Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00333/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00333-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benicia Unified School District
Defendant
Shalee Cunningham
Defendant
Laurie Ellen Flanagan
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAURIE ELLEN FLANAGAN,

NO. CIV. S-07-333 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

BENICIA UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, a governmental

agency, SHALEE CUNNINGHAM,

an individual,

Defendants.

 /

The plaintiff was a school-teacher at the Benicia Unified

School District (“BUSD”). She has brought suit against BUSD and

Shalee Cunningham, the Superintendent of the School District,

alleging nine causes of action relating to her termination from

her position. The defendants have moved for dismissal, for a

more definite statement, and to strike. For the reasons set

forth below, the court grants in part the motion to dismiss and

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1

 As is typical a “shotgun” complaint elicits a “shotgun”

motion. 

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for a more definite statement. It denies the motion to strike.1

I. BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS

The court described the allegations of the plaintiff’s

complaint in its November 19, 2007 order. Essentially, the

plaintiff has alleged that she was a probationary employee of

BUSD and was wrongfully discharged. She also has alleged that

BUSD and Defendant Cunningham reported misinformation about the

plaintiff to the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing

and the Benicia Police Department, causing her to lose her

credentialing and to be criminally prosecuted.

In accordance with the court’s November 19, 2007 order, the

plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on December 16, 2007.

In it, she provides additional factual allegations supporting

her causes of action. Among other things she alleges that BUSD

misclassified her employment status as probationary, leading to

her termination without the process due to her had she been

classified correctly. She also alleges that she attempted to

notify the appropriate government agency of her allegations

prior to filing suit, and that BUSD had actual knowledge of her

allegations by an e-mail to each member of BUSD’s Board. 

The plaintiff’s Second Amended Complain alleges nine causes

of action: (1) violations of her state and federal due process

rights, (2) violation of her right to free speech under the

California and United States Constitutions, (3) violation of her

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right to free association under the California and United States

Constitutions, (4) violation of her right to privacy under the

California and United States Constitutions, (5) unlawful

retaliation, (6) civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

(7) false light, (8) negligence, and (9) infliction of emotional

distress. She seeks compensatory and treble damages against all

defendants and punitive damages against Defendant Cunningham, as

well as injunctive relief.

II. STANDARDS

A. Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6

(1963). Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a

particular fact if that fact is a reasonable inference from

facts properly alleged. See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler,

373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963) (inferring fact from allegations of

complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The

court may not dismiss the complaint if there is a reasonably

founded hope that the plaintiff may show a set of facts

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consistent with the allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967-69 (2007). In spite of the

deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's

allegations, however, it is not proper for the court to assume

that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not

alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in

ways that have not been alleged." Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

B. Standard for Motion to Strike Pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(f)

Rule 12(f) authorizes the court to order stricken from any

pleading "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter." A party may bring on a motion to strike within 20 days

after the filing of the pleading under attack. The court,

however, may make appropriate orders to strike under the rule at

any time on its own initiative. Thus, the court may consider

and grant an untimely motion to strike where it seems proper to

do so. See 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380.

Motions to strike are generally viewed with disfavor, and

will usually be denied unless the allegations in the pleading

have no possible relation to the controversy, and may cause

prejudice to one of the parties. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380; See also Hanna

v. Lane, 610 F. Supp. 32, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1985). If the court is

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in doubt as to whether the challenged matter may raise an issue

of fact or law, the motion to strike should be denied, leaving

an assessment of the sufficiency of the allegations for

adjudication on the merits. See 5A Wright & Miller, supra, at '

1380.

C. Standard for Motion for a More Definite Statement Pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e)

"If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted

is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be

required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for

a more definite statement before interposing a responsive

pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). "The situations in which a

Rule 12(e) motion is appropriate are very limited." 5A Wright

and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1377 (1990). 

Furthermore, absent special circumstances, a Rule 12(e) motion

cannot be used to require the pleader to set forth "the

statutory or constitutional basis for his claim, only the facts

underlying it." McCalden v. California Library Ass'n, 955 F.2d

1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990). However, "even though a complaint

is not defective for failure to designate the statute or other

provision of law violated, the judge may in his discretion . . .

require such detail as may be appropriate in the particular

case." McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). 

III. ANALYSIS

The defendants move to dismiss all but plaintiff’s sixth

cause of action. They also move to strike her request for

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2

 Because the court considers this in the context of

defendants’ motion to dismiss, it need not address the defendants

motion to strike these portions of the Second Amended Complaint.

