Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01075/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01075-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Donald White
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-1075

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Donald White

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

 Submitted: December 15, 2016

 Filed: March 10, 2017

[Unpublished]

____________

Before WOLLMAN and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and WRIGHT,1

 District Judge.

____________

PER CURIAM.

In 1987, Donald White was charged in the Southern District of Florida with

threatening President Ronald Reagan, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a). The district

1The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. 

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court

2

found White to be mentally incompetent to stand trial and committed him to

the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 4241. White’s civil

commitment has continued at varioustreatment facilitiessince then. In August 2015,

White filed his most recent pro se motion for a discharge hearing, which the district

court

3

denied. White, now represented by counsel, appeals, arguing not that the

district court improperly denied his motion for a hearing, but that he should be

immediately released because the court no longer has jurisdiction over him. We deny

White’s requested relief. 

After White’s civil commitment by the district court in Florida, he was placed

at the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri (FMC-Springfield), and was

diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. FMC-Springfield recommended continued

inpatient treatment because of the substantial risk of injury to persons and damage to

property should White be released.

4

In May 1990, the district court5in the Western

District of Missouri reviewed the psychiatric assessment and agreed that White was

mentally ill and dangerous. Because the State of Florida refused to accept White for

treatment, the court entered an order committing White to the continued custody of

the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. White was transferred to the Federal

Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota (FMC-Rochester), in July 1990.

2The HonorableWilliamJ. Zloch, United States DistrictJudge for the Southern

District of Florida.

3The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

4The district court in the Southern District of Florida later entered a nunc pro

tunc order, directing the Attorney General to pursue civil-commitment proceedings

in the Western District of Missouri, the district in which White was then confined.

5The Honorable William R. Collinson, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri, now deceased. 

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In October 1992, a risk assessment panel at FMC-Rochester recommended that

White be conditionally discharged under a prescribed regimen of inpatient care to a

treatment facility in Florida. The district court

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ordered that White be conditionally

discharged “under the provisions of § 4246,” that he “comply with [the

recommended] treatment regimen,” and that he remain under the supervision of “the

U.S. Probation Office until he is finally discharged from treatment.” The court also

ordered that it was to be notified “[p]rior to any final discharge from treatment . . . so

that [White’s] conditions of release may be reviewed.” White was then transferred

fromFMC-Rochester to the Florida treatment facility, where he remained for roughly

six years under the terms of the court’s April 1993 conditional discharge order.

Several yearslater, White began having difficulty controlling his behavior and

was repeatedly abusive to staff members and other patients at the Florida treatment

facility. In a January 2001 letter, staff members reported that White was no longer

suitable for placement because of his noncompliance, was not benefitting from the

treatment program, and was a danger to others. The district court issued an arrest

warrant based on White’s violations of the conditions of his release, and White was

arrested and readmitted to FMC-Springfield. A risk assessment panel determined

months later that White had stabilized to the point that he could be returned to an

inpatient treatment facility in Florida. Following a hearing, the magistrate judge

found thatWhite’s unconditional release “pose[d] a substantial risk of danger to other

persons and the community.” Because “[s]tate placement [was] not presently

available,” the magistrate judge recommended that White “be recommitted under the

provisions of § 4246.” The district court adopted the recommendation and committed

White to the custody of the Attorney General under § 4246 based on the “unanimous

expert opinion” that White’s mental illness created a substantial risk of bodily injury

6The Honorable Russell G. Clark, United States DistrictJudge for the Western

District of Missouri, now deceased. 

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or serious property damage. The court also ordered the Attorney General to “attempt

to secure appropriate state placement.”

In November 2002, the government filed another motion for White’s

conditional discharge under § 4246(e), attaching a risk assessment report and a

related certification from the director of FMC-Springfield. The government noted

that White’s condition had improved such that his conditional discharge under a

prescribed regimen of care would no longer create a substantial risk, and it

recommended that White be conditionally released under § 4246(e) to the same

Florida treatment facility. The district court granted White’s conditional discharge,

subject to twenty-seven conditions of release recommended by the director of FMCSpringfield. Although the Florida treatment facility would make decisions regarding

White’smedical and psychiatric care, White wasto be supervised throughout his term

ofrelease “by the U.S. probation office, Southern District of Florida,” and any change

in his treatment program or placement had to “be approved, in advance, by his

supervising U.S. probation officer.” Any failure by White to comply with the stated

conditions would result in his arrest and appearance before the court for a hearing

under § 4246. The treatment facility was instructed to prepare and file with the

district court annual risk assessment reports as required under § 4247(e). The court

ordered White’s unspecified term of conditional release to continue “until further

order of this court.”

In 2007, White’s U.S. probation officer in Southern Florida received separate

reports from the treatment facility that White had attempted to strangle one patient

and had sexually assaulted another. White’s placement at the facility wasterminated,

and he was transferred to a different treatment facility in Florida, where his abusive

behavior continued. White’s probation officer was notified of three separate

incidents in May 2008 when White assaulted staff members or other patients. In a

May 2008 letter to the district court, White’s probation officer reported these

incidents, advised the court that White had “been terminated from each residential

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living program” in which he had been placed, and stated that there were “no other

residential programs available” in Florida. The district court granted the probation

officer’s request for a warrant, and White was arrested and returned to FMCSpringfield in August 2008.

