Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05435/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05435-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Communications Workers of America
Appellee
National Mediation Board
Appellee
US Airways, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 3, 1999 Decided May 28, 1999

No. 98-5435

US Airways, Inc.,

Appellant

v.

National Mediation Board and

Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(97cv01508)

Robert A. Siegel argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Tom A. Jerman.

Bruce G. Forrest, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee National Mediation

Board. With him on the brief were Frank W. Hunger,

Assistant Attorney General at the time the brief was filed,

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William Kanter, Deputy Director, and Ronald M. Etters,

General Counsel, National Mediation Board. Theodore C.

Hirt, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, entered

an appearance.

James B. Coppess argued the cause for appellee Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. With him on the

brief were Daniel M. Katz, Larry Engelstein, and Marsha S.

Berzon.

Before: Silberman, Williams, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Silberman, Circuit Judge: The National Mediation Board

(NMB) found that US Airways had interfered with its employees' free choice in a union representation election, and

issued an order setting aside the results of that election

(which the union had lost) and prescribing a re-run election

(which the union won). US Airways challenged the Board's

order in the district court on First Amendment grounds,

requesting that the results of the re-run election be set aside,

but was rebuffed. We reverse.

I.

The Communications Workers of America (CWA) failed in

the first election to garner the votes necessary to represent

the passenger service employees of US Airways. The union

saw its defeat as the product of a coercive anti-union campaign waged by the carrier's management leading up to, and

during, the representation election. Pursuant to s 2, Ninth

of the Railway Labor Act, the union requested that the Board

"investigate" the "representation dispute" and "utilize any

... appropriate method of ascertaining the names of [the

employees'] duly designated and authorized representatives

in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives

by the employees without interference, influence, or coercion

exercised by the carrier." 45 U.S.C. s 152, Ninth.

No one disputes the underlying facts found by the Board in

its investigation. For some time prior to the representation

election, an institution known as the "employee roundtable"

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was a key feature of management's relationship with the

several categories of non-represented passenger service employees. The roundtables, while focusing on operational and

other issues in their periodic meetings, also provided a forum

for occasional discussion and alteration of US Airways' employment policies. The impact has been real. Modifications

to the carrier's rules governing vacation scheduling, supervisors' disciplinary authority, and overtime were only a few of

the changes made from 1991-95.

In early 1996, a new management team announced the

formation of a company-wide "System Roundtable," an umbrella entity unifying the existing roundtables that would

continue, in the words of one executive officer, to provide a

forum for "issues affecting employees." The System Roundtable continued the tradition of its constituent bodies, implementing changes to the carrier's policies governing tardiness

and trading of shifts among employees, and also delegated to

several "task forces" the responsibility to study other policies.

The most notable of these task forces was assigned the job of

proposing changes to the carrier's apparently widely despised

policy governing paid days off for vacation and sick days.

Between the Board's authorization of the election in November 1996 and the ballot count on January 30, 1997, US

Airways' management highlighted the above described employment policy changes and the potential for future progress

on the matters under study by the task forces. In informational newsletters, telephone hotlines, and meetings, management communicated to the employees that the informal management-employee relationship embodied in the roundtables

was inconsistent with union representation: "Electing CWA

would force the company to eliminate face-to-face policy

making between management and employees at a time when

we are beginning to make real progress. Labor laws require

employees to deal exclusively with the union on issues of

employment policy."

After reviewing these facts, the Board's order set forth five

"initial standards" viewed as indicative of a carrier's interference with employee freedom of choice in the context of a

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workplace in which roundtables (also called employee committees) are present.

1) The establishment of a committee at any time after

the carrier becomes aware of a labor organization's organizing efforts;

2) A material change, or a carrier representation of such

a change during the critical period in the purpose or

activities of a pre-existing committee;

3) The use of a pre-existing committee to expand employee benefits during the critical period (the continuation of existing benefits is a prerequisite of a fair election);

4) Carrier campaigns which indicate a pre-existing committee is, or should be, a substitute for the collective

bargaining representative;

5) Carrier campaigns which indicate that the certification

of a labor organization as the representative of the

employees will lead to the termination of a pre-existing

committee.

