Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02681/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02681-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dick Busby
Appellee
Roy Edward Franklin
Appellant

Document Text:

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The Honorable J. Thomas Roy, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent

of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 03-2681

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Roy Edward Franklin,

Appellant,

v.

Dick Busby, Sheriff of 

Crittenden County, 

Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

 [UNPUBLISHED]

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Submitted: November 16, 2004

 Filed: January 24, 2005

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Before RILEY, JOHN R. GIBSON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

After being sentenced to a year’s imprisonment for loitering and possession of

drug paraphernalia by the District Court of West Memphis, Arkansas, Roy Edward

Franklin brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas1

 dismissed with

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prejudice Franklin’s petition, concluding that Franklin’s failure to pursue an appeal

of his state conviction procedurally barred him from federal habeas relief. Because

Franklin failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of judgment by the

federal district court, we are obliged to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2002, Roy Edward Franklin, the petitioner, first appeared before

the District Court of West Memphis, Arkansas on misdemeanor charges of loitering

and possession of drug paraphernalia. On September 6, 2002, Franklin pled no

contest to both charges. Franklin was sentenced to a term of one year’s

imprisonment, a fine of $1,000, and costs of $100.

Franklin could have appealed his conviction from the state district court and

obtained a trial de novo in the state circuit court. Ark. Inf. Ct. R. 9; Laxton v. State,

899 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Ark. App. 1995) (“[Inferior Court Rule 9] applies to criminal

appeals as well as civil appeals.”). Rather than seek a direct appeal to the Crittenden

County Circuit Court, Franklin chose to pursue state post-conviction relief from that

court. Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c). For a variety of reasons, this petition was never

considered by the state circuit court. 

Consequently, Franklin sought recourse in the federal courts, filing a petition

for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, he claims that he was

never offered counsel by the District Court of West Memphis nor did he voluntarily

waive his right to counsel. 

The federal district court dismissed with prejudice Franklin’s habeas petition

on March 21, 2003, finding that there was not good cause to excuse the procedural

default resulting from Franklin’s failure to appeal his state conviction. Within 30

days of the entry of judgment, Franklin placed in the prison mail system a filing

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The issue of this Court’s jurisdiction under Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure was first raised in Respondent’s brief. We will grant

Appellant’s Motion to Supplement Designated Record with Franklin’s Response to

Order and, as a result, will consider whether Franklin’s Response to Order suffices

as a notice of appeal as he argues in his reply brief.

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entitled “Response to Order.”2 On June 24, 2003, 94 days after the federal district

court dismissed with prejudice his habeas petition, Franklin filed a document entitled

“Notice of Appeal.” The federal district court construed the notice as a motion for

a certificate of appealability and held that a certificate of appealability should not

issue. This Court, however, issued a certificate of appealability on January 13, 2004,

and appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act.

II. DISCUSSION

The primary consideration in any appeal is whether the court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal. Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires

that a party bringing an appeal must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the

federal district court’s entry of order or judgment. This jurisdictional requirement is

mandatory, thereby depriving the appellate court of jurisdiction when the appealing

party does not comply. 28 U.S.C. § 2107; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). An appeal will

not, however, be dismissed for informality of form or title. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4);

see also Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 3, 1979 Amendment (“[I]t is important

that the right to appeal not be lost by mistakes of mere form. . . . [S]o long as the

function of notice is met by the filing of a paper indicating an intention to appeal, the

substance of the rule has been complied with.”). Further, the Court will construe a

pro se petitioner’s notice of appeal liberally where “an intent to appeal the judgment

in question [is] apparent and there [is] no prejudice to the adverse party.” Berdella

v. Delo, 972 F.2d 204, 207-08 (8th Cir. 1992); see, e.g., In re Cook, 928 F.2d 262,

263 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (construing a pro se prisoner’s motion for writs of

mandamus and prohibition as a notice of appeal).

