Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00582/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00582-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Buhler Barth GMBH
Defendant
Buhler Group
Defendant
Buhler, Inc.
Defendant
Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATIONWIDE AGRIBUSINESS 

INSURANCE COMPANY, a STATE 

corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

BUHLER BARTH GMBH, a Foreign 

Corporation, and DOES 1 

through 50,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-00582-JAM-EPG

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURIDSDICTION AND ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL 

ARBITRATION

Defendant Buhler Barth GMBH (“Buhler”) seeks an order to 

compel arbitration with Plaintiff Nationwide Agribusiness 

Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) or, in the alternative, to 

dismiss Nationwide’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(2) or, 

in the alternative, to dismiss Nationwide’s strict liability 

claim pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted (Doc. #19). Nationwide opposes the 

motion (Doc. #22).

As discussed below, the Court finds that it has specific 

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personal jurisdiction over Buhler. The Court further finds that 

Nationwide, as the subrogated insurer of Hilltop Ranch, Inc. 

(“Hilltop”), is required to abide by the valid and enforceable 

arbitration agreement entered into by Hilltop and Buhler. 

Because this finding dispositive, the Court does not reach 

Buhler’s motion to dismiss Nationwide’s strict liability claim.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Nationwide is an insurance company organized under the laws 

of California. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Buhler’s Notice 

of Removal, Attachment A (Doc. #1) at 6. Hilltop is a privately 

owned processor of almonds based in California. McDonald Aug. 3, 

2015 Decl. ¶3; McDonald Sept. 30, 2015 Decl. ¶5. Buhler is a 

German corporation centered in Freiberg am Neckar, Germany. 

Gustavsson Decl. ¶3-4.

On October 6, 2010, Buhler sold to Hilltop a Pasteurization 

System CCP10000 machine (“CCP10000”). Mot. at 2. The sale took 

place after telephonic and written negotiations between Hilltop 

and Buhler. Mot. at 3. The sale was finalized by an Order 

Confirmation, which included a section on General Conditions for 

Sale and Delivery (“General Conditions”). Gustavsson Decl. Exh. 

A, at 6-28. Section 72 of the General Conditions included the 

following arbitration clause: “[a]ll disputes arising out of or 

in connection with the Contract shall be finally settled under 

the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for October 7, 2015.

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Commerce.” Id. at 27.

Nationwide alleges that in the fall of 2013 the accumulation 

of almond dust in the valves of the CCP10000 caused the 

contamination of a batch of almonds that were to be processed and 

sold by Hilltop. Opp. at 2. Hilltop submitted a claim for their 

alleged losses under their insurance policy with Nationwide. Id. 

On or about March 3, 2014, Nationwide paid $150,000.00 to Hilltop 

in accordance with Hilltop’s insurance policy. Id.; FAC at 6.

Nationwide filed a complaint on February 23, 2015 in the 

California Superior Court for the County of Merced against 

Buhler, Inc. d/b/a Buhler Group (“Buhler, Inc.”). It then filed 

an amended complaint on March 3, 2015, adding Buhler Barth GMBH 

as a defendant. The complaint stated that Nationwide was 

“subrogated to the rights and entitled to enforce the remedies of 

Hilltop.” FAC at 6. Buhler, Inc. removed the case to federal 

court on April 15, 2015 (Doc. #1). On May 28, 2015, Plaintiff 

voluntary dismissed Buhler, Inc. pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i) 

(Doc. #14). As such, the case is proceeding only against Buhler 

Barth GMBH.

Nationwide brings two causes of action against Buhler. 

First, Nationwide alleges that Buhler was generally negligent 

because Buhler “negligently . . . reviewed, assessed, examined, 

manufactured, installed, designed and/or operated their business 

. . . so as to cause . . . the almonds to become contaminated.” 

FAC at 4. In support of this general negligence claim, 

Nationwide further alleges that Buhler negligently “hired, 

controlled, [and] supervised . . . work so as to cause . . . 

contamination of produce.” Id. Secondly, Nationwide alleges

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four claims of products liability, including strict liability, 

negligence, and breaches of implied and express warranties. Id.

at 5. Nationwide is seeking the reimbursement of the $150,000.00

it paid to Hilltop for damages related to the alleged 

contamination of Hilltop’s almond supply, as well as legal costs 

and prejudgement interest. Id. at 6.

