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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Scott A. Warner
Appellant

Document Text:

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... FILED 

United St.aw~. C., m oi Apper.ls 

Tenth circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 2 21991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

SCOTT A. WARNER, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 90-3107 

(D.C. No. 89-20042-01) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges and CHRISTENSEN, 

District Judge.** 

Defendant-appellant Scott A. Warner appeals from the 

imposition of an eighty-seven month prison sentence following his 

plea of guilty to possession of 112 grams of cocaine with intent 

to distribute and conspiracy, 21 u.s.c. SS 84l(a)(l) & 846. Our 

jurisdiction over this direct criminal appeal arises under 28 

u.s.c. S 1291. We affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-3107 Document: 010110034273 Date Filed: 04/22/1991 Page: 1 
I. 

In January 1989, defendant made arrangements with a friend to 

receive an express mail package containing cocaine from a suburb 

of Miami, Florida; he was arrested following delivery of that 

package. While this specific 112-gram shipment gave rise to 

defendant's conviction, the presentence report calculated that 

defendant's conviction was part of an ongoing course of criminal 

conduct involving some 993 grams of cocaine. The presentence 

report based this determination on several factors. First, a 

former associate of defendant testified that defendant used a 

similar scheme in 1986 and 1987 to ship over three pounds of 

cocaine to addresses in Kansas, Nebraska and Missouri. Second, a 

search of defendant's residence in 1988 following his arrest on a 

state drug charge revealed several airline boarding passes to and 

from Miami and fifteen express mail receipts addressed to Miami 

bearing defendant's alias. It was believed that these shipments 

contained payments for fifteen drug transactions. Third, postal 

files revealed five express mail labels which fit the drug package 

profile addressed to defendant's residence under his alias. The 

presentence report calculated the total amount of cocaine involved 

in this enterprise by multiplying the fifteen transactions 

evidenced by the express mail labels found in defendant's 

residance by an estimated two ounces per transaction to arrive at 

a total amount of 993.9 grams. 

Defendant argues .that the district court erred in finding 

that 993 grams of cocaine were involved in the course of his 

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criminal conduct. In calculating the appropriate Guideline range 

for a drug offense, the district court is not restricted only to 

the quantity of drugs associated with the offense of conviction, 

but may include "'all such acts and omissions that were part of 

the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense 

of conviction.'" United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1561 

(10th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States Sentencing Commission, 

Guidelines Manual, S 1B1.3(a)(2) (Nov. 1990)). When a defendant 

is convicted of a drug distribution offense, quantities of drugs 

not specified in the conviction, but part of the same course of 

conduct, are included in determining the offense level. Id. at 

1561-62; United States v. Ware, 903 F.2d 1538, 1542 (10th Cir. 

1990). Nevertheless, 

the guidelines do not permit the district court to hold 

a defendant responsible for a specific quantity of drugs 

unless the court can conclude the defendant is more 

likely than not actually responsible for a quantity for 

which the defendant is being held responsible. If the 

exact amount cannot be determined, an estimate will 

suffice, but ... a preponderance of the evidence must 

support the estimate. 

United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990) 

(emphasis in original). Findings of a district court applying the 

sentencing guidelines are reviewed for clear error. Rutter, 897 

F.2d at 1560. 

We hold that the district court was not clearly erroneous in 

determining that a preponderance of the evidence supported the 

probation office determination that defendant engaged in fifteen 

prior cocaine transactions of at least two ounces each. However, 

we find that the presentence report incorrectly calculated the 

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Appellate Case: 90-3107 Document: 010110034273 Date Filed: 04/22/1991 Page: 3 
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• . amount of cocaine involved in the course of defendant's criminal 

conduct. Defendant was convicted for possession of 112.1 grams of 

cocaine with intent to distribute. Additionally, the district 

court found that, in the course of his criminal conduct, defendant 

was involved in 'fifteen drug transactions of two ounces each. 

Utilizing the conversion factor of 28.35 grams to each ounce,~ 

u.s.s.G. § 201.1, comment. (n.10), defendant is responsible for an 

additional 850.50 grams of cocaine in addition to the offense of 

conviction. Thus, the quantity of cocaine used to arrive at 

defendant's base offense level was 962.6 grams, not 993.9 as 

stated in the presence report. This error does not effect 

defendant's sentence, however, because the 962.6 gram figure still 

falls within u.s.s.G. § 2Dl.l(c)(9) (500gm.-2kg.), the base 

offense level under which defendant was sentenced. See United 

States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir. 1990). We 

therefore cannot say that the district court was clearly erroneous 

in sentencing defendant using a base offense level of 26. See 

u.s.s.G. s 2Dl.l(c)(9). 

II. 

Defendant's presentence report recommended against a twolevel downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The 

report based this recommendation on the fact that defendant was 

arrested for the instant offense while on bond from state drug and 

assault charges, that defendant had not been forthcoming in 

providing information to the probation office and that he failed 

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• to report for five urine audits ordered as a condition of release. 

In response, defendant argued that a debriefing videotape made 

after his arrest constituted ipso facto proof of his acceptance of 

responsibility, that he in fact provided the probation office with 

all requested information and that his failure to show up for his 

urine audits resulted from a miscommunication. 

Defendant argues that the district court erred in declining 

to accord a two-level reduction in offense level on the basis of 

acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines provide for a twolevel reduction in the offense level "[i]f the defendant clearly 

demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal 

responsibility for his criminal conduct." u.s.s.G. S 3El.1 The 

defendant bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance his 

entitlement to such a reduction. United States v. Wach, 907 F.2d 

1038, 1040 (10th Cir. 1990). While the district court must 

provide the defendant with an opportunity to controvert the 

conclusion in the presentence report that he failed to accept 

responsibility, such a finding "cannot be overcome merely by a 

perfunctory expression of regret before the district court at 

sentencing." Id. We review a district court's determination on 

whether a defendant has accepted responsibility for clear error. 

United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 712 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Certainly, the evidence concerning defendant's acceptance of 

responsibility is subject to contrary interpretations. 

Nevertheless, we cannot say that the district court was clearly 

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Appellate Case: 90-3107 Document: 010110034273 Date Filed: 04/22/1991 Page: 5 
erroneous in adopting the interpretation put forward by probation 

office instead of the one advanced by defendant. 

III. 

In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the government 

promised not to oppose a two-level offense level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, not to argue for an enhancement of 

sentence based on other alleged drug activity and to dismiss the 

second count of the indictment alleging use of a conununication 

facility in connection with a drug crime under 21 u.s.c. S 843(b). 

After compilation of the presentence report, defendant 

specifically challenged the probation office's conclusion that he 

had not accepted responsibility and that his course of criminal 

conduct encompassed 993 grams of cocaine. The government in turn 

presented testimony in support of the factual allegations 

contained in the presentence report. 

Defendant contends that the government violated its plea 

agreement by offering testimony on his acceptance of 

responsibility and course of criminal conduct. When the 

government obtains a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement, 

such agreement must be fulfilled in order to maintain the 

integrity of the plea. United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856 

(10th Cir. 1990). A plea agreement must be construed in 

accordance with what the defendant "'reasonably understood'" when 

he entered his plea. Id. (quoting United States v. Shorteeth, 887 

F.2d 253, 256 (10th Cir. 1989)). On the other hand, a promise to 

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Appellate Case: 90-3107 Document: 010110034273 Date Filed: 04/22/1991 Page: 6 
• recommend a reduction or not to recommend an increase does not 

oblige the government to "stand mute in the face of incorrect or 

misleading testimony offered before the trial court." Id. The 

government bears the responsibility of bringing to the court's 

attention information which prevents its sentencing decision from 

being tainted by incomplete and inaccurate information; provision 

of such information does not violate a plea agreement where the 

prosecutor does not attempt to characterize or argue its effect to 

the sentencing judge. Id. at 856-57. 

In the instant case, defendant could not reasonably have 

interpreted the plea agreement as requiring the government to 

stand silent on factual challenges to the presentence report. Had 

the government advocated a particular position with respect to 

whether defendant should be credited for acceptance of 

responsibility or his sentence enhanced on the basis of his 

uncharged criminal conduct, the plea agreement clearly would have 

been violated. However, the government merely fulfilled its 

ethical obligation to prevent the court from being misled by 

inaccurate and incomplete information. See Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 

856-57. Such conduct did not violate the plea agreement. 

IV. 

Defendant argues that the district court violated his right 

to due process by granting the government's motion to continue the 

sentencing hearing. A court's decision to grant or deny a 

continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United 

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.. States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1475 (10th Cir. 1990) (en bane). 

We find no such abuse of discretion. 

v. 

Defendant contends that, assuming his state drug conviction 

was part of the course of conduct underlying his federal charge, 

it was error to use that state conviction in calculating his 

criminal history category. Defendant does not cite, nor can we 

find, any authority that criminal conduct relevant to the course 

of conduct inquiry cannot also be utilized in determining a 

defendant's criminal history category. The Guidelines suggest 

otherwise. See u.s.s.G. § 4Al.1. Accordingly, we reject this 

argument as meritless. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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