Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-02310/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-02310-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Isaiah Garone
Plaintiff
Gladys Mencias
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISAIAH GARONE,

Plaintiff,

v. 

GLADYS MENCIAS, 

Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-2310 CSK P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Plaintiff is a former pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil 

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Gladys Mencias’s fully briefed motion to 

dismiss is before the Court. As discussed below, the Court recommends that defendant’s motion 

to dismiss be partially granted. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

 In his first amended complaint (“FAC”), plaintiff alleges that on June 8, 2022, while 

housed at the Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center (“RCCC”), plaintiff slipped and fell on a puddle 

of water leaking from a swamp cooler over his work area. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) Plaintiff asked to go 

see medical, but since that time, all he has been provided is Tylenol. Plaintiff is still in constant 

pain and asked repeatedly to be seen by an outside specialist, but his requests were denied without 

explanation. Plaintiff states he wrote multiple kites and grievances to defendant Mencias, the 

lead supervising nurse, explaining the pain and suffering plaintiff was experiencing and the 

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urgency to be seen by an outside specialist, but defendant never addressed plaintiff’s requests. In 

addition, defendant failed to make sure her medical staff addressed plaintiff’s problems and failed 

to train and supervise her medical staff. (Id. at 2-3.) As a result of defendant’s multiple failures, 

plaintiff’s right knee has gotten progressively worse. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that medical staff 

left plaintiff untreated and refused to give plaintiff their names, which plaintiff claims is the result 

of defendant’s improper training and supervision. 

 In his second claim, plaintiff alleges that in the middle of 2022, he began having a lot of 

pain in, and had trouble breathing from, his left nostril. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that despite being 

scheduled for two outside ENT appointments, both appointments were cancelled without notice to 

plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that both times the John Doe nurse told plaintiff the appointment was 

cancelled for “unknown reasons.” (Id. at 3-4) The John Doe nurse told plaintiff that defendant is 

responsible for scheduling outside doctor appointments. Plaintiff believes defendant cancelled 

the appointments for unknown reasons, despite plaintiff’s multiple kites and grievances to 

defendant explaining about plaintiff’s breathing troubles and pain getting worse. 

II. BACKGROUND

 On April 12, 2023, the Court screened plaintiff’s FAC and found that the pleading states 

potentially cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claims for relief against defendant Gladys Mencias 

based on her alleged refusal and failure to provide plaintiff medical care on several occasions. 

(ECF No. 10 at 2.) In addition, plaintiff was advised of difficulties involved when naming Doe 

defendants in a federal court action. (Id.) At the time plaintiff filed this action, he was a pretrial 

detainee, and was later transferred to state prison. On October 28, 2024, plaintiff notified the 

Court that he was recently paroled. (ECF No. 24.) 

III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standards Governing Motion to Dismiss 

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) addresses the court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction. The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that the court has 

subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 

375, 377 (1994). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court may consider evidence outside of 

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the pleadings. Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Dreier v. 

United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1996) (a challenge to the court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the 

court).

 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 

considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and construe 

the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 

(1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999). Still, to survive 

dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 

556 U.S. at 678. 

 “As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in 

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(internal quotes and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa 

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Otherwise, the motion is treated as one for summary 

judgment. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. There are exceptions for material which is properly submitted 

as part of the complaint and “matters of public record” which may be judicially noticed. Id. at 

688-89. “If the documents are not physically attached to the complaint, they may be considered if 

the documents’ ‘authenticity . . . is not contested’ and ‘the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies’ 

on them.” Id. at 688 (quoting Parrino v. FHD, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

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 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears 

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would 

entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In general, pro se 

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally. 

Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal 

interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 

pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

B. The Parties’ Arguments 

1. Defendant’s Motion 

 Defendant contends she is entitled to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because “the 

complaint is entirely devoid of any specific allegations of wrongdoing by [defendant].” (ECF No. 

18-1 at 3.) Defendant argues that plaintiff’s allegations that defendant failed to train and 

supervise her staff, failed to ensure plaintiff be seen by a specialist for either his knee or nose 

issues, and at times cancelled his appointments without cause are insufficient, without more, to 

raise any reasonable inference that plaintiff suffered any civil rights violation or that he can 

recover under some other viable legal theory. (Id.) Defendant points out that plaintiff fails to 

identify any constitutional right plaintiff contends was violated. Defendant argues that the 

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Further, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to demonstrate this court has subject matter 

jurisdiction, supporting her motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. (Id.) Defendant contends that because plaintiff fails to identify the constitutional 

right he claims was violated by defendant, and the allegations as pled are insufficient to 

demonstrate such violation, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. (Id. at 4.) 

