Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03726/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03726-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Conway
Plaintiff
David A. Day
Defendant
Department of Health Services, State of California
Defendant
Estate of Raymond Earl Day
Defendant
Peter Quittman
Defendant
Rachelle Marie Rego
Defendant
Superior Court of Alameda County
Defendant
Dena R. Thaler
Defendant
Underwriters Insurance Co.
Defendant
Ron Valin
Defendant
Shirley H. Valin
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Plaintiff’s IFP application states that he has not been

employed since 1986. It declares that he is not married; he has no

income or assets and he has $20.00 in a bank account. Yet,

Plaintiff lists $331 in monthly expenses. Thus, Plaintiff would

need to refile his IFP application to explain how he meets his

expenses.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES CONWAY, 

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY;

ESTATE OF RAYMOND EARL DAY; DAVID

A. DAY, as Administrator of the

Estate of Raymond Earl Day;

UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO.; DENA

R. THALER, creditor; DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH SERVICES, STATE OF

CALIFORNIA, creditor; RACHELLE

MARIE REGO, non-creditor; SHIRLEY

H. VALIN, non-creditor; RON VALIN,

non-creditor; and PETER QUITTMAN,

attorney for administrator, 

 Defendants.

_________________________________

No. C 05-03726 CW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS AND

DISMISSING COMPLAINT

Plaintiff James Conway requests leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (IFP)1 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court denies

Plaintiff’s request and dismisses his complaint.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his complaint.

Raymond Earl Day attempted to commit fraud against Plaintiff when

the two entered into a contract for the sale of real property. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff filed a civil action against Raymond Day in the Alameda

Superior Court of the State of California for damages and

injunctive relief. Plaintiff alleged that, through their

contractual dealings, Raymond Day had wrongfully possessed an

estimated $51,000.00 of Plaintiff's money. Before the matter came

to trial, Raymond Day died and his son, Defendant David Day,

inherited his father's property including Plaintiff's money. 

Plaintiff filed an objection to David Day's petition to be

appointed administrator of his father's estate. David Day

responded to the objection, stating that, under California's

Probate Code, Plaintiff would be given notice and an opportunity to

object to actions taken by the administrator. The Alameda County

Superior Court appointed David Day as administrator; approved a

bond of $182,000.00, which was provided by Defendant Underwriters

Insurance Company; declared that Plaintiff was a creditor of the

estate; and directed David Day to give notice to Plaintiff of any

action taken by him. Although they stated to the court they would

provide notice to Plaintiff before taking any actions under the

estate, neither David Day nor his attorney, Defendant Peter

Quittman, notified Plaintiff.

David Day continued to convert assets and sell property

without giving notice to Plaintiff and fellow Defendant creditors

California Department of Health and Human Services and Dena Thaler. 

David Day did provide notice and showed favoritism to Defendant

non-creditors Rachelle Marie Rego, Shirley Valin and Ron Valin. 

David Day also refused to recognize Plaintiff as a creditor of the

estate. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

Section 1915(e)(2)(B) states:

. . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the

court determines that–

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.

3

Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order settling the

estate. At the hearing, Peter Quittman admitted that Plaintiff was

not provided notice. The Alameda County Superior Court denied

Plaintiff's motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The Ninth Circuit has indicated that leave to proceed IFP

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is properly granted only when the

plaintiff has demonstrated poverty and has presented a claim that

is not factually or legally frivolous within the definition of

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).2 O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.

1990); Tripati v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370

(9th Cir. 1987). In the Ninth Circuit, the court grants or denies

IFP status based on the plaintiff’s financial resources and then

independently determines whether to dismiss the complaint on the

grounds that it is frivolous. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,

1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). An affidavit supporting IFP status is

sufficient if it states that the plaintiff cannot, because of his

poverty, pay the court costs and still provide himself and his

dependents with the necessities of life. Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de

Nemours & Co., Inc., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION

In his first and second causes of action, Plaintiff asserts

that Defendants deprived him of due process under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, he claims Defendants denied

him notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning his property

and that he was divested of his property without just compensation. 

Under what is commonly known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a

federal district court, as a court of original jurisdiction, has no

authority to review the final determinations of a State court in

judicial proceedings, even when the challenge alleges that the

State court's action was unconstitutional. See District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983);

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); Worldwide

Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986). Stated

somewhat differently, federal district courts may not be utilized

as appellate tribunals to review errors allegedly committed by

State courts. See Turnbow v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d

1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1991); Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476; Rooker, 263

U.S. at 415. “The rationale behind this doctrine is that the only

federal court with the power to hear appeals from state courts is

the United States Supreme Court.” Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d

1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied Citizens for a

Constitutional Convention v. Yoshina, 525 U.S. 1103 (1999); see

also 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 

Here, the Alameda County Superior Court rendered a final

judgment concerning the estate of Raymond Day. It found that

notice had been given regularly and in the manner prescribed by
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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law. Pl’s Ex. 9 at 1-2. The court also considered Plaintiff's

motion to vacate its judgment. At that time, the court heard

Plaintiff's argument that Defendants David Day and Petter Quittman

denied him proper notice. Yet, the court denied Plaintiff’s motion

to vacate. Although Plaintiff had adequate opportunity to raise

his constitutional claims in State court, he did not avail himself

of the State's appellate courts. Therefore, under the RookerFeldman doctrine, this Court has no authority to act as an

appellate tribunal and review the alleged errors of the State

court.

Plaintiff also claims that certain Defendants as private

individuals denied him procedural due process afforded under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Courts have applied the Fifth

Amendment due process clause to private individuals when those

individuals have made “use of state procedures with the overt,

significant assistance of state officials.” Tulsa Prof’l

Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988). 

However, the complaining party must show “a sufficiently close

nexus” between the private individual’s action and State action. 

Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Additionally, “a

State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only

when it has exercised coercive power or has provided . . .

significant support . . . . Id. at 1004 (citations omitted). 

Similarly, the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be

enforced against private individuals unless State action is

involved. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982). 

The Court does not find any basis for Plaintiff’s claims
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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against Defendants as individuals. Even considering the alleged

facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he cannot

conceivably establish a “sufficiently close nexus” between the

actions of these Defendants and the federal or State governments. 

Nor can Plaintiff show that federal or State actors “exercised

coercive power” or provided “significant support” to the individual

Defendants who allegedly deprived him of his procedural due

process. Rather, the only State actor was the Alameda County

Superior Court which simply determined that Plaintiff was given

proper notice as required by law.

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a claim and, accordingly, 

his complaint is dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed

with prejudice. 

Dated 11/15/05

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Copies mailed to counsel

as noted on the following page
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Conway,

Plaintiff,

 v.

Superior Court of Alameda County et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-03726 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on November 15, 2005, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

James Conway

1555 3rd Street, Apt. 318

Richmond, CA 94801

Dated: November 15, 2005

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk