Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00585/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00585-15/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brame
Defendant
California Highway Patrol
Defendant
Harrison Orr
Plaintiff
Plumb
Defendant
State of California
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HARRISON ORR, individually,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a 

public entity; STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA, a public entity; 

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

OFFICERS BRAME, PLUMB, and 

DOES 1-10 individually,

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:14-585 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: RULE 

50(b) MOTION

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Harrison Orr brought this action against

defendants California Highway Patrol (“CHP”), Officer Jay Brame,

and Officer Terrence Plumb, arising out of plaintiff’s arrest on 

August 3, 2013. Plaintiff alleged that the officers unlawfully 

arrested him and used excessive force against him in violation of 

state and federal law. The case went to trial and on June 17, 

2015, the jury returned a verdict in part for plaintiff on claims 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 1 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

against Officer Plumb for $125,000. Presently before the court 

is Plumb’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law 

pursuant to Rule 50(b).

As shown by the evidence at trial, on the morning of

August 3, 2013, Officer Brame pulled plaintiff over because he 

suspected him of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 

At the time, plaintiff was a 76-year-old man with slurred speech 

and difficulties balancing, resulting from a brain stem stroke he 

suffered in 2006. Plaintiff’s disabilities caused him to fail 

several sobriety tests. As a further measure, Officer Plumb 

arrived at the scene with a breathalyzer testing device. 

Plaintiff blew a 0.0, indicating he had not been drinking. 

Plaintiff testified that he repeatedly told the officers he had 

suffered from a stroke which affected his balance, while the 

officers insisted at trial that plaintiff used the word 

“neurological condition.” The officers nevertheless determined 

that plaintiff must be under the influence of drugs and decided 

to arrest him.

Although plaintiff was initially cooperative, he 

refused to be handcuffed. In an attempt to handcuff plaintiff, 

the officers grabbed him from either side, Plumb punched 

plaintiff in his stomach, and the officers took plaintiff to the 

ground.

Officer Brame then took plaintiff to the CHP office for 

further evaluation. When it was determined he was not under the 

influence of drugs, he was booked for resisting arrest in 

violation of California Penal Code section 148. Plaintiff 

remained at the county jail until approximate 1:00 a.m.

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 2 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The jury did not find Brame or the CHP liable on any of 

plaintiff’s claims. It returned a verdict against Plumb on the 

following claims: (1) unlawful arrest for the offense of 

resisting arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California 

state law; (2) the use of excessive force in violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law; and (3) interfering with 

civil rights in violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. 

Plumb challenges the jury’s verdict on the grounds of legal 

insufficiency and also asserts that he is entitled to qualified 

immunity on plaintiff’s federal claims.

I. Excessive Force

Although a claim of battery by a police officer under 

California law does not require proof of the same elements as a

Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

for purposes of simplification, the parties agreed the jury could 

be instructed that if they found on plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that 

a defendant used excessive force on plaintiff, then plaintiff had 

established his claim for battery by a peace officer against that 

defendant under state law. Accordingly, in considering the 

pending motion under Rule 50(b), the court will analyze the 

sufficiency of the evidence on both of those claims by the same 

standards.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A motion for judgment as a matter of law on a claim may 

be granted under Rule 50 only if there was no legally sufficient 

basis for a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff on that 

claim. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 859 (9th Cir. 

2002). The court must generally draw all reasonable inferences 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 3 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

in favor of the plaintiff and may not make credibility 

determinations or weigh the evidence. Johnson v. Paradise Valley 

Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001).

Under both § 1983 and California law, whether force was 

unlawful turns on whether “the officers’ actions are ‘objectively 

unreasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 

them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” 

Graham v. Conor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The reasonableness 

analysis considers a variety of factors, including (1) the 

severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) 

whether he was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). These factors are 

non-exhaustive. The trier may also consider (4) the availability 

of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a suspect, see

id.; and (5) whether a warning was given where the force could 

have resulted in serious injury, if giving the warning was 

feasible, see Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1284 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

The jury was properly instructed that it could consider 

the foregoing factors in analyzing Plumb’s use of force, and 

competent counsel on both sides were given a full opportunity to 

argue their respective positions on the question of whether the 

amount of force used was reasonable under the circumstances. In 

making its determination, the jury not only had the benefit of 

hearing the testimony of the witnesses but also to observe them 

as they testified. Beyond that, the plaintiff and each of the 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 4 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

defendants sat and moved about the courtroom in the presence of 

the jurors throughout the nine-day trial. The jury thus had the 

unique ability to assess the relative prowess of plaintiff and 

defendants far better than can be described verbally in terms of 

pounds, inches, or years.

