Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-18-01811/USCOURTS-ca3-18-01811-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Garman
Appellee
Halderman
Appellee
Miller
Appellee
Briaheen Thomas
Appellant
Tice
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 18-1811 

________________

BRIAHEEN THOMAS, 

 Appellant, 

v.

DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT TICE, DEPUTY GARMAN,

CCPM MILLER, and MAJOR HALDERMAN

_

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(Civ. Action No. 4-16-cv-01487) 

District Judge: Hon. Matthew W. Brann

_

Argued January 16, 2019 

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and PORTER, 

Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 15, 2020) 

James P. Davy [Argued]

2362 East Harold Street

Philadelphia, PA 19125

Counsel for Appellant

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Sean A. Kirkpatrick [Argued]

Karen M. Romano

Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania

15th Floor, Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Counsel for Appellees

________________

OPINION

________________

PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Briaheen Thomas appeals from the District Court’s 

order granting summary judgment to Deputy Superintendent 

Eric Tice, Deputy Mark Garman, Correction Classification and 

Program Manager Timothy Miller, and Major Heather 

Halderman. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm in 

part and reverse in part the District Court’s order.

I

At all relevant times for this appeal, Thomas was an 

inmate at SCI-Rockview, in the custody of the Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections. On May 31, 2015, Thomas

received a friend in the prison’s visiting room. As they visited, 

Thomas’s friend handed him a bag of peanut M&Ms. He ate 

one and then quickly took a drink of soda. One of the guards, 

believing that Thomas had ingested contraband, immediately 

handcuffed him and removed him from the visiting room. 

Thomas was then placed in a dry cell in the prison’s infirmary.

A “dry cell” is a cell that lacks water—all standing 

water has been drained from the toilet, the room’s water supply 

has been shut off, and the sink and toilet have been capped to 

prevent inmate access. An inmate may be placed in a dry cell 

when prison staff have observed the inmate attempt to ingest 

an item of contraband or they learn that the inmate is 

attempting to introduce contraband into the prison. Dry cells 

are used to closely observe the inmate until natural processes 

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allow for the ingested contraband to be retrieved. To this end, 

dry cells lack all linens and moveable items other than a 

mattress, inmates’ clothes are exchanged for a simple smock,

and their movements are carefully controlled to prevent them 

from concealing or disposing of any retrievable contraband.

To expedite his release from the dry cell, Thomas was 

offered laxatives, which he accepted. Over the next four days, 

Thomas had twelve bowel movements. No evidence of any 

contraband was found in any of Thomas’s bowel movements.

Prison staff also x-rayed Thomas on June 1. The x-ray revealed 

no contraband.

Only the prison’s Program Review Committee 

(“PRC”)1 and facility manager2 are authorized to determine 

when to release an inmate from administrative confinement, 

including from a dry cell. DC-ADM 802 § 4.A. And 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections policies require the 

PRC to review an inmate’s administrative placement during 

the first seven days of confinement and determine whether that 

placement should continue. DC-ADM 802 § 2.A. On June 4, 

2015—day four of Thomas’s confinement in the dry cell—the 

PRC interviewed him at the dry cell. 

Following its interview with Thomas, the PRC decided

to continue Thomas’s confinement in the dry cell for five more

days, releasing him on June 9, 2015. Later, Thomas filed an 

administrative grievance against prison officials, which was 

ultimately upheld in part and denied in part on administrative 

appeal. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Thomas 

filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the members of 

the PRC had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free 

from cruel and unusual punishment. Following discovery, the 

PRC moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge, 

finding disputed issues of material fact, recommended that the 

motion be denied. Thomas v. Tice, No. 4:16-CV-01487, 2018 

WL 1278586 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2018). But the District Court 

 1 The appellees in this case were the members of the 

PRC. We sometimes refer to them collectively as the PRC.

2 Deputy Garman was both a member of the PRC and 

the facility manager at SCI-Rockview. J.A. 314.

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rejected the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation 

and granted the motion for summary judgment. Thomas v. 

