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Parties Involved:
Lisa Rosemary Thornton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

FI LED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 8 1991 

&.OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 89-6415 

) 

LISA ROSEMARY THORNTON, also known ) 

as Lisa Rosemary Austin, also known ) 

as Lisa Rosemary Sparger, also known ) 

as Lisa Rosemary Walker, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-89-187-R) 

Susan M. Otto, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Leslie M. Kaestner, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Timothy D. Leonard, 

United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 1 
Appellant Lisa Rosemary Thornton appeals her. sentence for a 

conviction of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846 (1988). On appeal, Thornton alleges 

that the district court's departure from the applicable guideline 

provisions resulted in an unwarranted and unreasonable sentence 

under the Sentencing Reform Act. We vacate the sentence and 

remand for resentencing. 

I. 

On August 16, 1989, the Midwest City Police Department raided 

the home of Rosemary Thornton, seizing .8 grams of methamphetamine, .7 grams of amphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. Thornton's 

fifteen year old daughter and John Easterling also resided at the 

home. Thornton, her daughter, and Easterling were subsequently 

arrested. 1 

Thornton was indicted on six counts of drug and firearms 

violations. Count one of the indictment charged Thornton with 

conspiring with John Easterling to distribute methamphetamine from 

July 15, 1989 to on or about August 16, 1989 in violation of 21 

1 Thornton's daughter was not indicted on criminal charges. 

Easterling was indicted on one count of conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846 (1988) and five 

firearms-related counts. Easterling pled guilty to the conspiracy 

count and one count of possession of firearm during commission of 

a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c) 

(1988). See United States v. Easterling, __ F.2d __ , No. 

90-6000 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 2 
U.S.C. § 846. The remaining counts related to the unlawful 

possession of various firearms. Thornton pled guilty to count one 

of the indictment, specifically admitting to possession of .7 

grams of amphetamine and .8 grams of methamphetamine with the 

purpose of selling such drugs. 

"In [my] house, I had .7 grams of amphetamine and .8 

grams of methamphetamine. I got the methamphetamine 

from John Easterling. I had the methamphetamine for 

purposes of selling it. I did this knowingly, 

understanding it was against the law." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 53 at 7, ,r 45. 2 These acts formed the factual 

basis of Thornton's conviction and sentencing. The remaining 

counts against Thornton ultimately were dismissed. 

In sentencing Thornton, the district court adopted the 

findings of the presentence report (PSR). It stated that Thornton 

had resided with Easterling for approximately eighteen months out 

of the last two years. It also reported that, according to a 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) investigation, 

Thornton had been selling and distributing drugs she received from 

Easterling. Rec., vol. III, at 3 ,r 7. Based on this conduct and 

the pending charge under section 846, the PSR computed a total 

2 This admission was similar to the one made by Easterling, 

Thornton's co-conspirator, concerning the conspiracy. In his 

signed plea agreement, Easterling stated, "the Government's 

evidence would show that the defendant was involved in the 

distribution of .8 grams of methamphetamine and .7 grams of 

amphetamine." Rec., vol. I, doc. 54 at 1. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 3 
offense level of twelve for Thornton for the conduct of conspiring 

to possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. 

Section 2D1.4, United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines 

Manual, 1990 (hereinafter Guidelines), states that the offense 

level for a conspiracy offense involving a controlled substance 

shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy had been 

completed. The PSR identified the .8 grams of methamphetamine and 

.7 grams of amphetamine seized during the raid as the object of 

the conspiracy. According to the PSR, a conspiracy to distribute 

that amount of drugs established a base offense level of twelve. 

The PSR added two specific offense points pursuant to Guidelines§ 

2D1.l(b)(l) for possession ·of firearms. However, two points were 

deducted for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to Guidelines§ 

3El.l(a), leaving the total offense level at twelve. 

The PSR established that Thornton had a total of three 

criminal history points, placing her in criminal history category 

II. The PSR assessed one point for her prior convictions of 

possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute and a 

related firearm charge. It also assessed two additional points 

because Thornton committed the instant offense while on probation 

for those crimes. An offense level of twelve and criminal history 

category of II placed Thornton in the guideline imprisonment range 

of twelve to eighteen months pursuant to Guidelines§ 5.2. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 4 
The PSR stated that "the making of drugs available to 

[Thornton's] juvenile daughter by [Thornton]" was a factor that 

might warrant upward departure in Thornton's case. Rec., vol. 

III, at 9 ,r 50. The PSR was referring to the fact reported under 

the heading of "Offense Conduct" that "Lisa Thornton's juvenile 

daughter also advised the ATF agent that John Easterling and her 

mother had given her drugs for personal consumption on numerous 

occasions. " Id. at 3 ,r 7. The PSR did not recommend an 

appropriate degree of departure. At the sentencing hearing, 

Thornton conceded that she had given her daughter small quantities 

of marijuana and amphetamines. 3 The court agreed with the PSR 

recommendation that an upward departure was appropriate, finding 

that because Thornton had distributed drugs to her minor child, 

"the guidelines that are established for .•. this offense do not 

adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct with which you 

were involved, whatever the explanation." Rec., vol. II, at 17. 

