Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-23-16156/USCOURTS-ca9-23-16156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Allegiant Air, LLC
Appellee
Ali Bahreman
Appellant
Transport Workers Union of America Local 577
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALI BAHREMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC; 

TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION 

OF AMERICA LOCAL 577, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-16156 

D.C. No. 

2:20-cv-00437-

ART-DJA 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Anne R. Traum, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 7, 2024

San Francisco, California

Filed December 10, 2024

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Lucy H. Koh, and 

Anthony D. Johnstone, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Johnstone

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2 BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC

SUMMARY*

Railway Labor Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of Allegiant Air and the Transport 

Workers Union in Allegiant flight attendant Ali Bahreman’s 

action alleging that the Collective Bargaining Agreement 

between Allegiant and the Union violated the Railway Labor 

Act of 1926.

The Agreement gives employees a choice between 

paying dues to join the Union or paying agency fees without 

joining the Union. The Agreement’s enforcement 

mechanism gives employees a third choice: pay neither dues 

nor fees, and lose bidding privileges for work 

schedules. Bahreman chose not to pay any fees, and lost his 

bidding privileges.

The panel held that the Railway Labor Act does not 

prohibit a collective bargaining agreement that conditions 

seniority-based bidding privileges—not continued 

employment—on payment of either union dues or agency 

fees.

Addressing Bahreman’s claims that the Agreement’s 

suspension of bidding privileges for nonpayment of agency 

fees violates the Act, the panel held that (1) the Agreement 

does not violate the Act’s anti-coercion provision because it 

does not induce employees to join the Union, (2) the Act 

does not prohibit unions from reaching collective bargaining 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC 3

agreements with different terms other than those that the Act 

explicitly permits, and (3) the Union did not violate its duty 

of fair representation because the Union enforced the 

Agreement equally among all members of the bargaining 

unit.

COUNSEL

Matthew B. Gilliam (argued) and Milton L. Chappell, 

National Right to Work Legal Foundation Inc., Springfield, 

Virginia, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Andrew D. McClintock (argued), Ford & Harrison LLP, 

Atlanta, Georgia; Jacquelyn L. Thompson, Ford & Harrison 

LLP, Washington, D.C.; Proloy K. Das, I, Ford & Harrison 

LLP, Hartford, Connecticut; Joshua A. Sliker, Jackson 

Lewis PC, Las Vegas, Nevada; Osnat K. Rind (argued) and 

Mark Richard, Phillips Richard & Rind PA, Miami, Florida; 

Richard G. McCracken, McCracken Stemerman & 

Holsberry LLP, Oakland, California; for DefendantsAppellees.

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4 BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC

OPINION

JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judge:

The Railway Labor Act of 1926, enacted to prevent labor 

disputes from interrupting interstate commerce, requires 

carriers and their employees to resolve disagreements 

through collective bargaining and arbitration. Over time, 

Congress has tailored the Act’s terms to protect the freedom 

of employees to associate by joining—or not joining—labor 

unions. First, in response to carriers’ use of “company 

unions,” Congress amended the Act to forbid carriers from 

interfering with employee organizing. Second, in response 

to “free riders,” Congress amended the Act to permit carriers 

and unions to compel union membership through “union 

security agreements,” and to deduct associated payments

from wages. Then the Supreme Court, in response to 

freedom of association concerns, specified that the Act did 

not require employees to support union activities unrelated 

to collective bargaining, like political spending. So carriers 

and unions began to replace their “union-shop” agreements, 

which require all employees to join the union, with “agencyshop” agreements, which allow employees to forgo union

membership as long as they pay “agency fees” to support 

collective bargaining. And the Supreme Court affirmed that 

the Act permits these agreements.

Ali Bahreman worked as a flight attendant at Allegiant 

Air, a carrier under the Act. Allegiant and the Transport 

Workers Union negotiated a Collective Bargaining 

Agreement that gives employees a choice between paying 

dues to join the union or paying agency fees without joining. 

