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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jackie Dee Willis
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NOV t1 O 1989 

f\OBBRTL ,HOECKER Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JACKIE DEE WILLIS, . 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 88-2718 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-74) 

Jeffrey D. Doniger of Doniger & . Vitek, 

Defendant-Appellant.· 

Denver, Colorado, for 

Michael P. Carey, Assistant U. S. Attorney (Michael J. Norton, 

Acting U. S. Attorney,. and Kathryn Meyer, Assistant u. s. Attorney, 

with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, HENLEY, * and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable J. Smith Henley, Senior United States 

Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 

Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2718 Document: 010110136502 Date Filed: 11/30/1989 Page: 1 
Jackie Dee Willis, defendant-appellant, appeals his conviction 

after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado1 for one count of conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute cocaine, 21 u.s.c. § 846 and 18 u.s.c. § 2; 

and one count of unlawful use of a communications facility to 

facilitate distribution of cocaine, 21 U.SeC. § 843(b). Defendant 

was sentenced to two years imprisonment for the conspiracy count, 

and five y~ars probation for the unlawful telephone use count. We 

affirm. 

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in (1) 

denying the defendant's motion _to sup~ress a wiretap; (2) denying 

the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) overruling 

the defendant's objection to the prosecution's introduction of 

rebuttal evidence; and (4) instructing the jury on the application 

of the law of complicity to the offense of conspiracy. 

FACTS 

Beginning June 9 and until July 23, 1987, a court-approved 

wiretap was in place on the telephone of Robert Moats, who resided 

at 1313 Williams Street, Condominium Unit 1502, in Denver, 

Colorado. Defendant, Jackie Dee Willis, lived in the same building 

in Unit 1204. Moats pleaded guilty to a drug related conspiracy 

charge prior to trial, and served as a government witness against 

Willis. 

According to the testimony of Moats, he was a drug dealer who 

had known defendant for approximately five years. Moats stored his 

cocaine in ·defendant's apartment, and as a storage fee he paid 

defendant $200.00 per month. In addition Moats deducted $200.00 

per month from an outstanding debt.that defendant owed him. The 

cocaine stored in defendant's apartment was kept in a wooden box 

1

The Honorable Zita L. Weinshienk, United States District 

Judge for the District of Colorado. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2718 Document: 010110136502 Date Filed: 11/30/1989 Page: 2 
along with a weighing scale. Moats further testified that 

defendant had sold cocaine for him and that he "believed'' defendant 

had been in defendant's apartment during at· least one drug 

transaction in July, 1987. 

Several intercepted telephone conversations were introduced 

into evidence by the government. Among these calls were: 

(1) A June 10, 1987 telephone call between Moats and 

defendant in which Moats said he wanted to bring a 

"plant" down to defendant's apartment. Moats testified 

"plant" was a code word for the box in which he kept his 

cocaine. 

(2) A telephone call, made a few days after the above 

call, between Moats and his accountant, Jeannie Brown, 

who advised Moats to keep his drugs at "Jack's" 

(defendant). 

(3) A June 29, 1987 telephone call between Moats and 

coconspirator Tom Mills in which they agreed to meet at 

defendant's apartment. Moats testified that at this 

meeting he sold cocaine to Mills. 

(4) A July 14, 1987 telephone call between Moats and 

defendant about which Moats testified that the phrase 

"watering cactuses," which was used, as well as a 

statement by the defendant that he would be out of town, 

meant his apartment would be available to Moats for his 

use. 

In addition, a conversation between Moats and Mills on July 

15, 1987 was overheard, taped, and introduced into evidence. In 

the conversation, the two discussed the fact that Moats kept his 

cocaine in defendant I s apartment. An. FBI agent also testified that 

he saw Moats and Mills later enter defendant's apartment. 

Karen Koday, Moats•s maid, testified that on one occasion she 

retrieved the box with the cocaine from defendant's apartment and 

that she had seen Moats take some cocaine from the box and give it 

to defendant. 

On June 26, 1987 Clive Duke and Moats were observed by a Drug 

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Enforcement Administration agent exiting the defendant's twelfth 

floor apartment. Duke testified he went with Moats to a twelfth 

floor unit to purchase cocaine in June of 1987. 

on July 23, 1987 search warrants were executed at the 

apartments of defendant and Moats. From defendant's apartment 

agents seized a wooden.box which contained more than 122 grams of 

cocaine. Cocaine was also found in Moats•s apartment. 

At trial, defendant acknowledged he used cocaine, and he knew 

Moats was a dealer, but said that he never _agreed to let Moats 

store cocaine in his apartment. Defendant also testified as to his 

financial problems, including his difficulty in paying his rent, 

which was $625. 00 per month. Defendant's landlady offered rebuttal 

testimony that defendant was chronically behind in his rent, but 

that in 1986 and 1987 he made four cash payments: $900.00 in 

November, 1986; plus $1,000.00 in February, $900.00 in May, and 

$650.00 in June, 1987. 

I. Minimization. 

Appellant first argues that the prosecution failed to use 

adequate efforts to minimize nonpertinent telephone calls during 

the course of the court-approved wiretap. Minimization is required 

by 18 u.s.c. § 2518(5). 2 As a result of the alleged failure, it is 

asserted that the motion to suppress evidence gained through the 

interception of telephone calls should have been granted. 

The starting point for review of the adequacy of minimization 

efforts is an examination of the reasonableness of the agents' 

efforts to refrain from monitoring conversations deemed 

nonpertinent to the investigation. See Scott v. United States, 436 

2

section 2518(5) provides in pertinent part that "every order 

and extension thereof ••• shall be conducted in such a way as to 

minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject 

t O 

o in t ercep t' ion ..•• II 

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Appellate Case: 88-2718 Document: 010110136502 Date Filed: 11/30/1989 Page: 4 
U.S. 128, 139 (1978); United States v. Apodaca, 820 F.2d 348, 350 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 s. ct. 245 (1987). Reasonableness 

must be determined from the fact~ of each case. United states v. 

Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 869 (5th Cir. 1978). 

We review this issue from two perspectives. First, we examine 

the general minimization effort involved in the wiretap of Robert 

Moats•s telephone. 3 Next, we look at the particular efforts to 

minimize made specifically with regard to defendant. 

The general wiretap of Moats•s telephone complied with 

§ 2518(5). During.the wiretap, 1643 interception~ took place. 

One hundred sixty-three of these calls ten per cent - were 

minimized. If we subtract pertinent calls and misdialed calls, 

neither of which need to be minimized, we are left with 537 

telephone calls, or an approximate thirty per cent minimization 

effort. If we further subtract the calls deemed nonpertinent which 

lasted less·than two minutes, which we think is appropriate, see 

Apodaca, 820 F.2d at 348, 350 n.3; cf. United States v. Losing. 560 

F.2d 906, 909 n.1 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 

(1978) (interception of the first two-three minutes of calls in 

certain conspiracy investigations complies with§ 2518(5)), we are 

left with an approximate minimization effort of seventy per cent. 

We see nothing which indicates that these statistics are 

anything short of reasonable. 

3

Although we see a potential standing problem were appellant 

to base his appeal on the minimization efforts of the agents for 

telephone calls in which he was not involved, such is not the case 

here. Appellant relies primarily on the interception of his eight 

telephone calls. Cf~ United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 

(9th Cir.1977) (court need not address standing issue when all 

calls during a wiretap could have been intercepted consistent with 

minimization requirements). We are convinced that no minimization 

problem exists as to the general wiretap, and we do not reach any 

issue of standing in this regard. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2718 Document: 010110136502 Date Filed: 11/30/1989 Page: 5 
Next, we turn to minimization as it relates specifically to 

defendant. We believe this to be the primary inquiry for this 

court as we consider minimization and appellant's case. Here, the 

question is whether such efforts were reasonable despite the fact 

that none of the eight calls involving defendant was minimized, 

with only two of the eight deemed pertinent by the investigation 

agents. 

