Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03114/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03114-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Warren P. Tilghman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 5, 1997 Decided February 3, 1998 

No. 96-3114

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WARREN P. TILGHMAN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cr00013-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Barbara J. Valliere, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Mary Lou 

Leary, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Convicted of lying in order to obtain 

disability benefits, appellant argues that the trial judge's 

repeated questioning of him prejudiced the jury and denied 

him a fair trial. Because the judge's questions could have 

telegraphed to the jury that he disbelieved appellant, and 

because appellant's defense in this case rested so heavily on 

his own personal credibility, we cannot find that the judge's 

questions were harmless. We therefore reverse and remand 

for a new trial.

I

After working for the U.S. Department of Agriculture for 

several years, appellant Warren P. Tilghman went on disability leave due to back injuries. For thirteen years he received 

disability benefits of approximately $32,000 per year. In 

1984, one year after going on disability, he incorporated 

Tilghman Enterprises Ltd. ("TEL"), through which he bid on 

federal agency contracts to investigate employment discrimination complaints. TEL's sole employee, Tilghman ran the 

company out of his home.

To receive disability benefits, Tilghman had to submit 

Department of Labor Form 1032 each year. That form 

required him to report salary or payments obtained from selfemployment, "employment other than self-employment," the 

theoretical market "rate of pay" associated with any uncompensated work, and "any [ ] enterprise in which [he] worked, 

and from which [he] received revenue, even if [the enterprise] 

operated at a loss." Except for 1991 when he reported $1500 

in self-employment earnings, Tilghman always answered "no" 

to questions asking whether he was employed or selfemployed and wrote "n/a" in response to questions asking 

how much he earned.

Learning of Tilghman's EEO work, the government conducted an investigation, then indicting him for mail fraud 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1341; for making false statements to 

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obtain federal employee compensation under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1920; and for making false statements to a federal agency 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. He was tried on one count of mail 

fraud and four misdemeanor counts (one each for the years 

1991 through 1994) of making false statements on Form 1032.

For his central defense, Tilghman testified that he had no 

intention of defrauding the government. He told the jury 

that he honestly believed that he had no obligation to report 

his EEO investigative work on Form 1032 because TEL 

operated at a loss, because he never received any salary from 

his EEO work, and because a DOL employee told him over 

the telephone that he could earn up to $300 a month without 

reporting it.

During the first of Tilghman's two days on the stand, the 

district judge questioned him extensively in the presence of 

the jury. Defense counsel offered no objection. On the 

morning of the second day and before trial began, defense 

counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the judge's questioning influenced the jury and deprived Tilghman of a fair 

trial. The district judge denied the motion and continued to 

question Tilghman. Defense counsel objected to four questions and renewed his motion for mistrial at the close of the 

case.

The jury acquitted Tilghman on the mail fraud count and 

on the two counts charging him with lying on DOL Form 

1032 for 1991 and 1992. He was convicted of lying on the 

forms he submitted for 1993 and 1994. The court sentenced 

him to fifteen months incarceration and one year of supervised release, ordering him to pay $84,000 in restitution. On 

appeal, Tilghman argues both that the judge's questioning 

deprived him of a fair trial and that the amount of loss 

underlying the sentence and restitution were incorrectly calculated.

II

Rule 614(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly 

permits judges to question witnesses. Judges may do so 

repeatedly and aggressively to clear up confusion and manage 

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trials or where "testimony is inarticulately or reluctantly 

given." United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519, 1525-26 

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding judge's participation in questioning defendant, although perhaps more extensive than it 

should have been, because it aimed at clarifying evidence) 

(quoting United States v. Barbour, 420 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C. 

Cir. 1969)).

District court authority to question witnesses and manage 

trials, however, has limits. Because juries, not judges, decide 

whether witnesses are telling the truth, and because judges 

wield enormous influence over juries, judges may not ask 

questions that signal their belief or disbelief of witnesses. 

United States v. Wyatt, 442 F.2d 858, 859-61 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 

(court's questioning of defendant and his alibi witnesses damaged defendant's credibility and therefore was reversible 

error). Because such questions can usurp the jury's factfinding function, cast the judge in the role of advocate, and 

"breach [ ] the atmosphere of judicial evenhandedness that 

should pervade the courtroom," they can deprive defendants 

of fair trials. Barbour, 420 F.2d at 1321. Judges must 

therefore strive to preserve an appearance of impartiality and 

" 'err on the side of [a]bstention from intervention.' " Norris,

873 F.2d at 1526 (alteration in original) (quoting United 

States v. Green, 429 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).

