Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_12-cv-00752/USCOURTS-alsd-1_12-cv-00752-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Corrections
Defendant
Holman Correctional Facility
Defendant
Gregory Hunt
Plaintiff
Walter Myers
Defendant
Tony Patterson
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

GREGORY HUNT, *

#Z-521 *

 *

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION NO.12-00752-WS-B

 *

WALTER MYERS, *

 *

Defendant. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Gregory Hunt, proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed a complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Doc. 1). This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before 

the undersigned on Defendant Walter Myers’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment. (Docs. 53, 54, 62). 1 After careful consideration of the 

motion, pleadings, briefs, and materials submitted in support of and 

in opposition to, the motion, the undersigned recommends that 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and that this

action be DISMISSED with prejudice.

 

1 Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for 

the Issuance of an Immediate Injunction. (Doc. 71). Because the 

undersigned finds that Defendant’s motion should be granted, and 

this action dismissed with prejudice, it is recommended that 

Plaintiff’s motion seeking immediate injunctive relief based on 

the claims raised in his lawsuit be denied. 

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I. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

From its review of the record, the Court summarizes the 

allegations that are material to the issues addressed in this Report 

and Recommendation. 2 At all times relevant to the complaint, 

Plaintiff Gregory Hunt was incarcerated as a death row inmate at 

Holman Correctional Facility. (Doc. 23). Hunt initiated this action 

in December 2012 based on alleged religious discrimination at the 

Holman Correctional Facility3 . According to Hunt, he is a member of 

an inmate led Sunday class called “Anointed Heart”, a “non-mainstream 

Christian sect” whose beliefs are different in some respects from 

mainstream Protestants. 4 (Docs. 23, 58). Hunt alleges that the 

 

2 For summary judgment purposes, the Court's analysis must 

begin with a description of the facts in the light most 

favorable to Hunt, who is the non-moving party. See Skrtich v. 

Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002). “[T]he ‘facts,’

as accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, 

may not be the ‘actual’ facts of the case." Priester v. City of 

Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000).

3 In addition to his original complaint (Doc. 1), Hunt filed 

a couple of amended complaints. (Docs. 11, 23). Currently before 

the Court is Hunt’s last amended complaint (Doc. 23), which is 

the operative pleading in this action. 

4 It is not at all clear from the pleadings and other 

materials the differences which exist between the beliefs of 

non-mainstream “Anointed Heart” group and the Protestants; 

except it is suggested that the “Anointed Heart” group believes 

in teaching early Christianity whereas mainstream Christians 

purportedly do not. (Doc. 66 at 9.). According to Plaintiff, 

back in 1995 he was kicked out of a volunteer led church service 

for being “too Christian”, and after filing a lawsuit regarding 

the volunteer led services, he was permitted, to start the 

Sunday class called “Anointed Heart” in 1998. (Doc. 58 at 1-2). 

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3

Defendant has “creat[ed] an excessive burden that is prohibiting [his] 

free exercise of religion, in a discriminatory manner.” (Doc. 23 at 

7). Specifically, Hunt contends that prison officials discontinued 

the “Anointed Heart” class in March of 2009 after an inmate fight, 

and that the only connection between the fight and the class was that 

both occurred on a Sunday. (Id. at 5; Doc. 58). When the “Anointed 

Heart” class was resumed in July 2010, the Chaplain imposed a new 

policy which prohibited the group from meeting without the presence of 

free world volunteers. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that this has imposed a 

“substantial burden” on the group’s ability to exercise their religion 

because volunteers have other obligations which prevent them from 

attending regularly, and as a result, it impacts the ability of the 

“Anointed Heart” group to exercise their religion by meeting on a 

“regular basis, missing ability to meet for [their] communion day, and 

other holy days . . . that [they] hold fundamental to [their] faith 

and spiritual growth.” (Doc. 23 at 5). Plaintiff further asserts that 

during a meeting with the Warden in November 2011, the Warden said 

that he would remedy the situation; however, all he did was to talk to 

the volunteers, who started to show up for the meetings, and then 

slacked off again. (Id. at 6). According to Plaintiff, because of the 

requirement of a volunteer, the “Anointed Heart” class is meeting no 

more than twice a week. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff contends that the “Anointed Heart” class is being 

treated differently because in September 2012, the Warden overruled 

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the Chaplain’s policy that required a free world volunteer at the 

