Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-05165/USCOURTS-caDC-08-05165-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Teresa C. Chambers
Appellant
United States Department of the Interior
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 2009 Decided June 16, 2009

No. 08-5165

TERESA C. CHAMBERS,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-00380-JR)

Paula Dinerstein argued the cause for the appellant.

Beverly M. Russell, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Jeffrey A. Taylor, United States

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief.

 Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Teresa C.

Chambers, former Chief of the United States Park Police,

brought this action against the Department of the Interior

(Interior) under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, alleging that

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Interior violated the Privacy Act by (1) failing to provide her

access to an appraisal of her job performance allegedly prepared

by National Park Service (NPS) Deputy Director Donald W.

Murphy in 2003 (Count I) and (2) failing to maintain and

safeguard the appraisal (Count II). The district court granted

summary judgment in Interior’s favor on Count I and dismissed

Count II for failure to state a claim. We reverse the summary

judgment on Count I because the record, viewed most favorably

to Chambers, presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether Interior intentionally destroyed the appraisal after

Chambers requested access to it. We similarly affirm the court’s

denial of summary judgment to Chambers on Count I based on

the same triable issue of fact. We affirm the court’s dismissal of

Count II because Chambers does not point to any adverse agency

determination she experienced because of Interior’s alleged

failure to maintain the appraisal.

I.

 On a motion for summary judgment, we view the facts in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Islamic Am.

Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

So viewed, the record establishes the following facts. On

February 10, 2002, Chambers assumed her duties as Chief of the

United States Park Police, a unit of NPS, which is in turn a

bureau within Interior. On September 22, 2003, Murphy,

Chambers’s supervisor, informed her by e-mail that he had

prepared her performance appraisal and that his secretary would

contact her to set up a meeting to review it; he also informed her

in person that he had completed the appraisal, adding “Don’t

worry. It’s a good one.” Compl. ¶ 6, Chambers v. Dep’t of

Interior, No. 05CV00380 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2005) (Compl.);

Second Affidavit of Teresa C. Chambers ¶¶ 6-7 (June 20, 2007),

(Joint Appendix (JA) A174). No meeting ever occurred.

On December 2, 2003, the Washington Post published an

article quoting from an interview with Chambers in which she

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The MSPB affirmed an administrative law judge’s decision

upholding Chambers’s removal and concluding that she had not made

a protected disclosure under the WPA. On appeal, the Federal Circuit

affirmed the MSPB’s decision as to Chambers’s removal but vacated

and remanded the WPA claim. See Chambers v. Dep’t of Interior, 515

F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

expressed “concerns about budget limitations and the potential

impacts on protection of national icons and persons visiting the

parks.” Compl. ¶ 8. The same day she expressed similar

concerns in an e-mail to “a high-ranking” congressional staff

member, the substance of which “was shared with [Chambers’s]

superiors, including Mr. Murphy.” Id. ¶ 9.

On December 5, 2003, Chambers was placed on

administrative leave. One week later, she was informed she

could return to her duty post if she agreed to certain

“stipulations,” including that she obtain prior approval from

Murphy or his designee before contacting the media or a member

of the Congress or its staff. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Chambers declined the

reinstatement terms and on December 17, 2003, Murphy

proposed that Chambers be removed from federal service. Id.

¶¶ 13-14. 

On January 29, 2004, Chambers filed a complaint with the

Office of Special Counsel (OSC) under the Whistleblower

Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (WPA). When the OSC

failed to act on the complaint, she filed an appeal to the Merit

Systems Protection Board (MSPB). On July 9, 2004, Interior

issued a decision removing Chambers from federal service,

which Chambers also appealed to the MSPB. The WPA claim

remains before the MSPB.1

During his deposition in the MSPB appeal, Murphy testified

that in late summer 2003, he prepared a written “narrative”

