Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00117/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00117-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Hardtly
Respondent
Lewis J. Satterfield
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEWIS J. SATTERFIELD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

J. HARDTLY, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:09-cv-00117-LJO-JLT HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RE: 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

THE FIRST AMENDED PETITION (Doc. 13) 

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (Doc. 20)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

January 20, 2009. Petitioner filed a first amended petition on July 13, 2009. (Doc. 7). On 1

In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see, Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382. The

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Ninth Circuit has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9 Cir. 2000), amended May 23, 2001, vacated and remanded on

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other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). The date the petition is signed may be considered the

earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v.

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9 cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal

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petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature

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September 25, 2009, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response to the first amended petition. 

(Doc. 8). On November 19, 2009, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss the amended

petition as untimely. (Doc. 13). On January 22, 2010, Petitioner filed his opposition. (Doc. 18). On

January 29, 2010, Respondent filed a Reply. (Doc. 19). On March 12, 2010, Petitioner filed a

request for judicial notice of facts, arguing that it cannot be disputed that the only person prejudiced

by a delay under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) is Petitioner

himself. (Doc. 20).

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

As mentioned, Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being filed outside

the one year limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from

the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or violating the state’s

procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to th

evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d

599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state th

procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent may file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitation period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural standing

to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and

appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for

calculating the running of the statute of limitation. Petitioner did not sign the instant petition nor is there a certificate of

service; accordingly, the Court will use the actual filing date of January 20, 2009.

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Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss

pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes various

requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. th

1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on January 20, 

2009, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, as embodied in § 2244(d)(1),

applies to habeas petitions challenging an administrative decision in the context of a parole board

determination. Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9 Cir. 2004); see Redd v. McGrath, 343 th

F.3d 1077, 1080 n. 4 (9 Cir. 2003). Under subsection (d), the limitation period begins to run on th

“the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.” In the context of a parole board decision, the factual basis is

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the parole board’s denial of a petitioner’s administrative appeal. Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066; Redd,

343 F.3d at 1082-1083. Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run the day following a petitioner’s

notification of the parole board’s decision. Id. Where the date Petitioner received notice of the

parole board’s hearing is not part of the record, Shelby rejected the notion that remand for an

evidentiary hearing was required to determine the date on which a petitioner found out about the

hearing, apparently establishing instead a presumption that an inmate will in fact receive notice on

the day the denial is issued, and that date will be used to calculate the statute of limitations unless the

petitioner rebuts that presumption:

“Here, as in Redd, Shelby does not dispute that he received timely notice of the denial of his

administrative appeal on July 12, 2001, and he offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore,

the limitation period began running the next day.”

Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066.

In this case, Petitioner is challenging a decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”)

following a hearing that took place on April 4, 2007. (Doc. 1, Ex. 3). Petitioner was present at that

hearing, and therefore had actual knowledge of the BPH’s decision on April 4, 2007. Therefore, the

one-year period would have commenced the following date, i.e., April 5, 2007, and would have

ended one year later, i.e., on April 4, 2008, absent either statutory or equitable tolling. 

As mentioned, the instant petition was filed on January 20, 2009, almost two years after the

date the one-year period would have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to either statutory or

equitable tolling, the instant petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable

delay in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

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by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is

allowed. For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an

appeal and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court,

because no state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. 

Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing of

a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period is not tolled during the time that a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120

(2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16,

2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period has already

run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“section 2244(d) does not permit the re-initiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner

is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The documents submitted with Respondent’s motion to dismiss establish that Petitioner filed

the following state habeas petitions related to the BPH’s 2007 decision: (1) filed in the San

Bernardino County Superior Court on November 1, 2007 and denied on November 21, 2007 (Doc.

13, Ex. 1); (2) filed in the California Court of Appeal on December 27, 2007 and denied on January

11, 2008 (Id., Ex. 2); (3) filed in the San Bernardino County Superior Court on April 2, 2008 and

denied on April 10, 2008 (Id., Ex. 3); filed in the California Court of Appeal on May 13, 2008 and

denied on May 21, 2008 (Id., Ex. 4); and (5) filed in the California Supreme Court on May 30, 2008

and denied on August 13, 2008. (Id., Ex. 5). 

As mentioned, the one-year period commenced on April 5, 2007 and continued to run until

Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on November 7, 2007, a period of 216 days. Thus, at

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that time, Petitioner had 149 days remaining on the one-year period. After Petitioner’s last state

petition was denied on August 13, 2008, the one-year period re-commenced the following day, i.e.,

on August 14, 2008, and continued to run until the remaining 149 days expired on January 10, 2009,

approximately ten days before Petitioner filed the instant petition. 

Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that all of Petitioner’s state petitions and the intervals

between them were entitled to statutory tolling, the petition would be untimely. However, as

Respondent correctly maintains, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the entire period

from the filing of the first petition until the denial of the last petition.

Under the AEDPA, there is no statutory tolling for the period between sets or “rounds” of

state habeas petitions. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9 Cir. 2003)(no tolling once California th

Supreme Court denied review); see also Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir. 2002)(no tolling th

during gap between first set of state petitions and second). In Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817,

820 (9 Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that a petitioner begins a separate round of review “each th

time [he] files a new habeas petition at the same or a lower level” of the state court system. See also

Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007 (intervals tolled between state court’s disposition of a state habeas

petition and the filing of “a petition at the next state appellate level.”)(emphasis supplied). 

