Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-50277/USCOURTS-ca9-11-50277-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brigido Lopez-Chavez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BRIGIDO LOPEZ-CHAVEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-50277

D.C. No.

3:10-cr-04882-LAB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 6, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed July 3, 2014

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, and Stephen Reinhardt

and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

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2 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel reversed a criminal judgment and remanded for

dismissal of an indictment charging illegal reentry under

8 U.S.C. § 1326 in a case in which Brigido Lopez-Chavez

argued that his attorney in the immigration proceedings

provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

The panel held that Lopez-Chavez received ineffective

assistance of counsel, where his attorney (1) conceded

removability based on Lopez-Chavez’s prior conviction for

possession of marijuana with intent to deliver under Missouri

Revised Statutes § 195.211, which covers conduct that may

fit under either the felony or the misdemeanor provisions of

the Controlled Substances Act; and (2) failed to pursue

appellate proceedings that the BIA had announced could

result in a holding that Lopez-Chavez’s conviction did not

constitute a removable offense. The panel held that counsel’s

conduct prevented Lopez-Chavez from reasonablypresenting

his case, rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair, and

resulted in prejudice.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 3

COUNSEL

Harini P. Raghupathi, Federal Defenders of San Diego, San

Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Mark R. Rehe (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney; Bruce R. Castetter,

Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Brigido Lopez-Chavez challenges his conviction for

criminal reentry by making a collateral attack on his

underlying removal order. He argues that his attorney in the

immigration proceedings provided ineffective assistance of

counsel in erroneously conceding his removability, failing to

appeal the removal order to the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”), and failing to petition the Seventh Circuit

for review. He asserts that counsel’s ineffective performance

was prejudicial because Lopez-Chavez’s state crime of

conviction—possession of marijuana with intent to deliver

under Missouri Revised Statutes § 195.211—did not

constitute an aggravated felony under the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”). We hold that Lopez-Chavez

received ineffective assistance of counsel throughout the

immigration proceedings, that he was deprived of his right to

due process, that the proceedings were fundamentally unfair,

and that the indictment for criminal reentry must be

dismissed.

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4 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

I.

Brigido Lopez-Chavez is the son of a seasonal

agricultural laborer who originally came to work in the

United States through the Bracero Program. In 1984, when

his father began to have health problems and could no longer

endure the physically demanding work in the fields, LopezChavez came to Live Oak, California, and worked picking

lemons, cherries, apples, strawberries, grapes, and lettuce, in

order to help support his family. In 1986, Lopez-Chavez

moved to St. Louis, Missouri, where he worked as a busboy

and then a prep cook in a Chinese restaurant. On December

1, 1990, Lopez-Chavez became a legal permanent resident. 

He paid taxes and purchased a mobile home but was still able

to send money home to his parents in Mexico to which his

father had returned. Lopez-Chavez also helped his sister and

her family and his brother and his family settle into St. Louis

and find employment.

On February 7, 2003, Lopez-Chavez was convicted of

possessing marijuana with intent to deliver under Missouri

Revised Statutes § 195.211. He received a sentence of 90

days with work release authorization and five years

probation. On June 13, 2003, he was issued a Notice to

Appear (“NTA”) that set forth five factual allegations:

(1) Lopez-Chavez was not a citizen or national of the United

States, (2) he was a native and citizen of Mexico, (3) he

entered the country without inspection, (4) he adjusted to the

status of Legal Permanent Resident in 1990, and (5) he was

convicted for the offense of “Possession with Intent to

Deliver a Controlled Substance, a Class B Felony, in

violation of Section 195.211” of the Missouri Revised

Statutes. On the basis of those allegations, he was charged as

being removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) as having

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 5

“been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section

101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, an offense relating to the illicit

trafficking in a controlled substance, as described in section

102 of the Controlled Substances Act, including a drug

trafficking crime, as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18,

United States Code.”

