Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01234/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01234-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee
Appellant
American Shrimp Processors Association
Not party
Apex Exports
Appellee
Falcon Marine Exports Limited
Appellee
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

APEX EXPORTS, AND 

FALCON MARINE EXPORTS LIMITED,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee,

AND

AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMMITTEE,

Defendant-Appellant,

AND

AMERICAN SHRIMP PROCESSORS 

ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

______________________ 

2014-1234

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in Nos. 1:11-cv-00291-RWG and 1:11-cv-00286-

RWG, Senior Judge Richard W. Goldberg.

______________________ 

Decided: February 5, 2015

______________________ 

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2 APEX EXPORTS v. US

LIZBETH R. LEVINSON, Kutak Rock LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellees. With her on the 

brief was RONALD M. WISLA. 

JOSHUA E. KURLAND, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendantappellee. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, Assistant Director. Of 

counsel on the brief was SCOTT D. MCBRIDE, Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & 

Compliance, United States Department of Commerce, of 

Washington, DC. 

DAVID A. YOCIS, Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. With him on 

the brief were ANDREW W. KENTZ, JORDAN C. KAHN, and 

NATHANIEL MAANDIG RICKARD. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge. 

Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee appeals the 

final decision of the Court of International Trade (“CIT”), 

sustaining the refusal by the Department of Commerce 

(“Commerce”) to deduct antidumping duties when calculating an export price. Apex Exports v. United States, No. 

11-00291, 2013 WL 6978901 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 31, 

2013). This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a)(5) (2012). Because Commerce’s interpretation of 

the antidumping statute is reasonable, we affirm. 

I 

Commerce is responsible for imposing antidumping 

duties. These duties are levied when foreign merchandise 

is sold in the United States at less than fair value and

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APEX EXPORTS v. US 3

such sales pose a threat to domestic industry. 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1673 (2012). Commerce calculates the antidumping duty 

using the export price methodology. See Certain Frozen 

Warmwater Shrimp from India, 76 Fed. Reg. 12025, 

12028 (Mar. 4, 2011) (prelim. admin. review, partial 

rescission, and prelim. determination). Under this method, Commerce determines whether subject merchandise is 

being sold at less than fair value. If it is, Commerce 

determines how much less, and then assesses antidumping duties to make up the difference. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.

For this calculation, Commerce first determines the 

“export price” (“EP”). This is the price that the first unaffiliated U.S. buyer pays for the subject merchandise. 19 

U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (2012). Then, Commerce calculates the 

“normal value” (“NV”). This is treated as the fair value, 

and it is the price at which the subject merchandise is 

sold in the exporting country. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i)

(2012). If EP is lower than NV, and it poses a threat to 

U.S. industry, then Commerce assesses a duty “equal to 

the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export 

price.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673. In practice, Commerce sets the 

duty by determining the dumping margin. A weighted 

average dumping margin is the difference between NV 

and EP, then divided by EP ((NV − EP)/EP). 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677(35) (2012). 

However, it is not quite that simple. The goal of this 

calculation is to allow Commerce to compare the fair 

value of the merchandise to the price charged in the U.S. 

Therefore, both EP and NV are subject to adjustments, so 

that they closely reflect the price of subject merchandise 

at a common point in the chain of commerce. 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677b(a)(1)(B); 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2); 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677b(a)(6). As it pertains to this appeal, EP is reduced 

by the cost of bringing merchandise to the U.S. 

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4 APEX EXPORTS v. US

Specifically, 

[t]he price used to establish export price . . . shall 

be . . . reduced by . . . the amount, if any, included 

in such price, attributable to any additional costs, 

charges, or expenses, and United States import 

duties, which are incident to bringing the subject 

merchandise from the original place of shipment 

in the exporting country to the place of delivery in 

the United States . . . . 