Islam class meetings, and that other groups on death row are allowed 

to meet in the dayroom without the presence of a volunteer or 

security officer. While Hunt acknowledges that the prison has 

security concerns for which the free world volunteers may be 

necessary, he asserts that the “Anointed Heart” class has been losing 

members because the volunteers do not show up, and he fears that the 

policy requiring free world volunteers in their meetings could result 

in “mainstream theology” being forced on their group. (Id. at 8). 

For relief, Plaintiff requests the elimination of the policy 

requiring a free world volunteer so that the “Anointed Heart” class

can meet regularly without the need for a free world volunteer. (Id.)

Defendant Walter Myers filed an answer, special report, and 

sworn affidavits denying that Hunt’s right to exercise his religion 

or his right to equal protection has been violated. (Docs. 53, 54).5

Defendant Myers contends that Plaintiff has several avenues available 

to him through which he can exercise his religion. Along with 

Defendant’s Special Report, the sworn affidavit of Christopher 

Summers, the Chaplin at the Holman facility, was submitted in support 

of the Special Report. (Doc. 54-4) According to Summers, the Alabama 

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”)does not make a distinction between 

 

5 At Plaintiff’s request, Defendant Warden Walter Myers was 

substituted for Tony Patterson on September 26, 2014 as Tony 

Patterson retired from the Alabama Department of Corrections as 

Warden at the Holman facility, and Myers has assumed Patterson’s 

duties at the facility. (Docs. 54, 59). 

Case 1:12-cv-00752-WS-B Document 72 Filed 09/30/15 Page 4 of 24
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individual sects or denominations within each recognized religion, 

and as Chaplin, it is his responsibility to allocate time for 

religious services as equally as possible to all religions, given he 

number of practitioners and the availability of religious volunteers. 

(Doc. 54-4). 

Summers further asserts that ADOC’s records reflect that 

Plaintiff is a “declared practitioner of Protestantism”, and that 

death row inmates who desire to participate in Protestant services 

can attend inmate-led services, supervised by a number of religious 

volunteers on Sundays from 7am to 10 am, as well as services on 

Monday and Friday nights, which are conducted by volunteers from a 

number of different churches and ministries. Summers also asserts 

that Protestant Christians are approved for additional services on 

Easter, Good Friday and Christmas by Administrative Regulation # 333, 

and that volunteers are trained to refrain from proselytizing during 

the services. (Id.) Summers avers that to the extent Plaintiff wishes 

to further study his non-mainstream Christian beliefs, he is 

permitted to purchase books and study materials, and can utilize free 

time in the day room and exercise yard to study or meet with fellow 

practitioners to share his non-mainstream beliefs. Additionally, 

Summers asserts that pursuant to Administrative Regulation #333, 

Islamic inmates are permitted a Friday Jumu'ah prayer service, from 

11:30 am to 2:30 pm, without a volunteer, because Jumu’ah is a 

required practice for Muslims, and the Islamic group does not have a 

Case 1:12-cv-00752-WS-B Document 72 Filed 09/30/15 Page 5 of 24
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religious volunteer available to come to Holman for their services. 

(Doc. 54-4 at 2). 

In an Order dated October 2, 2014, the Court converted 

Defendant’s Special Report and Answer into to a Motion for Summary 

Judgment, notified Plaintiff of his rights and responsibilities under 

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and afforded the 

parties an opportunity to respond. (Doc. 62). Subsequently, on 

October 28, 2014, Hunt filed an Objection to Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment, and again argued that the policy requiring a free

world volunteer is discriminatory and should be eliminated. (Doc. 

