Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02923/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02923-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Santa Clara Department of Corrections
Respondent
Charles Weathington
Petitioner
Toby K. Wong
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES WEATHINGTON, 

Petitioner,

 v.

CAPTAIN TOBY K. WONG, Main

Jail Complex Commander,

County of Santa Clara

Department of Correction,

Respondent.

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No. C 05-2923 CW (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Charles Weathington, a state prisoner who is

incarcerated at the Santa Clara County Main Jail Complex, filed

this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 challenging on several grounds the validity of his

conviction. 

Respondent has filed an answer. Petitioner has filed a

traverse. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

According to the allegations in the petition, Petitioner was

charged with five counts of issuing checks on insufficient funds

pursuant to California Penal Code § 476a. In November, 2000, he

was found guilty by a jury on two counts. The trial court found

Petitioner's five prior convictions true under California Penal

Code § 667 and struck four of his prior convictions pursuant to

California Penal Code § 1385. He was sentenced to seven years and

four months in state prison. 

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Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On December 22,

2003, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. 

(Resp't Ex. 6.) On April 14, 2004, the California Supreme Court

denied the petition for review. (Resp't Ex. 7.) 

On July 19, 2005, Petitioner filed the present federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. He raises the following three

claims for relief: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support

the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting prior

uncharged acts of writing bad checks; and (3) the prosecutor

committed misconduct by commenting on Petitioner's failure to

testify at trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In its written opinion, the California Court of Appeal

summarized the factual background as follows:

This is a bad check case, in which defendant engaged in

transactions with two computer companies, writing

checks to the companies that were returned for

insufficient funds. In one transaction, defendant sold

computer hardware that did not conform to his

representation. Defendant's refund check to the

company was returned for insufficient funds. In the

second transaction, defendant purchased computer

hardware from another company with a check written on

insufficient funds. Defendant wrote the checks on May

26 and 27, 1994. In the week preceding May 26 and 27,

1994, defendant had five other checks returned to

payees for insufficient funds. These checks totaled

$3,314.

Count 1 -- Palo Alto Computers

On the morning of May 27, 1994, defendant deposited a

$3,000 cashier's check in his Bank of America checking

account. Shortly thereafter, defendant went to Palo

Alto Computers to purchase computer memory. Defendant

paid $1,700 for the memory to David Wu by check drawn

on his Bank of America account. When Wu called Bank

of America, the bank verified that defendant's account

contained sufficient funds to cover the $1,764 check. 

After leaving Palo Alto Computers, defendant

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transferred $800 out of his checking account, and an

unspecified individual withdrew another $1,450 from

defendant's account by presenting a check to Bank of

America, payable to cash. Palo Alto Computers was

unable to cash defendant's check, because it was

returned due to insufficient funds in the account.

Count 2 -- Centurian Computer Surplus

On the morning of May 26, 1994, the day before

defendant bounced the check to Palo Alto Computers,

defendant offered to sell Centurian Computer Surplus a

package of computer memory. Centurian's owner, Jorge

Lovato accepted defendant's offer, and paid him $5,000

for the memory by check. After defendant left the

store, Lovato inspected the memory and realized it did

not conform to defendant's representations. After

discovering the problem with the memory, Lovato

instructed Renee Barry-Robles, Centurian's Chief

Financial Officer, to place a stop-payment order on the

$5,000 check. Barry-Robles informed Lovato it was too

late to order a stop payment, because defendant had

already cashed the check.

In the early afternoon that same day, defendant

deposited $4,300 in cash into his Bank of America

checking account. Defendant then returned to Centurian

to pick up a puppy he had purchased during his morning

visit to the store. Lovato confronted defendant about

the nonconforming merchandise, and defendant agreed to

refund Lovato $2,300. Defendant wrote Lovato a check

for $2,300 drawn on his Bank of America checking

account, post-dated to May 27, 1994. Lovato testified

that defendant did not tell him to hold the check, but

that he [Lovato] told defendant that he would be

depositing the check the following day. Lovato also

testified that defendant told him the check was good

for deposit.

At 5:40 p.m. on May 26, 1994, defendant purchased a

$3,500 cashier's check from Bank of America. Twelve

minutes later, defendant cashed the $3,500 cashier's

check, kept $500 cash and used the remaining $3,000 to

purchase another cashier's check. 

Barry-Robles took the $2,300 check to the bank to

deposit it after the close of business on May 26, 1994. 

