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Parties Involved:
Black Beauty Coal Company
Petitioner
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2012 Decided December 28, 2012 

No. 11-1306 

BLACK BEAUTY COAL COMPANY, 

PETITIONER

v. 

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

AND SECRETARY OF LABOR, 

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 

Ralph Henry Moore argued the cause for the petitioner. 

Patrick W. Dennison was on brief. 

Cheryl C. Blair-Kijewski, Attorney, United States 

Department of Labor, argued the cause for the respondent. W. 

Christian Schumann, Counsel, was on brief. John T. Sullivan, 

Attorney, Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 

Commission, entered an appearance. 

Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

USCA Case #11-1306 Document #1412409 Filed: 12/28/2012 Page 1 of 15
2 

 KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Petitioner 

Black Beauty Coal Company (Black Beauty) petitions for 

review of an order of the Federal Mine Safety and Health 

Review Commission (FMSHRC) adopting the findings of its 

administrative law judge (ALJ) that: (1) Black Beauty 

violated 30 C.F.R. § 75.400, which prohibits the accumulation 

of coal and combustible materials in certain areas of a coal 

mine; (2) the violation was an unwarrantable failure to 

comply with [§ 75.400]; and (3) the violation constituted high 

negligence. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the 

petition.1

I. 

Black Beauty operates the Air Quality No. 1 Mine 

(Mine), an underground bituminous coal mine located near 

Vincennes, Indiana. On February 26, 2009, Mine Safety and 

Health Administration (MSHA) inspector Danny Franklin 

(Franklin) entered the Mine to inspect its conveyor belts that 

are used to carry coal out of the Mine. Randy Hammond 

(Hammond), an inspector escort employed by Black Beauty, 

 

1

 The respondents in this case are the Secretary of the United States 

Department of Labor and FMSHRC, an “adjudicative agency that is 

independent of the Department of Labor.” Letter from John T. 

Sullivan, Attorney, FMSHRC to Mark J. Langer, Clerk, United 

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Black 

Beauty Coal Co. v. FMSHRC, No. 11-1306 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 13, 

2012). The Secretary filed the respondent’s brief and FMSHRC 

filed a letter stating that it responded to Black Beauty’s petition by 

“stand[ing] on its decision issued in its adjudicative capacity.” Id.

USCA Case #11-1306 Document #1412409 Filed: 12/28/2012 Page 2 of 15
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accompanied Franklin.2

 Shortly after entering the Mine, 

Franklin noticed the “distinct odor of coal burning” and asked 

three nearby miners about the smell. Transcript of ALJ Hr’g 

(Feb. 11, 2011) (Tr.) 80-81 (Joint Appendix (JA) 39A). One 

of the miners, Wayne Vogel (Vogel), told Franklin that he 

first noticed the smell approximately thirty minutes earlier. 

Vogel said he had investigated but had not found a cause so 

he did not report the burning smell to management. 

Franklin then “follow[ed his] nose” and walked to a 

location where the “three main north” belt dumps coal onto 

the “one west B” belt. Tr. 83, 85, 159 (JA 40A, 59A). Black 

Beauty had installed a skirt rubber between the two belts to 

channel coal and prevent spills. Upon Franklin’s arrival at the 

end of the one west B belt, also known as the “tail,” Franklin 

found coal “packed in around th[e] tail roller” and trapped in 

the guards surrounding the roller. Tr. 83 (JA 40A). Franklin 

testified that the packed coal measured “two feet by five feet 

by 19 inches” and was “packed into a point to where the 

moving roller was—was turning in this compacted coal.” Tr. 

85-86 (JA 40A-41A). Franklin believed the coal was “already 

hot and burning as evidenced by the smell.” Tr. 94 (JA 43A). 

Upon discovering the accumulation, Franklin asked 

Hammond “what was going to be done with this.” Tr. 96-97 

(JA 43A). When Hammond said that he would get someone to 

fix the problem, Franklin said: “[W]ait a minute, and I said I 

tell you what we’re going to do, I’m going to issue an order 

and we’re going to shut the belt off.” Tr. 97 (JA 43A). 

