Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02126/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02126-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Scott Fusci
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L ~ . .J 

United States Cioi.:-t of Appeabi 

TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

WILLIAM SCOTT FUSCI, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

FEB 2 5 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . No . 92-2126 

(D.C. No. CR-91-637-JC) 

(D.N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, HOLLOWAY, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

Appellant William Scott Fusci was charged with possession 

with intent to distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (D). Mr. Fusci 

was aboard an Amtrak train traveling from Flagstaff, Arizona to 

Chicago when he was questioned by Agent Kevin Small during a stop 

in Albuquerque. Mr. Fusci argued that Agent Small lacked 

reasonable suspicion and filed a motion to suppress. The district 

court denied the motion. Mr. Fusci entered a conditional guilty 

plea and now appeals the denial of the motion to suppress. We 

reverse . 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 . 

Appellate Case: 92-2126 Document: 010110176475 Date Filed: 02/25/1993 Page: 1 
Agent Small confronted Mr. Fusci during a stop-over in 

Albuquerque. Mr . . Fusci, who is not handicapped, had engaged a 

handicapped roomette on the train. This type of room is larger 

than a typical roomette and can only be reserved by nonhandicapped persons within 48 hours of departure. Agent Small 

stood in the doorway of the roomette and a police officer stood 

just behind him. After some preliminary questions, Agent Small 

asked Mr. Fusci whether he had any drugs in his luggage. Mr. 

Fusci said he did not. Agent Small then asked Mr. Fusci if he 

would voluntarily consent to a search of his luggage. Mr. Fusci 

refused to give his consent. Agent Small and the police officer, 

however, did not move away from the doorway. Rather, Agent Small 

continued questioning Mr. Fusci in an effort to seek another 

avenue to search his luggage. Mr. Fusci eventually consented to a 

dog sniff of his luggage. The dog alerted on a bag that was later 

found to contain 40 pounds of marijuana. 

We have addressed the issue of a police encounter aboard a 

train in United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992), 

and United States v . Ward, 961 F . 2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1992 ). A 

police encounter amounting to the seizure of a person within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment must be supported by reasonable 

suspicion. Ward, 961 F.2d at 1529. We review a district court's 

factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Bloom, 975 

F.2d at 1456; United States v. Walker, 941 F.2d 1086, 1090 (10th 

Cir. 1991), cert. denied. 112 s . Ct. 1168 (1992). However, the 

question of the reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth 

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Appellate Case: 92-2126 Document: 010110176475 Date Filed: 02/25/1993 Page: 2 
Amendment is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Bloom, 975 

F.2d at 1456. In determining whether a seizure has occurred, we 

examine the totality of the circumstances of the encounter and the 

police officer's conduct: "the crucial test is [w]hether, taking 

into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, 

the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person 

that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go 

about his business.'" Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 

(1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988 )). 

"[W]hether an encounter occurs in the public view is 

particularly significant." Ward, 961 F.2d at 1531. "In this 

Fourth Amendment inquiry, it is relevant that an individual 

traveling in a private train roomette has a higher expectation of 

privacy than an individual traveling in a public passenger car of 

the train." Id. at 1531-32 . "An important distinction . is 

that defendant was not in an open public place where he was within 

view of persons other than law enforcement officers." Id. at 

1531. 

Here, as in Ward, M~. Fusci had engaged a private roomette. 

Two law enforcement officials were present when Mr . Fusci was 

questioned. "[T]he presence of more than one officer increases 

the coerciveness of an encounter." Id., at 1533. Where a person 

is alone in a private setting and is approached by police to be 

questioned, he or she is more likely to feel like a "specific 

object of the officers' inquiry," whereas in a public setting, a 

"reasonable innocent person is less likely to feel singled out." 

Id . at 1532 . 

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Appellate Case: 92-2126 Document: 010110176475 Date Filed: 02/25/1993 Page: 3 
Agent Small questioned Mr. Fusci regarding his travel plans 

and then told him that the Drug Enforcement Agency had had 

problems with persons transporting drugs through Albuquerque to 

the East. Agent Small then immediately asked Mr Fusci if he was 

carrying any drugs. Mr. Fusci could reasonably have felt that he 

was being singled out as a specific target and was not free to 

leave . Moreover, Agent Small did not inform Mr. Fusci that he had 

a right to refuse t o answer questions or otherwise terminate the 

encounter. As we said in Bloom, "Agent Small's directly 

incriminating questions in a nonpublic setting would tend to 

communicate to a reasonable person that, as the specific target of 

the agents' inve stigation, he was unable to terminate the 

encounter." Bloom, 975 F.2d at 1454. The setting in the present 

case is similar to those in Ward and Bloom, and we thus conclude 

that Mr. Fusc i was seized under the Fourth Ame ndment. 

We next consider whether Agent Small and the police o ffice r 

had reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure of Mr. Fusc i. "To 

justify an invest igative detention of a person, the officer must 

have a reasonable suspic~on that the person is engaged in criminal 

activity . " Bloom, 975 F.2d at 1456 (citing United States v. 

Sokolow, 4 90 U. S . 1 , 7 (1 989) , and Terry v . Ohi o , 392 U.S. 1, 3 0 

(1968)). 

The government seeks to establish reasonable suspicion based 

on information primarily obtained from a confidential informant. 

Mr. Fusci was traveling alone, on a one-way ticket purchase d with 

cash . He was apparently traveling on short notice, having engaged 

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Appellate Case: 92-2126 Document: 010110176475 Date Filed: 02/25/1993 Page: 4 
a handicapped room which can not be purchased until 48 hours 

before departure. In response to a question by Agent Small, Mr. 

Fusci replied that he made his reservations about a week prior to 

the travel date. 1 Agent Small believes these facts fit the 

profile of a drug courier with which he is familiar. However, 

these same facts are "wholly consistent with innocent travel," 

Bloom, 975 F.2d at 1458, and therefore do not amount to reasonable 

suspicion. 

The government further argues that in any event Mr. Fusci 

consented to the dog sniff of his luggage. His consent, however, 

came only after he had refused to consent to a search of his 

luggage. More importantly, the dog sniff came during an illegal 

seizure. "'Evidence seized in a search conducted during an 

illegal detention must be suppressed unless there is sufficient 

attenuation between the detention and the consent to search.'" 

Ward, 961 F.2d at 1534 (quoting United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 

956, 958 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 230 (1991)). 

Consent is valid only if it is voluntary in fact. Id. at 1534. 

The Supreme Court has de~ineated three factors to consider: (1) 

the closeness in time between the Fourth Amendment violation and 

the alleged voluntary act; (2) whether intervening circumstances 

1 Agent Small decided that Mr. Fusci was lying at this point 

since the roomette could have only been reserved 48 hours prior to 

departure. However, Agent Small was also aware that the ticket 

was purchased through a travel agent. Mr. Fusci could very well 

have made his reservations earlier and left the purchase up to the 

travel agent. We therefore do not find this question and response 

significant. 

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are present; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the law 

enforcement officials misconduct. Id. at 1534 (citing Brown v. 

Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-4 (1975)). 

Agent Small, with no discernible break after Mr. Fusci 

refused to consent to a search, then asked Mr. Fusci to consent to 

a dog sniff of his luggage. There were no intervening factors or 

break in time between the illegal seizure and Agent Small's 

request for Mr. Fusci's consent to the dog sniff. See id. 

Likewise, Agent Small's purpose in asking further questions was 

unchanged; he wanted to search Mr. Fusci's luggage and was not 

deterred by Mr. Fusci's first unequivocal refusal. Id. at 1535. 

Therefore, Mr. Fusci's consent to the dog sniff was tainted by the 

prior illegal seizure. 

Following our decisions in Ward and Bloom, and after 

carefully reviewing the facts and circumstances in this case, we 

REVERSE the district court's order denying Mr. Fusci's motion to 

suppress and VACATE Mr. Fusci's sentence. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

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