Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06362/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06362-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel Scott Raymer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

\ ;mnitrh ~fates (!lourt of J\pprals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK July 5, 1991 

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

(Filed May 29, 1991, by Judge Baldock) 

Re: No 89-6362, USA v. Raymer ' 

(Lower docket: CR-89-115-P) 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844-3157 

IFTSl 564·3157 

The opinion filed May 29, 1991, in the captioned appeal 

has been ordered withdrawn. 

RLH:oac 

Sincerely, 

B 

.ct{MLl\ · P,atr~ck Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 89-6362 Document: 01019292961 Date Filed: 07/24/1991 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PI LEO 

United Sttfe!i C9urt ~f Appeals 

'renth Circuit 

MAY 2 9 19g1 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. No. 89-6362 

SAMUEL SCOTT RAYMER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-89-115-P) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Richard M. Wintery, Special Assistant United States Attorney and 

Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Scott M. Anderson, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

By superseding indictment, defendant-appellant Samuel Scott 

Raymer was indicted in eight of ten counts of an indictment 

* Through inadvertence, defendant's counsel failed to appear 

for oral argument on November 7, 1990. After examining the briefs 

and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that 

oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause therefore is ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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charging, in pertinent part, seven defendants with various 

offenses arising out of the alleged distribution of the drug 

methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA. Defendant also was charged 

with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. After a jury trial, 

defendant was convicted on seven counts: (1) counts four, five 

and seven, introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce 

with the intent to mislead or defraud, 21 u.s.c. §§ 331(a) & 

333(a)(2), 1 on or about January 1986, April 1986 and April 1987, 

respectively; 2) count one, conspiracy to commit this offense from 

June 1985 to April 1987, 18 u.s.c. § 371; 3) count eight, 

distribution of MDMA, a Schedule I controlled substance analogue, 

21 u.s.c. §§ 813, 841(a)(1), on or about April 11, 1987; 4) count 

two, conspiracy to commit this offense, 21 u.s.c. §§ 813, 

84l(a)(l), 846, from October 24, 1986 to April 1987; and 5) count 

three, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and 

distribution of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, from June 1985 to April 11, 1987. 

These offenses predated the Sentencing Guidelines, which 

apply only to offenses committed after November 1, 1987. See 

United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1040 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Defendant therefore was sentenced in accordance with 

pre-Guidelines law. On the MDMA misbranding convictions (counts 

one, four, five and seven) defendant was sentenced to a term of 

two years. On the convictions for conspiracy to distribute MDMA 

1 21 u.s.c. § 333(a)(2) was formerly designated§ 333(b). 

Although the parties have cited the former designation, we cite 

the current one. 

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and distribution of MDMA, a controlled substance analogue, (counts 

two and eight), and the conviction for conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute cocaine and distribution of cocaine (count 

three), defendant was sentenced to five years. The sentences on 

all counts ran concurrently. Additionally, on count three, 

defendant received a six-year supervised release term with 

mandatory participation in a drug aftercare program. 

MDMA became subject to federal controlled substance penalties 

as a controlled substance analogue on October 27, 1986. See 

United States v. Mitcheltree, No. 89-6406, slip op. at 9-10 (lOth 

Cir. May 15, 1991). Before and after October 27, 1986, defendant 

supervised a large MDMA distribution network in Texas and 

Oklahoma. Defendant initially traveled via commercial airline 

from Texas, where he resided, to Oklahoma and concealed the MDMA 

tablets on his person or in his personal belongings. Rec. supp. 

vol. III at 99. When in Oklahoma City, he then consigned or sold 

large quantities of MDMA tablets to other drug dealers including 

Lance Miller. Miller testified that he purchased 100 to 250 MDMA 

tablets per week for resale and estimated that defendant 

distributed as many as 2,000 MDMA tablets per week. Id. at 94-95. 

In October 1985, defendant was arrested in an undercover buy 

operation at Dallas Love Field, en route to Oklahoma City. Id. 

supp. vol. IV at 232, 244. The Dallas police obtained search 

warrants and found 2,450 unlabeled MDMA tablets in an airport 

locker and in defendant's carry-on luggage. Id. at 232. 

Defendant pled guilty in Texas state court and received a sentence 

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of ten years probation for his delivery of MDMA. Rec. supp. vol. 

XII, doc. 22 at 2 (citing Texas v. Raymer, Nos. F-85-92267-S & 

F-85-91340-NS (Dallas County, Tx. D. Ct. (282nd Jud. Dist.) Sept. 

2, 1986)). 

Defendant also possessed and distibuted cocaine. Danny Gile 

testified that between August 1985 and March 1986, he saw 

defendant with over an ounce of cocaine. Rec. supp. vol. Vat 

707. Defendant offered to sell Gile cocaine. Id. at 696. Gile 

tried some, but did not purchase any because he had another 

supplier. Id. at 696-97. Gile also saw the defendant with a 

briefcase containing cash and a revolver. Id. at 691. In October 

1985, defendant hosted a football party at his Texas home and 

provided MDMA and cocaine for his guests. Id. supp. vol. IV at 

161-62; supp. vol. III at 637. 

After his first arrest in October 1985, defendant was 

apprehensive about using the commercial airlines in connection 

with his MDMA distribution. He therefore obtained a new vehicle 

and began driving from Dallas to Oklahoma City because it entailed 

less chance of being caught with the contraband. Id. supp. vol. V 

at 450. While in Oklahoma City, he stayed with Kevin Volk and 

JoAnn Mitcheltree and distributed MDMA to various dealers. Id. 

By January 1986, defendant, Volk and Mitcheltree were packaging 

MDMA for resale. Id. at 456. 

In February 1986, defendant consigned six grams of cocaine to 

Volk with the understanding that Volk could keep any proceeds in 

excess of $80 per gram. Id. at 482. Volk sold five grams and 

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' 

used one. Id. at 482-83. This arrangement continued at least 

twice a month until the end of 1986 or early 1987, with Volk in 

Oklahoma City and defendant in Texas. Id. at 483. Also in 

February 1986, defendant offered to supply 

former-associate-turned-informant Leslie Lynn Ricks with cocaine. 

