Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07021/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07021-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Respondent
Veterans Justice Group, LLC
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VETERANS JUSTICE GROUP, LLC,

Petitioner

v.

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-7021

______________________ 

Petition for review pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 502.

-------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF VETERANS’ 

ADVOCATES, INC.,

Petitioner

v.

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-7025

______________________ 

Petition for review pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 502.

------------------------------------------------------------

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2 VETERANS JUSTICE GRP., LLC v. SEC’Y OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

THE AMERICAN LEGION, AMVETS, THE 

MILITARY ORDER OF THE PURPLE HEART, 

VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA, NATIONAL 

VETERANS LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM,

Petitioners

v.

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-7061

______________________ 

Petition for review pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 502.

______________________ 

Decided: April 7, 2016

______________________ 

 DOUGLAS J. ROSINSKI, Douglas J. Rosinski, Esq. Inc., 

Columbia, SC, argued for petitioner in 2015-7021.

 KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter 

Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for petitioner in 2015-

7025.

 FRANCESCO VALENTINI, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale 

and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, argued for petitioners in 

2015-7061. Also represented by CARL JOHN NICHOLS;

BARTON F. STICHMAN, National Veterans Legal Services 

Program.

 MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also 

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VETERANS JUSTICE GRP., LLC v. SEC’Y OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 3

represented by ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., BENJAMIN C.

MIZER; DAVID J. BARRANS, BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, Office of 

General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs.

THOMAS JAMES REED, Widener University, Wilmington, DE, for amicus curiae Warriors Helping Warriors, 

Inc. in 2015-7021. 

ANGELA K. DRAKE, The Veterans Clinic at the University of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, MO, for amici 

curiae Angela K. Drake, Brian Clauss, Yelena Duterte, 

Hugh McClean, Laurie Forbes Neff, Patricia E. Roberts, 

Susan Saidel, Stacey-Rae Simcox, Aniela K. Szymanski, 

Michael Joel Wishnie in 2015-7021. 

BRIAN BERLINER, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for amicus curiae Mazon: A Jewish Response to 

Hunger. Also represented by JASON ALAN ORR, DIMITRI 

PORTNOI, CATALINA JOOS VERGARA in 2015-7061.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, WALLACH and TARANTO,

Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge.

In related petitions,1 the American Legion (“American 

Legion”), the National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. (“NOVA”), and the Veterans Justice Group, 

LLC (“VJG”) (collectively, “Petitioners”), challenge the 

1 Veterans Justice Grp., LLC v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, No. 2015-7021 (Fed. Cir. argued Oct. 8, 2015), Nat’l 

Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans 

Affairs, No. 2015-7025 (Fed. Cir. argued Oct. 8, 2015); 

Am. Legion v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, No. 2015-7061

(Fed. Cir. argued Oct. 8, 2015). 

 

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4 VETERANS JUSTICE GRP., LLC v. SEC’Y OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

validity of regulations issued in 2014 by the Department 

of Veterans Affairs (“VA” or “Secretary”) pursuant to its 

notice-and-comment rulemaking authority. See Standard 

Claims and Appeals Forms, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,660 (Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs Sept. 25, 2014) (“Final Rule”).2 The 

Final Rule amends the VA’s adjudication and appellate 

regulations to require that all claims and appeals originate on standard VA forms. See id. at 57,678. For the 

reasons set forth below, we deny the petitions and hold 

the Final Rule valid because it accords with applicable 

rulemaking procedures and is not arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. 

BACKGROUND

To understand the issues relevant to this appeal, we 

discuss, in turn, the VA’s prior regulation, the Final Rule, 

and the general arguments in the Petitions for Review. 

I. Prior Regulation

A. Claim Initiation

Veterans are entitled to compensation “[f]or disability 

resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting 

injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty . . . during a period of war.” 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (1998). 

For veterans to receive compensation under the laws 

administered by the VA, “[a] specific claim in the form 

prescribed by the Secretary . . . must be filed.” Id.

§ 5101(a)(1). The VA’s prior regulation implemented this 

authority by providing that “[a]ny communication or 

action, indicating an intent to apply for . . . benefits[,] . . . 

may be considered an informal claim.” 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.155(a) (2014) (emphasis added) (“Prior Regulation”). 

2 The Final Rule took effect on March 24, 2015. See 

Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,660.

 

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Under the Prior Regulation, a veteran could establish a 

claim’s effective date (i.e., when the claimant begins to 

receive compensation) by filing an informal claim, so long

as a formal application was received by the VA “within 

[one] year from the date [the formal application form] was 

sent to the claimant.” Id. 

B. Appeal

If a claimant perfected an informal claim by filing a 

formal application within the one-year time period, a VA 

Agency of Original Jurisdiction, typically a VA regional 

office (“RO”), considered the claim, gave notice to the 

claimant of its decision, and informed the claimant of his 

or her right to appeal. See 38 U.S.C. § 5104 (1998); 38 

C.F.R. § 3.103(b)(1) (2014). An appeal could be initiated 

by filing a Notice of Disagreement (“NOD”), see 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7105(a) (1998), and unless the requested benefit was 

granted or the NOD withdrawn, the VA would issue a 

“statement of the case” (“SOC”) summarizing the reasons 

for the VA’s decision on each issue, id. § 7105(d)(1). 

Following issuance of the SOC, the “claimant [would] be 

afforded a period of sixty days from the date of the [SOC] 

to file a formal appeal” with the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Veterans Board”). Id. § 7105(d)(3). The statute 

provides that the “appeal should set out specific allegations of error of fact or law, such allegations related to 

specific items in the [SOC].” Id. 

The NOD is required to be: (1) filed within one year of 

the mailing of notice of the RO’s decision; and (2) in 

writing. Id. § 7105(b)(1). In addition to these statutory 

requirements, the VA required an NOD to “be in terms 

which [could] be reasonably construed as disagreement 

with [the RO’s decision] and a desire for appellate review,” although “special wording [was] not required.” 38 

C.F.R. § 20.201 (2014). However, if the RO’s notice of 

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tion the claimant was required to specify which agency 

determinations he or she sought to appeal. Id. 

II. Final Rule

In September 2014, the VA promulgated the Final 

Rule, which sought to “strike a balance between standardizing, modernizing, and streamlining” the claim initiation 

and appellate process, while providing “claimants . . . with 

a process that remains veteran-friendly and informal.” 

Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,664. 

Although the Final Rule incorporated a majority of 

the amendments originally proposed by the VA in 2013, it 

altered the proposed rule in one important respect. See 

Standard Claims and Appeals Forms, 78 Fed. Reg. 

