Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03832/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03832-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gloria Henry
Respondent
Pamela C. McCaffery
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Respondent requests that Warden Gloria Henry replace former

Warden Tina Hornbeak as Respondent in this case. Pursuant to Rule

25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court GRANTS

this request. The Clerk of the Court is directed to substitute Gloria

Henry as Respondent in this action. 

2

 On July 31, 2007, Petitioner filed an "Opposition to

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

as Untimely" (docket no. 22). On that same date, Petitioner filed

another document entitled, "Motion to Request Court's Review of

Possible Delayed Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus" (docket no.

24), in which Petitioner lists multiple factors that she alleges

entitle her to equitable tolling. Therefore, the Court DENIES the

motion (docket no. 24) as unnecessary and construes it as a supplement

to the opposition. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA C. McCAFFERY,

Petitioner,

 v.

GLORIA HENRY, Warden, 

Respondent. ____________________________

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No. C 06-3832 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket nos. 20, 24)

Petitioner Pamela C. McCaffery, a state prisoner incarcerated

at the Valley State Prison for Women, has filed a pro se petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In

response to the Court's Order to Show Cause, Respondent Gloria

Henry1 moves to dismiss Petitioner's habeas petition as untimely. 

Petitioner opposes the motion.2 Respondent filed a reply to the

opposition, and Petitioner filed a response to the reply. For the

reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

According to the allegations in the petition, on May 21,

1998, a jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder with

use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years

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3

 Petitioner's last name is spelled McCaffery. The Court notes

that the Clerk misspelled her name as "McCaffrey" in Case No. C 00-

3483.

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to life with a consecutive sentence of three years for gun use.

On October 20, 1999, the California Court of Appeal affirmed

the judgment and conviction. (Resp't Ex. 2.) On January 13,

2000, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. 

(Resp't Ex. 3.) 

Petitioner received a copy of the trial record from her

appellate counsel by February 7, 2000. (Resp't Ex. 4.)

In September, 2000, Petitioner filed her first federal habeas

action in this Court. See McCaffrey v. Middleton, Case No. C 00-

3483 CW (PR).3

 Petitioner filed a request for appointment of

counsel and an extension of time in which to file her federal

habeas petition until March 30, 2001. Petitioner claimed that she

had been unable to exhaust her state remedies as to additional

claims due to complications in receiving a copy of her trial

record. On November 28, 2000, the Honorable Charles A. Legge of

this Court denied her requests, dismissed the action, and ordered

the file closed. The Court advised Petitioner that the

limitations period began to run on the date of expiration of the

ninety-day period in which to petition for certiorari in the

United States Supreme Court. The Court also advised Petitioner

that she could be eligible for statutory and equitable tolling. 

However, the Court noted that whether Petitioner would be unable

to meet the one-year deadline and whether tolling would apply was

"a matter of speculation not yet ripe for this court's review." 

(Nov. 28, 2000 Order in Case No. C 00-3483 CW (PR) at 2.) The

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 A pro se federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed on

the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See

Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated and

remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002)

(holding that a federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed on

the date the prisoner submits it to prison authorities for filing,

rather than the date it is received by the courts). December 31, 2003

is the date her state habeas petition was signed and the earliest date

that the petition could have been delivered to prison authorities for

mailing. The Court assumes for the purposes of this discussion that

the petition was delivered to prison authorities on that date. 

3

Court added, "[W]hether petitioner may be entitled to equitable

tolling due to extraordinary circumstances beyond her control is a

question that can be answered only when the issue of untimeliness

is squarely before the court." (Id.) 

In October and November, 2000, the Alameda County Superior

Court denied Petitioner's ex parte motions for copies of the trial

record; specifically, she asked for People's Trial Exhibits 11 and

13 and for extra-record jury information. (Resp't Ex. 5; Pet. at

4-5.) Petitioner states that she needed the information to assist

her in determining if "jurors experimented with [the] handgun

beyond the scope of trial discovery." (Pet. at 5.)

On January 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ

of mandate requesting the public defender to produce portions of

her trial record, which Petitioner allegedly had lost in a house

fire in September, 1999. (Resp't Ex. 6, 10.) On May 30, 2003,

the Alameda County Superior Court denied her petition. (Resp't

Ex. 6.) 

On August 4, 2003, Petitioner obtained a copy of her trial

record through a copy service hired by a relative. (Resp't Ex. 7,

10.)

On December 31, 2003,4

 Petitioner mailed a state habeas

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petition to the California Court of Appeal seeking recall of the

remittitur in the prior appeal and reissuance of the opinion so

that she could petition for certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court. The appellate court denied the petition without

comment on February 13, 2004. (Resp't Ex. 8.) On March 3, 2004,

Petitioner filed a similar petition in the California Supreme

Court, which was also denied without comment on December 15, 2004. 

