Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-06-10688/USCOURTS-ca9-06-10688-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry James Grissom
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 06-10688 Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v.  CR 05-0550 MHP

LARRY JAMES GRISSOM,

OPINION Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Marilyn Hall Patel, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 27, 2007—San Francisco, California

Filed April 15, 2008

Before: John R. Gibson,* A. Wallace Tashima, and

Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

*The Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior United States Circuit Judge for

the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Hartley M. K. West, Assistant United States Attorney, San

Francisco, California, for the plaintiff-appellant. 

Geoffrey Rotwein, Law Offices of Geoffrey Rotwein, San

Francisco, California, for the defendant-appellee. 

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge: 

The United States appeals the sentence imposed on Larry

James Grissom following Grissom’s guilty plea and conviction for distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a). The government contends that the district court

erred in rejecting quantities of crack cocaine from two dismissed counts when calculating Grissom’s base offense level

under the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(“Guidelines”). It argues that the quantities, properly considered, would have resulted in a Guidelines range 21 months

higher than the sentence imposed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

vacate Grissom’s sentence and remand. 

BACKGROUND

On July 5, 2005, a witness cooperating with federal agents

arranged to purchase one ounce of crack cocaine from Grissom in the parking lot of a Best Buy store in East Palo Alto.

A short time later, the witness and Grissom completed the

transaction. 

Less than a week later, on July 11, 2005, a cooperating witness contacted an individual named Larry Darnell Hill, Jr., to

arrange the purchase of two ounces of crack cocaine. Hill told

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the witness to contact Grissom, who arranged for the transaction to take place in the parking lot of the same Best Buy

store. After the transaction was completed, Grissom notified

the witness that the delivery was underweight, and arranged

to provide the difference in amount1 the next day. Grissom,

accompanied by Hill, completed that transaction in the parking lot of an Office Depot store in East Palo Alto. 

On July 19, 2005, federal agents once again arranged with

a witness to purchase once ounce of crack cocaine from Hill.

This time, Hill instructed the witness to meet him at a residence in East Palo Alto to complete the sale. Once at the prearranged location, the witness observed both Hill and Grissom

approaching on the street. Hill stopped half a block away,

while Grissom completed the sale outside of the residence. 

Based on these three incidents, Grissom was indicted on

three counts of knowingly and intentionally distributing a

mixture and substance containing cocaine base in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a) in the amounts of 28, 49, and 28 grams,

respectively. He subsequently entered into a plea agreement

in which he agreed to plead guilty to Count Two, charging

him with distribution of 49 grams of cocaine base, in

exchange for the dismissal of Counts One and Three. Regarding his sentence, Grissom also agreed to a base offense level

of 32 and that, alternatively, his base offense level would be

34, if the court found that he was a career offender. The parties did not reach agreement as to Grissom’s criminal history,

and Grissom reserved his right to argue in favor of a downward departure from the calculated sentence range. 

1The government notes that there is a discrepancy between the total

amount of crack cocaine charged in the three counts of the indictment, 105

grams, and the amount attributed to Grissom in the Presentence Investigation Report, 113 grams. The difference most likely resulted from the failure of the indictment to include the amount left out of the underweight

delivery. For sentencing purposes, the difference in amounts is not material, and we will refer to the total amount as 105 grams for the sake of consistency. 

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Both parties, in their respective sentencing memoranda,

accepted the Guideline calculations of the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which set the base offense level at

32. Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, both parties accepted

as true all material facts as set out in the PSR. The district

court, however, expressed hesitation with the sentencing

range advocated by the government:

Mr. Grissom pled guilty to one count which involved

49 grams. Right? 

. . . 

He did not plead guilty to the other two counts. The

other two counts involved additional grams. He was

not charged with the conspiracy, he wasn’t swooped

up in a conspiracy; and I guess you could say that

perhaps every time there is another offense of a similar nature, that somehow is relevant conduct. But

when you do that, you’re essentially saying, “Okay.