Tice, No. 4:16-CV-01487, 2018 WL 1251831 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 

12, 2018). Thomas timely appealed from the District Court’s 

order.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction over Thomas’s civil 

rights action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have 

jurisdiction over this appeal from the District Court’s final 

order granting summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

“We exercise plenary review over the grant or denial of 

summary judgment and apply the same standard the district 

court should have applied.” Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 

895 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Summary 

judgment is appropriate when, drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, “the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” and 

thus the movant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 

2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A dispute is genuine if 

a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the nonmovant” and “material if it could affect the outcome of the 

case.” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 

294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 

U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986)). “We deny summary judgment if 

there is enough evidence for a jury to reasonably find” for the 

nonmoving party. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 309 (citation omitted).

III

Thomas brought his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that 

a person (or persons), acting under color of law, deprived him 

of a constitutional right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 

(1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 

474 U.S. 327 (1986). Thomas alleged that the conditions of his 

confinement in the dry cell violated his Eighth Amendment 

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The parties 

do not dispute that the PRC acted under color of law, but they 

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do dispute whether Thomas’s Eighth Amendment rights were 

violated.

The Eighth Amendment “prohibits any punishment 

which violates civilized standards and concepts of humanity 

and decency.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 

1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 

Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations 

omitted). To prevail against prison officials on a claim that an 

inmate’s conditions of confinement violated the Eighth 

Amendment, the inmate must meet two requirements: (1) the 

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious,”

and (2) the “prison official must have a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The first 

element is satisfied when an inmate is deprived of “the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 

U.S. 294, 299 (1991). The second element is satisfied when an 

inmate shows that prison officials acted with deliberate 

indifference to the inmate’s health or safety or conditions of 

confinement that violated the inmate’s constitutional rights. Id. 

at 302–03.

In light of Farmer, we adopted a subjective knowledge 

standard to establish deliberate indifference, requiring a 

showing that prison officials actually knew of and disregarded 

constitutional violations. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 

120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001). This tracks the general standard for 

liability, which requires a showing that each defendant was 

personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing. Evancho v. 

Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Rode v. 

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). “Personal 

involvement can be shown through allegations of personal 

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Id. And a 

defendant’s knowledge of a risk to health and safety “can be 

proved indirectly by circumstantial evidence to the effect that 

the excessive risk was so obvious that the official must have 

known of the risk.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 

2001).

When considering whether conditions of confinement 

violated the Eighth Amendment, we recognize that “the 

Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and 

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prisons ... which house persons convicted of serious crimes, 

cannot be free of discomfort.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 

337, 349 (1981). “To the extent that such conditions are 

restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that 

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. 

at 347. Indeed, even though administrative confinement in a 

dry cell is unpleasant and often unsanitary, so long as the 

conditions of that confinement are not foul or inhuman, and are 

supported by some penological justification, they will not 

violate the Eighth Amendment. Young, 960 F.2d at 364.

Thomas’s complaint makes two challenges to his 

confinement in the dry cell. First, he complains of specific 

deprivations he allegedly suffered during his confinement.

Second, he challenges the duration of that confinement. In its 

order granting summary judgment, the District Court 

addressed Thomas’s challenge to the specific deprivations he 

allegedly suffered during his confinement. It determined that, 

even if the specific deprivations allegedly suffered by Thomas

violated his Eighth Amendment rights, the PRC members 

could not be held liable because there was no evidence that 

they were personally involved in those deprivations. Thomas, 

2018 WL 1251831, at *5. Because the evidence did not provide 

a sufficient basis upon which a reasonable jury could conclude 

that the individual defendants had knowledge of Thomas’s 

conditions of confinement, including whether he was 

improperly shackled, we agree with the District Court that his 

condition of confinement claim against these defendants fails.

3

But the duration of Thomas’s confinement in the dry 

cell is a separate issue. Young, 960 F.2d at 364 (“The duration 

and conditions of segregated confinement cannot be ignored in 

deciding whether such confinement meets constitutional 

standards.” (citation omitted)). The PRC had the authority to 

 3 The District Court also concluded that, even if the 

members of the PRC had been personally involved in the 

alleged deprivations, they would still be entitled to qualified 

immunity. Thomas, 2018 WL 1251831, at *6–7. Because we 

agree with the District Court’s analysis on personal 

involvement in the alleged violations, we do not address this 

alternative ground for the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment.

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end Thomas’s administrative confinement in the dry cell and 

return him to the general population, so PRC members were 

personally involved in determining the duration of Thomas’s 

confinement in the dry cell. The District Court did not address 

this secondary claim in its summary judgment order. We will 

do so now. 

