Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01746/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01746-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rashid El Malik
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

RASHID EL MALIK,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2024-1746

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:20-cv-00267-MRS, Judge Molly R. Silfen.

______________________

Decided: December 6, 2024

______________________

RASHID EL MALIK, Palos Verdes Estate, CA, pro se. 

 LIRIDONA SINANI, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, LOREN 

MISHA PREHEIM. 

 ______________________

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, REYNA and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 EL MALIK v. US

PER CURIAM.

Rashid El Malik, a service-disabled veteran, was 

granted certain veterans benefits under Title 38, United 

States Code, by the United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA). The statutory benefits, provided to enable 

independent living, consisted of improvements to Mr. El 

Malik’s home. VA entered into a contract with Moderno, 

Inc., a construction company, for Moderno to perform the 

construction work. Dissatisfied with the work being done, 

Mr. El Malik sought relief through various routes. Before 

us now is his action in the United States in the Court of 

Federal Claims (Claims Court) under the Tucker Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), asserting a government breach of the 

VA-Moderno contract. The Claims Court dismissed the 

case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure 

to state a claim on which relief can be granted. El Malik v. 

United States, 170 Fed. Cl. 590 (2024) (Claims Court 

Decision). We affirm. 

I

A

Mr. El Malik, a service-disabled veteran, was granted 

benefits under the Vocational Rehabilitation and 

Employment (VR&E, now known as Veteran Readiness 

and Employment) program for independent-living services

and assistance. 38 U.S.C. § 3120(a), (b); 38 C.F.R. 

§ 21.160(a). In particular, on September 11, 2017, Mr. El 

Malik and a VR&E counselor executed an individual 

written rehabilitation plan that lists fourteen objectives to 

improve Mr. El Malik’s ability to live safely in his home. 

SAppx44–51. Meeting those objectives called for making 

improvements to Mr. El Malik’s home, and on May 30, 

2018, VA and Moderno entered into a contract—initially 

valued at $211,906.33—under which Moderno was to do 

specified home-improvement work. SAppx21; SAppx54–

87.

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EL MALIK v. US 3

On June 18, 2019, Mr. El Malik, asserting that he was 

a third-party beneficiary of the VA-Moderno contract, filed 

a claim with VA under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 

U.S.C. §§ 7101–07. He alleged that Moderno performed 

“faulty and incomplete” work that left him in “unhealthful 

and unsafe living conditions” and was causing “ongoing 

damage to his property.” SAppx28; SAppx30–37 

(enumerating specific work that was incomplete or had 

been performed poorly). And he requested that Moderno 

be required to fully perform the contract and also sought

damages of $983.68 and claim-preparation costs of 

$1,525.00. SAppx24–25.

When VA had not issued a decision after a certain time,

Mr. El Malik appealed VA’s “deemed denial” to the Civilian 

Board of Contract Appeals (Board or CBCA), which, on 

February 28, 2020, dismissed the case. El Malik v. 

Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 6600, 20-1 BCA 

¶ 37,536, at 3. The Board concluded that “[o]nly a 

‘contractor’ may appeal a contracting officer’s decision”—

that is, a “party to a federal government contract other 

than the Federal Government”—and “Mr. El Malik is not a 

contractor nor did he sign the contract.” Id. The Board 

added, however, that Mr. El Malik “could be considered a 

third[-]party beneficiary” and “[a]lthough such third-party 

beneficiaries cannot seek recourse under the [Contract 

Disputes Act], they may be able to utilize their third-party 

beneficiary status to seek damages in the Court of Federal 

Claims under the Tucker Act.” Id. at 3–4. Mr. El Malik did 

not appeal from the Board’s decision.

B

On March 9, 2020, Mr. El Malik filed a complaint in the 

Claims Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), 

including his extensive June 2019 CDA claim in the 

complaint. SAppx20–43. As relevant here, he asserted a 

government breach of the VA-Moderno contract, and he 

sought full performance of the contract and monetary 

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4 EL MALIK v. US

damages for allegedly incomplete and faulty work.

SAppx41–42.1 In July 2020, the government moved to 

dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including two 

now at issue. First, the government argued that Tucker 

Act jurisdiction is unavailable for Mr. El Malik’s claim

because it is a benefits claim subject to Title 38’s exclusive 

review process, established by the Veterans’ Judicial 

Review Act (VJRA), Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105

(1988), which requires proceeding through the United 

States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans 

Court), see 38 U.S.C. §§ 511(a), (b)(4), 7251–98. Second, the 

government argued that, in any event, Mr. El Malik had 

not alleged a government breach of the VA-Moderno 

contract, of which, moreover, he was not a third-party 

beneficiary.

