Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05194/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05194-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Boris Olarte-Morales
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL ~ iJ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAllsit.ed States Co~,rt qf Appeal!' 

Tenth C1rcu1t 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

APR 1 S 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 92-5194 

) (N.D. Okla., No. 86-CR-191-E) 

BORIS OLARTE-MORALES, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.** 

In this direct criminal appeal, the appellant raises several 

challenges to the district court's sentencing orders. On June 19, 

1987, the appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of violating the 

federal drug laws. 1 Two years later, on June 26, 1989, the 

district court sentenced the defendant to 10-years imprisonment on 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

detennined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the detennination of this appeal. ~ Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

1 The amended indictment contained eight different counts. The 

defendant pleaded guilty to counts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. The 

offenses relating to these five counts occurred between 1983 and 

1986. 

Appellate Case: 92-5194 Document: 010110201741 Date Filed: 04/15/1993 Page: 1 
the first two counts and 2-years imprisonment on the remaining 

three counts, with each of the sentences to run concurrently. 2 

The appellant submitted a timely motion for a reduction o f his 

sentences pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedu re 35 (b ) . 

In an order filed May 31, 1990, the district court granted the 

appellant's motion, reducing the appellant's sentence on Count 1 

to time served and his sentence on Count 2 to five years 

probation. 3 

2 The district court's sentencing order provided: 

The defendant shall be committed to the Custody of the 

Attorney General for terms as follows: 

Count 1 - 10 years 

Count 2 - 10 years 

Count 4 - 2 years 

Count 5 - 2 years 

Count 6 - 2 years 

Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6 to run concurrently with Count 1. 

Order of June 26, 1989. 

3 The court's order provided: 

Count 1 : The defendant is committed to the custody 

of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of three (3 ) years, 

five (5 ) months, and two (2) days with credit for time 

served. 

Count 2, 4, 5, and 6: The imposition of sentence is 

hereby suspended and the defendant placed on probation 

f o r a period of five (5 ) years. 

Order of May 31, 1990 . At the time the district court granted the 

appellant's motion t o reduce his sentence, he had served 3 years, 

5 months, and 2 days in jail, counting pretrial detention time. 

Thus, the appellant had already completed his sentences on the 

latter three c ounts, since these sentences were ordered to run 

concurrently with his sentence on Count 1. Accordingly, t he 

dist rict court erroneously included these counts in its order 

reducing the appellant's sentence. Recognizing its error, the 

district c ourt subsequentl y vacated that portion of its order 

dealing with these counts. 

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On August 31, 1992, the district court found that the 

appellant had violated the terms of his probation and ordered his 

probation to be revoked . In response, the appellant filed a 

motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 (a ) 

challenging the legality of the May 31, 1990 order sentencing him 

to five years probation on Count 2. In an order filed September 

16, 1992, the district court rejected the appellant's challenge to 

its order of probation, but stated that, in the event the Tenth 

Circuit found error in this order, it was conditionally altering 

its May 31, 1990 order to read that the execution, rather than the 

imposition, of the appellant's sentence on Count 2 was being 

4 suspended. In a separate order filed September 16, 1992, the 

district court resentenced the appellant to 10-years imprisonment 

pursuant to its prior order revoking his probation. 

The appellant is now appealing from the district court's 

order of August 31, 1992 as well as its subsequent orders of 

5 September 16, 1992. The appellant raises the following claims: 

4 The district court's order provided in relevant part: 

[I]n the event that the Tenth Circuit should find error 

in the [May 31, 1990] sentence as it relates to Count 2, 

then the Court will correct that sentence as follows, 

nunc pro tune: The execution of the remainder of the 

sentence of imprisonment is suspended on Count 2 and 

Defendant is hereby placed on probation for a period of 

five years. 

Order of September 16, 1992. 

5 The only order the appellant explicitly refers to in his notice 

of appeal is the district court's September 16, 1992 order 

resentencing him to 10-years imprisonment. However, since it is 

clear from the fac e of the appellant's appeal that he also 

int ended to appeal from the district court's August 31, 1992 

revocation order and its September 16, 1992 order denying his Rule 

35 (a ) motion, we construe his notice of appeal as encompassing 

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1 ) that the district court's May 31, 1990 order illegally 

sentenced him to 5-years probation on Count 2, 2 ) that the 

district court improperly revoked his probation because he had 

already completed his term of probation, and 3 ) that the district 

court's reimposition of a 10-year term of imprisonment constituted 

double jeopardy. We agree with the appellant that the district 

court's May 31, 1990 order illegally sentenced the appellant to 

5-years probation on Count 2 and find that this order was not 

adequately corrected by the district court's subsequent orders of 

September 16, 1992. Accordingly, we hold that the district 

court's May 31, 1990 order must be vacated with respect to Count 2 

and remand the case to the court for resentencing on this count. 

