Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-01101/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-01101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ocean Bio Chem/Kinpak, Inc.
Defendant
Denise Marie Reynolds
Plaintiff

Document Text:

Page 1 of 18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DENISE MARIE REYNOLDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

OCEAN BIO CHEM/KINPAK, INC.,

Defendant.

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CIV. ACT. NO. 2:12cv1101-MEF-TFM

 (WO)

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Denise Marie Reynolds (“Plaintiff” or “Reynolds”), a former employee of 

Kinpak, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Kinpak”), brings this action pro se pursuant to Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117. Specifically, she 

asserts that Kinpak discriminated against her on the basis of her race, gender, and 

disability by terminating her from her employment.

This court has jurisdiction over the Title VII claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5 and the ADA claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12117. Now pending before the 

court is the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc.26, filed August 21, 2013). The court 

has carefully reviewed the Motion and the supporting and opposing briefs and evidentiary 

materials and concludes that the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED.

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is 

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 

1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (Summary 

judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on 

file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving for 

summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court 

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including 

pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence 

of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence which would be 

admissible at trial indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the 

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on 

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324. 

Once the movant meets his evidentiary burden and demonstrates the absence of a 

genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish, 

with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his 

case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (“When a motion for summary judgment is 

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properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or 

denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a 

genuine [dispute] for trial.”). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the 

nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a 

verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

To survive the plaintiff’s properly supported motion for summary judgment, the 

defendant is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” “that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is 

merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be 

granted.” Id. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s 

position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could 

reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 

1990) quoting Anderson, supra. Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are 

likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not 

suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental 

Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). Hence, when a nonmoving party 

fails to set forth specific facts supported by appropriate evidence sufficient to establish 

the existence of an element essential to its case and on which the nonmovant will bear the 

burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving 

party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of 

the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”).

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For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are 

relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, 

Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the 

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec’y of 

Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual 

disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude 

entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not 

defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the 

outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th 

Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party 

opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine 

[dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its 

face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates that there is no genuine dispute 

of material fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a 

matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary 

judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the 

court show there is no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d 

at 1279 (to establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must 

produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

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However, if there is a conflict in the evidence, “the evidence of the non-movant is 

to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 255; Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, 207 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th 

Cir. 2000). With these principles of law in mind, the court will determine now whether 

summary judgment is appropriate and should be granted.

III. FACTS

Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in her favor, the following facts are taken as undisputed for the purpose of 

summary judgment. In the Spring of 2011, Reynolds began working in the testing 

laboratory as a temporary employee at Kinpak, a manufacturer of cleaning and 

maintenance products for vehicles and boats. (Def’s Tab A, Reynolds’ Dep, p. 25; Def’s 

Tab B, Exh. B, Hale’s Affid., p. 2). In June 2011, Kinpak Technical Services Manager 

Vincent Waclawek hired Reynolds as a full-time employee in the chemical laboratory. 

(Reynolds’ Dep., pp. 24-27, 118). Reynolds’ job responsibilities included mixing

chemicals while standing and entering data while sitting. (Id., pp. 48, 118). 

While outside her residence in February 2012, Reynolds stepped off a curb, 

injuring her ankle. (Reynolds’ Dep., pp. 28-29, 32-33). On April 10, 2012, Reynolds 

went to Dr. J. Juan Chung, complaining of ankle swelling and pain. (Id., pp. 32-33). Dr. 

Chung provided samples of pain medication and advised her to elevate her ankle. (Id., 

pp. 33-34). In addition, he provided a written physician’s statement, ordering “light duty 

for approximately one week.” (Def’s Ex. 6). The following day, Reynolds gave the 

physician’s statement to her supervisor. (Reynolds’ Dep., p. 35). Reynolds and her coCase 2:12-cv-01101-MEF-TFM Document 37 Filed 01/09/14 Page 5 of 18
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workers alternated duties with one another and she performed light duty for one week. 

(Id., p. 36). Reynolds’ condition, however, did not improve. (Id., p. 38). 

