Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01726/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01726-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ford Motor Company
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1726 

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:09-cv-00151-MAB, Judge Mark A. Barnett. 

______________________ 

Decided: February 3, 2016 

______________________ 

 STEPHANIE A. DOUGLAS, Bush Seyferth & Paige, 

PLLC, Troy, MI, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also 

represented by MATTHEW CALIGUR, Baker & Hostetler 

LLP, Houston, TX. 

 JUSTIN REINHART MILLER, International Trade Field 

Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, New York, NY, 

argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by AMY 

M. RUBIN, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, JOYCE R. BRANDA. 

______________________ 

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2 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

Before NEWMAN, DYK, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN. 

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) appeals from a final 

judgment of the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) 

dismissing all of its claims. Ford Motor Co. v. United 

States, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014) (“Ford 

III”). The CIT dismissed some of Ford’s claims as barred 

by the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i) and 

declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to issue 

declaratory relief for the remainder of Ford’s claims. 

We hold that we need not address the statute of limitations issue because the statute is not jurisdictional. We 

further hold that the CIT did not abuse its discretion in 

declining to issue declaratory relief. While the CIT did 

not reach the declaratory judgment issue with respect to 

some of Ford’s claims, we conclude that the CIT would 

have denied all claims on that ground, and that a remand 

is therefore unnecessary. Accordingly, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

 In 2004 and 2005, Ford imported Jaguar-brand cars 

from the United Kingdom into the United States. On the 

cars’ entry into the United States, Ford deposited estimated duty payments with Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”). Ford later concluded that it overpaid 

the duty actually owed because its estimates had been too 

high. Ford then filed nine reconciliation entries with 

Customs between June 2005 and October 2006, seeking a 

total refund of about $6.2 million. 

 Customs may liquidate an entry, which involves a 

determination of the amount of duty owed, based on any 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 3 

“just, impartial, and uniform appraisement” prescribed by 

the Secretary of the Treasury. 19 U.S.C. § 1502. Customs 

has one year from the time of filing to liquidate an entry 

under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a). It may extend that period if it 

needs additional information to properly appraise or 

classify the imported merchandise or if the importer 

requests an extension and demonstrates good cause. See 

19 U.S.C. § 1504(b). Customs is entitled to a maximum of 

three one-year extensions. 19 C.F.R. § 159.12(a), (d), (e). 

If not extended before the expiration of any one-year 

period, the entry “shall be deemed liquidated at the rate 

of duty, value, quantity and amount of duties asserted by 

the importer of record.” 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(1). Similarly, 

if Customs has not liquidated an entry after the maximum extended period of four years, it is deemed liquidated by operation of law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b); 19 C.F.R. 

§ 159.12(f). When an entry is deemed liquidated, Customs forfeits the ability to recalculate the duty owed; 

instead, the duty is calculated based on the importer’s 

own asserted rate, value, and quantity. See 19 C.F.R. 

§ 159.12(f). Here the rate “asserted” by the importer is 

the rate asserted in its reconciliation entries rather than 

the rate asserted at the time of original entry.1 Customs 

seeks to recalculate the duty owed, urging that the original rate was correct. 

 On April 15, 2009, Ford filed suit in the CIT to challenge Customs’ treatment of its nine reconciliation entries, arguing that Customs had failed to properly extend 

the liquidation period in accordance with 19 U.S.C. 

1 “A reconciliation is treated as an entry for purposes of liquidation, reliquidation, recordkeeping, and protest.” 19 U.S.C. § 1401(s). 

 

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4 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

§ 1504(b) and therefore could not recalculate the duty.2 

Customs contended that it had extended the liquidation 

periods, which did not expire until between June 29, 2009, 

and October 4, 2010, four years after entry. At the time 

Ford filed suit, Customs had yet to liquidate any of Ford’s 

nine entries. Because there were no liquidation decisions 

to protest under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), Ford brought its 

challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). The CIT’s residual 

jurisdiction provision is available only when jurisdiction 

under subsections (a) through (h) of § 1581 is not available.3 

Ford sought a declaratory judgment that its entries 

had deemed liquidated as a matter of law, and, therefore, 

that it was entitled to a $6.2 million refund based on its 

duty calculation asserted in the reconciliation entries. 