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punitive damages and certain other portions of the Second

Amended Complaint. Finally, they move for a more definite

statement of some of the plaintiff’s allegations. 

For the reasons provided herein, the court grants in part

the motion to dismiss and for a more definite statement. It

denies the motion to strike.

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Claim Two: Violation of Plaintiff’s Right to Free

Speech

The defendants move to dismiss those portions of the

plaintiff’s second cause of action relying on rights which

plaintiff asserts are protected by the First Amendment of the

United States Constitution. In that cause of action she alleges

that she suffered adverse employment consequences when she

attempted to discuss her concerns about her son’s school

performance and her own employment status. The court grants this

motion in part.2

Under present doctrine the government, as employer, may

restrict an employee’s speech unless the speech pertains to

matters of “public concern”. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146

(1983); Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d

971, 978 (9th Cir. 1998).On the other hand, where the employee

is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the

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employer may not lawfully restrict her speech. United States v.

Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995); see

also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2000).

Something is said to be of public concern if it relates to the

community’s “political, social, or other concerns.” Connick, 462

U.S. at 146. In contrast, public employee’s statements pursuant

to their official duties do not qualify as matters of public

concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Whether a

matter is of public concern is a question of law. Connick, 462

U.S. at 148 n. 7.

Here, the plaintiff’s second claim insofar as it relies on

allegations that plaintiff made statements regarding her

employment classification is not viable under present law. The

plaintiff’s statements about her classification are said to

relate to private matters which do not enjoy protection under

the First Amendment. See Connick,461 U.S. at 147-38, Nunez v.

Davis , 169 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1999). 

To the extent that the plaintiff alleges that she made

statements concerning her son’s education, however, it is not

clear that the court can conclude that as a matter of law these

statements were not of public concern and consequently that the

claim should be dismissed. Where a public employee speaks on

matters as a private citizen, which also incidentally relate to

her employment, a court may find that these matters are of

“public concern.” See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977)(accepting district

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court’s finding that a teacher’s communications to a radio

station about the school dress code were protected by the First

and Fourteenth Amendment). Here, the plaintiff alleges that she

complained to the defendants about the fact that her son had

received failing grades based on his behavior, not his academic

performance, and that he had not received adequate support from

the school. These are not statements relating to the plaintiff’s

own employment, nor were they made as part of the plaintiff’s

official duties. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410; Connick, 461

U.S. at 147-48. Moreover, although the statements concerned the

plaintiff’s son specifically, they arguably raised issues of

public concern, namely, whether the defendants adequately

responded to students with behavior problems in class. Cf.

Doyle, 429 U.S. at 284. So construed, it would appear that these

statements could provide a viable basis for the plaintiff’s

cause of action alleging a violation of her right to free

speech. 

Accordingly, the court grants the defendants’ motion to

dismiss the plaintiff’s second cause of action, only insofar as

it alleges that the defendants deprived her of her rights under

the First Amendment of the federal Constitution by impeding her

ability to speak about her employment classification. See Second

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 44-45.

2. Compliance With the California Government Claims Act

The defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s fifth, seventh,

eighth, and ninth causes of action on the grounds that the

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 The California Government Claims Act is now the correct

appellation of what had been the Tort Claims Act. City of Stockton

v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730 (2007).

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plaintiff has not complied with the presentment requirement of

the California Government Claims Act.3

 Again, The court will

grant this motion in part.

As the court explained in its November 19, 2007 order, the

Government Claims Act requires that any person who would bring

suit against a public entity must first present a written claim

to the entity’s board. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 945.4. In that order,

the court dismissed the plaintiff’s causes of action based on

state law, because she had not alleged compliance with the

Government Claims Act or alleged that an exception to it

applied.

The plaintiff has remedied this failure in her Second

Amended Complaint in which she alleges that she contacted the

Benicia Police Department to inquire as to how she should submit

a claim and was directed to the Benicia City Manager’s office.

She alleges that the Manager’s office confirmed to the plaintiff

that it was the proper office to receive her claim. Accordingly,

the plaintiff alleges, she filed a claim with that office. She

also alleges, however, that she sent an e-mail message to each

member of the BUSD Board “reiterating the complaints of the type

she advanced in her Claim.” Receipt of this e-mail, she alleges,

was confirmed by the BUSD Board President. These facts suffice

to allege both that the plaintiff substantially complied with

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the requirements of the Government Claims Act and that the

defendants have waived the argument that the plaintiff’s claims

should be dismissed for non-compliance with the Act. 

A plaintiff is deemed to have substantially complied with

the Government Claims Act if the claim was actually received by

the proper board. Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist., 84

Cal. App. 3d 529, 538 (1978); see also Elias v. San Bernadino

County Flood Control Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 70, 74 (1977). The

purpose of the Act is said to be to give the proper Board the

opportunity to investigate the claims, resolve them without

litigation, or prepare for litigation. Jamison v. State of

California, 31 Cal. App. 3d 513, 518 (1967); Dilts v. Cantua

Elementary School Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d 27, 33 (1987). It

follows that a court should construe the substantial compliance

rule liberally, permitting the claim to proceed where it appears

the purpose of the Act has been met by the proper Board’s actual

knowledge of the claim within the presentment period. Dilts, 189

Cal. App. 3d at 33. Here, the plaintiff has alleged facts that,

if true, would appear to constitute substantial compliance. She

alleges that the Board received her claims via e-mail in a “bona

fide effort to comply with the presentment requirement.” This

would have given the BUSD Board the opportunity to investigate

her claims and attempt to resolve them. The court can see no

reason why the plaintiff’s actions do not constitute substantial

compliance with the Act. 

Even if the plaintiff has not substantially complied with

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 The plaintiff also argues in her opposition that because the

BUSD Board did not inform her that her claim had not been properly

submitted, the defendants are equitably estopped from asserting now

that the plaintiff did not comply with the Government Claims Act.

A public entity is equitably estopped from asserting as a defense

that the Act has not been complied with, when the entity’s agents

have prevented or deterred compliance through some affirmative act.

John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. , 48 Cal. 3d 438, 445

(1989). The plaintiff has not alleged, however, that BUSD’s agents

took any affirmative act to deter her compliance with the

presentment requirements, but rather that they failed to act when

they had a duty to do so under California Government Code section

911. This theory does not support the plaintiff’s argument of

equitable estoppel, but only her waiver allegations, as discussed

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the Act, the plaintiff has alleged facts that, if true, would

show that the defendants waived this defense. When a public

entity receives notice of a claim for damages but that notice is

so defective so as to not constitute substantial compliance with

the Act, the entity has a duty to contact the claimant and alert

her to the deficiencies. Phillip v. Desert Hospital Dist., 49

Cal. 3d 699 (1989); Cal. Gov’t Code § 910.8. The claimant is

then given time to correct the deficiencies. Cal. Gov’t Code §

911.3; Phillip, 49 Cal. at 705-706. If the entity does not do

this, it waives any defense “as to the sufficiency of the claim

based upon a defect or omission in the claim as presented . . .

.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 911. Here, the plaintiff pleads that she

contacted the BUSD Board members by email and stated here claims

therein, and that she was not notified that the manner of

presenting her claim was deficient. This suffices to allege

that, per California Government Code section 911, BUSD has

waived its defense that the plaintiff’s claims are barred for

non-compliance with the Government Claims Act.4

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One deficiency with her pleading of compliance with the

presentment requirement occurs with regards to the plaintiff’s

fifth cause of action. In this claim, the plaintiff alleges that

the defendants unlawfully retaliated against her and she seeks

to enforce this through California Civil Code section 52.1 (the

Bane Act). The Government Claims Act requirements apply to

causes of action brought under the Bane Act. Gatto v. County of

Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744, 760 (2002). Because the plaintiff

does not plead substantial compliance with or the defendants’

waiver of the Government Claims Act in her fifth cause of

action, either explicitly or by integration, the fifth cause of

action is deficient. The motion to dismiss this claim is

granted, with leave for the plaintiff to amend in order to

allege compliance with or the defendants’ waiver of the

Government Claims Act’s requirements if such claim can be

truthfully made. 

3. Authorizing Statutes for Plaintiff’s Tort Claims

The plaintiff has alleged three tort claims: false light

(claim seven), negligence (claim eight) and infliction of

emotional distress (claim nine). The defendants move to dismiss

these claims as not being expressly permitted by a state

statute, which is required for a public entity to be held

liable. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. The court denies this motion,

except as to certain aspects of the plaintiff’s negligence

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claim.