Attorney Pari Sheth entered an appearance as LopezChavez’s counsel. Before the removal hearing had taken

place, Sheth inexplicably filed a “motion to reopen and for a

stay of deportation proceedings pending a bond hearing.” At

the removal hearing, Sheth conceded all five factual

allegations of the NTA. When the Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

asked for a response to the charge that Lopez-Chavez had

been convicted of an aggravated felony, Sheth and the IJ had

the following exchange:

IJ: And charge? (long pause) Yes, I’m still

waiting.

PS: Right. He admits to part of it. Denies

part of it.

IJ: Well there’s only one part really that, and

that is that after admission you have been

convicted as a aggravated, of an aggravated

felony under 101(a)43(b). That’s it.

PS: Okay. You’re right sir.

IJ: So I don’t see how it’s divisible really.

PS: He admits it.

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6 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

IJ: Okay. I find I agree. I find that the

respondent is removable as charged.

Sheth reserved Lopez-Chavez’s right to appeal, but did

not file an appeal of the removal order with the BIA, nor did

he petition the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for

review;1

finally, he did not discuss with Lopez-Chavez the

possibility of challenging the aggravated felony charge. 

Lopez-Chavez was deported on August 1, 2003.

On September 30, 2010, Lopez-Chavez was arrested at

the San Ysidro, California, Port of Entry, pedestrian facility,

where he had attempted to elude inspection. He was indicted

for attempted reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b) and

illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Lopez-Chavez moved to

dismiss the illegal reentry charge by collaterally attacking the

underlying removal order. He argued that his removal was

invalid, and in violation of his right to due process, because

his immigration attorney had provided ineffective assistance

throughout the removal proceedings and because the state

conviction for possession with intent to deliver did not

constitute an aggravated felony under the INA. The district

judge denied the motion. Lopez-Chavez pleaded guilty to

count one, the attempted reentry charge, reserving the right to

appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the

1 Although the Notice to Appear orders Lopez-Chavez to appear at a St.

Louis address, the Order of the Immigration Judge was issued from

Chicago, Illinois. “The petition for review shall be filed with the court of

appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed

the proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). Here, the proceedings were

completed in Chicago, Illinois, as shown on the Order of the Immigration

Judge recording the order of removal. The parties agree that Seventh

Circuit law would have applied had Lopez-Chavez appealed the removal

order to the BIA and then to the appropriate circuit.

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 7

indictment based on an invalid deportation. Lopez-Chavez

appeals.

II.

“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion

to dismiss an 8 U.S.C. § 1326 indictment when the motion to

dismiss is based on alleged due-process defects in the

underlying deportation proceeding.” United States v. MorielLuna, 585 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009).

III.

“Because the underlying removal order serves as a

predicate element of an illegal reentry offense under § 1326,

a defendant charged with that offense may collaterally attack

the removal order under the due process clause.” United

States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012)

(quoting United States v. Pallares-Gallan, 359 F.3d 1088,

1095 (9th Cir. 2004)). In order to prevail on such an attack,

a defendant must show, among other things,2that the removal

was “fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). A

removal is “fundamentally unfair” if the defendant’s due

process rights were violated in the removal proceedings and

he suffered prejudice as a result. United States v. UbaldoFigueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004).

2 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), an alien may not collaterally attack the

deportation unless: “(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies

that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the

deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly

deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry

of the order was fundamentally unfair.” See also United States v. UbaldoFigueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004).

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8 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

In his motion to dismiss the indictment, Lopez-Chavez

argued that the removal was fundamentally unfair because he

received ineffective assistance of counsel throughout the

removal proceedings and because his state crime of

conviction was not an aggravated felony as defined in federal

law. The district court denied the motion. We agree with

Lopez-Chavez that his due process rights were violated in the

removal proceedings, that he suffered prejudice as a result,

that the removal order was fundamentally unfair, and that the

indictment must be dismissed.

