Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cr-00483/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cr-00483-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry W. Campbell
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

NO. CR. S-03-0483 WBS

Plaintiff, 

v. FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

LARRY W. CAMPBELL,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter came on for trial by the court, sitting

without a jury, pursuant to a written waiver of jury trial

knowingly and voluntarily executed by the defendant with the

consent of the government and approval of the court, pursuant to

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, on August

9 and 11, 2005. Defendant was present and represented by

Assistant Federal Defender Jeffrey L. Staniels; and the United

States was represented by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kymberly A.

Smith and Samantha Spangler.

Defendant is charged with knowing possession of a

firearm while subject to a domestic restraining order, in

violation of § 922(g)(8). The Indictment charges that the

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1 As opposed to a temporary/ex parte restraining order. 

Cf. California Family Code § 6320.

2

defendant, on May 21, 2003, knowingly possessed two firearms: a

Springfield Armory, .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol, bearing

Serial Number NM124347; and a Jennings, .22 caliber semiautomatic pistol, bearing Serial Number 417659, both of which had

previously been transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 

The court having received and considered the evidence,

both oral and documentary, submitted on behalf of both the

government and the defendant, now finds the following facts

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Findings of Fact

1. On April 18, 1996, Lana Lingan, defendant’s exwife, obtained her first permanent restraining order1, from the

Placer County Superior Court, Judge Frances Kearney presiding,

which ordered that the defendant shall not “contact, molest,

attack, strike, threaten, sexually assault, batter, telephone, or

otherwise disturb the peace of” his ex-wife. (Placer County

Superior Court Case No. SDR7076; Government’s Trial Exhibit

(“GTE”) No. 19). This order was set to expire April 18, 1999. 

Id.; California Family Code (“CFC”) §6345(a). The hearing from

which this order issued was, according to this order, held on

April 8, 1996. This order included an express firearm

restriction by including the following language:

Any person subject to a restraining order is prohibited

from obtaining or purchasing or attempting to purchase

a firearm by [California] Penal Code section 12021. 

Such conduct may be a felony and punishable by a $1,000

fine and imprisonment . . . .

Id.

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2 This order had both a California Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System (CLETS), and Violence Against Women Act

Notice. (GTE No. 15, p.96).

3“CLETS” stands for California Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System.

3

2. The next series of protection orders obtained by

Ms. Lingan which protected her from the defendant were all issued

by Judge John Cosgrove, also of the Placer County Superior Court. 

Judge Cosgrove was also the judge assigned to adjudicate the

divorce, custody and other domestic disputes between Ms. Lingan

and the defendant. Judge Cosgrove issued: (a) a Stipulated

Judgment on Reserved Issues dated February 1, 1999, which

included a “no harassment” clause; (b) a Restraining Order After

a Hearing2 dated November 24, 1999 (the hearing of which,

according to the order, apparently occurred on November 12,

1999); and (c) a Findings and Order After Hearing dated December

8, 1999 (which was aparerently also based on the November 12,

1999, hearing). (GTE No. 18, 15, 14). 

3. All three of these orders appear to be intended to

work in tandem and all address protecting Ms. Lingan from the

defendant. Id. In addition to the express firearm restriction

notice (equivalent to the firearm restriction in the April 18,

1996 restraining order), the November 24, 1999 restraining order

also required firearm relinquishment within 24 hours of its

issuance. (GTE No. 15, p.95). While there is no date of

expiration on either the February or the December 1999 orders,

the November 24, 1999 - (“CLETS”3) order was set to expire on

November 24, 2002.

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4. On November 6, 2002, Ms. Lingan, who was

represented by Attorney Karen Easter Gurwell, filed a timely and

properly filed Motion to Extend the November 1999 Restraining

Order. (GTE Nos. 8-12). That domestic relations matter had, by

this time, been transferred to Orange County on Ms. Lingan’s

successful request for change of venue. (Government Witness

Testimony (“GWT”) Judge Nancy Pollard). That case had also been

randomly assigned to Judge Pollard, in Family Division of the

Orange County Superior Court. Id.

5. Judge Pollard has been a judge of the Orange County

Superior Court since January 7, 1997. Prior to her appointment

to the bench, Judge Pollard was in private practice where she

handled immigration and family law matters. The last 6 1⁄2 years

of Judge Pollard’s practice were devoted to family law. (GWT N.

Pollard).

6. While currently assigned to the “direct calender

assignment,” Judge Pollard has handled a variety of family law

related issues. Id. Judge Pollard also supervised the

“Dedicated Domestic Violence Calender” for 3 1⁄2 years during which

time she handled at least 3,000 civil domestic restraining

orders. Id.

7. Due to the highly litigious nature of the Lingan v.

Campbell domestic matter, and due to the frequent and voluminous

filings by the defendant, Judge Pollard required the Clerk of the

Court to bring, as received, all pleadings filed in this case to

her chambers for her immediate review. (GWT N. Pollard). This

was a departure from Judge Pollard’s regular practice of not

reviewing a matter until the night before the hearing. Id.

