Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01817/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01817-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jill Brown
Respondent
Steven McCauley
Petitioner

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN McCAULEY,

Petitioner,

v.

JILL BROWN, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-1817 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Steven McCauley, formerly a prisoner at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se action

seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the court for

consideration of the merits of the pro se habeas petition. For the reasons discussed below, the

petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Steven McCauley was convicted in Alameda County Superior Court of second degree

murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison in 1982. His habeas petition does not

concern that conviction directly, but instead focuses on a June 4, 2004 decision by a panel of the

Board of Prison Terms ("BPT") to find him not suitable for parole. 

The BPT identified two factors in support of its determination that McCauley was not

suitable for parole. First, "[t]he offense was carried out in a very cruel and a very callous

manner in that the victim was 75 years old and was a very defenseless man who was actually

behind the security of a screen door in his own home" and it was committed for a trivial reason.

Resp. Exh.

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5 (June 4, 2004 reporter's transcript of BPT hearing (hereinafter "RT")), at 65. Second,

McCauley's pre-commitment behavior indicated unsuitability, i.e., he had an unstable social

history, had a prior criminal record, and had long-term drug and alcohol abuse. RT 66-67. The

specifics regarding the crime and the circumstances supporting the finding of unsuitability are

described in the Discussion section later in this order.

McCauley filed habeas petitions in the California courts. The Marin County Superior

Court denied the petition in a reasoned decision. Resp. Exh. 2. The California Court of Appeal

and the California Supreme Court summarily denied McCauley's petitions.

McCauley then filed his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court found

cognizable two due process claims alleged in the petition: (1) the evidence was insufficient to

support the BPT's decision and (2) the BPT's decision breached the plea agreement. The court

ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not issue. Respondent filed an

unsuccessful motion to dismiss. Respondent then filed an answer and petitioner filed a traverse.

The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action occurred at San Quentin State Prison in Marin County, California, within this judicial

district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that

state court remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner challenging

the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency Of Evidence Claim

1. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support a Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process in

the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v. Allen,

482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1

(1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.

Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support

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the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. Id. at 1128 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that 'the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). The some evidence

standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law in the parole context for purposes

of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

Furthermore, and of key importance, the parole board is not precluded from relying on

unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the petitioner's preoffense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id. at 1129 (commitment offenses in

combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support denial of parole). The

familiar argument that the BPT cannot rely on these factors is based on the Ninth Circuit's

statements in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), that suggested that the value of

the criminal offense fades over time as a predictor of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s

decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors

considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance

of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at

916-17. In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release date based solely

on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that

“[o]ver time . . . , should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of

rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and

prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916.

These statements were dicta and not clearly established federal law as set forth by the Supreme

Court, such that the state court's refusal to adopt the Biggs reasoning would be a decision

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as set forth by the

Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit recently backed away from the Biggs statements, and

confirmed that these statements from Biggs were dicta and were inappropriate under § 2254.

See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. "Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about how future

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parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. What little guidance has come

from the Supreme Court suggests that judicial review should be extremely deferential to the

original decision-maker in the parole context. In addition to the very low evidentiary standard

that Superintendent v. Hill imposes, other Supreme Court comments suggest that the judiciary

should be quite mindful of the subjective and predictive nature of a parole board's decision. See

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13. "No ideal, error-free way to make parole-release decisions has been

developed; the whole question has been and will continue to be the subject of experimentation

involving analysis of psychological factors combined with fact evaluation guided by the practical

experience of actual parole decisionmakers in predicting future behavior. Our system of

federalism encourages this state experimentation." Id.; see also id. at 8.

Past criminal conduct is not some arbitrary factor like eye color that has nothing to do

with present dangerousness. Recidivism concerns are genuine. See Ewing v. California, 538

U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (O'Connor J.) (noting a report stating that over 60% of violent offenders were

arrested again within three years of their release). California's parole scheme does not offend

due process by allowing the BPT to predict that an inmate presents a present danger based on

a murder he committed many years ago.

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets the

criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to answer the

question, "'some evidence' of what?"

2. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A first

degree murder conviction yields a minimum term of 25 years to life and a second degree murder

conviction yields a base term of 15 years to life imprisonment. See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

4th 1061, 1078 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 92 (2005); Cal. Penal Code § 190. The upshot

of California's parole scheme described below is that a release date normally must be set unless

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The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the prisoner has an

unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual offense, the prisoner

has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and negative institutional

behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances tending to show suitability

for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social history, signs of remorse, a stressful

motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered from battered woman's syndrome, lack

of criminal history, the present age reduces the probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or developed marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15

Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

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various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is substantial. 

A BPT panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect

to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial

Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release

dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the panel "shall

set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal Code

§ 3041(b). 

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for offenses

of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."1

 The regulation also

provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on

parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(a). The panel may

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consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes.

