Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-02312/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-02312-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Plaintiff
Pedro Velasquez-Reyes
Defendant

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By order dated January 6, 2005, this matter was stayed pending a determination of

Velasquez-Reyes' mental competency to stand trial. Docket No. 11. As reflected in his report dated

March 11, 2005, Barry Morenz, M.D., concluded that Velasquez-Reyes was unable to understand

the pending proceedings and recommended the implementation of psychiatric evaluation and

treatment. Defendant's Exhibit R, p. 7. By order dated May 5, 2005, this case was stayed pending

Velasquez-Reyes' restoration of competency. Docket No. 23. On November 21, 2005, the Court

received a Forensic Report from the Federal Medical Center indicating that Velasquez-Reyes was

able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings. Docket No. 41. The hearing on

the instant motion was then set for January 9, 2006. Id. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

Pedro Velasquez-Reyes, 

Defendant. ______________________________________

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No. CR 04-2312-TUC-RCC (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

On March 31, 2005, Defendant Pedro Velasquez-Reyes filed a Motion to Dismiss

Indictment [Docket No. 17]. Pursuant to the District Court's Order dated November 17,

2004, the motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Marshall for hearing and report

and recommendation. Velasquez-Reyes' motion was heard by Magistrate Judge Marshall on

January 9, 2006.1

 Velasquez-Reyes was present and represented by counsel. No testimony

was presented and the Motion is submitted based on the pleadings and exhibits. Having

considered the motion, the exhibits, and the arguments of counsel, the Magistrate Judge

submits the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommends that the

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Velasquez-Reyes additionally alleged a violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment

of the United States Constitution. That allegation, however, was voluntarily withdrawn in his reply

brief and at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 10;

Tr. 3.

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District Judge, after independent review of the record, deny the Motion to Dismiss

Indictment. 

I. Findings of Fact

In his motion, Velasquez-Reyes seeks dismissal of the indictment on the basis that his

previous removal from the United States violated his right to due process.2

 As such, he

contends he is not subject to prosecution for a violation of § 1326(b)(2). The facts pertinent

to the evaluation of Velasquez-Reyes' claim are set forth below.

Velasquez-Reyes is a citizen of Mexico. Government's Exhibit 2, p. 2. On September

15, 1996, Velasquez-Reyes was arrested by the San Francisco, California Police Department

on charges of Assault with a Deadly Weapon and Second Degree Robbery. Defendant's

Exhibit A. Subsequently, on September 18, 1996, Velasquez-Reyes was taken into custody

by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") and was served with an Order to

Show Cause and a Notice of Hearing (the "OSC and Notice"). Defendant's Exhibit B. The

OSC and Notice informed him that the basis for deportation was that he had entered the

country without inspection. Id. The OSC and Notice informed him that he was entitled to

a hearing before an immigration judge, but did not provide a date or time for such a hearing.

Id.

On September 18, 1996, Velasquez-Reyes was also provided a Notification to Alien

of Conditions of Release or Detention, which set his bond in the amount of $25,000.00.

Defendant's Exhibit C. On that same form, Velasquez-Reyes requested redetermination of

the custody decision by an immigration judge. Id. On September 20, 1996, VelasquezReyes' bond was reduced to $3000.00. Defendant's Exhibit D. The bond amount was posted

by Brenda Perez Vasquez and Velasquez-Reyes was released. Id.

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On February 19, 1997, Velasquez-Reyes, through counsel, entered a plea of guilty in

the San Francisco Municipal Court to a felony charge of "Accessory to a Felony" in violation

of the California Penal Code. Defendant's Exhibit J. On March 19, 1997, the San Francisco

court imposed a sentence of five days in jail, with credit for time served, and three years

probation. Defendant's Exhibit K. 

On March 24, 1998, Velasquez-Reyes again was arrested in San Francisco, this time

for "Sale of a Controlled Substance." Defendant's Exhibit L. As a result, on May 21, 1998,

his probation on the 1997 Accessory to a Felony charge was terminated. Defendant's Exhibit

M. Subsequently, on April 23, 1998, he entered into a plea agreement with the government

on the drug charges and was sentenced to one year in jail followed by three years of

probation. Defendant's Exhibits G, N & O; Government's Exhibit 2. 

