Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08004/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rene Corral-Corral
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FIL E .b . Unitt:J St~ ~:; r~ .. u., c ~f _A, llt-JC..:i-s 

.. r en~ b C!r t.~!: 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L l-IOECK.ER 

TENTH CIRCUIT C!-erk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

VSe No. 89-8004 

RENE CORRAL-CORRAL, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(CR88-0039-01J) 

(702 F. supp. 1539) 

Lisa E. Leschuck, Assistant United states Attorney (Richard A. 

Stacy, United states Attorney, with her on the brief), Cheyenne, 

Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Glenn A. Duncan, Laramie, Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges and PHILLIPS, District 

Judge• 

PHILLIPS, District Judge. 

•Honorable Layn R. Phillips, United States District Judge for the 

western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-8004 Document: 01019730031 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 

On April 18, 1988, four grams of cocaine and $298,919.00 in 

cash were seized from Rene Corral-Corral's vehicle pursuant to a 

traffic stop and consent search near Laramie, Wyoming. Several 

hours later, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant 

from a California state municipal judge for Corral's residence in 

Pittsburg, California. Pursuant to this search warrant, the 

officers seized one kilogram of cocaine, a small quantity of 

marijuana, a Browning B-80 12-gauge shotgun, a Remington 22-

caliber bolt action rifle and a Browning 380 automatic handgun. 

In a thorough opinion, the United States District Court for 

the District of Wyoming upheld the traffic stop and consent search 

of Corral's vehicle, but suppressed the evidence seized from 

Corral's residence, rejecting the state municipal judge's probable 

cause determination. United States v. Corral-Corral, 702 F. Supp. 

1539, 154 7-51 (D. Wyo. 1988) . Specifically, the district court 

found that "a small quantity of drugs and a large sum of money 

found in a vehicle pursuant to a consent search (did not] amount 

to probable cause to search a residence 1000 miles away." Corral, 

702 F. Supp. at 1548. Moreover, the district court refused to 

apply the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule as set 

forth in United States v. Leon, 468 u.s. 897 (1984), concluding 

that "the affidavit was 'so lacking in the indicia of probable 

cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.'" 

Corral, 702 F. supp. at 1550. 

2 

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The government appeals pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 3731. 1 

Assuming but not holding that the affidavit fails to establis h 

probable cause, we believe the district court erred in refusing to 

apply the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule as s e t 

forth in Leon. Specifically, we f i nd that the affidavit was not 

so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 

belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, and hold that the 

officers' reliance on the probable cause determination of the state 

municipal judge was objectively reasonable. Leon, 468 u.s. at 923, 

926 . Accordingly, we ·REVERSE. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Whether the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rul e 

should be applied is a question of law, subject to de llQYQ review 

by this court. United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 606 (lOth 

cir·. 1988) . 

1

The statute provides in pertinent part: 

An appeal by the United States shall l i e to a court 

of appeals from a decision or order of a district courts 

(sic] suppressing or excluding evidence in a 

criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has 

been put in jeopardy and before the verdict . . . if the 

United States attorney certifies to the district court 

that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and 

that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact 

material in the proceeding. 

Section 3731 limits our review to the district court's order 

suppressing evidence. As a result, the district court's rulings 

upholding the consent search are not the subject of this appeal. 

Accordingly, at this juncture, we accept as correct the distri c t 

court's findings adverse to Corral, although Corral preserves the 

right to challenge such findings upon the entry of any f inal 

judgment. 

3 

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III. BACKGROUND 

On the afternoon of April 18, 1988, while heading west on ISO approximately thirteen miles west of Laramie, Wyoming, 

defendant-appellee Rene Corral-Corral was stopped for speeding by 

a state patrolman. Corral's driver's license listed his address 

as 110 Northstar Drive, Pittsburg, California. His vehicle, a 1983 

Ford Thunderbird, displayed a California license plate but was 

registered in California under the name of Javier Padilla. When 

questioned about the registration, Corral informed the patrolman 

that he was able to ·purchase the car at a discounted price of 

$4,000.00 because he was willing to pick it up in Aurora. 

Authorities later learned that Corral was returning to California 

from Aurora, Illinois. 

With Corral's consent, the patrolman searched the luggage 

located inside the automobile's trunk and discovered a black 

suitcase containing $298,919.00 in cash. Corral denied any 

knowledge of the money. A short time later, a backup patrolman 

recovered four grams of cocaine from a small toiletry bag found in 

the automobile's passenger compartment. Although the patrolman had 

not informed Corral where he found the cocaine, upon viewing the 

substance, Corral promptly claimed "[t)hat wasn't in the bag when 

I put the other things in there.'' Corral, 702 F. Supp. at 1541. 

Corral was arrested and transported to Laramie where 

authorities placed him in the custody of two agents of the Wyoming 

Division of Criminal Investigation. A federal Drug Enforcement 

Administration official informed the agents that contact had been 

4 

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made with Pittsburg, California detectives who were in the process 

of making an initial warrantless entry into the premises at 110 

Northstar Drive to prevent the possible destruction of contraband. 

