Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50340/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50340-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Angel Ramirez-Estrada
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSE ANGEL RAMIREZ-ESTRADA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50340

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-00371-

JAH-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 3, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed April 25, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Richard R. Clifton,

Circuit Judges, and John R. Tunheim, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Clifton

* The Honorable John R. Tunheim, District Judge for the United States

District Court for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

Reversing a conviction of attempted entry after

deportation and making a false claim to United States

citizenship, the panel held that use of the defendant’s postMiranda-invocation silence to impeach him violated his

constitutional rights under Doyle v. Ohio.

The panel clarified that a Doyle violation occurs where

the prosecution uses a defendant’s post-invocation silence to

impeach the defendant regardless of whether, as here, the

police complied with Miranda.

The panel disagreed with the government and the district

court that it was the defendant’s statements in response to

routine booking questions, rather than his silence, that were

used to impeach him. The panel explained that the

defendant’s statements, by themselves, are not directly

inconsistent with his testimony, and it is only what he omitted

from his statements that was relevant to impeach him.

The panel concluded that the error was not harmless, and

remanded.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA 3

COUNSEL

Caitlin E. Howard, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San

Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Anne Kristina Perry (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney, Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, and Bruce

R. Castetter, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,

Appellate Section, Criminal Division, San Diego, California,

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

This case concerns the scope of a criminal defendant’s

constitutional rights under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610

(1976), which prevents impeachment of a defendant with his

post-Miranda silence. Defendant-Appellant Jose Angel

Ramirez-Estrada was convicted after a jury trial of attempted

illegal reentry and making a false claim to U.S. citizenship.

Ramirez-Estrada testified in his own defense, but the

government in rebuttal introduced his prior statements in

response to booking questions posed by a Customs and

Border Protection (“CBP”) officer after Ramirez-Estrada had

been arrested and had invoked his Miranda rights. Nothing

Ramirez-Estrada said in those statements served to impeach

his testimony. Rather, it is what he failed to say that was

relevant to undermine his credibility. We thus conclude that

the use of Ramirez-Estrada’s post-invocation silence to

impeach him violated his rights under Doyle. Because this

error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we

reverse.

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4 UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA

I. Background

Ramirez-Estrada was indicted for attempted illegal

reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and for making a false

claim to U.S. citizenship in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911. He

was found guilty by a jury on both charges. The district court

sentenced him to twenty-four months’ imprisonment on each

count, with the sentences to run concurrently. RamirezEstrada timely appealed from that final judgment.

The facts were mostly undisputed at trial. RamirezEstrada is an alien who had been deported from the United

States on previous occasions. At some point during his prior

incarceration in the United States in 2005, Ramirez-Estrada

sustained a serious jaw injury, regarding which the defense

presented extensive testimony. Sometime thereafter,

Ramirez-Estrada was involved in court proceedings in front

of United States District Judge Dana Sabraw. Judge Sabraw

recommended to the Bureau of Prisons that RamirezEstrada’s jaw injury be treated while he was in custody. The

injury was never treated, and Ramirez-Estrada was later

deported to Mexico.

In the early morning hours of January 4, 2011, without

having obtained permission to reenter the United States,

Ramirez-Estrada approached the San Ysidro Port of Entry.

The only dispute at trial concerned what occurred when

Ramirez-Estrada approached the primary inspection area of

the Port of Entry.

CBP Officer Matthew Ponce de Leon manned the primary

inspection booth that Ramirez-Estrada approached. Although

Officer Ponce de Leon had a difficult time recalling RamirezEstrada’s name and other details of their encounter, he

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UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA 5

testified that when he asked Ramirez-Estrada about his

citizenship, Ramirez-Estrada responded that he was a U.S.

citizen born in Las Vegas but claimed to have no paperwork

because it had been stolen. Because Ramirez-Estrada gave

Officer Ponce de Leon his true identity, however, the officer

was able to look him up and discovered the prior

deportations. He then referred Ramirez-Estrada to secondary

inspection. Officer Ponce de Leon also testified that at no

point did Ramirez-Estrada complain of anyphysical ailments.

On cross-examination, the defense called into question

Officer Ponce de Leon’s memory and Spanish language

skills.

