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Parties Involved:
Ahamad R. Atkins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 18, 2016 

Decided March 18, 2016 

Before 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2180 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

AHAMAD R. ATKINS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 14-40061-001 

J. Phil Gilbert, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Ahamad Atkins pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, 

21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and the district court sentenced him to 216 months’ 

imprisonment. Atkins filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer has moved to 

withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967). Atkins agrees that counsel should be discharged but proposes that we appoint 

substitute counsel. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the 

nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be 

expected to involve. We limit our discussion to those issues plus the additional points 

that Atkins, disagreeing with counsel, believes have merit. See United States v. Bey, 748 

F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). For the reasons that follow, we grant counsel’s motion and 

dismiss the appeal. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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Atkins was indicted after making a number of small sales to informants totaling 

9.3 grams of crack cocaine and 1.1 grams of heroin. The probation officer estimated, 

though, that Atkins was responsible for distributing 1.2 kilograms of heroin, 753 grams 

of crack cocaine, and 1 kilogram of powder cocaine, which together equate to 4,097 

kilograms of marijuana. Atkins objected that the actual amounts were about 10% of these 

figures, and he also contested statements from several eyewitnesses who said that they 

had seen him with guns while selling drugs. The government called five witnesses at 

sentencing to substantiate the probation officer’s numbers: three former customers (who 

were cooperating with the prosecution) and two investigators involved in the 

investigation. 

Adam Calvert testified that he had purchased heroin from Atkins “most” days 

over 3 years, sometimes twice per day, in amounts of either .3 grams or 1 gram. He 

preferred the larger quantity because it was more economical, but he couldn’t say how 

often he could afford to do so. Calvert estimated that his monthly heroin purchases 

averaged about an ounce, but he also testified that about once each month he bought half 

a gram of crack or powder cocaine from Atkins. 

Matthew Davis testified that he had paid Atkins $50 to $500 for crack or powder 

cocaine at least 200 times over 4 to 5 years. Davis said that half a gram of either crack or 

powder cost $50. Most often he spent $100 or $200, and 75% of the time he bought crack, 

rather than powder. Davis also said that he’d purchased a quarter ounce of crack at least 

twice and .3 grams of heroin at least 20 times. 

Paul Irby, who made several of the controlled buys, testified that he had 

purchased crack or powder cocaine from Atkins at least 300 times from 2007 to 2014. 

When asked how many of those purchases occurred during the three years before he 

became an informant, Irby again estimated 300. After testifying that he typically bought 

2 grams of crack for $200, Irby had this exchange with the prosecutor: 

Q: What’s the smallest amount of crack you ever bought . . . ? 

A: $50 worth, a half a gram. 

Q: How many times do you think you bought the $50 amount? 

A: At least 300 plus times. 

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No. 15-2180 Page 3 

Q: Okay. So, if you bought the 50, if you bought the half-gram amounts 

300 times, how many times did you get—I thought you said you 

normally purchased two-gram amounts. 

A: Yes, when I had the money I would try to get as much as I could. 

Q: Okay. How many times do you think you bought the two-gram 

amounts? 

A: At least 300. 

Q: Okay. And then a dozen—approximately a dozen times of the 

quarter-ounce? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And at least eight to ten times of the half-ounce? 

A: Yes. 

Irby also testified that, after receiving a large settlement from a personal-injury lawsuit, 

he’d once purchased a kilogram of powder cocaine from Atkins for $28,000. 

 Deputy Sheriff Chris Kelly testified about purchases made by three other 

informants. One informant, he said, reported buying heroin roughly 25 times and .5 

grams of crack “on a few occasions.” The second informant, Kelly continued, bought .5 

to 1 gram of crack weekly for a year, and the third reported that she had purchased from 

.6 to 1 gram of heroin daily for more than 2 years. Finally, DEA special agent Bernie Gard 

testified about the controlled buys from Atkins. 