Wyoming agent Tony Hinton phoned Sergeant Evan Kohler, head of the 

Pittsburgh police department's narcotics division, and advised him 

of the facts surrounding Corral's arrest. Agent Hinton twice more 

phoned Sergeant Kohler, the latter time to inform him that Corral 

would soon be using the phone. Corral' s repeated collect calls to 

110 Northstar Drive were refused. Id. at 1541-42. 

At 1:35 a.m. on April 19, 1988, about seven hours after 

authorities seized the premises without a warrant, a California 

state municipal judge signed a search warrant for 110 Northstar 

Drive. The affidavit in support of the warrant, prepared by 

Sergeant Kohler, detailed the stop of Corral, his consent to search 

. . 

the automobile and the results of the search. The affidavit · 

further indicated that at the time of his arrest, Corral reported 

his address as 110 Northstar Drive, Pittsburg, California. 

Supplemental portions of the affidavit described the conduct of two 

of Corral's acquaintances who arrived at 110 Northstar Drive while 

the officers were awaiting the presentation of the search warrant 

to the state judge. Based upon both this information, and his 

education and experience, Sergeant Kohler formed the opinion that 

Corral was a drug trafficker operating out of 110 Northstar Drive. 

The search of the premises disclosed one kilogram of cocaine, a 

small quantity of marijuana, indicia of Corral's occupancy, and 

several firearms. Id. at 1542, 1547-48. 

5 

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Corral was indicted in the Wyoming federal district court for 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.s. c. § § 

841(a) (1) & 846, and for interstate travel in aid of racketeering 

in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1952(a) (3). Prior to trial, Corral 

moved to suppress the fruits of the purportedly illegal search of 

110 Northstar Drive under the exclusionary rule of the fourth 

amendment. Following a lengthy suppression hearing, Corral' s 

motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his 

residence was sustained by the district court. Corral, 702 F. 

Supp. at 1551. The government now seeks interlocutory review of 

the district court's suppression order. 

IV. THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY OF CORRAL 1 S RESIDENCE 

At the suppression hearing, Corral asserted that because the 

initial warrantless entry at 110 Northstar Drive violated the 

fourth amendment., the evidenc::e seized from the premises necessarily 

must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The district 

court concluded that the entry and securing of the premises was 

unjustified for lack of probable cause but did not explain the 

attendant consequences. Corral, 70:2 F. Supp. at 1548-49. We 

believe both Corral and the district court misapprehended the 

import of the warrantless entry. 

In Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), the Supreme 

Court addressed the issue of whether "an earlier illegal entry 

requires suppression of evidence seized later from a private 

residence pursuant to a valid search warrant which was issued on 

information obtained by the police before the entry into the 

6 

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residence ." Id. at 797-98 . The Court held that where an 

independent source is present for a search warrant under wh i ch 

evidence i s seized, the legality or illegality of an initial 

warrantless entry has no bearing on the admissibility of the 

evidence . The Court rejected the notion that "but for " the illegal 

entry, the suspects could have destroyed evidence used against 

them: "The essence of [defendant's argument] is that there is some 

'constitutional right' to destroy evidence . This concept defies 

both logic and common sense." Id. at 816. 

Segura controls ·our resolution of this first issue. The 

issuance of the search warrant and discovery of the cocaine, 

marijuana and firearms within the residence were wholly unrelated 

to the initial warrantless entry. The evidence was uncovered only 

as a result of the search conducted pursuant to the warrant. 

Moreover, none of the information on which the warrant was secured 

related to the initial warrantless entry. Because the evidence in 

our case, like in Segura, was the product of the search pursuant 

to the warrant, not the initial warrantless entry, the legality of 

the warrantless entry is not at issue. See id. at 814; [Record, 

Tr. of Sept. 6, 1988, Suppression Hearing at 271]. 

V. THE SEARCH OF CORRAL'S RESIDENCE; 

THE PROBABLE-CAUSE CONTROVERSY 

The legality of the search of Corral's residence, however, 

presents a separate question. Whether the district court properly 

suppressed the evidence obtained in the search of 110 Northstar 

Drive depends on whether the search warrant was supported by 

probable cause as required by the fourth amendment, or 

7 

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alternatively, whether the search was conducted by officers who in 

good faith believed that the warrant was valid under the fourth 

amendment. In 1813, Chief Justice Marshall defined the doctrine 

which is central to our decision: 

[T]he term "probable cause," according to its usual 

acceptation, means less than evidence which woul d justify 

condemnation . It imports a seizure made under 

circumstances which warrant suspicion. 

Locke v. United States, 11 u.s. (7 Cranch) 339, 347 {1813). 

Nearly two hundred years later, the doctrine continues to 

spark judicial debate. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), 

the Supreme Court adopted a "totality-of-the-circumstances 

approach11 to the "common-sense, practical question" of probable 

cause. Id. at 230. Noting that probable cause determinations 

involved "practical considerations of everyday life on which 

reasonable and prudent men, not .legal technicians, act~'' the Court 

reiterated: " 1 [T]he evidence thus collected must be seen and 

weighed not i n terms of library analysis by scholars, but as 

understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.'" Id. 

at 231-32 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 

(1981)). In so stating, the Court expressed a " strong preference" 

for searches authorized by warrant so as to encourage the use of 

the warrant process and lessen any intrusion upon protected 

interests: 

[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny 

by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not 

take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's 

"determi nation of probable cause should be paid great 

deference by reviewing courts. 11 1•A grudging o r negative 

attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants is 

inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment 1 s strong 

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preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant;" 

courts should not invalidate warrant[s) by interpreting 

affidavit(s) in a hypertechnical, rather than a 

commonsense, manner. 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 u.s. at 236, 237 n.lO (citations omitted); 

accord United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 850 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied sub nom., 110 s. ct. 348 (1989) (magistrate's probable 

cause determination entitled to 11 great deference") ; Kaiser v. Lief, 

874 F.2d 732, 734 (lOth Cir. 1989) (magistrate is not constrained 

by "limitations on his use of common sense"). Accordingly, a 

judicial officer's decision to issue a search warrant is afforded 

"great deference. n United States v. Shomo, 786 F. 2d 981, 983 (lOth 

Cir. 1986) ( 11 [W] e are more likely to affirm a law enforcement 

officer's determination of probable cause when it is backed by the 

authority of a search warrant."). 

