Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01718/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01718-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
3515 Hwy 99, LLC
Defendant
Manpreet Randhawa
Defendant
Run Roadlines, Inc.
Defendant
Unit 53, Inc.
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Unit 53, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Run Roadlines, Inc., et. al., 

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01718-DJC-CSK

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 

SETTING HEARING ON MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Unit 53, Inc’s Motion for Temporary 

Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Mot. (ECF No. 24).) Plaintiff 

seeks preliminary relief to prevent Defendants Run Roadlines, Inc. (“RRI”), Manpreet 

Randhawa, and 3515 Hwy 99, LLC, and their principals, agents and/or affiliates from 

selling, transferring, subleasing, or encumbering the 650 shipping containers that 

Plaintiff leased Defendant RRI. Plaintiff also seeks affirmative relief requiring RRI to 

provide Plaintiff with the location of the shipping containers. For the reasons 

discussed below the Court DENIES the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 

sets a hearing for the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 

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Case 2:24-cv-01718-DJC-CSK Document 26 Filed 11/27/24 Page 1 of 8
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I. Background 

Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with RRI under which Plaintiff leased 

650 shipping containers to RRI in exchange for monthly payments. (Mot. at 4.) The 

lease agreement stated that RRI was to provide the monthly payments beginning April 

1, 2023. (Id.) However, Plaintiff claims that RRI has failed to make any payments. (Id.) 

The amount owed to Plaintiff is now over $5 million, with increases of $200,000 each 

month. (Id.) In response to Plaintiff’s concern about the missed payments, RRI had 

granted Plaintiff an exclusive option to secure a deed of trust on RRI’s real property,

but RRI ultimately encumbered that property with a third party’s lien. (Id.) Defendant

Randhawa, one of RRI’s principal agents, then executed a personal guaranty for RRI’s 

obligations under the lease agreement. (Id.) However, Plaintiff alleges that Randhawa 

began transferring RRI’s real property to Defendant 3515 Hwy 99, an insider entity of 

RRI that is managed by Randhawa. Plaintiff then initiated the instant suit. (Id.) 

Following the initiation of the suit, an employee of Unit 53 saw a LinkedIn article 

stating that Run Rail, an alleged affiliate of RRI, has shut down all operations. (Id. at 5.) 

The employee also obtained an email sent on November 18, 2024, by Run Rail’s 

Executive Vice President to its customers stating that the company is temporarily 

suspending operations. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to respond 

in any way between November 7, 2024, and the date of this Motion. (Id.) Given these

circumstances, Plaintiff is concerned that RRI may be liquidating and may have falsely 

represented to railway companies that the leased shipping containers belong to RRI, 

and not Unit 53. (Id.) Specifically, many of the leased containers have been painted to 

show the Run Rail logo and brand and the SCAC Code on each container can be 

easily re-stenciled to conceal the true user of the containers. (Id. at 2.). 

Plaintiff seeks preliminary relief to prevent Defendants and their principals, 

agents and/or affiliates from selling, transferring, subleasing, or encumbering the 650 

shipping containers that Plaintiff leased RRI. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also seeks affirmative 

relief requiring RRI to provide Plaintiff with the location of all the shipping containers 

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leased by RRI. (Id.) However, Plaintiff states that the focus of this Motion is on 

preventing any sale or transfer of the containers. (Id.)

II. Legal Standard 

The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo and 

prevent irreparable harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no 

longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. Of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). 

The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 

are “substantially similar.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co., 240 F.3d 

832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff must show 

(1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the 

absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) 

that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 

U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Alternatively, courts within the Ninth Circuit may consider a request 

for a temporary restraining order using a “sliding scale” test in which “a stronger 

showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” All. for the Wild 

Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 

There is an even higher burden where the type of injunction sought is a 

“mandatory injunction.” See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015)

(explaining that the plaintiff faced a “doubly demanding” burden for a mandatory 

injunction). To obtain a mandatory injunction, a plaintiff must show that “the law and 

facts clearly favor her position, not simply that she is likely to succeed.” Id. (emphasis 

in original). Because a mandatory injunction requires that a responsible party take an 

action, they are “not granted unless extreme or very serious damage will result. . . .” 

Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 878–79) (9th Cir. 

2009). 

When deciding whether to issue a temporary restraining order, the court may 

rely on declarations, affidavits, and exhibits, among other things, and this evidence 

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need not conform to the standards that apply at summary judgment or at trial. See 

Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). 

III. Discussion 

A. Notice

A court may issue a temporary restraining order without notice only if the 

movant supplies “specific facts in an affidavit or verified complaint clearly show[ing] 

that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before 

the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (b)(1)(A). 

Additionally, a temporary restraining order may only be granted if “the movant’s 

attorney certifies in writing any efforts to give notice and the reasons why it should not 

be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (b)(1)(B). 

Here, Plaintiff supplies, via affidavit, multiple efforts to contact Defendants’ 

counsel between November 7, 2024, and the filing of the instant Motion. (Declaration 

of Christopher D. Hughes (ECF No. 24-3, Ex. C).) Plaintiff also alleges that “no one 

answers” Defendants’ counsel’s phones and that it is not possible to leave any 

voicemails. (Id. at 4.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues immediate and irreparable harm

will occur because the LinkedIn article and email from Run Rail points to the possibility 

that RRI is liquidating and potentially selling off the shipping containers owned by 

Plaintiff. (See id. at 5.) While notice of the ex parte application is sufficient, for the 

reasons described below, these allegations do not constitute “irreparable and injury, 

loss or damage.” 

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

The first Winter factor, the likelihood of success on the merits, “is a threshold 

inquiry and is the most important factor.” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 

2023) (quoting Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr., 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)). Here, Plaintiff 

brings several claims against the Defendants, but the relief Plaintiff requests appears 

to hinge on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. 

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A claim for breach of contract must allege (1) the existence of a valid contract; 

(2) that plaintiff performed or was excused from performance; (3) that the defendant 

breached the terms of the contract and (4) that the plaintiff was damaged as a result of 

the breach. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203 (2007). 

Plaintiff has demonstrated that a valid contract existed between the parties. 

The lease agreement shows that Plaintiff agreed to lease 650 units to RRI with a unit 

lease rate a $340.00 per month for five years with a $5,000.00 buyout after 60 months. 

(Declaration of Kent Delozier (ECF No. 24-2, Ex. 1-A).) The lease is signed by Plaintiff 

and by Randhawa for RRI. Plaintiff appears to have performed its end of the contract, 

as the 650 units in question are alleged to be in the Defendants’ possession. (See 

Mot. at 5.) Defendants are alleged to have breached the terms of the contract by 

failing to issue any payments to Plaintiff since the beginning of the Lease Agreement 

for the 650 shipping containers. (Id. at 4.) Finally, Plaintiff has demonstrated that it 

was likely damaged because it has not received over $5 million in payments from 

Defendants and do not know the whereabouts of the shipping containers leased to 

RRI. (Id.) As such, the Court finds that the likelihood of success on the merits factor 

weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. 

C. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm 

A plaintiff seeking preliminary relief must also make a “clear showing” of a 

likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of the relief requested. Winter, 555 U.S. 

at 22; see All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (“. . . plaintiffs must 

establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a 

preliminary injunction.”) “Irreparable harm is traditionally defined as harm for which 

there is no adequate legal remedy, such as an award of damages.” Ariz. Dream Act 

Coal. v. Brewer, 151 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014). The injury must be immediate, 

and not a speculative future injury. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., v. Baldridge, 844 

F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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Generally speaking, economic damages do not constitute irreparable injury. 

Damages for breach of contract is “quintessentially an action at law” for which 

equitable relief is unavailable. Great-West Life, & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudsen, 534 U.S. 

204, 210 (2002) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Wells, 213 F.3d 998, 401 (7th Cir. 