 

2

 Except where otherwise noted, the facts are from the testimony of 

Franklin and Hammond taken during the February 15, 2011 hearing 

before the ALJ. 

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Hammond disagreed, testifying that the coal was not 

burning. He believed that the burning smell came from the 

skirt rubber or the conveyor belt, both of which were made of 

fire-resistant rubber. He also testified that he did not see 

smoke or flames. Hammond also testified—as did Franklin—

that neither their personal carbon monoxide detectors nor the 

Mine’s carbon monoxide detectors indicated the presence of 

combustion. While Franklin testified that the carbon 

monoxide detectors activate at an “incipient” level of 

combustion, he also explained that the detectors work only if 

they are “in the right spot” and that he did not test the carbon 

monoxide detector at the one west B tail “belt drive.” See Tr. 

117, 119 (JA 48A-49A). 

Hammond and Franklin also disagreed on how long the 

coal had been turning in the tail roller. Franklin’s notes stated 

that the condition existed for approximately one hour but 

Hammond testified that the condition existed for only one 

minute or less before Franklin saw it and was caused by a 

sudden tear in the skirt rubber. Franklin did not dispute that 

the coal accumulation was caused by a tear in the skirt rubber 

or that such a condition could arise suddenly but believed the 

condition lasted for a longer time than Hammond estimated, 

primarily because Vogel told him the burning smell began at 

least thirty minutes before he arrived. Franklin and Hammond 

also disagreed on whether they saw coal spilling when they 

arrived at the belt; Hammond testified that he observed coal 

spilling when he and Franklin approached the one west B belt 

but Franklin testified that he did not see any spillage. 

Franklin issued a citation at approximately 9:40 a.m. on 

the date of his inspection, concluding: 

Combustible material is allowed to accumulate 

around the 1 West “B” tail roller [in violation 

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of 30 C.F.R. § 75.400]. The accumulations are 

in the form of loose and fine coal measuring 

approximately 2 by 5 feet by 19 inches in 

width. The tail roller was touching and running 

in coal 17 inches wide by 2 feet tall and 4 feet 

in length. When inspected there was a 

distinctive odor indicating there was material 

getting hot. 

With past history, the operator has engaged in 

aggravated conduct constituting more than 

ordinary negligence by continuing to violate 

this standard. This violation is an 

unwarrantable failure to comply with a 

mandatory standard. 

JA 6A. Franklin also checked a box on the citation form 

indicating that Black Beauty’s failure constituted “high 

negligence.” JA 6A. On April 15, 2009, MSHA sent Black 

Beauty a proposed penalty assessment, which Black Beauty 

timely contested. 

On February 15, 2011, the ALJ held a hearing on the 

Secretary’s petition for assessment of civil penalty based on 

the above violation. Black Beauty Coal Co., 33 FMSHRC 

1482 (2011) (ALJ). At the hearing, Black Beauty relied on the 

testimony of James Villain (Villain), a belt shoveler who 

cleaned the one west B tail on the day of Franklin’s inspection 

approximately twenty-to-twenty-five minutes before Franklin 

issued the citation. Villain testified that when he cleaned the 

tail, “there wasn’t very much spillage and so I just took the 

water hose that was there and washed it down.” Tr. 173 (JA 

62A). Additionally, the skirt rubber was intact and the belt 

was working and was not spilling any coal. Villain then left 

the one west B tail and drove for approximately ten minutes 

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to the one west B head. When he arrived at the head, the belts 

there were shut down. Villain returned to the tail where he 

saw Franklin and Hammond, observed spilled coal and 

noticed the torn skirt rubber. 

