Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02279/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02279-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Lee Brown
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILL PAppelll 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL~nltad S~~t 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

ROBERT LEE BROWN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant . ) 

JAN 21 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No . 91-2279 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D . C. No. CR- 91-107-07) 

Louis P. McDonald, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for DefendantAppellant. 

Tara C. Neda, Assistant United States Attorney (Don J. Svet, 

United States Attorney and James T. Martin, Assistant United 

States Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque , New Mexico, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK, SETH and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Robert Brown appeals his conviction for 

conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 

U.S .C. §§ 841(a) (1), 841(b) (1) (C) and 18 U. S.C. § 2 . Mr. Brown 

contends that the district court erred in denying hi s motion to 

suppress. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U. S.C. § 1291 and we · 

affirm. 

Appellate Case: 91-2279 Document: 010110157325 Date Filed: 01/21/1993 Page: 1 
Background 

On January 29, 1991, a state search warrant was issued based 

on the affidavit of detective Robert Radosevich (Warrant I ). The 

affidavit stated that the district attorney's office had 

approached the detective in reference to an infonnant who had 

infonnation concerning the theft and dismantling of motor 

vehicles. The infonnant stated that he spoke with two people at a 

house and was told that several vehicles on the premises were 

stolen, and that the two people sold the stolen vehicles by 

exchanging vehicle identification plates from salvaged vehicles 

and registering the stolen vehicles. The infonnant also reported 

that the same parties had offered to sell him carpeting for $1 per 

yard, a copier for $100, a computer, guns and electric motors. 

The detective drove by the house described by the infonnant 

and observed an individual under a partially dismantled truck 

doing some type of work with a cutting torch. He also observed 

another truck that the infonnant had stated the occupants of the 

house had claimed was stolen. The detective then learned that the 

utilities to the home were in the name of R.L. Brown. 

Warrant I authorized a search for: 

Vehicle parts to include the following, but not limited 

to: Bumpers, grills, fenders, hoods, cabs, dashes, truck 

beds, engines, transmissions, drive shafts, frames, rear 

ends, springs, steering parts, seats and other interior 

parts, VIN plates, titles, vehicle registrations, blank 

registration forms, •bills of sale, blank titles, driveout stickers, broadcast sheets, EPA stickers, windows, doors, tires, rims and truck bed toolboxes . Tools or 

toolboxes which are stolen or contain tools that can be 

used to disassemble or reassemble any vehicle, welders 

and cutting torches, air compressors, computers, 

computer components, photocopy machines, firearms, 

protective devices, carpeting which also may be stolen. 

Any other item which the Officers determine or have 

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reasonable belief is stolen while executing this search 

warrant . 

After the execution of Warrant I, and because items not 

specifically described in Warrant I were observed, a second state 

warrant was applied for on February 7 , 1991 (Warrant II). Warrant 

II authorized the following seizure: 

The property to be seized is a Quasar Microwave, serial 

number AW702701085 . A brown Cedar chest that is faded 

on the top lid and has a tray on the inside , approximately 3' wide and 4' in length and approximately 

21⁄2' t o 3' in depth, any other item which the Officers 

have determined or have reason to believe is stolen, while executing this search warrant . 

During the execution of Warrant II, the officers detected a 

strong odor of methamphetamine on the individuals present. They 

found a methamphetamine laboratory in the garage and drug 

paraphernalia and a substance which the officers suspected was 

methamphetamine in the house. Based on this information, a 

federal search warrant (Warrant III) was issued and executed that 

same day. The evidence seized during the execution of Warrant III 

led to Mr. Brown's conviction. 

Defendant filed a motion to quash the three warrants and to 

suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the warrants. The motion 

was denied and defendant was tried by a jury and convicted. Mr. 

Brown contends that the first two warrants were overbroad and that 

evidence derived from Warrant II was fruit of the illegal Warrant 

I. He also contends that the sole basis for Warrant I II was 

Warrants I and II, thus the evidence seized under Warrant III was 

fruit of the illegal f i rst two warrants. 

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Discussion 

I. Probable Cause 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits the issu ance of a warrant 

except upon probable cause. Under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S . 