66). Plaintiff also argued for the first time that Defendant 

violated his statutory rights under the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”). (Id.) In support of 

his opposition to Myers’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff included 

unsworn statements by inmates Earl J. McGahee and Anthony Tyson6. (Id. 

at 4-6)

 

6 Although the statements are not sworn nor made under penalty of 

perjury, the Court has summarized the contents of them since for the 

most part, they are cumulative of the assertions contained in 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint and other filings. (Doc. 66 at 4-6). 

McGahee asserts that prior to mid-2007, Plaintiff was permitted to 

lead a discipleship class for the “Anointed Heart” group on Sundays, 

that the Jumu’ah group was permitted to meet on Fridays, and at that 

time, both groups were permitted to meet without a volunteer. After a 

fight broke out, the classes were discontinued until it was 

determined that the fight had nothing to do with the religious 

classes. When the classes resumed, both classes were required to 

have volunteers in order to meet. Later, the volunteer requirement 

was lifted for the Jumu’ah class, but it continues to exist for the 

“Anointed Heart” group. According to McGahee, their Sunday class has 

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In his reply, Myers asserts that at this stage in the 

proceedings, Plaintiff should not be permitted to amend his amended 

complaint by raising, for the first time, a RLUIPA claim in his 

response to Defendant’s motion seeking Summary Judgment. (Doc. 67). 

Myers further asserts that in any event, Plaintiff has failed to meet 

his burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact under the 

Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the RLUIPA. The 

Court finds that Defendant’s motion is now ripe for resolution.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary Judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. 

 

always been an inmate-conducted class, with Plaintiff as the 

overseer, and him as the co-leader, and they teach their own, baptize 

their own and ordain their own. McGahee asserts that it is 

fundamental for the “Anointed Heart” group to meet weekly on Sunday, 

to have an agape love feast twice a year, to partake in communion on 

the first Sunday. He further asserts that “[i]t is a faith killer, 

when [they] try to meet and change only to find [they] cannot meet 

due to present policy”, and that as a result of the policy, their 

numbers have diminished substantially. (Id. at 4-5)

Inmate Tyson’s statement contains many of the same assertions as 

those made by inmate McGahee. According to Tyson, he is a member of 

“Anointed Heart”, and they believe in early Christianity teachings, 

and believe that “organized [C]hristianity is corrupt, and presents 

many false teachings that are not truly [C]hristian.”. He asserts 

that their group was allowed to meet without a volunteer until an 

inmate fight that did not involve their class, that the Jumu’ah class 

and other groups are allowed to meet without a volunteer, that being 

able to meet, sing and encourage each other is fundamental to the 

group’s faith, and that due to the lack of volunteers, their class 

membership has declined dramatically. (Id. at 6). 

Case 1:12-cv-00752-WS-B Document 72 Filed 09/30/15 Page 7 of 24
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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. 

Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 

573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate even if ‘some 

alleged factual dispute’ between the parties remains, so long as there 

is ‘no genuine issue of material fact.’”(emphasis in original)). 

The party asking for summary judgment “always bears 

the initial responsibility of informing the district court 

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions 

of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The movant 

can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there 

is no dispute of material fact, or by showing, or pointing 

out to, the district court that the nonmoving party has 

failed to present evidence in support of some element of 

its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. 

Id. at 322–24.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) 

“requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings 

and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ 

designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, 

the nonmoving party “must do more than show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). On the 

other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed 

and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. 

See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

ThyssenKrupp Steel USA, LLC v. United Forming, Inc., 926 F. 

Supp. 2d 1286, 1289-90 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2013) (citations omitted). 

In considering whether Defendant is entitled to summary judgment 

in this case, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable 

Case 1:12-cv-00752-WS-B Document 72 Filed 09/30/15 Page 8 of 24
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to Plaintiff. Comer v. City of Palm Bay, Florida, 265 F. 3d 1186, 

1192 (llth Cir. 2001) (“We view the evidence and all factual 

inferences raised by it in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of 

the non-moving party.”). 

