Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-02080/USCOURTS-ca7-16-02080-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Columbia College Chicago
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026

COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO,

Petitioner/Cross‐Respondent,

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent/Cross‐Petitioner.

____________________

Petition for Review and Cross‐Application for Enforcement of an  

Order of the National Labor Relations Board.  

Nos. 13‐CA‐073486, 13‐CA‐073487, 13‐CA‐076794,  

13‐CA‐078080, 13‐CA‐081162, 13‐CA‐084369

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 2, 2017

____________________

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Columbia College Chi‐

cago (“Columbia”) seeks review of a National Labor Relations

Board (“NLRB”) order. The order required Columbia to en‐

gage in “effects bargaining” with the Part‐Time Faculty Asso‐

ciation at Columbia College Chicago (“PFAC”) under the

terms of the parties’ collective‐bargaining agreement (“CBA”)

regarding credit‐hour changes to Columbia’s performing‐arts

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2 Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026

curriculum, and awarded bargaining expenses to PFAC. We

grant Columbia’s petition for review, and grant in part and

deny in part the NLRB’s application for enforcement. We thus

enforce in part and vacate in part the Board’s order, and re‐

mand for further proceedings.  

I. Background

Columbia is a private, independent college that specializes

in communication, media, and the arts. Since 1998, PFAC has

served as the exclusive collective‐bargaining representative

for part‐time faculty at Columbia, of which there were over

1,200. PFAC and Columbia were parties to a CBA that, by its

terms, was in effect from 2006 to August 31, 2010. The parties

agreed to keep the 2006 CBA in place while they bargained

for a successor agreement, and so the former was in effect at

all times relevant to this case.

The CBA contained several provisions that are pertinent

to this appeal. First, the agreement had a management‐rights

clause permitting Columbia to make decisions about its edu‐

cational, fiscal, and employment policies without first having

to bargain with PFAC:

Columbia ... retain[s] all ... rights ... inherent in

the management of [Columbia] ... except as spe‐

cifically modified by this Agreement during its

term. All the rights and responsibilities of Co‐

lumbia ... shall be retained and exercised in [its]

sole discretion including by way of example

and not in any way limited to:

A. The right to plan, establish, terminate,

modify, and implement all aspects of educa‐

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Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026 3

tional policies and practices, including curric‐

ula; admission and graduation requirements

and standards; scheduling; ... and the ... reduc‐

tion, modification, alteration ... or transfer of

any job, department, program, course, institute,

or other academic or non‐academic activity and

the staffing of the activity, except as may be

modified by this Agreement.

B. The right to manage [Columbia] and di‐

rect [Columbia’s] property, including fiscal and

budgetary policy ..., except as may be modified

by this Agreement.

C. The right to ... establish, modify, and dis‐

continue rules and regulations ... relating to the

performance of work, including workload,

scheduling of work and its location ..., except as

may be modified by this Agreement.

Second, the CBA determined part‐time faculty pay using

two main variables: the number of credit hours a course car‐

ried and the total number of credit hours the faculty member

had previously taught. The agreement contained a minimum‐ 

compensation schedule forthree‐credit‐hour courses and pro‐

vided that “[c]ompensation for courses totaling other than

three credits shall be prorated” accordingly. Minimum com‐

pensation for a given course increased as faculty accumulated

credit hours from prior semesters. The CBA required Colum‐

bia to notify the instructor of a given course of any significant

changes to the course.  

Finally, a section entitled “Entire Agreement,” also known

as a “zipper clause,” stated:

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4 Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026

The parties acknowledge that during the nego‐

tiations which resulted in this Agreement, each

had the right and opportunity to make demands

and proposals on any subject or matter ... and

that the understandings and agreements ar‐

rived at by the parties after the exercise of that

right and opportunity are set forth in this, the

sole Agreement between the parties regarding

wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of

employment.

By January 2010, PFAC and Columbia had begun negoti‐

ations for a successor CBA. The parties met weekly and kept

a running list of contract items that were not in dispute and

about which the parties planned to agree.