The evidence showed that plaintiff had agreed to submit 

to arrest, but explained to the officers that he was afraid of 

being handcuffed. He folded his arms in front of him, tensed his 

muscles and twisted his body to avoid being handcuffed. The 

officers flanked plaintiff and grabbed his arms. Before

plaintiff was forcibly taken to the ground and handcuffed, Plumb 

punched him in the stomach. Plumb described this as a 

“distraction blow” to divert plaintiff’s attention away from what 

he was doing. (Plumb Trial Tr. at 67:23-68:1, 82:25-83:2 (Docket 

No. 152-2).) 

After considering all the evidence, the court’s 

instructions, and the arguments of counsel, after two days of 

deliberation, the jurors unanimously found that the amount of 

force used by Officer Plumb was excessive. There was ample 

evidence to support the jury’s verdict. First, the “crimes” at 

issue could hardly have been more minor. Plaintiff’s only crime 

consisted of driving five miles per hour slower (sic) than the 

recommended speed on a dangerous curve and making what Officer 

Brame opined was an unsafe lane change. Although the officers 

also suspected plaintiff of being under the influence of some 

unspecified drug, he was not.

Second, there was no evidence that plaintiff posed any 

appreciable threat to the officers’ safety. Plaintiff was a 76-

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 5 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

year old disabled man confronted by two young officers. He had 

been a “model citizen” up to the point that he refused to be 

handcuffed. (Brame Trial Tr. at 127:5-11.) He was well dressed 

in what appeared to be golf clothes and demonstrated none of the 

behavior of a dangerous criminal.

At one point before Plumb punched him, Plumb said 

plaintiff raised his arms with his hands balled up in fists on 

either side of his face, palms facing forward, and elbows bent at 

an angle, as shown in the photo attached to this Order. (See

Plumb’s Dep. Vol. II at 63:22-64:13.) Brame testified that he 

saw no such thing. Assuming the jury accepted Plumb’s testimony 

on this point, which the court seriously doubts, it was for the 

jury to decide whether that stance was aggressive, as Plumb 

attempted to portray it, or defensive. The jury was entitled to 

find that--far from providing justification for the so-called 

“distraction blow”--plaintiff’s gesture was more reasonably 

interpreted as one of submission, which would have made it easier 

rather than harder to place the handcuffs on plaintiff without 

punching him. 

Further, after he was pulled to the side of the road, 

plaintiff posed no conceivable danger to other persons either. 

Because the stop took place on the side of the highway, no other 

pedestrians were present. Brame testified that the only thing he 

considered an immediate threat to officer safety was that 

plaintiff’s behavior prolonged the stop on the side of the 

highway, which is “not a safe location.” (Brane Trial Tr. at 

135:1-21.) However, it was Brame, not plaintiff, who chose the 

side of the highway as the location for the stop, and could have 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 6 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

moved the proceedings to another location if he had so chosen. 

(Id. at 135: 22-136:7.) 

Third, plaintiff was certainly not trying to avoid 

arrest by flight. Whether his resistance to being handcuffed 

could be called active or passive is more a semantic question 

than anything else. Fourth, there was evidence from plaintiff’s 

expert witness of the availability of alternative methods of 

taking plaintiff into custody. And fifth, neither of the 

officers warned plaintiff ahead of time that if he continued to 

resist being handcuffed he would be punched, or thrown to the 

ground, or that any other violent action would be taken against 

him.

Thus, considering all of the Graham factors summarized 

above, there was more than sufficient evidence presented at trial 

permitting the jury to rationally conclude from all of the facts

and circumstances that Plumb’s use of force was excessive in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment and state law. 

