Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-01876/USCOURTS-ca3-23-01876-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General United States of America
Respondent
Devon Nunes
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 23-1876 

___________ 

DEVON NUNES, Petitioner 

v. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

____________________________________ 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

(Agency No. A099-267-322) 

Immigration Judge: Andrew R. Arthur 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

February 20, 2024 

Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: March 1, 2024) 

___________ 

OPINION* 

___________ 

PER CURIAM 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 23-1876 Document: 28 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024
2 

 Devon Nunes, a citizen of Jamaica, has filed a pro se petition for review of a 

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his fourth motion to 

reopen his immigration proceedings. We will deny the petition for review. 

 The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against 

Nunes in 2009. Nunes conceded that he had failed to comply with the conditions of his 

admission as a non-immigrant student and that he was removable. An Immigration Judge 

denied Nunes’s application for cancellation of removal because he did not establish the 

requisite hardship to a qualifying relative. The BIA affirmed, and we dismissed Nunes’s 

petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. See C.A. No. 10-4209, 12/23/10 Order. 

In 2011, the BIA denied as untimely Nunes’s motion to reopen his proceedings in 

order to apply for adjustment of status based on his marriage to a United States citizen. It 

also ruled that reopening sua sponte was not warranted. We denied Nunes’s petition for 

review. Nunes v. Att’y Gen., 475 F. App’x 427, 430 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 

In 2018, Nunes, through counsel, filed a motion to reopen, reconsider, and 

terminate his proceedings. The BIA ruled that the motion was time- and number-barred. 

It rejected his argument that the IJ lacked jurisdiction over his proceedings under Pereira 

v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), because his notice to appear did not specify the time 

and date of his initial hearing.1 We denied Nunes’s petition for review. See C.A. No. 19-

3761, 2/6/20 Order; see also Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 2019) 

1

 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113-14, held that where a notice to appear does not include the 

time and place of the hearing, it does not “trigger the stop-time rule,” and continuous 

physical presence required for cancellation of removal continues to accrue. 

Case: 23-1876 Document: 28 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/01/2024
3 

(rejecting jurisdictional argument). 

In 2020, Nunes filed another counseled motion to reopen, reconsider, and 

terminate his proceedings. The BIA ruled that the motion was time- and number-barred 

and rejected his argument that the IJ lacked jurisdiction under Guadalupe v. Attorney 

General, 951 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2020).2 It found no basis to reopen his case sua sponte.3 

We denied Nunes’s petition for review. See C.A. No. 22-2130, 1/6/23 Order. 

 Meanwhile, in November 2022, Nunes filed a pro se motion to reopen, reconsider 

and terminate his proceedings asserting that counsel had failed to argue in his third 

motion to reopen that he had become eligible for adjustment of status. He stated that a 

ten-year bar that the BIA had ruled might apply in denying his first motion to reopen 

(because he had failed to file a voluntary departure bond) had expired. He also stated 

that, under Guadalupe, the stop-time rule was not triggered, that he had again accrued ten 

years of continuous physical presence, and that he was thus eligible for discretionary 

relief. On May 2, 2023, the BIA denied the motion as time- and number-barred and 

declined to reopen sua sponte. Nunes petitions for review.4

 As discussed further below, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of 

Nunes’s motion to reopen sua sponte. See Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 650-51 (3d 

2

 Guadalupe, 951 F.3d at 164, held that, for purposes of the stop-time rule, a notice of 

hearing does not cure a notice to appear that omitted the time and place of the hearing. 

Guadalupe abrogated Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General, 817 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2016). 

3

 Because Nunes did not receive the BIA’s September 14, 2020, decision, the BIA 

reissued it on May 17, 2022, to be treated as if issued on that date. 

4

 Nunes was removed on March 30, 2023. 

Case: 23-1876 Document: 28 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/01/2024
4 

Cir. 2017). We otherwise have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a). Darby v. Att’y Gen, 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2021). We review the decision 

for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb it unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or 

contrary to law. Id. 

 The BIA correctly determined that Nunes’s motion to reopen was time- and 

number-barred and that he did not establish that an exception to these limitations applied. 

A noncitizen may file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final 

administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 

motion to reopen at issue is Nunes’s fourth. His final removal order was issued in 2010, 

and he did not file this motion to reopen until 2022.5

 While there are exceptions to these 

requirements, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), they are 

not applicable here. 

Nunes argues that the time and number limitations should be equitably tolled 

because counsel failed to argue in his third motion to reopen that he had become eligible 

for adjustment of status. “The time limit for filing a motion to reopen is subject to 

equitable tolling, and perhaps the numerical limit is as well.” Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen., 639 

F.3d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Ineffective assistance of counsel can be a basis 

for equitable tolling. Id. We agree with the Government, however, that Nunes’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel argument is a non-starter because his third motion to 

reopen was also time- and number-barred, and his claim that he had become eligible for 

5

 Nunes’s motion is also labeled a motion to reconsider. This motion is also time- and 

number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A),(B). 

Case: 23-1876 Document: 28 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/01/2024
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adjustment of status does not implicate an exception to these limitations. 

Nunes also has not shown that the time and number requirements would have been 

equitably tolled had counsel raised his eligibility for adjustment of status in his third 

motion. Even if a ten-year bar on his eligibility had expired, and he satisfied other 

eligibility requirements, the BIA ruled in denying Nunes’s first motion to reopen sua 

sponte that, if relief were not barred, he could have pursued adjustment of status earlier. 

Nunes, 475 F. App’x at 428. Nunes has been married since 1996. Nunes may be correct 

that the BIA failed to address his equitable tolling argument in denying his latest motion 

to reopen, but, under the circumstances of this case, any error was harmless. See Nkomo 

v. Att’y Gen., 986 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2021) (requiring a noncitizen to pursue his 

rights diligently to be entitled to equitable tolling); Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 

(3d Cir. 2011) (holding harmless error applies in immigration cases).6

 Nunes also challenges the BIA’s decision to deny his motion to reopen sua sponte. 

Because such decisions are discretionary and “‘functionally unreviewable,’” we generally 

lack jurisdiction to review them. Darby, 1 F.4th at 164 (quoting Park, 846 F.3d at 651). 

Nunes argues that the BIA’s decision is insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate 

review. However, the BIA stated that it reviewed the evidence Nunes had submitted and 

that the circumstances were not exceptional. This discretionary ruling is outside our 

jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction where the BIA relied on an incorrect legal premise or 

6

 Nunes also has not shown that equitable tolling was warranted based on the change in 

law in Guadalupe. Nunes’s earlier application for cancellation of removal was not denied 

based on a failure to establish continuous physical presence. And he now seeks to apply 

for adjustment of status, not cancellation of removal. 

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departed from a settled practice. See id. Nunes does not argue that the BIA departed 

from a settled practice. And to the extent he contends that reopening sua sponte was due 

under Guadalupe, he has not shown legal error or that Guadalupe is implicated here. 

 Finally, Nunes asserts that the BIA failed to address his separate filing asking it to 

administratively close his removal proceedings so that he could apply for a waiver and an 

adjustment of status. Administrative closure is a tool used to remove cases from an IJ’s 

or the BIA’s active docket. Arcos Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 

2021). It may be used when there is a pending alternative resolution of a case or an event 

that might affect the outcome. Id. at 117. Nunes has not shown that relief is due based 

on his request for administrative closure. As the Government argues, Nunes’s removal 

proceedings were already closed, and because the BIA denied his motion to reopen, they 

remain closed. 

Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 

Case: 23-1876 Document: 28 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/01/2024