Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02416/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02416-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Corey D. Lyons
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2416

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Corey D. Lyons, *

*

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: January 11, 2006

Filed: June 19, 2006

___________

Before BYE and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE,1

 District Judge.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Corey Lyons and three accomplices robbed a Bank of America in Cape

Girardeau, Missouri, in January 2004, stealing approximately $10,300. Lyons pled

guilty to committing bank robbery while jeopardizing the lives of those in the bank

by use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) (Count

I), and to possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

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§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count II). He appeals his 180-month sentence for Count I, and we

affirm.

Lyons’s total offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines was

20, and his extensive criminal history placed him in criminal history category VI. The

resulting advisory guideline range for Count I was 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment.

The district court,2

 cognizant of its authority under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005), to vary from the advisory guidelines, sentenced Lyons to 180 months’

imprisonment on Count I. After describing Lyons’s extensive criminal history, the

court stated, “I think there is a serious danger that this defendant will commit further

crimes, and I think having him incarcerated for a longer time will be good[,] because

he can get some further education, and perhaps some self reflection that will lead him

to perhaps be rehabilitated.” (S. Tr. at 41). The court also imposed the statutory

minimum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for Count II, to be served

consecutively with the sentence on Count I.

Lyons challenges the reasonableness of the sentence on Count I. Review for

reasonableness is akin to review for abuse of discretion, United States v. Hadash, 408

F.3d 1080, 1083 (8th Cir. 2005), and we will consider a sentence unreasonable if the

district court “fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant

weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only

appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at

a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the

case.” United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

276 (2005). The “relevant factors” the district court must consider are those

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. May, 413 F.3d 841, 844-45 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 672 (2005).

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Although the 180-month sentence imposed on Count I was substantially greater

than the advisory guideline range found by the district court, we do not think it was

unreasonable under the circumstances. First, there was no procedural error. The court

considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors in sentencing Lyons, explaining “that a

higher sentence is necessary when I consider the nature and circumstances of the

offense,” see § 3553(a)(1), “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” see id.,

“the need for punishment,” see § 3553(a)(2)(A), “and a sentence that reflects the

seriousness of the offense to provide adequate deterrence[] and to protect the public

from further crimes of the defendant,” see §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). (S. Tr. at 41).

The court was particularly concerned that the bank robbery was an especially violent

crime, saying that “Mr. Lyons is frankly lucky that there was nobody inside who

didn’t follow their instructions or otherwise did not do something that ended up with

people shooting and people being killed,” (S. Tr. at 40), and that Lyons had been

convicted for 19 separate offenses in 15 years. (S. Tr. at 39). The court ruled that

Lyons was not a career offender under the guidelines, which it found “somewhat

ironic,” (S. Tr. at 37), and decided that his criminal history and the violent nature of

the instant offense warranted the upward variance. These are appropriate factors to

consider in deciding whether to vary from the guideline range, and the court did not

neglect factors that should have been given significant weight. 

We also conclude that the length of the sentence imposed was within the range

of reasonableness. The most apposite precedent is United States v. Shannon, 414 F.3d

921 (8th Cir. 2005), which held that where a defendant accumulated 31 criminal

history points, while only 13 points are necessary for placement in category VI, and

the district court identified other aggravating factors in the criminal history, it was

reasonable to vary from the advisory guideline range of six to twelve months and

impose a sentence of 58 months’ imprisonment. Id. at 922-24. We find a comparable

situation here.

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Lyons sustained 19 different criminal convictions over 15 years. The district

court’s summary of his criminal history is accurate and illustrative:

Mr. Lyons is 31 years old. Over the past 15 years, he has 19 separate

convictions. They include things like slamming his sister to the ground

and attempting to strangle her, which was a domestic battery; hitting a

police officer in the nose, which was a resisting arrest; delivery of

cocaine; obstruction of justice; battery, which involved pushing a victim

and grabbing him by the throat; several DWIs or DUIs; and then a large

number of property crimes; stealing from retail stores, stealing very

small things from retail stores like a dog collar or a six-pack of beer; and

things like stealing very large things, such as stereo speakers, cassette

tapes and a tape case, or stealing a leather jacket from a person.

(S. Tr. at 39).

Lyons scored 31 criminal history points under the guidelines, including four

points for committing the bank robbery while on probation and within two years of

his most recent release from custody. The district court aptly described his criminal

history as “a series of escalating criminal acts,” finally resulting in the “violent crime”

for which he was sentenced in this case. As in Shannon, this defendant committed one

offense right after another during 15 years of criminal activity, see United States v.

Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 1997), committed several violations of

probation or parole, (PSR ¶¶ 64, 68, 94); see United States v. Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823,

825-26 (8th Cir. 2005), and was treated with leniency by the state courts during his

lengthy criminal career, see United States v. Lang, 898 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.

1990).

These considerations could have justified a traditional upward departure under

the guidelines, see USSG § 4A1.3(a), which would have made a sentence at or close

to 180 months presumptively reasonable. See Shannon, 414 F.3d at 924. And even

if a traditional departure of this magnitude would have been somewhat excessive, we

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There is a bit of irony in Lyons’s challenge to the 180-month sentence, because

success in the appeal could well result in a longer sentence on remand. The district

court ruled that Lyons was not a career offender for purposes of USSG § 4B1.1,

because his conviction for driving while intoxicated was not a “crime of violence,” see

United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2005), but since then, we have held

that this offense is a crime of violence. United States v. Spudich, 443 F.3d 986, 987

(8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). If the present sentence were deemed unreasonable on

this record, and if the government on remand presented evidence from acceptable

sources showing that Lyons’s conviction for drunk driving necessarily rested on the

fact that he was driving while intoxicated, see United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967,

974 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc); cf. PSR ¶ 97, then Lyons would qualify as a career

offender. His advisory guideline range would be 188-235 months’ imprisonment, see

USSG § 4B1.1(b)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and a sentence even longer than that

imposed by the district court would be “presumptively reasonable.” United States v.

Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717-18 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 840 (2005). 

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do not believe it was unreasonable for the district court to exercise its additional

discretion under Booker to arrive at a sentence of 180 months. Id. Although we have

characterized an upward variance of this magnitude as “extraordinary,” and such an

extraordinary variance must be supported by extraordinary circumstances, the

combination of Lyons’s aggravated criminal history and the violence of the instant

offense are sufficiently extraordinary to justify the sentence imposed. Cf. United

States v. Kendall, 446 F.3d 782, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding upward variance

unreasonable where defendant was “low in the chain” of methamphetamine

manufacturing, and criminal history included a burglary as a juvenile, several driving

offenses, and a misdemeanor drug offense).3

Lyons also contends that the district court’s decision to vary from the advisory

guideline range based on the authority announced in Booker violates the Ex Post

Facto Clauses of the Constitution. These provisions do not apply to judicial

decisions, so we interpret Lyons’ argument to invoke the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment, and the “concepts of notice, foreseeability, and in particular the

right to fair warning.” Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456-57, 459 (2001). As

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noted, there is a substantial argument that the district court could have imposed the

same sentence prior to Booker, based on a traditional guidelines departure. See USSG

§ 4A1.3; United States v. Paulus, 419 F.3d 693, 698-99 (7th Cir. 2005). In any event,

Lyons’s due process contention is foreclosed by circuit precedent. United States v.

Counce, 445 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United States v. Wade, 435

F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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