Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-02298/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-02298-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Debra Jones
Defendant
Joseph Stephen West
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH STEPHEN WEST,

Plaintiff,

v.

HONORABLE JUDGE DEBRA

JONES,

Defendant.

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

Case No.: 1:14-CV-02298-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation (Docs. 29, 30) on May

4, 2015, recommending that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) be granted and

that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to supplement (Doc. 28) be treated as a motion for

leave to amend and be denied. On May 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed objections to the

report and recommendation. (Doc. 30). The case was reassigned to the undersigned

on May 19, 2015. (Doc. 32). Therefore, the matter is now before the undersigned for

decision.

Having carefully considered the materialsin the court file, including the report

and recommendation and after conducting a de novo review of the record relating to

Plaintiff’s objections, the court is of the opinion that the magistrate judge’s report is

FILED

 2015 May-22 PM 02:03

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 1 of 23
due to be ADOPTED and hisrecommendation is due to be ACCEPTED. Plaintiff’s

objections are due to be OVERRULED. Accordingly, and as set out more fully

below, Defendant’s motion is due to be GRANTED, Plaintiff’s motion is due to be

DENIED, and all of Plaintiff’s claims are due to be DISMISSED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This requires that the district judge “give fresh

consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party.”

Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

In contrast, those portions of the R & R to which no objection is made need only be

reviewed for clear error. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed. App’x. 781, 784 (11th Cir.

2006).1

“Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de

novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.”

1 Macort dealt only with the standard of review to be applied to a magistrate's factual

findings, but the Supreme Court has held that there is no reason for the district court to apply a

different standard to a magistrate's legal conclusions. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S. Ct.

466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985). Thus, district courts in this circuit have routinely applied a clear-error

standard to both. See Tauber v. Barnhart, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373–74 (N.D. Ga. 2006)

(collecting cases). This is to be contrasted with the standard of review on appeal, which distinguishes

between the two. See Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1991) (when a magistrate's

findings of fact are adopted by the district court without objection, they are reviewed on appeal under

a plain-error standard, but questions of law remain subject to de novo review).

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 2 of 23
United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

It is incumbent upon the parties to timely raise any objections that they may have

regarding a magistrate judge’s findings contained in a report and recommendation,

as the failure to do so subsequently waives or abandons the issue, even if such matter

was presented at the magistrate judge level. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360 at

1365 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While Pilati raised the issue of not being convicted of a

qualifying offense before the magistrate judge, he did not raise this issue in his appeal

to the district court. Thus, this argument has been waived or abandoned by hisfailure

to raise it on appeal to the district court.”). However, the district judge has discretion

to consider or to decline to consider arguments that were not raised before the

magistrate judge. Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173, 1176 (11th Cir. 2006);see also

Williams v. McNeil, 557 F. 3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009).

“Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to.

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district

court.” Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n. 8. “This rule facilitates the opportunity for district

judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result

compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act.” Id. at 410. Indeed, a contrary

rule “would effectively nullify the magistrate judge's consideration of the matter and

would not help to relieve the workload of the district court.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 3 of 23
III. PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS

Regarding the concerns raised in his objections more specifically, Plaintiff

contends first that “the recommendations were not recieved [sic] as required.” (Doc.

30 at p. 1). However, Plaintiff’s receipt of the report and recommendation is shown

by his objecting to them. Further, his objections were timely filed. Accordingly, this

objection is OVERRULED.

Next, Plaintiff objects to the authority of the magistrate judge to act without

Plaintiff’s consent. (Id.) 

It appearsthat Plaintiff misunderstands the report and recommendation process.

The magistrate judge is not making any final factual determinations or rulings, but

rather only providing recommendations. Instead, the undersigned has reviewed de

novo those portions of the record that relate to Plaintiff’s objections and separately

and independently determined the correctness of any objected-to findings and

recommendations. 

This accepted process is set forth statutorily in 28 U.S.C. § 636, which states

in part that:

(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary–

(A) a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and

determine any pretrial matter pending before the court,

except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the

pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an

indictment or information made by the defendant, to

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 4 of 23
suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to

permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to

involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may

reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A)

where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order

is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 

(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate judge to

conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to

submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the

court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of

applications for posttrial relief made by individuals

convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions

challenging conditions of confinement. 

(C) the magistrate judge shall file his proposed findings

and recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the

court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties. 

Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may

serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and

recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.

The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to

the magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis by underlining added).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection to the magistrate judge’s authority is

OVERRULED.

