot of questions, and he

never reallywould answer the questions about

how do you feel about that principle. He kept

talking about duty, but he would never answer

the questions. He avoided answering any

questions about what he felt about them

personally. He kept going back to his duty.

And based upon that, there were no

questions by the defense, obviously, because

they knew he was never going to come to

death, it was so obvious. He wasn’t facing the

issue.

So based on everything in his

questionnaire and all of the answers that he

gave in court and his demeanor in terms of

being unable to really answer the questions

and being evasive to the types of tough

questions I was asking him about putting

himself in that position, it’s clear to me he

couldn’t impose the death penalty on

anybody.

And besides that, I had many more better

jurors after him that were much more

pro-death-penalty. And I’m trying to get a

pro-death-penalty jury.

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 23

The trial court found that the prosecutor’s reasons for

striking Thompson and the other three jurors “were racially

neutral and that they were valid, there was justification,

there’s a good, cogent reason to excuse every one of these

jurors, and that they were facially neutral.” The California

Court of Appeal upheld this determination based on the

prosecutor’s explanation of his concerns, namely that

Thompson was active in the Baptist church and gave

“equivocal” responses regarding the death penalty. The

California Court of Appeal did not conduct a comparative

juror analysis.

In evaluating the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion,

we begin by reviewing the record. First, the prosecutor’s

characterization of Thompson’s statements was not contrary

to the evidence. Thompson testified that he was a Baptist

minister, and he stated that his religion taught him not to

judge others but that he could “obey the laws of the land.” 

The record also shows that Thompson’s statements regarding

his willingness to impose the death penalty could be

characterized as equivocal, because he consistently couched

his ability to impose the death penalty in terms of his duty to

obey the law. The prosecutor’s concern that a Baptist

minister who gave equivocal answers about the death penalty

and qualified his views with his understanding of the law

might be hesitant to impose the death penalty in a felony

murder case was not “implausible or fantastic.” See Purkett,

514 U.S. at 768.

Because the California Court of Appeal did not conduct

a comparative juror analysis, we conduct this analysis in the

first instance to determine if it gives rise to an inference that

the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual. Jamerson, 713 F.3d

at 1225. As the district court pointed out, the seated jurors

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24 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

had some characteristics similar to Thompson regarding their

willingness to impose the death penalty. Thompson’s juror

questionnaire responses and his voir dire statements showed

that he had not eliminated the possibility of imposing the

death penalty on non-shooters. His questionnaire response

also indicated that he was “moderately in favor” of the death

penalty. This statement was more favorable toward the death

penalty than seven of the seventeen selected jurors (including

those seated and alternates), all seven of whom stated that

they were “neutral” toward the death penalty. The other ten

selected jurors stated either that they were “moderately in

favor” or “strongly in favor” of the death penalty. The two

black jurors that were selected reported that they were

“neutral” toward the death penalty. Additionally, during voir

dire, eight of the selected jurors expressed some level of

uncertainty regarding whether they could impose the death

penalty on a non-shooter.

Nevertheless, the seated jurors were distinguishable from

Thompson in several key ways. The record shows that the

jurors who initially responded equivocally regarding the

death penalty later stated unequivocally that they could

impose the death penalty. For example, Juror 1's first answer

was: “Under certain circumstances, I believe I could” vote to

execute someone. The juror later stated definitively, “Oh,

yes, I could, yeah,” when asked whether the juror could

impose the death penalty. Similarly, Juror 2 first stated: “I’ve

never—I’ve never been in that situation. I guess the only way

I can answer that question is I would have to listen to all of

the facts. . . .” Each time the court or prosecutor subsequently

asked if Juror 2 could impose the death penalty, including

when the prosecutor confronted the juror with the earlier

statement that the juror had not thought about it before, Juror

2 unequivocally responded “yes.”

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 25

Moreover, the seated jurors expressed their personal

willingness to impose the death penalty in an appropriate

case. For example, when asked, “Knowing who you are, do

you think that you are capable of making that call even if it

happens to be the death penalty, the hard call?” Juror 1

responded, “Oh, yes, I do.” Juror 11 stated, “[‘I believe so’]

means that if I feel that—after hearing the evidence, that I

believe that I could, in fact, vote for a death penalty.” Juror

12 stated, “Just personally I think I would probably lean more

towards the death penalty, but I can’t say that I completely

eliminated life without the possibility of parole.” And

Alternate Juror 2 stated, “If I feel the death penalty is

warranted by the action, I would vote for it.”

By contrast, Thompson avoided expressing his personal

views and couched his answers to similar questions in terms

of objective legal requirements. For instance, when

repeatedly asked by the prosecutor how he felt as a person on

the topic, Thompson gave answers like: “I can’t hold

judgment on anyone, but at the same time I do have to hold

to account what the laws of the land are,” and “I mean, the

principle is basically what it is. It’s really not how I feel

about it.”

Some of the seated jurors also had characteristics similar

to Thompson regarding their religious faith. Four of the

seated jurors identified themselves as Catholic and two other

jurors discussed their religious beliefs. In addition, the record

shows that the prosecutor asked Thompson more questions

about religion than other prospective jurors. The prosecutor

did not ask the four Catholic jurors, or a prospective Catholic

juror (later excused by one of the defendants), about whether

their religious beliefs affected their attitudes about the death

penalty. The prosecutor briefly questioned two other

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26 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

prospective jurors, both of whom were black, about their

religious beliefs. Thompson differed from these prospective

jurors in that he identified himself as a minister in his faith

and made equivocal remarks about the effect of his faith on

imposing the death penalty. None of the seated jurors

expressed Thompson’s sentiment that his religion forbade

him from judging others, but he could nevertheless follow the

law.

Reading the voir dire transcript as a whole, the prosecutor

made persistent efforts to draw out Thompson’s personal

views about imposing the death penalty. The prosecutor’s

explanation for the strike indicates his concern about

Thompson’s nonresponsive answers, and his conclusion that

Thompson would not actually vote for the death penalty.

Having conducted this review of the record, we now turn

to the state appellate court’s ruling. The California Court of

Appeal concluded that the trial court properly deemed the

prosecutor’s reasons regardingThompson’s religious activity

and equivocal responses regarding the death penalty credible. 

Applying our doubly deferential standard, and giving the state

court the benefit of the doubt, this is not an objectively

unreasonable determination of the facts.

On the one hand, the record reflects that the seated jurors

had some similarities to Thompson, and Sifuentes does not

need to show “there is an exactly identical white juror” to

prevail on a Batson challenge. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 291.

But the record also shows material differences regarding

Thompson’s persistent equivocation about his willingness to

impose the death penalty. Although Sifuentes argues that the

prosecutor’s failure to question other jurors about their

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 27

religious beliefs as persistently raises the inference that his

concerns about Thompson’s faith were pretextual, the record

reasonably supports a conclusion that the prosecutor’s key

concern was Thompson’s couching his views on the death

penalty in terms of following the law.

Based on our review of the voir dire transcript, the trial

court could have reasonablyconcluded that the prosecutor did

not believe that Thompson would actually impose the death

penalty, “tak[ing] into account tone, demeanor, facial

expression, emphasis—all those factors that make the words

uttered by the prospective juror convincing or not.” Burks,

27 F.3d at 1429. Ambiguity as to whether a juror would be

able to give appropriate consideration to imposing the death

penalty is a legitimate and reasonable basis for striking a

juror. White v. Wheeler, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 456, 461

(2015). Even if “[r]easonable minds reviewing the record

might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility,” this is an

insufficient basis for habeas relief. See Jamerson, 713 F.3d

at 1224.

The state appellate court therefore did not unreasonably

determine that the trial court’s credibility finding was

supported by substantial evidence, so no habeas relief is

warranted on the basis of the prosecution’s peremptory

challenge of Thompson. See Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1170. In

holding otherwise, the district court failed to apply the doubly

deferential standard, and therefore we reverse on this point.

B

We now review the relevant portions of the record with

respect to juror Gibson. Gibson’s juror questionnaire stated

that she was 49 years old, had a 33-year-old son, and had

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28 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

been a substitute teacher from 1992 to 1995. It also reported

that she had gone to law school and was a member of the

California bar, although she had never practiced. She also

stated that she had applied to work at a DA’s office after law

school but had not been hired. When asked her views of the

criminal justice system, she stated “I believe the criminal

justice system serves us; however, it could improve.” Her

brother, her son, her brothers-in-law, and her cousins had

served time in prison. Gibson also stated that she was

“moderately in favor” of the death penalty, would vote to

retain it in an election, and believed that “the death penalty

has its place in the penal system.” She explained that she had

“a better understanding and appreciation for the death penalty

than [she] did when [she] was younger.”

During voir dire, the prosecutor asked whether Gibson

felt this case was serious enough to warrant the death penalty. 

She responded, “I think I could consider that as an option. I

don’t know if I could impose it without going through the

whole experience of the trial.”

The prosecutor’s questions regarding why her views of

the death penalty had changed gave rise to the following

exchange:

A. Well, I never thought that the death

penalty should be a viable option, because I

didn’t think that anyone had that right or

authority to impose that upon another person,

even though someone could murder a person

and, in essence, that’s the death penalty. But

for a jury to then turn around and decide that

the defendant should die, I never thought that

was quite right.

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 29

So, you probably want to know what’s

changed.

Q. Yeah.

A. Really what’s changed is that I’m

actually a Christian and Christian principles,

the death penalty is a viable option. And so I

would say that’s really what changed my

views.

Defense counsel later followed up on this issue, and asked

her “what about [her] Christian philosophy has now allowed

[her] to allow for the death penalty.”

A. Well, Christianity allows for—to have

two or three witnesses. So, if you have the

evidence and you have witnesses, then you

can really consider it, consider the

punishment.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. But, even before I was born again, my

views had started changing on the death

penalty.

Q. Politically or philosophically or just

religiously?

A. Well, if we have to put a label on it, I

would probably say I just became more

conservative as I got older.

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30 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

Q. All right.

A. And had a better idea of—or a

different understanding of why we have these

kind of laws.

Q. Okay. When you say that—and I got

the impression that you’re not ascribing to the

eye for an eye of the Old Testament. When

you say if you have two or three witnesses,

that can allow for the option of the death

penalty, what does that mean?

A. Well, an eye for an eye is more

revenge.

