Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01610/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01610-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cindy Adams
Plaintiff
City of Redding
Defendant
Kyle Corrigan
Defendant
Edward McGinnis
Defendant
Christopher Staup
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CINDY ADAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF REDDING, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-01610-TLN-DMC

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants City of Redding, Kyle Corrigan

(“Corrigan”), Christopher Staup (“Staup”), and Edward McGinnis’s (“McGinnis”) (collectively, 

“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 36.) Plaintiff Cindy Adams

(“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 38.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 42.) For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

On December 22, 2019, Officers Corrigan, Staup, and McGinnis patrolled Redding, 

California. (ECF No. 38-1 at 19.) Staup and McGinnis had civilian ride along passengers in their 

respective patrol vehicles. (Id.) At approximately 3:15 a.m., Corrigan observed a white Toyota

Scion with Washington State license plates travel past him northbound on Market Street. (Id. at 

21.) Corrigan followed the Scion, driven by Jesse Adams (“Adams”), to observe his driving 

given the high number of DUI arrests that evening. (Id.) Adams had two passengers with him in 

the Scion. (Id. at 20.) Corrigan observed the Scion drift from the center lane to the right lane

without signaling, then turn on its left blinker to return to the center lane. (Id. at 21.) Corrigan 

activated his overhead lights to initiate a stop while radioing dispatch to run the Scion’s license 

plate. (Id. at 21–22.) 

Adams pulled the Scion into a parking lot and parked in one of the stalls. (Id. at 22.) 

Corrigan approached the vehicle and advised Adams of the reason he had been pulled over. (Id.) 

Corrigan then received a message from the dispatcher that the license plate on the Scion was

associated with a person wanted on a felony warrant in Washington State. (Id. at 22–23.) Adams 

told Corrigan he could not locate his driver’s license, so Corrigan asked for Adams’s name and 

for Adams to spell it. (Id.) Adams responded that his name was Nicolas McGinnis. (Id.) 

Corrigan then radioed Staup to respond to the scene to conduct a DUI investigation. (Id.)

McGinnis and Staup arrived on the scene and formed a staggered line with their vehicles 

that blocked the parking lot exit. (Id. at 24.) The officers planned to remove Adams and his two 

passengers from the Scion. (Id. at 25.) When the officers approached the vehicle, Adams refused 

to roll his window down or unlock his door after the officers instructed him to do so. (Id.) While 

the car was still running, Staup saw Adams attempt to put the car into gear. (Id.) Corrigan then 

yelled at Adams to place his hands on the steering wheel and warned him that he would break his 

window if he did not comply. (Id. at 26.) Adams’s hand remained on the gear shift lever. (Id.) 

Corrigan then broke the driver-side window with his baton, tried to pull Adams from the vehicle, 

1 The facts herein are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. 

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and used pepper spray. (Id.) As Corrigan prepared to pepper spray Adams a second time, Adams 

put the car in reverse, accelerated backward, and hit the embankment on the other side of the 

parking lot. (Id. at 27.) Once on the embankment, the Scion paused for a short period of time, 

and Adams revved the engine. (Id.) The Scion then accelerated forward and collided with 

Staup’s patrol vehicle, which contained a civilian ride along passenger. (Id. at 29–30.)

The parties dispute most of what happened thereafter. In Defendants’ version of events, 

after the Scion collided with Staup’s vehicle, the Scion’s engine continued to rev, the Scion’s tires 

were squealing, and the car was pushing Staup’s vehicle backwards toward the street. (Id. at 30.) 

Staup approached the Scion and observed Adams attempting to put the vehicle in reverse with his 

left hand while also reaching with his right hand for the floorboard on the passenger side. (Id. at 

30–31.) After seeing Adams trying to get the Scion into gear and reach for something on the 

floorboard, Staup stepped up to the driver’s window and shot Adams in the chest. (Id. at 32.)

Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ narrative and offers a different version of events. In 

Plaintiff’s version of events, Staup shot Adams in the chest approximately 10 to 15 seconds after 

the Scion impacted Staup’s vehicle. (ECF No. 38-2 at 16.) No officer was in the path of the 

Scion immediately prior to or when Staup shot Adams. (Id. at 17.) The Scion was stopped and 

not moving when Staup shot Adams, there is no indication the Scion’s tires were spinning, and 

the Scion never moved in reverse after the collision. (Id.) As such, Plaintiff asserts Adams was 

not an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury at the time of the shooting. (Id. at 18.) 

