Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-10-05273/USCOURTS-ca4-10-05273-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Giuseppe Pileggi
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 10-5273

GIUSEPPE PILEGGI,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(3:06-cr-00151-RJC-1)

Argued: December 7, 2012

Decided: January 2, 2013

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and

DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published

opinion. Judge Davis wrote the opinion, in which Judge

Gregory joined. Chief Judge Traxler wrote an opinion concurring in the result.

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 1 of 15
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Rudolph Alexander Ashton, III, MCCOTTER,

ASHTON & SMITH, PA, New Bern, North Carolina, for

Appellant. Daniel Steven Goodman, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, John D. Buretta, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, Ellen R. Meltzer, Patrick M. Donley, Fraud Section,

Criminal Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

OPINION

DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

Giuseppe Pileggi appeals the restitution order that the district court entered after we remanded his case for resentencing. We previously held that the district court erred when it

sentenced Pileggi to 600 months (50 years) of imprisonment.

Specifically, we held that the court relied on an erroneous

view of the facts concerning the diplomatic assurances given

to Costa Rica when Pileggi was extradited to the United

States to face charges arising from his participation in a fraudulent sweepstakes scheme. United States v. Pileggi, 361 F.

App’x 475, 477–79 (4th Cir. 2010). In this second appeal,

Pileggi contends that the district court lacked authority to

reconsider the amount of restitution on remand. We agree. We

therefore vacate the restitution order and remand with instructions to the district court to reinstate the previous restitution

order directing Pileggi to make restitution in the amount of

$4,274,078.40.1

1Pileggi also contends that the district court abused its discretion in

refusing his request for a new presentence report ("PSR") before his resentencing. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. See

United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 2008) ("it is unnecessary to prepare new PSRs on remand where the parties receive an opportunity to be heard and no new information exists that would warrant an

update"). 

2 UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 2 of 15
I.

A.

From April 2003 until May 2006, Pileggi, a Canadian citizen, and more than four dozen co-conspirators ran an elaborate fraudulent sweepstakes scheme out of Costa Rica that

primarily targeted elderly United States citizens. Costa Rican

authorities extradited Pileggi after the United States agreed

that Pileggi "[would] not receive a penalty of death or one that

requires that he spend the rest of his natural life in prison."

Pileggi, 361 F. App’x at 476. Pileggi was tried in the Western

District of North Carolina and convicted of the following

offenses: one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, mail

fraud, and travel fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and

22 counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and

2. 

At sentencing, the prosecutor stated that the United States

had promised Costa Rica it would "not seek a sentence in

excess of 50 years." Pileggi, 361 F. App’x at 476. The court

sentenced Pileggi, then 48, to 600 months (50 years) in

prison, followed by three years of supervised release. The

court also ordered Pileggi to pay restitution of $3,952,9852

and to forfeit $8,381,962 to the United States.

Pileggi appealed the 600-month prison term, arguing that

the district court had relied on "clearly erroneous facts to

arrive at the sentence, namely the [g]overnment’s misrepresentation concerning the diplomatic assurances given to Costa

Rica to secure [his] extradition." Pileggi, 361 F. App’x at

477–78. Pileggi did not appeal the restitution order, and the

government did not file a cross-appeal. 

2On December 29, 2008, the court increased the restitution amount to

$4,274,078.40. 

UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI 3

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 3 of 15
We held that the district court had committed a significant

procedural error by imposing "a de facto life sentence" in reliance on "clearly erroneous facts": the government’s "indisputably false information" about its agreement with Costa Rica.

Pileggi, 361 F. App’x at 477–79. Thus, we vacated "Pileggi’s

600-month sentence and remand[ed] with instructions that the

case be reassigned for resentencing." Id. at 479. Our mandate

stated that "the judgment of the District Court [was] vacated,"

and remanded the case only for "further proceedings consistent with [our] decision."3

B.

At Pileggi’s resentencing in September 2010, the district

court imposed a sentence of 300 months (25 years) and

ordered Pileggi to pay restitution of $4,274,078.40. 

The government then asked to address the amount of restitution, noting that, in another case involving the same fraudulent sweepstakes operation in Costa Rica, this Court had

found that "losses for restitution purposes had to be attributed

to the individual rooms," or call centers, where each defendant had worked. J.A. 186. (citing United States v. Llamas,

599 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2010)). The government argued that

the $4.2 million figure in Pileggi’s case was "tainted" because

the trial judge had chosen to "group [the rooms] all together";

although the government "[did]n’t mind the $4.2 million figure," it argued that Pileggi would likely contend on appeal

that he had been wrongly held responsible for losses from

other rooms. Id. at 187–88. The government thus asked the

court to use the forfeiture amount—about $8.3 million—as

the restitution figure, even though the government had "gone

back" and done "another analysis which show[ed] that the

loss is even higher." Id. at 187–89.

