Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-13-04069/USCOURTS-ca2-13-04069-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeff Spruill
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

1

13‐4069‐cr   

United States v. Spruill                  

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Second Circuit 

________________

August Term, 2014

(Argued:  October 1, 2014      Decided:  December 16, 2015)

Docket No. 13‐4069‐cr

________________                                   

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

   

Appellee,

—v.—  

JEFF SPRUILL,

    Defendant‐Appellant.

________________                                  

Before:

POOLER, RAGGI, and HALL, Circuit Judges.

________________                                  

On appeal from a judgment of conviction entered in the United States

District Court for the District of Connecticut (Chatigny, J.), defendant invokes

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United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997), to argue that the district

court committed plain error in dismissing an alleged holdout juror for cause

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23.    Thomas does not support defendant’s argument

because the principles it enunciated do not pertain here, where the cause for

dismissal was extrinsic bias determined without intrusion into juror

deliberations.  In any event, defendant waived any challenge to the inquiry and

dismissal of the juror at issue by specifically telling the district court that he did

not object to either and by, in fact, recommending the very disposition he now

challenges.  The remainder of defendant’s arguments on appeal are addressed in

a summary order issued the same day.   

Judge POOLER dissents in a separate opinion.

AFFIRMED.

________________                                  

SARALA V. NAGALA, Assistant United States Attorney (Marc H.

Silverman, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for

Deirdre M. Daly, United States Attorney for the District of

Connecticut, New Haven, Connecticut, for Appellee.

         

HARRY SANDICK (Andrew D. Cohen, on the brief), Patterson, Belknap,

Webb & Tyler L.L.P., New York, New York, for Defendant‐

Appellant.

________________                                 

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REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Jeff Spruill appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on

July 12, 2013, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

(Robert N. Chatigny, J.), after a jury trial at which he was found guilty of two

counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and

cocaine base (Counts One and Two), one count of possession with intent to

distribute cocaine (Count Three), and one count of unlawful possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon (Count Four).  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2);  

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).    Spruill argues that the district court erred in

dismissing a “holdout” juror for cause during the course of jury deliberations, in

violation of principles enunciated in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d

Cir. 1997).    He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

convictions on Counts One, Two, and Four; the procedural reasonableness of his

sentence, in particular the district court’s application of a career offender

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1; and the effectiveness of former counsel’s

representation in failing to challenge the § 4B1.1 enhancement.    In a

supplemental pro se brief, Spruill further argues that knowledge of “drug type”

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is a here‐unproved predicate element of the drug offenses for which he was

convicted.1

As we explain herein, Spruill’s juror removal challenge fails for two

reasons.    First, the challenged removal is not subject to Thomas’s “any

possibility” rule, see 116 F.3d at 621–22, because the concern underlying Thomas,

juror nullification, was not here at issue.  Rather, removal was based on extrinsic

bias, a matter about which the district court could—and did—inquire without

intruding on jury deliberations.    See id. at 621.    Second, Spruill waived any

challenge to dismissal of the juror in question by specifically telling the district

court that he did not object either to its colloquy with the juror or to the juror’s

removal, and by in fact recommending the very disposition he now challenges.   

For reasons explained in a summary order issued this same day, we reject

Spruill’s remaining counseled and pro se arguments.   

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.   

                                              

1 On March 4, 2015, months after this case was argued, Spruill’s appellate counsel

moved for leave to allow Spruill to file a supplemental pro se brief.  This Court

granted the motion and subsequently received Spruill’s supplemental brief and

the Government’s response.   

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I. Background

A.   Controlled Purchases

In the summer of 2012, two confidential informants under the direction of

Middletown, Connecticut police purchased cocaine and cocaine base from

defendant Spruill.  The second purchase was made at 18 Glover Place, home of

Spruill’s girlfriend, Chanelle McCalla.

B.   Search Warrant

Soon thereafter, police applied for and were granted a warrant to search 18

Glover Place and Spruill’s person.    Upon executing the warrant, police found

Spruill to be carrying on his person two small plastic bags, one containing

marijuana and the other containing cocaine.2

At 18 Glover Place, they discovered men’s clothing and toiletries in the

master bedroom, as well as a bullet, which McCalla claimed was a souvenir from

a date at a shooting range.   An unlocked door near the entrance to the master

bedroom led to the attic, where police found plastic bags containing Spruill’s

                                              

2 Spruill does not challenge his conviction for the controlled substance found on

his person.  

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clothing, as well as garbage bags containing a bulletproof vest and two leather

bags, from which police seized a .357‐caliber handgun, a .40‐caliber handgun

with three boxes of ammunition, and a .380‐caliber pistol with one box of

ammunition.

C.   Trial:  Jury Selection & Deliberations

Jury selection in Spruill’s case took place on July 9, 2013.  The focus of our

attention on this appeal is Juror 11.3  During voir dire, this juror identified herself

as a “clinician in the State of Connecticut . . . do[ing] outreach in the prison

systems in Hartford.”  App. 51.  Juror 11 explained that “it’s not a reason not to

serve . . . I’m just thinking like if somebody’s found guilty, I could also see this

person in the prison system.”    Id.4    In response to a follow‐up question from

Judge Chatigny asking whether any jurors had “experiences or connections . . .

involving law enforcement,” Juror 11 explained that she worked in the

                                              

3 “Juror 11” denotes the juror’s place on the petit jury.    During voir dire, this

individual was denominated Juror 27.  To limit potential confusion, we use the

petit jury designation, Juror 11, to refer to this juror throughout our discussion.   