The Supreme Court reiterated its favor for ?earch warrants in 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, expressing the view that "'in a doubtful or 

marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where 

without one it would fall."' Id. at 914 (quoting United States v. 

Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965)). The basis for the Court's 

view lies in the realization that "[r]easonable minds frequent ly 

may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit 

establishes probable cause ... II Leon, 468 u.s. at 914 (emphasis 

supplied). 

This is such a case. Despite the above-referenced standards, 

all of which weigh in favor of the warrant procedure followed here, 

reasonable judges cannot agree on whether the search warrant 

affidavit in this case satisfies the probable cause requirement. 

9 

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The California state municipal judge found probable cause to exist. 

The Wyoming district court rejected this finding, reasoning that 

the circumstances surrounding the stop of Corral and the search of 

his vehicle did not sufficiently tie into 110 Northstar Drive and 

consequently did not support the state judge•s finding of probable 

cause to search the premises. Even this panel, with the benefit 

of further hindsight, cannot agree on whether the affidavit in 

support of the warrant for Corral's residence satisfies the 

probable cause requirement. As a result, for purposes of this 

opinion, we assume, but do not hold, that the district court was 

correct in finding that the affidavit failed to establish probable 

cause. We engage in this assumption because we find common ground 

for reversing the district court on the "good faith exception" to 

the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d 371, 

374 (lOth Cir. 1988) (applying good faith exception under 

assumption that affidavit failed to establish probable cause) , 

cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989). 

VI. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 

The exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy rather 

than a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved individual. 

~, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Stone v. Powell, 428 

U.S. 465, 486 (1976). The rule is not intended to protect the 

truth-finding process of the trial, but is to serve the privacy 

interests protected by the fourth amendment. United States v. 

Payner, 447 u.s. 727, 734 (1980}; United States v. Mitchell, 783 

F.2d 971, 978 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 860 (1986). 

10 

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In Leon, the Supreme Court modified the fourth amendment's 

exclusionary rule to provide that evidence seized under a warrant 

later found to be invalid may be admissible if the executing 

officers acted in good faith and with reasonable reliance on the 

warrant. Leon, 468 u.s. at 913; United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 

407, 409 {lOth Cir. 1987), later appeal, 842 F.2d 1194 (1988); see 

generally 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure§ 3.1 (1984). 

The Leon Court applied the "good faith" exception to admit the 

evidence from a search warrant subsequently invalidated by a lack 

of probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. In Massachusetts v. 

Sheppard, 468 u.s. 981, 988 & n.S (1984), the Court held that the 

same exception could also be applied to warrants that violate the 

fourth amendment's particularity requirement. 

Sheppard involved police officers who obtained incriminating 

evidence in a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that was later 

found invalid because it failed to describe with particularity the 

items to be seized. The Court there declined to exclude the 

evidence because the officers' good faith efforts to obey the 

warrant requirement demonstrated that the exclusionary rule's 

purpose to deter unlawful police conduct had no application in 

those circumstances. Id. at 988 & n.S, 990. Similarly, in Leon, 

the police obtained a search warrant that ultimately was found to 

be unsupported by probable cause. The Supreme Court held that the 

exclusionary rule did not apply because the officers in good faith 

had done all they could to adhere to the fourth amendment's 

mandate. 498 u.s. at 926. 

11 

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Of course, Leon and Sheppard do not mean that evidence 

obtained under an invalid warrant should never be suppressed. "The 

Court mandated that the exclusionary rule be invoked only in those 

'unusual' cases in which its purpose would be served, i.e., in 

which it would deter police misconduct." Medlin, 798 F.2d at 409. 

In determining whether we should apply the exception, the 

"good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable 

question of whether a reasonably well trained officer would have 

known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's 

authorization." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. To answer this 

"objectively ascertainable question," we are to consider "all of 

the circumstances," id., and assume that the executing "officers 

. have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits." Id. 

at 919 n.20, quoted in, United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d at 607. 

We must also review the text of the warrant and the affida~it to 

ascertain whether the agents might have "reasonably presume(d ) it 

to be valid." Leon, 468 u.s. at 923; accord Leary, 846 F.2d at 

607. Furthermore, "(t]he government, not the defendant, bears the 

burden of proving that its agents' reliance upon the warrant was 

objectively reasonable." United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 

1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 1986); accord Leary, 846 F.2d at 606 n.26. 

Leon described four scenarios in which the exclusionary rule 

is still applicable: 

(1) the magistrate issued the warrant in reliance on a 

deliberately or recklessly false affidavit (citing Franks 

v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)) ; 

(2) the magistrate abandoned his judicial role and failed 

to perform his neutral and detached function (citing Lo 

12 

Appellate Case: 89-8004 Document: 01019730031 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 12 
Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)); 

(3) the warrant was based on an affidavit "so lacking in 

indicia of probable cause as to render official belief 

in its existence entirely unreasonable" (quoting Brown 

v. Illinois, 422 u.s. 590, 610-11 {1975) {Powell, J., 

concurring)); or 

{4) the warrant was so facially deficient that it failed 

to particularize the place to be searched or the things 

to be seized (citing Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 u.s. 