See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For example, for second degree murders, the matrix of base

terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years to a high of 19, 20, or 21 years, depending on

some of the facts of the crime. Some prisoners estimate their time to serve based only on the

matrix. However, going straight to the matrix to calculate the sentence puts the cart before the

horse because it ignores critical language in the relevant statute and regulations that requires him

first to be found suitable for parole.

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's

expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th at 1070-71. Under state law, the matrix is not reached unless and until the prisoner is

found suitable for parole. Id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) ("[t]he panel shall set

a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). The California Supreme

Court's determination of state law in Dannenberg is binding in this federal habeas action. See

Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can alone

support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the prisoner

is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime

for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative analysis before

concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for

the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th

616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he nature of the prisoner's

offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole" but might violate due process

"where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or

violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense"). 

 3. Some Evidence Supports The BPT's Decision In McCauley's Case

The BPT identified two reasons for its decision to find McCauley unsuitable for parole:

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the commitment offense and the pre-offense behavior. The Marin County Superior Court

upheld the decision in a reasoned order. See Resp. Exh. 2. The Marin court stated that some

evidence had to support the decision and found that some evidence did support the decision.

See id. at 3-5. The state court applied the correct legal standard, as evidenced by its citation to

In re. Ramirez, 94 Cal. App. 4th 549, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), overruled on other grounds in

In re. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (Cal. 2005). Ramirez had cited and adopted the

Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard as the proper standard for judicial review of

evidentiary sufficiency for parole denial cases. See Ramirez, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 562-64.

Because the Marin County Superior Court's decision is the last reasoned decision, that is the

decision to which 2254(d) applies. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991);

Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006).

a. Commitment Offense

The reports considered at the parole suitability hearing described the crime leading to the

murder. See Resp. Exh. 7. McCauley was residing at the Dillard residence in Hayward for

about three months, was unemployed, was in arrears in his rent, and was asked by the

homeowner to move. On February 11, 1981, McCauley removed his personal property to the

driveway. 

McCauley and his crime partner Dean Stockton went to the neighbor's home, victim

Miller Marks, and requested transportation for themselves and McCauley's belongings.

Marks declined due to the lateness of the hour. An argument ensued and the screen door

was forced open and Marks was stabbed repeatedly. The wounds caused his death almost

immediately. The murder weapon was a hunting knife that Stockton had brought to the

scene. After the murder, McCauley fled the scene immediately. Stockton delayed long

enough to go through the residence in an apparent search for money. 

Resp. Exh. 7, Life Prisoner Evaluation Report, p. 1. The victim was 75 years old. The Life

Prisoner Evaluation Report also provided McCauley's version of the incident, which was

basically that the stabbing occurred after a day of alcohol and drug abuse by him and Stockton

and that Stockton had been talking repeatedly about robbing and killing the victim. See id. at

2. In McCauley's version, after Marks refused to give them a ride, Stockton started stabbing

Marks and McCauley only stabbed Marks after Stockton told him to do so. Also in McCauley's

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version, McCauley remained present while Stockton began searching through the victim's

pockets and Stockton told McCauley he would no longer supply McCauley with drugs and

alcohol if he did not go along with the crime. 

One of the circumstances tending to indicate unsuitability for parole is that the prisoner

"committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner." 15 Cal. Code Regs.

§ 2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in determining whether that circumstance exists are

that there were multiple victims, "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder," "[t]he victim was abused, defiled or mutilated

during or after the offense," "[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering," and "[t]he motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). The

BPT considered a circumstance and factors proper under California law. 

There was some evidence in the record to support the BPT's determination that the

circumstances of the commitment offense indicated unsuitability. The record supported a

determination that murder was committed in a very cruel and callous manner in that McCauley

and his crime partner forced entry into the 75-year old man's home with a hunting knife, stabbed

him multiple times and did nothing to aid him after stabbing him. The motive for the killing was

the height of triviality, i.e., because the victim would not give McCauley and his crime partner

a ride. Even under McCauley's version of the crime (which the BPT was not obligated to

believe), the motive was trivial, i.e. to avoid being cut off from alcohol or drugs. RT 66. The

BPT identified more than the minimum elements of a second degree murder when it determined

that McCauley committed the murder in a very cruel manner as shown by the completely

unprovoked forced entry with a knife into the victim's house, the repeated stabbing of the victim,

and the trivial reason for the killing, see Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071. 

b. Pre-Offense Behavior

The BPT also relied on McCauley's pre-offense history for its determination that he was

not suitable for parole. The record supported these findings. McCauley had been arrested for

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burglary, for which he was on probation at the time he killed the victim. RT 16-17. He also had

an unstable social history of leaving home at age 15 and having a "total disconnect with his

family." RT 17-23, 66. There also was evidence of McCauley's history of alcohol and drug

abuse starting at age 12. RT 23-24 (marijuana and alcohol were used most frequently but he

also used LSD, cocaine, and heroin on approximately a monthly basis).

