Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03082/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03082-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 16, 2008 Decided January 16, 2009

No. 06-3082

IN RE: SEALED CASE

______

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00390)

______

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

Kristina L. Ament, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. On the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S.

Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Elizabeth H. Danello,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

Concurring Statement filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS, with whom Senior Circuit Judge SILBERMAN joins.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant pled guilty to

maintaining a crack house, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2),

and to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation

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of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court sentenced him to

a 97-month term of imprisonment under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8(a)(1),

a provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(“Guidelines”) that imposes a substantially higher base offense

level for persons convicted of maintaining a drug establishment

who are also found to have participated in the underlying drug

crime. 

Appellant now challenges this sentence, arguing both that

the District Court erred in applying § 2D1.8(a)(1) to calculate

his base offense level, because there was insufficient evidence

in the record that he actually “participated” in the underlying

drug offense, and that his sentence is substantively

unreasonable. In addition, appellant requests that we remand his

case for resentencing in light of recent amendments to the

Guidelines that decrease the base offense levels for certain crack

cocaine offenses. 

The parties suggest that, because he never objected to the

District Court that the evidence was insufficient to support its

reliance on § 2D1.8(a)(1), appellant’s claim on appeal must be

reviewed only for plain error under United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725 (1993), and its progeny. We need not reach this issue,

because the District Court in this case made no findings on

appellant’s participation in the underlying drug offense. The

Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) contained no factual

findings on appellant’s participation in the underlying drug

offense; the trial judge offered no findings on this crucial issue;

and appellant’s participation cannot be inferred from the sparse

record under review on appeal. In these circumstances, we are

constrained to remand the case to allow the District Court to

determine in the first instance whether the Government carried

its burden at sentencing and proved participation by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 291-92 & n.22 (1982) (remand appropriate where

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district court altogether fails to make findings or fails to make

findings with respect to a material issue).

On remand, if appellant files a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) for a reduced sentence, the District Court should

also consider in the first instance the applicability of the recent

amendments to the Guidelines relating to base offense levels for

crack cocaine offenses. Finally, because we remand for

resentencing, we do not reach appellant’s challenge to the

substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

On August 30, 2004, appellant was charged by information

with maintaining a crack house, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 856(a)(2), and with possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On September 13,

2004, appellant pled guilty to both counts pursuant to a written

plea agreement. 

The proffer of facts supporting appellant’s guilty plea is

simple and straightforward. On June 4, 2003, officers of the

Metropolitan Police Department executed a search warrant at an

apartment leased by appellant. Though appellant shared the

apartment with his co-defendant, the two men had separate

bedrooms. Upon entering the apartment, the officers found the

co-defendant trying to step into the closet of his bedroom. The

officers’ search of the co-defendant’s bedroom closet revealed

35.3 grams of crack cocaine, a loaded Ruger .40 caliber

semiautomatic handgun, $676 in cash, a digital scale, identifying

documents, mail, a wallet, and a white plate with white rock

residue. In the dining room of the apartment, the officers found

a Pyrex measuring cup containing a white substance and a box

of rubber gloves. In appellant’s bedroom, the officers found a

triple-beam scale, a loaded Beretta 9-mm semiautomatic

handgun, a box of 9-mm ammunition, 63.25 grams of marijuana,

empty Ziploc bags, and Ziploc bags containing green, weed-like

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material. A search of appellant turned up $545 in cash.

Appellant’s fingerprints were later lifted from the plate with the

white rock residue found in his co-defendant’s bedroom closet.

 At the plea hearing, appellant admitted that the factual

proffer was accurate. He also admitted that he knew that crack

was present in his apartment and that he allowed the crack to be

stored there. Plea H’rg Tr. at 30 (Sept. 13, 2004), reprinted in

Appellant’s Appendix (“App.”) at Tab 1. 

Relying on the 2005 edition of the United States Sentencing

Commission Guidelines Manual, the PSR prepared by the

probation office calculated appellant’s base offense level under

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8(a), the section of the Guidelines that governs

convictions for maintaining a drug establishment under 21

U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). For a defendant who also participated in the

underlying drug offense, § 2D1.8(a)(1) advises the sentencing

court to use the offense level for the relevant drug type and

quantity from U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8(a)(1).