2. Plaintiff’s Opposition 

 In opposition, plaintiff apologizes for his limited legal resources and knowledge, but 

contends that does not excuse defendant’s lack of professionalism as lead nurse practitioner 

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supervisor, who oversees the medical care of RCCC inmates who have no control over their 

medical needs. (ECF No. 20 at 2.) Despite plaintiff writing multiple medical requests and 

grievances addressed to defendant, she “purposely ignored all requests [plaintiff] made, out of 

spite due to the multiple grievances [plaintiff] wrote toward[] the defendant.” (Id.) Due to this 

“spite,” defendant “purposely canceled” plaintiff’s outside medical appointments not once, but 

three times. (Id.) Defendant’s actions caused plaintiff unnecessary pain and suffering, and now, 

twelve months later, an ENT specialist determined that due to such delay, plaintiff has a 

permanent breathing dysfunction in his left nostril as well as a cosmetic deformity. (Id.) Plaintiff 

contends that defendant did not take reasonably available measures to avoid that risk, making the 

consequences of her actions obvious. Further, plaintiff claims that his knee is still in pain, and it 

did not return to normal after his fall because he was not treated correctly because of defendant’s 

animosity toward plaintiff. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff argues that he was purposely mistreated under 

defendant’s supervision and lack of direction to the nurses she supervises, in violation of 

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff contends that defendant’s unprofessional 

medical treatment resulted in permanent damage.

 3. Defendant’s Reply

 Defendant argues that unprofessional conduct or mistreatment, without more, does not 

amount to a constitutional violation. (ECF No. 21 at 2.) Defendant contends that plaintiff’s 

claims that defendant ignored plaintiff or acted out of “spite” are conclusory and insufficient. 

(Id.) (citing In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008); Marceau v. 

Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating court need not “assume the 

truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”)). Further, defendant argues 

that even assuming plaintiff’s appointments were canceled, his admissions that they were 

canceled for “unknown” reasons or “with no explanations,” undermine that plaintiff has alleged 

enough facts to state a claim for relief. (ECF No. 21 at 2.) 

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)) 

 1. Governing Standards 

A challenge to the court’s jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) can be either “facial” or 

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“factual.” Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). “A ‘facial’ attack 

asserts that a complaint’s allegations are themselves insufficient to invoke jurisdiction, while a 

‘factual’ attack asserts that the complaint’s allegations, though adequate on their face to invoke 

jurisdiction, are untrue.” Id. at 780 n.3. If the motion to dismiss constitutes a facial attack, the 

Court must consider the factual allegations of the complaint to be true and determine whether 

they establish subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale High Union Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 

F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). In the case of a facial attack, the motion to dismiss is 

granted only if the nonmoving party fails to allege an element necessary for standing. Spokeo, 

Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). 

Article III limits federal court jurisdiction to “cases and controversies.” Valley Forge 

Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 

102 (1982), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). A 

plaintiff cannot establish a case or controversy if a plaintiff cannot establish standing. Steel Co. 

v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998). To have Article III standing, a plaintiff 

must establish: “(1) [he] has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and 

(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the 

challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the 

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 

Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 

(1992)). 

2. Discussion

Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court liberally construes the FAC and resolves all 

doubts in his favor. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citations omitted). Liberally construing plaintiff’s FAC, the Court finds that plaintiff 

alleged sufficient facts to establish a case or controversy as to plaintiff’s claims that defendant 

Mencias cancelled plaintiff’s appointments with outside specialists on two occasions, despite the 

prison doctor’s order that plaintiff be seen by such specialist. As a result, plaintiff suffered 

continued pain and suffering, despite his multiple kites and grievances filed in an effort to gain 

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such medical care. Defendant’s alleged interference with plaintiff’s serious medical needs 

constitutes a violation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, is fairly traceable 

to defendant’s alleged actions in cancelling the appointments, and such injury can be redressed by 

a favorable decision. Thus, the Court recommends the motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction be denied. 

