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Parties Involved:
Anthony Augustine Lucca
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2859

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Anthony Augustine Lucca, *

*

Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: March 11, 2004

Filed: July 30, 2004

___________

Before MURPHY, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge. 

Anthony Lucca pled guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Prior to trial,

Lucca moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the execution of a warrant that

authorized the search of his residence, vehicles, and person. In connection with that

motion, Lucca requested a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154

(1978), in support of his claim that the warrant application included material false

statements. Lucca also moved to dismiss all counts brought under 21 U.S.C. § 841

on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey,

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1

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

2

The Honorable Raymond L. Erickson, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

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530 U.S. 466 (2000). The district court,1

 adopting the report and recommendation of

a magistrate judge,2

 denied the motions, and Lucca entered a conditional plea of

guilty that reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motions. During the pendency

of this appeal, Lucca filed a motion to remand the case for a Franks hearing in light

of "newly discovered evidence" that he submitted on appeal. We deny the motion to

remand and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Lucca claims that the affidavit in support of the search warrant for his

residence included intentional false statements that were necessary to the issuing

court's finding of probable cause. He argues that the alleged false statements are

revealed by considering the testimony of the affiant, Officer John Decker, concerning

the affidavit submitted in his case and an affidavit proffered in support of another

search warrant for the residence of one Jade Wegner.

The Wegner warrant application, including an affidavit from Captain Robert

Byman of the Koochiching County Sheriff's Office, was submitted to a Minnesota

state court judge on May 5, 2002. On May 6, police executed the search warrant and

seized cocaine from Wegner's residence. Also on May 6, a Minnesota state court

judge approved a search warrant for the residence, vehicles, and person of Anthony

Lucca. The application for this warrant included an affidavit of Officer Decker of the

International Falls Police Department. The Lucca search warrant also was executed

on May 6, and police discovered cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, $16,121 in

U.S. currency, drug paraphernalia, and scales at Lucca's property.

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Decker's affidavit in support of the Lucca warrant relied in part on information

from a "confidential reliable informant" ("CRI"). According to the affidavit, this CRI

previously had provided information to the police that resulted in several successful

searches, convictions, and controlled narcotics purchases. Decker stated in his

affidavit that within the last 72 hours, the CRI reported to him that Lucca was in

possession of cocaine, and that a cocaine transaction had transpired between Lucca

and Wegner. The affidavit also stated that the search of the Wegner residence

resulted in the discovery of cocaine. Decker further explained that an officer

conducting surveillance of Lucca on April 30 had witnessed Wegner visit Lucca's

residence for about 25 minutes, and observed other vehicles making short stops at the

residence during that time. The affidavit also recounted that Lucca had previous

arrests and convictions for controlled substance offenses, and that other sources and

CRIs had reported to Decker and other officers that Lucca was distributing controlled

substances. Finally, Decker stated that according to Captain Byman, a confidential

informant reported that Lucca was in possession of controlled substances in an ice

fishing house during the winter.

Lucca zeroes in on Decker's testimony concerning what Lucca describes as a

major factual discrepancy between the Wegner and Lucca warrant affidavits. While

the Lucca affidavit featured the CRI's allegation that Wegner and Lucca engaged in

a drug transaction within 72 hours of May 6, the Wegner affidavit submitted on May

5 did not mention this important evidence. At a hearing on Lucca's motion to

suppress, Decker first testified that the CRI information was not included in the

Wegner affidavit because Decker did not receive the information until after Byman's

affidavit had been submitted to the court. When Decker was confronted with the fact

that the Wegner affidavit was not submitted until May 5, Decker explained that he

believed it had been submitted one week earlier. Decker then testified that he had

discussed the new CRI information with Captain Byman, and that Byman had decided

to leave it out of the Wegner affidavit.

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Lucca argues that Decker's testimony at the hearing is incredible, because if he

really believed that the Wegner affidavit had been submitted in late April, then he

could not have spoken with Byman in early May about whether to include the new

CRI information in the Wegner affidavit. The district court concluded that Lucca's

attack on Decker's credibility was much ado about nothing. The district court (and

the magistrate judge) noted that Decker could have been mistaken about when the

Wegner affidavit was drafted and submitted to the court, because Decker was not

intimately involved in the preparation of that affidavit. Even if Decker believed that

Byman already had submitted the Wegner affidavit to the court in late April, the

district court thought it perfectly reasonable that Decker would share the new CRI

information with Byman in early May. Under this scenario, Byman could decide

whether to supplement his original affidavit or otherwise make use of the new

information concerning the target of his investigation. For these reasons, the court

rejected Lucca's contention that Decker's testimony was internally inconsistent.

