Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05609/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05609-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tim Adams
Plaintiff
Megan Carey
Defendant
Terry Ann DeLoria
Defendant
Jefferson Union High School District
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIM ADAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

TERRY ANN DELORIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05609-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 26

Defendants Terry Ann DeLoria and Megan Carey’s motion to dismiss came on for 

hearing before this court on February 19, 2020. Plaintiff Tim Adams appeared through 

his counsel, Stanley Apps. Defendants appeared through their counsel, Alexi Offill-Klein. 

Having read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and 

the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS 

defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tim Adams is a tenured teacher at Terra Nova High School and a former 

coach of the school’s varsity football team. This lawsuit arises out of his removal as the 

high school football coach. Plaintiff pleads two causes of action against defendants Terry 

Ann DeLoria, the Superintendent of the Jefferson Union High School District, and Megan 

Carey, the principal of Terra Nova High School, for: (1) Retaliation for protected speech 

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) Deprivation of due process rights in violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Dkt. 25.

On July 23, 2019, plaintiff filed the original complaint in San Mateo County

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Superior Court against defendant Jefferson Union High School District (erroneously sued 

as Board of Trustees of Jefferson Union High School District). Dkt. 1-1. On August 1, 

2019, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. 1-2. On September 5, 

2019, defendant Jefferson Union High School District removed this case to this court 

based on federal question jurisdiction. Dkt. 1. On September 9, 2019, defendant 

Jefferson Union High School District moved to dismiss the FAC under FRCP 12(b)(6). 

Dkt. 6. This court granted defendant’s motion in its entirety, but permitted plaintiff leave

to amend because, at the motion hearing, plaintiff indicated that he would name two 

individuals as defendants. Dkt. 24 at 4, 7. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was 

then timely filed and the newly added defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 26.

Plaintiff alleges that he was removed from coaching the Terra Nova Tigers high 

school football team because Principal Carey erroneously believed plaintiff had turned 

the team’s fan base against her. Plaintiff also alleges a procedural due process claim on 

the grounds that defendants hired a non-teacher, temporary employee as head varsity 

coach without making such an assignment available to (and giving notice of the 

assignment) teachers presently employed in the school district.

Plaintiff is a teacher at Terra Nova High School, and from 2014 to 2018 served as 

head varsity football coach. SAC ¶ 11. On August 11, 2017, a pre-season football game 

turned into a brawl. Id. ¶ 13. After the scrimmage was canceled due to the brawl, 

plaintiff gathered the football team on the field and told the players he was proud of them 

for supporting each other during the brawl. Id. ¶ 21. Carey, who was present at the 

game, but did not see the brawl, told the players that she was disappointed in them for 

their involvement in the brawl. Id. ¶ 24. Carey reported the brawl to the California 

Interscholastic Federation and eventually forfeited the first game of the year as a selfimposed penalty. Id. ¶ 22. Parents and team supporters were unhappy about forfeiting 

the first game of the season. Carey and plaintiff attended a meeting with around 75 

parents and supporters on August 18, 2017, during which supporters criticized defendant 

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Carey for forfeiting the football game. Id. ¶ 28. 

On September 5, 2017, Carey handed a draft Letter of Reprimand to plaintiff. Id.

¶ 31. In the letter, Carey asserted that plaintiff had increased tension between the 

administration and the Terra Nova High School community, which led to discontent from 

parents and the Terra Nova High School football community. Id. ¶ 32. The draft letter 

also sought to punish plaintiff for sending emails to persons outside the Terra Nova High 

School staff, including the sports editor of the local paper, parents serving in volunteer 

support roles on the football team, a retired Terra Nova football coach, and an assistant 

coach. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. The letter instructed plaintiff that he could no longer communicate 

with football program volunteers. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff acknowledges that he “followed 

Principal Carey’s instructions and changed his communication practices so that he no 

longer included football program volunteers in any communications pertaining to the 

Terra Nova football program.” Id. ¶ 38. The letter went through several drafts over the 

fall of 2017 due to negotiations between plaintiff, the union representing him, and 

defendant Carey. Id. ¶¶ 39–46. The third draft of the letter added a demand that plaintiff 

refrain from engaging in “negative talk about Terra Nova administration, teachers, or 

other staff members.” Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff alleges that he “had never engaged in any such 

‘negative talk.’” Id. A final version of the letter was never placed in Adams’ personnel 

file. Id. ¶ 47. 

