Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-01607/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-01607-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barrow Neurological Institute
Defendant
Dignity Health
Defendant
Emmitt Thompson
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Emmitt Thompson,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Dignity Health,

Defendant.

No. CV-17-01607-PHX-ROS

ORDER 

Plaintiff Emmitt Thompson (“Dr. Thompson”) was a second-year medical resident 

at Barrow Neurological Institute (“BNI”).1 BNI did not renew Dr. Thompson’s contract 

for his third year of residency. Dr. Thompson sued BNI for race discrimination, 

defamation, and breach of contract. (Doc. 29.) The Court granted BNI summary judgment 

on all counts. (Doc. 100.) BNI requested taxable costs, and the Clerk of Court entered a 

taxation judgment against Dr. Thompson in the amount of $8,362.22. (Docs. 104, 113.) 

BNI now moves for attorneys’ fees of $93,401.67 and related non-taxable costs of 

$14,439.28, and Dr. Thompson moves for review of the Clerk’s taxation judgment. (Docs. 

110, 115.) BNI’s motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Dr. Thompson’s motion 

is denied.

I. BNI’s Motion For Attorneys’ Fees

BNI moves for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and related non-taxable 

 

1 Defendant Dignity Health is a California corporation registered and doing business in 

Maricopa County, Arizona as Barrow Neurological Institute. (Doc. 29 at 2.) The Court 

will refer to Defendant as BNI to ensure consistency with the Court’s order granting 

summary judgment. (Doc. 100.)

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 1 of 10
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

expenses, requesting a total of $93,401.67 in attorneys’ fees ($88,979.17 for defending the 

action and $4,422.50 for preparing the motion) and $14,439.28 in non-taxable expenses. 

(Doc. 110 at 9.) Dr. Thompson objects, arguing that BNI’s requested attorneys’ fees are 

for work that was related to his civil rights claim, and therefore may not be awarded. (Doc. 

116 at 2.) Dr. Thompson argues, in the alternative, that BNI is entitled only to $4,442.502

in attorneys’ fees for work performed exclusively in defense of the contract claim. (Doc. 

116 at 4.) Dr. Thompson also challenges the non-taxable costs and the award of fees for 

work related to preparing the motion seeking fees. (Doc. 116 at 14–17.)

A. Arizona’s Contract Fee Award Statute

In Arizona, attorney fees may be awarded in “any contested action arising out of a 

contract, express or implied.” A.R.S. § 12-341.01. However, where contract claims are 

intertwined with nonfrivolous federal civil rights claims, as here, “the pro-rata allocation 

of general fees between claims for which a fee award is appropriate and claims for which 

such an award is not appropriate, based solely on the number of claims, is impermissible, 

for reasons that go to the heart of our civil rights policy.” Harris v. Maricopa Cty. Superior 

Court, 631 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2011). Because Dr. Thompson’s civil rights claims were 

not “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 

Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978), as BNI has implicitly 

conceded, BNI’s requested fee award of “one-third of its fees incurred in this action, as the

contract claim was one of three claims in the case,” is not allowed. (Doc. 110 at 5.)

The Ninth Circuit has clearly held that because “under Arizona law it is 

impermissible to require a plaintiff to pay fees that a prevailing defendant incurred in whole 

or in part defending against nonfrivolous civil rights claims,” “the only fees that may be 

attributed to [a plaintiff’s] contract[] claims for purposes of § 12.341.01(A) are those that 

the defendants are able to demonstrate would not have been incurred but for the inclusion 

of those claims in the complaint.” Harris, 631 F.3d at 972–73. Each time entry a prevailing 

defendant seeks a fee award for must be exclusively for work performed “in order to 

 

2 Dr. Thompson later refers to “the $3,727.50 award that Dignity Health could be eligible 

for,” but does not indicate the source for this lower number. (Doc. 116 at 7.)

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 2 of 10
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

provide a defense against claims for which fees are permissible.” Id. at 973.

