Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03098/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03098-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Floyd Bruce
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2002 Decided April 5, 2002

No. 01-3098

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Floyd Bruce,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00488-01)

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

for the appellant.

Suzanne Grealy Curt, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Roscoe E. Howard, Jr.,

United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman, Thomas E. Zeno and Joan Draper, Assistant United

States Attorneys, were on brief.

USCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 1 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: The appellant, Floyd Bruce, seeks reversal of

the district court's July 30, 2001 sentencing decision, see App.

of Appellant at 143-98, in which the court concluded that the

policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) are not binding upon sentencing courts. Bruce contends, simply, that the court erred

in so holding and that we should remand for resentencing.

We disagree.

I.

In December 1994 a grand jury issued a two-count indictment against Bruce, charging him with bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1344 (Count One), and with uttering and

possessing forged securities of an organization, in violation of

18 U.S.C. s 513(a) (Count Two). In February 1995 the petit

jury found Bruce guilty on both counts. The district court

sentenced him to a term of 24 months' imprisonment, which

was to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Bruce appealed his conviction and we affirmed. See United

States v. Bruce, 89 F.3d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Bruce served his time and was released on August 28, 1996;

accordingly, he was to remain on supervised release until

August 27, 1999. On October 7, 1997 the Probation Office

notified the district court that Bruce had violated his release

conditions because he had been arrested twice in New York

for motor vehicle violations, had twice tested positive for

marijuana and had failed to make restitution payments. The

district court found that Bruce had indeed violated his release

conditions; it therefore extended his supervised release period by one year--to end on August 27, 2000--and ordered him

to serve a 90-day period of monitored home confinement, to

participate in a drug aftercare program and to make monthly

restitution payments.

On January 22, 1998 and March 26, 1998 the Probation

Office forwarded reports to the district court advising it that

USCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 2 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Bruce had once again violated his release conditions by (1)

being arrested for and charged with larceny in New York in

October 1997; (2) failing to notify his probation officer of the

arrest; (3) failing to make restitution payments as ordered;

(4) failing to attend drug counseling as ordered; (5) failing to

adjust his telephone service to accommodate electronic monitoring as ordered; (6) being arrested yet again in New York

for forgery, possession of a forged instrument and possession

of stolen property; (7) failing to notify his probation officer of

the arrest; and (8) making false statements to his probation

officer that he is a United States citizen.

After Bruce failed to appear at a June 2, 1998 hearing, the

district court issued a warrant for his arrest. Bruce remained a fugitive until he was arrested on October 26, 2000 in

Blue Ash, Ohio, where he was indicted in state court on

several counts of theft, possessing criminal tools and receiving

stolen property. He was returned to the District of Columbia

and brought into custody on January 10, 2001 pursuant to the

district court's warrant. At a July 2001 status hearing Bruce

told the district court that he did not wish to contest the eight

supervised release violations alleged by the government and

that he preferred to proceed to resentencing.

At his July 30 resentencing hearing, Bruce waived his right

to contest the violations. The parties did not dispute (1) that

by statute, the maximum sentence of imprisonment the court

could impose for the violations was 36 months, see 18 U.S.C.

s 3583(e)(3) (a "defendant whose [supervised release] term is

revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve

... more than 3 years in prison if [his] offense [of conviction]

is a class B felony"); or (2) that the sentence provided in

Chapter 7 for a defendant (like Bruce) with a criminal history

of category II was six to 12 months, see U.S.S.G. s 7B1.4.

The parties did argue, however, about whether Chapter 7 is

binding upon the district court. Bruce contended that a 1994

amendment to 18 U.S.C. s 3553 had rendered Chapter 7's

policy statements mandatory; thus, he claimed that the court

was obligated to sentence him within the six- to 12-month

range. The government argued that the amendment effected

no such change in the law and that the court was free to

USCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 3 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

impose a sentence of up to 36 months under section

3583(e)(3).

The district court concluded that Chapter 7's policy statements are not binding. The court based its decision, first,

upon our pre-1994 holding in United States v. Hooker, 993

F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993), that the policy statements are not

mandatory and, second, upon several post-1994 circuit court

decisions concluding that the policy statements--even after

the amendment to 18 U.S.C. s 3553--remain non-binding.

The court, therefore, held that it could impose a sentence of

up to 36 months' incarceration for Bruce's uncontested supervised release violations but sentenced him instead to 24

months, finding that it would be "to a certain extent illogical"

to sentence him to "a period of time that exceeds what he was

sentenced to originally." App. of Appellant at 196. Bruce

timely filed a notice of appeal.

