Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01263/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01263-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
District Council 4, Graphic Communications Conference of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Intervenor for Respondent
Fort Dearborn Company
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 9, 2016 Decided April 12, 2016

No. 14-1263

FORT DEARBORN COMPANY,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

DISTRICT COUNCIL 4, GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS

CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 15-1007

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

 for Enforcement of an Order of 

the National Labor Relations Board

Richard L. Marcus argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

Valerie L. Collins, Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief

were Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, John H.

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 1 of 16
2

Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy

Associate General Counsel, and Jill A. Griffin, Supervisory

Attorney.

Thomas D. Allison, Jr. and N. Elizabeth Reynolds were on

the brief for intervenor District Council Four, Graphic

Communications Conference of the International Brotherhood

of Teamsters in support of respondent.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In 2010, Fort Dearborn Company

suspended and then fired an employee who was also a chief

steward for District Council Four, Graphic Communications

Conference of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Just

weeks earlier, during collective bargaining negotiations, a

manager had threatened to scrutinize closely and find a reason to

fire the employee. The National Labor Relations Board found

that the threat placed the Company in violation of section 8(a)(1)

of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board also found that

the Company violated sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act

when it suspended and fired the employee, purportedly for

bringing an unauthorized visitor into one of its label printing

plants and for not cooperating fully during a subsequent

investigation. The Company petitions for review. 

Although the Company challenges the Board’s findings and

conclusions, its principal contention is that the Board misapplied

the test in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), as articulated

in Sutter East Bay Hospitals v. NLRB, 687 F.3d 424 (D.C. Cir.

2012). The Board, the Company maintains, failed to consider

evidence of the Company’s good-faith belief in the existence of

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 2 of 16
3

circumstances that would have justified the suspension and

termination of the employee. Sutter East Bay is unhelpful to the

Company, however, because evidence of an employer’s goodfaith belief suffices to meet the employer’s burden under Wright

Line only if the employer acts on that belief as it normally

would. Here, substantial evidence in the record supports the

Board’s finding that the reasons given for suspending and firing

the employee were pretextual because the Company’s conduct

was not consistent with its policy and past practice. 

Accordingly, as the Company’s other challenges to the Board’s

decision are unpersuasive, we deny the petition and grant the

Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order. 

I.

The Fort Dearborn Company operates 10 manufacturing

plants in the United States and Canada, which print labels for

cans and plastic bottles. The events at issue occurred at its plant

in Niles, Illinois (“the Plant”). Incorporated into the Plant’s

label-making process are several proprietary techniques that the

Company considers trade secrets, and the Company asks its

employees to sign a confidentiality agreement. In addition,

according to the Company, it has a policy against allowing

unauthorized visitors into the Plant. During the “second shift,”

which runs from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., however, the Company took

no steps to enforce these policies or shield its proprietary

techniques from the eyes of non-employees. According to three

employees who worked that shift, food deliverymen, truck

drivers, the family members of employees, and former

employees often walked through the Plant during the evening

shift.

Prior to his termination, Marcus Hedger had worked at the

Plant for nine years, most recently as a second pressman 

installing plates on a printing press and monitoring printing runs. 

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 3 of 16
4

For six and a half years, Hedger also served as a union steward,

becoming chief steward for two of the Plant’s three bargaining

units — the Bindery, Shipping, and Sheeting Unit and the

Lithography Unit. His union duties included negotiating

collective-bargaining agreements with Companymanagement as

a member of the union’s bargaining committee. For most of his

tenure with the Company, Hedger maintained an exemplary

disciplinary record, accruing only a single verbal warning for

tardiness. Then, in June 2010, Hedger’s relations with

management took a turn for the worse.

During union-management negotiations over a new

collective-bargaining agreement, the union membership, on its

bargaining committee’s recommendation,rejectedmanagement’s

contract proposal. At the first meeting after that vote, on June 4,

2010, tension arose between management and the bargaining

committee. After accusing the union of misconduct relating to

use of a copying machine and leafleting in the Plant parking lot,

the Company’s senior vice president for operations, William

Johnstone, issued a “watch, catch, fire” threat to Hedger,

promising to subject his work to closer scrutiny in an effort to

catch him committing an offense that would justify the

termination of his employment. Hedger filed a union grievance

protesting the threat.