4 The district court thereafter explained the difference between the state and

federal prison systems to assuage any concern Juror 11 might have had as to the

likelihood of future contact with Spruill.

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Connecticut Offender Reentry Program, and that the Program’s mission is to

help inmates with mental health issues receive treatment and to “represent them

in the prison and [to] work on their . . . life goals.”  Id. at 53, 56.   

Spruill’s counsel initially applied, but then withdrew, a peremptory

challenge to Juror 11.  The record reflects the following exchange:  

THE COURT:  Mr. Weingast [defense counsel], I’m just interested in

why you removed [Juror 11].

MR. WEINGAST:   We discussed that very carefully.   The fact that

she worked in prisons . . . was basically what tipped the scales . . . .

THE COURT:  What is your concern?

MR. WEINGAST:  I think with work, she’s a bit jaded.  That was a

decision by both me and my client.

THE COURT:  But Mr. Spruill wanted you to remove her?

MR. WEINGAST:  Yes, Your Honor.  Can I just doublecheck?

THE COURT:  Yes.  

(Pause)

MR. WEINGAST:  We’ll keep her instead.

THE COURT:  I’m sorry?

MR. WEINGAST:  We’ll keep her.

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. . . .  

THE COURT:  To be clear, Mr. Weingast, I don’t want Mr. Spruill to

think that I am here to influence his exercise of peremptories,

because I’m not.

MR. WEINGAST:  No, Your Honor absolutely not.  This is . . . one

we weighed very carefully, and on balance with what the Court just

said, we talked about it some more and my client would like to keep

her.

THE COURT:  Okay.  

Id. at 116–17.  Juror 11 ultimately served on the jury.  

After the close of evidence, during deliberations, the court received two

jury notes in close succession.    The first revealed that the jury was divided,

apparently 11 to 1, and sought clarification as to the law of constructive

possession:

Your Honor, we have one juror that at this point that does not agree

with the jury.   He/she has doubts and at this point is unwilling to

change their vote.  There is also the law for constructive possession

and clarity on the law.    We would like you to confirm that we

should take what is stated on page 20 as law.   

The majority of the jurors are unwilling to stop too quickly at the

expense of justice.    How should we proceed?    Do we continue

discussing the points?  

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Id. at 521.    The second note indicated one juror’s concern about a conflict of

interest:

We have one juror who feels in their gut that they have a conflict of

interest.  We need to understand how to proceed.  

Id.  

Invited to comment on the first note, both the prosecutor and Spruill’s

counsel stated that the jury did not appear deadlocked and should be instructed

to continue deliberations.  As to the second note, counsel agreed that it was not

clear whether the “holdout” juror in the first note and the “conflicted” juror in

the second note were one and the same.   With counsel’s agreement, the court

decided to give the jury further instruction.

In response to the first note, the court reminded the jurors that “[e]ach of

you must decide the case for yourself” and “if after carefully considering all the

evidence and the arguments of your fellow jurors you entertain a conscientious

view that differs from the others, you are not to yield your conviction simply

because you are outnumbered.”   Id. at 530–31.    This immediately prompted a

third note, requesting a definition of “conscientious view.”  The court explained,

“the term refers to a view of the case based on fair and impartial consideration of

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all the evidence and full and fair discussion of the issues in the case with the

other jurors.”  Id. at 532.  The court then asked counsel whether they agreed with

the stated definition, and both responded with approval.

Addressing the second note, the district court instructed the jury on

“conflict of interest” as follows:   

Like judges, jurors are required to be impartial and unbiased.    A

juror is not permitted to have a personal bias for or against any

party.

A conflict of interest can arise when a juror has a financial interest in

a case, knows one of the lawyers or parties or witnesses, or has been

personally involved in a situation like the one at issue in the case.

A conflict of interest is in the nature of a personal stake or

involvement in the case that makes it difficult for the individual to

be fair and impartial, to decide the case based solely on the evidence

and the applicable law, not on anything else.

. . . .

[I]f after considering these brief comments it appears that there may

be a conflict of interest, then that is something that would need to be

disclosed and I would need to address it.

Id. at 533–34.  When the jury resumed its deliberations, the court confirmed that

counsel had no objections to any part of the instruction given:    “Not from the

government, Your Honor”; and “No, Your Honor, thank you,” from Spruill’s

counsel.  Id. at 535.   

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Shortly thereafter, the court received a fourth note, this time from Juror 11,

which stated as follows:

I had concerns during jury selection about being in a position where

I have involvement with similar cases when working with

individuals with similar charges.    After hearing deliberations, I’m

finding my “gut feeling” is potentially creating a bias.   

If possible, it may make sense to be replaced at this time by another

juror.

Id. at 536.  The court shared the note with counsel and solicited guidance on how

to proceed.    Agreeing with the Government, Spruill’s counsel urged further

inquiry:

I think the Court would need to inquire of her whether she can set

aside the bias and deliberate, and I suppose also the nature of the

bias so that we know if it’s something that is truly a bias in terms of

jury deliberations. . . .   

