Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03166/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03166-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dorian R. Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 9, 2006 Decided January 5, 2007

No. 05-3166

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DORIAN R. JONES,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cr00040-01)

William Francis Xavier Becker, appointed by the court,

argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and

Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

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Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: After pleading guilty to being a

felon in possession of a firearm, appellant sought to withdraw

his plea and proceed to trial. The district court denied the

request, finding that because it had previously accepted the

plea, appellant could withdraw it under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2) only for a “fair and just reason,”

which he failed to offer. Appellant argues that the district

court never accepted his plea, leaving him entitled under Rule

11(d)(1) to withdraw “for any reason or no reason.”

Concluding that the district court did accept appellant’s guilty

plea, we affirm. 

I.

In early 2005, a federal grand jury indicted appellant

Dorian Jones for possession with intent to distribute cannabis,

use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense,

and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In a written

deal with prosecutors, Jones agreed to plead guilty to the third

charge—illegal firearm possession—in exchange for the

government dropping the other two. The parties also agreed

on a sentencing range of 41 to 51 months. Under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), pursuant to which

the parties entered the plea agreement, this range would

become binding if the district court ultimately accepted the

agreement.

The district court conducted a plea hearing in early June,

during which it reviewed the factual basis for the plea,

explained to Jones the rights he relinquished by pleading, and

ensured that his plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). The court then explained to Jones

that “[i]f you plead guilty today and I ultimately accept your

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plea a presentence report will be prepared and I will then

consider whether or not to accept the plea agreement.” Tr. of

June 2, 2005 Hr’g at 31. 

Hearing this explanation of the plea process, Jones’s

attorney asked the court to “accept the agreement today before

he pleads guilty or wait for the presentence report and then

plead guilty on that.” Id. at 32. The court rejected this

proposal, explaining that “we can’t [sic] a presentence report

without a guilty plea and I can’t accept the plea agreement

without a presentence report.” Id. at 32-33. The court said it

would therefore “conditionally accept the guilty plea subject

to review of the plea agreement and the presentence report

that is prepared.” Id. at 33. In response, Jones’s attorney

urged the court to commit to a sentencing range before Jones

entered his plea, requesting that the parties “mak[e] a proffer

as to what we believe the range is going to be once the

presentence report is returned and the court make its decision

today.” Id. at 33-34. Again demurring, the court reiterated its

need to see a presentence report before it could pass on the

propriety of the agreed-upon range.

To ensure that “we’re all comfortable with it,” the court

described the plea process for a second time. Id. at 35.

“[T]he way it works,” the court explained, “is if you plead

guilty today and I accept the plea then the presentence report

is prepared, and I will then consider whether or not to accept

the plea agreement that goes along with the plea.” Id. at 36.

If it does not accept the plea agreement, the court continued,

the defendant “ha[s] the right and will be given the

opportunity to withdraw [his] plea and change [his] plea to

not guilty.” Id. at 37. 

Having twice heard the court’s explanation of the plea

process, Jones pleaded guilty. The court then “conditionally

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accepted [the plea] subject to review of the plea agreement

and the presentence report.” Id. at 41. 

When time came for sentencing, though, Jones changed

his mind. Midway through the sentencing hearing, as the

district court and attorneys discussed the appropriate

guidelines range, Jones, through counsel, asked to withdraw

his plea. Addressing the court himself, Jones said he thought

the plea would not be considered final until the court accepted

the plea agreement. 

Following a brief recess, the district court explained that

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(1), a

defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before the court accepts

it “for any reason or no reason.” Tr. of Aug. 15, 2005 Hr’g at

31. But once the plea is accepted, the court continued, it may

be withdrawn only if the defendant demonstrates a “fair and

just reason for withdrawal.” Id. at 32. Unsure whether it had

formally accepted the plea at the June hearing, the court

ordered the transcript produced. 

At a later status conference the court informed the parties

that, based on its review of the transcript and the parties’

briefs, it believed it had in fact accepted the guilty plea at the

June hearing. The court explained that under United States v.

Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997), a district court may accept a

guilty plea and at the same time defer decision on the

underlying plea agreement—precisely what it had done by

conditionally accepting Jones’s plea. Because Jones “ha[d]

not offered [a fair and just] reason [for withdrawal]” or

“assert[ed his] innocence,” and because “significant time

ha[d] elapsed since the plea before the withdrawal was

raised,” the court denied Jones’s motion to withdraw the plea.

Tr. of Sept. 7, 2005 Hr’g at 5. The district court subsequently

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accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Jones to 48

months. Tr. of Sept. 23, 2005 Hr’g at 13. 

Jones appeals, arguing that the district court should have

granted his motion to withdraw the plea. 

II.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which sets forth

procedures for pleas and plea agreements, describes three

instances in which a defendant may withdraw from a

previously tendered guilty plea. First, Rule 11(d)(1) provides

that “before the court accepts the plea,” the defendant may

withdraw “for any reason or no reason” at all. Second, if the

court has already accepted the plea, Rule 11(d)(2)(B) permits

the defendant to withdraw if he “show[s] a fair and just reason

for requesting the withdrawal.” Third, under Rule

11(d)(2)(A), the court must give the defendant an opportunity

to withdraw his plea when the court rejects a plea agreement

made pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A) (which allows the

agreement to provide that the government will not bring new

charges) or—more important for present purposes—Rule

11(c)(1)(C) (which, as noted, permits the prosecution and

defense to agree on a particular sentence or sentencing range).

Construing an earlier version of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court in Hyde clarified that

guilty pleas exist independently from plea agreements on

which they rest, explaining that “the Rules nowhere state that

the guilty plea and the plea agreement must be treated

identically.” 520 U.S. at 677. As a result, the Court ruled, a

district court may accept a guilty plea without simultaneously

accepting the underlying plea agreement. Read in conjunction

with the current Rules, which were clarified to reflect Hyde’s

holding, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note

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(2002 amendments), the decision establishes that when a

district court accepts a guilty plea but defers decision on the

plea agreement, the defendant may withdraw only for “a fair

and just reason,” except that if the court rejects the plea

agreement (and the agreement was made pursuant to Rule

11(c)(1)(A) or 11(c)(1)(C)), the defendant may again

withdraw as of right.

Although Jones’s brief is far from clear, we discern two

primary arguments. First, he contends that because the

district court accepted the guilty plea only “conditionally,” it

did not accept it for purposes of Rule 11(d)(1). In support of

this claim, Jones cites several portions of the transcript where

the district court referred to the acceptance as conditional.

For example, at one point the district court said that “[w]hat I

do is conditionally accept the guilty plea subject to review of

the plea agreement and the presentence report that is

prepared.” Tr. of June 2, 2005 Hr’g at 33. But this does not

help Jones. The acceptance was “conditional” only in that

under Rule 11(d)(2)(A) the court had to give Jones an

opportunity to withdraw the plea if it ultimately rejected the

plea agreement. As the government correctly points out,

Hyde ensures that such conditions subsequent do not nullify

otherwise valid acceptances. 520 U.S. at 679-80.

Second, Jones argues that the district court never actually

accepted the plea, factually distinguishing this case from

Hyde. In support, Jones alleges that the district court

“repeatedly acknowledged the unencumbered ability (or right)

of the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea up until the time

of its acceptance and the commitment by the Court to be

bound to all of its terms.” Appellant’s Br. 13. 

Until now, we have had no occasion to say what standard

of review applies to a district court’s determination of whether

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it accepted a plea. The government urges us to review for

abuse of discretion, citing United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450

(D.C. Cir. 2004), for the proposition that “[t]his Court

‘review[s] refusals of motions to withdraw [guilty pleas] for

abuse of discretion.’” Appellee’s Br. 9 (quoting West, 392

F.3d at 455). 

