Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03137/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel Santander Lopesierra-Gutierrez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 12, 2012 Decided March 1, 2013

No. 07-3137

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SAMUEL SANTANDER LOPESIERRA-GUTIERREZ,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00392-11)

Carmen D. Hernandez, appointed by the court, argued 

the cause and filed the brief for appellant. 

Vijay Shanker, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was 

Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General.

Before: TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Samuel Santander LopesierraGutierrez, a Colombian national, was extradited for, charged 

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with, and convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine with 

the knowledge or intent that it would be imported into the 

United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 960, and

963. The district court sentenced Lopesierra to 300 months’ 

incarceration. On appeal, he mounts numerous challenges to 

his conviction and sentence. Most significantly, he maintains 

that his trial attorney suffered from a conflict of interest that 

deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free 

representation and that excessive trial delays violated his 

constitutional and statutory speedy-trial rights. For the reasons 

given below, neither claim has merit. As to the rest of his 

claims, we conclude either that the district court made no 

error or that any such error was harmless.

I.

In October 2002, Samuel Santander Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 

a member of the so-called Osorio drug-trafficking network, 

was arrested in Colombia and extradited to Washington, D.C. 

Upon arrival, he was arraigned and charged with conspiracy 

to distribute cocaine, knowing or intending that it would be 

imported into the United States. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 960,

963. Over the next few years, fourteen other members of the 

Osorio gang were extradited from Colombia and charged with 

related offenses. By the end of an extended period of 

negotiation and discovery, most of Lopesierra’s alleged 

coconspirators had pled guilty. The trial of the remaining 

defendants, Lopesierra and another man, Dolcey Padilla, 

began nearly four years after Lopesierra’s initial arrest. 

At trial, Lopesierra never seriously disputed that he 

trafficked in large quantities of cocaine—indeed, he conceded 

as much during closing argument. But Lopesierra maintained 

his innocence of the crime charged, claiming that he neither 

knew nor intended that the cocaine was bound for the United 

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States. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a). The government, seeking to 

demonstrate that Lopesierra had the requisite mens rea when 

he distributed cocaine, introduced testimony focusing on 

several key transactions, including a 462-kilogram shipment 

to Puerto Rico. The government argued that this evidence, 

along with evidence of prior drug-importation activity and of 

money laundering in the United States, demonstrated 

Lopesierra’s awareness that at least some of the cocaine he 

conspired to distribute would be imported to the United 

States. After a nearly two-month trial, during which 

Lopesierra never testified, the jury found him guilty of 

conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine

knowing or intending that the cocaine would be imported into 

the United States. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 960, 963. The 

district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 300 

months. 

Lopesierra appeals both his conviction and his sentence 

on myriad grounds. Two of his arguments—that he was 

denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free 

representation and that the extensive trial delays violated his 

constitutional and statutory speedy-trial rights—merit indepth analysis. We shall address these in Sections II and III 

and then consider his remaining nine arguments, running the 

gamut from evidentiary challenges to sentencing claims, in 

Section IV.

II.

Lopesierra’s first and most serious contention is that his 

trial counsel suffered from a conflict of interest that amounted 

to a Sixth Amendment violation that prejudiced his defense. 

Here’s what happened. Quite literally on the eve of trial, the 

government discovered that a cooperating witness would

testify that, in the course of laundering money in the United 

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States for Lopesierra, he had sent $96,000 to Lopesierra’s 

attorney to cover legal fees. This testimony was part of the 

government’s evidence regarding the statutorily required 

nexus between Lopesierra’s activities and the United States.

The government informed the court about the potential 

conflict of interest, explaining that the witness’s testimony 

had spawned a Department of Justice investigation into 

whether the attorney had violated 18 U.S.C. § 1957, which 

criminalizes monetary transactions in property derived from 

unlawful activity. Arguing that the testimony and resulting 

investigation created an actual conflict of interest, the 

government moved to disqualify the attorney. 

