Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-72314/USCOURTS-ca9-08-72314-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mateo Cortez-Pineda
Petitioner
Eric H. Holder Jr.
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATEO CORTEZ-PINEDA, 

Petitioner, No. 08-72314

v. Agency No.  A094-086-105 ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

May 7, 2010—Seattle, Washington

Filed July 2, 2010

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Ronald M. Gould,

Circuit Judges, and James Ware, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Gould

*The Honorable James Ware, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Erin T. Hall, Carol L. Edward (argued), Law Offices of Carol

L. Edward, Seattle, Washington, for petitioner Mateo CortezPineda.

Tony West, Richard M. Evans, Allen W. Hausman, Michael

C. Heyse (argued), United States Department of Justice, Civil

Division, Washington, D.C., for respondent Eric H. Holder Jr.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Mateo Cortez-Pineda petitions for review of a decision of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his

appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for special rule cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

I

Cortez-Pineda, born in 1955, is a native and citizen of El

Salvador. The government initiated removal proceedings

against Cortez-Pineda in December 2005 with the filing of a

Notice to Appear. It alleged that Cortez-Pineda entered the

United States on or about June 1, 1990, and that he was

removable as an alien present in the United States without

having been admitted or paroled. Cortez-Pineda admitted the

allegations and conceded removability, but sought special rule

cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan

Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”),

which extends eligibility for relief from removal to Salvadoran nationals who, among other requirements not at issue

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here, “first entered the United States on or before September

19, 1990.” Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193-2201 (1997),

amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644-45 (1997).

At a June 2006 hearing, Cortez-Pineda testified in support

of his eligibility for special rule cancellation, stating that he

entered the United States in June 1990. During crossexamination, the government asked whether Cortez-Pineda

had admitted to immigration officers during a 1992 immigration fraud investigation1

 that, contrary to his claimed June

1990 entry, he “entered the United States in 1991.” CortezPineda answered, “No.” The government also pressed an

inconsistency between Cortez-Pineda’s claimed June 1990

entry date and a statement in Cortez-Pineda’s asylum application that he experienced problems in El Salvador “[t]owards

the end of 1990.” During the exchange, Cortez-Pineda’s counsel stated in passing that the Notice to Appear stated that June

1990 was his entry date. 

At the end of the June hearing, the government requested

that an evidentiary hearing be set on the issue of CortezPineda’s date of entry if the government was able to secure

evidence from the 1992 investigation. The IJ adopted that

plan. On July 17, 2006, the government filed and served on

Cortez-Pineda’s counsel a memorandum in which it formally

requested an evidentiary hearing concerning the “alleged date

of entry into the United States.” The IJ issued an order on July

19, 2006, notifying the parties that there would be a hearing

concerning “the critical issue of whether the respondent

entered this country in 1991 as opposed to the claimed entry

from June, 1990.” By later agreement of the parties, the IJ

scheduled the evidentiary hearing for November 20, 2006. 

At the November evidentiary hearing, the government

1The fraud investigation concerned allegedly fraudulent petitions for

immigration benefits. Cortez-Pineda was a witness in, but not the subject

of, the investigation. 

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offered testimony from the two immigration officers who had

interviewed Cortez-Pineda during the 1992 investigation. The

officers testified that during the interview, Cortez-Pineda had

admitted to entering on January 4, 1991, and had retracted as

false an earlier entry date indicated in his application for Temporary Protected Status. The government also introduced an

affidavit prepared by the officers in which they had contemporaneously memorialized their interview with Cortez-Pineda.

The IJ credited the testimony of the officers and determined

that Cortez-Pineda was not eligible for special rule cancellation because he entered the United States after September 19,

1990. 

Cortez-Pineda also sought relief from removal in the form

of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, and

the IJ denied these claims. The BIA, citing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), adopted the IJ’s

decision and dismissed the appeal. Cortez-Pineda’s timely

petition for review followed. 

II

When, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision citing Matter of Burbano, we review the IJ’s decision as if it were the

BIA’s. Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (9th Cir.

2005) (en banc). We review findings of fact for substantial

evidence and questions of law de novo. Id.

III

Cortez-Pineda argues that he met his burden of establishing

eligibility for special rule cancellation under NACARA, see

8 C.F.R. § 240.64(a), because the government alleged in the

Notice to Appear that Cortez-Pineda entered the United States

on or about June 1, 1990, and that allegation was a judicial

admission that bound the parties and the court when CortezPineda admitted that fact before the IJ. Cortez-Pineda relies

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on our decision in Hakopian v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 843 (9th

Cir. 2008). 

[1] In Hakopian, we established that an uncontested date

of entry alleged in the Notice to Appear is treated as a judicial

admission for establishing the alien’s date of entry. There, the

Notice to Appear alleged an entry date that would have rendered Hakopian’s asylum application timely. Id. at 845-46.

