Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00061/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00061-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lear Corporation EEDS and Interiors
Respondent
Lear Renosol Selma Manufacturing Facility
Defendant
National Labor Relations Board
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

NATIONAL LABOR )

RELATIONS BOARD, )

Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00061-WS-N

) 

LEAR CORPORATION )

EEDS and INTERIORS, )

Respondent. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Under 29 U.S.C. § 161(2), the National Labor Relations Board (“the 

Board”) has filed with the Court two applications to order enforcement of certain 

administrative subpoenas it has served on Respondent Lear Corporation EEDS 

and Interiors (“Lear”). (Doc. 1; Doc. 7 at 3 – 12, 315 – 414). Lear has timely 

filed responses in opposition to the applications (Doc. 7 at 101 – 308; Docs. 9, 10), 

and the Board has timely filed replies (Doc. 7 at 415 – 419; Doc. 12) to the 

responses.1 A hearing on the applications was held before the undersigned on 

Friday, April 15, 2016. Present were Alexandra K. R. Schule, Esq., counsel for 

the Board, and J. Trent Scofield, Esq. and Kathryn M. Willis, Esq., counsel for 

 1 The first subject application was filed in S.D. Ala. Case No. 1:16-mc-00001-WS-N 

(commenced 1/15/2016), the second in the above-styled action (commenced 2/11/2016). The 

Court has since consolidated the first-filed case into this one (see Doc. 6), and all filings from 

the first-filed action have been made a part of the record in this action (see Doc. 7). As the 

applications were brought at different times and consolidation did not occur until after 

separate schedules had been set, separate briefing has been filed for each of the applications.

Additionally, the Board has substituted new exhibits for the ones initially attached to 

its first-filed application. (See Doc. 8 at 2). Accordingly, the undersigned has not 

considered the replaced exhibits.

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Lear.

The applications are now under submission, are ripe for disposition, and 

under S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b), have been referred to the undersigned Magistrate 

Judge for entry of a recommendation as to the appropriate disposition, in 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

72(b), and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(1)(S).2 Upon consideration, the undersigned

finds that Lear’s objections to enforcement are due to be OVERRULED, that the 

Board’s applications for enforcement (Doc. 1; Doc. 7 at 3 – 12, 315 - 414) are due 

to be GRANTED, that Lear’s alternate requests for entry of a protective order

are due to be DENIED, and that the Board’s request for an award of attorneys’ 

fees incurred in bringing these applications is due to be DENIED.

I. Background

The Board requests that this Court issue an order enforcing a total of ten 

administrative subpoenas, collectively issued in three separate cases against 

Lear pending before the Board. Board Case No. 15-CA-140072 was initiated 

against Lear by the filing of a formal charge on November 3, 2014. (Doc. 7 at 

316). This charge has been amended on several occasions, with a third amended

charge being filed on January 26, 2016 (id. at 129 – 130), alleging twelve alleged 

incidents of improper conduct by Lear against certain employees for their union 

 2 See, e.g., NLRB v. Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that, because an 

application for enforcement under 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) is a dispositive matter, a district court 

must review a magistrate judge’s decision on the application under the de novo standard of 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)).

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activities, either in the form of retaliation, interrogation, or surveillance, 

occurring in June through October 2014. The following subpoenas have been 

issued in Case No. 15-CA-140072:

1. Subpoena Duces Tecum No. B-1-KFU8N5, issued December 17, 2014, 

“requires the production of the books, records, documents, and other 

materials within the possession or under the control of Lear Renosol 

Selma Manufacturing Facility, wherever such documents may be located,” 

which concern each of the charged incidents. (Id. at 324 – 331).

2. Subpoena Ad Testificandum No. A-1-KGCOJP, issued December 18, 2014, 

requires Kathy Jones, a Lear safety supervisor, to appear before a Board 

representative to testify concerning her knowledge of the charged

incidents at Lear. (Id. at 338 – 340).

3. Subpoena Ad Testificandum No. A-1-KGDB47, issued December 18, 2014, 

requires Matthew Robinson, a Lear supervisor, to appear before a Board 

representative to testify concerning his knowledge of the charged incidents 

at Lear. (Id. at 347 – 349).

4. Subpoena Ad Testificandum No. A-1-KGDH05, issued December 18, 2014, 

requires John Smith, a Lear supervisor, to appear before a Board 

representative to testify concerning his knowledge of the charged incidents 

at Lear. (Id. at 356 – 358). 

5. Subpoena Ad Testificandum No. A-1-KGDVG5, issued December 18, 2014, 

requires Tim Brugger, a Lear superintendent, to appear before a Board 

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representative to testify concerning his knowledge of the charged incidents 

at Lear. (Id. at 363 – 365).

6. Subpoena Ad Testificandum No. A-1-KGEB05, issued December 18, 2014, 

requires Connie Messer, a Lear human resources supervisor, to appear 

before a Board representative to testify concerning her knowledge of the 

charged incidents at Lear. (Id. at 370 – 372).

7. Subpoena Ad Testificandum No. A-1-KGEOUH, issued December 18, 

2014, requires Cindy Bozeman, a Lear materials supervisor, to appear 

before a Board representative to testify concerning her knowledge of the 

alleged incidents at Lear. (Id. at 377 – 379).

8. Subpoena Ad Testificandum No. A-1-KGD9T9, issued December 18, 2014, 

requires Mike Walkowski, a Lear supervisor, to appear before a Board 

representative to testify concerning his knowledge of the alleged incidents 

at Lear. (Id. at 384 – 386).

Board Case No. 15-CA-146313 was initiated against Lear by the filing of a 

formal charge on February 12, 2015. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). The charge has been twice 

amended, with a second amended charge filed January 26, 2016, listing seven 

alleged incidents of improper conduct by Lear against its employees in relation to 

their union activities, occurring in January and February 2015. (Id. at 7 – 8). 

Subpoena Duces Tecum No. B-1-NVOXOL, issued against Lear in Case No. 