Rec. supp. val. VII at 751. Ricks was provided with a sample to 

examine visually, but he declined to purchase any because he was 

satisfied with his existing supplier. Id. Thereafter, defendant 

twice offered to sell Ricks a remaining "eightball" (one-eighth 

ounce) of cocaine. Id. at 751. 

In June 1986, Plano, Texas police executed a search warrant 

at defendant's residence and arrested him. The search revealed 

typical drug dealer items--numerous pills in various unmarked 

bottles, small plastic bags containing white powder, several rolls 

of plastic bags, a cocaine grinder, a triple section scale, a gold 

plated straw, $6,000 in currency, numerous firearms, seven bags of 

bullets and a not-so-typical picture of defendant posing with a 

straw over a pound of cocaine on a plate glass mirror. Id. supp. 

val. IV at 276-77, 282-84, 314-15, 337-38, 354. Inside 

defendant's garage was a motorcycle with the license plate XTEXY 

(ecstasy). Id. at 307. The drugs found during the search 

contained the presence of cocaine (2.23 grams) and MDMA (63.69 

grams). Id. at 364-66, 368. Defendant was charged in two Texas 

state criminal cases with possession of cocaine and MDMA, and 

ultimately received ten years probation to run concurrently with 

his previous Dallas County sentence. Id. supp. val. XII, doc. 22 

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• 

at 2-3 (citing Texas v. Raymer, Nos. F-86-442-S & F-86-443-S 

(Collin County, Tx. D. Ct. (219th Jud. Dist.) Feb. 2, 1987)). 

Defendant agreed to cooperate with the Plano authorities for 

more lenient treatment. Rec. supp. vol. III at 78. Mitcheltree 

and Volk had to quit the MDMA business because defendant was no 

longer making trips to Oklahoma City. Id. supp. vol. IV at 469. 

According to Volk, a few months later defendant contacted 

Mitcheltree offering to send MDMA through the mail. Volk talked 

with defendant about which type of mail service was preferable. 

Defendant explained that express mail was preferable because "the 

law states you need a court order to get into the U.S. mail," id. 

at 470, and a private parcel service "can open it," id. at 471. 

For two or three weeks, MDMA tablets were sent to Mitcheltree and 

Volk through the mail. Id. 

During September-October 1986, defendant relied upon road 

trips and the mail for delivery of MDMA to other dealers. Covert 

distribution of MDMA or payment of cash frequently occurred in 

public places. For example, defendant confessed to the FBI that 

he used pagers to make arrangements with his MDMA suppliers. 

Later, he would retrieve the drugs which had been left for him 

from a designated place such a men's restroom at McDonalds or 

Burger King. Rec. supp. vol. III at 80. 

Defendant was arrested a third time in July 1987, for 

arranging the April 1987 sale of 401 MDMA tablets to Ricks, with 

delivery at the Will Rogers Airport in Oklahoma City. See id. 

supp. vol. VI at 767-769; supp. vol. VIII 1249-51. Defendant's 

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brother, Ryan Shane Raymer, made the actual delivery. Both were 

charged in an Oklahoma state felony information with conspiracy to 

distribute, possession with intent to distribute and distribution 

of MDMA. Id. supp. vol. XII, doc. 22 at 3 (citing Oklahoma v. 

Raymer, No. RF87-03966 (Okla. County D. Ct. Jul. 20, 1987)); 

Appellant's Brief at 1. Defendant waived extradition and was 

detained in Oklahoma for seven months, from December 22, 1987 

until July 22, 1988 when he made bond. Id. 

In November 1988, the Oklahoma state case against defendant 

and his brother was set for trial, but defendant did not appear 

due to his surrender on Texas misdemeanor charges as well as 

revocation of suspended sentence proceedings in Texas. Rec. supp. 

vol. XII, doc. 167 (R. Wintery affidavit, 11 4 at 2). The Texas 

misdemeanor charges were dismissed. Id. Defendant did not appear 

at subsequent trial settings of the Oklahoma state case. Id. 

Although defendant had waived extradition from Texas to Oklahoma 

in 1987, he indicated that he would not voluntarily return to 

Oklahoma. 

Oklahoma sought to extradite defendant; however, the 

proceedings "encountered significant procedural difficulties 

including the disappearance of the Governor's Warrant." Id. The 

prosecutor in the state case was Richard Wintery, who later was 

designated a special assistant United States Attorney. In his 

federal capacity, Mr. Wintery was instrumental in obtaining a 

federal indictment against the defendant and subsequently 

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arranging for the dismissal of the Oklahoma state case in lieu of 

federal prosecution. 

On appeal, defendant contends that the district court erred 

in not dismissing the superseding indictment (1) on double 

jeopardy grounds as a sham prosecution or (2) on due process 

grounds as a vindictive prosecution. He also contends that (3) 

his conviction on the three conspiracy counts (counts one, two and 

three) violates double jeopardy because the three conspiracies are 

but one; (4) the evidence is insufficient to prove a conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine (count 3); (5) the evidence is insufficient to 

prove conspiracy to introduce and introducing misbranded MDMA into 

interstate commerce with intent to mislead or defraud a government 

agency, including local police departments; and (6) classification 

of MDMA as a controlled substance analogue violates the ex post 

facto clause. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

I. Double Jeopardy-Successive Prosecution 

Relying on statements in Bartkus v. United States, 359 u.s. 

121 (1959), defendant argues that the federal prosecution in this 

case was merely a tool of the state authorities, a "sham and a 

cover" for an otherwise impermissible State of Oklahoma prosecution. See id. at 123-24. He claims that Mr. Wintery, in his 

capacity as state prosecutor, controlled and manipulated the 

federal process, Appellant's Brief at 11, as evidenced by an 

absence of significant federal involvement in investigation and 

prosecution. Further, by the State conducting proceedings on the 

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state felony information, and then dismissing those proceedings in 

favor of federal prosecution, defendant claims that he has been 

deprived of the right to a speedy trial on constitutional and 

statutory grounds. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 u.s. 514 (1972); 18 

u.s.c. § 3161-3174 (Speedy Trial Act). He also alleges that his 

right to a fair trial has been compromised in the absence of a 

speedy trial. The district court rejected the notion that the 

federal proceeding was a sham prosecution and denied the 

defendant's motion to dismiss. Rec. supp.-vol. III at 41. 

