Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01301/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01301-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC
Appellant
Garmin International, Inc.
Appellee
Garmin USA, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC.

______________________

2014-1301

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2012-

00001.

______________________

Decided: February 4, 2015

______________________

TIMOTHY M. SALMON, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, 

LLC, of Basking Ridge, New Jersey, argued for appellant. 

Of counsel on the brief was JOHN R. KASHA, Kasha Law 

LLC, of North Potomac, Maryland. 

NATHAN K. KELLEY, Solicitor, United States Patent 

and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for 

intervenor. With him on the brief were SCOTT C.

WEIDENFELLER and ROBERT J. MCMANUS, Associate 

Solicitors. 

_____________________

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

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2 IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Cuozzo Speed Technologies (“Cuozzo”) owns U.S. Patent No. 6,778,074 (the “’074 patent”). Garmin International, Inc. and Garmin USA, Inc. (collectively, “Garmin”) 

petitioned the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office (“PTO”) for inter partes review (“IPR”) of claims 10, 

14, and 17 of the ’074 patent. The PTO granted Garmin’s 

petition and instituted IPR. The Patent Trial and Appeal

Board (the “Board”) timely issued a final decision finding

claims 10, 14, and 17 obvious. The Board additionally 

denied Cuozzo’s motion to amend the ’074 patent by 

substituting new claims 21, 22, and 23 for claims 10, 14, 

and 17. 

Contrary to Cuozzo’s contention, we hold that we lack 

jurisdiction to review the PTO’s decision to institute IPR.

We affirm the Board’s final determination, finding no 

error in the Board’s claim construction under the broadest 

reasonable interpretation standard, the Board’s obviousness determination, and the Board’s denial of Cuozzo’s

motion to amend.

BACKGROUND

Cuozzo is the assignee of the ’074 patent, entitled 

“Speed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed 

and the Relevant Speed Limit,” which issued on August 

17, 2004. The ’074 patent discloses an interface which 

displays a vehicle’s current speed as well as the speed 

limit. In one embodiment, a red filter is superimposed on 

a white speedometer so that “speeds above the legal speed 

limit are displayed in red . . . while the legal speeds are 

displayed in white . . . .” Id. col. 5 ll. 35–37. A global 

positioning system (“GPS”) unit tracks the vehicle’s 

location and identifies the speed limit at that location. 

The red filter automatically rotates when the speed limit 

changes, so that the speeds above the speed limit at that 

location are displayed in red. The patent also states that 

the speed limit indicator may take the form of a colored 

liquid crystal display (“LCD”). Id. col. 3 ll. 4–6, col. 6 ll. 

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11–14. In claim 10, the independent claim at issue here, a 

colored display shows the current speed limit, and the 

colored display is “integrally attached” to the speedometer. Id. col. 7 l. 10.

Claim 10 recites: 

A speed limit indicator comprising:

a global positioning system receiver;

a display controller connected to said global positioning system receiver, wherein said display 

controller adjusts a colored display in response to signals from said global positioning 

system receiver to continuously update the delineation of which speed readings are in violation of the speed limit at a vehicle’s present 

location; and

a speedometer integrally attached to said colored 

display.

Id. col. 7 ll. 1–10. Claim 14 is addressed to “[t]he speed 

limit indicator as defined in claim 10, wherein said colored display is a colored filter.” Id. col. 7 ll. 23–24. Claim 

17 recites: “[t]he speed limit indicator as defined in claim 

14, wherein said display controller rotates said colored 

filter independently of said speedometer to continuously 

update the delineation of which speed readings are in 

violation of the speed limit at a vehicle's present location.” Id. col. 8 ll. 5–9.

On September 16, 2012, Garmin filed a petition with 

the PTO to institute IPR of, inter alia, claims 10, 14, and 

17 the ’074 patent. Garmin contended that claim 10 was 

invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) or as 

obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) and that claims 14 and 

17 were obvious under § 103(a). The PTO instituted IPR, 

determining that there was a reasonable likelihood that 

claims 10, 14, and 17 were obvious under § 103 over (1) 

U.S. Patent Nos. 6,633,811 (“Aumayer”), 3,980,041 (“Evans”), and 2,711,153 (“Wendt”); and/or (2) German Patent 

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No. 197 55 470 (“Tegethoff”), U.S. Patent No. 6,515,596 

(“Awada”), Evans, and Wendt. Although Garmin’s petition 

with respect to claim 17 included the grounds on which 

the PTO instituted review, the petition did not list Evans 

or Wendt for claim 10 or Wendt for claim 14.

In its subsequent final decision, the Board explained 

that “[a]n appropriate construction of the term ‘integrally 

attached’ in independent claim 10 is central to the patentability analysis of claims 10, 14, and 17.” J.A. 7. The 

Board applied a broadest reasonable interpretation 

standard and construed the term “integrally attached” as 

meaning “discrete parts physically joined together as a 

unit without each part losing its own separate identity.” 

J.A. 9. The Board found that claims 10, 14, and 17 were 

unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1) over

Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt; and, alternatively, (2) over 

Tegethoff, Awada, Evans, and Wendt.

The Board also denied Cuozzo’s motion to amend the 

patent by replacing claims 10, 14, and 17 with substitute 

claims 21, 22, and 23. The Board’s denial of the motion to 

amend centered on proposed claim 21.1 Claim 21 would 

have amended the patent to claim “a speedometer integrally attached to [a] colored display, wherein the speedometer comprises a liquid crystal display, and wherein 

the colored display is the liquid crystal display.” J.A. 357–

58. The Board rejected the amendment because (1) substitute claim 21 lacked written description support as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, and (2) the substitute claims

would improperly enlarge the scope of the claims as 

construed by the Board. 

1 The parties do not separately address claims 22 

and 23 and apparently agree that the motion for leave to 

amend on those claims presents the same issues as claim 

21. 

 

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Cuozzo appealed. The PTO intervened, and we granted Garmin’s motion to withdraw as appellee.2 We have 

jurisdiction to review the Board’s final decision under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

I

IPRs proceed in two phases. St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1375–76

(Fed. Cir. 2014). In the first phase, the PTO determines 

whether to institute IPR. In the second phase, the Board 

conducts the IPR proceeding and issues a final decision. Id. 

Cuozzo argues that the PTO improperly instituted

IPR on claims 10 and 14 because the PTO relied on prior 

art that Garmin did not identify in its petition as grounds 

for IPR as to those two claims (though the prior art in 

question was identified with respect to claim 17). Under 

the statute, any petition for IPR must “identif[y] . . . with 

particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to 

each claim is based . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). Cuozzo

argues that the PTO may only institute IPR based on 

grounds identified in the petition because “[t]he Director 

may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted 

unless the Director determines that the information 

presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows 

that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner

would prevail . . . .” Id. § 314(a).

