Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02737/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02737-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Lujan-Miranda
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 G 1988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 86-2738 

RUBEN RODRIGUEZ-PANDO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-86-220) 

Narciso Garcia of Toulouse, Toulouse & Garcia, P.A., Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Presiliano A. Torrez, Assistant u. s. Attorney (William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico, with him on 

the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District 

Judge.* 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 1 
Ruben Rodriguez-Pando appeals his conviction for violation of 

21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l), p6ssession with intent to distribute 

cocaine in excess of one kilogram. 

On July 9, 1986, Officers Frisk and Denton, each in separate 

patrol cars, were traveling west on County Road 21 in southwestern 

New Mexico. They had been informed that narcotics were being 

transported by airplane to that vicinity and were looking for 

evidence of aircraft landings. At approximately 10:00 a.m., they 

observed a red pickup truck followed closely by a blue pickup 

truck approaching them. Officer Frisk testified that the blue 

pickup was weaving erratically between the shoulder and the middle 

of the road. Suspecting an intoxicated driver, Officer Frisk 

turned around to follow the blue pickup. This action prompted the 

driver of the red pickup1 to substantially increase his speed. 

Officer Denton, who had also turned around, activated his 

emergency equipment, passed Officer Frisk and the blue pickup, and 

pursued the red pickup. 

Officer Frisk continued to follow the blue pickup for several 

miles and observed that it was carrying a heavy load. He surmised 

the driver was having trouble steering the vehicle. Officer Frisk 

testified that he intended to stop the blue pickup at the point 

where Officer Denton stopped the red pickup. However, when 

Officer Frisk saw the red pickup and Officer Denton turn right 

onto County Road 11 at a high rate of speed, he activated his 

1 Pando's codefendant, Juan Lujan-Miranda, was driving the red 

pickup. His appeal of his conviction on the same charge as 

Pando's is pending before us. United States v. Lujan-Miranda, 

slip opinion (10th Cir. February 26, 1988). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 2 
emergency equipment approximately 100 yards before reaching that 

road. Defendant slowed the blue pickup, turned onto County Road 

11, and stopped. 

In approaching the pickup, Officer Frisk observed· a yellow 

package wrapped in plastic as well as brown packages alongside a 

tarp which covered most of the load. He asked defendant for his 

driver's license, which Pando produced. Officer Frisk then asked 

for the truck's registration. Defendant opened the glove 

compartment of the pickup, and Officer Frisk saw the butt of a 

weapon protruding from a red rag. As Pando began pulling the gun 

out of the rag, Officer Frisk drew his weapon and ordered Pando to 

drop the gun. Pando released the weapon on the glove box drawer. 

Officer Frisk arrested, searched, and handcuffed Pando and then 

placed him in the back seat of his patrol car. He thereafter 

lifted the tarp in the back of the truck and found what was later 

determined to be over 1100 pounds of cocaine. After Pando's 

arrest, officers obtained a search warrant to obtain a urine 

sample and conduct a urinalysis. 

The next morning Pando made a tape-recorded statement to New 

Mexico State Police Officer John Sena. Pando claimed in this 

statement that he had been coerced into transporting the contraband and that both he and his family were threatened that morning 

with physical harm if he did not cooperate. At trial, the court 

excluded the statement as hearsay. 

Pando raises several issues on appeal. First, he argues that 

the district court erred in refusing to suppress the cocaine found 

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 3 
in his truck -- he claims that the evidence was obtained during an 

unconstit~tional search and seizure. Secbnd, he argues that the 

court erroneously admitted the results of the urinalysis. In this 

regard, he attacks the validity of the warrant used to obtain the 

sample; he also claims that the prejudicial impact of the evidence 

outweighed its probative value. Third, the defendant asserts that 

the court erred in excluding his tape-recorded statement to 

Officer Sena. His final contention is that his twenty-year 

sentence is excessive under the circumstances. 

Search and Seizure 

Pando claims that both the initial stop of his vehicle and 

its subsequent search were unconstitutional. We hold that the 

initial stop was based on "an articulable and reasonable 

suspicion" that the driver was intoxicated and was therefore 

justified. United States .Y..!.. Sharpe, 105 s. Ct. 1568, 1573 (1985). 

