Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03679/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03679-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jaime Lamon Esquivel
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3679

___________

United States of America, * 

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * 

*

Jaime Lamon Esquivel, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Appeals from the United States

No. 06-3681 District Court for the 

___________ District of Nebraska. 

United States of America, * 

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * 

*

Ricardo Esquivel, Jr., * 

* 

Appellant. *

Submitted: April 10, 2007

Filed: November 19, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

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The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable David L.

Piester, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Nebraska.

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Following the district court’s1

 denial of their motions to suppress evidence,

Jaime Esquivel (Jaime) and Ricardo Esquivel, Jr. (Ricardo) pled guilty to possession

of heroin with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), reserving their right to

appeal the suppression ruling. From the denial of their motions to suppress, Jaime and

Ricardo appeal. Their appeals are consolidated. We affirm.

I.

On January 20, 2006, Nebraska State Trooper Jeff Roby stopped a vehicle

driven by Jaime because the vehicle had no license plates and the trooper could not

observe a temporary registration permit or in-transit sticker on the vehicle. At the

time of the stop, Ruben Nunez and Ricardo were passengers in the vehicle. When the

trooper approached the vehicle, he asked to see Jaime’s driver’s license and the

vehicle registration. While Jaime was retrieving the requested documentation,

Trooper Roby noticed a document or “sticker” affixed to the bottom right side of the

inside of the windshield, which was later identified as a valid Nevada temporary

vehicle registration permit with an expiration date of January 29, 2006. Trooper Roby

testified that immediately after his initial look at the document, he believed the

document affixed to the passenger side windshield was issued from the Nevada

Department of Motor Vehicles. Jaime then gave Trooper Roby his California driver’s

license and the rental documentation for the vehicle. The rental documentation

revealed that the vehicle was rented in Las Vegas, Nevada, by Nunez. Jaime was

listed as an authorized additional driver on the rental agreement. Trooper Roby

explained that he had stopped the vehicle because the vehicle had no license plates.

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Government Exhibit One introduced at the suppression hearing is the videotape

of the stop and ensuing events recorded from the dash mounted camera on Roby’s

patrol car. The videotape includes audio of the interchange between Roby and the

appellants.

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He stated that he would have to take a look at the “sticker” to see if it was expired “or

what the story is with that.”2

After examining the rental documentation for the date, make, model, VIN

number and other identifying information, Trooper Roby directed Jaime to the front

passenger seat of his patrol car to issue a written warning and to further inspect the

rental documentation. While he reviewed the paperwork, ran Jaime’s driver’s license

and performed a criminal history check, Trooper Roby conversed with Jaime about

his travel activities and plans. Jaime told Trooper Roby that he and his two nephews,

Ricardo and Nunez, were on their way to a family wedding in Chicago. He said they

traveled from El Centro, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, in Nunez’s truck. Jaime

stated that the three gambled at the Queen’s Casino, spent the night in Las Vegas, and

rented the vehicle in Las Vegas. 

Dispatch then advised Trooper Roby that Jaime’s driver’s license was valid and

he had no active warrants. However, dispatch also advised Trooper Roby that Jaime

had a history of an immigration violation charge, several marijuana smuggling

charges, an assault charge and a drunk driving conviction. Trooper Roby advised

Jaime that the permit on the windshield looked “okay.” Roby further explained that,

although it was not Jaime’s fault, the vehicle needed license plates. Trooper Roby

then left Jaime in the patrol car and spoke with the passengers, Ricardo and Nunez,

obtained their driver’s license and identification cards, and discussed the details of

their trip with them. The passengers provided Trooper Roby with a different account

of the trip than did Jaime. For example, the passengers said that they gambled only

briefly while in Las Vegas, did not spend the night in Las Vegas, and named a

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different casino as the location of their gambling activities. Trooper Roby then

returned to his vehicle and conducted a driver’s license and warrant check on the two

passengers. While waiting for dispatch to provide the requested information on the

passengers, Trooper Roby began filling out a written warning and asked Jaime

detailed questions about his travel plans, the exact date of the wedding, and his

criminal history. Jaime told the officer about his past driving under the influence and

marijuana smuggling charges. While the passengers said that the wedding was on

Friday, Jaime told the trooper that the wedding was on Saturday. 