Just over two months later, on August 12, 2010, Peter

Schmidt, a union member and printer by trade, turned up at the

Plant with his bicycle during the “second shift.” Schmidt asked

for Hedger, who at 8:40 p.m. left his work station to meet him. 

Hedger then walked with Schmidt through the Plant and, at 8:51

p.m., saw him out, an exit captured by a Plant security camera. 

After management viewed the security camera footage, the Plant

manager, Robert Kester, initiated an internal investigation of the

bicycle incident. On August 18, Kester and two other

management officials interviewed Hedger. In response to

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 4 of 16
5

management’s questions about the incident, Hedger said he did

not recall anything about those events, and afterward he was

suspended with pay. On August 23, Kester and another manager

interviewed Hedger again. This time Hedger answered most of

management’s questions but at the instruction of his union

representative, he declined to give Schmidt’s name. Hedger did

say that he and the bicyclist were together in the Plant for only

a matter of minutes. During management’s interview on August

30, another Plant employee, Robert Schmitt, who was working

the “second shift” on August 12, said that Hedger and Schmidt

were together for 10 to 15 minutes at most. By letter of

September 7, 2010, the Company informed Hedger that he was

being fired because he “brought an unauthorized person into the

plant on August 12, 2010,” and he “did not respond truthfully to

the Company’s questions regarding events on that date of which

[he] w[as] fully aware.”

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the

Board. After an evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) ruled that Hedger’s termination violated Sections

8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act, but that the June 4 threat and

Hedger’s suspension did not violate the Act. ALJ Decision

(“ALJ Dec.”) at 3–11 (Nov. 30, 2011). The Board agreed with

the ALJ’s conclusion about Hedger’s termination, but otherwise

reversed, finding that the June 4 threat violated Section 8(a)(1)

of the Act and in light of that threat that Hedger’s suspension

violated Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1). Fort Dearborn Co. (“2012

Decision”), 359 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (2012). Afterthe appointments

of two Board Members were invalidated, see NLRB v. Noel

Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014), a new three-Member Board,

upon de novo review, adopted the 2012 Decision, Fort Dearborn

Co. (“2014 Decision”), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (2014), with one

Member concurring, id. at *2 (Member Miscimarra concurring). 

The Company petitions for review.

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 5 of 16
6

II.

Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is “an unfair labor practice

for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce

employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7

of the Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 7 grants employees

“the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor

organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of

their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities

for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or

protection.” Id. § 157. An employer violates Section 8(a)(1)

when its statement to an employee, “considering the totality of

the circumstances, . . . has a reasonable tendency to coerce or to

interfere with those rights.” Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d

114, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Dover Energy, Inc. v. NLRB,

No. 14-1197, 2016 WL 1104732, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 22,

2016). “Section 8(a)(1) prohibits coercive statements that

threaten employees with job loss . . . in retaliation for protected

union activities.” Progressive Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 538,

544 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Under Board precedent, threats to subject

employees to closer scrutiny because of union activity also

violate Section 8(a)(1). See Oldfield Tire Sales, 221 N.L.R.B.

1275, 1276 (1975). 

Section 8(a)(3) provides that it is “an unfair labor practice

for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to . . . tenure of

employment or any term or condition of employment to . . .

discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(3). Discharge of a worker because of union activity

violates Section 8(a)(3), NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S.

393, 394 (1983), and “a violation of § 8(a)(3) constitutes a

derivative violation of § 8(a)(1),” Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB,

460 U.S. 693, 698 n.4 (1983). Where the employer purports to

have disciplined the employee for reasons unrelated to protected

Section 7 conduct, the Board applies the test in Wright Line, 251

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 6 of 16
7

N.L.R.B. at 1089. See Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 394–95. 

First, the General Counsel must “make a prima facie showing

sufficient to support the inference that protected [i.e., unionrelated] conduct was a motivating factor” behind the discipline. 

Tasty Baking, 254 F.3d at 125 (alteration in original) (quoting

TIC-The Indus. Co. Se. v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 334, 337 (D.C. Cir.

1997)). Relevant factors include “the employer’s knowledge of

the employee’s union activities, the employer’s hostility toward

the union, and the timing of the employer’s action.” Vincent

Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(quoting Power, Inc. v. NLRB, 40 F.3d 409, 418 (D.C. Cir.

