Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-56374/USCOURTS-ca9-14-56374-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BLB Resources, Inc.
Appellee
Kevin Ziober
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KEVIN ZIOBER, an

individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BLB RESOURCES, INC., a

California Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-56374

D.C. No.

8:14-cv-00675-CJC-DFM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 5, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed October 14, 2016

Before: Mary H. Murguia and Paul J. Watford, Circuit

Judges, and Susan R. Bolton,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Murguia;

Concurrence by Judge Watford

* The Honorable SusanR. Bolton, United States District Judge for the

District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

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2 ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES

SUMMARY**

Arbitration / Labor Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s order compelling

arbitration and dismissing an action under the Uniformed

Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.

Joining other circuits, the panel held that USERRA does

not prohibit the compelled arbitration of claims arising under

its provisions, which establish employment rights for

returning servicemembers. The panel concluded that neither

the text nor the legislative history of USERRA evinced

Congressional intent to override the Federal Arbitration

Act’s mandate that courts rigorously enforce arbitration

agreements according to their terms.

Concurring, Judge Watford wrote that while the proper

interpretation of USERRA was open to debate, it was not

prudent to create a circuit split by reversing the district

court’s ruling.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES 3

COUNSEL

Peter Romer-Friedman (argued) and R. Joseph Barton, Cohen

Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Washington, D.C.; Kathryn S.

Piscitelli, Orlando, Florida; Thomas G. Jarrard, Law Office

of Thomas Jarrard, PLLC, Spokane, Washington; for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lonnie D. Giamela (argued), Jimmie E. Johnson, and Nathan

V. Okelberry, Fisher & Phillips LLP, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiff, Kevin Ziober, signed an agreement with his

employer requiring the arbitration of legal disputes. Ziober

later sued the employer, claiming that he was fired from his

job after providing notice of his deployment to Afghanistan

in the United States Navy Reserve. The lawsuit alleged

violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which

establishes employment rights for returning servicemembers. 

This case presents the question of whether USERRA

prohibits the compelled arbitration of claims arising under its

provisions. We join the other circuits to have considered the

question and conclude that USERRA contains no such

prohibition. We therefore affirm the district court’s order

compelling arbitration and dismissing Ziober’s complaint.

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4 ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES

I.

The facts, as alleged in the underlying complaint, are not

in dispute for purposes of this appeal. Ziober served in the

United States NavyReserve and worked in his civilian life as

an operations director for defendant BLB Resources, Inc., a

real estate marketing and management firm. Approximately

six months after joining the company, Ziober signed a

bilateral arbitration agreement. The agreement stated:

To the fullest extent allowed by law, any

controversy, claim or dispute between

Employee and the Company . . . relating to or

arising out of Employee’s employment or the

cessation of that employment will be

submitted to final and binding arbitration

before a neutral arbitrator . . . for

determination in accordance with the

American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”)

Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation

Procedures (excluding mediation), including

any subsequent modifications or amendments

to such Rules, as the exclusive remedy for

such controversy, claim or dispute.

Under the agreement, the company agreed to pay all

arbitration costs. The agreement further specified that the

scope of discovery and available remedies would be the same

in arbitration as they would be in court.

Ziober subsequently told the company that the Navy was

recalling him to active duty in Afghanistan. On Ziober’s last

scheduled day of work, the company informed him that he

would not have a job upon his return to civilian life.

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ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES 5

In April 2014, after returning from Afghanistan, Ziober

sued his former employer for violatingUSERRA’s provisions

protecting servicemembers against discrimination and

establishing reemployment rights. The complaint also

includes various state law claims, including claims for

wrongful termination and violations of a state statute

protecting servicemembers against discrimination. The

employer moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the

agreement Ziober had signed. The district court granted the

defendant’s motion after concluding that USERRA did not

invalidate or supersede the arbitration agreement. This appeal

followed.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) to review

the district court’s order compelling arbitration and

dismissing Ziober’s complaint. We review the district court’s

order de novo. Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Boston,

360 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004).

III.

Our analysis begins with more than three decades of

Supreme Court precedent recognizing the “liberal federal

policy favoring arbitration agreements,” as established by the

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.

v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 669

(2012). That pro-arbitration policy extends to arbitration

agreements in the employment contracts of nontransportation workers. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,

532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). The FAA requires courts to

“‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to

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6 ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES

their terms,” including agreements to arbitrate claims arising

under federal statutes. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors

Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (quoting Dean Witter

Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)); see also

CompuCredit, 132 S.Ct. at 669. Section 3 of the FAA

specifically directs federal district courts to stay proceedings

and compel arbitration of “any issue referable to arbitration

under an agreement in writing for such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C.