On April 18, 2013, Reynolds went to Dr. Curtis McLemore, a physician at PriMed Physicians, Inc. (Def’s Ex. 7). After conducting an x-ray of Reynolds’ ankle, Dr. 

McLemore determined the ankle was fractured. (Reynolds’ Dep., p. 39). Dr. McLemore 

gave her a doctor’s excuse, recommending that she return to work with limited walking 

on April 20, 2012, and referred her to an orthopaedic specialist. (Def’s Ex. 7; Reynolds’ 

Dep., p. 39). 

The next day, Reynolds went to Dr. Joseph F. Curtis at Southern Orthopaedic 

Surgeons. (Def’s Ex. 8). Dr. Curtis gave Reynolds a doctor’s excuse, in which he 

recommended “light duty from 4-19-12 to 4-18-12” with no squatting or kneeling, no 

climbing ladders or stairs, and no standing or walking greater than fifteen minutes per 

hour. (Def’s Ex. 8). When Reynolds returned to work the following day, she gave the 

excuse to Mr. Waclawek, explaining that the dates on the excuse were incorrect and that 

Dr. Curtis recommended light duty from April 19, 2012 until May 18, 2012. (Reynolds’ 

Dep., p. 45). Mr. Waclawek allowed Reynolds to continue light work, stating that “[a]s 

long as the lab was running it was no problem.” (Id., p. 45). Reynolds and her coworkers continued to alternate duties and she performed work with limited walking. (Id., 

pp. 40-41). 

On April 30, 2012, Reynolds returned to Dr. Curtis, complaining that her ankle 

condition had not improved. (Id., pp. 46-47). Dr. Curtis prescribed a boot and crutches. 

(Id., p. 49). He also gave Reynolds a doctor’s excuse, in which he ordered “sit down 

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work only” and that she could resume normal work duties beginning June 8, 2012. 

(Def’s Ex. 9). Reynolds returned to work that afternoon and gave the doctor’s excuse to 

Mr. Waclawek. (Reynolds’ Dep., pp. 47-49). 

Reynolds and her coworkers agreed that “they would do [her] walking and [she] 

would do their sitting-down work.” (Id., p. 58). Despite Reynolds’ and her coworkers’ 

agreement, Mr. Waclawek and his supervisor, Mr. Anthony Hale, met with Hale and 

advised her that Kinpak had no “sit down work only” jobs and that she was being 

terminated from her employment. (Def’s Tab B, Hale’s Affid., p. 8). Hale also stated, “I 

have this doctor’s excuse and you had several before, and we accommodated you with all 

this. But we can’t accommodate you with this sit-down only work.” (Reynolds’ Dep., 

pp. 59-60). When Reynolds offered to stand for fifteen minute increments rather than 

following her doctor’s orders, Mr. Waclawek refused to allow her to do so. (Id., p. 59). 

At the end of their meeting, Mr. Waclawek stated, “What we want you to do is go home 

and get your foot better, and in a couple of years if we have a position, come back and 

see us. You’re leaving on good terms, so we won’t have a problem.” (Id.) 

On May 2, 2012, Mr. Waclawek provided Reynolds a letter of recommendation, in 

which he stated that she “proved to be an efficient hard-working employee” and that she 

“has an ability to complete all assigned work in a timely and professional manner.” 

(Def’s Ex. E). On May 17, 2012, Mr. Waclawek also provided Reynolds with a letter “to 

whom it may concern” in which he stated that the “reason [for her] termination was lack 

of work.” (Def’s Ex. F). Kinpak subsequently replaced Reynolds with Lucrecia Reyes, a 

Hispanic woman. (Reynolds’ Dep., p. 101).

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When Reynolds returned to Dr. Curtis on May 25, 2012, the doctor recommended

that she discontinue the use of her crutches and boot and resume normal activities. 

(Reynolds’ Dep., p. 52). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

Kinpak asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because 

Reynolds fails to establish that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The 

ADA provides that no covered employer shall discriminate against “a qualified individual 

with a disability because of the disability of such individual” in any of the “terms, 

conditions [or] privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to establish a 

prima facie case of disability under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that (1) she has a 

disability; (2) she is a qualified individual; and (3) she was subjected to unlawful 

discrimination because of her disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. See Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 

207 F.3d. 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 

907, 910-11 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Without more, Reynolds’ termination is not evidence that Kinpak discriminated 

against her because of her disability. The same elements that are required to prove 

discrimination claims under the ADA are required to prove discrimination claims under 

Title VII. See Earl, supra. In an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff bears the 

ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination. Texas Dept. of Cmty Affairs v. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To defeat Defendant=s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Reynolds must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by one of three 

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generally accepted methods: (1) presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent; (2) 

presenting evidence to satisfy the four-part circumstantial evidence test set out in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); or (3) presenting statistical 

proof. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Reynolds does not present any direct evidence of discrimination nor does she rely 

on statistical evidence to support her claim. Because direct evidence of discrimination is 

difficult to produce, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas, supra, created the now 

familiar framework for the burden of production and order of presentation of proof to 

analyze circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall 

Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir 1984). To establish a prima facie case 

of wrongful discharge, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) 

she was discharged; (3) she was replaced by an individual outside her protected class; and 

(4) she was qualified for the position held. Coutu v. Martin County Bd. of County 

Comm’rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir. 1995). If Reynolds establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for her termination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. If Kinpak meets its burden 

of production, Reynolds must present substantial evidence that the defendant’s 

justification for her termination is pretextual. Id. 

Kinpak alleges that Reynolds fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 

because she has not demonstrated that she has a disability. Under the ADA, a person has 

an “actual” disability if she: (A) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially 

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limits one or more major life activities; (B) has a record of such impairment; or (C) is 

regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102. 

Reynolds argues that she is actually disabled because her ankle injury substantially 

limits her ability to perform work. In determining whether an individual is substantially 

limited in a major life activity, the following factors should be considered: (1) the nature 

and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; 

and (3) the permanent or long-term impact of the impairment. Hillburn v. Murata 

Electronics North America, Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 1999); Hetherington v. 

Wal-Mart, Inc., 511 Fed. Appx. 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Major life activities encompass “functions such as caring for oneself, performing 

manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 

Mendiola v. Vision Hospitality, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2008). An 

individual’s ability to work is substantially impaired if she is “significantly restricted” in 

her ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as 

compared to an average person who has comparable training, skills, and abilities. 

Hillburn, supra; Hetherington, supra. Reynolds fails to show that her ankle injury 

significantly restricted her ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs. 

In addition, temporary impairments are not commonly regarded as disabilities. 

See 28 C.F.R. § 35 app. B. “’A severe limitation that is short term and temporary is not 

evidence of a disability.’” Diaz v. Transatlantic Bank, 367 Fed. Appx. 93, 98 (11th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. At Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 507 F.3d 1306 1315 

(11th Cir. 2007)). See also Gilliard v. Ga. Dept. of Corrections, 500 Fed. Appx. 860, 866 

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(11th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff with spinal arthritis, a bulging disc, and osteoarthritis requiring

knee replacement surgery which affected her ability to walk, stand, and sit failed to 

establish a prima facie case of disability because her conditions were not “severe, longterm, or permanent”). There is no dispute that, after May 25, 2012, Reynolds was 

released from treatment by her physician and that she resumed normal day-to-day 

activities. (Reynolds’ Dep., pp. 50-52). Thus, Reynolds’ temporary ankle injury does 

not establish a disability under the ADA. 

Reynolds is also unable to demonstrate that Kinpak regarded her as having a 

disabling impairment. Reynolds argues that her supervisor’s remark that she should “go 

home and get her foot better” and to return “in a couple of years if we have a position” is 

evidence that her employer perceived her as suffering from a disability. (Reynolds’ Dep., 

p. 59). Transitory and minor impairments, however, are not considered to be disabilities. 

42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). “A transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or 

expected duration of 6 months or less.” Id. Whether an employer regards an employee 

as having an impairment that is transitory and minor is determined objectively, rather 

than subjectively. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f). The evidentiary materials indicate that, on or 

around April 30, 2012, Reynolds gave her supervisor medical documentation indicating 

that she would be able to return to normal work duties beginning June 8, 2012. (Def’s 

Ex. 9). Reynolds does not identify any record evidence which objectively shows that, at 

the time of her termination, her condition could reasonably be expected to last longer 

than six months. See Wallner v. MHV Sonics, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2039-JDW-EAJ, 2011 

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WL 5358749, at *4 (M.D. Fla., Nov. 4, 2011). Consequently, Reynolds fails to establish 

a prima facie case of ADA discrimination. 

Moreover, even assuming arguendo Reynolds established a prima facie case of 

ADA discrimination, the court concludes that Kinpak proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Reynolds and that Reynolds failed to demonstrate 

that the reason is pretextual. Under the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, the 

burden shifts to Kinpak to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Reynolds’ 

termination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In this Circuit, “[t]o satisfy this 

intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would 

allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been 

motivated by discriminatory animus.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 

1527-28 (11th Cir. 1997). “To satisfy [its] burden of production, ‘[t]he defendant need 

not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is 

sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it 

discriminated against the plaintiff.’” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528 (quoting Burdine, 450 

U.S. at 254-55). This intermediate burden is “exceedingly light.” Turnes v. AmSouth 

Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994). Kinpak contends that Reynolds was 

terminated because it had no jobs available which could accommodate Reynolds’ “sit 

down work only” restriction. (Doc. No. 27, Def’s Br., p. 8). Thus, the defendant has 

articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Reynolds’ termination. 

Next, the court turns to whether Reynolds has demonstrated that Kinpak’s 

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for her termination is a pretext for ADA 

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discrimination. Reynolds argues that Kinpak’s reason for terminating her based on “lack 

of work” is a pretext for discrimination because she was replaced the following day by a 

Hispanic woman, Lucrecia Reyes. The problem with Reynolds’ argument is that there is 

no showing that Ms. Reyes was hired to perform “sit down work only.” Thus, Reynolds 

fails to demonstrate pretext on this basis.

Reynolds also argues that Kinpak’s reason for her termination is pretextual 

because Kinpak “could have provided her a position where she won’t have to be on her 

feet standing as they have done with others before such as Randy Reyes.” (Doc. No. 33, 

Pl’s Resp., p. 9). She also argues that Kinpak refused to accommodate her disability even 

though both she and her coworkers agreed to redistribute their workload. (Id., p. 2.) The 

court construes Reynolds’ arguments as an accommodation claim.1

“The ADA defines ‘discrimination’ to include ‘not making reasonable 

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 

individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee . . . .’” 42 U.S.C. § 

12112(b)(5)(A). See also Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 

1997). Consequently, the ADA imposes upon employers the duty to provide reasonable 

accommodations for known disabilities unless doing so would result in an undue hardship 

to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). See also Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 

257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). It is the plaintiff’s burden to identify an 

accommodation and demonstrate that the accommodation would permit him to perform 

 

1 To the extent Reynolds argues that Kinpak’s failure to accommodate her is a pretext for discrimination, 

the court concludes her argument is without merit. 

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the essential functions of his job. Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1255-56. See also Stewart v. Happy 

Herman’s Chesire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Moreover, the 

burden of identifying an accommodation that would allow a qualified individual to 

perform the job rests with that individual, as does the ultimate burden of persuasion with 

respect to demonstrating that such an accommodation is reasonable.”). 

Reynolds fails to demonstrate that the reallocation of job duties between herself 

and her coworkers is reasonable under the circumstances. An employer is “not required 

to reallocate job duties to change the functions of a job.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 

1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000); Webb v. Donley, 347 Fed. Appx. 443, 446 (11th Cir. 2009). 

“[T]he law is clear that reallocation of job duties constitutes a change in the essential 

functions of the employee’s job and therefore is not required under the ADA.” Mont-Ros 

v. City of West Miami, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citations omitted). 

Reynolds’ argument that another employee was accommodated does not create a genuine 

dispute of material fact. Reynolds fails to present any admissible evidence demonstrating

that another employee classified as disabled with similar job duties was accommodated 

with a no-standing option on a prior occasion or that accommodating her in a similar 

manner would be reasonable under the circumstances. More importantly, Reynolds 

cannot establish an ADA accommodation claim because she is not disabled. This court 

therefore concludes that Reynolds fails to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact 

with respect to her accommodation claim. Consequently, the Motion for Summary 

Judgment on the ADA claims is due to be granted in favor of Kinpak.