1994)). Second, “[o]nce a prima facie case has been established,

the burden [of persuasion] shifts to the company to show that it

would have taken the same action in the absence of the unlawful

motive.” Bally’s Park Place, Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.3d 929, 935

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting Tasty

Baking, 254 F.3d at 126). 

The court will uphold the Board’s findings so long as they

are “supported by substantial evidence on the record considered

as a whole.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). Under the substantial evidence

standard, “the Board is to be reversed only when the record is so

compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find to the

contrary.” Inova Health Sys. v. NLRB, 795 F.3d 68, 80 (D.C.

Cir. 2015) (quoting Bally’s Park Place, 646 F.3d at 935). Our

review of the Board’s conclusions as to discriminatory motive is

even more deferential, “because most evidence of motive is

circumstantial.” Id. (quoting Traction Wholesale Ctr. Co. v.

NLRB, 216 F.3d 92, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The court accepts the

ALJ’s credibility determinations as adopted by the Board,

“unless they are patently insupportable.” Tasty Baking, 254 F.3d

at 124 (quoting Gold Coast Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 995 F.2d 257,

265 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Where the Board disagrees with the ALJ,

our standard of review remains unchanged. Local 702, Int’l Bhd.

of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 215 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir.

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 7 of 16
8

2000). The Board is free to disagree with the ALJ, but it must

explain the basis of its disagreement. Id.

A.

The Board found that Johnstone’s threat during the June 4

collective bargaining negotiations to watch, catch, and fire

Hedger constituted a Section 8(a)(1) violation. Although

Johnstone and Kester, the management representatives at the

June 4 bargaining session, denied that Johnstone threatened

Hedger, the ALJ credited the contrary testimony of Hedger and

David Ishac, a Plant employee and union member present at the

session. The ALJ gave particular weight to Ishac’s version of

events because Ishac testified adversely to the Company for

which he still worked at the time. Nevertheless, the ALJ found

no Section 8(a)(1) violation because the record left unclear

whether Johnstone meant he would catch and fire Hedger for

activity protected by the Act or for unprotected activity. ALJ

Dec. at 3. The Board did not disturb the ALJ’s credibility

determinations, but it disagreed with his legal analysis. In the

Board’s view, the ALJ “missed the point.” 2012 Decision, 359

N.L.R.B. No. 11 at *1. Where the ALJ relied on Johnstone’s

subjective motivation, the Board noted, he should instead have

considered, from an objective vantage, the effect of Johnstone’s

threat on the employee. Id. (citing Am. Freightways Co., 124

N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1959)). Applying the proper standard, the

Board found that “Johnstone appeared to” threaten Hedger

“because of his protected union activity” and so the threat

“tended to interfere with Hedger’s exercise of his Section 7

rights.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding. 

Johnstone uttered the threat at the first bargaining session after

the union membership had rejected management’s proposal for

a new collective-bargaining agreement. Ishac testified that

“Johnston[e] was very upset” about the union membership’s

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 8 of 16
9

vote. ALJ Hr’g Tr. at 98 (Oct. 13–14, 2011). Johnstone, for his

part, admitted that he was “frustrated” at the bargaining session. 

Id. at 348, 351–53. According to Hedger and Ishac, during the

June 4 session, Johnstone accused the union of malfeasance for

misusing the Plant’s photocopier and illegally placing flyers on

car windshields in the Plant parking lot. In addition, Hedger

testified that Johnstone objected to the union “circus,” id. at 30,

374–75, and, according to Hedger, either shortly before or

shortly after the “circus” comment, Johnstone told him: 

“[W]e’re watching you, Marcus, and we’re going to catch you

and we’re going to fire you and many people are going to laugh

at you.” Id. at 30; see also id. at 374–75. Hedger testified his

contemporaneous notes ofthe June 4 bargaining session recorded

the words “Watching you — fired.” Id. at 374. Ishac’s

testimony was to the same effect. He testified that, after

accusing the union of misconduct, Johnstone told Hedger: “[W]e

are watching you, we’re going to catch you, we will fire you and

70 people will be laughing at you.” Id. at 99. This evidence

supports the Board’s finding that, in view of the context and

timing, a reasonable employee in Hedger’s position would have

understood Johnstone to be threatening him in retaliation for his

role in the collective-bargaining process. 

