Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01266/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01266-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent
National Treasury Employees Union
Petitioner
United States Customs and Border Protection
Intervenor

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 27, 2006 Decided June 27, 2006

No. 05-1266

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Robert H. Shriver, III argued the cause for the petitioner.

Gregory O'Duden, Elaine D. Kaplan and Larry J. Adkins were

on brief.

James F. Blandford, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, argued the cause for the respondent. William R.

Tobey, Deputy Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations Authority, was

on brief.

William G. Kanter, Deputy Director, United State

Department of Justice, argued the cause for the intervenor.

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and Howard S.

Scher, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, were on

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The United States Customs Service was a part of the United

States Department of the Treasury until the Homeland Security Act of

2002 transferred it to the United States Department of Homeland

Security where it was renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border

Protection. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1502, 116 Stat. 2135, 2308

(2002); see also 6 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1). For convenience, the opinion

refers to the agency in either incarnation as “Customs.”

brief. Sandra W. Simon, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, entered an appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The National

Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) seeks review of a decision

of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA or Authority)

upholding an arbitration award in favor of the United States

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (Customs).1

 NTEU

Chapter 143, 60 F.L.R.A. No. 167 (May 16, 2005) (FLRA

Dec.). Before October 2001 Customs was bound under the

terms of its 1995 National Inspectional Assignment Policy

(NIAP) and a National Labor Agreement (NLA) to bargain with

NTEU Chapter 143 (Chapter 143) over changes in rotation and

regular days off (RDOs) for its El Paso, Texas passenger

customs inspectors. In its decision the FLRA concluded that

Customs effectively revoked its consent to bargain over rotation

and RDOs in 2001 when it implemented its revised NIAP

(RNIAP), which by its terms superseded both the 1995 NIAP

and the NLA, which had expired in 1999. Because the FLRA’s

decision is not arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to law,

we deny the NTEU’s petition for review. 

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I.

This case involves a continuing dispute between the NTEU

and Customs over the extent of Customs’ obligation to bargain

over changes wrought pursuant to the RNIAP. Although the

Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Statute),

5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 et seq., “generally obligates an agency to

negotiate with its employees’ bargaining representative over

‘conditions of employment,’ id. § 7103(a)(12)—i.e., ‘personnel

policies, practices, and matters . . . affecting working

conditions,’ id. § 7103(a)(14),” section 7106 of the Statute

“ ‘reserv[es] to management officials the authority to, inter alia,

make budget, organization, and work assignments.’ ” NTEU v.

FLRA, 414 F.3d 50, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting FLRA v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 994 F.2d 868, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 1993))

(alteration in original). Section 7106(b)(1) identifies permissive

subjects of bargaining involving such management rights over

which bargaining may take place “at the election of the agency,”

namely, “on the numbers, types, and grades of employees or

positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work

project, or tour of duty, or on the technology, methods, and

means of performing work.” 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1); see Nat’l

Ass’n of Gov’t Employees, Local R5-136 v. FLRA, 363 F.3d 468,

471 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees,

Local 2441 v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (Local

R5-136 ). “ ‘As to these decisions, the agency is permitted but

not required to negotiate with the labor organization.’ ” Local

R5-136, 363 F.3d at 471. “These rights of unilateral action,”

however, “are not unqualified. . . . ‘[A]lthough an agency is not

required to bargain with respect to its management rights per se,

it is required to negotiate about the impact and implementation

of those rights.’ ” NTEU v. FLRA, 414 F.3d at 53 (quoting

Dep’t of the Navy v. FLRA, 962 F.2d 48, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1992))

(alterations added). Further, as the FLRA has interpreted the

Statute, the mandatory bargaining obligation over impact and

implementation attaches only at “the level of exclusive

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recognition,” which in the case of bargaining between Customs

and the NTEU is at the national level, so that bargaining over

impact and implementation below that level is permissive. See

NTEU Chapter 137, 60 F.L.R.A. 483, 486 (2004) (citing U.S.

Food & Drug Admin., 53 F.L.R.A. 1269, 1274 (1998); Dep’t of

Defense Dependents Sch., 12 F.L.R.A. 52, 53 (1983)).

