Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03077/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aaron Bruns
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 9, 2010 Decided June 7, 2011

No. 09-3077

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

AARON BRUNS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cr-00100)

Roman Martinez, former Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman and Patricia

Z. Stewart, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Roy W. McLeese III,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit

Judge, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #09-3077 Document #1311833 Filed: 06/07/2011 Page 1 of 7
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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: A conviction for

possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) typically carries a maximum sentence of ten

years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). But if the

defendant “has a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any State

relating to . . . child pornography,” the statute requires a ten-year

minimum sentence. Ibid.1

 The question in this appeal is

1

 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) provides: 

Any person who * * * knowingly possesses . . . any

book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape,

computer disk, or any other material that contains an

image of child pornography that has been mailed, or

shipped or transported in interstate or foreign

commerce by any means, including by computer, or

that was produced using materials that have been

mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or

foreign commerce by any means, including by

computer * * * shall be punished as provided by

subsection (b).

Subsection (b)(2) states:

Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate,

subsection (a)(5) shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but, if

such person has a prior conviction under this chapter,

chapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under

section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice), or under the laws of any

State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual

abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor

or ward, or the production, possession, receipt,

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whether Aaron Bruns had such a “prior conviction” under the

laws of the State of Michigan. 

In 1999, Bruns, then nineteen years old, pled guilty in a

Michigan state court to distributing child pornography via the

Internet, a felony under Michigan law. The court accepted his

guilty plea, “assigned [him] to youthful trainee status” pursuant

to the Michigan Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, MICH. COMP.

LAWS §§ 762.11–.15, and imposed a sentence of three years’

probation. Two years later, the court granted Bruns an early

discharge and dismissed his case. 

In 2009, in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, Bruns pled guilty to a one-count information

charging him with possessing child pornography in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). In light of the Michigan proceeding, the district court sentenced Bruns to ten years’ imprisonment. The court stated that it would have imposed a lesser

sentence but for the statute’s mandatory minimum.

The Michigan Holmes Act applies to persons who commit

a criminal offense between the ages of seventeen and twentyone. The Act authorizes Michigan courts to “assign” an

individual to youthful trainee status and sentence him “without

entering a judgment of conviction” if the individual pleads

guilty to an offense other than those the Act exempts. MICH.

COMP. LAWS § 762.11. Under the Act, an assignment to

youthful trainee status “is not a conviction for a crime” and the

individual “shall not suffer a civil disability or loss of right or

privilege” because of it. Id. § 762.14(2). If the individual

mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation

of child pornography, such person shall be fined

under this title and imprisoned for not less than 10

years nor more than 20 years.

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successfully completes his sentence, the court dismisses the

case. Id. § 762.14(1).

This description of the Michigan Holmes Act seems—and

we emphasize “seems”—to indicate that the disposition of

Bruns’ guilty plea in the Michigan court was not a state-law

conviction. The district court nevertheless treated it as a

conviction for purposes of federal sentencing. The court relied

on the holding of Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460

U.S. 103 (1983), superseded by statute, Firearms Owners’

Protection Act, P.L. 99-308, § 101, 100 Stat. 449, 449-51

(1986), that the meaning of “convicted in any court” as used in

federal gun-control legislation did not depend on what constituted a conviction under state law. Absent a “plain indication to

the contrary,” the Court assumed that Congress would not make

the application of the federal law turn on the “vagaries of state

law.” Id. at 117, 119. “[F]or purposes of the federal gun control

laws, we equate a plea of guilty and its notation by the state

court, followed by a sentence of probation, with being ‘convicted.’” Id. at 114. An individual who pled guilty in state court

was therefore not eligible for a federal license to sell firearms

even though the state court later expunged the record of the

proceedings. Id. at 105.

Bruns points out the difference between the statutory

language in Dickerson—“convicted in any court”—and the

language of the child pornography statute—“has a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any State relating to . . . child pornography.” The reference to state law in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2),

he says, signifies that Congress intended state law to determine

whether a person has a prior conviction. We shall assume,

without deciding, that Bruns is correct.

As Bruns emphasizes, the Michigan Holmes Act provides

that assignment to youthful trainee status is “not a conviction for

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a crime” and does not result in a civil disability. MICH. COMP.

LAWS § 762.14(2). But another provision of Michigan law

treats such an assignment as a conviction when the defendant is

sentenced for committing a later offense.

For the vast majority of felony convictions under Michigan

law, the courts apply the Michigan sentencing guidelines to

determine the defendant’s minimum sentence. Id. §§ 777.1–.69. 

