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Parties Involved:
Carlos Fallins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0012p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CARLOS FALLINS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 14-5153 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Tennessee of Chattanooga. 

No. 1:12-cr-00127-1—Curtis L. Collier, District Judge. 

Decided and Filed: January 22, 2015 

Before: SILER, GRIFFIN, and WHITE, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ON BRIEF: Laura E. Davis, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN 

TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Gregg L. Sullivan, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee. 

_________________ 

OPINION

_________________ 

 SILER, Circuit Judge. Carlos Fallins pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. 

The district court found that Fallins qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Fallins challenges his sentence on the theories 

that attempted aggravated arson under Tennessee law is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s 

>

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residual clause and that the ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. For the 

following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment and sentence. 

I. 

In 2013, Fallins pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He had multiple prior Tennessee convictions, including: (1) a 1995 

robbery conviction; (2) a 1998 attempted aggravated arson conviction; and (3) a 2007 possession 

of crack cocaine for resale conviction. Based on these three prior convictions, the presentence 

report (“PSR”) concluded that Fallins qualified for an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)––the ACCA. Applying the ACCA enhancement, the PSR calculated a guidelines range 

of 180 to 210 months. 

Fallins objected to the ACCA enhancement and filed a motion for downward departure 

or, in the alternative, a downward variance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because “arson” is 

an “enumerated” offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and “attempted aggravated arson” is 

not, Fallins asserted that his attempted aggravated arson conviction was not a qualifying offense 

under the residual clause of the ACCA. He argued that his attempted aggravated arson 

conviction was not a “violent felony” because it did not involve conduct that “presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another.” 

Fallins argued that the district court could not rely on the Government’s proffered factual 

basis in the plea transcript for the attempted aggravated arson conviction because Fallins did not 

assent to the factual summary. The court agreed with Fallins that it could not rely upon facts that 

were proffered by the Government during the plea colloquy but not admitted by Fallins. 

Nonetheless, the court found that Fallins’s attempted aggravated arson conviction was a “violent 

felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause and also found that Fallins’s crack-cocaine conviction 

and his robbery conviction qualified as predicate offenses under the ACCA. Based on Fallins’s 

ACCA designation and after considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court 

sentenced him to 195 months of incarceration. 

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II. 

“We generally review de novo a district court’s determination that a prior conviction 

qualifies as a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA.” United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 399 

(6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 729 (6th Cir. 2011)). 

Fallins claims that his sentence enhancement was unwarranted because the district court 

erred when it found that his attempted aggravated arson conviction qualified as a “violent 

felony.” Under § 924(e)(1) of the ACCA, when a defendant is convicted of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm and has “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious 

drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another,” the defendant “shall 

be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years . . . .” The ACCA defines “violent felony” in 

§ 924(e)(2): 

(B) the term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a 

term exceeding one year . . . that–– 

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another; or 

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise 

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another. 

Courts may rely on a limited body of material when considering whether a predicate 

offense qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. Generally, we apply a “categorical 

approach” to assess whether a predicate offense is a violent felony. Under this approach, we 

only consider the statutory definition of the predicate crime. United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 

769, 774-75 (6th Cir. 2014). The particular facts underlying the conviction are irrelevant. Id.

However, some crimes are “divisible,” which “mean[s] they encompass different crimes 

embedded in one statute. If a divisible statute contains multiple crimes, and if at least one of the 

crimes is categorically a violent felony and at least one of the crimes is not, then we employ a 

‘modified categorical approach.’” United States v. Ball, 771 F.3d 964, 968 (6th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281-85 (2013)). Under the “modified 

categorical approach,” we consider a narrow category of documents, known as Shepard 

materials, to evaluate which crime within the statute was the basis of the defendant’s predicate 

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conviction. See United States v. Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552, 556 (6th Cir. 2012). Shepard 

materials include only the charging document, a written plea agreement and the transcript of the 

plea colloquy or some comparable judicial record of this information. Shepard v. United States, 

544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). 

