Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-01225/USCOURTS-caDC-09-01225-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
Amicus Curiae for Petitioner
Stephen J. Coonan
Petitioner
National Transportation Safety Board
Respondent
Mark K. Turner
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2010 Decided June 8, 2010

No. 09-1225

MARK K. TURNER AND STEPHEN J. COONAN,

PETITIONERS

v.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order 

of the National Transportation Safety Board

Gregory Sean Winton argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for petitioners. 

Kathleen A. Yodice was on the brief for amicus curiae 

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association in support of 

petitioners.

Benjamin S. Kingsley, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the 

brief were Michael Jay Singer and Michael E. Robinson, 

Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 1 of 10
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The Federal Aviation 

Administration suspended the Airline Transport Pilot 

Certificates of Mark Turner and of Stephen Coonan, the pilots 

appealed, and the FAA withdrew its complaints before an

Administrative Law Judge could hear their appeal. The ALJ 

then awarded the pilots attorneys fees and expenses pursuant 

to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), codified as 

amended in relevant part at 5 U.S.C. § 504, concluding each 

pilot was the “prevailing party” in his case. The FAA 

appealed to the National Transportation Safety Board, which 

reversed the award, and the pilots now petition for review of 

the Board’s order. We deny their petition. 

I. Background

The FAA suspended the pilots’ certificates because it 

concluded they had, among other things, operated an aircraft 

that was “unairworthy,” in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.7(a). 

Each pilot appealed his suspension, and both cases were 

assigned to the same ALJ, who scheduled hearings for June 

2008. In April the ALJ granted motions to continue the cases 

and re-scheduled the hearings for August.

Soon thereafter, however, the FAA withdrew the 

complaint against each pilot, stating only: “The Administrator 

hereby withdraws its [sic] complaint in this matter.” The ALJ 

terminated the proceedings against the pilots with an equally 

terse order that did not specify whether the termination was 

with or without prejudice. 

Invoking the EAJA, the pilots sought to recover their 

attorneys fees and expenses. Section 504(a)(1) of 5 U.S.C.

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 2 of 10
3

codifies the provision of the EAJA, as amended, that

addresses fee-shifting in agency adjudications. It provides: 

An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall 

award, to a prevailing party ... fees and other expenses 

incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding, 

unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the 

position of the agency was substantially justified.

*

The pilots argued they were “prevailing parties” because 

the FAA withdrew its complaints against them and the 

agency’s position “lacked ... substantial justification.” The 

ALJ agreed, holding that “[w]ith the ... total withdrawal of all 

of the Administrator’s charges ... it is clear that the applicants 

are the prevailing parties here,” and that, far from being 

“substantially justified,” the FAA had “proceeded on a weak 

and tenuous basis with a flawed investigation bereft of any 

meaningful evidence.” 

The FAA appealed to the NTSB, arguing the pilots were 

not prevailing parties and therefore were not entitled to fees 

under the EAJA. The Board, after acknowledging its “case 

law concerning prevailing party status under the EAJA may 

need clarification,” determined that the question whether the 

pilots were the prevailing parties was governed by the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Board and Care 

Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and 

 * Another section of the Act as amended, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d)(1)(A), similarly provides:

[A] court shall award to a prevailing party [fees and other 

expenses] in any civil action ... brought by or against the 

United States ... unless the court finds that the position of the 

United States was substantially justified.

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 3 of 10
4

Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), notwithstanding that 

Buckhannon arose from a civil action and not from an agency 

adjudication. The NTSB understood Buckhannon to define a 

prevailing party as one who either “receive[d] an enforceable 

judgment on the merits of [his] case” or “obtain[ed] a courtordered consent decree that resulted in a change in the legal 

relationship between the parties.” 

The NTSB held the pilots were not prevailing parties: 

They did not “prevail on any portion of the merits ... as the 

Administrator withdrew the charges before the [ALJ] could 

hold a hearing”; and the ALJ did not “issue an order akin to a 

court-supervised consent decree” because he “merely 

accepted the Administrator’s withdrawal of the charges.” The 

Board further concluded the ALJ “did not dismiss the case 

with prejudice or in any way alter the relationship of the 

parties.”*

One member of the Board dissented. He maintained 

Buckhannon does not apply to this case because the Court’s 

holding there was limited to rejecting the “catalyst theory,” 

under which a party prevails if it “achieved the desired result 

because [its] lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the 

defendant’s conduct,” 532 U.S. at 600, whereas the pilots here 

had not initiated proceedings but rather had successfully 

defended themselves against the FAA’s lawsuit.

