Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04186/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04186-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gail Lewis
Respondent
Donald Eugene Radonich
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD EUGENE RADONICH,

Petitioner,

 vs.

GAIL LEWIS, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 02-4186 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California incarcerated at Pleasant Valley

State Prison, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On March 21, 2003, this Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the writ should

not issue (docket no. 8). On August 28, 2003, Respondent filed an answer to the petition

(docket no. 11). On September 29, 2003, Petitioner filed the traverse (docket no. 16). 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 20, 1998, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Marin County Superior

Court of possession of ephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and

receiving stolen property. (Clerk Tr. 462.) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court

also found that Petitioner suffered a prior assault conviction alleged as a “strike” under

California Penal Code section 1170.12, and a prior conviction for possession of drugs for

sale alleged as a three-year enhancement under California Penal Code section

11370.2(b). (Clerk Tr. 462.) On December 21, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced to sixteen
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years and four months in state prison. (Clerk Tr. 592.) Petitioner appealed his

conviction. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction on

April 12, 2002, and the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review

on June 19, 2002. On September 3, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in this Court. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying the charged offenses, as found by the Court of Appeal of the

State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, are summarized as follows:

On February 17, 1998, the police stopped Radonich’s car for speeding. 

After learning Radonich was on probation with search conditions, the police

searched the car. On the floor behind the driver’s seat, the police found an opaque

plastic Sears shopping bag. The bag contained a clear zip-lock baggie of white

crystalline powder weighing two pounds. The powder was later identified as

containing ephedrine, a substance used to manufacture methamphetamine. The

police were not able to identify any fingerprints on the bags. Inside the car trunk,

the police found a bottle of isopropyl alcohol, which is sometimes used in the

manufacture of methamphetamine.

The police also found a stolen credit card in Radonich’s wallet. This credit

card belonged to the former owners of a house in Santa Cruz, then occupied by

Radonich’s acquaintances. One week before Radonich’s arrest, the police had

arrested one of Radonich’s acquaintances and searched the Santa Cruz house. 

The police found evidence that methamphetamine was being manufactured there,

including bottles of methamphetamine, glassware, and two large half pound bags

of white powder containing ephedrine, similar to the bag and substance found in

Radonich’s car. The police also found an address book listing Radonich’s name

next to a telephone number, but they found no evidence of Radonich’s

fingerprints at the house.

A Department of Justice witness with extensive training in investigating

methamphetamine laboratories testified that in his experience, there was no

legitimate use for the ephedrine in the form and weight found in Radonich’s car,

and there was no record that Radonich had the required state permit to possess

ephedrine, a controlled substance. The witness further testified that given the

state regulations regarding ephedrine and the weight of the substance found in

Radonich’s car, the ephedrine was possessed with the intent to manufacture

methamphetamine. The People also presented evidence regarding Radonich’s

history of using methamphetamine and possessing drug paraphernalia and

methamphetamine for sale.

Rebecca Schrank, the registered owner of the car, testified for the defense. 

She admitted that she was a past drug user, having once been arrested for

possession of methamphetamine, and that she had been convicted of credit card

fraud and burglary. Schrank claimed that her boyfriend had purchased the car and

she did not know the car had been registered in her name. When she found out

the car had been registered in her name, she told her boyfriend that she did not

want the car in her name, that it was illegal, and that she did not want any part of
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it. Schrank’s boyfriend told her he was going to remove her name, and that the

car had been sold to Radonich. Schrank subsequently saw Radonich driving the

car, and she believed that Radonich had the car for about three weeks. She did not

know that the car was still registered in her name until the police notified her that

the car had been impounded after Radonich’s arrest. At the time Schrank’s

boyfriend purchased the car he used drugs, but Schrank had never seen him in

possession of ephedrine.

(Resp. Exh. 6) (People v. Radonich, No. A085623, slip op. at 1-2 (Cal. Ct. App., April

12, 2002)).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d).

