Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05009/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benton County Detention Center
Defendant
Paul Carter
Defendant
Gene Drake
Defendant
Ferguson
Defendant
Hunter Petray
Defendant
Phetpinthong Senesackda
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

PHETPINTHONG SENESACKDA PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-5009

 

SHERIFF FERGUSON; MAJOR GENE 

DRAKE; CAPTAIN HUNTER PETRAY;

and LT. PAUL CARTER DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Phetpinthong Senesackda, a former inmate of the Benton County Detention Center,

brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Senesackda contends his

constitutional rights were violated when he was placed on lock-down without procedural due

process. 

On June 2, 2005, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19). By order

entered on June 30, 2005 (Doc. 23), Senesackda was directed to complete, sign, and return an

attached questionnaire that would serve as his response to the summary judgment motion. On

July 13, 2005, plaintiff's response to the court’s questionnaire (Doc.23) was filed. The summary

judgment motion is currently before the undersigned for issuance of this report and

recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

Senesackda was arrested on August 27, 2004, on charges of theft of property and

breaking and entering and booked into the Benton CountyDetention Center (BCDC). Plaintiff’s

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Response (hereinafter Resp.) at ¶ 1. The pending charges were the sole reason he was

incarcerated. Id. at ¶ 2. 

Senesackda was released to the Washington County Sheriff’s Office on August 28th and

booked back into the BCDC on August 31, 2004. Resp. at ¶ 3. A warrant was issued for his

arrest based on a probation violation charge on October 7, 2004. Id. at ¶ 4. He was also charged

with delivering a controlled substance. Id. 

On September 22, 2004, Senesackda was a trustee and was asked by Deputy C. Tomlin

to clean E-102 and E-103. Resp. at ¶ 6. According to Tomlin, he told Senesackda that when he

was cleaning he was not to talk to anyone or pass notes to anyone. Defendants’ Exhibit

(hereinafter Defts’ Ex.) 2 at p. 1. Tomlin maintains Senesackda agreed. Id.

Senesackda, on the other hand, contends Tomlin only told him to not speak to any

inmates. Resp. at ¶ 7. Senesackda agreed not to speak to another inmate. Id. at ¶ 8. 

Senesackda began cleaning E-102 and when he got to Jacob Penn’s cell he swept one or

two letters under Penn’s door. Defts’ Ex. 1 at p. 1 (two letters); Resp. at ¶ 9(A) (one letter).

Defendants maintain the letter was about gangs at the detention center. Defts’ Ex. 2 at p. 3.

Senesackda, however, states the letter that went under Penn’s door was from Ricky Garcia and

was not about gangs. Resp. at ¶ 9(B). 

Tomlin called Senesackda over to the control area and asked him what he had just done.

Resp. at ¶ 10. Senesackda replied nothing. Id. Tomlin asked a second time and Senesackda

again replied nothing. Id. at ¶ 11. 

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Tomlin then escorted Senesackda to booking. Resp. at ¶ 12. When they got to the

booking area, Tomlin asked Senesackda one more time what he put under Penn’s door and he

replied a letter. Id. at ¶ 13.

Tomlin talked to Deputy Faulkenberry about what Senesackda had done and it was

decided that he would lose his smoke breaks for one week. Resp. at ¶ 14. Tomlin told

Senesackda that he had lost his smoke breaks for one week. Id. at ¶ 15. Senesackda replied

okay. Id. at ¶ 16.

Tomlin indicates that later when he was booking someone into the facility he saw

Senesackda walking out the B-pod door for a smoke break. Defts’ Ex. 1 at p. 1. However,

Senesackda states he does not smoke and only went outside to take a break from working. 

When Senesackda was done with his smoke break, Tomlin told Senesackda that he was

no longer a trustee and that he needed to go to property and change out of his stripes. Defts’ Ex.

1 at p. 1. Senesackda maintains Tomlin misunderstood the situation. Resp. at ¶ 18. Senesackda

states he does not smoke but he was not going to argue with Tomlin. Id. Senesackda complied

with Tomlin’s order. Id. at ¶ 19.

On September 28, 2004, when DeputyButh and DeputyLisenbee were passing out clean

whites in D-pod, all inmates were told to line up by their cell doors. Resp. at ¶ 20. Senesackda

was standing in another inmate’s cell talking. Resp. at ¶ 21. Buth told Senesackda to go to his

assigned cell and stand in front of the door. Defts’ Ex. 2 at p. 2. 

