Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02012/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02012-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Charles Luellen
Defendant
Old United Casualty Company
Defendant
Bruce L. Speckert
Plaintiff
Worldwide Marine Underwriters, Inc.
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

BRUCE L. SPECKERT,

NO. CIV. S-05-02012 FCD GG

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

OLD UNITED CASUALTY COMPANY, a

Kansas Corporation, d/b/a

VANTAGE CASUALTY COMPANY;

WORLDWIDE MARINE UNDERWRITERS,

INC., a Michigan corporation;

ROBERT CHARLES LUELLEN, an

individual; and DOES 1 through

10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants’ Worldwide

Marine Underwriters, Inc. (“Worldwide”) and Robert Charles

Luellens’ (“Luellen”) motions to dismiss or transfer this case

for improper venue, or, in the alternative, to transfer venue for

convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of

justice. Plaintiff Bruce L. Speckert (“Speckert”) and defendant

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Because oral argument will not be of material 1

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

Old United Casualty Company (“Old United”) oppose the motions. 

For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motions are DENIED. 1

BACKGROUND

Defendant Worldwide is a Michigan corporation with its

principal place of business in Michigan. (Defs.’ Mot., filed

Oct. 18, 2005, at 2; Declaration of Robert C. Luellen (“Luellen

Decl.”), filed Oct. 18, 2005, ¶ 2). Worldwide is an agent and

general managing agent for various insurers, including codefendant Old United. (Defs.’ Mot. at 2). Defendant Luellen is

a resident of Michigan. (Luellen Decl. ¶ 4). Luellen is a

Michigan insurance agent and the vice-president of Worldwide. 

(Id. ¶¶ 2, 4).

In late August 2000, Luellen was contacted by a boat

dealership which had recommended Worldwide to assist plaintiff

Speckert in finding insurance for a performance boat. (Id. ¶ 5). 

Speckert is a resident of Nevada. Luellen spoke with Speckert

over the telephone, and Speckert chose insurance coverage under a

policy issued by defendant Old United. (Id.)

Old United is a Kansas Corporation that does business in

California. (Declaration of Douglas E. Semler (“Semler Decl.”),

filed Nov. 11, 2005, ¶ 3). On September 1, 2000, Old United and

Speckert entered into a contract to insure Speckert’s performance

boat. (Id. ¶ 6). The Old United policy had effective dates of

September 1, 2000 to September 1, 2001. (Id. ¶ 7). Worldwide

was the agent that secured the insurance contract. (Id. ¶ 6). 

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3

Old United issues it policies based upon the mooring address

of the vessel. (Id. ¶ 10). Old United initially rejected

Speckert’s application for insurance coverage that listed a

mooring address in Nevada; but, it later accepted Speckert’s

application that listed a California mooring address. (Id. ¶¶ 8-

12). Old United considered the insurance contract a California

contract. (Id. ¶ 12). Old United renewed its insurance contract

with Speckert on September 1, 2001. The new insurance contract

was effective from September 1, 2001 through September 1, 2002. 

Prior to the renewal date, the mailing and mooring address were

changed to reflect Speckert’s home address in Nevada. (Old

United Opp’n, filed Nov. 11, 2002, at 3). 

In 2001, Worldwide learned that Old United would no longer

write insurance contracts for performance boats. (Luellen Decl.

¶ 5). Worldwide helped Speckert find insurance with Markel

American Insurance Co. (“Markel”). (Id. ¶ 6). The Markel policy

was effective from September 1, 2002 to September 1, 2003. (Id.)

On or about September 2, 2002, Speckert tied his boat off in

Tahoe Vista, California. (Old United Opp’n at 3). On September

3, 2002, the boat was severely damaged by a storm. (Id.) 

Subsequently, Speckert filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of Nevada against Markel, Worldwide,

and Luellen based upon the denial of an insurance claim in

relation to the damage to the boat. (Luellen Decl. ¶¶ 8-9). On

November 24, 2004, Speckert accepted an Offer of Judgment against

defendants Worldwide and Luellen. (Id. ¶ 11). On December 13,

2004, the district court entered and served on the parties a

Stipulation and Order for Dismissal with Prejudice. (Id. ¶ 12).

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4

On July 22, 2005, Speckert filed a complaint in the Superior

Court of the State of California, Placer County, against Old

United, Worldwide, and Luellen. This claim is based upon the

denial of an insurance claim in relation to the damage to

Speckert’s boat in the September 3 storm. On October 5, 2005,

defendants Worldwide and Luellen removed the action to this

court.

On October 18, 2005, defendants Worldwide and Luellen filed

a motion to dismiss or transfer this action for improper venue. 

In the alternative, Worldwide and Luellen move to transfer this

case for convenience or in the interest of justice to the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Nevada or to

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Michigan. Defendant Old United and plaintiff Speckert oppose

defendants’ motions. 

STANDARD

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1441

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “any civil action brought in a

State court of which the district courts of the United States

have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or

the defendants, to the district court of the United States for

the district and division embracing the place where the action is

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Where the action is removed to

federal court from a state court, the district court must

determine whether venue is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a), not the general venue statute codified in 28 U.S.C. §

1391. Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 665

(1953). 

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B. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may “for the

convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice

. . . transfer any civil action to any other district where it

might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). A defendant

moving to transfer venue under section 1404(a) must therefore

satisfy both of the following requirements: (1) the transferee

district is one in which the action might have been brought

originally; and (2) transfer will enhance the convenience of the

parties and witnesses, and is in the interests of justice. See

Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964).