65,490, 65,492 (Dep’t of Veterans Affairs Oct. 31, 2013) 

(“Proposed Rule”). Under the Proposed Rule, submission 

of an informal claim––e.g., a narrative submission––

would no longer serve as an effective date placeholder 

that could later be perfected by the filing of a formal 

claim. See id. at 65,495 (altering the Prior Regulation’s 

definition of “claim” under 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(p) to exclude 

informal communications). Instead, an “incomplete 

claim” would provide the effective date placeholder function formerly provided by an informal claim, if perfected 

by the filing of a standard application form within one 

year. Id. at 65,494. However, in contrast to the flexible 

nature of the prior “informal claim” system, under the 

Proposed Rule, a submission would be considered an 

“incomplete claim” only if a claimant filled out, completely 

or incompletely, an online application via the VA’s webbased electronic claims application system, but “d[id] not 

transmit the online application for processing.” Id. 

Otherwise, claims would be considered received as of the 

date they were filed on a standard paper application form. 

When it published the Proposed Rule in 2013, the VA 

explained it was “facing an unprecedented volume of 

compensation claims” resulting in “unacceptable delays at 

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every phase of [the] process for adjudicating claims and 

appeals.” Id. at 65,492. The VA received fifty-three

comments in response to the Proposed Rule. While some 

commenters expressed approval of the agency’s attempt to 

bring increased clarity and efficiency, others expressed 

concern with certain aspects of the Proposed Rule, including the VA’s proposed interpretation of “incomplete 

claim,” which some perceived as unnecessarily parochial. 

In lieu of the Proposed Rule’s “incomplete claim” concept, the Final Rule establishes an “intent to file”3 process, which allows claimants to establish the effective 

date of an award in any of three ways. First, under the 

Final Rule, an intent to file may be established by saving 

an electronic application within a VA web-based electronic claims application system before submitting it for 

actual processing. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b)(1)(i) (2015). 

Second, a claimant may submit a VA standard form 

(“VAF 21-0966”) in either paper or electronic form. Id.

§ 3.155(b)(1)(ii); Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,666. 

Third, a claimant may establish intent to file by communicating orally with certain designated VA personnel 

“either in person or by telephone,” who will document the 

claimant’s intent. Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,666; see 

38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b)(1)(iii) (2015). So long as a formal 

application is filed within one year of the submission, the 

3 “An intent to file a claim must provide sufficient 

identifiable or biographical information to identify the 

claimant.” Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,665. In contrast 

to informal claims, an intent to file a claim does not 

require the claimant “to identify the specific benefit 

sought,” id., but does require an identification of the 

general benefit sought (such as compensation versus 

pension), 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b)(2) (2015).

 

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VA will deem the effective date to be the date the “intent 

to file” submission was received. 

Lastly, the Final Rule specifies that, where the RO 

“provides, in connection with its decision, a form identified as being for the purpose of initiating an appeal, an

NOD would consist of a completed and timely submitted 

copy of that form.” Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,679; see 

38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) (2015). The Final Rule further 

clarifies the “VA will not accept as [an NOD] an expression of dissatisfaction . . . that is submitted in any other 

format, including on a different VA form.” Final Rule, 79 

Fed. Reg. at 57,679; see 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) (2015). 

III. Petition for Review

Petitioners contend the Final Rule departs from the 

“paternalistic, veteran friendly, and non-adversarial 

nature of veterans benefits adjudication.” VJG (15-7021)

Br. 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).4 Petitioners 

timely filed this appeal pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 502, 

which provides this court with jurisdiction to review the 

Final Rule. See 38 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). “[U]nder 38 

U.S.C. § 502, we may review [the] VA’s procedural and 

substantive regulations, and the process by which those 

regulations are made or amended.” Paralyzed Veterans of 

Am. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. 

Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Petitions under 38 U.S.C. § 502 are reviewed under 

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), as codified in 5 

4 The numbers 15-7021, 15-7025, and 15-7061 denote the record materials and briefs in Appeal Nos. 2015-

7021, 2015-7025, and 2015-7061, respectively. 

 

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U.S.C. § 706. See Nyeholt v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 298 

F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Under § 706, we must 

“hold unlawful and set aside agency action” we find 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 

“This review is highly deferential to the actions of the 

agency.” Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of 

Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

II. The Final Rule Is a “Logical Outgrowth” of the Proposed Rule

“The APA’s rulemaking provisions generally require 

that notice of proposed rules be published in the Federal 

Register and that ‘interested persons’ be given the ‘opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments.’” AFL-CIO v. 

Chao, 496 F. Supp. 2d 76, 83 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting 5 

U.S.C. § 553(c)). Although the APA does not explicitly 

address the relationship the notice of proposed rulemaking must have to the final rule, it provides some guidance 

when it states that agencies must publish in their notice 

of proposed rulemaking “either the terms or substance of 

the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and 

issues involved.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). 

Under this standard, an agency’s final rule need not 

be identical to the proposed rule. Indeed, “[t]he whole 

rationale of notice and comment rests on the expectation 

that the final rules will be somewhat different and improved from the rules originally proposed by the agency.” 

Trans-Pac. Freight Conference of Japan/Korea v. Fed. 

Mar. Comm’n, 650 F.2d 1235, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 

Where a proposed rule is modified in light of public 

comment, the modified rule may be promulgated as a 

final rule without additional notice and opportunity for 

comment, so long as the final rule is a “logical outgrowth” 

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of the proposed rule. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface 

Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also 

Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174

(2007) (“Courts of Appeals have generally interpreted 

[certain language in 5 U.S.C. § 553] to mean that the final 

rule . . . must be a logical outgrowth of the rule proposed.” 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). “A 

final rule is a logical outgrowth of [a] proposed rule ‘only if 

interested parties should have anticipated that the 

change was possible, and thus reasonably should have 

filed their comments on the subject during the notice-andcomment period.”’ Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of 

Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 626 F.3d 84, 94–95 

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 

1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 

American Legion contends “[t]he Final Rule’s intentto-file [provision] should be set aside . . . because it is not 

a logical outgrowth of the Proposed Rule.” American 

Legion (15-7061) Br. 46 (citation omitted). According to 

American Legion, the Proposed Rule “did not propose 

[the] creat[ion] [of] a new ‘[i]ntent to [f]ile’ form for initiating claims.” Id. at 47. Instead, American Legion asserts

the VA’s Proposed Rule sought to modify “the informal 

claims process and replace it with a system where (i) 

existing application forms are designated as ‘complete’ or 

‘incomplete’; and (ii) electronic claims receive preferential 

treatment over paper [claims].” Id. (citing Proposed Rule, 

78 Fed. Reg. at 65,490, 65,494–97; Final Rule, 79 Fed. 

Reg. at 57,663). Accordingly, American Legion contends 

that, because “[t]he Final Rule replaces [the Proposed 

Rule] with something very different [,namely,] a new 

intent-to-file ‘concept’ based on a ‘new form’ that was 

never mentioned in the Proposed Rule,” id. (quoting Final 

Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,664), it could not have ‘“anticiCase: 15-7021 Document: 76-2 Page: 10 Filed: 04/07/2016
VETERANS JUSTICE GRP., LLC v. SEC’Y OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 11

pated that the change was possible,’” id. at 46 (quoting 

United Mine Workers of Am., 626 F.3d at 94–95). 

