Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01187/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01187-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Does
Defendant
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
Defendant
Richard Stafford
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RICHARD STAFFORD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC. and 

DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive,1

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-01187-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s renewed motion to remand filed on 

November 7, 2013. (ECF No. 46.) The motion was decided without a hearing. Plaintiff’s 

motion and the defendant’s opposition present a procedural question regarding the law-of-the-

 1

 The Ninth Circuit provides that “‘[plaintiffs] should be given an opportunity 

through discovery to identify [] unknown defendants’” “in circumstances . . . ‘where the identity 

of the alleged defendant[] [is] not [] known prior to the filing of a complaint.’” Wakefield v. 

Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 

(9th Cir. 1980)) (alterations in original). Plaintiff is warned, however, that unknown “doe” 

defendants will be dismissed where “‘it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or 

that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.’” Id. (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 

642). Plaintiff is further warned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), which states that the 

court must dismiss defendants who have not been served within 120 days after the filing of the 

complaint unless plaintiff shows good cause, applies to doe defendants. See Glass v. Fields, No. 

1:09-cv-00098-OWW-SMS PC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97604, at *1–3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 

2011); Hard Drive Prods. v. Does, No. C 11-01567 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109837, at *1–4 

(N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2011). 

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case doctrine: Is an alternative basis for upholding subject matter jurisdiction the law of the case? 

After carefully considering the parties’ briefing, the applicable law, and the entire record, for the 

reasons below, the court answers this question in the affirmative, and concludes the law-of-thecase doctrine bars reconsideration of the prior order denying plaintiff’s motion for remand and, 

therefore, DENIES plaintiff’s renewed motion. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

This is a wage and hour employment class action originally filed in state court, and 

removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. 109-2, 

119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Defendant Dollar Tree 

Stores, Inc. (“Dollar Tree”) is a discount retail store with many locations throughout California. 

Plaintiff was an employee of Dollar Tree, and he sued initially, on behalf of himself and similarly 

situated employees, alleging Dollar Tree “decreased its employment-related costs at its facilities 

. . . to increase . . . productivity and profits by systematically violating” state and federal wage 

and hour laws. (Notice of Removal, Ex. A, Compl. 2:1–20, ECF No. 1.) 

The operative complaint at the time of removal was plaintiff’s2

 First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”). For reasons explained below, the specific claims asserted therein inform the 

court’s decision on whether the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million for CAFA purposes. 

In the First Amended Complaint, plaintiff asserted the following claims: 

(1) failure to provide meal periods; 

(2) failure to provide rest periods; 

(3) failure to pay minimum and regular wages; 

(4) failure to pay overtime wages; 

(5) failure to maintain accurate records; 

(6) failure to provide and maintain itemized wage statements; 

(7) failure to timely pay wages due during employment; 

 2

 In the initial complaint, plaintiff Stafford was joined by two other named 

plaintiffs; in the current amended complaint, only plaintiff Stafford remains. (Compare Notice of 

Removal, Ex. A, Compl., ECF No. 1, with Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 (naming only 

Richard Stafford as a plaintiff).) 

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(8) failure to timely pay wages due upon separation; 

(9) violation of Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.; and 

(10) Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) claims. 

(Notice of Removal, Ex. C, FAC at 1.) 

Defendant removed the case based on the allegations contained in the First 

Amended Complaint to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on February 

5, 2013. (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 5, 12.) Defendant asserted removal jurisdiction under both 

CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and under ordinary diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (Id. 

at 2.) 

After the case was removed to federal court, plaintiff filed a Second Amended 

Complaint in which he omitted the class action allegations and asserted only PAGA claims. 

(Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff filed a motion to remand shortly 

thereafter. (ECF No. 22.) 

The District Court in the Central District of California denied plaintiff’s initial 

March 7, 2013 motion to remand. The court found it “had jurisdiction based upon the CAFA as 

well as diversity jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 37.) The court also granted defendant’s motion to 

transfer the case to this district. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed the pending renewed motion to remand on November 7, 2013, after 

the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 

1118 (9th Cir. 2013). The court in Urbino held that damages from PAGA claims could not be 

aggregated with damages from individual claims to satisfy the amount in controversy for ordinary 

diversity subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1122. The Ninth Circuit’s decision was issued after 

the Central District court denied plaintiff’s initial March 7, 2013 motion to remand. Defendant 

opposes plaintiff’s renewed motion to remand arguing the law-of-the-case doctrine prevents this 

court from reconsidering the decision denying plaintiff’s initial motion to remand, made by the 

transferor Central District court. 

