Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02257/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02257-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Oscar Flores-Sandoval
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable

John E. Simko, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2257

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

Oscar Flores-Sandoval, also known as * District of South Dakota.

Armando Polanco-Diaz, also known as, *

Daniel Sanchez-Rodriguez, *

 *

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 17, 2006

Filed: January 30, 2007

___________

Before MELLOY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Oscar Joel Flores-Sandoval was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). That indictment was dismissed, after this court's

opinion in United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2005). FloresSandoval was re-indicted one week later. The district court1

 denied his motion to

suppress evidence. This court affirms.

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I.

In July 2004, Flores-Sandoval was taken into custody. This court upheld the

district court's decision suppressing the fingerprints and statements obtained during

that illegal detention. Id. at 715. On October 6, 2005, the United States dismissed the

indictment. That same day, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) removed its detainer and Flores-Sandoval was released from jail. 

As Flores-Sandoval walked out of jail, ICE agent Tracy Warner approached

him on the sidewalk outside the jail. Warner identified himself as an ICE agent and

asked Flores-Sandoval's name, which he provided. Warner then asked where he was

born and he replied Mexico. Questioned about his immigration status, FloresSandoval stated that he had sent his documents home, had no identification, and did

not have a social security number. When asked why he did not have a social security

number or immigration documents, Flores-Sandoval admitted that he was in the

country illegally. 

Warner took Flores-Sandoval into custody. Flores-Sandoval told Warner that

his attorney had advised him not to answer questions or to give his name or

fingerprints. Flores-Sandoval inquired why he had been released; Warner showed him

a copy of the dismissed indictment. Warner asked if he wanted to call his attorney,

providing a telephone, lunch, and the number to the Federal Public Defender's office.

After placing a phone call to his attorney's office, Flores-Sandoval knocked on the

door of the holding cell and stated he was ready to give his fingerprints (he did not tell

the ICE agents that he had not spoken with his attorney). 

Flores-Sandoval's fingerprints were taken and placed into ICE's system, which

indicated that he had previously been deported. Further research showed that he had

not requested permission to reenter the country. Flores-Sandoval was re-indicted for

illegal reentry after deportation. After the district court denied his motion to suppress

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his statements and fingerprints, Flores-Sandoval entered a conditional guilty plea,

reserving an appeal of the denial of his motion. On appeal, Flores-Sandoval argues

that the statements and fingerprints were obtained during an illegal seizure and should

be suppressed.

II.

This court reviews for clear error a district court's factual determinations

supporting a denial of a motion to suppress, and its conclusions of law de novo.

United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 643 (8th Cir. 2006). This court reverses a

denial of a motion to suppress only if the decision "is unsupported by substantial

evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the

entire record, it is clear a mistake was made." Id., quoting United States v. Annis, 446

F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 2006).

Flores-Sandoval argues that his statements and fingerprints should be

suppressed because the sidewalk encounter violated the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments. He maintains that Warner did not have reasonable suspicion to stop

and question him and that his "unMirandized statements" are not admissible. Quoting

this court's opinion, he argues that "statements made from an illegal detention are not

admissible." Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d at 714, quoting United States v. HernandezHernandez, 384 F.3d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 2004). The government responds that the

encounter was consensual, and therefore does not implicate the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments.

A.

There are three categories of police encounters: (1) consensual communications

involving no coercion or restraint, (2) Terry stops – minimally intrusive seizures that

are significant enough to invoke the Fourth Amendment and must be supported by

reasonable suspicion, and (3) full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable

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cause. United States v. Johnson, 326 F.3d 1018, 1021 (8th Cir. 2003); see generally

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).

A consensual encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. United

States v. Hathcock, 103 F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 1997). "Law enforcement officers do

not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by

approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions

to them if they are willing to listen." United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 834 (8th

Cir. 2006), quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002). "Mere police

questioning does not constitute a seizure." United States v. Barry, 394 F.3d 1070,

1074 (8th Cir. 2005), quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991);

Hathcock, 103 F.3d at 719; United States v. Slater, 411 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir.

2005). A consensual encounter becomes a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment

when, considering the totality of the circumstances, the questioning is "so

intimidating, threatening, or coercive that a reasonable person would not have

believed himself free to leave." Hathcock, 103 F.3d at 718, quoting United States v.

McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1419 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Johnson, 326 F.3d

at 1021; INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). Flores-Sandoval contends that

the encounter was a seizure, not supported by reasonable suspicion. 

This court considers the totality of the circumstances, "not one particular

detail," to determine whether a seizure occurred. See Johnson, 326 F.3d at 1022.

Factors indicating a seizure are: the presence of several officers, a display of a weapon

by an officer, physical touching of the person, or the "use of language or tone of voice

indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Hathcock,

103 F.3d at 718-19, quoting United States v. White, 81 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1996);

Barry, 394 F.3d at 1075. A seizure occurs when the officer, "by means of physical

force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty" of a suspect. Id.

at 1074, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.

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 The district court did not find circumstance 3 as a fact. The district court

approved the magistrate judge's finding: "Agent Warner stated he was not aware of

the communication from the Marshal Service to the Jail. On the contrary, Agent

Warner testified he told the jail to drop the detainer."

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The question is whether by the totality of the circumstances, Flores-Sandoval's

liberty was restrained in such a way that a reasonable person would not feel free to

leave. This "'reasonable person test' presupposes an innocent person." Id. at 1075,

quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438.