The government’s reliance on West is misplaced. Unlike

Jones, West never argued that his plea had not been accepted;

rather, he contended that he had offered a fair and just reason

for withdrawing his plea after acceptance. West, 392 F.3d at

455-57. Reviewing only for abuse of discretion, we

recognized that determining the fairness and justness of a

defendant’s reason is entrusted to the discretion of the district

court. Under Rule 11(d)(1), however, the district court has no

discretion to deny a pre-acceptance withdrawal of a guilty

plea. The rule states that the defendant may withdraw “for

any reason or no reason.” See United States v. Head, 340

F.3d 628, 629 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e find that the district

court had no discretion, under Rule 11(d), to deny Head’s

motion to withdraw his guilty plea.”). The abuse of discretion

standard, moreover, makes little sense given that we are

reviewing the district court’s interpretation of its own words.

Under these circumstances, our review is de novo. The only

facts relevant to our decision, i.e., the words spoken at the

plea hearing, appear in the transcript, leaving for us the

evaluation of their legal consequences.

The district court itself acknowledged that it “may have

used language too loosely” at the plea hearing. Tr. of Aug.

15, 2005 Hr’g at 34. Indeed, immediately following the plea,

the court said it would “defer [its] decision on whether to

accept the plea agreement and . . . therefore the guilty plea set

out in the plea agreement.” Tr. of June 2, 2005 Hr’g at 40.

Read in isolation, this language suggests that the court may

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have deferred decision on the plea itself. Read in its entirety,

however, the transcript demonstrates the district court not

only accepted the plea, but also made clear to Jones he could

withdraw his plea only if the court rejected the plea

agreement. As described above, before taking the plea the

court twice explained that it could order a presentence

report—and thus pass judgment on the plea agreement—only

if Jones first pleaded guilty and the court accepted that plea.

Even more to the point, Jones’s attorney twice asked the court

to accept the plea agreement contemporaneously with the plea

itself. On both occasions, the court declined, citing its need

for a presentence report. And then, after Jones entered the

plea, the court announced that “the plea of guilty is

conditionally accepted subject to review of the plea

agreement and the presentence report, and I find you guilty.”

Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Given this, Jones had no

reasonable basis for thinking the court had not accepted his

plea. Moreover, contrary to Jones’s allegation, the district

court never intimated that the defendant had an

“unencumbered ability” to withdraw from the plea. Indeed,

the court repeatedly explained that after pleading, Jones could

withdraw his plea only if the court rejected the plea

agreement. 

Under these circumstances, Jones could have withdrawn

his plea only by offering a “fair and just reason.” FED. R.

CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). Although Jones told the district court

he had a qualifying reason for withdrawing his plea, a reason

the district court rejected, he makes no such argument on

appeal. We thus affirm the district court’s denial of the

motion to withdraw.

 So ordered.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

The majority is correct that “[u]ntil now we have had no

occasion to say what standard of review applies to a district

court’s determination of whether it accepted a plea.” Maj. op. 6-

7. Nor have we occasion now. Whether we review the court’s

decision here de novo, as the majority proposes, or for abuse of

discretion, as we have reviewed withdrawal denials in the past,

see United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(“We review refusals of motions to withdraw for abuse of

discretion.”), we reach the same result because the district

court’s determination that “the Court did accept the defendant’s

guilty plea” at the June hearing, 9/7/05 Hearing Tr. 4, is neither

incorrect as a matter of law nor an abuse of discretion. Thus, we

have no need to choose between the two standards to decide the

case before us. Further, whether or not we should review de

novo the district court’s legal disposition of a motion to

withdraw under Rule 11(d)(1) (rather than for abuse of

discretion as for a withdrawal determination under Rule

11(d)(2)), I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that our

review of the judge’s factual findings is somehow less

deferential because we are “reviewing the district court’s

interpretation of its own words” as memorialized in a verbatim

transcript. See maj. op. 7. We routinely review transcripts of

judicial hearings and, in this case, the trial judge’s finding was

based on his interpretation of the entire transcript of the Rule 11

colloquy, including not only his own words but, significantly,

also those of defense counsel who, as the majority notes, “twice

asked the court to accept the plea agreement contemporaneously

with the plea itself.” Id. 8. 

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