2 As relevant to this appeal, Ford’s pleadings consist of six claims. Claim 1 alleges that Customs failed to 

extend liquidation; Claim 2 alleges that even if Customs 

did extend liquidation, it never issued notices as required 

by 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b) and (c); Claim 3 alleges that, even 

if customs issued notices, the notices lacked reasons for 

extension as required by § 1504(b) and (c); Claim 4 alleges 

that even if Customs did extend, it had no valid reason to 

extend under § 1504(b); Claim 5 applies only to Entries B 

and C, which liquidated on June 19, 2009, and July 17, 

2009, respectively, and alleges that Customs’ purported 

reliquidations of these entries occurred more than four 

years after filing, in violation of § 1504(b); Claim 6 applies 

only to Entry D, which was liquidated on August 14, 2009, 

and alleges that Customs failed to fix the final appraisement or amount of duty as required by § 1500(a) and (c). 

3 See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 688 F.3d 

1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Ford II”). 

 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 5 

During the pendency of that action, Customs liquidated 

five of the nine entries. The government moved to dismiss 

Ford’s claims for lack of jurisdiction. The CIT granted the 

government’s motion as to those entries that had already 

liquidated, ruling that § 1581(a), not § 1581(i), was the 

proper basis to challenge those entries. Ford Motor Co. v. 

United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1310 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

2010) (“Ford I”). As to the four entries that remained 

unliquidated, the CIT recognized that § 1581(i) jurisdiction was proper but declined to issue discretionary declaratory relief, explaining that Ford would have ample 

opportunity to assert claims for those entries in a future 

§ 1581(a) action. 

Shortly after Ford I, Customs liquidated Ford’s remaining entries, declining to provide Ford with any 

refund. Ford protested the merits of all nine of Customs’ 

liquidations. Customs denied the protest for Ford’s 2005 

entries, and Ford commenced a separate court action 

challenging that denial under § 1581(a), which is pending 

as of the time of this appeal. Ford Motor Co. v. United 

States, Ct. Int’l Trade No. 10-00138. Ford’s protest for its 

2006 entries is currently held before Customs pending the 

outcome of this appeal. 

 Ford appealed from the CIT’s decision in Ford I

dismissing its claims for a declaratory judgment that its 

entries had deemed liquidated as a matter of law at 

Ford’s asserted rate. See Ford II, 688 F.3d at 1321. We 

reversed the CIT’s dismissal on jurisdictional grounds of 

those claims relating to the five entries that were liquidated during the pendency of the CIT action. Id. at 1324. 

We held that, based on the “time-of-filing rule,” “the 

government’s post-filings actions in liquidating the entries may have opened up a new avenue for judicial review under [28] U.S.C. § 1581(a), but the actions cannot 

defeat subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i).” Id. at 

1327. We vacated the CIT’s discretionary dismissal of 

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6 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

Ford’s claims that remained unliquidated because the 

CIT’s analysis “extended in significant part from its 

flawed jurisdictional analysis.” Id. at 1330. We explained 

that the CIT “retains authority, but no obligation, to 

revisit [its declaratory judgment authority] on remand.” 

Id. 

 On remand at the CIT, the government again moved 

to dismiss, this time arguing that Ford’s claims directed 

to its 2005 entries were barred by the two-year statute of 

limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i), which governs 

§ 1581(i) actions. The CIT again granted the government’s motion to dismiss for all claims directed to the 

2005 entries except Claim 5, finding that Ford’s action 

was barred by the two-year limitations period, having 

been commenced more than two years after Ford reasonably should have known about the existence of those 

claims. Ford III, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1356–57. Regarding 

Claim 5 and the claims directed to Ford’s 2006 entries—

as to which there was no statute of limitations issue—the 

CIT recognized that § 1581(i) jurisdiction was available 

but again declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. See id. at 1359. 

