Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04843/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04843-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Charles England
Petitioner
David L. Runnels
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN CHARLES ENGLAND,

Petitioner,

 v.

DAVID L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-04843 SI

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On July 6, 1999, a Santa Clara County jury found petitioner John Charles England guilty of

possession of methamphetamine (Cal. Health & Saf. Code §§ 11055(d)(2), 11377(a)), fleeing from an

officer with disregard for the safety of persons or property (Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.2), causing serious

bodily injury while resisting an officer (Cal. Pen. Code § 148.10(a)), being under the influence of

methamphetamine (Cal. Health and Saf. Code § 11500(a)), and resisting an officer (Cal. Pen. Code §

148(a)(1)). Ex. 1 at 81-82; Ex. 2 at 569-71. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court judge found that

petitioner’s out-of-state prior offenses constituted “serious felonies” and therefore “strikes” under

California state law. Ex. 2 at 585-86. Thereafter, the jury found that petitioner had in fact been

convicted of these priors and had previously served two prison terms (Cal. Pen. Code § 667.5(b)). Ex.

1 at 321-22, 326-27; Ex. 2 at 694-97. On November 5, 1999, petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate

sentence of 53 years to life.

On November 28, 2005, petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner raises four claims: (1) petitioner was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right

to a jury trial as to prior “strike” allegations beyond the “fact” of the prior convictions; (2) insufficient

evidence existed to prove that the “strike” priors had the required elements of “serious felonies” under

California law; (3) petitioner was denied his federal constitutional right to full, correct instructions on

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1

In the course of this detention, police discovered .28 grams of methamphetamine on petitioner’s

person. When this discovery was made, petitioner ran away and ultimately escaped custody. 

2

elements of the charged crime when the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury on the

requirement of foreseeability of intervening causes; and (4) petitioner's sentence of 50 years to life for

possession of methamphetamine and reckless flight from an officer is cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment.

After carefully reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record, the Court hereby DENIES the

petition for the reasons discussed below.

 BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as follows:

On June 24, 1998, Officer Moiseff saw defendant arrive at 281 Curtner in the truck

involved in [a] detention a month earlier.1

 Hoping to apprehend defendant but fearing

another chase, Moiseff called for assistance, notifying responding officers that defendant

was wanted for a felony arrest. As Moiseff was coordinating the arrival of other units,

he saw defendant enter the truck and drive off.

Moiseff followed defendant's truck as did Officers Ackermann, Sims, and Dziuba. The

four deferred the traffic stop to Officer Priddy, who was in a marked patrol car. Officer

Ouimet, also in a marked patrol car, was behind Priddy. At an intersection, Priddy and

Ouimet pulled behind defendant's truck and turned on their red lights. Defendant turned

around, looked at Officer Priddy, turned into a dirt lot, almost came to a stop, turned

again to look at Priddy, opened his door and slowed as if he were going to abandon the

truck, closed the door, and accelerated through a market parking lot at about 20 to 25

miles per hour.

. . .

Defendant exited the lot by turning at an unsafe speed. He then drove northbound on

Bascom Avenue. Dziuba tried to block his path, but defendant continued to accelerate,

and Dziuba was forced to back up and move the patrol car out of the way to avoid being

hit. The officers having their sirens and lights on enabled the traffic on Bascom to get

out of the way of the chase. Defendant drove through a red light and then, despite the

presence of “heavy traffic,” he drove about 15 to 20 seconds on the wrong side of the

street for about 200 yards. According to Ackermann, three or four cars had to take

evasive action to avoid a collision; Sims said the cars were “splitting just to let him

through.” Defendant then drove through a convenience store parking lot and exited into

a residential neighborhood where children were riding their bikes, one child was playing

basketball, and a man was mowing his lawn. Defendant made his way through the

residential neighborhood back to the residence on Curtner at speeds of approximately

35 to 55 miles per hour. 

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Defendant pulled into the driveway of his residence, abandoned the truck while it was

running, and fled on foot through a carport and over a three-foot chain link fence.

Priddy, Ackermann, and Sims ran after defendant and jumped over the same fence. In

doing so, Priddy suffered a puncture wound when a wire on top of the fence went

through his palm. Defendant jumped over a second fence, as did the three officers in

pursuit.