Q. Exactly.

A. And so we’re not really talking about

revenge. But I think when the judge was

questioning me also, what I said was

Christians were supposed to follow the law.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. And so, if the law allows for a death

penalty, and our law allows for the death

penalty, and we have witnesses to prove

that—

Q. An act?

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 31

A. An act and the guilt and go through all

of that, then I don’t have any adversity to

imposing the death penalty.

Q. Okay. That’s where I’m at right now

with you.

Now, because of that religious belief, it

allows you to consider it.

A. Yes.

Q. Does it tell you that if you get to that

point that you have to impose it?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So, basically you get to that

point, then it is not an eye for an eye, but it’s

an option?

A. It’s an option because the law allows

it and so the law also allows life without

parole.

The prosecutor also asked about her views of the felony

murder rule and whether she had any “philosophical beliefs

about that concept.”

A. Well, not philosophically. What I

believe is that if the law is on the books, then

that’s what we have to go by. And if it needs

to change, then that’s up to the legislature. 

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32 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

But if that’s the law, then that’s what we have

to apply and follow.

Q. Okay. If you were in charge, would

we have that kind of a law?

A. Well, that, you know, I don’t know. I

never aspired to be a legislator, so I don’t

know. I mean I can’t tell you.

You’re asking me if I agree with the law?

Q. If you agree with the concept that

somebody could be—

A. Well I mean I can see—I can

understand why we would have that type of a

law. If you know that you’re doing something

that is so dangerous that, you know, you could

kill someone, then you should be responsible

if someone dies. I mean I can understand the

law. So I can’t say that I have a philosophical

difference with it.

Q. Okay. I mean but I’m not sure

that—do you think that concept is a fair

concept?

A. I understand the concept. I don’t say

it’s unfair, so—

The trial court then asked her whether she could follow the

law if selected as a juror, and she stated she could. She also

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 33

stated that the death penalty was an option for her in an

appropriate case.

Next, the prosecutor asked about her background,

including her application to work at the DA’s office and her

family members that had been in prison. When asked

whether her brother had been treated fairly, she said

“Probably he was treated fairly, based on, you know, the little

bit I knew about it.” She said the same of her son’s

treatment.

The prosecutor provided six reasons for striking Gibson:

Gibson, she was a 49-year-old lawyer

working for SBC. She has a son who is 33, so

she had a son when she was 16. I find that a

problem. She was a school teacher in 1992 to

1995, indicates fairly liberal. She has a

doctorate; she’s a lawyer. I don’t want a

lawyer on my jury. I’ve never liked having

lawyers on juries. They’re know-it-alls, they

inject themselves into the case, they think

they can do a better job.

She said with respect to the criminal

justice system, “It serves us. However, it

could improve.”

In addition, page 7, she had numerous

relatives that have served time in the

penitentiary. In the late ‘60s, her [brother]

served time in Santa Rita, brother-in-law and

cousins who also served time. A lot of the

criminal element in her family. I just can’t

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34 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

have somebody on my jury that has those

kinds of problems.

The trial judge then noted that in a recent Los Angeles case,

a jury verdict had been overturned because there were

allegations that a lawyer on the jury “sort of took over the

jury and was making false representations as to the law . . . so

that’s always a problem with a lawyer upstairs.” The

prosecutor responded, “It is a problem. That’s precisely why

I don’t want lawyers on my juries.” The prosecutor

continued:

At page 6992, she said when she was

younger she never thought the death penalty

should be an available option because she

didn’t think that anyone had the right or

authority to impose death. She also said that

she was–6993–a born-again Christian and her

Christian beliefs would influence the way she

thinks.

When asked about the felony murder rule,

she wouldn’t directly answer the question

about how she felt about it; she dodged it.

Page 7005, she went back to Christian

beliefs: you have to have two to three

witnesses, then you can consider punishment. 

I emphasize the word “consider.” That

doesn’t mean it’s really on the table,

especially given her other answers.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I’ve heard

enough.

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 35

The trial court held that all of the prosecutor’s justifications

were “racially neutral and . . . valid” and were “good, cogent

reason[s].”

We evaluate the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation in

light of the evidence in the record. The prosecutor’s

statements that Gibson was a single mother, had a legal

education, was a school teacher and had relatives with

criminal histories are all consistent with the record. Given

Gibson’s statements that she had earlier opposed the death

penalty but had changed her mind after becoming a born

again Christian based on her reading of the Bible, her views

that the Bible required two or three witnesses before

imposing the death penalty, and her nonresponsive answers

to questions regarding her position on the felony-murder rule,

the prosecutor’s statement that Gibson’s Christian beliefs

might affect her decision on the death penalty are supported

by the record.

The California Court of Appeal conducted a comparative

juror analysis, and determined that, unlike Gibson, none of

the seated jurors had attended law school. Although several

of the seated jurors had relatives with prior criminal histories,

none had multiple relatives with criminal histories, as did

Gibson. Finally, none of the seated jurors expressed concerns

with the death penalty or qualified their willingness to apply

the death penalty, as did Gibson with the requirement that

there be “two or three witnesses.” Based on our review of the

voir dire testimony, the California Court of Appeal’s

comparative juror analysis was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts.

We now turn to the state appellate court’s ruling. The

California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s

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36 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON

determination based on the prosecutor’s explanation of his

concern: (i) that Gibson’s Christian beliefs and statement that

she could consider the death penalty on the evidence of two

or three witnesses could impact her decision whether to

impose the death penalty; (ii) that Gibson’s legal training

would cause problems, based on the prosecutor’s experience

with lawyers on juries; and (iii) that Gibson had numerous

relatives with criminal histories.

The California Court of Appeal’s determination that the

trial court properly assessed the credibility of the prosecutor’s

statements regarding Gibson was not objectively

unreasonable. Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1170. Rather than

expressing straightforward personal views about imposing the

death penalty, Gibson provided an unusual faith-based

explanation that she had overcome her prior opposition to the

death penalty when she became a Christian, because

Christians could consider imposing the death penalty on the

evidence of “two or three witnesses.” The prosecutor could

have reasonably believed that such responses made Gibson

appear unpredictable and raised the question whether Gibson

would require evidence (such as eyewitness statements)

beyond what the law requires before considering a vote for

the death penalty. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for

the state court of appeal to conclude that the prosecutor was

genuinely “uncomfortable” with Gibson’s responses.

The state court could reasonably determine that the

prosecutor’s explanation that Gibson’s legal training would

cause problems, based on the prosecutor’s experience with

lawyers on juries, was not pretextual. Sifuentes argues that

the prosecutor’s willingness to accept two other highly

educated jurors (an MIT graduate and a person with

undergraduate legal training) shows that the prosecutor’s

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 37

concerns with Gibson’s legal training were pretext. He also

points out that she had never actually practiced law. But

unlike Gibson, the two seated jurors had not graduated from

law school or become members of the bar, and while Gibson

never practiced law, the prosecutor may have reasonablybeen

concerned that a person with legal training would exhibit the

behaviors on a jury that the prosecutor feared.

The state court also held that the prosecutor’s explanation

that Gibson had numerous relatives with a criminal history

was not pretextual. Sifuentes argues that the fact that the

prosecutor retained white jurors who had family members

with criminal histories demonstrates his dismissal of Gibson

for the same reason was pretext. But even though the white

jurors had closely related family members who had

committed grave crimes, none of the seated jurors had

multiple family members with criminal backgrounds, and

therefore the trial court could determine that the prosecutor’s

greater concern regarding Gibson’s view of the criminal

justice system was genuine.

Sifuentes argues that the weakness of the prosecutor’s

other reasons, such as the prosecutor’s explanation that

Gibson had been a single mother and a school teacher, were

so weak that they raise the inference that the prosecutor

struck her on discriminatory grounds. We disagree. There is

no evidence the prosecutor viewed white single mothers

differently from black ones. None of these less persuasive

reasons is discriminatory and there is no evidence that these

less persuasive reasons “motivated in substantial part” the

prosecutor’s decision. See Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810,

815 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 485);

Collins, 546 U.S. at 340–41. Applying our doubly deferential

standard, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the

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trial court properlyassessed the credibility of the prosecutor’s

statements as to Gibson was not objectively unreasonable. 

The district court erred in holding otherwise.

C

Because we can affirm the trial court on any basis

supported by the record, see Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633,

638 (9th Cir. 2005), Sifuentes argues that even if we disagree

with the district court’s rulings regarding Thompson and

Gibson, we should affirm the district court’s grant of the

habeas petition on the ground that the state appellate court

unreasonably determined the facts in upholding the trial

court’s Batson determination with regard to six other jurors. 

We consider each of the jurors in turn.

1. We first consider juror Jackson. A review of the

record shows that Jackson expressed concerns about the death

penalty. In his questionnaire, he stated that he was not sure

if he would vote for the death penalty, stating, “[a]s more

[and] more new methods of investigation show the old flaws,

I am becoming less inclined toward it.” During voir dire, he

stated that he would be hesitant to impose the death penalty

because he doubted the fairness of the criminal justice

system. In striking Jackson, the prosecutor referred to

Jackson as a “resident of Berkeley, . . . a hotbed of anti-deathpenalty people.” The prosecutor also expressed concern that

Jackson had “problems with the system with respect to the

fairness of the death penalty”; for instance, he stated “‘I don’t

know if I can consciously end someone’s life.’” The trial

court concluded that the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for

striking Jackson were credible. The California Court of

Appeal conducted a comparative juror analysis. Based on its

comparison of seated jurors, the state court rejected

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 39

Sifuentes’s argument that the prosecutor’s explanations for

striking Sifuentes were pretextual because other seated jurors

lived in Berkeley and expressed similar concerns about the

death penalty.

We now evaluate the prosecutor’s race-neutral

explanations in light of the evidence in the record. The

prosecutor’s characterization of Jackson’s statements as

showing reluctance to impose the death penalty was not

contrary to the evidence. However, the prosecutor’s belief

that Jackson lived in Berkeley and that he said “I don’t know

if I can consciously end someone’s life” was an error: those

were true about juror Jasper, not Jackson. Sifuentes argues

that the prosecutor’s mistaken attribution of statements to

Jackson that were made by another black juror demonstrates

the prosecutor’s bias. While a prosecutor’s credibility may

be questioned if the prosecutor “mischaracterizes a juror’s

testimony in a manner completely contrary to the juror’s

stated beliefs,” a prosecutor’s “mistake in good faith, such as

an innocent transposition of juror information,” does not

support a finding that the prosecutor is not credible. Aleman,

723 F.3d at 982. Here, the state court found that the

prosecutor’s error in attributing Jasper’s statements to

Jackson’s was a “mistake in good faith,” because Jackson

expressed similar reservations. Based on our review of the

record, this conclusion was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Accordingly, applying our doubly

deferential standard, and giving the state court the benefit of

the doubt, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that

the prosecutor was credible is not an objectivelyunreasonable

determination of the facts.