We are working out a deal with you. You plead

guilty to one count and we’ll dismiss the other two,”

when in reality it doesn’t amount to dismissing the

other two because you’re still going to count them

out anyway; and as a result — you know — I think

the base offense level — I am going to change to

read 3[0], level 3[0], which I think reflects the 49

grams. Correct? That reduces it to an adjusted

offense level of 3[0] with acceptance of responsibility, and line 25 [Adjusted Offense level after acceptance of responsibility], it reduces it to a level 27. 

The district court then continued without interruption to discuss career offender status:

Not only do I not think that these prior convictions

really justify a career offender status; I don’t even

know what they mean — at least what the first one

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means at paragraph 31. And I think that as a result,

the criminal history scoring overstates his criminal

history . . . . I think that what more accurately is

reflected is a criminal history category of a level

three rather than a level four, to say nothing of

pumping up to career offender status. 

The district court further discussed substantive reasonableness

before selecting a sentence of 87 months, which is the low

end of the range for a level 27 sentence with a Criminal History Category of III. After explaining its reasons for not

departing downward to the “bottom of the mandatory [statutory] minimum” of 60 months, the court asked whether there

was “any legal cause why sentence should not be pronounced[.]” 

The government responded, “No, your honor. I would simply note the government’s objection on the record.” At that

point, the court stated, “I know. You know what you can do

with that. Take it to appellate court, if that’s what you want

to do. I don’t think it’s worth it myself, but that’s something

you have to decide.” This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I

We must first decide whether the government forfeited its

objection to the district court’s calculation of Grissom’s sentence by failing to state with specificity the asserted legal

error committed by the district court. Parties must present

objections to a sentence to the district court in order to assure

that they will be considered on appeal. United States v. Vieke,

348 F.3d 811, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). 

[1] In order for an objection to preserve a sentencing issue

on appeal, it must have a specific substantive basis. Id. at 813.

A specific objection “provides the district court with an

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opportunity to address the error in the first instance and

allows this court to engage in more meaningful review.”

United States v. Santiago, 466 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). This standard is not

met when the government lodges a general objection to the

court’s calculation of the defendant’s sentencing offense

levels, then on appeal asserts specific grounds of error. See

United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995)

(finding that general objection did not preserve for review

claimed errors of “(1) failing to increase their offense levels

. . . ; (2) granting . . . a . . . decrease in [an] offense level for

acceptance of responsibility; (3) decreasing [a defendant’s]

offense level . . . for medical reasons; and (4) granting

[another defendant] a . . . decrease in his offense level for

aberrant behavior”). Nor is it met when the government presents a “pro forma policy objection” to a type of departure

without actually engaging the reasoning of the court. Vieke,

348 F.3d at 813; see also United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d

865, 871 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a statement which “indicated to the district court that the government’s counsel

wished to speak, but . . . did not inform the district court or

defense counsel of the government’s position” was an insufficient objection); United States v. Riggs, 967 F.2d 561, 565

(11th Cir. 1992) (stating that a litigant “should raise [his or

her] point in such clear and simple language that the trial

court may not misunderstand it”). 

[2] But what happens when the district court indicates that

it has understood, and rejected, the substance of a party’s

objection? This case presents the issue of forfeiture in novel

circumstances. Neither party disputes that the government

objected to the sentence imposed on Grissom. Before the government articulated a basis for its objection, however, the district court stated “I know[,]” and the government pursued the

matter no further. The government now contends that its own

general objection, coupled with the district court’s terse statement, reflects that the district court was fully aware of the

government’s legal position regarding relevant conduct. 

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[3] Despite the seeming facial inadequacy of the objection,

we agree with the government that where the district court

indicates that it understands the basis for the objection and

that further argument is not desired, and the record reflects

this understanding, a general objection may suffice to preserve an issue for appeal. As the government argues, the purpose of a specific objection is to allow for meaningful review

by the district court and, if necessary, the appellate panel.

Santiago, 466 F.3d at 803. Thus, the court’s reassurance that

it “know[s]” the substance of a party’s complaint helps to

allay concerns about the ability of the district court to address

it. Cf. United States v. Pineiro, 470 F.3d 200, 204-05 (5th Cir.