We review a district court's legal conclusion on a double 

jeopardy claim de novo. United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 

665 (lOth Cir. 1989). Subsidiary factual findings are reviewed 

under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Jones, 816 

F.2d 1483, 1486 (lOth Cir. 1987) (whether conspiracies were 

separate and distinct under prior law was factual; district court 

finding reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard); United 

States v. Martinez, 562 F.2d 633, 638 (lOth Cir. 1977) (same). 

The burden is on the defendant to prove a double jeopardy claim. 

United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1531 (lOth Cir. 1991); 

Jones, 816 F.2d at 1486. When a defendant claims that federal and 

state officials are not acting as dual sovereigns, he has a 

substantial burden of proving one sovereign is so dominated by the 

actions of the other that the former is not acting of its own 

volition. United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 79 (D.C. Cir. 

1976). 

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• 

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment "bars any 

subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an 

essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will 

prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant 

already has been prosecuted." Grady v. Corbin, 110 s. Ct. 2084, 

2093 (1990) (footnote omitted); See also Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 

U.S. 682 (1977). Double jeopardy scrutiny is appropriate when 

there are "successive prosecutions arising from virtually the same 

conduct involving the same actors and overlapping time frames." 

Felix, 926 F.2d at 1531. It is well established, however, that a 

subsequent federal prosecution based upon the same conduct as a 

terminated state prosecution does not violate the double jeopardy 

clause of the fifth amendment. Abbate v. United States, 359 u.s. 

187, 195 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 

The dual sovereignty doctrine rests upon the notion that laws of 

separate sovereigns are indeed separate and that one act may 

violate the laws of each; accordingly, prosecution by each cannot 

be for the same offense and double jeopardy concerns are not 

implicated. Heath v. Alabama, 474 u.s. 82, 88 (1985). A possible 

exception to the dual sovereignty rule might exist where a federal 

or state prosecution was merely a tool manipulated by the other 

sovereign to revive a prosecution barred on federal constitutional 

grounds. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123-24; United States v. 

Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court determined 

that jeopardy had attached in state prosecution). Accordingly, 

courts have considered double jeopardy claims that (1) federal 

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• 

prosecutors have manipulated state processes rendering the state 

prosecution a sham and a cover for an otherwise barred federal 

prosecution, see, ~, United States v. Moore, 822 F.2d 35, 37-38 

(8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Patterson, 809 F.2d 244, 247 

(5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27, 30-32 (2d 

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 u.s. 1022 (1984); United States v. 

Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 

946 (1980); Liddy, 542 F.2d at 79, and (2) state prosecutors have 

manipulated federal processes rendering the federal prosecution a 

sham and a cover for an otherwise barred state prosecution, see, 

~' Bernhardt, 831 F.2d at 182. 

We consistently have recognized the dual sovereignty rule in 

holding that a defendant is not entitled to dismissal of an 

indictment even if the government does not comply with its Petite2 

policy. See United States v. Gourley, 835 F.2d 249, 250-51 (lOth 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988); United States v. 

2 See Petite v. United States, 361 u.s. 529, 530 (1960). The 

Petite policy provides that after a state trial a subsequent 

federal trial for the same conduct should not occur absent 

compelling reasons and prior approval by the Justice Department. 

See United States v. Valenzuela, 584 F.2d 374, 376 (lOth Cir. 

1978). 

Defendant requested that the Justice Department review its 

dual and successive prosecution policies in light of the initial 

indictment. Rec. supp. vol. XVI, doc. 177, supp. ex. at 1. The 

Justice Department indicated that its dual prosecution policy did 

not apply because jeopardy had not attached in the Oklahoma state 

criminal prosecution. Id. at 2. The Department also indicated 

that its successive prosecution policy was implicated by 

defendant's federal indictment, given the prior Texas state 

prosecutions involving MDMA and cocaine. Id. at 1. According to 

the Department, however, the federal indictment was broader in 

scope and reflected a substantial federal interest not vindicated 

by the Texas prosecutions. Id. at 1. 

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Padilla, 589 F.2d 481, 484 (lOth Cir. 1978); United States v. 

Fritz, 580 F.2d 370, 375 (lOth Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 439 

u.s. 947 (1978); United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184, 1187 

(lOth Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 439 u.s. 896 (1978). Padilla 

is of particular significance because it involves the same 

prosecutor at the federal and state levels. Judge Logan's 

concurring opinion described the facts as follows: 

The defendant here was charged in state court on six 

counts of trafficking in heroin. He ultimately pleaded 

guilty in all counts. A lawyer in the state 

prosecutor's office, apparently involved in the case in 

state court, became an Assistant United States Attorney 

and brought before a Federal grand jury the same 

transactions, securing indictments for the same acts 

previously charged in state court. The sole witness at 

the federal trial was a member of the Albuquerque, New 

Mexico Police Department who was involved in the 

gathering of evidence in the state case. 

Padilla, 589 F.2d at 485 (Logan, J., concurring). Defendant 

challenged his conviction on double jeopardy grounds and the court 

held that the federal conviction was not barred. Id. at 484. The 

double jeopardy circumstances in Padilla were far more compelling 

than those in this case, yet the dual sovereignty doctrine 

controlled the case. See id. at 485 (Logan, J., concurring) ("It 

is hard to imagine another situation where the law permits what 

appears on its face to be such an apparent injustice, making a 

defendant answer twice for the same acts."). 

Defendant's double jeopardy claim fails for any number of 

independent reasons. First, jeopardy never attached in the 

Oklahoma state prosecution. In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches 

when the jury is impaneled and sworn; in a bench trial, jeopardy 

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attaches when the first witness is sworn. Crist v. Bretz, 437 

u.s. 28, 37-38 (1978); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 

(1975). Prior to any trial, the Oklahoma prosecution was 

dismissed in lieu of federal prosecution. See Liddy, 542 F.2d at 

80 (state prosecution dismissed in lieu of federal prosecution). 

