Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01740/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01740-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wayne Frazee
Defendant
Olivia Moreno
Defendant
Cosme Presas
Plaintiff
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COSME PRESAS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT 

SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-01740---SKO 

ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED 

COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITH 45

DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 9)

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 5, 2015, Plaintiff Cosme Presas (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se 

and in forma pauperis, filed an amended complaint against Defendants Watchtower Bible and 

Tract Society (“the Society”), Olivia Moreno, Wayne Frazee, Marin Moreno, Alicia Navarro, and

several Doe defendants (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. 9.) For the reasons set forth below, 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

In his first amended complaint filed on January 5, 2015, Plaintiff details half a decade of 

abuse by congregation members and leaders of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New 

York. (Doc. 9, 1-3.) He alleges that from 1994 through 1998, he was physically and sexually 

abused by “Rosa,” in both Arvin, California, and Baja California, Mexico. (Doc. 9, 2.) 

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Plaintiff alleges that he was coerced into performing sexual acts by adult congregation 

members, for which he was incapable of consenting as a child. (Doc. 9, 2-3.) He alleges that the 

congregation members gained his compliance by threatening that God would “destroy” him if he 

“attempt[ed] to bring down [his] own.” (Doc. 9, 2.) When he did report abuse, he was 

“disfellowshipped,” his mother was threatened by his abuser, and the New York office repeatedly 

ignored his letters and calls. (Doc. 9, 3.) Plaintiff also alleges he was physically “punished” 

through whip lashings and forced feeding. (Doc. 9, 2-3.) 

Plaintiff alleges that when he reported the abuse to church elders or wrote the Society’s 

New York office, he either received no response or was told directly to “say nothing.” (Doc. 9, 2-

3 (“I was ignored by letter and phone and just told they could do nothing and to tell police . . . . I 

was made to believe nothing would be done.”).) Plaintiff “was told not to lie” when he would 

contact the New York office, and alleges that the elders and members “all showed deliberate 

negligence” in their refusal to acknowledge or end the abuse he was suffering. (Doc. 9, 3.) 

Plaintiff does not identify an amount in controversy, but seeks “declaratory judgment that 

the defendants violated the laws of the land and abused [him] in the ways listed[,]” monetary 

damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and nominal damages “in an amount to be 

determined at trial,” and all such further relief as the Court deems necessary and just. (Doc. 9, 4.) 

III. SCREENING STANDARD

In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen 

each case, and must dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of 

poverty is untrue, or the Court determines that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the 

complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies 

of the complaint are capable of being cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, 

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but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint may not simply allege a wrong has been 

committed and demand relief. The pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[;]” the complaint must contain “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). Further, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 

conclusions are not. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court must determine whether it has the power to consider the claims alleged within 

the complaint. Federal courts have no power to consider claims for which they lack subject-matter 

jurisdiction. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); see also Vacek v. 

United States Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Subject matter jurisdiction is determined and must 

exist at the time the complaint is filed. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of 

Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988) (looking to original complaint, and not 

amended complaint, for subject matter jurisdiction). 

The Court has an independent duty to consider its own subject-matter jurisdiction, whether 

or not the issue is raised by the parties (id.), and must dismiss an action over which it lacks 

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Cal. Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 

F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974) (“It has long been held that a judge can dismiss sua sponte for lack 

of jurisdiction.”). Subject matter jurisdiction to hear a plaintiff’s claim must either “arise under”

federal law or be established by diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. The burden 

is on the federal plaintiff to allege facts establishing that jurisdiction exists to hear his claims. 

A. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Cognizable Federal Claim

Construed liberally, Plaintiff seeks civil damages under California state law for

“defamation” (Cal. Civ. Code, § 44), “sexual assault” (Cal. Penal Code, § 11165.1(a-b)), “sexual 

exploitation” (id., § 11165.1(c)), “willful harming or injuring of a child” (id., § 11165.3), 

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“unlawful corporal punishment or injury” (id., § 11165.4).

1

See generally Cal. Civil Code, § 

340.1(a) (civil damages for childhood sexual abuse). Plaintiff alleges that among the Doe 

defendants who ignored or covered up his abuse were “brothers” and leaders of the Society. 