Ramirez-Estrada testified differently. He did not approach

the Port of Entry in an attempt to reenter the United States, he

testified, but only to seek help for his jaw injury, which had

become increasingly painful with time and for which he had

been unable to obtain any treatment in Mexico. He believed

that based on Judge Sabraw’s recommendation he would get

treatment from federal officials. He explained all this to

Officer Ponce de Leon and other officers at neighboring

booths. He was then told to leave, but he did not because he

was desperate to get treatment for his jaw injury, and so he

was arrested and sent to the secondary inspection area. He

also testified that he provided the officers with a Mexican

identification card containing his true name, photo, and

fingerprint. He denied that he ever claimed to be a U.S.

citizen or to have been born in Las Vegas, but he

acknowledged having told the officers that he had lived near

that city, among other places. His credibility was challenged

on cross-examination, in particular by suggestions that

Ramirez-Estrada might not know what procedures would take

place at the border or that the officers would ask for

documents.

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6 UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA

No other witness testified directly as to the events at

primary inspection. The government sought to impeach

Ramirez-Estrada’s testimony by offering testimony in

rebuttal by CBP Officer Gabriela Nicasio, who was

responsible for booking Ramirez-Estrada several hours

following the encounter between Ramirez-Estrada and

Officer Ponce de Leon. The district court permitted that

rebuttal testimony, over defense counsel’s objections,

including a Doyle objection. It is the allowance of that

testimony that is central to this appeal.

As part of the booking process, Officer Nicasio read

Ramirez-Estrada his Miranda rights, which he invoked by

electing to wait for an attorney before answering any

questions. Officer Nicasio thereafter did not ask any

questions about the circumstances of Ramirez-Estrada’s

crime, but instead asked him routine booking questions. She

testified about that at trial, as the government’s sole rebuttal

witness. Aside from background information and an

identification of Ramirez-Estrada as the suspect apprehended

on January 4, 2011, her direct rebuttal testimony consisted

entirely of the following:

Q. Agent Nicasio, when you met with the

defendant, did you ask him some questions?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you ask him questions regarding his

health?

A. Yes, I did.

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UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA 7

Q. What question did you ask him regarding

his health?

A. I asked him if he had any health problems.

Q. What was his response?

A. He stated no.

Q. Did you ask him any other questions where

he responded with information about his

health?

A. I asked him if during the biographical

information, if he had any scars or tattoos, to

which he remarked or stated that he had two

scars above his eyebrows, somewhere in

there, and he pointed to his forehead, and he

had had a broken nose.

On cross-examination, the precise wording of the first

question was elicited:

Q. Now, when you asked him about health

condition, you actually asked him if he had

any health problems, like a heart condition,

diabetes, or anything like that, right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. So those were your actual, specific

words, like a heart condition, diabetes,

anything like that?

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8 UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA

A. Yes, sir. I used those as examples.

The government explicitly referred to Officer Nicasio’s

testimony in its closing argument.1 The guilty verdict

followed, and later this appeal. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Ramirez-Estrada alleges that various

evidentiary and constitutional violations occurred at his trial.

We only address Ramirez-Estrada’s claim of constitutional

 

1

 The prosecutor argued:

There is another piece of evidence that you need to

consider. You’ll recall the very last witness who

testified in this case, that was Officer Nicasio, Gabriela

Nicasio. When did Officer Nicasio meet with the

defendant? Well, you’ll recall the testimony in this

case, ladies and gentlemen. The defendant claimed that

he told everybody that he needed help, that he hurt, that

the judge had told him he needed to have this surgery,

and he wanted help. And that has been the theme

throughout this case; he needed help.

Ladies and gentlemen, when he was specifically

asked by Officer Nicasio, do you have any physical

problems, diabetes, heart, anything, he said no. She

said, do you have any tattoos, any identifying marks?

He said, I have a broken nose.

Ladies and gentlemen, he is talking to an officer

who is making inquiries about his health, and he says

no. That is a circumstance, ladies and gentlemen, that

is direct evidence that he committed the crimes with

which he’s been charged . . . .

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UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA 9

error under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). We review

alleged violations of a defendant’s constitutional rights under

Doyle de novo. See United States v. Caruto, 532 F.3d 822,

827 (9th Cir. 2008). An error under Doyle requires reversal

unless the government can show that the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

A. Doyle Error

A criminal defendant’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966), including his right to remain silent, are

by now ingrained in our national consciousness. To protect

the right to remain silent, the Supreme Court held in Doyle

that a defendant’s silence after receiving Miranda warnings

cannot be used to impeach him should he choose to testify at

trial. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619. Doyle’s reach has been limited,

however. For instance, the Supreme Court held in Anderson

v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980), that a defendant’s trial

testimony can be impeached by introducing prior inconsistent

statements made at the time of arrest but after Miranda rights

had been waived. In Charles, the defendant had told the

police that he stole a car from one location but at trial

changed his story to say that the car had been stolen from a

different location. See id. at 404–06. Introducing such

inconsistent statements did not violate Doyle because no

meaning was being drawn from the defendant’s silence. Id. at

409.