The Company’s challenges to the Board’s Section 8(a)(1)

determination lack merit. First, the Company maintains that the

Board improperly relied on Hedger’s union “circus” testimony

because the ALJ did not mention it. But “the Board is the

agency entrusted by Congress with the responsibility for making

findings under [the Act],” Local 702, 215 F.3d at 15 (quoting

Carpenters Local No. 33 v. NLRB, 873 F.2d 316, 319 (D.C. Cir.

1989)), and it is not restricted to the evidence cited by the ALJ. 

Nothing in the ALJ’s decision suggests that he disbelieved

Hedger’s “circus” testimony. To the contrary, the ALJ generally

credited Hedger’s account of the June 4 negotiations over

management’s. Second, nor does it matter whether Hedger’s

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 9 of 16
10

protected activity was “the source of [Johnstone’s] frustration.” 

Pet’r’s Br. 21. The Company, like the ALJ, focuses on the

wrong facts as it is not the subjective motivation of the speaker

that matters but the statement’s effect, viewed objectively, on the

listener. See Dover Energy, 2016 WL 1104732, at *4. Third, the

answer to the Company’s question — “What Section 7 rights did

Johnstone’s statement ‘reasonably tend to interfere with’?”

Pet’r’s Br. 22 — lies in the Board’s emphasis on the context and

timing of the threat. Johnstone issued the threat during a

contentious round of collective bargaining shortly after union

bargainers — including Hedger — had successfully urged its

membership to reject management’s proposal. See 2012

Decision, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 11 at *1. Collective bargaining falls

well within the ambit of Section 7 protected activity. See 29

U.S.C. § 157. 

B.

With respect to Hedger’s suspension and firing, the

Company maintains chiefly that the Board’s application of the

test established in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, was flawed

because the Board ignored evidence supporting Company

management’s good-faith belief in facts justifying the discipline

it meted out. It necessarily follows under this court’s application

of Wright Line in Sutter East Bay, 687 F.3d at 434–37, the

Company maintains, that it did not violate Sections 8(a)(3) and

8(a)(l). Although the court will defer to the Board’s

interpretation of the Act, Stanford Hosp. &Clinics v. NLRB, 325

F.3d 334, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2003), an unexplained divergence from

its precedent would render a Board decision arbitrary and

capricious, see Teamsters Local Union Nos. 822 &592 v. NLRB,

956 F.2d 317, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Neither the Sutter East Bay

argument nor the Company’s other contentions, however,

demonstrate Board error or adjudication inconsistent with Wright

Line.

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 10 of 16
11

The Board’s threshold objection that the Company’s goodfaith-belief argument is not properly before the court because it

was not presented to the Board, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), is not

well taken. Even though the Company’s exceptions to the ALJ’s

decision do not clearly raise the good-faith issue, see Resp’t’s

Exceptions at 2, 6 (Jan. 11, 2012), at times “‘vague exception[s]’

to an ALJ’s finding may be sufficient ‘to preserve an issue for

appeal when [the] petitioner’s brief in support of its exceptions

adequately puts the Board on notice’ of the grounds on which the

petitioner is objecting.” DHL Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 813 F.3d

365, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Parsippany Hotel Mgmt. Co.

v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 417–18 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). That is true

here. In its supporting brief to the Board, the Company argued

that its managers reasonably believed that Hedger may have

compromised confidential company information by walking

Schmidt through the Plant for upwards of an hour. See Resp’t’s

Br. in Support of Exceptions at 18–19, 21 (Jan. 11, 2012). The

Company raised the issue more explicitly in other briefs to the

Board: “The Company did not and does not claim that Hedger

was discharged because he actually spent 50 minutes to an hour

with Schmidt on the evening of August 12, 2010. He was

discharged because of what [the Company] believed took place

on August 12 . . . .” Resp’t’s Reply to Charging Party’s Br. in

Opp’n to Resp’t’s Exceptions at 7 (Feb. 22, 2012) (emphasis in

original); see also Resp’t’s Br. in Reply to Acting Gen.

Counsel’s Answering Br. at 5 (Feb. 22, 2012). Taken together,

the Company’s submissions to the Board adequately raised the

good-faith issue, and the court has jurisdiction to consider these

challenges. See DHL Express, 813 F.3d at 372. 

