Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01502/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01502-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cliffton Harris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted January 7, 2020 

Decided January 8, 2020 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1502 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CLIFFTON HARRIS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 16-CR-73-JPS 

J. P. Stadtmueller, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

This case is on appeal for a second time. Cliffton Harris pleaded guilty to two 

counts of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. §§ 211(1) & (2), and one count of brandishing a firearm 

during a crime of violence. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii). The district court sentenced him to 

112 months’ imprisonment—28 months for the carjacking charges, followed by a 

mandatory consecutive 84-month term for the firearm charge. See § 924(c). In his first 

appeal, Harris challenged only his sentence, which we vacated in light of Dean v. 

United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2018). On remand, the district court explained the 

reasoning behind its original sentence, reweighed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and 

imposed an identical sentence. Harris appealed again. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

Case: 19-1502 Document: 17 Filed: 01/08/2020 Pages: 3
No. 19-1502 Page 2 

Harris’s counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. 

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of 

the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to 

involve. Because the analysis appears thorough and Harris has not responded to 

counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel 

discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel first considers whether Harris could challenge his conviction. She does 

not directly say whether Harris wishes to challenge his guilty plea. See United States v. 

Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 

(7th Cir. 2002). But counsel correctly determines that a challenge to the plea at this stage 

would be futile because only resentencing was within the scope of the mandate. 

See United States v. Dearborn, 873 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2017). Harris waived any issues 

surrounding his guilt by not raising them in his first appeal. See United States v. Whitlow, 

740 F.3d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel also considers whether Harris could challenge the application of the 

sentencing guidelines but properly rejects any such challenge as fruitless. First, the 

district court properly calculated Harris’s guidelines range and, in any event, Harris 

waived this challenge by not raising it in his first appeal. See Dearborn, 873 F.3d at 573. 

Counsel then discusses possible challenges to Harris’s supervised release conditions 

but, because Harris objected to them neither at the original proceeding nor on remand, 

properly concludes that any such challenge would be frivolous. See United States v. 

Flores, 929 F. 3d 443, 450 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Counsel next appropriately concludes that it would be frivolous for Harris to 

challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, which is 42 months below the 

low end of the correctly calculated guidelines range of 70 to 87 months on each of the 

carjacking convictions. Where, as here, the sentence falls below the guidelines range, we 

presume that it is reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–56 (2007); 

United States v. Chagoya-Morales, 859 F.3d 411, 424 (7th Cir. 2017). Counsel cannot 

identify any grounds for overcoming that presumption, nor can we. See United States v. 

Melendez, 819 F.3d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 2016). At resentencing, the district court properly 

considered each relevant 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) sentencing factor, specifically discussing 

Harris’s personal background (emphasizing his youth, remorse, and family ties but 

weighing them against his lack of engagement in programming for substance abuse and 

mental health issues), his criminal history (noting that he already had an extensive 

record at a young age and committed the current offense only two months after he had 

Case: 19-1502 Document: 17 Filed: 01/08/2020 Pages: 3
No. 19-1502 Page 3 

gotten out of jail for a probation revocation), the circumstances of the offense 

(discussing the trauma caused to the three victims by carjacking at gunpoint), and the 

need to protect the public and adequately deter future criminal conduct (concluding 

that a substantial prison sentence was necessary to deter further carjacking in the 

community). 

Finally, counsel considers arguing that Harris received inadequate 

representation in the district court but appropriately concludes that this claim would be 

better saved for collateral review. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 508–09 

(2003); United States v. Jones, 696 F.3d 695, 702 (7th Cir. 2012). 

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal. 

Case: 19-1502 Document: 17 Filed: 01/08/2020 Pages: 3