3

See Judgment, Docket No. 81-1 (vacating the district court judgment

and remanding for further proceedings) and Mandate, Docket No. 83 (giving effect to the Court’s judgment). 

4 UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 4 of 15
The district court decided to limit restitution to the $4.2

million figure, but agreed to "hold that restitution component

open" and allow the government to "file its amended figures"

within 30 days. Id. at 190. 

At a second hearing focused solely on restitution, the government argued that the $8.3 million forfeiture figure had

resulted from a "two-generation" analysis of wire transfer

records that had been done "as speedily as possible." J.A. 202.

Upon remand, the government had applied a "five-generation

analysis" to the same records, which had "increased the restitution amount from [$]8.3 [million] to about some [$]20 million." Id. The government asserted that "[t]his analysis was

done specifically in response to Llamas." Id. at 252.

The district court rejected Pileggi’s argument that it lacked

authority to reconsider the restitution amount, reasoning that

"the issue . . . was ripe for adjudication in light of the Llamas

case." J.A. 200, 205, 256. After hearing the testimony of the

government’s analyst, id. at 205–48, the court increased the

restitution amount to $20,726,005.18, id. at 256.

II.

A.

Pileggi argues that the district court lacked authority to

change the restitution amount, because our mandate remanded

the case only to correct "the prison sentence [that] was in violation of the extradition agreement"; "the restitution amount

was not addressed on [his] direct appeal," and the government

did not "file a cross-appeal claiming that the restitution

amount was too low." Opening Br. 16. 

"We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the

mandate." United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir.

2012). 

UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI 5

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 5 of 15
"Few legal precepts are as firmly established as the doctrine

that the mandate of a higher court is controlling as to matters

within its compass." United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th

Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Because this

mandate rule is merely a specific application of the law of the

case doctrine, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it

compels compliance on remand with the dictates of a superior

court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or

impliedly decided by the appellate court." Id., quoted in Susi,

674 F.3d at 283. 

"[T]o the extent that the mandate of the appellate court

instructs or permits reconsideration of sentencing issues on

remand, the district court may consider the issue de novo,

entertaining any relevant evidence on that issue that it could

have heard at the first hearing." Bell, 5 F.3d at 67 (internal

quotation marks omitted), quoted in Susi, 674 F.3d at 283.

But the mandate rule "forecloses litigation of issues . . . foregone on appeal or otherwise waived, for example because

they were not raised in the district court."4

[W]hen this court remands for further proceedings,

a district court must, except in rare circumstances,

implement both the letter and spirit of the . . . mandate, taking into account [our] opinion and the circumstances it embraces.

4Bell, 5 F.3d at 67 (emphasis added), quoted in Susi, 674 F.3d at 283.

Accord Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 465 (4th Cir. 2007) ("any issue that

could have been but was not raised on appeal is waived and thus not

remanded"); S. Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tenn., LP v. Riese, 356 F.3d 576, 584

(4th Cir. 2004) ("[u]nder the mandate rule, a district court cannot reconsider issues the parties failed to raise on appeal"); United States v. Barnes,

660 F.3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that, when an appellate court

"remands to correct a discrete, particular error that can be corrected . . . .

without . . . a redetermination of other issues, the district court is limited

to correcting that error"; "any issue that could have been raised on appeal

but was not is waived and, therefore, not remanded"). 

6 UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 6 of 15
Id. Accord S. Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tenn., LP v. Riese, 356 F.3d

576, 584 (4th Cir. 2004) ("the court must attempt to implement the spirit of the mandate").

We unhesitatingly conclude that the mandate rule barred

the district court from reconsidering the restitution order on

remand. Neither party had raised the issue before this Court,

and the government is not permitted to "use the accident of a

remand to raise . . . an issue that [it] could just as well have

raised in the first appeal."5 Although we "remand[ed] with

instructions that the case be reassigned for resentencing," we

vacated only "Pileggi’s 600-month sentence." Pileggi, 361 F.

App’x at 479. Thus, the opinion limited the district court to

correcting only the incarceration term of Pileggi’s sentence.

See Bell, 5 F.3d at 67. 