INS records reflect that Velasquez-Reyes "was given an opportunity to file for relief

from deportation," but that, "[h]e breached his bond, failed to appear [at an initial hearing on

February 27, 1997] and he was ordered deported to Mexico on May 14, 1999 . . . ."

Defendant's Exhibits E. Velasquez-Reyes, who was in jail at the time, apparently did not

receive notice of the May 1999 hearing and the deportation order was issued in absentia.

Defendant's Exhibit I. 

On July 15, 1999, the INS issued a Warrant of Removal/Deportation. Defendant's

Exhibit H. Velasquez-Reyes was subsequently deported into Nogales, Mexico, on July 18,

2001. Id. 

On July 30, 2002, Velasquez-Reyes again illegally entered the United States and was

prosecuted in this District for illegal reentry after deportation. See CR 02-1462 TUC-RCC

(JM). During that matter, the Court ordered a competency evaluation. On October 25, 2002,

Sergio I. Martinez, Ph.D., examined Velasquez-Reyes. The evaluation reports that he has

a borderline to low average range in areas of non-verbal functioning and a prorated

Performance IQ of 76. Government's Exhibit 2, pp. 9-10. On December 2, 2002, after

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reviewing the report, the District Court Judge found Velasquez-Reyes competent to proceed

and accepted his guilty plea. Id., p. 3. 

In the instant matter, on October 21, 2004, Velasquez-Reyes was arrested at or near

Nogales, Arizona, on immigration related charges. He was charged with Re-Entry After

Deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which was enhanced by 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)

based on his previous removal on July 18, 2001 and on his 1997 (Accessory to a Felony) and

1998 (Sale of Controlled Substance) California convictions. Id. On January 13, 2005, the

Court ordered another competency evaluation. Defendant's Exhibit R. He was diagnosed

by Barry Morenz, M.D., as suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and major

depression. Id., p. 5. He was also found to have borderline intellectual functioning. Id., pp.

5-6. Dr. Morenz concluded that 

[a]t the current time Mr. Velasquez-Reyes appears to be

psychotic and is suffering from a thought disorder that causes

him to be unable to understand the proceedings presently

pending against him and causes him to be unable to properly

assist his counsel in his own defense. 

Id., p. 7. Dr. Morenz recommended that Velasquez-Reyes be sent to the appropriate federal

facility for treatment and medication. Id. On May 5, 2005, the Court ordered that

Velasquez-Reyes be sent to an appropriate federal medical facility to determine whether

there was a substantial probability that Velasquez-Reyes' competency to stand trial could be

restored in the foreseeable future. Docket No. 23. Six months later, on November 18, 2005,

the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina, issued a Forensic Evaluation and a

Certificate of Restoration of Competency to Stand Trial.

II. Conclusions of Law

A. Can Velasquez-Reyes Challenge the Indictment?

On January 6, 2006, the Government filed a supplemental opposition to VelasquezReyes' Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure12(b)(3)(B) does

not provide a legal basis for the dismissal of the indictment. Docket No. 50. Relying on

United States v. Salman, 378 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2004), the Government asserts that "[t]he

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Ninth Circuit held that there is no explicit authority to grant a pretrial judgment as a matter

of law on the merits . . . ," and, therefore the Court "cannot grant a motion to dismiss an

indictment as a matter of law based on stipulated or undisputed facts." Government's

Opposition, p. 2. However, a review of Salman and Ninth Circuit decisions undermines the

Government's position.