The court indicated at the sentencing hearing that it 

intended to make an offense level departure from the applicable 

guideline offense level on the basis of Thornton's distribution of 

drugs to her daughter. After some discussion over the proper 

3 There is no evidence in the record regarding the quantity of 

drugs given to the daughter, nor was there evidence or argument 

that those distributions arose out of the same "course of conduct 

or common scheme or plan" as the one-month conspiracy to sell 

drugs. If there had been such evidence, the quantity of drugs and 

their distribution to a minor could have been used to increase the 

base offense level under Guidelines§ 1Bl.3(a)(2) and§ 2D1.2. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 5 
section to which the court should refer for guidance, defense 

counsel suggested that Guidelines§ 2D1.2 (effective Jan. 15, 

1988) should guide the court's offense level departure. Under 

section 2D1.2, which has a minimum base offense level of 

thirteen, 4 the court applies the trafficking provisions of 2D1.1 

but triples the amount of drugs involved for sentencing purposes 

if those drugs were distributed to a minor. The trial judge here, 

however, found that this guideline did not provide an adequate 

analogy for guiding the departure: 

"[2D1.2] does not, however, take into consideration 

the factor of sales or conveying drugs to your own 

child. 

"I'm just satisfied that the guidelines do not 

include that, doesn't contemplate that and do not factor 

that in. 

"I think that is a seriously exacerbating 

circumstance in this case. And I use that as a ground 

for departure. 

"I just don't think the guidelines in this case are 

adequate for the gravity of the offense." 

Rec., vol. II, at 20 (emphasis added). Having found no adequate 

guide for the offense level departure, the court sentenced 

Thornton to a sixty-month prison term without further explanation. 

4 At sentencing and at oral argument, Thornton conceded that 

the base level offense of thirteen should apply. This is the 

minimum sentence established for distribution to children under 

the age of fifteen. It appears undisputed that Thornton's 

daughter was fourteen when the distributions were made. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 6 
II. 

The three-part analysis set out in United States v. White, 

893 F.2d 276, 277-79 (10th Cir. 1990), guides our review of the 

validity of upward departures. According to White, we review 

upward departures by determining: (1) whether the district court 

correctly identified factual circumstances warranting departure; 

(2) whether such circumstances actually exist; and (3) whether the 

degree of departure is reasonable. Id. at 278. Thornton does not 

dispute the district court's factual conclusion that she provided 

drugs to her minor child. Therefore, we need only address whether 

this circumstance warranted upward departure and whether the 

degree of departure was reasonable. We hold that although the 

district court identified a circumstance that could provide the 

basis for an upward departure, it erred in determining the degree 

of departure by incorrectly referring to an offense level rather 

than to a criminal history category. 

We review de novo whether the district court justified its 

departure by citing appropriate circumstances. White, 893 F.2d at 

278 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)). If the district court 

"finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance 

of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration 

by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines," then 

it may depart from the Guidelines. Id. at 277-78 (quoting 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(b)). Information concerning "prior similar adult 

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 7 
criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction," may 

provide the basis for an upward departure from the applicable 

sentencing range. Guidelines§ 4Al.3(e). Such conduct provides 

the basis for an upward departure from the defendant's calculated 

criminal history category. See id.; United States v. Keys, 899 

F.2d 983, 990-91 (10th Cir. 1990). Departure is permissible 

because in such a case "the criminal history category does not 

adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past 

criminal conduct." Guidelines§ 4Al.3. 

The Guidelines give specific instructions as to how a 

defendant's prior criminal history should be used as a basis for 

departing from the applicable guidelines range. 

"A departure under this provision is warranted when 

the criminal history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal 

history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit 

further crimes ..•• 

II 

"In considering a departure under this provision, 

the Commission intends that the court use, as a 

reference, the guideline range for a defendant with a 

higher or lower criminal history category, as 

applicable. For example, if the court concludes that 

the defendant's criminal history category of III 

significantly under-represents the seriousness of the 

defendant's criminal history, and that the seriousness 

of the defendant's criminal history most closely 

resembles that of most defendants with a Category IV 

criminal history, the court should look to the guideline 

range specified for a defendant with a Category IV 

criminal history to guide its departure." 