The requirement to view the facts in the nonmoving party’s favor 

extends only to “genuine” disputes over material facts. A genuine 

dispute requires more than “some metaphysical doubt as to material 

facts.” Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1165 (internal citations omitted). A

“mere scintilla” of evidence is insufficient; the nonmoving party 

must produce substantial evidence in order to defeat a motion for 

summary judgment. Id. In addition, “[t]here is no burden upon the 

district court to distill every potential argument that could be made 

based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.” Resolution 

Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). More 

importantly, where “opposing parties tell two different stories, one 

of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no 

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that 

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 

167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007); see also Logan v. Smith, 439 F. App’x 798, 

800 (llth Cir. Aug. 29, 2011) (“In cases where opposing parties tell 

different versions of the same events one of which is blatantly 

contradicted by the record—such that no reasonable jury could believe 

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it—a court should not adopted the contradicted allegations.” 

(citations omitted) (unpublished)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

As a preliminary matter, the undersigned observes that although 

the Court is required to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s 

pleadings, the Court does not have “license to serve as de facto 

counsel for a party . . . or to rewrite an otherwise deficient 

pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of 

Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations 

omitted), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 

701 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Giles v. Wal-Mart Distrib. Ctr., 359 

F. App’x 91, 93 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted) (“Although pro se pleadings are held to a less strict 

standard than pleadings filed by lawyers and thus are construed 

liberally, this liberal construction does not give a court license to 

serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise 

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.”). 

As discussed above, Plaintiff seeks redress pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged constitutional deprivation and 

statutory violation arising out of the prison’s denial of his 

nonmainstream Christian group, “Anointed Hearts”’ ability to 

meet and hold class without the presence of free world 

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volunteers.7 (Doc. 23). Defendant Myers denies that Plaintiff’s 

rights have been violated. (Docs. 54, 67). 

The undersigned has conducted a careful review of all 

evidence contained in the record, and finds that Myers has met 

his evidentiary burden in this case and demonstrated the absence 

of any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the claims 

presented by Plaintiff. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to 

establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that 

a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clarks v. Coats 

& Clark, Inc., 929 F. 2d 604, 608 (llth Cir. 1991). Because 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material 

fact, Defendant Myer’s summary judgment motion is due to be 

granted.8

 

7 Section 1983 provides in pertinent part that: 

Every person who, under color of any 

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory or 

the District of Columbia, subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of 

the United States or other person 

within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, 

or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws, shall be liable 

to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

8 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he is 

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A. First Amendment Claim

The First Amendment, which was made applicable to the 

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, in relevant 

part, that government shall not prohibit the free exercise of 

religion. U.S. Const. amend I; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 

296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 903, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). In O’Lone 

v. Estate of Shabazz, the United States Supreme Court recognized 

that “‘convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional 

protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in 

prison.’” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) 

(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). “Inmates 

clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,

including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free 

exercise of religion.” Id. (citations omitted). However, 

“[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or 

limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified 

by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Id.

 

suing Myers in his official capacity. While state officials are 

entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for 

claims seeking monetary damages in their official capacities, 

see Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 

1995). Plaintiff has not requested any monetary damages. 

Instead, he seeks an order directing Myers to permit the 

Anointed One group to hold classes without the presence of a 

free world volunteer. (Docs. 23, 54 at 1, 2) “Official capacity 

suits for prospective relief to enjoin state officials from 

enforcing unconstitutional acts are not deemed to be suits 

against the state and thus are not barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment.” Scott Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251,1255 (11th Cir. 2005). 

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(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although 

prison inmates retain protections afforded by the First 

Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, prison officials may impose 

limitations on an inmate's exercise of sincerely held religious 

beliefs if the limitations are “reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests.” Id. at 349 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). In evaluating prisoners’ 

constitutional challenges to prison regulations, “courts have 

accorded wide-ranging deference to prison administrators in the 

adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their 

judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline 

and to maintain institutional security.” Lawson v. Singletary, 

85 F.3d 502, 510 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[t]o ensure that courts 

afford appropriate deference to prison officials . . . prison 

regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged 

under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that 

ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental 

constitutional rights.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348 (citation 

omitted). The Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, established 

four factors for determining the reasonableness of a regulation: 

(1) whether the regulation has a valid, rational 

connection to a legitimate governmental interest; (2) 

whether alternative means are open to inmates to 

exercise the asserted right; (3) what impact an 

accommodation of the right would have on guards and 

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inmates and prison resources; and (4) whether there 

are ready alternatives to the regulation.