15-CA-146313 on August 18, 2015, “requires the production of the books, records, 

documents, and other materials within the possession or under the control of 

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Lear Renosol Selma Manufacturing Facility, wherever such documents may be 

located,” which concern each of the charged incidents. (Id. at 17 – 25)

Board Case No. 15-CA-148040 was initiated against Lear by the filing of a 

formal charge on March 12, 2015. (Id. at 10). The charge has been twice 

amended, with a second amended charge filed January 26, 2016, listing four 

alleged incidents of improper conduct, occurring in March 2015, by Lear against 

certain employees for their union activities, either in the form of interrogation or 

retaliation. (Id. at 14). Subpoena Duces Tecum No. B-1-NVG15D was issued 

against Lear in Case No. 15-CA-148040, on August 18, 2015, and “requires the 

production of the books, records, documents, and other materials within the 

possession or under the control of Lear Renosol Selma Manufacturing Facility, 

wherever such documents may be located,” which concern each of the incidents. 

(Id. at 30 – 38).

The above-referenced ten subpoenas are collectively referred to herein as 

“the Subpoenas.” Lear filed petitions with the Board to revoke the Subpoenas, 

or alternatively to enforce them under a protective order (id. at 44 – 50, 52 – 58; 

Doc. 7 at 195 – 205), which the Board denied (Doc. 1-1 at 60 – 62, 64 – 66; Doc. 7 

at 306 – 308). After informal attempts to secure Lear’s compliance with the 

Subpoenas did not succeed, the Board filed the present applications seeking their 

enforcement.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Board’s applications are properly brought under 29 U.S.C. § 161(2), 

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which provides:

In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any 

person,[3] any district court of the United States . . . , within the 

jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the 

jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to 

obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by 

the Board shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order 

requiring such person to appear before the Board, its member, agent, 

or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give 

testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; 

and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by 

said court as a contempt thereof.

See also NLRB v. Wilson, 335 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1964)4 (“The district court 

has power to enforce [subpoenas issued by the Board] under 29 U.S.C.A. 

161(2)...”).

The Subpoenas were issued in connection with the Board’s investigation of 

charges alleging unlawful activity occurring at Lear’s facility in Selma, Dallas 

County, Alabama, which is part of this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 

81(c)(1).5 Thus, jurisdiction and venue in this Court are both proper.

III. General Legal Standards

“For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in the opinion of 

the Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested in it by 

sections 159 and 160 of this title[, t]he Board, or its duly authorized agents or 

 3 “The term ‘person’ includes one or more . . . partnerships, associations, [and ]corporations,” 

among other entities. 29 U.S.C. § 152(1).

4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh 

Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior 

to October 1, 1981.

5 This is the Board’s second subpoena enforcement action brought in this Court against of 

Lear. See S.D. Ala. Case No. 1:15-mc-00005-CG-N.

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agencies, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of 

examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated 

or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in 

question.” 29 U.S.C. § 161(1). “The provision can be read only as giving the 

[Board] a right to obtain that evidence, not a mere license to seek it.” Univ. of 

Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 192 (1990) (rejecting the contention that “that Title 

VII's subpoena enforcement provisions do not give the [Equal Employment 

Opportunity ]Commission an unqualified right to acquire []evidence” as 

inconsistent with “the plain language of the text of [42 U.S.C. ]§ 2000e–8(a), 

which states that the Commission ‘shall . . . have access’ to ‘relevant’ evidence 

(emphasis added).”).6

The Supreme Court has recognized the broad investigatory power of 

administrative agencies:

Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon 

evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, 

it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with 

seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise 

powers of original inquiry. It has a power of inquisition, if one 

chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judicial 

function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does 

not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence 

 6 EEOC investigations have also been governed by § 161 since 1972. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 

2000e-9. Thus, decisions involving the EEOC’s investigatory powers are equally relevant 

in construing those of the Board. Cf. EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 309 

n.6 (7th Cir. 1981) (“The investigatory powers of 29 U.S.C. s 161 ... originally belonged to the 

National Labor Relations Board, and ... were subsequently made available to the EEOC in a 

1972 amendment to 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-9. By that amendment Congress obviously intended 

the EEOC powers to be construed in light of prior interpretations of the Labor Board's 

powers.”).

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but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being 

violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.

United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43, 70 S. Ct. 

357, 364, 94 L. Ed. 401 (1950). See also Peters[ v. United States], 853 

F.2d [692,] 696[ (9th Cir. 1988)] (“[t]he authority of an 

administrative agency to issue subpoenas for investigatory purposes 

is created solely by statute”).

“It is well-settled that the role of a district court in a proceeding to 

enforce an administrative subpoena is sharply limited; inquiry is 

appropriate only into whether the evidence sought is material and 

relevant to a lawful purpose of the agency.” EEOC v. Kloster Cruise 

Ltd., 939 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1991). “As a general rule, an 

administrative subpoena should be enforced ‘if the inquiry is within 

the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the 

information sought is reasonably relevant.’ ” Federal Election Com'n 

v. Florida for Kennedy Committee, 681 F.2d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir.

1982) (citations omitted). See also Burlington Northern R. Co. v. 

Office of Inspector General R.R. Retirement Bd., 983 F.2d 631, 638 

(5th Cir.1993).

United States v. Fla. Azalea Specialists, 19 F.3d 620, 622-23 (11th Cir. 1994). 

See also Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 191 (1990) (“[W]hen a court is asked 

to enforce a Commission subpoena, its responsibility is to ‘satisfy itself that the 

charge is valid and that the material requested is “relevant” to the charge ... and 

more generally to assess any contentions by the employer that the demand for 

information is too indefinite or has been made for an illegitimate purpose.’ It is 

not then to determine ‘whether the charge of discrimination is “well founded” or 

“verifiable.” ’ ” (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 72 n. 26 (1984))). 

