Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05254/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05254-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas B. Cochran
Appellee
National Academy of Sciences
Appellant
Natural Resources Defense Council
Appellee
Federico F. Pena

Tri-Valley Cares
Appellee
Western States Legal Foundation
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 13, 1998 Decided July 17, 1998

Nos. 97-5253 and 97-5254

Natural Resources Defense Council, et al.,

Appellees

v.

Federico F. Pena, Secretary, The Department of Energy,

and

National Academy of Sciences,

Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00308)

Alisa B. Klein, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellant. Frank

W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Lou Leary,

United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and

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Mark B. Stern, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, were on brief.

Nathan C. Sheers argued the cause for appellant National

Academy of Sciences. Carter G. Phillips, James R. Wright

and Audrey Byrd Mosley were on brief.

Howard Crystal argued the cause for the appellees. Eric

R. Glitzenstein was on brief.

Before: Henderson, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: This appeal

poses the recurring question of what remedy is appropriate

for a federal agency's violation of the Federal Advisory

Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2, ss 1 et seq., (FACA). The

appellants, the United States Department of Energy (Department or DOE) and the National Academy of Sciences (Academy or NAS), appeal the district court's grant of a permanent

injunction against the Department's use of or reliance on a

report prepared by an Academy committee, which committee

both the Department and the Academy concede was organized and operated in violation of FACA. Because we have

serious doubts whether the "use injunction" redresses any of

the appellees' claimed injuries and because we believe the

district court erred in failing to afford the appellees an

opportunity to take discovery and refine their request for

equitable relief, we reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

In December 1995 a DOE official contacted the thenpresident of the Academy, proposing a contract between the

Department and the Academy pursuant to which the Academy would select and convene a committee of experts to study

and review certain technical and scientific issues associated

with the Department's Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF)

Program. "ICF is a conceptual method for achieving a fusion

reaction by compressing and confining a small pellet containing fuel such as a deuterium and tritium mixture through the

inward forces of inertia generated on the fuel by the ablation

... of the outer surface of the pellet." Zolandz Decl. p 7.

The scientific objective of ICF is to achieve "ignition"--i.e., a

self-sustaining fusion reaction that produces more energy

than is required to initiate the reaction. Id. p 6. The Department sponsors and performs research into and development of ICF processes to provide "valuable information for

national defense, energy, and other industrial and scientific

applications." First Crandall Decl. p 4.

The Academy and the Department formalized their agreement in a letter contract in May 1996. Under the contract,

the ICF committee (Committee) was given three missions:

"(1) determine the scientific and technological readiness of the

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NIF [National Ignition Facility] project, (2) assess the entire

ICF program (including program scope, balance, and priorities; facility operation; experimentation; theory; etc.) and

make recommendations to facilitate the achievement of the

scientific goal, which is ignition, and (3) evaluate the capabilities of the ICF program (in conjunction with NIF) to support

[Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program to maintain

national nuclear arsenal]." Taylor Decl. p 11. NIF is a

principal component of the Department's ICF program and is

"a national center to study inertial fusion and high-energydensity science." First Crandall Decl. p 5. It is being built,

at a projected cost in excess of $1 billion, at the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California. Id. When complete, the "NIF will house a powerful

laser, consisting of 192 beams, which will be used to simulate

processes that occur in nuclear weapons and to 'ignite' small

fusion targets in the laboratory for the first time." Id. As of

the date the Department contracted with the Academy to

form the Committee, NIF had entered the preliminary design

and planning stage but the Department had not yet decided

whether to proceed with construction. Id. p 12.

Pursuant to the letter contract, the Department agreed to

pay the Academy $335,700 to defray the Committee's costs

during the first (and, as it now turns out, only) year of its

existence. The Academy, in accordance with its own procedures but without reference to FACA, named fifteen scienUSCA Case #97-5254 Document #367564 Filed: 07/17/1998 Page 3 of 28
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tists to the Committee in May 1996. Zolandz Decl. pp 11, 13.

The Department had no input into or control over the appointments. Id. pp 13-14. While some Committee members,

it appears, had consulting contracts with, or other professional ties to, LLNL (see First Cochran Decl. p 8), "[n]o one

receiving any funding from a DOE ICF program ... was

permitted to serve as a member of the ICF committee."

Zolandz Decl. p 19. Moreover, no DOE personnel participated in the Committee's deliberations. Id. p 16.

The Committee met six times during the fall of 1996. At

the Committee's request, DOE personnel attended most of

the meetings and briefed the Committee on various aspects of

the ICF program and NIF. The majority of the briefings

were closed to the public because of their classified nature.

Upon request, the Academy apprised the public of the Committee's membership, agendas, open meetings and mission

statement. When appropriate, the Committee also allotted

meeting time to members of the public to present their views.

Indeed, three of the four appellees--the Natural Resources

Defense Council (NRDC), Dr. Thomas B. Cochran and TriValley CAREs (Citizens Against a Radioactive Environment)--made known to the Committee their views on the

ICF program and NIF. The fourth appellee, the Western

States Legal Foundation, was invited to a Committee meeting

but declined to attend. See Zolandz Decl. p 24; Velluvia Decl.

p 4.

The Committee concluded its meetings in December 1996

and began drafting a report of its findings. The same month

the Department approved the Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement for NIF, a statement required by the

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. ss 4321 et seq.,

thus clearing the last major regulatory bar to constructing

NIF. On February 14, 1997, however, the appellees filed a

complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that

the Committee was an "advisory committee" and that it had

not been established or operated in conformity with FACA.