Second, although defendant claims that his constitutional and 

statutory right to a speedy trial has been circumvented, he offers 

no fact-law integration to support the claim. Sometimes things 

are what they appear; the lack of factual development and legal 

analysis on this claim strongly suggests its lack of merit. 

Moreover, defendant has never explained how the Oklahoma state 

prosecution would be barred as a result of the difficulty in 

extraditing him from Texas to Oklahoma. A lone cite to Tex. Crim. 

Pro. Ann. art. 51.13 (Vernon 1979 & 1991 Cum. Supp.) does not 

provide sufficient specificity, particularly in view of the many 

sections pertaining to extradition. We will not presume that 

insurmountable obstacles barred defendant's extradition. Third, 

defendant has not shown that the district court's factual findings 

are clearly erroneous. 

The district court found that the state charges encompassed 

only a small part of defendant's alleged criminal activities. 

Rec. supp. vol. III at 42-43. The court also found that the 

federal superseding indictment involved criminal activity of a 

larger scope. Id. This is apparent from the federal indictment 

which charged a conspiracy to distribute MDMA and cocaine over 

approximately two years. Merely because some of the overt acts 

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contained in the conspiracy counts of the federal indictment 

encompass defendant's prior Texas convictions or Oklahoma charges 

does not violate double jeopardy. See Aleman, 609 F.2d at 309. 

Defendant concentrates on the degree of federal involvement 

in this case, arguing that it was insufficient. He points to the 

many witnesses who were involved in the previous state cases and 

Mr. Wintery's heavy involvement in both cases. As an initial 

matter, we question whether these factors alone could ever 

establish a sham prosecution given our holding in Padilla which 

involved the same state prosecutor and the same state evidence at 

the federal level. Assuming, arguendo, that the extent of 

independent federal involvement must be evaluated, see Bernhardt, 3 

831 F.2d at 183, the district court's finding on this score is not 

clearly erroneous. The district court found that the federal 

prosecution "involved substantial investigation separate and apart 

from the state charges," and that the federal designation of Mr. 

Wintery was appropriate to vindicate the substantial federal 

interest implicated by the scope of the alleged criminal activity. 

See Rec. supp. vol. III at 43. The federal government paid for 

the cost of prosecution, lawyers from the Justice Department and 

the local u.s. Attorney's office worked on the case, and a few 

witnesses were unique to the federal prosecution. 

3 In Bernhardt, the court determined that a federal prosecution 

is not a sham or cover for barred state prosecution when 

"sufficient independent federal involvement" exists. 831 F.2d at 

183. 

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Defendant's double jeopardy claim under Bartkus fails as a 

matter of law. Moreover, defendant did not meet his substantial 

burden of proving that the federal prosecution was merely a tool 

of the State. For these reasons, the district court properly 

declined to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. 

II. Vindictive Prosecution 

Defendant next claims that the original and superseding 

indictments in this case were products of prosecutorial 

vindictiveness. He suggests the following factors establish not 

only a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, but also actual, 

personal malice: (1) the federal prosecution was undertaken after 

defendant asserted rights incident to extradition, (2) a superseding indictment adding substantive counts was returned after 

defendant obtained pretrial release, contrary to the government's 

wishes, (3) the federal government lacked substantial involvement 

in the investigation and prosecution of this case, and (4) the 

state and federal investigations and prosecutions were influenced 

by the discretion of a single state prosecutor, Mr. Wintery. 

A. 

Vindictive prosecution claims often turn on the facts, and we 

review a district court's factual findings under the clearly 

erroneous standard; our review of the legal principles which guide 

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the district court is de novo. 4 United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 

F.2d 66, 67 (3rd Cir. 1989). Any remedy for prosecutorial 

vindictiveness selected by the district court is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242, 

1245-46, vacated, 816 F.2d 695, reinstated, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 u.s. 940 (1988); United States v. 

Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 1982). A defendant 

has the burden of proof and must establish either (1) actual 

vindictiveness, or (2) a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness 

which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. See 

United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374, 376, 380-81, 384 & 

n.l9; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 u.s. 711, 725 (1969); United 

States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1519, 1521 (lOth Cir. 1989) 

(citing Meyer, 810 F.2d at 1245-46); United States v. Heldt, 745 

F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1984). Thereafter, the burden shifts to 

4 The First and Ninth Circuits view vindictive prosecution 

claims as mixed questions of fact and law; the district court's 

resolution of these claims is reviewed under the clearly erroneous 

standard. United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242, 1244 (D.C. 

Cir.), vacated, 816 F.2d 695, reinsatated, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988); United States v. 

Spiesz, 689 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1982). See also United 

States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1990) (following 

Meyer; clearly erroneous standard governs). In this circuit, the 

standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law depends 

upon whether factual or legal inquiry predominates. "Where the 

mixed question involves primarily a factual inquiry, the clearly 

erroneous standard is appropriate. If, however, the mixed question primarily involves the consideration of legal principles, the 

de novo review by the appellate court is appropriate." Supre v. 

Rickets, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (lOth Cir. 1986). Provided the 

district court has been guided by the correct legal principles, we 

agree that a vindictive prosecution claim viewed as a mixed 

question of fact and law should be reviewed under the clearly 

erroneous standard. 

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the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, 

articulable, objective reasons. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374, Pearce, 

395 u.s. at 726; Doran, 882 F.2d at 1518; Meyer, 810 F.2d at 1248; 

Heldt, 745 F.2d at 1280. If the defendant does not meet his 

burden of proof, however, the district court need not reach the 

government justification issue. See Doran, 882 F.2d at 1523; 

Heldt, 745 F.2d at 1280. 

When a defendant exercises constitutional or statutory rights 

in the course of criminal proceedings, the government may not 

punish him for such exercise without violating due process 

guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Goodwin, 457 u.s. at 372; 

Bordenkirker v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); United States v. 

Mills, 925 F.2d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Doran, 882 F.2d at 

1518; Meyer, 810 F.2d at 1245. Thus, if a defendant successfully 

challenges a conviction, a more severe sentence may not be imposed 

after retrial in the absence of articulated reasons based upon 

objective information. Pearce, 395 u.s. at 726. Likewise, a 

prosecutor may not "up the ante" by filing felony charges when a 

convicted misdemeanant exercises his statutory appellate right to 

trial de novo. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 u.s. 21, 27-29 (1974). 

