Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01026/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01026-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance
Plaintiff
William Christofferson
Defendant
William Haushalter
Defendant
Lake Wildwood Association
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING

PROTECTION ALLIANCE,

NO. CIV. S-06-1026 WBS EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS

LAKE WILDWOOD ASSOCIATION,

WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, and

WILLIAM HAUSHALTER,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Based on alleged discharges of “wastewater” into Deer

Creek and the Yuba River, plaintiff California Sportfishing

Protection Alliance filed suit against defendants Lake Wildwood

Association (“the Association”), William Christofferson, and

William Haushalter, alleging violations of a National Pollution

Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit issued by the

California Regional Water Quality Control Board for the Central

Valley Region (“the Board”). Defendants move to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons,

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Congress created the NPDES permit program as part of 1

the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and thereby authorized the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and state agencies with

approved water quality programs to “regulate[] point sources of

pollution that reach the waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(a)-(b); County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. County of Kern,

127 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1562 n.18 (2005). “[O]n May 14, 1973,

California became the first state to be approved by the EPA to

administer the NPDES permit program.” Id., 127 Cal. App. 4th at

1565-66; 39 Fed. Reg. 26,061 (July 16, 1974).

The purpose of this release, or “drawdown” of the lake, 2

was to lower the lake’s level to allow for removal of sediment

and vegetation. (Compl. ¶ 33.) 

2

defendants’ motion will be granted.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In June 2000, under the power granted by the NPDES

permit program, the Board adopted a general order setting the 1

waste discharge limits for “low threat and dewatering wastewater

discharges.” (Pl.’s Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Ex. A.) 

Plaintiff, a non-profit public benefit corporation based in

Stockton, California, asserts that defendants, the persons

responsible for the upkeep of the artificially formed Lake

Wildwood, have violated and will continue to violate the terms of

that permit through their annual maintenance activities. (Compl.

¶¶ 6, 31, 33.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants’

release over a dam (spillway) of “several hundred acre feet of

water from Lake Wildwood” results in pollution that exceeds the

limits established in General Order No. 5-00-175/NPDES No.

CAG995001 (“the order/permit”). (Id. ¶¶ 13, 33.) 2

Indeed, according to plaintiff, the post-discharge

reports that defendants have filed with the Board from 2000-2004

reveal that defendants have discharged water “containing levels

of turbidity, temperature, and pollutants in excess of the

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Order’s Effluent Limitations . . . .” (Id. ¶ 36.) As a result,

Deer Creek and the Yuba River (“the receiving waters”) have

experienced an increase in ambient temperature and a decrease in

oxygenation, which negatively impacts the life cycles of fish and

other wildlife. (Id. ¶ 37.) Additionally, the discharges

contain high levels of fecal coliform bacteria, which threaten

human recreation activities. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 43.) Plaintiff further

alleges that defendants have failed to monitor and record the

impact of their operations on total suspended solids (“TSS”),

Biological Oxygen Demand (“BOD”), and pH in the receiving waters,

all in violation of the requirements of the order/permit. (Id. ¶

44.)

In light of these alleged violations, plaintiff has

taken the appropriate steps to bring a Clean Water Act (“CWA” or

“the Act”) citizen’s suit against defendants to enforce the NPDES

permit for dewatering activities. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)

(authorizing citizen suits). On January 17, 2006, plaintiff

provided several federal and state agencies with “notice of

Defendants’ violations of the Act, and of its intention to file

suit against Defendants . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 3); see also 33

U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (requiring plaintiffs to give 60 days

notice to designated entities before filing a citizen’s suit

under the act). Plaintiff alleges that none of the agencies

authorized to litigate this matter elected to do so. (Id. ¶ 4.) 

Accordingly, plaintiff filed this suit on May 10, 2006 alleging

violations of sections 301(a) and 402 of the CWA (33 U.S.C. §§

1311, 1342). Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint,

arguing that they are not subject to an existing NPDES permit and

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that their activities do not require a permit.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The

court may not dismiss for failure to state a claim unless “it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van

Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the pleader fails to

allege facts that support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); see

also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (complaint must

“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests”).

In general, the court may not consider material other

than the facts alleged in the complaint when deciding a motion to

dismiss. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“A motion to dismiss . . . must be treated as a motion for

summary judgment . . . if either party . . . submits materials

outside the pleadings in support or opposition to the motion, and

if the district court relies on those materials.”). However, the

court may consider extrinsic documents when “the plaintiff’s

claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant

attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, and the parties

do not dispute the authenticity of the document . . . .” Knievel

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v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, the

court may consider materials of which it may take judicial

notice, including matters of public record. Mir v. Little Co. of

Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Evid.

