Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01451/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01451-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Busby
Defendant
Keith Monroe Hutchinson
Plaintiff
Knight
Defendant
D. L. McDaniel
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH MONROE HUTCHINSON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. L. MCDANIEL, et al.,

Defendants

Case No. 1:12 cv 01451 LJO GSA PC

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF 

LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE

IN THIRTY DAYS

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule

302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. However, “the 

liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 

490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not 

supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union 

Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 

(9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

This action proceeds on the January 31, 2014, first amended complaint. Plaintiff, an 

inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at 

the California Training Facility at Soledad, brings this civil rights action against correctional 

officials employed by the CDCR at CSP Corcoran, where the events at issue occurred. Plaintiff 

names the following individual defendants: Lieutenant D. L. McDaniel; Correctional Officer 

Knight; C/O Busby. Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious 

threat to Plaintiff’s safety, resulting in injury to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that while he was housed in Administrative Segregation (AdSeg) at CSP 

Corcoran, he was forced to accept a cellmate that had just arrived from Atascadero State Hospital. 

The next day, Plaintiff requested another cellmate because his current cellmate “had begun 

talking to himself and making statements about hurting himself and others.” Plaintiff reported 

this to the floor staff, and was told that “we don’t move anybody just because they want to get 

moved, you know we have to see some blood and or catching you fighting.” 

Plaintiff alleges that he was attacked and sexually assaulted by his cellmate. During an 

interview regarding the assault, Defendant Knight stated that he was not able to observe Plaintiff 

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“because he was covered up from head to toe.” Plaintiff alleges no other conduct as to the 

named defendants. 

A. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of inmates, which has been interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th

Cir. 2005). A prisoner seeking relief for an Eighth Amendment violation must show that the 

officials acted with deliberate indifference to the threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate. 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). “Deliberate indifference” has 

both subjective and objective components. A prison official must “be aware of facts from which 

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and . . . must also draw 

the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Liability may follow only if a prison official “knows 

that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take 

reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. 

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts from which an inference could be drawn that any of the 

named defendants knew of a specific harm to Plaintiff and disregarded that harm. Plaintiff 

concludes that defendants are liable because he advised staff in general regarding his cellmate’s 

behavior. Plaintiff had adequately alleged that he was subjected to a serious threat to his safety 

and injured as a result, but Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that each named 

defendant knew of the harm and disregarded it. The only conduct charged to any defendant is 

that C/O Knight looked in on Plaintiff, but was unable to observe him. Such an allegation is 

insufficient to hold C/O Knight liable. Plaintiff does not indicate what, if any, specific 

information Defendants were aware of that indicated that Plaintiff’s cellmate was a particular 

threat to Plaintiff. The complaint must therefore be dismissed. Plaintiff will, however, be 

granted leave to file an amended complaint. 

Plaintiff need not, however, set forth legal arguments in support of his claims. In order to 

hold an individual defendant liable, Plaintiff must name the individual defendant, describe where 

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that defendant is employed and in what capacity, and explain how that defendant acted under 

color of state law. Plaintiff should state clearly, in his or her own words, what happened. 

Plaintiff must describe what each defendant, by name, did to violate the particular right described 

by Plaintiff. 

III. Conclusion and Order

The Court has screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and finds that it does not 

state any claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The Court will provide 

Plaintiff with the opportunity to file a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies 

identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff is cautioned that he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his amended complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607 (no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state 

what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights, Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 987-88. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations 

must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, 

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 

567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an 

original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d 

at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord

Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure 

to state a claim;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send to Plaintiff a complaint form;

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3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

second amended complaint; 

4. Plaintiff may not add any new, unrelated claims to this action via his amended 

complaint and any attempt to do so will result in an order striking the amended 

complaint; and 

5. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, the Court will recommend that this 

action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2014 /s/

Gary S. Austin 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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