In two pretrial situations, the Supreme Court has rejected a 

presumption of vindictiveness. Consequently, the presumption is 

without application when a prosecutor offers a defendant a chance 

to plead guilty or face more serious charges, provided the 

prosecutor has probable cause on the more serious charges and the 

defendant is free to accept or reject the offer. Bordenkirker, 

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434 U.S. at 363-64. Likewise, the presumption does not apply when 

a defendant declines to plead guilty to misdemeanor charges in 

order to exercise his right to a jury trial, and a different 

prosecutor obtains a felony indictment. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 

382-84. 

The Supreme Court has yet to apply the presumption of 

vindictiveness to a pretrial setting. Following Meyer, we have 

rejected the idea that a presumption of vindictiveness may never 

arise in the pretrial setting. Doran, 882 F.2d at 1520-21. 

Rather, in those pretrial situations which are genuinely 

distinguishable from Goodwin and Bordenkirker, we look at the 

totality of the objective circumstances to decide whether a 

realistic possibility of vindictive prosecution exists. Doran, 

882 F.2d at 1521 (applying totality of the circumstances approach 

to post-mistrial setting) & n.4 (discussing factors which 

distinguished Meyer from Goodwin). But see Meyer, 824 F.2d at 

1251 (dissent from denial of rehearing en bane arguing that Meyer 

panel distinguished Goodwin on "utterly irrelevant" facts). Here, 

the district court determined that a presumption of vindictiveness 

was not warranted, yet it held an evidentiary hearing, given the 

"serious allegations raised" by defendant. Rec. supp. vol. III at 

42. The district court found that (1) the federal prosecution was 

not an end-run around the procedural extradition problems 

encountered in the state prosecution, (2) the superseding 

indictment was not obtained in retaliation for the defendant 

obtaining bond, (3) a substantial federal interest was present in 

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the prosecution and was not vindicated by the narrower state 

prosecution, (4) the cross-designation of Mr. Wintory was 

appropriate because of his familiarity with the alleged 

conspiracies and the defendants, and (5) subsequent to the State's 

extradition difficulties, new investigative leads were developed 

that identified cooperating witnesses and other evidence. 

Given a variety of fact patterns, federal courts repeatedly 

have rejected the idea that federal prosecution, after state 

proceedings, constitutes vindictive federal prosecution. See, 

~' Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d at 68 (prosecution by a different 

sovereign tends to negate a vindictive prosecution claim); United 

States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3rd Cir. 1987); United States v. 

Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 127 (3rd Cir. 1986); United States v. 

Ballester, 763 F.2d 368, 369-70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 

842 (1985); Russotti, 717 F.2d at 31-32; United States v. Ng, 699 

F.2d 63, 68-70 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. DeMichael, 692 

F.2d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 u.s. 907 (1982); 

United States v. Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1981); 

United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836-38 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Separate sovereigns certainly may prosecute based on similar or 

identical facts, but here the federal and state lead prosecutors 

are one in the same person. See Fulford, 825 F.2d at 9 (court 

denied prosecutorial vindictiveness claim, court noted that 

federal prosecutor did not assist in state investigation or 

prosecution). In rejecting prosecutorial vindictiveness claims, 

however, courts have alluded to the idea that increased charges 

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resulting from the exercise of a pretrial procedural right might 

constitute vindictiveness. See Ballester, 763 F.2d at 370 

(defendants would be required to show that additional federal 

charges were added because of their attempt to dismiss state 

indictment; held, no presumption because independent judgment of 

dual sovereigns involved); Heldt, 745 F.2d at 1281 (vindictive 

prosecution claim might be successful where an increase in charges 

was in response to a motion to suppress); Robison, 644 F.2d at 

1272 (defendant would have to demonstrate a connection between 

exercise of rights in prior state prosecutions and federal 

prosecution) . 

B. 

Turning first to actual vindictiveness, defendant has only 

one incident on which to base a colorable claim. During 

defendant's preliminary hearing in the Northern District of Texas, 

the prosecutor, Mr. Wintery, was asked why he delayed in bringing 

this case before a federal grand jury. One of the reasons given 

was because of the extradition difficulties the State of Oklahoma 

was encountering in regaining custody of the defendant from the 

State of Texas. See Rec. supp. val. XVI, doc. 136 at 1, 4-6. 

During that hearing, Mr. Wintery testified concerning the 

defendant's reliance on "jurisdictional ploys" and "ploys and 

maneuvers" to avoid extradition and prosecution in the State of 

Oklahoma. Id. at 4-5. 

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It would be naive to think that the federal prosecution was 

not motivated in some part by the extradition difficulties. The 

question is whether the federal prosecution was "a direct and 

unjustifiable penalty for the exercise of a procedural right" by 

the defendant. See Goodwin, 457 u.s. at 384. The district court 

rejected this interpretation, instead finding that the federal 

prosecution was larger in scope and the product of new 

investigative leads concerning the defendant's criminal activity. 

See rec. supp. vol. III at 42-44. Although the motives for the 

federal prosecution appear mixed, the district court's finding 

concerning a lack of actual vindictiveness is not clearly 

erroneous for several reasons. First, the prosecutor's comments 

must be taken in context. These comments occurred during a 

preliminary hearing in which the government argued that the 

defendant was a flight risk based upon his failure to appear in 

Oklahoma after being released on bond and promising to return. 

The prosecutor contended that the lack of meritorious defenses to 

the federal charges made the risk of flight greater because 

defendant's exposure to federal and state (Texas) incarceration. 

Reasoning that defendant's extradition defense had gone by the 

wayside, the prosecutor unsuccessfully sought pretrial detention. 

Second, a permissible risk associated with defendant's insistence 

on formal extradition was that additional evidence would be 

uncovered concerning his criminal activity and the charges would 

be broadened. A claim of vindictive prosecution cannot insulate 

the defendant from the lawful consequences of his tactical 

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choices. Having delayed the state prosecution for several months, 

defendant could not be guaranteed that the prosecution would stand 

still. 

c. 