The balance of Plaintiff’s objections are merely argument that has already been

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 5 of 23
made before the magistrate judge. In any event, Plaintiff has wholly failed to point

to this court any “error” that he complains of in the report and recommendation.

Rather, except as discussed above, Plaintiff’s “objections” consist of conclusory

argument without reference to any specific finding or recommendation, and without

reference to any authority that even arguable contravenes such recommendations.

Thus, the remainder of his objections are due to be, and hereby are, OVERRULED

on that basis.

IV. THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION IS DE NOVO CORRECT

Nonetheless, the court has considered the entire file, including Plaintiff’s

objections, de novo, and determinesthat the magistrate judge applied the correct legal

standards and reached the correct conclusions. Specifically, the magistrate judge

deemed all “facts” actually alleged by Plaintiff (as opposed to conclusions asserted

by him) to be true.2 He then correctly determined that all claims set out in Plaintiff’s

Complaint

3,4 were due to be dismissed. The undersigned will discuss those

2

“As required by the standards applicable to Jones’s motion to dismiss, the factual

allegations of West’s pleading are taken as true, giving him all reasonable inferences. Thus, the facts

set forth in the text are assumed to be true for purposes of the instant motion to dismiss, but theymay

not be the actual facts.” (Doc. 29 at p. 3, fn.2).

3 The court agrees with the magistrate judge’s description of Plaintiff’s Complaint. “That pro

se pleading is a rambling 51 pages long, contains no numbered paragraphs as required by FED. R.

CIV. P. 10(b). Attached to that pleading is an “Exhibit” comprised of 48 more pages of

documents.”(Doc. 29 at p. 3, fn. 2).

4 The magistrate judge gleaned everypossible claim that arguablyappears in that Complaint,.

Indeed, Plaintiff does not, in his objections, argue that any claim was omitted. 

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 6 of 23
determinations in the order in which they appear in the report and recommendation.

A. Claims Against Judge Jones Based on Conduct of Non-Parties

The magistrate judge wrote:

As a threshold matter, the undersigned notes that while West has

formally identified and served only a single defendant in this action, i.e., Judge

Jones, the Complaint contains a host of allegations related to the conduct of

other individuals and entities that supposedly worked to violate West’s legal

rights. These include allegations against the CalhounCountyDrug Task Force,

Calhoun County District Assistant District Attorneys Lynn Hammond and

Jennifer Weems, and former Calhoun County Circuit Judges Malcolm Street

and Joel Laird. However, none of those parties are currently named defendants

in this action. Further, West has not pled facts supporting that any of them

were acting as agents or employees of Judge Jones. Indeed, many of the events

about which West complains occurred before Judge Jones even took the bench

in January 2011. Ultimately, West failsto give any hint how Judge Jones might

conceivably be liable for the alleged conduct of other parties, whether under

§ 1983, the FTCA, or any other law. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicariousliability isinapplicable to ... § 1983 suits,

a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Meyer v.

Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (“It is well established that traditional

vicarious liability rules ordinarily make principals or employers vicariously

liable for acts of their agents or employees in the scope of their authority or

employment.”). Thus, to the extent that West seeks to recover against Judge

Jonesfor the conduct of others, such claims are due to be dismissed under FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

(Doc. 29 at pp.8-9).

After de novo review, this court agrees. It will ADOPT this portion of the

report and will ACCEPT the recommendation that all claims by Plaintiff against

Judge Jones for the conduct of others be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state

a cognizable claim.

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 7 of 23
B. Section 1983

The magistrate judge next wrote, regarding Plaintiff’s individual capacity

claims against Judge Jones under 42 U.S.C. §1983, as follows.

1. Individual Capacity Claims under Section 1983

West claims that Judge Jones is liable in her individual capacity for

violating his rights under various provisions of the federal and state

constitutions, the RLUIPA, and the ICCPR. More specifically, the undersigned

discerns West to be claiming thatJudge Jones violated hislegal rights by virtue

of the following actions: (1) entering an order in West’s criminal case on

November 26, 2013, that imposed certain conditions and restrictions on his

release on probation; (2) entering another order on January 17, 2014, that

imposed still more restrictions on West’s probation; (3) failing to grant West’s

motion filed in his criminal case seeking return of property seized in

connection with his prosecution; (4) “enforcing” West’ssentence that extends

beyond sentencing guidelines and is disproportionate to sentences in similar

cases; (5) “enforcing” the allegedly unconstitutional provisions of the

ASORCNA; and (6) dismissing West’s putative civil action against hisformer

attorney that was filed in West’s criminal case. 

