Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00797/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00797-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
K9 Games AZ LLC
Counter Claimant
Jennifer Kafora
Defendant
Matthew Kafora
Defendant
Kristine Smith
Counter Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kristine Smith,

Plaintiff,

v. 

K9 Games AZ LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-20-00797-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendants K-9 Games AZ, LLC’s (“K-9 Games”) and 

Matthew Kafora and Jennifer Kafora’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc. 18.) For the following reasons, the Motion is denied.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kristine Smith alleges that she is an employee of Defendant K-9 Games, a

business that provides animal management services. Defendants Matthew and Jennifer

Kafora own majority ownership interest in K-9 Games. While working for K-9 Games, 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to maintain adequate records of her employment and 

to properly compensate her. Plaintiff brings this suit alleging violations of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Arizona Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”).

2

 Defendants 

1

 Defendants requested oral argument. That request is denied because the parties have had 

an adequate opportunity to discuss the law and evidence and oral argument will not aid the 

Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Invs. Grp., Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d 

724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991). 

2

 In her Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiff also alleged violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7434. 

However, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this claim after Defendants filed their Motion to 

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move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FLSA and AMWA claims. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise the 

right of relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). When analyzing a complaint 

for failure to state a claim, “allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 

(9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a

presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

II. Analysis 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss relies heavily on a complaint Plaintiff filed in 

Maricopa County Superior Court in Arizona against Defendants Matthew and Jennifer 

Kafora (“Superior Court Complaint”). See Complaint, Kristine Smith v. Jennifer Kafora 

and Matthew Kafora, No. CV2020-006377 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 26, 2020). Defendants 

request that the Court take judicial notice of the Superior Court Complaint and its 

allegations. (Doc. 18 at 2.) 

a. Judicial Notice

Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides that a court “may judicially notice a fact 

that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial 

court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” “Judicial notice of court records is 

routinely accepted.” Rowland v. Paris L.V., No. 3:13-cv-02630-GPC-DHB, 2014 WL 

Dismiss. (Doc. 24.) Accordingly, the Court does not consider Defendants’ arguments on 

Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Relief. 

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769393, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014). However, a court may not take judicial notice of 

disputed facts stated in public records. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 

(9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, while courts may take notice of records in another case to 

determine, for instance, what issues were actually litigated in the past, see Reyn’s Pasta 

Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006), courts may not take 

notice of the truth of the facts recited in those records, see Lee, 250 F.3d at 690. See also

M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 1983) 

(“[A] court may not take judicial notice of proceedings or records in another cause so as to 

supply, without formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to support a contention in 

a cause then before it.”). 

Contrary to Defendants’ characterization of their request, the Court finds that 

Defendants are asking the Court to go beyond merely recognizing that the allegations in 

the Superior Court Complaint were made. Defendants’ request necessarily requires the 

Court to consider the substance of Plaintiff’s allegations in the Superior Court Complaint 

and treat those allegations as if they are true. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice 

of the existence of the Superior Court Complaint and the nature of the claims brought in 

that case, but the Court does not take judicial notice of the factual assertions made in the 

Superior Court Complaint for the purpose of establishing essential facts in this case. See 

Reynoso v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., No. 03:13-cv-01600-HZ, 2013 WL 6919666, at 

*3-5 (D. Or. Dec. 31, 2013) (refusing to take judicial notice of allegations in a prior 

complaint for the purpose of establishing essential facts in a motion to dismiss). 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff is bound by the judicial admissions she made in 

the Superior Court Complaint. However, Plaintiff’s allegations in the Superior Court 

Complaint are not judicial admissions in this proceeding. “Judicial admissions are formal 

admissions in the pleadings which have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and 

dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact.” Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 

861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988). Although “[a]llegations in a complaint are considered 

judicial admissions[,]” Hakopian v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 2008), a party is 

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only bound by factual allegations in their pleadings in the case in which the admissions are 

made, see, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. O’Dea, 572 F.3d 785, 788 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing a 

Fifth Circuit case that held that judicial admissions in an action do not extend to other 

actions); Aginsky v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1236 (D. Or. 2005) (“The 

rule that an admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission applies only if the 

admission is made in the same judicial proceeding”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As the Superior Court Complaint is from a different judicial proceeding, the factual 

assertions made in that complaint are not judicial admissions here. Instead, the factual 

assertions are evidentiary admissions, which are non-binding. See Higgins v. Mississippi, 

217 F.3d 951, 954–55 (7th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to rely on 

the factual assertions made in the Superior Court Complaint in support of their Motion. 

b. FLSA 

The FLSA provisions that Defendants allegedly violated apply to “employees.” See 

29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c), 206(a), 207. The FLSA defines “employee” as any “individual 

employed by an employer” and “employer” as a person “acting directly or indirectly in the 

interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (e)(1). The Ninth 

Circuit employs an “economic reality” test to determine whether a claimant is an employee 

or an employer. See Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th 

Cir. 1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 

469 U.S. 528 (1985). The test’s factors include whether the claimant “(1) had the power 

to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or 

conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and 

(4) maintained employment records.” Id. at 1470. However, the determination depends 

on the “circumstances of the whole activity.” Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 

U.S. 722, 730 (1947). 

In her Complaint in this case, Plaintiff alleges she is a W-2 employee and holds the 

position of a Master Trainer, which includes job duties such as training staff, animals, and 

clients, conducting employee evaluations, and monitoring animal health and well-being. 

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(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7–8.) Plaintiff also alleges she earned a monthly salary and received onsite 

lodging as a requirement of her employment. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. Drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she is an employee of 

K9 Games. It is premature, at this stage, to delve further into the fact-intensive inquiry of 

whether Plaintiff is an employee or an employer because the Complaint does not provide 

the requisite information. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FLSA 

claims is denied. 

c. AMWA 

The AMWA defines an “employee” as “any person who is or was employed by an 

employer” and an employer includes someone “acting directly or indirectly in the interest 

of an employer in relation to an employee.” A.R.S. §§ 23-362(A) & (B). The AMWA 

looks to the standards of the FLSA to determine whether an individual is an employee. See 

Martinez v. Ehrenberg Fire Dist., No. CV-14-00299-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 3604191, at *2 

(D. Ariz. June 8, 2015). For the same reasons discussed with Plaintiff’s FLSA claims, 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged her AMWA claims.

3

 For the same reasons discussed with 

Plaintiff’s FLSA claims, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged her AMWA claims.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged her FLSA and AMWA claims. Accordingly, 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 18) 

is DENIED.

Dated this 10th day of November, 2020.

3

 In their reply, Defendants acknowledge that the AMWA claims are not time-barred under 

A.R.S. § 23-364, but that “to the extent [Plaintiff] seeks any damages or other remedies 

under A.R.S. § 23-355, those claims would be time-barred.” (Doc. 26 at 8.) As Plaintiff 

does not seek damages or remedies under A.R.S. § 23-355 in her Complaint, Plaintiff’s 

AMWA claims are not time-barred. 

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