Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02663/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02663-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University
Appellee
Marla Mallette
Appellee
Patrick Novak
Appellant
Sharon Shrock
Appellee
Lynn Smith
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2663

PATRICK NOVAK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN

ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:12-cv-00007-JPG-PMF — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 9, 2014 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 10, 2015

____________________

Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Patrick Novak brought this action 

against Southern Illinois University (“the University”) and 

three of its professors, alleging that he had been terminated 

from the University’s doctoral program in Curriculum and 

Instruction on the basis of his post-traumatic stress disorder, 

in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title 

II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
2 No. 14-2663

granted the University’s motion for summary judgment.1 It 

determined that Mr. Novak had not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination and that, in any event, he 

had not presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants’ stated reason for terminating him from the program was a pretext for discrimination. Mr. Novak filed a 

timely appeal.2 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we 

agree with the district court that Mr. Novak cannot show 

that the reason given by the University for his dismissal was 

pretextual. On that ground, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

I

BACKGROUND

A.

Mr. Novak was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 

disorder (“PTSD”) in 2001. That same year, he enrolled as an 

undergraduate student at the University. Through its office 

of Disability Support Services, the University provided 

Mr. Novak with the accommodations that he requested 

throughout his undergraduate career.

In 2005, Dr. Lynn Smith recommended Mr. Novak for 

admission into the University’s doctoral program in Curriculum and Instruction (“C&I”). The University accepted 

Mr. Novak into the program. After an initial period of study, 

1 The jurisdiction of the district court was premised on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 

and 1343.

2 Our jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-2663 3

all doctoral students in the C&I program must pass a Preliminary Examination in order to continue and become a candidate for a doctoral degree. The Preliminary Examination 

consists of three segments, referred to as “Days,” each of 

which covers a different aspect of preparation and study. 

Days 1 and 2 consist of timed exams, while Day 3 involves 

an untimed take-home assignment.

In September 2008, upon the advice of his psychologist, 

Mr. Novak requested and received extra time to complete 

the Day 1 portion of the exam because of his PTSD. He 

passed Day 1.

In summer 2009, Mr. Novak took Day 2 and Day 3. 

Dr. Smith and Dr. Marla Mallette, two of the professors serving on Mr. Novak’s doctoral committee, reviewed his Day 2 

and Day 3 exam answers, and gave Mr. Novak failing marks 

on both exams. Both professors provided reasons for failing 

Mr. Novak on Day 2 and Day 3 based on the content of his 

exam answers. Mr. Novak was not terminated from the C&I 

doctoral program at that time, despite the department’s rule 

that two failures would permit dismissal.

In fall 2009, again upon the recommendation of his psychologist, Mr. Novak requested and received the following 

accommodations based on his PTSD: (1) an opportunity to 

review his failing exam results, (2) an explanation of why his 

responses were insufficient, (3) extra time to complete Day 2, 

(4) the opportunity to meet with an instructor to prepare for 

retaking the exams, and (5) an opportunity to retake the exams. With these accommodations, Mr. Novak passed Day 2 

on his second attempt.

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
4 No. 14-2663

In spring 2010, Mr. Novak retook the Day 3 portion of the 

exam with the same accommodations he had requested in 

the fall of 2009.3 Again, Dr. Smith and Dr. Mallette found his 

Day 3 answers insufficient and, accordingly, gave 

Mr. Novak failing marks. Both professors again gave reasons 

for failing Mr. Novak on Day 3 based on the content of his 

answers.

Mr. Novak retook Day 3 for a third time in fall 2010, 

again with the same accommodations that he had requested 

in the fall of 2009. Dr. Smith and Dr. Mallette again found his 

Day 3 answers insufficient and awarded failing marks. This 

time, however, the professors did approve part of his submission—Chapter 1—and only asked him to rewrite the other part—Chapter 2.

In January 2011, Mr. Novak took Day 3 for a fourth time, 

again with the accommodations that he had earlier requested, plus additional written suggestions from Dr. Mallette to 

help him prepare. Mr. Novak failed the assignment. 