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pepper v. United

States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011), does not counsel otherwise. In

Pepper, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the

"law of the case" required a new judge, on remand, to adhere

to the prior sentencing judge’s downward departure from the

advisory guidelines sentence. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1251. The

Pepper Court reasoned that "an appellate court when reversing one part of a defendant’s sentence may vacate the entire

sentence . . . so that, on remand, the trial court can reconfigure

the sentencing plan . . . to satisfy the sentencing factors in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)." Id. at 1251 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the appellate court had "set aside [the defendant’s] entire sentence and remanded for a de novo

resentencing," the remand order had "effectively wiped the

slate clean." Id. (emphasis added). 

5United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing

the defendant’s second appeal because "[t]he sentencing issues that [he]

wishe[d] to raise . . . [had] not [been] affected by the error . . . that had

necessitated the remand"; "[o]nly an issue arising out of the correction of

the sentence ordered by [the] court could [have] be[en] raised in a subsequent appeal"). 

UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI 7

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 7 of 15
Here, by contrast, we vacated only Pileggi’s 600-month

term, not his entire sentence.6 Moreover, Pepper does not

"abolish waiver in the context of re-sentencing."7 The government waived any challenge to the amount of restitution by

failing to raise it on appeal.8 Because the mandate rule "forecloses litigation of issues . . . foregone on appeal," Bell, 5

F.3d at 67, the district court was prohibited from revisiting

restitution on remand.9

6Pileggi, 361 F. App’x at 479. Although our mandate broadly stated that

"the judgment of the District Court [was] vacated," it remanded the case

only for "proceedings consistent with [our] decision." See Docket Nos. 81-

1, 83. Vacating the restitution order was not consistent with our decision,

which addressed only the propriety of Pileggi’s prison term and vacated

only that aspect of his sentence. 

7United States v. Barnes, 660 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding

that, "when a case is generally remanded to the district court for resentencing, the district court may entertain new arguments as necessary to

effectuate its sentencing intent, but it is not obligated to consider any new

evidence or arguments beyond that relevant to the issues raised on

appeal"), quoted in Susi, 674 F.3d at 285 (finding no "requirement that

district courts disregard a prior waiver and entertain new evidence and

arguments where such is not necessary to effectuate the court’s sentencing

intent"). 

8

See United States v. Rendelman, 641 F.3d 36, 42 n.7 (4th Cir. 2011)

(finding that a party had abandoned an argument by not pursuing it on

appeal). 

9

In Susi, we referred to a district court’s "discretion to decline to consider waived arguments on remand," Susi, 674 F.3d at 284–84 (emphasis

added), but Susi is distinguishable. In Susi, which also involved a fraudulent sweepstakes scheme in Costa Rica, we "vacated [the defendant’s] sentence, including the order of restitution, and remanded the case for

resentencing consistent with the opinion." Id. at 280. "In the initial sentencing, the district court [had] erred in considering as a basis for Susi’s

sentence that the conspiracy entailed sixteen call centers instead of just the

one where Susi worked, and in attributing a $4.2 million loss from all the

call centers to him instead of an amount limited to the one call center." Id.

at 283. But because we "vacat[ed] the sentence in its entirety," id., the district court was free to "reconfigure the sentencing plan to satisfy the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)," see Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1251.

Nonetheless, we noted that "[n]othing in Pepper . . . require[d] the district

8 UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 8 of 15
The government’s citation to United States v. Fields, 552

F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2009), is equally unavailing. See Gov’t Br.

34–35. In Fields, the district court initially sentenced the

defendant to 12 months in prison and a $2,000 fine under the

2000 advisory sentencing guidelines; we vacated the entire

sentence and remanded, ordering the district court to resentence the defendant under the 2006 advisory sentencing

guidelines. Fields, 552 at 403. At resentencing, the district

court still imposed a 12-month term, but waived the fine. Id.

On the second appeal, we rejected the government’s contention that the mandate rule had precluded the lower court from

reconsidering imposition of the fine. Id. at 403–04. We

emphasized that the defendant had "framed the issue on [the

first] appeal broadly"—whether the district court had erred

"when it used the 2000 version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines to compute the guideline sentence rather than

the less punitive present 2006 version"—and the Court had

"not limit[ed] [its] remand order to a specific issue" beyond

the applicable guidelines manual. Id. at 404. 

court to reconsider every component of the sentencing decision during

resentencing." Susi, 674 F.3d at 284. 