Judge Jones, however, is entitled to judicial immunity as it relates to all

of West’s claims for money damages. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for

those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless

they acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’ ” Bolin v. Story, 225

F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)). “This immunity

applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in

excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id. Whether a judge’s actions were

made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the

act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events

occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy

involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation

arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.

Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1983). 

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 8 of 23
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005). West urges that Judge

Jones is not protected by immunity because she was allegedly acting without

“jurisdiction” and she violated his civil rights. However, the acts of Judge

Jones of which West complains were rulings she made in her capacity as the

presiding judicial official in West’s criminal case and were not made “in the

clear absence of all jurisdiction.” See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357

nn. 6, 7 (1978) (discussing the difference between a judge’s acts taken “in

excess of his jurisdiction” and those taken “in the clear absence of

jurisdiction”). West’s arguments to the contrary are without merit, and his

claims for money damages against Judge Jones are due to be dismissed. See

Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1071; Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239; Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d

1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 1985); Holt v. Crist, 233 F. App’x 900, 903 (11th Cir.

2007); Barber v. Alabama, 2012 WL 1340090, at *5-6 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 16,

2012). 

On the other hand, the Supreme Court recognized in Pulliam v. Allen,

466 U.S. 522 (1984), that judicial immunity does not apply to § 1983 claims

seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against state-court judges. However,

Congress partially abrogated Pulliam by passing the Federal Courts

Improvement Act (“FCIA”), Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996),

which amended § 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated

or declaratory relief was unavailable.” “After the FCIA, judicial immunity

typically bars claims for prospective injunctive relief against judicial officials

acting in their judicial capacity. Only when a declaratory decree is violated or

declaratory relief is unavailable would plaintiffs have an end-run around

judicial immunity—and neither is true here.” Ray v. Judicial Corrections

Services, Inc., 2014 WL 5090723, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2014); see also

Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242; Esensoy v. McMillan, 2007 WL 257342, at *1 n.5

(11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2007); Taylor v. Smithart, 2011 WL 1188553, at *1 (M.D.

Ala. Jan. 25, 2011). Because West’s § 1983 claims for injunctive relief against

Judge Jones are also based on acts taken in her judicial capacity, those claims

are barred under the FCIA. 

But even assuming that the FCIA did not apply, West still could not

prevail on any of his claims for declaratory or injunctive relief against Judge

Jones. West cannot use § 1983 as a device to obtain collateral review of state

court judgments. See Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070-71; Jones v. Crosby, 137 F.3d

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 9 of 23
1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 1998). West also cannot obtain declaratory or injunctive

relief under § 1983 if he had an adequate remedy at law, including appellate

review in the state courts with respect to an allegedly improper judicial ruling.

Id. at 1073-74; Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242-43; also cf. Dupree v. City of Phenix

City, 2011 WL 6778799, at *3-4 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 2011) (plaintiff failed to

state a § 1983 claim based on allegations that government defendants

unlawfully confiscated his property where state law provided adequate

postdeprivation remedies); Fisher v. Bushway, 2007 WL 1106133, at *2-3

(M.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2007) (same). West had an adequate remedy at law, for he

could have resorted to the Alabama appellate courts in order to obtain review

of the rulings made by Judge Jones. Accordingly, West’s § 1983 claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief against Judge Jones are due to be dismissed

for failure to state a claim.

Further, insofar as Westseeks declaratory or injunctive relief in the form

of an order that would result in an immediate or speedier release from

confinement, including release from parole or probation-based restrictions on

his liberty, he can seek such relief only through an application for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not through § 1983. See Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,

242-43 (1963); Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006);

Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir. 2003); Shaddix v.

Keeton Corrections, Inc., 2014 WL 3721047, at *2-3 (N.D. Fla. Jul. 28, 2014);

Scheffler v. Camon, 2009 WL 3481899, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 28, 2009).

Likewise, the Supreme Court has held that

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to

make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under

§ 1983. 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (footnote omitted). All of the

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 10 of 23
§ 1983 claims againstJudge Jones related to the validity of West’s conviction,

sentence, or probation conditions are thus barred by Preiser or Heck as well.

See Vickers v. Donahue, 137 F. App’x 285, 289-90 (11th Cir. 2005); Smith v.

Burnside, 2007 WL 2209242, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 30, 2007).

(Doc. 29 at pp. 12-13).

The magistrate judge also correctly noted that “the Eleventh Circuit has also

recently rejected the same arguments that West makes in his constitutional challenge

to ASORCNA. See Windwalker v. Governor of Alabama, 579 F. App’x 769 (11thCir.

2014), aff’g 925 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ala. 2013).” (Doc. 29 at p. 12, fn.7).