A

To determine whether Lopez-Chavez received ineffective

assistance of counsel, we first consider the question whether

his state crime of conviction—possession of a controlled

substance with intent to deliver, a violation of Missouri

Revised Statutes § 195.211—had been held to be an

aggravated felony under the INA at the time of the

immigration proceedings. We then examine the question

whether his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel

in conceding that Lopez-Chavez was convicted of an

aggravated felony under the INA and whether counsel’s

performance resulted in prejudice that rendered his removal

fundamentally unfair.

Lopez-Chavez was charged as removable on the ground

of having “been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined

in Section 101(a)(43)(B)” of the INA. To determine whether

Lopez-Chavez’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony,

we look “to whether ‘the state statute defining the crime of

conviction’ categorically fits within the ‘generic’ federal

definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.” Moncrieffe

v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (quoting Gonzales v.

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 9

Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007)). “[A] state

offense is a categorical match with a generic federal offense

only if a conviction of the state offense ‘necessarily’ involved

facts equating to the generic federal offense.” Id. (citing

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005) (plurality

opinion) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Controlled Substances Act treats possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute as a felony, except that

“distributing a small amount of marihuana for no

remuneration” is a misdemeanor. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) & (b);

Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685–86.3 Missouri Revised

Statutes § 195.211,4

however, criminalizes conduct that may

3

“Sharing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, let alone

possession with intent to do so, does not fit easily into the everyday

understanding of trafficking, which ordinarily means some sort of

commercial dealing.” Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693 (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted).

 

4

 The statute states in relevant part:

1. [I]t is unlawful for any person to distribute, deliver,

manufacture, produce or attempt to distribute, deliver,

manufacture or produce a controlled substance or to

possess with intent to distribute, deliver, manufacture,

or produce a controlled substance.

. . . .

3. Any person who violates or attempts to violate this

section with respect to any controlled substance except

five grams orlessofmarijuana isguiltyof a classB felony.

4. Any person who violates this section with respect to

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10 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

fit under either the felony or the misdemeanor provisions of

the Controlled Substances Act, because convictions under the

Missouri statute can involve small amounts of marijuana

distributed for no remuneration; yet all the conduct prohibited

by the Missouri statute constitutes a felony under state law. 

See, e.g., State v. Kellner, 103 S.W.3d 363, 365–66 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2003) (distribution includes being in possession of a

substance and giving it to another person); State v. Lawson,

232 S.W.3d 702, 705 & n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (to show

intent to distribute, the state need not show that a defendant

was dealing drugs but that he “had the intent merely to give

or otherwise transfer [the substance] to someone else”); State

v. Hairston, 268 S.W.3d 471, 473, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)

(conviction for intent to distribute small amount (24.74

grams) of marijuana). Thus, Lopez-Chavez’s statute of

conviction, the Missouri statute, covers conduct included in

the misdemeanor provisions of the Controlled Substances

Act, as well as conduct that falls within its felony provisions.

At the time of Lopez-Chavez’s removal proceedings in

2003, there was a circuit split as to whether a conviction that

is treated as a felony under state law but as a misdemeanor

under federal law can be treated as an aggravated felony

under the Controlled Substances Act. Lopez v. Gonzales,

549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006); see also Cazarez-Gutierrez v.

Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). The Second and

Third Circuits, joined shortly thereafter by the Ninth Circuit,

applied the rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Lopez and

central to Moncrieffe. Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d

distributing or delivering not more than five grams of

marijuana is guilty of a class C felony.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 195.211.

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 11

Cir. 1996); Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir.