At a status conference the next day, Lopesierra’s attorney 

insisted that he had no intention of withdrawing, that the 

witness could testify without identifying him as the recipient 

of the laundered funds, and that Lopesierra could waive any 

conflict. Speaking for himself, Lopesierra told the court that 

he was happy with the attorney’s work and wanted him to 

continue. Following the conference, Lopesierra filed a 

response to the government’s motion, which was signed by 

both the purportedly conflicted attorney and a law professor 

from whom the attorney had sought advice. In that response,

Lopesierra maintained that he had the right to continued 

representation by his counsel of choice notwithstanding the 

alleged conflict of interest. According to Lopesierra, the 

conflict could be avoided so long as the witness never 

mentioned the attorney by name. He also emphasized that he 

wished to waive any potential conflict of interest. In response, 

the government agreed that Lopesierra could waive the 

conflict—so long as he did so knowingly and voluntarily. The 

government also acquiesced to a stipulation about the 

laundered funds that omitted the attorney’s identity.

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The district court then held another status conference, at 

which Lopesierra was represented by appointed conflict 

counsel and at which the law professor appeared by 

telephone. Both lawyers, as well as the government, agreed 

that Lopesierra could waive any conflict of interest. After 

considering both parties’ statements and submissions, the 

district court concluded that any conflict of interest was in 

fact waivable. It then proceeded to engage Lopesierra, again 

represented by conflict counsel, in a detailed waiver colloquy. 

In response to the court’s questioning, Lopesierra assured the 

court that he was aware of the source of the conflict, that he 

understood its nature, and that he knew he had a right to 

conflict-free representation. Lopesierra confirmed that he had 

been thoroughly advised by conflict counsel, insisted that he 

had carefully considered his waiver decision, and made clear 

that he understood he was waiving his right to later claim that 

he had been prejudiced by a conflict of interest. Given all this, 

the district court found that Lopesierra had “knowingly, 

intelligently, [and] voluntarily waived any conflict of 

interest.” Lopesierra’s original attorney went on to represent 

him at trial.

On appeal, Lopesierra, now represented by new counsel,

argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right “to have 

the Assistance of Counsel for his defence,” U.S. Const. 

amend. VI, which includes a “correlative right to 

representation that is free from conflicts of interest.” Wood v. 

Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). Lopesierra begins by 

attempting to demonstrate that “an actual conflict of interest 

adversely affect[ed] the adequacy of [his] representation.” 

United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–51 (1980)). 

Only then does he turn to the question whether his waiver 

bars his claim. We begin with the decisive issue: waiver.

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Criminal defendants frequently waive their constitutional 

rights. By entering a guilty plea, for instance, a defendant 

waives rights as fundamental as the “privilege against 

compulsory self-incrimination, [the] right to trial by jury, and 

[the] right to confront his accusers.” McCarthy v. United 

States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). Of course, such waivers are 

subject to strict oversight by the court, which must find that 

they are made knowingly and voluntarily. See Godinez v. 

Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993). Like these other 

constitutional rights, the Sixth Amendment right to conflictfree representation is subject to knowing and voluntary 

waiver. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988); 

see also United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 734–36

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam). A defendant’s power to waive 

this right is grounded in another right situated in the Sixth 

Amendment: the right to counsel of choice. See Wheat, 486 

U.S. at 160.

In cases like this, where a defendant’s chosen counsel 

suffers from a conflict of interest, the two Sixth Amendment 

rights come into clear conflict. Also implicated are the court’s 

own institutional interests, as guaranteeing conflict-free 

counsel protects not just defendants’ rights, but also the 

“[f]ederal courts[’] . . . independent interest in ensuring that 

criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of 

the [legal] profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to 

all who observe them.” Id. at 161. Taking the court’s interests 

into consideration, the Supreme Court has held that a 

defendant’s counsel-of-choice right may sometimes be 

trumped by a conflict of interest. See id. at 159 (“[T]he 

essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective 

advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure 

that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer 

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whom he prefers.”). Specifically, a court may decline to 

accept a waiver if the conflict of interest jeopardizes the 

integrity of the proceedings. See id. at 162; see also Childress, 

58 F.3d at 734–36. In making this determination, a court 

balances the defendant’s right to choose his representative 

against both the defendant’s countervailing right to conflictfree representation and the court’s independent interest in the 

integrity of criminal proceedings. Cf. United States v. 

Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 806–07 (8th Cir. 2006). The 

outcome of that balance turns on the nature and extent of the 

conflict. We review a district court’s decision to accept or 

reject a waiver for abuse of discretion. See Childress, 58 F.3d 

at 734.

Attempting to get around his waiver, Lopesierra argues 

that his lawyer’s conflict of interest was so serious that it was 

simply unwaivable. Alternatively, he contends that, even if 

the conflict was waivable, his waiver was neither knowing nor

voluntary. 

Lopesierra’s primary argument relies heavily on a line of 

Second Circuit decisions that have defined a “very narrow 

category of cases” in which a conflict of interest is never 

subject to waiver. United States v. Perez, 325 F.3d 115, 126 

(2d Cir. 2003). In this class of cases, a district court that 

accepts a waiver necessarily abuses its discretion because the 

“conflict so permeates the defense that no meaningful waiver 

can be obtained.” United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 613 (2d 

Cir. 1993). Lopesierra urges us to adopt the Second Circuit’s 

approach and hold that this category of per se unwaivable 

conflicts includes those cases in which the attorney is the 

subject of a criminal investigation. Alternatively and more 

narrowly, we take his position to be that such conflicts are 

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unwaivable at least where the attorney’s supposed crime is 

related to the defendant’s.

The broader position is untenable. Lopesierra points to no 

circuit that has accepted the proposition that attorneys who 

are the subject of criminal investigations are incapable of 

providing constitutionally adequate representation, and the 

government identifies numerous circuits that have rejected it. 

See, e.g., Edelmann, 458 F.3d at 806–08; Reyes-Vejerano v. 

United States, 276 F.3d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 2002); United States 

v. Montana, 199 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 1999). Indeed, even 

the Second Circuit cases on which Lopesierra relies do not 

purport to extend to every scenario in which “a court learns 

that an attorney may have committed a crime,” but rather only 

to situations in which an attorney is implicated in a 

“sufficiently related” crime. Fulton, 5 F.3d at 611. This line 

makes sense. Whenever an attorney is or is likely to be the 

subject of a criminal investigation, courts worry that he might 

attempt to curry general favor with the government by pulling 

punches. Although this concern is serious, it hardly supports a

conclusion that “no rational defendant would knowingly and 

voluntarily desire the attorney’s representation.” United States 

v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). But when the attorney’s alleged 

criminal activity is “sufficiently related to the charged 

crimes,” Fulton, 5 F.3d at 611, courts have an additional

concern: the attorney’s “fear that evidence concerning [his]

involvement might come out” could potentially “affect 

virtually every aspect of his . . . representation of the 

defendant.” Id. at 613. For instance, the attorney’s advice to a

defendant about whether to cooperate, plead guilty, or take 

the stand could be colored by the attorney’s calculations about 

the likelihood that the defendant’s cooperation or testimony 

would reveal evidence of his own crimes.

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Given the seriousness of this kind of conflict, we might 

agree with the Second Circuit that when an attorney is 

accused of a “sufficiently related” crime, the resulting conflict 

“create[s] a real possibility that the attorney’s vigorous 

defense of his client will be compromised.” Id. at 611. Were 

we faced with the situation presented in Fulton—where a 

witness against a defendant charged with conspiracy to 

possess and import heroin accused defense counsel of 

personally receiving a portion of a heroin shipment and being

otherwise involved in heroin trafficking, see id. at 607—we 

may well have concluded that accepting a waiver amounted to 

an abuse of discretion. But that is not this case. Lopesierra’s 

attorney was accused only of accepting payment for his 

services in laundered funds. True, those laundered funds were 

allegedly the product of the charged cocaine-importation 

conspiracy. That, however, was the full extent of his supposed 

connection to Lopesierra’s crimes. Although the attorney’s 

alleged criminal activity thus in some sense “related” to 

Lopesierra’s, we see a significant difference between an 

attorney who conspired with the defendant to distribute drugs 

and one who was merely paid in laundered funds. In the 

former case—where it is impossible to discern, for instance, 

which witnesses the attorney might decline to call or hesitate 

to cross-examine for fear they will implicate him—every 

single aspect of representation could be infected, every choice 

suspect. But where the relationship between the attorney’s 

alleged crime and the defendant’s is as attenuated as here, the 

extent of the conflict is clear and can be mitigated by 

stipulation. A rational defendant—who may well have been 

responsible for and fully aware of the fact that his attorney

was paid with profits from unlawful activity—could thus 

make an informed choice to proceed in such a circumstance. 