Flores-Sandoval contends that the following circumstances indicated that a

reasonable person in his situation would not have felt free to leave: 

(1) Warner had previously arrested Flores-Sandoval and Flores-Sandoval

had been continuously imprisoned for the last 14 months due to that

arrest. (2) No one had informed Flores-Sandoval that the charges against

him had been dismissed before Warner stopped him. (3) Jail officials

held Flores-Sandoval in custody to be picked up by Warner on a new

detainer and did not release him until Warner arrived.2

 (4) Warner

commenced questioning Flores-Sandoval without first asking if he would

be willing to answer questions. (5) Warner displayed ICE credentials

and a badge to Flores-Sandoval as a show of authority and then began

questioning him. (6) The confrontation took place on the jailhouse

walkway near the door rather than in a neutral place. (7) Warner was

already present and waiting for Flores-Sandoval when the jailors finally

opened the door to release him into Warner's custody.

In addition to these circumstances, the district court found several other facts.

Warner did not indicate that answering his questions was required. Warner, wearing

plain clothes, was the only officer present. The detainer had been released and he was

free to leave. The district court found no evidence that Warner displayed a weapon,

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touched Flores-Sandoval, used language or a tone indicating that compliance would

be compelled, or that Flores-Sandoval resisted the request to identify himself. The

district court noted that there is no per se requirement than an officer inform an

individual of his right to refuse, and no presumption that consent is invalid where

given without an explicit notification of the right to refuse. The district court's

findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. 

By the totality of the circumstances, the atmosphere was not so intimidating or

threatening that a reasonable person would not have believed himself free to leave.

Agent Warner approached Flores-Sandoval, asked questions, and Flores-Sandoval

answered without resistance, even though his attorney had previously advised him not

to reveal his identity or offer his fingerprints. Flores-Sandoval was not restrained or

compelled to comply. His liberty was not restrained in such a way that a reasonable

person would have felt compelled to stay. Because the encounter was consensual, the

Fourth Amendment was not implicated, and reasonable suspicion was not required.

Hathcock, 103 F.3d at 718.

B.

Flores-Sandoval contends that the unMirandized statements he made on the

sidewalk were inadmissible. However, "police officers are not required to administer

Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question." United States v. LeBrun, 363

F.3d 715, 720 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,

495 (1977). The protections of Miranda apply to custodial interrogations. See United

States v. Black Bear, 422 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 2005); Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984). A custodial

interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any

significant way." Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144, 1146 (1986), quoting

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (1966). "The ultimate inquiry to determine custody for

Miranda purposes is whether there was a formal arrest, or restraint on freedom of

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movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Black Bear, 422 F.3d at

661. 

In making this determination, the court first considers the totality of the

circumstances confronting Flores-Sandoval and then determines whether a reasonable

person in his position would consider his "freedom of movement restricted to the

degree associated with formal arrest." United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 826

(8th Cir. 2004). This determination is "based on the objective circumstances, not on

subjective views of the participants." Black Bear, 422 F.3d at 661; see LeBrun, 363

F.3d at 720. 

Factors indicating custody are: (1) whether the suspect was informed that he

was free to leave and that answering was voluntary; (2) whether the suspect possessed

freedom of movement; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact or voluntarily

acquiesced; (4) whether strong arm tactics or strategies were employed; (5) whether

the atmosphere was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under

arrest at the end of questioning. United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th

Cir. 1990). These factors, however, are not exclusive, and custody "cannot be

resolved merely be counting up the number of factors on each side of the balance and

rendering a decision accordingly." Czichray, 378 F.3d at 827. 

While Flores-Sandoval was not informed that he was free to leave, he had been

released from jail and was free to leave, he voluntarily replied to the questions posed

to him, and the district court found no evidence that Warner coerced Flores-Sandoval's

responses through physical or verbal coercion. Further, even if Flores-Sandoval were

in custody, "a Miranda violation does not demand the suppression of derivative

physical evidence if the non-Mirandized statement was voluntary." United States v.

Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 2003). The district court found that

the absence of Miranda warnings did not render the fingerprints inadmissible. "The

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Fifth Amendment's Self Incrimination Clause offers no protection against compulsion

to submit to fingerprinting." Id. at 1019, quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.

582, 590 (1990). As Flores-Sandoval's encounter was consensual and he was not in

custody, the district court properly denied his motion to suppress.

C.

In addition to the Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments, Flores-Sandoval

contends that Warner's conduct violates 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) authorizing

immigration officials "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to

his right to be or to remain in the United States." See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.7,

287.8(c)(2)(i). Flores-Sandoval contends the government cannot show that the ICE

agent had reason to believe he was an alien other than as learned from the initial

illegal detention.

As a jurisdictional matter – rather than as an evidentiary matter – the body and

identity of a person cannot be suppressed as fruit of an unlawful detention. See

Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d at 715, quoting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,

1039 (1984); see also United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 753 (8th Cir.

2001). This court's previous opinion anticipates that ICE may retake custody of

Flores-Sandoval. Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d at 715. ICE obtained his statements and

fingerprints by consensual methods that did not violate the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments. See id.; Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 755. The statements and

fingerprints were not taken during an illegal detention. See United States v. PerezPerez, 337 F.3d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 2003); Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d at 715;

Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 756. For these reasons, the statements and

fingerprints are "untainted evidence" of identity, which the government may use. See

United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 619 (8th Cir. 2001). 

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III.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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