Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02870/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02870-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carl McIntosh
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-2870

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Carl McIntosh,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Eastern District of Missouri.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: January 11, 2007

 Filed: July 6, 2007

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Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Carl McIntosh appeals the 87-month sentence imposed by the district court1

after he pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A

& 2 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), and fraudulent use of unauthorized access devices, a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) (2000). After careful review, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

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I.

McIntosh and two other individuals were indicted by a federal grand jury on

January 5, 2006, in a seven-count indictment. The indictment specifically charged

McIntosh with conspiracy, two counts of aggravated identity theft, two counts of

access device fraud, and one count of possession of fifteen or more access devices.

Pursuant to a plea agreement McIntosh pleaded guilty on April 21, 2006, to one count

each of aggravated identity theft and access device fraud. McIntosh was appointed

new counsel prior to his sentencing date and filed several objections to the

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). A hearing was held on these objections prior

to his sentencing on July 7, 2006. 

McIntosh objected to statements in the PSR related to the calculation of his total

offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. These objections

included the use of relevant conduct to determine loss amounts and the determination

of both the number of participants in the scheme and the number of victims. McIntosh

objected to how the PSR determined and calculated this information, as the PSR

recommended a higher total offense level based upon these factors than what

McIntosh contended was a correct calculation. After the district court heard testimony

and argument on these matters, it overruled McIntosh's objections and adopted the

PSR in its entirety.

The district court then proceeded to sentence McIntosh. By statute, the district

court was required to impose a minimum sentence of two years on the aggravated

identity theft count, with the sentence running consecutively to any sentence imposed

on the access device charge. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. In determining the advisory

Guidelines range on the device charge, the district court considered the facts set forth

in the PSR as relevant conduct and found that the plea agreement itself specifically

established the number of victims. As to the amount of loss, the district court

combined the loss amount McIntosh claimed was an accurate measure of loss from the

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credit card fraud with the amount of loss listed in the PSR that was attributed to the

check fraud scheme. The check fraud scheme was uncharged conduct attributed to

McIntosh, but the district court noted that there was a clear connection between the

two fraud schemes through the people that were involved and the fact that both

schemes operated under an intention to obtain money and property through fraud.

McIntosh's base offense level was six. The district court then adjusted the

offense level upward eight levels based upon the amount of loss, United States

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E), up another two levels based

upon the determination that the crimes had more than ten victims but less than fifty,

USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i), and upward four levels for McIntosh's status as a leader

of criminal activity that involved five more or participants, USSG § 3B1.1(a).

McIntosh was then granted a three-level reduction in his offense level for acceptance

of responsibility. USSG § 3E1.1(a), (b). This established an adjusted offense level

of 17, which, when combined with McIntosh's category VI criminal history, produced

an advisory Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months of imprisonment. The district court

sentenced McIntosh to 63 months on the device count and imposed the required

consecutive sentence of 24 months on the aggravated identity theft count–resulting in

a total sentence of 87 months of imprisonment.

II.

McIntosh's arguments on appeal pertain to the calculation of his total offense

level based upon the three enhancements the district court assessed at sentencing.

Specifically, he contends the district court erred in determining that the amount of loss

was between $70,000 and $120,000, that the district court erred in finding that the

number of victims was more than ten but less than fifty, and that the district court

erred in determining that McIntosh was a leader or organizer of a criminal activity

involving five or more persons. The Government counters that McIntosh waived the

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right to appeal these issues in his plea agreement, but that even if the waiver does not

apply, the district court did not err in any of its challenged sentencing determinations.

"The 'general rule' is that 'a defendant is allowed to waive appellate rights,'

including those involving the sentence imposed." United States v. Aronja-Inda, 422

F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997 (2003)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1104

(2006). When we review a waiver, we must make two determinations: that the issue

falls within the scope of the waiver and that both the plea agreement and the waiver

were entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Id. Even if both of these determinations

are decided in the affirmative, we will not enforce a plea agreement waiver if

enforcement would cause a miscarriage of justice. Id. The burden is on the

Government to "establish: (1) that the appeal is [clearly and unambiguously] within

the scope of the waiver, (2) that the defendant entered into the waiver knowingly and

voluntarily, and (3) that dismissing the appeal based on the defendant's waiver would

not result in a miscarriage of justice." Id.

 McIntosh's plea agreement included a section involving waiver of postconviction rights, including sentencing issues. The waiver specifically stated that if

the district court accepted the plea and if the district court, when determining

McIntosh's sentence (1) applied the sentencing recommendations that the parties

agreed to and, (2) "after determining a Sentencing Guidelines range, sentence[d] the

defendant within that range," McIntosh "waive[d] all rights to appeal all sentencing

issues, including any issues relating to the determination of the Total Offense Level."

(D. Ct. R. at 15-16; Plea Agreement at 3-4.) Significantly, the appeal waiver did not

restrict its applicability only to a sentence based on the agreed upon recommendations.

We determine that the appeal waiver included in the plea agreement

encompasses all three issues McIntosh raises on appeal. In sentencing McIntosh, the

district court applied each of the specific recommendations on which consensus was

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reached between McIntosh and the Government, thus satisfying that aspect of the

waiver. The district court then arrived at an advisory Guidelines sentencing range

after making determinations on the issues where there was disagreement between the

parties and sentenced McIntosh within that advisory range. The waiver required only

that the district court accept the parties' sentencing stipulations where they could agree

and sentence McIntosh within an advisory Guidelines range thereafter determined by

the district court. The plain language of the plea agreement is thus satisfied by the

district court's actions. See United States v. Martinez-Noriega, 418 F.3d 809, 815 (8th

Cir. 2005) ("When a dispute arises over the meaning of a plea agreement, the court

must 'discern the intent of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the

agreement when viewed as a whole.'") (quoting United States v. Taylor, 258 F.3d 815,

819 (8th Cir. 2001)). In addition, all three of the issues raised by McIntosh involve

the determination of his total offense level, which was a subject specifically included

in the appeal waiver. 

