Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03088/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03088-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gwendolyn M. Hemphill
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 15, 2007 Decided February 8, 2008 

No. 06-3088 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

GWENDOLYN M. HEMPHILL AND 

JAMES ODELL BAXTER, 

APPELLANTS

Consolidated with 

06-3089, 07-3016 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 03cr00516-01) 

(No. 03cr00516-03) 

USCA Case #06-3088 Document #1097964 Filed: 02/08/2008 Page 1 of 25
2 

 Nancy Luque argued the cause for appellant Gwendolyn 

M. Hemphill. With her on the briefs was Arthur F. 

Fergenson. 

 Lisa Alexis Jones argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant James Odell Baxter II. 

 Suzanne G. Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and Anthony 

Alexis, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

 Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

 BROWN, Circuit Judge: Defendants Gwendolyn Hemphill 

and James Baxter appeal their convictions on multiple counts 

including embezzlement, money laundering, false pretenses, 

and conspiring to commit such crimes. We affirm the district 

court’s judgments as to both defendants. 

I 

A 

 The charges arose from a seven-year orgy of greed 

during which Hemphill, Baxter, and several others stole 

millions of dollars from the Washington Teachers Union 

(WTU). Barbara Bullock, WTU’s president during this 

period, and her chauffeur, Leroy Holmes, both pled guilty 

before trial. 

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 For approximately seven years, Bullock, Hemphill, 

Baxter, and friends appropriated for their own benefit much 

of the money union members paid as dues. They embezzled 

these funds through several channels, including American 

Express (Amex) cards issued on WTU’s account, checks 

written for fraudulent purposes and for excessive amounts, 

and payments to a front company, Expressions Unlimited. 

All union checks required two signatures, those of Bullock 

and Baxter, the union’s president and treasurer respectively. 

These two, therefore, had the key to the union treasury. 

 Initially, Bullock and Baxter simply used their WTU 

Amex cards for personal expenses, and they spent quite a lot. 

But the thefts became more audacious when Hemphill was 

hired as Bullock’s secretary and then also became the union’s 

bookkeeper. Spending increased so dramatically that Baxter 

placed a $5,000 per month limit on Bullock’s Amex 

spending. In response, the two opened a separate Amex 

account with WTU’s credit, billed to Hemphill’s home 

address. To pay the rapidly escalating bills on this account, 

they wrote checks to Expressions Unlimited, and they also 

passed money through Bullock’s chauffeur, Holmes. 

Hemphill wrote him checks for about double his salary, and 

he returned the excess directly to her bank account. 

 The conspirators’ thefts increased so significantly that in 

2001, WTU paid $925,000 in credit card bills; by 2002, the 

union was broke and could not pay its membership fees for 

the American Federation of Teachers. Bullock and Baxter, 

WTU’s officers, were forced to file fraudulent accounting and 

tax forms with the Department of Labor and the IRS. To 

cover the shortfall, they and Hemphill agreed to change a 

pending dues assessment of $16.09 per teacher to $160.09, 

reasoning that should questions arise, they could explain the 

discrepancy as a clerical error. 

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 Between 1995 and 2002, the conspirators stole millions 

of dollars from WTU and spent it on such things as a $50,000 

silver set for Bullock’s house, a wedding reception for 

Hemphill’s son, $29,000 in dental work for her and her 

husband, $19,000 in Washington Wizards tickets for Baxter 

and Bullock, car insurance for him, and art for his house. 

Sometimes they simply wrote themselves checks from the 

union treasury. After WTU received an infusion of cash from 

the inflated assessment in 2002, Hemphill and Baxter wrote 

themselves more checks totaling $18,805 and $31,000, 

respectively. In the end, the dues overcharge attracted so 

much attention the American Federation of Teachers alerted 

the federal government to WTU’s suspicious finances. 

B 

 Bullock pled guilty in 2003, and a grand jury indicted 

Hemphill and Baxter in November. The government filed a 

motion to exclude time to stay the seventy-day deadline 

imposed by the Speedy Trial Act, and the district court 

granted the motion on February 20, 2004. Trial began on 

May 31, 2005, and ended August 31. The jury convicted 

Hemphill and Baxter on all counts, while acquitting WTU’s 

accountant. At the sentencing hearing, Hemphill’s counsel 

first learned Holmes had a “history of minor thefts.” The 

government knew Holmes had been arrested twice in 

Maryland for theft, but not whether indictments or 

convictions resulted from those arrests. Hemphill moved for 

a new trial, arguing Holmes’s arrests were material 

information withheld by the government in violation of Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court denied 

her motion on October 18, 2005. 