According to the defendants, Senesackda did not comply and instead walked to a

different cell. Defts’ Ex. 2 at p. 2. Senesackda states his cell was “a ways from the cell I was at

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& I was on my way to my cell when I was told to get my stuff to go to the hole.” Resp. at ¶ 22.

Buth told Senesackda to go to his cell, gather his belongings, and go to D-130 door. Resp. at ¶

23.

Senesackda complied. Resp. at ¶ 24. Buth told Senesackda that he was being locked

down for disobeying the order of a deputy. Id. at ¶ 25. Senesackda was taken to E-pod. Id. at

¶ 26.

Senesackda was charged with a disciplinary violation as a result of the incident and found

to have disobeyed the order of a deputy. Resp. at ¶ 27. He was given ten days look-down and

loss of privileges. Id. at ¶ 28.

Senesackda appealed the decision and the decision was affirmed. Defts’ Ex. 2 at p. 4.

According to defendants’ records, Senesackda admitted to staying to speak to Inmate Bruce after

the whites had been brought into the cell. Id. Senesackda disagrees. He states he was speaking

to Bruce before the whites were passed out. Resp. at ¶ 29.

On October 1, 2004, when Deputy Lisenbee entered into E-103 to pass out new whites

he noticed Inmate David Perez and Senesackda waiting at the door. Defts’ Ex. 2 at p. 7. See

Resp. at ¶ 30 (Plaintiff indicates he is without knowledge to agree or disagree). Lisenbee’s

incident report provides as follows:

Inmate Perez handed me a set of boxers and a pair of socks. I threw his old

whites away and got his new whites from a trustee. As I handed the new whites

to Inmate Perez, he and Inmate Senesackda charged towards me with punches.

Inmate Perez struck the left side of my face with his right fist. As I started to

gather my bearings, I went towards Perez to detain him from attacking me. I

reached my arms towards Perez and Inmate Senesackda pinned both of arms

behind me over my head preventing me from grabbing Inmate Perez. Inmate

Perez continued to strike at the left side of my face with his right fist. I then

pushed Inmate Senesackda against the wall with my legs, stunning him enough

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to get my arms free. As we struggled, we all fell to the ground. Ifell onto Inmate

Senesackda and pulled Inmate Perez with me. Inmate Perez continued to punch

at me. In a defensive effort, I kicked Inmate Perez in the stomach with my right

foot, knocking the breath out of him. I then overheard the E103 door open and

Inmate Senesackda yelled, “here comes more of them, get on the ground.” Both

inmates rolled over on their stomachs. I jumped onto Inmate Perez to place him

in handcuffs. He then lifted himself with his arms, resisting against me. I placed

both of my hands on the back of his neck to prevent him from rising up again and

in the process his head bounced against the floor. Inmate Senesackda was lying

on the floor next to Inmate Perez. He then stated, “you slammed his head against

the floor.” He proceeded to stand up making aggressive gestures towards me.

Knowing Deputy Cantwell had entered the E103 Pod and had Inmate Perez’s legs

detained, I rose up to take Inmate Senesackda down. He immediately resisted

against me. I grabbed his right arm and with the assistance of Deputy Tomlin we

both took him down to the floor. I placed Inmate Senesackda into handcuffs and

double locked them.

Defts’ Ex. 2 at pps. 7-8. 

Senesackda disagrees with Lisenbee’s version of the events. Senesackda indicates that

when he was handed his whites, he turned around to place them on his bunk. Resp. at ¶ 31.

Senesackda indicates he is without knowledge to agree or disagree as to whether Perez struck

Lisenbee. Id. at ¶ 32, ¶ 34, & ¶ 37.

Senesackda denies that he pinned Lisenbee’s arms over his head, that Lisenbee pushed

him against the wall or that he fell to the ground with Lisenbee; Instead, Senesackda states he

left his cell and got on the ground. Resp. at ¶ 33, ¶ 35 & ¶ 36. He also denies that he knew

anyone else was coming into the pod. Id. at ¶ 38. Senesackda indicates he merely hollered for

Perez to get on the floor and he did. Id. 

Senesackda maintains Lisenbee slammed Perez’s head into the concrete floor. Resp. at

¶ 40 & ¶ 41. Senesackda admits he stood up but contends the move was not aggressive. Id. at

¶ 42. He states he stood up in case Lisenbee wouldn’t stop slamming Perez’s head against the

floor. Id. If Lisenbee didn’t stop, Senesackda states he was going to pull Lisenbee off to prevent

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Perez’s head being split open because Lisenbee was getting carried away and being

unprofessional. Id. 