B. Qualified Immunity

The jury expressly found that Plumb violated 

plaintiff’s right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from the 

use of excessive force in making an arrest. The court finds no 

reason to overturn that finding. In the qualified immunity 

analysis, the court must then address the questions of whether 

that right was clearly established and whether a reasonable 

officer would understand that his conduct violated that clearly 

established law. See Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 

1123 (9th Cir. 2011). Qualified immunity is only available on 

plaintiff’s federal claim under § 1983 and not on his state law 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 7 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

battery claim. 

Whether the unlawfulness of certain conduct is clearly 

established “depends largely ‘upon the level of generality at 

which the relevant legal rule is to be identified.’” Wilson v. 

Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 

483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). The right must be defined in a 

“particularized, and hence more relevant, sense,” requiring a 

court to strike a balance between defining a right too generally 

so that the definition necessarily leads to the conclusion that 

the right is clearly established and defining the right too 

narrowly so that prior precedent must mirror the facts of the 

case in order to conclude that the right has been clearly 

established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202–03 2001). 

“The Supreme Court has made clear that ‘officials can 

still be on notice that their conduct violates established law 

even in novel factual circumstances.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 

F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 

730, 741 (2002)). The Ninth Circuit has noted the importance of 

that principle “in the context of Fourth Amendment cases, where 

the constitutional standard--reasonableness--is always a very 

fact-specific inquiry.” Id. This is especially so when the 

inquiry involves the amount or degree of force used.

Plumb testified that according to his training an 

officer may use a “distraction blow” to divert someone’s 

attention away from what they were doing to enable the officer to 

pursue another avenue to get what he needs done. The concept of 

the so-called distraction blow has been discussed in a number of 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 8 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

cases.1 Simply labeling something a “distraction blow,” however,

does not necessarily make it lawful, and any reasonable police 

officer should know that. The lawfulness of force in effecting 

an arrest always depends on the totality of the circumstances. 

It is not reasonable to punch a non-threatening disabled and 

defenseless senior citizen in the stomach just to get his 

attention, and any reasonable police officer should know that 

too.

A review of Ninth Circuit case law shows that, even 

when an arrestee refuses to comply with an officer’s 

instructions, the use of a punch, or a “distraction blow,” is 

 

1 See, e.g., Russell v. City and County of San Francisco, Civ. No. 3:12-00929 

JCS, , 2013 WL 2447865 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (denying motion for summary 

judgment because factual issues remained as to whether officer’s use of a 

“distraction blow” to plaintiff’s face, from which plaintiff suffered a 

laceration and fractured neck, was reasonable under the circumstances);

Johnson v. Cortes, Civ. No. 3:09-039462011 SI, 2011 WL 445921 SI (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 4, 2011) (holding there was no Fourth Amendment violation where officers 

used distraction blows after plaintiff attempted to assault police officer);

Barber v. Santa Maria Police Dept., Civ. No. 2:08-062732010 DMG MLG, 2010 WL 

5559708 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010) (holding that officers’ use of three 

“distraction strikes” to plaintiff’s face and neck were objectively reasonable 

given that plaintiff was refusing to comply with the officers’ verbal 

commands, was attempting to destroy evidence, and was physically resisting 

attempts to handcuff him);

Vivero v. City of Merced Police Dept., Civ. No. 1:08-01751 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 

3625385 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (concluding the jury must sort through facts 

to determine whether officer’s use of “distraction blows to the face” was 

reasonable under the circumstances);

Wisler v. City of Fresno, Civ. No. 1:06-1694 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 2625865 (E.D. 

Cal. June 26, 2008) (concluding whether officer’s use of “distractions blows” 

was reasonable hinged on whether arrestee grabbed officer’s testicles before 

officer used “distraction blows,” which was disputed);

Gonazles v. Novosel, Civ. No. 3:07-04720 CRB, 2008 WL 4614665 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

16, 2008) (granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s excessive force claim 

because no reasonable juror could conclude the officers’ use of force, 

including four to six closed-fisted “distraction blows,” was unreasonable 

where it was in response to plaintiff’s aggressive and continuous violent).

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 9 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

impermissible when the arrestee’s conduct is non-threatening. 