At a December 2017 awards ceremony at the end of the season, spectators booed 

Principal Carey. Id. ¶ 49. According to plaintiff, Carey believed that plaintiff had caused 

her to be booed by football program supporters at the ceremony. Id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff states 

that his professional relationship with Carey continued to deteriorate and was 

“challenging” throughout the following 2018 football season. Id. ¶ 53. 

On January 25, 2019, Adams was told that he had been removed from his role as 

head varsity football coach but would retain his position as a tenured teacher at the 

school. Id. ¶ 54. On February 8, 2019, Carey provided plaintiff with a Memorandum of 

Concern stating that he had been removed for cause for “conduct in [his] role as Head 

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Varsity Football Coach unbecoming of the professional standards as outlined in Jefferson 

Union High School District Board policies.” Id. ¶ 55. He also contends that defendant 

DeLoria, who is defendant Carey’s supervisor, participated in and ratified the decision to 

terminate plaintiff as head football coach. Id. ¶ 59. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Carey 

wrongly believed that he was responsible for Carey’s poor relationship with supporters of 

the football team, because she falsely believed that he had engaged in negative talk 

about her with parents, players, fans and/or other supporters of the Terra Nova Tigers. 

Id. ¶ 85. Thus, plaintiff alleges his removal constituted retaliation against him for 

protected speech. 

After plaintiff’s termination as head football coach, defendants hired Jason 

Piccolotti, who at the time was a non-teacher, temporary employee, to serve as head 

varsity football coach for the 2019 season. Id. ¶ 61. Plaintiff explains that Jefferson 

Union School District Board Policy 4121 (“Board Policy 4121”) permits the school district 

to hire temporary employees to supervise student athletic activities “provided such 

assignments have first been made available to teachers presently employed in the 

district.” Id. ¶ 66. According to plaintiff, this policy codifies and restates California 

Education Code § 44919(b), which provides the same requirements as the board policy 

to make athletic positions available first to non-temporary teachers. Id. ¶ 67. Plaintiff 

alleges that defendants violated his due process right, pursuant to the school board 

policy and Education Code § 44919(b), to be informed of the availability of the head 

varsity football coach position and to be offered an opportunity to serve in that position. 

Id. ¶¶ 68–69.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests for the 

legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 

1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that 

a complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

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entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 

12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient 

facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th 

Cir. 2013).

While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, 

legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be 

accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). The complaint must proffer 

sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558–59 (2007). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court 

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it 

has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)). Where dismissal is warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is 

clear the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 

1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. Analysis

1. First Cause of Action—§ 1983 Retaliation

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff alleges a violation of 

the First Amendment. “The First Amendment shields public employees from employment 

retaliation for their protected speech activities.” Hagen v. City of Eugene, 736 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006)). However, 

“the State’s interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees requires 

[courts] to arrive at a balance between the interests of the public employee, as a citizen, 

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in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 

employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 

employees.” Id. 

Courts strike this balance by considering five factors:

(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) 

whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public 

employee; (3) whether the plaintiff’s protected speech was a 

substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment 

action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for 

treating the employee differently from other members of the 

general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the 

adverse employment action even absent the protected speech.

Id. (citing Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009)). “All the factors are 

necessary, in the sense that failure to meet any one of them is fatal to the plaintiff’s 

case.” Id. (quoting Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1067 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (en 

banc)). Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate the first three factors and if he does so, 

the burden shifts to defendants to demonstrate the fourth and fifth factors. See Garcetti, 

547 U.S. at 418 (“The question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an 

adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the 

general public.” (citation omitted)).

a. First Factor: Public Concern

With regard to the first factor, speech involves a matter of public concern “when it 

can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 

the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of 

general interest and of value and concern to the public.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 

241 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 

453 (2011)). Whether speech involves a matter of public concern is purely a question of 

law. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070 (citing Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 648 (9th 

Cir. 2006)).