The complaint sought equitable relief and attorneys' fees,

specifically requesting that the district court:

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(2) preliminarily and permanently enjoin DOE from

relying on any deliberations, reports or recommendations

from the ICF Committee;

(3) preliminarily and permanently enjoin DOE from

providing any funding for activities of the ICF Committee, including the dissemination of any reports or other

work product;

(4) preliminarily and permanently enjoin NAS from

permitting the ICF Committee to continue to meet,

deliberate, or prepare any work product, including the

Interim Report;....

Compl. 9-10.

Each of the four appellees is either a non-profit organization or an employee of such organization. Since 1982, appellee Western States Legal Foundation "has engaged in administrative proceedings, litigation, public education efforts and

grassroots organizing to promote disarmament, ensure the

clean-up of federal nuclear weapons research, testing and

production facilities, and challenge nuclear weapons programs." Compl. p 6. It includes members who "live and

engage in recreational activities in the vicinity of LLNL." Id.

Appellee Cochran is employed by the NRDC as the director

of its nuclear program and has a professional interest in and

involvement with nuclear energy and non-proliferation issues.

See id. p 4. Appellee NRDC has "over 300,000 members, and

is interested in the work of the ICF Committee." Id. p 3.

Appellee Tri-Valley CAREs is based in Livermore, California

and "undertakes projects that increase public knowledge of

the relationship between peace and environmental issues,

including public education regarding potential impacts from

the production, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous

and radioactive waste." Id. p 7. Tri-Valley's members "reside, own property, work, recreate and attend public meetings

near LLNL" and they "have participated in many administrative, legal and grassroots efforts involving the DOE's nuclear

weapons complex, including the plans for the NIF at LLNL."

Id. Of particular concern to Tri-Valley's membership is the

potential environmental contamination that may result from

NIF's operation, including release into the environment of

deuterium and tritium--two elements that are the primary

constituents of the fuel pellets NIF intends to ignite. See

Kelley Decl. pp 4-9.

The apparent impetus for this lawsuit is a decision of this

Court, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 367 (1997), (ALDF) which

on January 10, 1997 held that a committee created by the

Academy for the benefit of the United States Department of

Health and Human Services constituted an "advisory committee" and was therefore subject to FACA requirements. The

ALDF decision reversed a December 1995 district court order

which the Department and the Academy had apparently

relied on in determining that the Committee need not comply

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with FACA. Perhaps operating on the same assumption, the

appellees never invoked FACA, although they did complain

about the Committee's composition and raised conflict-ofinterest questions, until after ALDF was decided--at which

point the Committee had already concluded its meetings and

was drafting its final report.

In the wake of ALDF, the Department in effect conceded

that the Committee must be deemed an "advisory committee"

and that it had not complied with FACA. Both the Department and the Academy argued, however, that the district

court could not remedy the violations by means of an injunction proscribing either publication of the Committee's report

or the Department's use of the Committee's findings. The

district court disagreed with the latter argument and on

March 5, 1997 enjoined the Department from (1) expending

any additional unobligated money to fund Committee operations or (2) "utilizing, relying on or in any way incorporating

into its decisionmaking process the ICF Committee report or

any other work product of the ICF Committee." Natural

Resources Defense Council v. Curtis, No. 97-0308 (D.D.C.

Mar. 5, 1997) (order granting preliminary funding and use

injunctions), (NRDC I). In so concluding, the district court

reasoned:

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In this case, injunctive relief is necessary and appropriate to preserve the purposes of FACA, to avoid making it

a "nullity" and to preserve plaintiffs' right to ensure that

advisory committees to DOE comply with the statute's

dictates. The fact that some funds have already been

spent cuts in the opposite direction, while the record is

insufficient for the Court to determine whether the few

ICF Committee meetings that were open to the public

(less than 30 percent) constituted a sufficient attempt to

ensure public accountability. On balance, the Court

finds that the factors articulated in California Forestry

Ass'n v. United States Forest Service weigh heavily in

favor of injunctive relief.

Id. Citing the Committee members' First Amendment rights,

the district court declined, however, to enjoin the Academy

from publishing the Committee's final report. Id.

On March 11, 1997, six days after the injunction issued and

nine days before the Committee published its final report, the

Department announced its decision to construct NIF. Second Crandall Decl. p 2. While the question whether to construct NIF was not part of the Committee's charge, its report

assessed "the technical and scientific readiness of the NIF to

proceed to the construction phase, identifies specific technical

issues needing additional study, i.e., 'remaining hurdles' in

parallel with NIF construction, and arrives at certain findings

and conclusions related to the NIF." Id. p 5. Indeed, on

December 6, 1996, before the appellees brought suit, the

Committee orally apprised the Department that it saw no

"technical reason to delay [construction of] the NIF." First

Crandall Decl. p 17.

The Department subsequently moved for reconsideration

and clarification of the district court's use injunction but did

not contest the funding injunction or declaratory relief, thereby agreeing to the Committee's abolition notwithstanding it

was originally intended to meet for three years. See NAS Br.

17-18 ("The current ICF Committee has been disestablished

and does not exist anymore."). Thus, "[p]ursuant to FACA,

as amended, if the Academy is asked to continue the periodic

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review of the DOE's ICF Program, the Academy will create a

new advisory committee for that purpose." Id. at 17 n.6.

The district court denied the Department's reconsideration

request. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Curtis,

No. 97-0308 (D.D.C. May 13, 1997) (order denying motion for

reconsideration), (NRDC II). Further, the district court

clarified that its use injunction "encompasses all [departmental] employees and subcontractors, including the ten national

laboratories and six primary contractors performing ICFrelated work identified by DOE in its papers." Id.