Crediting Franklin’s testimony over that of Hammond 

and Villain, the ALJ found that the coal must have been 

“turning in the rollers for some time” because “the odor of 

burning coal had been evident for more than 30 minutes prior 

to the arrival of Hammond and Franklin.” Black Beauty Coal 

Co., 33 FMSHRC at 1487. The ALJ concluded that Black 

Beauty had violated section 75.400, which provides that 

“[c]oal dust, including float coal dust deposited on rockdusted surfaces, loose coal, and other combustible materials, 

shall be cleaned up and not be permitted to accumulate in 

active workings, or on diesel-powered and electric equipment 

therein.” 30 C.F.R. § 75.400. She rated the violation 

“significant and substantial” under 30 U.S.C. § 814(d) and 

also concluded that the violation was an unwarrantable failure 

to comply with section 75.400 and that the violation 

constituted high negligence.3 See Black Beauty Coal Co., 33 

 

3

 If a mine operator is found to have engaged in “high negligence,” 

it is subject to a larger fine. See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(d), (g). 

Violations that are “significant and substantial” and constitute an 

“unwarrantable failure” may result in the issuance of withdrawal 

orders (requiring the immediate removal of miners from the 

affected area of the mine): 

If the violation is found to be both “significant and 

substantial” and “caused by an unwarrantable failure of 

[the] operator to comply with [the] mandatory health or 

safety standards,” section 104(d)(1) requires a withdrawal 

order for a second mandatory standard violation caused by 

an “unwarrantable failure to comply” within 90 days of the 

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FMSHRC at 1485-88. Accordingly, the ALJ assessed a 

$70,000 civil penalty. Id. at 1488. Black Beauty timely 

petitioned for review. 

II. 

Black Beauty challenges the ALJ’s determination that 

Black Beauty violated section 75.400, that the violation was 

an unwarrantable failure, see 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1), and that 

the violation constituted “high negligence,” see 30 C.F.R. 

§ 100.3(d). We review the ALJ’s findings of fact for 

 

first. 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). Section 104(d)(2) requires a 

second withdrawal order for “violations similar to those 

that resulted in the issuance of the [first] withdrawal 

order.” Id. § 814(d)(2). Section 104(e)(1) requires 

withdrawal for “any violation of a mandatory health or 

safety standard which could significantly and substantially 

contribute to the cause and effect of a coal or other mine 

safety or health hazard” within 90 days after the operator 

has been notified of “a pattern of violations of mandatory 

health or safety standards in the coal or other mine which 

are of such nature as could have significantly and 

substantially contributed to the cause and effect of coal or 

other mine health or safety hazards.” Id.

§ 814(e)(1). Once a section 104(e)(1) withdrawal order 

issues, section 104(e)(2) requires another such order for 

“any violation of a mandatory health or safety standard 

which could significantly and substantially contribute to 

the cause and effect of a coal or other mine health or safety 

hazard.” Id. § 814(e)(2). 

Cyprus Emerald Res. Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review 

Comm’n, 195 F.3d 42, 43 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (alterations in 

original). 

USCA Case #11-1306 Document #1412409 Filed: 12/28/2012 Page 7 of 15
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substantial evidence and review questions of law de novo. 30 

U.S.C. § 816(a)(1); Sec’y of Labor v. Keystone Coal Mining 

Corp., 151 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

A. 

30 C.F.R. § 75.400 provides: 

Coal dust, including float coal dust deposited 

on rock-dusted surfaces, loose coal, and other 

combustible materials, shall be cleaned up and 

not be permitted to accumulate in active 

workings,4

 or on diesel-powered and electric 

equipment therein. 

Section 75.400 prohibits accumulations but not mere 

spillages. See Old Ben Coal Co. (Old Ben II), 2 FMSHRC 

2806, 2808 (1980). No bright line differentiates the two terms. 

See C. Gregory Ruffennach, Free Markets, Individual 

Liberties And Safe Coal Mines: A Post-Sago Perspective, 111 

W. Va. L. Rev. 75, 89 (2008). An accumulation exists if “a 

reasonably prudent person, familiar with the mining industry 

and the protective purpose of the standard, would have 

recognized the hazardous condition that the regulation seeks 

to prevent.” Utah Power & Light Co., 12 FMSHRC 965, 968 

(1990), aff’d, Utah Power & Light Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 951 

F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Old Ben II, 2 FMSHRC at 

2808 (“[T]hose masses of combustible materials which could 

cause or propagate a fire or explosion are what Congress 

intended to proscribe.”) 

