Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01913/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01913-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John M. Jenners
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1913

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of South Dakota.

John M. Jenners, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 16, 2006

Filed: January 17, 2007

___________

Before SMITH, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

John Jenners pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, counterfeiting,

and aiding and abetting counterfeiting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 474, and 2.

The district court sentenced Jenners to 108 months' imprisonment. Jenners did not

appeal. However, the district court subsequently granted Jenners habeas relief on his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to file a requested

appeal. The district court resentenced Jenners so that a timely appeal could be filed.

Upon resentencing, Jenners received the same sentence and now appeals, challenging

the sentence as unreasonable. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate Jenners's

sentence and remand the case for resentencing.

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1

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

2

One of the possible enhancements was based on the pending charges Jenners

had objected to.

3

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

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I. Background

As part of a plea agreement, Jenners pleaded guilty to two counts of a 26-count

indictment—Count 1, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and Count 25, counterfeiting

and aiding and abetting counterfeiting. In exchange for the guilty pleas, the remaining

24 counts of the indictment were dismissed. The court accepted the pleas, and the

probation office prepared a presentence investigation report ("PSR"). The PSR

recommended the applicable Guidelines sentencing range to be 63 to 78 months. 

Shortly after the PSR was prepared, the Supreme Court issued its Blakely1

decision. Jenners timely objected to the factual allegations set forth in 28 different

paragraphs of the PSR, including several paragraphs in the "Pending Charges" section

and the paragraphs discussing possible sentence enhancements.2

 Additionally, Jenners

contended that, under Blakely, the potential sentence enhancements were improper

because they had not been presented to a jury and had not been found beyond a

reasonable doubt. In light of this Blakely objection, the PSR was amended, and the

Guidelines range was recalculated to 24 to 30 months.

The district court sentenced Jenners after Blakely but before the Supreme

Court's Booker3

 decision. During this time, the district court treated the Guidelines as

advisory. The court determined that, under the mandatory Guidelines regime, Jenners

would have had a criminal history category of V and a total offense level of 20. The

court then stated that if it were sentencing Jenners under the mandatory Guidelines,

it would have upwardly departed to increase Jenners's criminal history category to VI

because it believed Jenners's "extensive criminal record" put him "far beyond a

criminal history of V." 

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The court, however, declared that it was not sentencing Jenners under the

Guidelines. The court subsequently reviewed Jenners's criminal background as

described in the PSR, including paragraphs that Jenners had objected to that

mentioned charges pending against him. Jenners's attorney then interjected:

I'm not sure how the presentence report and the objections apply now

that the guidelines are really not in play, but I have objected to a lot of

the things the Court went through here. And, so, I don't know if the

Court is making findings that those things are actually true, or –

The court responded:

No, I'm just going through what's in the presentence report. I think I'm

obligated to state the reason for any sentence. I'm not making findings

as to those matters. I'm just stating what's in the presentence report. I

realize that you have made objections to those. But if the sentencing

guidelines are unconstitutional I'm not required to make any findings of

that kind.

The court ultimately sentenced Jenners to 108 months' imprisonment followed by five

years of supervised release. 

No appeal was filed on Jenners's behalf, but Jenners filed a successful motion

to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255. The district court found that Jenners received ineffective assistance of counsel

because, although he requested an appeal, no appeal was filed on his behalf. The court

granted the motion and ordered Jenners to be resentenced. At the resentencing

hearing, Jenners sought to admit evidence of his rehabilitation while incarcerated, as

well as mitigating evidence as to his background. Jenners urged the court to consider

the evidence and impose a lesser sentence than previously imposed. The court refused

to allow the mitigating evidence. 

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Before resentencing Jenners, the court again recounted Jenners's criminal

history as detailed in the PSR, including the objected to pending charges. The court

then resentenced Jenners, again imposing a 108-month sentence. In doing so, the court

reinstated its prior rulings and incorporated the record of the initial sentencing

hearing.

II. Discussion

Jenners argues that the district court erred by sentencing him without consulting

and properly taking into account the Guidelines. Jenners notes that the court relied on

factual allegations contained in the PSR that had been objected to, without making

appropriate factual findings based upon the evidence. Additionally, Jenners asserts

that the court erroneously excluded his mitigation evidence at resentencing.