In the spring of 2010, Columbia administrators reevalu‐

ated the school’s curriculum. As part of that process, Colum‐

bia unilaterally decided to reduce the credit hours for ten

courses in its School of Fine and Performing Arts, with the

changes to take effect in the 2011–2012 academic year. Colum‐

bia notified part‐time faculty members affected by these

changes, but not PFAC.1

In July 2010, PFAC filed an unfair‐labor‐practice charge re‐

garding Columbia’s refusal to bargain over the effects of its

decision to reduce course credit hours in the Photography De‐

partment—a different department from the ones at issue in

this case. The parties settled that charge on October 22, 2010.2  

                                                  1 The 2006 CBA did not require Columbia to notify PFAC of such

changes, only the individually‐affected faculty members.

2 As part of the settlement, Columbia agreed to bargain over the ef‐

fects of changes to credit hours in the Photography Department, and not

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Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026 5

Meanwhile, the negotiations over the successor CBA were

still ongoing, and on October 27, 2010, Columbia sent PFAC a

proposal that included a modified management‐rights clause.

The modified clause was similar to the 2006 clause, but pro‐

posed new language extending the clause to explicitly waive

PFAC’s right to bargain over the effects or impact of Colum‐

bia’s management decisions. On October 29, PFAC expressed

concern about the proposed modification.

On March 30, 2011, Columbia submitted a new, compre‐

hensive CBA proposal to PFAC. The document included the

additional management‐rights‐clause language that Colum‐

bia had proposed in October 2010. In October 2011, after fur‐

ther negotiations, Columbia resubmitted its March 2011 pro‐

posal to PFAC. PFAC responded by saying that Columbia

was engaging in regressive bargaining.

Negotiations broke down and stalled for several weeks.

Then, on December 19, 2011, Columbia sent PFAC another re‐

vised contract, but with even stronger language in the man‐

agement‐rights clause, which was “intended to constitute a

clear and unmistakable waiver of any rights [PFAC] might

otherwise have to bargain over managerial rights and/or the

effects or impact on unit members of [Columbia’s] decisions

with respect to such rights.” (first alteration in original).

Around the same time, PFAC learned of the credit‐hour

reductions that Columbia had made in the spring of 2010.

PFAC sought a list of affected courses from Columbia and de‐

manded to bargain over the effects of the changes.  

                                                 

to violate the National Labor Relations Act “in any similar way” in the

future. However, the parties do not argue that the settlement’s non‐viola‐

tion provision impacts the current dispute.  

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6 Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026

On February 13, 2012, PFAC called for Columbia to re‐

sume face‐to‐face negotiations from the parties’ bargaining

positions as they had stood in October 2011. PFAC also stated

that it would not consider Columbia’s December 2011 pro‐

posal, which PFAC felt was regressive. On February 21, 2012,

Columbia notified PFAC that the college did not believe it had

an obligation to bargain with PFAC about the effects of

course‐credit‐hour reductions. Nevertheless, Columbia pro‐

vided a list of the impacted courses, and stated that it was

willing meet to discuss the issue if PFAC would first give Co‐

lumbia a proposal regarding the effects, and a list of PFAC

members that had been affected by the changes to course

credit hours. Similar exchanges followed in March and April

2012.

On May 4, 2012, Columbia agreed to meet and discuss the

credit‐hour reductions, and the parties resumed face‐to‐face

negotiations in late June 2012. (PFAC did not allege that Co‐

lumbia had engaged in bad‐faith bargaining after this date.)

On August 28, 2012, the NLRB lodged a complaint against

Columbia. The Board’s consolidated complaint alleged,

among other things, that Columbia had violated Sections

8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (5), by fail‐

ing to bargain: 1) over the effects of the credit‐hour reductions

from February to May 2012; 2) for a successor CBA from Feb‐

ruary to June 2012; and 3) in good faith with PFAC.

