Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-02138/USCOURTS-ca10-16-02138-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elliston Callwood
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

In re: ELLISTON CALLWOOD, a/k/a 

Michael Small, a/k/a Eliston Callwood,

 Movant.

No. 16-2138

(D.C. Nos. 1:96-CV-01735-JAP-JHG &

1:92-CR-00552-JAP-1)

(D. N.M.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before PHILLIPS, EBEL, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Elliston Callwood, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks authorization to file 

a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his 

sentence. For the following reasons, we deny authorization.

We may authorize the filing of a second or successive § 2255 motion if it is based 

on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2); see also id. 

§ 2244(b)(3)(C). Mr. Callwood asserts that he is entitled to bring a successive § 2255 

claim to challenge his three firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) based on 

the new rule of constitutional law announced in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 

(2015).

The Johnson decision voided in part the definition of a qualifying “violent felony” 

used for sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The 

problematic part of the definition is known as the “residual clause” and covers any crime 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 5, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 16-2138 Document: 01019651074 Date Filed: 07/05/2016 Page: 1 
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“involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that “imposing an 

increased sentence under the residual clause of the [ACCA] violates the Constitution’s 

guarantee of due process.” 135 S. Ct. at 2563. And in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

1257, 1268 (2016), the Court held that Johnson announced a new substantive rule that 

applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. 

We recently extended Johnson’s reach to defendants seeking authorization who 

were designated as career offenders under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, 

based on predicate felony offenses that relied on the residual clause in that guideline’s 

definition of “crime of violence.” See In re Encinias, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1719323, 

at *1-*2 (10th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016) (per curiam). The residual-clause language in the 

career-offender guideline definition of “crime of violence” is identical to the 

residual-clause language that the Supreme Court found unconstitutionally vague in 

Johnson. Id. at *1. We therefore concluded that a challenge to a sentence that relied on 

the residual clause in the definition of “crime of violence” in the career-offender 

guideline was sufficiently based on Johnson to permit authorization because “of the 

similarity of the clauses addressed . . . and the commonality of the constitutional concerns 

involved.” Id. at *2.

Mr. Callwood, however, did not receive an increased sentence under either the 

ACCA or the career-offender provision of the guidelines. Instead, his sentence was 

enhanced under the provision in § 924(c)(1) that provides for an increased sentence for 

possessing a firearm “during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime” and 

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possessing a firearm “in furtherance of any such crime,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), as 

well as the provision that provides for an increased sentence in the case of a second or 

subsequent conviction under that subsection, id. § 924(c)(1)(C). There is nothing in the 

definition of a “drug trafficking crime” that contains similar language to the residual 

clause invalidated in Johnson or implicates the same types of constitutional concerns at 

issue in Johnson, and Mr. Callwood does not explain how the new rule of constitutional 

law announced in Johnson otherwise supports his position. Mr. Callwood has therefore 

failed to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to authorization based on 

Johnson. 

Accordingly, we deny his motion. This denial of authorization “shall not be 

appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of 

certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 16-2138 Document: 01019651074 Date Filed: 07/05/2016 Page: 3