Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02142/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02142-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Tuni Dee Hernandez
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TUNI DEE HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-2142-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born February 6, 1970, applied on March 22, 2012 for DIB and SSI, alleging 

disability beginning October 28, 2009. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 14, 33, 175-190. 

Plaintiff alleged she was unable to work due primarily to arthritis and pain in her back and right 

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ankle. AT 210, 221. In a decision dated May 9, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not 

disabled.1 AT 12-24. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social

Security Act through December 31, 2014.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since October 29, 2009, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: 

osteoarthritis of the right ankle; degenerative disc disease of the 

thoracic spine; and a depressive disorder [not otherwise stated].

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) except the 

claimant can lift or carry 10 pounds frequently, 20 pounds 

occasionally, stand or walk for a total of 2 hours in an 8-hour 

workday and sit for a total of 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday. 

The claimant must be able to alternately sit or stand to alleviate 

discomfort, she can occasionally climb stairs and ramps, balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, but never climb ladders. The 

claimant should avoid extreme cold, vibrations, fumes, odors, dust, 

gases, and the claimant can perform simple and repetitive tasks with 

no high production work.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any of her past relevant work.

7. The claimant was born on February 6, 1970, and was 39 years 

old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the date 

of the alleged disability onset date.

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate 

in English.

9. The claimant has no job skills that are transferable to other work 

within her residual functional capacity. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience,

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from October 29, 2009, through the date of this 

decision.

AT 14-23. 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) relied on improper Vocational Expert (“VE”) testimony in determining that there 

were jobs available in significant numbers that plaintiff could perform given her functional 

limitations; (2) improperly assessed the medical opinion evidence in the record when determining 

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (3) improperly determined plaintiff’s 

testimony to be not credible.

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III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ Properly Relied on the VE’s Testimony

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ could not properly rely on the VE’s testimony because 

the VE stated that plaintiff had the RFC to perform the occupations of telephone quotation clerk, 

addresser, and order clerk, which was inconsistent with the definition for these three occupations 

in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)2because these occupations all require a 

reasoning ability higher than what the ALJ attributed to plaintiff through his RFC determination. 

The DOT states that a claimant must be able to perform “Level 3 Reasoning”3in order to perform 

the functions of a telephone quotation clerk or order clerk, and “Level 2 Reasoning”4in order to 

perform the functions of an addresser. Plaintiff argues that the mental limitations the ALJ 

ascribed to her fell below the reasoning requirements for jobs at Level 2 Reasoning and above, 

therefore making the ALJ’s failure to ask the VE to explain why a person with plaintiff’s mental 

limitations could nevertheless meet the reasoning demands of the DOT’s Levels 2 and 3 an error 

that requires remand.

At step five of the analysis, the Commissioner has the burden “to identify specific jobs 

existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that [the] claimant can perform despite 

[her] identified limitations.” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.1995); see also 20 

 

2

 The United States Dept. of Labor, Employment & Training Admin., Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles (4th ed. 1991), (“DOT”) is routinely relied on by the SSA “in determining the skill level of 

a claimant’s past work, and in evaluating whether the claimant is able to perform other work in 

the national economy.” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990). The DOT 

classifies jobs by their exertional and skill requirements. The DOT is a primary source of 

reliable job information for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1).

3

Per the DOT, occupations demanding Level 3 Reasoning require that a claimant be able to: 

“Apply commonsense understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or 

diagrammatic form. Deal with problems involving several concrete variables in or from 

standardized situations.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Appendix C, 1991 WL 688702 (4th 

ed. 1991).

4

Per the DOT, occupations demanding Level 2 Reasoning require that a claimant be able to:

“Apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed by uninvolved written or oral 

instructions. Deal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized 

situations.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Appendix C, 1991 WL 688702 (4th ed. 1991).

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C.F.R. § 416.920(g). After determining the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ then must consider what 

occupations the claimant is possibly able to perform in light of her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 

416.966. “In making this determination, the ALJ relies on the DOT, which is the SSA’s ‘primary

source of reliable job information’ regarding jobs that exist in the national economy.” Zavalin v. 

Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th 

Cir.1990)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.969, 416.966(d)(1). “In addition to the DOT, the ALJ relies 

on the testimony of vocational experts who testify about specific occupations that [the] claimant 

can perform in light of [her] residual functional capacity.” Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 864 (citing 20 

C.F.R. § 416.966(e)). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated:

When there is an apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and 

the DOT—for example, expert testimony that a claimant can perform an 

occupation involving DOT requirements that appear more than the claimant can 

handle—the ALJ is required to reconcile the inconsistency. Massachi v. Astrue, 

486 F.3d 1149, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ must ask the expert to explain 

the conflict and “then determine whether the vocational expert’s explanation for 

the conflict is reasonable” before relying on the expert’s testimony to reach a 

disability determination. Id.; see also Social Security Ruling 00-4P, 2000 WL 

1898704, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2000). The ALJ’s failure to resolve an apparent 

inconsistency may leave us with a gap in the record that precludes us from 

determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. See

Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154 (stating that “we cannot determine whether the ALJ 

properly relied on [the vocational expert’s] testimony” due to unresolved 

occupational evidence).

Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846.

As plaintiff correctly notes, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that an RFC 

finding limiting a claimant to performing “simple and routine work tasks” is inconsistent with the 

demands of jobs classified by the DOT to require Level 3 Reasoning, and that an ALJ’s failure to 

reconcile this apparent conflict by asking a VE to explain why a claimant with such a mental 

limitation could nevertheless perform work at this level is error. Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 847. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by failing to resolve the inconsistency 

between the VE’s testimony that plaintiff had the RFC to perform the occupations of telephone 

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quotation clerk and order clerk and the DOT’s determination that these jobs demand the ability to 

perform Level 3 Reasoning has merit.5

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Zavalin still leaves 

unresolved the question of whether a RFC limitation to “simple and repetitive tasks with no high 

production work” conflicts with the DOT’s description of jobs necessitating the ability to perform 

Level 2 Reasoning. Here, given that the VE testified that plaintiff could also perform the job of 

addresser, which requires Level 2 Reasoning, the question becomes whether the ALJ’s error as to 

the other two representative occupations was harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 

1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is 

harmless.”). If the VE’s testimony that a person with plaintiff’s mental RFC could perform work 

as an addresser was consistent with the DOT’s determination that the job requires Level 2 

Reasoning, then the ALJ’s error was harmless because he could have properly relied on the VE’s 

testimony regarding this occupation to determine that there were jobs that plaintiff could still 

perform at step five. However, if there was an inconsistency between the VE’s testimony and the 

DOT’s Level 2 Reasoning requirement for an addresser, then the ALJ’s step five analysis was 

erroneous and remand is necessary. The court now turns to this issue.

Defendant argues that there is no apparent inconsistency between the VE’s testimony that 

plaintiff could perform the job functions of an addresser given her mental RFC limiting her to 

“simple and repetitive tasks with no high production work” and the DOT’s requirement that a 

claimant be able to perform Level 2 Reasoning. In support of this argument, defendant refers to 

several district court cases from within the Ninth Circuit holding that claimants whose RFC limits

them to performing only simple tasks performed at a routine or repetitive pace are able to perform 

jobs listed in the DOT with a Level 2 Reasoning requirement. ECF No. 17 at 10 (citing Meissl v. 

Barnhart, 403 F. Supp. 2d 981 (C.D. Cal. 2005), Salazar v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4370056 (C.D. Cal. 

2008), and Tudino v. Barnhart, 2008 WL 4161443 (S.D. Cal. 2008)). Indeed, these cases indicate 

 

5 Defendant concedes in its cross-motion for summary judgment that the VE’s testimony that 

plaintiff could perform work as a telephone quotation clerk and an order clerk conflicted with the 

DOT’s definitions for these jobs, which required that plaintiff be able to perform Level 3 

Reasoning. ECF No. 17 at 10.

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that there is a general consensus within the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere that a limitation to simple 

and repetitive tasks is consistent with the jobs requiring Level 2 Reasoning. See, e.g., Hackett v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding Level 2 Reasoning to be consistent with 

a limitation to simple, routine work tasks); Salazar, 2008 WL 4370056, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2008)

(noting that “[n]umerous courts” within the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere have rejected the 

argument “that a limitation to simple, repetitive tasks is inconsistent with Level 2 reasoning 

ability” and citing to cases); Isaac v. Astrue, 2008 WL 2875879, *3-*4 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2008); 

Meissl, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 984-85. The court finds the reasoning in these cases persuasive.

Plaintiff argues that these cases are distinguishable because the ALJ in this case gave 

“significant weight” to the opinion of Dr. Renfro, a consulting psychologist who opined that 

plaintiff “is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple one or two-step job instructions,” 

but “unable to do detailed and complex instructions,” when determining plaintiff’s mental RFC. 

AT 581. Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Renfro’s opinion that plaintiff cannot carry out “detailed and 

complex” instructions is in direct conflict with the DOT’s requirements for Level 2 Reasoning, 

which requires a claimant to be able to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed

by uninvolved written or oral instructions.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Appendix C, 1991 

WL 688702 (4th ed. 1991) (emphasis added). However, as a number of courts that have 

addressed this issue have determined, while the DOT’s definition for Level 2 Reasoning includes 

the term “detailed” to describe the complexity of instructions to be carried out, those instructions 

are also qualified as being “uninvolved.” See Meissl, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 984 (“Even more 

problematic for [plaintiff’s] position is that she ignores the qualifier the DOT places on the term 

‘detailed’ as also being ‘uninvolved.’ This qualifier certainly calls into question any attempt to 

equate the Social Security regulations’ use of the term “detailed” with the DOT’s use of that term 

in the reasoning levels.”); Salazar, 2008 WL 4370056, at *7; Charles v. Astrue, 2008 WL 

4003651, at *5 (W.D. La. Aug. 7, 2008) (“In the DOT, a reasoning level of 2 means the worker 

must be able to follow ‘detailed’ instructions which are ‘uninvolved.’ Therefore, a DOT 

reasoning level of 2 is consistent with a RFC to perform simple, routine, repetitive work tasks.”).

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Moreover, while the ALJ did assign “significant weight” to Dr. Renfro’s opinion, the ALJ 

was not required to strictly adopt Dr. Renfro’s determination that plaintiff could not carry out 

“detailed” instructions as part of plaintiff’s RFC as plaintiff seems to suggest. The ALJ described 

plaintiff has having the mental RFC to “perform simple and repetitive tasks,” which was 

supported by substantial evidence from the record including Dr. Renfro’s opinion.

6

 Nowhere in 

the ALJ’s RFC determination is there an explicit limitation from “detailed” work. Furthermore, 

plaintiff contests that the ALJ erred by relying on the VE’s testimony, which was based on the 

ALJ’s hypotheticals. A review of the hearing transcript reveals that the ALJ’s hypothetical 

requested that the VE respond based on an individual that, among other limitations, was “limited 

to simple, repetitive tasks and non-high production work.” AT 52. As stated above, the court 

agrees with the other courts that have found that such a limitation is consistent with the DOT’s 

definition of Level 2 Reasoning. Therefore, the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony that 

plaintiff could perform work as an addresser was not in error.

In sum, the ALJ’s improper reliance on the VE’s testimony that plaintiff could work as a 

telephone quotation clerk and order clerk was harmless error because the ALJ properly relied on 

the VE’s testimony that plaintiff could also perform work as an addresser in support of his step 

five determination that there were jobs that plaintiff could perform given her limitations. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for remand on this basis is not well taken.

Plaintiff argues further that the ALJ’s step five finding was erroneous because the 

hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE included a sit/stand option but did not sufficiently identify 

the frequency at which plaintiff would need to alternate sitting and standing. Plaintiff asserts that 

this error requires remand so the ALJ can pose a proper hypothetical question to the VE.

An ALJ may pose a range of hypothetical questions to a vocational expert, based on 

alternate interpretations of the evidence. However, the hypothetical that ultimately serves as the 

basis for the ALJ’s determination, i.e., the hypothetical that is predicated on the ALJ’s final RFC 

 

6

In her motion, plaintiff does not contest the validity of the ALJ’s RFC determination with regard 

to her mental limitations. Plaintiff’s contentions regarding the ALJ’s RFC determination are 

limited to the ALJ’s treatment of the medical evidence with regard to plaintiff’s physical 

impairments.

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determination, must account for all of the limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant

that are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). “If an ALJ’s hypothetical does not reflect all of the 

claimant’s limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding 

that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). However, the ALJ “is free to accept or reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that 

are not supported by substantial evidence.” Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 

2006). Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit has observed, an ALJ may synthesize and translate 

assessed limitations into an RFC assessment (and subsequently into a hypothetical to the 

vocational expert) without repeating each functional limitation verbatim in the RFC assessment or 

hypothetical. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 

an ALJ’s RFC assessment that a claimant could perform simple tasks adequately captured 

restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace, because the assessment was consistent 

with the medical evidence). 

Here, the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the VE as to whether a sit and stand option would 

affect the jobs that the VE testified a person with plaintiff’s other limitations could perform. AT 

53. Plaintiff argues that this hypothetical was erroneous because the ALJ failed to specify the 

frequency at which plaintiff would need to alternate between sitting and standing. Plaintiff argues 

that this failure precluded the VE from testifying as to whether the frequency of changing 

between sitting and standing would have eroded plaintiff’s ability to perform the jobs the VE 

testified plaintiff could perform in light of her other limitations. However, even assuming, 

without deciding, that the ALJ’s hypothetical was lacking in this regard, plaintiff’s counsel at the 

administrative hearing questioned the VE regarding whether the frequency of alternating between 

sitting and standing positions would impact the jobs the VE testified plaintiff could perform, to 

which the VE testified that such alternation either would not impact the ability to perform the jobs 

he suggested or could be accommodated. AT 54-56. While the VE testified that a requirement to 

alternate between sitting and standing every 5 minutes would affect the jobs, he never testified 

that such a limitation would completely preclude the ability to perform such a job. To the 

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contrary, the VE’s testimony suggested that a sit-stand option, even if it were as limiting as the 

hypotheticals posed by plaintiff’s counsel, could be accommodated in such jobs. Id. 

Accordingly, any insufficiency in the ALJ’s hypothetical was cured by the questioning and 

hypotheticals posed by plaintiff’s attorney. Therefore, any error in this regard would have been

harmless. See England v. Astrue, 490 F.3d 1017, 1024 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Even if the hypothetical 

fell short . . . , however, [plaintiff’s] attorney posed to the VE a hypothetical that reflected these 

limitations, in response to which the VE testified that there would still be jobs that [plaintiff]

could undertake. Any inadequacy in the hypothetical was thus harmless.”); Isaac, 2008 WL 

2875879, at *4 (citing England, 490 F.3d at 1024).

B. The ALJ Properly Considered the Medical Opinion Evidence in the Record when 

Determining Plaintiff’s RFC

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly gave reduced weight to the opinions of Dr. 

King and Dr. Hart, two of plaintiff’s treating physicians. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred 

in assigning greater weight to the non-examining physicians who reviewed plaintiff’s medical 

records.

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

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independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

1. Dr. King

Dr. King began treating plaintiff on December 22, 2011 as plaintiff’s primary physician

and issued two opinions regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform physical work-related functions

during the course of her treatment. AT 540, 574-75, 658-59. In the first opinion, dated February 

21, 2012, Dr. King opined that plaintiff could not lift and carry objects weighting only a few 

pounds and could not do so while walking. AT 574. Dr. King opined further that plaintiff could 

stand and/or walk for a total of 30 minutes in an eight-hour workday due to having “significant 

tibiotalar and subtalar [joint] arthritis,” and could sit for a total of one hour in an eight-hour 

workday. Id. Finally, she opined that plaintiff could never climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, 

or crawl. AT 575. 

In her second opinion, dated March 8, 2013, Dr. King opined that plaintiff could sit for a 

total of no more than 45 minutes and could not stand or walk for any amount of time during an 

eight-hour workday. AT 658. She further opined that plaintiff could frequently lift up to 5 

pounds and occasionally lift up to 10 pounds. AT 659. She also opined that plaintiff could 

perform “none to little” reaching, handling, feeling, pushing/pulling, or grasping during an eighthour workday. Id. Ultimately, Dr. King opined that plaintiff’s impairments precluded her from 

performing any full-time work at any exertional level. AT 658.

In support of his determination to assign “little weight” to Dr. King’s opinion, the ALJ 

gave the following rationale:

Neither her own progress notes nor any other treating or consulting source has 

documented clinical findings or diagnostic studies that support the level of severity 

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that she had endorsed. For example, she indicates significant stiffness in the 

subtalar joint, minimal tibiotalar motion. Dr. King has noted that the claimant has 

not received any treatment for her back pain. Even with the claimant’s back pain 

and right ankle pain, Dr. King observed that the claimant “moves fairly well.” 

Thus, little weight is given to her opinion.

AT 21 (citations to the record omitted). These were proper reasons for discounting Dr. King’s 

opinion that were supported by substantial evidence in the record.

First, the ALJ reasoned that Dr. King’s own progress notes did not support her opinion 

that plaintiff’s impairments limited her to the degree Dr. King opined. This was a valid reason for 

discounting Dr. King’s opinion. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (holding that incongruities 

between a treating physician’s objective medical findings and that physician’s opinion constitute 

specific and legitimate reasons for the ALJ to reject that physician’s opinion); see also Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d at 856 (holding that the ALJ properly discounted treating physician’s 

functional recommendations that “were so extreme as to be implausible and were not supported 

by any findings made by any doctor,” including the treating physician’s own findings). 

Furthermore, substantial evidence from the record supported the ALJ’s reasoning. For instance, 

despite opining that plaintiff’s back and right foot impairments were so severe as to limit plaintiff 

to standing or walking for no more than 30 minutes, or, as she later opined, not at any time during 

the course of an 8-hour workday, Dr. King’s treatment notes indicate that plaintiff received no 

treatment for her back pain except for medication. See AT 621. Similarly, treatment notes from 

just prior to the date Dr. King issued her first opinion state that plaintiff “moves fairly well 

despite” the progression of her back and right foot impairments. AT 622.

Furthermore, plaintiff’s other treatment records further undermined Dr. King’s opinions 

that plaintiff’s physical impairments were extremely limiting. Dr. King noted in her first opinion 

that plaintiff used a cam boot on her right foot, but that she was in the process of being fitted for 

an Arizona brace. AT 574. On April 19, 2012, after Dr. King’s first opinion was issued, but prior 

to the date of her second opinion, Dr. Hong, another of plaintiff’s treating physicians, noted that 

plaintiff’s use of an Arizona brace and rocker bottom shoes “are helping [plaintiff] significantly.” 

AT 630. In particular, Dr. Hong observed that the shoes were significantly helping plaintiff 

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“even when she is out of the brace” and that plaintiff was “doing well.” AT 630-31. Later, on 

December 28, 2012, Dr. Hong observed that while x-rays revealed that there was “some slight 

worsening of the arthritis space” in plaintiff’s ankle and that “[t]here are significant posttraumatic changes to the talus,” plaintiff could still “maintain light activity levels.” AT 629. 

Despite these further clinical findings indicating that plaintiff had responded well to the use of 

moderate treatment and could still maintain some level of activity, Dr. King opined on March 8, 

2013 that plaintiff could not walk or stand for any amount of time during an eight-hour workday. 

AT 658. The ALJ was permitted to rely on the fact that Dr. King’s extreme opinions appeared to 

conflict with this objective evidence that plaintiff still had some level of physical functionality as 

a reason in support of his determination that Dr. King’s opinion was entitled only to diminished 

weight. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n ALJ need not 

accept a treating physician’s opinion that is conclusory and brief and unsupported by clinical 

findings.”). Accordingly, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. King’s opinion was not in error.

2. Dr. Hart

Dr. Hart, a physiatrist, treated plaintiff on several occasions for her back and leg pain 

beginning on July 25, 2012, and issued a written opinion regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform 

physical work-related functions on January 27, 2013. AT 642-55, 656-57. In his written opinion, 

Dr. Hart opined that plaintiff could not sit for more than 30 to 40 minutes in an eight-hour 

workday before she would begin to feel pain. AT 656. He further opined that plaintiff “[c]annot 

walk longer than 5-10 minutes” in an eight-hour workday. Id. He also opined that plaintiff 

would need to lie down or elevate her legs roughly every 30 to 40 minutes during the course of an 

eight-hour workday. Id. He further opined that plaintiff could lift less than ten pounds 

frequently, and would have difficulties lifting more than ten pounds. AT 656-57. Finally, Dr. 

Hart opined that plaintiff had “[n]o limitation of the hands.” AT 657.

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Determining that Dr. Hart’s opinion was entitled to “little weight,” the ALJ stated the 

following:

His own progress notes do not support the limits that he indicated that are 

primarily based on the claimant’s thoracic spine pain. For example, his progress 

notes show loss of forward flexion on bending but no other loss of range of motion 

of the lumbar or thoracic spine; no neurological deficits; only a slightly antalgic 

gait on the right; no positive straight leg raise testing; no evidence of muscle 

spasms. Further, no other treating or consulting source has documented clinical 

findings or diagnostic studies that support the level of severity that she has 

endorsed. Indeed, examinations in December 2011 and in January 2013, reflect 

that she had a normal gait. For the foregoing reasons, little weight is given to the 

opinion of Dr. Hart.

