Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03058/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03058-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sheila Gant
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee
Angel Wade
Appellant
Dorothy Wade
Appellant
Jean Wade
Appellant
Shelton Wade
Appellant

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 9, 2001 Decided July 3, 2001

No. 00-3058

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Shelton Wade, et al.,

Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00472)

Andrew P. McGuire argued the cause for the appellants.

John R. Fisher, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, United States

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elana Tyrangiel, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for the

appellee. Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 1 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Sentelle and Henderson, Circuit Judges, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Sheila Gant,

Shelton Wade, Angel Wade, Jean Wade and Dorothy Wade

appeal the district court order denying their petition for

attorney's fees under either the Equal Access to Justice Act,

28 U.S.C.A. s 2412(d) (EAJA), or the Hyde Amendment to

the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub.

L. No. 105-119, s 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997), 18

U.S.C.A. s 3006A, historical and statutory notes (Hyde

Amendment). We conclude that the EAJA does not apply to

the appellants who are intervenors in a criminal abatement

proceeding and that the appellants have failed to demonstrate

an entitlement to fees under the Hyde Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.

I.

On May 28, 1997 Charles Wade and his brother Eugene

Wade pleaded guilty to a three-count information alleging,

inter alia, the maintenance of a disorderly house in the

District of Columbia in violation of D.C. Code s 22-2722. See

United States v. Wade, 152 F.3d 969, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(recounting facts giving rise to this case). According to the

government, the Wades sold drugs from and near a residence

at 647 G Street, S.E., in the District. Although Charles and

Eugene did not reside at that address, their parents and

various other family members lived there at the time. Based

on the pleas, the district court entered an order of abatement

against 647 G Street. See D.C. Code s 22-2717 (requiring

abatement of nuisance in certain circumstances). The order

directed the United States Marshal to close the house for one

year.

The appellants, who either resided at or had an interest in

647 G Street, intervened seeking reconsideration of the order.

The court permitted the appellants to intervene but refused

to reconsider its decision, holding that an order of abatement

is a mandatory sanction upon conviction of keeping a disorUSCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 2 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

derly house under section 2722. See United States v. Wade,

992 F. Supp. 6, 10-11, 13 (D.D.C. 1997).

Charles and Eugene, joined by the appellants, appealed to

this court. We vacated the abatement order reasoning that,

"if confronted with this question, the D.C. Court of Appeals

would hold that conviction for keeping a disorderly house

under section 2722 will require an abatement order pursuant

to section 2717 only if that house was used, at least in part"

for "the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution."

Wade, 152 F.3d at 972-73. The government failed to establish in the district court that the house was used for such

purposes. See id.

Subsequently, the appellants petitioned this court for the

payment of attorney's fees and litigation costs under the

EAJA. We denied the petition "without prejudice to renewal

of the matter before the district court." United States v.

Wade, No. 97-3170 (consolidated with Nos. 97-3135, 97-3140,

97-3141, 97-3171) (D.C. Cir. Nov. 4, 1998). The appellants

then filed a fee petition with the district court but their

request was denied. See United States v. Wade, 93 F. Supp.

2d 19 (D.D.C. 2000). This appeal followed.

II.

We are asked to decide whether the appellants--intervenors in a criminal proceeding who successfully challenged an

abatement order entered as part of a criminal sentence--may

recover from the United States attorney's fees arising from

their challenge of the abatement order. To reach a decision,

we must consider three questions: (1) whether we have

jurisdiction to hear this appeal, (2) whether the appellants'

claim here is subject to the EAJA or the Hyde Amendment

and (3) whether the district court correctly applied the appropriate legal framework. Because resolution of the jurisdictional dispute depends on the disposition of the statutory

issue,1 we consider first the statutory question. We then turn

to jurisdiction and finally address the merits.