Drawing the line between appropriate and inappropriate 

judicial questioning of witnesses presents circuit courts with a 

challenging task. Appellate records often fail to convey 

nuance and tone. Unlike many federal circuit court judges, 

moreover, district judges are experts at supervising trials and 

managing witnesses. We thus scrutinize trial judge exercise 

of discretion with both deference and "respect appropriately 

reflective of the inescapable remoteness of appellate review." 

Paylor v. United States, 404 F.2d 1263, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 

At the same time, because we must ensure that defendants 

receive fair trials, we will set aside a conviction if witness 

management decisions by district judges "affect substantial 

rights," FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.

In reviewing allegations of improper judicial questioning, 

we examine each case on its own facts. We have reversed 

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when judicial interrogation "may have damaged the appellant's credibility in the eyes of the jury" or "may have given 

the jury the impression that the judge doubted the defendant's credibility." Wyatt, 442 F.2d at 860, 861. We have 

sustained judicial questioning where the case was not "close" 

and the issues addressed by the judge were "peripheral to the 

main issues in the case." United States v. Mangum, 100 F.3d 

164, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

The parties disagree about the applicable standard of review. The government argues that at least with respect to 

Tilghman's first day of testimony, we should review the 

district judge's questions only for plain error because counsel 

made no objection until the second day. United States v. 

Winstead, 74 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Relying on 

FED. R. EVID. 614(c)objections to witness interrogation by 

the court "may be made at the time or at the next available 

opportunity when the jury is not present"Tilghman argues 

that his mistrial motion made first thing on the morning of 

Day Two constituted a timely objection to Day One's questions. He urges us to review the judge's actions for abuse of 

discretion and harmless error. United States v. Lin, 101 

F.3d 760, 769 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Under the circumstances of this case, we need not decide 

whether the Day Two mistrial motion was sufficiently timely 

under Rule 614(c) to permit harmless error review of Day 

One questions. Counsel's objections were timely with respect 

to all Day Two questions; as the government concedes, 

moreover, when reviewing Day Two questions we must review the record as a whole, including Day One questions. See 

United States v. Williams, 113 F.3d 243, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 

(troublesome question reviewed in "context" not reversible 

error); United States v. Patterson, 652 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 

(D.C. Cir. 1981) (judge's "inquisitorial" questions analyzed 

"prospectively" and "in context of [ ] trial transcript" were 

proper).

The question before us, then, is whether the judge's Day 

Two questions, read in the context of the entire trial, amounted to an abuse of discretion and, if so, whether they were 

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harmless. To sustain defendant's conviction, we must "be 

able to declare [our] belief that [any error] was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 

U.S. 18, 24 (1967). We will reverse if there is "a reasonable 

possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Id. (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut,

375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)); see United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 

283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversal required if court "entertains a 'reasonable doubt' about whether error affected the 

outcome" (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24)). The burden of 

demonstrating harmless error rests with the government. 

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

III

With these standards in mind, we examine the district 

judge's questioning, beginning with the most troublesome 

questions on Day Two. Central to his defense, Tilghman 

asserted that DOL employee Julio Mendez told him in a 1984 

telephone call that he had no obligation to report earnings of 

up to $300 per month. While the prosecution questioned 

Tilghman about this claim, the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: You didn't put this on any form, did 

you?

DEFENDANT: Did I put it on a form? No sir; this 

was a telephone conversation.

THE COURT: Did this Julio Mendez put it on a 

form?

DEFENDANT: I don't know, sir.

THE COURT: We just have to take your word for it?

DEF. COUNSEL: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Over-ruled. Is that right?

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DEFENDANT: I'm sworn to tell the truth, sir.

THE COURT: I know, but we have to take your word 

for it; is that right?

DEFENDANT: I don't know if he has any record of it 

or not.

5/22 a.m. Tr. at 46. Focusing on the absence of any evidence 

of this phone call, the prosecutor then questioned Tilghman 

for several transcript pages.

Earlier that same day, while Tilghman described for the 

jury his understanding of DOL Form 1032, the judge questioned him as follows:

THE COURT: You were an employee of Tilghman 

Enterprises?

DEFENDANT: That is correct, sir.

THE COURT: Doesn't that fit in the paragraph Employment other than SelfEmployment? Under this heading, 

you must report all employment.

DEFENDANT: For which you receive wages.

DEF. COUNSEL: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It goes on to say if you perform work 

for which you were not paid, you 

must show a rate of pay of what it 

would have cost. You didn't put that 

in any of them?

DEFENDANT: I felt that was not applicable, sir, because there was no way to compute 

those figures.

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DEF. COUNSEL: Your Honor, if I may just renew my 

objection.

