Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03172/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03172-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Danny Maddox
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 19, 1995 Decided March 7, 1995

No. 93-3172

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DANNY MADDOX,

APPELLANT

No. 93-3178

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

NORMAN L. ROBINSON, JR.,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Crim. Nos. 92cr00476-01 & 02)

Tracy A. Thomas, appointed by this Court, argued the cause for

appellant Maddox. With her on the briefs was Carol E. Bruce.

David P. Sutton argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant

Robinson.

Timothy J. Heaphy, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Eric H. Holder,

Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese,

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III, Assistant United States Attorneys. 

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Appellants Danny Maddox and Norman L.

Robinson challenge their convictions on a variety of drug-related

charges stemming from their participation in a series of drug

transactions with a police informant in 1992. Officers of the

federal Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") arrested Maddox as

he attempted to sell crack cocaine to the informant for the third

time, and later arrested Robinson for supplying crack cocaine to

Maddox. After a five-day trial, a jury convicted both men of

conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, distributing crack cocaine,

and aiding and abetting the distribution offenses. The jury also

convicted Maddox of possession of crack cocaine with intent to

distribute, and ordered both appellants to forfeit $3500 in cash as

the proceeds of their drug activity, along with two automobiles

used to facilitate that activity.

Although appellants raise a number of issues on appeal, we

need not address most of them because we agree with appellants that

the District Court erred in rejecting their guilty pleas.

Appellants twice sought to plead guilty prior to trial. The

District Court rejected their first attempt after Maddox, in

responding to questions posed by the trial judge, appeared to deny

factual guilt of the relevant crime. Because the Government

conditioned Robinson's plea agreement on the successful entry of

Maddox's plea, the District Court's rejection of Maddox's guilty

plea effectively precluded Robinson from pleading guilty.

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Subsequently, in the wake of this aborted plea proceeding, Maddox

sent a letter to the District Court explaining that he

misunderstood the judge's questions and still wished to plead

guilty. The District Court rejected Maddox's renewed plea based

solely on doubts about the voluntariness of the plea in view of the

court's earlier colloquy with the defendant.

We hold that the District Court abused its discretion in

rejecting Maddox's guilty plea the second time it was offered.

While district courts must exercise discretion in deciding whether

to accept or reject a guilty plea, that discretion is not

unfettered. On the record before us, the trial judge was free in

the first instance to reject Maddox's plea, because the appellant

appeared reticent and seemed to deny guilt. But Maddox's

subsequent explanation for his actions obligated the court to

reconsider his plea when it was offered again. Instead, the

District Court summarily rejected the renewed plea based solely on

the judge's earlier observations of Maddox. Accordingly, we remand

the case to the District Court with instructions to conduct new

plea proceedings. If the pleas offered are satisfactory, the

original plea agreements between the appellants and the Government

should be accepted and the verdicts rendered by the jury should be

vitiated.

I. BACKGROUND

Maddox and Robinson twice sold crack cocaine to a DEA

informant during March and April of 1992. On each occasion, Maddox

acted as an intermediary, arranging for Robinson to supply the

drugs involved in the transaction. On July 30, 1992, Maddox again

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agreed to sell crack cocaine to the informant. Although Robinson

was not present during this transaction, Maddox told the informant

that Robinson had supplied the drugs to be sold. DEA agents

arrested Maddox before the final transaction was completed, and

later arrested Robinson.

On December 15, 1992, a grand jury indicted appellants on one

charge of conspiring to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846 (1988), and two charges of distributing and aiding and

abetting the distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii) (1988) and 18

U.S.C. § 2 (1988). In addition, the grand jury charged Maddox with

two counts of unlawfully using a communication facility to

facilitate the distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 843(b) (1988), and one count of possessing 50 grams or

more of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Finally, the indictment

sought the criminal forfeiture of $3500 representing the alleged

proceeds of appellants' drug activity, and two automobiles claimed

to facilitate that activity, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).

On June 14, 1993, after a trial jury had been selected,

lawyers for Maddox and Robinson informed the District Court that

both defendants had reached plea agreements with the Government.

Maddox's agreement called for him to plead guilty to the conspiracy

charge and to plead no contest to the criminal forfeiture of his

automobile. Robinson's agreement required him to plead guilty to

a lesser conspiracy offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) and to

submit to the criminal forfeitures of $3500 and his automobile.