In considering the second requirement, the court evaluates

the following:

(1) the location where the relevant agreements

were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that

is most familiar with the governing law, (3)

the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4) the respective

parties’ contacts with the forum, (5) the

contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of

action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences

in costs of litigation in the two forums, (7)

the availability of compulsory process to compel

attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and

(8) ease of access to sources of proof.

Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir.

2000).

ANALYSIS

A. Proper Venue in the Eastern District of California

Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed or

transferred because venue is improper in the Eastern District of

California. Defendants, however, rely on the general venue

statute codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 in support of their

assertions. This is the inappropriate standard to apply. See

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Polizzi, 345 U.S. at 665. Rather, because defendants Worldwide

and Luellen removed this case from California state court

pursuant to this court’s diversity jurisdiction, this court

analyzes venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Id. 

This action was filed in the Superior Court of the State of

California, Placer County. The United States District Court for

the Eastern District of California is the federal court presiding

over Placer County. Therefore, venue is proper in this court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Defendant’s motion to dismiss

or transfer this case on the grounds of improper venue is DENIED.

B. Section 1404(a) Transfer

In the alternative, Worldwide and Luellen argue that this

case should be transferred to the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Nevada or to the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for

convenience and in the interest of justice. Moving defendants

contend that this case should be transferred to Nevada because

plaintiff’s action against Markel, Worldwide, and Luellen was

filed in Nevada. They argue that defendants’ counsel from the

former action could handle the current matter, and the Nevada

district court could decide the res judicata claims that moving

defendants anticipate bringing in a motion for summary judgment. 

(Defs.’ Mot. at 9). If transfer to Nevada is denied, moving

defendants argue that this court should transfer the case to

Michigan because this is where Luellen, as well as other

Worldwide personnel, communicated with Speckert and where

Worldwide maintains its records. (Id. at 9-10). 

/////

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Because defendants have failed to meet this requisite 2

element for transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court

does not address whether this case could have been brought in

either Nevada or Michigan.

7

Old United opposes the transfer on the grounds that (1) this

case could not have been brought in Nevada or Michigan; and (2)

the convenience and interests of justice do not weigh in favor of

transferring this case to another venue. Speckert also opposes

the transfer on the ground that moving defendants have not

satisfied their burden of showing that convenience or justice

requires such a transfer.

Considering defendant’s showing in light of the factors

described in Jones, the court finds defendants have failed to

demonstrate that transfer is warranted. First, the location of 2

the relevant agreement favors litigation in this court. While

defendants Worldwide and Luellen communicated with Speckert from

Michigan, both Worldwide and Old United conduct insurance

business in California. (Luellen Decl. ¶ 2; Semler Decl. ¶ 3). 

Old United considered the insurance contract with Speckert to be

a California insurance contact because the original application

provided a California mooring address. (Semler Decl. ¶ 12).

Further, the policy was sent to the California mailing address

included on Speckert’s application. (Id. ¶ 14). 

Second, the events giving rise to plaintiff’s insurance

claim arose in California. Speckert’s boat was docked in Tahoe

Vista, California when it was damaged by a storm. (Old United

Opp’n at 3). Based upon the location of the accident, Old United

argues that any percipient witnesses to the accident would likely

be located in California. (Id. at 4). Further, the boat was

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removed from the water by High Sierra Marine, Inc., which is also

located in California. Therefore, Old United argues that the

convenience of witnesses weighs against the transfer of this case

to another forum. 

Third, while plaintiff’s choice of forum is not his place of

residence, and therefore not accorded great weight, Speckert’s

choice of California as a forum is still entitled to some

consideration. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir.

1987). “In judging the weight to be accorded [plaintiff’s]

choice of forum, consideration must be given to the extent of

both plaintiff’s and defendants’ contacts with the forum,

including those relating to [plaintiff’s] cause of action.” Id.

(citing Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 954

(9th Cir. 1968). Here, both Worldwide and Old United do business

in California. The underlying accident which gave rise to

plaintiff’s insurance claim occurred in California. Old United

considered the insurance contract with Speckert to be a

California contract. Based upon these facts, plaintiff and

defendants have considerable contacts with California relating to

this action. 

Defendants Worldwide and Luellen argue that convenience of

the parties and witnesses favors transfer because communications

between Worldwide and Luellen took place in Nevada and Michigan

and because Worldwide keeps its records in Michigan. However,

these arguments weigh only the convenience of Worldwide and

Luellen, not the convenience of Speckert or Old United. Thus,

moving defendants have not met their burden of showing that

convenience weighs in favor of transfer to an alternate forum. 

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Finally, this court is the most familiar with the governing

law. Worldwide and Luellen do not dispute that California law

applies in this case, and were the case to be transferred to

Nevada or Michigan, those courts would be bound to apply

California law. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 637-639 (when transfer is

granted under § 1404(a), the transferee court in a diversity

action must apply the law of the state in which the action was

originally filed). Worldwide and Luellen contend that this case

should be heard by the Northern District of Nevada because they

intend to bring a motion for summary judgment on the basis of res

judicata in relation to the former case brought by plaintiff

against them in Nevada. Res judicata principles will be applied

by this court if such a motion is brought. However, plaintiff’s

claims against all defendants involve the application of

California law. Therefore, judicial economy is not served by

transferring this action to a Nevada court that will apply and

interpret California law. 

CONCLUSION

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a). Further, defendant has not met his burden to show that

the convenience of witnesses and interests of justice warrant

transfer of this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Thus,

defendants’ motions are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 5, 2005 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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