Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00870/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00870-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ellis Akwiwu
Plaintiff
State of Alabama Department of Youth Services
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ELLIS AKWIWU,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF ALABAMA 

DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH 

SERVICES,

Defendant.

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CASE NO. 2:13-CV-870-WKW

 [WO] 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ellis Akwiwu sues his former employer, Defendant Alabama 

Department of Youth Services (“DYS”), for national origin discrimination, hostile 

work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964 as amended. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Before the court is DYS’s motion 

for summary judgment (Docs. # 19, 20, 21), which has been fully briefed (Docs. 

# 23, 28). Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the evidence, and the 

relevant law, the court finds that the motion is due to be granted.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Personal jurisdiction and venue 

are uncontested.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the 

inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. JeanBaptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010).

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes 

identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute 

of material fact. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Or, the movant can assert, 

without citing the record, that the nonmoving party “cannot produce admissible 

evidence to support” a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the movant 

meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish – with 

evidence beyond the pleadings – that a genuine dispute material to each of its 

claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine dispute of material 

fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable fact 

finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).

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III. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

1. Employment History and Alleged Discriminatory Treatment

DYS is a state agency which operates juvenile correctional facilities and 

provides educational services to the youths in its custody. Mr. Akwiwu was hired 

as a DYS Child Care Worker in 1990. A native of Nigeria with a “pronounced and 

strong” accent (Second Am. Compl., at ¶ 9), Mr. Akwiwu alleges that he was 

discriminated against repeatedly during his employment by “fellow staff and 

supervisors,” some of the latter of whom are named in his second amended 

complaint, (Second Am. Compl., at ¶ 9 (identifying James Tyler, Robert Lee, 

Victor Black and Ms. Byrdsong). No fellow staff members (i.e., non-supervisors) 

are identified by name as his antagonists in the pleading. Nor did Mr. Akwiwu 

name them during his deposition when asked for names. (See Akwiwu Dep. at 85–

88.) He simply testified that “every[ ]day” people “call [him] names” – although 

he did not describe or identify those names – and told him, “We cannot understand 

your Nigerian accent.” (Akwiwu Dep. at 85–86.) Mr. Akwiwu further claims that 

he was subjected to disparate treatment in disciplinary matters during his tenure on 

the basis of his race and national origin1and that DYS authorities subjected him to 

unwarranted “write-ups, warnings, reprimands, and a demotion.” (Second Am. 

 

1

The EEOC Charge of Discrimination and Mr. Akwiwu’s Opposition Brief assert 

national origin discrimination claims only. (Docs. # 20-4, 23.)

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Compl., at ¶ 9). Mr. Akwiwu has an extensive disciplinary record, but he does not 

believe that he was disciplined justly.

Mr. Akwiwu filed a previous Title VII lawsuit in 2001 in the Middle District 

of Alabama against DYS. DYS prevailed at summary judgment on February 18, 

2003. (See Doc. # 20-38.) Two of the persons identified in the second amended 

complaint (Mr. Tyler and Mr. Lee) were Mr. Akwiwu’s supervisors around or 

during the time that the prior civil suit was pending. Two other supervisors (Mr. 

Black and Ms. Byrdsong) supervised Mr. Akwiwu in 2010 and 2011, respectively. 

Mr. Black allegedly sent troubled students to a dorm that Mr. Akwiwu formerly 

managed and undermined Mr. Akwiwu’s authority there. (See Second Am. 

Compl., at ¶ 9). Ms. Byrdsong allegedly wrote up Mr. Akwiwu for an incident that

Mr. Akwiwu claims could not have occurred as reported because Mr. Akwiwu was 

off work that day. He further claims that DYS demoted him but allowed an 

unnamed comparator to be reassigned to a different facility in lieu of demotion. 

(See Second Am. Compl., at ¶ 9). The person responsible for deciding to 

recommend a demotion is not identified by name.

DYS represents that on March 31, 2012, Mr. Akwiwu indeed was demoted 

from Counselor I to Child Care Worker because he failed to properly perform the 

duties of his job. Mr. Akwiwu contested his demotion before the State Personnel 

Board (“the Board”). The Board affirmed the demotion on July 9, 2012. (See Doc. 

