Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00432/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00432-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General for the State of California
Respondent
M.C. Kramer
Respondent
Ronnie Lee
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONNIE LEE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

M.C. KRAMER et al., )

)

Respondents. )

 )

1:07-CV-0432 AWI JMD HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO TERMINATE RESPONDENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. He is serving a sentence of ten years

following his conviction for various narcotics and weapons charges. Petitioner does not challenge

the validity of his conviction, but instead challenges disciplinary action taken against him in 2005 at

North Kern State Prison. (Answer at 2; Ex. A.) 

On February 8, 2005, an incident occurred which resulted in Petitioner being charged with

participation in a riot. (Answer at 2.) On March 2, 2005, a hearing was conducted to adjudicate the

charge against him. Petitioner was found guilty. (Id.)

Petitioner filed an administrative appeal challenging the result of the hearing. The

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administrative appeal was denied at the Director’s Level. (Answer at 2; Ex. C.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court. The

court denied the petition because of improper service. (Answer at 2; Ex. D.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. The

court summarily denied the petition. (Answer at 3; Ex. E.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. The

court summarily denied the petition. (Answer at 3; Ex. F.)

On December 21, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition in this Court. The petition raises

the following two grounds for relief: 1) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when he was

not permitted to call witnesses and present evidence at the prison disciplinary hearing; and 2)

Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when prison officials failed to appoint a staff

representative to assist Petitioner at the prison disciplinary hearing.

On August 15, 2007, Respondents filed an answer to the petition. 

On August 31, 2007, Petitioner filed a traverse to the answer.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 8, 2005, an incident occurred which resulted in Petitioner being charged with

participation in a riot. (Answer at 2.) The Rules Violation Report prepared after the incident stated

that approximately ten to twenty Hispanic inmates began attacking Inmate Richardson, an AfricanAmerican, near the north basketball court on the Facility B exercise yard. (Answer, Ex. B at 1.) 

While correctional officers attempted to break up the altercation, a large group of African-American

inmates, who were lying in the prone position near the south basketball court, got up and began

yelling at the Hispanic inmates who were attacking Inmate Richardson. (Id. at 2.) One of the

African-American inmates yelled, “Come on let’s get em!,” and the group, numbering approximately

forty, began moving toward the north basketball court where the assault of inmate Richardson was

taking place. (Id.) As the group of African-American inmates approached the north basketball court,

a large number of Hispanic and Caucasian inmates, who had been lying prone near the area of the

assault, got up and formed a group. (Id.) The two groups of inmates began fighting. (Id. at 3.) 

Eventually, correctional officers were able to disperse the groups, with the African-American

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inmates returning to the south basketball court and the Hispanic and Caucasian inmates returning to

the north basketball court. (Id.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, at the time of the incident, Petitioner was confined at North Kern State

Prison, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. §

2241(d). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997),

quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997),

overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only

applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment

of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). 

Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of

the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

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evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words,

'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set

forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.

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1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and we are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Grounds One and Two

Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated when he was not permitted to call

witnesses or present evidence at his prison disciplinary hearing. Petitioner further argues that his due

process rights were violated when prison officials failed to appoint a staff representative to assist him

in preparing for the disciplinary hearing.

These claims were presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Kern County

Superior Court, which denied the petition because of improper service. (Answer, Ex. D.) The issues

were then raised in petitions for writ of habeas corpus to the California Court of Appeal and

California Supreme Court, which summarily denied the petitions. (Answer, Exs. E-F.) When the

state courts reach a decision on the merits but provide no reasoning to support their conclusion, we

independently review the record to determine whether the state courts clearly erred in their

application of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, although we independently review the record, we still defer to the state courts’ ultimate

decision. Id.

When an inmate is subjected to the loss of credits in connection with a disciplinary action,

due process requires that the inmate receive advance notice of the charges, a written statement of the

reasons supporting the disciplinary action, and a written statement of the evidence relied on in

reaching the decision. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). An inmate facing

disciplinary proceedings also has a limited right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence

in his defense and the right to obtain aid in the presentation of his case where he is illiterate or where

the complexity of the issues involved makes it unlikely that he will be able to collect and present the

necessary evidence. Id. at 566, 570. In addition, a disciplinary conviction resulting in the loss of

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good time credits must be supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457

(1985).

The state courts did not clearly err in their application of Supreme Court law. Petitioner

acknowledged that he received advance notice of the disciplinary hearing, and he received a written

statement of the reasons supporting the disciplinary decision and the evidence relied on in reaching

it. (See Petition, Exs. A-B.) There is also some evidence supporting the finding that Petitioner was

guilty of the charged offense, as he was identified as one of the African-American inmates that

advanced toward and fought with the Hispanic inmates while being instructed by correctional staff to

get into the prone position. (Petition, Ex. A at 4.)

Petitioner’s claim that he was improperly denied the opportunity to call certain witnesses at

his disciplinary hearing is contradicted by the record, which shows that Petitioner did not make a

request to call witnesses. (Petition, Ex. B at 1.) In any case, Petitioner has not shown prejudice

resulting from the failure to call his potential witnesses, or the failure to consider his witness list, as

he has not shown what the witnesses’ testimony would have been or that it would have been

sufficient to rebut the eyewitness account of correctional staff. See Howard v. U.S. Bureau of

Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that errors made by prison officials in denying

witness testimony at official hearings are subject to harmless error review); Piggie v. Cotton, 342

F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner has also not shown that it was necessary for prison officials to appoint a staff

assistant or investigative employee to his case. There is no evidence that Petitioner is illiterate or

otherwise had any difficulty understanding the nature of the proceedings. (See Petition, Ex. B at 1.) 

Further, the issue being adjudicated was not so complex that it was unlikely Petitioner would be able

to collect and present necessary evidence, as the only question was whether Petitioner was in the

group of individuals who approached the north basketball court and fought during the riot.

IV. Proper Respondent

Respondents state that only M.C. Kramer is a proper respondent in this matter and that the

Attorney General of California should therefore be terminated as a respondent. (Answer at 1 n.1.) 

Pursuant to Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Clerk will be directed to terminate

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the Attorney General for the State of California as a respondent in this matter. See Brittingham v.

U.S., 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992).

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate the

Attorney General for the State of California as a respondent in this matter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 7, 2008 /s/ John M. Dixon 

9f4gk8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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