The parties also provide video footage of the incident. (Dft’s Exh. A; Pltf’s Exh. 9.) Both 

videos appear to be taken from the same security camera, with Plaintiff’s video starting from the 

time Adams was pulled over and Defendants’ video only showing the moments right before the 

shooting. Neither video includes audio. Because Plaintiff’s video shows more of the events 

leading up to the shooting, the Court only references Plaintiff’s video herein. The video shows a 

patrol vehicle pulling over the Scion into what appears to be a narrow parking lot. (Pltf’s Exh. 9 

at 00:02.) The Scion parks in a stall, and an officer exits his patrol vehicle and approaches the 

Scion. (Id. at 00:25.) Approximately five minutes later, two other patrol vehicles arrive at the 

scene and appear to block the parking lot exit. (Id. at 05:50.) The officers exit their vehicles and 

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approach the Scion. (Id. at 06:00–07:30.) A few minutes later, the video shows the Scion 

suddenly drive in reverse, stop for a moment, accelerate forward, and then collide with a patrol 

vehicle. (Id. at 09:12–09:25.) It appears all the officers were able to remove themselves from the 

path of the Scion. (Id.) It is unclear from the footage whether the Scion continued to move after 

the collision, but the Scion appears to be wedged between patrol vehicles and unable to move. 

(Id.) It is also unclear from the footage at what point Staup shot Adams. 

Adams died as a result of the incident. (ECF No. 38-2 at 25.) Plaintiff, Adams’s mother,

initiated this action on behalf of Adams’s estate and on her own behalf on August 11, 2020. 

(ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on June 16, 

2021, alleging claims for: (1) excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and denial of medical 

care under the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”); (2) municipal liability 

for custom/policy/practice under Monell; (3) battery; (4) negligence; (5) failure to train under § 

1983; and (6) a violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1) (“Bane Act”). 

(ECF No. 28.) Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on January 31, 2024. 

(ECF No. 36.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue 

of any material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Under summary 

judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 

district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any,” 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof 

at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance 

solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id. at 

324 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered against a 

party who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 

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that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. 

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, 

the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings but is required to tender 

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in 

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must 

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the 

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that 

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party. Id. at 251–52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 288–89. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is 

to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee’s 

note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence 

of the opposing party is to be believed and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 

facts pleaded must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to 

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight 

Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, 

to demonstrate a genuine issue that necessitates a jury trial, the opposing party “must do more 

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than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. 

(ECF No. 36-1.) The Court will first address Plaintiff’s claims against the individual officers and 

then the Monell claim against the City. 

A. Claims Against the Individual Officers 

1. Excessive Force Under § 1983 

Plaintiff alleges the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment permits officers making 

an arrest to use force, but only an amount that is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 

Defendants argue the Court should grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force 

claim because the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable. (ECF No. 36-1 at 17.) More 

specifically, Defendants argue Staup’s use of deadly force was justified based on Adams’s actions 

and Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against McGinnis and Corrigan for their conduct leading up to 

the shooting. (Id. at 17–21.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues Staup’s lethal shooting of Adams was 

unreasonable because Adams was unarmed and in a stopped vehicle. (ECF No. 38 at 14.) 

Plaintiff also argues McGinnis and Corrigan may be held liable as integral participants because 

they were fundamentally involved in the incident. (Id. at 16.) The Court will address the 

excessive force claim against Staup and then the excessive force claims against McGinnis and 

Corrigan. 

a. Excessive Force Claim Against Staup

It is undisputed that Staup used deadly force. “The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of 

deadly force is unmatched.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 9. However, “whether or not [Staup’s] actions 

constituted application of ‘deadly force,’ all that matters is whether [his] actions were 

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reasonable.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). The inquiry is objective. Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Glenn v. Wash. Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2011). The 

vantage point is that of a reasonable officer confronted with the same facts, bearing in mind the 

decisions occurred in a “split” second and making every effort to ignore the advantages of “20/20 

vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.

In determining whether Staup’s actions were objectively reasonable, the Court “must 

balance the nature of the intrusion upon an individual’s rights against the countervailing 

government interests at stake, without regard for the officers’ underlying intent or motivations.” 

