Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-17-70329/USCOURTS-ca9-17-70329-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William P. Barr
Respondent
Elizabeth Lona
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELIZABETH LONA, AKA Lisa 

Elizabeth Lona, AKA Lisa Luna, 

AKA Chata Monkiker,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 17-70329

Agency No.

A090-045-915

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted December 5, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed May 15, 2020

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Consuelo M. Callahan, 

Circuit Judges, and Stephen R. Bough,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Callahan

* The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

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2 LONA V. BARR

SUMMARY**

Immigration

Denying Elizabeth Lona’s petition for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the denial 

of her motion for reconsideration, the panel held that: (1) the 

BIA’s denial of equitable tolling was not unreasonable; (2)

notwithstanding the BIA’s precedent regarding fundamental 

changes in the law, the BIA’s denial of sua sponte 

reconsideration was not premised on legal or constitutional 

error; and (3) Lona’s “settled course of adjudication” 

argument is barred by the general rule that the court lacks 

jurisdiction to review claims that the BIA should have 

exercised its sua sponte power in a given case. 

In 2013, Lona was removed to Mexico based on an 

aggravated felony conviction, which related to her California 

convictions for petty theft and/or burglary. Over two and a 

half years later, she moved for reconsideration in light of 

new case law, including Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 

863 (9th Cir. 2015), which held that convictions under 

California’s theft statute are categorically not aggravated 

felonies. First, she argued that Lopez-Valencia, and other 

decisions, fundamentally changed the law, invalidating the 

aggravated felony status of her convictions and her basis for 

removal. Second, she argued that she was entitled to 

equitable tolling of the thirty-day timeline for 

reconsideration. Third, she cited BIA precedent holding that 

a significant development in the law constitutes an 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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LONA V. BARR 3

“exceptional circumstance” warranting the agency’s 

exercise of its sua sponte authority to reopen or reconsider 

cases. The IJ denied the motion, and the BIA affirmed.

First, responding to Lona’s argument that the BIA erred 

by not addressing her equitable tolling claim, the panel 

concluded that the BIA implicitly rejected that claim. The 

panel inferred the BIA’s decision to mean that, regardless of 

whether the change in law effected by Lopez-Valencia was 

“fundamental,” Lona was not entitled to equitable tolling 

because (1) she failed to act with due diligence in 

discovering and raising the error asserted by Lopez-Valencia 

before the BIA and later, successfully before this court; and 

(2) she failed to do so despite the lack of impediments to 

obtaining vital information bearing on the existence of the 

claim. The panel agreed, explaining that Lona alleged no 

facts suggesting diligence, or that some extraordinary 

circumstance prevented her from timely filing her motion. 

Second, the panel rejected Lona’s contention that the 

BIA’s denial of sua sponte reconsideration was premised on 

or amounted to “legal or constitutional error” that is 

reviewable under Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575 (9th Cir. 

2016). The panel explained that review under Bonilla is 

limited to those situations where it is obvious that the agency 

has denied sua sponte relief not as a matter of discretion, but 

because it erroneously believed that the law forbade it from 

exercising its discretion, or that exercising its discretion 

would be futile. The panel found no such error in the BIA’s 

decision here. 

Third, the panel rejected Lona’s argument that the BIA’s 

decision was contrary to its previous decisions holding that 

a fundamental change in the law is an exceptional 

circumstance warranting sua sponte reopening. The panel 

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4 LONA V. BARR

viewed the argument as a tacit invocation of the Third 

Circuit’s “settled course of adjudication” doctrine. The 

panel explained that the Supreme Court case on which the 

Third Circuit based its “settled course” review is directly at 

odds with the Third Circuit’s approach, and that “settled 

course” review is incompatible with the general rule that the 

court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that the BIA should 

have exercised its sua sponte power in a given case. The 

panel further explained that “settled course” review is abuseof-discretion review, as it asks the court to evaluate the 

BIA’s exercise of its sua sponte authority in a given case 

against its decisions in past cases to consider whether the 

BIA may have irrationally departed from its settled practice. 

But, the court explained, this is precisely what the court’s 

case law prohibits: weighing the wisdom of the BIA’s 

decision in any given case.

COUNSEL

Ana F. Barhoum (argued), Olmos & Barhoum LLP, San 

Jose, California; Jennie I. Medina (argued), Mira Law Group 

A.P.C., San Leandro, California; Mei F. Chen, Canton, 

Georgia; for Petitioner.

Micah Engler (argued), Trial Attorney; Andrew N. 

O’Malley, Senior Litigation Counsel; Cindy S. Ferrier, 

Assistant Director; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C.; for Respondent.

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LONA V. BARR 5

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

Four years ago, in Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575 (9th 

Cir. 2016), we addressed how changes in immigration law 

“affect an individual ordered deported from the United 

States when, as it turns out, the law concerning the grounds 

for deportation, or for denial of relief from deportation, 

changes after the individual is ordered deported.” Id. at 578. 

We reaffirmed that the decision to grant or deny sua sponte 

relief in such circumstances is “committed to agency 

discretion by law and, therefore, unreviewable.” MejiaHernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 2011). At 

the same time, we held we have jurisdiction to review Board 

of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denials of sua sponte 

reconsideration or reopening for “legal or constitutional 

error.” Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588.