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8. Ms. Lingan’s November 6th filing included, inter

alia: an application and notice of motion; a memorandum of points

and authorities; a declaration; and a supplemental declaration. 

(GTE Nos. 8-12; GWT N. POLLARD).

9. On November 12 and 18, 2002, defendant filed the

following two documents: (a) an Orange County Superior Court

“Notice of Motion” form on which he checked “other” and handwrote “Response;” and (b) another Notice of Motion form, on which

he checked “visitation” and hand-wrote “venue, trial.” (GTE Nos.

37(a), 37(b)). Neither of these pleadings (nor any attachments

thereto) state or mention any information which could reasonably

be construed as a denial of or in any way related to Ms. Lingan’s

claims in support of her motion to extend the 1999 restraining

order. Id. 

10. The parties have stipulated that the motion on the

hearing to extend the restraining order was scheduled for and did

occur on December 6, 2002 (GTE Nos. 5, 42).

11. The parties have also stipulated that Lana Lingan,

Karen Easter Gurwell (Attorney for Lana Lingan), Harold LaFlamme

(Guardian Ad Litem), and the defendant were all present at the

December 6, 2002 hearing before Judge Pollard. (GTE No. 5, 42).

12. The parties have stipulated that the defendant

appeared at the December 6, 2002 hearing via telephone by virtue

of his own request pursuant to the American With Disabilities Act

(“ADA”). (GTE Nos. 5, 6, 7, 42). Judge Pollard granted the

defendant’s request to appear at the December 6, 2002 hearing via

telephone by way of a minute order. (GTE No. 7; GWT N. Pollard).

13. Defendant has been determined a “vexatious

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litigant” by the Superior Court of Placer County, and has

historically, routinely filed letters and motions with the

Superior Court of Orange County. (GWT N. Pollard). Defendant

himself testified that he has, in pro per status, filed at least

two appeals (one in which he prevailed), one motion and one

judicial recusal. (Defense Witness Testimony (“DWT”) Larry W.

Campbell). Defendant also testified that he enlists the legal

assistance of his brother, who he indicated has some legal

background. Id.

14. The court takes judicial notice that in the years

2003 and 2004 defendant also filed eleven civil actions in this

court, in each case representing himself without an attorney. 

15. Defendant was personally present at all times

during the trial in this case, and at all times appeared alert,

appeared to engage his legal counsel and when he took the stand

seemed to understand the legal process and his access to the

court system, and seemed assertive both in pursuing his legal

rights and in delivering his testimony. 

16. At the time Judge Pollard heard defendant’s

matter, there was no statutory or case law guidance for judges

faced with deciding whether to extend a civil domestic

restraining order. (GWT N. Pollard; CFC §6345(a); Cf. Ritchie v.

Konrad, 115 Cal.App.4th 1275 (2004). AS Judge Pollard testified,

there were and are three ways that an Orange County Superior

Court judge can obtain the information necessary to grant or deny

a motion to extend a restraining order pursuant to CFC §6345: 

(a) a judge may take testimony from one or both parties; (b) a

judge may accept evidentiary proffers subject to cross

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examination, and/or (c) a judge may decide the matter completely

by way of written pleadings and declarations through a process

referred to as “being Reiflerized” which is a local term of art

indicating that a judge hearing a domestic violence restraining

order matter may decide motions solely by the pleadings. Id.;

Reifler v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App. 3d 479 (May 24, 1974). At

the time of that hearing, the court was not required to utilize

more than one of these methods in deciding whether to grant a

non-contested motion to extend a restraining order. Id.

17. In preparation for the hearing on Ms. Lingan’s

motion to extend the 1999 restraining order, Judge Pollard

carefully and thoroughly reviewed and considered the following

documents from the record: 

(a) Lana Lingan’s: application and notice of motion;

memorandum of points and authorities; declaration in support of

the motion; and a supplemental declaration in support of her

motion (GTE Nos. 8-12); 

(b) Judge Cosgrove’s December 8, 1999, November 24,

1999, and February 1, 1999, orders (GTE Nos. 14, 15, 18);

(c) Other documents and letters filed by the defendant;

(d) Her personal observations about the defendant’s

emotional nature;

(e) And although difficult to understand, nonresponsive and filed in violation of the state court’s filing

rules, Judge Pollard also reviewed the defendant’s so-called

“response” to Ms. Lingan’s motion to extend the restraining

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4 Several other documents improperly faxed to the Family

Division of the Superior Court of Orange County by the defendant

were returned to him unfiled.

8

order4 as well as his request for trial. (GTE Nos. 5, 37(a),

37(b), GWT N. Pollard). 

The defendant verified on the state court record that

these documents were his “responsive declaration” to Ms. Lingan’s

motion to extend restraining order; and upon receipt of the 

defendant’s claim that Judge Cosgrove’s November 1999 order was

somehow null and void, Judge Pollard also searched the files for

some indication that the 1999 order had been vacated or set aside

but found no such documentation. (GTE. No. 5, p.5, lines 15-17;

GWT N. Pollard).