213, 238 (1983 ) , "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply 

to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ... there 

is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 

be found in a particular place." On review, we must "ensure that 

the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' 

that probable cause existed." Id. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. 

United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)); see United States v. 

Lacey. 969 F.2d 926, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1992), petition f o r cert. 

filed, Oct . 6, 1992 . 

The informant mentioned in the affidavit was able to provide 

several verifiable details. He stated that an occupant of the 

house had described two stolen vehicles, a 1970's Ford p i ckup and 

a 1986 Ford pickup. The informant also saw a red Chevrolet El 

Camino and a motorcycle. The affiant-officer drove by the 

residence and saw all of these items and, in addition, observed 

that someone was working on the partially dismantled 1 970's pickup 

with a cutting torch. We find that the corroboration of 

"'seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in light of the 

ini tial tip . '" Gates, 4 62 U.S . at 243 n.13 (quoting People v. 

Gates, 423 N.E.2d 887, 896 (1981) (Moran, J . dissenting) , rev 'd, 

462 U.S. 213 (1983 ) ). 

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With such corroboration, the issuing magistrate had a 

"'substantial basis for crediting the hearsay'" included in the 

tip. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-45 (quoting Jones, 362 U.S. at 269); 

see also United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 886-87 (10th Cir. ) , 

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 437 (1992). A male and a female who 

resided at the house admitted to the informant that they had 

stolen several vehicles, providing details regarding their scheme 

to reregister the vehicles. The couple offered to sell various 

items, including the trucks, toolboxes, rolls of carpet and a 

copier, for well below their market value. 

We conclude that there was a substantial basis for the judge 

to determine that ample probable cause supported Warrant I. 

II. Particularity 

The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants describe both the 

place to be searched and the things to be seized with 

particularity. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). The 

search should be "confined in scope to particularly described 

evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is 

demonstrated probable cause." Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 

404 (10th Cir. 1985) . The issue of whether a warrant is overbroad 

is subject to de novo review by this court. United States v. 

Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988). 

At issue in this case is the effect of the language in each 

of the two warrants quoted in part above (Warrants I and II) . 

Each of these warrants described, with specificity, some items to 

be searched or seized, but added an authorization to search or 

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seize other items which the officers determined or reasonably 

believed to be stolen. Mr. Brown argues that this language 

renders the warrant unconstitutionally broad. 

We find United States v. LeBron, 729 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1984 ) 

instructive. There, a warrant authorized a search for a list of 

specific items as well as for "other property, description 

unknown, for which there exists probable cause to believe it to be 

stolen." Id. at 536. That language, the court found, was not 

descriptive and did not adequately limit the discretion of the 

officers. Id . at 536. The instant warrant contained language 

very simil ar to the LeBron warrant. 1 

However, as in LeBron, the questionable portion of the 

warrant may be severed. "' [T]he infirmity of part of a warrant 

requires the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to that part 

of the warrant ... , but does not require the suppression of 

anything described in the valid portions of the warrant (or 

lawfully seized - on plain view grounds, for example - during 

their execution} . '" LeBron, 729 F.2d at 537 n.2 (quoting United 

States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633 , 637 (8th Cir. 1983) (en bane}, 

cert . denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984)). 

At least eight circuits have held that where a warrant 

1 Because we agree for purposes of this opinion that the 

contested language was overbroad, much of the dissent's discussion 

is superfluous. The dissent also contends that the cases we rely 

upon are distinguishable because the overbroad portion in this 

case "describes the legal status" of items which may be 

encountered during the search. Dissent at 9 . The cases cited in 

this opinion do not consider the overbroad language beyond the 

determination that it is impermissible and should be stricken o r 

redacted. 

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contains both specific as well as unconstitutionally broad 

language, the broad portion may be redacted and the balance of the 

warrant considered valid. See United States v. George, 975 F.2d 

72, 79 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 

1027 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 881 (1992); United 

States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1510 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d at 636-37; United States v. Riggs, 690 F.2d 

298, 300 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v . Christine, 687 F.2d 

749, 759-60 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Search Warrant Dated July 4, 

1977, 667 F.2d 117, 130-33 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 

U.S. 926 (1982); United States v . Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 734-35 (5th 

Cir. 1981) .