“appraisal” of Chambers’s performance over the previous fiscal

year (2002-2003) which was “in final form.” Dep. of Donald

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W. Murphy at 18-20 (Aug. 11, 2004) (JA A34-36) (8/11/04

Murphy Dep.). He also noted then that Terrie Fajardo, retired

NPS Chief of Human Resources, had seen the appraisal. Id. at

22-23 (JA A38-39). After she was “denied access” to the

appraisal in the MSPB proceeding, Compl. ¶ 20, Chambers,

through counsel, submitted a request pursuant to the Privacy Act

and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, (FOIA)

seeking the following documents:

1. A draft employee evaluation written by

Deputy Director Donald Murphy concerning

Chief Teresa Chambers during the time period

covering 2002 and/or 2003. 

2. All routings or transmittal documents

indicating what officials received copies of the

draft evaluation referred to in 1.

Letter from Richard Condit, General Counsel, Public Employees

for Envt’l Responsibility, to Diane Cooke, FOIA Officer, NPS

Headquarters (Oct. 26, 2004) (JA A43). In response to the

request, Murphy searched his e-mails for the appraisal and

instructed his assistant, Janice Brooks, to search his files.

Brooks discovered “a draft performance plan” for Chambers

entitled “Senior Executive Service Performance Plan” (SES

Plan). Dep. of Donald W. Murphy, at 24-25 (Nov. 21, 2005)

(11/21/05 Murphy Dep.); see Decl. of Diane Cooke ¶¶ 4-5 (June

15, 2007) (JA A163) (Cooke Decl.). The SES Plan, dated

February 11, 2003, sets out various performance standards for

Chambers to meet but contains no narrative appraisal of her

performance. See SES Plan (JA A28-30). Brooks forwarded the

SES Plan, along with a copy of Chambers’s request, to Steve

Krutz, an Employee Relations Specialist in NPS’s Division of

Labor and Employee Relations. Krutz “did not consider the SES

Plan to be responsive” but nonetheless forwarded a copy to NPS

FOIA Officer Diane Cooke. Cooke Decl. ¶¶ 5-6 (JA A163-64).

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Interior’s Office of the Solicitor also reviewed the SES Plan and

determined it was not responsive to Chambers’s request. 

In a January 18, 2005 letter to Chambers’s counsel, NPS

stated it had searched its files and “did not find any documents

responsive to [her] request.” Letter from Alfred J. Poole III,

Acting Associate Director, Administration, Business Practices,

and Workforce Development, NPS, Department of Interior to

Richard Condit at 1 (Jan. 18, 2005) (JA A46). In response,

Chambers’s counsel informed Cooke he found NPS’s response

to the document request “not credible” and attached an excerpt

from Murphy’s MSPB deposition describing the “narrative”

appraisal he said he had prepared. Letter from Richard Condit

at 1-2 (Jan. 26, 2005) (JA A48-49). In the letter and a follow-up

e-mail, Chambers asked that NPS search further for the

appraisal. Accordingly, Cooke asked Murphy to search his files

again. Murphy responded to Cooke in a hand-written note that

“the Performance Appraisal” he referred to in his MSPB

deposition was “the same as the document already reviewed,”

meaning the non-narrative SES Plan. Note from Donald W.

Murphy to Diane M. Cooke (rec’d Feb. 15, 2005) (JA A53)

(Murphy Note); see also Decl. of Donald W. Murphy ¶ 3 (Apr.

13, 2005) (JA A59) (Murphy Decl.). He also characterized the

document as a prospective appraisal plan to assess Chambers’s

performance in fiscal year 2003-04. Id. On March 14, 2005,

NPS wrote Chambers that it had “found one document that [was]

potentially responsive to [her] request,” namely, the SES Plan,

which was enclosed. Letter from Alfred J. Poole III to Richard

Condit at 1 (Mar. 14, 2005) (JA A56).