In a case with circumstances surprisingly similar to 

the present one, the Ninth Circuit held that under the Graham

analysis, the use of force was objectively unreasonable. In 

Winterrowd v. Nelson, 480 F.3d 1181, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007), police 

pulled over the plaintiff suspecting that his license plates were 

invalid. When plaintiff did not produce a valid registration, 

police ordered him to get out of the car and put his hands behind 

his back. Id. The plaintiff explained to the officers that he 

could not put his hands behind his back because he had a shoulder 

injury. Id. The officers responded by forcing plaintiff onto 

the hood of the car, grabbing plaintiff’s right arm, and forcing 

it up, until the plaintiff screamed in pain. Id. The Ninth 

Circuit concluded that because the officers did not reasonably 

fear for their safety, the use of force was unreasonable. 

Winterrowd therefore clearly established that, absent conduct 

that is reasonably perceived as physical abuse or a threat to the 

safety of the officers or third parties, a mere refusal to comply 

with an officer’s instruction does not justify the use of force.

In the present case, even assuming Plumb’s version of 

the facts, it was unreasonable for Plumb to fear for his and 

Brame’s safety. Plaintiff’s hands-up posture could not 

reasonably have been interpreted by Plumb as “physical abuse” or 

an immediate threat to officer safety. Plaintiff “didn’t take a 

swing at the officers,” nor did the officers suspect plaintiff 

was carrying a weapon. See Winterrowd, 480 F.3d at 1184. 

Moreover, plaintiff was an elderly man who, up until 

the point the officers insisted on handcuffing him, was 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 10 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

cooperative and agreed to the arrest. Plumb admitted that when 

approaching Brame and plaintiff, “I couldn’t hear anything, but I 

didn’t see anything physical that would make me assume he was 

being uncooperative”. Like Winterrowd, plaintiff was initially 

pulled over for several traffic violations for which he could 

have received mere citations. See Winterrowd, 480 F.3d at 1184. 

While not a case on all fours, Winterrowd is amazingly similar to 

the present case in material respects, and was sufficient to 

place an officer like Plumb on notice that the kind of conduct he 

exhibited here was unacceptable. See Torres v. City of Madera, 

648 F.3d 1119, 1128 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e have never required a 

prior case on all fours prohibiting that particular manifestation 

of unconstitutional conduct to find a right clearly established.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), 

decided by the Ninth Circuit a decade before plaintiff’s arrest, 

likewise clearly established the similar principle that 

resistance to being handcuffed does not alone justify the use of 

force. In that case, police encountered plaintiff Bybee while 

they were enforcing a warrant to search a building for signs of 

tax evasion. Id. at 1060. Bybee objected to the search and 

officers threw her to the ground and forcibly handcuffed her. 

Id. Although Bybee “objected vociferously to the search and she 

‘passively resisted’ the handcuffing,” the court found “the need 

for force, if any, was minimal at best.” Id. at 1061. 

As discussed above, whether a suspect’s resistance is 

labeled “passive” or “active” is a question of degree and depends 

on the totality of the circumstances required under the Fourth 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 11 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Amendment. As the Ninth Circuit recently recognized,

“Resistance” . . . should not be understood as a 

binary state, with resistance being either completely 

passive or active. Rather, it runs the gamut from the 

purely passive protestor who simply refuses to stand, 

to the individual who is physically assaulting the 

officer. We must eschew ultimately unhelpful blanket 

labels and evaluate the nature of any resistance in 

light of the actual facts of the case.

Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 830 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Harry Orr’s objection to being handcuffed was expressed 

verbally and by folding his arms in front of him and moving side 

to side. Whether his resistance to the handcuffing is labeled as 

“passive” or “active,” like Bybee, plaintiff was agreeable to 

accompanying the officers to the CHP office, made no attempt to 

flee the scene, and did not pose a safety risk and made no 

attempt to flee the scene. See Meredith, 342 F. 3d at 1061.

Together, both Meredith and Winterrowd clearly 

established that Plumb’s use of a “distraction blow” to get 

plaintiff to comply with the handcuffing, absent any conduct that 

could reasonably be interpreted as a threat to officer safety, 

was an unreasonable use of force in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. 

Plumb cites several other cases which he argues clearly 

established that his use of force was reasonable. In Tatum v. 

City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 

2006), the court found an officer’s use of a control hold 

reasonable, given the suspect’s potentially violent behavior 

which posed a threat to himself, the police, and possibly 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 12 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

passersby. Tatum does not stand for the proposition that the use 

of a punch is reasonable under the circumstances of either that 

case or the present case; to the contrary, the case suggests that 

a use of a punch to control a suspect under similar circumstances 

would be unreasonable, id. at 1097. 

