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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Thomas Stanley Werking
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

THOMAS STANLEY WERKING, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

SEP 2 6 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-8093 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. CR89-023-K) 

Laurence P. Van Court, of Cheyenne, Wyoming, for the DefendantAppellant. 

Richard A. Stacy, United States Attorney, District of Wyoming, and 

John R. Green, Assistant United States Attorney, of Cheyenne, 

Wyoming, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, BARRETT, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant, Thomas Stanley Werking, entered a 

conditional plea of guilty under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure ll(a)(2) in federal district court to possession with 

intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 

84l(a)(l). 1 Werking's plea was conditioned on .his right to bring 

this appeal challenging the district court's refusal to suppress 

evidence of approximately seventy-five pounds of marijuana that a 

highway patrolman obtained in a warrantless search of the vehicle 

Werking was driving. Werking contends the district court erred in 

finding: (1) the initial automobile stop was lawful; (2) the 

further questioning by the patrolman was a consensual encounter 

outside the scope of the fourth amendment; and (3) the consent to 

search the automobile was voluntary. We exercise jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. section 1291 and affirm. 

Following an evidentiary hearing on Werking's motion to 

suppress, the district court entered findings of fact in the 

record as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e). 

Based on its view of the testimony, the court found that the 

government had met the burden of proving the constitutionality of 

its actions and the defendant had failed to give any credible 

reasons to justify suppression. 

We are not empowered to substitute our judgment for findings 

of the district court unless clearly erroneous. See,~, United 

States Y...!.. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1989). In 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 2 
reviewing the district court's findings, we are mindful that "[a]t 

a hearing on a motion to suppress, the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence together with 

the inferences, deductions and conclusions to be drawn from the 

evidence, are to be determined, by the tr-ial .judge." United States 

~ Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, we 

review the evidence in a light favorable to the district court's 

determination. See,~, United States~ Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 

1198 (10th Cir. 1988); United States~ Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 

1376 (10th Cir. 1984). 

On the evening of March 18, 1989 Werking was driving a 1983 

Volvo with California conunercial vehicle license tags on 

Interstate 80 in eastern Wyoming when he overtook highway 

patrolman Dan Dyer in his patrol car. Although Werking was not 

speeding, Dyer decided to run a routine registration check on the 

Volvo. The check revealed it belonged to an automobile dealership 

in Poway, California. Dyer suspected the California car was being 

driven in violation of Wyoming's "one-trip" permit law. This law 

requires all vehicles brought into the state for sale to register 

at a port of entry and affix a permit to the vehicle's front 

windshield. The evening light made it impossible for Dyer to 

verify whether the Volvo had such a permit. He also thought the 

car could be stolen from a car lot or illegally registered. Based 

on the possibility of these violations, Dyer pulled Werking over 

to investigate the registration and purpose of the out-of-state 

vehicle. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 3 
When Dyer asked Werking whether the Volvo was being 

transported from one dealer to another, Werking told him he was 

delivering the car to a friend who had flown to Ohio when that 

friend's father had died. The patrolman then requested papers to 

verify the story. Werking. produced. registration papers, a 

driver's license, and a letter from the registered owner 

authorizing Werking to drive the Volvo. 

Dyer returned to his patrol car to check the driver's license 

and computer files for any outstanding warrants. Finding no 

problems with Werking's license or papers, Dyer filled out a 

"contact sheet" stating the reasons for the detention and 

indicating no violation had been found. Dyer returned Werking's 

registration papers and driver's license and handed him a copy of 

the contact sheet. 

Dyer then asked Werking if he was transporting firearms, 

narcotics, or large sums of money in the vehicle. Werking 

answered "no" to all three questions. Dyer asked whether Werking 

would mind if he took a look in the trunk. Werking said "no" and 

opened the trunk for the patrolman. There Dyer found five new 

nylon duffle bags. Dyer asked whether Werking minded if he opened 

them. Werking shook his head, again indicating "no." Dyer found 

approximately seventy-five pounds of marijuana in the bags. 

Werking first contends that the initial automobile stop was 

unlawful. In United States Y..!. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1363 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Threat Y..!. United States, 467 U.S. 

1255 (1984), we·identified three categories of citizen encounters 

with law enforcement officials. The first, a consensual 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 4 
encounter, involves a citizen's voluntary cooperation with an 

offical's non-coercive questioning. A consensual encounter is not 

a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The second, 

an investigative detention or "Terry stop," is a seizure within 

the scope of the fourth amendment that is justified when specific 

and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those 

facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is 

committing a crime. The third category, an arrest, is also a 

fourth amendment seizure that is characterized by a highly 

intrusive or lengthy detention and requires probable cause the 

arrestee has or is committing a crime. Although these three 

categories do not provide a litmus test for fourth amendment 

protections, they do operate as guidelines for characterizing 

citizen encounters with law enforcement officials. United States 

Y.!... Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1986). 

