Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-30149/USCOURTS-ca9-09-30149-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Teresita Dotson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 09-30149

v.  D.C. No.

TERESITA DOTSON, CR 08-5761 RBL

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 09-30150

v.  D.C. No.

WARREN F. FISHER, CR 08-5760 RBL

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 09-30158 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR 08-5757 RBL

ANNIE JONES,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 5, 2010—Seattle, Washington

Filed August 17, 2010

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Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Raymond C. Fisher, and

Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

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COUNSEL

Penny Fields, Perkins Coie Community Service Fellow, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Seattle, Washington, for the

defendants-appellants.

Aravind Swaninathan, Assistant United States Attorney, Seattle, Washington, for the plaintff-appellee.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Teresita Dotson, Warren Fisher, and Annie Jones (collectively, “Defendants”) appeal their convictions for furnishing

liquor to minors, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code

§ 66.44.270, assimilated into federal law under the Assimilative Crimes Act (“ACA”), 18 U.S.C. § 13(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1291. Because assimilation of

Washington state law was proper, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Defendants were employed at McChord Air Force Base,

Washington, by on-base establishments that sold alcohol.

Each was caught serving alcohol to underage servicemen.

Defendants were charged separately by information with supplying liquor to persons under the age of 21 in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 7 and 13 and Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.270,1a gross

misdemeanor. 

1Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.270 states: 

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Defendants filed identical motions to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that § 66.44.270 is not

properly assimilated under the ACA. After a magistrate judge

orally denied all three motions, Defendants entered conditional guilty pleas, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). Each Defendant was sentenced to pay a

$75.00 fine and $25.00 special assessment. 

On appeal, the district court affirmed the judgments of conviction, concluding that § 66.44.270 was assimilated under

the ACA, such that federal jurisdiction existed. Defendants

timely appealed, and we consolidated the appeals. 

ANALYSIS

We review de novo whether the ACA assimilates a state

law crime. See United States v. Souza, 392 F.3d 1050, 1052

(9th Cir. 2004). 

(1) It is unlawful for any person to sell, give, or otherwise supply

liquor to any person under the age of twenty-one years or permit

any person under that age to consume liquor on his or her premises or any premises under his or her control. . . . A violation of

this subsection is a gross misdemeanor punishable as provided

for in chapter 9A.20 RCW. 

***

(3) Subsections (1) and (2)(a) of this section do not apply to

liquor given or permitted to be given to a person under the age

of twenty-one years by a parent or guardian and consumed in the

presence of the parent or guardian . . . . 

(4) This section does not apply to liquor given for medicinal purposes to a person under the age of twenty-one years by a parent,

guardian, physician, or dentist. 

(5) This section does not apply to liquor given to a person under

the age of twenty-one years when such liquor is being used in

connection with religious services and the amount consumed is

the minimal amount necessary for the religious service. 

Id.

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[1] Congress enacted the ACA “to borrow state law to fill

in the gaps of federal criminal law applicable to federal

enclaves that occur when Congress has not passed specific

criminal statutes with respect to the missing offenses.” United

States v. Clark, 195 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 160 (1998)). The ACA

provides:

Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired as provided in

section 7 of this title, or on, above, or below any portion of the territorial sea of the United States not

within the jurisdiction of any State, Commonwealth,

territory, possession, or district is guilty of any act or

omission which, although not made punishable by

any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if

committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the

State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such

place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the

time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like

offense and subject to a like punishment.

18 U.S.C. § 13(a). Thus, the ACA “subjects ‘persons on federal lands to federal prosecution in federal court for violations

of criminal statutes of the state in which the federal lands are

located.’ ” Clark, 195 F.3d at 449 (quoting United States v.

Kiliz, 694 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1982)). In so doing, the

ACA “establishes uniformity in a state’s prohibitory laws

where such conduct is not made penal by federal statutes.”

United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir.

1977).

[2] Under the ACA, a state statute is properly assimilated

if it “is penal, it is prohibitory, and it is not precluded by generally applicable federal law that evinces an intent to punish

the culpable conduct to the exclusion of state law.” Clark, 195

F.3d at 448. Thus, there are two primary reasons the ACA

may not assimilate a state law: (1) the act or omission at issue

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is already made punishable by an enactment of Congress that

precludes application of the state statute to be assimilated; or

(2) the state statute to be assimilated is regulatory rather than

prohibitory. See, e.g., id. at 449-51 (addressing whether unauthorized practice of law statute was properly assimilated

based on the argument that it was regulatory rather than prohibitory and on the argument that defendant’s conduct was

punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice); Marcyes, 557 F.2d at 1364-66 (addressing whether fireworks law

was properly assimilated based on the argument that it was

regulatory rather than prohibitory and on the argument that

“Congress has provided other standards which are controlling

and preempt the field”).

In addition to these arguments, we also consider whether

failure to assimilate the law would “circumvent” the state’s

“determination that [the conduct] is dangerous to the general

welfare of its citizens,” and whether assimilation would further the ACA’s purpose of establishing uniformity. See Marcyes, 557 F.2d at 1364-65.

A

[3] We begin with the question whether furnishing alcohol

to a minor is an act already made punishable by an enactment

of Congress.2 A state statute may be assimilated “only if no

2A preemption-based challenge to assimilation is most often mounted in

a case where the state statute at issue is unquestionably prohibitory and

criminal in nature. See, e.g., United States v. Rocha, 598 F.3d 1144 (9th

Cir. 2010) (considering whether California statute prohibiting assault committed by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury was properly assimilated). However, preemption may also be raised as a secondary

argument against assimilation, where the primary issue litigated is whether

the law is prohibitory or regulatory. See, e.g., Clark, 195 F.3d at 450-51;

Marcyes, 557 F.2d at 1365-66. Although Defendants’ brief focused on the

contention that § 66.44.270 is regulatory rather than prohibitory, Defendants touch on a preemption argument by arguing that assimilation of

§ 66.44.270 would not further the ACA’s gap-filling function. 

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act of Congress makes such conduct punishable.” Marcyes,

557 F.2d at 1365. This presents a species of preemption

inquiry, for which we apply a two-part test:

“[T]he ACA’s language and its gap-filling purpose

taken together indicate that a court must first ask the

question that the ACA’s language requires: Is the

defendant’s act or omission made punishable by any

enactment of Congress. If the answer to this question

is ‘no,’ that will normally end the matter. The ACA

presumably would assimilate the statute. If the

answer to the question is ‘yes,’ however, the court

must ask the further question whether the federal

statutes that apply to the ‘act or omission’ preclude

application of the state law in question . . . .” 

United States v. Rocha, 598 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 164) (emphasis in Lewis). 

[4] Our inquiry ends at the first step, because we conclude

that no enactment of Congress makes punishable the conduct

at issue. Defendants direct our attention to 50 U.S.C. app.

§ 473, which authorizes the Secretary of Defense 

to make such regulations as he may deem to be

appropriate governing the sale, consumption, possession of or traffic in beer, wine, or any other intoxicating liquors to or by members of the Armed Forces

or the National Security Training Corps at or near

any camp, station, post, or other place primarily

occupied by members of the Armed Forces or the

National Security Training Corps.

Id. Defendants contend that this statute demonstrates that the

ACA’s gap-filling purpose would not be furthered by assimilation of § 66.44.270 because the statute already makes the

conduct in question punishable. 

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[5] We note that § 473 is a statute that grants rulemaking

authority to the Secretary of Defense, but that does not itself

set forth any rules or regulations governing the sale, consumption, possession of or traffic in beer, wine, or any other intoxicating liquors.3

 Even if § 473 did set forth specific

prohibitions, it would not preclude assimilation unless those

prohibitions were “of general applicability.” See Clark, 195

F.3d at 451 (“[A]lthough only those laws governing conduct

‘not made punishable by any enactment of Congress’ may be

assimilated, . . . ‘any enactment’ refers only to enactments of

general applicability.” (citing United States v. Debevoise, 799

F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986))). In both Clark and Debevoise, we held that state statutes were properly assimilated

even though the defendant was also subject to punishment

under certain articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

(“UCMJ”) because those articles were not “of general applicability.” Clark, 195 F.3d at 451; Debevoise, 799 F.2d at

1402-03; accord United States v. Mariea, 795 F.2d 1094,

1100 (1st Cir. 1986) (“It stands to reason that the federal laws

Congress had in mind as barring assimilation of state laws

were federal laws of a character similar to the state laws they

preempted — i.e., criminal laws of general application. The

articles of the UCMJ, however, pertain only to members of

the armed forces.”). 