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# 20-2.) DYS contends that the Board has authority to consider any charges of 

unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII and that Mr. Akwiwu failed to file 

a charge of discrimination with the EEOC “within thirty days after receiving notice 

that the [Board] ha[d] terminated [its] proceedings,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Mr. Akwiwu submitted a charge of discrimination to the EEOC, which the 

EEOC received on December 31, 2012. (See Doc. # 20-4.) In the charge, Mr. 

Akwiwu complained that he had been constantly harassed by supervisors, denied 

requests to use his leave or lost time earned, given low performance evaluations, 

falsely accused of infractions of DYS rules, and demoted. (Doc. # 20-4.) Mr. 

Akwiwu checked the box for “national origin” as the basis of the discriminatory 

treatment, and identified June 18, 2012, and November 30, 2012, as the earliest 

and the latest dates of discriminatory treatment. He also indicated that the 

discriminatory treatment was ongoing because he checked the “continuing action” 

box. (See Doc. # 20-4.) Assuming that Mr. Akwiwu was not obligated to lodge a 

charge of discrimination with the EEOC within thirty days of the Board’s final 

decision to uphold Mr. Akwiwu’s demotion, DYS argues that the charge was still 

untimely because it was not “filed within one hundred and eighty days after the 

alleged unlawful employment practice[s] occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

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2. Alleged Retaliation

On June 22, 2013, Mr. Akwiwu was caught on camera sleeping on-the-job 

while two youths under his supervision attempted to escape from DYS’s Mt. Meigs 

Campus. After the incident, DYS also determined that Mr. Akwiwu falsely 

reported that he conducted a head count shortly after awaking. The June incident 

occurred within one month of DYS’s issuance to Mr. Akwiwu of a prior written 

warning on May 28, 2013, for sleeping on the job on May 24, 2013. Mr. Akwiwu 

has maintained that he was not asleep. Mr. Black, as acting campus administrator 

at Mt. Meigs, set the June 22, 2013 incident for a fact-finding hearing in late July, 

2013. (See Doc. # 20-15 (letter dated July 11, 2013)). 

On September 4, 2013, upon a recommendation that Mr. Akwiwu be 

suspended or fired, Executive Director J. Walter Wood notified Mr. Akwiwu that a 

disciplinary hearing was set for September 17, 2013. (Doc. # 20-16.) DYS issued 

Mr. Wood’s letter within days of the EEOC’s issuance of a notice of right to sue 

letter on August 28, 2013. (See Doc. # 23-1, at 2.) Without acknowledging that 

DYS had already begun investigating the June 22, 2013 incident, Mr. Akwiwu 

asserts that DYS set the disciplinary hearing in retaliation for the EEOC’s issuance 

of the notice of right to sue letter a few days earlier. 

DYS’s administrative hearing was continued, per Mr. Akwiwu’s counsel’s 

request, to January 14, 2014. On February 4, 2014, DYS terminated Mr. 

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Akwiwu’s employment. Mr. Akwiwu filed a second charge of discrimination with 

the EEOC on February 20, 2014, alleging retaliatory termination for his 

engagement in protected activity. The Board upheld DYS’s decision on April 24, 

2014.

B. Judicial Complaint and Proceedings

On November 27, 2013, Mr. Akwiwu filed this suit. At that time, 

disciplinary action by DYS for sleeping on the job had yet to be completed. After 

the termination had become final in February 2014, Mr. Akwiwu filed his second 

amended complaint on April 14, 2014. The pleading alleges that DYS subjected 

Mr. Akwiwu to discrimination on the basis of national origin, a hostile work 

environment,2and retaliation for engagement in protected activity. DYS seeks 

summary judgment on all claims.

Mr. Akwiwu failed to timely respond to the motion for summary judgment 

in compliance with the court’s general briefing order and uniform scheduling 

order. When he did respond, DYS moved to strike his response, but the court 

denied the motion to strike. However, as a sanction, the court awarded DYS its 

costs incurred in bringing the matter to the court’s attention (see Doc. # 27), but 

DYS has not filed a statement accounting for its costs, as directed by the order.