II.

Bruce claims that the district court erred in sentencing him

to a prison term of 24 months by declining to follow U.S.S.G.

s 7B1.4's revocation table. He argues that the supervised

release policy statements contained in Chapter 7--section

7B1.4 included--are binding on the district court and that he

should have received only six to 12 months. As noted above,

we held in Hooker that "the Chapter VII policy statements

themselves are merely advisory." Hooker, 993 F.2d at 900.

Accordingly, the sole legal issue before us is whether, as

Bruce contends, the Congress's post-Hooker amendment to

18 U.S.C. s 3553(a) rendered the policy statements mandatory. Addressing that issue de novo, see United States v. Yeh,

278 F.3d 9, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we hold that it did not.

In 1990 the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) promulgated Chapter 7's policy statements pursuant

to its authority to prescribe "guidelines or general policy

statements regarding the appropriate use of the provisions

for ... modification of the term or conditions of supervised

release and revocation of supervised release set forth in

section 3583(e) of title 18." 28 U.S.C. s 994(a)(3). The

USCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 4 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Commission made clear that "[a]fter considered debate" it

had decided to promulgate only policy statements--not guidelines--with respect to supervised release revocation. U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt.

(2001). It believed that "this approach [would] provide[ ]

greater flexibility to both the Commission and the courts" and

that "the additional time to consider complex issues relating

to revocation guidelines ... [would] provide better opportunities for evaluation." Id. The Commission also advised that it

"intend[ed] to promulgate revocation guidelines" after "an

adequate period of evaluation." Id. It has yet to do so.

At the time Hooker was decided, 18 U.S.C. s 3553 ("Imposition of a sentence") provided, in pertinent part:

(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.-

The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not

greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set

forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection [including such

purposes as deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation]. The court, in determining the particular sentence

to be imposed, shall consider ...

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range

established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set

forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1)1 and

that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced;

(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2)2

__________

1 Section 994(a)(1) provides that the Commission has the authority to promulgate "guidelines ... for use of a sentencing court in

determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case." 28

U.S.C. s 994(a)(1).

2 Section 994(a)(2) provides that the Commission has the authority to promulgate "general policy statements regarding application

of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence

implementation that in the view of the Commission would further

[sentencing] purposes." 28 U.S.C. s 994(a)(2).

that is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced;

...

(b) Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence.-

The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within

the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the

court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating

circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately

taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission

in formulating the guidelines that should result in a

sentence different from that described. In determining

whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing

guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of

the Sentencing Commission. In the absence of an appliUSCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 5 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

cable sentencing guideline, the court shall impose an

appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes

set forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an

applicable sentencing guideline in the case of an offense

other than a petty offense, the court shall also have due

regard for the relationship of the sentence imposed to

sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar

offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy

statements of the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. s 3553 (1988) (emphases added).

In 1994, after Hooker, the Congress amended section 3553

by dividing subsection (a)(4) into two parts as follows:

(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.

The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not

greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set

forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection [including such

purposes as deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation]. The court, in determining the particular sentence

to be imposed, shall consider ...

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range

established for--

(A) the applicable category of offense committed

by the applicable category of defendant as set

forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing

Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title

28, United States Code, and that are in effect on

the date the defendant is sentenced; or

(B) in the case of a violation of probation or

supervised release, the applicable guidelines or

policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28,

United States Code; ...

18 U.S.C. s 3553(a) (emphases added). Subsection (b) ("Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence") remained

unchanged after the 1994 amendment.

Bruce's syllogistic argument proceeds as follows: first,

section 3553(b) requires the district court to "impose a sentence of the kind and within the range referred to in subsection (a)(4)"; second, after Hooker, subsection (a)(4) was

amended to include reference to "applicable guidelines or

policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission" for

supervised release violations; therefore, in amending (a)(4),

the Congress was announcing that a district court must

impose a sentence for a supervised release violation within

the range provided by the Commission, whether that range is

set forth in a guideline or a policy statement. As Bruce

candidly acknowledges, all of the circuits that have considered

the issue before us have "unanimously rejected his position,"

Br. of Appellant at 18, holding that the 1994 amendment did

not render Chapter 7's policy statements binding on sentencing courts. See United States v. Brown, 203 F.3d 557, 558

USCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 6 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

(8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v. George, 184

F.3d 1119, 1120-22 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Schwegel,

126 F.3d 551, 552-55 (3d Cir. 1997) (per curiam); United

States v. Cohen, 99 F.3d 69, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam),

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213 (1997); United States v. Hofierka,

83 F.3d 357, 360-61 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1071 (1997); United States v. Escamilla, 70 F.3d

835, 835 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), cert. denied, 517 U.S.

