Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-14514/USCOURTS-ca11-15-14514-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtis Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-14514

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00008-CAP-JSA-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CURTIS JONES,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(September 21, 2016)

Before HULL, MARCUS and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Curtis Jones appeals his conviction for one count of conspiracy to distribute 

cocaine and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and his 180-month sentence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In early January 2013, agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) 

began a wiretap investigation of a suspected cocaine trafficker, Jonathan Crutcher. 

On January 15, 2013, agents intercepted a call between Crutcher and another male, 

later identified as Curtis Jones, in which Jones advised Crutcher he had just 

received some drugs. Agents intercepted another call between Crutcher and Jones 

on January 29, 2013, in which they arranged for a drug transaction to take place 

later that day. The agents established surveillance on Crutcher and observed him 

meeting with Jones in a convenience-store-parking lot. After he met with 

Crutcher, the agents followed Jones to a residence located at 3964 Stonewall Tell 

Road in Atlanta, Georgia, and observed a number of vehicles coming and going 

from that residence over the course of the afternoon, including Crutcher’s vehicle 

and a red Dodge Ram.

Based on several intercepted calls between Jones and Crutcher during that 

time period, the agents learned Crutcher had turned over a large sum of money to 

Jones. In turn, Jones provided the drug proceeds to his source of supply, whom

agents believed was driving the Dodge Ram. When the Dodge Ram left the 

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Stonewall Tell Road residence, agents directed a local police officer to conduct a 

traffic stop of the vehicle. Three large bags of money were recovered from the 

vehicle, containing $614,811 in cash. The following day, January 30, 2013, agents 

intercepted a call between Jones and Crutcher in which Crutcher asked Jones for 

another four or five kilograms of cocaine. Following that call, the agents sought 

and obtained a wiretap for Jones’s phone.

On February 16, 2013, agents intercepted a call between Jones and an 

unidentified male, in which they discussed a future drug transaction. Two days 

later, on February 18, 2013, agents intercepted several calls between Jones and a 

person identified as “Dee,” which led them to believe the planned drug transaction 

would take place that day. The agents established surveillance on Jones at 2170 

High View Road in Atlanta. Agents observed a number of vehicles coming and 

going from the High View Road residence, including a blue Chrysler Pacifica and 

a gray Nissan Maxima. When the Pacifica left the High View Road residence, the 

agents directed local law-enforcement officers to conduct a traffic stop of the 

vehicle. The officers recovered a one-kilogram package of powder cocaine and a 

bag containing crack cocaine in the backseat of the vehicle. The agents likewise 

directed local law enforcement to conduct a traffic stop of the Maxima, when it left 

the High View Road residence. The officers recovered two kilograms of cocaine 

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under the hood of the vehicle and eight kilograms of cocaine from trap 

compartments under the floorboards.

Following the conclusion of the wiretap investigation, DEA agents 

conducted a “takedown,” in which they simultaneously arrested the various 

individuals involved in the investigation. R. at 1038. The takedown took place on 

January 15, 2014; DEA Special Agent Michael Connolly, the co-case agent for the 

investigation, was assigned arresting Jones. Special Agent Connolly arrested Jones 

at a Hampton Inn in East Point, Georgia. He subsequently took Jones to 515 

Platoro Court, Jones’s residence, because Special Agent Connolly had a seizure 

warrant for Jones’s BMW, which was located at that address. When they arrived 

at Platoro Court, Special Agent Connolly advised Jones of his Miranda1 rights. 

Jones waived his rights and gave Special Agent Connolly consent to search his

Platoro Court residence.

In the family room of the residence, the agents found a home-securitysystem monitor, a loaded firearm, and extra magazine under the couch cushions. 

In one of the kitchen cabinets, the agents found a money counter. They also 

recovered a number of plastic baggies from the residence. In the master bedroom, 

agents found another security-system monitor, a collection of watches, and a 

collection of sneakers that Jones stated was worth approximately $10,000.