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Accordingly, we hold that where the only relationship 

between the attorney’s possible crime and the defendant’s is 

the receipt of laundered funds and where a stipulation bars

presentation of incriminating testimony, the resulting conflict 

is not per se unwaivable. See United States v. Saccoccia, 58 

F.3d 754, 771 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding waiver where the 

attorney allegedly “conspired with appellant to launder the 

fruits of unlawful activity”). In cases such as this, the 

knowing and voluntary requirement, coupled with the abuse 

of discretion standard, strikes the appropriate balance between 

protecting defendants from conflicted representation and 

preserving their right to counsel of choice. If in the context of 

a particular case the district court believes a conflict is 

intolerable, it may decline to accept a defendant’s waiver. But

here, where the conflict was less serious, the district court 

acted well within its discretion by concluding that 

Lopesierra’s right to counsel of choice carried the balance.

This brings us, then, to Lopesierra’s fallback position—

that his waiver was neither knowing nor voluntary. But we 

have no doubt that it in fact was both. The district court held 

multiple hearings on this issue and went to great lengths to 

ensure that Lopesierra, who was represented by an 

independent attorney, was fully aware of the nature of the 

conflict and the consequences of waiver. The court explained, 

for instance, that because the attorney was himself the subject 

of a related criminal investigation, he might “have a divided 

loyalty between his interests and [Lopesierra’s] interests” and 

could “be in some way tempted to take actions that might not 

be to [Lopesierra’s] benefit in order to assist himself in 

connection with this other investigation.” It further 

emphasized that Lopesierra had a right to an attorney who 

lacked such a conflict and warned that “going forward could 

be ill-advised.” In response to all of this, Lopesierra 

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repeatedly told the court that he was “100 percent” 

determined to continue with the attorney who had been 

representing him for three years. He also assured the court 

that he understood he was waiving any argument that he was 

“in some way prejudiced because [the attorney] had this 

conflict of interest.”

We cannot conceive of—and Lopesierra fails to 

suggest—anything more the district court could have done to 

protect his rights. In the end, Lopesierra made a rational and 

informed decision that, given the stipulation and the limited 

nature of his attorney’s conflict, he wanted to proceed. That 

he now wishes he had chosen differently gives us no reason to 

doubt the validity of that choice.

III.

Lopesierra’s second major claim focuses on the 

substantial delay between his initial arrest and his trial. 

Asserting his constitutional and statutory speedy-trial rights, 

Lopesierra maintains that the three-and-a-half years he had to 

wait was simply too long. On both the constitutional and 

statutory claims, we review the district court’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its findings of facts for clear error. 

See United States v. Tchibassa, 452 F.3d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 

2006) (Sixth Amendment); United States v. Subblefield, 643 

F.3d 291, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Speedy Trial Act). Although 

we understand Lopesierra’s frustration with the pace of 

proceedings, we ultimately find that given the complexity of 

the case the delay fell within lawful bounds. 

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme 

Court established a four-factor test for determining whether a 

defendant has been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to 

a speedy trial: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the 

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defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 

defendant.” Id. at 530. Applying these factors, we have 

emphasized that “[n]one . . . is either a necessary or sufficient 

condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy 

trial; rather, they are related factors and must be considered 

together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” 

Tchibassa, 452 F.3d at 923 (internal quotation marks and 

alteration omitted). Here, it is indisputable that the delay was 

significant—two-and-a-half years longer than the one-year 

delay the Supreme Court has suggested to be “presumptively 

prejudicial.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52

& n.1 (1992). Nevertheless, it was considerably shorter than 

delays tolerated in prior cases. See, e.g., Tchibassa, 452 F.3d 

at 927 (no violation despite eleven-year delay). And more 

importantly, when the Supreme Court observed that “the 

delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is 

considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy 

charge,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, it could have been referring 

to this very case. 

