Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00216/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00216-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Merced
Defendant
L. McAbee
Defendant
Andrew Moua
Plaintiff
Unknown Merced Police Officers
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW MOUA,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

L. MCABEE; CITY OF MERCED;

UNKNOWN MERCED POLICE OFFICERS

DOES 1-20; DOES 21-30, 

 Defendants.

1:06-cv-00216 OWW SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT

CITY OF MERCED’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION 

I. INTRODUCTION.

This case arises out of the February 24, 2005 arrest of

Plaintiff Andrew Moua (“Andrew”) and seizure of his personal

property, a “Pantera Claw,” an object that appears similar to

metal brass knuckles, by Merced police officers at the home he

shared with his parents, girlfriend, and brother, Chou Moua, in

Merced, California. Chou was on probation at the time, the terms

of which included consent to warrantless residence searches, and

Merced police officers conducted a probation search of the Moua

house as part of Operation Safe Street II. This operation

involved a number of searches of probationers’ homes in response

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 1 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

to a recent double homicide.

Plaintiff Moua brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

42 U.S.C. § 1988, alleging Merced police officers violated his

Fourth, First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In addition,

Plaintiff alleges that the City of Merced and individual Merced

police officers should be held liable on various state law

theories.

Before the court for decision is Defendant City of Merced’s

motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary

adjudication as to Plaintiff’s entire complaint. Defendant seeks

judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot 1) establish his

federal constitutional claims, 2) overcome the qualified immunity

of the individual defendants, or 3) establish Monell liability of

the City of Merced. Defendant also argues the state law claims

should be dismissed because the officers 4) acted lawfully, 5)

are entitled to immunity under California Government Code §§

821.6 and 815.2(b), and 6) Plaintiff lacks evidence to support

some of his claims.

II.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

A. Events Leading Up to the Arrest and “Pantera Claw”

Seizure

1. Undisputed Facts

On February 24, 2005, the Merced Police Department and a

number of state, local and federal agencies conducted Operation

Safe Street II, consisting of probation searches across eastern

Merced County. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts (“DSUMF”) ## 1, 4.) The operation was undertaken in

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 2 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

response to two gang-related murders that had taken place in

Merced a few weeks earlier and was designed to generate

information and evidence as part of the investigation of the

murders. (DSUMF ## 2-3.) The residences targeted in Operation

Safe Streets II were selected based on a number of criteria,

including known gang affiliation, without respect to any gang’s

ethnic association. (DSUMF #5.) A temporary command post was

established at Merced County Fairgrounds for coordinating the

operation and processing arrested individuals. (DSUMF #6.)

One of the residences included in Operation Safe Street II

was the home of Chou Moua, the Plaintiff’s brother. (DSUMF #7.)

Chou was on probation following an August 18, 2003 conviction for

the felony of carrying a concealed loaded weapon in violation of

California Penal Code § 12025(b)(6). (DSUMF #8.) One condition

of Chou’s probation was that he submit his “person, vehicle,

place of residence or any other belongings to search and seizure,

without a warrant, any time day or night, by any Probation

Officer and/or Peace Officer, with or without probable cause.” 

(DSUMF #9.) 

The team that searched the Moua home midday on February 24,

2005 included probation officer Moses Nelson, police officers

Cruz Jasso, Jobe Sandhagen, and Larry McAbee, and two or three

state/federal agents. (DSUMF ## 11-14.) The front door to the

Moua home was open when officers arrived and Chong Moua,

Plaintiff’s father, was outside. (DSUMF ## 15-16.) The officers

spoke to Mr. Moua about Chou and, after entering the house, found

Chou on the couch in the living room located at the front of the

house. (DSUMF ## 16, 18.) No force was used to enter the house. 

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 3 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

(DSUMF #17.)

2. Disputed Facts.

Defendant claims Chou Moua was suspected of being associated

with a criminal gang in the area. (DSUMF #10.) Plaintiff does

not dispute that Officer Jasso testified to this but objects to

the characterization of Chou as vague. Defendant asserts that

Officer Nelson led the search team at the Moua residence. (DSUMF

#11.) Plaintiff contends that Officer Jasso was “in charge of

the search” and led the team.

When the officers arrived at the Moua house, Defendant

contends they asked Chong Moua, Plaintiff’s father, about Chou

and that Mr. Moua referred them inside the house. (DSUMF #16.) 

Plaintiff asserts officers only asked Mr. Moua his son’s name

upon arrival and Mr. Moua testified “...he was inside so they go

get him.”

B. The Arrest and Seizure Incident.

1. Undisputed Facts.

The officers gathered the occupants of the house into the

living room. (DSUMF #19.) At the time, Plaintiff, his

girlfriend Sara Watson, Chou, and Plaintiff’s mother and father

were home. (DSUMF #20.) When the officers entered the Moua

home, Plaintiff and Sara were sleeping in Plaintiff’s bedroom. 

(DSUMF #21.) The doors to Plaintiff’s bedroom were closed and

locked routinely for privacy and such was the case on the day of

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 4 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Although Officer Sandhagen’s police report stated that the 1

door to Plaintiff’s room was open and not locked when the

officers arrived and some officers testified in deposition that

they didn’t know if Plaintiff’s door was open and/or locked when

they arrived, Defendant does not contest this point in its

summary judgment motion, citing Plaintiff’s deposition testimony

to this effect. Defendant confirmed in its reply brief and at

oral argument that it does not contend Plaintiff’s bedroom door

was open when the officers first arrived.

