Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01945/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01945-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph William Dougherty
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

• • '\ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

. PI.LEO 

Uottcd S!ate, ~,r of Appeals 

f enth C1r::1!i. 

f:f.B l 6 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 88-1945 

JOSEPH WILLIAM DOUGHERTY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D.C. No. Cr. 83-162-T) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant-appellant Joseph William Dougherty appeals his 

conviction for robbery of a federally insured bank. Dougherty's 

principal contention is that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to be present at his trial, although he also challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence against him at trial. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-1945 Document: 01019964407 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 1 
• 

I. 

FACTS 

On December 29, 1982, two partially disguised men committed 

an elaborate and lengthy armed robbery of the Quail Creek Bank in 

Oklahoma City. The apparent leader, Terry Conner, was 

subsequently charged, tried, and convicted. Later, on July 6, 

1983, Joseph William Dougherty was indicted for the same robbery. 

Dougherty was apprehended almost two years after his 

indictment was issued, and he pled not guilty to the robbery. At 

the commencement of his trial, Dougherty's counsel informed the 

court that, aside from Dougherty, he would probably offer the 

testimony of only one other defense witness, Conner, who had 

previously been convicted of the same robbery. 

On June 17, 1985, in Dougherty's presence, the government 

began presenting its case. The government presented six 

witnesses, three of whom identified Dougherty as one of the two 

robbers. The government rested its case after two days of 

testimony, and the court recessed for the day. 

The next morning, before the defense introduced any 

witnesses, the district court learned that Dougherty would not be 

present because he had apparently escaped custody. To confirm 

Dougherty's absence, the court held a hearing outside of the 

jury's presence. The court began by stating that it had been 

advised that Dougherty was absent because he had escaped from 

custody, and that the purpose of the hearing was to establish "on 

the record the fact of the defendant, Dougherty's, absence." A 

United States marshal then testified that he had been informed by 

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a deputy marshal that Dougherty and Conner, "being transported 

from FCI El Reno to the federal courthouse in Oklahoma City, 

effected an escape at approximately 8:30 a.m. this date by 

overpowering the two deputy marshals, taking their weapons and 

government car. We did locate the government car some ten minutes 

later, and the defendant is still at large, as well as the 

defendant's witness." Dougherty's counsel was present during this 

hearing and made no objection to this testimony nor did he chose 

to question the witness nor to request the opportunity to call any 

witnesses of his own. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court ruled 

that the trial would continue. Once again Dougherty's attorney 

did not object. Because Dougherty and Conner apparently had fled 

to parts unknown and thus were unable to testify, the attorneys 

made their closing arguments without putting on any evidence, and 

the case was submitted to the jury. The jury found Dougherty 

guilty of the robbery. 

Three years later, Dougherty was apprehended and appeared at 

his sentencing hearing, at which time the district court sentenced 

him to the maximum permissible sentence. At the sentencing 

hearing Dougherty's attorney stated that Dougherty believed he was 

not guilty of bank robbery or the escape charges. However, he 

never suggested to the court that Dougherty's absence was not 

voluntary and he never proffered any explanation to the court as 

to why his client believed he was not guilty of the escape charge. 

Despite a direct invitation to Dougherty to make a statement, 

Dougherty himself chose to make no further statement nor to offer 

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Appellate Case: 88-1945 Document: 01019964407 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 3 
any explanation as t o why he failed to return to court to complete 

his trial as scheduled. 

Dougherty appeals his conviction on two grounds: (1) the 

d i strict court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation 

by continuing the trial in his absence; and (2) there was 

insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict against him. 

II. 

CONTINUATION OF THE TRIAL IN OOUGHERTY'S ABSENCE 

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ••• to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him." This confrontation 

clause encompasses the right of a criminal defendant to be present 

when the jury is hearing his case. Lewis v. United States, 146 

U.S. 370, 373 (1892); see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 

338 (1970). 

The right to be present at one's trial is not absolute, 

however, and may be waived by the accused. United States v. 

Taylor, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 

442, 458 (1912) 1 . The defendant's ability to waive his right to 

1 Diaz, quoting Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 454 

(1899), explained the policy concerns permeating the issue of 

waiver of the right to be present: 

The question is one of broad public policy, whether an 

accused person, placed upon trial for crime and 

protected by all the safeguards with which the humanity 

of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, 

can with impunity defy the processes of that law, 

paralyze the proceedings of courts and juri es and turn 

them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, 

for its own safety, to restrict the operation of the 

[continued on next page •.. ] 

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be present is reflected in Rule 43(b)(l) of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, which provides: 

(b) The further progress of the trial to and including the 

return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the 

defendant shall be considered to have waived his right to be 

present whenever a defendant, initially present, 

(1) Voluntarily absents himself after the trial has 

commenced. 

Under Rule 43(b), the "basic issue is whether petitioner's absence 

was voluntary." Burrell v. Aaron, 560 F.2d 988, 989 (10th Cir. 

1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018 (1978). 