(Doc. 9, 1-3.) As “clergy members,” the congregational leaders would be considered “mandatory 

reporters” under California law, and therefore would be criminally liable under state law for 

willfully failing to report and “covering up” Plaintiff’s allegations of abuse. Cal. Penal Code, § 

11165.7(a)(32) (defining “clergy members” to include priests, ministers, rabbis, religious 

practitioners, or similar functionaries of churches, temples, or recognized denominations or 

organizations); see also Id., §§ 11166(a); 11166(d)(2); 11166.01(a-b). However, these allegations 

do not constitute a federal claim against Defendants, and thus there is no cognizable federal claim 

to invoke the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

B. Plaintiff Fails to Plead Complete Diversity Jurisdiction 

Subject matter jurisdiction to hear a federal plaintiff’s state law claims may be established 

by diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Here, there is no federal issue underlying

Plaintiff’s state claims for childhood sexual abuse, so this Court must determine whether it has 

diversity jurisdiction to hear his claims. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts maintain original jurisdiction over all civil 

actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between “citizens of a State and 

citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” Here, Plaintiff fails to allege an amount in controversy in 

excess of the statutory threshold, instead pleading damages “in an amount to be determined at 

trial[.]” (Doc. 9, p. 34.) Generally, “the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is 

apparently made in good faith.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289

(1938). The complaint here, however, does not state a specific sum, and it is therefore unclear 

whether the case meets the statutory requirements for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

//

 

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 Plaintiff’s tort claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery as discussed 

in section C. These claims are time barred, and therefore are dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

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The more critical defect, however, is that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish complete 

diversity of citizenship between the parties. “Subject matter jurisdiction based upon diversity of 

citizenship requires that no defendant have the same citizenship as any plaintiff.” Tosco Corp. v. 

Communities for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), abrogated on 

other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 59 U.S. 77 (2010) (emphasis added). Plaintiff is a citizen 

of California, and it is unclear from the pleadings that all the named Defendants are citizens of 

foreign states. (See Doc. 9, 1-3.) If any Defendant has the same citizenship as the Plaintiff, the

Court has no diversity jurisdiction over this matter. 

As the first amended complaint is currently written, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s 

remaining state law claims for civil damages arising out of childhood sexual abuse because it does 

not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear them.2 See Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy 

Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f the court dismisses for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, it has no discretion and must dismiss all claims.”). 

C. Plaintiff’s State Tort Claims May Be Barred by the Statute of Limitations 

Under California law, defamation claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, 

meaning they must be brought within one year of publication of the defamatory statement or they 

are time-barred from being heard in court. Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 340(c). Generally, a cause of 

action for defamation accrues at the time the defamatory statement is “published,” that is “when 

the defendant communicates the defamatory statement to a person other than the person being 

defamed.” See, e.g., Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1247 (2003). Plaintiff’s first amended

complaint does not clearly state when Defendants “worked very hard to marr (sic) [his] image so 

that [he] would be discredited and so no one would believe [him,]” but indicates that their 

 

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 Plaintiff has asked the Court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages, regarding 

the physical and sexual abuse he allegedly suffered as a child. (Doc. 9.) Because the complaint is dismissed on 

jurisdictional grounds, the Court does not have to reach the merits and offers no opinion on whether it may grant the 

requested relief. 

 However, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s request for “declaratory judgment that the defendants violated the laws of 

the land and abused [him] in the ways listed” (Doc. 9, 4), is not an appropriate issue for declaratory judgment. See 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 57 advisory committee’s note (declaratory judgment is intended to affirm “[t]he existence or 

nonexistence of any right, duty, power, liability, privilege, disability, or immunity or of any fact upon which such 

legal relations depend, or of a status[.]”). 

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statements were made when he was “around the age of 12.” (Doc. 9, 2.) Based on this fact, it 

appears that the one-year statute of limitations has passed, and Plaintiff’s claim for defamation of 

character is time-barred. 

Tort claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault, and 

battery must be brought within two years of the commission of the tortious act or else they are 

time-barred. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 335.1. Here, Plaintiff alleges tort claims arising from abuse 

occurring nearly two decades ago, far exceeding the two-year statute of limitations. Id. In 

California, a cause of action for tort injuries of a minor does not accrue, and the statute of 

limitations does not begin to run, until the minor reaches the age of majority -- 18 years of age. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 352; see also Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (state law 

governs not only the length of the limitations period, but also issues of tolling); Wilson v. Garcia, 

471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985) (same). The first amended complaint does not allege sufficient facts for 

the Court to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims arising from his childhood sexual abuse are 

time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Here, Plaintiff fails to identify his age within 

the text of the first amended complaint, only noting that he was still a minor during the events he 

alleges occurred between 1994 and 1998. (Doc. 9, 1-2.) As the first amended complaint is 

currently written, the Court is unable to determine when Plaintiff turned 18; however, simple math 

indicates that unless he were born in the year 1994, the period for bringing these claims has 

already expired under the tolling provision for minority. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 352. 

