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Parties Involved:
Dexter Anderson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Accordingly, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 10, 2010*

Decided February 11, 2010

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐1238

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DEXTER ANDERSON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin.

No. 03‐CR‐261

William C. Griesbach,

Judge.

O R D E R

Dexter Anderson moved to reduce his prison sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

after the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowered the base offense level applicable to

his convictions.  The district court denied the motion.  We affirm that decision.  

In 2004 a jury found Anderson guilty of participating in a crack conspiracy in Green

Bay, Wisconsin.  The district court calculated a total offense level of 44 and a criminal

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐1238 Page 2

history category of III, which yielded a guidelines range of life imprisonment.  Applying

our holding in United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),

the district court declined to treat the guidelines as mandatory, concluding instead that a

life sentence was too severe in the absence of violent conduct.  Still, the court added, a

sentence above the statutory minimum was necessary to reflect Anderson’s aggravating

conduct: Anderson had tried to retrieve a loaded gun during his arrest and also lied at trial

about the extent of his involvement in the conspiracy.  The court imposed a total of 25 years’

imprisonment, 5 years above the 20‐year statutory minimum applicable because of the drug

quantity and Anderson’s criminal history.  We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal.

United States v. Anderson, 450 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2006).    

In 2008 Anderson moved for a lower sentence due to the retroactive amendments

applicable to his crack offenses.  See U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C 226‐31, 253 (2009)

(Amendments 706 & 713).  Under the amended guidelines Anderson’s total offense level is

two levels lower and his imprisonment range is 30 years to life; he argued for a comparable

reduction of his prison sentence.  The district court denied the motion, explaining that

Anderson’s original sentence had already been lowered because of the difference in offense

levels for powder cocaine and crack cocaine.  The court added that dropping the term any

closer to the statutory minimum would require overlooking Anderson’s conduct during and

after his arrest.

On appeal Anderson argues that the district court abused its discretion.  Although

the bottom of his modified imprisonment range is higher than the sentence imposed—30

years compared with 25—Anderson still contends that he is entitled to benefit from the

retroactive amendments.  He asserts that he has been on good behavior since he was

sentenced, and that he finally came around and accepted responsibility for his crimes at the

hearing on his § 3582(c)(2) motion.  He contends that these factors, combined with the

different offense levels for offenses involving like amounts of powder and crack cocaine,

gave the district court a compelling basis to resentence him.

We are satisfied that declining to do so was not an abuse of discretion.  After

considering applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a district court has discretion

to reduce a term of imprisonment if a reduction would be consistent with the policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); United States v.

Young, 555 F.3d 611, 613‐14 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Woods, 581 F.3d 531, 539 (7th Cir.

2009).  Those statements instruct the court to consider the movant’s postsentencing conduct

and the danger to the community posed by releasing him early.  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2) &

cmt. n.1(B)(ii), (B)(iii).  After reviewing the record, the district court concluded that

Anderson’s below‐range sentence already accounted for the difference in offense levels

between crack and powder cocaine.  The court rejected Anderson’s argument that he should

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No. 09‐1238 Page 3

be rewarded for his good behavior in prison and for accepting responsibility; the judge

questioned Anderson’s sincerity and opined that further reducing his prison term would

diminish the severity of his aggravating conduct contrary to the aims of § 3553(a).  This

explanation was sufficient. See United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2009);

United States v. Harris, 490 F.3d 589, 597 (7th Cir. 2007).  

               AFFIRMED.

       

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