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Sealed Case

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 2001 Decided April 24, 2001

No. 00-3057

In re: Sealed Case

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cr00196-01)

Gregory L. Poe, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Marc O. Litt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis, U.S.

Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, and Mary T.

O'Connor, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Williams, Ginsburg and Sentelle, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

Williams, Circuit Judge: Appellant pleaded guilty to one

count of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18

U.S.C. s 922(g)(1) and one count of unlawful possession of

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cocaine in violation of 33 D.C. Code s 33-541. The presentence investigation report found that appellant had threatened to shoot someone with the firearm, a separate felony

that under s 2K2.1(b)(5) of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines calls for a 4-level enhancement of the sentence for

gun possession. Appellant objected, and the district court

took evidence, including some hearsay testimony. On finding

by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant had indeed

made such a threat, the district court applied the enhancement and sentenced appellant accordingly.

Appellant challenges the court's reliance on the hearsay.

He also objects to the use of the preponderance standard,

contending that the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), requires the

government to prove the gun threat beyond a reasonable

doubt. (He makes no claim of entitlement to jury trial on the

gun threat.) Neither of appellant's claims prevails. We

address the Apprendi theory first.

* * *

Apprendi had pleaded guilty to a gun possession charge

carrying a sentence of 5-to-10 years. At sentencing, the trial

court found by a preponderance that he had committed the

crime with a racially biased purpose, a finding that under

New Jersey law allowed a 10-to-20 year sentence for the

underlying crime. The court imposed a 12-year sentence.

In vacating the sentence, the Supreme Court held that any

fact (other than a prior conviction) "that increases the penalty

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt." Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added).

In the present case, appellant's sentence, with the enhancement, was 48 months, far less than the 10-year statutory

maximum for the gun possession charge. 18 U.S.C.

s 924(a)(2). Thus appellant can win on his Apprendi claim

only if Apprendi also applies to a Guidelines enhancement

that results in a sentence within the statutory range. Because appellant failed to raise this issue at sentencing, we

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review for plain error, United States v. Foster, 988 F.2d 206,

209 (D.C. Cir. 1993); in fact there is no error at all.

Clearly Apprendi does not articulate a rule that takes the

step proposed by appellant. In addition, the Apprendi Court

specifically distinguished, and found permissible, the practice

of authorizing "judges to exercise discretion--taking into

consideration various factors relating both to offense and

offender--in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute." 120 S. Ct. at 2358 (citing Williams v.

New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)). See also id. at 2366 n.21

(stating that the Court took no position on the effect of the

decision on the Guidelines, but quoting the observation in

Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998), that

"petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims would make a

difference if it were possible to argue, say, that the sentences

imposed exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit.").

The opinion stressed that the Court had "often noted" that

judges had exercised this discretion "within statutory limits."

Id. at 2358. In fact, the Court recently approved enhancements based on acquitted conduct when supported by a

preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Watts,

519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997). Given this traditional latitude, and

the Apprendi Court's explicit endorsement of the tradition, it

is hard to see how the Court could have intended to mandate

the heightened standard for application of the Guidelines'

enhancement instructions when the resulting sentence remains within the statutory maximum. Reading the Apprendi

rule to avoid such a result is consistent with the Court's

statement that the case addressed a "narrow issue." Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2354.

Appellant seeks support in the fact that the Court has

granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded ("GVR'd") a Guidelines case for further consideration in light of Apprendi. See

Clinton v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000), remanding

United States v. Reliford, 210 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2000). At

best a GVR order could add little to appellant's case. While

it may indicate "a reasonable probability that the decision

below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject

if given the opportunity for further consideration," Lawrence

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v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996), it does "not amount to a

final determination on the merits," Henry v. City of Rock

Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777 (1964). But appellant's attempted

inference is even weaker here. The GVR'd case involved not

only Guidelines enhancements but also the application of a

statutory progression of minimum and maximum sentences

under 21 U.S.C. s 841 (providing for increasing penalties for

different quantities and types of drugs). Facts that trigger

the higher statutory maxima provided in s 841 are clearly

subject to Apprendi, as we found in United States v. Fields,

242 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Solicitor General supported a grant of certiorari in Clinton only for the statutory

penalty issues, but the Court issued the GVR order without

making the distinction. App. Br. at 22-23. As weak as

inferences from a GVR may be, an inference from the Court's

failure to sever some issues from the remand is feebler yet.

We give it no weight.

The Apprendi dissenters, to be sure, attacked the line

drawn by the majority as "meaningless formalism," 120 S. Ct.

at 2388-90, and appellant argues in essence that their reading

reveals that the logic of Apprendi will ultimately compel the

Court to apply the case to Guidelines enhancements. App.

