Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00029/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00029-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carolyn Long
Plaintiff
R & L Foods
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CAROLYN LONG, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-29-WKW

) [WO]

R & L FOODS, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This straightforward slip-and-fall case arose when Plaintiff Carolyn Long fell

and broke her hip at a Wendy’s restaurant. Ms. Long claims Defendant R & L Foods,

LLC, should pay for her injuries because restaurant employees failed to clean up an

alleged slippery substance that caused her fall. She brings this action to recover for

her injuries. R & L Foods, contending Ms. Long cannot show a genuine dispute of

any material fact, moved for summary judgment. (Doc. # 20.) But upon

consideration of the parties’ arguments (Docs. # 21, 33, 37) and the relevant law,

summary judgment on all counts is not warranted here.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The parties contest neither personal

jurisdiction nor venue.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the

inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 

Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010). 

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying

the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material

fact. Id. If the movant meets its evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to establish – with evidence beyond the pleadings – that a genuine

dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Id. at 324. A genuine dispute

of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a

reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental

Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). 

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

One spring day last year, Plaintiff Carolyn Long stepped into a crowded

Wendy’s restaurant during the lunch hour to use the facilities. She did not get far,

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however, before she slipped and fell, breaking her hip. Ms. Long does not know what

she slipped on. But she admits she never saw any water on the floor (or any other

substance, for that matter) that might have caused her fall.

As Ms. Long remembersit, the weather was dry that day. (Doc. # 20-1, at 17. ) 1

A cook at the restaurant, however, remembers that it had rained earlier that morning,

though the rain had stopped by 9:00 a.m. (Doc. # 33-3, at 9–10.) There is no

evidence the cook knew if the ground outside was still wet when Ms. Long came into

the restaurant. No one saw anything on the floor that might have caused Ms. Long

to slip, not even the assistant manager on duty who checked the floor immediately

after the fall. (Doc. # 33, at 6.)

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Summary judgment is due on Ms. Long’s premises liability claims.

The first two counts of Ms. Long’s complaint proceed on a theory of premises

liability, which would require her to prove three elements at trial: “[1] that her fall

resulted from a defect or instrumentality located on the premises, [2] that the fall was

a result of [R&L Foods’] negligence, and [3] that [R&L Foods] had or should have

 All evidentiary citations refer to the page numbers assigned by the court’s electronic 1

case management system, not the numbering of the original document.

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had notice of the defect or instrumentality before the accident.” Logan v. Winn-Dixie

Atlanta, Inc., 594 So. 2d 83, 84 (Ala. 1992). Ms. Long cannot get past the first.

Much of the evidence Ms. Long cites in opposition to summary judgment is

little more than speculation. For example, when pressed at his deposition, the cook

admitted “it was possible that water got tracked inside.” (Doc. # 33, at 2.) But a

thoughtful deponent must virtually always give an affirmative answer to a question

beginning with ‘is it possible that.” As Judge Posner has noted, “[T]here are no

metaphysical certainties.” Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th

Cir. 1994) (recognizing a possibility that “elves may have played ninepins with [a]

jar of peanuts while [the plaintiff and his roommate] were sleeping”). But that is why

Ms. Long must show more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”

if she hopes to defeatsummary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). All this to say, Ms. Long cannot create a triable issue of fact that water

got tracked into the store by pressing a deponent who lacks any firsthand knowledge

into admitting the possibility.

Other than evidence of what certain witnessesthink is possible, Ms. Long only

has one piece of evidence from which it might be suggested there may have been a

slippery substance on the floor of the restaurant when she fell: the cook’s testimony

that it had rained earlier that morning. That evidence, standing alone, cannot defeat

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summary judgment; otherwise, every fall on a rainy day would present a triable claim

for premises liability. The cook’s testimony, which does not indicate that it was

raining when Ms. Long entered the restaurant – or even that the ground outside was

still wet at the time – is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude the

restaurant floor was wet.

Ms. Long does, however, suggest direct evidence that might be sufficient to

defeat summary judgment if only it were admissible. Ms. Long claims that “she was

informed by the paramedics that attended her injuries that water was present all over

the area where she fell.” (Doc. # 33, at 2.) But thatstatement isinadmissible hearsay,

see Fed. R. Evid. 802, and counsel for Ms. Long informed the court at the pretrial

hearing that the paramedics no longer recall the incident and cannot be witnesses. 

Thus, no admissible evidence suggests anyone ever saw anything that might have

caused Ms. Long to slip and fall.

Ms. Long has not submitted sufficient evidence in support of her premisesliability claims to show there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly,

summary judgment is proper on Counts I and II.

B. Ms. Long’s negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim survives.

Count III of Ms. Long’s complaint does not proceed on a theory of premises

liability – at least, not directly. Instead, Ms. Long’s third cause of action proceeds on

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a theory of “negligent hiring, training and supervision.” (Doc. # 1-5, at 4.) Although

this theory is obviously similar to Ms. Long’s premises-liability claims, it is distinct

in important respects. For instance, CountsI and II accuse R & L Foods of breaching

a “duty to keep its premises in a reasonabl[y] safe condition” (Doc. # 1-5 ¶¶ 14, 18),

while Count III alleges R&L Foods breached a “duty to hire, train, supervise, and/or

monitor its agent(s), and employee(s) on keeping reasonably safe premises for

persons shopping thereon” (Doc. # 1-5 ¶ 24).

On summary judgment, the movant “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

323. As discussed above, R & L Foods’ motion met that burden on Counts I and II

by setting out the elements of proof for Ms. Long’s premises liability claims,

identifying which element she could not prove, and explaining why not with citations

to authority. 

R & L Foods’ motion does not, however, do more than mention Ms. Long’s

other theory, and that only once. In fact, this is all R & L Foods’ motion has to say

on the subject: “Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint . . . asserting the

following theories of liability . . . Count Three – Negligence in the hiring, training

and supervision of defendant’s employees on keeping reasonably safe premises for

persons shopping thereon.” (Doc. # 21, at 2–3.) The motion does not identify the

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elements of proof for Count III; it does not identify which element Ms. Long cannot

prove; it does not explain why not; and it cites no authority to that effect.

That is not to say the court is blind to the implications of its ruling on Ms.

Long’s premises liability claims. Because Ms. Long, has not presented sufficient

evidence to show R & L Foods’ premises were actually unsafe, it is hard to imagine

how she could prove her injuries were cause by the negligent hiring, training, and

supervision she alleges. But it is not the court’s role to make arguments in support

of R & L Foods’ motion. Because nothing in the motion for summary judgment

informs the court of a proper basis for summary judgment on Count III, the motion

is due to be denied to the extent it seeks such relief. 

V. CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED that R & L Foods’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 20) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

(1) With respect to Counts I and II of Ms. Long’s complaint, the motion is

GRANTED;

(2) With respect to Count III of Ms. Long’s complaint, the motion is

DENIED;

(3) This case is REMOVED from the trial docket and CONTINUED

generally; and

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(4) Defendant is granted leave to supplement its motion for summary

judgment on or before March 6, 2013.

DONE this 26th day of February, 2013.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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