The Board concluded that the Company violated Sections

8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) by suspending and firing Hedger, in part

reversing the ALJ, who had found that the suspension did not

violate the Act. The Board explained its reversal: the suspension

constituted an unfair labor practice “[i]nasmuch as the

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 11 of 16
12

suspension was one of the steps taken” by the Company to

unlawfully fire Hedger. 2012 Decision, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 11 at

*2. In affirming the ALJ’s decision that Hedger’s termination

violated the Act, the Board relied on the ALJ’s factual findings,

although not all of them. On Wright Line’s first step, the Board

described some found facts as “unnecessary” to its decision and

explained that “[i]n affirming the [ALJ’s] finding” that Hedger’s

firing was motivated by anti-union animus, it “additionally

rel[ied] on” Johnstone’s June 4 threat to “watch, catch, and fire”

Hedger for his union activity. Id. at *2 n.5. On the second step

of Wright Line, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding that the

Company’s first reason for firing Hedger — his walk with

Schmidt through the Plant — was pretextual, adopting “the

reasons given by the [ALJ].” Id. Likewise, the Board affirmed

the ALJ’s finding that the Company’s second reason for firing

Hedger — his failure to cooperate fully during August 18 and 23

interviews — was pretextual, emphasizing that the Company

took no disciplinary action against other employees who refused

to cooperate with the investigation into the August 12 incident. 

The Board declined to rely on two grounds on which the ALJ

based his pretext findings, but the remaining evidence amply

supports the Board’s determination that the Company’s stated

reasons for firing Hedger were pretextual. 

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination, on

Wright Line’s first step, that the General Counsel established a

prima facie case that Hedger’s union activity was a motivating

factor in his suspension and termination. The Company does not

dispute that Hedger served as a chief union steward and a

member of the union’s bargaining committee or that 

management knew this. There is ample record evidence that

Johnstone issued the “watch, catch, and fire” threat to Hedger,

and the Board was entitled to draw an inference of anti-union

motivation from that threat. See Vincent Indus., 209 F.3d at 735. 

Further, Johnstone’s threat is not the only evidence of anti-union

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 12 of 16
13

animus on which the Board relied. The Company’s insistence to

the contrary overlooks the Board’s statement that it was

“affirming the [ALJ’s] finding” as to Wright Line’s first step,

save for the ALJ’s reliance on enumerated pieces of evidence the

Board found “unnecessary” to its decision. 2012 Decision, 359

N.L.R.B. No. 11 at *2 n.5. By setting aside that “unnecessary”

evidence, the Board did not eliminate “all of the findings of

animus made by the ALJ,” Reply Br. 12, because it adopted the

ALJ’s reliance on evidence that the Company provided

pretextual reasons for firing Hedger. 

A finding of pretext may support an inference of unlawful

motive, see Pioneer Hotel, Inc. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 939, 947–48

(D.C. Cir. 1999); Citizens Inv. Servs. Corp., 342 N.L.R.B. 316,

330 (2004), and it does so here. Testimony before the ALJ

established that prior to Hedger’s suspension and firing, the

Company had never taken steps to enforce its confidentiality

policy or its policy against unauthorized visitors on the “second

shift,” when the Plant’s doors were often open and there was no

way to sign in at the front desk. Further, Kester testified that the

Company had a progressive discipline policy, yet, for

unexplained reasons, the Company failed to apply that policy to

Hedger, despite what Kester described as Hedger’s “very good”

nine-year record of only one verbal warning for tardiness. ALJ

Hr’g Tr. at 262–63. And Hedger faced disparate treatment. 

Kester and Ishac testified that after Hedger was fired, two

employees who allowed a former employee into the Plant each

received a one-day suspension. 

Substantial evidence also supports the Board’s

determination, on Wright Line’s second step, that the Company

failed to show that it would have suspended and fired Hedger

regardless of anti-union animus. In addition to the evidence that

it did not enforce its confidentiality or visitor policy on the

“second shift” and failed to explain why it did not follow its

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 13 of 16
14

progressive discipline policy, the Company’s stated reasons for

firing Hedger were undermined by evidence that food

deliverymen, truck drivers, employees’ family members, and

former employees regularly entered the Plant during the “second

shift.” Indeed, Kester acknowledged that prior to Hedger’s

suspension and termination, the Company had never disciplined

an employee for allowing a non-employee into the Plant. 

