Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01912/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01912-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory C. Curnett
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1912

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri. 

Gregory C. Curnett, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

 Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: January 11, 2005

Filed: February 9, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

On March 23, 2003, acting on information from a cooperating witness, Chief

George R. Poletis of the Lake Lotawana Police Department approached Gregory C.

Curnett’s residence. According to Chief Poletis, when he reached the house, the front

door was open, but the screen door was closed, so he knocked on the screen door and

said, “Police Officer, I need to talk to you.” Curnett then pushed the screen door

open, letting Chief Poletis in, and said “What’s the matter? What’s going on?”

Shortly after Chief Poletis entered, a second officer, Officer Leslie, arrived and

caught the partially open screen door so that he could enter the house. Concerned

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The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable

Robert E. Larsen, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of

Missouri.

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that Curnett was getting “squirrelly,” Chief Poletis asked Officer Leslie to handcuff

him, and both officers escorted Curnett outside the house. 

After being advised of his Miranda rights, Curnett admitted that he had illegal

materials in the house and consented to a search. A subsequent search of the

residence discovered glassware, Red Label ephedrine, black iodine, and numerous

other methamphetamine-related items. Curnett moved to suppress these items,

arguing that the warrantless entry was unlawful, and that his consent was tainted by

the unlawful entry, but the district court1

 denied his motion. After a jury trial, Curnett

was found guilty of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of

iodine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and unlawful possession of a

firearm as a previously convicted felon. He was sentenced to 262 months’

imprisonment. Curnett appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress

evidence obtained during the search of his home.

Curnett’s appeal focuses on a discrepancy between the testimony of Chief

Poletis, recounted above, and the testimony of Detective John Howe of the Jackson

County Drug Task Force. After the disputed search, Detective Howe prepared an

affidavit stating that Curnett was apprehended by Chief Poletis as Curnett fled into

the house. Detective Howe then testified at the suppression hearing that, although he

was not present at the time of Curnett’s arrest, Chief Poletis had informed him that

Poletis apprehended Curnett because Curnett fled into the residence. Chief Poletis

was questioned about Detective Howe’s statements, but Poletis maintained that

Curnett had not fled into the house and that when Poletis approached the house,

Curnett was already inside.

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As an initial matter, we reject Curnett’s argument that the district court failed

to make a proper factual determination on the circumstances of Chief Poletis’s entry

into the residence. Factual findings are inadequate, thus requiring remand, only if

there is no “reasonable view of the evidence” that will support the district court’s

decision. United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

This principle is not tested by Curnett’s case, because here the district court adopted

several findings of fact made by the magistrate judge concerning Chief Poletis’s

version of the day’s events. The court also explicitly addressed the “discrepancy”

between Chief Poletis’s testimony and the testimony of Detective Howe, finding that

the detective’s version was “not accurate.” These findings are sufficient to support

the district court’s subsequent conclusions.

Curnett also argues that the district court erred in finding that Chief Poletis

entered the home under the circumstances that he described. When evaluating the

district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, we review the legal conclusions de

novo and the factual findings for clear error. United States v. Anderson, 339 F.3d

720, 723 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1084 (2003). In Curnett’s view, the district

court’s finding was clearly erroneous because Chief Poletis had a “clear motive to lie”

and because Detective Howe’s testimony to the contrary was “overwhelmingly

credible.” We are not persuaded that the record shows a clear error. A district court’s

credibility determinations are entitled to great deference, United States v. Gregory,

302 F.3d 805, 811 (8th Cir. 2002), and in this case, the court’s conclusions survive

that deferential review. Curnett did not testify at the suppression hearing, and no

evidence other than Howe’s report of Poletis’s statement supported Curnett’s version

of the entry into his home. The district court reasonably resolved the conflict in

testimony in favor of Chief Poletis, and we see no basis to reverse its credibility

finding.

Finally, Curnett argues that the district court made an error of law in finding

that Curnett’s act of stepping aside to let Chief Poletis into the home constituted

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implied consent to the entry. We disagree. We have held that nearly identical actions

constitute implied consent to an entry. United States v. Turbyfill, 525 F.2d 57, 59

(8th Cir. 1975) (finding implied consent where the resident opened the interior door

and stepped back, allowing officers to open the outer screen door and enter); see also

United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1376 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding consent by a

resident who stepped aside and motioned officers in, even though the officers had

previously drawn their weapons). Because Curnett’s actions were sufficient to allow

a reasonable officer to infer consent to enter, we find that the entry was lawful.

Consequently, the evidence seized from Curnett’s home was not the fruit of an

unlawful search. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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