Plumb also cites Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485

F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007), arguing that it clearly established 

that a single punch can be a reasonable use of force in response 

to resistance. There, the court held that clearly established 

law put a reasonable officer on notice that “punching Blankenhorn 

to free his arms when, in fact, he was not manipulating his arms 

in an attempt to avoid being handcuffed was a Fourth Amendment 

violation.” Id. at 481. It does not follow from this holding 

that a distraction blow may be used any time an arrestee resists 

being handcuffed. Both Meredith and Winterrowd stand for the 

opposite principle. In fact, the Blankenhorn court itself in its 

qualified immunity analysis found it was clearly established that 

an officer must, before gang-tackling a subject, “first attempt[] 

a less violent means of arresting a relatively calm trespass 

suspect--especially one who had been cooperative in the past and 

was at the moment not actively resisting arrest.” Id. at 481. 

From all of these cases, it is clear that merely 

calling a punch a “distraction blow,” in department policy or on 

the witness stand, does not immunize an objectively unreasonable 

use of force from constitutional scrutiny. Neither does labeling 

a suspect’s resistance as “active.” Even viewing the facts in 

the light most favorable to Plumb--that is, accepting the story 

Plumb told on the stand which contravened all others--Plumb is 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 13 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s excessive force 

claim. The court must conclude that any reasonable officer in 

Plumb’s position would have known that his conduct violated 

clearly established law.

There was no legitimate explanation for why the 

distraction blow was necessary at all, other than possibly to 

retaliate against plaintiff for not following orders or for 

poking his finger at Plumb’s face while speaking with him. As 

long as the officers were going to take plaintiff to the ground 

anyway, Plumb could have bypassed the punch altogether and, with 

the assistance of Brame, immediately taken plaintiff to the 

ground to handcuff him as they did. Although the Attorney 

General persists in attempting to defend it, neither the jury nor 

the court can find any justification for that blow.

As the Supreme Court has instructed, the qualified 

immunity defense protects “all but the plainly incompetent or 

those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 

335, 341 (1986). The court expresses no opinion as to Officer 

Plumb’s competency. However, the court has no problem in 

concluding that Officer Plumb knowingly violated the law. 

Officer Brame testified unequivocally that the CHP required all 

of its officers to make a written report of any use of force. 

Although he admitted that he was fully aware of this rule, Plumb 

failed to ever make any written report of his striking of 

plaintiff. If he had truly believed he had done nothing wrong,

it is difficult to understand why he did not properly report it.

II. Unlawful Arrest for the Crime of Resisting Arrest

Again, while the elements of a § 1938 claim for 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 14 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

unlawful arrest are not the same as the elements of a false 

arrest claim under California law, for purposes of 

simplification, the parties agreed the jury could be instructed 

that if it found on plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest 

that Officer Brame and/or Officer Plumb unreasonably seized 

plaintiff by arresting him without probable cause, then plaintiff 

had established a claim for false arrest against that defendant 

under state law. For the same reasons, in considering the 

pending motion under Rule 50(b), the court will analyze the 

sufficiency of the evidence on both of those claims by the same 

standards.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Under both § 1983 and California state law, an arrest 

is unlawful if it was made without probable cause. “Probable 

cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances known 

to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded 

that there was a fair probability that [the suspect] had 

committed a crime.” United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 567, 573 

(9th Cir. 2004). “While conclusive evidence of guilt is of 

course not necessary under this standard to establish probable 

cause, ‘[m]ere suspicion, common rumor, or even strong reason to 

suspect are not enough.’” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 

1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 

1008 (9th Cir. 1984)). “The probable cause inquiry is an 

objective one, focusing on the facts known to the officer at the 

scene.” Fowler v. Cal. Highway Patrol, Civ. No. 3:13-1026, 2014 

WL 1665046, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2014) (citing Devenpeck v. 

Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004)). “The arresting officers’ 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 15 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

subjective intention . . . is immaterial in judging whether their 

actions were reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Lopez, 

482 F.3d at 1072.

The jury found that Plumb did not have probable cause 

to arrest plaintiff for the crime of resisting arrest in 

violation of California Penal Code section 148. The court 

instructed the jury that section 148 makes it a crime to 

willfully resist, delay, or obstruct a police officer in the 

lawful performance or attempted lawful performance of his duties. 

