Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01590/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01590-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Kernan
Defendant
Derek J. Simmons
Petitioner

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 The California Court of Appeal’s decision is Exhibit B to the instant petition. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEREK J. SIMMONS,

Petitioner,

 v.

SCOTT KERNAN,

Respondent. /

No. 06-1590 MMC (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; DISMISSING

PETITION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

Before the Court is respondent Scott Kernan’s motion, filed July 11, 2006, to dismiss

petitioner Derek J. Simmons’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground of

untimeliness. Petitioner has filed opposition. Respondent did not file a reply. Having

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court hereby

rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On January 4, 1991, petitioner was “sentenced to concurrent prison terms of life for

[ ] aggravated mayhem and of 12 years for [ ] attempted murder.” See People v. Simmons,

No. H007997, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1991).1

 On December 6, 1991, the

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 The California Court of Appeal stayed the execution of the 12-year term imposed

for attempted murder until the term of life in prison for aggravated mayhem had been

served, whereupon such stay would become permanent. (See id. at 13-14) 

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California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, as modified,2

 and, on February 26, 1992,

the California Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner’s conviction became final ninety

days thereafter. On January 8, 2003, petitioner filed the first of a series of state-court

applications for post-conviction relief, the last of which was denied by the California

Supreme Court on April 13, 2005. On February 26, 2006, petitioner filed the instant petition

in district court.

DISCUSSION

Respondent argues the instant petition was not filed within the one-year statute of

limitations applicable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Pursuant to AEDPA, a habeas petition must be filed within one year from “the date

on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because petitioner’s

conviction became final before the date AEDPA became effective, April 23, 1996, he was

“required to file any remaining federal petition for which [he was] eligible within one year of

AEDPA’s effective date, that is, by April 24, 1997.” See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919,

921 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner filed the instant petition on February 28, 2006, almost nine

years after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, absent an exception to

or tolling of the statute of limitations, petitioner’s federal habeas petition is subject to

dismissal as untimely.

In his opposition, petitioner does not rely on an exception to the statute of limitations;

rather, petitioner asserts he is entitled to tolling, both equitable and statutory. In his

petition, however, petitioner has not alleged any facts to support such entitlement. 

Accordingly, the Court considers whether it would be futile to allow petitioner to amend to

allege his entitlement to such relief. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 and n. 4

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 Petitioner does not assert that such circumstances existed after January 2003. 

Indeed, petitioner was able to file a state petition in January 2003, and to file thereafter

three other applications for relief with the state courts. 

3

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding petitioner entitled to amend petition where petitioner asserted, in

motion for reconsideration and affidavit in support thereof, grounds that might upon

“appropriate development of the record” warrant finding petitioner entitled to equitable

tolling).

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was denied

reasonable access to his legal materials and the prison law library. Petitioner also asserts

he is entitled to statutory tolling as of the date he filed his first application for state postconviction relief. 

“AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision is subject to equitable tolling.” Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to establish equitable tolling, a

petitioner must show “he has been pursuing his rights diligently” and “that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065,

1068 (9th Cir. 2006). The denial of access to legal materials and law a library may, under

certain circumstances, constitute grounds for equitable tolling. See Espinoza-Mathews v.

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding petitioner entitled to equitable

tolling where he was denied access to legal materials); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 967

and n. 2 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing “woefully deficient law library” in prison may constitute

extraordinary circumstance). 

Here, petitioner asserts he lacked reasonable access to his legal materials and to

the prison law library “until 2003.” (See Simmons Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7, 16.) According to

petitioner, such asserted extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing an

application for post-conviction relief until January 2003.3

Assuming, arguendo, petitioner can sufficiently allege his entitlement to equitable

tolling through January 2003, leave to amend would be proper only if petitioner could allege

his entitlement to statutory tolling thereafter, based on his applications for state postCase 3:06-cv-01590-MMC Document 28 Filed 02/20/07 Page 3 of 5
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4

 Neither party provided a copy of the “appeal” or the decision. Petitioner

acknowledges in his petition, however, that his “appeal” to the California Court of Appeal

was denied as “time barred.” (See id.) 

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 In denying the petition, the California Supreme Court cited In re Robbins, 18 Cal.

4th 770, 780 (1998), and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949). Such citation to Robbins

constitutes “a clear ruling that [the] petition was untimely,” see Thorson v. Plamer, No. 02-

17359, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3370, at *4 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2007), and the “Swain rule is

commonly referred to as the ‘untimeliness’ bar,” see Washington v. Cambra, 208 F.3d 832,

833 (9th Cir. 2000).

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conviction relief. Pursuant to AEDPA, the one-year statute of limitations is tolled for the

period of “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review . . . is pending.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “An application is ‘properly

filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable [state] laws

and rules governing filings including time limits upon its delivery.” See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation and

citation omitted). Consequently, when an application is untimely under state law, the

application is not “properly filed” and “that [is] the end of the matter for purposes of 

§ 2244(d)(2).” See id. at 414 (internal quotation omitted). 

Petitioner’s applications for state post-conviction relief were filed and resolved as

follows:

1. On January 8, 2003, in Monterey County Superior Court, petitioner filed his first

petition for a writ of habeas corpus (see Resp.’s Mot. Ex. D at Ex. C); the petition

was denied as untimely on January 15, 2003, (see Pet. Ex. C at first page). 

2. On or about July 29, 2003, petitioner filed a second habeas petition in Monterey

County Superior Court, (see Resp.’s Mot. Ex. D at Ex. E); the petition was denied

on September 2, 2003 as untimely, (see Pet. Ex. C at second page).

3. On a date unspecified by petitioner, petitioner filed an “appeal” in the California

Court of Appeal; it was denied as untimely on January 14, 2004, (see Pet. at 5).4

4. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for a writ for habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court, (see Resp.’s Mot. Ex. D); the petition was denied on

April 13, 2005 as untimely, (see Resp.’s Mot. Ex E).5

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As set forth above, each of petitioner’s applications for state post-conviction relief

was dismissed as untimely. As a result, none of those applications was “properly filed.” 

See Pace, 544 U.S. at 413. Consequently, petitioner cannot establish entitlement to

statutory tolling under 28 U.S. § 2244(d)(2). 

Accordingly, leave to amend to allege tolling of the statute of limitations would be

futile. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS respondent’s motion to

dismiss, and the petition is hereby DISMISSED without leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 20, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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