Meanwhile, Chambers filed this action on February 24,

2005, asserting two claims: (1) Interior’s “willful refusal to

provide the records requested violates the Privacy Act,” Compl.

¶ 35 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)) (Count I); and (2) Interior

“failed to establish and maintain physical safeguards to ensure

the security and confidentiality of records in its possession in

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violation of the Privacy Act and [Interior]’s regulations,” id. ¶ 42

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(9), (10); 43 C.F.R. § 2.51) (Count II).

Chambers asked that the court either (1) declare that Interior

“violated the Privacy Act by withholding the requested records”

and order Interior “to immediately make the requested records

available to [Chambers]” or (2) declare that Interior “violated the

Privacy Act by failing to safeguard records pertaining to

[Chambers]” and award Chambers “damages for all lost income,

benefits, and/or other adverse impacts.” Id. ¶ 44. Chambers also

requested that the court award her “all costs and attorneys’ fees

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2).” Id. 

After the suit was filed, Stephanie Yu, an Attorney-Advisor

in Interior’s Office of the Solicitor, contacted retired NPS

Human Resources Chief Fajardo about the appraisal and Fajardo

affirmed that she had created a performance appraisal of

Chambers. Fajardo later testified that she and Murphy had

prepared the appraisal together, she had given Chambers a

“satisfactory” evaluation and she had delivered the “[f]inal”

appraisal to Murphy “personally.” Dep. of Terrie Fajardo at 20-

22 (Oct. 7, 2005) (JA A69-71) (10/7/05 Fajardo Dep.). She also

testified that she was “sure” she had retained a copy of the

appraisal on her computer, describing the electronic file’s likely

location on the hard drive, id. at 27 (JA A76), that she believed

she stored it on a floppy disk as was her normal practice, id. at

35-36 (JA A84-85), and that she had filed a hard copy inside a

filing cabinet in her office, id. at 47 (JA A95). Yu met with

Fajardo in August 2005 to search for the appraisal in NPS

Human Resources records. Fajardo was provided a box of

floppy disks in which she located one disk containing “a portion

of the file” in which she “had done Ms. Chambers’ performance

appraisal.” Dep. of Terrie Fajardo at 106 (Nov. 16, 2005) (JA

A113) (11/16/05 Fajardo Dep.). The file she found, however,

was only “part of a performance appraisal document,” including

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Fajardo testified she and Murphy developed the standards

together—he had “drafted and reviewed” them and she had prepared

them “in final form.” 10/7/05 Fajardo Dep. at 18. 

the “performance standards”2 but not the “evaluation.” 10/7/05

Fajardo Dep. at 10-11 (JA A63-64). According to Fajardo, a

page was missing—“the part that was supposed to have been

marked where the comments were, where the comments that

[she] made that [she] discussed with Murphy—they weren’t

there.” 11/16/05 Fajardo Dep. at 106 (JA A113). Fajardo was

unable to search through her physical files at that time because

“[t]he individuals who knew the current location of the files . . .

were not in the office that day.” Cooke Decl. ¶ 17. In addition,

Fajardo’s old computer was no longer available to search

because it had been “prepared for surplus and disposal” and its

“hard drive memory . . . erased in its entirety as part of this

preparation” the previous month. Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s First Req.

for Prod. of Docs. and Things, Chambers v. Dep’t of Interior,

No. 05CV00380 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2005), at 4. On November 17,

2005, Yu and another Interior lawyer met at the NPS offices and

searched through three filing cabinets to which, they were

informed, Fajardo’s files had been moved after her retirement.

They found no file, either electronic or paper, that appeared to

contain an appraisal of Chambers. Cooke Decl. ¶¶ 20-24.

Finally, on September 8, 2006, Yu searched Murphy’s files page

by page but found no appraisal. Id. ¶ 25. 

