Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02165/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02165-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tylan Lucas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2165

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District of

* Nebraska.

Tylan Lucas, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 9, 2007 

Filed: August 23, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, BEAM, ARNOLD, MURPHY, BYE,

RILEY, MELLOY, SMITH, COLLOTON, GRUENDER, BENTON, and

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, with whom LOKEN, Chief Judge, and MELLOY, SMITH,

and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges, join.

Tylan Lucas, an escapee from the Nebraska prison system returned to custody

pursuant to an administrative arrest warrant, was convicted of drug and firearm

offenses, attempted obstruction of justice, and one forfeiture count and was sentenced

to 25 years in prison. Lucas appeals, arguing that his motions to suppress evidence

should have been granted, that there was insufficient evidence to uphold his

convictions for conspiracy and attempted obstruction of justice, and that the district

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The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

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court1

 erred by not dismissing the case under the Speedy Trial Act and by several trial

rulings. A panel of this court reversed, holding that the district court should have

granted his motion to suppress the evidence found when the warrant was executed.

United States v. Lucas, 451 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2006). The government's petition for

rehearing en banc was granted and the panel opinion vacated. We now affirm.

I.

In October 2003 Lucas escaped from the custody of the Nebraska Department

of Correctional Services (Department) while serving a sentence for possession of a

controlled substance and for felonious assault with a firearm. He absconded after he

was placed on work release, and Harold Clarke, Director of the Department, issued

a "Warrant of Arrest (for Escaped Prisoner)" on October 22. Clarke had statutory

authority as director to issue warrants for the arrest of escapees from the Department's

custody, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-173(11), and he stated in the warrant that he had

"reasonable cause to believe" that Lucas had escaped from custody. 

On January 4, 2004, Timothy Carmody, a sergeant of the Omaha Police

Department and member of its fugitive task force, received a report from Crime

Stoppers that Tylan Lucas was staying at 2316 Ogden Street apartment 1 in North

Omaha. That address was for a unit on the first floor of a house converted into

apartments. Carmody referred the tip to Deputy Gerald Kellogg of the county sheriff's

department, and Kellogg met the tipster and they drove by the residence where Lucas

had been sighted. At the suppression hearing Kellogg testified that the tipster had

reported seeing Lucas at the residence in the preceding 48 hours.

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Later that day officers from the fugitive task force went to the residence. They

had learned that the tenant in apartment 1 was Theresa Scaife, and on their arrival a

man and woman were heard speaking inside. The officers knocked on the front door,

and a woman's voice responded that she needed to get dressed. Scaife opened the

door a few minutes later, and the police asked whether Lucas was in the apartment.

She denied that he was. The officers told her they believed he was inside and wanted

to look for him. Scaife asked whether they had a search warrant. The officers said

they did not but that they did have an arrest warrant for Lucas and information that he

was living at that address. On that authority they intended to enter the premises and

search for him. Scaife then admitted that Lucas was in the apartment, and the officers

placed her in their squad car before looking for him.

The officers announced their presence and asked Lucas to come out of the

apartment. When he did not, they went inside and found him in the basement dressed

in boxer shorts. He was arrested and taken upstairs to the living room. Department

policy required that he be dressed because of the winter weather. Deputy Kellogg saw

a pair of men's warm up pants in the bedroom adjacent to the living room, picked them

up, and asked Lucas if they were his. Lucas replied that they were but he wanted to

wear a different pair. After picking up the pants, Kellogg discovered they contained

about $2,900 in cash, two bags of crack cocaine, and a bag of marijuana. The officers

finished dressing Lucas, and he was taken away for booking.

Scaife was then able to return to the apartment. Sergeant Carmody explained

that the officers suspected Lucas had a weapon and other contraband there and asked

for her permission to search. Scaife verbally consented to a search and also signed a

consent form. In the subsequent search of the apartment the officers found a stolen

Ruger revolver and a bag of marijuana.

Lucas was initially charged on January 23, 2004 with four counts – possession

with intent to distribute 5 or more grams of crack, possession of a Ruger revolver in

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2

The Honorable F.A. Gossett, United States Magistrate Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

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furtherance of possessing with intent to distribute 5 or more grams of crack,

possession of a Ruger revolver after having been convicted of assault in the first

degree, and a forfeiture count. Lucas moved to suppress the evidence from the search,

on the ground that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the officers'

illegal entry into Scaife's apartment. The magistrate judge2

 issued a report

recommending the motion be denied on the basis that the officers had entered pursuant

to a valid arrest warrant and that Scaife had consented to their entry. The district court

did not adopt the finding that Scaife had consented to the initial entry, but it denied

the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers had authority to enter the

apartment since they had an arrest warrant issued by a neutral and detached

magistrate. Although Director Clarke was not a judicial officer, the court noted that

the warrant was authorized by a Nebraska statute, that Clarke was not directly

involved in "ferreting out crimes," and that he was well positioned to determine

probable cause for the arrest of an escaped prisoner.

During the pretrial period Lucas continued serving the remainder of his state

sentence at the Douglas County Corrections Center where his telephone calls were

recorded as part of routine policy. The Omaha police obtained a subpoena for copies

of the recordings of these calls, and Lucas moved to exclude evidence of the calls. At

a suppression hearing an officer who was familiar with Lucas testified that it was his

voice on the recordings. In the recorded conversations the speaker was heard asking

several different individuals to claim they owned the Ruger revolver found at Scaife's

apartment and offering to pay for their assistance. Lucas's motion to exclude this

evidence was denied.

Based on these recordings and letters written by Lucas, the government filed

a superseding indictment on March 17, 2004 which charged him with additional

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3

This gun was not the revolver found in Scaife's apartment, but a different

weapon Lucas was charged with possessing in connection with the conspiracy.

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counts of attempted obstruction of justice and of conspiracy to distribute and possess

with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack. A second superceding indictment

on October 19, 2004 added two more firearm counts: possession of a semiautomatic

handgun3

 in furtherance of the conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack and

possession of a semiautomatic handgun after having been convicted of assault in the

first degree.

 Before trial Lucas filed several other motions. He moved to dismiss the counts

charging conspiracy and possession of a semiautomatic handgun. In addition he

moved in limine to exclude Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence and moved pro se to

dismiss all charges for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The motions were denied,

and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of the government's case and again at the

end of trial, Lucas moved to dismiss the charges for possessing a revolver in

furtherance of a drug crime and for possessing a semiautomatic handgun in

furtherance of the conspiracy to distribute crack. The motions were denied.

After a four day trial the jury found Lucas guilty of attempted obstruction of

justice, possession of at least 5 grams of crack with intent to distribute, conspiracy to

distribute between 50 and 150 grams of crack, possession of a Ruger revolver in

furtherance of the conspiracy, and being a felon in possession of a weapon. He was

found not guilty of possessing a semiautomatic handgun in furtherance of the

conspiracy and not guilty of being a felon in possession of a semiautomatic handgun.

Lucas appeals.

Lucas contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

evidence because the officers' entry into Scaife's apartment was illegal since the arrest

warrant had not been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, but by an executive

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officer answering to the governor and without judicial authority, citing Payton v. New

York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). He contends further that the good faith exception to the

exclusionary rule should not be extended to uphold the entry. See United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The government responds that the requirement for a

neutral and detached magistrate has no application here because Clarke's statutorily

authorized arrest warrant permitted the police to enter Scaife's home in order to retake

Lucas and return him to custody. We review the district court's factual findings for

clear error and its legal determinations de novo. United States v. Kelly, 329 F.3d 624,

628 (8th Cir. 2003). 

II.

Lucas contends that under the Fourth Amendment officers cannot enter "a

suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest" without a warrant or consent,

Payton, 445 U.S. at 576, and that the warrant must have been issued by a neutral and

detached magistrate who has found "probable cause" and "sufficient evidence . . . that

his arrest [was] justified." Id. at 602. The government responds that the Payton rule

applies only to routine felony arrests, not to the recapture of a person already

convicted of a crime and placed in state custody. 

The Constitution generally requires that "someone independent of the police

and prosecution," Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348 (1972), review a

warrant application to determine whether there is "probable cause to believe a citizen

guilty" of a crime and to issue an arrest warrant. Id. at 351; see also Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1971) (similar requirement for search warrant).

As the Court has explained, "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the

executive officers of the Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their

duty and responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute."

United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972). 

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The panel opinion concluded that Clarke as an executive officer was unable to

issue a valid warrant, just like the jailer in United States v. Parker, 373 F.3d 770 (6th

Cir. 2004). In Parker, the Sixth Circuit suppressed evidence seized pursuant to search

warrants issued by a deputy jailer in her alternate capacity as a county trial

commissioner. Since she had been appointed as jailer by an executive branch official,

she was employed in a law enforcement agency, and the jail had a financial interest

in the outcome of the warrant proceedings, she was not neutral and detached. Id. at

773. 

Although Director Clarke's role in issuing the arrest warrant for Lucas was quite

different from the jailer's issuance of search warrants in Parker, Clarke was not a

neutral and detached magistrate in the sense of a judicial officer. He was appointed

by the governor, who set his salary and had power to remove him at will. Neb. Rev.

Stat. §§ 81-102, -103. Clarke headed a corrections agency, and his duties closely

involved him with prisons and prisoners. By law he was responsible "for the custody,

control, safety, correction, and rehabilitation of persons committed to the department."

Id. § 83-173(3).

The fact that Clarke was not a neutral judicial officer does not end the Fourth

Amendment inquiry, however. This case is quite different from the cases on which

Lucas relies in which a neutral magistrate was needed to determine probable cause.

Here the administrative official responsible for the custody of prisoners issued a

warrant to retake an inmate who had already been convicted of a crime beyond a

reasonable doubt and had fled from his lawful custody. The standard for issuance of

a valid administrative warrant under the Fourth Amendment is different from the

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The arrest warrant here was issued to retake Lucas into custody. It was issued

by his custodian rather than by a prosecuting authority, and our conclusion that

Lucas's arrest was lawful is independent of any "semantic legerdemain" put forward

by the dissent.