On March 15, 2013, after a full hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued his recommended decision and or‐

der. He concluded that Columbia had failed to engage in ef‐

fects bargaining, had failed to adequately negotiate for a suc‐

cessor CBA, had set illegal preconditions to bargaining, and

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Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026 7

had demonstrated bad‐faith bargaining in its overall behav‐

ior. However, the ALJ declined to award special remedies, in‐

cluding reimbursement of PFAC’s bargaining expenses, not‐

ing, “I cannot find ... that [Columbia’s] misconduct was so

aggravated as to infect the bargaining process to the point

where traditional remedies would not be effective.” Colum‐

bia, PFAC and the NLRB each filed exceptions to the ALJ’s

decision.

On March 24, 2016, the NLRB, through a divided three‐

member panel, issued its decision and order. The NLRB

agreed that Columbia had failed to engage in effects bargain‐

ing, set unlawful preconditions to bargaining, and negotiated

in bad faith. Noting the absence of objections, the NLRB also

adopted the ALJ’s findings on Columbia’s failure to ade‐

quately bargain over a successor CBA.3  

However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ regarding

remedies, and awarded bargaining expenses. The NLRB or‐

dered Columbia to compensate PFAC for efforts to initiate ef‐

fects bargaining from February 21, 2012, to May 4, 2012, and

in connection with bargaining for a successor contract from

March 31, 2012, to June 13, 2012.  

                                                  3 The NLRB likewise adopted the ALJ’s findings regarding several al‐

legations not at issue in this appeal, including Columbia’s failure to pro‐

vide information on its professor‐evaluation system, misconduct toward

a PFAC negotiator and Columbia faculty member, and maintenance of an

overbroad work rule. Columbia does not challenge any of these adopted

findings. The NLRB further adopted the ALJ’s dismissal of several allega‐

tions against Columbia, and the NLRB does not challenge this aspect of

the order. We summarily enforce the unchallenged portions of the NLRB’s

decision and order. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Alwin Mfg. Co., 78 F.3d 1159, 1162 (7th

Cir. 1996); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).

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8 Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026

As to the governing standard for waivers of bargaining

rights, the NLRB majority stated,

We also reject our dissenting colleague’s argu‐

ment that [Columbia] had no duty to bargain

over the effects of its decision to change course

credit hours under the contract‐coverage test

endorsed by the District of Columbia Circuit

and the Seventh Circuit. The Board has declined

to adopt the contract‐coverage standard and in‐

stead has consistently applied the “clear and

unmistakable” waiver standard. See Provena St.

Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB 808 (2007) ....

The dissenting panel member argued that Columbia had

not violated the NLRA because the college had no duty to bar‐

gain over the effects of the credit‐hour reductions. The dissent

outlined three rationales for this conclusion: 1) the effects

were the inevitable consequence of a permissible managerial

decision under Fresno Bee, 339 NLRB 1214 (2003);4 2) under

binding case law from this Court, the effects of the credit‐hour

reductions were already “covered” by the CBA and there was

no indication that the effects should be treated separately

from the decision itself; and 3) Columbia did not violate the

NLRA even under the majority’s version of the unmistakable‐

                                                  4 Under Fresno Bee, an employer has no duty to bargain overthe effects

of a permissible managerial decision if “the change resulted directly from

that decision, [and] there was no possibility of an alternative change in

terms of employment that would have warranted bargaining.” 339 NLRB

at 1214–15 (citing Holly Farms Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 48 F.3d 1360, 1368 (4th Cir.

1995)).  

