Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00026/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00026-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Sandy Valdez
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDY VALDEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT BE DENIED AND 

THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER 

OF SOCIAL SECURITY BE AFFIRMED.

(ECF Nos. 13, 17)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

FOURTEEN DAYS

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Sandy Rae Valdez’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint for 

judicial review of an unfavorable decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration regarding her application for disability insurance benefits. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B) (providing for issuance of proposed findings of fact and recommendations); Local 

Rule 302(c)(15) (referring final social security decisions for findings and recommendations).

Plaintiff argues as follows:

A. The ALJ failed to incorporate all of Plaintiff’s limitations in the hypothetical questions 

posed to the vocational expert.

B. The ALJ failed to properly analyze Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony.

C. The ALJ improperly used activities of daily living to attack Plaintiff’s credibility in 

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

the subjective symptom analysis.

D. The ALJ did not properly consider Plaintiff’s obesity claim.

E. The ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff’s right hip pain, upper extremity numbness, 

depression and anxiety were non-severe impairments at step two.

Having reviewed the record, administrative transcript,

1

parties’ briefs, and the applicable 

law, the Court finds as follows.

I. ANALYSIS

A. Step Four

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred at step four by propounding hypotheticals to the 

vocational expert that omitted certain environmental limitations assessed in Plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”). (ECF No. 13-1 at 3–4; ECF No. 18 at 2–4). As a result, Plaintiff 

argues the vocational expert’s testimony lacked evidentiary value and it was improper for the ALJ 

to rely on the testimony to find that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. (ECF No. 13-1 

at 4). In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not commit legal error, and that the 

ALJ’s step four findings are supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 17 at 4–6).

“At step four, claimants have the burden of showing that they can no longer perform their 

past relevant work.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(e) and 416.920(e)). Past relevant work is work that was “done within the last 15 years, 

lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it, and was substantial gainful activity.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1565(a). “A claimant must be able to perform her past relevant work either as 

actually performed or as generally performed in the national economy.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 

F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) is the “best 

source for how a job is generally performed.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, SSA, 533 F.3d 1155, 1166 

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845). The ALJ may also rely on a vocational expert’s 

testimony at step four. See Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2) (providing that the 

agency “may use the services of vocational experts or vocational specialists, or other resources, 

such as the ‘Dictionary of Occupational Titles’” to determine whether the claimant can perform

1 ECF No. 12-1 through 12-11 comprise the sealed Administrative Record (“AR”). When citing to the 

record, the Court cites to the AR’s internal pagination in the lower right-hand corner of each page, rather 

than to the CM/ECF document number and page.

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

past relevant work). 

Despite the claimant’s burden at step four, “the ALJ still has a duty to make the requisite 

factual findings to support [her] conclusion.” Pinto, 249 F.3d at 844. The ALJ’s decision 

regarding a claimant’s past relevant work must be supported by substantial evidence, which “is 

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” 

when considering “the record as a whole.” Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 

1993) (per curiam).

In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work as 

defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567(b) with the following limitations:

The claimant is limited to occasional climbing ramps or stairs but never ladders, 

ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, crawl, or 

kneel. Additionally, the claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme 

cold, vibration, and hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights.

(AR 23). At issue here are the environmental limitations restricting Plaintiff’s exposure “to

extreme cold, vibration, and hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights.” (Id.) 

During the hearing, Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert testified regarding 

Plaintiff’s past work. Plaintiff testified that she began working at Del Monte Foods in February 

2003, and was a senior accounting analyst there when she went on long-term disability leave in 

May 2021. (AR 39, 46). Plaintiff indicated in her work background form that her job duties 

consisted of “analyz[ing] inventory transactions,” which she testified required “all [] day sitting

and lifting files.” (AR 46, 289). Relying on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), the 

vocational expert classified Plaintiff’s past work as an “accounting clerk, DOT code 216.482-010, 

sedentary, with an SVP of 5.” (AR 51). The ALJ posed three hypothetical questions to the 

vocational expert and Plaintiff’s attorney posed one follow-up hypothetical. (AR 51–52). The 

parties do not dispute that the hypotheticals to the vocational expert did not include any of the 

environmental limitations included in Plaintiff’s RFC. 

In her written decision, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff “is capable of 

performing past relevant work as an accounting clerk as actually and generally performed.” (AR 

26). In relevant part, the ALJ explained:

In comparing the claimant’s residual functional capacity with the physical and 

mental demands of this work, I find the claimant can return to their work as 

accounting clerk. In making this decision, I considered both the claimant’s 

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

description and testimony of their past work. Additionally, the vocational expert 

testified above residual functional capacity does not preclude the claimant from 

performing their past work as accounting clerk as they performed it and as it is

generally performed in the national economy.