US Airways, 24 N.M.B. 354, 385-86 (1997). The Board

determined that the carrier's activities ran afoul of each of

these five factors: the carrier had established a new roundtable during the critical period; represented to the employees

that pre-existing committees had been materially changed so

as better to address employment practices; used the roundtables to accomplish the recent changes in attendance and shifttrading policies and the creation of the task forces; portrayed

the roundtables as an alternative to union representation;

and predicted that the election of the union would result in

the elimination of the roundtable process. See id. at 388.

The Board concluded that "[b]ased upon the totality of the

circumstances in this case, ... the laboratory conditions

required for a fair election were tainted." Id. at 393.

The Board ordered a re-run election, making clear that

"[t]he Carrier is not permitted to influence, interfere [with] or

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tion." Id. at 396.1 The carrier, after failing to persuade the

Board to stay its order pending a motion for reconsideration,

filed a complaint in district court, along with an application

for a temporary restraining order barring enforcement of the

Board's order. Relying in part on the Board's representation

at the TRO hearing that "[i]f the election goes forward, and

then a decision is issued by the court that the board's decision

is invalid, the election will be null and void," the district court

denied the application. See US Airways, Inc. v. NMB, Civ.

Act. No. 97-1508, Mem. Order at 3 (D.D.C. July 3, 1997) ("If

at some point, the provisions of that Order are held to violate

either the statute or the Constitution, the election will be set

aside.").

US Airways, its request for a TRO denied, complied with

the Board's order. The carrier understood the order's fourth

and fifth factors to bar it from advocating the roundtables as

an alternative to union representation and from predicting

that election of the union would result in the disbanding of

the roundtables. So US Airways' management remained

silent on these matters. The union won the re-run election

by a slim margin: the ballot count on September 29, 1997,

revealed that of the 8,772 eligible voters, 4,773--or roughly

54%--cast ballots in favor of CWA. The NMB soon thereafter certified CWA as the bargaining representative for the

carrier's passenger service employees. Still awaiting a decision by the district court on the merits of its complaint, US

Airways amended its complaint to take account of the now

completed re-run election: "Because US Airways' speech was

__________

1 The Board's order also required US Airways: 1) to post and

mail to all employees a notice indicating that the Board had found

that US Airways had interfered with and coerced the employees'

choice of a representative; and 2) to provide the union with a list of

employee home addresses. See US Airways, 24 N.M.B. at 393.

US Airways unsuccessfully challenged these aspects of the order in

the district court on the ground that they exceeded the Board's

statutory powers. See US Airways, Inc. v. NMB, Civ. Act. No.

97-1508, Mem. Op. at 10-14 (D.D.C. July 21, 1998). As US Airways

does not renew these contentions before us, we express no view on

them.

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unconstitutionally restrained during the rerun election by

the Board's Order ..., US Airways seeks an order setting

aside the election and the certification of CWA." Supplemental Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

p 7 (filed Mar. 27, 1998) (emphasis added).

The district court ultimately rejected the carrier's constitutional arguments, granting the Board's motion for summary

judgment. US Airways, Inc. v. NMB, Civ. Act. No. 97-1508,

Mem. Op. (D.D.C. July 21, 1998). The court rejected the

carrier's analogy to cases, including NLRB v. Gissel Packing

Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), recognizing an employer's First

Amendment right to express its views on unionization prior to

a representation election. Those cases, the district court

observed, arose in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, not the Railway Labor Act, and were inapplicable

because "[t]he role of employers in representation elections

governed by the RLA is more limited than the activities

permitted employers under the NLRA." Mem. Op. at 14.

Alternatively, the district court assumed that the NLRA

caselaw does apply to the RLA context, and held that US

Airways' activities are not protected under that framework.

II.

The carrier seeks the invalidation of the results of the rerun election. Its arguments in support are two-fold: the

carrier first submits that the Board's order unconstitutionally

penalized it for the expressive activity in which it engaged

prior to the first election; alternatively, the carrier claims

that the order unconstitutionally restricted its expression

during the re-run election period. We begin, for reasons that

will become apparent, with the latter contention.