The guideline further advises that the offense level from § 2D1.1

should be reduced by four levels and capped at level 26 if the

defendant “had no participation in the underlying controlled

substance offense other than allowing use of the premises.”

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8(a)(2). Although the PSR contained no factual

findings on appellant’s participation in the underlying drug

offense, it applied § 2D1.8(a)(1) and recommended a base

offense level of 30. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5) (prescribing

base offense level of 30 for at least 35 grams of cocaine base).

The PSR recommended increasing the offense level by two

levels under § 2D1.1(b)(1), because appellant possessed a gun

in connection with a drug offense. The PSR also recommended

a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility under

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), resulting in a total offense level of 30.

Given appellant’s criminal history category of III, the applicable

Guidelines range was 121 to 151 months. After reviewing the

PSR, appellant’s counsel filed several sentencing memoranda

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with the District Court, in which he requested that appellant’s

offense level be determined in accordance with the Guidelines

for powder cocaine, rather than by applying the 100-to-one drug

quantity ratio between crack and powder cocaine then prescribed

by § 2D1.1. 

At the April 19, 2006 sentencing hearing, the District Court

accepted the PSR. See Sentencing H’rg Tr. at 4-5, 32-33 (Apr.

19, 2006), App. at Tab 2. However, the District Court made no

mention of § 2D1.8(a)(1) and made no factual findings on

appellant’s participation in the underlying drug offense. Instead,

the trial judge offered the following observations: 

Letting someone use your apartment to cook and store crack

cocaine for sale was no benign offense. That conduct

helped keep the most vulnerable and helpless among us

strung out on poison. And keeping a loaded semiautomatic

pistol in a crack house did nothing to promote a safe

environment. . . . However, it is true that you committed no

act of violence[,] you did not deploy or brandish the pistol,

and you did not use it here in connection with pedaling [sic]

crack. 

Id. at 33. After weighing the factors to be considered in

imposing a sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court

sentenced appellant to 97 months of imprisonment. Id. at 30-36.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Gall v. United States, 128

S. Ct. 586 (2007), appellate courts review sentences under an

abuse-of-discretion standard and set aside sentences found to be

“unreasonable.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-63; Gall, 128 S. Ct. at

597. This review proceeds in two steps. First, the court must

ensure that the district court committed no procedural error,

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“such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the

Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing

to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on

clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the

chosen sentence – including an explanation for any deviation

from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Once the

appellate court determines that a sentence is procedurally sound,

it reviews the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under

an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id.; see also United States v.

Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089,1092-93 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

In applying the clearly erroneous standard, an appellate

court must remain mindful that 

judicial findings of fact are presumptively correct. See

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,

500 (1984). This presumption “recognizes and rests upon

the unique opportunity afforded the trial court judge to

evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the

evidence,” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.

844, 855 (1982), the comparative expertise of trial and

appellate judges, and the cost of duplicative appellate

decisionmaking, Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,

574-75 (1985). Pursuant to this presumption, a finding of

fact will not be overturned as “clearly erroneous” unless,

“although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 573.

HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL

STANDARDS OF REVIEW – REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT

DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 62 (2007). “However, when

a district judge altogether fails to make findings or fails to make

findings with respect to a material issue, appellate courts

normally vacate the judgment and remand for the judge to make

those findings.” Id. at 63.

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“[F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts,

rather than appellate courts, and . . . the Court of Appeals

should not . . . resolve[] in the first instance [a] factual

dispute which had not been considered by the District

Court.”

Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 291-92 (second and third

alterations added) (citation omitted). 

The question that we face in this case is whether the District

Court judge made factual findings on appellant’s participation

in the underlying drug offense sufficient to survive appellate

review. Because, as we explain in the following sections, there

are no such findings and we can infer none, we are obliged to

remand the case to the trial court for appropriate findings.