(AR 26–27) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed clear legal error 

by relying on the vocational expert’s testimony at step four because the hypotheticals did not 

include the environmental limitations. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ did not overlook the environmental limitations 

in her step four analysis. Rather, the ALJ expressly acknowledged in her decision that the RFC 

contained “environmental limitations that were not presented to the vocational expert at the 

hearing,” but the ALJ stated that “according to the DOT, the position of accounting clerk does not 

have exposure to the environmental conditions such as extreme cold, vibration, and hazards.” 

(AR 27). Plaintiff does not point to any other evidence, either in the record or her testimony, 

showing that she was exposed to such environmental conditions in her past work. Therefore, 

Plaintiff did not meet her step four burden and the ALJ did not err in relying on the vocational 

expert’s testimony in conjunction with the DOT listing to find that Plaintiff’s past relevant work 

“does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by [Plaintiff’s] residual 

functional capacity.” (AR 26). 

Further, the Court’s review of the DOT listing for accounting clerk confirms that this 

listing does not include the environmental limitations assessed in Plaintiff’s RFC. See DICOT 

216.482-010 Accounting Clerk, 1991 WL 671933 (Jan. 1, 2016) (environmental conditions and 

hazards are either “not present” or “do[] not exist”). “From this it follows that the vocational 

expert’s answer to the hypothetical question[s] would not have been different” even if the 

environmental limitations “had been included as a part of the question[s].” McGarrah v. Colvin, 

650 F. App’x 480, 481 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Gaston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 577 F. 

App’x 739, 742 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ’s failure to include a reaching limitation in a hypothetical 

question was harmless error where the DOT listing for the job the vocational expert identified did 

not require such an ability). Thus, even if the ALJ erred by omitting the RFC’s environment 

limitations in the hypotheticals posed to the vocational expert, any error was harmless. See

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162 (explaining that an error is harmless when it is “inconsequential to 

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

the ultimate nondisability determination”) (citations omitted).

B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptoms

Plaintiff’s next two arguments concern the ALJ’s discounting of her subjective 

complaints. (ECF No. 13-1 at 4–11). First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to sufficiently identify 

her subjective symptom testimony and made a generalized “boilerplate statement that the record 

undermines [her] testimony.” (Id. at 8–9). Plaintiff asserts that the “ALJ did not link specific 

medical evidence to the relevant symptom testimony and explain why the former rendered the 

latter not credible.” (Id. at 8). Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “attempts to use activities of 

daily living to controvert Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, but never even attempts to 

meet the Ninth Circuit requirements to do so.” (Id. at 11).

The Commissioner counters that “substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of 

Plaintiff’s subjective testimony” and that the ALJ adequately explained how Plaintiff’s activities 

of daily living “were inconsistent with the severity of the symptoms she alleged.” (ECF No. 17 at 

6, 12).

As to a plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the Ninth Circuit has concluded as follows: 

Once the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the 

Commissioner may not discredit the claimant’s testimony as to subjective 

symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective evidence. Bunnell v. 

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Cotton v. Bowen, 

799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) (“it is improper as a matter of law to discredit 

excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is not fully corroborated by 

objective medical findings”). Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the 

claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s 

testimony must be “clear and convincing.” Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 

687 (9th Cir. 1989). General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify 

what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 

complaints.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). However, “[t]he 

standard isn’t whether [the] court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear 

enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). 

An ALJ’s reasoning as to subjective testimony “must be supported by substantial evidence in the 

record as a whole.” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995); see Carmickle, 533 

F.3d at 1161 (“Accordingly, our next task is to determine whether the ALJ’s adverse credibility 

finding of Carmickle’s testimony is supported by substantial evidence under the clear-andCase 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

convincing standard.”).

As an initial matter, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (AR 25). 

Accordingly, because there is no affirmative evidence showing that Plaintiff was malingering, the 

Court looks to the ALJ’s decision for clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial 

evidence, for not giving full weight to Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.

Here, the ALJ provided the following recitation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and 

her daily activities: 

The claimant alleges being unable to work because of lumbar degeneration status 

post fusion (May 2021), left knee pain status post partial joint replacement 

(October 2021), and hip pain. The claimant testified to significant pain resulting in 

difficulty sitting and walking. She reports balance issues requiring the use of a 

cane, specifically when going up or down a hill. Additionally, I acknowledge the 

claimant is obese. Ultimately, the representative argues the claimant is limited to 

less than sedentary exertional capacity and in simple and routine tasks.

