Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02686/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02686-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
LeShawn Stanbridge
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15-2686

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

LESHAWN STANBRIDGE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 14-cr-30020-SEM-TSH-1 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 26, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 23, 2016

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and POSNER, Circuit

Judges. 

BAUER, Circuit Judge. LeShawn Stanbridge appeals his 

conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent 

to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The drugs had been found 

in Stanbridge’s car after police in Quincy, Illinois, detained 

him on the ground that he committed a traffic offense by not 

signaling continuously for 100 feet before pulling alongside 

the curb to park. That understanding of Illinois law was 

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wrong, but the district court decided that the mistake was

reasonable and, for that reason, denied Stanbridge’s motion 

to suppress the drugs. We hold that the mistake of law was 

not reasonable, and thus Stanbridge’s motion to suppress 

should have been granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

Stanbridge was walking to his car carrying a duffel bag 

when two Quincy police officers passed by on patrol. Stanbridge hesitated and looked surprised when he saw the officers, so they circled the block and began shadowing him 

with the hope of catching him in a traffic violation. After 

driving just a short distance, Stanbridge activated his right 

turn signal, pulled to the side of the street, and parked parallel with the curb. Officer Steve Bangert, who was driving, 

had not witnessed any traffic violation before Stanbridge 

pulled over, but his partner, Officer Paul Hodges, later reported that Stanbridge had turned left at an intersection 

without signaling while being followed. Unaware of his 

partner’s observation, Bangert stopped behind Stanbridge 

and activated his blue flashers, effectively seizing Stanbridge. Bangert did so because Stanbridge had not activated 

his turn signal 100 feet before pulling to the curb. 

Stanbridge had a valid driver’s license, but a check for 

criminal history showed that he “did have priors,” prompting Officer Bangert to request a drug-sniffing dog (though 

Stanbridge’s only drug conviction was for marijuana possession, 11 years earlier when he was 17). The dog arrived 

10 minutes later, and its alert led to the discovery of methamphetamine, marijuana, and pills inside Stanbridge’s duffel bag. He was arrested and confessed to acting as a “midCase: 15-2686 Document: 25 Filed: 02/23/2016 Pages: 13
No. 15-2686 3

dleman” for two suppliers who had trafficked six pounds of

methamphetamine in as many months. 

Stanbridge was charged with conspiracy to distribute a 

controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and possession with intent to distribute, id. § 841(a)(1). He moved to 

suppress the evidence derived from the stop, asserting that 

he was seized unlawfully because he had not committed a 

traffic violation. The government responded that the police 

officers had two bases for seizing Stanbridge: He did not activate his turn signal 100 feet before pulling over to park, 

and he had made a left turn without signaling at all. Video 

from a dashcam in the officers’ patrol car confirms that Stanbridge did not signal for 100 feet before parking, but, the 

government conceded, the illegal left turn cannot be seen in 

the video. 

At a hearing on Stanbridge’s motion to suppress, both 

police officers testified, and the dashcam video was played. 

Officer Bangert acknowledged that he had not seen Stanbridge commit a traffic violation before the alleged turnsignal violation when parking. Indeed, Bangert’s only justification for detaining Stanbridge was that he had “started to 

signal after [his car] already started its turn pulling to the 

curb.” Officer Hodges, on the other hand, testified that he 

had seen Stanbridge turn left at an intersection without signaling; he didn’t mention this violation to Bangert when it 

occurred, he added, because he had assumed that his partner also witnessed the illegal turn. 

Stanbridge’s car did not come in view of the dashcam until just before he parked. Stanbridge was on a street without 

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lane markings, with no other traffic in sight (except for the

officers’ car). But the video does confirm that Stanbridge activated his turn signal just before he pulled to the right to 

park, not contemporaneously with the rightward movement 

as described by the police officers. 