The policy behind such limited review is “[t]o avoid delays that might paralyze 

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an agency’s ability to investigate . . . ” Fed. Election Comm'n v. Fla. for Kennedy 

Comm., 681 F.2d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 1982). Thus, “agency subpoena 

enforcement proceedings are ‘of a summary nature not requiring the issuance of 

process, hearing, findings of fact, and the elaborate process of a civil suit.’ ” 

EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 310-11 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting 

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d 450, 451 (6th Cir. 1941)).7

“The salutary policies of judicial and administrative efficiency that 

underlie the Morton Salt rule do not, however, require that the courts limit their 

scrutiny of agency subpoena requests in every case.” Fla. for Kennedy, 681 F.2d 

at 1284. For instance, characteristics of a subpoena may “make it necessary for 

the court to be certain of the [agency]'s investigative authority before enforcing 

it, although such scrutiny may entail some delay in enforcement.” Id. 

Moreover, “whenever it is made to appear to the court that a subpoena is too 

broadly or oppressively drawn or there are reasons to believe that it will be 

enforced capriciously or oppressively, it is the duty of the court to prevent abuse 

of its process[,]” Jackson Packing Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1953) 

(citing NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills, 197 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1952)), and “[i]t is 

 7 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “apply to proceedings to compel testimony or the 

production of documents through a subpoena issued by a United States officer or agency 

under a federal statute, except as otherwise provided by statute, by local rule, or by court 

order in the proceedings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(5). “Although the provision allows full 

recognition of the fact that the rigid application of the rules in the proceedings themselves 

may conflict with the summary determination desired, it is drawn so as to permit 

application of any of the rules in the proceedings whenever the district court deems them 

helpful.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (citations 

omitted).

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clear that the district court can effectively exercise its discretion so as to relieve 

the [subpoenaed party] from any undue oppression or burden without quashing 

the subpoenas entirely.” NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co. of Miami, 257 F.2d 672, 

673 (5th Cir. 1958). See also EEOC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F.3d 

757, 760, 763 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“A district court ... ‘may weigh such 

equitable criteria as reasonableness and oppressiveness in issuing a subpoena 

for documents.’ EEOC v. Packard Elec. Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 569 F.2d 315, 

318 (5th Cir. 1978) ... The court in Packard stated that a district court is 

authorized to ‘weigh such equitable criteria as reasonableness and 

oppressiveness’ and that ‘this rubric impl[ies] a balancing of hardships and 

benefits.’ 569 F.2d at 318. The use of such ... criteria’ and the plural of 

‘hardship’ and ‘benefit’ clearly indicates that a district court may consider a 

number of factors in this analysis, rather than requiring specific types of 

evidence on a single factor.”).

District courts have discretion to enter a protective order in conjunction 

with enforcing an administrative subpoena. See McLaughlin v. Serv. Emps. 

Union, AFL-CIO, Local 280, 880 F.2d 170, 174 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We review a 

district court's determination to issue a protective order imposing restrictions on 

an administrative subpoena for abuse of discretion.”); FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 

202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“In order to protect trade secrets, district courts have 

required appropriate protection as a precondition to enforcement of FTC 

subpoenas. The decision as to the type and scope of any protective order rests 

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within the sound discretion of the trial judge and must be determined on a case 

by case basis.” (citations omitted)); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 

772, 785 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Courts have inherent power to grant orders of 

confidentiality over materials not in the court file. In Seattle Times Co. v. 

Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 81 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1984), the Supreme 

Court confirmed that courts have the power to grant confidentiality orders over 

material not on file with the court, id. at 33 n.19, 104 S. Ct. at 2207 n.19, holding 

that ‘we have no question as to the court's jurisdiction to [enter protective orders] 

under the inherent “equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to 

prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices,” ’ id. at 35, 104 S. Ct. at 2209 

(quoting International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407–08 (2d Cir. 

1963)).”).

“[T]he sole criterion for determining the validity of a protective order is the 

statutory requirement of ‘good cause.’ ” In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 

F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. 

Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). See also Pansy, 23 

F.3d at 785-86. “ ‘Good cause’ is a well established legal phrase. Although 

difficult to define in absolute terms, it generally signifies a sound basis or 

legitimate need to take judicial action. In a different context, [the Eleventh 

Circuit] has identified four factors for ascertaining the existence of good cause 

which include: ‘[1] the severity and the likelihood of the perceived harm; [2] the 

precision with which the order is drawn; [3] the availability of a less onerous 

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alternative; and [4] the duration of the order.’ ” In re Alexander Grant, 820 F.2d 

at 356 (quoting Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1205 (11th 

Cir. 1985)). “In addition, this circuit has superimposed a ‘balancing of interests’ 

approach to Rule 26(c).” Id. (citing Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 

1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985)). See also Corcel Corp. v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 291 

F.R.D. 680, 681 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“The burden of persuasion is on the party 

moving for a protective order.” (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 

1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986))).

IV. Analysis

a. Duplicative Investigations & the Memorandum of Understanding

In support of its assertion that the Court should decline to enforce the 

Subpoenas, or in the alternative enter a protective order limiting their scope, 

Lear’s lone substantive contention is that the Board’s investigation is duplicative 

of an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigation into 

the same issues. (Doc. 9 at 7-9; M.C. Doc. 4 at 15-18).8 In Perez v. Lear Corp. 

EEDS & Interiors, et al, S.D. Ala. Case No. 2:15-cv-00205-CG-M, now pending 

before this Court, OSHA has secured preliminary injunctive relief and filed a 

Complaint against Lear based on fact patterns substantially related to those in 

 8 Lear’s briefs also cite authority generally stating other grounds for a district court to quash 

or modify an administrative subpoena (e.g., information sought is unrelated to underlying 

charge, or seeks to initiate or expand charges; investigation exceeds agency’s statutory 

authority; overbreadth; “fishing expedition”). However, Lear has offered no substantive 

analysis for why any of those other grounds apply in this action, either in its briefing or at 

oral argument. Because those issues are insufficiently raised, the undersigned declines to 

address them.