The Agreement’s novel enforcement mechanism, in effect, 

gives employees a third choice: pay neither dues nor fees,

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BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC 5

and lose seniority-based bidding privileges for work 

schedules. Bahreman chose not to pay and lost his bidding 

privileges. He sued Allegiant and the Union, claiming that 

the Agreement violates several provisions of the Act. The 

central question that Bahreman’s claims present is whether 

the Act prohibits a collective bargaining agreement that

conditions seniority-based bidding privileges—not 

continued employment—on payment of either union dues or

agency fees. In agreement with the district court, we answer 

no.

I. Bahreman’s challenge to the Agreement

Allegiant and the Transport Workers Union, which 

represents flight attendants for that carrier, entered a 

Collective Bargaining Agreement. Section 29 of the 

Agreement, entitled “Union Security,” offers flight 

attendants a choice between becoming dues-paying 

members of the Union or paying an agency fee in the form 

of a “service charge.” A flight attendant who fails to pay 

membership dues (for members) or the service charge (for 

nonmembers) loses bidding privileges for work schedules, 

including for flight assignments and leave. Flight attendants 

receive their flight assignments, work schedules, and other 

benefits such as vacation and leave through a seniority-based 

bidding program, so a loss of bidding privileges means a loss 

of important benefits. 

Bahreman began working for Allegiant as a flight 

attendant in 2015. He chose not to join the Union or pay the 

service charge. Allegiant therefore suspended his bidding 

privileges under the Agreement, beginning in 2019 and 

lasting until his resignation in 2022. Bahreman sued 

Allegiant and the Union, seeking declaratory relief, 

injunctive relief, and damages resulting from a loss of his 

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6 BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC

bidding privileges. He claims that the Agreement’s 

suspension of bidding privileges for nonpayment of agency 

fees violates the Act in three ways. First, it deviates from the 

employment-termination remedy in the Act’s “union 

security agreements” provision. Second, it coerces him to 

join the Union in violation of the Act’s “anti-coercion”

provision. Third, it violates the Union’s duty of fair 

representation to nonunion workers.

The district court granted summary judgment to 

Allegiant and the Union on all claims. Bahreman timely 

appeals. We review the district court’s summary judgment

order de novo. Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 

1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021).

II. The Railway Labor Act

Congress passed the Act to promptly resolve disputes 

between rail carriers and their employees to avoid 

interrupting the transportation that sustains interstate 

commerce. Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 

577 (1926); see also 45 U.S.C. § 151a(1). The Act does so 

by imposing a duty on both parties “to exert every reasonable 

effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of 

pay, rules, and working conditions” and “to settle all 

disputes” through the Act’s arbitration processes. 45 U.S.C. 

§ 152, First. After the 1926 enactment, labor unions soon 

complained “that the carriers interfered with the employees’ 

freedom of choice of representatives by creating company 

unions.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 

759 (1961). Congress responded in 1934 by amending the 

Act to guarantee employees “the right to organize and 

bargain collectively through representatives of their own 

choosing,” and prohibiting carriers from “influenc[ing] or 

coerc[ing] employees” in their choice of union membership. 

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BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC 7

45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth; Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691, 48 

Stat. 1187. Congress extended the Act to air carriers two 

years later. 45 U.S.C. § 181; see Act of April 10, 1936, ch. 

166, 49 Stat. 1189.

A decade later, the Supreme Court held that, under the 

Act, “a union’s status as exclusive bargaining representative 

carries with it the duty fairly and equitably to represent all 

employees . . . , union and nonunion.” Street, 367 U.S. at 

761 (citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 

U.S. 192 (1944)). This created a “free rider” problem, as

“[n]onunion members . . . share[d] in the benefits derived 

from collective agreements negotiated by the railway labor 

unions but b[ore] no share of the cost of obtaining such 

benefits.” Id. at 761–62 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 81-2811, at 

4 (1950)). Again, Congress responded. In 1951, it amended

the Act to permit carriers and unions “to make agreements, 

requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that . . . 

all employees shall become members of the labor 

organization representing” them. 45 U.S.C. § 152, 

Eleventh(a); Act of Jan. 10, 1951, ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238. In 

short, the Act permits but does not require union shops. It 

also permits “checkoff” agreements, under which employees

can authorize the carrier to deduct “any periodic dues, 

initiation fees, and assessments” from paychecks and pay 

them to the union. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(b).