Here, the district court and numerous attorneys had to 

untangle a complicated and far-reaching conspiracy, execute

fifteen extraditions, fairly treat all fifteen co-defendants, 

collect and decipher foreign evidence, and coordinate with 

foreign witnesses—all serious obstacles to a quick resolution. 

Furthermore, Lopesierra, who himself contributed to the delay 

by filing pretrial motions, taking an interlocutory appeal, and 

seeking a continuance, fails to demonstrate that the 

government was to blame for the delay. Nor does he offer 

reason to believe that the delay actually prejudiced his 

defense. Accordingly, we conclude that the delay, though 

significant, was neither so unjustified nor so prejudicial as to 

violate the Sixth Amendment, and we thus turn to 

Lopesierra’s statutory claim.

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The Speedy Trial Act provides that “the trial of a 

defendant charged . . . with the commission of an offense 

shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and 

making public) of the information or indictment, or from the 

date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the 

court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last 

occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection

h of the statute enumerates certain periods of delay that “shall 

be excluded in . . . computing the time within which the trial 

of any such offense must commence.” Id. § 3161(h). 

Here, the speedy-trial clock’s start and stop dates are 

undisputed: respectively, Lopesierra’s arraignment on 

September 2, 2003, and the date on which trial began, April 

18, 2006. There were 959 days in between. The only question

is whether delays permitted by subsection h make up the 

difference between the statutorily allotted 70 days and the 959 

that actually elapsed. Lopesierra concedes that much of this 

time may be properly excluded from the clock under one of 

subsection h’s automatic-exclusion provisions. For instance, 

he acknowledges that the 338-day period between his 

arraignment and the arraignment of the last-extradited codefendant was properly and automatically excluded. See id.

§ 3161(h)(6) (“A reasonable period of delay when the 

defendant is joined for trial with a co-defendant as to whom 

the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has 

been granted.”). Ultimately, the only exclusions he seriously 

contests are two “ends of justice” stays that cover the ground 

between August 4, 2004, and November 25, 2005, after which 

time automatic exclusions based on Lopesierra’s filing of a 

motion for release, see id. § 3161(h)(1)(D) (excluding “delay 

resulting from any pretrial motion”), and interlocutory appeal, 

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id. § 3161(h)(1)(C) (excluding “delay resulting from any 

interlocutory appeal”), kicked in. 

The first of the contested “ends of justice” stays would 

present no problem at all were it not for the unusual absence 

from the docket of a district court order. We pick up this 

mystery on August 14, 2003, well before the end of the first

automatic stay, when the government filed a motion to 

exclude time from the speedy-trial clock under Section 

3161(h)(7), which permits a judge to grant an exclusion where 

“the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the 

best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial,” 

id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). No order either granting or denying that 

motion appears on the docket. Indeed, not until almost two 

years later, on May 26, 2005, when the district court granted a 

subsequent Speedy Trial Act motion, does any order stopping 

the speedy-trial clock appear on the docket. See generally 

Order, United States v. Osorio Ortega, No. 02-00392 (D.D.C. 

May 26, 2005). Given this, Lopesierra makes a 

straightforward argument: no order tolled the speedy-trial 

clock during the 293 days between the expiration of the 

automatic stay and the district court’s 2005 order, and because 

the district court has no authority to retroactively toll the 

clock, dismissal is required. 

An examination of the record, however, makes clear that 

the phantom order was actually issued and its absence from 

the docket resulted from a clerical error. In memoranda 

regarding the government’s second Speedy Trial Act motion, 

both parties acknowledged that the district court had in fact

issued an order granting the government’s initial motion. In 

fact, Lopesierra’s memorandum appears to quote directly 

from the missing order:

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[T]he Government served on defense Counsel a 

motion asking the Court to toll the Speedy Trial 

Clock (“STC”), under 18 U.S.C. 3161 (h)7 and 

(h)8, which was granted “until the last Defendant 

or some other Defendant identified by the Court

[was] extradited from their native Colombia,” 

(h)(7), as well as because the case was “complex 

due to the nature of the prosecution,” Discovery 

being so ample, “witnesses resid[ing] outside the 

United States,” and the possibility that the case 

“may present novel questions of fact or law.” This 

order does not appear on the docket sheet but 

defendant accepts the fact that it was signed.