On August 3, 2015, Buhler filed this motion to compel 

arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or, in the 

alternative to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in 

the alternative, to dismiss the strict liability claim for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (Doc. 

#19). Nationwide opposes the motion (Doc. #22).

II. OPINION

A. Jurisdiction

For the Court to rule on the motion to compel arbitration, 

it must first find that it has personal jurisdiction over Buhler. 

Buhler makes no objection to the Court exercising personal 

jurisdiction over it with respect to the motion to compel 

arbitration. Under normal circumstances, this would lead the 

Court to conclude that Buhler has waived any objections to 

personal jurisdiction. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des 

Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (“the requirement of 

personal jurisdiction . . . can . . . be waived”). A party can 

waive the requirement of personal jurisdiction explicitly or 

implicitly, including by simply appearing in court. Id.

However, Buhler alternatively and secondarily moves for 

dismissal under FRCP 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

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This raises an issue as to whether a defendant may temporarily 

waive its objections to the exercise of personal jurisdiction to 

allow the court to rule on a motion to compel arbitration, 

thereby preserving its ability to bring an alternative and 

secondary motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Court concludes that it must decide the jurisdictional 

issue before ruling on Buhler’s motion to compel arbitration. 

Though a party is allowed to submit alternative and inconsistent 

claims under FRCP 8(d)(2) and FRCP 8(d)(3), a motion asserting 

that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction must be made in the 

first responsive pleading. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h). As such, it 

would be improper for the Court to rule on the motion to compel 

arbitration by assuming that Buhler has temporarily waived 

personal jurisdiction objections, only to subsequently rule on 

Buhler’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.2

A federal district court has personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant in a diversity of citizenship case where 

(1) a state statute of the forum confers personal jurisdiction 

over the nonresident defendant and (2) the exercise of 

jurisdiction accords with federal constitutional principles of 

due process. Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1392 

 

2 The Court notes that at least one court has ruled on a motion 

to compel arbitration before ruling on a motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Roach v. Tate Publ’g & 

Enterprises, No. 1:15-cv-00917-SAB, 2015 WL 5092690 (E.D. Cal. 

Aug. 28, 2015). The court in Roach granted the motion to compel 

arbitration and denied the motion to dismiss based on personal 

jurisdiction. It would have been problematic for the court to 

compel arbitration only to subsequently rule that it did not have 

jurisdiction over the defendant. To avoid such a problem, the 

Court believes it is best to decide the jurisdictional issue 

first.

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(9th Cir. 1984). With regard to the first requirement, section 

410.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure permits the 

exercise of jurisdiction to the extent authorized by the 

Constitution of the United States. Id. With regard to the 

second constitutional requirement, the “basic federal rule is 

that the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the 

forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has adopted the following approach in 

determining whether specific personal jurisdiction exists over a 

defendant:

(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or perform 

some act by which he purposefully avails himself of 

the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws. (2) The claim must be one which arises out of 

or results from the defendant's forum-related 

activities. (3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be 

reasonable. 

Id. at 1393.

Accordingly, Nationwide must demonstrate that Buhler 

purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in California and that this matter arises out of that 

California-related activity. Nationwide, as the party seeking to 

invoke federal jurisdiction, has the burden of establishing that 

personal jurisdiction over Buhler exists. Id. at 1392. 

Nationwide “must make only a prima facie showing of 

jurisdictional facts through the submitted materials in order to 

avoid a defendant's motion to dismiss.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. 

Tech. Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). In 

ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 

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“a court may consider declarations[,] discovery materials[, and] 

. . . uncontroverted allegations in the complaint.” ADO Fin., AG 

v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 931 F. Supp. 711, 714 (C.D. Cal. 

1996).

Nationwide has alleged sufficient facts to make a prima 

facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction. All that is 

required to meet the purposeful availment test is “some type of 

affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of 

business within the forum state.” Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, 

Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988)(emphasis added). 

“Physical contact with the forum state is not a necessary 

condition.” Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements 

Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). Buhler admits that it 

negotiated with Hilltop in writing and by telephone before 

finalizing the sale of the CCP10000. Gustavsson Decl. ¶15. 

