Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01811/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01811-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Respondent
Lilibeth Michelson
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

LILIBETH MICHELSON,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Respondent

______________________

2019-1811

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-0752-18-0424-I-1.

______________________

Decided: May 11, 2020

______________________

JACK BRADLEY JARRETT, III, Alan Lescht and Associates, PC, Washington, DC, for petitioner. 

 ISAAC B. ROSENBERG, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by JOSEPH H.

HUNT, REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., ROBERT EDWARD 

KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

 ______________________

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2 MICHELSON v. ARMY

Before CHEN, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Lilibeth Michelson (“Michelson”), a former Supply 

Technician at the Reserve Officer Training Corps in Daytona Beach, Florida, appeals from the final decision of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”), stemming from 

the Initial Decision of the Administrative Judge (“AJ”), affirming her removal from Federal Service based on three 

charges: (1) absent without leave (“AWOL”) from January 

9, 2018 through January 19, 2018; (2) failure to follow directions on January 29, 2018; and (3) creating a disturbance on January 29, 2018. Michelson v. Dep’t of the Army, 

No. AT-0752-18-0424-I-1 (Dec. 21, 2018) (“Initial Decision”). Because the AJ’s Initial Decision was in accordance 

with law and supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

Petitioner has the burden to show that the agency action is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).

With regard to the first charge, Michelson argues that 

the AJ erred by not accepting an October 25, 2018 letter 

from nurse practitioner Anthony Lagana as administratively acceptable evidence of Michelson’s anxiety and depression during the AWOL period. Substantial evidence 

supports the AJ’s finding that Lagana’s October 25, 2018 

letter was not administratively acceptable.1 As the AJ correctly found, several problems undermine the force of that 

letter. Most fundamentally, the letter does not go into detail about the relationship between Michelson’s anxiety 

1 Because the letter was found not to be administratively acceptable, we need not address whether the letter, 

dated after Michelson’s removal, was properly considered.

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MICHELSON v. ARMY 3

and depression and her inability to perform her work. Rather, the letter was conclusory in its key statements that 

“Ms. Michelson needed to be off work until 1/19/18 for medical purposes due to her anxiety and depression,” and was 

“medically incapacitated and unable to attend work.” J.A. 

42. See Young v. U.S. Postal Serv., 79 M.S.P.R. 25, 33 

(1998) (rejecting, due to a “lack of detail as to the medical 

condition, the diagnosis and prognosis,” a letter stating 

that “the appellant was unable to work” because “she was 

‘overwhelmed and depressed’”). Moreover, the letter’s conclusions were based on Michelson’s appointment with 

nurse practitioner Kayla Ritzel on December 13, 2017, a 

visit that was scheduled as a follow-up visit for a sore 

throat. According to the contemporaneous progress notes

of that appointment, anxiety was discussed, but there is no 

indication that Michelson would be imminently unable to 

perform her work duties. Indeed, the notes show that, 

while Michelson requested a month off “to help her anxiety, 

depression and get her started on her new meds,” J.A. 76, 

Ritzel made no determination that this was a medical necessity.

Moreover, as detailed in the Agency’s removal letter,

Michelson had thrice sought and been denied various types 

of leave for much of the time period for which she was 

AWOL: once as annual leave (January 8 through 19), once 

to take care of her ill father (January 8 through 16), and 

once based on a December 15, 2017 letter from Ritzel (December 18 through January 19).

Additionally, Michelson argues that the AJ refused to 

consider Lagana’s letter of October 25 because it was submitted after the AJ’s determination, and that this was error. See Initial Decision at 14 (“Further, the appellant 

failed to provide this information to the agency in a timely 

manner even in response to the notice of proposed removal. 

Thus, the agency’s AWOL decision remains appropriate” 

(citing Atchley v. Dept’ of the Army, 46 M.S.P.R. 297, 301

(1990))). However, the AJ did, in fact, consider that letter, 

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4 MICHELSON v. ARMY

and found it to be not administratively acceptable for substantive reasons. Id. at 13–14 (“[E]ven if [Lagana’s letter] 

had been timely submitted, this note does not comply with 

the leave restriction letter because it is conclusory and fails 

to explain the appellant’s incapacitation.”). 

Charges 2 and 3 address Michelson’s actions on January 29, 2018, the first day of her suspension.2 With respect 

to charge 2—failure to follow directions by going to work on 

January 29, 2018—Michelson argues that the letter suspending her was ambiguous as to whether her suspension 

began upon receipt of the standard form 50 or on a date 

certain. The letter stated: “[Y]ou will be suspended from 

duty without pay for seven (7) calendar days beginning 

Monday, 29 January 2018 through Sunday, 4 February 

2018,” and “A Standard Form 50, Notification of Personnel 

Action, documenting your suspension will be forwarded 

separately.” J.A. 93. 

As the AJ correctly found, Michelson’s suspension unambiguously began on January 29, and was not contingent 

on the receipt of Standard Form 50. Initial Decision at 15 

(“COL Kraft’s letter is unambiguous that the appellant was 

to be suspended on January 29, 2018. While it does state 

that an SF-50 will be issued, it does not indicate that the 

suspension will be held in abeyance until CPAC issues the 

SF-50.”). “The appellant does not dispute that she came to 

work on January 25, 2018.” Id. Substantial evidence supports the AJ’s determination that Michelson failed to follow 

the unambiguous instruction not to be at work on January 

29.

Michelson exacerbated that failure by remaining on 

campus at the computer lab after she was explicitly told to 

“leave the premises because she was officially suspended.” 

2 The suspension was independent of the AWOL 

dates in charge 1.

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MICHELSON v. ARMY 5

Id. at 16. The AJ was within her discretion to credit the 

contemporaneous statement by CPT Karlewicz about the

interaction and to discount Michelson’s assertion that she 

did not understand that “premises” referred to the whole 

campus and not just the supply room. Substantial evidence 

thus supports the AJ’s determination as to charge 2.

Charge 3—creating a disturbance by failing to leave 

the premises—is also supported by substantial evidence. 

Michelson argues that she was not violent and did not 

curse or resist when found in the computer lab, and therefore was not creating a disturbance. However, Michelson’s 

failure to leave after her confrontation with Karlewicz necessitated an “unnecessary[ily] disrupti[ve]” search of “the 

work place,” J.A. 82, and an escort to ensure Michelson left 

the premises. The determination of whether that “result[ed] in an adverse effect on morale, production, or 

maintenance of proper discipline,” AR 690-700, Chapter 

751, was within the Agency’s discretion.

Finally, we reject Michelson’s challenge to the Agency’s 

choice to remove Michelson from her position. Michelson 

failed to establish that the AJ erred in sustaining any of 

the Agency’s three charges. Moreover, as the AJ correctly 

observed, the Agency considered and balanced all of the relevant factors set forth in Douglas v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 5 M.S.P.R. 289, 305–06 (1981), including 

Michelson’s length of service with the Agency, in selecting 

the penalty of removal. Initial Decision at 23–24. We agree 

with the AJ that the Agency’s penalty did not “clearly exceed[] the bounds of reasonableness.” Parker v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 111 M.S.P.R. 510, 514 (2009), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 410 

(Fed. Cir. 2009).

* * *

For all the above reasons, we hold that the Board’s decision was in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence.

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6 MICHELSON v. ARMY

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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