Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01204/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01204-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clean Air Implementation Project
Intervenor for Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Utility Air Regulatory Group
Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 6, 2002 Decided February 28, 2003

No. 01-1204

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

CLEAN AIR IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review

Lauren E. Freeman argued the cause for the petitioner.

Mel S. Schulze was on brief.

Christopher S. Vaden, Attorney, United States Department

of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent. Gregory B.

Foote and Kerry E. Rodgers, Attorneys, United States Envi-

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-1204 Document #735018 Filed: 02/28/2003 Page 1 of 10
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ronmental Protection Agency, were on brief. Kent E. Hanson, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, entered

an appearance.

William H. Lewis, Jr., and Michael A. McCord were on

brief for the intervenor.

Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The petitioner,

the Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG), a trade association

whose members include inter alia individual electric utilities,

seeks review and vacatur of the interpretation given by the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency) to its

State Operating Permit Program regulations, 40 C.F.R.

§ 70.6(c)(1), and Federal Operating Permit Program regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 71.6(c)(1). According to the EPA, the

regulations authorize, pursuant to Title V of the Clean Air

Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661 et seq., permit issuing authorities to enhance the conditions included in operating permits

issued to facilities that release air pollutants, viz. by imposing

emission monitoring requirements on a case-by-case basis to

‘‘assure compliance’’ with federal emission standards. 42

U.S.C. § 7661c(a); 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.6(c)(1), 71.6(c)(1). UARG

asserts that the EPA’s interpretation—which it says is manifested in at least two permit-specific orders as well as an

Agency permit instruction manual—effectively, and without

required notice and comment, amends operating permit rules

the EPA promulgated in 1992 and 1996. Alternatively,

UARG asserts, the Agency’s interpretation of 40 C.F.R.

§§ 70.6(c)(1) and 71.6(c)(1) is unauthorized under the CAA.

For the following reasons, we dismiss the petition because

UARG lacks standing. In any event, the issue raised by

UARG is not ripe for judicial review.

I.

UARG’s petition for review is one of various industry

groups’ challenges to the EPA’s implementation of the 1990

amendments to Title V of the Clean Air Act. See, e.g.,

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Appalachian Power v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1019 (D.C. Cir.

2000); Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d

1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Title V of the CAA and its

implementing regulations govern the operating permit issuing

process for stationary sources of air pollution. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7661 et seq.; 40 C.F.R. parts 70, 71.1

 Under Title V, a

regulated source of air pollution cannot operate without obtaining an operating permit from the appropriate state or

local authority that administers an EPA-approved implementation plan (or from the EPA if no EPA-approved plan

exists). 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a). Although the state or local

authority may approve a new permit or a permit submitted

for modification or renewal, it must first submit the permit to

the EPA for its review. Id. § 7661d. The EPA may ‘‘object

to [the] issuance’’ of the permit within 45 days; if it does

object, ‘‘the permitting authority may not issue the permit’’

unless the permit is ‘‘revised to meet the objection.’’ Id.

§ 7661d(b)(3), (c).

Parts 70 and 71 of the EPA’s ‘‘Air Programs’’ regulations

establish the ‘‘minimum elements’’ of a Title V permit program, including provisions specifying the contents of each

permit. 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.6, 71.6. Under the EPA’s rules,

each permit must specify the permit’s duration, the emission

limitations and standards applicable to the source of air

pollution, monitoring and ‘‘measures to assure compliance’’

(including record keeping and reporting) with the conditions

and terms of the permit. 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.6(a)(1)–(3), (c),

71.6(a)(1)–(3), (c).

Because emission standards and monitoring requirements

differ depending on the particular source of air pollution, the

terms and conditions of each permit also vary. For some

1 Part 70 applies to state-implemented Title V permit programs

and Part 71 applies to Title V programs administered by the EPA

where an EPA-approved state program is not in place. Although

the regulations at issue here, 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.6(c)(1), 71.6(c)(1),

were promulgated at different times, Part 70 in 1992 and Part 71 in

1996, the relevant text of each is identical and therefore we treat

them the same.