981 (1984)). 

United States v. Gant, 759 F . 2d 484, 487 (5th Cir.) (parallel 

citations omitted) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923), cert. denied, 

474 U.S. 851 (1985). Corral contends, and the district court held, 

that the warrant at issue here falls within the third exception . 

Corral, 701 F. Supp. at 1550. Corral also contends that the first 

exception applies as well. We treat these issues in reverse order. 

A. ABSENCE OF A DELIBERATELY OR RECRLESSLY FALSE AFFIDAVIT 

There is no showing here that the state municipal judge issued 

the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly fa l se 

affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). Under 

the Supreme Court's decision in Franks, when a defendant makes a 

substantial preliminary showing that intentionally or recklessly 

false statements are included in an affidavit supporting a search 

warrant and that the affidavit without the false statements is 

insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the defendant 

is entitled to a hearing on the matter. Id. at 171. At the 

hearing the defendant must establish knowing or reckless falsity 

by a preponderance of the evidence before he may obtain suppression 

of the evidence obtained from the search. An affiant's 

negligence or innocent mistake resulting in false statements in the 

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affidavit is not enough to satisfy a defendant's burden. Id. at 

171; United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1508 (lOth cir. 1988). 

In the instant case, it is unclear whether Corral even requested 

a Franks hearing before the district court. (See Record, Vol. I 

at doc. 57, pp. 1-4, Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law, which lists 27 separate issues arising out of 

the suppression hearing, none of which pertain to Franks] . 

Although Corral made allegations of false statements at the 

suppression hearing, the Franks issue is mentioned only in the 

most cursory fashion ·in the papers before us, 2 and the district 

court made no Franks findings in its suppression order. 

In finding an absence of probable cause in the affidavit, 

however, the district court relied heavily on Sergeant Kohler's 

apparent lack of knowledge that 110 Northstar Drive was Corral's 

·address: 

In the affidavit for search warrant, Sgt. Kohler 

?rroneously stated that 11 (a)t the time of his arrest 

suspect Rene corral gave his address as 110 Northstar 

Drive Pittsburg, California." No one now contends that 

Corral made this statement. At the time the affidavit 

was filled out, police knew only that 110 Northstar Drive 

was the address listed on Corral's driver's license. 

2

see Corral's appeal brief at 39 where he states: 

Because the instant Affidavit for Search Warrant 

contained the recklessly false assertion that: "At the 

time of arrest suspect Rene Corral gave his address as 

110 Northstar Drive Pittsburg California," it was based 

on a reckless falsehood, and the warrant is invalid under 

rranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 

This is the only discussion of Franks in the brief filed by Corral. 

Similarly, the Franks decision is discussed nowhere in the 

government's opening brief or reply brief. 

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Corral, 702 F. Supp. at 1548 (emphasis added). This "error" does 

not rise to the level of a deliberate falsehood under Franks. 

Moreover, the district court made no findings that the affidavit , 

i nformation regarding Corral's address was either deliberately or 

recklessly false. Finally, a careful review of the record reveals 

that no such findings could be made. 

In the context of a Franks challenge, the focus is the 

credibility of the affiant. 438 U.s. at 171. Here, Kohler • s 

affidavit clearly indicates that he was not present at the scene 

of Corral's arrest i'n Wyoming. Instead, Kohler received the 

information regarding the Wyoming arrest and the location of 

Corral's residence from investigator Tony Hinton. [Record, 

Affidavit at 3-5 ) . There is nothing in this record to suggest that 

Kohler deliberately falsified the information he received from 

Hinto'n. At best, Corral has shown nothing more than either a 

miscommunication error by Hinton or an innocent error by Kohler, 

both of which are insufficient to satisfy his burden under Franks 

and its progeny. 3 United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 729 (lOth 

cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918, later proceeding, 828 F.2d 1476, 

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987): United States v. Carlson, 697 

3

corral's other claims of alleged false statements are 

similarly without merit. They include, for example, alleged 

misstatements regarding the location of the town of "Aurora", as 

well as Corral's claim that Kohler falsely identified agent Tony 

Hinton as a "Deputy Attorney General of Wyoming" rather than an 

investigator. [See Record, Affidavit at 1; Record, Tr. of Sept. 

6 , 1988, Suppression Hearing at 171] . The district court made no 

findings of deliberate falsehood concerning these statements and 

we see no record basis for such a conclusion now. [See Record, Tr. 

of Sept. 6, 1988, Suppression Hearing at 277]. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8004 Document: 01019730031 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 15 
F.2d 231, 238 (8th Cir. 1983). 

But whether Corral actually stated his address to authorities 

as 110 Northstar Drive, or authorities knew only that 110 Northstar 

Drive was the address listed on his driver's license, is of little 

significance. Under Section 14600 of the California Vehicle Code, 

law enforcement officials are entitled to presume that the address 

listed on the driver• s license of a California resident is the 

individual's residence. 4 Thus, Sergeant Kohler was entitled to 

presume that 110 Northstar Drive was Corral's residence. That the 

affidavit in support of the warrant may have incorrectly noted the 

source of this information is of no consequence. As the Supreme 

Court explained in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.s. at 235: "affidavits 

'are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a 

criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate 

specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper· 

4

Section 14600 reads: 

Change of address 

(a} Whenever any person after applying for or receiving 

a driver' s 1 icense moves, or acquires a new address 

different from the address shown in the application or 

in the license issued to him, he shall within 10 days 

thereafter notify the department of his old and new 

address . 

