Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00129/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John E. Potter
Defendant
Lina S. Siam
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINA S. SIAM,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-0129 MHP 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff Lina Siam brings this action against John E. Potter, in his official capacity as Postmaster

General of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). Plaintiff alleges that she faced discrimination, a

hostile work environment, and retaliation based on her race and national origin, as well as her sex, in

violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e et seq. In addition,

plaintiff alleges violations of overtime protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. section

201 et seq. Now before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on this court’s

subject matter jurisdiction and defendant’s liability. Having considered the parties’ arguments and

submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND1

Lina Siam has worked for the USPS since 1977, rising in her early years from the position of a

letter sorting machine operator to an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor/investigator. Pl.’s

Dep. at 18:18, 20:3-5. In addition to several promotions, plaintiff earned a number of awards for her

work, including a 1982 merit-based pay increase award, bonuses in 1995 and 1988, and certificates of

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achievement in 1986, 1990, and 1992. Dryovage Dec., Exh. A at 000096, 000118, 000136, 000142;

Simmons Dec., Exh. 1, Faison Aff. at 0001149. From 1988 through 1992, plaintiff was given a “detail”

(an advantageous short-term assignment) to the position of Manager of EEO Processing. Siam Dep. at

21:13-16. In February 1993, plaintiff was promoted to the position of Senior EEO Complaints Processing

Specialist at the EEO Center in San Francisco, California. Id. at 21:25-22:1. That same year, plaintiff

received a very strong evaluation for her work. Siam Dep. at 59:19-60:1. Several of the staff she

supervised testified that she was a strong manager, and one of the EEO Managers who worked extensively

with Siam described her as a hard working “team player” who assisted other employees when necessary,

completed assignments in “an outstanding and professional manner,” and took work home to clear case

back logs. See Dryovage Dec., Exh. G, Yee Aff. at 1-2. See also Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Dumaguit

Dec. at 1; Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Cruz-Crowder Dec. at 3. Yee also testified that Siam was “well

deserving” of an award for her detail to reorganize a district office in Denver. See Dryovage Dec., Exh. G,

Yee Aff. at 6. 

Plaintiff believes that a glass ceiling for Asian/Filipino females has blocked her advancement within

the USPS since 1993, when plaintiff received her highest promotion. She alleges that intersectional

discrimination on the basis of her race and national origin, on the one hand, and her gender, on the other,

have denied her training opportunities, performance awards, desirable temporary assignments, opportunities

to compete for promotions, participation in a bonus pay program, and information about entitlement to

overtime backpay. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 9-37. Verbal attacks by a co-worker and a supervisor, as

well as negative remarks made about plaintiff, magnified her experience of disparate treatment and allegedly

created a hostile work environment. Id. ¶¶ 38-44. Following plaintiff’s complaints about both of these

concerns to the EEO, she believes that retaliation fueled further adverse employment actions.

In addition to a system of competitive promotions, advancement at the EEO occurred through

short-term details to higher positions. These could last for less than thirty days, in which case the worker

would not receive a pay adjustment, or for longer periods (as long as several years in some instances), in

which case the employee would receive a full salary adjustment to the higher grade’s pay. Siam Dep. at

68:20-25. Detail assignments provided important means to improve one’s candidacy for promotion, and

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indeed employees were sometimes permanently promoted to positions they held on details. Opportunities

for details were not formally published, and they were rarely announced verbally to staff. See Dryovage

Dec., Exh. A-1, Cruz-Crowder Dec. at 000618; Dryovage Dec., Exh. A-1, Nelson Dec. at 000623. 

Employees could inform supervisors of their interest, but the EEO did not use a written application process

for the positions, nor did it announce which employees were selected for details. Siam Dep. at 70:21-23. 

Supervisors who anticipated that they would be absent for any length of time simply selected their

replacement. See Dryovage Dec., Exh. A-1, Cruz-Crowder Dec. at 000618. 

Plaintiff alleges that in approximately 1993, shortly after her promotion to senior EEO specialist

(graded as an “EAS-19” position), her upward trajectory at the USPS began to stall. In 1993, her first-line

supervisor, Tamu Tatum, issued Siam a performance evaluation of “outstanding.” See Siam Dep. at 36:7-

14. However, Bernadine Faison, Tatum’s superior, did not award plaintiff a bonus or a salary increase

normally commensurate with a performance evaluation of “outstanding.” See id. 59:19-60:1. She believes

that this lack of recognition was due to animus by her colleague William Norris, because shortly following

Tatum’s evaluation, Norris tossed a copy of the evaluation on Siam’s desk and remarked, “they think you

walk on water.” Siam Dep. at 39:13-22. Faison had written on a note attached to the copy that Faison

and Norris should “discuss” the evaluation, and Siam inferred on that basis that Norris influenced Faison to

believe the evaluation was undeserved. Id. During the ensuing period, plaintiff believes that she was

overlooked for details lasting longer than thirty days. See Dryovage Dec., Exh. A., Siam Aff. at 001081-

82. Plaintiff was formally recommended by her immediate supervisor for a “far exceed” merit in 1996 and

1997, but she believes that Norris and Faison blocked the award. Id. at 001080. She also believes that

Faison barred her from special recognition. Id. at 001081. Lastly, based on her own personal

observations as well as on a document she saw which listed the training hours given to employees, plaintiff

believes she was given the least number of training hours of any EAS-19 employee. Siam Dep. at 65:20-

66:25.

Plaintiff’s frustration with her pay grade and failure to receive bonuses continued. In June 1997,

plaintiff was assigned on yet another detail to a higher level position, but it was too short in duration to

receive additional pay under Postal Service policy. Siam Dep. at 101:3-11. In approximately April of

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1999, a desirable, extended detail to an EAS-21 position became available (again without an open

application), but plaintiff was passed up in favor of Brian Hemenway, a white male who was graded below

plaintiff as an EAS-17 employee. Id. at 70:7-14. In May 2000, when the Acting Manager position at

Siam’s EEO Complaints Processing Center (also an EAS-21 position) opened up for an extended detail,

plaintiff was not selected for the opportunity. Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Dumaguit Aff. at 1583. The detail

was filled by Gerald Dumaguit, a Filipino male employee at the San Francisco Center who testified that he

had fewer qualifications for the position than plaintiff. Dryovage Dec., Dumaguit Dec. at 1. At the time of

his promotion, Dumaguit informed the center’s acting manager that he felt Siam was more qualified for the

position and he asked whether she might file a discrimination complaint for being passed up. Id. The

manager replied that she could not do so, because both Dumaguit and Siam were Filipino. Id. Later that

year, plaintiff’s supervisor Mary Robinson told Siam that she would like to place her in an extended detail

to a desirable position in the office’s appeals section, but plaintiff was again passed up for the opportunity in

favor of Hemenway. Siam Dep. at 135:6-13. In September of 2000, Siam was excluded from

competition for a promotion to an EAS-21 position. Id. at 125:10-13. By 2001, plaintiff still held the

same position and grade she had acquired in 1993. 