Finally, as to these individual capacity claims under Section 1983, the

magistrate judge advised Plaintiff

To the extent that West’s pleading might be construed as a petition seeking

habeasrelief under § 2254, it is due to be dismissed without prejudice. Because

West remainssubject to probation conditions that impose substantial restraints

on his liberty, he remains in custody for purposes of habeas jurisdiction. See

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989); Jones, 371 U.S. at 242- 43.

However, West’s probation officer or a similar immediate custodian, notJudge

Jones, would be the proper respondent in a habeas proceeding. See Rumsfeld

v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004); Matthews v. Meese, 644 F. Supp. 380,

381 (D.D.C. 1986); 1976 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 2(b), RULES

GOVERNING § 2254 CASES. If he so chooses, West may file a separate

habeas proceeding, although it appearsthat he has not exhausted available state

remedies as to any claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509 (1982). To the extent that is so and the time in which to do so has expired,

unexhausted habeas claims would be procedurally defaulted and could not be

heard in this court absent a showing (1) of both “cause” for the default and

resulting “prejudice” or (2) that West is “actually innocent.” See Gore v.

Crews, 720 F.3d 811, 816 (11th Cir. 2013). It further appearsthat at leastsome

of West’s potential habeas claims would also be barred by the applicable

one-year statute of limitations, absent a showing of actual innocence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d); McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013).

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 11 of 23
(Doc. 29 at p. 13, fn.8).

After de novo review, this court agrees. It will ADOPT this portion of the

report and will ACCEPT the recommendation that all claims brought by Plaintiff

under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Judge Jones in her individual capacity be dismissed

with prejudice.5

2. Official Capacity Claims under Section 1983

Regarding Plaintiff’s official capacity claims under Section 1983, the

magistrate judge wrote:

West has also sued Judge Jonesin her official capacity. However, “a suit

against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,” and, “[a]s such, it is no

different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, West’s suit against Judge Jones in her

official capacity is effectively against her employer, the State of Alabama. See

Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996). Because such a suit

is barred by the State’s sovereign immunity, West’s official-capacity claims

against Judge Jones are due to be dismissed. 

(Doc. 29 at pp. 13-14).

After de novo review, this court agrees. It will ADOPT this portion of the

5 The court notes that, in his objections, Plaintiff asks, “[i]f, as the Defendants [sic] claim,

the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to compel state officials to abide by the Constitution, then

I must ask, who does?” This question was answered in the report and recommendation. First,

Plaintiff had an adequate state remedy: he could have appealed Judge Jones’s rulings. See Doc. 29

at pp. 11-12. Further, to the extent that he “seeks ... release from parole or probation-based

restrictions on his liberty, he can seek such relief [but] only through an application for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not through § 1983.” Doc. 29 at p. 12. However, if he does

make such an application, the magistrate judge advised him that such an application would be

properly brought against Plaintiff’s “probation officer or a similar immediate custodian, not Judge

Jones....” Doc. 29 at p. 13, fn. 8.

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 12 of 23
report and will ACCEPT the recommendation that all claims by Plaintiff brought

under Section 1983 against Judge Jones in her official capacity be dismissed with

prejudice as barred by sovereign immunity.

C. Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff also invoked the Federal Tort Claims Act. Regarding this claim, the

magistrate judge wrote:

West claims that Judge Jones is also liable under the FTCA. However,

the FTCA authorizes suits only against the United States, not individuals or

government agencies. See Trupei v. United States, 304 F. App’x 776, 782 (11th

Cir. 2008). And even then, the FTCA does not impose liability based on the

conduct of State officials except insofar as they might be deemed to be acting

as employees of the federal government. See Logue v. United States, 412 U.S.

521 (1973); Martinez v. Hall, 2011 WL 6182026, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13,

2011). On top of that, judicial immunity applies to FTCA claims as well. See

Washington Mut. Bank v. Bush, 220 F. App’x 974, 975-76 (11th Cir. 2007).

Because West’s claims all arise out of garden-variety state-court criminal

proceedings, the FTCA has no conceivable application. West’s FTCA claims

are frivolous and due to be dismissed.

(Doc. 29 at p. 14)(emphasis in original).

After de novo review, this court agrees. It will ADOPT this portion of the

report and will ACCEPT the recommendation that all claims by Plaintiff against

Judge Jones under the Federal TortClaims Act be dismissed with prejudice for failure

to state a cognizable claim.

