Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00114/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00114-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Irish Houston
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 Effective February 1, 2007, Michael J. Astrue was

confirmed by the Senate to serve as the Commissioner of Social

Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue should be substituted,

therefore, for Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the Defendant

in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this

suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

IRISH HOUSTON, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 06-0114-M

 :

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE1, :

Commissioner of :

Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Application for

Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. 23) and

Defendant's Notice of No Objection to Plaintiff’s Application for

Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc.

24). After consideration of the pertinent pleadings, it is

ORDERED that the Application be GRANTED, without objection, and

that Plaintiff's attorney be AWARDED an EAJA attorney's fee in

the amount of $1,462.50.

Plaintiff filed this action on March 1, 2006 (Doc. 1). On

September 12, 2006, upon written consent having been filed by the

parties (Doc. 13), Judge Steele referred this action to the

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undersigned Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to enter

final judgment (Doc. 14). On October 18, 2006, counsel filed a

Joint Motion to Waive Oral Argument (Doc. 19), which Joint Motion

was granted by the undersigned that same date (Doc. 20). On

October 20, 2006, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order

and Judgment, reversing and remanding this action to the

Commissioner for further proceedings, and entering judgment in

favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant (Docs. 21 and 22). On

January 12, 2007, Byron A. Lassiter, counsel for Plaintiff, filed

an Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, in which Plaintiff requests a fee of $1,462.50,

computed at an hourly rate of $125.00 for 11.7 hours spent in

this Court (Doc. 23). Defendant in the Notice of No Objection

filed January 25, 2007, stated that he has no objection to the

requested fee (Doc. 24).

 The EAJA requires a court to 

award to a prevailing party ... fees and

other expenses ... incurred by that party in

any civil action ..., including proceedings

for judicial review of Agency action, brought

by or against the United States ..., unless

the court finds that the position of the

United States was substantially justified or

that special circumstances make an award

unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA further requires that a

prevailing party file an application for attorney's fees within

thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. §

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2412(d)(1)(B). The court's judgment is final sixty days after it

is entered, which is the time in which an appeal may be taken

pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct.

2625, 2632 (1993).

Defendant concedes that Plaintiff became the prevailing

party when the Court remanded this action, Schaefer, 113 S.Ct. at

2631; that the fee application was timely filed; and that

Defendant’s position was not substantially justified (Doc. 24).

The EAJA, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is a fee-shifting statute. 

The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful starting

point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied

by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d

1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985)(EAJA), quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt,

461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983)(§ 1988). In

describing this lodestar method of calculation, the United States

Supreme Court stated:

This calculation provides an objective basis

on which to make an initial estimate of the

value of a lawyer’s services. The party

seeking an award of fees should submit

evidence supporting the hours worked and the

rates claimed. Where the documentation of

hours is inadequate, the district court may

reduce the award accordingly. The district

court also should exclude from this initial

fee calculation hours that were not

“reasonably expended” .... Cases may be

overstaffed, and the skill and experience of

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lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the

prevailing party should make a good-faith

effort to exclude from a fee request hours

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private

practice ethically is obligated to exclude

such hours from his fee submission. In the

private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an

important component in fee setting. It is no

less important here. Hours that are not

properly billed to one’s client also are not

properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant

to statutory authority.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use

professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should

only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he

would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on

vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836

F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).

 The Court, after examination of Plaintiff’s Application and

supporting documentation, and after consideration of the

reasonableness of the hours claimed, finds that Plaintiff’s time

expended in prosecuting this action before this Court for a total

of 11.7 hours is reasonable. 

With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to apply

in a given EAJA case, the express language of the Act provides in

pertinent part as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this

subsection shall be based upon prevailing

market rates for the kind and quality of the

services furnished, except that ... attorney

fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125

per hour unless the court determines that an

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2 Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour to

$125.00 per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp.

1997).

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increase in the cost of living or a special

factor, such as the limited availability of

qualified attorneys for the proceedings

involved, justifies a higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp. 1997).

In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be applied

in calculating attorney's fees under the Act.

The first step in the analysis, ... is to

determine the market rate for "similar

services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and

reputation." ... The second step, which is

needed only if the market rate is greater than

$75 per hour, is to determine whether the

court should adjust the hourly fee upward...to

take into account an increase in the cost of

living, or a special factor.

Id. at 1033-34 (citations omitted & footnote omitted)2. The

applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that

the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates. NAACP

v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more than the affidavit of

the attorney performing the work. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 (1984). Where the fees or time claimed

seem expanded or there is lack of documentation or testimony in

support, the court may make an award on its own experience. 

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Norman v. City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.

1988). Where documentation is inadequate, the court is not

relieved of its obligation to award a reasonable fee, but the

court traditionally has had the power to make such an award

without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. 

Id. 

The prevailing market rate in the Southern District of

Alabama is $125.00 per hour. See Smith v. Massanari, Civil Action

00-0812-P-M (October 25, 2001); Boone v. Apfel, Civil Action 99-

0965-CB-L (August 30, 2001); Lee v. Massanari, Civil Action 00-

0518-RV-S (June 29, 2001); Willits v. Massanari, Civil Action 00-

0530-RV-C (May 4, 2001); and Square v. Halter, Civil Action 00-

0516-BH-L (April 12, 2001). Because the market rate is not

greater than the statutory rate of $125.00 per hour, the Court

need not reach the second step set out in the Meyer case. 

Multiplying the 11.7 hours by the Southern District of Alabama

inflation-adjusted prevailing market rate of $125.00 results in a

fee of $1,462.50. 

 In conclusion, it is ORDERED, without objection, that

Plaintiff's Application be and is hereby GRANTED as set out above

and that Plaintiff's attorney be and is hereby AWARDED an EAJA

attorney's fee in the amount of $1,462.50.

DONE this 12th day of March, 2007.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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