I think the court needs to inquire of her individually.

Id. at 537–38.   

In discussing how to conduct such an inquiry without intruding on jury

deliberations, see id. at 538–39 (observing, “I don’t want to intrude on the jury’s

deliberations, I don’t want to know about the jury deliberation, but I need to

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respond intelligently to this note”),5 the district court posited two scenarios:

“either [1] Juror 11 has a conscientious view that differs from everybody else or

[2] she’s having difficulty deliberating as she would wish to do because of what

might be thought of as sympathy for Mr. Spruill,” id. at 539.    With counsels’

consent, the court then called Juror 11 into the courtroom.

Before making any inquiry, Judge Chatigny cautioned the juror:    

[I]t’s important that you not reveal to me anything about the jury

deliberations. . . .  That’s a matter for the jury alone and we need to

respect the confidentiality of the jury’s work and the secrecy of the

jury’s deliberations.  But with regard to your own personal situation

as a juror, we can talk about whatever problem is causing you

concern.  

Id. at 541.   

Juror 11 explained that her employment experience was the source of her

concern:    

I think when we had the jury selection . . . I had mentioned [that] I

work in the prison system and I work with inmates all the time.  

And I feel . . . like that was sort of a conflict in the beginning. . . .  But

                                              

5 The record consistently demonstrates Judge Chatigny’s commendable caution

in identifying the concerns presented by the court’s inquiry of a deliberating

juror regarding a potential conflict, and in further consulting with counsel before

every action taken.     

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I said, okay, well, maybe there isn’t a problem, because I presented it

to you as a judge and you continued to let me stay in there, so I

figured it probably wasn’t a problem.

. . . I’m trying to do my best . . . to make the best unbiased decisions,

but I also am feeling like my work and my involvement with people

in that matter and the things that I’ve heard from other inmates in

cases, similar cases that they have like this—you know, I work with

people that have had drug convictions and things like that—and

things that they say to me . . . [are] somewhat clouding my views.  

I’m trying not to. . . .  I’m trying to look at the evidence and trying to

make a decision on all that, and I feel like in some ways I kind of am.  

But somebody mentioned—I can’t bring up the deliberations, but it

just kind of made me think about it and it’s just been difficult.  

And they were asking me all this stuff and I was, look, I don’t know,

you know.  So I’m just trying to be honest about it.  I’m trying to do

my best . . . .

Id. at 542–43.   The court then asked, “So in a very real sense, you have clients

who are similarly situated to Mr. Spruill?” id. at 543, to which Juror 11 replied:

Yes.  I’ve had experience with that.

. . . .

And a lot of [my clients] have mentioned things to me that makes

me think about the system and things—I don’t know what’s truth

and what’s not—to create some cloudiness in my head about certain

things.

Id. at 543–44.

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The court then presented Juror 11 with the two possible scenarios

discussed previously with counsel, and she replied:

I’m trying to be as fair as I can be and I feel like I’ve been trying to

listen to all the evidence and I feel like I was coming to a fair

decision, but I feel like other members also felt maybe I didn’t, you

know.  So I don’t know where I feel like if I can even—I don’t know.  

I mean, for [the] interest of the Court and everybody’s time, it might

just make sense to have somebody else.  I just don’t know.

Id. at 546.  The court made no decision at that time as to whether Juror 11 could

continue to serve or should be dismissed.  Instead, it suggested to Juror 11 that

she take time to consider whether she could “fairly and impartially judge the

case based solely on the evidence.”    Id.    It directed her not to “be concerned

about time or imposing on other people,” and “simply [to] focus on whether you

are able to be a fair and impartial judge of the case or whether it’s really not a

suitable case for you given the work that you do.”  Id. at 547.   

After the juror departed the courtroom, the court asked counsel whether

they had “[a]ny objection to anything that happened just now,” to which both

responded, “No, Your Honor.”  Id. at 548.  The court again solicited guidance on

how to proceed, whereupon Spruill’s attorney stated, “I think we just need to

give her a few minutes . . . .  We just have to recess and . . . be nearby . . . .”  Id.   

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A short time later, the court received a fifth note.  Therein, Juror 11 asked

to be dismissed, stating that she was having “some difficulty in making a

decision on a verdict based on feelings of sensitivity toward individuals who

have similar cases to Mr. Spruill.”    Id. at 549.    When Judge Chatigny invited

comment, the prosecutor stated that Juror 11 “should be excused at this point.”  

Id. at 550.   Asked whether he agreed, Spruill’s counsel responded, “Yes, Your

Honor.”  Id.  The court then dismissed Juror 11, replacing her with an alternate.   

The jury began its deliberations anew, and soon thereafter returned a

guilty verdict on all counts.

D.   Sentencing  

At Spruill’s October 10, 2013 sentencing hearing, the court considered the

Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) in determining Spruill’s sentencing

range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  Referencing a transcript of

state court proceedings at which Spruill had pleaded guilty to (1) the sale of

narcotics in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a‐277(a) and (2) possession of

narcotics with intent to sell in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a‐277(a), the PSR

recommended that a § 4B1.2 enhancement be applied to Spruill’s firearm

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conviction and that he be designated a career offender under § 4B1.1, yielding a

Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment.    With objections not

relevant here, the court adopted the PSR’s calculation, considered the factors set

out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and sentenced Spruill to a below‐Guidelines sentence

of 120 months’ imprisonment.   

