Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05003/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05003-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Appellant
Central Intelligence Agency
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 18, 2003 Decided July 8, 2003

No. 02-5003

ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH CENTER,

APPELLANT

v.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv00525)

James H. Lesar argued the cause for the appellant.

G. Michael Harvey, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,

United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

United States Attorney, were on brief.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The appellant,

Assassination Archives and Research Center (AARC),

brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or

Act), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq., to compel disclosure by the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency) of a multivolume compendium of information on ‘‘Cuban Personalities’’

(Compendium) prepared by the Agency in 1962. The CIA

withheld disclosure of the entire Compendium on the grounds

that the documents contained in it are classified SECRET

and that disclosure is exempt under the National Security Act

of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403–3(c)(7). The district court upheld

the Agency’s decision, granting summary judgment in its

favor. AARC v. CIA, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–12 (D.D.C. 2001).

AARC argues that the CIA failed to carry its burden to

establish a FOIA exemption from disclosure and that, in any

event, the Agency waived any exemption available under the

Act because information regarding Cuban nationals had already been disclosed pursuant to the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act (JFK Act), Pub. L. No. 102–

526, § 2(b), 106 Stat. 3443 (1992) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2107

note). We reject AARC’s arguments and instead affirm the

district court.

I.

In February 1993, AARC filed a FOIA request with the

CIA. It sought the release of the Compendium, a five-volume

set of documents on Cuban personalities compiled in November 1962 by the CIA’s Biographic Register, Office of Central

Research. Initially, the CIA declined to waive copying fees—

concluding that 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii), which allows documents to be furnished at no charge or a reduced rate if the

information sought is ‘‘likely to contribute significantly to

public understanding of the operations and activities of the

government,’’ was not applicable—and AARC filed the instant

lawsuit. The district court directed the CIA to waive copying

fees associated with AARC’s request.

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The CIA then began processing AARC’s request and, on

March 21, 2000, informed AARC by letter that the Compendium was exempt from disclosure under Exemptions 1 and 3 of

FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (3).1

 AARC appealed the decision through the Agency review process but the Agency

determined the appeal was moot because AARC had already

initiated this litigation. The CIA subsequently moved for

summary judgment, AARC, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 3, supporting

its motion with the declaration of Herbert Briick, the Information Review Officer for the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, who explained that the Compendium represents a

‘‘compilation of personality profiles of, or biographic data on,

a number of Cuban individuals’’ that includes non-classified

biographies, which are as a general rule based on ‘‘open

source information,’’ although profiles that are marked SECRET are so identified because they rely on ‘‘information

collected clandestinely.’’ Declaration of Herbert Briick at

¶ ¶ 14, 19 (July 5, 2000) (First Briick Decl.), App. 34, 36–37.

Notwithstanding the nature of the sources from which the

contents of the Compendium derive varies, the entire Compendium was classified, Briick declared, because of the purpose behind the Compendium and the fact that disclosure of

information might reveal intelligence methods and sources.

Id. at ¶ 15, App. 34–35.2

 As a result, the Agency argued that

1 Exemption 1 exempts matters that are ‘‘(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept

secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B)

are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.’’ 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Exemption 3 protects matters ‘‘specifically

exempted from disclosure by statute TTT, provided that such statute

(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a

manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes

particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of

matters to be withheld.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).

2 Although the Briick Declaration does not expressly explain the

purpose, at oral argument the CIA stated the purpose of the

Compendium was to identify Cuban nationals who could lead the

country if Castro was ousted. Tape of Oral Argument, Mar. 18,

2003.

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the Compendium qualified for nondisclosure under both Exemptions 1 and 3 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (3).

On the other hand, AARC offered evidence rebutting the

CIA’s exemption claims and, in addition, asserted that the

CIA had waived any FOIA exemption with respect to at least

some of the material contained in the Compendium. AARC,

177 F. Supp. 2d at 7–8. Specifically, AARC proffered the

declaration of John M. Newman, an associate professor at the

University of Maryland, who opined that the CIA’s position

on nondisclosure was erroneous because similar, if not identical, information had already been disclosed pursuant to the

JFK Act. Id.; Declaration of John M. Newman at ¶ ¶ 7–9

(Sept. 24, 2000) (Newman Decl.), App. 53–54. According to

Newman, the CIA’s national security interest in preventing

disclosure of information contained in the Compendium was

minimal. Nonetheless, the district court concluded, first, that

the Agency was entitled to summary judgment on both

exemptions and, second, that the Agency had not waived its

claim to exemptions. AARC, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 5–12.