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probable cause showing necessary for a warrant to arrest someone suspected of a

crime.4

The Supreme Court has upheld administrative warrants and has never held that

administrative warrants must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate in the

sense of Shadwick or Coolidge. An administrative arrest warrant issued by a district

director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service pursuant to a deportation

statute led to a valid arrest in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234 (1960). There,

the Court recognized the "long-sanctioned practice" and "overwhelming ... legislative

recognition" favoring "the propriety of administrative arrest" in such circumstances.

Id. at 230, 233. The Court has required that administrative warrants be obtained

before inspectors enforcing housing code compliance may lawfully enter and inspect

residential units. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). And in the course

of striking down a federal statute as unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment for

authorizing Occupational Health and Safety Administration agents to make

warrantless safety inspections, the Court indicated that the requirements for issuance

of an administrative warrant are not identical to those for judicial warrants. Marshall

v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978).

The requirements for valid administrative warrants were also examined in

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), a case upholding a Wisconsin law

authorizing probation officers to make warrantless searches if there were reasonable

grounds to believe a probationer's home contained contraband. The dissent argued

that the Constitution required a warrant issued by a neutral member of the judiciary,

but the majority explained that administrative search warrants need not be issued by

judicial officers, in contrast to "constitutionally mandated judicial warrants." Id. at

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877-78. The "neutral magistrate or neutral officer envisioned by our administrative

search cases is not necessarily the 'neutral judge' envisioned by the dissent." Id. at 877

n.5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Like the probation officer in

Griffin, Director Clarke was "not an impartial magistrate, [but] neither [was] he the

police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen," for he

was charged with retaking an escapee while protecting both "the public interest" and

"the welfare of the [escapee]." Id. at 876. Just as the Griffin probation officer had

specialized knowledge, Clarke was well positioned to know if a convicted inmate in

his custody had escaped. As Director of the Department of Correctional Services, he

had access to information about such an escapee and the statutory duty to issue a

warrant. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-173 (director "shall" issue warrant for escapee).

Our conclusion that a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate was

not required for a lawful entry into Scaife's apartment is consistent with decisions of

other circuit courts. A Maryland statute authorizing prison wardens to issue retake

warrants for parolees was found by the Fourth Circuit not to violate the Fourth

Amendment in Henderson v. Simms, 223 F.3d 267 (4th Cir. 2000). Like the retake

warrants in Henderson, Clarke's administrative arrest warrant for escapee Lucas was

authorized under a state statute. According to a ruling of the First Circuit, a parole

violation warrant issued by the New York parole board and supported by "reasonable

cause" permitted a valid arrest consistent with the Fourth Amendment. See United

States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1990). Like that parole violation warrant,

Clarke's arrest warrant for Lucas was issued by an executive official with legislative

authority for the subject matter and was supported by reasonable cause.

Probable cause "in the criminal law sense" is not required for issuance of an

administrative warrant, Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320, for in the administrative context

probable cause "refer[s] not to a quantum of evidence, but merely to a requirement of

reasonableness." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877 n.4. The reasonableness of the officers'

entry into Scaife's apartment must be judged by balancing the government's "need to

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[arrest Lucas] against the invasion which the [arrest] entails." Camara, 387 U.S. at

537. Whatever expectation of privacy an escaped convict might have must be

weighed against the strong interest the government has in bringing him back into

custody. 

Like the prison escapee in United States v. Roy, 734 F.2d 108, 112 n.5 (2d Cir.

1984), Lucas "lost his presumption of innocence when he was convicted and

incarcerated," and his escape could not expand the very restricted expectation of

privacy he had while in the custody of prison officials. Id. at 111-12. Since Roy's

presence outside of custody was wrongful, id. at 111, the Second Circuit found he

lacked "a legitimate expectation of privacy against the government's intrusion." Id.

at 110. Evidence seized without a warrant from his locked trunk was therefore

admissible. Id. at 112. Lucas similarly had no right to be in Scaife's apartment, and

Nebraska's interest in the present case was even stronger than the state's in Roy

because the officers here were acting pursuant to a valid administrative warrant.

As an escapee Lucas had only a minimal expectation of privacy in Scaife's

apartment. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). Prisoners like Lucas

who are on work release are subject to special restrictions just like probationers. Their

liberty is legitimately constrained because "[p]robation, like incarceration, is a form

of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea

of guilty." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The state has a duty to protect the community from harm when a probationer or

escaped prisoner is "at large." Id. at 875. For these reasons a warrantless search of

a probationer's home without probable cause is permissible if it is based on the

reasonable suspicion of the probation officer. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,

121-22 (2001). The officers' entry into Scaife's apartment did not violate the Fourth

Amendment since Lucas was a convicted escapee whom they were seeking under the

authority of a valid administrative warrant issued by the responsible state official who

had reasonable cause to believe that Lucas had escaped.

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Lucas as an escapee from lawful custody had an even more circumscribed

expectation of privacy than the probationer in Knights or the parolee in Samson v.

California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2200 (2006) (state's "overwhelming interest in supervising

parolees" justified a warrantless search). Lucas had to sign a personalized plan

agreeing to the terms of his work release program before he could participate in it, and

these terms required him to return to the community corrections center after work.

See Neb. Dep't of Correctional Servs. Reg. 201.06 & app., available at

http://www.corrections.state.ne.us/policies/files/201.06.pdf; see also Trial Tr. at 259

(stipulation that Lucas was obligated to return to Omaha Community Corrections

Center after work). That Lucas expected to be recaptured wherever discovered is

evidenced by his comment to the arresting officers, "Damn, I knew I was going to get

caught eventually." 

Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), is also instructive. In that case

the police entered Steagald's home with an arrest warrant for Ricky Lyons, a fugitive

who was not present, but the officers discovered evidence incriminating Steagald.

The Supreme Court concluded that the search violated Steagald's personal Fourth

Amendment rights but that those of Lyons were not affected. Id. at 216. The

Supreme Court distinguished the rights of Steagald from those of Lyons, just as we

must analyze the respective rights in this case. The Court pointed out that "two

distinct interests were implicated by the search at issue here – Ricky Lyons' interest

in being free from an unreasonable seizure and petitioner's interest in being free from

an unreasonable search of his home." Id. While the arrest warrant would have

supported the search for and the seizure of Lyons if he had been there, it did not

justify the search that turned up evidence against Steagald. In our case it is Scaife

rather than Lucas who was in a position like Steagald's. Clarke's arrest warrant

authorized entry into Scaife's home for the purpose of arresting Lucas.

"Reasonableness" is the standard for issuance of an administrative arrest

warrant seeking to return a prison escapee to custody, see Camara, 387 U.S. at 539,

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Lucas and the dissent claim that the government waived its right to argue that

he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. The waiver doctrine is most

appropriately applied when the government has taken inconsistent positions during

the course of the litigation and such inconsistency has affected the factual record. See

United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374, 1381-83 (10th Cir. 1981); cf. Steagald, 451

U.S. at 210-11; United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763 (8th Cir. 1984). In this

case the government has never claimed that Lucas had a reasonable expectation of

privacy in Scaife's apartment, and our conclusion that he lacked such an expectation

is based solely on facts which the parties do not dispute. We are merely applying the

"well-settled principle" that a district court may be affirmed on any ground supported

by the record. United States v. Pierson, 219 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2000) (Beam, J.).

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rather than the probable cause requirement for a warrant to arrest a person suspected

of crime. Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 351. Clarke's administrative warrant met that

standard. We conclude that the entry into Scaife's apartment was reasonable because

the Omaha police were acting under the authority of a valid administrative warrant

and they had reason to believe Lucas was there. Cf. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602. They

had received and sufficiently corroborated a tip that Lucas would be found at Scaife's

apartment. Their source had reported seeing Lucas at Scaife's home within the prior

48 hours, and one of the officers had driven by the residence with the tipster to verify

as much of the information as possible. The balance of interests here tips in favor of

the state since Nebraska's interest in recapturing a convicted criminal who had

absconded from its custody is a strong one, and Lucas had no legitimate expectation

of privacy while hiding out in Scaife's residence.5

The dissent errs by overlooking Lucas's status as an escapee and focusing solely

on the fact that the officers entered a residence. Its statement that "expectation of

privacy tests . . . concern places rather than persons" is contrary to the teaching of the

Supreme Court, for "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1968). As the Fifth Circuit explained in United

States v. Taylor, 482 F.3d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2007), another case involving a

warrantless search of a girlfriend's residence in which the defendant was hiding, the

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In light of this conclusion we need not address the government's argument

based on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

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defendant had no greater Fourth Amendment rights in her place than he would have

had in his own, citing Katz and Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990). The Taylor

court applied the totality of circumstances approach taken in Knights to conclude that

the search had not violated the Fourth Amendment since Taylor had no special

protection in his girlfriend's residence, the officers had a misdemeanor arrest warrant

for him and reason to believe he was present in her residence, and Taylor's rights were

limited by his supervised release status.

Because Lucas's reasonable expectation of privacy was limited by his status as

an escapee and the officers possessed both a valid administrative warrant and

reasonable cause to believe Lucas was in Scaife's apartment, we conclude that his

Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the entry of the officers into the

apartment and his subsequent arrest.6

 Nor were they violated by the search incident

to his arrest and the subsequent search of Scaife's apartment with her consent. Since

Lucas does not have standing to assert Scaife's Fourth Amendment rights, any issue

of hers is not before us. See Pierson, 291 F.3d at 806 (Fourth Amendment rights are

personal and cannot be vicariously asserted); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-38;

Taylor, 482 F.3d at 319.

III.

Lucas also appeals several issues related to his trial. First, he argues that the

district court erred by not dismissing the conspiracy charge for lack of particularity.

He objects that the indictment only referred to coconspirators "known and unknown

to the grand jury." Lucas contends there can be no assurance that he was convicted

of the offense charged by the grand jury because the government introduced evidence

of several possible conspiracies. The government responds that it offered sufficient

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evidence that Lucas, Nathaniel Grant, James Edwards, and others joined in a single

crack distribution conspiracy.