19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2). This includes, for example, freight 

expenses, U.S. customs duties, and port charges. Id.; 76 

Fed. Reg. at 12028. Because these are costs incident to 

bringing all merchandise into the U.S., one would expect 

U.S. prices to be higher to account for those expenses. 

Those price increases do not have a bearing on the fair 

value of merchandise. Therefore, the statute instructs 

Commerce to deduct them from EP. NV is subject to 

similar adjustments. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(6). The overall 

goal is to arrange an apples-to-apples comparison between 

the domestic and foreign price of merchandise. Then 

Commerce can correct for dumping by imposing an additional duty. 

II

In 2005, Commerce made a final determination that 

certain shrimp imported from India were likely being sold 

in the U.S. at less than fair market value. Certain Frozen 

Warmwater Shrimp from India, 70 Fed. Reg. 5147 (Feb. 1, 

2005) (notice of amended final determination). During the 

fifth administrative review of that antidumping order, 

shrimp exporters Apex Exports (“Apex”) and Falcon 

Marine Exports Limited (“Falcon”) were selected as 

individual respondents. Commerce assessed a 2.31% and 

1.36% dumping margin for Apex and Falcon, respectively. 

Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from India, 76 Fed. 

Reg. 41203, 41205 (July 13, 2011) (final admin. review, 

partial rescission, and final determination). 

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APEX EXPORTS v. US 5

Commerce calculated the EP of merchandise sold by 

Apex and Falcon during the period of this fifth administrative review. Commerce started with the packed price of 

the shrimp charged to the first unaffiliated purchaser in 

the U.S. 76 Fed. Reg. at 12028. Then, in accordance with 

19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A), Commerce deducted certain 

expenses from that price to reach EP. 

Commerce deducted the following costs from Apex’s 

price to determine EP:

foreign inland freight expenses, export inspection 

agency (EIA) fees, foreign brokerage and handling 

expenses, various foreign miscellaneous shipment 

charges, international freight expenses, terminal 

handling charges, marine insurance expenses, 

U.S. customs duties (including harbor maintenance fees and merchandise processing fees), U.S. 

brokerage and handling expenses, and U.S. inland 

freight expenses . . . . 

76 Fed. Reg. at 12028. 

Commerce deducted the following costs from Falcon’s 

price to calculate EP:

cold storage expenses, loading and unloading expenses, trailer hire expenses, foreign inland 

freight expenses, port charges, export survey 

charges, terminal handling charges, foreign brokerage and handling expenses, international 

freight expenses, marine insurance expenses, U.S. 

customs duties (including harbor maintenance 

fees and merchandise processing fees), and U.S. 

brokerage and handling expenses . . . . 

Id. 

Neither Apex nor Falcon made sufficient sales in their 

home market—India—during the period of review to 

allow a proper comparison with U.S. sales. Therefore, to 

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6 APEX EXPORTS v. US

determine NV, Commerce looked at other comparison 

markets. For Apex, Commerce selected the United Kingdom, and for Falcon, Commerce selected Japan as the 

comparison market. Id. The companies sold similar products at similar volumes in those countries, as compared to 

U.S. sales. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(C); 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.404). Commerce made adjustments to the prices 

charged in those comparator countries to calculate NV, so 

that it could compare NV and EP at the same level of 

trade. 76 Fed. Reg. at 12028. 

As it pertains to this appeal, there is one important 

difference between the sales to the United Kingdom and 

Japan, as compared to sales in the U.S. Both Apex and 

Falcon ship merchandise to the United Kingdom and 

Japan on a cost and freight (“C&F”) basis. This means 

that the seller only covers the costs necessary to deliver 

merchandise to the named port of destination. Apex 

Exports, 2013 WL 6978901, at *7 n.6. In contrast, Apex 

and Falcon ship merchandise to the U.S. on a deliveryduty-paid (“DDP”) basis, such that they act as both the 

exporters and importers of record for the merchandise. 

Under such a contract, the exporter is also responsible for 

paying the costs associated with importation. That includes paying import and export duties and complying 

with customs formalities. Id. at *7 n.7. 