The district court denied Stanbridge’s motion in a written 

order. The court assumed that Officer Hodges had seen 

Stanbridge make an unsignaled left turn. But that observation, the court reasoned, would have given Hodges, not Officer Bangert, probable cause to make a traffic stop: 

Officer Hodges ... was not driving the po- lice 

car and did not initiate the traffic stop. Of- ficer 

Bangert, as the driver, did, but Officer Bangert 

testified that he did not see Stan- bridge’s left 

turn without a proper signal. Moreover, both 

officers testified that Officer Hodges did not tell 

Officer Bangert about Stanbridge’s unsignaled 

left turn, and Officer Hodges testified that he 

had assumed that Of- ficer Bangert saw the turn 

for himself. 

Thus, the court concluded, the left turn was irrelevant, and 

only Bangert’s explanation for detaining Stanbridge could 

justify the defendant’s seizure. The court opined that the Illinois Vehicle Code is ambiguous (and noted that courts in 

the state had not offered guidance) concerning whether a 

driver must signal for 100 feet before pulling to a curb. And, 

the district court concluded, Bangert’s belief “was reasonable, even if it were mistaken,” and thus the perceived ambiguity “must be resolved in the Government’s favor. 

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No. 15-2686 5

Stanbridge then entered a conditional guilty plea to the

count charging him with possessing the methamphetamine 

in his duffle bag, while reserving the right to challenge on 

appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See FED. R. CRIM. 

P. 11(c)(1)A), (B). He was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment. 

II. DISCUSSION

In this court Stanbridge argues that Illinois law does not 

require a driver to signal continuously for 100 feet before 

parking parallel to a curb, and that Officer Bangert’s mistake 

of law on this point was unreasonable and thus cannot be a 

basis for upholding the seizure. The government counters 

that Stanbridge’s challenge is not properly before us because, according to the government, in briefing this appeal 

he neglected to contest a second reason given by the district 

court for denying his motion to suppress. We therefore begin 

with the government’s contention that Stanbridge has committed waiver. 

In opposing Stanbridge’s motion in the district court, the 

government asserted that his failure to signal before turning 

left at an intersection, as seen by Officer Hodges but not captured on the dashcam video, provided a basis for the seizure 

independent of Stanbridge’s actions while parking. On appeal, the government’s primary contention is that Stanbridge 

has waived any challenge to his initial detention by not addressing what the government characterizes as “the district 

court’s unmistakable finding” of probable cause to seize him 

based on the unsignaled left turn. In his opening brief Stanbridge discusses only Officer Bangert’s justification for the 

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6 No. 15-2686

seizure, and thus, the government argues, Stanbridge has

left unchallenged an alternative rationale for sustaining his 

initial detention. This “omission,” the government insists, “is 

fatal to his appeal.” 

To the contrary, waiver is a problem for the government, 

not Stanbridge. That is because the government’s premise 

rests entirely on its untenable reading of the district court’s 

ruling. The court’s order, in the opening paragraph, does 

talk about improperly signaled “turns” giving the “officers” 

probable cause to make a traffic stop. Yet despite these plural references, the court’s decision later makes clear that the 

judge did not accept the government’s contention that it 

could rely on both “turns” to justify the detention of Stanbridge. The government correctly observes that the district 

court thought that Officer Hodges’s observation of Stanbridge turning left at an intersection without signaling provided Hodges with probable cause for a traffic stop, but the 

government omits what the court said next: 

Officer Hodges, however, was not driving the 

police car and did not initiate the traffic stop. 

Officer Bangert, as the driver, did, but Officer 

Bangert testified that he did not see Stanbridge’s left turn without a proper signal. 

Moreover, both officers testified that Officer 

Hodges did not tell Officer Bangert about 

Stanbridge’s unsignaled left turn, and Officer 

Hodges testified that he had assumed that Officer Bangert saw the turn for himself. 

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No. 15-2686 7

The district court thus believed that only Officer Bangert, the

driver of the patrol car, had effectuated Stanbridge’s seizure 

and thus only his rationale and the facts known to him mattered. In so doing, the district court rejected the government’s 

reliance on the unsignaled left turn as a justification for the 

initial detention. 

