Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00217/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00217-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jaelyn Nicole Nichols
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAELYN NICOLE NICHOLS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

1

Defendant.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00217-SKO

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 

SECURITY COMPLAINT

(Doc. 1)

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 17, 2024, Plaintiff Jaelyn Nicole Nichols (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint under 

42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security (the “Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application for Supplemental 

Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). (Doc. 1.) The 

matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral 

argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.2

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI payments, alleging that she became 

disabled on February 10, 2010, due to asthma, unspecified headache disorder, bipolar disorder, 

anxiety disorder, learning disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. (Administrative 

Record (“AR”) 21, 23.) 

Plaintiff was born on July 28, 2003, and was 18 years old on the application date. (AR 21, 

254.) Plaintiff had been enrolled in a Career Technical Education Program with a focus on 

cosmetology, (AR 496), from which she ultimately graduated. (AR 35.) Plaintiff is now enrolled 

1 Carolyn Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on November 30, 2024. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn Colvin should be substituted for Martin O’Malley as the defendant in 

this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the 

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

2 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 8, 14.)

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in cosmetology school. (AR 37). 

A. Relevant Evidence3

1. Joseph Alimasuya, M.D.

Beginning in January 2014, Plaintiff saw Joseph Alimasuya, M.D. for psychiatric 

treatment. (AR 798.) Dr. Alimasuya formally diagnosed Plaintiff with Bipolar and Related 

Disorder, ADHS (predominantly inattentive presentation), and Social Anxiety Disorder (Social 

Phobia), and over the course of several years Dr. Alimasuya prescribed Plaintiff various 

medications associated with these conditions, including (anti-psychotics, anti-convulsants, 

stimulants). (AR 768–69, 770, 792, 794–97.) Plaintiff is currently prescribed Lamictal, Vyvanse, 

Propranolol, Vitamin D, and Quetiapine. (AR 771.) Dr. Alimasuya’s notes also indicate that 

Plaintiff has a history of mood liability, anxiety, and neurodevelopmental symptoms. (AR 768.)

In a treatment note from September 30, 2021, Dr. Alimasuya recorded that Plaintiff rated 

her stability as “a 9.5 out of 10.” (AR 768.) He also observed that she was minimally 

communicative and defensive, had constricted affect, presented as anxious, and had a short 

attention span. (AR 769.) However, he also noted that she was calm, attentive, presented with 

normal speech and intact memory, was fully oriented with cognitive functioning within the normal 

range, had intact and logical associations and judgment, and did not present signs of depression or 

mood elevation. (Id.) 

In notes for a subsequent appointment on April 14, 2022, Dr. Alimasuya recorded 

observations that were mostly consistent with the September 2021 visit but noted several 

differences including that Plaintiff rated herself a “6 out of 10,” (AR 773), “displayed 

uncooperative behavior during the examination” and that she presented as “glum, attentive, 

minimally communicative,” with speech that was “scanty, and soft.” (AR 774.)

On September 11, 2022, Dr. Alimasuya made very similar observations as those he noted 

during her appointment from September of the previous year. (AR 779.)

3 Because Plaintiff’s assertion of error is limited to the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were not 

severe—meaning Plaintiff has waived any challenge to the ALJ’s findings as to any physical impairments, see Bray v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009)—only evidence relevant to that argument is 

discussed below. The Court has also omitted discussion of facts not relevant to its holding.

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2. Special Education Evaluations

Plaintiff has a long history—beginning in third grade—of qualifying for 

accommodations through an Individualized Education Program (IEP). (AR 417, 440.) For high 

school, Plaintiff attended Duncan Polytechnical High School, a Career and Technical Education 

(CTE) magnet school. (AR 509.) During her freshman year there, a 2018 report documented that 

Plaintiff had “struggled,” on the basis of which she was granted several accommodations, including 

extra time for testing and completing assignments. (AR 445, 454.) 

In 2020, her senior year, Plaintiff underwent a triennial special education assessment, which 

included formal testing (“Cognitive Functioning / Processing Assessments”), conducted by school 

psychologist Elizabeth Nixon, M.A. (AR 524, 542.) The triennial assessment report reflected the 

following findings: (1) a “clinically significant” finding as to Plaintiff’s attention (AR 531); (2) 

that executive functioning was a “weakness for [Plaintiff],” (AR 532); (3) that fluid reasoning was 

a “weakness for [Plaintiff],” (AR 533); and (4) that listening comprehension was a “significant 

weakness for [Plaintiff],” (AR 534). The results of all other cognitive functioning and processing 

assessments—including attention, auditory processing, fine motor, working memory, orthographic 

processing, phonological processing, and visual-spatial processing—were either mixed or in range 

of average. (AR 531–35.) 