A Franks hearing is required when the defendant makes "a substantial

preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with

reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,

and [ ] the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause[.]"

Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. This showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood is "not

lightly met." United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987). In

particular, a defendant must "point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit

that is claimed to be false; and [the allegations] should be accompanied by a

statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements

of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained." Franks,

438 U.S. at 171. We review the district court's denial of a Franks hearing for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Gabrio, 295 F.3d 880, 882 (8th Cir.), cert

denied, 537 U.S. 962 (2002).

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We agree with the district court that Lucca did not mount a substantial

preliminary showing sufficient to justify a Franks hearing. Like the district court, we

do not believe that Decker's testimony at the suppression hearing is internally

inconsistent, or that it leads to an inference that Decker falsified the CRI information

included in the Lucca affidavit. That Decker said he believed the Wegner affidavit

was submitted to the court in late April does not render incredible Decker's testimony

that he nonetheless conveyed the new CRI information to Byman in early May, and

discussed with Byman whether the information should be included in the Wegner

affidavit. It was eminently reasonable for the district court to conclude that police

officers confer about new information that develops in an ongoing investigation. As

the magistrate judge noted in his report and recommendation, an ongoing

investigation may require changes to an initial warrant affidavit or the issuance of

more than one search warrant. Decker's confusion about the timing of the Wegner

affidavit may have muddied the waters, but Franks requires stronger proof than what

Lucca has pieced together to create a substantial preliminary showing of intentional

falsehoods. 

II.

Lucca also filed a motion to remand the case for a Franks hearing in light of

"newly discovered evidence." He argues that three pieces of new evidence regarding

Officer Decker's credibility entitle him to a Franks hearing. This new information

includes: (1) findings of the International Falls Police Civil Service Commission

discharging Decker from the police department for taking evidence from the

department for personal use, making false statements to the police chief regarding his

whereabouts during a fire drill, and using a breath test device for personal use; (2) a

civil complaint filed by a private citizen, alleging "[u]pon information and belief" that

Decker provided "unreliable, exaggerated, or fabricated information" to a judge in

order to obtain a warrant to search her property; and (3) news articles regarding

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Decker's misconduct. The government contends that the new evidence would not

have resulted in a Franks hearing even if it had been available to the district court.

We have never considered the standard for reviewing a motion to remand for

a Franks hearing based on newly discovered evidence. Both the government and

Lucca analogize the situation to a motion for new trial, which requires a movant to

show that the evidence is new, the failure to discover it was not due to lack of

diligence, and "the evidence is such that at a new trial it would likely produce a

different outcome." United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 1073, 1078 (8th Cir. 1995).

According to the parties, when that standard is applied to the pending motion, we

must decide whether the newly discovered evidence would likely result in a Franks

hearing if considered by the district court. 

We have some doubt whether the parties focus on the correct "outcome" that

must be different before a remand is ordered. A Franks hearing is just a step along

the way to the ultimate goal of a motion to suppress, which is to have evidence

excluded, and the case dismissed. To focus on whether the district court would

permit a Franks hearing, rather than on whether the new evidence is likely to change

the overall outcome of the proceeding (i.e., the defendant's conviction and sentence),

may give insufficient weight to the interest in finality that motivates the rigorous

standard for granting a new trial. E.g., United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d

Cir. 1975). Nonetheless, because the government concedes that we should examine

only whether the new evidence warrants a Franks hearing, and because we ultimately

conclude in this case that it does not, we refrain from further analysis of the

appropriate standard for such a remand motion.

We conclude that the new evidence concerning Officer Decker, when

combined with the evidence presented in the district court, would not establish a

substantial preliminary showing of intentional or reckless falsehoods by Decker in the

Lucca warrant affidavit. While the information that Decker made a false statement

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to his police chief in an unrelated matter has some bearing on his credibility, it is not

sufficient standing alone to justify a Franks hearing on the Lucca warrant. See

United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1983). Nor do we view this as

a case in which Decker's credibility in the search warrant affidavit was seriously

challenged, such that the district court made a borderline decision to deny a Franks

hearing. The district court's decision, rather, was based on a conceptual flaw in

Lucca's submission that Decker's testimony at the suppression hearing was

necessarily inconsistent. 