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sources, in addition to restricting the amount of emitted

pollutants, the permit imposes periodic monitoring, testing

and recordkeeping requirements.2

 The monitoring and testing requirements ensure that sources continuously comply

with emission standards. For other sources no EPA or stateapproved standard imposes periodic monitoring or testing;

instead, the EPA regulation requires the state or other

permit authority to add monitoring and testing conditions

sufficient to monitor compliance with the permit. 40 C.F.R.

§ 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B); see Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1019

(explaining that section 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B) requires periodic monitoring if no periodic monitoring requirement exists).

Before the EPA employed the interpretation under challenge, it had read 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B)3

 to authorize

the inclusion of supplemental monitoring and testing conditions in a permit even if an EPA or state-approved periodic

monitoring or testing requirement was already in place. In

1998 the EPA issued a document entitled Periodic Monitor2 For example, for a source that engages in lead smelting, the

standards limit the total amount of stack emissions, 40 C.F.R.

§ 63.1543(a), and require the source to monitor daily the ‘‘baghouse

cell’’ pressure, inspect weekly to ensure that dust is removed from

hoppers and perform quarterly inspections of certain equipment, 40

C.F.R. § 63.1547.

3 Section 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B) provides that a permit must contain:

Where the applicable requirement does not require periodic

testing or instrumental or noninstrumental monitoring (which

may consist of recordkeeping designed to serve as monitoring),

periodic monitoring sufficient to yield reliable data from the

relevant time period that are representative of the source’s

compliance with the permit, as reported pursuant to paragraph

(a)(3)(iii) of this section. Such monitoring requirements shall

assure use of terms, test methods, units, averaging periods, and

other statistical conventions consistent with the applicable requirement. Recordkeeping provisions may be sufficient to

meet the requirements of this paragraph (a)(3)(i)(B) of this

section[.]

40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B).

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ing Guidance for Title V Operating Permits Programs (Guidance), which interpreted 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B) to require a permit issuer, if existing requirements failed to ‘‘yield

reliable data from the relevant time period that are representative of the source’s compliance,’’ to impose stricter monitoring and testing conditions. Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at

1019–20 (describing EPA’s view of 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B)

articulated in Guidance). In Appalachian Power, however,

electric utilities as well as associations representing the chemical and petroleum industries successfully challenged the

EPA’s interpretation as an impermissible broadening of the

EPA’s regulation. Id. at 1028. We concluded the Guidance

effectively, and invalidly, amended 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B)

without complying with the rulemaking requirements of the

CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d). Id.

Since Appalachian Power, in two permit-related adjudications and in the promulgation of its Instruction Manual for

Permit Application Forms, the EPA has used a ‘‘separate

‘sufficiency’ requirement’’ imposed by other regulations (sections 70.6(c)(1) and 71.6(c)(1)) to reach the same interpretation this court rejected in Appalachian Power. PacifiCorp’s

Jim Bridger and Naughton Electric Utility Steam Generating Plants, Petition No. VIII–00–1 at 18, at

http://www.epa.gov/region07/programs/artd/air/title5/t5memos

/woc020.pdf (Nov. 18, 2000) (order denying in part and granting in part petition challenging state operating permit) (PacifiCorp Order), Joint Appendix (JA) at 288; see Fort James

Camas Mill, Petition No. X–1999–1, at 7 (Dec. 22, 2000)

(order denying in part and granting in part petition to object

to state operating permit) (Fort James Camas Mill Order),

JA 29; Instruction Manual for Permit Application Forms

at 23 (Jan. 2001) (Manual), JA 36. According to the petitioner, the EPA now interprets section 70.6(c)(1) (as well as

section 71.6(c)(1)) to mandate, ‘‘[w]here the applicable requirement already requires periodic testing or instrumental

or non-instrumental monitoring,’’ that a permit issuer conduct ‘‘sufficiency reviews of periodic testing and monitoring

in applicable requirements, and enhancement of that testing

or monitoring through the permit as necessary to be suffiUSCA Case #01-1204 Document #735018 Filed: 02/28/2003 Page 5 of 10
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cient to assure compliance with the terms and conditions of

the permit.’’ PacifiCorp Order at 18–19.4

 For example, in

PacifiCorp, where a quarterly monitoring requirement was

required by existing standards, the EPA determined the

quarterly monitoring to be too ‘‘infrequent’’ to ‘‘ ‘assure compliance,’ ’’ and, using section 70.6(c)(1), conditioned issuance

of the permit on additional monitoring. PacifiCorp Order at

19.5

UARG challenges the EPA’s interpretation of sections

70.6(c)(1) and 71.6(c)(1), maintaining that it resurrects the

interpretation we rejected in Appalachian Power; that is, it

results in the same impermissible broadening of the rule.