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II. STANDARD 

A. Law of the Case 

The law-of-the-case doctrine states that “when a court decides upon a rule of law, 

that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” 

Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). The law-of-the-case doctrine is subject to three 

limited exceptions: a court may revisit a prior decision if (a) circumstances demonstrate that the 

earlier ruling was “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice,” id. at 618 n.8; 

(b) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial, Minidoka Irrigation Dist. v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 406 F.3d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 2005); or (c) an intervening controlling change 

in the law warrants reexamination of the prior ruling, id.; United States v. Mazak, 789 F.2d 580, 

581 (7th Cir. 1986). “Failure to apply the doctrine of the law of the case absent one of the 

[exceptions] constitutes an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 

(9th Cir. 1997). 

B. CAFA Jurisdiction 

CAFA vests federal district courts with “original jurisdiction of any civil action in 

which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and 

costs, and is a class action in which,” inter alia, “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of 

a State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). Under CAFA, “the burden of 

establishing removal jurisdiction remains . . . on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.” Abrego 

Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). 

“A defendant seeking removal of a putative class action must demonstrate, by a 

preponderance of evidence, that the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 

minimum.” Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2013). The 

preponderance of the evidence standard requires a defendant to “provide evidence establishing 

that it is ‘more likely than not’ that the amount in controversy exceeds[, in the CAFA context, 

five million dollars].” Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). 

A defendant can satisfy this burden by submitting evidence outside the complaint, including 

affidavits or declarations, of expected damages. See Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 

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395, 397 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that declaration established amount in controversy for removal 

jurisdiction). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff argues defendant’s aggregation of damages for PAGA claims is improper 

under the Ninth Circuit’s intervening decision in Urbino, 726 F.3d 1118. (Mem. P. & A. in Supp. 

of Pl.’s Mot. to Remand to State Court (“Mot. to Remand”) at 1:2–27, ECF No. 46-1.) Plaintiff 

also argues defendant’s asserted basis of removal relies on class action claims in a prior complaint 

that have been superseded by an amended complaint omitting all class allegations. (Id. at 1:15–

18.) Defendant opposes the motion arguing, in essence, plaintiff is simply trying to relitigate an 

issue already decided, and that plaintiff’s renewed motion is barred by the law-of-the-case 

doctrine. (Def. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.’s Mem. P. & A. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Remand 

(“Opp’n”) at 1:2–9, ECF No. 50.) Further, defendant argues the court’s decision prior to transfer 

was not clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust. (Id. at 2:1–4.) The court first addresses the issue 

whether the law-of-the-case doctrine applies in this case. Concluding the law-of-the-case 

doctrine applies, the court then addresses plaintiff’s alternative argument that the portion of the 

transferor court’s decision denying remand and upholding CAFA jurisdiction was clearly 

erroneous and manifestly unjust. 

A. Law-of-the-Case 

“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, a court is ordinarily precluded from 

reexamining an issue previously decided by the same court . . . in the same case.” Old Person v. 

Brown, 312 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, plaintiff argues this court should revisit the 

decision of its sister court in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Urbino, 726 F.3d at 1122. In 

Urbino, the Ninth Circuit concluded that when an employee asserts individual claims and claims 

under PAGA, the aggrieved employee’s individual interest is different from “the state’s collective 

interest in enforcing its labor laws through PAGA.” Id. Therefore, the court held PAGA claims 

cannot be aggregated together with an individual’s claims to meet the amount in controversy 

requirement for ordinary diversity jurisdiction. Id.

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In its order, the Central District court held it had diversity jurisdiction because the 

amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 after aggregating PAGA claims. Thus, this portion of 

the court’s decision may have been different under Urbino; plaintiff argues this court should 

revisit that decision under the exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine for an “intervening 

[change in] controlling authority.” Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 406 F.3d at 573. 

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Urbino, however, does not implicate the Central 

District court’s alternative basis for denying plaintiff’s initial motion to remand, that jurisdiction 

was proper under CAFA. (See Order Denying Pl.’s Mot. to Remand, May 6, 2013, ECF No. 37 

(“finding that the Court had jurisdiction based upon the CAFA as well as diversity jurisdiction”).) 

Thus, plaintiff’s motion presents the threshold question: whether the law-of-thecase doctrine applies to preclude the relitigation of a jurisdictional question if the court previously 

upheld jurisdiction on two alternative grounds, and only one of those grounds is affected by an 

intervening change in the law. 