In this case, the encounter between Dyer and Werking began as 

an investigative detention. As noted above, a person may be 

detained in this manner if specific and articulable facts and 

rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a 

reasonable suspicion that an offense is being committed. Cooper, 

733 F.2d at 1363. 

At the evidentiary hearing, Dyer testified that he stopped 

the Volvo because he suspected the driver may have been in 

violation of Wyoming's one-trip permit law. This statute requires 

that all vehicles driven through Wyoming for the purpose of sale 

obtain a single trip permit at a port of entry ·and display it on 

the lower right inside of the windshield. Wyo. Stat. § 37-8-403 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 5 
(Supp. 1989). To enforce this law, an officer must ask the driver 

of an out-of-state vehicle whether it is being driven for the 

purpose of sale. 

Dyer testified that he stops vehicles subject to the one-trip 

permit law nearly once.a week. Most drivers he stops are unaware 

of the statute's requirements and therefore do not have a permit. 

Here, Dyer's registration check revealed that the Volvo was 

registered to an auto dealership in California. It would be 

subject to the one-trip permit law if it was being driven through 

Wyoming for the purpose of sale. To enforce the law, Dyer had to 

stop the Volvo to investigate whether it was being driven for the 

purpose of sale or for some other purpose. 

Based on the facts revealed by the registration check and 

Dyer's testimony about the frequency of these violations, we 

cannot conclude the district court's finding that Dyer had a 

reasonable suspicion to stop Werking was clearly erroneous. We 

hold that Werking's initial stop and brief detention to inquire 

about the purpose of the trip satisfied the necessary 

prerequisites for a investigative detention and thus did not 

violate Werking's fourth amendment rights. 

Werking's argument that Dyer's stop was pretextual is without 

merit. In a pretextual stop, the law enforcement officer must 

deviate from his usual practice. United States Y..!.. Guzman, 864 

F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988). As noted above, Dyer stops 

vehicles nearly once a week based on his suspicion they are in 

violation of the one-trip permit law. His decision to investigate 

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Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 6 
the Volvo was therefore "business as usual," not a deviation from 

normal practice. 

Werking next contends that Dyer's further questioning after 

returning the driver's license and other papers violated his 

fourth amendment rights. The initial investigative detention was 

concluded when Dyer returned Werking's license and registration 

papers. At this point, the encounter between Werking and Dyer 

became an ordinary consensual encounter between a private citizen 

and a law enforcement official. 

A consensual encounter is simply the voluntary cooperation of 

a private citizen in response to non-coercive questioning by a law 

enforcement official. Because an individual is free to leave at 

any time during such an encounter, he is not "seized" within the 

meaning of the fourth amendment. See Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 890; 

Cooper, 733 F.2d at 1363. Whether a particular encounter 

constitutes a consensual encounter or an investigative detention 

involving fourth amendment protections depends on whether a 

reasonable person under the circumstances would believe she was 

not free to leave and/or disregard the official's request for 

information. See INS Y...!.. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (citing 

United States Y...!.. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (Stewart, J.), 

reh'g denied (1980)). 

An individual has been seized only if he has an objective 

reason to believe that he was not free to end his conversation 

with the law enforcement official and proceed on his way. United 

States Y...!.. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (Stewart, J.), reh'g 

denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980); Pliska Y...!.. City of Stevens Point, 823 · 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 7 
F.2d 1168, 1176 (7th Cir. 1987). In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart 

noted that there may be a seizure when there is "the threatening 

presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an 

officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or 

the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 

with the officer's request might be compelled." 446 U.S. at 554; 

see also Florida Y...!.. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) (defendant 

effectively seized for fourth amendment purposes when government 

agents retained his driver's licence and airline ticket); Pliska 

Y...!.. City of Stevens Point, 823 F.2d 1168, 1176 (7th Cir. 1987) 

(questioning by officer and request for identification outside the 

scope of fourth amendment until defendant locked in squad car); 

United States Y...!.. Pavelski, 789 F.2d 485, 488-89 (7th Cir.) 

(individual in an automobile bounded on three sides by police 

patrol cars not free to leave and thus encounter not consensual), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 917 (1986); United States Y...!.. Perate, 719 

F.2d 706, 709 (4th Cir. 1983) (squad cars blocking forward and 

rear path of limousine constituted an investigative detention). 

The determination of precisely when a law enforcement 

official's questioning rises to the level of a show of authority 

sufficent to constitute a seizure is "not always an easy one." 

United States Y...!.. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 135 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting 

United States Y...!.. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42, 44 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 

451 U.S. 970 (1981)), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983). The 

decision calls for the "refined judgment" of the trial court. 

