Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01765/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01765-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Beckmann
Appellant
John Vito Cavataio
Appellee
Yisun Cheng
Appellee
Haren S. Gandhi
Appellee
Robert Henry Hammerle
Appellee
Alexander Massner
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

THOMAS BECKMANN, ALEXANDER MASSNER,

Appellants

v.

HAREN S. GANDHI, JOHN VITO CAVATAIO, 

ROBERT HENRY HAMMERLE, YISUN CHENG,

Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1765

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Interference No. 

105,822.

______________________ 

Decided: April 29, 2016

______________________ 

MICHAEL H. JACOBS, Crowell & Moring, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellants. Also represented by 

VINCENT JOHN GALLUZZO; CHIEMI SUZUKI, New York, NY.

EDWARD ANTHONY FIGG, Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & 

Manbeck, P.C., Washington, DC, argued for appellees. 

Also represented by ROBERT DANNY HUNTINGTON, BRETT 

ALAN POSTAL. 

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2 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and DYK, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge LOURIE. 

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge BRYSON.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

This patent appeal arises as one of a dying breed of 

interference proceedings before the United States Patent 

and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(“the Board”) between Thomas Beckmann and Alexander 

Massner (collectively, “Beckmann”), the named inventors 

of U.S. Patent 7,584,605 (“the ’605 patent”), and Haren S. 

Gandhi, John Vito Cavataio, Robert Henry Hammerle, 

and Yisun Cheng (collectively, “Gandhi”), the applicants 

of U.S. Patent Application 12/877,901 (“the ’901 application”). Beckmann appeals from the Board’s decision, 

which held that all of Beckmann’s claims involved in the 

interference, viz., claims 1–4 of the ’605 patent, are unpatentable over the cited prior art, and that claims 5, 7, 8, 

and 10–17 of Gandhi’s ’901 application satisfy the written 

description requirement. See Beckmann v. Gandhi, 

Interference No. 105,822, Paper No. 114 (P.T.A.B. July 8, 

2013) (“Decision on Motions”); Beckmann v. Gandhi, 

Interference No. 105,822, Paper No. 117 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 

2015) (“Rehearing Decision”). 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Board’s determination that claims 3 and 4 of the ’605 patent are 

unpatentable as obvious over the cited prior art, and that 

the ’901 application contains an adequate written description of the “transitioning” limitation of claims 12–17, as 

well as the “minimizing the oxygen content” limitation of 

claims 7, 10, and 16. However, because the Board erred 

in construing claim 1 of the ’605 patent as not requiring a 

separate and distinct third “supplying” step, we vacate its

determination that claims 1 and 2 of the ’605 patent are 

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 3

unpatentable over the cited prior art and remand for 

further proceedings under the proper claim construction. 

Moreover, because the Board’s finding that the ’901 

application contains an adequate written description of 

the “minimizing the oxygen content . . . prior to a rich 

cycle” limitation of claims 5, 8, 11, and 17 is unsupported 

by substantial evidence, we vacate that finding and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

I 

The technology at issue relates to methods of reducing 

nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) emissions from internal combustion engines. When an engine operates in a lean mode, a 

reduced amount of fuel is provided to the cylinders, which 

improves fuel efficiency. But operating in the lean mode 

produces an exhaust gas with an excess of oxidizing 

constituents (“lean exhaust gas”), which decreases the 

effectiveness of the exhaust gas purification system, 

leading to NOx emissions. In contrast, a “rich exhaust 

gas” is one that has an excess of reducing constituents.

According to Beckmann, a prior-art solution for reducing NOx emissions involved operating the engine alternately in lean and rich modes to produce lean and rich 

exhaust gases. Appellants’ Br. 10. In the engine, an NOx

catalytic converter (or “lean NOx trap”) stores NOx produced during the lean cycle, and then converts the stored 

NOx to ammonia (“NH3”) during the rich cycle. A downstream selective catalytic reduction (“SCR”) catalytic 

converter then stores the NH3 and reacts it with any NOx

released from the NOx catalytic converter to produce 

nitrogen gas N2 for release into the atmosphere.

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4 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

J.A. 1453.

When the engine switches from lean to rich mode, 

however, the sudden change in exhaust gas composition

from lean to rich causes the direct mixing of oxidizing and 

reducing constituents inside the cavities of the NOx

catalytic converter. ’605 patent col. 2 ll. 15–27. Such

mixing impedes the efficient reduction of NOx to NH3, and 

also causes the release of a large amount of NOx from the 

NOx catalytic converter. Id. col. 2 ll. 27–35. That problem 

was known as “NOx spike.” 

Beckmann’s ’605 patent purportedly solves the NOx

spike problem by interposing a third operating mode

between the lean and rich modes. Id. col. 2 ll. 35–45. The

third operating mode takes place after the lean mode and 

before the rich mode, id. col. 2 ll. 7–10, during which the 

NOx catalytic converter is supplied with an exhaust gas 

that has a lower content of oxidizing constituents than the 

lean exhaust gas and a lower content of reducing constituents than the rich exhaust gas (“intermediate exhaust 

gas”), id. col. 2 ll. 10–14. In the third operating mode, the 

intermediate exhaust gas replaces the lean exhaust gas

inside the cavities of the NOx catalytic converter, which 

mitigates the NOx spike problem. Id. col. 2 ll. 46–61.

The ’605 patent has four claims, among which claims 

1 and 3 are independent. Claims 2 and 4 depend from 

claims 1 and 3, respectively. Claim 1 reads as follows: 

1. A method for purifying the exhaust gas from an 

internal combustion engine having an exhaustgas purification system including a nitrogen oxide storage catalytic converter and an SCR catalytic converter downstream of the nitrogen 

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 5

oxide storage catalytic converter, comprising 

the steps of: 

supplying the nitrogen oxide storage catalytic 

converter with exhaust gas containing an 

excess of oxidizing constituents [“the lean 

step”]; 

supplying the nitrogen oxide storage catalytic 

converter with exhaust gas containing an 

excess of reducing constituents [“the rich 

step”]; and 

supplying the nitrogen oxide storage catalytic 

converter, between the oxidizing constituents 

supplying step and the reducing constituents 

supplying step, with an exhaust gas which 

has a lower content of oxidizing constituents 

than in the oxidizing constituents supplying 

step and a lower content of reducing constituents than in the reducing constituents supplying step [“the intermediate step”],

wherein the step between the oxidizing constituents supplying step and the reducing constituents supplying step is terminated at the 

earliest when the nitrogen oxide storage catalytic converter is predominantly filled by 

exhaust gas delivered in step between the oxidizing constituents supplying step and the 

reducing constituents supplying step. 