Defendant argues the “law-of-the-case doctrine specifically applies to remand 

orders where, as here, the court denies a motion to remand and then transfers the case to a 

coordinate court,” relying on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Santamarina. (Opp’n at 5:5:21–

6:10, ECF No. 50 (citing Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 F.3d 570, 572 (7th Cir. 

2006).) Defendant also cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Christianson for the proposition 

that this doctrine applies to the litigation “of any issue—jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional.” 

(Opp’n at 5:5:21–6:10 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 

n.5, 817 (1988)).) Plaintiff counters the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply because of an 

“intervening change in controlling Ninth Circuit law,” pointing out that at least one district court 

has reconsidered a motion to remand after Urbino for this reason. (Pl.’s Reply [sic] in Supp. of 

Mot. to Remand to State Court (“Reply”) at 4:1–8, ECF No. 52 (citing Pagel v. Dairy Farmers of 

Am., Inc., No. 13-cv-2382, 2013 WL 6501707, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2013)).) 

Neither plaintiff nor defendant directs this court to binding authority addressing 

the precise question before the court: whether the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to an 

alternative basis for upholding subject matter jurisdiction. The court is unaware of any such 

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authority. It thus turns to persuasive authority, considered in light of the principles articulated by 

the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit in Christianson and Hanna Boys Center v. Miller, 

respectively, discussed below. 

The Supreme Court examined the law-of-the-case doctrine in Christianson and 

stated the doctrine “promotes the finality and efficiency of the judicial process by protecting 

against the agitation of settled issues.” 486 U.S. at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

Court noted that “[f]ederal courts routinely apply law-of-the-case principles to transfer decisions 

of coordinate courts,” and emphasized that “the policies supporting the doctrine apply with even 

greater force” in the event of transfer because “transferee courts [may] feel entirely free to revisit 

[prior] decisions of a coordinate court.” Id. (collecting sources). The Court also noted: “There is 

no reason to apply law-of-the-case principles less rigorously to transfer decisions that implicate 

the transferee’s jurisdiction. Perpetual litigation of any issue—jurisdictional or 

nonjurisdictional—delays, and therefore threatens to deny, justice.” Id. at 816 n.5. 

Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies not 

only to the explicit holding of a sister court, but also to “issues decided . . . by necessary 

implication in [a coordinate court’s] previous disposition.’” Hanna Boys Ctr. v. Miller, 853 F.2d 

682, 686 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 

1982)). In Hanna Boys Center, the Center, a tax-exempt nonprofit boys school affiliated with the 

Catholic Church, challenged the National Labor Relation Board’s (NLRB) decision that its childcare workers could unionize, arguing the Center was “a church-operated school and therefore is 

exempt from the [National Labor Relations Act].” Id. at 684. The district court granted a ninetyday stay so the NLRB could supplement the record, and the NLRB appealed the district court’s 

stay order. In a one-sentence summary order, the Ninth Circuit’s motion panel reversed and 

vacated the stay order. Four days later, the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction, and the Center appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding the “motion 

panel’s order is law of the case on the question of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 685. The 

court reasoned that even though the “motion panel’s order did not explicitly state that it granted 

the motion because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it necessarily did so by 

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implication.” Id. The court reached this conclusion by reviewing the record and noting that both 

parties’ briefs agreed the issue on appeal was subject matter jurisdiction, such that the motion’s 

panel “must have [vacated the district court’s stay order] on the basis that the district court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.

Against the backdrop of Christianson and Hanna Boys Center, persuasive 

authority teaches that the law-of-the-case applies to alternative holdings, even if the other holding 

has been vacated on appeal. In American Hotel International Group Inc. v. OneBeacon 

Insurance Co., the Second Circuit held the district court’s alternative holding, granting the 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, remained the law of the case even after the other 

grounds for summary judgment had been vacated on appeal. 374 F. App’x 71, 72–74 (2d Cir. 

2010) (summary order). In American Hotel, the district court granted summary judgment for the 

defendant on the plaintiff’s contract claims, holding that the claims, based on oral agreements, 

were barred by New York’s statute of frauds. In the alternative, the district court also held the 

defendant was entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaim that, even if the agreements 

were not within the statute of frauds, one agreement would have failed for want of consideration. 