2 See also 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, 

Criminal Procedure, §3.4(f) at 229 (1984). In such cases, only 

those items confiscated under the overbroad portion of the warrant 

are suppressed. George, 975 F.2d at 79. 

In both Holzman and George, the courts recognized that the 

seizure of articles found in plain view could be upheld if part of 

the warrant was valid. They reasoned that if the officers were 

legally upon the premises under any set of circumstances, items in 

plain view could be legitimately seized. See Holzman, 871 F.2d at 

1512; George, 975 F.2d at 78-80 . See also Horton v. California, 

110 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (1990) (if officer has lawful right of 

access, discovery of other incriminating evidence need not be 

2 

The dissent argues that these cases are distinguishable 

because they involve "va gue broad, and general descriptions of 

property which can be placed in some general category to permit 

severance." Dissent at 9. To the contrary, the overbroad nature 

of the search warrant in LeBron is indistinguishable from the 

warrant before us. 

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Appellate Case: 91-2279 Document: 010110157325 Date Filed: 01/21/1993 Page: 7 
inadvertent}. 

In this case, although one sentence in the warrant may have 

been overbroad, the infirm portion may be isolated and severed 

from the constitutionally adequate part. Because the state 

officers were legally on the premises and smelled the odor of 

methamphetamine, their call to the DEA agent is not tainted, 

George, 975 F.2d at 80, and the warrant obtained with that 

information is not invalid. While we had not directly addressed 

this issue until now, we recognized it in United States v . Leary, 

846 F.2d 592, 606 n.25 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing cases where 

severance was appropriate, but concluding severance was not 

possible because no portion of the warrant in that case adequately 

described the items to be seized}. 

Because the officers executing Warrant II were legitimately 

on the premises when they discovered or smelled the 

methamphetamine laboratory, the third warrant issued at the 

instance of federal agents is valid. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 91-2279 Document: 010110157325 Date Filed: 01/21/1993 Page: 8 
No. 91-2279 - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v . BROWN 

SETH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 

The majority holds that the overbroad portions of the 

warrants can be severed from the warrants, and thus the state 

officers were validly present when they detected the 

methamphetamine laboratory and contacted the DEA officers. 

Although the majority correctly notes that severance is an 

appropriate remedy in some cases, as discussed below, in this case 

the overbroad language so tainted the entire warrant that 

severance is not justified. I find that the warrants were grossly 

overbroad and thus the officers were not legitimately present on 

the premises. I would suppress the evidence. 

The concluding sentence in Warrant I authorized the search 

of: "[a]ny other item which the Officers determine or have 

reasonable belief is stolen while executing this search warrant . " 

Similarly, the concluding language of Warrant II authorized the 

search of items which the officers "have determined or have reason 

to believe" are stolen. These concluding statements follow a good 

listing of particular items of personal property although some 

descriptions are conditioned on the item being "stolen." The 

concluding provisions however are not descriptions of any tangible 

thing which is sought . At most, they are references to the legal 

status of any "items" the officers might see and "determine" to be 

stolen. The warrants would thus seem to be without any 

descriptive limits. Whether the warrants are general warrants 

Appellate Case: 91-2279 Document: 010110157325 Date Filed: 01/21/1993 Page: 9 
must be examined. The detective who obtained the warrants 

testified that: 

"Our procedure is anything we can identify as 

stolen, we seize. [A]ny property that 

is reasonably found to be stolen would be 

seized." 

The search under Warrant I also had an unusual variation as 

mentioned later. It lasted over a period of two or three days and 

included were town "people" who had reported property stolen and 

who were allowed to come on the premises to identify and claim 

"their property." This public participation seems at least to add 

an unusual expansion of the search. Over the period of the 

"search," about eleven officers participated, and these apparently 

were the "we" in the above quotation of the detective. It also 

appears that during the search under Warrant II a federal DEA 

agent was called. Two DEA agents joined the group and were shown 

around the premises to see what the state officers had found. The 

"visit" under Warrant II was the basis for Warrant III. 