The IJ nevertheless concluded that Hakopian’s asylum claim

was time-barred because Hakopian “ha[d] no documents to

establish the date, time, and manner of her entry, only her

own testimony.” Id. at 846. We held that the IJ erred, reasoning as follows:

The government alleged Hakopian’s arrival date

in its Notice to Appear, and Hakopian admitted the

government’s allegation at her hearing before the IJ.

Allegations in a complaint are considered judicial

admissions. See Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp.,

861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988). In immigration

proceedings, the Notice to Appear serves the same

function as a civil complaint. Therefore, both the

government and Hakopian agreed upon her date of

entry, thus rendering this fact undisputed.

Id. We reaffirmed Hakopian’s holding after briefing in this

case was complete. See Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067,

1073 (9th Cir. 2009). 

[2] Contrary to Cortez-Pineda’s contention, however,

Hakopian did not establish a blanket rule that facts alleged in

a Notice to Appear, if admitted before the IJ, bind the court

and the parties. We made explicitly clear in Hakopian that an

entry date alleged in a Notice to Appear might not bind the

IJ if the Notice to Appear is amended or if, as here, the entry

date is subsequently contested:

[A]t no point—either before or during Hakopian’s

hearing—did the government move to amend its

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Notice to Appear with respect to, or otherwise contest, Hakopian’s stated date of entry. Therefore,

Hakopian could scarce be expected to produce additional documentary evidence of her arrival date, as

the IJ required in his oral decision. Had the government ever withdrawn its allegation of or challenged

Hakopian’s claimed entry date, a different case

might obtain.

551 F.3d. at 847; see also Cinapian, 567 F.3d at 1073. 

[3] We hold that here, the government should not be held

to have made a binding judicial admission about CortezPineda’s entry date because the government vigorously disputed the entry date during the November 2006 evidentiary

hearing after notice was given to Cortez-Pineda that the issue

was in dispute, and Cortez-Pineda never expressly objected

on the grounds of judicial admission, instead stipulating to an

evidentiary hearing on the issue.2 Cortez-Pineda was specifically instructed by the IJ in a July order and again during an

August master calendar hearing that the entry-date issue

would be the focus of the November evidentiary hearing, and

Cortez-Pineda was given adequate time—almost half a year

from the June hearing—to prepare for the November hearing.

Cortez-Pineda’s counsel never suggested that the Notice to

Appear conclusively established Cortez-Pineda’s entry date,

and his counsel’s passing reference to the entry-date allegation in the Notice to Appear cannot reasonably be construed

2Matter of Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377 (BIA 1986), which concerned an alien’s attempt to disavow admissions of fact and a concession

to deportability earlier made for tactical reasons by the alien’s counsel, id.

at 382, is inapposite. Cortez-Pineda does not contend that the government’s allegation of the entry date in the Notice to Appear was a tactical

decision. And, unlike in Velasquez where the government relied on the

petitioner’s admission “[i]n order to prove the respondent’s deportability,”

id. at 379, here, as explained below, Cortez-Pineda did not rely on the

alleged entry date in trying to prove his eligibility for special rule cancellation. 

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as an objection to a contest of that issue. Instead, when the IJ

instructed Cortez-Pineda’s counsel at the June 2006 hearing

that she would have until July 21, 2006, to respond to the government’s request, if any, for an evidentiary hearing concerning the entry-date issue, Cortez-Pineda’s counsel then

acknowledged, “That would be okay.”

Moreover, although “admissions in the pleadings are generally binding,” Am. Title Ins. Co., 861 F.2d at 226, CortezPineda’s counsel did not raise the judicial admission argument

to the IJ. Had she done so, the government would have been

alerted that to avoid controversy, it should amend the Notice

to Appear and could have sought to do so. See In re Bakersfield Westar Ambulance, Inc., 123 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir.

1997).3 Nor did Cortez-Pineda rely in any way on the entry

date alleged in the Notice to Appear in making his case that

he was eligible for special rule cancellation; instead, CortezPineda’s counsel sought to establish Cortez-Pineda’s timely

entry through Cortez-Pineda’s direct testimony and through

documentary evidence. Cf. 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 626 (2008)

(“When a party does not rely on the judicial admission of his

adversary, but introduces evidence that has the effect of disproving his case, the party making the admission is not bound

by it.”).4

3We reject Cortez-Pineda’s argument that the government could not

have amended the Notice to Appear if it had been so informed. The applicable regulations provide that substituted charges or allegations may be

lodged “at any time.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.30, 1240.10(e). 

4Although Rule 15(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is

inapplicable in immigration proceedings, our decision accords with Rule

15(b)(2), which expressly permits a trial by consent of the parties of an

issue not raised in the pleadings. See id. (“When an issue not raised by the

pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be

treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings. . . . [F]ailure to amend

does not affect the result of the trial of that issue.”); see also Janis v.

Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 461 F.3d 1080, 1085 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006)

(unpleaded issue was tried by implied consent where no objection was

made when the issue was raised). 

