Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00622/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00622-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Muniz
Respondent
Manuel Ray Pontod
Petitioner

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MANUEL RAY PONTOD, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

WILLIAM MUNIZ, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:16-cv-0622 KJM GGH P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is serving a sentence of 25 years to life for a 2010 conviction of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm and ammunition with two prior strike convictions. (Res’t’s Lod Docs. 1, 

2.) Petitioner challenges the state courts’ finding that he was ineligible for resentencing under 

Proposition 36, also known as the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. He filed his petition on 

March 24, 2016, making the following claims: (1) application of the disqualifying provisions of 

Proposition 36 to petitioner’s case violated his due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments; (2) petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated 

when he was disqualified from resentencing under Proposition 36 because there was insufficient 

evidence that he was armed; and (3) violation of petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 1 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

Amendment rights when the disqualifying provisions of Proposition 36 were not pled or proven, 

thereby entitling him to resentencing. 

Currently before the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 

filed June 10, 2016. Petitioner has filed an opposition, and respondent has filed a reply. Having 

reviewed all filings, the court now issues the following findings and recommendations. 

DISCUSSION 

Preliminarily, the Rules governing habeas corpus practice do not provide for a motion to 

dismiss practice as is set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil procedure Rule 12(b)(6). And the 

failure-to-state-a-claim rubric of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is not a good fit in habeas corpus 

practice in that the answer in habeas corpus practice may make the same legal arguments. See 

Gallegos-Soto v. Adler, 2011 WL 2708822 *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 11, 2011). Moreover, habeas 

pleading standards do not conform to those of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, and if a habeas claim is noncognizable on its merits, the “with leave to amend” or “without leave to amend” practice of Rule 

12 makes little sense regardless of whether a petitioner could better plead the claim. 

Nevertheless, Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides, in pertinent 

part: 

If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that 

the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge 

must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the 

petitioner. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 of those same rules indicate that the court may 

deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the 

respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. See Herbst v. 

Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001). Therefore, the court will reach the merits of the petition and 

recommend a summary denial. 

Petitioner’s claims may be interpreted and summarized as follows: (1) The Three Strikes 

Reform Act of 2012 is unconstitutionally vague as applied; (2) insufficient evidence to support 

the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm; and (3) Three Strikes Reform Act violated 

petitioner’s constitutional rights where the prosecution was not required to plead or prove the 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 2 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

exclusionary factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Respondent contends that the habeas petition fails to state a claim because a challenge to 

state court sentencing laws is not cognizable on federal habeas review. While this is true in the 

vast majority of cases, it is not accurate to assert that state sentencing issues can never be a 

subject for federal habeas corpus. 

I. Constitutionality of Three Strikes Reform Act 

Petitioner first argues that the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 is unconstitutionally 

vague.

 1 

Proposition 36, also known as the Three Strikes Reform Act, [] 

added Section 1170.126 to the California Penal Code effective 

November 7, 2012 (“Section 1170.126”). Section 1170.126 

“created a postconviction release proceeding whereby a prisoner 

who is serving an indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to 

the three strikes law for a crime that is not a serious or violent 

felony and who is not disqualified, may have his or her sentence 

recalled and be sentenced as a second strike offender unless the 

court determines that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk 

of danger to public safety.” People v. Yearwood, 213 Cal. App. 4th 

161, 168 (2013). 

Yost v. Sherman, 2016 WL 4491500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016). The pertinent portion of 

the statute states: 

(a) The resentencing provisions under this section and related 

statutes are intended to apply exclusively to persons presently 

serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment pursuant to 

paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or paragraph (2) of 

subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12, whose sentence under this act 

would not have been an indeterminate life sentence. 

(b) Any person serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment 

imposed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 

or paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12 upon 

conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies that are 

not defined as serious and/or violent felonies by subdivision (c) of 

Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, may file a 

petition for a recall of sentence, within two years after the effective 

date of the act that added this section or at a later date upon a 

showing of good cause, before the trial court that entered the 

judgment of conviction in his or her case, to request resentencing in 

accordance with the provisions of subdivision (e) of Section 667, 

and subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12, as those statutes have been 

amended by the act that added this section. 

