Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-72370/USCOURTS-ca9-07-72370-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ivad Mohammed Hammad
Petitioner
Eric H. Holder Jr.
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IVAD MOHAMMED HAMMAD, 

Petitioner, No. 07-72370

v. Agency No.  A073-883-390 ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

February 12, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed April 22, 2010

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Marsha S. Berzon and

Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

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COUNSEL

Michael P. Karr and Lizbeth A. Galdamez, Law Offices of

Michael P. Karr & Associates, Sacramento, California, for

petitioner Hammad.

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Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen J.

Flynn, Senior Litigation Counsel, Karen Y. Stewart, Attorney,

and Ari Nazarov, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,

Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for respondent United

States.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

In 1995, Ivad Mohammed Hammad, a Palestinian immigrant to the United States, was granted permanent resident

status on a conditional basis, based on a petition filed by his

U.S. citizen wife. His permanent resident status lapsed when

his wife admitted to Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS) officials that she had entered into the marriage for a fee,

and withdrew her support of his petition to remove the condition on his residency. Now remarried, Hammad appeals a

determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

that he is not entitled to permanent resident status. Because

the BIA’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, we deny his petition.

I

Before discussing the facts of this case, we provide a brief

overview of the statutory and regulatory framework that

allows an alien to obtain legal permanent residency status

based on a petition from the alien’s U.S. citizen spouse. See

8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a), 1186a.

Under § 1154(a), a U.S. citizen may file a petition with the

INS1 to adjust the status of an alien spouse. An alien with a

1The INS ceased to exist on March 1, 2003. Homeland Security Act of

2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. At that time, its functions were

transferred to three new agencies within the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS). Id. We refer to the agency as the INS because the proceedings here were initiated before the transfer. 

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qualifying marriage to a U.S. citizen is generally granted the

status of lawful permanent resident, but maintains this status

on a conditional basis for a two-year period. § 1186a(a)(1).2

At any time before the end of the two-year conditional residency period, the INS may terminate the alien’s permanent

resident status if it determines that the alien’s qualifying marriage is fraudulent, was judicially annulled or terminated, or

that a fee or other consideration was paid to the citizen claiming to be a spouse. § 1186a(b)(1);3

see In re Stowers, 22 I. &

N. Dec. 605, 609 (BIA 1999). If the alien appeals this termination to the BIA, the burden of proof is on the agency “to

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts

2

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1) states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of

this chapter, an alien spouse . . . shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, to

have obtained such status on a conditional basis subject to the provisions

of this section.” 

3

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1) states: 

In the case of an alien with permanent resident status on a conditional basis under subsection (a) of this section, if the Attorney

General determines, before the second anniversary of the alien’s

obtaining the status of lawful admission for permanent residence,

that— 

(A) the qualifying marriage— 

(i) was entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s

admission as an immigrant, or 

(ii) has been judicially annulled or terminated, other than

through the death of a spouse; or 

(B) a fee or other consideration was given (other than a fee

or other consideration to an attorney for assistance in preparation of a lawful petition) for the filing of a petition under

section [1154(a) of this title] with respect to the alien; 

the Attorney General shall so notify the parties involved and,

subject to [a hearing], shall terminate the permanent resident status of the alien (or aliens) involved as of the date of the determination. 

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and information [presented by the alien] are not true with

respect to the qualifying marriage.” § 1186a(c)(3)(D).4

If the INS does not terminate the alien’s conditional resident status under § 1186a(b)(1), then ninety days before the

end of the two-year period of conditional status, the alien may

attempt to remove the conditional aspect of the permanent

resident status by following the procedure outlined in

§ 1186a(c). First, the alien and spouse must jointly file a petition requesting removal of the condition. § 1186a(c)(1)(A).

Next, the alien and spouse must appear for a personal interview before the INS. § 1186a(c)(1)(B). Following the interview, if the INS determines that the alien’s marriage to the

citizen was entered into in good faith, the INS will remove the

condition on the alien’s resident status. § 1186a(c)(3)(A)—

(B). If the INS makes an unfavorable determination, it will

terminate the alien’s resident status as of the date of the determination. § 1186a(c)(3)(C). The alien may appeal this determination to the BIA, in which case the burden of proof is on

the INS “to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the facts and information [contained in the petition] are not

true with respect to the qualifying marriage.” § 1186a(c)

(3)(D).

There are exceptions to this general procedure. Relevant

here, if the alien fails to meet the requirements for timely filing a joint petition, or for jointly appearing for a personal

interview, the alien may seek a waiver of these requirements.