The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants "particularly 

describe the place to be searched, and the person or things to be 

seized." This requirement ensures that the scope of a search is 

limited to particularly described evidence relating to a specific 

crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause. Voss v. 

Bergsgaard, 774 F . 2d 402 (10th Cir.). The particularity 

requirement prevents a "general, exploratory rummaging in a 

person's belongings," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 

467, and makes impossible general searches leaving nothing to the 

discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Stanford v . 

Texas, 379 U.S. 476. 

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Defendant maintains that the final sentence of the 

description of property to be seized in Warrant I, "[a]ny other 

item which the Officers determine or have reasonable belief is 

stolen while executing this search warrant," leaves too much to 

the discretion of the many officers under Stanford. It fails to 

meet the particularity requirement. To determine if the 

description of the items to be seized is "particular" courts 

generally apply the practical test of whether the descriptions of 

items in the warrant itself enables the searcher to reasonably 

ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized. 

United States v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750 (10th Cir.). It 

requires a description of tangibles ascertainable from the 

warrant. Similarly, in United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592 (10th 

Cir.), we held that a warrant itself must at the minimum allow the 

officers to distinguish between items that may and may not be 

seized. 

In this case, the language "[a]ny other item which the 

Officers determine or have reasonable belief is stolen" does not 

limit the search in any meaningful way. The phrase cannot, as the 

government asserts, be interpreted as contextually related to the 

preceding list of items because the list is already subject to a 

catch-all provision at the start of the list, "including, but not 

limited to." Nor can the phrase be interpreted as an articulation 

of the "plain view" doctrine, in which fruits or instrumentalities 

of a crime that are in plain view of an officer who is 

legitimately present may be seized without a warrant, because that 

doctrine requires a finding of probable cause as to those items, 

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Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468, and the warrant 

allows seizure for mere "reason to believe" the item was stolen. 

The appearance of the items did not signal whether they were 

stolen . The phrase must therefore be read as intending to 

encompass unanticipated items that fall short of the "plain view" 

doctrine, and thus expands to a limitless extreme the items that 

the executing officers could search. 

This interpretation is reinforced by Detective Radosevich's 

own interpretation of the warrant as mentioned. He testified that 

he had sole discretion to determine what property was stolen, and 

thus what property could be seized. Consequently, the broad 

authorization to seize any items that the officers determined were 

stolen failed to provide any guidelines to the executing officers 

as to what property was stolen and could be seized. 

Moreover, the proceedings of the search itself illustrate the 

exploratory nature of the search. Warrant I authorized a search 

on January 29, 1991, between 6:00 a .m. and 10:00 p.m. However, 

the search lasted for fifty-one hours, ending on January 31, 1991. 

Some courts have characterized a search under an overbroad 

warrant as "rummaging." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443. 

This is an apt description here not only by reason of the 

officers' actions, but for the added participants. These were 

various people who had reported property stolen who were allowed 

on the premises to identify and claim "their" property. 

The absence of particularity of the Warrant I is further 

illustrated by the items actually seized. In addition to the 

numerous auto parts and tools taken, the officers seized a fishing 

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reel, turquoise stones, Christmas wreaths, Christmas lights, and a 

bug sprayer. The detective admitted that they were unable to 

confirm that all of the items seized were in fact stolen. Such 

seizure of personal property exemplifies the inherent dangers of 

allowing a warrant to be so broadly drawn. 

I acknowledge that a warrant describing items to be seized in 

broad and generic terms may be valid if the description is as 

specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under 

investigation permit. United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 775 

(10th Cir.}, citing United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 

(10th Cir. }. However, in this case the property believed to be 

stolen was described with sufficient particularity. The 

government only had information regarding vehicles and other 

articles relating to a "chop shop," and possibly carpeting, a 

copier, a computer, guns and electric motors. 

Because Warrant I is facially and grossly overbroad, the 

"good faith" exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 

U.S. 897, which prohibits exclusion of evidence obtained by 

officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant that is 

ultimately found to be invalid, will not apply. In Leon the Court 

said: 

"[D]epending on the circumstances of the 

particular case, a warrant may be so facially 

deficient--i.e. , in failing to particularize 

the place to be searched or the things to be 

seized--that the executing officers cannot 

reasonably presume it to be valid." 