B. Appellant’s Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence

Supporting the District Court’s Reliance on § 2D1.8(a)(1)

Appellant contends that his sentence should be reversed for

two principal reasons: First, the District Court made no factual

finding that appellant participated in the underlying controlled

substance offense; and, second, the record is insufficient to

support a finding of participation. Appellant thus contends that

the District Court erred in applying § 2D1.8(a)(1) to calculate

his base offense level. 

The parties have briefed and argued the question of who

bears the burden of proof under § 2D1.8(a). Appellant contends

that the Government carries the burden of proving participation

under § 2D1.8(a)(1). The Government, in turn, argues that when

non-participation is at issue under § 2D1.8(a)(2), the defendant

bears the burden of proving non-participation because it is a

mitigating factor in sentencing. As explained in Part II.B.2

infra, we hold that remand is necessary in this case because the

District Court failed to make any finding on appellant’s

participation or non-participation. Because the District Court

will be required to apply the correct legal standard in its

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factfinding on remand, we first address the matter of the burden

of proof. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1333-

37 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (determining in the first instance the correct

legal standard to be applied by the district court on remand); see

also United States v. Hart, 324 F.3d 740, 750-51 (D.C. Cir.

2003) (stating the correct legal standard to be applied by the

district court and remanding the case because appellate court

could not determine whether district court had applied the

correct legal standard); United States v. McCoy, 242 F.3d 399,

410 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same). After addressing the burden of

proof issue, we explain why this case must be remanded for

further factfinding.

1. Section 2D1.8(a) and the Participation Requirement

Section 2D1.8 of the November 1, 2005 Sentencing

Guidelines provides:

(a) Base Offense Level:

(1) The offense level from §2D1.1 applicable to the

underlying controlled substance offense, except as

provided below.

(2) If the defendant had no participation in the

underlying controlled substance offense other than

allowing use of the premises, the offense level shall be

4 levels less than the offense level from §2D1.1

applicable to the underlying controlled substance

offense, but not greater than level 26. 

The criminal statute to which appellant pled guilty, 21

U.S.C. § 856(a)(2), does not require the Government to prove a

defendant’s participation in the underlying offense as an element

of the crime. The plain language of the applicable Guideline,

however, requires a finding of such participation for the higher

offense level in § 2D1.8(a)(1) to apply. Because, under the

Guidelines, the fact of participation enhances a defendant’s

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sentence, the Government bore the burden of proving

participation under § 2D1.8(a)(1) by a preponderance of the

evidence. See United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 444 (D.C.

Cir. 2005) (government “carries the burden of proving any facts

that may be relevant in sentencing”); United States v.

Washington, 115 F.3d 1008, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The burden

is on the government to prove facts in support of a sentence

enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence.”); United

States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that

“insofar as [a Guidelines provision] relates to a matter that

would enhance the defendant’s sentence, the burden of proof is

on the prosecution to satisfy the factual prerequisites of the

provision”). 

The Government does not dispute that it carried the burden

of proving appellant’s participation under § 2D1.8(a)(1); nor

does the Government doubt that proof of participation would

necessarily refute any claim of non-participation. Rather, the

Government advances the somewhat perplexing argument that,

because a defendant generally bears the burden of proof on

mitigating factors at sentencing, appellant bore the burden of

proving non-participation under § 2D1.8(a)(2). Appellee’s Br.

at 11-13. See United States v. Riley, 376 F.3d 1160, 1171 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (“It is the defendant [who] bears the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is eligible

for a downward departure[.]”) (quotation marks and citation

omitted); United States v. White, 1 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(“The defendant ‘properly bears the burden of proof under those

sections of the Guidelines that define mitigating factors.’”)

(quoting Burke, 888 F.2d at 869 n.10). 

