Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07229/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07229-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephen Bias
Appellee
District of Columbia
Appellant
Andrew M. Fredrick
Appellee
Michael J. Hairston
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 15, 2001 Decided June 26, 2001

No. 99-7229

Andrew M. Fredrick, et al.,

Appellees

v.

District of Columbia,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(96cv02093)

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Robert

R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel,

Deputy Corporation Counsel. Lutz A. Prager, Assistant

Deputy Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.

Janet R. Cooper argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellees.

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Before: Henderson, Randolph and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: Andrew M. Fredrick, Stephen

Bias and Michael J. Hairston sued the District of Columbia,

alleging that the District had discriminated against black

employees of the Metropolitan Police Department, in violation

of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. s 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. s 1981.

The first trial ended in a hung jury. After a second trial held

in May 1999, the jury found the District liable for discrimination and awarded damages, $100,000 for Fredrick, $60,000 for

Bias and $30,000 for Hairston. The District contends that it

is entitled to a new trial because the district court erroneously admitted evidence and because the evidence introduced in

the trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict.

I.

The contested evidence consisted of an excerpt of Monique

Blasio's testimony from the first trial which the court admitted at the second trial because Blasio was unavailable. Blasio, a black member of the Metropolitan Police Department,

testified as follows. While she was assigned to the Second

District vice unit in 1992, she went to see Lieutenant Knieser--a white officer--to express interest in an assignment to

the detectives unit. During this meeting, she suggested to

Knieser that the dearth of female promotions to detective was

"a gender issue." One day later she was reassigned to the

tactical unit. Blasio filed a grievance in 1993 or 1994 complaining of her reassignment. The "white officers" in the

tactical unit considered her a "snitch." At one roll call, Blasio

asked those members of the tactical unit who were gossiping

about her to not do so behind her back. This prompted

Officer Chagnon to throw something and to attempt to draw

her into a fight. Blasio testified that Sergeant Vincent, the

head of the tactical unit, sent her to see Lieutenant Knieser.

At the same time, Sergeant Vincent permitted Officer Chagnon to report for duty as usual.

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Blasio testified that Lieutenant Knieser took her statement, but made no audible response to her question: "How

can you effectively do an investigation on me when you so

[sic] biased?" Blasio said that "from that point on they just

kept bringing me in for questioning, having me write all kinds

of statements." She said she was later transferred to another

police district.

The District contends that Blasio's testimony regarding the

physical confrontation with Officer Chagnon was either irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. Relevant evidence is "evidence

having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is

of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401; see United States v. Crowder,

141 F.3d 1202, 1206, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The

argument in favor of relevancy is as follows. Fredrick,

Hairston and Bias were assigned to the Second District.

They alleged that they were denied opportunities to advance

to the vice and detective units, partly because Lieutenant

Knieser discriminated against them. In terms of Rule 401,

the fact of consequence here was Lieutenant Knieser's hampering Fredrick's and his co-plaintiffs' employment prospects

because of their race. Evidence that Knieser had conducted

his other duties, such as the investigation of a confrontation

between a black and a white police officer, in a racially-biased

fashion would make the existence of that fact more probable

than without the evidence. See Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d

780, 784-85 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).

Of course this assumes that Blasio's testimony is evidence

of racial bias on the part of Knieser. The District maintains

that Knieser's treatment of Blasio and Chagnon cannot support an inference that Knieser harbored racial bias. Other

evidence showed that he treated both Blasio and Chagnon

equally, recommending that both be disciplined for their roles

in the incident. If the jury understood the evidence this way,

the District has no cause to complain. We may overturn the

evidentiary rulings of the district court only when "a substantial right of the party is affected," Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), that is,

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only when the error affects the outcome of the trial. See

Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507,

1512 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Using that standard, we cannot see

how the District can prevail. Other evidence bore on the

question whether the District's employment practices were

racially-biased. This evidence, to which the District did not

object, included testimony regarding other incidents in which

discipline was not meted out in an even-handed fashion. On

the other hand, if the Blasio evidence did not tend to show

racial discrimination, it could not have influenced the jury

against the District. See Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137

F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1998). To the extent the jury shared

the District's view of the Blasio evidence, a racially-charged

incident occurred and Knieser handled it in a racially-neutral

manner.

Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ..." Fed. R.

