Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00637/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00637-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marilee Brown
Plaintiff
Sally Jewell
Defendant
United States Fish and Wildlife Service
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARILEE BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SALLY JEWELL,

Defendant.

No. 2:16-cv-0637 MCE CKD PS

ORDER AND 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Pending before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss. This matter was submitted on 

the briefs. ECF No. 31; E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). Upon review of the documents in support and 

opposition, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

In this action, plaintiff alleges retaliation arising out of her employment and subsequent 

removal from her law enforcement position as a United States Fish and Wildlife Service 

(“USFWS”) criminal investigator. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges one omnibus cause of action 

for retaliation, whistleblowing, discrimination on the basis of sex, perceived disability and age. 

The allegations in the complaint, however, relate only to plaintiff’s claim that defendants engaged 

in retaliation against plaintiff for her protected EEO activities.

In 2005, plaintiff sustained a back injury, for which she filed a worker’s compensation 

claim. Plaintiff again injured her back in 2009. Although plaintiff was released to full duty by 

her treating physician, plaintiff was placed on activity restrictions by the physician. Plaintiff was 

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thereafter removed from her position due to physical inability to perform the essential functions 

of her position, effective June 27, 2012. In support of the removal, the agency relied on a fitnessfor-duty report completed on April 11, 2011 by a reviewing physician from the Department of 

Health and Human Services’ Federal Occupational Health Services. Plaintiff’s removal was 

upheld by the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”).

Defendant moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 Plaintiff 

has filed an opposition comprising 407 pages, including exhibits. The exhibits submitted by 

plaintiff have not been considered by the court in ruling on the motion to dismiss as they are not

referred to in the complaint and are not subject to judicial notice.2

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. 

Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 

“naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. 

Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation has three elements. Plaintiff must allege that she engaged 

in protected activity, that she suffered an adverse action, and that there is a causal link between 

 

1 Defendant submits two MSPB decisions as background context for the motion to dismiss and 

requests that the court take judicial notice of these documents. The MSPB decisions are properly 

subject to judicial notice and defendant’s request will therefore be granted.

2

 The court has considered plaintiff’s exhibits insofar as they are relevant to the determination of 

whether leave to amend should be granted.

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the protected activity and the adverse action. See T.B. ex rel Brenneise v. San Diego Unified 

School Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 473 (9th Cir. 2015) (retaliation standard under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964); see also Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) (retaliation 

claim brought under Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Coons v. U.S. Dep’t Treasury, 383 

F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rehabilitation Act). Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation 

claim on the ground that she fails to allege any facts demonstrating causation. Assuming 

arguendo that plaintiff has sufficiently pled the first two elements, defendant is correct that 

plaintiff fails to allege plausible facts supporting an inference of causation. Plaintiff’s claim for 

retaliation is predicated on her involvement with EEOC proceedings dating back to 1996 which 

involved her sister and her own employment discrimination claim which plaintiff settled in 2008. 

The adverse action about which plaintiff complains is the fitness for duty examination conducted 

in 2011, and her subsequent termination in June 2012 as medically unqualified for her position 

after plaintiff refused other positions that were offered to her as an accommodation. The lapse in 

time between the alleged protected activity and the adverse action is simply too long to give rise 

to an inference of causation. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (18-month lapse too long to give rise to inference of causation). 

In opposition, plaintiff now asserts that she filed an EEO claim in January 2012 and 

contends this was the protected activity giving rise to the alleged retaliation. However, the fitness 

for duty examination, upon which plaintiff’s termination was based, was conducted in 2011. An 

alleged adverse action which predates the alleged protected activity cannot serve as the basis for a 

retaliation claim. In addition, plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that at least seven managers and 

supervisors conspired over two decades to retaliate against plaintiff, without more, is implausible 

on its face. The motion to dismiss should be granted. 

Plaintiff’s opposition, while prolix, does not suggest that amendment would be anything 

other than futile. Plaintiff raises a myriad of other vague, amorphous and conclusory claims in 

her opposition relating to alleged discriminatory actions based on perceived disability, age and 

gender. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate in her opposition how she can allege, within the strictures of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the elements necessary to establish any of these claims. 

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Because it appears amendment would be futile, the motion to dismiss should be granted with 

prejudice.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s request for judicial notice 

(ECF No. 20) is granted; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19) be granted without leave to amend; and

2. This action be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 28, 2017

4 brown0637.57

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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