Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08005/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Charles Thomas Walraven
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

Unitrd s.rates Court ,~f Appeab 

femh Cm:n!: 

DEC 2 7 1989 

ROBE.RTL. .HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-8005 

CHARLES THOMAS WALRAVEN, 

Uefendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. CR88-0034-02K) 

(699 F. Supp. 260) 

John Barksdale, Assistant United S.ta tes Attorney ( Richard A. 

Stacy, United States Attorney, Lisa E. Leschuck, Assistant United 

States Attoiney, Maynard D. Grant, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, on the brief), Cheyenne, Wyoming, for .PlaintiffAppellee. 

Kenneth M. Magill, Detroit, Michigan, for Defendant-Appellant. 

betcre*BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges and CONWAY, District 

JLtdge. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable John E. Conway, United States District Judge for the 

District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant, Charles Walraven, entered a conditional 

plea of gu~lty under Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(a)(2) in the federal 

district court to possession with intent to distribute cocaine as 

proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l). Walraven's plea was 

conditioned upon his right to bring this appeal challenging the 

district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of two 

kilograms of cocaine which Wyoming state officials obtained in a 

warrantless search of his vehicle. United States v. Pitchford, 

699 F. Supp. 260 JD. Wyo. 1988). Walraven specifically challenges 

the constitutionality of the authorities' (1) registration check 

on his vehicle, (2) initial stop of his vehicle, (3) detention of 

nis person, and (4) search of his vehicle. We exercise 

il,tisdict:ion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. 

I. 

Following an evidentiary.hearing on Walraven's motion to 

~~ppress, the ~istrict court entered thorough findings of fact 

into the record as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e). Based on 

its view of the testimony and the various witnesses' credibility, 

the court found that the government had met its burden of proving· 

the constitutionality of its actions. See United States v. 

Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir. 1989). While Walraven 

de11ied government witnesses' account of the facts,.we are not 

empm-1ered to substitute our judgment for that of the district 

court absent clear error. See United States v. Diaz-Albertini, 

7 7 2 F . 2 d 6 5 4 , 6 5 8 (1 0 th Ci r • 19 8 5 ) , c er t • . denied , 4 8 4 U . S . 8 2 2 

(1987). In reviewing the district court's findings, we are 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 2 
mindful that '''[a]t a hearing on a motion to suppress, the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the 

evidence together with ·the inferences, deductions and conclusions 

to be drawn from the evidence, are to be determined by the trial 

judge. 111 Id. (quoting United States v. Pappas, 735 F. 2d 1232, 

1~33 (10th Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, we accept the evidence in a 

Light most favocable to the district court's determinationi United 

States v. Medlin, ·042 F.2d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 1988), and 

decline to disturb its findings because they are not clearly 

erroneous. See United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1262-63 

(10th Cir. 1989). 

The district court's factual findings, which harbor ample 

support in the record, may be briefly summarized: On the morning 

of March 26, 1988, De~uty Robert Debree of the Albany County, 

Wycrrting, Sheriff's Department, observed two men in a 1983 brown 

C~dillac bearing the Tennessee license plate CYR 490 travelin9 

~ctst on I-80 near Laramie. Debree, a seven year veteran of law 

enforcement who routinely ran license and registration checki on 

011t-of-state vehicles, decided to do so on the Cadillac. A 

license check with the FBI's National Crime Information Center 

(NCIC) proved negatjve. The registration check, however, 

indicated that the plate number belonged to a 1988 Toyota. Debree 

activated his overhead lights in an attempt to stop the Cadillac. 

After receiving two blasts of Debree's siren and traveling an 

additional one and a half miles, the Cadillac pulled over. Debree 

testified as follows regarding his pursuit: 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 3 
Counsel: And can you tell us what happened after you 

activated the emergency lights with respect 

to what you observed the occupants in the car 

doing? 

Debree: What I recall, both the driver and the 

passenger were speaking to each other. 

The passenger of the vehicle at that time 

from what I can remember placed his hand on 

the rear view mirror, seemingly adjusting it 

to see behind him. At dne point the passenger 

even looked over his left shoulder directly at 

me. 

Counsel: Did this seem unusual to you based on your 

experience? 

Debree: Yes. 

Counsel: Why is that? 

Debree: Well, I felt a little uncomfortable, first Of 

all, if he could see me. The vehicle wasn't 

pulling over immediately. They both seemed to 

be conferring between each other, and th~y 

were not pulling over for me immediately. 