 

1

 Cal. Penal Code § 1170.126. 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 3 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

... 

(e) An inmate is eligible for resentencing if: 

(1) The inmate is serving an indeterminate term of life 

imprisonment imposed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) 

of Section 667 or subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12 for a 

conviction of a felony or felonies that are not defined as serious 

and/or violent felonies by subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or 

subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7. 

(2) The inmate’s current sentence was not imposed for any of the 

offenses appearing in clauses (i) to (iii), inclusive, of subparagraph 

(C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or clauses (i) 

to (iii), inclusive, of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of 

subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12. 

(3) The inmate has no prior convictions for any of the offenses 

appearing in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of 

subdivision (e) of Section 667 or clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of 

paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12. 

(f) Upon receiving a petition for recall of sentence under this 

section, the court shall determine whether the petitioner satisfies the 

criteria in subdivision (e). If the petitioner satisfies the criteria in 

subdivision (e), the petitioner shall be resentenced pursuant to 

paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 and paragraph (1) of 

subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12 unless the court, in its discretion, 

determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an 

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. 

(g) In exercising its discretion in subdivision (f), the court may 

consider: 

(1) The petitioner’s criminal conviction history, including the type 

of crimes committed, the extent of injury to victims, the length of 

prior prison commitments, and the remoteness of the crimes; 

(2) The petitioner’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation 

while incarcerated; and 

(3) Any other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines 

to be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in 

an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. 

(h) Under no circumstances may resentencing under this act result 

in the imposition of a term longer than the original sentence. 

Cal. Penal Code § 1170.126 (West). 

 The state court resentencing transcript indicates that at hearing the court framed the 

question as follows: 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 4 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

The issue is whether or not this defendant was armed with a firearm 

pursuant to 667(e)(2)(C)(iii), and 1170.12(c)(2)(c)(iii). And the 

question is whether or not he was armed during the commission of 

the offense. 

This can be proved by either physically arming or constructive 

possession which shows he had a knowing exercise of dominion or 

control. And there’s no section enhancement that is required. 

(Res’t’s Lod. Doc. 6.) 

 The court concluded: 

By kicking the firearm with his foot, the defendant was exercising 

dominion and control of the firearm when he tried to kick it under 

the front seat. Therefore, he was armed during the commission of 

this felony and is – and he is ineligible for resentencing. 

(Id.) 

 To the extent that petitioner argues that the sentencing reduction provisions are so vague 

as to violate federal due process, petitioner has stated a federal claim, but the claim here is not 

meritorious. Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2251 (2015), involved the federal Armed Career 

Criminal Act (“ACCA”), and contained a somewhat similar to the present case sentencing, i.e., 

vagueness claim of unconstitutionality of the statute. The court held that the statute, permitting 

enhanced sentences for previous “violent” felonies,” violated due process. 2 Justice Thomas’ 

concurrence concisely described the conditions which might render a statute vague: 

We have become accustomed to using the Due Process Clauses to 

invalidate laws on the ground of “vagueness.” The doctrine we have 

developed is quite sweeping: “A statute can be impermissibly vague 

... if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 

opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits” or “if it 

authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 

147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). 

Id. at 2566. 

Petitioner appears to argue the second instance, that the statute was arbitrarily or 

 

2

 A federal defendant could have his sentence for a present crime enhanced under the Armed 

Career Criminal Act if the defendant had three prior felony convictions for, inter alia, a “violent 

crime,” which included any past felony that involved conduct that presented “a serious potential 

risk of physical injury to another.” 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 5 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

discriminatorily applied to him. Unlike the ACCA in Johnson, however, which imposed an 

increased prison term if the defendant was found to meet its terms, including a felony that 

“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” the Three 

Strikes Reform Act serves only to reduce a previous, valid sentence if its terms are met. If 

petitioner is excluded from this Act, as he was in this case, his sentence is merely not reduced; in 

no way is it enhanced. Nevertheless, it is possible that a statute of clemency could be so vague in 

its exclusions that enforcement of the exclusions could result in “arbitrary” or “discriminatory” 

application. 