Bonilla remains settled law in the Ninth Circuit. BIA 

denials of sua sponte relief premised on legal or 

constitutional error remain the “one narrow exception” to 

our rule that the agency’s sua sponte authority is not subject 

to judicial review. Menendez-Gonzalez v. Barr, 929 F.3d 

1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2019). However, in MenendezGonzalez, we alluded to a potential expansion of Bonilla in 

cases where “petitioners ‘establish that the BIA has limited 

its discretion via a policy, rule, settled course of 

adjudication, or by some other method, such that the BIA’s 

discretion can be meaningfully reviewed for abuse.’” Id. 

at 1117 (quoting Sang Goo Park v. Attorney Gen., 846 F.3d 

645, 653 (3d Cir. 2017)).

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6 LONA V. BARR

The petitioner,1 Elizabeth Lona, seeks to take advantage 

of this language, asking us to exercise our limited 

jurisdiction under Bonilla to reverse the BIA’s denial of 

reconsideration based on “a fundamental change in the law” 

that occurred two years after she was ordered removed, 

waived her appeal, and was removed to Mexico. She points 

to BIA precedent that such changes qualify as “exceptional 

situations” warranting sua sponte relief and cites similar 

cases where the BIA granted sua sponte reopening or 

reconsideration. She also argues the BIA should have 

excused her untimeliness by applying equitable tolling.

We hold that: (1) the BIA’s denial of equitable tolling 

was not unreasonable; (2) notwithstanding the BIA’s 

precedent regarding fundamental changes in the law, the 

BIA’s denial of sua sponte reconsideration here was not 

premised on legal or constitutional error; and (3) Lona’s 

“settled course” argument is barred by our general rule that 

we lack jurisdiction to review claims “that the BIA should 

have exercised its sua sponte power” in a given case. 

Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

I

Elizabeth Lona is a native and citizen of Mexico. She 

entered the United States in 1974, the year she was born, and 

became a lawful permanent resident in 1989.

1 We use the term “petitioner” to refer to the party so described in 

this court, the person seeking relief from an order of removal. In 

proceedings before the BIA and the immigration court, that person is 

denominated the “respondent.” We attempt to minimize confusion by 

using “respondent” only when necessary.

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LONA V. BARR 7

In 2009, Lona was convicted of petty theft and petty theft 

with priors in violation of California Penal Code sections 

484 and 666. Two years later, she was convicted of seconddegree burglary, in violation of California Penal Code 

section 459, and was placed in removal proceedings. Lona 

applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 

under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), citing 

generalized fears of persecution and torture in Mexico due 

to her sexual orientation. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 

denied these applications and summarily ordered Lona 

removed based on her aggravated felony conviction.2 Lona 

moved to withdraw her right to appeal to the BIA, the IJ 

granted her motion, and in April 2013 she was removed to 

Mexico.

Over two and a half years later, Lona moved for 

reconsideration of her final removal order in light of LopezValencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2015), Rendon v. 

2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of 

an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”); 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (defining “aggravated felony” to include, 

inter alia, “a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or 

burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one 

year”). The IJ did not clarify which of Lona’s convictions (if not both) 

counted as an aggravated felony. DHS also alleged removability under 

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) based on Lona’s conviction of two crimes 

involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Lona argues that her seconddegree burglary conviction is not a CIMT under Rendon v. Holder, 

764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014), and an earlier decision, Hernandez-Cruz 

v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2011), and that this alternative 

grounds for removal is therefore invalid because, at most, she stands 

convicted of only one CIMT. See Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 

1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that petty theft under California

Penal Code section 484 is a CIMT). We do not consider this argument 

because the BIA sustained removability based on the IJ’s aggravated 

felony determination, and not the allegation of two CIMT convictions.

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8 LONA V. BARR

Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014), and Descamps v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013). First, she argued that 

these decisions fundamentally changed the law, invalidating 

the “aggravated felony” status of her convictions and, 

therefore, her basis for removal.3 Second, she argued that 

she was entitled to equitable tolling of the thirty-day timeline 

for seeking reconsideration because she filed her motion as 

soon as she discovered her eligibility for termination of 

removal proceedings.4 Third, she cited BIA precedent 

holding that “[a] significant development in the law 

constitutes an exceptional circumstance” warranting the 

agency’s exercise of its sua sponte authority to grant relief 

from removal. In re Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I. & N. Dec. 207, 

207–08 (BIA 2002).

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) opposed 

Lona’s motion, arguing that Descamps and Lopez-Valencia 

were not “fundamental changes in the law” and that, 

3 Under Lopez-Valencia, convictions under California’s theft statute 

are never aggravated felonies because the statute is categorically broader 

than the federal definition of “theft offense” under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(43)(G). 798 F.3d at 867, 871–72. Previously, convictions for 

petty theft resulting in imprisonment for at least one year (Lona’s petty 

theft conviction resulted in a 16-month sentence) were classified as 

“aggravated felonies.” United States v. Rivera, 658 F.3d 1073, 1077–78 

(9th Cir. 2011). Likewise, Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1084, invalidated the 

“aggravated felony” status of second-degree burglary under Cal. Penal 

Code section 459 based on categorical overbreadth, while Descamps, 

570 U.S. at 265, held that a conviction under section 459 is not a “violent 

felony” within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B).

4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) (providing that motions for 

reconsideration “must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of a 

final administrative order of removal”); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(2), 

1003.23(b)(1) (same).

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LONA V. BARR 9

regardless, Lona failed to cite any authority that those cases 

“are to be applied retroactively after someone has already 

been removed on an Immigration Judge’s order of removal 

that was valid when it was executed.” DHS noted that Lona 

had withdrawn her right to appeal from her initial order of 

removal and argued that no exceptions to untimeliness 

applied. The IJ agreed with DHS and summarily denied 

Lona’s motion.

Lona appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. Without 

expressly addressing Lona’s equitable tolling argument, the 

BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Lona’s motion to reconsider 

as “untimely” and noted that Lona “waived her appeal.” The 

BIA noted that it “must be persuaded that the respondent’s 

situation is truly exceptional” before exercising its sua 

sponte authority to reconsider and concluded that Lona had 

not met her burden of persuasion:

[Lona] argues that . . . Lopez-Valencia . . .

fundamentally changed the law, such that 

[her] conviction is no longer an aggravated 

felony. [She] had a full and fair opportunity 

to raise arguments similar to the ones 

accepted in Lopez-Valencia but failed to do 

so. She waived appeal from the Immigration 

Judge’s order of removal and was removed. 

Her case is final and does not warrant 

reconsideration.

Accordingly, the BIA dismissed Lona’s appeal.

Lona timely petitioned us to review the BIA’s decision.

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II

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Mata v. 

Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (2015); Avagyan 

v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011). We generally 

review the denial of a motion to reconsider a final order of 

removal for an abuse of discretion, reversing when the denial 

is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Go v. Holder, 

744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Where, 

as here, the BIA denies reconsideration pursuant to its sua 

sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), we review only 

for “legal or constitutional error.” Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588. 

If we find such error, we “remand to the BIA so it may 

exercise its authority against the correct ‘legal background.’” 

Id. (quoting Pllumi v. Attorney Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d 

Cir. 2011)).

III

A motion to reconsider a final order of removal generally 

must be filed within thirty days of the date of entry of the 

order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B). The BIA may equitably 

toll this statutory filing deadline, including in cases where 

the petitioner seeks excusal from untimeliness based on a 

change in the law that invalidates the original basis for 

removal. See Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337, 343–

45 (5th Cir. 2016). When equitable tolling is unavailable, 

the BIA may, in its discretion, exercise its sua sponte 

authority to “reopen or reconsider on its own motion any 

case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(a).

In order for an individual to obtain sua sponte relief 

under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), “the Board ‘must be persuaded 

that the respondent’s situation is truly exceptional.’” 

Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 585 (quoting In re G–D–, 22 I. & N. 

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LONA V. BARR 11

Dec. 1132, 1134 (BIA 1999)). The BIA has cautioned that 

its sua sponte authority “is not meant to cure filing defects 

or circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might 

result in hardship.” Id. (quoting In re J–J–, 21 I. & N. Dec. 

976, 984 (BIA 1997)). “‘[A] fundamental change in the law’ 

that represents ‘a departure from established principles’” 

qualifies as an exceptional circumstance for which “‘sua 

sponte action by the Board is appropriate.’” Id. (quoting In 

re G–D–, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1135). “Importantly, however, 

the Board is not required—by regulation or its own 

decisions—to reopen proceedings sua sponte in exceptional 

situations.” Id. (citing Ekimian, 303 F.3d at 1158).

Lona makes three arguments in support of her petition. 

First, she argues that the BIA erred in not addressing her 

entitlement to equitable tolling of the statutory deadline for 

seeking reconsideration because she filed her motion “as 

soon as practicable” after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

Lopez-Valencia, the timing of which was a circumstance 

“beyond her control.” Second, she argues that the BIA 

committed “legal error” under Bonilla by misconstruing its 

sua sponte authority to reconsider a final order of removal 

based on a fundamental change in the law even where, as 

here, the petitioner waived her initial appeal and was 

removed. Third, Lona argues that the BIA ignored or 

misapplied its own precedent “that a fundamental change in 

the law is an exceptional circumstance which warrants sua 

sponte reopening”—a tacit invocation of the “settled course” 

exception we discussed in Menendez-Gonzalez.

We reject Lona’s arguments and hold that the BIA’s 

decision fell within its broad discretion, did not involve legal 

or constitutional error, and does not entitle her to any relief.

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A

We “recognize[] equitable tolling of deadlines and 

numerical limits on motions to reopen or reconsider during 

periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of 

deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with 

due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error.” 

Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003). In 

addition, equitable tolling is available where, “despite all due 

diligence,” the party invoking the doctrine “is unable to 

obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the 

claim.” Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Although claims for equitable tolling typically arise in 

conjunction with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

see, e.g., Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 898–99, claims based on 

changes in the law are not unheard of, nor are they 

prohibited.

In Lugo-Resendez, the Fifth Circuit remanded for further 

factual development of Lugo-Resendez’s claim that he was 

entitled to equitable tolling based on Garcia-Carias v. 