I. The May 31. 1990 Sentencing Order 

The appellant advances two arguments in support of his 

contention that the district court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order 

was illegal. 6 First, he argues that the imposition of probation 

these orders as well. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 

67 n.21 (1978 ) (failure to specify order appealing from is not 

fatal "so long as the intent to appeal from a specific ruling can 

be inferred by probing the notice"); Jones v. Nelson, 484 F.2d 

1165, 1168 (10th Cir. 1973) (where intent to appeal judgment is 

clear failure to designate judgment in notice of appeal is 

harmless) . 

6 As previously mentioned, the appellant filed a motion under Rule 

35 {a) in connection with the probation revocation proceedings 

challenging the legality of the May 31, 1990 sentence imposing 

probation on Count 2. This belated challenge to the May 31, 1990 

sentencing order was specifically authorized by Rule 35 (a ) , which, 

at the time of the appellant's offense, provided: 

The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time 

and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner 

within the time provided herein for the reduction of 

sentence. 

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on Count 2 was impermissible because he had already served his 

time on Count 2. According to the appellant, his sentence on 

Count 2 was inextricably linked to his sentence on Count 1 because 

the district court declared these sentences to be concurrent in 

its initial sentencing order of June 26, 1989. Consequently, when 

his sentence on Count 1 was reduced to time served, appellant 

argues that his sentence on Count 2 was similarly reduced to time 

served thereby leaving no prison time for the district court to 

reduce to probation. 

The appellant's argument misconceives the concept of 

concurrent sentences. When two or more sentences are designated 

as concurrent, this designation means only that the sentences are 

to be served simultaneously . See Black's Law Dictionary 264 (5th 

ed. 1979). It does not mean that these sentences have been 

inextricably merged into a single sentence. Rather, concurrent 

sentences remain at all times distinct and independent sentences. 

Thus, an order reducing or reversing one sentence does not 

automatically affect a corresponding reversal or reduction of any 

other concurrent sentences. United States v . Montoya, 676 F.2d 

428, 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 856 (1982 ); see 

United States v. Bush, 659 F.2d 163, 167-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981) , 

United States v. Cardona, 650 F.2d 54, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1981); 

United States v . Durant, 648 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1981) . 

Rule 35(a) has since been amended several times. Since these 

amendments are no t retroactive, however, it is former Rule 35(a) 

which applies to the instant case and to which all subsequent 

mention of this rule will refer. The district court denied the 

appellant's Rule 35(a) motion and that order is one of the matters 

now raised on this appeal. 

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Accordingly, we reject the appellant's contention that the 

district court improperly imposed probation on Count 2 because his 

sentence on this count had expired. Notwithstanding the district 

court's reduction of his sentence on Count 1 to time served, the 

appellant's sentence on Count 2 remained 10-years imprisonment 

until the district court independently reduced this sentence to 

5-years probation. 

The appellant next argues that the district court's May 31, 

1990 sentencing order was illegal because the reduction of his 

sentence on Count 2 to 5-years probation violated the split 

sentencing limitations of 18 U.S.C. §3651. We agree. 

The district court reduced the appellant's sentence on 

7 Count 2 pursuant to Rule 35(b). However, the court's authority 

to reduce the appellant's sentence under this provision was 

circumscribed by the dictates of 18 U.S . C. §3651. 8 This provision 

7 At the time the appellant committed his offenses, Rule 35(b) 

provided: 

A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court 

may reduce a sentence without motion, within 120 days 

after the sentence is imposed or probation is 

revoked. Changing a sentence from a sentence of 

incarceration to a grant of probation shall constitute a 

permissible reduction of sentence under this 

subdivision . 

Like Rule 35 (a), Rule 35(b) has since been amended several times. 

Once again, however, these amendments do not apply retroactively 

and thus it is the unamended version of Rule 35(b) which governs 

the instant case. It is this version of Rule 35(b), therefore, to 

which all subsequent mention of this rule will refer. 

