Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04198/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04198-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patrick Nolan McSwain
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

PATRICK NOLAN MCSWAIN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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FILED 

Unlwt Bt.J.tat Court~ Appee.\a 'fenth Clrcutt 

JUL 1 1 \994 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 93-4198 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-160) 

G. Fred Metos, of McCaughey & Metos, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Bruce C. Lubeck (Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney, 

was with him on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA and MCKAY, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR,* District 

Judge. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-4198 Document: 01019283631 Date Filed: 07/11/1994 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant Patrick Nolan McSwain entered a 

CGnditional guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a) (2) to 

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and to carrying and using a firearm during and 

in relation to a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

Mr. McSwain now brings this appeal challenging the district 

court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during 

a warrantless search of his vehicle. Mr. McSwain argues for 

suppression on the ground that he was unlawfully detained. We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse and 

remand. 

I. Background 

On the afternoon of June 9, 1993, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 

Dennis Avery ("Trooper Avery") was patrolling eastbound Interstate 

70 in Sevier County, Utah, when he noticed an approaching vehicle 

in his rear view mirror. The vehicle did not have a front license 

plate, and as it passed, Trooper Avery noticed that the vehicle 

did not have a rear license plate either, though it did have a 

temporary registration sticker posted in the rear window. Trooper 

Avery was unable to read the expiration date on the sticker 

because it appeared to be covered with reflective tape. He 

stopped the vehicle to verify the validity of the temporary 

sticker. Trooper Avery's patrol car was equipped with a video 

camera that recorded the stop and the ensuing conversation between 

Trooper Avery and the vehicle's driver, Mr. McSwain. 

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As Trooper Avery approached the vehicle on foot, he noticed 

that the temporary registration sticker was from Colorado and that 

the reflective tape merely was a new device used by the State of 

Colorado to prevent alteration of the sticker's expiration date. 

Trooper Avery observed that the sticker was valid and had not 

expired. He then approached Mr. McSwain, made a comment about the 

sticker, and proceeded to ask whether Mr. McSwain had just bought 

the vehicle and whether he was taking it for a test drive. 

Trooper Avery next requested identification and vehicle 

registration. He testified that he routinely asks for these 

documents upon stopping a vehicle to ensure that the driver is 

licensed and is the vehicle's owner. Mr. McSwain produced a 

Colorado registration in his name and said that he did not have a 

driver's license, though he provided other identification. Mr. 

Fisher, a passenger in the vehicle's rear seat, produced a valid 

driver's license. Trooper Avery then asked them where they had 

been and Mr. McSwain told Trooper Avery that they had been 

gambling in Las Vegas, Nevada. Trooper Avery, however, observed 

on the front seat a receipt dated June 8, 1993 (the prior day) 

from a Jiffy Lube in Pasadena, California. 

Trooper Avery returned to his patrol car to request a 

computer check. He testified that he routinely.runs a criminal 

history check on persons driving without a license and who 

otherwise arouse his suspicions. Dispatch informed Trooper Avery 

that Mr. McSwain had a suspended driver's license and a prior 

record for drug and gun violations and assaults. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4198 Document: 01019283631 Date Filed: 07/11/1994 Page: 3 
Trooper Avery returned to the vehicle and gave back Mr. 

Fisher's license, Mr. McSwain's identification and the vehicle 

registration. Resting his arms on the driver's door, Trooper 

Avery inquired, 11What are you doing over in Denver, is that where 

you live? 11 He then asked if they were 11 packing 11 any alcohol, 

firearms or drugs in the vehicle. After Mr. McSwain answered in 

the negative, Trooper Avery asked, 11 Do you mind if I look? 11 Mr. 

McSwain responded, 11 Go ahead. 11 Trooper Avery said, 11 Why don't you 

step out a sec? 11 He then explained that, because Mr. McSwain's 

license had been suspended, Mr. Fisher would have to drive. 

Trooper Avery searched the interior of the car, conversing 

with Mr. McSwain and Mr. Fisher throughout the search. Trooper 

Avery specifically asked and received Mr. Fisher's permission to 

look inside a briefcase lying in the back seat. He then retrieved 

the keys from the ignition and approached the rear of the vehicle. 

He asked Mr. McSwain and Mr. Fisher if there were just clothes in 

the trunk and they said, 11 Yes. 11 After examining several items in 

the trunk, Trooper Avery found a green duffel bag. He asked who 

it belonged to, and Mr. McSwain said it belonged to him. Trooper 

Avery opened the duffel bag and discovered a set of scales, a gun 

and a plastic bag containing a substance which appeared to be 

crack cocaine. Trooper Avery asked Mr. McSwain if the substance 

in the bag was cocaine, and Mr. McSwain indicated that it was. 