As a result of the 2020 triennial assessment, the IEP team determined that Plaintiff remained 

eligible for special education services based on her “other health impairments”—specifically her 

diagnosis of ADHD and demonstrated “limited alertness with respect to the educational 

environment.” (AR 540, see also 542.) The report also included a recommendation that Plaintiff 

be granted accommodations. (AR 542.)

B. Administrative Proceedings

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially on December 29, 

2021, and again on reconsideration on June 9, 2022. (AR 53–66, 67–80.) Consequently, Plaintiff 

requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 102.) On December 7, 

2022, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified before an ALJ as to her alleged disabling 

conditions. (AR 34–50.) A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified at the hearing. (AR 50–52.)

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Among other things, Plaintiff’s testimony reflected that (1) she has a driver’s license—

though it took her ten attempts to pass the test, (2) it was taking her longer to complete cosmetology 

school, and (3) she was receiving what amounts to some form of accommodation in her current 

cosmetology program. (AR 25, 45.)

C. The ALJ’s Decision

In a decision dated December 14, 2023, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled, as 

defined by the Act. (AR 21–27.) The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920—stopping at step two. (AR 23–27.) The ALJ decided that Plaintiff had not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 1, 2021, the application date (Step One). (AR 

23.) The ALJ stopped the analysis after finding that the Plaintiff had not established a severe 

impairment. In making a determination of non-severity at Step Two, the ALJ considered the 

“Paragraph B” criteria4and concluded that the evidence failed to establish the presence of a severe 

mental impairment. (AR 25.)

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with ADHD, has a “history of childhood 

learning disorder” and acknowledged that Plaintiff alleged “difficulty with memory, concentration, 

understanding, following instructions, and completing tasks.” (AR 24–25.) The ALJ also 

discussed Plaintiff’s education records and history of being granted accommodations. (Id.) The 

ALJ nonetheless found that “[t]he record does not show the claimant to have more than a mild 

limitation in any of these areas.” (AR 25 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(4)).) Further, the ALJ 

determined that the record did not reflect more than a “minimal limitation” in Plaintiff’s ability to 

perform basic work activities. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that “[b]ecause [Plaintiff’s] 

medically determinable mental impairments cause no more than ‘mild’ limitation in any of the first 

three functional areas and the evidence does not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal 

limitation in the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities,5they are nonsevere.” (AR 25 (citing 

4 The Social Security regulations establish four functional areas, sometimes referred to as “Paragraph B” criteria, that 

are to be considered in evaluating the severity of limitations associated with mental impairments: “understanding; 

remembering or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and 

adapting oneself.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(4).

5

“[B]asic work activities are the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” SSR 85–28, 1985 WL 56856, at 

*3. Examples of “basic work activities” include (1) “[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, 

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling,” (2) “[c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking,” (3) 

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20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(d)(1)).) 

Plaintiff sought review of this decision before the Appeals Council, which denied review 

on December 14, 2023. (AR 1–6.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Applicable Law

An individual is considered “disabled” for purposes of disability benefits if he or she is 

unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

However, “[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [her] physical or 

mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do [her] 

previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

“In determining whether an individual’s physical or mental impairment or impairments are 

of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment or impairments could be the basis of eligibility 

[for disability benefits], the Commissioner” is required to “consider the combined effect of all of 

the individual’s impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered 

separately, would be of such severity.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(B). For purposes of this determination, “a 

‘physical or mental impairment’ is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. § 423(d)(3).

“The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining 

whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). “The claimant carries the initial 

burden of proving a disability in steps one through four of the analysis.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

“[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions,” (4) “[u]se of judgment,” (5) “[r]esponding 

appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations,” and (6) “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work 

setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.922(b).

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F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). The 

Ninth Circuit provided the following description of the sequential evaluation analysis, as relevant 

here:

In step one, the ALJ determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ 

proceeds to step two and evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. If not, the claimant is not disabled. 

Id.; see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (providing the “five-step sequential evaluation process”); 

42 U.S.C. § 416.920(a)(4) (same). “If a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any 

step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).