Black, 675 F.2d at 129. We are not persuaded that the findings of 

the district court on this close question of fact are clearly 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 8 
erroneous. The record indicates that Werking was free to proceed 

after Dyer returned his papers. As the district court pointed out 

in its findings, Dyer testified under oath that Werking then was 

free to leave. There was no evidence that Werking was constrained 

by an overbearing show of authority. The only show of authority 

in this case was the fact that Dyer was a uniformed police 

officer. This fact alone, however, is insufficient to prove 

Werking was "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 

See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (citing Terry Y.!.. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

31, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 

A panel of this court recently held that the continued 

questioning of an individual following a routine traffic stop can 

violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights. United States Y.!.. 

Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519-20 (10th Cir. 1988). In Guzman, the 

officer stopped the defendant's car because he was not wearing his 

seat belt, a violation of the state's traffic regulations .. Id. at 

1514. The defendant provided the officer with his driver's 

license and registration papers. After running a computer check 

that showed the license and registration were valid, the officer 

returned to the defendant's car and began questioning him. The 

officer did not return defendant's license. Id. at 1519. The 

court concluded that the officer did not have any reasonable 

suspicion to justify a temporary detention for questioning. Id. 

at 1520. 

Guzman is different from this case. Before Dyer asked 

Werking any further questions, he returned Werking's driver's 

license and registration papers and gave him the contact sheet. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 9 
The officer in Guzman, however, did not return the defendant's 

license before questioning him. The defendant legally could not 

proceed on his way. He thus was seized within the meaning of the 

fourth amendment. In the present case, however, Werking was free 

to leave the scene. He chose to engage. in a consensual encounter 

with Dyer. We hold that Werking's responses to Dyer's questions 

about transporting narcotics, firearms, or large sums of money 

were the voluntary cooperation of a private citizen with a law 

enforcement official and were not obtained in violation of the 

fourth amendment. 

Werking finally contends that he did not voluntarily consent 

to Dyer's search of the Volvo's trunk. Whether consent is 

voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality 

of the circumstances. Schneckloth Y..!.. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 

227 (1973). The government has the burden of proving that consent 

is given freely and voluntarily. Id. at 222. This court has 

established three requirements to identify voluntary consent: 

(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 

consent was "unequivocable and specific" and "freely and 

intelligently" given; (2) the government must prove 

consent was given without duress or coercion, express or 

implied; and (3) the courts indulge every reasonable 

presumption against the waiver of fundamental 

constitutional rights and there must be convincing 

evidence that such rights were waived. 

United States Y..!.. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977) 

(quoting Villano Y..!.. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 

1962), cert. denied sub. nom. Miller Y..!.. United States, 440 U.S. 

958 (1979)). 

The district court properly held that all three requirements_ 

for voluntary consent were satisfied by the testimony presented by 

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Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 10 
!1 

the government. First, Dyer testified that Werking answered "no" 

when asked whether he minded if Dyer looked in the trunk and later 

shook his head "no" when asked whether he minded if Dyer looked in 

the duffel bags. This testimony provides clear and positive 

evidence that Werking's consent was unequivocable, specific, and 

freely and intelligently given. 

Second, Dyer testified that when Werking was given his 

license, registration papers, and the contact sheet, he was free 

to leave. Werking was not subject to duress or coercion to 

continue cooperating with Dyer. 

Finally, as the district court pointed out in its findings, 

the fact Werking himself opened the Volvo trunk and voiced no 

objections to the search as it proceeded is additional evidence 

that Werking did waive his rights regarding the search. We 

therefore cannot conclude the district court's decision that the 

government met its burden of proof on this issue was clearly 

erroneous. 

This case is easily distinguished from the case relied on by 

Werking, United States Y..!.. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 

1985). In Recalde, the court held that the defendant's consent to 

the search was not voluntarily given because the officer retained 

the defendant's license and vehicle registration. The defendant 

therefore was not free to proceed at the time he gave consent to 

the search. Cf. United States Y..!.. Miller, 835 F.2d 187, 189 (8th 

Cir. 1987) (consent voluntary when agent returned driver's license 

and airline ticket before asking to search his luggage). In the 

present case, however, Dyer had returned Werking's license and 

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Appellate Case: 89-8093 Document: 01019847941 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 11 
registration before he asked to search the trunk. As noted above, 

Werking was then free to proceed. Accordingly, we hold the 

district court's finding that Werking voluntarily consented to the 

search is not clearly erroneous. 

Werking also contends his consent to further questioning and 

the automobile search was infected by an unlawful detention. This 

argument lacks merit because the encounter between Dyer and 

Werking was lawful at all stages from the initial detention to his 

ultimate arrest. 

The trial court properly denied Werking's motion to suppress 

because marijuana obtained from the search of the Volvo is 

admissible evidence. The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

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