§ 3.

An exception to the FAA’s arbitration mandate exists

when the mandate “has been ‘overridden by a contrary

congressional command.’” CompuCredit, 132 S.Ct. at 669

(quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S.

220, 226 (1987)). The burden rests on the party challenging

arbitration “to show that Congress intended to preclude a

waiver of a judicial forum” for the claims at issue. Gilmer v.

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Such

congressional intent “will be discoverable in the text of the

[statute], its legislative history, or an inherent conflict

between arbitration and the [statute’s] underlying purposes.”

Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 14 Penn

Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 258 (2009).

In this case, Ziober argues that the plain text and

legislative history of USERRA reveal that Congress intended

to preclude the compelled arbitration of claims arising under

its provisions. We join our sister circuits to have considered

the question and conclude that neither the text nor legislative

history evinces that intent. Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC,

537 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2008); Garrett v. Circuit City Stores,

Inc., 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Bodine v. Cook’s

Pest Control, Inc., No. 15-13233, 2016 WL 4056031 (11th

Cir. July 29, 2016) (holding that a USERRA claim was

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ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES 7

arbitrable even where the underlying arbitration agreement

contained terms that violated the statute because those terms

could be severed from the remainder of the agreement).

A.

Some historical context helps frame the discussion of

USERRA’s provisions. By the time Congress passed

USERRA in 1994, the FAA had been in place for nearly

seventy years, and the Supreme Court had made clear that “a

contrary congressional command” was required to override

the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate. McMahon, 482 U.S. at

226. Three years before USERRA’s passage, the Supreme

Court further held that an age discrimination claim arising

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

could be subject to compelled arbitration. Gilmer, 500 U.S.

at 23. Arbitration agreements in employment contracts were

not uncommon at the time. See, e.g., Erving v. Va. Squires

Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1066–67 (2d Cir. 1972);

Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 784–85 (1st Cir. 1971).

Against that backdrop, Congress passed USERRA to

broadly prohibit employment discrimination against, and to

establish reemployment rights on behalf of, those who serve

in the military and then reenter civilian life. See 38 U.S.C.

§§ 4301–4334. Central to this appeal, 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b)

provides:

This chapter supersedes any State law

(including any local law or ordinance),

contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or

other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates

in any manner any right or benefit provided

by this chapter, including the establishment of

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8 ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES

additional prerequisites to the exercise of any

such right or the receipt of any such benefit.

An individual may enforce his or her substantive rights

against a private employer in one of two ways. 38 U.S.C.

§§ 4322, 4323. First, an individual may file a complaint with

the Secretary of Labor and request that the Secretary refer the

matter to the Attorney General for further prosecution. Id.

§§ 4322, 4323(a)(1). Second, an individual may directly

pursue a civil action in federal court. Id. § 4323(a)(3).1

Section 4323 gives district courts jurisdiction over USERRA

claims, and it specifies the venue in which actions may

proceed. Id. § 4323(b), (c).

Taken together, Ziober argues that those statutory

provisions create a procedural right to sue in federal court

that precludes a contractual agreement to arbitrate. We

disagree. As an initial matter, it is well established that “[b]y

agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo

the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits

to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,

473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see also Circuit City, 532 U.S. at

123. Ziober therefore loses no substantive protections by

arbitrating his claims, and the only way he can prevail is if

USERRA creates a procedural right to a judicial forum,

protected by § 4302(b).

1 We do not reach the question of how the arbitration agreement in

this case would have affected any claims brought by the Attorney General

pursuant to § 4323(a)(1). See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,

295–96 (2002) (holding that the EEOC retained “the authority to pursue

victim-specific [judicial] relief regardless of the forum that the employer

and employee have chosen to resolve their disputes”).

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ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES 9

The Supreme Court’s decision inCompuCreditforecloses

the argument that USERRA includes a non-waivable

procedural right to a judicial forum. In CompuCredit, the

Court enforced a consumer agreement to arbitrate claims

arising under the Credit Repair Organizations Act

(CROA),which, similar to USERRA, prohibited the waiver of

“any right of the consumer” under the Act. 132 S.Ct. at 669.