D. Motion for Leave To Supplement Record and Clarify Defendants

Plaintiff’s entire objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that his

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 13 of 23
Motion for Leave To Supplement Record and Clarify Defendants (Doc. 28) is

contained in the following two sentences: “The ruling ‘construing’ a document which

was clearly marked ‘Supplement’ is unauthorized. F.R.Civ.P. Rule 15(d) allows a

supplement.” (Doc. 30 at pp. 1-2).

Rule 15(d) states as follows:

(d) Supplemental Pleadings. On motion and reasonable notice, the court

may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading

setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the

date of the pleading to be supplemented. The court may permit

supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in stating

a claim or defense. The court may order that the opposing party plead to

the supplemental pleading within a specified time.

FED.R.CIV.P. 15(d)(emphasis supplied).

There is nothing in Plaintiff’s “Supplement” that is alleged to have happened after the

date of the Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s objection is due to be OVERRULED.

The court now turnsto the substance of the magistrate judge’srecommendation

regarding this “Supplement.” On this issue, the magistrate judge wrote:

West has moved for leave “to supplement [the] record and clarify

defendants.” (Doc. 28). That pro se motion will be liberally construed as

seeking leave to amend the Complaint. Amendmentsto pleadings are governed

by FED. R. CIV. P. 15. Because West’s motion comes more than 21 days after

Judge Jones served her motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b), West

may only amend his pleading with the opposing party’s consent or leave of

court. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1), (2). West does not allege that he has obtained

the former, and the latter is due to be denied, as explained below. 

Under Rule 15(a)(2), courts should freely give leave to amend the

pleadings “when justice so requires.” However, a district court may deny leave

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 14 of 23
where the plaintiff’s motion fails to attach a copy of the proposed amendment

or sufficiently set forth the substance of the proposed amendment. See

Rosenberg v. Gould, 554 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir.2009); Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d

1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999). A proposed amendment may also be denied for

futility when the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed,

including because the claims would be barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. See Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 870 (11th Cir.

2010); Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1131 (11th Cir. 1993). 

Although West’s instant motion purportedly seeks to “supplement the

record,” it does not supply or point to any new evidence nor present any new

material factual allegations. Rather, the seven-page motion is devoted mostly

to expounding West’s legal theory that Judge Jones and other Alabama

officials violated their oath to be bound by the United States Constitution, see

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 3, such that all of their official acts, including all acts

related to West’s prosecution, conviction, sentence, and probation, are “null

and void ab-intio (sic).” (See Doc. 28 at 3). That proposition is pure nonsense,

of course. See Crawford v. United States, 2008 WL 2149858, at *4 (M.D. Ga.

May 21, 2008); Marr v. Jones, 2010 WL 199170, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4,

2010); Guidetti v. Haley, 2011 WL 1884153, at *2-4 (D.S.C. May 9, 2011);

Mechler v. Hodges, 2005 WL 1406102, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Jun. 15, 2005); Lewis

v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 554 n. 14 (D.D.C. 1986). West also states in his

motion that he would also demand the dismissal of all charges against him.

(Doc. 28 at 5). But again, even if his substantive claims were valid, such relief

is available only in a habeas corpus action, not under § 1983. See Preiser,

supra. 

Likewise, while West’s motion suggests that it would “clarify [the]

defendants” he intends to sue, it ironically does not specify the name of any

new putative defendants.

6

 Instead, West states vaguely that he desires to sue,

6

In his objections to the report and recommendation, the Plaintiff lists, for the first time,

these new putative defendants: “Former Judge Joel Laird, Former Judge Malcolm Street, Jr., District

Attorney Brian McVeigh, Asst. District Jennifer Weems, Asst. District Attorney Lynn Hammond,

Officer Chuck Battles, Officer Steve Roberson, [and] Sheriff Larry Amerson.” (Doc. 30 at p.10).

However, objections to a report and recommendation are not a proper place to add defendants. The

magistrate judge assumed that the “new putative defendants” that Plaintiff wished to add were

former Judge Joel Laird, former Judge Malcolm Street, Jr., Asst. District Jennifer Weems, and Asst.

District Attorney Lynn Hammond, and fully addressed Plaintiff’s claims as potentially applicable

to those defendants. The Plaintiff has not even stated, much less shown, any error in the magistrate

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 15 of 23
in both their individual and official capacity, “each judicial officer of the

Circuit Court of Calhoun County, Alabama, who was involved in [his] cases

prior to March 5, 2015.” (Doc. 28 at 5-6). At a minimum that description is

presumably is meant to encompass former Calhoun County Circuit Judges

Malcolm Street and Joel Laird, each of whom is referenced in the Complaint

as having issued certain judicial orders in the criminal proceedings involving

West. However, the Complaint’s allegations against Street and Laird relate

solely to their judicial rulings and actions in the criminal proceedings, so any

claims against them would be doomed for the same reasons that West’s claims

against Judge Jones are invalid. Therefore, leave to amendment that would

formally name Street or Laird as a defendant is due to be denied as futile. 