As noted above, administrative confinement in a dry 

cell must serve some penological interest. See Young, 960 F.2d 

at 364. Thomas was originally placed in the dry cell after a 

guard in the visitation room saw Thomas ingest what the guard 

suspected may have been contraband. The guard watched 

Thomas’s visitor fidget with something and then offer it to 

Thomas, which he swallowed with a drink of soda. Thomas 

explained that the “something” he ate was merely a peanut 

M&M. But Prison officials assert that hiding drugs in small, 

multi-colored balloons in bags of peanut M&Ms has become a 

popular method for introducing contraband into prisons. So the 

PRC reasonably argues that, under these circumstances, the 

guard’s suspicion that Thomas had ingested contraband was 

reasonable and warranted Thomas’s initial placement in the 

dry cell. 

Thomas argues that this initial suspicion was dispelled

by the time the members of the PRC interviewed him four days 

later, and they knew that there was no longer a penological 

justification for his continued confinement. Thomas’s claim is 

supported by the undisputed evidence. During the first four 

days of his confinement, with the aid of laxatives, Thomas had 

twelve bowl movements. His stool was carefully examined

after each bowl movement, and no evidence of contraband was 

found. Thomas also submitted to an x-ray of his abdominal 

cavity. The x-ray technician informed Thomas that his x-ray 

was clean; the only thing inside of him was a bullet near his 

spine. And although the x-ray report identified a foreign object 

in the region,4 it also noted, crucially, that there was no 

obstruction in Thomas’s gastrointestinal tract. During the 

administrative appeal, Deputy Garman explained: “Dry cell 

placement was done in good faith after staff reasonably 

believed [Thomas] had ingested contraband. Policy and 

 4 Presumably, this foreign object would have been the 

bullet.

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procedures were followed. However, once the x-ray failed to 

reveal any obstruction, and several bowel movements 

occurred, [Thomas] should have been released sooner.” J.A. 

314.

After the initial interview with an inmate in 

administrative confinement, prison regulations require the 

PRC to decide whether to end or continue the administrative 

confinement and to set forth its reason for that decision. See

DC-ADM 802 § 2.A. Following its June 4, 2015 meeting with 

Thomas, the PRC decided to continue his administrative 

confinement, and signed the appropriate forms, but it provided 

no reason for that decision. In their depositions, members of 

the PRC could not explain, or even recall, why they had 

continued Thomas’s confinement.

Now the PRC relies on the affidavit of Security Captain 

Herbert Probst to provide a reason for Thomas’s continued 

confinement in the dry cell. Probst asserts that he was advised

by the medical department that Thomas’s x-ray revealed an 

unspecified foreign body, which Probst believed warranted 

continued placement in administrative custody. But Probst was 

not a member of the PRC, and there is no evidence that he 

discussed with the PRC Thomas’s continued confinement in 

the dry cell. 

The PRC notes that, under prison regulations, it was 

required to confer with the security officer and consider his 

recommendations. Appellees thus ask us to infer that (1) they 

conferred with the security captain, (2) he recommended 

continued confinement based on secondhand information from 

the medical department (despite the negative x-rays and twelve 

samples of contraband-free stool), and (3) the PRC deferred to 

his recommendations. We cannot do this. First, our standard of 

review requires us to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the nonmovant, and PRC is the movant here. See Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 255. Second, the evidence before us shows that the 

PRC failed to follow prison regulations by, for example, failing 

to record any reason for its decision to continue Thomas’s 

confinement in the dry cell. It would be unreasonable to infer 

that the PRC strictly adhered to some regulations, such as 

conferring with the security officer, when it admittedly failed 

to follow others.

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We conclude that whether there was a penological 

justification to continue Thomas’s administrative confinement 

in the dry cell after June 4, 2015 constitutes a disputed issue of 

material fact. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate

on the duration issue.

IV

The PRC members also argue that, even if Thomas’s 

continued confinement without penological justification 

violated his rights, they would still be entitled to qualified 

immunity. On the record before us, we must disagree. 

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from 

civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or 

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of 

the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 

664 (2012) (citation omitted). “To be clearly established, a 

right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official 

would have understood that what he is doing violates that 

right.” Id. (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks 

omitted). To prevail against a claim of qualified immunity, the 

plaintiff need not produce “a case directly on point, but existing 

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 

question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 

741 (2011) (citation omitted). 