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 On May 22, 2006, the court sentenced Hemphill to 132 

months in prison; she appealed on May 30. On June 5, 2006, 

the court sentenced Baxter to 120 months in prison; he 

appealed on June 14. Hemphill also appeals the district 

court’s denial of her January 4, 2007, motion for a new trial. 

We consolidated the three appeals. 

II 

 We address Hemphill’s issues first, some of which 

Baxter joins. Second, we discuss the questions appealed 

solely by Baxter. 

A 

 At the outset of the investigation, Hemphill agreed to be 

interviewed by FBI agents. The information she provided 

appears to have been quite useful to the government, which 

then obtained financial records detailing bank transactions by 

her, Bullock, and Expressions Unlimited; credit card activity; 

and payments to Baxter. Presumably her statements also 

helped the government negotiate pleas with Bullock and 

Holmes. 

 Therefore, Hemphill argues the district court abused its 

discretion by refusing to hold a Kastigar hearing. “Kastigar” 

is a misnomer for the hearing she demanded, because that 

case applies when the government compels a witness to 

provide incriminating information. Kastigar v. United States, 

406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). If the government later prosecutes 

that witness, it cannot use her information at all, directly or 

indirectly. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 854 (D.C. 

Cir. 1990), reh’g granted in part, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 

1990). In a Kastigar hearing, the government has the 

significant burden to show its evidence was “derived from a 

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source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.” 

United States v. Rinaldi, 808 F.2d 1579, 1582 (D.C. Cir. 

1987). By contrast, when, like Hemphill, a witness provides 

information voluntarily, the government is not obligated to 

agree to any particular scope of immunity. See United States 

v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 337 (4th Cir. 2006). The agreement 

between the government and the witness determines the scope 

of immunity. In a subsequent prosecution, the defendant has 

the burden to prove any government breach of the agreement. 

United States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 

(citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)). 

The terms of Hemphill’s voluntary debriefing agreement 

determine what she had to prove or at least to allege to earn a 

hearing. We have not had occasion to interpret an agreement 

like Hemphill’s, which permitted the government to “make 

derivative use of any statements or information provided by 

Ms. Hemphill during the voluntary, ‘off-the-record’ 

debriefing(s) . . . to pursue its investigation” and barred her 

from challenging any government evidence obtained through 

derivative use of her statements. In Kilroy, the government 

had offered the defendant “use immunity.” Kilroy, 27 F.3d at 

685. We interpreted that language to incorporate Kastigar, 

concluding the government had, in effect, promised to assume 

the burden of proving its evidence was not tainted by 

immunized testimony. Id. “Use immunity” covered both 

direct and indirect utilization. In Hylton, the defendant spoke 

to investigators under an agreement that expressly allowed 

derivative use, but the interpretation of that clause was not 

before us because at trial the government had assumed the 

burden of proving the evidence was untainted. United States 

v. Hylton, 294 F.3d 130, 132, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

 Clearly the immunity Hemphill accepted was narrow. 

“The Government agree[d] only that no statements . . . 

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provided by Ms. Hemphill . . . will be used directly against 

her” except in a prosecution for perjury or obstruction of 

justice, and the government preserved “[t]he admissibility of 

any evidence obtained through . . . derivative use of Ms. 

Hemphill’s statements.” Such language prohibits the 

government only from attributing to her the statements a 

defendant made or the information she provided as evidence 

against her. See United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 711 

(11th Cir. 1998). Hemphill contends the government used her 

information “directly” twice: first, Special Agent Andrews 

testified before the grand jury after interviewing her; second, 

a government auditor, Nicholas Novak, read reports about 

those interviews before he prepared charts summarizing the 

fraudulent transactions, about which he testified at trial. 

However, neither witness attributed any statement to 

Hemphill, so their testimony was not direct use within the 

meaning of Hemphill’s agreement. 

B 

 Next, Hemphill argues the district court should have 

granted her motion for dismissal based on the Speedy Trial 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. We review a district court’s legal 

determinations under the Speedy Trial Act de novo. United 

States v. Fonseca, 435 F.3d 369, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

 Under the Speedy Trial Act, the government must bring a 

defendant to trial within seventy days of an indictment. 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The seventy-day period excludes “[a]ny 

period of delay resulting from . . . any pretrial motion, from 

the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing 

on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(1)(F). The “period of delay” includes the time 

during which parties prepare and file their briefs. Henderson 

v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 331 (1986). If there is no 

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hearing or anticipated hearing, the excluded time continues 

from the point when the court takes a motion under 

advisement after all parties have filed their briefs until the 

court decides on the motion, as long as the court’s 

consideration lasts no more than 30 days. § 3161(h)(1)(J); 

Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329; United States v. Holmes, 508 

F.3d 1091, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In addition, a trial court 

may exclude time “resulting from a continuance granted . . . 