Unlike USERRA, CROA explicitly provided that a consumer

had “a right to sue” a credit repair organization. Id. Like

USERRA, CROA included a section that created civil

liability and described available relief in the context of a

lawsuit in court. Id. at 670; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1679g

(CROA’s civil liability provisions). Despite the statute’s

seeming contemplation of a judicial forum for claims, the

Supreme Court rejected the argument that CROA created a

procedural right to bring a lawsuit in court. As the Court

reasoned, “[i]f the mere formulation of the cause of action in

this standard fashion were sufficient to establish the ‘contrary

congressional command’ overriding the FAA, valid

arbitration agreements covering federal causes of action

would be rare indeed.” 132 S.Ct. at 670 (citation omitted).

The Court in CompuCredit also looked to prior instances

when it had enforced arbitration agreements despite a

statute’s contemplation of a judicial forum for suits. In

Gilmer, for instance, the Supreme Court enforced an

arbitration agreement with respect to a claim brought under

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), even

though the statute provided that “[a]ny person aggrieved may

bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for

such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes

of this chapter.” CompuCredit, 132 S.Ct. at 670; see also

29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1). Before Gilmer, the Supreme Court

also repeatedly enforced arbitration agreements when the

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10 ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES

federal statute at issue created a cause of action in federal

courts without mentioning agreements to arbitrate. See

CompuCredit, 132 S.Ct. at 670–71 (discussing cases);

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227–28. In CompuCredit, the Court

reaffirmed that such statutory provisions do not create a right

to judicial enforcement of a claim. 132 S.Ct. at 671.

The same conclusion applies here. Like CROA, nothing

in the plain text of USERRA “mentions mandatoryarbitration

or the FAA.” Landis, 537 F.3d at 559. Instead, the statute

describes civil liability in a standard fashion similar to the

statutes considered in CompuCredit. As the Supreme Court

remarked in CompuCredit, when Congress has issued a

command precluding the arbitration of claims, it has done so

in far more unmistakable terms. See 132 S.Ct. at 672 (citing

7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (“No predispute arbitration agreement

shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires

arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”); 15 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a)(2) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

whenever a motor vehicle franchise contract provides for the

use of arbitration to resolve a controversy arising out of or

relating to such contract, arbitration may be used to settle

such controversy only if after such controversy arises all

parties to such controversy consent in writing to use

arbitration to settle such controversy.”)). Congress made no

similarly plain statement in USERRA’s text.

The closest that USERRA’s text comes to addressing the

compelled arbitration of claims is in § 4323(b)’s prohibition

of “the establishment of additional prerequisites” to the

vindication of substantive rights. However, as other circuits

have recognized, that language directly relates to “union

contracts and collective bargaining agreements” that require

an employee to take an additional step or exhaust certain

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ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES 11

remedies before filing suit. Garrett, 449 F.3d at 680; see also

Landis, 537 F.3d at 564 (Cole, J., concurring) (concluding

that Congress did not want USERRA plaintiffs to be forced

“to submit to arbitration, mediation, or any grievance

procedure as a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court”).

But an individual arbitration agreement between an employer

and an employee—operating like a forum selection

clause—allows an employee to immediately seek to vindicate

his or her rights in an arbitral forum, with no additional steps

or exhaustion of other remedies required.

Ziober also argues that USERRA should be interpreted

more liberally than other statutes given its focus on veterans.

As Ziober accurately observes, the Supreme Court and this

court have repeatedly affirmed the principle that statutes

concerningfederal reemployment rights for militarymembers

are “to be liberally construed for the benefit of those who left

private life to serve their country in its hour of great need.”

Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275,

285 (1946); see also Ala. Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581,

584 (1977); Imel v. Laborers Pension Tr. Fund for N. Cal.,

904 F.2d 1327, 1331–32 (9th Cir. 1990). We have also

liberally construed a veterans reemployment statute to

provide federal court jurisdiction over a claim. Imel,

904 F.2d at 1331–32. The principle of liberal construction,

however, is designed to ensure that veterans may take full

advantage of the substantive rights and protections provided

by a statute. See Ala. Power, 431 U.S. at 585–87. Yet, as

previously discussed, arbitration agreements like the one at

issue in this case operate like forum selection clauses that do

not require a party to give up any “substantive rights afforded

by the statute.” Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. Further, the

enforcement of an arbitration agreement does not undermine

the “social policies” underlying a given statute. Gilmer,

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12 ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES

500 U.S. at 27–28. Instead, arbitration “can further” the same

“broader social purposes” that litigation seeks to promote. Id.

at 28.

