Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00461/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00461-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Catholic Cemeteries of the Diocese of Phoenix
Defendant
Tanya Edmondson
Defendant
Falconer Funeral Home
Defendant
Debrah Keys
Counter Claimant
United of Omaha Life Insurance Company
Counter Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United of Omaha Life Insurance

Company, a Nebraska corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Tanya Edmonson; Debrah Keys; Catholic

Cemeteries of the Diocese of Phoenix; and

Falconer Funeral Home, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 04-0461-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff United of Omaha Life Insurance Company’s

Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses (Doc. #48). Ms. Keys filed a

Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. #49), to which United filed a Reply

(Doc. #52). For the following reasons, the Court will grant Attorney’s Fees and NonTaxable Costs moved for by Plaintiff.

I. Factual Background

On January 4, 2001, decedent Allan Keys (“Mr. Keys”) enrolled for group life

insurance coverage with United under Master Policy No. GLUG-6D35 in the amount of

$26,000. (PSOF, Doc. #40, at ¶1.) Additionally, Mr. Keys enrolled for group supplemental

life insurance coverage under Master Policy No. GLG-XL10 in the amount of $40,000. (Id.

at ¶2.) Mr. Keys designated his daughter, Tanya Edmondson, as primary beneficiary, and

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his sister, Ms. Keys, as secondary beneficiary. (Id. at ¶3.) Mr. Keys died on January 28,

2003. (Id. at ¶4.) 

Subsequently, on August 6, 2003, Ms. Keys submitted a Proof of Death Form to

United, wherein she claimed that she was entitled to the life insurance proceeds “as the new

beneficiary of record.” (Id. at ¶5.) Concurrently, Ms. Keys sent United a signed, notarized

statement from Mr. Keys dated April 19, 2001, requesting that Ms. Keys be substituted as

beneficiary on any insurance policy in which the designated beneficiary has not submitted

a claim to the insurer within four months after Mr. Keys’s death. (Id. at ¶6.) Mr. Keys did

not submit this form to either United or his employer before his death. (Id. at ¶7.) 

Thereafter, in October 2003, United received two forms signed by Ms. Keys that

purported to assign her rights to a portion of the insurance proceeds under Master Policy No.

GLUG-6D35. (Id. at ¶8.) The form stated that Ms. Keys assigned $4,435.30 in proceeds to

Defendant Falconer Funeral Home, and $1,239.63 to Queen of Heaven Cemetery, a division

of Defendant Catholic Cemeteries. (Id. at ¶9.) On January 8, 2004, United received a letter

from Ms. Keys disputing the amount of the assignment to Falconer Funeral Home and the

validity of the assignment to Catholic Cemeteries. (Id. at ¶10.) 

To date, Ms. Edmondson has not submitted a claim to United for the insurance

proceeds. (Id. at ¶11.) Following Ms. Keys’s death, United attempted to locate Ms.

Edmondson, but was unsuccessful. (Id.) 

On March 8, 2004, United initiated this interpleader action to resolve claims to the

$66,000 in proceeds due under the policies. (Doc. #1.) On July 2, 2004, Ms. Keys filed her

Answer and asserted a Counterclaim against United for breach of contract. (Doc. #15.)

Thereafter, on July 20, 2004, United moved to deposit the insurance proceeds with the Clerk

of the Court. (Doc. #20.) In light of Ms. Keys’s Counterclaim, the Court denied United’s

Motion to Deposit Insurance Proceeds without prejudice. (Doc. #21).

Discussion

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On August 18, 2005, this Court ordered that attorney’s fees and costs be paid to

Plaintiff. That order, in relevant part, stated:

United requests an award of its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in

bringing this interpleader action and defending against Ms. Keys’s

Counterclaim. Ms. Keys, however, objects to any award of fees to United,

arguing that the interpleader action was unnecessary. As previously discussed,

the Court finds that United’s filing of this action was consistent with its

obligations under the insurance policies and authorized under federal law.

Accordingly, the Court will grant United’s request, subject to its compliance

with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 54.2. 

(Doc. #46, at 11) (emphasis added). Pursuant to that order, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of

points and authorities, complying with L.R.Civ. 54.2, that requested attorney’s fees and costs.

(Doc. #48). Local Rule 54.2(c) dictates that proper content for a Memorandum in support

of a motion for attorney’s fees and costs includes a description of the movant’s eligibility for

such an award, entitlement to that award and the reasonableness of the requested award. The

Court is satisfied with the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and NonTaxable Expenses (Doc. #48) and its compliance with L.R.Civ. 54.2(c). Further, the Court

is persuaded by the documentation provided by United supporting the reasonableness of

their of attorney’s fees (Doc. #48, Appx. A&B). 