Our precedent makes clear that, without some 

penological justification, an inmate may not be 

administratively confined in a dry cell. See Young, 960 F.2d 

351, 364–65; cf. United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 

1256 (8th Cir. 1997) (dry cell justified when prison officials 

had reason to believe inmate was smuggling contraband into 

jail). See also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (conditions of 

confinement may not be “grossly disproportionate” or “result 

in pain without any penological purpose”); Gregg v. Georgia, 

428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (“[T]he sanction imposed cannot be 

so totally without penological justification that it results in the 

gratuitous infliction of suffering.”).

While the penological purpose must always be 

legitimate, Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 475, 476 (3d Cir. 

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2018), we have never determined the exact quantum or nature 

of penological interest that is needed to justify confinement in 

a dry cell. But we are satisfied that there must be at least some

interest. Here, the PRC failed to present evidence of any

continuing penological interest after its initial interview with 

Thomas. Without such a penological justification for Thomas’s 

continued confinement in the dry cell, the PRC members are 

not entitled to qualified immunity.

V

Our dissenting colleague would go farther and reverse 

the District Court on Thomas’s conditions-of-confinement 

claim as well as the duration claim. While acknowledging the 

severity of dry cells generally and Thomas’s particularly trying 

experience, we decline that approach. It is undisputed that the 

PRC members were not responsible for Thomas’s conditions 

of confinement. J.A. 194–95. Nor is there any record evidence 

that they actually knew about his alleged deprivations.

Thomas’s cell door had a window, but the record does not 

disclose what was visible through the window or whether PRC 

members actually saw Thomas’s deprivations.5 And while 

Thomas “yell[ed]” at the PRC as they left his cell, it was not to 

itemize his various grievances; he was trying to explain the 

circumstances that led to his placement in the dry cell. J.A. 

175–76. Thomas specifically admitted that he never spoke to 

the PRC about any of his requests for hygienic materials, 

explaining that his goal “wasn’t to stay there and wash my 

hands there,” but rather “to get out of there.” J.A. 179. So on a 

second visit, Thomas again failed to inform the PRC of his 

alleged deprivations. J.A. 179.

 5 For example, toilet paper and sanitizing wipes are 

provided to the inmate after he uses the bed pan or urine bottle. 

So the PRC members would not have known of this alleged 

deprivation merely by visual inspection. Nor would they have 

known by peering into the cell that Thomas’s smock had not 

been exchanged for a new one; and he did not tell them.

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The dissent relies heavily on our opinion in Young v. 

Martin, 801 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2015).

6 In addition to being 

factually distinguishable, Martin was an excessive-force case

decided under the applicable knew-or-should-have-known 

standard that was rejected for condition-of-confinement cases 

in Farmer. “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under 

the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane 

conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the 

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Even granting arguendo the many inferences that our 

dissenting colleague would draw in Thomas’s favor, there is 

simply no evidence in this record that the PRC members

appreciated the same facts and drew the same inferences.7

 6 The dissent also relies on Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 

(2002). Hope was an excessive force case, and we have since 

recognized that the Eighth Amendment test for claims related 

to use of excessive force by mechanical restraints on prisoners 

described in Hope differs from the Farmer test for claims 

related to conditions of confinement. Young v. Martin, 801 

F.3d 172, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2015). While the Hope “Court 

referred to Farmer briefly ... its analysis of whether the use of 

mechanical restraints violated the Eighth Amendment 

indisputably began and ended in terms drawn from its 

excessive force jurisprudence.” Id. at 179. We have not held 

that mechanical restraints cannot be considered in a conditionsof-confinement case; indeed, the improper use of mechanical 

restraints may be considered in a conditions-of-confinement 

case. But reliance on Hope here is inapposite. 

7 In Mammana v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 

368 (3d Cir. 2019), we recently held, on a motion to dismiss, 

the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to assert a viable Eighth 

Amendment violation. This appeal from a grant of summary 

judgment is distinguishable because unlike Mammana, where 

we were required to assume the truth of the plaintiffappellant’s factual allegations, here we scoured the evidentiary 

record and determined there is no evidence in the record 

allowing us to conclude the PRC participated in, or had actual 

knowledge of, Thomas’s conditions of confinement.

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VI

We recognize the importance of administrative 

confinement in dry cells in preventing the smuggling of 

contraband into prisons and protecting both inmates and prison 

staff. So we reiterate that when administrative confinement in 

a dry cell is not foul or inhuman, and serves a legitimate 

penological interest, it will not violate the Eighth Amendment. 