468 U.S. at 9 23. 

In Leary we held that the warrant was so facially deficient 

that the executing officers could not have reasonably relied on 

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it, and thus the government could not rely on the "good faith" 

exception. We there stated: 

"A reasonably well-trained officer should know 

that a warrant must provide guidelines for 

determining what evidence may be seized. A 

warrant that directs an officer to seize 

records 'relating to' violations of the 

federal export laws offers no such guidelines. 

The officers were left to their own 

discretion." 

846 F.2d at 609. Similarly, Warrant I, directing the officers to 

seize any item they reasonably believe is stolen, was so facially 

deficient in its description of property to be seized that the 

officers could not have reasonably relied on it. The nature of 

the "search," the participants, and the list of the items seized 

reinforces this conclusion. The good faith exception is not 

applicable . 

I therefore find that Warrant I is invalid because the 

description of the items to be seized lacks particularity in 

contravention of the Fourth Amendment. 

Defendant contends that Warrant II is invalid for two 

reasons: first, because it contains similar language to 

Warrant I, making it overbroad itself; and second, because it was 

the direct result of Warrant I, which is invalid. 

Like Warrant I, Warrant II lists in its description of 

property to be seized "any other item which the Officers have 

determined or have reason to believe is stolen." For the reasons 

stated above, this language makes Warrant II in violation of the 

particularity requirement. 

With the illegality of the search under Warrant I, it must be 

determined whether the evidence derived from Warrant II was "come 

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at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 

sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (quoting Maguire, 

Evidence of Guilt 221). Detective Radosevich testified he 

obtained Warrant II in order to seize the evidence observed but 

not taken during the execution of Warrant I. Since I find that 

the search under Warrant I is illegal, it is clear that Warrant II 

was a direct result of exploitation of that illegality. 

Therefore, for this second reason, the evidence seized pursuant to 

Warrant II may not be used against Defendant . 

During the execution of Warrant II, the state officers 

discovered a methamphetamine laboratory, drug paraphernalia, and 

suspected methamphetamine . Sergeant Rehm contacted the DEA and 

requested that personnel be sent to assist them in the 

investigation of the case. DEA Agents Brown and Spaulding 

responded to the request. The agents observed the laboratory and 

spoke with an Albuquerque Senior Criminalist/Drug Chemist 

regarding the laboratory. Based on this visit at the invitation 

of the state officers, Agent Brown requested and was issued 

Warrant III. 

Warrant III was thus derived entirely from the illegal 

presence and search under Warrant II. The DEA agents were called 

solely because of the discovery by the local officers of the 

methamphetarnine laboratory. The laboratory may have been 

assembled after the extended search under Warrant I. Warrant II 

was illegal. Warrant III exploits the illegal presence of the DEA 

agents on the premises under Warrant II by invitation of local 

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officers. This was the chance the agents had taken and the 

decision made in going on the premises under Warrant II illegally 

with the local officers. The record does not show whether there 

were town "people" on the premises at that time. 

The "good faith" exception of Leon cannot validate 

Warrant III. As mentioned, the DEA agents responded to a call 

from the state officers to assist the state officers in the 

execution of Warrant II. However, since that warrant was invalid, 

the DEA agents were assisting in the execution of an illegal 

search. The illegal search cannot subsequently be validated by 

obtaining a federal warrant. In United States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 

765 (10th Cir.), DEA agents seized a suitcase and held it for 

twenty-four hours before obtaining a search warrant. We stated 

that the search of the suitcase after the warrant was issued would 

not prevent us from evaluating the agent's behavior prior to the 

warrant, and held that since the DEA agents were not acting in 

reliance on a search warrant when they seized the suitcase and 

held it for twenty-four hours, Leon does not ratify their actions. 

Similarly, before the DEA agents in this case obtained 

Warrant III, they were illegally present on the premises pursuant 

to Warrant II. Thus, as in Scales, Warrant III cannot ratify 

their presence . Because I find that the officers who executed 

Warrant III had no valid purpose for being on the premises, the 

officers cannot rely on the "good faith" exception to the 

exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment. 