18. Judge Pollard did not review the circumstances,

hearing transcript or related information about how or why the

November 1999 order was issued. (GWT N. Pollard). Judge Pollard

did, however, notice that a church and a school had successfully

joined the December 1999 restraining order, which stood out to

her because it was an unusual circumstance. Id.

19. Although there was no statutory or case authority

to guide her, Judge Pollard instituted her own “reasonableness

standard” when deciding whether to extend a previously issued

domestic restraining order. Id. Judge Pollard required that the

moving party demonstrate a continued fear, and that such

continued fear was reasonable. Id. In light of her experience

as supervisor of the Dedicated Domestic Violence Calender, Judge

Pollard felt that respondents were entitled to the “respect” of a

hearing even if they did not file a written response or otherwise

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answer the pleadings. Id. Even if a moving party’s motion to

extend restraining order was completely uncontested, Judge

Pollard routinely held hearings in order to ensure that the

moving party’s continued fear was reasonable. Id.

20. Judge Pollard was very familiar with the Lingan v.

Campbell matter because it had from the beginning been very

litigious and voluminous. Id. When she received the case from

Placer County, it spanned two “Xerox boxes” which she described

as approximately 1' x 2' in size. Id. Judge Pollard also

explained that, in addition to creating a new system of review in

order to keep up with the defendant’s many filings, she was in

constant contact with her chambers clerk, as well as Jan Shaw

from the courthouse Clerk’s office. Ms Shaw was designated as

the point of contact for all pleadings filed by the defendant

with the court Clerk as his voluminous pleadings were a heavy

burden for the Clerk’s office. Id.

21. On the day of the December 6, 2002, hearing Judge

Pollard was prepared to take testimony or accept other evidence

and accept proffers of the parties regarding Lingan’s motion. 

Id. In fact, Judge Pollard specifically wanted to hear from the

defendant about his legal argument as she could not understand

his written “response.” (GTE 5, GWT N. Pollard). Judge Pollard

also noted that the defendant had not, in either the November 12

or 18 filings, denied, refuted or rebutted Ms. Lingan’s claims of

continued harassment and threatening behavior. (GWT N. Pollard;

GTE 37(a), 37(b)).

22. During the hearing, Judge Pollard informed the

defendant that she had received some documents from him and

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verified with him that those were his “response” to Ms. Lingan’s

motion. Id.; GTE No. 5. Judge Pollard also asked defendant if

there was anything else he had to say, which she intended as his

opportunity to address the claims made by Ms. Lingan in her

pleadings to extend the restraining order. Id. 

23. Instead of responding to the legal issues at hand,

defendant responded that he wanted a continuance and a contested

trial in order to subpoena judges, attorneys and others in Placer

County regarding the December 1999 restraining order. Id. 

24. When defendant did nothing to deny, refute or

rebut Ms. Lingan’s claims on the record, and due to the fact that

the pleadings were filed in an inappropriate manner (together

with the fact that the defendant failed to address the matter of

whether the restraining order should have been extended), Judge

Pollard treated the defendant as a “default” and granted Ms.

Lingan’s motion to extend the restraining order. Id.

25. Judge Pollard did not grant defendant’s request

for a continuance based on his claim that he did not receive the

attachments to the supplemental declaration filed by Attorney

Gurwell because she credited Ms. Gurwell’s sworn testimony that

the documents had been properly served on the defendant over his

claim that he did not receive the documents. Id.; GTE 5.

26. Judge Pollard did not grant defendant’s request

for either a continuance or his request for a trial because the

reason the defendant gave for wanting the continuance and the

trial - that is to prove that the November 24, 1999 restraining

order was “null and void” by subpoenaing several judges and at

least one attorney - was neither relevant nor germane to Ms.

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Lingan’s motion to extend the order. (See GTE No. 5, p. 5, lines

17-25; GWT N. Pollard). Defendant indicated on the record that

he intended to call as witnesses: a person he referred to as

Denize Gertz (believed to mean “Dirks”), his previous attorney

Donna Decuir, Judge Benesse, Judge Cosgrove and Judge Couzens. 

(GTE No. 5, p. 5)

27. The legal standard for a criminal domestic

restraining order requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but

in a civil domestic restraining order such as the one issued by

Judge Pollard the moving party need only show a reasonable basis

by a preponderance of the evidence. (GWT N. Pollard).

28. Judge Pollard was a credible witness at this trial

and indicated that she gave serious consideration to both sides

of this issue, searched the file to verify or reject defendant’s

claims and up and through the hearing maintained commitment to

giving the defendant an opportunity to refute, deny, or rebut Ms.

Lingan’s claims against him. Id. Judge Pollard indicated that

she would have received evidence from the defendant had he

provided any, which could have been as simple as him denying the

behavior or claiming that Ms. Lingan was somehow dishonest in her

pleadings. Id.

29. Judge Pollard credibly testified that she used a

reasonableness standard when she heard Ms. Lingan’s motion for a

restraining order, requiring Ms. Lingan to show that she was

reasonable in having a continuing fear of the defendant since the

1999 protection order was issued. Id.