Holder, 697 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2012), which reversed the 

BIA’s long-held and unequivocal ban on reopening of 

removal proceedings once an individual ordered removed 

has departed the United States (the so-called “departure 

bar”).5 Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 340–41, 343–45. Upon 

remand, the BIA found that Lugo-Resendez had “made 

repeated efforts over the course of approximately 3 years to 

learn whether his proceedings could be reopened” and 

5 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1) (providing that “[a] 

motion to reopen or to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a 

person who is the subject of removal, deportation, or exclusion 

proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States”).

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LONA V. BARR 13

abandoned these efforts only “because he was told on 

multiple occasions that there was nothing that could be done 

about his case and he was unaware that the law affecting his 

removability could change.” In re: Sergio Lugo-Resendez, 

No. AXXX XX0 500, 2017 WL 8787197, at *3 (BIA Dec. 

28, 2017). Once Lugo-Resendez became aware of the 

change in the law effected by Garcia-Carias, he took 

immediate steps to obtain sua sponte relief.6 Id. The BIA 

held that Lugo-Resendez was entitled to equitable tolling 

because he “pursu[ed] his rights with ‘reasonable diligence’” 

and “‘extraordinary circumstances . . . beyond his control’ 

prevented him from filing his motion” sooner. Id. (quoting 

Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 344).

Here, the BIA implicitly rejected Lona’s argument for 

equitable tolling when it concluded that her motion for 

reconsideration was “untimely by 2 years and 7 months” and 

found that Lona “had a full and fair opportunity to raise 

arguments similar to the ones accepted in Lopez-Valencia

but failed to do so.” We infer this to mean that, regardless 

of whether the change in law effected by Lopez-Valencia 

was “fundamental,” Lona was not entitled to equitable 

tolling because (1) she failed to act with due diligence in 

discovering and raising the error asserted by Lopez-Valencia 

6 Lugo-Resendez also relied on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision 

in Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006), which invalidated the 

“aggravated felony” status of his conviction for simple possession and, 

therefore, the basis for his removal. Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 339. 

Lugo-Resendez argued that it would have been futile for him to seek 

reopening based solely on Lopez because, until Garcia-Carias, the 

departure bar still applied. Id. at 339–40. The BIA agreed. See In re: 

Sergio Lugo-Resendez, 2017 WL 8787197, at *3 (holding that LugoResendez “filed his motion within a reasonable period of time after he 

learned of the change in law embodied in both Lopez and GarciaCarias”).

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before the BIA and later, successfully, before us; and (2) she

failed to do so despite the lack of impediments “to 

obtain[ing] vital information bearing on the existence of the 

claim.”7 Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1193.

We agree. Lona has alleged no facts—before the IJ, the 

BIA, or on appeal before us—suggesting a diligent pursuit 

of her rights in the intervening years between her removal 

and Lopez-Valencia; nor has she shown “that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way and prevented 

timely filing” of her motion based on Descamps and Rendon, 

which Lopez-Valencia plainly followed. Lugo-Resendez, 

831 F.3d at 344 (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. 

United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2016) (quoting Holland 

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010))). Unlike the complete 

reversal of BIA precedent at issue in Lugo-Resendez, our 

holding in Lopez-Valencia “[a]dher[ed] to the methodology 

established by Descamps and our follow-on opinion in 

Rendon”—an application of existing law to California’s 

7 Of course, it is preferable that the agency “show its work,” as it 

were, so that we are not left guessing at its reasons for denying relief. 

Although we could remand for a clearer explanation of why the BIA 

rejected this aspect of Lona’s appeal—see Viridiana v. Holder, 646 F.3d 

1230, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2011); Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 343–45—

we decline to do so for two reasons. First, “it is pointless to remand if it 

is clear what the agency decision must be,” Barradas v. Holder, 582 F.3d 

754, 765 n.9 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted), and we think it is obvious that the BIA, if we were to remand, 

would explicitly deny equitable tolling for the reasons we set forth. 

Second, in this case the determination of whether Lona has demonstrated 

the diligence necessary for equitable tolling “requires neither factual 

development nor agency expertise and is properly analyzed by this 

court.” Rivera v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1064, 1078 n.13 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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LONA V. BARR 15

theft statute that we characterized as “not complicated.” 

Lopez-Valencia, 798 F.3d at 866, 869.

Given the lack of evidence that Lona took any action 

prior to our decision in Lopez-Valencia and the obvious and 

uncomplicated nature of her underlying claim, we hold that 

the BIA’s implicit denial of Lona’s claim for equitable 

tolling was not “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Go, 

744 F.3d at 609. Accordingly, we deny Lona’s petition for 

review as to her motion for reconsideration under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(6).

B

We next address Lona’s contention that the BIA’s 

dismissal of her appeal was premised on or amounts to “legal 

or constitutional error” under Bonilla.

Before Bonilla, the rule we observed—despite the 

general “presumption favoring . . . judicial review of 

administrative action,” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237 

(2010) (citation omitted)—was that we have no jurisdiction 

to review the BIA’s sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(a). See Ekimian, 303 F.3d at 1159 (“[T]he decision 

of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is 

committed to its unfettered discretion . . . [and is] not subject 

to judicial review.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Luis v. 

