Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01746/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01746-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Carrillo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-1746

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

Miguel Carrillo, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 9, 2004

Filed: August 25, 2004

___________

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Miguel Carrillo appeals the district court's1

 denial of a two-level downward

safety-valve adjustment and the assessment of a two-level upward adjustment for

obstruction of justice. We affirm.

I. Background

Police arrested Carrillo and Melvin Fluhr on March 28, 2002, after the two sold

one-half pound of methamphetamine to an undercover officer. After his arrest, Fluhr

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 The government filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal to include

Carrillo's sentencing memorandum, which was omitted from the record. This

memorandum, filed by Carrillo's attorney, indicates that Carrillo only challenged

whether the jail assault was connected to the charged offense for purposes of the

safety-valve adjustment. We hereby grant the government's motion to supplement the

record on appeal. 

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gave the police a voluntary confession and made statements regarding Carrillo's

involvement in the drug sale. Carrillo received conditional pre-trial release. During

his release, police again arrested Carrillo for possession of 108.62 grams of

methamphetamine.

Prior to trial, Carrillo and two other men assaulted Fluhr in jail in an alleged

attempt to prevent Fluhr from testifying against Carrillo. One inmate held Fluhr in

Carrillo's cell while Carrillo and the other man attacked Fluhr. The jail's security

video camera recorded part of the assault. Carrillo threatened Fluhr's family should

Fluhr testify against him. Carrillo and the other inmates were charged with the

assault. 

On July 25, 2002, Carrillo pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine while on pre-trial release. Prior to sentencing, Carrillo contested

the facts in the presentence investigation report ("PSR") and the plea agreement's

stipulation of facts regarding the prison assault. The stipulation of facts contained not

only the factual basis for the drug charge, but a summary of the jail fight perpetrated

by Carrillo. Paragraph H, which detailed the jail fight, was marked through in the

stipulation of facts. However, prior to sentencing, Carrillo submitted a sentencing

memorandum that indicated that he admitted to the conduct at the jail, but that he

continued to claim that he was eligible for the safety-valve adjustment to his

sentence.2

 In addition, at sentencing, Carrillo withdrew his objection to the proposed

stipulated facts. Specifically, the district judge asked, "So, Mr. Carrillo, you're no

longer saying you didn't do what's in the stipulation of facts, is that fair?" Carrillo

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 Typically, absent some reason for failing to raise an argument in an opening

brief, we do not consider an argument first raised in a reply brief. United States v.

Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1549 n.18 (8th Cir. 1995). Carrillo has offered no justification

for his failure to raise these issues in its initial brief; consequently, we can choose not

to review it. United States v. Brown, 108 F.3d 863, 867 (8th Cir. 1997). However, we

briefly address his claims here for clarity.

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answered, "Yeah." The district judge clarified by asking, "You're admitting that you

did it?" Carrillo again answered, "Yeah." The only disputed issue during sentencing

continued to be whether Carrillo was eligible for the safety-valve adjustment. His

eligibility turned on whether his attack on Fluhr constituted obstructionist conduct or

conduct connected to the underlying drug offense. The district court denied the

safety-valve adjustment and sentenced Carrillo to 210 months' imprisonment and four

years' supervised release.

II. Analysis

As a preliminary matter, we address Carrillo's argument first raised in his reply

brief.3

 Carrillo contends that he objected to the facts supporting the obstructionist

conduct–the jail fight–before sentencing and that he did not stipulate to these facts

in his plea agreement. Thus, he argues, these matters were preserved. However, as

noted, Carrillo filed a prehearing sentencing memorandum that indicated that he

admitted to the conduct at the jail, but that he continued to claim that he was eligible

for the safety-valve adjustment to his sentence. Thereafter, Carrillo conceded at the

sentencing hearing that he no longer objected to the proposed stipulated facts in the

plea agreement–which included paragraph H's summary of the assault on Fluhr. In

addition, Carrillo's counsel indicated at sentencing that Carrillo conceded to the

conduct, but not to whether it constituted conduct "in connection with the offense."

Although this series of objections and concessions is somewhat convoluted, our

review indicates that Carrillo's concessions in his prehearing sentencing

memorandum and during the sentencing hearing render moot any fact issue regarding

his involvement in the jail fight. We will instead address the legal issue of whether

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Carrillo's conduct affects his eligibility for sentence adjustments under the

Guidelines. 

A. Obstruction of Justice

Carrillo first argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level increase

for obstruction of justice based on Carrillo's physical assault of Fluhr to prevent him

from testifying against Carrillo. Carrillo asserts that the government failed to prove

that he willfully attempted to obstruct or impede the administration of justice. The

government responds that a person's intent can be inferred from his voluntary actions,

and that Carrillo's attack on Fluhr, combined with his threat regarding Fluhr's family,

clearly demonstrated Carrillo's intent to willfully obstruct justice.

In considering an obstruction of justice sentencing issue, we typically review

the district court's factual findings for clear error, and its application of the Guidelines

de novo. United States v. Plumley, 207 F.3d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000); United States

v. Hunt, 171 F.3d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1999). However, the government asserts that

Carrillo failed to object to the increase at sentencing because he admitted to the

conduct and agreed that he was subject to the two-level increase. Therefore, the

government argues that we should review the matter for plain error. Under the plain

error standard of review, Carrillo would have to show a plain error that affects his

substantial rights. United States v. Cook, 356 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 2004); United

States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003). If he can make such a showing,

we have "discretion to correct a forfeited error if 'the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Id. (quoting United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). Given the record before us, we find that

the district court did not err in assessing a two-level increase for obstruction of justice

under either standard of review.