The Claims Court allowed the contract claim to 

proceed. SAppx123–25. Throughout 2021, the court held 

six conferences to receive status updates on the ongoing 

construction work. Such work included additional home 

improvements pursuant to multiple contract amendments

that increased the contract value to $692,609.66. In 2022, 

VA and Moderno “officially closed” the contract. Claims 

Court Decision, at 593.

On May 3, 2023, the court sought from Mr. El Malik 

specificity as to the items for which he sought monetary 

damages. Mr. El Malik responded six days later with a 

motion to amend his complaint, seeking to provide 

estimates of damages for his existing breach-of-contract

claim. On June 9, 2023, the government renewed its 

arguments to dismiss the breach-of-contract claim—for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of VJRA

1 Mr. El Malik also asserted tort claims and an 

Eighth Amendment violation, which were dismissed as 

outside the Claims Court’s jurisdiction, SAppx123–25, and 

are not at issue here.

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EL MALIK v. US 5

exclusivity and for no plausible allegation of a government 

breach of contractual obligations.

On April 8, 2024, the Claims Court—now acting 

through a newly assigned judge—granted the 

government’s motion and dismissed the case. Claims Court 

Decision, at 592. First, the court held that VJRA 

exclusivity barred Tucker Act jurisdiction over Mr. El 

Malik’s claim, whose subject was VA’s provision of veterans’ 

benefits under the Title 38 provisions governing

independent-living services. Id. at 594–97 (citing 38 U.S.C. 

§ 511; 38 C.F.R. § 20.3(e)). Second, the court ruled that 

even if it did have jurisdiction over Mr. El Malik’s claim

and if it did accept his assertion that he was a third-party 

beneficiary, dismissal for failure to state a claim was 

required because Mr. El Malik “ha[d] not plausibly alleged 

that the government breached its contract with Moderno.” 

Id. at 598 (emphasis added).

Mr. El Malik timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

II

The jurisdictional-exclusivity ruling by the Claims 

Court in this case is a matter of law, which we decide de 

novo based on accepting the plausible factual allegations of 

the complaint. See, e.g., Estes Express Lines v. United 

States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Texas Peanut 

Farmers v. United States, 409 F.3d 1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). The same standard of review applies to the Claims 

Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim because the 

complaint contains no plausible allegation of a breach of 

contract by the government. Turping v. United States, 913 

F.3d 1060, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In reading a complaint, 

some deficiencies of articulation are more readily 

overlooked for pro se plaintiffs than for represented 

plaintiffs. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). Here, that 

greater leniency makes no difference to the outcome.

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6 EL MALIK v. US

A

Mr. El Malik first challenges the Claims Court’s 

holding that VJRA exclusivity barred Tucker Act 

jurisdiction to hear his claim. El Malik Informal Opening 

Br. at 8. He contends that “[t]his is not a case about the 

determination or award of VA benefits, which would fall 

under the VJRA’s exclusive review scheme,” but rather “a 

contract dispute arising from the implementation of 

already-awarded benefits.” Id. We disagree with Mr. El 

Malik.

In VJRA, Congress, which has power “to define the 

jurisdiction of lower federal courts it creates,” “exercised 

this power to channel judicial review of certain agency 

actions to specified lower federal courts.” Personal Audio, 

LLC v. CBS Corp., 946 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2020)

(citations omitted). In 38 U.S.C. § 511(a), Congress 

provided that “[t]he Secretary shall decide all questions of 

law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under 

a law that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary 

to veterans . . . .” In the next sentence, Congress then 

declared: “Subject to subsection (b), the decision of the 

Secretary as to any such question shall be final and 

conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other official or 

by any court, whether by an action in the nature of 

mandamus or otherwise.” § 511(a). Subsection (b) states 

that the just-stated bar on any judicial review “does not 

apply to” four categories: rules and regulations subject to 

38 U.S.C. § 502; certain insurance matters subject to 38 

U.S.C. §§ 1975 and 1984; certain housing loan matters and 

small-business loan matters subject to 38 U.S.C. §§ 3701–

65; and—of most relevance here—“matters covered by 

chapter 72,” 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251–98, which provides for 

review by the Veterans Court of decisions of the VA’s Board 

of Veterans Appeals.