Negotiating with Hilltop, a California company, over the sale of 

the CCP10000 certainly is affirmative conduct that promoted 

Buhler’s business in California.

Additionally, there can be no doubt that Nationwide’s claims 

arise out of or result from Buhler’s forum-specific activities. 

Buhler’s forum-specific activities include negotiating the deal 

with Hilltop, making the sale to Hilltop, and assisting Hilltop 

with the commissioning of the machine. Nationwide’s negligence 

and product liability claims certainly arise out of Buhler’s 

marketing and sale of the CCP10000 to Hilltop.

Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction over Buhler is 

reasonable. Buhler dispatched representatives to assist Hilltop 

with the CCP10000 after Hilltop encountered problems 

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commissioning the machine. Rutan Decl. ¶6. At least one of 

these representatives presented a business card to Hilltop 

indicating that he was located in Santa Rosa, California. Id. 

Buhler concedes that several times a year, “an employee of Buhler

Barth may travel to California to assist with installation [and] 

service maintenance” of its machines, and that Buhler’s sales 

managers “occasionally travel to California for business 

purposes.” Gustavsson Decl. ¶11. This repeated interaction with 

the forum of California ensures that the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction in this case is reasonable and will not “offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l 

Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & 

Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

Thus, the Court finds that it may exercise specific personal 

jurisdiction over Buhler with respect to the claims brought by 

Nationwide. Since the Court has personal jurisdiction over

Buhler, it now turns to Buhler’s motion to compel arbitration.

B. Arbitration

The FAA permits a party “aggrieved by the alleged failure, 

neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate” in accordance with a 

written arbitration agreement to petition a district court for an 

order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration. 9 U.S.C. 

§ 4. When deciding such a petition, the court’s sole role is 

“determining [1] whether a valid arbitration agreement exists 

and, if so, [2] whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at 

issue.” Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Sevs., Inc., 363 F.3d 

1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). The FAA created a “strong federal 

policy favoring arbitral dispute resolution,” Simula, Inc. v. 

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Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 720 (9th Cir. 1999), and courts have 

been directed to resolve “any doubts concerning the scope of 

arbitrable issues . . . in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone 

Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). 

As such, the Supreme Court has held that a party seeking to avoid 

arbitration under the FAA bears the burden of proving that the 

claims are unsuitable for arbitration. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-

Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000); Daugherty v. 

Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194 (N.D. 

Cal. 2012) (“The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of 

showing that the arbitration agreement is invalid or does not 

encompass the claims at issue.”).

1. Validity of the Arbitration Agreement

The first step of the Lifescan analysis is to determine 

whether the arbitration agreement is valid. Nationwide makes 

two arguments against the validity and enforceability of the 

arbitration agreement. First, Nationwide argues that the 

agreement is inapplicable to Nationwide because it was Hilltop 

not Nationwide that signed the agreement. Opp. at 2-3. Second, 

Nationwide argues that the agreement is unconscionable and 

therefore unenforceable. Id. at 3-4.

Arbitration agreements are to be placed on an “equal 

footing with other contracts.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 

131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). As such, written arbitration 

agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 

any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. As discussed further below, 

Nationwide has no valid legal or equitable arguments for the 

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revocation of the arbitration agreement.

a. Parties to the Agreement

Nationwide claims that the FAA only mandates arbitration 

for parties who were signatories to an arbitration agreement. 

Opp. at 2. Because Nationwide was “not a party to and had no 

prior knowledge of[] any arbitration clause,” Nationwide argues 

it has not elected to arbitrate this case and cannot be required 

to do so. Id. at 2-3. Nationwide contends that “it goes 

without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty.” Opp. at 

3 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 

(2002). 

Nationwide’s claim that all categories of nonsignatories 

cannot be bound by an arbitration agreement is simply untrue and 

ignores the fact that Nationwide is operating in this case not 

as an unassociated third party but as the subrogated insurer of 

Hilltop. FAC at 6 (“[p]ursuant to . . . the laws of the State 

of California, Nationwide . . . is legally, equitably and 

contractually subrogated to the rights and entitled to enforce 

the remedies of Hilltop Ranch, Inc.”). The Ninth Circuit has 

adopted the “majority view” of circuit courts that in certain 

circumstances, “nonsignatories of arbitration agreements may be 

bound by the agreement under ordinary contract and agency 

principles.” Letizia v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 802 

F.2d 1185, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1986). Nationwide, as the 

subrogated insurer of Hilltop, finds itself in one of these 

circumstances. 