Defendant Santander Lopesierra’s Response in Opposition to 

Government’s Second Motion to Stay Speedy Trial Act at 1, 

United States v. Osorio Ortega, No. 02-00392 (D.D.C. Apr. 

28, 2005). Lopesierra’s own filing thus put the existence of 

the order beyond dispute, and the portions of the order he 

quotes enumerate perfectly adequate reasons for granting a

stay. Moreover, these reasons are confirmed and reiterated on 

the record in the district court’s order granting the 

government’s second motion. See Order at 1, United States v. 

Osorio Ortega, No. 02-00392 (D.D.C. May 26, 2005) (noting 

that the court had “previously granted the Government’s first 

Motion to Stay the Speedy Trial Act on grounds that several 

defendants had not been extradited from Col[o]mbia and due 

to the complexity and nature of the prosecution”). This 

suffices to satisfy Section 3161(h)(7)’s requirement that the 

court’s findings be “set[ ] forth, in the record of the case.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A); see Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 

489, 506–07 (2006); United States v. Edwards, 627 F.2d 460, 

461 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam).

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Having solved the mystery of the phantom order, we turn 

to the second contested “ends of justice” stay. According to 

Lopesierra, the district court failed to give a sufficient 

explanation of its reasons for granting the government’s 

second motion to toll the speedy-trial clock. The district court

stayed the clock for an additional six months, finding, as the 

statute requires, that the stay served the “ends of justice” and 

“outweigh[ed] the best interest of the public and the 

[remaining] defendant[s] in a speedy trial.” See Order at 1,

United States v. Osorio Ortega, No. 02-00392 (D.D.C. May 

26, 2005). In so doing, the court explained that it had 

considered the statutory factors, reciting some of the more 

pertinent ones: “the complexity of the case, the nature of the 

prosecution, and that it would be ‘unreasonable to expect 

adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial 

itself within the time limits established’ under the Act.” See 

id. at 2.

Lopesierra maintains that because only two defendants 

remained for trial and all discovery had been produced, the 

district court had no basis for finding that the case remained 

complex. According to Lopesierra, docket congestion—a 

statutorily impermissible consideration, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(h)(7)(C)—was among the “real” reasons the district 

court granted the exclusion. But we have little difficulty 

concluding that the district court’s explanation suffices. The 

court expressly invoked relevant factors and weighed the 

competing interests. Presented with no plausible justification 

for doing otherwise, we take the district court at its word. 

IV.

We can quickly dispatch with Lopesierra’s many

remaining claims: three evidentiary issues, three challenges to 

the jury instructions, two sentencing issues, and an 

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overarching argument that, given all of these supposed errors, 

Lopesierra was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial. 

Evidentiary Claims

Lopesierra challenges the admission of two pieces of 

evidence, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence with 

respect to his state of mind. 

Lopesierra’s first challenge is to the admission of a 

recorded phone call that the government failed to identify on 

its exhibit list during pretrial discovery. Because the defense 

relied at trial on the absence of the recording from the exhibit 

list, Lopesierra maintains that the district court should have 

denied the government’s motion to introduce it mid-trial. We 

disagree. The government produced the recording during 

discovery, as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 requires,

and it agreed to exclude the evidence if the defense refrained 

from suggesting that no such recording existed. The defense, 

fully aware of the consequences of doing so, opened the door 

to the recording’s admission by continuing its line of 

questioning. Under these circumstances, the district court 

acted well within its discretion. See United States v. Smart, 98 

F.3d 1379, 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“This court reviews a trial 

judge’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.”).

Lopesierra next contests the admission of testimony 

about his 1996 involvement in a conspiracy to ship cocaine to 

Miami. This incident took place prior to the start of the 

charged conspiracy, and the district court admitted it for the 

limited purpose of showing knowledge or intent. According to 

Lopesierra, admission of this evidence violated the so-called 

doctrine of specialty, which provides that “once extradited, a 

person can be prosecuted only for those charges on which he 

was extradited.” United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 892

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(D.C. Cir. 1989). We have previously noted conflicting 

authority as to whether a criminal defendant—as opposed to 

the extraditing state—has standing to assert the doctrine of 

speciality. See id. at 892 n.1 (collecting cases). But even 

assuming Lopesierra can make this claim, see id. (declining to 

resolve this question and proceeding to the merits), it is 

without merit. We agree with the other circuits to have 

considered this question that the doctrine of specialty governs 

prosecutions, not evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 

208 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated on other 

grounds, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001); Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 

385, 390 (8th Cir. 1989). Testimony about the 1996 incident 

was introduced only as evidence of the crime for which 

Lopesierra was extradited, the 1999–2002 conspiracy. 