 As outlined above, the exception to the Three Strikes Reform Act which the re-sentencing 

court applied to petitioner, was clear in its terms: a defendant is excluded from re-sentencing 

where he was armed with a firearm during the commission of the instant felony, and had two 

prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, pursuant to §§ 667(e)(2)(C)(iii) and 

1170.12(c)(2)(C)(iii). The terms of these statutes are specific and clear, and do not permit 

arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Either the defendant was in possession of a firearm, as 

was petitioner, or he was not. 

 There would be a much more colorable claim of vagueness if other portions of the Act had 

been applied to petitioner. For example, subdivision (f) of § 1170.126 provides a reason for a 

court to use its discretion to decline to resentence a petitioner where “resentencing the petitioner 

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” It can be argued that such language 

permits arbitrary enforcement because the terms are subject to boundless interpretation. 

Petitioner’s resentencing hearing was conducted pursuant to a much more specific and clear 

portion of the statute, and the court concisely set forth the subdivisions that applied and the 

reasons for its conclusion. Therefore, petitioner’s constitutional challenge fails. 

To the extent, however, that petitioner is simply attacking a “wrong” legal decision by the 

state court, petitioner “may not, however, transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by 

asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). The 

same principle applies for other constitutional challenges. For this reason, the claim that 

petitioner’s sentence should be reduced based on the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 is not 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 6 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

colorable. A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) only on the basis of 

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is unavailable 

for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d at 

1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 

F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. 

Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377, 92 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (1972). 

 The Supreme Court has reiterated the standards of review for a federal habeas court. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991). In Estelle v. McGuire, the Supreme 

Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which had granted 

federal habeas relief. The Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that the evidence 

was incorrectly admitted under state law since, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to 

reexamine state court determinations on state law questions.” Id. at 67-68, 112 S. Ct. at 480. The 

Court re-emphasized that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for error in state law.” Id. at 

67, 112 S. Ct. at 480, citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102 (1990), and 

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S. Ct. 871, 874-75 (1984) (federal courts may not grant 

habeas relief where the sole ground presented involves a perceived error of state law, unless said 

error is so egregious as to amount to a violation of the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of 

the Fourteenth Amendment). 

 The Supreme Court further noted that the standard of review for a federal habeas court “is 

limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States (citations omitted).” Id. at 68, 112 S. Ct. at 480. The Court also stated that in order for 

error in the state trial proceedings to reach the level of a due process violation, the error had to be 

one involving “fundamental fairness,” Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct. at 482, and that “we ‘have defined the 

category of infractions that violate “fundamental fairness” very narrowly.’” Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct. 

at 482. Habeas review does not lie in a claim that the state court erroneously allowed or excluded 

particular evidence according to state evidentiary rules. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 

919 (9th Cir. 1991). As more recently re-emphasized by the Supreme Court, “‘a mere error of 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 7 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

state law ... is not a denial of due process.’” Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 

1454 (2009) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 107, 121, n. 21, 102 S. Ct. 1558 [] (1982)). To state a 

cognizable federal habeas claim based on an alleged error in state sentencing, a petitioner must 

show that the error was “so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process” 

violation. Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992). 

Applying these principles in federal habeas proceedings, the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals has specifically refused to consider alleged errors in the application of state sentencing 

law. See, e .g., Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.1989). Thus, in Miller, the court 

refused to examine the state court’s determination that a defendant’s prior conviction was for a 

“serious felony” within the meaning of the state statutes governing sentence enhancements. Id. at 

1118–19. The court did not reach the merits of the petitioner’s claim, stating that federal habeas 

relief is not available for alleged errors in interpreting and applying state law. Id. (quoting 

Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085). 

