Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-30011/USCOURTS-ca9-07-30011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Martin Soto
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 07-30011

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  CR-06-02076-AAM

JOSE MARTIN SOTO, ORDER AND

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Alan A. McDonald, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 7, 2007—Seattle, Washington

Filed March 19, 2008

Before: William C. Canby, Jr., Susan P. Graber, and

Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam;

Concurrence by Judge Graber;

Concurrence by Judge Gould

2609

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 1 of 18
COUNSEL

Tracy A. Staab, Research & Writing Attorney, Federal

Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho, Spokane, Washington, for the defendant-appellant. 

UNITED STATES v. SOTO 2611

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 2 of 18
Thomas J. Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney, Yakima,

Washington, for the plaintiff-appellee.

ORDER

The petition for panel rehearing is GRANTED. The memorandum disposition filed on November 28, 2007, is withdrawn

and the Clerk is ordered to file the attached opinion in its

place. New petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing

en banc may be filed.

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Defendant Jose Martin Soto appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21

U.S.C. § 841(a). He argues that the district court violated Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), and James v. Kentucky,

466 U.S. 341 (1984), by failing to give his requested instruction that the jury make no adverse inference from his constitutionally protected choice not to testify. We hold that any error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We also reject

Defendant’s other challenge to the jury instructions. We

therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Police arrested Lenise Acevedo on drug charges. She

agreed to help them arrest several of her suppliers, including

Defendant. After a controlled sale of methamphetamine at

Defendant’s house, police obtained and executed a search

warrant. They arrested Defendant, who was asleep in bed, and

searched his house. That search uncovered drugs hidden in the

kitchen, in the bedroom where Defendant was sleeping, and

2612 UNITED STATES v. SOTO

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 3 of 18
in a nearby bedroom; two scales commonly used by drug distributors in a kitchen drawer; and $537 in cash. 

Defendant was indicted on one count of distribution of

methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, id. He

pleaded not guilty. In addition to the results of the search of

Defendant’s house, the primary evidence introduced by the

government in the three-day jury trial was the testimony of

Acevedo, who testified in exchange for a reduced sentence. 

In a pretrial conference on August 12, 2006, the district

court set a deadline of August 29—one week before trial—for

proposed jury instructions to be submitted in writing by both

parties. Neither party objected to the deadline or to the

requirement of written proposals. Only the government submitted proposed jury instructions in writing; Defendant did

not submit any proposed jury instructions, either orally or in

writing. 

At the close of trial and immediately before the parties’

closing arguments, Defendant’s counsel orally requested an

instruction that the jury should not “hold . . . against him” the

fact that Defendant had not testified. The court refused the

instruction because no timely written request had been made.

After the parties gave their closing arguments, the court

instructed the jury. The court charged the jury to consider the

instructions “as a whole” and to presume Defendant’s innocence, explained that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt rested with the government, and defined “reasonable

doubt.” The instructions also included this statement: “Your

sole interest is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case.

You’ve been chosen and sworn as jurors in this case to try the

issues of fact presented by the parties and determine the issue

of guilt or innocence.” The post-trial instructions did not

UNITED STATES v. SOTO 2613

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 4 of 18
include a statement that the jury should draw no adverse inference from the Defendant’s failure to testify.1

The jury convicted Defendant of possession, but acquitted

him of distribution. The lower end of the Sentencing Guidelines range was 188 months, but the district court imposed a

sentence of only 120 months—the statutory mandatory minimum. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Defendant timely appeals his

conviction.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo whether the district court committed

reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that it should

draw no adverse inference from a defendant’s failure to testify. United States v. Castaneda, 94 F.3d 592, 596 (9th Cir.

1996). 

When a defendant fails to object at trial to jury instructions,

we review for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United

States v. Lopez, 477 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

128 S. Ct. 131 (2007). 

1Pretrial, the court cautioned the jury pool: 

[Defendant’s] not required to take the stand himself. . . . If he

calls no witnesses, doesn’t testify, . . . you’re to draw no adverse

presumption from that fact. . . . 

. . . . 

He may not get on the stand for all kinds of reasons[,] . . .

[many of which] don’t have anything really to do with this case.

. . . You should simply remember that the burden lies over here

[referring to the government]. 

2614 UNITED STATES v. SOTO

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 5 of 18
DISCUSSION

A. “No Adverse Inference” Instruction

[1] In Carter, 450 U.S. 288, the Supreme Court “held that

a trial judge must, if requested to do so, instruct the jury not

to draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s failure to

take the stand.” James, 466 U.S. at 342. The government

argues that harmless error analysis applies to Carter error and

that, even if the district court erred, any error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.2

[2] The Supreme Court has recognized that some errors—

known as structural errors—“defy analysis by harmless-error

standards because they affect the framework within which the

trial proceeds.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct.