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Judgment in this case was entered on March 21, 2003. Ninety-four days later,

Roy Edward Franklin filed a document entitled “Notice of Appeal.” There is little

question that this document served as a notice of appeal. The Court may not,

however, take jurisdiction based on this notice of appeal because it was filed sixtyfour days after the expiration of the 30-day period created by Rule 4(a). “The

‘mandatory and jurisdictional’ requirement that an appellant file a timely notice of

appeal can operate harshly.” Faysound Ltd. v. Falcon Jet Corp., 940 F.2d 339, 345

(8th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960)).

Punctilious compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 4(a), however,

is required even of pro se petitioners. See Turner v. Armontrout, 922 F.2d 492, 493-

94 (8th Cir. 1991). 

In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, Franklin directs the Court’s attention

to his references to “a higher court” in his “Response to Order,” which is deemed to

have been filed within Rule 4(a)’s 30-day time period. He argues that the Response

to Order is the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. “Whether a particular type

of document is the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal may depend on its

content and surrounding circumstances rather than on any general rule.” Campiti v.

Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317, 320 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Berdella, 972 F.2d at 207-08

(stating that a document is the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal where it

gives the pertinent information and evinces an intent to appeal). We may not,

however, rely on the petitioner’s motivation for making the filing. Smith v. Barry,

502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). “While a notice of appeal must specifically indicate the

litigant’s intent to seek appellate review, the purpose of this requirement is to ensure

that the filing provides sufficient notice to other parties and the courts.” Id. (citations

omitted). Therefore, the notice afforded by the filing is determinative of whether it

is sufficient as a notice of appeal. Id. at 248-49.

Based on this legal standard and having thoroughly analyzed the Response to

Order, we conclude that it is insufficient to serve as the functional equivalent of a

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In his Response to Order, an eight-paged, single-spaced, hand-written

document, Franklin makes two references to “a higher court.” He writes:

18. Petitioner contends that the Respondents contention that

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing this matter in a

higher court is a failure by those . . . in [the] Community. . . . 

19. Petitioner contendes, having submitted in writing his complaint

. . . to state Authorities and their failure to respond in a timely

manner forfeits the states interest in this matter, thus allowing

petitioner to seek adjudication in a higher court. 

Placed in the context of the Response to Order, these references to “a higher court”

appear to refer to the federal district court as “a higher court” than the state circuit

court. There is no reasonable reading that would suggest that Franklin is referring to

this Court.

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Though not dispositive, our conclusion that the Response to Order was not

intended to serve as a notice of appeal is supported by Franklin’s subsequent filing

of a proper notice of appeal.

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notice of appeal. The document does not indicate an intent to appeal from the federal

district court’s judgment. Nowhere in the Response to Order does Franklin mention

an appeal to this or any other appellate court. Indeed, his two mentions of “a higher

court” appear to refer to the federal district court, rather than to an appellate court.3

The Response to Order does not ask that the federal district court or the respondent

take notice of his desire to appeal, nor did the court or the parties treat it as a notice

of appeal.4

 Instead, the Response to Order systematically challenges the federal

district court’s order dismissing his petition for habeas relief. Even giving Franklin

the benefit of liberal construction, the only reasonable conclusion is that the

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A motion to reconsider, whether properly characterized as a motion made

under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may toll the

time to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. Pro. 4(a)(4)(A). Even if we were to

construe the Response to Order as a motion to amend or alter the judgment or as a

motion for relief from judgment, Franklin failed to file it within ten days from the

entry of judgment as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or Fed. R. App. Pro.

4(a)(4)(A)(vi), respectively. United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 574 (8th Cir. 1995)

(“If [the petitioner’s] motion for reconsideration was not served within ten days of the

entry of judgment, it would not trigger the tolling effect of Rule 4(a)(4).”).

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“Response to Order” is more akin to a motion to reconsider5 than to a notice of

appeal. We conclude that the Response to Order is not the functional equivalent of

a notice of appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

Because Franklin’s Notice of Appeal was not filed timely and because he did

not file the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of

judgment, the Court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

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