Section 314(d) is entitled “No appeal” and provides 

that “[t]he determination by the Director whether to 

2 Garmin filed a motion to withdraw because it 

agreed not to participate in any appeal of the IPR written 

decision as part of a settlement agreement with Cuozzo. 

 

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institute an inter partes review under this section shall be 

final and nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). The PTO 

argues that § 314(d) precludes review of a determination 

to institute IPR. Cuozzo argues that § 314(d) does not 

completely preclude review of the decision to institute 

IPR, but instead merely postpones review of the PTO’s 

authority until after the issuance of a final decision by the 

Board. 

We have previously addressed § 314(d) and have held 

that it precludes interlocutory review of decisions whether 

to institute IPR. In St. Jude, we characterized § 314(d) as 

a “broadly worded bar on appeal” and held that § 314(d) 

“certainly bars” interlocutory review of the PTO’s denial 

of a petition for IPR. 749 F.3d at 1375–76. This result was 

supported by § 319, which “authorizes appeals to this 

court only from ‘the final written decision of the 

[Board] . . . .’” Id. at 1375 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 319) (alteration in original). Similarly, the bar to interlocutory 

review is supported by 35 U.S.C. § 141(c), which “authorizes appeal only by ‘a party to an inter partes review . . . who is dissatisfied with the final written decision 

of the [Board] under section 318(a).’” Id. (quoting 35 

U.S.C. § 141(c)) (alterations in original). But while we 

stated that § 314 “may well preclude all review by any 

route,” we did not decide the issue. Id. at 1376.

We conclude that § 314(d) prohibits review of the decision to institute IPR even after a final decision. On its 

face, the provision is not directed to precluding review 

only before a final decision. It is written to exclude all 

review of the decision whether to institute review. Section 

314(d) provides that the decision is both “nonappealable” 

and “final,” i.e., not subject to further review. 35 U.S.C. 

§ 314(d). A declaration that the decision to institute is 

“final” cannot reasonably be interpreted as postponing 

review until after issuance of a final decision on patentability. Moreover, given that § 319 and § 141(c) already 

limit appeals to appeals from final decisions, § 314(d) 

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would have been unnecessary to preclude non-final review 

of institution decisions. Because § 314(d) is unnecessary

to limit interlocutory appeals, it must be read to bar 

review of all institution decisions, even after the Board 

issues a final decision. Nor does the IPR statute expressly 

limit the Board’s authority at the final decision stage to 

the grounds alleged in the IPR petition. It simply authorizes the Board to issue “a final written decision with 

respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged 

by the petitioner and any new claim added under section 

316(d).” 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). 

Our decision in In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1367 

(Fed. Cir. 1998), confirms the correctness of the PTO’s 

position here. There, even absent a provision comparable 

to § 314(d),3 we held that a flawed decision to institute 

reexamination under 35 U.S.C. § 303 was not a basis for 

setting aside a final decision. Hiniker, 150 F.3d at 1367. 

Under the statute at issue in Hiniker, reexamination 

could only be instituted if the Commissioner determined 

that there was “a substantial new question of patentability,” i.e., new prior art not considered by the examiner. 35 

U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994). In Hiniker, the PTO instituted 

reexamination based on prior art considered in the original examination (Howard). Hiniker, 150 F.3d at 1365. But 

the PTO’s final decision relied on East (which had not 

been before the examiner in the initial examination) in 

finding the claims invalid. Id. at 1366. We held that our 

jurisdiction was only “over Hiniker’s appeal from the

[final] decision of the Board.” Id. at 1367. While the final 

3 Unlike § 314, the reexamination statute only provides that “[a] determination by the Commissioner . . . that no substantial new question of patentability 

has been raised will be final and nonappealable.” 35 

U.S.C. § 303(c) (1994) (emphasis added).

 

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decision would have been subject to reversal if it had 

improperly relied only on prior art presented to the examiner,4 any error in instituting reexamination based on the 

Howard reference was “washed clean during the reexamination proceeding,” which relied on new art. Id. The fact 

that the petition was defective is irrelevant because a 

proper petition could have been drafted. The same is even 

clearer here, where § 314(d) explicitly provides that there 

is no appeal available of a decision to institute. There was 

no bar here to finding claims 10 and 14 unpatentable 

based on the Evans and/or Wendt references. The failure 

to cite those references in the petition provides no ground 

for setting aside the final decision.

Cuozzo argues that Congress would not have intended 

to allow the PTO to institute IPR in direct contravention 

of the statute, for example, on grounds of prior public use 

where the IPR statute permits petitions only on the basis 

of “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 

35 U.S.C. § 311. The answer is that mandamus may be 

available to challenge the PTO’s decision to grant a petition to institute IPR after the Board’s final decision in 

situations where the PTO has clearly and indisputably 

exceeded its authority.

The PTO argues that our previous decisions preclude 

mandamus. In In re Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC, 749 

F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014), we held that mandamus 

relief was not available to challenge the denial of a petition for IPR. Given the statutory scheme, there was no 

4 See In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 

789, superseded by statute as recognized by In re NTP, 

Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Recreative 

Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Congress 

subsequently amended the statute to provide for consideration of prior art before the examiner. 35 U.S.C. § 303. 

 

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“‘clear and indisputable right’ to challenge a noninstitution decision directly in this court,” as required for 

mandamus. Id. And in In re Procter & Gamble Co., 749 

F.3d 1376, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2014), we held that mandamus was not available to provide immediate review of a 

decision to institute IPR. There was no “clear and indisputable right to this court’s immediate review of a decision to institute an inter partes review, as would be 

needed for mandamus relief.” Id. at 1379. Furthermore, 

that “[wa]s not one of the rare situations in which irremediable interim harm c[ould] justify mandamus, which is 

unavailable simply to relieve [the patentee] of the burden 

of going through the inter partes review.” Id. (citation 

omitted). However, we did not decide the question of 

whether the decision to institute review is reviewable by 

mandamus after the Board issues a final decision or 

whether such review is precluded by § 314(d). Id. Nor do 

we do so now.

Even if § 314 does not bar mandamus after a final decision, at least “three conditions must be satisfied before 

[a writ of mandamus] may issue.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. 

Court for the D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). “First, ‘the 

party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other 

adequate means to attain the relief he desires.’” Id. (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 426 

U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (alteration in original)). That condition appears to be satisfied since review by appeal is 

unavailable. “Second, the petitioner must satisfy ‘the 

burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is 

clear and indisputable.’” Id. at 381 (internal quotations, 

citation, and alterations omitted). “Third, the issuing 

court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied 

that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id.

(citation omitted).

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Here, Cuozzo has not filed a mandamus petition, but 

even if we were to treat its appeal as a request for mandamus,5 the situation here is far from satisfying the clearand-indisputable requirement for mandamus. It is not 

clear that IPR is strictly limited to the grounds asserted 

in the petition. The PTO urges that instituting IPR of 

claims 10 and 14 based on the grounds for claim 17 was 

proper because claim 17 depends from claim 14, which 

depends from claim 10. Any grounds which would invalidate claim 17 would by necessary implication also invalidate claims 10 and 14. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet 

Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A broader 

independent claim cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim stemming from that independent claim is 

invalid for obviousness.”). The PTO argues that Garmin 

implicitly asserted that claims 10 and 14 were unpatentable when it asserted that claim 17 was unpatentable. 