But here the PRC has not presented evidence of any 

penological justification for Thomas’s continued confinement 

in the dry cell. So we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 

District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the 

members of the PRC and remand for further proceedings on 

Thomas’s claim that his continued confinement in the dry cell 

without penological justification violated his constitutional 

rights.

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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, concurring in part, 

dissenting in part.

Those who violate our laws forfeit the opportunity to

create or control the conditions under which they live. 

However, our civilized society mandates that these conditions 

be humane and consonant with the Eighth Amendment. Here, 

the conditions of confinement in Thomas’s dry cell were 

deplorable, to say the very least, and far more egregious than 

any set of circumstances to which we or the Supreme Court 

have lent our imprimatur. As such, while I concur with my 

colleagues on Thomas’s duration claim, I am compelled to 

dissent from the Majority’s holding on Thomas’s conditionsof-confinement claim. 

I. THOMAS SUFFERED UNDER INHUMANE

CONDITIONS IN THE DRY CELL

Whether considered individually or on their own—and 

certainly in combination—the conditions Thomas suffered 

while in the dry cell deprived him of “the minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 

337, 347 (1981). I only mention some of these awful

conditions here. 

While in the dry cell, Thomas was only allowed to wear 

a paper-thin smock, which did not fit him. The smock was not 

replaced for a clean one for the duration of his time in the dry 

cell (over nine days). Despite repeated requests, and in 

violation of prison policies, he was repeatedly denied a blanket. 

As a result, he felt cold throughout his stay in the dry cell. His 

mattress was soiled and did not have a slip covering, sheet, or 

pillow. 

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The entire nine days that Thomas was in the dry cell, a 

light on the wall shined on him. Not only was he subject to 

constant illumination,1 but he was also continuously 

handcuffed in a painful position. In particular, his right hand

was tightly handcuffed to the metal frame of the bed in a 

manner that prevented him from even standing and required

him to sleep with his right arm outstretched above his head. 

Although he was given brief periods of respite, his right arm 

pained him at length, both during and after his dry-cell stay. 

Most egregiously, Thomas was repeatedly denied any 

means of cleaning himself, including after bowel movements 

and before meals. Despite his requests, and in violation of 

prison policies, he was never provided toilet paper, sanitizing 

wipes, or the opportunity to even wash his hands. Provided 

with the uncontested description of such squalor, we are 

reminded of the realism of both Dickens and Sinclair but no 

tale of fiction is this. Can we seriously dispassionately 

determine that a prisoner laying in filth and excrement deserves 

our judicial sanction? We should be pushed over the precipice 

when we note that these conditions forced Thomas to violate 

his religious obligations as a Muslim to cleanse himself before 

his daily prayers. 

 1 We recently recognized that “bright, constant illumination 

that causes ‘grave sleeping problems and other mental and 

psychological problems’ can establish an Eighth Amendment 

deprivation.” Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 

368, 374 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 

1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

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II. THOMAS’S CONDITIONS CLAIM MUST

PROCEED TO A JURY

Despite these inhumane conditions, the Majority 

entirely relieves Defendants2 of any possible liability by 

perfunctorily affirming the District Court’s determination that 

they were not personally involved. But, at this summary

judgment stage, that cannot be said as a matter of law. Further, 

qualified immunity should not be extended as a safe haven 

under these facts. Thomas’s conditions claim should proceed 

to a jury. 

A. There Exists a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact as to 

What Defendants Actually Knew

As the Majority notes, our precedent reveals that 

personal involvement can be shown through “actual 

knowledge and acquiescence.” E.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 

845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Here, 

since Defendants undoubtedly acquiesced through inaction, the 

only question is whether they actually knew about the 

conditions. This summary judgment record certainly 

demonstrates that a reasonable jury could indeed conclude 

such for three independent reasons. 

First, Defendants conducted the PRC hearing outside 

Thomas’s dry cell on the fourth day of his confinement there. 

Although we do not know exactly what their view into the dry 

cell was, we know enough to conclude that there is a factual 

 2 I refer to Appellees Eric Tice, Mark Garman, Timothy Miller, 

and Heather Halderman collectively as “Defendants” 

throughout this opinion. 