(Resp't Ex. 9.)

On July 6, 2004, Petition filed a habeas corpus petition

challenging her conviction in the California Court of Appeal. On

August 16, 2004, the appellate court summarily denied the petition

with a statement that Petitioner should first seek relief in the

Alameda County Superior Court, citing In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App.

2d 293 (1962). (Resp't Ex. 10.) Petitioner filed the

habeas petition in the superior court on September 24, 2004. 

(Resp't Ex. 11.) She also filed her explanation for delay,

statement of facts, and motions for judicial notice, augmentation

of the record and an evidentiary hearing. The superior court on

October 22, 2004 denied the petition as untimely and lacking a

prima facie case. (Resp't Ex. 12.) Petitioner filed a petition

in the California Court of Appeal which denied it without comment

on February 2, 2005. (Resp't Ex. 13.) Petitioner filed a

petition in the California Supreme Court on March 29, 2005, and it

was denied without comment on April 19, 2006. (Resp't Ex. 14.)

Meanwhile, on February 17, 2005, Petitioner filed her second

habeas corpus action in this Court, alleging ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel and seeking to compel the state

appellate court to recall the remittitur so that Petitioner could

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5

 June 10, 2006 is the date Petitioner's federal habeas petition

was signed and the earliest date that the petition could have been

delivered to prison authorities for mailing; therefore, it will be

deemed filed on that date. See Saffold, 250 F.3d at 1268.

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seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Separately,

she sought advice on her ability to amend her federal petition

with further claims. In an Order dated July 20,

2005, the Court noted that the federal petition appeared

unexhausted in light of the pending state habeas proceedings, and

dismissed it with leave to amend to clarify the nature and status

of the claims Petitioner sought to raise in federal court. (July

20, 2005 Order in Case No. C 05-0733 CW (PR) at 16.) When

Petitioner did not amend her federal petition, the Court in an

Order and Judgment of December 1, 2005, dismissed the petition

without prejudice as unexhausted and without further leave to

amend. The Order advised Petitioner that she could either file a

new action and seek a stay while she continued to exhaust state

remedies on her claims, or else await exhaustion on all claims

before filing a new federal action. The Court specifically

declined to offer an opinion as to which option Petitioner should

choose or whether any future federal petition would be timely. 

She filed the present federal habeas petition -- her third

federal habeas action -- on June 10, 2006.5

DISCUSSION 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), which became law on April 24, 1996, imposed a statute of

limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by

state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging nonCase 4:06-cv-03832-CW Document 30 Filed 03/28/08 Page 5 of 16
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capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one

year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became

final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for

seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application

created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such

action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional

right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right

was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the

claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

A state prisoner with a conviction finalized after April 24,

1996, such as Petitioner, ordinarily must file her federal habeas

petition within one year of the date her process of direct review

came to an end. See Calderon v. United States District Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part

on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

The one-year period generally will run from "the date on

which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). "Direct review" includes the ninety-day period

during which a criminal appellant can file a petition for a writ

of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether she

actually files such a petition or not. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In the present case, the California Supreme Court denied

review on January 13, 2000. The judgment became final for

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purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations ninety days later, on

April 12, 2000. See id. The one-year limitations period,

therefore, began to run on that date. Accordingly, Petitioner had

until April 12, 2001 to file the instant petition. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Therefore, the instant federal habeas petition filed

on June 10, 2006, more than five years after the limitations

period had expired, is untimely absent tolling.

I. Statutory Tolling

The petition may nonetheless be timely if the limitations

period was tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for a substantial

period of time. AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled

under § 2244(d)(2) for the "'time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

[with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim] is pending.'" 

Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)). In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223

(2002), the Supreme Court held that the limitations period is also

tolled during the time between a lower state court's decision and

the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court. In

California, where prisoners generally use the State's "'original

writ' system," this means that the limitations period remains

tolled during the intervals between a state court's disposition of

an original state habeas petition and the filing of a further

original state habeas petition in a higher court, provided the

prisoner did not delay unreasonably in seeking review in the

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 In California, the supreme court, intermediate courts of

appeal, and superior courts all have original habeas corpus

jurisdiction. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 n.2 (9th Cir.

1999). Although a superior court order denying habeas corpus relief

is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus

petition in the court of appeal. Id. If the court of appeal denies

relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court

by way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original

habeas petition in the supreme court. Id. at 1006 n.3.

