Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_01-cv-00780/USCOURTS-alnd-7_01-cv-00780-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donal Campbell
Respondent
Luther Jerome Williams
Petitioner

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

LUTHER JEROME WILLIAMS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 7:01-cv-780-IPJ-TMP

)

DONAL CAMPBELL, Commissioner, ) (Death Penalty Habeas)

Alabama Department )

of Corrections, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an action by an Alabama state prisoner pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the constitutional validity of the

conviction he received in the Tuscaloosa County Circuit Court on

November 30, 1989, of capital murder. The petitioner, Luther

Jerome Williams, with the assistance of an attorney, filed the

instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 29, 2001. He

is incarcerated at Holman State Prison in Atmore, Alabama. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 1, 1988, the petitioner was charged with first-degree

murder committed during the course of a robbery in violation of

Alabama Code Section 13A-5-40(a)(2). The victim, John Robert Kirk,

was shot once in the left side of the head, and his money and

FILED

 2005 Apr-20 PM 02:15

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 1 of 172
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pickup truck were stolen. Williams was convicted on November 30,

1989, after a jury trial, of capital murder.

A. The Crime

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals described the evidence

presented at trial as follows: 

On January 22, 1988, a 1981 dark blue Oldsmobile Regency

automobile was stolen from a motel parking lot in

Birmingham, Alabama. In the trunk of this vehicle was,

among other items, a .22 caliber pistol. A dark blue car

arrived at the Smithfield housing project in Birmingham

later that same evening and the appellant was identified

as the sole occupant. On the morning of January 23,

1988, John Robert Kirk was on his way home from work. He

stopped his vehicle – a red 1984 Chevrolet pickup truck

with a camper on the back – near the West Blocton exit on

Interstate 59 South in Tuscaloosa County. The appellant

and two men were traveling south on Interstate 59 in the

stolen Oldsmobile. After noticing the victim’s vehicle

beside the road, they stopped and confronted him. The

appellant led the victim to a nearby wooded area and shot

him once in the left side of the head, “execution style,”

with the .22 caliber pistol which had been in the trunk

of the stolen Oldsmobile. The victim’s body was left at

the site of the shooting, and his money and vehicle were

taken.

Later that same morning, several witnesses identified the

appellant as the driver of a red “camper truck” which was

parked at the Smithfield housing project. One of these

witnesses, Priscilla Jones, a relative of the

appellant’s, testified that the appellant had visited her

on the day of the murder. She stated that the appellant

told her that “he had killed a white man and stole his

truck,” and that he proceeded to show her the weapon,

which she described as having a white handle.

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On the night of January 24, 1988, after responding to a

call placed by a Rosie Mims, members of the Birmingham

Police Department interviewed Priscilla Jones regarding

the appellant. During this interview, the Birmingham

police learned of the appellant’s statement to Ms. Jones

concerning the shooting of a white man. They were also

informed that he was staying at an apartment in the

housing project, and that he was an escapee from the

supervised intensive restitution (SIR) program.

During the very early morning hours of January 25, 1988,

after verifying that the appellant had indeed escaped

from the SIR program and that a warrant was still

outstanding, the Birmingham police went to the apartment

in the Smithfield housing project where the appellant was

reportedly staying. The officers talked with the lessee

of the apartment, Margie Bush. They inquired as to the

whereabouts of the appellant and his girlfriend, Debra

“Bootsie” Bush. Margie Bush turned toward a curtain

which separated the front of the apartment from the back

bedroom and shouted for Bootsie, who then appeared from

behind the curtain. Bootsie stated that she did not know

where the appellant was at that time. However, one of

the officers happened to look behind the curtain and saw

the appellant lying in the bed. After a struggle, the

appellant was taken into custody.

The supervising officer then informed Margie Bush that

the appellant was thought to have a gun and requested

permission to search the apartment for it. Margie Bush

gave her permission. During the search, Bootsie stated

that the appellant had hidden the gun in the bedroom.

The murder weapon was found inside a black purse located

on top of a dresser in the room in which the appellant

was apprehended.

Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d 1062, 1065-66 (Ala.Crim.App.1991).

B. The Trial

Petitioner was represented pre-trial by Al Vreeland and Bobby

Cockrell. After Vreeland and Cockrell moved to withdraw as

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counsel, the court appointed John Bivens to represent petitioner.

Larry Ingram was later appointed as additional counsel for the

defense. Bivens and Ingram represented petitioner through the

guilt and penalty phases of the trial. After the penalty phase,

the jury returned a recommendation that the death penalty be

imposed. The recommendation passed by a 10-2 vote of the jury. On

February 12, 1990, after conducting an evidentiary hearing on

mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial judge entered

an order imposing the death penalty.

C. The Direct Appeal

Petitioner was represented by Bivens and Ingram on appeal. He

asserted that:

(1) the court erred in finding that the mitigating

circumstance of the defendant having no significant

history of prior criminal activity under Alabama Code

Section 13A-5-51(1) was not applicable;

(2) the court’s instruction at the penalty phase denied him

his constitutional rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments;

(3) the court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress

evidence obtained through an illegal search; and

(4) incriminating statements made by the defendant while in

a psychiatric facility for evaluation constituted a

custodial interrogation that required defendant to be

given a Miranda warning.

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1 For convenience and clarity, the issues are re-numbered

sequentially herein.

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 In a supplemental brief, petitioner raised the following

additional issues:1

(5) he was deprived of his right to a fair trial in

that the prosecutor improperly

(a) commented on defendant’s silence at the

guilt phase and thereby shifted the

burden of proof to the defense,

(b) argued during the guilt phase that

defendant would kill again, and

(c) emphasized the race of the appellant to

urge the jury to convict and to recommend

death;

(6) the court failed to instruct the jury adequately on

the lesser-included offenses of felony murder and

robbery in the first degree;

(7) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that

it had to find “actual doubt” in order to acquit;

(8) the trial court’s instruction on circumstantial

evidence impermissibly shifted the burden of proof

to the defendant;

(9) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that

it had a duty to reconcile the testimony of the

witnesses;

(10) the state’s presentation at the penalty phase of

psychiatric testimony by Dr. Bernard Bryant

concerning future dangerousness abridged

defendant’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments;

(11) the exclusion of potential jurors based upon their

“scruples against the death penalty” violated

defendant’s constitutional rights;

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(12) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion

to sequester the jury venire during voir dire;

(13) the conviction and sentence were improperly

obtained on the basis of the presentation of

evidence of personal characteristics of the victim

and the victim’s family, in violation of Booth v.

Maryland in that:

(a) the court allowed the victim’s widow to

sit at counsel table throughout trial and

sentencing pursuant to an Alabama statute

allowing a victim’s family member to sit

at counsel table, which is unconstitutional in capital cases, and

(b) the victim’s widow was allowed to give

impermissible testimony;

(14) the jury’s sense of responsibility was diminished

in that the jury repeatedly was told that its

sentence would be only a recommendation;

(15) the court improperly considered the pre-sentence

report, which contained hearsay, non-statutory

aggravating circumstances, and uncounseled

statements, specifically including

(a) the probation officer’s recommendation of

death,

(b) prejudicial hearsay remarks, and

(c) the parole officer’s interview with the

defendant; 

(16) the evidence was insufficient to support a capital

conviction or a death sentence;

(17) the prosecutor erroneously told the jury that it

could impose the death penalty under a standard of

“reasonable satisfaction”;

(18) the heightened sensibility required for a capital

case compels the court to reverse the sentence of

death because the jury was allowed unguided

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2 The court has re-numbered petitioner’s Rule 32 Claims to

group them in a logical fashion. References hereinafter are made

to the court’s re-numbered claims, rather than as they are

numbered in the Rule 32 petition.

-7-

discretion in weighing mitigating and aggravating

circumstances; and

(19) defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction

and sentence in a published memorandum opinion dated June 14, 1991.

Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d 1062. Petitioner sought rehearing,

which was denied on July 26, 1991. Petitioner then sought review

in the Alabama Supreme Court. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed

without opinion on November 2, 1992. Williams v. Alabama, 662 So.

2d 929 (Ala. 1992). The United States Supreme Court denied the

petition for certiorari. Williams v. Alabama, 506 U.S. 957, 113 S.

Ct. 417, 121 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992). 

D. The Post-Conviction Proceedings

Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant

to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure in the trial

court on or about April 8, 1994, alleging:2

(1) he was deprived of his right to a fair trial in

that the prosecutor improperly 

(a) commented on defendant’s silence by

saying “unless something else is shown as

to why [he] had that gun,” 

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(b) argued at the guilt phase that defendant

would kill again, and

(c) emphasized the race of the victim to urge

the jury to convict and to recommend

death;

(2) the court failed to adequately instruct the jury on

the lesser-included offense of felony murder under

Alabama Code § 13A-6-2(a)(3);

(3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that

it had to find “actual doubt” in order to acquit;

(4) the trial court’s instruction on circumstantial

evidence impermissibly shifted the burden of proof

to the defendant;

(5) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that

it had a duty to reconcile the testimony of the

witnesses;

(6) the state’s presentation of psychiatric testimony

by Dr. Bryant concerning future dangerousness

abridged defendant’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments;

(7) the exclusion of potential jurors based upon their

“difficulty” with, or “scruples against”, the death

penalty violated defendant’s constitutional rights;

(8) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion

to sequester the jury venire during voir dire;

(9) the conviction and sentence were improperly

obtained on the basis of the presentation of

evidence of personal characteristics of the victim

and the victim’s family, in violation of Booth v.

Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed.

2d 440 (1987), in that:

(a) the court allowed the victim’s widow to

sit at counsel table throughout trial and

sentencing pursuant to an Alabama statute

allowing a victim’s family member to sit

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at counsel table, which is unconstitutional in capital cases, and

(b) the victim’s widow was allowed to give

impermissible testimony;

(10) the jury’s sense of responsibility was diminished

in that the jury repeatedly was told that its

sentence would be only a recommendation;

(11) the court improperly considered the pre-sentence

report, which contained hearsay, non-statutory

aggravating circumstances, and uncounseled

statements including:

(a) the probation officer’s recommendation of

death,

(b) prejudicial hearsay remarks, and

(c) the parole officer’s interview with the

defendant;

(12) the evidence was insufficient to support a capital

conviction or a death sentence;

(13) the state erroneously told the jury that it could

impose the death penalty under a standard of

“reasonable satisfaction”;

(14) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to use

unguided discretion in weighing mitigating and

aggravating circumstances to determine whether to

recommend the death penalty;

(15) defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated;

(16) the trial court erred in finding that the

mitigating circumstance of the defendant having no

significant history of prior criminal activity

under Alabama Code Section 13A-5-51(1) was not

applicable;

(17) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion

to suppress evidence obtained through an illegal

search, conducted in violation of the Fourth

Amendment;

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(18) incriminating statements made by the defendant

while in a psychiatric facility for evaluation

constituted a custodial interrogation that required

defendant to be given a Miranda warning;

(19) statements made by defendant while at a psychiatric

facility were improperly used against him at the

guilt phase of the trial in violation of his right

against self-incrimination;

(20) defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial

by the prosecutor’s racially discriminatory use of

peremptory challenges;

(21) defendant was denied his right to a pool of grand

and petit jury members who were representative of

his community;

(22) Alabama’s death penalty statute is violative of the

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution and the Alabama

Constitution;

(23) defendant was denied effective assistance of

counsel at trial and on direct appeal in that: 

(a) Bivens was taking medication that

adversely affected his ability to provide

effective assistance at trial, 

(b) trial counsel failed to interview

defendant at length before trial,

(c) trial counsel never talked with Vreeland,

who represented defendant at the

preliminary hearing and at a motion

hearing,

(d) trial counsel failed to interview

witnesses who were subpoenaed prior to

the start of trial and did not follow-up

with cross examination relating to

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3 The name of this witness is spelled “Pricilla” and

“Priscilla” at different times in the transcripts and briefs. The

court uses the more common spelling as a matter of convenience, and

because the court has no information as to which spelling is

correct.

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inconsistencies in Priscilla3 Jones’

testimony,

(e) trial counsel failed to interview other

witnesses who had knowledge of the

proceedings,

(f) trial counsel failed to monitor and

supervise the work of the investigator

and social worker and to identify and

correct deficiencies in their

performances,

(g) trial counsel failed to employ a forensic

expert to analyze the state’s forensic

evidence,

(h) trial counsel failed to employ the

services of a psychologist,

(i) trial counsel failed to properly support

motions for expert assistance and failed

to renew those motions after they were

denied for lack of detail,

(j) trial counsel failed to properly support

the motion for sequestration of the jury

venire,

(k) trial counsel failed to conduct voir dire

as to whether any potential juror would

automatically impose a death sentence if

defendant were convicted of capital

murder,

(l) trial counsel failed to examine and

review adequately a report from Taylor

Hardin that was presented by the state

and that contained defendant’s statement

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that he had killed one “white motherfucker,” and would kill another,

(m) trial counsel failed to investigate and

present evidence of mitigating circumstances in that the sole investigator

interviewed only three of defendant’s

friends or family members,

(n) trial counsel failed to properly interview witnesses and potential witnesses

who could have offered testimony at the

penalty phase to support mitigating

circumstances,

(o) trial counsel failed to object to

repeated and prejudicial instances of

prosecutorial misconduct,

(p) trial counsel failed to object to

prosecutor’s improper comments on

defendant’s silence,

(q) trial counsel failed to object to

improper and repeated remarks about the

future dangerousness of defendant,

(r) trial counsel failed to object to

prosecutor’s attempts to inflame the

emotions of the jury by a “thematic

presentation of the race of the victim,”

(s) trial counsel failed to object to

erroneous instructions given by the

court,

(t) trial counsel failed to object to the

court’s failure to instruct the jury

adequately on lesser-included offenses,

(u) trial counsel failed to object to (and

stated he was satisfied with) the

instruction given by the court regarding

circumstantial evidence, which lessened

the degree of proof necessary for

conviction and shifted the burden of

proof to the defendant,

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(v) trial counsel failed to object to a jury

instruction that informed the jury that

they had a duty to reconcile the

testimony of all the witnesses,

(w) trial counsel failed to object to the

court’s instruction to jurors that they

had to find “actual doubt” in order to

acquit the defendant,

(x) trial counsel failed to object to the

testimony of Dr. Bryant on grounds that

the defense offered no expert testimony

on defendant’s mental health,

(y) trial counsel failed to object to the

admission of the report from Taylor

Hardin to rebut mitigation,

(z) trial counsel failed to object to the

introduction of the widow to the jury,

and to the widow’s improper and

prejudicial testimony at the guilt phase,

(aa) trial counsel failed to object to jury

instructions that were constitutionally

flawed, including:

(1) an instruction that limited the

jury’s discretion to impose a

sentence of life without

parole,

(2) the instruction that one

aggravating circumstance

already had been proven in that

the jury had found the

defendant guilty of a capital

offense,

(3) the description of the jury’s

sentence as a recommendation,

and

(4) the statement that reasonable

doubt was the same as moral

certainty;

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(bb) trial counsel failed to object to the

trial court’s consideration of a presentence report that contained hearsay,

non-statutory aggravating circumstances,

and uncounseled statement of the

defendant,

(cc) trial counsel failed to properly seek

suppression of the defendant’s incriminating statement made at Taylor Hardin,

(dd) trial counsel failed to waive reliance on

the mitigating circumstance of no

significant criminal history, thereby

allowing introduction of prior

convictions for nonviolent offenses,

(ee) trial counsel failed to object to the

court’s instruction that the jury had a

duty to reconcile the testimony of the

witnesses,

(ff) trial counsel failed to object to

exclusion of potential jurors based on

their scruples against the death penalty,

(gg) trial counsel failed to object to the

statements by the court and the

prosecutor that the sentence would be a

recommendation,

(hh) trial counsel failed to object to the

prosecutor’s use of the standard of

“reasonable satisfaction” for the

imposition of the death penalty,

(ii) trial counsel failed to object that the

trial court allowed the jury unguided

discretion in weighing aggravating and

mitigating circumstances,

(jj) trial counsel failed to obtain a speedy

trial,

(kk) trial counsel failed to object to the use

of jury pools that were not

representative of the community, and

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4 The trial court denied 22 of petitioner’s claims on

grounds that the claims were precluded by Alabama Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32.2(a). The court examined on the merits all of

petitioner’s claims that he had been denied effective assistance of

counsel. A copy of the trial court’s order denying relief on the

Rule 32 petition is contained within the exhibits provided by the

respondents at Tab 53, and is referred to hereinafter as “Order

Denying Rule 32 Petition.”)

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(ll) that each instance of ineffective

assistance was prejudicial, but that the

combined effect of the errors was

extremely prejudicial and a denial of

defendant’s constitutional right to

counsel under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and

under Article I of the Alabama

Constitution. 

On or about July 7, 1994, the petitioner filed an amendment to

his Rule 32 petition, but asserted no new claims. He was

represented in the Rule 32 proceedings by Lisa Borden and

Christopher Little. 

The court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on the Rule 32

petition on August 13 and 14, 1997, and allowed the parties to file

briefs after the evidentiary hearing. On March 22, 1999, the trial

court denied the petition.4 Petitioner appealed to the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals, asserting: 

(1) his due process rights were violated in the Rule 32

hearing in that: 

(a) the trial court refused to grant funding

for the appointment of expert witnesses;

and

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(b) the trial court erred in taking judicial

notice of the race of the trial

attorney’s secretary;

(2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at

the penalty phase of the trial in that trial

counsel failed to:

(a) investigate the petitioner’s background

and interview potential witnesses in

order to develop evidence of mitigating

circumstances, 

(b) seek the assistance of a psychologist to

prepare and present evidence,

(c) object to the testimony of the state’s

psychiatric witness, Dr. Bernard Bryant,

regarding the future dangerousness of the

petitioner,

(d) object to the court’s consideration of

the pre-sentence report, which contained

hearsay, uncounseled statements by the

defendant, and non-statutory aggravating

circumstances, and

(e) failed to object to the prosecutor’s

improper opening statement in which he

told the jury that they could recommend

the death penalty under a standard of

“reasonable satisfaction”; 

(3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at

the guilt phase of the trial in that trial counsel

failed to:

(a) investigate the case and interview

potential witnesses who could have

testified in his favor at trial,

(b) prepare for trial in a timely manner,

consult with petitioner’s previous

attorneys and interview the petitioner

before trial except in a summary fashion,

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(c) object on proper grounds to the

admissibility of Wallace Gaskin’s

statement at trial,

(d) present sufficient support for the motion

to suppress evidence found during an

illegal search,

(e) request funds to hire a forensic expert

and a forensic pathologist,

(f) present an adequate theory of the

defense,

(g) object to improper jury instructions

regarding:

(i) lesser-included offenses of

felony murder and first-degree

robbery,

(ii) reasonable doubt,

(iii) circumstantial evidence,

and

(iv) the jury’s duty to reconcile

the evidence; 

(h) object to prosecutorial misconduct when

the prosecutor:

(i) improperly commented on the

defendant’s silence,

(ii) improperly commented that the

defendant would “kill again,”

and

(iii) improperly commented on

the race of the victim;

(i) present sufficient evidence to support

the motion for sequestration of the jury

venire;

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(j) voir dire the jury venire as to whether

they would automatically impose the death

penalty;

(k) object to the role of the victim’s widow

at trial;

(l) impeach the prosecutor’s witness,

Priscilla Jones; and 

(m) secure a speedy trial;

(4) the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors served to

deny petitioner his constitutional right to a fair

trial; 

(5) the extremely low funding provided by the State of

Alabama for the compensation of defense attorneys

in capital trials acted to deny petitioner his

right to effective assistance of counsel;

(6) trial counsel’s failure to object at trial

prejudiced petitioner by limiting his rights on

appeal to that of review under the “plain error”

rule; and

(7) he was denied a fair trial in violation of the

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments and the law of Alabama. 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed by order dated March

31, 2000. Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App.

2000). Petitioner sought rehearing, which was denied May 19, 2000.

He subsequently sought certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court,

which denied the petition on October 27, 2000. 

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E. The Instant Habeas Petition

On March 29, 2001, petitioner filed the instant petition for

habeas relief in this court, asserting: 

(1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel

at the guilt phase of his trial in that his

attorneys at trial failed to:

(a) challenge the evidence against

petitioner,

(b) present a coherent theory of the defense,

(c) interview potential witnesses and investigate the facts and circumstances in

that counsel relied upon an investigator,

William Formby, instead of performing the

investigation himself, and failed to

supervise or correct the deficiencies in

Formby’s investigation, 

(d) call witnesses who could have testified

in petitioner’s favor at trial, including

Laura Williams and Sandra King,

(e) impeach witness Priscilla Jones by

calling her father to testify as to her

reputation as a liar or by demonstrating

that she “fenced” stolen items from her

apartment, 

(f) properly object to the admission of

Wallace Gaskin’s statement that petitioner said he had killed a man, 

(g) begin to prepare for trial until the week

before trial,

(h) interview the petitioner before trial

except in a summary fashion, and during

trial only occasionally, 

(i) call or return calls from Vreeland, who

represented petitioner at the beginning

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of a suppression hearing, which caused

counsel to appear at the continuation of

the suppression hearing without adequate

preparation,

(j) examine records from the state mental

hospital, which would have alerted

counsel to the potential testimony of

Gaskin, who “surprised” counsel at trial

by testifying he had heard petitioner say

he killed a man,

(k) properly object to or seek to exclude

admission of the murder weapon on the

basis that it was seized in an illegal

search of petitioner’s bedroom obtained

by consent of one who had no authority to

consent, 

(l) provide evidence to support his theory of

the defense, which was that the

petitioner did not commit the crime

because he was unconscious from alcohol

and drugs at the time of the crime,

(m) present evidence that someone other than

petitioner was driving the victim’s car

at the time of the murder, 

(n) point out to the jury the absence of

physical evidence against petitioner,

including the lack of fingerprint, blood,

or gunpowder evidence,

(o) argue to the jury that the co-defendants

had colluded to make it appear that

petitioner was guilty of the murder by

showing that the co-defendants had the

opportunity to collude during a hiatus in

the questioning,

(p) hire a forensic expert and a forensic

pathologist to analyze the state’s

evidence and to develop independent

evidence for the defense concerning the

lack of any finding of fingerprints,

gunpowder, or hair, 

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(q) object to the court’s failure to instruct

the jury on lesser-included offenses of

felony murder and first-degree robbery, 

(r) object to the court’s jury instruction

concerning reasonable doubt in that the

court told the jury that they had to have

an “actual doubt” or a “moral certainty”

in order to acquit the petitioner, 

(s) object to the court’s jury instruction

concerning circumstantial evidence by

suggesting that the jury must find an

explanation for the circumstantial

evidence that was consistent with the

petitioner’s innocence, which improperly

shifted the burden of proof to the

petitioner, 

(t) object to the court’s jury instruction

concerning the jury’s duty to reconcile

conflicting testimony by suggesting that

the jury had to convict if they could

reconcile all of the evidence with a

finding of guilt, 

(u) object to prosecutorial misconduct when

the prosecutor commented on the silence

of the petitioner, 

(v) object to the prosecutor’s improper

comment that the petitioner would kill

again, 

(w) object to the prosecutor’s improper

comments concerning the race of the

petitioner and racial slurs allegedly

spoken by the petitioner, 

(x) support a motion for sequestration of the

jury by demonstrating the amount of pretrial publicity,

(y) conduct an adequate voir dire designed to

identify jurors who were biased in favor

of capital punishment, 

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(z) object to testimony from the widow of the

victim regarding the personal characteristics of the victim that was irrelevant

and highly prejudicial, 

(aa) secure a speedy trial in that about 22

months elapsed between the issuance of

the arrest warrant and trial, which made

it difficult to find witnesses or

preserve evidence favorable to the

defense,

(bb) preserve for review on appeal numerous

issues, causing petitioner to be subject

to review only under the “plain error”

standard,

(2) that petitioner was denied effective assistance of

counsel because Alabama provides inadequate funding

for the compensation of defense attorneys and their

expenses in capital trials;

(3) that petitioner was denied effective assistance of

counsel at the penalty phase of his trial in that

his attorneys failed to: 

(a) investigate and develop mitigating evidence concerning petitioner’s traumatic

childhood, troubled adolescence, and

learning problems,

(b) seek the assistance of a psychological

expert to prepare and present evidence

related to mental health issues and drug

or alcohol dependency,

(c) object to the testimony of a

psychiatrist, Dr. Bernard Bryant,

presented by the state to testify

relating to petitioner’s future dangerousness, 

(d) object to the court’s consideration of

the pre-sentence report that contained

statements made by petitioner in

violation of his Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights, prejudicial hearsay,

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and suggestions that the death penalty

should be imposed on the basis of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, and

(e) object to the prosecutor’s opening

statement which referred to the wrong

standard for imposition of the death

penalty (referencing “reasonable satisfaction”); 

(4) that petitioner’s right to due process was denied

in the Rule 32 proceedings in that the state court:

(a) refused to grant funds for the

appointment of experts after petitioner

argued that his attorneys were

ineffective for failing to request funds

for experts, and

(b) improperly took judicial notice of the

race of trial counsel’s secretary, and

used that fact to justify the adequacy of

trial counsel’s investigation, which was

an issue in the Rule 32 proceedings;

(5) that petitioner was denied a fair trial in

violation of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because

the prosecutor improperly commented on petitioner’s

silence at the guilt phase of the trial; 

(6) that petitioner was denied a fair trial in

violation of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because

the prosecutor improperly commented on the

petitioner’s future dangerousness;

(7) that petitioner was denied a fair trial in

violation of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because

the prosecutor improperly referred to the race of

the victim and to racial slurs made by the

petitioner; 

(8) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by failing to adequately

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instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses

of felony murder and/or first-degree robbery;

(9) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by instructing the jury that

it had to find “actual doubt” or “moral certainty”

in order to acquit petitioner; 

(10) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by instructing the jury that

it had to find an explanation for the

circumstantial evidence that would be “consistent

with the defendant’s innocence” in order to acquit;

(11) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by instructing the jury that

it had a duty to reconcile the testimony of the

witnesses where the defendant failed to call any

witnesses; 

(12) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by allowing the state to

present psychiatric testimony concerning

petitioner’s future dangerousness;

(13) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments in that it excluded for cause

a potential juror who indicated that she could

follow the law despite her “difficulty” with

capital punishment; 

(14) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by denying counsel’s motion

for sequestration of the jury venire during voir

dire;

(15) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments in that the conviction and

death sentence were obtained on the basis of

improper evidence of the victim’s personal

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characteristics and the impact of the victim’s

death on the victim’s widow; 

(16) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments in that the jury was

repeatedly told that the sentence would be only a

“recommendation”;

(17) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by considering a highly

prejudicial pre-sentence report that contained

hearsay, non-statutory aggravating circumstances,

and uncounseled statements made by petitioner; 

(18) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments in that the evidence was

insufficient to support a conviction for capital

murder or a sentence of death;

(19) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by allowing the prosecutor to

tell the jury that it could impose the death

penalty under a standard of “reasonable

satisfaction”;

(20) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments in that it allowed the jury

at the penalty phase unguided discretion in

weighing the aggravating circumstances against the

mitigating circumstances;

(21) that the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial was

violated by the delay of almost two years between

the issuance of the arrest warrant and the

impaneling of the jury;

(22) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by finding that there were no

mitigating circumstances and that petitioner had

escaped from a prior sentence when he committed the

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5 For convenience and in order to logically group the

issues, the petitioner’s claims set forth in the amended petition

are numbered herein in sequence with the numbering of the claims in

the original petition. 

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capital offense, although the escape had never been

proven at trial; 

(23) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by denying the motion to

suppress evidence obtained through the search of

the home where petitioner was living;

(24) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by allowing the prosecution

to strike jurors on the basis of race in violation

of Batson; 

(25) that the trial court violated petitioner’s rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments in that the jury pools for

the grand and petit jury were selected from a list

of licensed drivers, a method that excluded certain

segments of the community and denied petitioner his

right to a jury that was representative of the

community; and

(26) that the Alabama death penalty statute violates the

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in

that it fails to ensure even-handed and nonarbitrary imposition of the death penalty because

it provides for a review of the application of the

death sentence only by comparison to other cases in

which the death penalty has been imposed.