8 Section 3651 was repealed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 

However, it continues to govern offenses committed prior to 

November 1, 1987. This section provides: 

Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense 

not punishable by death or life imprisonment, if the 

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prohibits a court from sentencing a defendant to a term of 

probation coupled with more than six months total imprisonment for 

a single offense. United States v . Shulman, 940 F.2d 91, 94 (4th 

Cir. 1991) ; United States v. Martin, 938 F.2d 883, 884-85 (8th 

Cir. 1991) ; United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9 th 

Cir. 1979 ) ; Sibo v. United States, 332 F.2d 176, 176 (2d Cir. 

1964) . And what a court may not initially impose as a split 

sentence under §3651 it may not subsequently craft under the 

authority of Rule 35(b). United States v. Carter, 704 F.2d 1063, 

1064 (9th Cir. 1983) ( "[S]ection 3651 is a limitation upon the 

Rule 35(b) power of the district court."); Advisory Committee 

Note, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) ("Should the reduction to a sentence 

of probation occur after the defendant has been incarcerated more 

than six months, this would put into issue the applicability of 18 

U.S.C . §3651." ) ; see United States v. Guevremont, 829 F . 2d 423, 

423-24 (3rd Cir. 1987) (reduced sentence imposed by district court 

under Rule 35(b) violated §3651's split sentencing limitation) . 

In the instant case, the district court's May 31, 1990 

sentencing order violated the split sentencing limitations of 

§3651. At the time the district court reduced the appellant's 

sentence on Count 2 to 5-years probation, the appellant had 

maximum punishment provided for such offense is more 

than six months, any court having jurisdiction to try 

o ffenses against the United States ... may impose a 

sentence in excess of six months and provide that the 

defendant be confined in a jail-type institution or a 

treatment institution for a period of not exceeding s ix 

months and that the execution of the remainder of the 

sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on 

probation for such period and upon such terms and 

conditions as the court deems best . 

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already served 3 years, 5 months, and 2 days in jail on this 

count. Consequently, the net effect of the district court's 

sentencing order was to convert the appellant's sentence on Count 

2 to a combined sentence of probation and prison. Since the 

appellant's prison sentence had already exceeded six months, 

however, §3651 prevented the district court from sentencing the 

appellant to any term of probation. See Martin, 938 F.2d at 884 

(split sentence of 8 months imprisonment and 12 months probation 

imposed after revocation of probation was illegal where defendant 

had already served 4 months in prison); United States v. 

Principato, 717 F.2d 1313, 1314 (9th Cir. 1983) (split sentence of 

6 months imprisonment and 3 and 1/2 years probation was illegal 

where defendant had already served 6 months in prison), cert. 

denied, 465 U.S. 1081 (1984). Accordingly, we conclude that the 

district court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order was illegal. 

Having concluded that the appellant was illegally sentenced 

to 5-years probation on Count 2, we must nevertheless detennine 

whether this illegality was cured by any of the district court's 

subsequent actions. Under Rule 35(a), the district court had the 

authority to correct its May 31, 1990 sentencing order at any 

time. Martin, 938 F.2d at 885. 

The district court purported to exercise its authority to 

corect an illegal sentence under Rule 35(a) in its September 16, 

1992 order denying the appellant's Rule 35(a) motion. In this 

order, the court stated that it was conditionally altering its May 

31, 1990 sentencing order nunc pro tune, should it be found 

defective, to read that the execution rather than the imposition 

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of the appellant's remaining prison term on count 2 was being 

suspended. While this conditional alteration may have resolved 

one defect, 9 it did not alter the fact that the district court's 

May 31, 1990 sentencing order imposed on the appellant a split 

sentence combining probation with a prison term in excess of six 

months. Accordingly, the district court's conditional alteration 

of its prior sentencing order did not prevent this order from 

violating §3651 . 

On the same day that the district court conditionally altered 

its May 31, 1990 sentencing order, the court, in a separate order, 

also resentenced the appellant to 10-years imprisonment. This 

sentencing order could be construed as a corrective order pursuant 

to Rule 35 (a ) . See Martin, 938 F.2d at 884-85 (construing 

district court's resentencing of defendant upon revocation of 

probation as correction of illegal split sentence under Rule 

35(a)); Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 427 (construing district court's 

subsequent alteration of illegal split sentence under Rule 36 as a 

corrective order pursuant to Rule 35(a) ). Under the facts of this 

case, however, we believe that such an interpretation of the 

district court's action would be a fiction. The court did not 

realize it was correcting an illegal sentence at the time it 

resentenced the appellant to 10-years imprisonment; rather, it 

thought that it was resentencing the appellant for a violation of 

his probation. While 18 u.s.c. §3653 permits a court to reimpose 

9 At least one circuit has held that a court violates §3651 if it 

imposes an otherwise valid split sentence without stating that the 

execution of the defendant's sentence is being suspended . See 

Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 424. We express no opinion on this issue 

h e re. 

