Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00894/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00894-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. Covello
Respondent
Sonny James Morales
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SONNY JAMES MORALES,

Petitioner,

v.

A. COVELLO,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:20-cv-00894-AWI-JDP

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A 

STAY AND ABEYANCE OF PETITION

ECF No. 7

Petitioner Sonny James Morales, a state prisoner without counsel, seeks a writ of habeas 

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. Petitioner states one fully exhausted claim for relief: 

that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Id. at 5-6. Additionally, he

moves for a stay and abeyance of his petition to exhaust the following two additional claims 

before the state courts: (1) that the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation 

of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

1

Id. at 

40-46. On July 1, 2020, we ordered petitioner to show cause why his motion for a stay and 

abeyance should not be denied. ECF No. 4. Petitioner responded with a renewed motion for a 

stay and abeyance, ECF No. 7, and a response to our order to show cause, ECF No. 8. 

Accordingly, we will discharge our order to show cause. ECF No. 4. Because petitioner has 

 

1 Petitioner did not state these claims in his petition.

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failed to meet the requirements for a stay and abeyance under Rhines, the undersigned 

recommends that his motion to stay be denied.

Discussion

Petitioner seeks a stay and abeyance under the Rhines procedure.2 See Rhines v. Weber, 

544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). Under Rhines, a stay and abeyance is available only where: (1) there is 

“good cause” for the failure to exhaust; (2) the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless”; 

and (3) the petitioner did not intentionally engage in dilatory litigation tactics. 544 U.S. at 277-

78. “Staying a federal habeas petition frustrates AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by 

allowing a petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal proceedings. It also undermines 

AEDPA’s goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s incentive 

to exhaust all his claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition.” Id. Therefore, a “stay 

and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances.” Id. 

“There is little authority on what constitutes good cause to excuse a petitioner’s failure to 

exhaust.” Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2014). Although good cause under Rhines

does not require a showing of “extraordinary circumstances,” Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-

62 (9th Cir. 2005), a petitioner must do more than simply assert that he was “under the 

impression” that his claim was exhausted, Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 

2008). “[U]nspecific, unsupported excuses for failing to exhaust—such as unjustified 

ignorance—[do] not satisfy the good cause requirement.” Blake, 745 F.3d at 981. Rather, “good 

 

2 Although petitioner exclusively seeks a stay under Rhines, an alternative procedure for the stay 

and abeyance of habeas petitions exists in our circuit under Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070-

71 (9th Cir. 2002). As we stated in our order to show cause, a stay under Kelly would not likely 

provide petitioner the relief he seeks. A stay under Kelly “does nothing to protect a petitioner’s 

unexhausted claims from untimeliness.” See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009). 

To be timely under Kelly, petitioner’s new claims must either (1) meet AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) or (2) “relate back” to the claims contained in 

the original petition that were exhausted at the time of filing. See King, 564 F.3d at 1143. A 

claim that simply arises from “the same trial, conviction, or sentence” does not necessarily relate 

back to the initial claims. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005). To “relate back,” the 

new claim must share a “common core of operative facts” with the claims in the pending petition. 

Id. Here, petitioner has waited until nearly the end of the federal statute of limitations period to 

file his federal habeas petition and his new claims do not appear to relate back to his original 

claim.

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cause turns on whether the petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient 

evidence, to justify” his failure to exhaust his claims. Id. at 982.

Petitioner has failed to set forth any “reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient evidence 

to justify” his failure to exhaust his claims. Id. Petitioner states that he has was unable to exhaust 

his Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he recently discovered “further 

facts” supporting his claims. ECF No. 1 at 40-46. However, the factual predicates of the claims 

were discoverable to petitioner at the time of his trial in 2016. Petitioner has neither presented

evidence that shows why he was unable to ascertain these claims at that time, nor why he did not 

seek habeas review of his claims after his conviction became final on direct appeal in January 

2019. We recognize that petitioner was without counsel to assist him in filing habeas petitions 

before the state courts, and “[a] petitioner who is without counsel in state post-conviction 

proceedings cannot be expected to understand the technical requirements of exhaustion and 

should not be denied the opportunity to exhaust a potentially meritorious claim simply because he 

lacked counsel.” Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2017). However, District Courts in 

this Circuit have found that “Dixon does not apply and good cause is lacking when a [pro se] 

petitioner has not filed any relevant state habeas petitions, particularly when there is evidence that 

the petitioner has not been expeditious in seeking relief.” Stacy v. Gastelo, No. CV 17-5482-

RGK (JPR), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61656, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018) (citing Dixon, 847 

F.3d at 721) (finding no good cause for a Rhines stay where the petitioner did not file any habeas 

petitions in state court); see Sangurima v. Montgomery, No. 2:17-cv-05022-PSG-KES, 2017 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 217018, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2017) (same). 

Petitioner also states that his prison’s law library has been inaccessible since March 20, 

2020. ECF No. 1 at 40-46. Petitioner’s recent lack of access to the law library is not a justifiable 

excuse for his failure to exhaust. Petitioner could have begun exhausting his claims at the state 

level after his conviction was final on direct appeal in January 2019. Although petitioner’s lack 

of access to the law library is unfortunate, he has failed to show how this lack of access over the 

past five months prevented him from timely exhausting his claims. 

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Finally, petitioner states that because he is a “layman of law,” he was unable to timely 

exhaust his claims. ECF No. 8 at 2. However, mere ignorance of the law is insufficient to 

demonstrate good cause because such a determination “would render stay-and-abeyance orders 

routine” and would be contrary to Rhines’ instruction that district courts should only stay mixed 

petitions in “limited circumstances.” See Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 

2008); Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting 

that ignorance of the law does not constitute an excuse from due diligence); Alcaraz v. 

Giurbino, No. CIV S-05-1597, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114017, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 

2009) (finding that ignorance of the law does not establish good cause for failure to exhaust). 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s motion for a stay and 

abeyance be denied.3 In the event these findings and recommendations are adopted by the district 

judge assigned to this case, petitioner will have the opportunity to proceed with his original 

petition, which contains his singular and fully exhausted claim. 

Findings and Recommendations 

The undersigned recommends that the court deny petitioner’s request for a stay and 

abeyance. ECF No. 7. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the U.S. District 

Court judge presiding over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty

days of the service of the findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written objections to 

the findings and recommendations with the court and serve a copy on all parties. That document 

must be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The 

district judge will then review the findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

 

3 Because petitioner has failed to meet the first prong of Rhines, we need not address the 

remaining prongs. However, we briefly note that petitioner’s unexhausted claims do not appear 

“plainly meritless” because they state violations of “clearly established federal law,” as required 

by § 2254(d)(1). And we have no reason to believe that petitioner engaged in “dilatory litigation 

tactics,” such as “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

No. 206.

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