The claimant lives in a house with her daughter. The claimant testified getting help 

from her daughter when it comes to “the lifting part” of activities. She reports 

having difficulties with grocery shopping, vacuuming, and laundry. Her hobbies 

include watching her grandchildren play sports. The claimant can manage her own 

finances without assistance. Additionally, I acknowledge the claimant completed a 

Function Report a few months following her lumbar surgery. During that recovery 

time, the claimant indicated significant difficulties in dressing, showering/bathing, 

using the toilet, and going outside alone. The claimant testified the only benefit of 

her back surgery is being able to stand straighter, but this is generally inconsistent 

with the evidence showing significant improvement, especially in pain.

(AR 23–24). 

Following this recitation, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s medical treatment, generally 

noting that Plaintiff’s physical impairments had improved with surgical intervention, medication

and physical therapy:

In May 2021, the claimant had a history of a lumbar degeneration along with a 

fusion at L4. She developed next segment disease, degenerative arthritis, and 

severe pain. 19F/4-9, 139. Christopher Ames, MD, the claimant’s orthopedic 

surgeon reported she had failed nonoperative treatment and ultimately performed a 

lumbar fusion at L3-L4 and L4-L5 without intraoperative complications. 8F/7-12, 

33-35.

Three months following surgery, Crystal Bravate, PA, reported the claimant was 

doing well and her pain had improved greatly despite some numbness in her feet. 

Examination revealed 5/5 motor strength. She was ambulating with an antalgic 

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

gait, but this was due to her left knee pain, which was in the process of being 

worked up. Diagnostic imaging revealed the claimant’s hardware as intact with 

improved alignment compared to preoperative images. She was recovering as 

expected. The claimant was treating with pain management and was referred to

start physical therapy. 20F/107-108.

Ian Duncan, MD, reported the claimant presented with left knee pain without 

traumatic injury. The claimant was using a knee brace to help with stability. 

11F/10. Diagnostic imaging revealed severe degenerative joint disease and the 

claimant underwent a left knee arthroplasty. 11F/15-16. Subsequently, the 

claimant reported being very pleased with the result and was without

complaints. She was overall better than before the surgery. The claimant was 

making significant improvement in physical therapy but was still using a walker to 

help her ambulate. 12F/2.

Physical therapy notes indicate the claimant was doing great and continuing 

exercises upon discharge. She was able to independently complete all activities 

and self-care without assistance. Gait and balance returned to normal. She was 

cleared to drive. 13F/12, 16, 17.

Jennifer Nelsen, NP, a pain specialist, reported the claimant’s back pain reached a 

baseline and despite some knee pain she was healing well. Examination revealed 

the claimant as obese (BMI 33) and in no acute distress. Her back was mildly 

tender with a reduced range of motion. Her knee retained normal motion without 

pain. Neurologically, the claimant had 5/5 motor strength, intact sensation, but an 

antalgic gait. However, she was able to stand without difficulty and mobilize 

without assistance. NP Nelsen assessed lumbar radicular pain status post-surgery 

and postoperative left knee pain. She was on opioid therapy without mention of 

side effects. She reported improved functional ability, including in attending to 

daily activities. 16F/2-6. 

In May 2022, John Burke, MD, a neurologist, reported the claimant was 

continuing to have occasional low back pain but was otherwise stable one year 

following lumbar surgery. She specifically denied weakness, numbness, or other 

neurological deficits. Examination revealed the claimant has 5/5 motor strength, 

ambulating in a normal fashion. Diagnostic imaging continued to show stability in 

comparison to prior postsurgical imaging. The doctor recommended the claimant 

continue to pursue therapy. 19F/1595-1596.

(AR 24). 

After discussing Plaintiff’s medical treatment, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s 

testimony regarding the severity of her impairments and her daily living activities was “not 

entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence.” (AR 24). The ALJ explained that:

The claimant testified she would be unable to work because of chronic pain in her 

back and knee. However, the medical evidence indicates the claimant’s pain 

improved greatly following back surgery and she was mostly concerned about her 

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

left knee. 8F/144. NP Nelsen indicated she was on opioid therapy without mention 

of side effects. She reported improved functioning, including in her ability to 

attend to daily activities.16F/2-6. Additionally, I acknowledge the claimant was 

very pleased with the result of her left knee arthroplasty. She was using a walker to 

help her ambulate during recovery but was eventually seen without any assistive 

[device]. 12F/2. Her gait was normal to antalgic thereafter. 13F/14, 16, 16F/5. 