30. Judge Pollard credibly testified that she did not

grant Ms. Lingan’s request to extend the protection order merely

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5 The hearing transcript shows that Judge Pollard also

denied the defendant’s request for written findings. However,

written findings are not required for matters less than eight

hours in length provided that the judge, if asked, makes an oral

statement of decision in the presence of the parties. California

Code of Civil Procedure §632.

12

because she asked for it. Id.

5

31. The hearing which took place before Judge Pollard

lasted approximately 30 minutes. (GWT N. Pollard).

32. State court judges have wide discretion in

determining whether to grant continuances, which are generally

discouraged absent a showing of good cause. California Rules of

Court §375(c).

33. Nowhere in the California Family Code, nor in any

case law issued at the time the hearing in this case took place,

was the state court required to grant the defendant a trial on

the motion to extend a restraining order. See Reifler, 39

Cal.App.3d 479.

34. On December 6, 2002, the defendant, Larry W.

Campbell, became the subject of Orange County Superior Court

Domestic Restraining Order No. 02D006203, issued by Judge Nancy

Pollard. (See GTE Nos. 3, 5). 

35. On February 8, 2003, Judge Pollard amended that

order (“Amended I”)(GTE p.12) adding conditions 15-17 which were

attached to the Amended I order. (GWT N. Pollard).

36. On March 27, 2003, Judge Pollard again amended

that order (“Amended II”). (Id.; GTE No. 1). This amendment was

due to the fact that the Amended I order incorrectly stated the

defendant/respondent’s name as “Larry R. Campbell” as opposed to

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the proper “Larry W. Campbell.” This was brought to Judge

Pollard’s attention by Petitioner Lingan’s counsel’s letter. Id.

37. The December 6, 2002 and the March 27, 2003,

restraining orders issued by Judge Pollard are the “predicate

order(s)” which trigger §922(g)(8).

38. Defendant was personally served with the Amended II

predicate order on April 21, 2003, by Placer County Deputy

Sheriff Nelson Resendes. (Government’s Exhibit Nos. 1(b), 1(c);

GWT Nelson Resendes). At the time of service, the defendant was

incarcerated at the “main jail” located in Auburn, Placer County,

California. Id.

39. Deputy Resendes has been employed by the Placer

County Sheriff’s Department for approximately six years. Id. At

the time he served the defendant with the Amended II order, he

was assigned to the main jail where he was responsible for a

variety of inmate related matters. Id.

40. Among his duties at the main jail was the periodic

assignment of being a “Floor Officer.” Floor Officers are

responsible for extra duties including acting as process server

to all of the inmates at the jail. Id.

41. As Deputy Resendes testified, the protocol for

personally serving inmates with court documents was to either

call the inmate to the front office of the jail, or to meet the

inmate at his cell. Id. Deputy Resendes would then provide the

inmate with the service copy and go over the document with the

inmate. Id. If and only if the inmate indicated that he

understood the nature and terms of the served papers would 

Deputy Resendes then execute the proof of service document. Id. 

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6 The order also protected Ms. Lingan’s two daughters,

one of whom is also the defendant’s daughter. Because they are

both minors their names are not included in the record.

14

This document was put into a bin for later filing with the court. 

Id. Deputy Resendes implemented this service-procedure because

it did not make sense to him that you could serve someone without

them understanding what they received. Id.

42. Deputy Resendes served at least 100 inmates with

court papers during his assignment to the Placer County main jail

and he executed the related proofs of service to be filed with

the court. Id. While Deputy Resendes does not specifically

remember serving the defendant, he always used the same protocol

to serve the inmates and has no reason to believe that his

service protocol would have differed with the defendant in any

way. Id.

43. There are two versions of the service of process

on the defendant of the Amended II order because Deputy Resendes

was asked to re-execute the proof of service to be in compliance

with court rules which required the proof of service form to be

typed. (Id.; GTE Nos. 1(b), 1(c))

44. The December 6, 2002, and the Amended II order are

charged in the indictment as the predicate orders triggering the

violation of §922(g)(8). The Amended II order supercedes the

December 6, 2002 order. The protected party of both the

December 6, 2002 and the Amended II predicate protection orders

is Lana Lingan.6

45. The parties have stipulated that Lana Lingan is

the defendant’s “intimate partner” within the meaning of

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7 Without an express date the order would expire in 3

years. CFC §6345(c).

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§922(g)(8) in that she is the defendant’s ex-wife, formerly

cohabitated with the defendant and is mother of their daughter.

46. The parties have further stipulated that:

(a) The December 6, 2002, restraining issued by

Judge Nancy Pollard of the Superior Court of Orange County

contained the terms restraining the defendant, LARRY W. CAMPBELL,

from harassing, stalking and threatening an intimate partner and

child of said intimate partner;

(b) This order also contained terms which 

explicitly prohibited the use, attempted use or threatened use of

physical force against said intimate partner or child that would

reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; and

(c) This order does not expire until December 6,

2050.7

47. The December 6, 2002, and the March 27, 2003

orders, also:

A. Required the defendant to stay at least 100 feet

away from Lana Lingan, her home, her place of

employment, her childrens’ school, her car, and

away from Lingan’s church and school; and

B. Required the defendant to relinquish any firearms

that he possessed within 24 hours of the issuance

of the order.