201(b) (defining the scope of judicial notice); see also Mack v.

S. Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)

(noting that reliance on matters of public record “does not

convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment”),

abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.

Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991). Because the additional materials

submitted by the parties in support of and opposition to this

motion (the Board’s orders and notices as well as the EPA’s

proposed rules) are matters of public record, the court may

consider them here. 

B. Defendants’ Obligations Under an Existing NPDES Permit

An action to enforce a NPDES permit necessarily depends

on the validity of the permit. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.

Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987) (“A citizen

suit may be brought only for violation of a permit limitation

‘which is in effect’ under the [CWA].”) (citing 33 U.S.C. §

1365(f)). The NPDES general permit that defendants have

allegedly violated, and will continue to violate, expired on June

1, 2005. (Pl.’s RJN Ex. A at 9 (“This Order expires on 1 June

2005.”).) Despite this explicit expiration date on the face of

the general permit, plaintiff contends that state and federal law

dictate that the permit’s terms and conditions are automatically

extended. 

Under the regulation cited by plaintiff, “[t]he terms

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and conditions of an expired permit are automatically continued

pending issuance of a new permit if all requirements of the

federal NPDES regulations on continuation of expired permits are

complied with.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23, § 2235.4 (2006). The

federal NPDES regulations referred to provide that an expired

permit will “continue in force under 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) until the

effective date of a new permit” if (1) the permitee has submitted

a timely and complete application for a new permit and (2) the

permitting authority fails to issue a new permit before the

expiration date of the previous permit. 40 C.F.R. § 122.6(a)

(2006). In turn, 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) provides that “[w]hen

application is made for a license required by law, the agency . .

. within a reasonable time, shall set and complete proceedings

required to be conducted. . . .”

From the plain language of these statutory provisions,

they do not appear to be applicable to a general permit like the

one at issue here. The purpose of a general permit is to “cover

one or more categories or subcategories of discharges . . .

within a geographic area.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(1) (2006). 

Thus, general permits are not issued in response to any

individual’s application, but instead at the discretion of the

Director of the EPA or state permitting authority. § 122.28(a)

(“The Director may issue a general permit. . . .”) (emphasis

added); § 123.25(a)(11) (granting states the discretion to

implement the general permit program). By contrast, individual

NPDES permits are issued to particular parties, who are engaged

in the potentially illegal discharge of pollutants, and are

therefore required to apply for a permit. § 122.21(a)(1) (“Any

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The purpose of this provision is to protect license 3

applicants, engaged in the otherwise illegal discharge of

pollutants, from facing permit expiration due to administrative

delay.

 The plain language of the EPA’s provisions echo this 4

same distinction, as they allow for permit continuation only when

a “permitee” has submitted a timely application. § 122.6(a)(1).

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person who discharges or proposes to discharge pollutants . . .

and does not have an effective permit, must submit a complete

application to the Director in accordance with this section.”). 

Thus, in § 558(c), the language “required by law”

refers to the agency’s obligation under that section to

“complete[] in an expeditious and judicious manner” any

“adjudicatory hearings mandated under other provision of law.”3

Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1260 n.25 (9th Cir.

1977). The obligatory language found in § 558(c) has no

relevance, however, when the original impetus for considering a

permit is purely discretionary, as with a general permit. The 4

lack of any parallel provisions for general permits indicates a

clear intention that extension of such permits is not governed by

this section. Kitlutsisti v. Arco Alaska, Inc., 592 F. Supp.

832, 843 (D. Alaska 1984), vacated as moot, appeal dismissed, 782

F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Section 558(c), however, does not

allow for the extension of a NPDES general permit.”). 

Moreover, both of these statutory provisions emphasize

that continuation of a permit is contingent upon an application

for renewal or a new license. § 558(c) (“When the licensee has

made timely and sufficient application for a renewal or a new

license[,] . . . a license . . . does not expire until the

application has been finally determined by the agency.”); §

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Plaintiff additionally contends that defendant conceded 5

that it is subject to an existing NPDES permit. (Pl.’s Opp. to

Mot. to Dismiss 1:18-19, 7:9.) The court finds this claim

unconvincing. The only language cited to by plaintiff in support

of this argument is defendants’ admission “[t]hat the association

submitted an application to be covered under Order No. 5-00-175 .