Whether or not the PTO is correct in these aspects, it is at 

least beyond dispute there is no clear and indisputable 

right that precludes institution of the IPR proceeding. We 

need not decide whether mandamus to review institution 

of IPR after a final decision is available in other circumstances.

II

Cuozzo contends in addition that the Board erred in 

finding the claims obvious, arguing initially that the

5 See 16 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3932.1 

(3d ed. 2012) (“Many cases illustrate the seemingly converse proposition that . . . an appeal can substitute for a 

writ in the sense that an attempted appeal from an order 

that is nonappealable can be treated as a petition for a 

writ.” (citations omitted)). 

 

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Board should not have applied the broadest reasonable 

interpretation standard in claim construction. 

A

The America Invents Act (“AIA”) created IPR, but the 

statute on its face does not resolve the issue of whether 

the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is appropriate in IPRs; it is silent on that issue. However, the 

statute conveys rulemaking authority to the PTO. It 

provides that “[t]he Director shall prescribe regulations,” 

inter alia, “setting forth the standards for the showing of 

sufficient grounds to institute . . . review,” and “establishing and governing inter partes review . . . and the relationship of such review to other proceedings . . . .” 35 

U.S.C. § 316(a)(2), (a)(4). Pursuant to this authority, the 

PTO has promulgated 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), which provides that “[a] claim in an unexpired patent shall be given 

its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.100(b). Cuozzo argues that the PTO lacked authority 

to promulgate § 42.100(b) and that the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is inappropriate in an adjudicatory IPR proceeding. The PTO argues that 35 U.S.C. 

§ 316 provides the necessary authority to the PTO to 

promulgate § 42.100(b) and that the broadest reasonable 

interpretation is appropriately applied in the IPR context. 

1

Before addressing the scope of the PTO’s rulemaking 

authority, we consider the history of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard and the bearing of that 

history on the interpretation of the IPR statute. No section of the patent statute explicitly provides that the 

broadest reasonable interpretation standard shall be used 

in any PTO proceedings.

Nonetheless, the broadest reasonable interpretation 

standard has been applied by the PTO and its predecessor 

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for more than 100 years in various types of PTO proceedings. A 1906 PTO decision explained, “[n]o better method 

of construing claims is perceived than to give them in 

each case the broadest interpretation which they will 

support without straining the language in which they are 

couched.” Podlesak v. McInnerney, 1906 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 

265, 258. For more than a century, courts have approved 

that standard. See, e.g., Miel v. Young, 29 App. D.C. 481, 

484 (D.C. Cir. 1907) (“This claim should be given the 

broadest interpretation which it will support . . . .”); In re 

Rambus, Inc., 753 F.3d 1253, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(“Claims are generally given their ‘broadest reasonable 

interpretation’ consistent with the specification during 

reexamination.” (citation omitted)); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. 

Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Giving 

claims their broadest reasonable construction ‘serves the 

public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, 

finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified.’” (quoting In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. 

Cir. 1984))); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 

1997) (“[W]e reject appellants’ invitation to construe 

either of the cases cited by appellants so as to overrule, sub silentio, decades old case law. . . . It would be 

inconsistent with the role assigned to the PTO in issuing 

a patent to require it to interpret claims in the same 

manner as judges who, post-issuance, operate under the 

assumption the patent is valid. The process of patent 

prosecution is an interactive one.”); In re Carr, 297 F. 542, 

544 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (“For this reason we have uniformly 

ruled that claims will be given the broadest interpretation 

of which they reasonably are susceptible. This rule is a 

reasonable one, and tends not only to protect the real 

invention, but to prevent needless litigation after the 

patent has issued.”); In re Kebrich, 201 F.2d 951, 954 

(CCPA 1953) (“[I]t is . . . well settled that . . . the tribunals 

[of the PTO] and the reviewing courts in the initial consideration of patentability will give claims the broadest 

interpretation which, within reason, may be applied.”).

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This court has approved of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in a variety of proceedings, including initial examinations, interferences, and post-grant 

proceedings such as reissues and reexaminations. Indeed, 

that standard has been applied in every PTO proceeding 

involving unexpired patents.6 In doing so, we have cited 

the long history of the PTO’s giving claims their broadest 

reasonable construction. See, e.g., Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at

1571–72 (reexaminations); In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 

1019 (CCPA 1981) (reissues); Reese v. Hurst, 661 F.2d 

1222, 1236 (CCPA 1981) (interferences); In re Prater, 415 

F.2d 1393, 1404–05 (CCPA 1969) (examinations). Applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard 

“reduce[s] the possibility that, after the patent is granted, 

the claims may be interpreted as giving broader coverage 

than is justified.” Reuter, 670 F.2d at 1015 

ing Prater, 415 F.2d at 1404–05).

There is no indication that the AIA was designed to 

change the claim construction standard that the PTO has 

applied for more than 100 years. Congress is presumed to 

legislate against the background of existing law where 

Congress in enacting legislation is aware of the prevailing 

rule. As we held in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United 

States, “the principle of legislative ratification is well 

6 The claims of an expired patent are the one exception where the broadest reasonable interpretation is not 

used because the patentee is unable to amend the claims. 

Rambus, 753 F.3d at 1256 (“If, as is the case here, a 

reexamination involves claims of an expired patent, a 

patentee is unable to make claim amendments and the 

PTO applies the claim construction principles outlined by 

this court in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005).” (citations omitted)). 

 

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established. In the case of a widely known judicial decision or agency practice, Congress is presumed to be aware 

of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute 

and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a 

statute without change.” 666 F.3d 732, 739 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), superseded in part by statute as recognized in 678 

F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 108, 110 (1991); Procter & 

Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, 549 F.3d 842, 848–49 

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (improper to presume that congress 

would alter the backdrop of existing law sub silentio).

Here, Congress in enacting the AIA was well aware 

that the broadest reasonable interpretation standard was 

the prevailing rule. See 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. 

Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (allowing written 

statements to be considered in inter partes review 

“should . . . allow the Office to identify inconsistent 

statements made about claim scope—for example, cases 

where a patent owner successfully advocated a claim 

scope in district court that is broader than the ‘broadest 

reasonable construction’ that he now urges in an inter 

partes review”). It can therefore be inferred that Congress 

impliedly adopted the existing rule of adopting the broadest reasonable construction.