At this point, defendant found himself in an enclosed area. Dziuba drew his gun, pointed

it at defendant, and ordered him to freeze. Sims testified he identified himself as a police

officer and ordered defendant to get on the ground, but defendant “wasn't paying

attention to my commands. He had not paid attention to Officer Dziuba's commands.

He had already run from us on several occasions. And it looked like he was still

continuing to run. He had already displayed a disregard for public safety. So I couldn't

possibly allow him to escape at that point. . . . I ended up just grabbing onto him.”

Defendant struggled on the ground with Sims and another officer as they tried to subdue

defendant, who “wasn't giving up.” Priddy described the scene as “pandemonium” as

they wrestled with defendant, trying to get him handcuffed. Ackermann, who is 6 feet

2 inches, 210 pounds, and a “pretty strong person,” said he was using all his strength but

was “having a very difficult time” subduing defendant, who was “thrashing” his arms,

kicking his legs, and trying to bite Ackermann.

In jumping over the second fence, Officer Dziuba “blew out his knee” when he came

down at an awkward angle.

Ex. 12 at 1-3. The California Court of Appeal further summarized petitioner’s relevant Minnesota priors

as follows:

In case No. 33938 . . . defendant admitted that, on the evening of September 8, 1980, he

and his codefendant Pat Arndt got a “crazy idea” of robbing a gas station. Defendant

stated that, when he entered the station to “look the place over,” there was “an

individual” in the store whom defendant later learned was named Patrick Norman.

Defendant used the telephone after he “asked for change for a quarter.” Then, pursuant

to their plan, Arndt came through the door wearing a mask and holding a knife.

Defendant testified that Arndt jumped over the counter and went towards “the clerk.”

The clerk pushed Arndt away; the clerk ran and Arndt followed. The clerk left the till

open and defendant grabbed about $100 from it. Defendant was arrested about two

weeks later.

[In case No. 33738], [t]he record reveals that, on February 5, 1983, defendant entered

a 7-Eleven store and asked the cash register clerk for a pack of cigarettes. When the clerk

handed over the cigarettes, defendant tried to reach into the till and grab money, but the

clerk slammed the till shut onto defendant's hand. Defendant never was able to grab the

money. He admitted he struggled with the clerk but denied striking her. 

Id. at 13-14. 

The California trial court sentenced petitioner to a determinate term of three years for the prior

prison term enhancements, two consecutive indeterminate terms of 25 years to life for the two felonies

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described above, and a concurrent indeterminate term of 25 years to life for a third felony that was later

dropped, for an aggregate sentence of 53 years to life. Ex. 1 at 439-41; Ex. 2 at 694-97. 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal. On April 12, 2002, the California Court

of Appeal affirmed the convictions. See Ex. 12. The court, however, found that there was insufficient

evidence to support one of the prior strike findings. Id. The court reversed the true finding as to that

alleged strike and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing and a potential retrial of the

alleged strike. Id. at 11-13, 17. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on July

12, 2002. See Ex. 14. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on December 2, 2002. See

Ex. 16. 

On remand, the trial court dismissed the reversed strike allegation and denied petitioner's request

to dismiss the other two strike allegations. See Ex. 22. Upon resentencing, the trial court imposed a

sentence identical to the original. Id. Petitioner again appealed to the California Court of Appeal. On

May 5, 2004, the Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's sentence. Id. The California Supreme Court

again denied review on July 14, 2004, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on

November 29, 2004. See Ex. 24; Ex. 26.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court

may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the 

adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the

law as set forth by the Supreme Court, or arrives at a different result in a case that is “materially

indistinguishable” from a Supreme Court decision. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001).

“Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” refers to the

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“holdings . . . of the Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). If there is no Supreme Court precedent that controls on the legal

issue raised by a petitioner in state court, the state court’s decision cannot be contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly-established federal law. Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071

(9th Cir. 2004). Circuit decisions may still be relevant as persuasive authority to assess what law is

“clearly established.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968

(2003). Unreasonable application of established law occurs when the court “correctly identifies the

governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts.” Id. Under AEDPA, although Supreme

Court precedent is the only controlling authority, Ninth Circuit case law is persuasive authority for the

purposes of review of previous state court decisions. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir.