Consideration of McCauley's pre-offense history was not improper. An unstable social

history is specifically listed as a circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability, see 15 Cal. Code

Regs. § 2402(c)(3). His burglary conviction also was properly considered. Although the

prisoner's "previous record of violence" on a victim is a specifically listed circumstance and nonviolent criminal history is not specifically listed as a circumstance that tends to indicate

unsuitability, § 2402(c)(2), the list of circumstances in § 2402(c) is non-exclusive, and §

2402(b) specifically allows the BPT to consider a great range of relevant and reliable

information, such as the prisoner's "past criminal history, including involvement in other

criminal misconduct which is reliably documented." Even without knowing the particulars of

the burglary so as to determine whether it was violent, the burglary conviction could be

considered by the BPT as tending to show unsuitability. Likewise, McCauley's lengthy history

of alcohol and drug abuse could be considered under § 2402(b), which allowed the BPT to

consider the "circumstances of the prisoner's social history." 

c. The State Court Properly Rejected The Claim

The BPT noted that several factors supported parole, but ultimately concluded that

McCauley was not suitable for parole. The factors listed by the BPT in support of its

determination that McCauley was not suitable for parole had evidentiary support. And the

factors were factors that could be considered in determining parole suitability. The Marin

County Superior Court's rejection of McCauley's insufficient evidence claim was not contrary

to or an unreasonable application of the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard.

McCauley is not entitled to the writ on this claim.

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B. Breach Of Plea Agreement Claim

McCauley also contends that the BPT's decision to find him unsuitable for parole

breached his plea agreement, in violation of his right to due process. See Santobello v. New

York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971) (defendant has a right to enforce terms of plea agreement).

The Marin County Superior Court rejected McCauley's claim that the BPT's decision

violated the plea agreement. "[T]his court is not persuaded that the plea agreement has been

violated by the petitioner's continued incarceration. At the time of his plea, he understood, by

his own admission, that the maximum punishment was 'life imprisonment' and when and if that

term ended and petitioner was released from custody was a determination that people other than

himself would make. His dispute is not with the original agreement, but with those who

determined that he is currently unsuitable for parole." Resp. Exh. 2, p. 4.

The state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court, as required for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). McCauley has not pointed to language in any plea agreement that shows that

any particular term in his plea agreement has been breached. His inability to identify any

particular term that has been breached makes his claim rather weak. His suggestion that his plea

agreement required that he be released from prison on his minimum eligible parole date is

unpersuasive because he has provided no evidence in support of the argument; the only evidence

on the sentence is the judgment that plainly shows his sentence is 15-to-life. Resp. Exh. 1. His

argument that the BPT cannot consider the actual circumstances of the crime because a jury did

not find any facts to be true is unsupported by the law as well as unsupported by any evidence

that such a term existed in his plea deal. The BPT is not limited to the bare judgment in trying

to assess whether the circumstances of the crime tend to show unsuitability. Despite his

argument to the contrary, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), has no

applicability to the BPT's decision., as the BPT is simply determining whether McCauley should

be paroled before he has served his maximum sentence. In McCauley's case, his maximum

sentence is life; neither the jury trial right nor Apprendi are implicated by a parole board's

decision whether to release him before that maximum sentence has been served. McCauley's

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sentence upon his conviction based on a plea agreement was 15-to-life and he has received the

parole considerations to which he was entitled under that sentence. His claim that his plea

agreement was breached in violation of his right to due process fails.

Moreover, as respondent correctly points out, the breach of the plea agreement claim is

time-barred. The factual basis for McCauley's claim is his alleged belief that he was entitled to

be paroled upon his minimum eligible parole date of September 22, 1989. The court agrees with

respondent's argument that the one-year period for filing a habeas claim started on September

23, 1989, the day after McCauley reached his minimum eligible parole date and still remained

in prison. The current petition is untimely under the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d),

because it was not filed until about fifteen years after the minimum eligible parole date. 

C. Petitioner's Motion To Expedite Consideration Of Petition

McCauley filed a motion for expedited consideration of his habeas petition. He reports

that he was found suitable for parole and was released from custody early in 2006 and wants

expeditious review so that he can be released from the burdens of parole sooner rather than later.

The motion is DENIED. (Docket # 13.) McCauley's status as a parolee does not mean that his

petition should be put ahead of the many other petitions from persons still in prison who contend

they were denied due process during their parole suitability hearings. The court has decided

McCauley's petition in the ordinary course. Also, because the petition has been denied, the

decision has no impact on the length of his parole following his release upon being found

suitable for parole in 2006. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied on the merits. The clerk shall close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 20, 2006 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-01817-SI Document 14 Filed 10/23/06 Page 13 of 14
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Case 3:05-cv-01817-SI Document 14 Filed 10/23/06 Page 14 of 14