S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Browder v. 

Nehad, 141 S. Ct. 235 (2020) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). “Whether a use of force was 

reasonable will depend on the facts of the particular case, including, but not limited to, whether 

the suspect posed an immediate threat to anyone, whether the suspect resisted or attempted to 

evade arrest, and the severity of the crime at issue.” Id. “The most important Graham factor is 

whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to anyone’s safety.” Id. (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 

661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). 

Reasonableness of force is usually a fact question for the jury. A.G.1 by & through Uribe 

v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-CV-01914-LJO-SAB, 2018 WL 4042906, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 

2018) (citing Liston v. Cnty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n.10 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Because the 

excessive force inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, 

and to draw inferences therefrom, [the Ninth Circuit has] held on many occasions that summary 

judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” 

Id. (quoting Avina v. United States, 681 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012)).

Defendants argue the material facts are not in dispute and the video evidence confirms the 

officers’ version of events. (ECF No. 36-1.) Specifically, Defendants argue the undisputed facts 

show: (1) the officers were informed that Adams was wanted in the State of Washington for 

burglary charges; (2) Adams’s behavior was consistent with drug use; and (3) Adams failed to 

comply with the officers’ orders, attempted to evade the officers, and created an immediate threat

to officer safety by driving the Scion wildly in a confined space. (ECF No. 36-1 at 17.) 

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Defendants argue these facts establish that Staup’s use of deadly force was reasonable. (Id.)

As Plaintiff correctly points out, Defendants fail to cite evidence to support these

arguments. (See id. at 17–18; ECF No. 38-1 at 7.) First, as to Defendants’ argument that “the 

officers were informed that Adams was wanted in the State of Washington for burglary charges,”

the Court is unable to locate evidence to support such an assertion. While it is undisputed the 

officers knew there was a felony warrant associated with the license plates on the Scion, 

Defendants fail to cite evidence establishing that the officers knew the warrant was based on a

burglary. Second, as to Defendants’ argument that “Adams’s behavior was consistent with drug 

use,” the Court notes that while Corrigan stated in his deposition that he suspected Adams was 

intoxicated, Corrigan offered no specific details about Adams’s conduct that led to his suspicion. 

The Court finds Defendants’ first and second arguments to be unsupported, undeveloped, and 

ultimately, unpersuasive. 

Third, and most importantly, while there is some evidence Adams failed to comply with 

the officers’ orders and attempted to evade arrest, there is conflicting evidence as to whether

Adams posed an immediate threat during the critical moments before Staup shot Adams. (ECF 

No. 36-1 at 18.) Defendants primarily rely on Staup’s declaration, dated January 23, 2024. (ECF 

No. 36-2 at 7.) In his declaration, Staup stated, 

After colliding with my patrol car, I could tell the driver still had the 

accelerator floored as the engine was revving loudly and the tires 

were squealing. It appeared to me that he was trying to push my 

patrol car back into the street, which would have been extraordinarily 

dangerous if anyone happened to be driving up Pine Street. While 

the engine was still revving loudly, I could see that the driver was 

shaking the gear selector wildly with his left hand, as if he was trying 

to put the car into reverse again. At the same time, he appeared to be 

reaching for something on the floorboard. The result was that he had 

his side exposed to me. At this point, I felt I had to stop the driver 

with way I could. If he put the car into reverse again, he could easily 

end up killing one of the other officers. If he tried to force his was 

out of the parking lot by crashing into the patrol cars again, he could 

seriously injure my wife or the other civilian ride along. Seeing the 

driver trying to put the car in gear again and reaching for the 

floorboard, I stepped up to the driver’s side window, I aimed at his 

upper left torso, and took a single shot with my service weapon. I 

did not feel like there was any time for a verbal warning. The driver 

immediately slumped forward and stopped moving.

(ECF No. 36-4 at 4–5.) 

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In opposition, however, Plaintiff cites Staup’s deposition testimony from October 12, 

2021, in which Staup testified that although the Scion’s engine was revving when he shot Adams, 

he did not remember whether the Scion was in gear and still moving forward. (ECF No. 40-4 at 

69.) Staup testified he thought the Scion was “mostly stationary at that point.” (Id.) Staup 

testified he did not know if the Scion was pushing the patrol vehicle, he could not remember if he 

saw Adams’s left hand on the gear shifter, and he did not see the Scion’s tires spinning. (Id. at 

70–71, 75, 77.) 