2002), amended by 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In reviewing a habeas corpus petition, a federal court must look at the last reasoned decision of

the state court to determine whether that court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application

of established federal law. Id. at 960-61. Here, the last reasoned decision of the state court is the

decision issued by the California Court of Appeal on May 5, 2004. See Ex. 22.

DISCUSSION

I. Jury Determination of Prior Strike Allegations

Petitioner contends that a jury, not the judge, should have determined whether his Minnesota

convictions contained all the elements of a “serious felony” under California law. In California, prior

crimes must be adjudged “serious felonies” in order to be considered “strikes” for the purpose of the

state's “Three Strikes” law. Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.12(b)(2). Under California law, the crime of robbery

is considered a serious felony. See id. § 1192.7(c)(19). Robbery under California law is the “felonious

taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and

against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” Cal. Pen. Code § 211. California robbery

also requires “a specific intent to permanently deprive the victim of the property.” People v. Torres, 33

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With respect to case No. 33938, the fact not established by a jury is whether the victim in the

gas station was a clerk and therefore in constructive possession of the money in the till. The fact not

established by a jury in case 33738 is whether petitioner forcefully removed his hand from the till in the

furtherance of his attempted robbery or whether it was to simply escape.

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Cal.App.4th 37, 50 (1995) (quoting People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 792 (1964)). 

In contrast, under Minnesota law, robbery is committed when a person, “having knowledge of

not being entitled thereto, takes personal property from the person or in the presence of another and uses

or threatens the imminent use of force against any person to overcome the person’s resistence or powers

of resistance to, or to compel acquiescence in the taking or carrying away of the property . . . .” Minn.

Stats. § 609.24. Therefore, Minnesota robbery lacks two elements of California robbery: (1) that the

victim of the crime be “in possession” of the property, and (2) that the person taking the property have

a “specific intent to permanently deprive” the person of possession of the property. At trial, the judge

found these elements to be present in petitioner’s Minnesota priors based on the records of conviction.

On that basis, the judge ruled that petitioner had committed “three strikes” under California law. 

Petitioner urges the Court to restrict the “prior conviction” exception announced in AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) to the mere fact of a prior conviction. In AlmendarezTorres, the United States Supreme Court held that prior convictions are not “elements” as contemplated

by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and their existence could therefore be determined by a judge.

Id. at 243-44; see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (“The Due Process Clause

requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the

definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged.”). The Court reasoned that recidivism “is

a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s sentence.”

Id. at 243. See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 

Petitioner argues that the facts concerning his Minnesota priors that were not established in the

prior proceedings2

 should be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike the “fact” of his prior

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conviction, the unestablished facts were never found by a jury. Petitioner claims, therefore, that the

missing facts lack the procedural reliability afforded to the “fact” of his prior convictions. Petitioner

cites the Supreme Court’s rationale in Apprendi: 

Both the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of prior conviction,

and the reality that Almendarez-Torrez did not challenge the accuracy of that ‘fact’ in

his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated

in allowing a judge to determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment beyond the maximum

of the statutory range. 

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument on several grounds. Citing People v.

Kelii, 21 Cal. 4th 452 (1999), the court first concluded that a defendant "has neither a statutory nor a

constitutional right to have a jury determine whether a prior conviction qualified as a serious felony or

strike." Ex. 12 at 15. The court further held that this type of determination “often is purely legal” in

which the trier of fact “considers only court documents.” Id. The court cited People v. Thomas, 91 Cal.

App. 4th 212, 216 (2001), in ruling that petitioner's narrow reading of Apprendi “takes the language out

of its context.” Id. at 17. The court concluded that the “language relied upon by defendant in Apprendi,

'other than the fact of a prior conviction,' refers broadly to recidivism enhancements.” Id. (quoting

Thomas, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 222). 