The court explained in its November 19, 2007 order that a 

public entity or its employees are not liable for injuries

caused by their acts or omissions, unless the cause of action is

specifically authorized by a state statute. Cal. Gov’t Code §

815. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s tort claims in that

order because the plaintiff had not pled any facts from which

one could infer they were authorized by statute. This error has

been remedied in her Second Amended Complaint.

A public entity or its agents can be sued for negligence if

it failed to discharge a mandatory duty. Cal. Gov’t Code §

815.6. Specifically, a public entity may be liable for

negligence if “an enactment” has created a mandatory, not

discretionary, duty for the purpose of protecting against the

risk of the type of injury which the plaintiff complains of,

and that the breach of the duty has proximately caused the

plaintiff’s injuries. Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 68 Cal.

App. 4th 1450, 1458 (1998). “An enactment” includes any statute,

constitutional provision, charter provision, ordinance or

regulation. Cal. Gov’t Code § 810.6.

 A school district has a mandatory duty to classify its

employees in accordance with the statutory scheme. Cal. Educ.

Code §§ 44831, 44929.21, 44917, 44920; see Cal. Teachers Ass’n

v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 135

(2007). In her eighth cause of action, the plaintiff has pled

that the defendants were negligent by breaching their duty to

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 The fact that such failure led to the misclassification in

no way undermines that aspect of plaintiff’s claim. 

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classify her correctly, which resulted in her not receiving the

due process to which she would have been entitled had she been

properly classified. This cause of action meets the requirements

of Government Code section 815.6. 

The plaintiff’s negligence claim also pleads, however, that

defendant Cunningham had a duty to conduct an “employment

investigation” accurately and that she breached that duty. See

Second Amended Complaint ¶ 92. The court is aware of no

enactment -- and the plaintiff indicates none in her complaint

nor in her Opposition to the defendants’ motion -- that

establishes this as a mandatory duty. Consequently, to the

extent that the plaintiff’s negligence claim is premised on

allegations of defendant Cunningham’s failure to properly

conduct an employment investigation, this cause of action is not

permitted under Government Code section 815.6.5

The plaintiff’s seventh and ninth causes of action, for

false light and infliction of emotional distress, respectively,

appear to the court to be authorized by state statute. A

plaintiff is permitted under California law to bring suit

against state official for intentional torts. Cal. Gov’t Code §

815.3. That claim may be brought so long as the plaintiff

alleges that the official’s conduct was intentional and so long

as the state agency and the official are named as co-defendants.

See id. Here, the plaintiff has pled in her infliction of

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emotional distress claim that defendant Cunningham acted

intentionally in committing the acts upon which the claim is

based. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 95. The plaintiff has also

named BUSD and defendant Cunningham as co-defendants, as

Government Code section 815.3 requires. Therefore, the

plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for infliction of emotional

distress is pled in a way that makes it not subject to dismissal

under Government Code section 815.6.

Similarly, the plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for

false lights is authorized by Government Code section 815.3. The

elements of the tort of false light are (1) the defendant caused

to be generated publicity of the plaintiff that was false or

misleading, (2) the publicity was offensive to a reasonable

person, and (3) that the defendant acted with actual malice.

Fellows v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 234, 238-39 (1986);

Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court of Marin County, 27 Cal.

3d 244, 265 (1984). Here, the plaintiff has pled that the

defendants acted with malice, i.e., intentionally. Second

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 13, 69. That coupled with her having named

BUSD and defendant Cunningham as co-defendants satisfies the

pleading requirements of Government Code section 815.3 and

815.6.

4. Immunity of Defendant Cunningham

Defendant Cunningham moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s

fifth, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action on the

grounds that defendant Cunningham is immune from liability. The

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court denies this motion. 

Public employees generally are immune from liability for

their acts that constitute an exercise of their discretion. Cal.

Gov’t Code §§ 820, 820.2; Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972,

981-82 (1995). Clearly, many decisions related to supervision

of employees are included within that broad protection. The

statute, however, has been characterized by the California

Supreme Court, as reaching only “basic policy decisions” and

acting at the “planning” level of decision-making. Sanborn v.