Notably, when he was unable to recall certain material facts about the incident during his 

2021 deposition, Staup repeatedly stated “it’s been over two years.” (Id. at 71, 84.) Yet Staup 

was somehow capable of providing a much clearer, conflicting narrative of the incident in his 

2024 declaration. These contradictions and credibility determinations should be resolved by a 

trier of fact rather than by summary judgment. See First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 288–89. This is 

even more true for excessive force claims, and the Ninth Circuit has held on many occasions that 

summary judgment should be granted sparingly for such claims. Glenn, 673 F.3d at 871; see also 

Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have held on many occasions that 

summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted 

sparingly.”). 

Further, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ assertion that the video footage confirms

Defendants’ version of events. It is true that when a video records the events in question, no 

genuine dispute of fact exists for anything that is clearly discernable in the recording. Scott v. 

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007). However, the video footage in the instant case is far from

clear — rather, it is blurry, shows the events from a distance, and does not include audio. 

Defendants assert “it would be obvious to any reasonable person that if Adams were allowed to 

put his vehicle into reverse and to again try to crash his way out of the parking lot, the lives of the 

officers, the civilian ride-along passengers, and the passengers in Adams’s vehicle, would all be 

in mortal danger.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 18.) Yet the video arguably shows that after the collision,

the Scion was wedged between patrol vehicles and unable to move and that there were no 

individuals in the path of the Scion in either direction. Moreover, without audio, it is unknown 

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whether Adams’s tires were spinning, whether the engine was revving, and at what point Staup 

fired his weapon.

2 Looking at the video in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a trier of fact 

could determine that Adams no longer posed a serious threat to the officers after he collided with 

Staup’s vehicle. Vos v. City of Newport Beach, No. 16-56791, 892 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 

2018) (“[V]ideo footage of the incident does not foreclose a genuine factual dispute as to the 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that footage.”). 

Lastly, Defendant analogizes the instant case to Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546 (9th 

Cir. 2010) and Monzon v. City of Murrieta, 978 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2020). Both cases are 

distinguishable. In Wilkinson, an officer shot and killed the driver of a stolen minivan after the 

minivan had crashed in a muddy, slippery yard during a pursuit. 610 F.3d at 548–49. At the time 

of the shooting, “[t]he minivan was accelerating, its tires were spinning, mud was flying up, and a 

fellow officer was nearby either lying fallen on the ground or standing but disoriented.” Id. at 

551. In Monzon, the police shooting occurred after an erratic, high-speed car chase. 978 F.3d at 

1154. Officers shot the suspect after he was still driving and turning his car toward the officers, 

and then continued to shoot after the suspect crashed his van into a police cruiser. Id. at 1158. 

Notably, it was undisputed in Monzon that the car crashed with enough force to push the cruiser 

into one of the officers. Id. In contrast to both Wilkinson and Monzon, there are factual disputes 

as to whether any individual was in immediate danger in the instant case. For example, taking the 

facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Scion appeared to 

be stopped and unable to move after colliding with Staup’s vehicle and no officers appeared to be 

in the path of the Scion. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds a reasonable jury could conclude that Adams 

did not pose an immediate threat that warranted the use of deadly force. See Gonzalez v. City of 

Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The key issue in this case is whether a reasonable 

jury would necessarily find that [the officer] perceived an immediate threat of death or serious 

2 Corrigan and McGinnis testified in their depositions that the shot was fired between 10 to 

15 seconds after the collision. (ECF No. 40-1 at 80–81 (10 to 15 seconds); ECF No. 40-3 at 39

(10 seconds).) 

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physical injury at the time he shot [the suspect] in the head.”); see also Vos, 892 F.3d at 1032

(concluding “a reasonable jury could conclude that [the suspect] was not an immediate threat to 

the officers” when the officers outnumbered the suspect eight to one, did not believe the suspect 

had a gun, and had less lethal methods available to stop the suspect from charging); Villanueva v. 

