Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07078/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charlie Clouse
Appellee
Rachel M. McFerren
Appellant
David H. McGee
Appellant
Carrell Vaughn
Appellee
Harlan Vinson
Appellee
Dale Whitecotten
Appellee
Lynn Wilde
Appellant

Document Text:

FIL ED 

United States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tf'nth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT .JUL 2 1992 

DAVID H. MCGEE; RACHEL M. MCFERREN; 

LYNN WILDE, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

DALE WHITECOTTEN, individually and as 

Sheriff of LeFlore County, Oklahoma; 

CHARLIE CLOUSE; CARRELL VAUGHN; HARLAN 

VINSON, as County Commissioners of 

LeFlore County, Oklahoma, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 91-7078 

) (D.C. No. CIV 90-403-S) 

) (E.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiffs purport to appeal from two orders of the district 

court entered March 1, 1991, one dismissing their action with 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-7078 Document: 010110275139 Date Filed: 07/29/1992 Page: 1
prejudice and the other denying their motion to compel discovery. 

Because we find Plaintiffs' appeal from the order of dismissal is 

properly before this court and the district court lacked 

jurisdiction for the dismissal, we reverse and remand with 

instructions. Because Plaintiffs did not designate the order 

denying their motion to compel in their notice of appeal, however, 

that issue is not properly before this court, and we dismiss it. 

Plaintiffs filed this action on August 13, 1990, alleging 

violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. 

The scheduling order established December 7 and 10, 1990, as the 

cutoff dates for discovery and motions, respectively. Plaintiffs 

moved for an extension of discovery on December 13, 1990, and 

filed a motion to compel discovery on January 14, 1991. Both 

motions were denied. Defendants filed a motion for summary 

judgment on December 10, which was denied on February 13, 1991. 

The parties were ordered to file a pretrial order by 

January 24, 1991. They did not do so, and the court set a show 

cause hearing for February 4 for the parties to explain why the 

case should not be dismissed. At the hearing, the court chose not 

to dismiss the case and ordered the parties to file the pretrial 

order by February 7. They did, but the court was not satisfied 

with it and held a second show cause hearing on February 21 for 

the parties to explain why numerous items the court considered 

irrelevant were included in it. On February 27, the parties 

presented a revised Agreed Pretrial Order. On March 1, 1991, the 

court entered orders rejecting the proposed Agreed Pretrial Order 

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Appellate Case: 91-7078 Document: 010110275139 Date Filed: 07/29/1992 Page: 2
and dismissing Plaintiffs' cause of action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs filed a motion 

to amend or alter the judgment of dismissal, which was denied. 

I 

Plaintiffs raise two issues: first, that dismissal with 

prejudice was improper; and, second, that they were unfairly 

limited in discovery. Defendants argue that these issues are not 

properly before this court because Plaintiffs did not name the 

order of dismissal or the order denying their motion to compel 

discovery in their notice of appeal; rather, Plaintiffs designated 

their appeal as from the denial of their "motion to reconsider." 

(In fact, there was no motion styled "Motion to Reconsider"; 

Plaintiffs filed a motion styled "Motion to Amend or Alter the 

Order of Dismissal" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) after the court 

entered its order of dismissal. It amounts to the same thing.) 

This defect is fatal to review of the discovery problem, but not 

to review of the dismissal. 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) states in part: 

"The notice of appeal ... shall designate the judgment, order or 

part thereof appealed from." This part of Rule 3(c) is not read 

hypertechnically, however, when a party designates appeal from a 

post-judgment order. If it is clear the party intended to appeal 

from the final judgment and the opposing party was not misled or 

prejudiced by the technical defect that a motion to reconsider was 

designated in the notice of appeal, the reviewing court may treat 

the appeal as taken from the final judgment. Matute v. Procoast 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-7078 Document: 010110275139 Date Filed: 07/29/1992 Page: 3
Navigation Ltd., 928 F.2d 627, 629-630 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 

112 S. Ct. 329 (1991); see also Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151, 1154 

n.4 (10th Cir. 1989)(appeal from denial of motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial raises underlying 

final judgment for review). 

In this case, Plaintiffs clearly intended to appeal from the 

dismissal with prejudice of their action: the dismissal with 

prejudice was what their Motion to Amend or Alter was aimed at. 

And, clearly, Defendants were not misled or prejudiced by 

Plaintiffs' designation of a "motion to reconsider" in the notice 

of appeal, because Defendants briefed issues surrounding the 

dismissal. Plaintiffs' appeal from the order of dismissal is 

therefore properly before this court. 

The same cannot be said for the appeal from the district 

court's order denying Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. 

That order is not designated in the notice of appeal and is not 

implicated by the order which is designated. This part of 

Plaintiffs' appeal is therefore dismissed. 

II 

The district court, on the eve of trial and on its own 

motion, dismissed Plaintiffs' action for the failure of the Agreed 

Pretrial Order and the complaint to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. The court's order does not set out 

adequate authority for the dismissal, and we find none. Indeed, 

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Appellate Case: 91-7078 Document: 010110275139 Date Filed: 07/29/1992 Page: 4
we are hard-pressed to imagine how the court could find 

Plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim after denying 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

Although the language of the court's order implies its 

reliance on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), that Rule does not provide a 

basis for dismissal as a sanction against a party. And, although 

a local district court rule may require counsel to draft a 

proposed pretrial order, the ultimate responsibility for the 

pretrial order lies with the district court, not with counsel. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). Dismissal of Plaintiffs' action because 

the court finds counsel's proposed pretrial order to be inadequate 

is therefore an inappropriate sanction not supported by 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). The court's proper recourse when it finds 

the proposed pretrial order to be inadequate is to redraft it or 

order counsel· ·to do so. 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED 

with instructions that the court vacate its order of dismissal 

entered March 1, 1991. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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