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Parties Involved:
MacArthur Martin Bryant
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

( P U B L I S H 

IN THE UNITED STATE~ COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

0£c 2 7 1989 

ROBERT L. I·IOECKER 

Clerk 

v .. 

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No.· 88-1836 

MacARTHUR MARTIN BRYANT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR 87-422) 

Peter Schoenburg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant 

Paula G. Bu~nett, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuqu~rque, 

New Mexico (William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, was also on_ the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee · 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, McKAY and EBEL, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 1 
Defendant-Appellant Bryant appeal~ his conviction for 

involuntary manslaughter. 18 u.s.c. § 1112. Bryant argues that 

(1) the district court abused its discretion by failing to define 

adequately for the jury t~e term "wanton or reckless disregard for 

human life'' as an element of involuntary man~laughter, and (2) the 

court violated his tights under the Double Jeopardy Clause when it 

based its sentence of Bryant on a view of the evidence that was 

contrary to that found by the jury. We affirm. 

I. 

The killing for which Bryant was proseduted took place during 

the summer of 1987 on the Navajo reservation in the Chuska 

Mountains near Sand Springs, New Mexico. On the night of July 25, 

1987, Oscar Wood and his brother Ervin Wood -- distant clan 

relations of Bryant 

defendant's half-brother. 

went to the home of Roy .Wood, the 

Oscar and Ervin Wood had a flat tire 

and, according ·to the testimony of Oscar, the Wood brothers hoped 

to borrow an air pump from Roy Wood. At Roy's home, Oscar, Ervin 

and Roy qua~relled and in an ensuing fight, Roy was badly beaten. 

After making his way to Bryant's home shortly thereafter, Roy told 

his half-brother what had happened. - The defendant then went.· with 

his wife in his truck to seek help for Roy at a nearby gathering~ 

On route, on a narrow mountain road, Biyant came upon the 

Wood brothers, driving their car with its flat tire. Both Bryant 

and the Woods stopped. Bryant left his truck, holding a damaged 

rifle1 that he ordinarily used to patrol the vicinity for a bear 

1 

Expert and nonexpert testimony suggested that damage to the 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 2 
( which threatened local livestock. The defendant stood before the 

Woods' driver's side window with the purpose, according to his 

testimony, of determining what had caused the fight that had 

occurred earlier that evening. III at 264. At this point, there 

is a conflict as to what transpired. Oscar testified that after a 

short exchange of words, Bryant simply discharged his rifle at 

Ervin. According to Bryant, however, Ervin grabbed the rifle 

after the exchange of words and in the struggle, the rifle -- with 

its damaged firing mechanism accidentally discharged. It is 

undisputed that the buliet from the rifle mortally wounded Ervin 

and- then struck Oscar in the shoulder. 

II. 

The resulting indictment charged the defendant with two 

criminal counts: (1) the second degree murder of Ervin Wood in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (offenses committed within Indian 

_country) and 18_U.S.Q. § llll(a) and (b) (mu_rder) and; (2) the 

assault of Oscar Wood with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 113(c). 

After hearing the testimony of twenty-two witnesses, 

including experts on ballistics and pathology, the jury acquitted 

the defendant of both the second degree murder of· Ervin and the 

assault with a dangerous weapon on Oscar, and convicted Bryant of 

the lesser included offense of the involuntary manslaughter of 

Ervin, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1112. The trial judge 

sentenced Bryant to three years' incareration, a $50 special 

(Footnote continued): 

rifle's firing mechanism may have made it more likely that the 

weapon would discharge.accidentally. 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 3 
assessment, and ordered '$1,988 in restitution to be paid by the 

defendant for Ervin's widow. The three-year prison term is the 

maximum incarceration allowable under 18 u.s.c. § 1112(b), 

although~ possible fine of up to $1,000 was not imposed. 

Bryant appeals, seekin9 reversal of his conviction and remand 

for a new trial, or alternatively vacation of his sentence and 

imposition of a new sentence. 

III. 

A. The jury instructions 

The defendant argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in its instructions regarding the lesser included 

offense of involuntary manslaughter. Although the charge recited 

the five elements of the involuntary manslaughter offense along 

with the definition of the crime set forth in the United. States 

Code, Bryant contends that the court coinrnitted reversible error by 

failing to define "wanton or reckless disregard for human life" 

and by failing to give. his proposed instructions J and K, which 

purported to explain the circumstances the jury could consider in 

deciding whether Bryant had acted with "wanton and reckless 

disregard for human life." We cannot agree that the court's 

instructions pertaining to involuntaiy mansl~~ghter constituted an 

abuse of discretion or.that the instructions were in error. 

