Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03154/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03154-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Homeland Security
Respondent
Susan Fitzgerald
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SUSAN FITZGERALD,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3154

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-0831-14-0684-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: September 20, 2016 

______________________ 

JOHN C. HERMAN, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd 

LLP, Atlanta, GA, argued for petitioner. Also represented 

by CARLTON JONES, ROBERT JAMES LEONARD. 

TARA K. HOGAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., PATRICIA 

M. MCCARTHY, KRISTIN MCGRORY. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, SCHALL, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Case: 15-3154 Document: 36-2 Page: 1 Filed: 09/20/2016
2 FITZGERALD v. DHS

SCHALL, Circuit Judge. 

Susan Fitzgerald is an employee of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (“the Agency”), a component of the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). She currently works as a “Law Enforcement Specialist (Forensics/Investigative Instructor)” at the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center (“FLETC”) in Glynco, 

Georgia. In this appeal, she challenges the April 2, 2015 

final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board 

(“Board”) that sustained the denial by the Agency of her 

request for secondary Customs and Border Protection 

Officer (“CBPO”) retirement credit based upon her service 

as an Instructor at FLETC. J.A. 1–8. For the reasons set 

forth below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I.

Federal retirement laws extend enhanced benefits to 

certain groups, such as law-enforcement officers (“LEOs”) 

and firefighters, who have served in physically rigorous 

positions. Under the Federal Employees’ Retirement 

System (“FERS”),1 those benefits include, inter alia, 

eligibility to retire with an annuity at an earlier age than 

many other federal employees and eligibility to retire 

based on fewer years of service. Compare 5 U.S.C. 

§ 8412(a) (2012) (providing an annuity once an employee 

 

1 Congress established FERS in 1986 as a successor 

to the retirement benefits scheme for federal employees 

under the Civil Service Retirement System. See Federal 

Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986, Pub. L. 

No. 99–335, § 101, 100 Stat. 514, 516–17; S. REP. NO. 99-

166, at 1 (1986). Both systems presently remain in effect; 

persons employed on or after January 1, 1984, are automatically placed in FERS. See 5 U.S.C. § 8401(11) (1988); 

42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(5) (1988).

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FITZGERALD v. DHS 3

has reached the age of 55 and has completed 30 years of 

service) with id. § 8412(d)(1),(2) (providing an annuity at 

any age after completing 25 years of service as an LEO or 

firefighter, or after reaching the age of 50 and completing 

20 years of such service). Germane to this case, in 2007, 

Congress passed legislation (“the Act”) that amended the 

federal retirement statutes to provide to employees who 

qualify as CBPOs enhanced retirement benefits similar to 

those available to LEOs and firefighters. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 535, 

121 Stat. 1844, 2075–77. The Act became effective on 

July 6, 2008. See id. § 535(e)(1). As charged by section 

535(d) of the Act, the Office of Personnel Management 

(“OPM”) has issued regulations governing enhanced 

retirement benefits for CBPOs. See Customs and Border 

Protection Officer Retirement, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,993 (July 

18, 2011) (codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 842, subpt. J).

II.

Ms. Fitzgerald began her career with the federal government as an Immigration Inspector (GS-1816 series) 

with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 

of the Department of Justice. She worked in that capacity

from August 2, 1987, to July 2, 1988. Subsequently, from 

July 3, 1988, to May 6, 2000, she served as a Customs 

Inspector (GS-1890 series) with the Customs Service 

(“Customs”) of the Department of the Treasury.2 

 

2 In March 2003, INS ceased to exist and its functions were transferred to DHS. At the same time, Customs became part of DHS and the agency was renamed 

the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 1502, 

116 Stat. 2135, 2308; REORGANIZATION PLAN 

MODIFICATION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY, H.R. DOC. NO. 108–32, at 4 (2003). Subsequently, the agency was renamed U.S. Customs and 

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4 FITZGERALD v. DHS

Ms. Fitzgerald has been continuously employed in various

Instructor positions at FLETC since May of 2000.3 One of 

her main responsibilities while at FLETC has been

providing training to criminal investigators and LEOs 

from various federal organizations.