The.district court found that Pando's truck "was moving from side 

to side and left the paved portion of the road once in a while. 

It also weaved over the center of t~e road." Erratic driving of 

this nature justified the officer's belief that Pando was driving 

while intoxicated and made the investigative stop proper. We also 

hold that Pando's arrest for assaulting an officer after he 

grabbed a weapon was ·lawful. 

We further hold that the subsequent warrantless search of the 

truck was valid. Under the automobile exception to the warrant 

requirement an automobile may be searched without a warrant if 

there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains 

contraband. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 4 
The events preceding the search gave the officer probable cause to 

believe the truck contained illegal drugs: the truck with which 

Pando was traveling attempted to evade the officers; the officers 

had redeived reports that drugs were being transported in the 

area; Pando was carrying a heavy load and appeared nervous; he 

reached for a weapon; and, finally, the officer saw several 

packages wrapped in a fashion often used to wrap cocaine. We hold 

that these circumstances gave the officer probable cause to search 

the truck. 

Urinalysis 

Pando next raises several objections to the use of the 

urinalysis results at trial. He argues first that the affidavit 

used to obtain the search warrant was insufficient to establish 

probable cause. 

The affidavit stated: 

[Pando] [w]as driving a 

approximately 675 lbs. of 

are bloodshot and subject 

condition, associated 

intoxicants. 

vehicle which was carrying 

cocaine. Also, subject's eyes 

appears to be in a stupporous 

by Officer Denton to be 

Pando asserts that the facts listed in the affidavit are 

erroneous. In particular, he argues that "'red, watery eyes, and 

a stuporous condition' are not symptoms of cocaine use or 

withdrawal." Before Pando may attack the veracity of the facts in 

the affidavit, he must make a "substantial preliminary showing 

that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with 

reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in 

the warrant affidavit,'' and that "the allegedly false statement is 

necessary to the finding of probable cause." Franks v. Delaware, 

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 5 
438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). Pando has not made a substantial 

showing that the affidavit·contained intentionally false 

statements. Indeed, an expert for the defense testified that 

"bloodshot" eyes are sometimes an indication of cocaine 

intoxication. Furthermore, most of the allegedly false statements 

to which Pando objects were found not in the affidavit concerning 

him but in a separate affidavit underlying a search warrant used 

to obtain a urine sample from Pando's codefendant. Since Pando 

has no cognizable interest in his codefendant's urine sample, any 

false statement that might exist in the separate affidavit did not 

violate Pando's constitutional rights. "(D]efendants ••• may 

only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own 

Fourth Amendment rights have ••• been violated." United States 

v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980). 

Pando's next objection to the urinalysis is that the 

magistrate himself was not familiar with the symptoms of cocaine 

use and therefore "was not acting as a neutral and detached and 

independent magistra~e." A magistrate is not held to the level of 

knowledge of an expert witness. Affidavits are to be viewed "with 

common sense and not subjected to hypertechnical scrutiny." 

United States v. Williams, 605 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979). The affidavit in this case set forth 

the underlying facts in sufficient detail to allow a neutral 

magistrate to make a determination as to probable cause. United 

States Y..!.. Marcello, 570 F.2d 324, 325 (10th Cir. 1978). 

Furthermore, the facts stated in the affidavit support the 

magistrate's determination that probable cause existed. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 6 
Pando raises two more issues regarding the urinalysis. He 

argues that the urinalysis was not ordered after a lawful arrest. 

We have already held that the arrest was lawful. Finally, Pando 

claims that the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed its 

probative value. "A trial court has broad discretion to determine 

whether the probative value of evidence outweighs the risk of 

prejudice." United States Y..!. Primrose, 718 F.2d 1484, 1492 (10th 

Cir. 1983). We cannot say that the district court abused its 

discretion by holding the evidence admissible. Pando's defense 

was that he was an innocent victim who was forced by threats to 

transport the cocaine. His own use of cocaine casts doubt on this 

story and is therefore probative. Pando argues, however, that any 

probative value is vitiated by the lack of reliability inherent in 

the tests used. We conclude that the question of how much weight 

should be given to this evidence was properly left to the jury. 