2006) (concluding that the government preserved its objection

to recalculating the defendant’s sentence by making statements throughout the sentencing hearing arguing that the prior

calculations were still appropriate); United States v. Curry,

461 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2006) (excusing the government’s

failure to object at the end of the sentencing colloquy where

the government argued vigorously throughout the hearing,

such that it “made unmistakably clear its position”). 

[4] Reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the district

court was indeed fully aware of the government’s position

regarding the district court’s calculation of relevant conduct.

First, the government consistently advanced its view that

quantities of crack cocaine from the dismissed counts of the

indictment should count for sentencing purposes. The plea

agreement, PSR, and both parties’ sentencing memoranda all

calculated Grissom’s offense level based on the total amount,

105 grams, rather than the 49 grams charged in the count of

conviction. Neither party challenged this calculation at the

sentencing hearing. Second, the district court’s comments

indicate an awareness that its decision not to consider the

amount from the dismissed counts produced the government’s

objection. After commenting that determining the calculation

based on 105 grams would not “amount to dismissing the

other two [counts] because [the government would] still . . .

count them out anyway[,]” the district court changed the base

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offense level to “reflect[ ] the 49 grams.” In short, the district

court knew it was deviating from a calculation based on the

total amount. Responding to the government’s objection, the

district court challenged the government to “take it to appellate court, if that’s what you want to do.” The district court’s

challenge to the government to appeal strongly suggests the

district court recognized and disagreed with the claimed error.

Therefore, we hold that the government’s objection was sufficient under the circumstances to preserve its objection to the

district court’s calculation of Grissom’s sentence.

II

Following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gall v.

United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), we employ a two-part

review of sentences. See United States v. Carty, Nos. 05-

10200, 05 30120, 2008 WL 763770, at *5 (9th Cir. Mar. 24,

2008) (en banc). First, we must “ensure that the district court

committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to

calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range

. . . .” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Second, “[a]ssuming that the

district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the

appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion

standard.” Id. Prior to Gall, we “review[ed] the district court’s

interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the

facts of a case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s

factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Cantrell, 433

F.3d 1269, 1279 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). We do not read Gall to change that practice.2 There2Gall states that “the appellate court must review the sentence under an

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. This language could

suggest that both procedural and substantive elements are reviewed under

this more deferential standard. Later in the same paragraph, however, following a discussion of procedural errors for which no standard of review

is mentioned, the Court states that “[a]ssuming that the district court’s sen4022 UNITED STATES v. GRISSOM

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fore, we will remand non-harmless procedural errors, see id.,

and only proceed to review the substantive reasonableness of

procedurally sound sentences. 

ANALYSIS

[5] Although the district court is no longer bound by the

Guidelines, it must still consult the Guidelines for advice as

to the appropriateness of a defendant’s sentence. Carty, 2008

WL 763770, at *4. The consultation requirement involves

determining the correct Guidelines range. Id. As the Supreme

Court recently reiterated, “a district court should begin all

sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable

Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596 (citing Rita v.

United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007)). Thus, “if the sentence

imposed resulted from an incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the error was not harmless, ordinarily we

will remand to the district court for further sentencing proceedings, permitting the district court on remand to consider

the proper Guidelines sentence along with other sentencing

factors.” United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 630

(9th Cir. 2006). 

Grissom pleaded guilty to distribution of 49 grams of

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (making it

a crime to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess

tencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then

consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. The Court only explicitly applies the

standard of review to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence;

indeed, the district court in Gall committed no procedural error, see id. at

598, so only substantive reasonableness was at issue in the case. It therefore appears that the opinion leaves untouched the preexisting standards

of review for questions of procedural reasonableness. Our recent opinion

in Carty, while also declining to state the standard of review applied to the

district court’s calculation of the Guidelines range, is not to the contrary.

See Carty, 2008 WL 763770, at *5. 

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with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance”). Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), the

crime carries a minimum sentence of 5 years, and a maximum

sentence of 40 years. 