Apex and Falcon brought suit in the CIT, challenging 

the dumping margins assigned to them as excessive 

because of an alleged error by Commerce in calculating 

the normal value of their exports. The CIT rejected their 

claim, and they do not appeal. Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade 

Action Committee (“Ad Hoc”), an intervenor-defendant 

association of domestic shrimp producers which participated in the administrative proceeding, also challenged 

the dumping margins in the CIT. Ad Hoc argued that the 

EP of the merchandise sold by Apex and Falcon should be 

recalculated by the deduction of the amount of antidumping duties assessed on their exports and paid by Apex and 

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APEX EXPORTS v. US 7

Falcon. Such a deduction would have the effect of increasing the dumping margins.

III

Ad Hoc’s challenge in the CIT was based on its plain 

language reading of the relevant statute, which provides 

that, when calculating EP, Commerce shall deduct “the 

amount . . . attributable to any additional costs, charges, 

or expenses, and United States import duties, which are 

incident to [importation].” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2). Ad Hoc 

argued that antidumping duties assessed on imports are 

necessarily “additional costs, charges, or expenses” associated with importation, where, as in this case, the exporter is responsible for payment of the antidumping 

duties. Thus, Ad Hoc argued that the words of the statute 

are unambiguously clear, requiring deduction of antidumping duties in the calculation of EP, and denying 

Commerce any authority to refuse to make such deductions.

Ad Hoc’s arguments to the CIT did not sound in a 

vacuum. Two precedents, one from the CIT and one from 

this court, stood in its way. In Wheatland Tube Co. v. 

United States, 495 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007), this court 

addressed under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2) whether antidumping duties fell within the meaning of “United States 

import duties,” in a fact setting where Commerce had 

refused to deduct § 201 safeguard duties when calculating 

EP.1 We held that “Congress has not defined or explained 

1 Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes 

the President to impose safeguard duties if merchandise 

is imported to the U.S. in such large quantities that it 

injures domestic industry. Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 

1357. Both antidumping and § 201 safeguard duties are 

remedial duties, in contrast to normal customs duties that 

serve no remedial purpose. Id. at 1362. This court con-

 

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the meaning or scope of ‘United States import duties’ as 

set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2), [and] [t]hus, because 

Congress has not ‘directly spoken to the precise question 

at issue,’ this court finds that the statute is ambiguous 

and proceeds to step two of Chevron.” Id. at 1359–60. We 

further upheld Commerce’s interpretation of the statute, 

which refused deduction of safeguard duties when computing EP, as reasonable. Id. at 1361.

In the light of Wheatland Tube, Ad Hoc did not argue 

that antidumping duties were included in “United States 

import duties” under the statute, and instead argued that 

under the same statute antidumping duties must be 

considered “additional costs, charges, or expenses.” Here, 

Ad Hoc ran up against Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action 

Committee v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (Ct. 

Int’l Trade 2013), in which it made the same statutory 

argument it presents in this case. The opinion in that 

case, relied upon by the CIT in the instant case, concluded 

that the statute does not speak directly to the question of 

whether antidumping duties must be considered “additional costs, charges, or expenses” under the statute. Id.

at 1367. In that situation, the statute’s ambiguity invoked 

the familiar Chevron step two inquiry, which asks whether Commerce’s long-standing interpretation of the statute 

is reasonable. The CIT deemed Commerce’s interpretation 

reasonable and thus worthy of deference. Id. at 1372.

Not surprisingly, the CIT in this case concluded that 

the statute does not define “costs, charges, or expenses” 

incident to importing merchandise. Apex Exports, 2013 

WL 6978901, at *6 (citing Wheatland Tube Co. v. United 

States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Therefore, the CIT considered whether Commerce’s approach to 

cluded it was reasonable for Commerce to treat antidumping and § 201 safeguard duties similarly for the purposes 

of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a. Id. 