To prove a single conspiracy the government relied in part on the testimony of

Grant and Edwards, two gang members who had previously pled to narcotics offenses.

Grant testified that he sold crack to Lucas on numerous occasions during October

2003 and saw him carrying a semiautomatic handgun during these dealings. Edwards

testified that between December 2003 and early January 2004 Lucas sold him crack

and that Lucas owned a semiautomatic handgun. The possibility that there were other

unknown individuals involved in the drug dealing does not mean there was more than

one conspiracy. The law recognizes that "[a] single conspiracy may exist even if the

participants and their activities change over time, and even if many participants are

unaware of, and uninvolved in, some of the transactions." United States v. Benford,

360 F.3d 913, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We

conclude that the indictment was constitutionally sufficient, that the district court did

not clearly err in concluding there was sufficient evidence of one conspiracy, and that

it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a multiple conspiracy instruction.

Lucas makes two objections relating to his conviction for attempted obstruction

of justice. He argues first that the phone recordings on which the charge was based

should have been excluded from evidence. Telephone calls may be intercepted

without a warrant if one of the parties to the call gives "prior consent." 18 U.S.C. §

2511(2)(c). There was uncontradicted evidence at the suppression hearing that the

Douglas County Corrections Center gave each inmate a handbook stating that all

outgoing telephone calls were monitored except those to attorneys. The Center

affixed placards to the inmate telephones warning that the calls were recorded, and an

audio message repeated the warning before each call. In a similar situation in United

States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir. 1992), we concluded that medical center

inmates had impliedly consented to the recording of their phone calls. The district

court was entitled to find from the notice given to inmates that any reasonable person

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18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) provides: "Whoever corruptly . . . obstructs, influences,

or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title

or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."

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in Lucas's position should have known of the policy. We conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recordings into evidence.

Lucas next contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of

attempted obstruction of justice. He argues that the statute under which he was

convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2),7 applies only to direct conduct obstructing an

official proceeding, not to an attempt to influence others to obstruct. Because Lucas

failed to make this argument below, we review for plain error and find none. The only

appellate decision we have found construing this statute, United States v. Reich, 479

F.3d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 2007), does not support his argument. See Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (plain error is one "clearly contrary" to established

law at time of appeal). After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, we can only

reverse if no reasonable jury could have found Lucas guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. United States v. Carlisle, 118 F.3d 1271, 1273 (8th Cir. 1997). An attempt

requires "(1) an intent to engage in criminal conduct, and (2) conduct constituting a

'substantial step' toward the commission of the substantive offense which strongly

corroborates the actor's criminal intent." United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841

(8th Cir. 1982). There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Lucas

asked both Shawnna Hilmer and Jaime Bonnett to claim ownership of the firearm

found in Scaife's apartment and that each understood his request to be in earnest. This

was enough to prove that Lucas took a "substantial step" toward obstruction of justice.

See United States v. Mims, 812 F.2d 1068, 1077-78 (8th Cir. 1987).

Lucas also objects to the admission of evidence of his past drug dealing and gun

possession under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The government filed a pretrial notice of

intent to introduce such evidence in order to establish motive, intent, plan and design

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in relation to the drug and firearm charges. Police reports of Lucas's prior arrests were

introduced and there was testimony by people who dealt drugs with him before he was

incarcerated in November 2000. Lucas contends that the evidence was not similar in

kind or close in time to the charged offenses and that any probative value of the

evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 

We review the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion and

will "reverse only when such evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was

introduced solely to prove the defendant's propensity to commit criminal acts."

United States v. Thomas, 398 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 2005), quoting United States

v. Howard, 235 F.3d 366, 372 (8th Cir. 2000). When a defendant has denied

ownership of seized drugs or the intent to distribute them, evidence of past drug

related activity is admissible to prove both knowledge and intent. United States v.

Love, 419 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2005). Since Lucas put his knowledge and intent

at issue, and the government had the burden of proof on these elements, admission of

the 404(b) evidence was proper. See United States v. Foster, 344 F.3d 799, 801 (8th

Cir. 2003). Furthermore, his drug related activities were not so remote in time to be

irrelevant. See Love, 419 F.3d at 828; Thomas, 398 F.3d at 1063; Foster, 344 F.3d

at 802.

Lucas asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was

violated when the district court did not allow all of the testimony he wanted to present

about John Ezell. Ezell had been living with Theresa Scaife before Christmas 2003.

One theory of Lucas's defense was that it was Ezell who had left the Ruger revolver

and crack in Scaife's apartment either accidentally, or purposely because he was angry

that Lucas was staying there and wanted to incriminate him. Lucas hoped to introduce

evidence that Ezell had four arrests related to crack and handguns, but the government

contended that the evidence was inadmissible. A criminal defendant's right to

compulsory process is violated if relevant evidence is excluded without sufficient

justification. United States v. Bernhardt, 642 F.2d 251, 253 (8th Cir. 1981); see also

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-17-

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). We review the court's evidentiary

decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077, 1080 (8th

Cir. 2006).

The district court allowed evidence to support Lucas's theory of defense. He

was permitted to question Scaife about her relationship with Ezell and about whether

the revolver and drugs belonged to him. See United States v. Becht, 267 F.3d 767,

773 n.7 (8th Cir. 2001), quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182-83

(1997). Evidence that is cumulative or "remote and speculative" may be excluded

under Fed. R. Evid. 403 to avoid confusing or misleading the jury, see United States

v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1987), and we conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion by not permitting Lucas to solicit all the evidence he

wished to present. See United States v. Yarns, 811 F.2d 454, 456 (8th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, Lucas argues that the district court violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18

U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. The Act requires that trial begin within 70 days after a

defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance unless the running of the time is

stopped for reasons set out in the statute. One authorized period of delay is triggered

if a district court expressly finds that the ends of justice served by granting a

continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

See id. § 3161(h)(8). Shortly before Lucas's trial was scheduled to begin, the

government moved for a continuance because the prosecutor was scheduled to start

a different trial the day before the Lucas case. The magistrate judge denied the motion

on the grounds that it was untimely and did not comply with the local rules. The

government appealed to the district court, explaining that the other trial involved

numerous witnesses from outside the district and one from another country. 

The district court issued an order on September 27, continuing the trial date

from September 28 to November 9, 2004 for the following reasons:

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[C]onsidering all of the relevant circumstances, the Court concludes that

the motion should be granted in the interest of justice. The Court finds

that, under the circumstances presented, the ends of justice outweigh the

interest of the public and of the Defendant in a speedy trial and failing

to grant a continuance would result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3161(h)(8)(A) & (h)(8)(B).

A superseding indictment with additional charges was later filed, and on October 25

another order was entered continuing Lucas's trial to January 4, 2005 on the ground

that a "failure to grant additional time might result in a miscarriage of justice." On

December 17 Lucas filed a pro se motion to dismiss all the charges under the Speedy

Trial Act. The motion was denied on December 20, and trial began as planned on

January 4.

Lucas argues that Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976 (2006), requires a

district court to detail its reasons for granting an ends of justice continuance, that the

court failed to do so in its September continuance order, and that that violation is not

susceptible to harmless error analysis. In the context of Speedy Trial Act rulings, we

review a district court's legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings for clear error,

and its ultimate determination for an abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1994).

The district court made explicit findings to support its ends of justice

continuance on September 27, finding that "failure to grant [a continuance would]

result in a miscarriage of justice." That factor is one of the permissible reasons for a

continuance, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i), and the court also balanced the ends of

justice and the interests of the parties and public. While there could have been more

detailed findings, its order was sufficient to show compliance with the Act,

particularly in the context of the government's stated reasons for requesting the

continuance. This record is unlike the situation in Zedner where the district court

"made no mention of the Act and did not make any findings to support exclusion."

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126 S. Ct. at 1982. We conclude that Lucas has not shown that the district court

abused its discretion in granting the September 27 continuance or that the district

court erred by not dismissing the case for violating the Speedy Trial Act. 

IV.

In sum, we conclude that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated, that the district

court did not err by denying Lucas's suppression motions or his motions to dismiss the

conspiracy and obstruction of justice charges for insufficient evidence, and that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in other trial rulings or in its jury instructions.

For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge, with whom COLLOTON and BENTON, Circuit Judges,

join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I concur in Parts I and III of the Court’s opinion and that portion of Part II that

holds that, as an escapee, “Lucas had no legitimate expectation of privacy while

hiding out in Scaife’s residence,” ante at 12. Therefore there can be no Fourth

Amendment violation in this case. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)

(“[T]his Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment

depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a

‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by

government action.”); United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002)

(“[I]n order to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment, there must be a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the area searched and the items seized. If there is no

legitimate expectation of privacy, then there can be no Fourth Amendment violation.”)

(citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 740); see also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 97 n.5

(1990) (“‘[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,’ and provides

sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy.”)

(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)); United States v. Kuenstler,

325 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘against

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8

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).

-20-

unreasonable searches and seizures,’ but its protections are personal and cannot be

asserted by persons lacking a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ in the place

searched.”) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). I find unnecessary

the plurality’s analysis with regard to the validity of the administrative arrest warrant

and the reasonableness of law enforcement’s belief that Lucas was present in the

apartment prior to entry and therefore decline to join it. 

BYE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the

judgment.

I join in the dissents of Judge Beam and Judge Riley to the extent they conclude

part II of the Court's analysis is flawed. But I concur in the Court's judgment

affirming the district court's denial of Lucas's motion to suppress the evidence found

at Lucas's primary residence because, in my judgment, while the administrative

warrant was invalid, the Leon8

 good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule saves the

evidence. Finally, I concur in part III of the Court's opinion, which addresses the

remainder of the issues raised in this appeal.

I

The majority contends "the [G]overnment has never claimed that Lucas had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in Scaife's apartment" and therefore did not waive

"its right to argue that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy." Ante at 12 n.5.

Why would the government ever argue a defendant had a reasonable expectation of

privacy? Such an argument would be raised by a defendant challenging a warrantless

search, not by the government where the government claims the search was executed

pursuant to a valid warrant.