Upon request, at “the Attorney General’s discretion,” the INS

4

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(D) provides: 

Any alien whose permanent resident status is terminated [by an

adverse determination] may request a review of such determination in a proceeding to remove the alien. In such proceeding, the

burden of proof shall be on the Attorney General to establish, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts and information

[presented by the alien] are not true with respect to the qualifying

marriage. 

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can waive this requirement, and remove the conditional basis

of the permanent resident status, if the alien demonstrates that

the marriage to the U.S. citizen “was entered into in good

faith by the alien spouse, but . . . has been terminated (other

than through the death of the spouse) and the alien was not at

fault in failing to meet the requirements” of submitting a joint

petition and appearing for a personal interview.

§ 1186a(c)(4)(B).5 The INS also can remove the conditional

basis of the alien’s permanent resident status if “extreme

hardship would result if such alien is removed.”

§ 1186a(c)(4)(A). Hardship is judged by considering “circumstances occurring only during the period that the alien was

admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.”

§ 1186a(c)(4). Generally, in considering these waiver

requests, “[t]he determination of what evidence is credible

and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within the

sole discretion of the Attorney General.” § 1186a(c)(4).

If the alien does not file the joint petition within the ninetyday period set forth in the statute, then the alien’s conditional

permanent resident status automatically terminates on the second anniversary of the date the alien received that status.

§ 1186a(c)(2)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1216.4(a)(6). In a subsequent

removal proceeding, “the burden of proof shall be on the alien

to establish compliance” with the joint petition and interview

requirements. § 1186a(c)(2)(B).

5

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) states in pertinent part: 

The Attorney General, in the Attorney General’s discretion, may

remove the conditional basis of the permanent resident status for

an alien who fails to meet the requirements of [filing a joint petition and appearing for an interview] if the alien demonstrates that

— 

. . . 

(B) the qualifying marriage was entered into in good faith by

the alien spouse, but the qualifying marriage has been terminated (other than through the death of the spouse) and the

alien was not at fault in failing to meet the requirements of

[filing a joint petition and appearing for an interview.] 

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II

Hammad attempted to obtain his permanent resident status

by means of the procedures described above. In 1993, Hammad was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant student. He married Veronica Fierro, a United States citizen, in

1994. Fierro submitted a petition to allow Hammad to adjust

his status and, on July 3, 1995, Hammad was granted permanent resident status on a conditional basis for two years.

On May 21, 1997, a little over a month before Hammad’s

two-year status was due to lapse, the couple filed a joint petition to remove the condition on Hammad’s resident status.

The couple appeared for a personal interview on August 7,

1997, and initially maintained that their marriage was bona

fide. INS officials then interviewed Hammad and Fierro separately and discovered inconsistencies between their descriptions of daily life together. After an INS official confronted

Fierro with the serious consequences of immigration fraud,

Fierro admitted that the marriage had been entered into solely

for immigration purposes and withdrew her support of the

petition. She also signed an affidavit, dated August 7, 1997,

stating that Hammad paid her $2,000 for helping him become

a permanent resident and that she had never lived with him or

had sexual relations with him. In light of this information, the

INS served Hammad with a Notice to Appear (NTA) and a

removal hearing was scheduled.

On June 26, 1998, before his removal hearing commenced,

Hammad filed a petition under § 1186a(c)(4)(C), asking the

INS to waive the joint petition requirement based on having

been battered or the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by

his spouse during the good faith marriage. To support his petition, Hammad submitted an undated written statement, purportedly signed by Fierro, which was not notarized.6

 In that

6To distinguish Fierro’s second statement, which was undated, from her

1997 and 2006 affidavits, the IJ referred to that statement as the “undated

one.” We adopt the IJ’s terminology and refer to Fierro’s second statement

as “the undated statement.” 

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undated statement, Fierro retracted her prior 1997 sworn

statement that her marriage to Hammad was fraudulent and

explained that she had lived with Hammad as his wife and

had withdrawn support of the joint petition because she felt

under duress by the INS. The undated statement further

explained that Fierro had withdrawn support of the petition

because she was angry with Hammad over rumors that Hammad was planning to remarry. She believed that Hammad was

upset with her for having another man’s child on October 27,

1995. When Hammad promised to take care of her and her

baby, and expressed a desire for the “family to be one unit,”

Fierro decided to come forward with the truth and reassert her

wish that the INS permit Hammad to become a permanent

resident.

