Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-06771/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-06771-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Baldini Real Estate, Inc.
Plaintiff
Ermeliza S. Torres
Defendant

Document Text:

ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

BALDINI REAL ESTATE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERMELIZA S. TORRES,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-06771-LB 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART THE 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

Re: ECF No. 6

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

This is an unlawful-detainer case removed by the defendant-possessor.

1 Baldini Real Estate, 

Inc. bought a piece of Daly City, California property in a foreclosure sale after Ermeliza Torres 

defaulted on the deed of trust.

2 Baldini served Ms. Torres with a three-day notice to quit.3 Ms. 

Torres, however, is still in possession of the property, and so Baldini filed an unlawful-detainer 

complaint in state court.4 Baldini demands damages of $100 per day from the notice-to-quit 

 

1

See Notice of Removal — ECF No. 1. Record citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File 

(“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.

2 Compl. — ECF No. 1 at 8–11, ¶ 6.

3

Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.

4

Id. ¶ 10.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 1 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

expiration date (starting on October 3, 2016) through the date of judgment; so far, approximately 

$7,800.

5

Ms. Torres then removed the case to this court.6She asserts that removal was proper and that 

the court has federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.7 But Baldini disagrees: it moves to 

remand the case because Mr. Torres did not comply with required removal procedures and the 

court lacks jurisdiction.8 Baldini also asks the court to declare Ms. Torres a vexatious litigant and 

impose sanctions.9

On Baldini’s motion, the court moved the hearing date from January 5, 2017 to December 22, 

2016.10 The deadline for Ms. Torres’s opposition brief remained December 15, but she did not file 

one. Ms. Torres did, however, consent to the undersigned’s jurisdiction.11

The court can decide the matter without oral argument and vacated the hearing. See N.D. Cal. 

Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).12 Because the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court remands the case 

to the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. The court denies Baldini’s request to 

declare Ms. Torres a vexatious litigant and impose a prefiling order and sanctions.

ANALYSIS

1. Removal Was Improper Because the Court Does Not Have Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

1.1 Removal Jurisdiction Legal Standard

A defendant in state court may remove an action to federal court if the action could have been 

filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The defendant has the burden of proving the 

basis for the federal court’s jurisdiction, and, generally, “the removal statute is strictly construed 

 

5

Id. ¶¶ 8–10, 12, Prayer ¶ 2.

6

See generally Notice of Removal.

7

Id. ¶ 3.

8 Motion to Remand — ECF No. 6 at 6–8.

9

Id. at 8–10.

10 Order — ECF No. 16.

11 Consent — ECF No. 17.

12 Clerk’s Notice — ECF No. 18.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 2 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

against removal jurisdiction.” Nishimoto v. Federman–Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 

(9th Cir. 1990); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941).

Original jurisdiction may be based on diversity or a federal question. See Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). For diversity jurisdiction, the opposing parties must be 

citizens of different states and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a). There will be federal-question jurisdiction if the case “aris[es] under the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The “well-pleaded complaint” rule 

requires a federal question to be presented on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint at the time of 

removal for federal-question jurisdiction to exist. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 

58, 63 (1987); Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). An actual or anticipated 

federal defense is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. 

Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983); Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 

1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009). Similarly, federal-question jurisdiction cannot rest upon an actual or 

anticipated counterclaim. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009). That said, a plaintiff 

may not defeat removal by omitting necessary federal questions from his or her complaint. 

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 463 U.S. 1 at 22.

If there is a defect in the removal procedure or in the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff may 

move to remand the case to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

1.2 The Court Lacks Diversity Jurisdiction

Ms. Torres does not claim that this case exhibits diversity jurisdiction. 

Ms. Torres resides in California.13 She alleges that Baldini Real Estate is licensed to do 

business in the State of California and does business here.14 It is unclear if the parties are diverse

but they probably are not. Moreover, because Ms. Torres lives in California, she is likely a 

 

13 Notice of Removal ¶ 1

14 Id. ¶¶ 2–3.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 3 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

California citizen and cannot remove a case from California state court on the basis of diversity 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).

In any event, the amount in controversy is not satisfied. In unlawful detainer actions, the right 

to possession of the property is contested, not title to the property, and the plaintiff may collect 

only damages that are incident to that unlawful possession. See Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. v. 

Villegas, No. C 10-5478 PJH, 2011 WL 204322, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011) (citing Evans v. 

Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 162, 170 (1977)). Here, with damages accumulating at a rate of 

$100 per day beginning on October 3, 2016, (totaling approximately $7,800 to date), the amount 

in controversy is not satisfied.