Id. at 73. On the first appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that 

Pennsylvania, not New York, law applied, and that the oral agreements were not within 

Pennsylvania’s statute of frauds. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the 

defendant because the prior appellate decision “did not address [the district court’s] prior 

alternative holding that the . . . Agreement failed for want of consideration.” Id. On the second 

appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed after concluding the alternative holding was the law-of-thecase: “[T]he findings of a district court not expressly or implicitly addressed on appeal remain the 

law of the case.” Id. (citing In re PCH Assocs., 949 F.2d 585, 593 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also 18B 

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 

§ 4478 (2d ed. 1987) (“And even if there has been a[n] [intervening] potentially sufficient change 

[in the law], the earlier decision may rest on an alternative foundation that makes the change 

immaterial.” (collecting sources)). 

/// 

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This court finds the alternative holding of the transferor court is binding as the law 

of the case on this court, as the transferee court. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 816. Even though the 

transferor court’s decision in this case was in a summary format, as in Hanna Boys Center, that 

court expressly held the court had subject matter jurisdiction on the alternative and sufficient 

basis under CAFA. In light of the persuasive authority that alternative holdings are the law of the 

case going forward, see Am. Hotel Int’l Grp., 374 F. App’x at 72–74, this court finds the 

transferor court’s decision under CAFA to be the law of this case. 

This conclusion is reinforced by the structure of CAFA and the fact that under 

CAFA, plaintiff could have appealed denial of his first motion to remand but chose not to. 28 

U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). Considering this statutory right to interlocutory appeal together with 

§ 1447(c), which provides that a motion to remand must be filed within thirty days of removal, 

CAFA promotes the early and final resolution of these jurisdictional questions. As the court 

observed in Santamarina, “it is arguable . . . that motions to reconsider orders denying remands 

under the Class Action Fairness Act are disfavored” for this reason. 466 F.3d at 572 (citation 

omitted). 

Finally, the court rejects plaintiff’s argument based on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), that he 

“is permitted to raise jurisdictional defects at any time during the litigation, including on appeal.” 

(Reply 1:8–9, ECF No. 52 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).) Although subject matter jurisdictional 

defects cannot be waived, the prior decision by a transferor court upholding jurisdiction remains 

the law of the case. The plaintiffs in Santamarina made the same argument plaintiff advances 

here, and the Seventh Circuit rejected it: “[W]e note our rejection of plaintiffs’ argument that an 

erroneous refusal to remand a case under the Class Action Fairness Act is a jurisdictional error, 

which must therefore remain corrigible until the litigation becomes final by issuance of a final 

judgment and exhaustion of appellate remedies.” 466 F.3d at 572. The Ninth Circuit has reached 

the same conclusion outside the CAFA context, in United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846 (9th 

Cir. 2004). In Phillips, the court rejected the appellant’s argument that the trial court erred by 

refusing to allow the jury to decide a jurisdictional question: whether a creek was a “navigable 

water” under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 856. The court explained this issue was decided before 

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trial based on uncontested facts; thus, “the instruction that the creek was a navigable water within 

the meaning of the CWA was the law of the case,” and “the district court would have abused its 

discretion if it had refused to abide by its previous ruling,” even though it was jurisdictional. Id. 

Plaintiff has already raised his jurisdictional argument, the transferor court rejected it, and he 

cannot raise it again before this court. 

The transferor court’s ruling upholding CAFA jurisdiction is the law of the case, 

and departing from this prior ruling is appropriate only if that ruling was “clearly erroneous and 

would work a manifest injustice.” Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8. 

B. CAFA Jurisdiction 

Plaintiff argues the transferor court’s prior ruling, denying plaintiff’s initial motion 

to remand and upholding jurisdiction under CAFA, is “clearly erroneous or works a manifest 

injustice.” (Reply 4:26–5:2, ECF No. 52.) A defendant may remove a class action under CAFA 

if the following requirements are met: (1) “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a 

State different from any defendant,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (2) “the number of members of all 

proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is” equal to or greater than “100,” id. at §1332(d)(5), 

(3) “the primary defendants are [not] States, State officials, or other governmental entities against 

whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief,” id., and (4) “the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” id. at 

§ 1332(d)(2). 

Here, defendant meets the first three requirements based on allegations contained 

in the First Amended Complaint. (See FAC ¶ 10; Notice of Removal ¶ 18, ECF No. 1 (declaring 

plaintiff and defendant are citizens of California and Virginia, respectively); Notice of Removal, 

Ex. D, McDearmon Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1 (averring the class includes 3,239 Assistant Managers); 

id. ¶ 2 (declaring the primary defendant is a corporation).) 