The majority cites several cases in which a warrant contained 

both specific and unconstitutionally broad language, and the court 

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severed the overbroad language from the warrant so that the 

remainder of the warrant was valid. These cases are factually 

distinguishable because they involve vague, broad, and general 

descriptions of property which can be placed in some general 

category to permit severance. In this case, the sentence at issue 

does not describe any tangible property, but instead describes the 

legal status of any items which may be encountered during the 

course of the search. The identification of the items is to be 

made during the search, and thus the warrant permits the searchseizure of absolutely anything at all believed to be stolen. The 

Supreme Court invalidated a similar warrant in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. 

v. New York, 442 U.S. 319. In that case, a warrant authorized the 

search of an adult bookstore and the seizure of two particular 

films as obscene, as well as "[t]he following items that the Court 

independently [on examination] has determined to be possessed in 

violation of Article 235 of the Penal Law " 442 U.S. at 

321-22 (footnote omitted). No items were listed following this 

statement, and the application stated that the purpose was to 

allow the Town Justice to determine independently if any other 

items at the store were possessed in violation of law and subject 

to seizure . The Court stated: 

"This search warrant and what followed 

the entry on petitioner's premises are 

reminiscent of the general warrant or writ of 

assistance of the 18th century against which 

the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect. 

Except for the specification of copies of the 

two films previously purchased, the warrant 

did not purport to 'particularly describ(e] .. . the .. . things to be seized. ' U.S. 

Const., Arndt . 4. Based on the conclusory 

statement of the police investigator that 

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other similarly obscene materials would be 

found at the store, the warrant left it 

entirely to the discretion of the officials 

conducting the search to decide what items 

were likely obscene and to accomplish their 

seizure. The Fourth Amendment does not permit 

such action." 

442 U.S. at 325 (citations omitted.) In United States v. Leary, 

846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. ) , the affidavit recited the attempted sale 

of a particular device. We held that a warrant that was limited 

by the requirement that the documents had to relate to the 

purchase, sale, and illegal exportation of materials in violation 

of the federal export laws provided no limitations at all. In 

holding that the warrant authorized a general search in 

conjunction with a federal crime and was overbroad on its face, we 

concluded that even if the reference to the federal statute was a 

limitation, it did not constitute a constitutionally adequate 

particularization of the items to be seized. Thus, we stated in 

Leary: 

"While some federal statutes may be narrow 

enough to meet the fourth amendment's 

requirement, the two statutes cited by the 

Kleinberg warrant cover a broad range of 

activity and the reference to those statutes 

does not sufficiently limit the scope of the 

warrant." 

846 F.2d at 601. Certainly, based on the affidavit, if this Leary 

warrant referencing two specific statutes is not particular 

enough, the warrant in this case, authorizing items which are 

reasonably believed to be "stolen", is overbroad. "As an 

irreducible minimum, a proper warrant must allow the executing 

officers to distinguish between items that may and may not be 

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seized." Leary, 846 F.2d at 602 (footnote omitted). As in Leary. 

the warrant here concerned does not provide such guidelines. 

The warrant before us was a general warrant on its face, and 

with the officers' statement as to what they could do when on the 

premis~s, and with what they actually did, the warrant in its 

entirety was used as a general warrant . Its original nature was 

thereby confirmed. What the officers did and could do revealed 

the nature of the warrant in its entirety. What they did was to 

"search" using 10-12 officers for some 50-55 hours--apparently 

over two or three days (a later affidavit recites that the search 

terminated the night of January 31, 1991 at 2030 hours--it began 

January 29), brought in members of the public to assist, and 

turned over some items to them. The property listed as seized is 

typical of a general warrant as were the actions of the officers. 

It was almost identical with Lo-Ji Sales. Inc. 

The most serious matter was that the warrant expressly 

authorized the officers themselves to determine probable cause 

after the search began. This was a true indicia of a general 

warrant. The search was a "rummaging," which the warrant 

permitted. The officers were illegally on the premises from the 

outset, and this also invalidated the later two warrants based on 

the original entry. Accordingly, I would suppress the evidence. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 91-2279 Document: 010110157325 Date Filed: 01/21/1993 Page: 19