Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_00-cv-02031/USCOURTS-arwd-2_00-cv-02031-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.
Plaintiff
Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corporation
Defendant
Volvo Trucks North America, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-1-

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

REEDER-SIMCO GMC, INC. PLAINTIFF 

V. Civil No. 00-2031

VOLVO GM HEAVY TRUCK CORPORATION

n/k/a VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. DEFENDANTS 

ORDER

On this 26th day of June 2006, there comes on for

consideration Volvo Trucks North America Inc’s Motion for

Release of Supersedeas Bond (Doc. 136), Volvo’s Motion for

Partial Taxation of Supersedeas Bond Premiums (Doc. 137-38),

Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 139) and Volvo’s Reply (Doc. 140). 

Plaintiff did not file a response to the Motion for Release

of Supersedeas Bond, and Volvo has satisfied the Amended

Judgment entered on May 22, 2006 (Doc. 135). Accordingly, the

supersedeas bond is released, and the United States District

Clerk is directed to return the original bond to Volvo’s

counsel.

In its Motion for Partial Taxation of Supersedeas Bond

Premiums, Volvo contends the Court should award Volvo costs in

the amount of $203,913.21 for supersedeas bond premiums

associated with the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA) claim upon which

it ultimately prevailed on appeal. Plaintiff asserts that such

an award is inappropriate as: (1) neither the Supreme Court nor

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the Eighth Circuit directed the district court to award the

supersedeas bond premiums as costs; (2) Volvo’s motion for costs

is time-barred; and (3) if the supersedeas bond premiums are

recoverable, the district court should exercise its discretion

to deny these costs.

Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

provides for the taxing of costs in the district court to

include premiums paid for a supersedeas bond to preserve rights

pending appeal. FED. R. APP. P. 39(e)(3). The rule also

prescribes that costs are taxed only as the court orders in

cases, such as the instant case, where the judgment on appeal is

affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified or vacated. FED.

R. APP. P. 39(a)(4).

Volvo points out that Rule 39 allows the district court to

tax supersedeas bond premiums as costs “for the benefit of the

party entitled to costs under this rule...” FED. R. APP. P.

39(e). Where a judgment is reversed in part, modified or

vacated, costs are taxed only as the court orders. FED. R. APP.

P. 39(a)(4). Volvo relies on Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co.,

324 F.3d 616 (8 Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 947 (2003) th

in support of its argument that this court must tax costs. In

Emmenegger, supra, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district

court’s award of partial bond costs that defendant incurred

during an appeal. Id. However, as noted by Plaintiff, in

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Emmenegger, the defendant moved the Eighth Circuit to tax the

bond premiums as costs and the Eighth Circuit specifically

directed the defendant to request such relief in the district

court. Id. at 626. In the instant case, the appellate courts

were silent as to the taxation of costs pursuant to Rule 39(e)

in this Court, and this court is without authority to tax the

supersedeas bond premiums as costs without direction from the

appellate courts. See Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v.

Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n., 117 F.3d 1328 (11 Cir. th

1998); Conway Groves, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (M.D. Fla.

1994)(where circuit court is silent on costs to be taxed by the

district court under Rule 39(e), the district court has no

authority to allocate costs); Graham v. Milky Way Barges, Inc.,

122 F.R.D. 18 (E.D. La. 1988)(finding the district court may

only tax costs pursuant to Rule 39(e) if the circuit court has

so ordered).

As the Court finds it has no discretion to tax the

supersedeas bond premiums as costs, it need not address

Plaintiff’s arguments that Volvo’s motion was untimely or that

the Court should exercise its discretion to deny costs.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, Volvo’s Motion for Release of

Supersedeas Bond (Doc. 136) is GRANTED, and the United States

District Clerk is directed to return the original bond to

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Volvo’s counsel. Further, Volvo’s Motion for Partial Taxation

of Supersedeas Bond Premiums (Doc. 137-38) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

Honorable Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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