Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00062/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00062-29/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennise Castro-Lopez
Defendant
Julio Chavez-Lucatero
Defendant
Bryan Sahagun
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Destaney Walker
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

United States Attorney 

LAUREL J. MONTOYA 

Assistant United States Attorney 

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 

Fresno, CA 93721 

Telephone: (559) 497-4000 

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

United States of America 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JULIO CHAVEZ-LUCATERO, 

DENNISE CASTRO-LOPEZ, 

DESTANEY WALKER, AND 

BRYAN SAHAGUN, 

 Defendants. 

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00062-JLT-KSO 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER 

DATE: December 7, 2022 

TIME: 1:00 p.m. 

COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto 

This case is set for a status conference on December 7, 2022. The parties stipulate and request 

the Court to order that the jury trial be set for January 30, 2024. This General Order was entered to 

address public health concerns related to COVID-19. Further, pursuant to General Order 614, 620, 624, 

628, and 630 and the CARES Act, this Court’s declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 

3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s judicial 

emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 1, 

2020.1

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

1

 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

Case 1:20-cr-00062-JLT-SKO Document 111 Filed 12/02/22 Page 1 of 4
 

2 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”). 

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, 618, and 620 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the 

case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).2

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

2

 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Case 1:20-cr-00062-JLT-SKO Document 111 Filed 12/02/22 Page 2 of 4
 

3 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”). 

STIPULATION 

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through defendants’ counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By this stipulation, parties now move to set the jury trial for January 30, 2024, and to 

exclude time from December 7, 2022, to January 30, 2024 under Local Code T4. 

2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports, photographs, cell phone records, and related documents in 

electronic form, which are voluminous in nature. All of this discovery has been either produced 

directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. 

b) Defense counsel has requested additional discovery that the government is 

attempting to obtain, review, and process if necessary. 

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence. 

d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 7, 2022 to January 30, 

2024, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

Cal. March 18, 2020). 

Case 1:20-cr-00062-JLT-SKO Document 111 Filed 12/02/22 Page 3 of 4
 

4 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED. 

Dated: December 1, 2022 PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

United States Attorney 

/s/ LAUREL J. MONTOYA 

 LAUREL J. MONTOYA 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: December 1, 2022 /s/ MARC DAYS 

MARC DAYS 

Counsel for Defendant 

Julio Chavez-Lucatero 

 Dated: December 1, 2022 /s/ KEVIN P. ROONEY 

 KEVIN P. ROONEY 

 Counsel for Defendant 

 Dennise Castro-Lopez 

 Dated: December 1, 2022 /s/ MONICA BERMUDEZ 

 MONICA BERMUDEZ 

 Counsel for Defendant 

 Bryan Sahagun 

 Dated: December 1, 2022 /s/ ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI 

 ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI 

 Counsel for Defendant 

 Destaney Walker 

ORDER 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 

 THE HONORABLE SHEILA K. OBERTO 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

12/2/2022

Case 1:20-cr-00062-JLT-SKO Document 111 Filed 12/02/22 Page 4 of 4