Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00024/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Citadel Commerce Corp.
Defendant
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Defendant
Joanne Noziska
Plaintiff
Terry Noziska
Plaintiff
Noziska Appraisal Service
Plaintiff
Placer Sierra Bank
Defendant

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28 This matter is deemed to be suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOANNE NOZISKA, TERRY NOZISKA, )

NOZISKA APPRAISAL SERVICE, )

 ) 2:10-cv-00024-GEB-JFM

Plaintiffs, )

) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

v. ) MOTION TO DISMISS AND

) DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL

PLACER SIERRA BANK, FEDERAL RESERVE) JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFFS’

BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, CITADEL ) STATE LAW CLAIMS*

COMMERCE CORP., DOES 1 to 20, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On January 5, 2010, the Federal Reserve Bank of San

Francisco (the “Federal Reserve”) filed a motion under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in which it seeks to be dismissed from this

action. (Docket No. 4.) Prior to the date on which an opposition was

due, Plaintiff Joanne Noziska filed a “Motion to Relieve Counsel,” in

which she states “I am requesting a substitution of attorney in this

case . . . [and] I am also asking [to] extend time in this case as

this . . . would give me more time to obtain new counsel.” (Docket No.

5.) Plaintiff’s request is construed as including a request for a

continuance of the Federal Reserve’s dismissal motion. However, for

the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s request for a continuance is

denied and the Federal Reserve’s dismissal motion is granted.

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I. BACKGROUND

On or about April 20, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in

the California Superior Court located in the County of Nevada. 

Plaintiffs complaint is against Placer Sierra Bank, the Federal

Reserve, Citadel Commerce Corporation (“Citadel Commerce”) and twenty

“Does”. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint state law claims for

breach of contract, credit card theft and fraud. Plaintiffs’ claims

relate to alleged unauthorized withdrawals from their Placer Sierra

Bank accounts. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that $117,148.63 was

improperly withdrawn from their personal and business bank accounts at

Placer Sierra Bank and paid to Citadel Commerce. Plaintiffs further

allege Citadel Commerce committed fraud by falsely representing that

Plaintiffs had authorized Citadel Commerce to withdraw funds from

Plaintiffs’ Placer Sierra Bank accounts for on-line gambling. 

The Federal Reserve removed this case to federal court under

12 U.S.C. § 632. Shortly after removal, the Federal Reserve filed its

now pending dismissal motion. Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition

to this dismissal motion.

II. Legal Standard

Granting a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) “is proper only where there is no

cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to

support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9th Cir. 2001). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must allege only

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 (2007). For

purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “all material allegations of the

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complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences

to be drawn from them.” Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Removal

A defendant may remove to federal court “any civil action

brought in a State court of which the district courts . . . have

original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Federal

Reserve argues that removal was proper under 12 U.S.C. § 632 (“Section

632"). Section 632 provides, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

all suits of a civil nature at common law or

in equity to which any Federal Reserve bank

shall be a party shall be deemed to arise

under the laws of the United States, and the

district courts of the United States shall

have original jurisdiction of all such suits;

and any Federal Reserve bank which is a

defendant in any such suit may, at any time

before the trial thereof, remove such suit

from a State court into the district court of

the United States for the proper district . .

. .

12 U.S.C. § 632 (emphasis added). Since Plaintiffs have named the

Federal Reserve as a party and it is before trial, removal of this

action was proper. Id. See also Suburban Nat. Bank of Palatine v.

Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 727 F. Supp. 402, 402 (N.D. Ill. 1989)

(stating that Section 632 “confers federal question jurisdiction over

civil suits in which a Federal Reserve Bank is a party”).

B. The Federal Reserve’s Dismissal Motion

The Federal Reserve argues it should be dismissed from this

case since “[n]owhere in the body of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is [the

Federal Reserve] . . . mentioned” and “[t]here are not facts . . .

suggest[ing] that [the Federal Reserve] had any role . . . whatsoever

in the purported electronic transfer of funds from Plaintiffs’

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accounts. In other words, there are no allegations that [the Federal

Reserve] caused any harm to Plaintiffs.”

Plaintiffs’ complaint is void of any factual allegations

against the Federal Reserve. Since no claim is stated against the

Federal Reserve, a continuance would have no affect on the disposition

of the Federal Reserve’s dismissal motion. Therefore, Plaintiff’s

request for a continuance is denied and the Federal Reserve’s

dismissal motion is granted. The Federal Reserve is, accordingly,

dismissed from this case.

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

Since the Federal Reserve has been dismissed, the basis for

the Court’s original jurisdiction is extinguished and only Plaintiffs’

state law claims remain. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district

court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

[state] claim” if “the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction . . . .” “While discretion to

decline . . . supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is

triggered by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is

informed by the . . . values of economy, convenience, fairness and

comity” as delineated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of

Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Acri v. Varian Associates,

Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). “Since state

courts have the primary responsibility to develop and apply state law,

. . . the Gibbs values do not favor continued exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction over [Plaintiffs’] state claims . . . .” Anderson v.

Countrywide Financial, No. 2:08-cv-01220-GEB-GGH, 2009 WL 3368444, at

*5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009); see also Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 (stating

that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated

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before trial, the balance of factors will point towards declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims (quotations

and citations omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ remaining state law

claims are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations for

any claim dismissed under § 1367(c)(3) “shall be tolled . . . for a

period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for

a longer tolling period.” Plaintiffs, therefore, will not be

prejudiced by the dismissal of their state law claims if they timely

re-file their state claims in the appropriate state court.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff Joanne Noziska’s request

for a continuance is denied and the Federal Reserve’s dismissal motion

is granted; the Federal Reserve is dismissed from this case. Further,

the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law

claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and these claims are dismissed

without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall include Joanne

Noziska in the service of this order by serving her at the following

address: 17316 Ruth Court, Grass Valley, California, 95949. This case

shall be closed.

Dated: February 18, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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