AARC then filed the instant appeal.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1079

(D.C. Cir. 1998). In the FOIA context, de novo review

requires the court to ‘‘ ‘ascertain whether the agency has

sustained its burden of demonstrating that the documents

requested are not ‘‘agency records’’ or are exempt from

disclosure under the FOIA.’ ’’ Id. at 1080 (quoting Gallant v.

NLRB, 26 F.3d 168, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal citations

omitted)).

The FOIA requires every federal agency, upon request, to

make ‘‘promptly available to any person’’ any ‘‘records’’ so

long as the request ‘‘reasonably describes such records.’’ 5

U.S.C. § 522(a)(3). The Act ‘‘reflects a general philosophy of

full agency disclosure,’’ Dep’t of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S.

487, 494 (1994) (internal quotations omitted), but also provides

for several exemptions under which an agency may deny

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disclosure of the requested records. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The

exemptions—there are nine—reflect the ‘‘Congress’s recognition that the release of certain information may harm legitimate governmental or private interests.’’ Summers, 140 F.3d

at 1080. If an agency invokes an exemption, it bears the

burden of establishing the applicability of the claimed exemption. Summers, 140 F.3d at 1080. And, even if an agency

establishes an exemption, it must nonetheless disclose all

reasonably segregable, nonexempt portions of the requested

record(s). 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).

Here, section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947,

50 U.S.C. § 403–3(c)(7), which directs the CIA Director to

‘‘protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized

disclosure,’’ is a statute that shields qualifying information

from disclosure under the Act because it meets the two

criteria of Exemption 3. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178–79

(1985); see supra note 1 (setting forth Exemption 3). We

held that section 102(d)(3) qualifies under Exemption 3 if the

records sought ‘‘can reasonably be expected to lead to unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods and sources.’’

Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

The Agency, through Briick, explained that disclosure of

the contents of the Compendium, which includes the ‘‘pool in

1962 of potential intelligence sources or targets of CIA intelligence collection,’’ would ‘‘reveal those individuals in whom

CIA had an intelligence interest and would provide leads to

identifying the intelligence sources who or which acquired the

information.’’ First Briick Decl. at ¶ ¶ 15, 19, App. 34, 37; id.

at ¶ ¶ 20–38, App. 37–49. In view of the weight we give the

Agency’s judgment as to the effect of disclosure, Sims, 471

U.S. at 174–75, 179; Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 766

(D.C. Cir. 1990) (‘‘The assessment of harm to intelligence

sources, methods and operations is entrusted to the Director

of Central Intelligence, not to the courts.’’); see Afshar v.

Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (‘‘[U]nless

it senses bad faith or a general sloppiness in the declassification or review process, a court will feel with special urgency

the need to accord substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit

concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed

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recordTTTT’’ (internal quotations omitted)); see also Goldberg

v. Dep’t of State, 818 F.2d 71, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (‘‘[We]

accord those affidavits ‘substantial weight,’ considering the

agency’s unique insights into what adverse [e]ffects might

occur as a result of public disclosure.’’ (internal quotations

omitted)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988), we have no

trouble concluding that the Agency may withhold the contents

of the Compendium pursuant to Exemption 3 of FOIA.3

3 Because we conclude that the Agency easily establishes that the

records AARC seeks are exempt from disclosure under Exemption

3, we do not consider the applicability of Exemption 1. AARC also

argued, first, that the Agency inadequately explained why it could

not reasonably segregate and disclose nonexempt portions of the

Compendium as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) and, second, that the

Briick Declaration does not meet the specificity requirements of

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,

415 U.S. 977 (1974). Regarding AARC’s first argument, we find the

Agency’s showing that the Compendium is not segregable adequate.