[A] district court would be well within its authority to decline to

revisit every sentencing issue on remand, unless the mandate

indicates otherwise or the interrelationship of sentencing components makes it advisable to do so. There is no reason to require

a district court to plow through the same arguments, take the

same evidence, and make the same findings that it has already

made in the original sentencing where such an effort would serve

no purpose. 

Id. at 286. Because "[t]he error requiring [Susi’s] resentencing was unrelated to the Sentencing Guidelines calculation," we did not resolve his

claim that "the district court [had] erred in concluding that it was barred

from reconsidering the Sentencing Guidelines calculation" on remand;

instead, we found that any such error was harmless. Id. at 283, 285. Notably, the government in Susi argued that the remand "was limited to the

issues of restitution and the § 3553(a) analysis"—even though we had

vacated Susi’s entire sentence. Id. at 283. 

UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI 9

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 9 of 15
Here, by contrast, Pileggi’s first appeal framed the issue

narrowly: whether the district court had relied on "clearly

erroneous facts to arrive at the sentence, namely the

[g]overnment’s misrepresentation concerning the diplomatic

assurances given to Costa Rica to secure Pileggi’s extradition." Pileggi, 361 F. App’x at 477–78. Our opinion focused

only on this issue, and we vacated only that portion of the

sentence that had imposed the 600-month term.10

In sum, our mandate barred the district court from reconsidering the amount of restitution on remand.

B.

"Even though the mandate of an appellate court may not

contemplate resurrecting an issue on remand, the trial court

may still possess some limited discretion to reopen the issue

in very special situations." Bell, 5 F.3d at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

These circumstances are: (1) a showing that controlling legal authority has changed dramatically; (2)

that significant new evidence, not earlier obtainable

in the exercise of due diligence, has come to light;

or (3) that a blatant error in the prior decision will,

if uncorrected, result in a serious injustice.

Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). "The

litany of exceptional circumstances sufficient to sidetrack the

[mandate rule] is not only short, but narrowly cabined."

United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir.

1991) (collecting cases). 

The government argues that a blatant error in the district

10Compare Pileggi, 361 F. App’x at 479 ("we vacate Pileggi’s 600-

month sentence and remand with instructions that the case be reassigned

for resentencing") (emphasis added), with Fields, 552 F.3d at 403 ("[w]e

vacate the sentence and remand this case for resentencing"). 

10 UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 10 of 15
court’s original restitution calculation, if uncorrected, will "result in a serious injustice to the victims of Pileggi’s conspiracy fraud conviction and . . . run counter to the Mandatory

Victim Restitution Act (‘MVRA’)." Gov’t Br. 35–36. The

government also contends that Llamas, issued after Pileggi’s

original sentencing and appeal, supports the district court’s

reconsideration of restitution on remand. See id. at 15, 45–47.

Neither argument is persuasive.

First, Llamas was not a dramatic change in controlling legal

authority that warrants a departure from the mandate rule. See

Bell, 5 F.3d at 67. In Llamas, the defendant "challenge[d] the

district court’s restitution order of more than $4.2 million,

contending that the court [had] erred in finding him jointly

and severally liable for losses caused by other Costa Rican

fraud schemes." Llamas, 599 F.3d at 390. The government

conceded the error, id., and we relied on our 2003 decision

in United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2003),

to conclude that the district court had abused its discretion in

ordering Llamas to compensate for losses not attributable to

his offense. Id. at 391. We reasoned that, 

[b]ecause the MVRA focuses on the offense of conviction rather than on relevant conduct, "the focus of

[a sentencing] court in applying the MVRA must be

on the losses to the victim caused by the offense."

United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 341 (4th

Cir. 2003). 

Id. at 390–91 (emphasis and alteration in original). Our decision in Llamas was "thus not a dramatic change in legal

authority, but simply an application" of the MVRA’s plain

language as interpreted by our earlier decision in Newsome.

See Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 467 (4th Cir. 2007). 

Second, we are not persuaded that the original restitution

order results in serious injustice. Importantly, the government

UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI 11

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 11 of 15
has not shown good cause for its failure to move for an

amended restitution order before Pileggi’s resentencing.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3664, which governs the issuance and

enforcement of restitution orders, the government generally

has until 90 days after sentencing to ascertain the amount of

victims’ losses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5). If a victim’s

losses are not finally determined by that time but a victim

subsequently discovers losses, the victim may petition the

court for an amended restitution order. Id. But such an order

"may be granted only upon a showing of good cause for the

failure to include such losses in the initial claim for restitutionary relief." Id. Here, the government simply reanalyzed

the information that it had already collected—the wire transfer records—which it could have done before Pileggi’s first

sentencing. 

