Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01825/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01825-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Apple Inc.
Appellee
GPNE Corp.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GPNE CORP.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

APPLE INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1825

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:12-cv-02885-LHK, 

Judge Lucy H. Koh.

______________________ 

Decided: August 1, 2016

______________________ 

 JUSTIN ADATTO NELSON, Susman Godfrey LLP, Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented 

by MAX LALON TRIBBLE, JR.; KALPANA SRINIVASAN,

FRANCES S. LEWIS, Los Angeles, CA; HOWARD JAY SUSSER, 

Burns & Levinson, LLP, Boston, MA.

 LAUREN B. FLETCHER, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale 

and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, argued for defendantappellee. Also represented by DANA OLCOTT BURWELL,

JOSEPH J. MUELLER; MARK D. SELWYN, Palo Alto, CA; 

RUFFIN B. CORDELL, Fish & Richardson, PC, Washington, 

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2 GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 

DC; BENJAMIN C. ELACQUA, Houston, TX; CHRISTOPHER 

OWEN GREEN, Atlanta, GA.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, TARANTO and CHEN, Circuit 

Judges.

PROST, Chief Judge. 

GPNE Corp. (“GPNE”) appeals from a final decision of 

the United States District Court for the Northern District 

of California. GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 

839 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Following a seven-day jury trial, 

the district court held that the asserted claims of U.S. 

Patent No. 7,570,954 (“’954 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 

7,792,492 (“’492 patent”) (collectively, “patents at issue”) 

were not infringed by Apple, Inc. (“Apple”). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The patents at issue relate to a two-way paging system, where paging devices are capable of not only receiving messages but also sending messages back in response. 

’492 patent col. 1 ll. 33–34, col 1 l. 66–col. 2 l. 17, col. 6 

l. 38–col. 8 l. 61. Devices communicate through a central 

control station, which receives a message from a sending 

device and then passes the message on to a recipient 

device. Id. at col. 3 ll. 30–50, col. 4 l. 57–col. 6 l. 37. The 

central control station is also capable of receiving a message from a telephone (such as a callback number, as in 

typical one-way pager operation) and passing it on to a 

recipient device. Id. at col. 5 ll. 37–48. The specification 

discloses that “the invention provides a two-way paging 

system which operates independently from a telephone 

system for wireless data communication between users.” 

Id. at col. 14 ll. 14–16.

GPNE asserts claim 44 of the ’492 patent and claims 

19 and 22 of the ’954 patent. All of these claims refer to 

the devices on the network as “nodes.” Id. at col. 21 ll. 8–

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GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 3

52, col. 22 l. 3–14; ’954 patent col. 16 l. 53–col. 17 l. 13, col. 

17 ll. 27–43, col. 17 ll. 51–58. The claims require that the 

“node” be “in a data network, the data network including 

a plurality of nodes,” have “at least one processor,” have 

“a memory providing code to the processor,” and have an 

“interface” that transmits and receives communication 

signals in a particular manner. See, e.g., ’492 patent col. 

21 ll. 8–52. The claims are otherwise silent as to the type 

of device a “node” must be. Id. 

Apart from the Abstract, the specification does not use 

the word “node,” but instead exclusively refers to the 

devices as “pagers” or “paging units.” See, e.g., id. at col. 1 

ll. 33–34, col. 1 l. 66–col. 2 l. 9, col. 3 l. 51–col. 4 l. 28, col. 

5 ll. 51–63, col. 14 ll. 14–16. The specification discloses 

that each “paging unit” includes a transmitter, a receiver, 

a beeper, a vibrator, an LCD display, a keyboard, and a 

“pager computer” which performs the processing necessary for the operation of the device. Id. at col. 3 l. 51–

col. 4 l. 19, fig.2. In several instances, the specification 

refers to “pagers” and “telephones” in the same sentence. 

See, e.g., id. at col. 1 ll. 44–51 (describing prior art attempts at two-way communication that “included efforts 

to connect the pager to a telephone”); id. at col. 5 ll. 31–47 

(describing differences in processing a “telephone message” versus a “pager message”). It never refers to the 

devices as “telephones.”

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2012, GPNE brought this action against Apple, alleging direct infringement by Apple’s iPhones and iPads 

that operate on the GPRS and LTE data networks. 