15 There is no diversity jurisdiction.

1.3 The Court Lacks Federal-Question Jurisdiction

Ms. Torres does invoke federal-question jurisdiction.16 The notice of removal states: “This 

court . . . has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 2605.13.”17 And in the 

notice of removal, Ms. Torres asserts that Baldini violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 

Act (“RESPA”).18 But this does not confer federal jurisdiction: the complaint asserts only a claim 

for unlawful detainer.19 Unlawful detainer claims do not arise under federal law and, without 

more, the court lacks federal-question jurisdiction. See, e.g., GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Rosario, No. 

C 11-1894 PJH, 2011 WL 1754053, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. 

Lopez, No. C 11-00451 WHA, 2011 WL 1465678, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011); Wescom 

Credit Union v. Dudley, No. CV 10-8203 GAF (SSx), 2010 WL 4916578, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 

22, 2010). Ms. Torres’s RESPA argument — whether raised as a defense or counterclaim — does 

not change this outcome. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60.

 

15 Compl. ¶¶ 8–12. 

16 Notice of Removal ¶ 3.

17 Id.

18 Id. ¶ 6.

19 See generally Compl.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 4 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

* * *

The court does not have diversity or federal-question jurisdiction. The court therefore remands 

the case to the San Mateo County Superior Court.

2. The Court Denies Baldini’s Request to Designate Ms. Torres as a Vexatious Litigant, to 

Require a Bond, and to Impose Sanctions

2.1 Vexatious Litigant and Prefiling Order 

Baldini asks the court to declare Ms. Torres a vexatious litigant, pointing to California Civil 

Procedure Code section 391(b)(3)’s definition of a vexatious litigant as “a person who . . . [i]n any 

litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or 

other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or 

solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.”20 It asks for a prefiling order to prevent Ms. Torres 

from again removing the case.

21

The district court has inherent power under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), to issue 

writs (such as the requested prefiling order) “necessary and appropriate” in aid of its jurisdiction to 

prevent litigants who file frivolous lawsuits from continuing to do so. See Molski v. Evergreen 

Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 

F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999)).

“Flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to 

preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of 

other litigants.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990). Nonetheless, “prefiling orders should rarely be filed” because such orders could impose a “substantial burden on the 

free-access guarantee” under the First Amendment, which is “one of the most precious of the 

liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 

1057, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted and quotations omitted). Prefiling orders 

are therefore an extreme remedy and “courts should not enter [them] with undue haste.” Molski, 

 

20 Motion to Remand at 8–9.

21 Id. at 9–10.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 5 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

500 F.3d at 1057 (citations omitted). “A court should enter a pre-filing order constraining a 

litigant’s scope of actions in future cases only after a cautious review of the pertinent 

circumstances.” Id.

Accordingly, “orders restricting a person’s access to the courts must be based on adequate 

justification supported in the record and narrowly tailored to address the abuse perceived.” De 

Long, 912 F.2d at 1149. A prefiling “injunction cannot issue merely upon a showing of 

litigiousness.” Moy v. United States, 906 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1990). “The plaintiff’s claims 

must not only be numerous, but also be patently without merit.” See id.

Before entering a prefiling order, district courts must comply with the procedural and 

substantive requirements set forth in De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147–48. See Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 

F.3d at 1062. Under De Long, a district court must:

(1) give litigants notice and “an opportunity to oppose the order before it [is] 

entered”; (2) compile an adequate record for appellate review, including “a listing 

of all the cases and motions that led the district court to conclude that a vexatious 

litigant order was needed”; (3) make substantive findings of frivolousness or 

harassment; and (4) tailor the order narrowly so as “to closely fit the specific vice 

encountered.”

Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1062 (quoting De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147–48).

2.1.1 Notice

The litigant must be provided with an opportunity to oppose the order before it is entered. See 

De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147. “Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id.

(quoting In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 

Here, Baldini filed its motion and served Ms. Torres.22 Baldini initially noticed the motion’s 

hearing date for January 5, 2017, but then asked to shorten the briefing schedule and move the 

hearing date to December 15, 2016.

23 Baldini served Ms. Torres with its motion to shorten time.24

 

22 Motion to Remand; Certificate of Service — ECF No. 9.

23 See Motion to Remand; Motion to Shorten Time — ECF No. 10 at 2.

24 Certificates of Service — ECF Nos. 12, 15.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 6 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The court granted Baldini’s motion in part: it moved the hearing date to December 22, 2016 and 

kept the opposition deadline as originally set for December 15.25

But Ms. Torres did not file an opposition. She did, however, consent to the undersigned’s 

jurisdiction, indicating that she received the Clerk’s Notice regarding magistrate jurisdiction, and 

thus likely received the court’s order regarding the opposition deadline. Although she did not 

respond, and although the court did not hold a hearing on the matter, the notice requirement has 

been satisfied. See Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Airlines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (holding that the opportunity to be heard does not require an oral or evidentiary hearing 

and instead, due process is satisfied by the opportunity to brief the issue).