As plaintiff’s ascent began to plateau in 1993, plaintiff’s colleague Norris, a Caucasian male,

continued a steady advance towards higher positions. This progress came in spite of his apparent alcohol

problem, as several employees, including Siam, testified that they regularly noticed the odor of alcohol on

Norris’s breath at work. See Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Dumaguit Dec. at 3; Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, CruzCrowder Dec., at 3; Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Nelson Aff. at 001322. Norris and Siam had begun their

service in the USPS in 1978 and 1977 respectively, and both moved into positions as EEO

counselor/investigators in 1987 and 1988, respectively. Norris Dep. at 16:17-17:6. Between 1988 and

1993, they occupied the same positions. Siam Dep. at 40:5-7. In 1993, Norris was given an extended

detail to an EAS-21 position, and then again detailed to the job for a full two years starting in 1997 or

1998. Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Siam Aff. at 001081. 

After a third extended detail to the EAS-21 level, Norris was permanently promoted into that

position in approximately August of 2000. Siam Dep. at 81:2-23; Norris Dep. at 17:8-14. Plaintiff alleges

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that management “changed the rules” on an EAS-21 position in order to block her eligibility and set Norris

up for a non-competitive promotion. Siam Dep. at 125:10-13. In 2000, an EEO restructuring led USPS

to offer local employees an option to downgrade their employment rank if they wished to remain in the area

headquarters rather than move into a district headquarters. Simmons Supp. Dec., Exh. 1, Robinson Aff. at

001598; Robinson Dep. at 26:1-2. Siam elected to move into the San Francisco district office rather than

accept the demotion. Simmons Supp. Dec., Exh. 1, Robinson Aff. at 001598. Norris similarly chose to

move into a district office, but one day after making his decision, he changed his mind and accepted the

demotion to EAS-17 to stay in the area office. Id.; Norris Dep. at 17:6-7. One month later, eligibility to

compete for promotions to EAS-21 and EAS-23 level positions were granted only to area employees,

making Siam and other Asian employees ineligible to compete for the positions. Simmons Supp. Dec.,

Exh. 1, Robinson Aff. at 001598. Norris was subsequently appointed to the EAS-21 opening, for which

only two employees could apply. See id.; Siam Dep. at 132:18-19. Plaintiff was later told that an EEO

manager had instructed certain persons not to share information regarding upcoming job openings with nonarea employees. Siam Dep. at 126:12-16. Plaintiff filed a second request for EEO counseling shortly

following this event. 

Brian Hemenway, also a Caucasian male, similarly advanced well beyond plaintiff, though he began

at a lower rank than plaintiff and was ,many years more junior in seniority and experience. In 1999-2000,

Hemenway was selected for his first extended detail over Siam. Siam Dep. at 70:7-14. Later in 2000,

plaintiff was informed that she would be chosen for a specific detail in which she had expressed interest, but

she later learned that Hemenway was awarded the post. Id. at 135:6-13. Several employees testified to

his inappropriate workplace conduct. See Siam Dep. at 135:6-13; Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Nelson Dec.

at 3; Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Cruz-Crowder Dec., at 3. One employee testified that Hemenway left the

office “on numerous occasions” for up to four hours at a time to go skating. Dryovage Dec., Exh. A,

Dumaguit Aff. at 001583. 

Plaintiff alleges that in addition to being treated more favorably, Norris and Hemenway created a

hostile work environment. At an undated time, Norris allegedly referred to plaintiff as “dragon lady,” a

remark which she perceived to be racially motivated. Siam Dep. at 50:19-20. Norris was also overheard

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saying that he “had no problem getting rid of Lina.” Siam Dep. at 46:23-47:3; Dryovage Dec., Exh. G,

Yee Aff. at 3. Two specific instances of verbal abuse occurred in 2000. At a staff meeting in 2000,

Hemenway, at the time a counselor/investigator at the EEO, asked a question regarding sexual harassment,

and in response to plaintiff’s answer, he stood up and aggressively told Siam “You don’t know what you’re

talking about. You don’t even know what sexual harassment is.” Siam Dep. at 161:22-162:3. The acting

EEO manager at the time told Hemenway he was “out of control” and referred the incident to managers at

the area office, but Hemenway was not disciplined. Id. at 162:24-165:15. 

On a second occasion in 2000, during a focus group meeting to discuss employee grievances,

plaintiff explained that the justification for a new sign in/sign out policy was the need to curb unannounced

employee exits during the day. Siam Dep. at 179:1-3. In response, Norris stood up, pounded his fist on

the table, and angrily shouted, “Why are you lying?” Id. at 173:1-2. See also Dryovage Dec., Exh. A,

Wright Dec. at 001327. Plaintiff testified that Norris smelled of alcohol, and she feared that he might strike

her. Id. at 173:7-12. The moderator of the meeting told Norris “we do not want personal attacks here,”

but plaintiff does not believe disciplinary action was taken. Siam Dep. at 173:12-15, 176:22-24. The

record suggests that the tensions at this meeting related to plaintiff’s efforts to address lax discipline at the

EEO Center, including employee tardiness and long stretches of absenteeism during working hours. See

generally Siam Dep. at 167-172. See also Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Dumaguit Aff. at 1583-84; Siam Dep.

167:21-23. 

In January, 2001, plaintiff left the USPS on stress-related medical leave, where she has remained

ever since. Approximately one month after plaintiff departed on stress leave, she was informed that her

photograph had been posted on a bulletin board in the entrance of her building which identified criminal

fugitives “wanted” by law enforcement. Siam Dep. at 180:8-16; Siam Dec. at 3. The placement of the

photograph was purportedly because due to her stress leave, plaintiff needed medical clearance before

entering the building. See Simmons Dec., Exh. 4, Bedell Dec. at 001673.

Plaintiff also alleges that during her leave from USPS, she was excluded from participation in two

advantageous programs and income opportunities on the basis of her sex, as well as her race and national

origin. First of all, USPS instituted a “variable pay program” for fiscal year 2001 which provided a form of

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performance-based pay. See Siam Dep. at 206:3-8; Siam Dec., Exh. C, Notice of Right to File at

001540; Palisoc Aff. at 001457. Plaintiff had commenced her medical leave in January of 2001, the first

year of the program. Plaintiff was not notified of the program and she was excluded from participation. 

Siam Dep. at 206:23-25. Secondly, USPS determined that several EEO positions had been misclassified

as exempt from overtime entitlement under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Simmons Dec., Exh. 6, Martin

Aff. at 001442-44. Employees determined to be eligible for overtime backpay were notified of their

eligibility, and Norris received between $6,000 to $7,000 in backpay for the same level work performed in

a the same period. Norris Dep. at 37:8-25. Plaintiff was not informed of the entitlement or her eligibility. 

Siam Dep. at 206:23-24.

Other employees also experienced ill treatment and harassment that they perceived to be motivated

by their race or national origin, and several witnesses testified to barriers to their advancement, as well as

double standards for workers depending on their race or ethnicity. See Exh. A-1, Dumaguit Dec. at

000613-616; Exh. A-2, Cruz-Crowder Dec. at 000620. In addition, witnesses testified that the office was

divided along racial lines. See Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Dumaguit Dec. at 000613; Exh. A, Cruz-Crowder

Dec. at 000620; Exh. A, Nelson Dec. at 000623. Michael Yee, an EEO manager, testified that over time

“it became more apparent” that Faison, an African-American supervisor in charge of many details and

promotions, “has a problem with Asians,” and that over the years he had to question her treatment of

several Asian staff members, including Siam. Dryovage Dec., Exh. G, Yee Aff. at 5. Plaintiff testified that

Filipino persons in the personnel department were routinely subjected to comments such as “[t]his place is

like Manila Town.” See Siam Dep. at 124:6-13.

