Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04249/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04249-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adam McDonald
Plaintiff
San Francisco Unified School District
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM MCDONALD,

Plaintiff, No. C 07-4249 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO DISMISS

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED 

SCHOOL DISTRICT

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. 

Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments, and good cause

appearing, the court hereby GRANTS the motion for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff was employed as an art teacher at Abraham Lincoln High School starting in

August 2005. Abraham Lincoln High School is part of defendant San Francisco Unified

School District (“SFUSD”). 

A theft occurred in plaintiff’s classroom on November 14, 2006, and plaintiff refused

to cooperate with the administration in identifying students who may have been in plaintiff’s

classroom at the time of the theft. Plaintiff was issued a letter of reprimand by the school

on November 15, 2006. Plaintiff did not return to his employment at the school after

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

November 15, 2006. On March 1, 2007, plaintiff was advised that he would not be re-hired

for the 2007-2008 school year. 

Plaintiff filed an administrative charge with the EEOC, asserting employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, et

seq. (“Title VII”). Plaintiff claimed that the alleged discrimination took place on November

14, 2006. His description of the facts was as follows (in its entirety):

I was employed with Respondent as an Art Teacher since August 2005. My

supervisor was Ron Pang [Principal] and Kristen Cacal, Assistant Principal.

On November 14, 2006, Cacal asked me to identify students who were not on

the roster, but, who were in my classroom when a theft was reported. I

refused to provide the names.

My last day of work was November 14, 2006. I did not return to work after

that incident.

I believe I have been discriminated against because of my gender, Male, race

(did not identify) and religion (spiritual), in violation of the Statute.

The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter, and plaintiff filed the present action, alleging

discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion, sex, and “social and economic

background.” The original complaint asserted that the discrimination took place from

“9/2006 – present.” Plaintiff alleged as “acts complained of” 

required mandatory participation in an act of discrimination, stolen properties,

psychological abuse, sexual harassment, violation of personal privacy,

withdraw of funds from personal checking, conspiracy, child abuse (in

process of harassment), violations of the contract in their handling of my

reports. 

Plaintiff also submitted a lengthy document entitled “Facts Surrounding Claim” at the

time he filed the complaint. This voluminous submission does not make clear exactly what

acts gave rise to the complaint. 

SFUSD filed a motion to dismiss. SFUSD argued that the case was time-barred, as

plaintiff had failed to file the complaint within the 90-day limitations period; and also

asserted that the complaint failed to state a claim under Title VII; that any state law tort

claims that plaintiff intended to assert were barred because plaintiff had not submitted a

claim under the California Tort Claims Act; that to the extent that plaintiff intended to allege

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 2 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

breach of labor contract, he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and that any

discrimination claims falling outside the Title VII administrative charge should be dismissed

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff filed no substantive opposition to the motion. Instead, on October 19, 2007,

nine days after the opposition was due, he filed a “motion to outline compensation,” in

which he asserted his entitlement to $30,000,000 in damages.

The court granted the motion to dismiss, with leave to amend. The 11-page order,

which was issued on October 24, 2007, set forth the elements of the claims, provided a

statement of the reasons that the complaint was deficient, and advised plaintiff how to

amend the complaint in order to state a claim. The court hereby incorporates the October

24, 2007, order by reference.

The October 24, 2007, order also directed plaintiff to file a declaration regarding the

circumstances under which he received the right-to-sue notice (i.e., when he received it,

and where and at what address), and advised SFUSD that it could file a short reply to

plaintiff’s declaration.

On November 6, 2007, plaintiff filed a declaration “in support of plaintiff’s opposition

to defendant’s motion to dismiss.” After SFUSD’s reply was filed on November 14, 2007,

the court issued an order on November 21, 2007, finding that the action was not timebarred, but reaffirming that the complaint was dismissed on all other grounds argued by

SFUSD. The court ordered plaintiff to file an amended complaint in accordance with the

October 24, 2007, order (which stated that the amended complaint was due by December

5, 2007).

On December 4, 2007, plaintiff filed his 39-page first amended complaint (“FAC”),

which appears to incorporate by reference the voluminous document entitled “Facts

Supporting Claims.” Plaintiff’s main complaint appears to be that he was not treated with

respect by SFUSD, and that he was terminated from his position. Despite the court’s

explicit instructions in the October 24, 2007, order, the FAC does not mention the alleged

discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and sex.

