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Parties Involved:
Sammie Eubanks
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10948

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SAMMIE EUBANKS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 7:21-cr-00049-WLS-TQL-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10948

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

After pleading guilty, Sammie Eubanks appeals his 57-

month sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At the time of his 

§ 922(g) firearm offense in 2019, Eubanks was on state probation. 

The state court revoked Eubanks’ probation and imposed a fouryear state sentence, which he was still serving at the time of his 

federal sentencing in 2023. 

At his federal sentencing, the district court imposed a 57-

month sentence, within the advisory guidelines range of 51 to 63 

months. The district court ordered that the 57-month sentence run 

concurrent to the undischarged portion of the state sentence

(which had approximately six months left). On appeal, Eubanks 

argues his 57-month sentence is substantively unreasonable

because the district court improperly weighed the sentencing 

factors, focused primarily on his criminal history, and failed to give 

adequate consideration to the more than three years he spent in 

custody before his federal sentencing, either in state custody or in 

federal pretrial detention. After review, we affirm Eubanks’ 

sentence.

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23-10948 Opinion of the Court 3

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. 2019 Offense Conduct and State Probation Revocation

In August 2019, police officers responded to reports of a 

domestic dispute at a residence in Valdosta, Georgia. During their 

investigation, officers encountered Eubanks, who matched the 

reported description of the man involved in the domestic dispute. 

Initially, Eubanks gave officers a fake name. Eubanks later 

admitted to the officers that he and his girlfriend had a verbal 

dispute. 

As the officers questioned Eubanks, his girlfriend 

approached, and Eubanks began to back away. To prevent 

Eubanks from fleeing, the officers grabbed him and pulled him to 

the ground. While the officers struggled to place Eubanks in 

handcuffs, Eubanks threw a loaded firearm from his body to the 

ground. After restraining Eubanks, officers found bullets for the 

firearm in the backpack Eubanks was wearing. 

At the time, Eubanks was a convicted felon. Specifically, in 

2012, Eubanks pled guilty in Georgia state court to robbery by 

intimidation and aggravated assault. Eubanks was still on 

probation for these prior state convictions when in August 2019, 

the officers discovered the firearm and ammunition in his 

possession. As a result, in January 2020, Eubanks’ state probation 

was revoked, and later he was ordered to serve four years in state 

prison. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10948

B. 2022 Federal Charge and Guilty Plea

Meanwhile, agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) examined the firearm that was 

found in Eubanks’ possession in August 2019. The ATF agents 

determined that the firearm was manufactured in California and 

therefore had traveled in interstate commerce to reach Georgia. 

On October 14, 2021, a federal indictment was filed charging 

Eubanks with the current § 922(g) firearm offense. A federal arrest 

warrant was issued on October 14, 2021. 

On June 7, 2022, Eubanks was arrested on the federal 

warrant at Wilcox State Prison. Pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus 

ad prosequendum, Eubanks was moved to federal custody. At his 

initial appearance on June 9, Eubanks consented to pretrial 

detention in his federal case in light of the fact that he was still 

serving a state sentence anyway. Accordingly, the district court 

ordered Eubanks to be detained in federal custody pending trial. 

In September 2022, Eubanks pled guilty as charged in the 

federal indictment without a plea agreement. 

C. Presentence Investigation Report 

Eubanks’ presentence investigation report (“PSI”) calculated 

a total offense level of 17 and a criminal history category of VI. 

Eubanks’ criminal history category was based on eleven criminal 

history points for prior criminal convictions, including possession 

of marijuana, serious injury by vehicle, battery-family violence, 

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23-10948 Opinion of the Court 5

and criminal trespass in addition to the 2012 robbery by 

intimidation and aggravated assault convictions. 

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), the PSI added two more 

criminal history points because Eubanks committed the current 

§ 922(g) firearm offense while on probation for the 2012 Georgia 

convictions. The resulting advisory guidelines range was 51 to 63 

months’ imprisonment. 

Eubanks did not object to the PSI’s facts or guidelines 

calculations. 

D. 2023 Sentencing

At Eubanks’ March 2, 2023 sentencing, the district court 

confirmed that Eubanks had no objection to the PSI. The district 

court determined that the advisory guidelines range was 51 to 63 

months, as calculated by the PSI. 

The government requested a sentence at the top of the 

advisory guidelines range, citing Eubanks’ criminal history, which 

included convictions for violent crimes and prior violations of state 

probation, and Eubanks’ provision of a fake name to officers before 

the firearm and ammunition were discovered. 