INS, 196 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1999)). This rule was rooted 

in “the ‘truly exceptional situations’ locution” the BIA 

adopted for exercising its discretion to reconsider or reopen 

on its own motion. Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 585 (quoting In re 

G–D–, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1134). We explained that “the 

breadth and generality” of this benchmark “provides no 

judicially manageable standard with which to” review the 

BIA’s exercise of discretion. Id. at 585–86 (citation 

omitted). We held that because there is no “law to apply,” 

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16 LONA V. BARR

id. at 586, “it is impossible to evaluate agency action for 

‘abuse of discretion.’” Ekimian, 303 F.3d at 1158 (quoting 

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).

In Bonilla, we carved out a narrow exception to this 

jurisdictional bar. The BIA had denied Bonilla’s untimely 

motion for reopening not on its merits, but rather because the 

agency “believed, incorrectly, that Bonilla had lost his 

lawful permanent resident status when he was deported and, 

even if reopening were granted,” he would not regain his 

status to become eligible for certain relief. 840 F.3d at 589. 

On appeal, we held that, as a matter of law, granting the 

motion would vacate the final deportation order that caused 

Bonilla to lose his lawful permanent resident status, such that 

the reopening would not be futile. Id. at 589–90. In other 

words, the “legal backdrop” against which the BIA initially 

assessed the exceptionality of Bonilla’s situation was 

flawed, with the result that the agency had not truly 

exercised its discretion. Id. at 579. Because there was “law 

to apply” in this situation, we held that we had limited 

jurisdiction to recognize the BIA’s reliance “on an incorrect 

legal premise” and to remand for the agency to “exercise its 

authority against the correct legal background.” Id. at 588–

89 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Our opinion in Bonilla built on our opinion in Singh v. 

Holder, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014), where we found “legal 

error” in the BIA’s denial of Singh’s untimely motion to 

reopen because it was based on the BIA’s incorrect belief 

that “it lacked authority to reopen his exclusion proceedings” 

on its own motion.8 Id. at 650. In both cases, we held that 

8 This incorrect belief was rooted in the BIA’s reliance on In re 

Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 2009), an inapposite case in which the 

BIA erroneously interpreted Yauri’s untimely motion to reopen and 

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LONA V. BARR 17

the BIA’s denials of sua sponte relief were not “exercises” 

of its unfettered discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) 

because they were premised on legal error. Bonilla, 

840 F.3d at 579, 592; see Singh, 771 F.3d at 650 (“Where, 

as here, the BIA concludes that it lacks the authority to 

reopen, rather than denying a motion to reopen as an exercise 

of discretion, we hold that Ekimian does not preclude our 

jurisdiction.”).9 In Bonilla, we held that “[i]f, on remand, 

the Board again declines to exercise its sua sponte authority 

to reopen, and does so without relying on a constitutionally 

or legally erroneous premise, its decision will not be 

reviewable.” 840 F.3d at 592.

Here, we see no “incorrect legal premise” in the BIA’s 

decision to deny sua sponte relief. The BIA clearly 

articulated the “truly exceptional situations” standard for its 

exercise of discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). It cited In 

re G–D–, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132—under which a 

“fundamental change in the law” qualifies as an “exceptional 

situation” for which sua sponte action may be appropriate, 

continue her removal proceedings as a request for a stay of removal so 

that she could pursue an application for adjustment of status before the 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services—a request the BIA 

had no authority to grant. Singh, 771 F.3d at 651. We held that “the 

Board’s denial of Singh’s motion to reopen [in reliance on Yauri] on 

jurisdictional grounds was legal error” and remanded “to the BIA for an 

exercise of the agency’s discretion.” Id. at 653.

9 See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 

Security, 908 F.3d 476, 497 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]here the agency’s 

decision is based not on an exercise of discretion, but instead on a belief 

that any alternative choice was foreclosed by law, the APA’s ‘committed 

to agency discretion’ bar to reviewability, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), does not 

apply.”), cert. granted sub nom. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of 

the Univ. of California, No. 18-587, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (mem.) (2019), 

argued Nov. 12, 2019.

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id. at 1135—and acknowledged Lona’s argument that 

Lopez-Valencia “fundamentally changed the law” by 

invalidating the aggravated-felony status of her petty theft 

conviction. It then noted three factors weighing against a 

finding of exceptional circumstances in her case: (1) Lona’s 

failure “to raise arguments similar to the ones accepted in 

Lopez-Valencia” despite “a full and fair opportunity” to do 

so; (2) Lona’s waiver of appeal; and (3) her actual removal. 

Finally, the BIA concluded that Lona’s “case is final and 

does not warrant reconsideration,” demonstrating that the 

agency clearly understood the discretionary nature of its 

decision.

Lona argues that the BIA’s decision was incorrectly 

premised on the finality of her case, her appeal waiver, and 

her removal to Mexico, and that none of these deprived the 

BIA of its authority to grant sua sponte relief. She notes that 

in Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 

2006), we reaffirmed that an alien who files a timely motion 

to reopen removal proceedings may be entitled to reopening, 

even post-removal, if his state conviction is vacated and that 

conviction formed a “key part of his removal 

proceedings.”10 Id. at 1106–07 (citing Wiedersperg v. INS, 

896 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1990); Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 

F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981)). Indeed, like the Fifth Circuit, we 

have held the regulatory departure bar—prohibiting postdeparture motions to reconsider or reopen subsequent to the 

10 Lona also cites In re L–V–K–, 22 I. & N. Dec. 976 (BIA 1999), 

arguing that there the BIA granted a motion to remand for adjustment of 

status “despite the fact that the movant had previously waived appeal of 

her case.” Lona is mistaken. Rather, the BIA found that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider a motion for adjustment of status where the 

movant waived appeal, “her deportation proceedings were never 

reopened[,] and the motion to remand was not timely filed following the 

[IJ’s] final administrative order.” Id. at 980.