Like their federal counterparts, the Michigan guidelines take

into account the class of the offense, the specific characteristics

of its commission and the defendant’s criminal history to

determine a sentencing range. Id. § 777.21. Absent a “substantial and compelling reason,” the sentencing judge must impose

a minimum sentence within that range. Id. § 769.34(2)-(3).2

With respect to a defendant’s criminal history, the guidelines define a series of “prior record variables” based on the

number and severity of a defendant’s previous “convictions.” 

Id. §§ 777.50-.55. For scoring these variables, the guidelines

state that “‘[c]onviction’ includes . . . [a]ssignment to youthful

trainee status” pursuant to the Holmes Act. Id. § 777.50(4)(a)(i). 

We believe this provision, dealing directly with sentencing in

light of prior offenses, is the controlling state-law definition of

conviction, rather than the more general provision of the Holmes

Act.

In supplemental briefing, Bruns argues that the guidelines

provision would not “transform prior HYTA adjudications into

2

 Michigan employs an indeterminate sentencing system. The

judge sentences a defendant to both a minimum and a maximum

sentence. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 769.8-.9. A defendant’s maximum

sentence in Michigan is typically set by statute, and his actual time

served is determined by the state parole board. See People v. Drohan,

715 N.W.2d 778, 789-91 (Mich. 2006). 

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‘convictions’ for all purposes under Michigan law.” Def.’s

Supp. Br. 5. But we are not concerned with all purposes. The

question is whether Bruns had a prior conviction under state law

for the purpose of determining Bruns’ minimum sentence. The

Michigan courts would answer that question affirmatively in

light of § 777.50(4)(a)(i), as the Sixth Circuit recognized in

Adams v. United States, 622 F.3d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 2010). See

People v. Jackson, 2008 WL 2037805, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App.

May 13, 2008).

The other state laws to which Bruns directs our attention

have no bearing on the question. Bruns pled guilty to possession

of child pornography—a felony subject to the sentencing

guidelines in Michigan, MICH.COMP.LAWS § 777.16g(1). That

these guidelines may not apply to the state-law crimes of firstdegree murder or treason does not matter. Section 2252A(b)(2)

does not apply to sentencing for those crimes either. Whether

Michigan’s habitual offender laws, MICH. COMP. LAWS

§§ 769.10-.12, would treat Bruns’ assignment as a conviction for

determining Bruns’ maximum sentence is also immaterial. We

are concerned with Bruns’ minimum federal sentence.

For the first time in his supplemental reply brief, Bruns

contends that use of the present tense in § 2252A(b)(2)—“‘has’

a prior state ‘conviction’”—forecloses any inquiry into whether

he “would have a prior conviction if, hypothetically, he were

instead being sentenced in state court.” Supp. Reply Br. 3. 

Ordinarily, we do not address an argument first offered in a

reply brief. See Rollins Envtl. Servs. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 653

n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110,

123 (D.C. Cir. 2010). But even if this argument were not

waived, it is unconvincing. Whether Bruns “has” a prior

conviction is a legal question. See Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 111-

12. Michigan law defines “conviction” differently for different

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purposes.3 If state law governs whether Bruns had a “conviction” within the meaning of § 2252A(b)(2), we must determine

if Michigan law would treat his Holmes Act assignment as a

prior conviction in sentencing proceedings for a later offense. 

Cf. United States v. Jefferson, 88 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1996). 

And that is precisely what we are seeking to determine.

The bottom line is this: If Bruns had been convicted in state

court of the conduct for which he was sentenced in federal court,

his assignment under the Michigan Holmes Act would have

been treated as a “conviction” for determining his minimum

sentence. It follows that even if Michigan law determined his

minimum federal sentence, Bruns had a prior conviction under

Michigan law relating to child pornography.4

 The district court

therefore properly imposed the ten-year mandatory minimum

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).

Affirmed.

3

 For example, assignment to youthful trainee status pursuant to

the Holmes Act before October 1, 2004, is a conviction for the

purposes of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act. MICH.COMP.

LAWS § 28.722.

4

 The Michigan sentencing statute instructs courts to ignore

convictions that precede a period of ten years or more between the

defendant’s discharge date from the prior conviction and his

commission of another offense. MICH.COMP.LAWS § 777.50(1). The

statute does not say, however, that an assignment to youthful trainee

status is any less a “conviction” if it was beyond the ten-year period. 

In any event, Bruns pled guilty to possessing child pornography on or

about January 23, 2009. He was discharged from probation for his

Michigan offense in 2001.

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