In response, the VA argues it “has not switched direction from the substance of the [P]roposed [R]ule, but has 

declined to go as far as originally proposed, following 

consideration of the public comments.” VA (15-7061) Br. 

37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

VA asserts the potential results of the Proposed Rule that 

could have been anticipated include “declin[ing] to totally 

eliminate effective date placeholders for paper claims,” 

and “attempt[ing] to reconcile [the effective date placeholder] policy with its need for standard inputs.” Id. at 

38. Accordingly, the VA asserts that, although “[t]he 

[F]inal [R]ule uses different terminology and structure,” it 

“effects a policy urged to reconcile these issues.” Id. 

We conclude that, under the circumstances of this 

case, “interested parties should have anticipated that the 

change” reflected in the “intent to file” provision of the 

Final Rule was possible in light of the notice provided in 

the Proposed Rule. United Mine Workers of Am., 626 F.3d 

at 94–95. In lieu of the Proposed Rule’s introduction of 

the “incomplete claim” concept, the VA adopted an “intent 

to file” process. Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,664–67. In 

addition to allowing a claimant to establish a claim’s 

effective date through the submission of an application on 

a VA web-based electronic application system, as under 

the Proposed Rule, the Final Rule expanded a claimant’s 

options by also allowing an effective date to be established 

by the submission of a written intent to file a claim on a 

standard VA form, see 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b)(1)(ii) (2015), or 

via a telephone call or in person, see id. § 3.155(b)(1)(iii). 

Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,664–67. 

Contrary to American Legion’s contention, the VA’s 

substitution of the “intent to file” process for the proposed

“incomplete claim” concept does not constitute a change in 

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12 VETERANS JUSTICE GRP., LLC v. SEC’Y OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

the basic approach of the Proposed Rule––the standardization of the claim initiation process. See Griffin Indus., 

Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 183, 196 (1992) (“The 

approach . . . adopted by the [agency], while different from 

the [P]roposed [R]egulation, was a logical outgrowth of 

the original proposal” because “[t]he [F]inal [R]ule 

changed neither the substance nor the approach” of the 

proposed regulation). What is more, not only were the 

“changes . . . in character with the original scheme[,] 

[they] were additionally foreshadowed in proposals and 

comments advanced during the rulemaking” and public 

comment period. S. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 

658 (1st Cir. 1974); see also Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 

57,663–64 (many commenters expressed dissatisfaction 

with the Proposed Rule’s elimination of an effective date 

“placeholder” for paper claims). “[I]t would be antithetical 

to the purposes of the notice and comment provisions of 

the [APA] . . . to tax an agency with ‘inconsistency’ whenever it circulates a proposal that it has not firmly decided 

to put into effect and that it subsequently reconsiders in 

response to public comment.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986). 

Lastly, we find American Legion’s assertion puzzling 

because it is incongruent with the contentions it proffers 

regarding the substantive validity of the Final Rule. 

Unlike the Proposed Rule, the Final Rule introduces 

multiple avenues by which claimants may establish an 

effective date placeholder, thereby creating increased 

opportunities for claimants to establish a claim’s effective 

date. The Final Rule does not go as far as the Proposed 

Rule because it does not limit the intent to file process to 

a VA web-based electronic claims application system. See

Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,666. However, “[o]ne 

logical outgrowth of a proposal is surely . . . to refrain 

from taking the proposed step.” Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. 

EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Accordingly, we 

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find that the Final Rule is a logical outgrowth of the 

Proposed Rule. 

III. Validity of the Amended Regulations

Petitioners’ challenge to the Final Rule may be analytically divided into three categories: 1) claim initiation; 

2) appeals; and 3) duty to develop claims. 

As to claim initiation, Petitioners assert that the 

amendment of 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(p) (2014), the Prior Regulation’s informal claims provision, is arbitrary and capricious. 

With respect to appeals, Petitioners challenge amended 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) and (a)(4), requiring that, 

when the RO provides an appeal form to a claimant in 

connection with the RO’s decision, an NOD initiating 

appellate review can be effected only by completing that 

form. 

Lastly, Petitioners argue the Final Rule abrogates the 

VA’s duty to develop veterans’ claims because it 

“[i]mpermissibly [r]estricts [t]he [c]laims [d]eemed 

[r]aised [b]y [v]eterans,” American Legion (15-7061) Br. 

51, and therefore does not allow the VA to adjudicate 

claims “reasonably raised” by the record, id. at 54. Specifically, Petitioners point to new 38 C.F.R. § 19.24(b), which 

requires claimants to “enumerate[] the issues or conditions for which appellate review is sought,” and new 38 

C.F.R. § 3.160(a)(3)–(4), under which claimants must 

“identify the benefit sought” and provide “a description of 

symptom(s) or medical condition(s) on which the benefit is 

based,” respectively. We address each of these contentions in turn. 

A. Claim Initiation: 38 C.F.R. Part 3

Our review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute 

that it administers is governed by the two-step framework 

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articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). See 

Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 691 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000). Under Chevron step one, we ask “whether 

Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 

issue.” 467 U.S. at 842. If we conclude that it has, “that 

is the end of the matter.” Id. 

However, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 

respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 

whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 

construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. Alternatively, if a 

statute is silent, but “Congress has explicitly left a gap for 

the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 

statute by regulation.” Id. at 843–44. The resulting 

regulations are afforded “controlling weight unless they 

are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 

statute.” Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). 

American Legion challenges the Final Rule’s requirement that claims must originate on standard VA forms, 

asserting “Congress has . . . enacted legislation that 

affirmatively contradicts VA’s attempts to eliminate 

informal submissions as placeholders for effective dates.” 

American Legion (15-7061) Br. 30. It first argues that 

Congress, via the Veterans’ Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. 