On August 3, 2012, Ms. Fitzgerald requested that the 

Agency review her employment history so that she could

obtain CBPO retirement credit for her past service with 

INS and Customs. The Agency denied her request on 

July 25, 2013, stating that the Act did not provide “retroactive service” credit for service performed before July 6, 

2008, the effective date of the Act. Ms. Fitzgerald requested reconsideration and sought CBPO credit for her 

service at FLETC after the Act’s effective date; the Agency denied her request on April 17, 2014. 

III.

Ms. Fitzgerald timely appealed the denial of her claim 

to the Board. After conducting a hearing on September 

19, 2014, the administrative judge (“AJ”) to whom the 

appeal was assigned affirmed the Agency’s denial in an 

initial decision dated September 29, 2014. Fitzgerald v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., AT-0831-14-0684-I-1, 2014 WL 

4987282 (Sept. 29, 2014) (“Initial Decision”). In arriving 

at his decision, the AJ examined the pertinent statutory 

and regulatory framework for determining whether 

 

Border Protection. See Name Change From the Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, 72 Fed. Reg. 20,131 (Apr. 23, 2007).

3 The record indicates that Ms. Fitzgerald has been 

an Instructor at FLETC since May of 2000, even though 

her position title has changed. See J.A. 205, 207, 215, 

221. 

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FITZGERALD v. DHS 5

Ms. Fitzgerald is entitled to CBPO retirement credit

based upon her service at FLETC. 

The Act amended FERS to make CBPOs eligible for

enhanced retirement benefits. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, § 535(b)(2) (codified at 5 U.S.C.

§ 8412(d)). The Act defines a CBPO as

an employee in [DHS] (A) who holds a position 

within the GS-1895 job series (determined applying the criteria in effect as of September 1, 2007) 

or any successor position, and (B) whose duties include activities relating to the arrival and departure of persons, conveyances, and merchandise at 

ports of entry, including any such employee who is 

transferred directly to a supervisory or administrative position in [DHS] after performing such 

duties (as described in subparagraph (B)) in 1 or 

more positions (as described in subparagraph (A)) 

for at least 3 years. 

Id. § 535(b)(1)(C) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8401(36)) (emphasis added). As noted, the amendments made by section

535 of the Act became effective on July 6, 2008. See id. 

§ 535(e)(1). In regard to service performed before its

effective date, the Act provides as follows: 

(i) GENERAL RULE.—Except as provided in 

clause (ii), nothing in this section or any amendment made by this section shall be considered to 

apply with respect to any service performed as a 

[CBPO] before [July 6, 2008]. 

(ii) EXCEPTION.—Service described in section . . 

. 8401(36) . . . rendered before [July 6, 2008] may 

be taken into account to determine if an individual who is serving on or after such effective date 

then qualifies as a [CBPO] by virtue of holding a 

supervisory or administrative position in [DHS]. 

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6 FITZGERALD v. DHS

Id. § 535(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). Thus, while not 

retroactive, the Act is retrospective. In other words, it 

does not allow service rendered before the July 6, 2008 

effective date to form the basis for CBPO retirement 

credit. However, it does permit such prior service to be 

considered when determining whether a position held in 

DHS on or after the effective date (Ms. Fitzgerald’s circumstance) qualifies as a “supervisory or administrative” 

position for purposes of CBPO retirement credit (the 

question in Ms. Fitzgerald’s case). See 76 Fed. Reg. at 

41,994 (explaining that if an individual is in a supervisory 

or administrative position on July 6, 2008, that individual’s eligibility to be a CBPO will be determined by “looking back at the individual’s employment history to 

determine whether the requirements for coverage would 

have been met if the provisions of [section] 535 had been

in effect during the earlier employment history”).

Pursuant to its authority to promulgate regulations to 

implement the amendments to FERS, OPM issued final 

regulations governing enhanced retirement benefits for 

CBPOs on July 18, 2011. The regulations’ definition of 

CBPO relates to the definition of CBPO in 5 U.S.C. 

§ 8401(36). See 5 C.F.R. § 842.1002. Like the statute, the

regulations split CBPOs into two categories of positions 

(referred to in the regulations as “primary” and “secondary” positions) for which early retirement coverage under 

5 U.S.C. § 8412(d) may be available. See id. 

Under the regulations, a primary CBPO position is a 

position “classified within the [CBPO] (GS–1895) job 

series (determined applying the criteria in effect as of 

September 1, 2007) or any successor position whose duties 

include the performance of work directly connected with 

activities relating to the arrival and departure of persons, 

conveyances, and merchandise at ports of entry.” 5 C.F.R. 