C. The Title VII Claims

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Reynolds asserts that Kinpak violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., by terminating her from her position on the basis of 

her race and gender. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin in a variety of employment practices. See Walker v. 

NationsBank of Fla., N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish a prima 

facie case of Title VII discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) she is a member of a 

protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job from which she was discharged; (3) she 

was discharged; and (4) she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated person 

outside her protected class or her former position was filled by a person outside her 

protected class. See, e.g., Maynard v. Rd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 

2003). 

Kinpak argues that Reynolds fails to show that similarly situated persons outside 

of her protected class received more favorable treatment. With respect to her claim that 

she was discriminated based on her race and gender, Reynolds alleges that she is 

similarly situated to one Hispanic male employee – Randy Reyes. Reynolds argues that 

Mr. Reyes broke his ankle and continued to work even though he wore a cast and used 

crutches. Kinpak asserts that Mr. Reyes is not a proper comparator because he did not 

request “sit down work only” and used vacation time and unpaid leave before returning to 

work with no restrictions. Mr. Reyes and Reynolds are not similarly situated. The 

undisputed evidence demonstrates that Reynolds provided a medical excuse to her 

supervisor which ordered “sit down work only.” Nothing in the record indicates that Mr. 

Reyes provided a similar excuse to his supervisors or otherwise requested an 

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accommodation. Given the dissimilarities, Reynolds’ accusations of discrimination on 

this basis are insufficient to establish that both Reynolds and Mr. Reyes were similarly 

situated. Thus, Mr. Reyes is not a proper comparator in this case. 

To the extent Reynolds argues that she has established a prima facie case of 

gender discrimination because she was replaced by a Hispanic woman, her argument is 

without merit. Both Reynolds and Ms. Reyes are female. Thus, Ms. Reyes is not outside

Reynolds’ protected class. It is arguable, however, that Reynolds has established a prima 

facie case of race discrimination because she alleges that she was replaced by a Hispanic 

woman.

2

 Nonetheless, as previously discussed, Kinpak has set forth a non-discriminatory 

reason for Reynolds’ termination and Reynolds fails to demonstrate that Kinpak’s reason 

for her termination is a pretext for race discrimination. 

This Circuit has consistently held that federal courts, in resolving these types of 

claims, do not review the accuracy of an employer’s decision to terminate a plaintiff’s 

employment. See e.g., Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1321 n.16 

(11th Cir. 1998), quoting Nix, 738 F.2d at 1187 (“Title VII is not a shield against harsh 

treatment at the workplace. . . The employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a 

bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action 

is not for a discriminatory reason.”). Instead, the crucial question is whether the 

employer was motivated by an improper discriminatory bias. See, e.g., Standard v. 

 

2 The pleadings filed by the plaintiff are not a model of clarity. In her response, Reynolds argues that 

Kinpak “treat[s] the Hispanic worker better [than] anyone else (other races especially black but more so 

black females).” (Doc. No. 33, Pl’s Resp., p. 11). The court, however, is unable to discern whether 

Reynolds is African-American or a member of another protected class. The defense does not argue that 

Reynolds fails to establish a prima facie case on this basis. 

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A.B.E.L. Servs., 161 F.3d 1318, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998); Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538. The 

court concludes that there is no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to Reynolds’ 

claims of race and gender discrimination. Consequently, the Motion for Summary 

Judgment on the Title VII claims is due to be granted in favor of Kinpak.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the 

RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge as follows:

(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendant. 

(Doc. No. 26).

(2) This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

(3) The costs of these proceedings be taxed against Plaintiff.

Finally, it is

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation 

on or before January 24, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically identify the 

findings in the Magistrate Judge s Recommendation to which the party objects. 

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. 

The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, 

therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

Case 2:12-cv-01101-MEF-TFM Document 37 Filed 01/09/14 Page 17 of 18
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upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 9th day of January, 2014.

 /s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:12-cv-01101-MEF-TFM Document 37 Filed 01/09/14 Page 18 of 18