Petitioner filed an amended petition on June 7, 2001, reasserting the claims set forth in the original petition, and

adding:5

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(1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel

at trial in that his attorneys failed to: 

(cc) consult with petitioner upon hearing the

testimony of Wallace Gaskin in that

petitioner could have explained that

Gaskin was biased because he believed

petitioner had filed a grievance against

him; and

(dd) object to the testimony of the state’s

medical examiner relating to the angle of

the gunshot wound being consistent with

the victim being on his knees or lying

down, and the prosecutor’s use of that

opinion in closing argument. 

On August 6, 2001, after seeking and receiving an extension of

time in which to file a response to the habeas petition, the

respondents filed an answer, supported by exhibits, and an initial

brief on the merits. After seeking and receiving extensions of

time in which to respond to the answer, petitioner filed a brief on

October 15, 2001, along with a motion for funds for a psychologist

and a motion for evidentiary hearing. On November 9, 2001, the

respondents filed objections to the petitioner’s motions. 

On July 15, 2002, petitioner sought additional time in which

to submit arguments and briefs on issues including the

constitutionality of Alabama’s death sentencing scheme. The motion

for time was granted, and on August 30, 2002, petitioner filed a

brief on that issue. Respondents sought leave to respond and to

address issues raised by the United States Supreme Court opinion in

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 27 of 172
6 Petitioner conceded in that brief that the Supreme Court

had determined in Shriro that Ring does not apply retroactively.

Consequently, Ring does not impact the instant conviction or

sentence. 

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(2002). The motion was granted, and both parties filed briefs on

the Ring issue. This court, anticipating the Supreme Court’s

further analysis of relevant issues, informally stayed the action

pending the decision in Schriro v.Summerlin, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.

Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004). Thereafter, the court directed

the parties by order dated August 18, 2004, to file any additional

arguments on those issues no later than September 15, 2004. The

petitioner filed a supplemental brief on September 15, 2004,6 and

sought leave to file an additional brief, which was granted. The

petitioner filed a final brief on October 15, 2004.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

There are several guiding principles that must be followed in

evaluating any claim arising in a federal habeas case. These

principles and legal standards will apply to most of the

petitioner’s claims in this case, and need not be repeated with

respect to each individual claim. Accordingly, the general

standards which inform consideration of certain aspects of all

habeas claims are set forth below, and will be referenced only

briefly in the discussion of each individual claim that follows.

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 28 of 172
7 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted as

binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided

prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206 (11th Cir. 1981)(en banc).

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A. Exhaustion

An application for writ of habeas corpus will not be

considered unless the applicant has exhausted available state-court

remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Walker v. Zant, 693 F.2d 1087, 1088

(11th Cir. 1982). The exhaustion requirement is designed "to effect

a proper balance between the roles of state and federal judicial

institutions in protecting federal rights." Ogle v. Estelle, 592

F.2d 1264, 1267 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Lerma v. Estelle, 585 F.2d

1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1978)).7 As a matter of comity, the rule

requires the federal courts to allow the states the initial

“opportunity to pass upon and correct errors of federal law in the

state prisoner’s conviction." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 83

S. Ct 822, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963). Section 2254(c) provides that

"[a]n applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right under

the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the

questions presented." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 n.9, 102 S.

Ct. 1198, 71 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1982). If the unexhausted claims would

now be deemed procedurally barred by the state court to which the

petitioner would be required to submit his claims in order to meet

the exhaustion requirement, those claims are considered

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 29 of 172
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procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas relief.

Kennedy v. Hopper, 156 F.3d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1998).

B. Procedural Default

Procedural default is the manner in which the habeas

requirement of exhaustion of state remedies is enforced. Smith v.

Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001)(“The teeth of the

exhaustion requirement comes from its handmaiden, the procedural

default doctrine.”). Before a federal habeas court may consider

the merits of a claim, the state courts first must be given the

opportunity to address and cure any constitutional defect that may

exist in the conviction or sentence.

1. Claims Raised But Defaulted In State Courts

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

has stated:

The federal courts’ authority to review state court

criminal convictions pursuant to writs of habeas corpus

is severely restricted when a petitioner has failed to

follow applicable state procedural rules in raising a

claim, that is, where the claim is procedurally

defaulted. Federal review of a petitioner’s claim is

barred by the procedural default doctrine if the last

state court to review the claim states clearly and

expressly that its judgment rests on a procedural bar,

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043,

103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989), and that bar provides an

adequate and independent state ground for denying relief.

See id. at 262, 109 S. Ct. at 1042-43; Johnson v.

Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 1987,

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 30 of 172
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100 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1988). The doctrine serves to ensure

petitioners will first seek relief in accordance with

state procedures, see Presnell v. Kemp, 835 F.2d 1567,

1578-79 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050,

109 S. Ct. 882, 102 L. Ed. 2d 1004 (1989), and to “lessen

the injury to a State that results through reexamination

of a state conviction on a ground that a State did not

have the opportunity to address at a prior, appropriate

time.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 111 S.Ct. 1454,

1470, 113 L.Ed. 2d 517 (1991).

Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1173 (11th Cir. 1991); see

also Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 1999)(“A state habeas

corpus petitioner who fails to raise his federal claims properly in

state court is procedurally barred from pursuing the same claim in

federal court absent a showing of cause for and actual prejudice

from the default.”). Thus, if a claim has been presented in some

form previously to a state court, a federal habeas court may refuse

to hear that claim only if the last state court rendering the

judgment “‘clearly and expressly’ states that its judgment rests on

a state procedural bar." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S.

Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308, 317 (1989). The stated bar also must

be “independent and adequate,” as determined under federal law.

See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376, 122 S. Ct. 877, 885, 151 L.

Ed. 2d 820 (2002)(“There are, however, exceptional cases in which

exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state

ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.”);

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 1987,

100 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1988). 

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2. Claims Never Presented In State Courts

 A claim may be procedurally defaulted in at least two ways:

first, when the claim is presented to the state courts in a way

that does not comport with state procedural rules, and, second,

when the claim has never been presented to the state courts and has

become barred from being presented by state procedural rules.

Again, the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Such procedural default can arise in two ways. First,

where the state court correctly applies a procedural

default principle of state law to arrive at the

conclusion that the petitioner’s federal claims are

barred, Sykes requires the federal court to respect the

state court’s decision. Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d

952, 956 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1165,

115 S. Ct. 2624, 132 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995); Meagher v.

Dugger, 861 F.2d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 1988). Second, if

the petitioner simply never raised a claim in state

court, and it is obvious that the unexhausted claim would

now be procedurally barred due to a state-law procedural

default, the federal court may foreclose the petitioner’s

filing in state court; the exhaustion requirement and

procedural default principles combine to mandate

dismissal. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 737

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 963, 119 S. Ct. 405,

142 L. Ed. 2d 329 (1998); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A)(1994)(pre-AEDPA) (“An application for

writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be granted unless it

appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State....”).

Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1999); see Smith

v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001)(“If the petitioner

has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available,

that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas

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relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental

miscarriage of justice exception is established”). Consequently,

the habeas court is required not only to determine how claims

presented to the state court were treated by those courts, but also

to tag those claims asserted in the habeas action that were never

alleged during state proceedings

3. “Cause and Prejudice”

If it is determined that a claim was procedurally defaulted in

state court, the petitioner may obtain review of the claim in

habeas corpus only by showing “cause and actual prejudice” to

excuse the default, Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1572-73, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433

U.S. 72, 86, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977), or by

showing that refusal to consider the claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.

527, 537-38, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2668, 91 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1986). The

“cause and prejudice” test of Engle v. Isaac and Wainwright v.

Sykes is in the conjunctive; therefore, petitioner must prove both

cause and prejudice.

The United States Supreme Court summarized the “cause” prong

of the standard in the following manner:

In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), this Court

adopted the “cause and prejudice” requirement of Francis

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v. Henderson, supra, for all petitioners seeking federal

habeas relief on constitutional claims defaulted in state

court. The Sykes Court did not elaborate upon this

requirement, but rather left open “for resolution in

future decisions the precise definition of the ‘cause’-

and-‘prejudice’ standard.” 433 U.S. at 87. Although more

recent decisions likewise have not attempted to establish

conclusively the contours of the standard, they offer

some helpful guidance on the question of cause. In Reed

v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984), the Court explained that

although a “tactical” or “intentional” decision to forego

a procedural opportunity normally cannot constitute

cause, id., at 13-14, “the failure of counsel to raise a

constitutional issue reasonably unknown to him is one

situation in which the [cause] requirement is met.” Id.,

at 14. The Court later elaborated upon Ross and stated

that “the existence of cause for a procedural default

must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show

that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s

procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986). We explained that “a showing that the factual or

legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to

counsel, ... would constitute cause under this standard.”

Ibid. (Citations omitted.)

Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 221-22, 108 S. Ct. 1771, 1776, 100 L.

Ed. 2d 249 (1988).

The petitioner also must demonstrate that he was prejudiced;

he must show “not merely that the errors ... created a possibility

of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,

170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982)(emphasis in

original).

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A federal habeas court will consider a procedurally defaulted

claim on one additional basis in the absence of a showing of “cause

and prejudice”: if a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” has

“probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S. Ct. 2661,

91 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1986)(quoting, respectively, Engle, 456 U.S. at

135, and Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). This exception requires a

showing of innocence of the fact of the crime, not merely “legal”

innocence. The burden rests on the petitioner to come forward with

evidence tending to establish a colorable claim of actual

innocence. Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002)(“In

order to show the type of ‘miscarriage of justice’ that will excuse

a procedural bar, a petitioner must make ‘a colorable showing of

actual innocence.’” (quoting Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1306

(11th Cir. 1999))); see also Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1327

(11th Cir. 2002); see generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,

113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed. 2d 203 (1993); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477

U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed. 2d 364 (1986).

In the instant habeas action, the respondents have asserted

that many of the petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

Those claims will be examined using the standards discussed supra.

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C. Claims Adjudicated On the Merits In the State Courts

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), the petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief

on claims resolved on the merits by the state courts only if he

shows that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ adjudication of

the ineffective-assistance claim “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed.

2d 389 (2000); Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001).

This standard of review is strict, and federal courts are required

to give “greater deference to the determinations made by state

courts than they were required to under the previous law.” Verser

v. Nelson, 980 F. Supp. 280, 283 (N.D. Ill. 1997)(quoting Spreitzer

v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1441 (7th Cir. 1997)).

The state court determination of an issue will be sustained

under § 2254(d)(1) unless it is “contrary” to clearly established,

controlling Supreme Court law or is an “unreasonable application”

of that law. These are two different inquiries, not be confused.

The Supreme Court has explained:

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Section 2254(d)(1) defines two categories of cases in

which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief

with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in

state court. Under the statute, a federal court may

grant a writ of habeas corpus if the relevant state-court

decision was either (1) "contrary to... clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an

unreasonable application of... clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States." [Emphases added.]

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519,

146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). A state-court determination is

“contrary” to clearly established Supreme Court law in either of

two ways:

First, a state-court decision is contrary to this Court’s

precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of

law. Second, a state-court decision is also contrary to

this Court’s precedent if the state court confronts facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant

Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite

to ours.

Id. at 405. Likewise, a state-court determination can be an

“unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law

in two ways:

First, a state-court decision involves an unreasonable

application of this Court’s precedent if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal rule from this

Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of

the particular state prisoner’s case. Second, a

state-court decision also involves an unreasonable

application of this Court’s precedent if the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our

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precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new

context where it should apply.

Id. at 407; see Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2001).

Whether the application is “reasonable” turns not on subjective

factors, but on whether it was “objectively unreasonable.” The

question is not whether the state court “correctly” decided the

issue, but whether its determination was “reasonable,” even if

incorrect. The court will examine all of petitioner’s claims that

have been adjudicated on the merits in the state courts by using

this standard.

D. Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

The Supreme Court’s clearly established standard for assessing

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is found in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984). The United States Supreme Court has established a

national standard for judging the effectiveness of criminal defense

counsel under the Sixth Amendment. “The benchmark for judging any

claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that

the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064,

80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The Court elaborated:

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A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance

was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction

or death sentence has two components. First, the

defendant must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This

requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as

to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable.

466 U.S. at 687. 

In order to show ineffectiveness of counsel, the movant must

demonstrate that his attorney’s performance fell below “an

objective standard of reasonableness,” 466 U.S. at 688, and that

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” 466 U.S. at 694. Also, in making such an evaluation,

“the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to

have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”

466 U.S. at 690. The effectiveness or ineffectiveness must be

evaluated by consideration of the totality of the circumstances.

Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 962 (11th Cir. 1983). The court must

remember that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional

right only to adequate counsel; he is not entitled to the very best

legal representation. Stone v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1477, 1429 (11th

Cir. 1988).

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The second requisite element in a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is a showing of prejudice. Even if counsel

made an error so egregious as to be outside the broad scope of

competence expected of attorneys, a movant can obtain relief only

if the error caused actual prejudice to the defendant. See

Strickland v. Washington, supra. Prejudice means a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different had the errors not occurred. “When evaluating this

probability, ‘a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must

consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.’”

Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1060 (11

th Cir. 2002)(quoting

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052,

2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). The court of appeals has

explained:

Significantly, although a petitioner must show that

counsel’s errors had more than “some conceivable effect

on the outcome of the proceeding,” the Supreme Court has

said that a petitioner is not required to show that

“counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered

the outcome in the case.” Rather, as the Supreme Court

has held, “the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the

fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is

being challenged.”

Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 694-695 (11th Cir. 2002)(quoting

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80

L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). A “reasonable probability” is one that

undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.

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Nonetheless, the court of appeals has stated that “The

petitioner’s burden of demonstrating prejudice is high,”

Wellington v. Moore, 314 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002), and that

“this standard is difficult to meet.” Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d

1043, 1059 (11th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1177

(11th Cir. 2001). The reason the burden is so difficult lies in the

fact that errors are made in every case, but it is only those

errors that affect the fundamental fairness of the proceeding that

rise to the level of prejudice under the ineffectiveness standard.

The Eleventh Circuit stated as follows:

A finding of prejudice requires proof of “‘unprofessional

errors’ so egregious ‘that the trial was rendered unfair

and the verdict rendered suspect.’” Eddmonds v. Peters,

93 F.3d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir. 1996)(quoting Kimmelman v.

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2582, 91

L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)). As we recently explained, “habeas

petitioners must affirmatively prove prejudice because

‘[a]ttorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as

likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as

they are to be prejudicial.’ ‘[T]hat the error had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding’ is

insufficient to show prejudice.” Gilreath v. Head, 234

F.3d 547, 551 (11th Cir. 2000)(quoting Strickland).

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1177 (11th Cir. 2001). Moreover,

the court of appeals has cautioned:

The petitioner bears the burden of proof on the

“performance” prong as well as the “prejudice” prong of

a Strickland claim, and both prongs must be proved to

prevail. The Strickland test is not easily met; as we

have said, “the cases in which habeas petitioners can

properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance

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8 The petitioner did not raise at the Rule 32 stage, or

anywhere at the state court level, his guilt-phase claims set forth

herein as Claim 1(a)(a general claim that counsel failed to

challenge the evidence), Claim 1(g)(a general claim that counsel

failed to prepare for trial until the week before trial), Claim

1(l)(that counsel failed to present evidence that petitioner was

unconscious at the time of the crime), Claim 1(m)(that counsel

failed to present evidence that someone other than petitioner was

driving the victim’s car), Claim 1(n)(that counsel failed to argue

to the jury the absence of physical evidence), and Claim 1(o)(that

counsel failed to argue that the co-defendants had colluded to

implicate petitioner). 

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of counsel are ‘few and far between.’” Waters v. Thomas,

46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995)(en banc)(citation

omitted).

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176 (11th Cir. 2001).

In the instant case, petitioner advances 28 specific claims of

ineffective assistance by his trial attorneys at the guilt phase of

his trial, plus the general claim that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel due to alleged inadequacies in Alabama’s

funding for the defense in capital cases. In addition, petitioner

asserts five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the

penalty phase of his trial. The state trial court conducted an

evidentiary hearing that examined all but six8 of these claims, and

entered a lengthy opinion in which the claims were found to be

without merit. See Order Denying Rule 32 Petition, Tab 53 at

Exhibits to Respondents’ Answer. The claims also were considered

on appeal by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. See Williams

v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). The court will

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examine each of petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance

of counsel below, applying the Strickland standard, and all other

applicable law.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Habeas Claim 1(a) (Failure To Challenge the Evidence)

Petitioner’s first claim, found at paragraph 35 of the amended

petition, alleges in vague and conclusory terms that his trial

attorneys failed to challenge the evidence against the petitioner.

Without identifying any particular errors by counsel, this claim

could be read to refer to errors by counsel which are alleged as

separate grounds for relief at other places in the petition (set

forth herein as Claims 1 (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (i), (j), (k),

(o), and (p)). To the extent that it states a separate claim, it

is procedurally defaulted because it has never been properly raised

on direct appeal or in a post-conviction motion. See Bailey v.

Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1999). It is due to be

dismissed because petitioner has failed to assert “cause and

prejudice” to excuse his default. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433

U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977). Accordingly,

Claim 1(a) is due to be dismissed. To the extent, however, that

Claim 1(a) simply restates more specific claims, it will be

examined in more detail infra.

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9 Vague, general, or conclusory allegations do not

constitute sufficiently compelling grounds for federal habeas

relief. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978).

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B. Habeas Claim 1(b) (Failure To Present a Coherent Defense)

Petitioner’s Claim 1(b), found at paragraphs 35 and 70-77 of

the amended petition, likewise alleges only in vague terms that

counsel exposed the jury to improper and inadmissible evidence

against him. Petitioner fails to identify what “coherent defense”

should have been presented. Accordingly, the claim does not merit

the court’s consideration because it is vague and conclusory.9

Furthermore, to the extent that it could state a separate and

viable claim, it is procedurally defaulted because it was raised

for the first time in the appeal from the Rule 32 petition, and was

never properly raised in the trial court or on direct appeal. See

783 So. 2d at 130. To the extent, however, that it refers to

counsel’s failure to present specific evidence and argument

detailed more fully in petitioner’s Claims (1)(l), (m), (n), and

(o), the claim is addressed more fully infra.

C. Habeas Claims 1(c), (g), (h), (j) and (cc) (Failure To

Timely Prepare and Consult With Petitioner)

Petitioner alleges that he was denied effective assistance of

counsel in that his trial attorneys relied upon an investigator,

Formby, instead of performing the investigation into the facts and

circumstances of the crime themselves, and that they failed to

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supervise or correct the deficiencies of Formby’s investigation

(Claim 1(c)). Similarly, petitioner alleges that trial counsel

failed to sufficiently interview petitioner before and during trial

(Claim 1(h)), and failed to sufficiently investigate and review

mental health records (Claim 1(j)). These claims, set forth in the

amended petition at paragraphs 37-47, 50, and 52, first were raised

in the Rule 32 petition and were examined by the trial court in its

written memorandum opinion. (See Rule 32 Claims 23(b), (c), (d),

(e), (f), (l); Order Denying Rule 32 Petition, pp. 15-30.) The

claims were then raised on appeal from the Rule 32 denial, and the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the trial court’s opinion

in finding that the petitioner had failed to show that the use of

Formby constituted ineffective assistance. (See Rule 32 Appeal

Claims 3(a) and (b); Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d at 123-29.)

After a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the Alabama state courts

made findings of fact, both explicit and implicit, in regards to

the general allegation that counsel failed to conduct a reasonable

investigation by relying on Formby to interview petitioner,

interview potential witnesses, and review the mental health records

of petitioner. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated those

findings as follows:

First, the appellant contends that his attorneys rendered

ineffective assistance because they allegedly did not

properly investigate the case and interview potential

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witnesses. The circuit court made the following findings

concerning this contention:

“[Trial counsel] principally relied on Dr.

Formby, who had been engaged by his

predecessor counsel, to conduct the case

investigation and witness interviews. Dr.

Formby was well qualified for that role by

virtue of many background attributes, as

detailed by his testimony at the evidentiary

hearing and his ‘vitae’ introduced as State’s

Exhibit 6 to the same. During the time of his

engagement on the case, he was also a coprincipal with Dr. Sumrall in the forensic

services firm of Veritas, Inc. ... Dr. Formby

testified that he ‘probably put in easily 200

hours’ on the investigation, having commenced

it in the service of [trial counsel’s]

predecessor attorneys and therefore having

been on the case ‘essentially longer than

anybody else.’ (EH 398). Dr. Formby ‘spent a

good bit of time talking with Luther

[Williams]’ and spent a good bit of time

talking to potential witnesses in the

Smithfield Apartments area of Birmingham. (EH

378). He visited with some of Williams’

family members in the Titusville projects and

Debra Bush in the Avondale projects. (EH

378). He went to see Margie Bush, the

grandmother of Debra Bush and she admitted him

to her apartment where Luther had been

apprehended, showing him the bedroom. Dr.

Formby spent many hours ‘just walking around

that area talking to people.’ (EH 380). For

various reasons adequately explained in his

testimony, he did not keep detailed records of

everyone he interviewed or of all the time he

devoted to the case. He interviewed Priscilla

Jones and DeWayne Pierce. (EH 382-83). A lot

of his investigation and interviewing was

devoted to trying to develop connections

between Williams’ co-defendants and the

property stolen from Mr. Kirk, and other

evidence against the co-defendants. (EH 381,

384). He went to the Titusville projects and

spent approximately two hours interviewing

Williams’ grandmother and one of his sisters.

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(EH 3834).... As the District Attorney’s

office provided the defense with more and more

discovery materials, Dr. Formby ‘would go back

to Luther and talk to him again to see if he

could push me or give me leads in other

directions.’ He talked to Williams a lot.

(EH 388). Dr. Formby went to the crime scene

on a couple of occasions. (EH 388-89). He

attempted to follow the route that Williams

and his two co-defendants had traversed at

different points during the incidents in

question. (EH 389). He and [trial counsel]

routinely ‘would have meetings probably twice

a week up until the last few weeks before

trial, and then we met virtually every day.’

(EH 389-90). Dr. Formby would brief [trial

counsel] on all that he had developed, and

[trial counsel] would provide guidance in

terms of things that he felt were important

that Dr. Formby needed to follow up on. (EH

390).... “For his part, [trial counsel]

personally tried to locate witnesses who could

corroborate Mr. Williams’ claim that he was

incapacitated by intoxication on the night of

the murder. (EH 78-80).”

(C.R. 658-61.)

The appellant also contends that his attorneys rendered

ineffective assistance because they did not interview and

present witnesses who he alleges could have rebutted most

of the circumstantial evidence presented in the case.

Specifically, he asserts that there were witnesses who

could have placed his codefendant in the victim’s truck

on the day of the murder and who could have impeached

Priscilla Jones, the appellant’s sister, who testified

that the appellant told her that he had killed a white

man. In regard to this issue, the circuit court made the

following findings:

“Williams argues in his Post-Hearing Brief

that ‘[t]o counter the damaging evidence that

Mr. Williams was seen driving Mr. Kirk’s

truck, trial counsel could have offered

testimony through Laura Williams or Sandra

King that Albert Carmichael had been seen

driving the red truck, that he smelled of

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gasoline and that Mr. Carmichael had white

man’s cigarettes on him Saturday evening, just

hours after Mr. Kirk was murdered.’ (PHB, p.

12). Ms. Williams and Ms. King testified at

the evidentiary hearing that they were at Ms.

King’s apartment house on a Saturday night

when they observed Albert Carmichael in a red

truck parked in the parking lot by Priscilla

Jones’ house. As far as the date on which

that occurred, Ms. Williams was only asked if

she remembered being at Ms. Kings’ ‘a few days

before the time that Luther was arrested for

the murder,’ and she identified it as a

Saturday night, and Ms. King was asked if she

could remember being at home with Laura

visiting her ‘January 23, I believe a Saturday

night, Saturday afternoon or night. I may be

wrong on the day, but I think that is the

date, January 23. Do you remember being home

on that date?,’ to which she answered in the

affirmative. (EH 181). Both testified that

Carmichael came into King’s apartment and they

were then able to notice the smell of gasoline

on him. Ms. Williams testified that he ‘had

some cigarettes that he didn’t smoke,’ which

were ‘a white man’s kind of cigarettes.’

Asked what brand they were, she testified that

they were ‘Merit or something like that. I

can’t really remember what kind they were,’

whereas Carmichael usually smoked Kools. Ms.

King testified that Carmichael usually smoked

‘Kools or either Newport 100s’ and that the

cigarettes he had with him on the occasion in

question were not ‘the same kind’ but she

could not state what brand they were. (EH

175-76, 183-84).

“....

“Considering all of the interviewing of

Williams and his family members conducted by

Dr. Formby, and considering all of the

evidence showing the involvement of Albert

Carmichael and Trosky Gregory in various

critical events of the weekend in question,

the court does not find that Williams has

carried his burden of proving that a failure

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to use Laura Williams or Sandra King as

defense witnesses constituted ineffective

assistance of counsel; or that the omission of

their testimony prejudiced the defense in the

way required by the Strickland test. Under

Strickland, it is not enough to show that

trial errors ‘had some conceivable effect on

the outcome of the proceeding,’ rather the

defendant ‘must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.’

(Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94[, 104 S. Ct.

2052]) (Emphasis added). That Albert

Carmichael was observed in the red camper

truck at the apartment complex during the

night of Saturday, January 23rd, after Luther

Williams had been observed to have been

involved with it at earlier points in time

that day, would not have altered the impact or

implication of any of the State’s critical

evidence. There is no indication that either

Laura Williams or Sandra King ever told anyone

before Williams’ trial that they had seen

Albert Carmichael in the red truck....

“Williams asserts in his post-hearing brief

that defense counsel should have countered the

damaging testimony of Priscilla Jones by

eliciting testimony from her father, Jesse

Hill, that she was ‘a big liar.’ Under Rule

608(a) of the Alabama Rules of Evidence ..., a

witness may impeach the credibility of a

witness who has testified by offering the

second witness’s opinion regarding the first

witness’s untruthfulness. The Alabama Rules

of Evidence did not become effective until

January 1, 1996, however, and the law of

evidence existing at the time of Williams’

trial restricted the testimony of an

impeaching witness to the limited fact of the

other witness’ general reputation in the

community for untruthfulness. Before a

witness can testify concerning the reputation

in the community for the truthfulness or

untruthfulness of another witness, a predicate

must be laid establishing that the impeaching

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witness actually has knowledge of the other

witness’s reputation for truthfulness or

untruthfulness in the first witness’s

community. That was the evidentiary point

addressed by the court in its comments to

counsel during Mr. Hill’s testimony. (EH 164-

66). Although the question put to Mr. Hill

was rephrased so as to properly inquire as to

‘reputation,’ Mr. Hill persisted in expressing

the matter in terms of his own personal

knowledge of her lack of veracity. His

testimony as ultimately offered related to his

own personal assessment or opinion of her

history of untruthfulness, rather than

relating it to her reputation in the

community. He expressed his opinion that

Priscilla ‘had come down here and told the

people out here a bunch of – to me, it is a

bunch of fairy tales.’ (EH 166). Mr. Hill

conceded, however, that he [had] no knowledge

about the evidence in the case and that it was

his testimony that Priscilla was telling the

people in Tuscaloosa ‘fairy tales’ because

‘that is my daughter, and I know what she is

capable of doing. My daughter would do

anything, say anything to anybody.’ (EH 167).

When asked how, if he did not know anything

about the facts of the case, he could attack

the credibility of her testimony, he answered

that Priscilla was ‘a big liar,’ and that she

‘never tells the truth about a lot of things.’