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The Gov ernment conditioned its agreement with Robinson on the

successful entry of a guilty plea by Maddox. Specifically, the

agreement provided that if Maddox decided to proceed to trial or

withdraw his plea, Robinson's plea agreement would be nullified

unless Robinson agreed to testify against Maddox at trial. In

exchange for appellants' guilty pleas, the agreements obligated the

Government to request the dismissal of all other charges. Relying

on the plea agreements, the District Court dismissed the jury.

When Maddox proffered his guilty plea to the District Court

the next day, the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: Mr. Maddox, step forward, please. Are you

prepared to plead guilty this morning to

conspiracy and to forfeiture of the automobile?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

[MADDOX'S

COUNSEL]: The judge is talking to you.

THE COURT: Are you prepared to do that or not? I sense

from your attitude

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: that you're not prepared to do that.

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THE DEFENDANT: I said yes.

THE COURT: Are you guilty of conspiring to commit the

offense of distributing cocaine base or crack?

Did you do that?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Go back.

Hearing Tr. (June 15, 1993) at 4-5, reprinted in Appendix for

Appellant Danny Maddox ("App.") 51-52. The District Court judge

then ordered the case set for trial, stating that there was "no

point in going further with Mr. Robinson since they are

co-defendants." Id. at 5, reprinted in App. 52. Finally, the

judge said, "I don't want anybody to come back and say that the

defendant has changed his mind because that would indicate to me

that there was pressure on him to give up his right to a trial. So

we are going to go to trial in this case." Id. at 6, reprinted in

App. 53.

Despite the trial judge's admonition, Maddox's counsel sent

the District Court a letter on June 18, 1993, explaining that

Maddox's behavior during the June 15 colloquy resulted from

confusion about the judge's questions, not from any desire to

withdraw from his plea agreement. The letter stated that Maddox's

denial of guilt reflected his mistaken belief that the judge was

asking him whether he had, in fact, distributed cocaine, instead of

whether he had aided and abetted the distribution or conspired to

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1At the close of the Government's case, the District Court

dismissed the two counts of the indictment charging Maddox with

unlawfully using a communication facility to facilitate the

distribution of crack cocaine. 

do so. The letter concluded by requesting "that the Court grant

defendant a second opportunity to enter a guilty plea in this

case." Letter from Arthur M. Reynolds to the District Court of

6/18/93, at 3, reprinted in App. 30. The District Court judge

rejected this request on the first day of jury selection for

appellants' trial, June 21, 1993, stating that he was "not

convinced that any guilty plea entered today, in view of the

circumstances and the events of last week, would be voluntary."

Trial Tr. (June 21, 1993) at 4, reprinted in App. 56.

The District Court then conducted a five-day trial, at the

conclusion of which the jury convicted Maddox and Robinson of all

remaining charges in the indictment and imposed the criminal

forfeiture requested by the Government.1 On September 13, 1993,

the District Court sentenced Maddox to 121 months in prison, five

years of supervised release, and a $200 special assessment. On

September 24, 1993, the District Court sentenced Robinson to 120

months in prison, five years of supervised release, and a special

assessment of $150. The District Court further ordered appellants

to forfeit $3500 and their automobiles.

II. ANALYSIS

Both appellants challenge the District Court's rejection of

their guilty pleas. Appellants first contend that the District

Court erred by rejecting Maddox's initial guilty plea. They rely

on circuit precedent that bars a District Court from rejecting a

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guilty plea based solely on a defendant's refusal to admit factual

guilt of a crime. In addition, they claim the District Court erred

by failing to reconsider Maddox's plea the second time it was

offered. We reject appellants' first contention but agree with the

second.

Although plea bargaining is "an essential component of the

administration of justice," defendants have "no absolute right to

have a guilty plea accepted." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.

257, 260, 262 (1971). Instead, the Supreme Court has made clear

that "[a] court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial

discretion." Id. at 262; accord United States v. Washington, 969

F.2d 1073, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1287

(1993). However, as the Sixth Circuit has stated, "[b]y leaving

the decision whether to accept or reject a plea to the exercise of

sound judicial discretion, the Supreme Court did not intend to

allow district courts to reject pleas on an arbitrary basis."