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In fact, Lucas argued, in his pre-trial briefing prior to the suppression hearing,

that he had "standing to challenge the officers' warrantless entry of the residence to

effect his arrest" based on his status as an overnight guest at his girlfriend's house.

Def.'s Br. Support Mot. Suppress at 2. Did the Government challenge this claim of

standing? No. Instead, the Government responded: "A valid arrest warrant 'carries

with it the authority to enter the residence of the person named in the warrant in order

to execute the warrant so long as the police have a reasonable belief that the suspect

resides at the place to be entered and that he is currently present in the dwelling.'"

Gov't Br. Opposition Mot. Suppress at 5 (quoting United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d

841, 843 (8th Cir. 2000)). The Government also argued in the alternative that Lucas's

girlfriend had given consent to search the premises, quoting United States v. Matlock,

415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974): "[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority

over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with

whom that authority is shared." Far from leaving open the door that Lucas lacked a

reasonable expectation of privacy at the residence, the focus of the testimony elicited

by the Government at the suppression hearing went to show law enforcement officers

arrested Lucas at his primary residence—proof that supported the Government's

position the law enforcement officers had a reasonable belief Lucas resided there,

which, coupled with a valid arrest warrant, would make the search of the premises

valid. In other words, all along, the premise underpinning the Government's defense

of the search was that Lucas's standing to challenge a warrantless search (which was

accepted by the Government) was irrelevant because officers possessed a valid arrest

warrant and possessed a reasonable belief he was at the premises searched.

At oral argument before the panel in this case, the Government conceded it had

never before argued Lucas lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy due to his

escapee status:

Judge Beam: As an escapee from custody, was a warrant

necessary?

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-22-

Government: Well, your honor, at this point in time that is,

that's an issue and— 

Judge Beam: It, well, it wasn't an issue that you raised, was it?

Government: No. It wasn't.

The Government further volunteered at oral argument before the panel that the only

issues raised concerning the suppression issue were (1) whether the arrest warrant was

valid, and (2) if not valid, whether the officers relied on the warrant in good faith. The

record demonstrates the Government presented its Johnny-come-lately theory—in

essence, that the Director of Correctional Services is detached and neutral enough for

the purposes of issuing an arrest warrant because an escapee lacks a reasonable

expectancy of privacy anywhere—for the first time in its petition for rehearing en

banc.

Generally, both the government and defendants are barred from raising Fourth

Amendment arguments for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., United States v.

Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 360 n.5 (1994) ("Finding no exceptional

circumstances that would warrant reviewing a claim that was waived below, we

adhere to our general practice and decline to address respondent's Fourth Amendment

argument."); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1958) (finding, where

the government defended the legality of the petitioner's arrest "by relying entirely on

the validity of the warrant," to allow the government to argue for the first time before

the Supreme Court that even a warrantless arrest would have been valid "would

unfairly deprive petitioner of an adequate opportunity to respond"); United States v.

Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding, by failing to raise it to the district court,

the government waived its argument the subjective intent of the officers was irrelevant

for establishing probable cause); United States v. 22249 Dolorosa St., 167 F.3d 509,

512 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the

defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the

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-23-

argument to the district court); United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir.

1996) (per curiam) (holding the government waived its standing argument when it was

put on notice the defendant would claim a privacy interest).

As Judge Beam explains in his dissent, in United States v. Steagald, the

Supreme Court determined that the government had waived its right to raise a standing

issue in circumstances similar to those presented here. 451 U.S. 204, 208-11 (1981).

In reaching its conclusion, the Steagald Court stated: 

the Government was initially entitled to defend against petitioner's

charge of an unlawful search by asserting that petitioner lacked a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched home . . . . The

Government, however, may lose its right to raise factual issues of this

sort before this Court when it has made contrary assertions in the courts

below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or

when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during the

litigation. 

Id. at 209-10, quoted with approval and applied in United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d

761, 764 (8th Cir. 1984). Here, the Government referenced case law and facts at the

suppression hearing and in defense of the magistrate's report and recommendation that

show its theory of the case was Lucas lived at the house entered and it was his

"primary residence." The Government arguably benefitted from similar testimony at

trial in linking Lucas to the drugs and firearm found at the residence (as opposed to

Lucas's theory that someone else had placed the firearm in the residence). The

Government also made no objection to the district court's finding Lucas was a cooccupant of the residence. Moreover, the Government acquiesced in the magistrate

and district court's winnowing of the issues to two: (1) the validity of the warrant; and

(2) in the absence of a valid warrant, the applicability of the Leon good-faith

exception. Finally, as noted above, the Government expressly conceded at oral

argument before the panel it never argued below, as it now does, that Lucas's escapee

status justified a warrantless (or warrant-light) search of the premises. In light of the

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9

Our case law suggests plain error review is inapplicable under these

circumstances. See United States v. Harrison, 393 F.3d 805, 806 (8th Cir. 2005)

("Waiver extinguishes a potential "error" under [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure]

52(b)."). In any case, I would decline such review because any failure to consider the

Government's belated argument does not "seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, and

public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Montanye, 996 F.2d 190,

193 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc).

-24-

above, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it is my view the Government

waived the right to challenge Lucas's standing to challenge the validity of the search.9

Thus, I respectfully dissent from part II of the Court's opinion for the reasons

articulated in Judge Beam's dissent.

II

The now-vacated panel decision in this case noted the Leon good-faith

exception exists because the exclusionary rule is not meant to deter magistrate judge

errors—it is meant to curb overzealous law enforcement officials. I agree. Because

the panel found the Nebraska Director of Correctional Services was too intertwined

with Nebraska law enforcement officials and the state executive branch to be

"detached and neutral," the panel concluded the Leon good-faith exception did not

apply. Similarly, in his dissent, Judge Beam contends the Leon good-faith exception

is "inapplicable" because the warrant was not issued by a neutral magistrate. This

conclusion is at odds with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Leon in Krull v.

Illinois, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).

Less than three years after deciding Leon, the Supreme Court handed down

Krull. The Krull Court described the question in the case as "whether a good-faith

exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies when an officer's

reliance on the constitutionality of a statute is objectively reasonable, but the statute

is subsequently declared unconstitutional." 480 U.S. at 342. The Illinois statute in

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10Consent was an issue early on in the case but was not an issue before the

Supreme Court.

-25-

question required licensed automobile dealers to permit state officials to inspect

vehicle records "at any reasonable time during the night or day" and to allow

"examination of the premises of the licensee's established place of business for the

purpose of determining the accuracy of required records." Id. at 343. Pursuant to the

statute, a Chicago police officer entered a licensee's property and asked to see certain

records. The officer then requested and received permission to search cars on the

property.10 The officer determined some of the cars had been reported stolen, seized

the cars, and placed an employee of the licensee under arrest. The holder of the

license was later arrested and charged with criminal violations of Illinois motor

vehicle statutes.

The state trial court found the warrantless administrative search of licensees

unconstitutional and suppressed the evidence seized. The Appellate Court of Illinois

held the officer's good-faith reliance on the statute might be relevant and remanded

the matter to the trial court. On remand, the state trial court adhered to its original

decision and found the good faith of an officer is relevant only when he acts pursuant

to a warrant. The government appealed the trial court's decision directly to the

Supreme Court of Illinois which affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois held the

statute unconstitutional because it vested too much discretion in state officials to

decide who, when, and how long to search. The court also held the good-faith

exception did not apply to a procedural statute directly authorizing warrantless

searches.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Illinois

decision. The Krull Court stated the Leon exception applies where an officer's

reliance on a judge-issued warrant is objectively reasonable, even though the warrant

is ultimately found to be defective. The Krull Court noted Leon created the exception

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-26-

because (1) the exclusionary rule was historically designed to deter police misconduct

rather than punish the errors of judges, (2) there was no evidence judges were inclined

to subvert or ignore the Fourth Amendment, and (3) "of greatest importance to the

Court, there was no basis 'for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to

a warrant [would] have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or

magistrate.'" Krull, 480 U.S. at 348. In considering these factors, the Krull Court first

concluded suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to an invalid statute "would have

as little deterrent effect on the officer's actions as would the exclusion of evidence

when an officer acts on a warrant." Id. at 349. Second, the Krull Court also declared:

"although [judges and legislators] clearly serve different functions in the criminal

justice system . . . . legislators, like judicial officers, are not the focus of the rule." Id.

at 350. The Krull Court found no evidence the legislators in question were inclined

to subvert the Fourth Amendment and stated: "Although legislators are not 'neutral

judicial officers,' as are judges and magistrates, neither are they 'adjuncts to the law

enforcement team.'" Id. at 35-51. Third, the Krull Court found the greatest deterrent

to the enactment of such legislation was not to exclude evidence in a particular case

but to invalidate the statute itself. The Krull Court stated: "[T]o the extent that

application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that

possible benefit must be weighed against the 'substantial social costs exacted by the

exclusionary rule.'" Id. at 352-53 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 907).

In addition, the Krull Court noted Leon had set forth two situations in which the

good faith exception would not apply: where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned

his judicial role or where the warrant was so facially deficient the executing officers

could not have reasonably presumed it to be valid. Similarly, the Krull Court found

evidence seized pursuant to a statute later invalidated would not qualify for the goodfaith exception if the legislature (1) "wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact

constitutional laws," or (2) if the statute's "provisions are such that a reasonable officer

should have known that the statute was unconstitutional." Id. at 355. The Krull Court

found neither of these factors present in its review of the Illinois statute. To the extent

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11The Krull Court noted in a footnote: "The answer to this question might well

be different when police officers act outside of the scope of the statute, albeit in good

faith." Krull, 480 U.S. at 360. It is arguable the officers here acted outside the scope

of Lucas's arrest warrant by using the warrant to enter a private residence. If they

acted outside the scope, the Krull holding might not apply to their conduct, even if

they acted in good faith. Id. But the Supreme Court has held, at least where a

judicially issued arrest warrant is involved, an arrest warrant can be used to enter a

private home where the officer holding the warrant has reasonable suspicion the

person named in the arrest warrant is in the home. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. Here, the

officers executing the arrest warrant did have a reasonable suspicion Lucas was in the

house, so it appears they were acting within the scope of the arrest warrant when they

entered the house and seized Lucas.