Case: 16-2080 Document: 37 Filed: 02/02/2017 Pages: 17
Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026 9

waiver standard. The dissent concluded that bargaining ex‐

penses were inappropriately awarded. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Though “we give substantial deference to both [the

NLRB’s] findings of fact and its interpretations of the

[NLRA],” we must still “determine whether the Board’s deci‐

sion is supported by substantial evidence and whether its le‐

gal conclusions have a reasonable basis in law.” Roundy’s Inc.

v. N.L.R.B., 674 F.3d 638, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omit‐

ted). “We defer to the Board’s interpretation of the [NLRA]

unless its legal conclusions are irrational or inconsistent with

the Act. Where a matter involves analysis of state law for

which the Board has no special expertise, however, our re‐

view is de novo,” including in matters of contractual interpre‐

tation. Id. at 646 (citations and internal quotation marks omit‐

ted). Additionally, courts “refuse[] enforcement of Board or‐

ders where they ha[ve] no reasonable basis in law, either be‐

cause the proper legal standard was not applied or because

the Board applied the correct standard but failed to give the

plain language of the standard its ordinary meaning.” Ford

Motor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) (citation and in‐

ternal quotation marks omitted).

The NLRB, in finding for PFAC, applied the “clear and un‐

mistakable waiver” standard. However, as the NLRB’s order

recognized, when a binding CBA fully defines the parties’

rights on the contested issue, we look only to the language of

the agreement; the clear‐and‐unmistakable‐waiver standard

is irrelevant. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. N.L.R.B., 974 F.2d 933,

937 (7th Cir. 1992). Because the NLRB chose to apply a stand‐

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10 Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026

ard that conflicts with this Court’s precedents, we owe no def‐

erence to the NLRB’s legal conclusions. See Ford Motor Co., 441

U.S. at 497; Roundy’s Inc., 674 F.3d at 645–46.  

A. Contractual Waiver of Effects Bargaining  

The NLRA allows employees to bargain collectively

through a chosen bargaining representative. 29 U.S.C. § 157.

An employer must bargain with the representative over sig‐

nificant changes in working conditions. See id. § 158(a)(5);

Contemporary Cars, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 814 F.3d 859, 868 (7th Cir.

2016); Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL‐CIO v. Exelon

Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 783 (7th Cir. 2007). Statutory rights such

as these may be waived by the bargaining representative, of‐

ten “to secure gains it considers of more value to its mem‐

bers.” Metro. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 460 U.S. 693, 707 (1983),

Waivers of statutory rights must be “clear and unmistakable.”

Id. at 708.

Since Metropolitan Edison, this Court has determined that  

where the contract fully defines the parties’

rights as to what would otherwise be a manda‐

tory subject of bargaining, it is incorrect to say

that the union has “waived” its statutory right

to bargain; rather, the contract will control and

the “clear and unmistakable” intent standard is

irrelevant.

Chicago Tribune, 974 F.2d at 937 (quoting Local Union No. 47 v.

N.L.R.B., 927 F.2d 635, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The parties refer

to this agreement‐centric approach as “contract‐coverage

analysis.”  

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Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026 11

This type of analysis applies to decisions taken by employ‐

ers and to the effects of those decisions, unless the parties’ col‐

lective‐bargaining agreement contemplates treating effects

separately from the decisions covered by the terms of the

agreement. Enloe Med. Ctr. v. N.L.R.B., 433 F.3d 834, 838–39

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Whether the parties contemplated that the

collective bargaining agreement would treat the effects of a

decision separately from the decision itself is just as much a

matter of ordinary contract interpretation as is the initial de‐

termination of whether the agreement covers the matter alto‐

gether. It would be rather unusual, moreover, to interpret a

contract as granting an employer the unilateral right to make

a particular decision but as reserving a union’s right to bar‐

gain over the effects of that decision. This is not to say that

such an interpretation is inconceivable, but it would seem that

there would have to be some language or bargaining history

to support the proposition that the parties intended to treat

the issues separately.”).  

Thus, under Chicago Tribune, the NLRB or reviewing court

should first look to see whether the parties are subject to an

agreement, such as a collective‐bargaining agreement, that

sets out their respective rights and responsibilities. If there is

such an agreement, the adjudicating body should determine,

using normal principles of contract interpretation, whether

the agreement “fully defines the parties’ rights as to what

would otherwise be a mandatory subject of bargaining.” 974

F.2d at 937. If it does, the court should apply the terms of the

agreement to the facts of the case in deciding whether the em‐

ployer has fulfilled its contractual obligations. Finally, if the

bargaining representative argues that the employer was obli‐

gated to bargain over the effects of the employer’s decision,

the court should look to see whetherthe governing agreement

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12 Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026

or the parties’ bargaining history indicates an intent to treat

effects bargaining separately from bargaining over the deci‐

sion itself. See Enloe Med. Ctr., 433 F.3d at 838–39.  