(GTE Nos. 1, 3).

48. Judge Pollard’s restraining orders extend the

restraining order issued against the defendant on November 24,

1999, by Judge Cosgrove of the Placer County California Superior

Court. (GTE Nos. 1, 3, 15)

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49. Pursuant to California Family Code §6345, orders

of protection expire three (3) years from the date of issuance

unless successfully extended upon motion of either party; there

is no statutory mandate for the expiration of an extension of a

previously issued restraining order; and a party who has been

restrained may ask the court to reconsider via motion. See

California Family Code §6345.

50. In addition to the stipulation as stated in GTE No.

42, the Amended II predicate order inter alia:

C. Ordered the defendant not to: harass, attack, strike,

threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow,

stalk, molest, destroy the persona property of, disturb

the peace of, keep under surveillance, or block the

movements of Lana Lingan et. al.;

D. Ordered the defendant not to: contact (either directly

or indirectly), or telephone, or send messages by mail

or email to Lana Lingan et. al.;

E. Required the defendant to stay at least 100 feet away

from Lana Lingan, her home, her place of employment,

her children’s school, her car, and away from Lingan’s

church and school;

F. Notified the defendant that he could not own, possess,

have, buy, receive, or try to receive, or in any other

way get a gun or firearm;

G. Required the defendant to sell to a licensed gun dealer

or turn in to police any guns or firearms that he

possessed or controlled within 24 hours of the issuance

of the order;

H. Required the defendant to bring a receipt to the court

within 72 hours of receiving the order to prove that

the guns or firearms have been turned in or sold; and

I. Included yet another reminder with a picture that the

defendant was not allowed to:

...own, have possess, buy or try to buy,

receive ro try to receive, or otherwise get a

gun while this order is in effect. If you

do, you can go to jail and pay a $1,000 fine. 

You must sell to a licensed gun dealer or

turn-in to police any guns or firearms that

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you have in your control. The judge will ask

you for proof that you did so. If you do not

obey this order, you can be charged with a

crime. Federal law says you cannot have guns

or ammunition while this order is in

effect...This is a Court Order...

(GTE No. 1, paragraphs 5, 6, 10, 11, 20);

51. Ms. Lingan’s previous Attorney, Denise Dirks,

successfully obtained an order restraining the defendant from

harassing her. (GTE No. 28). This order also contains an

express firearm restriction. Id.

52. In September 2003, the defendant made statements

to Special Agent Erik Crowder that he was aware of the December

6, 2002, restraining order but claimed that it did not have a

firearms restriction. (GWT E. Crowder). The defendant verified

these statements at trial by testifying that he in fact received

a copy of the December 1999 restraining order by mail. (DWT L.

Campbell). Contrary to the defendant’s statements, this order

has at least two express firearm restriction notices. (GTE No.

3).

53. During the above described interview between the

defendant and Special Agent Crowder, the defendant made

additional statements that he received personal service of the

Amended II predicate order while incarcerated. (GWT E. Crowder).

The defendant also stated that he chose to disregard it or, in

Agent Crowder’s words, “blow it off,” because he did not think

the order was valid. Id.

54. All of the statements made by the defendant to

Special Agent Crowder were voluntary, at the defendant’s home

where he was not detained, not handcuffed, not threatened or

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promised anything and was free to terminate the interview at any

time. Id. These statements were witnessed by ATF Special Agent

Sarah Lewis. Id.

55. The parties have stipulated that each of the

firearms described above in Paragraph 51 had, prior to May 21,

2003, been transported in interstate or foreign commerce. That

is:

(a). The Springfield Armory .45 caliber semi-automatic

pistol (NM124347), was manufactured outside of the

state of California before it was seized from the

defendant’s home located at 1116 Cottonwood Drive,

Roseville, in the state and Eastern District of

California; and

(b). The Jennings .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol

(417659), was manufactured in the state of California

but was then shipped to Carson City, Nevada, and then

shipped to Reno, Nevada before it was transported back

to and later seized from the defendant’s home located

at 1116 Cottonwood Drive, Roseville, in the state and

Eastern District of California.

56. The parties have stipulated that through testing

by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, it has been

determined that the two firearms identified in Paragraphs 51 and

52 each meet the definition of a “firearm” as defined by 18

U.S.C. §921(a)(3).

57. The defendant has since April 18, 1996, and

through November 6, 2050, been subject to a restraining order

protecting Lana Lingan from the defendant. (GTE Nos. 1, 2, 3,

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14, 15, 18, 19). With the exception of the February 1, 1999, and

the December 8, 1999 (GTE Nos. 14, 15), orders, each of these

orders contains a firearm restriction and each of the orders

tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8)(B) and (8)(C)(ii).

58. This court has adopted and incorporated into this

trial record its findings of fact and conclusions of law with

respect to the evidentiary hearing which determined that the

search warrant executed at the defendant’s residence on May 21,

2003, was legally obtained and executed.