The CIT explained that “adjudicating the claims 

would not be an efficient and effective use of the court’s 

time and resources,” because Ford “retains the ability to 

seek relief” for all of its claims in its pending protest and 

§ 1581(a) action. Id. The CIT further explained that 

“[t]he § 1581(a) case will allow [Ford] to challenge not 

only the question of whether the entries in question were 

deemed liquidated, but the substance of any actual liquidations or reliquidations that occurred (i.e., the merits of 

[Ford’s] reconciliation claims), an option not available in 

this declaratory judgment case.” Id. Ford appealed. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(5). We review the CIT’s dismissal for lack of 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 7 

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Heartland By-Prods., 

Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1244, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). We review the CIT’s decision not to issue declaratory relief for abuse of discretion. Wilton v. Seven Falls 

Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289–90 (1995); Sony Elecs., Inc. v. 

Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1288 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007). 

DISCUSSION

I 

 As to Claims 1–4 and 6 concerning Ford’s 2005 entries, we first consider whether the statute of limitations 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i) is jurisdictional, such that we 

must address it before considering the merits. See, e.g., 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 

(1998). Ford argues that our mandate in Ford II precluded the CIT from considering the statute of limitations 

because we reversed the CIT’s dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, and the statute of limitations is 

jurisdictional. The government argues that the CIT was 

“powerless to adjudicate Ford’s claims” because they fell 

outside of the CIT’s authority under § 2636(i), and that 

the mandate in the original appeal is not a bar even 

though “the statute of limitations is . . . jurisdictional.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 31. We disagree with both parties. 

Section 1581(i)’s two-year statute of limitations is not 

jurisdictional. 

 Section 2636(i) of title 28 provides that a “civil action 

of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction 

under section 1581 of this title, other than an action 

specified in subsections (a)-(h) of this section, is barred 

unless commenced in accordance with the rules of the 

court within two years after the cause of action first 

accrues.” 

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8 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

In SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 556 F.3d 1337, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009), we assumed 

without deciding that this statute of limitations was 

jurisdictional. In recent years, the Supreme Court has 

articulated a more stringent test for determining when 

statutory time limits are jurisdictional. United States v. 

Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632–33 (2015), is the 

latest in a series of Supreme Court opinions developing 

this test.4 The Court explained that there is a “high bar 

to establish that a statute of limitations is jurisdictional. 

In recent years, we have repeatedly held that procedural 

rules, including time bars, cabin a court’s power only if 

Congress has clearly stated as much.” Id. at 1632 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Absent such 

a clear statement, “courts should treat [a] restriction as 

nonjurisdictional.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). While Congress need not “incant 

magic words,” it must “do something special, beyond 

setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a statute of 

limitations as jurisdictional.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). This is true “even when the 

time limit is important (most are) and even when it is 

framed in mandatory terms (again, most are).” Id. The 

statutory language, see Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16, 

placement of the provision within the statutory scheme, 

Henderson, 562 U.S. at 439, and “context, including 

[Supreme Court] interpretations of similar provisions in 

many years past,” Auburn Reg’l, 133 S. Ct. at 825 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), are indicative 

of whether a provision is jurisdictional. 

4 See, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 

S. Ct. 817 (2013); Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 

(2011); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 

(2010); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 

 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 9 

Recently in Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 

773 F.3d 1315, 1320–22 (Fed. Cir. 2014), we followed 

those cases and held that the six-year limitations set forth 

in 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A) governing the Contract Disputes Act was not jurisdictional. We explained that the 

statute, which provides that “[e]ach claim by a contractor 

against the Federal Government relating to a contract . . . 

shall be submitted within 6 years after the accrual of the 

claim,” did “not speak in jurisdictional terms,” nor did its 

context “suggest that it is jurisdictional.” Id. at 1321 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because no “long-standing interpretation by the Supreme 

Court” counseled to the contrary, we thus held that the 

statute lacked “any special characteristic that would 

warrant making an exception to the general rule that 

filing deadlines are not jurisdictional.” Id. at 1322. 

 Here, § 2636(i) similarly “does not speak in jurisdictional terms.” Id. at 1321 (quoting Auburn Reg’l, 133 S. 