California, 986 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2021) (“We have consistently found use of deadly force 

to stop a slow-moving vehicle unreasonable when the officers could have easily stepped out of 

the vehicle’s path to avoid danger.”). The Court thus concludes there is a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether Staup used unreasonable force under Graham. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s excessive force 

claim against Staup.

b. Excessive Force Claims Against McGinnis and Corrigan 

Defendants next argue Plaintiff fails to establish Corrigan or McGinnis used excessive 

force. (ECF No. 36-1 at 21.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues Corrigan is independently liable for 

his excessive force in breaking the Scion’s window with a baton, grabbing Adams, and pepper 

spraying Adams twice. (ECF No. 38 at 15.) Plaintiff also argues Corrigan and McGinnis may be 

held liable as integral participants to Staup’s use of deadly force. (ECF No. 38 at 16.)

The parties’ briefing on this issue is inadequate. As to Corrigan’s individual actions, it is

undisputed that Corrigan used his baton to shatter Adams’s window, reached into the vehicle to 

try to pull Adams out, and used pepper spray on Adams. (ECF No. 38-1 at 26–27.) However, 

neither party applies the Graham factors when discussing Corrigan’s conduct. In Defendants’ 

moving papers, they argue in a single, conclusory sentence that “Corrigan’s breaking of Adams’s

window and use of pepper spray was objectively reasonable under the circumstances as Adams 

was ‘violently’ moving the gear selector in an apparent intent to put the car in gear, and was 

revving the engine.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 21.) Although Defendants attempt to bolster this 

argument in their reply, Defendants’ reply brief fails to cite legal authority on this issue and fails 

to analyze Corrigan’s conduct within the Graham framework. (ECF No. 42 at 7–8.) Ultimately, 

the Court need not and does not consider arguments raised for the first time in reply that could 

have been raised in Defendants’ moving papers. Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 

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2007). Based on the limited briefing before the Court, the Court cannot say Corrigan’s individual 

actions were objectively reasonable as a matter of law. 

However, the Court agrees with Defendants that they are entitled to summary judgment as 

to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against McGinnis. Plaintiff does not cite, nor can the Court 

locate, any allegations about McGinnis using force against Adams. Instead, Plaintiff only argues 

McGinnis is liable as an “integral participant” in the group conduct. (ECF No. 38 at 16.)

“In some situations, the Constitution may impose on an officer a duty to intervene to 

prevent an ongoing constitutional violation.” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 889 (9th Cir. 2022). 

“But in general, one does not ‘subject’ someone to a deprivation of a constitutional right — or 

‘cause [someone] to be subjected’ to such a deprivation — simply by watching others violate the 

Constitution.” Id. “To be liable under [§] 1983, a defendant official must be more than a mere 

bystander.” Id. (citing Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930, 941 (9th Cir. 2020))

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n official whose individual actions do not themselves 

rise to the level of a constitutional violation may be held liable under [§] 1983 only if the official 

is an ‘integral participant’ in the unlawful act.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff vaguely argues “[e]very officer participated in the plan, participated in the yelling 

at the occupants, failed to de-escalate the situation, failed to remain behind cover, failed to 

communicate with each other, failed to work as a team to position themselves appropriate instead 

of creating the peril, and knew about Corrigan’s and Staup’s uses of force when deployed.” (ECF 

No. 38 at 16.) Plaintiff does not cite legal authority to support the argument that this conduct 

would be sufficient to establish liability under an integral participant theory, nor does Plaintiff 

cite any evidence as to McGinnis’s conduct specifically. As such, Plaintiff has failed to raise a 

triable issue that McGinnis was anything more than a “mere bystander” to the alleged excessive 

force used by Staup and Corrigan. Peck, 51 F.4th at 889. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the 

excessive force claim against Corrigan and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

as to the excessive force claim against McGinnis.

///

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2. Delay in Medical Care Under § 1983 

Plaintiff also alleges a § 1983 claim based on delay in medical care. The Due Process 

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “the responsible governmental entity to provide 

medical care to persons who have been injured while being apprehended by the police.” City of 

Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 239 (1983). In defining the contours of this duty, the 

Ninth Circuit held that a police officer acts reasonably by “either promptly summoning the 

necessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a hospital.” Maddox v. City of L.A., 

792 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Defendants argue the Court should grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s delay in 

medical care claim because the only evidence in the record is that Staup promptly called for 

medical assistance. (ECF No. 36-1 at 22.) Plaintiff does not address this claim in her opposition. 

