Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00015/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commercial Bank of Ozark
Defendant
Larry Ezell
Defendant
Clarissa Pearson
Plaintiff
Lorenzo Pearson
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

LORENZO PEARSON and )

CLARISSA PEARSON, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 1:12cv15-MHT

v. ) (WO)

)

COMMERCIAL BANK OF OZARK )

and LARRY EZELL, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

The court now has before it two motions to proceed in

forma pauperis filed by pro se plaintiffs Lorenzo and

Clarissa Pearson. Lorenzo Pearson removed this case from

state to federal court.

It is well established that a two-step procedure

should be followed in processing a case initiated

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “First, the district court

should determine whether the plaintiff satisfies the

economic eligibility criterion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Upon a finding of economic justification, the court

should allow the complaint to be docketed without

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1. Section 1915(a)(1) provides:

“Subject to subsection (b), any court of

the United States may authorize the

commencement, prosecution or defense of

any suit, action or proceeding, civil or

criminal, or appeal therein, without

prepayment of fees or security therefor,

by a person who submits an affidavit

that includes a statement of all assets

such prisoner possesses that the person

is unable to pay such fees or give

security therefor. Such affidavit shall

state the nature of the action, defense

or appeal and affiant’s belief that the

person is entitled to redress.”

2. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

close of business on September 30, 1981. 

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prepayment of fees.”1

 Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271

(5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see also Procup v.

Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1114 (11th Cir. 1985).2

Second, once leave has been granted, this provision

allows the district court summarily to deny relief if it

determines the complaint “is frivolous or malicious,”

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,”

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3. Given the disjointed nature of Lorenzo Pearson’s

pro se filings, the court cannot be certain that it has

(continued...)

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or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-

(iii). The motions filed by the Pearsons satisfy the

economic eligibility criteria of § 1915(a)(1). This

case, however, should be remanded to state court because

the notice of removal, which initiated this case, is

frivolous. 

Lorenzo Pearson filed a notice of removal asserting

federal-question jurisdiction over his pending statecourt lawsuit against defendants Commercial Bank of Ozark

and Larry Ezell. According to the Pearsons’ state-court

complaint, the bank, acting under the direction of Senior

Vice President Ezell, promised to provide them a loan

with which they planned to build a home. Relying on that

promise, the Pearsons began construction. However, the

promised loan never arrived and the Pearsons suffered

economic loss and damage to their credit.3

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(...continued)

accurately set forth his allegations. Any misstatement,

however, is immaterial because this court plainly lacks

jurisdiction over the dispute.

4

The Pearsons brought suit in state court, alleging a

number of state-law claims, including negligence,

wantonness, fraudulent inducement, promissory estoppel,

and breach of fiduciary duty. That action has been

pending for nearly two years and, according to Lorenzo

Pearson, the state court will soon rule on motions to

dismiss.

Unhappy with the course of the state-court

proceedings, Lorenzo Pearson filed a notice of removal in

this court asserting federal-question jurisdiction.

Lorenzo Pearson argues that, while he “went in the State

Court as a Plaintiff,” he is now “defending [him]self for

due process, a federal issue under federal law.” Removal

Notice 1 (Doc. No. 1). More precisely, he alleges that

the state-court judge has conspired with the defendants

and their counsel to thwart his state-court action by

denying him indigent status, ignoring false statements

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made against him, denying his request that the judge

recuse himself, and committing mail and wire fraud

against him.

Subsection (a) of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which governs the

removal of lawsuits from state to federal court, provides

in pertinent part as follows:

“Except as otherwise expressly provided

by Act of Congress, any civil action

brought in a State court of which the

district courts of the United States

have original jurisdiction, may be

removed by the defendant or the

defendants, to the district court of the

United States for the district and

division embracing the place where such

action is pending.”

(Emphasis added). The Supreme Court has cautioned that

this statute should be strictly construed. Shamrock Oil

& Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941). Given

that admonishment and the express and unambiguous terms

of the statute itself, it is unsurprising that the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that

§ 1441(a) authorizes defendants only, and not plaintiffs,

to remove a suit to federal court. See FDIC v. S & I 85-

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1, Ltd., 22 F.3d 1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 1994).

Consequently, this action must be remanded because

§ 1441(a) does not grant Lorenzo Pearson the right to

seek removal of a cause of action in which he is the

plaintiff.

Lorenzo Pearson attempts to circumvent that reality

by characterizing himself as defendant, rather than

plaintiff. He explains: “I am a Plaintiff in these cases

that has become a Defendant because the State has denied

me due process in all my cases.” Removal Notice 2 (Doc.

No. 1). But new allegations of wrongdoing by the

defendant (or by state-court officials) cannot be enough

to transform a plaintiff into a “defendant” within the

meaning of § 1441(a). Otherwise, every plaintiff, merely

by asserting a new federal claim (nearly every claim

embodies allegations of wrongdoing) in a pending statecourt action, could remove his case to federal court.

That would render meaningless the language of § 1441,

which refers to only defendants.

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It may be that Lorenzo Pearson, because he is acting

pro se, filed this notice of removal without a proper

understanding of federal procedure. For his benefit, and

because he is a plaintiff in similar actions pending in

state court, this court wants to ensure that he

understands that an individual filing an action against

another party is considered the plaintiff under federal

law. The federal removal statute does not authorize

plaintiffs to remove their cases to federal court, except

in rare situations not applicable here. That is

particularly true where, as here, the plaintiff appears

to be removing the case solely to avoid a potentially

unfavorable ruling from the state court.

Moreover, even if Lorenzo Pearson could remove this

case to this court, it would still need to be remanded

because there is no “federal question” presented. All of

Pearson’s claims are state-law claims; he has not alleged

any federal claims in state court. He simply contends

that he is being mistreated in state court in violation

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of federal law. This mistreatment is not an independent

federal claim but rather is an argument that he should

present to a state appellate court should he lose on his

state-law claims in state court. Removal jurisdiction is

not an avenue for federal review of state-court actions.

***

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is the

ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follows:

(1) Plaintiffs Lorenzo and Clarissa Pearson’s motions

to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. Nos. 2 & 3) are

granted.

(2) This cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of

Dale County, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4).

The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to take

appropriate steps to effect the remand.

This case is closed.

DONE, this the 10th day of January, 2012. 

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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