Moreover, statutory tolling is inapplicable to periods between successive petitions that do not

form part of a progressive series from the Superior Court, to the Court of Appeal, to the California

Supreme Court. See Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984 (9 Cir. 2001)(statute of limitation not tolled th

during interval between successive state habeas petitions filed to the state’s highest court); see also

Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007 (intervals tolled between state court’s disposition of a state habeas

petition and the filing of “a petition at the next state appellate level.”); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d

1262 (9 Cir. 2000). th

Here, assuming, without deciding, that Petitioner was entitled to statutory tolling for the first

and second petitions and the interval separating them, his third petition was not filed in the “next

state appellate level,” which would have been the California Supreme Court. Instead, Petitioner

returned to the Superior Court, thus commencing a new “round” of filings. Hence, he is not entitled

to the interval between the denial of the second petition and the filing of the third petition, a period

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of 82 days. Thus, at this point in the analysis, the petition would now be 92 days late.

Respondent then contends that Petitioner is not entitled to additional statutory tolling for the

fourth petition because it was successive to the second petition, also filed in the California Court of

Appeal. The Court agrees. Petitioner is not entitled to interval tolling for the period between

successive petitions. Thus, he cannot be credited with the period between the denial of the third

petition and the filing of the fourth one, a period of 32 days. Added to the prior 92 days, this would 2

make the petition untimely by 124 days. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling 3

sufficient to compensate for those 124 days, the petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

In his motion for judicial notice, Petitioner apparently requests that the Court take judicial

notice of the fact that the only person who would be prejudiced by Petitioner’s late filing of the

petition is Petitioner himself, since he is already serving a life sentence and therefore any delay

merely postpones a potential parole date for Petitioner. While Petitioner’s logic is novel, it is

ultimately unpersuasive. The AEDPA has no provision for the Court’s own exercise of its own

discretion in providing relief from the operation of the one-year limitation period. The “exceptions”

to the one-year limitation period, i.e., statutory and equitable tolling, are clearly set forth in the

discussion supra. No other exceptions exist. From that discussion, it is patent that the petition is

untimely. There is nothing in those provisions permitting the Court to weigh competing prejudice

from an untimely petition to thereby excuse a tardily filed petition. Accordingly, the Court will deny

Petitioner’s motion for judicial notice and recommend that the amended petition be dismissed.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances

The Court has already disallowed interval tolling between the denial of the second petition and the filing of the third

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petition.

Respondent apparently contends that when a petition is not filed at the next higher appellate level, or when a

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successive petition is filed at the same level, the petitioner is not only divested of statutory tolling for the interval separating

those filings, but also for the pendency of the petitions themselves. (Doc. 13, pp. 5-6). The Court does not read the cases

to deny statutory tolling for the pendency of “properly filed” petitions, even if they are not filed at the next higher appellate

level. However, the cases clearly disallow interval tolling in such instances. Here, the divergent views of Respondent and

the Court regarding pendency tolling is not determinative since, under either analysis, the petition is untimely and must be

dismissed.

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beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland,

410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When 

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct.

1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at

1107. 

Here, Petitioner contends in his opposition that medical disabilities entitle him to equitable

tolling. Specifically, Petitioner maintains that on July 15, 2007, he suffered a stroke that was

original mis-diagnosed by health care personnel and that it was not until July 17, 2009 that the

condition was “formally diagnosed.” (Doc. 18, p. 4). Petitioner also contends that he suffered a

“knowledge deficit,” slurred speech, a weak left hand, and decreased response in his left leg as a

result. (Id.). Additionally, Petitioner maintains that he underwent spinal surgery for a herniated disk

on February 5, 2008 and wore a cervical collar for ten weeks while “re-teach[ing] himself to walk,

write, and regrow neural pathways around the damaged areas of the brain.” (Id.). 

Apparently, Petitioner is contending that he is entitled to equitable tolling because these

severe medical conditions constituted extraordinary circumstances beyond his control that prevented

him from timely filing his petition. The flaw in Petitioner’s reasoning is that he has provided no

evidence, apart from the mere existence of these medical conditions themselves, that they were the

“but for” cause for filing a late petition. Indeed, Petitioner provides no evidence whatever regarding

whether or how those medical circumstances prohibited him from filing his federal petition in a

timely manner. As Respondent correctly notes, Petitioner was apparently able to file all five of his

state petitions during this period of purported disability. 

Furthermore, as discussed above, Petitioner’s problem ultimately was in waiting too long to

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initiate the state habeas process in the first place, and then waiting too long after that process

concluded to file his federal petition. As mentioned, those two periods alone exceeded the 365 days

permitted by the AEDPA. In other words, even if Petitioner had properly filed all of his petitions in

the correct state courts, the instant petition would still be untimely. Petitioner provides no

explanation for how the medical conditions described in his opposition precluded him from timely

filing his federal petition but permitted him to properly file five state petitions during the same time

period. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Thus,

the petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. Petitioner’s motion for judicial notice of facts (Doc. 20), is DENIED.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. 13), be GRANTED and the first amended habeas corpus petition (Doc. 7), be DISMISSED for

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The

Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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