Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02025/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02025-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Luis Soria-Garcia
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OCT 2 2 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

JOSE 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) No. 91-2025 

) 

) 

LUIS SORIA-GARCIA, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. CR-90-505 SC) 

Presiliano A. Torrez, Assistant United States Attorney (William L. 

Lutz, U.S. Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Richard C. Cauble, Las Cruces, New Mexico, Attorney for DefendantAppellee. 

Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-2025 Document: 01019291283 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 1 
In a two-count indictment Jose Luis Soria-Garcia (Soria) was 

charged in the first count with unlawfully importing less than 

fifty kilograms of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, 

into the United States of America from the Republic of Mexico, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) and 21 u.s.c. § 960(a)(1) and 

(b)(4). In the second count, Soria was charged with unlawfully 

possessing with an intent to distribute less than fifty kilograms 

of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of 

21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(1) and 21 u.s.c. § 841(b)(1)(D). 

Prior to trial, Soria, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3) 

and 41(f), moved to suppress the use at trial of the marijuana 

taken in a search of his vehicle, and, also, to suppress the use 

at trial of his post-arrest statements to special agents of the 

United States Customs Service (Customs). After an evidentiary 

hearing, the district court denied Soria's motion insofar as it 

sought to suppress the use at trial of the marijuana taken from 

his automobile, but granted that part of the motion which sought 

to suppress the use at trial of his post-arrest statements to the 

special agents of Customs. Pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 3731, the 

government appeals the latter ruling. 

At the evidentiary hearing on Soria's motion to suppress, the 

government called three witnesses, Frankie Renteria, an inspector 

for Customs, and Winn Kapping and Bart Skelton, both special 

agents for Customs. Soria did not himself testify, nor did he 

call any witnesses. Without going into unnecessary detail, Soria 

was stopped by Inspector Renteria at a border checkpoint near 

Columbus, New Mexico, as he was entering the United States from 

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Appellate Case: 91-2025 Document: 01019291283 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 2 
Mexico. A search of the automobile Soria was driving disclosed 

twenty-five pounds of marijuana. Special agents of Customs were 

called in, and they testified that they thereafter questioned 

Soria in the presence of Inspector Renteria. All testified that 

Soria spoke no English and that a Miranda warning was read to him 

in Spanish and that he then signed the printed form, which was 

also in Spanish. Skelton went on to testify that Soria thereafter 

stated, in Spanish, that he had purchased the marijuana in Mexico 

and was going to his home in Fresno, California, where he proposed 

to sell the marijuana. 

As indicated, the district court denied Soria's motion to 

suppress the use at trial of the marijuana seized in a search of 

his automobile. Accordingly, we are not concerned with that 

ruling in the present appeal. 

As stated, Customs agents read a Miranda warning form to 

Soria which was in Spanish. Translated into English by one of the 

agents who testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress, 

that form reads as follows: 

You have the right to remain silent. Anything 

you say can be used against you in a court of 

law or in any other criminal procedure [sic]. 

You have the right to speak with a lawyer and 

to have him present with you during 

questioning or present with you while 

you're being questioned. If you don't have 

the money to employ a lawyer one will be 

appointed to vou before answering any 

questions, if you so decide. If you decide to 

answer questions now without a lawyer present, 

you still h~ve the right to remain silent. 

You also have the right to stop the 

questioning at any time if you would like to 

speak with a lawyer. I have read this 

declaration of my rights and I understand all 

of it. (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 91-2025 Document: 01019291283 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 3 
The motion to suppress Soria's post-arrest statements was 

based on counsel's belief that Soria's statements were not 

voluntary, citing Tague v. Louisiana, 444 u.s. 469 (1980), and 

Orozco v. Texas, 394 u.s. 324 (1969). 

As we understand it, the district court did not reach the 

question of voluntariness and found, sua sponte, that the printed 

form, the contents of which were read to Soria and to which he had 

affixed his signature, was deficient because it did not in so many 

words advise Soria of his right to an attorney "at no cost" to 

himself. In this connection, the district court asked his court 

interpreter to translate into English the portion of the warning 

given Soria which we have above underlined, and his translation 

thereof was as follows: 

If you do not have the money to employ an 

attorney, one can be obtained for you before 

we ask you any questions, if you so desire. 

In suppressing Soria's post-arrest statements given Customs 

agents, the district court opined as follows: 

What I'm going to do in this case, I'm going 

to suppress the statement. I'm going to 

suppress the statement based upon an 

inadequate advice of his Miranda rights, based 

upon our discussion here, and based upon my 

interpretation and Mr. Pena's [the court 

interpreter's] interpretation of his part of 

the exhibit, Government's Exhibit Number 1. I 

feel that it is less than clear, and it's 

ambiguous as to what a at least some 

defendants, and particularly a defendant who's -- well, I don't know the situation of this 

defendant, he may be a graduate of some law 

school or whatever -- but I think that one 

would have to read into this, imply into this 

that the lawyer is going to be appointed to 

him at no cost. And I don't think that 

defendants, particularly along the border, 

defendants who don't speak or understand 

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Appellate Case: 91-2025 Document: 01019291283 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 4 
English and are -- at least so many of the 

ones, the majority of the ones that come in 

before my court are persons of minimal or no 

education. So based upon that, I'm going to 

suppress the statements. (emphasis added). 