5

the incident when the officers entered the Moua home.1

(Plaintiff’s Further Material Facts (“PFMF”) #66.) Plaintiff’s

bedroom is a converted garage with two doors, one leading to the

living room and one leading to the backyard. (Declaration of

Andrew Moua (“Moua Decl.”), ¶ 1.) Plaintiff is of Hmong descent

while Sara is Caucasian with blonde hair. (DSUMF ## 22-23.) One

officer knocked on Plaintiff’s bedroom door, awakening Sara, who

got up to open the door. (DSUMF #24.) Sara unlocked the door in

response to the officer’s knock. (Moua Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff

asserts officers were standing at his bedroom door when Sara

opened it and heard the door being unlocked. (Id.) The officer

told Sara that all the occupants of the house were requested to

go to the living room. (DSUMF #25.) Sara woke Plaintiff up and

both of them went to the living room. (DSUMF #26.) Neither

closed the bedroom door behind them as they left the room. 

(DSUMF #30.) No officer otherwise spoke to Plaintiff or Sara at

that time. (DSUMF #27.) Officer Sandhagen knew that Plaintiff

and Sara, not probationer Chou, occupied Plaintiff’s bedroom. 

(PFMF #67.)

Plaintiff’s bedroom was well-lit by sunlight at the time. 

(DSUMF #29.) Plaintiff contends officers entered his bedroom

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 5 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

without asking for or receiving consent and without a warrant,

knowing the room was not occupied by probationer Chou but by

others and that the door was locked until the officers knocked. 

(PFMF ## 66, 67, 71.) Officer Jasso testified that “[i]f the

rooms were locked and we didn’t get consent, we wouldn’t go into

a locked room.” (PFMF #72.) One of the searching officers,

Officer McAbee, characterized the search as “very low risk” and

didn’t recall the officers entering the Moua home with their

weapons drawn because “typically for a low risk search, we’re not

going to go in with our weapons drawn.” (Ex. H, Holland

Declaration, McAbee Depo. at 30.) In deposition testimony,

Officers Nelson, Sandhagen and McAbee all mentioned a safety

sweep to secure or clear the area. Defendant asserts for the

first time in its reply brief that a car matching the description

of one associated with the homicides being investigated was

parked outside the Moua home. (Doc. 30.) In support of this

assertion, Defendant points to a supplemental report filed by

Detective Sterling on February 24, 2005 which mentions such a car

but does not indicate when the car was observed or whether the

officers at the Moua home saw the car and, if so, when. (Doc.

30, Larsen Declaration, Exhibit B.) No Detective Sterling is

alleged to have been at the Moua home during the search incident. 

At some point an officer pointed out an object that he

thought was a weapon hanging on Plaintiff’s bedroom wall. (DSUMF

#33.) Officer Sandhagen testified he went into Plaintiff’s

bedroom and found the object mounted on the wall immediately to

his right as he walked into the bedroom. (DSUMF ## 34-35.) 

Officer Sandhagen described the object as a pair of brass

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 6 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

knuckles with three eight-inch long knives protruding from them. 

(DSUMF #37.) The object was not adhered to the wall or plaque on

which it was mounted in any way. (DSUMF ## 35-36.) It was made

of metal, leather and possibly wood and had four holes through

which fingers could be inserted. (DSUMF #38.) The knuckle area

was about the size of a closed fist, or slightly larger. (DSUMF

#39.) Officer Sandhagen testified he recognized the object as

metal knuckles within the meaning of California Penal Code §

12020(c)(7). (DSUMF #40.) He arrested Plaintiff for possession

of the object in violation of California Penal Code §

12020(a)(1). (DSUMF #41.) Plaintiff later told the officers the

object was called a “Pantera Claw.” (DSUMF #42.) The officers

seized the Pantera Claw. (DSUMF #43.)

When Plaintiff was arrested, he was in the living room on

the couch. (DSUMF #46.) An officer approached him, told him he

was under arrest and requested that he stand up and put his hands

behind his back. (DSUMF ## 46, 49.) Plaintiff complied and his

wrists were handcuffed. (DSUMF #47.) The handcuffs did not

cause Plaintiff any pain. (DSUMF #48.) Plaintiff was led

outside to a police car and driven to the fairgrounds, where he

was questioned. (DSUMF ## 50, 54.) He was then taken to the

Sandy Mush Correctional Facility, where he was released on bail

after approximately 24 hours. (DSUMF ## 55-56.)

Plaintiff purchased the Pantera Claw on the Internet,

through eBay. (DSUMF #51.) He found it in eBay’s “collectibles,

knives, hobbies” category. Plaintiff thought the Pantera Claw

was “just a decoration” and had no understanding that it could be

used as a weapon. (DSUMF #53.) Plaintiff was never prosecuted

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 7 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

on the charge for this incident. (DSUMF #57.) He has never

requested the return of the Pantera Claw and understands it is in

the custody of the Merced police department. (DSUMF ## 44-45.)

After the incident, Plaintiff never sought medical care nor did

he suffer any emotional distress. (DSUMF #64.)

Finally, Plaintiff points to the Merced County District

Attorney’s Refusal of Complaint in support of his claims, noting

charges were not filed because “1. Weapon appears not to be

covered by PC12020, and 2. Suspect’s room should not have been

searched-suspect was not on probation/parole did not consent to

the search, and there was no exigency justifying the search.” 

(Holland Decl., Ex. A.) Defendant objects to this evidence on

hearsay and relevance grounds. This objection is overruled as

these documents are admissible as business records kept in the

ordinary course of business under Fed. R. Evid. 803(b).

2. Disputed Facts.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not see any officer

searching his bedroom. (DSUMF #28.) Plaintiff asserts that he

saw officers go into his bedroom and they acknowledged they

searched his room at minimum to find the Pantera Claw. Defendant

contends the officers performed a protective sweep of the

residence that included entry into Plaintiff’s bedroom. 