Dr. Smith and Dr. Mallette again cited the content of his exam response in the Chapter 2 rewrite as their reason for failing him. Dr. Sharon Shrock, another member of Mr. Novak’s 

doctoral committee, agreed that Mr. Novak had failed the 

assignment, also citing the content of his exam response. Notably, Dr. Shrock only reviewed Chapter 2 of Mr. Novak’s 

response, and some of her criticisms were that Mr. Novak 

had omitted parts that, unbeknownst to her, he actually had 

included in Chapter 1 of his response.

3 The request for additional time was not applicable because Day 3 was 

an untimed take-home exam. 

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-2663 5

In their review of Mr. Novak’s various Day 3 submissions, Drs. Smith, Mallette, and Shrock did not all give the 

same reasons for failing Mr. Novak. Following his spring 

2011 failure, they met privately with each other to discuss 

Mr. Novak’s performance and also as a group with 

Mr. Novak to review with him their reasons for his failure.

Given Mr. Novak’s repeated failure to pass Day 3, the 

C&I Department terminated his participation in the doctoral 

program in spring 2011. The Department offered, however, 

to convert his doctoral credits into a master’s degree, but 

stated that if Mr. Novak accepted this offer, his credits 

would no longer be available to apply toward a doctoral degree. Mr. Novak accepted the department’s offer and received a master’s degree in May 2011.

B.

Mr. Novak brought this action in the district court on 

January 4, 2012, against the University, its College of Education, Dr. Smith, Dr. Mallete, Dr. Shrock, Dr. Janet Fuller, and 

Dr. Paul Angelis.4 He alleged that he was terminated from 

the C&I doctoral program based on his PTSD, in violation of 

section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

4 The district court dismissed Mr. Novak’s claims against the College of 

Education, Dr. Fuller, and Dr. Angelis on October 18, 2012. These decisions are not at issue in this appeal.

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
6 No. 14-2663

On April 18, 2012, the district court entered a scheduling 

and discovery order with a discovery cutoff date of October 

15, 2012. In this scheduling order, the court required that 

Mr. Novak disclose any expert witnesses on or before October 1, 2012. The order also required that the parties file any 

dispositive motions on or before December 15, 2012.

On November 9, 2012, the magistrate judge conducted a 

conference about discovery disputes and scheduling matters. 

The magistrate judge granted the parties’ joint oral motion to 

modify scheduling and discovery. The court’s order stated 

that “[a]ll present deadlines and hearings are stricken.”5 The 

order then set specific deadlines for discovery and the filing 

of dispositive motions. Notably, the order made no reference 

to extending the time for the disclosure of experts.

On May 15, 2013, Mr. Novak again requested that the 

district court extend the time for the completion of discovery. His motion made no reference to extending the time for 

the disclosure of experts. On June 18, 2013, the magistrate 

judge granted Mr. Novak’s request and set new deadlines 

for discovery and the filing of dispositive orders. This order 

made no reference to extending the time for the disclosure of 

experts.

On December 16, 2013, the day that discovery in this case 

was to be completed, Mr. Novak’s counsel sent defense 

counsel two emails purporting to be disclosures of his expert 

witnesses: Dr. Kevin Wise and Dr. Jerry Becker. The emails 

attached letters signed by counsel for Mr. Novak, rather than 

the proposed experts, and contained bulleted lists of the con5 R.24.

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-2663 7

tent of their testimony. Neither Dr. Wise nor Dr. Becker 

submitted a signed, written report on December 16, 2013.

On December 27, 2013, the defendants filed their motion 

for summary judgment, as well as a motion to exclude 

Mr. Novak’s experts, accompanied by a supporting memorandum and exhibits. In due course, Mr. Novak filed responses to the defendants’ motion to exclude and to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Attached to his 

response to the motion to exclude were affidavits from 

Mr. Novak’s expert witnesses. The defendants later filed a 

reply in support of their motion to exclude Mr. Novak’s experts, to which Mr. Novak filed a motion to strike.

