Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01516/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01516-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Association of American Railroads
Intervenor
National Association of Reversionary Property Owners
Petitioner
Rails to Trails Conservancy
Intervenor
Surface Transportation Board
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 1, 1998 Decided September 22, 1998

No. 97-1516

National Association of Reversionary Property Owners,

Petitioner

v.

Surface Transportation Board and

United States of America,

Respondents

Association of American Railroads and

Rails to Trails Conservancy,

Intervenors

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Surface Transportation Board

Cynthia L. Amara argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

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Evelyn G. Kitay, Attorney, Surface Transportation Board,

argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief

were Henri F. Rush, General Counsel, and Martin W. Matzen, Attorney, United States Department of Justice.

Louis P. Warchot and Kenneth P. Kolson were on the brief

for intervenor Association of American Railroads.

Andrea Ferster and Charles H. Montange were on the

brief for intervenor Rails to Trails Conservancy.

Before: Wald, Williams and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: In 1996, the Surface Transportation

Board ("STB" or "Board") issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking addressing the process by which railroad corridors

are formally abandoned and may be opened to subsequent

use as trails. The National Association of Reversionary

Property Owners ("NARPO") submitted comments asking the

STB to require that individual notice be provided abutting

landowners of trail conversion proposals. The STB declined

to provide for such notice in its Final Rule, and denied

NARPO's petition for reconsideration. NARPO petitioned

this court for review, claiming that such notice is required by

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The STB

and the United States moved to dismiss the petition as

untimely, because the STB's predecessor, the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), had rejected individual notice in

a previous rulemaking, and the rulemaking under review did

not reopen that issue. We conclude that we are without

jurisdiction to review NARPO's claim, and therefore grant

the motion to dismiss.

I. Background

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Rail carriers acquire the right to use the land over which

railroad cars travel in a variety of ways. Some land is

obtained in fee simple, but often a railroad company holds a

lesser interest in the land such as an easement or a fee simple

determinable. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d

694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1988). We refer to such a right to use the

land as a right-of-way, and any underlying interest maintained by the grantor as a reversionary interest. In the

beginning of the railroad era, state property law determined

when a railroad company's right-of-way lapsed and the original grantor regained full ownership and control. Long ago,

however, the federal government assumed a role in that

process with passage of the Transportation Act of 1920, ch.

91, s 402, 41 Stat. 456, 477-78. See Chicago & N.W. Transp.

Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 319-20 (1981). A

railroad may no longer abandon or discontinue use of a

railroad corridor without the STB's approval.1 See 49 U.S.C.

s 10903(a)(1), (d); National Wildlife Fed'n, 850 F.2d at 704.

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latory jurisdiction ends.2 At that point state property law

returns to the foreground and controls the disposition of the

land. See id.

The National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 created the current version of the so-called "rails to trails" program. See Pub. L. No. 98-11, s 208, 97 Stat. 42, 48 (codified

as amended at 16 U.S.C. s 1247(d)) ("Trails Act").3 Under

__________

1 The word "abandon" has a precise meaning in this regulatory

scheme. An abandoned railroad corridor is one that is no longer

used for rail service and is removed from the national transportation system. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5-6 n.3 (1990). A

line that is no longer in use, but has not been officially abandoned,

may be reactivated later and is termed "discontinued." See id.

2 The Board authorizes abandonment when it "finds that the

present or future public convenience and necessity require or

permit the abandonment...." 49 U.S.C. s 10903(d).

3 Section 1247(d) states in full:

The Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Surface

Transportation Board, and the Secretary of the Interior, in

administering the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 [45 U.S.C.A. s 801 et seq.], shall encourage

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the program, railroad corridors otherwise ripe for abandonment may be converted to trails for recreational use. STB

regulations govern the process of abandonment and trail

conversion. As revised by the 1996 rulemaking under review

here they provide for the following process.4

When a railroad wishes to abandon a corridor it files a

Notice of Intent with the STB. See 49 C.F.R. s 1152.20(a)(1).

The railroad must provide a copy of the Notice to significant

users of the railroad, certain state entities including the

governor, certain federal entities, Amtrak (if it uses the line),

the Railroad Labor Executives' Association, and relevant

railway labor organizations. See 49 C.F.R. s 1152.20(a)(2).

