Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00462/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00462-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Calvin Frank Morris
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

Calvin Frank Morris, 

Defendant-Movant. ______________________________________

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No. CR-04-1088-PHX-JAT

No. CV 08-0462-PHX-JAT (JCG)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Movant Calvin Morris is currently confined at a Federal Correctional Institution in

Fort Dix, New Jersey. Pending before the Court is Movant's pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody filed on

March 12, 2008. (Doc. No. 1, CV-08-0462-PHX-JAT (JCG).) On April 17, 2008, Movant

filed a Memorandum of Law in support of his § 2255 Motion. (Doc. No. 150, CR-08-0462-

PHX-JAT (JCG).) Respondent filed an Answer to the § 2255 Motion on September 15, 2008

and Movant timely replied. (Doc. Nos. 5 & 8, CV-08-0462-PHX-JAT (JCG).) 

In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate

Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, deny the

Motion.

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1

 Unless otherwise indicated, citation to the Court’s docket refers to the criminal docket at

CR-04-1088-PHX-JAT.

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BACKGROUND

On October 12, 2004, Movant was indicted on three offenses: Conspiracy to Possess

with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 841(a)(1) &

(b)(1)(A)(ii); Attempted Possession with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846, 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A)(ii); and Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). (Doc. No. 6.)1

 Co-defendant Florian Hipolito Jimenez

also was charged in all three counts of the indictment. (Id.) 

On July 6, 2005, Movant proceeded to trial. (Doc. No. 74.) The evidence at trial

established that Movant participated in a conspiracy with co-conspirator Florian Hipolito

Jimenez to purchase with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Between

July 18, 2004 and September 19, 2004, Jimenez engaged in a series of telephone calls with

nightclub owner and DEA cooperative informant Jose German. (TR 7/7/05, pgs. 22-23, 59-

60, 75.) During those telephone calls, Jimenez told German that he and a “compadre”

wanted to travel from New York to Arizona on October 7, 2004 to set up a drug trade; they

planned to make an initial purchase of several kilograms of cocaine and then purchase

additional amounts each month. (TR 7/7/05, pgs. 59-75; Tr 7/12/05 pgs. 122-23.) Jimenez

also told German that he was working with someone who knew how to seal cash and drugs

“like Juan Valdez.” (Exhibit 53A, pgs. 8-9.)

The evidence at trial also established that Movant communicated by telephone with

Jimenez, often just after one of the co-defendants committed an act in furtherance of the

conspiracy. (TR 7/12/05, pg. 122.) Movant purchased two can sealers and various supplies

from the Wells Can Company, paid for them using his own credit cards, addressed the

packages to himself and shipped the materials to his home and to a shipping store in Phoenix.

(TR 7/12/05, pgs. 120-21, 83-85; TR 7/7/05 71-74, 78-80.) Movant booked (and re-booked)

airfare for himself and Jimenez to travel from New York to Arizona. (TR 7/12/05, pgs. 10-

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13.) Movant traveled to Phoenix with Jimenez, rented a car together and drove to a shipping

store where they picked up three shipping boxes. (TR 7/7/05, 126-28, 163-64, 166-68.)

Movant rented a hotel room for himself and Jimenez and the two men unloaded the shipping

boxes at the hotel. (TR 7/7/05 180-81.) Movant and Jimenez then drove together to Havana

Café, where Jimenez had agreed to meet German. (TR 7/7/05 pgs. 148-49.) Movant waited

in the vehicle while Jimenez met with German and two undercover DEA agents posing as

cocaine suppliers. (Id.) Jimenez told German and the DEA agents that he was working with

a partner who had traveled with him to Phoenix. (TR 7/12/05, pgs. 58-59.) Movant was

arrested while waiting in the vehicle; the duffle bag he had placed in the vehicle contained

six sealed cans stuffed with $58,000. (TR 7/12/05, pgs. 65, 87.) After searching Movant’s

hotel room, agents discovered additional evidence demonstrating Movant’s attempts to ship

canning supplies to Phoenix. (TR 7/7/05, pgs. 205-14.) 

After a six-day jury trial, Movant was convicted on all three counts as charged. (Doc.

No. 83.) On October 3, 2005, Movant was sentenced to a 165-month term for count 1, a 165-

month term for count 2, and a 60-month term for count 3. (Doc. No. 104.) All sentences

were ordered to run concurrent, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. (Id.)

Movant was also ordered to pay a $300 special assessment. (Id.) 

