Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01828/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01828-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
GKN Aerospace North America
Not Party
Lodge 837
Not Party
Peter J. Shelton
Appellant
The Boeing Company
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1828

___________

Peter J. Shelton, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri

The Boeing Company, *

*

Defendant-Appellee, *

*

GKN Aerospace North America, Inc.; *

Lodge 837, International Association *

of Machinists and Aerospace Workers *

AFL-CIO, *

*

Defendants. *

___________

Submitted: November 19, 2004

Filed: March 7, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, McMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 04-1828 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/07/2005 Entry ID: 1875241 
1

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

2

At oral argument, we sua sponte questioned counsel as to whether Shelton had

adequately preserved the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies issue in his Notice

of Appeal (NOA) where the NOA designated only “the final judgment” entered on

March 3, 2004, and not the district court’s order of November 17, 2003, as that which

was being appealed. We raised this jurisdictional issue in recognition of our “special

obligation” to consider our own jurisdiction. Thomas v. Basham, 931 F.2d 521, 522-

23 (8th Cir. 1991) (indicating that jurisdictional issues should be raised sua sponte by

a federal court whenever it appears that jurisdiction may be lacking). However, upon

independent review, we are now satisfied that we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

Under Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), Shelton’s designation in the NOA of the final

judgment, as opposed to an interlocutory order, was sufficient to permit review of the

district court’s order of November 17, 2003. See In re National Warranty Ins. Risk

Retention Group, 384 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 2004) (Where the appellant’s Notice of

Appeal identified only the order of the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) affirming

an order of the bankruptcy court, and both the BAP’s order and the bankruptcy

court’s order “represent[ed] the final orders of the respective courts,” holding that

jurisdiction to review a discovery order was proper because “[t]he obvious intent of

-2-

Peter J. Shelton appeals from an order entered in the United States District

Court1

 for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissing his claims against his former

employer, The Boeing Company (Boeing), under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. See Shelton v. The Boeing Co.,

No. 4:02CV286 (E. D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2003) (order granting Boeing’s motion for

partial dismissal) (hereinafter “slip op.”). For reversal, Shelton argues that the district

court erred in dismissing, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, his claims

of discriminatory refusal to rehire arising after June 25, 2001. For the reasons

discussed below, we affirm.

Jurisdiction in the district court was proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.

Jurisdiction in this court is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was

timely filed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).2

Appellate Case: 04-1828 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/07/2005 Entry ID: 1875241 
the Notice of Appeal was to appeal all orders, including discovery orders, that led up

to the courts’ final decisions” and no prejudice had been demonstrated.); Greer v. St.

Louis Reg’l Med. Ctr., 258 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Ordinarily, a notice of

appeal that specifies the final judgment in a case should be understood to bring up for

review all of the previous rulings and orders that led up to and served as a predicate

for that final judgment.”); cf. Parkhill v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1051,

1058 (8th Cir. 2002) (designation in NOA of order granting summary judgment

insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction to review order issued a year earlier

denying class certification); Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 788

& nn.2-3 (8th Cir. 2001) (where the NOA specified only one plaintiff as the party

appealing, and designated only the district court’s judgment against that specific

plaintiff, court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review separate earlier order granting

summary judgment against two other plaintiffs) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A)).

-3-

Shelton was a production material coordinator for Boeing. After Boeing sold

the division in which Shelton worked, he was notified that he would be laid off

effective January 12, 2001. Shelton was 50 years old at the time of the layoff. On

October 24, 2001, Shelton filed an intake questionnaire, or administrative charge,

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that Boeing

had discriminated against him on the basis of his age in terminating him and refusing

to rehire him for another position. On his administrative charge, in the section

entitled “Hiring/Promotion,” Shelton wrote: “Applied to Boeing 10 times,” and he set

forth the specific positions for which he applied. In response to the question: “When

did you apply for that position?,” Shelton indicated a time period of November 15,

2000, through June 25, 2001. To the question: “When did you learn that you were not

selected? (Date),” he wrote: “NO RESPONSE FROM BOEING.” 

After Shelton received a Right to Sue letter, he brought the present action in

federal court. In his second amended complaint, Shelton alleged: “Since Plaintiff’s

termination, he has repeatedly applied for other positions with Defendant Boeing and

has been repeatedly denied employment, often losing the position to individuals who

are younger and less qualified.” Appellant’s Appendix at 16. 

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-4-

Following some discovery, Boeing moved to dismiss Shelton’s claims, for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, to the extent he was seeking redress for

refusals to rehire occurring after June 25, 2001. 