-27-

the statute vested too much discretion in state officials to decide who, when, and how

long to search, the Krull Court found "the additional restrictions on discretion that

might have been necessary are not so obvious that an objectively reasonable police

officer would have realized the statute was unconstitutional without them." Id. at 359-

60. Therefore, the Krull Court concluded that the officer had "relied, in objective

good faith, on a statute that appeared legitimately to allow a warrantless administrative

search of [the licensee's] business."11 Id. at 359.

Given the broad language used in Krull, even though, in my judgment, the

Nebraska statute at issue here, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-173, is unconstitutional (at least

as applied in this case to search the house of the escapee named in the arrest warrant

where the Government does not contest the escapee's standing to challenge a

warrantless search), the seizure of evidence incident to Lucas's arrest—based on an

arrest warrant issued pursuant to the invalid statute—resulted from the officers'

objectively reasonable reliance on the statute which required the issuance of the

warrant. The administrative warrant in question specifically references § 83-173 for

its authority. In § 83-173(11), the Nebraska legislature has mandated: "The Director

of Correctional Services shall . . . [i]ssue or authorize the issuance of a warrant for the

arrest of any person committed to the department who has escaped from the custody

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-28-

of the department." No deterrent effect would result from suppressing the evidence

discovered as a result of the execution of the administrative arrest warrant at issue,

which affords no discretion to the Director of Correctional Services (which is another

reason why he is not neutral or detached as set forth in Shadwick v. City of Tampa,

407 U.S. 345 (1972)). If this court invalidated the warrant, Nebraska law enforcement

officers would continue to rely on other warrants authorized by other statutes. Krull,

480 U.S. at 349 ("Penalizing the officer for the [legislature's] error, rather than his

own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations."

(alteration in original) (paraphrasing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921)). And there is no

evidence here the Nebraska legislature was trying to subvert the Fourth Amendment

in authorizing the administrative arrest warrant for escapees. Further, if the statute or

warrant were ruled invalid, the Nebraska Legislature would be sent a strong message

to more carefully craft legislation in the future. 

Finally, I submit it is not apparent from the face of the statute the administrative

warrant is invalid. The Supreme Court has held warrantless arrests of escapees are

valid if the arrest is made in public. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24

(1976). Thus, had the statute authorized the warrantless arrest of an escapee in a

public space, it would have been valid (albeit unnecessary). It is unreasonable to

expect an officer to know, because the statute instead added the additional step of

having an executive branch officer issue the arrest warrant, the warrant would be

invalid where used to enter a private residence. Further, there are a host of "re-take"

state statutes and at least one federal statute authorizing the Attorney General to issue

arrest warrants (arrest warrants for aliens pending deportation under 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a)) that authorize non-judicial arrest warrants. Thus, despite my position the

search of Lucas's primary residence was conducted pursuant to an invalid

administrative warrant, I conclude it was objectively reasonable for officers, in

arresting Lucas in his primary residence, to rely on the statute that authorized the

issuance of the arrest warrant. As a result, I disagree with Judge Beam's view that the

good-faith exception was inapplicable in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt,

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-29-

893 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding the Leon good-faith exception

applied to save evidence seized as part of the execution of an arrest warrant issued by

the Oregon Department of Corrections pursuant to its authority under an Oregon

statute and citing the Krull decision in support), opinion withdrawn in part on other

grounds, 925 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1991). I would apply the exception to save the

evidence seized from Lucas's residence. Thus, like the majority, I would affirm the

district court but for the very different reasons articulated in this concurrence.

RILEY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the

judgment.

Judge Beam, Judge Murphy, and Judge Bye have prepared thorough and

persuasive opinions. As a member of the original three-judge panel, I agree with

Judge Beam that the government has mended its hold by raising new arguments in its

petition for rehearing en banc. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 208

(1981); In re Hen House Interstate, Inc., 177 F.3d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc)

(rejecting a newly raised argument made for the first time in a petition for rehearing

en banc). The majority recognizes the panel was correct in its ruling on the issue

actually presented to the panel on appeal–the warrant was not issued by a neutral and

detached magistrate. Therefore, I join the conclusions of Judge Beam’s dissent,

except for the conclusion regarding United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). I am

persuaded by Judge Bye’s concurrence and his conclusion Leon and Krull v. Illinois,

480 U.S. 340 (1987), save the day for the government’s evidence seized from Lucas’s

residence. Thus, I join Judge Bye’s concurrence affirming the district court’s denial

of Lucas’s motion to suppress. I also concur in part III of the majority opinion.

BEAM, Circuit Judge, with whom WOLLMAN and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, join,

dissenting, and with whom BYE and RILEY, Circuit Judges, join in part.

 This is a garden variety separation of constitutional powers case gone awry. A

majority of the judges in regular active service in this circuit employed late blooming,

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12This is the dance routine dramatizing the Texas Governor's reluctance to

follow existing law as made famous in the 1978 Broadway play The Best Little

Whorehouse in Texas. Scott Cain, Cincinnati: The Best Little Whorehouse in Texas,

http://www.talkinbroadway.com/regional/cincy/cincy19.html.

-30-

previously unannounced legal concepts, advanced by the government for the first time

in its petition for rehearing en banc to vacate the unanimous opinion of the three-judge

panel and to create an en banc court. The en banc panel, contrary to existing Supreme

Court and circuit precedent, now accepts these new government theories to administer

to Tylan Lucas what the court apparently believes are his just desserts for being a bad

person and an escaped felon. To reach this result, the court performs a Texas

"Sidestep"12 around clearly established and plainly articulated Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence as established in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) and

Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972). From this unjust result, I

respectfully dissent.

BACKGROUND

Tylan Lucas was convicted of two felonies by the State of Nebraska in 2000.

He was sentenced to prison for each crime. In 2003, in anticipation of his release

from incarceration, he was assigned a job in the Nebraska Department of Correctional

Services' work-release program. In October of 2003, Lucas walked away from his

work-release assignment and an administrative warrant was almost immediately

issued for his arrest. Thereafter, Lucas began to reside with Theresa Scaife at her

apartment in Omaha. 

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13The evidence indicates that Lucas lived at this address with Scaife and the

Omaha Police considered it his "primary residence." Officer Carmody, an Omaha

Police Sergeant, testified that the Omaha Police consider a place where a person is

believed to be residing a primary residence. The government has not disputed that this

Ogden Street primary residence was Lucas's home at all times relevant to this

litigation.

14The Task Force is a multi-agency task force encompassing the United States

Marshals Service, the Douglas County Sheriff's Office, the Omaha Police Department,

the Nebraska State Patrol and the Council Bluffs Police Department.

-31-

He was taken into custody within his home13 at 2316 Ogden Street by the

Omaha Police Department's Metro Fugitive Task Force14 on January 4, 2004. He was

returned to state control and housed at the Douglas County, (Nebraska) Correctional

Center. Evidence gathered at the time of the arrest was later used by the United States

to prosecute Lucas for the offenses at issue in this case. This evidence is the subject

of the motion to suppress under consideration in this appeal.

The officers used a warrant issued by Harold Clarke, the Director of

Correctional Services, an executive officer of the State of Nebraska, to force entry into

Lucas's home without consent. Clarke was statutorily authorized to and did issue the

warrant authorizing and directing Lucas's seizure and return to state custody. Neb.

Rev. Stat. § 83-173(11). Accordingly, any commissioned police officer "authorized

by law to make arrest[s]" in Nebraska having knowledge of the walk away or being

apprised of the contents of Clarke's warrant, with or without actual use of the

administratively issued document, was authorized to arrest Lucas if found on the street

or in any other place not affording him a protectable expectation of privacy as defined

by the Constitution. But, neither Nebraska statutes and regulations nor Clarke's

administrative arrest warrant purport to authorize or could authorize a nonconsensual

entry into Lucas's home to arrest him for a felony or to search for evidence of new

federal drug crimes, especially federal crimes for which neither reasonable suspicion

nor probable cause existed at the time of entry. Whether or not the warrant authorized

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15Judge Bye in his dissent and concurrence takes exception to my contention

that a good faith exception under Leon is inapplicable in this case. He cites Illinois

v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), in support of his contrary view. I agree with almost

every part of Judge Bye's discussion of Krull. I disagree only with his conclusion that

Krull somehow opens the door to a determination that the evidence at issue in this

case is admissible under the teachings of Leon. As Judge Bye appears to concede in

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Lucas's return to Nebraska's custody to serve the remainder of his previously imposed

felony sentences or to stand trial for his 2003 felony escape is not at issue here. The

plurality opinion authored by Judge Murphy contends that Lucas had signed a

"personalized plan" that required him to return to the Omaha Community Corrections

Center after work. I find nothing in the record that supports the existence of such an

agreement signed by Lucas. But, I find this irrelevant. At all times relevant here,

Lucas was chargeable with a Class III felony for the crime of escape when he walked

away from work release, with or without an agreement to return. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-

912(5). 

DISCUSSION

I. Waiver

The government argued in the district court that Director Clarke was the

"neutral and detached magistrate" required by Payton or, if not, that the police entered

Scaife and Lucas's home by consent. The district court rejected the government's

"consent" argument, which ruling was not appealed, but accepted the government's

neutral and detached magistrate contention. On appeal to the three-judge panel, the

government renewed its argument that Clarke was the neutral and detached magistrate

required by Supreme Court precedent and, if not, that a "good faith" exception

applied. The neutral magistrate contention was rejected by the panel, a rejection now

conceded by the en banc court to have been correct. This made the good faith issue

inapplicable. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).15

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footnote 11 of his dissent and concurrence, the Supreme Court requires that when the

police enter a private residence, a Leon-qualifying warrant must be issued by a

"neutral magistrate" to "provide[] the detached scrutiny" necessary to accord "a more

reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law

enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out

crime." Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14 (quotation omitted). There was no such warrant

here. Third, as also seemingly conceded by Judge Bye, Nebraska Revised Statute §

83-173 as applied in this case is unconstitutional. And, as Krull suggests, the proper

deterrent in such a situation is for the court to invalidate the statute–the greatest

deterrent to enactment of an unconstitutional statute is the power of the court to

invalidate because invalidation informs the legislature of its constitutional error and

affects admissibility of subsequently obtained evidence. Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-53.