Additionally, the claimant testified needing assistance with her activities of daily 

living, but physical therapy notes indicate she was independent in completing all 

activities, including self-care without assistance. 13F/12. Overall, I find the 

claimant’s statements generally inconsistent with the evidence of record.

After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with 

the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in 

this decision.

(AR 24–25).

Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that the ALJ provided “findings 

sufficiently specific to permit the [C]ourt to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit 

[Plaintiff’s] testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002); see Lambert v. 

Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Our cases do not require ALJs to perform a line-byline exegesis of the claimant’s testimony, nor do they require ALJs to draft dissertations when 

denying benefits.”). The ALJ reasonably determined that the medical evidence, which generally 

showed self-reported and objective improvement, was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations of 

disabling physical limitations. See Leonard v. Colvin, 633 F. App’x 362, 363 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“The ALJ offered specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Leonard’s testimony 

regarding the severity of his symptoms, including evidence that Leonard’s symptoms improved 

after his surgeries and the lack of evidence of post-surgery treatment.”); Morgan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that conflicts between testimony and 

objective medical evidence supported discounting a plaintiff’s credibility). Further, the ALJ made 

a reasonable determination that Plaintiff’s daily activities, as reported in her physical therapy and

other post-surgical treatment records, were inconsistent with her hearing testimony. Smartt, 53 

F.4th at 499 (“An ALJ may also consider whether the claimant engages in daily activities 

inconsistent with the alleged symptoms. Even if the claimant experiences some difficulty or pain, 

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

her daily activities may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that 

they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.”). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, 

supported by substantial evidence, for not giving full weight to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

C. Consideration of Obesity

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not properly analyze how her obesity affected her 

RFC. (ECF No. 13-1 at 12–13). 

An ALJ is required to consider an individual’s obesity at steps two through five of the 

sequential disability evaluation. SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281 (Sept. 12, 2002). Moreover, 

obesity must be considered in combination with the individual’s other impairments. Id. SSR 02-

1p directs that “[the ALJ] will not make assumptions about the severity or functional effects of 

obesity combined with other impairments.” Id. Rather, “[the ALJ] will evaluate each case based 

on the information in the case record.” Id. When the record does not contain evidence of 

functional limitation due to obesity, or indicate that obesity exacerbated other impairments, the 

ALJ is not required to consider obesity in combination with other impairments. Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Garcia v. Comm’r of SSA, 498 F. App’x 

710, 712 (9th Cir. 2012) (the ALJ’s finding that obesity did not impact the RFC was proper where 

the Plaintiff “did not provide any evidence of functional limitations due to obesity which would

have impacted the ALJ’s analysis”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hoffman v. Astrue, 266 

F. App’x 623, 625 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The ALJ’s failure to consider Hoffman’s obesity in relation 

to his RFC was proper because Hoffman failed to show how his obesity in combination with 

another impairment increased the severity of his limitations.”).

In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s obesity was a severe impairment at step two. (AR 

20). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s obesity, either alone or in combination with 

Plaintiff’s other impairments, did not meet or medically equal a listing. (AR 22). Next, in the 

RFC discussion, the ALJ explicitly stated that she considered Plaintiff’s obesity in formulating 

Plaintiff’s RFC. (AR 22). In particular, the ALJ found persuasive the findings of a physical 

medical consultant who took into account Plaintiff’s obesity. (AR 25). The ALJ ultimately 

formulated an RFC that limited Plaintiff to a “reduced range of sedentary exertion” due to the 

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

“combination of [Plaintiff’s] obesity and musculoskeletal impairments.” (Id.) The ALJ explained: 

[The] residual functional capacity assessment is supported by evidence such as the

findings of the medical consultants, diagnostic testing, physical examinations, 

surgical intervention, type of treatment, response to treatment, third-party 

statements, the claimant’s admitted activities and the record. The claimant is obese 

with back and knee pain status post surgeries. Examinations reveal the claimant in 

no acute distress. She had a reduced range of motion in her back and tenderness in 

her left knee. Although the claimant has an antalgic gait, the claimant can stand 

and walk without assistance. There were no persistent issues with sitting. In fact, 

the claimant reported significant improvement in her back pain following surgery 

and was very pleased with the outcome of the left knee arthroscopy. Additionally, 

physical therapy notes indicate the claimant was able to perform activities without 

assistance, including independently performing self-care and driving. All these 

supports limiting the claimant to sedentary exertion with mostly occasional 

postural movements and limitations in climbing and environment.

