Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cr-00269/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cr-00269-39/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brent Douglas Cole
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRENT DOUGLAS COLE,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cr-269-GEB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTIONS FOR A NEW TRIAL 

Pro se Defendant Brent Douglas Cole filed new trial 

motions docketed in the district court as ECF numbers 189, 190, 

195, and 196.1 When Cole filed ECF No. 189, his direct appeal to 

the Ninth Circuit was pending. The United States filed a response 

to Cole’s new trial motion in which it argued: “Because the 

defendant's case is pending direct appeal at the Ninth Circuit, 

pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1), this Court may not rule on the 

Motion for New Trial until defendant's appeal is completed and “the 

appellate court remands the case.” Resp. to Mot. for New Trial at 

2:10-12, ECF No. 191. The United States requested in this response

 

1 Cole’s request to represent himself was granted in the district court on 

April 24, 2015, but he elected to be represented by counsel on appeal from the 

judgment. However, after his direct appeal was decided he insisted that his 

appellate counsel withdraw from the case and “that . . . no counsel . . . be 

assigned to the case.” Letter from Brent Douglas Cole to appellate counsel,

ECF No. 207.

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“that [the district judge] defer consideration of the motion and 

stay any briefing on this matter until the conclusion of 

defendant's direct appeal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 37(a).” Id. at 2:17-20. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(1) prescribes: “If an 

appeal is pending, the court may not grant a motion for a new trial 

until the appellate court remands the case.” Further, Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 37(a) prescribes: “If a timely motion is made 

for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an 

appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may: (1) 

defer considering the motion; (2) deny the motion; or (3) state 

either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals 

remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial 

issue.” The United States’ request was granted in an order filed 

January 5, 2017, in which the district judge deferred consideration

of Cole’s motion for a new trial and stayed further briefing on 

the motion until the conclusion of Cole’s direct appeal. Order, 

ECF No. 192. 

Subsequently, the United States filed a motion on 

December 10, 2018, in which it requested an order be issued lifting 

the stay “because direct appeal is complete” and “extend[ing] the 

time [for] the United States [to file an] opposition until March 

1, 2019.” 2:24, 3:10-11, ECF No. 197. Cole filed a response to 

this request on December 26, 2018, arguing: “[t]he court should 

lift the stay and deny the government[‘s] request for [time to file 

an opposition].” Resp. to United States Mot. at 2, ECF No. 199. 

The district judge lifted the stay and granted the United States 

until March 1, 2019 to file an opposition to Cole’s new trial 

motions in an order filed January 3, 2019. ECF No. 200. 

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On March 1, 2019, the United States filed an opposition 

to Cole’s motions for a new trial arguing, inter alia: “Because 

Cole does not meet the standard necessary for a new trial, the 

Court should deny all of Cole’s motions.” Opp’n at 1:19-20, ECF 

No. 210. 

On February 11, 2015, Cole was convicted by a jury of 

one count of assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 111(a) and 111(b), one count of assaulting a person assisting a 

federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a) and 111(b), 

and one count of discharging a firearm during and in relation to a 

crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and

924(c)(1)(A)(iii).

The Ninth Circuit decided the direct appeal as follows: 

Cole argue[d] on appeal that his indictment is 

invalid because the government interfered with 

the independent structure of the grand jury[;] 

that the district court denied his right of 

allocution and [therefore the] case [should] 

be remanded for a new sentencing hearing[; and] 

that his two assault convictions under 18 

U.S.C. §§ 111(a) and 111(b) are not “crimes of 

violence” for purposes of sustaining his 

firearm conviction.

[A]ny error in the grand jury proceedings here 

was rendered harmless when the petit jury 

convicted Cole on all three counts. Cole has 

not otherwise established that the grand 

jury’s structural protections in this case 

were compromised.

[A] district court’s failure to give the right 

of allocution at sentencing [is reviewed for 

harmless error]. The district court afforded 

Cole his right of allocution on multiple 

occasions during sentencing and properly 

limited Cole’s discussion to issues pertaining 

to mitigation.

This Court has held that a defendant charged 

with assault by using a deadly or dangerous 

weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) must 

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necessarily threaten the use of force. As 

such, a § 111(b) weapons charge is 

categorically a “crime of violence.” Cole’s 

convictions on Counts One and Two necessarily 

threaten the use of force and are therefore 

categorically “crimes of violence.” The jury’s 

determination that Cole committed a “crime of 

violence” was not an error.

Ninth Circuit Memorandum at 2–3, ECF No. 193 (citations omitted).

