Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02006/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Carmichael
Appellee
Harry Christianson
Appellee
Full House, Inc.
Appellee
Gold Dust Casino
Appellee
Tony Milos
Appellee
Larry Ray Smith
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2006

___________

Larry Ray Smith, *

*

Plaintiff – Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Gold Dust Casino; Full House, Inc.; *

Harry Christianson, Owner; *

Brian Carmichael, General Manager; *

Tony Milos, Human Resources *

Manager, *

*

Defendants – Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: March 14, 2008

Filed: May 27, 2008

___________

Before MURPHY, BRIGHT, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Larry Ray Smith (“Smith”), brought an action pro se against

Appellees, Gold Dust Casino, Full House, Inc., Harry Christianson, Brian Carmichael,

and Tony Milos (collectively “Gold Dust”), alleging that he had been discharged from

his employment with Gold Dust in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The district court, on Gold Dust’s

motion, dismissed the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure of Smith to

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make full discovery. Smith appeals. We reverse and remand with instructions to the

district court to reinstate the action.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2005, Smith, pro se, filed a complaint in District Court for the

District of South Dakota alleging that Gold Dust terminated Smith’s employment in

violation of the ADA. 

The district court, on November 16, 2005, issued a scheduling order directing

that discovery shall terminate on March 1, 2006 and that the parties shall file all

motions, excluding motions in limine, by April 1, 2006. In a letter to the district court

and defense counsel dated January 5, 2006, Smith requested a thirty-day extension to

permit him to look for counsel. Smith also explained that he was experiencing health

problems related to, among other things, cardiac artery disease. The district court

granted Smith’s request and extended the discovery and motions deadlines to April

1, 2006 and May 1, 2006, respectively. In an effort to comply with the discovery

schedule, Smith informed the district court and defense counsel on January 30, 2006

that he intended to use, as “expert testimony”, Smith’s medical record and documents

relating thereto. 

On February 27, 2006, Smith informed both the court and defense counsel that

he was scheduled to undergo heart surgery which would, most likely, prevent Smith

from finding an attorney or complying with the discovery deadline. In light of

Smith’s medical problems, the parties filed a joint request for an extension of the

discovery and motions deadlines. On April 7, 2006, the district court granted the joint

motion and reset the discovery deadline for July 1, 2006 and the motions deadline for

August 1, 2006. In the eight months that followed, neither Smith nor Gold Dust

informed the court of any discovery problems. 

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On December 11, 2006, the district court issued an order setting a March 6,

2007 trial date. Shortly thereafter, on December 15, 2006, Gold Dust filed a motion

to dismiss Smith’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to comply

with the court’s discovery deadlines. Gold Dust alleged that Smith failed to: (1)

provide relevant disclosures; (2) adequately answer interrogatories; and (3) respond

to Gold Dust’s requests for production of documents. Gold Dust also asked the

district court to award attorneys’ fees. Alternatively, Gold Dust requested that the

court enter an order compelling Smith to comply with discovery. This was Gold

Dust’s first contact with the district court since the court’s April 7, 2006 order

extending the discovery and motions deadlines. 

Smith responded that he had found trial counsel willing, upon condition, to take

his case, and requested that the district court postpone the March 6, 2007 trial date

until the middle to late summer. Smith attached to his response a letter to Smith from

George C. Price (“Price”), a Colorado attorney. Price indicated that he would take

Smith’s case but would not be prepared to go to trial until mid-summer. Price also

indicated that he was not admitted to the Federal Bar in South Dakota and therefore

needed to obtain local counsel willing to sponsor his admission pro hac vice. Price

stated that his representation of Smith was contingent upon Smith obtaining a

continuance of the trial date and Price obtaining local counsel willing to sponsor

Price’s admission pro hac vice. Price had advised Smith to request a continuance of

the March trial date. 

In an order dated February 20, 2007, the district court denied Smith’s request

for a continuance, granted Gold Dust’s motion to dismiss Smith’s complaint, and

entered judgment for Gold Dust and against Smith, together with costs. While the

district court recognized Smith’s pro se status, the court stated that regardless, Smith

was “not permitted to refuse compliance with the plain wording of the court’s orders.”

The court concluded that Smith’s “contentious refusal to adhere to the orders of the

Court warrants dismissal.”

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Smith filed a motion for reconsideration on March 2, 2007. Smith argued that

he attempted to complete discovery but had considerable difficulty retaining counsel

willing to represent him. In support of his motion for reconsideration, Smith attached

a letter from a South Dakota attorney noting that Smith briefly retained him to render

an opinion on the merits of his suit and to assist him in complying with discovery.

The letter indicated that while Smith may have failed to comply with discovery, this

noncompliance was not willful. 

