Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-23-02887/USCOURTS-ca7-23-02887-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eliezer Ruiz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued November 19, 2024 

Decided November 26, 2024 

Before

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge 

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge

No. 23-2887 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ELIEZER RUIZ, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 1:20-CR-00115(2) 

Steven C. Seeger, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Eliezer Ruiz pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing an unregistered shortbarreled rifle. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). At sentencing, the district court applied a special 

offense characteristic for possessing the gun in connection with another felony, which 

increased Ruiz’s offense level by four. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). On appeal, Ruiz argues 

that the court erred by finding that he committed a felony. Because the court chose 

between two plausible ways to interpret the evidence and stated that it would have 

reached the same sentencing decision regardless, we affirm Ruiz’s sentence.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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On July 19, 2019, Ruiz was riding with James Lowry in Lowry’s van when they 

rear-ended Victim A’s car. All three men got out of their cars, and when Victim A took 

out his cell phone to take a picture of Lowry’s license plate, Lowry pulled out a knife 

and threatened Victim A. Ruiz then punched Victim A in the face. Ruiz and Lowry fled 

in Lowry’s van, and Victim A pursued them in his car. Lowry stopped the van twice.

The first time, Lowry got out of the car with a short-barreled rifle but did not fire. The 

second time, Lowry stopped in an alley, got out of the van, and fired six shots at 

Victim A’s car. Victim A was not struck.

Lowry then got back in the van and handed the rifle to Ruiz, who put it in a bag, 

jumped out of the van, and fled on foot while Lowry drove away. Ruiz told a passerby 

that he had a gun in the bag before hiding it in a trash can in a nearby alley. Before 

arresting Ruiz or even suspecting him of being involved, police officers questioned him 

and the passerby. Ruiz lied and told them that Victim A had fired a gun. Ruiz later 

returned to the trash can, and officers arrested him. Ruiz then told police officers what 

happened and asked for protection from Lowry.

A grand jury charged Lowry with possessing ammunition as a convicted felon, 

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), and both Lowry and Ruiz for knowingly possessing an 

unregistered short-barreled rifle, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). 

Under an agreement with the government, Ruiz pleaded guilty. The parties 

agreed that, under the Sentencing Guidelines, Ruiz would have a base offense level of 

18 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(5), but they disagreed about whether to apply a four-level 

increase for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony, § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). 

(The government asserted that Ruiz had possessed the weapon in connection with the 

federal offense of aiding and abetting attempted murder and the Illinois offense of 

obstruction of justice.) The government agreed that both the two- and one-level 

reductions in offense level for acceptance of responsibility were appropriate. U.S.S.G. 

§ 3E1.1(a)–(b).

A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR). As 

relevant to this appeal, the PSR applied the four-level increase based on the connection 

of the firearm possession to another felony offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). 

In their sentencing memoranda, each party attempted to interpret Ruiz’s 

motivation for hiding the gun after the shooting. Ruiz argued that he hid the gun only 

to avoid getting caught with it himself, citing the evidence from a police report that he 

told a passerby that he had a gun. The government, on the other hand, argued that if 

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Ruiz were only looking out for himself, he could have left the gun in the van or simply 

dropped it in the alley. The government also contended that Ruiz covered up for Lowry 

by lying to police officers about the circumstances of the shooting (that Victim A had 

fired) rather than telling the truth or staying silent.

Overruling Ruiz’s objections, the court concluded that the four-level increase 

applied. Finding that Ruiz and Lowry acted as a team and that Ruiz intended to protect 

Lowry, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Ruiz hid the gun in the 

trash can with the intent to conceal Lowry’s crime and therefore committed at least two 

felonies: accessory after the fact to attempted murder and obstruction of justice.

These conclusions led to a total offense level of 19 under § 2K2.1. With a criminal 

history category of I, Ruiz’s guidelines range was 30 to 37 months in prison. The court 

ultimately sentenced Ruiz to 37 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release.

Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level enhancement for possession 

of a firearm in connection with another felony. It “applies when a preponderance of the 

evidence connects the defendant’s use or possession of a firearm to another felony 

offense, even if the defendant was neither charged for nor convicted of the second 

crime.” United States v. Ingram, 40 F.4th 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2022). On appeal, Ruiz 

challenges the application of this enhancement. In particular, he contests the finding 

that he acted as an accessory after the fact to attempted murder. Encompassed in this 

argument is the assertion that he necessarily lacked the similar state of mind required 

for obstruction of justice, so we need not address the two offenses separately. This court 

reviews the district court’s factual findings (such as Ruiz’s motivation for hiding the 

rifle) for clear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. 

United States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Ruiz contends that no reliable evidence suggests that he hid the gun to help or 

protect Lowry, so he could not have obstructed justice or been an accessory to 

attempted murder. See United States v. Tipton, 3 F.3d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1993) 

(obstruction of justice); United States v. Bell, 819 F.3d 310, 323 (7th Cir. 2016) (accessory 

after the fact). Ruiz argues that, in fact, clear evidence shows that he was not attempting 

to protect Lowry. By taking the gun away from Lowry, for example, he protected the 

victim and the public, leaving Lowry unarmed. And, he contends, evidence that he told 

a bystander about the gun and eventually cooperated with police demonstrates that he 

did not intend to obstruct the investigation of the shooting.

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But the district court did not clearly err by finding by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Ruiz acted with the necessary intent to cover up Lowry’s shooting. 

“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between 

them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). Here, the 

district court was presented with two competing stories based on the same evidence. It 

therefore could not have clearly erred by choosing between them.

Moreover, there was more than sufficient evidence to support the district court’s 

findings by a preponderance of the evidence. Ruiz witnessed Lowry threaten Victim A 

with the rifle and fire six shots at Victim A’s car. After the shooting, Lowry handed Ruiz

the rifle he had used to shoot at Victim A and Ruiz placed it in a bag. Ruiz jumped out 

of the car with the rifle in the bag, and he hid the rifle in a trash can in a nearby alley. 

He then lied to the police about the shooter. Based on this evidence, the district court 

did not err in imposing the enhancement.

Furthermore, any error in applying § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) here would have been 

harmless. “A court’s statement that ‘it would have imposed the same sentence,’ even if 

it had improperly calculated the defendant’s Guidelines range, renders the error 

harmless.” United States v. Cook, 108 F.4th 574, 583 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States 

v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2018)). And here, the district court stated that, 

even if it had calculated the guidelines differently, Ruiz would have received the same

sentence of 37 months’ imprisonment. For a so-called “inoculating” statement to be 

valid, it must be detailed, and it must consider the parallel result. United States v. 

Caraway, 74 F.4th 466, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Asbury, 27 F.4th 576, 

581–82 (7th Cir. 2022)). Here, the court specifically considered Ruiz’s disputes to its 

guidelines calculation and determined that, even if Ruiz were correct, it would not 

affect the ultimate outcome.

AFFIRMED

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