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dispute about what Defendants saw. In particular, it is 

undisputed that the hearing was conducted immediately 

outside the dry cell, Appellees’ Br. 14 (stating that the hearing 

was held “at his [dry] cell door”); that the door to the dry cell 

had a window through which prison officials on the outside 

could see Thomas, id. at 122–23 (indicating that “[t]here was 

[a] window” into the dry cell through which a “guard . . . 

watch[ed Thomas]” all day and night), 136 (noting that, “on 

the door” to Thomas’s dry cell, “[t]here was a window [and] a 

slot”); and that Defendants were close enough to the dry cell to 

listen to Thomas’s oral complaints, id. at 201 (documenting 

that Thomas participated in the hearing orally). 

This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to 

conclude that Defendants personally viewed, and thus knew, at 

least some of the conditions about which Thomas complains—

his being handcuffed in a painful position; lacking a blanket, 

toilet paper, and sanitizing wipes; and being subject to artificial 

illumination. Indeed, we must hold so since, as the Majority 

also notes, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

Thomas, the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 

U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of 

Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998).

Second, Thomas suggests that he discussed the 

conditions of his dry cell with Defendants at the PRC hearing. 

In fact, when asked during his deposition whether Halderman 

and other Defendants gave him a chance to tell them his “side 

of things” during the hearing, Thomas stated: “if [Halderman] 

heard me yelling, then she got it. I was still trying to yell so 

she could hear me as [Defendants] continued to walk on.” 

App. 175–76. This statement can be reasonably interpreted to 

mean that Thomas informed Defendants about the deplorable 

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conditions in his dry cell—and they thus had actual knowledge 

about the conditions. 

To be sure, Defendants contend that Thomas never 

complained about his confinement conditions to them. Of 

course, we do not have authoritative evidence as to what 

Thomas told Defendants chiefly because, contrary to prison 

policies, Defendants did not write a summary of Thomas’s oral 

statements and, as far as the Court is aware, apparently failed 

to take notes of any kind during the hearing. See App. 39. 

Nonetheless, in support of their position, Defendants point to 

deposition testimony where Thomas was asked whether, when 

he saw Defendants on an unspecified date, he spoke “to any of 

them about [his] request . . . to wash [his] hands or for a shower 

[or] for soap.” Id. at 179. Thomas responded in the negative. 

See id. 

But this sole statement, inquiring only about some of his 

complaints, does not preclude a determination that Defendants 

were personally involved in the many indecent conditions of 

Thomas’s dry cell. Even if Thomas did not tell Defendants 

about his requests to wash his hands, for a shower, or for soap, 

he still could have told—and generally indicates he did tell—

them about the other grievous conditions he was 

experiencing—including his pain resulting from being 

continuously handcuffed, cold from lacking a blanket and 

wearing a smock too small, unsanitary state from being denied 

toilet paper and sanitizing wipes, and lack of sleep from being 

constantly illuminated. At a minimum, drawing all inferences 

in Thomas’s favor, we are compelled by our jurisprudence to

determine that there exists a genuine dispute as to many 

material facts regarding what exactly Thomas told Defendants

and the knowledge that may reasonably be imputed to them. 

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On its own, that precludes summary judgment on Thomas’s

conditions claim. 

Put simply, we cannot say as a matter of law that 

Defendants did not have personal knowledge of, and thus were 

not personally involved in, the conditions of Thomas’s

confinement in the dry cell. Especially since we must make all 

reasonable inferences in Thomas’s favor, this factual dispute 

precludes summary judgment.3

 In entirely overlooking these 

facts, the Majority makes a glaring error. 

B. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Upon summarily affirming the District Court’s personal 

involvement analysis, the Majority explicitly declines to 

determine whether Defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity on Thomas’s conditions claim. But because, as 

 3 This conclusion accords with our precedent, as we have 

previously recognized that a party’s state of mind is “typically 

not a proper issue for resolution on summary judgment,”

Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.3d 351, 360 (n.21) (quoting Wilson v. 

Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 866 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated on other 

grounds, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)), because it is “inherently a 

question of fact which turns on credibility.” Id. (citing Int’l

Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1265 (5th Cir.

1991); Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir. 1990); Nat’l

Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 1989); 60 

Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1437 (6th Cir.

1987); 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and 

Procedure, Civil 2d § 2730 (1983 & 1991 Supp.)), superseded 

by statute on other grounds as stated in Ghana v. Holland, 226 

F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2000).