Thus, at the bottom line, Krull is clearly not the pathway to a Leon good faith

exception in this case.

-33-

Because it obviously believed that a Payton warrant was necessary to validate

Lucas's arrest and search, the government reasserted its neutral and detached

magistrate argument (or an argument that the warrant was close enough to the real

thing to do the job) in its en banc papers. Undeterred in its quest to prosecute Lucas

for federal drug crimes, the government in its petition for rehearing en banc also raised

for the first time two new and different legal theories. First, the government asserted

that as an at-large felon, Lucas had a diminished expectation of privacy that permitted

the arrest, the residential search and the property seizure notwithstanding the strictures

of Payton and Shadwick. The government's second new theory asserted that the

warrant was a valid administrative warrant that obviated the requirements of Payton

and Shadwick altogether. 

As noted, the en banc court correctly rejects the neutral and detached magistrate

argument. Further, the en banc court accepts and adopts the government's new legal

theories over Lucas's well-articulated objections that the government waived these

arguments by failing to raise them in the first instance. Neither of these government

suppositions were presented to nor argued before the three-judge panel.

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In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 208 (1981), the government was not

permitted to assert an "expectation of privacy" argument not raised in a timely fashion.

While there are instances in which this circuit has considered issues raised for the first

time on appeal, such situations have involved purely legal arguments requiring no

additional factual development or requiring an affirmative showing of manifest

injustice. Orion Fin. Corp. v. Am. Foods Group, Inc., 281 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir.

2002). Of course, factual considerations are required to evaluate both of these newly

minted legal theories and the issue of manifest injustice, if any, runs toward Lucas and

away from the government.

"Arguments and issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally not

considered," especially when "no good reason has been advanced to depart from that

rule." Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 779 (8th Cir. 2004). The reason

advanced by government counsel at oral argument was as follows:

Frankly, I don't think we anticipated the nature and the

scope of the [three-judge] court's ruling in this matter. And

again, I stand by the works of my colleagues and the

position of my office, but had I been writing the brief [on

appeal], I would have taken a different tack . . . and

different argument.

This essentially amounts to a confession by the government that they thought they

would win with the arguments advanced but when they did not, they needed to assert

a new theory in their petition for rehearing en banc.

Likewise, matters raised for the first time in a reply brief on appeal have been

routinely and peremptorily rejected by this court. Bearden v. Lemon, 475 F.3d 926,

930 (8th Cir. 2007). And, prior to the unusual procedure followed by the en banc

court in this case, the precedent of this circuit has been clear. Then Chief Judge

Bowman, writing in In re Hen House Interstate, Inc., 177 F.3d 719 (8th Cir. 1999),

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rejected a new assertion made in a petition for rehearing en banc and noted that a

"party [first] raising [an] argument on en banc rehearing would 'be allowed to deprive

the panel of the ability to address the issue first.'" Id. at 724 (quoting Stupak-Thrall

v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1275 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996)). Adapting Justice

O'Connor's statement in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747 (1991), to this

situation, it may correctly be said that consideration of these new issues for the first

time by the en banc court will have the effect of making the district court trial and the

three-judge panel's consideration of the issues asserted in the first appeal merely a

"tryout on the road," leaving open the option of presenting a newly created script

when the en banc court becomes the intended audience. Indeed, after intensive

computerized research of existing databases, I have been unable to find a single

instance in this circuit when an en banc panel has allowed new issues it believed to be

controlling to be raised for the first time by the losing party in a petition for rehearing

en banc, except, of course, matters of subject matter jurisdiction or Article III

standing. Considerable circuit precedent is being extinguished today by this en banc

opinion.

II. Arrest

The "physical entry of [Lucas's] home is the chief evil against which the

wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States Dist.

Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). While "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the

individual's privacy in a variety of settings[,] [i]n none is the zone of privacy more

clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an

individual's home–a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms:

'The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.'"

Payton, 445 U.S. at 589 (omissions in original). It is this constitutional language that

"unequivocally establishes the proposition that '[a]t the very core [of the Fourth

Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free

from unreasonable governmental intrusion.'" Id. at 589-90 (quoting Silverman v.

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United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (alterations in original). In Payton, the

Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment, applied to the states through

the Fourteenth Amendment, "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and

nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest."

Id. at 576. And, a warrant for such purpose or for the purpose of a search for and

seizure of property within the home may be issued only by an official who is "neutral

and detached" and "capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the

requested arrest or search." Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 350.

The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is . . . a grave

concern, not only to the individual but [also] to a society which chooses

to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the

right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule,

to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government

enforcement agent.

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (emphasis added). But, an escaped

felon who has been arrested with a defective warrant does not get a free pass; he may

be returned to jail and he must still stand trial. Payton, 445 U.S. at 592, n.34.

However, evidence found and seized during such arrest and entry is subject to an

exclusionary rule analysis and may be inadmissible at trial. Id. at 591-92.

Even though an administrative warrant based specifically upon Lucas's escape

from work release was used to force entry into his home, the government contends

in its petition for rehearing en banc that "[t]he [Clarke] warrant was not based on a

new criminal charge." The court en banc appears to join this contention when it says

in support of the newly created administrative warrant theory, which theory I will

discuss in more detail shortly, "[t]he standard for issuance of a valid administrative

warrant under the Fourth Amendment is different from the probable cause showing

necessary for a warrant to arrest someone suspected of a crime." Ante at 7 (emphasis

added).

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It is more than obvious that the Fourth Amendment prohibited police entry into

Lucas's home if he was not suspected of a crime. It is equally obvious that breaching

the privacy of his home to arrest him for a suspected felony required compliance with

Payton and Shadwick. However, adherence to these cases did not occur.

The en banc court concedes that the three-judge panel was correct in finding

that Clarke's warrant did not pass muster under Payton. It says

Although Director Clarke's role in issuing the arrest warrant for Lucas

was quite different from the jailer's issuance of search warrants in

[United States v.] Parker, [373 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2004)], Clarke was not

a neutral and detached magistrate in the sense of a judicial officer. He

was appointed by the governor, who sat his salary and had power to

remove him at will. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-102, -103.

Ante at 7. To extract themselves from this constitutional dilemma, the government

and the court en banc advance this "no new crime" argument, a clearly spurious

contention under the facts of this dispute. But, even if correct, it leads them nowhere.

The government and the court do not tightly reason the details of their position.

Presumably the contention relies upon a diminished or nonexistent expectation of

privacy approach which in some way relates to Lucas's year 2000 convictions and

sentences. In other words, they seem to say that a mantle of criminality carrying with

it the evaporation of constitutional protections hovered over Lucas, even in his workrelease assignment, until his year 2000 sentences had expired. Accordingly, then, they

say, it was this continuing vestment of illegality, not his more recent escape felony,

that permitted Lucas's in-home arrest. Of course, neither fact nor precedent support

this theory. Indeed, case-based reasoning counsels to the contrary. See Griffin v.

Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) ("A probationer's home, like anyone else's, is

protected by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be 'reasonable.'");

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984) (noting that while imprisonment carries

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16In footnote 4, ante at 7, the plurality opinion concedes, at least by implication,

that its several conclusions are erroneous if Tylan Lucas was arrested for a felony at

2316 Ogden Street in Omaha. Although it makes no real difference as I point out

below, to dispel the erroneous contention that the administrative warrant was issued

only to "retake" Lucas, I attach a copy of the document to this dissent as Appendix A.

To buttress its arrest arguments, the plurality appears to contend that the words

"arrest" and "retake" have different meanings in this dispute. At best, this finding is

an act of semantic legerdemain, that is, it advances a difference without a distinction

to reach a predetermined result while steadfastly resisting the application of clearly

established Fourth Amendment law. And, unfortunately, Judge Shepherd's

concurrence seems also to incorporate elements of this same fiction. United States v.

Sager, 881 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1989), addresses this point. Sager, a parolee, contended

that as such he could not be subject to an "arrest warrant." Id. at 366. Although the

parole statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201 et seq., referred to by the Sager court has been

-38-

with it the circumscription of some rights "persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many

protections of the Constitution").

First the facts. The "warrant of arrest," issued by Director Clarke was "for

[2003] escaped prisoner" Tylan Lucas. It referred to his underlying convictions and

sentences of January and June 2000 and noted that Lucas had been "delivered to the

Nebraska Department of Correctional Services on March 1, 2000, [and] has [now]

escaped from the custody of the Department." It further "authorized and directed

[the] arrest of said escapee." (Emphasis added). The escape set forth in the warrant

resulted when Lucas failed to return from this work-release assignment to community

corrections following temporary leave granted for work release for a limited period.

See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-912(1). It was this warrant that was used to force a

nonconsensual entry into the residence of Theresa Scaife and Lucas at 2316 Ogden

Street, Omaha, Nebraska. At that time, Lucas was arrested by Omaha Police

Department Task Force officers, as permitted and required by Nebraska law, for

escape, a Class III felony and not for unstated continuing obligations arising from his

year 2000 sentences or for violation of any work release administrative rules

established by Nebraska statutes or duly promulgated agency regulations.16

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repealed effective November 2005, as a result of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,

the Seventh Circuit correctly analyzes the issue for our purposes: 

In support of his position, Mr. Sager invites our attention to the

statutory language. The statute dealing with parole violations, 18 U.S.C.

§ 4213, empowers the Parole Commission to "issue a warrant and retake

the parolee." 18 U.S.C. § 4213(a)(2) (emphasis added). By contrast,

Rule 4, dealing with the apprehension of a person wanted to answer a

criminal charge, employs the word "arrest." Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.

Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3606, dealing with the apprehension of probation

violators and those on supervised release, speaks in terms of "arrest."

Therefore, Mr. Sager argues, section 1071 is not applicable because there

was no outstanding arrest warrant for Carlos Aubrey at the time Mr.

Sager allegedly concealed him.

Id. at 365 (footnote omitted).

The Seventh Circuit then said:

While it is true that a parolee is "in custody," it is also true that he

retains a legally cognizable liberty interest that is significantly

greater than that enjoyed by one who is incarcerated. See

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). To deprive him

of that liberty interest and place him in a custodial status is indeed

to arrest him, as that term is usually understood. We must assume

that Congress intended the term to be given such a common-sense

meaning. Certainly, this conclusion is not undercut simply

because Congress did not use the term "arrest" in section 4213

when it was dealing exclusively with the process of parole

revocation. There, without unnecessarily limiting the ambit of the

section, Congress was able to employ the more descriptive phrase

"retake." However, even in that section, Congress manifested, in

the later subsections of section 4213, its understanding that the

execution of a "warrant to retake" effectuates an "arrest." The

physical deprivation of liberty described in subsection (d)

certainly constitutes a sufficient deprivation of liberty to constitute

-39-

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an "arrest." Indeed, the Parole Board and other courts of appeals

have characterized this event as an arrest.

Id. at 366-37 (footnotes omitted).

Tylan Lucas, as a work-release assignee, even in escapee status, had a "legally

cognizable liberty interest that is significantly greater than that enjoyed by one who

is [confined within a prison] incarcerated." Id. at 366. This is especially true because

he is now being confined, at least in large part, for prosecution for a new federal drug

crime on the basis of the unconstitutionally gathered evidence, not for his year 2000

offenses or for the crime of escape.

-40-

In State v. Coffman, 330 N.W.2d 727 (Neb. 1983), the defendant walked away

from work release and was arrested and charged under Nebraska statute section 28-

912(1). The defendant contended, "cunning[ly]" the court noted, that "work release

[was] a form of parole" and that, accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to

convict him of the crime of "escape." Id. at 728-29. The Nebraska Supreme Court,

again citing the precise "temporary leave" language set forth above, rejected

Coffman's argument that work release is parole (calling it variously absurd, farcical

and frivolous) and said "for the purposes of determining whether one has escaped it

is but 'temporary leave,'" id. at 729, as defined in the statute and "when [Coffman] did

not return . . . he had obviously escaped." Id. He was properly arrested and charged

according to the Nebraska court. Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court has made clear

that Lucas, like Coffman, committed a new felony and was arrested in his home for

the offense–with a defective warrant.

Now the precedent. Ignoring that the warrant clearly targeted the commission

of the new crime of escape, the government contends, and the en banc court seemingly

agrees, that, with or without a warrant, Lucas's home, because he was a prison

escapee, afforded him only a diminished (or non-existent in the view of some)

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17The plurality opinion says "[a]s an escapee Lucas had only a minimal

expectation of privacy in Scaife's apartment." Ante at 10. See also Judge Shepherd's

concurrence.

18In footnote 5, ante at 12, the plurality opinion and Judge Shepherd, in apparent

agreement, contend that the "government has never claimed that Lucas had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in Scaife's apartment." As carefully and correctly

noted by Judge Bye in his dissent and concurrence, the record clearly demonstrates

the inaccuracy of this statement.

-41-

measure of constitutionally protected privacy.17 Lucas, says the government, is a

prison escapee from whom the public must be protected.18 Indeed, it says, the

government had a duty to apprehend this at-large felon. Both the duty to apprehend

and diminished privacy theories have to rely on Lucas being regarded, even in his

home, as the "trespasser on society" referred to in dicta in United States v. Roy, 734

F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1984). Roy's facts reject this long discredited rationale.

Roy involved the search of the passenger compartment and trunk of an

automobile, not a home. Id. at 108. Thus, the automobile exception recognized in

California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), was clearly in play.

"[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by

the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the

beginning of Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between

a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which

a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship,

motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not

practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved

out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."

Id. at 390 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)) (alteration in

original). "The capacity to be 'quickly moved' was clearly the basis of the holding in

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Carroll, and our cases have consistently recognized ready mobility as one of the

principal bases of the automobile exception." Id.

Further, Judge Friendly, concurring in Roy, said

I am not at all convinced that Roy's Fourth Amendment claims should be

dismissed on the ground that, because he had escaped from prison, he

had no expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize as

'reasonable'." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,

J., concurring). When Justice Harlan's much-quoted observation is read

in context, it becomes apparent that he was speaking of the places where

society would be prepared to recognize an individual's reasonable

expectation of privacy, not adumbrating a doctrine whereby certain

classes of persons could be denied Fourth Amendment protections that

would otherwise extend to them.

Roy, 734 F.2d at 112 (footnote omitted). Hudson, 468 U.S. 517, enlightens this same

issue. The Supreme Court noted that "while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many

protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the

circumscription or loss of many significant rights." Id. at 524 (emphasis added). The

Supreme Court further said: 

We have not before been called upon to decide the specific question

whether the Fourth Amendment applies within a prison cell, but the

nature of our inquiry is well defined. We must determine here, as in

other Fourth Amendment contexts, if a "justifiable" expectation of

privacy is at stake. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The

applicability of the Fourth Amendment turns on whether "the person

invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a

'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by government

action." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979), and cases cited.

We must decide, in Justice Harlan's words, whether a prisoner's

expectation of privacy in his prison cell is the kind of expectation that

"society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Katz, supra, at 360,

361 (concurring opinion).

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19While the Supreme Court in Hudson found no expectation of privacy inside

the prison cell, the Court has not addressed the Fourth Amendment rights of prisoners

outside the cell, even while in an incarcerated status. See Thompson v. Souza, 111

F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The Supreme Court has not decided whether prison

inmates retain rights cognizable under the Fourth Amendment."). The Ninth Circuit

has determined that incarcerated prisoners do have some Fourth Amendment

protections, dependent upon the prison context. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d

328 (9th Cir. 1988) (examining reasonableness of strip search under Fourth

Amendment). Likewise, other circuits have made similar holdings. See Peckham v.

Wisconsin Dep't of Corr, 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) (incarcerated prisoners do

enjoy some Fourth Amendment protections against strip searches); Franklin v.

Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 655-56 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). The considerations of the

Supreme Court in Hudson involved the confinement of individuals guilty of antisocial

criminal and violent conduct, the prevention of the introduction of drugs into the

premises, the ability of inmates to conceal contraband in their cells, and the need to

maintain a sanitary environment. However, none of these concerns apply to

individuals who are free to come and go on work release assignments. Indeed, none

apply outside the prison yard.

20For example, see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (automobile);

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prison cell); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.

573 (1980) (home); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen register); Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (telephone booth). 

-43-

Id. at 524-25 (footnotes omitted).19 Thus, while Fourth Amendment rights are

personal, United States v. Pierson, 219 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2000), it is abundantly

clear that the expectation of privacy tests applied by the court in the implementation

of the Fourth Amendment concern places rather than persons.20 Certainly, Lucas had

a constitutionally supported expectation of privacy in his home that he may not have

had in his prison cell or in his automobile or while using a telephone booth or a

telephone wired to a pen register. Accordingly, Roy is inapposite to the government's

and the en banc court's expectation of privacy contentions and the court supplies

absolutely no precedent to the contrary. 

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-44-

III. Administrative Warrant

With regard to the government and the plurality opinion's administrative

warrant emanations, the court advances ten cases in support of its analysis. With one

exception, none involve a home search by a police agency. The one exception is

directly contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent. I will briefly discuss each

case.

Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), a case that actually supports Lucas,

arose out of a non-criminal custodial detention using an administrative warrant issued

by the Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as a preliminary

to Abel's deportation as an illegal alien. Id. at 218. Evidentiary "seizures did not

occur in connection with the exertion of the criminal process against [Abel]." Id.

Abel's immigration restraint occurred in a New York hotel room by action of INS

operatives. Prior to this, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the only police

agency involved, was informed that Abel was suspected of espionage. The FBI asked

permission to interview Abel before any immigration detention. This venture proved

unfruitful and the FBI then deferred to INS agents who seized him. After Abel had

"agreed to check out of the hotel," the FBI asked hotel management for permission to

search the room, which permission was granted, and a search for evidence to make a

criminal case of espionage was undertaken. Id. at 224-25. The Supreme Court

emphasized that any administrative search by INS agents was to look for

"documentary evidence of alienage." Id. at 226-28. Of perhaps even more

importance, the Fourth Amendment validity of the administrative warrant was not

considered by the Court because Abel failed to raise the issue in the lower courts. Id.

at 230. In sum, Abel provides little support for any of the en banc court's rulings.

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), also substantively supports

Lucas. The case involved an alleged violation of section 503 of the San Francisco

(California) Building Code, a "part of a regulatory scheme which [was] essentially

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-45-

civil rather than criminal in nature" according to the California District Court of

Appeal. Id. at 528 (quotation omitted). And, a violation of any part of the Code was

but a "misdemeanor." Id. at 527 n.2. But even in these circumstances the Supreme

Court required the use of a warrant reviewed and issued by a neutral magistrate, id.

at 532, stating:

"The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave

concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to

dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the

right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule,

to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government

enforcement agent."

Id. at 529 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). The Court

further said, "[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private

property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is

suspected of criminal behavior," id. at 530 (footnote omitted), and that even the most

law-abiding citizen has an interest in preventing entry into his home without a

warrant, even for civil purposes. Id. at 530-31.

The en banc court substantively ignores the principal thrust of Henderson v.