 

4

 “[A]ctive workings” is defined as “[a]ny place in a coal mine 

where miners are normally required to work or travel.” 30 C.F.R. 

§ 75.2. 

USCA Case #11-1306 Document #1412409 Filed: 12/28/2012 Page 8 of 15
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 Black Beauty argues that it did not violate section 75.400 

because the coal turning in the tail roller was the result of a 

sudden spill that occurred only briefly before Franklin 

observed it. Because Black Beauty did not have a reasonable 

amount of time to clean up the coal before Franklin issued the 

citation, it argues that the coal did not accumulate within the 

meaning of section 75.400. We disagree. FMSHRC has 

expressly rejected the argument that “accumulations of 

combustible materials may be tolerated for a ‘reasonable 

time.’” Old Ben Coal Co. (Old Ben I), 1 FMSHRC 1954, 

1957-58 (1979)5

; see also Utah Power, 12 FMSHRC at 968 

(section 75.400 “‘was directed at preventing accumulations in 

the first instance, not at cleaning up the materials within a 

reasonable period of time after they have accumulated’”) 

(quoting Old Ben I, 1 FMSHRC at 1957).6

 

5 Old Ben interpreted 30 U.S.C. § 864(a), a provision almost 

identical to 30 C.F.R. § 75.400. Section 864(a) was an interim 

safety standard in effect before the current regulation was 

promulgated. See 30 U.S.C. § 861(a). 

6

 Black Beauty relies on a footnote in Utah Power & Light Co. v. 

Sec’y of Labor, 951 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1991), containing the 

following dicta: “While everyone knows that loose coal is 

generated by mining in a coal mine, the regulation plainly prohibits 

permitting it to accumulate; hence it must be cleaned up with 

reasonable promptness, with all convenient speed.” Id. at 295 n.11. 

While some FMSHRC ALJ decisions have relied on the dicta to 

find that section 75.400 can be violated only after a reasonable 

time, “[a] decision of a[n ALJ] is not a precedent binding upon the 

[FMSHRC].” 29 C.F.R. § 2700.69(d). FMSHRC has not followed 

the Tenth Circuit’s twenty-year-old dicta nor has any court, 

including the Tenth Circuit. 

USCA Case #11-1306 Document #1412409 Filed: 12/28/2012 Page 9 of 15
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 Moreover, the ALJ found that coal had been turning in 

the tail roller for a significant period. Black Beauty makes 

several arguments contesting this finding. First, it contends 

that the record establishes that the coal spilled because the 

skirt rubber tore, the tear occurred just minutes before 

Franklin saw it and the spill occurred almost immediately 

after the tear. It notes that Franklin testified, in response to 

Hammond’s statement that the accumulation was caused by 

the skirt rubber tear: “I thought that that was very reasonable. 

I didn’t doubt what he was saying. I was pleased to hear that 

he had found the root cause.” Tr. 91 (JA 42A); see also Tr. 

101 (JA 44A) (Franklin: “I think that it was a result from coal 

spilling”). Franklin also conceded that coal could “gob up” in 

the tail roller in as little as “30 seconds to—to a couple 

minutes.” Tr. 90 (JA 42A). Black Beauty also notes that 

Hammond believed the coal had accumulated for “a minute or 

less” because he saw coal spilling at the time he arrived at the 

tail and also observed wet coal on the ground. Tr. 162-63 (JA 

60A). Hammond also testified that the skirt rubber could tear 

“in an instant.” Tr. 162 (JA 60A). 

After considering these facts, however, the ALJ 

explained that none of the evidence explained the smell of 

burning coal that occurred at least thirty minutes before 

Franklin’s arrival. Black Beauty Coal Co., 33 FMSHRC at 

1487. Accordingly, the ALJ found “that Franklin presented a 

scenario that was the most likely and well grounded in fact.” 

