Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01400/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01400-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
On Habeas Corpus
Respondent
Vester L. Patterson
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1), Petitioner has 

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge 

to conduct all further proceedings in the case, including the entry 

of final judgment, by manifesting his consent in a signed writing

filed by Petitioner on October 2, 2014. Pending before the Court 

are 1) the petition, which was filed on September 8, 2014; 2) the 

Court’s order of September 25, 2014, directing Petitioner to show 

VESTER L. PATTERSON,

 Petitioner,

v.

ON HABEAS CORPUS,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01400-BAM-HC

ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW 

CAUSE (DOC. 6)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION 

FOR A STAY (DOC. 10)

ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE (DOC. 1)

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

AND DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

CLOSE THE CASE

Case 1:14-cv-01400-BAM Document 11 Filed 11/04/14 Page 1 of 9
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cause why the petition should not be dismissed for failure to 

exhaust state court remedies;

1 and 3) Petitioner’s motion for a stay 

of the proceedings on the instant petition so that he may exhaust 

state court remedies, which was filed on October 29, 2014.

I. Screening the Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States 

District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a 

preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 

Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears 

from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court....” Habeas Rule 4; 

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also 

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 

2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief 

available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each 

ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not 

sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a 

real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory 

Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 

(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). 

Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably 

incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 

908 F.2d at 491.

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the 

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition 

 

1

 Because Petitioner responded to the order to show cause, the order will 

be discharged.

Case 1:14-cv-01400-BAM Document 11 Filed 11/04/14 Page 2 of 9
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has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 

Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 

2001).

A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without 

leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief 

can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 

13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

Here, Petitioner challenges the calculation of his release date 

made by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(CDCR) as being in excess of his sentence and a violation of the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner describes the process 

of exhausting state administrative remedies within the prison. 

(Pet., doc. 1, 4-5.) However, in the petition, Petitioner does not 

document, specifically describe, or even mention any proceedings in 

the state courts in which he exhausted his claims. In Petitioner’s 

response to the order to show cause, which was filed on October 9, 

2014, Petitioner again mentions his resort to administrative 

remedies, but he does not allege or document his having received a 

ruling on his claim or claims from the California Supreme Court. 

II. Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge 

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives 

the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's 

alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. 

Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1988).

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A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by 

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting 

it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no state remedy 

remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); 

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court 

will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair 

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the 

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. 

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992), superceded by statute as

stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the 

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v. 

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 

1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme 

Court reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct= alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

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court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule 

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), 

as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 

2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended 

by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001).

Where none of a petitioner=s claims has been presented to the 

highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine, the 

Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed petition in 

abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been 

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extended to petitions that contain no exhausted claims. Raspberry, 

448 F.3d at 1154.

Here, Petitioner has not shown that he has exhausted his state 

court remedies as to any of the claims stated in the petition before 

the Court. Although non-exhaustion of state court remedies has been 

viewed as an affirmative defense, it is established that it is the 

petitioner’s burden to prove that state judicial remedies were 

properly exhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Darr v. Burford, 

339 U.S. 200, 218-19 (1950), overruled in part on other grounds in

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 

1104 (9th Cir. 1981). If available state court remedies have not 

been exhausted as to all claims, a district court must dismiss a 

petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982). Petitioner

did not allege in the petition or in his response to the order to 

show cause that he had obtained a decision from the California 

Supreme Court on his claims. Petitioner has failed to meet his 

burden to establish exhaustion of state court remedies.

III. Motion for a Stay

On October 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion for a stay in 

which he stated that on October 22, 2014, an issue was sent to the 

California Supreme Court. (Doc. 10, 2.) However, Petitioner has 

not alleged that the California Supreme Court has ruled on his 

claims. 

Further, although Petitioner requests a stay, he does not 

contest the fact that all of his claims are unexhausted. 

Petitioner has not provided any reasonable excuse for his 

failure to exhaust state court remedies. Cf. Rhines v. Weber, 544 

U.S. 269, 276 (2005); Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th 

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Cir. 2008), cert. den. 129 S.Ct. 2771 (2009); Blake v. Baker, 745 

F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. den. Baker v. Blake, 2014 WL 

2646896, 83 USLW 3019, 3170, 3194 (Oct 06, 2014). Petitioner thus 

states no good cause for a stay; he simply states that he believes 

that he will be prejudiced by staying in custody beyond what he 

believes is his release date. However, Petitioner has not shown any 

reason why he should not first be required to present his claim to 

the state courts, which are a competent and available forum for 

Petitioner’s claim regarding the calculation of his release date. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for a stay will be denied, and 

the petition will be dismissed without prejudice 2 for failure to 

exhaust state court remedies as to any of the claims in the 

petition.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

 

2

A dismissal for failure to exhaust is not a dismissal on the merits, and 

Petitioner will not be barred by the prohibition against filing second habeas 

petitions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) from returning to federal court after 

Petitioner exhausts available state remedies. See, In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 

(9th Cir. 1996). However, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

[I]n the habeas corpus context is would be appropriate for

 an order dismissing a mixed petition to instruct an applicant

 that upon his return to federal court he is to bring only 

 exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). 

 Once the petitioner is made aware of the exhaustion 

 requirement, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all

 potential claims before returning to federal court. The

 failure to comply with an order of the court is grounds for

 dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).

Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that in the event he returns to federal 

court and files a mixed petition of both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the 

petition may be dismissed with prejudice. 

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appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

 Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

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manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

Accordingly, the Court will decline to issue a certificate of 

appealability.

V. Disposition 

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that:

1) The order to show cause that issued on September 25, 2014, 

is DISCHARGED; and 

2) Petitioner’s motion for a stay is DENIED; and 

3) The petition is DISMISSED without prejudice for 

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies; and

4) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability; 

and

5) The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case because dismissal 

will terminate the proceeding in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3, 2014 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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