Trooper Avery arrested Mr. McSwain and Mr. Fisher. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4198 Document: 01019283631 Date Filed: 07/11/1994 Page: 4 
II. Discussion 

Mr. McSwain argues that the evidence found in the trunk of 

his vehicle was the fruit of an unlawful detention and that the 

trial court therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress. In 

reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we must 

accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1489 (lOth Cir. 

1993). Additionally, we must view the evidence on appeal in the 

light most favorable to the government. United States v. Pena, 

920 F.2d 1509, 1513 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207 

(1991). In examining the district court's findings, we are 

mindful that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be 

given the evidence together with the inferences, deductions and 

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, are to be determined by 

the trial judge. United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 973 

(lOth Cir. 1989). However, the ultimate determination of 

reasonableness is a conclusion of law that we review de novo. 

United States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728, 730 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

A. Lawfulness of Detention 

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches 

and seizures. "The stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its 

occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment." United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815 (lOth Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1168 (1992). To determine the 

reasonableness of such a seizure, we employ a dual inquiry: "[1] 

whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and 

[2] whether [the action] was reasonably related in scope to the 

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circumstances which justified the interference in the first 

place." United States v. Dewitt 1 946 F.2d 1497 1 1501 (lOth Cir. 

1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio 1 392 U.S. 1 1 19-20 (1968)) 1 cert. 

denied 1 112 S. Ct. 1233 (1992); see also United States v. Sharpe 1 

470 U.S. 675 1 682 (1985); Florida v. Royer/ 460 U.S. 491 1 500 

(1983) ("The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to 

its underlying justification."). The first prong of this inquiry 

is not at issue here because Mr. McSwain concedes the propriety of 

the initial stop. He argues 1 however 1 that the initially valid 

stop evolved into an unreasonable detention. We agree. 

Trooper Avery stopped Mr. McSwain for the sole purpose of 

ensuring the validity of the vehicle 1 S temporary registration 

sticker. Once Trooper Avery approached the vehicle on foot and 

observed that the temporary sticker was valid and had not expired/ 

the purpose of the stop was satisfied. Trooper Avery 1 s further 

detention of the vehicle to question Mr. McSwain about his vehicle 

and travel itinerary and to request his license and registration 

exceeded the scope of the stop 1 S underlying justification. 

The government nevertheless contends that Tenth Circuit 

precedent entitles Trooper Avery to engage in such "minimally 

intrusive" conduct. Though we have held in several cases that an 

officer conducting a routine traffic stop may inquire about 

"identity and travel plans 1 " United States v. Rivera/ 867 F.2d 

1261 1 1263 (lOth Cir. 1989) 1 and may "request a driver 1 S license 

and vehicle registration/ run a computer check/ and issue a 

citation~" United States v. Guzman 1 864 F.2d 1512 1 1519 (lOth Cir. 

1988); see also United States v. Soto 1 988 F.2d 1548 1 1554 (lOth 

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Appellate Case: 93-4198 Document: 01019283631 Date Filed: 07/11/1994 Page: 6 
Cir. 1993), these cases -- cited by the government -- are 

inapposite. They all involve situations in which the officer, at 

the time he or she asks questions or requests the driver's license 

and registration, still has some "objectively reasonable 

articulable suspicion" that a traffic violation "has occurred or 

is occurring." Soto, 988 F.2d at 1554 (speeding); see also United 

States v. Trimble, 986 F.2d 394 (lOth Cir. 1992) (expired license 

plate), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2943 (1993); Rivera, 867 F.2d at 

1263 (tailgating); Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519 (seat belt violation). 

Such cases stand in sharp contrast to the facts of the instant 

case: Trooper Avery's reasonable suspicion regarding the validity 

of Mr. McSwain's temporary registration sticker was completely 

dispelled prior to the time he questioned Mr. McSwain and 

requested documentation. Cf. United States v. Millan-Diaz, 975 

F.2d 720, 722 (lOth Cir. 1992) (holding that reaso~able suspicion 

of illegal alien smuggling was dispelled as soon as border patrol 

agent determined that no illegal aliens were in the vehicle) . 

Having no "objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that 

illegal activity ha[d] occurred or [was] occurring," Soto, 988 

F.2d at 1554, Trooper Avery's actions in questioning Mr. McSwain 

and requesting his license and registration exceeded the limits of 

a lawful investigative detention and violated the Fourth 

Arnendrnent. 1 

1 We point out that when police officers engage in a 

"consensual encounter" with a particular individual "they may 

generally ask questions of that individual [and] ask to examine 

the individual's indentification," even though the officers have 

no reasonable suspicion regarding the individual. Florida v. 

Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991) (citations omitted). A 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

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The government asserts that not allowing an officer to 

request a driver's license and registration in this type of case 

will require the officer to "stop a vehicle, approach the vehicle 

on foot, observe it, then walk away, get in his police car, drive 

away and wave, leaving the stopped citizen to wonder what had just 

occurred. 11 Our holding does not require such absurd conduct by 

police officers. As a matter of courtesy, the officer could 

explain to drivers in Mr. McSwain's circumstances the reason for 

the initial detention and then allow them to continue on their way 

without asking them to produce their driver's license and 

registration. See Ohio v. Chatton, 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Ohio 

19 84) . 

B. Effect of Consent to Search 

A question remains as to whether Mr. McSwain's consent to the 

search of his vehicle cleansed the taint of the unlawful 

detention, thereby validating the search. 11 A search preceded by a 

Fourth Amendment violation remains valid if the consent to search 

was voluntary in fact under the totality of the circurnstances. 11 

United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 881 (lOth Cir. 1994); see 

also Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1520. 11 The government bears the burden 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

consensual encounter occurs where a 11 reasonable person would feel 

free to disregard the police and go about his business. 11 Id. 

(internal quotations omitted). Here, no consensual encounter 

occurred because Trooper Avery pulled over Mr. McSwain,s vehicle 

and began asking him questions and requesting his documentation, 

indicating 11 to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to 

ignore the police presence and go about his business." Id. at 

2387 (internal quotations omitted). Cf. United States v. 

Langston, 970 F.2d 692, 698-99 n.3 (lOth Cir.) (finding consensual 

encounter where driver voluntarily stopped car after police drove 

beside car and made eye contact with driver), cert. denied, 113 S. 

Ct. 439 (1.992). 

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Appellate Case: 93-4198 Document: 01019283631 Date Filed: 07/11/1994 Page: 8 
of proving the voluntariness of consent, and that burden is 

heavier when consent is given after an illegal [detention] . 11 

Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 881 (citations omitted); see also United 

States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1457 (lOth Cir. 1985). The 

government must demonstrate that Mr. McSwain's consent to search 

is 11 Sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of 

the illegal [detention]. n

2 _,U""n...,i::....l:t::..:e::..:d~S~t~a,_,t,e~s~v~._M=.=a,_,e'-'=-z, 872 F.2d 1444, 

1453 (lOth Cir. 1989); see also United· States v. Lowe, 999 F.2d 

448, 451 (lOth Cir. 1993); United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 

F.2d 993, 1012 (lOth Cir. 1992). No single fact is dispositive 

under the totality of the circumstances test, Fernandez, 18 F.3d 

at 882, but the three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 

422 U.S. 590 (1975), are especially relevant: 11 the temporal 

proximity of the illegal detention and the consent, any 

intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and 

flagrancy of the officer's unlawful conduct. 11 Walker, 933 F.2d at 

818 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04); see also Mendoza-Salgado, 

964 F.2d at 1011; Maez, 872 F.2d at 1454. 

The district court concluded that Mr. McSwain voluntarily 

consented to the search. This finding is insufficient, however, 

because the court incorrectly found that the protracted detention 

of Mr. McSwain was lawful and therefore did not.conduct the Brown 

11 taint analysis. 11 See Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 881-82 n.7; see also 

2 Though the 11 voluntariness in fact 11 and 11 sufficiently an act 

of free will 11 tests are often blurred and frequently overlap, the 

government must demonstrate both 1) that the consent was voluntary 

in fact, and 2) that there was a break in the causal connection 

between the illegal detention and the consent. United States v. 

Melendez-Garcia, No. 93-2104, 1994 WL -----, at *15-16 (lOth Cir. 

June --, 1994). 

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Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1457. We conduct the taint analysis here 

"because the proceedings below resulted in a record of amply 

sufficient detail and depth from which the determination may be 

made." Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 881-82 n.7 (internal quotations 

omitted); see also Lowe, 999 F.2d at 451 n.5; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 

1521 n.10. 

The record shows that Mr. McSwain's consent to search was not 

sufficient to purge the taint of his illegal detention. After Mr. 

McSwain denied having any contraband in the vehicle, Trooper Avery 

asked, "Do you mind if I look," to which Mr. McSwain replied, "Go 

ahead." Trooper Avery's manner was pleasant and he did not use an 

insisting tone of voice. However, several elements suggesting 

lack of voluntariness were present. Though possibly not designed 

to coerce or intimidate, Trooper Avery was leaning over and 

resting his arms on the driver's door when he asked for consent to 

search. 3 Additionally, though Trooper Avery,s return of Mr. 