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the Board’s unfair labor practice charges that are the subject of the Subpoenas. 

OSHA’s actions are brought pursuant to Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety 

and Health Act (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c). (See S.D. Ala. Case No. 

2:15-cv-00205-CG-M [Doc. 1 at 1; Doc. 50 at 1]). 

Lear asserts that, by insisting on compliance with the Subpoenas even as 

OSHA’s Perez action remains ongoing, the Board is contravening a 1975 

Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies that has been 

published in the Federal Register, 40 Fed. Reg. 26083 (hereinafter, the “MOU”).9 

The stated purposes of the MOU are “to avoid duplicate litigation and insure that 

the exercise by employees of their rights in the area of health and safety will be 

protected...” 40 Fed. Reg. at 26083. Discussing the overlap of subject matter 

between the agencies’ respective statutory mandates in section 11(c) of the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”) and Sections 7 and 8 of the 

National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), the MOU recognizes:

Although there may be some safety and health activities which may 

be protected solely under the (OSH) Act, it appears that many 

employee safety activities may be protected under both Acts. 

However, since an employee’s right to engage in safety and health 

activity is specifically protect by the OSH Act and is only generally 

included in the broader right to engage in concerted activities under 

the NLRA, it is appropriate that enforcement actions to protect such 

safety and health activities should primarily be taken under the 

OSH Act rather than the NLRA.

Id. (paragraph 3-A). See also NLRB v. Oakes Mach. Corp., 897 F.2d 84, 91 (2d 

Cir. 1990) (discussing the MOU’s provisions); 15 Emp. Coord. Workplace Safety § 

 9 Lear has also filed copies of the MOU with the record. (See Doc. 7 at 191 – 192; Doc. 10-1).

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5:65 (same).

Section B of the MOU sets out various procedures to be followed where a 

charge filed with the Board involves issues covered by section 11(c) of the OSH 

Act, depending on the circumstances:

B. Procedural agreement. 1. When a charge involving issues 

covered by Section 11(c) of the OSH Act has been filed with the 

[NLRB’s] General Counsel and a Complaint has been filed with 

OSHA as to the same factual matters, the General Counsel will, 

absent withdrawal of the matter, defer or dismiss the charge. The 

General Counsel will inform the charging party of its action and will 

send a copy of such letter to OSHA.

2. Where a charge involving issues covered by section 11(c) of the 

OSH Act has been filed with the General Counsel, but no complaint 

has been filed with OSHA, the General Counsel will notify the 

employee of his right to file a complaint under section 11(c), which 

right should be exercised within 30 days. If the employee notifies 

the General Counsel of the filing of an OSHA complaint, or if the 

General Counsel is so informed by OSHA pursuant to consultations 

at the end of the 30-day period, then the General Counsel will 

proceed in accordance with paragraph B-1 above.

3. The General Counsel will process under the NLRA those charges 

involving issues covered by section 11(c) of the OSH Act where, after 

notice pursuant to paragraph B-2 above, the charging party has not 

filed or, having filed, has withdrawn a complaint with OSHA.

4. Where a charge has been filed with the General Counsel which 

includes both issues covered by Section 11(c) of the OSH Act and 

matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Counsel, the 

General Counsel and the Office of the Solicitor of Labor will consult 

in order to determine the appropriate handling of the matter.

5. The parties to this agreement will engage in periodic consultations 

in order to review its implementation.

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See id. at 26084. 

In its briefing at the administrative level, Lear asserted that the 

Subpoenas were due to be revoked, or alternatively that a protective order should 

be entered, because, inter alia, the underlying charges were due to be dismissed 

or deferred under paragraph B-1 of the MOU. In opposition to Lear’s petitions 

to revoke, the Board’s General Counsel did not dispute that paragraph B-1 was 

the relevant provision but argued that an investigation was necessary to 

determine if dismissal or deferral was appropriate. (See Doc. 7 at 198 – 200, 

293, 295 – 296, 299 – 302; Doc. 1-1 at 46 – 49, 54 – 57 [duplicate at Doc. 10-6 at 4 

– 7]).

A majority of a 3-member panel of the Board rejected Lear’s petitions to 

revoke. After summarily rejecting Lear’s other arguments for revocation, the 

majority, essentially agreeing with the General Counsel’s position, held that “the 

MOU does not require the Region to determine whether to defer or dismiss such 

charges, or engage in consultations with the Solicitor of Labor concerning 

deferral or dismissal, without having investigated the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the allegations.” Though the majority specifically quoted only 

paragraph B-1 as the “relevant part” of the MOU, their mention of “consultations 

with the Solicitor of Labor” suggests they also considered the applicability of

paragraph B-4. (Doc. 1-1 at 60 – 61, 64 – 65; Doc. 7 at 306 – 307).10

 10 The Board panel issued three separate orders in denying Lear’s various petitions to 

revoke. However, the orders are substantively identical in all relevant aspects.

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The dissenting member voiced his belief that, “in light of its stated goal of 

‘obviat[ing] duplicate litigation,’ .... the MOU requires the General Counsel to 

comply with [Section B’s] procedures before the Region conducts any 

investigation.” Asserting that the relevant MOU provision was paragraph B-4 

and noting there was no evidence that a consultation prescribed by that provision 

had occurred, the dissent would have revoked the Subpoenas, but without 

prejudice to reissuance of one or more of them following the consultation. 

Appearing to accept “the General Counsel’s assertion that ‘the totality of the 

circumstances must be considered’ to determine the merits of the allegations that 

arise solely under the NLRA,” the dissent stated that he “would not attempt to 

sort out which aspects of the subpoenas seek evidence related to issues covered 

by Sec. 11(c) of the OSH Act, and which seek evidence limited to matters within 

the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Counsel.” Notably, the dissent did not 

suggest that the charges against Lear should be deferred or dismissed under the 

MOU. Moreover, in stating his belief that no investigation could commence 

prior to compliance with the MOU, the dissent conceded “the MOU does not 

explicitly indicate when compliance with [its] procedures is to occur ...” 