United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 1979). 

Tape Recording 

"In a review of the evidentiary rulings of a trial court, 

this court may not reverse in the absence of an abuse of 

discretion." United States Y..!. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1366 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984). The need for deference 

to a trial court ruling on a hearsay objection is particularly 

great because the determination of whether certain evidence is 

hearsay rests heavily upon the facts of a particular case. We 

hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding Pando's tape-recorded statement to the police officer. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 7 
Pando argues that the tape recording was admissible because 

it was not offered to prove that someone was going to kill him and 

his family, but rather to show his state of mind. It is true that 

the tape was not offered to prcive that someone was actually going 

to kill Pando. However, we agree with the district court's 

implicit determination that the matter asserted in the tape was 

that Pando had been threatened. Thus, the tape was offered to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted and was therefore hearsay. 

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in so holding. 

Here we do not have the defendant testifying about matters 

within his personal knowledge, the words of Mr. X. Rather, we 

have what amounts to an offer of proof that a third party heard 

the defendant describe the words of Mr. X. This certainly seems 

to be an attempt to establish by hearsay that those words were 

spoken. The issue in this case then is not whether Pando could 

testify as to the out-of-court statement of the person who 

threatened him. The question is whether the jury may hear a tape 

recording of Pando's out-of-court repetition of the threat. 

United States~ Herrera, 600 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1979), upon 

which Pando relies, involved different facts. In that case, the 

Fifth Circuit held that the trial court erroneously excluded the 

defendant's in-court testimony regarding a threat she had 

received. In Herrera, the defendant's repetition of the threat 

would have been made under oath and in the presence of the jury. 

Furthermore, Herrera would have been subject to cross-examination. 

By contrast, Panda's repetition of the threat was not made 

under oath; indeed, it was made in circumstances which cast 

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 8 
serious doubt on its credibility -- a post-arrest interview with a 

police officer. Nor did Pando repeat the threat in the presence 

of the jury. Moreover, Pando was not available for crossexamination concerning his assertion that he had been threatened. 

Herrera and similar cases cited by the defendant are simply 

inapposite. See,~' United States~ Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 

1098 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (defendant sought to testify in court 

regarding a threat he had received). See also United States v. 

Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (defendant sought to testify 

in court regarding statements made to him), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 

864 (1979); United States~ Scanditia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 t2d Cir. 

1968) (when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness's 

account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in 

order to explain the inconsistency), vacated on other grounds, 394 

U.S. 310 (1969). There is a great difference between what the 

defendant would testify, and what the third party would testify 

that the defendant said out of court, in terms of fair opportunity 

to test the truth of defendant's declaration that someone actually 

uttered the threatening words. 

The evidentiary ruling that we review here raises concerns 

similar to those discussed by the Eleventh Circuit in United 

States~ Willis, 759 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 

U.S. 849 (1985). In that case two men were apprehended with 800 

pounds of cocaine on their private plane. One of the defendants 

told the arresting officer that he thought the plane contained 

only mail. At trial the defendant sought to elicit this statement 

from the officer during cross-examination. He claimed that the 

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 9 
statement was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that the plane contained only 

mail. The trial court held the evidence inadmissible. The court 

of appeals affirmed saying: 

"The appellants also take issue with the court's 

ruling that the defense could not elicit, through the 

cross-examination of Agent Anderson, [the defendant's] 

allegedly exculpatory statements at the time of his 

arrest. Obviously, the defense sought to place [the 

defendant's] remarks before the jury without subjecting 

[him] to cross-examination. This is precisely what is 

forbidden by the hearsay rule." 

Id. at 1501. Similarly, the district court in this case was 

concerned not with the admissibility of the threat itself, but with 

the admissibility of evidence offered through a third party 

regarding Panda's out-of-court repetition of the threat. The 

district court did not err in ruling that the recording was hearsay. 

The court correctly observed that the recording was not 

admissible under any exception. The state of mind exception, Fed. 