 

2

There is no separate count for hostile work environment. The allegation is included in 

paragraph nine of the second amended complaint.

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. National Origin-Based Discrimination

DYS offers multiple bases for summary judgment in its favor on Mr. 

Akwiwu’s disparate treatment discrimination claims. (See Doc. # 20, at 6–10; 16–

17 (asserting that certain claims are time-barred, not administratively exhausted, 

and precluded by res judicata).) Mr. Akwiwu does not responsively engage with 

DYS’s arguments, but instead asserts generally that he was repeatedly 

discriminated against on the basis of his Nigerian origin.

1. Claims Not Timely Raised in EEOC Charge of Discrimination

First, DYS argues that all of Mr. Akwiwu’s discrimination claims are timebarred. Title VII provides:

A charge [with the EEOC] . . . shall be filed within one hundred and 

eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred 

and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances 

of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the 

person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, 

except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect 

to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with 

a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such 

practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon 

receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of 

the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged 

unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after 

receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the 

proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a 

copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State 

or local agency.

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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (emphases added). “A plaintiff may not sue under 

Title VII . . . unless he first exhausts administrative remedies by filing a timely 

charge of discrimination with the EEOC.” Street v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 822 

F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1364 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (citing Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 

F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001)). The requirement of timeliness is usually 

stringent. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (“[S]trict 

adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best 

guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.”).

DYS asserts that the discriminatory acts complained of were filed in an 

EEOC charge more than thirty days after the Board upheld Mr. Akwiwu’s 

demotion, or alternatively, more than 180 days after the alleged unlawful 

employment practices occurred. (Doc. # 20, at 7 (citing § 2000e-5(e)(1)).) The

Board had authority to grant relief from discriminatory mistreatment, see Ala. 

Admin. Code r. 670-X-4-.03,

3

and Mr. Akwiwu instituted proceedings with the 

Board when he appealed his demotion and raised allegations of discrimination 

 

3

That rule provides that

[a]ny applicant or employee who has reason to believe that he has been 

discriminated against because of religious or political opinions or affiliations or 

race, sex, national origin, age, or handicap in any personnel action may appeal to 

the State Personnel Board. The appellant and the person responsible for the 

alleged discriminatory action shall have the right to be heard by the Board or a 

special hearing agent and to present evidence. If the Board finds after hearing 

that there was discrimination on any of the above nonmerit factors, it shall order 

appropriate corrective action and its decision shall be final.

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based on national origin, disparate treatment, and a pattern of harassment and 

hostility. (See Doc. # 20-3 (Letter to State Personnel Director).) Hence, § 2000e5(e)(1) required Mr. Akwiwu to lodge his complaints of discrimination with the 

EEOC within thirty days of the Board’s July 9, 2012 decision upholding the

demotion, and the charge of discrimination received by the EEOC on December 

31, 2012 was untimely.

Further, DYS emphasizes that the same enforcement statute calls upon the 

complaining party to identify “discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act[s]” and the 

dates of such acts in his EEOC charge of discrimination. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002). Neither the second amended 

complaint nor Mr. Akwiwu’s testimony and evidence identify any discrete acts of 

discrimination occurring within 180 days of December 31, 2012, save the final 

Board decision to uphold Mr. Akwiwu’s demotion. Assuming that the previously 

cited thirty-day period discussed above is inapplicable, DYS argues that Mr. 

Akwiwu’s complaint of discriminatory demotion also falls outside of the 180-day 

window for filing a charge because Mr. Akwiwu’s demotion was effective in 

March 2012.

Upon consideration of these arguments, the court finds that Mr. Akwiwu 

failed to timely file his charges of national origin discrimination with the EEOC. 

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Consequently, his judicial claim of national origin discrimination is due to be 

dismissed.4

2. No Prima Facie Case

Assuming that Mr. Akwiwu could show that his national origin 

discrimination claims were timely and properly raised before the EEOC, DYS also 

asserts that Mr. Akwiwu fails to make a prima facie case of discrimination. (See

Doc. # 19, at ¶¶ 6–7.) The essence of Mr. Akwiwu’s discrimination claim is that 

“he has been subjected to numerous disciplinary actions that are without merit.” 