During allocution, Eubanks accepted full responsibility for 

his actions and asked the court for compassion, stating that he was 

“not the same person” he was in 2019, when he was first arrested 

for violating his state probation. 

Eubanks asked for a 40-month sentence, a variance below 

the guidelines range. In mitigation, Eubanks stressed that: (1) his 

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10948

verbal dispute with his girlfriend was non-violent and did not 

involve the firearm; (2) he had a difficult upbringing and lost his 

birth parents to incarceration at an early age; (3) the majority of his 

past criminal conduct and probation violations occurred when he 

was 18 or 19 years old; (4) while previously incarcerated, he 

obtained his GED; (5) he had an eleven-year-old daughter he 

wanted to build a relationship with upon his release; and (6) during 

his almost four years in state custody since his 2019 arrest, Eubanks 

had “done a lot of self-reflection,” had matured, and had not 

smoked marijuana or taken any other drugs. 

At his March 2, 2023 sentencing, Eubanks also pointed out 

that he was still serving his state sentence, which had 

approximately six months remaining. Eubanks asked the district 

court to run his federal sentence concurrently so that he could go 

“straight into federal custody where he’ll be able to take advantage 

of whatever programs the [Federal] Bureau of Prisons has . . . that 

will help him when he gets out on supervised release.” Eubanks 

also asked the district court to consider the fact that he had “been 

in custody for the past three years and seven months” and that, 

although his offense occurred in August 2019, he was not brought 

to federal court until June 2022. 

After considering the PSI, the advisory guidelines range, and 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court 

imposed a 57-month sentence. The district court explained that it 

was “struck” by the fact that, while most of Eubanks’ prior criminal 

conduct took place earlier in his life, he was “only 29 now” and was 

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23-10948 Opinion of the Court 7

at a criminal history category VI, the highest category. The district 

court also stressed that some of Eubanks’ prior offenses were 

“pretty serious and resulted in harm,” including a vehicular offense 

in which the struck pedestrian lost the use of his legs. The court 

highlighted Eubanks’ state probation violations, including one for 

failing to comply with compulsory anger management treatment 

and stated that “looking across [Eubanks’] cases anger was clearly 

a contributory factor to some of [his] conduct.” 

The district court expressed concern that Eubanks’ current 

offense stemmed from a domestic dispute, noting that domestic 

disturbances can often “turn into something . . . much bigger or 

worse.” The court acknowledged, however, that Eubanks did not 

use the firearm during his dispute with his girlfriend and that 

Eubanks had “admitted [he] had no business with a firearm.” The 

district court stated that although a sentence at the top of the 

advisory guidelines range could easily be justified, a “midlevel 

sentence” was appropriate given Eubanks’ forthrightness and 

acceptance of responsibility. 

As for Eubanks’ request to run his federal sentence 

concurrent to the state sentence he was still serving, the district 

court recognized that Eubanks had been in state custody since 

2019. The court stated that Eubanks should be punished for his 

federal crime “independent of and not necessarily overlapping of 

the other conduct for which you’ve been in custody.” The district 

court ordered Eubanks’ 57-month sentence to run “concurrent as 

of the entry of [the federal] judgment.” 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-10948

Further, the district court clarified that the federal sentence 

was “not intended to relate back to the beginning of [Eubanks’] 

state sentence,” but instead would “overlap that remaining part of

[his] sentence that [he] might have in state custody.” The district 

court opined that “in view of that [state] sentence expected to be 

ended this year . . . there’s adequate remaining sentence under the 

federal sentence that takes into account adequate[] punishment for 

the federal offense.” Eubanks objected to the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence. 

On March 6, 2023, the district court entered the judgment 

ordering Eubanks’ 57-month sentence “to run concurrent to the 

undischarged terms of imprisonment” imposed by the Georgia 

court in his 2012 criminal case for his 2019 violation of probation, 

“beginning from the entry of this [federal] judgement [sic].” 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Substantive Reasonableness

“We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for 

abuse of discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” 

United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023). As 

the party challenging the sentence, Eubanks bears the burden of 

establishing that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light 

of the record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id.; United States 

v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).1

1 The § 3553(a) sentencing factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of 

the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need 

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23-10948 Opinion of the Court 9

A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a 

substantively unreasonable sentence when it (1) fails to consider 

relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives 

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or 

(3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper 

factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (en banc). Our review of the substantive reasonableness 

of a sentence involves “examining the totality of the 

circumstances.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th 

Cir. 2008). We will only vacate a sentence as unreasonable if we 

are left with a “definite and firm conviction that the district court 

committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) 

factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of 

reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 

F.3d at 1190 (quotation marks omitted).

