Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03866/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03866-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael L. Bradford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3866

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Michael L. Bradford, also known as Derrick Lamont Brown

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

 Submitted: September 25, 2015

 Filed: December 3, 2015

____________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Michael L. Bradford pleaded guilty to two counts of being a felon in

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and one

count of distribution and possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance

containing PCP and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). 

Appellate Case: 14-3866 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/03/2015 Entry ID: 4342409 
Bradford appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motions for a

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subpoena ad testificandum and a subpoena duces tecum. We affirm.

I. Background

In late 2011, a joint task force of federal and local authorities established a

covert storefront operation. According to Special Agent Tyree Koerner ofthe Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the purpose of the operation was “[t]o

take illegal firearms off the street.” 

Bradford sold or facilitated the sale of drugs and firearms to the storefront

operation. In late September 2012, Bradford contacted an undercover agent and told

him that a friend was willing to sell hand grenades. Bradford thereafter brought

David LaBlance to the storefront, where Bradford facilitated the sale of a nonfunctioning grenade by LaBlance to an undercover agent. On October 30, 2012,

LaBlance was found dead, having been shot twice in the head.

On November 1, 2012, Bradford called a confidential informant, telling him

that he had a “dirty” firearm for sale. The confidential informant instructed Bradford

to bring the firearm to the storefront on the following Monday, which he did. 

Bradford sold the firearm—a Llama .38 caliber revolver—to an undercover agent. 

When asked by the agent about the LaBlance murder, Bradford replied that he had

been with him the morning of October 30, but that they later had separated. Bradford

also said that he thought LaBlance was getting in “over his head.”

It was later determined that the Llama .38 caliber revolver had been used in

LaBlance’s murder, testing having revealed that the two bullets recovered from

The Honorable David GregoryKays, Chief Judge,UnitedStates DistrictCourt

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for the Western District of Missouri. 

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LaBlance’s head matched the firearm. A bullet from an earlier gunshot wound was

found in LaBlance’s hip. 

Bradford was arrested and later charged in a five-count superseding indictment. 

He entered into a written plea agreement with the government. The agreement

included an appeal waiver and a binding sentencing recommendation of no less than

180 months’ imprisonment and no more than 300 months’ imprisonment. Bradford

thereafter pleaded guilty to the three counts set forth above, and the remaining

charges were dismissed. 

The presentence investigation report (PSR) applied § 2K2.1(a)-(b) of the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines), which sets forth the base offense level

for the unlawful possession of firearms and the specific offense characteristics that

increase or decrease the base offense level. The PSR did not apply the crossreference set forth in § 2K2.1(c)(1)(B), which instructs the district court to apply “the

most analogous offense guideline” from the homicide subpart, 2A1, when the

defendant used any firearm in connection with the commission of another offense,

death resulted, and the resulting offense level is greater than the one determined

without the cross-reference. The government argued that the cross-reference should

apply because Bradford used the Llama .38 caliber revolver in the murder of

LaBlance, the most analogous offense guideline was § 2A1.2 (second-degree

murder), and Bradford’s offense level under § 2A1.2 was greater than his offense

level under § 2K2.1(a)-(b). 

Bradford filed two pre-sentencing ex parte motions for subpoenas. The first 2

requested a subpoena ad testificandum that would require Bradford’s father to appear

at the sentencing hearing for the purpose of testifying “to his contact with Michael

We grant Bradford’s unopposed motion to supplement the record with copies 2

of the two ex parte motions. 

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Bradford on October 30, 2012 and October 31, 2012.” The second requested a

subpoena duces tecum that would require the Truman Medical Center to release

“medical records related to treatment of David LaBlance . . . related to gunshot

wounds between the dates of October 29, 2011 and October 29, 2012.” The district

court denied the motions. 

At sentencing, defense counsel proffered that on October 30, the night of

LaBlance’s murder, Bradford’s family had gathered to discuss what might happen in

a criminal case pending against Bradford’s father. Counsel stated:

It’s not an alibi, because nobody can say [Bradford] was there at the

time of the murder. So absolutely not an alibi. But they can say that he

spent a good portion of his time that evening with them.

And I think it helps establish the fact that he’s not thinking about going

out and murdering somebody. He’s actually very concerned about his

father who then the next day pled guilty in a rape case in Jackson

County and went to prison.

The government did not object to the proffer, and the district court accepted it. In

support of the § 2K2.1(c)(1)(B) cross-reference, the government presented the

testimony of Special Agent Koerner and a time line of events linking Bradford to

LaBlance’s murder. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Koerner about

the bullet found in LaBlance’s hip. Koerner testified that, according to the forensics

report, the bullet “was from a previous gunshot wound that was never pulled out.”

The district court found that the evidence supported the § 2K2.1(c)(1)(B) crossreference to § 2A1.2, which resulted in an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of

292 to 365 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Bradford to 300

months’ imprisonment, the maximum term allowed under the plea agreement. 