(Jury Instruction No. 11); see Cal Pen. Code § 148. The court 

further instructed that “[a] police officer is not lawfully 

performing his or her duties within the meaning of the statute if 

he is unlawfully arresting someone or using unreasonable or 

excessive force when making or attempting to make an otherwise 

lawful arrest or detention.” (Jury Instruction No. 11); see

People v. White, 101 Cal. App. 3d 161, 166 (4th Dist. 1980) 

(holding a person cannot be convicted of violating section 148 

when the arrest was unlawful); id. at 167 (holding an arrest is 

unlawful if the officers lacked probable cause or used excessive 

force). 

Neither side objected to this instruction, nor do they

now disagree with the proposition of law it embodies. Under this 

instruction, because the jury found that Plumb used excessive 

force in making the arrest, they had no choice but to conclude 

that the arrest was unlawful. Since Plumb knew of his use of

excessive force, it had to follow that he did not have probable 

cause to arrest plaintiff for violating § 148. The evidence was 

sufficient to support the verdict.

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 16 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

Defendant confounds the issue by arguing that it was 

Brame, and not Plumb, who made the arrest for the crime of 

resisting arrest. That argument might carry some weight if the 

arrest for the crime of resisting arrest took place away from the 

scene after plaintiff was cleared of driving under the influence. 

However, that was not defendants’ theory at trial nor was it 

supported by the evidence. First, it was not defendants’ theory 

at trial because in settling instructions, the court proposed 

that the following question be included in the verdict form: 

“After it was determined at the CHP office that plaintiff was not 

under the influence of drugs, did the officer(s) unlawfully 

arrest plaintiff for resisting arrest in violation of California 

Penal Code Section 148?” Counsel for defendants opposed this 

question, insisting the jury be left to decide when the arrest 

for resisting arrest occurred. Counsel represented that 

defendants wanted the jury to be able to conclude for themselves 

whether the arrest took place at the office or previously at the 

scene on the highway. The court accommodated defendant’s request 

and struck the phrase “after it was determined at the CHP office 

that plaintiff was not under the influence of drugs.”

Second, all the evidence at trial supported a finding 

that plaintiff was arrested for the crime of resisting arrest at 

the scene on the side of the highway, while Plumb was present. 

Plumb testified that he warned plaintiff at the scene that if he 

did not agree to be handcuffed, he would arrest him for 

resisting. (Plumb Trial Tr. at 76.) Brame’s conduct also 

suggested he was taking plaintiff into custody for resisting 

arrest. Prior to the struggle with the two officers over the 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 17 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

handcuffing, Brame had told plaintiff that if he tested negative 

for drugs at the CHP office, then Brame would personally bring 

plaintiff back to his car, give him his keys, and send him on his 

way. (Brame Trial Tr. at 125:1-5.) Nevertheless, after the 

handcuffing incident, Brame inventoried plaintiff’s car to check 

for valuables before it could be taken into custody. (Id. at 

120:6-21.) 

Both Plumb and Brame’s conduct is consistent with the 

view that the purpose of the arrest had shifted from arrest for 

DUI to arrest for violation section 148, and that the arrest for 

the section 148 violation took place at the scene. It was 

reasonable for the jury to conclude from the evidence that 

plaintiff, as well as his car, were taken into custody because 

there was no longer any thought of taking plaintiff back to his 

car if he tested negative for drugs but that instead plaintiff 

was going to be taken to the jail and booked for resisting 

arrest.

Assuming it found the arrest for resisting arrest took 

place at the scene, the jury could also have reasonably concluded 

that Plumb, who was present at the scene, was a substantial 

factor in causing plaintiff’s arrest. (See Jury Instruction No. 

15 (defining substantial factor for the purposes of causation).) 

Moreover, the jury was instructed that

[a] police officer has a duty to intercede when their

fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a 

suspect or other citizen. If the defendant officer 

had a realistic opportunity to intercede in the other 

officer’s unlawful arrest of plaintiff, but failed to 

do so, the defendant can also be held liable for the 

unlawful arrest.