2.1.2 Adequate record for review

The district court must create a record for review which includes “a listing of all the cases and 

motions that led [it] to conclude that a vexatious litigant order was needed.” De Long, 912 F.2d at 

1147. The record must at least show, in some manner, “that the litigant’s activities were numerous 

or abusive. Id.

In Baldini Real Estate, Inc. v. Cruz, an unlawful detainer case, the court imposed a prefiling 

order requiring the defendant to seek leave before again removing the case. No. 15-cv-04231-JCS, 

2015 WL 6725079 at *4–*5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2015), report and recommendation adopted by 

No. 15-cv-04231-YGR, 2015 WL 6692272 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015). There, the defendant had 

removed the case once before. Id. at *1. On that first removal, the court remanded the case 

because removal was not timely and the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. But the 

defendant again removed the case. Id. at *2. On the second removal, the court found that “there 

[was] an adequate record of abuse of the removal procedure” to impose a prefiling order. Id. at *4. 

The court reasoned: first, the “second Notice of Removal fail[ed] to adequately respond to the 

reasons” for the initial remand; second, the defendant stated at the hearing “that he intended to 

 

25 Order — ECF No. 16.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 7 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

delay the action to allow himself more time to obtain a lawyer”; and third, “there [was] a record of 

[the defendant] submitting numerous improper bankruptcy filings for the purpose of delay.” Id.

Here, unlike Cruz, the record does not support a prefiling order. Unlike Cruz, this is the first 

time that Ms. Torres removed the case and she has not declared an intent to delay the proceedings. 

The current record therefore does not demonstrate Ms. Torres’s abuse of the removal procedure 

and does not warrant a prefiling order. Cf. Cruz, 2015 WL 6725079 at *1, *4 (declaring the 

defendant a vexatious litigant where the defendant had removed the case once before); PNC Bank 

Nat’l Assoc. v .Ahluwali, No. 3:15-cv-01264-LB (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2015), report and 

recommendation adopted by No. C 15-01264 WHA, 2015 WL 3866892 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2015) 

(finding the defendant a vexatious litigant where the defendant removed the case five times); Bank 

of New York Mellon v. Brewer, No. C-12-03179 RMW, 2012 WL 3904342 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 

2012) (concluding that the defendants were vexatious litigants where they removed the case three 

times).

Baldini, however, argues that Ms. Torres’s removal is just one of several steps intended to 

delay the foreclosure proceeding.

26 For example, it argues that like Cruz, Ms. Torres has used the 

bankruptcy system to delay and avoid foreclosure. She transferred the Daly City property to a 

“company that had filed bankruptcy in order to obtain the protection of the [bankruptcy’s] 

automatic stay” even though the company in bankruptcy “did not have any ties to the subject 

property” or Ms. Torres.27 She also “filed for bankruptcy herself in an attempt to stop the 

foreclosure sale,” but the bankruptcy judge dismissed Ms. Torres’s case because she did not 

comply with one of the court’s orders.28 This was just one of Ms. Torres’s three bankruptcy suits: 

the first was in March 2011, which was dismissed for failing to make payments; the second was in 

January 2012, which was discharged.29 And separately, without following proper “meet and 

 

26 See Motion to Remand at 4–5, 8–9.

27 Kenny Decl. — ECF No. 7, ¶ 6, Ex. E.

28 Id. ¶ 7, Ex. F.

29 Id. ¶ 8, Ex. G.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 8 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

confer” and notice procedures in state court, Ms. Torres filed a demurrer, which the court 

overruled.30

Ms. Torres’s use of the bankruptcy system may or may not be an attempt to delay the 

foreclosure. Unlike in Cruz, however, there is no existing prefiling order that requires Ms. Torres 

to obtain leave of court before filing new bankruptcy actions. See 2015 WL 6725079 at *3. And 

more importantly, there is no evidence that Ms. Torres’s removal was an abuse of the system 

designed to delay the case. This conclusion may change, however, if Ms. Torres again removes the 

case (without any basis justifying its propriety).

2.1.3 Substantive findings of frivolousness or harassment

The district court must make “substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the 

litigant’s actions.” De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148 (quoting In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 431). It must find 

the litigant's claims to be frivolous after looking at “both the number and content of the filings as 

indicia of the frivolousness,” or, alternatively, find that the claims show a pattern of harassment. 