In 1961, the Supreme Court further clarified the Act’s 

scope. Street, 367 U.S. at 767. The Court explained that

Section 2, Eleventh “contemplated compulsory unionism to 

force employees to share the costs of negotiating and 

administering collective agreements” and settling disputes 

under them. Id. at 764. But, the Court held, “unions must not 

support [political] activities, against the expressed wishes of 

a dissenting employee, with his exacted money.” Id. at 770.

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8 BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC

Unions and carriers adapted by negotiating new terms in 

collective bargaining agreements. Instead of union-shop 

agreements, some unions and carriers negotiated agencyshop agreements, which do not require formal union 

membership or payment of union dues. Instead of joining the 

union, an employee can pay an agency fee, used only to 

support collective bargaining and administration of the 

contract. See Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 

U.S. 435, 439, 446–48 (1984) (analyzing under Section 2,

Eleventh an agreement interpreted so that “employees need 

not become formal members of the union, but must pay 

agency fees”). An agency shop “places the option of 

membership in the employee while still requiring the same 

monetary support as does the union shop.” NLRB v. Gen. 

Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 744 (1963) (applying the National 

Labor Relations Act).

Although Section 2, Eleventh refers to “members” and 

“membership” of a “labor organization,” the Supreme Court 

has read the Act to permit agreements under which

nonmembers also must also financially support unions’ 

collective bargaining activity. In other words, the Act

“allows . . . agency-shop agreements.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n 

v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 872 (1998) (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, 

Eleventh); see also Ellis, 466 U.S. at 446–48. This 

interpretation of the Act permits a form of collective 

bargaining agreement that arose after its enactment: the

agency-shop agreement. See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447. As the 

Court explained in authorizing agency-shop agreements 

under the similar language of the National Labor Relations 

Act, any “difference between the union and agency shop . . .

is more formal than real,” because “‘[m]embership’ as a 

condition of employment is whittled down to its financial 

core.” Gen. Motors, 373 U.S at 742, 744. Thus, for present 

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BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC 9

purposes, the terms “members” and “membership” include 

employees who join the union and those who pay agency 

fees. See Air Line Pilots, 523 U.S. at 872; Klemens v. Air 

Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 736 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1984).

III. The Agreement does not violate the Act.

The question presented here is whether the Act permits a 

collective bargaining agreement that conditions only bidding 

privileges, and not continued employment, on payment of

either union dues or agency fees. All parties agree that,

because it does not condition continued employment on 

payment of dues or fees, the Agreement is not a “union 

security agreement” as defined by the Act. They disagree on 

what follows. To Bahreman, this means that the Agreement

is not permitted by the union security authorization in 

Section 2, Eleventh, which he contends is the only exception 

to the anti-coercion prohibition in Section 2, Fourth. To 

Allegiant and the Union, this means that the Agreement is 

not contemplated by either the Act’s union security 

authorization or its anti-coercion prohibition. On that view,

like any other negotiated term of employment not covered 

by the Act, the Agreement is lawful.

A. The Agreement does not induce employees to join 

the Union in violation of Section 2, Fourth.

Bahreman claims the Agreement violates the Act’s anticoercion provision in Section 2, Fourth. To protect 

employees’ “right to organize and bargain collectively 

through representatives of their own choosing,” Section 2, 

Fourth prohibits carriers from “influenc[ing] or coerc[ing] 

employees in an effort to induce them to join . . . any labor 

organization.” 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth. Under the 

Agreement, an employee who pays neither dues nor fees 

loses bidding privileges regardless of union membership. So 

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10 BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC

we ask whether an agreement that treats union members the 

same as any other bargaining unit member coerces 

employees to join the union. We hold that it does not. 