Id. col. 13 ll. 15–39 (emphases added). 

Claim 3 recites the same preamble and lean and rich 

steps as claim 1, but a different intermediate step and 

wherein clause, which are reproduced below.

3. . . . 

supplying the nitrogen oxide storage catalytic 

converter, between the oxidizing constituCase: 15-1765 Document: 48-2 Page: 5 Filed: 04/29/2016
6 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

ents supplying step and the reducing constituents supplying step, for a predetermined period with a constant exhaust gas 

composition which has a lower content of oxidizing constituents than in the oxidizing 

constituents supplying step and a lower content of reducing constituents than in the reducing constituents supplying step [“the 

intermediate step”],

wherein in step of supplying the nitrogen oxide 

storage catalytic converter between the oxidizing constituents supplying step and the 

reducing constituents supplying step, an 

air/fuel ratio which set to control exhaust 

gas composition is set to be slightly greater 

than 1, such that the oxidizing constituents 

in the exhaust gas have an oxygen excess of 

1% or less. 

Id. col. 14 ll. 11–36 (emphases added).

II

In 2010, Gandhi filed the ’901 application, which is a 

continuation in a series of applications, including U.S. 

Patent Application 10/065,470 (“the ’470 application”). 

The ’470 application was issued as U.S. Patent 7,332,135 

(“Gandhi ’135”), which is prior art to Beckmann’s ’605 

patent. Gandhi’s ’901 application and Gandhi ’135 share 

the same specification in relevant part.

In the Background section, the ’901 application describes the NOx spike problem that “occurs during the 

short period in which the NOx trap transitions from lean 

to rich,” and states that “FIG. 1a [shows] that during this 

lean-rich transition, NOx spikes, the large peaks of unreacted NOx,” account for significant NOx emissions. J.A. 

502. Then, in the Summary of the Invention section, the 

’901 application states that the NOx spike problem was

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 7

solved “with the use of an NH3-SCR catalyst placed downstream of the lean NOx adsorber catalyst.”1 J.A. 503. The 

’901 application explains that “[t]he advantage of the 

catalyst system of this invention is the use of a combination of a lean NOx trap and an NH3-SCR catalyst.” J.A. 

505. Additionally, in paragraph 41, the ’901 application 

states that: “For this invention, the lean NOx trap is 

optimized for ammonia generation by removing oxygen 

storage capacity (OSC) and thereby enhancing the rich 

cycle and thus creating a greater quantity of ammonia for 

reaction with the NOx in the downstream NH3-SCR 

catalyst.” Id. (emphasis added).

When filing the ’901 application, Gandhi added claims 

3–17, seeking to provoke an interference with Beckmann. 

Gandhi’s claim 3 was copied from, and thus is identical to, 

claim 1 of the ’605 patent. Although none of Gandhi’s 

other claims, viz., claims 4–17, is completely identical to 

any of Beckmann’s claims, Gandhi stated that claims 

4–11 “are substantially identical to, and have been copied 

from,” Beckmann’s claim 1, and that claims 12–17 “correspond substantially to” Beckmann’s claim 1. J.A. 515. 

Claims 5, 8, 11, and 17 of the ’901 application each 

contain a “minimizing the oxygen content . . . prior to a 

rich cycle” limitation. J.A. 507–08, 510–13. Claim 5 is 

illustrative and reads as follows: 

5. A method for reducing pollutants in the exhaust gas of an engine having a system including a nitrogen oxide adsorber and a NH3-SCR 

catalyst downstream of the nitrogen oxide adsorber, comprising the steps of: 

 

1 Here, the ’901 application refers to the NOx catalytic converter as a lean NOx adsorber catalyst, and the 

SCR catalytic converter as an NH3-SCR catalyst. 

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8 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

supplying the nitrogen oxide adsorber with exhaust gas while the engine operates under 

lean conditions, wherein the exhaust gas is 

a lean exhaust gas;

transitioning the engine operations from lean 

to rich conditions[;]

supplying the nitrogen oxide adsorber with exhaust gas during said transitioning;

minimizing the oxygen content of the nitrogen 

oxide adsorber prior to rich conditions to facilitate the reduction of NOx to NH3; 

completing the transition from lean to rich conditions; and 

supplying the nitrogen oxide adsorber with exhaust gas while the engine operates under 

rich conditions, wherein the exhaust gas is a 

rich exhaust gas. 

J.A. 507, 510 (emphasis added). Claims 7, 10, and 16 

each contain the limitation “the oxygen content of the 

lean NOx trap is minimized to facilitate the reduction of 

NOx to NH3,” but those claims do not include any “prior to 

a rich cycle” language. J.A. 508, 511–12. Claims 8, 11, 

and 17 depend from claims 7, 10, and 16, respectively.

Claim 12 and its dependent claims 13–17 require

“transitioning” between a lean exhaust gas supplying step 

and a rich exhaust gas supplying step and “completing

said transition.” Claim 12 reads as follows: 

12. A method for purifying the exhaust gas from 

an engine, comprising: 

supplying a zoned catalyst system with a lean 

exhaust gas, wherein said zoned catalyst 

system comprises a first zone of lean NOx

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 9

trap and a second zone of SCR catalyst 

downstream of the first zone;

supplying the zoned catalyst system with a rich 

exhaust gas;

transitioning between said lean exhaust gas 

supplying step and said rich exhaust gas 

supplying step, wherein exhaust gas is supplied to said zoned catalyst system during 

said transition; and

completing said transition from said lean exhaust gas supplying step to said rich exhaust 

gas supplying step. 

J.A. 508, 512 (emphases added).

III

In July 2011, the Board declared Interference No. 

105,822 between Gandhi’s ’901 application and Beckmann’s ’605 patent. The interference involves a sole 

count corresponding to claims 1–4 of the ’605 patent and 

claims 3–17 of the ’901 application. The Count is identical to Beckmann’s claim 1 and Gandhi’s claim 3. When 

declaring the interference, the Board accorded Gandhi the 

benefit of the ’470 application, filed in October 2002, and 

accorded Beckmann the benefit of an application filed in 

October 2003.2 Id. Based on those filing dates, the Board 

designated Gandhi as the senior party.

 

2 Because both the ’901 application and the ’605 patent have effective filing dates before the enactment of the 

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 

112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), the pre-AIA versions of 35 

U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 apply in this appeal. See Pub. 