59. During trial, this court granted the government’s

request to dismiss from the indictment all of the firearms which

were suppressed (i.e., all of the firearms seized from the

defendant’s uncle’s home), as well as the muzzle loader which,

due to the fact that it is an “antique,” does not meet the

definition of a “firearm” within the meaning of §921. 

60. In the Supplemental Stipulations of the Parties

filed with this court, the defendant stipulates to the fact that

he knowingly possessed the firearms which were seized from his

home on May 21, 2003, pursuant to a validly issued and executed

search warrant, to wit: the Springfield Armory .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol (NM124347), and The Jennings .22 caliber semiautomatic pistol (417659); these firearms are charged in the

indictment.

Conclusions of Law

61. This court has jurisdiction over this case

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3231.

62. Section 922(g)(8) makes it illegal for a

“prohibited person,” that is, someone who is subject to a “court

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order,” to possess a firearm provided that the “court order”: 

was issued after a hearing to which the defendant had actual

notice and at which he had the opportunity to participate;

protects the defendant’s intimate partner or child of the

intimate partner; restrains the defendant from harassing,

stalking, or threatening the defendant's intimate partner or

child of such intimate partner or of the defendant; and by its

terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against the defendant's intimate partner or

child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. 

18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8).

63. In order to prove the offense charged in the

Indictment, the government must prove each of the following

elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: The defendant knowingly possessed at least one

firearm as charged in the indictment;

Second: The firearm or firearms had been shipped or

transported from one state to another, or from a

foreign nation to the United States; and

Third: At the time he possessed the firearm or firearms,

the defendant was subject to a court order.

64. It is not necessary for the government to prove

that the defendant actually knew that the firearm or firearms

were, or had at any time prior to or during his possession of

them, been in or affecting commerce. Although the indictment

alleges that the defendant possessed two firearms, possession of

one firearm is sufficient to find him guilty of this charge.

65. The term “firearm” means any weapon which will or

is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a projectile

by the action of an explosive. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).

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66. The term "court order" as stated in Section

922(g)(8) of Title 18 of the United States code, means that there

was an order issued by a court which:

A. Was issued after a hearing of which the defendant

received actual notice, and at which the defendant had

an opportunity to participate;

B. Restrains the defendant from harassing, stalking, or

threatening the defendant's intimate partner or child

of such intimate partner or of the defendant, or

engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate

partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the

partner or child; and

C. (i) includes a finding that such person represents a

credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate

partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly

prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the defendant's intimate partner

or child that would reasonably be expected to cause

bodily injury.

67. The term “intimate partner” means the defendant's

spouse, the defendant's former spouse, an individual who is a

parent of the defendant's child, or an individual who cohabitates or has cohabited with the defendant. 18 U.S.C. §

921(a)(32).

68. Section 922(g)(8) is silent on the type of

participation required but clearly states that the defendant is

only entitled to the “opportunity to” participate - this statute

does not require actual or meaningful participation. Id.

69. Section 922(g)(8) does not require that the

defendant receive service of (personal or otherwise), or have

personal knowledge that the court order which proscribes

possession of the firearm in fact, issued. United States v.

Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Coccia, 249 F.Supp.2d 79, 81 (D.Mass. 2003). This statute

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requires very minimal due process and is, practically speaking,

only meant to protect a defendant from being railroaded by a

completely ex parte proceeding.

70. In light of the stipulation of the parties as

stated in GTE No. 42 (paragraph 2), the government has met its

burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that both of the

firearms seized from the defendant’s residence on May 21, 2003,

to wit: the .45 caliber Springfield Armory, and the .22 caliber

Jennings semi-automatic pistol, as charged in the indictment,

traveled in interstate or foreign commerce sometime before the

defendant’s possession of each of them, and therefore, the

interstate nexus requirement for §922(g)(8), is, beyond a

reasonable doubt, met as to both firearms.

71. In light of the stipulation of the parties as

stated in GTE No. 42 (paragraphs 3, 4), the government has met

its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that both of the

firearms seized from the defendant’s home on May 21 2003, to wit: 

the .45 caliber Springfield Armory, and the .22 caliber Jennings,

as charged in the indictment, meet the definition of a “firearm”

pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C., §921(a).

72. In light of the stipulation of the parties as

stated in GTE No. 42 (paragraph 7),the government has met its

burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that Lana Lingan is

the defendant’s intimate partner within the meaning of Title 18,

U.S.C., §922(g)(8), in that she is the defendant’s ex-wife, she

formerly cohabitated with the defendant and is the mother of

their daughter.

73. In light of the stipulation of the parties as

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stated in GTE No. 42 (paragraph 5), and the plain wording of the

documents themselves (GTE Nos. 1, 3); the government has met its

burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the predicate

orders, as charged in the indictment, to wit: the domestic

restraining order issued by Judge Nancy Pollard on December 6,

2002, and the Amended II domestic restraining order issued by

Judge Pollard on March 27, 2003, track the language which

triggers application of §922(g)(8) in that these orders restrain

the defendant, LARRY W. CAMPBELL, from harassing, stalking and

threatening an intimate partner and child of said intimate

partner; and contain terms which explicitly prohibited the use,

attempted use or threatened use of physical force against said

intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to

cause bodily injury; this Court further finds that this order

does not expire until December 6, 2050.