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 8 
Guidelines§ 4Al.3. In this circuit, the sentencing judge follows 

this procedure by departing to a higher criminal history category 

when a criminal history category does not adequately reflect the 

seriousness of defendant's past conduct. See generally United 

States v. Jackson, __ F.2d __ , No. 89-6118 (10th Cir. Dec. 17, 

1990) (en bane); see also United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 

1436-39 (10th Cir. 1990); Keys, 899 F.2d at 989; White, 893 F.2d 

at 279; see also United States v. Harris, 907 F.2d 121, 124 (10th 

Cir. 1990) (upward departure from applicable criminal history 

category reversed because the district court failed to make any 

comparisons to higher criminal history categories). In Keys, the 

district court departed from the applicable guideline range on the 

basis of defendant's prison disciplinary record. Because the 

guidelines did not address the seriousness of the defendant's past 

conduct, for which there were no convictions, we held the district 

court properly departed to the next criminal history category in 

sentencing the defendant. Keys, 899 F.2d at 990-91. 

Prior criminal conduct reflecting on the adequacy of 

defendant's criminal history category does not provide the basis 

for an offense level departure. Factors considered in departing 

from applicable criminal history categories are distinct from 

those used in departing from appropriate offense levels. United 

States v. Fortenbury, 917 F.2d 477, __ , No. 89-2291 at 5 (10th 

Cir., Oct. 26, 1990); see also United States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 

1450, 1456 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Roberson, 872 

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 9 
F.2d 597, 607-08 (5th Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 267 

(1990); United States v. Bernhardt, 905 F.2d 343, 345-46 (10th 

Cir. 1990). Offense level departures must be based on a 

circumstance that is "substantially in excess of that which is 

ordinarily involved in the offense of the conviction." Guidelines 

§ 5K2.0 (emphasis added). Extraordinary aspects of the offense 

for which the defendant was convicted are typically the 

"aggravating factors" that provide the basis for an upward 

departure. See,~, Fortenbury, 917 F.2d at __ , No. 89-2291 

at 5; United States v. Baker, 914 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1990) 

(aggravating factors of use of dynamite and abduction of 

storeowner during the commission of crime merited upward departure 

to higher offense level); United States v. Schular, 907 F.2d 294, 

298 (2d Cir. 1990) (fact that defendant knew illegally procured 

firearms were to be used for an illicit purpose warranted upward 

departure to higher offense level). 

As in Keys, the district court in this case could have 

properly departed to a higher criminal history category because 

the Guidelines do not reflect the seriousness of Thornton's prior 

conduct. Thus we do not overrule the district court's conclusion 

that Thornton's distribution of drugs to her minor child 

constitutes an aggravating circumstance not adequately taken into 

account when the Guidelines were formulated. 5 While the district 

5 On appeal, the Government also contends Thornton's testimony 

that she intended to continue living with Easterling, her co-

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 10 
court correctly determined that the act of giving drugs to one's 

minor child may justify an upward departure, we hold that the 

district court erred in determining the degree of upward departure 

because it ignored the distinction between offense level and 

criminal history category departures. 

Thornton's prior uncharged criminal conduct reflects on the 

adequacy of her criminal history category, not the base offense 

level. The act to which Thornton pled guilty was a conspiracy to 

distribute .7 grams of amphetamine and .8 grams of methamphetamine 

during a one-month conspiracy from July 15 to August 16, 1989. As 

indicated by her statement to the court, see supra slip op. at 3, 

the object of the conspiracy was to sell the drugs. See also 

rec., vol. I, doc. 53 at 7 (plea agreement). There is no evidence 

in the record to establish that Thornton gave drugs to her 

daughter during the time frame of the conspiracy charged in Count 

one, and in any event the prior acts of giving small quantities of 

conspirator, justified the decision to depart and the degree of 

departure. We find no evidence in the record that the trial judge 

actually sentenced Thornton on that basis. See rec., vol. II, at 

17-20. Furthermore, we disagree with the Government that such a 

factor could be the basis for criminal sentencing. First, the 

court cannot sentence on the basis of mere intention or "bad 

thoughts." Moreover, the Guidelines prohibit sentencing decisions 

made on the basis of a defendant's lifestyle choices. See 28 

u.s.c. § 994(e) (1988) (Congressional mandate that Guidelines 

"reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the 

education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and 

responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant."); 

Guidelines§ 5Hl.1-5Hl.10; United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 763, 

768 (5th Cir. 1989) (defendant's education, sophistication, and 

criminal past did not justify departure from Guidelines). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6415 Document: 010110015390 Date Filed: 01/08/1991 Page: 11 
drugs to her child were not part of the crime of conspiracy to 

sell drugs for which Thornton was charged and convicted. 

Thornton's act of giving drugs to her daughter was therefore not 

an "extraordinary aspect of the offense for which [she] was 

charged," Fortenbury, 917 F.2d at __ , slip op. at 5. The judge 

therefore incorrectly calculated the degree of upward departure by 

departing from the Guidelines offense level rather than the 

criminal history category. 

In consideration of the foregoing, we VACATE the sentence and 

REMAND for resentencing not inconsistent with this opinion. 

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