[for] the ends of justice.” § 3161(h)(8)(A). 

 Here, the government’s evidence involved thousands of 

financial documents. Because of the large volume of 

material, the government moved on January 9, 2004, for a 

continuance that would stay the seventy-day trial deadline 

imposed by the Speedy Trial Act. Defendants responded to 

that motion on January 27, 2004, three days before the 

deadline was originally set to expire, and the government 

filed its reply brief seven days later. Finally, on February 20, 

2004, the district court granted the government’s motion and 

extended the speedy trial deadline indefinitely. 

 Since the seventieth day after Hemphill’s indictment was 

January 30, 2004, Hemphill contends this continuance was 

nunc pro tunc, in violation of the Act. If, in fact, the seventyday Speedy Trial period ended on January 30, then the district 

court had no power to grant a continuance. The government 

violates the statute, when, without a trial, “dawn breaks on the 

[next] day” after the Speedy Trial period ends. United States 

v. Taylor, 497 F.3d 673, 677 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2007). If, on the 

other hand, the government’s motion tolled the clock, 43 days 

were excluded from the Speedy Trial period, and the district 

court had the power to grant the continuance.1

 

 

1

 Trial did not begin until May 31, 2005, over fifteen months after 

the district court granted the continuance. Hemphill does not 

challenge the length of this delay. 

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 Although Hemphill urges us to create an exception from 

the Speedy Trial Act for motions to exclude time, we decline 

to do so. The statute itself excludes the time resulting from 

“any pretrial motion.” § 3161(h)(1)(F). We have interpreted 

this phrase to mean what it says: any motion will toll the 

clock. See United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440, 1443 

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to consider whether a motion 

actually caused delay or whether the motion was necessary to 

file before trial). Indeed, a defendant’s motion to dismiss for 

a speedy trial violation will itself stop the clock. Id. at 1444. 

We agree with the First Circuit that a government motion to 

exclude time and obtain a continuance gives rise to an 

excludable period of delay. United States v. Richardson, 421 

F.3d 17, 29 (1st Cir. 2005). Any motion may take time to 

resolve, and the Speedy Trial Act excludes that time from the 

seventy-day limit. 

 Hemphill argues that permitting government continuance 

motions to toll the Speedy Trial clock would allow 

prosecutors to exclude time unilaterally and arbitrarily. To 

the contrary, § 3161(h)(1)(F) gives the government the power 

to exclude only the day on which it files its motion. See 

Fonseca, 435 F.3d at 372 (holding that excluded time 

includes the day on which a motion is filed). After the 

government files a motion, the defense prepares its 

opposition, and that is the time excluded from the seventy-day 

period. How long this portion of the “period of delay” lasts is 

therefore in the defense’s hands. The period of delay while 

the court considers the motion is, obviously, in the court’s 

control. If the government had filed a frivolous, obstructive 

motion, the court could have denied it immediately. The 

government’s motion here was sound enough that the court 

ultimately granted it. 

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C 

 Hemphill also appeals the district court’s refusal to give a 

limiting jury instruction about the government’s extensive 

embezzlement evidence. We think the district court erred, but 

its failure to give the limiting instruction was harmless. 

 The indictment charged Hemphill with six specific acts 

of embezzlement, as well as the general conspiracy to 

embezzle and commit fraud. The government introduced 

evidence of thousands of transactions in which Hemphill took 

money from the union. She argues this evidence was 

inadmissible on the embezzlement counts because it showed 

crimes other than the embezzlements charged. See FED. R.

EVID. 404(b). 

 As the government notes, these transactions were all 

relevant to prove the conspiracy charged as Count One. The 

conspiracy comprised all the thefts and concealments; and 

“where the incident offered is a part of the conspiracy alleged 

. . . the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) because it is 

not an ‘other’ crime.” United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 

447 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But unlike the defendant in Mejia, 

Hemphill faced charges in addition to conspiracy. With 

respect to the other charges, particularly the six specific 

embezzlements, the additional transactions were indeed other 

bad acts. Under Rule 404(b), these other transactions were 

not admissible to prove Hemphill’s character in order to show 

she committed the specific embezzlements “in conformity 

therewith.” See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 

 When the prosecution introduces evidence of prior bad 

acts and the defendant requests a limiting instruction, a trial 

court “must immediately provide one.” United States v. 