 * The NTSB also held the pilots were not entitled to fees because § 

504(a)(1) of the EAJA applies only where there was “an adversarial 

adjudication,” but the FAA does not defend that argument in its 

brief to this court. 

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 4 of 10
5

II. Analysis

The pilots’ main argument is that they were “prevailing 

parties” within the meaning of that term in 5 U.S.C. § 

504(a)(1). They also contend they were entitled to fees and 

other expenses under § 504(a)(4).

A. Section 504(a)(1)

We review de novo the question of law whether the pilots 

were prevailing parties for purposes of § 504(a)(1). See 

Thomas v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 330 F.3d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). Because the EAJA is a statute of general application, 

we do not defer to the NTSB’s or to any one agency’s 

interpretation of it. See, e.g., Contractor’s Sand & Gravel, 

Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 199 F.3d 

1335, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (court not “bound to defer to the 

agency’s construction” of the EAJA because “[it] is a statute 

of general application and not one committed to 

administration by the Commission or the Secretary”).

This court has distilled from Buckhannon a three-part test 

for determining whether a party has “prevailed”: 

(1) there must be a “court-ordered change in the legal 

relationship” of the parties; (2) the judgment must be in 

favor of the party seeking the fees; and (3) the judicial 

pronouncement must be accompanied by judicial relief. 

District of Columbia v. Straus, 590 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (quoting Thomas, 330 F.3d at 492–93) (internal 

quotation marks removed).*

 * As the Government acknowledges, we have never specifically 

held Buckhannon defines “prevailing party” as it is used in § 

 We “have applied [the] latter 

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 5 of 10
6

two requirements [of that test] to requests by defendants,” see 

id., and we need not consider here whether the first 

requirement also applies because we think it clear the pilots 

received nothing akin to judicial relief and therefore were not 

prevailing parties. We do note that although the NTSB

concluded a party prevails only if he receives “an enforceable 

judgment on the merits of [his] case” or “a court-ordered 

consent decree that resulted in a change in the legal 

relationship between the parties,” under the test laid out in 

Straus a party need receive only some form of judicial relief, 

not necessarily a court-ordered consent decree or a judgment 

on the merits. See Carbonell v. INS, 429 F.3d 894, 899 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (collecting cases from the “vast majority” of 

circuits holding prevailing party status not so limited); see 

also, e.g., District of Columbia v. Jeppsen, 514 F.3d 1287, 

1290 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (acknowledging possibility that “ruling 

on a jurisdictional ground” may create prevailing party 

despite absence of a judgment on merits); Select Milk 

Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 945 (D.C. Cir. 

2005) (grant of preliminary injunction may create prevailing 

party “under certain circumstances”); Carbonell, 429 F.3d at 

895–96 (plaintiff who “obtained a court order incorporating a 

voluntary stipulation” staying plaintiff’s deportation was 

prevailing party). There is no need to remand this case for the 

 

504(a)(1), which governs fee-shifting in an agency adjudication; 

our cases broadly stating the “understanding of ‘prevailing party’ 

[in Buckhannon] applies to EAJA’s use of the term,” e.g., Consol. 

Edison Co. v. Bodman, 445 F.3d 438, 447 (2006), have all involved 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), which concerns fee-shifting in a civil 

action. Because the pilots themselves acknowledge no distinction 

between agency and court cases, we proceed upon that premise and 

do not determine whether the understanding of “prevailing party” in 

Buckhannon necessarily or always applies to that phrase in § 

504(a)(1).

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 6 of 10
7

NTSB to apply that test, however, because we conclude the 

pilots are not prevailing parties as a matter of law.

The pilots contend they prevailed because the ALJ 

dismissed their cases with prejudice and thereby changed the 

legal relationship between the parties. The FAA maintains 

the ALJ dismissed the cases without prejudice, and a 

“dismissal without prejudice ... cannot be a ‘court ordered 

change in the legal relationship of the parties’” in this case 

because the pilots “were left in exactly the same legal position 

they would have been in had there been no proceedings in the 

first place.”

First, we conclude that, although his order is silent on the 

subject, the ALJ dismissed the complaints without prejudice. 

That is consistent with the rule in civil proceedings; when a 

court dismisses a complaint at the request of the plaintiff, the 

dismissal is presumed to be without prejudice. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 41(a)(2). It is also consistent with the Board’s 

treatment of the similarly silent order in Administrator v. 