D. Alleged Failure to State a Claim (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

 1. Legal Standards: Medical Claims

 The Court evaluated plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claims under the Fourteenth 

Amendment applying an objective deliberate indifference standard. See Gordon v. Cnty. of 

Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 

1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)). The elements of such a claim are: “(i) the defendant made 

an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; 

(ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the 

defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable 

official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved -- making 

the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the 

defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (citing Castro, 833 F.3d at 

1071). 

 “With respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively 

unreasonable, a test that will necessarily ‘turn[ ] on the facts and circumstances of each particular 

case.’” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (quoted sources omitted)). 

 Moreover, a defendant’s “mere lack of due care” is insufficient to state a Fourteenth 

Amendment claim. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (citations omitted). “Thus, the plaintiff must ‘prove 

more than negligence but less than subjective intent -- something akin to reckless disregard.’” 

Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (citing Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070). Therefore, gross negligence, a 

difference in medical opinion, medical malpractice, or misdiagnosis does not establish a 

constitutional violation. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990); Thompson 

v. Worch, 6 F. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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That said, a complete denial of medical care is not required to show deliberate 

indifference. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference may 

be found where prison officials “intentionally interfere with treatment once prescribed.” 

Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation 

omitted). Deliberate indifference may be found if defendants “deny, delay, or intentionally 

interfere with [a prisoner’s serious need for] medical treatment.” Hallet v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 

734 (9th Cir. 2002); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

2. Discussion 

 a. Plaintiff’s Claim Concerning His Knee (First Claim)

With regard to plaintiff’s allegations that defendant violated plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights by ignoring his requests to be seen by an outside specialist for his knee, the Court agrees 

that plaintiff does not raise sufficient factual allegations concerning the medical treatment for his 

knee. 

A defendant’s negligence or “mere lack of due care” is insufficient to state a Fourteenth 

Amendment claim. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (citations omitted). “Thus, the plaintiff must ‘prove 

more than negligence but less than subjective intent -- something akin to reckless disregard.’” 

Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (citing Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070). Therefore, even gross negligence 

does not establish a constitutional violation. Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334; Thompson, 6 F. App’x at

616. 

Plaintiff contends that defendant ignored plaintiff’s request to be seen by an outside 

specialist for injuries sustained to his knee, and that his right knee has worsened over time. But 

unlike the alleged issues with plaintiff’s nose, other than noting he was given Tylenol for his right 

knee, plaintiff identifies no medical treatment he received at the jail that supported his request to 

be seen by an outside specialist or any order by a jail physician that plaintiff needed to be seen by 

an outside specialist for alleged injuries to plaintiff’s right knee. For example, plaintiff does not 

state that an x-ray supported his view that he should be seen by an outside specialist for injuries to 

his knee. 

In his opposition, plaintiff provides no additional facts to support his claim against 

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defendant based on the failure to provide an outside specialist to treat plaintiff’s right knee. 

Rather, he states that he was not treated correctly in the first place. (ECF No. 20 at 2.) However, 

medical malpractice is insufficient to state a cognizable civil rights claim. See Wood, 900 F.2d at 

1334. Further, plaintiff alleges no facts demonstrating defendant was personally involved in 

treating plaintiff’s right knee. Although plaintiff includes general failure to supervise or train 

allegations as to defendant, such conclusory allegations are insufficient. An individual’s 

supervisory role does not render them liable for the actions of her subordinates under a respondeat 

superior theory. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 675 (“Government officials may not be held liable for the 

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior”); Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“There is no respondeat superior liability under section 

1983.” (citation omitted)). Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed 

the violations or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. 

Thus, the failure of defendant to respond to plaintiff’s demands to see an outside specialist 

for plaintiff’s right knee, standing alone, is insufficient to state a cognizable civil rights claim. 

While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 

678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In light of the above, defendant’s motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s first claim should be granted. It is unclear whether plaintiff can allege sufficient facts 

to support his claim against defendant concerning the failure to provide an outside specialist to 

treat plaintiff’s knee, but in an abundance of caution, plaintiff should be granted leave to amend. 