The district court granted Interior’s motion to dismiss or,

alternatively, for summary judgment. Chambers v. U.S. Dep’t of

Interior, 538 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D.D.C. 2008). The court granted

summary judgment on Count I—for failure to provide access to

Chambers’s records under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1)—because it

concluded Interior had conducted an adequate search for the

missing appraisal. Id. at 267-68. The court dismissed Count

II—for failure to establish rules and safeguards to maintain the

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security and confidentiality of Chambers’s records—because it

concluded that the Privacy Act does not provide a remedy for

failure to retain agency records. Id. at 268-69. 

Chambers then filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II.

Chambers appeals both the district court’s summary

judgment on Count I and its dismissal of Count II. We address

each count separately, reviewing de novo the district court’s

disposition of each. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at

732. 

A. Count I

First, Chambers contests the summary judgment on Count

I, which alleges that Interior “willful[ly] refus[ed] to timely

provide the records requested.” Compl. ¶ 35 (citing 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(d)). We may affirm the summary judgment only if,

“viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to [Chambers],

‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ”

Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 732 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)). “At summary judgment, ‘all inferences must be

viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.’ ”

McCready v. Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting

Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Applying this

standard, we conclude that the district court improperly granted

summary judgment in Interior’s favor.

In a suit seeking agency documents—whether under the

Privacy Act or FOIA—“ ‘[a]t the summary judgment stage,

where the agency has the burden to show that it acted in

accordance with the statute, the court may rely on a reasonably

detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of

search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain

responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.’ ” Id.

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at 14 (quoting Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d

321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). The district court concluded that the

Declaration of Diane Cooke, NPS FOIA and Privacy Act Officer,

which “gives a detailed description of the numerous searches that

[Interior] conducted,” satisfied this standard. Chambers, 538 F.

Supp. 2d at 267. The court reasoned:

The search of Murphy’s files was unquestionably

sufficient. The Cooke declaration explains that these

files were searched on three separate occasions, twice

by Murphy and his secretary, and once by Ms. Yu.

. . . The Cooke declaration explains that all

presently existing systems of records which might

reasonably have been expected to contain the

performance evaluation have been searched, some of

them numerous times. 

Id. We agree with Chambers that the Cooke Declaration is not

adequate under the Privacy Act because, if all reasonable

evidentiary inferences are drawn in Chambers’s favor, a

reasonable jury could find that Interior intentionally destroyed

the document—rendering the subsequent search ineffective—and

there is therefore a genuine issue of material fact whether the

search was adequate. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d

at 732 (“ ‘A dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if the

evidence is “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” ’ ” (quoting McCready, 465 F.3d at 7

(quoting George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 410 (D.C. Cir.

2005)))).

Generally, “an agency has no duty to retrieve and release

documents it once possessed but that it legitimately disposed of

prior to the date a FOIA request was received.” McGehee v.

CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1103 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (construing

Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445

U.S. 136, 155 n.9 (1980)) (first emphasis added), reh’g granted

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and vacated in part in other respect, 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir.

1983); see also SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197,

1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“If the agency is no longer in possession

of the document, for a reason that is not itself suspect, then the

agency is not improperly withholding that document . . . .”)

(emphasis added). Nonetheless, as the italicized language

suggests—and as the Government acknowledged at oral

argument, Chambers v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 08-5165, Oral

Argument Tr. at 18-20 (D.C. Cir. May 8, 2009) (Oral Argument

Tr.)—an agency is not shielded from liability if it intentionally

transfers or destroys a document after it has been requested under

FOIA or the Privacy Act. See Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d

1128, 1136 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“We do not suggest that mere

physical possession of records by a government agency is the

sole criterion for determining whether they fall within the scope

of FOIA. Obviously a government agency cannot circumvent

FOIA by transferring physical possession of its records to a

warehouse or like bailee.”), aff'd, Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S.