B. Scope of Review

“This court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits [only] 

when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in 

the record as a whole.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is 

defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Edlund v. Massanari, 

253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098). “Put another way, 

substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). 

“This is a highly deferential standard of review.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). “The ALJ’s findings will be upheld if supported by inferences 

reasonably drawn from the record.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id.; see, e.g., Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156 (“If 

the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner.” (citations omitted)).

Nonetheless, “the Commissioner’s decision ‘cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a 

specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 

143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Rather, a court must ‘consider the record as a whole, 

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weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] 

conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s sole assertion of error is that the ALJ erred in finding at Step Two that Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments were not severe. (See Doc. 18 at 6–11; Doc. 23 at 1–3.) The Court agrees and 

will remand the case for further proceedings on that basis.

A. The ALJ Committed Harmful Error at Step Two

1. Legal Standard

“At step two of the five-step sequential inquiry, the Commissioner determines whether the 

claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.” Smolen v. Chater, 

80 F.3d 1273, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140–41 (1987)). 

“[A]t the step two inquiry, . . . the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant’s 

impairments on [their] ability to function, without regard to whether each alone was sufficiently 

severe.” Id. at 1290 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) and Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 86–8).

“[A]n impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit [the claimant’s] . . . ability 

to do basic work activities.” Id. at 1290 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) & 404.1521(a)). See also

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 416.921(a). 

“An impairment or combination of impairments can be found ‘not severe’ only if the 

evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has ‘no more than a minimal effect on an 

[individual’s] ability to work.’” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290 (quoting SSR 85–28). Additionally, “an 

ALJ may find that a claimant lacks a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments 

only when their conclusion is ‘clearly established by medical evidence.’” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 

F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing SSR 85–28); cf. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1006 

(9th Cir. 2005) (finding that the claimant “failed to meet his burden of establishing disability” 

where “none of the medical opinions included a finding of impairment, a diagnosis, or objective 

test results”).

“Great care should be exercised in applying the not severe impairment concept.” SSR 85–

28. “The Commissioner has stated that ‘[i]f an adjudicator is unable to determine clearly the effect 

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of an impairment or combination of impairments on the individual’s ability to do basic work 

activities, the sequential evaluation should not end with the not severe evaluation step.’” Webb, 

433 F.3d at 687 (alteration in original) (quoting SSR 85–28).

Ultimately, “[t]he severity regulation increases the efficiency and reliability of the 

evaluation process by identifying at an early stage those claimants whose medical impairments are 

so slight that it is unlikely they would be found to be disabled even if their age, education, and 

experience were taken into account.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 153. In other words, “the step-two 

inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290 

(citing Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 153–54). Nonetheless, “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of establishing 

the severity of the impairment.” Cookson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:12–cv–2542–CMK, 2014 

WL 4795176, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2014); see, e.g., Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (“The claimant 

carries the initial burden of proving a disability in steps one through four of the analysis.”) (citing 

Swenson, 876 F.2d at 687)).

2. Analysis

At step two, the ALJ noted Plaintiff had “medically determinable mental impairments.” 

(AR 23.) The ALJ found those impairments were not severe because they caused no more than a 

“mild” limitation in the four functional areas of (1) understanding, remembering or applying 

information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and (4) 

adapting or managing oneself. (AR 23–27.) 

Viewing the record as a whole, the medical evidence in this case does not “clearly establish” 

that Plaintiff lacks a medically severe mental impairment. Webb, 433 F.3d at 687. In concluding 

that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were nonsevere, the ALJ improperly (1) failed to explain why 

“significant probative evidence was rejected”—specifically with regard to evidence relating to the 

Cognitive Functioning / Processing Assessments, see Vincent on Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 

F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981))—and 

(2) improperly selectively highlighted those portions of Plaintiff’s records that supported the ALJ’s 

conclusion that the impairments were nonsevere, while downplaying or omitting evidence to the 

contrary, see Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722–23 (9th Cir. 1998) (An ALJ may not “cherry 

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pick” from a record to support the conclusion, but rather must account for the context of the whole 

record.); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Although it is within the power 

of the [ALJ] to . . . weigh conflicting evidence, he cannot reach a conclusion first, and then attempt 

to justify it by ignoring competent evidence in the record that suggests an opposite result.). (See 

Doc. 18 at 8–10.)