In 1993 the President issued Executive Order 12871

directing that all federal agencies “negotiate over the subjects set

forth in 5 U.S.C. 7106(b)(1),” 58 Fed. Reg. 52,201, 52,203

§ 2(d) (Oct. 1, 1993), that is, the permissive subjects of

bargaining explicitly set out there. In accordance with the

executive order, the 1995 NIAP required that such subjects as

workweek length, work hours, scheduling, staffing levels and

days off be negotiated and determined at the local level. See

NIAP § 5(A), JA 158-62. Accordingly, Customs agreed in the

NLA to bargain locally over various permissive subjects of

bargaining, including, specifically, work station rotation. NLA

Article 20, section 15.B specifically provided that Customs “will

give timely notice and the opportunity to bargain . . . when a

change is to be made in an established rotation system which has

an impact, or one which is [sic] reasonably foreseeable, on

conditions of employment,” JA 235, and Article 37, section 6.B

stipulated that “[p]roposed changes which apply within one (1)

organizational office”—such as the El Paso rotation

system—“will be negotiated within that office,” that is, at the

local level, JA 243. Thus, under the NLA, recurring rotation

regimes that applied only locally were required to be negotiated

locally. The NLA expired in 1999. 

On February 17, 2001 Executive Order 12871 was revoked

by Executive Order 13203, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,227 (Feb. 17, 2001),

which directed that all executive agencies “promptly move to

rescind any orders, rules, regulations, guidelines, or policies

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The order expressly stated: “Nothing in this order shall abrogate

any collective bargaining agreements in effect on the date of this

order.” 66 Fed. Reg. at 11,227.

implementing or enforcing Executive Order 12871.”2 On

August 2, 2001 Customs sent the NTEU a copy of the RNIAP

along with a cover letter announcing that Customs had decided

“to exercise its statutory right to terminate and no longer be

bound by the provisions in the national agreement in which we

agreed to bargain over matters covered by 5 USC 7106 (b)(1).”

JA 141. Section 4 of the RNIAP expressly provides that it

“supersedes and replaces [the 1995 NIAP] as well as all local

agreements that address matters contained within [the RNIAP].”

JA 144. Section 3 more broadly states that the RNIAP’s

“policies and procedures . . . take precedence over any and all

other agreements, policies, or other documents or practices

executed or applied by the parties previously, at either the

national or local levels, concerning the matters covered within

this Handbook.” JA 144 (emphasis added). Section 3 also

states that “[n]o further obligation to consult, confer, or

negotiate, either upon the substance or impact and

implementation of any decision or action, shall arise upon the

exercise of any provision, procedure, right or responsibility

addressed or contained within this Handbook.” Id. Section 5

then directs that “agency managers,” in accordance with

“workload,” “operational needs” and/or “budgetary limitations,”

are to make decisions regarding such “Scheduling” and

“Staffing Levels” matters as “Length of Workweek,” “Work

Hours,” “Days Off,” “Scheduling,” “Staffing Levels,” “Staffing

Flexibility” and “Shift Swaps.” JA 145-46. Customs’ cover

letter states the RNIAP is to take effect on September 30, 2001.

On October 3, 2001 the El Paso Port Director notified

Chapter 143 of a change in personnel rotation and RDOs. Up to

that time, each Customs passenger inspector in El Paso was

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In implementing the new local bridge rotation scheme and the

RNIAP, Customs apparently intended no change to its existing “bid

and rotation process” for particular job positions. See infra note 5. 

rotated among three bridges there—serving for two weeks at

each bridge, then starting the sequence over—and received a

four-day weekend every three weeks. Under the new policy,

each passenger inspector was to be assigned to a single bridge

for a one-year term and to receive a four-day weekend only

every five to six weeks. On October 4, 2001 the NTEU filed a

request to bargain over the change pursuant to the NLA, which

Customs denied. On October 7, 2001 Customs implemented the

RNIAP.3 The NTEU filed a grievance alleging an unfair labor

practice in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1) and (5). When

Customs failed to respond, the NTEU invoked arbitration. 

The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Customs, rejecting

the NTEU’s contentions that the RNIAP violates Articles 20 and

37 of the NLA because, the arbitrator concluded, these

provisions were “trumped” by the FLRA’s decision in United

States Department of the Treasury Customs Service, 59 F.L.R.A.

703 (2004), review denied, NTEU v. FLRA, 414 F.3d 50, 57

(D.C. Cir. 2005), in which the FLRA upheld Customs’

implementation of the RNIAP. The arbitrator further found that

the RNIAP, unlike its predecessor NIAP, “ ‘did not contain

provisions authorizing local bargaining’ ” and observed that “he

was ‘bound to the [Authority’s] conclusions’ as well as case law

holding that the obligation to bargain attaches at the level of

exclusive recognition.” FLRA Dec. at 5 (quoting arbitration

award at 15, 16). Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that

“ ‘[w]ithout an obligation to bargain at the local level . . . there

can be no violation of the Statute . . . for a failure or refusal to

bargain.’ ” Id. (quoting arbitration award at 16).