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262, 96 

L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987). The fourth factor considers whether “a 

prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that 

fully accommodates the asserted right while not imposing more 

than a de minimis cost to the valid penological goal.” Overton 

v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136, 123 S. Ct 2162, 156 L. Ed. 2d

162 (2003)(citation omitted). This standard ensures that 

correctional officers will have the ability “‘to anticipate 

security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the 

intractable problems of prison administration,’ ibid., and 

avoids unnecessary intrusion of the judiciary into problems 

particularly ill suited to ‘resolution by decree.’” O’Lone, 482 

U.S. at 349. Consequently, the defendant does not have the 

burden of proving the validity of an administrative action or 

security decision; rather, the burden is on the plaintiff to 

disprove it. Turner, 482 U.S. 89-91.

In this case, Hunt has not demonstrated that the ADOC 

policy requiring that the “Anointed Heart” have free world 

volunteers in attendance at their Sunday class has impinged on 

his ability to practice his religion within the confines of the 

prison, nor has he shown that this policy is unreasonable. That

is, first, Hunt has not shown that this regulation does not have 

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a valid, rational connection to a legitimate governmental 

interest. In this case, there is no dispute that prison 

officials have a clear interest in allocating resources in 

order to maintain order and overall security in the prison. 

Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that the policy requiring the 

presence of a free world volunteer was instituted after an 

inmate fight, and that prisons have security concerns that could 

justify the need to have free world volunteers in prisonerconducted religious classes. (Doc. 23 at 7). Further, the 

facility has to allocate time for religious services amongst all 

religious groups as equally as possible, and must take into 

account the number of practitioners and the availability of 

religious volunteers. (Docs. 54-3 at 2; 54-4 at 3) Moreover, 

alternative means are open to Plaintiff to exercise his right to 

practice his religion. (Doc. 54-4 at 3). “An inmate’s free 

exercise right does not ‘depend upon his ability to pursue each 

and every aspect of the practice of his religion.” Osuna v. 

Clark, No. 1:05-CV-173-MEF, 2007 WL 2461903 at * 8 (M.D. Ala. 

Aug. 29, 2007)(citing Canedy v. Boardman, 91 F.3d 30, 33 (7th 

Cir. 1996)). The record reflects that a number of Protestant 

based services are open to Plaintiff and other “Anointed Heart”

members including an inmate led Sunday morning service, as well 

as Protestant services on Monday and Friday evenings, conducted 

by volunteers from a number of different churches and 

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ministries. (Doc. 54-4 at 2). Further, Protestants are afforded 

additional services on their approved sacred days, such as 

Easter, Good Friday and Christmas. (Id.). Hunt may also “study 

whatever religious material he likes within his cell and possess 

approved religious items, or congregate with other inmates 

during day-room or yard time.” (Id. at 3). See Overton, 539 

U.S. at 135 (“Were it shown that no alternative means of 

communication existed, though it would not be conclusive, it 

would be some evidence that the regulations were unreasonable. 

That showing, however, cannot be made.”).

While Hunt contends that he is not Protestant, and that the 

“Anointed Heart” class practices Christian teachings different 

from mainstream Christianity, ADOC records indicate that Hunt’s 

declared religion is Protestantism (Christianity) and Hunt does 

not refute the fact that his beliefs fall under the ambit of 

Christianity. (Doc. 54-1). In seeking to allocate time for 

religious services as equally as possible to all religions, ADOC 

does not make a distinction between individual sects or 

denominations within each recognized religion. The fact that 

Plaintiff’s individual beliefs do not line up perfectly with the 

teachings of the mainstream Christian groups is of no moment 

given that Christian services are available to him, that his 

“Anointed Heart” class is allowed to meet on Sunday whenever a 

volunteer is available, and that he can possess books and visit 

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with like-minded believers during free time in the day room or 