The government may disagree with the district court’s 

reasoning, but it does not argue in its brief that we should 

reject that reasoning and view the left turn as an alternative 

basis for upholding the stop of Stanbridge. By instead misconstruing the court’s order and arguing that Stanbridge has 

engaged in waiver, the government has failed to recognize, 

let alone challenge, the district court’s rejection of its position that the stop was alternatively justified by the unsignaled left turn. The government, like other litigants, can 

waive its opportunity to challenge an adverse ruling on an 

argument presented to the district court. See United States v. 

Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that 

government “inexplicably abandoned reliance” on valid justification for vehicle search by failing to challenge district 

court’s rejection of that ground presented at suppression 

hearing); United States v. Wilson, 390 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (7th 

Cir. 2004) (refusing to review factual assertions where government failed to challenge district court’s rejection of those 

same contentions); United States v. Dyer, 580 F.3d 386, 390 

(6th Cir. 2009) (finding waiver where government failed to 

challenge district court’s determination that defendant had 

standing to bring Fourth Amendment claim). The government has not asked us to reject as unsound the district 

court’s conclusion that only Officer Bangert, not the “team,” 

seized Stanbridge, and that Officer Hodges’s observation 

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8 No. 15-2686

cannot be considered. The government’s oversight in failing

to argue the issue is so large that we conclude it has waived 

reliance on the left turn as a justification for Stanbridge’s seizure. 

That leaves Stanbridge’s challenge to the sole ground on 

which the district court did rely: He did not signal for 

100 feet before pulling to the curb to park. Section 11-804 of 

the Illinois Vehicle Code provides: 

When signal required. (a) No person may turn 

a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is 

in proper position upon the roadway as required in Section 11-801 or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise 

turn a vehicle from a direct course or move 

right or left upon a roadway unless and until 

such movement can be made with reasonable 

safety. No person may so turn any vehicle 

without giving an appropriate signal in the 

manner hereinafter provided. 

(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left 

when required must be given continuously 

during not less than the last 100 feet traveled 

by the vehicle before turning within a business 

or residence district, and such signal must be 

given continuously during not less than the 

last 200 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning outside a business or residence district. 

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No. 15-2686 9

(c) No person may stop or suddenly decrease

the speed of a vehicle without first giving an 

appropriate signal in the manner provided in 

this Chapter to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such a signal. 

(d) The electric turn signal device required in 

Section 12-208 of this Act must be used to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes or start 

from a parallel parked position but must not be 

flashed on one side only on a parked or disabled vehicle or flashed as a courtesy or “do 

pass” signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear. However, such signal 

devices may be flashed simultaneously on both 

sides of a motor vehicle to indicate the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard requiring unusual care in approaching, overtaking and 

passing. 

625 ILCS 5/11-804. Stanbridge disagrees with the district 

court’s belief that this statute is ambiguous concerning the 

100-foot minimum signaling distance. Stanbridge is willing 

to concede that moving from a traffic lane to a curb is a lane 

change governed by § 11-804(d), but even so, he argues, the 

statute requires only that a signal “must be used” when 

changing lanes, not that a signal be used for 100 feet or any 

other specified distance. In response, the government has 

abandoned its previous argument that pulling to a curb constitutes a “turn” requiring a 100-foot warning, and instead 

the government argues that a “driver cannot ‘indicate an inCase: 15-2686 Document: 25 Filed: 02/23/2016 Pages: 13
10 No. 15-2686

tention’ to change lanes while he is already changing lanes,”

because to do so would fail to give other drivers sufficient 

notice and defeat the statute’s purpose. 

We agree with Stanbridge that § 11-804 is not ambiguous, 

and does not require a driver to signal for 100 feet before 

pulling alongside a curb to park. The minimum signaling 

distances required by subsection (b) apply only when a driver intends “to turn right or left” (emphasis added). And no 

other subsection includes an explicit command to signal before moving toward a curb to park. As the district court noted, “[i]f the Illinois General Assembly had meant for the signal requirement to apply to a motorist pulling to a stop at 

the curb under § 11-804(d), it knew how to do so explicitly, 

as § 11-804(d) clearly requires the use of a turn signal before 

‘start[ing] from a parallel parked position’.” This is a sensible reading of the statute, and the government has not given 

us reason to think that the legislature intended to require 

drivers seeking parking in congested urban areas to continuously signal for 100 feet before determining that a possible 

parking space is not only large enough, but also free of fire 

hydrants, yellow curbs, and other parking restrictions. 