169 (1980); cf. Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 155 n.9 (“There is no

question that a [FOIA] ‘withholding’ must here be gauged by the

time at which the request is made since there is no FOIA

obligation to retain records prior to that request. . . . We need

not decide whether this standard might be displaced in the event

that it was shown that an agency official purposefully routed a

document out of agency possession in order to circumvent a

FOIA request.”); see, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Commerce, 34 F. Supp. 2d 28, 41 (D.D.C. 1998) (directing

magistrate judge to preside over discovery “designed to explore

the extent to which [Department of Commerce] . . . illegally

destroyed and discarded responsive information, and possible

methods for recovering whatever responsive information still

exists outside of the DOC’s possession”); Landmark Legal

Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting

that earlier in litigation court had held U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency in contempt and ordered it to pay plaintiff’s

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The following colloquy occurred at oral argument:

Judge: . . . So, the government now agrees, the

government agrees that if [the appraisal] was intentionally

destroyed and they knew about it, then there would be a

cause of action under the Privacy Act. So the question then

is, was there a triable issue of fact on that question, correct?

Ms. Russell: No, Your Honor.

Judge: No?

Ms. Russell: There is no, there is no triable issue. 

Judge: No, but isn’t that the question, whether there was?

Because this was summary judgment, right?

Ms. Russell: This, yes. This is summary judgment. 

Judge: I mean, if a reasonable jury could have concluded

from the evidence that there was intentional destruction of

this document, then . . . summary judgment would have

been inappropriate, correct?

Ms. Russell: But I don’t think a reasonable judge, jury

could conclude—

Oral Argument Tr. at 20-21. Shortly thereafter, the panel

recharacterized this exchange: “Remember, a triable question about

whether it was intentionally destroyed. That’s the question you and

I agreed is critical.” Id. at 21. Government counsel did not demur.

costs and fees “caused by EPA’s contumacious conduct,”

namely, destroying “potentially responsive material contained on

hard drives and email backup tapes”). Thus, summary judgment

is inappropriate, as the Government all but acknowledged,3

 if,

viewing all inferences in a light most favorable to Chambers, a

triable issue exists as to whether Murphy (or any one else at

Interior) intentionally destroyed the appraisal Chambers

requested. We conclude such a triable issue of fact exists.

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The first time he was deposed, Murphy testified that in 2003

he had indeed prepared a “narrative” appraisal in “final form” of

Chambers’s past performance and that Fajardo had seen it.

8/11/04 Murphy Dep. at 18-20, 22-23. Fajardo too testified that

the appraisal existed and that she had stored it, as she routinely

did, on her computer’s hard drive, on a floppy disk and, in hard

copy, in a filing cabinet. 10/7/05 Fajardo Dep. at 27, 35-36, 47.

Yet, Interior’s response to Chambers’s first document request,

submitted on October 26, 2004, was limited to Murphy’s own

examination of his e-mails and his assistant’s inspection of his

files; no search was made of Fajardo’s computer, floppy disks or

filing cabinets, where, according to Fajardo’s testimony, the

appraisal was likely to be found. Then, after Chambers’s second

request in January 2005, Murphy recanted his earlier

characterization of the 2003 document as a “narrative”

“performance appraisal,” asserting it was in fact the nonnarrative SES Plan Brooks had found in his files to be used to

measure Chambers’s future performance. See Murphy Note ( JA

A53); Murphy Decl. ¶ 3 (JA A59). Further, notwithstanding

Chambers requested the appraisal for a second time in January

2005, Interior failed to undertake a thorough search until August

2005—one month after Interior erased Fajardo’s computer hard

drive—at which time, according to Fajardo, the “evaluation”

portion of the appraisal was missing from her floppy disk. When

Interior finally searched Fajardo’s paper files in November 2005,

the hard copy Fajardo insisted she had filed was likewise

missing. From this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that

Murphy and Fajardo did prepare a narrative appraisal in 2003,

that Murphy subsequently misrepresented that the appraisal

consisted only of the SES Plan and that the appraisal was

thereafter intentionally removed from Murphy’s computer and

files and from Fajardo’s computer hard drive, floppy disk and

files before a thorough search for the appraisal was finally

undertaken in August 2005. Thus, there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Interior (and in particular, Murphy)