The Court follows the Ninth Circuit’s guidance that in a mixed civil rights and 

contract case such as the present case, “under Arizona law [the Court must] include only 

fees for legal work that was not performed in whole or in part in order to defend against 

the nonfrivolous civil rights claims.” Id. at 975.

B. Time Spent Exclusively On Contract Matters

Accordingly, the Court turns to the eighteen individual time entries the parties have 

identified as relating to the contract claim to determine the award for which BNI is eligible.

1. August 8, 2017: .7 hours, fee $175. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 

4.)

2. August 21, 2017: .4 hours, fee $100. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 

5.)

3. January 9, 2018: .4 hours, fee $120, for “Correspondence with C. Schusse and 

S. Muley regarding meeting with plaintiff about appeal.” (Doc. 111-1 at 11.) The 

Court accepts BNI’s explanation that the factual investigation of the May 31, 

2016 and June 6, 2016 meetings related to the contract claim and not the civil 

rights claims, and this $120 fee is therefore permissible. (Doc. 117 at 3 n.1.)

4. January 29, 2018: 1.6 hours, fee $400, to “Review and analyze audio recordings 

regarding May and June 2016 meetings with Thompson for purposes of 

modifying case memorandum.” (Doc. 111-1 at 13.) Because the Court accepts 

BNI’s explanation that the factual investigation of the May and June 2016 

meetings related to the contract claim and not the civil rights claims, this $400 

fee is permissible.

5. January 29, 2018: 1.3 hours, fee $325. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 

at 5.)

6. January 30, 2018: 2.1 hours, fee $525, to “Begin draft of case update to client 

by analyzing strengths of Plaintiff’s discrimination and breach of contract 

claims.” (Doc. 111-1 at 14.) This fee is for legal work that was performed in part 

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 3 of 10
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to defend against non-frivolous civil rights claims. No fees are awarded.

7. March 27, 2018: 2.7 hours, fee $675. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 

5.)

8. April 4, 2018: .4 hours, fee $120. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 5.)

9. May 31, 2018: .4 hours, fee $120, for “Correspondence with S. Muley, C. 

Schusse, and A. Chowdhury-Johnson regarding calendar records to show 

meeting with plaintiff.” (Doc. 111-1 at 36.) Because the Court accepts BNI’s 

explanation that the factual investigation of the May and June 2016 meetings 

related to the contract claim and not the civil rights claims, this $120 fee is 

permissible.

10.June 4, 2018: .8 hours, fee $240. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 5.)

11.June 20, 2018: .6 hours, fee $180. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 5.)

12.June 22, 2018: .7 hours, fee $175. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 5.)

13.June 22, 2018: 1.1 hours, fee $275, to “Analyze case law regarding plaintiff’s 

breach of contract claims in preparation of motion for summary judgment.” 

(Doc. 111-1 at 38.) This $275 fee is permissible because it relates exclusively to 

the contract claim.

14.June 22, 2018: 3.7 hours, fee $925. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 

5.)

15.June 23, 2018: 1.6 hours, fee $400. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 

5.)

16.June 26, 2018: .3 hours, fee $90. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 116 at 5.)

17.September 15, 2018: .5 hours, fee $137.50. Conceded by Dr. Thompson. (Doc. 

116 at 5.)

18.September 17, 2018: 3.6 hours, $990, to “Draft reply in support of motion for 

summary judgment including portion on contract claim.” (Doc. 111-1 at 43.) If 

the contract claim was a “portion” that was “include[ed]” in the section of the 

reply that was drafted on this date, then the work was not performed exclusively 

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 4 of 10
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in relation to the contract claim and was instead performed in part to defend 

against non-frivolous civil rights claims. No fees are awarded.

Therefore, the total permissible fee award relating exclusively to the contract claim 

which BNI is eligible to recover is $4,457.50. 