Normally, district courts lack jurisdiction to review certification decisions rendered by the NMB within its scope of

authority under s 2, Ninth of the RLA. Railway Labor

Executives' Ass'n v. NMB, 29 F.3d 655, 662 (D.C. Cir.) (en

banc); id. at 673 (Randolph, J., concurring, joined by Mikva,

C.J., Wald, J., Edwards, J., and Sentelle, J., together comprising a majority of the court), amended 38 F.3d 1224 (D.C.

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Cir. 1994) (en banc).2 But this presumption of nonreviewability falls away if the complainant makes a " 'showing

on the face of the pleadings that the certification was a gross

violation of the [RLA] or that it violated the constitutional

rights of an employer, employee, or Union.' " Professional

Cabin Crew Ass'n v. NMB, 872 F.2d 456, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 839 F.2d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir.), amended 848

F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (alteration in original). Once an

employer (or employee or union) pleads a violation of its

constitutional rights or a gross violation of its statutory rights

arising from an NMB order, jurisdiction depends on the

merits of the argument.

As US Airways points out, however, our approach to the

two exceptions to the presumption of non-reviewability differs

somewhat. In examining a challenge predicated on the ex-

__________

2 The ordinary presumption of non-reviewability of NMB adjudicatory decisions rendered pursuant to 45 U.S.C. s 152, Ninth stems

from Switchmen's Union of North America v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297

(1943), where the Supreme Court inferred from Congress' careful

measures to preserve the neutrality and prestige of the NMB in the

Board's treatment of the "explosive problem" of labor relations in

the railway industry that if Congress had desired to implicate the

federal judiciary, it would have said so. Id. at 303. Though

decided prior to the enactment of the APA, which provides in

relevant part that judicial review is precluded only to the extent

that a statute so provides or the agency action is committed to

agency discretion by law, 5 U.S.C. s 701(a), Switchmen's has since

been reaffirmed, see Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for

the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 658-60

(1965). We have reconciled the Switchmen's presumption with the

APA by describing the presumption as a situation where judicial

review is precluded by statute, as judicially interpreted; however,

because the statute does not by its terms preclude judicial review of

NMB rulemaking and has never been judicially interpreted to do

so, the Switchmen's presumption does not apply outside the context

of NMB adjudications pursuant to 45 U.S.C. s 152, Ninth. See

Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 29 F.3d at 673 (Randolph, J.,

concurring, joined by Mikva, C.J., Wald, J., Edwards, J., and

Sentelle, J., together comprising a majority of the court).

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ception for a gross violation of the RLA, we take only a "peek

at the merits"; that is, we limit the inquiry to "specific

statutory language, without extension to 'arguing in terms of

policy and broad generalities as to what the Railway Labor

Act should provide.' " International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 402 F.2d 196, 205 (D.C.

Cir. 1968) (quoting Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association

for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 671

(1965)). The district court thought it was similarly compelled

to take only a "peek at the merits" of US Airways' constitutional challenge. That was erroneous. Although both constitutional and statutory challenges to NMB decisions should be

processed by a reviewing court with dispatch given Congress'

purpose in the RLA "[t]o avoid any interruption to commerce

or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein," 45 U.S.C.

s 151a; see International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 402

F.2d at 205, the "peek" framework is simply not suited to the

evaluation of constitutional claims. For constitutional arguments cannot sensibly be restricted to the plain text of the

clause at issue, which is what the "peek" framework would

require. To be sure, we have suggested otherwise in dicta.

See Professional Cabin Crew Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 459 ("Courts

take only a 'peek at the merits' to determine if the NMB has

committed an error of 'constitutional dimension or gross

violation of the statute.' ") (quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 402 F.2d at 205).3 But our only holding

confirms that a court must do more than just peek. We

did not reject the constitutional claim in International

__________

3 Two of our sister circuits have quoted this dicta approvingly,

but neither has used it to evaluate a constitutional challenge to an

NMB decision. See America West Airlines, Inc. v. NMB, 119 F.3d

772, 775 (9th Cir. 1997); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way

Employees v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 961 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th

Cir. 1992). The Fifth Circuit has stated that jurisdiction to review

a constitutional challenge to an NMB decision exists only "where a

complaining party makes a 'substantial showing' of a violation of

that party's constitutional rights as a result of the Board's action."