In addition to submitting the undated statement, Hammad

was interviewed again by the INS. At the interview, Hammad

explained that contrary to the statement made in his petition,

he had not been subject to any mental or physical cruelty during marriage, and that he instead sought a waiver based on

having entered into a good faith marriage that ended in

divorce. See § 1186a(c)(4)(B). Hammad’s marriage had not

actually ended in divorce at the time of the interview;

although Hammad had filed for divorce, the divorce was not

yet final.

On October 9, 1998, the INS denied Hammad’s petition for

a waiver and terminated Hammad’s conditional resident status. In its termination letter, the INS noted that the undated

statement from Fierro was internally inconsistent, inconsistent

with Hammad’s testimony, and lacked specificity. Among

other things, the INS pointed out that the undated statement

supposedly prepared by Fierro asserted that Hammad and

Fierro had a bona fide marriage and lived together as husband

and wife, but also stated that Fierro had a child by another

man less than one year into the marital relationship. The INS

also noted that Fierro’s undated statement said that Hammad

had promised to take care of Fierro and her baby, while HamHAMMAD v. HOLDER 6041

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mad testified in his interview with the INS that he had

decided not to get back together with Fierro. The INS concluded that there was evidence that Hammad had engaged in

marriage fraud, in violation of § 1154(c).7 Because there was

reason to doubt that Hammad had entered into his marriage

with Fierro in good faith and because Hammad had failed to

present objective evidence to overcome inconsistencies in the

record and to show that the marriage was not fraudulent, the

INS denied Hammad’s petition.

At his removal hearing in 2006,8 Hammad requested relief

from removal on the ground that the INS had erred in denying

his June 1998 petition for a waiver from the joint petition

requirement. The government submitted a new declaration

from Fierro, dated 2006, which said that the undated statement submitted by Hammad was neither written nor signed by

her and, in fact, contained lies. The 2006 affidavit supported

Fierro’s 1997 story that she married for immigration purposes

and never had romantic relations with Hammad. In addition

to proffering this new evidence, the government moved to

allow Fierro to testify by telephone. Hammad objected

because the government had not notified him about Fierro’s

7

8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) provides in pertinent part: 

[N]o petition shall be approved if (1) the alien has previously

been accorded, or has sought to be accorded, an immediate relative or preference status as the spouse of a citizen of the United

States or the spouse of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent

residence, by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney

General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the

immigration laws, or (2) the Attorney General has determined

that the alien has attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage

for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. 

8At Hammad’s first removal hearing, the IJ ruled that Hammad did not

qualify for a waiver to the joint petition requirements, in part because he

was not divorced, and issued a final order of deportation. Hammad filed

a motion to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA

granted on March 26, 2004. Sometime between July 23, 2003 and June 21,

2005, Hammad finalized his divorce from Fierro and married Rula Yaghmour. 

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proposed testimony until two days before the hearing. Despite

this objection, the IJ granted the government’s request, noting

that under local court rules, no notice was necessary for testimony being introduced for impeachment or rebuttal purposes.

Hammad then requested that the IJ allow his friend, Yassar

Dahbour, to testify as a rebuttal witness. When the IJ asked

if Dahbour was waiting outside, Hammad responded that

Dahbour was available to testify only by telephone, but if the

IJ wanted Dahbour to appear in person, Hammad would

request a continuance. The IJ allowed Dahbour to appear by

telephone and, therefore, denied the continuance motion.

At the hearing, Fierro swore that her 2006 affidavit was

truthful, and confirmed that she had never been romantically

involved with Hammad. She explained that she had not seen

the undated statement purportedly signed by her until the government sent it to her a few months before the hearing. She

noted that the undated statement contained several mistakes,

such as the date and place of her daughter’s birth, as well as

the allegation that she was angry with Hammad.

Hammad and his friend Dahbour attempted to counter this

testimony by explaining how Fierro came to sign the undated

statement. Hammad testified first, and stated that after his

attorney prepared the undated statement for Fierro, he drove

from his house in Daly City to Fierro’s place of work in San

Mateo with his friend Dahbour, who was visiting from Sacramento. According to Hammad, after he and Dahbour arrived,

Fierro came out of the building, read the statement, and

signed it outside of the car, in view of Dahbour. Hammad

could not remember the date these events transpired, but testified that it was during the day, a few months after his July

1997 interview. In addition, Hammad was unsure whether he

drove his white Nissan or green Toyota, and could not recall

whether it was rainy or whether the undated statement was

two or three pages long.