On October 11, 2005, Movant filed a Notice of Appeal. (Doc. No. 107.) In his direct

appeal, Movant presented three claims: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient

to convict him, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Movant’s prior drug arrest

and (3) federal agents engaged in sentencing entrapment by selling a co-conspirator cocaine

at an artificially low price. See United States v. Calvin Frank Morris, 210 Fed. Appx. 738

(9th Cir. December 12, 2006) (unpublished disposition). On December 12, 2006, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a memorandum decision affirming

Movant’s convictions. Id. Movant did not petition the United States Supreme Court for

certiorari. On March 12, 2008, Movant filed the pending pro se Motion pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255.

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CLAIMS

Movant presents six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: 

1. Ground 1: trial counsel failed to challenge the government’s impermissible

change of theory of the case;

2. Ground 2: trial counsel failed to move for a separate jury trial regarding the

issue of the quantity of drugs involved;

3. Ground 3: trial counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s Pinkerton

instruction to the jury; 

4. Ground 4: trial counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s defective jury

instruction that placed the burden of proof upon the Movant; 

5. Ground 5: trial counsel failed to move for a downward departure at

sentencing based upon Movant’s minimal involvement; and 

6. Ground 6: trial and appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of sentencing

guidelines not being mandatory and/or move for the sentencing court to

sentence Movant pursuant to the advisory scheme of guidelines. 

(Doc. No. 1, CV-08-462-JAT (JCG).) 

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides: 

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of

Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or

that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the

sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise

subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence

to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

Thus, in order to prevail on his Petition, Movant must demonstrate that his sentence was

imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or federal law. Rule 4(b) of the Rules

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts provides, in

relevant part, that "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the

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record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must

dismiss the motion and direct the clerk to notify the moving party."

B. Exhaustion

Respondent contends that Movant waived his right to present Grounds 1-6 in his

section 2255 Motion because he did not raise those claims in his direct appeal. However,

Grounds 1-6 allege claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant’s “failure to raise

an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being

brought in a later appropriate proceeding under § 2255." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.

500, 509 (2003). Accordingly, Movant is not precluded from presenting those claims in the

pending Motion.

C. Legal Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel

Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal

defendant has a right to “effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel has two

components. A defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient,

i.e., that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 687. It requires the defendant

to show that counsel's conduct “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466

U.S. at 687–88. Second, a defendant must show that the mistakes made were "prejudicial

to the defense," that is, the mistakes created a "reasonable probability that, but for [the]

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 466 U.S. at

694. Counsel's performance is strongly presumed to fall within the ambit of reasonable

conduct unless Movant can show otherwise. Id. at 689–90. 

D. Merits

1. Ground 1

In Ground 1, Movant claims that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to

challenge the government’s impermissible change of theory of the case. The government

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alleged in the indictment that Movant conspired and/or attempted to possess with intent to

distribute 5 or more kilograms of cocaine. According to Movant, the government argued in

its rebuttal at trial that Movant attempted to purchase 4 kilograms of cocaine but also

negotiated for future cocaine deals, such that the total amount of cocaine involved in the

conspiracy exceeded 5 kilograms. Movant contends that the government’s rebuttal argument

signified a change in the government’s theory of the case, to which his trial counsel should

have objected.

“After an indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened through

amendment except by the grand jury itself.” Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16

(1960). If the government constructively amends the indictment by altering, either literally

or in effect, the terms of an indictment after the grand jury has last passed upon them,

reversal is required. See United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citations omitted). If, however, the proof offered at trial merely varies slightly from the

allegations of the indictment, the variance does not require reversal unless it prejudices the

defendant's substantial rights. Id. 

In the present case, the government alleged in its indictment that Movant participated

in a conspiracy to purchase and distribute 5 or more kilograms of cocaine. The evidence

presented at trial was consistent with this allegation. German testified regarding several

conversations that he had with co-conspirator Jimenez. During those conversations, Jimenez

told German that he wanted to travel to Arizona with Movant in order to get “four to five

kilos of cocaine,” and “within due time buy ten.” (TR 7/7/05 pg. 64-66; 72.) Jimenez later

told German that he wanted to buy five kilograms of cocaine and take a sixth kilogram on

credit. (TR 7/7/05, pg. 76.) Jimenez also told undercover DEA agent Ruben Garcia that he

wished to purchase five kilograms of cocaine and obtain a sixth kilogram on credit. (TR

7/12/05, pg. 54.) The government also presented evidence that Movant was found in

possession of over $58,000.00 in U.S. currency at the same time Jimenez was attempting to

negotiate the purchase of five kilograms of cocaine at $11,000.00 per kilogram. (TR 7/12/05,

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pgs. 54-55, 65 & 87.) Accordingly, the government’s evidence did not vary from the

indictment’s charge; the amount of cocaine at issue in this trial was five kilograms or more.