Plaintiff acknowledges officers entered his bedroom, but disputes

the characterization of the purpose of their entry as a

protective sweep. Plaintiff disputes the timing of when the

officer pointed out the Pantera Claw hanging on Plaintiff’s

bedroom wall and when Officer Sandhagen went into the bedroom and

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 8 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

found it. Plaintiff asserts it is unclear whether these events

occurred during any initial purported “protective sweep” or

during a search for evidence. Plaintiff points to Officer

Sandhagen’s report after the event, Merced Police Department

Report No. 2005-08366 dated February 25, 2005, in which he states

“While searching the residence, we noticed that Andrew Moua’s

bedroom door was open when we arrived [sic] and that it was not

locked. Chou had access to Andrew’s bedroom so we searched

Andrew’s bedroom.” (PFMF #65.) Plaintiff also disputes Officer

Sandhagen’s description of the object as “brass knuckles,”

claiming the officer was unsure of the attributes of the object

and whether it met the definition of brass knuckles.

Defendant asserts that officers found a rifle and ammunition

in the closet of the bedroom of Plaintiff’s parents. Plaintiff

does not dispute the fact that a rifle and ammunition were found,

but asserts that Mr. Moua directed officers to the rifle in his

bedroom. Plaintiff also claims Chou did not have access to

Plaintiff’s bedroom and that Chou was being held by officers in

the living room when Plaintiff’s bedroom door was first opened. 

(PFMF #68.)

C. The Officers’ Behavior and Treatment of Residents.

1. Undisputed Facts.

1) It is undisputed that the officers did not exhibit any

intimidation toward Plaintiff or threaten him in anyway. (DSUMF

#62.) 

2) Plaintiff did not experience any pain when officers

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 9 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

placed handcuffs on him. (DSUMF #48.) 

3) The officers directed no physical or verbal abuse toward

Plaintiff, Sara, or Plaintiff’s family. (DSUMF #61.) 

4) The officers never made any profane comments to Plaintiff

or belittled him or his family. (DSUMF #59.) The officers did

not say anything that Plaintiff perceived as rude or

unprofessional. (DSUMF #63.) 

5) None of the officers made any comments to Plaintiff about

his Asian descent or the fact that he had a Caucasian girlfriend. 

(DSUMF ## 58, 60.)

D. Summary of the Complaint.

Plaintiff’s complaint contains a laundry list of

constitutional deprivations and torts allegedly suffered by

Plaintiff at the hands of Defendant City of Merced and its police

officers Larry McAbee and unknown officers Does 1-20 and 21-30. 

The officers are sued in their individual capacities and City of

Merced is sued as a municipal entity that “acts by and through

its individual officers.” (Doc. 1.) Count I contains

allegations of federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s officers violated his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure

when they searched his bedroom, in which he possessed a

reasonable expectation of privacy, without a warrant and with

actual knowledge that the room was separate, locked and/or closed

off from the rest of the house. Plaintiff alleges the officers

encountered his locked bedroom door and were informed that

Plaintiff resided in the bedroom, that there was a separate

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 10 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

exterior entrance and that other family members did not have

access to the room. Plaintiff contends Defendant’s officers

searched his room over his objections and without his consent, a

warrant, probable cause or legal or reasonable justification and

thus illegally seized the Pantera Claw. He also alleges Fourth

Amendment violations on grounds of excessive force and false and

unjustifiable restraint, arrest and imprisonment.

Plaintiff complains of violations of his Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free from racial discrimination based on

the grounds that officers undertook law enforcement action

against him because of his Asian race and ethnicity and the fact

that his girlfriend was Caucasian. On the same grounds,

Plaintiff alleges a violation of his First Amendment right to

free association. Plaintiff further alleges retaliation by

Defendant and its officers in response to a request for the

police report of the incident on Plaintiff’s behalf, presumably

asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim.

Count II recites state common law claims for trespass,

trespass to chattel and conversion, violation of privacy, false

arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, and infliction of

emotional distress arising out of the incidents described in

Count I. Count III alleges violations of Art. I §§ 2 and 13 of

the California Constitution which provide rights to free speech

and require probable cause for arrest, respectively. Also under

Count III, Plaintiff asserts a violation of California Civil Code

§ 52.1, the “Bane Act,” which prohibits persons from interfering

or attempting to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion,

with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual of rights

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 11 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States or by

the Constitution or laws of the State of California.

E. Procedural History.

Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 24, 2006 for

violations of federal civil rights, state common law rights and

state statutory rights. (Doc. 1.) Defendant City of Merced

filed its answer on June 27, 2006. (Doc. 7.) Defendant Larry

McAbee filed his answer to Plaintiff’s complaint on August 15,

2006. (Doc. 9.) Defendant City of Merced filed this motion for

summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication on

July 30, 2007. (Doc. 18.) Defendant seeks judgment on the

grounds that Plaintiff cannot 1) establish his federal

constitutional claims, and specifically cannot establish his

Fourth Amendment claims because the Pantera Claw was in plain

view, observed by the officers from inside the Moua home where

they were legitimately present, 2) overcome the qualified

immunity of the individual defendants, or 3) establish Monell

liability of the City of Merced. Defendant also argues the state

law claims should be dismissed because the officers 4) acted

lawfully, 5) are entitled to immunity under California Government

Code §§ 821.6 and 815.2(b), and 6) Plaintiff lacks evidence to

support some of his claims.

Plaintiff filed his opposition to summary judgment or, in

the alternative, summary adjudication on September 6, 2007. 