Brawner, 32 F.3d 602, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing 

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United States v. Copelin, 996 F.2d 379 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); cf. 

United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d 1449, 1453–54 (D.C. Cir. 

1995) (trial court need not provide a limiting instruction sua 

sponte when prosecution introduces evidence suitable only 

for impeachment). Hemphill did not initially request a 

limiting instruction, but on June 21, 2005, she asked the court 

to tell the jury “that while it may consider the evidence to 

decide whether Mrs. Hemphill joined a conspiracy, it may not 

consider it as proof of the charged embezzlements.” In 

addition, she suggested language for the instruction. 

Nevertheless, the district court refused to provide such an 

instruction during trial or when charging the jury. 

 Although the court erred, we will not reverse a 

conviction for a failure to issue a limiting instruction if the 

error was harmless. See United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 

228, 266–67 (D.C. Cir. 1997). To uphold the conviction, we 

must analyze the trial record, United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 734 (1993), and find “fair assurance . . . that the 

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” United 

States v. Bailey, 319 F.3d 514, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). 

 

 Hemphill’s conviction on the embezzlement charges 

could hardly have been affected by the additional evidence, 

because the government produced so much competent 

evidence to prove those specific charges, including cancelled 

checks recovered from banks and copies of them from the 

union offices after cancellation, as well as false memos 

written on the checks to conceal their true purposes. Trial 

Transcript at 4203–10. To prove illicit purchases, the 

prosecution introduced testimony from vendors who sold the 

items to Hemphill and Baxter. Trial Transcript at 2077–80, 

2168–73, 2240–66. In addition, Bullock testified to 

Hemphill’s involvement in the specific charged 

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embezzlements; and Novak summarized the charged 

transactions, Gov. Exh. C28. 

 Given the volume of evidence on these six counts, the 

district court’s failure to give a limiting instruction about the 

other transactions was harmless error. 

D 

 Next, Hemphill’s challenge to the government’s 

summary evidence is groundless. We review a trial court’s 

decision to admit summary charts for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 

1983). 

 Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a 

party to introduce a chart summarizing “[t]he contents of 

voluminous writings . . . which cannot conveniently be 

examined in court.” To be admissible, a chart must 

summarize documents so voluminous “as to make 

comprehension ‘difficult and . . . inconvenient,’” although not 

necessarily “literally impossible”; the documents themselves 

must be admissible, although the offering party need not 

actually enter them; the party introducing the chart must make 

the underlying documents reasonably available for inspection 

and copying; and the chart must be “accurate and 

nonprejudicial.” United States v. Bray, 139 F.3d 1104, 1109–

10 (6th Cir. 1998). In addition, as part of the foundation for a 

chart, the witness who prepared the chart should introduce it. 

Id. at 1110. 

 Hemphill contests the admissibility of the government’s 

charts on all four of these conditions, but we address only one 

of her arguments in detail. The rest turn on her 

misapprehension that the government must actually introduce 

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the documents on which it bases a summary chart.2

 To the 

contrary, the point of Rule 1006 is to avoid introducing all the 

documents. As long as a party has laid a foundation for the 

underlying documents, a chart summarizing them can itself be 

evidence under Rule 1006. Here, the government proffered 

certifications for the documents under Rule 902(11), and 

Hemphill’s counsel does not appear to have objected.3

 

2

 In the district court, citing United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142-

JAR, 67 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 364, (D. Kan. May 23, 

2005), Hemphill also argued the documents’ certifications as 

business records, pursuant to Rule 902(11), violated the 

Confrontation Clause because she could not confront the 

documents’ custodians. It is unclear whether certifications are 

testimonial evidence, since they are, after all, affidavits prepared 

purposefully for use in prosecution; this court has not decided the 

question. Compare United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th 

Cir. 2006) with United States v. Adefehinti, No. 04-3080, ___ F.3d 

___, 2007 WL 4386110, at *8–9 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 2007). We do 

not address it here, because Hemphill has not presented the issue. 

Instead, she suggests the chart evidence itself violated the 

Confrontation Clause. Needless to say, bank records and credit 

card statements are not testimonial evidence, and that is what the 

Confrontation Clause regulates. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 

36, 68 (2004). 