2002); Cazarez-Gutierrez, 382 F.3d at 910 (9th Cir. 2004);

see also In re Yanez-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390, 394–96

(BIA 2002) (en banc). The Lopez/Moncrieffe rule holds that

“[u]nless a state offense is punishable as a federal felony it

does not count” as a felony punishable under the Controlled

Substances Act. Lopez, 549 U.S. at 55. In other words, “to

satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must

meet two conditions: It must ‘necessarily’ proscribe conduct

that is an offense under the [Controlled Substances Act] and

the [Controlled Substances Act] must ‘necessarily’ prescribe

felony punishment for that conduct.” Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct.

at 1685. In contrast, several other circuits, including the Fifth

Circuit, had concluded that a drug offense that is punishable

under the Controlled Substances Act is an aggravated felony

under the INA so long as it is a felony under state law. 

United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505, 508 (5th

Cir. 2001); see also Yanez-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 395.

In the face of this conflicting circuit law, in 2002 the BIA

adopted a bifurcated rule in its precedential decision In re

Yanez-Garcia. Where a circuit had spoken, it would use the

rule of the circuit. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 396–97. Where a

circuit had not spoken, it would apply the Fifth Circuit rule,

i.e., “a state drug offense that is classified as a felony under

the law of the convicting state [is permitted] to qualify as a

felony under the [Controlled Substances Act] even if it could

only be punished as a misdemeanor under federal law.” Id.

at 395. If a circuit subsequently spoke, however, the BIA

held that on remand it would apply whatever rule the circuit

adopted. See id. at 396–98; see also, e.g., In re Harris, A41-

660–573, 2006 WL 2803374, at *1 (BIA July 25, 2006)

(unpublished) (remanding case to the IJ to apply the Seventh

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12 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

Circuit’s rule after it had spoken in Gonzales-Gomez v.

Achim, 441 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.)).

When Lopez-Chavez’s hearing before the IJ commenced,

the Seventh Circuit had not yet decided the question that

divided the circuits, although it would do so soon thereafter. 

See Garcia v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2005)

(noting that the question remained open). Thus, although an

IJ in the Seventh Circuit was bound to follow the BIA’s

default rule, an alien had a clear path to a contrary ruling by

petitioning the Seventh Circuit for review. In short, in 2003

the BIA would apply the default rule to an appeal filed within

the Seventh Circuit but the ruling would become effective

only if the alien failed to petition the Seventh Circuit for

review or otherwise failed to obtain a favorable decision from

that court as to the rule to be applied. In fact, in 2006, only

three years after Lopez-Chavez’s removal hearing, an alien

did petition theSeventh Circuit, which unhesitatinglyadopted

the rule followed by the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits

(and later the Supreme Court), and remanded the petition to

the BIA for the application of that rule. Gonzales-Gomez,

441 F.3d at 533. Upon receiving the remand from the

Seventh Circuit, the BIA in accordance with Yanez-Garcia

vacated its holding and applied the newly adopted Seventh

Circuit rule to the petitioner. In re Gonzalez-Gomez, No. A73

360 554 (BIA May 8, 2007) (unpublished). Specifically, the

Seventh Circuit held that a state-law felony that is punished

as a misdemeanor by federal law is not an aggravated felony

for purposes of the INA. Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim,

441 F.3d at 533. In other words, the Seventh Circuit adopted

the rule ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in Lopez,

549 U.S. at 55, and rejected the rule that the IJ had applied in

Lopez-Chavez’s case. The court explained that the BIA’s

position was “inconsistent with the interest in uniform

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 13

standards for removal, and is inconsistent with the legislative

history.” Gonzales-Gomez, 441 F.3d at 533. “Allowing

[relief] to depend on how severely a particular state punishes

drug crimes,” the Seventh Circuit said, “would have the

paradoxical result of allowing states, in effect, to impose

banishment from the United States as a sanction for a

violation of state law.” Id. at 535.

The Missouri statute of conviction covers conduct that

falls within both the felony and misdemeanor provisions of

the Controlled Substances Act. Under the rule adopted by the

Seventh Circuit when it first decided the issue in 2006,

convictions such as Lopez-Chavez’s constituted aggravated

felonies for the purposes of the INA only if they were

punishable as felonies under federal law.5 Gonzales-Gomez,

441 F.3d at 533. Also, under the then-applicable rules of the

BIA, the BIA was required to apply the Seventh Circuit’s rule

to the petitioner in the case in which the rule was first

announced and to all subsequent petitioners. Thus, had

Lopez-Chavez’s counsel challenged the IJ’s ruling regarding

the classification of his conviction as an aggravated felony,

that ruling almost certainly would have been reversed.