(Doc. 28.) Plaintiff opposes summary judgment on grounds that

triable issues of material fact exist as to his Fourth Amendment

claim and common law false imprisonment, trespass, and conversion

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 12 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

claims. Plaintiff argues Defendant’s officers exceeded the

legally permissible scope of any search or protective sweep of

Plaintiff’s room and thus their actions cannot be shielded under

the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff contends his arrest, based on illegally

discovered evidence, was also illegal and resulted in his false

imprisonment under common law. Plaintiff further contends the

illegal entry into his room constitutes the common law tort of

trespass and taints the seizure of the Pantera Claw. Plaintiff

argues the unconstitutional seizure of the Pantera Claw, his

personal property, makes out the common law tort of conversion. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues neither the City of Merced nor the

individual defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity

or investigative immunity.

In his opposition brief, Plaintiff states he does not oppose

summary adjudication of his state constitutional and statutory

claims, his common law claims for intentional infliction of

emotional distress and harassment, or his claims based on alleged

racial or ethnic discrimination. In this brief Plaintiff does

not address his First Amendment claims, his Fourth Amendment

claims based on false imprisonment and excessive force, or his

common law tort claims for invasion of privacy and trespass to

chattels. At oral argument, Plaintiff confirmed he abandons his

Fourteenth Amendment racial discrimination claim, Fourth

Amendment excessive force claim, First Amendment retaliation and

restriction of free association claims and his state law claims

for violation of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, and

harassment. He further confirmed abandonment of his California

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 13 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

constitutional claims and Bane Act claims. As to all these

claims, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND.

A. Standard of Review.

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56©;

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). The evidence

must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. West Oregon Wood Products,

Inc., 268 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 2001 WL

1490998 (9th Cir. 2001). Facts are “material” if they “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 

Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

at 248). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 14 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th

Cir. 2000). However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of

proof at trial, the moving party must only show “that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the

moving party has met its burden of proof, the non-moving party

must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could

find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in light of the

evidentiary burden the law places on that party. Triton Energy

Corp., 68 F.3d at 1221. The nonmoving party cannot simply rest

on its allegations without any significant probative evidence

tending to support the complaint. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076.

[T]he plain language of Rule 56© mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to the party's case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In

such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to

any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

“In order to show that a genuine issue of material fact

exists, the nonmoving party must introduce some ‘significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint.’” Rivera v.

AMTRAK, 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249). If the moving party can meet his

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 15 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

burden of production, the non-moving party “must produce evidence

in response....[H]e cannot defeat summary judgment with

allegations in the complaint, or with unsupported conjecture or

conclusory statements.” Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343

F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). “Conclusory allegations

unsupported by factual data cannot defeat summary judgment.” 

Rivera, 331 F.3d at 1078 (citing Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley

Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)).

B. Section 1983.

Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

provides a cause of action “against any person acting under color

of law who deprives another ‘of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United

States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887

(9th Cir. 2003)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “The rights

guaranteed by section 1983 are ‘liberally and beneficently

construed.’” Id. (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443

(1991). 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff may bring a civil

action for deprivation of rights under the following

circumstances: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,

except that in any action brought against a

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 16 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Although Monell dealt with a municipal government’s 2

liability under § 1983, the standard there announced was

more broadly framed in terms of “a local government.” Brass

v. County of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“There is certainly no constitutional impediment to 3

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth

Amendment.’” Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v.

Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). There is no “basis for

concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal

liability.” Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.

445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530

(1890)).

17

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in

such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive

relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory

decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.

To establish liability under 1983, a plaintiff must show 1)

that he has been deprived of a right secured by the United States

Constitution or a federal law, and 2) that the deprivation was

effected “under color of state law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d

1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003).

C. Monell Liability.

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for 2

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen v. 3

Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). “[T]he

legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 17 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other

local government units to be included among those persons to whom

§ 1983 applies.” Id. at 690. These bodies “can be sued directly

under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief

where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional

implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's

officers...[or for] deprivations visited pursuant to governmental

‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal

approval through the body’s official decision making channels.” 

Id. at 690-91. 

A local government’s liability is limited. Although a local

government can be held liable for its official policies or

customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s actions

outside of the scope of these policies or customs. 

[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background

of the same legislative history, compels the conclusion

that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held

liable unless action pursuant to official municipal

policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In

particular,...a municipality cannot be held liable

solely because it employs a tortfeasor, in other words,

a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The statute’s “language plainly imposes

liability on a government that, under color of some official

policy,‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s constitutional

rights.” Id. at 692.

To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove the

existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy. Haugen, 351

F.3d at 393. 

[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 18 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

custom, whether made by its law-makers or by those

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There are various ways a plaintiff may

prove the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy under

the Monell doctrine. These are discussed in context below.

D. Suits Against Government Officials: Official Capacity

and Individual Capacity Suits.

Suits against an official in her or his official capacity

are treated as suits against the entity on whose behalf that

official acts. In such suits, the real party in interest becomes

the entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21, 25 (1991). A federal action for monetary damages against an

individual State official acting in his official capacity is

barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the same way that an action

against the State is barred. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l

Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official for actions [taken]

under color of state law.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1027 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985))(internal quotations omitted). To establish personal

liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the

official, “acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal

quotations omitted). Public officials sued in their personal

capacity may assert personal liability defenses, such as

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 19 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

qualified immunity. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027. Here Plaintiff

sues Officer Larry McAbee and unknown Merced police officers in

their individual capacities.

E. Qualified Immunity.

In this case, Defendant City of Merced asserts the defense

of qualified immunity on behalf of all the individual defendants. 