Those provisions plainly state a bar on judicial review 

of Secretary decisions on “all questions of law and fact 

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EL MALIK v. US 7

necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law that 

affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to 

veterans,” § 511(a), subject to those four specific 

exceptions. The bar, where it applies, is applicable to

review of such a decision “whether by an action in the 

nature of mandamus or otherwise.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Although there are four exceptions, none of them apply to 

allow the present case in the Claims Court. The first three 

involve subject matter different from what is at issue here. 

And the fourth, where it applies, routes review to the 

Veterans Court, 38 U.S.C. § 7252, whose decisions are 

reviewed by this court, 38 U.S.C. § 7292—not authorizing 

review in the Claims Court.

The review bar applies here because Mr. El Malik’s 

claim would require review of “questions of law and fact 

necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law that 

affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to 

veterans.” § 511(a). VA administered the independent 

living program for Mr. El Malik under 38 U.S.C. § 3120, 

SAppx2, which is part of chapter 31 (“Training and 

Rehabilitation for Veterans with Service-Connected 

Disabilities”) and which states that the Secretary may 

promote a veteran’s independent living by providing 

services “necessary to enable [a] veteran to achieve 

maximum independence in daily living.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 3120(d). The services Mr. El Malik receives under his 

VR&E plan—house modifications to improve his capacity 

to live safely and independently in his home—qualify as 

such benefits. 38 C.F.R. § 20.3(e). And Mr. El Malik’s 

contract action challenges VA’s decisions about carrying out 

a contract VA entered into to implement its duties and its 

authority under the law providing for these rehabilitation 

benefits. The contract action thus involves issues of law 

and fact necessary to the Secretary’s decision “under” the 

rehabilitation-program benefits law. § 511(a); compare 

Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (holding, 

before the 1988 VJRA provided for judicial review of 

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8 EL MALIK v. US

benefits claims, that what is now § 511(a) did not bar a 

constitutional challenge to a veterans-benefit statute, as it 

did not challenge an action “under” such a statute).

This straightforward application of § 511 makes 

particular sense because Mr. El Malik recognizes that this 

result does not leave him without review: He concedes that 

such review is available, though in a different forum. The 

implementing decisions that are at issue, because they are 

about benefits, come within the fourth exception to the bar 

on review—for “matters covered by chapter 72,” 38 U.S.C. 

§§ 7251–98, i.e., reviewable by the Veterans Court. It is not 

disputed that such an implementation decision, under 38 

U.S.C. § 3120(d) (incorporating review mechanisms 

specified in § 3107(c)), would be “review[able] on appeal to 

the Secretary,” whose “[f]inal decisions on such appeals 

shall be made by the Board” of Veterans Appeals. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7104(a); see 38 C.F.R. § 20.104(a)(6). A Board decision is 

then reviewable by the Veterans Court, nowhere else. 38 

U.S.C. § 7252(a). Not surprisingly, Mr. El Malik has used 

just that review process, and we have confirmed its 

availability in several nonprecedential decisions, including 

where we recognized the consequence of precluding a 

contract claim in the Claims Court. See El Malik v. 

McDonough, Nos. 23-1684, 23-2279, 2024 WL 1109263, at 

*3–4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 14, 2024); El Malik v. Shulkin, 684 F. 

App’x 961, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Sindram v. United States, 

130 F. App’x 456, 457–58 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also El Malik 

v. United States, 800 F. App’x 560, 561 (9th Cir. 2020)

(similar for claim under Federal Tort Claims Act).

Mr. El Malik, invoking the “law of the case” doctrine,

argues that the Claims Court could not properly draw this 

conclusion because, earlier, it had denied the government’s 

motion to dismiss on this ground. El Malik Informal

Opening Br. at 14–16. But the doctrine, as applied to a 

court’s pre-judgment reconsideration of its own earlier 

ruling, “is a principle that guides courts in the exercise of 

their discretion, not a binding rule,” and “rigid adherence 

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EL MALIK v. US 9

to rulings made at an earlier stage of a case is not required 

under all circumstances.” Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. 