Russell v. NMB, 714 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting

United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, 1366 (5th Cir. 1969)

(quoting Boire v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 343 F.2d 17, 21 (5th

Cir. 1965))). This formulation seems rather unhelpful.

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Association of Machinists until we had "independently" satisfied ourselves, 839 F.2d at 812, that there was no authority

for the proposition of constitutional law asserted by the

appellants in that case. As we thus engaged in our own

research in support of a complainant's constitutional challenge to an NMB decision, but cf. Carducci v. Regan, 714

F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983), a fortiori we evaluated the

complainant's claim on its "full merits."

We therefore turn to the carrier's claim that the Board's

order unconstitutionally restrained the carrier (prospectively)

from engaging in protected expression leading up to the rerun election. US Airways submits that the order's fourth and

fifth factors evince the Board's intent to find carrier interference based on speech alone, wholly apart from conduct. Such

an approach, we are told, is an affront to Gissel's teaching

that the First Amendment allows an employer to express

anti-union views (so long as threats of reprisal or promises of

benefits are not imparted) and to make objective, nonmisleading predictions of the likely effects of union representation. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618; see also, e.g., General

Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 627, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Crown

Cork & Seal Co. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1130, 1134 (D.C. Cir.

1994).

The district court rejected US Airways' reliance on the

First Amendment principles announced in these cases: "Gissel Packing, and the other cases cited by Plaintiff are inapposite for the simple reason that they were decided under the

NLRA, not the RLA, which is the statute governing this

case." Mem. Op. at 14. The district court observed that

"[t]he role of employers in representation elections governed

by the RLA is more limited than the activities permitted

employers under the NLRA," id., and reasoned that "[t]he

Constitution does not tolerate expression by an employer

found to be specifically prohibited by an Act of Congress," id.

at 15 (quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 892, 896 (D.D.C. 1990)).4

Of course the First Amendment does not ebb and flow with

the legislative will. Yet the force of the First Amendment

__________

4 The district court found further support in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426

has been held to vary with context, if not with the desires of a

given Congress. For example, in Gissel, the Supreme Court

noted that the rights of employers to express their anti-union

views must be balanced with the rights of employees to

collectively bargain, and explained that "any balancing of

those rights must take into account the economic dependence

of the employees on their employers, and the necessary

tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick

up intended implications of the latter that might be more

readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear." Gissel, 395

U.S. at 617. Not only is a "balancing" required, the NLRB

calibrates the scales. See id. at 620 ("[A] reviewing court

must recognize the Board's competence in the first instance

to judge the impact of utterances made in the context of the

employer-employee relationship.") (citation omitted). In an

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attempt to exploit this reasoning, the NMB points to two

facets of the RLA that differ from the NLRA, and argues

that these differences justify less employer protection in

RLA-governed representation elections than in NLRAgoverned representation elections. But the first asserted

difference is irrelevant: Section 8(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.

s 158(c) ("The expressing of any views ... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of

the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains

no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."), while

absent from the RLA, "merely implements the First Amendment," Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617. And the second does not even

exist: the RLA's language prohibiting employer "influence"

of employees, 45 U.S.C. s 152, Third, Fourth, Ninth, while

superficially broader than the NLRA's proscription of "inter-

__________

(1989), where the Supreme Court cautioned that "the NLRA 'cannot

be imported wholesale into the railway labor arena. Even rough

analogies must be drawn circumspectly with due regard for the

many differences between the statutory schemes.' " Id. at 439

(quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal

Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969)). This is sound advice, but clearly

does not govern the situation presented here where we are interpreting not the RLA, but the First Amendment, which applies to

both the RLA and the NLRA.