As a threshold matter, Salman is not, as the Government asserts, a case from the Ninth

Circuit. Rather, it is a decision from the Eleventh Circuit in which the defendant was

arrested under 18 U.S. C. § 922(g)(5)(A) for possessing a firearm while being an alien

“illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the

indictment, arguing that based on undisputed facts, he was not “illegally or unlawfully in the

United States” as a matter of law at the time of his arrest. The district court agreed and

dismissed the indictment. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that “[b]y looking beyond

the face of the indictment and ruling on the merits of the charges against Salman, the district

court in effect granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.” Id. The Salman court

relied upon Eleventh Circuit precedent, stating that "[t]here is no summary judgment

procedure in criminal cases. Nor do the rules provide for a pre-trial determination of

sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 1268 (quoting United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307

(11th Cir.1992)). The Salman court noted that the Sixth Circuit disagreed with its

conclusion, but it stated that cases from three other circuits, including the Ninth Circuit,

supported its conclusion. See id. at 1268 n. 5.

Further examination of Salman indicates that the relevant part of the decision was

expressly rejected in United States v. Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that

the holding in Salman was unique to the Eleventh Circuit), and United States v. Flores, 404

F.3d 320, 324-325 (5th Cir. 2005). However, the Ninth Circuit's treatment of criminal

motions to dismiss is less straightforward. In United States v. Jensen, 93 F.3d 667 (9th Cir.

1996), the defendants were charged with sending an unseaworthy ship to sea in violation of

46 U.S.C. § 10908. Id. at 668-669. The defendants filed motions to dismiss contending

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venue in the Western District of Washington was improper because, at the time the crimes

were allegedly committed, the unseaworthy vessel was in Alaskan waters or on the high seas.

Id. at 669. The district court granted the motions based on documentary evidence provided

by the defendants as to the location of the vessels. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found

that the district court had erred in considering the documentary evidence submitted by the

defendants because "[a] defendant may not properly challenge an indictment, sufficient on

its face, on the ground that the allegations are not supported by adequate evidence." Id.

(citations omitted). Such a motion, the Appeals Court determined, would be tantamount to

a summary trial of the evidence and the district court "should not consider evidence not

appearing on the face of the indictment." Id.

At first blush, Jensen appears to support the Government's position here. There is no

dispute that the indictment is facially sufficient. The Government has alleged the elements

required to support an indictment for the violation of section 1326: (1) the defendant is an

alien; (2) was previously deported; and (3) he thereafter reentered the United States without

permission. United States v. Meza-Soria, 935 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir.1991). The rule

described in Jensen suggests that these allegations, properly alleged, insulate the indictment

from dismissal. The problem with this conclusion, however, is that it is obviously wrong:

the Ninth Circuit regularly reviews motions dismiss charges founded on section 1326 and

allows defendants to collaterally attack the underlying deportations in certain circumstances.

See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 429 F.3d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.

Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir.2002) (motion to dismiss indictment under §

1326); United States v. Gastelum-Almeida, 298 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002). The

distinguishing factor between Jensen and the section 1326 challenges is not readily apparent.

However, in the section 1326 cases, a predicate offense is alleged and the Constitution

therefore requires that a defendant charged under the section be permitted to collaterally

attack the removal order under the due process clause. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481

U.S. 828, 837-38 (1987). As the Supreme Court declared in Mendoza-Lopez, “where a

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determination made in an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent

imposition of a criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful review of the

administrative proceeding.” Id. at 837-38 (emphasis omitted). 

Congress effectively codified the holding of Mendoza-Lopez such that a collateral

attack is expressly authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). In pertinent part, that section

provides: 

In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may not

challenge the validity of the deportation order described in

subsection (a)(1) of this section or subsection (b) of this section

unless the alien demonstrates that– 

(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may

have been available to seek relief against the order;

(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued

improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial

review; and 

(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). This section and the Mendoza-Lopez decision clearly establish the

propriety of a motion to dismiss an indictment under section 1326 based on an alleged defect

in the underlying deportation.

B. Can Velasquez-Reyes Collaterally Attack His Prior Deportation?

The Government alleges that Velasquez-Reyes cannot collaterally attack his prior

deportation because he has not exhausted his administrative remedies as required under

section 1326(d)(1). It notes that an alien who is "ordered deported in absentia may have that

order rescinded upon the filing of a motion to reopen with the Immigration Judge '[a]t any

time if the alien demonstrates that he or she was in federal or state custody and the failure to

appear was through no fault of the alien.'" Response, p. 4 (quoting 8 C.F.R. §

1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(2)). In response, Velasquez-Reyes asserts that his mental condition

prevented him from pursuing the available remedies and, citing Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d

1096 (9th Cir. 2001), contends that his condition provides a basis for reopening his prior

deportation case. Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 5-9. It thus appears that

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 As of the date of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Velasquez-Reyes had not sought

to re-open his deportation proceedings. Tr. 13-14.