1127 (1996); United States v. West, 59 F.3d 32, 33-36 (6th

Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 980 (1995). Because Bruce's logic

finds no support in the statutory text, we decline to break

rank with our sister circuits.

USCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 7 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The plain language of section 3553(a) merely states that a

district court must "consider ... the applicable guidelines or

policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3)" when imposing a sentence for a

violation of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. s 3553(a)(4)(B)

(emphasis added). To "consider" means to "reflect on,"

"think about," "deliberate," "ponder" or "study." Webster's

Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 483 (1993).

It does not mean to "adhere to," "be bound by" or "follow."

Turning to section 3553(b), one sees that it unambiguously

requires a sentencing court to "impose a sentence of the kind,

and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4)." 18

U.S.C. s 3553(b). Bruce contends that because subsection

(a)(4)--specifically (a)(4)(B)--now references policy statements, sentencing courts must adhere to those statements by

virtue of section 3553(b)'s mandate. His interpretation is not

entirely implausible; while our sister circuits all appear to

agree that the purpose of the 1994 amendment was "to clarify

that resentencing for probation and supervised release violations should be based upon sentencing guidelines and policy

statements issued by the Commission specifically for that

purpose, rather than upon the guidelines applicable to ... the

original offense," George, 184 F.3d at 1121-22 (quoting

Schwegel, 126 F.3d at 554) (internal quotations omitted), the

Congress could have made its aim somewhat clearer textually. Indeed, as Bruce suggested at oral argument, it could

have amended section 3553(b) to require imposition of "a

sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in

subsection (a)(4)(A) [as opposed to (a)(4)]," thus requiring--

explicitly--application of the guidelines but only consideration

of the policy statements. The "Congress-could-have" argument, however, works as much to Bruce's detriment as it does

to his advantage. As its heading suggests, section 3553(b)

pertains to "[a]pplication of [the] guidelines" and only asks a

court to "consider" or have "due regard for" the "applicable

policy statements" in "the absence of an applicable sentencing

guideline." 18 U.S.C. s 3553(b) (emphasis added). Thus, as

the Second Circuit has put it, "[a]bsent any applicable guidelines in Chapter 7, s 3553(b)'s mandatory language does not

USCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 8 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

apply." Cohen, 99 F.3d at 71 (citing West, 59 F.3d at 35).

Without much difficulty, the Congress could have amended

3553(b) to require adherence to policy statements. It did not;

accordingly, we are left with a statute that plainly requires a

district court to apply guidelines (where they exist) but

merely consider (i.e., "reflect on," "think about," "deliberate,"

"ponder" or "study") policy statements.

Bruce resists this conclusion, claiming that "it is not at all

clear whether Congress intended the term 'guidelines' [in

section 3553(b)] to exclude policy statements." Br. of Appellant at 19. For several reasons, we disagree. First, in

mutually exclusive terms, section 994(a)(3) of title 28 requires

the Commission to promulgate "guidelines or general policy

statements regarding the appropriate use of the provisions

for ... modification of the term or conditions of supervised

release and revocation of supervised release set forth in

section 3583(e) of title 18." 28 U.S.C. s 994(a)(3) (emphasis

added). Second, pursuant to that responsibility, the Commission chose to promulgate non-binding policy statements to

preserve the "flexibility [of] both the Commission and the

courts" until the Commission had sufficient time to evaluate

fully the "complex issues relating to revocation guidelines."

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory

cmt. (2001) (emphasis added). Significantly, in the several

years since the 1994 amendment--during which time the

courts have repeatedly rejected Bruce's theory--neither the

Congress nor the Commission has done anything to call into

question the Commission's initial decision to prescribe policy

statements in lieu of guidelines. Until one or both of them do

so, we will not disturb the discretion of the district court to

sentence a supervised release violator in a manner consistent

with 18 U.S.C. s 3583(e).

III.

The district court sentenced Bruce to 24 months' incarceration, a term which is well within the statutory limit. See 18

U.S.C. s 3583(e)(3). Because we conclude that the court's

USCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 9 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

discretion was not otherwise restricted, we affirm its resentencing of Bruce.

` So ordered.

USCA Case #01-3098 Document #669776 Filed: 04/05/2002 Page 10 of 10