R. Evid. 803(3), does not apply since Panda's post-arrest statement 

to Officer Sena was a "statement of memory or belief" expressly 

excluded by Rule 803(3) itself. "The essence of the state of mind 

exception is that there are circumstantial guarantees of 

trustworthiness attendant to a statement that reflects a then 

existing mental, emotional or physical condition ... " Trustees 

of the Univ. of Pa.~ Lexington Insurance Co., 815 F.2d 890, 905 

(3d Cir. 1987). "[S]tatements relating to a person's state of mind 

have probative value mainly because the declarant has no chance to 

reflect upon and perhaps misrepresent his situation." United States 

v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1315 (7th Cir. 1986). Panda's post-

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 10 
arrest statement to an officer was not admissible to show his state 

of mind at the time of arrest. 

Pando next claims that the district court erred in "advising 

the government when it had no objection to the admission that if the 

government objected, the court would sustain the objection." Our 

review of the record reveals that this claim is unfounded. The 

government did object by pointing out that the evidence was hearsay. 

There appears to have been some confusion as to basis of the 

objection, and the government offered to withdraw it. The court 

said, "Okay. 

objection •• 

You can withdraw it if you want. It's a valid 

" We find no reversible error in this comment. 

Sentence 

Panda's final contention is that his twenty-year sentence is 

excessive. He complains that he received the same sentence as his 

codefendant who had a prior criminal record. 

Since the sentence was within the statutory limits, we may not 

reduce it on appeal in the absence of a proper motion by the 

defendant to the district court under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b). 

United States v. Martinez, 749 F.2d 601, 607 (10th Cir. 1984). 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 11 
No. 86-2738 - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RUBEN RODRIGUEZ-PANDO 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I agree with all the majority has said except its treatment 

of the hearsay issue. Perhaps no rule of law has so bedeviled 

lawyers and judges nor been so uniformly misunderstood by both. 

Of course, it has been difficult for those of us educated in 

former times to accept the fact that hearsay is whatever Fed. R. 

Evid. 801 says it is. The key part of that rule for present purposes is 80l(c). It provides: 

(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one 

made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 

· matter asserted. 

It is clear from the text of the rule itself that a hearsay 

objection always involves a two-step analysis. The first step is 

to determine if it was an out-of-court statement. No one disputes 

that in this case. The second (and mandatory) step is to see if 

it was "offered" for the truth of the matter asserted. No one can 

really dispute that the "offer" in this case was to show state of 

mind, not the truth of the matter asserted. The majority suggests 

that the trial court made an "implicit determination" that the 

"offer" was to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 

It is not up to the trial judge to "implicitly determine" 

that it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The 

duty of the trial court is to consider -the party's offer and 

determine whether it is admissible as offered. The trial court 

cannot change the offer. Here the trial court did not rule that 

Appellate Case: 86-2737 Document: 010110018339 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 12 
state of mind was not at issue or that this offer did not show 

state of mind. If there was another basis for excluding the evidence, the trial court did not rely on i~; and we may npt rely on 

it either. 

The same statement can be hearsay in one trial and nonhearsay 

in another because the purpose for which it is offered determines 

whether the statement is hearsay. A statement not offered to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather to indirectly 

infer a party's state of mind or to show the effect of a statement 

on ·a party has long been recognized as nonhearsay. The subject 

matter of the assertion is not an express articulation of state of 

mind; instead the declarantjs state of mind may be inferred from 

the fact that the assertion was made. Whether the actual subject 

matter of the assertion is true or not is irrelevant. For 

example, the defendant in United States v. Herrera, 600 F.2d 502 

(5th Cir. 1979), was convicted of transporting illegal aliens. At 

trial, she mounted a duress defense, claiming that a Ms. Escamilla 

had threatened her with physical harm in a telephone conversation 

if she did not cooperate. The trial court refused to admit 

testimony regarding the contents of the telephone conversation on 

hearsay grounds. The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court, 

holding that the conversation was not hearsay. 

The threatening statements made by Escamilla during the 

conversation were not offered to prove that Escamilla 

would actually carry through the threats, but rather to 

show Herrera's state of mind in consequence of the 

statements. The trial court instructed the jury on the 

duress defense; therefore, the jury was entitled to consider Escamilla's statements and Herrera's reaction to 

them in resolving the issue of criminal intent. 