Deciding not to proceed with discovery and a trial on the

merits in the event the district court had properly awarded

injunctive relief pursuant to California Forestry Association

v. United States Forest Service, 102 F.3d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1996),

on July 14, 1997 the Department moved for expedited entry

of a permanent use injunction. The appellees opposed the

motion, contending that bypassing discovery and further factfinding deprived them of the opportunity to compile a factual

record that would sustain a permanent use injunction on

appeal as well as the chance to request additional equitable

relief. Indeed, in contesting the expedited entry of a permanent use injunction, the appellees conceded that a use injunction was the "most Draconian" relief they could be awarded

and that it was "not necessarily" the relief they would seek

after discovery. Status Conference of 8/6/97 Tr. 10. Instead,

they requested the use injunction simply to maintain the

status quo, recognizing that the Department "ultimately

might be able to use" the technical provisions of the report

and they might eventually obtain only "access" to Committee

materials. Id. at 9; see also id. at 4, 7.

The district court, however, sided with the Department,

concluding that the "plaintiffs have already obtained all the

relief they requested, except for an injunction against the

National Academy of Sciences, which the Court expressly

denied in its March 5, 1997 decision and order, and an award

of attorneys' fees, a matter that obviously remains open."

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Pea, No. 97-0308

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nent use injunction), (NRDC III). The appellees subsequently moved to supplement the record but the district court

denied the motion, concluding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) does

not authorize post-judgment supplementation. See Natural

Resources Defense Council v. Pea, No. 97-0308 (D.D.C. Oct.

9, 1997) (order denying motion to supplement), (NRDC IV).

In so ruling, the district court noted that because "the

Department of Energy has stated that on appeal it does not

intend to challenge the completeness of the record that was

before the Court when it entered final judgment[,] ...

[p]laintiffs therefore will not be in the position of arguing the

sufficiency of the factual record that was before this Court."

Id. The Department and the Academy timely appealed only

the district court's permanent use injunction, declining to

contest either the declaratory relief or the funding injunction

the district court also awarded.

II. DISCUSSION

The Department argues that we should reverse and vacate

the district court's use injunction because the appellees do not

have standing to sue for such relief and, even if they do, the

equities do not warrant such a draconian remedy. The

Academy adds that the district court misapplied the test set

forth in California Forestry, the appellees' conflict-of-interest

and unbalanced-composition claims are either inapposite or

not justiciable and FACA does not extend to a technical

committee like the Committee that does not provide advice to

a federal agency on a discrete governmental policy.1 The

__________

1 The Academy's last argument is difficult to square with its

representation that it does not challenge "those portions of the

district court's judgment declaring that the DOE and the Academy

violated FACA and prohibiting any further funding or support to

the ICF Committee." NAS Br. 18; but cf. id. at 35 ("Here, where

the ICF has provided purely scientific and technical advice that is

not advice on any identified governmental policy, FACA's provisions

should not apply...."). As a result, we doubt whether the Academy has preserved for appeal an objection to the district court's

declaration of a FACA violation.

appellees respond to these arguments and also contend that

the Department's decision to seek expedited entry of a permanent use injunction estops it (and the Academy) from

challenging (1) the adequacy of the factual record, (2) the

district court's application of the law to the facts and perhaps

even (3) the use injunction itself. Alternatively, they argue

that if the district court's use injunction cannot be sustained

on the current record, we should remand so that they have

the opportunity to discover the materials necessary to support the injunction or to request other equitable relief. Because the standing question goes to our jurisdiction, we

address it first. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,

118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998) ("We decline to endorse such an

approach [reaching merits rather than addressing jurisdictional questions] because it carries the courts beyond the

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bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers.").

A. The Appellants' Standing

"The most obvious difference between standing to appeal

and standing to bring suit is that the focus shifts to injury

caused by the judgment rather than injury caused by the

underlying facts." 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure

s 3902, at 63 (2d ed. 1991). The appellees argue that because

the use injunction was entered at the behest of the Department, it is not injured by the district court's final order and

__________

Were we to reach the merits of the Academy's argument on

FACA's applicability, we doubt we would find the argument persuasive because it focuses on how the Committee was used rather than

on the Committee's creation. See ALDF, 104 F.3d at 428 ("[T]he

definition given by the Court [in Public Citizen v. United States

Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989)] to an advisory committee utilized by the federal government focuses not so much on how

it is used but whether or not the character of its creating institution

can be thought to have a quasi-public status.") (emphasis original).

But cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 76 F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) ("Accordingly, we have recognized that [FACA] is limited

to [established] committees that provide advice on an identified

governmental policy.").

"may not appeal from a disposition in its favor." Showtime

Networks, Inc. v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The

argument exalts form over substance. While the Department

did request expedited entry of the permanent use injunction,

it plainly did not do so to secure a "disposition in its favor."

Cf. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 83 (1917) (denying motion

to dismiss appeal where plaintiffs did not oppose dismissal

below because "[t]he plaintiffs did not consent to a judgment

against them, but only that, if there was to be such a

judgment, it should be in final form instead of interlocutory,

so that they might come to this court without further delay");

Devex Corp. v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 382 F.2d 17, 20-21 (7th

Cir. 1967) (defendant's role in proposing terms of final injunctive order did not divest court of appellate jurisdiction to

review order at defendant's behest).

Moreover, we do not believe the Department waived its

right to appeal by moving for expedited entry of a permanent

use injunction. The consent-to-judgment waiver doctrine

provides that a party that consents to entry of final judgment

waives its right to appeal the judgment unless it expressly

reserves that right. See Shores v. Sklar, 885 F.2d 760, 764

n.7 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Shores' argument is intuitively suspect,

because it would effectively eliminate the long-established

consent-to-judgment waiver doctrine; that doctrine, and each

case applying it, rests upon the consent (i.e., waiver) of the

party.... This consent-to-judgment doctrine does not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, although the

doctrine is sometimes cast in jurisdictional language, with

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references of the 'standing' of the party to contest the issue

on appeal."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990); Coughlin v.