During claim construction, the parties disputed the 

meaning of “node.” GPNE proposed that a “node” should 

be construed as “[a] device in a network that can transmit 

and receive information.” Apple contended that “node” 

should be “[a] pager in a network operating independently 

of a telephone network.” In its Markman briefing and at 

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4 GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 

the Markman hearing, GPNE expressed concern that 

construing a “node” as a “pager” would lead to a fight 

about what “pager” meant. J.A. 510 (Markman Br. 4) 

(“Defendants propose an incorrect ambiguity by inserting 

the term ‘pager’ into ‘node’ as it . . . only begs the question 

of what a ‘pager’ is . . . .”); J.A. 1568 (Markman Tr. 80:18–

24) (“[T]he mischief here is . . . we get into the definition 

of, what is a pager?”). The court pressed Apple on this 

point:

If I do say [a “node” is] “a pager that’s got this enhanced capability to do two-way data communication,” then I’m just kicking the can down the road 

and then we’re going to have a fight as to what a 

pager is . . . . So tell me, then what is a pager? 

How are we going to define that? Are we going to 

need to have a subsequent claim construction on 

that term?

J.A. 1569–70 (Markman Tr. 81:19–82:2). Apple responded that “I don’t think we’re setting up a situation where 

we construe the construction . . . because there’s more to 

[‘node’] than just a pager.” J.A. 1571 (Markman Tr. 

83:15–18).

On August 13, 2013, the court issued a Markman order construing “node” as “pager with two-way data communications capability that transmits wireless data 

communications on a paging system that operates independently from a telephone network.” J.A. 74–75. It 

rejected GPNE’s position that “node” cannot be described 

as a “pager,” reasoning “while the Court agrees that the 

specification makes clear that the claimed invention is 

distinguishable from prior art pagers in that the claimed 

devices are capable of two-way communications, this does 

not support the conclusion that the claimed devices are 

not a type of pager.” J.A. 68.

The district court held a seven-day jury trial between 

October 6 and 21, 2014. True to the concerns expressed at 

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GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 5

Markman, the parties spent time at trial discussing 

whether the accused iPhones and iPads could be “pagers.” 

Apple asked GPNE’s experts, its own experts, and several 

lay witnesses whether they thought an iPad or an iPhone 

was a pager. E.g., J.A. 28119 (Dr. Dinan, GPNE’s technical expert), J.A. 28670–71 (Mr. Dansky, GPNE’s damages expert), J.A. 28805 (Mr. Casanova, Apple’s Senior 

Director of Product Marketing), J.A. 28861–900 (Dr. 

Wilson, Apple’s infringement expert), J.A. 29079–80 (Mr. 

Rysavy, Apple’s invalidity expert). Apple also contrasted 

the accused iPhones and iPads to characteristics of 1990sera pagers during opening and closing arguments. See, 

e.g., J.A. 6705–10, 29488. GPNE did not object to these 

questions or arguments. GPNE did, however, present 

rebuttal testimony from its expert, see, e.g., J.A. 27970 

(Dr. Dinan warning that Apple is “going to point you to 

the same little Motorola beeper that I used to carry on my 

belt” but that this is “not how we analyze patents”), and 

rebuttal argument, see, e.g., J.A. 6676–78; Transcript of 

Jury Trial at 1696–99, GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 

3:12-cv-02885-LHK (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2015), ECF No. 

590. It also cross-examined Apple’s expert, Dr. Wilson, on 

this point. See, e.g., J.A. 28965. 

During the second week of trial, GPNE requested an 

instruction on “pager,” which read:

As to [“pager” or “paging system that operates independently from a telephone network”], you 

should apply their plain and ordinary meaning to 

a person of skill in the art after reading the entire 

patent and file history. The court’s construction 

does not prohibit a “node” from being both a pager 

and a telephone. A pager could transmit certain 

communications on a paging system that operates 

independently from a telephone network while 

engaging in other types of communication on the 

telephone network.

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6 GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 

J.A. 7128. The court denied this request and instructed 

the jury to apply plain and ordinary meaning for terms 

not otherwise construed. J.A. 26689.

On October 22, 2014, the jury issued a verdict finding 

that the ’492 and ’954 patents were not invalid, but not 

infringed. GPNE moved for JMOL, or, in the alternative, 

a new trial. The court denied these motions. 

GPNE now appeals the denial of its post-trial motions. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, GPNE argues that the district court’s noninfringement judgment should be reversed because (1) it 

is based on an erroneous construction of “node;” and 

(2) the court violated O2 Micro International Ltd. v. 