Rec. vol. II at 43. Based on his observations, Debree radioed for 

assistance because the men matched a "drug courier" profile and 

acted "suspicious." 

Debree approached the Cadillac to inform its driver, Barry 

Pitchford, of the discrepancy in the registration check. Because 

Walraven, a passenger in the vehicle, admitted ownership, Debree 

asked both men to produce their driver's license as well as the 

vehicle's registration. After running a negative check with the 

NCIC on the men, Debree again ran a license plate check. Although 

Debree reported the plate as CYR 490, he noted that the dispatcher 

recorded the plate as CYR 409. A transcript of Debree's 

correspondence with the dispatcher during his pursuit of the 

Cadillac indicated that the dispatcher had made the same mistake 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 4 
ac least two previous times without Debree's knowledge. This 

time, however, Debree corrected the dispatcher and the license 

plate 0as properly identified as belonging to the Cadillac. 

Between two and three minutes later, Debree's backup, 

S~rgeant Lance Ro~inson arrived. With Robinson positioned at the 

r~ar right side of the Cadillac, Debree again approached the 

veriicle to return the licenses and registration. When Debree 

a~ked if they were transporting any illegal narcotics or firearms, 

both men responded 11 no. 11 Debree then. requested to search the 

Cadillac. According to Debree, Pitchford replied: "I don't know 

why you would want to, but I imagine you can go ahead." Walraven 

thereafter said: "Sure, go ahead." Debree also testified that 

.when he asked to search the trunk, Walraven push~d the release 

button inside the glove box and Pitchford opened the truck. 

Inside the trunk, Debree recovered a blue satchel which contained 

.two kilograms of cocaine. Both men were taken into custody and 

transported to the Albany County jail. 

II. 

Walraven initially contehds that Debree's random registration 

check on his out-of-state vehicle violated the Constitution's 

privileges and fmmunities clause, U.S. Const. art. IV,§ 2, and 

equal protection clause, U.S. Const. amend, XIVr § 1, by impeding 

his right to interstate travel, We disagree. While the right to 

travel freely interstate is a "basic right" embodied in the 

Constitution, United States v. Guest, jSJ U.S. 745, 758 (1966), we 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 5 
de not believe that this right was abridged in this instance. The 

right to interstate travel protects individuals from "statutes, 

rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this 

movement." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969). 

Moreover, because they are in plain view, no privacy interest 

~xists in license plat~s. United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 

127~, 1285 (lrrth Cir. 1980). Debree's registration check on 

Walraven's Cadillac neither unreasonably burdened nor restricted 

Walraven's travel. Unless a registration check reveals 

information which raises a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity, the subject remains unaware of the check and 

unencumbered. As the district court aptly noted: "In view of the 

manner in which the license checks are conducted, the extent of 

any intrusion upon the traveling public~ .. hardly rises to an 

impermissible interference with _the fundamental right to travel 

from state to state." Pitchford, 699 F. Supp. at 264. 

III. 

Walraven next asserts that Debiee's initial stop of the 

Cadillac violated the fourth amendment's proscription against 

unlawful seizures. According to Walraven, Debree~s failure to 

remedy the dispatcher's incorrect relay of the Cadillac's license 

plate until after the deputy had stopped the vehicle to inquire as 

to its registration was an unreasonable mistake of fact, or in the 

alternative, merely .support for a pretextual stop. The district 

court disagreed: 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 6 
Notwithstanding the officer's failure to detect the 

dispatcher's error on three separate occasio~s within a 

three and a half minute period, he unquestionably acted 

in good faith upon the report when he pulled defendants' 

vehicle over to investigate the perceived registration 

discrepancy. . . . [T]here existed in his mind a belief 

which would alert a reasonable person that some sort of 

crime had been or was in the process of being committed. 

Pitchford, 699 F. Supp. at 263-64. 

The district court implicitly recognized that whether 

Debree's failur~ to detect the dispatcher's error tainted his stop 

of the Cadillac and subsequent discovery of the cocaine depended 

upon the objective reasonableness of his inaction. See United 

States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 606 n.24 (10th Cir. 1988) (term 

"good faith" used despite objective nature of inquiry); Brierley 

v. Schoenfeld, 781 F.2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1986) (officer's good 

faith b~lief must be reasonable). In United States v. Leon, 468 

U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court explained that use of the 

exclusionary rule would not deter improper police conduct where an 

officer engaged in objectively reasonable law enforcement 

activity: "In short, where the officer's conduct is objectively 

reasonable, 'excluding the evidence will not further the ends of 

the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way. 111 Id. at 919-20 

(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539 (1976) (White, J., 

dissenting)). Of course, the burden is on the government to 

convince the district court that the officer's conduct was 

obiectively reasonable. See United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d 371, 

( 10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989). 