Plaintiff’s history of EEO filings is as follows. On April 29, 1999, shortly after her denial of a higher

level detail, plaintiff filed her first request for counseling, a prerequisite to the formal complaint she filed on

September 4, 1999.2 An administrative law judge heard plaintiff’s case on the issue in January of 2002,

and held that the hiring decision was not influenced by discrimination. His findings were adopted as the final

agency decision on June 6, 2003 and upheld on appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Center

Office of Federal Operations on December 8, 2003. 

Plaintiff filed a second request for EEO counseling on October 2, 2000, after the EEO restructuring

in which she was prevented from applying for open positions.3 She filed her formal complaint in this second

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matter on February 10, 2001. After plaintiff’s departure on medical leave, and precipitated by her

discovery that her photograph had been posted in the lobby, plaintiff filed a third EEO request for

counseling on February 7, 2001, followed by a formal complaint on April 15, 2001.4 Lastly, after plaintiff

learned that she was not included in the variable pay program, she filed a fourth request for counseling on

December 7, 2001 and a formal complaint on February 20, 2002.5 Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter

and a final decision on all of her complaints on December 8 and 9, 2003, one month prior to the filing of the

present civil complaint on January 9, 2004. 

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether plaintiff timely exhausted

the administrative prerequisites to this suit. In addition, plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on the

issue of her prima facie case of discrimination and whether she has mitigated her damages. Defendant has

asked this court to strike plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as procedurally improper and has moved

for summary judgment on liability for all claims, including plaintiff’s eligibility to be classified as non-exempt

for the purposes of the FLSA. Neither party has filed a single evidentiary objection with the court.6 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The moving party

for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and

affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the

moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings

and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

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trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving party’s allegations. Id.;

Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1994). The court may not make

credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520

(1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

DISCUSSION

The present motions raise three issues for consideration: whether plaintiff filed a proper motion for

summary judgment, whether plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies, whether defendant can be

liable under Title VII for discrimination and retaliation, and whether defendant has carried its burden to

show that plaintiff’s exemption from overtime might violate the FLSA. 

I. Propriety of Plaintiff’s Motion

Defendant asks that this court deny plaintiff’s motion on the basis that it is procedurally improper,

because she has moved for summary judgment on subparts of her claims. Arguing that summary judgment

requires appealable judgments disposing of entire claims, defendant argues that plaintiff has impermissibly

requested that this court decide sub-issues. Indeed, the propriety of partial motions for summary judgment

on subparts of claims remains disputed, though a consensus towards recognition of such motions is

emerging. See 11-56 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 56.40 (2005); Advanced Semiconductors

Materials America, Inc. v. Applied Materials, 1995 WL 419747 *2-3 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Whyte, J.). This

court made its views on the question clear in an earlier disposition, which defendant acknowledges and

groundlessly distinguishes. In Bushnell v. Vis. Corp., this court wrote: “[t]his court believes that a proper

interpretation of Rule 56(b) allows summary adjudication on individual parts of claims brought against a

party.” 1996 WL 506914, *11 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (Patel, J.). This holding was based soundly on the plain

language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. As applied to the present action, that language states that

a plaintiff may “move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon

all or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). In addition, based on the plain language of Rule 56(d),

it is now well-established that where a court denies judgment on a claim, it may nevertheless “grant” partial

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summary “judgment” that establishes the existence or nonexistence of certain facts, even though no actual

judgment is entered on a claim. See 11-56 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 56.40 (2005). 

Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on whether she has exhausted her remedies, established

a prima facie case of discrimination, and mitigated her damages. As an issue of subject matter jurisdiction,

plaintiff’s exhaustion of administrative remedies is clearly an appealable issue, and defendant has moved for

summary judgment on this same issue. In regards to plaintiff’s prima facie case, the Ninth Circuit recently

considered, on the merits, a lower court’s denial of a plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment

regarding his showing of a prima facie case. See Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802,

804-05 (9th Cir. 2004). The circuit has implicitly deemed the motion procedurally acceptable. Similarly,

on the merits and without reference to impropriety, the circuit has considered a defendant’s motion for

partial summary judgment on the issue of mitigation of damages. See E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros., 31 F.3d

891, 906 (9th Cir. 1994). 

On the basis of the plain language of rule 56(a), prior rulings of this court, and the Ninth Circuit’s

implicit recognition of such motions, plaintiff’s motion is held to be procedurally proper. 

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

To preserve the right to maintain a suit alleging employment discrimination against an agency of the

United States, a claimant must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a claim of discrimination with

the allegedly offending agency in accordance with published procedures. Leorna v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

105 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1997). See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614 et seq. (setting forth Federal Sector

Equal Employment Opportunity Regulations). Federal regulations require an aggrieved person to consult a

counselor prior to submitting a formal complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). Such contact must be made

within forty-five days of the allegedly discriminatory actions unless the complainant is entitled to an equitable

extension. Id. § 1614.105(a)(1). See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding

that the principles of waiver, equitable tolling, and estoppel apply to timely administrative filing

requirements).

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The scope of this court’s jurisdiction over Title VII claims depends upon the scope of a plaintiff’s

discrimination charge with the EEO department of their federal agency employer or the Equal Employment

Opportunity Center (“EEOC”). EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 1994).7 To be

considered within the jurisdictional scope of the original charge, the claim must fall within the scope of a

“reasonably thorough investigation” by the agency, even if no such investigation took place. Gibbs v. Pierce

County Law Enforcement Support, 785 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986). “When an employee seeks

judicial relief for incidents not listed in his original charge to the EEOC, the judicial complaint nevertheless

may encompass any discrimination like or reasonably related to the EEOC charge.” Oubichon v. North

American Rockwell Co., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973).

From the period of April 29, 1999 to December 7, 2001, plaintiff brought each discrete incident of

alleged discrimination and harassment to the attention of the EEO. There is little question—and indeed

defendant does not contest the point— that her series of EEO filings covered all race and sex discrimination

concerns during this period, as all incidents alleged in plaintiff’s complaint would fall within the scope of a

reasonably thorough administrative investigation of her race and sex discrimination claims. Farmer Bros.,

31 F.3d at 899. 

The incidents contested by defendant for purposes of exhaustion are incidents prior to March 15,

1999, the latest possible date of the forty-five day EEO filing period.8 The continuing violations doctrine

allows courts to consider conduct that would ordinarily be time-barred as long as the untimely incidents

cumulatively represent an ongoing unlawful employment practice. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002). In the case of hostile work environment claims, the entire pattern of conduct

cumulatively creating the abuse working environment can be considered, as long as one act falls within the

filing period. Id. at 117. Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal

to hire cannot be reached under this doctrine, as each one is an independently actionable event triggering

employer liability. Id. at 114. Since these acts cannot be treated under this doctrine, this court cannot find

any basis of coverage for plaintiff’s discrimination-related claims during this period. Morgan, 536 U.S. at

114. Plaintiff did file a request for counseling alleging a hostile work environment on February 7, 2001,

theoretically enabling plaintiff to reach a pattern of prior events cumulatively creating the abusive

atmosphere. Id. at 116-17. However, as discussed infra, plaintiff’s allegations are not cognizable as

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hostile work environment claims, and therefore cannot be bootstrapped as timely through this cause of

action. 