(EH 168). Accordingly, as the record stands,

there is no affirmative showing that Mr. Hill

could have offered testimony that would meet

the foundational requirement of showing that

it related to Priscilla Jones’ reputation for

truthfulness/untruthfulness in her community

in 1989.... [Trial counsel] impeached

Priscilla Jones with respect to the

inconsistencies between her trial testimony

and her preliminary hearing testimony, and her

testimony on several important points was

corroborated by that of Teresa Ann Evans. One

of the critical features of Priscilla Jones’

testimony was that Luther Williams told her,

on the occasion that he came to her apartment

building the morning of Saturday, January 23,

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in the ‘red and white camper truck,’ that he

had killed a white man (R. 479), and ‘I just

killed a white man.’ (R. 502). She did not

believe him at the time. (R. 480, 502).

Immediately prior to making that statement, he

had hugged her and apologized to her for the

altercation between them the preceding night.

(R. 476, 502). He had the odor of gas on him.

(R. 480). When she returned to her apartment,

he followed her and showed her ‘a pistol and

some bullets,’ with the pistol having ‘a clear

handle,’ meaning that it was ‘white.’ (R.

480). As the only other participant to that

conversation, Williams was the only person who

could have contradicted Jones’ testimony about

it, but he did not testify and the trial

strategy decision in that regard is not

challenged in this proceeding. The court does

not consider the fact that Mr. Hill might have

testified that he had knowledge of his

daughter’s reputation for truthfulness, and

that her reputation was bad in that regard and

she had a reputation for untruthfulness, would

have been of such import as to impeach her as

a witness to the extent that the outcome of

the trial would have been different.”

(C.R. 662-72.)

We agree with the circuit court’s findings as to these

claims and adopt them as part of this opinion. Because

the appellant has not established that his attorneys

rendered ineffective assistance in these instances, he is

not entitled to relief on these claims. See Strickland,

supra.

783 So. 2d 108, 123-26. The court further stated: 

Fifth, the appellant contends that his attorneys rendered

ineffective assistance because they allegedly did not

examine the records furnished by the State and therefore

did not discover that he had made a statement to an

employee at Taylor Hardin to the effect that he had

killed one white man and would kill another. He also

argues that counsel should have objected to the admission

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of the statement on the ground that it was not relevant.

In addressing these contentions, the circuit court made

the following findings:

“The thrust of Williams’ treatment of this

contention in his post-hearing brief is that

[trial counsel] erred by not interposing a

relevancy objection to this testimony of Mr.

Gaskin....

Indisputably, [trial counsel] was surprised by

Mr. Gaskin’s testimony concerning the

statement made in his presence by Williams,

because neither Dr. Sumrall nor Dr. Formby had

noted it or called it to his attention. Dr.

Formby testified that he had gone through the

records in question but ‘just simply didn’t

pick up on it.’ (EH 414).

“The Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed the

content and context of the statement

attributed to Williams by Gaskin in its

opinion, although it did so in connection with

responding to Williams’ contention that the

statement should have been excluded because he

had not been read his Miranda rights prior to

making the statement. Nonetheless, at the end

of the entire opinion, after having addressed

all issues which had been specifically raised,

the court declared, ‘...We have searched the

entire record for any error which may have

adversely affected the appellant’s substantial

rights and have found none.’ 601 So. 2d at

1087. As previously noted, ‘[a] finding of no

plain error is one factor to consider when

assessing the performance of trial counsel.’

Hallford v. State, 629 So. 2d 6, 10 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1992).

“Does it constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel to delegate various aspects of case

investigation to an apparently qualified

professional investigator, who then fails to

note, or appreciate the significance of, a

prejudicial entry in medical records under

review? At least one court has so held. In

Stubbs v. Thomas, 590 F. Supp. 94 (S.D. New

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York 1984), defense counsel asked the courtappointed investigator to look into some

records. The investigator visited an

incorrect address and, when the business at

that address did not have the records, failed

to pursue the issue. The Defendant was

convicted of murder and the state trial judge

subsequently found that the attorney could not

be faulted for the investigator’s deficient

performance. However, in reconsidering the

issue in the habeas proceeding before him,

U.S. District Judge Lowe noted that the right

to effective assistance of counsel encompassed

the right to adequate investigation, and went

on to observe:

“That right may not be defeated by delegating

investigative services to someone other than

counsel. Therefore, where an investigator is

appointed, he has a duty to provide the

defendant with reasonably competent

investigative assistance. His failure to do

so may constitute a violation of the

defendant’s right to effective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments.’

“590 F. Supp. 94, 100.

“Nonetheless, Judge Lowe concluded that the

investigator’s misconduct did not satisfy the

prejudice prong of Strickland because there

was not a reasonable probability that, absent

the error, the jury would have had a

reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s

guilt. Likewise, this court finds in this

case that any deficiency in the records

review, or investigation otherwise, by Dr.

Formby, Dr. Sumrall, and/or [trial counsel]

did not result in the requisite degree of

prejudice. Unless a defendant satisfies both

the deficient performance prong and the

prejudice prong of Strickland, ‘it cannot be

said that the conviction or death sentence

resulted from a breakdown in the adversary

process that renders the result unreliable.’

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687[, 104 S. Ct.

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2052].... [T]he court finds that there is no

reasonable probability that a relevancy

objection would have been sustained, nor that

overruling it would have constituted

reversible error. The testimony of Mr. Gaskin

followed immediately after the testimony of

Priscilla Jones. She had testified that when

she encountered Williams at her apartment

project the morning of Saturday, January 23,

1988, he had made the statement to her in the

course of their conversation that he had

killed a white man. (R. 479-80). When

questioned further as to whether Mr. Williams

had told her: ‘I just killed a white man,’ she

confirmed that as his statement to her. (R.

502). On the heels of that testimony, Mr.

Gaskin testified that Williams had stated in

the course of an argument with another patient

at Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility, in

Mr. Gaskin’s presence and hearing, on December

12, 1988, ‘I have killed one white m_____

f_____; I’ll kill another one.’ (R. 515-17,

537-38). The patient with whom Williams was

arguing was white and Mr. Gaskin is black.

(R. 549). Mr. Gaskin recorded that statement

in the ‘SOAP notes’ portion of Mr. Williams’

record at Taylor Hardin. (R. 539-43; State’s

Exhibit 3 at the evidentiary hearing.)

Williams had been arrested during the early

morning hours of January 25, 1988, and had

been incarcerated at various locations at all

times between then and the date of the

statement overheard by Mr. Gaskin. Presumably

there would have been no opportunity to kill

undetected a white person, or any other

person, during that time frame. Accordingly,

the statement made by Williams in the hearing

of Gaskin would have related to an event

preceding January 25, 1988. Consequently, it

is not ‘remote’ to the January 23, 1988,

incident, and statements that date to

Priscilla Jones. The court finds the

testimony was relevant. ‘The rule is stated

to be that the acts, declarations and demeanor

of an accused before or after the offense

whether a part of the res gestae or not are

admissible against him, but unless a part of

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the res gestae are not admissible for him’

Smoot v. State, 381 So. 2d 668, 671 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1980). In Oryang v. State, 642 So.

2d 989 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), the Defendant

was convicted of attempted murder with respect

to shootings that occurred in December 1991.

A witness was allowed to testify that,

‘sometime in 1990,’ the Defendant had made the

statement, while drinking, that one day he was

going to kill someone ‘for the hell of it.’

After concluding that the statement was

admissible for one purpose, the court opined,

further, the testimony concerning the

appellant’s statement that one day he was

going to kill someone “for the hell of it,”

was relevant and not too remote.’ (642 So. 2d

at 997)(Emphasis supplied.) The court went on

to say that ‘Moreover,’ the statement was

admissible under the rule quoted above from

Smoot. (642 So. 2d at 997).

“Accordingly, the court concludes that the

statement was not objectionable on grounds of

relevancy, and also concludes that the Court

of Criminal Appeals would have noted it to

have been thus objectionable, under the

‘search the record for error’ rule of review

attending capital murder appeals, were that

not so.”

(C.R. 679-83.) We agree with the circuit court’s

findings and adopt them as part of this opinion.

Accordingly, the appellant is not entitled to relief on

these claims.

Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 127-29.

The state appellate court’s findings and conclusions are

entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed.

2d 389 (2000). Petitioner has not attempted to show that they are

contrary to or an unreasonable application of binding Supreme Court

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 55 of 172
10 Petitioner urges that the court must look only to

Formby’s time sheets, and not to his testimony, as to the best

evidence of the time he spent. This court cannot say, however,

that the state court’s reliance upon Formby’s testimony at the Rule

32 hearing was objectively unreasonable.

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precedent. Indeed, the conclusions reached by the state courts

clearly are based upon the Strickland standard and, thus, are not

“contrary” to Supreme Court precedent.

These conclusions also are not an “unreasonable application”

of Strickland. In essence, the state courts found that counsel

conducted a reasonable investigation, through Formby, in

preparation for trial.10 The trial court found that Formby was well

qualified to conduct the investigation, and that he invested

“easily 200 hours” in the case. He repeatedly interviewed the

petitioner, sought and interviewed potential witnesses in the

apartment complex where petitioner was then living, talked with

petitioner’s family members, and met with petitioner’s girlfriend

and her grandmother (who had consented to the search that resulted

in the seizure of the murder weapon). He interviewed the key

prosecution witness, Priscilla Jones, and her boyfriend, Dewayne

Pierce. He visited the crime scene and traced the route petitioner

was accused of having followed on the night of the crime. Formby

met frequently with counsel and worked closely with counsel’s

psychological expert. The state courts found that it was not

unreasonable for counsel to rely on Formby’s efforts and skills.

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11 Formby further testified that he reported the results of

these meetings to counsel. In addition to meetings with Formby,

petitioner met several times with Vreeland, and notes from those

meetings were delivered to Bivens when Bivens was appointed as

counsel. (See Rule 32 Hearing Transcript pp. 89-90.) It is not

clear from the Rule 32 hearing transcript whether Bivens met faceto-face with Williams before trial. 

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The only specific conduct petitioner now alleges constitutes

insufficient “investigation” is Formby’s failure to: (1) take

notice of records from Taylor Hardin, in which was recorded that

petitioner told Gaskin he had killed a man, and (2) adequately

interview petitioner and potential witnesses. The trial court

noted that Formby did review the Taylor Hardin records and did

forward them to the expert witness, but failed to notice or alert

counsel to the significance of the statement Gaskin testified

about. As to the interviews with petitioner, Formby testified that

he met with petitioner several times and at some length.11 Finally,

Formby did interview and meet with several potential witnesses, but

apparently did not interview Laura Williams or Sandra King, who

could have testified at the guilt phase that they saw co-defendant

Albert Carmichael driving the victim’s truck after the crime and

that Carmichael smelled of gasoline and was smoking “white man’s”

cigarettes. 

While courts have recognized that there is a duty imposed on

counsel to conduct a pre-trial investigation into the facts and

circumstances, that duty does not require counsel to conduct a

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12 Petitioner alleges that Formby went through a period of

inactivity between his early investigation and the investigation

conducted immediately prior to trial. Even assuming, as his time

sheets suggest, that Formby did nothing on this case for some

period of time, petitioner fails to demonstrate that any critical

evidence would have been discovered during that time that was

unavailable at the time closer to trial. Although this court is

troubled by the fact that it appears that almost all of the trial

preparation occurred in the few days leading up to trial,

petitioner still has the burden of showing that counsel’s

procrastination prejudiced him. Petitioner’s related claim that

his attorney did not prepare for trial until one week before trial

(Claim 1(g)) was never presented to the Alabama state courts on

appeal or in the Rule 32 petition and, thus, is barred from review

here. Even if not procedurally barred, however, the claim suffers

from the same deficiency as the other “preparation” claims in that

petitioner has failed to demonstrate the prejudice required by

Strickland. 

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perfect pre-trial investigation. Defense counsel must make a

“reasonable investigation” or must arrive at a “reasonable decision

that makes particular investigation unnecessary.” Kelley v.

Secretary for the Department of Corrections, 377 F.3d 1317, 1333

(11th Cir. 2004). While the lower court in Kelley found that

counsel was ineffective in hiring a “disbarred attorney, lazy to a

fault” to conduct the pre-trial investigation, there is no

precedent for a finding that delegating the pre-trial investigation

to an investigator, rather than having defense counsel conduct the

investigation personally, itself constitutes ineffective

assistance. Here, there is no allegation that Formby was

incompetent or otherwise unqualified.12 Rather, petitioner merely

asserts that Formby failed to interview every potential witness,

failed to properly note the importance of a portion of the Taylor

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13 Petitioner asserts that Formby never met with him until

the week before trial, but Formby’s testimony at the Rule 32

hearing indicates that he met with petitioner early on, and on

multiple occasions. The state courts apparently found Formby’s

oral testimony credible. Petitioner further argues that counsel’s

failure to interview petitioner during trial prejudiced him in that

counsel did not learn that Gaskin was biased against petitioner

because petitioner had filed a grievance against him. Counsel for

petitioner in the instant action admits that this claim was never

asserted in the state courts. (See Petitioner’s Brief, p. 31 n.

6).

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Hardin records that proved damaging to the petitioner, and did not

meet with petitioner as often or for as long as petitioner would

have liked.13 These “failings” of counsel’s pre-trial investigation

do not rise to the level of unreasonableness necessary to

constitute ineffective assistance.

First, there is no indication that petitioner knew about the

potential testimony of Williams and King, that he told Formby or

counsel of the existence of those witnesses, that he would have

informed Formby of the witnesses if Formby had met with him, or

that a “reasonable investigation” would have uncovered those

witnesses. In any criminal case, it is likely that some facts or

circumstances remain uncovered even after a reasonable

investigation. A “reasonable investigation” does not require that

counsel interview every conceivable potential witness. Nor is

counsel required to conduct investigatory activities every day, or

even every week, before the trial begins. Finally, there is no

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minimum amount of time that must be spent in meetings with a

defendant before or during the trial. 

Furthermore, even if counsel performed deficiently by relying

upon Formby’s investigation, petitioner’s claim has merit only if

petitioner has shown that “but for” the investigative shortcomings,

the outcome of the trial would have been different. In short, the

petitioner must demonstrate prejudice. 

Petitioner’s argument with regard to potential witnesses is

simply that Williams and King could have testified that petitioner

was not the only person in possession of the victim’s truck,

because they saw co-defendant Carmichael in possession of the

truck. This testimony merely further inculpates the co-defendant;

it does not exculpate the petitioner. The jury was presented with

evidence that Carmichael committed the robbery along with the

petitioner. The testimony of the witnesses does not rebut or

contradict evidence that petitioner also was in possession of the

victim’s truck immediately after the crime. Additional evidence of

Carmichael’s involvement in the crime does not compel the

conclusion that the jury would have found petitioner any less

culpable. In fact, such testimony could be viewed as further

evidence of petitioner’s guilt because petitioner does not dispute

that he was with Carmichael at the scene of the crime. 

As to the amount of time spent investigating or interviewing

petitioner, that claim must fail absent some showing that the

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14 To the contrary, the trial court has indicated that the

statement was admissible, and the appellate court has indicated

that it would have upheld admission of the statement. 

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additional time spent would have resulted in information that would

have changed the outcome of the trial. At the Rule 32 hearing,

Bivens testified that he would have spent more time with the

petitioner if he had had some knowledge about the case that would

be helpful to the defense. (See Rule 32 Hearing Transcript, pp.

58-59.) In this case, the petitioner has maintained – both then

and now – that he was incapacitated by drugs and alcohol during the

commission of the crime. Accordingly, petitioner had no

information about the crime itself. Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that he had any other knowledge regarding witnesses

that would have helped his defense that counsel could have obtained

through more extensive interviews with petitioner. 

The fact that Formby and Sumrall overlooked a statement in the

medical records also does not provide a basis for finding that

counsel was constitutionally inadequate. Bivens testified that the

only advantage he would have gained from having knowledge of the

statement was to make his objection in advance in writing, rather

than orally at trial, and to seek a suppression hearing. (Rule 32

Hearing Transcript, pp. 65-69.) There is no indication that the

statement would have been excluded.14 Nor is there any showing

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that, absent the admission of the statement, petitioner would have

been acquitted. 

The state appellate court’s conclusion that counsel’s

investigation of the facts and circumstances in 1988 was not

constitutionally ineffective assistance is neither contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Consequently, it is entitled to a presumption of correctness and

deference under § 2254(d). Even if these claims were due to be reexamined on the merits by this court, petitioner would not be

entitled to relief because of his failure to meet the two-pronged

test of Strickland. For these reasons, Claims 1(c), (h), and (j)

are due to be dismissed.

Finally, petitioner’s Claim 1(cc), set forth at paragraph 62,

that counsel unreasonably failed to consult with him at trial as to

any bias Gaskin may have had against him, is presented for the

first time in the instant habeas action. Because the state courts

have never been given an opportunity to rule on this issue, it is

precluded from review here. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135 (11th

Cir. 2001). Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice, or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, to avoid the procedural

default.

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 62 of 172
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D. Habeas Claim 1(d) (Failure To Call Witnesses)

Petitioner also contends, at paragraphs 44 and 72 of the

amended petition, that counsel was ineffective in failing to call

as a witness at trial Laura Williams or Sandra King. (Claim 1(d).)

As discussed above, petitioner asserts that Williams or King could

have testified that they saw Albert Carmichael, one of petitioner’s

co-defendants, driving the victim’s truck after the victim was

killed. Petitioner further asserts that they could have testified

that Carmichael smelled of gasoline and had “white man’s”

cigarettes. This testimony, petitioner asserts, would have diluted

the evidence that petitioner was seen driving the truck, and would

have bolstered a “reasonable doubt” defense. Petitioner raised

this claim in the Rule 32 proceedings, and the trial court examined

the issue. See Rule 32 Claim 23(e); Order Denying Rule 32

Petition, pp. 19-26. Petitioner also raised the claim in his

appeal from the Rule 32 proceedings, and the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals adopted the trial court’s findings, noting that

the evidence that would have been given by Williams and King did

not “alter the implication or impact” of the evidence provided by

the state: that petitioner was in possession of the victim’s truck

after the crime. (See Rule 32 Appeal Claim 3(a); Williams v.

State, 783 So. 2d at 123-25.) The state courts concluded that

because this evidence probably would not have changed the outcome

of the trial, it was not ineffectiveness for counsel not to call

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 63 of 172
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the witnesses. Moreover, the state courts pointed out that there

is no evidence that either Formby or Bivens ever became aware of

the testimony Williams or King might have given, and that

petitioner does not allege that the fact that Williams or King had

seen Carmichael with the truck was known to Formby or Bivens or was

reasonably available to Formby or Bivens. Moreover, petitioner has

admitted that he drove the red truck on the morning after the

murder and parked it near his girlfriend’s grandmother’s apartment,

where he was then living. (See Rule 32 Hearing Transcript, pp.

200-06). He then moved the truck to the area near his stepsister’s

(Priscilla Jones’) apartment. (Id. at 246-49.) He has admitted

that Carmichael told him to drive the truck to that area, and that

he left the keys in the truck. (Id. at 244-45.) The court fails

to see any reason that evidence that Carmichael drove the victim’s

truck later would lead a reasonable juror to entertain a reasonable

doubt that petitioner was guilty of the murder, especially when the

murder occurred closer in time to the time petitioner was seen with

the truck. As to the cigarettes, there was no evidence that the

cigarettes belonged to the victim, and even if they did, facts that

may inculpate Carmichael in this case do not serve to exculpate the

petitioner. 

 The mere fact that witnesses existed but were never discovered

in spite of an investigation does not, in itself, indicate that

counsel was ineffective. The state appellate court’s conclusion

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 64 of 172
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that counsel’s failure to call Williams or King as witnesses at the

guilt phase of the trial was not constitutionally ineffective

assistance is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application

of Supreme Court precedent. Consequently, it is entitled to a

presumption of correctness and deference under § 2254(d).

E. Habeas Claim 1(e) (Failure To Impeach Jones)

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in that he

failed to impeach Priscilla Jones’s testimony by calling Jones’s

father, Jesse Hill, as a witness to testify that Jones was a “liar”

and had “fenced” stolen items from her apartment (Claim 1(e).)

This claim is set forth in the amended petition at paragraphs

103–05. Petitioner claims that, had they investigated, counsel

would have known to call Jones’s father to testify as to Jones’s

poor reputation for veracity, and could have impeached her by

evidence that she had “fenced” stolen merchandise. This claim was

raised in the Rule 32 petition and was denied by the trial court.

(See Rule 32 Claim 23(d), Order Denying Rule 32 Petition, pp. 26-

29.) Petitioner raised the claim again on appeal from the denial

of Rule 32 relief, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

adopted the trial court’s opinion, stating: 

Ninth, the appellant contends that his attorneys rendered

ineffective assistance because they did not impeach

Priscilla Jones. Specifically, he contends that counsel

should have impeached her with the testimony of Jesse

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 65 of 172
15 Even though the potential merit of such a claim is not

the basis for this court’s denial of it, the court notes that

petitioner does not allege any basis, and the court is not aware of

any, in which the alleged use of Jones’s apartment to fence items

would have been admissible for impeachment. Moreover, petitioner

does not allege that Jones was convicted of the crime of selling

stolen property, nor does he allege that such an offense would be

considered one that bears on the veracity of a witness, as would

the offense of, for example, perjury. The only testimony elicited

during the Rule 32 hearing that would evidence fencing activities

was when the petitioner told the court that the reason he parked

the truck at Jones’ apartment was because that was “where we take

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Hill concerning her reputation for untruthfulness and

should have impeached her by presenting evidence that she

allegedly allowed her apartment to be used to fence

stolen items. However, he did not specifically present

these claims to the circuit court in his original or

amended petition. Rather, in his amended petition, his

entire argument in this regard is that “[t]rial counsel

did not follow-up with cross-examination of

inconsistencies in Priscilla Jones’ story.” (C.R. 156.)

This statement was not sufficient to satisfy the pleading

or specificity requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b),

Ala. R. Crim. P., or the requirements of Strickland,

supra. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

783 So. 2d at 130. See also 783 So. 2d at 125-26. The last state

court to evaluate this claim held that it had not been properly

presented in the Rule 32 petition. A review of the record,

including the original and amended petitions filed in the Rule 32

proceeding, shows only a reference to trial counsel’s failure to

cross-examine Jones about “inconsistencies” in her testimony.

(Rule 32 Claim 23(d).) The petition does not mention Jesse Hill,

Jones’s credibility, or her reputation for veracity. Furthermore,

the Rule 32 petitions make no mention of fencing activities.15 The

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 66 of 172
all our hot stuff.” (See Rule 32 Hearing Transcript, p. 248.) 

16 Even in the brief filed in support of the instant habeas

petition, petitioner does not assert that counsel knew or should

have known about Hill, except to state that Hill “lived in the

Smithfield area of Birmingham.” (Petitioner’s Brief at p. 27.)

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post-hearing brief filed by petitioner’s counsel after the Rule 32

hearing similarly recounts alleged “inconsistencies,” but does not

assert that Hill was available to testify as to her reputation for

truthfulness.16 (See Post-Hearing Brief, p. 9, at Tab 49 of

Respondents’ Exhibits.)

Petitioner’s claim that his counsel rendered ineffective

assistance because they failed to impeach Jones with Hill’s

testimony or evidence of fencing was not properly presented to the

state courts for consideration. Federal review of this claim is

barred by the procedural default doctrine because the last state

court to review the claim stated clearly and expressly that its

judgment rested on a procedural bar, Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

263, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989), and that bar

provides an adequate and independent state ground for denying

relief. See id. at 262, 109 S. Ct. at 1042-43; Johnson v.

Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 1987, 100

L. Ed. 2d 575 (1988). 

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 67 of 172
17 Although the Rule 32 petitions did not specifically

assert that the proper objection was one of relevancy, that

assertion clearly was made in the brief filed after the evidentiary

hearing. (See Post-Hearing Brief, p. 14.)

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F. Habeas Claim 1(f) (Failure To Object To Gaskin Statement)

At paragraphs 54-61 of the amended habeas petition, petitioner

pleads that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to object to the admission of a statement made by Wallace

Gaskin that he heard petitioner state that he had “killed one white

motherfucker and would kill another.” (Claim 1(f)). This claim is

similar to habeas Claims 1(c) and (j), which focused on counsel’s

alleged failure to discover Gaskin’s statement contained in the

medical records from Taylor Hardin, where Gaskin was employed. The

claim also is similar to one raised in the direct appeal, in which

petitioner asserted that the statement was inadmissible because

petitioner had not been given a Miranda warning. (See Appeal Claim

4; Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d at 1071-72.) In his Rule 32

petition, the claim was raised as a claim that counsel failed to

properly object to the statement (Rule 32 Claim 23(y)) and as a

claim that counsel failed to seek to suppress the statement (Rule

32 Claim 23(cc)).17 In the instant habeas action, petitioner

asserts that counsel at trial should have objected to the statement

on relevancy grounds. 

In resolving this claim during the direct appeal, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the statement was not

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18 It should be noted that trial counsel did conduct a

lengthy voir dire of the witness out of the presence of the jury in

an attempt to establish the inadmissibility of the statement on the

basis that the statement was obtained in violation of petitioner’s

Miranda rights, but counsel’s objections on those grounds were

eventually overruled. (Trial Transcript, pp. 509-35.)

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objectionable because it was made voluntarily and not in response

to any interrogation. See 601 So. 2d at 1072. In the context of

the Rule 32 petition, the trial court further opined that any

relevancy objection would not have been sustained because the

statement was relevant and not too remote. (See Order Denying Rule

32 Petition, p. 39.) The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed, adopting that view. See 783 So. 2d at 129 (set forth

herein at Section III C). The state appellate court’s conclusion

that the statement was not objectionable on relevancy grounds is

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent.18 Consequently, it is entitled to a presumption

of correctness and deference under § 2254(d). Because the

statement was not objectionable, counsel’s failure to object cannot

be deemed ineffective assistance, even if counsel’s failure to

discover Gaskin’s statement was unreasonable. Put another way,

because any objection would not have been sustained at trial or on

appeal, the petitioner did not suffer any prejudice from counsel’s

failure to object. Accordingly, the claim does not meet the

Strickland standard and is due to be dismissed. 

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G. Habeas Claims 1(i), 1(k), and 23 (Suppression/Search)

Petitioner alleges in paragraphs 51 and 67 of the amended

petition that counsel rendered ineffective assistance pre-trial by

failing to contact petitioner’s first attorney before arguing the

motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of

petitioner’s bedroom (Claim 1(i).) Similarly, petitioner asserts

at paragraphs 63-69 that counsel unreasonably failed to present

sufficient support for the motion to suppress (Claim 1(k).)

Finally, petitioner makes the substantive claim, at paragraphs 190-

91, that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress

(Claim 23). Each of these claims is due to be denied for

procedural reasons, as well as because the search of Margie Bush’s

apartment, which yielded the murder weapon, was not violative of

the Fourth Amendment.

Vreeland filed the original motion to suppress the gun

obtained in the search. Bivens took over representation of

petitioner while the motion to suppress was under consideration.

Petitioner argues that Bivens “misperceived” the issue and argued

only the issue of consent to the search, while he should have

argued that petitioner had an expectation of privacy in the

apartment.

While phrased differently at different stages of this case,

petitioner has made these claims before. On direct appeal,

petitioner challenged the legality of the search (but not the

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effectiveness of counsel) on grounds that the consent given by

Margie Bush was not voluntary. See Appeal Claim 3. The Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals first considered that issue based upon

the efficacy of the consent, but further noted that the legality of

the search might turn upon petitioner’s legitimate expectation of

privacy. The appellate court specifically held that the gun was

found inside a woman’s purse, that the purse did not belong to

petitioner, and that the purse was located on a dresser in a

portion of the apartment that was separated from the rest of the

space by only a curtain. The court further found that all

occupants of the apartment had access to that area, that petitioner

had “no expectation of privacy” in the area where the gun was

found, and that petitioner had “no standing to challenge” the

search. See 608 So. 2d at 1069-71. The court weighed factors set

forth by the United States Supreme Court in Rawlings v. Kentucky,

448 U.S. 98, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980). Those

factors included whether petitioner could exclude others from the

place searched, whether he exhibited a subjective expectation that

the area would remain free from governmental invasion, and whether

he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy. Williams v.