 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

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Jones told Special Agent Connolly he lived at Platoro Court, and a barber 

and his son also had stayed there. When asked whether there were any firearms in 

the house, Jones stated the barber may have left a gun in the house. When Special 

Agent Connolly asked Jones about his involvement in narcotics trafficking, Jones 

admitted he was a marijuana trafficker. Jones initially denied any involvement in 

cocaine trafficking but later stated he could get five to ten kilograms of cocaine 

from “the Mexicans.” R. at 1064.

Special Agent Connolly asked Jones about a house located at 1980 Childress 

Drive, which Jones had stated he owned. Special Agent Connolly requested 

permission to search that residence; Jones gave his consent. After the search at 

Platoro Court concluded, Special Agent Connolly drove Jones to the Childress 

Drive residence. On the ride there, Special Agent Connolly asked Jones whether 

he had a large stash of money somewhere; Jones admitted there was approximately 

$250,000 in the trunk of his BMW. Agents later searched the BMW and found 

three bags in the trunk of the car containing a total of $274,668 in cash.

At Childress Drive, Special Agent Connolly observed a security-system 

monitor in the living room of the residence. In the kitchen, agents discovered 

marijuana in the oven and in a hidden compartment behind the kick plate on the 

cabinets. They also found a scale in one of the cabinets and a firearm on top of one 

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of the cabinets. In a kitchen drawer, Special Agent Connolly found a money

ledger of the type commonly seen in drug-trafficking cases.

Based on the wiretap investigation, a federal grand jury indicted Jones on 

one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (Count 1), and one count of distribution of and 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A) (Count 2). Jones pled not guilty and proceeded to trial.

Prior to trial, Jones’s counsel moved for a Daubert2 hearing on the 

admissibility of the proposed expert testimony of government witness Lieutenant 

David Noe on drug trafficking. At the hearing, Jones’s counsel objected to the 

proposed testimony to the extent the government sought to have Lieutenant Noe 

testify a certain code referred to specific drugs. He did not object to a general 

explanation regarding the use of code words in wiretapped conversations. The 

government represented Lieutenant Noe would not interpret any of the intercepted 

calls in this case, and it did not intend to ask him whether specific terms in those 

calls commonly referred to a particular drug. To the extent Jones agreed

Lieutenant Noe was going to testify only about code words generally, he had no 

objection. Based on this understanding, the magistrate judge issued an order 

denying Jones’s motion as moot but stating the agreed-upon limits to Lieutenant 

 2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1983).

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Noe’s testimony. The order explained Jones’s counsel’s objections to Lieutenant 

Noe’s proposed testimony and the government’s representation it would not ask 

Lieutenant Noe about code words associated with specific drugs. The order further 

required the government to provide notice before trial if it later decided to elicit 

such testimony from Lieutenant Noe and stated Jones could refile his Daubert

motion at that time.

At trial, the government first called Special Agent Connolly. In testifying 

about wiretap investigations generally, Special Agent Connolly stated intercepted 

conversations typically were in coded language. Jones’s counsel objected to 

Special Agent Connolly’s testimony, because he had not been given notice Special 

Agent Connolly would be providing testimony about coded conversations. Jones’s 

counsel asserted he had been given notice Lieutenant Noe would be providing 

expert testimony on the use of coded language in intercepted calls and argued the 

government could not seek to present that information through a different witness 

without providing requisite notice. The government contended Special Agent 

Connolly was not offering expert testimony; his testimony was clearly admissible 

as a lay opinion, because it was based on his personal experience. The government 

further maintained it was not going to elicit testimony about whether specific code 

words referred to particular drugs. Instead, the government represented it was 

offering testimony regarding the fact drug dealers use coded language, which was 

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appropriate lay testimony. The judge overruled the objection but granted Jones’s 

counsel’s request for a continuing objection.