The United States argues in its opposition to Cole’s new 

trial motions: 

In scattershot fashion across four pleadings 

filed in 2016 and 2018, Cole raises various 

issues in support of his request for new trial, 

a summary of which includes: (1) 

jurisdictional error, failure to recuse, and 

bias by the Court; (2) improper indictment and 

prosecutorial misconduct before the grand 

jury; (3) ineffective assistance of trial 

defense counsel; (4) inability to present a 

defense during the proceedings and lack of 

allocution at sentencing; (5) the Court’s 

failure to suppress law enforcement’s initial 

contact with Cole and his confession after the 

shooting; (6) newly “discovered” medical 

records; (7) Government’s suppression of 

exculpatory evidence; (8) unsubstantiated 

allegations of misconduct against a Nevada 

County Sheriff’s investigator; and (9) 

Government’s concealment of Cole’s personal 

papers and missing state court pleadings.

Cole fundamentally misunderstands the purpose 

of a new trial motion. None of the issues 

raised merits a new trial as each: (1) is timebarred; (2) is not based on newly discovered 

evidence; or (3) has been previously litigated 

and decided by this Court or the Ninth Circuit.

Opp’n at 6:2-13.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 concerns a motion

for a new trial. Rule 33(b)(1) prescribes: “Any motion for a new 

trial grounded on newly discovered evidence must be filed within 3 

years after the verdict or finding of guilty.” Rule 33(b)(2) 

prescribes: “Any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason 

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other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 14 days 

after the verdict or finding of guilty.”

Cole makes conclusory and unsupported arguments that the 

district judge should have recused himself in this case. “A judge 

should not recuse himself based upon conclusory, unsupported or 

tenuous allegations.” In re Kaminski, 960 F.2d 1062, 1065 n.3 (D.C. 

Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Cole’s recusal motion is denied. Cole

also argues that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over the 

offenses of which he was convicted. This basis for the motion 

lacks merit and is denied. Cole also makes an argument that could 

be construed as an assertion that a defect exists in the indictment. 

However, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(A) requires

such a challenge to the indictment to be raised “by pretrial 

motion.” This is an untimely motion and is therefore is denied.

Cole also seeks suppression of evidence in his motion. 

Cole’s suppression of evidence arguments are denied since the 

arguments were required to have been made in a Rule 12 pretrial 

motion and are therefore untimely. Cole’s motion also contains 

arguments concerning the grand jury. These arguments are 

disregarded because they involve an issue decided by the Ninth 

Circuit. The district judge will not address issues decided by 

the Ninth Circuit on direct appeal. Cole’s motion also contains 

allegations against Nevada County Sheriff Detective Rusty Greene,

which are time-barred under Rule 33 because they are raised more 

than three years after the entry of the jury verdict. Cole’s 

motion also contains conclusory contentions that the government 

seized his personal papers following his arrest and concealed them. 

Cole has not shown that these allegations justify granting his 

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motion. Cole also argues that documents in a state case court file 

are missing or were removed. This argument does not justify 

granting Cole’s new trial motion.

Cole also argues his motion should be granted because a 

newly discovered diagnostic imaging report conclusively proves that 

Bureau of Land Management Ranger Thad Pultorak fired the first shot 

involved in the gunfight offenses of which Cole was convicted. The 

referenced report does not support Cole’s assertion. Nor is the 

report newly discovered evidence within three years after entry of 

the February 11, 2015 jury verdict. The United States evinces this 

point in its opposition, as follows: “Cole admitted he received 

the report on or about April 27, 2018 . . . [and] this issue was

not raised in Cole’s first new trial pleadings filed in December 

2016. (ECF 189 and 190).” Opp’n at 10:8-9. This motion is denied.

Cole also argues that the United States suppressed 

exculpatory evidence of the interview of Tom Browning, one of the 

EMS personnel who responded to the campsite where the gunfight 

occurred. The United States concedes in its opposition that it 

had “inadvertently withheld the audio copy of Mr. Browning’s 

interview, but [explains it gave Cole’s trial counsel] a written 

summary of [Mr. Browning’s] interview [which is] contained within 

a police report [in] its discovery production to trial defense 

counsel[; and] that the police report containing the summary of 

Mr. Browning’s interview also indicated that the interview had been 

audio recorded and that a copy of the recording had been placed 

into evidence.” Opp’n at 10:19-24. The United States further 

argues the probative value of the referenced audio copy of the 

interview is limited because: 

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Cole cites the following passage [from the 

report] “and that he [Cole] was the one that 

had returned fire” [for the purpose of showing 

that Cole was shooting in self-defense and did 

not initiate the gunfight]. Cole wholly 

ignores Mr. Browning’s further explanation on 

the next page where he stated “Didn’t mean to 

say it that way if I did. I’m sorry. That 

there was gunfire and the he [Cole] was one 

person shooting and the officers were the other 

persons shooting. I don’t know whether he 

[Cole] shot first or second or anything like 

that.” Indeed, Mr. Browning wasn’t present 

during the shooting and only responded to the 

scene afterwards. 

