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Parties Involved:
Dennis Hall
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

–————

Argued April 6, 2004 Decided June 11, 2004

No. 01-3017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DENNIS HALL,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cr00435–01)

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W.

McLeese III, and Daniel M. Cisin, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an

appearance.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge; HENDERSON and RANDOLPH,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: This is the third time the case of

United States v. Hall has been before us. In the earlier

cases, the government appealed district court orders granting

Hall new trials. United States v. Hall, 214 F.3d 175 (D.C.

Cir. 2000); United States v. Hall, 324 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir.

2003). We reversed both orders. In this case, Hall appeals

his conviction for possessing a firearm by a convicted felon

(18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). His arguments are that his trial

attorney’s failure to file a timely new trial motion constituted

ineffective assistance and that errors at trial, mainly during

closing argument, tainted the verdict.

I.

At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, the district

court told the jury that the prosecution and defense stipulated that Hall had been convicted in the District of Columbia

of ‘‘a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year’’ (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). Hall’s defense was that he

did not possess the pistol recovered under a van just after

midnight on December 3, 1998.

The events leading to recovery of the pistol that evening

are as follows. Plainclothes officers were on a routine patrol,

traveling in two marked police cruisers in the Barry Farms

housing project, a high crime and drug area in the District of

Columbia. Officers noticed Hall alone in a walkway between

townhomes. As one of the police cars approached, Hall

bolted. Officers in the other car saw Hall running through

the alleys. Two of these officers – Moye and Rollins – got

out of their car and watched Hall run around another house.

Officer Moye saw him stop behind a van, bend down and

place an object under the van, and start running again, this

time toward the two officers. Officer Rollins detained Hall

while Officer Moye went to the van, under which he found a

loaded .22 caliber pistol. He left the pistol there, returned to

Officer Rollins and ‘‘motioned with [his] lips’’ that there was a

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gun under the van. Hall, who was on his knees facing away

from Officer Moye, asked Officer Rollins: ‘‘What did he say,

there’s a gun under the car? Did he say he found a gun?’’

The officers then arrested Hall. A search incident to the

arrest produced a small amount of marijuana. (Hall was also

indicted for illegally possessing marijuana; he conceded his

guilt at trial.)

The jury returned its verdict of guilty on May 5, 1999.

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(2), new trial

motions based on grounds other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within seven business days after the

verdict ‘‘or within such further time as the court sets during

the 7-day period.’’ See FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(a) & (b)(2). On

May 14, seven business days after May 5, Hall’s attorney filed

a motion to extend the time for filing a new trial motion. The

district court did not act on the extension motion until early

June, when the court issued an order ‘‘nunc pro tunc,’’ giving

Hall until June 10 to file a motion for a new trial. Hall filed

his motion on that date and, over the government’s objection,

the district court granted it. We reversed on the ground that

the district court had no authority under Rule 33 to grant an

extension of time after the seven-day period expired. 214

F.3d at 178.

On remand, the district court again ordered a new trial,

this time on the basis of ‘‘newly discovered evidence,’’ a

ground that may be raised within three years of the verdict.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1). The newly discovered evidence was

the failure of Hall’s attorney to file a new trial motion within

seven business days of the verdict. We reversed, holding

that the court erred in granting ‘‘a new trial based on conduct

that did not occur until after trial.’’ 324 F.3d at 724.

II.

Hall’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rests on the

proposition that his attorney should have filed a new trial

motion rather than a motion for extension of time. We think

there is nothing to this. Hall’s attorney complied with the

rules; she missed no deadlines; her motion was timely; and

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Rule 33 clearly authorizes motions for extensions of time to

file new trial motions. As we have recognized, seven days

may not always be ‘‘adequate time to make a well-supported

motion for a new trial,’’ which is why Rule 33 ‘‘affords judges

great flexibility to set a new due date,’’ United States v.

Marquez, 291 F.3d 23, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002). It is true that

Hall’s attorney waited until the eleventh hour before seeking

an extension and thus ran the risk that the district court

might not act before the end of the seven-day time limit (or

might deny the motion at the last minute). But it is also true

that the attorney’s assistant called the district court’s chambers several times on the afternoon of May 14 to stress the

urgency of the motion. The district court took no action, not

out of neglect, but deliberately, apparently believing – incorrectly – that it could ignore the Rule 33 deadline. The court

explained in its nunc pro tunc order of June 3 that it ‘‘held

the motion [for extension] in abeyance in order to afford the

United States an opportunity to respond,’’ United States v.