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higher court. See id. at 220-25.6 

In the present case, Petitioner's first state habeas petition

was deemed filed on December 31, 2003, which was almost four years

after the California Supreme Court denied her petition for review

on direct appeal. It also was almost three years after the April

12, 2001 deadline for filing her federal habeas corpus petition. 

Because the state habeas petition was filed after the one-year

statute of limitations had expired, the time it was pending in

state court cannot serve to toll the statute. See Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). For the same

reason, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the period during

which she filed her second round of state habeas petitions,

beginning with her petition in the California Court of Appeal

filed on July 6, 2004. 

Petitioner claims that she is entitled to tolling under

§ 2244(d)(2) for various filings she made in the state courts

before she filed the state habeas petitions. However, none of the

pleadings she filed constitutes "a properly filed application for

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). For

example, Petitioner's filings in state superior court, including

her motions for copies of the trial record in 2000 and her

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 The Court finds that the present petition does not relate back

to Petitioner's second federal habeas action, which was dismissed

without prejudice as unexhausted. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d

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petition for a writ of mandate to compel the public defender to

provide her a copy of the trial record in 2003, did not toll the

limitations period because they did not constitute a challenge to

Petitioner's conviction. See Hodge v. Greiner, 269 F.3d 104, 107

(2d Cir. 2001) (requests for discovery of evidentiary materials

upon which to base petition for post-conviction relief did not

constitute an application for state post-conviction relief and did

not toll limitations period); see also Woodford v. Garceau, 538

U.S. 202, 210 (2003) (request for counsel in capital case is not

equivalent to an actual habeas petition for purpose of determining

whether AEDPA applies). Therefore, the limitations period will

not be tolled based on these state court filings.

That Petitioner filed two federal habeas actions in this

Court does not compel a different result. It is well-established

that an application for federal habeas review is not an

"application for State post-conviction or other collateral review"

within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

167, 180-81 (2001). Furthermore, Petitioner's first habeas action

in 2000 consisted of a request for appointment of counsel and for

an extension of time in which to file a federal petition;

therefore, it was not a "pending" case for habeas corpus relief. 

See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 210. Petitioner filed her second

federal habeas petition in 2005, after the limitations period had

expired; therefore, the time it was pending cannot serve to toll

the statute.7

 See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823. Therefore, the

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1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (petition that has been dismissed without

prejudice no longer pending within meaning of relation-back doctrine);

see also Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (relationback doctrine inapplicable when initial habeas petition was dismissed

because there is no pleading to which to relate back); Marsh v.

Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that habeas

petition filed after previous petition has been dismissed without

prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies does not relate back

to earlier petition). Even if relation back did apply, the February

17, 2005 federal habeas petition was untimely because it was filed

after April 12, 2001 deadline had passed.

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limitations period was not tolled for the periods during which

Petitioner's first and second federal habeas actions were pending

in this Court. 

Accordingly, statutory tolling is not sufficient to overcome

the time bar to Petitioner's federal petition.

II. Equitable Tolling 

The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled

because § 2244(d) is a statute of limitations and not a

jurisdictional bar. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. Equitable tolling

is unavailable in most cases, because it is applied only if

"extraordinary circumstances beyond [a] prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time." Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). "When external forces, rather

than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The petitioner must show that the

"extraordinary circumstances" were the cause of her untimeliness. 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that this

"extraordinary exclusion" should apply to her. Miranda v. Castro,

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292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). The threshold to meet the

burden for equitable tolling under AEDPA is a high one. Id. at

1066. 

In Laws v. Lamarque, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district

court's order granting a motion to dismiss because it failed to

develop the record in response to Law's claim of mental

incompetency. 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth

Circuit found that the allegations of the verified state petition

attached to Law's traverse, stating that he was "deprived [] of

any kind of cons[ci]ousness" during the period when his petitions

should have been filed, may be treated as an affidavit in

opposition to the motion to dismiss. Id. (citing McElyea v.

Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987)). The Ninth Circuit

determined that a district court should not require the petitioner

to "carry a burden of persuasion" at the time he asserts equitable

tolling to merit further investigation into the merits of his

arguments for tolling. Id. at 924. Instead, Ninth Circuit cases

require only that there be "circumstances consistent with [the]

petitioner's petition . . . under which he would be entitled to

. . . equitable tolling" to trigger further factual development of

the record. Id. (citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (remanding case to district court for

development of facts concerning whether AEDPA materials were

unavailable in the prison law library and the legal significance

of such a finding)). The Ninth Circuit found that the district

court erred in granting judgment against Laws based upon the

papers before it and that "[i]t [was] enough that Laws 'alleged

mental competency' in a verified pleading." Laws, 351 F.3d at 924

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(citations omitted). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that Laws

was entitled to further factual development or an evidentiary

hearing on the issue of whether he was precluded from filing his

petition by reason of mental impairment. Id.