By this time, DeputyCantwell had come to assist Lisenbee. Resp. at ¶ 43. Cantwell took

a hold of Perez’s legs. Id. Senesackda denies that he resisted Lisenbee but says he stood there

staring at him. Id. at ¶ 45. When Deputy Tomlin arrived and asked Senesackda to get on the

floor, he states he complied. Id. Senesackda was placed in handcuffs and escorted to pod

control. Id. at ¶ 46.

Lisenbee was taken to the hospital for treatment. Defts’ Ex. 2 at p. 8. He had a fracture

of his left cheekbone, was bleeding from the nose, had severe bruising under his left eye, and a

laceration over his left ear. Id. 

According to defendants, following the incident, Senesackda was placed in red and white

stripes and Deputy Faulkenbury told him that he would be on twenty-four hour look-down and

would be shackled anytime he was out of his cell. Defts’ Ex. 2 at p. 13. On October 2, 2004, 

Senesackda indicates he was told by Deputy Ransom that Senesackda was not to be allowed any

recreation or privileges for as long as he was at the BCDC. Resp. at ¶ 49. Senesackda indicates

Perez was told the same thing. Id. 

Senesackda indicates the only disciplinary he had was the one he was given on September

27th. Resp. at p. 32. As a result of this disciplinary, he was put on lock-down for ten days and

lost his privileges during that time period. 

Following the October 1st incident, Senesackda indicates there was no paperwork. Resp.

at ¶ 32. Instead, he states he was put on lock-down without privileges twenty-four hours a day

seven days a week on the assumption that he attacked a deputy. Id. Senesackda states he was

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told that from October 1, 2004, until April 5, 2005, he was on administrative segregation. Id.

However, he states the paper signed by Captain Petray indicating Senesackda was put on

administrative segregation is dated April 5, 2005. Id. See also attached “administration

segregation action form dated 4/5/05 indicating Senesackda is a threat to others and a threat to

the security of the detention facility (same document submitted to the court as Defts’ Ex. 2 at p.

53). Furthermore, if he was on administrative segregation instead of lock-down, Senesackda

questions why he received no privileges. Id. 

Senesackda was charged with second degree battery as a result of the incident. Resp. at

¶ 50(A). On October 6, 2004, an order of probable cause for continued detention was signed and

a $10,000 bond set on the battery charge. Id. at ¶ 50(B). The charge is still pending. Id. at ¶ 51.

In response to one of Senesackda’s requests dated October 29, 2004, he was told he was

due off look-down on November 10th. See Defts’ Exhibit 2 at p. 26. Senesackda maintains he

did not get off look-down until April 5, 2005. Resp. at ¶ 52. 

Senesackda was placed on suicide watch for one night in December of 2004. Id. at ¶ 66.

Senesackda contends this was due to a misunderstanding. Id.

In Senesackda’s opinion he was not a danger to the deputies. Resp. at ¶ 53. He indicates

he gave no signs of any threat to the deputies nor did he give them any problems. Id. 

Senesackda was allowed to shower every three or four days. Resp. at ¶ 54. However, he

was shackled, cuffed, and escorted to the shower and back. Id. 

Senesackda could send and receive both personal and legal mail. Resp. at ¶ 55. He had

access to newspapers or some other source of information regarding news and current events but

did not have access everyday. Resp. at ¶ 56. Additionally, he didn’t get access unless he kept

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asking. Id. Senesackda maintains he also had to keep writing grievances in order to be provided

with indigent supplies such as paper and pens, etc. Id. at ¶ 61.

He was given the opportunity to exercise inside his cell but was not allowed outside

recreation. Resp. at ¶ 57(A). There was sufficient room in his cell to do push ups, sit ups,

jumping jacks, or similar exercises if Senesackda desired to do so. Id. at ¶ 58. Although

defendants maintain Senesackda refused recreation on a number of occasions, defts’ ex. 3,

Senesackda states he would never refuse recreation and remained locked in his cell twenty-four

hours a day seven days a week. Resp. at ¶ 57(B).

The cell was eight foot by ten foot in size. Resp. at ¶ 59. It had bunks, a table with a

stool, a sink, a shelf, and a commode. Id. 

Senesackda indicates he lost visitation, recreation, and phone call privileges. Resp. at ¶

60. He states this caused him to suffer stress, depression, and mental anguish because he could

not call his family or receive visits before he left for prison. Id. 