 

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APEX EXPORTS v. US 9

calculating EP was based on a reasonable construction of 

the statute. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 

The CIT concluded that Commerce’s construction of 

the statute was reasonable. Apex Exports, 2013 WL 

6978901, at *6. For one, the CIT determined Commerce’s 

approach works as intended to bring NV and EP into 

alignment. Id. Moreover, if Commerce deducted antidumping duties as Ad Hoc suggested, importers such as 

Apex and Falcon “would pay more in duties than the 

antidumping statute intends.” Id. at *7. The CIT found 

that Ad Hoc’s proposed approach to calculating EP would 

lead to circular calculations and double counting of the 

antidumping margins. Id. Therefore, the CIT concluded it 

was reasonable for Commerce to apply the statute to 

avoid that result. Id.

IV

On appeal, Ad Hoc again argues that the plain meaning of the statute governs, and Commerce must deduct 

antidumping duties when it calculates EP where those 

duties are included in the price of the merchandise. 

Alternatively, Ad Hoc argues that Commerce’s interpretation of the statute is unreasonable, and thus not entitled 

to deference. Ad Hoc emphasizes that Apex and Falcon 

sell shrimp in the U.S. on a DDP basis. Under these 

agreements, Apex and Falcon expressly agree to cover 

antidumping duties. Therefore, Ad Hoc argues, the price 

on those contracts includes the antidumping duty, and it 

should be deducted from EP as a cost incident to bringing 

merchandise to the U.S. We disagree.

A 

This Court reapplies the standard of review applied 

by the CIT when reviewing Commerce’s final determinations. Dupont Teijin Films USA, LP v. United States, 407 

F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “Commerce’s determinaCase: 14-1234 Document: 55-2 Page: 9 Filed: 02/05/2015
10 APEX EXPORTS v. US

tion should therefore be upheld unless it is unsupported 

by substantial evidence on the record or is not in accordance with law.” Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i)

(2012); Micron Tech. Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 

1393 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Regarding Commerce’s statutory 

interpretations, we apply the two-part framework laid out 

in Chevron. Union Steel v. United States, 713 F.3d 1101, 

1106–07 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 

(1984)).

B 

The first step in the Chevron analysis asks if the statute in question is ambiguous. If not, the statute speaks for 

itself in its plain language, and the interpretation springing from the unambiguous language governs. Where the 

statute is ambiguous, the second step asks if the interpretation proffered by the government is reasonable. If so, it 

is entitled to deference and is applied as a matter of law.

Whether a statute is ambiguous can be ascertained in 

different ways. The Supreme Court instructs that ambiguity resides where Congress has not “directly addressed 

the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. If 

the language of a statute suggests that Congress may 

have directly addressed the issue at hand, but nonetheless has not done so to produce an “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” id., the statute cannot be said 

to be unambiguous. By either test, 19 U.S.C. §1677a(c)(2) 

is ambiguous on the question of whether antidumping 

duties must be deemed “additional costs, charges, or 

expenses” for purposes of calculating EP.

Congress did not address the specific question before 

this Court. The statute does not define “any additional 

costs, charges, or expenses.” Moreover, nothing in the 

statute or legislative history instructs Commerce whether 

to deduct antidumping duties from EP as such a cost, 

charge, or expense.

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APEX EXPORTS v. US 11

This Court previously held that “Congress has not defined or explained the meaning or scope of ‘United States 

import duties’ as set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A).” 

Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1359

(Fed. Cir. 2007). We agree that Congress was similarly 

silent on the precise definition of § 1677a(c)(2)(A)’s “any 

additional costs, charges, or expenses”—and specifically 

silent as to whether antidumping duties fall within that 

definition. 