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LONA V. BARR 19

movant’s departure from the United States—to be invalid 

and to pose no limitations on an alien’s ability to seek 

reconsideration or reopening or the BIA’s authority to grant 

such relief. Toor v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2015); see also Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073 (9th 

Cir. 2011); Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2010).

But the BIA’s decision here evinces no 

misunderstanding about its unfettered discretion under 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Furthermore, the BIA’s interest in 

finality, Lona’s appeal waiver, and her removal are not 

irrelevant.11 The agency found that Lona’s appeal waiver 

and removal supported its conclusion that her situation is not 

“exceptional” and, therefore, her case “does not warrant

reconsideration.” It did not state that it lacked the authority 

to grant reconsideration or to consider the merits of her 

motion based on these factors. The scope of our review 

under Bonilla is limited to those situations where it is 

obvious that the agency has denied sua sponte relief not as a 

matter of discretion, but because it erroneously believed that 

the law forbade it from exercising its discretion, see Singh, 

771 F.3d at 650, or that exercising its discretion would be 

futile, see Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588–89. In other words, our 

review under Bonilla is constricted to legal or constitutional 

error that is apparent on the face of the BIA’s decision and 

11 See Muyubisnay-Cungachi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 

2013) (“As a general rule, motions to reopen removal hearings are 

disfavored as contrary to ‘the compelling public interests in finality and 

the expeditious processing of proceedings.’”) (citation omitted); 

Villatoro-Ochoa v. Lynch, 844 F.3d 993, 994 (8th Cir. 2017) (noting that 

motions to reopen are “disfavored because they undermine the 

government’s legitimate interest in finality, which is heightened in 

removal proceedings” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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does not extend to speculating whether the BIA might have 

misunderstood some aspect of its discretion.

Because we hold that the BIA’s decision was free of 

“legal or constitutional error,” we need not decide whether 

Lopez-Valencia fundamentally changed the law. However, 

even if Lopez-Valencia was a fundamental change, it does 

not follow that the BIA committed legal or constitutional 

error in denying Lona relief. “[T]he Board is not required

. . . to reopen proceedings sua sponte in exceptional 

situations,” id. at 585 (citing Ekimian, 303 F.3d at 1158), 

even those involving “a ‘fundamental change in the law’” id.

(quoting In re G–D–, 22 I. & N. at 1135). Instead, as the 

Eighth Circuit has noted:

[t]he governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(a), still grants the Board unfettered 

discretion to reopen sua sponte as it sees fit. 

The Board’s recognition of a “fundamental 

change in the law” in a particular case is 

simply a means of describing when the Board 

has decided that a certain intervening 

development constitutes an “exceptional 

situation” warranting an exercise of its 

discretion to reopen. A finding of 

“fundamental change” is thus an expression 

of discretion; it is not the sort of “legal 

premise” that concerned the courts in 

[Bonilla,] Pllumi and Mahmood.

12

12 See Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 160 (“[W]hen presented with a BIA 

decision rejecting a motion for sua sponte reopening, we may exercise 

jurisdiction to the limited extent of recognizing when the BIA has relied 

on an incorrect legal premise.”); Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 

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LONA V. BARR 21

Barajas-Salinas v. Holder, 760 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 

2014); see also Sang Goo Park, 846 F.3d at 650 (“[T]he 

presence of an exceptional situation does not compel [the 

BIA] to act; the BIA may still decide against reopening.”).

In short, unlike in Bonilla and Singh, the BIA’s denial of 

Lona’s motion to reconsider was untainted by legal or 

constitutional error. Because the BIA’s decision evinces no 

misunderstanding of the agency’s broad discretion to grant 

or deny sua sponte relief—that is, the BIA “exercise[d] its 

authority against the correct legal background”—there is 

nothing left for us to review. Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588, 592.

C

Finally, we reject Lona’s argument that the BIA’s 

“arbitrary and capricious decision is not entitled to deference 

because it is contrary to its previous decisions” and its 

precedent holding “that a fundamental change in the law is 

an exceptional circumstance which warrants sua sponte 

reopening.”

We view this as a tacit invocation of the Third Circuit’s 

“settled course of adjudication” doctrine, which we alluded 

to, but did not adopt, in Menendez-Gonzalez. In that case, 

we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s 

denial of Menendez-Gonzalez’s untimely motion to reopen 

based on the vacatur of his underlying conviction, even 

though he presented some evidence (ten unpublished cases) 

of the BIA’s practice of granting sua sponte reopening in 

(2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the Agency may have declined to exercise its 

sua sponte authority because it misperceived the legal background and 

thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail, remand to 

the Agency for reconsideration in view of the correct law is 

appropriate.”).

