Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01019/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01019-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Lee Saltzman
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

FILL D 

PUBLISH United State& Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 2 1993 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 92-1019 

) 

DANIEL LEE SALTZMAN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

OH APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. Ho. 91-CR-342) 

Vicki Marani (Michael J. Norton, United States Attorney, and Craig 

F . Wallace, Assistant United States Attorney, Distr ict of 

Colorado; Patty Merkamp Stemler, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief), United States Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Vicki Mandell-King {Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, with 

her on the brief), Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, 

Colorado , for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY , Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, 

and KELLY, circuit Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge . 

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 1 
The Government appeals the district court's s ua sponte 

dismissal with prejudice of the information filed against Da niel 

Lee Saltzman. The district court concluded the seven-month time 

period between Saltzman's arrest and filing o f the information 

constituted a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S .C. 

§§3161-3174 (1985 ) . The issues presented are whether the delay 

in charging the Defendant mandates dismissal, 

dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate remedy. 

I. 

and whether 

On March 14, 1991, Daniel Lee Saltzman obtained one liter of 

phenyl- 2 -propanone (P2P) 1 from an undercover agent and was 

subsequently arrested. After executing a valid search warrant, 

the agent found chemicals and supplies used for manufacturing 

methamphetamine in Saltzman's garage. On April 3, 1991, the 

Defendant orally "waived" his right to an indictment within thirty 

days guaranteed by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), after indicating to the 

magistrate judge that he understood this right. The Defendant 

executed a written "waiver" of his right to a speedy indictment on 

April 18, 1991. On May 8, 1991, the Defendant was once again 

brought before a magistrate judge and both counsel agreed that the 

Defendant would "waive" his rights to a speedy indictment until 

July 1, 1991. A similar situation occurred on July 12, 1991, 2 

1 P2P is an essential precursor chemical for the manufacture of 

metharnphetamine. 

2 We note there exists a lapse in the time period. The 

indictment was waived until July 1; on July 12 another waiver was 

executed, but there exists no waiver for the time in between. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 2 
extending the speedy indictment waiver until August 23, 1991. 

Subsequently, at least two more continuances were granted 

before an information was finally filed on October 7, 1991. 

Despite at least nine opportunities, the magistrate judges never 

made the specific findings required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (A) 

"that the ends of justice served by [granting a continuance] 

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial." The prosecutor and defense counsel also neglected 

to request that such findings be made . 

During this seven-month delay, the Defendant was incarcerated 

for the first thirty-three days but then agreed to assist the 

Government as an informant and was released. This cooperation 

proved helpful to the Defendant because the plea agreement 

executed halved the Defendant's potential sentence. 3 This 

agreement was never entered, however, due to the trial court's sua 

sponte dismissal . 

~he trial court noticed the lack of these essential findings 

3 The plea agreement placed the Defendant at an offense level of 

12, yielding a potential sentence of fifteen to twenty-one months, 

as opposed to a level of 20 with a range of forty-one to fifty-one 

months, which the Defendant would have received under the original 

charge. The discrepancy in offense levels can be attributed to 

the fact that the original charge was for possession of P2P with 

intent to manufacture methamphetamine, which is given a higher 

drug equivalency conversion than mere possession of P2P, the 

charge in the plea. United States Sentencing Commission, 

Guidelines Manual, § 2Dl.1 (Drug Equivalency Tables) at 86 (Nov. 

1991) . 

- 3-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 3 
and acted sua sponte in dismissing the information with prejudice. 

The court reasoned that no waiver occurred because (1 ) the waiver 

was not knowing, informed and voluntary, and (2 ) the Defendant's 

purported waivers were invalid as a matter of law. The court 

appl ied the standards enunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a ) (1 ) in 

determining the appropriate sanction was dismissal with prejudice . 

II. 

The dual purpose of the Speedy Trial Act is to protect a 

defendant's constitutional right to a speedy indictment and trial, 

and to serve the public interest in bringing prompt criminal 

proceedings. United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 1686 (1991). Accordingly, 

§ 3161(b) requires an indictment or information be filed within 

thirty days of the arrest. 4 On its face, the Government violated 

this provision. 

Delays causing an indictment or information to be filed in 

excess of thirty days may be excludable under§ 316l{h). The 

exceptions in § 316l(h) are exclusive. United States V. 

Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382, 388 (3rd Cir. 1981). The only 

applicable exception for this case is§ 316l(h) (8), which excludes 

4 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) provides in pertinent part: 

(b) Any information or indictment charging an 

individual with the commission of an offense shall be 

filed within thirty days from the date on which such 

individual was arrested or served with a surranons in 

connection with such charges. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 4 
any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted on the 

basis of a judge's findings that the ends of justice served by the 

continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

defendant in a speedy trial. 5 The factors to be considered in 

making ends of justice findings are provided in§ 3161(h) (8) (B). 

The Third Circuit explains the dual purpose of making these 

findings: 

First, Congress wanted to insure that a district judge 

would give careful consideration when balancing the need 

for delay against "the interest of the defendant and of 

society in achieving speedy trial." Second, the 

requirement provides a record so that an appellate court 

may review the decision. 

United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 520 (3rd Cir. 1982) 

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073 (1983). The 

specific language in§ 316l(h) (8) (A) states periods of delay are 

not excludable unless the court sets forth "ends of justice" 

findings either orally or in writing. The record is completely 

void of such findings. 

5 Section 3161(h) (8) (A) specifically excludes: 

'Any period of delay resulting from a continuance 

granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request 

of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the 

attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such 

continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends 

of justice served by taking such action outweigh the 

best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a 

continuance granted by the court in accordance with this 

paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection 

unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, 

either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding 

that the ends of justice served by the granting of such 

continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

-sAppellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 5 
The Tenth Circuit also recognizes the importance of 

enunciating the "ends of justice" findings . "Fail u re to address 

these issues on the record creates the unnecessary risk o f 

granting c ont inuances for the wrong purposes, a nd encourages 

overuse of this narrow exception. " United States v. Doran, 882 

F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1989 ) . Other circuits concur in 

holding no excludable delays are permitted without "ends of 

justice" findings. United States v. Perez-Reveles, 715 F . 2d 1348, 

1352 (9th Cir. 1983); Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d at 389-90; United 

States v. New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368, 376 n.12 (2d 

Cir. 1979 ) . Further, the findings must occur contemporaneously 

with the continuance because Congress intended that the decision 

should be prospective, not retroactive. Doran, 882 F.2d at 1516. 

Therefore, the magistrate judges' failure to make "ends of 

justice" findings at each continuance precludes an examining court 

from justifying the continuances retroactively. 

The Government contends that Mr. Saltzman knowingly waived 

his right to a speedy indictment. This contention fallaciously 

assumes a defendant has the authority to waive the speedy 

indictment provision. The right to a speedy indictment belongs to 

both the defendant and society. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d at 389. 

Therefore, provisions of the Speedy Trial Act cannot be waived by 

a defendant acting unilaterally because it would compromise the 

public interest in speedy justice. United States v. Willis, 958 

F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Berberian, 851 F.2d 

-6-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 6 
236, 239 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989); 

United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 433-434 (1st Cir. 1984 ) . 

This interpretation comports with Congress' intent . 

Committee made clear, 

The Senate 

in the strongest possible terms, that any construction 

which holds that any of the provisions of the Speedy 

Trial Act is waivable by the defendant, ... is contrary 

to legislative intent and subversive of its primary 

objective: protection of the societal interest in 

speedy disposition of criminal cases by prevent ing undue 

delay in bringing such cases to trial. 

S . Rep . No. 212, 96th Cong . , 1st Sess. 29 (1979). 

Consequently, the Defendant's purported "waivers" of his 

right to a speedy indictment do not extend the statutory thirtyday period in which an indictment must be filed. "The fact that 

the defendant has requested the continuance or consents to it is 

not in itself sufficient to toll the operation of the time 

limits." Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 

Amended Speedy Trial Act Guidelines (Aug . 1981) , reprinted in 

Robert L. Misner, Speedy Trial Federal and State Practice, app . B 

775 (1983). It is incumbent on the court to make the necessary 

§ 3161(h) (8) (a) findings before a court may grant a continuance. 

