Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03004/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Pamela J. Walker
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

2

Walker withdraws her argument that she was denied the benefit of her plea

agreement when the district court took into account the total amount of loss associated

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3004

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Pamela J. Walker, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 11, 2006

Filed: March 9, 2006

___________

Before WOLLMAN, GIBSON, and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Pamela Walker pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud. The district court1

sentenced her to five months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.

Walker appeals, arguing that the sentence is unreasonable and that the district court

erred in taking into account the sentence of Walker’s sister and the total amount of

loss involved in the conspiracy when it fashioned Walker’s sentence.2

 We affirm.

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with the conspiracy rather than the small portion to which she stipulated in the plea

agreement.

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I.

Walker pleaded guilty to conspiring with her relatives to commit financial aid

fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. In her plea agreement, Walker stipulated that

the 2004 version of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines applied to her case, that her base

offense level was six, and that the amount of loss for which she was responsible was

between $10,000 and $30,000. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), to which

Walker did not object, instead applied the 2000 version of the guidelines because

Walker committed her criminal acts while this version of the guidelines was in effect

and because applying the 2000 version would be beneficial to Walker. Applying the

2000 version of the guidelines, the PSR provided that Walker’s base offense level was

six and that the amount of loss for which Walker was responsible was between

$10,000 and $20,000, resulting in an adjusted offense level of nine. Taking into

account a two-level reduction for Walker’s acceptance of responsibility and her

criminal history category of three, the appropriate sentencing range was determined

to be four to ten months’ imprisonment.

In determining Walker’s sentence, the district court stated that it was required

to consult the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and asserted that it did so. It

also stated that: 

[W]hen we look at the loss regarding Ms. Walker, hers is $10,730. The

government could have pushed to have Ms. Walker responsible for the

entire [amount involved in the conspiracy,] $400,000, which would have

bumped her sentence up significantly, as well as increased the amount

of restitution. When I have sentenced all of the people involved in this

conspiracy, and I guess I have one more left to sentence, I have tried to

take into account the -- their involvement based on the dollar loss the

government holds them responsible for. And I agree that in terms of the

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dollar amount of the loss, Ms. Walker most closely resembles [her sister]

Betty Walker. 

Sentencing Tr. at 19. Finally, the district court sentenced Walker to five months in

prison and three years of supervised release, within the 2000 advisory guidelines

range. Walker now appeals her sentence.

II.

Walker first argues that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence

because it did not adequately evaluate all of the factors that it was required to consider

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We review for abuse of discretion the reasonableness of

the sentence imposed by the district court. United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909

(8th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gatewood, No. 05-1865, slip op. at 2, 2006

WL 452902 at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2006). 

A sentence may be unreasonable if the district court failed to consider a relevant

factor that should have received significant weight, gave significant weight to an

improper or irrelevant factor, or considered only appropriate factors but nevertheless

committed a clear error of judgment by imposing a sentence that lies outside of the

range dictated by the facts of the case. United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1084

(8th Cir. 2005). Although a district court is required to consider each of the § 3553(a)

factors in determining the proper sentence to impose, it need not “categorically

rehearse each of the [§] 3553(a) factors on the record when it imposes a sentence as

long as it is clear that they were considered.” Dieken, 432 F.3d at 909. Here, the

district court acknowledged that it was required to consider the § 3553(a) factors and

confirmed that it did consider them. Although the district court did not discuss each

of the factors in detail, we are satisfied that the district court gave them adequate

consideration. Id.

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Further, a sentence within the guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.

United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005). Walker’s sentence of

five months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release fell within the 2000

guidelines range for the crime to which she pleaded guilty. Additionally, Walker

received a lesser sentence than one that would have resulted from the stipulations in

her plea agreement under the 2004 guidelines. Walker failed to rebut the presumption

that the sentence imposed was reasonable.

III.

Walker next argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32 and the Fifth Amendment when, without first giving reasonable notice

to Walker, it took into account evidence not in the record when fashioning Walker’s

sentence. Because Walker raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review it

for plain error. See United States v. Murphy, 248 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 2001).

Under plain error review, we cannot correct an error not raised at trial unless there was

an error, it is plain, and it affects substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 732 (1993); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

If each of these conditions is met, we may exercise our discretion to notice the

forfeited error only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550.

Sentencing judges exercise wide discretion in the types of evidence that they

may consider in determining defendants’ sentences. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.

241, 246 (1949) (cited with approval in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304-05

(2004)). This latitude is manifested in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32, which provide for the consideration of evidence outside of the

trial record in sentencing a defendant. See also Williams, 337 U.S. at 246. Rule 32

provides, however, that before a district court may impose a sentence, it must provide

the defendant and her attorney with an opportunity to speak on the defendant’s behalf.

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Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4). Further, to give meaning to this opportunity to speak, a

district court must reasonably notify the parties if it contemplates departing from the

sentencing guidelines range on a ground not identified for departure in the presentence

report or a prehearing submission. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h); Burns v. United States, 501

U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991). This is consistent with the notice requirements of the Fifth

Amendment. Cf. United States v. Egenberger, 424 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2005)

(noting that the core concepts of the Fifth Amendment are notice, foreseeability, and

the right to fair warning). 

Walker, in essence, argues that this rule requiring notification for departures

should be extended to require a district court to reasonably notify the defendant if it

contemplates relying on evidence outside of the record in sentencing the defendant

within the guidelines range. This concern of notice is not at issue in Walker’s case,

however, because Walker was put on constructive notice that the district court might

consider her codefendants’ sentences in sentencing her. Indeed, § 3553(a)(6)

mandates that a district court consider the “need to avoid unwarranted sentence

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of

similar conduct.” 18 U .S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Accordingly, the district court properly

considered Walker’s sister’s sentence. Because Walker had adequate notice, the

district court did not violate Rule 32 or Walker’s Fifth Amendment rights.

Finally, we disagree with Walker that the district court considered the total

amount of loss involved in the conspiracy when determining her sentence. The

district court merely referenced the $400,000 in comparing Walker’s situation to the

situations and sentences of her codefendants as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

If the district court had relied on the $400,000 amount instead of the lesser amount to

which Walker stipulated, Walker’s adjusted offense level would have been thirteen

instead of nine, triggering a sentencing range of eighteen to twenty-four months.

Compare U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(d) (2000) (providing for a three-level increase when

the offense involved more than $10,000) with U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(J) (2000)

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(providing for a nine-level increase when the offense involved more than $350,000).

Instead, the district court imposed a significantly lesser sentence.

We conclude that because the district court properly considered Walker’s

sister’s sentence and did not rely on the total amount of loss involved in the

conspiracy in fashioning the sentence, no error, plain or otherwise, occurred during

the sentencing process. 

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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