Consistent with the other circuits to have considered the

question, we therefore conclude that the plain text of

USERRA does not preclude the compelled arbitration of

disputes arising under its provisions. See Garrett, 449 F.3d at

677 (concluding that “[i]t is not evident from the statutory

language that Congress intended to preclude arbitration by

simply granting the possibility of a federal judicial forum”);

Landis, 537 F.3d at 562 (observing that nothing in

USERRA’s text indicates that Congress chose to exempt the

statute “from the policy favoring arbitration”); see also

Bodine, 2016 WL 4056031, at *5 (affirming a district court’s

order compelling arbitration of USERRA claims after

severing from the arbitration agreement terms that violated

the statute)2.

B.

Even if we were to conclude that USERRA’s text was

ambiguous on the question, the limited legislative history

cited by Ziober also does not satisfy his burden “to show that

Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum.”

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Ziober relies largely on a paragraph

in a House Committee Report concerning the scope of

§ 4302(b). The paragraph states:

2 The parties in Bodine “expressly agree[d] that USERRA claims are

arbitrable,” and limited their argument to the enforceability of the specific

arbitration agreement at issue. 2016 WL 4056031, at *3

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ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES 13

Section 4302(b) would reaffirm a general

preemption as to State and local laws and

ordinances, as well as to employer practices

and agreements, which provide fewer rights or

otherwise limit rights provided under

amended chapter 43 or put additional

conditions on those rights. See Peel v. Florida

Department of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070

(5th Cir. 1979); Cronin v. Police Dept. of City

of New York, 675 F. Supp. 847 (S.D. N.Y.

1987) and Fishgold, supra, 328 U.S. at 285,

which provide that no employer practice or

agreement can reduce, limit or eliminate any

right under chapter 43. Moreover, this section

would reaffirm that additional resort to

mechanisms such as grievance procedures or

arbitration or similar administrative appeals is

not required. See McKinney v. Missouri–K-T

R.Co., 357 U.S. 265, 270 (1958); Beckley v.

Lipe-Rollway Corp., 448 F. Supp. 563, 567

(N.D.N.Y. 1978). It is the Committee’s intent

that, even if a person protected under the Act

resorts to arbitration, any arbitration decision

shall not be binding as a matter of law. See

Kidder v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 469 F. Supp.

1060, 1064–65 (S.D. Fla. 1978).

H.R. Rep. No. 103-65(I), at 20 (1993).

The passage, however, is consistent with our analysis of

§ 4302(b)’s express prohibition on the creation of “additional

prerequisites” for the vindication of substantive rights under

the statute. As the legislative history confirms, Congress’s

concern was with contractual agreements that forced an

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14 ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES

employee to take an additional step (i.e., exhausting

contractual grievance procedures) before bringing suit. That

concern, however, does not reach individual agreements to

arbitrate like the one at issue in this case, because such

agreements do not require a plaintiff to take any additional

steps before seeking to vindicate his or her rights in an

arbitral forum. See Garrett, 449 F.3d at 680 (remarking that

the cited legislative history “strongly suggests that Congress

intended § 4302(b) only to prohibit the limiting of

USERRA’s substantive rights by union contracts and

collective bargaining agreements, and that Congress did not

refer to arbitration agreements between an employer and

individual employee”); Landis, 537 F.3d at 562–63.

The legislative history’s citation to McKinney v.

Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. confirms that reading.

The Supreme Court in McKinney considered a USERRA

predecessor statute and held that a collective bargaining

agreement could not require an employee to “exhaust other

avenues of relief” before filing suit. 357 U.S. 265, 270

(1958). McKinney, however, did not address arbitration

agreements that operate similar to forum selection clauses

like the one at issue in this case. And as the Supreme Court

has since made plain, the act of bringing a claim in arbitration

allows a plaintiff to vindicate his or her substantive statutory

rights to the same extent as filing a lawsuit in federal court.

See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (rejecting the argument that

arbitration is a “method of weakening the protections

afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants”).

We therefore conclude that Ziober has failed to establish

that the legislative history evinces Congress’s intent to

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ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES 15

prevent the enforcement of the arbitration agreement he

signed.3

IV.

We acknowledge the possibility that Congress did not

want “members of our armed forces to submit to binding,

coercive arbitration agreements.” Landis, 537 F.3d at 564

(Cole, J., concurring). That intention, however, is not

expressed in the statute itself, or in the legislative history. We

therefore affirm the district court’s order compelling

arbitration and dismissing Ziober’s complaint.

AFFIRMED.

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Ijoin the court’s opinion, but I have doubts about whether

we are reaching the right result.

A strong argument can be made that the Uniformed

Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994

(USERRA) contains a “contrary congressional command”

overriding the Federal Arbitration Act’s pro-arbitration

3 Even if the House Committee Report more directly addressed

individual arbitration agreements, no similar language appears in the

relevant Senate Report, or any other legislative history cited by the parties.

See S. Rep. No. 103-158, at 41 (1993). We agree with the Fifth Circuit

that “[s]uch a scant record, unless explicitly and on point, hardly proves

Congress’s intention toward all cases involving arbitration.” Garrett,

449 F.3d at 679.

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16 ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES

mandate. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665,

669 (2012). USERRA contains a provision that renders

unenforceable anycontract or agreement that “reduces, limits,

or eliminates in any manner any right . . . provided by this

chapter.” 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b). Kevin Ziober’s contract with

his employer requires him to submit USERRA claims to final

and binding arbitration. That contract certainly“limits”—and

for all practical purposes “eliminates”—his right to litigate

those claims in court. So the threshold question is whether

USERRA confers on servicemembers the right to litigate

USERRA claims in court.

The statute seems to confer such a right. Section 4323

authorizes servicemembers to “commence an action for

relief” against a private employer, and it says, as relevant

here, “[i]n the case of an action against a private employer by

a person, the district courts of the United States shall have

jurisdiction of the action.” 38 U.S.C. § 4323(a)(3), (b)(3).

I’m not sure what additional language would be necessary to

create a right to bring an action in court. If USERRA confers

the right to a judicial forum, then § 4302(b) arguably renders

invalid any pre-dispute waiver of that right through an

agreement to submit USERRA claims to arbitration.

CompuCredit may seem controlling at first glance, but

that case is not on all fours with this one. The statute at issue

there, the Credit Repair Organizations Act, included a nonwaiver provision that invalidated a consumer’s waiver of any

of the rights conferred by the statute, but the Supreme Court

held that the statute did not confer the right to bring an action

in court. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 669–70. The other

statutes to which the Court referred in CompuCredit—the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and the Clayton

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ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES 17

Act—all involved the reverse situation: Each statute

conferred the right to bring an action in court, but each lacked

a non-waiver provision. See id. at 670–71. USERRA is

different because it contains both a non-waiver provision

(§ 4302(b)) and a provision conferring the right to bring an

action in court.

I concede, though, that the proper interpretation of

§ 4302(b) is open to debate. On the one hand, the

Department of Labor, the agency charged with administering

USERRA, has read § 4302(b) as including “a prohibition

against the waiver in an arbitration agreement of an

employee’s right to bring a USERRA suit in Federal court.” 

70 Fed. Reg. 75246, 75257 (Dec. 19, 2005). That reading is

consistent with a long line of authority holding that

legislation benefitting servicemembers is to be liberally

construed in their favor. See, e.g., Henderson ex rel.

Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011); Fishgold v.

Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946). 

On the other hand, § 4302(b) is general in scope; it does not

explicitly address waiver of the right to a judicial forum. So

there is room to argue that Congress intended to preclude

only the waiver of substantive rights conferred by the statute,

not the waiver of procedural rights such as the right to bring

an action in court. Nothing in the legislative history of

USERRA definitively resolves this ambiguity.

With reasonable arguments to be made on both sides, I

don’t think it’s prudent for us to create a circuit split by

reversing the district court’s ruling, particularly given the

ease with which Congress can fix this problem. If we and

other circuits have misinterpreted the scope of § 4302(b),

Congress can amend the statute to make clear that it does

render pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate USERRA claims

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18 ZIOBER V. BLB RESOURCES

unenforceable. See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC,

537 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir. 2008) (Cole, J., concurring). 

Indeed, at least one amendment has been proposed recently

that would do just that. See 162 Cong. Rec. S3205 (daily ed.

May 25, 2016) (proposed amendment 4180 to Senate Bill

2943). If we have erred by construing § 4302(b) too

narrowly, Congress will surely let us know.

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