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 3 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The FAC also adds a summary claim that his First, Seventh, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated. He does not, however, clarify which acts by SFUSD

allegedly violated his constitutional rights. Rather, the FAC asserts a lengthy list of

“injuries,” as follows:

I was stalked. I was threatened in my home. Illegal searches were done in

my studio. Police hand-cuffed me and entered my residence without a

warrent [sic]. Public property and devices were used to intimidate me. My

education, world view, and cultural upbringing were insulted. I was asked to

participate in a racist, staged “investigation” which contradicted my social and

ethical principles. The union failed in thier [sic] protection of one of their

members. I was not given the rights and processes of the Contract. The

Union decieved [sic] me in thier [sic] assistance. The Union, the District, and

Members of Abraham Lincoln assisted each other in decieving [sic] me. I was

forced to abandon my position as art teacher at Abraham Lincoln High

School. Abraham Lincoln High School hired a replacement teacher prior to

my leaving – confident in their scheming. I was forced to sell and abandon

thousands of dollars [sic] personal items and assets. Personal mail was

opened. Time sensitive documents mailed to incorrect addresses. 

Homeless, forced to live out of my car for over eight months. The halt of

production of paintings for my contemporary art business. Rashes,

teethgrinding, and dysentary [sic] without comfortable facilities. Personal

Privacy violated – dug up old associations and family members – People I did

not want to hear from. Professional and educational perspective insulted. (I

was being treated like I was a slave – who failed to meet the masters [sic]

command.) Insubordination is an abusive term. I was denied communication

outlets of the internet. Over a year of silent treatment from Administration at

Abraham Lincoln High School. Cut from payroll – extrean [sic] financial

instability. Neer [sic] altercation of someone breaking into my car while I was

sleeping inside. Psychological changes, the terrors of being stocked [sic],

confusion “what and why is this happening.” The loss of trust in humanity, not

know [sic] who is dependable and trustworthy. Betrayal and exclusion,

alienation and conspiracy. Theft of personal funds from checking account –

fear of further embezelment [sic] and powerlessness to legaly [sic] prevent or

defend myself from victimization. Theft of personal and intelectual property

(some recently returned). Used political and finacial [sic] power to prevent me

from, the rights listed in the Contract, union representation, legal assistance

agencies, and attornies [sic]. Being homeless I became vulnerable to other

predatory criminals. The police force is worthless, and equally abusive. 

Sabatage [sic] of over eight years of schooling and refence [sic] employment

experience in education. They tried to murder me, they did not use knives but

I was tossed into the snow without a blanket. Loss of life, years of working

toward particular goals, now shattered. I will need to rebuild and redefine

who and what I am. They destroyed by dream of working in and stablizing

[sic] my life through the “noble” profession of education.

FAC, pages 32-34.

Plaintiff also asserts that SFUSD violated various provisions of the contract between

U.E.S.F. (presumably a reference United Educators of San Francisco, AFT/CFT, AFL-CIOCase 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 4 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

NEA/CTA, the bargaining representative for the teachers in SFUSD). 

 SFUSD now seeks an order dismissing the FAC.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims

alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003).

Review is limited to the contents of the complaint. Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen.

Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). To survive a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, a complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that the

complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Specific facts are unnecessary – the statement need only give the defendant “fair

notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct.

2197, 2200 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). 

All allegations of material fact are taken as true. Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2200. However, a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (citations and quotations omitted). Rather, the

allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Id. at 1965. A motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint does not proffer

enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See id. at 1966-67. 

B. Defendant’s Motion

SFUSD argues that the FAC should be dismissed for reasons similar to the reasons

argued with regard to the original complaint (with the exception of the argument that the

action was filed more than 90 days after the issuance of the right-to-sue letter). SFUSD

contends that the FAC fails to state a claim under Title VII or any other law; that plaintiff’s

non-statutory claims, to the extent he states any, are barred because he failed to exhaust

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 5 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

administrative remedies; and that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

under Title VII, and thus, to the extent he is attempting to allege any claims outside the

scope of his administrative charge, such claims are barred.

SFUSD makes five arguments in support of its motion. First, SFUSD argues that the

FAC fails to state a claim under Title VII or any other law. In the original complaint, plaintiff

alleged discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, and social/economic background. 

In the order dismissing the complaint, the court ruled that plaintiff must, at a minimum,

“state what the discriminatory action was and when it occurred,” and in addition, “state . . .

what race he is and what religion he practices . . . , whether he is alleging a claim of sex

discrimination or sexual harassment, and must identify the action(s) that constituted that

alleged discrimination or harassment.” The court further advised plaintiff that

“social/economic background” is not a protected category under Title VII, and therefore

cannot provide a basis for a claim of discrimination. 