In the alternative, plaintiff may choose to voluntarily dismiss his claim concerning his right knee 

and choose to proceed solely on his claim against defendant based on the failure to provide an 

outside specialist for treating plaintiff’s nose. 

 b. Plaintiff’s Claim Concerning His Nose (Second Claim)

 The Court finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a Fourteenth Amendment 

deliberate indifference claim against defendant based on her alleged interference with plaintiff’s 

ability to see a specialist for plaintiff’s nose. Plaintiff alleges that a prison nurse and doctor 

confirmed the unusual medical issue with plaintiff’s nose. (ECF No. 8 at 3-4.) The prison doctor 

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told plaintiff he would request plaintiff be seen by an outside ENT specialist. (Id.) Plaintiff was 

provided at least two appointments with an outside specialist to be seen for plaintiff’s nose. 

However, plaintiff alleges that defendant cancelled plaintiff’s appointments with the ENT 

specialist on two separate occasions. (Id. at 2-3.) Such cancellations took place despite 

plaintiff’s multiple kites and grievances complaining of his constant pain and breathing issues. 

Liberally construed, such allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable civil rights claim based 

on defendant’s interference with plaintiff’s ability to see an outside specialist, which allegedly 

only defendant could schedule. 

 In the reply, defendant makes much of plaintiff’s repeated reference to defendant having 

cancelled plaintiff’s outside specialist “for unknown reasons.” (ECF No. 21 at 1, 2.) However, 

when plaintiff inquired as to why his appointments with the outside specialist were cancelled, the 

John Doe nurse informed plaintiff that the scheduled appointments were cancelled “for unknown 

reasons.” (ECF No. 8 at 4.) That plaintiff repeats what he was told by an unnamed nurse is 

insufficient to rebut an inference that the cancellation of plaintiff’s outside specialist 

appointments interfered with plaintiff’s medical care and demonstrates her deliberate 

indifference. 

Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second claim (nose) should be denied. 

E. Conclusion 

 For the above reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 

jurisdiction should be denied, and defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should be 

granted in part. The 12(b)(6) motion should be granted as to plaintiff’s first claim (right knee) 

and denied as to plaintiff’s second claim (nose). It is unclear whether plaintiff can amend to state 

a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against defendant in connection with the 

lack of medical care for plaintiff’s right knee, but plaintiff should be granted leave to amend 

should he have additional facts he can provide as to defendant’s involvement in medical treatment 

for plaintiff’s right knee. Plaintiff is not required to amend and may opt to dismiss his claim 

concerning his right knee. 

///

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IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court should grant leave to amend unless it 

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegations of other facts. Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1130. Because plaintiff might be able to cure the pleading defects as to the 

allegations concerning his right knee, dismissal should be granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff 

is granted leave to file a second amended complaint as to the knee allegation. If plaintiff opts to 

amend, he should take care to include all relevant facts as to each claim within the section 

addressing such claim, and include the second claim concerning his nose from his FAC. 

 Any second amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, specifically 

identifying the Constitutional violation alleged, that the action is brought in the right place, and 

that plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must contain a request for 

particular relief. Plaintiff is encouraged to use the Court’s complaint form. 

 In the second amended complaint, as to each specific claim alleged, plaintiff must set 

forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft, 566 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although legal conclusions 

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, and are 

not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. 

In other words, plaintiff should allege facts addressing each element of his Fourteenth 

Amendment claim as to each alleged claim: “(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with 

respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the 

plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable 

available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances 

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would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved -- making the consequences of the 

defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the 

plaintiff’s injuries.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. 

 Any second amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior 

pleading. Local Rule 220; see Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as 

non-existent.’” (internal citation omitted)). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, all 

prior pleadings are superseded. Thus, if plaintiff opts to file a second amended complaint he 

should renew his Fourteenth Amendment claim against defendant as to plaintiff’s nose (the 

second claim raised in the first FAC).

 As discussed above, plaintiff is not required to amend his complaint, but may choose to 

dismiss his claim concerning his right knee and opt to proceed solely on his claim against 

defendant based on her alleged interference with plaintiff’s ability to see an outside specialist for 

plaintiff’s nose. 