Because the government did not change its theory of the case at trial, counsel was not

ineffective for failing to present such an objection. Failure to take futile action can never be

deficient performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly,

Ground 1 is without merit.

2. Ground 2

In Ground 2, Movant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move

for a separate jury trial regarding the issue of the quantity of drugs involved. At trial,

Movant testified that he was not involved in and did not have any knowledge of the pending

drug transaction. (TR 7/12/05, pg. 185.) In closing argument, defense counsel argued that

the government had not sustained its burden of proof with respect to the amount of cocaine

at issue in the case. (TR 7/13/05, pg. 48.) Movant contends that defense counsel should

have sought bifurcation of the trial, ie. a trial as to Movant’s guilt followed by a separate trial

as to the quantity of drugs involved, in order to avoid a conflict between Movant’s testimony

and defense counsel’s closing argument.

The jury rejected Movant’s version of the facts. At sentencing, the trial court noted

that Movant’s testimony was not credible and that the jury had every legitimate reason to

believe Movant had lied on the stand. (TR 10/3/05, pgs. 16-17.) In addition, the evidence

against Movant was overwhelming. Given Movant’s lack of credibility and the weight of

the evidence against him, trial counsel made a sound strategic decision to argue in favor of

a lesser-included offense with respect to the quantity of drugs involved. “Strategic choices

made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Accordingly, Ground 2 is without merit.

3. Ground 3

In Ground 3, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the trial court’s Pinkerton instruction to the jury. According to Movant, the trial

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2

 At trial, defense counsel attempted to argue that Jimenez was acting on his own behalf, and

not in furtherance of the conspiracy between Jimenez and Movant, when Jimenez negotiated for

more than four kilograms of cocaine and/or future cocaine purchases. 

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court’s instruction regarding participation in a conspiracy improperly suggested that Movant

could be liable for acts committed by Jimenez in furtherance of a separate conspiracy.2

 

The Pinkerton doctrine is a judicially-created rule that makes a conspirator criminally

liable for the substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when they are reasonably

foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Long, 301 F.3d

1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946)).

In order to establish Pinkerton liability, the prosecution must demonstrate: “(1) the

substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the offense fell

within the scope of the unlawful project; and (3) the offense could reasonably have been

foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.” See United States

v. Fonseca-Caro, 114 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Douglass, 780

F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir.1986)). 

In this case, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

Each member of the conspiracy is responsible for the actions of the

other conspirators performed during the course and in furtherance of the

conspiracy. If one member of a conspiracy commits a crime in furtherance of

a conspiracy, the other members have also, under the law, committed that

crime. 

Therefore, you may find the defendant guilty of attempting to possess

with the intent to distribute cocaine as charged in Count 2 of the indictment if

the government has proved each of the following elements beyond a

reasonable doubt:

1. A person named in Count 2 of the indictment committed the

crime of attempting to possess with intent to distribute cocaine

as alleged in that count;

2. The person was a member of the conspiracy charged in Count

2 of the indictment;

3. The person committed the crime of attempting to possess with

intent to distribute cocaine in furtherance of the conspiracy;

4. The defendant was a member of the same conspiracy at the time

the offense charged in Count 2 was committed; and

5. The offense fell within the scope of the unlawful agreement and

could reasonably have been foreseen to be [a] necessary or

natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.

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(Doc. No. 88.) This jury instruction conforms to the requirements of Pinkerton and is an

accurate statement of the applicable law. A nearly identical jury instruction was upheld by

the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1202-03 (9th Cir.

2000). Moreover, contrary to Movant’s assertions, the jury instruction clearly advises the

jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Movant was involved in the same

conspiracy as his co-conspirator in order to be found guilty of his co-conspirator’s crimes.

Because the jury instruction was not defective, trial counsel was not ineffective in

failing to object to it. See Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1445 (failure to take futile action can never be

deficient performance). Accordingly, Ground 3 is without merit.

4. Ground 4

In Ground 4, Movant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the trial court’s defective jury instruction, which incorrectly placed the burden of

proof upon the Movant. 

During the reading of the aiding and abetting instruction, the Court misread a portion

of the instruction and stated “the defendant must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant acted with knowledge and intention of helping that person commit attempted

possession with attempt to distribute cocaine.” (TR 7/13/05, pgs. 18-19.) The beginning of

the instruction should have read that “the evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant ...” (Doc. No. 88, pg. 29.) The written instruction provided to the jury

correctly stated the instruction. (Id.) 

“Jury instructions, even if imperfect, are not a basis for overturning a conviction

absent a showing they constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion.” United States v.

Bordallo, 857 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The court must examine whether

the jury instructions, taken as a whole, were misleading or represented a statement inadequate

to guide the jury’s deliberation. See United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.