SFUSD notes that the FAC contains no additional descriptive information about

plaintiff’s race, although he did assert in the November 6, 2007 declaration that he is “1/16

Pacific Island, 3/16 Amerindian, 1/4 Hispanic (Portugues [sic] and Spanish) and the rest

English, French, Scotish [sic].” The only references in the FAC to race are the statements

about “Latina girls used as decoys” and an allegation that SFUSD demanded that he

“participate in a mandatory, racist, investigation, where African American males were

inflicted.”

SFUSD asserts that plaintiff has failed to plead any facts to support a claim that

SFUSD discriminated against him because of his race; that he has failed to state that he

suffered any adverse employment action on the basis of his race; and that he has failed to

identify any action by SFUSD that allegedly constituted race discrimination, or to state

when it allegedly occurred or provide any other details. 

With regard to the claim for religious discrimination, SFUSD contends that plaintiff

has provided no additional facts sufficient to state a claim. SFUSD notes that plaintiff

stated in his November 6, 2007 declaration that he is a “practicing Zen Catholic Yogi, who

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 6 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

is also a member of the Noetic Society.” SFSUD contends that beyond this statement, the

declaration and the FAC fail to address the claim for religious discrimination. 

SFUSD asserts that as with the claim of racial discrimination, plaintiff has not set

forth any facts alleging that he was subject to any adverse employment action by the

school district on the basis of his asserted religion, and fails to identify any action by the

school district that constituted discrimination on the basis of religion, or to state when it

occurred or provide any other details. 

With regard to the claim for sex discrimination, SFUSD contends that plaintiff –

despite the court’s order – has failed to clarify whether he is claiming sexual harassment or

discrimination. SFUSD asserts that plaintiff has provided no additional facts in the FAC

indicating that he suffered an adverse employment action on the basis of his gender, and

does not identify any discriminatory acts, or indicate when they occurred or provide any

other details.

SFUSD argues that the FAC and plaintiff’s numerous other submissions, even taken

together, fail to put SFUSD on notice as to the nature of the claims being asserted against

it. SFUSD contends that plaintiff fails to allege on what bases he was discriminated

against, when the alleged discrimination took place, where it took place, or any other

details of what allegedly happened. SFUSD asserts that plaintiff’s vague and unintelligible

assertions have no nexus with conduct prohibited by Title VII, and are ambiguous at best

as to how the statements connect to a cognizable Title VII claim.

SFUSD’s second argument is that the FAC fails to state a claim as to the non-Title

VII claims. SFUSD asserts that plaintiff is equally vague in terms of what other laws were

allegedly violated, who committed the alleged violations, and what exactly plaintiff is

complaining of. For example, SFUSD notes that plaintiff alleges in the FAC that someone

else entered student grades for his classes, that “eerie music was played over the loud

speaker into [his] classroom, that the Lincoln High School principal greeted plaintiff with a

“nervous ‘good morning’” although it was afternoon; that Latina girls were “used as decoys,”

and that his Internet connection was not operating in his classroom (citing FAC pages 3-5). 

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 7 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

SFUSD asserts that none of these claims are related to any recognized claim against the

district.

SFUSD also notes that the FAC mentions that plaintiff was “stalked,” “threatened,”

and subjected to “illegal searches;” that “public property and devices were used to

intimidate” him; that the police entered his residence without a warrant; that his “education,

world view, and cultural upbringing were insulted;” that “the union failed in their protection

of one of their members” and deceived him; that he was “forced to sell and abandon

thousands of dollars personal items and assets” [sic]; that his personal mail was opened;

and that he was forced to live out of his car for eight months. SFUSD contends, however,

that plaintiff does not allege who did these things to him, or when they did these things to

him – let alone allege that anyone employed by the school district committed the acts.

Again, SFUSD argues, plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to put the school

district on notice of the nature of the claims being asserted against it. In addition, the

allegations fail to even suggest a cognizable claim against SFUSD.

SFUSD’s third argument is that to the extent that plaintiff is intending to allege a

claim of breach of labor contract, he has failed to allege facts supporting the elements of

the claim (as explained in the October 24, 2007, order) – the existence of a contract,

performance by plaintiff, breach by SFUSD, and damages. In addition, SFUSD asserts, in

the context of public employment or a collective bargaining agreement, employees may

have to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. SFUSD argues that plaintiff has

not only failed to clarify his claim – it appears that he is alleging that his contract with the

SFUSD was somehow violated – but has failed to allege that he utilized the administrative

remedies set forth in the contract, and also fails to plead any of the elements of breach of

contract. 