Here, plaintiff characterizes the Terra Nova High School football team as a matter 

of public concern in the Pacifica area. SAC ¶ 60. Other courts have found that issues 

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concerning school leadership or addressing school personnel assignments to be matters 

of public concern. See, e.g., Duffy v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., No. 15-cv-423-EPG, 

2015 WL 6881119, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2015) (“The superintendent of schools was 

proposing to transfer a teacher and varsity coach. Because teachers and coaches in a 

public school district can deeply impact children’s lives, school personnel assignments 

obviously are of considerable concern to those children, their parents, and others in the 

community” (quoting Lewis v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 1, 805 F.2d 310, 314 (8th Cir. 

1986))). Accordingly, it is plausible that management of the local high school football 

team is a matter of public concern.

b. Second Factor: Speech as Private Citizen

The second factor requires plaintiff to demonstrate that the speech was “spoken in 

the capacity of a private citizen and not a public employee.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071; see 

also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to 

their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 

purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 

discipline.”). “Statements are made in the speaker’s capacity as citizen if the speaker

‘had no official duty’ to make the questioned statements, or if the speech was not the 

product of ‘performing the tasks the employee was paid to perform.’” Id. (quoting Posey 

v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Courts must undertake a “practical” inquiry to determine whether an employee 

acted pursuant to his or her official duty. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. In turn, determining 

an employee’s official duty requires examining an employee’s official job responsibilities. 

Hagen, 736 F.3d at 1257. The scope of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities is a mixed 

question of law and fact. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1072 (citing Posey, 546 F.3d at 1130). 

More specifically, the scope and content of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities is a question of 

fact and the ultimate constitutional significance of the facts is a question of law. Hagen, 

736 F.3d at 1257.

Defendants challenge whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or a public 

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employee; they contend his speech was as a public employee and therefore not 

protected. Mtn. at 7. They argue that the instances of speech, identified in the SAC,

were within plaintiff’s job responsibilities as a high school football coach. Id. In response, 

plaintiff relies on Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994) (plurality opinion), as 

permitting a First Amendment retaliation claim when a government employer retaliates

against an employee based on “an erroneous and unreasonable belief about what 

plaintiff said.” Plaintiff would apply that theory here because defendant Carey 

erroneously and falsely believed that plaintiff caused protected speech of others—the 

speech of the fans and supporters of the Pacifica football team. Opp. at 6–7. In other 

words, it was the speech of other people, who were speaking as private citizens, that 

caused Carey to retaliate against plaintiff Adams.

Wasson v. Sonoma County Junior College, 203 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2000), is 

directly on point to the issue at hand: whether an employee can bring a First Amendment 

retaliation claim based on the speech of others. There, the plaintiff, a professor, brought 

a First Amendment retaliation claim after the school district board terminated her because 

the board thought the plaintiff was responsible for anonymous public writings that 

disparaged the school district president. Id. at 661–62. Notably, the plaintiff denied she 

was the author of the writings. The Ninth Circuit focused on this critical fact: the plaintiff 

was not the speaker, but instead argued that she was retaliated against because of a 

mistaken belief about her identify. The court reasoned that “a First Amendment 

retaliation claim seeks to vindicate a public employee’s exercise of free speech rights 

when she has suffered an adverse employment action in response to having spoken out 

publicly. It cannot be used to remedy a case of mistaken identity.” Id. at 663. The court

then held that “there can be no First Amendment claim when an employee is falsely 

accused of making statements uttered by someone else.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Wasson’s holding controls here. The SAC alleges two events where team 

supporters directed their discontent at Principal Carey: an August 2017 meeting soon 

after defendant Carey forfeited a football game and a December 2017 award ceremony. 

