Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cr-00090/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cr-00090-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Danado Eugene Moore
Defendant
Antonio Nicholas Smith
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANADO EUGENE MOORE and 

ANTONIO NICHOLAS SMITH,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cr-00090-JAM

ORDER DISMISSING INDICTMENT

AGAINST DEFENDANT MOORE 

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Danado Eugene Moore (“Mr. Moore”) is charged with 

one count of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ECF No. 14. On August 26, 2016, Assistant 

United States Attorney Timothy Delgado (“Mr. Delgado”) called Mr. 

Moore’s attorney, Sean Riordan (“Mr. Riordan”), and stated that 

“the government had changed course with respect to Defendant 

Moore, and intended to dismiss the indictment against him.” 

Delgado Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 35-1. Neither attorney memorialized 

the conversation in writing on the date the conversation 

occurred. Tr. 3, Sept. 6, 2016, ECF No. 30. Three days later, 

Mr. Riordan sent Mr. Delgado an email stating that “the defense 

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would like to see [the dismissal] happen as soon as possible.” 

Ex. A4 to Riordan Decl., ECF No. 34-5. Mr. Delgado did not 

respond to Mr. Riordan’s email. Delgado Decl. ¶ 10. Mr. Riordan 

sent Mr. Delgado another email on September 1, 2016, inquiring 

about “the Rule 48(a) filing.” Ex. A5 to Riordan Decl. Later 

that day, Mr. Delgado called Mr. Riordan and said that “in light 

of recent case developments . . . the [G]overnment would not be 

dismissing the charge against Defendant Moore.” Id. ¶ 11. 

On September 6, 2016, the case came before this Court for a 

trial confirmation hearing. See ECF No. 26. The Court 

instructed the parties to “brief the issue of whether [the Court] 

should enter a dismissal based on the [G]overnment’s 

representation” that it would dismiss the indictment against Mr. 

Moore. Tr. 6. The Government and the defense both submitted 

briefs on whether the Court should dismiss the indictment against 

Mr. Moore. ECF Nos. 34, 35. For the reasons set forth below, 

the Court concludes that the indictment against Mr. Moore must be 

dismissed. 

II. OPINION

Contract law principles apply in the context of promises 

made to defendants by prosecutors. See e.g. United States v. 

Weaver, 905 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1990) (analyzing estoppel with 

respect to a federal agent’s promise of immunity); Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (“[P]lea bargains are 

essentially contracts.”); United States v. Washington, 887 F. 

Supp. 2d 1077, 1099 (D. Mont. 2012), adhered to on 

reconsideration, 2012 WL 4602838 (D. Mont. Oct. 2, 2012)

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(analyzing promissory estoppel in defendants’ motions to dismiss 

indictments). 

Mr. Moore argues that the Court should dismiss the 

indictment in this case under the doctrine of promissory 

estoppel. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 8, ECF No. 34. To 

successfully invoke promissory estoppel, the promisee must show 

“(1) the existence of a promise, (2) which the promisor 

reasonably should have expected to induce the promisee's 

reliance, (3) which actually induces such reliance, (4) that such 

reliance is reasonable, and (5) that injustice can only be 

avoided by enforcement of the promise.” Washington, 887 F. Supp. 

2d at 1099 (citing Aguilar v. Intl. Longshoremen's Union Loc. No. 

10, 966 F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1992)). The promise must be 

clear and unambiguous. Id. 

It is uncontroverted Mr. Delgado made a clear and 

unambiguous promise to dismiss Mr. Moore during his August 26, 

2016 conversation with Mr. Riordan. Mr. Riordan unequivocally 

stated in his declaration that Mr. Delgado told Mr. Riordan “that 

the Government would dismiss the case against Mr. Moore.” 

Riordan Decl. ¶ 7. This promise is also evidenced by the email 

Mr. Riordan sent to Mr. Delgado on August 29, 2016 asking Mr. 

Delgado to file the Rule 48(a) dismissal as soon as possible. 

Ex. A4 to Riordan Decl. Furthermore, Mr. Delgado does not 

contest that he told Mr. Riordan he would dismiss the indictment. 

In fact, Mr. Delgado indicates in his declaration that he told 

Mr. Riordan “that the government had changed course with respect 

to Defendant Moore and intended to dismiss the indictment against 

him.” Delgado Decl. ¶ 4. Mr. Delgado also never responded to 

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Mr. Riordan’s August 29 email to indicate that anything Mr. 

Riordan had stated in his email was incorrect or that his promise 

to dismiss the indictment was conditional in any manner. Indeed, 

if Mr. Delgado had changed his mind or intended to add 

undisclosed conditions to the promise to dismiss the indictment 

against Mr. Moore, he should have responded to Mr. Riordan 

immediately to clarify the Government’s intent. At no time did 

the government indicate in writing that it was withdrawing or 

adding conditions to its promise to dismiss Mr. Moore. 