The check was returned due to insufficient funds. When

Lovato eventually found defendant and confronted

defendant about the insufficient funds, defendant gave

Lovato $200 cash, and promised to repay the remainder

the following day.

Defendant did not pay Lovato the following day, and

instead defendant's brother paid Lovato the outstanding

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1 FN2. When he received the check from defendant's brother,

Lovato signed a declaration stating that at the time defendant wrote

the check, defendant told him there was not enough money in the

account to cover the check and that Lovato should hold the check until

the following day. At trial, Lovato testified that he only signed the

declaration to get his money back and that defendant's brother told

him what to say. In addition, Lovato testified that defendant never

told him that there was not enough money in the account to cover the

check.

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 FN3. Count 3 alleged defendant wrote a check in December 1992

for $5,103.39 to Comtech Group, Inc., a computer parts distributor,

that was returned for insufficient funds. Count 4 alleged that

defendant wrote a check in January 1993 for $1,000 to Comtech, in an

effort to satisfy the debt defendant incurred through the bouncing of

the first check. The $1,000 check also bounced. Although the court

sustained a demurrer to these counts, it admitted evidence of these

uncharged acts at trial pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101(b). 

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balance in 1995.[FN2]1 The information also alleged

that defendant had five prior convictions under the

"Three Strikes" law. (§§ 667, 1170.12.)

The court sustained defendant's demurrer to counts 3

and 4 for failure to commence prosecution within the

statute of limitations.[FN3]2

(Resp't Ex. 6 at 4-8 (brackets and footnotes in original).)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claims: 

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

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the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the 'unreasonable

application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The

only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the

time of the relevant state court decision. Id. at 412. 

In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). Where, as here, the highest state court to reach the

merits issued a summary opinion which does not explain the

rationale of its decision, federal court review under § 2254(d) is

of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. Bains v.

Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this

case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner's claims is the opinion of the California Court of

Appeal. 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted

only if the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson,

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 638 (1993)).

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 In People v. Swanson, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1024 (2d Dist. 1981),

the California Court of Appeal held that the essential elements to

prove the offense of issuing a check without sufficient funds under

California Penal Code § 476a(a) are: (1) the making, drawing, uttering

or delivering of the check with (2) insufficient funds or credit with

the drawee bank at the time the check was made, (3) knowledge of the

lack of sufficient funds, (4) and the intent to defraud. Knowledge of

insufficient funds may be proven by circumstantial evidence as well

as direct evidence. 

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DISCUSSION 

I. Insufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner claims that the appellate court's decision was

unreasonable because there was insufficient evidence to support his

two convictions for writing checks with insufficient funds on

deposit, in violation of California Penal Code § 476a.3

 Petitioner

also argues that he presented evidence that he had disclosed to the

payee that there were insufficient funds to cover the check he

wrote to Centurian as an affirmative defense to the intent element. 

(Traverse at 5.) 

The appellate court rejected Petitioner's claim based on the

following factual and legal analysis:

Proof of a violation of section 476a requires a showing

that defendant wrote checks to Centurian and Palo Alto

Computers (1) acting with the specific intent to

defraud; (2) at the time the checks were written and

delivered, there were not sufficient funds in the bank

upon which the checks were drawn to pay in full upon

their presentation and all other outstanding checks;

and (3) the defendant knew of the insufficiency of the

funds when he wrote the checks. (§ 476a; CALJIC No.

15.20.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "'[T]he

relevant question is whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" (People v. Johnson, (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Further, "'The test is

whether substantial evidence supports the [conclusion

of the trier of fact], not whether the evidence proves

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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citations.]" 

(People v. Crittenden, (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139.)

In this case, there was sufficient evidence to support

the jury's finding that the three elements of writing a

check on insufficient funds were present on counts 1

and 2.

Count 1 -- Palo Alto Computers

Defendant contends the fact that Wu called the bank to

verify that defendant had sufficient funds in his

account on the day defendant wrote the check negates

the element of intent to defraud. However, the fact

that Wu called the bank to verify funds in the account

had no impact on whether defendant wrote the check with

the intent to defraud Palo Alto Computers. Indeed, it

was reasonable for the jury to conclude that

defendant's act of withdrawing $3,500 from his account

the day before he wrote the check, and re-depositing

$3,000 the same day was done to create the balance

reflected by the bank's verification and defraud Palo

Alto Computers into believing he had sufficient funds

in the account to cover the check. 

