Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01886/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01886-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Douglas Alarid
Petitioner
Department of the Army
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

DOUGLAS A. ALARID,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Respondent

______________________

2023-1886

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-0752-14-0256-B-2.

______________________

Decided: December 4, 2024

______________________

DOUGLAS ALARID, Union City, CA, pro se. 

 JANA MOSES, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BRIAN M. BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY. 

 ______________________

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2 ALARID v. ARMY

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, TARANTO, Circuit Judge, and 

SCHROEDER, District Judge.

1

PER CURIAM.

In 2013, the Army removed Douglas A. Alarid from his 

position as a police officer after finding that he had engaged 

in misconduct involving a conspiracy to purchase and 

distribute an unauthorized federal police badge and 

involving the manufacture and distribution of an 

unauthorized federal police identification (ID) card. The 

Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) sustained the 

removal. Alarid v. Department of the Army, No. SF-0752-

14-0256-B-2, 2023 WL 2482656, at *1 (¶ 1) (M.S.P.B. Mar.

13, 2023) (2023 Board Order), adopting, as Board decision,

Alarid v. Department of the Army, No. SF-0752-14-0256-B2, 2016 WL 6837435 (M.S.P.B. Nov. 14, 2016) (Board 

Decision). Mr. Alarid timely petitioned for review by this 

court. We affirm.

I

Mr. Alarid was working for the Army as a Police Officer 

at the Camp Parks police department when the events 

underlying the present appeal occurred. In 2011 and 2012, 

the Camp Parks police department received “several 

threatening letters and packages” and anonymous letters 

containing emails about Mr. Alarid’s involvement in 

unlawful police-badge purchases and ID-card 

manufacturing. SAppx198.2 Richard DeOcampo, who had 

been an Army police officer until he agreed to resign in 

1 Honorable Robert W. Schroeder III, District Judge, 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Texas, sitting by designation.

2 “SAppx” refers to the Supplemental Appendix 

submitted by the Respondent.

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ALARID v. ARMY 3

2011, was arrested in mid-2012 in connection with those 

mailings.

When arrested, Mr. DeOcampo had with him an 

unauthorized Camp Parks police ID card and a police flat 

badge. Earlier, in the 2011 settlement agreement for Mr. 

DeOcampo to resign, the Army had agreed to provide Mr. 

DeOcampo with a police ID card that would state the 

period during which he had worked as a Camp Parks police 

officer on the back. The ID card that was recovered from 

Mr. DeOcampo in mid-2012, however, contained 

unauthorized language on the back stating that he was 

allowed to carry firearms, make arrests, and serve 

warrants.

The 2011–12 mailings also led to an internal 

investigation of Mr. Alarid by then-Chief of Police 

Morningstar, then-Deputy Chief Chappell, and thenDetective Hunt. Chief Morningstar was replaced by Chief 

Lovett, and in October 2013, Chief Lovett issued a Notice 

of Proposed Removal of Mr. Alarid based on two charges:

(1) that Mr. Alarid had conspired with Mr. DeOcampo to 

purchase unauthorized federal police badges and to 

distribute the badges among themselves, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 371, and (2) that Mr. Alarid had manufactured an 

unauthorized federal police ID card for Mr. DeOcampo, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 701. SAppx197–202. Mr. Alarid 

responded by denying both charges and asserting that the 

removal proposal was rooted in reprisal for several 

grievances that he, as vice president of the police union, 

had brought against then-Chief Morningstar on behalf of 

other employees. SAppx190–95. In December 2013, the 

deciding official, Director of Emergency Services Walker,

found that both charges were supported by a 

preponderance of evidence and warranted Mr. Alarid’s 

removal from his position. SAppx177–88.

Mr. Alarid appealed to the Board. In March 2015, the 

assigned Board administrative judge (AJ) issued an initial 

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4 ALARID v. ARMY

decision, Alarid v. Department of the Army, No. SF-0752-

14-0256-I-1, 2015 WL 1539301 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 30, 2015)

(2015 Initial Decision); SAppx24–39, affirming the 

removal. The AJ determined that the Army had proven 

both charges by a preponderance of the evidence and that

Mr. Alarid failed to carry his burden of proving the 

affirmative defense of retaliation for protected equal 

employment opportunity activity. 2015 Initial Decision, at 

2–14.