3

 We cannot tell for sure whether the government entered the 

certifications into evidence, as it was required to do, United States 

v. Johnson, 594 F.2d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing 5 Weinstein 

on Evidence ¶ 1006-5) (1975) (noting that proponent of a chart 

must lay a foundation for the underlying documents). Nor is it 

clear whether Hemphill’s counsel objected. Although Hemphill 

attacks the charts for lack of foundation in her opening brief, her 

actual argument is that Novak could not present the charts because 

he lacked personal knowledge of the transactions. Of course, for 

charts entered under Rule 1006, he need only have knowledge of 

the documents he reviewed to prepare the charts. Meanwhile, 

Hemphill does not raise the proper foundation issue until her reply 

brief, and she does not support her tardy argument with any record 

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 In her most serious contention, Hemphill claims the 

charts were argumentative, prejudicial, and selective. In 

particular, she says Novak, the government auditor, used his 

accounting skills to prepare charts purposefully to show that 

Hemphill had a source of funds outside her regular income. 

But the fact that a non-expert witness, like Novak, prepared a 

chart or testified about it does not make the chart 

inadmissible. See United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 563 

(6th Cir. 1979) (necessary only that the investigator “had 

properly catalogued the exhibits . . . and had knowledge of the 

analysis”). Nor is it problematic for a witness to perform 

some calculations in preparing a chart. United States v. 

Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 799–800 (11th Cir. 1990) (government 

witness added $100 per month to the defendant’s accounts); 

United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1984) 

(government exhibit extrapolated defendant’s reimbursement 

by assuming a value for average daily expenditure). Even if 

the calculations are mistaken, the chart is itself admissible, 

since admissible evidence may be unpersuasive and a 

defendant has the opportunity to rebut it. Evans, 910 F.2d at 

800. Therefore, it was not error for the district court to allow 

Novak to testify about charts he prepared based on documents 

he reviewed. 

E 

 In addition, Hemphill protests she was unable adequately 

to confront Holmes, a key government witness. First, she 

says the district court improperly limited her crossexamination of Holmes by barring questions about his 

proclivity for gambling, thus infringing her Sixth Amendment 

 

evidence. In the absence of any information to show whether the 

government entered a foundation for the underlying documents, we 

cannot consider this issue. 

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right to confront him. Second, she accuses the government of 

withholding Brady information about Holmes. 

 Although the right to cross-examine and impeach a 

witness is an important component of the right of 

confrontation, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1974), 

a trial court retains broad discretion to control crossexamination, id. at 316. In particular, the court may prevent 

questioning that does not meet “[t]he basic requirement of 

relevancy, as well as other factors affecting admissibility.” 

United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128, 1138–39 (D.C. Cir. 

1989). Among those factors, “counsel must have a 

reasonable basis for asking questions . . . which tend to 

incriminate or degrade the witness.” United States v. Lin, 101 

F.3d 760, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Thus, a trial court commits 

no error by rejecting an unfounded line of questioning, 

especially if the court leaves open the possibility of resuming 

the inquiry if the defense proffers a reasonable basis. 

 Defense counsel’s illogical and attenuated inferences 

were not a substitute for relevance. Counsel wanted to show 

Holmes was a gambler in order to argue Holmes had a motive 

to steal the money on his own. But the evidence showed 

Hemphill continued to write checks to Holmes in excess of 

his salary, and the excess ended up in Hemphill’s or 

Bullock’s accounts. Trial Transcript at 3596. If Holmes 

thwarted the conspirators by retaining the excess, why would 

Hemphill have continued to use him? The trial court pressed 

Hemphill’s counsel to offer any basis for thinking Holmes 

kept the excess money, but she provided no explanation. 

Trial Transcript at 3595–96. Since Holmes’s gambling was 

not relevant for any purpose other than to suggest a 

motivation to steal the excess money, the trial court 

committed no error when it prevented counsel’s inquiry. 

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 Second, the government denies a defendant due process 

when it suppresses information requested by a defendant that 

is material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Information is material “if 

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 

(1995) (citation omitted). Whether information was material 

is a question for de novo review. United States v. Cuffie, 80 

F.3d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

 Here, there is no dispute that the government knew 

Holmes had been arrested twice in Maryland for theft and did 

not disclose these facts. Impeachment evidence, such as a 

witness’s prior crimes, is material if “the undisclosed 

information could have substantially affected the efforts of 

defense counsel to impeach the witness.” Id. “[A]n 

incremental amount of impeachment evidence on an already 

compromised witness” is not material. United States v. Derr, 

990 F.2d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Impeachment 

evidence is incremental “only if the witness was already 

impeached . . . by the same kind of evidence.” Cuffie, 80 

F.3d at 518. 

 Assuming Holmes’s arrests led to convictions, the 

information would still be immaterial because the defense had 

impeached Holmes with the “same kind of evidence” as the 

supposed Maryland thefts, including the substantial thefts he 

committed during the WTU conspiracy. He had pled guilty to 

stealing much more substantial sums than those involved in 

the two undisclosed arrests. Moreover, the defense also 

impeached him with more damaging evidence, such as his 

perjury and other lies. For example, Holmes concealed his 

profits from the conspiracy by falsifying his tax returns, Trial 

Transcript at 3322–30, and he lied during the FBI’s 

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investigation, Trial Transcript at 3374. The additional minor 

thefts could have done no further damage to Holmes’s 

severely compromised credibility. 

 Our conclusion that Hemphill had the proper opportunity 

to confront Holmes,4

 together with our decision that the 

summary charts were properly in evidence, also disposes of 

the attack on her sentence. Since Hemphill’s claim is simply 

that her sentence was based on improper evidence, namely the 

charts and Holmes’s testimony, our decision that this 

evidence was proper means the appeal of her sentence must 

fail. 

F 

 Finally, Hemphill appeals her convictions for money 

laundering, Counts Nineteen through Twenty-Three. First, 

she complains there was insufficient evidence to prove these 

charges. She apparently concedes the government introduced 

relevant evidence; she simply contends it was inadmissible. 

To the extent the government relied on the summary charts 

discussed by Novak, we have already concluded they were 

admissible. As for the other evidence necessary to support 

the money-laundering convictions, the government entered 

most of it without objection. For the few pieces to which 

Hemphill’s counsel did object, she has provided no reason to 

question the district court’s decision, in its discretion, to 

admit the evidence. 

 

4

 Hemphill also suggests she could have used the supposed thefts to 

support her theory that Holmes stole the excess cash instead of 

returning it to her. This use would have failed, because Holmes’s 

supposed prior thefts would not have been admissible to show he 

stole from Hemphill. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 

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 More seriously, Hemphill argues the prosecutor’s closing 

argument confused the jury into convicting her for unindicted 

crimes. Hemphill and the government agree money 

laundering requires two transactions: the illegal generation of 

money and the concealment of that act. In this case, there 

was some confusion because the transactions were closely 

connected. The indictment characterized bank deposits or 

credit card payments as acts of concealment; the source of the 

funds was the checks. In closing, the prosecutor said the 

conspirators allowed checks to be written in their names in 

order to steal money and called that activity “money 

laundering.” Hemphill criticizes this discrepancy from the 

indictment. 

 The confusion and argument over the money-laundering 

charges continued through the trial, but it is not clear whether 

Hemphill’s counsel properly objected to the closing argument 

itself. In any case, we cannot see that the prosecution’s 

misstatement was prejudicial. 

 In reviewing closing arguments, we ask whether any 

potential error was prejudicial to a defendant. United States 

v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Whether 

it was sufficiently prejudicial depends on its “severity, 

centrality, mitigation, and closeness of the case.” Id. A 

single misstatement in a lengthy argument, like this one, is 

rarely a severe error, id. As for centrality, we look to the 

importance of the error itself, not of the issue it concerned. 

Id. Here, the prosecutor followed the misstatement in 

question by immediately saying “money came right on back 

. . . into Gwendolyn Hemphill’s bank account. It is just 

another form of stealing and covering it up to get away with 

it.” Thus, the prosecutor’s statement, in context, differed only 

slightly from the indictment. There was mitigation, in that the 

court used the money-laundering charge Hemphill suggested. 

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Trial Transcript at 6957–61. Finally, there was abundant 

proof of the acts of concealment; the prosecution entered 

specific evidence for each count. In this context, the 

prosecutor’s misstatement at closing was inconsequential. 

III 

 Appellant Baxter appeals his convictions for conspiracy 

(Counts One and Sixteen) and various substantive offenses 

for lack of sufficient evidence; he challenges the jury 

instructions with respect to the conspiracy charge; and he 

appeals his sentence for lack of sufficient findings as to the 

scope of the conspiracy or the amount of the thefts. In 

addition, he challenges his indictment for conspiracy as 

“legally flawed.” 

A 

 In a sufficiency of the evidence review, we look at the 

evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” and 

we ask whether “any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(emphasis in original). To prove a conspiracy charge, the 

government must show that the defendant agreed to engage in 

criminal activity and “knowingly participated in the 

conspiracy” with the intent to commit the offense, as well as 

that at least one overt act took place in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. Id. The conspirators must have agreed at least on 

“the essential nature of the plan,” not necessarily on “the 

details of their criminal scheme.” Id. 