L. No. 112-29, § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.

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The parties then filed several preliminary motions, 

including: (1) Beckmann’s motion alleging that Gandhi’s 

claims 3–5, 7, 8, and 10–17 are unpatentable for lack of

written description support (“Beckmann Motion 1”); 

(2) Beckmann’s motion alleging that Gandhi’s claims 3, 4, 

6, 9, and 12 are unpatentable in view of European Patent 

Publication EP 0 814 241 (“Kinugasa ’241”), U.S. Patent 

6,109,024 (“Kinugasa ’024”), and U.S. Patent Publication 

2003/0056499 (“Binder ’499”) (“Beckmann Motion 2”); and 

(3) Gandhi’s motion alleging that Beckmann’s claims 1–4 

are unpatentable in view of Gandhi ’135 and U.S. Patent 

6,604,504 (“Surnilla ’504”) (“Gandhi Motion 1”). The 

Board decided the parties’ motions in the following order: 

(1) Beckmann Motion 1; (2) Beckmann Motion 2; and 

(3) Gandhi Motion 1. Decision on Motions at 4.

First, the Board denied Beckmann Motion 1, finding 

that Gandhi’s claims 3–5, 7, 8, and 10–17 are not unpatentable for lack of written description support. Id. at 

7–24. Beckmann raised three separate written description challenges: (1) that Gandhi’s claims 3 and 4, copied 

from Beckmann, must be construed in light of the ’605 

patent as requiring a third exhaust gas supplying step 

that is (a) separate and distinct from the lean and rich 

exhaust gas supplying steps and (b) controlled in terms of 

exhaust gas composition and duration, and that Gandhi’s 

’901 application lacks an adequate written description of 

such a third supplying step; (2) that Gandhi’s ’901 application lacks an adequate written description of the “transitioning” limitation of claims 12–17; and (3) that 

Gandhi’s ’901 application lacks an adequate written 

description of the “minimizing the oxygen content” limitation of claims 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, and 17. 

With respect to Gandhi’s claims 3 and 4, the Board 

recognized the differences between Beckmann’s and 

Gandhi’s disclosures, and agreed with Beckmann that 

Gandhi’s ’901 application does not contain a written 

description of a separate and distinct third exhaust gas 

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 11

supplying step that is controlled in terms of exhaust gas 

composition and duration. Id. at 14–15. But the Board 

concluded that Gandhi’s claims 3 and 4, as construed in 

light of Beckmann’s ’605 patent, see Agilent Techs., Inc. v. 

Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009), do 

not require such a third supplying step. Decision on 

Motions at 15–16.

Instead, the Board concluded that the claims only require that, between the lean and rich exhaust gas supplying steps, the NOx catalytic converter “is supplied with an 

exhaust gas having less oxidizing constituents than lean 

operations and less reducing constituents than rich conditions, and that this supplying step terminates at the 

earliest when the lean NOx trap is predominantly full of 

exhaust gas supplied during this step.” Id. at 16. The

Board also noted that the differences between Beckmann’s claim 1 (which is identical to Gandhi’s claim 3) 

and Beckmann’s claim 3 (which requires “a constant 

exhaust gas composition” and “a predetermined period” 

for the third supplying step) further support its construction of Gandhi’s claim 3. Id. at 16–19. 

The Board then found that the ’901 application provides an adequate written description of Gandhi’s claims 

3 and 4 because it describes “the short period in which the 

NOx trap transitions from lean to rich,” and because the 

claims only require “the transition between lean and rich 

supplying steps in which an exhaust gas having less 

oxidizing constituents than lean operations and less 

reducing constituents than rich conditions is supplied, 

and that this supplying step (transition step) terminates 

at the earliest when the lean NOx trap is predominantly 

full of the exhaust gas supplied.” Id. at 19–20.

With respect to Gandhi’s claims 12–17, the Board reasoned that claim 12 does not require “a separate and 

distinct transition step between the supply of lean and 

rich exhaust gases,” and that the claim “merely requires 

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12 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

transitioning between lean and rich conditions and completing the transition to rich conditions, as described by 

Gandhi’s disclosure.” Id. at 21. The Board again relied 

on the ’901 application’s description of “the short period in 

which the NOx trap transitions from lean to rich” and its

Figure 1a to find that the ’901 application adequately 

describes “transitioning” between lean and rich conditions 

and “completing” that transition. Id. at 21–22.

With respect to Gandhi’s claims 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, and 

17, the Board noted that those claims require “the minimization [of] the oxygen content in the NOx catalytic 

converter prior to the rich cycle.” Id. at 23 (emphasis in 

original). The Board found that the ’901 application,

especially its paragraph 41, which describes “removing 

oxygen storage capacity” of the lean NOx trap, adequately 

describes the “minimizing” limitation. Id.

Next, the Board granted Beckmann Motion 2 in part, 

holding that Gandhi’s claims 3, 4, 6, and 9, as construed 

in light of Gandhi’s ’901 application, see Agilent, 567 F.3d 

at 1375, are anticipated by, or would have been obvious 

over, Kinugasa ’241 and Kinugasa ’024. Decision on 

Motions at 24–35. The Board denied the motion as to 

Gandhi’s claim 12, however, finding that the cited reference, Binder ’499, is not prior art to Gandhi’s claim 12. 

Id. at 35–41.

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.207(c), the Board then considered whether Beckmann rebutted the presumption of 

cross-applicability of the prior art to its own claims, viz., 

claims 1–4 of the ’605 patent. The Board concluded that 

Beckmann failed to do so as to claims 1 and 2. Id. at 

42–44. Specifically, the Board noted that Beckmann 

sought to overcome the presumption by making the same 

claim construction argument, namely, that Beckmann’s 

claims, as construed in light of the ’605 patent, require a 

separate and distinct third exhaust gas supplying step 

that is controlled in terms of exhaust gas composition and 

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 13

duration. Recognizing that Beckmann’s claims 3 and 4 

indeed require a constant exhaust gas composition and a 

predetermined period for the third exhaust gas supplying 

step, the Board concluded that Beckmann successfully 

overcame the presumption as to those claims. But because the Board, when deciding Beckmann Motion 1,

rejected Beckmann’s proposed construction of Gandhi

claim 3 and Beckmann claim 1, the Board concluded here 

that Beckmann failed to rebut the § 41.207(c) presumption as to its claims 1 and 2. The Board therefore held

that claims 1 and 2 of the ’605 patent are unpatentable

over Kinugasa ’241, Kinugasa ’024, and Binder ’499. 

Last, the Board granted Gandhi Motion 1 as to Beckmann’s claims 3 and 4, concluding that those claims 

would have been obvious over Gandhi ’135 and Surnilla 

’504. Id. at 45–52. The Board acknowledged that claims 

3 and 4 require a constant exhaust gas composition, a 

predetermined period, and a specific air/fuel ratio for the 

third exhaust gas supplying step. Id. at 48. As discussed 

below, the Board implicitly found that those claims require a separate and distinct third step. But it found that 

those features were taught or suggested by Surnilla ’504. 