In light of certain allegations in the Complaint, however, West’s pro se

motion will be liberally construed as seeking leave also to name as defendants

both Lynn Hammond and Jennifer Weems, Calhoun County Assistant District

Attorneys mentioned in the pleading asitrelatesto their participation in West’s

prosecution, probation revocation proceedings, and the State’s retention of

seized property. (See Compl. at 5, 7-9, 15-16, 46). Specifically, West suggests

in the Complaint that Hammond might be liable based on the following:

(1) she “issued or witnessed an affidavit which contained a false

statement,” resulting in West being arrested on a solicitation

charge in September 2008 without probable cause (see Compl. at

4, 14-15, 46); and

(2) she withheld an allegedly exculpatory recording fromthe defense

in a bond revocation hearing, also in September 2008. (Id.) 

West appears similarly to claim that Weems violated his rights in connection

with the following:

judge’s analysis as to those defendants. Further, he has stated no reason why he could not have

named these new putative defendants earlier. In its discretion, the court declines to consider any

claims Plaintiff might now wish to add against the putative defendants listed by him in his objections

and not addressed bythe magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See Williams v. McNeil, 557

F.3d at 1291 (concluding that a district court has broad discretion in reviewing a magistrate judge's

report and recommendation, and, therefore, does not abuse its discretion in declining to consider

arguments that was not presented to the magistrate judge.).

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 16 of 23
(1) in February 2010, she made a “false statement” in a motion to

have West’s bond revoked after he was convicted of a

misdemeanor offense (Compl. at 5);

(2) in December 2010, she made “many false statements” at West’s

guilty-plea hearing (id. at 23);

(3) in December 2013, Weems made “several false statements”

within a filed response in opposition to West’s motion for the

return of seized property (id. at 8-9);

(4) in January 2014, she made a “false statement” in a motion to have

West’s probation revoked or its conditionsmodified (id. at 7); and

(5) in support of that same motion in January 2014, Weems, by

unspecified means, “coerced” Don Ray of the Calhoun County

Sheriff’s Office to testify falsely against West at the hearing (id.

at 7-8). 

However, insofar as West would raise § 1983 claims against Hammond

or Weems that demand relief in the form of an order requiring an immediate

or speedier release from onfinement or probation conditions, those claims

would be barred by Preiser because such a remedy is available only in habeas

corpus. Section 1983 claims against Assistant District Attorneys Weems and

Hammond in their official capacity would also be subject to dismissal as a suit

against the State of Alabama itself. See Garrett v. Talladega Cnty. Drug &

Violent Crime Task Force, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ala. 2013);

Harris v. Falls, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 255-56 (N.D. Ala. 2013). And again, the

FTCA has no possible application to this case. 

Any ostensible § 1983 claimsfor damages against Weems or Hammond

in their individual capacity based on the allegations of the Complaint would

fare no better. Just as state court judges are entitled to absolute immunity from

damages claims for their judicial acts, state district attorneys and prosecutors

are likewise entitled to absolute immunity in executing their prosecutorial

functions:

Absolute immunity accordingly applies to the prosecutor’s

actions “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.”

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 17 of 23
Imbler [v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)]. Prosecutors are

immune for appearancesin judicial proceedings, including prosecutorial

conduct before grand juries, statements made during trial, examination

of witnesses, and presentation of evidence in support of a search warrant

during a probable cause hearing. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490-92

(1991); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997); see also Van de

Kamp [v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 129 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2009)]. “A

prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from

the prosecutor’s function as advocate.” Jones [v. Cannon, 174 F.3d

1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999)]. Such absolute immunity also “extends to

a prosecutor’s acts undertaken ... in preparing for the initiation of

judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his

role as an advocate for the State.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord

Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (11th Cir.