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II. Discussion

A. Appeal Waiver

The government argues that Bradford’s appeal should be dismissed because it

falls within the scope of the appeal waiver set forth in his plea agreement. We

generally will enforce an appeal waiver “as long as the appeal falls within the scope

ofthe waiver, and the defendant’s accession to the plea agreement and the waiver was

knowing and voluntary.” United States v. Azure, 571 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2009). 

The government bears the burden of establishing that the plea agreement clearly and

unambiguously waives the defendant’s right to appeal. United States v. Andis, 333

F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). We conclude that the government did not

meet that burden here. 

The waiver in Bradford’s plea agreement states, in relevant part:

The defendant expressly waives the right to appeal any sentence,

directly or collaterally, on any ground except the following five (5)

claims: . . . (3) an illegal sentence; . . . . An “illegal sentence” includes

a sentence imposed in excess ofthe statutorymaximumor different from

the range recommended in this binding plea agreement, but does not

include less serious sentencing errors, such as a misapplication of the

Sentencing Guidelines or an abuse of discretion.

The government argues that the plea agreement gives the term “illegal

sentence” the same meaning as our en banc court gave the term in United States v.

Andis, in which we stated that we will “refuse to enforce an otherwise valid waiver

if to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” 333 F.3d at 891. We went on to

explain that a miscarriage of justice results if the district court imposes an illegal

sentence, but we emphasized that “the illegal sentence exception to the general

enforceability of an appeal waiver is an extremely narrow exception.” Id. at 892. 

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“Any sentence imposed within the statutory range is not subject to appeal. 

Specifically, an allegation that the sentencing judge misapplied the Sentencing

Guidelines or abused his or her discretion is not subject to appeal in the face of a

valid appeal waiver.” Id. 

Despite the government’s argument to the contrary, the definition of “illegal

sentence” set forth in Bradford’s appeal waiver is materially different from the

language set forth in Andis. Unlike in Andis, the appeal waiver here does not

precisely limit the definition of an illegal sentence. The appeal waiver does not state,

for example, that a sentence is illegal only if it is greater than the statutory maximum

or if it is outside the sentencing range set forth in the plea agreement. Instead, it

provides that an illegal sentence “includes” at least two types of sentences and “does

not include” at least two “less serious sentencing errors.” The language thus implies

that there exists a range ofsentencing errors and that not all of those errorsfall within

the scope of the waiver. Bradford has argued that his constitutional rights were

violated at sentencing, which, if true, might bring his sentence within the appeal

waiver’s definition of illegal sentence. Accordingly, because the government has not

shown that Bradford clearly and unambiguously waived his right to bring this appeal,

we will proceed to the merits of Bradford’s argument.

B. Subpoenas

Bradford argues that the district court denied his Sixth Amendment right to

compulsory process and his Fifth Amendment right to due process when it refused to

issue subpoenas under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. We

disagree. 

Under Rule 17(b), a “court must order that a subpoena be issued for a named

witnessif the defendantshows an inability to pay the witness’s fees and the necessity

of the witness’s presence for an adequate defense.” Bradford failed to establish that

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his father’s presence was needed at sentencing, for his motion for a subpoena ad

testificandum alleged only that his father would testify regarding their contact on the

day of and the day after LaBlance’s murder. “Mere allegations of materiality and

necessity are not sufficient to establish that a witness is necessary to an adequate

defense.” United States v. LeAmous, 754 F.2d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1985). Moreover,

the district court accepted as true defense counsel’s proffer that Bradford had

gathered with his family on the evening of October 30. Bradford’s failure to explain

what additional information his father would have provided fell short of satisfying

Rule 17(b)’s requirements, and thus the district court did not err in denying the

motion.

A subpoena duces tecum orders a witness to produce documents within its

control. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c). The requesting party must identify the documents

with adequate specificity and show that the documents are relevant and admissible. 

United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2013). Bradford states that

he “requested a subpoena duces tecum for LaBlance’s medical records for the year

preceding his death . . . in an effort to verify that LaBlance had been previously shot

a short time before his death on October 30, 2012.” Bradford argues that LaBlance’s

medicalrecords were relevant because theymight have contained information tending

to show that Bradford was not the person who killed LaBlance. “The relevance and

specificity elements ‘require more than the title of a document and conjecture as to

its contents,’ and a subpoena should not issue based upon a party’s ‘mere hope’ that

it will turn up favorable evidence.” Stevenson, 727 F.3d at 831 (quoting United

States v. Hang, 75 F.3d 1275, 1283 (8th Cir. 1996)). We view Bradford’s request as

a “mere hope” that LaBlance’s medical records might identify someone who was

motivated to injure or kill LaBlance, particularly in light of the fact that the district

court had before it testimony that LaBlance had been shot in the hip in an incident

unrelated to his killing. Bradford thus failed to show that a subpoena was warranted,

and the district court did not err in denying the motion that it be issued.

 

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III. Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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