At the evidentiary hearing on Soria's motion to suppress, the 

government offered as exhibit number 1 the printed Miranda 

warning, in Spanish, which was read to Soria and to which he 

affixed his signature. It was received without objection. The 

English translation of the Miranda warning given in Spanish, which 

was a part of the record before the district court, has been set 

forth above. Contained therein was the statement that "[i]f you 

don't have the money to employ a lawyer one will be appointed to 

you before answering any questions, if you so decide. II 

We do not regard the court interpreter's translation of that 

particular language to be much different. He translated that 

particular language from the Spanish into English as follows: 

"[If] you do not have the money to employ an attorney, one can be 

obtained for you before we ask you any questions, if you so 

desire." The flaw that the district court perceived in apparently 

both translations was that the Miranda warning did not contain a 

statement that an attorney would be given Soria "at no cost" to 

him. We believe the district court was overly exacting and that 

the thrust of the warning, regardless of which translation is 

used, is that if Soria had no money to employ a lawyer, and he 

desired one, one would be afforded him. We reject counsel's 

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Appellate Case: 91-2025 Document: 01019291283 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 5 
suggestion that the warning, as given, left open the possibility 

that Soria would be "billed later." 1 

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966), the Supreme 

Court stated that a person in custody must be warned in advance of 

any questioning of his right to remain silent, that any statement 

he did make could be used as evidence against him, and that he had 

a right to the presence of an attorney, "either retained or 

appointed." To apprise a person fully, he must be warned "not 

only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also 

that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent 

him. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if 

not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent . that 

he too has a right to have counsel present." The Court in Miranda 

recognized the FBI practice of informing a person that he has a 

right to free counsel if he is unable to pay and suggested that 

such practice might be emulated by state and local law enforcement 

agencies. The Court, however, stopped short of mandating precise 

language, instead requiring the warnings only in the absence of a 

"fully effective equivalent." The Supreme Court went on to state 

in Miranda that if so warned, the person could thereafter waive 

1 We regard our standard of review to be de novo. The district 

judge in reality made no "findings of fact" which could be 

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The district judge 

did state that based on his experience other defendants in other 

criminal proceedings if given the Miranda warning given Soria 

would not have known that if they had no money to employ an 

attorney one would be appointed "at no cost." Such, however, is 

just an observation and not a true finding of fact. As stated, 

Soria himself did not testify in the hearing on the motion to 

suppress. Accordingly, for all we know, Soria knew that if he did 

not have money to employ an attorney, and one was appointed to 

represent him, that such would be "at no cost" nor would he be 

"billed later." 

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Appellate Case: 91-2025 Document: 01019291283 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 6 
those rights, "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly 

and intelligently." Id. at 444. 

In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986), the Supreme 

Court, observing that the Miranda inquiry has two "dimensions," 

commented as follows: 

First, the relinquishment of the right must 

have been voluntary in the sense that it was 

the product of a free and deliberate choice 

rather than intimidation, coercion, or 

deception. Second, the waiver must have been 

made with a full awareness of both the nature 

of the right being abandoned and the 

consequences of the decision to abandon it. 

Only if the "totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the interrogation" reveals both an 

uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 

comprehension may a court properly conclude 

that the Miranda rights have been waived. 

As previously indicated, we are not here concerned with 

whether Soria's waiver was voluntarily and intelligently made. 

Rather, we are concerned with whether he was adequately advised of 

his rights. In this regard, it is undisputed that he was advised 

of his right to remain silent, and that if he chose to make a 

statement, what he might say could be used as evidence against him 

in a criminal proceeding. Further, regardless of the translation 

used, Soria was advised that if he didn't have "money to employ an 

attorney," he would have one either "appointed," according to the 

translation by the Customs agent, or "one would be obtained for 

you before we ask you any questions," according to the translation 

of the court interpreter. The warning given Soria clearly 

indicates that if Soria had no money to hire an attorney one would 

be either "appointed" or "obtained" before any questioning. The 

"at no cost" language might be desirable, but, under the 

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Appellate Case: 91-2025 Document: 01019291283 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 7 
circumstances, such is not necessary in order that there be a full 

advisement of Soria's rights. In support of the foregoing, see 

Chambers v. Lockhart, 872 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 

110 S. Ct. 335 (1989). 2 

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 u.s. 195 (1989), sheds light on the 

present case. There a defendant in a state criminal proceeding 

was advised of his right to talk to a lawyer before answering any 

questions, and was further advised that an attorney would be 

appointed for him "if and when you go to court." In reversing the 

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and holding that such advisement 

did comply with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 u.s. 436 (1966), the 

Supreme Court opined as follows: 

Reviewing courts therefore need not examine 

Miranda warnings as if construing a will or 

defining the terms of an easement. The 

inquiry is simply whether the warnings 

reasonably "conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights 

as required by Miranda." Prysock, supra, 453 

u.s., at 361. 

Duckworth, 492 u.s. at 203. 

The warning in the present case "reasonably conveyed" to 

Soria his various constitutional rights as required by Miranda. 3 

2 State courts which have addressed this issue likewise have 

found warnings adequate despite the lack of "no cost" language. 

See Smith v. State, 729 S.W.2d 5 (Ark. 1987); Commonwealth v. 

Marsh, 271 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1970); State v. Hutton, 789 P.2d 778 

(Wash. App. 1990). But see Perez v. People, 491 P.2d 969 (Colo. 

1971). 

3 For illustrative cases where a Miranda warning has been 

given, at least in part, in a language other than English, see 

United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988), Arabic; 

United States v. Boon San Chong, 829 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1987), 

Chinese; Perri v. Director, Department of Corrections, State of 

Illinois, 817 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1987), Italian; and United States 

v. Gonzales, 749 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984), Spanish. 

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Appellate Case: 91-2025 Document: 01019291283 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 8 
. ' ,, 

The order of the district court suppressing the use at trial 

of Soria's post-arrest statement to the Customs agents is vacated, 

and the case is remanded for further proceedings. 

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Appellate Case: 91-2025 Document: 01019291283 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 9