State, 601 So. 2d at 1071.

Petitioner subsequently raised a related claim in his Rule 32

petition, asserting that Bivens was ineffective in that he failed

to meet with Vreeland before attending the suppression hearing.

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(See Rule 32 Claim 23(c), Order Denying Rule 32 Petition, pp. 9-

12.) On appeal, petitioner asserted the same claim, and further

asserted that the trial court erred in denying the motion to

suppress the gun. See Rule 32 Appeal Claim 3(b). The Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the claim regarding counsel’s

failure to consult with Vreeland, and found that the contention in

the Rule 32 petition was “not sufficient to satisfy the specificity

requirements of Rule 32.6(b)” or the pleading requirements of Rule

32.3. Williams, 783 So. 2d at 127. 

The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief on any of the

claims related to the search of the apartment. The claim that

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to meet with

Vreeland regarding the motion to suppress was rejected by the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on an adequate and independent

state procedural ground. Consequently, Claim 1(i) is barred from

review in this habeas action. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263,

109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989). The claim that

counsel unreasonably failed to support the motion is due to be

denied because it has never been properly raised in the state

courts. Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1999);

Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2001)(“If the petitioner

has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available,

that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas

relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental

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19 The court notes that, even if the ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim were not procedurally barred, it would be due to

be denied because the search was not violative of the Fourth

Amendment, and therefore any failure to support a motion to

suppress on grounds that the search was improper would not have

prejudiced the petitioner. 

-73-

miscarriage of justice exception is established”). Petitioner has

made no showing of cause and prejudice, or of a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, to avoid the procedural default.

Furthermore, even if Claim 1(k) had been raised, it is without

merit because the courts have found that the search was valid based

both on “consent” and a lack of “expectation-of-privacy.”

Accordingly, counsel’s failure to raise the privacy issue cannot

have prejudiced the petitioner because the objection would not have

bee sustained. Absent prejudice, there was no Sixth Amendment

ineffectiveness.

Moreover, petitioner is not entitled to relief on the

substantive claim that the search was illegal because the state

courts examined the issue on the merits, applying the proper

standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. The state

court’s conclusion that the search was legal is neither contrary to

nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Consequently, it is entitled to a presumption of correctness and

deference under § 2254(d).19

Finally, the substantive claim implicating the petitioner’s

constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment is due to be

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dismissed because petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate his claims in a state court proceeding. The Supreme Court

has held that:

[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full

and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the

Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be

granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that

evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or

seizure was introduced at his trial.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d

1067 (1976). Stone teaches that under such circumstances he is

not entitled to further consideration of the claims in habeas. As

the Court noted in Stone, exclusionary rule claims are not related

to the petitioner’s guilt, and thus have “no bearing on the basic

justice of [petitioner’s] incarceration.” Id. at 491, n. 31.

Accordingly, petitioner’s claim relating to the validity of the

search warrant itself, Claim 23, fails to state a cognizable claim

under habeas law and therefore is due to be dismissed. 

 

H. Habeas Claims 1(l), (m), (n) and (o)(Failure To Present

Evidence and Argument

Petitioner asserts at paragraphs 70-77 that his trial counsel

were ineffective because they failed to present certain evidence

and argument to the jury at the guilt phase of the trial.

Specifically, petitioner alleges at paragraph 70 that counsel

failed to present evidence that petitioner was unconscious from

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20 The court notes that the petitioner fails to assert what

evidence, short of petitioner’s own testimony, could have been

presented to support a finding that petitioner was unconscious.

Trial counsel attempted to find a witness at a convenience store

where petitioner alleges he was asleep or unconscious in the car

used in the robbery and murder, but was unable to find any employee

of the store who remembered seeing the petitioner. Petitioner does

not allege that he wanted to testify or that he should have

testified at the guilt phase of the trial, yet the only evidence

adduced at the Rule 32 hearing regarding intoxication on the night

of the crime was petitioner’s own account of what happened.

Petitioner does argue, at Petitioner’s Brief, pp. 47-48, that

counsel should have presented evidence of Williams’ “debilitating”

drug and alcohol habit. However, he offers no explanation of how

such evidence would be admissible to show that petitioner was

unconscious or asleep at the particular time of the crime. 

21 This claim is a restatement of petitioner’s claim that

counsel unreasonably failed to call Laura Williams and Sandra King

as witnesses, which is discussed supra at Section III C.

22 There appears to be no evidence of collusion either,

except for an observation that Trosky and Carmichael were together

alone at some time and could have colluded to implicate petitioner.

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drugs and alcohol at the time of the murder (Claim 1(l)).20

Petitioner further asserts at paragraph 72 that counsel failed to

present evidence that Carmichael was seen driving the victim’s

truck (Claim 1(m))21 and, at paragraph 74, that counsel failed to

present evidence that Carmichael and Gregory colluded to make it

appear that petitioner was guilty of the murder they had committed

(Claim 1(o)).22 Finally, petitioner asserts at paragraph 73 that

counsel unreasonably failed to point out to the jury that no

fingerprints, blood, or gunpowder was found that implicated the

petitioner in the murder (Claim 1(n)). 

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23 It should be noted, however, that the brief references

the absence of fingerprint evidence, but omits any reference to a

lack of blood or gunpowder evidence. Accordingly, those assertions

have never been submitted to any state court and are procedurally

barred for that separate reason. 

-76-

Although petitioner asserted these claims in his brief on

appeal from the trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 petition,23 the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected these claims because

they were not raised in the trial court. See 783 So. 2d at 130.

A review of the petition and amended petition reveals that,

although 37 claims of ineffective assistance were raised in the

trial court, these specific claims were not asserted. Each of

these claims was rejected by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

on an adequate and independent state procedural ground. Petitioner

has made no showing of cause and prejudice, or of a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, to avoid the default. Consequently, Claims

1(l), (m), (n), and (o) are barred from review in this habeas

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24 The court further notes that petitioner has not, to date,

specified what evidence might have been offered to prove that he

was “unconscious” at the time of the crime. Petitioner does not

allege that he wanted to testify or that he was prevented from

testifying. Bivens specifically testified at the Rule 32 hearing

that he attempted to find a witness at the convenience store where

the defendants stopped the night of the crime (who presumably may

have witnessed the petitioner unconscious in the back seat of the

car), but that none of the employees of the store remembered any of

the defendants having stopped there. Petitioner has likewise

failed to present any evidence that counsel could have presented at

trial that would have supported an argument that the co-defendants

colluded against him. 

-77-

action.24 Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043,

103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989).

I. Habeas Claim 1(p)(Failure to Hire Experts)

Petitioner asserts at paragraphs 78-80 of his habeas petition

that his counsel at trial unreasonably failed to hire forensic

experts to analyze and rebut the evidence presented by the

prosecution. (Claim 1(p).) Petitioner first raised the claim in

his Rule 32 petition. See Rule 32 Claim 23(g). The trial court

denied relief, asserting that the claim was not stated with “the

specificity and particularity” required by Rule 32, and no proof

was offered in support of it at the evidentiary hearing. See Order

Denying Rule 32 Petition, p. 30. Petitioner again asserted the

claim on appeal, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

on grounds that the claim failed to satisfy Alabama Rules of

Criminal Procedure 32.6(b) and 32.3. This claim was rejected by

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25 Petitioner does not argue in his brief that he was

entitled to an instruction on robbery, but only on felony murder,

although petitioner fails to assert that any evidence was presented

that would support a finding that the victim’s death was an

unintended result.

-78-

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on an adequate and

independent state procedural ground. Petitioner has made no

showing of cause and prejudice, or of a fundamental miscarriage of

justice, to avoid the default. Consequently, claim 1(p) is barred

from review in this habeas action. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

263, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989).

J. Habeas Claims 1(q), (r), (s), (t), and 8, 9, 10, and 11

(Improper Jury Instructions)

Petitioner makes several claims that his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance in that they failed to object to

certain jury instructions at the guilt phase of the trial.

Specifically, petitioner asserts at paragraphs 82-83 that counsel

should have objected to the court’s failure to instruct the jury on

lesser-included offenses of felony murder and robbery (Claim

1(q)).25 He further argues at paragraphs 84-86 that counsel should

have objected to the instructions concerning reasonable doubt

(Claim 1(r)), circumstantial evidence (Claim 1(s)), and reconciling

testimony (Claim 1(t)). Petitioner also asserts at paragraphs 166-

169 that he was denied a fair trial because the court failed to

adequately instruct the jury on the same topics (Claims 8-11). 

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The petitioner first raised the substantive issues regarding

these instructions on direct appeal. See Appeal Claims 6-9.

Petitioner next raised the issues as both substantive claims and as

claims of ineffective-assistance in his Rule 32 proceedings. See

Rule 32 Claims 2-5 and 23(s)-(w). 

1. Lesser-Included Offenses 

On the subject of lesser-included offenses, the appellate

court stated on direct appeal:

The appellant next argues in his supplemental brief that

the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the

lesser included offenses of felony murder and robbery in

the first degree. Initially we observe that no objection

was made to this failure to instruct. We believe no

plain error occurred here. There was absolutely no

evidence presented during the trial that would warrant an

instruction on felony murder or robbery in the first

degree.

The evidence at trial tended to establish that the victim

was killed, execution style, with one bullet to the head.

Powder burns were found on his head. The appellant was

seen driving the victim’s truck on the same day that the

murder occurred. The appellant went to visit Ms. Jones

that same day and showed her a gun and bullets and told

her that he had killed a white man. There is absolutely

no evidence to support an instruction on felony murder.

As Judge Bowen stated in White, supra:

“‘[T]he purpose of the felony-murder doctrine

is to hold felons accountable for unintended

deaths caused by their dangerous conduct.’ W.

LaFave and A. Scott, 2 Substantive Criminal

Law § 7.5 at 210 (1986). See Ex parte Ritter,

375 So. 2d 270, 273-74 (Ala. 1979), vacated on

other grounds, 448 U.S. 903, 100 S. Ct. 3044,

65 L. Ed. 2d 1133 (1980); Ex parte Bates, 461

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So. 2d 5, 7 (Ala. 1984). Here the evidence

shows that the defendant intentionally killed

his wife. There is no rational basis for a

verdict convicting him of felony-murder.

§ 13A-1-9(b).”

White, 587 So. 2d at 1231.

Furthermore, the facts do not support a charge on robbery

in the first degree. No error occurs in not giving a

charge on a lesser included offense when there is no

reasonable theory to support the lesser offense. See

Dill. “‘A trial judge may refuse to charge on a lesser

included offense when it is clear to the judicial mind

that there is no evidence to support the jury’s being

charged on the lesser included offense.’” Dill, 600 So.

2d at 360, quoting Gurganus v. State, 520 So. 2d 170, 174

(Ala. Cr. App. 1987). No plain error exists here.

601 So. 2d at 1075. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the

substantive claim that the trial court erred in failing to instruct

on lesser-included offenses because the state courts examined the

issue on the merits, applying Alabama law. The state courts’

conclusion that there was “absolutely no evidence” to support an

instruction on felony murder or robbery is neither contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Consequently, it is entitled to a presumption of correctness and

deference under § 2254(d).

It then follows that the claim that counsel was ineffective in

failing to object to the court’s failure to so instruct the jury is

without merit. The related claim of ineffective-assistance was

raised in the Rule 32 petition. See Rule 32 Claim 23(t). The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals again addressed the issue on

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appeal, stating that there was “no basis for an objection by

counsel” because there was no basis for an instruction on the

lesser charges. 783 So. 2d at 133-34. Consequently, petitioner is

not entitled to relief on the ineffective-assistance claim related

to an instruction on lesser-included offenses because the state

courts examined the issue, both substantively and as it related to

counsel’s performance, on the merits. Furthermore, the state court

applied the proper standard under Alabama law and under Strickland.

The state courts’ conclusion that the failure to charge the jury on

felony murder and first-degree robbery was not objectionable is

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent. Consequently, it is entitled to a presumption of

correctness and deference under § 2254(d). 

2. Reasonable Doubt

As to the claims relating to the jury instruction on

reasonable doubt, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated: 

The appellant next argues that the following instruction

on reasonable doubt violated the holding in Cage v.

Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S. Ct. 328, 112 L. Ed. 2d 339

(1990):

“Now I have mentioned the term ‘reasonable

doubt’ just as the attorneys have because

that’s a basic, fundamental concept in the

trial of a criminal case. What is ‘beyond a

reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty’?

First, the two terms are synonymous. That is,

they mean the same thing. Whatever is beyond

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a reasonable doubt is to a moral certainty.

‘Beyond a reasonable doubt’ simply means

beyond a doubt for which a reason can be

given.

“The phrase ‘reasonable doubt,’ then is rather

self-explanatory and efforts to further define

it do not always help to clarify it in any

way. But it might help some to say that the

doubt which would justify an acquittal must be

an actual doubt which arises from the evidence

or from a lack of evidence or from

contradictory evidence and which remains after

a careful consideration of all of the evidence

in the case. The doubt which justifies an

acquittal cannot be a mere fanciful or vague

or conjectural or speculative doubt, but it

must be a reasonable doubt which, as I said,

comes from the evidence or from the lack of

evidence.

“If after considering all of the evidence in

this case, you have an abiding conviction of

the truth of the charge in this case and

you’re convinced beyond a reasonable doubt,

then it would be your duty to convict the

defendant of the offense of capital murder.

The reasonable doubt which entitles the

accused to an acquittal is not a mere fanciful

or vague or conjectural or speculative doubt,

but, as I said, it must arise from the

evidence or from a lack of evidence.”

Initially, we observe that no objection was made to this

instruction during the trial. While this failure will

not bar review in this case, it will weigh against any

claim of prejudice. See Kuenzel.

In Cage, the complained-of instruction on reasonable

doubt contained the phrases, “grave uncertainty,” “actual

substantial doubt,” and “moral certainty.” It appears

from the opinion that the Court’s problem with the

instruction lay in the phrases, “grave uncertainty” and

“actual substantial doubt.” The United States Supreme

Court stated:

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 82 of 172
-83-

“It is plain to us that the words

‘substantial’ and ‘grave,’ as they are

commonly understood, suggest a higher degree

of doubt than is required for acquittal under

the reasonable doubt standard. When those

statements are then considered with the

reference to ‘moral certainty,’ rather than

evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a

reasonable juror could have interpreted the

instruction to allow a finding of guilt based

on a degree of proof below that required by

the Due Process Clause.”

We do not believe that Cage is applicable to the charge

in the instant case. The trial court did not use the key

terms “grave uncertainty” and “actual substantial doubt”

used in Cage. The trial court thoroughly instructed the

jury that its reasonable doubt must be based on evidence

in the case or the lack thereof. The instruction in Cage

is distinguishable from the instruction in the present

case.

We note that the instruction given in this case is

similar to one this court has recently held was not

violative of Cage. See Adams v. State, 587 So. 2d 1265

(Ala. Cr. App. 1991). No plain error occurred here.

601 So. 2d at 1076-77. With respect to the instruction on

reasonable doubt, the Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the charge

given, and concluded that the charge was thorough and correct in

its explanation of the term “reasonable doubt.” That court again

examined the instruction in the context of the post-conviction

motion and specifically held that there was “no basis for

objection.” 783 So. 2d at 134. Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on either the substantive or ineffectiveassistance claim related to the “reasonable doubt” instruction

because the state courts examined the issues on the merits,

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 83 of 172
26 The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that

the use of the term “moral certainty” does not render an

instruction violative of the Constitution. Victor v. Nebraska, 511

U.S. 1, 9, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1994). 

-84-

applying the proper standard under state and federal26 law, both

with respect to the content of the jury instructions and the

effectiveness of counsel under Strickland. The state courts’

conclusions that the charge was sufficient and was not

objectionable are neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. Consequently, they are

entitled to a presumption of correctness and deference under

§ 2254(d). 

3. Circumstantial Evidence

 As to the claims relating to the jury instruction regarding

circumstantial evidence, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

stated: 

The appellant next argues that the instruction regarding

circumstantial evidence given by the trial court in its

instruction in the guilt phase of the trial, lessened the

degree of proof necessary to convict the appellant and

shifted the burden of proof. Counsel made no objection

at trial. In fact, defense counsel stated that he was

satisfied with the court’s instruction. The trial court

gave the following instruction on circumstantial

evidence:

“Circumstantial evidence simply means all

evidence of an indirect nature. In other

words, there is direct evidence and there is

indirect evidence. So circumstantial evidence

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 84 of 172
-85-

is simply evidence of an indirect nature.

When the evidence against a defendant is

partially circumstantial or indirect, his

innocence should be presumed by the jury until

his guilt is established by the evidence in

all of the material aspects of the case beyond

a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty,

the same as if the evidence were wholly direct

or wholly circumstantial. The question always

comes back to: Did the State by the evidence

prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt?

“The test of the sufficiency of circumstantial

evidence in a criminal case is whether the

circumstances as proven are capable of an

explanation upon a reasonable hypothesis

consistent with the defendant’s innocence, and

if they are so capable of such an explanation,

then a defendant should be acquitted. Because

in that instance what we are saying is that

you can explain away the evidence to the point

where you reach a reasonable basis for

doubting the evidence before you, and in that

event you’re not convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt, so we come back to the basic

instruction that the State carries the burden

of proof.

“So circumstantial evidence is as good as any

other kind of evidence, but like that of

positive evidence it must produce in the minds

of the jury a conviction of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. So the presence, or absence

even, of circumstantial evidence does not

change the burden of proof. In any case on

any kind of evidence, the burden always

remains on the State to prove the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. No more, no

less.”

The trial court thoroughly charged the jury on

circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt. We believe

this charge was sufficient. See Wabbington v. State, 446

So. 2d 665 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.

1254, 104 S. Ct. 3542, 82 L. Ed. 2d 846 (1984). See also

Marlow v. State, 538 So. 2d 804 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988).

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 85 of 172
-86-

This in no way conflicts with our holding in Davenport v.

City of Birmingham, 570 So. 2d 1298 (Ala. Cr. App.

1990), in which we reversed the trial court based on its

instruction on circumstantial evidence. In Davenport,

there was absolutely no instruction on the proof

necessary to convict on circumstantial evidence. There

was such an instruction in this case.

601 So. 2d at 1075-76. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the

charge given and concluded that the charge regarding circumstantial

evidence was thorough and sufficient. That court again examined

the instruction in the context of the post-conviction motion, and

specifically held that the charge provided “no basis for

objection.” 783 So. 2d at 134. Consequently, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on the substantive or ineffective-assistance

claims related to the circumstantial evidence instruction because

the state courts examined the issues on the merits, applying the

proper standard under state and federal law and Strickland. The

state courts’ conclusions that the charge was sufficient and was

not objectionable, and, therefore, that counsel were not

ineffective, are neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. Consequently, they are

entitled to a presumption of correctness and deference under §

2254(d). 

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-87-

4. Reconciling Testimony

Petitioner’s final claims relating to jury instructions assert

that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on a duty to

“reconcile the testimony” of the witnesses to make them speak the

truth. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed this

substantive claim on direct appeal and stated: 

The appellant next argues that the trial court erred in

instructing the jury that they had a duty to reconcile

the testimony of all the witnesses to make them speak the

truth. He maintains that this instruction “impermissibly

conditions the juror’s right to disbelieve even

uncontroverted testimony” and violated his right to a

fair trial. The record reflects that no objection was

made to this instruction at trial. The trial court gave

the following instruction:

“You should, in the trial of this case, of

course, attempt in every way you can to

reconcile all of the evidence in this case so

as, if possible, to make all witnesses speak

the truth. If you cannot do that, and you

find that the evidence is in conflict on

material points, then it’s up to the jury to

decide what are the true facts and what is

usually accepted and received by the jury and

used by the jury and what is due to be

rejected or ignored. In other words, you may

have to pick and choose through this evidence

and decide just what is believable and what is

not. But in passing upon that, you do not

have to capriciously accept or reject the

testimony of any witness.

“You should look at all of the evidence in the

case with a view of determining what the true

facts are and make your decision from the

evidence. If you find that some of that

evidence is unworthy of belief, you have the

right to throw it out. But you still have the

remainder, and that would be what you would

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act upon. But you first start out with all of

the evidence with a view of determining what

the true facts are and you sort through it,

always remembering that your job is to

determine what are the true facts.”

When the single instruction underlined above is viewed in

the abstract, it could be confusing. However, “[a]

single instruction to a jury may not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context

of the overall charge.” Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d at 517. The

instruction was a charge on the jury’s function as the

sole factfinder. The jury has the “‘responsibility of

assessing the credibility of each witness and weighing

all the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, as

they viewed it.’ Cumbo v. State, 368 So. 2d 871 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 877 (1979).

Moreover, a conflict in the testimony is the sole

province for the jury to determine....” Boggan v. State,

455 So. 2d 228, 240 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984). See also White

v. State, 546 So. 2d 1014 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989). There

was no plain error in the above instruction.

601 So. 2d at 1076. With respect to the instruction on reconciling

the testimony, the Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the charge

given, and concluded that the charge may have been confusing when

viewed in isolation, but did not constitute plain error when viewed

in the context of the overall charge. That court again examined

the trial court’s instruction in the context of the post-conviction

petition, and specifically held that there was “no basis for

objection.” 783 So. 2d at 134. Consequently, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on the substantive or ineffective-assistance

claim related to the instruction on reconciling the testimony

because the state courts examined the issues on the merits,

applying the proper standards under Alabama law and Strickland.

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27 In addition, petitioner is not entitled to relief on the

substantive claim related to the instruction on reconciling the

testimony because he concedes that the issue of the propriety of

this instruction turns on a question of state law and is not

subject to review as an independent claim on habeas review.

(Petitioner’s Brief, p. 131-32.)

-89-

The state courts’ conclusions that the charge was not in error and

was not objectionable, and, therefore, counsel were not

ineffective, are neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent.27 Consequently, they are

entitled to a presumption of correctness and deference under

§ 2254(d). 

Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, petitioner’s

claims relating to the propriety of the jury instructions, Claims

1(q), (r), (s), (t), and 8, 9, 10, and 11 are due to be denied.

K. Habeas Claims 1(u), (v), (w), and 5, 6, and 7 

(Prosecutorial Misconduct)

At paragraphs 89-94 of the amended habeas petition, petitioner

asserts three claims of ineffective-assistance of counsel that

relate to comments made by the prosecutor. Specifically,

petitioner asserts that his trial attorneys should have objected to

the prosecutor’s comment on petitioner’s lack of an explanation for

why he had the murder weapon (Claim 1(u)). He further asserts that

the prosecutor’s suggestion that the petitioner would kill again

should have prompted an objection (Claim 1(v)). Finally,

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petitioner asserts that the prosecutor’s improper comments on the

race of the victim and racial slurs spoken by petitioner should

have drawn an objection (Claim 1(w)). These same issues also are

stated at paragraphs 164-65 as substantive claims that petitioner’s

constitutional rights were violated by the improper comments made

to the jury (Claims 5, 6, and 7, respectively). 

Petitioner first raised the substantive claims of

prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal. See Appeal Claims 5(a)-

(c). Petitioner next raised the issues as both substantive claims

and as claims of ineffective assistance in his Rule 32 proceedings.

See Rule 32 Petition Claims 1(a)-(c) and 23(o)-(r). 

On the subject of comments on defendant’s failure to testify,

the appellate court stated on direct appeal:

The appellant further argues that he was prejudiced by

the following remarks made by the prosecutor in his

closing argument in the guilt phase of the trial:

“You heard his comment about ‘Well, it’s just

as possible that Trosky and Carmichael were

the ones that shot Mr. Kirk as anybody else,’

and I submit to you: What fathom of evidence

at all indicates that they were involved in

the execution of John Robert Kirk? What

fathom of evidence at all indicates that this

weapon hidden in a purse in that very room –

if you are going to use this as an item to

pawn, you don’t hide it in the room that you

are staying in; you hide it somewhere else or

you get rid of this quick. If you are going

to use it as a tool of the trade, you keep it

handy.”

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“The last thing I will submit to you is that,

you know, when you talk about circumstantial

evidence, one thing everybody says is when

some parts of the case are circumstantial,

circumstantial evidence is just as good as

regular evidence. You notice he didn’t

comment on this part at all. In this case,

first you have the circumstance that he is

found with the murder weapon. That in and of

itself is sufficient circumstances unless

something else is shown as to why that person

had that gun other than they did the killing.

There is no evidence of that whatsoever.”

Defense counsel had, prior to the above comments made by

the prosecutor, argued the following in his closing

argument:

“Reasonable doubt is a doubt for which you

have a reason. If you can tell me, ladies and

gentlemen, that based on the facts in this

case that you can exclude Trosky Gregory and

Albert Carmichael as the persons that pulled

the trigger in this case based on the evidence

that is before you like going out to the

scene....

“....

“I want to talk to you about the gun. To the

person who shot Mr. Kirk, this is a weapon,

but to a thief who steals and pawns things,

this is money; this is money. To the person

who shot Mr. Kirk, you take this with the

knowledge that Mr. Kirk has been shot and you

get rid of this evidence. To the person who

has stolen that and has not used it as a

murder weapon, you keep it until you sell it.

Which did Luther Williams do? He kept it in a

purse at the house. He didn’t get rid of it.”

Initially, we observe that no objections were made to the

complained-of portions of the prosecutor’s argument.

While this does not bar review in a case involving the

death penalty, it will weigh against any prejudice that

the appellant may have suffered. See Kuenzel.

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It is clearly impermissible for a prosecutor to directly

comment on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial.

See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229,

14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965). However, the above comments

made by the prosecutor in his rebuttal were replies to

the comments made by defense counsel in his closing

argument. “When the door is opened by defense counsel’s

argument, it swings wide, and a number of areas barred to

prosecutorial comment will suddenly be subject to reply.”

Davis v. State, 494 So. 2d 851, 855 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986).

Recently this court, in Stephens, supra, stated the

following regarding prosecutor’s statements in arguments:

“‘... “[I]t must be examined in its context

and in light of what had transpired, that is,

in light of preceding argument of defense

counsel, to which the prosecutor’s argument

was an answer.” Washington v. State, 259 Ala.

104, 65 So. 2d 704 (1953); Gibson v. State,

347 So. 2d 576 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977);

Rutledge v. State, [482 So. 2d 1250][Ms. 5

Div. 610, August 16, 1983](Ala. Crim. App.

1983). The rule in Alabama is that “remarks

or comments of the prosecuting attorney,

including those which might otherwise be

improper, are not grounds for reversal when

they are invited, provoked, or occasioned by

accused’s counsel and are in reply to or

retaliation for his acts and statements.”

Shewbart v. State, 33 Ala. App. 195, 32 So. 2d

241, cert. denied, 249 Ala. 572, 32 So. 2d 244

(1947); Camper v. State, 384 So. 2d 637 (Ala.

Cr. App. 1980); Wilder v. State, 401 So. 2d

167 (Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057,

102 S. Ct. 606, 70 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1981);

Miller v. State, 431 So. 2d 586 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1983); Rutledge, supra.’”

Stephens, 580 So. 2d at 21, quoting Henderson v. State,

460 So. 2d 331, 333 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984). The United

States Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson, 485

U.S. 25, 108 S. Ct. 864, 99 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1988), narrowed

the Court’s holding in Griffin concerning a prosecutor’s

comment on the defendant’s failure to testify and stated

the following:

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“‘[T]he protective shield of the Fifth

Amendment should [not] be converted into a

sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate

comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in

the defense case.’...

“...

“‘[T]he central purpose of a criminal trial is

to decide the factual question of the

defendant’s guilt or innocence.... To this

end it is important that both the defendant

and the prosecutor have the opportunity to

meet fairly the evidence and arguments of one

another.’”

Robinson, 108 S. Ct. at 869. (Citations omitted.)