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similar circumstances. Menendez-Gonzalez, 929 F.3d 

at 1117–19. We held that Menendez-Gonzalez did “not 

establish a ‘settled pattern of adjudication’ or provide us 

with any meaningful standard to apply to limit the agency’s 

exercise of discretion”; nor did he establish “any ‘incorrect 

legal premise’ in the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte 

where [he] waited years before moving to reopen.” Id. at 

1118–19 (quoting Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588). Nevertheless, 

we mused that “the BIA’s departure from an established 

policy, set ‘by rule or by settled course of adjudication,’ 

could amount to a legal or constitutional error” under 

Bonilla. Id. at 1118 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

We commented, however, that “the existence of a ‘settled 

course’ cannot be lightly inferred,” and that “[t]he question 

is whether the agency has acted to constrain its otherwise 

unfettered discretion.”13 Id.

We note that the Supreme Court case upon which the 

Third Circuit based its adoption of “settled course” review, 

INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996), did not address 

the BIA’s sua sponte authority to reopen or reconsider under 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), or the jurisdiction of the Courts of 

Appeals to review the agency’s exercise of that authority. 

Far from it: the Supreme Court specifically stated that 

“jurisdiction over this matter [the granting of waivers of 

deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(H)] is not in 

13 Since deciding Menendez-Gonzalez, we have engaged in “settled 

course” review of the BIA’s sua sponte authority in at least three 

unpublished cases, denying the petition for review in each instance. See 

Chavez-Mier v. Barr, 773 F. App’x 960 (9th Cir. 2019); SanchezMiranda v. Barr, 782 F. App’x 544 (9th Cir. 2019); Meza-Diveni v. Barr, 

773 F. App’x 412 (9th Cir. 2019). Of course, the denial of relief under 

the “settled course” exception is not necessarily an affirmation of that 

standard of judicial review.

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LONA V. BARR 23

question.”14 Id. at 29 n.1 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702). Instead, 

Yueh-Shaio Yang concerned the scope of the Attorney

General’s authority to grant such waivers—specifically, 

whether the Attorney General was authorized under the 

statute to “take into account acts of fraud committed by the 

alien in connection with his entry into the United States” 

despite the INS’s “settled policy” of not doing so. 519 U.S. 

at 27, 30–31. The Supreme Court reversed, not because the 

Attorney General had deviated from “settled policy,” but 

rather the opposite: the Court held that that the Attorney 

General’s “unfettered discretion” was not cabined by the 

agency’s settled policy, and therefore our contrary 

conclusion was erroneous. Id. at 31–32. Thus, the holding 

in Yueh-Shaio Yang is directly at odds with the Third 

Circuit’s “settled course” approach.

The Supreme Court did note that an agency’s past 

practice is not “irrelevant,” and that an agency could, “by 

rule or by settled course of adjudication,” adopt “a general 

policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, 

[such that] an irrational departure from that policy (as 

opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action 

that must be overturned as ‘arbitrary, capricious, [or] an 

abuse of discretion.’” Id. at 32 (alteration in original) (citing 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). But Yueh-Shaio Yang did not state 

or imply that an agency’s deviation from its past practice in 

a particular case is, by default, irrational or improper; or that 

agencies must provide special justification whenever they 

14 The Court noted that the Illegal Immigration Reform and 

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA), which stripped courts of 

jurisdiction to review any “decision or action of the Attorney General the 

authority for which is specified under [Title 8 U.S.C.] to be in the 

discretion of the Attorney General,” was not yet in effect. 519 U.S. at 29 

n.1 (alteration in original).

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exercise their discretion in an apparently inconsistent 

manner. Furthermore, contrary to the Third Circuit, we do 

not read Yueh-Shaio Yang as stating or implying that “settled 

course” review could be available in the context of agency 

actions that are “committed to agency discretion by law and, 

therefore, unreviewable.” Mejia-Hernandez, 633 F.3d 

at 823–24 (citing Ekimian, 303 F.3d at 1159).

More fundamentally, we conclude that “settled course” 

review is incompatible with the general rule, reaffirmed in 

Bonilla, that we lack jurisdiction to review claims “that the 

BIA should have exercised its sua sponte power” in a given 

case.15 Ekimian, 303 F.3d at 1159 (emphasis added). The 

general rule applies in all cases, even those in which the 

petitioner presents evidence, as Lona has, that the BIA has 

granted sua sponte relief in similar circumstances in the past, 

such as where there has been a fundamental change in the 

law.16 Because the jurisdictional bar still applies, we have 

15 See Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 586 n.7 (collecting fifteen published 

opinions where we relied on or approvingly cited Ekimian’s holding that 

“the ‘exceptional situation’ benchmark does not provide a sufficiently 

meaningful standard to permit judicial review” and noting that Ekimian

“remains good law”).

16 Lona cited three unpublished BIA decisions which, she claims, 

demonstrate the BIA’s settled policy that “a fundamental change in law 

warrants sua sponte reopening.” See In re Benigno Longoria-Ramos, 

No. AXX-XX5-773, 2007 WL 2299627 (BIA July 28, 2007) (granting 

sua sponte reconsideration and terminating removal proceedings based 

on the movant’s “exceptional situation,” after the Fifth Circuit held that 

a conviction under Texas’ assault statute is not an aggravated felony for 

purposes of removal); In re Francis Okogwu, No. AXX-XX6-621, 2007 

WL 2074435 (BIA Jun. 13, 2007) (finding “an exceptional situation 

exists due to a change in the law” and ordering sua sponte reopening after 

the sole basis for removal was invalidated by a Supreme Court decision 

issued one year after filing of the removal order); In re Angel Bringas, 

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LONA V. BARR 25

no authority to consider the consistency of the BIA’s 

decisions, or to even begin comparing the circumstances of 

the present case against the circumstances in past cases 

where sua sponte relief was granted.