Qualified immunity grows out of the policy concern that few

individuals would enter public service if they risked personal

liability for their official decisions. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The immunity protects "all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” 

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991), and "spare[s] a

defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands

customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out

lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). 

Qualified immunity is not a defense on the merits; it is an

“entitlement not to stand trial or face the burdens of

litigation” that may be overcome only by a showing that (1) a

constitutional right was in fact violated and (2) no reasonable

officer could believe defendant’s actions were lawful in the

context of fact-specific, analogous precedents. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 200-202 (2001). Thus deciding qualified immunity

entails a two-step analysis. Detailed legal background on the

qualified immunity defense is provided in context below.

IV. DISCUSSION.

A. Monell Liability of the City of Merced.

Plaintiff advances the following theories of liability on

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 20 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

the part of the City: 1) that the City “countenanced, allowed,

condoned, or knowingly ratified the actions and inactions” of the

officer defendants by “failing to adequately train, supervise,

direct, discipline or control” their anticipated and preventable

conduct in “recurring situations” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 18); 2) that

supervising officer Cruz Jasso failed to “countermand Officer

Sandhagen’s decision [to arrest] though he possessed the

authority to do so” and knowledge that the entry into Plaintiff’s

bedroom was unlawful (Doc. 28 at 4, 16); and 3) that the City has

“consciously-chosen indifference to a deprivation of plaintiff’s

constitutional rights” by promoting Corporal between the incident

and filing of the complaint (Doc. 28 at 16).

Local government entities and local government officials

acting in their official capacity can be sued for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief, but only if the allegedly

unconstitutional actions took place pursuant to some “policy

statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body's officers....” Monell, 436 U.S. at

690-91. Alternatively, if no formal policy exists, plaintiffs

may point to “customs and usages” of the local government entity.

 Id. A local government entity cannot be held liable simply

because it employs someone who has acted unlawfully. 

Id. at 694. See also Haugen, 351 F.3d at 393 (“Municipalities

cannot be held liable under a traditional respondeat superior

theory. Rather, they may be held liable only when "action

pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a

constitutional tort.... [T]o establish municipal liability, a

plaintiff must prove the existence of an unconstitutional

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 21 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

municipal policy.”). 

To prevail in a civil rights claim against a local

government under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part

test: 

(1) The local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights;

(2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom

and may not be an isolated incident; and

(3) There must be a link between the specific policy or

custom to the plaintiff’s injury.

Id. at 690-92.

There are a number of ways to prove a policy or custom of a

municipality. A plaintiff may show (1) “a longstanding practice

or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of

the local government entity;” (2) “the decision-making official

was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy in the area of decision;” or (3) “the official with final

policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or

ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” Menotti v. City of

Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit

has held that a municipal policy “may be inferred from widespread

practices or evidence of repeated constitutional violations for

which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or

reprimanded.” Id. 

Here, there is no direct evidence of the existence of any

unconstitutional policy, nor any evidence of a pattern of

activity on the part of the City of Merced. No other incidents

are described. Plaintiff conclusorily alleges “recurring

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 22 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

situations” of officer misconduct in his complaint but never

provides any facts to show his alleged constitutional violation

was part of a policy or custom of the City of Merced. 

Nevertheless, a municipality may be liable under Monell for a

single incident where: (1) the person causing the violation has

“final policymaking authority;” (2) the “final policymaker”

“ratified” a subordinate’s actions; or (3) the “final

policymaker” acted with deliberate indifference to a

subordinate’s constitutional violations. Christie v. Iopa, 176

F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1999).

The first Christie exception -- where the person causing the

violation has “final policy making authority” -- appears not to

be applicable here. To prove “ratification” Plaintiff must show

by admissible evidence that an “authorized policymaker [has]

approve[d] a subordinate's decision and the basis for it” and

that the policymaker has knowledge of the alleged constitutional

violation. Id. at 1239. 

The ratification doctrine, asserted as a basis for

municipal liability, originated in St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988). There, a plurality of

the Supreme Court stated that "[i]f the authorized

policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the

basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to

the municipality because their decision is final.” Id.

at 127. But the sentence from Praprotnik must be read in

context. The Court held in Praprotnik that to establish

municipal liability, a plaintiff must "prove [ ] the

existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy." Id.

at 128. A single decision by a municipal policymaker

"may be sufficient to trigger section 1983 liability

under Monell, even though the decision is not intended

to govern future situations," Gillette v. Delmore, 979

F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir.1992)(citing Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81,(1986)), but the

plaintiff must show that the triggering decision was the

product of a “conscious, affirmative choice” to ratify

the conduct in question. Gillette, 979 F.2d at

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 23 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

1347....See, e.g., Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 382

(1st Cir.1989) (refusing to hold that the “failure of a

police department to discipline in a specific instance

is an adequate basis for municipal liability under

Monell”).

Haugen, 351 F.3d at 393 (emphasis added). Plaintiff alleges the

team of officers at his house on February 24 committed

constitutional violations, not anyone with policy making

authority. The only person present at the scene with any

“authority” was the supervising officer Cruz Jasso. Plaintiff

does not contend or offer evidence that Officer Jasso was

involved in any policymaking for the Merced Police Department.

The third exception -- the final policymaker acted with

“deliberate indifference” to a subordinate’s constitutional

violations -- is a “stringent standard of fault, requiring proof

that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence

of his action.” Board of County Com'rs of Bryan County, Okl. v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). A municipality’s failure to

train, supervise, or discipline an employee can be the basis for

§ 1983 liability if there is proof of deliberate indifference. 

