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Parties Involved:
Cesar Marcellino Mendez-Cruz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2003 Decided June 3, 2003

No. 02-3052

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CESAR MARCELLINO MENDEZ-CRUZ,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cr00066-01)

Tony Axam, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A.

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. On the brief were Roscoe C. Howard,

Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Barbara J. Valliere,

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-3052 Document #752385 Filed: 06/03/2003 Page 1 of 10
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William J. O’Malley, Jr., and Ann M. Carroll, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: On May 20, 1999, appellant Cesar

Marcellino Mendez-Cruz pleaded guilty to illegal reentry

after deportation as an aggravated felon, in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2). Appellant was subsequently sentenced to 66 months of incarceration, to be followed by three

years’ supervised release. This sentence was based on a

Presentence Investigation Report (‘‘PSR’’) that included a

two-point criminal history enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.1(d), because appellant had committed some part of the

offense (the act of reentering the United States) while he was

on parole. Appellant did not challenge this enhancement at

the sentencing hearing, but he now argues that it was improper. Appellant contends that the District Court erred in

applying the two-point enhancement, because, in his view, he

pleaded guilty to the status offense of being ‘‘found in’’ the

United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2), and that reentering the

country is neither an element of, nor conduct relevant to, that

offense. Appellant also contends that, even if reentry were

considered relevant conduct, he did not reenter the country

before his parole expired. Because these claims were not

raised during the sentencing hearing, we review for plain

error, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), and conclude that the

District Court did not plainly err.

Appellant advances the additional claim that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise any

challenges to the two-point enhancement. We reject this

contention, because appellant can demonstrate neither that

his attorney committed errors ‘‘so serious that counsel was

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment,’’ Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984), nor that counsel’s failure to challenge the twopoint enhancement resulted in prejudice to appellant.

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I. BACKGROUND

On April 15, 1985, appellant was convicted of possession

with the intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Appellant was paroled in 1987.

While under parole supervision, appellant was arrested in

New Jersey, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to

distribute, and convicted in 1988. On August 31, 1994, while

still on parole for his 1985 conviction, appellant was deported

to the Dominican Republic. Appellant’s parole was due to

expire on March 24, 1998.

On December 15, 1998, appellant was arrested in Washington, D.C. following a surveillance operation by agents with the

INS and Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as Metropolitan Police Department officers. At the time of his

arrest, appellant possessed a driver’s license and vehicle

registration in the name of Angel Luis Viera. However, after

the authorities discovered a piece of paper bearing the name

Cesar Mendez-Cruz in appellant’s car, appellant admitted

that he was Cesar Mendez-Cruz, and that he previously had

been deported from the United States following a drugrelated conviction. According to the PSR, appellant informed

officers at the scene ‘‘that he had entered the United States

about one year prior to that date.’’ PSR at 5, ¶ 3 (quoted in

Br. of Appellant at 13). Search warrants were issued for two

of appellant’s properties and agents found further identification documents bearing appellant’s likeness but made out in

false names. One of the documents was a United States

passport bearing the name Angel Luis Viera.

On February 25, 1999, appellant was indicted. He subsequently pleaded guilty to the lead count of the indictment,

illegal reentry after deportation as an aggravated felon. Following appellant’s plea, the District Court ordered that a PSR

be prepared. In the report writer’s interview with appellant,

appellant said that he had returned to the United States in

1996. The PSR detailed appellant’s offense conduct and

indicated that, after his arrest, appellant admitted to the

arresting agents that he had been deported following a prior

drug-related conviction. It also noted appellant’s remark at

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the time of his arrest ‘‘that he had entered the United States

about one year prior to that date.’’ The PSR Guidelines

calculation yielded an Offense Level of 21, and a Criminal

History Category of IV. Two criminal history points were

included in that calculation under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), because appellant had committed some part of the offense while

on parole.

On August 16, 1999, the District Court adopted the PSR

after neither party objected to the final version of the report.

