Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50040/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50040-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshuaron Antwionne Standifer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50040

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JOSHUARON ANTWIONNE STANDIFER, also known as Joshua Antwion

Standifer

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:08-CR-74-2

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Joshuaron Antwionne Standifer (“Appellant”) brings several

challenges to his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

crack cocaine. We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 28, 2008, police officers in Waco, Texas, participated in an

undercover drug buy between Appellant, his cousin Jeremy Standifer (“Jeremy”)

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 6, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

 Case: 09-50040 Document: 0051997278 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/06/2010
No. 09-50040

2

and a confidential paid informant named Denny Boyd (“Boyd”). Boyd set up the

buy with Jeremy, arranging to purchase 40 grams of crack cocaine for $2,000.

The meeting took place in the parking lot of a Walmart in Copperas Cove, Texas.

During the course of his drive to the Walmart parking lot Boyd had a series of

phone conversations with Jeremy about their progress on the drive and where

they would meet. Boyd testified that he spoke mainly to Jeremy but that he

spoke once directly to Appellant. 

When Appellant and Jeremy arrived at the Walmart they pulled up next

to Boyd’s car, and Appellant gestured that they should go over to the side of the

building, around a Hollywood Video store. Both vehicles parked, and Jeremy

exited the car and removed an envelope from the “breather cap” in the motor of

the car in which the cousins had arrived. According to Boyd, Appellant stayed

in the car and was looking around the area while Jeremy removed the drugs.

Jeremy got in Boyd’s car and asked Boyd if he had the money. Boyd showed

Jeremy a roll of bills and asked to see the drugs. Jeremy showed Boyd that the

envelope contained crack cocaine. Boyd began to count out the money, and then

the officers came in and arrested Jeremy, Appellant, and Boyd.

Appellant and Jeremy were charged in a superseding indictment with one

count of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and

one count of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). At trial Boyd testified as to his interactions

with the defendants and his observation of what took place during the exchange.

In addition, the Government presented as a witness a prisoner, Mark Johnson

(“Johnson”), who testified that he became acquainted with Appellant in prison

and that Appellant had told him that he and Jeremy went out of town on a drug

deal “to serve an undercover,” and that although the police had a “phone tap”

they had “nothing on him” because “the phone wasn’t in his name.” Johnson also

 Case: 09-50040 Document: 0051997278 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/06/2010
No. 09-50040

3

testified that Appellant told him they had agreed to deliver 56 grams of crack

but had only brought 47 to the buy, and that they thought they could “get over”

on Boyd because he was a drug user and wouldn’t have a scale with him. A crime

lab technician testified at trial that the envelope contained 26.41 grams of crack

cocaine. Records from the Motel 6 in Waco were introduced to prove that Jeremy

had rented rooms at the motel during the time that Boyd had been staying there.

The arresting officer testified that two cell phones were found in the car in which

Appellant and Jeremy had arrived at the scene of the buy. The phone records of

calls made to and from those phones were admitted as business records at trial.

The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the count of aiding and

abetting possession with intent to distribute but a verdict of guilty on the count

of conspiracy to commit possession with intent to distribute. The district court

sentenced Appellant to 110 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised

release. Appellant timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

Appellant challenges his conviction on several grounds. First, he argues

that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Second, he argues

that his acquittal on the charge of aiding and abetting possession with intent to

distribute is inconsistent with his conviction for conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute. Finally, Appellant challenges two of the district court’s

evidentiary rulings. We address each issue in turn.

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. We review a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction de novo.

United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 435 (5th Cir. 2009). We review the

evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict, deferring to the reasonable

inferences of fact drawn by the trial court,” and any conflicts in the evidence

must be resolved in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Lee, 217 F.3d 284,

 Case: 09-50040 Document: 0051997278 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/06/2010
No. 09-50040

4

288 (5th Cir. 2000). This standard of review remains the same whether the

evidence is direct or circumstantial. United States v. Bryant, 770 F.2d 1283, 1288

(5th Cir. 1985). The elements of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to

distribute under the statutes charged in this case are (1) an agreement with one

other person to possess with intent to distribute at least five grams of cocaine;

(2) defendant’s knowledge of the agreement, and (3) defendant’s voluntary

participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Percel, 553 F.3d 903, 910 (5th

Cir. 2008) (listing elements where amount required is 5 kilograms); 21 U.S.C.

841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (identifying quantity requirement of 5 grams). Agreement may

be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Percel, 553 F.3d at 910.

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient because (1) Boyd, the

confidential informant, was not credible, and (2) mere presence is insufficient to

support a conviction for conspiracy. As to Boyd, Appellant argues that Boyd was

not credible because he was a drug user (Boyd’s drug use came out at trial and

Appellant’s counsel cross-examined him about it) and because he was confused

about the dates of the arrest. It is well-established that credibility judgments

about witnesses are the province of the fact-finder – in this case, the jury. United

States v. Millsaps, 157 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1998). We “must accept all

credibility choices that tend to support the jury’s verdict.” United States v.

Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 936 (5th Cir. 1984). The lapses, if they are such, that

Appellant identifies are minor inconsistencies and a reasonable jury could have

found Boyd credible.

Appellant is correct that mere presence or association cannot support a

conviction for conspiracy. See United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1359, 1552 (5th

Cir. 1994). But in this case there was far more than mere presence. The evidence

showed that Appellant and Jeremy drove to meet Boyd together, and, based on

his conversation with Boyd and his overheard instruction that they would arrive

in 10 minutes, the evidence further showed that Appellant knew they were

 Case: 09-50040 Document: 0051997278 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/06/2010
No. 09-50040

 The two charges at issue in this case are (1) aiding and abetting (acquittal) and (2)

1

conspiracy (conviction). To prove aiding and abetting the Government must show that the

defendant: “(1) associated with a criminal venture; (2) participated in the venture; and (3)

sought by action to make the venture successful. To be guilty of possession with intent to

distribute, the defendant must have aided and abetted both the possession and the intent to

distribute.” United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). To

prove conspiracy, the Government must show (1) an agreement with at least one other person

to possess with intent to distribute, (2) defendant’s knowledge of the agreement, and (3)

defendant’s voluntary participation in the conspiracy. Percel, 553 F.3d at 910.

5

driving to meet someone in a Walmart parking lot. Upon arrival Appellant told

Boyd the cars should drive to a more secluded area of the parking lot. Although

Appellant stayed in the car while Jeremy delivered the drugs, he saw Jeremy

pull an envelope out of a hidden area of the car under the trunk and get into

Boyd’s car, and Boyd testified that Appellant appeared to be keeping watch

while the transaction took place. Boyd also testified that he had seen Appellant

and Jeremy in possession of marijuana and crack cocaine before the day in

question. Further, a prison inmate, Johnson, testified that Appellant had

discussed the case with him and admitted to participating in the deal. This

evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Appellant guilty of

conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Appellant next argues that his acquittal on the aiding and abetting charge

is inconsistent with his conviction on the conspiracy charge. “In considering

whether alleged inconsistent verdicts may be reconciled, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to upholding the jury’s decision by a finding of

consistency.” Ellis v. Weasler Eng’g, Inc., 258 F.3d 326, 343 (5th Cir. 2001).

Inconsistent verdicts do not generally require reversal of a criminal conviction.

United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 930 (5th Cir. 1998). This court has

specifically held that “even if the counts [are] overlapping, the law does not

require consistency of verdict between the separate counts.” United States v.

Pena, 949 F.2d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S.

