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Parties Involved:
Joy Louise Brown
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. ' 

FILED 

Unlred States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci~ruit 

DEC 2 8 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

JOY LOUISE BROWN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

No. 89-8102 

(D.C. No. CR89-0219-01J) 

(Distict of Wyoming) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before Anderson and Brorby, Circuit Judges and Brimmer**, Chief 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief District Judge for the 

District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

Background 

Appellant Joy Louise Brown was convicted by a jury of assault 

within Indian Country resulting in serious injury, and sentenced 

to 43 months. Appellant, a 56 year old Shoshone, who had lost her 

left arm several years before the incident in question, shot her 

son-in-law Rex Lindberg in the leg, which was subsequently 

amputated because of complications arising from the gunshot wound. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-8102 Document: 010110097386 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 1 
., 

Appellant, her daughter, and Lindberg had been drinking 

heavily and had engaged in arguments over the several hours 

preceding the shooting. Lindberg was standing beside a truck in 

front of appellant's trailer home talking to his wife and a 

neighbor, when appellant shot him. Immediately following the 

shooting, appellant told various individuals that she had not 

intended to shoot Lindberg, that she thought the gun was empty, and 

that the gun fired accidentally. Appellant claimed that because 

she has only one arm and was suffering from an ankle injury, she 

stumbled on the porch in front of her home and the gun went off. 

Appellant presents the following issues on appeal: 

1. Whether there was adequate evidence for the jury to 

have determined that the Defendant, Joy Louise Brown, was 

guilty of the charge under Section 113(f) of Title 18 of the 

United States Code .... 

2. Whether the Judge erred in answering the the [sic] 

jury's question, which was stated as follows: 

Judge Johnson we are having a problem with 

interpretation of instruction 12A. The part •such 

as would give the victim reason to fear or expect 

harm'. Does the victim have to have knowledge of 

the threat, or does the threat just have to exist. 

Discussion 

Appellant first argues that the jury verdict was not supported 

by substantial evidence. In reviewing a criminal conviction on a 

challenge of sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will "view all 

of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, and all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to 

the government." United States v. Shelton, 736 F.2d 1397, 1401 

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Appellate Case: 89-8102 Document: 010110097386 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 2 
(10th cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984). 

Appellant contends that the shooting was accidental. She 

argues that the only evidence that the shooting was intentional was 

the testimony of the neighbor, John Kahler, who was in the truck. 

He testified that the porch from where the shot was fired was 

shaded and that he could not see appellant's face. He also 

testified that appellant was right up against a bannister on the 

porch. Appellant argues that the evidence showed that she could 

not have been, since the bannister was blocked by a load of wood. 

Appellant testified that she stumbled because of her injured 

ankle, and was not even looking at the victim when the gun fired. 

She also testified that she thought the gun was empty. While 

appellant admits there was serious bodily injury, she denies the 

assault. She asserts that there was no evidence of threat or 

intent to inflict injury. 

On the issue of appellant's intent, there was evidence that 

appellant was angry with the victim, and had shot another with the 

same gun at a time after she had lost her left arm. Her daughter 

testified that she had seen appellant load the gun. Moreover, the 

evidence revealed that appellant told Ken Marcos, who arrived on 

the scene shortly after the shooting, that if she had wanted to 

kill Lindberg, she would have. From this evidence, a jury could 

have rejected appellant's defense and found beyond a reasonable 

doubt that appellant had the requisite general intent to assault 

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Appellate Case: 89-8102 Document: 010110097386 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 3 
Lindberg. See United States v. Big Crow, 728 F.2d 974, 975-76 

(8th Cir. 1984). 

The argument that there was no threat is properly addressed 

in the resolution of the second issue presented in this appeal. 

Appellant argues that in order for the shooting to constitute an 

assault, Lindberg must have been in apprehension of harm by 

appellant, citing United States v. Dupree, 544 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 

1976). 

In citing this case for the proposition that Lindberg must 

have been in apprehension of harm before appellant could be 

convicted of criminal assault, appellant misstates the law of 

assault as defined in Dupree. As stated by the Ninth Circuit: 

Assault had two meanings at common law. 

assault was an attempt to commit a battery .. 

A criminal 

A tortious 

assault was an act which put another in reasonable 

apprehension of harrn .... 

Both concepts of assault have become recognized as 

criminal assaults ... and are included under the federal 

definition of assault. 

Id. at 1051 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Bell, 

505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 

(1975). In Brundage v. U.S., 365 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966), the 

defendant struck the victim on the back of the head without 

warning. This Court held that the assault merged with the battery 

and that the defendant was properly convicted. "When an actual 

battery is committed, it includes an assault." U.S. v. Jacobs, 632 

F.2d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1980). In other words, it is not necessary 

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Appellate Case: 89-8102 Document: 010110097386 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 4 
/ '' ...--

that a victim know of defendant's acts in order for those acts to 

constitute assault under federal criminal assault statutes. 

In the case at bar, the jury was instructed: 

Any knowing attempt or threat to inflict injury on the 

person of another, when coupled with an apparent present 

ability to do so, and any intentional display of force 

such as would give the victim reason to fear or expect 

immediate bodily harm constitutes an assault. 

Upon a request for clarification, the judge instructed the jury 

that "it is not necessary that Rex Lindberg see or have knowledge 

of any threat or fear bodily injury from the plaintiff." This 

instruction is entirely consistent with the law of this circuit as 

expressed in Brundage. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 

5 

Entered for the Court: 

Clarence A. Brimmer, 

Chief Judge, 

United States District Court 

Appellate Case: 89-8102 Document: 010110097386 Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Page: 5