No. 85-56, 71 Stat. 83 (1957) (“1957 Act”), codified the 

1956 version of the “informal claims” regulation, 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.27 (1956), thus precluding the VA from eliminating 

the informal claims concept. It next argues that 

“[l]egislative developments since the 1957 Act confirm 

Congress’[s] intent to allow veterans to claim their earliest informal written request to [the] VA as the effective 

date for benefits.” American Legion (15-7061) Br. 29. We 

address each of these contentions in turn. 

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1. Congress Did Not Codify the “Informal Claims” Provision of 38 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1956)

a. In Adopting the VA’s 1956 “Effective Date” Regulation, the 1957 Act Did Not Also Adopt the “Informal 

Claims” Regulation 

In an effort to “expedite the adjudication of claims and 

render the system more comprehensible to veterans and 

the public,” H.R. Rep. No. 85-279, at 1214 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N 1214, 1217 (capitalization omitted), the 1957 Act consolidated “into a single act the 

subject matter of the extensive body of existing legislation 

authorizing and governing the payment of compensation 

for service-connected disability or death to persons who 

served in the military, naval, or air force of the United 

States,” id. at 1214 (capitalization omitted). In addition 

to the consolidation of existing legislation, the 1957 Act 

also consolidated “all the administrative provisions relating to” pension, medical, and other VA benefits. Id. at 

1215 (emphasis added). 

American Legion contends that when Congress enacted the current effective date provision in 1957 (codified as 

amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)–(b)(1) (2012)), it also

made statutory the VA’s longstanding rule that informal 

submissions can establish a claimant’s effective date. 

Thus, American Legion asserts that the VA cannot amend 

the regulations to exclude informal submissions. 

Before the 1957 Act, the VA’s effective date provision 

was codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.212 (1956). That regulation 

stated: 

Initial awards of disability compensation will 

be payable . . . provided an appropriate claim 

therefor has been filed and, if incomplete, the 

necessary evidence to complete such claim is 

submitted within [one] year from the date of 

request therefor. . . . [The] claim [must be] 

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filed within [one] year from date of discharge

from such period of service [in order to benefit from an earlier effective date] . . . . 

38 C.F.R. § 3.212 (1956) (emphases added). During this

period, the VA defined the term “informal claim[]” as 

“[a]ny communication from or action by a claimant . . . 

which clearly indicates an intent to apply for disability or 

death compensation or pension.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1956). 

Section 3.27 further provided that an informal claim 

would serve to establish an effective date if a formal 

application—which would “be considered as evidence 

necessary to complete the initial application”—was “received [by the VA] within [one] year from the date it was 

transmitted for execution by the claimant.” Id. (emphasis 

added). 

Without addressing claim completeness or informality, the 1957 Act codified the “one year” provision: 

(b) The effective date of an award of disability compensation to a veteran shall be the 

date of his discharge or release if application 

therefor is received within one year from 

such date of discharge or release. 

1957 Act, § 910(b), 71 Stat. at 119 (emphasis added). 

American Legion asserts that, because informal 

claims were considered sufficient to establish a claim’s 

effective date under the VA’s Prior Regulation, the elevation of the effective date regulation to statute also codified 

the means (i.e., the filing of an informal claim) by which 

claimants may establish the effective date of their 

awards. 

American Legion’s contention effectively raises a 

Chevron step one question because it requires us to address whether Congress “has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 467 U.S. at 842. That is, we must 

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determine whether, in codifying the VA’s pre-1957 effective date award regulation, Congress also codified the 

VA’s Prior Regulation that informal claims were sufficient 

to establish the effective date of an award––thus foreclosing the VA’s attempt to substitute the informal claims 

regulation with new 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b)(1)’s “intent to 

file” process. 

While Congress modeled the 1957 effective date provision on pre-1957 VA regulations, the provision is only 

indirectly tied to the informal claims definition. It does 

not define “informal claim,” or even include that term. It 

does not include any of the 1956 regulation’s operative 

terms, such as that an effective date will be established by 

“[a]ny communication from or action by a claimant . . . 

clearly indicat[ing] an intent to apply for disability.” 38 

C.F.R. § 3.27 (1956). See 1957 Act, § 910(a)–(b), 71 Stat. 

at 119. There is no reason to presume that when Congress codified the effective date regulation, it also legislatively adopted, sub silentio, the informal claims 

regulation. See NLRB v. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 79, 

404 U.S. 116, 129–130 (1971) (“It is at best treacherous to 

find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a 

controlling rule of law.” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)); Groff v. United States, 493 

F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (because “Congress did 

not [] define” the relevant term, the statute is silent as to 

its meaning). Accordingly, the effective date provision 

does not speak to what action or conduct by the claimant 

constitutes an informal claim. 

What is more, Congress chose not to codify the informal claims provision of 38 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1956) at the 

same time that it did codify a number of other pre-1957 

VA regulations related to a veteran’s application for 

disability benefits. See 38 U.S.C. § 3001 (1958) (codifying 

38 C.F.R. § 3.26(a) (1956), which provided that a properly 

completed, VA-prescribed form “constitutes an application

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for benefits”); id. § 3004 (codifying 38 C.F.R. § 3.201(a) 

(1956), which provided that where “[n]ew and material 

evidence” is submitted after a claim is finally disallowed, 

the new evidence “will constitute a new claim and have all 

the attributes thereof”); id. § 3010(b) (codifying 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.212 (1956), which allowed an earlier effective date for 

claims filed “within [one] year from date of discharge”). 

“[T]he Legislature’s silence” with respect to one aspect of 

a regulatory scheme, in light of its codification of administrative rules governing other aspects of that scheme, 

“indicates that Congress left the [former] matter where it 

was” before the statute was enacted. Kucana v. Holder, 

558 U.S. 233, 235 (2010); see also Prestol Espinal v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 222 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011) 

(where Congress “codif[ies] some regulations while ignoring others,” its “nuanced consideration of which limitations and regulations to codify offers stronger evidence of 

Congress’[s] intent than does Congress’[s] . . . silence” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Legislative history is also relevant under the Chevron 

framework, and “may foreclose an agency’s preferred 

interpretation” if it “makes clear what [the statute’s] text 

leaves opaque.” Catawba Cnty., N.C. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 

35 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Here, the statute’s “legislative history . . . is [also] silent on the precise issue before us.” 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862. Neither the 1957 Act nor the 

House Conference Report accompanying the Act, see H.R. 