Viewed the other way, the statute is equally ambiguous. Ad Hoc insists that Congress unambiguously meant 

what it said: namely, that “any” cost, charge or expense it 

pays to get the shrimp to the United States must under 

the explicit words of the statute be deducted in computing 

EP. But Ad Hoc’s view overlooks that we have held that 

Congress intended to exclude antidumping duties from 

the calculation of EP, when such duties were labeled as 

“United States import duties.” Ad Hoc’s position depends 

on its implicit assertion that what Congress intended for 

antidumping duties when associated with terms most 

closely describing them (import duties) is exactly the 

opposite of what Congress meant for antidumping duties, 

when associated with the more general description of 

“cost[], charge[], or expense[].” Further, Ad Hoc assumes 

that Congress meant for antidumping duties necessarily 

to be costs, charges or expenses “incident to bringing the 

subject merchandise from the original place of shipment . . . to the place of delivery in the United States.” 

The statute is not so clear, and leaves for question whether antidumping duties are instead incident to pricing 

decisions made by the exporter, and not costs related 

solely to importation. Ad Hoc cannot overcome these 

questions, which stand in the way of any assertion that 

Congress unambiguously stated that antidumping duties 

must be deducted from the computation of EP. 

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12 APEX EXPORTS v. US

C 

Because the statute is ambiguous, we turn to the second step of the Chevron analysis, and consider “whether 

the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Since it is 

reasonable, consistent with the goals of the statute, and 

reflects Commerce’s long-standing practice, we conclude

Commerce’s refusal to deduct antidumping duties from 

EP is entitled to deference. 

Commerce considers antidumping duties as distinct 

from normal selling expenses and customs duties. Normal 

customs duties have no remedial purpose. Wheatland 

Tube, 495 F.3d at 1362. Antidumping duties, on the other 

hand, are special duties that implement a trade remedy. 

See Stainless Steel Wire Rod from the Republic of Korea, 

69 Fed. Reg. 19153, 19159 (Apr. 12, 2004) (final admin. 

review). As the CIT has described it, antidumping duties 

are “an element of a fair and reasonable price,” not an 

import duty or cost associated with importation. Hoogovens Staal BV v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1220 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 1998). Furthermore, legislative history 

signals that antidumping duties are special remedial 

duties, distinct from U.S. import duties. See, e.g., S. Rep. 

No. 67-16, at 4, 10–11 (1921); Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d 

at 1361. It is therefore reasonable for Commerce not to 

treat antidumping duties as costs of importation when 

calculating EP. 

The statute in question instructs Commerce to make 

two reductions when calculating EP: (1) subtract the 

amount attributable to U.S. import duties and (2) subtract the amount attributable to additional costs, charges, 

or expenses incident to importation. 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677a(c)(2)(A). Since antidumping duties are not deducted from EP as “United States import duties,” it is 

reasonable for Commerce to likewise refuse to deduct 

antidumping duties as “costs, charges, or expenses . . . 

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APEX EXPORTS v. US 13

incident to bringing the subject merchandise” to the U.S. 

See § 1677a(c)(2)(A). It is strange to suggest otherwise—

that antidumping duties are not U.S. import duties, but 

instead costs incident to importation that must therefore 

be deducted from EP. It is reasonable for Commerce to 

avoid such a construction of the statute. 

What is more, Commerce declines to deduct antidumping margins when calculating the margins because 

that would be inappropriately circular and result in a 

double counting of the remedy.2 In arguing otherwise, Ad 

Hoc misses the point of the antidumping statute. The goal

of imposing the duty is to prevent dumping by effectively 

raising the price of subject merchandise in the U.S. to the 

2 Before the CIT and in their briefs to this Court, 

both parties offer elaborate hypothetical calculations 

about the effect that deducting antidumping duties would 

have on calculating the margin. Commerce, Apex, and 

Falcon explain that Ad Hoc’s proposed approach would 

eventually result in an EP of zero. During the first calculation, Commerce would take NV minus EP. The result 

would be a first antidumping margin (“AD-1”). Then, Ad 

Hoc’s approach would require Commerce to go back and 

recalculate EP minus AD-1. This would render EP-2, and 

require another margin calculation of NV minus EP-2. 