Bahreman argues that the Agreement induces him to join 

the Union by requiring that he either pay agency fees or 

forgo bidding privileges. But requiring agency fees does not 

incentivize union membership because, under the 

Agreement, those fees cannot exceed union dues. In fact,

according to Bahreman, monthly agency fees at Allegiant 

were $25 compared with $31 for union dues. Because it 

would cost Bahreman less to pay agency fees than to pay 

union dues, there is no financial inducement to join the 

Union. Similarly, the suspension of bidding privileges for 

nonpayment of agency fees does not induce union 

membership because members face the same consequence

for nonpayment of union dues. Employees who pay union 

dues or agency fees maintain their bidding privileges. Those 

who do not make those payments lose their bidding 

privileges. Allegiant cannot very well coerce Bahreman into 

the Union by employing him under terms that treat union 

members and nonmembers alike.

So Bahreman turns to a different statute not at issue:

Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 

U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Section 8(a)(3) prohibits reductions in 

seniority for nonpayment of union dues in the absence of a 

valid union security agreement. See Radio Officers’ Union 

of Com. Telegraphers Union, AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 24, 

41–42 (1954). Bahreman argues that, because Section 

8(a)(3) of the NLRA and Section 2, Eleventh(a) of the Act 

share “nearly identical language,” Comm’ns Workers of Am. 

v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1988), we should import this 

prohibition into Section 2, Fourth. This argument fails. The 

NLRA does not apply to Allegiant and “cannot be imported 

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BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC 11

wholesale into the railway labor arena.” Trans World 

Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 

426, 439 (1989) (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. 

Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969)). 

Because the Act lacks the NLRA’s language prohibiting 

“discrimination in regard to . . . any term or condition of 

employment,” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), there is no analogous 

textual grounding for an attack on the Agreement’s 

seniority-related provisions. Neither the NLRA nor Radio 

Officers’ Union controls.

Nor does the Agreement violate Section 2, Fourth’s

prohibition on “deduct[ing] from the wages of employees 

any dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions payable 

to labor organizations.” That is because Section 2, 

Eleventh(b) expressly permits a carrier and a labor 

organization together “to make agreements providing for the 

deduction” of these payments. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(b). 

As the First Circuit explained, “[r]ead together, §§ 152, 

Fourth and Eleventh(b) provide that carriers may not 

unilaterally deduct dues from employee wages, but may do 

so upon the agreement of all parties involved.” Wightman v. 

Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 235 (1st Cir. 

1996). And the Act allows checkoff agreements for agency 

fees. See Felter v. S. Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326, 330–31 (1959).

“Thus, even in the absence of a union shop agreement” 

permitted by Eleventh(a), “employees and carriers may 

agree to a dues deduction schedule under § 152, 

Eleventh(b).” Wightman, 100 F.3d at 235.

B. Section 2, Eleventh(a) does not prohibit the 

Agreement.

Bahreman also claims that the Agreement violates 

Section 2, Eleventh(a). That provision permits a carrier and 

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12 BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC

a union “to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of 

continued employment, that . . . all employees shall become 

members of the labor organization representing their craft or 

class.” 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh(a). The Agreement does 

not require employees to join the Union or pay agency fees

as “a condition of continued employment.” So we ask 

whether this permissive statute prohibits an agreement with 

different terms. We hold that it does not.

Two material terms distinguish the Agreement here from 

the agreements contemplated by Eleventh(a). First, the 

Agreement does not require membership in a union. Instead, 

it allows employees to pay an agency fee to support “the 

administration of the Agreement and the representation of” 

employees. And as we have observed, “[a]lthough the statute 

explicitly authorizes only union-shop agreements, it also 

permits agency-shop agreements.” Klemens, 736 F.2d at 

494. Second, unlike a typical agency-shop agreement, the 

Agreement does not require payment of agency fees “as a 

condition of continued employment.” Instead of being fired, 

employees who fail to pay agency fees, like member 

employees who fail to pay union dues, forgo their bidding 

privileges. This second distinction, Bahreman claims, 

disqualifies the Agreement under Section 2, Eleventh(a).