57, 65 (1984)). The verdicts in this case are not necessarily inconsistent at all: 1

 Case: 09-50040 Document: 0051997278 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/06/2010
No. 09-50040

6

“To convict [the appellant] of conspiracy, the jury did not have to find that he

participated in the actual sale . . . . It had to find that he entered into an

agreement to participate in that sale, and there was sufficient evidence for it to

so conclude.” United States v. Fontenette, 1994 WL 93273, at *3 (5th Cir. March

9, 1994) (unpublished). Even if they were inconsistent however, we will not

generally reverse inconsistent verdicts, because they “may simply be a reflection

of the jury’s leniency.” Pena, 949 F.2d at 755. See also United States v. Pereira,

1997 WL 681129, at *5 (5th Cir. Oct. 10, 1997) (unpublished) (upholding

conviction on conspiracy and acquittal on aiding and abetting on the grounds

that inconsistent verdicts are to be tolerated because they may result from jury

nullification or compromise). We see no reason to reverse the conviction in this

case. 

Finally, Appellant brings two evidentiary challenges. We review

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Parsee, 178 F.3d 374,

379 (5th Cir. 1999). If we find abuse of discretion, we will apply a harmless error

analysis. United States v. Morgan, 505 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2007). Error is

harmless unless it substantially prejudices a defendant’s rights. Id.

Appellant’s first contention is that the district court abused its discretion

by admitting into evidence telephone records that were obtained from Sprint and

corresponded to the phone numbers of two phones found in the front seat of the

car in which Appellant and Jeremy arrived at the scene of the crime. Appellant

challenges both the relevancy and the authentication of these records. Neither

objection has merit. The phones were found in the front seat of the car in which

Appellant and Jeremy arrived at the scene, and there was testimony by

Appellant that he had spoken on a cell phone his cousin had handed him during

the drive and testimony by the confidential informant, Boyd, that he had spoken

to Appellant and Jeremy during their drive. The phone records tended to

corroborate that testimony and admitting them was therefore not an abuse of

 Case: 09-50040 Document: 0051997278 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/06/2010
No. 09-50040

7

discretion as to relevancy. Appellant also argues that the records were not

properly authenticated because the phone was not in his name. The phone,

however, was found in the car that Appellant and Jeremy drove to the scene of

the drug deal and Appellant admitted to speaking on the phone. It was not an

abuse of discretion to consider the records properly authenticated. Even if the

district court had abused its discretion as to relevancy or authentication, or both,

the error would be harmless given the wealth of evidence against Appellant. See

Morgan, 505 F.3d at 339.

Appellant’s second evidentiary contention is that the district court abused

its discretion in excluding a statement made by Jeremy that Appellant was not

involved in the crime. (The statement was allegedly made verbally at the time

of the arrest and later in a written statement). Appellant argues that the

statement should have been admitted as a statement against penal interest. A

statement will be admitted under the “against penal interest” exception to the

hearsay rule if certain conditions are met: “(1) The declarant must be

unavailable; (2) The statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to

criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have made

the statement unless he believed it to be true; and (3) The statement must be

corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.” United

States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1492 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. Evid.

804(b)(3).

Appellant attempted to call Jeremy to testify, but Jeremy invoked his 5th

Amendment right not to testify. Jeremy was therefore clearly unavailable. Fed.

R. Evid. 804(a)(1); see also United States v. Briscoe, 742 F.2d 842, 846 (5th Cir.

1984). This statement, however, was not clearly against penal interest, because

while it tended to exculpate Appellant it did not necessarily inculpate Jeremy.

More importantly, even if the district court did abuse its discretion in admitting

the statement, the error was harmless. Appellant drove with Jeremy to the site

 Case: 09-50040 Document: 0051997278 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/06/2010
No. 09-50040

8

of the drug deal, encouraged the informant to move to a more secluded area of

the parking lot, kept watch while the drug deal happened, and later confessed

in detail to a jailhouse informant. Appellant was therefore not substantially

prejudiced by any error in the exclusion of this statement. See Morgan, 505 F.3d

at 339.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

 Case: 09-50040 Document: 0051997278 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/06/2010