__________

State and local agencies and private interests to establish

appropriate trails using the provisions of such programs. Consistent with the purposes of that Act, and in furtherance of the

national policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way

for future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation

use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad

rights-of-way pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or

otherwise in a manner consistent with this chapter, if such

interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for

railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for

purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the

use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. If a State,

political subdivision, or qualified private organization is prepared to assume full responsibility for management of such

rights-of-way and for any legal liability arising out of such

transfer or use, and for the payment of any and all taxes that

may be levied or assessed against such rights-of-way, then the

Board shall impose such terms and conditions as a requirement

of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a manner

consistent with this chapter, and shall not permit abandonment

or discontinuance inconsistent or disruptive of such use.

4 When a railroad seeks abandonment authorization under exemption procedures pursuant to 49 U.S.C. s 10502 (available when no

local traffic has run on the line in at least two years), the process is

less involved in some respects from the one we describe. See 49

C.F.R. ss 1152.50, 1152.60. The Trails Act rules of 49 C.F.R.

s 1152.29 remain fully applicable. 49 C.F.R. s 1152.50(a)(2).

The Notice must also be posted in relevant railroad stations

and published in a newspaper once a week for three weeks in

each affected county. See 49 C.F.R. s 1152.20(a)(3), (4). The

Notice must include, inter alia, the beginning and ending

railroad mileposts, the names of the stations affected, and the

zip codes traversed. It must inform readers that "[a]ny

interested person ... may file with the Surface Transportation Board written comments concerning the proposed abandonment ... or protests to it," that such comments must be

filed within forty-five days of the application, that "the line

may be suitable for other public use, including interim trail

use," 5 and that "[p]ersons opposing the proposed abandonment ... that do wish to participate actively and fully in the

process should file a protest." See 49 C.F.R. s 1152.21.

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The railroad then files an application for abandonment with

the Board fifteen to thirty days after the Notice of Intent.

See 49 C.F.R. ss 1152.20(b), 1152.24(a). The application

must be served on some of the same state entities that

receive the Notice of Intent and must be available for inspection at relevant railroad stations. See 49 C.F.R. s 1152.24(c).

Within twenty days the Board publishes notice of the

application in the Federal Register. See 49 C.F.R.

s 1152.24(e)(2). The Federal Register notice explains how

anyone can file a comment or protest. See 49 C.F.R.

s 1152.22(i).

If a state or local government, or a private entity, is

interested in converting the railroad corridor to a trail, it

must submit a trail use proposal within forty-five days of the

filing of the abandonment application. See 49 C.F.R.

s 1152.29(b)(1). Reflecting the statutory criteria of the Trails

Act, proposals must include a statement of willingness to

manage the corridor, assume liability, and pay taxes. See 49

C.F.R. s 1152.29(a).6

__________

5 The use is deemed "interim" because the corridor may be

returned to active railroad use in the future. See Birt v. STB, 90

F.3d 580, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

6 Offers of financial assistance and public use proposals may also

be filed. See 49 U.S.C. ss 10904, 10905; 49 C.F.R. ss 1152.27,

Within 110 days of the filing of the application, the Board

determines whether the corridor qualifies for abandonment.

See 49 C.F.R. s 1152.26(a). If abandonment conditions are

met (and the line is not maintained pursuant to a subsidy or

sale agreement under 49 C.F.R. s 1152.27, covering offers of

financial assistance), the STB must determine whether any

trail use proposals filed conform to s 1152.29(a). If not, the

Board authorizes the railroad to abandon the line.7 If there

is a qualifying trail use proposal, the railroad may decide

whether to attempt to negotiate a trail use agreement with

the prospective trail operator. See 49 C.F.R. s 1152.29(b)(1),

(d)(1). If the railroad declines that option, abandonment is

authorized. See 49 C.F.R. s 1152.29(b)(1)(ii). If negotiations

prove unsuccessful, the railroad is authorized to abandon the

line after 180 days. See 49 C.F.R. s 1152.29(c). If an

agreement is reached the corridor becomes a trail and abandonment is not authorized.