V. POTENTIAL NEW CLAIM

 Plaintiff’s opposition included new facts that suggest plaintiff may be attempting to 

include a retaliation claim which is not plead in the FAC. (ECF No. 20.) For example, plaintiff 

now claims that defendant “purposely ignored” plaintiff’s multiple requests “out of spite due to 

[plaintiff’s] multiple grievances.” (Id. at 2.) Also, plaintiff claims that defendant purposely 

cancelled plaintiff’s outside doctor’s appointments not twice, but three times. (Id.) In addition to 

plaintiff’s pain and suffering, plaintiff adds that the one year delay in providing plaintiff medical 

treatment for his nose resulted in a permanent breathing dysfunction to his left nostril as well as a 

cosmetic deformity. (Id.) 

The Court declines to address the merits of a potential retaliation claim because it is not 

plead in the FAC. See, e.g., Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 116 F. Supp. 3d 1104 (C.D. Cal. 

2015) (“As courts routinely recognize, it is improper for a plaintiff to assert an unpled theory of 

liability in opposition to a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss”); Brown v. Martinez, 

2015 WL 4730186, *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015) (“an opposition to a motion to dismiss is not an 

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appropriate place to raise and argue new claims”); Elizabeth L. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 2014 

WL 2621408, *4 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2014) (refusing to consider unpled theories of liability 

raised for the first time in opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss). Because plaintiff did not 

include a retaliation claim in the FAC, plaintiff must file a motion to amend in which he seeks 

leave to add the retaliation claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Any motion to amend must be 

accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. As discussed above, plaintiff must include all of 

his claims in any proposed amended complaint. Local Rule 220; see Ramirez, 806 F.3d at 1008. 

It is unclear whether plaintiff intended to pursue a retaliation claim, and this Court makes 

no finding as to whether plaintiff can state a viable retaliation claim against defendant Mencias. 

Plaintiff is not required to seek leave to amend. In order to assist plaintiff in determining whether 

he can, in good faith, allege sufficient facts to state a cognizable retaliation claim against 

defendant Mencias, plaintiff is provided the following standards. 

Standards Governing Retaliation Claims: “Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file 

grievances against prison officials and to be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th 

Cir. 2009)). A viable retaliation claim in the prison context has five elements: “(1) An assertion 

that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff must allege specific facts addressing 

each of the five elements under Rhodes. 

VI. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to assign a district judge to this case. 

2. The Court declines to consider plaintiff’s putative retaliation claim raised in his 

opposition. 

Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) be granted as to plaintiff’s first claim 

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(right knee) and denied as to plaintiff’s second claim (nose). 

2. Plaintiff be granted leave to file a second amended complaint, unless he chooses to 

stand on his FAC and pursue claims against defendant based solely upon his allegation 

that she interfered with plaintiff’s medical treatment by cancelling his appointments 

with outside specialists. 

3. Within thirty days from the date of any district court order addressing these findings 

and recommendations, plaintiff shall file the appended Notice of Election form, and if 

he opts to file a second amended complaint, the election form should be accompanied 

by plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint. Defendant is relieved of the 

obligation to respond to plaintiff’s FAC pending further order of court. 

4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to send plaintiff the form for filing a civil rights 

complaint by a prisoner, as well as a copy of his FAC (ECF No. 8). 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: December 16, 2024 

/1/garo2310.mtd.csk

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISAIAH GARONE,

Plaintiff,

v. 

GLADYS MENCIAS, 

Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-2310 CSK P

NOTICE OF ELECTION

After the district judge addresses the findings and recommendations concerning 

defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18), plaintiff elects to proceed as follows. (Plaintiff 

should choose only one of the options below.) 

1. ______ Plaintiff opts to stand on his first amended complaint (“FAC”) raising 

Fourteenth Amendment claims against defendant Gladys Mencias based on her alleged 

interference with medical care for plaintiff’s nose, and consents to dismissal of plaintiff’s 

Fourteenth Amendment claim against defendant Mencias based on medical treatment for 

plaintiff’s right knee without prejudice. 

OR

2. ______ Plaintiff opts to file a second amended complaint adding additional facts in 

an attempt to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim against defendant Mencias 

concerning medical care for plaintiff’s right knee. 

 (If plaintiff chooses option two, plaintiff must file his proposed second amended 

complaint along with this completed Notice of Election form. Plaintiff is reminded to include 

from the FAC his second claim alleging defendant’s interference with plaintiff’s ability to see an 

outside specialist for treatment for plaintiff’s nose.) 

DATED: _______________________________ 

 Plaintiff

Case 2:22-cv-02310-DAD-CSK Document 25 Filed 12/16/24 Page 15 of 15