Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04740/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04740-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Committee to Bridge the Gap
Plaintiff
Norman Y. Mineta
Defendant
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
Plaintiff
Public Citizen, Inc.
Plaintiff
Redwood Alliance
Plaintiff
Sierra Club
Plaintiff
United States Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration
Defendant

Document Text:

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For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND

RESOURCE SERVICES; COMMITTEE TO

BRIDGE THE GAP; PUBLIC CITIZEN, INC.;

REDWOOD ALLIANCE; and SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH AND

SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION

and NORMAN Y. MINETA, Secretary of

Transportation,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C 04-4740 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

This action seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a final rule issued by the United States Department

of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration revising certain regulations related to the

transport of radioactive materials. Now before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Having considered the

parties’ arguments and for the reasons stated below, the court enters the following memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Nuclear Information and Resource Services, Committee to Bridge the Gap, Redwood

Alliance, and Sierra Club are nonprofit environmental advocacy and educational organizations. Plaintiff

Public Citizen, Inc. is a nonprofit research, lobbying, and advocacy organization that, among other activities,

engages in advocacy for more stringent regulation of the nuclear industry. The United States Department of

Transportation (“DOT”) Research and Special Programs Administration and Secretary of Transportation

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Norman Y. Mineta (collectively “defendants”) are responsible for implementing the Federal Hazardous

Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq., which governs the transportation of hazardous

materials “in commerce.” Id. § 5101. The Act authorizes the DOT to promulgate regulations classifying

certain materials, including radioactive materials, as “hazardous” and prescribing the means for the safe

transport of such materials. Id. § 5103. Pursuant to a 1979 Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”)

between the DOT and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), the DOT promulgates regulations

governing the transportation of radioactive materials in consultation with NRC. See 44 Fed Reg. 38,690

(July 2, 1979).

Beginning in 1999, the DOT and NRC undertook a joint rulemaking in which they sought to amend

the radioactive materials transportation regulations codified at 49 C.F.R. parts 171 through 180. After

receiving extensive public comment, the DOT, in coordination with the NRC, promulgated a final rule

revising various provisions of those regulations on January 26, 2004. See 69 Fed. Reg. 3,631 (Jan. 26,

2004). The revised regulations apply to the transport of radioactive substances by rail, aircraft, and sea as

well as to the carriage of such materials on public highways. Id. at 3,693-96 (listing revisions to 49 C.F.R.

pts. 174-77).

On November 9, 2004, plaintiffs filed the instant action seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the

revised radioactive materials regulations on the ground that they were promulgated in violation of the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that

defendants violated NEPA by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) that identifies

the environmental effects of the radioactive materials rule and evaluates alternatives to the DOT’s chosen

course of action. See id. § 4332. In addition to this district court action, plaintiffs have filed a petition in

the Ninth Circuit naming the NRC and the United States as respondents and challenging the radioactive

materials rule on grounds that it was not issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, NEPA, the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and “other applicable law.” Glazer Decl., Exh. 1 at 2. 

On January 10, 2005, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, arguing that the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action under the

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Administrative Orders Act (hereinafter “Hobbs Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 2341 et seq. Defendants’ motion is

now pending before the court.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests the subject matter

jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039-40 (9th

Cir. 2003), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2067 (2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing the propriety of the court’s jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). Consequently, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted if the complaint, when considered

in its entirety, on its face fails to allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Savage, 343

F.3d at 1039 n.2; Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

1979). Alternatively, a defendant may seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) by presenting evidence to refute

the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint. Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n.2; Thornhill Publ’g, 594 F.2d

at 733. Once the defendant has introduced such evidence, the plaintiff “must furnish affidavits or other

evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage, 343 F.3d at

1039 n.3 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

In adjudicating the instant motion, the court is called upon to determine whether this court may

exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim that the DOT’s revised hazardous materials regulations were

issued in violation of NEPA. Under NEPA, federal agencies must “include in every recommendation or

report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment [] a detailed statement . . . [describing] the environmental impact of the proposed

action.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i); Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004). The

EIS requirement is intended to compel federal agencies to take a “hard look” at the environmental

consequences of their proposals. Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 361 F.3d

1108, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kern v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1066

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(9th Cir. 2002)). Consequently, “[a]n EIS must be prepared if substantial questions are raised as to

whether a project may cause significant degradation of some human environmental factor.” Id. (quoting

Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir.1998)) (original emphasis, alterations,

and quotation marks omitted).

A district court generally has jurisdiction over NEPA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See,

e.g., Surfrider Found. v. Dalton, 989 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-15 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 196 F.3d 1057

(9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, although NEPA itself does not expressly provide for judicial review, claims

that an agency unlawfully failed to prepare an EIS or that it prepared an inadequate EIS have been held to

be “final agency actions” reviewable under Chapter 7 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Cetacean

Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1179; Ocean Advocates, 361 F.3d at 1118. Thus, the allegations in plaintiffs’

complaint give rise to a federal question over which this court could ordinarily exercise jurisdiction.

However, a number of federal statutes provide for direct review of certain agency actions in the

court of appeals. Where such statutes apply, it is well-established that “[s]pecific grants of exclusive

jurisdiction to the courts of appeals override general grants of jurisdiction to the district courts.” Carpenter

v. Department of Transp., 13 F.3d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, if an action for judicial review

falls within the scope of a federal statute that designates the court of appeals as the exclusive jurisdiction for

the review of a particular agency decision, the district court is divested of its jurisdiction to entertain such

actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. 

The specific grant of jurisdiction relevant to the instant action is set forth in the Hobbs Act, which

vests in the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction over actions seeking judicial review of “all final agency

actions described in section 20114(c) of title 49,” a provision codifying section 202(f) of the Federal

Railroad Safety Act of 1970. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(7). In turn, 49 U.S.C. § 20114(c) provides in relevant

part that “a final action of the Secretary of Transportation under [Title 49, Subtitle V, Part A] or, as

applicable to railroad safety, chapter 51 or 57 of [Title 49] shall be brought in an appropriate court of

appeals as provided in [the Hobbs Act].” 49 U.S.C. § 20114(c). The instant action involves regulations

promulgated pursuant to chapter 51 of Title 49, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-27, which codifies the Hazardous

Materials Transportation Act. Thus, it is apparent from the face of the relevant judicial review provisions

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that an action challenging the validity of those regulations, as applicable to railroad safety, must be

brought in the court of appeals.

Nevertheless, as noted above, the DOT regulations at issue here govern the transport of radioactive

substances by road, air, and sea as well as by rail. This gives rise to the possibility that the district court

would retain jurisdiction to review those portions of the radioactive materials rule that are unrelated to rail

transport, while the court of appeals would have exclusive jurisdiction over any part of the rule that is

“applicable to railroad safety.” In Rudd v. United States Department of Labor, 347 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir.

2003), the Ninth Circuit faced a similar question that arose in the context of determining its own jurisdiction

over a petition for judicial review. The case before the court arose out of the Department of Labor

Administrative Review Board’s decision to approve a settlement of claims under the whistleblower

provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9610(b). Rudd, 347 F.3d at 1087. The

claimant subsequently sought to undo the settlement, and after the Board denied his request to do so, he

filed a petition for review of the Board’s decision in the Ninth Circuit. Id. 

Before reaching the merits of the petition, however, the Ninth Circuit had to address what it

characterized as the “knotty” jurisdictional issue that it raised. Id. This issue arose from the fact that the

Clean Air Act vested exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner’s whistleblower claim in the court of appeals,

see 42 U.S.C. § 7622(c), whereas his CERCLA claim, if freestanding, would have been properly filed in

district court, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9610(b), 9613(b). The Ninth Circuit resolved the question in favor of its

own jurisdiction, holding that “the court of appeals should entertain a petition to review an agency decision

made pursuant to the agency’s authority under two or more statutes, at least one of which provides for

direct review in the courts of appeals, where the petition involves a common factual background and raises

a common legal question.” Rudd, 347 F.3d at 1090.