3 The AJ also found that the Army had shown that a 

nexus existed between Mr. Alarid’s actions and his removal 

to promote the efficiency of the service and that removal 

was the maximum reasonable penalty. Id. at 15–16.

Mr. Alarid petitioned the full Board for review. In 

August 2015, the Board determined that the AJ had 

misconstrued Mr. Alarid’s affirmative defenses—which 

were accurately understood as reprisal against unionrelated activities in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B)

and reprisal against whistleblowing in violation of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(8)—and failed to inform Mr. Alarid of the 

burdens of proof on those defenses. Alarid v. Department 

of Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, 605–09 (¶¶ 7–15), 610–11 (¶ 18)

(2015) (2015 Board Decision); SAppx50–57. The Board also 

ruled that the AJ had failed to consider Mr. Alarid’s 

allegation of a due process violation. 2015 Board Decision, 

at 609–10 (¶¶ 16–17). Accordingly, the Board remanded 

the matter to the AJ. Id. at 610–11 (¶ 18).

On remand, the AJ held a supplementary hearing on 

March 3, 2016, and issued a new initial decision in 

3 For the 2015 Initial Decision and the Board 

Decision, we cite the page numbers on the AJ opinions in 

the Board file. See Alarid v. Department of the Army, 

No. SF-0752-14-0256-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 41

(M.S.P.B.) (2015 Initial Decision); Alarid v. Department of 

the Army, No. SF-0752-14-0256-B-2, id., Refiled Remand 

File, Tab 5 (Board Decision).

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ALARID v. ARMY 5

November 2016—which we will call the Board Decision

because the full Board, in 2023, adopted it as such. Board 

Decision; SAppx69–101. The AJ again found that the Army 

had proven the two charges, that a nexus to the efficiency 

of the service existed, and that the penalty of removal was 

reasonable. Board Decision, at 2–12, 25–26. The AJ then 

determined that Mr. Alarid had neither established a 

violation of due process rights nor proven his affirmative 

defenses of reprisal for union activity or whistleblowing. 

Id. at 13–25.

Regarding reprisal for participation in union activity,

the AJ first noted that the Army (agency) had conceded 

that Mr. Alarid had engaged in protected activity under 5 

U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B). Id. at 18 n.12. Applying the 

burden-shifting standard set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), 

the AJ then determined that Mr. Alarid had not shown that 

the proposing official, Chief Lovett, was aware of the 

protected activity (personally or by imputation) when 

proposing to remove Mr. Alarid but had shown that the 

deciding official, Director Walker, had such awareness 

when deciding to remove him (because Mr. Alarid disclosed 

the activity in responding to the removal proposal). Id. at 

20. The AJ then concluded that the agency nonetheless 

prevailed because it had shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that it would have taken the removal action in the 

absence of the protected union activity. Id. at 21.

Regarding reprisal for whistleblowing, the AJ 

determined that Mr. Alarid had been involved in filing 

three complaints that constituted protected disclosures 

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id. at 24. The AJ noted, 

however, that “Chief Lovett and [Director] Walker testified 

that they were unaware of the appellant having filed the 

[three complaints], and there is no evidence to the 

contrary.” Id. The AJ also noted that Mr. Alarid had not 

mentioned those complaints in responding to the removal 

proposal, even though he had discussed his union activity 

in that response. Id. Accordingly, the AJ concluded that 

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6 ALARID v. ARMY

Mr. Alarid had not shown that the proposing or deciding 

official had knowledge of his protected disclosures or 

(therefore) that they contributed to his removal. Id.

Mr. Alarid petitioned for review. On March 13, 2023, 

the full Board issued a final order, with an accompanying 

opinion reviewing the AJ decision point by point. 2023 

Board Order; SAppx1–18. The Board denied the petition 

for review and affirmed the AJ’s 2016 decision, which, the 

Board declared, “is now the Board’s final decision.” 2023 

Board Order, at *1 (¶ 1). Mr. Alarid timely petitioned for 

review by this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).

II

We may set aside the Board’s decision only if it is “(1) 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(c). The petitioner bears the burden of 

establishing reversible error in the Board’s final decision.

Sistek v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 955 F.3d 948, 953 

(Fed. Cir. 2020). We review the Board’s legal decisions 

without deference and its findings of fact for substantial 

evidence. McIntosh v. Department of Defense, 53 F.4th 630, 

638 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “Substantial evidence consists of ‘such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Frederick v. 