2. Based on our review of the record, Juror Norman

expressed both religious and personal qualms with the death

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penalty, including stating that he was against it “for the most

part” and would eliminate it in California if given the choice. 

He also stated that he could impose it as part of his “duty,” or

“if [he] had to, yes,” prompting the court to step in several

times to make sure he was actually eligible to serve as a juror

in a death penalty case. The record also shows that Norman

failed to appear in court twice. The prosecutor’s

characterization of Norman’s statements, and his failure to

appear on two occasions, were not contrary to the evidence. 

The California Court of Appeal did not conduct a

comparative juror analysis. Conducting this analysis in the

first instance, we conclude that none of the seated jurors

expressed the serious concerns about the death penalty stated

by Norman; none of the seated jurors stated that they would

have voted against retaining the death penalty if it were on

the ballot; and none of the seated jurors failed to appear.

Sifuentes argues that Norman was a probation supervisor

and, from some of the trial court’s questions, there appeared

to be initial concerns that he would be sympathetic to the

prosecution. He acknowledges that Norman expressed

several times his negative views of the death penalty, but

points out that Norman also responded he could impose the

penalty if warranted. Norman’s significant qualms about

imposing the death penalty do not suggest the strike was

pretextual, or that the trial judge and state appellate court

were objectively unreasonable in accepting the prosecutor’s

justification. Thus, applying our doubly deferential standard,

the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial

court did not err in concluding that the prosecutor’s reasons

for striking Norman were genuine was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts.

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3. The record shows that prospective juror Jasper

expressed significant reservations about the death penalty. 

She stated that “I don’t know if I can consciously end

someone’s life” and “I don’t know if I could live with

thinking I’ve basically killed this person. That’s pretty

tough.” When the trial judge questioned her, she said she had

mixed feelings but could impose the death penalty “[i]f it’s

justifiable.” Jasper also stated that she believed the criminal

justice system “is biased toward those who do not have

enough money to pay for a decent lawyer,” and that her

brother’s friend had been charged with murder. Jasper also

stated that she could serve as a juror without risking her job,

and her employer’s request that she be allowed a

postponement because of a co-worker’s maternity leave

“really doesn’t matter for me.”

In explaining his reasons for striking Jasper, the

prosecutor expressed concerns about her “mixed feelings on

whether or not killing someone is the right thing to do,” about

her remarks that the criminal justice system is biased, and that

her familiarity with her brother’s friend who was charged

with murder would interfere with her ability to sit in a murder

case. The prosecutor also remarked on the fact that she was

a single mother with a six year old who came to court

wearing leather pants. The prosecutor further noted Jasper’s

remark about her co-worker’s maternity leave, and stated his

view that she was not concerned about hardship to her

employer. Finally, he stated that Jasper was not friendly to

him.

The California Court of Appeal conducted a comparative

juror analysis regarding Jasper’s views on the death penalty

and criminal justice system, and determined that her

statements were more negative than Thompson and Gibson,

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and that none of the seated jurors identified by Sifuentes

knew someone who was charged with murder. Based on our

independent review of the record, the state court’s

conclusions are not an unreasonable determination of the

facts in the record. Nor did the prosecutor otherwise misstate

the evidence.

Sifuentes argues that the record shows that the

prosecutor’s reasons for striking Jasper were pretextual. He

claims that the prosecutor’s reference to her single-mother

status and attire showed that the prosecutor stereotyped black

women and relied on reasons unrelated to the case. Sifuentes

also argues that the record does not reflect Jasper’s lack of

interest in a career.

Although the explanations based on Jasper’s appearance

and personal characteristics are not persuasive, they are race

neutral on their face. The trial court could reasonably

determine that there was no Batson violation because “[t]he

prosecutor provided a number of other permissible and

plausible race-neutral reasons.” Collins, 546 U.S. at 340–41. 

Finally, Sifuentes notes that the trial court made no findings

that Jasper had an unfriendly demeanor. But there is no

clearly established Supreme Court rule that “a

demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge did

not observe or cannot recall the juror’s demeanor.” Thaler v.

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 48 (2010). Applying our doubly

deferential standard, the state appellate court’s conclusion

that the trial court did not err in crediting the prosecutor’s

reasons was not an unreasonable determination of the facts.

4. The relevant portions of the record show that juror

Webster expressed opposition to the death penalty. He stated

in his questionnaire that “I hope some day it will be

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considered uncivilized,” and that he would vote against it if

it were on the ballot. During voir dire, he said that he might

be willing to impose the death penalty for people like

“Charlie Manson,” but that it would be “very difficult” for

him to do so. When asked how he felt about the death

penalty “on a scale of 1 to 10, between Mother Theresa and

Rambo,” he responded “Oh. 7.” In response to the court’s

questioning, Webster stated that “it’s unlikely” he would vote

to execute non-shooters, but that he’d “like to think it’s not

impossible.” The trial judge denied a challenge for cause.

In explaining why he struck Webster, the prosecutor

expressed concern that Webster generally opposed the death

penalty and would be unlikely to vote for it. He also called

Webster “hostile and argumentative,” and noted that Webster

had been treated for depression in 1995. The trial court

concluded that the prosecutor’s reasons were racially neutral

and valid.

Reviewing the trial court’s conclusion in light of the

evidence in the record, the prosecutor’s concerns about

Webster’s strong opposition to the death penalty are

supported by the evidence. Webster stated that he hoped the

death penalty would one day be eliminated, that he had a high

threshold for imposing it, and he would be unlikely to impose

it. The California Court of Appeal did not conduct a

comparative juror analysis, so we conduct one here in the first

instance. None of the seated jurors expressed as strong

opposition to the death penalty as Webster, and none stated

they would have voted against retaining the death penalty if

it were on the ballot. Therefore, a comparative juror analysis

does not raise the inference that the prosecutor’s reasons were

pretextual.

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Sifuentes argues that the prosecutor confused Webster

with Massey when he stated that Webster was “hostile and

argumentative.” The record indicates that any confusion

between Webster and Massey was a “mistake in good faith,”

Aleman, 723 F.3d at 982, and does not raise the inference that

the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual.

We now turn to the California Court of Appeal’s

conclusion that the trial court properly accepted the

prosecutor’s reasons. This determination was not an

objectively unreasonable determination of the facts, because

the trial court could reasonably determine that the

prosecutor’s primary motivation in striking Webster was his

opposition to the death penalty. See Cook, 593 F.3d at 815;

Collins, 546 U.S. at 340–41.

5. We next turn to juror Massey, and review the relevant

portion of the record. In response to the jury questionnaire,

Massey stated that his sister was the only familymember who

had been charged with a crime. The court later learned that

Massey’s twin brother had a four-page rap sheet listing

multiple arrests. In response to questioning, Massey insisted

that he did not know of his brother’s arrests.

Massey initially gave equivocal responses to the court’s

question whether he could impose the death penalty, stating,

“I’ve never really thought about that,” and that he did “not

really” have “any feelings” about the death penalty. When

the prosecutor asked whether he could make the “hard call”

of imposing the death penalty, Massey responded, “I haven’t

thought about that, because I’ve never had to do that.” When

pressed further, Massey stated that he could see himself

choosing to impose the death penalty on non-shooters

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 45

because they were eligible for the death penalty under the

law.

The prosecutor gave several reasons for striking Massey. 

First, the prosecutor was concerned that Massey “obviously

didn’t like [him].” He believed Massey was lying when he

claimed he was unaware of his brother’s arrests, given that

the record showed the twins lived at the same address. The

prosecutor also noted that Massey was a postal worker, and

“they’re lazy.” Finally, the prosecutor stated that Massey was

“totally nonresponsive” to questions regarding the death

penalty, and he “said they’re all eligible because the law says

they are eligible, not that he’d ever do it.” The trial court

concluded these were valid, race-neutral reasons. The

California Court of Appeal conducted a comparative juror

analysis and concluded that, while some of the seated jurors

also gave short, “snippy” responses to the prosecutor’s

questions, their answers did not raise red flags about the

jurors’ inclination to impose the death penalty. The

California Court of Appeal then concluded that the trial court

properly accepted the prosecutor’s reasons.

In evaluating this ruling, we first conclude that the

prosecutor’s explanation about Massey’s lack of credibility

and nonresponsive answers was consistent with the record. 

Although the prosecutor’s stereotype of postal workers is not

persuasive, it is race neutral on its face, and the trial court

could have reasonably determined that “[t]he prosecutor

provided a number of other permissible and plausible raceneutral reasons.” Collins, 546 U.S. at 340–41. Accordingly,

the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the trial

court’s credibility finding was supported by substantial

evidence is not an objectively unreasonable determination of

the facts.

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6. Finally, we turn to juror Skruggs and review the

relevant portions of the record. In response to the juror

questionnaire, Skruggs stated that she was a 27-year-old with

a seven-year-old son. She had a prior conviction for forgery

for writing a series of fraudulent checks. During voir dire,

Skruggs expressed equivocal views regarding the death

penalty. While she stated that she could vote to execute a

non-shooter, if, for example, “someone was egging him on,”

she also stated that the death penalty was “not necessarily

something that I would be able to place on someone that did

not actually commit the shooting.”

The prosecutor gave three reasons for striking Skruggs:

she was a single mother who had a child at age 20, which

“shows a lack of responsibility”; she wrote a series of

fraudulent checks, which “indicates dishonesty”; and she

expressed conflicting views of the death penalty. The trial

court concluded that these reasons were valid and race

neutral. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal conducted

a comparative juror analysis. The court concluded that the

one seated juror who expressed similar reservations about

imposing the death penalty on a non-shooter was

distinguishable from Skruggs, because that juror did not have

a prior criminal history. The California Court of Appeal

upheld the trial court’s determination that the prosecutor was

credible in offering race-neutral reasons.

Based on our review, the prosecutor’s explanations that

he struck Skruggs because she had a prior conviction and

gave conflicting views of the death penalty are supported by

evidence in the record. Sifuentes argues that one of the

prosecutor’s reasons for striking Skruggs, that she was a

single mother who was irresponsible, demonstrates the

prosecutor’s negative stereotyping of black women. He also

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argues that the prosecutor’s statement that he struck Skruggs

due to her equivocal views on the death penalty was

pretextual, because other jurors had expressed similar views. 