Mindful of these principles, we sustain the district court's 

finding that Debree acted in an ostensibly reasonable manner in 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 7 
failing to identify the dispatcher's mistake. Based upon the 

circumstances as he perceived them, Debree.had an "articulable and 

reasonable suspicion" that his stop of the Cadillac would reveal 

the existence of a crime. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 

663 (1979). The court explicitly found that bec~use Debree was 

ccncentiating on the Cadillac he did not hear the dispatcher 

incorrectly repeat the license plate information. Pitchford, 699 

F. Supp. at 261. Debree testified that he was concentrating on 

the road as well. Given Debree's testimony, the district court 

acted well within its authority in finding that Debree's £ailure 

to correct the dispatcher was objectively reasonable and not a 

pretext for his subsequent actions. 

IV. 

Walraven argues that even if Debree's initial stop of the 

Cadillac was lawful, no legal basis existed for his continuing 

0~t~ntion once Debree confirmed the vehicle's registration. 

~_,Jr~ven's continuing detention is best described as an 

i1;1estigative detention. As w~ explained in United States v. 

Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986): 

While an investigative detention is a seizure within the 

meaning of _the Fourth Amendment, it need not be 

supported by probable cause. An investigative detention 

is justified where specific and articulable facts and 

rational inferences from those facts give ~ise to 

reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is 

committing a crime. 

(ci~ing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). In determining the 

reasonableness of an investigative detention, "common sense and 

-8-

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 8 
ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." 

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). 

Aside from the registration discrepancy, the district court 

cited the suspicious actions of Walraven and Pitchford, the men's 

failure to promptly stop the Cadillac in response to Debree's 

flashing lights, their nervous mannerisms, and Debree's law 

enforcement experience as support for its finding that Debree 

reasonably believed the men had committed or were committing a 

crime. The district court justified Debree's detention of the men 

for the two to three minutes before Sergeant Robinson arrived as 

sirnp1y prudent in view of Debree's perceived threat to his own 

well-being, Pitchford, 699 F. Supp. at 263-64. 

That the fourth amendmint ''does not require police officers 

to close their eyes to suspicious circumstances'' is beyond 

peradventure. Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 891. Balancing the nature 

and quality of the brief detention on Walraven!s constitutional 

guarantees against the governmental interests in crime prevention 

and detection, as we must under United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 

696, 703 (1983), we conclude that the character and extent of 

Walraven's detention was minimally intrusive and, thus outweighed 

by these governmental interests. After resolving the registration 

problem, Debree sought only to maintain the status quo momentarily 

before questioning the men in the presence of Sergeant Robin~on. 

See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). We note that 

Debree requeste? Sergeant Robinson's assistance prior to resolving 

the registration discrepancy. Once that discrepancy was 

-9-

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 9 
corrected, Debree certainly was entitled to request permission to 

search the vehicle. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d at 655 (officer's 

request to search vehicle permissible following negative NCIC 

check). The fact that Debree waited a moment for his backup to 

arrive before asking Walraven to consent to a search of the 

c~~illac was nothing more than reasonable police procedur~. 

v. 

Lastly, Walraven submits that he did no~ consen~ to Debree's 

search of the Cadillac despite Debree's testimony to the contrary. 

No one doubts that an official may search a vehicle without 

probable cause if voluntary consent is given. ~-, Rivera, 867 

F.2d at 1265. Furthermore, Walraven does not dispute that 

"voluntariness" in consent matters is a question of fact to be 

determined from the totality of the circumstances. ~-, 

Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 892. Given these well-established precepts 

and the conflict between Debree's and Walraven's testimony, we 

need only repeat our words in United States v. Guglielmo, 834 F.2d 

866, 869 (10th Cir. 1987): "It is not this court's function to 

d~termine which of these parties was telling the truth. That was 

a matter for· the trial judge, who heard the testimony of the 

witnesses." See Pitchford, 699 F. Supp. at 264-65. 

AFFIRMED. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 89-8005 Document: 010110194672 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 10