74. In light of the stipulation of the parties as

stated in GTE No. 42 (paragraph 6), GTE No. 5 and the testimony

of Judge Pollard, the government has met its burden of showing

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received “actual

notice,” within the meaning of Title 18, U.S.C., §922(g)(8), of

the hearing from which the predicate orders issued based on the

defendant’s appearance by telephone at the hearing. This Court

further finds that this hearing took place on December 6, 2002,

before Judge Pollard, Orange County Superior Court, California

and also present at this Court proceeding were Attorney Karen

Easter Gurwell, Attorney Harold LaFlamme, and Lana Lingan. (GWT

N. Pollard; GTE 5).

75. In light of the stipulations of the parties as

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stated in GTE 42 (paragraph 6), and the testimony of Deputy

Resendes, the government has met its burden of showing beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant received personal service of

the March 27, 2003 Amended II order on April 21, 2003.

76. The Ninth Circuit has yet to expressly determine

what is meant by an “opportunity to participate” within the

meaning of Title 18, U.S.C., §922(g)(8)(A). This court therefore

looks to the decisions of the Sixth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.

77. The Sixth Circuit has held that the term “hearing”

as defined in §922(g)(8) is unambiguous. United States v. Calor,

340 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit found that

the language of §922(g)(8) is plain, and reasoned that where the

language of a statute is plain, “the sole function of the courts

is to enforce it according to its own terms.” Id. The court

reasoned that though narrow, the proof requirement for a

§922(g)(8) hearing meets due process requirements. Id. According

to the Sixth Circuit, in order to prove that a §922(g)(8)

“hearing” occurred, the government is required prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant was given actual notice,

and (2) the defendant was given an opportunity to participate. 

Id. As stated, the parties have stipulated to “actual notice” in

this case.

“Opportunity to participate” is satisfied where the

defendant was given an opportunity in court, whether in person or

in writing, where he could have presented reasons why the court

should not enter an order finding that he posed a credible threat

to the safety of the petitioner. Id.; See Reifler, 39

Cal.App.3d 479.

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78. The Fifth Circuit concluded a hearing within the

meaning of §922(g)(8) requires only: (1) actual notice, and (2)

an opportunity to participate. United States v. Banks, 339 F.3d

267, 270-71 (5th Cir. 2003). Whether the defendant utilizes the

opportunity to put on evidence is not determinative of whether a

§922(g)(8) hearing took place. Id. at 271.

79. The Seventh Circuit made a ruling similar to Banks

in United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998), when it

considered a due process challenge to the defendant's §922(g)(8)

conviction. Even though no proof was presented, the Seventh

Circuit found that the defendant was afforded the opportunity,

either in person or in writing, to be heard at a “meaningful time

and in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 289-90, 291. 

78. In another federal case, United States v. Falzone,

1998 WL 351471 (D.Conn.), the district court examined the issue

of whether a defendant in a §922(g)(8) prosecution had the

“opportunity to participate,” within the meaning of §922(g)(8). 

The district court noted, “due process requires notice and an

opportunity to be heard before a person may deprived of life,

liberty, or property by law.” Id. (citing Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust, Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The

district court went on to state that the “...due process clause

will not proscribe the authority of the state to regulate

procedures under its criminal laws unless the state practice

<...offends some principle of justice so rooted n the traditions

and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'”

Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 437, 445 (1958)). The

district court also stated, “due process is not vitiated if a

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person fails to take advantage of an existing opportunity to

participate.” Id.

80. Judge Pollard did not violate any of the

provisions of the ADA in her handling of defendant’s case.

81. Judge Pollard acted well within her discretion to

deny the defendant’s requests for counsel, for a facilitator, for

a continuance, and for a contested hearing. 

82. In light of defendant’s responses which he filed

November 12 and 18, 2002, which were unintelligible within the

context of this case, and did provide a valid legal response to

Ms. Lingan’s motion to extend the December 1999 restraining

order, Judge Pollard’s ultimate decision that the defendant

defaulted was appropriate.

83. The “minimum requirements of §922(g)(8) comport

with the requirements of due process,” in that it requires: (1)

actual notice and (2) an opportunity to participate. See Calor,

340 F.3d at 431. Further, the boundaries of §922(g)(8) will be

protected by this Court.

84. This case is analogous to a prosecution under

§922(g)(1) in that a defendant's attempt to collaterally attack a

predicate felony is a matter of law, not fact. United States v.

Lomas, 30 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1994)rev'd on other grounds

in United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001);

See also United States v. Engesser, 788 F.3d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.