The district court concluded that Calvert, Davis, and Irby all were credible and 

then found Atkins responsible for 1,431 grams of heroin, 701.2 grams of crack, and 1,009 

grams of powder, together equivalent to 4,135.8 kilograms of marijuana. That quantity 

yielded a base offense level of 32. The court added 2 levels for possession of a firearm, 

see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and agreed with the government that Atkins should not 

receive a decrease for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, because he had 

frivolously contested relevant conduct. The total offense level of 34, combined with 

Atkins’s criminal history category of III, resulted in a guidelines imprisonment range of 

188 to 235 months. 

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Appellate counsel begins by contending that Atkins’s guilty plea was knowing 

and voluntary, and that any challenge to the plea would be frivolous. Counsel does not 

say if she consulted Atkins about whether he wants his guilty plea vacated. See United 

States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–

71 (7th Cir. 2002). Regardless, our review would be limited to plain error because Atkins 

did not move to withdraw his plea in the district court (even though the court 

specifically offered him an opportunity to do so). See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 

(2002); United States v. Griffin, 521 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2008). We agree with counsel 

that any argument challenging the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of 

Atkins’s plea would be frivolous because the district court substantially complied with 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 before accepting the plea. And contrary to 

Atkins’s contention, his guilty plea was not undermined by his lack of access to a law 

library, since a defendant who is represented by counsel is not entitled to legal materials 

for independent research. United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 311 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Counsel also considers whether Atkins could challenge the district court’s 

application of a 2-level upward adjustment for possession of a firearm, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1), or the court’s denial of credit for acceptance of responsibility, 

see id. § 3E1.1. As counsel correctly points out, numerous witnesses testified about the 

specific types of guns that Atkins possessed in their presence, and the prosecution 

introduced a taped conversation in which Atkins attempted to purchase a larger caliber 

weapon. The district court was entitled to both credit this testimony and find that 

Atkins’s continued insistence that he had never possessed a firearm meant that he had 

falsely denied relevant conduct and thus wasn’t entitled to a reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. See United States v. Willis, 300 F.3d 803, 806–08 (7th Cir. 2002); United States 

v. Fiore, 178 F.3d 917, 925–26 (7th Cir. 1999). 

In his Rule 51(b) response, Atkins continues to challenge the veracity of the 

witnesses who testified at sentencing as well as the drug quantity for which he was 

found responsible. Indeed, there were inconsistencies in the testimony. For example, 

Irby said that he’d purchased drugs from Atkins a total of 300 times, but when asked 

about quantities, Irby claimed to have purchased half a gram 300 times, 2 grams 300 

times, a quarter-ounce a dozen times, and a half-ounce 8 to 10 times. Irby’s 300 

purchases thus ballooned into 620 total buys. And the quantities that Agent Gard gave 

for the controlled buys conflicted with those listed in the presentence report (albeit by 

only a few grams). As counsel correctly points out, however, the district court was 

entitled to believe the witnesses and rely on their estimates to determine Atkins’s 

relevant conduct. See United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining 

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that appellate review is “especially deferential” where a sentencing challenge is based on 

a credibility determination). And even if the court had credited only the most 

conservative estimates given by each witness, the testimony still would have been 

sufficient to place Atkins above 3,000 kilograms of marijuana equivalent—meaning that 

his offense level would remain unchanged. An appeal challenging the district court’s 

drug-quantity finding would therefore be frivolous. 

Finally, Atkins tells us that he wishes to challenge counsel’s performance as 

deficient for not giving him access to discovery before he pleaded guilty, and not 

adequately (in his opinion) objecting to the testimony at sentencing concerning the drug 

quantity. We have emphasized repeatedly that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

should be reserved for collateral review, so that a record may be developed in the district 

court. See Vinyard v. United States, 804 F.3d 1218, 1227–28 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. 

Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 341–42 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, Atkins’s motion for 

substitute counsel is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

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