A. Objections to the PSR

A PSR is not evidence. United States v. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th

Cir. 2004). But, "[a] sentencing court may accept the facts in a PSR as true unless the

defendant objects to specific factual allegations." United States v. Wintermute, 443

F.3d 993, 1005 (8th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). However, "[i]f the defendant objects

to any of the factual allegations contained [in the PSR] on an issue on which the

government has the burden of proof, such as . . . any enhancing factors, the

government must present evidence at the sentencing hearing to prove the existence of

the disputed facts." Poor Bear, 359 F.3d at 1041. Unless the disputed facts have been

proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the district court cannot rely on them at

sentencing. Id. (citing United States v. Hammer, 3 F.3d 266, 272 (8th Cir. 1993)).

Otherwise, the sentence is in error and must be vacated and remanded for

resentencing. Wintermute, 443 F.3d at 1005.

Here, Jenners objected to multiple factual allegations in the PSR, including

objections to the allegations of pending charges and possible sentence enhancements.

The PSR noted that Jenners's pending charges were factors that could warrant an

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upward departure under § 4A1.3(a)(2)(D) & (E) of the Guidelines. The government

did not present any evidence at sentencing as to the pending charges, or any other

disputed facts, nor were any findings made by the court as to the disputed facts. 

At both the original sentencing and the resentencing, the court went through

Jenners's criminal history, on the record, as detailed in the PSR. Despite Jenners's

objections to the factual allegations in the PSR, the court never received any evidence

on those issues or made any factual findings on the objections. When asked by

Jenners's counsel about the objections to the PSR, the court said, "I'm just going

through what's in the presentence report. I think I'm obligated to state the reason for

any sentence. I'm not making findings as to those matters. I'm just stating what's in the

presentence report." (emphasis added). 

By including the disputed factual allegations in its "reason" for Jenners's

sentence, the court appears to have relied on, at least in part, the disputed facts in

determining the sentence. Therefore, in accordance with Wintermute and Poor Bear,

the sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing. Because of the general

nature in which Jenners raised his factual objections, the government may offer

substantiating evidence on remand. See Wintermute, 443 F.3d at 1005; United States

v. Sorrells, 432 F.3d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 2005).

B. Mitigating Evidence

Jenners also contends that the court erred by not allowing him to present

mitigation evidence at his resentencing. Generally, unless an appellate court has

imposed limitations on the sentencing court's function at resentencing, "[o]nce a

sentence has been vacated or a finding related to sentencing has been reversed and the

case has been remanded for resentencing, the district court can hear any relevant

evidence on that issue that it could have heard at the first hearing." United States v.

Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992). However, a defendant is not entitled to

a de novo resentencing when the "defendant has been unconstitutionally deprived of

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appellate review due to ineffective assistance of counsel." United States v. Prado, 204

F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2000). In that situation, "the prescribed procedure is for the

district court to vacate the sentence and then reimpose it, allowing the defendant ten

days to appeal from the imposition of the new sentence." Id. Because Jenners's case

was remanded for resentencing solely because he had been unconstitutionally

deprived of appellate review due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court

did not err in refusing to allow the mitigation evidence at resentencing. Id.

In contrast, we are now remanding Jenners's case for resentencing, not due to

the constitutional deprivation of appellate review claim, but because of a sentencing

error. On remand, the district court may now hear any relevant evidence that it could

have heard at the first sentencing hearing, including the potentially mitigating

evidence Jenners seeks to adduce. See Cornelius, 968 F.2d at 705. However, evidence

of Jenners's post-sentencing rehabilitation is not relevant and will not be permitted at

resentencing because the district court could not have considered that evidence at the

time of the original sentencing. United States v. Sims, 174 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir.

1999) ("Rehabilitation that takes place behind the prison walls after the original

sentencing . . . is not relevant [at resentencing], since the sentencing court obviously

could not have considered it at the time of the original sentencing.").

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Jenners's sentence and remand for

resentencing in accordance with this ruling.

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