Id. at 48–50. In particular, the Board found that Surnilla 

’504 taught a stepwise transition from lean to rich conditions, which resulted in constant intermediate exhaust 

gas compositions over a predetermined period and reduced NOx emissions. Id. at 49–50. The Board reasoned 

that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to 

implement the stepwise transition taught by Surnilla ’504 

in the system disclosed by Gandhi ’135 to further reduce 

NOx emissions. The Board therefore concluded that 

claims 3 and 4 of the ’605 patent would have been obvious 

over Gandhi ’135 and Surnilla ’504.

Gandhi also argued that Beckmann’s claims 1 and 2 

are unpatentable over Gandhi ’135 and Surnilla ’504. But 

the Board did not reach that issue because it found

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14 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

Beckmann’s claims 1 and 2 unpatentable over Kinugasa 

’241, Kinugasa ’024, and Binder ’499. Id. at 44.

Because the Board found all of Beckmann’s involved 

claims to be unpatentable, it terminated the interference 

and entered judgment. Beckmann v. Gandhi, Interference No. 105,822, 2013 WL 3788515 (P.T.A.B. July 8, 

2013). Beckmann timely requested rehearing, which the 

Board denied. Rehearing Decision at 13. Beckmann then 

appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). 

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo, 

In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and its

factual findings for substantial evidence, In re Gartside, 

203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind might 

accept the evidence to support the finding. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

On appeal, Beckmann argues that the Board erred in 

construing claims 1–4 of the ’605 patent and in determining that those claims are unpatentable over the cited 

prior art. Beckmann also argues that the Board erred in 

construing claims 12–17 of Gandhi’s ’901 application and 

in finding that the ’901 application provides adequate 

written description support for the “transitioning” limitation of those claims. Finally, Beckmann argues that the 

Board erred in finding that the ’901 application contains

an adequate written description of the “minimizing the 

oxygen content” limitation of claims 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, and 

17.3 We address each of those arguments in turn.

 

3 Beckmann did not appeal the Board’s finding that 

the ’901 application provides adequate written description 

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 15

I 

We first consider whether the Board erred in construing claims 1 and 2 of the ’605 patent. We review the 

Board’s ultimate claim construction de novo and its underlying factual determinations involving extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. ProxyProxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

Here, because the intrinsic record fully determines the 

proper construction, we review the Board’s construction 

de novo. See id.

“Interference counts are given the broadest reasonable interpretation possible.” Davis v. Loesch, 998 F.2d 

963, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Yorkey v. Diab, 605 F.3d 

1297, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that claims are 

given their broadest reasonable interpretation in an 

interference proceeding). “In determining the true meaning of the language of the count, the grammatical structure and syntax thereof may be instructive.” Credle v. 

Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

When deciding Beckmann Motion 1, the Board construed Gandhi’s claim 3, which is identical to Beckmann’s 

claim 1, in light of the ’605 patent specification, see Agilent, 567 F.3d at 1375, and rejected Beckmann’s argument that the claim requires a separate and distinct third 

 

support for Gandhi’s claims 3 and 4. See Appellants’ Br. 

2–3. That finding is therefore not at issue here. Moreover, this appeal is premised on the Board’s determination that claims 1–4 of the ’605 patent and claims 3–17 of 

the ’901 application correspond to the Count. We need 

not decide what impact the revised construction of claim 1 

of the ’605 patent (which is also the interference count) 

would have on these issues. That is a matter for the 

Board in the first instance.

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exhaust gas supplying step that is controlled in terms of 

exhaust gas composition and duration. Decision on Motions at 15–16. Based on that construction, when deciding 

Beckmann Motion 2, the Board found Beckmann’s claim 1 

and dependent claim 2 to be unpatentable over the cited 

prior art. Id. at 42–44.

Beckmann argues that the Board erred in construing 

its claim 1 as not requiring a separate and distinct third 

exhaust gas supplying step. According to Beckmann, the 

structure and wording of the claim demonstrate that each 

of the three “supplying” steps is distinct from the other

two. Beckmann contends that the Board’s construction 

improperly reads the third supplying step out of the claim 

and is inconsistent with the ’605 patent’s specification, 

which describes three distinct operating modes (viz., lean, 

intermediate, and rich), solves the NOx spike problem by 

supplying an intermediate exhaust gas between the lean 

and rich modes, and distinguishes the claimed method 

from prior-art methods that involved only lean and rich

modes and direct transitions between those two modes. 

Beckmann additionally argues that the Board erred in 

construing claim 1 as not requiring the third exhaust gas 

supplying step to be controlled in terms of both exhaust 

gas composition and duration. According to Beckmann, 

the claim specifies the exhaust gas composition, viz., an 

intermediate exhaust gas with a lower level of oxidizing 

constituents than the lean exhaust gas and a lower level 

of reducing constituents than the rich exhaust gas, as well 

as the duration of the third supplying step, viz., that the

third step be “terminated” when the NOx catalytic converter is “predominantly filled” with the intermediate 

exhaust gas. Beckmann contends that those limitations 

imply control over the exhaust gas composition and 

duration. Finally, Beckmann argues that the Board 

misapplied the principles of claim differentiation when 

analyzing the differences between Beckmann claim 1 and 

Beckmann claim 3. 

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 17

Gandhi responds that the Board’s construction is consistent with the plain meaning of the claim language, as 

well as the specification of the ’605 patent. According to 

Gandhi, the Board properly declined to import limitations 

from the specification into the claim. Gandhi contends

that Beckmann chose to draft its claim broadly, and that 

nothing in the grammar, structure, or wording of the 

claim requires that there be three separate and distinct 

exhaust gas supplying steps or that the exhaust gas 

composition be controlled over time during the third step. 

Gandhi also responds that the Board’s construction does 

not read the third step out of the claim because the construction clearly requires that the third supplying step 

occur between the first and second supplying steps. 

Finally, Gandhi responds that the Board did not misapply

claim differentiation by recognizing that Beckmann claim 

1 is broader than Beckmann claim 3. 

We agree with Beckmann that its claim 1 requires a 

third exhaust gas supplying step that is separate and 

distinct from the lean and rich exhaust gas supplying 

steps, but we conclude that the claim does not require 

that the third supplying step be controlled in terms of 

exhaust gas composition and duration.