In this way, the conversion from railroad to trail use blocks

the abandonment of the corridor even though the conditions

for abandonment are otherwise met. But for the negotiation

of a trail use agreement, state property law would be revived

and, possibly, trigger the extinguishment of rights-of-way and

the vesting of reversionary interests. When such a reversion

is blocked, the interim trail use has been deemed a taking, see

Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550, 1552 (Fed.

Cir. 1996) (in banc), and the holder of a reversionary interest

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__________

1152.28. These involve alternative uses for rights-of-way and the

opportunity for any person to avoid abandonment by subsidizing or

purchasing the line. They are not at issue in this case.

7 The railroad is given the option of abandoning the corridor, but

is not required to do so. If the railroad exercises its authority, it

must file a notice of consummation with the STB. 49 C.F.R.

ss 1152.29(e)(2), 1152.50(e). The line is then abandoned and federal jurisdiction over the corridor ends. If a notice of consummation

is not filed within one year, abandonment authorization expires

(unless there are legal or regulatory barriers to consummation) and

the line cannot be abandoned without a new proceeding. 49 C.F.R.

s 1152.29(e)(2).

tion in the United States Court of Federal Claims under 28

U.S.C. s 1491(a)(1) (the Tucker Act). See Preseault v. ICC,

494 U.S. 1, 4-5(1990).

B. Rulemaking Proceedings

In 1986 the ICC adopted rules to implement the Trails Act.

See Rail Abandonments--Use of Rights-Of-Way as Trails

(49 CFR Parts 1105 & 1152), 2 I.C.C.2d 591 (1986). The

notice provisions did not (as they do not today) provide for

individual notice to holders of reversionary interests of abandonment proceedings, or of the subset of abandonment proceedings involving interim trail use proposals.

Two years later, NARPO asked the ICC to consider whether several revisions should be made in the rules, including

whether trail groups making rails to trails proposals should

be required to give individualized notice to abutting landowners. NARPO's petition was granted and the 1986 rulemaking

was reopened. See Rail Abandonments--Use of Rights-ofWay as Trails--Supplemental Trails Act Procedures, Ex

Parte No. 274 (Sub-No. 13), 1988 ICC WL 224273, at *2 (May

23, 1988) ("we request comments on NARPO's suggestion

that trail groups identify themselves to reversionary interest

holders, and how this might be implemented"). One year

later, however, the ICC decided not to change its original

notice requirements in this respect. See Rail Abandonments--Use of Rights-of-Way as Trails--Supplemental

Trails Act Procedures, Ex Parte No. 274 (Sub-No. 13), 1989

ICC WL 238631 (May 18, 1989). The ICC explained that

NARPO's alleged notice deficiency was not a real problem

because of already available notice mechanisms, "abundant

local publicity about trail proposals," and frequent local public

hearings, and that "any requirement to identify, locate and

notify reversionary interest holders--individually or through

a general published notice--would be a time-consuming, expensive and burdensome task." Id. at *5 & n.7. Further,

such individualized notice did not fit with "our limited role

and responsibilities under the Trails Act" and "would be

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inconsistent with the purposes of the Trails Act, which is to

encourage and facilitate the interim use as trails of railroad

rights-of-way that might otherwise be abandoned." Id. at *4,

*5. The Commission reiterated that reasoning in denying

NARPO's petition for reconsideration.8 See Rail Abandonments--Use of Rights-of-Way as Trails--Supplemental

Trails Act Procedures, Ex Parte No. 274 (Sub-No. 13), 1990

ICC WL 287321 (Feb. 13, 1990). NARPO did not seek

judicial review.

In 1994, NARPO again asked the ICC to require railroads

or prospective trail operators to give individual notice to

landowners along the railroad corridor. This time NARPO

framed its request as a petition for a new rulemaking, not the

reopening of a prior rulemaking. The ICC denied this petition as well. See Rail Abandonments--Use of Rights-ofWay as Trails--Supplemental Trails Act Procedures, Ex

Parte No. 274 (Sub-No. 13), 1994 ICC WL 390552 (July 27,

1994). NARPO asked this court to set aside the denial. We

explained that "an agency decision not to initiate rulemaking

is accorded extraordinary deference" and is only reversed in a

"rare and compelling case," National Ass'n of Reversionary

Property Owners v. ICC, No. 94-1581, 1995 WL 687741, at *3

(D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 1995) (quotation marks and citations omitted), and concluded that NARPO did not present such a case.