1089). A single jury instruction may not be viewed in isolation, but must be viewed in the

context of the overall charge. Bordallo, 857 F.2d at 527 (citations omitted). 

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Viewing the jury instructions are viewed as a whole, this Court concludes that the trial

court’s mis-reading of a single word in the aiding and abetting instruction in no way mislead

the jury or inadequately guided the jury’s deliberation. See United States v. Brown, 522 F.2d

10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that the jury was fairly apprised of the government's burden

of proof and that the error in omitting the words “beyond a reasonable doubt” from one

particular instruction did not require reversal under the plain error rule.) Although the trial

court inadvertantly misstated the aiding and abetting instruction while reading the instruction

aloud, the jury received the correct instruction numerous other times during the trial. At the

close of the case, the jury was instructed that Movant was presumed innocent and that “the

government has the burden of proving every element of the charge beyond a reasonable

doubt.” (TR 7/13/05, pg. 13.) The trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the burden

of proof when discussing each of the separate counts of the indictment. (TR 7/13/05, pgs.

11, 14, 16-17.) The printed instruction provided to the jury correctly stated that the

government, not the defendant, bore the burden of proof on the aiding and abetting charge.

(Doc. No. 88, pg. 29.) Elsewhere within the aiding and abetting instruction, the trial court

correctly stated: “to prove a defendant guilty of aiding and abetting, the government must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt ...” (TR 7/13/05, pg. 18.) Because Movant was not

prejudiced by the trial court’s inadvertent mis-reading of the aiding and abetting instruction,

Movant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object. Accordingly, Ground 4 is

without merit.

5. Ground 5

In Ground 5, Movant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for

a downward departure at sentencing based upon Movant’s minimal involvement.

Specifically, Movant contends that his trial counsel should have argued that Movant was

entitled to a reduced sentence pursuant to Section 3B1.2 of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines, which allows for a downward adjustment based on a defendant’s minimal

participation in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) (1998). 

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 Contrary to Movant's assertion, United v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) does not overrule

the “exceptional circumstances” standard set forth in Pena-Gutierrez.

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A downward adjustment under section 3B1.2 is to be used “infrequently and only in

exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Pena-Gutierrez, 222 F.3d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir.

2000) (citation omitted).3

 “The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of

the evidence that he is entitled to a downward adjustment based on his role in the offense.”

Id. (citation omitted). The Guidelines define a “minor participant” as “any participant who

is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as

minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.3) (1998). A minor role adjustment is warranted

only if the defendant is “substantially” less culpable than his co-participants. See PenaGutierrez, 222 F.3d at 1091. 

In the present case, Movant would not have been entitled to a downward role

adjustment. The evidence presented shows that Movant actively participated in a conspiracy

to purchase and distribute cocaine. Movant purchased two can sealers and other equipment;

Jimenez told German that his “friend” had a system for sealing drugs and cash. Movant

booked and paid for airfare for himself and Jimenez to travel to Arizona together. Movant

shipped sealing equipment from his home address to an Arizona address in his name.

Movant also shipped $58,000 which was intended to be used to purchase cocaine. Movant

then traveled to Arizona with Jimenez, rented a car, picked up a package containing the

$58,000 in cash and maintained control over the cash until his arrest. Although Movant was

not directly involved in purchase negotiations, German testified that it was typical for a drug

transaction to involve as few people as possible; thus Movant’s lack of participation does not

make his role insignificant. In light of these facts, trial counsel made a sound tactical

decision when he elected not to argue for a sentence reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

Accordingly, Ground 5 is without merit. 

6. Ground 6

In Ground 6, Movant alleges: “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Trial/Appellate) -

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Failure to raise issue of Guidelines being Non-Mandatory and move for Sentencing Court

to sentence Petitioner under Advisory Scheme of Guidelines, at Sentencing and upon

Appeal.” (Doc. No. 1, pg. 5, CV-08-462-PHX-JAT (JCG).) Although Movant states in his

Motion that facts supporting Ground 6 have been alleged in his Memorandum of Law, he

does not actually provide any specific or detailed facts to support this claim. Conclusory

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the government noted

in its response to the Motion that Movant had failed to properly brief Ground 6; Movant does

not address the government’s argument or the merits of Ground 6 in his Reply and therefore

appears to have conceded this issue. Accordingly, Ground 6 is without merit.

RECOMMENDATION

For all of the above reasons, the Magistrate recommends that the District Court, after

its independent review, issue an Order DENYING Movant's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody. (Doc. No. 1,

CV-08-0462-PHX-JAT (JCG).) 

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: No. CV 08-0462-

PHX-JAT.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues.

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See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 12th day of January, 2009.

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