When he was advised that the passengers had no outstanding warrants, Trooper

Roby completed the written warning, asked Jaime to sign for the document and

handed the warning ticket to Jaime, telling him that they “were done with the traffic

stop” and to have a safe trip. Trooper Roby then asked Jaime if he would agree to

answer further questions, to which Jaime agreed. At that point, the trooper asked

Jaime if there was marijuana, methamphetamine, or cocaine in the car. Jaime denied

that such substances were in the vehicle. The trooper then asked for and received

verbal consent to search the vehicle from Jaime, Ricardo, and Nunez. Other officers

then arrived to assist Trooper Roby. One of the other officers, Sergeant Duis, arrived

with his K-9 partner and performed a walk-around search on the exterior of the

vehicle. The K-9 alerted at the rear of the vehicle. The officers then began a physical

search of the vehicle and found heroin in the shape of shoe insoles inside the car.

When the defendants were placed under arrest, heroin was also located inside the

shoes they were wearing. After being Mirandized, Jaime and Ricardo stated that they

were transporting five pairs of shoe insoles containing heroin. Jaime, Ricardo and

Nunez each wore a pair of the insoles and the remaining two pairs of insoles, which

also contained heroin, were hidden in the rear of the car. 

Jaime, Ricardo, and Nunez were indicted for possession with intent to distribute

heroin. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The defendants jointly moved to suppress the

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evidence seized from the vehicle in which they were traveling. Following a

suppression hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied,

concluding that: the traffic stop was valid; that the officers had reasonable suspicion

to warrant extending the stop; that Jaime and Ricardo voluntarily consented to the

search; and, such voluntary consent purged the taint of any illegal detention. This

recommendation was adopted by the district court. The defendants conditionally

entered pleas of guilty subject to this appeal of the denial of the suppression motion.

II.

Jaime and Ricardo concede the validity of the initial traffic stop of the vehicle

for no license plates and no visible temporary registration permit. See United States

v. Bueno, 443 F.3d 1017, 1024-25 (8th Cir. 2006) (neither mistake of law or fact

render traffic stop illegal as long as actions of officer were objectively reasonable

under the circumstances; because lack of license plate or temporary registration would

have constituted violation of state law, officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the

vehicle); United States v. Ehrmann, 421 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 1099 (2006) (traffic violations, however minor, create probable cause to

stop vehicle). However, the appellants argue that: (1) the investigation which

followed the traffic stop was excessive in length and scope, and (2) the appellants’

consent to a search of the vehicle did not “purge the taint of the illegal detention.”

In an appeal of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, the district court’s

factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, and we review de novo its legal

conclusions as to whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated. United States v.

Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2007). “Guided by this standard, we must affirm the

district court’s decision on a suppression motion unless it is not supported by

substantial evidence on the record; it reflects an erroneous view of the applicable law;

or upon review of the entire record, [we are] left with the definite and firm conviction

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that a mistake has been made.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 2004)). Substantial evidence is less than a

preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support

a conclusion. See United States v. Cruz, 285 F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 2002). 

Appellants concede that the detention was legitimate until Trooper Roby

received the radio message that Jaime’s driver’s license check was clear. At that

point, they argue, Trooper Roby’s detention of Jaime and Ricardo became illegal.

After carefully reviewing the video and audio recording of the traffic stop and the

transcript of the suppression hearing, we find it unnecessary to address the appellants’

contention that the traffic stop was excessive in length and scope, because even

assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, the appellants’ consents to search the

vehicle validated the subsequent search. See United States v. Grajeda, 497 F.3d 879,

882 (8th Cir. 2007) (unnecessary to address whether the act amounted to an illegal

search because, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, subsequent search was

validated by intervening voluntary consent); United States v. Kreisel, 210 F.3d 868,

869 (8th Cir. 2000) (consent was sufficiently an act of free will to purge taint of

detention). “An illegal detention is only the start, and not the end, of our fourth

amendment analysis, for the evidence seized from [appellants and their vehicle] need

not be suppressed if [their] voluntary consent provided an independent basis for the

search . . . .” United States v. Smith, 260 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2001). 

After returning the paperwork and advising Jaime that the traffic stop was

complete, Trooper Roby asked Jaime if he would agree to answer additional

questions. Jaime agreed. There is no indication in the record that this post-stop

encounter was anything other than consensual. See United States v. Salazar, 454 F.3d

843, 847 (8th Cir. 2006) (no indication that the post-stop encounter was a seizure

rather than consensual); United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1078 (8th Cir.

2002) (during post-stop consensual encounter, officer may, without reasonable

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suspicion, ask further questions unrelated to the traffic stop). Further, we find that the

district court did not clearly err in finding that Jaime, Ricardo and Nunez voluntarily

consented to the search of the vehicle during the post-stop consensual encounter. 