The NTEU excepted to the arbitral award and the FLRA

denied its exceptions in a decision issued May 16, 2005. In

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upholding the award, the Authority relied principally on its

decisions in Customs Service and in NTEU Chapter 137, 60

F.L.R.A. 483 (2004), recons. denied, 61 F.L.R.A. 60 (2005). In

Chapter 137, the Authority determined that Customs had no

obligation to bargain at the local level over a change in local

Sunday overtime assignments because RNIAP “section 3

terminated locally negotiated agreements concerning

inspectional assignment matters, as well as the Agency’s

obligation to bargain at the local level regarding such matters.”

60 F.L.R.A. at 487.eu v.

 Nonetheless, the Authority further concluded in Chapter 137

that the fact that section 3 “unilaterally, but lawfully,

implemented RNIAP did not extinguish Customs’ statutory

bargaining obligations at the national level (that is, at the level

of exclusive recognition) to bargain over all mandatory subjects

of bargaining concerning overtime inspectional assignments.”

60 F.L.R.A. at 488. The Authority applied the same reasoning

here to local bargaining over bridge assignment rotation and

RDOs:

Section 3 of the RNIAP by its terms effectively

terminated any previously existing agreement that

required the Agency to bargain at the local level over the

impact and implementation of decisions concerning the

assignment of inspectors. “[S]ection 3 established the

RNIAP as the governing policies and procedures with

respect to inspectional assignment matters,” including,

as provided in Article 5 of the RNIAP, the length of the

work week, tours of duty, and days off. NTEU Chapter

137, 60 F.L.R.A. at 487. Therefore, for reasons

previously expressed in NTEU, Chapter 137, the Agency

did not have any obligation to bargain at the local level

over the impact and implementation of the changes

concerning bridge assignments and RDOs.

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The NTEU also filed petitions for review of Chapter 137 and of

United States Customs and Border Patrol Port of Seattle/NTEU

Chapter 139, 60 F.L.R.A. No. 97 (Dec. 17, 2004), recons. denied, 61

F.L.R.A. No. 16 (July 8, 2005), in which the Authority rejected unfair

labor practice charges based on Customs’ unilateral change of local

overtime policies. See NTEU v. FLRA, No. 05-1338 (pet. filed Aug.

24, 2005); NTEU v. FLRA, No. 05-1352 (pet. filed Sept. 2, 2005).

Those petitions have been held in abeyance pending the decision here.

FLRA Dec. at 15-16. The NTEU filed a timely petition for

review of the FLRA’s decision.4

II.

“[W]hen acting ‘within its authority’ and ‘consistent with the

congressional mandate,’ the Authority’s decision may only be

set aside if it is found to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’ ” NTEU v.

FLRA, 414 F.3d at 57 (quoting Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v.

FLRA, 250 F.3d 778, 782 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(A); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA,

464 U.S. 89, 97 & n.7, 98 n.8 1983))) (alteration in NTEU).

Applying this deferential standard, we uphold the Authority’s

decision. The NTEU acknowledges that the requirement in

NLA Article 37, section 6.B that Customs bargain locally over

changes in rotation and RDOs “concerns a permissive subject of

bargaining” and “[t]herefore, it became subject to revocation by

either party upon the expiration of the national agreement in

1999.” Opening Br. 16 (citing Fed. Aviation Admin., 14

F.L.R.A. 644 (1984)). The only issue therefore is whether the

FLRA reasonably determined that the RNIAP effectively

revoked section 6.B. We conclude the Authority’s determination

was reasonable given the expansive language of RNIAP section

3 preempting all previous agreements and disclaiming all further

bargaining obligations on the matters covered in the RNIAP.

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Nonetheless, the NTEU raises two arguments against

revocation. We address, and reject, each one in turn. 

First, the NTEU argues that the FLRA failed to follow its

precedent requiring that an agency give explicit notice of intent

to terminate a bargaining provision. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