C. Associated Indemnity Factors

Simply because BNI is eligible to recover a maximum of $4,457.50 in fees does not 

mean BNI is entitled to those fees; the Court must consider the factors outlined in 

Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567 (1985) and decide that a fee 

award is warranted. Harris, 631 F.3d at 974. There are six Associated Indemnity Factors: 

(1) whether the unsuccessful party’s claim or defense was meritorious; (2) 

whether the litigation could have been avoided or settled and the successful 

party’s efforts were completely superfluous in achieving the result; (3) 

whether assessing fees against the unsuccessful party would cause an 

extreme hardship; (4) whether the successful party prevailed with respect to 

all of the relief sought; (5) whether the legal question presented was novel 

and whether such claim or defense have previously been adjudicated in this 

jurisdiction; and (6) whether the award would discourage other parties with 

tenable claims or defenses from litigating or defending legitimate contract 

issues for fear of incurring liability for substantial amounts of attorney’s fees.

Id. at 974 n.3 (quoting Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 394 

(1985)).

First, Dr. Thompson’s contract claim was not meritorious. The Court previously 

held that “under the plain terms of the contract, BNI did not breach the Agreement in 

declining to reappoint Dr. Thompson and renew his contract.” (Doc. 100 at 20.) Dr. 

Thompson does not argue that this claim had merit, but only that the Court erred in relation 

to the other aspect of his contract claim when the Court “constru[ed] the contract to mean 

that Dr. Thompson’s first meeting on May 31, 2016 was a part of the appeal process.” 

(Doc. 116 at 8.) Dr. Thompson has provided no legal authority to support his conclusion 

that the Court erred. (Doc. 116 at 7–8)

Second, the stark contrast in the parties’ representations of the non-monetary 

settlement terms indicate that BNI’s litigation efforts were not completely superfluous. 

BNI describes the equitable relief at issue as an “unrealistic demand,” Doc. 110 at 4, and 

“a face-to-face confrontation with the physicians he believed wronged him,” Doc. 117 at 

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 5 of 10
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4, and asserts that Dr. Thompson did not respond to either BNI’s last mediation demand or 

BNI’s settlement offer regarding attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 117 at 4.) Dr. Thompson, in 

contrast, describes the equitable relief as a request for BNI “to discuss with him and 

consider more objective measures of achievement, such as quizzing or written testing, 

rather than relying on subjective evaluations that favor people with better access to mentors

and often result in better marks for people who look like their teachers than those of diverse 

backgrounds . . . The mediation . . . failed because [BNI] was unwilling to meet with Dr. 

Thompson and discuss his concerns about race discrimination.” (Doc. 116 at 8–9.) Dr. 

Thompson does not assert that he responded to BNI’s last mediation demand or BNI’s 

settlement offer regarding attorneys’ fees, but confirms that BNI did engage in attempts to 

settle the present motion. (Doc. 116 at 13.)

Third, assessing fees against Dr. Thompson would not cause extreme hardship. Dr. 

Thompson has provided evidence of an annual salary of $130,000, and has not provided 

the necessary prima facie evidence of financial hardship. See O’Connor v. Phoenix Sch. of 

Law, LLC, No. CV-13-01107-PHX-SRB, 2014 WL 12672226, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 20, 

2014). Fourth, BNI prevailed with respect to all relief sought. Fifth, the legal questions 

were not novel.

Sixth, the award would not discourage other parties with tenable civil rights claims 

from litigating legitimate contract issues for fear of incurring liability for substantial 

amounts of attorney’s fees. BNI incurred attorneys’ fees in the amount of $266,937, of 

which only $4,457.50 is eligible for award pursuant to A.R.S. 12-3401.01. (Doc. 110 at 3.) 

This is approximately 1.7% of the total fees incurred.

The Associated Indemnity factors weigh in favor of awarding $4,457.50 in 

attorneys’ fees.