Reagan, 768 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir. 1985) ("While it is

possible for a party to consent to a judgment and still

preserve his right to appeal, he must reserve that right

unequivocally, as it will not be presumed."). The Department's motion for expedited entry of a permanent use injunction makes clear its intent to appeal the district court's final

judgment. See DOE's Mot. for Expedited Entry of Permanent Inj., and Supp. Mem. 2, p 5 ("[T]he Secretary seeks the

opportunity to appeal a permanent injunction now, rather

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than waiting for entry of final judgment after plaintiffs'

claims for relief against NAS are resolved, which will not

occur for at least several months."). Therefore, while the

Department's strategy may have been unnecessary in light of

28 U.S.C. s 1292(a) (allowing appeal from interlocutory injunctive order), it did not thereby waive its right to appeal.

Even if the Department had not expressly reserved its

right to appeal, it would not have waived its objection to the

appellees' standing--an objection directed to the district

court's subject matter jurisdiction. See White v. Commissioner, 776 F.2d 976, 977 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting two exceptions to consent-to-judgment waiver doctrine: "(1) where the

party did not actually consent; (2) where the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment"); Coughlin, 768 F.2d at 470 ("Relief on appeal from a consent

judgment is available only on a showing of either lack of

actual consent, fraud in obtaining consent, lack of federal

jurisdiction, or mistake."). Thus, we would have appellate

jurisdiction at least over the Department's challenge to the

appellees' standing--which in any event, for the reasons

discussed below, is the only claim we reach.

The Academy, however, is not so situated. As the district

court recited below, "The preliminary injunction runs only

against the Department of Energy and not against the NAS

in any way." NRDC II, supra; accord NRDC III, supra

("[P]laintiffs have already obtained all the relief they requested, except for an injunction against the National Academy of

Sciences, which the Court expressly denied."). We therefore

fail to see how the Academy is aggrieved. It plainly was not

harmed by the district court's decision to deny the appellees'

prayer for injunctive relief against the Academy. See Public

Serv. Comm'n of Mo. v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 306

U.S. 204, 206 (1939) ("[T]he successful party below has no

standing to appeal from the decree denying the injunction.");

McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 1989)

("Because the preliminary injunction does not affect any

legally cognizable interest of CSS, we will dismiss this appeal

of CSS for lack of standing."). Moreover, when we pressed

the Academy at oral argument to describe how it had been

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harmed by the district court's use injunction, the only answer

the Academy gave was that the injunction infringed its First

Amendment right to be heard by the audience of its choosing

(i.e., the Department), relying on the holding in City of

Madison, Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). See Oral

Argument of 5/13/98 Tr. 29-31. Even assuming the Academy

had such a right, the district court's use injunction does not

infringe it. The injunction does not forbid the Department

from listening to the Academy's views; it bars the Department from "utilizing, relying on or in any way incorporating

into its decisionmaking process the ICF Committee report or

any other work product of the ICF Committee." NRDC III,

supra; cf. Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689, 694

(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("We see no serious constitutional problems

inherent in application of FACA to independent organizations

acting as spokesmen for their members. AASHTO and its

members remain free to communicate their views to the

Administrator. They remain free to lobby the FHWA. Congress has determined simply that when a federal executive

official utilizes an advisory committee to assist him in discharging his responsibilities, in most instances he must do so

openly and publicly. AASHTO has no First Amendment

right to have the Administrator keep its communications

secret."). Accordingly, we conclude that the Academy is

without standing to appeal the district court's use injunction.

B. The Appellees' Standing

Having determined that only the Department can appeal,

we turn now to the question of the appellees' standing to sue

for a use injunction. We think it important to note first that

our California Forestry decision in no way suggested that the

standing inquiry is optional if a FACA use injunction is

involved. Indeed, we did not address the question of standing in that case because the district court had not had the

opportunity to consider whether injunctive relief was proper,

much less to find facts determining the plaintiff's standing to

sue for the relief. See California Forestry, 102 F.3d at 613

("We are unable to determine the propriety of injunctive

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relief at the summary judgment stage because the district

court has yet to make factual findings.").2 Moreover, because

Article III standing is always an indispensable element of the

plaintiff's case, neither we nor the Congress can dispense

with the requirement--even if its application renders a FACA

violation irremediable in a particular case. See Bennett v.

Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997) (comparing "immutable

requirements" of Article III standing with prudential standing limitations, which, "unlike their constitutional counterparts, ... can be modified or abrogated by Congress");

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)

("Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather

an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element [of

standing] must be supported in the same way as any other

matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e.,

with the manner and degree of evidence required at the

successive stages of the litigation."); Florida Audubon Soc'y

v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)

("[A]n inescapable result of any standing doctrine application

is that at least some disputes will not receive judicial review.

That analysis of a party's standing should sometimes dictate

this result is not a reason to reject either the result or the

analysis.").

The Article III standing inquiry includes three elements:

First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately

proven) an injury in fact--a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. ... Second, there must be causation--a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's

injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant.

... And third, there must be redressability--a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged

injury. ... This triad of injury-in-fact, causation, and

redressability comprises the core of Article III's case-orcontroversy requirement, and the party invoking federal

__________

2 Similarly, the authority the appellees use for support, Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. DOI, 26 F.3d 1103 (11th

Cir.1994), does not directly address standing.

jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.

Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1016-17 (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

The Supreme Court's decision in Public Citizen v. United

States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), addresses

the standing of a private party to seek redress for a FACA

violation. In Public Citizen the plaintiffs sued for injunctive

and declaratory relief based on the Justice Department's

failure to abide by FACA requirements in consulting with the

American Bar Association's (ABA's) Standing Committee on

the Federal Judiciary about the qualifications of a nominee

for appointment to a federal judgeship. The plaintiffs did not

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seek to enjoin the Justice Department from using the ABA

Committee's work product; rather, they sought to enjoin it

from "utilizing the ABA Committee as an advisory committee

until it complied with FACA." Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at

447 (emphasis added). The ABA argued that the plaintiffs

did not have standing to sue for injunctive relief because (1)

their asserted injury--exclusion from committee meetings

and no access to committee documents and records--was "a

general grievance shared in substantially equal measure by

all or a large class of citizens" and because (2) the plaintiffs

"have not demonstrated that a decision in their favor would

likely redress the alleged harm, because the meetings they

seek to attend and the minutes and records they wish to

review would probably be closed to them under FACA." Id.

at 448-49 (citation to brief omitted). The Supreme Court

rejected both arguments: first, it concluded that "refusal to

permit appellants to scrutinize the ABA committee's activities

to the extent FACA allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct

injury to provide standing to sue," id. at 449; second, it held

that the "[a]ppellants' potential gains are undoubtedly sufficient to give them standing," id. at 451 (emphasis added).

With respect to the latter holding, the Supreme Court observed that a ruling in the appellants' favor would require the

ABA Standing Committee "to file a charter and give notice of

its meetings" and would allow the appellants to attend at least

some meetings and to obtain at least some documents--

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especially, "discussions and documents regarding the overall

functioning of the ABA Committee, including its investigative,

evaluative, and voting procedures." Id. at 450.

The Department contends that the appellees here lack

standing to sue because the use injunction will not redress

any of their claimed injuries--namely, exclusion from past

Committee meetings and denial of access to Committee records and documents. In other words, the Department argues, the appellees have not shown that the Department's use

of the Committee's report or other work product will cause

them to sustain an Article III injury in fact.

The appellees first counter that, as the district court concluded, Public Citizen makes clear their standing to sue for a

use injunction. We disagree. Unlike the injunctive relief at

issue in Public Citizen, the use injunction awarded here will

not give the appellees access to Committee documents and

future Committee meetings. Indeed, the Committee has

been dissolved and will no longer meet, deliberate or generate

documents or records. Moreover, the use injunction does not

require the disclosure of any Committee documents or records. Accordingly, we agree with the Department that Public Citizen does not compel the conclusion that the appellees

have standing to seek any and all kinds of equitable relief for

the admitted FACA violations. Cf. City of Los Angeles v.

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (while past exposure to alleged

illegal conduct was presumably sufficient to establish plaintiff's standing to sue for damages, it was inadequate standing

for injunctive relief).

Alternatively, the appellees argue that the use injunction

redresses both their past and their future injuries:

First, plaintiffs were denied their rights to contemporaneous access to the workings of the ICF Committee.

Had DOE and NAS complied with FACA, plaintiffs could

have reviewed materials presented to, and prepared by,

the ICF Committee, presented comments based on this

review, and generally played the public oversight role for

which FACA is designed. Instead, they were denied this

contemporaneous access. An injunction against the use

of the ICF Committee Report redresses this injury by

preventing DOE from making use of the product of this

illegal process. See Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Department of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir.

1994).

Second, plaintiffs' injury continues to the present

because DOE and NAS are withholding materials which

Section 10 of FACA requires be released to the public.

Thus, were the Court to permit DOE to make use of the

ICF Committee Report now, plaintiffs' injury would be

compounded because they still would not have the materials to which they are entitled under FACA, and which

they need in order to publicly critique the Report in the

manner that FACA allows. Enjoining DOE from using

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the Report--at least until and unless DOE and NAS

make some additional effort to comply with FACA--

redresses this injury by preventing DOE from both

taking advantage of the Report and simultaneously denying plaintiffs access to the materials underlying it.

Appellees Br. 27 (emphasis original; footnote omitted).3 We

are not convinced by either argument.

The first erroneously presumes that the punitive consequences of the injunctive order suffice to establish that the

order redresses the Department's past FACA transgressions.

On the contrary, injunctive relief principally serves a remedial purpose, not a punitive one, and thus the injunction's

collateral punitive effects do not by themselves satisfy Article

__________

3 The appellees also argue that the Department's request for

entry of a permanent use injunction, and the resulting cessation of

discovery, estops it from now challenging their standing. See

Appellees Br. 28. We cannot agree. Standing is a "threshold

jurisdictional question," Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1016, and "no action

of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction." Insurance

Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.

694, 702 (1982). "Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant, ...

principles of estoppel do not apply, ... and a party does not waive

the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the

proceedings." Id. (internal citations omitted).

III's redressability requirement. See Hartford-Empire Co.

v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 409 (1945) ("[W]e may not

impose penalties in the guise of preventing future violations."); id. at 435 (Black, J. dissenting) ("[R]elief in equity is

remedial, not penal."); 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure

s 2942, at 53-54 (2d ed. 1995) ("[S]ince the purpose of an

injunction is remedial, not punitive, if the effect of granting

relief is to penalize defendants ... it may be denied.")

(footnotes omitted). To the extent the appellees suggest that

the use injunction serves the admittedly remedial purpose of

deterring the Department from violating FACA in the future,

in the absence of allegations regarding the likely occurrence

of such violations, such a "generalized interest in deterrence

... is insufficient for the purposes of Article III." Steel Co.,

118 S. Ct. at 1019. Moreover, their argument mistakenly

assumes that injunctive relief redresses past FACA violations. To the contrary, "Past exposure to illegal conduct does

not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding

injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing,

present adverse effects." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,

495-96 (1974); accord Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020 ("Because

respondent alleges only past infractions of [the statute], and

not a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not redress its injury."); City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) ("Lyons' standing to

seek the injunction requested depended on whether he was

likely to suffer future injury from the use of the chokeholds

by police officers.") (emphasis added); Juidice v. Vail, 430

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U.S. 327, 331-33 (1977) (certain appellees lacked standing to

sue for injunctive relief because they had completed prison

term or paid applicable fine and were not "threatened with

further or repeated proceedings."); Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Because injunctions regulate future conduct, a party has standing to seek

injunctive relief only if the party alleges, and ultimately

proves, a real and immediate--as opposed to merely conjectural or hypothetical--threat of future injury.").

The appellees' second argument--that the use injunction

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ment's ongoing refusal to give them FACA access to Committee documents and records--is equally without merit. That

the appellees may have sustained a continuing injury by

virtue of the Department's ongoing denial of FACA access to

Committee documents and records cannot support their

standing to sue for an injunction that does not itself address

the access issue. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1019 ("Relief

that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a

plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the

redressability requirement.").

Finally, the appellees argue in the alternative that they

should have the opportunity to take discovery and/or to

streamline their request for equitable relief in order to overcome any standing problem or other shortcoming. The argument is tied to the significant differences between the evidentiary support required for preliminary injunctive relief and

that required for permanent injunctive relief:

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to

preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial

on the merits can be held. Given this limited purpose,

and given the haste that is often necessary if those

positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is

customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are

less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a

trial on the merits. A party thus is not required to prove

his case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing, ...

and the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a

court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding

at trial on the merits.... In light of these considerations, it is generally inappropriate for a federal court at

the preliminary injunction stage to give a final judgment

on the merits.

University of Texas v. Carmenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)

(citations omitted); accord Communications Maintenance,

Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 761 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A

court must be cautious in adopting findings and conclusions

from the preliminary injunction stage in ruling on a motion

for summary judgment for two reasons. First, a court's

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findings of fact and conclusions of law at the preliminary

injunction stage are often based on incomplete evidence and a

relatively hurried consideration of the issues. ... Second,

the questions focused on differ in deciding a motion for

preliminary injunction and in deciding a motion for summary

judgment. In the former, a court considers whether there is

a reasonable likelihood that the moving party will prevail on

the merits; in the latter a court considers whether there is

any issue of material fact remaining after construing the

facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.")

(emphases original; citations omitted).

The district court's decision to omit both discovery and a

trial on the merits, thus losing the opportunity to consider

less severe equitable relief, had the same effect as would have

occurred had the appellees been required to fully make their

case at the preliminary injunction hearing--a practice at odds

with both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the

provisional nature of preliminary injunctive relief. See United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 277 (6th Cir.) ("[W]e must

vacate the permanent injunction and remand this case to the

district court to allow [the plaintiff] to conduct additional

discovery and present his version of the facts at an evidentiary hearing. Otherwise, we would create a rule that would

obligate a party to present his full case at a hearing for a

preliminary injunction."), cert. dismissed sub nom. Spirko v.

United States, 516 U.S. 983 (1995).

Moreover, we believe the unusual circumstances here indicate that reversal and remand, rather than vacatur, appropriately dispose of the appeal. In this regard, we rely on our

decision in Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir.

1994). In Fair Employment the plaintiffs' only viable claim

sought injunctive relief. Their complaint, however, did not

allege a likely future injury that would be redressed by such

relief and thus their claim was fatally defective on standing

grounds. Id. at 1272-74. Nonetheless, because the district

court erroneously believed that the plaintiffs' allegations were

sufficient to establish their standing, it did not consider

whether the plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their

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complaint to add allegations of prospective injury. Id. at

1275. We then determined that a remand rather than outright dismissal was preferable:

[W]hile we vacate the district court's denial of [the

defendant's] motion to dismiss the individual testers' suit,

we do not order it to grant that motion; instead, we

remand the case for the district court to exercise its

sound discretion over whether to permit amendment.

We see no reason why plaintiffs who win in the district

court should automatically be in a worse position than

plaintiffs whose allegations of standing have been rightly

found defective by the district court.

Id. (emphasis original). Indeed, the case for remand is

somewhat stronger here than in Fair Employment because

here the appellees plainly have standing to request injunctive

relief directing the Department to make Committee documents and records available to the full extent permitted by

FACA, see Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 450-51; see also FEC

v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1784 (1998), and on appeal they

have indicated their desire to specifically request that relief.

See Oral Argument of 3/13/98 Tr. 36; cf. California Forestry,

102 F.3d at 614 ("We cannot assess these competing claims at

this stage and therefore remand to the district court to

fashion an appropriate remedy in the first instance.").

Finally, we think a remand here is also consistent with our

precedent allowing jurisdictional discovery and factfinding if

allegations indicate its likely utility. See Women's Equity

Action League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("On

the record before this court, we are unable to decide these

[standing] issues in the first instance. Issues of unresolved

fact may be implicated. Moreover, it is our general practice

to allow full development and presentation in the district

court of matters that surface initially on appeal. ... We

will therefore remand this case to the district court for a

current ruling on whether standing and other threshold Article III requirements are satisfied."); cf. El-Fadl v. Central

Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (remanding

because "even though El-Fadl's present jurisdictional allegations are insufficient, he has sufficiently demonstrated that it

is possible that he could supplement them through discovery"); Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel,

949 F.2d 415, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding after concluding that "it is an abuse of discretion to deny jurisdictional

discovery" in light of allegations suggesting jurisdiction);

Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (similar). Here,

the record suggests at least one way in which the appellees

may be able to establish their standing. At oral argument

the appellees' counsel suggested that the Committee report

might be used by the Department to continue NIF's construction or might otherwise affect the future operation of NIF.

In turn, certain appellees who live near LLNL could have an

increased exposure to hazardous substances that may be

emitted during the ignition process. See Oral Argument of

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ery, such threatened injuries might establish their standing.

Cf. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d

663, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("For appellants to establish standing in this case, therefore, they must allege (1) an injury that

is (2) fairly traceable to the HUD Report and (3) likely to be

redressed by a judicial decision rescinding the Report."). At

this stage, however, their complaint and affidavits do not

explain how forbidding the Department from using the Committee report likely would redress their exposure injury or

how the Department's use of the report will make it more

likely that some of them could be exposed to increased

emissions of hazardous substances.4 Cf. Community for

Creative Non-Violence, 814 F.2d at 669 ("[A]ppellants must

show that the agency's action is more than only one of the

many factors whose relative influence may affect the third

__________

4 To the extent the appellees' injury stems from the effect of

the report on the Department's decision to build NIF, their claims

appear to suffer from a fatal causation defect: the Department's

use of the report cannot be responsible for their injury because the

Department decided to proceed with construction without reference

to the Committee's conclusions. See United Transp. Union v. ICC,

891 F.2d 908, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[S]ince any hypothetical future

injury could also occur even in the absence of the challenged ICC

rule, a favorable decision from this court would not be 'likely' to

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parties' behavior."); id. ("[S]atisfying [the redressability]

aspect of the standing inquiry entails more than simply

alleging facts that indicate that the withdrawal and rescission

of the report will make a difference because it will remove

one influence possibly motivating third parties' injurious actions."); Physicians' Educ. Network, Inc. v. HEW, 653 F.2d

621, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1981); cf. Florida Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d

at 664 ("[T]he [Supreme] Court has never freed a plaintiff

alleging a procedural violation from showing a causal connection between the government action that supposedly required

the disregarded procedure and some reasonably increased

risk of injury to its particularized interest.").5

If the district court concludes that the plaintiffs have

standing to sue for a use injunction, that conclusion would not

__________

redress it."), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). Moreover, even if

the appellees can establish standing based on their proximity to

NIF and resulting exposure to hazardous emissions, that would

provide no basis to enjoin the Department from using those portions of the report that recommend conducting experiments at sites

other than LLNL. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Brock, 778 F.2d 834, 842

(D.C. Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (1996) ("The

[injunctive] remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy

that produced the injury-in-fact that the plaintiff has established.");

cf. id. n.6 ("But standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to

complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred

the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen

aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state

administration before the courts for review.").

5 At oral argument the Department also stated that if we

uphold the use injunction there is at least "a reasonable possibility"

the Department may have to duplicate the efforts of the nowdefunct Committee by creating a new committee. See Oral Argument of 3/13/98 Tr. 7-8. If so, the use injunction may have the

same effect as an injunction directing the Department to establish a

new ICF committee that complies with FACA so that the appellees

can then participate contemporaneously in the committee's activities--an equitable remedy redressing loss of a past opportunity by

mandating provision of a future one. Whether the court can use its

equitable power to order a co-equal branch of government to

mandate a judgment in their favor. And unlike the district

court, we do not think California Forestry may be read to

suggest otherwise.

In California Forestry we observed that a use injunction

might be appropriate in some cases, and perhaps even

this case, if the unavailability of an injunctive remedy

would effectively render FACA a nullity. On remand,

however, the district court should inquire whether under

the circumstances an injunction would promote FACA's

purposes. The preparation of the report has already

consumed millions of dollars. If the Forest Service

needs a scientific evaluation of the Sierra Nevada for its

own use, an injunction prohibiting its use of the SNEP

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study would require it to commission another (presumably duplicative) study of the Sierra Nevada. That result would not meet FACA's aim to reduce wasteful

expenditures. ... A second purpose of FACA is to

enhance the public accountability of advisory committees

established by the Executive Branch. ... The record

indicates that at least some of the Science Team meet-

__________

affirmatively perform a discretionary act is a question we leave for

another day. Cf. Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 976-77 & n.1 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (noting that mandatory injunction against President is

appropriate only (1) if petitioner satisfies requirements needed for

mandamus relief and (2) if injunction will compel performance of

"ministerial" rather than discretionary obligation).

In any event, their current allegations do not suggest they will be

injured by the withholding of a use injunction because it will

deprive them of the "reasonable possibility" that they can participate in the activities of a reconstituted committee in the future.

See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020 ("Because respondent alleges only

past infractions of [the statute], and not a continuing violation or the

likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not redress its

injury."); Fair Employment, 28 F.3d at 1272 ("[T]he tester plaintiffs['] ... federal claims reduce to their request for injunctive or

declaratory relief. Yet ... they lack standing to seek such prospective relief, for they have not made sufficient allegations that they

are threatened with any future illegality.").

ings were open to the public. Furthermore, SNEP made

other efforts to keep the public informed--it published

newsletters and provided information to a "key contacts

group" comprised of eighty-seven individuals and representatives of various organizations, including CFA. The

need for injunctive relief may be reduced where, as here,

there has been at least some attempt to ensure public

accountability.

California Forestry, 102 F.3d at 614 (citations and quotations

omitted). The district court distilled from this passage a

four-part test to decide whether to grant a use injunction:

"(1) whether 'the unavailability of an injunctive remedy would

effectively render FACA a nullity'; (2) whether an injunction

would promote FACA's purposes; (3) whether substantial

funds have already been spent, and (4) whether 'there has

been at least some attempt to ensure public accountability.' "

NRDC I, supra. We believe in doing so, it misread the

opinion.

In California Forestry our discussion about whether denial

of a use injunction would "render FACA a nullity" was

intended to highlight that the relief should be awarded only

rarely; we did not mean that if suit is not brought until late

in the day, an injunction should necessarily issue to ensure

respect for the law. Because of its First Amendment implications, punitive effect and likely standing complications, a use

injunction should be the remedy of last resort. While denying a use injunction may leave a plaintiff without an effective

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remedy, that circumstance cannot determine the plaintiff's

ultimate entitlement to the relief. If the plaintiff has failed to

prosecute its claim for injunctive relief promptly, and if it has

no reasonable explanation for its delay, the district court

should be reluctant to award relief. Cf. Independent Bankers

Ass'n v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The

venerable maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas

subvenit (equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on

their rights) requires that a suit in equity, though otherwise

meritorious, be dismissed if two requirements are met: (1)

unreasonable delay in bringing the claim for relief and (2)

prejudice caused by the delay."). On the other hand, if the

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defendant is responsible for the delay, or if it has acted to

deprive the plaintiff of effective relief, the district court

should weigh that in providing a remedy.6

The district court should also consider whether FACA's

principal purposes--(1) avoidance of wasteful expenditures

and (2) public accountability--will be served by granting a

use injunction. While a complaint filed after a committee has

completed its meetings and is in the process of wrapping up

its affairs will likely produce waste if a use injunction is

granted, the district court should also consider the magnitude

of the waste, the value of the committee's work to the

sponsoring federal agency and the effect of the FACA violation on the committee's findings. As to the last, if the FACA

violation appears to have had little deleterious effect on the

committee's output and accountability and the public's participation, the district court should withhold a use injunction.7

For example, where, as here, a large part of the Committee's

deliberations involved classified materials to which the public

would not have had access even under FACA, the loss of

public participation is less significant. Similarly, the district

__________

6 Unlike the district court, we do not think denying a use

injunction would "render FACA a nullity." The court's funding

injunction ensured against future violations by the Committee and,

indeed, prompted its dissolution. The declaratory relief provided

the appellees and others ammunition for their attack on the Committee's findings. Further, an injunction directing the Academy

and the Department to disclose Committee records and documents

to the full extent permitted by FACA, which was plainly within the

district court's power, see Public Citizen, supra, would have redressed any informational injury they may have sustained. All of

this constitutes "effective relief" for FACA violations and, although

it does not redress their "contemporaneous participation" injury, we

have never intimated that partial relief would "render FACA a

nullity."

7 The Administrative Procedure Act directs a reviewing court

to take "due account" of "the rule of prejudicial error." 5 U.S.C.

s 706. If a complaint is not filed until after a committee has

completed its work, a district court can do this by looking to the

effect of the FACA violation on the committee's work.

court's public accountability inquiry should focus on the actual

deprivation resulting from non-compliance. Substantial efforts to include members of the interested public in at least

some committee meetings and attempts to screen for conflicts

of interest among committee members counsel against a use

injunction. Moreover, if members of the public will have

another opportunity to comment on an agency decision, the

district court should determine whether the subsequent opportunity will render harmless (or at least less harmful) the

loss of any past opportunity to participate.8 Cf. National

Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327, 336 (2d

Cir.1979) (Friendly, J.) ("Applicable rulemaking procedures

afford ample opportunity to correct infirmities resulting from

improper advisory committee action prior to the proposal.").

The appellees who live near LLNL presumably had the

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opportunity to comment on NIF's Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement--a study specifically addressed to

the kind of adverse environmental effects they fear will be

produced by NIF's construction and operation. Further,

Tri-Valley CAREs has highlighted its long-standing involvement with LLNL health and safety issues:

Tri-Valley CAREs has a long-held interest in the proposed National Ignition Facility, and has--via gathering

__________

8 A future opportunity may create a causation problem in the

standing inquiry. If a report produced in violation of FACA cannot

be acted on by the agency without first undertaking a rulemaking

or adjudication, the plaintiff may have difficulty showing the FACA

violation is responsible for a concrete injury it has sustained or will

sustain based on the administrative decisionmaking process. See

Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176, 188 (D.C. Cir.

1977) ("One would hope that any governmental entity which formulates national policy, be it DOI, FEA, the Congress or any other

group, would seek out, consider and balance all available information before arriving at final decisions. In this case, appellant

Metcalf seeks to eliminate or alter a particular source of information so that he can produce what he believes to be the 'best

legislative product.' ... If subjective feelings of injury were sufficient to confer standing, the rather drastic consequences of a

curtailed information flow could result quite easily and often.").

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written information, conducting meetings with technical

experts and other means--systematically carried out research regarding the NIF since 1994. These activities

by Tri-Valley CAREs have included, but are not limited

to, participation on the LLNL NIF Environment, Safety

and Health Working Group, testimony at public hearings

on environmental, nuclear proliferation and other questions regarding NIF and numerous meetings with DOE

and LLNL officials.

Kelley Decl. p 10.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse and remand the case to the district court to

consider further the plaintiffs' standing to sue for a use

injunction pursuant to Public Citizen and to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to undertake discovery. On remand, and

following discovery, the district court should determine if the

plaintiffs have standing and, if so, it should consider whether

other injunctive relief would redress their alleged injuries.

So ordered.

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