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a lesser sentence than that originally imposed when revoking 

probation, 10 a court may often feel compelled to reimpose its 

initial sentence in such a situation. Such a compulsion is less 

likely to exist, however, when a court is resentencing a defendant 

anew. Consequently, we do not believe it can be said that the 

district court would necessarily have imposed the same sentence on 

the defendant had it known it was resentencing the defendant 

pursuant to Rule 35(a) . We therefore refuse to construe the 

district court's resentencing order as a corrective order under 

this rule. 

Given our conclusion that neither of the district court's 

September 16, 1992 orders adequately remedied the court's May 31, 

1990 sentencing order, we hold that this order must be vacated 

with respect to Count 2 and remand the case to the court for 

resentencing on this count. We reject the appellant's claim that, 

in lieu of remanding, we should simply strike that portion of the 

district court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order which placed the 

appellant on probation. A prisoner is not entitled to escape 

punishment for a valid conviction merely because the court 

committed an error in passing sentence. Bozza v . United States, 

330 U.S. 160, 166 (1947 ) . "The Constitution does not require that 

l O Section 3653 provides in relevant part: 

[T]he court may revoke the probation and require [the 

probationer] to serve the sentence imposed, or any 

lesser sentence, and, if imposition of sentence was 

suspended, may impose any sentence which might 

originally have been imposed. 

Like §3651, §3 653 was repealed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 

1984 but continues to govern offenses committed prior to November 

1, 1987. 

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sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge 

means immunity for the prisoner." Id. at 166-67. Thus, a court 

may always correct an illegal sentence by imposing all or part of 

the sentence that might originally have been imposed. Principato, 

717 F.2d at 1314. 11 In the instant case, therefore, the district 

court may impose any sentence that it was authorized to impose in 

its original sentencing order of June 26, 1989, so long as this 

d . f b . 12 sentence oes not contain a term o pro ation. The defendant 

11 A court may, consistent with double jeopardy, correct an 

illegal sentence by imposing a more stringent sentence. United 

States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 707 (7th Cir. 1983); United 

States v. Carter, 704 F.2d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir. 1983). However, 

when a court does impose a more stringent sentence, a risk of 

judicial vindictiveness exists. United States v. Jefferson, 760 

F.2d 821, 825 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 474 U.S. 806 

(1985). This risk is reduced, however, where the illegal sentence 

follows an original sentence and the modified sentence does not 

exceed this original sentence. Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 429 (3rd 

Cir. 1987). In such a situation, the threat of judicial 

vindictiveness is reduced since the modified sentence is 

consistent with the sentencing judge's initial intentions as 

evidenced by the original sentencing scheme. Id. 

12 We note that in resentencing the defendant, the district court 

is not required to limit its consideration of the defendant's 

character and background to factors known to the court at the time 

of its May 31, 1990 sentencing order, but may take into account 

subsequent conduct of the defendant, including the fact that he 

violated the court's probation order. A court has virtually 

unlimited discretion in determining what information it will rely 

on in imposing sentence. 18 U.S . C. §3661 ("No limitation shall be 

placed on the information ... which a court of the United States 

may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an 

appropriate sentence."); United States v. Graves, 785 F.2d 870, 

872 (10th Cir. 1986) (court may rely on any information in 

imposing sentence as long as information is accurate and is not 

linked to the denial of a constitutional right). Thus, a 

sentencing court may consider not only conduct of the defendant 

that has occurred since the imposition of an illegal sentence, see 

Jefferson, 760 F.2d at 825, but may even consider conduct that 

specifically violated that sentence, cf. United States v. 

Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1155 (7th Cir. 1978) (district court 

properly considered prior convictions of defendants in sentencing 

notwithstanding fact that convictions occurred under statute later 

held to be unconstitutional ) . 

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will of course be entitl ed to credit the time he has already been 

incarcerated against whatever sentence he receives. Martin, 938 

F.2d at 885; Principato, 717 F.2d at 1314. 

II. The Probation Revocation Order 

The appellant's second claim is that the district court 

erroneously revoked his probation because he had already completed 

his term of probation. The appellant argues that he spent more 

than 3 years in jail prior to the district court's May 31, 1990 

sentencing order and another 2 years on probation prior to the 

district court's September 16, 1992 revocation order. Thus, he 

contends that he had already served five years of probation prior 

h d . . ' ' f h. b ' 13 tote 1str1ct courts revocation o is pro ation. 