§ 842.1002. As will be seen, Ms. Fitzgerald does not 

contend that her employment at FLETC has been in 

primary CBPO positions. Rather, she argues that her 

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FITZGERALD v. DHS 7

employment at FLETC has been in secondary CBPO 

positions and that, for that reason, she is entitled to 

CBPO retirement credit. Pertinent to Ms. Fitzgerald’s 

claim, a secondary CBPO position is a position in DHS

that is either:

(1) Supervisory; i.e., a position whose primary duties are as a first-level supervisor of [CBPOs] in 

primary positions; or

(2) Administrative; i.e., an executive, managerial, 

technical, semiprofessional, or professional position for which experience in a primary [CBPO] position is a prerequisite. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

An employee’s service in a primary CBPO position is 

automatically “covered,” meaning the service is credited 

toward retirement eligibility under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d). 

See id. § 842.1003(a)(1). However, in order for an employee’s service in a secondary CBPO position to be covered, 

the regulations require that the service meet certain

criteria. See id. § 842.1003(b). With some exceptions not 

applicable to this case, the employee must have 

(1) transferred directly (i.e., without a break in service 

exceeding 3 days) from a primary position to a secondary 

position, (2) completed 3 years of service in a primary 

position, and (3) been continuously employed in secondary 

positions since transferring from a primary position

without a break in service exceeding 3 days. See id. 

§ 842.1003(b)(1)-(3). Because the determination of 

whether an employee is in a covered secondary position 

might, as it does here in Ms. Fitzgerald’s case, require 

consideration of employment periods that occurred before 

September 1, 2007, the regulations include counterpart 

definitions of primary and secondary positions solely for 

the purpose of applying the criteria of § 842.1003(b)(1)-(3)

to those periods. See id. § 842.1003(c). A primary position in that context (hereinafter, a “Retrospective CBPO 

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8 FITZGERALD v. DHS

Position”) is deemed to include a CBPO position classified 

in the GS-1895 series and a predecessor CBPO position 

that would have been classified in the GS-1895 series had 

it then existed.4 See id. § 842.1003(c)(1)(i)-(ii). For the 

same purpose, the regulations provide that a secondary 

position in that context includes: 

(i) A first-level supervisor of an employee in [a

Retrospective CBPO Position]; or

(ii) A executive, managerial, technical, semiprofessional, or professional position for which experience in [a Retrospective CBPO Position] is a 

mandatory prerequisite. 

 

4 Specifically, § 842.1003(c)(1)(i)-(ii) provides that a 

Retrospective CBPO Position includes: 

(i) A position whose duties included the performance of work directly connected with activities 

relating to the arrival and departure of persons, 

conveyances, and merchandise at ports of entry 

that was classified within the Immigration Inspector Series (GS–1816), Customs Inspector Series (GS–1890), Canine Enforcement Officer 

Series (GS–1801), or any other series which the 

agency head determines were predecessor series 

to the Customs and Border Protection Series (GS–

1895), and that would have been classified under 

the GS–1895 series had it then existed; and

(ii) A position within the Customs and Border Protection Series (GS–1895) whose duties included 

the performance of work directly connected with 

activities relating to the arrival and departure of 

persons, conveyances, and merchandise at ports of 

entry.

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FITZGERALD v. DHS 9

Id. § 842.1003(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). 

Before the Board, Ms. Fitzgerald did not contend that 

any of her Instructor positions at FLETC were primary 

positions; instead, she argued that they were secondary 

positions. Thus, to be entitled to CBPO retirement credit 

for her service at FLETC from the effective date of the Act 

(July 6, 2008) forward, Ms. Fitzgerald’s prior service had 

to meet the criteria of § 842.1003(b)(1)-(3) and her Instructor positions after July 6, 2008, had to be secondary 

positions under § 842.1002. 