In Caruto, we interpreted the analytical framework

established by these cases as follows:

As stated in Charles, the primary inquiry in

cases where a defendant waives his or her

Miranda rights is whether the prosecutor’s

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10 UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA

question or argument is “designed to draw

meaning from silence” or instead merely “to

elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent

statement.” 447 U.S. at 409. The Supreme

Court noted that “[e]ach of two inconsistent

descriptions of events may be said to involve

‘silence’ insofar as it omits facts included in

the other version.” Id. However, the Court

held that “Doyle does not require any such

formalistic understanding of ‘silence,’ and

we find no reason to adopt such a view in

this case.” Id. Where, as here, it is a

defendant’s invocation of her Miranda rights

that results in the omitted facts that create the

difference between the two descriptions,

cross-examination based on those omissions

draws meaning fromthe defendant’s protected

silence in a manner not permitted by Doyle.

532 F.3d at 830–31 (citation omitted).

Caruto highlighted two crucial factors that trigger Doyle:

(1) a defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent and

(2) an omission in post-Miranda statements arguably

inconsistent with his trial testimony. See id. at 831 (“Where

a defendant has invoked her Miranda rights, it is even more

important that the distinction between inconsistency and

omission be carefully observed.”). By contrast, a direct

inconsistencybetween the post-Miranda statements, in and of

themselves, and the trial testimony may be used to impeach

a defendant. See Charles, 447 U.S. at 408–09.

We analyze the facts of this case under this framework.

Although neither the Supreme Court nor this court has

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UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA 11

previously faced the particular situation presented here, we

conclude that Doyle bars admission of Ramirez-Estrada’s

statements to Officer Nicasio. It is clear and undisputed that

Ramirez-Estrada invoked his Miranda rights by asking for a

lawyer. The difficult question is the second one: whether his

statements in response to Officer Nicasio’s routine booking

questions were directly inconsistent with his trial testimony.

We conclude that they were not and that it was, instead, his

silence that was used against him.

We initially clarify that, for purposes of Doyle, it is

irrelevant that there was no Miranda violation. The

government argues that no Doyle violation could have

occurred because there was no Miranda violation. This

argument misreads our precedent. In Caruto, this court held

that there was a Doyle violation even though there was no

Miranda violation. The defendant there initially waived her

Miranda rights and answered the police’s questions; only five

to seven minutes later did she invoke her Miranda rights and

cut off the interview. Caruto, 532 F.3d at 824. Here, there

was also no Miranda violation. Although Ramirez-Estrada

invoked his Miranda rights at the outset of the interview,

Officer Nicasio permissibly asked him routine booking

questions not covered by Miranda. See Pennsylvania v.

Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990). Nevertheless, a Doyle

violation occurs where the prosecution uses defendant’s postinvocation silence to impeach him, regardless of whether the

police complied with Miranda.

This brings us to the central question in this case: whether

the prosecution in fact used defendant’s silence to impeach

him. The government argues that Ramirez-Estrada’s silence

was not used to impeach him. The government asserts that it

was his statements in response to the routine booking

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12 UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA

questions that were used to impeach him, because of those

statements’ inconsistency with his trial testimony.

2 The

district court agreed. It reasoned that this case was

distinguishable from Doyle because the prosecution here

sought to impeach Ramirez-Estrada only with his answers to

Officer Nicasio’s questions and not with his silence—unlike

Doyle, where the prosecution sought to impeach the

defendant with his failure to tell his story to the police.

We disagree. Ramirez-Estrada’s statements, by

themselves, are not directly inconsistent with his testimony.

It is only what he omitted from his statements—in other

words, his silence—that was relevant to impeach him.

There is no doubt that in some circumstances a

defendant’s silence may be used to impeach him. In

particular, a defendant may reasonably “be impeached by

[his] previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which

that fact naturally would have been asserted.” Jenkins v.

Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980). Here, the asserted

inconsistency is precisely that: Ramirez-Estrada failed to

mention his jaw injury to Officer Nicasio. Had RamirezEstrada never invoked his Miranda rights, this kind of

impeachment would have been permissible. His invocation of

his Miranda rights, however, brings this case within the

purview of Doyle.

 

2

 The government also argues that even if the statements were taken in

violation of Miranda, they can be used to impeach the defendant’s

inconsistent trial testimony. Although correct, this argument again

misreads our court’s precedents: as we have already discussed, in the

context of Doyle, we are not concerned with whether Miranda was

complied with. All that matters is that the defendant invoked his Miranda

rights. See Caruto, 532 F.3d at 824.

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UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA 13

The facts of this case compel our conclusion that Doyle

was violated. As part of the booking process after RamirezEstrada’s arrest, Officer Nicasio asked Ramirez-Estrada two

questions that are relevant here. First, she asked him: “do you

have any health problems, like a heart condition or diabetes

or anything like that?” Ramirez-Estrada answered “no.”

Second, she asked him “do you have any tattoos, any scars?”

After Ramirez-Estrada described his tattoos, she asked again

“what about anymajor scars, no scars?” To this, he responded

that he had a broken nose from when he was a boxer.3 Based

on this exchange, Officer Nicasio gave the testimony in

rebuttal quoted above. The significance of his responses was

not what he said, but what he did not say: he never mentioned

his jaw injury.

In the context of Officer Nicasio’s first question, “health

problems” referred to potentially life-threatening conditions,

“like a heart condition or diabetes.” As part of the booking

process, it makes sense that such a question would be asked,

given that the location of his detention pending trial may

depend on whether he has any significant health conditions.

It is therefore not directly inconsistent for Ramirez-Estrada to

have answered “no” despite his claim that he approached the

Port of Entry to seek help for his jaw injury. By that point,

Ramirez-Estrada had been arrested and had invoked his right

to remain silent. His answer is thus relevant only insofar as it

demonstrates his failure to talk about the circumstances of his

offense. In other words, the impeachment operated as a

comment on Ramirez-Estrada’s silence, which is

impermissible under Doyle.

3 A recording of the interview, from which we can draw precise

quotations, is part of the record.

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14 UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA

Similarly, Officer Nicasio’ssecond question, which asked

about tattoos and scars, presumably for purposes of future

identification, did not directly call for Ramirez-Estrada to

mention his jaw injury. His answer, which mentions a broken

nose but not his jaw injury, is again relevant only insofar as

it demonstrates what Ramirez-Estrada failed to state. It is

another impermissible comment on his silence.

That Officer Nicasio’s testimony operated as a comment

on Ramirez-Estrada’s silence is made clear when we compare

the facts of this case to the facts presented in cases cited by

the government. For example, in United States v. Gomez,

725 F.3d 1121, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2013), the defendant

refused to answer border officers’ questions regarding

methamphetamine found hidden in the gas tank of his car.

Despite refusing to answer their questions after being given

Miranda warnings, the following exchange occurred:

[Officer] Fuentes: You don’t, don’t want to

talk?

Gomez: No, it’s that no, I can’t talk. It . . . it’s

my family, you see.

Fuentes: Say again?

Gomez: It’s my family.

Fuentes: Your family?

Gomez: Yes. It’s, I’m just going to say

something. Okay?

Fuentes: [unintelligible]

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UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA 15

Gomez: Listen, listen, listen, listen, listen

[unintelligible] . . . I can’t say anything

because my family . . . my family will get

killed. Okay?

Id. During the government’s rebuttal, Officer Fuentes was

permitted to testify regarding Gomez’s statement that his

family would get killed to impeach Gomez’s trial testimony

that he had no knowledge of the methamphetamine. Id. at

1125. The court held that, “in order to be admissible, the

[prior] statement must be ‘arguably’ inconsistent with the

defendant’s testimony at trial.” Id. at 1126. Therefore, the

defendant’s statement that his family would get killed if he

talked was admissible to impeach his claimed lack of

knowledge, because of the arguable inconsistency between

what he previously said and what he testified to at trial. Id. at

1126–27. In other words, his statement, in and of itself, was

arguably inconsistent with his trial testimony.

By contrast, the government here sought to impeach

Ramirez-Estrada not based on what he said but on what he

failed to say—that is, by his silence. His statements, by

themselves, are not arguably inconsistent with his testimony;

it is only his failure to mention his jaw injury, in response to

questions that did not directly call for that information, that

arguably impeaches him. Officer Nicasio’s testimony is thus

relevant only insofar as it highlights Ramirez-Estrada’s

silence regarding his jaw injury.

We offer an additional reason for our conclusion.