(Doc. 1-1 at 61 – 62, 65 – 66; Doc. 7 at 407 – 408 (emphasis added)).

Here, Lear asserts that, whether paragraph B-1 or B-4 of the MOU applies, 

the Board is required to follow the prescribed procedures upon the filing of a 

charge and prior to undertaking any investigation. Because the Board has not 

done so, Lear argues, the Court should decline to enforce the Subpoenas. For its 

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part, the Board essentially restates the arguments of its General Counsel that 

won the day at the administrative level and the opinion of the Board majority. 

The Board has never taken the position that it does not intend to comply with the 

MOU at some point, nor does it contest Lear’s ability to challenge in this Court 

the Board’s compliance with the MOU. The Board has cited no authority in 

support of its position (other than the above-discussed Board opinions), and the 

undersigned finds the scant authority Lear has cited to be unrevealing on the 

issue.11 See infra, n.15. However, the undersigned need not determine when

the terms of the MOU require compliance with its procedures. 

“[N]ot all agency publications are of binding force...” Lyng v. Payne, 476 

U.S. 926, 937 (1986). “[I]n other words, the guidelines in question must be ‘the 

kind of agency law the violation of which is remediable at all.’ ” Coliseum 

Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 229 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lyng, 

476 U.S. at 937)).

In determining whether a regulation has the “force and effect of 

law,” the Supreme Court has distinguished between “substantive 

rules” on the one hand, and “interpretive rules, general statements 

of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” on 

the other. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 

1717, 60 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1979). For a regulation to have the force and 

effect of law, and thus to be the source of an affirmative legal 

 11 Lear admits that it “cannot locate a reported decision where a district court has been 

required to address this particular issue presented.” (Doc. 7 at 118). The undersigned has 

similarly come up empty-handed.

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obligation, it must be a “substantive rule.” United States v. Harvey,

659 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).[12]

Smith v. Russellville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d 1544, 1547-48 (11th Cir. 1985). 

“[A] substantive or legislative-type rule i[s] one ‘affecting individual obligations,’ 

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 94 S. Ct. 1055, 1073, 39 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1971) 

which has been issued by the agency pursuant to statutory authority and 

promulgated in accordance with the procedural requirements of the 

Administrative Procedure Act. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 302-303, 

99 S. Ct. at 1718.” Harvey, 659 F.2d at 64. 

“Nonlegislative rules are those not promulgated pursuant to a power to 

issue regulations with binding effect; they are merely an expression of how the 

agency interprets and intends to enforce its governing statute, how it intends to 

exercise a discretionary function, or the procedure an agency intends to use in 

exercising its powers.” Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 688 F.2d 

1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, I.C.C. v. Am. Trucking 

Ass’ns, Inc., 467 U.S. 354 (1984). “[N]on-substantive rules are not judicially 

enforceable.” Gatter v. Nimmo, 672 F.2d 343, 347 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing 

Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per curiam); Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. 

at 301-02)). Accord First Family Mortg. Corp. of Fla. v. Earnest, 851 F.2d 843, 

844-45 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing cases). See also Harvey, 659 F.2d at 64-65 

 12 In Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982), the Eleventh Circuit 

adopted as binding all decisions issued by a Unit B panel of the former Fifth Circuit.

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(provisions of administrative manual were general statements of agency policy 

that did “not create substantive rights ... enforceable in federal court”).

Though it is published in the Federal Register, there is no indication that 

the MOU was promulgated in accordance with the notice-and-comment 

requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers 

Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203-04 (2015) (describing APA procedures); Coliseum 

Square, 465 F.3d at 230 (“Here, plaintiffs neither argue nor offer evidence that 

HUD’s guidelines were promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act’s 

procedural requirements. Plaintiffs’s [sic] first argument therefore fails: HUD 

has not acted contrary to law by using methodology different from that contained 

in the Guidebook.”). Moreover, nothing in the MOU indicates intent to allow 

non-parties to invoke its provisions. Rather, read as a whole, the undersigned 

finds the MOU is most appropriately considered a non-substantive general 

statement of policy, with Section B setting forth non-substantive rules of agency 

procedure or practice to implement that general policy.13

Smith v. Russellville Production is illustrative. There, the appellants 

argued “that a regulation stating that, as a general policy, [federally charted 

Production Credit Associations] shall provide means of forbearance to 

 13 See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The distinctive 

purpose of [the] exemption[] for ‘rules of agency organization, procedure or practice,’ is to 

ensure ‘that agencies retain latitude in organizing their internal operations.” ... ‘A useful 

articulation of the exemption’s critical feature is that it covers agency actions that do not 

themselves alter the rights or interests of parties, although it may alter the manner in 

which parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.’” (quoting Batterton v. 

Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation omitted)).

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cooperative borrowers, see 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510(d)(1), imposes an affirmative 

duty on PCAs and provides the basis for an implied private right of action.” 777 

F.2d at 1547. Analyzing its precedent in Harvey, the Eleventh Circuit held:

[T]he “means of forbearance” regulation ... is not a substantive rule 

but, rather, is a general statement of agency policy. The regulation 

states that, when banks and associations develop their loan 

servicing policies and procedures, “the policy shall provide a means 

of forbearance” for borrowers meeting certain criteria. 12 C.F.R. § 

614.4510(d)(1) (emphasis added). Although the term “shall” 

indicates the mandatory nature of this policy, the regulation is 

nevertheless directed at agency policy, and is not a substantive rule. 

Accordingly, we hold that 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510(d)(1) does not have 

the force and effect of law, and does not provide the basis for an 

implied private right of action on behalf of borrowers such as the 

Smiths.

Id. at 1548. Like the regulation in Smith, the MOU, despite the mandatory 

nature of Section B in its use of the term “will,” is “directed at agency policy, and 

is not a substantive rule.” Id.

The undersigned also finds, as did the D.C. Circuit in American Hospital v. 