 There was abundant evidence of criminal actions by the 

conspirators, so Baxter disputes his agreement on the 

essential nature of the plan. Even on this point, the 

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government introduced sufficient evidence. To start, Bullock 

testified that she stole WTU’s money together with Hemphill 

and Baxter. Trial Transcript at 1261. Baxter made personal 

purchases, including $19,660 of Washington Wizards tickets 

and at least $5,000 of art for his home, using WTU’s Amex 

card—a form of larcency Hemphill and Bullock had 

perfected. As the union’s treasurer, Baxter signed blank 

checks written to Holmes. Baxter also wrote himself several 

“pension” checks drawn on the union’s general fund rather 

than its pension fund, which was empty. 

 To show Baxter’s involvement in concealing the thefts, 

the government introduced sequential drafts of fraudulent 

financial reports faxed to Baxter and recovered from his files. 

At least one of the drafts had handwritten notes showing how 

to report the conspirators’ improper Amex expenditures 

falsely by distributing debits into other budget categories. In 

addition, Baxter signed a fraudulent form LM-2 that did not 

report payments to Hemphill or Holmes, even though 

handwritten notes recovered from Baxter’s house recorded 

the total of those payments. Finally, when the conspirators 

decided to overcharge WTU’s members, Bullock testified that 

Baxter came up with the idea of setting dues at $160.09 

instead of $16.09 so the figure could plausibly be explained 

as a clerical error. In the two weeks after the proceeds of the 

overcharge arrived at the union, Baxter wrote himself WTU 

checks worth $31,000. 

 Thus, Baxter, Bullock, and Hemphill engaged in 

strikingly similar behavior. Some of Baxter’s fraudulent 

transactions involved Bullock or Hemphill; for example, 

WTU checks required Bullock’s signature or her signature 

stamp (which Hemphill possessed). And, of course, Baxter 

signed numerous fraudulent checks to Bullock, Hemphill, 

Holmes, and Expressions Unlimited (in addition to the checks 

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he wrote to himself)—without his signature on these checks, 

the embezzlement would not have been possible. Baxter was 

actively engaged in the concealment of the conspiracy. 

Moreover, he conceived the plan for the final concealment by 

overcharging the union’s members. This evidence, relating to 

multiple aspects of the conspiracy, shows Baxter’s consent to 

the “essential nature of the plan.” 

 Baxter claims the jury should have discounted the 

dubious testimony of government witnesses and interpreted 

the evidence differently. For example, he asserts some of the 

checks he received were merely pension payments. However, 

since the government showed WTU was not contributing to 

other employees’ pensions because of its financial straits, the 

jury was free to conclude Baxter’s nominal pension payments 

were illegitimate. As another example, Baxter claims there 

was no evidence he received any personal benefit from the 

conspiracy, ignoring the fact that the Washington Wizards 

tickets and the art were delivered to his house. The jury was 

free to think these purchases were for his personal use. 

Baxter also says it was illogical to find he conspired in the 

improper credit card purchases, because he put $5,000 limits 

on Bullock’s and Hemphill’s corporate Amex accounts. 

Viewing this fact in light of all the other evidence, the jury 

could reasonably have noted Baxter did not close their 

accounts. In short, the government’s evidence was sufficient, 

and Baxter asks us to second-guess the jury’s interpretation of 

it. That, of course, we may not do. 

 Baxter also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on 

the substantive offenses. First, he argues there were multiple 

conspiracies, rather than a single conspiracy, and 

consequently the substantive offenses were not foreseeable 

under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 

Second, he argues the government did not prove his 

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intentional or knowing involvement in the substantive 

offenses. We conclude the evidence showed a single 

conspiracy. Baxter does not suggest any further reason to 

think the substantive offenses were not foreseeable, so it 

follows his convictions were proper. Therefore we need not 

examine the evidence of his direct personal culpability for 

each substantive offense. 

B 

 Baxter wanted the trial court to instruct the jury to 

consider whether the evidence proved multiple conspiracies. 

If “record evidence supports the existence of multiple 

conspiracies,” then a district court must instruct the jury to 

consider them. United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1472 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 

1384, 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). On the other hand, when the 

evidence shows a single conspiracy, the court need not 

instruct on multiple conspiracies. Id. 

 Whether activities constitute a single or multiple 

conspiracies depends on several factors, including “whether 

participants shared a common goal . . .; interdependence 

between the alleged participants . . . and, though less 

significant, overlap among alleged participants.” Id. at 1471. 

Overlap requires only that the main conspirators work with all 

the participants. United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 23–24 

(D.C. Cir. 2000). In addition, the general characteristics of 

similar conspiracies are also relevant. Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 

1393. In particular, laundering of funds to hide their source 

can be part of a broader illegal profit-seeking conspiracy. See 

id. at 1393–94. A conspiracy may pursue multiple schemes 

with different modi operandi without dividing into multiple 

conspiracies, as long as there is a single objective. See 

Gatling, 96 F.3d at 1520 (single conspiracy involving the 

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same central figure comprised two schemes in different cities, 

operating in a different manner). Moreover, “a conspiracy’s 

purpose should not be defined in [terms] too narrow or 

specific . . . .” Id. 

 Each of the specific acts Baxter cites as proof of multiple 

conspiracies can be more sensibly interpreted as the pursuit of 

a single objective: to steal money from the union. All the 

participants worked together to achieve that end. As we have 

explained, each participant was engaged in each form of 

criminal activity, and Baxter cooperated with Bullock, 

Hemphill, and Holmes on various occasions to commit or 

conceal the thefts. Concealment, of course, is a natural part 

of a conspiracy to steal money, as Baxter acknowledges. The 

mere fact that the conspirators found different ways to 

transfer money to themselves (by improper credit card 

charges, payments to Expressions Unlimited, “pension” 

checks to Baxter, and overpayments to Holmes) does not 

break the conspiracy into parts. 

 Since the evidence showed a single conspiracy, the trial 

court properly refused to instruct the jury on multiple 

conspiracies, and the government’s case did not vary from the 

indictment. 

C 

 Baxter also protests the district court’s failure at 

sentencing to enter specific findings about the scope of 

activity to which he agreed. However, the court made all the 

findings required. To be sure, a district court must describe 

explicitly “the scope of a defendant’s conspiratorial 

agreement” before imposing a sentence that holds him 

responsible for his co-conspirators’ “reasonably foreseeable 

conduct in furtherance of the joint undertaking.” United 

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States v. Tabron, 437 F.3d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2006). We 

demand such findings because “[a] jury verdict convicting the 

defendants of participation in a single conspiracy . . . speaks 

to the scope of the defendant’s agreement only in very general 

terms [but does not say] which specific actions were in 

furtherance of that single conspiracy or were foreseeable to 

the conspirators.” United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 

722 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Here, however, the government 

charged Baxter with the relevant conduct and obtained 

convictions on those charges under a Pinkerton instruction. 

Thus, Baxter’s sentence held him responsible for acts found 

by the jury to be reasonably foreseeable crimes in furtherance 

of the conspiracy. 

 It was still necessary for the trial court to find Baxter’s 

crimes resulted in losses of more than $2.5 million. Since the 

losses all arose from crimes of which the jury convicted 

Baxter, these findings did not need to revisit the scope of the 

agreement or the foreseeability of the crimes. Rather, the 

court was obligated to connect the actual quantities of loss 

caused by those crimes to evidence before the jury. It did, 

Sentencing Transcript at 16–18, so we will not vacate 

Baxter’s sentence. 

 Finally, Baxter says the district court ignored its duty 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to consider whether his sentence 

was greater than necessary to accomplish its purposes. In 

particular, he complains of the disparity between his sentence 

of ten years and Bullock’s sentence of five years. However, 

the district court discussed the § 3553(a) factors thoroughly, 

explaining the disparity was reasonable because Bullock pled 

guilty and testified against her co-conspirators. Baxter makes 

no effort to explain why the district court should not have 

considered these factors. Cf. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 

3E1.1 (decreasing offense level by 2-3 levels for a timely 

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guilty plea); United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 114 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007) (disparity partly justified by the fact that coconspirators “provided substantial assistance in the 

investigation of the scheme”). 

D 

 Finally, Baxter challenges his conspiracy indictment, 

Count One, as depending on multiple, alternative object 

offenses. He argues an indictment on alternative grounds is 

valid only if all the grounds are legally permissible, and he 

contends one of his object offenses, deprivation of honest 

services, was legally flawed. However, he did not raise this 

claim before trial, as required by Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, and we decline to consider it 

without a showing of cause for relief from his waiver. See 

United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 952–53 (D.C. Cir. 

1999). 

IV 

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district 

court are 

Affirmed. 

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