United States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 1990)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). Rather, the rule in

this circuit and others is that "the trial judge must provide a

reasoned exercise of discretion in order to justify a departure

from the course agreed on by the prosecution and defense." United

States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord

United States v. Robertson, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 1995 WL 24339, at

*10 (10th Cir. Jan. 23, 1995) (requiring district courts to "set

forth, on the record, the prosecution's reasons for framing the

bargain and the court's justification for rejecting it"); United

States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); see

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also Moore, 916 F.2d at 1135-36 ("[A] defendant is entitled to

plead guilty unless the district court can articulate a sound

reason for rejecting the plea." (quoting United States v. Delegal,

678 F.2d 47, 50 (7th Cir. 1982)).

Applying that rule here, we hold that the District Court

permissibly rejected Maddox's guilty plea when it first was

offered. Appellants point out that the District Court ended its

colloquy with Maddox immediately after Maddox denied factual guilt

of the conspiracy charge. Thus, they claim that the District Court

ignored circuit precedent holding that "the trial judge errs in

insisting on trial merely because the defendant refuses to

accompany his plea to lesser charges with an admission of the guilt

indicated by the other evidence presented to the court." United

States v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In their

haste to invoke the Gaskins rule, however, appellants

mischaracterize the District Court's decision.

Contrary to appellants' contention, the record of proceedings

before the District Court demonstrates that the trial judge

rejected Maddox's initial plea not merely because of his denial of

factual guilt, but also because of doubts about the voluntariness

of his plea. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

which governs guilty plea proceedings, bars a district court from

accepting a guilty plea without first ascertaining that it is

voluntary. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d); see also Washington, 969

F.2d at 1078 ("The final element necessary to enter a valid plea of

guilty is that the plea be voluntary and knowing."). Here,

Maddox's demeanor during his colloquy with the District Court

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indicated that he may have had reservations about pleading guilty.

Although the printed transcript generally casts only a dim light on

a defendant's demeanor, in this case the trial judge put his

opinion of the defendant's conduct on the record, telling Maddox

that, "I sense from your attitude ... that you're not prepared to

[plead guilty]." Hearing Tr. (June 15, 1993) at 4-5, reprinted in

App. 51-52. The fact that Maddox's own counsel was required to

admonish Maddox that "[t]he judge is talking to you," id. at 4,

reprinted in App. 51, further suggests that the defendant was not

fully engaged in the colloquy. Indeed, Maddox's counsel

acknowledged in his subsequent letter to the trial judge that,

"[a]s a result of defendant's attitude and demeanor, the Court was

concerned, and with extreme justification, with the voluntariness

of the guilty plea defendant was tendering." Letter from Arthur M.

Reynolds to the District Court of 6/18/93, at 2 (emphasis added),

reprinted in App. 29. Finally, when the District Court again

addressed Maddox's guilty plea the next week, he rejected it with

the explanation that he was "not convinced that any guilty plea

entered today, in view of the circumstances and the events of last

week, would be voluntary." Trial Tr. (June 21, 1993) at 4

(emphasis added), reprinted in App. 56. Thus, Maddox's denial of

factual guilt did not stand alone, but rather formed part of a

pattern of conduct suggesting that his plea failed to satisfy Rule

11's voluntariness requirement. While the District Court ideally

might have inquired further to ascertain the reason for Maddox's

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2In this regard, we reject appellants' argument that Rule 11

mandated a more searching inquiry into Maddox's state of mind. 

Appellants correctly point out that Rule 11 calls for an

extensive colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant, see

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c), (d), (f), but they fail to recognize that

the rule "acts primarily as a safeguard to prevent the hasty

acceptance of guilty pleas that are not made knowingly and

voluntarily," Washington, 969 F.2d at 1077 (emphasis added). 

Thus, Rule 11 establishes a series of inquiries that a District

Court must conduct "[b]efore accepting" a guilty plea. FED. R.

CRIM. P. 11(c) (emphasis added). 

reticence,2 we think the record adequately reflects that the trial

judge reasonably exercised his discretion in rejecting Maddox's

initial guilty plea.

However, we cannot reach the same conclusion with respect to

the District Court's subsequent rejection of Maddox's renewed plea.