This timely appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Citing language in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997),

stating that “‘if the record evidence discloses any possibility that the request to

discharge stems from the juror’s view of the sufficiency of the government’s

evidence, the court must deny the request,’” id. at 621–22 (emphasis omitted)

(quoting United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1987)), Spruill

argues that the district court erred in dismissing Juror 11 because she was the

holdout against conviction based on doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence,

see id. at 622 & n.11.  Because Spruill did not object to Juror 11’s dismissal in the

district court, we would normally review the challenged decision only for plain

error.  See United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (holding that party

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claiming plain error must show (1) error; (2) that is clear or obvious, rather than

subject to reasonable dispute; (3) that affected party’s substantial rights; and (4)

that seriously affected fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings); United States v. Wernick, 691 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2012).  As we

explain in the next section of this opinion, Spruill cannot demonstrate plain error

because Juror 11 was not removed for possible nullification, the concern

underlying Thomas’s “any possibility” rule, but, rather, for extrinsic bias, which

the district court was able to assess without intruding on jury deliberations.  In

any event, Spruill did not simply forfeit but, rather, waived any challenge to the

district court’s inquiry and dismissal of Juror 11 by affirmatively agreeing to

those actions.  

A. The Alleged Plain Error Under Thomas

To demonstrate error in the removal of a deliberating juror for cause under

Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b), Spruill must show that the district court abused the

considerable discretion it is accorded in this area.  See United States v. Simmons,

560 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2009); cf. United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 168 (2d

Cir. 2011) (according district court “broad flexibility” in handling alleged juror

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misconduct, “mindful that addressing juror misconduct always presents a

delicate and complex task, particularly when the misconduct arises during

deliberations” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).6  Such discretion

extends to decisions whether, and to what degree, to question a deliberating

juror regarding circumstances that may give cause for removal.    See United

States v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2001).    Such questioning must be

pursued cautiously, however, so as not to intrude on one of the cornerstones of

our jury system:   preservation of the secrecy of jury deliberations.    See United

States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618 (observing that “delicate and complex task” of

investigating reports of juror misconduct or bias becomes “particularly sensitive”

where court investigates allegations of juror misconduct during deliberations).  

Spruill’s claim that Juror 11’s removal was Thomas error ignores a critical

context difference.  The concern here was juror partiality or bias attributable to

                                              

6 We have observed that where a juror is the “lone holdout for acquittal” that

juror’s removal must be “meticulously scrutinized.”  United States v. Hernandez,

862 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1988); accord United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 624–25.  

But even in such cases, what the removal is scrutinized for is abuse of discretion.  

See United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying abuse of

discretion standard in rejecting Thomas challenge to apparent holdout juror).

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an extrinsic cause:  the juror’s employment experience.  In Thomas, the concern

was possible juror nullification, i.e., a purposeful refusal to consider the evidence

and the court’s instructions on the law in reaching a verdict.    See id. at 614.  

Thomas stated that “a juror who intends to nullify the applicable law is no less

subject to dismissal than is a juror who disregards the court’s instructions due to

an event or relationship that renders him biased or otherwise unable to render a

fair and impartial verdict.”  Id.  At the same time, Thomas recognized that where

“no allegedly prejudicial event or relationship” is at issue, id. at 621, juror

disregard of the law is “a particularly difficult allegation to prove and one for

which an effort to act in good faith may easily be mistaken,” id. at 618.  Thus, a

court presented with a claim of nullification during deliberations confronts a

serious dilemma.   Without an adequate inquiry, the court may remove a juror

who is simply unpersuaded by the Government’s case, which would deny the

defendant his right to a unanimous verdict.  See id. at 621.  But to conduct such

an inquiry of a deliberating juror suspected of nullification necessarily gives rise

to an “especially pronounced” conflict between a trial court’s “duty to dismiss

jurors for misconduct” and its duty to “safeguard[] the secrecy of jury

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deliberations.”  Id. at 618.  It was to balance these concerns properly that Thomas

pronounced a strict limitation on the removal of a deliberating juror “in any case

where the juror allegedly reuses to follow the law”:    “if the record evidence

discloses any possibility that the request to discharge stems from the juror’s view

of the sufficiency of the government’s evidence, the court must deny the

request.”  Id. at 621–22 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).7  It was

because the record in Thomas admitted such a possibility that we concluded that

the district court erroneously removed the juror.  See id. at 624.   

                                              

7 The first quotation belies our dissenting colleague’s assertion that “[n]othing in

Thomas . . . suggests that the ‘any possibility’ standard applies only in the juror

nullification context.”   Dissenting Op., post at [4].   Indeed, Thomas makes the

point again in pronouncing the standard “an imperfect rule” that, while

“leav[ing] open the possibility that jurors will engage in irresponsible activity . . .

outside the court’s power to investigate or correct,” nevertheless serves a system

of justice where “the judge’s duty and authority to prevent nullification and the

need for jury secrecy co‐exist uneasily.”  United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622

(emphasis added).  The Thomas footnote cited by the dissent itself makes clear

that nullification is the concern of the any possibility rule:  “Accordingly, if the

record raises any possibility that the juror’s views on the merits of the case,

rather than a purposeful intent to disregard the court’s instructions, underlay the

request that he be discharged, the juror must not be dismissed.”  United States v.

Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622 n.11 (emphasis omitted and emphasis added).

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Thomas itself recognized that where concerns as to a deliberating juror’s

continued ability to serve arise in a context other than nullification—for example,

juror unavailability or incapacitation—its strict “any possibility” rule is not

required because a trial judge can “conduct a thorough examination of the basis

for removal” and “make appropriate findings of fact,” including juror credibility,

“without any inquiry into the juror’s thoughts on the merits of the case.”  Id. at

620 (emphasis in original).    Thomas observed that “[t]he need to protect the

secrecy of jury deliberations begins to limit the investigatory powers where the

asserted basis for a deliberating juror’s possible dismissal is the juror’s alleged

bias or partiality in joining or not joining the views of his colleagues.”  Id. at 620–

21 (emphasis added).  But Thomas did not apply the “any possibility” rule to all

such claims.    Rather it recognized that where the claimed bias or partiality is

attributable to an extrinsic event, a judge might well be able to determine its

prejudicial likelihood “without intrusion into the deliberative process.”    Id. at

621; see United States v. Egbuniwe, 969 F.2d 757, 762–63 (9th Cir. 1992) (cited

approvingly in Thomas) (upholding removal of deliberating juror whose

girlfriend had been arrested and mistreated by police); United States v. Ruggiero,

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928 F.2d 1289, 1300 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding dismissal of deliberating juror

subjected to intimidation by two men in driveway); United States v. Casamento,

887 F.2d 1141, 1186–87 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding dismissal of deliberating juror

whose daughter received threatening phone call).  In short, by contrast to cases

of alleged nullification, where “the judge may well have no means of

investigating the allegation without unduly breaching the secrecy of

deliberations,” in cases of possible bias from extrinsic factors, “the presiding

judge can make appropriate findings and establish whether a juror is biased or

otherwise unable to serve without delving into the reasons underlying the juror’s

views on the merits of the case [because] an event or relationship itself becomes

the subject of investigation.”   United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621.    Thus

Thomas mandated its “any possibility” rule in the former circumstance but not in

the latter.    See id. at 623 (stating that it adopted rule in nullification context

because where “duty and authority to prevent defiant disregard of the law or

evidence comes into conflict with the principle of secret jury deliberations, we

are compelled to err in favor of the lesser of two evils—protecting the secrecy of

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23

jury deliberations at the expense of possibly allowing irresponsible juror

activity”).

Since Thomas was decided, this court has reiterated that its strict “any

possibility” rule does not reach beyond nullification to other forms of juror

misconduct.  Notably, in United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d at 131–32, we identified

a “subtle, but important,” distinction between a juror “determin[ed] to vote

without regard to the evidence” and a juror who admittedly “refused to

participate in deliberations as required by her obligations as a juror,” such that

the “stringent rule announced in Thomas” applied in the former circumstance

but not in the latter.    See id. (explaining that “stringent rule announced in

Thomas . . . is based on the difficulty in detecting the difference between a juror’s

illegal act of nullification . . . and the juror’s failure to be convinced of the

defendant’s guilt”; where “juror refused to participate in deliberations as

required by her obligations as a juror, the rule of Thomas does not apply . . .”).  

Thus, we held that the district court acted within its discretion in removing a

juror who had “improperly made up her mind prior to the beginning of

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24

deliberations and refused to engage in deliberations with the other jurors.”  Id. at

130.   

Our sister circuits also have recognized that the Thomas rule does not

apply where a district court can safely distinguish between instances of actual

juror misconduct and a juror’s views on the merits, such as in cases involving

partiality or bias that can be assessed without reference to the jury’s

deliberations.  See United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 n.6 (9th Cir.

1999) (distinguishing between allegations that go to “quality and coherence” of

juror’s views on merits, which require strict Thomas‐based standard of dismissal,

and questions of juror bias or competence that focus on some identifiable event

or relationship, which do not demand strict standard); see also United States v.

Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 303 n.25 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that strict no‐reasonable‐

possibility rule does not apply in “many instances” of alleged juror bias where

district court can “focus on the existence of a particular act that gives rise to the

bias”).

Applying these principles here, we observe that even if the record suggests

that Juror 11 was a holdout, it raises no nullification concern as in Thomas.  To

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25

the contrary, the record indicates that Juror 11 understood and accepted the duty

to base a verdict on the evidence and the law, but that she herself voiced concern

about her ability to perform that duty in light of an extrinsic factor:  her work in

the state prison system, which may have been causing a bias in favor of

defendant.  This is not a circumstance akin to Thomas, where an excusal inquiry

necessarily risked intrusion on jury deliberations as to require application of a

strict “any possibility” standard to the district court’s removal decision.  Rather,

it is a circumstance where the removal inquiry and decision could, and did, focus

on the extrinsic matter identified.   