Cuozzo argues that judicial or congressional approval 

of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard for

other proceedings is irrelevant here because the earlier 

judicial decisions relied on the availability of amendment, 

and the AIA limits amendments in IPR proceedings.7

7 See, e.g., Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571–72 (“An 

applicant’s ability to amend his claims to avoid cited prior 

art distinguishes proceedings before the PTO from pro-

 

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But IPR proceedings are not materially different in 

that respect. Section 316(d)(1) provides that a patentee 

may file one motion to amend in order to “[c]ancel any 

challenged patent claim” or “[f]or each challenged claim, 

propose a reasonable number of substitute claims,” 35 

U.S.C. § 316(d)(1), though “[a]n amendment . . . may not 

enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce 

new matter,” id. § 316(d)(3). The PTO regulations provide 

that “[a] patent owner may file one motion to amend a 

patent, but only after conferring with the Board.” 37 

C.F.R. § 42.221(a). “The presumption is that only one 

substitute claim would be needed to replace each challenged claim, and it may be rebutted by a demonstration 

of need.” Id. § 42.221(a)(3). The statute also provides that

“[a]dditional motions to amend may be permitted upon 

the joint request of the petitioner and the patent owner . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(2). “A motion to amend may be 

denied where” the amendment either “does not respond to 

ceedings in federal district courts on issued patents.”

(emphasis added)); Reuter, 670 F.2d at 1019 (“It is well 

settled that claims before the PTO are to be given their 

broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the 

specification during the examination of a patent application since the applicant may then amend his claims . . . .”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Prater, 415 F.2d at 

1404–05 (“[T]his court has consistently taken the tack 

that claims yet unpatented are to be given the broadest 

reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification 

during the examination of a patent application since the 

applicant may then amend his claims . . . .”); see also, e.g., 

In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“As 

explained in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 

(MPEP) . . . , Applicant always has the opportunity to 

amend the claims during prosecution . . . .” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

 

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a ground of unpatentability involved in the [IPR] trial” or 

“seeks to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or 

introduce new subject matter.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(2). 

Although the opportunity to amend is cabined in the 

IPR setting, it is thus nonetheless available. The fact that 

the patent owner may be limited to a single amendment, 

may not broaden the claims, and must address the ground 

of unpatentability is not a material difference. Nor is the 

fact that IPR may be said to be adjudicatory rather than 

an examination. Interference proceedings are also in some 

sense adjudicatory, see Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 

867–68 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (characterizing interference 

proceedings as adjudicatory and holding that the Board’s 

decision be reviewed on the record), yet the broadest 

reasonable interpretation standard applies, 

see Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 500 

(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“In the absence of ambiguity, it is fundamental that the language of a count should be given the 

broadest reasonable interpretation it will support . . . .”

(quoting In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686 (CCPA 1981))). In 

any event, Congress in enacting the AIA was aware of 

these differences in terms of amendments and adjudication and did not provide for a different standard than the 

broadest reasonable interpretation standard. We conclude 

that Congress implicitly adopted the broadest reasonable 

interpretation standard in enacting the AIA. 

2

Even if we were to conclude that Congress did not 

adopt the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in 

enacting the AIA, § 316 provides authority to the PTO to 

conduct rulemaking. Although we have previously held 

that 35 U.S.C. § 2(b) does not grant substantive rulemakCase: 14-1301 Document: 35-2 Page: 16 Filed: 02/04/2015
IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 17

ing authority to the PTO,8 Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 

536 F.3d 1330, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the AIA granted 

new rulemaking authority to the PTO. Section 316(a)(2) 

provides that the PTO shall establish regulations “setting 

forth the standards for the showing of sufficient grounds 

to institute a review . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(2). Section 

316(a)(4) further provides the PTO with authority for 

“establishing and governing inter partes review under 

this chapter and the relationship of such review to other 

proceedings under this title.” Id. § 316(a)(4). These provisions expressly provide the PTO with authority to establish regulations setting the “standards” for instituting 

8 Section 2 provides, in relevant part: 

(b) Specific Powers.—the Office—

. . .

(2) may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which

(A) shall govern the conduct of 

proceedings in the Office;

(B) shall be made in accordance 

with section 553 of title 5;

(C) shall facilitate and expedite 

the processing of patent applications, particularly those which can 

be filed, stored, processed,

searched, and retrieved electronically, subject to the provisions of 

section 122 relating to the confidential status of applications[.]

35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A)–(C).

 

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review and regulating IPR proceedings. The broadest 

reasonable interpretation standard affects both the PTO’s 

determination of whether to institute IPR proceedings 

and the proceedings after institution and is within the 

PTO’s authority under the statute.

Because Congress authorized the PTO to prescribe 

regulations, the validity of the regulation is analyzed 

according to the familiar Chevron framework. See United 

States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Wilder 

v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). Under Chevron, the first question is “whether 

Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 

issue.” Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); accord Cooper, 536 F.3d at 1337 

(quoting Hawkins v. United States, 469 F.3d 993, 1000 

(Fed. Cir. 2006)). If the statute is ambiguous, the second 

question is “whether the agency’s interpretation is based 

on a permissible construction of the statutory language at 

issue.” Cooper, 536 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Hawkins, 469 

F.3d at 1000).

In the text of the IPR statute, Congress was silent on 

the subject of claim construction standards, and, if we 

assume arguendo that it did not adopt the broadest 

reasonable interpretation standard, step one of Chevron is 

satisfied. We proceed to step two of the Chevron analysis. 

The regulation here presents a reasonable interpretation 

of the statute. The PTO has long applied the broadest 

reasonable interpretation standard in other proceedings, 

suggesting that a broadest reasonable interpretation 

standard is appropriate in IPRs. As discussed above, the 

policy rationales for the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in other examination proceedings also apply 

in the IPR context. The statute also provides for the PTO 

to exercise discretion to consolidate an IPR with another 

proceeding before the PTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(d). The 

possibility of consolidating multiple types of proceedings 

suggests a single claim construction standard across 

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IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 19

proceedings is appropriate. 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a) reflects a 

permissible construction of the statutory language in 

§ 316(a). Even if the broadest reasonable interpretation 

standard were not incorporated into the IPR provisions of 

the statute, the standard was properly adopted by PTO 

regulation.

B

The second issue is whether the Board here properly 

construed the claims under the broadest reasonable 

interpretation standard. We review the Board’s claim 

construction according to the Supreme Court's decision in 

Teva Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. 

Ct. 831, 841 (2015). We review underlying factual determinations concerning extrinsic evidence for substantial 

evidence and the ultimate construction of the claim de 

novo. See id. Because there is no issue here as to extrinsic 

evidence, we review the claim construction de novo.

Claim 10 includes the following limitation: “a speedometer integrally attached to said colored display.” ’074

patent col. 7 l. 10. Cuozzo argues that the board improperly construed the phrase “integrally attached.” The Board 

construed “integrally attached” as meaning “discrete 

parts physically joined together as a unit without each 

part losing its own separate identity.” J.A. 9. Cuozzo 

contends that the correct construction of “integrally 

attached” should be broader—“joined or combined to work 

as a complete unit.” Appellant’s Br. 33. Before the Board, 

Cuozzo stated that its construction would cover “a display 

that both functionally and structurally integrates the 

speedometer and the colored display, such that there only 

is a single display.” J.A. 10. Cuozzo argues that the 

Board’s claim construction improperly excludes a singleLCD embodiment of the invention wherein the speedometer and the speed limit indicator are on the same LCD.