Specifically, Nationwide, as Hilltop’s subrogated insurer, 

“stand[s] in the shoes” of Hilltop. Gulf Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. 

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Co., 86 Cal.App.4th 422, 431 (2001). Nationwide is therefore 

“substitut[ed] . . . in the position of its insured in order to 

seek reimbursement from responsible third parties for the loss 

paid the insured by the insurer.” Crowley Mar. Corp. v. Boston 

Old Colony Ins. Co., 158 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1067 (2008). In that 

position, the insurer may not invoke rights that the insured 

would not have. Id. (“The right of subrogation is purely 

derivative. An insurer entitled to subrogation is in the same 

position as an assignee of the insured's claim, and succeeds only 

to the rights of the insured.”) (quoting Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. 

v. Maryland Casualty Co., 65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1292 (1998)). 

Thus, Nationwide may not extricate itself from Hilltop’s binding 

arbitration agreement. See Allianz Global Risk U.S. Ins. Co. v. 

Gen. Elec. Co., 470 F. App’x 652, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 

that subrogated insurer is entitled to enforce arbitration 

agreement signed by insured against the responsible party); 

Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borden Co., 268 F. Supp. 303, 314 

(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“[T]here is no valid basis in law or equity why 

an arbitration clause should not be enforced against a subrogee. 

To hold otherwise would seriously impair the validity of 

arbitration clauses since either party could escape the effect of 

such a clause once he has settled with his insurer.”). 

Nationwide cites three cases in arguing that it cannot be 

bound by an agreement that it did not sign. These cases are 

easily distinguishable from the present matter in that none of 

them involved an entity that “stands in the shoes” of a party to

an arbitration agreement. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297 

(“[T]he EEOC does not stand in the employee’s shoes.”) (emphasis 

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added); Cnty. of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 

Inc., 47 Cal.App.4th 237, 239 (1996) (holding that “an agreement 

to arbitrate between a plaintiff[] and a defendant[] does not 

bind a cross-complainant.”); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of 

Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-79

(1989) (holding that the FAA allows parties to exclude certain 

claims from the scope of arbitration because “parties are 

generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they 

see fit.”).

As Buhler aptly points out in its reply, it would be 

contrary to controlling authority and inequitable to allow 

Nationwide to “use its position as a subrogee as both a sword 

and a shield.” Reply at 1. The Court concludes that Nationwide 

can be bound by the arbitration agreement in light of its status 

as a subrogated insurer of Hilltop.

b. Unconscionability

Nationwide secondarily argues that the agreement is 

unconscionable and thus unenforceable because it “unreasonably 

favors [Buhler,] the more powerful party” by requiring 

Nationwide to arbitrate in a distant country where it does not 

operate. Opp. at 3-4. Buhler’s response is that the 

arbitration clause does not contain a forum selection clause and 

does not require the arbitration to take place in Europe. Reply

at 2-3. 

Indeed, Nationwide offers no factual or legal support for 

its contention that the arbitration agreement requires 

arbitration in a location “over 5,000 miles away,” Opp. at 4, 

and the Court can find no reason to conclude the arbitration 

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agreement requires as such. Instead, the Court accords weight 

to the fact that Hilltop, under the very same rules that would 

control Nationwide’s potential arbitration, has sought to 

conduct arbitration in San Francisco, California. McDonald

Sept. 30, 2015 Decl. ¶4. The Court further notes that the 

General Conditions contain no forum selection clause and that 

Article 5, section 1(f) of the Rules of Arbitration of the 

International Chamber of Commerce permit a responding party to 

submit “proposals as to the place of arbitration.” At the very 

least, Nationwide failed to meet its burden of showing that the 

arbitration agreement is invalid because the forum is required 

to be 5,000 miles away. Green Tree Fin., 531 U.S. at 91-92; 

Daugherty, 847 F.Supp.2d at 1194.