A policy can be one of action or inaction. See City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Under

Canton, a plaintiff can allege that through its

omissions the municipality is responsible for a

constitutional violation committed by one of its

employees, even though the municipality's policies were

facially constitutional, the municipality did not

direct the employee to take the unconstitutional

action, and the municipality did not have the state of

mind required to prove the underlying violation. Id. at

387-89. To impose liability against a county for its

failure to act, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a

county employee violated the plaintiff's constitutional

rights; (2) that the county has customs or policies

that amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) that

these customs or policies were the moving force behind

the employee's violation of constitutional rights.

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 24 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1193-94 (9th

Cir.2002).

Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185-86 (9th Cir.

2006)(citations edited).

For example, a failure to train can satisfy the “deliberate

indifference” standard under certain circumstances:

The issue is whether the training program is adequate

and, if it is not, whether such inadequate training can

justifiably be said to represent municipal policy. Id.

at 390.

In Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397

(1997), the Supreme Court discussed the circumstances

under which inadequate training can be the basis for

municipal liability. The first is a deficient training

program, “intended to apply over time to multiple

employees.” Id. at 407. The continued adherence by

policymakers “to an approach that they know or should

know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by

employees may establish the conscious disregard for the

consequences of their action-the ‘deliberate

indifference’-necessary to trigger municipal

liability.” Id. Further, “the existence of a pattern of

tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may

tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather

than a one-time negligent administration of the program

or factors peculiar to the officer involved in a

particular incident, is the ‘moving force’ behind the

plaintiff's injury.” Id. at 407-08.

A plaintiff also might succeed in proving a

failure-to-train claim without showing a pattern of

constitutional violations where “a violation of federal

rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a

failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific

tools to handle recurring situations.” Id. at 409.

Id. at 1186 (citations edited).

Nevertheless, a court should hesitate to impose liability

based on a single decision. In applying the “deliberate

indifference” exception, the Christie court relied on Board of

County Com'rs of Bryan County, Okl., 520 U.S. at 408-409: 

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 25 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

Where a claim of municipal liability rests on a single

decision, not itself representing a violation of

federal law and not directing such a violation, the

danger that a municipality will be held liable without

fault is high. Because the decision necessarily governs

a single case, there can be no notice to the municipal

decisionmaker, based on previous violations of

federally protected rights, that his approach is

inadequate. Nor will it be readily apparent that the

municipality's action caused the injury in question,

because the plaintiff can point to no other incident

tending to make it more likely that the plaintiff's own

injury flows from the municipality's action, rather

than from some other intervening cause.”

Here Plaintiff provides no evidence regarding officer

training or its adequacy. Plaintiff does not assert how the City

of Merced was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional

rights. Nor does Plaintiff provide evidence that any deliberate

indifference on the City’s part or alleged failure to train any

officer “was the moving force” behind the violation of his

constitutional rights. There is no training evidence.

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Officer Jasso was promoted

at some time after the incident, contending his promotion was a

ratification by the City of his alleged unconstitutional conduct. 

To prove ratification under Christie, Plaintiff must offer

evidence that an “authorized policymaker [has] approve[d] a

subordinate’s decision and the basis for it” and that the

policymaker had knowledge of the alleged violation. Christie,

176 Cal.3d at 1239. Here Plaintiff has not submitted any

evidence that any command level policymaker promoted Officer

Jasso or that any supervisor had knowledge of the alleged

conduct, let alone that such a person made a “conscious

affirmative choice to ratify the conduct in question.” Haugen,

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 26 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

351 F.3d at 393.

The evidence of only one example, this case, does not show

that the City of Merced either operates under a policy or custom

that allows officers to make unlawful entries and seizures, or to

act with deliberate indifference toward the rights of persons to

be free from such conduct. There are no material issues of fact

concerning the City’s Monell liability. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the City of Merced

as to Plaintiff’s Monell claim.

B. Qualified Immunity of Individual Merced Police Officers

on Fourth Amendment Claim.

Defendant City of Merced moves for summary judgment on

behalf of the individual defendants on the grounds that they are

entitled to qualified immunity. The standard for qualified

immunity implicates the legal bases for the alleged

constitutional violations. Deciding qualified immunity entails a

two-step analysis. First, a court must ask whether a

constitutional violation occurred at all. If the answer to this

question is yes, the court must then inquire whether the right

violated was “clearly established” by asking whether a reasonable

officer could believe that the defendant’s actions were lawful. 

See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 

The traditional summary judgment approach should be used in

analyzing the first step of the Saucier analysis: 

A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity

issue must consider, then, this threshold question:

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 27 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

[official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right?

Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and

determinations of credibility are manifestly the

province of a jury.

Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110-1111 (9th Cir.

2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the second

step, the court must ask whether it would be clear to a

reasonable official that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation confronted. Although this inquiry is primarily a legal

one, where the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that his

conduct was lawful “depends on the resolution of disputed issues

of fact...summary judgment is not appropriate.” Wilkins v. City

of Oakland, 364 F.3d 949, 1110-11 (9th. Cir. 2003) (citing

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg J., concurring)). 

Under Saucier, the first question is whether “taken in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the

facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right.” Here Plaintiff alleges the officers

violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

search and seizure by entering his bedroom and seizing his

Pantera Claw. Defendant contends the entry was lawful under the

plain view doctrine and thus the seizure was also lawful. 

Under the Fourth Amendment the right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S.

Const. amend. IV.; Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F. 3d 1113,

1152 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has held that “in the

ordinary case, seizures of personal property are unreasonable

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 28 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, without more, unless

accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued by a neutral

and detached magistrate after finding probable cause.” Id. 

However, when faced with special law enforcement needs, the

Supreme Court has found that certain general, or individual,

circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure

reasonable. Id. 

