Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00279/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00279-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Allen Wimberley
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s motion to dismiss the 1

petition.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD ALLEN WIMBERLEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES A. YATES, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-00279 OWW LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #7]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus, following his conviction on

December 17, 2004, of first degree burglary in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2), making

criminal threats in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 422, and various enhancements. Petitioner was

sentenced to serve a total determinate prison term of eighteen years and four months. 

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

Petitioner thereafter appealed the conviction. On November 29, 2005, the California Court

of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (hereinafter “5 DCA”) affirmed the conviction. See Lodged th

Document No. 4.

On December 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court. See Lodged Document No. 5. Review was summarily denied by the California Supreme

Court on February 1, 2006. See Lodged Document No. 6.

On March 13, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. Petitioner raises the following ground for relief: (1) “The trial court violated petitioner’s right

to due process under the 6 and 14 Amendment of the United States Constitution by denying th th

petitioner’s motion for mistrial.”

On June 27, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust

state remedies.

On July 19, 2006, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be raised by the

attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” The Ninth

Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitioner failed to

exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

§ 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d

599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). th

Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s

motion for dismissal pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

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U.S. District Court

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petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full th

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999); th

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court th

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

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U.S. District Court

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underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In addition, in order to fully exhaust a federal claim, the petitioner must properly raise the

federal constitutional claim at every level of review, including the intermediate court of appeal.

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (“where the [federal] claim has been presented for the

first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered unless there are

special and important reasons . . . [r]aising the claim in such a fashion does not . . . constitute fair

presentation.”); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916-918 (9 Cir. 2004) (concluding that the th

petitioner did not fairly present his federal constitutional claims by raising them for the first and only

time to the state's highest court on discretionary review). 

In the instant petition before the Court, Petitioner raises one ground for relief. Respondent

contends the ground is unexhausted because Petitioner did not present the federal basis of his claim

at all levels of direct review. Specifically, he argues Petitioner only presented the federal basis to the

California Supreme Court on discretionary review in a petition for review. The Court has reviewed

Petitioner’s briefing to the 5 DCA and finds Respondent is correct. Petitioner introduced his claim th

to the 5 DCA as follows: “The judgment of guilt must be reversed because the trial court th

erroneously refused a defense motion for a mistrial.” Throughout the brief, Petitioner argues the

claim only in the context of a state law violation. He cites and argues California case law almost

exclusively. He mentions one federal case, Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 (1967), toward the

end of his brief; however, this citation in passing does not fairly alert the appellate court of a federal

constitutional claim. 

Accordingly, the instant petition is unexhausted and must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9 Cir. 2001). th

///

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U.S. District Court

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RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be GRANTED and the Petition be DISMISSED. This Findings and

Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the

United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation,

any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” 

Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if

served by mail) after service of the Objections. Provided Petitioner does not move to withdraw the

unexhausted claims, the Finding and Recommendation will be submitted to the District Court for

review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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