The phrase “integrally attached” was not included in 

either the specification or the claims as originally filed. 

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20 IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

The phrase was introduced by an amendment to claim 10

to overcome a rejection that the claim was anticipated 

under § 102(e) by Awada.9

We see no error in the Board’s interpretation. The 

word “attached” must be given some meaning. As the 

Board explained, it would “be illogical to regard one unit 

as being ‘attached’ to itself.” J.A. 9. The specification 

further supports the Board’s construction that the speedometer and the speed limit are independent—it repeatedly refers to a speed limit indicator independent of any 

speedometer and states that “the present invention essentially comprises a speed limit indicator comprising a 

speed limit display and an attached speedometer.” ’074 

9 Claim 10 of the ’074 patent corresponds to the 

claim numbered as claim 11 during patent prosecution. 

Prior to amendment, claim 10 included the limitation: 

“a speedometer attached to said speed limit display.” J.A. 

100. Cuozzo’s proposed amendment to that limitation 

recited “a speedometer integrally attached to said colored 

display.” Id. In proposing the amendment, Cuozzo argued 

that the amendment overcame Awada because

“[t]he cited Awada (6,515,596) lacks a speedometer integrally attached to the speed limit display . . . . The vehicle’s driver is forced to look in 

two separate locations and then mentally compare 

the speed limit with his vehicle’s speed to determine how close he is to speeding if he is not already doing so sufficiently to activate the light 

and/or tone. . . . In contrast, the present invention 

provides an integrated display allowing the driver 

to immediately ascertain both his speed and its 

relation to the prevailing speed limit.” 

J.A. 104–105.

 

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IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 21

patent col. 2 ll. 52–54. The Board did not err in its claim 

construction.

C

The third question is whether claims 10, 14, and 17 

were obvious. We review the Board’s factual findings for 

substantial evidence and review its legal conclusions de 

novo. In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012). The ultimate determination of obviousness 

under § 103 is a question of law based on underlying 

factual findings. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 

U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). What a reference teaches and the 

differences between the claimed invention and the prior 

art are questions of fact which we review for substantial 

evidence. Id. (citations omitted). Cuozzo states that, “[f]or 

the purposes of this appeal, claims 10, 14, and 17 rise and 

fall together.” Appellant Br. 17 n.1. Therefore, we analyze 

only claim 10.

Even under its own claim construction, Cuozzo agrees

that the disclosed mechanical embodiment with a red 

colored filter is within the claim scope. In the analog

embodiment disclosed in the specification, a red filter is 

superimposed on a white speedometer so that “speeds 

above the legal speed limit are displayed in red . . . while 

the legal speeds are displayed in white . . . .” ’074 patent 

col. 5 ll. 35–37. A GPS unit tracks the vehicle’s location, 

and the speed limit at that location is determined. The 

red filter automatically rotates in response so that speeds 

over the legal speed limit are displayed in red. 

It is a “long-established rule that ‘claims which are 

broad enough to read on obvious subject matter are unpatentable even though they also read on nonobvious 

subject matter.’” Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 

F.3d 1318, 1328 n.4 (quoting In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 

1015 (CCPA 1972)) (internal alterations omitted). Thus if 

the mechanical embodiment is obvious, claim 10 is obvious. The Board determined that the mechanical embodiCase: 14-1301 Document: 35-2 Page: 21 Filed: 02/04/2015
22 IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

ment was obvious over Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt. We 

see no error in that determination. 

Aumayer discloses a display which shows a vehicle’s 

speed and indicates the current speed limit by highlighting the appropriate mark on a speed scale or by producing 

a scale mark of a different length or color. Aumayer col. 1 

l. 12, col. 5 ll. 19–31. Aumayer further teaches obtaining 

the current location of a vehicle from an on-board 

GPS, id. Abstract, col. 4 ll. 41–45, and “updating the 

speed limit data stored in the vehicle by means of a radio 

connection . . . by means of a data carrier,” id. col. 2 ll. 54–

57. Figure 2a provides an illustration:

Element 105 displays a maximum speed limit, and element 107 highlights this same speed limit on the speed 

scale. The pointer designated by element 102 displays the

vehicle’s current speed.

Evans discloses a transparent plate that “bears warning indicia, for example, a special color and/or a plurality 

of marks, spaces, ridges, etc. so that when the speedometer dial is viewed through it, a portion of the dial representing speeds in excess of a predetermined limit are 

demarked by the warning indicia.” Evans col. 2 ll. 3–8. 

The plate is generally fixed but can be removed and recut 

and/or repositioned in order to extend over a different 

range of numbers on the dial. Figure 3 is illustrative:

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IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 23

Wendt discloses a speed limit indicator which is attachable by a suction cup to the cover of a speedometer. 

The indicator has a pointer which is rotatable to indicate 

the current speed limit. 

Cuozzo argues that Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt do 

not disclose “continuously updat[ing] the delineation of 

which speed readings are in violation of the speed limit at 

a vehicle's present location,” as required by claim 10. ’074 

patent col. 7 ll. 6–9. In particular, Cuozzo contends that 

Aumayer discloses updating speed limits associated with 

a region and not with a geographic position determined by 

the GPS locating device. The Board found that “it is 

indisputable that Aumayer displays the speed limit for 

the current location of a vehicle as determined by a GPS 

receiver, and not merely the speed limit for a certain class 

of road in a given region without any connection to the 

vehicle’s current location.” J.A. 34. The Board’s finding is 

supported by substantial evidence. 

Cuozzo also argues that there is no motivation to 

combine Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt because Aumayer is 

an automatic device while Evans and Wendt are manual 

devices. However, “[a]pplying modern electronics to older 

mechanical devices has been commonplace in recent 

years.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 

F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007). It would have been 

obvious to combine Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt to arrive 

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24 IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

at the analog embodiment. Cuozzo does not contend that 

any secondary considerations argue against a finding of 

obviousness. 

Claim 10 would have been obvious over Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt because it encompasses the analog embodiment of the invention discussed in the specification. 

We need not address whether claim 10 is also obvious 

over Tegethoff, Awada, Evans, and Wendt, as the Board 

also concluded.

D

Finally, we consider whether the Board properly denied Cuozzo’s motion for leave to amend, finding that 

Cuozzo’s substitute claims would enlarge the scope of the 

patent. Cuozzo moved to substitute claim 10 with the 

following substitute claim 21: 

A speed limit indicator comprising: 

a global positioning system receiver determining a 

vehicle’s present location, a vehicle’s present 

speed and a speed limit at the vehicle’s present location; 

a display controller connected to said global positioning system receiver, wherein said display 

controller adjusts a colored display in response to signals indicative of the speed limit 

at the vehicle’s present location from said 

global positioning system receiver to continuously update the delineation of which speed 

readings determined by the global positioning 

system receiver are in violation of the speed 

limit at the vehicle’s present location; and 

a speedometer integrally attached to said colored 

display,

wherein the speedometer comprises a liquid crystal display, and 

wherein the colored display is the liquid crystal 

display.