Viewed in that light, the new information about Decker's credibility and

character is not sufficient to warrant a remand. As with an informant whose

information is recounted in an affidavit, we believe that where the affiant's statement

are "at least partially corroborated, attacks upon credibility and reliability are not

crucial to the finding of probable cause." United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254,

258-59 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating principle in the context of informant reliability). Here,

Decker's statement that a CRI informed him of a drug deal between Lucca and

Wegner was at least partially corroborated by surveillance that observed automobile

traffic at Lucca's residence during a visit by Wegner in the previous week, and by the

seizure of cocaine from Wegner's residence. Lucca's involvement with controlled

substances also was bolstered by Captain Byman's information regarding Lucca's use

of drugs at an ice fishing house, and by general intelligence received from other

informants. After considering the totality of the evidence relating to the Lucca search

warrant, we are not persuaded that the new evidence concerning Decker's character

and credibility in unrelated matters would likely result in the ordering of a Franks

hearing upon remand. Accordingly, we conclude that the motion to remand should

be denied.

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III.

Lucca also contends that there was not probable cause to support the issuance

of the search warrant. As a reviewing court, we pay "great deference" to the probable

cause determinations of the issuing judge or magistrate, and our inquiry is limited to

discerning whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that

probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 238 (1983). Even if the

affidavit were deemed deficient in hindsight, moreover, evidence would not be

suppressed if the police acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a

neutral and detached magistrate. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984).

Lucca argues that because the affidavit did not provide the factual basis for the

CRI's knowledge regarding Lucca's alleged drug transaction with Wegner, the

warrant was not supported by the necessary probable cause. We disagree. When a

confidential informant provides information in support of a search warrant, the

issuing magistrate considers the informant's reliability and the basis of his knowledge.

Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. The totality of the circumstances analysis, however, does not

mandate that both factors be present before a warrant may issue. Instead, a strong

showing of one may compensate for a deficiency in the other. Id. For example, if an

"informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of

criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth

the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of

probable cause . . . ." Id.; see also United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 612, 615 (8th

Cir. 1991). The information from a CRI is sufficiently reliable if it is corroborated

by other evidence, or if the informant has a history of providing reliable information.

United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). 

In this case, the CRI's reliability was supported by his previous work with the

International Falls Police Department and the department's corroboration of his

information. The CRI had a track record of supplying reliable information, which

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resulted in three successful felony controlled substance convictions, five controlled

substances purchases, and four pending controlled substance convictions. See

Gabrio, 295 F.3d at 883 (the informant's provision of reliable information on at least

two occasions and return of stolen property were sufficient to establish reliability);

United States v. Wright, 145 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 1998) (informant's track record

of reliability was established by successful controlled purchases of crack cocaine).

In addition, as noted above, Decker's affidavit included corroborating information,

such as the observations of Wegner's visit to the Lucca residence, and the seizure of

cocaine from Wegner's residence. See United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847, 850 (8th

Cir. 1994) (CRI information was reliable where independent investigation of the task

force agents corroborated CRI information). We conclude that under the totality of

the circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that

probable cause existed.

IV.

Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Lucca also contends

that his convictions and sentence are unconstitutional, because they were based on

drug quantities that the government was not required to prove as an element of the

offense. Our circuit previously rejected this argument, United States v. Carter, 294

F.3d 978, 980-81 (8th Cir. 2002), but we must consider whether the Supreme Court's

decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), has breathed new life into

the claim. Blakely declared, in a case involving a sentencing proceeding in

Washington state, that "[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict

alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes

essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his proper authority." Id. at 2537

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

Whatever the ramifications of Blakely for the constitutionality of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines, we perceive no constitutional flaw in Lucca's sentence.

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Lucca was sentenced to a term of 120 months imprisonment, which is the mandatory

minimum term of imprisonment established by statute for a defendant who is

convicted of trafficking in excess of 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing

methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Blakely explained that a sentence may

be imposed by a judge if it is based solely on the "facts reflected in the jury verdict

or admitted by the defendant." 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (emphasis in original). The

indictment in this case alleged that Lucca possessed with intent to distribute in excess

of 500 grams of methamphetamine, and he admitted this fact as part of his guilty plea.

No additional finding was required by the district court to justify the sentence of

imprisonment that was imposed pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, Lucca's

sentence was consistent with the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Blakely and

Apprendi.

* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to remand is denied, and the judgment

of the district court is affirmed.

_____________________________

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