In considering Ms. Fitzgerald’s prior service, the AJ 

began by looking to the rules for service that occurred 

before September 1, 2007, because Ms. Fitzgerald transferred to FLETC in the year 2000. The AJ found that 

Ms. Fitzgerald’s positions at INS and Customs qualified 

as Retrospective CBPO Positions, which meant she had 

completed the requisite 3 years of service in a primary 

position before transferring to FLETC. See Initial Decision at 4. Next, the AJ considered whether the Instructor 

position at FLETC to which Ms. Fitzgerald initially 

transferred (“the Initial Position”) qualified as a secondary position. The AJ found that “there is no evidence” 

that the Initial Position qualified as a “first-level supervisor” position under § 842.1003(c)(2)(i). See id. Thus, the 

AJ explained, in order to meet the requirements of 

§ 842.1003(b)(1), the Initial Position had to be an executive, managerial, technical, semiprofessional, or professional position for which experience in a Retrospective 

CBPO Position was a mandatory prerequisite, as required 

by § 842.1003(c)(2)(ii). See id.

On this point, the AJ looked to the Initial Position’s 

job description and determined that experience in a 

Retrospective CBPO Position was not a prerequisite for 

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10 FITZGERALD v. DHS

the position.5 Rather, the AJ noted, the position description only required experience or knowledge as an LEO. 

Id. According to the AJ, although Ms. Fitzgerald acquired 

the requisite knowledge and skill to qualify for the Initial 

Position through her years of service in Retrospective 

CBPO Positions with INS and Customs, the position 

description included no language suggesting that 

knowledge or experience unique to CBPOs was required 

to perform the duties of the Initial Position. See id. at 4–

5. The AJ therefore concluded that the Initial Position 

did not qualify as a secondary position under 

§ 842.1003(c)(2)(ii). Id. at 5. Consequently, the AJ found 

that Ms. Fitzgerald could not establish that, when she 

stepped into the Initial Position, she transferred directly 

from a primary position to a secondary position. Id. She

therefore could not establish that her prior service met all 

of the criteria of § 842.1003(b)(1)-(3).6 See id.

 

5 The AJ noted that Ms. Fitzgerald and the Agency 

disputed the position description under which the Initial 

Position fell. Initial Decision at 4. However, for the 

purpose of this case, the AJ assumed that Ms. Fitzgerald’s 

proffered description was correct. See id. We do too.

6 In light of his determination that Ms. Fitzgerald 

did not transfer directly from a primary to a secondary 

position, the AJ added that, even if the Instructor positions to which Ms. Fitzgerald was later assigned qualified 

as secondary positions, her time at FLETC could not be 

credited toward retirement because she was employed in 

the Initial Position for more than 3 days. See id. at 5. 

Thus, contrary to the requirements of 5 C.F.R. 

§ 842.1003(b), Ms. Fitzgerald had a break in service 

exceeding 3 days between a primary position (the last of 

her Retrospective CBPO Positions) and the first Instructor position she held after the Initial Position. The AJ 

accordingly did not determine whether her Instructor 

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FITZGERALD v. DHS 11

In addition to her arguments on the merits of her eligibility for CBPO retirement credit, Ms. Fitzgerald asserted that OPM’s regulations were inconsistent with the 

statute. The AJ disagreed. In his view, OPM’s interpretation of the phrase “supervisory or administrative position in [DHS]” in 5 U.S.C. § 8401(36) is entitled to 

deference because, “at best, the statute is ambiguous” 

regarding its meaning. See id. at 8 n.2. Accordingly, the

AJ affirmed the Agency’s denial of Ms. Fitzgerald’s claim 

for CBPO retirement credit for her service at FLETC from 

July 6, 2008, onward. Id. at 5. 

Ms. Fitzgerald filed a petition for review of the Initial 

Decision. Echoing the AJ’s reasoning, a two-member 

panel of the Board denied the petition and affirmed the 

Initial Decision, which became the Board’s final decision. 

See J.A. 1–9. Ms. Fitzgerald timely petitioned for review 

of the final decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

I.

We review the Board’s decision to determine whether 

it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2012); Miller v. Fed. Deposit 

Ins. Corp., 818 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Under 

the substantial evidence standard, this court reverses the 

Board’s decision only ‘if it is not supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 800 F.3d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting 

 

positions from July 6, 2008, forward in fact qualified as 

secondary positions under § 842.1002. 

