Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02712/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02712-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leo Adams
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2712

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Eastern District of Missouri.

*

Leo Adams, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 19, 2006

Filed: July 3, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, and BOWMAN and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

In October 2002, a jury found Leo Adams guilty of conspiracy to distribute

drugs, and the District Court1

 sentenced him to 360 months in prison. On appeal, we

affirmed his conviction but remanded for resentencing in accordance with the then

recently issued decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). United

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The Supreme Court, at 126 S. Ct. 492 (2005), denied the petition for writ of

certiorari filed by Carl Parker, Adams's co-defendant at trial, whose conviction and

sentence we affirmed in Adams.

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States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2005).2

 On remand, the District Court again

sentenced Adams to 360 months in prison. Adams appeals and we affirm.

At trial, the jury specifically found Adams responsible for conspiring to

distribute more than a kilogram of heroin. At resentencing, the District Court found

that the prosecution had shown, in addition, that Adams was responsible for at least

thirty kilograms of heroin while distributing drugs in the St. Louis area beginning in

the late 1990s and continuing over several years. The court deemed this to be relevant

conduct for sentencing purposes and adjusted Adams's base offense level accordingly.

See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3 (2001). Adams contends that the

District Court violated his constitutional rights by making a factual finding that

increased his base offense level because the jury that convicted him did not find the

necessary fact beyond a reasonable doubt. He notes the Booker holding that the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional because they permit a sentence to be

calculated based on facts not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See 543

U.S. at 226–27 (opinion of Stevens, J.). He ignores, however, the remedial holding

of Booker: that application of the Guidelines will be constitutional if they are read by

the courts not as mandatory but only as advisory. See id. at 245 (opinion of Breyer,

J.). With the sentencing court free to exercise its discretion, "the defendant has no

right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant," id. at 233, and

so a district court's finding of relevant conduct by a preponderance of the evidence

does not offend the Sixth Amendment, see United States v. Ault, 446 F.3d 821, 822

n.2 (8th Cir. 2006). We are, of course, bound by both the constitutional and the

remedial holdings of Booker, and we therefore reject Adams's argument. 

Adams also challenges the factual finding itself that led the District Court to

calculate his base offense level using a greater quantity of heroin than that found by

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the jury at his trial. The District Court arrived at the thirty-plus kilograms of heroin

by crediting evidence of not only Adams's participation in the Rush-Bey

conspiracy—the conspiracy for which he was convicted—but also his earlier

involvement in the so-called Serrano conspiracy, for which he was not tried. See

generally Adams, 401 F.3d at 890–92 (summarizing Adams's involvement in the

conspiracies). The court determined that the heroin that was shown to have been

purchased for distribution during Adams's participation in both conspiracies was

relevant conduct that should be considered in calculating his base offense level. 

Conduct is relevant for sentencing purposes if it is "part of the same course of

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(2). Adams maintains that the court erred in finding

that his participation in both conspiracies was part of the same course of conduct and

therefore relevant. "Whether uncharged conduct is part of the same course of conduct

as the offense of conviction is a fact-intensive inquiry. Thus, we review the

sentencing court's relevant conduct findings for clear error." Ault, 446 F.3d at 823.

The evidence showed that Adams purchased heroin for distribution from the Serrano

co-conspirators until he and the Serrano brothers had a falling out over money, at

which time he joined the Rush-Bey conspiracy for a source of heroin. Considering

the "similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity of the charged and uncharged

conduct," id., we see no error in the District Court's finding that Adams's dealings in

at least thirty kilograms of heroin constituted conduct relevant to his offense of

conviction and therefore should be considered in establishing his base offense level.

Finally, Adams argues that the District Court committed a constitutional ex post

facto violation by applying the Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory.

According to Adams, "Booker's remedial holding unexpectedly and indefensibly

struck the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines

mandatory, and in doing so, raised the maximum [sentence] from the maximum

authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict to the U.S.

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Code maximum." Brief of Appellant at 25. Since briefing was completed in this case,

we decided United States v. Wade, 435 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). In

Wade, we noted, inter alia, that the application of the remedial portion of Booker,

even to pre-Booker conduct, was mandated by the Supreme Court, and "the Supreme

Court would not direct us to violate the Constitution." Id. at 832. Accordingly, we

reject Adams's ex post facto argument.

Post-Booker, we review an advisory Guidelines sentence for reasonableness

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Tobacco, 428 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir.

2005). Adams's 360-month sentence, being within the advisory Guidelines range, is

presumptively reasonable, and Adams has not shown that the District Court, in

imposing the sentence, failed to consider a relevant factor, gave significant weight to

an irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error in judgment. See id. The sentence is

affirmed.

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