Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02580/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02580-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
AT&T Corporation
Defendant
Daniel Valverde
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL VALVERDE,

Plaintiff,

v.

AT&T CORPORATION and DOES ONE

through TWENTY, inclusive,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-03-2580 DFL JFM

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Defendant AT&T (“AT&T”) moves for summary judgment. For the

reasons stated below, the court GRANTS the motion.

I.

On April 10, 2000, AT&T first placed Valverde on the payroll

as a switch engineer. (Thomas Decl. ¶ 4.) During Valverde’s

employment, AT&T had a policy requiring regular attendance as an

essential condition of employment. (Id. ¶ 14.) In addition,

AT&T had a policy that employees who worked for more than six

months would be paid for sick leave at the discretion of a

manager. (Id. ¶ 15.) On August 18, 2000, Valverde received a

written warning for missing eight days of work. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

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Valverde was warned that if he missed additional days of work

before July 14, 2001, he might be subject to disciplinary action. 

(Id. ¶ 19.) On September 11, 2000, Valverde missed work. On

September 12, 2000, Valverde was late for work. (Id. ¶ 21.) 

After missing work on October 16, 2000, Valverde submitted a

request for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. (Id. ¶¶

22, 23.) AT&T denied his request for medical leave. (Id. ¶ 24.) 

Valverde did not return to work until November 9, 2000. (Id. ¶

25.) He missed work a number of additional times: (1) from

February 5, 2001 through April 1, 2001; (2) from May 29, 2001

through August 1, 2001; and (3) from August 13, 2001 through

November 19, 2001. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 31, 33.) On November 19, 2001

AT&T dismissed Valverde. (Id. ¶ 49.) In a fifteen month period,

from September 2000 through November 2001, it appears that

Valverde missed approximately 178 days of work. AT&T issued

Valverde a final paycheck after he was terminated. Because it

miscalculated the payroll tax withholding, AT&T sent Valverde a

second check to cover the difference. (Id. ¶ 52.)

On November 5, 2003, Valverde filed a complaint in

Sacramento Superior Court against AT&T. On December 16, 2003,

AT&T filed a notice of removal based on diversity jurisdiction. 

Valverde brings five claims against AT&T: (1) wrongful

termination; (2) breach of implied contract; (3) a disability

claim under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12900 et seq.; (4) violation of the

California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”), Cal. Gov’t. Code §

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12945.2; and (5) violation of California’s Labor Code. AT&T

moves for summary judgment on all five claims.

II.

A. FEHA Discrimination Claim

AT&T argues that Valverde’s claim for employment

discrimination fails because: (1) he is not a qualified

individual; and (2) AT&T terminated his employment for a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. (Mot. at 7-11.) In

assessing claims brought under FEHA, California courts have

looked to the framework established by federal courts applying

federal antidiscrimination laws. See Guz v. Bechtel National,

Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (2000). California courts have adopted

the three-stage burden-shifting test for weighing claims of

disparate treatment as set forth by the United States Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.

1817 (1973). Id. That test requires a plaintiff to first

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which will

generally require evidence sufficient to support a finding that

“(1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) he was

qualified for the position he sought or was performing

competently in the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse

employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an

available job; and (4) some other circumstance suggests

discriminatory motive.” Id. at 355. The burden then shifts to

the employer to provide evidence that its action was taken for a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Id. at 355-56. If the

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employer is successful in making that showing, the burden then

shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the stated reason is a

mere pretext, or to offer additional evidence of discriminatory

motive. Id. at 356.

AT&T argues that Valverde is not a qualified individual

under FEHA because he failed to regularly attend work, an

essential function of his job. (Mot. at 7-10.) Because the FEHA

provisions relating to disability discrimination are based on the

ADA and other federal law, decisions interpreting federal

antidiscrimination laws are relevant in interpreting the FEHA’s

similar provisions. Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 235

(1997). Under the ADA, a “qualified individual with a

disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the employment position that such individual holds

or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

Numerous courts have held that attendance at work is an

essential job function. See Nesser v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff did not

establish that he could perform essential functions of his job

without accommodation because he was unable to attend work on a

regular basis); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(coming to work regularly was an “essential function”); Tyndall

v. Nat’l Educ. Centers, Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994)

(“[A] regular and reliable level of attendance is a necessary

element of most jobs.”).

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Valverde concedes that regular attendance is an essential

function of employment. (Opp’n at 4.) In addition, he admits

that his physician has not stated that he can return to work. 

