Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01169/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01169-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lydia Cencil
Defendant
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LYDIA CENCIL,

Defendant. /

No. C-10-01169 EDL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

REMAND

Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank has filed a motion to remand this unlawful detainer complaint to

Contra Costa County Superior Court following Defendant Lydia Cencil’s procedurally and

substantively improper removal. Defendant has not opposed the remand motion or consented to this

Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the following reasons, the Court

recommends granting the motion to remand. 

Background

This action began as a residential unlawful detainer action filed by Plaintiff in Contra Costa

County on October 23, 2009. Plaintiff alleges that it is the owner of and entitled to immediate

possession of the real property located at 2528 Crystal Way in Antioch. Compl. ¶ 1(b), 5. The

property was allegedly sold in accordance with California law under a power of sale contained in a

deed of trust executed by Defendant. Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that the sale has been duly

perfected in Plaintiff by the recording of a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale in the Contra Costa County

official records. Compl. ¶ 6. 

Plaintiff alleges that on October 10, 2009, Plaintiff served Defendant a written notice to quit

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and deliver possession of the property to Plaintiff within three days. Compl. ¶ 7: Ex. A. Defendant

did not deliver possession of the property within three days, and remains in possession of the

property without Plaintiff’s consent. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is not a tenant

or subtenant. Compl. ¶ 10. The reasonable rental value of the property is at least $50.00 per day. 

Compl. ¶ 11. 

Legal Standard

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a

State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be

removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district

and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If at any

time before final judgment, it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case

shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” 

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Thus, “[f]ederal

jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id.

(citation omitted). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant

always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id.; see also Abrego v. Dow

Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). Removal jurisdiction may be based on diversity

of citizenship or on the existence of a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Whether removal

jurisdiction exists must be determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). 

Discussion

A. The Removal Was Untimely

Plaintiff moves to remand on the basis that Defendant’s removal was untimely under 28

U.S.C. § 1446, which requires that an action be removed within thirty days of service or thirty days

after it becomes ascertainable that the action could be removed. Defendant was served with the

summons and complaint on October 26, 2009, and did not remove until March 19, 2010. See

Wallace Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. B. Nothing in the interim changed the nature of the original complaint or

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made it any more or less removable than it was on the date it was served. Even taking into

consideration the leniency afforded to pro se litigants, there is no basis for Defendant’s delay in

timely removing, so remand is appropriate on this basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (removed case

may be remanded to state court based on a “defect” in the removal procedure).

B. No Federal Court Jurisdiction

1. No Federal Question Jurisdiction

Defendant based removal on federal question jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff’s allegations

are claims brought under “the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act, the Truth in Lending Act, Generally Accepted Accounting Principals, the Universal

Commercial Code, and thereby specifically causing the enforcement of the invalid subject Deed of

Trust, and for wrongful foreclosure by a party without standing to foreclose.” Notice of Removal at

1-2. Plaintiff responds that the complaint only alleged a single, state law unlawful detainer claim. 

Where a civil action over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction is brought in

state court, the defendant may remove the action to federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. A

case may be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 only where a federal question appears on the

face of the properly pleaded complaint. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987);

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002) (“The

well-pleaded-complaint rule has long governed whether a case “arises under” federal law for

purposes of § 1331.”); see also Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.

2002) (“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.”). This rule makes the plaintiff

the master of its claim in that the plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on

state law. Id. Further, whether a case arises under federal law does not depend upon matters raised

in the answer. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 830-31 (“. . . whether a case arises under federal patent law

‘cannot depend upon the answer.’ Moreover, we have declined to adopt proposals that ‘the answer

as well as the complaint ... be consulted before a determination [is] made whether the case “ar[ises]

under” federal law ... .’”) (internal citations omitted); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415

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U.S. 125, 127-28 (1974) (“The federal questions ‘must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint,

unaided by the answer.’ Moreover, ‘the complaint itself will not avail as a basis of jurisdiction in so

far as it goes beyond a statement of the plaintiff's cause of action and anticipates or replies to a

probable defense.’”). 

Here, the face of the complaint, which asserts one state law claim only, does not provide any

ground for removal. To the extent that Defendant may have raised federal law issues in her answer,

those issues do not provide a basis for removal. Therefore, remand is proper because the complaint,

on its face, does not arise under federal law. 

2. No Diversity Jurisdiction

Although Defendant does not ground her removal on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,

Plaintiff argues that diversity jurisdiction does not exist. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, this Court

has diversity jurisdiction where the parties are diverse and “the matter in controversy exceeds the

sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” Defendant has not opposed the motion or

made any other effort to show that the statutory minimum of $75,000 has been met, and the face of

the complaint shows that it has not been met. The cover page of the complaint states in the caption,

“AMOUNT DEMANDED DOES NOT EXCEED $10,000.” Wallace Decl. Ex. A. Therefore, the

case was not removable as a diversity action and remand is appropriate.

C. The Court need not reach the abstention issue 

Defendant argues that the Court should remand this case based on abstention principles

because this unlawful detainer action is a purely local state action. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) (abstention focuses on the federal court’s power to refrain from

hearing cases based on “‘scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments’

and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary.”) (quoting Railroad Comm’n of Texas v.

Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941)). Because remand is appropriate in light of the

procedural and substantive defects, as described above, the Court need not reach the abstention

issue. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court recommends granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. Any party may

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serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within fourteen (14) days after

being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Civil Local Rule 72-

3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court's order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: May , 2010 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

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