Next, Dahbour testified that he had accompanied Hammad

to San Mateo to get a document signed near the end of 1997.

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He guessed that Hammad drove them in his car to Fierro’s

place of work in the afternoon, but could not readily recall

who drove. According to Dahbour, Hammad called Fierro on

his cell phone from the car to come out from her office, which

she did. To the best of Dahbour’s recollection, Fierro proceeded to open the car door and read a one-page document

while standing beside the car, but Dahbour also thought that

Fierro may have sat down in the back seat of the car. Dahbour

stated that he did not read the undated statement or see Fierro

actually sign the document because he was looking away.

Instead, he just assumed that Fierro signed it because he saw

Hammad hand Fierro a pen and heard Hammad say “thank

you” when she left.

After considering all the evidence, the IJ concluded that

Hammad had not carried his burden of proving that his marriage was entered into in good faith. According to the IJ, “the

evidence of record does not establish that the marriage was a

good faith marriage, or that it was entered into with any purpose other than for respondent to gain an immigration benefit.” The IJ noted the inconsistencies between Hammad’s and

Fierro’s testimony, and also noted inconsistencies between

Hammad’s and Dahbour’s testimony about how Fierro came

to sign the undated statement. The IJ held that Hammad had

given false testimony to support his claim, and therefore was

not eligible for voluntary departure. Accordingly, the IJ

denied Hammad’s petition to remove the condition on his resident status, denied his application for voluntary departure,

and ordered Hammad removed to Jordan.

Hammad appealed the IJ’s July 21, 2006, decision to the

BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s determination. The BIA held

that the IJ did not err in concluding that Hammad’s marriage

was not bona fide under § 1186a(c), and also rejected Hammad’s claim that “several due process violations occurred at

his hearing below” because he had failed to show prejudice.

Finally, the BIA determined that Hammad “failed to demonstrate that his removal would result in extreme hardship where

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circumstances occurring only during the period that he was

admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis can

be considered.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1186(c)(4).

III

Hammad raises several arguments on appeal. He first

argues that the BIA erred in its allocation of the burden of

proof on the question whether he had entered into his marriage to Fierro in good faith. Because the government bears

this burden of proof, according to Hammad, it was the government’s obligation to present sufficient evidence to prove

that his marriage was in bad faith. Claiming that the decisions

by the BIA and IJ were infected by this erroneous allocation

of proof, he also argues that the BIA erred by (1) upholding

the IJ’s erroneous adverse credibility determination, (2)

affirming the INS’s denial of Hammad’s waiver request, (3)

failing to consider whether Hammad was entitled to a waiver

based on extreme hardship, and (4) ignoring due process violations at his hearing. We consider each of these arguments in

turn.

A

[1] Hammad’s overarching argument is that the IJ and BIA

erred in holding that he bore the burden of proving that his

marriage was bona fide. According to Hammad, § 1186a(b)

puts the burden of proof on the government to prove that his

marriage was fraudulent. This is incorrect. As noted above,

§ 1186a(b) applies to the situation where the INS determines

that the alien’s qualifying marriage was improper during the

two-year period before the conditional status terminates. By

its terms, § 1186a is inapplicable to Hammad, because the

INS did not terminate Hammad’s conditional permanent resident status until August 7, 1997, when Hammad’s two-year

period had already lapsed.

[2] The provision applicable to Hammad is § 1186a(c),

which provides that an alien’s conditional resident status terHAMMAD v. HOLDER 6045

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minates automatically when the alien and the alien’s U.S. citizen spouse fail to file a joint petition. We have held that

“when one party makes a written withdrawal of support from

a joint petition, the petition is considered not to have been

filed.” Singh v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010).

As noted above, when the U.S. citizen fails to file the petition

to remove the alien’s conditional status, that status terminates

automatically at the end of the two-year period,

§ 1186a(c)(2)(A), and at the subsequent removal hearing, “the

burden of proof shall be on the alien to establish compliance”

with the requirements for obtaining a removal of conditional

status, § 1186a(c)(2)(B). Although Hammad and Fierro timely

filed a joint petition and appeared for an interview with the

INS, Fierro withdrew her support of the petition before it was

adjudicated. Because Fierro’s withdrawal of her petition is

equivalent to the failure to file, Singh, 591 F.3d at 1198, Hammad had the burden of establishing eligibility for a removal

of the conditional status. 

[3] Hammad attempted to establish this eligibility by

obtaining a waiver from the joint petition requirement. See

§ 1186a(c)(4). But again, under § 1186a(c)(4), it was Hammad’s burden to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the Attorney General, that “the qualifying marriage was entered into in

good faith.” § 1186a(c)(4); see Matter of Mendes, 20 I. & N.