[6] Under the Guidelines, once the district court determines

the guideline most appropriate to the offense of conviction, it

must determine the correct base offense level as dictated by

that particular guideline. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.1(b) (2005);3 United States v. Crawford,

185 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 1999). The guideline for distribution of cocaine base, § 2D1.1, requires that the court take

into account the quantity of drugs when selecting the base

offense level. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). Where there are multiple drug transactions, the Application Notes to this guideline

states that “the quantities of drugs are to be added.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.6. 

[7] Various portions of the Guidelines make clear the fact

that these quantities are to be added even if they are not part

of the offense of conviction. First, the conduct determining

the offense level is not limited to the conduct underlying the

conviction, but can include “all relevant conduct under

§ 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt.

n.1(H). Such relevant conduct applies to crimes where “the

offense level is determined largely on the basis of . . . the

3We pause to note that the edition of the Guidelines Manual used is significant in Grissom’s case because of changes to the guideline setting the

base offense levels for quantities of crack cocaine, made effective on

November 1, 2007. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a)(3), (c) (2007); see also

U.S.S.G. app. C amend. 706 (2007). The effect of these changes will be

discussed infra. Unless otherwise noted, however, we will refer to the

2005 Guidelines manual in evaluating the district court’s calculation,

because Grissom was sentenced under the 2005 Guidelines, and that version of the Guidelines is still applicable to him on remand. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(g) (requiring a district court to “apply the guidelines . . . that were

in effect on the date of the previous sentencing of the defendant prior to

the appeal . . .”). 

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quantity of a substance involved,” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), and

includes “all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same

course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense

of conviction[.]” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). See also United

States v. Scheele, 231 F.3d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]

defendant who pleads guilty or is convicted of distributing the

equivalent of 300 kg of marijuana will receive the same base

offense level as a defendant who is convicted of distributing

the equivalent of 3000 kg of marijuana, if the sentencing

judge determines that he also distributed an additional 2,700

kg of marijuana.”); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.3 (providing an

example where three separate drug sales are counted for purposes of the base offense level even though not all are

charged). 

[8] Moreover, the Guidelines directly address the use of

conduct that might fall outside the scope of a plea agreement.

Guideline § 6B1.2(a) states that “a plea agreement that

includes the dismissal of a charge . . . shall not preclude the

conduct underlying such charge from being considered under

the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in connection

with the count(s) of which the defendant is convicted.” See

also U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 (Policy Statement) cmt. (“This paragraph prevents a plea agreement from restricting consideration of conduct that is within the scope of § 1B1.3 . . . in

respect to the count(s) of which the defendant is convicted[.]”). Under this guideline, the fact that the parties agreed

to dismiss the two counts involving 28 grams of crack cocaine

does not affect the district court’s responsibility to calculate

Grissom’s base offense level by taking into account those

amounts. 

[9] Further, courts have held that provisions of the Guidelines that use compulsory language require the district court

to consider drug amounts from acts outside the offense of the

conviction, so long as they “were part of the same course of

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction[.]” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). See, e.g., United States v.

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Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the

district court must consider conduct when it satisfies the

requirements for grouping under U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.1-2);

United States v. Kemmish, 120 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1997)

(same); United States v. Register, 931 F.2d 308, 313 (5th Cir.

1991) (using mandatory language to describe § 1B1.3(a)(2)).

[10] We are not unmindful of the fact that “[t]he relevant

conduct ‘aggregation’ rule . . . is a powerful prosecutorial

tool[,]” in that “[t]he offense level for a relatively minor drug

crime may be dramatically increased when uncharged drug

quantities introduced at sentencing are aggregated.” United

States v. Wilson, 502 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations omitted). The district court was clearly concerned

about such an effect in this case:

The Court: . . . Mr. Grissom pled guilty to one count

which involved 49 grams. Right? 

Mr. Rotwein: Yes. 

Ms. Morgan-Kelly: Yes. 

The Court: He did not plead guilty to the other two

counts. . . . [W]hen you do that, you’re essentially

saying, “Okay. We are working out a deal with you.

You plead guilty to one count and we’ll dismiss the

other two,” when in reality it doesn’t amount to dismissing the other two because you’re still going to

count them out anyway; and as a result — you know

— I think the base offense level — I am going to

change to read 3[0], level 3[0], which I think reflects

the 49 grams. . . . 