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 18 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

(Jury Instruction No. 12); see Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F. 3d 

1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000). Consistent with this instruction, 

the jury could have found that Plumb, who was present at the 

scene when plaintiff was arrested for resisting arrest, had a 

reasonable opportunity to intercede in an arrest he knew was 

unlawful. 

Perhaps defendant’s best argument is one that he hardly 

touches upon. Why? Most probably because it puts the Attorney 

General in a conflict of interests. It can be argued that the 

verdicts with respect to Plumb and Brame were inconsistent 

because the jury could not have reasonably found that Brame had 

probable cause to arrest plaintiff for resisting arrest, whereas 

Plumb did not. 

This argument, however, if successful, would place the 

Attorney General in a dilemna if she is to effectively represent 

both officers, because the remedy for truly inconsistent verdicts

generally is not to accept one verdict over the other but to 

order an entirely new trial. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 

U.S. 796, 806) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Malley-Duff & 

Associates v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 145 (3d Cir. 

1984); Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Nebeker, 541 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 

1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b)(4) (providing that where the jury’s 

answers to written questions are inconsistent with each other and 

the verdict, the remedy is to order a new trial)). Ordering a 

new trial would be detrimental to the interests of Brame, whom

the jury exonerated of all liability. The court cannot see how 

the Attorney General can persist in this argument on behalf of 

Plumb given its potential adverse effect on the other client to 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 19 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

whom she still owes the same duty of representation in this case

Nevertheless, to the extent the argument is made in 

Plumb’s brief, the court rejects it. Not only would a new trial 

be detrimental to Brame, it would be unfair to the plaintiff, 

whom the jury deemed entitled to compensation for his injuries, 

and unfair to the jurors who took time from their jobs and 

families to decide this case. A judge nevertheless retains 

authority to let an inconsistent verdict stand. Zhang v. Am. Gem 

Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 

cases).

“[W]hen faced with an apparently inconsistent verdict, 

a court has a duty to attempt to read the verdict in a manner 

that will resolve inconsistencies.” Heller, 475 U.S. at 806 

(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. 

Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963)). The law recognizes “the jury’s 

right to an idiosyncratic position, provided the challenged 

verdict is based upon the evidence and the law.” Malm v. U.S. 

Lines Co., 269 F. Supp. 731, 731-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 

The jury’s verdicts for Brame and against Plumb were 

perhaps idiosyncratic, but they can nevertheless supported by the 

evidence presented at trial. The jury, having found that Plumb 

used excessive force, could have reasonably concluded that Plumb 

was not “lawfully performing his duties” under Cal Pen. Code 

section 148. It was undisputed at trial that Brame did not see 

the punch occur, nor did Brame discover that Plumb had punched 

plaintiff until the time of the deposition. Brame was thus 

unaware of any facts suggesting plaintiff could not be resisting 

arrest because Plumb had used excessive force. Plumb, on the 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 20 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

other hand, had knowledge of his own unreasonable conduct, and 

could not have had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for 

resisting arrest because an element of that crime could not be 

met. See White, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 166 (holding a section 148 

violation only occurs when an officer was in the lawful 

performance of his duties).

Defendant argues that even if Plumb had knowledge that 

he had used excessive force, there was probable cause to arrest 

plaintiff for a section 148 violation because plaintiff resisted 

arrest before Brame punched him. (Def.’s Mem. at 17.) There was 

no clear-cut narrative that emerged from the testimony of the two 

officers. The jury could have found that Brame and Plumb each 

observed or were aware of a different set of facts, calling for 

two separate probable cause analyses under the Fourth Amendment. 

The two verdicts can thus be read harmoniously, and the 

court will not disturb the jury’s verdict against Plumb on this 

claim on the basis that it was unlikely given its verdict for 

Brame. Even if such a reading of the verdicts is inelegant, the 

court sees no reason to keep one and dispose of the other or to 

order a new trial.2 

B. Qualified Immunity

Again, qualified immunity is available only on 

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and not on his state law claim for false 

arrest. On this claim, the court finds that defendant’s

qualified immunity argument has no traction. The jury returned a 

 

2 Defendant does not attack the verdict against Plumb on the unlawful arrest 

claim upon the ground that it is inconsistent with the verdict in his favor on 

the claim of unlawful arrest for driving under the influence. The court 

therefore does not address that potential argument.