Senesackda did not see, speak to, or otherwise communicate with Sheriff Ferguson or

Major Drake about his being on look-down. Resp. at ¶ 63 & ¶ 65. He has no evidence Sheriff

Ferguson or Major Drake were involved in the decision to place him on look-down. Id. at ¶ 62

& ¶ 64.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), the record "show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

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judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once a party moving for summary

judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth

specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact

exists." National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

"A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary

judgment." Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants have moved for summary judgment. They contend Senesackda cannot

present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was denied due process. Further, they

state he can prove no harm by the alleged denial of exercise or phone and visitation privileges.

On September 28, 2004, defendants indicate Senesackda was placed on lock-down for

disobeying the order of a deputy. Following the October 1, 2004, attack on a deputy, defendants

state Senesackda was charged with second degree battery and also placed on lock-down.

Defendants indicate Senesackda lost certain privileges for a time because of the attack. 

“We begin with the fundamental principle that a person held in confinement as a pretrial

detainee may not be subjected to any form of punishment for the crime for which he is charged.”

Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1999). See also Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d

421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992)(“Pretrial detainees are presumed innocent and may not be punished.”).

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Under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979), “restrictions

on pretrial detainees that implicate a liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause may

not ‘amount to punishment of the detainee.’” Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 188 (2nd Cir.

2001). “However, not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to

‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996).

“Once the Government has exercised its conceded authority to detain a person pending

trial, it obviously is entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention.”

Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. In determining whether a particular restriction constitutes a permissible

restriction or amounts to impermissible punishment, the court first asks “whether the restriction

is based upon an express intent to inflict punishment.” Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039,

1045 (9th Cir. 2002)(citations omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 2110, 155 L. Ed.

2d 1087 (2003). If “there is no indication of such an express intent,” the court next considers

“whether punitive intent can be inferred from the nature of the restriction.” Valdez, 302 F.3d at

1045. 

In this regard, the Supreme Court in Bell held that “if a particular condition or restriction

of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not,

without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. “An action may be reasonably

related to a legitimate governmental purpose if an alternative purpose to which the act may

rationally be connected is assignable for it and the action does not appear excessive in relation

to the alternative purpose assigned.” Robles v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, 302 F.3d

262, 269 (4th Cir. 2002)(internal citations and punctuation omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,

123 S. Ct. 1634, 155 L. Ed. 2d 486 (2003). 

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A reasonable relationship between the governmental interest and the challenged

restriction does not require an “exact fit,” nor does it require showing a “least

restrictive alternative.” Otherwise, every administrative judgment would be

subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had

a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand. Moreover, it does not

matter whether we agree with the defendants or whether the policy in fact

advances the jail’s legitimate interests. The only question that we must answer

is whether the defendants’ judgment was rational, that is, whether the defendants

might reasonably have thought that the policy would advance its interests.

Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1046. 

In Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit stated:

A pretrial detainee cannot be placed in segregation as a punishment for a

disciplinary infraction without notice and an opportunity to be heard; due process

requires no less. But no process is required if he is placed in segregation not as

punishment but for managerial reasons. Suppose for example that the only

vacant cell left in the jail was in the segregation ward when a new prisoner

arrived; placing him in that cell would be a managerial decision. Or suppose, .

. . that a prisoner was placed under particularly restrictive conditions of

confinement at the jail because he was considered a suicide risk. Again, no

hearing would be required. Ditto if he was placed in segregation to protect

himself from other prisoners, or to protect jail staff from his violent propensities.

As long as the purpose was indeed preventive rather than a punitive one, he

would not be entitled to notice and a hearing. . . . In none of these cases would

a hearing be practicable, or even useful, because managerial decisions do not

have the character of rulings applying legal standards to facts, the kind of rulings

for which adjudicative hearings are designed. 

Id. 286 F.3d at 438. See Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992)(“Requiring a

pretrial detainee to work or be placed in administrative segregation is punishment. . . .

Regardless of whether the detentions are classified as ‘administrative,’ if a pre-trial detainee must

remain in a lock-up area if he does not work, the detention amounts to punishment.”). 

It is not clear from the materials submitted when Senesackda was released from “lockdown” following his alleged attack on Lisenbee on October 1, 2004. See e.g., Defts’ Ex. 2 at

p. 24 (no privileges until lock-down lifted–dated October 22, 2004); p. 26 (due off lock-down

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on November 10, 2004–dated November 1, 2004); (lock-downs do not get phone calls except

for bondsmen and attorneys dated December 10, 2004); p. 32 ( Senesackda voices complaints

about being on lock-down–Petray responded on December 20, 2004, that Senesackda was being

charged with assaulting a deputy); p. 34 (eligible for visitation privileges–dated December 29,

2004); p. 50 (Petray states he will review Senesackda lock-down status–dated March 28, 2005);

p. 53 ( Senesackda placed on administrative segregation because he is a threat to others and to

the security of the facility–dated April 5, 2005). However, Senesackda essentially argues that

whether it was called disciplinary lock-down or administrative segregation, the fact remains that

he was on lock-down twenty-four hours a day seven days a week beginning on October 1, 2004,

until April 5, 2005, and during this time had no privileges. 

