Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02893/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02893-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott R. Fonseca
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2893

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Scott R. Fonseca

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

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 Submitted: May 14, 2015

Filed: June 24, 2015

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Before LOKEN, BOWMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Scott Fonseca pleaded guilty to stealing thirty six firearms from a federally

licensed firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(u) and 924(i)(1). Prior to

this conviction, Fonseca was convicted in the District of Kansas of knowing

possession and disposal of eight of those firearms; he was serving that 70-month

sentence at the time he wassentenced for this offense. The presentence investigation

report determined an advisory guidelines range of 63-78 months in prison and

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recommended that the district court reduce the sentence for time served on the

undischarged Kansas sentence if the Bureau of Prisons would not do so. See

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1). Consistent with the plea agreement, the government urged

a guidelines range sentence of 70 months, reduced by the Kansas time served (50

months). Fonseca urged a greater sentence credit resulting in a sentence of 13

months, to be served concurrent with the undischarged remainder of his Kansas

sentence. Emphasizing Fonseca’s lengthy criminal history and other § 3553(a)

sentencing factors, the district court varied upward from the advisory range to 88

months, applied a 50-month credit for Kansas time served, and sentenced Fonseca to

38 months in prison, concurrent with the remainder of the Kansas sentence, plus a

criminal restitution penalty of $18,666.62. Fonseca appeals the sentence. We affirm

in part and remand to the district court for further restitution proceedings.

1. On appeal, Fonseca’s counsel moved to withdraw and filed a brief under

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the district court abused its

discretion in varying upward and in not granting an additional sentence credit for 5.4

months of good time credit the Bureau of Prisons gave him while serving the Kansas

sentence. Fonseca filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing that the district court’s

sentence, viewed in relation to the Kansas sentence, was vindictive or a violation of

the Double Jeopardy Clause; and that counsel’s unavailability between the plea and

sentencing hearings violated Fonseca’s right to due process. 

We conclude these contentions are without merit. In the written plea

agreement, Fonseca waived his right to appeal his sentence. As is common, an

enumerated exception allowed him to appeal an “illegal sentence,” including a

sentence that exceeds the statutorymaximum, but the exception “does not include less

serious sentencing errors, such as a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines, an

abuse of discretion, or the imposition of an unreasonable sentence.” The sentencing

issuesraised in counsel’s Anders brief, and Fonseca’s pro se argument that the district

court should not have sentenced him more harshly than the District of Kansas judge,

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fall within the scope of this appeal waiver. We will enforce the waiver because the

plea-hearing record convinces us that Fonseca entered into the plea agreement and

the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, and that no miscarriage ofjustice would

result from enforcing it. See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010)

(de novo review).

Fonseca’s pro se double jeopardy argument, even if outside the appeal waiver,

is without merit because the District of Kansas conviction and this conviction were

not for the same offense. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998). To

the extent Fonseca’s pro se complaint about trial counsel’s unavailability can be

construed as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it falls outside the appeal

waiver, but we decline to review that claim on direct appeal. See United States v.

Looking Cloud, 419 F.3d 781, 788-89 (8th Cir. 2005). 

2. The district court imposed a criminal restitution penalty of $18,666.62 to be

paid to two victims: $2500 to 417 Guns, the licensed dealer from which the firearms

were stolen, and $16,166.62 to Gibson and Associates, the amount it paid to 417

Guns for its insured loss from the theft (an amount that included both the value of the

stolen firearms and damage to the building caused by the break-in). At sentencing,

the government advised that eighteen firearms had been recovered, but the district

court did not reduce the amount of restitution by the value of the recovered firearms. 

Following our review of the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we

directed the government to file a brief “(i) clarifying the status under the district

court’s restitution order of ‘the weapons that are actually in police custody’ referred

to on page 4 of the Sentencing Hearing transcript, and (ii) addressing the question

whether the district court committed plain error in ordering restitution in an amount

greater than the victims’ actual losses at the date of sentencing.” 

The government’s responsive brief reported that eight ofthe recovered firearms

were turned over to insurer Gibson and Associates, which then sold the firearms to

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417 Guns for $2,025. An additional ten firearms were recovered and are currently in

police custody. The remaining eighteen stolen firearms have not been recovered. 