Ct. at 825). While the first clause of § 2636(i) references 

the CIT’s “jurisdiction under section 1581 of this title,” it 

does so only to distinguish the reach of § 2636(i) from 

§ 2636(a)–(h), which covers all § 1581 actions other than 

the residual provision of § 1581(i). The remainder of 

§ 2636(i), which provides the actual time limitation at 

issue here, simply provides that § 1581(i) actions are 

“barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules of 

the court within two years after the cause of action first 

accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i). This does not “suggest, 

much less provide clear evidence, that the provision was 

meant to carry jurisdictional consequences.” Henderson, 

562 U.S. at 438. Like the time limitations addressed in 

Kwai Fun Wong and Sikorsky, § 2636(i) “reads like an 

ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute of limitations, spelling 

out a litigant’s filing obligations without restricting the 

court’s authority.” Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed, 

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10 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

the text is even clearer here than in Kwai Fun Wong and 

Sikorsky, because the first clause of § 2636(i) provides 

that jurisdiction has already been established in all cases 

governed by the two-year limitations provision: “A civil 

action of which the Court of International Trade has 

jurisdiction under section 1581 . . . is barred unless” 

commenced within two years after accrual. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2636(i) (emphasis added). 

 Nor does the placement of § 2636(i) within the statutory scheme provide any indication that the provision is 

jurisdictional. The Court has “often explained that Congress’s separation of a filing deadline from a jurisdictional 

grant indicates that the time bar is not jurisdictional.” 

Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633. Whereas § 2636 

provides the time limitations for civil actions against the 

United States, a different section of title 28 confers jurisdiction on the CIT to hear such actions. See, e.g., § 1581(i) 

(The CIT “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil 

action commenced against the United States, its agencies, 

or its officers.”). As in Kwai Fun Wong, “[n]othing conditions the jurisdictional grant on the limitations periods, or 

otherwise links those separate provisions.” 135 S. Ct. at 

1633. Treating § 2636(i)’s time bar as jurisdictional would 

thus “disregard the structural divide built into the statute.” Id. 

 Finally, nothing in the history of the statute suggests 

that it is jurisdictional. Unlike John R. Sand & Gravel 

Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2007), or Bowles 

v. Russel, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007), where “stare decisis” 

required following a long line of cases holding that the 

particular statutes of limitations were jurisdictional, this 

is not a situation in which longstanding precedent has 

interpreted the provision as jurisdictional. See Sikorsky, 

773 F.3d at 1321–22. Accordingly, because Congress 

“failed to provide anything like the clear statement [the] 

Court has demanded before deeming a statute of limitaCase: 14-1726 Document: 64-2 Page: 10 Filed: 02/03/2016
FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 11 

tions” jurisdictional, we hold that § 2636(i) is not jurisdictional. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633. We thus need 

not address the limitations issue if the CIT properly 

dismissed the claims on other grounds. 

II 

 We first address whether the CIT abused its discretion in declining to issue declaratory relief for Ford’s 

claims with respect to Claim 5 and all claims directed to 

the 2006 entries. We review a trial court’s decision to 

decline declaratory relief for abuse of discretion. Wilton, 

515 U.S. at 289–90; Sony Elecs., 497 F.3d at 1288. An 

abuse of discretion “may occur when the trial court’s 

decision was based on an incorrect conclusion of law or 

clearly erroneous findings of fact, was devoid of any 

evidence in the record upon which the court rationally 

could have based its decision, or was clearly unreasonable 

or arbitrary.” Serco Servs. Co., L.P. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 51 

F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “[i]n a 

case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any 

court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal 

relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Trial courts retain “unique and 

substantial discretion” in deciding whether to exercise 

jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 

286. “[T]here is no absolute right to a declaratory judgment, for the statute specifically entrusts courts with 

discretion to hear declaratory suits or not depending on 

the circumstances.” Serco Servs. Co., L.P., 51 F.3d at 

1039. Trial courts “must determine whether hearing the 

case would serve the objectives for which the Declaratory 

Judgment Act was created,” namely, allowing “a party 

who is reasonably at legal risk because of an unresolved 

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12 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

legal dispute[] to obtain judicial resolution of that dispute 

without having to await the commencement of legal 

action by the other side.” Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. 