(b) The department may thereupon change the address as 

shown upon the license or application or, should the 

department for any reason fail to so change the address 

upon the license, then the licensee shall mark out the 

former address on the face of the license and type or 

write the new address in ink on the reverse side of the 

license with the date and signature of the licensee. 

Cal. Veh. Code§ 14600 (Deering 1989). 

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place in this area . '" (quoting Ventresca, 380 U.S . at lOB) ; accord 

McCoy, 781 F.2d 168, 172 (lOth Cir. 1985) (warrant is not to be 

read in such a restrictive manner as will discourage officer from 

seeking warrant before conducting search). 

B. THE OFFICERS' RELIANCE ON THE MAGISTRATE'S ISSUANCE 

OF THE WARRANT WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE 

Although Sergeant Kohler's affidavit was not a model of 

specificity, we do not believe it was so lacking in probable cause 

as to render official belief in its existence entirely 

unreasonable. Here, the affidavit supporting the warrant was 

neither a "bare bones" affidavit, nor was it "devoid" of facts. 

Leon1 468 u.s. at 926; United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d at 373; 

United States v . Wright, 791 F.2d 133, 135 (lOth Cir. 1986); United 

States v. Cardall , 773 F. 2d 1128, 1133 (lOth Cir. 1985) . The 

search warrant issued in this case was supported by an· affidavit 

which was h u rriedly prepared by law enforcement officials in the 

midst of a rapidly unfolding investigation. United States v. 

Ventresca, 380 u.s. at 108. The affidavit consisted of the 

following eight documents, all of which were stapled together: 

Document #1: A nine-page Pittsburg, California Felony Report 

authored by Sergeant Kohler. This report outlined the events in 

Wyoming as relayed to Kohler from one of the Wyoming investigators, 

Tony Hinton. This report contained the following opinion by 

Kohler: "Due to the fact that $298 ,919.00 in U.S. currency was 

located in the trunk of the vehicle along with four grams of 

cocaine it is my opinion the currency was the proceeds from the 

sale of cocaine and remainder of the cocaine was possessed for 

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sa-le. 11 [Record, Report at 5). This report also detailed how the 

officers secured 110 Northstar Drive while the warrant and 

affidavit were being prepared. [Id. at 6-7]. During this waiting 

period, two persons, Hilario Cerra 1 and Cesar Garcia, arrived 

outside the residence at 110 Northstar Drive. [Id. at 8]. Garcia 

had a brown suitcase with him. 5 Hilario Corral, after being 

Mirandized, agreed to give a written statement. This report 

references a supplementary report containing Hilario Corral' s 

written statement. ( Id. ] . 

Document #2: A one-page "Admonishment of Rights 11 form for 

Hilario Corral. This form sets forth · all of the rights d i scussed 

in the Supreme Court's Miranda decision and bears the initialed 

waiver and signature of Hilario Corral. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

u.s. 436, 467-76 {1966). 

Document #3: A four-page Pittsburg, California Supplementary 

Report authored by Detective Elzie. This report reflects that 

Hilario Corral told Elzie that Hilario was the cousin of defendant 

Rene Corral. It further indicates that Hilario Corral claimed that 

he had nothing to hide, was not involved in any illegal activities, 

and would consent to the search of his own residence at 2160 

Peachtree Circle. The report reflects that upon arrival at 2160 

Peachtree circle, Hilario Corral stated that defendant Rene Corral 

had left a bag at Hilario's residence for safekeeping. Hilario 

Corral denied knowledge of the bag • s contents. The bag which 

5

The suitcase was subsequently searched pursuant to warrant 

and $31,000.00 in U.S. currency was recovered. This search is not 

before us on appeal. 

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Hilario later showed to the officers was a red, white & blue canvas 

athletic bag. It was completely closed. The officers did not open 

the bag, but took it to 110 Northstar Drive and began to prepare 

a warrant request to search the bag along with the residence. 6 

. Document #4: A two-page handwritten Pittsburgh Police 

Department statement signed by Hilario Corral. The statement reads 

as follows: 

The above is my true and correct name. 

statement as told to Det. Elzie. 

This is my 

Today about 12:30 p.m. I got a phone call from Cesar 

Garcia to give him a ride from the San Francisco Airport 

at 5:30p.m. I told him yes since I had to go to san 

Francisco anyway to pick up a computer from my cousin's 

house. Cesar is my friend and I have known him for 

approx. 2 yrs. I arrived late at the Airport due to car 

trouble but still met Cesar. We then got a burrito to 

eat and went to my cousin's house to get the computer at 

app rox . 7:00 p.m. After a short stay we then drove on 

back to Pittsburg to Cesar's house. The police were at 

the house when we arrived. I'm· a computer operator for 

Bechtel. Corp. in San Francisco. I ·have no knowledge of 

narcotics at this house except maybe only party favors 

but not large amounts for sell that the police are 

thinking of. I knew nothing about Cesar's trip only that 

he needed a ride home from the Airport. I have nothing 

to hide from the police and they could search my 

residence for narcotics or contraband if so desired. 

This statement was written b¥ Det. George Elzie as 

told by me. [emphasis supplied]. 

6Subsequent search of the bag pursuant to a warrant revealed 

$77 ,000.00 in United States currency. The district court found 

that Corral lacked standing to contest this search, and it is not 

before us on appeal. Corral, 702 F. Supp. at 1549. 