Republic of Iraq, 24 F.4th 686, 697–98 (D.C. Cir. 2022); see 

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 506 (2011); Arizona 

v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618–19 (1983); Momenta 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 

809 F.3d 610, 619–20 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Claims Court 

at least had discretion here to dismiss the case when its full 

analysis led it to the firm conclusion that it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction, even if it had earlier drawn a contrary 

conclusion on a much more truncated analysis. See

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)

(explaining that courts “have an independent obligation to 

determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even 

in the absence of a challenge from any party,” and “when a 

federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its 

entirety”); Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction may be 

challenged at any time by the parties or by the court sua 

sponte.”); Rules of the Court of Federal Claims Rule 

12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 

action.”).

B

Although the foregoing discussion suffices for 

affirmance of the dismissal, we briefly address the Claims 

Court’s separate ruling that, even if it had jurisdiction over 

the breach-of-contract claim, Mr. El Malik had failed to 

state a claim on which relief could be granted. We agree 

with that ruling.

Mr. El Malik argues that the Claims Court erred in 

considering Mr. El Malik’s claim to be only that he was a 

third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce certain 

government obligations under the contract—rather than

“recognizing Mr. El Malik as a party to the contract with 

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10 EL MALIK v. US

specific performance obligations.” El Malik Informal

Opening Br. at 11. But in the Claims Court, Mr. El Malik 

did not plead or otherwise argue that he is a party to the 

contract with enforcement rights; rather, he asserted only 

that he is a third-party beneficiary. See, e.g., SAppx29 

(complaint: “the veteran is not authorized to enforce the 

contract”); SAppx39 (complaint: describing Mr. El Malik as 

“an intended and direct third party beneficiary” of the 

contract). Earlier, in fact, CBCA expressly determined that 

he is not a party to the contract, El Malik, CBCA 6600, 20-

1 BCA ¶ 37,536, at 3 (“Mr. El Malik is not a contractor nor 

did he sign the contract.”), and Mr. El Malik did not appeal 

that ruling and did not challenge that conclusion in the 

Claims Court. The contention that he is a party with rights 

as a promisee is forfeited. See California Ridge Wind 

Energy LLC v. United States, 959 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 

2020) (“We may deem an argument forfeited when a party 

raises it for the first time on appeal.”). And this is not a 

case in which the contention newly made on appeal is 

clearly correct. To the contrary, we see no basis for 

concluding that just because Moderno, as part of its 

performance obligation to VA, was to check with Mr. El 

Malik about the choice of fixtures, he thereby became a 

party to what on its face is a two-party contract between 

Moderno and the government.

In any event, the decisive flaw in Mr. El Malik’s 

contract complaint, as identified by the Claims Court, is 

independent of whether he was a party or a third-party 

beneficiary. That defect is that Mr. El Malik has not 

alleged anything that plausibly constitutes a government 

breach of any contractual obligation—which is a 

requirement for his breach claim (whether he is asserting 

breach as a party or as a third-party beneficiary). Sullivan 

v. United States, 625 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010). He 

asserts that the government’s closing out of the contract 

violated Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 

§ 4.804(c)(1), see El Malik Informal Opening Br. at 14, but 

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EL MALIK v. US 11

that is an assertion of a regulatory violation, not of a 

contract duty. Likewise, the government had the right to 

enforce Moderno’s duties against it, but such enforcement 

was not a contractual duty of the government. See 

Sullivan, 625 F.3d at 1381 (explaining that it is not a 

breach of contract for the government to “fail[] to enforce a 

contract provision that it was entitled to enforce”). 

Although Mr. El Malik relies on a sentence from Schneider 

Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364, 370 

(1984)—to the effect that a promisor has the same defenses 

against a third-party beneficiary as it has against the 

promisee in whose shoes the third-party beneficiary 

stands—that principle says nothing to identify what duties 

the government has under the contract. For those reasons, 

we see no error in the Claims Court’s conclusion that Mr. 

El Malik failed to plead a breach-of-contract claim against 

the government on which relief could be granted.

C

Mr. El Malik argues that the Claims Court abused its 

discretion in denying him leave to amend his complaint. El 

Malik Informal Opening Br. at 16. But he has not 

identified how any proposed amendment would cure either, 

let alone both, of the two determinative defects on which 

the Claims Court relied to dismiss the case.

III

We have considered Mr. El Malik’s other arguments 

and find none of them persuasive. We therefore affirm the 

Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and failure 

to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 

The parties shall bear their own costs. 

AFFIRMED

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