The Government’s argument is specious, especially given

that it does not dispute that the prosecution is obliged to prove

participation without regard to whether § 2D1.8(a)(2) is a

mitigating factor. It is not correct, as our dissenting colleague

suggests, that the District Court’s obligation to make a factual

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finding about participation “arguably arises only when the

defendant invokes [§ 2D1.8(a)(2)] and offers supporting

evidence.” Because participation is an element of the sentence,

and the Government “carries the burden of proving any facts

that may be relevant in sentencing,” Price, 409 F.3d at 444, the

District Court must make the necessary factual findings to

determine whether the Government has carried its burden of

proof. It makes no difference whatsoever whether the defendant

invokes § 2D1.8(a)(2) – the Government cannot seek a sentence

based on § 2D1.8(a)(1) unless it first proves participation.

Furthermore, § 2D1.8(a) by its plain terms provides for a

base offense level, not a mitigating departure. The section is

titled “Base Offense Level” and advises the sentencing court

either to import the “offense level” from § 2D1.1 if the

defendant also participated in the underlying drug offense, or to

reduce that “offense level” if the defendant “had no

participation.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8(a)(1), (2). See United States

v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[B]ecause the

purpose of § 2D1.8 is to establish a defendant’s base offense

level, the government must prove the fact of participation[.]”).

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Dickerson,

195 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 1999), upon which the Government

relies, does not persuade us to the contrary. There, the court

held that a defendant has the burden of proving nonparticipation under § 2D1.8(a)(2) because “subsection (a)(1)

effectively presumes that a defendant personally participated in

the underlying controlled substance offense.” Dickerson, 195

F.3d at 1189, 1190. First, neither the plain language of the

Guideline nor the commentary creates such a presumption of

participation. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2D1.8 cmt. n.1 (2005). Second, the fact of participation

enhances a defendant’s sentence based on uncharged, unproven

conduct; it is clear that such a fact may not be “presumed” true,

but must instead be proven by the Government by a

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preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Washington, 115 F.3d

at 1010 (“The burden is on the government to prove facts in

support of a sentence enhancement by a preponderance of the

evidence.”). 

2. The Need to Remand the Case for Further Factfinding

The Government argues in the alternative that there was

sufficient evidence in the record from which the District Court

could have concluded that it met its burden of proving that

appellant actually participated in the underlying offense. In

particular, the Government points to several pieces of evidence

from the factual proffer, including the plate with white rock

residue containing appellant’s fingerprints that officers found in

his co-defendant’s closet as well as the drug paraphernalia and

gun found in the shared dining room and appellant’s bedroom.

Appellee’s Br. at 14-17. The problem here is that the District

Court made no findings of fact on participation. We can only

speculate as to what the trial judge might have concluded from

the evidence had such findings been made. The District Court’s

only comments on appellant’s conduct concerned the charged

offense of maintaining a crack house. See Sentencing H’rg Tr.

at 33 (“Letting someone use your apartment to cook and store

crack cocaine for sale was no benign offense.”). If anything,

these comments might be seen to suggest that appellant did not

participate in a crack offense in any way beyond allowing others

to store crack at his apartment. See id. (“[Y]ou committed no

act of violence[,] you did not deploy or brandish the pistol, and

you did not use it here in connection with pedaling [sic] crack.”)

(emphasis added). 

The Government suggests that we can infer the facts

necessary to conclude that the District Court implicitly found

that appellant participated in the underlying offense. See, e.g.,

United States v. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905, 906-07 (D.C. Cir.

1991) (inferring facts to support District Court’s implicit factual

finding at sentencing). We will not follow that approach here.

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The District Court’s utter silence on the participation question

is reason enough to give us pause. More important, however, is

the Supreme Court’s admonition in Pullman-Standard: “Where

the trial court fails to make findings, or to find on a material

issue, and an appeal is taken, the appellate court will normally

vacate the judgment and remand the action for appropriate

findings to be made[.]” 456 U.S. at 292 n.22 (citation omitted).

Indeed, even when a trial court’s findings are set aside on an

error of law, “the court of appeals is not relieved of the usual

requirement of remanding for further proceedings to the tribunal

charged with the task of factfinding in the first instance.” Id. at

293. 