Bowen, that

[t]he Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States Department of Labor v. 

Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1984), is particularly 

instructive with regard to this [issue]. In Kast Metals, the court of 

appeals held that the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (“OSHA”) had validly developed a calculus to target 

employers for inspection, despite the fact that this calculus had been 

adopted without notice and comment rulemaking. The court 

reasoned that OSHA's inspection plan, known as CPL 2.25B, fell far 

short of the sort of investigative activity likely to have the intent or 

effect of substantially altering party behavior. Id. at 1150. “The 

creation and use of CPL 2.25B to select employers for inspection did 

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not of itself constitute investigation; rather, the plan sets forth 

procedural steps to guide the agency in exercise of its statutory 

authority to conduct investigations.” 744 F.2d at 1150 (footnote 

omitted). In classifying OSHA’s rule as procedural under § 553, the 

Fifth Circuit wrote, “[t]he Secretary used CPL 2.25B to concentrate 

OSHA’s inspection resources in industries with the highest potential 

for safety and health violations.... The plan is procedural on its face.” 

Id. at 1152. 

834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Applying the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, 

the D.C. Circuit held that, “[l]ike OSHA rule CPL 2.25B, HHS Manual IM85–2[, 

promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services to define 

procedures governing the review functions of peer review organizations,]

operates to concentrate agency inspection resources in areas (here, medical 

procedures) with the highest potential for statutory violations (here, violations of 

Medicare's reimbursement standards), and like CPL 2.25B, HHS’ manual is 

procedural on its face.” Id.

Similar to the administrative promulgations in Kast Metals and American 

Hospital, the MOU is simply an interagency agreement that “sets forth 

procedural steps to guide [OSHA and the Board] in exercise of [their shared] 

statutory authority to conduct investigations” related to certain protected 

activity. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d at 1150. In those cases, the 

promulgations were aimed at maximizing use from limited agency resources by 

concentrating them in areas with the highest potential for violations; here, the 

MOU is aimed at conserving limited agency resources by “avoid[ing] duplicate 

litigation.” See also Am. Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1050 (“[E]nforcement plans 

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developed by agencies to direct their enforcement activity warrant considerable 

deference.”).14 Because the MOU is non-substantive, Lear, having failed to 

persuade the Board to follow its view of the MOU, is not entitled to have this 

Court force the Board to do so here.

Lear asserts that the Board’s “clear disregard of its own defined protocol 

casts suspicion on its true intentions in this case” (Doc. 7 at 110 – 111), which

could certainly be relevant to whether there is a “reason[] to believe that [the 

Subpoenas] will be enforced capriciously or oppressively,” thus invoking “the 

duty of the court to prevent abuse of its process,” Jackson Packing, 204 F.2d at 

844, or “that the demand for information ... has been made for an illegitimate 

 14 The undersigned has located one published case in which the Board and OSHA did 

not appear to treat the MOU as binding. In NLRB v. Oakes Machine Corp., 897 F.2d 84 (2d 

Cir. 1990), an employee filed both a complaint with OSHA and a charge with the Board, 

claiming that he was discharged in violation of both Section 11(c) of the OSH Act and 

Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA for seeking workplace safety information from two state 

government agencies. See 897 F.2d at 90-91. It was undisputed that, at the time the 

charge was filed, the employee “could have succeeded on his claim under either the NLRA or 

the OSH Act and could have obtained identical relief in either forum...” Id. at 91. 

Nevertheless, as the Second Circuit criticized, OSHA and the Board “contravened the 

general policy of their joint agreement, and decided that OSHA would defer to the NLRB” on 

the matter – “ironically, because his ‘rights [might be] vindicated more quickly through 

Board processes than [by OSHA]’.” Id. 

However, the court expressed no opinion on the MOU’s substantive nature vel non, 

or to what extent the agencies were bound to comply with it. Rather, the court’s criticism 

was made in the context of determining whether manifest injustice counseled against giving 

retroactive effect to a change in Board policy that occurred during the intervening six years 

the Board took to process an appeal from an initial favorable decision by an administrative 

law judge. The court answered that question in the affirmative, finding that the charging 

party’s reasonable reliance on “the agencies’ assessment of the issue” in deferring to the 

Board on his charge resulted in his case “languish[ing]” for eight years at the 

administrative level, during which time the Board overruled prior standards crucial to the 

employee’s claims.

Moreover, as is explored elsewhere in this recommendation, the MOU’s “general 

policy” of deferring to OSHA is far clearer from the plain text of the document than when

deferral should occur.

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purpose.” Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 191 (quotations omitted). However Lear 

has failed to persuade the undersigned that the Board’s decision to conduct some 

investigation to determine whether dismissal or deference under the MOU is 

warranted is a capricious, oppressive, or otherwise illegitimate use of its 

subpoena power. Lear has provided no evidence or authority suggesting the 

Board has disregarded prior precedent on the issue or has otherwise engaged in 

inconsistent or selective enforcement of the MOU.15 Indeed, consideration of 

the majority and dissenting opinions in the Board’s orders denying revocation 

suggests that the issue of when compliance with the MOU is to occur is an 

unsettled question at the administrative level. Neither the majority nor the 

dissent cited any authority in support of its respective position regarding the 

MOU, and the dissent expressly acknowledged “the MOU does not explicitly 

indicate when compliance with [its] procedures is to occur.” See Lyng, 476 U.S. 

at 939 (“[A]n agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to 

substantial deference.”). Lear’s bare insinuations that the Board is acting as a 

union “litigation arm,” rather than a neutral “enforcer of federal labor law” (Doc. 

 15 The two advice memoranda from the Board’s General Counsel that Lear has cited, 

Subject: Mazer Chemicals, Inc., Case 13-CA-21004, 1981 WL 25947 (June 29, 1981), and 

Subject: Tsa Corp., Case 30-CA-6620, 1983 WL 29399 (May 5, 1983), provide little clarity on 

the issue. Neither memorandum specifically discusses or mentions the MOU as a basis for 

recommending dismissal of its subject charge. While each memorandum contains some 

language referencing the policy of deferring to OSHA on certain matters, neither document 

discusses this policy in absolute or mandatory terms (Mazer Chemical, for instance, simply 

refers to it as “current policy”). More importantly, neither document indicates that its 

recommendation of dismissal was issued prior to any investigatory activities by the Board. 