In the absence of a CBA, credit‐hour changes would likely

be a mandatory subject of bargaining between the parties.

However, in this case, PFAC and Columbia agreed to con‐

tinue the terms of their 2006 CBA while negotiating a succes‐

sor agreement. The 2006 agreement gave Columbia “sole dis‐

cretion” to, among other things, “modify ... all aspects of ed‐

ucational policies and practices,” including the “modification

[or] alteration ... of any ... course.” Reducing the number of

credit hours for a course constitutes a modification or altera‐

tion of that course. The management‐rights clause thus fully

defined the parties’ rights with respect to course‐credit‐hour

changes.5  

Further, the agreement did not create a decisions‐effects

bargaining dichotomy. PFAC did not adduce bargaining‐his‐

tory evidence or point to contractual language showing that

the parties intended to treat effects bargaining separately

from Columbia’s decision‐making rights. To the contrary, Co‐

lumbia had made many credit‐hour changes in prior years,

and PFAC had not demanded effects bargaining until the

2010 Photography Department lawsuit. 6 When PFAC first de‐

manded to engage in effects bargaining over the credit‐hour

                                                  5 Columbia complied with its related contractual obligation to notify

affected faculty members of impending significant changes to courses.   

6 The NLRB argues that the Photography Department settlement

agreement’s effects‐bargaining provision indicates that PFAC did not

waive its effects‐bargaining rights. Columbia argues that years of unchal‐

lenged curriculum changes shows the opposite. While true that “[t]he fail‐

ure to demand bargaining in the past, without more, does not waive that

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Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026 13

reductions in this case, Columbia’s initial rejoinder stated that

Columbia did not have such a bargaining obligation.7 Regard‐

ing the CBA’s terms, the parties agreed both to tie part‐time‐

faculty compensation to credit hours and to allow Columbia

to unilaterally modify those hours, without engaging in sep‐

arate effects bargaining for changes in faculty pay.  

In sum, Columbia and PFAC bargained over their respec‐

tive rights and duties, and agreed to a binding CBA. The

terms of that contract gave Columbia the right to alter course

credits—the subject area over which PFAC wanted to engage

                                                 

bargaining right forever,” N.L.R.B. v. Roll & Hold Warehouse & Distrib.

Corp., 162 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 1998), such a failure is a good indication

that the parties did not intend to separate decision bargaining from effects

bargaining under Enloe. Further, the NLRB does not develop an argument

as to why the Photography Department settlement agreement shows an

intention to separate effects from decisions; the settlement’s effects‐bar‐

gaining provision could also be understood as a concession to PFAC to

settle the dispute, and not as a wider indication of what the 2006 CBA

meant. In fact, the notice to employees generated by the settlement is ex‐

pressly limited to the effects of credit‐hour changes “in the Photography

Department.” This settlement is not sufficient to demonstrate that the par‐

ties intended to treat the two types of bargaining separately.      

7 Additionally, Columbia twice attempted to insert explicit effects‐

bargaining waivers into the proposed management‐rights clause during

the 2010–2011 negotiations. PFAC argues that the correct interpretation of

this bargaining posture reveals that Columbia never believed that it actu‐

ally had obtained an effects‐bargaining waiver from PFAC. However, the

rejected modifications can also be understood as attempts by Columbia to

clarify its pre‐existing rights using exceedingly clear waiver language. In

the context of the 2010 Photography Department lawsuit and the negotia‐

tions underlying this lawsuit, such a goal would have been understanda‐

ble. This Court therefore declines to interpret these contract‐modification

attempts as definitive evidence of the parties’ intent to treat effects bar‐

gaining and decision bargaining separately.    