1986), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in United

States v. Dhams, 938 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 199l)(whether a defendant

may collaterally attack a predicate felony conviction in order to

assert a defense to a charge violating §I201 (precursor statute

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to §922(g)(l)) is a question of law); Lewis v. United States, 445

U.S. 55, 63-65 (1980). Even a prior conviction that is subject

to collateral attack on the basis of being constitutionally

invalid may nevertheless serve as a predicate felony for a

§922(g)(1) conviction. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65

(1980).

85. In United States v. Padilla, 387 F.3d 1087, 1090

(9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit held that the district court

was within its discretion to deny defendant's motion for a new

trial despite the fact that the predicate state conviction to a

§922(g)(1) prosecution was vacated by the state. In Padilla,

approximately six months after the defendant was convicted of

violating §922(g)(l), the Los Angeles County Superior Court

entered an order vacating the defendant's prior and predicate

state conviction nunc pro tunc to the original date of

disposition. In finding that the state court's nunc pro tunc

order had no effect on the validity of the federal conviction,

the Ninth Circuit stated:

Lewis teaches that 'a contested felon [must] challenge

the validity of a prior conviction or otherwise remove

his [firearm] disability, before obtaining a

firearm.' ... the only relevant circumstance for

present purposes is Padilla's status as a convicted

felon at the time he possessed a firearm.

Id. at 1091 (quoting Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67)(emphasis added). See

also United States v. Marks, 379 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.

2004)(reversing and remanding district court's dismissal of

§922(g)(1) indictment on defendant's argument that predicate

state felony was unconstitutional); United States v. Johnson, 988

F.2d 941, 945(9th Cir. 1993) (affirming §922 (g)(1) conviction

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despite defendant's claim that his state court felony was reduced

to a misdemeanor upon his completion of probation because on the

date he was found to possess a firearm, he was a convicted

felon); United States v. McCroskey, 681 F.2d 1152, 1153 (9th Cir.

1982) (per curium) (finding that a state order which later

expunged nunc pro tunc defendant's predicate state conviction did

not warrant dismissal of §922(g)(l) indictment because the

defendant had not cleared his status before being restrained

against potential violence).

86. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Padilla, this Court

must look at the defendant's status at the time he was found to

possess firearms. Padilla, 387 F.3d at 1091 (emphasis added). 

Thus, as is the case with previously convicted felons, if

defendant desired the right to possess firearms he should have

attacked the validity of the state court order before continuing

to possess his firearms which was both in violation of the law

and in violation of the state court’s order. 

87. The government has met its burden of showing

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had an “opportunity

to participate,” in the hearings before Judge Pollard, within the

meaning of Title 18, U.S.C. §922(g)(8) for the following reasons:

(a) The defendant received actual notice of the

hearing from which the predicate order issued, at which he, at

his own request, appeared via telephone;

(b) Though considered by Judge Pollard, the

defendant’s “response” was not intelligible and was properly

determined to be “non-responsive” by Judge Pollard;

(c) When given the opportunity to state a reason

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for contesting the extension of the 1999 order and for requesting

the continuance of the December 1999 restraining order, and

requesting a further hearing, the defendant failed to participate

in any meaningful way and indicated to Judge Pollard that his

defense strategy was going to be an attempt to collaterally

attack the previous restraining orders; because this was beyond

the scope of the task before Judge Pollard, there was a fair and

reasonable basis to deny the defendant’s requests for continuance

and for trial;

(d) Judge Pollard credibly testified that it was

her practice to require a basis to extend a previously issued

restraining order and that she would not have granted the

extension merely because Lana Lingan requested the order; and

(e) The application, motions, declarations and

related documentation filed on behalf of Lana Lingan by Attorney

Karen Easter Gurwell, provided a substantial basis for Judge

Pollard to conclude that Ms. Lingan’s continued fear of the

defendant was reasonable, and that therefore an extension of the

previously issued order pursuant to California Family Code §6345

was appropriate.

88. Ritchie v. Konrad, 115 Cal.App.4th 1275 (2004),

cited by defendant, is not on point. In that case, the judge

thought he had no choice other than to grant a §6345 extension if

asked, and failed to provide a record that showed that in any

case the need for continued protection was reasonable. This case

is distinguishable in that Judge Pollard knew she could say no to

the moving party, and because, unlike the court in Ritchie, she

created a record which evidences that her ruling extending the

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1999 order advanced the intent of the legislature, that is to

prevent future incidents of violence where appropriate and where

reasonable

89. The fact that part of the proceedings in the

Placer County Superior Court on November 12, 1999 were held in

chambers with defendant’s attorney, but not defendant himself,

present did not invalidate the court orders which followed that

hearing, nor was defendant permitted by law, either in the Orange

County proceedings or in the proceedings in this case, to have

the Placer County order declared null and void based upon that

fact.

90. Defendant’s attempt to directly and collaterally

attack the validity of the Amended II predicate restraining order

is outside the scope of §922(g)(8), not relevant, and provides no

legal defense to this crime.

91. For the foregoing reasons, the government has met

its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each of the

elements necessary to establish that the defendant violated Title

18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8), and the defendant is therefore adjudged

GUILTY of the offense charged in the Indictment.

DATED: August 15, 2005

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