__________

1 If the appellants' fee petition is governed by the EAJA, the

proceeding to recover the fee is a civil action and appeal from an

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 3 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

A. Applicability of the EAJA and the Hyde Amendment

In the United States, under what is known as the "American Rule," each party to a lawsuit usually bears its own

attorney's fees "unless there is express statutory authorization to the contrary." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

429 (1983) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness

Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). See generally In re Turner, 14

F.3d 637, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (discussing attorney's fees and sovereign immunity). Even if a fee award is

otherwise authorized, sovereign immunity protects the United

States from attorney's fees liability "except to the extent it

has waived its immunity." Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463

U.S. 680, 685 (1983) (citing Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 267-

268 & n.42). Any waiver of immunity, however, "must be

'construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,' " Sierra Club,

463 U.S. at 685 (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S.

25, 27 (1951)), and the court "may not find a waiver unless

Congress' intent is ' "unequivocally expressed" ' in the relevant statute." Hubbard v. EPA, 982 F.2d 531, 532 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538

(1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))).

Of relevance here, the Congress has elected to waive

sovereign immunity for attorney's fees in two circumstances:

under the EAJA and under the Hyde Amendment. The two

statutes respectively provide:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a

court shall award to a prevailing party other than the

United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any

costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by

that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding

in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any

__________

order denying the fee must be taken within 60 days from entry of

the order. See infra at 7-8. Alternatively, if the fee petition is

governed by the Hyde Amendment, we must decide whether a

proceeding instituted to recover the fee is civil or criminal and

whether Rule 4(a) or Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure applies to it.

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 4 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court

finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an

award unjust.

EAJA, 28 U.S.C.A. s 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

During fiscal year 1998 and in any fiscal year thereafter,

the court, in any criminal case (other than a case in

which the defendant is represented by assigned counsel

paid for by the public) pending on or after the date of the

enactment of this Act [Nov. 26, 1997], may award to a

prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation expenses, where

the court finds that the position of the United States was

vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds

that special circumstances make such an award unjust.

Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C.A. s 3006A, historical and statutory notes.

The appellants contend the district court erred in concluding their fee petition is governed by the Hyde Amendment

rather than the EAJA. We are not persuaded. The EAJA

by its terms authorizes the award of attorney's fees to a

prevailing party "in any civil action." The statute does not

define a "civil action" but, however else that phrase may be

defined, "one definition that is always correct is that civil

actions are those that are not criminal." United States v.

Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Black's

Law Dictionary 245 (6th ed. 1990); Ballentine's Law Dictionary 202 (3d ed. 1969)). Here, the action against Charles and

Eugene Wade was plainly criminal. The proceeding was

instituted in order to "punish an infraction of the criminal

laws." See Black's Law Dictionary 372 (6th ed. 1990). They

were charged with a crime, brought to court, found guilty

based on their pleas and sentenced. See Black's Law Dictionary 372 (defining criminal action as "[p]roceeding by which

person charged with a crime is brought to trial and either

found not guilty or guilty and sentenced"). The appellants

intervened in the proceeding before the district court to

challenge part of Charles's and Eugene's sentence. Their

intervention did not change the nature of that proceeding. It

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 5 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

was and remained criminal. Because the appellants were

party to a criminal action and because the EAJA applies only

to civil actions, they cannot recover under the EAJA. Rather, their fee petition is governed by the Hyde Amendment.

The appellants point to cases that treat criminal forfeiture

proceedings as civil actions under EAJA. See Brief of Appellants at 10-11 (citing cases). They contend a similar conclusion is warranted with regard to an abatement order. We do

not agree. A third party asserting an interest in a forfeiture

proceeding is "expressly barred by 21 U.S.C. s 853(k)(2) from

'commenc[ing] an action at law or equity against the United

States concerning the validity of [its] alleged interest in the

property.' " United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 586 (11th

Cir. 1995) (quoting 21 U.S.C. s 853(k)(2)); accord United

States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 907 (11th Cir. 2001). A third

party's only avenue for protecting his interest is the procedure set forth in 18 U.S.C. s 853(n), which provides that