This is not to ignore the challenges confronting the district court in making

a decision to excuse Juror 11.    As the able trial judge recognized, initially the

juror herself was not clear as to whether she was, in fact, operating under an

actual bias favoring defendant, or whether she simply possessed a conscientious

view of the evidence at odds with her fellow jurors.  See App. 539 (observing that

Juror 11 either “has a conscientious view that differs from everybody else or

she’s having difficulty deliberating as she would wish to do because of what

might be thought of as sympathy for Mr. Spruill”).  Compare id. at 536 (stating,

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26

in jury note, that “I had concerns during jury selection about being in a position

where I have involvement with similar cases when working with individuals

with similar charges,” and that “[a]fter hearing deliberations, I’m finding my ‘gut

feeling’ is potentially creating a bias”), with id. at 542 (“I’m trying to look at the

evidence and trying to make a decision on all that, and I feel like in some ways I

kind of am.”).   

Judge Chatigny, however, was careful to resolve that ambiguity with

minimal inquiry of the juror, and certainly without any inquiry into the juror’s

views of the evidence.  Cf. United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d at 132 (observing, in

upholding dismissal of deliberating juror, that “it is often difficult to steer such

interviews clear of revealing the jurors’ views”).  He commendably afforded the

juror additional time to consider for herself whether she was “able to be a fair

and impartial judge of the case or whether it’s really not a suitable case for you

given the work that you do.”  App. 547; see generally United States v. Nelson,

277 F.3d 164, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is important that a juror who has

expressed doubts about his or her impartiality also unambiguously assure the

district court, in the face of these doubts, of her willingness to exert truly best

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27

efforts to decide the case without reference to the predispositions and based

solely on the evidence presented at trial.” (emphasis in original)).  Moreover, he

ensured that the juror would feel no pressure to make a hasty decision,

emphasizing that she should not be concerned with the amount of time needed

or any possible inconvenience.  See App. 546–47.   

After taking some time, Juror 11 reported to Judge Chatigny that she was

having “some difficulty in making a decision on a verdict based on feelings of

sensitivity toward individuals who have similar cases to Mr. Spruill.”  Id. at 617

(emphasis added).    On this record, and with no intrusion whatsoever on jury

deliberations, the district court was able to determine—and both prosecution and

defense counsel agreed—that Juror 11 needed to be removed for extrinsic bias.  

These circumstances are thus distinguishable from Thomas, and not controlled

by its “any possibility” rule.  See United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d at 131–32.  

Accordingly, Spruill cannot show error, let alone plain error, in the

dismissal of Juror 11.  See generally United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d at 1300

(observing that appellate court “would be rash indeed to second guess the

conclusion of the experienced trial judge, based in large measure upon personal

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28

observations that cannot be captured on a paper record, that [the juror] was

disabled by fear from continuing to participate in the jury’s deliberations”); see

also United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d at 129, 131 (upholding dismissal where

record indicated deliberating juror was not removed for “nonconforming view of

the evidence,” notwithstanding her insistence that views were “based on the

evidence”).    In any event, Spruill confronts an even higher hurdle than plain

error, because, as we explain in the next section, his challenge to Juror 11’s

removal is precluded by waiver.

B. Spruill’s Waiver of Any Challenge to Inquiry and Removal of  

Juror 11

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), this court has discretion to correct errors that

were forfeited because not timely raised in the district court, but no such

discretion applies when there has been true waiver.  See United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 731–34 (1993); United States v. Kon Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1121

(2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that “forfeiture does not preclude appellate

consideration of a claim in the presence of plain error, whereas waiver

necessarily ‘extinguishes’ the claim altogether”).    Forfeiture occurs when a

defendant, in most instances due to mistake or oversight, fails to assert an

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objection in the district court.  See United States v. Kon Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d at 1122

(“If a party’s failure to take an evidentiary exception is simply a matter of

oversight, then such oversight qualifies as a correctable ‘forfeiture’ for the

purposes of plain error analysis.”); see also United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129,

138 (2d Cir. 2013) (reviewing jury instruction for plain error where defendant

failed to make timely objection at trial); United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 42 (2d

Cir. 1998) (observing that defendant’s failure to present timely argument or

objection to merger issue amounted to forfeiture).  By contrast, waiver can result

only from a defendant’s intentional decision not to assert a right.    See United

States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 321 n.21 (2d Cir. 2007) (defining waiver as

“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); accord United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 282

(2d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Zubia‐Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th

Cir. 2008) (observing that “waiver is accomplished by intent, but forfeiture comes

about through neglect” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  We

here identify such intentional action by Spruill with respect to the district court’s

inquiry and removal of Juror 11.   