This calculation would render another, higher antidumping margin, AD-2. There is no mathematical reason why 

the calculation should end there. The new antidumping

margin would feed in to a third iteration of the calculation, and so on until the antidumping margin was equal to 

NV. We agree that Commerce could approach this sort of 

calculation without necessarily creating absurd results, as 

it does with the reimbursement circumstance mentioned 

later in this opinion. However, the cyclical nature of the 

underlying calculation highlights a flaw in Ad Hoc’s 

proposal. 

 

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fair value. The importer has less incentive to charge an 

unfairly low price, because it will have to make up the 

difference through a duty payment. 

The principle underlying the proposed additional 

[antidumping] duty . . . is to add such an amount 

of duty as will equalize sales at less than the foreign home market value . . . , thereby making it 

unprofitable to dump goods on the markets of the 

United States at lower prices. If the seller of the 

goods is compelled to add as duty the difference 

between the sales price and what he would receive 

by selling in the otherwise highest obtainable 

market, all reward or inducement to dumping is 

removed. 

H.R. Rep. No. 67-1, at 23 (1921). By raising the price for 

sales made on a DDP basis, to cover the risk of antidumping duties, Apex and Falcon would likely do just that—

charge U.S. buyers more. This achieves the goal of the 

statute, and because the price already reflects an antidumping charge (in the form of a higher DDP price), 

following Ad Hoc’s suggestion would in fact result in 

double counting that amount. 

Finally, as the CIT noted, Commerce’s current position is consistent with its longstanding practice of treating antidumping duties as special, and not deducting 

them to calculate EP. Apex Exports, 2013 WL 6978901, at 

*8; see also Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1362–63; Ad Hoc 

Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 925 F. 

Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 n.19 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013) (referring 

to “Commerce’s practice of not reducing export price by 

the amount of antidumping deposits paid”); Stainless 

Steel Wire Rod from the Republic of Korea, 69 Fed. Reg. at 

19159 n.23 (final admin. review) (listing cases where the 

CIT agreed that Commerce need not deduct antidumping 

duties when calculating for export price). We conclude 

that Commerce’s refusal to deduct antidumping duties 

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APEX EXPORTS v. US 15

when calculating EP reflects a permissible construction of 

19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A).

We reject Ad Hoc’s contention that Commerce’s interpretation is unreasonable. Ad Hoc largely argues that 

Commerce’s approach does not constitute a fair comparison between NV and EP—rehashing similar arguments 

made as to statutory construction. Ad Hoc suggests that 

Commerce is not making an apples-to-apples comparison 

when calculating antidumping margins. Regarding the 

question of double counting, and Commerce’s refusal to 

deduct antidumping margins from EP because that would 

duplicate the remedy, Ad Hoc counters that there is no 

evidence double counting would occur. However, as we 

have already explained, exporters would likely increase 

the price of subject merchandise in DDP contracts to cover 

the risk of antidumping duties. Commerce’s interpretation, and approach to calculating EP, are reasonable and

achieve the goals of the statute. 

D 

Ad Hoc makes an additional argument, citing Commerce’s so-called “reimbursement regulation.” 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.402(f). Ad Hoc does not contend that the reimbursement regulation applies in this case. Instead, it 

argues that since the regulation requires deduction of 

antidumping duties in some cases, Commerce must also 

allow those deductions in this case. 

The reimbursement regulation provides that Commerce will deduct antidumping duties from EP in one 

circumstance—when an exporter or producer agrees to 

either pay antidumping duties “directly on behalf of [an] 

importer” or reimburses an importer for the expense. Id.

The regulation contemplates a foreign exporter or producer that sells merchandise to another entity, and it is that 

entity which is responsible for importing merchandise 

into the U.S. When an exporter or producer pays the 

antidumping duties on behalf of the importer, it triggers 

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16 APEX EXPORTS v. US

§ 351.402(f). In that circumstance, Commerce will deduct 

the duty amount the exporter pays directly or reimburses 

when calculating export price, effectively treating the 

payment as a price rebate. Id. 