The court then reviewed the Guidelines calculation set forth

in the report. The court specified the basis for each calculation, and noted that ‘‘an additional two points [were added to

appellant’s criminal history calculation] because he was on

parole when he committed this offense.’’ Sent. Tr. at 4. In

passing sentence, the trial court noted that both of appellant’s

prior convictions involved substantial amounts of drugs. Id.

at 20. The court reviewed the offense conduct, noted that

appellant’s 1985 conviction was an aggravated felony, and

pointed out that when he was deported, appellant was given

notice of the penalty he would suffer if he returned. The

District Court denied appellant’s request for a downward

departure pursuant to United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649

(D.C. Cir. 1994), based upon his status as a deportable alien.

Sent. Tr. at 23-24.

After sentencing, appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate,

set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. In an attached memorandum, appellant asserted

that his counsel was ineffective because: (1) counsel failed to

file, as requested, a notice of appeal; (2) counsel failed to

object to the calculation of his criminal history points; and (3)

counsel failed to request a downward departure based on

factors contained in the PSR. With respect to the second

claim, appellant urged that, because, in his view, he was

convicted of being ‘‘found in’’ the United States, his illegal

entry was not part of the offense of conviction, and thus he

did not commit any part of the offense to which he pleaded

guilty while on parole. Further, based on an April 1998 datestamp on the passport bearing the name Angel Luis Viera,

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appellant argued that the record indicated that he entered

the United States after his parole had expired.

On June 28, 2001, after the government opposed the motion, the District Court issued an 11-page Memorandum

Opinion denying in part appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. With respect to the calculation of appellant’s criminal history category, the District Court stated:

By Defendant’s own admission to the officers that

arrested him on December 15, 1998, he ‘‘had entered

the United States about one year prior [to the date

of his arrest].’’ [PSR] at 5, ¶ 13. Thus, according to

the Defendant himself, he likely entered the United

States sometime around December 1997. By any

reasonable interpretation, entering the country is

directly relevant to the instant offense of being

‘‘found in the United States after having been deported.’’ Defendant’s parole from earlier convictions

did not expire until March 25, 1998; as such, he

committed part of the instant offense while on parole, subjecting himself to the application of U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.1(d) and its enhancements. Defendant’s contention that the enhancement was erroneous is simply invalid.

United States v. Mendez-Cruz, Nos. 00-1702, 99-66-01 (D.D.C.

June 28, 2001) (mem.), at 7, Appendix (‘‘App.’’) 79 (‘‘June 28

Opinion’’). The District Court thus found that, because

application of the enhancement was appropriate, counsel had

no obligation ‘‘to make an objection that would ultimately

prove either frivolous or in vain,’’ and thus ‘‘counsel’s failure

to object was neither deficient nor prejudicial.’’ Id. at 7-8,

App. 79-80.

The District Court, however, found that the record evidence was insufficient for it to decide appellant’s claim with

respect to the filing of his notice of appeal. The court thus

granted a hearing on that portion of appellant’s motion.

After that hearing, the District Court issued another Memorandum Opinion, holding that counsel had failed to consult

with appellant regarding an appeal, as required by Roe v.

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Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478-79 (2000). Given the evidence of appellant’s desire to pursue an appeal, the court

found that appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure. The

court thus reentered the judgment so that appellant could

appeal his sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Two-Point Enhancement

In challenging the two-point enhancement to his sentence,

appellant first argues that the act of reentering the United

States is not an element of being found in the United States

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and is inconsequential in establishing a violation of the statute. Appellant points out that

§ 1326(a)(2) provides criminal penalties for any alien who

‘‘enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the

United States.’’ Three separate offenses are contained in

subsection (a)(2): (1) reentry of a deported alien; (2) attempted reentry of a deported alien; and (3) being a previously

deported alien who is found in the United States. See United

States v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000)

(noting that entering, attempting to enter, and being ‘‘found

in’’ the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 are ‘‘three

distinct offenses’’); United States v. Ruelas-Arreguin, 219

F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). Appellant argues

that, while the first two offenses require the government to

prove an affirmative act on the defendant’s part (reentry or

attempted reentry), the third offense requires no evidence of

an affirmative act, but only requires that the government

‘‘find’’ the defendant in the United States. Thus, appellant

argues that because being ‘‘found in’’ the United States does

not require the government to prove that the defendant

committed an act, any analysis of his relevant conduct should

only concern the events of December 15, 1998: ‘‘Actions by

the defendant at any other time are irrelevant to determine

his culpability for conviction or to evaluate relevant conduct.’’