Plaintiff argues the prior decision upholding CAFA jurisdiction was clear error for 

two reasons: (1) plaintiff had agreed to amend his complaint to remove all class claims, so his 

Second Amended Complaint which omits class allegations controls, and the court lacks CAFA 

jurisdiction because the case is not a class action, and (2) defendant cannot show by a 

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preponderance of the evidence the amount in controversy is met. These arguments are addressed 

in turn below. 

1. Plaintiff’s Argument the Court Lacks CAFA Jurisdiction Because His 

Complaint Omits Class Allegations 

The transferor court’s decision upholding CAFA jurisdiction was not clearly 

erroneous because plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, not his Second Amended Complaint, is 

the controlling complaint. Challenges to removal jurisdiction are determined “at the time the 

notice of removal is filed.” Spencer v. U.S. Dist. Court, 393 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 2004); see 

also Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939) (holding plaintiffs’ pleading at time of 

removal, not second amended complaint, should have been considered). Here, defendant timely 

removed the action to federal court based on the allegations contained in the First Amended 

Complaint. It was not until seven days later, that plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint, 

which asserts only PAGA claims and omits all class allegations. Therefore, the transferor court’s 

decision upholding CAFA jurisdiction based on allegations in the First Amended Complaint was 

not clear error. 

Moreover, the court notes plaintiff’s assertion that he amended his complaint after 

removal to omit class allegations pursuant to a good faith agreement with defendant, made before 

removal, that plaintiff would dismiss class claims. Plaintiff’s argument, that the federal court 

lacked CAFA jurisdiction to begin with because these claims therefore were frivolous, might 

have some merit if this court were to consider the argument anew. The Ninth Circuit does 

recognize an “exception[] to the general rule of ‘once jurisdiction, always jurisdiction’” if “there 

was no jurisdiction to begin with because the jurisdictional allegations were frivolous from the 

start.” United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l 

Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010). But this court, as the transferee 

court, is not “entirely free to revisit [prior] decisions of a coordinate court” under the law-of-thecase doctrine. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 816. As in Hanna Boys Center, even though the 

transferor court’s decision denying plaintiff’s initial motion to remand “did not explicitly state 

that it” denied the motion to remand because plaintiff’s class action claims were nonfrivolous, by 

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upholding jurisdiction under CAFA, “it necessarily did so by implication.” 853 F.2d at 685. 

Therefore, because “[t]he law of the case applies to ‘issues decided explicitly or by necessary 

implication in [the transferor] court’s previous disposition,’” id. at 686 (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 691 F.2d at 441), this implicit decision may be revisited only for clear error. Review of the 

operative complaint reveals no such clear error. Thus, this argument is unavailing. 

2. Amount in Controversy 

Plaintiff argues the case should be remanded to state court because the prior ruling 

upholding CAFA jurisdiction was clearly erroneous, because the amount in controversy did not 

exceed $5 million. The record does not support plaintiff’s contention. 

a. Failure to Provide Meal Periods 

Plaintiff advances several arguments arguing defendant’s estimations of the 

damages from its failure to provide meal periods are incorrect. Plaintiff argues defendant 

overestimates the type and number of assistant managers’ missed meal periods, because meal 

periods were missed only in those “instances when Assistant Managers were the only Manager 

on-duty and when they were eligible for a meal or rest period.” (Mot. to Remand at 11:5–6, ECF 

No. 46-1 (emphasis in original) (citing SAC ¶ 17).) But this argument is unavailing because it 

relies on allegations contained in the wrong complaint. Here, the operative First Amended 

Complaint alleges that defendant refused to allow non-exempt employees to take a thirty-minute 

duty-free meal period before the commencement of the sixth hour of work, and did not provide a 

second meal period when required, regardless of the number of assistant managers on duty. (FAC 

¶ 23.) This argument does not discredit defendant’s estimates. 

Next, plaintiff argues defendant failed to account for the fact that some employees 

were fired and hired at different points of the relevant period. (Mot. to Remand at 10:18–22.) 

However, defendant explains assistant managers record their work time using a punch-based 

timekeeping system, which defendant uses to calculate their approximate number of earned meal 

periods. (Notice of Removal, Ex. E, Pearson Decl. ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 1.) The court finds the 

automated method by which defendant has recorded employees’ time to be reliable, and the 

transferor court’s reliance on defendant’s estimation was therefore not clearly erroneous. 