The text of Section 2, Eleventh(a) is permissive. It 

provides that carriers and unions “shall be permitted” to 

enter into agreements that require payment of union dues as 

a condition of continued employment. 45 U.S.C. § 152, 

Eleventh(a). It does not by its terms prohibit carriers and 

unions from reaching collective bargaining agreements other 

than those it explicitly permits, including agency-shop 

agreements. See Street, 367 U.S. at 766–67; Ellis, 466 U.S. 

at 438–39. Bahreman’s alternate, prescriptive gloss on the 

Act contravenes its purpose: to provide the means for

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BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC 13

carriers and unions to collectively bargain for the pay, rules, 

and working conditions that the parties want. The Agreement

reflects the deal struck by Allegiant and the Union. It links 

the bargained-for bidding privileges to the agency fees that 

support the bargaining. This resolves the problem of

nonpaying employees taking a free ride to the bidding 

privileges the Union negotiated. Thus, the Agreement arose 

from the Act’s collective-bargaining process, does not 

contradict its text, and is consistent with its anti-free rider 

purpose.

Bahreman points to cases, like Ellis, 466 U.S. at 438–39, 

and Klemens, 736 F.2d at 494, 496–98, that he says limit the 

enforcement of agency-shop agreements to termination. But

Ellis holds only that unions and carriers may negotiate a 

contract “requiring all employees to become members of or

to make contributions to the union.” 466 U.S. at 448

(emphasis added). Ellis says nothing about whether the Act 

permits other types of agreements that encourage payment 

of agency fees. Klemens offers even less help to Bahreman. 

There, we held that the Act allows “a cause of action against 

unions that attempt to enforce agency shop agreements in a 

manner inconsistent with” Section 2, Eleventh(a). Klemens, 

736 F.2d at 496. We explained that unions may collect dues 

or fees only under a lawful collective bargaining agreement, 

but we said nothing about the other terms that such an 

agreement could contain. See id. at 496, 498 n.5. These cases 

do not require a departure from the permissive plain meaning

of Section 2, Eleventh(a).

IV. The Union did not violate its duty of fair 

representation.

When a union becomes the exclusive bargaining 

representative for a group of workers, it must “represent 

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14 BAHREMAN V. ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC

fairly the interests of all bargaining-unit members.” Int’l 

Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979); see 

also Demetris v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 

862 F.3d 799, 804–05 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining this duty 

also applies to unions under the Act). A union breaches this 

duty “when its conduct toward a member of the bargaining 

unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Demetris, 

862 F.3d at 805 (quoting Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 

Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998)). The Union’s actions here were 

not discriminatory because all employees who fail to pay 

union dues or agency fees face the same result, and no 

individual employee is singled out. See Amalgamated Ass’n 

of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. of Am. v. Lockridge, 

403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971). Nor were they arbitrary, 

discriminatory, or in bad faith because the Union acted 

according to the Agreement when it suspended Bahreman’s 

bidding privileges. See Burkevich v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 

Intern., 849 F.2d 346, 349 (9th Cir. 1990); Demetris, 862 

F.3d at 805.

* * *

The Railway Labor Act empowers carriers and their 

employees, through unions, to collectively bargain the terms 

of employment. Its protections neither prescribe termination 

nor proscribe alternative conditions on agency-fee 

agreements made and maintained through its processes.

Allegiant therefore does not unlawfully induce union 

membership under Section 2, Fourth. Nor is the Agreement 

prohibited by Section 2, Eleventh. And the Union does not 

violate its duty of fair representation in enforcing the

Agreement equally among all members of the bargaining 

unit. 

AFFIRMED.

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