Prods., Inc., 387 F.3d 1352, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). There 

“must be well-founded reasons for declining to entertain a 

declaratory judgment action.” Id.

In the original appeal, while we vacated the CIT’s discretionary dismissals of the declaratory claims, we remanded “with the understanding that the Court of 

International Trade retains authority, but no obligation, 

to revisit this question on remand.” Ford II, 688 F.3d at 

1321, 1330. On remand, the CIT again declined to issue 

discretionary declaratory relief for most of Ford’s claims, 

explaining that “adjudicating the claims would not be an 

efficient and effective use of the court’s time and resources,” because Ford “retains the ability to seek relief” 

for these claims in its pending protest and § 1581(a) 

action. Ford III, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. The CIT further explained that “[t]he § 1581(a) case will allow [Ford] 

to challenge not only the question of whether the entries 

in question were deemed liquidated, but the substance of 

any actual liquidations or reliquidations that occurred 

(i.e., the merits of [Ford’s] reconciliation claims), an option 

not available in this declaratory judgment case.” Id. Ford 

contends that the CIT abused its discretion in declining to 

exercise discretionary jurisdiction because of the general 

rule favoring first-filed actions and because it would be 

less efficient to defer resolution until the § 1581(a) actions. We disagree. 

As Ford points out, first-filed actions are generally 

preferred “unless considerations of judicial and litigant 

economy, and the just and effective disposition of disputes, require otherwise.” Serco, 51 F.3d at 1039 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, 

the “trial court’s discretion tempers the preference for the 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 13 

first-filed suit, when such preference should yield to the 

forum in which all interests are best served.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). Here the firstfiled suit—the declaratory action—does not provide a 

venue for resolution of the correct amount of duty for the 

entries. Section 1581(i) only allows Ford to challenge 

whether its entries deemed liquidated as a matter of law. 

It does not permit Ford to challenge the correctness of 

Customs’ actual duty calculations if the entries are not 

deemed liquidated as a matter of law. See Ford II, 688 

F.3d at 1328. On the other hand, Ford’s protest action 

pursuant to § 1581(a) encompasses both questions—the 

deemed liquidation issue and the proper rate of duty if the 

entries were not deemed liquidated. 

All of Ford’s entries have now liquidated, and by filing 

a protest Ford has challenged the merits of those entries 

before Customs. Customs denied the protest for Ford’s 

2005 entries, and Ford has already filed a § 1581(a) action 

challenging that denial. Section 1581(a) will be available 

for Ford’s protest of its 2006 entries when Customs acts 

on that protest, which Customs has said it will do upon 

resolution of this appeal. See J.A. 139. The CIT did not 

abuse its discretion in dismissing Ford’s declaratory 

claims in favor of addressing both the issue of whether 

Ford’s entries deemed liquidated and the correct rate of 

duty in one streamlined § 1581(a) action. 

We have previously held that § 1581(a) is a suitable 

avenue for resolving challenges, like Ford’s, to Customs’ 

extensions of liquidation and issues of deemed liquidation. 

See, e.g., Chemsol, LLC v. United States, 755 F.3d 1345, 

1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 

286 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Indeed under these 

circumstances, § 1581(a) is likely to provide a superior 

forum even as to the deemed liquidation issue, because 

§ 1581(a) review is de novo and conducted based on a 

complete record developed before the court, see 28 U.S.C. 

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14 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

§ 2640(a)(1), whereas § 1581(i) review is confined to the 

more limited record developed before Customs, see 28 

U.S.C. § 2640(e). While the existence of another adequate 

remedy does not necessarily bar a declaratory judgment, 

see, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 499–500 

(1969), district courts may refuse declaratory relief where 

an alternative remedy is better or more effective. See, 

e.g., Serco, 51 F.3d at 1039; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 

Jefferson Tr. & Sav. Bank of Peoria, 993 F.2d 1364 (8th 

Cir. 1993). Here the alternative remedy would be more 

effective, and the CIT was justified in refusing declaratory 

relief. 