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Id. at 504. See also United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 514 

(10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 

(D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); United States v. 

Kostoff, 585 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1978} (per curiam}; United 

States v. Cline, 570 F.2d 731, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1978); United 

States v. Pate, 543 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir. 1976); United States 

v. Decarlo, 458 F.2d 358, 363-64 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. 

denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 

244, 251 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 

310 (1969). 

The exception to the hearsay rule enunciated in Rule 803(3} 

only comes into play when the statement is undeniably hearsay 

because it is a direct and explicit declaration of state of mind, 

i.e., it is offered to prove the truth of the substance of what 

the declarant said. For example, ''I intended to kill John" is 

hearsay if it is offered to prove the declarant's mens rea of 

intent. Unlike the nonhearsay described in Herrera, no extrapolation from the subject matter of the assertion is necessary in 

order to infer the declarant's state of mind, and the truth of the 

subject matter of the assertion is the critical inquiry. The contemporaneous requirement in Rule 803(3) is the putative circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness that justifies allowing the 

trier of fact to consider the substance of the hearsay utterance 

as proof of the declarant's state of mind at the time he or she 

commented on it. The advisory committee notes on the rules make 

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this clear when they state, "Exception (3) is essentially a specialized application of Exception (1) [present sense impression], 

presented separately to enhance its usefulness and accessiblity." 

The statement in the present case is to the effect that 

Mr. Pando was threatened with physical harm on the morning of his 

arrest if he failed to cooperate and transport the contraband.* 

At trial, Mr. Pando sought to introduce this evidence in support 

of his defense that he lacked criminal intent because he performed 

the acts for which he was charged under mental duress and coercion. The statement was not offered to prove the truth of the 

substance of what was told to him, i.e., that someone was going to 

kill both him and his family. Mr. Pando could have misconstrued 

what was told to him or even imagined the threats. Rather, just 

as in Herrera, the statement was offered to demonstrate that 

Mr. Pando believed he was threatened with bodily harm, acted 

because of the impact of this statement, and thus lacked the requisite criminal intent. The statement was offered to indirectly 

establish his state of mind, the essence of his coercion defense. 

Hearsay analysis thus dictates that because the statement was not 

offered to prove the truth of what was said, it is nonhearsay and 

admissible without resort to the hearsay exception in Rule 803(3). 

I am persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in 

* Mr. Pando told Officer Sena that on the morning of his arrest 

he had been confronted by armed men and told to drive toward 

Hobbs, New Mexico, with the contraband. The men allegedly told 

Mr. Pando that he would be stopped somewhere along the way, and 

the cocaine would be unloaded. He was warned that he would be 

watched and that if he failed to do as he was told, his family 

would be harmed. 

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refusing to admit the taped statement on the grounds of hearsay. 

See Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th 

Cir. 1984) (evidentiary ruling will only be reversed on a showing 

that the trial court abused its discretion). 

The Government essentially argues that failure to admit the 

statement, if erroneous, was harmless error because it was cumulative of other evidence supporting Mr. Pando's duress defense. 

Mr. Pando called two police officers as well as a deputy sheriff 

who testified that Mr. Pando had reported prior threats on his 

life both in June of 1986 and July 4 or 5 of 1986. One incident 

involved a shooting at a cafe where Mr. Pando, apparently the 

intended victim, appeared to be very frightened. Mr. Pando had 

told the police that those w~o were threatening him believed him 

to be an "informant." 

The excluded evidence pertained to his state of mind the very 

morning of Mr. Pando's arrest and was therefore not cumulative of 

the police officers' testimony relating to· the two prior incidents. Moreover, the defendant's own tape-recorded statement made 

the morning of the arrest was critical evidence of his duress 

defense for the crime committed that same day and for which he was 

being tried. The nexus between the state of mind in question and 

the crime committed that day was compelling; there was no indication that the prior threats testified to by the officers had any 

direct connection to, much less actuated, the crime for which 

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Mr. Pando was arrested. The erroneous exclusion of this evidence 

was not harmless. I would remand for retrial. 

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