In this case, there are several Tennessee statutes at issue. Fallins was convicted of 

attempted aggravated arson, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101. Tennessee defines 

aggravated arson as: 

(a) A person commits aggravated arson who commits arson as defined in [Tenn. 

Code Ann.] § 39-14-301 or § 39-14-303: 

(1) When one (1) or more persons are present therein; or 

(2) When any person, including firefighters and law enforcement officials, suffers 

serious bodily injury as a result of the fire or explosion. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-302. 

Arson is defined in two separate sections of the Tennessee Code: (1) § 39-14-301, which 

defines arson of a structure; and (2) § 39-14-303, which defines arson of personal property or 

real estate. The former offense is defined as: 

(a) A person commits [arson] who knowingly damages any structure by means 

of a fire or explosion: 

(1) Without the consent of all persons who have a possessory, proprietary or 

security interest therein; or 

(2) With intent to destroy or damage any structure to collect insurance for the 

damage or destruction or for any unlawful purpose. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-301. Arson of personal property or real estate is defined as: 

(a) A person commits arson who knowingly damages any personal property, 

land, or other property, except buildings or structures covered under § 39-14-301, 

by means of a fire or explosion: 

(1) Without the consent of all persons who have a possessory or proprietary 

interest therein; or 

(2) With intent to destroy or damage any such property for any unlawful 

purpose. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-303. 

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Because “arson” is an “enumerated” offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)––

meaning it is a violent felony––aggravated arson undoubtedly qualifies as a “violent felony” 

under the ACCA. However, because Fallins’s conviction was for attempted aggravated arson, 

we must also consider Tennessee’s attempt statute. Under Tennessee law, an attempt may be 

committed in one of three ways: 

(a) A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability 

otherwise required for the offense: 

(1) Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute an 

offense, if the circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person believes 

them to be; 

(2) Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and 

believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the person’s 

part; or 

(3) Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would 

constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the 

person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step toward 

the commission of the offense. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101. 

Subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) set forth three ways an individual can commit the 

offense of criminal attempt. Id. However, we need not pinpoint which subdivision formed the 

basis of Fallins’s predicate crime. Applying the two-part test discussed below, it appears that 

any form of attempted aggravated arson––under subdivision (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3)––would be a 

categorically violent felony. Therefore, we must apply the categorical approach and only 

consider the statutory definitions of the predicate crime. See Davis, 751 F.3d at 774-75. 

 Accordingly, the issue is whether Fallins’s attempted aggravated arson conviction 

qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). As a threshold 

matter, the Supreme Court has held that an attempt to commit an enumerated offense may come 

within the scope of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual provision. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 

192, 201 (2007). In James, the Supreme Court upheld a finding that attempted burglary is a 

violent felony under the residual clause. Id. at 195. We have not yet addressed whether 

attempted aggravated arson under Tennessee law––or under any other state’s law––constitutes a 

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violent felony under the residual clause.1 However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a 

conviction for attempted arson under Florida law is a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual 

clause. United States v. Rainey, 362 F.3d 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. 

Adkison, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (table) (noting that the defendant’s “distinction between 

arson and attempted arson is immaterial. Arson or attempted arson, by their very nature, pose 

serious potential risk of physical injury to other persons . . . . Adkison’s inability to consummate 

the arson does not negate the risk of harm.”). Fallins has not identified case law from any other 

circuit to the contrary to support his position that attempted aggravated arson is not a violent 

felony under the ACCA’s residual clause. 

We apply a two-step test to determine if a crime is “violent” under the ACCA’s residual 

clause. See United States v. Stafford, 721 F.3d 380, 399 (6th Cir. 2013). The first step evaluates 

whether the predicate offense, as defined by statute, “presents a serious potential risk of physical 

injury to another.” United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054, 1060 (6th Cir. 2014). “The crime 

need not actually result in physical injury; the residual clause requires only ‘a serious potential 

risk of physical injury.’” Ball, 771 F.3d at 969 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 628, 

632 (6th Cir. 2012)). 