[6] Defendants also rely on Secretary of the Air Force

Instruction 34-219 (Oct. 17, 2007) (“AFI 34-219”). Although

they do so in support of the argument that § 66.44.270 is regulatory rather than prohibitory, a contention we address in the

next section, we also briefly consider whether the instruction

constitutes an enactment of Congress that would preclude

3Similarly, 10 U.S.C. § 2683, does not itself govern the furnishing of

alcohol to minors, but rather authorizes and instructs the Secretary to do

so. See id. (“[Subject to certain exceptions], the Secretary concerned shall

establish and enforce as the minimum drinking age on a military installation located in a State the age established by the law of that State as the

State minimum drinking age.”). 

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assimilation. AFI 34-219 “applies to all personnel who sell,

serve, purchase, or consume alcohol on Air Force installations

or aircraft” and “Air National Guard [ ] units and members

when on Air Force bases.” Id. Failure to comply with the relevant portions of the instruction is a violation of Article 92 of

the UCMJ, and violations may also “result in administrative

disciplinary action without regard to otherwise applicable

criminal or civil sanctions for violations of related laws.” Id.

Because the prohibitions in the instruction are limited to military personnel, as opposed to civilians, they cannot be considered “of general applicability.” See Clark, 195 F.3d at 451

(citing Debevoise, 799 F.2d at 1403).4

[7] Because 50 U.S.C. app. § 473 and AFI 34-219 contain

no generally applicable prohibitions, they “do not establish

federal policy against which a state statute must be measured

for conflict or inconsistency.” See Clark, 195 F.3d at 451 (citing Debevoise, 799 F.2d at 1403). Accordingly, we conclude

that no enactment of Congress precludes assimilation of

§ 66.44.270 under the ACA. 

B

We turn now to the question whether § 66.44.270 is regulatory or prohibitory. To answer this question, we consider the

intent behind the statute: If the “statute is intended to prohibit

particular conduct in order to promote the general welfare,”

it is a properly assimilated prohibitory law; if, on the other

hand, the statute is “primarily a licensing law aimed at regulating particular conduct . . . and generating revenues,” it is

regulatory. Clark, 195 F.3d at 450; see also Marcyes, 557

F.2d at 1364. 

4Defendants do not contend that the limited authority of a commanding

officer to lower the drinking age on base, see AFI 34-219, was invoked

with respect to these sales, so that authority likewise poses no obstacle to

assimilation here. 

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The inquiry presents an issue of framing. Defendants urge

us to focus on Washington’s Title 66, which contains

§ 66.44.270. They contend that the intent behind the title is to

permit the sale, distribution, and consumption of alcohol, subject to regulation. The government counters that § 66.44.270

flatly prohibits the furnishing of alcohol to minors, with only

limited exceptions. 

In support of their approach to framing, Defendants rely on

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202

(1987). In Cabazon, the Supreme Court considered whether a

California law governing bingo was prohibitory or regulatory.5

Id. at 208-12. “In light of the fact that California permits a

substantial amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and

actually promotes gambling through its state lottery,” the

Supreme Court concluded, “California regulates rather than

prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular.” Id. at

211. Defendants contend that, like California’s gambling statutory scheme, in which California allowed for and benefitted

from gambling, Washington’s alcohol statutory scheme

allows for widespread sale and consumption, authorizing

state-run liquor stores, and generating income from alcoholrelated taxes and fees. Defendants, however, focus on the

overarching scheme to the exclusion of the specific statute at

issue. Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, such an approach

is not condoned by Cabazon, which, in addition to discussing

California’s approach to gambling generally, specifically

noted that California did not prohibit but rather regulated

bingo “in particular.” See id. (noting that bingo was widely

5Cabazon did not address the ACA, but rather Public Law 280, Pub. L.