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 21 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

verdict that Plumb used excessive force. As discussed above, 

that verdict was supported by the evidence. It is clearly 

established that an officer lacks probable cause to arrest a 

suspect for resisting arrest under California law where the 

officer knew or should have known that at the time he was not in 

the lawful performance or attempted lawful performance of his 

duties. See Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 573; White, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 

166 (holding a section 148 violation only occurs when an officer 

was in the lawful performance of his duties).

Because Plumb used excessive force, he was not lawfully 

performing his duties when he punched plaintiff. As discussed, 

under clearly established law, Plumb was on notice that his use 

of force was excessive, and thus it would have been unreasonable 

for him to conclude otherwise. Plumb therefore either knew or 

should have known that an element of a section 148 violation was 

missing when Plumb arrested plaintiff, and he is not entitled to 

qualified immunity on the federal claim for unlawful arrest. 

III. Bane Act Claim

Qualified immunity does not apply to plaintiff’s Bane 

Act claims, so Plumb only challenges this claim based on the 

sufficiency of the evidence. The Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 

52.1, creates an individual cause of action where “a person . . . 

whether or not acting under the color of law, interferes by 

threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by 

threat, intimidation, or coercion” with a right secured by 

federal or state law. Id. § 52.1(a). Section 52.1 was 

originally adopted in response to a rise in hate crimes, but it 

is not limited to such crimes, nor does it require plaintiffs to 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 22 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

demonstrate discriminatory intent. Venegas v. County of Los 

Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 843 (2004) (holding that “plaintiffs 

need not allege that defendants acted with discriminatory animus 

or intent, so long as those acts were accompanied by the 

requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion”). The court’s 

instruction to the jury closely tracked the statute. (See Jury 

Instruction No. 20.)

Plumb argues that claims of Fourth Amendment violations 

of wrongful arrest and excessive force are insufficient alone to 

raise a Bane Act claim; there must be some additional element of 

blameworthy interference. (Def.’s Mem. at 15.) “[Plaintiff] has 

based his claim on the inherent coercive, threatening or violent 

nature of the punch as a constitutional violation in itself.” 

(Id.) 

The Ninth Circuit has recently held that a wrongful 

arrest claim will not necessarily on its own establish a claim 

under section 52.1. See Gant v. County of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 

608, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2014) (“There is little Bane Act precedent 

defining what constitutes ‘coercion’ independent from that which 

is inherent in a wrongful arrest, but . . . such conduct must be 

“intentionally coercive and wrongful, i.e., a knowing and 

blameworthy interference with the plaintiffs’ constitutional 

rights.” (citing Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 

4th 947, 961 (2d Dist. 2012)).

Courts have recognized, however, that establishing an 

excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment can also satisfy

the elements of section 52.1. See Chaudhry v. City of Los

Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014); Cameron v. Craig, 

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 23 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

713 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013); Bender v. County of Los 

Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 978 (2d Dist. 2013) (holding that 

where an arrest is unlawful and excessive force is applied in 

making the arrest, there has been coercion in violation of the 

Bane Act); Venegas, 32 Cal. 4th at 843.

Even if a Bane Act claim requires conduct in excess of 

the minimum required for showing an excessive force claim, there 

was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably 

concluded Plumb’s behavior was threatening, intimidating, or 

coercive. According to plaintiff, Plumb informed him he was 

going to be handcuffed without heeding plaintiff’s concerns about 

being able to balance. The jury could also have interpreted 

Plumb’s failure to inform Brame or provide a written report about 

the punch as an attempt to hide behavior he felt was blameworthy. 

Lastly, the jury could conclude that the punch constituted an 

interference with a civil right in excess of what is minimally 

required for a constitutional violation. There is thus a legally 

sufficient basis to support the jury’s verdict against Plumb on 

plaintiff’s Bane Act claim. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) for judgment as 

a matter of law be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

Dated: July 8, 2015

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 24 of 26
EXHIBIT G

Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 25 of 26 Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 158-7 Filed 07/01/15 Page 1 of 2
Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 162 Filed 07/08/15 Page 26 of 26 Case 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 158-7 Filed 07/01/15 Page 2 of 2