Hall, No. 98-435-LFO (D.D.C. June 3, 1999), an explanation

the court reiterated in its first order granting a new trial.1

United States v. Hall, No. 98-435-LFO, Order at 4 (D.D.C.

Nov. 3, 1999). Given this state of affairs, it may not have

mattered that defense counsel filed the extension motion on

the seventh business day after the verdict rather than on, say,

the third or the fourth. The local rules gave the government

eleven days to reply to the motion, unless the court ordered

otherwise, which it did not. D.C. L. CR. R. 47(b). In Hall I

we faulted defense counsel for filing an extension motion

rather than a new trial motion, stating that at oral argument

counsel for Hall ‘‘offered no explanation’’ for following the

former course. 214 F.3d at 178. Whatever may have occurred at oral argument in this court, the extension motion

did provide a reason to the district court – defense counsel

1 The district court granted a new trial on the ground that the

prosecution failed to give the notice that it would use Hall’s prior

conviction in a manner permitted by Rule 404(b) of the Federal

Rules of Evidence, a point the court raised sua sponte. It is worth

noting that Hall does not make this argument in urging that we

reverse his conviction.

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stated that she had been hospitalized, after which her trial

schedule became ‘‘especially demanding,’’ so much so that she

had not had a chance to address the issues warranting a new

trial. The district court realized that any blame could not be

laid at the feet of Hall’s attorney. In granting the first new

trial motion, the court described Hall’s motion for an extension of time as ‘‘timely’’ and stated that it would be ‘‘manifestly unjust’’ to ‘‘penalize the defendant for the Court’s delay in

granting the motionTTTT’’ Hall, No. 98-435-LFO, Order at 4

(D.D.C. Nov. 3, 1999). The problem Hall encountered was

therefore not that his attorney negligently missed a deadline

as in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). The problem

was that the district court did not view the seven-day period

as a strict deadline. (The court was not alone in that view.

See United States v. Marquez, 291 F.3d at 26-27.) For all of

these reasons, we hold that in filing the extension motion on

the seventh day, Hall’s attorney did not perform in a ‘‘professionally unreasonable’’ manner and that Hall was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).2

III.

Hall complains that the prosecution referred to his felony

conviction too often in its arguments to the jury: four times

in the opening argument, eight times in the closing argument,

and four times in the rebuttal. Hall never objected on this

ground3

 and so the question is whether the district court

2 Hall argues that the government waived a challenge to the new

trial rulings because it did not contest the merits of those rulings in

Hall I or Hall II. We decided both cases on jurisdictional grounds

in favor of the government. That the government limited its

arguments to those jurisdictional grounds did not signify that it was

waiving any argument in support of the verdict after the new trial

orders had been vacated and Hall had appealed his conviction.

3 Citing the transcript of the prosecutor’s opening argument, Hall

claims he attempted to make such an objection. The claim is

frivolous. After the prosecutor referred – for the first time – to

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committed plain error in not, at some point, calling a halt to

these remarks. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732

(1993).

In United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 382 (D.C. Cir.

1997), we stated that a defendant may ‘‘be unduly prejudiced

by repeated and gratuitous references to the existence of the

previous conviction.’’ Hall relies heavily on this statement,

but the undue prejudice Moore had in mind did not relate to

the § 922(g) charge in that case; it related to the additional

charges that were joined with the felon-in-possession count,

charges for which a prior felony conviction was not an element of the offense. United States v. Myles, 96 F.3d 491, 495

(D.C. Cir. 1995), and United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 322

(D.C. Cir. 1995), are additional examples.