The instant action presents a slightly different question. As the Rudd panel observed, the court’s

holding does not directly address the scope of a district court’s jurisdiction over the kind of “mixed agency

decision” that the court of appeals faced in that case. Id. at 1090 & n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Indeed, the court expressly declined to decide whether its jurisdiction was concurrent or exclusive with

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respect to the aspects of the petitioner’s claims that would otherwise give rise to original jurisdiction in the

district court. Id. at 1090. In addition, Rudd can be distinguished from the instant action on the ground that

the conflict between district and appellate court jurisdictions that the Ninth Circuit confronted arose from

incompatible provisions of two separate statutes, whereas the issue here involves the application of a single

jurisdictional provision in the Railroad Safety Act.

In short, there is nothing in Rudd that expressly forecloses the possibility that this court might

exercise jurisdiction over certain aspects of plaintiffs’ claims. In fact, the Rudd court itself speculated in

dicta that its own jurisdiction over a “mixed agency decision” might be concurrent with the district court

“insofar as [that decision] rests upon a statute giving rise to district court jurisdiction.” Id. at 1090 n.5

(internal quotation marks omitted). However, were the Ninth Circuit to so hold, it would clearly be

adopting a minority view. The weight of authority, including the holdings of panels in Second and Seventh

Circuits, favors the view that the jurisdiction of the court of appeals in such cases is exclusive. See Sutton

v. United States Dept. of Transp., 38 F.3d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the court of appeals has

exclusive jurisdiction over agency determinations that are based “in substantial part” on a statutory provision

providing for exclusive review by the appellate court); Suburban O’Hare Comm’n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186,

192-93 (7th Cir.) (“If a decision of an administrative agency is based, in substantial part, on a statutory

provision providing for exclusive review by a court of appeals, then the entire proceeding must be reviewed

by a court of appeals.”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847 (1986); see also Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 47 F.3d

1186, 1195 (D.D.C. 1995) (“[W]here an agency order arising from a common factual background and

addressing a common question of law relies on two statutory bases that give rise to separate paths for

judicial review, the entire order should be reviewed in a comprehensive and coherent fashion, and that

review should take place in the court of appeals.”). In reaching this conclusion, these courts have identified

a number of policy considerations that support consolidated review of mixed agency decisions in the court

of appeals, including the relative expertise that appellate courts bring to the task of conducting an on-therecord review of completed administrative proceedings and the inefficiencies that follow from subjecting a

single agency decision to multiple levels of review in the district and circuit courts. See generally Rudd, 347

F.3d at 1090 (reviewing cases). However, what is undoubtedly the most persuasive reason for vesting

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exclusive jurisdiction over such actions in the court of appeals is the practical benefit of litigating all claims

arising from a single agency decision in the same forum. Accord id. at 1090 (concluding that the

petitioner’s “petition for review [was] best adjudicated in one proceeding because it challenge[d] a single,

indivisible decision”); see also Sutton, 38 F.3d at 625 (observing that “[t]he policy behind having a special

review procedure in the first place . . . disfavors bifurcating jurisdiction over various substantive grounds

between the district court and the court of appeals”). Where a district court lacks jurisdiction to review

certain aspects of an agency’s decision—those aspects in this case being the provisions of the radioactive

materials rule related to railroad safety—such a benefit can only be achieved by a rule that grants the circuit

court exclusive jurisdiction to review the decision in the its entirety.