As we explained in United States v. Pack, 773 F.2d 261 (10th 

Cir. 1985): "Although a criminal defendant is entitled to an 

instruction regarding his theory of the case, a trial judge is 

given substantial latitude and discretion in tailoring and 

formulating the instructions so long as they are correct 

statements of law and fairly and adequately cover the issues 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 4 
( presented. II Id. at 267; accord, United States v. Pinto, 838 F. 2d 

426, 435-36 -( 10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Scafe, 822 F. 2d 

928, 932 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Lofton, 776 F.2d 918, 

919-20 (10th Cir. 1985). A defendant is not entitled to an 

instruction which lacks a reasonable legal and factual basis. See 

Scafe, 822 F.2d at 932; United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 

1451 (10th Cir. 1987). Nor is a defendant entitled to any 

specific wording of instructions. United States v. Hoffner, 777 

F.2d 1423, 1426 (10th Cir. 1985); Lisko, 747 F.2d at 1238. Our 

inquiry here, therefore, is whether the failure to define the 

phrase "wanton and reckless disregard for human life" and the 

rejection of proposed instructions J and K, left untreated a 

theory of defense finding support in the evidence and the law. 

Scafe, 822 F.2d at 932; Lofton~ 776 F.2d at 919-20. See also 

United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095, 1097 (5th Cir. 1986) ( "an 

abuse of discretion occurs only when the failure to glve a 

requested instruction serves to prevent the jury from considering 

the defendant's defense"). 

Jury Instructions 14A-14C as given show that the court did 

not err. The jury was clearly instructed that if the prosecution 

failed to establish guilt of second degree murder b~yond a 

reasonable doubt, the jurors should consider the defendant's guilt 

or innocence of involuntary manslaughter. Jury Instructions 14A, 

14B. Moreover~ the instructions set forth both the statutory 

definition of involuntary manslaughter, Jury Instruction 14B, and 

the five elements that the government must prove to convict a 

defendant of the offense, Jury Instruction 14C. Although the jury 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 5 
( requested a definition of "wanton and reckless disregard for human 

life" during its deliberations, it has not been demonstrated to 

our satisfaction that the court's decision to have the jury apply 

the common understanding of the "wanton and reckless" element left 

the jury wi~h insufficient guidance. These terms are commonplace. 

Moreover the charge was sufficient to encompass the legally and 

factually arguable defense theories, i.e., that the killing of 

Ervin Wood was not ~econd degree murder and instead was no crime 

at all or merely involuntary manslaughter. 2 

Defendant's case is distinguishable from cases such as United 

States v. · Lofton, 776 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1985), 3 where a 

defendant's ~onviction for second degree. murder was reversed 

because the trial court had failed to instruct correctly on the 

defendant's heat of passion defense. Lofton at 919-22. There the 

defendant relied solely· on the heat of passion defense, id. at 

921, and presented the theory adequat~ly at trial. Id. at 919. 

The factual finding on the specific question whether the defendant 

had killed her victim in the heat of passion, given the facts of 

her case and her reliance on the mens rea defense, should have_ 

been substantially determinative of whether she would be convicted 

of murder or of involuntary manslaughter .. Id. at 920. Yet the 

trial court in the instructions failed to state clearly that heat 

2 

See generally United States v. Lesina, 833 F.2d 156, 160 (9th 

Cir. 1987) ("An accidental killing may be second degree murder, 

manslaughter, or no crime at all."). 

3 

See also United States v. Lesina, 833 F.2d 156, 160 (9th Cir. 

1987) (applying Lofton-type analysis to trial errors and factual 

circumstances similar to those discussed in Lofton). 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 6 
( of passion ~as a defense to murder and failed to distinguish the 

mental state consistent with second degree murder from that 

consistent with involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 921-22. 

Here the court's instructions clearly delineate the mens rea 

elements at issue. Jury Instructions 10 (providing statutory 

definition of murder including the element of malice 

'' 

aforethought), 11 (stating the four elements of the second degree 

murder offense including malice aforethought), and 12 

(specifically defining malice aforethought in two paragraphs as 

willful intent to take a human life) constitute three interrelated 

statements that malice aforethought -- the willful intent to kill 

someone must be established in order to convict for murder. 

