Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04919/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04919-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles T. Fonteneau
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4919

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHARLES T. FONTENEAU,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,

District Judge. (1:04-cr-00050-NCT)

Submitted: April 24, 2008 Decided: May 12, 2008

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, L. Patrick Auld,

Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 07-4919 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/12/2008 Pg: 1 of 5
1Because Fonteneau failed to raise this claim below, we review

it for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Charles T. Fonteneau challenges the supervised release

portion of the sentence imposed upon the second revocation of his

supervised release. Fonteneau contends the forty-one month term of

supervised release violated his constitutional protection against

double jeopardy1 and is unreasonable. After reviewing the record,

we affirm. 

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment

protects defendants against second prosecutions for the same

offense after either an acquittal or a conviction and against

multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v.

Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The protection against multiple

punishments ensures “that sentencing courts do not exceed, by the

device of multiple punishments, the limits prescribed by the

legislative branch of government, in which lies the substantive

power to define crimes and prescribe punishments.” Jones v.

Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989). 

 When a court revokes supervised release and imposes a

term of imprisonment, it may also reimpose a term of supervised

release. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(h) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). “The

length of such a term of supervised release after imprisonment

shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by

Appeal: 07-4919 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/12/2008 Pg: 2 of 5
2Forty-one months equals sixty months (statutory maximum term)

minus ten months (term of imprisonment imposed when Fonteneau’s

supervised release was revoked in 2004), minus nine months (term of

imprisonment imposed in the underlying 2007 revocation proceeding).

- 3 -

statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of

supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed

upon revocation of supervised release.” Id.

The maximum term of supervised release authorized by

statute for Fonteneau’s original bank fraud conviction is five

years. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1) (2000). Thus, when the district

court revoked Fonteneau’s supervised release, the maximum

authorized term of supervised release was forty-one months.2

Fonteneau concedes that his forty-one month term of supervised

release was authorized by statute. He nonetheless argues the term

subjected him to unconstitutional double jeopardy because it

exceeded the thirty-six month term of supervised release imposed

upon his original conviction. However, as explained, the term of

supervised release did not exceed the sentence authorized by

Congress and the starting point for calculating the term that may

be imposed upon revocation is the term authorized for the original

offense, not the term actually imposed upon the defendant’s

conviction. Furthermore, because a sentence imposed after the

revocation of supervised release is not considered a new

punishment, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated. United

States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United

Appeal: 07-4919 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/12/2008 Pg: 3 of 5
- 4 -

United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he

term of supervised release, the revocation of that term, and any

additional term of imprisonment imposed for violating the terms of

the supervised release are all part of the original sentence.”)

(citation omitted). 

Fonteneau also argues that the term of supervised release

renders his revocation sentence unreasonable. We will affirm a

sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is

within the prescribed statutory range and not plainly unreasonable.

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006),

cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1813 (2007). In making this

determination, we first consider whether the sentence is

procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438-39. Only

if a sentence is unreasonable will we determine if it is “plainly”

so. Id. at 439. 

Although the district court provided no explanation for

its selection of the maximum allowable term of supervised release,

the court properly calculated the amount of supervised release it

was authorized to impose and imposed a term within its

authorization. We find nothing clearly or obviously erroneous

about the sentence, especially in light of the fact that it was

Fonteneau’s second revocation of supervised release. See United

States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007) (defining

Appeal: 07-4919 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/12/2008 Pg: 4 of 5
- 5 -

“plainly unreasonable” sentence as one that is clearly or obviously

erroneous.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation of

supervised release and the sentence imposed. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

Appeal: 07-4919 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/12/2008 Pg: 5 of 5