Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03797/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03797-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Monte Boyd Devore
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3797

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Southern District of Iowa.

* 

Monte Boyd Devore, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 21, 2005

Filed: June 24, 2005

___________

Before MURPHY, BYE and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After the district court1

 denied his motion to suppress evidence seized in a

search of his home, Monte Boyd Devore entered a conditional guilty plea to being a

felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 30 months. Devore appeals,

arguing that the district court erred in finding that his girlfriend had voluntarily

consented to a search of the house and in refusing to strike a portion of his

presentence investigation report (PSR). We affirm.

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On December 30, 2002, officers entered Devore's house to execute a warrant

for his arrest on state child endangerment and sex offense charges. The officers

arrested Devore without incident but were stopped by Shannon Gilleland, Devore's

girlfriend. Gilleland struggled with the officers as they removed Devore from the

house and then resisted her own arrest for interfering with official acts. Once in

custody Gilleland consented to the search of the house where officers located firearms

and drug paraphernalia.

On April 15, 2003 Devore was indicted for being a felon in possession of a

firearm. Devore filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of

his house, arguing that Gilleland had not voluntarily consented to the search. After

a hearing, the district court found that her consent had been voluntarily given and

denied the motion. Devore subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea preserving

his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 

At sentencing, Devore objected to three paragraphs in his PSR that described

the conduct underlying the state child endangerment and sex offense charges for

which he had been arrested and later convicted. Devore requested that the paragraphs

be moved from the section describing his federal offense, arguing that they were

unrelated to his possession of a firearm. The district court overruled the motion and

sentenced Devore to 30 months, to be served consecutive to his state sentence. He

appeals.

Devore first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress, contending that Gilleland's consent was not voluntarily but rather a product

of duress and police coercion. See United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 380 (8th

Cir. 1990) (no authority to search when consent "the product of duress or coercion,

express or implied" (internal quotations omitted)). After arresting Gilleland, officers

handcuffed her and placed her in the back of a squad car. An officer first requested

her consent to search the home after she had been in the vehicle for forty minutes to

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an hour while the officers arranged care for her children. The interchange between

Gilleland and the officer regarding the search was videotaped. She asked the officer

a number of questions about the search, but never refused consent. After being told

that she could "say yes or no" and asked seven times for her permission to search the

house, Gilleland consented and assisted the officers in locating contraband. Officers

found firearms and drug paraphernalia.

Devore argues that Gilleland was held handcuffed in a squad car for more than

forty minutes, that she was unlawfully arrested without a warrant, and that the

officer's repeated requests for permission were coercive. We will reverse a district

court's finding of voluntary consent only for clear error. United States v. White, 42

F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1994). Although Gilleland was in custody at the time of her

consent, this does not preclude a finding of voluntariness. See United States v.

Becker, 333 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2003). Officers were polite to Gilleland while

she was in the squad car and notified her that she could refuse consent. Gilleland

questioned the officers about the search and carefully considered her decision, at no

point telling them that they could not search the home. After expressing her consent,

Gilleland assisted the officers in finding contraband. The district court was not

clearly erroneous in finding that Gilleland's consent was voluntarily given.

Devore also argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32(d)(3) by refusing to move paragraphs in the PSR about his state child

endangerment and sex offenses for which he was arrested on the evening authorities

found firearms in his home from the PSR section detailing his federal offense.

According to Devore, the inclusion of the paragraphs in the offense conduct section

of the PSR will harm him by requiring that he undergo sex offender treatment in

federal prison. Because Devore challenges the placement of the statements within the

report rather than their factual accuracy, the district court was not required to serve

as "an editor as well as an arbiter of justice" by moving the paragraphs to another

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section of the PSR. United States v. Beatty, 9 F.3d 686, 689 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting

United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1990)).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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