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IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 25

J.A. 357–58.

The statute and PTO regulation bar amendments 

which would broaden the scope of the claims. 35 U.S.C. 

§ 316(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(2)(ii). In the past, we 

have construed this requirement in the context of reissues 

and reexaminations. In both contexts, we have applied 

the test that a claim “is broader in scope than the original 

claims if it contains within its scope any conceivable 

apparatus or process which would not have infringed the 

original patent.” Tillotson, Ltd. v. Walbro Corp., 831 F.2d 

1033, 1037 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in the reissue context); see 

In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Tillotson, 831 F.2d at 1037 n.2) (in the reexamination 

context). The same test applies in the context of IPRs. 

Therefore, we inquire whether Cuozzo’s proposed substitute claims would encompass any apparatus or process 

that would not have been covered by the original claims.10

The Board held that claim 21 was broadening because it 

would encompass a single-LCD embodiment wherein both 

the speedometer and the colored display are LCDs, which 

was not within the original claims. Cuozzo argues that 

the proposed claims were not broadening and instead 

copied limitations from two dependent claims in the 

patent. 

10 Cuozzo argues that its substitute claim is narrowing because it is limited to the single-LCD embodiment 

and no longer would encompass the mechanical embodiment. This argument misstates the test for broadening. 

“[A] claim is broadened if it is broader in any respect than 

the original claim, even though it may be narrowed in 

other respects.” In re Rogoff, 261 F.2d 601, 603 (C.C.P.A. 

1958); see also Senju Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., 746 

F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

 

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26 IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Based on the proper construction of the phrase “integrally attached,” we agree with the PTO that Cuozzo’s 

proposed amendment is broadening. Cuozzo itself argues 

that the motion to amend was denied solely because of the 

PTO’s interpretation of “integrally attached,” and argues 

only that a remand is necessary if we were to reverse the 

Board’s claim construction (which we have not done).

Cuozzo admits that the Board’s construction of “integrally 

attached” “excludes the single LCD embodiment of the 

invention in which the speedometer includes an LCD that 

is the colored display.” Appellant Br. 33. Proposed claim 

21 recites “a speedometer integrally attached to said 

colored display, wherein the speedometer comprises a 

liquid crystal display, and wherein the colored display 

is the liquid crystal display.” J.A. 358 (emphasis added). 

The word “the,” emphasized in the quoted language 

above, requires a single-LCD embodiment that includes

both the speedometer and the colored display in one LCD. 

Because proposed claim 21 would encompass an embodiment not encompassed by claim 10, it is broadening, and 

the motion to amend was properly denied.

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-1301 Document: 35-2 Page: 26 Filed: 02/04/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC.

______________________

2014-1301

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2012-

00001.

______________________

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent, for several of the panel majority’s rulings are contrary to the legislative purpose of the 

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 

125 Stat. 284 (2011) (effective September 16, 2012).

The America Invents Act established a new Inter 

Partes Review system for the purpose of “providing quick 

and cost effective alternatives to litigation.” H.R. Rep. 

No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011). This purpose was achieved 

by providing a new adjudicatory proceeding in the administrative agency, the Patent and Trademark Office in the 

Department of Commerce, whereby a newly formed 

Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) serves as a surrogate for district court litigation of patent validity. The 

goal is improved service to technology-based innovation, 

and thus to the nation. The panel majority thwarts the 

statutory plan in several ways.

First, the panel majority holds that the PTAB, in conducting its adversarial proceedings, need not and should 

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2 IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

not apply the same legal and evidentiary standards as 

would apply in the district court. Instead, the panel 

majority authorizes and requires treating the claims of an

issued patent in the same way as pending claims in the 

patent application stage, where claims are subject to the 

“broadest reasonable interpretation” examination protocol. The panel majority thus precludes achieving review 

of patent validity in Inter Partes Review comparable to 

that of the district courts, where validity is determined 

based on the correct claim construction, not an artificially

“broadest” construction.

This court has approved the use of “broadest reasonable interpretation” as an expedient in examination and 

reexamination, but our approval was based on the unfettered opportunity to amend in those proceedings. That 

opportunity is not present in Inter Partes Review; 

amendment of claims requires permission, and since the 

inception of Inter Partes Review, motions to amend have 

been granted in only two cases, although many have been 

requested.1

The purpose of Inter Partes Review is to “convert” inter partes reexamination “from an examinational proceeding to an adjudicative proceeding.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, 

pt.1, at 46. See also 157 Cong. Rec. S1111 (Mar. 2, 2011)

1 See Andrew Williams, PTAB Update – The Board 

Grants Its Second Motion to Amend (At Least in Part), 

PATENT DOCS (Jan. 8, 2015), 

http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/01/ptab-update-theboard-grants-its-second-motion-to-amend-at-least-inpart.html; see also Jennifer E. Hoekel, PTAB Grants First 

Opposed Motion to Amend Claims – Patent Trial and 

Appeal Board, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Jan. 14, 2015), 

http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ptab-grants-firstopposed-motion-to-amend-claims-patent-trial-and-appealboard.

 

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IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 3

(statement of Sen. Leahy) (the purpose is to “decrease[]

the likelihood of expensive litigation because it creates a

less costly, in-house administrative alternative to review 

patent validity claims”). By refusing to apply to Inter 

Partes Review the procedural and substantive law of the 

district courts, the panel majority defeats the legislative 

purpose, for the PTO tribunal cannot serve as a surrogate 

for district court litigation if the PTAB does not apply the 

same law to the same evidence.

Second, and as a further departure from the legislative plan, the panel majority holds that the “final and 

nonappealable” statutory provision relating to whether to 

institute Inter Partes Review means that “§ 314(d) . . . 

must be read to bar review of all institution decisions, 

even after the Board issues a final decision.” Maj. op. at 

7. Does this mean that such decisions can never be judicially reviewed, even if contrary to law, even if material to 

the final appealed judgment? This ruling appears to 

impede full judicial review of the PTAB’s final decision, 

further negating the purpose of the America Invents Act

to achieve correct adjudication of patent validity through 

Inter Partes Review in the administrative agency.

Several other aspects of the America Invents Act are 

incorrectly or confusingly treated. For example, as Cuozzo points out, here the PTAB decision relies on arguments 

and evidence that had not been raised in the petition to 

institute, although the statute requires that all arguments and evidence must be presented in the petition. 

The panel majority holds that “[t]he fact that the petition 

was defective is irrelevant because a proper petition could

have been drafted.” Maj. op. at 8. Such broad and conflicting departure from the statutory provisions cannot 

have been intended.