Fisher's and Mr. McSwain's identification and the vehicle 

registration may be a factor indicating that Mr. McSwain was free 

to leave, see Soto, 988 F.2d at 1557 (analyzing Tenth Circuit 

cases and noting that returning the driver's documentation is 

necessary, but not always sufficient, to show that the driver is 

free to proceed on his or her way), Trooper Avery failed to 

specifically inform Mr. McSwain that he was free to leave the 

scene or that he could refuse to give his consent. These are 

"important factors in our consideration." Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 

3 Trooper Avery testified that "[u]nfortuhately, it is a habit" 

of his to lean on the driver,s window. 

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882; see also id. ("Although informing a defendant of his right to 

refuse consent is not a prerequisite to establishing voluntary 

consent, we consider it a factor particularly worth noting.") 

(citations and internal quotations omitted) ;

4 United States v. 

Ward, 961 F.2d 1526, 1533 (lOth Cir. 1992) (advising an individual 

of the right to refuse consent is important because it shows the 

individual that the police officer is prepared to respect the 

assertion of that right); Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1459 (finding 

consent tainted where officer held the driver's ticket, license 

and registration without telling the driver he was free to leave) . 

We next consider the three "Brown factors." The first two 

factors weigh heavily against finding the taint cleansed. Mr. 

McSwain consented to the search only a few minutes after being 

illegally detained and questioned by Trooper Avery. See 

Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 883 ("only moments" elapsed between illegal 

detention and consent); Ward, 961 F.2d at 1534 ("only minutes" 

passed between illegal seizure and consent); Maez, 872 F.2d at 

1447, 1455 (consent form signed thirty minutes after illegal 

arrest) . Also, there were absolutely no intervening circumstances 

in the short period of time between the illegal detention and Mr. 

McSwain's consent. See Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 883 (finding no 

intervening circumstances present); United States v. Peters, 10 

F.3d 1517, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1993) (same); Maez, 872 F.2d at 1455 

4 We point out that just because an officer informs an 

individual of the right to refuse consent does not necessarily 

mean the individual's consent will be voluntary in fact. See 

Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 882 n.8 (citing cases in which consent did 

not purge taint of illegal police actions even though individuals 

signed consent to search form or were informed of right to refuse 

consent). 

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(same) . These factors both indicate that there was no "break in 

the causal connection between the illegality and the evidence 

thereby obtained." Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 883 (quoting Recalde, 

761 F.2d at 1458). 

Finally, the third Brown factor -- the purpose and flagrancy 

of Trooper Avery's conduct -- weighs against finding the taint 

purged. Trooper Avery testified that he detained Mr. McSwain only 

because he routinely requests a driver's license and registration 

upon stopping a vehicle to ensure that the driver is licensed and 

is the owner of the vehicle. The record, however, suggests that 

Trooper Avery's aims in this case were not so narrow. Before he 

even requested identification and vehicle registration, Trooper 

Avery inquired whether Mr. McSwain had just bought the vehicle and 

whether he was just taking it for a test drive. Requesting 

identification and vehicle registration, Trooper Avery then 

quizzed the vehicle's occupants about their travel itinerary. 

Later, upon returning their documentation, he asked what they were 

doing in Denver and if that was where they lived. This 

unnecessary questioning, viewed in its factual context, suggests 

that Trooper Avery detained Mr. McSwain's vehicle with a "quality 

of purposefulness," Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, embarking upon a 

fishing expedition "in the hope that something might turn up," id. 

Cf. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 883 (finding "quality of purposefulness" 

because officer detained driver based "solely on a tension in the 

air and his vague hunch that something was afoot, with the hope 

that something might turn up") (internal quotations omitted); 

Peters, 10 F.3d at 1523 (finding flagrant misconduct where agent 

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stopped a vehicle 11 solely on an unsupported, inarticulable 

'hunch' 11 supplied by another officer who previously had stopped 

and searched the vehicle and found no evidence of drugs or illegal 

activity) . 

Considering the totality of the circumstances and giving 

special emphasis to the three Brown factors, we conclude that Mr. 

McSwain's consent was not 11 sufficiently an act of free will to 

purge the primary taint of the illegal [detention] . 11 Maez, 872 

F.2d at 1453. 

III. Conclusion 

Trooper Avery unlawfully detained Mr. McSwain. Because Mr. 

McSwain's subsequent consent to the search of his vehicle was not 

sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal detention, we REVERSE 

the district court's denial of Mr. McSwain's motion to suppress 

the evidence found in his vehicle. We REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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