Since the time that the California Court of Appeal issued its opinion in this case, the California

Supreme Court decided People v. McGee, 38 Cal. 4th 682 (2006), which squarely held that the Apprendi

jury trial right does not extend to proof of facts concerning a prior conviction which show that the prior

conviction is a serious felony. The California Supreme Court’s decision in McGee, authored by Chief

Justice George, summarized its holding as follows:

The issue presented in the case before us is whether . . . a criminal defendant has

a right under the federal Constitution to have a jury, rather than the court, examine the

record of the prior criminal proceeding to determine whether the earlier conviction

subjects the defendant to an increased sentence when that conviction does not itself

establish on its face whether or not the conviction constitutes a qualifying prior

conviction for purposes of the applicable sentencing statute. The Court of Appeal held

that the federal Constitution grants a criminal defendant the right to have a jury make

such a determination, interpreting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Apprendi . . .as compelling that conclusion . . . .

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As we shall explain, we read the United States Supreme Court’s decisions that

we cite and discuss as authority for our conclusion that defendant’s federal constitutional

right to a jury trial was not implicated in he proceedings below. Unless and until the

high court directs otherwise, we shall assume that the precedents from that court and

ours support a conclusion that sentencing proceedings such as those conducted below

do not violate a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.

Although we recognize the possibility that the high court may extend the scope

of the Apprendi decision in the manner suggested by the Court of Appeal, we are

reluctant, in the absence of a more definitive ruling on this point by the United States

Supreme Court, to overturn the current California statutory provisions and judicial

precedent that assign to the trial court the role of examining the record of a prior criminal

proceeding to determine whether the ensuing conviction constitutes a qualifying prior

conviction under the applicable California sentencing statute.

Id. at 685-86.

 As noted by the California Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide

on the precise issue raised by petitioner. Further, while petitioner cites no persuasive authority for his

proposition, respondents cite several circuit court decisions explicitly rejecting the limitation of the

Apprendi exception to the mere “fact” of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 293 F.3d 1010,

1012 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 987 (2002) (judicial determination that prior convictions were

committed on occasions different from one another was proper); United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287

F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 914 (2002) (judicial determination that a prior conviction

is “aggravated” is proper); United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535

U.S. 1070 (2002) (judicial determination that prior convictions were committed on occasions different

from one another was proper). As such, there is no “clearly established” federal law on point, and the

state court’s decision cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established

federal law. See Stevenson, 384 F.3d at 1071. The Court, therefore, must deny petitioner’s claim for

habeas corpus relief based on the denial of a jury trial.

Because the Court has ruled that there is no constitutional error, it need not consider whether the

error was harmless as required by Washington v. Recuenco, __ U.S. __, 165 L. Ed. 2d 466, 477 (2006).

II. Insufficient Evidence that Priors are “Serious Felonies” 

Petitioner contends that the record contains insufficient evidence to prove that the two Minnesota

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robberies are in fact “serious felonies” necessary to constitute “strikes” under California's “Three

Strikes” law. In an insufficiency of evidence challenge to a state criminal conviction brought under

§ 2254, a petitioner is only entitled to relief if “it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial

no rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). 

The California Court of Appeal compared the elements of Minnesota and California robbery and

concluded that both the “specific intent to permanently deprive” and the “possession” elements of the

California crime were missing from the definition of the Minnesota crime. Ex. 12 at 12. The court

further concluded, however, that there was sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy both of the

missing elements for each of the Minnesota priors. Id.

The California Court of Appeal first addressed Minnesota prior No. 33938. After assessing the

facts of the case and the testimony at trial, the court found that the person in the gas station was in fact

the clerk. Id. at 14. Therefore, the victim was in constructive possession of the money in the till and

the “possession” element of California robbery was fulfilled: 

We are convinced the record in case No. 33938 meets the “possession” requirement of

California law because defendant's testimony was adequate to support a finding that

Norman was an employee with constructive possession of the money in the gas station's

till. (See People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 761-762, and authorities cited

therein.) Given that Norman was the sole victim named in the charging document,

Norman was the only person named in defendant's testimony, and defendant testified

there was only “an” individual inside the store, a reasonable trier of fact would conclude

that defendant, who was “casing” the station before Arndt's entry, asked Norman, the

clerk, for change, possibly as a way of getting him to open the till. Similarly, the fact

defendant fled with the cash and was not arrested for two weeks provides ample

evidence of the required intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property.