(Pl.’s Response to DSUF 59.) However, in an affidavit, Valverde

asserts that his physician released him to work four hours per

day. (Valverde Decl. ¶ 5.) Despite this contradictory

statement, Valverde does not argue, or offer evidence, that

working four hours per day would be considered regular attendance

or a reasonable accommodation. Instead, Valverde seems to argue

that the court should “expand” the law to provide assistance to

people with mental disabilities. (Reply at 4.) He cites no

cases to support his position. Because Valverde fails to

introduce evidence that he could regularly attend work, or that

AT&T refused to provide him a reasonable accommodation, the court

GRANTS AT&T’s motion for summary judgment on Valverde’s

discrimination claim.

B. Wrongful Termination

Valverde’s wrongful termination claim is based on the same

theory and evidence as his discrimination claim. Therefore, for

the same reasons discussed above, AT&T’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED as to the wrongful termination claim. 

C. Breach of Implied Contract

Plaintiff concedes his breach of implied contract claim. 

(Opp’n at 3.)

D. Wage and Hour Violations

AT&T argues that Valverde’s claims for wage and hour

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violations fail as a matter of law. (Mot. at 18.) Valverde

raises six wage and hour violations in his complaint: (1) on

November 20, 2001, he only received a partial payment of his

wages that were due and it took another thirty days before he

received the additional $1,200; (2) he was entitled to two

additional days of vacation pay; (3) he was entitled to $8327.00

in sick pay; (4) he was entitled to a $200.00 award dinner; (5)

he was entitled to a twenty year ring; and (6) he was entitled to

an annual cash bonus.

Under California Labor Code section 201, “if an employer

discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time

of discharge are due and payable immediately.” An employer must

pay penalties for willfully failing to pay these wages. Cal.

Labor Code § 203. The penalties accrue from the date the wages

become due until they are paid or until an action is commenced. 

Id. Under this section, “willful” means “the employer

intentionally failed or refused to perform an act which was

required to be done.” Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co., 125

Cal.App.3d 1, 7-8 (1981) (emphasis omitted) (citing Davis v.

Morris, 37 Cal.App.2d 269 (1940)). An employer’s good faith

belief that wages are not owed may negate a finding of

willfulness. Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. G & G

Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 102 Cal.App.4th 765, 782 (2002); see also

Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 8, § 13520 (providing that an employer’s

good faith dispute, based in law or fact, that any wages are due

will preclude imposition of waiting time penalties under § 203).

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 Valverde claims that he received this check in the mail on 1

November 11, 2001. (Valverde Decl. ¶ 4.)

 Valverde avers that he received the second check in the 2

mail on November 30, 2001. (Valverde Decl. ¶ 4.)

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AT&T argues that it did not act willfully, even though

Valverde did not immediately receive all of the wages that he was

owed. (Reply at 6.) In support of this argument, AT&T provides

an affidavit from Stephen Jones (“Jones”), a manager at AT&T,

stating that on November 19, 2001, AT&T issued a check for the

incorrect amount to Valverde because it withheld too much for

taxes. (Jones Decl. ¶ 3.) Jones avers that AT&T mailed a 1

second check after it discovered the error. (Id.) Valverde 2

fails to introduce evidence showing that AT&T did not act in good

faith by withholding part of his check. Therefore, the court

GRANTS AT&T’s motion for summary judgment on Valverde’s claim for

waiting time penalties. 

AT&T notes that, in his response to AT&T’s statement of

undisputed material fact, Valverde failed to dispute that: (1)

AT&T provided a twenty year party and ring; (2) supervisors at

AT&T award sick time at their own discretion based on an

employee’s attendance record; and (3) an employee terminated

during the year is not entitled to a year-end bonus. (Reply at

7; Pl.’s Response to DSUF ¶¶ 62, 15, 36.) Valverde provides no

evidence to support a finding that he could succeed on these

claims at trial. Therefore, the court GRANTS AT&T’s motion for

summary judgment on Valverde’s claims for sick pay, an award

dinner, a twenty year ring, and an annual cash bonus.

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Finally, AT&T argues that it does not owe Valverde two days

of vacation pay because he used them to cover the two days of

work he missed on November 7, 2000 and November 8, 2000. (Def.’s

Supp. Brief at 2.) In his deposition, Valverde states that he

seeks payment for two vacations he took after returning to work

from disability leave in October 2000. (Pl.’s Depo. at v.2 95.) 

However, Valverde also states that he used those vacation days to

cover his absences from work. (Id. at v.1 143.) Because

Valverde acknowledged that he used his vacation time to cover the

two days he was absent from work, AT&T does not owe him vacation

pay. Therefore, the court GRANTS AT&T’s motion for summary

judgment on Valverde’s claim for two days of vacation pay. 

E. CFRA Violations

Plaintiff concedes his CFRA claim. (Opp’n at 5-6.)

III. 

For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS AT&T’s motion

for summary judgment. The clerk shall enter judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/12/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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