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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Darius Monterro Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10639

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DARIUS MONTERRO WILLIAMS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00401-LCB-GMB-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10639

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Darius Williams argues for the first time on appeal that the 

district court plainly erred in failing to orally pronounce the 

standard conditions of supervised release at sentencing.1 After 

review, we affirm. 

I. Background

Williams pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea 

agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 

1 Williams also lists as an issue in his counseled brief “whether the guilty plea 

was made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences.” 

However, he provides no argument that the plea was not knowingly and 

voluntarily made. Instead, he appears to concede that the plea was knowingly 

and voluntarily made by recounting the procedural history of his case and 

stating that:

A careful review of the district court proceedings reflect 

compliance that the Appellant was fully competent and 

capable of entering an informed plea; he was aware of the 

nature of the charge and the consequences of entering a plea 

of guilty; that he was knowingly and voluntarily entering that 

plea; and such plea was supported by an independent basis in 

fact which contained each of the essential elements of the 

offense.

Accordingly, we conclude that he has abandoned any challenge to the 

knowing and voluntary nature of his plea, and we do not address this issue 

further. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872–73 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. 

denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). 

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24-10639 Opinion of the Court 3

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).2 As part of the plea, 

the government agreed to a binding, stipulated sentence of 180 

months’ imprisonment followed by a period of supervised release 

“to be determined by the [c]ourt, subject to the [c]ourt’s standard 

conditions of supervised release” and any special conditions 

determined by the court.3 

At sentencing, the district court explained that Williams’s 

plea agreement called for a specific sentence, and the court 

concluded that the specified sentence satisfied the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. The district court then sentenced 

Williams to 180 months’ imprisonment per the stipulation in the 

plea agreement to be followed by 5 years’ supervised release. The 

district court explained that “while on supervised release, 

[Williams] shall comply with the standard conditions of supervised 

release of record in this court.” Additionally, the district court 

imposed six special conditions of supervised release and reviewed 

each of the special conditions with Williams. Williams did not raise 

any objections at sentencing. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion 

2 As part of the plea agreement, Williams stipulated to the fact that he had four 

prior Alabama robbery convictions that qualified as violent felonies for 

purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. 

3 The plea agreement also contained a sentence-appeal waiver, but the 

government expressly declines to invoke the waiver in this case. Because the 

government does not seek to invoke the waiver, we do not address Williams’s 

arguments concerning the validity of the appeal waiver. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10639

Williams argues that the district court plainly erred in failing 

to orally pronounce each of the standard discretionary conditions 

of supervised release at sentencing. 

“We [generally] review the terms of . . . supervised release 

for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1304 

(11th Cir. 2006). “When a defendant fails to object at sentencing to 

the conditions of supervised release, we ordinarily review for plain 

error.” United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832, 838 (11th Cir. 2024).

Under plain-error review, “[a]n appellate court may not correct an 

error the defendant failed to raise in the district court unless there 

is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.”

United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2023). “If 

all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise 

its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

Section 3583 of Title 18 of the United States Code imposes 

several mandatory conditions of supervised release and provides 

that the court may order further conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for thirteen standard 

conditions that are generally recommended.4 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c), 

4 The standard conditions in the sentencing guidelines include that the 

defendant report to the probation office within 72 hours of his release from 

prison; “report to the probation officer as instructed” and answer the officer’s 

questions truthfully; not leave his district of residence without permission 

from the probation officer or the court; reside at a location approved by the 

probation officer and notify the probation officer in advance of any change in 

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24-10639 Opinion of the Court 5

(d). The Northern District of Alabama has adopted these same 

mandatory and standard conditions, and all conditions appear in a 

published general order and are also listed on the court’s website. 

See United States District Court, N.D. Ala., General Order Regarding 

Conditions of Probation and Supervised Release (March 2018),

https://perma.cc/VL2P-KET6; see also Conditions of Supervision,

https://www.alnp.uscourts.gov/conditions-supervision 

[https://perma.cc/8W47-7KCD]. 

“[A] district court must pronounce at the defendant’s 

sentencing hearing any discretionary conditions of supervised 

release—that is, any condition of supervised release other than 

those mandatory conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).” 

Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1246. The failure of the district court to do 

so violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process. 

Id. at 1247–48. However, this requirement does not require the 

district court to orally pronounce each and every individual 

discretionary condition. Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838. Rather, the 

residence; allow the probation officer to visit and inspect his residence; work 

full time; refrain from associating with other convicted felons or anyone 

engaged in criminal activity; notify the probation officer if the defendant is 

arrested or questioned by police; refrain from possessing or having access to 

guns and ammunition and other dangerous weapons; not agree to act, or 

otherwise act, as a confidential source to law enforcement without permission 

of the court; as determined by the probation officer, notify certain persons or 

organizations that the defendant poses a risk to another; and follow the 

probation officer’s instructions related to supervision conditions. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 5D1.3(c). 

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10639

“district court may easily satisfy this requirement by referencing a 

written list of supervised release conditions,” such as a standing 

administrative order. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1246; see also Hayden, 

119 F.4th at 838 (“A reference to a written list of conditions is 

enough to afford a defendant the opportunity to challenge the 

conditions of supervised release, which is all that due process 

requires.”). 

Here, the district court stated at sentencing that Williams 

would be required to “comply with the standard conditions of 

supervised release of record in this court.” Williams did not object 

to the district court’s failure to describe each of the standard 

conditions. Therefore, “we review his [due process] challenge for 

plain error.” Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838.

We conclude that no error, much less plain error occurred. 

Contrary to Williams’s argument, the district court was not 

required to orally pronounce each individual standard condition. 

Id. Rather, the district court complied with the oral 

pronouncement requirement when it referenced expressly “the 

standard conditions of supervised release of record in this court.” 

Id. This pronouncement provided Williams with notice that the 

court was imposing the standard conditions as adopted by the 

Northern District of Alabama, and at that point, Williams had an 

opportunity to object to those conditions or seek clarification as to 

the nature of each individual condition, but he failed to do so. Id. 

(“A reference to a written list of conditions is enough to afford a 

defendant the opportunity to challenge the conditions of 

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24-10639 Opinion of the Court 7

supervised release, which is all that due process requires.”); 

Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1246 (“By referencing at sentencing a written 

list, the court affords any defendant who is unfamiliar with the 

conditions the opportunity to inquire about and challenge them.”). 

The district court then included those same conditions in 

Williams’s written judgment. Accordingly, there was no due 

process violation. 

AFFIRMED.

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