2557, 2564 (2006) (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted); see generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,

307-10 (1991) (dividing errors into “trial errors” and “structural errors”). “If the defendant had counsel and was tried by

an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that

any other constitutional errors that may have occurred are

subject to harmless-error analysis. Only in rare cases has [the

Supreme] Court held that an error is structural . . . .” Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2551 (2006) (citations,

internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). The Court

has expressly reserved the question whether harmless error

analysis applies to Carter error. James, 466 U.S. at 351; Carter, 450 U.S. at 304. 

[3] We hold that failure to give a Carter instruction is not

a structural error, because it does not “affect the framework

within which the trial proceeds.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct.

at 2564 (alteration omitted). The types of errors deemed struc2We therefore need not reach the government’s alternative argument

that the district court did not err because it properly enforced the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a). 

UNITED STATES v. SOTO 2615

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 6 of 18
tural are different in kind from a failure to give a Carter

instruction. See Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. at 2551 n.2 (cataloguing

structural errors: “complete denial of counsel,” “biased trial

judge,” “racial discrimination in selection of grand jury,” “denial of self-representation at trial,” “denial of public trial,”

and “defective reasonable-doubt instruction”). The failure to

give a Carter instruction is more akin, for example, to the

failure of a trial judge to instruct the jury on an element of the

offense. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)

(holding that failure to instruct the jury on an element of the

offense is not structural error because it “does not necessarily

render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable

vehicle for determining guilt or innocence”). Moreover, a

Carter instruction is not required in every criminal trial; it is

merely available if a defendant so requests. Carter, 450 U.S.

at 305. We therefore join the only other circuit to have

addressed the question and hold that Carter error is subject to

harmless error analysis. See United States v. Brand, 80 F.3d

560, 568 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the “failure to give a

requested Carter instruction falls comfortably” in the category of errors amenable to harmless-error analysis); see also

People v. Evans, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 549-50 (Ct. App. 1998)

(reaching the same conclusion). 

[4] Here, assuming that the district court erred, its failure

to give a “no adverse inference” instruction was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386

U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (stating the standard that, “before a federal

constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be

able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). The evidence that Defendant distributed

methamphetamine was not particularly strong, but the jury

acquitted Defendant of that charge. The uncontradicted evidence that Defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent

to distribute, by contrast, was overwhelming. See Brand, 80

F.3d at 568 (finding that any Carter error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt because the uncontradicted evidence against the defendants was “overwhelming”). 

2616 UNITED STATES v. SOTO

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 7 of 18
[5] When police executed the search warrant of Defendant’s own home, Defendant was the only person there. The

police found methamphetamine hidden in the bedroom where

Defendant was sleeping, as well as in a nearby bedroom and

in the kitchen. They also found drug-weighing scales and a

substantial amount of cash. Because the evidence demonstrated that Defendant was the sole occupant of his residence

and that drugs, cash, and scales were discovered in the residence, we hold that the district court’s failure to instruct the

jury not to draw any adverse inference from Defendant’s failure to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Defendant asserts that the error cannot be harmless because

the question for the jury was one of credibility. Defendant’s

theory of the case was that Acevedo planted drugs in the

house before the controlled buy and before the execution of

the search warrant and then lied about it on the witness stand.

According to Defendant, the jury naturally would look to him

to dispel Acevedo’s account of the events, and the district

court’s failure to instruct on his silence therefore had an indisputable effect on the jury’s deliberations. We might be persuaded by Defendant’s argument were it not for the fact that

the jury acquitted him of distribution. Logically, on this

record, the jury rejected Acevedo’s testimony, which was the

only link to the distribution charge. That is, the jury’s determination on the possession count, which was supported

mainly by the physical evidence, did not turn on the question

of Acevedo’s credibility. 

We have addressed the question of reversible error in this

context once before. In Castaneda, 94 F.3d at 596, we

assessed similar facts and held that “[t]he district court did not

commit reversible error by rejecting Castaneda’s proposed

[Carter] instruction.” Castaneda is not a model of clarity, as

at least one court has observed. See Evans, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d

at 546 (noting that “the opinion is not entirely clear as to the

grounds on which the court rested its decision”). Defendant

also contends that Castaneda was wrongly decided. But our

UNITED STATES v. SOTO 2617

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 8 of 18
holding today rests on independent grounds that are different

from, but not inconsistent with, the reasons given in Castaneda. We therefore need not address the correctness of Castaneda nor, if we were to agree that Castaneda was wrongly

decided, request en banc rehearing. See Miller v. Gammie,

335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that, in

the absence of an intervening Supreme Court decision, only

the en banc court may overrule a decision by a three-judge

panel). 

