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Parties Involved:
Michael Coleman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 13, 2017

Decided February 13, 2017

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐2430

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL COLEMAN,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States   

District Court for the Southern District

of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:15CR00064‐001

Jane Magnus‐Stinson,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

A police officer stopped Michael Coleman for walking in the middle of a

residential street in Indianapolis. Coleman gave the officer a phony name, and after this

lie was discovered, another officer searched him and found a handgun in his pocket.

Coleman was arrested under an Indiana statute criminalizing the refusal to provide

identification, IND. CODE § 34‐28‐5‐3.5, and federal authorities then charged him with

possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Coleman filed an unsuccessful

motion to suppress, and afterward he entered a conditional guilty plea allowing him to

appeal that ruling. But his plea agreement also includes an appeal waiver, which

forecloses all other claims about his conviction and sentence. The district court sentenced

Coleman to 100 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. He filed a notice

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 16‐2430    Page 2

of appeal, but his appointed attorney moves to withdraw on the ground that the appeal

is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel has submitted a brief

explaining the nature of the case and addressing contentions that an appeal likely would

involve. Coleman opposes counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis

appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the points she discusses and the

additional contentions in Coleman’s response. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776

(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel tells us that Coleman does not wish to challenge his guilty plea unless

the ruling on his motion to suppress is overturned, and thus the lawyer appropriately

forgoes discussing the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of the plea.

See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox,

287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). And because Coleman’s appeal waiver would stand

unless his guilty plea is set aside, see United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013);

United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011), the only possible ground for

appeal is the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

At the evidentiary hearing on that motion, Coleman and the two police officers

testified. The first officer saw the 41‐year‐old Coleman in a residential area walking in

the street instead of using one of the sidewalks running along either side. The officer

asked for identification, prompting Coleman to say that he possessed an Indiana

identification card but did not have it with him. He gave a name, “DeWayne Coleman,”

and, in quick succession, three dates of birth: September 34, 1973; September 31, 1930;

and, finally, September 30, 1973. The last of these was at least plausible, but the officer’s

mobile, online search of Bureau of Motor Vehicles records turned up neither a driver’s

license nor an identification card. After first confirming with Coleman the spelling of the

name and date of birth he had given, the officer placed him in handcuffs. The second

police officer then asked Coleman if he had a weapon, and when he said yes, the officer

found and removed a handgun from his pants pocket. At this point only five to ten

minutes had elapsed since the encounter began. For his part, Coleman testified that he

had been walking in the street to avoid snow on the sidewalks. But the district court,

relying on the first officer’s testimony and street photos taken the next day, found that

the sidewalks had been clear of snow. In his Rule 51(b) response, Coleman does not

dispute this finding.

Appellate counsel first considers whether Coleman could press his contention

that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. In the district court the government

conceded that Coleman had been seized when the police demanded identification.

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No. 16‐2430    Page 3

Indiana law prohibits walking in a “roadway”—meaning any publicly maintained

street—if a sidewalk is available. IND. CODE §§ 9‐21‐17‐12, 9‐13‐2‐73, ‐157. A violation is a

civil infraction, id. § 9‐21‐17‐24, but still the Constitution (and even state law) authorizes

detention. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 745 (7th Cir. 2015) (upholding

investigatory detention on suspicion of committing noncriminal parking violation);

see also IND. CODE § 34‐28‐5‐3 (authorizing brief detention to issue citation for infraction

or ordinance violation); Pinkney v. State, 742 N.E.2d 956, 958 (Ind. App. Ct. 2001)

(upholding consent search performed after suspect was detained for walking in

roadway instead of using sidewalk). The district court’s uncontested finding that

Coleman could have used the sidewalk renders frivolous any conceivable appellate

claim. In his Rule 51(b) response, he accuses the police of stopping him because he is

black, but that would not be a basis for suppression of the gun even if true, see Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to

intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the

Fourth Amendment.”).   

Second, counsel evaluates whether Coleman could pursue his challenge to the

arrest. Coleman addresses this same question in his Rule 51(b) response. In Indiana a

person detained for a civil infraction commits a misdemeanor by refusing to give his

name, address, and date of birth. IND. CODE § 34‐28‐5‐3.5; Weaver v. State, 56 N.E.3d 25,

26 (Ind. 2016); see Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 185

(2004) (upholding state law criminalizing refusal to provide identification during

investigative stop). Coleman had given two obviously fictitious dates of birth and then a

third date that, although plausible, did not yield a match in the state’s identification

database for the name he used. And since Coleman had said he possessed a state

identification card, this lack of a match all but confirmed he was lying about his identity,

allowing the police to make a custodial arrest, even for this minor criminal offense

committed in their presence. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001);

United States v. Garcia, 376 F.3d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 2004). We agree with counsel that it

would be frivolous to challenge the arrest.   

Lastly, challenging the search would be frivolous. Police may conduct a search

incident to arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973); United States v. Hill,

818 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2016), even before the arrest is announced, Rawlings v.

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980); United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 748 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015);

United States v. Jackson, 377 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2004). In this case, the police gained

probable cause to arrest Coleman for refusing to provide identification, and, as soon as

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No. 16‐2430    Page 4

he was in handcuffs, the gun was found in his pants pocket. It would be frivolous to

argue that the gun should have been suppressed.

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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