Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00726/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00726-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frank Chang
Defendant
John Louis Spears
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN LOUIS SPEARS,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRANK CHANG,

Defendant.

Case No.: 1:22-cv-00726 SKO (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Doc. 2.) 

Plaintiff John Louis Spears is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (Doc. 2.) He 

contends the “interests of justice” support his request for the following reasons: (1) due to his 

incarceration, Plaintiff is restricted in “his ability to effectively litigate” the action due to COVID19, resulting in limited access to the law library; (2) an attorney “can do things” Plaintiff cannot, 

including “access, research, making appearances, trial preparations, interviewing witnesses, 

defendant(s), other investigative strategies, and, lastly, the complexity of the case;” (3) the 

“permanent loss of [Plaintiff’s] finger has created many disadvantages” including being unable 

“to grip a pen or pencil without being in pain,” limiting his “ability to write or type” and requiring 

“assistance from inmates and or ADA worker that will ultimately create a liability that can will 

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expose [him] to dangers unseen;” (4) Plaintiff suffers from PTSD, night terrors, depression and 

anxiety, making it difficult to “truly concentrate and do the task at hand”; (5) a trial will “involve 

conflicting testimony and counsel would better enable plaintiff to present evidence and cross 

examine witnesses.” (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint counsel “from the California 

Pro Bono Project.” (Id. at 2.) 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in § 1983 actions. Rand v. 

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952, 954 

n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Nor can the Court require an attorney to represent a party under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(1). See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1989). However, in 

“exceptional circumstances,” the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant 

to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.

Given that the Court has no reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the 

Court will seek volunteer counsel only in extraordinary cases. In determining whether 

“exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on

the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (internal quotation marks &

citations omitted).

In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even 

assuming Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and has made serious allegations that, if proven, 

would entitle him to relief, Plaintiff’s case is not exceptional. The Court is faced with similar 

cases almost daily. While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is at a disadvantage due to his pro se

status and his incarceration, the test is not whether Plaintiff would benefit from the appointment 

of counsel. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). The test is whether 

exceptional circumstances exist; here, they do not. Indeed, circumstances common to most 

prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish 

exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. In 

this case, Plaintiff’s complaint asserts an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to 

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serious medical needs following an incident on February 2, 2017, wherein Plaintiff’s “finger was 

severed in an accident” and his finger could not be reattached because the treating physician at 

the prison facility did not properly store and preserve the amputated finger. (Doc. 1.) While 

perhaps unusual, Plaintiff’s case is simply not one involving exceptional circumstances. 

At this stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff is likely to 

succeed on the merits because his complaint has not yet been screened. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

Nevertheless, based on a review of the record in this case, the Court does not find that Plaintiff 

cannot adequately articulate his claims.

To the extent Plaintiff’s access to the law library is restricted due to COVID-19, the Court 

will entertain motions for additional time to comply with deadlines in this case, for good cause 

shown. Such restrictions, however, are not a basis for the appointment of counsel. See, e.g.,

Faultry v. Saechao, 2020 WL 2561596, at *2 (E.D. Cal., May 20, 2020) (stating that 

“[c]ircumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law 

library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances supporting appointment of counsel” 

and noting that the “impacts of the COVID-19 health crisis on prison operations are also common 

to all prisoners”); Snowden v. Yule, 2020 WL 2539229, at *1 (E.D. Cal., May 19, 2020) (noting 

that “limited access to the prison law library and resources, particularly during the current 

COVID-19 health crisis” is a circumstance that plaintiff shares with many other prisoners).

Regarding Plaintiff’s contention that PTSD, night terrors, depression and anxiety 

necessitate the appointment of counsel, those circumstances do not change the analysis. See Jones 

v. Kuppinger, 2015 WL 5522290, at *3–*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015) (“[c]ircumstances common 

to most prisoners, such as a deficient general education, lack of knowledge of the law, mental 

illness and disability, do not in themselves establish exceptional circumstances warranting 

appointment of voluntary civil counsel”); Jones v. Stieferman, 2007 WL 4219169, at *1 (E.D. 

Cal., Nov. 29, 2007) (“being disabled and requiring use of a wheelchair to assist with mobility is 

not the type of exceptional circumstances which allow the court to request voluntary assistance of 

counsel”); see also Fletcher v. Quin, No. 15CV2156-GPC (NLS), 2018 WL 840174, at *2 (S.D. 

Cal. Feb. 13, 2018) (impairment must be “an incapacitating mental disability” and be supported 

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by “substantial evidence of incompetence”); McElroy v. Cox, Civil No. 08-1221-JM (AJB), 2009 

WL 4895360 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009).

The fact that an attorney may be better able to perform research, investigate, and prepare 

for and represent Plaintiff at trial, again, does not change the analysis. There is little doubt most 

pro se litigants “find it difficult to articulate [their] claims,” and would be better served with the 

assistance of counsel. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. For this reason, in the absence of counsel, 

federal courts employ procedures which are highly protective of a pro se litigant's rights. See

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding pro se complaint to less stringent standard) 

(per curiam). In fact, where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the court must construe 

the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim–Panahi v. Los 

Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.

1992). Thus, where a pro se litigant can “articulate his claims” in light of the relative complexity 

of the matter, the “exceptional circumstances” which might require the appointment of counsel do 

not exist. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331; accord Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint adequately articulates his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference 

claim against a single defendant. 

Finally, as to Plaintiff's physical limitations, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that these 

limitations impede his ability to litigate this case. A review of Plaintiff’s complaint reveals “an 

amputation of his distal phalanx on the left middle finger distal to the DIP. ... The amputated 

distal fingertip measures 2 cm in length with the entire nail bed within the fragment.” (Doc. 1 at 

6-7.) While Plaintiff’s amputated fingertip may be sensitive and painful, there is no evidence 

Plaintiff’s disability prevents him from articulating his claim. Further, Plaintiff acknowledges the 

availability of assistance from another inmate and/or ADA worker and can adequately articulate 

his claims with that assistance. See Montano v. Solomon, No. 2:07-CV-0800 KJN P, 2010 WL 

4137476, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2010) (denying indigent plaintiff's motion for appointment of 

counsel as failing to present an exceptional circumstance under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) where 

“plaintiff has adequately presented, albeit through another inmate, the salient factual allegations 

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of this case ... as well as the matters now before the court”). 

Plaintiff’s contention that those individuals “create a liability that can and will expose 

[him] to dangers unseen,” (Doc. 2 at 1-2), is speculative and defies common sense. Plaintiff does 

not explain how another inmate or an ADA worker’s assistance would “create a liability” or 

present “dangers unseen,” particularly where those individuals are presumably assisting Plaintiff 

by writing or typing documents at Plaintiff’s direction, rather than authoring the documents 

themselves. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel (Doc. 2) 

is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2022 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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