Merging the Fourth Amendment standard with the qualified

immunity presumption results in a two-step inquiry in which

Plaintiff must establish that 1) the officers’ search of his

bedroom exceeded the scope of a valid probation search or

protective sweep and the plain view exception is inapplicable,

and 2) that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer,

confronting the same circumstances, that the actions of the

officers were illegal. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

1. Constitutional Violation

Plaintiff does not dispute that the officers had lawful

authority for a probation search of Chou’s residence, given the

conditions of his brother’s probation. Plaintiff contends that

the officers exceeded the scope of their authority in entering

his bedroom, which was not a proper subject of their search. 

Plaintiff also asserts that any entry by the officers based on a

protective sweep theory is improper under the Fourth Amendment as

there was no reasonable justification for such a sweep at the

time. 

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 29 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

Defendants contend that while it is unclear whether officers

observed the Pantera Claw from outside of Plaintiff’s bedroom or

after entry, it is immaterial because defendant officers were

legally justified to be in Plaintiff’s room regardless, either as

part of a lawful probation search or protective sweep, incident

to that search. Accordingly they claim they observed the Pantera

Claw from a lawful place in plain view.

It is well established that a person does not have a

reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to items that are

in plain view from a place where officers have a legitimate right

to be. U.S. v. Garcia, 997 F.3d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Under the plain view doctrine, officers may lawfully seize an

item if the following three conditions are met: 1) the item is in

plain view; 2) the officers are lawfully searching in a place for

one thing; and 3) the incriminating nature of the item is

immediately apparent. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-36

(1990). 

Here there is no dispute that the Pantera Claw was in plain

view on the wall of Plaintiff’s bedroom. Officer Sandhagen

testified that he recognized the object as brass knuckles within

the meaning of California Penal Code 12020(c)(7), describing the

object as containing projections of eight-inch long blades, made

partially of metal, and the approximate size of a fist with holes

through which fingers could fit. The incriminating nature of an

object is “immediately apparent” if the officer has probable

cause to associate it with criminal activity. U.S. v. Hudson,

100 F.3d 1409, 1420 (9th Cir. 1996). Metal knuckles are defined

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 30 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

as:

any device or instrument made wholly or partially of metal

which is worn for purposes of offense or defense in or on

the hand and which either protects the wearer’s hand while

striking a blow or increases the force of impact from the

blow or injury to the individual receiving the blow. The

metal contained in the device may help support the hand or

fist, provide a shield to protect it, or consist of

projections or studs which would contact the individual

receiving a blow.

Cal. Penal Code § 12020(c)(7).

Officer Sandhagen’s testimony clearly establishes he had

probable cause to associate the Pantera Claw with criminal

activity, meeting the “immediately apparent” prong of the plain

view doctrine. The first and third requirements of the plain

view doctrine are satisfied. If the officer made the observation

of the Pantera Claw from outside of Plaintiff’s bedroom, either

in the hallway or at the threshold of Plaintiff’s bedroom door,

then the analysis would stop here and the search and seizure

would be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment’s plain view

doctrine. However, Defendants concede that there is a dispute in

the evidence about the officer’s location when he first made the

observation and there is no evidence that this observation was

made from outside Plaintiff’s bedroom. There is a further

dispute whether the bedroom door was initially locked and the

door not accessible or in view through a closed, locked door. 

Factual inferences must be drawn against the moving party. 

a. Valid Scope of Probation Search. 

A critical issue is whether the officers were legitimately

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 31 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

in the location from which they observed the Pantera Claw. 

Officer Sandhagen testifies that one of the officers pointed the

Pantera Claw out to him and he saw it on the wall as he “walked

into the bedroom immediately to [the] right.” From this

testimony it is unclear from what location the Pantera Claw was

first observed. Defendants argue that if the observation took

place inside Plaintiff’s room, it was lawful because incident to

the probation search they had the right to search areas that Chou

had access to or over which he had at least joint authority.

In evaluating the unlawful search and seizure claims of two

defendants who lived with a probationer subject to a probation

search condition under federal constitutional standards, the

California Supreme Court in People v. Woods held “[T]he search in

[a probation] case remains limited in scope to the terms

articulated in the search clause [citations] and to those areas

of the residence over which the probationer is believed to

exercise complete or joint authority.” 21 Cal.4th 668, 981 (1999)

(citing U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S.164, 170-171 (1974)). “Moreover

officers generally may only search those portions of the

residence they reasonably believe the probationer has complete or

joint control over. [Citations.] That is, unless the

circumstances are such as to otherwise justify a warrantless

search of a room or area under the sole control of a

nonprobationer (e.g., exigent circumstances), officers wishing to

search such a room or area must obtain a search warrant to do

so.” Id.

Plaintiff claims he and his girlfriend Sara had sole

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 32 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

authority over his bedroom and probationer exercised no such

authority over that bedroom. He points to the fact that the door

was locked when police arrived, was routinely closed and locked

for privacy, and the fact that it has a separate exterior

entrance. Plaintiff claims the officers knew he and Sara

occupied the room, not Chou. Defendant counters that while the

bedroom door was closed when officers arrived, officers were not

aware it was locked or that Chou had no access to the room, or

that Plaintiff’s bedroom had a separate exterior entrance. They

further point out that Plaintiff and Sara left the door open when

they exited the bedroom.

Disputed issues of material fact exist as to what the

officers knew in regard to whether Chou had joint authority over

Plaintiff’s room or whether Plaintiff and Sara had sole and

complete authority over the bedroom. No one told the officers

that Chou did not have access to the room or that it had a

separate entrance. Plaintiff claims officers had to know the

door was locked because they must have heard Sara unlock it in

response the officer’s knock. But no officer testified that he

thought the door was locked or heard it being unlocked. Because

these material facts are in dispute, summary judgment cannot be

granted on the valid probation search theory.

b. Valid Protective Sweep.