Because petitioner was ineligible for resentencing, no further analysis was required. See 

Hawkins v. Soto, 2015 WL 631957, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Feb.12, 2015) (finding that discretionary 

factors in section 1170.126 do not come into play where offense is a violent one). Federal courts 

in California are bound by the state courts’ conclusion that petitioner is precluded from relief 

under section 1170.126. Id., citing Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S.Ct. 602, 163 

L.Ed.2d 407 (2005). 

II. Insufficient Evidence to Support Conviction for Felon in Possession of a Firearm 

Petitioner also contends that his argument in state court was that as an aider and abettor 

found not guilty of being armed, he was eligible for resentencing under Proposition 36. (ECF No. 

10 at 3.) Petitioner has failed to demonstrate there was anything arbitrary, capricious or 

fundamentally unfair in the state courts’ finding that his conviction for felon in possession of a 

firearm rendered his Three Strikes sentence ineligible for recall. Petitioner relies upon Read v. 

Valenzuela, 2016 WL 3383726 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2016), for the proposition that the court 

should address the merits of the conviction, and that petitioner had argued in state court that “as 

an aider and abettor found not guilty of being armed, he was in fact eligible for resentencing 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 8 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

under Prop. 36.” Under similar circumstances, the court in Read found that it could not revisit the 

state court determination that petitioner was armed during the offense, which made him ineligible 

for resentencing. Id. at *6. Although the court did address the merits, it noted that “[t]here is no 

Supreme Court precedent holding that due process is violated when the prosecutor is not required 

to plead and prove a fact that the court relies upon to determine that the prisoner is disqualified 

from a discretionary reduction of a lawfully imposed sentence.” Id. Therefore, the Read court 

came to the same conclusion as this court, that petitioner’s claim implicates a state law 

determination that may not be revisited by this court.3

 

3

 The state court’s decision in Read is instructional in regard to petitioner’s claim of insufficiency 

of the evidence: 

“[W]hen an initial sentencing for a current offense is at issue, there 

is a clear statutory pleading and proof requirement with respect to 

factors that disqualify a defendant with two or more prior strike 

convictions from sentencing as a second strike offender.” (Osuna, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033, italics added; People v. Blakely

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1058 (Blakely).) 

“Fairly read, however, section 1170.126 does not impose the same 

requirements in connection with the procedure for determining 

whether an inmate already sentenced as a third strike offender is 

eligible for resentencing as a second strike offender.” (Blakely, 

supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058; White, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 527 [“the pleading and proof requirement plainly is a part of 

only the prospective part of the Reform Act”].) It incorporates the 

disqualifying factors set forth in sections 667 and 1170.12, but not 

those sections’ pleading and proof requirements. (Blakely, supra, 

225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058; White, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 

527; see also People v. Manning (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1133, 

1139; People v. Bradford, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332 [“no 

similar language in the resentencing statute”].) As resentencing is 

ultimately a discretionary act of leniency to an inmate with a valid 

life sentence, there is no superseding constitutional requirement that 

the basis for the denial of leniency have been pleaded and proved. 

(Blakely, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1060, 1063 [“Like facts 

invoked to limit the ability to earn conduct credits, facts invoked to 

render an inmate ineligible for downward resentencing do not 

increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, and 

so need not be pled or proved.”]; Osuna, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1039–1040.) 

Since there is no pleading and proof requirement, “a trial court may 

deny section 1170.126 resentencing relief under the armed-with-afirearm exclusion even if the accusatory pleading, under which the 

defendant was charged and convicted of possession of a firearm by 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 9 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

Petitioner in essence is attacking the underlying conviction with a claim that there was 

insufficient evidence to convict him of being a felon in possession. As such, there is no federal 

due process requirement that sentencing proceedings, or resentencing proceedings, give him a 

trial on the evidence of conviction. This type of attack is simply unavailable here where 

petitioner challenges only his resentencing proceedings, where the state courts were surely able to 

rely on the conviction itself. 