Beyond Innovation Technology Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 

(Fed. Cir. 2008), by allowing the jury to decide the meaning of “pager.” Apple responds that the district court 

handled these issues correctly and also offers several 

alternative grounds to affirm the district court’s noninfringement judgment. 

I 

We review a district court’s claim construction under 

the standard set forth in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 

v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).

The district court construed “node” as “pager with 

two-way data communications capability that transmits 

wireless data communications on a paging system that 

operates independently from a telephone network.” J.A. 

74–75. GPNE takes issue with two aspects of this construction: “pager” and “operates independently of a telephone network.”

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GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 7

A 

We begin with “pager.” GPNE argues that the district 

court erred in classifying a “node” as a “pager” because 

nothing in the claims requires that a “node” must be a 

“pager.” GPNE concedes that the specification consistently refers to “nodes” as “pagers”, but emphasizes that the 

specification also contains evidence that “node” should be 

construed more broadly. As examples, GPNE points to 

how the specification describes “nodes” as devices that 

operate on a sophisticated data network and contain 

complex features like image displays and a writing pad. 

GPNE also argues that claim differentiation counsels 

against construing a “node” as a “pager” because the 

parent patent to the ’492 and ’954 patents, U.S. Patent 

No. 5,542,115 (“’115 patent”), specifically uses the terms 

“paging system” and “paging unit” in its claims. 

The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, which is the meaning that 

the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the 

art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp.,

415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed 

to read the claim term not only in the context of the 

particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but 

in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. at 1313. Accordingly, “the only meaning that 

matters in claim construction is the meaning in the 

context of the patent.” Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

We have recognized that when a patent “repeatedly 

and consistently” characterizes a claim term in a particular way, it is proper to construe the claim term in accordance with that characterization. See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. 

Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2014); ICU 

Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1374–

75 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Here, the words “pager” and “pager 

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8 GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 

units” appear in the specification over 200 times, and, 

apart from the Abstract, the specification repeatedly and 

exclusively uses these words to refer to the devices in the 

patented system. Although GPNE is correct that the 

specification discloses information about the features the 

devices have and the network they operate on, none of 

this is inconsistent with characterizing the devices as a 

type of pager. The prosecution history also supports 

construing “node” as a type of “pager” because the inventor’s Rule 131 declaration consistently and exclusively 

describes the invention as a system of pagers. J.A. 657–

83. In light of this consistent disclosure, the district court 

did not err in characterizing a “node” as a “pager.”

GPNE’s claim differentiation argument does not alter 

this conclusion. Claim differentiation is “not a hard and 

fast rule,” but rather a presumption that will be overcome 

when the specification or prosecution history dictates a 

contrary construction. Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR, 

Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Because the 

specification and the prosecution history so consistently 

describe “nodes” as “pagers,” such is the case here. In 

addition, the claims that GPNE contrasts differ in more 

ways than just their use of “node” or “pager,” so the 

inference that “different words or phrases used in separate claims . . . indicate that the claims have different 

meanings and scope,” id. at 1368, is weak at best. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that “node” is 

properly characterized as a “pager.”

B 

Turning to “operates independently of a telephone 

network,” GPNE argues that this limitation is improper 

because it is based on what it contends is a “single summation sentence” from the specification. Appellant’s Br. 

30. This sentence reads: “Thus, the invention provides a 

two-way paging system which operates independently 

from a telephone system for wireless data communication 

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GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 9

between users.” ’492 patent col. 14 ll. 14–16 (emphasis 

added).

We agree with GPNE that the phrase “operates independently from the telephone system” appears in only one 

sentence of the Detailed Description section, but disagree 

that it was improper for the district court to limit the 

claims in this way. “When a patent . . . describes the 

features of the ‘present invention’ as a whole, this description limits the scope of the invention,” Verizon Servs. 

Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1308 

(Fed. Cir. 2007). As GPNE recognizes, this is a summation sentence which describes “the invention” as a whole. 

This characterization is bolstered by the prosecution 

history, as the inventor’s Rule 131 declaration several 

times states that the invention operates independently of 

a telephone network. J.A. 657, 666. Accordingly, it was 

proper for the district court to conclude that a “node” 

should have the capability to “operate[] independently 

from a telephone network.”

II

GPNE argues that even if we agree with the district 

court’s construction, the district court nonetheless committed reversible error because it failed to provide a 

construction for “pager,” which left an issue of claim 

construction for the jury. See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362 

(“When the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to 

construe it.”).

The potential for “pager” to create difficulties for the 

jury is something that both parties and the district court 

had been aware of from the outset of claim construction. 