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14 Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026

in effects bargaining. Further, the CBA did not indicate sepa‐

rate treatment of effects bargaining and decision bargaining.

Therefore, Columbia was not under any further obligation to

bargain with PFAC over the effects of the credit‐hour reduc‐

tions. The college had already satisfied its statutory bargain‐

ing duty on this issue when it negotiated and entered into the

2006 CBA.8  

B. Bargaining Expenses

Columbia does not contest on appeal that it failed to ade‐

quately negotiate for a successor CBA in 2012. For “the vast

majority of bad‐faith bargaining violations,” the traditional

remedies of a bargaining order, “cease‐and‐desist order[,] and

the posting of a notice[] will suffice to induce a respondent to

fulfill its statutory obligations.” Frontier Hotel & Casino, 318

NLRB 857, 859 (1995). However,  

[i]n cases of unusually aggravated misconduct,

... where ... substantial unfair labor practices

have infected the core of a bargaining process to

such an extent that their “effects cannot be elim‐

inated by the application of traditional reme‐

dies,” an order requiring the respondent to re‐

imburse the charging party for negotiation ex‐

penses is warranted ... .  

Id. (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614

(1969)).  

                                                  8 Because we decide that Columbia had no further duty to bargain

under Chicago Tribune, we do not address whether the effects of the credit‐

hourreductions were inevitable consequences of a permissible managerial

decision under Fresno Bee, 339 NLRB 1214, or whether Columbia would

have succeeded under the NLRB’s version of waiver analysis.  

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Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026 15

The NLRB awarded bargaining expenses to PFAC under

this standard, partially relying on conduct that Columbia

does not challenge on appeal, but also on Columbia’s behav‐

ior during the effects‐bargaining negotiations. Because we

conclude that Columbia was not obligated to engage in such

bargaining, we vacate the award of bargaining expenses and

remand to the NLRB to decide whether such a remedy is still

warranted in this case without considering the effects‐bar‐

gaining behavior.  

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT Columbia’s petition

for review, and GRANT in part and DENY in part the NLRB’s

application for enforcement of the Board’s order. We VACATE

the order’s effects‐bargaining and negotiation‐expense com‐

ponents, summarily enforce the remainder, and REMAND for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

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16 Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. Judge Flaum’s opin‐

ion for the court applies correctly this circuit’s precedents on

“effects bargaining.” See, e.g., Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 974

F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1992). The Board quite deliberately chose not

to follow this circuit’s precedents in this case, perhaps to set

up a test case to resolve the circuit split on the “clear and un‐

mistakable” standard for waiver on effects bargaining. See

generally Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 709

(1983) (rejecting finding of waiver of union officials’rights un‐

der no‐strike clause: “to waive a statutory right the duty must

be established clearly and unmistakably”).

There are strong arguments in favor of the Board’s “clear

and unmistakable” standard for waiver of bargaining rights

on effects that management decisions have on employees. See,

e.g., Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB 808 (2007).

Our different approach is settled law in this circuit, however.

If this legal standard is to change, it will need to happen in a

different forum.

On the remedial issue, even without the effects‐bargaining

issue, the Board’s decision to impose a remedial award of ne‐

gotiating costs had ample support. Columbia College has not

even challenged the Board’s findings that it violated the Na‐

tional Labor Relations Act by engaging in bad‐faith bargain‐

ing, by failing to meet and bargain over a successor agreement

for four months, by failing to provide the union with re‐

quested information, by harassing a union official and then

threatening her with discipline when she complained about

it, by discriminating against the same union official, by main‐

taining an overly broad policy on use of the college’s com‐

puter network, and by setting an unlawful precondition to

bargaining. Because the effects‐bargaining issue was part of

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Nos. 16‐2080 & 16‐2026 17

the Board’s calculus in using its remedial discretion, I agree

we must remand the remedial issue to the Board. There was

plenty of other egregious conduct by the employer here, how‐

ever, and Judge Flaum’s opinion leaves the Board ample dis‐

cretion to impose that remedy again on remand.

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