Rejecting defendant's claim of actual vindictiveness, we next 

must consider whether defendant was entitled to a presumption of 

vindictiveness. "There is no vindictiveness as long as the 

prosecutor's decision is based upon the normal factors ordinarily 

considered in determining what course to pursue, rather than upon 

genuine animus against the defendant for an improper reason or in 

retaliation for exercise of legal or constitutional rights." 

DeMichael, 692 F.2d at 1062. Accord Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 67; 

Fulford, 825 F.2d at 9; Oliver, 787 F.2d at 126. In the absence 

of procedural unfairness to the defendant, the government may 

increase charges or make them more precise based upon new 

information or further evaluation of the case. Gallegos-Curiel, 

681 F.2d at 1169. Our inquiry must be whether, "as a practical 

matter, there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood of 

prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for 

hostility or punitive animus towards the defendant because he 

exercised his specific legal right." Id. 

At first blush, the prosecutor's obtaining a more serious 

federal indictment when the defendant asserted a right concerning 

extradition may appear to warrant an inference of vindictiveness. 

However, for two independent reasons, we believe that a 

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" 

presumptive inference is foreclosed completely by the Supreme 

Court's decisions in Goodwin and Bordenkirker. First and 

foremost, a prosecutor's response to a defendant's decision to 

resist extradition is in the nature of those prosecutorial 

responses which do not warrant a presumption of vindictiveness. 

Goodwin, 457 u.s. at 381. Extradition is a procedural right, 

routinely invoked, which will place some burden on the 

prosecution, but "it is unrealistic to assume that a prosecutor's 

probable response ••. is to punish and deter." Id. at 381. 

The second reason why a presumption of vindictiveness is not 

warranted by the extradition decision here is that the 

prosecutor's strategy was a product of failed plea negotiations 

which culminated in the defendant's insistence on formal 

extradition, notwithstanding his earlier promise to return to 

Oklahoma. The Court has cautioned that "changes in the charging 

decision that occur in the context of plea negotiation are an 

inaccurate measure of improper prosecutorial 'vindictiveness.'" 

Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 379-80; Bordenkirker, 434 U.S. at 363-65. 

Just as "a prosecutor may file additional charges if an initial 

expectation that a defendant would plead guilty to lesser charges 

proves unfounded," Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380, so too may a state 

prosecutor refer a prosecution to federal authorities when plea 

negotiations fail. Without creating a presumption of 

vindictiveness, a state prosecutor may notify a defendant that his 

case will be referred to the federal government in the event that 

the state prosecution cannot proceed to trial. Ballester, 763 

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F.2d at 369-70. Likewise, a prosecutor may notify a defendant who 

declines to plead guilty that his case will be transferred to a 

forum in which stricter penalties are available. Mills, 925 F.2d 

at 463. 

A presumptive inference of vindictiveness is not warranted as 

a matter of law by the sequence of events preceding the 

superseding indictment. First, the federal indictment and 

superseding indictment occurred before any state or federal trial; 

"[a]t this stage of the proceedings, the prosecutor's assessment 

of the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized." 

See Goodwin, 457 u.s. at 381. This lack of crystallization may be 

attributable to the prosecutor's discovery of additional 

information or a better understanding of the broader significance 

of existing information. Id. Second, it is not reasonably likely 

that the government, having failed in its opposition to 

defendant's pretrial release, acted vindictively in obtaining a 

superseding indictment. The government takes a position on 

pretrial release in almost every criminal prosecution. Even if 

the government does not prevail, it is not reasonably likely that 

future prosecutorial decisions are punitive; if the government is 

dissatisfied with a release decision, the government may appeal. 

See 18 u.s.c. §§ 3141, 3142 & 3145. See Goodwin, 457 u.s. at 381, 

384. Third, the prosecutor represents that the defendant was 

notified to anticipate a superseding indictment which would allege 

substantive counts (in furtherance of the conspiracies alleged) in 

the event the defendant did not change his plea. Plainly, this is 

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an exercise of prosecutorial discretion which cannot support a 

presumptive inference of vindictiveness. See Id. at 380; 

Bordenkirker, 434 U.S. at 364-65. 

Nor does the lack of federal involvement from the outset of 

this case warrant a presumptive inference of vindictiveness. To 

the extent that the federal case is based upon different facts 

than the Oklahoma case, this weakens the prosecutorial 

vindictiveness claim. Robison, 644 F.2d at 1272-73. Moreover, it 

is unlikely that cooperation between state and federal law 

enforcement authorities results from any desire to punish a 

defendant for the exercise of procedural rights. Prosecutorial 

discretion to vindicate the societal interest in prosecution 

includes a decision to refer a case for prosecution in a more 

suitable forum. Cf. Goodwin, 457 u.s. at 382 ("A prosecutor 

should remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion 

entrusted to him to determine the societal interest in 

prosecution.") See also Mills, 925 F.2d at 463. Several reasons 

may favor a federal prosecution: (1) a substantial federal 

interest in the subject matter, (2) more appropriate federal 

penalties, (3) greater prosecutoria1 resources, and (4) efficiency 

concerns. See Burt, 619 F.2d at 838. 

Finally, given the circumstances, we must reject the idea 

that the presence of the state prosecutor in the federal case 

warrants a presumptive inference of vindictiveness. Jeopardy 

never attached in the state prosecution and nothing in the record 

indicates that the state prosecution was barred. Even a cursory 

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look at the indictment and superseding indictment in this case 

reveals marked differences between the federal prosecution and 

state prosecution including different offenses and defendants. 

The district court's finding that a presumption of 

vindictiveness is not warranted is not error. We have considered 

the circumstances which the defendant claims create a presumption 

of vindictiveness; these circumstances do not create a reasonable 

likelihood of vindictiveness given the Supreme Court's decisions 

in the pretrial context. Because a presumption does not arise, we 

need not consider the district court's findings supporting a 

conclusion that the government had successfully rebutted any 

presumption. The district court properly declined to dismiss the 

superseding indictment based upon prosecutorial vindictiveness. 