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12 FITZGERALD v. DHS

Abrams v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 703 F.3d 538, 542 (Fed. Cir. 

2012)).

Ms. Fitzgerald makes two arguments on appeal. 

First, she contends that the regulations upon which the 

Board based its decision should be found invalid for 

contradicting the plain language of 5 U.S.C. § 8401(36). 

And second, she urges that, even if the regulations are not 

invalid, the Board’s decision should be reversed because 

the Initial Position was a secondary position. We turn 

first to her challenge to the regulations. 

II.

A.

“Our review of questions of statutory interpretation is 

de novo, except to the extent deference to an agency’s 

construction of a statute it administers is required under 

the two-step analysis set forth in Chevron.” NSK Ltd. v. 

United States, 390 F.3d 1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Vassallo v. Dep’t of Def., 797 F.3d 

1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that we review an 

agency’s statutory interpretation using the two-pronged 

framework established by Chevron). The first prong of 

Chevron requires us to assess “whether Congress has 

directly spoken to the precise question at issue”; if so, we 

“must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 

of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). If the statute 

does not answer the specific question at issue, however, 

meaning that it is “silent or ambiguous,” then, under 

prong two of Chevron, we must determine whether the 

agency provided “a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843; Hymas v. United States, 810 F.3d 1312, 

1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “If Congress has explicitly left a 

gap for [an] agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 

authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of 

the statute by regulation.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 

“Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 

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FITZGERALD v. DHS 13

unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844. In other words, to survive judicial scrutiny, an agency’s interpretation of an

ambiguous statute need not be “the only reasonable 

interpretation or even the most reasonable interpretation.” Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United 

States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation 

omitted). 

Ms. Fitzgerald argues that OPM’s regulations—

namely, 5 C.F.R. §§ 842.1002 (defining secondary position) and 842.1003(c)(2) (defining secondary position 

retrospectively, prior to the effective date of the Act)—

impermissibly contradict the plain language and purpose 

of 5 U.S.C. § 8401(36). In her view, § 8401(36) expressly 

provides that employees are entitled to CBPO status in a 

secondary position if they served in a covered primary 

position for at least 3 years (as she had prior to her transfer to FLETC) and then transferred directly to a supervisory or administrative position in DHS (as she contends 

she did). Because the statute does not qualify the latter 

requirement, she reasons, it entitles CBPOs who transferred to any supervisory or administrative position to 

maintain CBPO status so long as that position is “in 

DHS.” Ms. Fitzgerald further argues that OPM’s regulations contradict the broad language of the statute by 

further restricting entitlement to CBPO status to only 

those CBPOs who transfer or transferred into (a) CBPOspecific supervisory positions or (b) administrative positions that require CBPO-related experience as a prerequisite.

In support of her position, Ms. Fitzgerald avers that 

OPM’s regulations also conflict with the purpose of the 

statute. According to Ms. Fitzgerald, the legislative 

history shows that the Act was intended to help recruit 

and retain CBPOs by providing to them the same retirement benefits enjoyed by LEOs. The regulations do not 

promote these goals, she contends, because, under the 

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14 FITZGERALD v. DHS

regulations, CBPOs may not transfer to positions for 

which their experience is valuable but not a prerequisite 

without losing their CBPO status and associated retirement credit. Without such flexibility, Ms. Fitzgerald 

reasons, CBPOs have less incentive to work at DHS.

For its part, the government contends that the statute 

is silent regarding what constitutes a “supervisory or 

administrative” position for purposes of CBPO status. 

Given this silence, and pursuant to its statutory authority 

to administer the Act, the government argues, OPM 

promulgated valid regulations that are entitled to deference under Chevron. In the government’s view, Congress’s reliance on OPM to fill the gaps as to the meaning 

of the term “supervisory or administrative” position is 

consistent with its approach to retirement benefits for 

other special groups (e.g., LEOs and firefighters), which 

indicates it intended for the Act to be implemented in the 

same manner. The government also suggests that Congress’s silence as to the meaning of this term is consistent 

with its express delegation of rulemaking authority to 

OPM to administer the Act.

Regarding prong two of Chevron, the government urges that OPM’s interpretation is based on a permissible 

construction of the statute. According to the government, 

the regulations are consistent with the purpose of recruiting and retaining CBPOs because they provide enhanced 

retirement benefits to CBPOs consistent with those 

enjoyed by other special groups, and they ensure that 

senior CBPOs stay in the Agency to share their 

knowledge and experience with junior CBPOs.

B.

In our view, Congress has not directly spoken to the 

precise question at issue in this case. We have explained 

that “[i]dentifying ‘the precise question at issue’ is a 

necessary prerequisite to determining whether or not 

Congress has directly spoken on it.” GHS Health Maint. 

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FITZGERALD v. DHS 15

Org., Inc. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 

2008) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). The precise 

question at issue here, we think, is this: what constitutes 

a supervisory or administrative position in DHS for the 

purpose of meeting the definition of a CBPO? The statute

is silent on this question. See 5 U.S.C. § 8401. Section 

8401(36) defines a CBPO to include an “employee who is 

transferred directly to a supervisory or administrative 

position in [DHS].” Id. (emphasis added). The terms

“supervisory” and “administrative” are not defined within 

the definition of a CBPO, however. Nor are they defined 

in any other part of the statute. In fact, the definitions for 

an LEO and a firefighter also include the “employee who 

is transferred directly to a supervisory or administrative 

position” language, but those definitions likewise fail to 

explain what constitutes a “supervisory or administrative 

position.” See id. § 8401(14),(17),(33). Consequently, we 

think the statute does not clearly and unequivocally 

answer the question at hand.

Congress’s awareness of OPM’s approach to other special retirement groups bolsters our conclusion on the first 

prong of Chevron. As noted, LEOs and firefighters already received enhanced retirement benefits when the Act 

was enacted in 2007. Because the statute in place did not 

define “supervisory or administrative” positions for the 

purpose of qualifying as an LEO or a firefighter, OPM

issued regulations that did. See 5 C.F.R. § 842.802. 

Given the general presumption that “Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it 

enacts,” Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 

184–85 (1988); see also Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. 

United States, 361 U.S. 173, 187 (1959) (presuming that 

Congress was aware of applicable regulations when 

enacting pertinent legislation), we agree with the government that Congress likely intended for the framework 

for CBPOs to be implemented similarly to that for LEOs

and firefighters. Put another way, Congress likely inCase: 15-3154 Document: 36-2 Page: 15 Filed: 09/20/2016
16 FITZGERALD v. DHS

tended to leave a gap as to the meaning of a “supervisory

or administrative position in [DHS]” that OPM would fill 

through regulations. Finally, our view of Congress’s

approach to § 8401(36) is also consistent with the Act’s

express delegation of rulemaking authority to OPM for 

the purpose of carrying out the amendments made by the 

Act. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, § 535(d) 

(“Any regulations necessary to carry out the amendments 

made by [section 535] shall be prescribed by the Director 

of [OPM].”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 8461(g) (providing OPM 

the authority to “prescribe regulations to carry out the 

provisions of [FERS]”). 

Contrary to Ms. Fitzgerald’s assertion, neither the

statute nor the legislative history clearly demonstrates 

that Congress intended for secondary CBPO positions to 

include any supervisory or administrative position in 

DHS. Section 8401(36) plainly refers to “a” supervisory or 

administration position, not “any” such position. Accepting Ms. Fitzgerald’s interpretation would impermissibly 

read the word “any” into the statute. See Vallee v. Office 

of Pers. Mgmt., 58 F.3d 613, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“It is 

incorrect to read a statute contrary to its plain text, 

absent compelling evidence of contrary congressional 

intent.”) Lest there be any doubt on this point, counsel 

for Ms. Fitzgerald agreed at oral argument before us that 

§ 8401(36) cannot refer to any supervisory or administrative position in DHS. Oral Arg. at 3:34–40, available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

15-3154.mp3 (The Court: So you agree that [§ 8401(36)] 

cannot be any supervisory or administrative position in 

[DHS], right? Counsel: Correct.). 