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Cortez-Pineda next argues that the government’s failure to

amend the Notice to Appear deprived him of the opportunity

to respond to the amended allegation before the merits hearing on the issue. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.30, 1240.10(e) (providing that in the event that substituted charges or allegations are

lodged, the alien “may be given a reasonable continuance to

respond to the additional factual allegations and charges”).

This argument is without merit. When the government contested the entry date during the June 2006 hearing, the hearing

was continued, and Cortez-Pineda had until November to prepare a response on this issue, which we conclude was a reasonable amount of time in the circumstances of this case. 

[4] Evaluating the evidence of Cortez-Pineda’s entry date,

the IJ’s determination that the June 1990 entry date was not

credible is supported by substantial evidence.5 The testimony

of the immigration officers—that Cortez admitted to entering

the United States in January 1991—was consistent, detailed,

and corroborated by a contemporaneously prepared affidavit.

The IJ appropriately concluded that Cortez-Pineda was not

eligible for special rule cancellation.6 We hold that substantial

evidence supports this conclusion of the IJ. 

IV

We also review for substantial evidence the factual findings

underlying the IJ’s determination that a petitioner has not

established eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or

5We reject Cortez-Pineda’s contention that the IJ should have considered the “possibly coercive nature and circumstances regarding Mr.

Cortez-Pineda’s August 1992 sworn statement which changed his date of

entry date into the U.S. from 1990 to January 1991.” Cortez-Pineda never

stated that he was coerced into changing his entry date and instead stated

that he did not recall retracting the June 1990 entry date. This is insufficient to rebut the substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s conclusion. 

6We recognize that the better procedure would have been for the government to amend the Notice to Appear, if only to avoid disputes like the

present one, and we encourage the government to do so in future cases.

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CAT relief. Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1019-20, 1025

(9th Cir. 2009). 

To qualify for asylum, a petitioner must establish that he or

she meets the statutory definition of a refugee, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b), as someone “who is unable or unwilling to return

to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the

protection of, [his or her] country because of persecution or

a well-founded fear of persecution on account of” a protected

ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The IJ made an explicit

adverse credibility determination and denied Cortez-Pineda’s

asylum claim on that basis. We review an adverse credibility

determination for substantial evidence. Shrestha v. Holder,

590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). Even if some of the factors relied upon by the IJ are unsupported, in the case of an

asylum application filed before May 11, 2005, we must

uphold an adverse credibility finding “[s]o long as one of the

identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and

goes to the heart of [the petitioner’s] claim of persecution.” Li

v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2004) (first alteration

in original).7

[5] At least two of the grounds relied on by the IJ in making the adverse credibility determination go to the heart of

Cortez-Pineda’s claim and are supported by substantial evidence. First, the IJ determined that the inconsistency between

Cortez-Pineda’s claimed June 1990 entry date and the January

1991 entry date he admitted to during the fraud investigation

undermined his credibility on his asylum claim. Second, the

IJ determined that Cortez-Pineda’s statement in the asylum

application that he was seeking asylum because of threats he

received toward the end of 1990 was inconsistent with his

hearing testimony that he left El Salvador because of threats

7The REAL ID Act’s elimination of the requirement that inconsistencies

must go to the heart of the claim does not apply here because CortezPineda filed his asylum application before May 11, 2005. See Shrestha,

590 F.3d at 1039-40. 

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he received in March 1990. These are not insignificant inconsistencies about the precise date on which an event occurred,

cf. Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000), but

are material and call into question whether Cortez-Pineda

actually experienced the problems that he said precipitated his

decision to depart El Salvador. The IJ did not have to accept

Cortez-Pineda’s unpersuasive explanations for these

inconsistencies—that he did not recall retracting his June

1990 entry date during the 1992 investigation, and that he

“made a mistake in the dates” in the asylum application. See

Rivera v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, the IJ’s conclusion that the affidavits from CortezPineda’s family members—which described threats and injuries from unknown and unidentified persons—did not support

his persecution claim, is supported by substantial evidence.

We hold that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and

denial of asylum relief are supported by substantial evidence.

Because Cortez-Pineda did not satisfy the lower standard of

proof for asylum, he necessarily did not satisfy the more stringent standard of proof for withholding of removal. See Farah

v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).8

[6] Finally, when, as here, the petitioner’s CAT claims

“are based on the same statements . . . that the [IJ] determined

to be not credible,” and the petitioner “points to no other evidence that he could claim the [IJ] should have considered,”

the CAT claim must be rejected. Id. at 1157. 

DENIED.

8Because only one ground is necessary to support an adverse credibility

determination, see Li, 378 F.3d at 964, we do not reach the additional

grounds cited by the IJ. Similarly, we do not reach the IJ’s alternative conclusion that Cortez-Pineda’s testimony, even if credible, did not establish

that he met the statutory definition of a refugee. 

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