on the exercise yard9. See Boxer X v.Donald, 169 Fed. Appx. 555,

560 (llth Cir. 2006)(“Because the DOC regulation, which provides 

prisoners with a generic religious service for a given religion 

and not a separate service for the denominations or sects, is 

reasonably related to the DOC’s penological interest in not 

overburdening its resources, the district court did not err by 

granting summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff’s 

First Amendment claim.”) Thus, the policy of requiring a free 

world volunteer to be present at the “Anointed Heart” Sunday 

class does not substantially burden or significantly interfere 

with Plaintiff’s ability to engage in the free exercise or 

practice of his religion. He has therefore failed to establish a 

violation of his First Amendment rights. Consequently, summary 

judgment is due to be granted in favor of Defendant on this 

claim.

B. Equal Protection Claim 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government 

treat similarly situated people in a similar manner. See City 

of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. 

Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985). “To establish an equal 

 

9 While Plaintiff asserts that in 1995, he was kicked out of 

a religious service, he has not alleged let alone put forth any 

evidence that suggests that he is not permitted to attend the 

inmate led Christian service that is conducted on Sundays, or 

the other Christian services held at the facility.

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protection claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) he is 

similarly situated to other prisoners who received more 

favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious 

discrimination against him based on race, religion, national 

origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis.” Sweet 

v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted); see Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 

785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that to establish 

an Equal Protection claim, the Appellant must establish that he 

is similarly situated to other inmates who did not have their 

parole extended and that the appellee engaged in invidious 

discrimination). Plaintiff’s equal protection claim must fail 

because he has not shown that he was treated differently from 

other, similarly situated prisoners. In his amended complaint, 

Plaintiff alleges that “Anointed Heart” class is being treated 

differently than similarly situated groups, namely Project Hope 

and Muslim inmates. (Doc. 23 at 6). However, these groups are 

not similarly situated. While Plaintiff’s class, “Anointed 

Heart”, is not permitted to meet without a volunteer, the record 

does not reflect that any other sect or subgroup of a larger 

religious group is being permitted to meet without a free world 

volunteer. (Doc. 54-4). 

With respect to the weekly Jumu’ah prayer services, the 

record reflects that the weekly Jumu’ah prayer services are 

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required by the Muslim faith and are therefore mandated by the 

ADOC Administration Regulation Number 333 (“AR #333”). (Doc. 54-

4 at 2). Furthermore, unlike inmates such as Plaintiff, who 

practice Christianity, the Islamic group does not have religious 

volunteers available to come to Holman for its prayer service. 

In addition, Plaintiff does not assert, and the record does not 

reflect that there are alternative Islamic services that are 

available to Islamic inmates at the Holman facility. In 

addition, Project Hope is a non-denominational group organized 

for the purpose of eliminating the death penalty. (Id. at 2). 

Because it is not considered a religious group, it is not 

afforded time on the Religious Activities calendar coordinated 

by the Chaplain. (Id.). Meetings for that group require the 

approval of the security staff. (Docs. 54 at 12, 54-3, 54-4).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has been 

treated differently than similarly situated inmates. 

Even if Plaintiff had shown that he had been treated 

differently than similarly situated inmates, he has not 

proffered facts that suggest that he was treated differently as 

a result of invidious discrimination tied to a constitutionally 

protected interest. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 

F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the equal 

protection clause prohibits only intentional discrimination.”); 

see also Cruz v. Skelton, 543 F.2d 86, 92-93 (5th Cir. 1976) 

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(affirming dismissal of prisoner’s equal protection claim 

because there was no allegation of “‘invidious discrimination’ 

based on such considerations as race, religion, national origin, 

or poverty.”); Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F. App'x. 892, 899 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (prison officials did not violate Equal Protection 

Clause by providing Jewish inmates with kosher diet and not 

providing Muslim inmates with halal diet; facts viewed in light 

most favorable to Muslim inmate did not establish that prison's 

decision to serve kosher meals but not halal meals was the 

product of intentional discrimination). Plaintiff has not 

established a genuine issue of material fact regarding his Equal 

Protection Claim. Accordingly, this claim must also fail. 

