Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02888/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02888-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael L. Arnold
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2888

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Michael L. Arnold, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 5, 2005

Filed: May 10, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Michael L. Arnold appeals the sentence that the district court1

 imposed after

he pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(j). The sentence calculations included, in relevant part, a base offense level of

24 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2); a 2-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(4) for possession of a stolen firearm; and a Category VI criminal history

based on 14 criminal history points. The district court sentenced Arnold to 92 months

Appellate Case: 04-2888 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/10/2005 Entry ID: 1900993
-2-

in prison (the bottom of the relevant Sentencing Guidelines imprisonment range) and

3 years supervised release. 

On appeal, Arnold reiterates objections he made below that the district court

(1) erred in imposing the section 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement because it resulted in

double counting, and (2) erred in calculating his criminal history by separately

counting prior sentences that were ordered to run concurrently with one another. He

argues for the first time that the district court’s calculation of the base offense level

and imposition of the section 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement violated Blakely v.

Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 

Arnold’s arguments fail for the following reasons. First, a 2-level enhancement

under section 2K2.1(b)(4) did not constitute double counting because Arnold’s base

offense level was calculated under section 2K2.1(a)(2), not section 2K2.1(a)(7). See

United States v. Hawkins, 181 F.3d 911, 912 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 981

(1999). Second, the district court did not err in calculating Arnold’s criminal history

because the offenses at issue occurred on different occasions and were adjudicated

in different Missouri counties, there is no indication they were part of a common

scheme or plan, and there was no order consolidating these cases for trial or

sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) & comment. (n.3). Finally, Arnold’s Blakely

arguments fail because he stipulated to a base offense level of 24 in his plea

agreement, see United States v. Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995); and he

admitted that he knew the firearm was stolen--the single fact underlying the section

2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement, see United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-2888 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/10/2005 Entry ID: 1900993