Id. at *4.

The ICC was abolished effective January 1, 1996, and its

railroad abandonment and interim trail use responsibilities

passed to the STB. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub.

L. No. 104-88, ss 101, 201, 317, 109 Stat. 803, 804, 933-34,

949 ("ICCTA"). The ICCTA made some changes to the

abandonment application process, such as eliminating the

processing timetable and requiring that offers of financial

assistance be filed within four months of an abandonment

__________

8 In its denial of reconsideration the ICC also explained why the

case of Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908),

cited by NARPO, was inapposite. See Rail Abandonments--Use of

Rights-of-Way as Trails--Supplemental Trails Act Procedures,

Ex Parte No. 274 (Sub-No. 13), 1990 ICC WL 287321, at *2-*3

(Feb. 13, 1990).

application, see 49 U.S.C. s 10904(c), but no changes were

made to the Trails Act procedures.

In order to implement the ICCTA's changes and to make

other revisions to 49 C.F.R. pt. 1152 (governing abandonment

and discontinuance, and encompassing the Trails Act regulations), the STB published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

("NPRM") on March 19, 1996. Abandonment & Discontinuance of Rail Lines and Rail Transportation Under 49 U.S.C.

10903, 61 Fed. Reg. 11,174 (1996).9 In its NPRM, the STB

proposed to:

(1)modify the schedule for processing abandonment

applications (among other changes, the NPRM proposed giving Federal Register notice earlier in the

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process),

(2)add NARPO and the Rails to Trails Conservancy

("RTC") to the list of entities that must be served

with a Notice of Intent,

(3)add zip codes to the identifying information that

railroads must provide,

(4)require railroads to provide draft Federal Register

notices,

(5)relax the requirement for filing system diagram

maps which identify lines that are, or may soon be,

the subjects of abandonment applications,

(6)eliminate the summary application process, which

allowed applicants anticipating no substantial or

material opposition to omit certain information

from its application,

(7)eliminate separate procedures for bankrupt railroads,

(8)add the notice of consummation filing requirement,

(9)stop issuing certificates when abandonment applications are granted and issue only decisions instead,

(10)modify the content requirements for abandonment

applications,

__________

9 The NPRM also proposed conforming changes to its environmental rules in 49 C.F.R. pt. 1105.

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(11)modify the financial assistance regulations,

(12)modify the method of making certain financial

calculations in abandonment applications, and

(13)eliminate an appendix from its regulations.

See id. at 11,175-79.

NARPO filed comments asking the STB to require actual

notice of interim trail use proposals to each owner of land

along a line proposed for abandonment. Consistent with its

previous decisions, the STB rejected NARPO's proposal. See

Abandonment and Discontinuance of Rail Lines and Rail

Transportation Under 49 U.S.C. 10903, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,876,

67,877 (1996) ("Final Rule"). The STB repeated perfunctorily

its previous responses to the same NARPO request, i.e., that

actual notice is not feasible or necessary, citing to those

previous decisions. Id.10

NARPO then filed a petition for reconsideration, again

asking the STB to require individualized notice. The STB

again declined on the same grounds, see Abandonment and

Discontinuance of Rail Lines and Rail Transportation Under 49 U.S.C. 10903, Ex Parte No. 537, 1997 ICC WL 351419,

at *1-2 (June 18, 1997), this time including a brief discussion

of Preseault v. ICC and Preseault v. United States, explaining

why neither case dictated a contrary result.11 See id. at *2.

NARPO filed a petition for review with this court, claiming

that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires

actual notice of trail use proposals to holders of reversionary

interests because a rails to trails conversion sometimes causes

a taking. The STB and the United States filed a motion to

__________

10 Because of NARPO and RTC's opposition to their inclusion on

the list of entities receiving Notices of Intent that proposal was

dropped. 61 Fed.Reg. at 67,877.

11 In the former case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Trails Act. See Preseault, 494 U.S. at 4-5. In the

latter case, the Federal Circuit held that a conversion to interim

trail use was a taking when the railroad originally obtained only an

easement that did not encompass trail use. See Preseault, 100 F.3d

at 1552.

dismiss as untimely. RTC and the Association of American

Railroads intervened in support of respondents.

