Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00740/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00740-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
N. A.
Plaintiff
Janet Ainsworth
Plaintiff
Anthony Clark
Defendant
Chris Inabinett
Defendant

Document Text:

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

N.A., a minor who sues by and through )

Janet Ainsworth, his mother and next )

friend, and Janet Ainsworth )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 2:05-CV-740-DRB

) WO

DEPUTY CHRIS INABINETT, in his )

individual capacity, )

)

Defendant. )

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS SHERIFF CLARK

By ORDER entered January 6, 2006 (Doc. 25) this court DISMISSED Sheriff Anthony Clark

as a defendant but reserved ruling on whether his dismissal should be with or without prejudice. 

After due consideration of the parties’ oral arguments, and as now explained, the court concludes

that the dismissal should be prejudicial. 

I.

In this Section 1983 action alleging excessive force by a Covington County deputy sheriff in

restraining the minor plaintiff who had reportedly threatened suicide at his residence, the complaint

as first amended (Doc.20) designated as defendants both the deputy and the Sheriff, not present

during the encounter. For the Sheriff’s alleged culpability, the Complaint specified the following

facts:

• Sheriff Anthony Clark was, at all times material hereto, well aware of the violent,

sadistic, and assaultive tendencies of Inabinett. Clark was aware that retaining

Inabinett as a deputy sheriff posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the members of

the public with whom Inabinetet would certainly come into contact. (¶ 40)

Case 2:05-cv-00740-DRB Document 29 Filed 01/27/06 Page 1 of 4
Defendants assumed arguendo a finding that Deputy Inabinett violated the Plaintiffs’ rights 1

but maintained vigorously that he did not. See Defs.’ Mem. Br., n.4 at 10, citing Cottone v. Jenne,

326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11 Cir. 2003) (setting an ‘extremely rigorous’ standard for supervisory th

responsibility in requiring the existence of a causal connection between the actions of the supervising

official and constitutional violations committed by subordinates).

2

• Clark was deliberately indifferent to unreasonable risk of harm posed by the

retention of Inabinett. (¶ 41)

• No reasonable law enforcement officer in Clark’s position and possessed of the

information known to Clark would have retained Inabinett as a deputy sheriff and

permitted him to continue to carry weapons and a badge. (¶ 42)

• The harm suffered by N.A and Janet was precisely the sort of risk to which Clark

was deliberately indifferent.

These facts alone form the basis of the § 1983 claim against Sheriff Clark in Count III,

alleging his status as “the decision maker for the Sheriff’s Department of Covington County,

Alabama” (¶ 71); that he is charged with “developing and promulgating policies governing the

operations of his office”, “all decisions regarding hiring and retention of deputies under his

supervision”, [and] “proper training and equipping of deputies under his supervision” (¶¶ 72-74);

and, in connection with Deputy Inabinett’s purportedly wrongful conduct, charging him with

liability arising from alleged deliberate indifference with respect to hiring, training, and retaining the

deputy. (¶¶ 75-80) 

In a motion for dismissal (Doc 7) of the original complaint – which contained the same

factual allegations and legal claims – Defendants asserted their entitlement to qualified immunity,

and argued in relevant part:1

[A] supervisor may be held liable under 1983 only when he directly participates in

a violation of a plaintiff’s federally protected rights or where the supervisor’s actions

directly cause the violation. [citing Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11 Cir. th

1990)] 

Case 2:05-cv-00740-DRB Document 29 Filed 01/27/06 Page 2 of 4
3

***

 The only “facts” alleged by the Plaintiffs to support their hiring/retention claim

against Sheriff Clark is a single incident of alleged excessive force in [another] case.

... [W]ith respect to this one incident, Sheriff Clark can only be charged with

knowing that an incident occurred in which a criminal grand jury found insufficient

evidence existed of unlawful conduct to even warrant an indictment. There are no

facts whatsoever alleged in the complaintwith respect to anything Sheriff Clark knew

about Deputy Inabinett before he hired him.

The allegations in the Complaint are insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate

that Sheriff Clark was deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm posed by Deputy

Inabinett. *** The Plaintiff has not alleged any facts whatsoever indicating what

Deputy Inabinett’s history was prior to his hiring.

Defs. Mem. Br. (Doc 8) at 9-11.

Plaintiffs responded as follows to Sheriff Clark’s assertion of qualified immunity:

The plaintiffs cannot provide specific enough information relevant to the hiring,

supervision, training of Deputy Inabinett by the Sheriff Anthony Clark. To this end

Plaintiffs concede the issue. However, Plaintiffs seek to reserve their right to amend

the complaint re-adding Sheriff Clark should discovery reveal that Sheriff Clark

negligently or willfully trained, supervised or maintained the employment of Deputy

Inabinett.

Pls.’ Resp. To Motion to Dismiss at 5 (Doc 10) Thereafter, Plaintiffs did not designate the Sheriff as

a defendant in their amended complaints (see Docs. 20 -26) 

II.

The court readily concurs with Defendants’ argument that the fundamental purpose of

qualified immunity is wholly defeated if a plaintiff is allowed to continue discovery with a view to

re-designating a party whose dismissal has been granted on an undisputed showing of his qualified

immunity from the lawsuit. Having prevailed on his Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, asserted solely

on the grounds of his immunity from suit, Sheriff Clark properly claims all the protections of that

Case 2:05-cv-00740-DRB Document 29 Filed 01/27/06 Page 3 of 4
See 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.34[6][a] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.); NAACP v. Hunt,

2

891 F.2d 1555, 1560 (11 Cir. 1990) (Supreme Court has clearly stated that “the dismissal for failure th

to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’”).

See, e.g., Williams v. Alabama State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11 Cir. 1997) (motion 3 th

to dismiss proper on grounds of qualified immunity for defendants in § 1983 civil rights action when

former professor’s complaint alleging retaliatory firing for criticizing textbook written by superior

failed to allege violation of established constitutional right). 

4

immunity, including the avoidance of costs and inconvenience of involvement as a party in the same

lawsuit at any time. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal summarily terminates cases on their merits, and it is

presumed to be with prejudice and a claim preclusive effect. Accordingly, courts generally disfavor 2

such motions unless the complaint sets forth facts showing that qualified immunity applies or, as in

this case, plaintiff concedes that he cannot support even the indisputably conclusory facts averred.3

 “Unless the Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a Defendant

pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” See

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

Pursuant to the foregoing facts and reasoning, it is now

 ORDERED that the Order (Doc. 25) granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22)

to the extent of its request for dismissal of Defendant Sheriff Anthony Clark, is now supplemented

to enter such dismissal WITH PREJUDICE.

Done this 27 day of January , 2006. TH

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00740-DRB Document 29 Filed 01/27/06 Page 4 of 4