Although the alleged incidents of disparate treatment during the period of 1993 to March 15, 1999

are not actionable, they can serve as “relevant background evidence” to put timely claims in context. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112. Evidence, either direct or circumstantial, will be deemed relevant background

evidence where it tends to show intentional discrimination and combines with evidence of the employer’s

present conduct to give rise to an inference of discrimination or disprove an employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2002). In the present

action, evidence of the assignment of details, the posting of promotional opportunities, the allocation of

performance-linked bonuses, and the management of staff all serve to place the specific incidents during

1999 and 2000 in a greater context, helping the factfinder to understand incidents in that period as plaintiff

herself, or a reasonable person in her situation, might have understood them. See id., 307 F.3d at 1108-09

(holding that incidents tending to show intent prior to the statutory period, including denials of access to

favorable details and promotions, may be considered in assessing defendant’s liability for similar actions

within the statutory period). Other employees’ experiences of discrimination are also admissible under the

post-Morgan standard, as such evidence is probative of defendant’s intent. Id. at 1110, n.12. 

The court therefore finds that plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies to sue on incidents

alleged after March 15, 1999. Incidents prior to that date are admitted where relevant as described above.

III. Title VII Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges unlawful discrimination and the creation of a hostile work

environment on the basis of race, national origin, and/or sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964. See 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e, et seq. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “to

discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(k). An employer violates Title VII if a protected characteristic is “a motivating factor for

any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m). Despite great confusion on this issue prior to 2002, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a

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plaintiff’s burden in a Title VII disparate treatment case is no different than the “conventional rule of civil

litigation.” Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003). That is, “the plaintiff in any Title VII case may

establish a violation through a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) that a

protected characteristic played a motivating factor [in the employer’s challenged actions].” See Costa, 299

F.3d 838, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2002) aff’d 539 U.S. 90 (2003).9 

A. Disparate Treatment

In cases alleging disparate treatment on basis of gender, Title VII requires a plaintiff to prove that

the employer acted with a conscious intent to discriminate. See Costa, 299 F.3d at 854. To prove intent

to discriminate, plaintiff can pursue one of two analytical approaches: she can provide direct or

circumstantial evidence of intent or she can invoke the now well-settled prima facie case and burdenshifting paradigm from McDonnell Douglas to establish circumstances sufficient to support an inference of

discrimination.10 See Costa, 299 F.3d at 855; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. 

The McDonnell Douglas inquiry involves three analytical stages. First, a plaintiff must establish a

prima facie case of discrimination. Costa, 299 F.3d at 855. Second, the burden of production shifts,

requiring defendants to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. If

defendant succeeds at carrying his burden of production, the plaintiff then has “the full and fair opportunity

to demonstrate,” through presentation of her case and through cross-examination of the defendant’s

witnesses, that discrimination, rather than the proffered reason, was the true reason for the employment

decision. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). Throughout these stages, a plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to prove

unlawful discrimination. Costa, 299 F.3d at 855. As a general matter, the plaintiff in an employment

discrimination action need produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer’s motion for

summary judgment. This is because “the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a

searching inquiry—one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.” Chuang v.

University of California Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations

omitted).

1. Failure to Promote and Assign to Details

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Plaintiff’s theory of disparate treatment largely turns on allegations that she was overlooked for

promotions and desirable details. The Ninth Circuit has held, in a case very similar to the present action,

that a pattern of denying advantageous temporary assignments to employees on the basis of race can

constitute actionable discrimination under a “failure to promote” theory. Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1111-12. To

establish a prima facie case of failure to promote due to racial discrimination, plaintiff must show 1) she is a

member of a protected class; 2) she applied for and was qualified for open jobs; 3) she was rejected for

these positions; and 4) an employee with qualifications similar to her own was treated more favorably. 

McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122, n.17 (9th Cir. 2004). The requisite degree of

proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII claims on summary judgment “does not even

need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot, 26 F.3d 885, 889

(9th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff need only offer evidence which gives rise to the necessary inference of

discrimination. Costa, 299 F.3d at 855. 

As a Filipino female, plaintiff clearly falls into a protected class covered by the plain language of

Title VII and FEHA. Siam has also provided clear evidence of adverse employment actions, the third

prong of the prima facie test. In 1999, she was denied two details to higher positions, and in May of 2000,

she was denied the opportunity to compete for a promotion to EEO Center Manager. Plaintiff has raised

genuine issues of material fact as to whether exclusion from eligibility for promotion and short-term details

were indeed promotions. See Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1113 (holding that denial of temporary details could be

deemed adverse employment actions by a reasonable factfinder); Strother v. S. California Permanente

Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding adverse employment actions where an employee

was excluded from meetings, seminars and positions that would have made her eligible for salary increases). 

In addition, plaintiff has provided evidence that in 2000, she was excluded from participation in a variable

pay bonus program and entitlement to overtime backpay. As the effect of these incidents was to deny Siam

compensation, they constituted changes to the terms and conditions of employment, and thus fall under the

broad definition of adverse employment actions articulated by the Ninth Circuit. See Ray v. Henderson,

217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Normally in failure to promote cases, a plaintiff must also show that she was qualified and applied

for open positions. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1122, n.17. However, it is well-settled that where openings

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are not published, or where they are awarded without a competitive application process, “it would be

unreasonable to require plaintiff to present direct evidence of the actual job qualifications as part of his

prima facie case” or show that he “applied” for the job through a formal procedure. See Lyon, 307 F.3d at

1114. Instead, a plaintiff must merely provide circumstantial evidence of her qualification for the position,

which may include her own self-assessment of performance. Id. at 1115. See also Jones v. Firestone Tire

& Rubber Co., 977 F.2d 527, 533 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that an employee need not establish that he

applied for an available position where it is not published and where applications are not accepted for it). 

In the present action, plaintiff has met her burden to establish that she was qualified for open details

and promotions. Defendant does not contest, and the evidence bears out, that plaintiff was qualified for

promotion. She served the USPS for 28 years, including more than eight years in a EAS-19 grade

position. Before 1993 she was promoted several times, and after this point, she received performance

reviews of “outstanding,” earned certificates of achievement, and was formally recommended for so-called

“far exceed” appraisals of her work. Several of her peers testified of the quality of her work and the lack

of any concerns about performance. The record does not contain a scintilla of evidence that her work was

less than satisfactory or that she was otherwise failing to meet expectations, and Siam testified that she

worked longer hours than Norris, cleared her backlogs and those of others more diligently, helped to

modernize the office’s computerization, and had greater management experience. See Dryovage Dec.,

Exh. A, Siam Aff. at 001084. See also Norris Dep. at 42:22-43:7 (testifying that he had never seen Siam

fail to fulfill her duties and he was unaware of anything that would bar her from a promotion to an EAS-21

position). Furthermore, detail assignments within the EEO were not published, and there was no

application procedure for obtaining the positions. Therefore, plaintiff needn’t show that she applied. See

Lyon, 307 F.3d at 1114 (holding, in a factually indistinguishable context, that a plaintiff need not show that

they applied for temporary assignments to higher grade posts which were allocated without an application

process).

The last requirement of plaintiff’s prima facie case is that other employees were treated more

favorably. Plaintiff argues that two white male employees in her office, William Norris and Brian

Hemenway, were given extended, higher level detail assignments, and that other non-Asian, male

employees including Carl Thomas and Clotilde Blake were also favored. Siam Dep. at 69:22-25, 90:16-

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19. Siam contends that she received a detail in 1996-97, but it was limited to less than 30 days to “give

others a chance” for the experience, thus denying Siam the higher pay given for details longer than 30 days. 