Accordingly, we conclude that Congress has not “directly spoken” to the question of what constitutes a supervisory or administrative position in DHS for the 

purpose of meeting the definition of a CBPO under 

§ 8401(36). We will therefore defer to OPM’s interpretaCase: 15-3154 Document: 36-2 Page: 16 Filed: 09/20/2016
FITZGERALD v. DHS 17

tion as long as it is “a permissible construction of the 

statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

C.

Turning to prong two of Chevron, we think 5 C.F.R. 

§§ 842.1002 and 842.1003(c)(2) are based on a permissible 

construction of the statute. As noted, the regulations do 

not conflict with the statute; instead, they merely cabin it 

by restricting entitlement to CBPO status to employees in 

certain CBPO-related positions. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 842.1002, 

842.1003(c)(2). This restriction is reasonable for at least 

two reasons. First, it is reasonable to conclude that, for 

purposes of attaining CBPO status, all supervisory and 

administrative positions in DHS are not created equal. 

Indeed, there are likely many supervisory and administrative positions in DHS that have no connection to the 

CBPO occupation. After all, the Agency is only one of 

many governmental entities in DHS. See 6 U.S.C. § 203;

REORGANIZATION PLAN MODIFICATION FOR THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, H.R. DOC. NO. 108–

32, at 4 (2003). Absent a restriction on where CBPOs in 

primary positions may transfer, a CBPO might be able to 

transfer, for example, to a position as an administrative 

assistant in human resources or to a position as an office 

administrator—positions for which CBPO experience is 

presumably neither required nor relevant—while maintaining the benefits of CBPO status for purposes of retirement. We do not think it is unreasonable to conclude 

that Congress did not intend for such results to occur.7 

 

7 Notably, like the regulations for CBPOs, the regulations for LEOs and firefighters also restrict LEO and 

firefighter status to employees who transfer into (a) LEOor firefighter-specific supervisory positions or (b) administrative positions that require law-enforcement or firefighting experience as a prerequisite. See 5 C.F.R. 

§ 842.802. 

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18 FITZGERALD v. DHS

And second, the restriction encourages career service as a 

CBPO. OPM explained that “one policy goal of special 

retirement coverage is to encourage career service by an 

employee in the particular occupation chosen by the 

employee.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,996. Enticing employees in 

primary CBPO positions to transfer into, and remain in,

CBPO-related positions in order to maintain CBPO status 

is a sound method for trying to increase the number of 

employees who remain in CBPO-related occupations 

throughout their careers.8

In any event, Ms. Fitzgerald does not explicitly argue

that OPM’s interpretation is an impermissible construction of the statute. Rather, she asserts that the regulations are inconsistent with the purpose of the Act, which 

could be read as a contention that the regulations are 

unreasonable. Either way, we are not persuaded. 

Ms. Fitzgerald cites legislative history that suggests the 

purpose of the Act is “to help recruit and retain [CBPOs] 

by providing them the same retirement benefits as other 

[LEOs].” H.R. REP. NO. 110-181, at 9 (2008). But even if 

we accept that the cited legislative history accurately 

reflects what Congress had in mind when it drafted the 

Act, the fact remains that the regulations do not limit the 

retirement benefits of CBPOs as compared to those of 

LEOs. Instead, they merely restrict who may attain

CBPO status in order to obtain the same retirement 

 

8 In our view, the regulations at issue are likely to 

achieve the stated “policy goal” because employees will be 

motivated to maintain CBPO status for at least 25 years 

(or for at least 20 years if they have reached the age of 50) 

in order to be eligible for early retirement with an annuity

on account of their CBPO status. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 8412(d)(1),(2). Consequently, employees who start a 

career as a CBPO will have an incentive to stay in CBPOrelated positions for the rest of their careers.

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FITZGERALD v. DHS 19

benefits as LEOs. In addition, while it may be true that 

more flexible regulations (e.g., ones allowing CBPOs to 

maintain their CBPO status even after transferring into 

secondary positions not having the existing, priorexperience requirement) would help recruit and retain 

CBPOs better than the regulations at issue do, that fact

alone does not render OPM’s interpretation unreasonable. 

See Yangzhou, 716 F.3d at 1377 (explaining that an 

agency’s interpretation need only represent a “reasonable 

construction of the statute,” not necessarily “the most 

reasonable interpretation”) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, because we find that Congress has not 

answered the specific question at issue and because we 

find that OPM has provided a permissible construction of 

the statute, we conclude that the regulations at issue are 

not invalid.