"[a]ny person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal

interest in property which has been ordered forfeited to the

United States pursuant to this section" may "petition the

court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged

interest in the property." In establishing this statutory

system, "Congress intended that third-party petitions ancillary to a criminal forfeiture take the place of civil cases, and

that such a procedure would enable innocent parties to adjudicate their property interests swiftly instead of having to file

separate civil suits." Gilbert, 244 F.3d at 907 (describing

conclusion of Douglas court); see also H.R. Rep. No. 98-1030,

at 206-07 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3389-

90 ("[O]nce the indictment or information is filed, a third

party is not to commence a civil suit against the United

States; instead the third party should avail himself of the

ancillary hearing procedure.... This provision assures a

more orderly disposition of both the criminal case and third

party claims. Indeed, it is anticipated that the new hearing

procedure should provide for more expedited consideration of

third party claims than would the filing of separate civil

suits."). It is for these reasons that courts have treated a

third-party proceeding ancillary to a criminal forfeiture prosecution as a civil action under the EAJA. But these reasons

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 6 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

do not apply to the appellants' intervention. The appellants

were not prohibited by statute or otherwise from bringing a

civil action against the government in order to protect their

interest in the property subject to the abatement order. Had

they done so, they would have been eligible to recover their

attorney's fees under the EAJA. But that is not what they

did. They chose instead to intervene in a criminal action.

And their choice forecloses their fee request under EAJA.

B. The Timeliness of the Appeal

Having determined the appellants' petition for fees is governed by the Hyde Amendment, we turn next to the question

of jurisdiction. The district court's order denying the appellants' petition was issued on March 24, 2000. It was not

entered on the district court docket until April 12, 2000, see

Appendix 14, and the appellants assert they did not receive

notice of the decision until May 23, 2000. See Brief of

Appellants at 5. On that same day, or 41 days after the entry

of the order, the appellants filed their notice of appeal.

The government maintains that, because the appellants

failed to file their notice of appeal within 10 days after the

entry of the order, as required by Rule 4(b) of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure,2 the appeal is untimely and we

are without jurisdiction to consider it. See United States v.

Feuver, 236 F.3d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("It is well settled

that the time limits set out in [Rule 4] are 'mandatory and

jurisdictional.' " (quoting Browder v. Director, Dep't of Cor-

__________

2 Rule 4(b) provides:

(A) In a criminal case, a defendant's notice of appeal must be

filed in the district court within 10 days after the later of:

(i) the entry of either the judgment or the order being

appealed; or

(ii) the filing of the government's notice of appeal.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).

rections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978))). The appellants counter

that Rule 4(b) is not applicable here and that the appeal is

timely under the 60-day limit set forth in Rule 4(a).3

Rule 4(a) provides that, in a civil case, the notice of appeal

must be filed within 30 days after the order appealed from is

entered. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The time period is

extended to 60 days when the United States is a party. See

id. 4(a)(1)(B). Rule 4(b), on the other hand, requires that a

defendant's notice of appeal in a criminal case be filed within

10 days of the entry of the order being appealed. See id.

4(b)(1)(A). In order to resolve this case, we must determine

whether a petition for attorney's fees filed by a successful

intervenor in a criminal abatement proceeding is a "civil case"

or a "criminal case" under the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure. The language of the Hyde Amendment is silent

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 7 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

on this point but we find two decisions, one from the Fourth

Circuit and one from Fifth Circuit, instructive on this issue.

In United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898, 902-04 (5th

Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit held that Rule 4(a) rather than

Rule 4(b) governs an appeal made by a criminal defendant in

a Hyde Amendment proceeding. The court gave two grounds

for its holding. First, it noted that a petition under the Hyde

Amendment is the equivalent of a petition under the EAJA

designed to redress the government's violation of certain

notions of fair play in litigation. The court saw no reason

why the time for filing a notice of appeal in actions addressing

the same problem should vary based on the nature of the

underlying action.4 Second, the court expressed concern that

__________

3 Rule 4(a)(1) provides:

(A) In a civil case, except as provided in Rules 4(a)(1)(B),

4(a)(4), and 4(c), the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must

be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.

(B) When the United States or its officer or agency is a party,

the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days

after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).

