Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cr-00141/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cr-00141-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Michael Harries
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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Record references are to the docket in Case No. CR-02-0141-PHX-MHM.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

James Michael Harries,

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CR-02-0141-PHX-MHM

 CIV 04-1941-PHX-MHM (SLV)

ORDER

Movant pro se has filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 111-112). The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Stephen L.

Verkamp who has issued an Amended Report and Recommendation that recommends that

the § 2255 motion should be denied. (Doc. 124).1

 Movant has filed written objections to the

Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 125). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must review the legal analysis in the Report and Recommendation de novo.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court must review the factual analysis in the Report and

Recommendation de novo for those facts to which objections are filed. "Failure to object to

a magistrate judge's recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact."

Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 562 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Case 2:02-cr-00141-MHM Document 128 Filed 11/10/05 Page 1 of 7
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DISCUSSION

 On June 13, 2002, Movant was charged by superseding indictment with possession

of a stolen Kimber .45 caliber handgun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) (Count I); unlawful

possession of a short-barreled shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (Count II); and

unlawful possession of three explosive devices, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871

(Count III). On July 1, 2002, Movant pleaded guilty to Counts II and III without a plea

agreement. Count I was later ordered dismissed. On September 16, 2002, Movant was

sentenced to concurrent terms of 56 months imprisonment on the two counts of conviction,

to be followed by 36 months of supervised release. Judgment was entered on September 19,

2002. Movant's conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Harries, 2004 WL

900927 (9th Cir. April 23, 2004). Notice of the appellate mandate was entered on the docket

in the district court on May 25, 2004. (Doc. 108). Movant filed his motion under § 2255 on

September 16, 2004. (Doc. 111). 

Movant has raised the following grounds in his motion for relief under § 2255. Movant

contends that his sentence was enhanced based on facts not found by a jury in violation of the

Sixth Amendment, relying in part on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), that 26

U.S.C. § 5861(d) is unconstitutional and that the government engaged in prosecutorial

misconduct because his prosecution was based on unconstitutional gun laws. 

The Magistrate Judge has recommended that Movant is not entitled to relief on his

Sixth Amendment claim regarding his sentence because Movant's conviction and sentence

became final prior to the decision in Blakely. In addition, at his sentencing hearing, Movant

admitted to possessing the .45 caliber handgun but denied knowing that the gun was stolen.

Movant objected to any increase under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b) based on his possession of a

stolen firearm. However, Movant withdrew his objection to this enhancement and the twolevel increase was applied in determining his sentence. Movant has filed an objection to the

Magistrate Judge's recommendation, contending that he was sentenced based on a crime for

which there was no finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Movant also objects on the

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ground that his "statutory maximum" is the maximum a judge may impose based solely on the

facts reflected in the jury's verdict or as admitted by the defendant, not the maximum term set

forth in the relevant federal statute. 

In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that a sentence increase based on facts not found

by a jury violates the Sixth Amendment. At issue in Blakely was Washington State's

sentencing scheme, a scheme similar to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Blakely

decision issued on June 24, 2004. 

As discussed above, notice of the appellate mandate was entered on the docket in the

district court on May 25, 2004. (Doc. 108). It does not appear that Movant filed a petition

for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. A case is considered final and no longer

on direct review when a "judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal

exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally

denied." Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n. 6 (1987); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S.

522, 532 (2003)("for federal criminal defendants who do not file a petition for certiorari with

[the Supreme Court] on direct review, § 2255's one-year limitation period starts to run when

the time for seeking such review expires"). Movant's conviction became final 90 days after

the April 23, 2004 decision by the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction, that is, on July

22, 2004. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S., at 525 (the time in which to petition for a writ

of certiorari expired 90 days after entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment, referring to

Supreme Court Rule 13(1)). It therefore appears that Movant's conviction became final after

the decision in Blakely issued on June 24, 2004. Movant filed his motion under § 2255 on

September 16, 2004. (Doc. 111).

Movant's contention that his sentence was imposed in violation of Blakely is now

governed by the intervening decision issued on January 12, 2005 in United States v. Booker,

125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the holding in Blakely

applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See, Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 610

and n.1 (3d Cir.)(noting that Blakely reserved decision about the status of the Federal

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Sentencing Guidelines, and Booker established a new rule for the federal system)(citing

McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 288

(2005)); Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir.)(where federal criminal

defendant filed § 2255 motion contending that his sentence was imposed in violation of

Blakely, the claim was governed by the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Booker), cert.

denied, 126 S.Ct. 199 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court held that "[a]ny fact (other than

a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum

authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by

the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., 125 S.Ct. at 756. The

Supreme Court also stated in Booker that the statutory maximum for purposes of Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), is the maximum sentence a judge may impose based

solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Booker,

125 S.Ct. at 749. 

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that Booker applies to cases

pending on direct appeal. United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005)(en

banc). In United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that

Booker does not apply retroactively and does not apply to cases on collateral review where

the conviction was final as of the date of Booker's publication. Movant's conviction and

sentence became final no later than July 22, 2004, prior to the date of decision in Booker on

January 12, 2005. Booker does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review where

the conviction was final prior to the date of decision, as in Movant's case. 