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413

(2000). Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Id. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: "A state court's decision can

involve an 'unreasonable application' of federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the

governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively

unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a
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new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable." Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d

1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-07), overruled in part on

other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S.

433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state court’s application of governing federal

law must be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent

to “incorrect” application of law). 

In deciding whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the

highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a reasoned decision.

LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives

no reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no

reasoned lower court decision on the claim, there is a somewhat different standard of

review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In

such a case, a review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the state court's

decision was objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002); Bailey v. Newland,

263 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000). If the state court only considered state law, the federal court must ask whether

state law, as explained by the state court, is “contrary to” clearly established governing

federal law. See Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001).
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DISCUSSION

I. Evidence of Acquaintance’s Arrest

In his first claim for relief, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by

admitting evidence of the arrest in Santa Cruz of his acquaintance, Kelly Moriarty, for

manufacturing methamphetamine. Petitioner contends that this error in admitting the

evidence was prejudicial. This claim does not warrant habeas relief.

A. Legal Standard

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a

specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the

result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v.

Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). Failure to comply with state rules of evidence is

neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief on due process

grounds. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th

Cir. 1991). While adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was

conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is certainly possible to have a fair trial even

when state standards are violated; conversely, state procedural and evidentiary rules may

countenance processes that do not comport with fundamental fairness. See Jammal, 926

F.2d at 919 (citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 838 (1984)). Juries are presumed to follow a court's limiting instructions with

respect to the purposes for which evidence is admitted, except in extreme situations in

which curative instructions will not neutralize the prejudice when evidence is improperly

admitted. Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of

evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley, 784 F.2d at 990. In
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order to obtain habeas relief on the basis of an evidentiary error, Petitioner must show

that the error was one of constitutional dimension and that it was not harmless under

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). He would have to show that the error had

“‘substantial and injurious effect’ on the verdict.” Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623).

B. Analysis

This Court looks to the analysis of the Court of Appeal in evaluating Petitioner’s

claim. LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669 n.7. The Court of Appeal found that “[a]t trial, the

People sought a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the evidence [of the

methamphetamine operation at Moriarty’s home], arguing that such evidence was

relevant to prove Radonich’s knowledge, intent and motive, and to rebut his proposed

defense that he did not know the ephedrine was in the car, which was registered to a

convicted drug user, and that even if he possessed the ephedrine, he did not know the

nature of the substance and he did not intend to manufacture methamphetamine. Over

Radonich’s objections that such evidence was irrelevant and its admission would be

unduly prejudicial and time-consuming, the trial court ruled the proposed evidence was

admissible to show Radonich’s ‘knowledge or motive or both and that the probative

value in view of the other evidence in the case, vastly outweighed any prejudice.’

Additionally, because of the proposed defense, the trial court believed ‘it would be

entirely unjust and unfair to preclude the prosecutor from demonstrating some of

Radonich’s history with methamphetamine and ephedrine, which is used in the

manufacturing of methamphetamine.’” (April 12, 2002 slip op. at 3.) 

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s ruling of admissibility, finding that

the evidence of a methamphetamine operation at Moriarty’s home was not admitted to

show Petitioner’s guilt by association, but to prove his knowing possession and intent. 

Id. at 4-5. The Court of Appeal also held that “the trial court could properly find that the
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probative value of the challenged evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect,” and that it

was the province of the jury to consider whether the evidence tended to establish a

motive for Petitioner’s possession of the ephedrine, or that he knowingly possessed the

ephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine.

The Court of Appeal also rejected Petitioner’s due process claim on appeal that

the evidence of a methamphetamine operation at the Santa Cruz home might have caused

the jurors to find him guilty by association. The Court of Appeal found that the trial

court gave the jury a limiting instruction that the evidence “‘has collateral relevance here. 

Nobody is accusing the defendant of maintaining a lab at that location. This evidence

has some possible relevance, depending upon what you think of it ultimately, on the

subjects such as knowledge or intent.’” (April 12, 2002 slip op. at 5-6.) See Rep. Tr.

270. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court gave the jury similar limiting

instructions on the evidence of other crimes Petitioner may have committed. (April 12,

2002 slip op. at 6.) See Rep. Tr. 484. 

As the Court of Appeal found, the challenged evidence was relevant to the issues

of knowledge and intent and did not render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny

Petitioner due process of law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70-75 (1991) (due

process rights not violated by admission of relevant evidence or limiting jury

instruction). Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s admission of the evidence of

methamphetamine production found at Moriarty’s arrest was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or that the

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003). Petitioner’s claim is therefore denied.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his second claim for relief, Petitioner contends that he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to
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object to the trial court proceeding without a jury on the allegation of his prior drug

conviction, which was alleged as a three-year enhancement under section 11370.2(b) of

the California Penal Code. This claim also fails to state a basis for habeas relief.

A. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of

the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but

effective assistance, of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 

The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial

cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id. The right to effective

assistance counsel applies to the performance of both retained and appointed counsel

without distinction. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980).

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim,

Petitioner must establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel's performance

was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

B. Analysis

Petitioner has demonstrated deficiency in trial counsel’s failure to request a jury

trial or verify whether Petitioner waived his statutory right to a jury trial on the

enhancement allegation of his prior drug conviction, meeting the first prong under

Strickland. However, Petitioner does not meet the second prong under Strickland, which

requires a showing that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.
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The California Court of Appeal, the last state court to issue a reasoned decision in

this case, found that “the record shows that before trial, the court obtained Radonich’s

waiver of a jury trial on the prior serious felony conviction, but failed to obtain a jury

trial waiver regarding the prior felony drug conviction. However, Radonich failed to

object to the discharge of the jury after they rendered their verdict on the substantive

offenses. Subsequently, the trial court, defense counsel and prosecutor each stated they

could not recall whether Radonich had waived his right to a jury trial on the prior felony

drug conviction.” (April 12, 2002 slip op. at 6-7.) See Rep. Tr. 514-22. After some

discussion about determining whether Petitioner’s pretrial waiver of a jury trial on the

prior assault conviction also covered the prior drug conviction, the trial court found both

prior conviction allegations true “subject to our review of the record to make sure that”

Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on the prior drug conviction. (Rep. Tr. 522.) 

The Court of Appeal found that “[a]t no time thereafter did defense counsel seek

confirmation from the trial court that Radonich had waived his right to a jury trial. Nor

did defense counsel request a jury trial on the prior felony drug conviction in any posttrial motions or subsequent court proceedings.” (April 12, 2002 slip op. at 7.) 

The Court of Appeal held that Petitioner failed to preserve the issue for appeal,

but considered the substantive claim “in order to forestall any claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel.” Id. Although Petitioner did not present his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, Respondent concedes that the claim is

exhausted. (Mem. P&A in Supp. Of Answer, 2.) The Court will proceed in denying

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim notwithstanding the apparent failure to exhaust

remedies in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

The Court of Appeal applied a harmless error analysis, under People v. Watson,

46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (1956), to the trial court’s failure to obtain Petitioner’s waiver of a

jury trial on the prior drug conviction allegation, and held that Petitioner made no
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showing “that it is ‘reasonably probable’ that a result more favorable to him would have

been reached if a jury had resolved the issue of whether he had a prior felony drug

conviction.” (April 12, 2002 slip op. at 7.) The Court of Appeal found that “the People

submitted certified documents of a 1996 felony conviction for possession of

methamphetamine for sale, which were sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that

Radonich had a prior felony drug conviction.” Id. See Clerk Tr. 178-236. The Court of

Appeal reasonably concluded that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the denial of a jury

trial on the sentencing enhancement allegation for his prior drug conviction. Petitioner

has not demonstrated a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim for

ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment for Respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2005

 

 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge