Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10654/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10654-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Todd Russell Fries
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TODD RUSSELL FRIES, AKA Todd

Burns,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10654

D.C. No.

4:11-cr-01751-

CKJ-CRP-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 6, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed August 10, 2015

Before: Richard C. Tallman and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

* The Honorable Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

Affirming a sentence for unlawful possession of

unregistered destructive devices, the panel rejected the

defendant’s contention that the district court impermissibly

included his prior convictions for false statements and use of

a chemical weapon, which were severed from the

unregistered device charges, in calculating the defendant’s

criminal history category. 

The panel held that the district court properly calculated

the defendant’s criminal history pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2. The panel explained that the defendant’s prior

concurrent sentences for use of a chemical weapon and

making false statements were prior sentences under U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(a)(1) because they involved conduct that was

unrelated to the defendant’s possession of unregistered

destructive devices; and that the prior concurrent sentences

did not constitute multiple sentences under U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(a)(2). The panel rejected the defendant’s contention

that he was punished for successfully severing the unrelated

counts.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 3

COUNSEL

Richard C. Bock, Tucson, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney, Robert L. Miskell,

Appellate Chief, and Peter D. Sax (argued), Assistant United

States Attorney, Tucson, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Todd Russell Fries (Fries) challenges his

sentence for his unlawful possession of unregistered

destructive devices in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Fries

asserts that the district court impermissibly included his prior

convictions for false statements and use of a chemical

weapon, which were severed from the unregistered device

charges, in calculating Fries’ criminal history category. We

affirm Fries’ sentence.1

I. BACKGROUND

In a second superseding indictment, Fries was charged

with use of a chemical weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 229(a), making a false statement to a Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) agent in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001,

and unlawful possession of unregistered destructive devices

1 Fries raised several other issues concerning his trial and conviction,

which are addressed in a memorandum disposition filed

contemporaneously with this opinion.

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4 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871. Count One

alleged that Fries:

did knowingly develop, produce, and

otherwise acquire, transfer directly or

indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own,

possess, use, and threaten to use a chemical

weapon, namely a combination of a

chlorinated cyanuric acid and an unknown

reactive chemical component, which when

combined, created airborne toxic chemicals,

including chlorine not intended for peaceful

purposes, protective purposes, unrelated

military purposes or law enforcement

purposes as described in 18 U.S.C. § 229F(7),

by placing a device on the driveway in front

of the garage and on the back porch of [a]

residence . . . [i]n violation of Title 18 U.S.C.

§§ 229(a) and 2.

Count Two alleged that Fries “did knowingly and

willfully make false, fraudulent, and fictitious material

statements and representations, in a matter within the

jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation” in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).

Count Three alleged that Fries knowingly possessed

“two . . . cylindrical type devices, sealed at both ends, fused

with common hobbyfuse, and containing low-explosive main

charge and with copper plated metal balls adhered to the

cylinders as an added fragmentation” and “one . . . spherical

device, sealed, fused with common hobby fuse, and

containing low-explosive main charge and with copper plated

metal balls adhered to the sphere as an added fragmentation

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 5

enhancement . . .” in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and

5871.

Count Four charged Fries with knowingly possessing

“fifteen . . . cylindrical type devices, sealed at both ends,

fused with common hobby fuse, and containing lowexplosive main charge” and “six . . . spherical devices, sealed,

fused with common hobby fuse, and containing lowexplosive main charge” with “copper plated metal balls for

use as an added fragmentation enhancement . . .” Counts

Three and Four also alleged that Fries failed to register the

devices in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer

Record as required by 26 U.S.C. § 5841.

Fries filed a motion to sever the chemical weapons and

false statement offenses from the offenses charging

possession of unregistered devices. The magistrate judge

considering the motion recommended severance of the counts

because the chemical weapons charge “involved the creation

of a chemical cloud using a combination of chlorcyanuric

acid and an unknown reactive chemical component,” whereas

the possession of destructive devices charges involved

“devices discovered at [Fries’] home in August 2011. These

devices [were] not created with chemicals. They [were]

mechanical in nature, made with fuses, metal bars and a lowexplosive main charge.” The magistrate judge observed that

“the chemical cloud and the explosive devices [were]

separated by twenty-one months of time. The chemical cloud

was allegedly created in May 2009 and the explosive devices

were discovered in August 2011. There is no allegation that

the explosive devices were made contemporaneously to the

chemical cloud.” The magistrate judge also noted that Fries

“allegedly had a target for the chemical cloud; the cloud was

created to seek revenge against a specific set of victims for a

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6 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

specific reason . . . In contrast, the Government has not

alleged a victim nor a motive for the creation of the explosive

devices discovered in August 2011. . . .”

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s

recommendation and granted severance of the destructive

devices counts because the charges were “not sufficiently of

similar character or connected to meet the requirements of

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. . . .”2

In a separate trial, Fries was convicted by a jury for his

use of chemical weapons and for making false statements to

the FBI. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 151

months’ imprisonment for the chemical weapons offense and

60 months’ imprisonment for the false statement offense. See

United States v. Fries, 781 F.3d 1137, 1140, 1146 (9th Cir.

2015).

After Fries was convicted by a jury on the severed

charges of possession of unregistered destructive devices, the

presentence report (PSR) was prepared. Fries’ base offense

level was calculated at 18 and his total offense level was 24. 

A Criminal History Category of II was recommended based

on Fries’ prior convictions for making a false statement and

for use of a chemical weapon. The PSR recommended a

 

2

 Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

The indictment or information may charge a defendant

in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if the

offenses charged – whether felonies or misdemeanors

or both – are of the same or similar character, or are

based on the same act or transaction, or are connected

with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 7

guideline sentencing range of fifty-seven to seventy-onemonths’ imprisonment.

Fries objected to the criminal history calculation. The

district court rejected Fries’ argument that his prior

convictions should not be included in his criminal history,

and adopted the recommendations in the PSR. The district

court concluded that, because the prior convictions were

severed and based on totally separate incidents, the prior

convictions should be included in Fries’ criminal history. 

The district court observed that there was no risk of double

punishment because it did not consider the prior convictions

as part of Fries’ relevant conduct in the subsequent case. 

Ultimately, the district court adopted the recommended

guideline sentencing range of fifty-seven to seventy-onemonths’ imprisonment, and sentenced Fries to sixty months’

imprisonment, with twenty months running consecutively to

his prior sentence.

Fries filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of

the Sentencing Guidelines, such as its inclusion of a prior

conviction in the calculation of the criminal history

score. . . .” United States v. Gonzalez, 739 F.3d 420, 422 n.1

(9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Fries contends that the district court erred in sentencing

him to sixty-months’ imprisonment based on a criminal

history category that reflected his prior convictions for use of

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8 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

a chemical weapon and for making false statements, when

those charges had been severed from the charges of

possessing unregistered devices. Fries maintains that if the

prior counts had not been severed, United States Sentencing

Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) §§ 4A1.2 and 5G1.3 would not have

supported a higher sentence. Fries specifically argues that he

was punished for having prevailed on his severance motion.

We disagree, and conclude that the district court did not

err in including Fries’ prior convictions for the severed counts

in its computation of Fries’ criminal history score.

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1) (2013)3

:

The term “prior sentence” means any sentence

previously imposed upon adjudication of

guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of

nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the

instant offense.

Section 4A1.2(a)(2) (2013) delineates that:

If the defendant has multiple prior sentences,

determine whether those sentences are

counted separately or as a single sentence. 

Prior sentences always are counted separately

if the sentences were imposed for offenses

that were separated by an intervening arrest

(i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first

offense prior to committing the second

offense). If there is no intervening arrest,

prior sentences are counted separately unless

 

3

 The PSR utilized the 2013 version of the sentencing guidelines.

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 9

(A) the sentences resulted from offenses

contained in the same charging instrument; or

(B) the sentences were imposed on the same

day. Count any prior sentence covered by (A)

or (B) as a single sentence. . . . (citation

omitted).

The Application Note for Sentencing Guideline § 4A1.2

provides that:

“Prior sentence” means a sentence imposed

prior to sentencing on the instant offense,

other than a sentence for conduct that is part

of the instant offense. A sentence imposed

after the defendant’s commencement of the

instant offense, but prior to sentencing on the

instant offense, is a prior sentence if it was for

conduct other than conduct that was part of

the instant offense. Conduct that is part of the

instant offense means conduct that is relevant

conduct to the instant offense under the

provisions of §1Bl.3 (Relevant Conduct).

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.1 (citation omitted).

“[T]he purpose of § 4A1.2 is to reflect the seriousness of

a defendant’s criminal history, while, at the same time,

avoiding overstating the seriousness of the defendant’s

criminal conduct.” United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d

1162, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation, alteration, and

internal quotation marks omitted). “The ultimate goal

remains finding a sentence that accurately reflects both the

seriousness of the underlying federal offense and the extent

and nature of the defendant’s criminal past.” Id. at 1170

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10 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To ensure

that a defendant’s criminal history is not overstated or double

counted, § 4A1.2(a)(1) first limits conduct that can be

considered in the criminal history calculation to conduct that

is “not part of the instant offense.” Id. Second, § 4A1.2(a)(2)

requires treating prior sentences that are imposed in related

cases as a single sentence. See id. The application note

“clarifies that if the two prior sentences are not separated by

an intervening arrest, they are considered related if they

resulted from sentences that (A) occurred on the same

occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or plan,

or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing.” Id.(footnote

reference and internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus,

§ 4A1.2 limits the number of points that can be assigned in

criminal history by first ensuring that the prior sentence has

not actually been calculated as part of the instant offense, and

secondly, by ensuring that prior cases, related to each other,

do not count twice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court’s inclusion of Fries’ convictions for use

of a chemical weapon and for making a false statement in the

calculation of Fries’ criminal history complied with U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2. As charged in the second superseding indictment,

the false statement and chemical weapon offenses occurred in

August, 2009, whereas the unlawful possession of

unregistered destructive devices occurred in May, 2011. It is

evident from the indictment and the record that Fries’

offenses were not related, as they occurred on separate

occasions, were not part of a common scheme, were not

consolidated, and the earlier offenses involved conduct that

was not “part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 &

cmt. n.1.