So the only possible relevance of § 11-804 is the requirement in subsection (d) that a signal be used to indicate an 

intention to “change lanes.” “Lane” is not defined (and the 

Illinois courts have not had occasion to construe the term, 

especially as applied to an unstriped roadway). But even if 

moving toward the curb of unstriped pavement to park constitutes “changing lanes,” § 11-804(d) requires only that a 

turn signal “be used.” And Stanbridge did use his signal, as 

the government is compelled to acknowledge. What’s more, 

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No. 15-2686 11

the dashcam video refutes the government’s assertion that

Stanbridge activated his turn signal only after pulling toward the curb; the light was on before Stanbridge moved to 

the right. 

This does not end our inquiry, however, because a police 

officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law can provide reasonable suspicion for a seizure. See Heien v. North Carolina, 

135 S. Ct. 530, 534–35, 539–40 (2014) (concluding that police 

officer’s mistaken belief that ambiguous vehicle code required more than one functional brake light was objectively 

reasonable). The district court concluded that Officer 

Bangert was objectively reasonable, even if mistaken, in believing that § 11-804 requires motorists to signal for at least 

100 feet before pulling to a curb. Rather than defend this 

conclusion, the government in its brief dismisses as an “academic proposition” Stanbridge’s argument that the district 

court erred. 

We view the government’s silence as an implicit concession that, as Stanbridge maintains, Officer’s Bangert’s misunderstanding of § 11-804 was not objectively reasonable. 

The statute isn’t ambiguous, and Hein does not support the 

proposition that a police officer acts in an objectively reasonable manner by misinterpreting an unambiguous statute. 

See United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2015) 

(concluding that police officer could not reasonably have believed that motorist’s use of license-plate frame found on 

“vast” number of cars violated Illinois statute). The 100-foot 

requirement in § 11-804(b) unambiguously applies to turns, 

and nothing more. Bangert simply was wrong about what 

the provision required, yet “an officer can gain no Fourth 

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12 No. 15-2686

Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws

he is duty-bound to enforce.” Hein, 135 S. Ct. at 539–40. 

The government suggests that we disregard whether Officer Bangert acted reasonably and instead declare that Stanbridge violated § 11-804 for a reason unrelated to the 100- 

foot signaling minimum. In the government’s eyes, Stanbridge signaled “too late” and failed to give adequate warning to other drivers. For this proposition the government relies on the requirement in § 11-804(c) that drivers give notice 

to vehicles directly behind them before suddenly decreasing 

speed if “there is opportunity to give such a signal.” The 

government also echoes the district court’s statement that 

“the overall purpose of the statute is plainly to regulate the 

movement of vehicles and to provide notice of that movement to other motorists.” 

It should suffice to note that this argument wasn’t made 

in the district court and is thus forfeited. See, e.g., United 

States v. Dachman, 743 F.3d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 2014); Fryer v. 

United States, 243 F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (7th Cir. 2001). Anyway, 

who else was on the road to warn? Once again the dashcam 

video upends the government’s contention; as is plain from 

that video, the police officers’ distant patrol car was the only 

other vehicle in sight of Stanbridge, and he already was 

moving slowly when he decided to pull over and park. 

III. CONCLUSION

Stanbridge fully complied with § 11-804. Officer 

Bangert’s contrary belief was not objectively reasonable, and 

thus the officer’s mistake of law cannot justify Stanbridge’s 

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No. 15-2686 13

seizure. Accordingly, the denial of the defendant’s motion to

suppress must be overturned. The judgment of conviction is 

VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court 

for further proceedings. 

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