Reply Br. of Appellant at 5. This argument is without merit.

The date of reentry must be considered relevant conduct

because it was an ‘‘act[ ] committed TTT during the commisUSCA Case #02-3052 Document #752385 Filed: 06/03/2003 Page 6 of 10
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sion of the offense of conviction, [or] in preparation for that

offense.’’ U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Reentry was clearly an

act committed during the offense of being found in the United

States because that offense is a continuing violation that

commences with the illegal entry. See, e.g., United States v.

Lopez-Flores, 275 F.3d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2001); PachecoMedina, 212 F.3d at 1166 (‘‘[T]he concept of entry not only

illuminates but also is embedded in the ‘found in’ offense.’’);

Ruelas-Arreguin, 219 F.3d at 1061 (‘‘[T]he crime of being

‘found in’ the United States commences with the illegal

entryTTTT’’); United States v. Diaz-Diaz, 135 F.3d 572, 575

(8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Castrillon-Gonzalzes, 77

F.3d 403, 406 (11th Cir. 1996) (‘‘The crime of being ‘found in’

the United States illegally TTT was commenced by the TTT

illegal entryTTTT’’).

Appellant argues that, even if the date of entry constitutes

conduct relevant to the offense of being found in the United

States, the record evidence does not support the District

Court’s conclusion that appellant’s most recent reentry occurred while he was on parole. Appellant argues – and we

agree – that the relevant conduct in this case should be

limited to the reentry immediately preceding appellant being

found in the United States: If appellant had previously

entered and then left the country, he avoided prosecution for

that distinct offense when he left. See Ruelas-Arreguin, 219

F.3d at 1061 (‘‘[A]n alien can avoid being ‘found in’ the United

States by departing after his illegal re-entry.’’); United

States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 425 (9th Cir. 1994) (‘‘To avoid

being ‘found in’ the United States, a deported alien can either

not re-enter the United States or, if he has already re-entered

the United States, he can leave.’’). When the District Court

sentenced appellant, it relied on the PSR, which could support a 1996 or 1997 reentry date, either of which would have

occurred while appellant was still on parole. Subsequent to

the sentencing, the District Court made clear that it believed

appellant’s most recent entry had occurred in 1997, based on

‘‘Defendant’s own admission to the officers that arrested him

on December 15, 1998, [that] he ‘had entered the United

States about one year prior [to the date of his arrest].’ ’’

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June 28 Opinion at 7, App. 79. Thus, we examine whether

the District Court erred in finding that appellant reentered

the country in 1997, rather than in April 1998. Because

appellant’s counsel did not object to the enhancement at

sentencing, we review for plain error. See FED. R. CRIM. P.

52(b); United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(‘‘[The defendant] did not raise a timely objection to the

findings or analysis of his pre-sentence reportTTTT [T]he

district court’s decision to adopt the findings and analysis of

that report is therefore reviewable only for plain error.’’)

(citations omitted).

Appellant argues that the 1998 date-stamp on the passport

bearing the name Angel Luis Viera is the clearest evidence of

the date of his most recent reentry. Appellant raised this

argument in his § 2255 motion, but not at his sentencing

hearing. The District Court apparently gave no credence to

this claim, nor do we. A fraudulent passport can hardly be

regarded as conclusive evidence of the date when appellant

unlawfully reentered the United States.

Appellant also argues that the District Court erred in

relying on his statement to the arresting officers in determining that appellant’s most recent reentry occurred in late 1997.

