Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01126/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01126-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry Ashley
Petitioner
Singh
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LARRY ASHLEY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

SINGH, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-1126 TLN AC P 

ORDER 

 Petitioner, a state prisoner, seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On June 12, 2013, 

respondent was ordered to file a response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on June 5, 

2013. Petitioner’s July 23, 2013 motion for temporary restraining order is before the court. 

 Petitioner seeks an order preventing the California Department of Corrections (“CDCR”) 

from transferring him “in violation of F.R.A.P. Rule 23(a)....” ECF No. 10 at 1. Petitioner 

believes he is being transferred in retaliation for having filed a complaint against CDCR staff and 

asserts that a transfer will separate him from his legal property and the inmate assistance he has 

been receiving at his current facility. Id. at 2. 

 The purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending 

a fuller hearing. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; see also E.D. Cal. Local Rule 231(a). The 

standards governing the issuance of temporary restraining orders are “substantially identical” to 

those governing the issuance of preliminary injunctions. Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. John 

D. Brushy and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). In general, a plaintiff in a civil 

Case 2:13-cv-01126-TLN-AC Document 11 Filed 07/25/13 Page 1 of 3
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case seeking a TRO “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los 

Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). A TRO is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a 

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 

 As a threshold matter, convicted prisoners have no reasonable expectation that they will 

remain in any particular facility, and prison officials have broad authority to transfer prisoners 

from one facility to another. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 

427 U.S. 236 (1976). “[A] prisoner’s liberty interests are sufficiently extinguished by his 

conviction that the state may generally confine or transfer him to any of its institutions, indeed, 

even to a prison in another state, without offending the Constitution.” Bravo v. Hewchuck, 2006 

WL 3618023, *1 (N.D.Cal.2006) (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has 

stated: 

Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be 

incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no 

justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular 

State. Often, confinement in the inmate’s home State will not be 

possible. A person convicted of a federal crime in a State without a 

federal correctional facility usually will serve his sentence in 

another State. Overcrowding and the need to separate particular 

prisoners may necessitate interstate transfers. For any number of 

reasons, a State may lack prison facilities capable of providing 

appropriate correctional programs for all offenders. 

Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245–246 (1983) (holding that an interstate prison transfer 

does not, standing alone, implicate the Due Process Clause). 

 In support of his motion, petitioner cites Fed. R. App. P. 23(a), which provides, in relevant 

part: 

Pending review of a decision in a habeas corpus proceeding 

commenced before a court, justice, or judge of the United States for 

the release of a prisoner, the person having custody of the prisoner 

must not transfer custody to another unless a transfer is directed in 

accordance with this rule. 

Fed. R. App. P. 23(a). 

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 Here, there has been no decision for the release of petitioner. Accordingly, the cited rule 

is inapplicable. 

 Further, petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order essentially presents a 

challenge to the conditions of his confinement, which may not be addressed in this habeas corpus 

action. When a prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his custody and a determination of his 

action may result in entitlement to an earlier release, the sole available federal remedy is a writ of 

habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th 

Cir. 1990). The proper mechanism for raising a federal challenge to conditions of confinement, 

however, is through a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 

573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Finally, even if petitioner’s allegations were properly presented here, they would still fail 

to demonstrate that a temporary restraining order would be warranted. His contentions of future 

injury are, at this time, no more than theoretical. Petitioner also has not shown likelihood of 

success on the merits, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, or that an injunction is in the 

public interest. 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT petitioner’s motion for a 

temporary restraining order (ECF No. 10) is denied. 

DATED: July 25, 2013 

 

 ___________________________________ 

 ALLISON CLAIRE 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

AC:ls//ashl1126.47 

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