After evaluating the prosecutor’s comments in relation to

the whole case, we cannot say that this comment, which

was a reply in kind to a statement made by defense

counsel in his closing argument, amounted to plain error.

See Dill. To constitute plain error the error must be so

“egregious as to ‘seriously affect the fairness or

integrity of the judicial proceedings.’” Dill, 600 So. 2d

at 355; quoting, Ex parte Womack, 435 So. 2d 766 (Ala.),

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986, 104 S. Ct. 436, 78 L. Ed. 2d

367 (1983).

Furthermore, there is some question whether the comment

was intended to be a reference to the appellant’s failure

to testify. See Duncan v. Stynchcombe, 704 F.2d 1213

(11th Cir. 1983).

601 So. 2d at 1073-75.

On the subject of the prosecutor’s references to the race of

the petitioner, the court opined: 

The appellant also argues that the prosecutor emphasized

the race of the appellant to urge the jury to return a

verdict of death. No objections were made to any

evidence received at trial that may have emphasized the

race of the appellant. We must apply the plain error

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analysis, i.e., is the error so egregious that it

seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the

proceeding? See Dill and Kuenzel.

The following statement made by the appellant while he

was at Taylor Hardin, was received into evidence. “I

killed one white m____ f____; I’ll kill another one.”

(See part V of this opinion.) Priscilla Jones also

testified that the appellant said that he had killed a

white man. These statements were not brought out to

emphasize race. These were statements made by the

appellant himself. There is absolutely no evidence in

the record that the prosecuting attorney tried to

prejudice the minds of the jurors by emphasizing the

difference in race between the appellant and the victim.

Furthermore, the trial court made the following

admonition to the jury concerning race:

“The fact that the deceased was a white man or

that the defendant was a black man is

irrelevant insofar as your determination and

duty in this case is concerned. Whether or

not race played any part in the death of John

Robert Kirk and regardless of the presence, if

any, of any racial epithets or statements,

considerations of race simply do not enter

into this courtroom or inject themselves into

your consideration of the evidence in the

case.”

No plain error exists here.

601 So. 2d at 1073.

In considering whether the prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s

future dangerousness, the court stated:

The appellant next argues that the prosecutor

impermissibly stated during his rebuttal closing argument

in the guilt phase of the trial that the appellant would

kill again. No objection was made to this comment.

While the fact that no objection was made will not

preclude review in a case where the appellant has been

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sentenced to death, it will weigh against any claim of

prejudice. See Dill v. State, 600 So. 2d 343 (Ala. Cr.

App. 1991); Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474 (Ala. Cr.

App. 1990), aff’d, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1991). “‘This

court has concluded that the failure to object to

improper prosecutorial arguments ... should be weighed as

part of our evaluation of the claim on the merits because

of its suggestion that the defense did not consider the

comments in question to be particularly harmful.’” Dill,

600 So. 2d at 356, quoting Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d at 489.

The prosecutor made the following statement during his

rebuttal closing argument:

“Circumstantial evidence is kind of like a big

rat and a little rat in a box. Circumstantial

evidence is when you put that lid on that box

at night and make sure there are no holes.

And you open up the box the next day. The big

rat ... is still there but the little mouse is

gone. You look down there and you say, ‘Well,

that big rat ate that little mouse’ which is

what you have in this case. But then what

happens is that you look at that big rat and

what does the big rat say? This is not

circumstantial evidence. He says, ‘I ate the

mouse.’ He says that to some of the first

people that saw him. He also has in his

possession some of the fur of the little mouse

that the little mouse had. And also at a

later time he says ‘I ate the little mouse and

I will eat another little mouse if you give me

a chance.’”

The appellant maintains that the underlined portion of

the argument was a comment that the appellant would kill

again. (The analogy is similar to statements made by the

trial court in its instructions to the prospective jurors

during voir dire and statements made by defense counsel

in his closing argument.) The prosecutor’s statement was

a comment on the statement made by the appellant, which

was received into evidence at trial. See part V of this

opinion. “‘The test of legitimate argument is that

whatever is based on a fact or facts in evidence is

within the scope of proper comment in argument to the

jury.’” White v. State, 587 So. 2d 1218, 1229 (Ala. Cr.

App. 1990). “Whatever is in evidence is considered

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subject to legitimate comment by counsel.” Bankhead v.

State, 585 So. 2d 97 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989), aff’d, 585 So.

2d 112 (Ala. 1991). See also Ward v. State, 440 So. 2d

1227 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983). “The prosecutor has the right

to present his impressions from the evidence. He may

argue every matter of legitimate inference and may

examine, collate, sift, and treat the evidence in his own

way.” (Citations omitted.) Donahoo v. State, 505 So. 2d

1067, 1072 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986).

Furthermore, “‘[s]tatements of counsel in argument to the

jury must be viewed as having been made in the heat of

the debate, and such statements are usually valued by the

jury at their true worth.’” Stephens v. State, 580 So.

2d 11 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990), aff’d, 580 So. 2d 26 (Ala.

1991), quoting Harris v. State, 539 So. 2d 1117, 1123

(Ala. Cr. App. 1988). No plain error occurred here.

601 So. 2d at 1072-73. 

 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on any of the

substantive claims that the trial court erred in permitting the

prosecutor to make the comments. The state courts examined the

issues on the merits, applying the proper standard regarding

comments on silence that was applied by the Supreme Court in

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d

106 (1965). The state courts also made findings of fact in

determining that the racial references of which petitioner

complains were not made to prejudice the jury or to emphasize race,

but were mere recitations of statements made by the petitioner

himself, stating that he had killed a white man. Finally, the

state courts properly assessed the comment regarding future

dangerousness as fair comments on the evidence presented -

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petitioner’s own statement that he had killed one “white

motherfucker” and would “kill another.” The state courts’

conclusion that the comments did not “‘seriously affect the

fairness’” of the trial is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. Consequently, the state

court findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and

deference under § 2254(d).

The claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to object

to the prosecutor’s comments also are without merit. The claims of

ineffective-assistance were raised in the Rule 32 petition. The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals again addressed the issue on

appeal, stating that there was “no basis for an objection by

counsel” because none of the comments rose to the level of plain

error. 783 So. 2d at 134. Consequently, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on the ineffective-assistance claims related to

prosecutorial misconduct because the state courts examined the

issues, both substantively and as they related to counsel’s

performance, on the merits. Furthermore, the state court applied

the proper standard under Strickland. The state courts’

conclusions that the comments were not objectionable, and,

therefore, that counsel were not ineffective, are neither contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Consequently, those conclusions are entitled to a presumption of

correctness and deference under § 2254(d).

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L. Habeas Claim 1(x) and (y), and 13, 14, 24, and 25 (Jury

Selection)

At paragraphs 95-98 of the amended habeas petition, petitioner

alleges that counsel unreasonably failed to present sufficient

support for the motion to sequester the jury venire. Petitioner

complains that the motion should have been supported by news

articles to demonstrate pretrial publicity (Claim 1(x)). At

paragraphs 173-74, he also raises the substantive claim that the

court erred in denying the motion for sequestration of the venire

(Claim 14), and at paragraph 99 that counsel failed to adequately

conduct a voir dire to identify biased jurors (Claim 1(y)).

Petitioner alleges at paragraph 172 that the court erred in

excluding for cause a potential juror who said she had “difficulty”

with the death penalty but could follow the law (Claim 13).

Finally, petitioner asserts at paragraph 192 that the trial court

violated his constitutional rights by allowing the prosecutor to

strike jurors on the basis of race in violation of Batson (Claim

24), and at paragraph 193 that the selection of the jury venire

from licensed drivers denied petitioner of his right to a jury that

was representative of the community (Claim 25).

Petitioner first raised the substantive claim regarding

sequestration on direct appeal. See Appeal Claim 12. Petitioner

next raised the issue as both a substantive claim and a claim of

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ineffective assistance in his Rule 32 proceedings. See Rule 32

Petition, Claims 8 and 23(j). 

Speaking to the issue of sequestration, the appellate court

stated that petitioner was not prejudiced by the lack of

sequestration, stating in the opinion affirming his conviction:

The appellant next contends that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to sequester the venire during voir

dire examination. The appellant claims that the trial

court’s denial of his motion limited his opportunity “to

expose the effect of pretrial publicity on the venire.”

This court has heretofore concluded that there is no

requirement mandating that the defendant be allowed

individual voir dire of potential jurors and

sequestration of potential jurors during voir dire.

Browning v. State, 549 So. 2d 549 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989);

Bell v. State, 475 So. 2d 601 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984),

aff’d, 475 So. 2d 609 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.

1038, 106 S. Ct. 607, 88 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1985). Any

decision to allow individual questioning or sequestration

of potential jurors is within the discretion of the trial

court. Heath v. State, 480 So. 2d 26 (Ala. Cr. App.

1985).

The appellant claims that pretrial publicity may have

affected the venire. However, during voir dire

examination, the appellant, as well as the state, had

ample opportunity to question the veniremembers about

their knowledge of the case at hand. When asked, only

one member of the venire stated that he had any knowledge

of the case. This veniremember was ultimately excused

and did not sit on the jury. Furthermore, the appellant

presented no evidence of a significant possibility of

prejudice due to pretrial publicity. [FN1] See Brown v.

State, 571 So. 2d 345 (Ala. Cr. App.), writ quashed, 571

So. 2d 353 (Ala. 1990). Absent such a showing, the mere

fact that veniremembers might know something about a case

is not sufficient to prove prejudice. United States v.

Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1981); Waldrop v. State,

462 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. Cr. App.), cert. denied, 472 U.S.

1019, 105 S. Ct. 3483, 87 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1984).

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Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly denied

the appellant’s motion to sequester the venire during

voir dire.

FN1. We note that the appellant did file copies

of news articles that appeared in local newspapers

around the time of his arrest. However, these

articles were filed in conjunction with his motion

for a change of venue and not to support his claim

of prejudicial pretrial publicity. In addition,

the most recent of these articles was published

more than a year before the date of the appellant’s

trial.

601 So. 2d at 1067-68.

Subsequently, when evaluating counsel’s performance regarding

seeking sequestration, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

adopted the trial court’s conclusion that petitioner had failed to

demonstrate that pre-trial publicity had in any way tainted the

jury pool, and that petitioner had failed to satisfy the prejudice

prong of the Strickland test. The court stated:

Tenth, the appellant contends that his attorneys rendered

ineffective assistance because they allegedly did not

present sufficient evidence to support his motion for

individual voir dire examination of the veniremembers.

In addressing this contention, the circuit court found as

follows:

“The substantive issue concerning the trial

court’s denial of trial counsel’s motion to

sequester the venire during voir dire

examination was fully addressed on direct

appeal. Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d at

1067-68. Williams’ present assertion is that

his trial counsel ‘unreasonably failed to

properly support’ that motion. He offered no

evidence in support of this contention at the

evidentiary hearing, but does address it at

pages 52-53 of his Post-Hearing Brief. As

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noted by the Court of Criminal Appeals,

‘[D]uring voir dire examination, the

appellant, as well as the state, had ample

opportunity to question the veniremembers

about their knowledge of the case at hand,’

but, when asked, ‘only one member of the

venire stated that he had any knowledge of the

case,’ and he was ultimately excused. Rule 32

counsel have made no showing, and have

presented no argument, concerning how the lack

of sequestered voir dire prevented adequate

inquiry into and exploration of possible

effects of pretrial publicity. Williams

argues in his post-hearing brief that because

the jurors were not sequestered ‘their answers

could be heard by the rest of the venire.’

However, he does not identify any such answer.

He argues that non-sequestered voir dire

‘impeded Mr. Williams from making an adequate

showing of pretrial prejudice.’ Again, he

does not explain how this impediment took

place. There was no restriction on the right

of either counsel to inquire concerning

whether or not any venireperson had been

exposed to any pretrial publicity of any

nature or degree, and there was no restriction

on the right of either side to request that a

responding venireperson be asked to remain

after the conclusion of the voir dire for

‘private,’ individualized questioning. That

was exactly the approach followed at the

conclusion of the general voir dire with

respect to numerous individuals who had given

answers concerning various matters. (R. 294-

324). Accordingly, even assuming that trial

counsel’s motion for sequestered voir dire

might have been better supported, and even

assuming that a better supported motion might

have persuaded the trial judge to sequester

the venire during voir dire, Rule 32 counsel

have made no showing of prejudice resulting

from a non-sequestered voir dire. To the

extent that Rule 32 counsel fault trial

counsel for having presented no evidence of

pretrial publicity more recent than newspaper

articles published over a year before the date

of the trial (filed in conjunction with

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 101 of 172
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Williams’ motion for a change of venue), they

offer no evidence of subsequent pretrial

publicity. They do state in footnote 8 at

page 52 of the Post-Hearing Brief that

‘articles from Mr. Lemley’s file following the

hearings of March and August 1989' demonstrate

that there was ‘continuing coverage.’ In that

regard, they reference ‘Attachment B’ which

consists of a photostatic reproduction of an

article from the August 9, 1989, edition of

The Tuscaloosa News. This item was not

offered as an exhibit at the evidentiary

hearing and was not otherwise placed in

evidence. Certainly the court cannot now take

judicial notice of something simply presented

as an attachment to a brief. The handwritten

annotations on the article, because of their

content, seemingly are those of Williams. At

any rate, there is no showing of ‘articles,’

but rather only a single article appearing

some 3 1⁄2 months prior to trial. The court

finds that, at the very least, Williams has

failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test as to the contention asserted

in these two grounds.”

(C.R.676-78.) We agree with the circuit court’s findings

and adopt them as part of this opinion. Therefore, the

appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

783 So. 2d at 130-132.

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

specifically noted that there exists “no requirement that the

defendant be allowed individual voir dire of potential jurors.”

601 So. 2d at 1067. In evaluating counsel’s failure to request

individual voir dire, the same court held that petitioner had

failed to meet his burden of proof under Strickland. 783 So. 2d at

130.

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In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S. Ct. 940, 71 L. Ed.

2d 78 (1982), the United States Supreme Court discussed the

constitutional right to an impartial jury and the remedy for an

alleged violation of the right. The Court stated that it “has long

held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a

hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual

bias.” Id. at 215. Due process does not require that every

instance of potential bias by a juror result in the setting aside

of the jury’s decision. Rather, the defendant must be given an

opportunity to prove that the possible bias caused him “actual

prejudice.” In refusing to apply a standard to proceedings in

state court different from that in federal court, the Court

explained: 

 

Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide

the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial

judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences

and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they

happen. Such determinations may properly be made at a

hearing like that ordered in Remmer [v. United States,

347 U.S. 227, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 654 (1954)], and

held in this case. 

Id. at 217. The right to be tried by an impartial jury carries no

implied prejudice; rather, actual prejudice must be proven at a

hearing for that purpose. The burden of proving prejudice falls to

the petitioner. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 442,

120 S. Ct. 1479, 146 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)(held: petitioner was

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 103 of 172
28 The case cited by petitioner in support of his argument

that voir dire should have been conducted on an individual basis,

Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751

(1961), was based upon the perceived danger that questioning as a

group would “apprise otherwise ignorant jurors of prejudicial

material.” In this case, petitioner has failed to show that any

such “prejudicial material” was elicited by any question or answer.

-104-

entitled to an evidentiary hearing because “[i]t may be that

petitioner could establish that [a particular juror] was not

impartial”).

Here, petitioner was afforded an evidentiary hearing at which

he had the opportunity to attempt to prove actual prejudice from

the lack of sequestration, the failure of counsel to seek and

conduct individual voir dire, or pre-trial publicity. Petitioner,

both then and now, has failed to show that pre-trial publicity

tainted the jury pool, or that any answers given in voir dire in

any way tainted other veniremembers.28 The conclusions by the

state court are not factually unreasonable nor are they contrary to

or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Factually, the trial record reveals no evidence that any juror was

tainted by publicity, that sequestration was appropriate or

necessary, or that any juror had any bias that would have been

revealed only through individual voir dire. The state court’s

conclusions are entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on any of petitioner’s

claims that challenge the jury selection process.

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As to his specific allegation that one juror was improperly

excused for cause because of her “difficulty” with the death

penalty, the appellate court found no error, stating:

The appellant contends that the trial court erred by

granting the state’s challenge for cause of a

veniremember based on her adversity to the death

penalty. The following exchange took place during voir

dire:

“THE COURT: ... you had indicated earlier that

you had strong religious beliefs against

capital punishment. Would those beliefs be so

strong that if you sat on this case and you

heard the evidence and you decided under the

law and under the statutes that the defendant

in fact was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,

would you because of your beliefs vote not

guilty rather than vote guilty whereby the

defendant would be placed in jeopardy of

receiving capital punishment?

“[JUROR]: I wouldn’t vote not guilty if I was

convinced he was guilty.

“THE COURT: Let’s suppose, then, at that point

the verdict were to be guilty, would you

refuse to vote for capital punishment, that

is, the death penalty under all circumstances

regardless of the evidence?

“[JUROR]: I don’t think that I would try to

obstruct justice. I would say yes, that I

would vote for the capital punishment, but it

would be very difficult for me. I think there

would be an after effect, my conscience, and I

would question my decision, whether I had done

the right thing; but I wouldn’t want to do

something that was illegal against the State.

“THE COURT: So, if the evidence did convince

you that under the law that this person was

guilty of capital murder and it came down to

voting for the death penalty, you could do

that?

“[JUROR]: Well, I say that now, but when I got

in there I might change my mind and not do it,

and that wouldn’t be right.

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“THE COURT: Unfortunately people can change

their mind, but the question right now is –

and you’re under oath – I have to ask you

again –

“[JUROR] I’m just going to say I wouldn’t do

it. I’m going to say no.

“THE COURT: You would not do it?

“[JUROR]: Right.

“THE COURT: In answer to my question, if I

asked you in this case if the State proved

their case beyond a reasonable doubt and to a

moral certainty in the case, and the defendant

in your mind was guilty of capital murder,

would you refuse to impose the death penalty

regardless of the evidence?

“[JUROR]: I would refuse to do it because I

would be afraid.”

This veniremember was further questioned by defense

counsel and by the prosecutor, and she continued to

vacillate on whether she would be capable of voting to

impose the death penalty.

The “standard for determining when a prospective juror

may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on

capital punishment ... is whether the juror’s views would

‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his

duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and

his oath.’” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105

S. Ct. 844, 852, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985). See also Haney

v. State, 603 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991). In the

present case, the answers given by the prospective juror

clearly indicate the possibility that she would be unable

to perform her duties as a juror. In reaching its

decision to exclude a juror for cause, the trial court

need not determine whether this impairment has been

demonstrated with “unmistakable clarity.” Wainwright,

supra 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S. Ct. at 852. It is

sufficient if the trial court, after taking into

consideration the veniremember’s answers and demeanor,

“is left with the definite impression that a prospective

juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply

the law.” Wainwright, supra at 426, 105 S. Ct. at 853.

See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S. Ct.

2464, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1988); Whisenhant v. State, 555

So. 2d 219 (Ala. Cr. App.), aff’d, 555 So. 2d 235 (Ala.

1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943, 110 S. Ct. 3230, 110

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 106 of 172
29 Petitioner points to fewer than 20 newspaper articles and

one broadcast report, most of which were published more than a year

before the trial began. While there may have been a couple of

articles published within a few months of the trial, those were

never offered by petitioner as evidence in the state courts. 

-107-

L. Ed. 2d 676 (1990); Brownlee v. State, 545 So. 2d 151

(Ala. Cr. App. 1988), aff’d, 545 So. 2d 166 (Ala. 1989),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S. Ct. 208, 107 L. Ed. 2d

161 (1989).

In reviewing the answers provided by the veniremember

during her individual voir dire, we find no error in her

exclusion. Additionally, the appellant included a

footnote in his brief claiming that five other

veniremembers were “improperly questioned in such a

manner as to suggest answers which the court then used to

exclude them.” However, we note that this claim is

totally unsupported by the record. 

601 So. 2d at 1068-69. This final claim related to jury selection

also is due deference pursuant to Section 2254(d). The record

supports a finding that the juror was biased against the death

penalty, in that she clearly stated that she would refuse to impose

the death penalty, even if the state proved its case beyond a

reasonable doubt. See id. at 1068. The fact that she equivocated

on her stance did not make the trial court’s actions in excusing

this juror unreasonable.

Even if evaluated on the merits, petitioner has failed to

present evidence of the quality or quantity that might demonstrate

any bias caused by what appears to have been scant pre-trial

publicity.29 Petitioner also has failed to show any error that

occurred during the jury selection process. Finally, petitioner’s

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bare assertion that the questions posed to potential jurors were

“too conclusory” and that the veniremembers were “unlikely” to

admit biases (see Petitioner’s Brief, p. 63), are insufficient to

demonstrate prejudice. 

Petitioner’s final assertions of error in the selection of his

jury are that black jurors were struck in violation of Batson, and

that the jury pools for the grand and petit juries were selected

from a list of licensed drivers, which excluded segments of the

community in derogation of his constitutional rights (Claims 24,

25). These claims were first raised in the post-conviction

petition. See Rule 32 Claims 20 and 21. Petitioner failed to

raise these issues, however, when he appealed from the trial

court’s denial of these claims. Accordingly, Claims 24 and 25 are

due to be denied because they are procedurally defaulted pursuant

to Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1995)(failure to

appeal a claim denied in a post-conviction petition is a procedural

default of the claim). 

For all the reasons set forth herein, petitioner’s claims

relating to the selection of his jury are without merit and are due

to be dismissed. 

M. Habeas Claim 1(z) and 15 (Role Of the Victim’s Widow)

Petitioner asserts at paragraphs 100-02 that his trial counsel

unreasonably failed to object to the role the victim’s widow was

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allowed to play at trial in that she sat with the prosecuting

attorney and testified to personal characteristics of the victim

not relevant to guilt (Claim 1(z)). Petitioner also asserts at

paragraph 175 a substantive claim that the trial court erred in

allowing evidence of the victim’s character and victim impact to be

admitted (Claim 15). The issue of admissibility of the widow’s

testimony first was raised on direct appeal. See Appeal Claim

13(b). On review, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated: 

The appellant further argues that the trial court erred

in allowing the victim’s widow to testify in the guilt

phase of the trial. Her testimony consisted of

identifying the camper truck that the victim was driving,

identifying certain items of evidence, and testifying as

to the victim’s habits. He contends that this testimony

violates the United States Supreme Court holdings in

Booth and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.

Ct. 2207, 104 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1989). As the Supreme Court

held in each of these cases, evidence concerning victim

impact is inadmissible in the sentencing phase of a

capital trial. This is so because, “Our capital cases

have consistently recognized that ‘[f]or purposes of

imposing the death penalty ... [the defendant’s]

punishment must be tailored to his personal

responsibility and moral guilt.’” Gathers, 490 U.S. 810,

109 S. Ct. at 2210. As the state correctly argues in its

brief, the rulings of these cases has been limited to

circumstances arising in the sentencing phase of a death

penalty case. See Pierce v. State, 576 So. 2d 236 (Ala.

Cr. App. 1990), cert. denied, 576 So. 2d 258 (Ala. 1991).

Furthermore, the evidence in no way violated the Supreme

Court’s holdings in Booth and Gathers. The testimony was

relevant to the state’s case and was correctly received

into evidence.

601 So. 2d at 1079-80. Petitioner raised the claim as an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his Rule 32 petition and

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 109 of 172
30 It should be noted that petitioner relies on Booth and

Gathers to support his assertion that the widow’s testimony in the

guilt phase was violative of the Eighth Amendment, even though both

cases limit the analysis of victim impact evidence to the

sentencing phase of a capital trial. In any event, the testimony

of which petitioner complains, such as the widow’s reading of an

anniversary card, were elicited in response to questions designed

to identify items found in the victim’s truck as belonging to the

victim. That evidence was relevant and admissible. Any comments

that may have been irrelevant, such as the witness’s reference to

a granddaughter, certainly were not so prejudicial as to render the

trial fundamentally unfair. 

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on appeal from the denial of that petition. See Rule 32 Appeal

Claim 3(k). The appellate court rejected the claim, holding that

there was no basis for objection. 783 So. 2d at 134. 

As previously discussed, the resolution of this issue reached

by the Alabama courts is entitled to a presumption of correctness

and deference unless it is contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. The state courts correctly

analyzed the widow’s testimony in light of Booth v. Maryland, 482

U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1987), and South

Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 104 L. Ed. 2d

876 (1989). The courts found that the evidence did not violate the

Supreme Court precedent.30 Petitioner has not pointed out any way

in which the conclusions reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals

were contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent. This court’s own review of the record persuades it that

the state courts’ assessment of the evidence and the conclusions

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 110 of 172
31 Petitioner’s only argument regarding the victim’s widow’s

placement at counsel table references p. 203 of the trial

transcript, at which the prosecutor addresses the venire,

introduces himself, the district attorney, an assistant, and the

widow as the people seated at the prosecutor’s table. He simply

states the widow’s name and explains. “She is the widow of John

Robert Kirk, the man who was killed in this case. She’s from

Gordo, Alabama, Pickens County. Mr. Kirk and his family were long

time residents of Pickens County. He happened to be killed in

Tuscaloosa County.” This recitation was merely information

pertinent to the process of jury selection, which was followed by

questions about whether any member of the venire knew or knew of

any party related to the case. Petitioner does not cite any case

that would suggest that such an introduction of the victim, or her

placement at counsel table, violated any of petitioner’s

constitutional rights. 

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drawn from it are essentially correct and reasonable.31

Accordingly, the claims related to the widow’s testimony are

without merit.

N. Habeas Claims 1(aa) and 21 (Speedy Trial)

Petitioner asserts at paragraphs 106-07 that his counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to assert his right to

a speedy trial, and, at paragraphs 185-87, that his constitutional

rights were violated because it took almost two years for his case

to come to trial. (Claims 1(aa) and 21).) Petitioner first raised

the speedy-trial claim on direct appeal. See Appeal Claim 19. The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals examined the claim and held: 

The appellant contends that he was denied his right to a

speedy trial due to the 22-month delay between the date

of his arrest and the date of his trial.

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In analyzing such a contention, four factors must be

considered in determining whether the accused has been

denied a speedy trial: the length of the delay, the

reasons for the delay, the appellant’s assertion of his

right to a speedy trial, and the degree of prejudice to

the appellant’s case caused by unnecessary delay. Barker

v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.

Ed. 2d 101 (1972).

In the case now before us, 22 months elapsed between the

date of the appellant’s arrest and the date of his trial.

However, such a period is not presumptively prejudicial,

rather, “the length of delay that will provoke such an

inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the particular

circumstances of the case.” Barker, at 530-31, 92 S. Ct.

at 2191-92. See also United States v. Herman, 576 F.2d

1139 (5th Cir. 1978)(22-month delay not unduly arduous);

Kelley v. State, 568 So. 2d 405 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990)(15-

month delay deemed not excessive under the

circumstances); Smelley v. State, 564 So. 2d 74 (Ala. Cr.

App.), cert. denied, 564 So. 2d 89 (Ala. 1990)(28-month

delay did not warrant reversal).

“Although the length of the delay has been said to

trigger the examination of the remaining factors, most

courts do not analyze a speedy trial argument without

taking into account all four factors discussed in

Barker.” Goodson v. State, 588 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala. Cr.

App. 1991). We now look to the reasons for the

aforementioned delay. In his brief, the appellant claims

that he caused none of the delay. However, the record

clearly contradicts this claim. The pretrial history of

this case is as follows:

January 25, 1988 – Appellant arrested for

escape from SIR program.

January 27, 1988 – Capital warrant issued for

appellant.

April 29, 1988 – Appellant indicted by

Tuscaloosa County grand jury for murder during

first degree robbery.

July 20, 1988 – Appellant files a motion to

continue arraignment. Motion granted.

August 19, 1988 – Appellant arraigned, at

which time he pleaded not guilty. Appellant

petitioned for psychiatric evaluation to

determine his competency to stand trial.

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Petition granted. Appellant ordered to be

admitted to Taylor Hardin Secure Medical

Facility as bed space became available.

November 9, 1988 – Appellant admitted to

Taylor Hardin.