Indeed, Mazer Chemicals expressly based its recommendation of dismissal in part on 

insufficiency of the evidence, suggesting that some investigation of the charge had occurred 

beforehand.

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7 at 101), and its general complaints regarding the expense of complying with the 

Subpoenas16 also fail to convince the undersigned that the Subpoenas should not 

be enforced.17

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that Lear’s objections to 

enforcement of the Subpoenas are due to be OVERRULED, and that its 

alternative request for a protective order “to clarify the information sought by 

the NLRB and necessarily limit it in order to eliminate the duplicate overlap 

with OSHA’s § 11(c) whistleblower investigation” (Doc. 7 at 119 – 120) (in effect,

simply another way of asking the Court to enforce Lear’s view of the MOU) is 

due to be DENIED. 18 Accordingly, and being otherwise satisfied that 

enforcement of the Subpoenas is appropriate under the relevant standards, the 

 16 Cf. NLRB v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 707 F.2d 110, 114 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“The 

mere fact that compliance with the subpoenas may require the production of thousands of 

documents is also insufficient to establish burdensomeness.”).

17 Lear also argues that “the potential for contradictory fact findings and conclusions of law 

that could result from dual-track investigations by OSHA and the NLRB is obvious” and 

“promises to create chaos in future litigation.” (Doc. 7 at 118). While dual-track 

investigations certainly may be inconvenient, Lear has not cited any demonstrative 

authority or otherwise explained how it would be prejudiced by this. Indeed, the MOU 

expressly recognizes that OSHA and the Board share statutory authority over certain 

subject matter, and the very fact the MOU was negotiated indicates that dual-track 

investigations could be contemplated under those statutes. Regardless, any such concern is 

too speculative at this point.

18 The Board is cautioned, however, that this recommendation should not be interpreted as 

license to conduct an indefinite investigation of the underlying charges under the guise of 

determining whether to defer to OSHA under the MOU. At all times in this action, the 

Board has represented to the Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 that it intends 

to make a determination of how to proceed under the MOU at some point and that the 

information sought by the Subpoenas is necessary to making an informed decision of 

whether to defer to OSHA. (See Doc. 7 at 417 – 418; Doc. 12 at 2 – 3). The longer the 

Board’s investigation of this matter continues without such a determination, the more 

persuasive Lear’s assertions the investigation is capricious, oppressive, or otherwise 

illegitimate may become in future subpoena enforcement actions.

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undersigned finds that the Board’s applications for enforcement are due to be 

GRANTED. 

b. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Board’s applications also request that Lear be ordered “to reimburse 

the Board for the costs and attorneys fees (calculated at the prevailing market 

rate) incurred in initiating and prosecuting this subpoena enforcement action...” 

(Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 7 at 11). Lear has responded that such an award of attorneys’ 

fees is inappropriate. (Doc. 7 at 120 – 121; Doc. 9 at 10). As an initial matter, 

the authorities cited by both parties, and the undersigned, are in agreement that 

29 U.S.C. § 161 does not, on its face, provide for an award of attorney’s fees to 

any party in subpoena enforcement actions like this one. See NLRB v. 

Edwards, No. 2:11MC3546-WKW, 2012 WL 235522, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 

2012) (Walker, M.J.) (“Although the statute authorizing enforcement of the 

Board’s administrative subpoena provides that the court may punish the 

respondent for contempt in the event he fails to obey the court’s order requiring 

him to appear, it does not provide expressly for an award of attorney fees upon 

the court’s issuance of such an order.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

2:11-MC-3546-WKW, 2012 WL 229637 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2012) (Watkins, C.J.). 

The Board has not, however, cited any authority under which it may be awarded

attorney’s fees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B) (“Unless a statute or a court order 

provides otherwise, [a] motion [for attorney’s fees] must . . . specify the judgment 

and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award . . .”); 

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NLRB v. Cable Car Advertisers, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 991, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 

(“[N]either § 161(1) nor § 161(2) has any provision regarding payment of 

attorney fees or costs incurred in enforcing a subpoena in district court. The only 

basis for allowing fees or costs is under § 161(2), when ‘failure to obey such order 

of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.’ However, 

this applies when the district court has already issued an order enforcing 

compliance to the subpoena and the party disobeys the order. See 29 U.S.C. § 

161(2). It does not appear that the statute would cover costs incurred in filing a 

motion to enforce compliance.”).

In the authorities cited by the Board, district courts awarded it fees in § 

161(2) subpoena enforcement actions as discovery sanctions against the opposing 

parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. See Cable Car, 319 F. Supp. 

2d at 999 – 1001 & n.9 (awarding fees under Rule 37(d) for failure to comply with 

discovery, noting that “the Board's subpoenas seek documents from and 

depositions of the opposing party and, in this respect, are comparable to 

discovery requests pursuant to Rules 34 (documents) and 30 (depositions).”);19

 19 The undersigned notes that the Cable Car opinion consists of a magistrate judge’s report 

and recommendation and a district judge’s order on same, with the pertinent language on 

attorneys’ fees found in the R&R. The district judge adopted the R&R “in every respect, 

except the Court f[ound] that the costs and attorneys' fees are inconsequential, and thus 

order[ed] the parties to bear their own costs and attorneys' fees[,]” though the “order 

regarding attorneys' fees and costs [wa]s made without prejudice” to the Board “renew[ing] 

its motion for attorneys' fees and costs should further attorneys' fees and costs be incurred. 