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fer[ing] with, restrain[ing] or coerc[ing] employees," 29

U.S.C. s 158(a)(1), has been interpreted to mean pretty much

the same thing, see Texas & N.O. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of

Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568 (1930). In short, the Board

provides us with nothing to support its claim that the key

characteristic of representation elections identified by the

Gissel Court as mandating lesser-than-usual First Amendment protection of employers' expression--the economic dependence of employee on employer--should be thought of

differently when that employer is a carrier governed by the

RLA.

Thus, we must apply Gissel to determine whether the

Board's order unconstitutionally restrained US Airways'

speech leading up to the re-run election. As noted, the Board

set forth five factors to provide "general guidance concerning

carrier actions in connection with employee committees," US

Airways, 24 N.M.B. at 386, a clear indication of their prospective effect.

The Board has determined that the following carrier

conduct regarding employee committees [i.e., roundtables] interferes with employee freedom of choice:

1) The establishment of a committee at any time after

the carrier becomes aware of a labor organization's organizing efforts;

2) A material change, or a carrier representation of such

a change during the critical period in the purpose or

activities of a pre-existing committee;

3) The use of a pre-existing committee to expand employee benefits during the critical period (the continuation of existing benefits is a prerequisite of a fair election);

4) Carrier campaigns which indicate a pre-existing committee is, or should be, a substitute for the collective

bargaining representative;

5) Carrier campaigns which indicate that the certification

of a labor organization as the representative of the

employees will lead to the termination of a pre-existing

committee.

Id. at 385-86. These factors were not linked by the word

"and"; nor did the Board ever suggest that more than one

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must be present to support a finding of carrier interference.

And the Board made clear in the notice it required US

Airways to post that "[t]he carrier is not permitted to influence, interfere [with] or coerce employees in any manner in

an effort to induce them to participate or refrain from participating in the upcoming election." Id. at 396 (emphasis added). US Airways reasonably interpreted all this to mean that

any of "the following conduct" would suffice, and therefore

that each of the five proscribed activities had to be avoided

leading up to the re-run election.

That the fourth and fifth factors--which by their terms

regulate pure speech--stand apart from the other three (and

indeed from each other) simplifies the analysis by obviating

the need for us to confront the situation where an employer's

otherwise protected speech becomes unprotected because the

employer also engages in conduct tending to coerce. See

NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 478

(1941) ("The mere fact that language merges into a course of

conduct does not put the whole course without the range of

otherwise applicable administrative power. In determining

whether the Company actually interfered with, restrained,

and coerced its employees the Board has a right to look at

what the Company has said as well as what it has done."); see

also Schweitzer v. NLRB, 144 F.2d 520, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1944).

This is why we have chosen to focus on US Airways' contention that its expression leading up to the re-run election was

unconstitutionally restrained rather than its alternative claim

that it was unconstitutionally penalized for the expression in

which it engaged prior to the initial election. The carrier's

campaign prior to the initial election was a potpourri of

speech and conduct, and the Board's order would have to be

evaluated under the theory of Virginia Electric.5 We need

__________

5 If we applied Virginia Electric and determined that US Airways

could not constitutionally be penalized for the particular mix of

speech and conduct in which it engaged prior to the initial election

(perhaps because the campaign involved mostly speech and not so

much conduct), we would be obliged to direct a remand to the

Board for a determination whether it would reach the same result

based on the conduct alone. That would afford US Airways less

than the full relief that it seeks.

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not do so, however, because US Airways does not ask that the

results of the first election (which the union lost) be reinstated, only that the results of the re-run election (which the

union won) be set aside. See Supplemental Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief p 7 (filed Mar. 27,

1998). That requested relief would follow from a showing

that US Airways' speech was unconstitutionally restrained

leading up to the re-run election.

The fourth and fifth factors proscribe exactly what Gissel

protects. Whereas the fourth factor would restrict "[c]arrier

campaigns which indicate a pre-existing committee is, or

should be, a substitute for a collective bargaining representative," US Airways, 24 N.M.B. at 386, Gissel teaches that "an

employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his

general views about unionism or any of his specific views

about a particular union, so long as the communications do

not contain a 'threat of reprisal or force or promise of

benefit,' " Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618 (quoting 29 U.S.C. s 158(c)).