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intentionally destroyed the narrative appraisal identified by

Fajardo (and initially by Murphy as well) and, consequently, as

to whether Interior’s search for the appraisal was adequate as

well. As we explained above, Interior’s search would not be

adequate under the Privacy Act if Interior officials, aware of

Chambers’s document requests, deliberately destroyed her

performance appraisal before completing the search in order to

avoid providing the document to her. See supra pp. 10-11. Such

a search would not be “ ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all

relevant documents’ ”—which is what the Privacy Act, like

FOIA, requires, see Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State,

257 F.3d 828, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Nation Magazine v.

U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995))—but

instead would be designed to keep concealed the particular

document that is most relevant. Accordingly, we reverse the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in Interior’s favor.

At the same time, we affirm the court’s denial of Chambers’s

summary judgment motion because the same evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to Interior, reveals a triable issue of

fact as to whether Interior intentionally destroyed documents or

whether a narrative appraisal in fact ever existed.

B. Count II

We next address Chambers’s challenge to the district court’s

dismissal of Count II. “[A]ccept[ing] the complaint’s factual

allegations as true and giv[ing] [Chambers] the benefit of all

inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom,” we affirm

the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim because

Chambers’s complaint fails to “ ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)).

Count II seeks to recover actual damages from Interior under

section 552a(g) of the Privacy Act for “fail[ing] to establish and

maintain physical safeguards to ensure the security and

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Section 552a(e)(9) and (10) imposes on each federal agency the

duties to

(9) establish rules of conduct for persons involved in the

design, development, operation, or maintenance of any

system of records, or in maintaining any record, and instruct

each such person with respect to such rules and the

requirements of this section, including any other rules and

procedures adopted pursuant to this section and the penalties

for noncompliance; [and]

(10) establish appropriate administrative, technical, and

physical safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality

of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or

hazards to their security or integrity which could result in

substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or

unfairness to any individual on whom information is

maintained; . . . .

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(9)-(10). Regulation 2.51 recites the “Privacy Act

require[ment] that records subject to the Act be maintained with

appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to insure

the security and confidentiality of records and to protect against any

anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity” and sets out

in detail rules for physically maintaining records. 43 C.F.R. § 2.51.

confidentiality of records in its possession in violation of the

Privacy Act and [Interior]’s regulations,” alleging Interior’s

“refusal to properly safeguard records pertaining to [Chambers]

has damaged [her] ability to successfully compete for positions

in the federal government.” Compl. ¶ 42-43 (citing 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(e)(9), (10); 43 C.F.R. § 2.51).4 Subsection (g)(4) of

section 552a authorizes recovery of actual damages in an action

brought under subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) if “the court

determines that the agency acted in a manner which was

intentional or willful.” By its terms, subsection (g)(1)(C) applies

if, as alleged here, an agency fails to maintain a record accurately

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Subsection (g)(1)(C) provides:

Whenever any agency

 . . .

 (C) fails to maintain any record concerning any

individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness,

and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in

any determination relating to the qualifications,

character, rights, or opportunities of, or benefits to

the individual that may be made on the basis of such

record, and consequently a determination is made

which is adverse to the individual; 

. . .

the individual may bring a civil action against the agency,

and the district courts of the United States shall have

jurisdiction in the matters under the provisions of this

Subsection.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C).

and completely.5 To recover damages in an action under

subsection (g)(1)(C), a plaintiff must establish four elements:

(1) he has been aggrieved by an adverse determination;

(2) the [agency] failed to maintain his records with the

degree of accuracy necessary to assure fairness in the

determination; (3) the [agency’s] reliance on the

inaccurate records was the proximate cause of the

adverse determination; and (4) the [agency] acted

intentionally or willfully in failing to maintain accurate

records.