Rep. No. 85–279 (1957), discuss the informal claims 

regulation or any of its operative terms. 

b. Congress Did Not Codify 38 C.F.R. § 3.27 Via Post1957 Legislation

In further support of its contention that Congress codified the informal claims regulation, American Legion 

next argues that “[l]egislative developments since the 

1957 Act confirm Congress’[s] intent to allow veterans to 

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claim their earliest informal written request to [the] VA 

as the effective date for benefits.” American Legion (15-

7061) Br. 29. Specifically, according to American Legion, 

“[b]etween 1957 and 2014, Congress took action in connection with the statute’s effective-date provisions, 38 

U.S.C. § 5110, more than a dozen times. On at least three 

of these occasions, Congress amended, reenacted, or 

renumbered the very subsections that had first been 

signed into statutory law in 1957 . . . .” Id. (footnote 

omitted).

However, “there is nothing to indicate that [the informal claims regulation] was ever called to the attention 

of Congress,” and the reenactment of 38 U.S.C. § 5110 

“was not accompanied by any congressional discussion 

which throws light on its intended scope.” United States v. 

Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 (1957); see also Comm’r v. 

Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (“Reenactment [of a statute]––particularly without the slightest affirmative indication that Congress ever had [a 

particular] decision before it––is an unreliable indicium at 

best.”); Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428, 432 (1941) 

(legislative ratification is “no more than an aid in statutory construction” and “does not mean that the prior construction has become so embedded in the law that only 

Congress can effect a change” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we reject American Legion’s contention that Congress’s reenactment of the effective date provision 

between 1957 and 2014 evidences an intent to codify the 

informal claims regulation. 

c. The “Incomplete Application” Provision of 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5102(b)–(c) Does Not Indicate Congress Intended to 

Codify the Informal Claims Regulation 

Finally, American Legion asserts that “[s]ince 1957, 

Congress has not merely acquiesced with VA’s position; 

[it] has also enacted legislation that affirmatively contradicts VA’s attempts to eliminate informal submissions as 

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placeholders for effective dates.” American Legion (15-

7061) Br. 30. American Legion first points to 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5102(b), which provides that “[i]f a claimant’s application . . . is incomplete, the Secretary shall notify the 

claimant . . . of the information necessary to complete the 

application.” 38 U.S.C. § 5102(b) (2012). An adjacent 

subsection further states that if a claimant has been 

“notified under section (b)” and the claimant fails to 

furnish necessary information “to complete [the] application, . . . no benefit may be paid or furnished.” Id.

§ 5102(c)(1) (emphasis added). American Legion argues 

that these subsections, when read in conjunction, require 

“a claim’s effective date [to be] tied to the date on which 

the veteran initiates [the application]—not the date of 

ultimate compliance with the formal application procedures.” American Legion (15-7061) Br. 31. Accordingly, 

American Legion asserts that when Congress enacted 

section 5102(c) in 2003, because the VA “had long defined 

the term ‘application’ to mean ‘a formal or informal communication in writing requesting a determination of 

entitlement or evidencing a belief in entitlement, to a 

benefit[,]’” the “VA cannot . . . eviscerate what Congress 

plainly understood it was accomplishing when it enacted 

§ 5102(c).” Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(p) (2003)). 

American Legion’s contention is predicated solely on 

the fact that Congress possessed knowledge of the VA’s 

definition of “application.” This begs the question. It is of 

little import that Congress was aware of the VA’s previous definition of “application” as including an informal 

written communication. As the Supreme Court has 

stated: 

The oft-repeated statement that administrative construction receives legislative approval by reenactment of a statutory provision, 

without material change[,] covers the situation where the validity of administrative acCase: 15-7021 Document: 76-2 Page: 20 Filed: 04/07/2016
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tion standing by itself may be dubious or 

where ambiguities in a statute or rules are 

resolved by reference to administrative practice prior to reenactment of a statute; and 

where it does not appear that the rule or 

practice has been changed by the administrative agency through exercise of its continuing rule-making power. It does not mean 

that a regulation interpreting a provision of 

one act becomes frozen into another act merely by reenactment of that provision, so that 

that administrative interpretation cannot be 

changed prospectively through exercise of appropriate rule-making powers. The contrary 

conclusion would not only drastically curtail 

the scope and materially impair the flexibility of administrative action; it would produce 

a most awkward situation. Outstanding regulations which had survived one Act could be 

changed only after a pre-view by the Congress.

Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100–01 (1939) 

(emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Nat’l Cable 

& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 

967, 981 (2005) (‘“An initial agency interpretation is not 

instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency 

must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of 

its policy on a continuing basis.”’ (quoting Chevron, 467 

U.S. at 863–64)). 

The relevant inquiry is not whether Congress was 

aware of the prior regulations, but whether it intended to 

bind the VA to its existing definition via the enactment of 

38 U.S.C. § 5102(b) and (c). In this case, “Congress has 

not given any indication of whether it intended” to bind 

the VA to its previous definition. VE Holding Corp. v. 

Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.3d 1574, 1581 (Fed. 

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Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); see 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) 

(providing definitions, but leaving “claim” and “application” undefined). In light of this congressional silence, the 

enactment of 38 U.S.C. § 5102(b) and (c) do not limit the 

VA’s discretion in the manner American Legion asserts. 

See, e.g., United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 

132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“[A] 

statute’s silence or ambiguity as to a particular issue 

means that Congress has not directly addressed the 

precise question at issue (thus likely delegating gap-filling 

power to the agency).” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 

U.S. 208, 222 (2009) (“It is eminently reasonable to conclude that [a statute’s] silence is meant to convey nothing 

more than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands. . . .”). 

2. Amended 38 C.F.R. Part 3, Requiring that Claims 

Be Initiated Via a Standard VA Form Is Consistent 

with 38 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)(2) and 5110(a)(1)

The statute is not only silent as to the definition of 

“application,” but affirmatively grants “[t]he Secretary . . . 

authority to prescribe all rules and regulations . . . including––the forms of application by claimants under such 

laws.” 38 U.S.C. § 501; see also id. § 5101(a)(1) (“A specific claim in the form prescribed by the Secretary . . . must 

be filed in order for benefits to be paid. . . .” (emphasis 

added)); Mansfield v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008) (“Congress has provided the VA with authority 

to establish the requirements for ‘claims’ for veterans’ 

benefits.”). Where Congress has “express[ly] delegat[ed] 

authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of 

the statute by regulation,” those “legislative regulations 

are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 

capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (footnote omitted). 