7In suppressing the evidence, the district court erroneously 

stated: "Unlike Cook and other cases, no one claims to know of 

drugs at 110 Northstar Drive, and no surveillance was conducted 

there." Corral , 702 F. Supp. at 1550 . (emphasis supplied). The 

distribution of cocaine as a "party favor" can constitute a felony 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841. United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 

119, 124 (1st Cir. 1987) ("An exchange of money is not a required 

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Appellate Case: 89-8004 Document: 01019730031 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 19 
Document #5: A one-page supplemental statement by Hilario 

Corral, which reads: 

On Thursday 4-14-88 or Friday 4-15-88 my cousin Rene 

Corral brought a red and blue canvas carry bag to my 

house to keep for him while he went out of town. Myself 

nor my wife does not know what's in the bag and have no 

connections to my cousin. He (my cousin) has never left 

anything here for us to keep other than a few suits and 

ties. 

Me and my wife both knew the bag was here but not 

the contents of the bag. 

Document #6: A 11Consent to Search" form signed by Hilario 

Corral for his residence at 2160 Peachtree Circle . 

Document #7: A three-page document setting forth Sergeant 

Kohler's training and experience as a thirteen-year veteran of the 

police force and a four and one-half year veteran of its Narcotics 

Division, 8 as well as the followi ng pertinent opinion: 

Based on the above information, I formed the expert 

opinion that Cocaine is possessed for sale at 110 North 

Star Drive Pittsburg, California. Persons who sell 

Cocaine often keep additional amounts in their home and 

vehicles, as well as on their persons, for future use 

and/or sale. Persons who sell cocaine do not carry their 

entire supply of Cocaine on their persons because of the 

element of [21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1)]."); United States v. Ramirez, 

608 F.2d 1261, 1263-64 (9th cir. 1979) ("(A]lthough apparently no 

commercial scheme is involved, [the defendants' ] sharing t h e 

cocaine with Zamora and Leon constitutes "di stribution" for 

purposes of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a) (1) . "). 

8

The affiant's expertise is substantial. The affidavi t 

reflects that Kohler has been involved in over 400 narcotics 

investigations, and has both authored and executed search warrants 

on dozens of occasions. He also has worked undercover on more than 

150 narcotics purchases and witnessed more than 200 narcotics 

purchases. Thi s portion of the affidavit also reflects that Kohler 

has qualified as an expert witness in numerous drug cases and has 

received specialized training in narcotics recogniti on, packaging, 

use and sales. 

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ever present danger of being robbed by the persons they 

sell Cocaine to and because it is common knowledge among 

narcotic/dangerous drug dealers 'that the penalty for 

being arrested for Possession for Sales of larger 

quantities is usually more severe than Possessi on only; 

thus motivating them to carry smaller quantities on their 

person. 

Document #8: An "Affidavit for Search Warrant" form, 

incorporating the foregoing police reports and records, and 

containing a description of the residence at 110 Northstar Drive 

and a description of the items to be searched and seized. The 

affidavit bears the signature of Sergeant Evan Kohler. 

I n short, b a sed · upon the large amount of cash9 and small 

amount of cocaine present in Corral's vehicle in Wyoming, the 

suspicious conduct and statements of Hilario Corral, as well as his 

knowl edge of the nature of drug trafficking, Sergeant Kohler 

formed. the opinion, expressed in his affidavit, that cocaine was 

possessed· for sale at 110 Northstar Drive. [Record, Af'fidavit at 

19). 1° Courts frequently have relied on the expert opinion o f 

9

We are not unmindful of the regulation which attends 

transactions in currency in excess of $10,000.00, see 31 u.s.c. § 

5313 & 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (currency transaction report), together 

with the unusual nature of transporting almost $300,000.00 in cash 

contained in a suitcase in the trunk of a personal automobi le. 

Unexplained large amounts of currency have been viewed by many 

courts as evidence of narcoti cs trafficking. ~, United Sta tes 

v. Jaba ra, 618 F.2d 1319, 1329 (9th cir. 1980), cert. denied sub 

nom., 446 U.S. 987 and 449 U.S. 856 ( 1980) ; Un i ted States v. 

Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 437 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., 

429 u.s. 1091 (1977). 

10we reject the district court's reasoning that because 

Sergeant Kohler had difficulty at the suppression hearing 

distinguishing between the affidavit for warrant and actual 

warrant, his expertise was somehow diminished. Corral, 702 F. 

Supp. at 1547-48. (See Record, Tr. of Sept. 7, 1988, Suppression 

Hearing at 320-38). Such confusion is simply irrelevant to the 

issue of whether the state judge could find probable cause upon the 

information contained in the affidavit, as well as to the issue of 

whether Kohler was acting in good faith at the time he sought the 

warrant. 

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officers in determining where contraband might be kept. United 

States v. Medl in, 798 F.2d at 409; ~United States v. Fama, 758 

F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1985) (agent's expert opinion is factor 

contributing to objective good faith). 

Probable cause undoubtedly requires a nexus between suspected 

criminal activity and the place to be searched. United States v. 