AT 21 (citations to the record omitted). As with Dr. King’s opinion, the ALJ determined that the 

Dr. Hart’s opinion was entitled to little weight because it opined limitations more severe than 

what was warranted by the objective medical evidence in the record and by his own treatment 

notes. As discussed below, substantial evidence supported these reasons for discounting Dr. 

Hart’s opinion.

Similar to Dr. King’s opinion, Dr. Hart opined that plaintiff was severely restricted in her 

ability to stand and walk, stating that she was limited to walking for no more than 5 to 10 minutes 

in an eight-hour workday. AT 656. This opinion was dated January 27, 2013, just prior to the 

date of Dr. King’s second opinion finding that plaintiff could not stand or walk for any amount of 

time. While Dr. Hart opined that plaintiff was somewhat less limited in her ability to stand and 

walk than what was indicated in Dr. King’s second opinion, the treating records discussed above 

with regard to Dr. King also do not support the level of severity opined by Dr. Hart. See AT 629-

31.

Furthermore, Dr. Hart’s own treatment records suggest that plaintiff’s physical limitations 

were not to the degree of severity Dr. Hart opined. For instance, Dr. Hart noted that plaintiff 

claimed her pain arose primarily from her lumbar spine, but the results of an MRI Dr. Hart 

ordered of plaintiff’s back showed only mild degenerative disc disease “resulting in no central 

stenosis or foraminal narrowing.” AT 654. He also noted that a prior MRI of plaintiff’s thoracic 

spine showed only “old fractures with mild impingement with mild impingement on the thecal 

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sac, but no canal or foraminal stenosis.” AT 649. Furthermore, Dr. Hart’s notes for both his 

initial examination of plaintiff and a February 13, 2013 examination of plaintiff’s musculoskeletal 

system state that plaintiff exhibited full passive range of motion in her extremities, “a loss of 

forward flexion on bending,” but “no loss of motion for lateral bending or rotation,” and “no 

problem with extension.” AT 643, 648. Both sets of notes also state that plaintiff exhibited full 

motor strength and a gait that was only “slightly antalgic on the right.” AT 643, 648-49. Such 

findings do not suggest the extremely limited physical functional capacity Dr. Hart opined. 

Accordingly, the ALJ properly relied on this evidence as a reason for discounting Dr. Hart’s 

opinion.

3. Non-treating Physicians

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s treatment of the opinions of Dr. King and Dr. Hart was 

in error because the ALJ improperly based his RFC decision on the opinions of non-examining 

physicians who reviewed plaintiff’s medical records, rather than the opinions of these two 

treating physicians. This argument lacks merit. As stated above, the ALJ discounted the opinions 

of the two treating physicians because their restrictive functional determinations were not 

supported by their own treating records and, more generally, the other objective medical evidence 

in the record. The ALJ did not diminish these physicians’ opinions solely because they were at 

odds with the opinions of plaintiff’s non-examining physicians. Furthermore, this same evidence 

from the record reasonably supported the less restrictive opinions of the non-examining 

physicians. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in assigning greater weight to these opinions in 

support of his RFC determination. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We 

have held that the findings of a nontreating, nonexamining physician can amount to substantial 

evidence, so long as other evidence in the record supports those findings.”); Andrews v. Shalala, 

53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1989).

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C. The ALJ’s Determination that Plaintiff’s Testimony Lacked Credibility was 

Supported by Substantial Evidence in the Record

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the credibility of plaintiff’s 

testimony because the ALJ determined that it was not credible without providing clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so.

The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the 

ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., 

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an 

explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be 

supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”). 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR 55406-

01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and 

effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. 

Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek 

treatment for an allegedly debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ 

in determining whether the alleged associated pain is not a significant nonexertional impairment. 

See Flaten v. Secretary of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part, 

on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 

1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 

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(9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the 

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” 

Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the ALJ found plaintiff’s testimony concerning the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of her symptoms to be “not entirely credible” based on: (1) plaintiff’s treatment 

records not reflecting the level of severity plaintiff claimed; (2) the conservative medical 

treatment plaintiff received; and (3) plaintiff’s daily living activities not supporting the level of 

debility claimed by plaintiff. AT 18-20. These were clear and convincing reasons for 

discounting plaintiff’s testimony that were supported by substantial evidence in the record.

First, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s treatment records did not support the level of 

impairment plaintiff alleged. AT 18-19. Plaintiff argues that this reason was improper because 

the ALJ failed to specify which of plaintiff’s complaints were contradicted by these objective 

medical findings. However, the ALJ did specify which of plaintiff’s complaints were undermined 

by this evidence, namely, plaintiff’s complaints regarding the severity and limiting effects of her 

back and ankle pain. See id. The ALJ cited to numerous instances from over the course of

plaintiff’s treatment history that indicate that plaintiff’s back and ankle impairments imposed 

physical limitations that were less severe than what plaintiff alleged. Id. Indeed, many of the 

treatment records the ALJ referred to in her decision suggest that plaintiff’s limitations were not 

as limiting as plaintiff claimed. See, e.g., AT 361, 541, 631, 648, 654. While an ALJ may not 

rely solely on the lack of objective medical findings to discredit a claimant, see Thomas, 278 F.3d 

at 960, the ALJ in this case used the medical evidence in the record that conflicted with plaintiff’s 

allegations concerning the severity of her symptoms, particularly her claims of limitation related 

to back and right ankle, to corroborate his determination that plaintiff’s testimony was 

exaggerated, rather than relying on it as the sole basis for his credibility finding. Because, as 

discussed below, the ALJ provided other clear and convincing reasons for finding plaintiff not 

credible, the ALJ’s discussion of inconsistencies between plaintiff’s testimony and the medical 

findings set forth in her treating records in support of his adverse credibility determination was 

not in error. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (“Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole 

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basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility 

analysis.”).

Second, the ALJ reasoned that plaintiff’s conservative course of medical treatment during 

the relevant period belied plaintiff’s claims as to the debilitating severity of her limitations. AT 

19. This reason properly supported the ALJ’s decision to discount plaintiff’s testimony, see

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the ALJ’s reference to 

medical evidence of the “conservative treatment” the plaintiff received supported the ALJ’s 

adverse credibility determination because such evidence “suggest[ed] a lower level of both pain 

and functional limitation” than what the plaintiff alleged), and was substantially supported by the 

medical evidence in the record. For instance, in early 2011, plaintiff’s treating physician stated 

that plaintiff seemed to have “run of the mill” lower back pain and “[e]ncouraged stretching and 

core strengthening” as treatment for this condition. AT 361. While some of plaintiff’s treating 

physicians discussed with plaintiff the possibility of surgery for her right ankle impairment, they 

also generally encouraged non-operative measures such as physical braces, rocker shoes, and pain 

medication, and assessed similar measures to manage her back pain. E.g., AT 629-34, 639, 641, 

644, 649, 675-76. Notably, plaintiff herself stated to her physicians that her pain and overall 

condition generally improved as a result of these conservative treatments and insisted on the 

further use of moderate, non-surgical treatment for her back and right ankle impairments. See AT 

629, 631, 634. The ALJ highlighted this substantial evidence in his discussion of plaintiff’s 

credibility and properly determined that it supported a finding that plaintiff’s testimony regarding 

the extent of her limitations was not fully credible. AT 19-20.

Finally, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s daily living activities generally undermined 

her claims that her impairments limited her to the degree of dysfunction she alleged. In support 

of this determination, the ALJ referenced plaintiff’s written statement reports and statements she 

made to her physicians that described plaintiff as able to prepare meals, do her own laundry, clean 

her kitchen, shop, and drive for up to 20 miles at a time. AT 20, 227, 241-42, 579. The ALJ also 

highlighted a report that plaintiff was acting as her sister’s main caregiver as recently as early 

February of 2013, just over a month prior to the administrative hearing where plaintiff testified as 

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to the disabling nature of her impairments. AT 20, 640. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reasoning based on this evidence was flawed because these 

activities do not relate to actual workplace functions. However, the ALJ did not suggest that 

these activities meant that plaintiff could perform certain jobs or work-related activities. Rather,

the ALJ recognized that this evidence suggests that plaintiff’s allegations at the hearing regarding 

the severity of her limitations were exaggerated. See AT 20. This conclusion was drawn from 

the above substantial evidence regarding a claimant’s living activities and constituted proper 

support for the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Valentine v. Commissioner of Social 

Security, 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ALJ’s recognition that the evidence 

of claimant’s daily living activities undermined the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of 

his limitations constituted a clear and convincing reason in support of the ALJ’s adverse 

credibility determination).

The ALJ provided multiple clear and convincing reasons for diminishing plaintiff’s 

subjective complaint testimony, all of which were supported by substantial evidence from the 

record. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in making his credibility determination with regard to 

plaintiff’s testimony.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: August 10, 2015

11 Hernandez.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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