In addition, defendant's contention that the jury

should not have considered the five outstanding checks

totaling $3,314 in determining if his account had

sufficient funds is incorrect. A violation of section

476a requires insufficient funds "for the payment [of

the check in question] . . . and all other

checks, . . . upon such funds then outstanding, . . . (§ 476a, [emphasis] added.) Moreover, once returned

for insufficient funds, a check may be re-submitted to

the bank for up to six months from the date the check

was written. As a result, a reasonable juror could

conclude that the outstanding checks in defendant's

account totaling $3,314 made defendant's account

insufficient to cover the check to Palo Alto Computer

[sic].

Count 2 -- Centurian Computer Surplus

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of

his intent to defraud Centurian, because he post-dated

the check for the following day. When a payee has

knowledge at the time he accepts a check that the

drawer does not have funds at the bank to cover the

check, there is insufficient evidence to support a

conviction for a violation of section 476a. (People v.

Poyet (1972) 6 Cal.3d 530.) The court in Poyet stated,

"No matter how fraudulent the promise to make a deposit

sufficient to cover a check, disclosure of the present

insufficiency of funds precludes conviction . . . ."

(Id. at p. 536.)

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Although disclosure of the present insufficiency of

funds is sufficient to negate the intent to defraud,

the writing of a post-dated check alone is

insufficient. (Poyet, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 533.) The

evidence conflicts on whether defendant told Lovato

there were insufficient funds in defendant's account to

cover the check. In his declaration, Lovato stated

defendant told him the account was insufficient to

cover the check. However, at trial, Lovato testified

that he only signed the declaration to be paid the

money defendant owed him, and further stated: "When

[defendant] gave me the check, he said it was good, to

put it in, it was good for deposit." Although

defendant wrote a post-dated check, the evidence was

sufficient to support the conclusion that defendant did

not inform Lovato that the account contained

insufficient funds.

Additionally, the representations Lovato may have made

to defendant that he [Lovato] would not deposit the

check until the following day, or the representations

the bank made to Lovato regarding defendant's account

balance does not negate defendant's intent to defraud

Centurian. The fact that defendant withdrew $3,500

from his account at the close of business on May 26,

1994, and re-deposited $3,000 shortly after the bank

opened the next day could lead a reasonable trier of

fact to believe that defendant was trying to avoid the

bank's payment of the check to Centurian, and

therefore, had the intent to defraud Centurian when he

wrote the check. 

Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to

support a finding that his account actually contained

insufficient funds, because his balance contained

enough to cover the check at the time he wrote it. 

However, a violation of section 476a requires

insufficient funds "for the payment [of the check in

question] . . . and all other checks, . . . upon such

funds then outstanding, in full upon its presentation."

(§ 476a)

At the time he wrote the check to Centurian,

defendant's account balance was $3,912,57, an amount

sufficient to cover the $2,300 check. However,

defendant also had $3,314 of outstanding checks. 

Therefore, defendant would have needed at least $5,614

in his account to cover the $2,300 check to Centurian

in addition to his remaining outstanding checks, making

his account balance insufficient. 

Defendant's contention that the $3,314 worth of

outstanding checks could not be considered in

determining if the account had sufficient funds because

he could have satisfied the debts resulting from the

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checks outside the banking system is incorrect. As

discussed above, evidence that defendant wrote $3,314

worth of checks that were returned for insufficient

funds, and that the checks could be resubmitted at any

time for up to six months, is sufficient to support the

jury's conclusion that the account contained

insufficient funds. 

Contrary to defendant's assertion, we do not believe

the fact that defendant looked at his account balance

on May 28 and 29, 1994, provides, "undisputed evidence

that [he] believed he had enough money in his account

on the day the checks were written," thus, negating the

element of knowledge. Initially, defendant wrote the

checks in this case on May 26 and 27, 1994, not the

days he looked at his account balance. In addition,

the fact that defendant looked at his balance of

$3,747.57 does not demonstrate that he knew he had

sufficient funds, because prior to writing the checks

charged in this case, defendant wrote checks totaling

$3,314, all of which were returned for insufficient

funds. Coupled with the two checks in this case, the

outstanding checks left defendant's account balance

insufficient by $1,700. Therefore, regardless of the

fact defendant looked at of [sic] his account balance,

the jury could reasonably conclude that he knew the

account contained insufficient funds to cover the check

to Centurian.

(Resp't Ex. 6 at 4-8 (brackets and emphasis in original).)

Petitioner claims that the appellate court's decision, as to

both counts, is unreasonable because "the evidence demonstrates that

there was money in the account at the time the check[s] [were]

written and delivered, but removed shortly thereafter." (Pet. at 6-

A.)

A. Applicable Federal Law

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary

to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly

characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to

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 The Ninth Circuit has left open the question whether 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) requires an additional degree of deference to a state

court's resolution of sufficient evidence claims. See Chein v.

Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982-83 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Bruce v.

Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2004). However, five other

circuits have concluded that a sufficiency of the evidence claim

presents a legal determination that must be evaluated through the

AEDPA standard of review embodied in § 2254(d)(1). No circuit has

explicitly held that a state court's Jackson inquiry is exempt from

AEDPA's standard of review. Bruce, 376 F.3d at 958-59 (O'Scannlain,

J., concurring specially).

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find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a

constitutional claim, which, if proven, entitles him to federal

habeas relief. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321, 324

(1979).

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction

does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982

F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843 (1993). 

The federal court "determines only whether, 'after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" See id. (quoting Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may the writ be

granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338;

Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 992-93 (9th Cir.), amended, 768

F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1985);

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469

U.S. 838 (1984).4

If confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences,

a federal habeas court "must presume –- even if it does not

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affirmatively appear on the record –- that the trier of fact

resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must

defer to that resolution." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. A jury's

credibility determinations are therefore entitled to near-total

deference. Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Except in the most exceptional of circumstances, Jackson does not

permit a federal habeas court to revisit credibility determinations. 

See id. at 952.

The prosecution need not affirmatively rule out every

hypothesis except that of guilt. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-

97 (1992) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). The existence of some

small doubt based on an unsupported yet unrebutted hypothesis of

innocence therefore is not sufficient to invalidate an otherwise

legitimate conviction. See Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 910 (9th

Cir. 1994). Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that

evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Walters v.

Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). Mere suspicion and

speculation, however, cannot support logical inferences. Id.

B. Analysis

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution and resolving any conflicting inferences in favor of the

prosecution, the Court finds that "a rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt." Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. That is, a rational juror could

have found that the evidence was sufficient to show that there were

not enough funds in Petitioner's bank account when the checks in

question were issued or presented. 

Regarding count one, the appellate court's decision rejecting

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Petitioner's argument was not unreasonable. Although Petitioner

contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish intent to

defraud, the appellate court was not unreasonable in finding that

the circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence

were sufficient to sustain the conviction. Walters, 45 F.3d at

1358. Petitioner alleges that the fact that Wu called the Bank of

America to verify that Petitioner had funds in his account indicates

that Petitioner lacked the specific intent to defraud because Wu had

actual knowledge of the insufficiency in the bank account. 

(Traverse at 2.) However, as the appellate court reasoned, "the

fact that Wu called to verify funds in the account had no impact on

whether defendant wrote the check with the intent to defraud Palo

Alto Computers." (Resp't Ex. 6 at 5 (emphasis in original).) By

his own admission, Petitioner withdrew funds from his account

shortly after delivering the check to Wu. (Pet. at 6-A.) 

Petitioner transferred $800 from his account the day he wrote the

check to Wu. Later that same day, he had an unspecified individual

withdraw an additional $1,450. Petitioner did not tell Wu that he

intended to transfer funds from his account. When Wu attempted to

cash the check the following day, it was returned due to

insufficient funds in Petitioner's account. Furthermore, the jury

was not required to accept Petitioner's defense that he lacked the

specific intent to defraud.

As to count two, Petitioner contends that the evidence is

insufficient to establish the second prong of California Penal Code

§ 476a because he post-dated the check to Centurian for May 27,

1994. To support his argument, Petitioner relies on People v.

Poyet, 6 Cal. 3d 530 (1972) for the conclusion that "[n]o matter

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how fraudulent the promise to make a deposit sufficient to cover the

check, disclosure of the present insufficiency of funds precludes

conviction under . . . section [476a]." (Traverse at 4 (citing

Poyet, 6 Cal. 3d at 536).) However, the Poyet court also noted that

the fact alone that a check is postdated is not a defense to

California Penal Code § 476a. See Poyet, 6 Cal. 3d at 534.

Furthermore, Petitioner's contention that there were sufficient

funds in the account because on May 28, 1994 the account balance was

$2999.57 is unavailing. As the appellate court noted, the May 28

balance does not negate Petitioner's intent to defraud Centurian. 

(Resp't Ex. 6 at 6.) The gravamen of the offense charged was

Petitioner's delivery of a check to Lovato, his act of withdrawing

$3,500 from his account at the close of business on May 26, the day

the check was issued, and re-depositing $3,000 shortly after the

bank opened the next day. Petitioner knew that his account would

be depleted and, under the circumstances, the record supports an

inference that he issued the check to Centurian with the intent to

defraud. Therefore, the appellate court did not unreasonably find

that the jury's verdict as to count two was adequately supported by

the evidence.

Accordingly, the appellate court's rejection of Petitioner's

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Therefore, this claim for habeas corpus relief is denied. 

II. Improper Admission of Prior Bad Acts

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by admitting

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 Respondent argues that Petitioner merely alleges state law

error and does not present any constitutional issue; however, the

Court finds that, liberally construed, Petitioner has pleaded a

federal due process violation. Respondent further argues that

Petitioner's due process claim is unexhausted. Although Petitioner

has failed to exhaust this claim, the Court may deny an unexhausted

claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

6

 FN4. The conduct alleged in counts 3 and 4 of the information.

14

evidence of prior acts of passing bad checks because the evidence

was more prejudicial than probative under California Evidence Code

§ 352.5

 (Pet. at 6-B.) 

In rejecting Petitioner's claim, the appellate court reasoned:

The trial court admitted evidence of defendant's prior

conduct of writing bad checks on the ground that such

conduct was relevant to prove a common plan or method

and intent pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101,

subdivision (b). The court admitted defendant's prior

acts of writing bad checks to Comtech in 1992 and

1993,[FN4]6

 and defendant's conduct of writing a check

on insufficient funds and depositing it into his

savings account at Provident Credit Union. Defendant

then withdrew most of the cash from the savings

account, leaving the account with a substantial

shortfall.

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) permits

"the admission of evidence that a person committed a

crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove

some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a

prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted

unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good

faith believe that the victim consented) other than his

or her disposition to commit such an act." Further, on

appeal, the trial court's determination of whether

prior uncharged acts should be admitted pursuant to

Evidence Code section 1101, "being essentially a

determination of relevance, is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. [Citations.]" (People v. Kipp , (1998) 18

Cal.4th 349, 369.) The determination whether such

evidence should be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code

section 352 is also reviewed for abuse of discretion.

(Ibid.) 

The two prior incidents of defendant's bad check

writing and the crimes charged in the instant case were

sufficiently similar to demonstrate a common plan under

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7 FN5. Defendant claims the Comtech incident is not relevant to

[sic] because it happened too long ago. However, the Comtech incident

was not remote to the current case, having occurred 17 months prior

to the crimes charged.

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Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). In People

v. Ewoldt, (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, the California Supreme

Court explained that the admissibility of evidence

pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (b) depends on

the degree of similarity between the uncharged act and

the charged offense. In overruling People v. Tassell, (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77, the court held that "evidence of a

defendant's uncharged misconduct is relevant where the

uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are

sufficiently similar to support the inference that they

are manifestations of a common design or plan." 

(People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 401-402.) 

The degree of similarity needed to prove the existence

of a common design or plan is less than that needed to

prove identity. (Id. at pp. 402-403.) The evidence

need only show "'such a concurrence of common features

that the various acts are naturally to be explained as

caused by a general plan of which they are the

individual manifestations' [citation]" (Id. at pp.

393-394), "but the plan thus revealed need not be

distinctive or unusual." (Id. at p. 403.) A

concurrence of common features, if capable of being

naturally explained as caused by a common plan, will

suffice. (People v. Balcom, (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414,

423-424.)

Like Ewoldt, in the instant case, there were common

features among the charged counts of writing bad checks

and the uncharged incidents such that evidence of the

uncharged incidents could be admitted to show a common

design or plan. Specifically, in both the charged and

uncharged incidents, defendant wrote checks that were

returned for insufficient funds. In addition, like the

present offenses, the Comtech incident involved

defendant bouncing two checks to a computer

store.[FN5]7 Further, like the present offenses, in

the Provident incident, defendant wrote a check on an

account and later withdrew the money from the account

before the check could be paid. Although the prior

uncharged offenses are not identical to the present

crimes, the similarities are such that they demonstrate

a common design or plan. As the court explained in

Ewoldt, there is no requirement that there be a

"'signature'" similarity of the acts to show a common

plan or design. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7

Cal.4th at p. 403.) As a result, although the

uncharged acts and the charged crimes do not

necessarily show a "'signature,'" they are sufficiently

similar to demonstrate a common plan. (Ibid.)

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In addition to being admissible to prove a common plan,

evidence of the uncharged acts was admissible to show

intent under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision

(b). The Ewoldt court explained the standards for

admissibility of evidence to prove intent as follows:

"The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged

act and the charged offense) is required in order to

prove intent. [Citation.] '[T]he recurrence of a

similar result . . . tends (increasingly with each

instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or

self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental

state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least,

though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e.,

criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . .' 

[Citation.] In order to be admissible to prove intent,

the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar

to support the inference that the defendant '"probably

harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance." 

[Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.)

In the present case, the charged and uncharged

incidents of bad check writing were sufficiently

similar "to support the inference that the defendant

'"probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each

instance." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v.

Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.) Specifically, the

same intent in both instances was to defraud a check

payee by manipulation of account balances. Because of

the similarity between the two incidents, evidence of

the prior incidents of passing bad check was probative

of appellant's intent to commit check fraud in the

present case.

Defendant contends that the combination of the two

prior incidents of passing bad checks was unduly

prejudicial and "served to create an impression with

the jury that [defendant] was a crook." However, even

without reference to the prior bad acts, the facts of

the crimes charged in this case demonstrate defendant's

proclivity toward criminality. Considered in light of

its probative value to prove common plan and intent,

evidence of prior acts of passing bad checks was

admissible under Evidence Code section 352. The trial

court's decision to admit the evidence did not "fall[]

outside the bounds of reason," such that it must be

reversed on appeal. (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2

Cal.4th 1198, 1226.)

The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of

the prior acts of passing bad checks under Evidence

Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The evidence is

admissible to demonstrate both common plan and intent,

and is more probative than prejudicial under Evidence

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Code section 352.

(Resp't Ex. 6 at 8-11 (brackets and footnotes in original).)

A. Applicable Federal Law

Erroneous state evidentiary rulings are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus proceedings unless the admission of evidence

violated the petitioner's rights under the Constitution. Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment provides the framework for evaluating claims

based on alleged constitutional error in state court evidentiary

rulings. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). Permitting

a jury to hear evidence of prior crimes or bad acts may violate due

process. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438-39 n.6

(1983); Fritchie v. McCarthy, 664 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1981)

(citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 (1967)). But a federal

court cannot disturb on due process grounds a state court's decision

to admit evidence of prior crimes or bad acts unless the admission

of the evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the

trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357; Colley v.

Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839

(1986).

The admission of other crimes evidence violates due process

where there are no permissible inferences the jury can draw from

the evidence (in other words, no inference other than conduct in

conformity therewith). See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384

(9th Cir. 1993); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

1991). The relevance of the evidence of other bad acts to motive

or intent, the opportunity for the jury to weigh the credibility of

the witness's account of the other bad acts, and the trial court's

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use of a cautionary instruction to limit the jury's consideration

of the other bad acts all are factors a federal court may consider

to determine whether a due process violation occurred. See Houston

v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 910 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (admission of similar

prior bad acts to show motive and intent, coupled with limiting

instructions, was appropriate). Juries are presumed to follow a

trial court's limiting instructions with respect to the purposes

for which evidence is admitted. Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d

815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997).

B. Analysis

California evidence rules are analogous to the federal rules. 

Evidence that is admissible under California Evidence Code § 1101

is limited by California Evidence Code § 352. California Evidence

Code § 352 parallels Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

because it permits a trial judge to exclude evidence when its

probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial

effect. See Cal. Evid. Code § 352. 

In relevant part, California Evidence Code § 1101 excludes,

with specified exceptions, character evidence in the form of

specific instances of conduct, unless such evidence is relevant to

prove some fact such as motive, intent or plan. Cal. Evid. Code

§ 1101. In other words, the prosecution cannot introduce the

evidence simply to show defendant has a propensity to commit

crimes. See Cal. Evid. Code § 352. To be admissible under this

section, the evidence must be introduced to prove a material fact;

the uncharged offense must have a tendency to prove the material

fact; and admission of the evidence must not violate another rule

or policy. Id. Also, the trial court must determine that its

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probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id.