THE COURT: The objection is over-ruled.

PROSECUTOR: In other words, Mr. Tilghman, it is 

your belief that the Department of 

Labor had to specifically ask you, 

Okay, Mr. Tilghman, asterisks, we 

want to know about your corporation?

DEFENDANT: No. It was my belief that I had to 

answer carefully, accurately, and 

honestly; and I did so.

5/22 a.m. Tr. at 40-41.

As in United States v. Wyatt, we think these questions 

"may have given the jury the impression that the judge 

doubted the defendant's credibility." Wyatt, 442 F.2d at 861. 

The judge's questions could have been particularly damaging 

because the indictment charged Tilghman with lying, making 

his credibility unusually critical to his defense. The jury 

could have interpreted the Mendez question"[W]e have to 

take your word for it; is that right?"as signaling that the 

judge considered Tilghman's oath irrelevant and his word 

suspect. Even the government conceded at oral argument 

that the judge should not have asked this question, calling it 

"unfortunate." From the second set of questions, the jury 

could have inferred that the judge accepted the government's 

theory of the case that Tilghman should have checked off the 

"self-employment" box on Form 1032.

Turning to Day One, the judge's questions reinforce our 

perception that the Day Two questions may have colored the 

jury's assessment of Tilghman's veracity. For example, as 

Tilghman explained to the jury how a bank officer had 

instructed him to fill out a loan application, the following 

exchange took place:

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THE COURT: You're an educated man, aren't you? 

You have a master's degree, and you 

did work for a doctorate. Is that 

right?

DEFENDANT: That's correct, sir.

THE COURT: Now, this is supposed to get a loan 

from the bank, and you put down as 

annual income $45,000 and expenditures $14,000. On the basis of that, 

they were going to give you a loan, 

right?

DEFENDANT: I would assume so, yes.

THE COURT: And those figures aren't accurate because the chairman of the board told 

you to put them in.

DEFENDANT: You say they are or are not? 

THE COURT: They're not accurate. You say they 

aren't accurate because he just told 

you what to put in.

DEFENDANT: In essence, he did tell me what to put 

in.

THE COURT: Do you think that any sane bank 

would give somebody a loan on figures that are totally made up? I 

mean, as an educated man who's 

been in business off and on, and 

government business, private business. Do you think [a] bank would 

give a loan to somebody on the basis 

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of figures that are just made up by 

the chairman of the board?

5/21 p.m. Tr. 84-85.

Later on Day One, Tilghman described the bidding process

for EEO investigative contracts, stating that he and other 

investigators routinely lost money or broke even:

THE COURT: Other people who [bid] in the same

ball park with you, and they all must

have lost money, too, is that right?

DEFENDANT: Im assuming so, sir, yes, sir, because

[a] lot of them went out of business.

THE COURT: I see. Its a peculiar business where

everybody stays in for years and loses money all the time.

DEFENDANT: All I can--the only thing I know to

relate it to--

THE COURT: Wouldnt you agree its a peculiar

business?

DEFENDANT: Sir?

THE COURT: Wouldnt you agree its a peculiar

business?

DEFENDANT: Not necessarily. I taught for years,

and I could have made much more

money doing something else.

5/21 p.m. Tr. at 107. A moment later, the judge interjected:

THE COURT: Just a minute. Something occurred to

me. You were not in the business of

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tracts. You were perfectly content 

to lose money on these contracts.

DEFENDANT: I was--

THE COURT: You were a philanthropist; you wanted 

to help these people.

DEFENDANT: No, I was hoping I could at least 

break even.

5/21 p.m. Tr. at 109.

Like the questions on Day Two, these inquiries could have 

suggested to the jury that the judge disbelieved Tilghman. 

From the first set of questions, particularly the judges 

reference to any sane bank, the jury could have inferred 

that the judge thought Tilghman was lying about the basis of 

the loan. The judges reference to philanthropy likewise 

could have suggested to the jury that he did not believe that 

Tilghman was losing money, as he testified. Having heard 

these Day One questions and the judges Day Two challenge 

to Tilghmans honesty under oath, the jury could well have 

concluded that the judge considered Tilghman an untruthful 

witness.

As the government argues, it is possible that the judges 

comments actually helped appellant bring out his defense.