Id.

The California Court of Appeal then turned its attention to Minnesota prior No. 37738.

Petitioner argued that there was no “specific intent to permanently deprive” the store of its money

because he used force to escape rather than in an attempt to complete his crime. In addressing this

argument, the court first considered the language of petitioner’s guilty plea. According to the court, by

pleading guilty, petitioner admitted he “used force against Karla Hinnekamp to overcome her resistance

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to the attempted carrying away of the property . . . .” Id. at 15. The court further concluded that the

record was consistent with the notion that petitioner had the specific intent to permanently deprive the

store of its money: 

Defendant used force to try to take the money, and he acknowledged that he knew that

he was not entitled to it. We reject defendant's claim that the use of force was separate

from the attempt to take the money and was solely in an effort to escape. The fact

defendant tried to grab money from a till and was only stopped by the clerk's defensive

actions provides evidence from which we can conclude that defendant intended to

permanently deprive the rightful owner of possession by forcibly taking the property

from someone who had constructive possession of it.

Id. at 15. 

This Court holds that it was reasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that the

Minnesota priors satisfied the elements of California strikes beyond a reasonable doubt. The court

carefully and thoroughly reviewed the record and came to a rational conclusion. In case No. 33938, it

is reasonable to conclude that Mr. Norman was the gas station clerk and thus in constructive possession

of the till. He was the sole victim in the charging document, and the only person inside the store at the

time of the robbery. 

With respect to case No. 37738, it was reasonable for the California Court of Appeal to hold that

petitioner used force in an effort to complete his crime, thereby satisfying the “specific intent to

permanently deprive” element. The record indicates that petitioner tried to grab money from the till and

only stopped when the clerk slammed the till door on his hand. Ex. 12 at 15. From this fact, in addition

to the language of petitioner's guilty plea (admitting to the use of “force against Karla Hinnekamp to

overcome her resistance to the attempted carrying away of the property” (Id.)), it is reasonable to

conclude that petitioner's use of force was contemporaneous with his attempt to steal the money. When

combined with petitioner's admission that he knew he was not entitled to the money in the till, the

“specific intent to permanently deprive” element is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. 

III. Instructional Error

Petitioner claims that the trial court failed to correctly instruct the jury on the requirement of

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 Pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.40, the trial court instructed the jury: 

To constitute the crime of felony resisting arrest, there must be in addition to the serious bodily

injury to the officer, an unlawful act or omission which was the cause of that serious bodily injury to

the officer.

The criminal law has its own peculiar way of defining cause. A cause of the serious bodily

injury to the officer is an act or omission that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct,

natural, and probable consequence of the act or omission the serious bodily injury of the officer and

without which the serious bodily injury to the officer would not occur.

Pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.41, the jury was also instructed:

There may be more than one cause of the serious bodily injury to the officer. When the conduct

of two or more persons or events contributes concurrently as a cause of the serious bodily injury to the

officer, the conduct of each is a cause for the serious bodily injury to the officer if that conduct was also

a substantial factor contributing to the result. 

A cause is concurrent if it was operative at the moment of the serious bodily injury to the officer

and acted with another cause to produce the serious bodily injury to the officer. If you find the

defendant's conduct was a cause of injury to another person, then it is no defense that the conduct of

some other person, even the injured person, contributed to the injury.

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foreseeability of intervening causes with regard to his conviction for violating Cal. Pen. Code § 148.10,

causing serious bodily injury while resisting an officer.3

 The California Court of Appeal held that

petitioner waived this argument when he did not object to the instructions at trial. Ex. 12 at 5.

According to the court, “it was incumbent upon defendant to seek clarification or amplification of the

instructions if he felt such clarification or amplification was necessary.” Id. Citing California law, the

court found that because he failed to question the jury instructions at trial, “defendant has waived any

appellate issue regarding” the jury instructions. Id. 

In a habeas petition, a federal court may not review a state court's decision if it rests on

independent and adequate state law grounds unless petitioner can show cause and prejudice or that

failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). Here, petitioner has not attempted to show either cause and

prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. The Court finds that the California Court of Appeal adequately

and independently relied on the state law ground of waiver, and will therefore not address the

sufficiency of the instructions themselves. 