Moreover, as noted in the Report and Recommendation, Movant withdrew his

objection to the two-level enhancement based on possession of a stolen firearm under

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4). (Doc. 87 at pp. 29-35). Movant raised this issue on direct appeal and

the Court of Appeals held that Movant had waived the issue on appeal. (Doc. 124, at n.3

citing United States v. Harries, 2004 WL 900927 (9th Cir. 2004)). Movant's objections

numbered 2 and 3 are overruled. 

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Movant appears to raise a claim as to his criminal history category of III determined

at the sentencing hearing. (see Doc. 111 (attached motion at p. 3); Doc. 112 at p. 3). The

Court reviewed Movant's criminal history at the sentencing hearing and Movant did not object

to the Court's findings. (Doc. 87 at pp. 35-39). Fact-finding regarding prior convictions as

relevant to sentencing has not been taken "out of the hands of the courts." See United States

v. Quintana-Quintana, 383 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2004)(as discussed in Blakely, sentencing

enhancement based on a defendant's prior conviction does not have to be presented to a jury),

cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1100 (2005); United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 897, 907

(9th Cir. 2005)(the Supreme Court has made clear that enhancements based on prior

convictions need not be proven beyond reasonable doubt by a jury or admitted by the

defendant to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, citing Booker). 

The Magistrate Judge has recommended that Movant's contention that 26 U.S.C. §

5861(d), which prohibits the possession of an unregistered firearm, is unconstitutional should

be rejected. Claims that § 5861(d) violates a defendant's right to be free of self-incrimination

and is not a valid exercise of Congressional power have been repeatedly rejected by the

federal courts as discussed in the Report and Recommendation. The cases cited in the Report

and Recommendation include several decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Movant has objected to this recommended finding by contending that it misconstrues

the issue he has raised. Movant has objected that he is contending that § 5861(d) is

unconstitutional as applied to his case because "the BATF precludes [Movant] from paying

the Transfer Tax and Registering the said firearms in this case." (Doc. 125 at p. 3). The Court

has reviewed Movant's motion for post-conviction relief (Doc. 111-112) and his response

(Doc. 120) for clarification of the issue raised. Movant contends that the maker of the

firearms in this case was not a licensed manufacturer, importer or dealer and thus not even the

maker could register the firearms as required by law. Therefore, even Movant could not pay

the transfer tax and registration as either the maker, which Movant claims he was not, or

transferee. (Doc. 120 at pp. 2-7). Movant supports his claim by citing United States v.

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Dalton, 960 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1992) and United States v. Rock Island Armory, Inc., 773 F.

Supp. 117 (C.D.Ill. 1991), among others.

Arguments similar to Movant's have been rejected. In United States v. Shepardson,

167 F.3d 120, 123-25 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit held that the fact that defendant

Maxwell as a transferee was himself unable to register the sawed-off shotgun did not render

§ 5861(d) unconstitutional as applied to him. The appellate court also rejected the defendant's

argument that the maker, as a matter of law, could not have secured the BATF's permission

to make and register the sawed-off shotgun. See also, United States v. Ridlehuber, 11 F.3d

516, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1993)("it is true that a transferee may be prosecuted for possessing an

unregistered firearm even though he himself cannot comply with the registration

requirement"; rejecting defendant's argument that "this result offends due process"). In United

States v. Bournes, 105 F. Supp. 2d 736, 745 n.3 (E.D.Mich. 2000), the district court noted that

the reasoning of Rock Island Armory has been rejected by the Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit. Id., (citing United States v. Ross, 9 F.3d 1182, 1192-04 (7th Cir. 1993),

vacated on other grounds, 511 U.S. 1124 (1994)). Movant's objection numbered 4 is

overruled.

The Magistrate Judge has recommended rejection of Movant's third ground based on

prosecutorial misconduct, that is, the government allegedly prosecuted him for a crime under

§ 5861(d) knowing he could not possibly comply with the statute. Movant's contention that

§ 5861(d) is unconstitutional as applied to him has been rejected. His claim of prosecutorial

misconduct likewise is without merit. Movant's objection numbered 5 is overruled.

Movant has objected that he appealed his sentence and not his conviction. The Court

has noted Movant's objection numbered 1 in this regard. Movant's objection is not a

substantive objection. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Movant's objection numbered 1 is noted as not a substantive

objection and his objections numbered 2 through 5 (Doc. 125) are overruled.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Amended Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 124) is adopted in part and as supplemented by this Order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 111-112) is denied. 

DATED this 4th day of November, 2005.

Case 2:02-cr-00141-MHM Document 128 Filed 11/10/05 Page 7 of 7