Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02328/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02328-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
UBS Financial Services Inc.
Defendant
David Waisbein
Plaintiff

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Plaintiff, in turn, responded to defendant’s supplemental declaration by filing an

objection thereto. Because consideration of the supplemental declaration does not affect

the Court’s decision with respect to defendant’s motion for an order shortening time, the

Court denies plaintiff’s objection as moot.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID WAISBEIN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES INC.,

Defendant

 /

No. C-07-2328 MMC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING

TIME FOR HEARING ON DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY

The Court is in receipt of defendant UBS Financial Services Inc.’s motion, filed

January 11, 2008, seeking an order “Shortening Time for Hearing on Defendant UBS

Financial Service Inc.’s Motion to Stay Discovery.” Essentially simultaneously therewith,

defendant filed a Motion to Stay, noticed for hearing on February 15, 2008, as well as a

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment,

noticed for hearing on February 22, 2008. Thereafter, plaintiff David Waisbein filed

opposition to defendant’s motion for an order shortening time, to which defendant

responded by filing a supplemental declaration.1

Case 3:07-cv-02328-MMC Document 52 Filed 01/17/08 Page 1 of 3
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The discovery in question was initially served by plaintiff on defendant on August

28, 2007. (See Yu Decl., filed January 16, 2008, ¶ 3.) Through a series of stipulations, the

most recent having been made “prior to January 4,” the parties agreed to extend the

deadline by which defendant was required to respond thereto. (See id. ¶ 6.)

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In its motion to stay, defendant argues it is entitled to a stay of discovery until the

Court has ruled on the merits of defendant’s dispositive motion, because, inter alia, there

exists a “substantial likelihood” the Court will grant defendant’s dispositive motion. In its

motion for an order shortening time, defendant observes it is currently required to respond

to plaintiff’s discovery requests on January 18, 2008,2 and asserts that if the Court does not

conduct a hearing on defendant’s motion to stay before January 18, 2008, defendant’s

motion for a stay will become “moot.” Consequently, defendant argues, good cause exists

to hear its motion to stay on shortened time.

Because plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s motion for an order shortening time was

not due until January 16, 2008, see Civil L.R. 6-3(c), and the parties, in conformity with the

Court’s Standing Orders, delivered on January 17, 2008 a chambers copy of the

documents they electronically filed on January 16, 2008, the Court has not had, until

today’s date, the opportunity to consider the propriety of defendant’s motion for an order

shortening time. In any event, were the Court to find the motion to stay raises an issue

appropriate for determination on shortened time, the Court would first need to afford

plaintiff some opportunity to file a response as to the merits of the motion to stay. Needless

to say, a decision rendered under such rushed circumstances is rarely warranted, even if,

as defendant appears to assume, the Court were in a position to cease work on all other

pending matters. In this instance, the motion to stay, as noted, is based on an asserted

likelihood that defendant’s dispositive motion will be found meritorious. Consequently, in

order to determine whether defendant is entitled to a stay of discovery, the Court would be

required, on essentially little to no time, to determine the merits of defendant’s dispositive

motion.

In that regard, the Court further observes that the ground on which defendant’s

dispositive motion is premised – plaintiff’s having filed a claim under the Private Attorneys

Case 3:07-cv-02328-MMC Document 52 Filed 01/17/08 Page 2 of 3
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According to plaintiff, plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, in which he first alleged

his PAGA claim, was filed in state court on or about January 16, 2007, whereas the

approval to file such a claim was not provided until February 9, 2007.

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General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) before plaintiff had obtained a notice from the Labor and

Workforce Development Agency allowing him to file a PAGA claim – was known to

defendant for at least two months before such motion was filed. (See Primo Decl., filed

November 2, 2007, ¶ 3.)3

 Defendant offers no explanation as to why it delayed filing such

dispositive motion until only one week before it was required to respond to plaintiff’s

requests for discovery. Put another way, the situation defendant is attempting to address,

by having its motion to stay heard on shortened time, was created entirely by defendant.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for an order shortening time is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2008 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-02328-MMC Document 52 Filed 01/17/08 Page 3 of 3