Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07029/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07029-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Grant Anderson
Appellant
District of Columbia
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided December 29, 1995

No. 95-7029

GRANT ANDERSON,

APPELLANT 

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(89cv02776)

ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE AND REVERSAL

Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Edward Eugene Schwab, Assistant

Corporation Counsel, were on the motion forsummary affirmance for appellee District of Columbia.

Grant Anderson, pro se, filed the motion for summary reversal.

Before BUCKLEY, GINSBURG, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: The question presented here is whether a notice of appeal is fatally defective

because it mistakenly stated that the appeal from an order of the district court was being taken to the

United States Supreme Court instead of to the United States Court of Appeals. We hold that it is

not.

I. BACKGROUND

Grant Anderson filed a civil action against the District of Columbia in which he alleged that

police officers used excessive force in arresting him. On July 24, 1992, the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia awarded summary judgment to the District of Columbia.

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Anderson timely filed a notice of appeal in the district court but improperly designated the United

States Supreme Court as the court to which the appeal was taken. After being advised of his error,

Anderson filed various motions in attempts to salvage his right of appeal. In one of them, he asked

the district court to "process" what he described as a timely appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4 ("Appeal as of Right"). While he conceded that his direct appeal to the

SupremeCourt wasimproper, he nevertheless asserted that the notice should be construed as a notice

of appeal to this court. In another motion, he asked the district court to grant him relief pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) ("Relief From Judgment or OrderMistakes; Inadvertence;

... etc.").

The first of his motions, the one invoking Rule 4, wasfiled on January 8, 1993, 137 days after

the time for filing an appeal had elapsed. The district court denied it as untimely. While it recognized

that Rule 4 allows a district court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a showing of

good cause or excusable neglect, the court noted that the motion must be filed no later than 30 days

after the time for noting an appeal has passed. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) & (5). In this case, more

than four months had elapsed. The court also determined that the pleading Anderson denoted as a

Rule 60(b) motion could not be construed as such because it had not been filed within one year after

entry of judgment, as required if the relief sought is due to "mistake"; nor had Anderson

demonstrated the "extraordinary circumstances" that would warrant relief in the case of a later-filed

motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) & (6).

II. DISCUSSION

Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

A notice of appealshall specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each

party in either the caption or the body of the notice of appeal.... A notice of appeal

must designate the judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from, and must name

the court to which the appeal istaken. An appeal will not be dismissed for informality

of form or title of the notice of appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to

appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.

Id. (emphasis added).

The "specificityrequirement" ofRule 3(c) isjurisdictional. Torres v. Oakland ScavengerCo.,

487 U.S. 312, 314 (1988). Several courts, however, have determined that a defective notice of

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appeal does not warrant dismissal where the intention to appeal to a certain court of appeals may be

inferred fromthe notice and where the defect has not materiallymisled the appellee. See, e.g., United

States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1301 (7th Cir. 1991); Graves v. General Insurance Corp., 381 F.2d

517, 519 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Blue, 350 F.2d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other

grounds, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); Trivette v. NewYork Life Insurance Co., 270 F.2d 198, 199-200 (6th

Cir. 1959).

Central to the specificity requirements of Rule 3(c) is the principle of fair notice to the

opposing party and to the court. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318. In Torres, the Supreme Court held that

the use of "et al." in the notice of appealrather than the name of each party filing the notice was fatal

to the unspecified parties' appeal because the court and opposing party were not on notice as to the

identity of the party taking the appeal. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court

acknowledged that the notice could contain the "functional equivalent" ofthe rules'requirements and

that " "mere technicalities' should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits." Id.

at 316. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that

if a litigant files papers in a fashion that is technically at variance with the letter of a

procedural rule, a court may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the

rule if the litigant's action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires. But

although a court may construe the Rules liberally in determining whether they have

been complied with, it may not waive the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and

4, even for "good cause shown" under Rule 2, if it finds that they have not been met.

Id. at 316-17 (citations omitted).

Like the notice of appeal at issue in Musa, Anderson's notice unambiguously informs the

opposing counsel and the district court that Anderson appeals the order entered on July 24, 1992.

This court, of course, is the only one to which Anderson may appeal. See Musa, 946 F.2d at 1301

(even though appellant designated the wrong court of appeals, because there was only one court to

which appellant could properly appeal, that court had jurisdiction). See also McLemore v. Landry,

898 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendant's failure to designate any circuit in the notice of appeal

not a bar to jurisdiction because the Fifth Circuit was the only court to which an appeal could be

taken). Thus, although Anderson named the wrong appellate court in his notice of appeal, because

it was obviousin which court his appeal properly lay, Anderson gave fair notice to the opposing party

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and the court.

The Government cites Donovan v. Richland County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 454 U.S.

389 (1982), to support its position that Anderson's failure to name the proper appellate court was

fatal. In Donovan, appellants were required by 28 U.S.C. § 1252 to file a direct appeal to the

Supreme Court from the district court's decision holding the Fair Labor Standards Act

unconstitutional. Instead, they appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals, which proceeded to

decide the matter. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court vacated the judgment and

opinion of the Court of Appeals because the latter lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the

district court. Id. at 389-90. The Supreme Court also noted that the time for filing a direct appeal

fromthe decision ofthe district court had passed, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2101(a), and declined to remand

the matter to the district court for entry of a new order from which a timely appeal might be taken.

Musa, however, is not inconsistent with Donovan. Musa and the cases which preceded

Donovan hold that when no party has been materially misled or prejudiced, a defective notice should

not compel dismissal of an appealfor lack ofjurisdiction. See, e.g., Musa, 946 F.2d at 1301; Graves,

381 F.2d at 519. Cf. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318. In Donovan, the entire process before the Court of

Appeals had been completed before the defect was discovered. Thus the appellees had been put to

the trouble and expense of two appeals by the appellants' mistake. That is not the case here.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the intention to appeal to this court may be inferred from Anderson's notice, and the

defect in the notice has not materiallymisled the appellee, the jurisdictionalrequirements ofRule 3(c)

have been met. Accordingly, the motion for summary reversal is granted, the district court's order

is vacated, and the case is remanded for entry of the notice of appeal.

It is so ordered.

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