Without explicit findings, we cannot conclude with any

certainty that the District Court was aware of the participation

requirement in § 2D1.8(a)(1) or that it employed the correct

legal standard in determining appellant’s sentence. Where, as

here, the evidence points to no clear conclusion on appellant’s

alleged participation, we will not infer it. Rather, the case must

be remanded to allow the trial judge to make appropriate

findings that are susceptible to appellate review should the

appellant again seek review in this court. See McCoy, 242 F.3d

at 410 (remanding case for district court to determine

applicability of sentencing enhancement because “on the record

before us we cannot conclude with confidence that it employed

the correct legal standard in applying the . . . enhancement”); cf.

United States v. Hutchinson, 268 F.3d 1117, 1118 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (remanding case for further factfinding, because the trial

judge had failed to make findings of fact essential to decide the

issue on review). 

III. CONCLUSION

On remand, the District Court should determine, on the

existing record, whether the Government met its burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant

participated in the underlying offense. If the District Court

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determines that the Government did meet its burden, then

appellant will be free to seek review of the District Court’s

factual findings on participation. During the proceedings on

remand, appellant may file a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) for a reduced sentence in light of the recent

amendments to the Guidelines that lower the base offense levels

for certain crack cocaine offenses. Finally, because we remand

for resentencing, we will not consider appellant’s challenge to

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence ultimately

imposed by the District Court at this time. See In re Sealed

Case, 527 F.3d 188, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (remanding to district

court for correction of procedural sentencing error and declining

to assess the substantive reasonableness of sentence). 

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate appellant’s sentence

and remand the case for resentencing consistent with this

opinion.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring, with whom

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, joins: The question before

this court is whether a preponderance of the evidence supports

the trial court’s decision to sentence appellant under U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.8(a)(1). With no attention paid to the relevant federal

rules or applicable case law, the parties assumed that appellant’s

claim was subject to plain error review because he failed to

preserve his objection to the trial judge’s factual findings. After

determining that the District Court made no factual findings on

appellant’s participation in the underlying drug offense, we had

no occasion to address the applicable standard of review.

Nonetheless, because we think the issue is important, especially

in the context of sentencing, we write separately to explain why

we think the parties were likely misguided in their assumption.

Our premise is simple: We are required to apply “a clear

error standard of review for appellate challenges to judicial

fact-finding at sentencing,” United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d

201, 222 (2d Cir. 2005), without regard to whether appellant

objected to the trial judge’s factual findings below. 

As the Supreme Court recently stated in Gall v. United

States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), we review a sentencing court’s

factual determinations for clear error. See id. at 597 (holding

that a sentence is subject to reversal if the trial judge “select[s]

a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts”); see also United

States v. Edwards, 496 F.3d 677, 681, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(appellate courts review sentencing court’s factual findings for

clear error). However, with respect to certain matters (other

than a trial judge’s factfinding in support of a particular

sentence), if a criminal defendant fails to object to an error at

sentencing, a challenge to that error on appeal is deemed

forfeited unless the more demanding plain error standard of

review is satisfied. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b) (“Preserving a

Claim of Error”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (“Plain Error”); see

also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). Thus,

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for example, if on appeal an appellant raises a theory in support

of a downward adjustment that was never raised at sentencing,

the matter will be reviewed for plain error. See, e.g., In re

Sealed Case, 349 F.3d 685, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Likewise,

parties in a sentencing proceeding must file timely objections to

the findings contained in a PSR in order to preserve any

objections for appeal. See FED.R.CRIM. P. 32(f) (“Objecting to

the Report”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(1) (parties must object

within 14 days to “material information, sentencing guideline

ranges, and policy statements contained in or omitted from the

[presentence] report”); cf. United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283,

286 (D.C. Cir. 1994)(reviewing for plain error appellant’s claim

that district court erred in calculating his base offense level

where appellant failed to object to the findings in the PSR). 

