Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00248/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00248-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ken Clark
Respondent
Jesse Collins
Petitioner

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 In that petition, Petitioner contended that California Three Strikes law was improperly applied to him, the 1

prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence for a finding of guilt on the sentencing enhancements, his counsel

was ineffective, and the trial court abused its discretion by failing to strike one or both of the prior convictions. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE COLLINS,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARK,

Respondent.

 /

1:08-cv-00248 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition on February 20, 2008. Petitioner is challenging

a conviction arising out of the Kern County Superior Court for his third strike offense of

possession of a controlled substance in violation of California Health and Safety Code section

11350. Petitioner contends that his right to a jury trial was violated because there was not

sufficient evidence presented to find the strike prior true beyond a reasonable doubt. 

On the form petition, Petitioner neglected to indicate that he has previously filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, in case number 1:05-cv-0541 OWW DLB HC,

Collins v. Adams, which was dismissed, with prejudice as untimely on February 8, 2007.1

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on March 1, 2007, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

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denied a certificate of appealability on September 7, 2007. (See Court Docs. 34, 37, in 1:05-cv0541 OWW DLB HC.) 

DISCUSSION

Because the current petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to Petitioner's current

petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). A federal court must dismiss a second or

successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The

court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner

can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis

of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).

However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets

these requirements, which allow a petitioner to file a second or successive petition. 

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by

this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of

appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words,

Petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive

petition in district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must

dismiss any second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave

to file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or

successive petition. Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v.

Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v.

United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

A second or successive petition for habeas corpus is not considered “successive” if the

initial habeas petition was dismissed for a technical or procedural reason versus on the merits. 

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-87 (2000) (holding that a second habeas petition is not

successive if the initial habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust); Stewart v.

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Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1998) (a second habeas petition is not successive if the

claim raised in the first petition was dismissed by the district court as premature.) 

The prior petition in CV-F-05-0541 OWW DLB HC, was dismissed, with prejudice, as

time-barred by the statute of limitations. Although a dismissal based on the statute of limitations

does not include an examination of the merits of the petition, it nonetheless operates and is

equivalent to a final judgment on the merits. See e.g. Ellingson v. Burlington Northern Inc., 653

F.2d 1327, 1330 n.3 (9 Cir. 1981) (“[a] judgment based on the statute of limitations is ‘on the th

merits’, citing Mathis v. Laird, 457 F.2d 926, 927 5 Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871 th

(1972)); In re Marino, 181 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9 Cir. 1999) (explaining that “for res judicata th

purposes a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be treated as a dismissal on the

merits.”) A dismissal based on untimeliness under the statute of limitations bars further review

of the action. Therefore, because the prior petition was adjudicated “on the merits”, the instant

petition is a “second or successive petition” under § 2244(b). 

Petitioner makes no showing that he has obtained prior leave from the Ninth Circuit to

file his successive petition attacking the conviction. That being so, this Court has no jurisdiction

to consider Petitioner's renewed application for relief from that conviction under § 2254 and must

dismiss the petition. See Greenawalt, 105 F.3d at 1277; Nunez, 96 F.3d at 991. If Petitioner

desires to proceed in bringing this petition for writ of habeas corpus, he must file for leave to do

so with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3).

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas

corpus be DISMISSED, without prejudice, as a successive petition.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

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shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 10, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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