4 The court also observed that generally Hyde Amendment proceedings are governed by the same procedures as EAJA proceedadopting the position advocated by the government--that a

Hyde Amendment proceeding is a criminal proceeding--

would mean the government itself would be unable to appeal

a district court order granting Hyde Amendment fees because the government may not pursue an appeal in a criminal

case unless authorized by statute. The court could find no

statute permitting the government to appeal in a Hyde

Amendment proceeding and, therefore, thought it best to

apply Rule 4(a) to a Hyde Amendment appeal in order to give

both parties an opportunity to obtain appellate review.

The issue of the timeliness of appeal in a Hyde Amendment

proceeding was before the Fourth Circuit in In re 1997

Grand Jury, 215 F.3d 430, 433-36 (4th Cir. 2000). Concluding that such a proceeding is a civil action, the court held that

a notice of appeal must comply with Rule 4(a) rather than

Rule 4(b). The court analogized the fee petition to a Rule

41(e) action to recover property, pointing out that "the action

is simply a means to determine a claimant's rights arising

from criminal proceedings" and "not a part of the trial and

punishment process that is criminal law." See id. at 435

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The court

also found it "notable that the burden of proof in a Hyde

Amendment action is on the claimant, rather than the Government" and commented that as a general rule the burden is

on the claimant only in civil cases. Id. at 436 n.7 (citations

omitted).

We agree with the Fourth and Fifth Circuit decisions5 and

conclude that the appeal of an intervenor's fee petition under

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 8 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the Hyde Amendment is subject to the time limitations set

out in Rule 4(a). Accordingly, the appellants' notice of appeal

was timely and we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

__________

ings (except for the burden of proof) and, because the timeliness of

a notice of appeal for EAJA proceedings is governed by Rule 4(a),

the rule for Hyde Amendment proceedings should be the same.

5 The Tenth Circuit's contrary decision on this point lacks any

persuasive power as the decision provides little analysis. See

United States v. Robbins, 179 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999).

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 9 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

C. The Merits

Now that we finally come to the merits of the appellants'

case, we find there is nothing left to decide. Whether

because of their belief that the fee petition was governed by

the EAJA or their realization that, under these facts, they

could not carry the Hyde Amendment's heavy burden,6 the

appellants directed all their arguments to showing that before

the district court the government failed to carry its burden of

proving that its position was substantially justified. The

appellants, however, failed to argue that the district court

abused its discretion in denying their petition under the Hyde

Amendment. Their omission is not lost on the government

which argues that any allegations of error on this issue are

abandoned. We agree and therefore leave undisturbed the

district court's decision on this issue. See Feuver, 236 F.3d at

727 n.3 (issues not briefed are abandoned) (citing Terry v.

Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520

U.S. 1264 (1997)).7

__________

6 Unlike an EAJA action where the burden is on the government

to establish that its position was substantially justified, see Air

Transp. Ass'n of Canada v. FAA, 156 F.3d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (citing Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801, 806 (D.C. Cir.

1984)), in a Hyde Amendment proceeding the burden of persuasion

rests with the claimant who must convince the court that the

government's position was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith." 18

U.S.C.A. s 3006A, historical and statutory notes; see id. (Hyde

Amendment awards "shall be granted pursuant to the procedures

and limitations (but not the burden of proof) provided for an award

under [EAJA]."); see also, e.g., United States v. True, 250 F.3d 410,

419 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Hyde Amendment explicitly does not

adopt the EAJA burden of proof. Instead, it requires the applicant

to prove that the government's position was 'vexatious, frivolous, or

in bad faith.' " (citations omitted)); United States v. Lindberg, 220

F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); In re 1997 Grand Jury, 215

F.3d at 436 (same); Truesdale, 211 F.3d at 908-09 (same); United

States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).

7 Because of our disposition, we need not decide whether the

district court was correct in concluding the appellants were not

"prevailing parties" under the Hyde Amendment. In light of our

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 10 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Accordingly, the district court's denial of the appellants'

petition for attorney's fees is

Affirmed.

__________

disposition, the appellants' motion for attorney's fees for prosecuting this appeal is denied.

USCA Case #00-3058 Document #607462 Filed: 07/03/2001 Page 11 of 11