Our case law is unclear on whether a criminal defendant

must object to a sentencing court’s factual determinations at the

time of sentencing in order to avoid forfeiting any challenges on

appeal. See United States v. Brodie, 524 F.3d 259, 269-70 & n.7

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining to resolve whether unpreserved

challenge to district court’s finding on sentencing enhancement

is reviewable only for plain error and concluding that the

enhancement was not erroneous); United States v. Gewin, 471

F.3d 197, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same, where court’s implicit

factual finding on appellant’s ability to pay fine was not

erroneous). We believe that, as with judge-made factual

findings in civil bench trials, an appellant in a criminal case may

seek clear error review of a sentencing court’s factual findings

without regard to whether the appellant requested findings,

objected to them, or moved to amend the findings before the

trial judge. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) codifies the clearly

erroneous standard of review for findings of fact in civil bench

trials. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). In Maine v. Taylor, 477

U.S. 131 (1986), the Supreme Court adopted Rule 52(a)’s

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clearly erroneous standard for appellate review of findings of

fact by a district court in criminal cases on issues other than

those that determine guilt. Id. at 145; see also 9C CHARLES

ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE: TRIALS § 2573 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter WRIGHT

& MILLER] (Rule 52(a)’s clearly erroneous standard applies to

“findings of a district judge in a criminal case on issues other

than guilt”). The Taylor Court reasoned that applying Rule

52(a)’s clearly erroneous standard in criminal cases was

appropriate, because the “Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

contain no counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)”

and “the considerations underlying Rule 52(a) – the demands of

judicial efficiency, the expertise developed by trial judges, and

the importance of first-hand observation – all apply with full

force in the criminal context, at least with respect to factual

questions having nothing to do with guilt.” Taylor, 477 U.S. at

145 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

Since Taylor, the Court has reaffirmed that the clearly

erroneous standard applies to judicial factfinding in criminal

cases. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365-66 (1991)

(plurality opinion) (noting that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

52(a) . . . permits factual findings to be set aside only if clearly

erroneous” and that “we have held that the same standard should

apply to review of findings in criminal cases on issues other than

guilt”) (citing Taylor, 477 U.S. at 145; Campbell v. United

States, 373 U.S. 487, 493 (1963)). This court, in turn, has

invoked Rule 52(a) in holding that the clearly erroneous

standard governs our review of factual findings in criminal

cases. See United States v. Williams, 951 F.2d 1287, 1289 (D.C.

Cir. 1991) (citing Rule 52(a) and noting that the clearly

erroneous standard was “imported from the civil rules for cases

tried to the court . . . because the rules of criminal procedure

were silent on the matter”) (internal citation omitted). 

USCA Case #06-3082 Document #1159665 Filed: 01/16/2009 Page 16 of 23
4

By its own terms, Rule 52 makes clear that a party need not

object to a trial judge’s findings of fact in order to preserve a

challenge on appeal: 

Questioning the Evidentiary Support. A party may later

question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

findings, whether or not the party requested findings,

objected to them, moved to amend them, or moved for

partial findings. 

FED.R.CIV. P. 52(a)(5). See also 9C WRIGHT &MILLER § 2581

(noting that “Federal Rule 52 is not intended to create formal

barriers to appellate review” and that, under Rule 52(a), it is not

“necessary for a party seeking to question the sufficiency of the

evidence on appeal to have made an objection in the district

court to the findings”); HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A.

ELLIOTT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW – REVIEW OF

DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 62 (2007)

[hereinafter EDWARDS & ELLIOTT] (noting that, under Rule 52,

an “appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the factual findings

on which a judgment or judgment on partial findings rests is not

affected by a party’s failure to preserve the issue”). This

exemption from the error-preservation requirement has been part

of Rule 52 since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were

adopted in 1937. See 3 JAMES WM. MOORE & JOSEPH

FRIEDMAN, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 52.02 (1938)

(analyzing the error-preservation provision in Rule 52 and

noting that “all pitfalls in securing review have been avoided”).

The provision was initially housed in Rule 52(b). In 2007, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended and the errorpreservation provision was moved from Rule 52(b) to Rule

52(a)(5). See EDWARDS & ELLIOTT at 201. However, the

content of the provision was retained without material change.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 52, advisory committee’s notes (2007

amendments). 