(AR 26). 

Based on the above, it is clear that the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s obesity in her RFC 

assessment. Plaintiff does not point to “any evidence of functional limitations due to obesity

which would have impacted the ALJ’s analysis.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 683; see also Tsosie v. 

Berryhill, 717 F. App’x 680, 682 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[Plaintiff] has not shown that the ALJ ignored 

any relevant evidence of obesity that could have affected his residual functional capacity 

determination. We therefore find that the ALJ gave legally sufficient consideration to [Plaintiff’s] 

obesity.”) (internal citation omitted). Because the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s obesity in 

conjunction with her other impairments and Plaintiff points to no functional limitations that the 

ALJ did not consider, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s treatment of Plaintiff’s obesity.

D. Step Two

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously determined that her right hip pain, upper 

extremity numbness, depression and anxiety were non-severe impairments at step two. (ECF No. 

13-1 at 13–14). In response, the Commissioner argues that the substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s step two findings. (ECF No. 17 at 13–14).

The Ninth Circuit has provided the following guidance regarding whether medically

determinable impairments are severe under Step Two: 

An impairment or combination of impairments may be found “not severe only if

the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal 

effect on an individual’s ability to work.” [Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 

(9th Cir. 1996)] (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see Yuckert 

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988). The Commissioner has stated that 

“[i]f an adjudicator is unable to determine clearly the effect of an impairment or 

combination of impairments on the individual’s ability to do basic work activities, 

the sequential evaluation should not end with the not severe evaluation step.” 

S.S.R. No. 85–28 (1985).

Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686-87 (9th Cir. 2005). A step two finding must be supported 

by substantial evidence, which “is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 686.

Regarding Plaintiff’s right hip pain, the ALJ observed at step two that since Plaintiff’s hip 

surgeries, which occurred a decade before Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, there was “minimal 

treatment in the current record” for hip-related issues. (AR 20–21). The ALJ noted that diagnostic 

evidence confirmed Plaintiff’s total hip prosthesis remained in place and that Plaintiff reported in 

May 2021 that her symptoms were “not believed to be related to her prior hip issues.” (Id. at 21).

The ALJ found there was “no evidence the claimant’s right hip pain causes more than a minimal 

limitation in her ability to perform basic work functions,” and as such, the ALJ concluded it was a 

non-severe impairment. (Id.)

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s upper extremity numbness was not a severe impairment for 

similar reasons. (AR 21). The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony that she had “numbness in her 

arms but admitted it did not interfere with her ability to use her arms during the day.” (Id.) The 

ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s testimony was consistent with medical evidence showing that “she

had no loss of sensation in her upper extremities and retained full motor strength.” (Id.) Although 

the ALJ found the numbness to be nonsevere, the ALJ stated that limiting Plaintiff to sedentary 

exertion would “fully account for her allegations.” (Id.)

As to Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had medically 

determinable impairments of depression and anxiety, but concluded that they were non-severe

because they caused “no more than ‘mild’ limitation in any of the functional areas and the 

evidence does not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal limitation in [Plaintiff’s] 

ability to do basic work activities.” (AR 21–22). In reaching this determination, the ALJ pointed 

to Plaintiff’s testimony that she had not been diagnosed with any mental conditions. (AR 21, 46). 

The ALJ also addressed in detail the four functional areas set out in the “Paragraph B” criteria for 

evaluating mental impairments. (AR 21–22). The ALJ’s analysis of the four functional areas 

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

specifically contrasted Plaintiff’s subjective statements about her mental limitations with the 

relevant objective medical evidence. Finally, the ALJ stated that her RFC formulation, which 

included no mental limitations, “reflect[ed] the degree of limitation [the ALJ] found in the 

‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.” (AR 22).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step two findings regarding Plaintiff’s right hip 

pain, upper extremity numbness, and mental impairments. Plaintiff does not identify any evidence

that the ALJ failed to consider or otherwise explain why the record does not support the ALJ’s 

step two findings. As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not shown error. 

II. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) be DENIED.

2. The Commissioner of Social Security’s request to affirm the agency’s decision (ECF 

No. 17) be GRANTED. 

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner of 

Social Security and close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 

(14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” The objections shall not exceed more than fifteen (15) pages, 

including exhibits. Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) 

days after service of the objections. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result 

in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2025 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:24-cv-00026-JLT-EPG Document 19 Filed 01/17/25 Page 12 of 12