Chronicle Pub. Co., 18 Cal. 3d 406, 415-16 (1976). Here, the

plaintiff has alleged that some of defendant Cunningham’s acts

were ministerial, including her misclassification of the

plaintiff’s employment status, and consequently she enjoyed no

immunity for them. The plaintiff’s additional factual bases for

these claims are that defendant Cunningham reported false or

misleading statements to the Benicia Police Department and that

she improperly informed the plaintiff’s children of employment

decisions involving the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that

this latter group of acts, while not ministerial, do not

constitute an exercise of policy-making discretion for which

defendant Cunningham would be granted immunity. Since

plaintiff’s position appears well taken, it suffices to defeat

the defendant’s motion on this ground. See Lopez v. S. Cal.

Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 794 (1985)(holding that

whether a public employee’s acts were a conscious exercise of

discretion, per Government Code section § 820.2, was a question

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of fact and not a basis upon which the court should sustain

defendants’ demurrer).

5. Privilege for Defendants’ Communications

The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff’s fourth,

fifth, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action on the

grounds that they are based on privileged communications. The

court grants the motion in part.

Under California law, civil actions for damages are barred

if based on statements a defendant is alleged to have made in

any judicial proceeding or any other proceeding authorized by

law. Cal. Civil Code § 47(b). This includes statements made to

police, a local prosecutor, or a regulatory agency, even if the

statements were made in bad faith. Hagberg v. Ca. Fed. Bank, 32

Cal. 4th 350, 360 (2004). It also includes statements that would

prompt an official investigation, which may result in the

initiation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 361-64. California

courts have applied this privilege liberally to immunize

defendants, including in cases of intentional infliction of

emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and negligence. Action

Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal. 4th 1232,

1241-42 (2007). 

Here, the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for invasion

of privacy and seventh cause of action for false light are

premised on the allegation that defendant Cunningham passed

information to the Benicia Police Department that later caused

the plaintiff to suffer the tort of false light and invasion of

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privacy. Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 55-59, 82-84. The plaintiff

has pled no facts that would permit the court to infer that this

alleged communication does not fall within the ambit of Civil

Code section 47(b) immunity. See also Action Apartment Ass’n, 41

Cal. 4th at 1241-42. As it is the only factual basis of her

fourth and seventh causes of action, those claims must be

dismissed. 

The plaintiff’s fifth, eighth, and ninth causes of action,

however, do not rely exclusively on the factual allegation that

defendant Cunningham passed information to the Benicia Police

Department. To the extent that they do not, defendants’ motion

must be denied.

B. Motion to Clarify

1. Claim One: Violation of Plaintiff’s Due Process Rights

The defendants move for a more definite statement with

regards to the code sections that the plaintiff cites in her

first cause of action. The plaintiff acknowledges typographic

errors in her Second Amended Complaint and agrees to correct

them. To that extent, the court grants the defendants’ motion

with leave to amend.

2. Claim Two: Violation of Plaintiff’s Right to Free

Speech

The defendants move for clarification of the plaintiff’s

second cause of action on the grounds that she has only cited

the Fourteenth Amendment in this claim, not the First Amendment.

The defendants note that in its November 19, 2007 order the

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court stated that it interpreted the plaintiff’s claim to state

that the defendants violated her First Amendment rights, as

inmade applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth

Amendment. 

The court’s statement was made for the sake of precision

only. It was not meant to suggest that the plaintiff’s claim was

defective in this regard. In the present motion, the defendants

have not shown that the plaintiff’s second cause of action is so

vague or ambiguous that the defendants are unable to frame a

responsive pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The second claim

plainly alleges that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s

rights to free speech under the California and United States

Constitutions. The defendants motion for a more definite

statement is therefore denied. 

C. Motion to Strike

The defendants move to strike the plaintiff’s request for

punitive damages, asserting that punitive damages may not be

sought against BUSD. The plaintiff’s prayer for relief makes it

explicit that the plaintiff only seeks punitive damages against

defendant Cunningham for the plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, seventh,

eighth, and ninth causes of action. Second Amended Complaint,

Prayer for Relief ¶ 2. Additionally, she has pled in her sixth

cause of action that defendant Cunningham acted with the

requisite intent that would permit an award of punitive damages.

Second Amended Complaint ¶ 13. The motion to strike is denied.

////

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V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above analysis, the court orders as

follows:

1. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s

fifth cause of action is GRANTED;

2. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s

second, fourth, seventh, and eighth causes of actions

is GRANTED IN PART, as stated above;

3. The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to all other

claims;

4. The defendants’ motion to clarify is GRANTED as to the

plaintiff’s first cause of action;

5. The plaintiff is granted fifteen days from the date of

this order to file an amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 14, 2008.

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