Under Tennessee law, arson is defined as setting fire to a structure, Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 39-14-301, or to personal property or real estate, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-303. Aggravated 

arson requires that one or more persons be present in the structure or that serious bodily injury 

occurs to any individual as a result of the fire or explosion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-302. We 

have recognized that arson (without the added element of aggravation) causes a serious potential 

risk of physical injury. See United States v. Adams, 51 F. App’x 507, 508 (6th Cir. 2002) 

(“Arson . . . involves conduct posing a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” and 

the “serious potential risk of physical injury to others exists because the fire could harm 

firefighters and onlookers and could spread to occupied structures.”). And, for the following 

 1

An attempt to commit another enumerated offense––burglary––is covered by the ACCA’s residual clause. 

United States v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895, 903 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that “[defendant’s] conviction for attempted 

burglary [under Ohio law] is a ‘violent felony’ under the [residual clause]”). While this illustrates that we have held 

that an attempt to commit an enumerated offense may constitute a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause, 

whether an attempt to commit an enumerated offense is a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause is 

determined on a case-by-case basis by looking to each state’s attempt statute. 

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reasons, attempted aggravated arson also creates a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another. 

Satisfying the “serious potential risk of physical injury” requirement under the ACCA’s 

residual clause does “not require metaphysical certainty. Rather, § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual 

provision speaks in terms of a ‘potential risk.’ These are inherently probabilistic concepts. 

Indeed, the combination of the two terms suggests that Congress intended to encompass 

possibilities even more contingent or remote than a simple ‘risk,’ much less a certainty.” James, 

550 U.S. at 207-08. Under subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) of Tennessee’s criminal attempt 

statute, attempted aggravated arson creates the requisite potential of risk contemplated under the 

ACCA’s residual clause. 

“[S]ubdivision (a)(1) [of Tennessee’s criminal attempt statute] is directed at a completed 

course of conduct.” State v. Byrd, No. E2000-00520-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 840290, at *3 

(Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2001) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101, Sentencing Comm’n 

Cmts.). In order to commit an attempt under subdivision (a)(1), Fallins would have had to 

engage in conduct that would have constituted aggravated arson but for a mistake in fact. He had 

to have taken all steps required to commit aggravated arson––which necessarily requires either 

the presence of one or more persons in the targeted structure or serious bodily injury resulting 

from the arson––yet failed to complete the offense due to some mistake of fact, such as that an 

explosive device was defective. This scenario does not negate the inherent serious potential risk 

of physical injury. 

Subdivision (a)(2) is: 

a codification of the generally accepted “last proximate act” doctrine as a basis for 

imposing attempt responsibility. The law is that if an offense is defined in terms 

of causing a certain result, an individual commits an attempt at the point when the 

individual has done everything believed necessary to accomplish the intended 

criminal result. 

State v. Braden, No. 01C01-9408-CR-00264, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 262, at *2-3 (Mar. 

23, 1995). Thus, taking all steps required to commit aggravated arson––which necessarily 

requires either the presence of one or more persons in the targeted structure or serious bodily 

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injury resulting from the arson––yet being unsuccessful in carrying out the crime, does not 

negate the inherent potential risk of physical injury. 

Subdivision (a)(3) imputes attempt responsibility––beyond mere preparation but short of 

the completed offense––when an individual’s intentional “conduct constitutes a substantial step 

toward the commission of the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101(a)(3); see State v. Reeves, 

916 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that a jury may find that subdivision (a)(3) is 

satisfied when a defendant “possesses materials to be used in the commission of a crime, at or 

near the scene of the crime, and where the possession of those materials can serve no lawful 

purpose . . . if such action is strongly corroborative of the actor’s overall criminal purpose” 

(emphasis added)). Significantly, “[c]onduct does not constitute a substantial step under 

subdivision (a)(3), unless the person’s entire course of action is corroborative of the intent to 

commit the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101(b). When one possesses materials 

necessary to commit arson at or near the scene with the intent to commit aggravated arson, the 

conduct creates a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 

Because attempted aggravated arson under Tennessee law always “presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another” under the first step of the residual clause analysis, we 

proceed to step two. To qualify as a violent felony under the second step of the residual clause 

analysis, the crime “must also be similar ‘in kind as well as in degree of risk posed’” to the 

enumerated crimes in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), e.g., burglary, arson, extortion and crimes 

involving explosives. United States v. Vanhook, 640 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008)). 