Br. at 21-22. The Apprendi dissent suggested that the

majority's stated rule would allow a legislature to set astronomic statutory ceilings for crimes, and then direct the courts

to make adjustments in accordance with facts determined

solely by the judge. 120 S. Ct. at 2389. But the majority

responded that "structural democratic constraints exist to

discourage legislatures from enacting penal statutes that

expose every defendant ... to a maximum sentence exceeding that which is, in the legislature's judgment, generally

proportional to the crime." Id. at 2363 n.16. It is clearly not

for us to disregard a conceptual line that the Court majority

has not only stated but also stoutly defended against a

dissenting challenge.

We therefore join all of our sister circuits that have addressed the issue in declining to extend Apprendi beyond its

stated coverage. See United States v. Caba, 241 F.3d 98, 101

(1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 184 (2d

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Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 862-63

(3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 198-201

(4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 786-87

(5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410, 413-14

(6th Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. United States, 226 F.3d 839,

841 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220

F.3d 926, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 2000);

United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1235-36 (10th Cir.

2001); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829 (11th Cir.

2000).

* * *

The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a sentencing judge

may use relevant information to resolve a dispute over a

factor without regard to admissibility at trial, "provided that

the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support

its probable accuracy." U.S.S.G. s 6A1.3 (2000). The evidence supporting the finding of a gun threat was clearly

hearsay that would not have been admissible at trial. Officer

Spalding of the Metropolitan Police Department gave testimony that included reports of statements made to him by the

complainant and a friend of hers, and (double hearsay) statements made by the complainant to another police officer

(Sergeant White) and relayed to Spalding. Appellant asserts

that the crediting of hearsay testimony delivered by Officer

Spalding violates both s 6A1.3 and appellant's due process

rights under United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447

(1972), which holds that a sentence founded on "misinformation of constitutional magnitude" may not be sustained. We

have recently held that use of hearsay at sentencing does not

per se violate a defendant's rights. See United States v.

Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2000). As we cannot

imagine how hearsay with "sufficient indicia of reliability to

support its probable accuracy" could violate Tucker's due

process standard, our analyses of the due process and Guidelines arguments merge for the purposes of this appeal.

Appellant argues that we should review the reliability

determination de novo. In support he cites Ornelas v. United

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States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996), prescribing such review for

district court findings of reasonable suspicion or probable

cause, and the plurality opinion in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S.

116, 136 (1999), requiring de novo review to resolve whether

hearsay received in a criminal trial had the "particularized

guarantees of trustworthiness" that are required under the

Confrontation Clause for hearsay not meeting any recognized

exception, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The

government argues for an abuse of discretion standard, on

the ground that the issue is basically an evidentiary ruling in

a phase of the proceeding where the judge exercises broad

discretion. We need not decide this dispute, because even

under de novo review we find that the hearsay testimony has

sufficient indicia of reliability.

Spalding testified that he responded to a radio run for a

man with a gun at an apartment in Southeast Washington.

Spalding went to the apartment and found appellant and his

sister. Appellant "appeared distraught." Spalding asked if

"there was a weapon in this apartment that needs to be

removed," and appellant directed him to the back bedroom

where another officer, White, found a 12-gauge shotgun. See

Transcript of Sentencing, May 9, 2000 ("Tr.") at 14-16. After

the gun was secured, Spalding interviewed those present in

the apartment while White interviewed people on the street,

including the complainant. See id. at 16-17. Spalding conducted follow-up interviews with the complainant and, at her

suggestion, a friend of hers who was also present during the

incident but who was not interviewed at the time. See id. at

20. The friend's story was consistent with the complainant's

in all relevant respects. At the sentencing hearing Spalding

offered the statements made to him and to White.

It appears agreed that appellant was acquainted with the

complainant and that she took offense when he made a lewd

comment about her from the apartment window as she passed

by on the street. It is further agreed that appellant went

down to the front of the building to intercept her, and an

argument ensued. Here the agreement ends. According to

the complainant's version as reported by Spalding, she made

some (possibly threatening) reference to her boyfriend, and

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appellant responded that "he would take care of her, or he

would take care of them." Id. at 18. Appellant retreated

into the building, while complainant remained at the locked

front door to the building. See id. Appellant then returned

carrying something in his right hand. See id. When complainant recognized the item as a gun, she began to flee but

then changed her mind. See id. at 19. As she returned

toward the building, her friend stepped between her and the

door. See id. at 19-20. Appellant reportedly told complainant's friend "to move out of the way, because he did not want

to shoot her." Id. at 20, 21-22. Complainant understood

herself to be the intended target. See id. at 20.

To establish reliability the government notes that complainant presented her version of the facts on the night of the

incident, maintained it consistently in more than one later

interview, and testified to it before the grand jury under oath.