The fifth factor would forbid US Airways from "indicat[ing]

that the certification of a labor organization as the representative of the employees will lead to the termination of a preexisting committee." US Airways, 24 N.M.B. at 386. But

Gissel shields just this sort of prediction:

[An employer] may even make a prediction as to the

precise effects he believes unionization will have on his

company. In such a case, however, the prediction must

be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to

convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable

consequences beyond his control.... If there is any

implication that an employer may or may not take action

solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to

economic necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on

available facts but a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such without the

protection of the First Amendment.

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Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618. Thus, an employer is free to make

objective predictions, such as that its employees will lose

vacation time under the terms of the union's national agreement, General Elec., 117 F.3d at 632, or that unionization will

create a perception that the company is strike-prone and

unreliable, leading to the loss of customers, id. at 633-34;

Crown Cork, 36 F.3d at 1134-35, or that unionization will lead

to prolonged bargaining between the union and the employer,

Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1166, 1174

(D.C. Cir. 1998), but not subjective predictions (i.e., those

lacking a connection to objective circumstances), such as a

bare assertion that temporary layoffs could occur if the union

is elected, General Elec., 117 F.3d at 635; Allegheny Ludlum

Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Here, the objective circumstance stems from law rather

than economics, but it is objective nonetheless. Where the

NMB has certified a representative for a carrier's employees,

the RLA imposes on the carrier the duty to "treat with" that

certified representative and none other in negotiating working conditions and wages. 45 U.S.C. s 152, First, Ninth; see

Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548-

49 (1937). The Board and appellee CWA do not dispute this

basic proposition, but argue that US Airways' statement that

unionization "would force the company to eliminate face-toface policymaking between management and employees" was

only a half-truth given the way US Airways structured its

roundtables. The Board found that the roundtables primarily

discussed operational issues having no relation to employment

policies and only occasionally turned their attention to the

latter. Appellees accordingly urge that continuation of the

roundtables in their capacity as a forum for discourse on

operational issues would be entirely consistent with the strictures of 45 U.S.C. s 152, Ninth, and hence it was misleading

for the carrier to represent to its employees that the roundtables would have to be shut down in all respects.

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sistent with union representation. "But if unions are free to

use the rhetoric of Mark Antony while employers are limited

to that of a Federal Reserve Board chairman, ... the employer's speech is not free in any practical sense." Crown

Cork, 36 F.3d at 1140 (holding protected an employer's prediction that unionization would increase costs, risking the loss

of cost-sensitive projects and consequent layoffs, notwithstanding employer's failure to emphasize that the loss of such

projects was only a risk and not an absolute certainty). It

was enough for US Airways to connect its prediction that the

roundtables would be disbanded to the "labor laws," US

Airways, 24 N.M.B. at 370, 371, 375, especially given the

history of the fleet service employees' roundtable, which had

been disbanded after those employees had unionized, id. at

359; see Crown Cork, 36 F.3d at 1141 (employer's prediction

that unionization would cause loss of employee benefits under

the union's ambiguous master agreement supported by past

authoritative interpretations of the master agreement in similar circumstances).

In concluding that the Board's order unconstitutionally

restrained US Airways' speech leading up to the re-run

election, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition in

Gissel that "an employer, who has control over [the employeremployee] relationship and therefore knows it best, cannot be

heard to complain that he is without an adequate guide for his

behavior." Gissel, 395 U.S. at 620. Here, there was not a

lack of guidance in any sense. Rather, the order exactly (and

unconstitutionally) informed US Airways of what sort of

expression was proscribed.

III.