In the present case, Petitioner has listed several "factors"

that she alleges "contributed to [her] delay in filing of petition

for a writ of habeas corpus." (Supp. to Opp'n at 1-6.) However,

Petitioner has not shown that equitable tolling should apply to

her. That is, she alleges no facts which show that her failure to

raise her claims prior to the expiration of the limitations period

was because of circumstances which were beyond her control and

which made it impossible to file a timely federal petition. 

Petitioner's allegations do not show a causal connection between

the factors she lists and her inability to file a timely federal

habeas application. The record in this case is adequate to allow

the Court to evaluate the strength of Petitioner's claim of

factors that entitle her to equitable tolling. Cf. id. (finding

the record "patently inadequate" and that more factual development

was required to allow the court to evaluate the strength of Laws's

claim of mental incompetency). 

Petitioner claims that she is "a layperson unfamiliar with

criminal law, court rules and procedures, and research/preparation

of significant amount of meritorious claims which are manifested

in the magnitude of habeas corpus." (Supp. to Opp'n at 1-2.) 

However, her alleged ignorance of the law and layman status do not

amount to extraordinary circumstances. A pro se petitioner's lack

of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary

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circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at

1154; cf. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905,

909 (9th Cir. 1986) (illiteracy of pro se petitioner not

sufficient cause to avoid procedural bar); Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson,

162 F.3d 295, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1998) (pro se status during state

habeas proceedings did not justify equitable tolling); United

States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1993) (pro se

status, illiteracy, deafness and lack of legal training not

external factors excusing abuse of the writ). Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to tolling based on her ignorance of

the law. 

Petitioner asserts that she "had difficulty in obtaining

copies of her trial attorney [sic] case file." (Supp. to Opp'n at

2.) As mentioned above, Petitioner alleges that she lost portions

of her trial record in a house fire in September, 1999. After

being unsuccessful at litigation to have those portions of the

public defender's trial record reproduced at the public's expense,

Petitioner eventually copied her trial record at her family's

expense in 2003. The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to

show that the "extraordinary circumstances" exception to the

statute of limitations applies to her because the delay in

obtaining her trial record was not a circumstance beyond

Petitioner's control. Petitioner could have had her trial record

copied at an earlier date. Thus, Petitioner did not exercise

reasonable diligence. Furthermore, Petitioner received copies of

the trial record from her appellate counsel by February 7, 2000,

before the statute ran. (Resp't Ex. 4.) Therefore, the Court

finds that Petitioner fails to show that "extraordinary

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circumstances," instead of her own delay in making copies of the

trial record, made it impossible for her to file a timely federal

petition, particularly when she had the record on appeal in her

possession. See Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.

2000) (if the petitioner has not exercised reasonable diligence in

attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began,

the link of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and

the failure to file is broken); cf. Gassler v. Bruton, 255 F.3d

492, 495 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting equitable tolling based on

delay in receiving trial transcripts because possession of trial

transcript is not a condition precedent to filing for postconviction relief; a petition seeking collateral relief could have

been filed, following which, if necessary for decision of the

issues raised, the court could have ordered production of the

transcript). Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner's claim

that she had difficulty in obtaining copies of her trial record

does not entitle her to equitable tolling. 

Finally, Petitioner asserts that her appellate counsel

ineffectively argued her claims on direct appeal. Petitioner

fails to show how her appellate attorney's alleged ineffectiveness

prevented her from filing a timely federal petition. Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling based on her

appellate attorney's ineffectiveness. Cf. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at

800-01 (equitable tolling appropriate where attorney was retained

to file and prepare petition, failed to do so, and disregarded

requests to return files pertaining to petitioner's case until

well after the date the petition was due; remanding on issue of

whether petitioner exercised reasonable diligence). 

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.06\McCaffrey3832.grantMTD.frm 15

Accordingly, the limitations period will not be equitably

tolled. Therefore, the petition is DISMISSED because it was not

timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely

is GRANTED; the petition hereby is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate

all remaining motions, and close the file. 

3. This Order terminates Docket nos. 20 and 24.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/28/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-03832-CW Document 30 Filed 03/28/08 Page 15 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.06\McCaffrey3832.grantMTD.frm

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA C. MCCAFFERY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GLORIA HENRY et al,

Defendant. 

Case Number: CV06-03832 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on March 28, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter

listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an

inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Laurence K. Sullivan

Office of Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Ave., Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Pamela C. McCaffery W74990

C1-28-4L

Valley State Prison for Women

P.O. Box 96

Chowchilla, CA 93610-0096

Dated: March 28, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-03832-CW Document 30 Filed 03/28/08 Page 16 of 16