The standard of proof required is that the defendant's 

absence must be "clearly established." Cureton v. United States, 

396 F.2d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Taylor v. United States, 414 

U.S. 17, 19 n.3 (1973) ("[I]f a defendant at liberty remains away 

during his trial the court may proceed provided it is clearly 

established that his absence is voluntary.") 

Here, the court received evidence at its hearing on June 19, 

1985 from which it could properly conclude that the defendant's 

absence from the third day of trial was voluntary. The evidence 

showed that Dougherty and Conner consciously, and with the 

deliberate use of force, overpowered two deputy marshals and 

escaped. Although that testimony was hearsay testimony, no 

... continued from previous page] 

principle of personal liberty. Neither in criminal nor 

in civil cases will the law allow a person to take 

advantage of his own wrong. And yet this would be 

precisely what it would do if it permitted an escape 

from prison, or an absconding from the jurisdiction 

while at large on bail, during the pendency of a trial 

before a jury, to operate as a shield. 

223 U.S. at 458. 

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objection to it was raised by Dougherty's counsel, who was present 

during the entire hearing. Dougherty's counsel did not seek to 

cross-examine the marshal, nor did he seek the opportunity to put 

on any contrary evidence. No argument was advanced to the court 

that the defendant's departure was anything other than voluntary. 

Furthermore, the trial proceeded without objection from 

Dougherty's counsel and without any claim being raised to the 

court that Dougherty's constitutional right to confront witnesses 

was being violated or that Dougherty's absence for the remainder 

of the trial was not voluntary. 

Finally, Dougherty himself was offered a second opportunity 

to dispute the voluntariness of his departure from the trial when 

he was finally apprehended and brought before the court for 

sentencing. Dougherty was specifically invited by the court to 

make a statement, and he declined to offer any explanation for his 

escape or to assert that his departure from the trial was 

involuntary. His counsel made one passing reference to the fact 

that Dougherty believes he "is not guilty of the escape charges 

that have been filed that haven't been handled to completion in 

this court." However, that argument was not further advanced or 

elaborated upon, and there was no suggestion that Dougherty was 

arguing that he was innocent of the escape charges because his 

departure was involuntary. We can not now speculate as to what 

defense to the escape charge Dougherty's attorney may have had in 

mind when he made that statement, but the record is clear that 

neither Dougherty nor his attorney ever asserted that his escape 

and his departure from trial were involuntary. 

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At the sentencing hearing the d i strict court had before the 

additional fact that Dougherty had remained on escape status for 

nearly three years before he was apprehended. That prolonged and 

unexplained absence certainly provided further evidence of the 

voluntariness of Dougherty's initial escape and failure to appear 

at court to complete his trial. 

In Burrell v. Aaron, 560 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1977), a 

defendant disappeared during the middle of the trial over a lunch 

recess. Defense counsel stood mute on the issue of the reason for 

the defendant's absence and the court ordered the trial to 

continue in defendant's absence. The jury returned a guilty 

verdict against the defendant in abstentia. Approximately one 

month later, the defendant was taken into custody and sentenced. 

At the sentencing hearing, the court asked the defendant if he had 

anything to say, and the defendant replied "no, nothing to say to 

nobody • " We concluded that the circumstances of the 

defendant's departure during the middle of trial, coupled with the 

failure of defendant and his counsel to argue that the defendant's 

absence was not voluntary, was sufficient to justify the trial 

court's conclusion that the defendant's absence was voluntary. 

Here, the evidence of the defendant's voluntary absence from 

trial is even stronger than it was in Burrell. There was 

testimony here that defendant's absence was caused by a deliberate 

and conscious act of escape, and defendant's absence from custody 

was much longer than was the case in Burrell. On this record, we 

conclude that it was clearly established that defendant's absence 

from the trial was voluntary and that the district court properly 

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concluded that the defendant "had absented himself by having 

escaped." Thus, Dougherty's constitutional rights were not 

violated when the trial court continued the trial against him. 2 

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

Dougherty also argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

sustain his conviction. We find no merit to Dougherty's 

contention. 

The standard of review for sufficiency of evidence is 

"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in 

original). Here, six eye witnesses testified for the prosecution. 

Three witnesses positively identified Dougherty as one of the 

robbers. While it is true that two of the witnesses had 

previously said that the robber had a pock-marked complexion, 

which Dougherty does not have, and none of the three witnesses 

recognized Dougherty in a photo lineup just after the robbery, we 

2 Dougherty also argues on appeal that we should conclude that 

it was an abuse of discretion to continue the trial against him 

even if his departure was voluntary. We disagree. Here, the 

trial was well under way at the time of Dougherty's escape. The 

government had rested its case, and no further witnesses were 

called to testify after Dougherty's escape. The only additional 

witnesses that had been planned was Dougherty himself, and Conner, 

and their escape obviously prevented that testimony. Under these 

circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's 

decision to continue with the trial. 

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are persuaded that the evidence, viewed under the standards 

enunciated in Jackson was sufficient. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, we hold that Dougherty's absence of trial 

was voluntary and that it was proper for the trial court to have 

continued the trial in his absence. We also hold that the 

evidence against him was sufficient to sustain the conviction. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 

Entered for the court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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