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SAC ¶¶ 77, 79, 83. Principal Carey “believed Adams was responsible for the anger and 

criticism directed at her by parents of athletes and other team supporters at” the August 

2017 meeting and she continued to “scapegoat” plaintiff after the December 2017 

ceremony. Id. ¶¶ 78. Yet, plaintiff alleges no instance of him speaking to team 

supporters. In fact, Plaintiff states that he never engaged in any such “negative talk.” Id.

¶ 42. Because plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in any speech directed at the 

parents and supporters of the team, his allegations are similar to Wasson. There, the 

professor claimed that the school district retaliated against her for the false belief that she 

wrote disparaging letters. Here, plaintiff alleges defendant Carey retaliated against him 

for the false belief that he communicated with team supporters. In both here and 

Wasson, the plaintiff alleges he or she did not speak. Because plaintiff Adams denies

engaging in any speech, First Amendment protection is not available to him with regard 

to a purported mistaken belief by defendant Carey concerning the speech of others.

Waters v. Churchill does not require a different outcome. That case involved two 

nurses who engaged in a conversation, the nurses’ supervisor heard about the 

conversation, and then fired one of the nurses because of the conversation. 511 U.S. at 

664. The supervisor had received two different versions about what the nurses said; one

version that would be protected by the First Amendment, one version that would not be 

protected. The question in Waters was what procedures were required of the supervisor 

to determine what the employee said. Id. at 667–68. Waters held that the government 

employer would be liable under the First Amendment if an unreasonable investigation led 

it to believe the unprotected version of the plaintiff’s speech. Id. at 677. As the Wasson

court pointed out, Waters does not apply to a situation where the employee denies 

having spoken at all. 203 F.3d at 663. Indeed, Waters required a reasonable 

investigation when there was a “mistake about the content of the plaintiff’s speech, not 

about the identity of the speaker.” Id. Here, plaintiff’s argument is even more attenuated; 

there is no mistaken identity (team supporters spoke) or mistaken content (they booed 

defendant).

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Throwing one last hail mary, plaintiff argues that he has standing to vindicate the 

rights of other speakers—i.e., the parents and other team supporters. Opp. at 7. Yet, 

plaintiff conflates jurisdictional standing (i.e., injury in fact, traceability, and redressability) 

with third party standing. Id. at 7–8. “Parties ordinarily are not permitted to assert 

constitutional rights other than their own.” Wasson, 203 F.3d at 663. “A litigant can 

maintain ‘third party’ standing only when she satisfies a three-prong test: (1) the litigant 

must have suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ (2) the litigant must have a close relation to the third 

party, and (3) there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or 

her own interests.” Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410–11 (1991)). Plaintiff

does not demonstrate how he has a close relationship with any third party or why that 

party cannot protect his or her own interest. In sum, plaintiff cannot state a First 

Amendment retaliation claim for the speech of others.

Turning to the remaining instances of speech in the SAC, plaintiff alleges that, 

after an on-field brawl between his players and an opposing team, plaintiff told his players 

that he was proud of them for how they responded to protect their fellow teammates from 

danger. SAC ¶¶ 21, 30. Plaintiff alleges that “Principal Carey’s anger stemmed from 

Adams’ statement to his players that he was proud of them for defending their 

teammates.” Id. ¶ 79. While the SAC does not fully detail plaintiff’s job responsibilities as 

head coach, the ultimate constitutional significance is clear. “[T]eachers necessarily act 

as teachers for purposes of a Pickering inquiry when [1] at school or a school function, [2] 

in the general presence of students, [3] in a capacity one might reasonably view as 

official.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 827 (9th Cir. 2017) (alterations 

in original) (quoting Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 

2011). Adams spoke during a high school football scrimmage to his student athletes and 

addressed them as football coach, thus, he meets all three conditions. Further, plaintiff’s 

speech “owes its existence”, id., to his position as head football coach; indeed, the SAC 

alleges that “Head Coach Adams asked his players to take a knee in the endzone.” SAC 

¶ 21. His players listened to his speech because he was the football coach; this 

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demonstrates that plaintiff’s speech was as an employee, not as a private citizen.1

Plaintiff has not demonstrated any speech as a private citizen. Because he fails to 

meet this factor, he fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim and the court need 

not address the remaining factors. See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1067 n.4. 

