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Parties Involved:
Leroy Vincent Ballejos
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TEBTII CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FI LED 

Uoited Statts Courr of Appeals· Tenth Ci::-ruit 

/1.PR 1 7 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 90-2167 

v. 

LEROY VINCENT BALLEJOS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D.C. No. CR 90-83-JC-01) 

(D. New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JODGMER'l'* 

Before LOGAH, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After participating in the planning of a bank robbery and 

driving the get away car for his two coconspirators who actually 

entered the bank and took money at gunpoint, defendant Leroy 

Vincent Ballejos entered a plea of guilty to charges of bank 

larceny and aiding and abetting. In a written plea agreement, Mr. 

Ballejos and the government stipulated that Mr. Ballejos had been 

a "minimal participant" in the offense for the purpose of 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2167 Document: 010110034233 Date Filed: 04/17/1991 Page: 1 
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sentencing. Notwithstanding, at the arraignment defendant 

acknowledged his recognition that the court was not bound by the 

stipulation. 

At sentencing, the trial court refused to accept the 

stipulation and found instead defendant was a "minor participant." 

Mr. Ballejos now appeals on the ground the district court should 

have given him a four level reduction as a minimal participant and 

should have given him credit for the presentence time during which 

he was under curfew. We affirm. 1 

Mr. Ballejos makes an impassioned plea that as a matter of 

law he was entitled to a finding by the trial court that he was a 

minimal participant because he had no knowledge that one of his 

coconspirators was armed; that he was under the influence of 

marijuana at the time of the offense: 2 that his coconspirators 

kept the truth from him; and all he did was drive the car. The 

district court, however, found that "[h]e is every bit as 

important to a bank robbery as the people who went in if he's 

driving the car." 

Whether a defendant is a minimal or minor participant in a 

criminal transaction is a question of fact. United States v. 

Calderon-Porras, 911 F.2d 421 (10th Cir. 1990). Factual findings 

1After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2The fact 

S 5K2.13 

drugs may 

offense). 

is irrelevant to 

(diminished mental 

be considered only 

the sentencing decision. u.s.s.G. 

capacity from non-voluntary use of 

in sentencing for a nonviolent 

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Appellate Case: 90-2167 Document: 010110034233 Date Filed: 04/17/1991 Page: 2 
made for the purpose of sentencing are subject to a clearly 

erroneous review by this court. United States v. Poole, 

F.2d (1991 WL 45364 (10th Cir.)). Defendant fails to 

dispute whether the trial court's finding was erroneous, raising 

instead a rhetorical question for our consideration. 3 

First, asserting the defendant was "induced" to plead guilty 

to bank larceny by the government's recommendation of a four point 

reduction, counsel posits, "What does counsel do when a defendant 

asks whether he should plead guilty, or go to trial?" Although 

the question fails to address any issue before us, we would 

suggest it is counsel's duty to advise the accused of all the 

possible consequences of pleading guilty or going to trial and 

letting the client make an informed decision. 

Moreover, the impassioned argument rings hollow. The 

defendant clearly understood that the court was not bound by the 

government's recommendation, and he stated that understanding 

before the district court accepted his plea. Defendant was also 

advised: "If you do not get credit for six a reduction of six 

under the guidelines, I will not allow you to withdraw your plea, 

because those stipulations are not binding on me." Not only did 

defendant then voice his understanding of that admonition, but 

also counsel acknowledged the court correctly stated the terms of 

the plea agreement. To now argue the defendant was somehow 

3counsel also cites cases dealing with downward departure; 

however, because this is a case of level reduction and not 

downward departure (both of which are distinctly different 

considerations) defendant's authority is inapposite. Moreover, 

the discretionary refusal to depart downward is not subject to 

review. United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 882, 883 (10th Cir. 

1990). 

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Appellate Case: 90-2167 Document: 010110034233 Date Filed: 04/17/1991 Page: 3 
' misled, or that the justice system must recompense him for 

treating lightly his plea, is simply disingenuous. 4 

Finally, defendant argues because he was subject to a 7:00 

p.m. to 7:00 a.m. presentence curfew monitored by an electronic 

ankle bracelet, he should have been given credit for time served 

as part of his sentence. Counsel quixotically argues, "Members of 

this court should not render a decision in this case until each 

has worn a four ounce bracelet around an ankle for a period for 

perhaps forty-eight hours, trying to forget that it exists." 

Since the issue turns, however, on the legal question of whether 

curfew is "official detention," this invitation is, at best, 

gratuitous. 

A defendant is entitled to credit toward the service of a 

term of imprisonment for "any time he has spent in official 

detention prior to the date the sentence commences." 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3585. In United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1301 (1990), we held that presentence 

time spent by a defendant in a halfway house was not official 

detention for the purpose of S 3585. We reasoned that official 

detention means imprisonment "in a place of confinement, not 

stipulations or conditions imposed upon a person not subject to 

full physical incarceration." Woods, 888 F.2d at 655. Despite 

the additional burden of having to wear a plastic ankle bracelet, 

4counsel also asks "this court to state a policy which will effect 

[sic] the future of plea bargains in this circuit by making this 

appellant's waiver of his right to a trial a meaningful one." The 

import of this request is unclear, but if cou·nsel is suggesting we 

should hold as a matter of law a trial court must be bound by the 

stipulations in a plea agreement, his dog won't hunt. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2167 Document: 010110034233 Date Filed: 04/17/1991 Page: 4 
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, the time spent by defendant under curfew is no more full physical 

incarceration than residence in a halfway house. 

persuaded to the contrary by counsel's passion. 5 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

We are not 

5The government argues that we do not have jurisdiction over this 

case because defendant asked for clarification of his sentence 

before filing his notice of appeal. United States v. Green, 847 

F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1988), leads us to the contrary conclusion. 

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