Seeking to avoid the clear implication of such a rule, plaintiffs engage in a laborious (and labored)

analysis of the legislative history leading up to the passage of the “non-substantive” 1994 amendment to the

Railroad Safety Act’s judicial review provision, 49 U.S.C. § 20114(c). In essence, plaintiffs’ argument

amounts to a claim that the phrase “as applicable to railroad safety,” which defines the scope of direct

appellate review of hazardous materials regulations, actually means “to the extent solely applicable to

railroads.” The origin of this narrowing construction of section 20114(c)’s jurisdictional provision is a June

11, 1991 draft of the revised statutory language, which included the “solely applicable to railroads”

language on which plaintiffs rely. See Railroad Safety Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on

Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102 Cong., 1st

Sess., at 110-11 (1991). Yet the court could just as easily draw a contrary inference from the absence of

the “solely applicable” phrase in the final statute and conclude that the revised statutory text counsels against

reading such a limitation into the contested provision. Indeed, one could certainly argue that any ambiguity

in the legislative history of section 20114(c) should be resolved in favor of broad appellate court

jurisdiction, given that it is the court of appeals rather than the district court that is ordinarily charged with

reviewing the final actions of agencies within the DOT. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342(5) (granting the court

of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review rules, regulations, and final orders of the Surface Transportation

Board); 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (conferring jurisdiction on the court of appeals to review final orders of the

Federal Aviation Administration). 

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While one might debate whether it is proper to draw such an inference from a purportedly nonsubstantive amendment to the Railroad Safety Act, the fact that one is able to do so attests to the

ambiguous nature of section 20114(c)’s legislative history. In light of that fact, the sounder course is to rely

on the relatively clear language of the statutory text and interpret it according to the ordinary meaning of the

words therein. Cf. California Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 853 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Carson Harbor Vill. Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 877 (9th Cir. 2001)) (“Courts look at

legislative history where the plain language is unambiguous only if ‘the legislative history clearly indicates that

Congress meant something other than what it said.’”). The court therefore finds no reason to limit the

appellate court’s original jurisdiction under the Railroad Safety Act to hazardous materials regulations that

are “solely” applicable to railroad safety.

In any event, the problem with plaintiffs’ reading of section 20114(c) is not so much that it is wrong

(although it is), but rather that it fails to address the question presented by defendants’ motion. Even

assuming that plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute is correct, it is apparent that at least one part of the

challenged rulemaking falls within the scope of the “solely applicable to railroad safety” construction that

plaintiffs advocate. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 3,693 (amending 49 C.F.R. pt. 174 (Carriage By Rail)). Thus,

regardless of how the court chooses to interpret section 20114(c), it is still confronted with a situation

where some provisions of the regulations at issue here are “applicable to railroad safety” (and thus subject

to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of appeals), while other provisions are not. Nothing in the text or

legislative history of the Railroad Safety Act suggests that Congress even contemplated where original

jurisdiction would lie in actions seeking judicial review of such “multimodal” rulemaking, and there is

certainly no suggestion that Congress conclusively resolved this question one way or another. 

In the absence of such a clear expression of congressional intent, the court finds the considerations

that led the Second and Seventh Circuits to assign the court of appeals the task of reviewing such mixed

agencies decisions to be equally apposite here. Even plaintiffs must concede that certain aspects of DOT

rulemaking under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act—in their view, the promulgation of

regulations that are solely applicable to railroad safety—are directly and exclusively reviewable by the court

of appeals. Yet here, as will often be the case, the aspects of the DOT’s radioactive materials rule that are

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“applicable to railroad safety” are legally and factually intertwined with other aspects of the same rule that

would not otherwise be subject to direct appellate review. Under similar circumstances, the Rudd court

observed that “the interests of assuring a forum capable of treating the case coherently might justify the

comparatively modest displacement of the district court.” 347 F.3d at 1090 (quoting Shell Oil, 47 F.3d at

1195). This court finds these interests to be dispositive here and therefore holds that exclusive jurisdiction

over the instant action lies with the court of appeals. For this reason, defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction must be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 31, 2005 _______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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ENDNOTES

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