Perez-Reveles, 715 F.2d at 1352 . Therefore, we find an attempted 

"waiver" by the Defendant is necessarily invalid unless the court 

simultaneously makes "ends of justice" findings . See 

Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d at 390 . "It would be inconsistent with the 

statutory scheme to permit a defendant, through a purported 

'waiver,' to relieve the court of this obligation. " 

Speedy Trial Act; Guidelines at 776. 

-7-

Amended 

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 7 
Because the filing of the indictment or information lies 

entirely within the prosecutor's discretion, it is ultimately the 

obligation of the Government to ensure compliance with the Speedy 

Trial Act. As the Supreme Court points out in Doggett v. United 

States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693-94 (1992 ) , "[t]he Government, 

indeed, can hardly complain too loudly, for persistent neglect in 

concluding a criminal prosecution indicates an uncommonly feeble 

interest in bringing an accused to justice; the more weight the 

Government attaches to securing a conviction, the harder it will 

try to get it." 

The courts share with the government the responsibility t o 

protect the speedy trial rights of both the defendant and society. 

Doran, 882 F.2d at 1517. The magistrate judges' collective 

failure to make any § 3161 (h) (8) (a) "ends of justice" findings is 

a blatant disregard to detail and an abandonment of their 

obligation to protect the rights of the Defendant and of the 

public. Moreover, the statute imposes an obligation upon the 

court to reject a waiver offered by the Defendant. Pringle, 751 

F.2d at 434. 

The applicable law is clear. The fact that a defendant is 

desirous of waiving his right to receive an information does not 

result in a waiver. An effective waiver occurs only if the judge 

considered the defined factors and concluded the ends of justice 

are served by an acceptance of the defendant's waiver. We can 

-8-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 8 
sympathize with the fact that magistrate judges must face a large 

number of cases; however, a busy docket does not excuse a 

magistrate judge's failure to accomplish a mandatory duty imposed 

by law. The prosecutor should not lose sight of the fact that she 

is more than a prosecutor; she represents the people and for this 

reason shares the obligation to assure the mandates of the law are 

followed . In the case before us, the system failed. Mr. Saltzman 

was desirous of waiving his rights to the prompt filing of an 

information in return for a lesser sentence, while the prosecutor 

and the magistrate judges were oblivious to their obligations to 

protect the public's concomitant rights as mandated by law. 

We concur with the district court's conclusion to dismiss the 

information. We review the disposition of a Speedy Trial Act 

issue for clear error as to factual findings and de nova as to 

application of legal standards. Berberian, 851 F.2d at 239. The 

factual findings of a violation of the Speedy Trial Act are well 

substantiated. The district court correctly applied the first 

sentence in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1) 6 requiring mandatory dismissal 

of the information when the Act is violated. See United States v. 

Peeples, 811 F.2d 849, 850 (5th Cir. 1987). 

6 18 U.S.C. § 3162{a) (1) begins: 

If, in the case of any individual against whom a 

complaint is filed charging such individual with an 

offense, no indictment or information is filed within 

the time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended 

by section 3161{h) of this chapter, such charge against 

that individual contained in such complaint shall be 

dismissed or otherwise dropped. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 9 
III. 

In determining whether to dismiss the information with or 

without prejudice for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, the 

district court should consider the following factors listed in 

§ 3162(a) (1 ) : "[T]he seriousness of the offense; the facts and 

circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the 

impact of reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and 

on the administration of justice. 11 The district court's 

determination will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. 

Peeples, 811 F.2d at 850. Because "Congress has declared that a 

decision will be governed by consideration of particular factors," 

appellate review is limited to ascertaining "whether a district 

court has ignored or slighted a factor that Congress has deemed 

pertinent to the choice of remedy. 11 United States v. Taylor, 487 

U.S. 326, 336-337 (1988). It is imperative for the district 

court, however, to "carefully consider those factors as applied to 

the particular case and ... clearly articulate their effect". Id. 

at 336. Because Congress put in place meaningful standards, 

review must ensure the purposes of the Act are put into effect. 

Id. The Supreme Court notes, "a decision calling for the exercise 

of judicial discretion 'hardly means that it is unfettered by 

meaningful standards or shielded from thorough appellate review.'" 

Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co.v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 

(1975)). 

-10-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 10 
The district court erred in interpreting from the legislative 

history that a dismissal without prejudice is only available in 

"exceptional circu.mstances." 7 The Supreme Court specifically 

rejected this reading of the legislative history and stated: 

"[W]e are unwilling to read such a preference into the statute, 

which evinces no presumptions. " Taylor, 487 U. S . at 335 n.8. 

Thus, the district court misapplied the law in assuming dismissal 

with prejudice is the preferred remedy. 

Because the district court began its analysis with an 

incorrect premise as to the determination of the appropriate 

remedy, we will reexamine the factors enunciated in § 3162(a) (1) 

to ensure these factors are carefully considered and the purpose 

of the Act is effectuated, in accordance with Taylor. 

A. SERIOUSNESS OF OFFENSE 

If the court determines the offense committed by the 

defendant is serious, this factor weighs in favor of dismissing 

without prejudice. See United States v. May, 819 F.2d 531 (5th 

Cir. 1987) . The district court correctly evaluated the 

Defendant's charge as serious. Obtaining P2P with the intent to 

manufacture methamphetamine is a serious drug- related crime . 8 

"When the charges are serious, courts should impose the sanction 

7 H.R . Rep. No. 96-390 indicates dismissal without prejudice 

should be the exception not the rule. 

8 Generally, felony drug charges have been treated as serious 

offenses. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337 - 38; United States v . 

Kottmyer, 961 F.2d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 1992); May, 819 F.2d at 534 . 

-11-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 11 
of dismissal with prejudice only f or a correspondingly serious 

delay, especially in the absence of a showing of prejudice." May, 

819 F . 2d at 534. 

B. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

In evaluating the second aspect of the test, facts and 

circumstances leading to the dismissal, the court should focus "on 

the culpability of the delay-producing conduct . " United States v. 

Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 925 (1st Cir.}, cert. denied, 488 U. S . 925 

(1988 } . The district court emphasized the Government's failure to 

file a timely indictment in compliance with the Speedy Trial Act, 

as well as the Defendant's lack of understanding of his speedy 

trial rights. While we agree the Government bears the burden of 

ensuring the Defendant's speedy trial rights are not violated, a 

violation mandates dismissal but does not on its face indicate 

whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. The 

district court should specifically articulate its reasoning behind 

the determination that the second factor merits dismissal with 

prejudice. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337. 

Beyond citing the Government's responsibility in filing a 

timely indictment, the district court only referenced two 

particular facts or circumstances which it feels support dismissal 

with prejudice. First, the district court cited the Government's 

alleged failure to conform with the requirements of the Bail 

Reform Act. The dismissal provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 

however, may not be used to remedy other violations. See 

-12-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 12 
Hastings, 847 F.2d at 927. Thus, any detention that allegedly 

violated the Bail Reform Act is irrelevant when considering Speedy 

Trial Act remedies. 

Second, the district court questioned the adequacy of defense 

counsel's advice, concluding the Defendant's acquiescence to the 

delays was ill-informed. Not only do we disagree that the 

Defendant's acquiescence was unknowing, but we conclude the record 

indicates the delays were equally attributable to both the defense 

counsel and the Government. During the hearing on April 3, 1991, 

the Defendant acknowledged his understanding of the speedy 

indictment right upon questioning of the court yet acquiesced to a 

purported "waiver" of that right. During the May 8, 1991 hearing, 

defense counsel reiterated the government's request to "waive" 

speedy indictment rights, and on July 12, 1991, defense counsel 

made a concurrent motion for the permanent abandonment of the 

Defendant's speedy indictment right. Further, the signed 

purported "waiver" of the Defendant's speedy indictment right 

indicates that the Defendant's acquiescence was indeed knowing. 

The record provides no indication that the Defendant did not fully 

understand his right to a thirty-day indictment. 

In fact, the 

rights in an effort 

informant and thus 

Defense counsel's 

indictment rights 

Defendant disregarded his speedy indictment 

to cooperate with the Government as an 

gain the advantage of a lesser sentence. 

non-assertion of the Defendant's speedy 

was a strategic ploy designed to reduce the 

-13 -

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 13 
charge or sentence imposed against the Defendant. The plea 

agreement the parties sought to enter charged the Defendant with 

the crime of possession with intent to distribute P

2P, instead of 

the original charge of possession with intent to manufacture 

methamphetamine, cutting the Defendant's potential sentence range 

in half. 

Where the delay is the result of intentional dilatory 

conduct, or a pattern of neglect on the part of the Government, 

dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate remedy. Kottmyer, 961 

F.2d at 573. Conversely, "[a] defendant who waits passively while 

the time runs has less claim to dismissal with prejudice than does 

a defendant who demands, but does not receive, prompt attention." 

United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 982 (1988). In this situation, the Defendant did 

not only wait passively, but completely acquiesced to the 

postponement of his indictment. Similarly, in Peeples, the 

defendant also attempted to execute a "waiver" of his speedy trial 

rights. The court reasoned since the defendant was at least 

partially responsible for the delay, it "substantially undercuts 

any weight the length of the delay may have had in favor of 

dismissal with prejudice" . Peeples, 811 F.2d at 851. Because 

Saltzman knowingly acquiesced to speedy indictment delay, and the 

delay was attributable largely to Saltzman's cooperation with the 

Government for a reduced sentence, the facts and circumstances 

leading 

prejudice. 

to the dismissal would favor a dismissal without 

-14-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 14 
C. IMPACT OF REPROSECOTION ON ADMINISTRATION OF ACT AND JUSTICE 

In concluding 

administration of 

dismissal with prejudice serves the 

the Act and justice, the district court relied 

primarily on two arguments. First, the district court explained, 

"[t]o grant dismissal without prejudice would sanction the conduct 

described herein and undermine the Act." The Supreme Court, 

however, has specifically rejected this notion. If the "deterrent 

effect of barring reprosecution could alone support a decision to 

dismiss with prejudice, the consideration of the other [statutory] 

factors ... would be superfluous, and all violations would warrant 

barring reprosecution." Taylor, 487 U.S . at 342. The Supreme 

Court also emphasizes that dismissal without prejudice is not a 

toothless sanction but forces the Government to obtain a new 

indictment and raises potential statute of limitations problems. 

Id . 

Second, the district court also emphasized the importance of 

the§ 3161(h) (8) (A) findings on the administration of justice. 

The court concluded mandatory dismissal serves the administration 

of justice but never addressed whether dismissal with or without 

prejudice better served the administration of justice with 

reference to the facts in this particular case. 

We conclude the administration of justice in this instance is 

best served by d i smissing without prejudice and allowing 

reprosecution. In making this determination, a court should 

-15-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 15 
consider the prejudice suffered by the defendant from the delay. 

Kottmyer, 961 F.2d at 573. The district court neglected to 

evaluate whether the delay caused any prejudice to the Defendant. 

Although the Supreme Court clarifies that prejudice to the 

defendant should not be the dispositive factor, the Court notes 

"there is little doubt that Congress intended this factor to be 

relevant for a district court's consideration." Taylor, 487 U.S. 

at 334. 

Saltzman suffered no prejudice as a result of the seven-month 

delay prior to the filing of his information. Because his 

cooperation with the Government led to a reduced charge, the delay 

proved beneficial to Saltzman. In his brief, Saltzman claims he 

suffered prejudice from his incarceration, and did not receive a 

favorable plea agreement. Because Saltzman was released after 

thirty-three days of incarceration, he suffered minimal prejudice 

as a result of the failure to file an indictment within thirty 

days. Although Saltzman waived his right to contest pretrial 

detention, any prejudice endured resulting from an unknowing 

waiver of this right cannot be converted into prejudice resulting 

from not obtaining a speedy indictment. Speedy indictment 

prejudice would not commence until the thirtieth day, and in this 

case is held to be minimal. Further, the plea agreement reduced 

the Defendant's potential sentence in half. See supra n . 3 . 

Finally, the defendant has a burden under the Act to show specific 

prejudice other than that occasioned by the original filing. 

United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1987); Peeples, 

-16-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 16 
811 F.2d at 852. Because the Defendant failed to sustain his 

burden, the administration of justice is best served by dismissal 

without prejudice . 

Therefore, the totality of the factors considered under 

§ 3162 (a ) (1 ) leads us to conclude dismissal without prejudice is 

the appropriate remedy. 

AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The matter is 

REMANDED to the District Court for such further proceedings as may 

be appropriate in accordance with this opinion. 

-17-

Appellate Case: 92-1019 Document: 010110159205 Date Filed: 01/22/1993 Page: 17