5 Although some circuits held, before being definitively reversed by the

Supreme Court under Moncrieffe v. Holder, that a conviction under a

statute that criminalizes conduct described by both the felony and the

misdemeanor provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 constituted a felony under the

Controlled Substances Act, the Seventh Circuit was not among them. 

133 S. Ct. at 1684 n.3. The government does not argue otherwise.

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14 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

B

1

A competent immigration attorney would have been

aware of Yanez-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390, one of the few

precedential decisions ever issued by the BIA on the precise

question of when a state drug offense may be considered to

be an aggravated felony under the INA. That decision

explicitly states that the BIA will defer to “applicable circuit

authority” on the issue. Id. at 396. A competent immigration

attorney would, moreover, have determined following

minimal research that the question was an open one in the

Seventh Circuit. In the face of such a clear basis for

appealing Lopez-Chavez’s removal order, no competent

attorney would have conceded that his conviction was for an

aggravated felony under the INA, and no competent attorney

would have failed to appeal to the BIA and then petition the

Seventh Circuit to answer the dispositive open question. 

Lopez-Chavez’s attorney inexcusably failed in both of these

ways: he erroneouslyconceded Lopez-Chavez’s removability

and failed to pursue appellate proceedings that the BIA had

announced could result in a holding that Lopez-Chavez’s

conviction did not constitute a removable offense. These two

actions on counsel’s part alone unquestionably constituted

ineffective assistance, although we note that, in addition,

counsel first reserved the right to appeal and then failed to do

so without advising Lopez-Chavez of his rights or discussing

the possibility of an appeal with him.

There is no constitutional right to counsel in deportation

proceedings, but due process must be accorded under the

Fifth Amendment. Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. Reno,

232 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). To establish ineffective

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 15

assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings in violation

of the right to due process, a petitioner must show (1) that

“the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien

was prevented from reasonably presenting his case,” and

(2) prejudice. Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir.

2004) (quoting Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.

1985)).

An alien’s “right to a full and fair presentation of his

claim include[s] the right to have an attorney who would

present a viable legal argument on his behalf supported by

relevant evidence, if he could find one willing and able to do

so.” Id. at 1025. In cases in which an attorney did not make

a considered determination as to the viability of arguments

that would benefit an alien, we have held that the alien

received ineffective assistance. In Santiago-Rodriguez v.

Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 835 (9th Cir. 2011), we found an

attorney to be ineffective where she did not have “sufficient

knowledge of the facts to make a strategic judgment based on

the plausible statutory interpretations.” In Mohammed v.

Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2005), an attorney’s

failure to raise female genital mutilation as part of an asylum

claim was found to be ineffective. We have also found

failure to perform legal research to be ineffective

performance by an attorney. In Lin, the attorney’s “lack of

preparation prevented her from researching and preparing

basic legal arguments fundamental to the asylum claim.” 

377 F.3d at 1024. Similarly, the Third Circuit held that

counsel may have been ineffective when, among other errors,

he “had not done enough research to know of the impending

[CAT] treaty, let alone whether it would apply to [his

client’s] claim.” Rranci v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 540 F.3d 165,