2. Second Cause of Action—§ 1983 Deprivation of Due Process

Plaintiff’s second claim is for deprivation of due process under § 1983. As 

guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the “fundamental requirement of 

due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 

manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). To state a procedural due 

process claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a deprivation of a constitutionally 

protected liberty or property interest, and a denial of adequate procedural protections. 

Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 716 (9th Cir. 2011); Kildare v. 

Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff contends that Board Policy 4121 and California Education Code 

§ 44919(b) create a statutory hiring preference, which in turn vests in the employee a 

constitutionally protected property interest. Opp. at 8. Plaintiff further argues that he was 

deprived of his opportunity to obtain the hiring preference due to him under California law 

because he was not notified of his opportunity to exercise that preference prior to the 

hiring of a new head football coach. Id. at 9. Defendants contend that the statute in 

question did not restrict a school district’s discretion to deny employment to qualified 

applicants; instead, it merely created a preference for applicants who are existing 

teachers. Mtn. at 15.

1 The SAC also includes allegations that he sent emails to football program volunteers, a 

retired head coach who was plaintiff’s predecessor, an assistant coach, and the sports 

editor of the Pacifica Tribune, all regarding the football program. SAC ¶¶ 33–35. Plaintiff 

does not allege this speech as part of his retaliation claim. See id. ¶¶ 71–89. Even if the 

court were to consider the speech, its fails the first, second, and third Eng test elements. 

First, there are no allegations the content of the emails was a matter of public concern. 

Second, the speech in question was undertaken as a public employee because plaintiff 

sent emails “pertaining to the Terra Nova Tigers.” Id. ¶ 33. Third, plaintiff does not allege 

how the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in his termination. 

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Education Code section 44919(b) provides: 

Governing boards shall classify as temporary employees 

persons, other than substitute employees, who are employed 

to serve in a limited assignment supervising athletic activities 

of pupils; provided, such assignment shall first be made 

available to teachers presently employed by the district. 

Service pursuant to this subdivision shall not be included in 

computing the service required as a prerequisite to attainment 

of, or eligibility to, classification as a permanent employee of a 

school district.

The parties agree that Board Policy 4121 is substantively identical to Education Code 

section 44919(b). SAC ¶ 67; Mtn. at 11.

The California Supreme Court in California Teachers Association. v. Governing 

Board of Rialto Unified School District, 14 Cal. 4th 627 (1997), examined the 

circumstances under which section 44919(b) creates a hiring preference for teachers 

presently employed by a school district. Rialto determined the appropriate statutory 

interpretation of § 44919(b) for a teacher’s claim for preferential employment rights in

vacant high school coaching positions. The court explained that school districts have 

flexibility as to hiring of athletic coaches, which takes two forms as reflected in the

statute. First, with certain restrictions not relevant here, “districts may establish the 

qualifications for athletic coaches as high as necessary to coincide with local 

preferences.” Id. at 639. “Second, the discretion granted districts permits them to assess 

the knowledge, competence, skill and experience of any coaching applicants in 

accordance with the qualifications so established.” Id. at 640. Taking both those factors 

into account, the court held that “section 44919(b) establishes, for limited-duty 

assignments of athletic coach, a limited employment preference for credentialed teachers 

presently employed by the school district, a preference conditioned on such a teacher 

applying for the position and meeting the qualifications established by the school district.” 

Id. at 652–53.

Here, plaintiff does not allege any facts that he applied for the position of head 

football coach. In fact, plaintiff contends that defendants should have told him about the 

position, so that he could apply for the position. SAC ¶ 69. Rialto requires plaintiff to 

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apply for a coaching position in order to receive employment preference under 

§ 44919(b), but that did not occur here. Accordingly, plaintiff could not receive any 

employment preference created by section 44919(b) and further could not have a 

constitutionally protected property interest. 