Defendant draws our attention to but one telephone call of the 

eight intercepted involving him as being offensive to the 

minimization requirements of§ 2518(5). Although transgression of 

minimization requirements on a single call in some future case 

might be enough to establish a violation of the statute, 4 a review 

of the totality of the circumstances does not indicate anything 

about this call so questionable as to require us long to ponder the 

question. 

We turn then to the call which was intercepted on June 9, 

1987, day one of the court-approved wiretap. Detective Thomas R. 

Fisher, Denver Police Department, testified that the call, although 

"innocuous," was not minimized. Fisher testified that the call was 

not minimized because it was received at the beginning of the 

wiretap when monitors were attempting to learn and identify code 

words. 

It has been recognized that monitors may need to listen for 

longer periods of time in the early stages of such investigations 

in order to determine identity of speakers and significance of 

conversations. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 141. We find nothing which 

indicates that the district court did not carefully consider the 

4

But see United states v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535, 540 (6th cir. 

1985) (citing United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 391 (N.D. 

Ille), aff 0 d in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 690 F.2d 

1217, 1230 (7th Ciro 1982)) (pattern of abuse required to violate 

minimization requirements). 

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minimization issue in the suppression hearing, nor do we see 

anything clearly erroneous about the trial court's determination 

that minimization efforts were reasonable. 

once the government has made a prima facie showing of 

reasonable minimization, the burden then shifts to the defendant 

to show more effective minimization could have taken place. United 

States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 

U. s. 858 ( 1975) • The defendant has failed to point to any specific 

way in which more effective minimization could have taken place, 

short of minimizing the particular call in question on the first 

day of the wiretap Such ordered conduct suggested ex post facto 

is not required of law enforcement officials by the statute. 

Law enforcement officers need reasonable latitude to pursue 

investigatory techniques in order to uncover surreptitious criminal 

activity. In this information age, with the potential for the 

planning and the perpetration of criminal activities via telephones 

and other communications devices so great, procedures exist whereby 

investigators may go to a United States district judge and upon a 

showing of probable cause gain temporary permission to monitor the 

telephone calls of individuals believed involved in criminal 

activity. See, ~, 18 u.s.c. § 2518. If the courts were to find 

the facts at bar represented unreasonable conduct, it might serve 

to handcuff law enforcement_ personnel. See United States v. Cox, 

567 F.2d 930, 933 (10th Cir~ 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 

(1978) (an overly restrictive interpretation of the minimization 

requirement could make it impossible to use this device in 

connection with the investigation of organized criminal 

conspiracies). This we decline to do. 

II. Motions for Acquittal . 

. (a) Conspiracy Count. Appellant next asserts that the 

prosecution failed to prove that he had knowledge of the basic 

elements of the conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The argument is 

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therefore made that the denial of the motion for acquittal was 

error and must lead to reversal. 

As stated, there was testimony by Moats that appellant 

actually sold cocaine for him and knowingly allowed cocaine to be 

stored in his. apartment. In criminal cases, there is a single test 

that applies in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. "The 

evidence both direct and circumstantial, together with the 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom is ~ufficient if, 

when taken in the light most favorable to the government, a 

reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt." United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (10th Cir.), 

ceit. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (198~). 

"'The connection of the defendant to the conspiracy need only 

be slight, if there is sufficient evidence to establish that 

connection beyond a reasonable doubt."' United states v. Savaiano, 

843 F.2d 1280, 1294 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Batimana, 

623 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038 

(1980)), cert. denied, 109 s. ct. 99 (1988). A jury could quite 

rationally make the inference that an individual who sells and 

stores cocaine for someone he knows to be a drug dealer is aware 

of the nature of the dealer's business. Although a jury could also 

conclude otherwise, the role of this court is not to second-guess 

such a finding. 