II. Analysis

After the ICC's denial of NARPO's petition for reconsideration of its individualized notice proposal in 1990, NARPO

had sixty days to seek review in this court under the Hobbs

Act. See 28 U.S.C. s 2344. It did not do so. NARPO

argues that the 1996 STB rulemaking reopened the issue of

individualized notice so that the sixty-day period runs anew

from the most recent denial of that proposal. See, e.g., Ohio

v. U.S. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Appellees and intervenors disagree that the issue was ever reopened in the 1996 rulemaking, so that the earlier denials

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remain intact and the time for requesting their review has

consequently passed. Because the time constraints of s 2344

are jurisdictional, see, e.g., United Transp. Union-Ill. Legislative Bd. v. STB, 132 F.3d 71, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("UTU"), if

NARPO's reopening theory does not apply, we are without

jurisdiction to consider NARPO's due process claim.12

The reopening doctrine is well established in this circuit,

creating "an exception to statutory limits on the time for

seeking review [of an agency decision]...." Id. at 75-76.

Questions of its application arise in situations where an

agency conducts a rulemaking or adopts a policy on an issue

at one time, and then in a later rulemaking restates the policy

or otherwise addresses the issue again without altering the

original decision. We have said that when the later proceeding explicitly or implicitly shows that the agency actually

reconsidered the rule, the matter has been reopened and the

__________

12 Intervenor RTC raises an additional jurisdictional issue, questioning NARPO's standing. While an intervenor can only address

issues raised by a party, see, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 911

F.2d 776, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1990), this court may consider standing sua

sponte. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 697 n.20 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (en banc). We find that NARPO's petition for review contains allegations sufficient to support standing even though, inexplicably, it did not repeat those allegations in its briefs.

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time period for seeking judicial review begins anew. See

Public Citizen v. NRC, 901 F.2d 147, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

"[T]he general principle [is] that if the agency has opened the

issue up anew, even though not explicitly, its renewed adherence is substantively reviewable." Id. (quoting Association of

American R.Rs. v. ICC, 846 F.2d 1465, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

To determine whether an agency reconsidered a previously

decided matter, thus triggering the reopening doctrine, a

court "must look to the entire context of the rulemaking

including all relevant proposals and reactions of the agency...." Id.

There are several factors we have emphasized when deciding if a reopening has taken place. The language of the

NPRM itself is one factor. See id. An explicit invitation to

comment on a previously settled matter, even when not

accompanied by a specific modification proposal, is usually

sufficient to affect a reopening. See Edison Elec. Inst. v.

U.S. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Ambiguity in an NPRM may also tilt toward a finding that

the issue has been reopened. In Association of American

R.Rs., 846 F.2d at 1473, we scrutinized the ICC's rulemaking

notice on the question of what "rate of return" to use when

weighing the subsidization of railroads. We asked whether

the notice reopened the decision, made years earlier, to use a

"real" rate of return when weighing railroad abandonment

applications. See id. Because the rulemaking notice was

ambiguous, and could fairly be read to "suggest[ ] that the

search for harmony might lead to a rethinking of old positions," we found that the earlier decision was reopened. Id.

When an agency invites debate on some aspects of a broad

subject, however, it does not automatically reopen all related

aspects including those already decided. National Mining

Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Interior, 70 F.3d 1345 (D.C.

Cir. 1995), involved a petition for rulemaking on which the

Department of Interior sought comments asking the Department to repeal one old rule (the "NOV" rule) and to modify a

second one. See id. at 1348. The NOV rule addressed the

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tion to a mine operator not in compliance with the Surface

Mining Control and Reclamation Act or a permit condition.

See id. at 1347. Under the NOV rule, a notice would not be

issued if a state took appropriate action within ten days of

notification by the Department. See id. The second rule

involved the standard used by the Department to assess a

state response to notification of a violation. Id. at 1348.