Plaintiff seeks to overcome Rialto’s holding by contending that, in the absence of 

state procedural protections, federal law authorizes a procedural due process claim to 

obtain a federal remedy for the absence of due process safeguards. Opp. at 9. Plaintiff 

cites Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990), for that proposition. As relevant here, 

Zinermon dealt with the circumstances under which a plaintiff could bring a § 1983 claim 

for inadequate state law remedies. Id. at 124. The Court stated that “[i]n procedural due 

process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in 

‘life, liberty, or property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the 

deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.” Id. at 125 (citations omitted). 

The Court further explained that “[t]he constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is 

not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State 

fails to provide due process. Therefore, to determine whether a constitutional violation 

has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was 

constitutionally adequate.” Id. at 126.

Yet, as Zinermon alludes to, a procedural due process claim first requires having a

constitutionally protected interest and then the failure of the State to provide due process. 

The order of those events matters. A plaintiff must establish the predicate life, liberty, or 

property interest before any procedural safeguards attach. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of 

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (“Respondents’ federal constitutional claim 

depends on their having had a property right in continued employment. If they did, the 

State could not deprive them of this property without due process.” (citations omitted)). 

The Court in Loudermill went on to state: “[w]hile the legislature may elect not to confer a 

property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the 

deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural 

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safeguards.” Id. at 541 (second alteration in original) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 

U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part)). The 

question here is whether the California legislature elected to confer a property interest on 

certain public employees; Education Code § 44919(b) and Rialto controls whether 

plaintiff had a property interest in the first instance. Because plaintiff did not apply for the 

position in question, he did not have a property interest in an athletic coaching position. 

Therefore, defendants could not deprive him of his due process when he did not possess

a constitutionally protected property interest.

The court finds that plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected right in a 

hiring preference under section 44919(b) or Board Policy 4121, which implemented that 

statute. Accordingly, his procedural due process claim fails.

3. Claims Against Defendant DeLoria and Defendants in Their Official 

Capacity

The court briefly addresses two ancillary issues. Plaintiff brought suit against 

Superintendent DeLoria, but his allegations with regard to her do not go beyond those 

alleged against Principal Carey. He alleges: “[p]rior to terminating Adams, Principal 

Carey sought and obtained approval of Superintendent DeLoria, who is Principal Carey’s 

supervisor and mentor and who participated in and ratified the decision to terminate 

Adams from the Head Varsity Coach position.” SAC ¶ 59. There are no allegations of 

independent retaliatory conduct by defendant DeLoria. Additionally, plaintiff brought suit 

against both defendants in the official capacities for the same two claims addressed in 

this order. 

Because plaintiff has failed to state a claim for both of his causes of action, then 

his claim against defendant DeLoria and against both defendants in their official 

capacities also fail. 

4. Amendment Would Be Futile

Plaintiff argues that leave to amend would be appropriate due to a potential chilling 

effect on First Amendment speech if plaintiff were not able to vindicate his claims. The 

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court finds that further amendment would be futile. Plaintiff has already had the 

opportunity to amend his complaint in response to this court’s order granting defendant

Jefferson Union High School District’s motion to dismiss the FAC. Dkt. 24. In response 

to that opportunity, plaintiff has alleged that he did not engage in protected speech, which

forecloses his First Amendment claim. See Wasson, 203 F.3d at 663. Thus, he cannot 

argue a chilling effect if he was not the speaker. Plaintiff also alleges that he did not 

apply for the football head coach position, which forecloses any property interest under 

Rialto and Labor Code § 44919(b) that might otherwise be protected by the Due Process 

Clause. No additional factual allegations can change those dispositive elements.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Because the court finds that further amendment would be futile, and because plaintiff has 

already been provided an opportunity to amend, the Second Amended Complaint is 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2020

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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