UARG points out that the regulatory history, the same

history applicable to section 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B), does not indicate

that section 70.6(c)(1) was meant to impose a separate regulatory standard requiring a permit issuer to conduct sufficiency

reviews. See also Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1026–27

4 Sections 70.6(c)(1) and 71.6(c)(1) both state:

(c) Compliance requirements. All part [70 or 71] permits shall

contain the following elements with respect to compliance:

(1) Consistent with paragraph (a)(3) of this section, compliance

certification, testing, monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping

requirements sufficient to assure compliance with the terms

and conditions of the permit. Any document (including reports) required by a part [70 or 71] permit shall contain a

certification by a responsible official that meets the requirements of § [70.5(d) or 71.5(d)] for [sic] this part.

40 C.F.R. §§ 70.6(c)(1), 71.6(c)(1).

5 In the Fort James Camas Mill Order the EPA, explaining that

‘‘the separate regulatory standard at section 70.6(c)(1) applies’’

where periodic testing or monitoring exists, decided that two permit

conditions failed to provide sufficient monitoring. Fort James

Camas Mill Order at 7–9, JA 29–31. The Manual likewise directs

Part 71 permit approval authorities to apply the same interpretation, requiring authorities to ‘‘enhance TTT testing or monitoring’’

where the applicable requirement is not ‘‘sufficient to assure compliance with the terms and conditions of the permit.’’ Manual at 23,

JA 36.

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(‘‘The short of the matter is that the regulatory history EPA

offers fails to demonstrate that § 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B) initially had

the broad scope the Guidance now ascribes to it.’’). Alternatively, UARG argues that the EPA’s interpretation results in

a regulation unauthorized by the CAA.

II.

‘‘[B]efore we reach the merits of any claim, we must first

assure ourselves that the dispute lies within the constitutional

and prudential boundaries of our jurisdiction.’’ La. Envtl.

Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C. Cir.

1996). A court must confine itself ‘‘to adjudicating ‘actual

cases’ and ‘controversies,’ ’’ Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750

(1984), and in the administrative context, should avoid ‘‘premature adjudication TTT until an administrative decision has

been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.’’ Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,

148–49 (1967). For UARG, this means that UARG has

standing to challenge the EPA’s interpretation, and, if so,

that the controversy is ripe for us to review. Because UARG

petitions on behalf of its members, it has standing only if ‘‘at

least one of its members would have standing to sue in his

own right,’’ Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n,

432 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1977)). As an ‘‘irreducible constitutional minimum,’’ then, it must meet the Article III requirements

for standing; it must have suffered ‘‘a concrete and particularized injury that [was]: (1) actual or imminent, (2) caused

by, or fairly traceable to an act that [it] challenges in the

instant litigation, and (3) redressable by the court.’’ Fla.

Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);

see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61

(1992).

While UARG identifies several instances in which the EPA

has applied the ‘‘interpretation’’ it seeks to have overturned,

it does not specify how any particular action(s) has injured it

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or its members.6

 Of the three Agency actions UARG discusses in its brief,7

 we need consider only whether the EPA’s

issuance of the Manual has caused it injury because it expressly disavows any challenge of the two permit proceedings.

Brief for Petitioner at 30; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 9.8

UARG’s petition, however, fails to allege any ‘‘concrete and

particularized’’ injury that is ‘‘actual or imminent[ ] [and] not

conjectural or hypothetical’’ based on the EPA’s interpretation contained in its Manual. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v.

FERC, 198 F.3d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1999). UARG does not

assert that the interpretation in the Manual has affected any

Title V permit of any UARG member or the Title V permitting process. Although UARG contends that the EPA’s

interpretation has caused ‘‘permitting authorities to continue

to be under pressure to issue final Title V permits consistent

with EPA’s new statement of the law,’’ Brief for Petitioner at

23, it has not presented one instance in which any of its

members has felt so pressured.