American Legion contends the “VA’s elimination of informal effective-date placeholders runs contrary to ConCase: 15-7021 Document: 76-2 Page: 22 Filed: 04/07/2016
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gress’[s] overarching purpose in enacting the veterans’ 

benefit laws: maintaining a claimant-friendly, nonadversarial process for providing service-related benefits 

to veterans and their families.” American Legion (15-

7061) Br. 34. Accordingly, it asserts that the new and 

amended regulations under 38 C.F.R. Part 3 are arbitrary 

and capricious because the VA: “(1) has failed to establish 

a rational connection between its requirement that initial 

submissions be on standard forms and its asserted objectives; and (2) has not adequately considered the [Final] 

Rule’s impact on the veteran population.” Id. at 39 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 38 (asserting the Final Rule 

is likely to disproportionately impact veterans for whom 

“it will be impossible to access [the] VA’s electronic platform or . . . understand the requirements [the] VA is 

imposing”).

The VA’s stated reason for favoring standard claims 

forms is sufficient to show that the Final Rule’s standard 

form requirement is rational. We note that the VA is in a 

better position than this court to evaluate inefficiencies in 

its system. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 

(1985) (“The agency is far better equipped than the courts 

to deal with the many variables involved in the proper 

ordering of its priorities.”); see also Hettleman v. Bergland, 642 F.2d 63, 66–67 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he government has an interest in seeing that the program [it 

administers] runs efficiently; . . . and the Secretary, as 

head of the responsible agency, is in the best position to 

promulgate uniform procedures.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). The VA explained that, by standardizing the claim initiation process, it “will be able to cut 

processing time in identifying and developing claims, 

which will result in faster delivery of benefits to all veterans.” Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,661; see also id. (The 

“rulemaking will allow [the] VA to decrease the processing

time in identifying, clarifying, and processing nonstandard submissions as claims or appeals since [the] VA 

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will be able to easily target and identify these claims or

initiations of appeals based on the submitted form”); VA 

(15-7061) Br. 33 (“By controlling the possibility that any 

document might contain an overlooked claim, adjudicators can focus on developing and deciding the claims 

before them” instead of devoting time to “interpret[ing] 

the correct procedural identity of every claimant submission.”). We decline to second guess the agency where, as 

here, its action has not been shown to be arbitrary or 

capricious. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. 

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (asserting 

that courts generally will defer to an agency’s construction of the statute it is charged with implementing and to 

the procedures adopted to implement the statute). 

We also conclude the VA has adequately considered 

and addressed the impact on the veteran population. In 

issuing the Final Rule, the VA noted that “approximately 

half of the claimant population . . . [already] file[s] claims 

on a prescribed form.” Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,661. 

To mitigate adverse effects on those in the remaining half 

who are not familiar with the standard form, the VA 

“delay[ed] the effective date of [the Final Rule] by 180 

days . . . in order to perform robust outreach to inform and 

educate claimants and authorized representatives of this 

new standardized procedure.” Id. 

Additionally, it unlikely that the amended regulations, and in particular the intent to file provisions codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b)(1)(i)–(iii), will unduly burden 

veterans seeking to initiate claims. Although the Final 

Rule may disproportionately impact some of the nation’s 

veterans who either do not have or possess limited Internet access, see J.A. 15-7061 204, J.A. 15-7061 207, this 

issue is attenuated because new 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.155(b)(1)(iii) allows claimants to initiate their claims 

with a phone call. Thus, practically speaking, the increase in burden on claimants is de minimis. If anything, 

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the Final Rule is more claimant-friendly because it increases the menu of options available to the initiating

claimant. Accordingly, we find that the VA’s amendment 

and new provisions to 38 C.F.R. Part 3, requiring claimants to originate their claims on a standard VA form is 

not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute.” Favreau v. United States, 317 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002) (asserting that the court will defer to the 

agency’s interpretation of a statute if the regulation is not 

arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute). 

Lastly, as to American Legion’s contention that the 

Final Rule does not accord with the overarching purpose

of the veterans’ benefit laws, we agree with the VA that 

“[c]onsistency with the ‘statutory framework’ plainly 

cannot be reduced to the single-factor test of whether the 

regulation is uniformly ‘pro-claimant.’” VA (15-7061) Br.

8 (quoting Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1330 (Fed. 

Cir. 2003)). As we explained in Sears, “we must take care 

not to invalidate otherwise reasonable agency regulations 

simply because they do not provide for a pro-claimant 

outcome in every imaginable case.” 349 F.3d at 1331–32. 

B. Appeals: 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) and (a)(4)

1. 38 U.S.C. § 7105 Is Not Exhaustive

When an RO makes a decision that impacts the payment of benefits or the granting of relief, the RO typically 

provides claimants with a notice of the decision and of the 

procedure for appeal. See 38 U.S.C. § 5104 (2012); 38 

C.F.R. § 3.103(b)(1) (2015). Claimants have one year to 

initiate review of the RO’s decision with the Veterans 

Board by filing an NOD with the RO. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)

(2012). As with the claim initiation process, the Final 

Rule requires claimants to initiate an appeal on a standard NOD form. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) (2015). Where

multiple determinations are at issue, the Final Rule 

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tions with which the claimant disagrees.” Id.

§ 20.201(a)(4). 

Petitioners challenge § 20.201(a) both as to its standard form requirement and its requirement that claimants 

identify specific determinations of the notice of disagreement with which they disagree. Petitioners contend that 

we need only look at Chevron step one because “Congress 

has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” 

namely, whether the VA may add to the statutory requirements established in 38 U.S.C. § 7105 when determining what constitutes an NOD. 467 U.S. at 843. 

Specifically, NOVA argues that “congressional intent 

requires that [an NOD] only contain two elements: [1] 

Expression of intent to appeal and [2] Disagreement with 

a determination,” and that the statute therefore “clearly 

excludes imposing the use of a standardized form.” 

NOVA (15-7025) Br. 8 (capitalization modified). VJG 

similarly argues “[nothing] in 38 U.S.C. [§] 7105 authorize[s] the Secretary to require . . . detailed ‘technical 

pleading’ in order to obtain appellate review of an adverse 

decision.” VJG (15-7021) Br. 25. It adds that “requiring 

specification of the issues on appeal in [an NOD] and a 

formal appeal is redundant.” Id. at 26 (Comparing 38 

C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(4) (requiring identification of “the 

specific determinations with which the claimant disagrees”), with 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3) (“The appeal should 

set out specific allegations of error of fact or law, such 

allegations related to specific items in the statement of 

the case.”)). NOVA also argues that Congress’s use of the 

term “notice of disagreement” in 38 U.S.C. § 7105, instead 

of the term “forms of application,” which is used elsewhere in Title 38, directly addresses and precludes the 

VA’s ability “to require a claimant to file a standardized 

form to initiate the appeal process.” NOVA (15-7025) Br. 