GPNE raised the concern in both its Markman briefing 

and at the Markman hearing that using the word “pager” 

would lead to fights about what “pager” meant. See J.A. 

510, 1568. However, after the district court issued its 

Markman order, GPNE did not make a formal request for 

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10 GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 

clarification until the second week at trial, when it requested a jury instruction on “pager.” J.A. 7128.

On appeal, Apple argues that GPNE waived its ability 

to raise an O2 Micro challenge because it never requested 

a construction for “pager” and the concerns it expressed at 

Markman were insufficient to put this issue in dispute. 

We disagree. In general, “litigants waive their right 

to present new claim construction disputes if they are 

raised for the first time after trial.” Lazare Kaplan Int’l, 

Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 628 F.3d 1359, 1376 (Fed.

Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); Broadcom 

Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 694 (Fed. Cir. 

2008) (finding waiver where parties did not propose that a 

term be construed at Markman and plaintiff argued for a 

construction in its post-trial motions). As just noted, that 

is not what happened here. And when GPNE sought a 

clarifying instruction on “node” before the case went to 

the jury, it was hardly reversing course on a point it had 

“implicitly conceded” earlier. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm 

Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding 

implicit concession on need for construction by failure to 

seek any construction before evidence closed). To the 

contrary, at Markman, the parties disputed the construction of “node,” including whether “pager” would be an 

appropriate word to help define the scope of “node.” The 

parties presented opposing views on this point: GPNE 

argued that the parties would “get into the definition of, 

what is a pager?,” while Apple responded that the parties 

were not “setting up a situation where we construe the 

construction.” J.A. 1568, 1571. The district court was 

aware of this dispute, as it itself pressed Apple on this 

point. J.A. 1569–70. In these circumstances, we find no 

waiver by GPNE of the objections it raised to the construction of “node” before the case went to the jury. 

Finding no waiver, we turn to the merits of GPNE’s 

O2 Micro challenge. GPNE argues that Apple devoted a 

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GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 11

substantial amount of time at trial to comparing the 

accused iPhones and iPads to 1990s-era legacy pagers, 

effectively “using [legacy pagers] to define the terms 

‘pager’ and ‘paging systems.’” Appellant’s Br. 42. According to GPNE, because the district court allowed these 

arguments, the jury was left to determine the meaning of 

“pager,” which violated O2 Micro. 

We disagree. In O2 Micro, we held that “[w]hen the 

parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the 

scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.” 

521 F.3d at 1362. This is because “the ultimate question 

of construction [is] a legal question,” which “is for the 

judge and not the jury.” Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 135 S. 

Ct. at 838, 842. This duty, however, is not without limit. 

Where a district court has resolved the questions about 

claim scope that were raised by the parties, it is under no 

obligation to address other potential ambiguities that 

have no bearing on the operative scope of the claim. Eon 

Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 

1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] court need not attempt 

the impossible task of resolving all questions of meaning 

with absolute, univocal finality.”); see also Function 

Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1326 (Fed.

Cir. 2013) (“Nearly every patent case will involve some 

amount of ‘word games,’ because claims and claim constructions are, after all, just words.”); Acumed LLC v. 

Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A]

sound claim construction need not always purge every 

shred of ambiguity.”); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & 

Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly 

those terms need be construed that are in controversy, 

and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). This is because “[s]uch an endeavor could proceed 

ad infinitum, as every word—whether a claim term itself, 

or the words a court uses to construe a claim term—is 

susceptible to further definition, elucidation, and explanation.” Eon Corp. IP Holdings, 815 F.3d at 1318. 

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12 GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 

Here, the district court’s construction was sufficient to 

resolve the parties’ dispute over the scope of “node.” Its 

construction specifies that “node” is not simply any “pager,” but one that must be capable of “two-way communications,” “transmit[ting] wireless data communications on a 

paging system,” and functioning on a “paging system that 

operates independently from a telephone network.” J.A. 

74–75. These requirements were sufficient to clarify that 

the type of “pager” a “node” must be is not a 1990s-era 

legacy pager, which is the post-hoc O2 Micro challenge 

that GPNE raises here.

At bottom, then, GPNE’s complaint rests not with the 

district court’s failure to define claim scope, but with its 

allowing Apple to make certain arguments to the jury. 

The focus of GPNE’s argument is that Apple allegedly 

devoted a substantial amount of time at trial to comparing the accused iPhones and iPads to 1990s-era legacy 

pagers. Accurately characterized, this is an argument 

about whether Apple’s arguments to the jury were improper by “offering the jury appealingly simplifying ways 

to determine . . . infringement thus inviting the jury to 

shirk its key factfinding function.” Verizon Servs. Corp. v. 

Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For this issue, we turn to the law of the regional circuit. See id. In the Ninth Circuit, “[a] federal judge has 

broad discretion in supervising a trial, and his or her 

behavior during trial justifies reversal only if it abuses 

that discretion.” United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 

537 (9th Cir. 1988). This discretion extends to the supervision of attorney arguments; the Ninth Circuit “will not 

reverse a judgment because of statements made in the 

arguments of counsel unless they were so prejudicial that 

a failure to declare a mistrial was an abuse of discretion.” 

Guam v. Ignacio, 852 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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On the record before us, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion when it found that 

Apple’s arguments did not require a new trial. Whether 

Apple’s accused iPhones and iPads could be “pagers” was 

extensively debated at trial. GPNE had ample opportunities to present rebuttal testimony and argument that the 

iPhones and iPads were “pagers,” and it took advantage of 

these opportunities on a number of occasions. For example, GPNE had its expert, Dr. Dinan, warn the jury during his direct examination that Apple is “going to point

you to the same little Motorola beeper that I used to carry 

on my belt” and explain that this was a red herring because this is “not how we analyze patents.” J.A. 27970. 

GPNE also cross-examined Apple’s expert, Dr. Wilson, on 

this point, see, e.g., J.A. 28965, and addressed whether 

iPhones and iPads could be “pagers” in both its opening 

statement and closing argument. See, e.g., J.A. 6676–78; 

Transcript of Jury Trial at 1696–99, GPNE Corp. v. Apple 

Inc., No. 3:12-cv-02885-LHK (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2015), 

ECF No. 590. Given this counter-balancing testimony 

and argument, it was within the district court’s discretion 

to conclude that the jury was not misguided in carrying 

out its role as infringement factfinder and that a new trial 

was not warranted.

One final aspect of the district court’s conduct at trial 

which GPNE’s arguments call into question is its refusal 

to issue a clarifying instruction on “pager.” As discussed 

above, in the second week of trial, GPNE requested that 

the jury be instructed:

As to [“pager” or “paging system that operates independently from a telephone network”], you 

should apply their plain and ordinary meaning to 

a person of skill in the art after reading the entire 

patent and file history. The court’s construction 

does not prohibit a “node” from being both a pager 

and a telephone. A pager could transmit certain 

communications on a paging system that operates 

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14 GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 

independently from a telephone network while 

engaging in other types of communication on the 

telephone network.

J.A. 7128. The district court did not abuse its discretion 

in refusing to give this instruction. The plain words of the 

district court’s construction direct that “operat[ing] independently from a telephone network” is a “capability.” 

GPNE’s proposed instruction merely restates this point, 

although in more words and with language that directly 

draws from non-infringement arguments made at trial. 

In light of this, the district court was entitled to conclude 

that its given construction sufficiently clarified this point 

and no further explanation was needed. 

In sum, none of the arguments that GPNE raises with 

respect to claim scope compel us to remand for a new 

trial. The district court correctly construed the terms and 

instructed the jury to apply its constructions. It also 

sufficiently resolved questions regarding the scope of 

“node” such that no O2 Micro problems are present here. 

We also discern no abuse of discretion in the district 

court’s rejection of GPNE’s proposed jury instruction or 

refusal to grant a new trial on the basis of Apple’s pagerbased arguments; thus, the district court properly rejected 

GPNE’s request for a new trial on these grounds.

III

GPNE does not appear to articulate an infringement 

position under the district court’s construction of “node.”1 

 

1 In particular, GPNE has not developed any argument for why the following evidence fails to support the 

jury’s non-infringement verdict. All of the accused devices 

operate on either the GPRS or LTE networks. At trial, 

GPNE’s expert conceded that both of these networks 

become inoperable without GSM resources, J.A. 28417, 

and that the GSM system is a “telephone network.” J.A. 

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GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. 15

Accordingly, because we affirm the district court’s construction and find no basis under which GPNE is entitled 

to a new trial, we affirm the district court’s judgment of 

non-infringement. We need not reach Apple’s alternative 

grounds for affirmance, and provide no opinion on these 

issues.

AFFIRMED

 

28413. Apple’s expert testified to the same. See J.A. 

28901–03, 28906. Linking these statements together 

yields the conclusion that the accused devices do not 

“operate independently of a telephone network.” 

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