But Skruggs’s prior conviction was a valid and race-neutral

reason for striking her, and the California Court of Appeal

could reasonably conclude that this conviction made her

distinguishable from other seated jurors. Applying our

doubly deferential standard, the California Court of Appeal

did not make an objectively unreasonable determination of

the facts in upholding the trial court’s ruling that the

prosecutor’s reasons were genuine.

D

Applying the deference to the fact finder’s credibility

determination required by Batson, the California Court of

Appeal concluded that the trial court did not err in

determining that the prosecutor was credible. Based on our

own review of the record, including conducting a

comparative juror analysis in the first instance where the state

appellate court has not done so, and applying our doubly

deferential standard, we conclude that the California Court of

Appeal’s decision was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Accordingly, we may not grant

Sifuentes the writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

IV

Sifuentes argues that we can uphold the district court’s

grant of the writ on the alternative ground that the trial court

erred in precluding him from rebutting the prosecutor’s

explanations for four of his strikes of prospective jurors, and

this error was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619 (1993).

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A

At trial, Sifuentes made three motions under Batson. In

his first motion, he argued that the prosecutor’s strikes of

prospective jurors Jackson, Norman, and Jasper were

purposely discriminatory on the basis of race. He raised the

same claim in his second motion with respect to the

prosecutor’s strikes of prospective jurors Webster and

Massey. The trial court held that Sifuentes had made out a

prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and so the

burden shifted to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral

explanation. After the prosecutor provided race-neutral

explanations, Sifuentes’s counsel asked the court for an

opportunity to rebut the proffered reasons. The trial court

denied the request, explaining, “This isn’t argument. I

already made a prima facie finding. You put your statements

on the record; now the district attorney has to justify his

challenges. That’s the way it works.”

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal indicated that

the trial court had erred in failing to permit the defense

counsel to address the prosecutor’s reasons. In reaching this

conclusion, the court relied on the California Supreme

Court’s decision in People v. Ayala, which held that it was

error “as a matter of state law” for a trial court to conduct an

ex parte hearing on a Batson motion, but that such error “was

harmless under state law and that, if federal error occurred, it,

too, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of

federal law.” 24 Cal. 4th 243, 262, 264 (2000) (citing People

v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1956) and Chapman v.

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SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 49

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), respectively).5 Relying

on the reasoning in People v. Ayala, the California Court of

Appeal concluded that the trial court’s error “was also

harmless whether we apply Chapman or Watson standard,”

because of “the trial court’s findings that the prospective

African-American jurors were challenged for proper, raceneutral reasons.”

B

Under AEDPA, we must determine whether the

California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Sifuentes’ claim

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As a threshold matter, the Supreme

Court has expressly declined to decide whether a defendant’s

constitutional rights are violated when the trial court declines

to allow the defendant to participate in the trial court’s Batson

colloquy with the prosecutor. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197. 

Instead, the Supreme Court assumed “for the sake of

argument” that the habeas petitioner’s “constitutional rights

were violated when the trial court heard the prosecution’s

justifications for its strikes outside the presence of the

defense.” Id. Further, no Supreme Court case requires

rebuttal during Batson hearings, and Batson explicitly

declined “to formulate particular procedures to be followed,”

5 The subsequent history of People v. Ayala is significant here. On

habeas review, we held that People v. Ayala was wrongly decided because

the trial court’s error was not harmless, and granted defendant’s habeas

petition. See Ayala v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656, 660 (9th Cir. 2013). Our

decision was then reversed by the Supreme Court. See Davis v. Ayala,

135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015).

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476 U.S. at 99. However, we need not reach the question

whether the trial court’s decision to preclude Sifuentes from

rebutting the prosecutor’s explanation was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme

Court precedent. Rather, we follow Ayala’s lead and assume

for the sake of argument that the trial court’s conduct, which

the California Court of Appeal identified as an error, was a

federal constitutional error. Therefore, again like the

Supreme Court in Ayala, we turn to the question whether any

such error was prejudicial. See Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197.

C

In Ayala v. Davis, the Supreme Court provided a

framework for a federal court to address a habeas petitioner’s

claim that a state court erred in determining that a

constitutional error was harmless.

The Court first noted that on direct appeal, “the

harmlessness standard is the one prescribed in Chapman,”

namely that a federal constitutional error is harmless if the

court can declare “that it was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting Chapman,

386 U.S. at 24); see also Deck v. Jenkins, No. 13-55130, slip

op. at 62 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2016) (“even on direct review a

constitutional trial error will not warrant reversal if it was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). By contrast, in a

collateral proceeding, habeas petitioners “are not entitled to

habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that

it resulted in ‘actual prejudice’” under Brecht v. Abrahamson.

Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637);

see also Deck, No. 13-55130, slip op. at 62 (“In a collateral

proceeding, the test is more forgiving to the prosecution.”). 

“The inquiry under Brecht is not whether the federal habeas

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court could definitively say that there were no winning

arguments that the defense could have made,” Ayala, 135 S.