The district court denied Smith’s motion for reconsideration noting that while

Smith’s noncompliance may not have been willful, Smith nevertheless knew that he

had not complied with discovery and did not request assistance in complying with the

discovery deadlines. This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

A district court may, in its discretion, dismiss an action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 41(b) if “the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with [the Federal Rules] or a

court order.” We review the district court’s factual finding of willful or intentional

failure to prosecute or comply with court orders for clear error. Hunt v. City of

Minneapolis, 203 F.3d 524, 527 (8th Cir. 2000). This court reviews the district

court’s decision to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 41(b) for abuse of discretion.

Good Stewardship Christian Ctr. v. Empire Bank, 341 F.3d 794, 797 (8th Cir. 2003).

When determining whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing an

action, “this court employs a balancing test that focuses foremost upon the degree of

egregious conduct which prompted the order of dismissal and to a lesser extent upon

the adverse impact of such conduct upon both the defendant and the administration

of justice in the district court,” Rodgers v. The Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 135 F.3d

1216, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). We have

repeatedly stressed that the “sanction imposed by the district court must be

proportionate to the litigant’s transgression,” id. (emphasis added), and that

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“[d]ismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction and should be used only in cases

of willful disobedience of a court order or continued or persistent failure to prosecute

a complaint,” Givens v. A.H. Robins Co., 751 F.2d 261, 263 (8th Cir. 1984).

We conclude that the sanction of dismissal with prejudice under these

circumstances was disproportionate to Smith’s transgression. The district court

therefore abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice Smith’s complaint.

The record does not show that Smith intended to delay the proceedings by

failing to comply with discovery. Nor, does the record support the district court’s

characterization that Smith contentiously refused to comply with court orders. To

justify the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice, this court has required far

more egregious and willful conduct than presented here. See, e.g., Good Stewardship

Christian Ctr., 341 F.3d at 797-98 (holding dismissal with prejudice warranted when

the record showed that plaintiff’s conduct which included making several ex parte

statements in violation of a district court order, making numerous baseless motions

for sanctions against opposing counsel, failing to properly answer requests for

admissions, and obstructing discovery during depositions, was designed to delay

proceedings); Hunt, 203 F.3d at 527-28 (holding dismissal with prejudice warranted

when between the issuance of the pretrial order and the date trial was set to

commence, the litigant “engaged in at least six distinct violations of the court’s orders

or of the Federal Rules”); Rodgers, 135 F.3d at 1218 (holding dismissal with prejudice

warranted when the litigant failed to appear at two court ordered depositions,

disregarded the district court’s order to produce certain material documents, and

violated a court order prohibiting him from firing his fourth set of counsel). 

In this case, Smith was simply incapable of complying with the discovery

deadlines because of, among other things, a serious health problem which required

surgery. Furthermore, the record shows that throughout the discovery period Smith

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made sincere efforts to complete discovery, inform the court of his progress, and give

explanations for any delays. 

This is not a case where a litigant flagrantly disregarded or ignored any advance

warning from the district court that failure to comply with discovery deadlines would

result in dismissal with prejudice. The district court did not give any such warning

here. While the failure to give warning that a litigant is “skating on thin ice,” does

not, alone, compel reversal, we certainly encourage it as it would put a litigant,

especially a pro se litigant such as Smith, on notice that he risks irreversibly losing the

right to bring suit. See Rodgers, 135 F.3d at 1221. The district court’s failure to give

Smith any advance warning weighs against imposing the extreme sanction of

dismissal with prejudice. This is especially so in light of the fact that in the eight

months that passed between the district court’s April 7, 2006 order extending the

discovery and motions deadlines and Gold Dust’s motion to dismiss Smith’s

complaint, Gold Dust made no effort to inform the district court of Smith’s

noncompliance. 

When determining whether or not to dismiss a case with prejudice a district

court should first “consider whether any less-severe sanction could adequately remedy

the effect of the delay on the court and the prejudice to the opposing party.” Mann v.

Baumer, 108 F.3d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1997). The record does not show that the district

court gave adequate consideration to a less-severe sanction. Indeed, Appellees

requested as an alternative to dismissing the action that the district court issue an order

compelling Smith to comply with discovery. By the time the district court considered

Gold Dust’s motion to dismiss, Smith had found counsel willing to take his case

contingent upon Smith obtaining a continuance of the trial date. In these

circumstances, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the action cannot be approved. 

While parties who do not comply with court orders may face sanctions, we

reiterate that “the punishment should fit the crime, and not every instance of failure

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to comply with an order of [the] court, however inexcusable, justifies total extinction

of a client’s cause of action.” Givens, 751 F.2d at 263. We conclude that the district

court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice Smith’s complaint. 

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s dismissal of this case and remand with

instructions that the district court reinstate the case for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

______________________________

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