2002) (holding prosecutor who proffered perjured testimony and

fabricated exhibits at trial is entitled to absolute immunity, but a

prosecutor who participated in the search of a suspect’s apartment is

entitled to only qualified immunity). Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828,

837-38 (11th Cir. 2010). This immunity extends to pretrial advocacy in

connection with the initiation of a prosecution, including bond

applications and revocations. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487

(1991); Castaneira v. Owens, 2012 WL 3028338, at *5 (N.D. Ga. May

31, 2012); Spano v. Satz, 2011 WL 1303147, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31,

2011). It likewise applies to advocacy on behalf of the State in the

continuation of the sentencing process, including as it relates to the

granting or revocation of parole or probation. See Hart v. Hodges, 587

F.3d 1288, 1296-97 (11thCir. 2009); Allen v. Thompson, 815 F.2d 1433,

1434 (11th Cir.1987); Flournoy v. Ingram, 2011 WL 1485272, at *2

(M.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2011). Further, Heck precludes claims for damages

under § 1983 to the extent that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

necessarily impugn the validity of an extant conviction or sentence,

including asitrelatesto parole or probation conditions. See Heck, supra;

Vickers, 137 F. App’x at 289-90; Smith, 2007 WL 2209242, at *2. Also,

§ 1983 claims in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of

limitations. Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Even assuming arguendo that claims against new parties could

relate back under FED.R.CIV.P. 15(c), West did not file this action until

November 2014, while his claims against Hammond arise out of her

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 18 of 23
alleged actions taken as an Assistant District Attorney in September

2008, in connection with obtaining a warrant for West’s arrest and the

revocation of his bond. The undersigned therefore concludes that any

such claims would be subject to dismissal based upon one or more of the

following: (1) absolute prosecutorial immunity, (2) the statute of

limitations, (3) West’s failure to set forth enough specific factual matter

to state a “plausible” claim for relief for purposes of FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6) and Iqbal, and (4) the Heck bar. Accordingly, leave to amend

is due to be denied as it relates to claims against Hammond. 

Likewise, § 1983 claimsfor damages against Weems based “false

statements” she allegedly made in motions and court hearings in the

course of advocating the State’s position with respect to the revocation

of West’s pretrial bond in February 2010, his guilty plea in December

2010, or the revocation or modification of his probation conditions in

January 2014 would be barred by prosecutorial immunity, Heck, or both.

See Conner v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor enjoyed

absolute immunity as it related to his involvement in accepting a guilty

plea); Salas v. Pierce, 297 F. App’x 874, 876 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding

that Heck barred claims alleging district attorney conspired with the

plaintiff’s counsel to coerce a guilty plea); Cline v. City of North Miami,

2010 WL 3943541, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2010) (ruling that

plaintiff’s allegationsthat prosecutors engaged in wrongdoing in “filing

a motion to revoke bond” was “insufficient to remove their cloak of

absolute immunity”); Jackson v. Edwards, 2013 WL 6858882, at *2-3

(M.D. Ga.Dec. 30, 2013)(plaintiff’s claims against prosecuting attorney

at probation revocation hearing were precluded by absolute immunity

and Heck); Williams v. Holsey, 2010 WL 4261354, at *2-3 (M.D. Ga.

July 7, 2010) (same); Lockett v. Wright, 2013 WL 497592, at *3 (S.D.

Ga. Jan. 15, 2013). 

West also asserts that Weems “coerced” a representative of the

Calhoun County Sheriff’s Department to testify falsely at his probation

revocation hearing in January 2014. However, West’s allegation that

Weems “coerced” the witness is conclusory and would not be entitled

to a presumption of truth on a motion to dismiss. See Pugh v. Horace,

2014 WL 912000, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 2014); Candelario v. City of

New York, 2013 WL 1339102, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2013). In any

event, this claim too would be barred by immunity, Heck, or both. See

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 19 of 23
Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11thCir. 2005) (parole officers

enjoy immunity for testimony given during parole revocation hearings

when they act within the scope of their duties); Rehberg, 611 F.3d at

841-42 (where witness enjoyed absolute immunity for allegedly false

testimony before grand jury, prosecutor waslikewise entitled to absolute

immunity on a claim alleging a conspiracy to make up and present the

testimony); Williams, 2010 WL 4261354, at *2-3 & n.1 (claims that

prosecutor falsified evidence, withheld evidence, and knowingly

presented perjured testimony at parole revocation hearing dismissed

based on Heck and prosecutorial immunity). 

That leaves only West’s would-be § 1983 claim against Weems

based on an allegation that, in December 2013, she made “false

statements” in a legal memorandum filed on behalf of the State in

opposition to West’s motion in his criminal case seeking the return of

seized property. (See Compl. at 8-9, 48; Doc. 1-1 at 38-42; id. at 43-44).

