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Parties Involved:
Ruben Reyes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United Staces Coun of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

OCT 15 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 88-2110 

v. (D.C. No. CR 87-404-5) 

(D. of New Mexico) 

RUBEN R. REYES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

Before HOLLOWAYi Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and KANE, 

District Judge. * 

In a multi-count indictment Ruben R. Reyes and six codefendants were charged with various drug offenses. Reyes was 

charged in four counts as follows: In count 1 with conspiring 

from March 3, 1987 to September 16, 1987, with the six other codefendants, and others, to possess and distribute cocaine in an 

amount in excess of five kilograms, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 

84l(a)(l), 21 U.S.C. S 84l(b)(l)(A), and 21 u.s.c. § 846; in count 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable John L. Kane, United States District Judge for the 

District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2110 Document: 010110059621 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 1 
5 with the possession of cocaine on September 16, 1987, in an 

amount greater than five kilograms with an intent to distribute, 

in violation of 21 u.s.c. S 84l(a)(l), 21 U.S.C. S 84l(b)(l)(A), 

and 18 u.s.c. S 2; in count 13 with carrying a loaded, semiautomatic rifle and a loaded carbine rifle on September 16, 1987, 

during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, namely, the 

possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) and 18 u.s.c. S 2; and in count 14 

with carrying a loaded handgun on September 16, 1987, during and 

in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 u.s.c. 

S 924(c){l) and 18 u.s.c. S 2. 

In a joint trial with his six co-defendants, Reyes was found 

guilty on counts 1, 5, and 14. He was sentenced to ten years 

imprisonment on counts 1 and 5, the two sentences to be served 

concurrently. Reyes was also sentenced to five years imprisonment 

on count 14, that sentence to be consecutive to the sentences 

imposed on counts 1 and 5, making his total term of imprisonment 

fifteen years. Reyes appeals his several convictions, and the 

sentences imposed thereon. 

Brief background facts are in order. In February, 1987, the 

United States Border Patrol Anti-Smuggling Unit connnenced an 

undercover investigation of drug activities in and around the 

small connnunity of Vado, New Mexico. Agent Carrillo first 

contacted one Luis Corrales in Vada, New Mexico, in February, 

1987. Corrales was known to the Border Patrol to have been previously involved in smuggling illegal aliens into the United States. 

Carrillo expressed to Corrales his desire to purchase cocaine, and 

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' Corrales indicated that he knew where he could obtain cocaine. On 

March 3, 1987, Carrillo purchased six ounces of cocaine which 

Corrales obtained from one Jose Castillo for $10,000. On May 5, 

1987, Carrillo purchased another six ounces of cocaine for $9,000. 

On this occasion, Corrales drove Carrillo to the Jose Castillo 

residence where the sale was made. On August 8, 1987, Carrillo 

purchased one kilogram of cocaine from Castillo at the latter's 

residence for $28,000, paying $14,000 at the time of delivery and 

the balance a short time later. 

Negotiations ensued thereafter to purchase ten kilograms from 

Castillo. It was the government's theory of the case that 

Castillo and Ruben Reyes were "business associates" in the 

distribution of cocaine in the Vado area, and that Reyes was 

Castillo's "source." In any event, plans were consummated whereby 

on September 16, 1987, Carrillo would purchase ten kilograms of 

cocaine from Castillo for $210,000 in cash. The cocaine was 

inspected and then packed into the door panels of a truck in a 

shed located on Reyes' property. When the defendants, or at least 

five of them, including Reyes, were in the process of making 

delivery of the ten kilograms of cocaine, arrests were made and 

the cocaine seized. Reyes was at the arrest scene and he and four 

other defendants were taken into custody. 

Prior to trial, Reyes' counsel moved to have his case tried 

separately from the trial of his six co-defendants. As grounds 

for a severance, counsel asserted that statements made by the 

other defendants, which would be admissible in a joint trial, 

implicated Reyes, but that they would not be admissible if he were 

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tried separately, and that cautionary instructions would not 

remedy the damage done. He also asserted that if Reyes were tried 

alone, Jose Luis Castillo, who was not going to testify in a joint 

trial, had indicated that he would testify in Reyes' behalf. That 

motion was denied. 

Reyes elected to testify in his own behalf and his testimony 

was that he was not a part of any conspiracy and that he was 

"merely present" at the time of the attempted delivery of ten 

kilograms of cocaine on September 16, 1987. He also testified 

that he did not know that the shed on his property was being used 

to transfer the cocaine from one vehicle to another. Before resting his case, Reyes again moved for a separate trial and this time 

supported his motion with an affidavit from Jose Luis Castillo 

wherein the latter indicated that he would testify if Reyes were 

tried separately and that his testimony would show that Reyes was 

indeed "merely present" at the September 16, 1987, transaction. 