District courts have “discretion to decide how much weight 

to give each § 3553(a) factor.” Williams, 526 F.3d at 1323. And 

while the district court is required to consider all § 3553(a) factors, 

it is permitted to attach “great weight” to one factor over others. 

for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for 

the law, and provide just punishment; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need 

to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational 

or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; 

(7) the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements 

of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 

disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to the victims. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a).

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10 Opinion of the Court 23-10948

United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013)

(quotation marks omitted). “Placing substantial weight on a 

defendant’s criminal record is entirely consistent with § 3553(a) 

because five of the factors it requires a court to consider are related 

to criminal history.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 

1263 (11th Cir. 2015). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the 

guideline range to be reasonable. United States v. Foster, 878 F.3d 

1297, 1309 (11th Cir. 2018).

B. Eubanks’ 57-Month Sentence

On appeal, Eubanks argues his 57-month sentence is 

substantively unreasonable because the district court did not 

properly consider or give sufficient weight to the more than three 

years Eubanks was in state custody “for the same federal offense 

conduct” or to the nine-month period Eubanks was in federal 

pretrial detention—between June 7, 2022, when he was moved 

from state custody to federal custody, and March 2, 2023, when he 

was sentenced. Instead, Eubanks contends, the district court 

“placed primary focus on [his] criminal history.” 

Eubanks has not shown that his 57-month sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. During Eubanks’ sentencing hearing, 

the district court stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors

and the advisory guidelines range. The district court specifically 

noted Eubanks’ significant criminal history that was amassed by 

the age of 29 and involved serious crimes, some of which had 

harmed others. The district court also listened to and 

acknowledged Eubanks’ arguments in mitigation, placing 

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23-10948 Opinion of the Court 11

particular emphasis on the fact that Eubanks had not used the 

firearm during his dispute with his girlfriend and readily admitted 

he should not have possessed the firearm. Indeed, the district court 

cited Eubanks’ forthright acceptance of responsibility for its 

decision to impose a sentence in the middle of the advisory 

guidelines range rather than the top. And the fact that Eubanks’ 

sentence falls within the advisory guidelines range is another sign 

of its reasonableness. See Foster, 878 F.3d at 1309.

The district court also explicitly considered Eubanks’ 

request for a concurrent sentence to account for his roughly four 

years in state custody, which included his nine months in federal 

pretrial detention awaiting federal sentencing. Thus, the record 

belies Eubanks’ claim that the district court “failed to properly 

weigh” this factor. Eubanks argues the district court placed too 

much weight on his criminal history, but the district court was 

within its discretion to do so. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1263; 

Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 638.

Further, the district court was within its discretion to run 

Eubanks’ federal sentence concurrent with only the undischarged 

portion of his state sentence (which had approximately six months 

left) and to begin his federal sentence from the entry of the 

judgment of conviction on March 6, 2023. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) 

(providing terms may run concurrently or consecutively to other 

undischarged terms to which the defendant is already subject); 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) (providing that sentences may “run 

concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior 

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-10948

undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable 

punishment for the instant offense”). 

In fact, the district court explained its decision to run 

Eubanks’ 57-month sentence “partially concurrent” with his state 

sentence and “as of the entry of the judgment,” stating that it was 

necessary to provide independent punishment for Eubanks’ federal 

firearm offense, which is separate conduct from his state probation 

violation.2 The district court’s decision to impose the 57-month 

sentence concurrent with only the undischarged portion of his 

state sentence and as of the entry of the federal judgment on 

March 6, 2023 was not an abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED.

2 Eubanks’ appeal brief states in passing that the district court “declined to give 

[him] credit for the months he sat in federal custody” and complains “that the 

Bureau of Prisons will not give credit” for this time. However, Eubanks’ brief 

does not raise any procedural error as to the district court’s imposition of his 

sentence or argue that the district court erred by failing to give him “credit” 

for his time in federal pretrial detention. We note, in any event, that the 

Bureau of Prisons, not the sentencing court, calculates credit for time in 

pretrial detention that has not been credited against another sentence. See 

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1992) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) 

does not authorize the district court to compute the amount of credit at 

sentencing). 

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