Instruction 14B (statutory definition of involuntary manslaughter) 

specifically states that involuntary manslaughter is a killing 

"without malice" and Instruction 14C states that a necessary 

element of involuntary manslaughter is acting with wanton or 

reckless disregar~ for human life. Id. These .instructions are 

adequate for the purpose of permitting the jury to consider 

whether Bryant had the requisite mental state for 

involuntary manslaughter~ or no crime at all. 

murder, 

Regarding the court's decision to reject proposed 

Instructions J 4 and K, 5 we note that these instructions were 

4 

Proposed Instruction J was as follows: 

In determining whether or not the defendant is 

guilty of involuntry manslaughter, the jury must 

measure his conduct in arming himself before 

approaching Erwin [sic] and Oscar Wood against all 

of the existing circumstances and determine 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 7 
( ostensibly proposed in order to amplify the court's explanation of 

those factors the jury should consider in eva·luating the 

defendant's guilt or innocence of involuntary manslaughter with 

references to the trial testimony. To the extent that proposed 

instructions J and K relate to involuntary manslaughter, we 

believe that the district court was within its discretion to 

reject these proposed "amplifications," see Troutman, 814 F.2d at 

1451, since the involuntary manslaughter defense was adequately 

set forth in the instructions the jury actually received. Jury 

Instructions 14A-14C. The proposed instructions bear little 

relation to involuntary manslaughter and they appear to introduce 

a self-defense or "right to .arm". theory. Thus the court's refusal 

of the proposed instructions was within its sound discretion. 

(Footnote continued):• 

therefrom whether his actions [·sic] was in its 

nature dangerous to life. Some of the special 

circumstances you may consider in this case are the 

fight that had occurred earlier between Roy Wood 

and Erwin [sic] and Oscar Wood, that the 

defendant's knee is partially disabled, and that 

the defendant know [sic] about Erwin [sic] Woods' 

[sic] propens~ty for violence when drunk. 

IR., Document No. 25. 

5 

The text of proposed Instruction K was as follows: 

A person is justified in arming himielf when and to 

the extent that he reasonably believes that such 

conduct is necessary to defend himself or another 

against the imminent use of unlawful force. 

IR., Document No. 25. 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 8 
( There is nothing in the record indicating that Bryant ever 

requested a self-defense instruction. Moreover, a self-de(ense 

theory is inconsistent with the defense theory ·on which the 

defendant primarily relied. Bryant's defense at trial· was, in 

essence, that Ervin's death resulted from the accidental discharge 

of the defendant's rifle (as a result of the struggle and the 

rifle's damaged firing mechanism) after the victim grabbed the 

rifle and pulled it toward him in his car. The jury was 

adequately instructed to consider this defense to the second 

degree murder charge. IR., Document No. 25, Jury Instructions 

12, 14A-14C. There is no evidentiary basis in the record t6 

support a self-defense theory, and therefore no obligation on the 

part of t·he court to .instruct , the jury on self-defense. See 

Scafe, 822 F.2d at 932-33. 

As for the "right to arm" tha.t Bryant appears to be positing 

in proposed instructions J. and K, there is no subs_tantial 

authority for the proposition that this alleged "right" bears a 

material relationship to the issue of guilt or innocence of 

involuntary manslaughter here. The defendant cites United States 

v. Benally, 756 F.2d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1985), for the 

proposition that "'gross negligence is a necessary ~lement of the 

crime of involuntary manslaughter.'' Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 

17. But, as the Benally case states, "[g]ross negligence is 

defined 'as wanton or reckless disregard for human life. 111 

Benally at 776. Since Instruction 14C specifically states that 

the government must prove that the defendant acted with a wanton 

or reckless disregard for human life, we cannot agree that the 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 9 
court's failure to instruct the j~ry further constituted error. 

If, as appears to be the case, the dispute is actually over the 

specific wording of the instruction~ the trial court's discretion 

regarding the exact language of the charge is· a matter of settled 

law. See ~, Hoffner, 777 F.2d at 1426; Lisko, 747 F.2d at 

1238; United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1396 (11th· Cir. 

1984). 

In sum, we are satisfied that there was no error in the 

instructions given, nor in the refusal to give the further 

instructions requested. 

B. Sentencing 

The defendant's remaining claim of error is that the trial 

court violated his constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy 

Clause 6 by imposing a sentence that contravened the jury's 

verdict. Appellant's Brief in Chief at 22-26. Bryant cites 

statements by t~e trial judge to the effect that he was fortunate 

to be getting the sentence imposed, rather than what he would have 

gotten had the case been tried to the court alone. The pertinent 

portions of the sentencing tran~cript are reproduced in the 

Appendix to this opinion. 