Siam Dep. at 101:3-11, 104:1-5, 104:21-105:1. Yet, plaintiff argues that her replacement on that detail

was a man who had enjoyed the same detail several times before. Id. at 94:23-25. Siam also provides

evidence that in 1999-2000, Hemenway (ranked below plaintiff as an EAS-17 employee) was given two

extended details, one of which plaintiff had been told she would receive. Id. at 70:6-11; 135:6-13. Norris,

who had a nearly identical work history as an EEO counselor/investigator until 1993, was similarly given an

extended detail to a higher position in 1993, as well as a 1997-98 detail which lasted for two years.11

These details led to Norris’s permanent promotion in August 2000. Id. at 81:10-19; Norris Dep. at 17:8-

14. 

In addition, plaintiff provided evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that

management “changed the rules” on the EAS-21 position in August 2000 in order to block her and other

Filipino employees’ eligibility and set Norris up for a non-competitive promotion. Siam Dep. at 125:10-13. 

Contrary to her supervisor’s comment that plaintiff could not claim discrimination based on the promotion

of a Filipino employee to an extended detail in 2000, “proof that the employer filled the sought position with

a person not of the plaintiff’s protected class is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of proving a

Title VII case.” See Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1116 (internal quotations omitted). By showing that during the

long course of her eligibility for details and promotions, Norris and Hemenway were allowed to take

extended details denied to plaintiff purportedly as a matter of policy, and they were given the opportunity to

prove themselves in supervisorial promotions that led to their ultimate promotion, plaintiff has carried her

burden on this prong of her prima facie case as well.

Plaintiff has satisfied her prima facie burden to show disparate treatment in office details and

assignments. In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has sought judgment on this issue. The court

determines that partial summary judgment on this issue would not appropriate, though plaintiff has indeed

satisfied her burden. At the trial stage, the burden-shifting framework dissolves into a singular inquiry for

the factfinding jury: whether plaintiff has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant

intentionally discriminated against plaintiff based on her sex and race/national origin. Costa, 299 F.3d at

855-56. For this court to announce its judgment on the prima facie case to a jury would thwart plaintiff’s

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holistic showing of discrimination, foreclosing important items of evidence and intruding upon the

factfinder’s mission of weighing all of plaintiff’s evidence and determining whether she has proven

discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Under the Title VII burden-shifting framework, defendants must come forward with legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their decisions to bypass plaintiff for these opportunities. See Costa, 299 F.3d

at 855. Defendant proffers the testimony of Bernadine Faison, one of plaintiff’s supervisors during the

period, who attested that she had instructed on of her managers to give Siam a detail to the Appeals Center

in an EAS-21 position, but that Siam declined the detail. Simmons Dec., Exh. 1, Faison Aff. at 001150. 

Faison also testified that Siam could not be given an EAS-21 detail at the Northern California Center

because she did not get along with Judy Martinez, another EAS-19 working there, nor with some of the

counselor/investigators there. Id. 

Defendant has provided evidence that the decisions made during the restructuring of 2000, both of

which led to the hiring of Norris in the EAS-21 position, were made pursuant to a restructuring policy

called “RIF avoidance.” According to the testimony of Mary Robinson, an EEO manager at the time, this

policy limits the first round of competition for new positions to those employees whose positions had been

impacted or abolished by the restructuring. Robinson Dep. at 26:6-23. Robinson testified that EEO

positions in the Pacific Area were limited to competition among EEO employees from that Area pursuant to

this policy of RIF avoidance. Id. at 26:1-2. She also testified that the decision to implement this policy

“came from headquarters” and that she did not know of the decision or inform Norris of the decision prior

to the actual job posting. Simmons Supp. Dec., Exh. 1, Robinson Aff. at 001598. She also stated that

Norris, Siam, and all other EAS-19 employees were given the same option to chose between a lower level

job with two years protected salary or to move out of the Pacific Area and into a specific California district. 

Id. These policy decisions, along with Siam’s alleged reluctance to accept details and promotions for

interpersonal reasons, satisfy defendant’s burden to show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for her

termination.

At the third stage in the burden-shifting analytical framework, the burden of production shifts back

to the plaintiff, requiring her to introduce evidence that the employer’s proffered reason for the adverse

employment decisions was pretextual. Costa, 299 F.3d at 855. To survive summary judgment,

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circumstantial evidence of pretext must be “specific and substantial.” Bergene v. Salt River Proj. Agr.

Improv. & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001). The trier of fact may still consider “the

evidence establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie case and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the

issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiff has provided a great deal of evidence to demonstrate that defendant’s evidence is a pretext

for discrimination. First of all, she has provided her own testimony, as well as that of Yee, Cruz-Crowder,

and Dumaguit, who attested that plaintiff never refused or expressed disinterest in being detailed. Dryovage

Dec., Exh. A, Dumaguit Dec. at 1 (describing that Faison informed him that Siam was being skipped over

for the EAS-21 position because Siam “will never manage the center”); Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, CruzCrowder Dec. at 2. Secondly, plaintiff provided the declarations of Cruz-Crowder, Nelson, and Yee, who

stated that Siam did not have any interpersonal conflict with employees that would have impaired her

suitability for promotion. See Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Cruz-Crowder Dec. at 3; Dryovage Dec., Exh. A,

Nelson Dec. at 2. Thirdly, Norris’s reference to plaintiff as a “dragon lady” during a time when he acted as

one of her supervisors would suggest intent, as a jury could reasonably find that the comment was hostile to

Asians. See Lyon, 307 F.3d at 1110, n.12 (holding that a single racially-motivated remark outside of the

statutory period, while not actionable standing alone, can be offered as background evidence tending to

prove intent and pretext for discrimination). 

Plaintiff has also shown that while her career stagnated, Norris and Hemenway steadily advanced

from 1993-1999, providing relevant background evidence that plaintiff was not on a level playing field at

the commencement of the statutory period. See Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1111.12 Similarly, plaintiff’s showing

that details were allocated on a non-competitive basis and that such details were held by white male

employees for extended periods of up to two years, thus denying other employees the opportunity to

benefit from them, also provides important background evidence for assessing liability during the statutory

period. See id. at 1111-12 (holding that such evidence may be “offered for its probative value in assessing

whether the employer’s justifications for its present conduct lack credibility”). EEO Manager Yee’s

testimony that Faison had an active bias against Siam and other Asian employees further reinforces this

evidence. Dryovage Dec., Exh. G, Yee Aff. at 5-6.

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Finally, Siam argues that underrepresentation of Filipinos and other Asians in supervisory positions

at the USPS is further evidence of pretext. Statistical evidence may be admitted to show that a particular

employment decision was motivated by a pattern of discrimination. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58

F.3d 359, 443 (9th Cir. 1995). See also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805. See also McGinest v.

GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1111, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2004) (accepting statistical disparities in

ethnic representation as evidence of discrimination in the disparate treatment context). However, the court

may properly evaluate the evidence for flaws, fallacies, or deficiencies in the data, including statistics based

on an unqualified applicant pool, small or incomplete data sets, and inadequate statistical techniques. See

Cerrato v. San Francisco Comm’y College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1994). The nature of

plaintiff’s statistical submissions—the overall representation of Filipinos and other Asians in the Bay Area

and California populations as a whole and the representation of Filipinos and other Asians in the USPS

workforce as a whole—do not tell a complete story, because plaintiff has submitted no evidence of the

representation of these groups in the USPS workforce in general and in supervisory positions in particular.13

Even without making an adequate statistical showing, plaintiff has provided “specific and

substantial” evidence to meet her burden of showing pretext, and she is entitled to go to a jury on the

question of liability for discriminatory failures to promote during the period spanning March of 1999 to

January of 2001. While her evidence is not overwhelming, construing the record in the light most favorable

to plaintiff raises the necessary inference of discrimination. The “elusive factual question of intentional

discrimination” makes summary judgment inappropriate where plaintiff has stated a prima facie case and

raised genuine issues as to pretext. See Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371,1377 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting

Texas Dept. of Comm’y Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981)). Plaintiff has created triable

issues as to whether defendant’s denial of details in 1999 and 2000, and promotion in 2000, were animated

by discrimination.

2. Denial of Variable Pay and Overtime Backpay as a Disparate Treatment Claim

Plaintiff also argues that she was discriminated against in her exclusion from the variable pay

program in 2001 and in the failure to include her as eligible for overtime backpay. Her prima facie case on

this claim differs slightly from the failure to promote context. Here, plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs

to a protected class, (2) she was performing according to her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she

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suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) other employees with qualifications similar to her own were

treated more favorably. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et

seq. Bergene v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001). As

discussed, she has satisfied the first and second showings, and the court is satisfied that denial of income

through a bonus program or through overtime entitlement is an adverse employment action, which has been

broadly defined by the Ninth Circuit to include proven delays or reductions in compensation. Ray v.

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2004). 

However, plaintiff has not carried her burden to show that other employees were treated more

favorably in exclusions from participation in the variable pay program for fiscal year 2001. Plaintiff had

taken stress leave in January, 2001, and she did not return to work that year. The EEO investigation of

plaintiff’s 2001 complaint to the EEO revealed that between nine and eleven other employees in addition to

plaintiff were excluded from participation in the variable pay program due to long absences during the prior

year. See Siam Dec., Exh. C, Notice of Right to File Suit, at 001540. See also Palisoc Aff. at 001457. 

Managers interviewed pursuant to the investigation stated that USPS policy instructed them to exclude

employees who did not fully contribute to the performance of the organization and that as a general rule, an

employee was expected to have been at work at least two months during the fiscal year to be eligible for

the program. Siam Dec., Exh. C, Notice of Right to File Suit at 001540; Simmons Dec., Exh. 5, Blair Aff.

at 001458.

Nor has plaintiff carried her burden to show that other employees were treated more favorably in

notification of eligibility to apply for overtime back pay in 2001. Defendant submitted the affidavit of Laree

Martin,14 who described that in August of 2001, a backpay entitlement notice went to those employees that

held EAS-17 positions during the period of May 1, 1999 through approximately August 7, 2001. 

Simmons Dec., Exh. 6, Martin Aff. at 001442-44. Siam was not identified by a computer generated list of

employees who held such a position during the relevant time frame. Id. Norris’s name did appear on this

list, however, and the evidence bears out that Norris was temporarily downgraded to EAS-17 during

2000. Id; Norris Dep. at 17:6-7. Norris did, however, end up receiving between six to seven thousand

dollars in overtime backpay for his work at level EAS-17 between 1987-1993, much earlier than the

eligibility time frame described by Laree Martin. Norris Dep. at 37:8-25. 

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If plaintiff is claiming that in 2001, based on discrimination, she was denied notice of her entitlement

to overtime backpay for the pre-1993 period that she and Norris had both served as EAS-17

investigators, Norris’s receipt of backpay for his pre-1993 service would have been relevant to plaintiff’s

claims. Mysteriously, however, plaintiff has only alleged that she was denied backpay for hours worked

after February 1993, when she was promoted to level EAS-19. See Comp. ¶ 76. She is not, therefore,

claiming backpay for her service at level EAS-17. As there is no evidence in the record that any employee

received overtime compensation for their work as an EAS-19 employee, plaintiff has not satisfied the prima

facie requirement that other employees were treated more favorably on the issue of entitlement to overtime

backpay. 

Therefore, plaintiff has not raised triable issues of material fact on discriminatory exclusion from the

variable pay program or the overtime backpay program. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on

these components of plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim. 

B. Hostile Work Environment

An employer is liable under Title VII for conduct giving rise to a hostile environment where the

employee proves that: (1) he or she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature; (2)

this conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. Civil Rights Act of

1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; Pavon v. Swift Trans. Co., Inc. 192 F.3d 902, 908

(9th Cir. 2001); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).

To prevail on his hostile environment claim, a plaintiff is required to establish a “pattern of ongoing

and persistent harassment severe enough to alter the conditions of employment.” Draper v. Coeur

Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67). Whether an

environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive to violate Title VII, depends on “all the circumstances,

including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.” Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 854, 872 (citing Harris v. Forklift

Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). More frequent conduct requires a lower level of severity, and vice

versa. Id. “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not

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amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. (citing Faragher v. City

of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). If plaintiff can show an

ongoing pattern of conduct creating an abusive working environment, her claims may include incidents prior

to the statutory period, as long as at least one event falls within the filing period. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. 

In the present action, the focus of plaintiff’s hostile work environment allegations within the statutory

period relates to verbal remarks made to plaintiff, or about plaintiff to third persons. These include

Hemenway’s eruption at plaintiff during a staff meeting and Norris’s angry and nearly violent confrontation

of plaintiff during a focus group session. Siam Dep. at 161:22-162:3, 162:24-165:15, 173:1-2, 179:1-12. 

Plaintiff testified that disciplinary action was not taken on either incident, and there is no evidence to the

contrary. Id. at 173:12-15, 176:22-24. In addition, she alleges that a hostile work environment was

created by the management condoning the posting of plaintiff’s photograph on a “wanted” board for

criminal fugitives in approximately January of 2001. Id. at 180:8-16. 

Plaintiff also alleges a series of incidents for which she cannot remember any approximate date, but

which probably occurred prior to the statutory period. These included: (1) Norris’s comment to Faison

that he would prefer to “get rid of Siam” than her peer, which was overheard by Michael Yee, Dryovage

Dec., Exh. G, Yee Dec. at 3; (2) Norris’s reference to plaintiff as a “dragon lady” in the presence of

another employee, Siam Dep. at 50:19-20; (3) Faison’s comment to Dumaguit that “Lina Siam will never

manage this office,” Dryovage Dec., Exh. A, Dumaguit Dec. at 1; (4) Norris’s letter to Faison accusing

Siam of improper work on behalf of her counselor/investigators, Siam Dep. at 198:3-13; (5) Norris’s

belittling comments with regards to plaintiff’s project to computerize EEO forms, id. at 201:3-10; (6) a

comment made to another Filipino employee that if the Filipino employees speak Tagalog in the office, they

should do it in a locked room, id. at 201:12-14; and (7) an incident in which another senior specialist

coerced her subordinate to write a letter accusing Siam of harassment, id. at 211:1-7. Other than these

incidents, plaintiff’s evidence of a hostile work environment is focused primarily on disparate treatment,

rather than incidents of animus or hostility. 