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5

In sum, plain error review always has been inapplicable to

factual challenges governed by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. HPSC, Inc., 480 F.3d

26, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We see no reason why [a party],

following a bench trial, cannot argue now for the first time [on

appeal] that the court’s findings were clearly erroneous or that

they cannot support the judgment.”) (citation omitted); Colonial

Penn Ins. v. Mkt. Planners Ins. Agency Inc., 157 F.3d 1032,

1036 & nn.2-3 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Monaghan v. Hill, 140

F.2d 31, 33 (9th Cir. 1944) (same). Mindful that the clearly

erroneous standard applies to a trial judge’s factual findings in

criminal cases (on issues other than guilt), including findings

made at sentencing, see Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597, we believe that

the clearly erroneous standard governs the sort of factual

sufficiency challenge at issue in this appeal. We find no merit

in the parties’ suggestion that plain error review would have

applied in this case had we been required to address the standard

of review. Nothing in Taylor or the Supreme Court’s more

recent cases applying the clearly erroneous standard in criminal

cases purports to require a criminal defendant to preserve a

challenge to the sufficiency of a district court’s non-guilt factual

findings at sentencing. 

In reaching this conclusion, we follow the approach taken

by the Second Circuit in Garcia. In that case, the appellate court

reviewed a sentencing judge’s factual findings for clear error,

even though one of the defendants had failed to challenge the

findings below. 413 F.3d at 205, 219 n.13, 222-23. In applying

the clearly erroneous (not plain error) standard of review, the

Garcia court effectively adhered to the mandate of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 52(a)(5). We recognize that some circuits

seem to assume that plain error is the appropriate standard for

reviewing challenges to a sentencing court’s factual findings

raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., United States v.

Salado, 339 F.3d 285, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the

appellate court reviews challenges to a trial judge’s factfinding

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6

in support of sentencing for plain error when the appellant failed

to object below); cf. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570

(3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“A sentence imposed as a result of a

clearly erroneous factual conclusion will generally be deemed

‘unreasonable’ and, subject to the doctrines of plain and

harmless error, will result in remand to the district court for

resentencing.”). However, these decisions lend little to our

analysis, because they entirely fail to consider the fact that the

clearly erroneous standard involves no preservation requirement.

More than 20 years ago, the Supreme Court noted that “the

‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review long has been applied to

nonguilt findings of fact by district courts in criminal cases.”

Taylor, 477 U.S. at 145. And since the adoption of Rule 52 in

1937, it has also been clear that an appellant need not object to

a trial judge’s factual findings in order to seek clearly erroneous

review of those findings on appeal:

Rule 52 makes clear that, in contrast to most questions

raised on appeal, an appellate challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting the factual findings on which a

judgment or judgment on partial findings rests is not

affected by a party’s failure to preserve the issue.

. . .

Plain error review is consequently inapplicable to review of

such challenges. 

EDWARDS & ELLIOTT at 62-63. 

To preserve a claim of error on appeal, a party typically

must raise the issue before the trial court. See, e.g., FED. R.

EVID. 103(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 30(d); FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b);

FED. R. CIV. P. 46; FED. R. CIV. P. 51(c), (d). “No procedural

principle is more familiar . . . than that a . . . right may be

forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make

timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction

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7

to determine it.” Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444

(1944). There are at least three good reasons for this procedural

principle: (1) to allow the trial judge, before whom the matter

is being tried, to address a party’s claims in the first instance,

see Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941); (2) to afford

the appellate court the benefit of the trial judge’s views on

matters that may come before it on appeal, see United States v.

Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Robinson,

J., concurring); and (3) to prevent one party from sandbagging

another by raising new claims on appeal, see Singleton v. Wulff,

428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); Hormel, 312 U.S. at 556; In re Sealed

Case, 356 F.3d 313, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Blackwell, 694 F.2d

at 1344-45 (Robinson, J., concurring). Given the importance of

this procedural principle, it is notable, but not surprising, that

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(5) carves out a significant

exception to the normal requirements of error preservation for

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting findings

of fact underlying judgments in bench trials. The exception is

unsurprising, because factfinding in a bench trial occurs only

after a trial judge has reviewed the parties’ evidentiary

submissions and arguments. In other words, a trial judge almost

always has the benefit of the parties’ views on the evidence

before making findings of fact. Therefore, it would serve no

good end to require the parties to formally object to the judge’s

findings of fact in order to preserve a challenge on appeal. 