Thus, the Court rejects Nationwide’s argument that 

enforcement of the arbitration agreement would be 

unconscionable. The arbitration agreement passes the first part 

of the Lifescan two-part inquiry and is valid and enforceable 

against Nationwide.

2. Scope of Agreement

Once the court concludes that the parties have entered into 

a valid arbitration agreement, the court must then determine 

whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. 

Lifescan, 363 F.3d at 1012. To determine this, the court first 

looks to the language of the agreement. Waffle House, Inc., 534 

U.S. 279, 289 (“Absent some ambiguity in the agreement, [] it is 

the language of the contract that defines the scope of disputes 

subject to arbitration.”). The Ninth Circuit has concluded that 

the phrase “arising in connection with” reaches “every dispute 

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between the parties having a significant relationship to the 

contract.” Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 721 

(9th Cir. 1999). Thus, when an arbitration agreement employs 

the phrase “in connection with,” a party’s factual allegations 

“need only ‘touch matters’ covered by the contract containing 

the arbitration clause” in order for the court to require 

arbitration. Id.

Here, Nationwide does not even challenge Buhler’s assertion 

that the agreement encompasses Nationwide’s general negligence 

and products liability claims. Presumably this is because the 

agreement contains broad language. Section 72 of the General 

Terms states that “[a]ll disputes arising out of or in 

connection with the Contract shall be finally settled under the 

Rules of Arbitration . . . .” Gustavsson Decl., Exh. A. at 27 

(emphasis added). The use of the phrase “arising . . . in 

connection with” places this arbitration agreement squarely in 

the line of cases in which a party’s factual allegations “need 

only touch matters covered by the contract.” Simula, 175 F.3d 

at 721.

The Order Confirmation issued between Buhler and Hilltop is 

over twenty pages and includes detailed information about the 

construction, installation, and operation of the CCP10000. 

Gustavsson Decl., Exh. A. at 6-28. It also includes payment 

terms, delivery requirements, and loads of technical data. Id.

Nationwide’s accusations of general negligence and products 

liability certainly “touch matters” covered by the Order 

Confirmation.

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3. Conclusion

The FAA directs district courts, when ruling on a motion to 

compel arbitration, to liberally interpret the arbitration 

agreement in accordance with the federal policy favoring 

alternative dispute resolution. This federal policy is 

especially important in cases such as this one that involve 

international commerce. Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit 

Co., 937 F.2d 469, 478 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court is sensitive 

to Nationwide’s concerns that it might be required to arbitrate 

this dispute against a foreign corporation in a foreign country 

in which it does not operate. But as the Supreme Court stated,

“[a] parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce 

an international arbitration agreement would . . . damage the 

fabric of international commerce and trade.” Mitsubishi Motors 

Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)

(quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974). 

The Court finds that these policy considerations can only 

support its legal conclusion that Nationwide, as Hilltop’s 

subrogated insurer, is required to abide by the valid and 

enforceable arbitration agreement entered into on October 6, 

2010 by Hilltop and Buhler.

C. Dismissal

Having concluded that the Court has personal jurisdiction 

over Buhler and that Buhler’s motion to compel arbitration should 

be granted, the Court turns its attention to Buhler’s motion to 

dismiss Nationwide’s strict liability claim. The FAA does not 

require a Court that has granted a motion to compel arbitration 

to issue a stay. Instead, a district court may dismiss the case 

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if all claims are barred by the arbitration clause. Sparling v. 

Hoffman Const. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding 

that “the arbitration clause was broad enough to bar all of the 

plaintiff's claims since it required” all claims to be submitted 

to arbitration.); see also Luna v. Kemira Specialty, Inc., 575 

F.Supp.2d 1166, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[t]he weight of authority 

clearly supports dismissal of the case when all of the issues 

raised in the district court must be submitted to arbitration.”)

(emphasis in original). 

Given that Nationwide has not requested a stay and given the 

Court’s conclusion that the broad arbitration clause covers all 

of Nationwide’s claims, the Court finds no reason to issue a stay 

in this case. Instead, the case is dismissed and the parties are 

required to submit their dispute to arbitration in accordance 

with the General Conditions of the October 6, 2010, contract. As 

such, the Court has no need to specifically decide Buhler’s

alternative motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6).

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED. The 

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The matter 

is REMANDED to arbitration. The case is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2015

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