Ramirez-Estrada had no way to effectively cross-examine

Officer Nicasio without bringing out the fact that he had

invoked his Miranda right to remain silent. See Caruto,

532 F.3d at 830 (“Caruto could not fully explain why her

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16 UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA

post-arrest statement was not as detailed as her testimony at

trial without disclosing that she had invoked her Miranda

rights.”). As we have already discussed, Officer Nicasio’s

booking questions were narrow questions that did not call for

Ramirez-Estrada to mention his jaw injury. Although defense

counsel tried to elicit from Officer Nicasio the narrow nature

of her question regarding Ramirez-Estrada’s health, it was

impossible for defense counsel to probe the limited nature of

her inquiry without eliciting from her the fact that RamirezEstrada had invoked his Miranda rights. Notably, defense

counsel could not ask Officer Nicasio whether she inquired

as to Ramirez-Estrada’s reasons for approaching the Port of

Entry. Because Officer Nicasio’s direct testimony necessarily

implicated Ramirez-Estrada’s silence, the only way his

counsel could effectively cross-examine her was by eliciting

the reason for that silence—his invocation of Miranda.

Unsurprisingly, defense counsel did not go down that route,

as that would have been more likely to damage RamirezEstrada’s case than to help it. Therefore, by operating as a

comment on Ramirez-Estrada’s silence, Officer Nicasio’s

testimony was in practice irrebuttable save by further

highlighting the fact of Ramirez-Estrada’s silence. But Doyle

safeguards Miranda rights by keeping from the jury the fact

that a defendant invoked his right to remain silent. It would

thus run counter to Doyle to allow the government to

introduce testimony inevitably implicating defendant’s

silence after invocation of Miranda, leaving the defendant

with no practical way to rebut that testimony other than by

highlighting his invocation of Miranda—precisely what

Doyle mandates that the jury should not be exposed to. See

Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619.

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UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA 17

B. Harmfulness of Error

Given the constitutional Doyle error that occurred,

reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. See United States v. Velarde-Gomez,

269 F.3d 1023, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). We consider

three factors in deciding the question of harmlessness: “[1]

the extent of comments made by the witness, [2] whether an

inference of guilt from silence was stressed to the jury, and

[3] the extent of other evidence suggesting defendant’s guilt.”

Id.(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Newman,

943 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Although the jury here was not explicitly urged to make

an inference of guilt from silence, the first and third factors

suggest that the error was harmful, the third factor strongly

so. Regarding the first factor, Officer Nicasio’s entire

substantive testimony on direct examination consisted of

relating Ramirez-Estrada’s responses to the two booking

questions at issue. This, combined with the fact that Officer

Nicasio was the sole government rebuttal witness and was

thus the last witness to testify before the jury’s deliberations,

endowed the fact of Ramirez-Estrada’s failure to mention his

jaw injury to Officer Nicasio with great significance. Cf. id.

at 1035 (“[T]he qualitative extent [of the witness’s testimony]

. . . endowed the fact of [the defendant’s] silence with great

significance . . . .”).

More importantly, as to the third factor, the extent of the

other evidence was very limited. The only disputed issues at

trial were whether Ramirez-Estrada intended to enter the

United States and what he said to Officer Ponce de Leon at

the primary inspection area of the Port of Entry. This issue

boiled down to a credibility battle between Ramirez-Estrada

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18 UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-ESTRADA

and Officer Ponce de Leon. Their stories were inconsistent,

and the credibility of each was attacked. Ramirez-Estrada’s

failure to mention his jaw injury to Officer Nicasio was

offered by the government in rebuttal for the purpose of

undermining Ramirez-Estrada’s credibility, and if it

persuaded the jury, it was very damaging to his defense.

Indeed, “because the defendant offered ‘plausible, innocent

explanation[s]’” for his conduct “and for the inconsistencies

in his statements to . . . officials”—including a potential

language barrier between himself and Officer Ponce de

Leon—Ramirez-Estrada’s “credibility was of utmost

importance.” Id.(alteration in original) (quotingUnited States

v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000)). RamirezEstrada’s theory, “while not necessarily compelling, is . . .

plausible.” Id. As such, we cannot conclude that the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

III. Conclusion

Allowing Officer Nicasio to testify in a manner that could

only invite the jury to draw inferences from RamirezEstrada’s post-invocation silence violated his constitutional

rights under Doyle. Because this constitutional violation was

not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse RamirezEstrada’s conviction and remand the case to the district court.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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