A defendant’s voluntary consent to be searched is an exception to the

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). A court determines whether consent is

voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Gipp,

147 F.3d 680, 685 (8th Cir. 1998). The Government bears the burden of

proving voluntary consent by a preponderance of the evidence and must

show that the defendant behaved in such a manner that the officer

reasonably believed that the search was consensual. United States v.

Cedano-Medina, 366 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2004). In evaluating the

reasonableness of the officer’s belief, we consider the characteristics of

the person consenting, “including the party’s age, intelligence and

education, whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol,

whether he was informed of his right to withhold consent, and whether

he was aware of rights afforded criminal suspects.” United States v.

Almendares, 397 F.3d 653, 660 (8th Cir. 2005). We also consider the

environment in which the alleged consent took place, “specifically (1)

the length of time he was detained; (2) whether the police threatened,

physically intimidated, or punished him; (3) whether the police made

promises or misrepresentations; (4) whether he was in custody or under

arrest when the consent was given; (5) whether the consent occurred in

a public or a secluded place; and (6) whether he stood by silently . . . as

the search occurred.” United States v. Smith, 260 F.3d 922, 924 (8th

Cir. 2001).

United States v. Esquivias, 416 F.3d 696, 700 (8th Cir. 2005).

As noted above, the duration of the stop which preceded the consensual poststop encounter and consent to search was brief and the majority of the trooper’s

investigation was lawful. The appellants spoke and understood the English language.

At the time of his arrest, Jaime was 44 years old and had a ninth grade education.

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Although Jaime was born in Mexico, he had become a United States citizen. Ricardo

was born in Los Angeles, California, was 30 years of age and had a high school

education. Further, there is no evidence that Trooper Roby used coercion to obtain

consent to search or to compel the appellants to answer questions. Id. at 700-701 (the

totality of the circumstances establish that the officers reasonably believed consent to

search was voluntary where 19-year-old Hispanic suspect understood English, was not

under influence of drugs or alcohol, was only detained short time, was not threatened

or intimidated by police, and was described by officers as very cooperative).

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding the government proved by

a preponderance of the evidence that appellants consented freely and without

coercion. See United States v. Becker, 333 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2003) (the

government has the burden of proving that the consent to search was freely given and

without coercion). 

Although the consent to search was voluntary, “that is not the end of our

inquiry.” United States v. Becker, 333 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2003). Because

voluntary consent to search, “which was preceded by an illegal police action, does not

automatically purge the taint of an illegal detention,” we must next determine if the

voluntary consent was an “independent, lawful cause” of the discovery of the heroin

in the vehicle and the appellants’ shoes. Id. at 862. In order to make that

determination, we must consider the following factors: 1) the temporal proximity

between the illegal search and the consent; 2) the presence of intervening

circumstances; and 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. See

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 (1975). 

When assessing the temporal proximity factor, we must focus on the time from

which the stop became illegal to the time of the consent. “[T]his court has found

consent given a short time after the stop [was] sufficient to purge the taint if other

circumstances indicate the consent was sufficiently an act of free will.” United States

v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1105, 1112 (8th Cir. 2007); see United States v.

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Palacios-Suarez, 149 F.3d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that consent was

sufficiently an act of free will to purge the taint of the initial stop where the officer

asked the defendant several times if he could search the vehicle nine minutes after the

initial stop); see also United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir. 1994)

(finding consent sufficient to purge the taint where the arrest and consent were “close

in time”). As the district court noted, the appellants were not in custody or being

detained when they consented. A review of the video of the traffic stop reveals that

9 minutes and 35 seconds passed between the time the detention allegedly ceased

being valid and the time the consents to search were obtained. Next, Trooper Roby

had already returned the rental paperwork, the warning ticket and Jaime’s driver’s

license when Jaime consented to the search. Although fairly close in time to the

completion of Trooper Roby’s check of Jaime’s driver’s license, which is the point

that appellants contend the detention became illegal, the Trooper’s announcement that

the traffic stop was over and Jaime was free to leave was also an intervening

circumstance between the presumed illegal detention and the consent. Lastly, the

district court found no evidence of official misconduct on the part of the trooper. A

thorough review of the record reveals that substantial evidence supports this finding.

“The totality of the circumstances indicate that [appellants’] consent[s] [were] . . .

act[s] of free will and . . . independent intervening cause[s] of the discovery of

contraband, sufficient to cure the taint of any prior Fourth Amendment violation.”

Grajeda, 497 F.3d at 883. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that the

consent to search given by Jaime, Ricardo and Nunez purged the taint of any portion

of the stop which may have been illegal. 

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III.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

 

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