The government concedesthe district court committed plain error by not reducing the

restitution owed to insurer Gibson and Associates by $2,025, the amount it received

when it sold the eight recovered firearms to 417 Guns. We agree there was plain

error, but we reject the government’s contention that this modification is sufficient. 

First, because restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act

(MVRA) is a compensatory remedy, the restitution awarded to a MVRA victim“must

be based on the amount of loss actually caused by the defendant’s offense.” United

States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The

government has the burden to prove that the restitution awarded does not exceed the

actual, provable loss caused by the offense. See United States v. Frazier, 651 F.3d

899, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2011). When a victim’s tangible property is lost or destroyed,

such as stolen firearms, actual loss equals “the greater of . . . the value of the property

on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or . . . the value of the property on the

date ofsentencing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(i). Absent proof that a firearm was

unique, the actual loss resulting from a theft of a firearm dealer’s inventory includes

the fair market value of the stolen firearms. Frazier, 651 F.3d at 910.

Here, the MVRA victim was 417 Guns, not its insurer, Gibson and Associates. 

Frazier, 651 F.3d at 907. The restitution awarded for the actual loss of 417 Guns may

not be reduced because all or part of the loss was compensated by insurance. 18

U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B). Rather, the district court properly ordered that restitution be

paid to Gibson and Associates for that portion of the victim’s loss it had

compensated. See § 3664(j)(1). It may be reasonable to assume for restitution

purposes that a property insurer’s payment of the victim’s claim fairly reflected the

fair market value of the lost property, but that assumption can be challenged by the

victim or by the restitution defendant, as in Frazier, 651 F.3d at 907-10.

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The situation is complicated in this case because part ofthe stolen propertywas

recovered before an order of restitution was entered. The statute unambiguously

provides that a restitution award must be reduced by “the value (as of the date the

property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii); see Robers v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1854, 1858 (2014) (the

statute “directs the court to value the returned jewelry as of the date it was returned

and subtract that amount from the value of all the jewelry the swindler obtained”). 

The reduction must be based on the fair market value of the recovered property to the

victim, 417 Guns, not the value to its insurer, Gibson and Associates. Return of the

eight recovered firearms to the insurer may have been logical or convenient, but the

restitution award must be reduced by the value of the eight firearms to 417 Guns on

the date they were returned, not by the amount 417 Guns paid its insurer in what may

have been a sale at salvage or liquidation prices. Thus, on remand, the government

must prove the proper amount of the reduction for these eight firearms.

Second, the ten firearms that the government advises have been recovered but

remain in police custody require further inquiry by the district court before a final

order of restitution is entered. When a criminal proceeding is completed, the

government has a duty to return property in its custody to the rightful owner, unless

it is subject to forfeiture. See United States v. Gregoire, 638 F.3d 962, 974 (8th Cir.

2011). In some cases, the sentencing court may enter a restitution order providing

that the order will be credited by the value of property in the custody of government

officials when it is returned to the MVRA victim. See United States v. McCracken,

487 F.3d 1125, 1129 (8th Cir. 2007). But McCracken involved cash seized from the

defendant. Cash is a fungible commodity whose value rarely changes over time. 

Determining the fair market value of firearms “as of the date the property isreturned”

is more complex, and the statute gives the sentencing court “adequate authority” to

provide credits against an offender’s restitution obligation, to prevent either a

windfall to the government if it chooses not to return the property, or a double

recovery to the MVRA victim. Robers, 134 S. Ct. at 1858. Therefore, on remand, the

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district court is directed to obtain from the government an accounting of the

recovered firearms in official custody, including when they will be returned to 417

Guns or an explanation why they will not be returned, and proof of the fair market

value of those firearms on the date they were recovered. Those facts should enable

the district court to determine whether the restitution award should be further reduced

or credited for all stolen firearms that have been recovered but remain in official

custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) 

For the foregoing reasons, we deny defense counsel’s motion to withdraw,

vacate the restitution order, and remand to the district court for further proceedings

to determine the amount of restitution that should be awarded. In all other respects, 

the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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