No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28

U.S.C. § 1360, 25 U.S.C. § 1321-1326), which allows application of state

laws on tribal lands if Congress expressly so provides. 480 U.S. at 207.

The prohibitory/regulatory distinction applies in both contexts. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211 n.10 (noting that Marcyes applied the prohibitory/

regulatory distinction); Clark, 195 F.3d at 449 (entertaining a Cabazonbased argument against assimilating a state law under the ACA). 

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played and legally sponsored by several organizations, pursuant to the state statute). 

Indeed, we previously have rejected Defendants’ approach

to framing. In Clark, we considered whether a provision making the unauthorized practice of law a misdemeanor was properly assimilated under the ACA. 195 F.3d at 448. The

defendant argued that the provision was regulatory because

the statutory scheme as a whole regulated the practice of law,

rather than prohibited the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at

449. The defendant in Clark invoked Cabazon in support of

her argument that “the district court misfocused the inquiry by

analyzing the unauthorized practice of law rather than the

practice of law,” contending that “California statutes regulating the practice of law are similar to its gambling statutes,

which the Supreme Court held [in Cabazon] are regulatory

because California did not prohibit all forms of gambling but

only certain types of high stakes bingo.” Id. (citing Cabazon,

480 U.S. at 211-12). 

[8] We rejected this argument, emphasizing that a penal

provision that is part of a larger regulatory scheme can nonetheless be assimilated where the penal provision is criminal

and prohibitory. Id. at 450. We held that the statute at issue

was properly assimilated under the ACA because the unauthorized practice of law was “flatly prohibited and criminally

penalized.” Id. 

[9] Here, too, the conduct at issue — the furnishing of

alcohol to minors — is flatly prohibited and criminally penalized. Section 66.44.270’s limited exceptions for alcohol given

by a parent or guardian and consumed in the parent’s or

guardian’s presence, alcohol given for medicinal purposes,

and alcohol given for religious services do not remove it from

the realm of prohibitory laws. See Marcyes, 557 F.2d at 1364

(holding that fireworks statute was prohibitory even though

there were exceptions for public displays and movies).

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[10] The specific statute at issue, § 66.44.270, is the type

of prohibitory law we previously have deemed properly

assimilated under the ACA. See, e.g., United States v. Quemado, 26 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that state

statute prohibiting driving after suspension or revocation of

license was properly assimilated); United States v. Foumai,

910 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that state statutes

prohibiting driving without insurance and driving with a suspended license were assimilated); United States v. DeWater,

846 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that state statute

prohibiting driving under the influence was assimilated); cf.

United States v. Carlson, 900 F.2d 1346, 1347-48 (9th Cir.

1990) (holding that state speed limit law that categorized noncompliance as a violation rather than a criminal offense was

not properly assimilated). Its presence in what is arguably a

regulatory scheme does not alter our conclusion that Section

66.44.270 is prohibitory.6

C

Finally we consider Washington’s public policy and the

effect of assimilation on the ACA’s uniformity goal. We

agree with the government that declining to assimilate

§ 66.44.270 would “circumvent” the state’s purpose in penalizing the conduct at issue. See Clark, 195 F.3d at 450 (noting

that “failure to assimilate [the state statute] would circumvent

California’s determination that the unauthorized practice of

law poses a threat to the general public”); Marcyes, 557 F.2d

at 1364 (noting that declining to assimilate “would entirely

circumvent Washington’s determination that the possession of

fireworks is dangerous to the general welfare of its citizens”).

6Defendants contend that AFI 34-219 is “further evidence” that

§ 66.44.270 is regulatory because “the Air Force has also chosen to regulate the furnishing of liquor to those under the legal drinking age in a state,

but has done so differently than the State of Washington.” Our inquiry,

however, focuses on the intent behind the state statute to be assimilated.

The existence of an Air Force instruction on the same subject is not relevant to that inquiry. 