C. RLUIPA

While Plaintiff did not reference RLUIPA in his amended 

complaint(Doc. 23), [p]ro se pleadings are held to a less 

stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, 

therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States,

148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). In light of Plaintiff’s 

pro se status and the fact that his amended complaint contains 

key language found in the statute, namely that prison officials 

placed a “substantial burden” on his ability to exercise his 

religion, the undersigned will consider his RLUIPA claim below. 

(Doc. 23 at 5). 

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Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall 

impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 

person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if 

the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 

U.S.C.A. § 2000cc–1(a)(1). To set forth a prima facie case

under section 3 of RLUIPA, “a plaintiff must demonstrate 1) that 

he engaged in a religious exercise; and 2) that the religious 

exercise was substantially burdened.” Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 

1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part by, Sossamon v. 

Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 179 L. Ed. 2d 700 (2011). This standard 

is applied with “due deference to the experience and expertise 

of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary 

regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security, and 

discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited 

resources.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723, 125 S. Ct. 

2113, 2123, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (2005). In Smith, the court 

defined the plaintiff’s “religious exercise” as the practice of 

his religion and thus, did not limit definition of “religious 

exercise” to a particular act of worship. Smith, 502 F.3d at 

1277. 

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 

government must then show that the challenged government 

practice is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental 

interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that 

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compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 1266. As noted supra, 

Plaintiff has repeatedly asserted that he practices “nonmainstream Christianity.” (Docs. 23, 67). And, “[d]efendants do 

not dispute that Hunt’s practice of ‘non-mainstream 

Christianity’ constitutes a religious exercise.” (Doc. 67 at 2). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has met the first prong of his prima 

facie case under RLUIPA. However, Plaintiff’s claim must fail 

on the “substantial burden” element required by RLUIPA. As the 

court in Smith explained: 

We have previously defined a “substantial burden” 

as being “significant pressure which directly coerces 

the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior 

accordingly.” More pertinent to the present action, we 

have made clear that, in order to constitute a 

“substantial burden” on religious practice, the 

government's action must be “more than . . . 

incidental” and “must place more than an inconvenience 

on religious exercise.” That is, to constitute a 

substantial burden under RLUIPA, the governmental 

action must significantly hamper one's religious 

practice.

Smith, 502 F.3d at 1277(citations omitted). The requirement 

that the “Anointed Heart” inmate-led Sunday class be supervised 

by free world volunteers has not burdened or restricted Hunt’s 

ability to exercise his religion. He is able to practice his 

religion in many ways. As he has done on at least one occasion, 

Hunt may attend and lead the prisoner conducted services held on 

Sunday mornings. (Doc. 54 at 3). Protestant services conducted 

by volunteers are also held on Monday and Friday evenings and 

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“Protestants are afforded additional services on their approved 

sacred days as time and space permits.” (Id.). Additionally, 

Plaintiff “may study on his own, or meet with other inmates when 

they are allowed in the day room or on the yard.” (Id.).

Plaintiff may also encourage free world members of his 

particular sect to engage in the process to become volunteers 

for the “Anointed Sunday” class. (Id. at 11). Simply put, 

Plaintiff has not established that the regulation requiring free

world volunteers in the Anointed Sunday class constitutes a 

substantial burden on his ability to exercise his religion. 

Thus, he has failed to state a claim under RLUIPA.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned concludes 

that Defendant Walter Myers is entitled to summary judgment. 

Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment be GRANTED, that this action be DISMISSED with 

prejudice, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant 

Walter Myers and against Plaintiff Gregory Hunt. 

Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who 

objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within 

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fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file 

specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. Gen. L.R. 

72.(c). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the 

specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, 

state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific.

DONE this 30th day of September, 2015.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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