319 F. Supp. 2d at 993. Since the district judge ended up awarding no fees in that opinion, 

Cable Car’s reasoning on fees could be considered dictum. However, this observation is 

largely academic, as district court dicta have as much precedential authority as district 

court holdings – that is, none at all. See United States v. Cerceda, 172 F.3d 806, 812 n.6 

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NLRB v. Baywatch Sec. & Investigations, Civil Action No. H-04-220, 2005 WL 

1155109, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2005) (applying Cable Car’s reasoning and 

awarding the Board fees under Rule 37(d)); NLRB v. Coughlin, No. 4:04-MC-8, 

2005 WL 850964, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2005) (appearing to analogize a 

subpoena enforcement action under § 161(2) to a Rule 37(a) motion to compel 

and awarding fees under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)).20 However, the undersigned finds 

more persuasive the authorities cited by Lear indicating that subpoena 

enforcement actions under § 161(2) are not the equivalent of engaging in 

discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In particular, those authorities direct attention to EEOC v. Deer Valley 

Unified School District, 968 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1992), in which the Ninth Circuit 

determined that a subpoena enforcement action like this one is “not a form of 

discovery enabled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 968 F.2d at 906. 

The court reasoned as follows:

The investigatory subpoena power of the EEOC is based on specific 

statutory authority, not on the general discovery provisions of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The EEOC has express statutory 

authority to issue “subpoenas requiring the attendance and 

 

(11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam) (“The opinion of a district court carries no 

precedential weight, even within the same district.”).

20 The Board has also cited NLRB v. A.G.F. Sports Ltd., No. MISC. 93-049 (CBA), 1994 WL 

507779, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 1994), as supporting an award of fees to the Board for 

bringing this action. However, as another district court has already noted, that case 

“pertains to calculation of the amount of fees and costs allowable pursuant to an earlier 

order awarding costs and fees. It includes no discussion regarding the legal authority 

supporting such an award and, accordingly, is not persuasive.” Edwards, 2012 WL 235522, 

at *2 n.3.

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testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence” during its 

investigations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–9, incorporating the provisions of 

29 U.S.C. § 161(1). It is clear that the EEOC has the power to 

investigate charges of discrimination and to utilize the statutory 

subpoena power in doing so. EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr.,

719 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc); EEOC v. Maryland 

Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 815, 

107 S. Ct. 68, 93 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1986); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–5(b); 2000e–

8(a); 2000e–9.

Because this is not a form of discovery enabled by the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, no “discovery motion” is required to enforce it. 

The EEOC brought an original action to enforce a statutorily 

authorized subpoena. It is significant to note that the comments to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, which authorizes subpoenas in aid of discovery, 

specify that “[i]t does not apply to the enforcement of subpoenas 

issued by administrative officers and commissions pursuant to 

statutory authority. The enforcement of such subpoenas by the 

district courts is regulated by appropriate statutes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

45 advisory committee’s notes.

The function of administrative investigatory subpoenas differs from 

that of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The discovery provisions apply to actions that have 

already been filed with the court, and the parties are seeking to 

develop evidence for the action that is before the court. The statutory 

subpoena authority, on the other hand, is designed for 

administrative investigations, which may or may not result in any 

further action before the district court. The enforcement is 

dependent upon the interpretation of statutory authority, not the 

interpretations of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court stated in United States v. 

Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S. Ct. 357, 94 L. Ed. 401 (1950), 

that an agency “has a power of inquisition ... which is not derived 

from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, 

which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get 

evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is 

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being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is 

not.” Id. at 642–43, 70 S. Ct. at 364.

Id. (footnote omitted) (vacating sanction against EEOC for failure to comply with 

district court local rule requiring parties to meet to discuss their dispute before 

filing any discovery motion). See also Edwards, 2012 WL 235522, at *2 (relying 

on Deer Valley and other authorities in denying fees to the Board under Rules 37 

and 45); NLRB v. Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., No. 3:14MC52/MCR/EMT, 2015 WL 

150898, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2015) (Rodgers, C.J.) (same).

Accordingly, the undersigned finds the Board is not entitled to an award of 

attorneys’ fees under § 161(2), Rule 37, or Rule 45 for bringing this subpoena 

enforcement action. As the Board cites no other “statute, rule, or other 

grounds” indicating such an award is appropriate, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(d)(2)(B)(ii), the undersigned finds that its request for attorneys’ fees is due to 

be DENIED.21

 However, at this time, the undersigned finds no reason to believe that the 

Board would not be entitled to an award of costs in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides 

otherwise, costs – other than attorney’s fees – should be allowed to the prevailing 

 21 Even if Rule 37 were applicable, the undersigned would still recommend that the Board be 

awarded no attorneys’ fees under that Rule in this instance. Though the undersigned has 

rejected them, Lear’s arguments against enforcement of the Subpoenas were based on a 

plausible reading of the MOU, were not contrary to any clear precedent (certainly none cited 

by the Board), and were not otherwise frivolous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii) & (d)(3) 

(attorney’s fees should not be awarded where the opposing party’s resistance to discovery 

was “substantially justified”).

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party.”); Edwards, 2012 WL 235522, at *2, report and recommendation adopted, 

No. 2:11-MC-3546-WKW, 2012 WL 229637, at *1 (taxing costs against 

respondent under Rule 54). In the event the Board is the prevailing party in 

this action, it may apply for costs in accordance with S.D. Ala. CivLR 54 and the 

Court’s Standing Order No. 13.22

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is RECOMMENDED that 

Lear’s objections to enforcement of the Subpoenas be OVERRULED, that the 

Board’s applications for enforcement (Doc. 1; Doc. 7 at 3 – 12) be GRANTED, 

that Lear’s alternate request for entry of a protective order be DENIED, and that 

the Board’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing these 

applications be DENIED. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS the Court 

set a date certain for Lear to comply with the Subpoenas.

VI. Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or 

anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this 

document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c). The parties 

should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a 

magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and 

 22 www.alsd.uscourts.gov/sites/alsd/files/STDO13.PDF

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recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the 

absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain 

error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to 

which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or 

refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 10th day of May 2016.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson 

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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