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Various circumstances can manifest a defendant’s intentional

relinquishment of a known right.  For example, this court has recognized waiver

where a party actively solicits or agrees to a course of action that he later claims

was error.  See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d at 320–22 (stating that

defendants who solicited and agreed to erroneous jury instruction that, if death

penalty were not imposed, life imprisonment was mandated, could not later

claim that imposition of life sentence was plain error); United States v. Coonan,

938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendant who welcomed

admission of evidence relating to gang membership waived right to appeal

admission of that evidence); see also United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1316

(10th Cir. 2006) (stating that when defendant, through counsel, proposed and

agreed to conditions of supervised release, defendant could not later appeal

conditions).  We have identified waiver where a party asserts, but subsequently

withdraws, an objection in the district court.  See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 930

F.2d 185, 198 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant who withdrew objection to

exclusion of documents waived right to appeal exclusion); see also United States

v. Zubia‐Torres, 550 F.3d at 1205 (“We typically find waiver in cases where . . . a

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party attempts to reassert an argument that it previously raised and abandoned

below.”); United States v. Denkins, 367 F.3d 537, 543–44 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding

that defendant waived any competency challenge to guilty plea where counsel

secured competency evaluation but later abandoned competency argument and

withdrew any previous objections).   We have also recognized waiver where a

party makes a “tactical decision” not to raise an objection.  United States v. Kon

Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d at 1122–23 (holding that, where defendant objects to certain

evidence as irrelevant and prejudicial but opts, as tactical matter, not to object to

other evidence, such inaction “constitutes a true ‘waiver,’ which will negate even

plain error review”); accord United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d at 321.  In each

of these circumstances, the record has supported the critical determination that

the defendant, through counsel, acted intentionally in pursuing, or not pursuing,

a particular course of action.8

                                              

8 Judge Pooler observes that Spruill did not personally waive any objection to the

removal of Juror 11.    See Dissenting Op., post at [10].    To be sure, personal

waiver is required for certain rights; a defendant “has the ultimate authority to

determine whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf,

or take an appeal.”  Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted).  But while “there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive

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The record in this case convincingly demonstrates that Spruill, through

counsel, also acted intentionally when he affirmatively agreed to and, at times,

even recommended the actions he now challenges with respect to the removal of

Juror 11.  Thus, his Thomas argument is not simply forfeited without plain error,

but waived.

From the start of trial, and long before jury deliberations commenced,

Spruill was aware that Juror 11’s employment might affect her jury service.  

Indeed, during voir dire, Spruill initially exercised, but then withdrew, a

peremptory challenge to Juror 11 based on concern that she might be “jaded”

because of her work.  App. 116.  Thus, when, during jury deliberations, Juror 11

expressed concern about a possible conflict based on her work, Spruill

                                                                                                                                                  

without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the

lawyer has—and must have—full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.  

The adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision

required client approval.”  Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988) (footnote

omitted).    Spruill has nowhere argued that his consent to the removal of a

deliberating juror had to be personal rather than through counsel to foreclose a

challenge on appeal.    Nor has the dissent cited any authority supporting that

conclusion.  As the cited cases show, most waivers are effected through counsel.  

And as we observe infra at [37–39], a defendant who thinks his attorney’s waiver

of a point was unreasonable and prejudicial may have a Sixth Amendment claim

for ineffective representation.

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33

specifically urged the district court to undertake the very inquiry of Juror 11 that

he now challenges.     

I think the Court would need to inquire of her whether she can set

aside the bias and deliberate, and I suppose also the nature of the

bias so that we can know if it’s something that is truly a bias in terms

of jury deliberations. . . .   

I think the Court needs to inquire of her individually.

Id. at 537–38.  A colloquy ensued in which the district court remarked that it was

“reasonable to infer that the jury has taken a vote on the merits and Juror 11 is

alone in opposing the other jurors,” either because she had a “conscientious view

that differs from everybody else” or because “she’s having difficulty deliberating

as she would wish to do because of what might be thought of as sympathy for

Mr. Spruill.”    Id. at 538–39.    Even after hearing these observations—which

anticipate the argument he makes on appeal—Spruill expressed only support for,

not opposition to, the district court’s questioning of Juror 11.    Notably, when

Judge Chatigny advised the parties that he wished, “with your consent,” to

inquire further of Juror 11, Spruill’s counsel provided that consent:  “Yes, Your

Honor, thank you.”  Id. at 540.  At this juncture, Spruill could have objected to

the inquiry he now challenges.    His decision not to object, but rather to

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34

encourage further inquiry, was an intentional, tactical decision that we deem a

true waiver of any Thomas challenge to the inquiry.   

Our conclusion is only reinforced by Spruill’s subsequent actions.    For

example, rather than argue that Juror 11 should not have been questioned,

Spruill’s counsel indicated agreement both with how the court conducted its

minimal inquiry, and with its suggestion that Juror 11 take more time to consider

her ability to deliberate fairly and impartially.  When specifically asked if Spruill

had “[a]ny objection to anything that happened just now,” defense counsel

replied, “No, Your Honor,” and stated, “I think we just need to give her a few

minutes . . . .  [W]e just have to recess and . . . be nearby . . . .”  Id. at 548.   

Most important, when Juror 11 sent her next note expressing “difficulty in

making a decision on a verdict based on feelings of sensitivity toward

individuals who have similar cases to Mr. Spruill” and proposing that she be

excused, id. at 549, Spruill voiced no objection but, rather, agreed that the juror

needed to be excused:  “The Court:  Are you [a]greed that I need to excuse her?  

Mr. Weingast:  Yes, Your Honor,” id. at 550.      