Department of Justice, 73 F.3d 349, 352 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). We conclude that Mr. Alarid has not presented 

any argument that warrants setting aside the Board 

decision.

A

To remove an employee, the government must prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that “(1) the charged 

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ALARID v. ARMY 7

misconduct occurred, (2) there is a nexus between what the 

employee did and disciplining the employee to promote the 

efficiency of the service, and (3) the particular penalty is 

reasonable.” Hansen v. Department of Homeland Security, 

911 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (first citing Pope v. 

U.S. Postal Service, 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 

and then citing Hale v. Department of Transportation, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 772 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. 

Cir. 1985)). Mr. Alarid challenges the Board’s ruling on 

those elements.

1

Mr. Alarid challenges numerous factual findings made 

by the Board in finding that the Army proved its charges. 

See 2023 Board Order, at *1–3 (¶¶ 1–8); Board Decision, at 

2–12. He argues that the Board should have found that he 

had not admitted to wrongdoing, that he had not created 

the ID card he was accused of creating, that he did not 

know that the ID card he did prepare for Mr. DeOcampo

was unauthorized, and that he did not know that the 

purchase of a police badge for Mr. DeOcampo was 

unauthorized, among other things. He also contends that 

the Board should not have relied on the testimony of the 

deciding official, Director Walker, or the testimony of 

former Chief Morningstar and former Deputy Chief 

Chappell. We reject these challenges.

Mr. Alarid’s arguments rest on disagreement with the 

Board’s decision to credit the testimony of the agency 

witnesses over the conflicting testimony of Mr. Alarid and 

his witnesses in making its factual findings. But the 

crediting of the agency witnesses in this case reflected the 

AJ’s demeanor assessment, and we have held that “[t]he 

determination of the credibility of the witnesses is within 

the discretion of the presiding official who heard their 

testimony and saw their demeanor.” Griessenauer v. 

Department of Energy, 754 F.2d 361, 364 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 

see also Kahn v. Department of Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1313 

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8 ALARID v. ARMY

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that “an evaluation of witness 

credibility is within the discretion of the Board and that, in 

general, such evaluations are ‘virtually unreviewable’ on 

appeal” (quoting King v. Department of Health & Human 

Services, 133 F.3d 1450, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998))). In the

present case, the AJ considered the relevant evidence, 

including the evidence in Mr. Alarid’s favor, and explained 

the resulting credibility determinations. Mr. Alarid has 

not met the high standard for disturbing the credibility 

determinations.

The evidence besides demeanor provides no basis for 

disturbing the Board’s factual findings, which are 

supported by substantial evidence. Regarding the charge 

of conspiracy to purchase and distribute an unauthorized 

federal police badge, the Board had before it Mr. Alarid’s 

testimony (admitting that he ordered the badge for Mr. 

DeOcampo but arguing that he thought it was permissible 

to order the badge because it was commemorative), the

testimony of several police officers (stating that the “flat” 

badges at issue were carried by officers for off-duty 

identification and that they needed a letter of 

authorization from the Chief to order a flat badge), the 

testimony of a sales representative for the badge vendor

(stating that the badge Mr. Alarid ordered for Mr. 

DeOcampo was not marked as commemorative, nor was it 

marked as being for a retired officer), and records of emails 

between Mr. Alarid, Mr. DeOcampo, and that sales 

representative. See Board Decision, at 10–12; SAppx233–

57, 1293–1304, 1330–39, 1349–50, 1416–29. This was 

substantial evidence.

Regarding the charge of making an unauthorized 

federal police ID card, the Board had before it, among other 

things, Mr. Alarid’s testimony identifying the unauthorized

ID card recovered from Mr. DeOcampo as the ID card he 

made. See Board Decision, at 4; SAppx272 (ID-card 

images), 1417–18 (Mr. Alarid’s testimony). The Board 

noted Mr. Alarid’s testimony that he had been directed to 

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ALARID v. ARMY 9

make a card by Chief Morningstar pursuant to Mr. 

DeOcampo’s 2011 settlement agreement and had never 

been shown the settlement agreement, and the Board 

observed that it was unclear what instruction had been 

given to Mr. Alarid regarding the card. Board Decision, at 

4–7. The Board found, however, that Mr. Alarid should 

have known what language was—and was not—allowed on 

the backs of the cards, and that finding was sufficiently 

supported by the testimony of other officers (stating that 

Mr. Alarid was responsible for making most of the ID cards 

for Camp Parks police), the lack of evidence that Chief 

Morningstar had personally reviewed or approved the card,

and the lack of evidence that Chief Morningstar had ever 

approved the use of the expansive language on the back of 

Mr. DeOcampo’s card. Id. at 8–10; SAppx1297, 1330–31.