Later in his testimony, when discussing the money ledger found at Childress 

Drive, Special Agent Connolly explained he believed the ledger was of the type 

commonly used by drug traffickers because “the amount 32,500 [in the ledger] was 

the amount of [a] wholesale kilogram of cocaine.” R. at 1082. Jones’s counsel

objected based on a lack of foundation; the district judge allowed the government 

to lay a foundation. Special Agent Connolly explained he knew the wholesale 

price of cocaine during the time frame of the investigation was $32,500 from 

conducting investigations and debriefing informants and defendants. He further 

testified the wholesale price of marijuana at the time of the investigation was 

between $800 and $2,500 per pound. On cross-examination, Special Agent 

Connolly was asked about his knowledge of the wholesale price of cocaine, which 

he stated was based on his own investigative experience in other cases during the

same time period as this investigation. Special Agent Connolly admitted he did 

not have any documentation showing the wholesale price of cocaine in the Atlanta 

area in 2013 was $32,500 and that price was never mentioned in the intercepted 

calls in this case. On re-direct examination, Special Agent Connolly explained,

when drug traffickers purchase cocaine at a wholesale price, they generally 

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increase the price by $1,000 to $2,000 on resale to make a profit. In this case, the 

intercepted calls showed Jones was selling cocaine for approximately $34,000.

The government also presented testimony from DEA Special Agent 

Deverron Ramcheran, who was the lead case agent in the investigation of Jones. 

During Special Agent Ramcheran’s testimony, the government played a number of 

intercepted calls from the investigation. In response to a question regarding the 

intercepted call on February 16, 2013, between Jones and an unidentified male, 

Special Agent Ramcheran testified he anticipated there was going to be a drug 

transaction, because “Mr. Jones says that he is going to be receiving another 40 

kilograms of cocaine.” R. at 1285. Jones’s counsel objected to Special Agent 

Ramcheran’s statement, because no foundation had been laid for his interpretation 

of the call, and the government had stated it did not intend to offer this

interpretation. The government responded it was appropriate lay-opinion 

testimony and contended it specifically had asked Special Agent Ramcheran to 

describe what investigative steps the call had caused him to take. The district 

judge overruled Jones’s counsel’s objection.

Regarding the February 18, 2013, calls between Jones and Dee, Special 

Agent Ramcheran testified he believed a drug transaction was going to take place 

because Jones told Dee the “black ones” would be there in an hour or two. R. at 

1288. When Special Agent Ramcheran began to explain the meaning of the phrase 

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“the black ones,” Jones’s counsel objected; the judge sustained the objection. 

Special Agent Ramcheran then stated: “I knew that Mr. Jones and Dee had made 

an arrangement for Dee to receive ten, because he refers to it as one zero, ten 

kilograms of cocaine.” R. at 1289. Jones’s counsel objected and again argued the 

government had stated at the Daubert hearing it would not elicit testimony about 

specific words in the intercepted conversations referred to a particular drug. He 

argued the government was doing that by having Special Agent Ramcheran testify 

certain calls were discussing kilograms of cocaine, rather than stating the calls 

were referring generically to a drug transaction. Jones’s counsel reiterated the 

interpretation of specific code words was expert testimony for which the 

government was required to provide notice; consequently, the government could 

not present it as a lay opinion.

The government contended Jones was misrepresenting what had occurred at 

the Daubert hearing. The government had agreed Lieutenant Noe, the proposed 

expert, would not interpret any of the calls in this case and would not give general 

testimony about common code words used to refer to cocaine and marijuana. The 

government further asserted it was not required to provide notice of anything other 

than expert testimony and further stated it no longer intended to call Lieutenant 

Noe to testify.

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Jones’s counsel reiterated his argument that, because the government had 

agreed not to elicit the challenged testimony concerning code words from its expert 

witness, it should not be able to do so through Special Agent Ramcheran. The 

judge said the government did not need an expert to give that sort of testimony. 

Based on the government’s representation at the hearing, Jones’s counsel asserted 

he reasonably had been under the impression the government was not going to 

elicit testimony about code words and reiterated that testimony exceeded the 

bounds of lay testimony.

In response, the government maintained it was appropriate for Special Agent 

Ramcheran to give lay testimony interpreting calls to help the jury understand the 

agents’ reasons for conducting surveillance on a particular occasion. The judge

ultimately overruled the objection; the government stated it would refrain from 

discussing specific code words. Jones’s counsel requested and was granted a

continuing objection. Following the close of the evidence, the jury found Jones 

guilty on both counts with which he had been charged.

Prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence 

investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI applied a base-offense level of 32; Jones also 

received a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), because a firearm 

was possessed. Specifically, the probation officer noted firearms were recovered 

from both Platoro Court and Childress Drive. Jones’s offense level was 34, and his

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criminal-history category was III, which resulted in a Sentencing Guidelines range 

of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. Jones’s counsel objected to the two-levelfirearm enhancement and asserted neither of the firearms had been possessed 

during the criminal conduct. He also objected to imposition of a criminal-history 

point for one of his prior crimes.

At sentencing, the judge sustained Jones’s counsel’s objection to the 

criminal-history point, reducing his criminal-history category to a II. Concerning 

the firearm enhancement, Jones argued there was no evidence of drug-related 

activity at the Platoro Court residence. He further contended the evidence found at 

the Childress Drive residence showed only the firearm found there may have been 

used in connection with marijuana trafficking, not with the charged cocaine crimes. 

In addition, Jones asserted the record showed no one ever observed Jones with a 

firearm during the course of the investigation, and neither of the residences was

connected to the cocaine transactions.

The government argued the firearm enhancement applied, unless it was 

clearly improbable the weapon was connected with the crime. The government 

noted a money counter, expensive BMW, and more than a quarter-of-a-million 

dollars in drug proceeds were found at the Platoro Court residence and contended 

the firearm found at that address was there to protect the drug proceeds. The 

government also asserted the firearm at Childress Drive was there to protect 

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Jones’s marijuana. Based on all of the indicia of drug trafficking found at both 

residences, the government argued it was not clearly improbable the firearms were 

used in connection with the charged crimes.

Jones’s counsel presented the testimony of Apollo King-el, a barber who had 

lived with Jones at Platoro Court during 2013 and 2014. King-el testified he 

owned a firearm during that period of time, but he had not seen any drug 

transactions take place at the Platoro Court residence. On cross-examination, 

King-el testified he was not living with Jones at the time of Jones’s arrest. When 

he lived with Jones, King-el kept his firearm either in the upstairs bedroom, where 

he stayed, or in the laundry room. King-el did not take the firearm with him when 

he left Platoro Court.

Following King-el’s testimony, the judge overruled Jones’s counsel’s 

objection to the firearm enhancement. The judge found both firearms, which were 

loaded pistols, were possessed by Jones and connected with the drug crime,

because they were the type of weapons for offense or defense, rather than hunting. 

The firearm at Childress Drive was found in the same room, where there was 

obvious drug activity. Based on the reduction in his criminal-history category to II 

and his base- offense level of 34, the judge calculated Jones’s Guidelines

imprisonment range as 168 to 210 months. The judge imposed a sentence of 180 

months for each count of conviction, to be served concurrently.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Rulings

On appeal, Jones argues the district judge erred in admitting some of Special 

Agent Connolly’s testimony as lay testimony. He asserts Special Agent 

Connolly’s testimony regarding the interpretation of the intercepted calls, money

ledger, and the wholesale prices of cocaine and marijuana was based on specialized 

knowledge and fell within the scope of expert, rather than lay testimony. Jones 

acknowledges there was overwhelming evidence of his involvement in the drug 

trade but maintains he was harmed by the judge’s error, because his defense at trial 

was he trafficked only in marijuana, not cocaine.

We ordinarily review a trial judge’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Frediani, 790 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Even if the judge had abused his discretion, we will not reverse an erroneous 

evidentiary ruling unless the error was not harmless. Id. at 1200. An error is 

harmless unless, in light of the record as a whole, there is a reasonable likelihood 

the error had a substantial influence on the outcome of the proceeding. United 

States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). If a defendant does not 

plainly and prominently raise an issue on appeal, we consider that issue 

abandoned, even if it was properly preserved at trial. United States v. Jernigan, 

341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003).

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When a defendant fails to preserve his challenge to an evidentiary ruling 

before the district judge, we review only for plain error. United States v. Edouard, 

485 F.3d 1324, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). Under that standard, the defendant must 

show (1) an error (2) that was plain and (3) affected his substantial rights. Id. at 

1343 n.7. If those three conditions are met, then we may correct the error if it 

“seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An error is plain 

if it is clear from either the plain meaning of a statute or constitutional provision, 

or from a holding of the Supreme Court or this court. United States v. Pantle, 637 

F.3d 1172, 1174-75 (11th Cir. 2011). An error affects substantial rights when it is 

prejudicial to the defendant, meaning the defendant must show the error affected 

the outcome of the trial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 

113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993).

Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits lay witnesses to give opinion 

testimony if that testimony is “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; 

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a 

fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. We have held lay 

witnesses, including police officers, may offer testimony based on particularized 

knowledge garnered from experience in a particular field, and this testimony is not 

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“specialized knowledge” within the meaning of Rule 702. Tampa Bay 

Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1223 & n.17 

(11th Cir. 2003). But see United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1119-20 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (questioning whether an agent’s testimony regarding the market value 

of cocaine, based wholly on past experience rather than the specific circumstances 

of the case, exceeded the bounds of lay testimony, but ultimately declining to 

resolve that issue because any error was harmless).

In addition, we have held a government agent properly may testify as a lay 

witness regarding his interpretation of alleged code words in intercepted telephone 

calls. United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1102-04 (11th Cir. 2011). In 

Jayyousi, we explained this testimony rationally was based on the agent’s 

perception, because it came from his review of numerous documents during the 

course of the investigation. Id. at 1102-03. We further held the testimony was 

helpful to the jury, because the agent’s knowledge of the investigation allowed him 

to draw inferences the jury could not readily have drawn. Id. at 1103. Finally, we 

rejected the defendant’s contention the agent’s testimony was from specialized 

knowledge, because it was based on his experience in that particular investigation. 

Id. at 1103-04.

The district judge did not err in his evidentiary rulings. Jones did not 

challenge Special Agent Ramcheran’s testimony interpreting the intercepted calls 

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in his initial brief; therefore, he has abandoned that challenge on appeal, even 

though he preserved an objection to Special Agent Ramcheran’s testimony at trial. 

See Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1283 n.8. Furthermore, Jones’s challenge to Special 

Agent Connolly’s testimony concerning the intercepted calls, though preserved on 

appeal, ultimately fails. First, Special Agent Connolly did not interpret specific 

code words during his testimony or indicate particular calls referred to cocaine 

transactions. Instead, he stated as a general matter drug traffickers often use coded 

language in phone calls. Moreover, even if Special Agent Connolly had testified 

regarding the meaning of specific code words in the intercepted calls, his testimony 

would have been proper lay testimony under our case law.

3

 See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 

at 1102-04; Tampa Bay Shipbuilding, 320 F.3d at 1223.

Jones’s other argument concerning the admission as lay opinions of Special 

Agent Connolly’s testimony about the money ledger and the wholesale prices of 

cocaine and marijuana also fails. At trial, Jones’s counsel did not object to the 

admission of the ledger and objected only to Special Agent Connolly’s testimony 

concerning the wholesale price of cocaine for lack of foundation, not as improper 

expert testimony by a lay witness. Consequently, Jones did not preserve his 

 3 This is equally true for Special Agent Ramcheran’s testimony. Even if Jones had not 

abandoned his challenge to Special Agent Ramcheran’s testimony on appeal, he would not have 

prevailed.

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present challenge at trial; therefore, we review his challenge only for plain error. 

Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1343.

The district judge did not plainly err in admitting Special Agent Connolly’s 

testimony, because our precedent does not demonstrate clearly that testimony fell 

outside the proper bounds of lay testimony. In Tinoco, we stated testimony such as 

that given by Special Agent Connolly might exceed the bounds of permissible lay 

testimony because it was based on past experience, rather than information learned 

during the course of the investigation. See Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1119-20. We 

ultimately did not resolve that question in Tinoco, however, and our decision in 

Tampa Bay Shipbuilding could be read to support the admission of Special Agent 

Connolly’s testimony as lay testimony, because it was based on his particularized 

knowledge of the drug trade garnered through his experience in the field. See id.; 

Tampa Bay Shipbuilding, 320 F.3d at 1223 & n.17. In the absence of clear 

precedent showing Special Agent Connolly’s testimony was impermissible as a lay 

opinion, there was no plain error. Pantle, 637 F.3d at 1174-75.

