Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02222/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02222-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marquette Condon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2222

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of South Dakota.

Marquette Condon, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 11, 2005

Filed: January 10, 2006

___________

Before ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Marquette Condon appeals his conviction and sentence on two counts of

aggravated sexual abuse, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 1153. Mr. Condon asserts that the

evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, and that he was deprived of his

sixth amendment right to cross-examination and his due process right to a fair trial.

With respect to his sentence, he contends that the district court1

 erred in not granting

his motion for a downward departure and that his 151-month sentence was

unreasonable. We affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects.

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The victim, J.H., a minor, testified that after she and Mr. Condon returned to

their neighborhood following a party, the defendant induced her to enter his trailer by

lying about whether there was a bathroom there. He then forcibly restrained her,

penetrated her vagina with both his fingers and penis, and attempted to force her to

engage in anal and oral intercourse. Mr. Condon, through his counsel, maintained at

trial, as he does on appeal, that any sexual contact between him and J.H. was

consensual.

I.

Mr. Condon argues that no reasonable person could have believed the victim's

testimony and that his conviction should therefore be overturned for insufficient

evidence. He contends that J.H.'s testimony that she was raped was inherently

incredible because J.H. did not scream or cry out during the alleged attack and

witnesses testified that she had appeared to "be positively relating" to Mr. Condon

earlier in the evening. Mr. Condon also argues that the difference between J.H.'s

testimony that she and others walked back to their neighborhood after the party and

the testimony of other witnesses that they returned by automobile makes J.H.'s

account of the later sexual abuse irrational and implausible.

Mr. Condon relies on United States v. Chancey, 715 F.2d 543, 546-48 (11th Cir.

1983), a case in which the court deemed the testimony of an alleged kidnap victim

inherently incredible because she had numerous opportunities for escape and did not

act on them and because there was no evidence of force. Here, however, there was

medical evidence that J.H. suffered injuries consistent with being overpowered and

forcibly penetrated. J.H. testified, moreover, that she did not call out while

Mr. Condon pinned her down because she was frightened. This is decidedly

dissimilar from the testimony of the supposed kidnap victim in Chancey, 715 F. 2d at

545, who did not ask for help from people present even when her purported kidnapper

left her alone and who manifested no signs that force had been used against her.

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A "verdict must be upheld if there is an interpretation of the evidence that

would allow a reasonable jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Decisions

regarding the credibility of witnesses are to be resolved in favor of the jury's verdict."

United States v. Uder, 98 F.3d 1039, 1045 (8th Cir. 1996). Because a reasonable jury

could have believed J.H.'s testimony about what happened in the trailer, Mr. Condon's

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim must fail.

II.

Mr. Condon assigns error to the district judge's actions during J.H.'s testimony

and during defense counsel's cross-examination of other witnesses. At trial, the judge

instructed defense counsel to question the witnesses in a direct manner without

additional narrative commentary and to refrain from eliciting cumulative testimony.

The judge also told J.H. to remove her hand from her mouth so that she could be

clearly heard by the jury. "We review a district court's decision to limit

cross-examination for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if there has been clear

abuse of discretion and a showing of prejudice to the defendant." United States v.

Wipf, 397 F.3d 677, 683 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 64 (2005). This is

a difficult standard to meet because " 'trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the

Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive

or only marginally relevant.' " United States v. Chauncey 420 F.3d 864, 875 (8th Cir.

2005) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The district

court's instructions were reasonable, given the circumstances, and Mr. Condon has not

shown that he was prejudiced. Nor do we see any error in the district court telling J.H.

on direct examination to remove her hand from her mouth so that the jury could hear

her testimony. Therefore Mr. Condon's claims on these grounds must fail.

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III.

Mr. Condon raises two matters related to his sentence, which was at the top of

the range provided by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. First, he appeals the

denial of his motion for a downward departure. But a district court's refusal to grant

"a traditional downward departure" under the "now-advisory guideline scheme" is

unreviewable. United States v. Frokjer, 415 F.3d 865, 874-75 (8th Cir. 2005).

Mr. Condon also contends that the court erred because in passing sentence it failed to

consider that he had a history of childhood abuse and did not advert to letters of

support from his current and former acquaintances.

We review sentencing decisions by a district court for an abuse of discretion.

See United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 276 (2005). At sentencing, the district court must consider the "factors" set

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), determine whether a guidelines or non-guidelines

sentence is most appropriate, Haack, 403 F.3d at 1002-03, and "state in open court the

reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). While the

district judge did not specifically refer to Mr. Condon's history of childhood abuse or

the letters of support before imposing a sentence, earlier in the sentencing proceeding

he had ruled on a motion for a downward departure that was based on the abuse

history and letters. In passing sentence the court discussed other aspects of "the nature

and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,"

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and it specifically noted the other § 3553(a) "factors." While

a failure to explicate the reason for a sentence may violate § 3553(c), United States

v. Engler, 422 F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 2005), there was no such failure here. We

therefore reject Mr. Condon's contention that his sentence was imposed improperly.

______________________________

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