Typically, the Court would construe Plaintiff’s failure to address Defendants’ arguments about a 

claim as abandonment of that claim. See Est. of Shapiro v. United States, 634 F.3d 1055, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment on a claim because the plaintiff “abandoned th[e] 

claim by failing to raise it in opposition to the [defendant’s] motion for complete summary 

judgment”); Jenkins v. Cty. of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting a 

plaintiff “abandoned her other two claims by not raising them in opposition to [the defendant’s] 

motion for summary judgment.”). However, Plaintiff does dispute this fact in response to 

Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts by citing Corrigan’s deposition. (ECF No. 38-1 at 33.) 

Absent meaningful argument from Plaintiff, the Court finds Corrigan’s deposition 

supports Defendants’ argument that the officers promptly summoned medical care. In the cited 

portion of the deposition, Corrigan states Staup called for medical aid immediately after the shot 

was fired. (ECF No. 40-1 at 85.) After confirming McGinnis and Staup were unharmed, 

Corrigan “briefly spoke” with McGinnis about removing the passengers from the Scion. (Id. at 

85–86.) Corrigan then states from the time he got Adams out of the vehicle and began medical 

interventions, it was approximately ten minutes before fire or emergency medical services arrived 

at the scene. (Id. at 90.) As such, Plaintiff fails to persuade the Court that the officers 

unreasonably delayed Adams’s medical care. See Monzon, 978 F.3d at 1164 (granting summary 

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judgment on § 1983 denial of medical care claim where “[t]he officers promptly called for 

medical assistance once they secured [the suspects], and the ambulance arrived within five 

minutes of the van finally coming to rest.”). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to 

Plaintiff’s delay in medical care claim. 

3. Qualified Immunity 

Defendants argue even if there was an underlying constitutional violation, the officers are 

entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 36-1 at 22.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues there are 

triable issues of material fact which preclude qualified immunity, it was obviously unreasonable 

for officers to use deadly force against an unarmed stopped vehicle, and there was no officer in 

the path of the Scion at the time of the shooting. (ECF No. 38 at 20.) 

Qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability where a reasonable officer would 

not have known that his conduct violated a clearly established right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 

U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987). It “gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 

229 (1991). An officer may be denied qualified immunity at summary judgment in a § 1983 suit 

only if (1) the facts alleged, viewed most favorably to plaintiff, show the officer used excessive 

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) the right was clearly established so a 

reasonable officer would have known his conduct to be unlawful. Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 

821 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he two prongs of qualified immunity balance two important, competing 

interests: the need to hold public officials accountable for irresponsible actions, and the need to 

shield them from liability when they make reasonable mistakes.” Id. at 822. 

As of the date of this incident in 2019, case law “clearly established that an officer may 

not use deadly force to apprehend a suspect where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the 

officer or others.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2010); Longoria v. Pinal 

Cnty., 873 F.3d 699, 709–10 (9th Cir. 2017) (denying qualified immunity at summary judgment 

where fact and credibility issues were to be decided by a jury in a case in which an unarmed 

suspect was shot after a chase). Determining whether a law was clearly established does not 

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“require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S. Ct. 2074 

(2011). At the time of the shooting, it was clearly established that officers may not use deadly 

force against a person who is armed but cannot reasonably be perceived to be taking any furtive, 

harrowing, or threatening actions. See George, 736 F.3d at 838; Curnow By and Through 

Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 324–25 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Estate of Lopez by 

and through Lopez v. Gelhaus, 871 F.3d 998, 1020 (9th Cir. 2017). This is true even in 

circumstances in which the suspect has allegedly “committed a violent crime in the immediate 

past.” See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith, 2018 WL 

5880610, at *9 (“Decedent may have initially attacked the Responding Officers, but if Decedent 

no longer posed a threat, the use of deadly force violated clearly established law.”).

Defendants’ briefing on this issue is limited and conclusory. (ECF No. 46-1 at 22–23.) 

Defendants merely cite general legal standards and argue “there can be little doubt that all three 

individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity.” (Id.) Defendants also argue the Ninth 

Circuit found no constitutional violation in Wilkinson and Monzon, so finding a Fourth 

Amendment violation in this case “would be a departure from existing precedent” and “qualified 

immunity would clearly apply.” (Id.) For the reasons already discussed above, the Court finds 

Wilkinson and Monzon to be distinguishable from the instant case. Defendants’ other conclusory 

arguments are unpersuasive. 