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[11] The Washington Supreme Court has clearly identified

the purpose behind § 66.44.270 as “protect[ing] minors’

health and safety interests from their ‘own inability to drink

responsibly’ and . . . protect[ing] against the particular hazard

of ‘alcohol in the hands of minors.’ ” Schooley v. Pinch’s Deli

Market, Inc., 951 P.2d 749, 753 (Wash. 1998) (quoting Hansen v. Friend, 824 P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1992)).7

 Like the

unauthorized practice of law statute and the fireworks statute

at issue in Clark and Marcyes, respectively, § 66.44.270

reflects a specific determination by Washington that particular

conduct poses a certain threat. Failure to assimilate

§ 66.44.270 would circumvent that determination. 

[12] We also conclude that assimilating § 66.44.270 furthers the ACA’s goal of uniformity. “Congress’ purpose in

enacting the ACA was to fill in the gaps in the criminal law

applicable to federal enclaves created by the failure of Congress to pass specific criminal statutes.” Marcyes, 557 F.2d at

1364 (citing United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958),

and Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946)). Thus, a

statute is properly assimilated where assimilation would “uphold[ ] [Congressional] policy by insuring that [a state’s laws]

will be uniformly applied to all citizens . . . on or off [the federal enclave].” Marcyes, 557 F.2d at 1364-65. 

[13] Applying the state law governing the furnishing of

alcohol to minors on base would further uniformity between

the base and the state of Washington. Defendants misunder7Citing to Schooley, Defendants assert that Washington’s underlying

interest is “seek[ing] generally to promote the health and safety of its citizens.” They argue that if this interest were a sufficient justification for

assimilation, any provision of Title 66 could be assimilated, as its stated

purpose is “the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety

of the people of the state.” See Wash. Rev. Code § 66.08.010. The concern

that assimilating § 66.44.270 would lead to widespread assimilation of any

law whose purpose was to protect the general welfare is unfounded, however, because Schooley articulated the state’s interest much more specifically. 

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stand the ACA’s goal of uniformity, contending that, in light

of an Air Force instruction that permits the suspension of the

drinking age requirement in specific instances, the criminal

law that would apply to military personnel on base, and the

civilian personnel that serve them, would differ from that

applied to civilian employees on base. Our inquiry, however,

does not concern the level of uniformity within the federal

enclave, but rather the level of uniformity between the federal

enclave and the state in which it is situated. 

AFI 34-219 states that, as a general rule, the minimum

drinking age “must be consistent with the law of the state . . .

in which the installation is located.” Id. However, the instruction allows a Major Air Command Director of Services to

approve a suspension of the minimum drinking age “for

attendees at a particular unit gathering” when “an entire unit

marks a unique or non-routine military occasion on a military

installation.” Id. Where such a suspension occurs, military or

civilian personnel on base are permitted to furnish alcohol to

certain underage military personnel on base, but are not permitted to furnish alcohol to other underage military personnel

or civilians. This lack of on-base uniformity would exist irrespective of assimilation, as the general minimum drinking age

under the instruction — which would remain in effect for all

those not subject to an exception — is the same as the state

in which the base is located. Moreover, the lack of uniformity

within a federal enclave is not the uniformity problem the

ACA aims to rectify. See Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 295. 

Defendants also argue that if § 66.44.270 is assimilated,

civilians and military personnel off base would have a different law applied to them than military personnel on base. This

argument focuses on the proper uniformity question. However, the apparent anomaly is a result of the discrepancy

between the Air Force instruction, which applies on base, and

the state law, which applies off base. This discrepancy, too,

will exist irrespective of whether § 66.44.270 is assimilated.

Indeed if § 66.44.270 is assimilated, the discrepancy will be

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ameliorated, because sales to underage civilians and sales to

underage military personnel that occur while a suspension of

the drinking age is not in effect will be subject to the same

rules whether the underage individuals are on or off base. 

CONCLUSION

[14] Accordingly, we conclude that § 66.44.270 is penal,

prohibitory, and not precluded by generally applicable federal

law, and that assimilation of § 66.44.270 furthers the ACA’s

uniformity purpose.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgements of conviction are

AFFIRMED.

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