Similarly, the Board noted that the Company did not discipline

employees besides Hedger who failed to cooperate with its

investigation into the events of August 12. Kester testified that

several of the employees he approached as part of his

investigation “clearly didn’t want to get involved,” ALJ Hr’g Tr.

at 178, and so, for example, he had not interviewed Tony Sass,

who was working on the same press as Hedger on August 12,

because Sass “said that he did not want to get involved,” id. at

246–47. There is no record evidence any of these other

employees were subject to discipline for failure to cooperate with

the investigation. 

Upholding the Board’s findings and conclusions is

consistent with our precedent. The court has upheld Board

determinations that employers have violated Sections 8(a)(3) and

8(a)(1) on facts similar to those present here. See, e.g., Inova

Health Sys., 795 F.3d at 84–85; Bally’s Park Place, 646 F.3d at

936–39; Tasty Baking, 254 F.3d at 126–27; Parsippany Hotel, 99

F.3d at 425. The Company’s challenges to the Board’s Wright

Line analysis are unpersuasive. 

The Company’s principal contention relies on this court’s

opinion in Sutter East Bay, 687 F.3d 424. In that case, the court

noted that, when assessing an employer’s disciplinary action, the

Wright Line inquiry asks not what an employee actually did but

what the employer in good faith believed the employee did. 

Sutter E. Bay, 687 F.3d at 435. The Company maintains that the

ALJ and the Board failed to evaluate whether its managers held

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 14 of 16
15

a good-faith belief in the existence of five facts that would have

justified suspending and firing Hedger: (1) Hedger left his work

station at a crucial moment, the start of “wash-up” after finishing

a production run around 7:45 p.m.; (2) Hedger and Schmidt were

in the Plant for about an hour; (3) Hedger did not have

permission to leave his work station or escort Schmidt through

the Plant; (4) Hedger’s “guided tour” could have compromised

confidential company information; and (5) Hedger lied during

the August 23, 2010, interview with management. Pet’r’s Br. 26,

30–31. But the Company has overlooked a key component of

Sutter East Bay’s gloss on the Wright Line test. Whether an

employer’s disciplinary action was justified turns on what the

employer “believed, whether [the] beliefs were reasonable, and

whether [its] actions based on those beliefs were consistent with

[its] policies and past practice.” Sutter E. Bay, 687 F.3d at 436

(emphasis added). That is, an employer meets its burden to rebut

the General Counsel’s prima facie case of anti-union motive only

if it can show that it parceled out discipline as it normally would

when confronted with the same kind of employee misconduct

that its managers reasonably believed had occurred. See id. at

435–37. A good-faith belief, therefore, is of little aid to an

employer where the discipline imposed by the company departs

from its policy or practice. 

Here, the Board found that the Company acted in a manner

not consistent with its policies and past practices, and as

discussed, substantial evidence supports this finding. The

Company inexplicably did not apply its progressive discipline

policy to Hedger. Before suspending and firing Hedger, the

evidence showed, the Company had never taken steps to enforce

its confidentiality or visitor policies on the “second shift.” 

Neither did the Company discipline employees who violated

those policies as harshly as it punished Hedger. Nor did it

punish employees who, like Hedger, declined to cooperate fully

with the investigation into the events of August 12. So even if

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 15 of 16
16

the Company’s managers had believed in good faith what it

claims they believed, Sutter East Bay provides it no safe harbor. 

The Company’s other challenges to the Board’s findings of

anti-union motive and pretext merely reflect the Company’s

preferred interpretation of the record evidence and do not

demonstrate the Board lacked substantial evidence to support its

findings. “[W]e may not reject [the Board’s findings] simply

because other reasonable inferences may also be drawn.” Tasty

Baking, 254 F.3d at 125. To the extent the Company maintains

that the lies Hedger told at the August 18 interview justify

suspending him, this is non-responsive to the Board’s conclusion

that the suspension violated Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the

Act “[i]nasmuch as the suspension was one of the steps taken as

part of the [Company’s] unlawfully motivated efforts to

discharge Hedger.” 2012 Decision, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 11 at *2. 

Even if suspension alone was warranted, it is the suspension’s

place in the context of the Company’s overall efforts to fire

Hedger that renders it an unfair labor practice. See Beverly Calif.

Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 153, 154 (1998), enf’d in relevant part, 227

F.3d 817, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Accordingly, we deny the Company’s petition and grant the

Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its 2014 Decision

and Order.

USCA Case #14-1263 Document #1608205 Filed: 04/12/2016 Page 16 of 16