175 (3d Cir. 2008). The BIA, too, has found ineffective

assistance of counsel and allowed the withdrawal of a

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16 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

concession where an attorney conceded removability after

“failing to research and advise a client that there [was] no

sound basis for the charges.” In re Shafiee, No. A24 107 368,

2007 WL 1168488, at *1 (BIA Mar. 2, 2007) (unpublished).

Here, it is evident that Lopez-Chavez’s counsel failed to

do the minimal research that would have allowed him to

acquire an understanding of immigration proceedings and

would have revealed the key precedential BIA decision

concerning the ground for Lopez-Chavez’s removability,

Yanez-Garcia. Although, in the colloquy with the IJ, counsel

appeared to begin by conceding the charge “in part” and

denying it “in part”—an illogical response to the charge—he

almost immediately conceded the charge in full when the IJ

pointed out to him that there was no concession to be made

only in part. Counsel then acknowledged without pause, and

without cause, that the IJ was correct and made his

unqualified concession. Moreover, the remainder of the

colloquy with the IJ showed counsel’s utter lack of

understanding of the nature of immigration proceedings.6

Here, as a result of counsel’s erroneous and uninformed

concession that Lopez-Chavez was removable and of his

failure to pursue that open question (in the Seventh Circuit)

through the available appellate fora, Lopez-Chavez was

prevented from “reasonably presenting his case.” Lin,

377 F.3d at 1023.

The government has not suggested, nor have we

discovered, any strategic or tactical reason why Lopez6 Lopez-Chavez’s attorney showed a profound and fundamental lack of

understanding ofimmigration proceedings by, for instance, filing a motion

to reopen before the removal hearing had taken place or the removal order

had been issued.

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 17

Chavez’s counsel would have conceded that Lopez-Chavez

was convicted of an aggravated felony under the INA and

thereby ensured his client’s swift removal. See Singh v.

Holder, 658 F.3d 879, 886 (9th Cir. 2011) (“It is nigh

impossible to imagine how a competent attorneywould make

a conscious decision to pursue a course leading to certain

failure, when faced with several paths to success.”). Nothing

in the transcript or in the record suggests that this was a

strategic or tactical decision, let alone an informed one. 

Counsel’s concession of Lopez-Chavez’s removability was

particularly grave because it amounted to counsel “giv[ing]

up ‘the only defense available.’” Knowles v. Mirzayance,

129 S. Ct. 1411, 1422 (2009). The “serious consequences of

the admission . . . were as clear then as they are now.” 

Santiago-Rodriguez, 657 F.3d at 835.

The government argues that it is not ineffective assistance

of counsel to fail to anticipate later decisions of the court. 

“[A] lawyer cannot be required to anticipate [the court’s]

decision in [a] later case, because his conduct must be

evaluated for purposes of the performance standard of

Strickland ‘as of the time of counsel’s conduct.’” Lowry v.

Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). “A lawyer’s zeal

on behalf of his client does not require him to file a motion

which he knows to be meritless on the facts and the law.” Id.

Here, however, counsel’s ineffectiveness did not depend on

a later change in law, nor at the time of the removal

proceedings was it “meritless.” The BIA’s governing

decision had made clear that the BIA would follow the law of

the circuit when a circuit spoke on the issue. Because the

Seventh Circuit had not yet spoken, a competent counsel

would have pursued that avenue of relief as suggested by the

BIA’s decision in Yanez-Garcia. It was therefore ineffective

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18 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

for an attorney to fail to pursue the open issue, just as it was

ineffective to stipulate that Lopez-Chavez had committed a

deportable offense when the question remained open at the

time of the concession.

In sum, Lopez-Chavez’s counsel’s conduct not only

“prevented [Lopez-Chavez] from reasonably presenting his

case” but rendered the proceedings “fundamentally unfair.” 

Lin, 377 F.3d at 1023.