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administrative remedies remain available to Velasquez-Reyes and a collateral attack on his

prior deportation is unavailable under section 1326(d)(1).3

 

There are exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. The exhaustion requirement does

not apply where there is a constitutional challenge to the immigration laws or the procedures

implementing the law. Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1567 (9th Cir. 1994). Under this

exception, to successfully collaterally attack the underlying deportation order as

"fundamentally unfair," Velasquez-Reyes must show a due process violation in connection

with that proceeding and that he can plausibly argue that he suffered prejudice as a result.

United States v. Arrieta, 226 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Proa-Tovar,

975 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1992). Velasquez-Reyes has offered evidence of a potential due

process violation in relation to his deportation. However, he has not offered a plausible

argument that he suffered prejudice as a result.

The Due Process Clause protects aliens in deportation proceedings and includes the

right to a full and fair hearing as well as notice of that hearing. Landon v. Plasencia 459 U.S.

21, 32-33 (1982). An alien does not have to actually receive notice of a deportation hearing

in order to satisfy due process requirements. Due process is satisfied if service is conducted

in a manner "reasonably calculated" to ensure that notice reaches the alien. See Farhoud v.

INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Here, Velasquez-Reyes alleges

that his due process rights were violated because the OSC and Notice did not advise him of

the time and date of his deportation hearing. He notes that the section designated to provide

that information is blank. Defendant's Exhibit B. The Government does not dispute this

assertion and has not provided any evidence that Velasquez-Reyes received notice of the

February 27, 1997 or May 14, 1999 hearings which resulted in his deportation. As such, he

has established the necessary due process violation. 

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Velasquez-Reyes also contends that his mental illness rendered him unable to

meaningfully participate in his deportation proceedings and resulted in a due process

violation. Motion, pp. 6-10. However, even when an alien is not competent to participate

intelligently in his deportation proceedings, such proceedings may still satisfy due process

requirements. See Nee Hae Wong v. INS, 550 F.2d 521, 522 (9th Cir.1977). The Ninth

Circuit has distinguished deportation proceedings from criminal proceedings, holding that

"the full trappings of procedural protections that are accorded criminal defendants are not

necessarily constitutionally required for deportation proceedings.” Id. at 523. As discussed

above, however, Velasquez-Reyes did not receive notice and, therefore, did not participate

in his deportation hearings. As such, the effect his mental illness had on his ability to

participate intelligently in the proceeding cannot be evaluated.

Even though Velasquez-Reyes can establish a due process violation, Proa-Tovar and

Arrieta require a plausible showing of prejudice. "To establish prejudice, [a defendant] does

not have to show that he actually would have been granted relief. Instead, he must only show

that he had a 'plausible' ground for relief from deportation." United States v. UbaldoFigueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004). Toward this end, Velasquez-Reyes highlights

the fact that he requested a redetermination of his bond amount and that the Immigration

Judge in his case reduced his bond from $25,000 to $3000. See Defendant's Exhibits C &

D. Velasquez-Reyes asserts that "[t]he Immigration Judge would not have reduced [his]

bond from $25,000 to $3,000 if he did not have a 'plausible ground for [relief]." Motion, p.

10; Tr. 6-8 ("The only thing I have to present for the Court's consideration, is that the . . .

immigration judge reduced the bond from $25,000 to $3,000."). However, Velasquez-Reyes

does not offer any indication of what that "plausible ground" may have been. Standing alone,

the reduction of his bond is not the sort of evidence that constitutes a plausible ground for

relief. See generally Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1050-51 (finding plausible ground for

discretionary relief from deportation under former Immigration and Nationality Act section

212(c)); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding plausible

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ground for INA § 212 waiver of removal); United States v. Jimenez-Marmolejo, 104 F.3d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding plausible ground for relief where the alien's entire family

lived in the United States and the alien suffered from borderline retardation). As a result, he

has not established the potential prejudice necessary to support relief. 