Beginning with the language of the claim, claim 1 is 

directed to a method “comprising the steps of . . . .” ’605 

patent col. 13 l. 19 (emphasis added). The claim then lists 

three parallel “supplying” clauses, separated by line 

indentation, id. col. 13 ll. 20–32, and followed by a 

“wherein” clause that refers back to the three “supplying” 

clauses as steps, id. col. 13 ll. 33–39 (“wherein the step

between the oxidizing constituents supplying step and the 

reducing constituents supplying step . . . delivered in step 

between the oxidizing constituents supplying step and the 

reducing constituents supplying step” (emphases added)). 

The structure of the claim thus indicates that the claimed 

method comprises three different supplying steps. 

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18 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

Moreover, both the third “supplying” clause and the 

“wherein” clause require the third supplying step to be 

between the first step (the oxidizing constituents supplying step or the lean step) and the second step (the reducing constituents supplying step or the rich step). Id.

col. 13 ll. 26–39. Accordingly, the claim imposes a sequential requirement that the third step occur between 

the first and second steps. 

The claim language also requires that the supplying 

steps be separate and distinct from each other. In each 

step, a different exhaust gas is supplied to the NOx catalytic converter: a lean exhaust gas is supplied in the first

step; a rich exhaust gas is supplied in the second step; 

and an intermediate exhaust gas is supplied in the third 

step. Each step is therefore distinctly characterized by a 

different exhaust gas composition that is being supplied

to the NOx catalytic converter. Moreover, the “wherein”

clause requires that the intermediate exhaust gas supplying step, occurring between the lean and rich steps, be

“terminated at the earliest when” the NOx catalytic converter is “predominantly filled by exhaust gas delivered” 

in the step between the lean and rich steps. Thus, the 

“wherein” clause imposes a further limitation that the 

intermediate supplying step does not end, and the next 

supplying step does not begin, until the NOx catalytic 

converter is “predominantly filled” with the intermediate 

exhaust gas. Id. col. 13 ll. 33–39. 

Notably, the claim uses different terms, “supply[ ]” 

and “fill[ ],” and those terms carry different meanings 

when read in the context of the surrounding claim language. For example, during the third supplying step, an

intermediate exhaust gas is “suppl[ied]” to the NOx catalytic converter, meaning that the intermediate exhaust 

gas is introduced through an inlet into the NOx catalytic 

converter. Inside the cavities of the NOx catalytic converter, that exhaust gas is then mixed with the existing 

exhaust gas, and shortly after the intermediate exhaust 

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 19

gas “predominantly fill[s]” the NOx catalytic converter, 

the third supplying step terminates. This interpretation 

of “supply[ ]” and “fill[ ]” is consistent with the plain 

meaning of the claim and the specification of the ’605 

patent. See, e.g., ’605 patent col. 2 ll. 15–61, col. 4 

l. 48–col. 5 l. 16, col. 7 l. 63–col. 8 l. 6, col. 8 ll. 47–59. 

In rejecting Beckmann’s proposed claim construction, 

the Board reasoned that “when operations are transitioned from lean to rich, there will be mixing between the 

leading edge of the rich exhaust gas and the lean exhaust 

gas preceding it such that intermediate exhaust gas will 

have a composition varying between lean and rich.” 

Rehearing Decision at 4. But the Board failed to properly 

consider the “wherein” clause, which requires that the 

intermediate exhaust gas supplying step not end, and the 

rich exhaust gas supplying step not begin, until the NOx

catalytic converter is “predominantly filled” with the 

intermediate exhaust gas.

It is true that when an engine transitions directly

from lean to rich, a natural consequence of that transition 

is the mixing of lean and rich exhaust gases at the interface to form a small amount of intermediate exhaust gas, 

which is then supplied transitorily into the NOx catalytic 

converter. But there is no evidence that such a small 

amount of intermediate exhaust gas would inevitably 

“predominantly fill[ ]” the NOx catalytic converter before

the rich exhaust gas is beginning to be supplied into the

converter. In those circumstances, the cavities of the NOx

catalytic converter may still be predominantly filled with 

the lean, rather than the intermediate, exhaust gas. As 

the ’605 patent specification explains, a direct transition 

from lean to rich modes leads to the direct mixing of lean 

and rich exhaust gases inside the cavities of the NOx

catalytic converter, which causes the undesirable NOx

spike problem. ’605 patent col. 2 ll. 21–27 (“Since the 

nitrogen oxide storage catalytic converter used is either a 

honeycomb body with passages passing through it or a 

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20 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

bulk bed of shaped bodies, in the event of a sudden 

change in the exhaust-gas composition from oxidizing to 

reducing, the exhaust gases of different compositions 

become mixed with one another in the cavities formed by 

these catalyst converter structures.”).

We therefore conclude that the Board failed to properly consider the structure and wording of the claim and 

erred in construing claim 1 in an unreasonably broad 

manner as not requiring a separate and distinct third

exhaust gas supplying step. 

We agree with the Board, however, that claim 1 of the 

’605 patent does not require control over exhaust gas 

composition and duration of the third supplying step. 

Although the specification of the ’605 patent describes 

various means for controlling the exhaust gas composition 

and duration of the exhaust gas supplying steps, see, e.g., 

’605 patent col. 2 l. 62–col. 3 l. 3, col. 10 l. 59–col. 11 l. 50,

those descriptions are not part of claim 1. Indeed, the 

language of claim 1 does not specify any means by which 

to control the exhaust gas composition and duration

beyond the requirement that the NOx catalytic converter 

be “suppl[ied]” with a certain type of exhaust gas in each 

of the supplying steps.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Beckmann’s claims 1 and 2 require a third exhaust gas supplying step that is separate and distinct from the other two 

exhaust gas supplying steps, but that the claims do not 

require control over exhaust gas composition and duration

of the third supplying step. Accordingly, we reverse the 

Board’s construction of claims 1 and 2 of the ’605 patent. 

II

We next consider whether the Board erred in construing claims 3 and 4 of the ’605 patent. On appeal, Beckmann alleges that the Board erred in construing claim 3 

and its dependent claim 4 as not requiring a separate and 

Case: 15-1765 Document: 48-2 Page: 20 Filed: 04/29/2016
BECKMANN v. GANDHI 21

distinct third exhaust gas supplying step. Appellants’ Br.

20–28 (same argument as that raised for claims 1 and 2). 

Beckmann does not allege, however, that the Board erred 

by failing to construe claims 3 and 4 as requiring a third 

exhaust gas supplying step controlled in terms of both 

exhaust gas composition and duration. See id. at 28–30.

The Board did not formally construe claim 3 of the 

’605 patent, but the record shows that it recognized that 

claim 3, unlike claim 1, requires a third exhaust gas 

supplying step that has a constant exhaust gas composition, a specific air/fuel ratio, and a predetermined duration. Decision on Motions at 17, 19, 45, 48. Indeed, 

relying on those limitations of claim 3 not present in 

claim 1, the Board concluded that Beckmann overcame 

the presumption under 37 C.F.R. § 41.207(c) for claims 3 

and 4, but not for claims 1 and 2. Id. at 43–44.

By correctly recognizing that claim 3 requires a third 

exhaust gas supplying step with a constant exhaust gas 

composition, a specific air/fuel ratio, and a predetermined 

duration, the Board implicitly construed claim 3 as requiring a third intermediate exhaust gas supplying step 

that is separate and distinct from the lean and rich steps. 

Beckmann’s argument to the contrary is without merit. 

We therefore conclude that the Board did not err in 

construing claims 3 and 4 of the ’605 patent.

III 

We next consider whether the Board erred in concluding that claims 3 and 4 of the ’605 patent would have been 

obvious over Gandhi ’135 and Surnilla ’504. Obviousness 

is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. 

In re Baxter, 678 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Those

factual inquiries include what a reference teaches, In re 

Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and the 

existence of a reason to combine references, In re Hyon, 

679 F.3d 1363, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

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22 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

The Board found that Gandhi ’135 discloses the lean 

and rich exhaust gas supplying steps, but does not disclose a third exhaust gas supplying step with a constant 

exhaust gas composition, a predetermined duration, and a 

specific air/fuel ratio as required by claim 3. Decision on 

Motions at 48. The Board nevertheless found that Surnilla ’504 discloses or suggests those features. Id. The 

Board also found that one of ordinary skill in the art

would have been motivated to combine those references to 

achieve the claimed invention. Id. at 51.

On appeal, Beckmann argues that Surnilla ’504 does 

not disclose the exact composition of exhaust gas supplied 

to the lean NOx trap. According to Beckmann, Surnilla 

’504 only discloses the composition of exhaust gas supplied to an “emission control device” 32 upstream to the 

NOx trap 34. Beckmann argues that emission control 

device 32 is an unknown device, and that the Board erred 

in finding that component 32 is necessarily a three-way 

catalyst. Gandhi responds that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s finding on what the prior art teaches

and the Board’s finding that there would have been a 

reason to combine Gandhi ’135 and Surnilla ’504. 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s finding that Surnilla ’504 teaches or suggests a 

third exhaust gas supplying step with a constant exhaust 

gas composition, a predetermined period, and a specific 

air/fuel ratio as required by claim 3. In particular, the 

Board correctly found that Surnilla ’504 discloses controlling engine operations to achieve constant compositions of 

intermediate exhaust gas when transitioning between 

lean and rich conditions. Surnilla ’504 col. 6 ll. 8–37; id.

fig.3 & fig.4. Surnilla ’504 achieves this by sequentially 

stepping down the air/fuel ratio provided to each of four 

cylinders from a lean ratio to a rich ratio. Id. col. 4 

l. 64–col. 5 l. 6; id. fig.2. As the Board correctly found, in 

the Surnilla ’504 process, when three of the four cylinders 

are stepped down, the combined air/fuel ratio is slightly 

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 23

greater than 1, and at that point, the exhaust gas necessarily has an excess oxygen content of 1% or less. Further, the Board properly found that Surnilla ’504 discloses 

that each of the down-steps involves a specific, predetermined wait period. Those factual findings are all supported by substantial evidence. 

We are also unpersuaded by Beckmann’s argument 

that the Board made a reversible error by finding that 

Surnilla ’504 discloses that component 32 is a three-way 

catalyst. As the Board noted, Surnilla ’504 explains that 

three-way catalysts are also referred to as emission 

control devices, id. col. 1 ll. 31–32, and then refers to 

component 32 as an emission control device, id. col. 4 

l. 52. Substantial evidence therefore supports the Board’s 

finding that emission control device 32 is a three-way 

catalyst.

It is true that Surnilla ’504 also refers to component

34 as an emission control device, id., and later refers to 34 

as an NOx trap, id. col. 6 ll. 11–12, suggesting that an 

emission control device could be an NOx trap. But for 

obviousness, we consider not only what a reference necessarily discloses, but also what that reference would have 

suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art. Here, in view 

of the teachings of Surnilla ’504 as a whole, we conclude 

that the Board did not err in finding that Surnilla ’504

teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 3 not otherwise disclosed by Gandhi ’135.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Board did 

not err in concluding that claims 3 and 4 would have been 

obvious over Gandhi ’135 and Surnilla ’504. 

IV

We next consider whether the Board erred in finding

claims 1 and 2 of the ’605 patent to be unpatentable over 

Kinugasa ’241, Kinugasa ’024, and Binder ’499. When 

granting Beckmann Motion 2 in part, the Board deterCase: 15-1765 Document: 48-2 Page: 23 Filed: 04/29/2016
24 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

mined that Beckmann’s claims 1 and 2 are also unpatentable because Beckmann failed to rebut the presumption of 

cross-applicability of prior art to those claims under 37 

C.F.R. § 41.207(c). But that determination is premised on 

an erroneous construction that claim 1 and dependent 

claim 2 do not require a separate and distinct third exhaust gas supplying step. Because we reverse the Board’s 

construction of claim 1, we vacate its determination that 

claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable over Kinugasa ’241, 

Kinugasa ’024, and Binder ’499, and remand for further 

proceedings under the proper claim construction. 

The Board did not decide whether claims 1 and 2 of 

the ’605 patent would have been obvious over Gandhi ’135 

and Surnilla ’504, an issue raised by Gandhi. On remand, 

the Board will have an opportunity to address that issue.

V 

We next consider whether the Board erred in construing claims 12–17 of the ’901 application and in finding 

that the ’901 application has an adequate written description of the “transitioning” limitation of those claims. 

Sufficiency of written description is a question of fact, 

which we review for substantial evidence. Ariad Pharm., 

Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (en banc). Claims must be sufficiently supported by 

the written description of a patent, such that the disclosure “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that 

the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter 

as of the filing date.” Id. “[W]hen a party challenges 

written description support for an interference count or 

the copied claim in an interference, the originating disclosure provides the meaning of the pertinent claim language.” Agilent, 567 F.3d at 1375. “When a party 

challenges a claim’s validity under § 102 or § 103, however, this court and the Board must interpret the claim in 

light of the specification in which it appears.” Id.