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 11

Relying on our decision in Gonzalez, Fries asserts that

offenses charged in the same indictment should not have been

utilized in calculating his criminal history score. In that case,

the defendant asserted that his prior sentences should have

been construed as a single sentence because “the two

sentencing hearings originally were scheduled for the same

day and would have taken place on the same day if not for the

fact that the proceedings were set at two different

courthouses. . . .” 739 F.3d at 422 (emphasis in the original). 

Rejecting the defendant’s argument, we observed that the

prior convictions were properlyincorporated into the criminal

history calculation because “the crimes took place two years

apart, the crimes were charged separately, and the two

sentences were imposed on different days.” Id.

Contrary to Fries’ assertions, neither Gonzalez nor

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2)(A) precludes inclusion of Fries’ prior

convictions for the severed offenses from the calculation of

his criminal history score. Fries’ strongest argument is that

the severed offenses were contained in the same charging

instrument as the remaining offenses. To be sure, in

Gonzalez we cited the fact that “[t]he two offenses were

charged in two separate instruments” in analyzing whether

the prior sentences should be counted separately. Gonzalez,

739 F.3d at 422. Nevertheless, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2)(A)

does not categorically preclude consideration of a prior

sentence in calculating a criminal history category for

offenses “contained in the same charging instrument.” 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2)(A). Rather, the guideline provides

that “multiple prior sentences” for offenses charged in the

same instrument are treated as a single sentence in certain

circumstances. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (emphasis added). 

Notably, Fries’ sentence did not involve “multiple prior

sentences,” but rather a “prior sentence” that was “imposed

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12 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

upon adjudication of guilt . . . by . . . trial . . . for conduct not

part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1); see also

Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d at 1170 (articulating that U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(a)(2) requires “prior sentences imposed in related

cases to be treated as one sentence”) (alteration and internal

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also

Gonzalez, 739 F.3d at 422 (referencing the “two prior

sentences”) (emphasis added).

The district court’s inclusion of Fries’ prior concurrent

prison terms for the severed counts comports with

§ 4A1.2(a)(1) because Fries’ use of a chemical weapon and

false statements to the FBI involved conduct that was not

relevant to Fries’ possession of unregistered destructive

devices. See Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d at 1174 (explaining

that “[w]here there is no difficulty identifying severable

harms caused by multiple offenses, the goal of § 4A1.2 in

preventing overstating a defendant’s criminal history is not

offended”). Although Fries received separate sentences for

his chemical weapon and false statement convictions, they

were designated to run concurrently, therebyhaving the effect

of a single sentence. Indeed, they were treated as a single

sentence in the PSR, as only three criminal history points

were assessed for the separate sentences. See U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.1 (providing that the district court may “[a]dd 3 points

for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year

and one month”). Additionally, the severed counts were

temporally distinct from the counts charging unlawful

possession of unregistered destructive devices. See Gonzalez,

739 F.3d at 422 (observing that two prior sentences were

correctly included in the defendant’s criminal history

calculation partly because “the crimes took place two years

apart”).

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UNITED STATES V. FRIES 13

The district court, therefore, did not err in including Fries’

prior convictions related to the severed counts in calculating

Fries’ criminal history category under U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(a)(1), and the court imposed a reasonable sentence

of sixty months’ imprisonment with twenty months running

consecutively to Fries’ prior sentence. See United States v.

Shouse, 755 F.3d 1104, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding

a consecutive sentence); see also U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). Fries

does not otherwise challenge the reasonableness of his

sentence.

Accordingly, Fries’ contention that he was punished for

successfully severing the unrelated counts is unpersuasive. 

See United States v. Mack, 200 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2000)

(concluding that “[n]othing in the record indicates that the

district court based the enhanced sentences on the defendants’

decision to exercise their constitutional right to go to trial”);

see also United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 661 (6th Cir.

2012) (holding that the district court’s proper application of

the sentencing guidelines did not punish the defendant “for

exercising his right to receive a full and fair trial”) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court properly calculated Fries’ criminal

history category pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. Fries’ prior

concurrent sentences for use of a chemical weapon and

making false statements were prior sentences under U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(a)(1) because they involved conduct that was

unrelated to Fries’ possession of unregistered destructive

devices. However, they did not constitute multiple sentences

under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). The district court’s sentence

was reasonable, did not contravene the sentencing guidelines,

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14 UNITED STATES V. FRIES

and did not punish Fries for successfully severing unrelated

counts.

AFFIRMED.

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