We are not persuaded that the Board lacked

substantial-evidence support, considering the record as a 

whole, for its finding that the Army had proven both 

charges against Mr. Alarid.

2

Mr. Alarid argues that the Board erred in concluding 

that the Army had shown that there was a nexus between 

what he did and removing him to promote the efficiency of 

the service. He contends that his alleged misconduct 

occurred off-duty; that his actions were unknown to the 

press, public, or other government agencies; and that 

Director Walker presented no evidence to support his 

assertion that Mr. Alarid’s actions affected the efficiency of 

the service. We reject this challenge.

An agency can prove the required nexus by showing 

that an employee’s conduct led to a “reasonable loss of trust 

and confidence” in the employee. Brook v. Corrado, 999 

F.2d 523, 527 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Kruger v. Department of 

Justice, 32 M.S.P.R. 71, 74 (1987). The Board so found in 

the present case. Board Decision, at 25. Neither logic nor 

cited authority requires that the agency’s loss of trust and 

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10 ALARID v. ARMY

confidence in the employee occur due to on-duty or public 

misconduct.

The Board’s finding that Mr. Alarid’s conduct led to the 

Army’s loss of trust and confidence in him—because Mr. 

Alarid’s actions were “directly antithetical to his duties and 

the agency’s mission,” as Mr. Alarid was a Police Officer 

who “was charged with enforcement of Federal criminal 

laws such as the ones he violated here,” Board Decision, at 

25—is supported by substantial evidence. Director Walker

stated, in the removal decision letter, that Mr. Alarid’s

“unlawful” conduct was “contradictory to expectations of a 

Federal Police Officer” who is “held to a higher standard,” 

as an officer’s “duties include the enforcement of Federal 

criminal laws involving persons and property, and the 

protection of government property and facilities.” 

SAppx185–86. Director Walker added that Mr. Alarid did 

not acknowledge his actions or Mr. DeOcampo’s 

harassment of him until Mr. DeOcampo revealed them to 

the agency. SAppx186. And Director Walker stated that 

he had lost trust and confidence in Mr. Alarid even while 

recognizing Mr. Alarid’s good record in his eight years of 

service. Id. We see no reversible error in the Board’s 

finding on this issue.

3

We similarly see no error in the Board’s determination

that removal was a reasonable penalty, after the Board 

properly sustained the Army’s charges. Board Decision, 

at 26. Director Walker determined, in light of the conduct 

at issue, that “alternative measures” such as “suspension 

or demotion” would be “detrimental to this organization,”

as alternative measures could create a “hostile 

environment for others” and “[o]fficers must be able to 

trust each other in the office and out on the field.” 

SAppx187. That was a reasonable determination. See 

Watson v. Department of Justice, 64 F.3d 1524, 1530 (Fed.

Cir. 1995) (“Law enforcement officers are held to a higher 

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ALARID v. ARMY 11

standard of conduct than are other federal 

employees. . . .”); Lawton v. Department of Veterans 

Affairs, 53 M.S.P.R. 153, 158 (1992) (similar); Dikiy v. 

Department of Treasury, 23 M.S.P.R. 454, 457 (1984)

(similar). We have no basis to overturn the penalty 

determination. See Mings v. Department of Justice, 813 

F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“This court . . . will not 

disturb a choice of penalty within the agency’s discretion 

unless the severity of the agency’s action appears totally 

unwarranted in light of all the factors.”); see also Lachance 

v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (collecting 

cases).

B

Mr. Alarid argues the Board’s decision regarding 

reprisal for whistleblowing and union-related activities

should be set aside. We disagree.

The framework for addressing assertions of reprisal 

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or § 2302(b)(9), whether as an 

affirmative defense to a removal action or in an individualright-of-action appeal to the Board, is well established. 

First, an employee must show via a preponderance of the 

evidence that a protected disclosure was a “contributing 

factor” to an adverse employment decision. See Kewley v. 