Ms. Keys’s Rule 54.2(f) Objections

Local Rule 54.2(f) provides that an adverse party may file a “responsive memorandum

of points and authorities in opposition to a motion for award of attorney’s fees and related

non-taxable expenses [that] shall identify with specificity all disputed issues of material fact

and shall separately identify each and every disputed time entry or expense item.” However,

under the guise of responding to Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to L.R. Civ. 54.2(f) (Doc. #48),

Ms. Keys continued making the same arguments opposing the award of attorney’s fees

against which the Court has already ruled. 

Rather than “identify with specificity” any disputed issues of material fact, Ms. Keys

argues in her responsive memorandum that “if United had distributed to her, at the outset, the

$66,000 in insurance proceeds . . . there would have been no need for” an interpleader action,

Ms. Keys’s counterclaim, United’s motions to deposit funds and for summary judgment, or

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for Ms. Keys’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. #49, at 3). The Court has already ruled

that the interpleader action was appropriate and ordered that reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs should be awarded for both bringing the interpleader action and defending Ms. Keys’s

counterclaim. (Doc. #46, at 11). Further, the Court finds that in defending against Ms.

Keys’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #39), United did not contest the portions of that

Motion dedicated to which of the Defendants were entitled to payment of the proceeds,

rather, needed to defend against the portion of that Motion that sought to “dismiss[] the

complaint for interpleader.” (Doc. #39). Because the substance of that work was to maintain

and defend United’s ultimately successful interpleader action, the fees and costs relating to

that work must also be awarded. 

Contrary to Ms. Keys’s analysis in her reply, the issue before the Court is not

“whether any legal fees and costs should be awarded at all” but rather, the amount that should

be awarded. (Doc. #49, at 7). Ms. Keys objections to United’s attorney’s fees are based on

whether or not United’s attorneys should have had to have done the work, not what is the

reasonable fee for the work done. The Court has already ordered “awarding United of

Omaha its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in an amount to be determined at a later

date and to be paid from the interpled funds.” (Doc. #46, at 12). Therefore, the only

question remaining for the Court to decide is the amount to be paid.

II. Reasonable Fees and the “Lodestar” Method

“District courts must calculate awards for attorney’s fees using the ‘lodestar’ method.”

Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Caudle v.

Bristow Optical Co., Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated

by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th

Cir. 1996) (citing Jordan v. Multnomah Cty., 815 F.2d 158, 162 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Although

in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award, the district court

may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for other factors which are not

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subsumed within it.” Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1449 n.4 (citations omitted). The other factors

that may be considered are: 

(1) the time and labor required, 

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, 

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case,

(5) the customary fee, 

(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, 

(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, 

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained, 

(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, 

(10) the 'undesirability' of the case, 

(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and 

(12) awards in similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70. 

Plaintiff has presented the Court with detailed explanations of its counsel’s

justification for the attorney’s fees requested, addressing not only the preliminary

requirements to satisfy the lodestar method, but addressing each of the Kerr factors for

deviation from the lodestar award. The Court has considered the above factors and finds

Plaintiff’s fees to be reasonable. 

To that end, Ms. Keys only objects that United’s “counsel’s billing judgment, the

standard or discounted billing rates of partners and associates, and the fact that the

accounting department generates monthly bill, have nothing to do with the issue of

reasonableness.” (Doc. #49, at 8). Once again, contrary to Ms. Keys objection, United’s

counsel’s assertions go to the very heart of justifying what fees are reasonable. United’s

proof of careful and accurate billing, the frequency and itemized organization of the billing

statements, and their multiple attempts to discount rates and otherwise keep down expenses

in this litigation is not only proof that their requested attorney’s fees are reasonable, but that

their attorneys themselves are reasonable and responsible. Accordingly, the Court will grant

United’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses.

IT IS ORDERED that United of Omaha’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and NonTaxable Expenses is GRANTED awarding United of Omaha its reasonable attorney’s fees

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in the amount of $12,917.50 and costs in the amount of $5,421.55, to be paid from the

interpled funds. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall distribute all remaining

funds to Defendant Debrah Keys, consistent with the Court order dated August 18, 2005

(Doc. #46).

 

 DATED this 18th day of November, 2005.

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