Simms, 223 F.3d 267 (4th Cir. 2000), a "qualified immunity" case that presents none

of the issues at large in this case. Henderson is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in which three

validly released inmates who were subject to "'mandatory supervision,' a release status

similar to parole," id. at 269, were mistakenly reincarcerated for a number of days

through use of administrative retake warrants authorized by Maryland law. The

inmates sued individual state officers alleging violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments. While the Fourth Circuit stated that a few days of "reincarceration"

using a retake warrant based upon findings specifically delineated by Maryland statute

did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the court also opined at length that if it did, the

court was "convinced that [the Fourth Amendment] rights were not clearly established

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at the time of the seizures." Id. at 273. This case offers exceedingly thin gruel as

nourishment for the en banc court's Fourth Amendment emanations.

In United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1990), which the two-judge

majority characterized as "Griffin Redux," the First Circuit validated a police search

of Cardona's Rhode Island residence through the use of a parole violation warrant

issued by the New York parole board. But, as noted by the Cardona dissent, "the

majority distorts both the substance and method of [F]ourth [A]mendment

jurisprudence." Id. at 69 (Bownes, J., dissenting). This, according to the dissent, is

because the Cardona court strains to extend Griffin's "'special needs' exception from

searches by parole administrators to seizures by police officers, a situation clearly not

covered, and arguably forbidden, by the language of Griffin." Id. The dissent is

clearly correct that Griffin is restricted to administrator's arrests and searches based

upon detailed and pervasive regulations put in place by state statute and court order.

Thus, Cardona is irrelevant to Lucas's situation.

The warrentless search in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), was

specifically consented to through a signed agreement arising from a court order

granting probation, id. at 114, and in Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006),

the parolee was searched and seized while walking on the street, not in his home. And

while the en banc court cites these two cases for the proposition that "an escapee from

lawful custody [has] an even more circumscribed expectation of privacy than

[probationers] and [parolees]," such words or inferences appear in neither of the

opinions and as applied to this case are palpably incorrect. Likewise, the court's

statement that Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978), stands for "a minimal

expectation of privacy" for Lucas at his home is not supported by the cited footnote.

Indeed, a full examination of the note establishes a contrary proposition.

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), an Occupational Safety and

Health Act (OSHA) regulation case cited by the court, notes that a lower standard for

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the issuance of an administrative warrant stems from "relatively unique

circumstances" involving certain industries with "such a history of government

oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist" for the owner of the

business. Id. at 313 (citation omitted). But, the Supreme Court has specifically noted

that the Camara-Marshall definition of administrative probable cause is not

"[p]robable cause in the criminal law sense." Id. at 320. Indeed, when "seeking

evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, the usual standard [of probable cause]

will apply." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978) (alteration in original)

(quotation omitted). 

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), comes closest to supporting the en

banc court's administrative warrant position. But, in the final analysis, it is

inapplicable to Lucas's situation.

Joseph Griffin, a probationer, had his home searched without a warrant. The

supervisor of Griffin's probation officer received a tip that Griffin's apartment might

contain contraband. Based upon this information, he authorized Griffin's probation

officer to conduct a search of Griffin's home, in which the supervisor participated.

Wisconsin law puts probationers in the legal custody of the State

Department of Health and Social Services and renders them 'subject

. . . to . . . conditions set by the court and rules and regulations

established by the department.' Wis. Stat. § 973.10(1) (1985-1986). One

of the Department's regulations permits any probation officer to search

a probationer's home without a warrant as long as his supervisor

approves and as long as there are 'reasonable grounds' to believe the

presence of contraband.

Id. at 870-71 (omission in original). To protect the probationer's Fourth Amendment

rights, "[t]he rule provides that an officer should consider a variety of factors in

determining whether 'reasonable [constitutional] grounds exist" to search. Id. at 871.

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Justice Scalia writing for a five-member Court in Griffin, noted that a state's

operation of a probation system or other possible plans, including, specifically, a

work-release program, present "'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement"

activities, id. at 873-74, because they are "a form of criminal sanction imposed by a

court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty." Id. at 874 (quotation

omitted). However, "[a] probationer's [and a work release walk away's] home, like

anyone else's, is protected by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be

'reasonable.'" Id. at 873. It is important to note that in Griffin, the Wisconsin

Supreme Court allowed a search of the probationer's home "because [Griffin's]

probation diminishes [his] reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 872. Upon

review by the United States Supreme Court, this "new principle of law" adopted by

the Wisconsin court was pointedly not "embrace[d]." Id. Accordingly, these "special

needs" beyond the normal need for law enforcement are employable only when "the

[usual] warrant and probable-cause requirement[s] [are] impracticable." Id. at 873

(quotation omitted). Additionally, it seems certain that there must be in place, as in

Wisconsin, a state-enacted regulatory scheme that satisfies the Fourth Amendment's

reasonableness requirements and the entry, detention and search must be carried out

entirely by administrative officers under the authority of the state's regulations. See

id. at 873-75. 

While the direct facts of Griffin encompass a probationer (as opposed to a work

release walk away) and a residential search for contraband (as opposed to a residential

arrest and search incident thereto), there is little doubt, even giving the government

and the court en banc the case's best gloss, that Griffin establishes legal principles

fully applicable to Lucas. Thus, the following analysis controls the outcome of this

case. The usual warrant and probable cause requirements were fully practical. There

was nothing that prohibited the securing of the Ogden Street residence while a judicial

officer was consulted. The probation supervisor's approval of the probation officer's

search can probably be considered a reasonable substitute for Director Clarke's

administrative warrant. The supervisor's approval was directed to an agency

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21Griffin stresses the completeness of Wisconsin's probation scheme as

promulgated by statute and regulation. The statutory and regulatory scheme underpinning Nebraska's work-release program is not comparable. Nebraska Revised

Statute § 83-183(1) provides that individuals in custody of the Department of

Correctional Services should be put into the work force to aid their rehabilitation. The

same statute requires that the Director of the Department of Correctional Services

"shall make rules and regulations governing the hours, conditions of labor, and the

rates of compensation of persons committed to the department." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-

183(2). Generally, "[i]t is the Department's policy to provide . . . employment

programs to those inmates who are in need of such . . . programs." 68 Neb. Admin.

Code Ch. 7, § 002 (2007). Other than this general statement, the Nebraska

Administrative Code's chapter for the Department of Correctional Services is silent

on the administration of work release. However, more detailed regulations may be

found at http://www.corrections.state.ne.us/policies/index.html. These administrative

regulations, promulgated by the Director of the Department of Correctional Services,

contain various provisions regarding the criteria and approval process for participation

in work-release programs, universal job requirements, worker job descriptions, pay

scales, performance evaluation, job termination, overtime, and even excused and nonexcused absences. See Nebraska Department of Correctional Services Administrative

Regulations 109.01, 113.18, 201.07, and 209.02. However, as far as I have found,

these regulations contain nothing similar to those of Wisconsin regarding authority to

"arrest," "retake" or search within the home of a prisoner who walks away from his

work-release job.

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employee (the searching probation officer) but Director Clarke's directions were

addressed only to police personnel authorized by law to make arrests. The

supervisor's approval was based upon a finding of reasonable grounds to believe that

there was contraband in Griffin's home but Clarke's warrant was based upon a finding

that Lucas "had escaped from . . . custody," not that he could or would be found at his

home. However, I concede that the Omaha police officers developed reasonable

suspicion that he was at his home on Ogden Street. The Griffin supervisor's actions

were based upon Wisconsin's comprehensive administrative rules regime. But, there

is no showing in the record that Nebraska has any administrative agency procedures

that are at all comparable to the Wisconsin scheme. Indeed, a search of the record and

research beyond the record reveals a contrary environment.21 The Wisconsin approval

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and search was undertaken and completed by state probation officers but Lucas was

arrested in his home by agents of an Omaha Police Department task force, not

Department of Corrections employees, and through use of a warrant defective under

Payton.

Finally, and most importantly, the Nebraska legislature has affirmatively

deemed escape a Class III felony rather than an administrative rules violation, and,

as interpreted by State v. Coffman, has made Lucas's arrest an apprehension for a

"routine felony" requiring a warrant that passes constitutional muster under Payton.

Accordingly, the evidence seized in Lucas's home must be suppressed.

IV. Theresa Scaife

The court's rhetoric that Lucas has no standing "to assert Scaife's Fourth

Amendment" rights is beside the point. The record establishes that the intruding

police officers were ultimately concerned with Scaife's connection with drugs found

in her coat in the residence and with a weapon found under the mattress of the only

bed in the premises. Except for the limited "non-prosecution" agreement she has with

the United States, Appendix at 21, she, too, is at risk of prosecution for state and

federal drug crimes, especially, for instance, for possession or conspiracy to possess

illegal drugs for her own use, if not for distribution. 

At the time Scaife refused to give the police permission to enter, she was not

suspected of committing a crime nor was she on parole, probation or in an escape

status. Nonetheless, if the fruits of this search are declared valid, Scaife and many

other similarly situated individuals in this circuit who share an abode with an alien,

OSHA or housing code violator, parolee, probationer or escapee, will have little if any

basis to exclude evidence in a criminal prosecution. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547

U.S. 103 (2006) (physically present co-occupant's refusal to permit entry makes search

unreasonable as to him); United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991) (nonAppellate Case: 05-2165 Page: 50 Date Filed: 08/23/2007 Entry ID: 3344449
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probationer co-occupant cannot suppress evidence found in jointly used portions of

residence, with or without inquiry as to ownership by police).

CONCLUSION

The police arrived at the home of Theresa Scaife and Tylan Lucas and used an

administrative arrest warrant that concededly did not pass Payton v. New York

constitutional muster to enter, arrest and search Lucas. The court, acting upon new

theories advanced in the petition for rehearing en banc, finds these acts to be

constitutional.

In doing so, the court offers a series of inapposite and distinguishable cases

supposedly authorizing this entry because the administrative warrant was

constitutionally sufficient or because Lucas had a limited expectation of privacy in his

home as a result of his escape status. This is error.

Lucas is not a model citizen. And it is almost certain that a valid warrant would

have been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, if requested, making the

requirement seem but a technicality. Nonetheless, even escapees have the right to

expect the benefits of the rule of law. These benefits were denied him by the Omaha

Police Department and are being denied him by the court en banc today. The evidence

at issue should be suppressed.

I dissent.

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