2000). Here, Plaintiff argues it is likely to suffer irreparable injury to its business, 

particularly in light of the financial expenditures that it may have to take in the event of 

a liquidation sale by Defendants. (Mot. at 8.) Plaintiff states that if the “dissolution 

rumors hold true,” then RRI may sell or transfer the shipping containers to third 

parties. (Id.) In the event of a wrongful sale, Plaintiff would have to undergo further 

expenditures to recover the transferred proceeds and/or may not be able to recover 

the property from a third-party buyer or transferee. (Id. at 8–9.)

There are certain instances in which economic injury can be awarded, but none 

of those exceptions appear to apply here. For instance, economic injuries may be 

recoverable if they are unavailable under the cause of action raised by the Plaintiff. E. 

Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640, 667 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding 

irreparable injury arising from a lack of funding, since damages are not available in a 

suit under the Administrative Procedures Act). But damages are certainly available 

under the theories asserted in the Complaint. Or irreparable harm may be found if 

economic injury results in some other, non-economic harm, such as where the 

business at issue may be bankrupted, which does not appear to be the case here. See

Am. Passage Media Corp. v. Cass Commc’ns, Inc., 750 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(“[t]he threat of being driven out of business is sufficient to establish irreparable 

harm”). No such allegations are made here.

Plaintiff suggests that Defendant may be insolvent. (See Mot. at 8.) As an initial 

matter, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiff has made an adequate showing in that 

regard. More significantly, however, Plaintiff does not cite, and the Court is unaware 

of, any case holding that economic damages may be an irreparable injury solely

because of Defendants’ potential insolvency. 

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To the extent Plaintiff argues it need show only a mere possibility of irreparable 

injury to satisfy the “sliding scale” test, that argument fails. See Stormans, Inc. v. 

Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that a possibility of irreparable 

harm is the incorrect standard under Winter). The Supreme Court has expressly held 

that a likelihood of irreparable injury must be demonstrated in every case. See Winter, 

555 U.S. at 20. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of 

irreparable injury. 

D. Balance of Equities 

A court must “balance the interests of all parties and weigh damage to each” 

when determining the balance of equities. Stormans, Inc., 586 F.3d at 1138 (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the 

hardship tips in their favor. As evidenced by the lease agreement, the shipping 

containers belong to Plaintiff. Thus, prohibiting the Defendants and their principals, 

agents and/or affiliates from selling, transferring, or leasing them would not cause any 

hardship. Furthermore, Plaintiff has explained that any sale of the shipping containers 

by Defendants to third parties would make recovery difficult. (Mot. at 9.) Therefore, 

the balance of equities supports Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. 

E. Public Interest 

The public interest factor takes into account the interests of non-parties and 

considers whether equitable relief will be adverse to the public interest. See Winter, 

555 U.S. at 24. Here, Plaintiff makes no argument as to why this factor is satisfied. 

However, it appears from the facts that the public interest is served by maintaining the 

status quo. Given Plaintiff’s business, there is a possibility that non-parties who also 

seek to lease shipping containers may be harmed if the containers are sold, 

transferred, or leased by Defendants. 

IV. Conclusion

While many of the Winter factors favor Plaintiff, a showing of irreparable injury is 

required for issuance of a temporary restraining order, even under the sliding scale 

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analysis. See All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (discussing Winter, 129 S. Ct. 

at 375–76). Plaintiff has not made that showing to support its request to maintain the 

status quo or established that the law and facts clearly favor its position to be granted 

affirmative relief. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary 

Restraining Order (ECF No. 24) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

is set for hearing on December 20, 2024, at 1:30 PM before the Honorable Daniel J. 

Calabretta in Courtroom 7. Defendant’s Opposition shall be filed on or before 

December 11, 2024, and Plaintiff’s Reply shall be filed on or before December 17, 

2024. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 27, 2024 

Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:24-cv-01718-DJC-CSK Document 26 Filed 11/27/24 Page 8 of 8