Clearly there may be permissible non-punitive reasons for confining pretrial detainees

to disciplinary segregation, lock-down, or administrative segregation; Just as clearly placement

in such housing may constitute a form of punishment. See Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 291

n.5 (7th Cir. 1995); House v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1085-86 (4th Cir. 1993)(administrative

segregation may not be used as pretext for indefinite confinement); Brown-El v. Delo, 969 F.2d

644, 647 (8th Cir. 1992)(detention center has a legitimate interest in segregating individual

inmates from general population for non-punitive reasons, such as where there is a threat to the

safety and security of the institution); O’Bar v. Pinion, 953 F.2d 74, 84-85 (4th Cir.

1991)(recognizing that administrative segregation can be a form of punishment). 

In this case, we believe there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Senesackda’s due

process rights were violated when he was placed on “lock-down” following the incident with

Lisenbee. Defendants indicate Senesackda was placed “on lockdown for the attack.” Defts’

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Statement of Indisputable Material Facts at ¶ 6 (Doc. 21)(sworn to under penalty of perjury by

Captain Hunter Petray pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746). Defendants maintain Senesackda was also

believed to be a danger to the deputies. Id. at ¶ 7. 

 “A pre-trial detainee is entitled the procedural protections of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), before imposition of punishment for a

disciplinary infraction.” Jones v. Brown, 300 F. Supp. 2d 674, 678 (N.D. Ind. 2003). Nothing

before the court indicates Senesackda received any type of hearing prior to, or after, his

assignment to “lock-down” as a result of the incident with Lisenbee. Senesackda was not given

an opportunity to present his views to the official who decided he should be placed on lockdown. Senesackda was not charged with a rule violation and did not have a disciplinary hearing.

Although Senesackda was charged with a crime as a result of the incident, it is clear he cannot

be punished for this crime having not yet been convicted of it. 

While an inmate striking a detention center officer presents a legitimate security concern,

defendants submitted nothing tending to establish that Senesackda had shown violent

propensities either before or after this event. Senesackda only had one disciplinary infraction

prior to the incident with Lisenbee and this was for disobeying a deputy. It did not tend to show

he had violent propensities or had threatened to do physical harm to detention center personnel

or to other inmates. There is no evidence that after the incident with Lisenbee that Senesackda

continued to be unruly or violent. 

No evidence was introduced showing that prior to the October 1st incident that

Senesackda was classified as a security risk. He had not been assigned to an area of the jail with

more restrictive conditions of confinement in light of his being viewed as a security risk. After

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the incident with Lisenbee, nothing indicates Senesackda was moved to, or kept on, lock-down

because he was viewed as a security threat rather than as punishment for his role in the incident

with Lisenbee. In fact, it was not until April 5, 2005, that Captain Petray completed a form

indicating Senesackda would be housed in administrative segregation because he was viewed

as a threat to others and to the security of the facility. 

With respect to Sheriff Keith Ferguson and Major Gene Drake, we find there is no

genuine issue of material fact as to whether they can be held liable for any alleged constitutional

violation. A supervisor may not be held liable for a section 1983 violation on the basis of

respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018,

56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Senesackda has not alleged that either Sheriff Ferguson or Major

Drake directly participated in the alleged constitutional violation or that a failure to properly

supervise and train the offending employee caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Tilson v. Forrest City Police

Dep't, 28 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir.1994); Mark v. Nix, 983 F.2d 138, 139-40 (8th Cir.

1993)(section 1983 liability requires some personal involvement or responsibility). Further, the

record in this case is devoid of any suggestion of the existence of a custom or policy on which

to hold Benton County liable. In short, there is nothing to suggest Senesackda’s alleged

constitutional deprivations were caused by a custom or policy of Benton County. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Itherefore recommend that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted in part

and denied in part. Specifically, I recommend that it be granted as to the plaintiff’s claims

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against Sheriff Keith Ferguson and Major GeneDrake. Irecommend that the summary judgment

motion be denied as to Captain Hunter Petray and Lt. Paul Carter.

The parties have ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which

to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 15th day of September 2005.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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