We also conclude that McIntosh's waiver was knowing and voluntary. The

waiver was included in the plea agreement that McIntosh signed, and the district court

questioned McIntosh about his understanding of the waiver during the change of plea

hearing. See Aronja-Inda, 422 F.3d at 738 (finding that appeal waiver was knowing

and voluntary based on presumption that the appellant read the plea agreement prior

to signing it and the fact that the magistrate judge had probed the defendant's

understanding of the waiver at the change of plea hearing). In addition, McIntosh

does not argue that he entered into the agreement unknowingly or involuntarily.

United States v. Blue Coat, 340 F.3d 539, 541-42 (8th Cir. 2003) (giving weight to the

fact that Blue Coat did not claim that the waiver was not knowing or voluntary when

determining if the appeal waiver should be enforced). Enforcing the appeal waiver

would also not amount to a miscarriage of justice in this case. See Andis, 333 F.3d

at 891-92 (discussing that the miscarriage of justice exception to enforcing an

otherwise valid appeal waiver is extremely narrow and stating that "an allegation that

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the sentencing judge misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines or abused his or her

discretion is not subject to appeal in the face of a valid appeal waiver").

Even if we determined that the plea wavier did not apply and reviewed the

district court's sentencing calculations, we would affirm. We generally view "plea

agreements as contracts, requiring the parties to fulfill their obligations under that

contract." United States v. Fowler, 445 F.3d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir. 2006). In the plea

agreement, McIntosh agreed that two levels should be added to his base offense level

because of the number of victims. The agreement specifically stated that "[t]he parties

recommend that the following Specific Offense Characteristic applies: 2 levels should

be added . . . because the offense involved more than 10 victims." (D. Ct. R. at 18;

Plea Agreement at 6.) McIntosh is bound by that concession and cannot now claim

error in the district court's application of that recommendation.

McIntosh, however, did not agree with the Government's recommendations in

the plea agreement regarding the amount of loss attributable to the scheme and

McIntosh's role as a leader in the criminal activity. These objections were noted in the

plea agreement and McIntosh objected to the PSR, which mirrored the Government's

recommendations on these two issues.

We first look to the district court's loss calculation. The district court's loss

determination included $57,496.06 that was attributed to the access device fraud. In

addition, the district court included $26,943.47 in losses attributable to the uncharged

check fraud scheme. The amounts are not disputed in this appeal by either party, but

McIntosh contends that the district court erred in its conclusion that the check fraud

scheme constituted relevant conduct that could properly be considered when

determining the amount of loss under the Sentencing Guidelines. "A district court's

determination whether actions were part of the same course of conduct as the counts

of conviction is a question of fact reviewable only for clear error." United States v.

Redlin, 983 F.2d 893, 897 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 820 (1993). "The district

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court's method for calculating the amount of loss must be reasonable, but the loss

'need not be determined with precision.'" United States v. Craiglow, 432 F.3d 816, 820

(8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Whatley, 133 F.3d 601, 606 (8th Cir. 1998)).

The burden is on the Government to prove the loss attributable to the defendant. Id.

"Relevant conduct under the guidelines need not be charged to be considered

in sentencing, and it includes all acts and omissions 'that were part of the same course

of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.'" United States v.

Radtke, 415 F.3d 826, 841 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2)). The district

court's conclusion that the check cashing scheme was relevant conduct attributable to

McIntosh when determining the amount of loss was not clearly erroneous. The

district court concluded that McIntosh was a participant in a broad fraud scheme that

took many forms and that, because there was a clear connection between the

individuals involved in the various methods of fraud and in the intent to fraudulently

obtain money and property, it was proper to consider losses from the check fraud

scheme when determining the Sentencing Guidelines range on the access device fraud

charge. We agree, as both the information contained in the plea agreement

stipulations and the testimony at the sentencing hearing sufficiently support this

finding by the district court. There was not improper grouping of conduct as

McIntosh alleges, but a finding that the conduct of the uncharged offenses was

relevant to a loss determination on the access device fraud count to which McIntosh

pleaded guilty.

Likewise, we find no error in the district court's finding that McIntosh was a

leader of a criminal enterprise involving five or more people. See United States v.

Mickle, 464 F.3d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating the standard of review), cert.

denied, 127 S. Ct. 1308 (2007). The stipulations made by McIntosh and the evidence

presented at the sentencing hearing sufficiently establish that McIntosh was a leader

in this fraud conspiracy and that five or more people were involved in the various

schemes. See id. at 807-08 (noting that the admissions made by the defendants and

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McIntosh has filed a pro se motion to supplement the appellate brief filed by

his appointed counsel, claiming the grand jury indictment was unsigned and therefore

invalid. We generally do not accept pro se motions or briefs when an appellant is

represented by counsel, see United States v. Payton, 918 F.2d 54, 56 n.2 (8th Cir.

1990), and as such we deny McIntosh's motion. In any event, a review of the record

shows that the grand jury indictment included in the district court record is signed,

contrary to McIntosh's contention.

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the testimony of the FBI agent at the sentencing hearing "provided a sufficient

foundation for the district court to conclude" that the defendants had operated as

leaders through recruitment, organization, planning, and control). For the same

reasons that it was not error for the district court to include losses attributable to

uncharged conduct when determining loss amount, it was not improper for the district

court to consider McIntosh's leadership role in the fraud scheme as a whole. Thus,

even if we were to disregard the appeal waiver included in the plea agreement that

binds McIntosh, we would still affirm the sentence imposed by the district court and

find no error in its calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines.

 

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.2

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