After inviting comment on the two issues by way of publishing the petition the Department declined to open a rulemaking on the NOV rule, noting that its repeal "had already been

considered in previous rulemakings." Id. The portion of the

petition dealing with the standard for state responses was

granted, however, and a rulemaking initiated on that subject

alone. Id. The petitioner argued that, by publishing and

seeking comments on the NOV repeal request, the Department implicitly reopened that issue, and its ultimate decision

not to begin a rulemaking on the repeal of the NOV was

appealable. Id. at 1351. This court disagreed, noting that

"[t]he decision to publish a petition for rulemaking ... is not

evidence of a reexamination of the policy at issue in the

petition." Id. More importantly for present purposes, however, the petitioner had also argued strenuously that the two

issues were inextricably linked, so that by conducting a

rulemaking on the state response standard the Department

implicitly reopened the NOV rule. See id. We again disagreed, explaining that anything less than a direct relationship

between the two rules would be too lax a standard for

triggering the reopening doctrine:

We can scarcely imagine any rulemaking that does not

impact at least several rules that are not explicitly at

issue in the rulemaking. Permitting any affected rule to

be reopened for purposes of judicial review by a rulemaking that does not directly concern that rule would

stretch the notion of "final agency action" beyond recognition....

Id.

We also consider an agency's response to comments filed

by parties during a rulemaking in deciding if a prior rule has

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been reopened. See Public Citizen, 901 F.2d at 150. In

UTU, a union sought review of a new STB requirement that

parties submit certain documents on computer diskette, as

well as "the STB's longstanding rules and policies regarding

public access to transcripts and to pleadings and correspondence from docket files." UTU, 132 F.3d at 72. The agency's proposed rule concerning the diskettes on which it invited

comments did not suggest changing the public access rules

and policies or solicit comments on them. See id. at 76. In

the union's comments filed during the rulemaking, however, it

asked for improved public access. See id. at 74. The STB, in

its Final Rule and modified Final Rule, did reference and list

its existing access mechanisms. See id. at 76. Because "the

STB's discussion of its policies and rules regarding public

access to transcripts, pleadings, and correspondence came

only in response to the UTU's unsolicited comments, and ...

the Board merely reiterated its (and its predecessor's) longstanding policies," we held that the public access provisions

had not been reopened and that the challenge was therefore

untimely. Id. at 76. Our decision in UTU was in accord with

our earlier statement that:

[t]he "reopening" rule of Ohio v. EPA is not a license for

bootstrap procedures by which petitioners can comment

on matters other than those actually at issue, goad an

agency into a reply, and then sue on the grounds that the

agency had re-opened the issue. To so read Ohio v.

EPA would undermine congressional efforts to secure

prompt and final review of agency decisions.

American Iron & Steel Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 398

(D.C. Cir. 1989); see also National Mining Ass'n, 70 F.3d at

1352 ("Of course, that a statement accompanies the denial of a

petition for rulemaking is not, without much more, sufficient

to trigger the reopener doctrine.").

In this case, NARPO contends that the STB's NPRM both

explicitly and implicitly reopened the individual notice issue,

and that the STB's responses to its comments and its petition

for reconsideration demonstrate reconsideration on the merits

by the agency.

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To support that claim NARPO highlights several parts of

the NPRM:

[T]he Board is proposing to revise part 1152 to implement the changes brought about by the ICCTA and to

streamline and update the regulations.

We view the ICCTA as reform legislation. As a result,

we are taking this opportunity to examine, reform and

streamline the existing rules and process.

We have also attempted to update the regulations to

improve notice to the public and ensure ample opportunity for full public participation early in our proceedings,

which we believe will ultimately result in an expeditious

resolution satisfactory to the interested parties.

Because of the importance of proposing rules to implement the new law as soon as possible, we recognize that

we may have overlooked some potential improvements or

may have proposed to retain provisions or language that

no longer serves a useful purpose. We therefore welcome public comments on these proposals, and on any

other areas where changes might be made, to streamline

our abandonment regulations further and to assist us in

carrying out the will of the Congress in the most efficient

manner possible.

We view the notice as a critical step in meeting the new

timeframes applicable to the abandonment process, because the notice apprises the public of proposed abandonments and ensures that potential concerns are brought to

light at an early stage in the process and addressed.

61 Fed. Reg. at 11,175-76. NARPO also points to three of

the changes proposed by the STB--giving actual notice to

NARPO and RTC, changing the timing of Federal Register

notice, and adding zip codes to identifying information that

railroads seeking abandonment authorization must provide.

NARPO views the language quoted and the specific changes

proposed as evidence that the STB laid open the entire

subject of notice, including the previously resolved question of

individual notice to reversionary interest holders.

We begin our assessment of NARPO's argument with some

initial observations. First, we note that the NPRM included

other more qualifying language than the invitational overtures NARPO cites. See id. at 11,175 ("we are not proposing

major revisions at this time to our ... Trails Act rules").

Second, we nonetheless acknowledge that parts of the NPRM

when read in isolation do sound like a call for suggested

changes. Third, we point out that the NPRM does not in any

way mention the subject of individual notice to landowners.

More critically, though, we go on to consider the cited

language in the NPRM in the "entire context of the rulemaking." Public Citizen, 901 F.2d at 150. Indeed, for our

purposes it is the context here that makes all the difference;

it shows why this NPRM, unlike the one at issue in AssociaUSCA Case #97-1516 Document #383787 Filed: 09/22/1998 Page 14 of 19
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tion of American R.Rs., for instance, was not ultimately

ambiguous.

NARPO argues that the STB's NPRM is comparable to the

EPA's solicitation of comments on a proposed rule at issue in

Edison Electric Institute, where we found that the invitation

did act to reopen a prior rulemaking. The EPA had issued in

1986 a hazardous waste storage rule to implement s 3004(j)

of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. See Edison

Elec. Inst., 996 F.2d at 329. In 1989 the EPA proposed

another rule on hazardous waste, and explicitly asked for

comments on an alternative interpretation of s 3004(j). Id.

at 329-30. After the agency ultimately adhered to its original

view, we found the reopening doctrine applicable. See id. at

332. In Ohio v. U.S. EPA, we also found that a 1985

rulemaking had reopened 1982 regulations. In that case the

EPA republished the old rules in an NPRM as part of a new

proposal. See Ohio, 838 F.2d at 1328. Although the EPA

explicitly sought comments on the new provisions only, it

discussed the operation of the older ones in "general policy

terms" as part of its statement of basis and purpose and

responded on the merits to a comment on the older rule. Id.

at 1328-29. Ohio relied on Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740

(D.C. Cir. 1984), which found that a 1981 proposal reopened a

1978 rule concerning reclamation fees collected from mine

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operators. The proposal "held out [the 1978 rule] as a

proposed regulation, offered an explanation for its language,

solicited comments on its substance, and responded to the

comments in promulgating the regulation in its final form."

Id. at 744. Unlike the proposals and requests for comments

in Edison, Ohio, and Montana, the STB's NPRM in this case

did not mention the settled subject of the earlier rulemaking--owner notice. The STB did not explicitly seek comments on the propriety of not affording individualized notice

or on any alternative approach to dealing with reversionary

interest holders; in short, unlike Edison, Ohio, and Montana,

it did not focus attention in any way on the settled notice

provision.

The three specific proposals in the NPRM involving enhanced notice do not themselves in any way suggest or

require a wholesale review of the STB's notice regime. The

proposed change in timing of Federal Register notice was

just that--a change in timing. Such a notice was already

required, only at a different point in the process. The change

was occasioned by the statutory changes made by the ICCTA

to the abandonment process timetable. The second change--

adding NARPO and RTC to the notification list--although

not prompted by the ICCTA, represented only a modification

of a technique currently used by the Board to promote

awareness of abandonment applications; the STB already

required a railroad proposing abandonment to serve certain entities with its Notice of Intent. See 49 C.F.R.

s 1152.20(a)(2) (1996). Moreover, there is a qualitative as

well as quantitative difference in kind in notifying known

entities, such as NARPO and RTC, about a trail use proposal

and giving notice to all individuals who hold reversionary

interests in land abutting the railroad corridor, in terms of

the ease of ascertaining the identities of such owners and

assuring individualized communication with them. The third

notice change--adding zip codes--is similarly only an easily

accomplished modification to the already existing requirements of publication and notice to organizational entities. In

sum, these three specific notice proposals involved incremental improvements to the methods previously adopted by the

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STB to notify potentially interested parties of abandonment

applications. Like the state response standard involved in

National Mining Ass'n, none of these three are inextricably

bound up with the kind of owner-notice sought by NARPO;

in truth, the connection between the proposed changes and

the rule sought to be reopened is much weaker than the one

asserted there. By making these notice proposals, the Board

did not in any way signal its intent to revisit the distinct and

settled subject of individualized notice to those with reversionary interests. At most, the Board signaled a willingness

to tinker with existing notification procedures, but not to

adopt brand new and potentially much more complex and

expensive ones.