Appellant argues that, although his statement indicated that

he had entered the United States ‘‘about a year prior to that

date,’’ the phrase ‘‘that date’’ is ambiguous, because it is

unclear from the statement or its context to what specific

date the phrase ‘‘that date’’ refers. Moreover, appellant

argues that, from the context of the PSR, the statement in

question seems to refer to an entry that occurred before

appellant’s 1985 drug conviction, rather than to his reentry

immediately preceding the instant offense. The PSR’s entire

discussion of appellant’s admission reads:

The agent showed the defendant the document bearing the name of Cesar Mendez-Cruz. The agent

informed the defendant that he believed the defendant was Cesar Mendez. He also told the defendant

that he was aware that Cesar Mendez had sustained

a prior drug conviction and had previously been

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deported. The defendant then acknowledged that

he was the Cesar Mendez-Cruz who had sustained a

drug-related conviction and had been previously deported. The defendant informed that he had entered the United States about one year prior to that

date. The agent transported Mendez-Cruz to the

detention center where he was charged accordingly.

PSR at 5, ¶ 3 (quoted in Br. of Appellant at 12-13). Appellant’s interpretation of the language in the PSR is by no

means so clear that we can find that the District Court plainly

erred by interpreting it to mean that appellant admitted to

illegally entering the country in late 1997. See Saro, 24 F.3d

at 286-87 (stating that, to satisfy the plain error standard, the

error must have been both ‘‘obvious’’ and also prejudicial);

see also United States v. Washington, 115 F.3d 1008, 1010

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (‘‘[E]ven for sentencing, ‘obvious’ means

obvious; the district court is not required to have second

sight.’’).

B. Ineffectiveness of Counsel

We also find no error in the District Court’s determination

that appellant’s counsel did not perform ineffectively by failing to challenge the two-point enhancement. The standard

for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is set

forth in Strickland. There, the Supreme Court set forth a

two-pronged analysis, requiring the defendant to show: (1)

that his attorney’s errors were ‘‘so serious that counsel was

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment’’; and (2) that the defendant was

prejudiced by those errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Appellant does not satisfy either prong of this test.

To satisfy the first Strickland prong, appellant must prove

that, in light of all the circumstances as they appeared at the

time of the relevant conduct, ‘‘counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness’’: In other

words, that it fell below the ‘‘prevailing professional norms.’’

Id. at 688; see also United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 758

(D.C. Cir. 1998). ‘‘Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance

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must be highly deferentialTTTT [T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ’’

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350

U.S. 91, 101 (1955)); see also United States v. Weathers, 186

F.3d 948, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Appellant cannot make this

showing, because appellant’s counsel may have decided not to

challenge the two-point enhancement for sound strategic reasons. To challenge the enhancement, counsel would have had

to point out that appellant had entered the country illegally to

obtain the fraudulent passport, then left the country and used

the passport again to illegally reenter. Counsel may have

believed that appellant’s case would not be advanced if counsel reminded the court of appellant’s repeated violations,

particularly when appellant was seeking a downward departure.

As for the second Strickland prong, the District Court

found that there was no prejudice, because appellant’s most

recent entry into the country occurred in late 1997. In other

words, on the facts found by the District Court, appellant’s

two-point enhancement was undoubtedly correct. Therefore,

he was not prejudiced by any failure of his counsel. We must

accept the District Court’s findings of fact regarding appellant’s ineffectiveness claims ‘‘unless they are clearly erroneous.’’ United States v. Askew, 88 F.3d 1065, 1070 (D.C. Cir.

1996); see also United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58

(D.C. Cir. 1990). For the reasons provided in supra Part

II.A, we find that the District Court did not clearly err in

determining that appellant’s most recent entry occurred in

late 1997.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons enumerated above, we affirm appellant’s

two-point criminal history enhancement, and also affirm the

District Court’s determination that appellant’s counsel did not

act ineffectively by failing to challenge the enhancement at

sentencing.

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