Evid. 403. The District claims Blasio's testimony about the

Chagnon incident resulted in a "mini-trial of the entire roll

call incident." It also claims that the evidence was prejudicial

because it prompted the jury to find for Fredrick and his coplaintiffs out of sympathy for Officer Blasio or because the

jury concluded that the police mismanaged the Second District.

Neither objection is persuasive. The trial court has broad

discretion to weigh the extent of potential prejudice against

the probative force of relevant evidence. See United States v.

Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Here the court

carefully considered the District's objections and concluded

that the District's fears of prejudice and confusion were

unwarranted. The court disagreed with the idea that allowing the testimony would lead to a "mini-trial": that Knieser

would testify to a different version of events would not "make

[the trial] any longer than necessary." And because the roll

call confrontation was a clear and distinct event, testimony

about it was unlikely to cause the jury to confuse the District's responsibility for actions against Blasio with its liability

for actions against Fredrick and his co-plaintiffs.

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II.

The District also seeks a new trial on the ground that the

evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict with respect

to any of the three plaintiffs. The plaintiffs counter that the

District may not raise sufficiency of the evidence on appeal

because, after it moved for judgment as a matter of law at the

close of their case, the District never renewed the motion and

it filed no post-verdict motion to set aside the judgment.

A party may move for judgment as a matter of law "at any

time before submission of the case to the jury." Fed. R. Civ.

P. 50(a)(2). When the District filed its motion after the

plaintiffs' case-in-chief, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear your motion.

MR. BOLDEN [Counsel for the District]: Your honor,

I'd like to move for a judgment as a matter of law as to

the complaint.

It is the District's position that the plaintiff has the

burden of making out a prima facie case of discrimination. We believe that case has not been made.

The court said it would take the motion under advisement,

after which the District presented its evidence in defense.

The court never expressly ruled on the District's motion.

It is common ground that under no circumstances may the

District win more than a new trial. A party wishing to renew

a motion for judgment as a matter of law after a verdict has

been rendered must do so within ten days of the entry of

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). If "a party has failed to

move for j.n.o.v., an appellate court may not, in reversing the

denial of a directed verdict, enter judgment; relief is limited

to ordering a new trial. See Johnson v. New York, N.H. &

H. R.R., 344 U.S. 48 (1952)." Harbor Ins. Co. v. Schnabel

Found. Co., 946 F.2d 930, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see Cone v.

West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 218 (1947).

In the Harbor Insurance case just quoted, a company

sought review of the district court's denial of its motion for a

directed verdict. Like the District in this case, the company

"did not make a timely motion for j.n.o.v. or a new trial [after

judgment had been entered], but instead appealed directly to

this court." See Harbor Ins., 946 F.2d at 934.1 We ordered

a new trial on the single issue--contributory negligence--the

company had raised in its motion for a directed verdict at the

end of all evidence. See id. at 933.

The District is not in the same position as the party in

Harbor Insurance. Its only motion came at the close of the

plaintiffs' case; it never filed a motion for judgment at the

close of all the evidence. The rule, followed in the other

courts of appeals, is that "a party who moves for judgment

after an opponent's opening statement or at the close of the

opponent's evidence must ordinarily reassert the motion at

the close of all evidence or risk waiving the right to renew the

motion under Rule 50(b) ... and the right to appellate review

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of the sufficiency of an opponent's evidence...." 9 James

Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice s 50.20[3] (3d

ed. 2000); see Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1135-36 (10th

Cir. 1999); American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Bolt, 106 F.3d

155, 160 (6th Cir. 1997); Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 878

(9th Cir. 1996); BE & K Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of

Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 90 F.3d 1318, 1324-25 (8th Cir.

1996); Umpleby v. Potter & Brumfield, Inc., 69 F.3d 209, 212

(7th Cir. 1995); Kiesling v. Ser-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19

F.3d 755, 758-59 (1st Cir. 1994); Scala v. Moore McCormack

Lines, Inc., 985 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1993); McCann v.

Texas City Refining, Inc., 984 F.2d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 1993);

Keith v. Truck Stops Corp. of Am., 909 F.2d 743, 744 (3d Cir.

1990); National Indus., Inc. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 781 F.2d

1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986).

Our court has never squarely adopted this general rule,

although we have held that "a prerequisite to any motion for

__________

1 The Harbor Insurance opinion uses the phrases "directed

verdict" and "judgment not on the verdict." Under the 1991

revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these terms have

been replaced by the generic phrase "judgment as a matter of law."