As we have discussed, the trial judge's abrupt termination of his

original colloquy with Maddox gave the defendant no opportunity to

explain the inconsistency between his stated desire to plead guilty

and his denial of factual guilt. Maddox's counsel later explained

that Maddox simply misunderstood the judge's questionan

explanation that appeared quite reasonable in light of the

confusion that prevailed at the earlier proceeding. In these

circumstances, the District Court was obligated to "provide a

reasoned exercise of discretion" before rejecting Maddox's plea

again. Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 622. Instead, the District Court

summarily rejected the plea "in view of the circumstances and the

events of last week." Trial Tr. (June 21, 1993) at 4 (emphasis

added), reprinted in App. 56. In short, based solely on Maddox's

reticence and denial of factual guilt during the first plea

colloquy, the District Court precluded him from entering any

subsequent plea, no matter how knowing and voluntary. As even the

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Government acknowledged at oral argument, the District Court's

summary rejection of Maddox's renewed plea was arbitrary.

We certainly do not mean to suggest that a district court must

conduct a full-blown guilty plea colloquy every time a defendant

whose guilty plea has been rejected comes forward to offer a new

plea. However, where, as here, a defendant offers a timely and

reasonable explanation for actions that prompted a district court

to reject a guilty plea, the court must at least exercise its

discretion to ascertain whether its earlier concerns have been

addressed. In this case, the District Court should have conducted

an inquiry to verify the explanation submitted by Maddox's counsel,

and, upon doing so, should have gone on to ensure that all of Rule

11's requirements were satisfiedi.e., that the renewed plea was

knowing, voluntary, and supported by a basis in fact. See FED. R.

CRIM. P. 11(c), (d), (f). It failed to do so, and therefore abused

its discretion.

Finally, although we recognize that the erroneous rejection of

a guilty plea may be harmless where the defendant "was ultimately

convicted of precisely the same charge to which he attempted to

plead guilty," Washington, 969 F.2d at 1079, we think it obvious

that the District Court's error was prejudicial in this case. Both

defendants were convicted of several offenses in addition to those

involved in their plea agreements. Maddox's plea agreement

required him to plead guilty to a conspiracy charge and not to

contest the forfeiture of his automobile. After trial, Maddox was

convicted of three offenses in addition to those encompassed by the

agreement, and ordered to forfeit $3500 along with his automobile.

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3Maddox's plea agreement required him to plead guilty to a

charge of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine

base, an offense carrying a minimum prison sentence of 10 years,

see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), and corresponding to a Sentencing

Guideline range of 121 to 151 months, see USSG § 2D1.1, 5 pt. A. 

The sentencing calculation performed by the District Court judge

after trial likewise yielded a mandatory minimum sentence of 10

years and a Sentencing Guideline range of 121 to 151 months. See

Sentencing Tr. (Sept. 13, 1993) at 7, reprinted in App. 228. 

Robinson's plea agreement required him to plead guilty to a lesser

conspiracy charge and to forfeit $3500 and his automobile. He

ultimately was convicted of three more serious drug-related

offenses and subjected to both forfeitures. Thus, both appellants

suffered significant harm from the District Court's action.

We reach this conclusion as to Maddox despite the fact that

his convictions subjected him to the same sentence as his plea

agreement.3 While the District Court's actions may have had no

impact on the total number of days of imprisonment that Maddox must

serve, the collateral consequences of Maddox's additional

convictions amply demonstrate the prejudice of the trial judge's

error. For example, a record of drug-related violations increases

the penalties available for certain federal offenses. See, e.g.,

18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988) (enhancing penalty for federal firearms

offenses for persons with three previous convictions for serious

drug crimes). Federal law recognizes the severity of such

collateral consequences. Thus, the most remote possibility that a

defendant will suffer collateral consequences from a criminal

conviction is sufficient to justify appellate review of criminal

proceedings even after the defendant has served his sentence. See

United States v. Fadayini, 28 F.3d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("A

criminal appeal is moot only if there is "no possibility that any

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collateral legal consequences will be imposed' upon the defendant."

(quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968) (emphasis

added))). Accordingly, the potential collateral consequences of

Maddox's additional convictions establish prejudice here.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we remand appellants' convictions

to the District Court with instructions to permit appellants to

offer guilty pleas on the terms originally agreed to by the

Government. Upon satisfactory completion of plea proceedings, the

jury verdicts against the appellants shall be vacated. 

So ordered.

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