December 23, 1988 – Appellant released from

Taylor Hardin.

January 25, 1989 – Report from Taylor Hardin

submitted to the trial court.

February 1, 1989 – Pretrial conference, Trial

set for April 3, 1989.

February 9, 1989 – Appellant files a plethora

of motions and requests an evidentiary hearing

on many of them.

March 9, 1989 – Hearing on previously filed

motions. Appellant announces his intent to

file for a continuance of April 3, trial date.

The state opposes the granting of a

continuance and announces that it is ready for

trial.

March 10, 1989 – Appellant files motion for

continuance. Motion granted.

May 23, 1989 – Appellant files motion for

continuance because one of his attorneys was

injured in an automobile accident. Motion

granted.

August 8, 1989 – Pretrial hearing.

November 27, 1989 – Trial begins.

This court has previously held that, “[d]elays occasioned

by the defendant or on his behalf are excluded from the

length of delay and are heavily counted against the

defendant in applying the balancing test of Barker.”

Walker v. State, 386 So. 2d 762, 763 (Ala. Cr. App.),

cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 765 (Ala. 1980).

Although the appellant claims in his brief that he

asserted his right to a speedy trial, a review of the

record fails to support his claim. We find no evidence

that the appellant either demanded or made any attempt to

obtain an earlier trial. This point, coupled with the

fact that the appellant is largely responsible for the

delay of his trial, leads us to conclude that the

appellant was not denied his right to a speedy trial.

601 So. 2d at 1066-67. 

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In his post-conviction proceeding, petitioner challenged his

attorney’s performance for failing to secure speedy trial. See

Rule 32 Appeal Claim 23(jj). The appellate court determined that

any delay in the trial date was sought by petitioner or on his

behalf, and thus was caused by petitioner. See 783 So. 2d at 132.

Petitioner contends that, because there was a delay of almost

two years between his indictment on the capital murder charge and

his trial, witnesses and evidence became unavailable. However, the

only witness that petitioner specifies was unavailable to testify

was Ms. Wilkins, petitioner’s aunt, who acted as an adoptive mother

to him. There is no allegation that Wilkins had any knowledge of

the facts of the crime, only that she could have testified as to

petitioner’s difficult childhood. Accordingly, there is no

evidence or argument that the delay impaired the fairness of the

guilt phase of the trial — only that petitioner lost evidence that

might have been presented at the penalty phase as evidence of

mitigating circumstances. At the penalty phase, the attorneys’

presentation of mitigation evidence included evidence of his

childhood and the deprivation he suffered. Essentially, Wilkins’

testimony would have been cumulative, and the petitioner did not

suffer any prejudice from the absence of Wilkins’ testimony. For

that reason alone, the ineffective-assistance claim relating to the

delay in trial is due to be denied. See Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

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Furthermore, petitioner has not contested that any of the delays

identified by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals as being sought

by petitioner through his attorneys, were, in fact, not sought by

or approved by petitioner. Put another way, petitioner has failed

to demonstrate that he ever asserted his right to a speedy trial

before trial. For all of these reasons, both the substantive

speedy-trial claim and the related claim of ineffective assistance

are due to be denied. 

O. Habeas Claim 1(bb)(Failure To Preserve Issues For Appeal)

Petitioner asserts at paragraph 161 that his counsel at trial

unreasonably failed to make objections to numerous defects in the

trial, which resulted in the application of the “plain error”

standard of review on appeal (Claim 1(bb)). If the objections had

been made at trial, they would have been sustained, petitioner

argues. Because no objection was made, however, the claims on

appeal were dismissed under the stringent “plain error” review.

Petitioner did not raise this claim on appeal or in his Rule 32

petition in the trial court. He raised it for the first time in

the appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. See Rule 32

Appeal Claim 6.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the claim as

procedurally barred because it was not presented in the circuit

court below. See 783 So. 2d at 133. Accordingly, the last court

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 115 of 172
32 Petitioner concedes that this claim was first raised in

his amended habeas petition. (Petitioner’s Brief, p. 75 n. 14).

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to review this claim has clearly stated that the claim was

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has made no showing of cause

and prejudice, or of a fundamental miscarraige of justice, to avoid

the default; therefore, petitioner is entitled to no relief.

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d

308, 317 (1989).

P. Habeas Claim 1(dd)(Failure To Object To Gunshot Evidence)

Petitioner’s final claim of ineffective assistance is set

forth at paragraphs 110-12 and alleges that his attorneys should

have objected to testimony from a medical examiner who said the

angle of the victim’s gunshot wound was consistent with the victim

being shot while on his knees or lying down. This claim was not

raised on direct appeal, and was not included in the Rule 32

petition. It has never been presented to the state courts.32

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to any relief on this claim

in the instant action. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir.

2001). 

Petitioner’s Claim 1(dd) is due to be dismissed as

procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise this specific

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the state court in

his Rule 32 petition. The mere fact that other claims of

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 116 of 172
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ineffective assistance were raised in the Rule 32 petition is not

enough to exhaust this claim. The Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals has held that to allow a petitioner “to allege a single

instance of ineffective assistance in his state post-conviction

proceedings and then proceed to federal court to allege additional

instances would be contrary to the state’s ‘full and fair

opportunity to address the claim on the merits.’” Footman v.

Singletary, 978 F.2d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir. 1992). Presentation of

the claim in state court now is barred by Alabama’s successive

petitions rule, found at Rule 32.2(b) of the Alabama Rules of

Criminal Procedure, and it would be untimely under Rule 32.2(c).

Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice to excuse these default. Claim 1(dd) is due

to be dismissed.

Q. Habeas Claim 2 (Alabama’s Inadequate Funding For Defense

Of Capital Cases

In relation to the quality of the work of his defense counsel

at trial, petitioner further alleges at paragraphs 108-109 that,

because Alabama provides inadequate funding for the compensation of

defense attorneys and their expenses in capital trials, he received

ineffective assistance of counsel (Claim 2). This claim first was

raised in his appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition. See

Rule 32 Appeal Claim 5. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 117 of 172
33 Even if this claim were due to be examined on the merits,

which it is not, it would fail because petitioner alleges only

generally that inadequate pay results in inadequate representation.

Petitioner does not offer any evidence that his representation at

this trial was actually inadequate because of the state’s

compensation scheme. In fact, both his attorneys and the

investigator have testified that they worked more hours than they

could be compensated for. Petitioner urges this court essentially

to conclude that any attorney who works pro bono therefore provides

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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denied the claim on grounds that it had not been raised in the

original Rule 32 petition or the amended petition, and thus was not

properly before the court. See 783 So. 2d at 132. Accordingly,

the last state court to examine the claim clearly decided that the

claim was procedurally defaulted, and petitioner is not now

entitled to any relief on that claim. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308, 317 (1989).33

But even if not procedurally defaulted, it fails to state a

claim for habeas relief. Under the Strickland standard, a

petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must identify

particular errors or deficiencies in counsel’s representation,

proving how those errors and deficiencies cause actual prejudice to

the defense. Here, petitioner has made no attempt to link

particular errors, deficiencies, or problems with his defense to a

lack of funding for counsel. Even though one might assume that the

limitation of funding for counsel in capital cases causes real

problems, an assumption is not enough to prove a constitutional

violation. Petitioner must allege and show that some specific

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 118 of 172
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shortcoming in counsel’s representation of him was directly

attributable to a lack of funding. That has not been done in this

case. Many of petitioner’s complaints, such as counsel’s failure

to object, could not have been cured by funding. Moreover, it is

undisputed that counsel performed work for which they were not

paid; consequently, it cannot be argued that counsel declined to

work on petitioner’s behalf when the funding for the defense was

depleted. Given the strong presumption of competence afforded

counsel under Strickland, the court cannot simply assume that

inadequate defense funding actually produced a constitutionally

ineffective performance by counsel. The issue is not what counsel

could have done if they were given greater or unlimited funding;

rather, it is whether the limitation on funds sank their

representation below a constitutional minimum. Aside from the

general complaint that funding was inadequate, there is an

insufficient showing by petitioner that inadequate funding produced

an ineffective performance by counsel. No relief is warranted on

this claim. 

R. Habeas Claims 3(a) and (b) (Failure To Present Evidence

Of Mitigating Circumstances)

Petitioner also asserts that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial. At

paragraphs 117-32, petitioner asserts that his counsel unreasonably

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 119 of 172
34 Petitioner further asserts that the presentation of

evidence of mitigation was constitutionally inadequate in light of

more recent Supreme Court pronouncements on the issue of a

defendant’s intellectual abilities and psychological makeup in

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471

(2003). See Petitioner’s Supplemental Memorandum, pp. 2-7. 

35 Petitioner also complains that Sumrall failed to access

Department of Corrections records on petitioner, but petitioner has

not described any information contained in those records that might

have been beneficial in proving mitigating circumstances. 

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failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence, including

evidence of petitioner’s psychological profile.34 Petitioner

complains that counsel should have discovered and presented

witnesses who could have testified about his difficult childhood

and his learning problems. He specifically names: (1) Herbert

Echoles, who could have testified that petitioner was regularly

whipped with belts and extension cords by his stepfather and that

petitioner was “slow” in school; (2) Deborah Grenshaw, who could

have testified that petitioner frequently was locked out of his

home as an adolescent and was forced to live on the streets for

days at a time; (3) Laura Williams, who could have testified about

the lack of adult involvement in petitioner’s childhood; and (4)

Jesse Hill, petitioner’s stepfather, who allegedly whipped

petitioner with belts and cords.35 Next, petitioner asserts that

counsel failed to seek the assistance of an expert psychologist to

investigate mitigating mental health issues, testify about the

effects of drug and alcohol abuse and an “impoverished and abusive

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 120 of 172
36 Petitioner has moved this court for approval of funds for

the appointment of a psychologist or psychiatrist to examine

petitioner in connection with the instant petition. He asserts

that expert assistance would support petitioner’s claims that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the

presentation and rebuttal of evidence relating to petitioner’s

psychological condition (court document #27). Petitioner’s motion

is due to be and hereby is DENIED. The assistance of a

psychologist or psychiatrist at this stage of the litigation would

not change the resolution of the petitioner’s instant claim that

his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present

the testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist at trial. As

discussed in this section, the state courts adjudicated the issue

of the attorneys’ competence, appropriately applying Strickland,

and found that the petitioner failed to meet either prong of the

Strickland test. The state courts determined that counsel made a

reasoned, informed decision to present the evidence through Sumrall

instead of through another professional. Such tactical decisions

are “virtually unassailable.” Williams v. Head, 185 F. 3d 1223,

1242 (11th Cir. 1999). The finding that Bivens made a defensible

strategic choice was supported by the testimony of Bivens (Rule 32

Hearing Transcript, p. 50), and thus was not an unreasonable

application of the facts. Accordingly, even if the examination of

a psychologist or psychiatrist now would demonstrate that counsel’s

strategic choice was “wrong” or that another expert would have

provided more favorable testimony, counsel’s performance still

withstands scrutiny under the highly deferential review of

strategic choices mandated by Strickland, and required by §

2254(d). 

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environment,” and advise counsel about how to rebut testimony from

the state’s mental health experts.36

Petitioner first raised these claims in the context of his

post-conviction petition. See Rule 32 Claims 23(i) and (m); Rule

32 Appeal Claims 2(a) and (b). In reviewing the claim about

investigating and presenting mitigating evidence, the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals stated: 

First, the appellant contends that his attorneys rendered

ineffective assistance because they allegedly did not

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investigate and present sufficient mitigating evidence

during the penalty phase of his trial. Specifically, he

contends that counsel should have called witnesses who

could have testified about his background and upbringing,

including the “personal hardships and severe

deprivations” he suffered. (Appellant’s brief at p. 44.)

In Daniels v. State, 650 So. 2d 544, 568-70 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1024, 115 S. Ct. 1375,

131 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1995), we stated the following

regarding a claim that trial counsel had rendered

ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of a

capital murder trial:

“In determining whether Haas was ineffective

at original sentencing, ... we recognize that

the 

“‘two-pronged Strickland analysis applies

whether the ineffectiveness complained of

occurred in the defendant’s trial or in a

subsequent adversarial sentencing proceeding.

However, in a challenge to the imposition of a

death sentence, the prejudice prong of the

Strickland inquiry focuses on whether “the

sentencer ... would have concluded that the

balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances did not warrant death.”’

“Stevens v. Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1081 (11th

Cir. 1992)(citation omitted), cert. denied,

507 U.S. 929, 113 S. Ct. 1306, 122 L. Ed. 2d

695 (1993). We also recognize that

“‘[w]hile “[i]t should be beyond cavil that an

attorney who fails altogether to make any

preparations for the penalty phase of a

capital murder trial deprives his client of

reasonably effective assistance of counsel by

any objective standard of reasonableness,” see

Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533 (11th Cir.

1985), it is unclear how detailed an

investigation is necessary to provide a

defendant with the effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland only requires that

counsel’s actions fall within the wide

spectrum of what can be considered reasonable

assistance of counsel.’

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 122 of 172
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“White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1224 (11th

Cir. 1992). The principles regarding an

attorney’s duty to conduct an investigation

into mitigating evidence have been summarized

as follows:

“‘An attorney has a duty to conduct a

reasonable investigation, including an

investigation of the defendant’s background,

for possible mitigating evidence. Thompson v.

Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir.

1986). First, it must be determined whether a

reasonable investigation should have uncovered

such mitigating evidence. If so, then a

determination must be made whether the failure

to put this evidence before the jury was a

tactical choice by trial counsel. If so, such

a choice must be given a strong presumption of

correctness, and the inquiry is generally at

an end. Funchess v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 683,

689-90 (11th Cir. 1985). If, however, the

failure to present the mitigating evidence was

an oversight, and not a tactical decision,

then a harmlessness review must be made to

determine if there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Thus, it must be determined that

defendant suffered actual prejudice due to the

ineffectiveness of his trial counsel before

relief will be granted.’

“Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 493 (11th

Cir. 1988).

“Applying the foregoing principles to the

issue of whether Haas provided effective

assistance of counsel at original sentencing,

we conclude that the appellant’s claim is

without merit. Although the defense called

only one witness at the sentencing hearing,

that witness was Mrs. Hebert, the appellant’s

mother, who pleaded for the appellant’s life.

Mrs. Hebert had retained Haas, conferred with

him at length, paid all his trial fees, and,

by the time of sentencing, had exhausted her

funds. The circuit court’s sentencing order

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stated that ‘it is apparent to the court that

[Mrs. Hebert] was devoted to [the appellant].’

“Since Haas had spoken with Mrs. Hebert about

the appellant and had observed by her words

and actions that she appeared to be ‘devoted’

to the appellant, we cannot fault Haas for

failing to discover the appellant’s

‘traumatic’ childhood, in which, according to

later testimony by Dr. Herlihy, Mrs. Hebert’s

‘emotional rejection’ of her son played a

large part. Compare Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883

F.2d 1503, 1520 (11th Cir. 1989)(defense

counsel held to have provided effective

assistance on claim that counsel overlooked or

failed to investigate evidence of defendant’s

traumatic childhood, where counsel interviewed

defendant’s parents), cert. denied, 497 U.S.

1032, 110 S. Ct. 3296, 111 L. Ed. 2d 804

(1990). See also Beets v. Collins, 986 F.2d

1478, 1488-89 (5th Cir. 1993)(although counsel

did not ‘conduct a thorough investigation of

[the defendant’s] medical, mental, and

psychological history,’ which would have

revealed that the defendant ‘was raised in

abject poverty, experienced a debilitating

hearing loss, was afflicted with learning

disabilities, had received head injuries as a

child, and suffers from battered woman

syndrome,’ the court observed that the

defendant never gave her attorney ‘any hint

that she had been abused by previous husbands

or boyfriends. Neither [the defendant] nor

any other member of her family ever conveyed

to [the attorney] any information giving him

reason to believe that she had a history of

being physically abused.’), rehearing granted,

998 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1993); Cantu v. Collins,

967 F.2d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1992)(despite

fact that counsel failed to present evidence

of defendant’s ‘low IQ, emotional immaturity,

troubled youth, trauma as a result of his

parents’ divorce, and appearance of neglect,’

court found that counsel had ‘thoroughly

investigated these claims, consulting with his

client as well as [client’s] father and

brother for possible mitigating evidence,’ and

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the claims were not supported in fact), cert.

denied, 509 U.S. 926, 113 S. Ct. 3045, 125 L.

Ed. 2d 730 (1993); Wilkerson v. Collins, 950

F.2d 1054, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1992) (although

attorney failed to discover or develop

mitigating evidence that defendant had a

‘deprived family background,’ and

psychological and mental ‘limitations,’ the

court observed that ‘trial counsel interviewed

[the defendant], his mother, and other

relatives. Neither [the defendant] nor his

relatives were able to supply the names of

potential defense witnesses. Investigation

did not reveal reason to suspect that [the

defendant’s] mental capacity was in any

fashion impaired.’), cert. denied, 509 U.S.

921, 113 S. Ct. 3035, 125 L. Ed. 2d 722

(1993); Thompson v. State, 581 So. 2d 1216,

1238 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991)(upholding circuit

court’s finding that counsel, who presented

only the testimony of defendant’s mother at

sentencing, was not ineffective for failing to

present evidence of the defendant’s violent

family background, addiction and substance

abuse), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030, 112 S.

Ct. 868, 116 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1992).

“We hold that Haas was not ineffective at the

original sentencing proceeding.”

650 So. 2d at 568-70 (emphasis omitted). Also, counsel

does not necessarily render ineffective assistance simply

because he does not present all possible mitigating

evidence. “Although the failure to conduct a reasonable

investigation of possible mitigating evidence may

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘counsel

may make a reasonable strategic judgment to present less

than all possible available evidence in mitigation.’

Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 965 (11th Cir. 1983), 467

U.S. 1219, 104 S. Ct. 2667, 81 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1984).”

Lundy v. State, 568 So. 2d 399, 403 (Ala. Crim. App.

1990).

“When a decision to not put on certain

mitigating evidence is based on a ‘strategic

choice,’ courts have always found no

ineffective performance. Moore v. Maggio, 740

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F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472

U.S. 1032, 105 S. Ct. 3514, 87 L. Ed. 2d 643

(1985); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285 (5th

Cir. 1987), aff’d, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S. Ct.

546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1988). No two lawyers

would try a case exactly the same way.

“We cannot say that counsel’s performance is

deficient because he failed to call more

witnesses at the sentencing phase. ‘The

decision not to call a particular witness is

usually a tactical decision not constituting

ineffective assistance of counsel.’ Oliver v.

State, 435 So. 2d 207, 208 (Ala. Cr. App.

1983). At the hearing on the Rule 32

petition, the appellant’s mother, two of his

aunts, an uncle, and several old friends

offered character testimony. Most of these

witnesses did not have contact with the

appellant near the time of the murder. There

has never been a case where additional

witnesses could not have been called. The

appellant presented relatives and personal

friends who, upon interview, were found to

testify on his behalf. We refuse to set a

standard that a court may be reversed because

it did not hear unoffered testimony from still

more friends and relatives. We also refuse to

say that a member of the bar is guilty of

ineffectiveness for not calling every witness

and friend who was willing to testify. To

hold otherwise would clog an already

overburdened system with repetitious

testimony. The appellant has failed to

satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.”

State v. Tarver, 629 So. 2d 14, 21 (Ala. Crim. App.

1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078, 114 S. Ct. 1664, 128

L. Ed. 2d 380 (1994).

“With regard to McKinnon’s representation of

Morrison at the punishment-fixing and

sentencing phases of his trial, we find that

the observations of the court in Clark v.

Dugger, 834 F.2d 1561, 1568 (11th Cir. 1987),

are appropriate:

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“‘The failure to conduct a reasonable

investigation of possible mitigating evidence

may render counsel’s assistance ineffective.

Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1025

(11th Cir. 1987); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787

F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

481 U.S. 1042, 107 S. Ct. 1986, 95 L. Ed. 2d

825 (1987). “After a sufficient investigation, however, ‘counsel may make a

reasonable strategic judgment to present less

than all possible available evidence in

mitigation.’” Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1025

(quoting Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 889

(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1026,

107 S. Ct. 3248, 97 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1987) and

Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 965 (11th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, sub nom. [Stanley v.

Kemp,] 467 U.S. 1219, 104 S. Ct. 2667, 81 L.

Ed. 2d 372 (1984)). In essence, “[c]ounsel

has no absolute duty to present mitigating

character evidence.” Id. (quoting Mitchell,

762 F.2d at 889). [Counsel] conducted a

reasonable investigation to determine the

availability of appropriate mitigating

evidence and simply made a tactical decision

to not present some of the available

mitigating evidence. In this circuit,

[counsel’s] decision is “accorded a strong

presumption of correctness which is ‘virtually

unchallengeable.’” Id. (quoting Sinclair v.

Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1519 (11th Cir.

1987) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984)). Given the alternatives ...

faced, [counsel’s] handling of the penalty

phase was not unreasonable. See Stanley, 697

F.2d at 958-70. We therefore conclude that

there has been no showing of ineffective

assistance nor prejudice to defendant in the

way trial counsel prepared and tried [this]

case.’”

Morrison v. State, 551 So. 2d 435, 445 (Ala. Crim. App.

1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 911, 110 S. Ct. 1938, 109

L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)(alterations in original).

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“We find that the holding of Fleming v. Kemp,

748 F.2d 1435, 1452 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1058, 106 S. Ct. 1286, 89 L.

Ed. 2d 593 (1986), is applicable here:

“‘In summary, we are not persuaded by

petitioner’s argument that ... [defense

counsel] rendered him ineffective assistance

of counsel. Petitioner’s examples of

professional dereliction dissolve away under

close scrutiny, leaving at best a handful of

colorable claims. A defense attorney is not

ineffective solely because his client is

sentenced to death. “Intrusive post-trial

inquiry into attorney performance,” such as

that which has been required in this case, may

“dampen the ardor and impair the independence

of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance

of assigned cases, and undermine the trust

between attorney and client.” Strickland v.

Washington, [466] U.S. at [690], 104 S. Ct. at

2066. Counsel’s performance, here, ensured a

fundamentally “fair trial” which “produced a

just result.” Id. at [686], 104 S. Ct. at

2064. There is no reason to set aside

petitioner’s conviction or his penalty on

account of the representation he received.’”

Bell v. State, 518 So. 2d 840, 847 (Ala. Crim. App.

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1036, 108 S. Ct. 2024, 100

L. Ed. 2d 611 (1988). Finally, the appellant bears a

heavy burden of proof when he claims that his counsel

rendered ineffective assistance.

“Further, we cannot say that the appellant

suffered any prejudice based on counsel’s

performance because he failed to demonstrate

any evidence of mitigation. Prejudice cannot

merely be alleged; it must be affirmatively

proved. Duren v. State, 590 So. 2d 360 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1990). Thus, the appellant has not

shown that there is a reasonable probability

that the outcome of his trial would have been

different, but for trial counsel’s

performance. Baldwin [v. State, 539 So. 2d

1103 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988)], Thompson v. State,

581 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), cert.

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denied, 502 U.S. 1030, 112 S. Ct. 868, 116 L.

Ed. 2d 774 (1992).”

Brooks v. State, 695 So. 2d 176, 182 (Ala. Crim. App.

1996), aff’d, 695 So. 2d 184 (Ala.), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 893, 118 S. Ct. 233, 139 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1997).

The record from the appellant’s direct appeal shows that

Dr. Raymond O. Sumrall testified before the jury during

the penalty-phase proceedings. Dr. Sumrall, who was a

professor at the School of Social Work at the University

of Alabama and an associate professor with the

University’s Department of Criminal Justice, testified

that he spent ten hours interviewing the appellant and

that he had reviewed the appellant’s background. He

testified that the appellant’s mother deserted him when

he was very young; that he lived with his maternal

grandmother; that, at age seven, when his maternal

grandmother died, he moved in with his aunt; that he did

not have a stable home environment; that he had not had

any relationships with significant adult and stable women

in his life; that he did not have a relationship with his

father because his father left when the appellant was two

years old; that, from the ages of nine to twelve, “he was

pretty much a street kid who came and went without very

much supervision from anybody” (Trial R. 1026); that he

could not discipline himself; and that he had been

extensively involved in the use of drugs and other

substances since he was sixteen. Dr. Sumrall also

testified that he had not observed any pattern of

behavior in the appellant that was assaultive or violent

and that committing murder was not consistent with the

appellant’s prior behavior, which involved only property

offenses.

There was also testimony that the appellant had been

evaluated at the Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility

(“Taylor Hardin”) by several doctors. Using that

evaluation, Dr. Bernard E. Bryant, a psychiatrist,

testified that the appellant had an antisocial

personality and that he showed remorse about the offense.

Finally, the trial court held a separate bench sentencing

hearing after the jury had returned its recommendation

and after the presentence investigation had been

completed. At this hearing, Reverend Charles Hunter

testified that he had known the appellant since the

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appellant was a child and that he was not a violent

person. The appellant also testified at the hearing that

he was the type of person who liked to help people and

“look out” for people. He further testified that he did

not have a history of violence and that he had never

previously been convicted of a violent crime.

When addressing this claim, the circuit court made the

following findings:

“In his Post-Hearing Brief, Williams contends

that testimony could have been adduced by

defense counsel through Herbert Echols, Debra

Grenshaw (spelled ‘Grinshaw’ in the transcript

of the evidentiary hearing), Jesse Hill [the

appellant’s stepfather] and/or Laura Williams

to paint a picture of Luther Williams’

deprived and impoverished childhood. There is

some question as to Mr. Echols’ accessibility

and availability during the period of [trial

counsel’s] representation of Williams,

inasmuch as Mr. Echols testified at the

evidentiary hearing that he was living in

Detroit from 1988 to 1990, and even his

brother did not really know how to find him,

because at one point in time he was homeless.

(EH 145). Nonetheless, the testimony elicited

from him and from the other aforementioned

witnesses at the evidentiary hearing related

to information essentially cumulative to that

provided the jury by Dr. Sumrall. Williams

argues in his Post-Hearing Brief that those

witnesses could have acquainted the jury with

the fact that his mother had deserted him and

his siblings when he was still very young;

that his father likewise had abandoned him;

that he thereafter was raised by Laura

Wilkins; and that he was often locked out of

her house and forced to fend for himself. In

his testimony at the evidentiary hearing,

Luther Williams explained that when Ms.

Wilkins would lock him out, for two to three

days at a time, he would live ‘over [at] other

friends’ houses.’ (EH 189-90). The contention is made in the Post-Hearing Brief that

testimony could have been presented through

Mr. Echols that Luther, along with Mr. Echols,

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was regularly whipped by Mr. Hill with

switches, belts, and extension cords.

Williams himself testified at the evidentiary

hearing that he had a good relationship with

Mr. Hill when he didn’t whip him, and Luther

still loved him. (EH 190). Dr. Sumrall put

before the jury that Luther Williams’ ‘mother

deserted him at a very young age’ and that he

lived with a maternal grandmother for a while

but that she died when he was seven, leaving

Luther with an aunt who apparently adopted him

when he was about nine; that ‘from his birth

to age nine he had no stable environment’;

that he had ‘no relationship with significant

adult and stable women in his life’; that he

had no relationship with a significant father

figure in his life’; that his father had left

him when he was only two years old; and that

from about nine to twelve years of age ‘he was

pretty much a street kid who came and went

without very much supervision from anybody.’

(R. 1025-26). When Williams’ present counsel

called Jesse Hill to the stand at the

evidentiary hearing, he was not asked any

questions concerning any alleged mistreatment

of Luther by him. Further, Mr. Hill was asked

virtually no questions at that hearing

concerning Luther Williams’ impoverished or

deprived background, other than concerning the

undisputed fact that Luther’s mother and

father were not involved in his life after his

early years. (EH 163). With respect to the

argument made in the post-hearing brief that

use of a psychologist, such as Dr. Barbara

Tarkin, could have paved the way for

presentation of significant non-statutory

mitigation evidence, the testimony she

presented was not in disagreement with that of

Dr. Sumrall or the State’s penalty-phase

expert, Dr. Bernard E. Bryant. The contention

is made in the post-hearing brief that ‘Dr.