Plaintiff argues that taken together, the incidents of harassment and race- and sex-based

discrimination constituted a hostile work environment. Plaintiff’s evidence indeed tends to show that her

workplace was permeated with various forms of malicious conduct directed at plaintiff. As Siam correctly

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argues, the circuits to have addressed the issue have held that a plaintiff need not prove that the hostile

conduct she experienced was sexual or racist per se, however, she must prove that “but for her

womanhood” (and/or race or national origin), the harassment would not have occurred. See McKinney v.

Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) abrogated on other grounds by Stevens v. Dep’t of

Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 7 (1991); Burns v. City of McGreggor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir.

1993); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia , 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990); Bell v. Crakin Good

Bakers, 777 F.3d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985); Lipsett v. Uni. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st

Cir. 1988). In the present action, plaintiff must demonstrate that racial or gender-based animus was at the

heart of this conduct, and she must show that the incidents occurred with the level of frequency or severity

required to make them actionable. Draper, 147 F.3d at 1108. 

Construing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—including accepting plaintiff’s

characterization that Norris’s reference to plaintiff as a “dragon lady” was a racial epithet, that the “verbal

attacks” by Norris and Hemenway were severe, and that posting plaintiff’s photograph was done out of

malice rather than as a matter of policy—plaintiff has nevertheless shown only a few isolated incidents that

were not objectively serious or frequent enough to interfere with plaintiff’s ability to do her job. Faragher,

524 U.S. at 787. Furthermore, other than the single “dragon lady” comment, and a comment made by

plaintiff’s peer to a third person concerning language discrimination against other employees, plaintiff has

not demonstrated that hostility towards her stemmed from her identity as an Asian female. See McKinney,

765 F.2d at 1138. 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim arising under

Title VII. 

C. Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, plaintiff must show (1) that she acted

to protect her Title VII rights; (2) that an adverse employment action was thereafter taken against her; and

(3) that a causal link existed between the two events. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §

2000e-3(a); McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004). In addition, “a

plaintiff must make some showing sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer that the defendant was

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aware that the plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.” See Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch.

Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff clearly satisfies the first requirement of the prima facie showing. Under the express terms of

the statute, engaging in a protected activity includes filing a charge of discrimination, testifying, or assisting in

any manner with an official investigation by the Equal Opportunity Commission or an equivalent state

agency. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff filed her first request for counseling at USPS on April

29, 1999, and subsequently submitted a series of requests and formal complaints in 2000, 2001, and 2002. 

The second element of the prima facie case, requiring an adverse employment action, is also

satisfied. As discussed, the Ninth Circuit has broadly defined such actions to be any incident “reasonably

likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243

(9th Cir. 2000). After April 29, 1999, plaintiff has raised four specific claims of adverse employment

actions: (1) alleged maneuvering to block plaintiff and other Filipino employees’ eligibility for a promotion in

or around October, 2000, Siam Dep. at 125:10-13; (2) posting of plaintiff’s picture in early 2001 as a

“wanted poster” at the facility where she had formerly worked, Siam Dep. at 180:8-16; (3) failure to notify

plaintiff of potential eligibility for overtime backpay in August of 2001, Dryovage Dec., Exh. A-14; and (4)

exclusion of plaintiff from the variable pay program in 2001. Siam Dep. at 206:3-8. Any one of the actions

alleged would deter an employee from reporting discrimination, because they represent denied

advancement or income, as well as public mockery by an employer. Plaintiff has satisfied this requirement. 

A plaintiff must also show that the adverse employment action is causally linked to the protected

activity. Such causality may be inferred by close proximity in time between the two events, although such

proximity must be “very close.” See Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 865-66 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding that proximity in time may by itself constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliation). See also

Porter v. California Dept. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that twenty

months is too attenuated a length of time to suggest causation, but that causation was established where

specific reasons explained this delay). If a plaintiff cannot show proximity in time, he can prove causation

by providing direct evidence of retaliatory motivation. Miller v. Fairchild, 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.

1986).

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Approximately nineteen months lapsed between the time of plaintiff’s April 1999 EEO filing and her

exclusion from eligibility for promotion in August of 2000. Time, therefore, does not support an inference

of causation on this claim. Plaintiff has failed to provide any circumstantial evidence of retaliatory

motivation for this incident. While the handling of the restructuring in August 2000 did create triable issues

as to disparate treatment between Siam and Norris, and a pattern of advantageous treatment of white male

employees generally, there is no further evidence in the record tending to show that retaliation was a

motivating factor. 

The three additional retaliatory incidents alleged by plaintiff all occurred in 2001, and each one

occurred one to four months after one of plaintiff’s 2001 EEO filings, dated in February, April, and

December. This timing is sufficient to satisfy the causation element. See Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d

1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that sufficient evidence existed where adverse actions occurred less

than three months after complaint filed, two weeks after charge first investigated, and less than two months

after investigation ended). 

Plaintiff has also made a marginal showing that Siam and others in her office were aware of

plaintiff’s complaint to the EEO in 1999. See Siam Dep. at 137:1-4. This evidence is barely adequate for

a reasonable trier of fact to infer that supervisors in plaintiff’s office were aware that plaintiff had engaged in

protected activity. See Raad, 323 F.3d at 1197. But taking the evidence in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, she has satisfied this element and made a prima facie showing on her latter three claims of

retaliation. 

Defendant has, however, provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the actions alleged to

be retaliatory. First of all, Bedell, whom Siam believes was responsible for posting Siam’s picture as a

“wanted” sign in her building, testified that the picture was “posted in this normal manner” because Siam

had been out on stress leave for over 21 days, and that there was concern for her “safety and well-being if

she returned to the facility that she claimed was responsible for her stress.” Simmons Dec., Exh. 4, Bedell

Aff. at 0001673. In addition, Bedell believed that Siam needed medical clearance before entering the

facility. Id. It is not for this court to determine whether Bedell’s testimony amounted to a sarcastic

overstatement of the risks to Siam—and perhaps an expression of resentment that Siam was on medical

leave—or strict policy adherence based on a genuine concern for her safety. In addition, as discussed

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earlier in this order, defendant provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons (namely, USPS policies) for

plaintiff’s exclusion from the variable pay program and backpay for overtime. 

In all three allegations of retaliation, plaintiff has failed to provide evidence raising a genuine issue

that defendant’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons are pretextual. As to the “wanted” poster incident,

plaintiff has shown, at worst, hostility and mockery directed at her based on her absence for stress-related

medical leave. She has made no showing in either evidence nor arguments that her EEO filings triggered

this mockery, nor any evidence that Bedell was aware of plaintiff’s EEO filing. As for the overtime and

backpay programs, plaintiff has not provided any evidence that her exclusion was based on anything more

than general policy decisions affecting all employees equally. There is no insinuation of discrimination, nor

anything that would link management’s decisions on these matters to plaintiff’s EEO filings or to the

allegedly discriminatory staff in plaintiff’s office. While exclusion from these opportunities constituted

adverse employment actions, plaintiff has not raised triable issues of material fact as to whether her

exclusion was motivated by her protected conduct. 

Therefore, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims.

IV. Plaintiff’s Mitigation of Damages

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether she mitigated her

damages. Under California law, “[a] plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages and cannot recover losses it

could have avoided through reasonable efforts.” Thrifty-Tel, Inc v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 474

(1996). See also Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically,

Title VII “requires the claimant to use reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment.” Odima v.