The government’s citation to Dolan v. United States, 131

S. Ct. 2533 (2010), is unavailing. In Dolan, the Court held

that a district court retained the power to order restitution,

even after expiration of the 90-day post-sentencing period,

when it had made clear prior to the deadline that it intended

to impose restitution. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537. But the case

is distinguishable. In Dolan, the district court had held open

the restitution order at sentencing because there was "insufficient information . . . regarding possible restitution payments

that may be owed"; 67 days later, the probation office prepared an addendum to the PSR, recommending a total amount

of restitution. Id. Despite this information, the defendant did

not request a hearing, and the court did not hold a hearing

until about three months after the 90-day deadline had

expired. Id.

Here, by contrast, the original sentencing court made a final

determination of the amount of Pileggi’s restitution at the

September 24, 2008, sentencing. The court did not find "insufficient information" to determine the amount. See Dolan,

130 S. Ct. at 2537. Although the district court increased the

amount by about $321,000 in December 2008, it was not until

12 UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 12 of 15
about two years later that the government proposed a five-fold

increase in restitution.11 The request came suddenly—during

the resentencing hearing—not in an addendum to the PSR that

would have provided Pileggi some notice. See Dolan, 130 S.

Ct. at 2541 ("the defendant normally can mitigate any harm

that a missed deadline might cause—at least if, as here, he

obtains the relevant information regarding the restitution

amount before the 90–day deadline expires"). Moreover, the

government’s request was based not on new information

brought forth by victims but merely on a more detailed analysis of the same information that the government possessed at

the original sentencing. 

Although we are sympathetic to the reality that many of

Pileggi’s victims will not be made whole, we cannot, on the

facts presented, conclude that this misfortune stemmed from

a blatant error in the district court’s original calculation of restitution. Rather, it resulted from the government’s unexplained failure to comply with the dictates of § 3664. This

failure falls short of the serious injustice required to depart

from the mandate rule. Cf. United States v. Becerra, 155 F.3d

740, 755 (5th Cir. 1998) ("the government cites no case where

our court (or any court, for that matter) has found that a prior

opinion works a manifest injustice where the party claiming

injustice had all the means and incentive to provide the relevant information in the first appeal"), abrogated on other

grounds, as recognized in United States v. Farias, 481 F.3d

289, 291 (5th Cir. 2007).

Because relitigation of the issue of restitution was fore11The government contends that some of the delay was "the result of

Pileggi’s successful appeal." See Gov’t Br. 37. Assuming that is true, it

does not militate against enforcing the mandate rule. To so casually excuse

the government’s failure to raise restitution in a cross-appeal would effectively penalize Pileggi for exercising his appellate rights, simply because

the appeal "shaved 25 years off [his] prison term" and "made it more

likely that some meaningful restitution would be paid to [his] victims." Id.

UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI 13

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 13 of 15
closed in this case, the district court erred when it increased

the amount of restitution on remand.12

III.

For the reasons set forth, we vacate the restitution order and

remand with instructions to the district court to reinstate the

previous restitution order directing Pileggi to make restitution

in the amount of $4,274,078.40. 

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

TRAXLER, Chief Judge, concurring in the result:

I concur in the result reached in this case. In cases involving a general remand, the resentencing is de novo, and the district court is entitled (but not required) to reconsider any and

all issues relevant to sentencing, whether or not the issues

were raised in the first appeal. See United States v. Susi, 674

F.3d 278, 284-86 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Pepper v. United

States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1250-51 (2011) (noting that general

remands for resentencing place no restrictions on district

court’s discretion at resentencing).

The remand for resentencing in this case, however, was a

limited remand that restricted the district court to reconsideration of the term of imprisonment only. See, e.g., United States

v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66-67 (4th Cir. 1993) (remand limited to

consideration of specific issue). The mandate rule therefore

precluded the district court from reviving the restitution issue

foregone by both parties in the original appeal. See id. at 66.

12Because we find that the district court lacked the authority to reconsider the amount of restitution, we do not address Pileggi’s alternative

argument that the evidence does not support a restitution amount of more

than $20 million. 

14 UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 14 of 15
While there are exceptions to the mandate rule, see id. at 67,

none of those exceptions are applicable to this case so as to

permit the district court to change the amount of restitution.

UNITED STATES v. PILEGGI 15

Appeal: 10-5273 Doc: 51 Filed: 01/02/2013 Pg: 15 of 15