It is also possible that the judges questioning generated jury 

sympathy for Tilghman. But under the harmless error standard, we cannot speculate about what transpired behind the 

jury room door. We ask only whether the judges questions 

may have damaged Tilghmans credibility. Wyatt, 442 F.2d

at 860. Because the jury could reasonably have interpreted 

the judges pointed comments as reflecting his personal disbelief of Tilghman, we cannot find that the government has

prove[n] beyond a reasonable doubt that [the judges commentary] did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

We think the questions asked in this case were even more 

inappropriate than the quite troublesome query the same 

district judge posed in United States v. Williams, 113 F.3d at 

248. There, he asked the defendant why if he was not a drug 

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dealer he used code words for drugs in conversations with 

potential buyers. Although we worried about the "increasing 

number of cases in which our trial judges have been overly 

pointed in questioning witnesses, particularly defendants," id., 

observing that "this case borders on that category," id., we 

upheld that conviction because "there was not an objection, 

and we do not think any error could be characterized as 

plain," id. Here, not only did counsel object, but the judge 

asked several "overly pointed" questions.

This case also differs from United States v. Mangum,

where "any impact the [judge's] questions might have had on 

the jury was insignificant in relation to the overwhelming 

evidence against [the defendant]." 100 F.3d at 174. This 

jury acquitted Tilghman of two counts and the government 

concedes in a post-argument submission that it has no evidentiary basis for distinguishing those two counts from the two 

on which Tilghman was convicted. To us, the split verdict 

suggests both jury uncertainty and susceptibility to judicial 

influence.

The government argues that because the judge also asked 

intrusive questions of government witnesses and badgered 

the prosecutor about her handling of exhibits, the jury could 

have perceived him as evenhanded. The record shows that 

the district judge did criticize the prosecution's case, implying, for example, that some government witnesses were unclear, confused, or inept. After questioning one government 

witness, the judge said to the prosecutor, "You better ask the 

questions. I don't know what she's talking about." 5/13 p.m. 

Tr. at 70. To other witnesses he made such comments as: 

"You have never said just 'no' or 'yes.' You always go on and 

on and make a whole speech," 5/15 Tr. at 41, "Nevermind, 

nevermind. You are not helping me," 5/15 Tr. at 45, and 

"Just answer the question.... We don't need an encyclopedia in response to every question." 5/16 p.m. Tr. at 71. He 

also commented on the prosecution's evidence. When granting a defense objection, for example, he said: "I don't see any 

relevance whatever. I am surprised nobody has objected 

before," 5/16 a.m. Tr. at 27, and during the prosecution's 

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ished with this line of questioning?.... Or are you dredging 

up some more?" 5/20 Tr. at 149-50. In addition, the judge 

criticized the prosecution's inefficient handling of exhibits. "I 

want to congratulate you," he said at one point, "[t]his is 

actually marked with a sticker." 5/15 a.m. Tr. at 52.

Contrary to the government's argument, we think the 

nature of the judge's treatment of the prosecution differed 

fundamentally from his questioning of Tilghman. Indeed, 

comparing the two illustrates the difference between appropriate, active, even aggressive judicial management and prejudicial judicial questioning. As the manager of the proceedings, the district judge had ample authority to discipline 

government counsel for disorganization or inefficiency. It is 

one thing to criticize counsel about exhibits; it is quite 

another to question the defendant's credibility on the stand 

when the central issue is whether he is telling the truth. The 

judge's comments on the confusing quality of government 

testimony could not possibly undermine the prosecution's case 

in the same way that his questioning of Tilghman could have 

punctured the heart of the defense.

The government argues finally that the judge's instructions 

to the jury cured any improprieties. Having explained that 

the jury bears sole responsibility for determining the facts, 

the district judge instructed the jury as follows:

And if I say anything about the facts, which normally I 

don't, you just disregard it because I don't have any 

responsibility, any obligation on the facts. It's entirely 

up to you. And if I say something, if I said something in 

the trial or say something in this closing charge about 

the facts, you just disregard it because you are [as] much 

judges on the facts as I am judge on the law. I hope you 

understand that. And that applies to anything I said in 

the course of the trial, the questions I may have asked or 

rulings I may have made, they're all not designed, and 

you should not take them as being my opinion on the 

facts because it's your opinion on the facts that counts.

5/22 p.m. Tr. at 74-75. This instruction was too little too late. 

Although jury instructions can cure certain irregularities, at 

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least under the plain error standard, Winstead, 74 F.3d at 

1319, we agree with the Second Circuit that where, as here, 

the trial judge asked questions, objected to by counsel, that 

could have influenced the jury's assessment of the defendant's 

veracity, such interference with jury fact-finding cannot be 

cured by standard jury instructions. United States v. Filani,

74 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 1996). We need not consider 

whether special instructions or other measures might cure 

such errors, for none were employed here.

Because we reverse defendant's conviction and remand for 

a new trial, we have no need to reach the sentencing and 

restitution issues.

So ordered.

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