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 25

Beckmann argues that, when deciding the written description motion, the Board made a legal error by construing Gandhi’s claims 12–17 in light of the specification and 

prosecution history of Gandhi’s ’901 application, contrary 

to Agilent. Beckmann contends that the proper construction requires the “transitioning” step to be separate and 

distinct. Under that construction, Beckmann argues, the 

’901 application lacks an adequate written description of 

the “transitioning” limitation because the application does 

not contain any express or inherent disclosure of a separate third exhaust gas supplying step controlled in terms 

of both exhaust gas composition and duration.

Gandhi responds that the Board’s construction is consistent with Beckmann’s ’605 patent specification. Gandhi argues that the Board referred to extrinsic evidence 

only to support its understanding as to the plain meaning 

of the claim terms and to find written description support

in the ’901 application. Gandhi also responds that the 

Board properly declined to import limitations from the 

specification into the claims, and properly construed the 

claims as not requiring a separate and distinct transition 

step. Finally, Gandhi responds that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s finding that Figure 1a and its related description in the ’901 application provide an adequate 

written description of the “transitioning” limitation as the 

Board properly construed it. 

We agree with Gandhi and the Board that claim 12 

does not require a separate and distinct transitioning step 

between the lean and rich exhaust gas supplying steps, 

and that the plain language of the claim merely requires 

“transitioning” between lean and rich supplying steps and 

“completing” the transition from lean to rich. Here again, 

because the intrinsic record fully determines the proper 

construction, we review the Board’s construction de novo. 

See Microsoft, 789 F.3d at 1297.

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26 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

Unlike claim 3 of the ’901 application, which is identical to Beckmann’s claim 1, claim 12 of the ’901 application 

only refers to “supplying” the lean and rich exhaust gases 

as “supplying step[s],” but does not refer to “transitioning”

between the lean and rich supplying steps or “completing” 

the transition as a step. J.A. 508 (“transitioning between 

said lean exhaust gas supplying step and said rich exhaust gas supplying step, wherein exhaust gas is supplied 

to said zoned catalyst system during said transition; and 

completing said transition from said lean exhaust gas 

supplying step to said rich exhaust gas supplying step” 

(emphases added)). Moreover, claim 12 does not impose 

any limitation on the composition of exhaust gas being 

supplied during the transition to distinguish it from the 

lean and rich supplying steps; rather, the claim only 

requires that “exhaust gas [be] supplied . . . during said 

transition.” Id. Accordingly, unlike Beckmann’s claim 1 

and Gandhi’s claim 3, Gandhi’s claim 12 does not require

a separate and distinct transitioning step. Nor does it 

require a separate and distinct third exhaust gas supplying step that is controlled in terms of exhaust gas composition and duration.

The specification of the ’605 patent does not compel a 

different conclusion. On appeal, the parties do not dispute that claim 12, purportedly copied from Beckmann, 

should be construed in light of the specification of the ’605 

patent. See Agilent, 567 F.3d at 1375. The ’605 patent 

repeatedly refers to the third intermediate exhaust gas 

supplying step as a “third method step.” ’605 patent col. 4 

l. 48–col. 5 l. 67. The written description of the ’605 

patent uses the term “transition” only once, and that 

isolated usage does not define the term differently from 

its plain meaning. Id. col. 5 l. 2 (“during the transition to 

the second method step”). Accordingly, in light of the 

plain claim language and the ’605 patent specification, we 

conclude that claim 12 of the ’901 application does not 

require a separate and distinct transitioning step.

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 27

We also agree with Gandhi that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s finding that the ’901 application 

provides adequate written description support for the 

“transitioning” limitation of claims 12–17. Figure 1a of 

the ’901 application illustrates the NOx output when the 

engine transitions from lean to rich operations. J.A. 495. 

The ’901 application further describes “the short period in 

which the NOx trap transitions from lean to rich” and 

refers to Figure 1a as showing the NOx spikes during the 

“lean-rich transition.” J.A. 502. Indeed, on appeal, 

Beckmann only challenges the Board’s written description 

finding under its proposed narrower construction.

We therefore affirm the Board’s finding that the ’901 

application contains an adequate written description of 

the “transitioning” limitation of claims 12–17. 

VI

Finally, we consider whether the Board erred in finding that the ’901 application contains an adequate written 

description of the “minimizing the oxygen content” limitation of claims 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, and 17.

Beckmann argues that the Board erred by relying on 

paragraph 41 of the ’901 application, which describes 

“removing oxygen storage capacity” of a lean NOx trap, to 

find support for the “minimizing” limitation. According to 

Beckmann, the Board conflated the physical characteristics of a lean NOx trap, which is described by paragraph 

41, with a method step that takes place “prior to rich 

conditions,” which is what the claims require. Beckmann

argues that, reading paragraph 41 and the following 

paragraphs in their entireties, one of ordinary skill would 

understand that the description of “removing oxygen 

storage capacity” refers to how a lean NOx trap could be 

constructed, not how it could be used during engine 

operation. Gandhi responds that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s finding that the ’901 application 

provides adequate written description support for the 

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28 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

“minimizing” limitation, and that the Board did not err in 

not crediting Beckmann’s expert testimony on that issue, 

which did not specifically address paragraph 41.

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s written description finding regarding the “minimizing the oxygen content” limitation of claims 7, 10, and 

16, but not as to claims 5, 8, 11, and 17. The claims at 

issue are all directed to “a method . . . comprising” a list 

of actions, including “minimizing the oxygen content” of 

the NOx trap. But those claims differ in that claims 5, 8, 

11, and 17 contain a “minimizing the oxygen content . . . 

prior to a rich cycle” limitation, whereas claims 7, 10, and 

16 recite that “the oxygen content of the lean NOx trap is

minimized” without requiring that the minimization occur 

“prior to” a rich cycle. Notably, claims 8, 11, and 17 

respectively depend from claims 7, 10, and 16, suggesting 

that the “prior to” language imposes a temporal requirement that “minimizing” take place “prior to” rich conditions as part of the claimed method. 

The Board did not consider and analyze whether the 

’901 application provides an adequate written description 

of the “prior to” limitation. We therefore vacate its written description decision as to claims 5, 8, 11, and 17.

We do agree with the Board, however, that paragraph 

41 of the ’901 application provides an adequate written 

description of the “minimizing the oxygen content” limitation of claims 7, 10, and 16 because those claims do not 

require that “minimizing” occur before a rich cycle. Even 

if the disclosures in paragraph 41 of the ’901 application 

are limited to designing and constructing an NOx trap to 

minimize its oxygen storage capacity, that description is 

sufficient to support the “minimizing” limitation of claims 

7, 10, and 16. We therefore affirm the Board’s decision

that the ’901 application contains an adequate written 

description of the “minimizing the oxygen content” limitation of claims 7, 10, and 16.

