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Parties Involved:
Christopher Dozier
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-12467

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CHRISTOPHER DOZIER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00084-MMH-LLL-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-12467

Before JORDAN, LUCK, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Dozier appeals his 224-month total sentence 

imposed following his convictions for two counts of Hobbs Act 

robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) & (b), and one count of brandishing a 

firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). On

appeal, Dozier argues that the district court committed procedural 

error at sentencing by incorrectly applying the Sentencing Guidelines. The government, in turn, moves to dismiss Dozier’s appeal, 

arguing that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal.

We review the validity and scope of an appeal waiver 

de novo. King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2022). 

Sentence appeal waivers are enforceable if they are made knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 1367. To enforce a waiver, “[t]he government must show that either (1) the district court specifically 

questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver 

during the Rule 11 colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the 

record that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 

(11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1192 

(11th Cir. 2020) (noting that the “touchstone for assessing” if a sentence appeal waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily “is 

whether ‘it was clearly conveyed to the defendant that he was giving up his right to appeal under most circumstances’” (alterations 

adopted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1352-

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24-12467 Opinion of the Court 3 

53)). “We have consistently enforced knowing and voluntary appeal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. Bascomb, 

451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). “An appeal waiver includes 

the waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable legal issues 

or even blatant error.” United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 

1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Here, Dozier pleaded guilty to three of the four counts he 

was charged with and entered into a written plea agreement with 

the government. That agreement contained, under a section titled 

“Defendant’s Waiver of Right to Appeal the Sentence,” an appeal 

waiver provision which stated: 

The defendant agrees that this [c]ourt has jurisdiction 

and authority to impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum and expressly waives the right to appeal defendant’s sentence on any ground, including 

the ground that the [c]ourt erred in determining the 

applicable guidelines range pursuant to the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines, except (a) the ground 

that the sentence exceeds the defendant’s applicable 

guidelines range as determined by the [c]ourt pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines; 

(b) the ground that the sentence exceeds the statutory 

maximum penalty; or (c) the ground that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution; provided, however, that if the government exercises its right to appeal the sentence 

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12467

imposed . . . then the defendant is released from his 

waiver and may appeal . . . . 

(emphasis in original). Dozier signed the agreement and put his 

initials on each page. 

During his plea colloquy, Dozier confirmed that he understood his plea agreement and was not under the influence of drugs, 

alcohol, or medication that might impair his ability to understand

it. The magistrate judge also explained the appeal waiver provision 

of the agreement to Dozier and confirmed with Dozier that he understood. As part of this conversation, the magistrate judge listed 

the terms and exceptions of the appeal waiver and confirmed that 

Dozier understood the rights he was giving up by entering into the 

agreement. Dozier stated that he did not have any questions about 

it and he testified, under oath, that he had entered into the waiver 

freely and voluntarily. We generally assume those statements are

true. See United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994) 

(“There is a strong presumption that the statements made during 

[a plea] colloquy are true.”). The magistrate judge recommended 

that the district court accept Dozier’s guilty plea and, subsequently, 

the district court did so. 

Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that “the district 

court specifically questioned [Dozier] concerning the sentence appeal waiver during [his] Rule 11 colloquy,” Bushert, 997 F.2d at

1351, and that “it was clearly conveyed to [Dozier] that he was giving up his right to appeal under most circumstances,” Boyd, 975 F.3d 

at 1192 (quoting Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1352-53). 

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24-12467 Opinion of the Court 5

Dozier’s arguments on appeal fall within the scope of that 

waiver and do not fall into any of the exceptions. Indeed, Dozier’s 

arguments—that the district court incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines—are expressly covered by the text of the waiver, 

which states that the waiver bars challenges to the sentence “including the ground that the [c]ourt erred in determining the applicable guidelines range pursuant to the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines.” Further, no exception applies, as Dozier does not argue that his sentence exceeds the applicable guidelines range as determined by the court at sentencing; that his sentence exceeds the 

statutory maximum; nor that his sentence violates the Eighth 

Amendment. Moreover, the government has not appealed. Accordingly, Dozier’s appeal waiver bars his appeal. 

In the alternative, Dozier argues that we should not hold 

him to his appeal waiver in the interest of justice.1 However, no 

extraordinary circumstances exist to support Dozier’s request that 

we not enforce his appeal waiver.2

1 Dozier also asks us to hold his appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of a 

petition for rehearing en banc in another appeal addressing the Sentencing 

Guidelines challenge he raises on appeal. We deny that request. We note that 

the pending petition for rehearing en banc that he references does not raise an 

issue relating to the enforceability of appeal waivers in this context. 

2 We have discussed the possibility of a miscarriage of justice exception to appeal waivers, but have not, to date, applied such an exception. See Bushert, 

997 F.2d at 1350 n.18; United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 n.5 (11th Cir. 

1999); King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1367 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 

143 S. Ct. 1771 (2023). As these prior panels have done, we assume without 

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-12467

In sum, we conclude that Dozier knowingly and voluntarily 

waived his right to appeal his sentence and his challenges on appeal 

fall within the scope of that waiver. Accordingly, we GRANT the 

government’s motion to dismiss. See Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1294; 

Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.

deciding the availability of such an exception and find that it would be unwarranted on these facts. 

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