McCoy, 781 F.2d at 172; see generally, 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, 

criminal Procedure at§ 3.3, pp. 214-15 {1984). Here, the state 

judge spent ninety minutes with Sergeant Kohler before making .an 

informed and deliberate determination of probable cause . Changes 

were made to the affidavit and additional information provided as 

a result of the state judge's questioning of Kohler. [See Record, 

Tr. of Sept. 6, 1988, Suppression Hearing at 271-72, 290]. Upon 

all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, the judge 

. . 

concluded that there was a "fair probability" that evidence of a 

crime would be found at 110 Northstar Drive . Illinois v. Gates, 

462 u.s. at 238 (emphasis added); accord United states v. Cardall, 

773 F . 2d at 1131. We believe both Kohler and the officers who 

executed the warrant should be entitled to place substantial weight 

on this finding in defending an attack on their good faith. 

This is not the first time that this court has applied the 

"good faith" exception to a warrant which arguably failed to set 

forth probable cause. In United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d at 372, 

we assumed, but did not hold, that the affidavit in support of a 

search warrant failed to establish probable cause. Nevertheless, 

we upheld the search and reversed the district court on the ground 

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Appellate Case: 89-8004 Document: 01019730031 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 22 
that "the detective 1 s reliance on the judge 1 s probable cause 

determination and on the technica l sufficiency of the warrant was 

objectively reasonable." Id. at 374. In Cook, a "first-time 

confidential informant" told a detective that he had recently been 

to an identified apartment at which he has observed Cook in 

possession of large sums of currency and several "paper decks'' of 

cocaine. The informant told the detective that he had seen Cook 

there with cocaine several times. A day before the warrant was 

obtained a police officer had observed substantial foot traffic 

near that apartment, which, based on the affiant's experience and 

training, was consistent with drug trafficking. The affiant also 

learned through investigation that Cook occupied the apartment. 

Moreover, at the time, Cook was on probation for possession of a 

controlled substance. Another detective learned that Cook had at 

least ·twice been arrested for ~ossession of a controlled substance. 

These facts were all included in an affidavit for search warrant, 

which was presented to, and approved by, a state court judge. Id, 

We acknowledge that Cook involved a stronger warrant affidavit 

than the affidavit in the instant case. Here, there was no 

confidential informant with information concerning either Corral 

or 110 Northstar Drive. Similarly, there was no surveillance of 

110 Northstar Drive prior to Corral's traffic stop in Wyoming. 

These factors, of course, are not prerequisites for a finding of 

probable cause. See Section V above. Moreover, as previously 

discussed, it is clear that the application for a warrant to search 

110 Northstar Drive was supported by much more than a "bare bones" 

23 

Appellate Case: 89-8004 Document: 01019730031 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 23 
affidavit. United states v. Leon, 468 U.s. at 926. 11 While the 

strength of the affidavit in this case lies somewhere short of the 

showing which supported our good faith finding in cook, in our view 

the instant affidavit, taking into account all of the 

circumstances, is not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as 

to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." 

Leon, 468 u.s. at 923 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Brown v. 

Illinois, 422 u.s. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in 

part) ) . 12 

Also cutting in the government's favor on the good-faith issue 

in this case is the fact that in Cook, "[t]he Government's 

elicitation of facts at the suppression hearing was anemic at 

best. " Cook, 854 F.2d at 373. In sharp contrast, the evidentiary 

record developed in this case was substantial. At the suppression 

hearing, Kohler was questioned extensively regarding his expertise, 

the i nformation he received from Wyoming, the reasonableness of the 

assumptions he made and his conversations with the state municipal 

11The Court stated in Leon, 468 U.s. at 926: 

[The ] application for a warrant clearly was supported by 

much more than a "bare bones" affidavit. The affidavit 

related the results of an extensive investigation and, 

as the opinions of the divided panel of the Court of 

Appeals make clear, provided evidence sufficient to 

create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges 

as to the existence of probable cause. Under these 

circumstances, the officers' reliance on the magistrate's 

determination of probable cause was objectively 

reasonable. 

12We note that on three occasions the district court 

erroneously quoted this portion of the Supreme Court's opinion in 

Leon and omitted the word 11 entirely". 702 F. Supp. at 1549-50. 

The word "entirely" is not mere verbiage. 

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judge. (See Record, Tr. of Sept. 6-7, 1988, Suppression Hearing at 

250-301 & 312-49]. This record, combined with the facts stated in 

the affidavit, "demonstrates that a reasonably well-trained law 

enforcement officer would not have known that the search was 

illegal (assuming it was] despite the magistrate's authorization, 

as contemplated in Leon, 468 u.s. 897. " Cook, 854 F.2d at 

3 7 3 (bracketed material in original) ; accord United States v. 

Wright, 791 F.2d at 135. 

This is not to say that a judicial official's concurrence in 

improper activity brings the law enforcement officer's conduct 

within Leon and Sheppard. United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144, 

1149 (lOth Cir. 1990) (per curiam) . Indeed, a controversy has 

apparently developed among various courts as to what favorable 

weight may be given to an officer's reliance on a judicial 

official's opinion regarding the propri~ty of a contemplated 

search. Compare United States v. Martin, 833 F . 2d 752, 755 (8th 

Cir. 1987) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 u.s. 335 (1986) for the 

proposition that an officer "may not rely entirely on the 

magistrate's finding of probable cause") with Martin at 756-57 

(Lay, c.J. , concurring) (disagreeing with "great weight 11 attached 

by majority to magistrate's finding that probable cause had been 

established, and concluding that magistrate's issuance of warrant 

is "irrelevant to the question of the officer's good faith") and 

Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425, 1434 n.20 (D.C. 

Cir.) (magistrate's determination should carry "some weight" in 

inquiry regarding officer's good faith), vacated in part, reh'q 

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granted en bane, 817 F.2d 144, reinstated. sub nom., reh'g 

dismissed on reconsideration en bane, ·824 F.2d 1240 (1987). 