Inter Partes Review is intended as a far-reaching and 

powerful surrogate for district court validity determinations. The plan is that an adversarial proceeding in the 

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4 IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

PTO will resolve most issues of patent validity, without

the disruption and expense and delay of district court 

litigation. I write in dissent because the court today 

moves Inter Partes Review in directions contrary to the 

language and intent of the America Invents Act, thereby 

impeding its purpose to serve as a surrogate for district 

court litigation.

I

Inter Partes Review as surrogate for 

district court litigation

The goal of Inter Partes Review is to rehabilitate the 

innovation incentive, by reinforcing valid patents and 

eliminating invalid patents through an expeditious and 

cost-effective alternative to litigation, on whose results 

the innovation community can rely. To this end, the new 

Inter Partes Review proceedings provide for discovery, 

expert testimony, depositions, subpoenas, briefs, and oral 

argument by adversaries. See Abbott Labs. v. Cordis 

Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (the America 

Invents Act created an adversarial proceeding as in the 

district courts, where all appropriate evidence can be 

adduced).

Inter Partes Review is limited to patent validity, for 

validity is a central issue in patent litigation, and often is 

dispositive of the entire litigation. To serve as a reliable 

substitute for district court validity determination, the 

legislation was designed to achieve the same correct 

decision as would be obtained in a district court on the 

same evidence and the same law. However, this court

holds that PTAB adjudication need not conform to the law 

and consider the same evidence as in the courts. Instead, 

the panel majority authorizes the PTAB to employ the 

expedients and shortcuts that were developed for the giveand-take of examination and reexamination, instead of 

determining validity as a matter of fact and law, as required in the courts.

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IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 5

Although the PTAB is authorized to apply trial and 

evidentiary procedures, my colleagues hold that the PTAB

need not apply the same rules of law and evidence as in

the district courts. It is critical to the success of Inter 

Partes Review that it serve its purpose as a district court 

surrogate, yet it is not disputed that the “broadest reasonable interpretation” of claims and technology can differ 

from the ultimately correct decision on the standards of 

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 45 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 

banc). This built-in discrepancy defeats the legislative 

purpose of substituting administrative adjudication for 

district court adjudication, for a PTAB decision based on 

this artificial “broadest” standard cannot substitute for 

litigation directed to the correct result.

A

My colleagues argue that Inter Partes Review is simply a reexamination of the patent, and thus should be 

conducted on the same broadest reasonable interpretation 

as for reexamination. This argument is negated by the 

heavy legislative emphasis on differences from reexamination as achieved by these new procedures.

The House Report states that the America Invents Act 

“converts” Inter Partes Reexamination “from an examinational proceeding to an adjudicative proceeding.” H.R. 

Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011); see also id. at 75 

(describing post-grant review and Inter Partes Review as 

“adjudicative systems”). The Report further explains:

Unlike reexamination proceedings, which provide only a limited basis on which to consider 

whether a patent should have issued, the postgrant review proceeding permits a challenge on 

any ground related to invalidity under section 

282. The intent of the post-grant review process 

is to enable early challenges to patents . . . . The 

Committee believes that this new, early-stage 

process for challenging patent validity . . . will 

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6 IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

make the patent system more efficient and improve the quality of patents and the patent system.

Id. at 46. It is undisputed that Congress intended that 

Inter Partes Review would differ from examination or 

reexamination, and that these new proceedings would be 

adjudicative, like the validity proceedings in the district 

courts. In the PTAB’s words, “[a]n inter partes review is 

neither a patent examination nor a patent reexamination,” but is “a trial, adjudicatory in nature [which] constitutes litigation.” Google Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic 

Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00191, Paper No. 50, at 4 (PTAB 

Feb. 13, 2014).

To implement the intent of the America Invents Act, 

the administrative judges of the PTAB must apply the 

same procedural and substantive law as the district 

courts. By adopting the examination protocol of broadest 

reasonable interpretation, the PTO and the panel majority negate the legislative purpose, for the PTAB tribunals 

cannot serve as a surrogate for district court litigation if 

the PTAB does not apply the same law to the same evidence. Instead, Inter Partes Review will merely become 

another mechanism for delay, harassment, and expenditure, despite the Congressional warning:

While this amendment is intended to remove current disincentives to current administrative processes, the changes made by it are not to be used 

as tools for harassment or a means to prevent 

market entry through repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity of a patent. 

Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.

H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 47 (2011).

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IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 7

The broadest reasonable interpretation standard is 

not a rule of law, but a pragmatic protocol applied in 

patentability examination and reexamination. See In re 

Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (giving 

claims their broadest reasonable interpretation “serves 

the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, 

finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified”); see also, e.g., In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 

The broadest reasonable interpretation is an examination 

expedient, not a canon of construction. It serves not to 

state the correct meaning of the claim, but to provide a 

framework for clarification and amendment.

Contrary to the panel majority’s theory, the differences between reexamination and the new post-grant 

proceedings are very relevant to Inter Partes Review. The 

standard for adjudication of validity is set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., where claims are given their correct 

construction as understood by a person of ordinary skill in 

the field of the invention. Adoption of a broadest interpretation renders the PTAB rulings legally unreliable, 

leaving the parties to district court proceedings, whatever 

the decision of the PTAB. That was not the legislative 

plan.

B

The panel majority holds that it is irrelevant that the 

America Invents Act does not mention a “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard, stating that endorsement of this approach is “implicit” in the legislative 

silence. Maj. op. at 16. To the contrary, the language of

the America Invents Act demonstrates that Congress did 

not intend that the PTAB tribunals would construe claims 

differently from the district courts.

While the reexamination, interference, and reissue 

statutes and regulations refer to the “patentability” of a 

claim, 35 U.S.C. §§ 305; 135; 37 C.F.R. § 1.97, the term 

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“validity” is used throughout the Inter Partes Review 

statute. 35 U.S.C. § 316. The distinction is carefully 

made in the statute, for “validity” is the province of adjudication, while “patentability” applies to examination. 

See In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. 

Cir. 1994) (referring to “a patentability determination in 

the PTO or . . . a validity or infringement determination 

in a court”). This distinction is significant.

The America Invents Act refers to the “proper meaning of a patent claim,” see 35 U.S.C. §301(d) (referring to 

“the proper meaning of a patent claim in a proceeding 

that is ordered or instituted pursuant to section 304, 314, 

or 324”). The “proper meaning of a patent claim” is the 

correct meaning. Correctness is the province of the

courts, and correctness is the purpose of Inter Partes 

Review.

C

The panel majority further argues that the Federal 

Circuit has “approved” the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard in “a variety of [PTO] proceedings.” Maj. 

op. at 13. Indeed we have, explaining in In re Yamamoto

that the expedient of broad interpretation during examination and reexamination is based on the ready ability to 

amend claims, the Yamamoto court stressing this difference from judicial proceedings:

An applicant’s ability to amend his claims to 

avoid cited prior art distinguishes proceedings before the PTO from proceedings in federal district 

courts on issued patents. When an application is 

pending in the PTO, the applicant has the ability 

to correct errors in claim language and adjust the 

scope of claim protection as needed. This opportunity is not available in an infringement action

in district court.