In its fourth argument, SFUSD asserts that plaintiff failed to comply with the

California Tort Claims Act. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 910(a), 945.4. SFUSD argues

that because plaintiff failed to file a timely claim with the school district, the claims must be

dismissed. 

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 8 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Finally, in its fifth argument, SFUSD contends that the FAC alleges claims that do

not fall within the scope of the EEOC charge. SFUSD notes that in the October 24, 2007,

order, the court recognized that the claim that plaintiff was required to participate “in an act

of discrimination” and the claim that he was sexually harassed are not contained in the

EEOC charge. SFUSD argues that because these claims are not “like or reasonably

related to” the allegations in the EEOC charge, they must be dismissed. In particular,

SFUSD contends, plaintiff has made no attempt to show that whatever happened on

November 14, 2006, in any way relates to these new claims. Consequently, SFUSD

argues, they should be dismissed. 

In opposition, plaintiff does not address any of SFUSD’s arguments. Instead, he

asserts that he has adequately stated a claim under Rule 8, that the FAC lists “specific

events, names, and dates,” and “included an outline of the constitutional rights violated.” 

Indeed, he appears to have dropped the Title VII claims, as he refers in his opposition to

SFUSD as having “intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights,” not to any act of

discrimination in employment. 

Moreover, it is impossible to determine from plaintiff’s opposition or the FAC which

claims he is asserting against SFUSD. For example, he contends that the police entered

his home without a warrant, that the union failed to represent him, that someone opened

his mail, that someone mailed “time-sensitive documents” to incorrect addresses, and that

someone attempted to break into his car while he was sleeping in it. None of these actions

appear to provide any basis for a claim against SFUSD. Thus, aside from the other

deficiencies described above, the court finds that the FAC fails to put SFUSD on notice of

the claims being asserted against it.

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED, for the reasons argued by

SFUSD. The FAC does not set out plaintiff’s individual claims, much less provide the

necessary allegations of facts supporting the elements of the specific claims. Nor does the

FAC attempt to remedy the other deficiencies noted by the court with regard to the original

complaint. To the extent that plaintiff alleges discrimination in violation of Title VII, the FAC

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 9 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

fails to state a claim for the reasons stated in the October 24, 2007, order. In addition,

plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to Title VII claims that are outside the

scope of the EEOC charge. To the extent that plaintiff alleges any non-Title VII claims

against SFUSD, the FAC fails to allege what the claims are, who committed the alleged

violations, and what facts support the elements of any such claims, and also fails to allege

that plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies as to any tort claims. To the extent that

plaintiff alleges a claim of breach of labor contract, the FAC fails to allege facts supporting

the elements of such a claim, and fails to allege that plaintiff exhausted administrative

remedies. 

As for the allegations of constitutional violations, those claims must also be

dismissed. With few exceptions not relevant here, a plaintiff has no cause of action directly

under the United States Constitution. “[A] litigant complaining of a violation of a

constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los

Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and quotation omitted). 

 Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the 'deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

(1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1)

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2)

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245

(9th Cir. 1987). 

Nevertheless, § 1983 does not provide an actionable claim for every injury in which

a governmental entity may have played some role. The Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution precludes suits against a state, unless the state has waived its

immunity or Congress has exercised its power to override that immunity. See Will v.

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 10 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The court finds the motion to be appropriate for decision without oral argument. See

Civil L.R. 7-1(b); see also Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir.1998); Lake at Las

Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991)

(court's consideration of moving and opposition papers is deemed adequate substitute for

formal hearing).

11

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-71 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment does

not bar suits against cities and counties, which are not arms of the State, or their officials. 

Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). In this case,

however, SFUSD cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is an arm of the State under the

Eleventh Amendment, and is therefore not a “person” within the meaning of 

§ 1983. See Belanger v. Madera Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1992);

Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified Sch. Dist., 83 Cal. App. 4th 1098, 1105-15 (2000); see

also Will, 491 U.S. at 65-69. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the court hereby GRANTS the motion. Because

plaintiff failed to amend the complaint in accordance with the court’s prior instructions, the

court finds that further leave to amend would be futile. Thus, the dismissal is WITH

PREJUDICE. 

The hearing on the motion, previously set for Wednesday, January 30, 2008, is

VACATED.1

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2008 

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-04249-PJH Document 34 Filed 01/23/08 Page 11 of 11