(b) .Telephone Count. With regard to the telephone-use count 

and the motion for acquittal, as mentioned, there was admitted into 

evidence a telephone call between Moats and appellant on June 10, 

1987, during which discussion took place involving the code word 

"plant," which Moats testified signaled Moats' s desire to bring his 

cocaine down to appellant's apartment. Hin order to obtain a 

conviction under 21 u.s.c. § 843(b), the government must prove (1) 

knowing or intentional (2) use of a communications facility (3) to 

commit, cause or facilitate the commission of a drug felony. 11 

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United States v. Johnstone, 856 F.2d 539, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1988). 

The evidence of actual use of the telephone in this conversation 

is enough to satisfy the government's burden here. See, ~, 

United states v. Watson. 594 F.2d 1330, 1343 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979). 

on the evidence presented, it is reasonable to conclude that 

defendant's telephone conversation of June 10, 1987 satisfied all 

necessary elements. When defendant utilized the telephone to 

converse with Moats about a "plant" (box of cocaine) which Moats 

wished to bring to defendant's apartment, criteria one and two were 

clearly satisfied. Furthermore, in allowing the use of his 

residence for the purpose of cocaine storage, defendant clearly 

"commit[ted), cause[d], or facilitate[d] the commission of a drug 

felony." Johnstone, 856 F.2d at 542-43. Therefore, viewing the 

conspiracy and telephone use motions for acquittal in the light 

most favorable to the government, 0 as we must, we believe a 

reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1531. 

III. Rebuttal Testimony. 

Next, appellant argues that the admission of testimony by 

uefendant•s landlady that defendant paid his rent at certain times 

with large amounts of cash was prejudicial in excess of probative 

value. The prosecution offered this testimony to rebut appellant's 

claim that he never agreed to Moats' s storing cocaine in his 

apartment. 

Although we do not find the rebuttal testimony particularly 

probative on the storage issue, we also do not find it irrelevant. 

The admission of rebuttal testimony rests within the sound 

discretion of the trial judge. United states v. Posey. 647 F.2d 

· 1048, 1052 {10th Cir. 1981). While this evidence may be somewhat 

tenuous, its admission does not constitute an abuse of discretion 

since it was offered to rebut defendant's denial of an agreement 

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to store cocaine. See, ~, United States v. Seely. 570 F. 2d 322, 

324 (10th Cir. 1978). Even assuming that the admission of the 

rebuttal testimony was erroneous, it was not so prejudicial as to 

warrant reversal, given the other evidence in the case. See United 

States v. Delvecchio, 816 F.2d 859, 864 (2d Cir. 1987); Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 52(a). 

JURY INSTRUCTIONS 

Finally, appellant argues that the instruction to the jury on 

aiding and abetting was erroneous because it did not include the 

necessary element that the appellant knew of the ·existence of the 

conspiracy at the time of his acts. 

It is fundamental that an essential element of aiding and 

abetting a conspiracy is that the defendant have knowledge of the 

conspiracy's existence at the time he performs acts which aid the 

conspiracy. United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 309-10 (7th 

Cir. 1984). We therefore agree that were we to find such a lack 

of knowledge, we would be bound to remand. 

The following instructions, or parts thereof, are relevant to 

the inquiry before us. 

No. 19 

With respect to each defendant, the Government must 

prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt 

to establish the conspiracy charged: 

1. a· conspiracy, as defined in this instruction, 

existed; 

2. the defendant knew at least the essential objectives 

of the conspiracy; and 

3. the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part 

of the conspiracy. 

No. 23 

In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime, 

it is necessary that the accused willfully associate 

himself in some way with the criminal venture, and 

willfully participate in it as he would in something he 

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Appellate Case: 88-2718 Document: 010110136502 Date Filed: 11/30/1989 Page: 10 
wishes to bring about; that is to say, that he willfully 

seek by some act of his to make the criminal venture 

succeed. 