The district court denied this motion, commenting that the motion 

came "late in the day," since the three-week trial was then nearing the end. 

It is agreed that a motion to sever the trial of one 

defendant, who is jointly charged with others, is a matter which 

lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the 

denial of such will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is "a 

strong showing of prejudice." United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 

1011, 1022 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 

1374 (10th Cir. 1978). 

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The pretrial motion for a severance, insofar as it was based 

on a so-called Bruton violation, did not require a severance. 

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Some of the staterr.ents of the other defendants did not even implicate Reyes. Other 

statements were either admissible against Reyes, or were covered 

by a cautionary instruction given the jury by the trial court. 

Where a defendant seeks a severance on the ground that a codefendant will testify on his behalf if he is tried separately, 

but will not testify if the trial be a joint one, the defendant 

"bears a heavy burden of demonstrating prejudice to his case." 

United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671, 682 (10th Cir. 1987). In 

United States v. McConnell, 749 F.2d 1441, 1445 (10th Cir. 1984), 

we indicated the factors to be considered where a defendant seeks 

a severance so that a co-defendant can testify in his behalf. As 

was stated in Mabey. severance is not a matter of right and that 

the defendant has a "heavy burden" of showing real, not imagined, 

prejudice. 

We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Reyes' several motions for a severance. Castillo apparently 

was unwilling to give a pretrial affidavit, and counsel states 

that as soon as Castillo was willing to give an affidavit, it was 

promptly submitted to the district court. That no dqubt is true, 

but it still came as the three-week trial was drawing to a close. 

As indicated, Reyes' defense of "mere presence" was already before 

the jury, and Castillo's testimony, at best, would be only cumulative. And of course Castillo's statement that he would testify if 

Reyes was tried later and separately was always subject to change. 

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' Reyes' 

misconduct. 

next ground for reversal is alleged prosecutorial 

The misconduct relied on is the fact that after the 

district court had ruled, out of the presence of the jury, that 

certain questions were improper, the prosecutor, in examining 

Agent Carrillo in the presence of the jury, asked the same questions, to which objections were made, and sustained, and a 

cautionary instruction given the jury to disregard the form and 

substance of the questions. It is further argued that later, in 

his closing argument, the prosecutor made reference to the matter. 

No timely objection was made to the closing argument, and, as 

indicated, the district court sustained counsel's objections to 

the questions asked. We find no reversible error in this regard. 

It should be remembered that this was a three-week trial involving 

seven defendants, each represented by his own counsel. Objections 

were constantly flying around the courtroom. The trial may not 

have been 100% "perfect," but in our view it was "fundamentally 

fair." 

Reyes next argued that the district court erred in admitting 

into evidence certain statements made by his co-defendant, Luis 

Corrales, to Agent Carrillo in February, 1987. Counsel concedes 

that the prosecution is not bound by the data set forth in the 

indictment as to when the conspiracy commenced, in this case March 

3, 1987. In any event, we find no reversible error in connection 

with Agent Carrillo's testimony regarding statements made to him 

by Corrales. They had little to do with Reyes and are 

insignificant when viewed in light of other testimony tying Reyes 

into the attempted distribution on September 16, 1987, of ten 

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• kilograms of cocaine when a shed on Reyes' premises was used to 

facilitate the distribution and his foreman "cleared the area." 

At trial a taped conversation between Agent Carrillo and Jose 

Luis Castillo was received into evidence. The conversation was in 

Spanish and a dispute over translation arose. The dispute was 

whether Castillo said he was going to use Ruben Reyes' shed to 

"fix" a truck or to "get ready" a truck. Counsel argues that if 

Reyes knew that a truck was being "readied," as opposed to getting 

"fixed," "arguably" Reyes knew that his shed was being used to 

facilitate the drug transaction of September 16, 1987. This, to 

us, is a purely semantical matter without much real substance. 

What real difference is there between "fixing" the truck or "getting it ready"? In any event, Reyes testified that he gave no one 

permission to use his shed on September 16, 1987, and that he 

never knew what did go on in his shed on that date. In that 

situation it doesn't make much difference to Reyes whether 

Castillo used the word "fix" or "ready." 

Shortly after Reyes' arrest, agents, armed with a search warrant, searched Reyes' premises, including the shed, and found in 

the shed a gram scale, two boxes of baggies, a jar of mannetal, 

and a spoon. Other testimony indicated that mannetal was 

frequently used to dilute cocaine and that the spoon was conunonly 

used to accomplish the dilution. Counsel objected to the admission of these items on the ground that none had any relevance to 

the crimes charged. On appeal, this particular matter is not really pushed. In any event, we perceive relevance as did the 

district court. 