Notwithstanding Ford’s argument, Capo is not to the 

contrary. In Capo we held that the district court’s refusal 

to afford declaratory relief was an abuse of discretion 

because there was a direct charge of infringement by the 

patentee, Capo was continually threatened by the prospect of an infringement suit, and no infringement action 

had been commenced. 387 F.3d at 1355–56, 1358. Because dismissal left Capo “helpless and immobile so long 

as the patent owner refuses to grasp the nettle and sue,” 

we held that the district court’s dismissal contravened the 

purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. at 1358 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also 

Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 936–39 

(Fed. Cir. 1993). Here, on the other hand, Ford is not 

forced to “await the commencement of legal action by the 

other side,” Capo, 387 F.3d at 1352, because Ford itself 

has already protested Customs’ liquidations and its 

protests will be acted on upon resolution of this appeal.5 

5 If Customs does not act promptly, Ford will not be 

without a remedy. A protestor may request an accelerated disposition of protest at any time “concurrent with or 

following the filing of” its protest under § 1515(b), which 

 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 15 

See J.A. 139. The CIT did not abuse its discretion in 

declining declaratory relief. 

III 

The CIT’s reasoning for declining to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction applies equally to Claims 1–4 and 

6 relating to Ford’s 2005 entries, which the CIT found 

time-barred. Indeed, these claims are even more clearly 

amenable to resolution in a future § 1581(a) action than 

the claims relating to Ford’s 2006 entries because Customs has already rejected Ford’s protest with respect to 

its 2005 entries and Ford has already brought a § 1581(a) 

action directly challenging that denial, which is currently 

pending before the CIT. See Ford Motor Co. v. United 

States, Ct. Int’l Trade No. 10-00138. Where the CIT 

dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and it is 

clear that the CIT would have declined to exercise its 

discretionary jurisdiction in any event, we need not remand. Fleshman v. West, 138 F.3d 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 

1998) (a reviewing court may “affirm[] an agency decision 

on a ground different from the one used by the agency” if 

“the agency would have reached the same ultimate result 

had it considered the new ground”) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Here, the CIT already 

refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over 

Claim 5 as directed to Ford’s 2005 entries, and explicitly 

stated that the same reasoning applies to the other claims 

directed to Ford’s 2005 entries that it found time-barred. 

compels Customs to act on the protest within thirty days. 

A protest “which has not been allowed or denied in whole 

or in part within thirty days . . . shall be deemed denied.” 

19 U.S.C. § 1515(b). A protestor may then appeal under 

§ 1581(a). See, e.g., Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v. United 

States, 687 F.3d 1325, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

 

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16 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

[Ford] retains the ability to seek relief for [the 

time-barred] claims in the § 1581(a) case pending 

before the court. . . . In addition to being an adequate vehicle for the court to address the issues 

[Ford] raised within the time-barred claims, litigating the claims pursuant to § 1581(a) would 

provide a more complete avenue for judicial review of Customs’ actions. The § 1581(a) case will 

allow [Ford] to challenge not only the question of 

whether the entries in question were deemed liquidated, but the substance of any actual liquidations or reliquidations that occurred (i.e., the 

merits of [Ford’s] reconciliation claims), an option 

not available in this declaratory judgment case. 

Ford III, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (citation omitted). 

Because the CIT would have dismissed on discretionary 

grounds the same claims it found time-barred, a remand 

is unnecessary. We may and do affirm the dismissal on 

that ground as being within the CIT’s discretion. 

AFFIRMED 

 

Case: 14-1726 Document: 64-2 Page: 16 Filed: 02/03/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1726 

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:09-cv-00151-MAB, Judge Mark A. Barnett. 

______________________ 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

It is not seriously disputed by the Customs Service, or 

by the panel majority, or by government counsel, that 

Ford overpaid import duties by 6.2 million dollars, and 

timely filed for reconciliation and refund. The government has for nine years avoided refunding the overpayment. Even on this appeal, the government does not 

dispute the merits of the claim, and the record filed with 

the Court of International Trade is replete with timely, 

full and compelling documentation of Ford’s entitlement 

to the refund. Thus I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ holding that Ford must now repeat this administrative process; it is time that the refund be paid. 