Department of Health & Human Services, 153 F.3d 1357, 

1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). One way that an employee may 

make this showing is by meeting the “knowledge/timing 

test”: an employee may show that “(A) the official taking 

the personnel action knew of the disclosure or protected 

activity; and (B) the personnel action occurred within a 

period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude 

that the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing 

factor in the personnel action.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); 

Kewley, 153 F.3d at 1361–62. If the knowledge/timing test 

is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the agency to

“demonstrate[] by clear and convincing evidence that it 

would have taken the same personnel action in the absence 

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12 ALARID v. ARMY

of such disclosure.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Kewley, 153 F.3d 

at 1361–63. To determine whether the agency has carried

its burden, the Board considers “the strength of the 

agency’s evidence in support of its personnel action; the 

existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the 

part of the agency officials who were involved in the 

decision; and any evidence that the agency takes similar 

actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but 

who are otherwise similarly situated.” Carr v. Social 

Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 

1999).

Here, the AJ applied the established framework. The 

AJ first found that Mr. Alarid had in fact met the 

knowledge/timing test because the deciding official, 

Director Walker, knew of the protected activity when 

making the removal decision, as Mr. Alarid had told him 

about it in responding to the removal proposal. See Board 

Decision, at 20; SAppx193. The AJ then turned to the Carr 

factors and found, in relevant part, that the strength of any

motive to retaliate on the part of Chief Lovett or of Director 

Walker was at best weak, because the evidence in the 

record showed only that former Chief Morningstar and 

former Deputy Chief Chappell may have had animosity 

towards Mr. Alarid. Board Decision, at 21. The AJ also 

found that there is “no evidence” that Mr. Alarid’s protected 

activities were “personally directed at either of [Chief 

Lovett or Director Walker].” Id.

On appeal, Mr. Alarid first argues that Director Walker 

constructively knew of the protective activity, Petitioner’s 

Informal Br. 13, but this argument addresses a piece of the 

reprisal-analysis framework already decided in Mr. 

Alarid’s favor. The AJ found that Director Walker knew of 

Mr. Alarid’s protected union activity when deciding on the 

proposed removal and, under the knowledge/timing test, 

that the protected activity was a contributing factor in his 

removal. Board Decision, at 20. To the extent, then, that 

Mr. Alarid argues about imputing a mental state of former 

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ALARID v. ARMY 13

Chief Morningstar or former Deputy Chief Chappell to 

Director Walker, the argument can only be about a 

retaliatory motive relevant under the second Carr factor: 

“the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on 

the part of the agency officials who were involved in the 

decision.” Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323. But Mr. Alarid has not 

shown reversible error by the Board on this step of the 

reprisal analysis.

The Board’s finding that Director Walker lacked 

retaliatory motive was supported by substantial evidence, 

especially given the wide discretion the Board has 

regarding credibility determinations (as already noted). 

The Board reasonably credited Director Walker’s 

testimony that he had never spoken to the former Chief;

that the former Deputy Chief had never shared with him 

any opinion about Mr. Alarid; and that, while he knew Mr. 

Alarid was a union representative at Camp Parks there, 

the grievances that reached his level (as Director at Fort 

Hunter Liggett, which oversees Camp Parks) were filed by 

the union at that facility, not by Mr. Alarid’s union at Camp 

Parks. Board Decision, at 19–20; SAppx1304. There was 

evidence, moreover, that the former Chief had been on 

administrative leave starting before Director Walker’s 

arrival at Camp Parks and was decertified as a police 

officer, pending removal, for a year before issuance of the

proposal to remove Mr. Alarid. Board Decision, at 21; 

SAppx179, 197, 1304. And there was no evidence that any 

of Mr. Alarid’s protected activities had been personally 

directed at Director Walker. Board Decision, at 21; 

SAppx193 (alleging reprisal for grievances filed by Mr. 

Alarid under former Chief Morningstar).

For those reasons, we see no merit in Mr. Alarid’s 

attack on the Board’s implementation of the established 

reprisal-analysis framework. Nor do we see any merit in 

his suggestion that the Board should have provided him an 

individual-right-of-action appeal and corrective action 

under 5 U.S.C. § 1221. Petitioner’s Informal Br. 14–15. He 

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14 ALARID v. ARMY

points to no material difference in the evaluation of the 

reprisal contentions whether analyzed in an individualright-of-action appeal or as an affirmative defense to the 

removal appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. And he is not 

entitled to corrective action under § 1221(g)(1) if, as here, 

the Board has properly rejected the reprisal assertion on 

its merits.