Id. (quoting In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 431) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Ms. Torres improperly removed the case, wrongfully asserting federal-question 

jurisdiction (see above). Ms. Torres’s misunderstanding of removal jurisdiction, as a pro se 

litigant, may be understandable. But the well-pleaded-complaint rule is well defined and clear, and 

the court warns her that future removals on the same basis may result in a prefiling order and 

sanctions. See Cruz, 2015 WL 6725079 at *5 (noting that “a pro se litigant’s misunderstanding of 

the law may in some circumstances be understandable” but that the plaintiff there could not “claim 

ignorance as to his second removal after receiving the Court’s order remanding the case after his 

first removal”). 

 

30 Id. ¶¶ 11–13.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 9 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

2.1.4 Breadth of the order

The order “must be narrowly tailored to closely fit the specific vice encountered.” De Long, 

912 F.2d at 1148. An order preventing a litigant from filing any further actions without leave of 

court is overly broad and cannot stand. See id.; Moy, 906 F.2d at 470–71. So too is an order that 

states that the court will not allow a new action to be initiated unless the court deems the action 

“meritorious,” which is not possible to determine from pleadings alone; such an order “is not 

narrowly tailored to address the particular concern that [plaintiff] will continue to pursue frivolous 

litigation.” Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1066. 

Here, a narrowly tailored prefiling order would necessarily be directed only at future removals 

by Ms. Torres. But as described above, the record does not indicate repeated, abusive use of the 

removal procedure and thus the court does not think such an order is appropriate at this time.

* * *

In sum, the record does not support a prefiling order. As described above, though, if Ms. 

Torres attempts to remove the case on the same basis, a prefiling order may be appropriate.

2.2 Sanctions (Rule 11 and § 1447(c))

Baldini asks the court to sanction Ms. Torres under Rule 11 to send “a strong message that 

such impermissible conduct will not be tolerated by this Court” and to “deter any future abuse.”31

It asks for $3,150 in attorney’s fees.32

A defendant who removes a case improperly may be sanctioned under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447. In particular, § 1447(c) provides that “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment 

of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 

Here, the record does not warrant sanctions. This is the first time that Ms. Torres removed the case 

and, although wrong, she may reasonably have believed that RESPA would support federal-

 

31 Motion to Remand at 10.

32 Kenny Decl. ¶ 14; Proposed Order — ECF No. 13 at 2.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 10 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

question jurisdiction. But the court warns Ms. Torres that if she removes the case again on the 

same basis she risks being sanctioned. See Benson v. SI Handling Sys., Inc., 188 F.3d 780, 783 

(7th Cir. 1999) (“Multiple removals could encounter problems — could even lead to sanctions —

if nothing of significance changes between the first and second tries.”) (internal citation omitted).

The court denies Baldini’s request for sanctions.

3. Collateral Estoppel

Baldini argues that the court’s remand order “should be considered a final judgment on the 

issue of whether [Ms. Torres] can remove the Unlawful Detainer action” and should bar future 

attempts under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.33

“The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents parties from relitigating issues that have been 

resolved in an earlier action between the same parties or their privies.” Peterson v. Clark Leasing 

Corp., 451 F.2d 1291, 1292 (9th Cir. 1971). “Collateral estoppel applies if: (1) the issue sought to 

be relitigated is identical to one necessarily decided in a previous proceeding; (2) the previous 

proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral 

estoppel is asserted was a party (or was in privity with a party) in the prior proceeding.” E. Bay 

Law v. Ford Motor Co., No. 15-CV-04257-TEH, 2015 WL 7571809, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 

2015) (citing People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 692 (1974)).

Here, the issue of collateral estoppel is premature. Ms. Torres could remove the case on a new 

or different basis that this court has not considered. And Baldini cites no authority for the 

proposition that a court remanding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should consider the 

matter final for purposes of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (dismissal for lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits); E. Bay Law, 2015 WL 7571809 

at *3 (“The dismissal of a prior federal case for failure to plead jurisdiction does not bar removal 

of a subsequent state case, so long as the jurisdictional defects are cured in the second suit.”); but 

 

33 Motion to Remand at 9.

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 11 of 12
ORDER — No. 16-cv-06771-LB 12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

see Hohu v. Hatch, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (applying collateral estoppel to 

dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). The court therefore denies this request.

CONCLUSION

The court remands the case to the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. The 

court denies Baldini’s requests to designate Ms. Torres a vexatious litigant, impose a prefiling 

order, order sanctions, and consider the decision final for purposes of collateral estoppel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 20, 2016

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:16-cv-06771-LB Document 19 Filed 12/20/16 Page 12 of 12