Here, the appellate court was not unreasonable in finding that

Petitioner's previous acts -- writing bad checks to Comtech in 1992

and 1993, as well as writing a check from his Provident Credit

Union account and later withdrawing the money from that account

before the check could be paid -- have a tendency to prove intent. 

As the appellate court reasoned, the prior bad acts of writing bad

checks were material and tended to show Petitioner acted with a

common plan or scheme in all the incidents. (Resp't Ex. 6 at 9

(citing People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 403 (1994)).) 

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressed no

opinion on whether a state law, such as California Evidence Code

§ 1101 in the present case, would violate the Due Process Clause if

it permitted the use of "prior crimes" evidence to show propensity

to commit a charged crime. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 & n.5

(declining to rule on the constitutionality of propensity

evidence); Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864-67 (9th Cir.

2006). Because habeas relief may not be granted unless the state

court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court,

see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and there is no Supreme Court precedent that

the admission of propensity evidence pursuant to California

Evidence Code § 1101 violates due process, the decision of the

appellate court cannot be said to have contradicted or unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law in upholding the

constitutionality of section 1101. See Alberni, 458 F.3d at 866-67

(under AEDPA, habeas relief cannot be granted on claim Supreme

Court has reserved). 

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Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish that he is

entitled to habeas relief on the basis of this claim.

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor violated his Fifth

Amendment due process rights by commenting in violation of Griffin

v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), during closing argument and

rebuttal on Petitioner's failure to testify. The appellate court

summarized the prosecutor's comments as follows:

During closing argument and rebuttal, the prosecution

commented on defendant's failure to show he satisfied

his outstanding checks prior to writing the checks to

Centurian and Palo Alto Computer. Defendant's

assertion that these comments constituted Griffin error

is without merit. (Griffin v. California (1965) 380

U.S. 609 (Griffin).) 

During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 

"Well, Mr. Weathington has had an opportunity in this

courtroom as a part of our constitutional, democratic

trial process to present evidence to refute any of

these checks to show that well before May 26 or May

27[,] [1994,] they were paid off, thus they no longer

were out there standing as debits against his account.

Well, has he represented anything to you?" Defendant's

counsel approached the bench and objected to this

argument. The prosecutor further stated: "[w]hat we

have is an absence of any showing, an absence of any

evidence that any of these checks here, check 411, 800;

412 for $614, check 413 for $400, 406 for $200 and

check 441 for $1,300 had in any way been made good or

nullified or neutralized prior to the checks being

written to Mr. Wu and Mr. Lovato. [¶] . . . There is

no possible way that the checks to Mr. Wu and Mr.

Lovato could possibly have been good. [¶] And who is

the one human being on the planet earth who knew that? 

The person who authored these other checks? Mr.

Weathington." 

During rebuttal, the prosecutor stated: "Where is the

evidence then to show that they were paid by some other

means? . . . The only person or persons that can carry

that out are the defendant himself or his brother

Calvin that we know of, and Calvin's testimony if you

recall, he being the one who eventually is sent out to

make good on the checks that really need to be taken

care of immediately or a house gets lost or somebody

stays in jail said, yeah, I paid off these two checks

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and then hmm, on some occasion or occasions I went to

the foreclosure place and made some payment. Beyond

that, the evidence that we have is that -- well, we

have no other evidence to show that any of these checks

were paid off." 

(Resp't Ex. 6 at 11-12 (brackets in original).) The appellate

court added:

Defendant ultimately made a motion for a mistrial based

on the prosecutor's statements during his closing

argument and rebuttal, and the court denied the motion,

concluding that there was no violation of defendant's

Fifth Amendment rights, and if there was a violation,

it was either harmless error or was cured by CALJIC

Nos. 2.60 and 2.61.

(Id. at 12)

A. Applicable Federal Law

Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable on federal habeas

corpus. A defendant's due process rights are violated when a

prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial "fundamentally unfair." 

Id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone

of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial

misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the

prosecutor."). Where a prosecutor on his own initiative asks the

jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence or to

treat the defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt, the

defendant's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is

violated. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. While it is proper for the

prosecution to address the defendant's arguments, a comment is

impermissible if it is manifestly intended to call attention to the

defendant's failure to testify or is of such a character that the

jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the

failure to testify. Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir.