The statute of limitations may also be tolled if the plaintiff’s discovery of the injury 

forming the basis of the cause of action was delayed. Rupe v. Beard, No. CV-08-2454-EFS PC, 

2013 WL 2458398, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2013). The accrual date is set by the date when a 

plaintiff suspects, or should suspect, that his injury was caused by wrongdoing. Id. However,

Plaintiff does not allege that he only recently discovered an injury that had been caused by 

Defendants’ wrongdoing. Plaintiff states that he “was made to believe nothing would be done and 

[that]’s why [he] did not prosecute the matter until now that [he] became aware of the laws about 

sexual abuse and physical abuse towards minors in California.” (Doc. 9, 2.) Therefore, the statute 

of limitations for these tort claims was not tolled by Plaintiff’s delayed discovery of his injuries. 

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As the first amended complaint is currently written, even if the Court had diversity 

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s state tort claims, these claims may be time-barred by their respective 

statutes of limitations. 

D. Plaintiff’s State Claims for Sexual Abuse May Be Barred by the Statute of 

Limitations

California amended its law governing civil claims for damages based on childhood sexual 

abuse in 1990 to require such claims be brought within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains 

the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should 

have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused 

by the sexual abuse, “whichever occurs later.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 340.1(a)

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; see Perez v. 

Richard Roe 1, 146 Cal.App.4th 171, 182-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the law could not 

constitutionally revive claims that had lapsed under prior limitations periods). Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code, § 640.1(a)(1-3). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges childhood sexual abuse occurring between 1994 and 1998, while he 

was a minor. (Doc. 9, 1-2.) The Court is unable to determine from the first amended complaint 

exactly when Plaintiff turned 18, and whether his claims were brought within eight years of 

turning 18. It is also unclear from the first amended complaint whether at some point since 

turning 18 Plaintiff has discovered, or should reasonably have discovered, a physical injury or 

illness that was caused by the abuse. The first amended complaint does not allege sufficient facts 

for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims arising from his childhood sexual abuse are 

time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

//

//

 

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 California’s penal code permits the State to prosecute child sexual abuse at any time after the expiration of the 

statute of limitations, or revive a cause of action previously dismissed by the expiration of the statute of limitations, 

when (1) a victim has reported an allegation of abuse to the police, (2) “there is independent evidence that clearly and 

convincingly corroborates the victim's allegation,” and (3) the prosecution is begun within one year of the victim’s 

police report. Cal. Penal Code, §§ 803(g); 803(g)(A). Federal law similarly permits prosecution of child sexual abuse 

long after the normal statute of limitations expires. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3283, 3299. These statutes tolling the statute of 

limitations are not applicable in this case, because they only authorize prosecution of criminal acts committed years 

beforehand—they do not extend to a federal district court for a civil cause of action for damages. 

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E. Leave to Amend Should Be Granted

The first amended complaint has not set forth a cognizable federal claim, and there are no 

facts establishing complete diversity between the parties to establish diversity jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s state law claims for childhood sexual abuse. Because Plaintiff has failed to plead facts 

invoking the Court’s jurisdiction, the first amended complaint must be dismissed. Thompson v. 

McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A party invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction has 

the burden of proving the actual existence of subject matter jurisdiction.”). Plaintiff will be 

permitted to amend the complaint, to cure these jurisdictional defects and invoke the Court’s 

jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff’s tort claims for defamation, assault, and battery also appear to be time-barred by 

their respective statutes of limitations, and his claim for civil damages for childhood sexual abuse 

may be time-barred, even if jurisdiction is established. Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in his 

amended complaint to both invoke the Court’s jurisdiction and show his tort claims and claim for 

civil damages are not time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 

Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend the deficiencies of the complaint as 

discussed above.

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 

Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The amended 

complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Rule 

220 of the Local Rules of the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Once 

Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the 

case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the 

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended 

complaint or fails to cure the deficiencies identified above, the Court will recommend that the 

complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

2. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within forty-five (45) days from the date 

of service of this order; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, the Court will recommend that this 

action be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 17, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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