Appellee CWA (intervenor below) raises additional arguments not presented by the Board. The union suggests that

US Airways was not really restrained by the Board's order;

it remained silent before the re-run election for tactical

reasons. If the union lost, US Airways would get its desired

result with no fear that the Board might again order a new

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election; if the union won, US Airways would invoke its

unconstitutional restraint argument to get a second bite at

the apple. The union points out that US Airways never once

presented its "chill" argument to the Board, and argues that

this failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal. The

union believes US Airways should have sought a clarifying

opinion from the NMB as to the order's prospective effect.6

However, the carrier made its request for a TRO, predicated in part on its chill theory, after the Board had issued its

order and before the re-run election was held, so it was hardly

sitting on its claim. At that juncture, the carrier surely

wished to engage in expression proscribed by the fourth and

fifth factors of the Board's order, and was concerned that

doing so might result in an even more severe sanction--as a

repeat offender--than a re-run election on the Board's standard ballot. For as the Board has explained, the more

egregious an employer's behavior, the more severe the penalty. See US Airways, 24 N.M.B. at 381-83 (citing Laker

Airways, Ltd., 8 N.M.B. 236 (1981) (re-run election on "yes"

or "no" ballot where the majority of votes cast would determine the outcome); Key Airlines, 16 N.M.B. 296 (1989) (rerun election on ballot where certification would result unless a

majority of eligible voters voted against the union); Sky

Valet, 23 N.M.B. 276 (1996) (certification based on a check of

authorization cards)); see also 45 U.S.C. s 152, Tenth (providing for NMB referral of a carrier's willful violation of 45

__________

6 The union makes the quite valid observation that First Amendment chilling effect claims are apparently always advanced when

the claimant has an interest in engaging in speech in the future, see,

e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997); Chamber of

Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1995), whereas

here US Airways contends only that its speech was chilled in the

past, identifying its present injury in the results of the re-run

election. We admit this is a unique situation, but we see no reason

why an injury flowing from the suppression of one's speech in the

past (if only by chilling) should not be remediable. In any event,

US Airways undoubtedly has an interest in engaging in expression

in future elections (including the second re-run election that will be

held if the results of the first re-run election are set aside).

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U.S.C. s 152, Fourth to the United States attorney for prosecution as a misdemeanor). Such possibilities, in conjunction

with the order's fourth and fifth factors, created a more than

credible threat that the carrier's speech would be suppressed

by subsequent application of the order, thereby conferring

standing on the carrier to make the chill argument. See

Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 836-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing

Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93

(1988)).

If US Airways had been unable to invoke its chill argument

later to reverse a union victory (perhaps on the very ground

that the union advances that one who lacks an ongoing

interest in speaking cannot be chilled), it would have been

irreparably harmed. Responding to this concern at the TRO

hearing, the Board's counsel represented to the district court

that "[i]f the election goes forward, and then a decision is

issued by the court that the board's decision is invalid, the

election will be null and void. The situation will be rectified

down the road. They will not be stuck with a union representative if the board's order is struck down." And the district

court, discussing the irreparable harm issue in the course of

denying the requested TRO, specifically noted that "[i]f at

some point, the provisions of that Order are held to violate

either the statute or the Constitution, the election will be set

aside." Mem. Order at 3.

We assume this is why only the union, and not the Board, is

advancing the exhaustion argument. The Board's failure to

join undermines the union's claim, since the only litigant with

an institutional interest in such an exhaustion requirement

has not argued for it, see Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 891

n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting an intervenor's claim that

appellants had failed to exhaust administrative remedies in

part because the agency did not press the issue); but cf.

Coalition for the Preservation of Hispanic Broadcasting v.

FCC, 931 F.2d 73, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that the

exhaustion doctrine concerns economy not only of agency but

also of judicial resources and that a court may in its discretion raise the issue sua sponte), and there is no suggestion

that any failure to meet such a requirement (if one exists)

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strips us of jurisdiction, see Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137,

147 (1993). In any event, it would have been futile for US

Airways to seek a clarifying opinion. While we treat such a

credible First Amendment chilling effect claim as satisfying

Article III's case or controversy requirement, see Skaggs, 110

F.3d at 836-37, the Board has rejected just such a claim as an

impermissible request for an "advisory opinion," America

West Airlines, 17 N.M.B. 226, 233 (1990).

* * * *

We accordingly reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the NMB and remand the case to

the district court with instructions to remand in turn to the

NMB to set aside the results of the re-run election and for

further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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