13. 

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Our decision in Gallegos v. Principi squarely addresses this issue. See 283 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In 

Gallegos, we determined that 38 U.S.C. § 7105 

does not . . . define [NOD] or suggest sufficient expressions to make a writing an NOD. 

The statute also does not suggest that its 

specifications for an NOD––writing, one-year 

time limit from notice, etc.––are the only requirements for a valid NOD. . . . In a general 

sense, the statute does not define an 

NOD. . . . Therefore, under [Chevron,] [38 

U.S.C. § 7105] contains “a gap for an agency 

to fill” with regard to the definition of a legally valid NOD. 

283 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843) 

(emphasis added). 

Consistent with our decision in Gallegos, we conclude 

38 U.S.C. § 7105(b) is not exhaustive and does not restrict 

the VA’s authority to fashion or articulate additional 

requirements claimants must satisfy in order to complete 

an NOD. See Gallegos, 283 F.3d at 1314 (“Section 7105 

does not preclude other requirements for an NOD.”). 

Lastly, with respect to NOVA’s assertion that Congress’s use of the term “notice of disagreement” instead of 

“forms of application” necessarily precludes the VA from 

mandating that NODs be completed on standard forms, 

we find nothing inherent in the term “notice” that precludes the VA from requiring such notice to be communicated on a standard VA form. See Notice, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (providing many contextdependent definitions (i.e., “due notice,” “implied notice,” 

“notice filing”) of the term “notice”). 

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2. The Final Rule’s Imposition of a Mandatory NOD 

Identifying Specific Issues of Disagreement Is Not Arbitrary

A regulation is not arbitrary and capricious as long as 

there is a ‘“rational connection between the facts found 

and the choice made.”’ Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, 

Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 669 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 

Petitioners assert that, by requiring standardized NOD 

forms in which claimants must enumerate specific points 

of disagreement, “[t]he Secretary . . . has improperly . . . 

burdened veterans with[] an adversarial benefits claims 

process––an act which is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to Congressional mandate.” VJG (15-7021) Br. 13. 

NOVA similarly argues that, by imposing “additional 

requirements” for the NOD, the “VA is exercising more 

authority than Congress delegated.” NOVA (15-7025) Br. 

8. 

VJG further argues that under the Prior Regulation, 

the form required to perfect a formal appeal “contain[ed] a 

box for claimants to check if he or she ‘want[ed] to appeal 

all of the issues listed on the [SOC].’” VJG (15-7021) 

Reply Br. 11 (quoting VA Form 9, § 9.A5) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to VJG, the “designation 

of ‘all of the issues’ contained in the decision document 

has long been sufficiently detailed for the Secretary to 

accept as ‘specific allegations of error of fact or law’ pur5 The VA previously required this form to perfect a 

formal appeal. See Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, VA Form 9: 

Appeal to Board of Veterans’ Appeals, available at, 

http://www.va.gov/vaforms/va/pdf/VA9.pdf. As to substantive appeals, the VA will continue to use Form 9 upon 

the implementation of the Final Rule, as required under 

38 C.F.R. § 20.202. 

 

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suant to 38 U.S.C. [§] 7105(d)(3).” Id.; see also id. at 12 

(asserting that the VA’s acceptance of “a blanket designation of ‘all of the issues’ in a ‘substantive appeal’ form (i.e., 

VA Form 9)” necessarily means the VA must also “accept 

at least that level of generality in an NOD”). 

We conclude that the requirement to use a standard 

form to identify the specific issues of disagreement, see 38 

C.F.R. §§ 19.24, 20.201(a)(4) (2015), is rationally related 

to the adjudication of veterans’ appeals. While we are not 

unsympathetic to Petitioners’ contentions, those contentions are primarily derivative of the fact that the VA 

seeks to change the appeal initiation process, and do not 

persuasively explain why the change constitutes an 

unreasonable exercise of the VA’s authority. The VA has 

adequately explained why its regulations are rational. 

The VA notes that under its Prior Regulations, “broad and 

unclear requirements” led to delays in appeals processing, 

Proposed Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 65,497, and that “use of 

the standardized NOD enables [agency] personnel to more 

quickly conduct targeted development and consideration 

of a veteran’s appeal,” id. at 65,498. The VA further 

points out that “[e]rrors in identifying NODs can complicate otherwise straightforward claims.” Id. at 65,497. It 

asserts that the form must be mandatory because a 

standardized form’s “positive impact would be greatly 

diluted” if even a few claimants did not make use of the 

form, because the VA would then “still be required to 

scour all claimant submissions and engage in the timeintensive interpretative exercise of determining whether a 

given document could be reasonably construed as an 

NOD.” Id. at 65,498 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

And it stresses that timely consideration of appeals is 

facilitated by the specification of disagreements as early 

as possible. Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,685. 

The VA’s efficiency rationale is sufficient; the VA possesses a duty not only to individual claimants, but to the 

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effective functioning of the veterans compensation system 

as a whole. Moreover, because the VA possesses limited 

resources, these dual obligations may sometimes compel it 

to make necessary tradeoffs. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 

549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“[A]n agency has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources 

and personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities.” 

(citation omitted)). Although the VA’s mandatory standard form increases the burden to some claimants when 

initiating the appeals process, to the extent standardization augments the overall efficiency of the appeals process, individual claimants also reap its benefits. 

We recognize Congress desired the veterans’ benefits 

claim system to be as “informal and nonadversarial as 

possible.” Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,

473 U.S. 305, 323–24 (1985). However, because the 

agency’s action is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 

contrary to the statute, we uphold the Final Rule’s 

amendment of 38 C.F.R. § 20.201(a)(1) and (a)(4), requiring claimants to initiate appeals on a standard VA form in 

which specific points of disagreement are identified. See 

Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001) (“A regulation is manifestly contrary to the 

statute if it is outside the scope of the authority delegated 

under the statute.”).

C. Duty to Develop Claims: 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.160(a)(3)–(4), 

and 19.24(b) 

1. The Statute Does Not Directly Address Whether the 

VA Must Develop Claims Unrelated to the Claim Presented 

Under the Final Rule, a “complete claim must identify 

the benefit sought,” 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(a)(3) (2015), and 

include “[a] description of any symptom(s) or medical 

condition(s) on which the benefit is based,” id.