III.

A.

We now turn to the Agency’s denial of Ms. Fitzgerald’s 

claim for retirement credit for her service at FLETC from 

July 6, 2008, forward. 

Ms. Fitzgerald asserts that, even if the regulations at 

issue are not invalid, the Board incorrectly determined 

that the Initial Position was not a secondary position. 

The parties do not dispute that the Initial Position was

not a supervisory position under 5 C.F.R. 

§ 842.1003(c)(2)(i). Ms. Fitzgerald also concedes that the 

job description for the Initial Position did not explicitly 

state that experience in customs and border protection 

was required. Nevertheless, in her view, the job description made clear that the Initial Position required CBPOrelated experience because it stated that FLETC Instructors must have the knowledge to train LEOs from a “wide 

variety” of Federal organizations, which she suggests 

includes the specialized law-enforcement area of customs 

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20 FITZGERALD v. DHS

and border protection. According to Ms. Fitzgerald, 

FLETC would not have hired her but for her prior experience in Retrospective CBPO Positions.

The government responds that there is no evidence in 

the record indicating that the Initial Position required 

experience in a Retrospective CBPO Position. In its view, 

the job description alone is substantial evidence that an 

individual could have obtained the Initial Position without ever having served in a Retrospective CBPO Position.

B.

As explained above, in order for Ms. Fitzgerald to prevail on her claim for retirement credit based upon her 

serving as an Instructor at FLETC, the Board had to find, 

inter alia, that CBPO experience in a Retrospective CBPO 

Position was a mandatory prerequisite for the Initial 

Position, meaning the Initial Position qualified as a 

secondary position under § 842.1003(c)(2)(ii). If such 

experience was not a prerequisite, Ms. Fitzgerald’s service 

could not meet the criteria of § 842.1003(b). The Board 

concluded that the job description for the Initial Position 

indicated that such experience was not a prerequisite. 

J.A. 6–7. After reviewing the job description, we see no 

reason to disturb the Board’s conclusion. See 5 C.F.R. 

§ 842.1004(b) (“A determination under § 842.1003(b) must 

be based on the official position description and any other 

evidence deemed appropriate by the agency head for 

making the determination.”).

On its face, the job description only required 

“[e]xperience in a primary Federal law enforcement 

position.” See J.A. 351–53. Nor did it implicitly indicate 

that the requisite experience pertained to work related to 

the unique duties of an individual in a Retrospective 

CBPO Position—i.e., work directly connected with activities relating to the arrival and departure of persons, 

conveyances, and merchandise at ports of entry. See id.; 

5 C.F.R. § 842.1003(c)(1). Indeed, as the job title suggestCase: 15-3154 Document: 36-2 Page: 20 Filed: 09/20/2016
FITZGERALD v. DHS 21

ed—Law Enforcement Specialist (Instructor)—the listed 

duties reflect those of someone with prior lawenforcement experience, not necessarily experience in 

customs and border protection. See J.A. 351–53. Although Ms. Fitzgerald might train a “wide variety” of 

employees in law enforcement (including CBPOs), and

although she might have obtained the Initial Position 

only by virtue of her prior service in Retrospective CBPO

Positions at INS and Customs, that does not establish 

that her experience in those positions was a “mandatory 

prerequisite,” as required under the regulations. Instead, 

it merely indicates that some overlap likely exists between the knowledge and experience required for the 

Initial Position and that gained by Ms. Fitzgerald while 

working in those positions. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s decision 

that Ms. Fitzgerald’s prior service did not meet the criteria of § 842.1003(b) and that she therefore is not entitled 

to CBPO retirement credit for her time at FLETC is 

supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

We hold that 5 C.F.R. §§ 842.1002 and 842.1003(c)(2) 

are not invalid, because they do not impermissibly contradict the plain language or purpose of 5 U.S.C. § 8401 

and because they are based on a permissible construction 

of the statute. We also hold that the Board’s final decision, which affirmed the Agency’s denial of Ms. Fitzgerald’s request for retirement credit, is supported by 

substantial evidence. We therefore affirm the final decision.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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