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In sum, the record reveals that (1) from voir dire forward, Spruill

recognized Juror 11’s potential work‐related bias; (2) when, during deliberations,

juror notes were ambiguous as to the reason jurors could not reach a verdict,

Spruill encouraged further instructions, specifically agreeing to the district

court’s “conscientious view” and “conflict of interest” instructions; (3) when

Juror 11 herself expressed a conflict concern, Spruill encouraged and agreed to a

district‐court inquiry as to the nature and extent of any bias; (4) when, upon such

inquiry, Juror 11 expressed uncertainty about her ability to deliberate fairly and

impartially, Spruill supported the court’s decision to give the juror time to

consider the matter further; and (5) when Juror 11 reported that it may be best to

excuse her—because she would have difficulty returning a verdict, due to

sensitivity toward persons with similar cases—Spruill’s counsel agreed that she

should be excused.    Indeed, after Juror 11 was replaced and the jury was

instructed to begin its deliberations anew, Spruill’s counsel affirmed that he did

not object “to anything that ha[d] transpired.”  Id. at 554.9

                                              

9 Judge Pooler observes that Spruill challenges Juror 11’s removal, not her

questioning, on appeal.    See Dissenting Op., post at [5].    Nevertheless, to the

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This record plainly demonstrates that Spruill’s counsel did not “fall asleep

at the wheel” with respect to the inquiry or dismissal of Juror 11.  United States

v. Kon Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d at 1123.  Rather, he actively engaged in the matter and

agreed to every action taken by the district court.    These intentional actions

manifest true waiver of any challenge to the district court’s inquiry and removal

of Juror 11.  See United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d at 320–23.  

In urging otherwise, Spruill maintains that his trial counsel’s actions were

not a permissible “tactical decision” and, thus, cannot demonstrate waiver.  We

disagree.  As an initial matter, while an identifiable tactical benefit provides some

evidence that the relinquishment of a right was intentional, see, e.g., id. at 320–

22, we have not made a tactical benefit a prerequisite to identifying waiver where

the totality of circumstances otherwise demonstrate the requisite intentional

action, see, e.g., United States v. Celaj, 649 F.3d 162, 170 n.5 (2d Cir. 2011)

(holding that defense counsel’s agreement to factual stipulation regarding

                                                                                                                                                  

extent waiver is a product of intent, it is appropriate to review the totality of

circumstances leading to Juror 11’s removal to determine what intent is evident

with respect to removal.    See Grayton v. Ercole, 691 F.3d 165, 174–78 (2d Cir.

2012) (examining record as whole to find defendant’s Confrontation Clause

rights implicitly waived).

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interstate commerce element of offense waived sufficiency challenge, without

identifying tactical benefit of action).  In any event, we cannot foreclose a tactical

motivation for counsel’s actions regarding Juror 11.  Counsel may initially have

thought that further inquiry would resolve tension between the first two notes in

a way that would secure his client a mistrial.  Thereafter, upon observing Juror

11 firsthand and hearing her repeated equivocal responses and uncertainty as to

whether she could proceed impartially, counsel may have thought the juror more

likely to succumb to the views of other jurors than to maintain an opposing view

and, in those circumstances, thought it better to substitute the first alternate and

begin deliberations anew.    Or counsel may simply have recognized that the

juror’s final response acknowledged an extrinsic bias that compelled removal.

Whether such determinations—if, in fact, counsel’s view—were objectively

reasonable can, like other attorney actions, be raised on a Sixth Amendment

challenge to counsel’s representation.  Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

688 (1984); United States v. Best, 219 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that

counsel’s “election to forgo an unsupported argument” reflected sound trial

strategy); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 701 (2002) (rejecting habeas

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38

challenge to state court’s determination that counsel’s waiver of final argument

in capital case was legitimate trial tactic); United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302,

310 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that counsel’s waiver of closing argument on count

submitted to jury independently, “while admittedly a gamble,” was reasonable

strategic choice where jury had acquitted defendant on all other counts); United

States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236, 243 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that “counsel’s failure

to object to the prosecutor’s remark and to request a curative instruction seems

consistent with a reasonable tactical decision to minimize any harm the

prosecutor’s remark may have caused, by not inviting further attention to it”).  

Because such a challenge must generally be brought collaterally to allow

adequate development of the record, see Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,

504 (2003) (recognizing that “in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is

preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance”), we

express no conclusive view on that matter, although our rejection of Spruill’s

Thomas challenge may well bear on a Sixth Amendment claim.  As to waiver, we

conclude only that a defense action is no less intentional, and thus, no less a “true

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39

waiver,” merely because a defendant may subsequently claim ineffective

assistance of counsel.   

We therefore conclude that Spruill, through counsel, having intentionally

urged the questioning of Juror 11 and specifically agreed to her dismissal,

waived the challenges that he now raises on appeal.

III. Conclusion

To summarize, we conclude:

1. Spruill waived any challenge to dismissal of the juror in question by

specifically telling the district court that he did not object either to its colloquy

with the juror or to the juror’s removal, and by in fact recommending the very

disposition he now challenges.   

2. Even if Spruill had not waived any Thomas argument, the

challenged juror removal is not subject to Thomas’s “any possibility” rule, see

116 F.3d at 621–22, because the concern underlying Thomas, juror nullification,

was not here at issue.    Rather, removal was based on extrinsic bias, a matter

about which the district court could—and did—inquire without intruding on

jury deliberations.   

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Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and in a summary order

addressing the remaining issues on appeal, the district court’s judgment of

conviction is AFFIRMED.   

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