The only other charge against Hall was possession of

marijuana, as to which he conceded his guilt. In effect, then,

the case was the same as if he were tried on a one-count

indictment for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a

felony. In such prosecutions, mentioning the defendant’s

previous conviction to the jury can hardly be considered

‘‘gratuitous’’; the conviction is an element of the offense, as

the district court instructed the jury in this case. A written

copy of those instructions was with the jury when it was

deliberating, as was the indictment. Both documents, of

course, recited Hall’s prior conviction and served as a constant reminder to the jury of that uncontested fact. The

Hall’s status as a felon and then said there was a stipulation to that

effect, Hall’s attorney began ‘‘Your Honor’’ and was cut off by the

court, which stated ‘‘That’s all right.’’ Three points. One, it is

impossible to view this as an attempt to object on the ground that

the prosecutor had mentioned Hall’s conviction too many times. At

the time of the exchange, the prosecutor had mentioned this but

once. Two, in context the most likely point defense counsel wanted

to make was that the prosecutor should not have referred to the

stipulation. Defense counsel’s interjection occurred not at the first

mention of Hall’s conviction but when the prosecutor then referred

to the stipulation. Three, despite many opportunities, at no point

did defense counsel ever object on the ground that the prosecutor

was mentioning Hall’s conviction too often.

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prosecutor’s mentioning of Hall’s conviction more than a

dozen times in her opening and closing arguments only

reminded the jury of something it already knew. All but a

few of the references either stated the nature of the § 922(g)

charge or the fact that Hall’s status as a felon was uncontested. The remaining references consisted of the prosecutor’s

argument that Hall fled from the police because he knew he

was a felon and did not want to be caught with a firearm.4

Repetition may or may not be an effective way to argue a

case. Prosecutors – like defense attorneys – may strike

‘‘hard blows,’’ although not ‘‘foul ones.’’ Berger v. United

States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). While we do not deny the

discretion of district courts to rein in overly zealous prosecutors, we hold that the district court did not commit plain error

in failing to limit the prosecutor to some number (unspecified

by Hall) of references to Hall’s conviction.

Hall also takes issue with another aspect of the prosecutor’s argument to the jury. In response to the prosecutor’s

contention that Hall fled from the police because he was a

convicted felon, defense counsel told the jury that it is normal

for young black men in the District of Columbia to feel

intimidated by, and run from, the police. In rebuttal, the

prosecutor challenged this assertion and asked the jury not to

‘‘let [defense counsel] get away with playing the race card.’’

Hall objected, but the district court took no corrective action.

The prosecutor’s statements were not an improper reply to

the argument of defense counsel. The prosecutor implored

the jury not to take race into account; defense counsel

wanted the jury to consider Hall’s race. Thus, unlike United

4 Defense counsel objected, unsuccessfully, that this was a misuse

of Hall’s conviction. Although Hall’s argument on appeal is that the

sheer number of references to his conviction constituted undue

prejudice, one sentence in his opening brief claims there was no

evidence that he ran from the police because of his prior conviction.

This one sentence, unaccompanied by argument or any citation to

authority, does not preserve the issue for decision. See, e.g., United

States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 27 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2000); SEC v.

Banner Fund Int’l, 211 F.3d 602, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

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States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 1998),

the prosecutor was not injecting race into the case. See also

United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990). He

was trying to take race out of the case.

Hall also contends that the prosecutor, in his rebuttal

argument, improperly asked the jury what possible motive

Officers Moye and Rollins would have to lie and asserted that

it was ‘‘ridiculous’’ to claim that they would put their careers

at risk to win one conviction. Hall cites United States v.

Boyd, 54 F.3d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1995), where we said that a

prosecutor’s remark about a police officer not risking his

career for one conviction ‘‘was clearly improper.’’ Id. at 871.

There is no indication in Boyd that the prosecutor was

responding to defense arguments. In this case, Hall’s attorney attacked the officers’ credibility, stating among other

things that it was ‘‘unconscionable that two police officers

could take the stand against anyone and not tell you the

whole truth,’’ that Officers Moye and Rollins had a ‘‘stake in

the outcome of this trial,’’ and that they wanted ‘‘some

validation of their police conduct.’’ Defense counsel thus

suggested that the officers’ desire not to jeopardize their

careers gave them a motive to commit perjury. The prosecutor’s denial of this suggestion did not constitute prejudicial

error.5

 See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985);

United States v. Robinson, 59 F.3d 1318, 1323 (D.C. Cir.

1995); United States v. Nnanyererugo, 39 F.3d 1205, 1209

(D.C. Cir. 1994).6

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of conviction is

affirmed.

5 We do not mean to say that the defense argument – or the

prosecutor’s reply – was proper. See United States v. Young, 470

U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

6 We have considered and rejected Hall’s other arguments.

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