Ad Hoc argues that “[b]y asserting that assessed antidumping duties will be deducted from export price if the 

exporter pays them on behalf of the importer, but not if 

the exporter acts as the importer of record and pays them 

on behalf of the U.S. buyer, Commerce elevates form over 

substance and treats economically identical situations 

differently.” However, we agree with the CIT that just 

because Commerce deducts reimbursed antidumping 

duties under this regulation, that does not mean it is 

unreasonable for Commerce to decline to deduct antidumping duties in other circumstances. Apex Exports, 

2013 WL 6978901, at *9. 

The rationale behind the reimbursement regulation is 

reasonable. Where the antidumping duty is paid by the 

exporter, the importer acquires merchandise in the U.S. 

at less than a fair price, thus frustrating the purposes of 

the antidumping law. By assuming the cost of the antidumping duties—either through direct payment or reimbursement—the exporter effectively reduces the U.S. 

price. See Hoogovens Staal BV v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 

2d 1213, 1217 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998); Color Television 

Receivers from the Republic of Korea, 61 Fed. Reg. 4408, 

4410 (Feb. 6, 1996) (final admin. review) (describing the 

purpose behind the reimbursement regulation).

The reimbursement regulation at § 351.402(f) is designed to “ensure that the . . . incentive for importers to 

buy at non-dumped prices is not negated by exporters 

who . . . remov[e] the importer’s exposure to antidumping 

liability.” Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United 

States, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1375 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013). 

The regulation creates an added disincentive for the 

exporter. If the exporter pays or reimburses for antidumpCase: 14-1234 Document: 55-2 Page: 16 Filed: 02/05/2015
APEX EXPORTS v. US 17

ing duties, Commerce will basically double count the 

antidumping margin. Id. at 1376; see also Hoogovens 

Staal BV, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1217 (“Presumably, an exporter will be reluctant to continue paying the cost of antidumping duties because the margin will increase . . . each 

time Commerce reviews it.”). The rationale of the reimbursement regulation, to discourage exporters from 

reimbursing antidumping duties, is reasonable. 

On the other hand, Commerce’s general approach of 

refusing to deduct antidumping duties addresses a mirror 

image situation. Where the importer has to pay antidumping duties itself, the standard disincentive operates 

to protect domestic producers because the U.S. price 

increases. Commerce refuses to double count the duty 

where it is already being paid by the importer. As above, 

we conclude that Commerce’s approach is reasonable. 

For the purposes of the present case, it is better to 

view Apex and Falcon through their role as importers. 

Here, both companies are paying antidumping duties as 

an importer. These duties, in turn, discourage them from 

charging a harmfully low price to U.S. buyers. There is no 

need to impose dumping remedies twice—the rationale of 

the reimbursement regulation does not apply here. 

Ad Hoc suggests that Commerce has no grounds to 

distinguish the facts of this case from the reimbursement 

context. That is incorrect. Ad Hoc’s argument focuses on 

comparing the position of Apex and Falcon to that of 

reimbursing exporters. As importers, Apex and Falcon 

face the risk of antidumping duties just like every other 

importer. Because the reimbursement regulation addresses a different factual situation and is designed to serve a 

distinct purpose, this case is easily distinguished from the 

fact setting in which the reimbursement regulation applies. 

Case: 14-1234 Document: 55-2 Page: 17 Filed: 02/05/2015
18 APEX EXPORTS v. US

CONCLUSION

Because Commerce’s interpretation of the antidumping statute is a permissible construction, the CIT’s decision to sustain Commerce’s refusal to deduct antidumping 

duties when calculating export price is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

No costs.

Case: 14-1234 Document: 55-2 Page: 18 Filed: 02/05/2015