(Second Am. Compl., at ¶ 9.) Although “[t]he methods of presenting a prima facie 

case . . . are flexible and depend to a large degree upon the employment situation,” 

Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004), a plaintiff

typically makes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) he belongs to 

 

4 DYS contends that some of Mr. Akwiwu’s allegations in the second amended complaint 

– e.g., that he was subjected to unwarranted warnings and reprimands, that his work schedule 

was changed arbitrarily and unfairly by Mr. Lee, that Mr. Black undermined his authority in a 

certain dorm, and that DYS disciplined an unnamed employee more leniently – were not 

specifically raised in his EEOC charge and therefore not administratively exhausted. (Doc. # 20, 

at 8–9.) In light of the court’s conclusion that no claims of discrimination were timely and 

discretely raised before the EEOC, this argument is moot.

DYS also raises a limited res judicata defense. Mr. Akwiwu’s prior lawsuit identified 

specific complaints of discrimination against Mr. Lee and Mr. Tyler. (See Doc. # 20-37 (Plf.’s 

Second Am. Compl. filed Feb. 14, 2002).) DYS represents that Mr. Lee resigned his 

employment with DYS in 2003 shortly after final judgment was entered in DYS’s favor. 

Similarly, DYS contends that Mr. Tyler was Mr. Akwiwu’s supervisor from 1999–2000. Hence, 

DYS asserts that the allegations in the present suit involving Mr. Lee and Mr. Tyler are barred by 

res judicata because the claims were – or could have been – litigated in the prior case. (Doc. 

# 20, at 17.) Again, because it apparent that no claims of discrimination were timely and 

discretely raised before the EEOC prior to the filing of this suit, consideration of the res judicata

defense is moot. But the res judicata defense appears to have merit.

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a protected class; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) the 

employer treated similarly situated employees outside of his class more favorably; 

and (4) he was qualified for his position. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 

(11th Cir. 1997). 

Mr. Akwiwu cites a comparable standard for what constitutes a prima facie 

case (see Doc. # 23, at 6), but he does not present any evidence that non-Nigerian 

employees of DYS have been treated more favorably than himself. (See Doc. 

# 23-1.) Hence, Mr. Akwiwu fails to meet his obligation to cite “particular parts of 

materials in the record” showing that there is a genuine dispute whether DYS 

disparately applied its disciplinary policies to him. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

Assuming arguendo that Mr. Akwiwu properly exhausted his administrative 

remedies prior to filing his suit, the court finds DYS’s motion for summary 

judgment is nevertheless due to be granted on the merits.

B. Hostile Work Environment

DYS raises multiple arguments in support of its motion for summary 

judgment on Mr. Akwiwu’s hostile work environment claim. Again, Mr. 

Akwiwu’s brief is basically unresponsive.

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1. Claims Not Timely Raised in the EEOC Charge of Discrimination

or Otherwise Not Administratively Exhausted

DYS argues that Mr. Akwiwu failed to timely raise his allegations of hostile 

work environment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) because he did not 

specify in his EEOC charge which allegations related to the allegedly hostile work 

environment. (Doc. # 19, at ¶ 1.) While a plaintiff should be able to identify his 

employer’s discrete, discriminatory actions by date (for example, the day he was 

reprimanded, suspended, demoted, or discharged), a hostile work environment 

claim is often based on ongoing workplace harassment, which Mr. Akwiwu’s 

Charge claims was “constant” and “continuing” through November 2012. (Doc. 

# 20-4.) DYS does not explain why the hostile environment claim should not be 

saved by the continuing violation doctrine, which creates an exception to 

Title VII’s timely filing requirement. See Malone v. K-Mart Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 

1287, 1300–01 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (distinguishing discrete instances of 

discriminatory conduct from an ongoing pattern of workplace harassment).