. . .” (Defs.’ Reply to Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss 4 n.1.) This

admission, however, refers merely to defendants’ application for

coverage under the order at a time when it was still in effect. 

In no way does this speak to whether defendants’ discharges

currently “are subject to an existing NPDES permit . . . .”

(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 1:18-19) (emphasis added).

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122.6(a)(1) (“[T]he conditions of an expired permit continue in

force . . . if: (1) [t]he permitee has submitted a timely

application which is a complete application for a new permit.”)

(citations omitted). Significantly, there is no process for an

“application” for a general NPDES permit, since the decision to

issue one lies solely within the discretion of the EPA or the

state permitting authority. Therefore, the relevant statutory

authority does not indicate that this general order should

continue in perpetuity, and the effect of its terms and

conditions ceased as of its June 1, 2005 expiration date.5

Consequently, plaintiff cannot base its claims on a

violation of General Order No. 5-00-175/NPDES No. CAG995001. 

Plaintiff is only authorized to prosecute suits “against any

person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of . . . an order

issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to [an

effluent] standard or limitation.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(B)

(emphasis added); see also Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59 (“[T]he

interest of the citizen-plaintiff is primarily

forward-looking.”). In other words, because a citizen suit must

be based on a permit which “is in effect,” plaintiff has no cause

of action against defendants for a violation of the expired

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permit/general order. Id. at 59 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f));

id. at 67 (holding that a citizen-plaintiff cannot “maintain an

action based on wholly past violations of the Act”).

C. Defendants’ General Obligations Under the NPDES Program

However, this fact does not settle the matter before

the court, because plaintiff can still file a citizen’s

enforcement suit under the CWA if defendants are engaged in an

activity that requires an NPDES permit. See 33 U.S.C. §

1365(a)(1)(A), (f) (authorizing citizen suits against any person

who is alleged to have committed “an unlawful act under

subsection (a) of section 1311 of this title”); id. § 1311(a)

(making illegal “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”);

Ass’n to Protect Hammersley, Eld, & Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res.,

Inc., 299 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a state

agency’s determination that the defendant does not discharge

pollutants from a point source, and thus does not require an

NPDES permit, does not bar a “citizen’s otherwise proper federal

suit to enforce the Clean Water Act”).

 At issue is § 301(a) of the CWA, which “makes unlawful

the discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters except as

authorized by specified sections of the Act,” such as section

402, which permits the Administrator of the EPA and/or authorized

state agencies to “issue permits authorizing the discharge of

pollutants in accordance with specified conditions.” Gwaltney,

484 U.S. at 52 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342). As defendants

correctly emphasize, however, discharges that require an NPDES

permit must add pollutants to the waters of the United States. 

33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). 

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Moreover, an NPDES permit is required only when someone

seeks to discharge pollutants from a “point source”--specifically

“any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but

not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,

discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal

feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which

pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)

(definition of “point source”); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (definition

of “discharge of any pollutant”); League of Wilderness

Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309

F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002). Nonpoint source pollution “is

regulated in a different way and does not require [an NPDES]

permit . . . .” Id.; Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172

F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Nonpoint source pollution is

not regulated directly by the Act, but rather through federal

grants for state wastewater treatment plans.”); Envtl. Prot.

Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105-06

(N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Unlike ‘point sources,’ ‘nonpoint sources’ are

regulated indirectly: The CWA directs EPA to disseminate

information regarding nonpoint pollution sources . . . .” 

(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f))).

Reduced to a more concise test, the aforementioned

provisions of the CWA require an NPDES permit whenever someone

“(1) discharge[s], i.e., add[s] (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable

waters (4) from (5) a point source.” Comm. To Save Mokelumne

River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.

1993). Defendants concede that the alleged pollutants in this

case--sediment, heat, and fecal coliform bacteria--qualify as

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“pollutants” under the act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (“The term

‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, . . . biological materials, . .

. heat, . . . rock, [and] sand . . . discharged into water.”). 

Likewise, they do not contend that the receiving waters are not

navigable waters. The questions remaining for the court then are

(1) whether the release of water through the dam “adds”

pollutants to the receiving waters; and (2) whether the dam

constitutes a point source.

Defendants rely on National Wildlife Federation v.

Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and National Wildlife

Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988),

for the proposition that “there is no addition[, as required by

the CWA,] ‘unless a source “physically introduces a pollutant

into the water from the outside world.”’” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss

6 (quoting Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584 (quoting Gorsuch, 693

F.2d at 174-75)).) The courts held in both cases that the EPA’s

decision to define “addition” as the “physical[] introduc[tion

of] a pollutant into water from the outside world” deserved

considerable deference. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 161; Consumers

Power, 862 F.2d at 584. With this definition in mind, the courts

concluded that the water quality changes associated with dams

(e.g., increased turbidity, decreased oxygenation) were not

“discharge[s] of a pollutant” because the structures themselves

did not “introduce” anything into the water that was not already

present. Accordingly, the EPA was not required to issue NPDES

permits. See also S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot.,

126 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2006) (“[S]omething must be added in order

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Plaintiff criticizes the deference given to the EPA’s 6

reasoning in Gorsuch and Consumers Power, citing Catskill

Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,

273 F.3d 481, 489-90 (2nd Cir. 2001), for the proposition that

“deference should not be accorded proposed agency rules.” (Pl.’s

Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss 9 n.3.) As the Catskill court itself

made clear, however, “courts do not face a choice between Chevron

deference and no deference at all. . . . [T]he agency position

should be followed to the extent persuasive.” Catskill, 273 F.3d

at 491, citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235

(2001).

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to implicate § 402 . . . .”).6

Adopting this reasoning, the inquiry into whether

something has been introduced from the “outside world” centers

around whether the source and receiving waters are actually the

same body of water. See Catskill, 273 F.3d at 492 (analogizing

that if one “takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the

pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has not ‘added’ soup or

anything else to the pot . . . .”). For an “addition” of a

pollutant from the “outside world” to occur, Lake Wildwood and

the receiving waters in this case must be “distinct” bodies of

water. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of

Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 110-11 (2004)(holding that if a district

court determines that the source and the receiving waters “are

not meaningfully distinct water bodies”, then the alleged

discharger “will not need an NPDES permit”). 

There is no clear legal test for determining whether

two bodies of water are distinct, but several courts have

suggested that if the upstream and downstream bodies of water

would naturally comprise one uninterrupted flow but for the

artificial interruption, then they are not sufficiently

“distinct.” Cf. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 112 (observing

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that some courts have held that if the transfer of water from one

“body” of water to another would happen naturally, absent some

artificial transfer, then the waters are not distinct, but rather

“are two hydrologically indistinguishable parts of a single water

body” and logically, pouring some of one water into the other

cannot “add” anything); see also Catskill, 273 F.3d at 492

(distinguishing Gorsuch and Consumers Power because “[in

Catskill] the water is artificially diverted from its natural

course . . . .”).

In general, the weight of authority specific to dams

counsels that water behind and in front of a dam are not

“meaningfully distinct.” See Catskill, 273 F.3d at 491

(discussing Gorsuch and noting that “[t]he reservoir above the

dam and the stream below, at least arguably, were sufficiently

the ‘same’ water”) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has

additionally found this analysis to be persuasive. S.D. Warren,

126 S. Ct. at 1850. (“Before Miccosukee, one could have argued

that transferring polluted water from a canal to a connected

impoundment constituted an ‘addition.’ Miccosukee is at odds

with that construction of the statute . . . .”). Indeed, in this

case plaintiff concedes in its complaint that the lake “is

artificially formed by a dam that interrupts the natural flow of

Deer Creek.” (Compl. ¶ 31 (emphasis added).) Undoubtedly, but

for the dam, the creek would flow uninterrupted.

Accordingly, this court concludes that the release of

water from Lake Wildwood over the dam does not constitute the 

///

///

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Additionally, it doubtful that the dam in this case can 7

be considered a “point source” under the NPDES program. Cf. 33

U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(F) (creating a non-NPDES method of

controlling pollution caused by “changes in the movement, flow,

or circulation of any navigable waters or ground waters,

including changes caused by the construction of dams. . . .”);

see also Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175 (noting that “Congress had no

occasion to consider whether NPDES permits were desirable for

dams . . . .”). But see id., at 165 n.22 (noting that pipes and

spillways of dams could perhaps operate as point sources if their

operation results in “the discharge of grease, oil, or trash . .

. .”). Regardless, the court need not reach the issue.

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“addition” of pollutants for which defendants are required to

have an NPDES permit.7

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 

DATED: September 24, 2006

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