C

Mr. Alarid suggests that the Army should have carried 

out its investigation of him under Army Regulation (AR) 

15-6—which, among other things, requires investigators to 

be at level GS-13 or above and senior to the person being 

investigated—rather than relying on two Military Police 

Investigation (MPI) investigators, one at level GS-7 and 

one at GS-8, to conduct the investigation. Petitioner 

Informal Br. 7. But he has not shown error in the AJ’s 

conclusion that “AR 15-6 does not govern” investigations 

into law-enforcement personnel. Board Decision, at 15. 

The Army regulation that covers the use of MPI 

investigators and Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) 

detectives/investigators states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided, MPI and DAC detectives/investigators will 

normally be employed in the following investigations: . . . 

Allegations against law enforcement personnel, when not 

within the investigative responsibilities of [U.S. Army 

Criminal Investigation Command].” AR 190-30, paragraph 

4-2 (2005). That regulation permits use of MPI 

investigators for an investigation, like this one, of a lawenforcement employee. Moreover, AR 15-6 states that its 

requirements “may be made applicable to investigations or 

boards that are authorized by another regulation or 

directive, but only by specific incorporation by that 

regulation or directive, or in the memorandum of 

appointment,” AR 15-6, paragraph 1-5 (2016) (emphasis 

added), and Mr. Alarid has not pointed to any portion of AR 

190-30 or a directive, or the memorandum of appointment, 

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ALARID v. ARMY 15

that would require the use of AR 15-6 procedures in his 

investigation.

D

Finally, Mr. Alarid argues that the AJ fell “asleep 

during much of the Supplemental Hearing” and thereby 

“violated federal law” and “sections of the MSPB Judges 

Handbook, and deprived [him] of [his] due process right to 

a full and fair hearing.” Petitioner’s Informal Br. 7; see also

id. at 6, 8–10; Appendix to Petitioner’s Informal Br. at 

7–15. Mr. Alarid identifies only one specific instance of the 

AJ allegedly falling asleep: during the testimony of Chief 

Lovett, when Chief Lovett stated that he believed that

Chief Morningstar had briefed Director Walker about the 

investigation. Petitioner’s Informal Br. 8; see 

SAppx1214–15. We see no reversible error in the Board’s 

rejection of this challenge to the AJ’s ruling. 2023 Board 

Order, at *3 (¶¶ 9–10).

The Board determined, first, that Mr. Alarid “did not 

raise the [AJ’s] alleged inattentiveness at any point during 

the proceedings [before the AJ] or in his written closing 

argument” and that “failure to object below precludes him 

from pursuing this argument on review.” Id. Mr. Alarid 

has not shown error in the finding that he did not raise the 

matter to the AJ. See Alarid v. Department of the Army, 

No. SF-0752-14-0256-B-2, Refiled Remand File, Tab 4 

(M.S.P.B.) (appellant written closing argument); id., 

Petition for Review File, Tab 3 at 17–20 (raising the issue 

for the first time in the Petition for Review). Nor has he 

shown error in the Board’s insistence that this is the kind 

of issue that needs to be raised when the alleged problem 

arises and when contemporaneous remediation is possible.

The Board also found that “the record does not support 

[Mr. Alarid’s] claim that the [AJ] was asleep during 

testimony,” specifically focusing on the allegation that the 

AJ was sleeping during a portion of Chief Lovett’s 

testimony. 2023 Board Order, at *3 (¶¶ 9–10). We see no 

Case: 23-1886 Document: 41 Page: 15 Filed: 12/04/2024
16 ALARID v. ARMY

reversible error in that finding, which the record supports. 

The AJ asked the question that elicited Chief Lovett’s 

statement as an answer, and the AJ asked a relevant 

follow-up question immediately following that answer. 

SAppx1214. Mr. Alarid provides no other citations to the 

record for his generalized allegation that the AJ was asleep 

during “much” of the hearing, Petitioner’s Informal Br. 7, 

and we see no such indication in the transcript of the 

March 3, 2016 hearing. See Transcript of Hearing, Alarid 

v. Department of the Army, No. SF-0752-14-0256-B-1

(M.S.P.B. Mar. 3, 2016).

Mr. Alarid has therefore not shown error—much less 

prejudicial error—on this ground.

III

We have considered Mr. Alarid’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. We affirm the Board’s

decision.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

AFFIRMED

Case: 23-1886 Document: 41 Page: 16 Filed: 12/04/2024