Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01410/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01410-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Pao Xiong
Appellant

Document Text:

The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by

designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-1410

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PAO XIONG,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 1:07-cr-00112-WCG-2—William C. Griesbach, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 19, 2010—DECIDED FEBRUARY 8, 2010

Before BAUER and WOOD, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY,

District Judge.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Pao Xiong burned down his

mother’s supermarket to help her collect the insurance

money. He is currently serving fifteen years in prison. The

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2 No. 09-1410

district court convicted him of arson, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i);

mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; conspiracy to commit arson

and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 371; and the use of fire

to commit another felony (the mail fraud), 18 U.S.C.

§ 844(h). These various offenses overlap, Xiong claims,

to such a degree that they violate his rights under the

Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. We disagree.

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person

shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put

in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In addition to protecting people from being subjected to

multiple trials for the same offense, the clause also

protects against cumulative punishments imposed in a

single trial by “prevent[ing] the sentencing court from

prescribing greater punishment than the legislature

intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).

The test often used to determine legislative intent, and

the one Xiong urges us to use, is the well-established

rule from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932),

which compares the elements of one offense to the elements of another to determine “whether each provision

requires proof of a fact that the other does not,” i.e.,

whether the offenses are effectively different. Id. at 304.

When the two offenses are effectively different, we presume Congress intended separate punishments for the

multiple offenses. When they are effectively the same,

we presume Congress intended only one punishment.

See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996).

The Blockburger test usually compares the elements only

of two offenses, but Xiong urges us to compare the eleCase: 09-1410 Document: 20 Filed: 02/08/2010 Pages: 4
No. 09-1410 3

ments of one offense (use of fire to commit a felony) to

the sum of the elements of multiple offenses (arson,

mail fraud, and conspiracy), as one of our sister circuits

has done. See United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 390, 398

(5th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Patel, 370 F.3d 108,

114 (1st Cir. 2004). “It is just as unlikely,” Xiong claims,

“that Congress would have intended two crimes to be

charged, when one is identical to the other, as it would

be for four crimes to be charged, where the fourth is

identical to the preceding three.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.

We have not applied this combination approach to

Blockburger in similar circumstances. See United States v.

Gardner, 211 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Zendeli, 180 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1999). And we need not

decide whether to adopt the Blockburger combination

approach as a proper rule of statutory construction. Even

if we were to apply it, Xiong’s convictions would stand,

because each of the sum of the first three offenses, on the

one hand, and the use of fire to commit a felony, on the

other, “requires proof of a fact that the other does not.”

Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.

First, the sum of arson, mail fraud, and conspiracy

requires proof that use of fire to commit a felony does

not, and we will name two: an agreement and arson.

The use of fire to commit a felony does not require proof

of an agreement, one element of a conspiracy. Nor

does it require proof of arson, which involves burning

a “building, vehicle, or other real or personal property,”

18 U.S.C. § 844(i), because it could be proved, for

instance, if one were to commit insurance fraud by

burning crops.

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4 No. 09-1410

On the flip side, use of fire to commit a felony requires

proof that the sum of the other three does not: a nexus

between the use of fire and the felony. See, e.g., Patel, 370

F.3d at 116; Smith, 354 F.3d at 399; United States v. Martin,

523 F.3d 281, 292-93 (4th Cir. 2008). The sum of arson,

mail fraud, and conspiracy does not require proof that

the arson or the overt act element of a conspiracy were

done in furtherance of the mail fraud. Indeed, all three

could be unconnected events without any nexus. It

matters not that Mr. Xiong’s arson, mail fraud, and

certain overt acts were connected, because the Blockburger

test focuses not on the facts of an individual’s case, but

generically “on the proof necessary to prove the

statutory elements of each offense.” Illinois v. Vitale, 447

U.S. 410, 416 (1980).

Under the Blockburger combination approach Xiong

urges, we discern that Congress intended separate punishments for Xiong’s convicted offenses. His convictions

are AFFIRMED.

2-8-10

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