Deters v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 85 F.3d 655, 657 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (citing Dickson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 828 F.2d 32, 37

(D.C. Cir. 1987); Rose v. United States, 905 F.2d 1257, 1259

(9th Cir. 1990)). Central to a cause of action under subsection

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16

6

In particular she asserts that when she reapplied for the position

of U.S. Park Police Chief, she was “unable to provide the most recent

performance evaluation that the application required,” Chambers Br.

at 28, but not that Interior or NPS took an adverse action against

her—such as rejecting her application outright or refusing to hire

her—because she lacked an accurate appraisal.

7

Chambers now appears to pursue Count II solely under

subsection (g)(1)(D), which authorizes a cause of action based on

“adverse effect.” See Reply Br. at 19-20 (“The Act specifically

provides a damages remedy for violation of its provisions ‘in such a

way as to have an adverse effect on an individual.’ ” (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4))). In Deters, however, we held unequivocally

that a plaintiff seeking damages for failure to maintain records “must

sue under subsection (g)(1)(C) and not subsection (g)(1)(D).” Deters,

85 F.3d at 660. Chambers’s exclusive remedy, if any, for failure to

maintain records therefore lies, as it did in Deters, under section

552(g)(1)(C). Perhaps to avoid this result, Chambers casts her

complaint as a violation of the duties imposed under section

552a(e)(9) and (10), supra note 4—to “establish rules of conduct” for

(g)(1)(C) is the existence of an adverse agency determination

resulting from inaccurate agency records. Yet Chambers does

not even attempt to identify an adverse determination by a

government agency that was caused by Interior’s alleged failure

to accurately maintain her records. Instead, she claims Interior’s

loss of her appraisal has had an “adverse effect” in that it has

“hampered [her] in her ability to apply for jobs in the federal

government by the lack of a performance appraisal.” Chambers

Br. 28; see also Reply Br. 20 (“Here, a Privacy Act record was

destroyed, resulting in an adverse effect on Chambers’ ability to

seek employment and to seek reinstatement to her former

position.”).6

 Such an adverse effect, however, is not enough to

make out a claim under subsection (g)(1)(C),which requires a

specific “adverse determination” resulting from an agency’s

failure to maintain accurate records.7 Because Chambers does

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maintaining records and “appropriate administrative, technical, and

physical safeguards to insure [their] security and

confidentiality”—rather than of the duty under section 552a(e)(5) to

“maintain . . . records . . . as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness

to the individual in the determination,” which, as Deters explains,

underlies a section 552a(e)(5) cause of action. Chambers has not

identified any rule or safeguard, however, that Interior should have

established but did not. See Oral Argument Tr. at 11 (“We’re not

alleging that they haven’t established rules.”); see also 43 C.F.R.

§ 2.51 (setting out detailed rules for physically maintaining records).

To the contrary, at oral argument, Chambers’s counsel acknowledged

she is “alleging that in this case, the document is not safeguarded and

was not maintained.” Oral Argument Tr. at 11 (emphases added).

The statutory duty to safeguard and maintain records arises solely

under section 552a(e)(5).

not point to any such agency determination, we affirm the district

court’s dismissal of Count II. Cf. Hutchinson v. CIA, 393 F.3d

226, 230 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of subsection

(g)(1)(C) claim in part because “record fails to show proximate

cause—a vital element of a section 552a(g)(1)(C) claim”) (citing

Deters, 85 F.3d at 657).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Count II and reverse the summary judgment in favor

of Interior on Count I, remanding for proceedings consistent with

this opinion. In remanding, we note that, should Chambers

prevail on Count I, the available remedies may be limited given

that additional searches at this late date would likely prove futile.

Nonetheless, she may be entitled at a minimum to “reasonable

attorney fees and other litigation costs” pursuant to section

552(g)(2)(B).

So ordered.

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