B. Sentencing Enhancement

Jones also contends the district judge erred in applying a two-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), because the government did not show 

a nexus between the two firearms found and the charged cocaine conspiracy. 

Jones asserts there was no evidence any cocaine transactions took place at either 

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Platoro Court or Childress Drive, or that Jones was ever seen with a weapon during 

the course of the investigation. Jones argues the government failed to prove the 

firearms found at those locations were present at the site of the charged conduct.

We review a trial judge’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines to 

the facts de novo and the judge’s findings of fact for clear error. United States v. 

Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1194-95 (11th Cir. 2011). A factual finding is clearly 

erroneous when, upon review of the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. at 1195. Whether a firearm was 

possessed in connection with a crime is a factual finding we review for clear error. 

United States v. Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2006).

Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a two-level increase in 

a defendant’s base-offense level if a dangerous weapon, including a firearm, was 

possessed. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). “The enhancement should be applied if the 

weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected 

with the offense.” Id. cmt. n.11(A). For the enhancement to apply, the 

government must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence either the 

firearm was present at the site of the charged conduct or the defendant possessed 

the firearm during conduct associated with the crime of conviction. Stallings, 463 

F.3d at 1220. Mere possession of a firearm is not sufficient for the enhancement to 

apply; “the government must show that the firearm had some purpose or effect 

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with respect to the drug trafficking crime.” Id. at 1220-21 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). If the government satisfies this burden, then the burden 

shifts to the defendant to show a connection between the firearm and the crime was 

clearly improbable. Id. at 1220. The proximity of a firearm to drugs and drugrelated items is sufficient to satisfy the government’s initial burden under 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1). See United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 91-92 (11th Cir. 

2013).

We have upheld the application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement where the 

firearm at issue was found in the same room as several drug-related objects, 

including a set of scales, a ziplock bag with cocaine residue, and a large amount of 

cash. United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63-64 (11th Cir. 1995). The defendant in 

Hall was charged with importation of marijuana based on a wiretap investigation, 

however, no marijuana was found at the defendant’s residence. See id. at 63. We

held the district judge properly applied the firearm enhancement because “[t]he 

proximity of the handgun to several drug-related objects, located in the house 

where conversations concerning the marijuana importation occurred, sufficiently 

showed the handgun was possessed during the offense.” Id. at 64.

The judge did not err in applying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. First, 

both firearms were found in close proximity to drugs or drug-related items. See 

Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 91-92. At Platoro Court, the firearm was found in the 

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same residence as a money counter, an item commonly associated with drug 

trafficking operations, and the BMW containing more than $270,000 in drug 

proceeds. Similarly, the firearm at Childress Drive was found in the same room as 

a scale, marijuana, and a money ledger containing entries that referenced the 

wholesale price of cocaine. Unlike Stallings, this is not a case in which the 

government is relying on the mere possession of a firearm at the defendant’s 

residence, unconnected with any other evidence of drug-trafficking activity. See 

Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220-21 (noting the only evidence presented in support of 

the enhancement was that three firearms were found in the defendant’s residence, 

where no activities related to the conspiracy had occurred).

Jones nevertheless protests this evidence is insufficient to provide a nexus 

between the firearms and cocaine trafficking, because no cocaine was found at 

either residence, and there was no evidence Jones conducted any cocaine 

transactions at those addresses. As we held in Hall, it is not necessary for the 

firearm to be found in the same location as the charged drug for the enhancement 

to apply. See Hall, 46 F.3d at 63-64. Furthermore, the money ledger at Childress 

Drive contained entries related to cocaine transactions, showing the firearm at that 

address was possessed during conduct associated with the charged offenses. 

Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220. In addition, the firearm at Platoro Court had the 

potential to facilitate the charged crime, since it could be used to protect Jones’s

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drug proceeds. See Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 91-92. Because the jury concluded 

Jones was involved in cocaine trafficking in addition to his admitted involvement 

in marijuana trafficking, it is not clearly improbable the drug proceeds found at

Platoro Court came from Jones’s cocaine trafficking activities. Stallings, 463 F.3d 

at 1220. 

AFFIRMED.

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