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At trial, government witnesses testified that Reyes arrived 

at the scene about 20 to 25 minutes before the arrests. Reyes 

testified that he had not been at the arrest scene for 20 to 25 

minutes and arrived only minutes before the authorities moved in. 

To support his version, Reyes sought to introduce a statement made 

by an F.B.I. agent in an affidavit supporting a criminal complaint 

initially filed against these defendants which would have 

indicated that Reyes had not been at the arrest scene 20 to 25 

minutes before the arrest. The district court denied this 

request. We find no reversible error. Whether Reyes was at the 

arrest scene 20 to 25 minutes before the actual arrests, or only, 

say, 5 to 10 minutes, was certainly not one of the material issues 

in the case. 

Agent Carrillo, in answer to a question by the prosecutor, 

"volunteered" that he had seen Reyes use cocaine at Jose Luis 

Castillo's home in May, 1987, at a poker party. Objection was 

made, sustained, and the jury was instructed to disregard the 

answer. Counsel argues that this was not enough, and that a 

mistrial should have been declared. Mistrial is a drastic remedy 

for a "volunteered" answer by an over-enthusiastic government witness. It should be cured, and in this case was cured, by a forceful cautionary instruction by the court. 

In count 14, Reyes was charged with, and later convicted of, 

carrying a loaded handgun on September 16, 1987, during and in 

relation to a drug trafficking charge. Counsel offered an 

instruction to the effect that under New Mexico law it was lawful 

to carry a concealed loaded firearm in a private automobile for 

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• self-protection. The district court rejected the tendered 

instruction with the comment that it was a "red herring." We 

agree. Reyes was not charged with carrying a concealed weapon. 

He was charged with carrying a loaded firearm "during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime." Further, Reyes testified that 

it was not his firearm which was found in his truck, and that this 

firearm had been tossed into his truck by Jose Luis Castillo. 

Lastly, Reyes argues that while none of the above, standing 

alone, may require reversal, the "cumulative effect" dictates 

reversal. We do not agree. As stated above, this may not have 

been a perfect trial, but in our view it was a fair trial. United 

States v. Shelton, 736 F.2d 1397, 1404 (10th Cir. 1984). 

In a companion case involving the appeals of Jose Luis 

Castillo, No. 88-2106, and Manuel Castillo, No. 88-2107, the 

government and defense counsel agree that in imposing ten-year 

sentences on the conspiracy conviction for all defendants, the 

district court and all concerned were of the mistaken belief that 

there was a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment 

on that count. Under the statute in effect on the dates appearing 

in the present indictment (21 u.s.c. § 846), one convicted of 

conspiracy to commit a drug offense could not be sentenced to a 

term exceeding the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the 

"target offense," which, for the possession of more than five 

kilograms of cocaine with an intent to distribute, was life 

imprisonment. 21 u.s.c. S 84l(b) (1) (A) (ii). The "target 

offense," i.e., possession of more than five kilograms of cocaine 

with an intent to distribute, also imposed a mandatory minimum of 

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ten years. 21 u.s.c. S 84l(b)(l)(A)(ii). From this the district 

court, and all of counsel and the probation department, concluded 

that there was a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for 

conspiring to possess more than five kilograms of cocaine with an 

intent to distribute. 

Counsel in the Castillo appeals agreed that under Bifulco v. 

United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980), the mandatory minimum provided 

for in 21 u.s.c. S 841(b)(l)(A)(ii) did not attach to 21 u.s.c. § 

846, to the end that the imprisonment for conspiring to possess 

more than five kilograms of cocaine with an intent to distribute 

was a sentence somewhere between one year and life, not a sentence 

of somewhere between ten years and life. In Bifulco, the Supreme 

Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not permit the imposition of 

a special parole term permitted by 21 u.s.c. S 84l(b) as punishment for one convicted of the "target offense." 

In the present case, Reyes has not argued that the ten-year 

sentence imposed under count 1 should be vacated and that he be 

resentenced on count 1. It is true that in this case, as was true 

in the appeal of Manuel Castillo, that the ten-year sentence 

imposed on count 1 is to be served concurrently with a ten-year 

sentence imposed on count S. However, as in the case of Manuel 

Castillo, we believe that a sentence imposed under a mistaken 

understanding of the proper penalty provided by the statute, 

should not go unnoticed. 

Accordingly, the sentence imposed on count 1 is vacated and 

the case is remanded with direction that Reyes be resentenced on 

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count 1. In all other respects, the judgments of conviction and 

the sentences imposed thereon are affirmed. 

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Entered for the Court 

Robert H. Mcwilliams 

Circuit Judge 

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