The government moved for revocation of White’s conditional release in

September 2008 and requested a hearing under § 4246(f) “to determine whether he

should be confined in a suitable facility on the ground that his continued release

would create a substantial risk of bodily injury” or serious property damage. A risk

assessment report by staff at FMC-Springfield concluded that White posed a

substantial risk to others and that conditional release was not appropriate. FMCSpringfield staff had inquired into whether the state of Florida “would be willing to

assume responsibility for [White’s] care, custody, and treatment” and learned that

such placement was not possible. After a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended

that White’s conditional release be revoked. The district court adopted that

recommendation, and in March 2009, White was committed to the custody of the

Attorney General under § 4246 and was later transferred to FMC-Rochester.

In August 2015, White filed a pro se motion for a discharge hearing and

unconditional release. The government opposed the motion and submitted FMCRochester’s most recent risk assessment report, which concluded that White’s

“unconditionalrelease would create a substantialrisk of danger due to mental illness”

and that he “continue[d] to meet the criteria for commitment” under § 4246. The

report also discussed whether White could be conditionally released to a treatment

facility in Florida, but declined to recommend such a course given White’s insistence

that he would not abide by the facility’s rules. The district court denied White’s

motion for a discharge hearing. As set forth above, White appeals, arguing that the

district court lost jurisdiction over him in 1993 when the State of Florida assumed

responsibility for his custody, care, and treatment under § 4246(d)(1). He seeks

immediate and unconditional release from FMC-Rochester.

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A district court’s jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo, and

a challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the

first time on appeal. United States v. Afremov, 611 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir. 2010);

see also United States v. Hacker, 450 F.3d 808, 814, 814 n.4 (8th Cir. 2006). 

White was initially committed to the custody of the Attorney General under

18 U.S.C. § 4241 after being found to suffer fromamental disease or defect rendering

him mentally incompetent to stand trial on federal criminal charges. Because his

condition did not improve during a “reasonable period of time” such that he was

competent to stand trial, White became subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246.

See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). “Section 4246 provides for the indefinite hospitalization

of a person who . . . , as the result of a mental illness, poses a significant danger to the

general public.” United States v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 1997). Under

§ 4246(a), if a person is hospitalized after being committed to the custody of the

Attorney General under § 4241 and is found to be “presently suffering from a mental

disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of

bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, and . . .

suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the person are not available,” the

director of the facility at which the person is hospitalized must file a certification to

that effect with the district court. If, after a hearing, the court finds by clear and

convincing evidence that the person is indeed mentally ill and dangerous, the court

“shall commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 4246(d). 

Thereafter, the Attorney General is required to “release the person to the

appropriate official of the State in which the person is domiciled or was tried,” but

only “if such State will assume responsibility for his custody, care, and treatment.”

Id. The Attorney General must “make all reasonable efforts to cause such a State to

assume such responsibility,” but if those efforts are unsuccessful, the Attorney

General must “hospitalize the person for treatment in a suitable facility, until (1) such

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a State will assume responsibility; or (2) the person’s mental condition is such that

his release, or his conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical,

psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment would not create a substantial risk of

bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.” Id. The

Attorney General has a continuing obligation to make efforts to “cause such a State

to assume responsibility for the person’s custody, care, and treatment,” but has no

authority to force such a state to do so. Id. 

The Attorney General is also authorized to “contract with a State, a political

subdivision, a locality, or a private agency for the confinement, hospitalization, care,

or treatment of, or for the provision of services to, a person committed to his

custody.” Id. § 4247(i)(A). As we read this provision, a state that merely enters into

a contract with the Attorney General under § 4247(i) does not thereby agree to

“assume responsibility for [the] custody, care, and treatment” of a person committed

to the custody of the Attorney General under § 4246. Likewise, the Attorney General

does not lose authority over a person committed to his custody under § 4241 or

§ 4246 merely because he contracts with a state to provide such services. Instead, the

Attorney General is required to “release” the person only to “the appropriate official

of the State” and only if the “State will assume responsibility for his custody, care,

and treatment.” Id. § 4246(d); see also Ecker v. United States, 575 F.3d 70, 74 (1st

Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the government has options that include “entering into

a contractual relationship with the [State] or a private agency for [civilly committed

person’s] care” under § 4247(i) or “making an affirmative application for [his] civil

commitment under the [State] mental health statute”); cf. United States v. Lapi, 458

F.3d 555, 563 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that federal district court no longer had

authority to intervene after “state civil commitment proceedings were instituted and

the defendant was transferred to state custody” as contemplated by § 4246(a)

(emphasis omitted)).