Understanding the limited scope of these specific notice

proposals in the NPRM aids in interpreting the expansive

language quoted by NARPO more accurately. The references to "improv[ing] notice to the public" and "notice as a

critical step" are most reasonably read simply as expressing

the agency's motivation and rationale for the specific changes

it proposed, not as altering the actual scope of the changes it

would entertain. The Board proposed some relatively minor

modifications to its rules on notice, and in so doing rhetorically observed the importance of notice in the abandonment and

conversion process. We do not believe such observations

conferred on NARPO a license to challenge a settled and

wholly different decision just because it also involved some

form of notice.

Nor do the references to the ICCTA in the NPRM suggest

reopening. The ICCTA only affected the rails to trails

program insofar as it made changes to the abandonment

process. By eliminating the statutory abandonment processing schedule and requiring that offers of financial assistance

be filed within four months of an application, Congress necessitated the promulgation of a new schedule. As the Board

explained in the NPRM, the ICCTA "generally preserve[d]

requirements for public notice and the opportunity for public

participation in development of a record upon which abandonment ... applications will be decided." 61 Fed. Reg. at

11,175. Thus, in announcing a rulemaking to render the

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abandonment regulations consistent with the new statute, the

STB was not pointing up a need or intention to revisit the

question of actual notice to reversionary interest holders.

The new law did not change the notice requirements in such a

way that the STB could not avoid reconsidering the actual

notice issue.

At bottom NARPO's strongest support comes from a sentence it quotes from the background section in the NPRM:

"We ... welcome public comments on these proposals, and on

any other areas where changes might be made, to streamline

our abandonment regulations...." Id. Liberal though that

language may be, we cannot construe the reopener doctrine

to mean that the Board, by that one sentence, threw the

rulemaking open to any possible changes that any member of

the public might conjure up with the result that summary

denial of such changes becomes reviewable by the courts.

Agencies that do not intend to reopen an old rule might do

well to use less hospitable language in their NPRMs, but, on

balance, we consider such a diffuse invitation to be more akin

to "Y'all come and see me" than to a formal invitation to join

in the proceeding. Inserting what amounts to a suggestion

box in the Federal Register hardly eviscerates jurisdictional

time constraints.

We also find less significance than NARPO in words like

"revise," "streamline," "update," "examine," and "reform."

These words, used primarily in the supplementary and background sections of the NPRM, must also take their meaning

from their context. The context, as we have explained, was

one of making incremental adjustments to existing regulations and updating in light of a statute that did not call the

STB's notice provisions into question. The use of these

words, therefore, does not indicate that the Board was soliciting comments on the settled issue raised by NARPO.

NARPO also directs us to the agency's responses to its

comments, arguing that even if the invitation was not ambiguous the responses reflect a genuine reconsideration by the

agency of whether to provide actual notice to reversionary

interest holders. We think not. In the Final Rule, the Board

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did note that some parties had asked for individualized notice,

but in dispensing with the request offered in two paragraphs

basically the same rationale given in 1989 (concluding the

rulemaking on the question), 1990 (denying NARPO's request

to reconsider the 1989 decision), and 1994 (denying NARPO's

petition for a rulemaking on the subject). The mere act of

repeating old reasons for an old policy in response to unsolicited comments is not the equivalent of reconsidering, and

therefore reopening, the old issue. See UTU, 132 F.3d at 76;

Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Pena, 64 F.3d 702, 705-06

(D.C. Cir. 1995). The STB did precisely the same thing in

responding to NARPO's 1997 request for reconsideration,

adding only a brief explanation of why two cases did not

require a different result. Needless to say, simply noting

that a longstanding policy is not in conflict with two recent

cases in response to an unsolicited comment is not enough to

reopen the policy itself.

III. Conclusion

We find that the STB did not reopen the question of

individualized notice to landowners abutting the railroad corridor which its predecessor, the ICC, had addressed in an

earlier rulemaking. Accordingly, because NARPO's petition

for review was not filed within sixty days of the earlier

decision, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. The motion

to dismiss is granted.

So ordered.

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