Westin Tuscan Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1497 (9th Cir. 1995). Employers carry the burden of proving that a

plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. Sanger v. United Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir.

1980). 

Plaintiff has submitted evidence of her applications to at least fourteen other jobs in various agencies

of the federal government, as well as for a lateral transfer within the USPS. See Siam Dec., Exh. D. 

Plaintiff’s evidence of a job search commences in early 2003, approximately two years after she took stress

leave from USPS. Id. Defendant argues that the current record provides an insufficient basis on which to

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determine when plaintiff should have begun to seek alternate employment. Defendant also argues that

decision on this issue would be premature under Rule 56(f), because expert discovery has not yet

concluded on whether plaintiff could have begun seeking work earlier or how her damages should be

calculated. 

Defendant has submitted no evidence to meet its burden of showing that during the time in question

there were substantially equivalent jobs available which plaintiff could have obtained and that plaintiff failed

to use reasonable diligence in seeking one of these positions. See EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d

891, 906 (9th Cir. 1994). Nor has defendant formally moved for a continuance under 56(f) by submitting

“(a) a timely application which (b) specifically identifies (c) relevant information, (d) where there is some

basis for believing that the information sought actually exists.” Employers Teamsters Local Nos. 175 and

505 Pension, 353 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendant has failed to show how the information

sought would preclude summary judgment, nor offered any reasons why satisfaction of its burden on these

issues could not be accomplished prior to the conclusion of discovery, nor any specific identification of

evidence that a continuation could achieve. See id. at 1130. 

Nevertheless, the court agrees with defendant that it would be premature to grant summary

judgment on the issue of mitigation of damages at this early stage. The parties have not yet begun expert

discovery, and, as a matter of case management, it makes little sense to separate the issue of when and

whether plaintiff mitigated her damages from trial-phase questions concerning the amount of her damages as

a whole. Such questions are properly reserved for trial. 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of mitigation of damages is therefore denied.

V. Fair Labor Standards Act Claim

Plaintiff alleges that she did not qualify as an exempt employee under the FLSA and therefore was

entitled to overtime pay during the period from February 1993 through the present. Compl. ¶ 54, 75-77. 

Ordinarily, the FLSA requires employers to pay their employees time and one-half for work exceeding

forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Persons “employed in a bona fide executive, administrative,

or professional capacity,” however, are exempt from overtime requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 

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Though it failed to argue the point in its papers on summary judgment, defendant raised the

affirmative defense of applicable statute of limitations in its answer. Defendant has not, therefore, waived

the defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c). See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.

Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 788 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[t]he inclusion of the defense in an

answer is sufficient to preserve the defense”). Claims under the FLSA are governed by a statute of

limitations of two years, or three years in cases of wilful violations by the defendant. See 29 U.S.C. §

255(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on January 9, 2004, was more than two years after plaintiff left her

employment with the USPS for medical leave in January of 2001. Plaintiff has failed to argue or provide

evidence of a wilful violation that would bring her claim within the statute of limitations, even were she able

to argue that her claim accrued after January 9, 2001. 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s FLSA claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and as described herein, the court hereby GRANTS in part, denies in

part, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to exhaustion, prima facie liability under Title VII, and

mitigation of damages. The court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to liability under

Title VII for hostile work environment and retaliation claims only, as well as for liability under the Fair

Labor Standards Act. The court DENIES defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to liability under

Title VII for disparate treatment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/16/2005

_/s/___________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. The parties in this action failed to submit a Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts, as required by this court’s

standing order and pursuant to Local Rule 56(2)(B). 

2. EEO case number HO-0111-99. 

3. EEO case number HO-0004-01.

4. EEO case number HO-0087-01.

5. EEO case number HO-0010-02.

6. Defendant states in its motion forsummary judgment that “[m]ost ofplaintiff’s claims are based upon nothing

more than hearsay upon hearsay,” but never once names a specific item of objectionable evidence.

“Unobjected to hearsay is admissible and of probative value in the district courts.” N.L.R.B. v. Int’l Union of

Operating Eng’rs, 413 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Fireguard Sprinkler Sys., Inc. v. Scottsdale

Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 648, 651-52 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1988)(failure to object to allegedly defective evidence waives

the objection for purposes of summary judgment). District courts cannot be expected to sift through the large

bodyof evidence submitted to the court in order to apply a party’s vague and generalized objections. Similarly,

defendant’s failure to object to any ofthe declarations or affidavitsin evidence waivesthe objections the USPS

could have made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. New

Hampshire Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 1991). 

7. Scope of investigation standards developed in the context ofEEOC complaints also apply to federal EEO

filings. See generally Yamaguchi v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir.

1997).

8. Defendant erroneously argued this period to be 30 days.

9. Plaintiff’s bifurcation of direct evidence to prove discrimination and “indirect evidence” through the burden

shifting framework is thus erroneous. Costa v. Desert Palace, decided now three years ago and subsequently

affirmed by the Supreme Court, clarified the confusion in this doctrine. See 299 F.3d 838; 539 U.S. 90.

10. While it is clear under Costa, which was affirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court, that a plaintiff may

choose to argue her case in terms of evidence of intentional discrimination or the burden shifting analysis, the

Ninth Circuit recently held that disparate treatment claims “must proceed” along the McDonnell Douglas

framework. Compare Bodett, 366 F.3d at 743 with Costa, 299 F.3d at 855. This distinction is merely a

difference in the nomenclature ofpre-trialanalysis, as either way, plaintiffreturns to her ultimate burden to prove

by a preponderance ofthe evidence that her employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis ofher

sex or race/national origin. Indeed, the burden-shifting framework is not appropriate for introduction to a jury.

Costa, 299 F.3d at 855-56.

11. It does not matter that Norris’s advantageous details predated the statutory period for plaintiff’s claims.

The statutory period does not apply to Norris, and there is no case law binding plaintiffs to “similarly-situated”

colleagueswho were treated more favorably simultaneous to plaintiff’silltreatment, so long as those employees

had a similar disciplinary history and occupied the same job level. Furthermore, evidence of other employees’

treatment priorto the statutory period speaks to the context ofthe events of1999-2001. Practically speaking,

withoutsuch evidence, no employee could demonstrate that they had faced a “glass ceiling” barrier on upward

mobility. 

12. This court notes its strong agreement with the court in Lyons that under Morgan and Evans, relevant,

admissible background evidence from outside the period of actionable conduct may include indicators of a

prior pattern of exclusion and barriers to advancement. See Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1111; Morgan, 536 U.S. at

ENDNOTES

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112; UnitedAir Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557-58 (1977). Without such an interpretation, Morgan would

serve as a barrier to liability in most (if not all) failure to promote cases. Realistically, such cases involve the

slow emergence of awareness by a plaintiffthat their advancement has been blocked forreasons other than her

qualifications or the poor judgment of decision-makers. Few plaintiffs would jump to an immediate conclusion

ofdiscriminationafter a first incident of exclusionfrompromotions or other advancement opportunities. A prior

pattern of thwarted advancement is relevant and probative evidence that timely actions were motived by

reasons other than qualification or happenstance. 

13. Plaintiff off-handedly commented in her opposition briefthat defendant has denied this information to her.

However, she has never raised this discovery dispute before this court. 

14. Defendant erroneously identified this document as the affidavit of Cynthia Lefter. The affidavit was written

pursuant to an investigation by Lefter, but Laree Martin was the affiant. 

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