As Briick explained, ‘‘Release of the information in this document

would specify precisely which Cuban nationals were and were not of

interest to the CIATTTT Such an explication of CIA interests would

provide key insights into current CIA intelligence targeting and

analytic processes.’’ First Briick Decl. ¶ 38, App. 49. Because the

Compendium contains ‘‘personality profiles and biographic data on

persons of intelligence interest to CIA[,] [b]y definition, the release

of information from such a profile, or the release of such biographic

data, directly or indirectly reveals information about the individual

discussed.’’ Id. at ¶ 39, App. 50. To reveal even the names of the

individuals or the number of names contained in the Compendium,

Briick said, would ‘‘reveal CIA interest’’ and ‘‘the extent of the U.S.

intelligence collection effort directed at Cuba in the 1960s.’’ Id.

Thus, he suggested, even partial release of the substantive biographic data—which comprise the Compendium—threatens the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. Id.

 As to AARC’s second argument, under Vaughn, in order ‘‘to

permit adequate adversary testing of the agency’s claimed right to

an exemption,’’ Schillier v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir.

1992), we require an agency to provide information justifying the

exemption that is as specific as possible ‘‘without actually disclosing

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Indeed, AARC does not dispute that the Agency could

withhold the Compendium under Exemption 3 but for the

earlier disclosures under the JFK Act. AARC argues that

those disclosures have either (1) already revealed all intelligence sources and methods used in the Compendium, thereby

making the CIA’s invocation of Exemption 3 meritless or (2)

effected a waiver of the Exemption with respect to at least

some of the information in the Compendium.

On AARC’s first contention, we side with the Agency. The

Agency has explained that notwithstanding the JFK Act

disclosures, releasing the Compendium would lead to the

revelation of intelligence sources and methods. AARC maintains that:

the CIA has released thousands of pages of records that

reveal the Agency’s use of mail intercepts, phone intercepts, penetrations of Cuban diplomatic missions and

other sources and methods used to collect information on

these Cuban personalities [and that] [i]n many instances,

the CIA cryptonyms for these operations already have

been released too, especially where these sources and

methods were connected to gathering information on

Cuban personalities.

Newman Decl. ¶ 8, App. 53–54. However, as Briick explained

in response to Newman’s conclusion that disclosure of the

Compendium would be harmless, the Agency has never ‘‘released any portion of the document in any form at any time,

whether as part of the [JFK Act] or otherwise.’’ Supplemental Declaration of Herbert Briick at ¶ 7 (Nov. 30, 2000), App.

58 (Briick Supp. Decl.). Briick attests, moreover, that

[R]elease of the information contained in the ‘Cuban

Personalities’ document would be expected to reveal the

identity of a confidential human source or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or

method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence

information that deserves protection.’’ Oglesby v. Dep’t of the

Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We think that Briick’s

Declaration meets the Vaughn specificity standard.

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source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source

would clearly and demonstrably damage the national

security interests of the United States.

Id. at ¶ 6, App. 58. Given our deference to the Agency’s

judgment on the matter, Sims, 471 U.S. at 179, we uphold the

Agency’s determination that disclosure of the Compendium,

even in light of the JFK Act disclosures, ‘‘can reasonably be

expected to lead to the disclosure of intelligence sources and

methods.’’ Gardels, 689 F.2d at 1103.

Regarding its waiver claim, AARC relies on Afshar v.

Department of State, 702 F.2d at 1130, which holds that an

agency may waive its claim that information is exempt from

disclosure if a FOIA plaintiff carries his ‘‘burden of pointing

to specific information in the public domain that appears to

duplicate that being withheld.’’ Id.; Public Citizen v. Dep’t

of State, 11 F.3d 198, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Fitzgibbon, 911

F.2d at 765. Because the Compendium contains a comprehensive collection of information about Cuban operatives and

because the biographies of several Cuban operatives were

released under the JFK Act, AARC argues, at least some

information contained in the Compendium must have already

been disclosed; therefore, AARC concludes, the Agency has

waived Exemption 3 with regard to such material.4

Afshar requires a FOIA plaintiff to show that an agency’s

previous disclosure ‘‘appears to duplicate’’ the material

sought, Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130, i.e., that the disclosure is

‘‘as specific as’’ and ‘‘match[es]’’ the sought material. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765 (citing Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1133); Public

Citizen, 11 F.3d at 201. In Public Citizen v. Department of

State, the FOIA plaintiff sought the disclosure of documents

relating to a meeting between the then-Ambassador to Iraq

and the President of Iraq. 11 F.3d at 199. The plaintiff

4 Fitzgibbon emphasized that an agency waives an Exemption 3

claim only if it has made an ‘‘official disclosure’’ of the information.

Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765. Because we conclude infra that AARC

failed to show that the JFK Act disclosures revealed the ‘‘specific’’

information sought from the Compendium, we do not consider

whether the JFK Act disclosures were ‘‘official’’ under Fitzgibbon.

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argued that the State Department had waived its Exemption

1 claim because the ambassador had testified before the

Congress about the meeting.5

 We rejected the plaintiff’s

argument because it did not ‘‘meet Afshar’s requirement that

it show that [the ambassador’s] testimony was ‘as specific as’

the documents it seeks in this case, or that her testimony

‘matches’ the information contained in the documents.’’ Public Citizen, 11 F.3d at 203 (citing Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765).

Even if her testimony effected ‘‘partial disclosures of classified information’’ contained in the requested documents, we

said, those disclosures did not result in waiver because they

did not precisely track the records sought to be released.

Public Citizen, 11 F.3d at 203–04.

Similarly, here, it may be that some information disclosed

pursuant to the JFK Act is included in the Compendium.6

5 We noted in Public Citizen that Afshar is relevant to both

Exemptions 1 and 3. Public Citizen, 11 F.3d at 202 n.4.

6 We highlighted how specific the FOIA plaintiff’s showing must

be under Afshar in Davis v. Department of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276,

1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In that case, the Justice Department

resisted disclosure of tape recordings made during a criminal

investigation of a reputed mafioso. Id. at 1278. Although the

government conceded waiver as to the tapes that were played at

trial and agreed to release tapes for which the plaintiff could

provide trial transcripts, we held that the plaintiff’s reliance on

newspaper stories that generally referred to the tapes did not meet

the specificity requirement. Id. at 1280. We emphasized that the

plaintiff had to show ‘‘the exact portions’’ of the tapes that were

played. Id.

 In Davis we also noted that as a practical matter waiver under

Afshar yields the FOIA plaintiff little new information. Id. Indeed, if a plaintiff can establish that the specific records he seeks

have become ‘‘ ‘freely available, there would be no reason to invoke

the FOIA to obtain access to the information.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Dep’t

of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,

764 (1989) (internal quotations omitted)). We suggested that, although the government ‘‘[was] willing to give Davis only exactly

what he can find in hard copy,’’ that meant that Davis would receive

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But AARC must show that information duplicates the contents of the Compendium and it has not met this burden.

AARC’s only showing came from Newman who stated that

the CIA made ‘‘300,000 pages of its records available,’’ that

‘‘[a] very high percentage of this volume of documents concerned Cuba, Cuban exiles and Cuban exile organizations’’

and that, in his judgment, ‘‘the overwhelming majority of

Cuban personalities in whom the CIA has had an interest

have been disclosed under the JFK Act.’’ Newman Decl. at

¶ ¶ 5, 9, App. 52, 54. Newman, however, made no specific

showing that any of the JFK Act disclosures revealed information that is ‘‘as specific as’’ and ‘‘match[es]’’ that included

in the Compendium. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765. In fact,

what we know about the contents of the Compendium comes

from the Agency, which explains that the Compendium represents ‘‘the pool in 1962 of potential intelligence sources or

targets of CIA intelligence collection,’’ First Briick Decl. ¶ 15,

App. 34, and that it has ‘‘never released this document, nor

has it ever released any portion of the document in any form

at any time, whether as part of the [JFK Act] or otherwise.’’

Briick Supp. Decl. at ¶ 6, App. 58. Because we cannot

conclude that AARC has shown that specific portions of the

Compendium have been disclosed, we reject its contention

that the Agency has waived FOIA Exemption 3.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

So ordered.

‘‘merely the added value of voice inflection’’ if he established waiver.

Id.

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