In a related vein, West alleges that “because of these false statements,

by Weems, the state has refused to return the property which was seized

....” (Compl. at 9). However, to the extent that West might attempt to

hold Weems liable for damages merely for statements she made in a

legal paper filed in court on the State’s behalf, West would fail to state

a cognizable § 1983 claim. Although the criminal prosecution proper

against West had concluded by December 2013, the opposition that

Weems filed in response to West’s motion was premised on the

argument that the subjectseized property was being lawfully retained by

the State in the event that it might be needed for a potential trial, insofar

as West had continued to assert that his conviction and sentence were

infirm. Weems’s opposition filing was thus clearly made in her role as

an advocate for the State in judicial proceedings and was thus protected

by absolute immunity. See Hart, 587 F.3d at 1296 (recognizing that

absolute immunity may extend to certain post-sentencing conduct of a

prosecutor); Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281 (“A prosecutor enjoys absolute

immunity from allegations stemming from the prosecutor’s function as

advocate.”); Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 799 (6th Cir. 2003)

(“Absolute immunity applies to the adversarial acts of prosecutors

during post-conviction proceedings, including direct appeals, habeas

corpus proceedings, and parole proceedings, where the prosecutor is

personally involved in the subsequent proceedings and continues his

role as an advocate.”). 

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 20 of 23
Notably, West has not pled that Weems was herself either

responsible for the initial seizure or in possession or control of the

subject property thereafter and refused to return it. But even if West

amended to include such allegations, he could not prevail on an

associated § 1983 claim against Weems. Any claim alleging that the

initial seizure, which appears to have been in September 2008 but in no

event later than West’s guilty plea in December 2010, was

unconstitutional would be barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

See Holt v. Valls, 395 F. App’x 604, 605-06 (11th Cir. 2010); Reynolds

v. Murray, 170 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2006). It istrue, however, that

“a complaint of continued retention of legally seized property raises an

issue of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2009). Further,

once a criminal prosecution has concluded and all appeals exhausted,

retention of seized property by the prosecutor may at a certain point be

protected only by qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity. See

Morris v. Jackson, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1201-02 (M.D. Ala. 2005),

aff’d, 167 F. App’x 750 (11th Cir. 2006). Despite that,

“no procedural due process violation has occurred if a meaningful

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Lindsey [v.

Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir. 1991)] (internal quotation

marks omitted); see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984);

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). “ Hudson made clear that

as long assome adequate postdeprivation remedy is available, no

due process violation has occurred.” Lindsey, 936 F.2d at 561. Id.

at 1331; see also City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234

(1999) (due process does not require that the State provide notice

of available state-law remedies for the return of seized property).

Here, Alabama state law provides adequate remedies so as to

preclude a viable procedural due process claim in this context

under § 1983. See Hagood v. Morgan County, Ala., 2014 WL

7337413, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 2014) (recognizing that ALA.

CODE § 41-9-60 provides for the State Board of Adjustment to

consider claims against the state or its agents, and that, if such

claim is denied, a claimant is authorized to file a state court

action); Houston v. Alabama, 2013 WL 4777198, at *4 (N.D. Ala.

Sept. 5, 2013) (same); Jaggars v. City of Sheffield, Ala., 2014 WL

2123210, at *5 n.9 (N.D. Ala. May 21, 2014) (“Alabama law

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 21 of 23
recognizes in rem actions by claimants for the return of property

seized by municipal law enforcement agencies.”); see also

Dupree v. City of Phenix City, 2011 WL 6778799, at *3-4 (M.D.

Ala. Oct. 20, 2011); Lindsay v. Brogden, 2008 WL 4542755, *6

(S.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 2008); Dawson v. City of Montgomery, 2008

WL 659800, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 2008). Accordingly, West’s

putative claims against Weems would be subject to dismissal as

well, so any amendment on that score would also be futile.

(Doc. 29 at pp. 14-24) (footnote omitted).

After de novo review, this court agrees. It will ADOPT this portion of the

report and will ACCEPT the recommendation that all Plaintiff’s motion to

supplement the record be treated as a motion for leave to amend and be denied as

futile.

V. DEMAND FOR HEARING

In his objections, “Plaintiff demands a hearing on this case.” (Doc. 30 at p. 9).

The court treats this demand as a motion for a hearing. That motion is due to be, and

will be, DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, Plaintiff’s objections are due to be

OVERRULED. The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is de novo

correct and will beACCEPTED by the undersigned. Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss

is due to be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion To Supplement is due to be DENIED.

Plaintiff’s demand for a hearing is due to be DENIED. All of Plaintiff’s claims are

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 22 of 23
due to be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A separate order will be entered.

DONE this the 22nd day of May, 2015.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

Case 1:14-cv-02298-VEH Document 34 Filed 05/22/15 Page 23 of 23