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory committee's note; 9 James Wm.

Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice s 50.03 (3d ed. 2000).

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judgment n.o.v. is a motion for directed verdict at the close of

all the evidence," and that a defendant cannot raise insufficiency of the evidence on appeal unless the defendant filed a

directed verdict motion seeking judgment on that basis. U.S.

Indus., Inc. v. Blake Constr. Co., 671 F.2d 539, 548 (D.C. Cir.

1982). If we applied that holding to the District, it would lose

because it failed to move for judgment as a matter of law at

the close of the evidence. But in light of the district court's

failure to rule on the District's motion at the close of the

plaintiffs' case, the District urges us to treat that motion as

the equivalent of one filed at the close of all the evidence.

Rule 50(b) of the civil rules states that "[i]f, for any reason,

the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of

law made at the close of all the evidence ... [t]he movant

may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by

filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). This is of no assistance to the District.

The text of Rule 50(b) envisions a motion made after "entry

of judgment," something the District neglected to do.

There is another problem for the District. With some

exceptions courts of appeals hold that even if a defendant files

a motion for judgment at the close of the plaintiff's case, the

defendant must move for judgment as a matter of law at the

close of all evidence in order to preserve lack of sufficient

evidence as a ground for appeal--again something the District neglected. See, e.g., Patel, 103 F.3d at 878 & n.9;

Umpleby, 69 F.3d at 212. Although exceptions have grown

up over the years, see, e.g., Douglas County Bank v. United

Financial Inc., 207 F.3d 473, 477 (8th Cir. 2000); Scala, 985

F.2d at 684 n.2, the basic rule remains intact and has become

common to both civil and criminal practice. The Supreme

Court treated it as a foregone conclusion as much as a

century ago. See Bogk v. Gassert, 149 U.S. 17, 23 (1893);

Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202,

206 (1892). The logic behind the rule is simple. "It not

infrequently happens that the defendant himself, by his own

evidence, supplies the missing link; and, if not, he may move

to take the case from the jury upon the conclusion of the

entire testimony." Bogk, 149 U.S. at 23; see also United

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States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d 845, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (suggesting that" 'negative inferences' " from defendant's manner of

testifying could "suppl[y] enough evidence to convince any

rational juror of ... guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").

Our practice in criminal cases is comparable. Rule 29 of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was intended to

"accord with the practice prescribed for civil cases by Rule

50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," Fed. R. Crim.

P. 29 advisory committee's note. A defendant may move for

a judgment of acquittal (previously called a motion for a

directed verdict) on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction," id.; the motion may be made at

the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief or at the close of

all the evidence. Id. But in this circuit, as in others, "a

criminal defendant who, after denial of a motion for judgment

of acquittal at the close of the government's case-in-chief,

proceeds to the presentation of his own case, waives his

objection to the denial." United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d

1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc). A defendant also

waives his right to object to the sufficiency of the evidence on

appeal if he fails, at the end of all evidence, to renew the

motion he lodged at the close of the government's case. See

United States v. Sherod, 960 F.2d 1075, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

(In criminal cases, Rule 29(b) provides that if "the court

reserves decision"--as the district court did here--"it must

decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the

ruling was reserved," but civil Rule 50 has no comparable

provision.)

For the District to escape the force of these precedents it

must come up with some exception to the requirement that a

Rule 50 motion be renewed at the close of all evidence in

order to preserve a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim for appeal. A Fifth Circuit decision, the District tells us, recognizes such an exception when the motion at the end of the

plaintiff's case sufficiently warned the plaintiff of the issues

and the district court "either refused to rule or took the

motion under advisement." Polanco v. City of Austin, 78

F.3d 968, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1996). Even if we followed Polanco, the District would not qualify for the exception. Its oral

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motion did not fairly warn the plaintiffs of the issues it now

seeks to raise on appeal and the District's own witnesses

provided evidence that could support the plaintiffs' case. For

example, Lieutenant Knieser testified that jobs were sometimes filled without posting vacancy notices, a fact relevant to

the District's objection that plaintiffs could not have been

denied jobs for which they never had applied.

Given the District's procedural default, we are limited in

our review to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute

a manifest miscarriage of justice. Cf. Bristol Steel & Iron

Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.

1994). Whatever flaws there may be in the record compiled

by the plaintiffs, they are not that severe.

Affirmed.

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