Tarkin, or another qualified psychologist,

could have offered an opinion, consistent with

that of Taylor Hardin’s psychiatrist, that Mr.

Williams’ condition was a condition that

developed in all probability by virtue of his

very early childhood deprivation.’ (PHB, p.

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17). Dr. Bryant, who testified that he was

employed at Taylor Hardin from April 1 of 1986

through August 31 of 1989, opined that

Williams had an antisocial personality (R.

108). He explained that it is a ‘characterological or personality’ disorder developed

during a person’s formative years, of ages ‘2,

3, 6, 7, 8 years old,’ whereby ‘the person has

ended up with this personality.’ (R. 1082).

Dr. Bryant acknowledged during crossexamination by [trial counsel] that an

unstable family could, if there were not a

proper male or female role model, contribute

to a person having antisocial characteristics.

(R. 1097). He further acknowledged that

‘substance abuse does exacerbate’ (R. 1098).

“The court does not find that the failure to

utilize the witnesses now suggested by

Williams constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel.... The pertinent information was

presented to the jury through Dr. Sumrall,

without the risk being run of possibly harmful

information being elicited from those

witnesses on cross-examination. Furthermore,

even if [trial counsel’s] preparation and

presentation were deficient in this regard,

Williams has failed to show the requisite

second prong of prejudice. He has not met the

Strickland test of showing a reasonable

probability that, absent the error in

question, the sentencer would have concluded

that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances did not warrant death; he has

not shown a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.”

(C.R. 684-87.) We agree with the circuit court’s

findings and adopt them as part of this opinion. In

addition, we note that the trial court found, as

nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, that the appellant

had an antisocial personality, that he did not have a

significant prior history of assaultive or violent

conduct, that he had not had a stable family environment

during his formative years, and that he had extensively

abused alcohol and drugs since he was about 16 years old.

(Trial R. 1433). For the above-stated reasons, the

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appellant has not shown that counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in the preparation and presentation of

mitigating evidence. See Strickland, supra.

783 So. 2d at 115-21. The appellate court further stated, in

relation to the claim that counsel failed to present expert

psychological testimony:

Second, the appellant contends that his attorneys

rendered ineffective assistance because they did not seek

the assistance of a psychologist to help present

mitigating evidence. The circuit court made the

following findings regarding this claim:

“[Trial counsel’s] utilization of Raymond O.

Sumrall was a defensible strategic choice.

Dr. Sumrall spent nine to ten hours

interviewing Williams, exclusive of any other

case investigation/preparation (R. 1042), and

he brought to his assignment, and detailed for

the jury, a diverse and extensive background

of both academic and professional credentials

and a wide variety of work experiences (R.

1006-19). At the time of this testimony, he

was a professor at the School of Social Work

and was also an associate professor with the

Department of Criminal Justice; he taught

courses in criminal justice, crime, and

delinquency; he has a Master’s degree in

social work with an emphasis in psychiatric

social work; a Master’s of Divinity degree

with an emphasis on pastoral counseling; and a

Ph.D. He had worked as a chief probation

officer, a parole officer, and a consultant to

the Office of the Chief of Police of

Birmingham. Such a background might well be

expected to more favorably impress a jury than

the ‘ivory tower’ perspective of a

psychologist or a psychiatrist.”

(C.R. 683-84.) The circuit court also found:

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“The court finds that [trial counsel’s]

decision to use the services of Dr. Sumrall,

rather than a psychologist, was a tactical

decision within the wide range of

professionally competent assistance. The

court has carefully reviewed and reconsidered

the testimony of the clinical psychologist who

Williams put forward at the evidentiary

hearing to develop support for this ground,

Dr. Barbara Tarkin. She was offered as an

expert in clinical psychology. (EH 285).

From her review of records relating to Mr.

Williams, she noted that a diagnosis of

antisocial behavior had been put forth as a

diagnosis, and, although she had not been

asked to develop a psychological diagnosis of

Mr. Williams, she included among the ‘working

hypotheses in my head’ a diagnosis that ‘Mr.

Williams engaged in significant antisocial

behaviors.’ ... Dr. Tarkin’s testimony was

not inconsistent with the opinions expressed

by Dr. Sumrall and Dr. Karl Kirkland. The

testimony of Dr. Tarkin does not support the

proposition that the use of the services of a

psychologist by trial counsel, ‘who could have

examined [Williams] and prepared a report on

his mental condition’ would have developed any

beneficial information. Stated another way,

there is no showing of prejudice, as required

by Strickland.

(C.R. 673-74.) We agree with the circuit court’s

findings and adopt them as part of this opinion.

Accordingly, the appellant has not shown that his

attorneys rendered ineffective assistance in this regard.

See Strickland, supra.

783 So. 2d at 121-22. 

Insofar as petitioner criticizes counsel’s failure to present

evidence of his traumatic childhood as a mitigating factor, the

state courts concluded that evidence of petitioner’s childhood was,

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in fact, presented to the jury during the penalty phase through the

testimony of Sumrall, a professor and licensed, certified social

worker. Sumrall interviewed Williams personally for approximately

10 hours; he reviewed mental health records, police records, and

probation and parole records. (Transcript, pp. R-1028-30, 1032,

1042, 1046.)

As the trial and appellate courts noted, Sumrall testified

that petitioner was deserted by his mother at a very young age,

that he was reared by a grandmother until she died when he was 7

years old, and that he then lived with an aunt. (Transcript, p. R1025.) He specifically stated that petitioner had “no stable

environment” as a small child, and had “no relationships with

significant” women or father figures. (Transcript, p. R-1025.) He

said petitioner had abused drugs and alcohol since age 16, and that

from age 9 to 12 he was “pretty much a street kid who came and went

without very much supervision from anybody.” (Transcript, p. R1026.)

The only evidence that petitioner suggests was not presented

but could have been was that of four witnesses. The first is

Herbert Echoles, who could have testified that petitioner was

regularly beaten by his stepfather, was slow in school, and was

picked on by others as a child because of his small stature. (See

Rule 32 Hearing Transcript, pp. 138-147.) The other witnesses

named by petitioner are Debra Grenshaw, Jesse Hill, and Laura

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Williams, all of whom petitioner states could have described

petitioner’s deprived childhood. Grenshaw apparently could have

testified that petitioner had been locked out of his house as an

adolescent. Laura Williams, petitioner’s step-sister, could have

testified to the “lack of adult involvement” in petitioner’s early

life. Although petitioner does not describe what Hill might have

testified to, it would appear that petitioner expected Hill to

admit to having beaten petitioner as a child. 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals noted that there was a

question as to whether Echoles was available as a witness at the

time of trial because he was living in Detroit. 783 So. 2d at 120.

Echoles stated at the Rule 32 hearing that he had been in Detroit

from 1988-1990, and that he had been homeless for some of that

time. (See Rule 32 Hearing Transcript, p. 145.) The court further

noted that the proffered testimony of Grenshaw and Williams was

cumulative to that given by Sumrall. Finally, petitioner has

presented no evidence that Hill was available or would have

testified that he was violent toward his stepson. Petitioner

failed, however, to elicit any such testimony from Hill at the Rule

32 hearing. Because petitioner had an opportunity to prove the

claim related to Hill’s testimony in state court proceedings, he

cannot offer additional evidence in support of the claim in these

proceedings without showing cause and prejudice explaining his

earlier failure to do so. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112

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S. Ct. 1715, 118 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1992). Petitioner has not offered

any explanation for his failure to elicit this evidence from Hill

at the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing. 

The claim as to all of the witnesses urged by petitioner must

fail, however. First, this court must find that the state court’s

assessment that counsel made a strategic choice not to present the

witnesses urged by petitioner was an “unreasonable application” of

the facts because there was no testimony elicited at the Rule 32

hearing that counsel made such a tactical decision. To the

contrary, Bivens testified that he simply presented what evidence

he had, which at least suggests that he was unaware of the

potential witnesses. (Rule 32 Hearing Transcript, p. 50).

Certainly, Bivens never described any evaluation of the proposed

testimony or any decision to avoid the potential negative

consequences of the testimony, as the state court suggests.

Even so, this court must agree with the state appellate

court’s determination that petitioner has failed to show that he

was prejudiced by the absence of these witnesses. The essential

facts to which they would have testified were presented to the jury

through Sumrall. There is no basis upon which the court can find

that the absence of the witnesses actually prejudiced the

petitioner. A showing of prejudice requires a finding that, if the

mitigation evidence had been presented, the sentencing authority

“would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and

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mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Stevens v. Zant,

968 F.2d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929,

113 S. Ct. 1306, 122 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1993).

The court is cognizant that evidence of violence against the

defendant as a child can sometimes be used to justify a conclusion

that the defendant would likely use violence against others. Even

if the additional mitigating evidence had been fully presented to

the court and jury during the sentencing phase, it is at least

debatable, and therefore objectively reasonable, to conclude that

it would not have swayed the sentencing decisions. 

Other courts have noted that the type of mitigation evidence

urged by petitioner is not always helpful at trial. The courts

have noted that evidence of drug and alcohol abuse “often has

little mitigating value and can do as much or more harm than good

in the eyes of the jury.” Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1321

(11th Cir. 2002); see also Haliburton v. Secretary for the

Department of Corrections, 342 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2003). Because

of the double-edged sword such evidence presents, counsel is given

great deference in the decision whether or not to resort to it.

Evidence of childhood abuse, like that of drug and alcohol abuse,

often can do little good and can cause harm. For example, in

Haliburton, the court of appeals quoted the testimony of an

attorney on the difficulty of the decision to present such

evidence:

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At the state evidentiary hearing, Bailey testified that

he chose not to present evidence about Haliburton’s

abusive background in part because such evidence “can

paint an appealing picture of how your client was abused

and all those factors lead up to him doing what [he] did

and you may convince the jury of that absolutely; but you

may also convince them that, paint a picture of

Frankenstein.”

342 F.3d at 1244 n. 30. Although Haliburton is a different case

involving a different petitioner, the difficulty of deciding

whether to present childhood-abuse evidence remains the same. The

effect such evidence might have on the jury cannot be said to be

universally favorable. That being the case, the court cannot

simply assume that if counsel had presented such evidence, it would

have had a mitigating effect; it might have had just the opposite

effect. Thus, whether “correct” or not, the conclusion by the

state courts that it would not have had a significant mitigating

effect to undermine confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase

cannot be said to be objectively unreasonable. Even if this court

were to find that counsel acted below the acceptable standard of

conduct by failing to discover and present these witnesses,

petitioner’s claim still would not succeed because it fails to meet

the prejudice prong of Strickland. The issue is not whether this

court might view the mitigating impact of this evidence

differently, or even whether the state courts’ conclusions are

“correct.” Rather, under § 2254(d), the question is whether the

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37 At the Rule 32 hearing, Bivens testified: “There was

nothing to indicate anything of a mental defense for Luther and

nothing that demonstrated to me that a psychiatrist or psychologist

or a social worker would have any better or more standing with a

jury. So, a social worker would do just as well. The point was to

get somebody who could – I could depend on to assist with the

preparation of the penalty phase and to provide me with the

information I needed. And I felt that Ray [Sumrall] was more than

adequate to do that. I didn’t think the credentials would be an

issue, not with the jury.” (Rule 32 Hearing Transcript, p. 72.)

This explains why counsel did not supplement the earlier motion

seeking appointment of a psychologist, conduct which also forms a

basis for petitioner’s claim. See Petitioner’s Brief, p. 94. 

-140-

conclusion that the mitigating impact of the potential evidence was

insufficient to have compelled a different sentencing outcome is

objectively unreasonable. Because it is not, that conclusion is

entitled to deference, and habeas relief is not warranted.

Petitioner’s claims that counsel were ineffective in failing

to seek the assistance of a psychologist at the penalty phase also

is unavailing. The credentials of the expert selected by the

defense were impressive, and the trial court noted that the choice

to call Sumrall was a “defensible strategic choice.” 783 So. 2d at

121. That conclusion is backed up by Bivens’ testimony.37 Although

in hindsight it could be asserted that petitioner might have

benefitted from a psychologist, or a psychiatrist, or some other

expert witness, such conjecture falls far short of the showing of

prejudice required to meet the Strickland test. It should be noted

that Sumrall offered favorable testimony - which might not have

been elicited from another expert - when he stated that petitioner

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was not “assaultive or violent.” In sum, petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that his counsel were ineffective in failing to utilize

a psychologist, or in choosing to present selected mitigating

evidence through Dr. Sumrall. On this issue, petitioner has failed

to meet either prong of the Strickland test. Accordingly,

petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claims 3(a) and (b). 

S. Habeas Claims 3(c) and 12 (Testimony Of State’s Expert

Regarding Future Dangerousness)

Petitioner contends at paragraphs 133-35 that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of

his trial because counsel failed to object to the testimony of the

state’s expert psychiatrist, Dr. Bernard Bryant. (Claim 3(c)).

Similarly, he alleges at paragraphs 170-71 that the court erred in

allowing Bryant to testify regarding the petitioner’s future

dangerousness. (Claim 12). Petitioner first raised the

substantive issue of Bryant’s testimony on direct appeal. See

Appeal Claim 10. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed

the issue, stating:

The appellant further argues in his supplemental brief

that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of

a psychiatrist during the penalty phase of his trial.

Specifically, he maintains that the testimony of the

psychiatrist, which included his observations concerning

the “future dangerousness” of the appellant, violated his

constitutional rights. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.

454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981).

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Initially, we note that no objection was made to this

testimony at trial. Thus, we must evaluate the alleged

defect under the plain error doctrine. Is the defect so

egregious that the fairness and integrity of the judicial

proceeding has been affected? See Kuenzel.

As the state notes, prior to the commencement of the

trial the appellant filed a motion requesting that a

psychiatrist evaluate the appellant to assist him in his

defense and to aid counsel in the “sentencing phase of

the trial if defendant is convicted.” He also filed a

petition for “inquisition on the sanity” of the

defendant. It is clear that the appellant’s sanity at

the time of the offense was put at issue prior to the

trial.

After the appellant had been found guilty and during the

sentencing phase of the proceedings, appellant introduced

the testimony of Professor Raymond Sumrall, a certified

social worker, as to the issue of mitigating evidence.

Sumrall testified that the act of murdering an individual

would be inconsistent with the appellant’s previous

behavior. To rebut this testimony, the prosecution

presented the testimony of Dr. Bernard Bryant, a

psychologist. He testified that the appellant has a

personality disorder, that treatment for this disorder is

often ineffective, and that because of the attitude of

people with personality disorders they are very unlikely

to change.

The appellant relies on Estelle v. Smith, supra, as the

basis for his argument that his constitutional rights

were violated.

“The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment,

commands that ‘[n]o person ... shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself.’ The essence of this basic

constitutional principle is ‘the requirement

that the State which proposes to convict and

punish an individual produce the evidence

against him by the independent labor of its

officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient

of forcing it from his own lips.’”

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Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462, 101 S. Ct. at 1872 (citations

omitted). The United States Supreme Court in Estelle

held that under the circumstances of the case, the

psychiatrist could not be allowed to testify concerning

the “future dangerousness” of the defendant. Estelle is

readily distinguishable from the instant case. In

Estelle, the prosecutor had the burden of proving the

existence of future dangerousness, beyond a reasonable

doubt, at the sentencing hearing. Further, in Estelle,

the mental competency of the defendant was not placed at

issue.

We quote the recent Alabama Supreme Court case of Ex

parte Wilson, 571 So. 2d 1251, 1258 (Ala. 1990):

“We are mindful that the defendant offered the

psychiatric testimony in this case in order to

establish mitigating circumstances under

[Ala.] Code 1975, § 13A-5-51(2). The

defendant clearly bears the burden of proving

mitigation under § 13A-5-45(g). However, §

13A-5-45(g) states that once the defendant

interjects the issue of mitigation ‘the State

shall have the burden of disproving the

factual existence of that circumstance by a

preponderance of the evidence.’ Thus, the

State was justified in producing its own

expert to rebut the evidence of mitigation

offered by the defendant’s expert.”

The Supreme Court went on to say further that Estelle was

readily distinguishable. They stated “the Supreme Court

[of the United States] noted that ‘a different situation

arises where a defendant intends to introduce psychiatric

evidence at the penalty phase’ as opposed to the case

where the defendant intends to offer no such evidence.”

Wilson, 571 So. 2d at 1259, quoting from Estelle, 451

U.S. at 472, 101 S. Ct. at 1878. In Wilson, the Supreme

Court stated that the appellant had been notified that

the examination would cover any evidence of mitigating

evidence. As the state argues, it appears from the

motion filed by the appellant that he was aware that the

examination would cover any evidence offered during the

sentencing phase of the trial.

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38 It should be noted that Estelle is instructive but not

dispositive of this issue because Estelle was limited to the issue

of whether use of a defendant’s statement made to a state-employed

psychiatrist violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights and

has not been expanded to cover the situation at bar. Petitioner

now alleges that Estelle is distinguishable because Sumrall was not

a psychiatrist, but petitioner offers no legal support for this

distinction, and the court is unaware of any. Moreover, a review

of Bryant’s testimony reveals that Bryant never actually testified

that the petitioner posed a future danger. Bryant simply testified

that the petitioner exhibited traits of an antisocial personality,

and that persons with that personality disorder tend to persist in

behaviors of prevarication and theft. Accordingly, this claim also

is without merit because it is not based in fact in that petitioner

mischaracterizes Bryant’s testimony as supporting a finding of

future dangerousness. 

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601 So. 2d at 1078-79. Petitioner raised the ineffectiveassistance claim in his appeal from the denial of his Rule 32

petition. Rule 32 Appeal Claim 2(b). The appellate court noted,

however, that the claim was not raised in the Rule 32 petition or

by amendment, and was procedurally barred. The court additionally

noted that the decision on appeal was correct, and that petitioner

was not prejudiced by the failure to object to Bryant’s testimony,

which included statements favorable to the defense. 783 So. 2d at

122-23.

The court notes that Bryant was called to rebut the testimony

put forth by the defendant by Sumrall regarding his non-violent

nature. As the state court determined on direct appeal, the

admission of his testimony was in accordance with the Supreme

Court’s comments in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct.

1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981).38 The appellate court’s adjudication

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of this issue applied the correct legal standard and did not

involve any unreasonable application of the facts. Accordingly,

the substantive claim is due to be dismissed because it was

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts and the state courts’

decision is due deference. In addition, the related ineffectiveassistance claim is due to be denied as procedurally barred

pursuant to Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 103

L. Ed. 2d 308, 317 (1989). 

T. Habeas Claims 3(d) and 17 (Consideration Of the PreSentence Report)

Petitioner alleges at paragraphs 136-38 that he was denied

effective assistance of counsel in that his attorneys at the

penalty phase failed to object to the court’s consideration of the

pre-sentence report on grounds that it contained hearsay and

suggested that the death penalty should be imposed on the basis of

non-statutory aggravating circumstances (Claim 3(d)). Similarly,

petitioner contends at paragraphs 177-180 that his constitutional

rights were violated by consideration of the pre-sentence report

(Claim 17). The substantive claim relating to the pre-sentence

report first was raised on direct appeal. See Appeal Claims 15(a)-

(c). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals examined the issue on

the merits and held: 

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Last, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in

considering a presentence report, which contained

nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, a recommendation

by the preparer, statements made by the appellant while

counsel was not present, and hearsay. Initially, we

observe that the appellant made no objection to this in

the court below. Thus, we must apply the plain error

doctrine. Is the error so egregious that the fairness of

the proceedings were affected? See Dill and Kuenzel.

Initially, we recognize the important function that the

presentence report serves. Section 13A-5-47(b) specifically provides for the preparation of presentence reports.

“A presentence report is recognized as a valuable

sentencing aid.” Colquitt, Death Penalty Laws, 33 Ala.

L. Rev. 213, 330 (1982).

Regarding the recommendation by the parole officer, this

court has recently addressed this issue on several

occasions. See Dill; Kuenzel; and Lawhorn v. State, 581

So. 2d 1159, 1171 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990). We stated in

Lawhorn:

“‘Although we do not approve or condone such a

recommendation, we find that error harmless in

this case. Rule 45, A.R.A.P. “[T]he mere

presence of information in the pre-sentence

report which should not be considered for the

purpose of enhancing punishment is not, per

se, prejudicial.” Johnson v. State, 521 So. 2d

1006, 1031 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986), affirmed, 521

So. 2d 1018 (Ala.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

876, 109 S. Ct. 193 [102 L. Ed. 2d 162] ...

(1988).’”

Lawhorn, 581 So. 2d at 1171, quoting Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d

at 527.

In both Lawhorn and Kuenzel this court noted that it was

apparent from the trial court’s findings that the court

independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances and found that the aggravating

circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.

It is apparent from a review of the trial court’s

findings in the instant case that the trial court

independently weighed the evidence. The trial court’s

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order complies with § 13A-5-47(d), Code of Alabama 1975.

See Lawhorn.

The appellant further argues that the presentence report

was improper since it contained hearsay statements.

Judge Bowen recently addressed this issue in Kuenzel:

“‘Courts are permitted to consider hearsay

testimony at sentencing.... While hearsay

evidence may be considered in sentencing, due

process requires both that the defendant be

given an opportunity to refute it and that it

bear minimal indicia of reliability.... These

protections apply not just to hearsay

testimony but also to any information

presented at sentencing.... When, as in this

case, the defendant claims that his due

process rights were violated by the sentencing

court’s reliance on materially false

information, the defendant must establish not

only that the disputed information is

materially false or unreliable, but also that

the sentencing judge relied on the

information.’

“United States v. Giltner, 889 F.2d 1004, 1007

(11th Cir. 1989). A sentencing judge may

consider hearsay evidence so long as the

defendant had a fair opportunity at rebuttal.

Smiley v. State, 435 So. 2d 202, 206 (Ala. Cr.

App. 1983), Johnson v. State, 399 So. 2d 859,

864 (Ala. Cr. App), affirmed in part, reversed

in part on other grounds, 399 So. 2d 873 (Ala.

1979).

In Thompson [v. State], 503 So. 2d [871,] at

880 [1986], this Court rejected the argument

that the presentence report was inadmissible

at the sentence hearing because, among other

things, it ‘included hearsay ... [and] the

summary of the crime was prejudicial’:

“‘It is clear to this court that the report is

entirely consistent with Alabama’s capital

murder statute regarding evidence to be

considered in sentencing. Section 13A-5-

45(d), Code states, “[a]ny evidence which has

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probative value and is relevant to sentence

shall be received at the sentence hearing

regardless of its admissibility under the

exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the

defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to

rebut any hearsay statements.’ Further, the

report itself is an out-of-court statement and

is entirely hearsay. However, it is

admissible under § 13A-5-47 Code of Alabama,

being specifically called for consideration by

the trial court.

“‘It is equally clear to this court that the

summary of the offense contained in the presentence report was not prejudicial to this

appellant. He argues that this summary

contained an opinion [by a parole officer] as

to his culpability in the crime in question.

This argument is without merit. The

appellant’s culpability was established by the

jury’s verdict of guilt. Further, the summary

of the offense is consistent with the evidence

presented by the State and with the

appellant’s own statement which was admitted

into evidence at trial. The appellant was not

prejudiced by this information.’

“Thompson, 503 So. 2d at 880.

“The exclusion of hearsay evidence that is

highly relevant to a critical issue in the

penalty phase of a trial may constitute

reversible error. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S.

95, 97, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 2151, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738

(1979).”

Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d at 528-29. See also Dill, supra.

The hearsay in the instant case is similar to that which

the court ruled was not error to include in a presentence

report in Thompson. The appellant had every opportunity

to refute the statements contained in the presentence

report. No plain error exists here.

The appellant also contends that the inclusion in the

presentence report of comments made by the appellant in

an interview with his parole officer deprived him of his

constitutional right against self-incrimination. [FN2]

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Initially, we note that no objection was made to this in

the trial court. While this will not bar review in a

case involving the death penalty it will weigh against

any claim of prejudice. See Dill and Kuenzel. We apply

the same harmless error analysis that this court applied

in Kuenzel and Dill. Like the statements in Kuenzel and

Dill, the statements in the report which were credited to

the appellant were insignificant. (For a thorough

discussion of this issue, see Kuenzel, supra.) We can

conceive of no possible reason why these statements would

have affected the trial court’s imposition of the death

sentence. No plain error exists here.

FN2. We note that some federal courts have ruled that

Miranda warnings are not needed in the above situation.

For a discussion of this see Kuenzel.

601 So. 2d at 1084-86. Petitioner’s related claim of ineffective

assistance was raised in the Rule 32 context, and the appellate

court examined that issue on appeal, finding that there was no

basis for objection, and that the trial court did not consider any

improper information in imposing the sentence. 783 So. 2d at 134.

The petitioner contends that the pre-sentence report contained

improper information in three ways: (1) that it included statements

made by the petitioner without benefit of counsel in violation of

his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; (2) that it related

prejudicial hearsay by unnamed sources; and (3) that it improperly

suggested that the death penalty should be imposed on the basis of

non-statutory aggravating circumstances. As the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals pointed out, the mere existence of improper

statements in the pre-sentence report does not constitute error

unless the trial court relied on that information in imposing the

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39 The trial court’s sentencing order is contained at Tab R1, within Vol. 7 of the respondents’ exhibits, at pp. 1427-1434.

Specific findings as to statutory aggravating circumstances are set

forth at pp. 1429-1430.

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sentence. Where the trial court “independently weighed the

evidence” and otherwise complied with state law and the

Constitution, the presence of inappropriate information in the

report is not per se prejudicial. 601 So. 2d at 1085. A review of

the transcript of the sentencing phase, the sentencing order, and

the Rule 32 hearing indicates that the information in the presentence report - even if improper, which this court has not found

that it was - was not prejudicial because the trial court had

independent information upon which to form the basis of its

findings.39

The state court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with

regard to the use of the pre-sentence report have not been shown to

be contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.

Accordingly, they are due deference, and the petitioner is not

entitled to any relief on these claims.

U. Habeas Claims 3(e) and 19 (Prosecutor’s Reference To

“Reasonable Satisfaction”)

 

At paragraph 183 petitioner asserts that he was denied a fair

trial because the prosecutor told the jury during opening statement

at the penalty phase of his trial that they must find to a

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“reasonable satisfaction” that the aggravating circumstances

outweighed the mitigating circumstances (Claim 19). Similarly,

petitioner asserts at paragraphs 139-140 that he received

ineffective assistance because his attorneys failed to object to

that statement (Claim 3(e)). Petitioner first raised the

substantive claim on direct appeal. See Appeal Claim 17. The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered the claim, stating: 

The appellant further argues that the following statement

made by the prosecutor in his opening statement during

the sentencing phase was error. The prosecutor said:

“And I anticipate upon hearing that evidence

and all other offered mitigating circumstances

and evaluating the weight of these two amounts

of evidence simply this: To the reasonable

satisfaction of the jury, the appropriate

punishment for the personal responsibility and

moral guilt of the defendant is nothing other

than death.”

The appellant maintains that “reasonable satisfaction”

was not the correct standard upon which the jury would

fix punishment. Initially, we observe that no objection

was made at trial. Thus, we must evaluate the above

comment according to the plain error doctrine and ask

whether the error is so egregious that it affected the

fairness of the proceeding. See Dill and Kuenzel.

We do not believe that this comment, made once during a

lengthy opening statement by the prosecutor, affected the

fairness of the proceedings. The trial court thoroughly

instructed the jury on the finding of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances. The court told the jury that

they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that any

aggravating circumstance had been proven. The court also

stated in its instruction, “If there’s a dispute as to

the factual existence pertaining to any of the offered

mitigating circumstances, then the State would have the

burden of disproving the factual existence of that

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circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence.” The

isolated comment made by the prosecutor in no way

constitutes plain error.