740 F.2d at 1572.

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In routine examination and reexamination, the 

amendment of a claim is a fluid, back-and-forth process 

between an examiner and the applicant, who may present 

proposed amendments and new claims. Reexamination is

“conducted according to the procedures established for 

initial examination under the provisions of Sections 132 

and 133.” 35 U.S.C. § 305. The focus of reexamination 

proceedings “returns essentially to that present in an 

initial examination.” In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. 

Cir. 1985). It is significant that when claims in reexamination are not eligible for amendment, as when a patent 

has expired, the PTO instructs examiners not to use the 

broadest reasonable interpretation. MPEP § 2258 G 

states:

In a reexamination proceeding involving claims of 

an expired patent, claim construction pursuant to 

the principle set forth by the court in Phillips v. 

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 

(words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a 

person of ordinary skill in the art in question at 

the time of the invention) should be applied since 

the expired claims are not subject to amendment.

The panel majority is incorrect in stating that Inter 

Partes Review proceedings are “not materially different” 

from pre-AIA proceedings with respect to the opportunity 

to amend. Maj. op. at 15.

It is reported that the ability to amend claims in Inter 

Partes Review proceedings, as administered by the PTO,

is almost entirely illusory. Amendment requires permission, 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(b), and to date motions to amend 

have been granted in only two cases, see supra note 1. 

Patent owners are limited to “one motion to amend,” and 

are presumptively limited to substituting one issued claim 

for one amended claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(3). Additional motions to amend are allowed only “to materially 

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advance the settlement of a proceeding” or “as permitted 

by regulations prescribed by the Director.” 35 U.S.C. 

§ 316(d)(2).

It is beyond debate that Inter Partes Review does not 

allow the kind of iterative amendment process that initially justified adoption of a “broadest reasonable interpretation” protocol in examination and reexamination.

D

The panel majority states that the PTO is acting within its rulemaking authority. The Supreme Court has 

stated that “although an agency’s interpretation of the 

statute under which it operates is entitled to some deference, ‘this deference is constrained by our obligation to 

honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its 

language, purpose, and history.’” Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 

442 U.S. 397, (1979) (quoting Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 

U.S. 551, 566 n. 20 (1979)); see also Muwwakkil v. Office 

of Pers. Mgmt., 18 F.3d 921, 925 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“When 

an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to 

administer is contrary to the intent of Congress, as divined from the statute and its legislative history, we owe 

it no deference.”).

In promulgating 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b), the PTO departed from the purpose of the America Invents Act to 

create a reliable substitute for district court litigation. 

The invocation of the “broadest” construction rather than 

the correct construction is inconsistent with the language, 

purpose and history of the America Invents Act. 

Regulations must implement the statute they seek to 

serve, not defeat it. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 

U.S. 185, 213–14 (1976) (“The rulemaking power granted 

to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. 

Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into 

effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.”). Pending potential legislative action, it is our 

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obligation to interpret the statute in accordance with its 

legislative purpose.2

In sum, the procedure whereby claims are given their 

broadest reasonable interpretation instead of their correct 

construction defeats the purpose of Inter Partes Review as 

a surrogate for district court litigation.

II

The nonappealable decision to institute 

Inter Partes Review

The America Invents Act states that the PTO’s decision whether to institute Inter Partes Review is “final and 

nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). The panel majority 

holds that this means that rulings in connection with the

institution of Inter Partes Review, whether review is 

granted or denied, cannot be appealed to any court, either 

by interlocutory appeal or on appeal of final judgment. 

That is not what the statute states, or requires.

The panel majority “conclude[s] that § 314(d) prohibits review of the decision to institute IPR even after a 

final decision. On its face, the provision is not directed to 

2 On December 5, 2013, the House passed H.R. 

3309, amending section 316(a) to state that in Inter 

Partes Review “each claim of a patent shall be construed 

as such claim would be in a civil action to invalidate a 

patent under section 282(b), including constructing each 

claim of the patent in accordance with the ordinary and 

customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of 

ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history 

pertaining to the patent . . . .” H.R. Rep. No. 113-279, at 

13–14 (2013). The corresponding Senate bill was reported 

to have stalled for reasons unrelated to this section. This 

proposed clarification is further evidence of legislative 

intent.

 

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precluding review only before a final decision. It is written to exclude all review of the decision whether to institute review.” Maj. op. at 6. On this conclusion, the panel 

majority holds that we are barred by § 314(d) from reviewing compliance with the statutory limits of Inter 

Partes Review.

The majority acknowledges that situations may arise 

“where the PTO has clearly and indisputably exceeded its 

authority,” and suggests that possibly “mandamus may be 

available to challenge the PTO’s decision to grant a petition to institute IPR after the Board’s final decision.” 

Maj. op. at 8. This hint is disputed by the PTO, pointing

to the Federal Circuit’s strict requirements for mandamus.

The ultimate authority regarding what a statute says 

and how it applies is the judiciary. The purpose of the 

“nonappealable” provision apparently is to bar interlocutory proceedings and harassing filings by those seeking to 

immobilize the patent or exhaust the patentee. The bar of 

interlocutory appeals is routine. However, sensitive 

scrutiny is required, not blanket enlargement for all 

circumstances. In Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family 

Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) the Court explained that 

“[f]rom the beginning ‘our cases [have established] that 

judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved 

person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason

to believe that such was the purpose of Congress’.” Id. at 

670 (alteration in original) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)).

Cuozzo points out that here the PTAB decision relies 

on arguments that had not been raised in the petition for 

review, contrary to the requirements of the statute. 35 

U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (the petition must identify the grounds 

and evidence as to each challenged claim). The panel 

majority holds that “[t]he fact that the petition was defective is irrelevant because a proper petition could have 

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been drafted.” Maj. op. at 8. Is this prohibited appellate 

review of the nonappealable petition? Or simply a curious 

departure from the fundamental rule of administrative 

action, that agency decisions must be reviewable on 

appeal? In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 

U.S. 340 (1984), the Court elaborated on the principle of 

judicial review of agency determinations. The Court 

summarized:

Whether and to what extent a particular statute 

precludes judicial review is determined not only 

from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the 

administrative action involved.

Id. at 345.

The statute requires thoughtful adjustment to the legislative purpose, not heavy-handed foreclosure of all 

review of anything related to the petition.

Conclusion

The America Invents Act has the purpose of “providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.” 

H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011). The PTO is

authorized to review the validity of issued patents in 

accordance with new procedures, to reach the correct 

decision, but faster, cheaper, and sooner than in the 

district court. The panel majority fails to implement the 

statutory purpose.

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