Petitioner argues that the Coleman doctrine is not applicable for two reasons: First, regardless

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of a state court procedural ruling, both California law and federal constitutional principles entitle a

defendant to instructions on any element of offense which affects his or her substantive rights. Second,

the California Court of Appeal’s decision regarding the jury instructions was based on the court's

substantive conclusion on the merits of the argument rather than petitioner's procedural default. Id. at

23. The Court finds both arguments unavailing.

The Court agrees with petitioner that he has the constitutional right to jury determination beyond

a reasonable doubt on every element of the crime for which he is charged. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S.

391, 400 (1991); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). Petitioner also correctly notes that

“foreseeability” is a required element of the crime of Cal. Pen. Code § 148.10, causing serious bodily

injury while resisting an officer. Petitioner's argument fails, however, because this element was

sufficiently laid out in the jury instructions. 

Petitioner conceded to the California Court of Appeal (Ex. 12 at 5) that CALJIC 3.40 was

promulgated in response to a California Supreme Court decision which had disapproved an earlier

proximate cause test (Mitchel v. Gonzalez, 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1052 (1991)), and that CALJIC 3.40 has

been approved in several appellate court decisions. See, e.g., People v. Gardner, 37 Cal.App.4th 473,

475 (1995); People v. Autry, 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355-57 (1995). Further, this Court agrees with the

California Court of Appeal that the clause “direct, natural, and probable consequence” (CALJIC 3.40)

adequately encompasses the concept of reasonable foreseeability. See Ex. 12 at 5. The Court therefore

finds that the jury instructions given by the trial court adequately encompass every element of Cal. Pen.

Code § 148.10, causing serious bodily injury while resisting an officer.

Alternatively, petitioner contends that the Coleman doctrine does not apply because the

California Court of Appeal did not rest its ruling on the independent state procedural rule of waiver, but

rather on the merits of his jury instruction claim. While it is true the court addressed the merits of

petitioner's argument, it did so only to supplement its ultimate ruling of waiver. See Ex. 12 at 5. 

The Court finds that the Coleman doctrine applies. Therefore, the Court need not rule on the

constitutional firmness of the instructions themselves. 

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IV. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner argues that his 50 years-to-life sentence for possession of methamphetamine, fleeing

from an officer with disregard for the safety of persons or property, and causing serious bodily injury

while resisting an officer violates his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.

Respondent argues that this claim is unexhausted and therefore inappropriate for this Court's review,

and that the claim is without merit. 

A. Exhaustion 

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings either

the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state judicial remedies, either on

direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair

opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1,

3 (1981); McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1988). The state's highest court must be given

an opportunity to rule on the claims even if review is discretionary. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 845 (1999) (petitioner must invoke “one complete round of the State’s established appellate review

process”). To comply with the fair presentation requirement, a claim must be raised at every level of

appellate review; raising a claim for the first time on discretionary review to the state’s highest court

is insufficient. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that where petitioner only

raised his federal constitutional claim on appeal to the Washington State Supreme Court, claim was not

fairly presented). However, exhaustion does not require repeated assertions if a federal claim is actually

considered at least once on the merits by the state's highest court. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,

350 (1989); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2002); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d

526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). This is true even where alternative

avenues of review are still available in state court. See id.

In this case, petitioner argued the Eighth Amendment claim in his original brief in front of the

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4

 It is immaterial both that the California Supreme denied review, and that petitioner failed to

argue this issue during the second round of appeals. See Clinkscale v. Carter, 375 F.3d 430, 438 (6th

Cir. 2004) (“it is beyond peradventure that exhaustion does not require a state court adjudication on the

merits of the claim at issue”); see also Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989) (exhaustion does

not require repeated assertions if a federal claim is actually considered at least once on the merits by the

state's highest court). 

5

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this claim on the merits, this Court reviews it de novo. See Hudson v. Hunt, 235 F.3d 892, 895 (4th Cir.

2000). 