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Lastly, the transferor court could have reasonably credited defendant’s estimate 

that each assistant manager missed fifty percent of her meal periods. In Stevenson v. Dollar Tree 

Stores, No. 2:11-cv-1433, 2011 WL 4928753 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2011), this court held it was 

reasonable to estimate that fifty percent of meal periods were missed because the plaintiff alleged 

that “members of the class were ‘routinely’ denied meal periods” as part of a “policy and 

practice,” id. at *4. Here, plaintiff’s complaint contains similar language. Plaintiff alleges 

defendant “systematically” violated both state wage and hour laws and the IWC Wage Order as 

part of an “illegal polic[y] and/or practice[].” (FAC ¶¶ 6, 33(e).) “Systematically” and 

“routinely” are arguably synonymous. WILLIAM C. BURTON, BURTON’S LEGAL THESAURUS 612

(3d ed. 1998). Therefore, the transferor court could have reasonably credited defendant’s 

estimate that, for this claim alone, the amount in controversy is $5,314,825.69. (Notice of 

Removal ¶ 49.) 

b. Other Claims 

The amount in controversy also includes plaintiff’s claims for failure to provide 

accurate wage statements, waiting-time penalties, and failure to pay wages. (Id. ¶ 47.) Defendant 

conservatively estimates that each employee was not provided an accurate wage statement on at 

least one occasion. (Id. ¶ 52.) Defendant computes the amount according to Section 226(e) of 

the California Labor Code, resulting in $161,950.00. (Id.) Next, under California law, waitingtime penalties are recoverable for up to thirty days’ wages for failure to pay terminated employees 

in a timely manner. CAL. LAB. CODE § 203. Defendant declares that approximately 1,573 

assistant managers were terminated in California within the relevant period, and from this 

information estimates that waiting-time penalties amount to $3,592,319.74. (Id. ¶ 54.) 

Further, the amount in controversy includes attorneys’ fees, and a common 

estimate for the attorneys’ fees award is 25 percent of the recoverable damages. See Stevenson, 

2011 WL 4928753, at *5 (“in California, where wage and hour class actions have settled prior to 

trial for millions of dollars, it is not uncommon for an attorneys’ fee award to be in the realm of 

25% to 30% of the settlement and, thus, in excess of $1 million” (quoting Muniz v. Pilot Travel 

Ctrs. LLC, No. 2:07-cv-0325, 2007 WL 1302504, at *4 n.8 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2007))). 

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Accordingly, the amount in controversy, excluding missed-meal-period claims, 

equals $4,692,837.18, adding together waiting-time penalties, inaccurate wage statements, and 

attorney’s fees. In Stevenson, this court found that $4,013,498.75, before accounting for missedmeal-period claims, established the requisite amount in controversy. Id. (“Without determining a 

definitive amount in controversy as related to the meal period claim, the court is satisfied that 

more likely than not the amount in controversy in plaintiff’s action, in the aggregate, is greater 

than five million dollars.”). Similarly, the amount here very nearly approaches five million 

dollars, before the addition of missed-meal and rest-period damages. Therefore, the transferor 

court could have reasonably concluded the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, and its 

decision upholding jurisdiction under CAFA not was “clearly erroneous” or “a manifest 

injustice.” Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8.3

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to remand (ECF No. 46) is DENIED 

as barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 27, 2014. 

 

 3

 In addressing plaintiff’s argument that the transferor court committed clear error 

in ruling that CAFA’s $5-million-amount-in-controversy requirement was satisfied, this court’s 

order excluded PAGA claims. This proved prescient given the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 

Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., ___ F.3d ___, No. 12-55644, 2014 WL 983587 (9th Cir. 

Mar. 13, 2014). In Baumann, the Ninth Circuit held “PAGA actions are not sufficiently similar to 

Rule 23 class actions to trigger CAFA jurisdiction.” Id. at *4. Here, as discussed above, the 

relevant complaint for CAFA jurisdiction was the complaint at the time of removal—plaintiff’s 

First Amended Complaint—and not the Second Amended Complaint, which omitted class 

allegations and included only PAGA claims. See subpart III.B.1 supra. Because the pertinent 

complaint asserted non-PAGA claims potentially exceeding $5 million in controversy, unlike 

Baumann in which the only claims were PAGA claims, id. at *1, this decision is not affected by 

Baumann. 

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