Case: 14-1726 Document: 64-2 Page: 17 Filed: 02/03/2016
2 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

In two trips to the Court of International Trade, as 

summarized by Ford, “the CIT has twice dismissed Ford’s 

claims, holding the first time that Ford was not patient 

enough with Customs to allow the administrative process 

to unfold, and thus filed its claims too early, and the 

second time that Ford was too patient with Customs’ 

inaction, and thus filed its claims too late.” Ford Br. 2. 

The administrative record, upon its release to the Court of 

International Trade, reveals multiple internal verifications of Ford’s refund entitlements. 

Ford’s reconciliation methodology and entries were 

not disputed, and were accepted for Ford entries of a 

different product. Two separate divisions of Customs, the 

Area Director of the Port of Newark and the National 

Commodities Specialist Division, confirmed Ford’s entitlement to refund in early 2006. However, these internal 

notices were followed by nearly three years of silence and 

inaction, although Ford apparently pressed Customs for 

response. Customs issued no decision that could be 

protested, requiring Ford to file suit in the Court of International Trade under 28 U.S.C. §1581(i). Thereafter 

Customs apparently withdrew its prior internal approvals. 

These procedures appear to be irregular. This is not a 

complicated claim; Ford overestimated the expected value 

of Jaguar imports and, after the value was accurately 

determined, according to appraisement methods found 

acceptable, Ford entered the statutory reconciliation 

procedure and documented the $6.2 million in overpayments. The reconciliation statute and regulations provide 

that Customs has one year to liquidate the reconciliation 

entries, 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(1), or to extend liquidation for 

up to three years if Customs lacks the information necessary to complete the liquidation. The statute and regulation only permit Customs to extend liquidation if “the 

information needed for the proper appraisement or classiCase: 14-1726 Document: 64-2 Page: 18 Filed: 02/03/2016
FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 3

fication of the imported or withdrawn merchandise . . . or 

for ensuring compliance with applicable law, is not available.” 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b); see 19 C.F.R. § 159.12(a)(1), (d). 

The only times Customs requested additional information 

was in 2005, which was promptly provided, and in July 

2009 after Ford filed this suit. There is no objection to 

Ford’s data, price information, or anything else. 

The Customs actions are devoid of support. On this 

appeal, the government brief is silent; no justification is 

offered, although it appears that statute and regulation 

have not been met. 

In 2009, during these legal proceedings, Customs reliquidated Ford’s entries, refusing to pay the refund. The 

reason given is that Ford did not provide certain documentation that was requested, with one month’s deadline, 

after three years of silence and inaction. The reliquidations were not based on any position that Ford’s 

appraisement and reconciliation were flawed. Although 

the panel majority announces that “Customs seeks to 

recalculate the duty owed, urging that the original rate 

was correct,” Maj. Op. at 3, that is strange, for nowhere 

does Customs state that the overpayments were correct. 

The government, in its brief on this appeal, presents 

no argument that the duty should be recalculated—

leaving uncertainty as to the source of my colleagues’ 

statement. Customs simply re-liquidated the entry at the 

original overpaid amount, ignoring the law and regulations of reconciliation and refund and ignoring its own 

internal documents that refunds were due. 

The government’s brief does not mention the overpayment, the litigation history, or the statute or regulations. Although my colleagues now hold that the claim 

requires resolution, their proposal is that Ford should 

start again, to request the refund that was first requested 

in 2005. However, the record of overpayment and refund 

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4 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

obligation is not now challenged. The government does 

not now argue otherwise. 

The judicial role is to bring the matter to a close, not 

to start again. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (appellate court may 

“reverse any judgment . . . and direct the entry of such 

appropriate judgment, decree, or order . . . as may be just 

under the circumstances”); see also Chief Justice John 

Roberts, 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 

at 7, 11 (Dec. 31, 2015) (judges should “take on a stewardship role” to achieve “speedy, fair and efficient justice”). 

The panel majority apparently agrees that Ford is entitled to the refund. Indeed, the government does not 

dispute the merits of Ford’s entitlement, after six years of 

this litigation. On the unanimous holding that Ford is 

not barred from receiving the refund, the appropriate 

judicial role is to order the refund, and close the case. 

Case: 14-1726 Document: 64-2 Page: 20 Filed: 02/03/2016