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explained above, we cannot determine as a matter of law that 

Defendants were not personally involved in the conditions of 

Thomas’s dry cell, we must answer this qualified immunity 

question. In so doing, our precedent demands that we resolve 

this issue in Thomas’s favor. 

As the Majority notes, qualified immunity does not 

shield a government official where she has “violated a statutory 

or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 

of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 

664 (2012) (citations omitted). As I view it, precedent from 

our Court and the Supreme Court clearly establishes that the 

conditions Thomas faced in the dry cell taken together violate 

the Eighth Amendment. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 

(indicating that conditions of confinement, “alone, or in 

combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities”). 

Most directly applicable is our decision in Young v. 

Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1992). There, Kenneth Young, 

a federal inmate, was placed in a dry cell like Thomas’s for 96 

hours. See id. at 355. During this confinement, Young was not 

allowed to wash his hands before eating nor provided with 

toilet paper upon defecating. See id. Moreover, during the first 

29 hours of his confinement in the dry cell, Young was denied 

permission to leave the dry cell to urinate or defecate and thus 

relieved himself in a corner of his cell. See id. 

After the lower court granted summary judgment for the 

defendant prison officials, we reversed. See id. at 353. In 

relevant part, we held that the totality of conditions in the 

inmate’s confinement in the dry cell violated the Eighth 

Amendment. See id. at 365. In particular, we reasoned: 

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[W]e cannot condone dehumanizing treatment 

such as was allegedly given Young by [] prison 

officials once he was confined to the dry cell. 

Riley [v. Jeffes], 777 F.2d[ 143,] 148 [(3d Cir. 

1985)] (where plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts 

which, if proven, would entitle plaintiff to relief 

under the Eighth Amendment, dismissal of 

complaint was inappropriate). Even if Young 

was properly confined to the dry cell, [prison] 

officials do not have a license to impose 

unconstitutional conditions upon him. See

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667[] (1977) 

(Eighth Amendment proscribes punishment 

grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 

crime); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 

(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Martorano, 866 

F.2d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 1989).

When viewed in their totality, the alleged actions 

of [the] prison officials—not allowing Young to 

leave his cell more than once to defecate or 

urinate over a period of several days, not 

providing Young with a plastic urinal for 29 

hours, not allowing Young to empty his urinal 

more than twice, not allowing Young to wash his 

hands before eating, not allowing Young to bathe 

or shower, not providing Young with toilet paper 

despite his diarrhea, not providing Young with 

water to drink, suggesting instead that he drink 

his urine, and the mocking taunts by guards and 

their threats to chain Young to a steel slab if he 

complained about his conditions—would if 

proved demonstrate a violation of the basic 

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concepts of humanity and decency that are at the 

core of the protections afforded by the Eighth 

Amendment. It would be an abomination of the 

Constitution to force a prisoner to live in his own 

excrement for four days in a stench that not even 

a fellow prisoner could stand. 

The conditions that Young was allegedly made 

to endure for four days are all the more revolting 

considering that Young is HIV positive, and, 

hence, more susceptible to infection and disease. 

See Tillery [v. Owens], 907 F.2d [418,] 428 [(3d 

Cir. 1990)]. Such a denial of even basic 

sanitation in our opinion is “cruel and unusual 

because, in the worst case, it can result in 

physical torture, and, even in less serious cases, 

it can result in pain without any penological 

purpose[.]” Estelle [v. Gamble], 429 U.S. [97,] 

103 [(1976)]. We find that Young has 

sufficiently alleged that the actions of certain [] 

prison officials “resulted in unquestioned and 

serious deprivation of basic human needs,” 

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347[], and as such, Young 

has satisfied the objective component of a claim 

for violations of the Eighth Amendment.

Young, 960 F.2d at 364-65. 

Young thus clearly established in 1992 that an inmate’s 

extended confinement in a dry cell where she, among other 

things, cannot wash her hands before eating, use toilet paper 

after defecating, bathe, or shower violates the Eighth 

Amendment. This principle is directly applicable here: the 

conditions of Thomas’s confinement violated clearly 

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established Eighth Amendment law given their similarity to the 

conditions of Young’s confinement.4

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 

U.S. 730 (2002), further tips the scale in Thomas’s favor. 

There, Larry Hope, a state inmate, fell asleep during a 

“morning bus ride to [his] chain gang’s worksite.” Id. at 734. 