As noted by the district court, a calculation based on relevant

conduct which includes quantities in the dropped counts may

yield a sentence of the same length as if the defendant was

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convicted by a jury for the total amount charged.4

 In light of

the potential severity of this rule, the district court must “carefully scrutinize uncharged relevant drug conduct to ensure it

bears the necessary relation to the convicted offense.” Wilson,

502 F.3d at 723 (citation and quotation marks omitted). It cannot, however, decline to consider conduct that qualifies as relevant under the guideline. 

The district court did not consider drug quantities from the

dismissed counts when calculating Grissom’s sentence. Grissom contends that the district court actually made a factual

finding that the dismissed quantities were not part of the same

course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense

of the conviction, thereby relieving the district court of the

duty to consider them. We do not agree. Grissom points to the

following statement by the court to support his contention:

The other two counts involved additional grams. He

was not charged with the conspiracy, he wasn’t

swooped up in a conspiracy; and I guess you could

say that perhaps every time there is another offense

of a similar nature, that somehow is relevant conduct. But when you do that, you’re essentially saying, ‘Okay. We are working out a deal with you.

You plead guilty to one count and we’ll dismiss the

other two,’ when in reality it doesn’t amount to dismissing the other two because you’re still going to

count them out anyway[.] 

Grissom interprets this to mean “that because the three

offenses did not factually have the characteristics of a con4Of course, although relevant conduct has a substantial effect on the

sentencing guidelines range for drug crimes, it does not raise the statutory

minimum or maximum for the crime of conviction. If Grissom had been

convicted by a jury on one of the other counts, for example, he would have

been sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) to a term of no less than

10 years, instead of under § 841(b)(1)(B), which requires a minimum sentence of 5 years. 

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spiracy, which was confirmed by the fact that the government

did not charge Appellee with conspiracy, the conduct underlying the two dismissed counts was not part of the same course

of conduct, common scheme or plan as related to the one

charge.” It is clear from the context of the comment, however,

that the district court was not making a finding that the dismissed drug quantities were not relevant conduct, but rather

reacting to the adverse effect of taking such conduct into

account, as discussed above. 

Grissom’s contention that the absence of explicit factual

findings about relevant conduct proves that the district court

found otherwise is likewise lacking in merit. The Guidelines

clearly set out the factors a district must consider in determining whether assertedly related conduct counts as relevant

under § 1B1.3(a). Comment 9(B) to that guideline notes several appropriate factors, including “degree of similarity . . .

regularity . . . and the time interval between the offenses.”

U.S.S.G. §1B1.3 cmt. n.9(B). We have previously stated that

“the sentencing court must consider the conduct’s ‘similarity,

regularity, and temporal proximity’ to the charged offenses.’ ”

United States v. King, 200 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1999)

(emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The

fact that not one of these factors was discussed by the district

court makes it highly unlikely that it intended to make a factual finding about relevant conduct. 

[11] We thus conclude that the district court made no relevant conduct determination, but instead made an erroneous

legal determination that it was not required to take such conduct into account. The district court erred by refusing to consider the dismissed quantities of crack cocaine in calculating

Grissom’s sentence.

CONCLUSION

We note that the most recent version of the Guidelines,

effective November 1, 2007, reduces the base offense level

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for each threshold quantity of crack cocaine by two levels.

See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a)(3), (c) (2007); see also U.S.S.G.

app. C amend. 706 (2007). Although Grissom must be resentenced under the 2005 version of the Guidelines, see 18

U.S.C. § 3742(g), on March 3, 2008, he became eligible to

pursue a sentencing modification under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1237

n.2 (9th Cir. 2008); Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,

U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Votes Unanimously to Apply

Amendment Retroactively for Crack Cocaine Offenses (Dec.

11, 2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/

rel121107.htm. 

We also note that the district court is free to consider on

remand the Supreme Court’s recent decision in which it held

that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court

to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the

crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes . . . .” Kimbrough v.

United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007); see also United

States v. Casteneda, 511 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 2008).

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Grissom’s sentence

and remand for resentencing. 

VACATED and REMANDED. 

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