In sum, the Court concludes Staup is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified 

immunity because, as established previously, there is a material issue of fact as to whether Staup

violated Adams’s clearly established constitutional right. Longoria, 873 F.3d at 711; Espinosa v. 

City & Cnty. of S.F., 598 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of summary judgment 

on qualified immunity because “there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the officers 

violated [the plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights[, which] are also material to a proper 

determination of the reasonableness of the officers’ belief in the legality of their actions”); Lopez 

v. City of Mesa, No. 22-15278, 2024 WL 3250380, at *1 (9th Cir. July 1, 2024) (affirming denial 

of qualified immunity where an officer shot the driver of a vehicle that was no longer in motion). 

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Moreover, Defendants fail to raise specific arguments as to why Corrigan is entitled to qualified 

immunity for his independent actions. Accordingly, Defendants fail to persuade the Court that 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. 

In sum, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to qualified 

immunity. 

4. State Law Claims

Defendants argue Plaintiff state law claims for battery, negligence, and violation of the 

Bane Act fail for the same reasons already addressed as to the excessive force claim. (ECF No. 

36-1 at 26–27.) As discussed above, the Court finds there are triable issues of material fact as to 

the excessive force claim. Defendants’ arguments as to the state law claims appear to be entirely 

derivative of their argument as to the excessive force claim. Therefore, for the same reasons 

discussed as to excessive force claim, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment as to the state law claims. 

B. Monell Claim Against the City 

Municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional torts of their 

employees based solely on respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 

436 U.S. 658, 693–94 (1978). Pursuant to Monell, a municipality is only liable under § 1983 

when its own illegal acts are a “moving force” in the constitutional violation. Id. A plaintiff may 

assert Monell liability based on: (1) an official policy; (2) a “longstanding practice or custom 

which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity”; (3) the act of 

an “official whose acts fairly represent official policy such that the challenged action constituted 

official policy”; or (4) where “an official with final policy-making authority ‘delegated that 

authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.’” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citations omitted). 

Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot sustain a Monell claim against the City because there is 

no evidence of a constitutionally deficient policy and there is no evidence of a lack of adequate 

training. (ECF No. 36-1 at 23–24.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues the City is liable because it: 

(1) ratified Defendants’ excessive force; (2) failed to discipline Defendants; (3) made no changes 

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to their policies or training as a result of the incident; (4) had a custom of failing to terminate, or 

even discipline, any officers in the last ten years for use of excessive force; (5) did not implement 

“de-escalation” training; (6) did not provide training as to how to handle a situation with a suspect

in a vehicle; and (7) did not require officers to carry less lethal options or to use audio or video 

recording devices during critical incidents. (ECF No. 38 at 25–26.) In reply, Defendants 

summarily argue Plaintiff fails to describe how the City’s policies are unconstitutional. (ECF No. 

42 at 11.) Defendants also vaguely argue “there is no evidence offered to suggest the City ratified 

Plaintiff’s unsupported version of events.” (Id.) 

The briefing from both sides on this issue is subpar. However, Plaintiff does cite to 

evidence to support its arguments on this issue in its Statement of Disputed Facts. (ECF No. 38-2 

at 19–27.) For example, Plaintiffs cites several portions of the deposition of Mark Montgomery, 

the City’s person most knowledgeable, who describes what could be perceived as deficiencies in 

the City’s training practices, such as a lack of de-escalation training and a lack of training on how 

to handle suspects in a vehicle. (ECF No. 40-11 at 25–26, 43–44, 53–54, 67–68.) Arguably such 

deficiencies could support a Monell claim. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64 (2011) 

(discussing the “possibility, however rare, that the unconstitutional consequences of failing to 

train could be so patently obvious that a city could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a preexisting pattern of violations.”). Defendants make no effort to rebut this evidence, and their reply 

is effectively nonresponsive to Plaintiff’s opposition. As such, Defendants fail to persuade the 

Court that Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City fails as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the 

Monell claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 36) as follows:

1. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the § 1983 

excessive force claim against McGinnis; 

2. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the § 1983 

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delay in medical care claim; and

3. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in all other respects. 

The parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report within thirty (30) days of the 

electronic filing date of this Order indicating their readiness to proceed to trial on Plaintiff’s 

remaining claims and proposing trial dates. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 7, 2025

___________________________________

TROY L. NUNLEY

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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