The second element—reasonable expectation of reliance—is 

also present here. Mr. Delgado clearly and reasonably expected 

Mr. Riordan to rely on Mr. Delgado’s promise to dismiss the 

indictment as evidenced by Mr. Delgado’s statement in his 

declaration that he “was aware that [Mr. Riordan] was 

contemplating a lengthy discovery motion” and Mr. Delgado “wanted 

to notify [Mr.] Riordan without delay so as to spare him any 

unnecessary work over the coming weekend.” Delgado Decl. ¶ 14. 

Additionally, Mr. Riordan told Mr. Delgado that “his client would 

be happy to hear the news.” Id. ¶ 8. The evidence demonstrates

that Mr. Delgado “reasonably expected” that his promise to 

dismiss the indictment would induce Mr. Riordan to (1) stop 

working on the discovery motion and other trial preparation; and 

(2) tell his client that the Government would dismiss the federal 

charge against him.

As to the third element of promissory estoppel, it is clear

that Mr. Moore and Mr. Riordan actually relied on Mr. Delgado’s 

promise. Mr. Riordan indicates that based on Mr. Delgado’s 

representation, Mr. Riordan “met with [Mr. Moore] to relay the 

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good news to him.” Riordan Decl. ¶ 9. Mr. Riordan also 

indicated in a request to the Court that he had “stopped work on 

the case—including stopping forensic analysis of the firearm in 

question and stopping a social science expert’s work.” Def.’s 

Req. at 2, ECF No. 24. 

There is no dispute that, as to the fourth element of 

promissory estoppel, Mr. Moore’s and Mr. Riordan’s reliance was 

reasonable. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 

Professional Conduct implore attorneys to keep clients informed 

of the status of the client’s case. Model Rules of Prof’l 

Conduct r. 1.4(a). It was both reasonable and ethically expected 

of Mr. Riordan to inform Mr. Moore that the Government intended 

to dismiss the federal charge against him. It was also 

reasonable for Mr. Riordan to stop working on the discovery 

motion and other trial preparation. In fact, as noted above, the 

government told Mr. Riordan on Friday, August 26, 2016 of its 

intent to dismiss Mr. Moore “without delay so as to spare him any 

unnecessary work over the coming weekend.” See Delgado Decl. 

¶ 14. 

Lastly, injustice against Mr. Moore can only be avoided by 

enforcing the government’s promise to dismiss the indictment. 

Mr. Moore remains in jail on the federal charge as of the date of 

this Order, nearly a month after Mr. Moore was informed that the 

indictment against him would be dismissed. Mr. Delgado’s failure 

to follow through with his promise has also created the risk of 

“undermining Mr. Moore’s trust in counsel and interfering with 

the attorney/client relationship.” Mot. to Dismiss at 9. 

Furthermore, because of Mr. Delgado’s promise to dismiss the 

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indictment, Mr. Riordan stopped his discovery, investigation and 

trial preparation efforts on this case. Mr. Riordan lost several 

critical days of preparation for Mr. Moore’s impending trial. 

While the government argues that dismissal of the indictment is 

too drastic of a remedy under the circumstances, the Court 

disagrees. Dismissal is necessary to ensure justice. This Court 

admittedly holds federal prosecutors to a higher standard than 

the usual litigant and expects them to follow through on their 

promises. The Court can think of no promise more significant than 

the one made in this case to dismiss Mr. Moore. It must be 

enforced. United States v. Hoffman, 2015 WL 5604419, at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. Sept. 23, 2015). “Courts expect even higher ethical 

standards from prosecutors.” Morrow v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 

App. 4th 1252, (1994), as modified (Jan. 5, 1995). 

Constitutional principles of due process and fundamental 

fairness also support dismissal of the indictment against Mr. 

Moore. The Ninth Circuit has stated that “fundamental fairness 

requires that promises made during plea-bargaining and analogous 

contexts be respected.” Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633 

(9th Cir. 2014). Additionally,

Defendants have a due process right to enforce 

governmental promises. Requiring the government to 

uphold the agreements into which it enters is a matter 

of great public interest. With respect to federal 

prosecutions, the courts’ concerns run even wider than 

protection of the defendant’s individual 

constitutional rights—to concerns for the honor of the 

government, public confidence in the fair 

administration of justice, and the effective 

administration of justice in a federal scheme of 

government.

United States v. Jensen, 996 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 (D. Utah 

2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Both the 

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private interest of Mr. Moore and public interest in the fair 

administration of justice oblige the Government to uphold the 

promise it made to Mr. Moore and his counsel. The government in 

a criminal case wields considerable power. Hoffman, 2015 WL 

5604419, at *3. It therefore “has a vital responsibility to 

criminal defendants, the courts, and to the public to exercise 

its powers responsibly and justly.” United States v. Gourley, 

2006 WL 2585027, at *4 (Sept. 7, 2006). A prosecutor’s word is 

his bond. In this case, on August 26, 2016 the government 

unequivocally and unconditionally told Mr. Moore’s attorney that 

the federal charge against his client would be dismissed. Given

the government’s refusal to now honor its promise to Mr. Moore, 

the Court is obligated to step in and enforce this promise. 

Accordingly, the indictment against Mr. Moore is dismissed.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court dismisses the 

indictment against Mr. Moore. The case will proceed against 

Defendant Antonio Smith. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 23, 2016

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