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California Court of Appeal. See Ex. 3 at 9-65. The state court, without ruling on the cruel and unusual

punishment issue, upheld petitioner's conviction but remanded the proceedings to the trial court for

retrial of a strike allegation that was eventually dropped. See Ex 12 at 17. Petitioner appealed the

court's decision to the California Supreme Court, at which time he properly presented his Eighth

Amendment argument. See Ex. 13. Because the Eighth Amendment issue was presented to the highest

state court available, the claim was exhausted and consideration on the merits is proper.4

B. Merits of Eighth Amendment claim5 

The Supreme Court has identified “one governing legal principle” with which to analyze Eighth

Amendment claims in Three Strike cases: “A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to

sentences for terms of years.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). The Supreme Court further

noted that this principle is “applicable only in the 'exceedingly rare' and 'extreme' case.” Id. at 73. In

Lockyer, the petitioner was found guilty of petty theft when he stole $153 worth of videotapes from two

different stores. Id. at 66. Under California's Three Strikes law, the petitioner was sentenced to 50 years

to life. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction, holding that it was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 77. The Supreme Court again

applied the “grossly disproportionate” principle in a Three Strikes case in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.

11 (2003). In Ewing, the petitioner was convicted of felony grand theft for stealing $1200 worth of golf

clubs, and subsequently sentenced to 25 years to life under California's Three Strikes law. Id. at 18.

The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that under the circumstances, 25 years to life was

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 The California Court of Appeal outlined petitioner's lengthy criminal history and explained that

his present offenses were:

“a continuation of [his] career of criminal behavior.” The report noted “defendant's

criminal record shows seven prior felony convictions for Burglary, Aggravated Robbery,

two counts of Simple Robbery, and three counts of Inflicting Corporal Injury on

Cohabitant.” It also listed defendant's other prior misdemeanor convictions for

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not grossly disproportionate and therefore did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the

Eighth Amendment. Id. at 30-31. Notably, the court reviewed the petitioner's “long history of felony

recidivism” in its proportionality discussion. Id. at 29. 

Petitioner argues that his sentence of 50 years to life is grossly disproportionate to the crimes

that he committed. Petitioner notes that absent the prior two strikes, the maximum sentence he could

have received in California would be 5 years and 4 months. Petitioner also argues that his sentence

vastly exceeds the most extreme punishments available in any other jurisdiction for the same crimes

with the same record of prior convictions. Finally, petitioner wishes the Court to consider that all three

crimes are “wobblers,” i.e. crimes which in the discretion of the prosecutor or the court can be charged

as misdemeanors. 

This Court concludes that petitioner's Eighth Amendment challenge fails. The Supreme Court

has emphasized that the “gross disproportionality” hurdle is extremely high. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72-73. The crimes at issue in this case are no less severe than those in Lockyer or Ewing. Further, the

Court finds petitioner's disproportionality argument as it relates to similar crimes in other states

unavailing. This argument is akin to challenging the Three Strikes system itself, undermining the

Supreme Court's conclusion in upholding the system that California's legislature has made a “deliberate

policy choice” based on “legitimate goals” of deterring recidivism and incapacitating recidivist felons.

See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29. This Court, like the courts in Lockyer and Ewing, also rejects the “wobbler”

argument. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28-29; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 67. Those decisions make clear

that “wobblers” are felonies by default and are only downgraded to misdemeanors if the defendant's

rehabilitation would be adversely affected by incarceration. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28-29; see also

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 67. Given petitioner's long criminal history,6

 charging his crimes as felonies rather

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“Unauthorized use of motor vehicle, Fleeing Police Officer in a Motor Vehicle, Sale or

Distribution of Hypodermic Syringe Without License, Possession of Controlled

Substance Paraphernalia, two counts of Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance,

and two counts of Public Intoxication.” The report added that defendant had a pending

San Joaquin County case in which he was charged with driving under the influence and

other vehicle code violations and that he was on parole when he committed the present

offenses.

Ex. 22 at 6. 

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than misdemeanors was appropriate. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29. In sum, in light of petitioner’s

extensive criminal history, along with California's legitimate interest in deterring and punishing

recidivism, this Court finds that petitioner's sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his crime and is

therefore not in violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and good cause shown, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of

habeas corpus. (Docket No. 1). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 24, 2007 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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