The Supreme Court has established two different standards for assessing whether a 

crime’s riskiness is comparable to the enumerated crimes. In Begay, it held that the underlying 

crime––driving while under the influence––did not possess the requisite degree of risk because 

DUI is not inherently “purposeful, violent and aggressive.” 553 U.S. at 144-45. In Sykes v. 

United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2276 (2011), it drew a distinction between “crime[s] akin to strict 

liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes” such as the DUI at issue in Begay and those that 

are not. 131 S. Ct. at 2276. “When a crime carries a specific mens rea, the Court [in Sykes] 

explained, the inquiry is not whether the crime was purposeful, violent, and aggressive. Instead, 

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courts should compare the risk posed by the crime in question to the risk posed by its closest 

analog among the ACCA’s enumerated offenses.” Ball, 771 F.3d at 970 (citing Sykes, 131 S. Ct. 

at 2273). 

Fallins’s crime of attempted aggravated arson requires a specific mens rea. Attempt, 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101, is an intentional offense under each of the three prongs of the 

statute. See State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tenn. 1996) (“The nature of an attempt 

. . . is that it requires a specific intent.”). And Tennessee law provides that arson must be done 

“knowingly.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-301 & 39-14-303. Because Tennessee’s attempt 

statute requires a specific mens rea, the Sykes test applies. And the question under Sykes is 

whether the crime at issue––attempted aggravated arson––poses a risk similar to that of “its 

closest analog among the enumerated offenses.” Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2273 (quoting James, 

550 U.S. at 203). 

Here, arson is the closest enumerated offense to the crime of attempted aggravated arson. 

In evaluating whether the crime of attempted burglary satisfied the requisite degree of risk to be 

a “violent” felony under the ACCA, the Supreme Court in James concluded that attempted 

burglary is akin to and possesses the same kind of risk as the enumerated offense of burglary. 

550 U.S. at 203-04. Applying the Court’s logic in James, we recognize that attempted 

aggravated arson is akin to and possesses the same kind of risk as arson. 

 Accordingly, we hold that attempted aggravated arson under Tennessee law qualifies as a 

violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause. 

III. 

Fallins claims for the first time on appeal that the ACCA is “unconstitutionally vague in 

whole, and/or in part with respect to the residual clause.” He acknowledges that “current 

precedent is against him,” yet offers no reason why we can or should depart from binding 

precedent. Constitutional sentencing issues not raised below are reviewed for plain error. 

United States v. Yancy, 725 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Fallins is unable to satisfy the first prong of the plain-error test because binding precedent 

from the Supreme Court as well as our court precludes his vagueness challenge. The Court in

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James stated that, “[w]hile ACCA requires judges to make sometimes difficult evaluations of the 

risks posed by different offenses, we are not persuaded by Justice Scalia’s suggestion . . . that the 

residual provision is unconstitutionally vague.” 550 U.S. at 210 n.6.2

 The Court later interpreted 

the ACCA and relied on its residual clause to uphold the judgment in Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2277. 

Similarly, we have recognized that “[b]inding precedent holds that the ACCA’s residual clause is 

not unconstitutionally vague.” United States v. Phillips, 752 F.3d 1047, 1051 (6th Cir. 2014); 

see also Taylor, 696 F.3d at 633 (rejecting the defendant’s vagueness challenge to the ACCA’s 

residual clause and noting that in James and Sykes the Supreme Court “stated that the statute is 

sufficiently definite, stripping us of any authority to hold otherwise”). Accordingly, we find no 

error. 

AFFIRMED. 

 2

 We recognize that the Supreme Court recently granted reargument on this issue in Johnson v. United 

States, No. 13-7120, 2015 WL 132524, at *1 (Jan. 9, 2015), but until a decision is reached, the ACCA residual 

clause is not void for vagueness. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2277 (relying on the residual clause to uphold the judgment). 

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