In any event, the Supreme Court has made it plain that the

clearly erroneous standard of review set forth in Rule 52 applies

in both civil and criminal contexts. The exception to the errorpreservation requirement now found in Rule 52(a)(5) is part of

the standard and, therefore, we can discern no good reason to

limit the exception to civil cases alone. Accordingly, we believe

that the clearly erroneous standard governs an appellate court’s

review of a sentencing judge’s factual findings, whether or not

those findings have been challenged below.

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BROWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Here we confront the 

proverbial question: which comes first—the chicken or the 

egg? Different intuitions lead to different conclusions. Thus, 

the court remands; while I would simply affirm. 

If a district court found a defendant was born in May 

1957, when, in fact, she was born two months earlier, we 

would not remand for the district court to correct its mistake 

unless on appeal the defendant explains how the factual error 

affected a legal conclusion. Nor would we remand if the 

district court made no age finding at all, unless the defendant 

spells out why that failure corrupted the legal analysis. An 

appellate court simply does not resolve questions of fact (or 

force a district court to make a factual determination) unless 

the answer to the factual question matters. 

For a remand to be appropriate, Appellant needs two 

separate questions both to break his way: (1) whether the 

district judge was legally required to make a factual finding 

on participation; and (2) whether the district court did so. If 

the answer to Question (1) is “no”—that is, if the district court 

was not required to make a finding—then the answer to 

Question (2) is irrelevant. 

The court only asks “whether the District Court judge 

made factual findings on appellant’s participation in the 

underlying drug offense[.]” Maj. Op. at 7. I agree the district 

court did not explicitly do so. But the more important 

question is whether the district judge was obligated to make 

such a finding in the first place. If § 2D1.8(a)(2) is a 

mitigation provision, the district court’s obligation to make a 

factual finding about participation arguably arises only when 

the defendant invokes the provision and offers supporting 

evidence. It is, after all, the defendant’s burden to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence any “mitigating factors.” 

United States v. White, 1 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 

(Silberman, J). On the other hand, if § 2D1.8(a)(2) sets the 

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2 

base offense level, then the district court might have been 

required to make a factual finding as to participation, 

regardless of whether the defendant raised the issue. See 

United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 444 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Question (1) in this case thus depends on whether 

§ 2D1.8(a)(2) is a mitigating factor. 

However it is resolved, determining § 2D1.8(a)(2)’s 

character is a purely legal question. Questions of law receive 

either de novo review (if objected to) or plain error review (if 

unobjected to). HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT,

FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW – REVIEW OF DISTRICT 

COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 5 (2007). Because 

Question (1) in this case was unobjected to, it ought to be 

reviewed for plain error. Instead, the court decides the legal 

question, asserting “[t]he plain language of” § 2D1.8(a)(2) 

“requires a finding of such participation for the higher offense 

level in § 2D1.8(a)(1) to apply.” Maj. Op. at 8. Because 

there was no factual finding, the majority remands. 

However, under the plain error standard that should be 

applied here, Appellant loses; this court has never resolved 

whether § 2D1.8(a)(2) sets the base offense level or is a 

mitigation provision, and in fact, as the majority observes but 

fails fully to credit, there is a circuit split on this very 

question. Compare United States v. Dickerson, 195 F.3d 

1183, 1189–90 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding burden is on the 

defendant to show applicability of § 2D1.8(a)(2)) and United 

States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(holding burden is on the government to show participation 

under § 2D1.8(a)(1)). Indeed, it is not surprising that there is 

a circuit split, because § 2D1.8(a)’s legal character is by no 

means obvious. Thus even assuming error, we should affirm 

because the district court did not “fail[] to follow an 

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3 

absolutely clear legal norm.” United States v. Andrews, 532 

F.3d 900, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

I respectfully dissent. 

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