2

To show ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration

proceedings, Lopez-Chavez must show not only, as he has,

that his counsel’s deficient performance rendered the

proceedings fundamentally unfair, but also that counsel’s

performance resulted in prejudice. Correa-Rivera v. Holder,

706 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “We find prejudice ‘when the performance of

counsel was so inadequate that it may have affected the

outcome of the proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Ortiz v. INS, 179

F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999)). Here, we have unusually

clear evidence of what the outcome of Lopez-Chavez’s case

would have been had he received effective assistance of

counsel. As explained above, less than three years after

Lopez-Chavez was ordered removed, the Seventh Circuit, in

a case posing the issue that was decisive in Lopez-Chavez’s

case, decided the open question and adopted the rule

previously announced by the Second, Third, and Ninth

Circuits—a rule under which Lopez-Chavez would have been

found ineligible for removal. Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim,

441 F.3d 532, 533 (7th Cir. 2006). It follows that, had

counsel presented the Seventh Circuit with the question of

which rule to adopt, Lopez-Chavez’s order of removal would

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 19

have been held unlawful and would not have gone into

effect.7 Thus, Lopez-Chavez’s counsel’s ineffectiveness not

only may have affected, but actually did, “affect[] the

outcome of the proceedings.”

We thus conclude that Lopez-Chavez has shown

ineffective assistance of counsel in his immigration

proceedings in violation of his right to due process, as well as

the requisite prejudice.

C

Because Lopez-Chavez received ineffective assistance of

counsel in his immigration proceedings in violation of due

process, and was prejudiced thereby, he has necessarily

established that for the purposes of the collateral attack on his

removal, “the entry of the order [of removal] was

7 Similarly, if the modified categorical approach had been used, LopezChavez would easily have shown that the ineffective assistance “may have

affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Correa-Rivera, 706 F.3d at

1133. It is clear from the record that the documents that may be

considered under the modified categorical approach do not establish “that

the offense involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of

marijuana.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013). We

reject the government’s contention that the federal misdemeanor exception

for “distributing a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration,”

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4), applies only to distribution and not to possession

with intent to distribute, Lopez-Chavez’s crime of conviction. LopezChavez and the Third Circuit are correct that this distinction leads to

absurd results insofar as “it is impossible to conceive of a case in which

someone could distribute a drug but not, at least for an instant, actually or

constructively possess the drug with intent to distribute,” and thus “every

defendant who fell under Section 841(b)(4) would also be excluded from

it by virtue of the fact that he or she also necessarily possessed the

marijuana in the act of distributing it.” Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377,

382 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003).

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20 UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ

fundamentally unfair,” thus meeting the principal statutory

requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). United States v.

Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) . The

remaining two requirements for a collateral attack are

procedural: a defendant must show (1) that he “exhausted any

administrative remedies that may have been available to seek

relief against the order,” and (2) that the removal proceedings

“deprived [him] of the opportunity for judicial review.” Id.

at 1048 n.6 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1)–(2)). Just as it

rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair, counsel’s

ineffectiveness also caused Lopez-Chavez’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and deprived him of his opportunity

for judicial review. United States v. Gonzalez-Villalobos,

724 F.3d 1125, 1131 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013); see also United

States v. Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 2010). The

government’s principal argument in response is that LopezChavez cannot rely on ineffective assistance of counsel

because he failed to comply with Matter of Lozada, 19 I. &

N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). Assuming arguendo that Lozada is

applicable to proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the rule

would in any event be of no effect here. The Lozada

requirements need not be applied where the ineffective

assistance of counsel is “clear and obvious” from the record,

as it is here. Hernandez-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 537 F.3d 976,

978 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282

F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2002)). Thus, Lopez-Chavez

satisfies all three requirements necessary to sustain a

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UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-CHAVEZ 21

collateral challenge to his underlying removal.8See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(d). 

*

For the reasons given above, we reverse the district court

and remand for dismissal of the indictment.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

8 Accordingly, we need not reach Lopez-Chavez’s alternative argument

that his crime of conviction is not an aggravated felony under the INA in

light of Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. 1678. We recently held that the law that

governs removability in collateral attack cases is the applicable law at the

time the case is decided on appeal. United States v. Aguilera-Rios, No.

12-50597, slip op. at 12–13 (9th Cir. June 17, 2014). Under AguileraRios, Moncrieffe is applicable here.

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