The Third Circuit, however, suggests that the

“evaluation of the authorities marshaled by the petitioner 

logically precedes, rather than follows, a finding of 

jurisdiction to conduct abuse-of-discretion review—

although we can of course refer to the BIA’s decision from 

which the petition arises to determine whether it fits into the 

pattern alleged by the petitioner.” Sang Goo Park, 846 F.3d 

at 653. In our opinion, “settled course” review is abuse-ofdiscretion review, regardless of when undertaken. It asks 

that we evaluate the BIA’s exercise of its sua sponte 

authority in a given case against its decisions in past cases to 

consider whether the BIA may have “irrationally departed 

from its settled practice.” Menendez-Gonzalez, 929 F.3d at 

1117. But this is precisely what Ekimian prohibits: our 

weighing the wisdom of the BIA’s decision in any given 

case. Nothing in Bonilla undermined or amended that 

general prohibition.17

No other Court of Appeals has joined the Third Circuit 

in recognizing a “‘settled course’ exception in the context of 

No. AXX-XX8-709, 2004 WL 1398720 (BIA Apr. 14, 2004) (granting 

sua sponte reopening after the Ninth Circuit held that a state conviction 

for possession of methamphetamine is not an aggravated felony for 

immigration purposes, invalidating the basis for removal).

17 Cf. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 854 n.8 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“Framing the question in this manner does not avoid the 

jurisdictional bar because this approach, like a direct challenge on the 

merits, requires a merits analysis. Calling it something else does not 

change the legal character of the challenge.”).

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26 LONA V. BARR

sua sponte reopening.” Sang Goo Park, 846 F.3d at 653 

n.35. To the extent we suggested that we might do so in 

Menendez-Gonzalez, we walk back that suggestion now. 

Short of the BIA adopting an explicit rule that it will apply 

in every case, our review of the BIA’s unfettered discretion 

to reconsider or reopen on its own motion is limited to 

instances where the agency misconstrues the parameters of 

its sua sponte authority based on legal or constitutional error 

and, as a consequence, does not truly exercise its discretion. 

See Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588–89. The Eighth Circuit has 

similarly rejected “settled course” review as incompatible 

with its own precedent that the BIA is not required to grant 

sua sponte relief in a given case, even in cases involving 

“exceptional situations.” Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 

1000, 1005 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam).

We further note that adoption of the Third Circuit’s 

“settled course” approach would conflict with the general 

principle that there is no “theory of partial reviewability” for 

actions committed to agency discretion. Schilling v. Rogers, 

363 U.S. 666, 674–75 (1960); see Dep’t of Commerce v. New 

York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2605 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in 

part and dissenting in part) (“[W]hen an action ‘is committed 

to agency discretion by law,’ the Judiciary has no role to 

play, even when an agency sets forth ‘an eminently 

reviewable proposition.’” (quoting ICC v. Bhd. of 

Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282–83 (1987) (rejecting 

the proposition that “if [an] agency gives a ‘reviewable’ 

reason for [an] otherwise unreviewable action, the action 

becomes reviewable”))). Citing this general principle, the 

Eighth Circuit recently declined to adopt an “incorrect legal 

premise” exception similar to the one we adopted in Bonilla, 

in a case in which the petitioner, like Lona, sought review of 

the BIA’s denial of sua sponte relief based on a 

“fundamental change in the law.” See Chong Toua Vue v. 

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LONA V. BARR 27

Barr, 953 F.3d 1054, 1056–57 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing 

Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. at 282–83) (“As the 

Supreme Court has made clear, when the law commits 

certain actions to agency discretion, we cannot pick and 

choose what to review depending on the particulars of each 

case.”).

In sum, our review for legal or constitutional error under 

Bonilla does not encompass alleged inconsistencies between 

the BIA’s grants or denials of discretionary relief. Rather, 

we look to whether the particular decision at issue involved 

legal error, as the Supreme Court held in Yueh-Shaio Yang. 

Here, because Lona’s assertion that the BIA’s denial of sua 

sponte relief is inconsistent with its decisions in other cases 

does not present an issue of legal or constitutional error, we 

deny her petition for review.

CONCLUSION

As we observed in Bonilla: “Immigration law changes 

over time. New statutes are enacted; agency interpretations 

change; new appellate and Supreme Court decisions issue.” 

840 F.3d at 578. Not every circumstance involving a change 

in the law that occurs after an individual’s departure from 

the United States warrants reconsideration of the 

individual’s final removal order or reopening of removal 

proceedings. The BIA is empowered to determine on a caseby-case basis whether the circumstances are exceptional 

such that the agency’s exercise of sua sponte authority is 

warranted. We decline to adopt an approach that would 

invite us to consider—and, inevitably, to second-guess—the 

BIA’s case-by-case determination of when to grant sua 

sponte relief.

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28 LONA V. BARR

The BIA determined Lona’s case to be unexceptional 

and not entitled to sua sponte reconsideration. We cannot, 

by law, disagree.

THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IS DENIED.

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