D. Local Rule 54.2

a. Reasonableness Factors

Local Rule 54.2 requires the Court consider a variety of other factors, in addition to 

the Associated Indemnity factors, in determining the reasonableness of the requested fee 

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 6 of 10
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

award.3

The time and labor of counsel weigh in favor of the requested fee award. Two 

associates, Kristen Briney and Nicole Simmons, performed 6.7 and 7.6 hours (respectively) 

of the contract-related work, while Lindsay Fiore, a partner, performed 2.9 hours of the 

contract-related work. (See Doc. 111 at 2–3, Doc. 111-1 at 2–43.) The questions presented 

were not novel or difficult, and no unique skills were required to perform the legal service 

properly, but BNI’s counsel achieved success on all claims. BNI’s counsel performed over 

1,100 hours of legal work on this matter, which precluded other employment. (Doc. 111 at 

5–6.) The Court credit’s Ms. Fiore’s declaration regarding customary fees, and notes that 

Dr. Thompson provided no evidence casting doubt on Ms. Fiore’s conclusions. (Doc. 116 

at 11–12.)

The amount of money involved was substantial: nearly $2,000,000 in lost earnings 

damages and unspecified emotional distress and punitive damages. (Doc. 110 at 7; Doc. 

111-1 at 112.) Through the efforts of counsel, BNI obtained summary judgment on all 

counts. BNI’s counsel have established the requisite experience, reputation, and ability to 

merit an award of fees, and have represented BNI in at least 15 separate employment 

litigation matters over several years. (Doc. 110 at 8; Doc. 111 at 5.)

The Court concludes that the requested fee of $4,457.50 is reasonable pursuant to 

Local Rule 54.2.

b. Supporting Documentation

Local Rule 54.2(d) requires all motions for attorneys’ fees include a statement of 

consultation, a fee agreement, a task-based itemized statement of fees and expenses, and 

an affidavit of moving counsel. Dr. Thompson challenges BNI’s failure to include the 

statement of consultation and an “adequate[]” description of the fee agreement with the 

motion. (Doc. 116 at 13–14.)

The Court may, in its discretion, consider a motion for attorneys’ fees that lacks a 

statement of consultation that complies with Local Rule 54.2(d)(1), and does so here. Gary 

 

3 The nature of the fee agreement, any potential time limitations, the undesirability of the 

case, and awards in similar actions are not relevant factors in this case.

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 7 of 10
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. Carbon Cycle Arizona LLC, 398 F. Supp. 3d 468, 483 (D. Ariz. 2019). BNI demonstrated

attempts to settle the attorneys’ fees and costs in good faith in both motions for an extension 

of time to file the instant motion. (“The parties are also currently discussing a potential 

resolution to this matter,” Doc. 102 at 2; “The parties are still having ongoing discussions 

about resolution of this matter, and Dignity Health is hopeful the parties will be able to 

reach an agreement shortly.” Doc. 106 at 2.) This is “in accordance with the purpose behind 

the rule.” Gary, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 483 (collecting cases).

As to the fee agreement, Ms. Fiore provided a statement to the effect that no written 

fee agreement specifically applicable to this case exists, and recited the core terms of the 

fee agreement, in accordance with Local Rule 54.2(d)(2). (See Doc. 111 at 2, 4.)

E. Non-Taxable Costs

BNI originally requested $14,439.28 in non-taxable costs. (Doc. 110 at 9.) But nontaxable costs “may not be included in an award of attorneys’ fees made pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 12–341.01.” Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bach, 193 Ariz. 401, 404 

(1999); Harris, 631 F.3d at 979–80.

F. Fees for Preparing the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

The purpose of the attorney fee award under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 is “to mitigate the 

burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense.” A.R.S. § 12-

341.01(B); see Gametech Int’l, Inc. v. Trend Gaming Sys., L.L.C., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 

1101 (D. Ariz. 2005) (citing Associated Indemnity, 143 Ariz. at 569). “Including the 

reasonable time to prepare an attorney’s fees application in an award of attorney’s fees to 

the prevailing party furthers the purpose of awarding such fees.” Gametech, 380 F. Supp. 

2d at 1101. Fee awards for the preparation of a successful fee application are “subject to 

the same reasonableness determination as all other attorneys[’] fees awards.” Harris, 631 

F.3d at 979.

BNI requests $4,422.50 in fees incurred in preparing the motion for attorneys’ fees. 

Because BNI based its fee calculation on a clearly impermissible approach to a case 

presenting a mix of nonfrivolous civil rights and contract claims, as discussed supra, I.A., 

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 8 of 10
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Court will not consider awarding fees for the legal research which yielded such a 

conclusion, or for the time to draft the impermissible portion of the motion, which the Court 

estimates at approximately 30 percent of the motion. Therefore, BNI is eligible to recover 

only $3,000 in fees relating to the preparation of the motion for attorneys’ fees.4

II. Dr. Thompson’s Motion for Review of Taxation of Costs

On April 4, 2019, the Clerk of the Court taxed $8,362.22 in costs against Dr. 

Thompson. (Doc. 113.) Dr. Thompson now asks the Court to review the Clerk’s action, 

exercise discretion, and decline to tax any costs. (Doc. 115.) 

Dr. Thompson relies on Association of Mexican-American Educators v. State of 

California, 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000) to claim it would be inappropriate and inequitable 

to tax costs against him, but he draws the wrong conclusion from that case by concluding 

that all Title VII plaintiffs would be intimidated from filing their claims if there was a risk 

that costs would be imposed. (Doc. 115 at 3.) In Mexican-American Educators, a class of 

minority candidates sued the State of California challenging the use of a screening test 

which had a disparate impact on minorities. Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 

578. Because Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) “establishes that costs are to be awarded as a matter 

of course in the ordinary case,” the Ninth Circuit’s “requirement that a district court give 

reasons for denying costs is, in essence, a requirement that the court explain why a case is 

not ‘ordinary’ and why, in the circumstances, it would be inappropriate or inequitable to 

award costs.” Id. at 593. Mexican-American Educators was an extraordinary case because 

the plaintiffs in that case had demonstrated limited resources; the issues were “of the 

gravest public importance” and were “close and complex”; the case affected “tens of 

thousands of Californians and the state’s public school system as a whole”; and the costs 

($216,443.67) were “extraordinarily high.” Id.

Dr. Thompson, to the contrary, earned $130,000 per year working part time during 

the pendency of the litigation, and his vocational expert opined that in 2020 his income 

 

4 Of the $1,422.50 requested but not awarded, $665 was deducted for the 1.9 hours of legal 

research and legal writing performed on March 18 and 20, 2019, and $757.50 represents 

approximately 30 percent of the $2555 in fees incurred drafting the motion.

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 9 of 10
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

would be $137,917 if he continued to work part time, but $190,550 if he chose to take a 

full-time position as a primary care physician in Phoenix. (Doc. 111-1 at 112–13.) The 

costs therefore constitute at most 6%, and as little as 4.4%, of one year of Dr. Thompson’s 

income. Dr. Thompson sued one health care provider, about one of its residency programs, 

with classes of fewer than a dozen people per year, not an entire state about a public school 

system that affected tens of thousands of people. It is not inappropriate or inequitable to 

tax costs against him. Therefore, Dr. Thompson’s motion for review of the Clerk’s taxation 

of costs is denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED BNI’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Related NonTaxable Expenses (Doc. 110) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Dr. 

Thompson shall pay BNI $4,457.50 in attorneys’ fees and an additional $3,000 for fees 

incurred in preparing the fee motion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Dr. Thompson’s Motion for Review of Clerk’s 

Taxation of Costs (Doc. 115) is DENIED. The taxation of $8,362.22 in costs is therefore 

final.

Dated this 17th day of January, 2020.

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver

Senior United States District Judge

Case 2:17-cv-01607-ROS Document 119 Filed 01/21/20 Page 10 of 10