(The grand jury testimony was not admitted into evidence but

government counsel proffered that she had read it and that it

was consistent with the accounts by Spalding except as to the

exact words of the appellant's threat. Gov't Br. at 20-21

n.15.) See United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 910, 914-15

(1st Cir. 1993) (crediting hearsay declarant who had previously presented story under oath and therefore subjected to

perjury); United States v. Corvin, 998 F.2d 1377, 1386 (7th

Cir. 1993) (crediting hearsay based in part on fact that

declarant gave statement to police at the scene "without

opportunity for reflection" and maintained a consistent version).

Appellant tries to turn the complainant's self-consistency

around, saying that she had an "obvious incentive to hold

fast" once she had told her story. See App. Br. at 25.

Perhaps so, but self-consistency, in accounts given virtually in

the heat of the event and later with a clear exposure to

perjury, must still count as a plus. Appellant further argues

that complainant's self-corroboration is insufficient because

her grand jury testimony differed from the earlier interviews.

But all we know is that there was a minor difference in her

report of the wording of the threat. This alone is not enough

to undermine credibility. Finally, appellant notes that comUSCA Case #00-3057 Document #591716 Filed: 04/24/2001 Page 7 of 9
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plainant failed in the first instance to reveal a past sexual

relationship between them that might have created bias. But

the testimony of co-conspirators and informers is often credited if other indicia of reliability are present, despite the fact

that they may be perceived as interested parties. See United

States v. Golden, 17 F.3d 735, 736 (5th Cir. 1994) ("This court

has previously concluded that information provided by an

'interested adverse witness' was sufficiently reliable."); United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 403 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[A] coconspirator's prior inconsistent statement, brought out during

his testimony at the sentencing hearing, was sufficiently

reliable, when considered along with the other corroborating

circumstances present.") (citing United States v. Sciarrino,

884 F.2d 95, 97 (3rd Cir. 1989)).

The government points to other indicia of reliability besides

self-consistency. First, appellant's own sister, testifying on

his behalf, gave testimony consistent with the complainant's

account at least up to the point of appellant's retreat into the

building. She also acknowledged, on listening to a tape of a

911 call placed from the apartment, that appellant can be

heard screaming, "[W]here is the gun?", that he was "pretty

angry at this point," and that another woman at the scene

was repeatedly yelling at appellant "to get into the house."

Tr. at 75-78. That appellant was actively in search of the

gun during the confrontation supports the likelihood of his

using it to make a threat, and the would-be pacifier's shouts

suggest that she at least saw a risk of violence. Finally, the

account of complainant's friend matched hers in all serious

respects. Although there is no non-hearsay witness precisely

confirming the threat, appellant has not pointed us to any

case that would demand it. And it would make little sense

for this court to make such a demand, especially in the

context of judicial sentencing, as then the hearsay would be

largely unnecessary to the court's finding.

Appellant takes several shots at the corroborating data, but

most of his critiques show no more than that each item taken

alone falls short of independently establishing the threats.

Beyond that, he observes that the district court gave no

weight to the claim by another sister of appellant, who was

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not present during the incident, that complainant had been

drinking and smoking marijuana laced with PCP earlier in

the day. See id. at 53-54. But the district court noted the

testimony, expressed grave doubt as to its credibility, and

said that even if true it was of little relevance, as there was no

doubt of her ability to identify appellant correctly. See id. at

95-96.

Appellant also argues that the district court erred in discrediting the sister who was present. The court observed

that it "was perfectly clear that her desire to protect her

brother outweighed her desire, if any, to tell the truth." Id.

at 95. The decision to disbelieve this direct witness, though

affecting the court's ultimate assessment of the hearsay, was

a garden-variety credibility issue that we could reverse only

for clear error. We find none. The sister's testimony was

jumbled and inconsistent and included retractions. Further,

Spalding testified that neither sister had been forthcoming on

the night of the incident and that both seemed committed to

consulting with each other before talking with the police. We

therefore find that the hearsay has substantial indicia of

reliability and that appellant has failed to undermine our

confidence in this assessment.

Finally, appellant claims for the first time on appeal that

s 6A1.3(b) of the Guidelines and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1)

(which s 6A1.3(b) makes applicable to resolution of disputed

sentencing factors) required specific written findings relating

to the reliability and credibility of the hearsay declarants.

But we have long and consistently held that one who fails to

object to the absence of Rule 32(c)(1) findings waives his right

to challenge an enhancement on these grounds and that we

will uphold an enhancement supported by the record. See,

e.g., United States v. Sobin, 56 F.3d 1423, 1428 (D.C. Cir.

1995). In any event, because here we have reviewed the

issue de novo, any error would appear harmless.

The judgment of conviction and sentence are

Affirmed.

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