DYS also asserts that Mr. Akwiwu’s judicial complaint includes allegations 

that he was harassed by fellow coworkers while the EEOC Charge attributes

harassment only to “supervisors.” (See Doc. # 20-4.) Therefore, DYS claims that 

the hostile work environment claim, as it relates to coworker harassment, was not 

exhausted with the EEOC. However, DYS’s position fails to acknowledge the 

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well-settled standard that a judicial complaint is bound “by the scope of the EEOC 

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of 

discrimination.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th 

Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs typically file charges of discrimination without the assistance

of counsel. Hence, courts are encouraged to construe charges of discrimination 

liberally and to permit Title VII plaintiffs to seek judicial redress when their 

judicial allegations are “like or related to the allegations contained in the charge.” 

Id. (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970)). 

For these reasons, DYS’s arguments are not well taken, and the court will 

not dismiss Mr. Akwiwu’s complaint of hostile work environment for failure to 

timely file his charge of discrimination or for failure to exhaust his administrative 

remedies with the EEOC.

2. No Prima Facie Case

DYS also argues that Mr. Akwiwu’s hostile work environment claim must 

be dismissed because, like his discrimination claim, he cannot make a prima facie 

case.

[A] plaintiff wishing to establish a hostile work environment claim 

[must] show: (1) that he belongs to a protected group; (2) that he has 

been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment must 

have been based on a protected characteristic of the employee, such as 

national origin; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create 

a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the 

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employer is responsible for such environment under either a theory of 

vicarious or of direct liability.

Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). DYS 

contests elements (2)–(5), asserting that there was no harassment, that Mr. Akwiwu 

lacks evidence that the alleged harassment was based on his national origin, that 

the harassment was not severe enough to create a hostile environment, and that 

there is no legal basis for holding DYS liable for the harassment. (Doc. # 20, 

at 11.)

When asked about his subjection to harassment, Mr. Akwiwu said that 

“every[ ]day” unnamed people in the workplace “call[ed] [him] names” – he did 

not say what those names were – and told him repeatedly that they could not 

understand his “Nigerian accent.” (Akwiwu Dep., at 85.) He also testified that 

when speaking to his former supervisors, he always had to repeat himself. Because

he speaks English, he believes people should have no difficulty understanding him. 

(Akwiwu Dep., at 86–87.) Mr. Akwiwu says that being told that he could not be 

understood and having to repeat himself was embarrassing.5

Other federal courts have allowed hostile work environment claims to 

proceed where a plaintiff was ridiculed for having a foreign accent. For example, 

 

5 DYS is baffled that Mr. Akwiwu has admitted in his pleading that he has a heavy accent 

but complains that colleagues asked him to repeat himself. (Doc. # 20, at 14.) It does not matter 

whether Mr. Akwiwu has contradicted himself concerning the existence or non-existence of his 

accent. The relevant question is whether Mr. Akwiwu’s testimony about the response of others 

to his manner of speech is adequate to support a finding that he was subjected to unwelcome 

harassment on the basis of his national origin. 

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in Costantin v. New York City Fire Dep’t, Case No. 06 CIV. 04631GBDTHK, 

2009 WL 3053851 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2009), the court considered a plaintiff’s 

complaint that her supervisor humiliated, harassed, and ridiculed her by demanding 

that she read her written reports aloud in front of coworkers so that they could 

laugh at her Brazilian accent and peculiar pronunciation of certain words. Id.

at *19. The court noted that “[t]he EEOC ‘defines national origin discrimination 

broadly as including’ unequal treatment ‘because an individual has the physical, 

cultural[,] or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.’” Id. (quoting 29 

C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2005)). The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s testimony about 

her supervisor’s ridicule could support a finding that the employer created a hostile 

work environment on the basis of the plaintiff’s national origin.6

Additionally, in the context of disparate treatment claims, the Eleventh 

Circuit has said that “[c]omments about [a plaintiff’s] accent may indicate 

discrimination based on one’s national origin.” Albert-Aluya v. Burlington Coat 

Factory Warehouse Corp., 470 F. App’x 847, 851 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Akouri 

 

6

See also Levitant v. City of New York Human Res. Admin., 625 F. Supp. 2d 85, 97

(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff 

complained that supervisors “disparaged his national origin, mocked his Russian accent, [and] 

instructed him not to conduct telephone calls in his native Russian”). But see Edmond v. Univ. of 

Miami, 441 F. App’x 721, 725 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment on hostile 

environment claim where a coworker or supervisor – it is unclear which – reminded the plaintiff 

that he had a Haitian accent and embarrassed the plaintiff by asking others to interpret for him); 

Prado v. L. Luria & Son, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1349, 1355–56 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (granting 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment in spite of plaintiff’s allegations that defendant’s 

supervisors mocked employees who had heavy accents, prohibited employees from speaking 

Spanish, and prohibited persons with heavy accents from answering phones or using a public 

address system).