Id. at 11:18-23 (citations omitted). 

“[T]o prevail on a Rule 33 motion for a new trial, the 

movant must satisfy a five-part test: (1) the evidence must be 

newly discovered; (2) the failure to discover the evidence sooner 

must not be the result of a lack of diligence on the defendant’s 

part; (3) the evidence must be material to the issues at trial; 

(4) the evidence must be neither cumulative nor merely impeaching; 

and (5) the evidence must indicate that a new trial would probably 

result in acquittal.” United States v. Kulczyk, 931 F.2d 542, 548 

(9th Cir. 1991). The referenced audio copy of Mr. Browning’s 

interview is cumulative considering the discovery provided to Cole

and is not material since Mr. Browning did not witness the gunfight. 

Therefore, this motion is denied.

Cole also seeks a new trial based on: 

Mr. Browning’s observations of the crime scene 

wherein he mentions seeing “another citizen 

. . . kind of further back by the camp, [and 

it] appeared that he might have been 

handcuffed, and sitting down. Never spoke with 

him or had any contact with him.” Other than 

mentioning the supposed existence of this 

alleged material witness, Cole provides no 

further analysis as to how this fact alone 

entitles him to a new trial under the Kulcyzk

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factors. 

Opp’n at 12:2-7 (citations omitted). 

The United States argues that the trial record does not 

support Cole’s contention that an unidentified person witnessed 

the gunfight or was present at or near the campsite when other law 

enforcement and medical personnel responded to the scene after the 

conclusion of the gunfight. The United States further argues:

Cole provides no offer of proof that suggests 

what, if anything, this alleged material 

witness might say about the shooting. In fact, 

whether this witness actually exists is 

subject to serious doubt. As [Andrew D.

Forristel, Special Agent with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation states in his 

affidavit attached to the opposition] Mr. 

Browning’s statement was the only one that 

referenced this alleged material witness. No 

other witness at the scene during the shooting 

(Ranger Pultorak, Officer Hardin and Cole) or 

responding to the scene immediately after the 

shooting (Officer Zelhart and Deputy Liller) 

made mention of another witness. (Exhibit B). 

It is virtually inconceivable that no other 

law enforcement officer at the scene of the 

shooting on June 14, 2014, especially Deputy 

Liller who was in charge of scene security, 

noticed or documented the existence of a 

supposedly handcuffed civilian witness. 

(Exhibit A). [Moreover,] Mr. Browning’s 

interview by a Nevada County investigator 

occurred nearly two months after the shooting 

on August 21, 2014. Considering he did not 

write a report about the incident and no other 

law enforcement officer present at the 

shooting scene on June 14, 2014 noticed or 

mentioned this alleged material witness, it is 

quite likely Mr. Browning was simply mistaken 

in his observations when he spoke with the 

Nevada County investigator. Even if he was 

not, Cole fails to establish a cognizable Brady 

claim that entitles him to a new trial under 

Rule 33.

Opp’n at 12:14-26, 13:1. 

Cole has not shown the likelihood that another person 

witnessed issues involved in the trial, and that the referenced 

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person would provide material evidence which would probably result 

in Cole’s acquittal as required under the third and fifth Kulcyzk

factors. 931 F.2d at 548 (stating “(3) the evidence must be material 

to the issues at trial . . . ; and (5) the evidence must indicate 

that a new trial would probably result in acquittal.”). Therefore, 

this missing witness argument does not entitle Cole to a new trial.

Cole also argues he should be granted a new trial because 

his attorney provided him ineffective assistance in the district 

court. The United States counters: “Cole’s briefing [on this 

argument] is devoid of any legal or factual bases to support this 

claim, or [to] otherwise explain how [his attorney’s representation 

of him] entitles him to a new trial.” Opp’n at 8:4-5. Cole’s 

argument that his attorney provided him ineffective assistance in 

the district court is conclusory, devoid of factual support, and 

fails to satisfy the newly discovered evidence requirement in Rule 

33. 

For the stated reasons, Defendant’s motions for a new 

trial are denied. 

Dated: March 13, 2019

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