Because he was never prosecuted for any crime stemming 

from the 1996 incident, the doctrine of specialty has no 

bearing here.

Our review of Lopsierra’s third claim—that the jury 

lacked sufficient evidence to conclude that he knew or 

intended that the drugs he distributed would be imported into 

the United States—is “highly circumscribed.” United States v. 

Battle, 613 F.3d 258, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Indeed, we must 

uphold the jury's verdict if “ ‘any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Andrews, 532 F.3d 900, 

903 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Because Lopesierra failed to renew his 

motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the 

evidence, this already “exceedingly heavy burden” is made

“even heavier.” United States v. Booker, 436 F.3d 238, 241 

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unless 

“ ‘declining to consider the sufficiency of the evidence . . .

cause[s] a manifest miscarriage of justice,’ ” id. (quoting 

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United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 

2002)), Lopesierra will be considered to have waived his 

claim. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, see 

Andrews, 532 F.3d at 903 n.1, the evidence clearly supports 

an inference of knowledge or intent. For example, witnesses 

testified to Lopesierra’s statements that the drugs he 

purchased were to be transported to Puerto Rico, that 462 

kilograms of cocaine had in fact arrived there, and that Puerto 

Rican buyers were complaining about drug quality. Given all 

this, Lopesierra comes nowhere close to demonstrating the 

“manifest miscarriage of justice” required for reversal.

Jury Instructions Claims

Lopesierra argues that the district court erred by 

declining to give a multiple-conspiracies instruction. He

emphasizes that he had little interaction with co-defendant 

Padilla and maintains that the evidence demonstrated the 

existence of three distinct conspiracies—a conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine knowing or intending that it would be 

imported into the United States (the one charged), a 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine within Puerto Rico, and a 

conspiracy to commit money laundering. We review a district 

court’s refusal to give a multiple-conspiracies instruction de 

novo. See United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 

737 (D.C. Cir. 2009). If the record supports the existence of 

multiple conspiracies, the district court errs by failing to

instruct the jury accordingly. See id.

In distinguishing a single conspiracy from multiple 

conspiracies, we ask “whether the participants shared a 

common goal, were dependent upon one another, and were 

involved together in carrying out at least some parts of the 

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plan.” Id. Although Lopesierra and Padilla may have been 

involved in different aspects of the conspiracy, “there is no 

requirement that each conspirator [even] know the identity of 

every other conspirator.” United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 

1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Rather, we have “require[d] 

only that the main conspirators”—here, the higher ups in the 

Osorio network, not the two defendants who went to trial—

“work with all the participants.” United States v. Hemphill, 

514 F.3d 1350, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2008). And while some of the 

cocaine distributed by the Osorio group was not bound for the 

United States, that fact, in and of itself, fails to demonstrate 

the existence of multiple conspiracies. Not only has 

Lopesierra failed to cite any support for such a proposition,

but so holding would render most drug-distribution 

conspiracies subject to parsing.

Next, Lopesierra asserts that the district court should 

have instructed the jury that it had to unanimously find either 

“knowledge” or “intent,” the two states of mind covered by 

21 U.S.C. § 959(a). Because he failed to raise this issue at 

trial, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Hurt, 

527 F.3d 1347, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Lopesierra cites nothing to suggest that, where a statute 

contemplates alternative states of mind, a jury must 

unanimously agree about which one the defendant in fact 

possessed. To the contrary, several circuits, relying on the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 

(1991), have squarely held that “a district court is not required 

to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree as to which 

mens rea the defendant possessed at the time of the offense.” 

United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009)

(per curiam). We agree. That the statute encompasses both 

“knowledge” and “intent” brings it nowhere close to the 

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“point at which distinct incidents go from being different 

means of committing the same crime, to being different 

crimes.” Hurt, 527 F.3d at 1353. 

Finally, Lopesierra challenges the instruction the district 

court gave when the jury sent a note explaining that it was 

“having difficulty coming to a unanimous decision,”

notwithstanding eighteen hours of deliberations. In response

to the note, the district court gave a version of an “initial 

instruction” listed in the Criminal Jury Instructions for the 

District of Columbia—then designated Instruction 2.91, now 

designated Instruction 2.601:

Your note indicates the jury has been unable, at this 

point, to reach a unanimous verdict as to both 

Defendants. My best judgment is that you have 

been deliberating for a total of about 18 hours, 

which is not unusual in a case of this duration.

Consequently, I am going to ask that you deliberate 

further in this case and continue to give it your best 

efforts. You may resume your deliberations 

tomorrow morning. You are done for today. A good 

night’s rest might be of some assistance to you. 

The court also reminded the jury that it had already given a 

multiple-defendant instruction, which stated that “at any time 

during your deliberations you may return your verdict of 

guilty or not guilty with respect to any Defendant, after which 

you may resume your deliberations as to any remaining 

Defendants.”

Lopesierra objects to the court’s decision to instruct the 

jury to continue deliberating instead of declaring a mistrial, to 

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its use of the “initial instruction” instead of the anti-deadlock 

instruction we approved in United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 

1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc), and to its reference to the 

previously given instruction about multiple defendants. 

Lopesierra’s failure to request a mistrial or object renders this 

claim subject only to plain-error review. See United States v. 

Yarborough, 400 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The district 

court’s instructions easily clear that low bar. The “initial

instruction” was appropriate and no more coercive than that 

approved in Thomas, and its reference to the multiple 

defendant instruction—which correctly stated the law—

suggested no particular result. 

Sentencing Claims

In support of his first sentencing claim, Lopesierra

invokes Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in 

which the Supreme Court held that a jury must find any facts 

“that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a 

criminal defendant is exposed.” Id. at 490 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). According to Lopesierra, Apprendi required 

the jury to find the quantity of drugs attributable to Lopesierra 

individually—as opposed to the quantity attributable to the 

conspiracy as a whole. But we need not resolve this issue, for 

even assuming Apprendi error, such error was harmless. See 

United States v. Lafayette, 337 F.3d 1043, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 

2003) (Apprendi errors subject to harmless-error review). 

Although the jury convicted Lopesierra for conspiracy to 

import only five kilograms, record evidence shows that he

was personally involved in the importation of many times that 

weight. The Puerto Rico transaction alone involved 462 

kilograms. Accordingly, we have no doubt that the jury would 

have found the importation of at least five kilograms to have 

been reasonably foreseeable by Lopesierra himself. 

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Lopesierra also challenges the substantive reasonableness 

of his 300-month sentence, which fell below the 324- through 

405-month guidelines range. We review such claims for abuse 

of discretion. See United States v. Hall, 610 F.3d 727, 744 

(D.C. Cir. 2010). Moreover, a rebuttable presumption of 

reasonableness applies to sentences within the guidelines 

range. See United States v. Lawrence, 662 F.3d 551, 563 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). Indeed, it is “hard to imagine” how a 

sentence “below the range we ordinarily view as reasonable”

could be unreasonably high. United States v. Mejia, 597 F.3d 

1329, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Insisting that his sentence was 

nonetheless unreasonable, Lopesierra emphasizes that his codefendants received more lenient sentences as a result of 

pleading guilty and contends that his higher sentence thus 

infringed on his Sixth Amendment right to choose trial by 

jury. This claim is meritless. That some defendants pled guilty 

while others did not provides a perfectly valid basis for a 

sentencing disparity, see id. at 1344, and such disparity 

imposed no impermissible burden on Lopesierra’s jury-trial 

right, see United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1477–80

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc).

Fundamental-Fairness Claim

Finally, Lopesierra argues that even if none of the errors 

he has alleged, taken alone, requires reversal, their cumulative 

effect deprived him of his right to a fundamentally fair trial. 

Again, we disagree. Lopesierra was fairly tried, convicted, 

and sentenced. Our laws require nothing more.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm both Lopesierra’s 

conviction and his sentence.

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So ordered.

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