Defendants argue that even if officers did not have lawful

authority to enter Plaintiff’s room as part of the probation

search, they validly entered the room as part of a protective

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 33 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

sweep of the residence prior to the start of the search. 

A protective sweep is a quick and limited search of

premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to

protect the safety of police officers or others. 

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).

We hold that there must be articulable facts which,

taken together with the rational inferences from those

facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in

believing that the area to be swept harbors an

individual posing a danger to those of the arrest

scene. Id. at 334.

Defendant argues officers had knowledge of undisputed

articulable facts that would warrant a reasonably prudent

officer’s belief that the area posed a danger. Defendant cites

the fact that officers were at the Moua home as part of an

investigation into a double homicide they suspected was gangrelated. The officers suspected Chou was a gang member, but do

not assert he was validated. The Officers knew he had been

convicted of the felony of carrying a concealed loaded weapon. 

Defendants also provide Detective Sterling’s supplemental report

that a vehicle matching the description of the one involved in

the double homicide, a silver Acura Integra, was parked outside

the Moua residence. 

Plaintiff does not dispute any of these facts but argues the

officers did not have reasonable suspicion in this case to

perform a protective sweep, because other evidence shows officers

did not believe there was a danger to their safety at the time of

the incident. Plaintiff claims that Officer Sandhagen’s police

report about the reason officers entered plaintiff’s bedroom is

inconsistent with other testimony he provides and the testimony

of other officers. In the police report Sandhagen prepared the

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 34 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

day after the incident, Officer Sandhagen stated the reason they

entered the room was: “Chou had access to Andrew’s bedroom, so we

searched Andrew [Plaintiff’s] bedroom.” The police report does

not mention any concern about safety or any need for a protective

sweep. However, in deposition testimony Officer Sandhagen cited

safety as a concern, as did Officers Nelson and McAbee. Officer

McAbee in his deposition characterized the search as very low

risk and did not recall any of the officers drawing their weapons

upon entry. 

Disputed issues of material fact exist as to whether officers

went into Andrew’s room to search for evidence or as part of a

safety or protective sweep and whether articulable facts existed

to support the officers’ reasonable suspicion that there was a

need for a protective sweep. On the day of the incident, the

arresting officer reports officers went into Plaintiff’s room to

search because “Chou had access.” Later the same officer

testifies they didn’t consult Plaintiff about entry into his room

because of safety purposes. (Sandhagen Depo. at 54-55.) These

differences implicate credibility. Such conflicting evidence

must be resolved by a trier of fact. Other officers claim they

“secured” or “cleared” the area for safety reasons but Officer

McAbee, testified that he could not recall any officer drawing a

weapon,, and characterized the search as “very low risk.” It is

undisputed that Chou was in the front room when officers entered

the residence. They did not need to search the house to find

him. It is undisputed that no officer said anything to the

Plaintiff or Sara when they exited their bedroom. This supports

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 35 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

the inference that no officer asked whether anyone else was in

their room. No officer verbally expressed safety concerns at the

residence to justify entering the bedroom. At oral argument,

defendants’ counsel argued the search was “a slow very deliberate

standard probation search” that involved no rushing, and “was not

a high profile tactical entry.” On the other hand, Defendant

notes that an officer who wasn’t on the scene, stated in a

supplemental police report that a car matching the description of

one used in the recent homicides was parked outside the Moua

home. However, Defendant does not claim that the searching

officers at the Moua residence, observed or knew about this car

at the time of their entry, nor does anyone explain when the car

was observed. 

The evidence is in conflict as to the reason for entering

Plaintiff’s room and as to the existence of articulable facts to

support reasonable justification for a protective sweep. Summary

judgment cannot be granted on these grounds. 

2. Was the law clearly established?

Here the facts are in dispute as to whether the officers

acted reasonably in including Plaintiff’s room within the scope

of the probation search because the facts about what the officers

knew about the probationer’s access to or authority with respect

to Plaintiff’s bedroom are unclear. Facts underlying whether the

officers had reasonable suspicion that potential danger existed

to justify a protective sweep are also in dispute. The

reasonableness of the officers’ beliefs that their actions were

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 36 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

lawful in this situation depends on how the facts are ultimately

determined by a trier of fact. They cannot be decided as a

matter of law. 

3. Conclusion

For all the reasons stated above, summary judgment is DENIED

as to Defendant’s claim that the officers committed no Fourth

Amendment violations because their actions were lawful incident

to the probation search and/or the protective sweep.

C. Remaining state law claims: False Imprisonment, False

Arrest, Trespass and Trespass to Chattel/Conversion.

Because Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims of unlawful

search and seizure survive due to the existence of disputed

issues of material fact, his remaining state claims also survive

as they flow from the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. 

Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s state law claims for

false imprisonment, false arrest, trespass and trespass to

chattels/conversion.

V. CONCLUSION

Defendant City of Merced’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s 1) Fourteenth Amendment racial

discrimination claim, Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, and

First Amendment retaliation and restriction of free association

claims; 2) state common law claims for violation of privacy,

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 37 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38

infliction of emotional distress, and harassment and California

constitutional and Bane Act claims; and 3) Monell claim.

Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claim of

unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s state law claims

for false imprisonment, false arrest, trespass and trespass to

chattels/conversion.

Defendants’ counsel shall prepare and lodge an order with

this Court within five days following the date of service of this

decision. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00216-OWW -SMS Document 41 Filed 11/14/07 Page 38 of 38