Consequently, he “was less than prompt in responding to an 

order to get off the bus” and eventually got into a “wrestling 

match with a guard.” Id. As a result, Hope was handcuffed, 

placed in leg irons, and transported back to the prison where he 

was cuffed on a “hitching post.” Id. “The guards made him 

take off his shirt, and he remained shirtless all day while the 

sun burned his skin.” Id. at 734–35. He was chained to the 

post for seven hours and was given water only once, denied 

bathroom breaks, and taunted by the guards. See id. at 735.

 4 Defendants seek to elude the inevitable grasp of Young’s 

reach by highlighting that Young, unlike Thomas, was HIV 

positive and thus had a heightened risk of infection from being 

in proximity to his bowel movements. But Young’s HIV status 

was but one aspect we considered in that case—and that, too, 

after we already deemed that the totality of the other conditions 

of his confinement constituted an Eighth Amendment 

violation. 960 F.2d at 365. Using Defendants’ logic, no Eighth 

Amendment violation would ever be clearly established given 

the inevitable factual novelties in the real-world scenarios that 

come before the courts. For this reason, the Supreme Court has 

recognized that “officials can still be on notice that their 

conduct violates established law even in,” as here, “novel 

factual circumstances.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741

(2002). If anything, this case presents such a circumstance.

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On these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that an 

“Eighth Amendment violation is obvious.” Id. at 737–38 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme 

Court explained:

[T]he respondents knowingly subjected [Hope] 

to a substantial risk of physical harm, to 

unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and 

the restricted position of confinement for a 

[seven]–hour period, to unnecessary exposure to 

the heat of the sun, to prolonged thirst and 

taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks 

that created a risk of particular discomfort and 

humiliation. The use of the hitching post under 

these circumstances violated the “basic concept 

underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is 

nothing less than the dignity of man.” Trop v. 

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100[] (1958). This punitive 

treatment amounts to gratuitous infliction of 

“wanton and unnecessary” pain that our 

precedent clearly prohibits.

Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (footnote omitted).

Hope therefore clearly established in 2002 that extended 

and painful handcuffing of an inmate violates the Eighth 

Amendment. That is precisely what Thomas endured here, 

where his right hand was painfully handcuffed throughout his 

nine days in the dry cell, save for occasional and fleeting 

periods of respite.5

 5 As with Young, Defendants attempt to undermine Hope’s 

applicability by asserting that Hope was handcuffed outdoors 

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Finally, our recent decision in Mammana v. Federal 

Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 2019), further 

demonstrates that Defendants cannot avail themselves of 

qualified immunity. There, Anthony Mammana, a federal 

inmate, alleged that he was “deprived of his clothing, provided 

only ‘paper like’ coverings instead, denied bedding [and toilet 

paper], and exposed to low cell temperatures and constant 

bright lighting for four days.” Id. at 374. We held that the 

conditions under which Mammana suffered—many of which 

are identical to those Thomas endured here—violated the 

Eighth Amendment. See id. at 372–73. Although Mammana

postdates the events giving rise to this appeal, it relies on an 

array of cases decided well before the instant case. See id. at 

372 (citing, inter alia, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 

(1991)).

In short, then, qualified immunity does not shield 

Defendants from Thomas’s conditions claim. Among others, 

Young, Hope, and the cases on which Mammana relies clearly 

established before Thomas’s confinement in the dry cell that 

the conditions he suffered there taken together violate the 

Eighth Amendment. Hence, Thomas’s conditions claim must 

proceed to a jury. 

III. THE LAW MANDATES A FULL REVERSAL

“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment 

is nothing less than the dignity of man.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 

 

in the sun whereas Thomas was not. But, as Hope itself 

explains at length, the key question in the qualified immunity 

arena is whether the law gives a defendant fair warning that 

her actions are unconstitutional. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. 

Here, Defendants had such fair warning. 

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U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion). Here, Thomas was 

housed in a dry cell in utterly undignified conditions. On that, 

the record is clear. As to whether Defendants were personally 

involved in these conditions, the record reveals a genuine 

dispute of material facts that precludes summary judgment. 

Qualified immunity, moreover, is of no aid to Defendants 

given the ample precedent deeming similar conditions as 

violative of the Eighth Amendment. I would vacate in full the 

District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand to the 

District Court for trial on both Thomas’s duration and 

conditions claims. Given my divergence of viewpoint, I 

dissent from the Majority’s disposition of Thomas’s conditions 

claim. 

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