III. Three Strikes Reform Act Does not Violate Apprendi 

Lastly, petitioner has failed to present a federal basis for relief with regard to his claim 

relating to the Three Strikes Reform Act because a jury did not find the exclusion to the clemency 

statute to be satisfied. No federal court has found federal challenges to the Three Strikes Reform 

Act to be cognizable in federal habeas. In Olivarez v. Lizarraga, 2015 WL 521431 at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 9, 2015), the court distinguished Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 

(2000), as applicable to facts which may increase a sentence and therefore potentially violate the 

Sixth Amendment, unlike the Three Strikes Reform Act which “is an ameliorative provision, and 

can only decrease a petitioner’s sentence.” In the AEDPA context, Apprendi could not apply 

because the situation here is so different from the context of Apprendi (what must be pled and 

proven at trial), such that the present situation (a years-after sentencing application of partial 

 

a felon, did not allege he or she was armed with a firearm during 

the commission of that possession offense.” (White, supra, 223 

Cal.App.4th at p. 527; also People v. Elder (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 

1308, 1314–1316.) The trial court may look to uncharged conduct 

manifest from examining “relevant, reliable, admissible portions of 

the record of conviction.” (Blakely, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

1059, 1063; Osuna, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030) [relying on 

prior appellate court decision]; see also Couzens & Bigelow, The 

Amendment of the Three Strikes Sentencing Law (Aug. 2014) pp. 

17, 32 [“Nothing requires a sentence to be imposed for a specific 

disqualifying factor” and “[i]t seems likely that if the entire record 

of conviction can be used in determining the existence of a strike 

for an original sentencing proceeding, the same record can be used 

in determining whether a person qualifies for second strike 

sentencing under Proposition 36”]. 

People v. Read, 2014 WL 6657586, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2014) (emphasis 

in original). 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 10 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

clemency), would require a Supreme Court case dealing with the present situation. See Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2009) (under AEDPA, holdings of Supreme Court regarding invalidity of 

state sponsored courtroom practices could not be extrapolated to context of private spectator 

courtroom conduct; therefore, ruling of the state court on spectator conduct could not be an 

unreasonable application of federal law as announced by the Supreme Court).4

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss, filed June 10, 2016 (ECF No. 7), be granted on the 

grounds as discussed above; and 

2. This petition be summarily denied.5

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are 

 

4

 Moreover, petitioner would not be able to present challenges to clemency law application under 

the rubric of due process or equal protection. Holloway v. Price, 2015 WL 1607710, at *6–*8 

(C.D. Cal. Apr.7, 2015) (holding that petitioner’s federal due process and equal protection claims 

challenging the denial of his application for resentencing under § 1170.126 were noncognizable); 

Aubrey v. Virga, 2015 WL 1932071, at *9–*10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2015) (same); Morgan v. 

Spearman, 2015 WL 2452781, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2015) (summarily dismissing habeas 

petition alleging that failure to resentence petitioner under the Reform Act violated the federal 

constitution, including the Ex Post Facto Clause); Occeguedo v. Dep’t of Corr., 2015 WL 

4638505, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2015) (rejecting as noncognizable petitioner’s federal due 

process challenge to state court’s denial of his application for resentencing under the Three 

Strikes Reform Act); Johnson v. Davis, 2014 WL 2586883, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2014) 

(“Petitioner’s attempt to transform his claim of an alleged misapplication of Section 1170.126 

into a claim of a violation of his federal constitutional rights, by conclusory references to ‘due 

process’ and ‘equal protection,’ is unavailing”). 

5

 Because the undersigned reached the federal merits of the vagueness and Apprendi claims, the 

petition should be denied as opposed to being dismissed, if this difference in terms of 

adjudication makes any practical difference. 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 11 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: September 22, 2016 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

GGH:076:pont0622.mtd 

Case 2:16-cv-00622-KJM-GGH Document 12 Filed 09/23/16 Page 12 of 12