55 F.L.R.A. 201, 205 (1999) (“Authority precedent suggests that

to be effective, a party must give notice that explicitly contains

a statement of intent to terminate a provision dealing with a

permissive bargaining subject.”). The NTEU contends the

RNIAP falls short of this requirement because it does not

specifically identify article 37, section 6.B as being revoked or

disclaim a bargaining obligation on the local level. As to the

former, we find no requirement in FLRA precedent that the

employing agency cite the specific provision revoked. Quite the

contrary, in Federal Aviation Administration, 23 F.L.R.A. 209

(1986), the Authority concluded that the union effectively

revoked a waiver of its right to negotiate, set out in an expired

agreement, when its president informed the Federal Aviation

Administration that “ ‘any prior bargaining authority given to

any [union] representative other than [himself was] . . . revoked

with respect to the national unit,’ ” 23 F.L.R.A. at 210

(emphasis and first alteration added). Similarly, in this case, the

Authority’s finding of valid revocation relies on the express

language of RNIAP section 3, which declares that the RNIAP is

to “take precedence over any and all other agreements, policies,

or other documents or practices executed or applied by the

parties previously . . . concerning the matters covered” and that

Customs is to be subject to “[n]o further obligation to consult,

confer, or negotiate.” JA 144 (emphasis added). Relying on

Chapter 137’s construction of this broad language, the FLRA

reasonably found that “Section 3 of the RNIAP by its terms

effectively terminated any previously existing agreement that

required the Agency to bargain at the local level over the impact

and implementation of decisions concerning the assignment of

inspectors,” FLRA Dec. at 15, notwithstanding Chapter 137 also

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concluded Customs could not lawfully refuse to bargain at the

national level (“the level of exclusive recognition”) over the

impact and implementation of such decisions. In fact, NTEU

acknowledges that “the purpose of [the second paragraph of

section 3] is to foreclose all bargaining over any future

management actions take pursuant to RNIAP” so that Customs

“would have no duty to bargain—whether at the local or the

national level—over the impact and implementation of

management actions taken pursuant to RNIAP.” Opening Br.

19-20. It argues, however, that the FLRA’s subsequent

determination in Chapter 137 that Customs cannot avoid its

statutory obligation to bargain over impact and implementation

at the national level somehow voided its intent, conveyed to

NTEU through section 3 of the RNIAP, not to bargain at the

local level. The Authority reasonably concluded otherwise in

both Chapter 137 and its decision here. 

The NTEU’s fallback position is that, even if section 3 gave

effective notice of Customs’ intent to revoke its agreement to

bargain over matters “covered,” “addressed” or “contained” in

the RNIAP, JA 144, because the term “rotation” is not

specifically mentioned therein, the obligation to negotiate

locally over rotation survives. We reject this argument as well.

The NLA defines “rotation” as “[t]he recurring assignment of

employees to different work locations, assigned work, shifts,

and/or tours of duty within the confines of the employees’ post

of duty and/or other locations to which the employees are

regularly assigned.” JA 226. Under this definition, the bridge

rotation at issue, including RDOs, is reasonably encompassed

within the subject matter that RNIAP section 5 expressly

declares is to be determined by “agency managers” in

accordance with “workload,” “operational needs” and/or

“budgetary limitations,” namely, the “length of the workweek

and tours of duty,” “work hours in each day of the basic

workweek,” “days off,” “scheduling the numbers, types and

grades of employees . . . for any particular tour, shift, location,

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The NTEU points to testimony of Customs official Dennis

Reischl and an annotated version of the RNIAP, with accompanying

“Frequently Asked Questions,” which appear to refer to a pre-existing

annual or semiannual “bid and rotation process” by which employees

“bid to various positions—cargo, passenger processing, whatever,” for

which “a seniority system [had] been applied in the past against . . .

preferences and bids,” JA 118-19, and not to the regular rotation of

employees in one position—here, passenger inspector—from one

location to another. See JA 116 (Reischl testimony that RNIAP “did

not control or affect the annual bid and rotation systems that were set

up across country”); JA 120 (“NIAP FAQS” # 7 stating RNIAP

“affects your current bid and rotation system only to the extent that the

number, types or grades of employees who will be required to bid into

a particular assignment may change” but “[o]therwise it does not

address current systems”); JA 133 (“Relative to local bid systems, the

assignment procedures remain in effect until such time as they may be

changed through national negotiations. . . . How the bid process is

administered (e.g. seniority, duration, etc.) is the portion that remains

unchanged at this time and will be addressed nationally at a later point

in time.”). In any event, whatever the cited evidence might suggest

regarding Customs’ intent, it does not lessen the notice effect of the

RNIAP itself on the NTEU which was not privy to the annotated

RNIAP or to Reishchl’s opinion.

special team or task,” “the number of inspectional personnel

assigned to any inspectional activity . . . on a regular workday or

holiday” and “assign[ing] employees from one facility to

another.” JA 145-46. Nor does any of the arbitration hearing

evidence cited by NTEU, which is at best ambiguous in its

references to rotation, plainly contradict the FLRA’s

determination that Customs effectively revoked its agreement to

negotiate rotation on the local level.5

Because the FLRA reasonably determined that Customs,

through the RNIAP, effectively revoked its agreement in the

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NLA to bargain over rotation and RDOs at the local level, the

petition for review is denied.

So ordered.

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