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When White was accepted into the Florida treatment facility in 1993 and again

in 2002, he was subject to a “conditional release plan” proposed by FMC-Rochester

or FMC-Springfield and approved by the district court under § 4246(e)(2). Each

conditional release plan—and White’s prescribed regimen of care—included

significantsupervision and oversight by the U.S. Probation Office and, ultimately,the

district court. Although the Attorney General is required to release a person

committed to his custody “to the appropriate State . . . if such state will assume

responsibility,” the State of Florida never assumed ultimate responsibilityoverWhite,

instead deferring to the U.S. Probation Office and the district court regarding changes

in White’s treatment program and decisions regarding his discharge from treatment

or change in placement. Moreover, the director of the Florida treatment facility

notified the U.S. probation officer—as required under the conditional release

plan—when White’s noncompliance twice led to his termination from the treatment

program. The district court then exercised its jurisdiction over White under § 4246(f)

when it twice revoked White’s conditional discharge, ordered that White be arrested,

determined after a hearing that White’s mental illness rendered him a danger, and

concluded that White should be remanded to a “suitable” federal medical facility. 

Given the absolute authority retained by the government each time White was

conditionally discharged to the Florida facility, as well as the court’s indication that

the discharge was pursuant to § 4246(e), we are satisfied that the “appropriate

official” of the State of Florida never “assume[d] responsibility” for White under

§ 4246(d). Rather, the Attorney General merely “contract[ed] with [the] State” of

Florida” for the “confinement, hospitalization, care, or treatment of, or the provision

of servicesto” White, “a person committed to his custody” under the relevant federal

statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(i); see United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 146

(2010) (noting that the Attorney General isrequired to “encourage the relevant States

to take custody” of a sexually dangerous individual who has been civilly committed

under 18 U.S.C. § 4248 “and to relinquish federal authority whenever a State asserts

its own” (emphasis added)); United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 987-90 (8th

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Cir. 2000) (observing that district court retained authority to revoke conditional

discharge under § 4246(f) after person civilly committed under § 4246 at FMCRochester was conditionally discharged under regimen of care to South Carolina

Department of Mental Health).

White notes that the State of Florida initially refused to assume responsibility

for him, due in part to the pending federal criminal charges against him for

threatening the president. White speculates that those charges must have been

dismissed or that Florida must have made an exception to its policy not to accept

civilly committed persons with pending federal charges. He argues that because the

federal charges against himmust have been dismissed, the federal government has no

continuing interest in exercising jurisdiction over him. There is nothing in the record

to indicate that the federal charges against White have been dismissed or that Florida

made an exception to its policy. As noted above, under § 4247(i), a state may

contract with the Attorney General under § 4247(i) to provide care and treatment to

a civilly committed person without assuming ultimate responsibility under § 4246

over that person. See Ecker, 575 F.3d at 78 (noting general rule that “there must be

some federal interest in order for the federal government to retain custody over a

mentally ill person”). 

“[T]he district court is trusted with ‘an awesome responsibility to the public to

ensure that a clinical patient’s release issafe.’” S.A., 129 F.3d at 999 (quoting United

States v. Bilyk, 949 F.2d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1991)). “Section 4246 is specifically

designed to avert the public danger likely to ensue fromthe release of mentally ill and

dangerous detainees” and to ensure thatsuch “individuals receive proper treatment.”

Id. at 999. Although civil commitment of the mentally ill is traditionally a matter of

state concern, § 4246 applies when “suitable arrangements for state care and custody

are unavailable.” Id. at 1000. Such arrangements were unavailable in this case.

When White’s conditional discharge was revoked in 2002, the court noted that

“[s]tate placement [was] not presently available.” And when White’s conditional

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discharge was revoked again in 2008, FMC-Springfield staff first noted that they

were attempting to “determine if the [State of Florida] would be willing to assume

responsibility for his care, custody, and treatment,” but were eventually forced to

“rule out state placement,” in part due to White’s refusal to cooperate. Had Florida

assumed responsibility in 1993 for White’s custody, care, and treatment as

contemplated by § 4246(d), FMC-Springfield would not have been attempting to

secure Florida’s consent to assume such responsibility in 2008. Moreover, had the

State of Florida assumed such responsibility for White in 1993, it would not have

repeatedly deferred to the conditions ofrelease imposed by the district court, reported

violations of those conditions to the U.S. Probation Office, or relinquished custody

of White to the U.S. Marshals. The Attorney General “must encourage [the

appropriate State] to assume custody” of the person and must “immediately ‘release’

that person ‘to the appropriate official of’” such State “‘if such State will assume

[such] responsibility.’” Comstock, 560 U.S. at 143-45 (construing similar language

of 18 U.S.C. § 4248). The State “has the right, at any time, to assert its authority over

the individual, which will prompt the individual’s immediate transfer to State

custody.” Id. In other words, § 4246 requires the Attorney General “to relinquish

federal authority whenever a State asserts its own.” Id. (emphasis added). The State

of Florida did not assert such authority in this case. 

The FMC-Springfield medical experts unanimously agree that White is

currently suffering from a mental disease or defect such that his release would create

a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of

another. Further, the FMC-Springfield director has certified that there is no suitable

state treatment facility that will assume responsibility for White’s custody, care, and

treatment, rendering his continued commitment to the custody of the Attorney

General proper under § 4246. The district court thusretained jurisdiction over White.

Because White continues to meet the § 4246 criteria for commitment to the custody

of the Attorney General, we deny his request for immediate release. 

______________________________

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