III. Double Jeopardy-Cumulative Punishment 

In addition to successive prosecutions, the double jeopardy 

clause of the fifth amendment also protects against cumulative 

punishment for the same offense. Pearce, 395 u.s. at 717. Given 

a claim of multiple punishments, the double jeopardy clause 

protects against a court prescribing more punishment than the 

legislature intended. See Brown v. United States, 432 U.S. 161, 

165 (1977). Traditional double jeopardy analysis provides "that 

where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 

distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine 

whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each 

requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger 

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v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Although the 

Blockburger test recently has been supplemented in the double 

jeopardy subsequent prosecution context, see Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 

2090, we believe it remains the test in the multiple punishment 

context. 

The Supreme Court has had several occasions to apply the 

Blockburger test in the cumulative punishment context. See Grady, 

110 S. Ct. at 2091 n.8. For example, the Court determined that 

Sherman Act convictions for conspiracy in restraint of trade, 15 

u.s.c. § 1, and conspiracy to monopolize, 15 u.s.c. § 2, do not 

amount to multiplicity of punishment. American Tobacco Co. v. 

United States, 328 u.s. 781, 787-88 (1946). Both sections of the 

Act "require proof of conspiracies which are reciprocally 

distinguishable from and independent of each other although the 

objects of the conspiracies may overlap." Id. at 788. Likewise, 

consecutive sentences may be imposed for a conspiracy to import 

marijuana, 21 u.s.c. § 963, and a conspiracy to distribute 

marijuana, 21 u.s.c. § 846; each conviction required proof of a 

fact the other did not. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 

334, 339 (1981). 

Judged against these standards, defendant's claim that the 

three conspiracies alleged in the indictment cannot be punished 

cumulatively is without merit. Count one involves conspiracy to 

misbrand drugs (MDMA), see 18 u.s.c. § 371, 21 u.s.c. §§ 331 & 

333(a)(2); count two involves conspiracy to distribute MDMA, a 

controlled substance analogue, 21 u.s.c. §§ 813, 841(a)(l) & 846; 

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... 

and count three involves a conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute and distribute cocaine, 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846. 

The differences between the three conspiracies charged are 

manifest. All three conspiracies have different objects, from 

introducing misbranded MDMA into interstate commerce with the 

intent to defraud or mislead, to distributing MDMA, to 

distributing cocaine. See Albernaz, 450 u.s. at 339. Unlike the 

conspiracies in counts one and two, the conspiracy in count three 

involves a different drug, cocaine. Each conspiracy requires 

proof of different facts. 

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence-Count Three 

According to defendant, the evidence is insufficient on count 

three, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and 

distribution of cocaine, 18 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. We review 

the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the government to "determine "whether any rational 

trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

Defendant acknowledges that Kevin Volk testified concerning 

the consignment arrangement he had with defendant to sell cocaine. 

See Appellant's Brief at 27; rec. supp. vol. Vat 481-84. Another 

drug dealer, Leslie Lynn Ricks testified concerning defendant's 

efforts to sell him cocaine. Rec. supp. vol. VI at 750-54. 

Finally, defendant confessed to purchasing quantities of cocaine 

from his MDMA supplier. Id. supp. vol. III at 77. Although 

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• . .

defendant claimed that the cocaine was for his personal use, he 

also indicated that sometimes he sold to close personal friends. 

According to defendant, the evidence is insufficient because 

There is no evidence of any sale of cocaine outside the 

alleged conspiracy, and no evidence of any ability to 

distribute any significant quantity of the drug, and no 

evidence of any agreement to distribute cocaine between 

Raymer and Volk 

Appellant's Brief at 28. On the first point, the only two parties 

named in count three were defendant and Jeffrey Wynn Casale (who 

was acquitted), yet Volk testified to distributing cocaine 

supplied by defendant to Cama Coats and Terry Frammel, among 

others. Moreover, for a sufficiency analysis, it makes no 

difference whether the defendant sold only to close friends. The 

federal drug laws do not admit a "close friend" exception. 

Concerning the second point, defendant distributed cocaine to Volk 

and it must be remembered that defendant's picture, posing over a 

pound of suspected cocaine, was admitted into evidence. The 

evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction on count three. 

v. Sufficiency of the Evidence-Counts One, Four, Five and Seven 

Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of conspiracy to introduce and introducing misbranded 

MDMA into interstate commerce with intent to mislead or defraud a 

government agency, specifically a local police department. We 

agree. Codefendant Mitcheltree adopted defendant's brief on this 

point and we analyzed the issue in her appeal, fully considering 

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the facts in both cases. See Mitcheltree, slip op. at 34-51. We 

determined that if the government proceeds on the theory that a 

defendant introduced misbranded drugs into interstate commerce 

with an intent to mislead or defraud a government agency, "there 

must be a demonstrated link between the [21 U.S.C.] § 331 violation and an intent to mislead and defraud an identifiable drug 

regulatory agency involved in consumer protection. Id. at 43 

(emphasis in original). We then held: "After a thorough review 

of this record, no rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt the defendants (Mitcheltree and Raymer) acted to 

mislead or defraud a government agency responsible for drug safety 

and efficacy with the objective of consumer protection." Id. at 

47. 

Likewise, we also determined "that the specific intent 

requirement in§ 333(a)(2) requires not only proof of misbranding 

under § 331, but also proof of an intent to mislead or defraud 

which is connected to the misbranding violation under§ 331." Id. 

at 43 (emphasis in original). On this point, we held that "not a 

scintilla of evidence links the defendants' misbranding activities 

with a specific intent, 21 u.s.c. § 333(a)(2), to violate or 

defeat agency enforcement of the actual federal drug regulatory 

provisions alleged" in the indictment, "i.e., 21 u.s.c. §§ 331(a); 

352(b),(c),(e),(j) & (o); 331(k); 331(p) & 360." Id. at 47-48. 

During the time period alleged in the indictment, local police 

departments were investigating the distribution of MDMA as well as 

other controlled substances. "But merely because the activities 

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of the defendants and the police may have been contemporaneous 

does not constitute sufficient proof that the defendants knowingly 

misbranded with the specific intent to mislead or defraud those 

police departments." Id. at 48. 