We cannot speak for other circuits or other cases. Under the 

circumstances in this case, however, we believe the state judge's 

probable cause finding is not only a relevant factor, but a 

signifi cant one as well, in the good-faith equation. As our 

circuit stated in United States v. Cardall, 773 F. 2d at 1133 

(citations and emphasis omitted): 

The first notion to be remembered in considering the 

good faith principle is the presumption created in Leon 

that when an officer relies upon a warrant, the officer 

is acting in good faith. While this presumption is not 

an absolute, it must carry some weight. Second, it must 

also be remembered that the knowledge and understanding 

of law enforcement officers and their appreciation for 

constitutional intricacies are not to be judged by the 

standards applicable to lawyers. 

When we consider whether the officer relied in good 

faith upon a warrant, we must look to the underlying 

documents to see whether they are devoid of factual 

support, not merely whether the facts they contain are 

legally sufficient. When a warrant has issued, the legal 

sufficiency of the underlying affidavit has already been 

determined by the magistrate, and the magistrate 1 s 

determination is entitled to credence. Courts cannot 

make the good faith of an officer turn upon whether his 

reliance on a warrant was misplaced. It is only when the 

reliance was wholly unwarranted that good faith is 

absent. 

Here, Sergeant Kohler attempted to act in conformity with the 

fourth amendment by presenting this "close call" to a neutral and 

detached judge for review. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14; Aguilar v. 

Texas, 378 u.s. 108, 111 (1964), overruled on other grounds, 

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Illinois v. Gates, 462 u.s. at 238. 13 The record reveals that 

Kohler was questioned by an experienced state judge, and that 

certain changes were made to the affidavit as a result of that 

questioning. [Record, Tr. of Sept. 6, 1988, Suppression Hearing 

at 256, 271-72, 290]; cf. United States v. Rome, 809 F.2d 665, 668 

(lOth Cir. 1987). In total, the affiant spent over one hour with 

the state judge reviewing the sufficiency of the warrant. After 

all of this, the state judge found that the facts established 

probable cause to issue the search warrant for Corral's residence. 

Just as reviewing courts give "great deference" to the 

decisions of judicial officers who make probable-cause 

determinations, police officers should be entitled to rely upon the 

probable-cause determination of a neutral magistrate when defending 

an attack on their good faith for either seeking or executi ng a 

warrant~ This is particularly true, · where, · as here, with the 

benefit of hindsight and thoughtful reflection, reviewing judges 

still cannot agree on the sufficiency of the affidavit. Martin, 

833 F . 2d at 756 ("When judges can look at the same affidavit and 

come to differing conclusions, a police officer's reliance must, 

therefore, be reasonable."). In such cases, the good faith 

principles of Leon are triggered and come directly into bearing. 

Cook, 854 F.2d at 372; United States v, Medlin, 789 F.2d at 489. 

As the Leon Court stated: 

13contrary to Corral's suggestion, the record in this case does 

not reveal that the state judge abandoned his impartial role in 

granting the warrant. Cf. United States v. Rome, 809 F.2d 665, 668 

(lOth Cir. 1987); Cardall, 733 F.2d at 1333. 

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In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to 

question the magistrate's probable-cause determination .... "(O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally 

nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply 

with the law. 11 • • • Penalizing the officer for the 

magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically 

contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment 

violations. 

Leon, 468 u .s. at 921 (citations omitted). Here, the record 

establishes that both Kohler and the officers who executed the 

search of Corral's residence were entitled to rely on the 

California state judge's determination of probable cause, and this 

reliance was objectively reasonable. United States v. Wright, 791 

F.2d at 135. 

V'I:t. CONCLUS:tON 

Perhaps years ago, as suggested by the district court, the 

distance between Wyoming and Corral ' s residence in Pittsburg, 

California, would have precluded a finding of probable cause in 

this case. But today, the drug trade has taken on not only 

national, but international dimensions. Drug trafficking pervades 

all corners of our country. Drug traffickers freely travel our 

nation's highways in operating their illicit enterprise. 

Here, a large amount of United states currency and a small 

quantity of cocaine had been seized from a suspected drug 

trafficker in Wyoming who was traveling across the country. 

suspicious circumstances occurred at his residence in California. 

After discussions with other law enforcement officers and a brief 

but intense investigation, a trained narcotics detective attempted 

to act in conformance with the fourth amendment by presenting the 

results of his investigation to a neutral judge in the form of an 

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affidavit requesting judicial authorization to search the suspect's 

house. The state judge carefully considered the matter and issued 

the warrant, which resulted in the seizure of cocaine, marijuana 

and firearms. While in hindsight the detective's affidavit 

arguably fell short of the probable cause mark, it was not so 

deficient that official belief in its validity was rendered 

entirely unreasonable. Indeed, we find that the officers' reliance 

on the state judge's determination of probable cause was 

objectively reasonable. 

This is not one of those "unusual" cases where suppression of 

the evidence is appropriate to deter government misconduct. With 

due regard to those cherished rights protected by the fourth 

amendment, a review of all of the circumstances in this case leads 

us to find in favor of the compelling "public interest in 

prosecuting those accused of crime and having tpem acquitted or 

convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the 

truth." Alderman v. United States, 394 u.s. 165, 175 (1969), 

quoted in, Leon, 468 U.S. at 900. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the extreme sanction of suppression is inappropriate in this case. 

REVERSED. 

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