The offBnse involved here occurred on July 26, 1987. This 

was prior to the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act of 

1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., and thus the Sentencing Guidelines 

did not control the sentencing of the defendant Bryant. United 

6 

U.S. Const., amend. V ("[N]or shall any per~on be subject for 

the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . • ti ) • 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 10 
States v. Stewart, 865 F.2d 115, 117 (7th Cir. 1988). The 

Sentencing Reform Act, which "makes all sentences basically 

determinate," Mistretta v. United st·ates, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 

647, 652 ( 1989), and the Guidelines pr.omulgated by the Commission 

thereunder not being controlling, the earlier system of 

indeterminate sentencing, which "nearly always gave the sentencing 

judge wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be 

incarcerated and for how long," Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 650, 

applied here. Under that earlier system, as a general 

proposition, once it was determined that a sentence was within the 

limitations set forth in the statute, appellate review .was at an 

end. Dorsynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974). And 

by statute, no +imitation was placed on the information which a 

federal court could receive and consider concerning the 

background, character and conduct of a person convicted of an 

offense .. See 18 u.s.c. § 3577 (1979); United States v. Tucker, 

404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 

(1949) (briefly discussing the Anglo-American history of 

sentencing). 

There were, however, established rules regarding 

constitutional limitations narrowing the factors that a trial 

court was permitted to consider in imposing sentence. See,~, 

Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447-49 ·(consideration in sentencing of prior 

convictions obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 

U.S. 335 

Burke, 

(1963), 

334 U.S. 

constitutionally 

736, 740-41 

impermissible); Townsend 

(1948) (sentencing based 

v. 

on 

consideration of "materially untrue" information is· "inconsistent 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 11 
~ith due process of law''): United States v. Shepard, 739 F.2d 510, 

515 (10th Cir. 1984) · (defendant "has a constitutional right to 

sentencing based on accurate information") 

It is true that the trial judge here disagreed wi~h the 

jury's resolution of the offense of which the defendant was found 

guilty. The judge stated that "the sentence I am going to give 

you, you're quite lucky to be' getting rather than what you would 

have gotten had it been tried • to the court alone. II Id. 

Apparently the judge was· thinking of a second degree murder 

conviction, 18 u.s.c. § 1111, under the indictment which could 

have carried imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 

§ llll(b). As it was, the maximum sentence for the lesser 

included offense of involuntary manslaughter was a. fine not to 

exceed $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than three years, or 

both. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b). 

Defendant Bryant here relies on United States v. Campbell, 

684 F.2d 141, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and the court's statement that 

''a judgment of acquittal is a more final and binding determination 

of facts than the requisite standard of proof might at first seem 

to allow." However, the Campbell opinion upheld a sentence which 

was challenged for the trial court's failure to give proper effect 

to a jury's acquittals in a prosecution under the RICO statute, 

the· conspiracy statute, and for the .giving and receiving of 

bribes. 18 U.S.C. § 20l(b) and (c). Despite the statement in 

that opinion relied on by defendant Bryant here, the trial judge 

was upheld in Campbell although he stated, 684 F.2d at 152, that 

he could properly refer to evidence introduced with respect to 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 12 
crimes for which the defendant was acquitted, relying on United 

States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d. 181 ~2d Cir. 1972). The trial judge 

referred in Campbell ·to testimony from a witness, which he said 

was untruthful, the. judge stating that the defendant there had 

been fortunate to escape conviction for some of the more serious 

charges. 

Although we have not specifically addressed a· double jeopardy 

claim like that before us here, our decisions in similar appeals 

provide no substantial support for Bryant's position. In Reyes v. 

Quintana, 853 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1988), we rejected a 

constitutional challenge similar to the one raised here by 

defendant Bryant. Reyes had been tried in a New Mexico state 

co~rt for first 9egree murder and was convicted by a jury of 

second degree murder. The state trial court imposed a sentence of 

10 years for second degree murder and an additional three years 

was added to the sentence under a state statute ba~ed on the 

aggravating circumstance of the defendant's having pursued the 

victim before murdering her. Concluding that there was a factual 

basis for the judge's finding of aggravating circumstances, we 

held that regardless of the jury's having acquitted the defendant 

of first degree murder, " .•. the trial judge's consideration of 

these facts in enhancing the sentence does not constitute a 

violation 6f rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause." Reyes, 853 

F.2d at 787. 

We cannot agree that Bryant presents a case of violation of 

the Double Jeopardy Clause in light of the opinions we have 

considered above. See also Roussell v. Jeane, 842 F.2d 1512 (5th 

13 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 13 
Cir. 1988); United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1981). 