While Plaintiff is not a minor,6courts have determined that “like with determinations for 

older adolescents, records from special education school programs can be relevant to 

determinations for young adults.” Kristy M. P., No. 19-CV-00749-TSH, 2020 WL 5760476, at *9 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2020). Indeed, the agency itself has issued a policy document setting forth 

that “[b]ecause ‘[t]he abilities, skills, and behaviors that young adults use to do basic work activities 

are the same as those that older adolescents use for age-appropriate activities,’ the evidence an ALJ 

considers in making a disability determination for a young adult ‘is generally the same as, or similar 

to,’ evidence an ALJ considers in making determinations for older adolescents.” See id. (quoting 

SSR 11-2p). In light of that policy document, the Court is convinced that the results of the 

Cognitive Functioning / Processing Assessment—which showed at least one clinically significant 

result as to Plaintiff’s attention and involved findings of weakness as to Plaintiff’s executive 

functioning, fluid reasoning, long-term recall, and listening comprehension (AR 531–35)—were 

significant and probative to the ALJ’s Paragraph B analysis. It was, therefore, error for the ALJ to 

fail to consider the formal testing evidence. See Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1395.

In addition to ignoring significant probative evidence, the ALJ cherrypicked evidence 

tending to support his conclusion while ignoring evidence that would tend to undermine his 

conclusion. For example, while the ALJ observed that the Plaintiff obtained a driver’s license, he 

failed to account for the fact that it took Plaintiff ten attempts before she was able to pass the 

6 The Court observes that were Plaintiff still a minor, the ALJ would have been obligated by regulation to consider 

school records including “any reports that the school may have that show the results of formal testing,” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.924a(a)(2)(iii); see also id. § 416.924a(b)(7)(iii). Moreover, medical evidence, for the purposes of evaluating 

disability for children, includes “formal testing that provides information about your development or functioning in 

terms of standard deviations, percentiles, percentages of delay, or age or grade equivalents.” Id. § 416.924a(a)(1)(i); 

but see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (noting that a licensed or certified school psychologist is an “[a]cceptable medical source” 

for the purposes of assessing “impairments of intellectual disability, learning disabilities, and borderline intellectual 

functioning only.”). 

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driver’s test. (Compare AR 25, with AR 45). Also, while the ALJ also observed that the Plaintiff 

was enrolled in cosmetology school, he did not explicitly consider that Plaintiff receives 

accommodations as a part of that program. (Compare AR 25, with AR 46–47). Finally, while the 

ALJ took into account some “mood disturbances” and “uncooperative” behavior with Dr. 

Alimasuya in April 2022, he did not address the treatment records from September 2021, which 

included findings that Plaintiff was minimally communicative and defensive, had constricted 

affect, presented as anxious, and had a short attention span. (AR 769, see also AR 779.) This 

selective 

While Plaintiff may not “succeed in proving that [she] is disabled,” the ALJ “lacked 

substantial evidence to find that the medical evidence clearly established [plaintiff’s] lack of” a 

medically severe mental impairment. Webb, 433 F.3d at 688. Accordingly, the ALJ’s Step Two 

finding cannot stand. And although courts “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of a 

harmless error,” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017), harmless error only “exists 

when it is clear from the record that ‘the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.’” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006)). Because the ALJ ended his evaluation of Plaintiff’s claim at 

step two, his error at step two is de facto harmful. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 682; Nunes v. Saul, No. 

2:17-CV-2683-EFB, 2019 WL 4670767, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2019).

B. Remand for Further Proceedings is Appropriate.

The Court has the discretion to remand the case for additional evidence and findings or to 

award benefits. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. In the present case, the Plaintiff seeks only a “remand 

to the agency for additional investigation or explanation,’” Simmons v. Colvin, No. CV 12-06060-

AJW, 2013 WL 3337666, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2013) (quoting Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 

886 (9th Cir. 2004)). (See Doc. 23 at 3). Because the Court finds that further proceedings are 

necessary for further additional explanation, the Court remands this matter to the Commissioner 

for further administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Simmons, 2013 WL 3337666, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. 

July 1, 2013) (finding error at step two and remanding for further administrative proceedings).

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V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence and is, therefore, VACATED and the case REMANDED to the ALJ for further 

proceedings consistent with this Order. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment 

in favor of Plaintiff Jaelyn Nicole Nichols and against Defendant Carolyn Colvin, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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