Id. at 1488; see also Keystone Coal Mining Corp., 151 F.3d at 

1107 (ALJ’s “determinations of credibility are entitled to 

great deference”). 

Black Beauty argues before us that Franklin’s testimony 

was inconsistent with Villain’s testimony that he (Villain) had 

not noticed “very much spillage” when he “hosed . . . off” the 

tail just minutes before Franklin arrived. Tr. 173 (JA 62A). 

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Black Beauty maintains that the ALJ erroneously credited 

Franklin’s testimony over Villain’s because Franklin’s 

testimony, relying as it did on Vogel’s statements, was 

hearsay. But testimony based in part upon hearsay can be 

credited over other testimony. See generally Hoska v. U.S. 

Dep’t of the Army, 677 F.2d 131, 138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 

(“[U]nder certain circumstances, hearsay can constitute 

substantial evidence[,]” such as “where declarants are 

disinterested witnesses”); cf. Windsor Coal Co., 21 FMSHRC 

997, 1002 (1999) (“[T]he Commission has permitted duration 

to be established through the use of circumstantial 

evidence.”). Moreover, the ALJ rejected Villain’s testimony 

because he did not testify as to the existence vel non of a 

burning odor7

 nor did he testify whether there was coal 

accumulated in the tail roller guard or turning in the roller. 

See Black Beauty Coal Co., 33 FMSHRC at 1487-88. 

Black Beauty also argues that the ALJ’s duration finding 

was unsupported by substantial evidence because the burning 

smell Franklin described was unaccompanied by combustion. 

Neither smoke nor flames accompanied the smell and neither 

Franklin’s nor Hammond’s carbon monoxide detectors (which 

activate at an incipient level of combustion) emitted any 

warning. But Franklin did not testify to the contrary; he 

further explained that the carbon monoxide detectors worked 

only if they were “in the right spot” and that he did not test 

the carbon monoxide detector at the belt drive. Tr. 119 (JA 

49A). The lack of smoke, flames or a carbon monoxide 

monitor warning does not mean that the ALJ’s duration 

finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. 

 

7

 Although Black Beauty claims that Villain testified that there was 

“no smell . . . ten minutes before,” Reply Br. 4, Villain did not 

testify one way or another regarding a smell. 

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In sum, the ALJ’s conclusion that Black Beauty violated 

section 75.400 is supported by substantial evidence. 

B. 

The ALJ also concluded that Black Beauty’s violation of 

section 75.400 constituted an unwarrantable failure. See 30 

U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). 

The Commission has defined “unwarrantable 

failure” as “aggravated conduct, constituting 

more than ordinary negligence, by a mine 

operator in relation to a violation of the Act.” 

Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 

MSHA, 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1997, 2004 (1987). It 

is characterized by “indifference,” “serious 

lack of reasonable care,” “reckless disregard,” 

or “intentional misconduct.” Cyprus Plateau 

Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, MSHA, 16 

F.M.S.H.R.C. 1610, 1615 (1994) (citations 

omitted). If an operator reasonably, but 

erroneously, believes in good faith that the 

cited conduct is the safest method of 

compliance with the applicable regulations, its 

actions will not constitute aggravated conduct 

that exceeds ordinary negligence. Id.

Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 103 F.3d 1020, 1025 

(D.C. Cir. 1997). 

FMSHRC uses several factors to determine whether an 

unwarrantable failure sanction is appropriate. The factors 

include “the length of time that the violation has existed, the 

extent of the violative condition, whether the operator has 

been placed on notice that greater efforts were necessary for 

compliance, the operator’s efforts in abating the violative 

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condition, whether the violation was obvious or posed a high 

degree of danger, and the operator’s knowledge of the 

existence of the violation.” IO Coal Co., 31 FMSHRC 1346, 

1350-51 (2009). “While an administrative law judge may 

determine, in his discretion, that some factors are not relevant, 

or may determine that some factors are much less important 

than other factors under the circumstances, all of the factors 

must be taken into consideration and at least noted by the 

judge.” Id. at 1351.