1987) (citing United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 494 (9th Cir.

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1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1023 (1986)). 

A prosecutor's comments calling attention to a defendant's

failure to testify require reversal only if: "(1) the commentary

is extensive; (2) an inference of guilt from silence is stressed to

the jury as a basis for the conviction; and (3) where there is

evidence that could have supported an acquittal." Jeffries v.

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted),

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that, although the trial court's

failure to offer a curative instruction may "compound" Griffin

error, whether an instruction is given is not dispositive. See

Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 588 (9th Cir. 2004). "[W]hen

the comments are limited in nature and could not have affected the

verdict, we have declined to reverse even in the absence of

curative instructions." Id.

B. Analysis

The appellate court rejected Petitioner's claim that the

prosecutor violated Griffin, stating:

We do not believe the prosecutor committed Griffin

error in this case. "Under the rule in Griffin, error

is committed whenever the prosecutor or the court

comments, either directly or indirectly, upon

defendant's failure to testify in his defense. It is

well established, however, that the rule prohibiting

comment on defendant's silence does not extend to

comments on the state of the evidence, or on the

failure of the defense to introduce material evidence

or to call logical witnesses. [Citations.]" (People

v. Medina, (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 755.) Here, like

Medina, the prosecutor did not comment on defendant's

failure to testify. Rather, he was observing

defendant's failure to provide evidence that his debts

resulting from the outstanding checks had been

satisfied. Such observations fall outside the purview

of Griffin.

The instant case is unlike People v. Guzman, (2000) 80

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Cal.App.4th 1282, in which the court found the

prosecutor committed Griffin error, "By emphasizing

holes in the defense case that only [the defendant]

could fill, the prosecutor naturally and necessarily

drew the jury's attention to the fact that [the

defendant] did not take the stand." (Id. at p. 1289.) 

Defendant was not the only person who could testify as

to whether the debts from the outstanding checks were

satisfied. Each of the outstanding checks represents a

two-party transaction. Certainly, the payees of the

outstanding checks would have known if the debts were

paid, and could have testified as such. As a result,

the prosecutor's statements in this case were not like

those in Guzman, because defendant was not the only

person who could fill in the holes.

In sum, the prosecutor's statements in his closing

argument and rebuttal were a comment on the state of

the evidence and defendant's failure to call material

witnesses or present exculpatory evidence, not on

defendant's choice not to testify. As a result, the

prosecutor did not commit Griffin error in this case.

(Resp't Ex. 6 at 11-13 (brackets in original).) 

The appellate court's determination that the prosecutor's

comments were not Griffin error is not an unreasonable application

of United States Supreme Court law. Most of the prosecutor's

comments referred to Petitioner's failure to provide evidence to

support his theory of the case, and were not "manifestly intended

or of such a character that the jury would naturally and

necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify." 

United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding

prosecutor's comments not improper where comments did no more than

remind jury that defense had failed to present certain evidence). 

The prosecutor's rhetorical question, "Has he represented

anything to you?" does appear to be a comment on the failure to

testify. Even if this comment violated Griffin, however,

Petitioner has not shown that the prosecutor's comments rendered

his trial fundamentally unfair. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.

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168, 181 (1986) (relevant question is whether the prosecution's

closing argument, which included comments implying that the death

penalty would be the only guarantee against a future similar act

and several offensive comments reflecting an emotional reaction to

the case, "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process"). As discussed

above, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find

Petitioner guilty of writing bad checks. Furthermore, the trial

court included in the jury charge CALJIC No. 2.60, which states

that a defendant has a right not to testify and that the jury

cannot draw inferences from his failure to do so. The trial court

found that any error was harmless and was cured by the

instructions. The prosecutor's comments were not extensive and an

inference of guilt from silence was not emphasized as a basis for

the conviction. See Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1192. Therefore, habeas

relief is not warranted because any Griffin error resulting from

the prosecutor's comments did not have a "substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht,

507 U.S. at 638.

Accordingly, the appellate court's rejection of Petitioner's

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of

the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED as to all claims. The Clerk of the Court shall

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terminate all pending motions, enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/14/08

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WEATHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-02923 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on March 14, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Charles Weathington 

BEN 586

885 North San Pedro St.

San Jose, CA 95110

Ross Charles Moody

Attorney General of the State of California

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Dated: March 14, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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