B. Jury Instructions on the Government’s Burden of

Proof

We hold that the district court did not err when instructing

the jury on the government’s burden of proof. See United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (holding that plain

error requires, first, that the district court erred). 

[6] “In evaluating the constitutionality of the jury charge,

we must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood

that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction

based on proof insufficient to meet the requirements of due

process.” Ramirez v. Hatcher, 136 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir.

1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The challenged

instruction is not examined in isolation; “[r]ather, taken as a

whole, the instructions must correctly convey the concept of

reasonable doubt to the jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted). 

[7] Here, the district court repeatedly emphasized the government’s burden to prove all elements of the offense beyond

a reasonable doubt.3 In light of those clear jury instructions,

3The district court’s charge included the following jury instructions: 

The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a defendant. . . .

The test for conviction is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It

is not required that the government prove guilt beyond all possi2618 UNITED STATES v. SOTO

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 9 of 18
we think that there is no likelihood that the jury understood

that any lower standard of proof could suffice. The district

court’s statement challenged by Defendant—“Your sole interest is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case. You’ve

been chosen and sworn as jurors in this case to try the issues

of fact presented by the parties and determine the issue of

guilt or innocence”—is correct and does not contradict its

numerous instructions on the government’s burden of proof.

CONCLUSION

Any error stemming from the district court’s failure to give

a Carter instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,

ble doubt, but reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt

based upon reason and common sense, the kind of doubt that

would make a reasonable person hesitant to act. Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced that

the defendant is guilty. A reasonable doubt may arise not only

from the evidence, but also from the lack of evidence. 

If after a careful and impartial consideration of all of the evidence, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant is guilty, it is your duty to find the defendant not

guilty. On the other hand, if after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, it’s your duty to find the

defendant guilty. 

. . . . 

The defendant[’s plea of] “not guilty” . . . imposes on the government the burden of establishing each of these elements by

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

. . . It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes beyond

a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed on a date reasonably near the date alleged. 

. . . [T]he government must prove each of the following elements [on Count 1] beyond a reasonable doubt. 

. . . . 

. . . [T]he government must prove each of the following elements [on Count 2] beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Emphases added.) 

UNITED STATES v. SOTO 2619

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 10 of 18
and the district court properly instructed the jury on the government’s burden of proof. 

AFFIRMED. 

GRABER, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I write separately to address an additional, alternative

ground for affirmance not reached by the opinion: whether the

district court erred by enforcing the procedural requirements

of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a). Op. at 2615 n.2.

In my view, the district court did not abuse its discretion when

it refused Defendant’s proposed instruction on the ground that

he had failed to make a “proper request” within the meaning

of Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981). 

Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 

Any party may request in writing that the court

instruct the jury on the law as specified in the

request. The request must be made at the close of the

evidence or at any earlier time that the court reasonably sets. When the request is made, the requesting

party must furnish a copy to every other party. 

Pursuant to Rule 30(a), the district court here set a deadline

of a week before trial for submission of proposed jury instructions in writing. Defendant did not object, and he has never

argued that the date or the requirement of written proposals

was unreasonable. Defendant submitted no written proposed

jury instructions at any time. 

At the close of evidence, the following colloquy occurred

between the judge and Defendant’s counsel: 

2620 UNITED STATES v. SOTO

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 11 of 18
MR. SCOTT: Your Honor, the government has

not proposed the instruction because the defendant,

rather, has not testified. And I would ask that that —

I believe that that is typically given, but that was not

part of the proposed instructions, and I would just

ask formally on the record that the court instruct the

jury that they should not take that and hold that

against him. 

THE COURT: Counsel, I’m not going to do

that. 

MR. SCOTT: I understand. 

THE COURT: You had the opportunity to submit instructions that you proposed. That’s what the

rule [Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] requires. And the court would then have an

opportunity to look at it in context and hear from the

government concerning any objections it might have.

I’m not going to make one up. I don’t think you need

to be concerned. I really think that, from the instructions the court proposes to give, that his constitutional rights are protected. And I spent a good deal

of time talking to them about it when they were

being selected. 

MR. SCOTT: I think that you have, Your

Honor. 

THE COURT: And I’m not going to deal with

instructions unless they’re proposed to the court,

provided according to the rules. 

In short, Defendant’s proposed jury instruction was both

untimely and in incorrect form. Citing the requirements of

Rule 30, the district judge rejected Defendant’s request. In my

view, the district court did not err. 

UNITED STATES v. SOTO 2621

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 12 of 18
The bare failure to give a Carter instruction is not itself

error. It is only when the defendant makes a proper request

that the trial court is obliged to give the instruction. The question, then, is whether the trial court constitutionally can

impose reasonable restrictions on the form and timing of that

request.1

Both Carter and James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984),

strongly suggest that the defendant’s right to a Carter instruction does not trump reasonable procedural rules. The Court in

Carter concluded: 

The freedom of a defendant in a criminal trial to

remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will is guaranteed by the

Fifth Amendment and made applicable to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth. And the

Constitution further guarantees that no adverse inferences are to be drawn from the exercise of that privilege. Just as adverse comment on a defendant’s

silence cuts down on the privilege by making its

assertion costly, the failure to limit the jurors’ speculation on the meaning of that silence, when the

defendant makes a timely request that a prophylactic

instruction be given, exacts an impermissible toll on

the full and free exercise of the privilege. Accordingly, we hold that a state trial judge has the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to

1There is no doubt that the district court generally can impose such

restrictions. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(a); United States v. Cunningham, 194

F.3d 1186, 1200 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court’s denial of

a proposed instruction because it was not submitted in writing); United

States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 633, 652-53 (11th Cir. 1983) (same: because

the request was untimely); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 750-51

(9th Cir. 1977) (holding that any jury instruction error by the district court

was “excusable in light of [the defendant’s] tardiness” in submitting jury

instructions after the close of evidence rather than five days before trial,

as required by local rule). 

2622 UNITED STATES v. SOTO

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 13 of 18
minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant’s failure to testify. 

450 U.S. at 305 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added). In James, the entire issue the Court

faced was whether the petitioner had procedurally defaulted

by requesting the instruction in incorrect form by using the

term “admonition” rather than “instruction.” 466 U.S. at 342.

Although the Court concluded that, under Kentucky law, the

procedural error was nonexistent, or slight at best, id. at 348-

49, its reasoning inescapably suggests that a more firmly

rooted and clear-cut procedural rule would have changed the

outcome. 

Admittedly, Carter and James were appeals from state

cases, and the issue was whether an independent and adequate

state ground barred the federal courts from considering the

constitutional claim. But if state courts are free to impose procedural requirements that defendants make a “proper request,”

Carter, 450 U.S. at 305, there is no principled reason why

federal courts could not do the same. In fact, the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure do impose certain requirements,

including that proposed instructions be submitted in timely

fashion and in writing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(a). 

Allowing district courts to impose reasonable procedural

restrictions on requests for jury instructions (including a Carter instruction) makes sense. A contrary rule would mean that

the district court would be at the mercy of a defendant, no

matter when or how a request is made and no matter how reasonable the court’s directions. Defendant here complains that

he did not submit the instruction because he was unsure

before trial whether he would testify. Although the applicability of that argument in this particular case is doubtful,2

 there

2Defendant submitted no proposed jury instructions, so it is questionable whether he truly mulled over the possibility of submitting this one

particular instruction. 

UNITED STATES v. SOTO 2623

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 14 of 18
still is no conflict with the district judge’s requirements:

Defendant clearly could have submitted a conditional jury

instruction, to be read if Defendant indeed invoked his right

not to testify. 

That reasonable restrictions may be imposed on the form

and timing of a defendant’s request for a Carter instruction

does not mean that district courts could reject reasonable

requests by a defendant. Here, however, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in rejecting Defendant’s request. The

request was untimely because it was made for the first time

several days after the deadline and at the end of a three-day

trial, and Defendant neither objected to the reasonableness of

the deadline nor requested an extension. The request was not

in the correct form because it was not submitted in writing.

Defendant did not ask for time to submit the request in writing. To the contrary, even though the judge asked both counsel if they wished to proceed that afternoon or wait until the

next day, Defendant’s counsel responded that he wished to

proceed immediately. The request was not in the correct form

also because it was only a general request for the instruction,

not a succinct proposed instruction: “I would just ask formally

on the record that the court instruct the jury that they should

not take that and hold that against him.” The district court

explained its reasons for rejecting that request, and Defendant

acceded. 

I emphasize that a district court might well abuse its discretion if it applied procedural requirements rigidly, even if the

requirements were consistent with Rule 30. A mere technical

failure or a slight untimeliness likely would not trump the

strong reasons behind the constitutional right to the Carter

instruction. But the several failures in this case and the wholly

reasonable approach and explanations by the district court

counsel against reversal. 

I acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit reached a different

conclusion in United States v. Eiland, 741 F.2d 738, 742 (5th

Cir. 1984): 

2624 UNITED STATES v. SOTO

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 15 of 18
[Defendant’s] objection to the omission of this

charge had the same effect as a valid request for the

instruction. We have cautioned against blindly

applying the procedures for requesting or objecting

instructions so as to create a “trap for the unwary.”

United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir.

1978). Eiland’s objection and the court’s response

. . . clearly preserved the defendant’s constitutional

right to an instruction on his failure to testify. 

(Footnote omitted.) But Eiland is factually distinguishable. In

that case, the district court’s only stated reason for not including the instruction was that the court thought that the other

instructions were sufficient. See id. at 742 n.1 (“Well, I told

[the jury] several times that the defendant is not required to

prove his innocence, doesn’t have to produce any evidence at

all. I think that is sufficient.”). On that point, the district court

was wrong under Fifth Circuit precedent, and the Fifth Circuit

reversed on that ground. Id. at 743. It appears that the defendant’s request in Eiland was timely and that the government

did not argue that the defendant had violated Rule 30’s

requirement that the proposed instruction be in writing. Here,

moreover, the district court clearly explained the required procedures, so there was no “trap for the unwary.” 

In conclusion, I agree fully with the opinion that any error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give

Defendant’s proposed instruction that was untimely, not in

writing, not in precise form, and in violation of Rule 30(a).

GOULD, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I join the per curiam opinion in full. Given the other evidence of Soto’s guilt on the possession offense, and the fact

that he was acquitted on the distribution offense, the error

UNITED STATES v. SOTO 2625

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 16 of 18
caused by the judge’s refusal to instruct the jury as Soto had

requested regarding Soto’s failure to testify was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. I write separately, however, to

state my view that the refusal of the district court to give such

an instruction when requested at trial was error, and that our

precedent of United States v. Castaneda, 94 F.3d 592 (9th Cir.

1996) which seems to reach a contrary conclusion,1 was

wrongly decided and, at an appropriate opportunity, should be

revisited through our en banc process. 

The Supreme Court has stated in no uncertain terms that

judges presiding over jury trials have a “constitutional obligation . . . to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant’s failure to testify” and that they

are to discharge this obligation by instructing the jury, when

a defendant properly requests such an instruction, that the jury

may draw no adverse inference from the defendant’s decision

not to take the stand. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288,

305 (1981); see also James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 342

(1984) (reaffirming the Carter rule). While purporting to

acknowledge this Supreme Court authority, our opinion in

Castaneda effectively ignored it by holding that a model

Ninth Circuit jury instruction regarding the presumption of

1

It is unclear whether Castaneda held that the failure to give a “no

adverse inference” instruction was not error at all because the substance

of that proposed instruction was adequately covered by other instructions

that the jury was given, or whether the Castaneda court concluded that

there was error under Carter but that the error was harmless because the

judge made remarks during voir dire about the defendant’s right not to testify and cautioned that “if he exercises that right, you cannot allow that to

affect your determination of the issues.” See Castaneda, 94 F.3d at 596.

In my view, this confusion about the proposition for which Castaneda

actually stands is one of the chief problems with the opinion, but I believe

that either interpretation is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Carter and James. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s precedents on

this issue suggests that the judge’s “constitutional obligation” to warn the

jury not to give evidentiary weight to the defendant’s failure to testify can

be met through statements made during voir dire rather than a formal jury

instruction, when requested, at the close of trial. 

2626 UNITED STATES v. SOTO

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 17 of 18
innocence and the government’s burden of proving guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt “sufficiently covered the substance

of Castaneda’s proposed instruction: the defendant’s failure to

testify does not lessen the government’s burden to prove its

case.” Castaneda, 94 F.3d at 596. 

In deciding Carter, however, the Supreme Court dismissed

an almost identical “presumption of innocence” jury instruction as “no substitute for the explicit instruction that the petitioner’s lawyer requested.” Carter, 450 U.S. at 304. The

Court reasoned that while “the Fifth Amendment privilege

and the presumption of innocence are closely aligned[,] . . .

these principles serve different functions,” and so the explicit

“no adverse inference” instruction, when requested by a

defendant, is still required by the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments. See id. at 304-05. Thus, Castaneda represents

a mistake waiting to be corrected. 

I hope that when a proper occasion arises, a larger complement of our court’s judges will remedy the confusion caused

by Castaneda and bring this circuit’s jury instruction jurisprudence into complete harmony with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Carter. Following the Supreme Court’s advice in

Carter will ensure fairness to those accused of crimes and

help to attain a superior criminal procedure.

UNITED STATES v. SOTO 2627

Case: 07-30011 03/19/2008 ID: 6476646 DktEntry: 31-1 Page: 18 of 18