Because the MDMA misbranding counts (counts one, four, five 

and seven) were submitted to the jury on a theory for which 

insufficient evidence exists, we reverse the convictions on those 

counts with instructions that a judgment of acquittal be entered. 

As in Mitcheltree, "we decline to order the district court to 

impose misdemeanor convictions on those counts." Id. at 50-51 

n.l7. 

VI. Ex Post Facto Clause and the Controlled Substance Analogue 

Enforcement Act-Counts Two and Eight 

In Mitcheltree, we discussed the checkered history of 

scheduling MDMA as a schedule I controlled substance. Id. at 

9-10. MDMA did not become subject to federal controlled substance 

penalties until October 27, 1986. Pursuant to 21 u.s.c. § 81l(h), 

the DEA first sought to schedule temporarily MDMA as a schedule I 

controlled substance. 50 Fed. Reg. 22,119 (1985). In United 

States v. Spain, 825 F.2d 1426 (lOth Cir. 1987), we held that this 

attempted temporary scheduling was invalid and that an order 

scheduling the drug had not been timely issued. 5 Id. at 1429. 

5 The Supreme Court subsequently determined that temporary 

scheduling by the Attorney General or the DEA was not invalid as 

an unlawful delegation. United States v. Touby, No. 90-6282, slip 

op. at ___ , (May 20, 1991) [1991 WL 79099, *6]. Touby overruled 

that portion of United States v. Spain, 825 F.2d 1426, 1427-29 

(lOth Cir. 1987), to the contrary, and also overruled United 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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See also United States v. Caudle, 828 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir. --- ----

1987) (holding MDMA temporary scheduling procedurally defective). 

A final rule placing MDMA in schedule I, effective November 13, 

1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,552 (1986), was vacated for further agency 

consideration. Grinspoon v. Drug Enforcement Adm'n, 828 F.2d 881, 

898 (1st Cir. 1987). Thus, during the period when the scheduling 

was invalid on procedural grounds, MDMA was not a controlled 

substance. United States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 652-53, reh'g 

denied, 868 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1989). 

As a controlled substance analogue, MDMA was treated as a 

schedule I controlled substance as of October 27, 1986. The 

Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. 

99-570, tit. I, subtit. E, § 1202, 100 Stat. 3207-13 to 3207-14 

(Oct. 27, 1986), provided that a controlled substance analogue 

intended for human consumption would be treated as a schedule I 

controlled substance. 21 u.s.c. § 813. Effective March 23, 1988, 

however, MDMA was permanently scheduled in schedule I as a 

controlled substance. 53 Fed. Reg. 5,156 (1988). 

However, as of October 27, 1986, MDMA, as a controlled 

substance analogue, was validly included in schedule I. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 813 provides: 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

States v. Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587 (lOth Cir. 1990). However, 

Touby does not alter the Spain court's conclusion that the initial 

temporary scheduling of MDMA was invalid on procedural grounds. 

See Spain, 825 F.2d at 1426; Caudle, 828 F.2d at 1112-13. 

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.. • 

Treatment of controlled substance analogues 

A controlled substance analogue shall, to the 

extent intended for human consumption, be treated, for 

the purpose of this title and title III as a controlled 

substance in schedule I. 

The Act further provides that a controlled substance analogue 

"does not include ... a controlled substance." 21 u.s.c. 

§ 802(32) (B)(i). 

Defendant argues that MDMA could not be a controlled 

substance analogue during the times alleged in the superseding 

indictment because the government had attempted to schedule it as 

a regular controlled substance. Once the government tried to 

schedule MDMA as a controlled substance, defendant contends that 

it could not be a controlled substance analogue. According to the 

defendant, it makes no difference that MDMA was not validly 

scheduled as a controlled substance for two reasons. First, the 

definition of a controlled substance analogue may not include a 

controlled substance. Second, the definition of a controlled 

substance includes "a drug or other substance, or immediate 

precursor, included in Schedule I, II, III, IV or V of part B of 

this subchapter." 21 U.S.C. § 802(6); thus, because MDMA was 

included in Schedule I (albeit invalidly) it had to be a 

controlled substance and could not be a controlled substance 

analogue. Defendant argues that the above definition permits no 

inquiry as to whether a substance is properly included in schedule 

I; once scheduled, always scheduled. Persisting in this argument, 

defendant claims that any other interpretation would violate the 

~ post facto clause. 

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• 

For a law to be ex post facto, "it must be retrospective, 

that is it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, 

and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it." Weaver v. 

Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (footnotes omitted). An ex post 

facto law is more severe than the prior law. Miller v. Florida, 

482 U.S. 423, 431 (1987). On the other hand, a procedural change 

in the law which does not alter substantial personal rights does 

not violate the gx post facto clause. Id. at 430. 

Defendant's argument brings to mind an old saying: "Just 

because you're standing in a garage doesn't make you a car." Just 

because MDMA had been scheduled ~ g controlled substance did not 

mean that its scheduling could never be challenged and held 

invalid. In upholding the temporary scheduling provision from an 

unlawful delegation challenge, the Supreme Court noted that the 

restriction on judicial review under 21 u.s.c. § 811(h)(6) "does 

not preclude an individual facing criminal charges from bringing a 

challenge to a temporary scheduling order as a defense to 

prosecution." United States v. Touby, No. 90-6282, slip op. at 

___ , (May 20, 1991) [1991 WL 79099, *6]. A successful challenge 

may have the effect of invalidating the scheduling. We are in 

complete agreement with the Fifth Circuit on this point: once the 

scheduling was held invalid procedurally, MDMA was not a 

controlled substance and quite correctly could be considered an 

analogue within the definition contained in 21 u.s.c. §§802(6) and 

802(32). Desurra, 865 F.2d at 653. 

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.. "" 

Thus, defendant's ex post facto argument must be rejected. 

The addition of MDMA to schedule I as a controlled substance 

analogue was effective October 27, 1986. Defendant was prosecuted 

under the analogue statute for activities occurring subsequent to 

this time. Thus, the statute is not being applied 

retrospectively. Moreover, defendant's argument necessarily 

presumes that the faulty schedulings were effective; that being 

the case defendant would be unable to show prejudice arising from 

the inclusion of MDMA in schedule I pursuant to the analogue 

statute. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. 

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