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v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 2005)). Hence, the 

court concludes that disparaging remarks about Mr. Akwiwu’s accent potentially 

could constitute harassment on the basis of his national origin.

But the fourth element of a hostile work environment claim is a high hurdle: 

Mr. Akwiwu must show that he was subjected to harassment that was severe or 

pervasive. The alleged harassment must be both subjectively and objectively 

severe. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 

That means that Mr. Akwiwu personally must have perceived the alleged 

harassment to have been so severe that it altered the terms or conditions of his 

employment,

7

and his perception must have been objectively reasonable in view of 

“all the circumstances.” Id. Four factors are helpful in determining whether 

harassment was objectively severe: “(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the 

severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or 

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct 

unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance.” Id.

Mr. Akwiwu has vaguely testified that “[s]ome” – perhaps even “most” – of 

the DYS staff called him unidentified “names” and told him that they could not 

understand his “Nigerian accent.” (Akwiwu Dep. at 85–86.) He claimed that he 

 

7 DYS contends that the alleged harassment “cannot possib[ly] be perceived as . . . 

subjectively abusive” (Doc. # 20, at 14), but it is hard to contend against a plaintiff’s testimony 

of his subjective perception unless that testimony is impeachable. DYS’s argument is rejected at 

this juncture.

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could identify some of the perpetrators, but declined to actually offer their names. 

(Akwiwu Dep. at 86.) He also complained that his supervisors required him to 

repeat himself. (Akwiwu Dep. at 86–87.) Mr. Akwiwu claims that this made him 

feel embarrassed and humiliated, but it is not clear from his testimony whether 

others were ridiculing him for his accent and national origin or just expressing their 

difficulty understanding his speech.8

Applying the four factors, Mr. Akwiwu was confronted about his accent on a 

daily basis, so the alleged harassment was frequent. But as for the degree of 

severity, it is difficult to determine from the record whether coworkers or 

supervisors spoke to Mr. Akwiwu in a demeaning or derogatory manner or whether 

they simply expressed their inability to understand him.9 Even if coworkers or 

 

8

Furthermore, Mr. Akwiwu’s deposition testimony appears to conflate disparate 

treatment with hostile work environment. (See, e.g., Akwiwu Dep. at 87–89 (complaining about 

being given leave without pay as opposed to being allowed to use sick or annual leave hours, or 

being assigned to maintain order among the youths in a certain dormitory without any staff 

assistance).) Mr. Akwiwu’s testimony does not associate this alleged disparate treatment with 

any person’s indication of hostility about Mr. Akwiwu’s national origin, and therefore, it is not 

considered in this hostile work environment analysis.

9 Cf. Yili Tseng v. Florida A & M Univ., 380 F. App’x 908, 909–10 (11th Cir. 2010). 

There, the Taiwanese plaintiff attempted to prove direct evidence of discrimination for failure to 

promote him by offering “several comments by his supervisors in annual evaluations and in 

faculty meetings that ‘language [was] a challenge for him’ and that he needed to ‘work on his 

English skills.’” The court rejected these remarks as evidence of direct discrimination because 

“an employee’s heavy accent or difficulty with spoken English can be a legitimate basis for 

adverse employment action where effective communication skills are reasonably related to job 

performance.” Id. at 909. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished these supervisors’ comments from 

cases where harassers made “blatant remarks,” “mock[ed] [the plaintiff’s] accent” or “ma[de] 

disparaging remarks about” the plaintiff’s nationality. Id. at 909–10. Thus, it is important to 

distinguish honest criticism (e.g., “I cannot understand what you are saying”) from national 

origin-based hostility.

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supervisors were rude when they told Mr. Akwiwu that they could not understand 

him, “[d]iscourtesy or rudeness should not be confused with [national originbased] harassment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). 

Furthermore, without knowing what “names” Mr. Akwiwu was called, it is 

impossible to discern the severity of any alleged name-calling. Next, there is no 

indication that the harassment involved threats of physical violence, but because 

the comments were critical of Mr. Akwiwu’s accent, and by association, his

Nigerian origin, see Albert-Aluya, 470 F. App’x at 851, it was objectively 

reasonable for Mr. Akwiwu to feel humiliated.10 Lastly, DYS points out that when 

it pressed Mr. Akwiwu to describe an instance of harassment that caused him to be 

unable to perform his job well, he responded that “[he] was performing [his] job 

. . . like any other person.” (Akwiwu Dep. at 82.) However, a fair reading of the 

deposition transcript shows that Mr. Akwiwu may not have understood defense 

counsel’s question. (See Akwiwu Dep. at 82 (“There’s nothing. There’s no 

incident. There’s no sickness that made me not perform my job.”).) Hence, the 

record is unclear as to whether Mr. Akwiwu claims that his job performance 

suffered as a result of the alleged spoken harassment.

 

10 Consider a person with a speech impediment. Even if others are kind and respectful to 

him about the existence of his impediment, he nevertheless feels some degree of embarrassment. 

Hence, whether others were cruel to Mr. Akwiwu or not, it is objectively reasonable that he felt 

humiliated about others’ reactions to his accent.

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Upon consideration of the four factors and the totality of the circumstances, 

and viewing Mr. Akwiwu’s testimony in the light most favorable to him, the record 

evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Mr. Akwiwu’s coworkers or 

supervisors subjected him to harassment that was severe or pervasive as a matter of 

law. Mr. Akwiwu’s deposition testimony raises as many questions as it offers 

answers, and his opposition brief provides no analysis on how the evidence is 

sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case of hostile work environment. It is Mr. 

Akwiwu’s burden to make a prima facie case, see Freeman v. City of Riverdale, 

330 F. App’x 863, 865 (11th Cir. 2009), and DYS has properly employed summary 

judgment to show that Mr. Akwiwu “cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support” a case of hostile work environment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).

Consequently, DYS’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted 

with respect to Mr. Akwiwu’s hostile work environment claim.11

C. Retaliation

DYS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Akwiwu’s 

complaint of retaliatory discharge because Mr. Akwiwu cannot make a prima facie 

case of retaliation, and even if he could, he cannot rebut DYS’s legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for firing him.

 

11 In the absence of thorough briefing, the court declines to address whether Mr. Akwiwu 

can establish the fifth element, i.e., a basis for holding DYS liable for the allegedly hostile work 

environment.

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1. No Prima Facie Case

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff 

must show (1) that [he] engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that [he]

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some causal relation 

between the two events.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 

(11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff may meet his 

burden of showing causation if there is “close temporal proximity between the 

statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action.” However,

“temporal proximity, without more, must be very close.” Id. at 1364.

Mr. Akwiwu relies on close temporal proximity. (Doc. # 23, at 5, 11.) As 

alleged in the second amended complaint, the retaliation claim is partially

premised upon Mr. Akwiwu’s allegation that he engaged in statutorily protected 

activity when the EEOC issued its notice of right to sue letter on August 28, 2013, 

almost nine months after he filed his charge of discrimination. (See Second Am. 

Compl., at ¶ 7.) Mr. Akwiwu posits that Mr. Wood’s issuance of a letter on 

September 4, 2013, scheduling a hearing on the recommendation that Mr. Akwiwu 

be suspended or dismissed from his job, is causally related to the EEOC’s letter. 

DYS protests that Mr. Akwiwu did not engage in protected activity by passively 

receiving the EEOC’s issuance of a notice of right to sue letter. (Doc. # 20, at 18 

(citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam).) 

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The objection is well taken. In Clark County School District, the Supreme 

Court rejected in dicta a litigant’s “utterly implausible suggestion that the EEOC’s 

issuance of a right-to-sue letter – an action in which the employee takes no part – is 

a protected activity of the employee.” Id. at 273. The Supreme Court also 

explained that “[e]mployers need not suspend previously planned [actions] upon 

discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines 

previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence 

whatever of causality.” Id. Here, as DYS points out, disciplinary action against 

Mr. Akwiwu was ongoing and did not begin or end with Mr. Wood’s letter on 

September 4, 2013. (See Doc. # 20-15; see also Doc. # 20, at 20 (asserting that 

Mr. Wood’s letter merely set a hearing and did not mete out final discipline).) 