Ct. at 2203, but rather whether the evidence in the record

raises “grave doubts about whether the trial judge would have

ruled differently.” Id. (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch,

513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)) (internal quotation marks and

alteration omitted). A conclusion that such grave doubts exist

“requires much more than a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the

result of the hearing would have been different.” Id. (quoting

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). Rather, “[t]he Brecht standard

reflects the view that a State is not to be put to the arduous

task of retrying a defendant based on mere speculation that

the defendant was prejudiced by trial error; the court must

find that the defendant was actually prejudiced by the error.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998)).

While a petitioner seeking federal habeas relief must meet

the Brechtstandard, “that does not mean, as the Ninth Circuit

thought, that a state court’s harmlessness determination has

no significance under Brecht.” Id. at 2198. Although in Fry

v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007), the Supreme Court “held

that the Brecht standard ‘subsumes’ the requirements that

§ 2254(d) imposes when a federal habeas petitioner contests

a state court’s determination that a constitutional error was

harmless under Chapman . . . . [t]he Fry Court did not

hold—and would have had no possible basis for

holding—that Brecht somehow abrogates the limitation on

federal habeas relief that § 2254(d) plainly sets out.” Ayala,

135 S. Ct. at 2198. Accordingly, “[w]hile a federal habeas

court need not formally apply both Brecht and

AEDPA/Chapman,” AEDPA nevertheless “sets forth a

precondition to the grant of habeas relief.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted).

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After explaining the relationship between Brecht and

AEDPA, Ayala then explained how federal courts must apply

the AEDPA precondition subsumed in Brecht. AEDPA

“demands an inquiry into whether a prisoner's ‘claim’ has

been ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court; if it has,

AEDPA’s highly deferential standards kick in.” Id. If a state

court concludes that “any federal error was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt under Chapman,” such a decision

“undoubtedly constitutes an adjudication of [the prisoner’s]

constitutional claim ‘on the merits’” for purposes of AEDPA. 

Id. Under these circumstances, “a federal habeas court

cannot grant [the prisoner] relief unless the state court's

rejection of his claim (1) was contrary to or involved an

unreasonable application of clearlyestablished federal law, or

(2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 

Id. Under this standard, a court may not overturn the state

court’s decision “unless that court applied Chapman in an

objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also id. at 2199 (“When a Chapman

decision is reviewed under AEDPA, a federal court may not

award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness

determination itself was unreasonable.”). Because “a

state-court decision is not unreasonable if fairminded jurists

could disagree on its correctness,” id. (quoting Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)) (internal quotation marks

and alteration omitted), a habeas petitioner must show that

the state court's harmless error determination “was so lacking

in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at

103).

In sum, a petitioner “necessarily cannot satisfy” the

Brecht requirement of showing that he was “actually

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prejudiced” by the state court’s error in receiving the

prosecution’s explanation for a challenged strike without the

defense present “if a fairminded jurist could agree with the

[state appellate court] that this procedure met the Chapman

standard of harmlessness.” Id. at 2199. By the same token,

if a petitioner does satisfy the Brecht requirement of showing

that an error resulted in “actual prejudice,” then the petitioner

necessarily must have shown that the state court’s

determination that the error was harmless was objectively

unreasonable. See Deck, No. 13-55130, slip op. at 63 (“A

determination that the error resulted in actual prejudice

necessarily means that the state court’s harmlessness

determination was not merely incorrect, but objectively

unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).6

D

With this framework in mind, we now consider whether,

assuming that the trial court’s denial of Sifuentes’s request to

rebut the prosecutor’s proffered reasons was a federal

constitutional error, any such error was prejudicial. See

Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197. Because AEDPA “sets forth a

precondition to the grant of habeas relief,” id. at 2198, we

begin by considering whether Sifuentes’s claim has been

adjudicated on the merits. Here, the California Court of

Appeal determined that the trial court’s error was harmless

under Chapman. Because this constitutes an adjudication of

the claim on the merits, “the highly deferential AEDPA

standard applies, [and] we may not overturn the [state court’s]

6 Of course, because the Brechtstandard subsumes the AEDPA analysis,

an error could be objectively unreasonable under AEDPA and still not be

actually prejudicial.

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decision unless that court applied Chapman in an objectively

unreasonable manner.” Id.

Here a reasonable jurist could conclude that the California

Court of Appeal’s application of Chapman was not

objectively unreasonable. The prosecutor challenged each of

the jurors for race-neutral reasons, and the trial court listened

to and evaluated each of those reasons and determined that

they were genuine. Sifuentes has not identified how an

opportunity to respond to the prosecutor’s explanations for

striking any of the potential jurors could have made any

difference to the trial court and state appellate court’s

acceptance of the prosecutor’s credibility. As in Ayala, there

is “no support for the suggestion” that Sifuentes’s attorney, if

allowed to participate, would have been able to convince the

trial court that the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual. Id.

at 2205. We therefore conclude that the California Court of

Appeal’s determination that any error was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt was not an unreasonable application of

Chapman. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because “a

fairminded jurist could agree” with the state court’s Chapman

determination, Sifuentes “necessarily cannot satisfy” the

Brecht requirement of showing that he was “actually

prejudiced” by the state court’s error. Id. at 2199. Moreover,

there is no reasonable possibility the trial judge would have

ruled differently had he allowed rebuttal, and therefore we do

not have a “grave doubt” that Sifuentes was actually

prejudiced. See Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197–98.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to

DISMISS the petition.

 Case: 13-17603, 06/09/2016, ID: 10007710, DktEntry: 59, Page 54 of 54