The ALJ discussed the relevant factors and found several 

supported by substantial evidence See Black Beauty Coal Co., 

33 FMSHRC at 1484. As we noted earlier, substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that the violation existed 

for a significant period. Second, substantial evidence also 

supports the ALJ’s finding that Black Beauty did not take 

sufficient action to abate the violation. She stated that “[i]t is 

clear . . . that the mine has failed to train its miners” based on 

the fact that miner Vogel failed “to call or seek help when [he 

could not] discover the source of a burning smell” and 

because “[t]his mine [ ] had a number of prior violations for 

accumulations, along with prior warnings for excessive 

accumulations on the belt line.” Id. at 1488. In fact, Black 

Beauty received 102 citations and orders for accumulations 

violations for the Mine less than one year before this citation, 

234 citations and orders for accumulations violations in the 

previous two years and Franklin issued citations for three 

other nearby accumulations at the Mine on the same day. Id.

at 1483, 1488. 

Black Beauty claims that the ALJ’s lack-of-training 

finding is insufficient because there was no record evidence 

of its miners’ training. But FMSHRC has in the past relied on 

circumstantial evidence to find inadequate training. Rock of 

Ages Corp., 20 FMSHRC 106, 122-23 (1998) (“[T]he judge 

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relied on the 26 percent misfire rate of pyrodex, and foreman 

Kelty’s failure to engage in a further search for additional 

misfires after Batchelder’s discovery of the four bags, as 

strong circumstantial evidence of inadequate training . . . .”). 

Moreover, as the ALJ discussed, Black Beauty presented no 

evidence to refute Franklin’s opinion that the “little had been 

done to address accumulations on the belt at this mine.” Black 

Beauty Coal Co., 33 FMSHRC at 1488.

Black Beauty further asserts that past violations cannot 

be used to support an unwarrantable failure finding unless 

they are similar to the cited violation. As FMSHRC has 

explained, however, “[r]epeated similar violations may be 

relevant to an unwarrantable failure determination to the 

extent that they serve to put an operator on notice that greater 

efforts are necessary for compliance with a standard.” San 

Juan Coal Co., 29 FMSHRC 125, 131 (2007). And it “has 

rejected the argument that only past violations involving the 

same regulation and occurring in the same area within a 

continuing time frame may properly be considered when 

determining whether a violation is unwarrantable.” Id.

Instead, “even if a different area was cited, past violations 

may, nonetheless, provide an operator with sufficient 

awareness of an accumulation problem.” Id (footnote 

omitted). The ALJ used Black Beauty’s past violations of 

section 75.400, including warnings for excessive 

accumulations on the belt line, Black Beauty Coal Co., 33 

FMSHRC at 1488, to conclude that its violation constituted an 

unwarrantable failure pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). 

C. 

 Finally, Black Beauty contends that the ALJ’s high 

negligence finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. 

High negligence exists if “[t]he operator knew or should have 

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known of the violative condition or practice, and there are no 

mitigating circumstances.” 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(d) Table X. 

Mitigating circumstances include, but are not limited to, 

“actions taken by the operator to prevent or correct hazardous 

conditions or practices.” Id. § 100.3(d). Black Beauty does 

not detail any mitigating circumstances, leaving as the only 

question whether Black Beauty “knew or should have known 

of the violative condition or practice.” Id. & Table X. 

The ALJ’s high negligence finding appears to be based 

on four facts: (1) Black Beauty had been cited for several past 

accumulations violations (including warnings for belt line 

accumulations); (2) the burning smell existed for a significant 

time period; (3) Villain “should have . . . seen and noted” the 

coal turning in the tail roller; and (4) Vogel and the other 

miners did not alert management after noticing a burning 

smell. See Black Beauty Coal Co., 33 FMSHRC at 1487–88. 

Black Beauty makes the same argument here that it made to 

contest the ALJ’s unwarrantable failure finding. And we 

reject the argument for the same reasons we rejected it in 

connection with the unwarrantable failure sanction. 

For the foregoing reasons, Black Beauty’s petition for 

review is denied. 

So ordered. 

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