§ 3.160(a)(4). Similarly, a complete NOD generally requires an identification of “[t]he claim to which the form 

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pertains,” as well as “[a]ny information necessary to 

identify the specific nature of the disagreement” which, 

“[f]or compensation claims,” includes an “enumerat[ion] 

[of] the issues or conditions for which appellate review is 

sought.” Id. § 19.24(b). 

Petitioners contend that because new 38 C.F.R. 

§§ 3.160(a)(3)–(4) and 19.24(b) place “restrictions on 

claims that are raised by record evidence but not specifically identified by the veteran, [they are] contrary to law.” 

American Legion (15-7061) Br. 48 (capitalization omitted); 

see also VJG (15-7021) Br. 25 (“Following submittal of [an 

NOD], [the] VA is required to take such development or 

review action as it deems proper.” (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted)). Specifically, Petitioners 

contend that under 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.160(a)(3)– (a)(4) 

and 19.24(b), the VA is not required to “adjudicate benefits for any medical condition that is not specifically 

identified and that [the] VA deems ‘unrelated to those 

particular claims’—no matter how apparent the condition 

is on the face of the record.” American Legion (15-7061) 

Br. 51 (quoting Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57,672). 

Similarly, VJG asserts the VA “abandoned” its 

“‘longstanding practice to infer or identify and award 

certain benefits that a claimant has not expressly requested but that are related to a claimed condition and 

[where] there is evidence of record indicating entitlement.’” VJG (15-7021) Br. 19 (quoting Final Rule, 79 Fed. 

Reg. at 57,672). VJG further argues the Final Rule 

contravenes 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2012), which directs the 

VA to consider “‘all information and lay and medical 

evidence of record in a case’––not just evidence related to 

claimed conditions or specific claims.” VJG (15-7021) Br. 

21 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)). American Legion similarly argues the “VA may not limit its review and adjudication to medical conditions and symptoms that are 

expressly identified in the veteran’s filings and conditions 

secondary to those.” American Legion (15-7061) Br. 52 

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32 VETERANS JUSTICE GRP., LLC v. SEC’Y OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

(citing Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001)). 

Both parties agree the VA is required to develop evidence related to the claim. The VA states, for example, 

that “under the [F]inal [R]ule, only an issue that has no 

factual, medical, or causal relationship to any of the 

symptoms or conditions identified on the standard form 

would not be considered part of the claim.” VA (15-7061) 

Br. 42. However, it takes the position that, when an issue 

“bears no factual, causal, medical or other relationship to 

the issues that were presented for adjudication,” the VA 

does not have a statutory duty to develop the evidence 

pertaining to that issue. Id. at 43. Petitioners, by contrast, interpret the VA’s position to mean that the “VA 

will no longer look for or award claims only contained in 

the evidence no matter how sound, obvious or significant.” 

VJG (15-7021) Br. 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Similarly, American Legion asserts “[t]he implications of 

[the Final Rule]” are such that “[i]f a veteran files a 

disability claim based on PTSD but fails to mention in his 

application that he lost both legs during service, [the] 

VA . . . ha[s] no obligation to develop, adjudicate, or even 

inform the veteran of any benefits related to his amputations––even if those amputations are obvious on the face 

of the record and the VA adjudicator has actual 

knowledge of them.” American Legion (15-7061) Br. 52. 

Again, we “engage[] in the familiar two-step analytic 

process articulated in Chevron.” Hawkins v. United 

States, 469 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We first 

inquire “whether Congress has directly spoken to the 

precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 

Here, the precise question at issue is whether 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5107 requires the VA to develop evidence outside the 

scope of the claim at issue. 

Section 5107(a) provides that “a claimant has the responsibility to present and support a claim for benefits.” 

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38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (2012). That is, § 5107 places responsibility on the claimant for presenting and supporting a 

claim. Petitioners, however, focus on subsection (b). That 

subsection is entitled “Benefit of the Doubt,” and requires 

“[t]he Secretary [to] consider all information and lay and 

medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary” 

and, having considered this evidence and found “an 

approximate balance of positive and negative evidence, . . . give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” 

Id. § 5107(b). 

Although Petitioners focus on the requirement that 

the Secretary “consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record,” see VJG (15-7021) Br. 20 (quoting 

38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)); American Legion (15-7061) Br. 52–

53 n.26 (same), the context indicates this statutory command is directed at ensuring consideration of all relevant

evidence, such that the VA resolves close cases in favor of 

the veteran. Contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, it does not 

directly address whether the VA must develop evidence 

outside the scope of a pending claim. We therefore turn to 

Chevron step two, and ask whether the regulations in 

question are based on a reasonable interpretation of the 

statute. See 467 U.S. at 843.

2. The Final Rule Is a Reasonable Interpretation of the 

Statute and Does Not Alter the VA’s General Practice of 

Identifying and Adjudicating Issues

‘“[T]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily 

requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules 

to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”’ 

Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 345 F.3d at 1340 (quoting 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). In light of this principle, “the 

court may not . . . substitute its own construction of a 

statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made 

by an agency.” Id. (citation omitted). 

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34 VETERANS JUSTICE GRP., LLC v. SEC’Y OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

We find the challenged portions of 38 C.F.R. 

§§ 3.160(a)(3)–(4) and 19.24(b) reflect a reasonable interpretation of the statute. In fact, the regulations do not 

substantively diverge from the VA’s prior regulation; they 

do not alter the VA’s general practice of identifying and 

adjudicating issues and claims that logically relate to the 

claim pending before the VA. See Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 

at 57,672 (“Although the rule requires claimants to specify the symptoms or conditions on which their claims are 

based and the benefits they seek, it generally would not 

preclude the VA from identifying, addressing, and adjudicating related matters that are reasonably raised by the 

evidence of record which the claimant may not have 

anticipated or claimed. . . .”). 

We are even more convinced of this determination because, contrary to Petitioners’ position, a veteran’s claim 

is not extinguished if the unclaimed condition is not 

reflected in the claim presented to the VA because the 

claimant may file a new claim directed to the unrelated 

evidence. Therefore, we find that new 38 C.F.R. 

§§ 3.160(a)(3)–(4) and 19.24(b) of the VA’s Final Rule

requiring that claimants identify symptoms or medical 

conditions at a high level of generality is a permissible 

construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 

CONCLUSION

We uphold the Final Rule, which generally requires 

that all claims and appeals originate on a standard VA 

form, and find that it does not contravene Congress’s 

mandate that the VA has a duty to develop veterans’ 

claims. For the foregoing reasons, the petitions are

DENIED

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