No. 24 

Mere presence at the scene of the crime and 

knowledge that a crime is being committed are not 

sufficient to establish that the defendant aided and 

abetted the crime, unless you find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant was a participant and not merely 

a knowing spectator. 

No. 25 

The court has ruled as a matter of law that 

Instructions Nos. 22, 23, and 24 apply only to Count One 

[conspiracy count] and not to Counts Four, Five, and 

Fourteen [other counts] of the indictment. 

The focus of appellant's complaint involves Instruction No. 

2 3, the aiding and abetting instruction. Appellant contends it was 

error for the court not to specifically instruct the jury that the 

"criminal venture" referred to in Instruction No. 23 was the crime · 

of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Absent such an instruction, 

argues appellant, a reasonable jury could have found him guilty of 

· conspiracy to distribute cocaine even if he had no knowledge 

concerning any conspiracy to distribute cocaine. "The jury could 

reasonably have concluded that a defendant who merely associated 

himself with the criminal venture of possessing cocaine would by 

operation of the complicity instruction be a complicitor to the 

offense of conspiracy to distribute cocaine," argues defendant in 

his brief. 

We disagree. Although the instruction might have been 

tailored to be more precise, jury instructions are not mathematical 

equations to be computed with rigid• formality. So long as the 

relevant instructions on the whole offered the jury an accurate 

statement of the law - which we believe was the case here - we 

will not disturb the district court's determination on 

instructions. See United ·states v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 673 

(10th Cir. 1989). 

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our standard of review is not whether an instruction was 

faultless in every respect, but whether the jury, considering the 

instructions as a whole, was misled. "'Thus, only in those cases 

where the reviewing court has a substantial doubt whether the jury 

was fairly guided in its deliberations should the judgment be 

disturbed. 1 11 Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 174 

(10th cir. 1982) (quoting Mid Texas Communications v. American Tel. 

& Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1390 n.16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 

U.S. 912 (1980)). 

The government maintains that Instruction No. 23 at a minimum 

implicitly requires a, finding by the jury that defendant had 

knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy. In support of this 

position, the government points to Instruction No. 25 which limited 

Instruction No. 23 to the conspiracy charge. 

since the jury was instructed that the aiding and abetting 

language of Instruction No. 23 applied specifically to the 

conspiracy count, we do not think it unreasonable to assume that 

the jury understood that if it were to find appellant guilty of 

aiding and abetting a conspiracy, it was essential that it 

determine that defendant was aware of the conspiracy. 

Instruction No. 24 was also limited specifically to the 

conspiracy charge, and we believe this further buttresses the 

government's position. This instruction, as we read it, requires 

the jury to find that a defendant is an aider and abettor only if 

he is a participant and "not merely a knowing spectator. " In order 

to participate and be more than a knowing spectator, we believe one 

must be aware of the existence of the underlying criminal venture, 

in this case conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 

We therefore _believe, looking at the instructions "as a 

whole, 11 id., that the_ average juror would conclude that the 

criminal venture involved was conspiracy to distribute cocaine, not 

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the simple possession of cocaine. We find no likelihood that the 

jury was misled. 

Assuming arguendo, however, that the instruc~ion was error, 

the question is whether prejudice to appellant resulted therefrom. 

See Cardall, 885 F.2d at 673. Given the evidence at trial, 

including testimony that the defendant stored anq sold for, 

purchased from, and used cocaine with Moats, as well as his 

knowledge· that Moats was a cocaine dealer, we find no such 

prejudice. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). We believe appellant was 

convicted by a jury based on evidence which led it to believe 

either that appellant was a conspirator himself, or that he was so 

active in, and cognizant of, Moats•s illicit activities as to be 

convicted for aiding and abetting the conspiracy. 

For the reasons set out above, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed. 

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