A two-level increase in a defendant's offense level is appropriate if the

defendant "willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the

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administration of justice during the . . . prosecution, or sentencing of the instant

offense." United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 3C1.1. The Guidelines

describe obstructive behavior as "threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully

influencing a . . . witness . . . directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so." See id.,

application note 3(a), (i); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), § 1512(b)(2)(A). "'An attempt to

intimidate or threaten a witness, even if unsuccessful, is sufficient to sustain a

two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.'" United States v. Vaca, 289 F.3d

1046, 1049 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Thompson, 210 F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir.

2000); United States v. Moss, 138 F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 1998)). Under U.S.S.G. §

3C1.1, the defendant must have "willfully" obstructed justice, which requires that he

knew that he was under investigation or had "'a correct belief that an investigation

[was] probably underway.'" Brown v. United States, 169 F.3d 531, 536 (8th Cir.

1999) (quoting United States v. Oppedahl, 998 F.2d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 1993)).

In Thompson, for example, the evidence showed that the defendant intimidated

two prosecution witnesses. Prior to trial, the defendant telephoned one witness and

demanded that he swear on the lives of his children that he had not cooperated with

authorities. The defendant also warned the witness that he could expect a visit from

him once he was released from prison. At trial, the defendant directed similar threats

to the other witness, calling the witness derogatory names and making a throat-cutting

gesture while the witness testified. The district court interpreted these acts as attempts

to impermissibly influence or intimidate a witness under § 3C1.1, and we determined

that the district court did not clearly err. Thompson, 210 F.3d at 861; See also Moss,

138 F.3d at 745–46 (finding defendant's "cutthroat" gesture to witness during trial

was obstruction of justice); United States v. Nunn, 940 F.2d 1128, 1133 (8th Cir.

1991) (finding a telephone threat made to a potential witness constituted obstruction

of justice).

The district court specifically found that Carrillo's assault on Fluhr–who had

furnished evidence against Carrillo and, at the time of the attack, was scheduled to

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testify against Carrillo–occurred in the course of attempting to avoid responsibility

for the offense. The district court also determined that Carrillo used violence or

credible threats of violence in connection with the offense. Given these facts, whether

reviewed for clear error or plain error, we hold that the district court did not err in

assessing a two-level increase for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

B. Safety-Valve Reduction

Carrillo next argues that the district court erred in denying the two-level

downward safety-valve adjustment in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. He asserts that the court

erred in determining that his jailhouse attack on Fluhr was "in connection with" the

charged crime and that he was attempting to avoid responsibility for the drug crime

by threatening, attacking, and intimidating Fluhr. Carrillo concedes that if the attack

was an attempt to avoid responsibility for the drug offense, the court's denial of the

reduction was correct. Carrillo asserts, however, that his attack on Fluhr occurred

because he "reacted criminally out of anger" rather than because he was attempting

to avoid responsibility. The government responds that Carrillo failed to prove that the

assault was not "in connection with" his drug offense. The government asserts that

because Carrillo's attack "obstructed justice," he cannot meet the requirements of the

safety-valve provision. The government further notes that even if Carrillo's attack

arose from a spontaneous burst of anger, it was still in an attempt to dissuade Fluhr

from testifying, as evidenced by Carrillo's threat against Fluhr's family. 

The safety-valve provision permits a court to impose a sentence without regard

to a statutory minimum if certain conditions are met. A defendant seeking relief under

the safety valve has the burden to show that each condition of the statute has been

satisfied. Wright v. United States, 113 F.3d 133, 134 (8th Cir. 1997). The standard of

review for such a finding is clear error. United States v. Quintana, 340 F.3d 700, 702

(8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Tournier, 171 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999).

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Sentencing Guideline § 5C1.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) establish five criteria

that a defendant must meet to be entitled to the safety-valve reduction, including:

(1) The defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as

determined under the sentencing guidelines before application of

subsection (b) of 4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal

History Category);

(2) The defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or

possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another

participant to do so) in connection with the offense;

(3) The offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any

person;

(4) The defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor

of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines

and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in

21 U.S.C. § 848; and

(5) Not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has

truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the

defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the

same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that

the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or

that the Government is already aware of the information shall not

preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied

with this requirement.

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. 

The parties agree that Carrillo met four of the five criteria. However, they

dispute whether he met the second provision for using "violence or credible threats

of violence . . . (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the

offense." 

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The term "offense," as used in subsections (a)(2), (3), and (4), and "offense or

offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or

plan," as used in subsection (a)(5), mean the offense of conviction and all relevant

conduct. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 cmt. n.3. Furthermore, Guideline § 1B1.3 notes that

"relevant conduct" includes:

(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,

commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant;

and

(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan,

scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert

with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably

foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly

undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the

offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course

of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense

. . . . 

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to these provisions, because Carrillo's conduct qualified

as an attempt "to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense" (i.e. threatening

and attacking a witness to dissuade him from testifying at trial against the defendant),

that same conduct would also apply to defeat a request for a safety-valve reduction.

As such, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in denying a safetyvalve reduction to Carrillo.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment.

______________________________

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