Without showing a plausible ground for relief, Velasquez-Reyes is left only to argue

that the due process violation standing alone should merit the rejection of his underlying

deportation as a sufficient predicate offense to support the current charges against him. A

similar contention was discussed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Ferguson in United States

v. Leon-Leon, 35 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 1994). In Leon-Leon, which was an appeal from

conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), the court determined that the defendant's due process

rights had been violated during his prior deportation hearing. However, the conviction was

nevertheless affirmed because the court concluded, as is the case here, that the defendant was

required to establish prejudice resulting from the violation and had failed to do so. Id. at

1431-32. 

In dissent, Judge Ferguson disagreed with the majority's determination that prejudice

necessarily was required to mount a successful collateral attack on a prior deportation

hearing. Id. at 1433. Reviewing the facts underlying Leon-Leon's previous deportation

hearing, Judge Ferguson noted that the hearing was

without any evidence that he consented to not being physically

present. Other than the preliminary questions, the judge's

questions were not translated into Spanish, making it impossible

for the appellant to participate or even understand what was

happening.

Id. at 1434. Judge Ferguson characterized these facts as constituting "structural defects that

affected the very framework within which the hearing proceeded." Id. The error in the

hearing not being discreet but permeating the hearing itself, Judge Ferguson would have held

that such error could not be subjected to harmless error analysis. Id. Thus, he would have

held that the prior deportation order should not have been used to prove an element of LeonLeon's § 1326 violation. Id.

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Although compelling, Judge Ferguson's dissent does not constitute authority upon

which this court can rely in evaluating Velasquez-Reyes' claims. The majority opinion in

Leon-Leon clearly requires that, before relief can be granted, the defendant must establish

that prejudice resulted from any due process violation found in an underlying deportation

hearing. Here, Velasquez-Reyes has failed to offer any evidence of prejudice and, even

assuming that a due process violation occurred, he would not be entitled to relief.

C. Can Velasquez-Reyes Collaterally Attack His Prior Convictions?

Velasquez-Reyes also contends that the indictment must be dismissed because the

predicate state aggravated felony convictions were constitutionally defective. The transcripts

of both the 1997 and 1998 changes of plea in the state court proceeding do not reflect any

consideration of his mental competency. Defendant's Exhibits J & N. Velasquez-Reyes,

relying on Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), asserts that this omission violated due

process and places the accuracy of the convictions in doubt. Motion, pp. 7-9. 

In Godinez, the Supreme Court concluded that the competency standard for pleading

guilty or for waiving the right to trial is the same as the competency standard for standing

trial. Id. at 398. However, even if Velasquez-Reyes were able to establish that the trial court

had "sufficient doubt of his competence" and nevertheless accepted his pleas, see, e.g., Drope

v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975), he would not be entitled to relief under Godinez. This

is because the Ninth Circuit has held that, in relation to reviewing a challenge to a conviction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, "the Constitution requires only that collateral attacks in illegal reentry after deportation proceedings be allowed on convictions obtained in violation of the

right to counsel." United States v. Gutierrez-Cervantez, 132 F.3d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1997).

As it is apparent from the transcripts related to the California convictions, Velasquez-Reyes'

was provided counsel in both cases. As such, neither of Velasquez-Reyes' claims collaterally

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This is not to suggest that Velasquez-Reyes had no federal remedy for the alleged defects

in the California proceedings. The proper procedure for raising these claims in federal court requires

the filing of a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See, e.g., Godinez, 509 U.S.

at 393-94.

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attacking his prior convictions raise Sixth Amendment claims, he is not entitled to relief

under the Gutierrez-Cervantez decision.4

III. Recommendation 

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an Order denying Defendant Pedro Velasquez-Reyes' Motion to Dismiss

Indictment [Docket No. 17].

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge

may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). If objections

are filed, they should bear the following case designation: CR 04-2312-TUC-RCC.

DATED this 26th day of January, 2006.

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