The district court held that Shelton had failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies for his post-June 25, 2001, claims because they were not raised in the

administrative charge nor like or reasonably related to the claims that were raised.

Slip op. at 4-5. The district court therefore dismissed “all claims for failure-to-hire

arising from hiring decisions made . . . after June 25, 2001.” Id. at 5. Following the

entry of final judgment, Shelton appealed.

On appeal, Shelton argues that the district court erred in dismissing his refusalto-rehire claims under the ADEA arising out of post-June 25, 2001, employment

decisions. He notes that his administrative charge referenced ten incidents in which

Boeing refused to rehire him, occurring both before and after his termination. He

argues that ten subsequent incidents in which he unsuccessfully applied for job

vacancies at Boeing are “reasonably related” to the administrative charge. Shelton

points out that the scope of his complaint may be as broad as the EEOC investigation

that reasonably may be expected to result from his administrative charge. He argues

that the scope of his claim in the second amended complaint, incorporating multiple

post-June 25, 2001, refusals to rehire, is no broader than the EEOC investigation that

reasonably could be expected to grow out of his administrative charge. See Brief for

Appellant at 11-14 (citing, e.g., Butts v. City of New York Dep’t of Hous. Pres. &

Dev., 990 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1993) (circumstances permitting conclusion that a

discrimination claim is “reasonably related” to the administrative charge include:

where the plaintiff alleges further incidents of discrimination carried out in the same

manner as alleged in the administrative charge and where the conduct complained of

falls within the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected

to grow out of the charge)). 

Appellate Case: 04-1828 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/07/2005 Entry ID: 1875241 
-5-

We review the district court’s dismissal of Shelton’s claims de novo.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition precedent to the filing of an

action under the ADEA in federal court. See Dorsey v. Pinnacle Automation Co., 278

F.3d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2002). The reason for requiring the pursuit of administrative

remedies first is to provide the EEOC with an initial opportunity to investigate

allegations of employment discrimination and to work with the parties toward

voluntary compliance and conciliation. See, e.g., Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72

F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing exhaustion requirement under Title VII).

“The proper exhaustion of administrative remedies gives the plaintiff a green light to

bring [his or] her employment-discrimination claim, along with allegations that are

‘like or reasonably related’ to that claim, in federal court.” Id. Although we have

often stated that we will liberally construe an administrative charge for exhaustion of

remedies purposes, we also recognize that “there is a difference between liberally

reading a claim which lacks specificity, and inventing, ex nihilo, a claim which

simply was not made.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

claims of employment discrimination in the complaint may be as broad as the scope

of the EEOC investigation which reasonably could be expected to result from the

administrative charge. See, e.g., Kells v. Sinclair Buick–GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d

827, 836 (8th Cir. 2000).

In the present case, it is undisputed that Shelton, in his EEOC intake

questionnaire, identified a specific time period in which he alleged the discriminatory

conduct occurred. The ending date, June 25, 2001, was four months before the date

on which Shelton submitted the intake questionnaire to the EEOC. Neither Boeing

nor the EEOC was on actual notice that Shelton was claiming additional acts of

alleged age discrimination occurring after June 25, 2001. Shelton nevertheless now

maintains that he should be permitted to sue Boeing under the ADEA on the basis of

ten incidents in which Boeing refused to rehire him after June 25, 2001.

Appellate Case: 04-1828 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/07/2005 Entry ID: 1875241 
-6-

In Boge v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co., 976 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1992),

the plaintiff had been hired and terminated by the same employer three times. We

affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim arising out of the last

termination, where the administrative charge only alleged age discrimination in the

first termination. Relevant to the case at bar, we explained: “a layoff from

employment constitutes a completed act at the time it occurred . . . . [A]n employer’s

failure to recall or rehire does not constitute a continuing violation of the ADEA.

Each alleged discriminatory recall constitutes a separate and completed act by the

defendant.” Id. (citations omitted); accord National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 114-15 (2002) (“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote,

denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of

discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a

separate actionable unlawful employment practice.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Because a refusal to hire or rehire is a discrete employment action, Shelton

could have identified, either in his original administrative charge or by amendment,

each refusal to rehire that he contends was based upon unlawful age discrimination.

Moreover, because refusals to hire or rehire constitute discrete employment actions,

it is not reasonable to expect the EEOC to look for and investigate such adverse

employment actions if they are nowhere mentioned in the administrative charge. We

therefore hold that Shelton’s claims of discriminatory refusal to rehire arising after

June 25, 2001, are not like or reasonably related to the claims in his administrative

charge. The order of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-1828 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/07/2005 Entry ID: 1875241