Furthermore, UARG does not assert injury based on the

EPA’s adoption of the Manual qua an amendment to sections

70.6(c)(1) and 71.6(c)(1) without providing the notice and

comment procedures required by 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) for any

CAA regulation because the Manual constitutes neither a

regulation nor an amendment thereto. It is instead an

agency policy statement—issued without the signature of any

Agency official and applied, it appears, on a purely ad hoc

6 UARG also notes a notice of deficiency issued to the State of

Texas, Texas Notice of Deficiency Order, 67 Fed. Reg. 732 (Jan. 7,

2002), a revoked draft Periodic Monitoring Technical Reference

Document and several regional comment letters—all applying the

interpretation under challenge, Brief for Petitioner at 20–23—but it

fails to allege any resulting injury.

7 See supra p. 5.

8 UARG’s disavowal is understandable for it would face a serious

venue problem if it did challenge the two regional orders since a

challenge to a ‘‘locally or regionally applicable’’ action must be

brought in the appropriate regional circuit court. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b).

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basis—and in no way binds the Agency or regulated entities.

Cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 382–84 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (‘‘Guidance Document’’ binding both EPA and applicant

under Toxic Substances Control Act is, on its face, regulation,

not policy statement); Molycorp v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 545–

46 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (‘‘the ultimate focus of the inquiry [is]

whether agency action partakes of the fundamental characteristic of a regulation, i.e., that it has the force of law.’’); see

also Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 88

F.3d 1191, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (‘‘We have interpreted ‘regulation’ to mean a statement that has ‘general applicability’ and

that has the ‘legal effect’ of ‘binding’ the agency or other

parties.’’) (citations omitted). Compare Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 198 F.3d at 269–70 (FERC opinions rendered moot

by settlement although they ‘‘offered useful discussions of

recurring issues’’ and may have had future value as policy

statements only), with Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1023

(because Guidance ‘‘reads like a ukase’’ and ‘‘State authorities, with EPA’s Guidance in hand, are insisting on [additional

monitoring],’’ document was binding in effect and thus subject

to notice and comment requirements). Accordingly, the

EPA’s interpretation as set forth in the Manual is ‘‘merely an

announcement to the public of the policy which the agency

hopes to implement in future rulemakings or adjudications,’’

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38

(D.C. Cir. 1974), and does not injure UARG in any imminent

or redressable manner.

Furthermore, even if UARG has standing, the claim that it

has raised is not ripe for judicial review. Courts are obliged

to avoid ‘‘entangling themselves in abstract disagreements

over administrative policies[ ] and TTT to protect the agencies

from judicial interference until an administrative decision has

been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.’’ Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148–49. In

determining whether a case is ripe, we consider ‘‘both the

fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to

the parties of withholding court consideration.’’ Id. at 149.

In considering whether an issue is fit for review, ‘‘we look to

see whether the issue ‘is purely legal, whether consideration

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of the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting, and

whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final.’ ’’ Clean Air

Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F.3d

1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Of these three criteria, the

third, at least, is not satisfied. The EPA is currently undertaking a rulemaking to amend section 70.6(c)(1) and 71.6(c)(1).

Revisions To Clarify the Scope of Sufficiency Monitoring

Requirements for Federal and State Operating Permits Programs, 67 Fed. Reg. 58,561 (proposed Sept. 17, 2002). It

would be a waste of judicial resources for us to reach the

merits of UARG’s petition while the rulemaking is pending.

Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(‘‘The interest in postponing review is powerful when the

agency position is tentative. Judicial review [then] improperly intrudes into the agency’s decisionmaking process. It also

squanders judicial resources since the challenging party still

enjoys an opportunity to convince the agency to change its

mind.’’) (citing Pub. Citizen Health Res. Group v. FDA, 740

F.2d 21, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB,

522 F.2d 107, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc)).

Finally, we note that UARG is not without remedies to

address the present situation. At least until the ongoing

rulemaking is complete, UARG, or one of its members, can

seek relief from a regional circuit court if the EPA takes

action affecting a permit pursuant to the challenged interpretation. For this reason, we find no hardship to the petitioner

in withholding judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the petition for

review.

So ordered.

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