Tanner, 4 N.T.S.B. 1354 (1984).

The pilots nonetheless contend the order should be 

considered a dismissal with prejudice because it came after 

the statute of limitations had run on the charges brought by 

the FAA; as a practical matter, they say, the dismissal protects 

the pilots from the FAA ever reviving the charges. We need 

not evaluate this argument on its merits because the pilots 

have not identified a statute of limitations with that effect. 

They point only to 49 C.F.R. § 821.33(a), but that regulation 

merely authorizes an ALJ, upon motion, to dismiss a 

complaint the FAA files more than six months after the 

alleged events occurred if and only if the FAA fails to show 

either that “good cause existed for the delay” or that “the 

imposition of a sanction is warranted in the public interest.” 

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 7 of 10
8

A provision that requires an additional showing in order to 

file a complaint after a certain time is not a statute of 

limitations and does not change the legal relationship between 

the parties in any meaningful way.*

Because the ALJ dismissed the cases without prejudice, 

there was nothing in this case analogous to judicial relief. See 

Straus, 590 F.3d at 901. Once the FAA withdrew its 

complaints, the pilots were no longer the subject of 

proceedings to suspend their licenses. For all practical 

purposes, the FAA had unilaterally ended the adversarial 

relationship between the parties, leaving them where they 

were before the complaint was filed. The order of the ALJ 

dismissing the cases was just an administrative housekeeping

measure, not a form of relief, because the FAA did not need 

the ALJ’s permission to withdraw a complaint. See 49 C.F.R. 

§ 821.12(b) (“Except in the case of ... a complaint ... 

pleadings may be withdrawn only upon approval of the [ALJ] 

or the [NTSB]”). Had the ALJ done nothing, the pilots would 

have been in essentially the same position as they were after 

the ALJ dismissed this case. These circumstances do not 

make them prevailing parties according to the criteria of 

Buckhannon as interpreted in Straus. 

The pilots also argue the NTSB violated its own rules and 

arbitrarily interpreted its own precedent in concluding they 

were not prevailing parties under Buckhannon. We need not 

address that argument because our holding the pilots were not 

prevailing parties as a matter of law renders harmless any 

such alleged error. See PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 

 * We also doubt whether § 821.33(a) creates a demanding 

requirement for the FAA; a court would likely defer to the agency’s 

interpretation of its own regulation that it is in the public interest to 

sanction a pilot for conduct that makes flying less safe. 

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 8 of 10
9

799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (if “agency’s mistake ... did not 

prejudice” petitioner then it “would be senseless to vacate and 

remand for reconsideration”).*

 

B. Section 504(a)(4)

In the alternative the pilots argue they are entitled to fees 

and other expenses under § 504(a)(4). That subsection 

provides:

If ... the demand by the agency is substantially in excess 

of the decision of the adjudicative officer and is 

unreasonable when compared with such decision ... 

[then] the adjudicative officer shall award to the party 

[its] fees and other expenses. 

They contend the FAA’s demand that they be suspended was 

“substantially in excess” of the ALJ’s decision dismissing the 

case. The FAA responds that § 504(a)(4) does not apply here 

because that provision addresses only situations in which the 

Government prevails but “obtains a judgment that is less than 

it [had] sought.”

We agree that § 504(a)(4) applies only when the 

Government has prevailed. As the Seventh Circuit has 

pointed out, the interpretation of § 504(a)(4) the pilots are 

advancing here would 

undercut the “substantially justified” standard of [§ 

504(a)(1)] by giving litigants a second bite at the same 

apple under a different (but seemingly not a more 

demanding) standard. The sensible interpretation ... 

 * The pilots’ other arguments do not merit treatment in a published 

opinion. 

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 9 of 10
10

confines [§ 504(a)(4)] to the case in which the 

government prevails but the relief it obtains is meager in 

comparison to the relief it had sought.

See Park Manor, Ltd. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 

495 F.3d 433, 437 (2007). In short, the pilots may not recover 

under § 504(a)(4) in this case because the FAA did not 

prevail.

III. Conclusion

Because the pilots are not prevailing parties for purposes 

of § 504(a)(1), they are not entitled to recover their attorneys 

fees and expenses under that section. Because the FAA did 

not prevail, the pilots are not entitled to attorneys fees and 

expenses under § 504(a)(4). Accordingly, their joint petition 

for review of the NTSB order is 

Denied.

USCA Case #09-1225 Document #1248597 Filed: 06/08/2010 Page 10 of 10