Dec. 833, 838-39 (BIA 1994) (holding that withdrawal of

support for a joint petition by a petitioning spouse raises the

question whether the marriage was entered into in bad faith,

and therefore, “the Act then shifts the burden onto the alien

to demonstrate that the marriage was nevertheless entered into

in good faith”). Accordingly, the IJ’s allocation of the burden

of proof was not an error. To the extent Hammad’s arguments

are based on his claim that the government had an obligation

to prove that Hammad’s marriage with Fierro was not bona

fide, we reject them.

B

[4] Having concluded that the IJ and BIA did not err in

determining that Hammad bore the burden of proof, we now

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consider Hammad’s four subsidiary arguments. Hammad first

argues that the IJ’s determination that he was not credible was

not supported by substantial evidence. According to Hammad,

there was no basis in the record to believe Fierro’s testimony

over his own and, therefore, it was improper for the IJ to base

its adverse credibility determination on the inconsistencies

between Hammad’s and Fierro’s testimony. This argument

fails in light of the correct standard of review. The BIA’s

determination “must be upheld if ‘supported by reasonable,

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered

as a whole.’ ” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481

(1992) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4)). “To reverse the BIA

finding we must find that the evidence not only supports [petitioner’s argument], but compels it.” Id. at 481 n.1 (emphasis

omitted). Here, the record does not compel us to overturn the

IJ’s and BIA’s conclusion. Hammad’s testimony was inconsistent not only with Fierro’s testimony, but also with the testimony of his own witness, Dahbour. “Because we must

accept the IJ’s adverse credibility finding if any of the supporting grounds proffered in the IJ’s decision is valid,”

Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1183 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008),

we affirm the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.

C

Second, Hammad argues that the IJ erred in affirming the

INS’s denial of Hammad’s request for a waiver of the joint

petition requirement under § 1186a(c)(4)(B), which allows the

Attorney General to waive requirements for specified good

faith marriages that have terminated. Hammad argues that the

evidence in the record would not compel a reasonable factfinder to find that Hammad’s marriage was not bona fide.

[5] Again, we must reject this claim in light of the correct

standard of review. We held in Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales,

406 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2005), that the substantial evidence

standard governs our review of waiver determinations under

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§ 1186a,9

 and the court “must affirm the BIA’s order when

there is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might

accept as adequate to support it, even if it is possible to reach

a contrary result on the basis of the evidence.” Id. at 1147;

Damon v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“Whether [the alien] entered into the qualifying marriage in

good faith is an intrinsically fact-specific question reviewed

under the substantial evidence standard.”). Given the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony, Hammad failed to carry

this burden. Because the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusion that Hammad’s marriage to Fierro was fraudulent was based on “such

relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support it,” Oropeza-Wong, 406 F.3d at 1147, there

9A reasonable question can be raised as to whether we have jurisdiction

to review adverse credibility determinations under § 1186a, even though

we do have jurisdiction to review determinations regarding whether the

alien has demonstrated that “extreme hardship would result” absent a

waiver of the joint petition requirement, § 1186a(c)(4)(A). Singh, 591 F.3d

at 1195 & n.3. Section 1186a(c)(4) states that “[t]he determination of what

evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be

within the sole discretion of the Attorney General.” Congress removed

federal courts’ “jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General

‘the authority for which is specified under [the INA] to be in the discretion

of the Attorney General.’ ” Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010)

(quoting § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). Because § 1186a(c)(4) places credibility

determinations in the discretion of the Attorney General, the jurisdictionstripping provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) applies. See § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The majority

of our sister courts have held that we lack jurisdiction to review credibility

determinations in this context. See, e.g., Ibrahimi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 758,

764 (8th Cir. 2009); Contreras-Salinas v. Holder, 585 F.3d 710, 713-14

(2d Cir. 2009); Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 984-85 &

n.6 (10th Cir. 2005); Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2005);

Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2004); Urena-Tavarez v.

Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 161 (3rd Cir. 2004). Our holding to the contrary

in Oropeza-Wong has been criticized by other circuits. See ContrerasSalinas, 585 F.3d at 714 n.4; Perales-Cumpean, 429 F.3d at 985 n.6. But,

we are bound by our precedent. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

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was substantial evidence to support the BIA’s denial of Hammad’s 1998 waiver petition.10

D

[6] Third, even if the BIA had not erred in upholding the

INS’s denial of his waiver request, Hammad suggests that the

IJ and BIA erred in failing to consider a waiver to the joint

petition requirement based on extreme hardship. This argument also fails. Hammad did not file a waiver petition with

the INS based on extreme hardship, and could not seek such

a waiver from the IJ in the first instance. See Matter of Anderson, 20 I. & N. Dec. 888, 892 (BIA 1994) (“The immigration

judge only has jurisdiction to review the denial of a waiver

application.”); 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)-(f). Nor did Hammad ask

the IJ to continue his hearing so he could pursue such a

waiver application with the INS. See Stowers, 22 I. & N. Dec.

at 613-14 (“[W]here an alien is prima facie eligible for a

waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Act [codified as 8

U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)] and wishes to have his or her waiver

application adjudicated by the Service, the proceedings should

be continued in order to allow the Service to adjudicate the

waiver application.”). In any event, Hammad was not eligible

for an extreme hardship waiver. “In determining extreme

hardship, the Attorney General shall consider circumstances

occurring only during the period that the alien was admitted

for permanent residence on a conditional basis.”

§ 1186a(c)(4). Because Hammad’s extreme hardship argument is based on the effect his removal will have on a family

from his second marriage, which did not exist during his twoyear conditional resident status, he does not qualify for a

waiver on that ground.

10Hammad also asks us to hold that the INS erred in determining that

there was evidence of marriage fraud in violation of § 1154(c). Because

Hammad did not appeal this ruling to the IJ or BIA, it is not exhausted,

and we lack jurisdiction to address it. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d

674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).

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E

Finally, Hammad asserts that the last-minute admission of

Fierro’s telephone testimony and new affidavit at his 2006

hearing before the IJ violated his right to due process because

the government did not follow applicable court rules and he

was not given adequate time to prepare in light of the IJ’s

denial of his request for a continuance. Although “[t]he rules

of evidence are not applicable to immigration hearings,” the

proceeding must be conducted “in accord with due process

standards of fundamental fairness.” Ramirez-Alejandre v.

Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). A due process violation occurs

when the alien shows that the hearing was fundamentally

unfair and that the alien “was prejudiced by the violation.”

Salgado-Diaz v. Gonzales, 395 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir.

2005); see Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 876-77 (9th Cir.

2002).

[7] Hammad cannot show that the admission of Fierro’s

telephone testimony was fundamentally unfair. The government’s notification of Hammad two days before trial did not

violate the local court rule Hammad cites. See Local Operating Procedure No. 3, Immigration Court, San Francisco, CA

(stating that “pre-hearing briefs and proposed exhibits must be

filed with the Immigration Court no later than fifteen (15) calendar days before the scheduled Individual Calendar hearing,”

but this “procedure shall not apply to exhibits which are to be

submitted for purposes of rebuttal and impeachment”).

Because the government proffered Fierro’s testimony and

2006 affidavit to impeach Hammad’s testimony, the government was not required to give fifteen days notice. Furthermore, the government informed Hammad of the substance of

Fierro’s testimony two days before the hearing, and Hammad

had the opportunity to cross-examine Fierro and offer the testimony of a rebuttal witness. Cf. Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft,

339 F.3d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the introduc6050 HAMMAD v. HOLDER

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tion of hearsay was fair in part because “Rojas-Garcia had the

opportunity to cross-examine both officers”).

[8] Hammad’s argument that he requested a continuance to

allow him time to prepare a proper cross-examination of

Fierro, is contradicted by the record. The hearing transcript

establishes that he requested a continuance only if Dahbour

had to testify in person. The IJ’s decision to allow Dahbour

to testify by telephone mooted the request for a continuance.

Moreover, the IJ’s denial of Hammad’s request for a continuance did not deny Hammad the opportunity to fully present

his case. Despite the denial of the continuance, Hammad was

able to present his version of the events, cross-examine

Fierro, and have Dahbour testify on his behalf to rebut Fierro’s assertions. Because Hammad was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial, he cannot claim a violation of due

process.

IV

Hammad has traveled far down the road of turning his conditional legal resident status into a permanent status. Although

Hammad makes many arguments why he should be allowed

to take the final step, his wife’s withdrawal of her support and

the INS’s determination that Hammad had not entered into the

marriage in good faith are fatal. The IJ’s and BIA’s rulings

against Hammad were supported by substantial evidence in

the record and, in light of our standard of review, none of

Hammad’s arguments can prevail. 

PETITION DENIED.

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