Since the appellant failed to raise this issue below, we may 

review the appellant's claim only if it constituted plain error. 

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52{b). Plain error is "obvious and 

substantial" error that affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. 

Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1254 {10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. 

Ct. 238 (1991) . 

The heart of the appellant's claim is that he is entitled to 

credit his prison time against his sentence of probation. In 

13 Notwithstanding our conclusion that the appellant was illegally 

sentenced to probation and must be resentenced, we do not believe 

the appellant's second claim is moot. If the appellant had 

already completed his term of probation on Count 2, resentencing 

him might very well implicate the appellant's due process and 

double jeopardy rights. See Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 429 n.8. 

Given our ultimate disposition of the appellant's claim, however, 

we need not reach these constitutional issues. 

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suppo r t of this prop osition, the appellant relies on a f ootno te i n 

Sullen s v. United States, 409 F.2d 545, 548 n.5 (5th Cir. 19 69 ) , 

where the court suggested that a defendant sentenced to probation 

is entitled t o reduce that sentence by any time previously spent 

in detention. Not only is this footnote dicta, however, but it is 

also in tension with a number of court decisions holding that a 

term of probation commences on the day that the sentence of 

probation is imposed, unless otherwise ordered by the court. See 

United States v. Freeman, 922 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991) ; 

United States v. Gaddis, 280 F . 2d 334, 336 (6th Cir. 1960 ) ; 

Sanford v . King, 136 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1943). Under these 

latter decisions, the appellant would not be entitled to credit 

his prior incarceration time against his sentence of probation 

since the district court failed to provide for such a result in 

its May 31, 1990 sentencing order. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's revocation 

of probation did not rise to the level of plain error. Given the 

absence of plain error, it is inappropriate for us to review this 

claim. 

III. The Resentencing Order 

Finally, the appellant argues that the district court's 

September 1 6 , 1992 order resentencing h im t o 1 0 -years probation 

constituted double j eopardy. According to the appellant, h e had 

alr eady serve d two years o f probation before his probation was 

r e v o ked. Thus, when the district court resentenced him t o 

10 -years imprisonment, his o riginal sentence was increased f r om 

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ten to twelve years, in violation of his right to be free from 

d bl , d 14 ou e Jeopar y. 

Since the appellant failed to present his argument to the 

district court, we must once again review the appellant's claim 

for plain error. When reviewing potential errors of 

constitutional magnitude, however, we apply the plain error rule 

less rigidly. See Jefferson, 925 F.2d at 1254. 

The appellant's argument was considered and rejected by this 

court in Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 795 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964). In that case, we held that a 

defendant is not entitled to credit time spent on probation 

against a subsequent prison sentence. Id. at 797. Accordingly, 

we concluded that a defendant initially sentenced to a suspended 

sentence of 5-years imprisonment was not twice placed in jeopardy 

when, after spending almost two years on probation, his probation 

was revoked and he was resentenced to five years imprisonment. 

Id.; accord United States v. Briones-Garza, 680 F.2d 417, 423 (5th 

Cir. ) , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); Hall v. Bostic, 529 F.2d 

990, 991-92 (4th Cir. 1975); Kaplan v. Hecht, 24 F.2d 664, 665 (2d 

Cir. 1928 ). 

14 Once again, we do not believe the appellant's claim is moot 

notwithstanding our conclusion that the appellant was illegally 

sentenced to probation on Count 2 and must be resentenced. As 

note d above, the district court upon remand may impose any prison 

sentence that it could have originally imposed on the appellant in 

its June 26, 1989 sentencing order. Si nce Count 2 of the amended 

indictment charged the appellant with conspiring to import 

cocaine, in violation of §§952 (a), 960 (a) (1), and 963, the 

district court could originally have imposed a prison sentence of 

up to 15 y e ars. Should the court choose upon resentencing to 

impose a prison sentence anywhere between 8 and 15 years, the very 

situation currently challenged by the appellant would again be 

placed in issue . 

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Since the instant case is indistinguishable from Thomas, we 

conclude that the district court's resentencing of the appellant 

was consistent with the double jeopardy clause. Once again, 

therefore, we conclude that the appellant's claim falls short of 

plain error and that it is inappropriate for us to review it. 

The district court is directed to VACATE its May 31, 1990 

sentencing order with respect to Count 2 and the case is REMANDED 

to the district court for resentencing on this count. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith . 

--------

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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