The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Roussell, 842 F.2d at 1524, 

is persuasive: 

In this case, the court clearly believed that 

a second degree murder verdict would have been 

truer to the evidence than the manslaughter verdict 

which the jury returned. But the court did not 

incorrectly assume that the jury had convicted 

[defendant] Roussell of second degree murder -- the 

court wa~ well aware that Roussell stood convicted 

of manslaughter and could be sentenced only for 

that offense. Unlike the situation in Tucker, 

Townsend, and similar cases, the sentence was not 

based on a nonexistent or constitutionally invalid 

conviction .... We read the court's comments as 

indicating its view that Roussell's crime was as 

serious a manslaughter as could be imagined, and 

that any sentence short of the maximum for 

manslaughter would deprecate the gravity of 

Roussell's act. The court did not violate the 

Constitution in 'acknowledging the impact of the 

evidence presented at trial,' Campbell, 684 F.2d at 

184, because it did not incorrectly assume that 

Roussell had been convicted of, or could be 

sentenced for, second degree murder. 

As in Roussell, here there is no. suggestion that the trial 

judge considered nonexistent or constitutionally invalid prior 

convictions. Nor does the record suggest that the judge believed 

that any perceived "error" justified sentencing Bryant for second 

degree murder, rather than involuntary manslaughter. The court 

acted within its discretion in sentencing Bryant to the statutory 

maximum period of incarceration allowable for the offense of which 

he was convicted, and we hold that no violation of the Double 

Jeopardy Clause occurred. 

We-are not persuaded that any error occurred in the trial or 

sentencing. of the defendant and the judgment and sentence are 

accordingly 

AFFIRM.ED. 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 14 
APPENDIX 

The pertinent portions of the Sentencing Transcript (V R. 

482-489) are as follows: 

MR. SCHOENBURG.: I think if the jury found that the defendant 

pointed the gun at him, that would be an aggravated assault. And 

if one commits a felony that results then in the negligent death 

of someone, you are not entitled to an involuntary manslaughter 

verdict. And they were instructed that it need be an unlawful act 

not amounting to a felony, that was the Court's Instruction 14-B, 

and to presume the logic, rational nature of the jury verdict, it 

certainly presumes against the defendant --

THE COURT: I don't assume that in this case. I think 

that was just a compromise verdict by the jury. It was .a job of 

good lawyering on your part to come in 

when he got out of the truck with the 

as testified to by your ~lient, 

impossibility. 

with that verdic~. Cle~rl~ 

gun out, and this scenario, 

to me was. basically an 

MR. SCHOENBURG: Judge, I think that that --

THE COURT: Starting with when your client testified he found 

the -- that's another case. Go ahead. 

MR. SCHOENBURG: I think what the Court proposes here really 

pre::,ents a double jeopardy problem for my client, because the 

Court now is essentially reviewing the facts already decided by 

the .jury, necessarily, as a matter of law, and I think 

THE COURT: There is no way that I can say that the jury 

found he never pointed the gun at him. It is just as believable 

that he pointed the gun at him and that he then -- the deceased 

pushed it aside and t~at's how it went off. 

i 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 15 
MR. SCHOENBURG: That could not.be as a matter of law, could 

not .be involuntary manslaughter, because the discharge of the 

firearm would have been preceded by a felony, the aggravated 

assault, and that would not be involuntary manslaughter. And I 

think that we have to presume the rationality of the jury's 

verdict. They have considered those facts and made a decision. 

I know· the Court may not share their resolution of the 

factual disputes and of the testimony, but, nonetheless, I think 

that they were the triers of fact in this case and we have to 

presume the rationality of their verdict, and I think my client is 

entitled to that, in the pre-sentence report. 

THE· COURT: Well, you can file whatever you want to with the 

Bureau of Prisons, but I'm not going to change the pre-sentence 

report. 

THE. COURT: All right. Mr. . Bryant, I think you received 

excellent representation during your trial. The jury's verdict 

reflects, I think, what your counsel wanted to get across to them, 

and he did an excellent job. 

Although you will not agree with .this sentence, the sentence 

I am. going to give you, you are quite lucky to be getting that 

rather than what you would have gotten had it been tried to the 

Court alone. 

It will be the judgment and sentence of the Court that the 

defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General of 

the United States or his duly authorized 'representative for 

imprisonment for a term of three years. · 

ii 

Appellate Case: 88-1836 Document: 010110194029 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 16 
Pursuant to the Victim and·witness Protection Act of 1982, 

the Court orders the defendant to make restitution in the amount 

of $1988.01, to be paid to the Department of Justice, during the 

time that he is on parole. This money is then to be paid to the 

victim's wife, Annabelle Wood, Box 1951 Sheep Springs, New Mexico. 

A $50 special penalty assessment is hereby imposed. 

Voluntary surrender will be allowed. 

iii 

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