601 So. 2d at 1080. Petitioner again raised the substantive claim

in the Rule 32 petition and added the related claim of ineffective

assistance. See Rule 32 Claims 13, 23(hh). The appellate court

examined those claims in petitioner’s appeal from the denial of

post-conviction relief, stating that the statement was not “plain

error, and did not provide any basis for objection by counsel. 783

So. 2d at 135. 

The state courts have examined this substantive claim and have

found that it was not in error. Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that the finding is not due deference under § 2254(d).

Similarly, the courts have found that the statement was not

objectionable, and that counsel could not have been ineffective for

failing to raise such an objection. This finding also is due

deference. Alternatively, even if counsel can be faulted for not

objecting, no prejudice resulted because the comments did not

undermine the fundamental fairness of the sentencing process. See

Spivey v. Head, 207 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000); Drake v. Kemp, 762

F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985)(“Improper argument will only warrant

relief if it renders a petitioner's trial or sentencing

‘fundamentally unfair’”). It is clear from the transcript that the

jury was fully informed that they must make their determination at

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the penalty phase based on the “reasonable doubt” standard. The

phrase was used in the context of an opening statement that

referenced “reasonable satisfaction” was merely an isolated

comment. Accordingly, the claims related to the statement

concerning the jury’s “reasonable satisfaction” are meritless.

V. Habeas Claims 4(a) and (b) (Lack Of Due Process During

Rule 32 Proceedings)

 

Petitioner asserts at paragraphs 141-58 that his due process

rights were violated in the Rule 32 proceeding in that the trial

court refused his request for funds to hire experts, and took

judicial notice of the fact that the investigator’s secretary was

black. (Claims 4(a) and (b).) These claims are alike in that both

allege error that occurred in the post-conviction proceedings,

which have no bearing on the capital murder conviction or on the

imposition of the death penalty. Because these claims do not “in

any way undermine[] the validity of petitioner’s conviction,” they

do not state a basis for habeas relief. Spradley v. Dugger, 825

F.2d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1987). The conduct that petitioner

complains of relates only to the petitioner’s post-conviction

proceeding, to which the federal constitution provides no right.

Consequently, the claims relating to the Rule 32 proceeding (Claims

4(a) and (b)) are due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

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W. Habeas Claims 16 and 20 (Jury Instructions At Penalty

Phase)

Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in “repeatedly”

telling the jury that its sentence would be only a

“recommendation.” Specifically, petitioner contends at paragraph

176 that the trial court referred to the verdict more than 20 times

as a recommendation, which “diminished the jury’s sense of

responsibility for its sentence of death” (Claim 16). In addition,

petitioner claims at paragraph 184 that the trial court allowed the

jury “unguided discretion” at the penalty phase in weighing the

aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances

(Claim 20). These claims were presented to the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals on direct appeal. See Appeal Claims 14, 18. In

weighing the propriety of the court’s statements to the jury at the

penalty phased, the court stated: 

The appellant next contends that several of the jury

instructions in the sentencing phase were

constitutionally flawed. No objections were made to

these instructions at trial. “‘While this failure to

object does not preclude review in a capital case, it

does weigh against any claim of prejudice.’ Ex parte

Kennedy, 472 So. 2d 1106, 111 (Ala. 1985).” Kuenzel. As

provided for by Rule 45A, A. R. App. P., we must review

any case involving the death penalty for plain error. As

Judge Bowen restated in Kuenzel, plain error is, “‘error

which, when examined in the context of the entire case,

is so obvious that failure to notice it would seriously

affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of

the judicial proceedings.’” Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d at 489,

quoting United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528, 1535

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, Waites v. United States, 479

U.S. 933, 107 S. Ct. 407, 93 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1986). We

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recognize that instructions receive a more intense

scrutiny from appellate courts than from the jurors

themselves.

As the Supreme Court of the United States stated in

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S. Ct. 837, 93 L.

Ed. 2d 934 (1987), when deciding whether a trial court

erred in delivering a jury instruction, we must consider

the interpretation a reasonable juror places on the

instruction,

“‘focus[ing] initially on the specific

language challenged. Francis v. Franklin, 471

U.S. [307, 315, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1971, 85 L.

Ed. 2d 344 (1985)]. If the specific

instruction fails constitutional muster, we

then review the instructions as a whole to see

if the entire charge delivered a correct

interpretation of the law.”

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. at 541, 107 S. Ct. at 839.

The first instance complained of by the appellant is the

following instruction: “[Y]our verdict in this case, your

deliberation, should be based on the evidence you’ve seen

and heard and the law that has been explained to you.”

The appellant argues that this statement limits the

jury’s discretion and does away with the jury’s option to

impose a sentence of life without parole. He contends

that the instruction prevented the jury from making a

“moral” response.

A review of the jury charge shows that the instruction in

no way impinged on the ability of the jury to sentence

the appellant to life without parole. The trial court

gave very detailed instructions on the mitigating

circumstances which would militate against the death

penalty. As the United States Supreme Court stated in

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L.

Ed. 2d 393 (1977), “It is of vital importance to the

defendant and to the community that any decision to

impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on

reason rather than caprice or emotion.” Gardner, 430 U.S.

at 358, 97 S. Ct. at 1204.

The appellant next argues that the trial court erred in

failing to instruct the jury on “their unfettered option”

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to impose a sentence of life without parole. The jury

may not recommend mercy without reason. See Morrison v.

State, 500 So. 2d 36 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985), aff’d, 500 So.

2d 57 (Ala. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct.

1634, 95 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1987). The jury does not have an

“unfettered option” to recommend a sentence of life

without parole unless after weighing the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances it finds that life without

parole is warranted. The record clearly shows that the

trial court did instruct the jury, on several occasions,

regarding its option to sentence the appellant to life

without parole. Also, the court thoroughly instructed

the jury on aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

The appellant also argues that the trial court erred in

instructing the jury that it was to avoid any arbitrary

factor in reaching a decision regarding sentencing. No

objection was made to this instruction during the trial.

The appellant states that the jury might easily have

believed that it “could not consider mercy or sympathy or

any factor in mitigation that was not expressly addressed

by the trial judge.” The trial court gave the following

instruction:

“In reaching your findings concerning the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and

in determining what your recommendation will

be as to the punishment in this case, you must

avoid any influence of passion, prejudice, or

arbitrary factors. Your determination, your

verdict in this case, your deliberation,

should be based on the evidence that you’ve

seen and heard and the law that has been

explained to you. There is no room in the

trial of such cases for any influence of

passion, prejudice, or any type of arbitrary

factors to come into your determination or

consideration.”

The trial court did not err in giving this instruction.

See California v. Brown, supra. See also Saffle v.

Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415

(1990). In California v. Brown, the jury was instructed

not to be swayed by “mere sentiment, conjecture,

sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public

feeling.” As the Supreme Court stated:

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“An instruction prohibiting juries from basing

their sentencing decisions on factors not

presented at the trial, and irrelevant to the

issues at the trial, does not violate the

United States Constitution. It serves the

useful purpose of confining the jury’s

imposition of the death sentence by cautioning

it against reliance on extraneous emotional

factors, which, we think, would be far more

likely to turn the jury against a capital

defendant than for him.”

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. at 543, 107 S. Ct. at 840.

A similar instruction was considered by this court in

Pierce, supra. Judge Tyson wrote:

“‘In evaluating this alleged constitutional

error, the Court must determine how a

reasonable juror could construe the

instruction. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.

307, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1971-72, 85 L. Ed. 2d

344 (1985)....’”

Pierce, 576 So. 2d at 255, quoting Julius v. Jones, 875

F.2d 1520, 1528 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 900,

110 S. Ct. 258, 107 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1989).

This court, in the recent case of Haney, supra,

considered a comment made by the prosecutor in his

closing argument, which asked the jury to put aside their

sympathies. As Judge Patterson stated:

“Our examination of the portion of the closing

argument set out above leads us to the

conclusion that it is no more than the

prosecutor urging the jury not to be

distracted by matters unrelated to the

evidence, but to confine itself to the facts

and the law.”

Haney, 603 So. 2d at 394. The same can be said of the

instruction in the instant case. The jury was thoroughly

instructed that it could consider any evidence in

considering mitigating circumstances. The trial judge’s

comment in the instruction, when viewed with the

instruction as a whole, was not plain error.

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Furthermore, as the State argues, the instruction is

substantially the same as the pattern instruction in

Proposed Pattern Jury Instructions for use in the

Sentence Phase of Capital Cases Tried under Act No. 81-

178. “‘[W]e do not think we should hold that the trial

judge plainly erred when he instructed the jury pursuant

to a pattern jury instruction ‘recommended’ by this

Court, especially in the absence of an objection or

request from the defendant.’” Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d at

520, quoting Ex parte Harrell, 470 So. 2d 1309, 1315

(Ala. 1985).

The appellant further argues that the trial court erred

in instructing the jury that one aggravating circumstance

had already been proven by the fact that the jury had

found the appellant guilty of a capital offense. He

states that this forced him to overcome a presumption

that the death sentence should be imposed. We do not

agree. As Judge Tyson wrote in Pierce, supra:

“‘Alabama’s “statutory sentencing scheme does

not provide, that if even one aggravating

circumstance is found, ‘death is presumed to

be the proper sentence’ unless overcome by

sufficient mitigating circumstances.”

[Citation omitted.] Neither the oral charge

of the trial judge nor Alabama’s statutory

sentencing scheme “presumes” that death is the

appropriate punishment upon the finding of the

existence of at least one aggravating

circumstance.’ Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d 474 at

521. Thus, there is no ‘automatic death

penalty’ upon conviction for a capital offense

for which there is an ‘overlap’ between one of

the elements of the offense and a statutory

aggravating circumstance.”

Pierce, 576 So. 2d at 255; see also Kuenzel.

The appellant further contends that during the

instructions in the sentencing phase, the trial court

lessened the jury’s responsibility by stating that its

sentence was a recommendation to the trial court. He

contends that this violates the holding of Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d

231 (1985). Initially, we observe that no objection was

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made to this during the trial. As the state correctly

argues:

“‘[T]he comments of the prosecutor and the

instructions of the trial court accurately

informing a jury of the extent of its

sentencing authority and that its sentence

verdict was ‘advisory’ and a ‘recommendation’

and that the trial court would make the final

decision as to sentence does not violate

Caldwell [v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.

Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985)].’ Martin

v. State, 548 So. 2d [488, 494 (Ala. Cr. App.

1988), aff’d, 548 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1989)].”

Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d at 502.

The appellant further contends that the trial court erred

in giving the jury no guidance in weighing the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. No objection

was made to this at trial. This will not bar review in

a case involving the death penalty. See Kuenzel.

For the death penalty to be imposed in Alabama, it does

not have to be proven that beyond a “reasonable doubt”

the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating

circumstances. The aggravating circumstances must simply

outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See § 13A-5-48,

Code of Alabama 1975. As Judge Patterson wrote in

Rutledge v. State, 523 So. 2d 1087 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987),

rev’d on other grounds, 523 So. 2d 1118 (Ala. 1988):

“‘While the existence of an aggravating or

mitigating circumstance is a fact susceptible

to proof under a reasonable doubt or

preponderance standard, ... the relative

weight is not. The process of weighing

circumstances is a matter for judge and jury,

and, unlike facts, is not susceptible to proof

by either party.’”

Rutledge, 523 So. 2d at 1111-12, quoting Ford v.

Strickland, 676 F.2d 434, 442 (11th Cir. 1982), vacated,

696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104

S. Ct. 201, 78 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1983)(same statement is

contained in both cases). See also Whisenhant v. State,

482 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982), aff’d in part and

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40 Comments minimizing the jury’s responsibility in

sentencing a capital defendant may violate the Constitution, but

the threshold of unacceptability of such comments is high. For

example, in Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1316 (N.D. Ga.

1989), a case cited by petitioner, the prosecutor told the jurors

that the defendant had “signed her own death warrant,” that the

jury was “merely one cog in the criminal process,” and quoted the

Bible to them, stating: “He is the servant of God to execute his

wrath on the wrongdoer.” Id. at 1316. The prosecutor further

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remanded, 482 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1985). The trial court

committed no error in failing to instruct the jury that

the aggravating circumstances must outweigh the

mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

After a review of the specific challenges to the jury

instructions and a review of the jury instructions as a

whole, we can find no error on the part of the trial

court.

601 So. 2d at 1080-83. The appellate court examined claims that

the jury instruction unduly limited the jury’s discretion to impose

the penalty of life without parole, and specifically cited the

court’s instructions on mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

The court relied upon United States Supreme Court authority in

determining whether the instructions violated the Constitution.

Id. at 1081-82, citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.

Ct. 837, 93 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1987); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472

U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985). Under §

2254(d), this court is bound to give those findings of fact and law

due deference, absent some showing by petitioner that the state

courts adjudication of the claims was contrary to federal law or

involved an unreasonable application of the facts.40 Petitioner has

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stated that “No one - no one else, including you should feel any

responsibility for what happens to her, for it is she that broke

into that room that night....” Id. at 1316, n. 11. None of the

comments complained of in the instant case similarly remove the

“responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the

defendants death,” as required by Caldwell in order to trigger

habeas relief. 

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not demonstrated either; accordingly, he is not entitled to any

relief on these claims challenging the trial court’s instructions

at the penalty phase of his trial. 

X. Habeas Claim 18 (Sufficiency Of the Evidence)

At paragraphs 181-82, petitioner asserts generally that the

evidence adduced at trial was constitutionally insufficient to

support a conviction for capital murder or a sentence of death

(Claim 18). This claim was raised on direct appeal. See Appeal

Claim 16. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals clearly found that

the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and sentence,

stating:

The appellant also contends in his supplemental brief

that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty

of murder committed during the course of a robbery. We

do not agree. The evidence was clearly sufficient for

the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

appellant was guilty of capital murder.

The state’s evidence tended to show that on January 23,

1988, the victim was shot, execution style, with one

bullet to the head. The appellant and two other

individuals were on Interstate 59, South, when they saw

the victim’s car on the side of the road. They took the

victim to a wooded area and shot him once in the head at

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very close range. The victim’s money and truck were

taken from the site. Later that same day, the appellant

was seen driving the victim’s truck. The appellant went

to visit a relative and showed her a gun and bullets and

said that he had killed a white man and stole his truck.

A statement was also admitted which was made by appellant

in which he said, “I have killed one white m____ f____;

I’ll kill another one.” This evidence was clearly

sufficient to present the issue of appellant’s guilt to

the jury for their determination. There is no reason to

disturb their verdict on appeal. “We will not substitute

our judgment for that of the jury.” Neal v. State, 460

So. 2d 257, 260 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984).

601 So. 2d at 1077-78. 

The court first notes that this claim has been adjudicated on

the merits in the state courts and, thus, is entitled to deference.

The court further emphasizes that the federal courts play a limited

role in weighing the constitutional sufficiency of evidence in a

state criminal prosecution. See Martin v. State, 730 F.2d 721, 724

(11th Cir. 1984). The sole question to be determined when a state

prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that the

evidence at his trial was insufficient is “whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Smith v. White, 815 F.2d

1401, 1403 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 863 (1987), citing

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.

Ed. 2d 560 (1979). “The government’s proof need not rule out every

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 162 of 172
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theory except guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bishop v. Kelso,

914 F.2d 1468, 1470 (11th Cir. 1990)(emphasis in original). 

When presented with conflicting testimony, a federal habeas

court must presume that the trier of fact resolved the conflict in

favor of the prosecution. Machin v. Wainwright, 758 F.2d 1431,

1435 (11th Cir. 1985). In other words, the federal courts must

defer to the judgment of the jury in assessing the credibility of

the witnesses and weighing the evidence. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at

326; Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Upon an independent review of the record, the Court concludes

that a rational trier of fact could have found the petitioner

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of capital murder. The evidence

showed that petitioner was driving the pickup truck stolen from the

murder victim the morning after the murder, that the murder weapon

was found in petitioner’s bedroom, and that the petitioner told at

least two people that he had killed a white man shortly after the

robbery and murder occurred. As the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals determined when this issue was raised on appeal, those

facts, which a reasonable juror could find, are sufficient to show

that the petitioner was guilty. For these reasons, the claim

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.

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41 The claim relating to the criminal history also was raised

in the Rule 32 petition. See Rule 32 Claim 16. His appeal from

denial of Rule 32 relief, however, did not contain the claim. It

was exhausted nonetheless on direct appeal, and it was not

necessary to relitigate it during Rule 32 proceedings. Thus, there

is no procedural default due to the failure to appeal the denial of

the Rule 32 petition.

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Y. Habeas Claim 22 (Consideration Of Prior Criminal Activity

and Escape)

In another challenge to the propriety of the penalty phase,

petitioner contends at paragraphs 188-189 that the trial court

erred in finding that there were no mitigating circumstances and in

concluding that petitioner had escaped. More specifically,

petitioner asserts that the court should have recognized as a

mitigating factor that petitioner’s prior criminal history

contained no crimes of violence. Further, petitioner asserts that

the court’s finding that petitioner was on escape when the capital

crime occurred never was proven at trial. This claim was raised on

direct appeal.41 See Appeal Claim 1. The Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals addressed the claim, stating: 

The appellant next argues that the trial court erred in

its written findings as to mitigation. Specifically, he

argues that the trial court erred in finding that the

mitigating circumstance of the defendant’s having no

significant history of prior criminal activity under §

13A-5-51(1), Code of Alabama 1975, was not applicable.

The trial court made the following findings:

“The mitigating circumstances. The defense

asserted the presence of mitigating

circumstances. Although the defense did not

rely on all of the statutory mitigating

circumstances, the court reviews all of the

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statutory mitigating circumstances in this

sentencing order.

“1. The defendant has no significant history

of prior criminal activity. See Ala. Code §

13A-5-51(1)(1982 repl. vol.). The court finds

that this mitigating circumstance is

inapplicable. 

“The defense argued that the defendant has no

significant history of prior criminal

activity. According to the defense this

mitigating circumstance should be deemed

established by the absence of previous

convictions for crimes of violence. Although

the defendant does not have a record of prior

convictions for violent felonies, he does have

a history of prior criminal activity, and that

history is significant. In 1979 he was

convicted of grand larceny. By his own

account, he was sent to the Frank Lee Youth

Center, but after only four months he was

transferred to Draper prison. Then he was

placed in a work-release program in Mobile,

but was ‘busted’ for shoplifting and returned

to prison, this time at Atmore. In 1981 he

was convicted of burglary in the third degree.

He served the two-year sentence. Obviously,

though, he did not serve the entire sentence,

for in 1982 he was convicted of possessing

burglar’s tools. In 1983 he was convicted of

two counts of breaking and entering a motor

vehicle and one count of burglary in the third

degree. He served a split sentence on the

burglary conviction. In 1984 he was convicted

of receiving stolen property, burglary in the

third degree, and violation of the Alabama

Controlled Substances Act. He was given two

fifteen year sentences to run concurrently on

the first two convictions. He was on escape

from these sentences when he committed this

capital offense. He also has been convicted

of giving false information and disorderly

conduct. Moreover, in 1978 the defendant was

adjudicated a youthful offender in 1978 based

on a charge of grand larceny. The court can

consider that adjudication. See Ala. Code §

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15-19-7(a)(1982 repl. vol.)(‘[I]f he is

subsequently convicted of crime, the prior

adjudication as youthful offender shall be

considered.’). This mitigating circumstance

refers to no significant history of prior

criminal ‘activity,’ not convictions. Even if

that adjudication were not considered by the

court though, the defendant nevertheless has

an extensive criminal record.

“Additionally, the defendant has served at

least portions of six separate sentences. He

has had at least one probation sentence

revoked. He has violated the conditions in

two separate work release programs. Thus,

disregarding the youthful offender adjudication and the misdemeanor convictions, the

defendant has five prior felony convictions.

“The defense proffered the opinion of a

witness that ‘the defendant does not have a

significant history of violent or assaultive

behavior in his prior criminal activity.’

That is true, but does not establish this

mitigating circumstance. The statutory

definition never refers to violent or

assaultive conduct. The court discussed this

circumstance to this degree only in deference

to the defense’s argument that it was present.

The defendant’s long and substantial history

of criminal behavior requires the court to

reject this mitigating circumstance.”

We agree with the trial court. The appellant did have a

significant history of prior criminal conduct. It was

sufficient enough not to invoke the mitigating provision

of § 13A-5-51(1), Code of Alabama 1975. This section

states that, “Mitigating circumstances shall include ...

(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior

criminal activity.”

The appellant argues that § 13A-5-51(1) should apply

since he has no prior convictions which involve violent

behavior. We do not agree. “Unlike the aggravating

circumstance related to prior criminal acts, this

mitigating circumstance is not restricted to prior

convictions of capital felonies or felonies in which

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violence was used.” Colquitt, Death Penalty Laws, 33

Ala. L. Rev. 213, 300 (1982). We have upheld the

practice of not applying this mitigating provision when

the significant history was based on prior misdemeanor

convictions. See Richardson v. State, 376 So. 2d 205

(Ala. Cr. App. 1978), aff’d, 376 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1979).

Section 13A-5-51, Code of Alabama 1975, which lists

mitigating circumstances, does not specifically state

that the history of criminal activity referred to therein

refers only to convictions for violent crimes. However,

§ 13A-5-49(2), Code of Alabama 1975, which lists

aggravating circumstances, specifically provides that a

conviction for a violent crime is an aggravating

circumstance. Had the legislature intended that

convictions for nonviolent crimes not be considered in

determining whether there has been “no significant

history of prior criminal activity” for purposes of

determining the existence of mitigating circumstances, it

would have specifically so stated in the statutes. The

trial court committed no error in not finding as a

mitigating circumstance that the appellant lacked a

significant history of prior criminal activity.

The appellant also argues that the court erred in finding

as a prior conviction the crime of escape from the SIR

program. It is clear from the record that this escape

was not considered in the trial court’s review of

mitigating circumstances. The trial judge referred to

the fact that the appellant had escaped from the SIR

program, but he does not cite that escape as a prior

conviction.

It is clear from the record that the trial court allowed

the appellant to introduce “any matter” which would point

towards mitigation. No error occurred here. Clisby v.

State, 456 So. 2d 99 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983), aff’d, 456 So.

2d 105 (Ala. 1984).

601 So. 2d 1083-84. 

In examining the trial court’s written findings as to

petitioner’s criminal history, the court in the direct appeal aptly

applied Alabama statutes and case law in determining whether the

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petitioner’s prior convictions for non-violent offenses could

constitute a “significant history of prior criminal activity.” In

viewing the claim relating to the escape, the appeals court made a

finding of fact that the escape had not been considered by the

trial court as a factor. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

the claims related to the court’s findings on mitigation because

the state courts examined the issues on the merits, applying the

proper standards under Alabama law. As noted by the state courts,

the Alabama statute speaks of “criminal activity,” not simply

violent criminal activity. The state trial court correctly found

that petitioner had a significant history of criminal activity,

even if it was non-violent. The state courts’ conclusions of law

are neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent. Nor is that court’s finding an unreasonable

application of the facts. Consequently, the appellate court’s

decision is entitled to a presumption of correctness and deference

under § 2254(d), and petitioner is not entitled to any relief on

this claim.

 

Z. Habeas Claim 26 (Unconstitutionality Of Alabama’s Death

Penalty Statute)

At paragraphs 194-95, petitioner asserts in the instant habeas

petition that Alabama’s death penalty statute is violative of his

rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Case 7:01-cv-00780-IPJ-TMP Document 48 Filed 04/20/05 Page 168 of 172
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Specifically, petitioner contends that the appellate courts, in

carrying out the proportionality review of death sentences mandated

by state law, limit the review to other death penalty cases. Thus,

petitioner argues, a death sentence may never be “deemed to have

been imposed in a disproportionate manner if compared only to other

cases in which death sentences have been imposed” (Claim 26).

Petitioner did not raise this claim in his direct appeal. In

his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner first asserted

the claim. See Rule 32 Claim 22. The trial court denied relief on

this and more than 20 other substantive constitutional claims on

grounds that the claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a) because

they could have been raised on appeal but were not. Order Denying

Rule 32 Petition, pp. 3-4. Petitioner argued in his appeal to the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that, although the court

generally applies the preclusionary effect of Rule 32.2(a) in all

cases, the state courts should recognize an exception where the

failure to raise the claims was caused by counsel’s ineffective

assistance. See Petitioner’s Brief on Appeal of Rule 32, pp. 129-

34. Essentially, petitioner urged the state courts to adopt the

test of “cause and prejudice” employed by the federal courts in

deciding questions of procedural default in habeas cases. Id.,

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42 Although petitioner asserted in the Rule 32 appeal that

the reason this claim was not raised on direct appeal was that his

appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance, he did not make

that specific claim of ineffective-assistance at any point prior to

the Rule 32 appeal, even though, in the original Rule 32 petition,

he raised more than 40 instances of ineffective assistance. Such

a claim of ineffectiveness-as-cause must be both exhausted and not

procedurally defaulted in state court. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529

U.S. 446, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 146 L. Ed. 2d 518 (2000); Hill v. Jones,

81 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 1996). 

-170-

citing Wainwright v. Sykes.

42 The appellate court examined that

argument and held: 

The appellant also argues that 23 alleged constitutional

defects [FN2] that the circuit court found to be

procedurally barred pursuant to the provisions of Rule

32.2, Ala. R. Crim. P., should be considered

“independently to find that trial counsel was

ineffective.” (Appellant’s brief at p. 132.) However,

he did not first present this argument to the circuit

court in his original or amended petition. Therefore, it

is not properly before this court. See Morrison, supra.

FN2. The appellant appears to concede that

the 23 substantive claims are procedurally

barred. To the extent he may argue that we

should make an exception to our rules of

preclusion, we decline to do so. To the

extent he may argue that they are not barred,

his argument is without merit. The circuit

court properly found that the claims are

barred pursuant to the provisions of Rule

32.2, Ala. R. Crim. P.

783 So. 2d at 133. The last state court to examine this claim

specifically held that the claim was procedurally defaulted, and

petitioner has made no showing of cause and prejudice or of a

fundamental miscarriage of justice to avoid the default. Edwards

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v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 146 L. Ed. 2d 518

(2000). Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim.

Even if this claim could be examined on the merits here, it

would not warrant relief. It is clear that the Supreme Court has

never mandated proportionality review as an indispensable part of

a constitutionally sound capital sentencing scheme. In Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct. 871, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1984), the

Court squarely rejected the notion that proportionality review is

constitutionally necessary in capital sentencing schemes using

other means to assure that the sentence is not arbitrarily applied.

That Gregg and Proffitt did not establish a

constitutional requirement of proportionality review is

made clearer by Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct.

2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976), decided the same day. In

Jurek we upheld a death sentence even though neither the

statute, as in Georgia, nor state case-law, as in

Florida, provided for comparative proportionality review.

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 48, 104 S. Ct. 871, 878, 79 L. Ed.

2d 29 (1984). As long as the sentencing scheme provides for

assurances of rationality and guidance for the sentencing

authority, proportionality review is not necessary. For example,

some means by which arbitrariness can be checked include limiting

the number and types of offenses subject to the death sentence,

bifurcating proceedings, requiring a finding of aggravating

circumstances, and consideration of mitigating circumstances. All

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43 Insofar as petitioner alleges that the state courts failed

to conduct an adequate proportionality review under state law, the

claim fails to state a violation of a federal right; federal habeas

corpus is not available to correct a violation of state law.

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct. 871, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29

(1984).

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of these features are present in the Alabama capital sentencing

scheme, thus eliminating the constitutional need43 for proportionality review under Pulley. See also Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d

1137 (11th Cir. 1987). Regardless of the adequacy of the

proportionality review conducted by the state courts, habeas relief

is not warranted because proportionality review is not required by

federal law. There not being a violation of federal constitutional

law, this claim also is due to be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court finds

that the petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

is due to be denied and dismissed with prejudice. A separate order

will be entered denying and dismissing the petition for relief.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this memorandum

opinion upon counsel for the petitioner and upon counsel for the

respondents.

DATED this 20th day of April, 2005.

 

INGE PRYTZ JOHNSON

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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