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 29

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing 

reasons, we reverse the Board’s construction of claims 1 

and 2 of the ’605 patent, but we affirm the Board’s decision that claims 3 and 4 of the ’605 patent would have 

been obvious over the cited references and that the ’901 

application contains an adequate written description of 

the “transitioning” limitation of claims 12–17 and the 

“minimizing the oxygen content” limitation of claims 7, 

10, and 16. Additionally, we vacate the Board’s determination that claims 1 and 2 of the ’605 patent are unpatentable over the cited references and its finding that 

the ’901 application contains an adequate written description of the “minimizing the oxygen content . . . prior to a 

rich cycle” limitation of claims 5, 8, 11, and 17, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 15-1765 Document: 48-2 Page: 29 Filed: 04/29/2016
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

THOMAS BECKMANN, ALEXANDER MASSNER,

Appellants

v.

HAREN S. GANDHI, JOHN VITO CAVATAIO, 

ROBERT HENRY HAMMERLE, YISUN CHENG,

Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1765

______________________ 

BRYSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.

I concur in all parts of the majority opinion except for 

Part I of the Discussion section, which holds that the 

Board erred in construing claims 1 and 2 of the ’605 

patent. I would sustain the Board’s construction of those 

claims and the invalidity ruling based on its construction 

of those claims. 

Claims 1 and 2 of the ’605 patent (copied in Gandhi’s 

claims 3 and 4) recite three steps: (1) supplying the catalytic converter with exhaust gas containing an excess of 

oxidizing constituents; (2) supplying the catalytic converter with exhaust gas with exhaust gas containing an 

excess of reducing constituents; and (3) during the period 

between those two steps, supplying the catalytic converter 

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2 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

with exhaust gas that has a lower content of oxidizing 

constituents than in the oxidizing step and a lower content of reducing constituents than in the reducing step. 

The intermediate step ends at the earliest when the 

catalytic converter is filled by exhaust gas delivered 

during that step. In other words the three steps of the 

claims consist of two distinct endpoint states and a transition phase between those endpoints. 

The Board found that the claims did not require that 

the exhaust gas supplying steps be separate and distinct 

from each other or that the intermediate step be controlled in terms of composition and duration. The majority agrees with the Board that the intermediate step is not 

controlled in any way, but it concludes that Board erred in 

finding that the steps were not required to be separate 

and distinct. I believe that the issues are interrelated and 

would hold that the Board was correct on both points.

The logic of the Board’s position can be explained by 

using a simple analogy: consider a first step consisting of 

supplying an acidic solution; a second step consisting of 

supplying a basic solution; and a third step consisting of 

supplying a neutral solution during the transition time 

between the first and second steps. In that example, the 

neutral solution would simply be a natural and inevitable 

consequence of the mixture created by transitioning 

between the acidic and basic states. The same principle 

applies here. As the Board explained, the claim language 

is broad enough to read on a system that transitions 

smoothly from a predominantly oxidizing mixture to a 

predominantly reducing mixture. The Board explained 

that the third step requirement is satisfied as long as the 

quantity of oxidizing constituents is lower than in the 

first step and the quantity of reducing constituents is 

lower than in the second step. That means that the 

intermediate step will naturally occur during the transition between the oxidizing and reducing states. The 

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BECKMANN v. GANDHI 3

Board is therefore correct that the transition step necessarily occurs between the other two steps. 

Beckmann argues that the claims “require the supply 

of three separate and distinct gases, where the composition of the third exhaust gas and the amount of time the 

third exhaust gas is supplied are both controlled.” That 

is, Beckmann argues that the transition phase constitutes 

a separate and distinct step because transition phase 

requires that a specific composition of gas be present for a 

specific amount of time. As the majority acknowledges, 

however, claims 1 and 2 of the ’605 patent contain no 

requirement that the amount of time that the third exhaust gas is supplied be controlled. Thus, the claims 

place no constraints on the transition; they only require 

the transition to occur. And while it is true that the

claimed exhaust gases in the three steps differ in composition, that is simply the necessary product of transitioning from an oxidizing to a reducing mixture. 

The majority characterizes the three claimed steps as 

separate and distinct in part because the structure of the 

claims identifies them as “three different supplying 

steps,” and states that the third step occurs between the 

first and second steps, such that the claim “imposes a 

sequential requirement that the third step occur between 

the first and second steps.” But the fact that the claims 

identify three steps does not mean that the steps necessarily constitute separate and distinct states. As discussed above, the intermediate step lacks the controlled 

composition or duration that would allow it to be an 

identifiable state. Without a substantive way of characterizing the intermediate state, the three states are 

“separate and distinct” only by virtue of the claim characterizing them as such. Although the gas in the three 

states differs—lean, rich, and in between—the characterization of the gas as having three distinct states is entirely 

arbitrary. The gas could as easily be divided into five 

stages—lean, mostly lean, intermediate, mostly rich, and 

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4 BECKMANN v. GANDHI

rich. The claims would still not capture anything other 

than transitioning between two distinct levels.

The majority notes that the claims use the terms 

“supply” and “fill” with reference to the gases of each step, 

which the majority concludes is consistent with the steps 

being separate and distinct. The use of those terms, 

however, is entirely consistent with the construction of 

the claims adopted by the Board and does not add an 

additional limitation. As the gas supply transitions from 

lean to rich, the mixture of the gas that is supplied to—

and fills—the catalytic converter will necessarily begin 

lean, transition to intermediate, and then end up as rich. 

Nothing defines those states as separate and distinct 

except Beckmann’s characterization of them as such.

Finally, the fact that claim 1 of the ’605 patent recites 

that the intermediate step “is terminated at the earliest” 

when the catalytic converter “is predominantly filled by 

exhaust gas delivered in [the] step between the oxidizing 

constituents supplying step and the reducing constituents 

supplying step” contributes nothing to defining the intermediate step as “separate and distinct,” because the gas 

that is delivered in the step between the oxidizing and 

reducing steps simply consists of gas that is less oxidizing 

than the gas of the first step and less reducing than the 

gas of the second step. All that is required of the second 

stage gas, therefore, is that the converter be predominantly filled with gas that is in transition from the lean to the 

rich state. For the reasons given by the Board, that does 

not define a “separate and distinct step,” as opposed to a 

transient transition phase.

With regard to the issue of the construction of claims 

1 and 2 of the ’605 patent (and thus the corresponding 

Gandhi claims 3 and 4), I therefore respectfully dissent. 

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