Eliminating from consideration the EEOC’s issuance of the notice of right to sue 

letter, Mr. Akwiwu most recently had engaged in protected activity upon filing his 

EEOC charge on December 31, 2012, and there is insufficiently close temporal 

proximity between that date and any allegedly retaliatory employment action, 

particularly his termination in February 2014.

12

 

12 Additionally, DYS asserts that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in University 

of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), “Title VII retaliation 

claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation.” Id. at 2533. 

“This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the 

alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Id. DYS argues that because Mr. Akwiwu 

continued to commit disciplinable infractions, he cannot show that but for his filing of his charge 

of discrimination, he would have kept his job. While this argument is sound, it anticipates and 

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Mr. Akwiwu thus fails to make the requisite causal connection on the basis 

of close temporal proximity. Because there is no evidence causally connecting Mr. 

Akwiwu’s engagement in protected activity with an adverse employment action, 

Mr. Akwiwu fails to make a prima facie case of retaliation.

2. Legitimate, Nonretaliatory Reason Not Rebutted

Even if Mr. Akwiwu could make a prima facie case of retaliation, he does 

not rebut DYS’s reason for the termination as pretext. After a plaintiff makes his 

prima facie case, the employer may “articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason 

for the challenged employment action as an affirmative defense to liability. The 

plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving retaliation by a preponderance of the 

evidence and that the reason provided by the employer is a pretext for prohibited 

retaliatory conduct.” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th 

Cir. 2008). In this case, DYS asserts that Mr. Akwiwu lost his job because he slept 

on the job while youths attempted to escape and falsely reported conducting a head 

count upon awaking.

In response, Mr. Akwiwu contends that DYS’s reason for terminating 

employment is “subjective.” (Doc. # 23, at 8.) By calling the reason subjective, 

Mr. Akwiwu continues to advance his narrative that he never slept on the job, and 

he proposes that DYS’s proffered reason cannot be conclusively proven and 

 

essentially duplicates DYS’s proffered legitimate nonretaliatory reason for terminating Mr. 

Akwiwu’s employment, which is addressed separately infra.

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therefore is illegitimate. DYS’s video evidence supports its belief that Mr. 

Akwiwu slept while youths fled his supervision, but even if it that evidence did not 

exist, Mr. Akwiwu has not contested DYS’s ancillary conclusion that he failed to 

actually conduct a head count upon awaking. Moreover, “subjective reasons are 

not the red-headed stepchildren of proffered nondiscriminatory explanations for 

employment decisions. Subjective reasons can be just as valid as objective 

reasons,” so long as they are “clear and reasonably specific.” Chapman v. AI 

Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Here, DYS’s reason for 

terminating Mr. Akwiwu has been clearly articulated with a “specific factual 

basis,” and this court must not second-guess an honest reason that would motivate 

a reasonable employer. Id. at 1030, 1034.

Mr. Akwiwu also suggests that DYS’s reason should be disbelieved because 

Mr. Akwiwu “has a history of complaint[s] against DYS, including [an] EEOC 

charge and civil rights litigation.” (Doc. # 23, at 8.) In other words, he claims that 

DYS should be suspected of looking for a reason to fire him. But to successfully 

rebut the reason as pretextual, Mr. Akwiwu is required to confront DYS’s reason 

“head on.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. This argument evades the requisite head 

on rebuttal. Hence, even if Mr. Akwiwu could make a prima facie case of 

retaliation, he has not shown that DYS’s stated reason for terminating his 

employment is a pretext for retaliation. 

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For these reasons, DYS’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted 

as to Mr. Akwiwu’s claim of retaliation.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, no Title VII claim survives. In accordance with the foregoing 

analysis, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 

# 19) is GRANTED.

A separate final judgment will be entered.

DONE this 15th day of October, 2014.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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