On April 15, 2014, the magistrate judge granted the defendants’ motion to exclude Mr. Novak’s experts and denied 

Mr. Novak’s motion to strike the defendants’ reply as moot. 

Mr. Novak sought review of the magistrate judge’s order, 

but the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s order. 

The court also granted, in that same order, the defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment. After the court entered 

judgment, Mr. Novak filed a timely appeal.

II

DISCUSSION

A.

Mr. Novak first submits that the district court erred in 

granting the University’s motion to exclude his expert witnesses. “We review a trial court’s discovery determinations, 

including the decision to exclude expert testimony, under an 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
8 No. 14-2663

abuse of discretion standard.” Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 

356 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2004).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires parties 

to timely disclose their expert witnesses in accordance with 

any deadlines set by the district court. The rule further requires parties to disclose a “written report,” “prepared and 

signed by the witness,” and containing the following:

(i) a complete statement of all opinions 

the witness will express and the basis 

and reasons for them;

(ii) the facts or data considered by the 

witness in forming them;

(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;

(iv) the witness’s qualifications, including 

a list of all publications authored in 

the previous 10 years;

(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness 

testified as an expert at trial or by 

deposition; and

(vi) a statement of the compensation to be 

paid for the study and testimony in 

the case.

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-2663 9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a) results in automatic and 

mandatory exclusion of the proffered witness “unless the 

failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

Mr. Novak’s December 2013 disclosure of Dr. Wise and 

Dr. Becker did not include the information required under 

Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i), (iii), (iv), (v), or (vi). Further, Mr. Novak 

disclosed these witnesses more than one year after the 

court’s October 1, 2012, deadline for expert witnesses. The 

district court determined that these errors were neither substantially justified nor harmless. The court noted that 

Mr. Novak had known about these witnesses because he had 

listed them as potential experts in his May 2012 interrogatory responses. The disclosures were, moreover, so late that 

defendants had no opportunity to depose Dr. Wise or 

Dr. Becker, to challenge the admission of their testimony 

under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 

579 (1993), or to identify opposing experts.

Mr. Novak now submits that his December 2013 disclosure was timely because, after initially setting the deadline 

for expert witness disclosures on October 1, 2012, the court 

later entered an order on November 9, 2012, stating that 

“[a]ll present deadlines and hearings are stricken.”6

Mr. Novak further contends that any other deficiencies in his 

disclosures were harmless because he was in substantial 

compliance with Rule 26.

6 Id.

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
10 No. 14-2663

Both of Mr. Novak’s arguments are without merit. His 

timeliness argument takes the district court’s action out of 

context. Although the court’s November 9 order stated that 

“all” present deadlines were stricken, the remainder of that 

order—particularly when read in conjunction with the 

court’s earlier April 18, 2012, scheduling order (which the 

November 9 order modifies)—makes clear that the court was 

not referring to the deadlines set for the disclosure of expert 

witnesses. Immediately after this statement, the court’s November 9 order set new deadlines for the close of discovery 

and the filing of dispositive motions. The order made no reference to extending the time for the disclosure of experts. 

The only deadline ever announced by the district court for 

the disclosure of expert witnesses was in its order of April 

18. That order listed separate dates for the close of discovery 

(October 15, 2012) and for the disclosure of expert witnesses 

(October 1, 2012). The magistrate judge never addressed the 

expert disclosure date—the one at issue here—in his subsequent order.

The failure of Mr. Novak’s disclosures to conform substantially to the requirements of Rule 26 provides an independent basis for the district court’s exclusion order. 

Mr. Novak does not dispute the existence of these deficiencies. Rather, he submits that they were harmless because his 

disclosures were in substantial compliance with Rule 

26(a)(2). He relies on our decision in Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 

F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2007). In Jenkins, we determined that a district court had not abused its discretion by allowing for the 

admission of a party’s experts, even though that party’s Rule 

26(a) disclosure was prepared and signed by the attorney 

rather than the proffered experts. There, the absence of the 

witnesses’ signatures was the “main defect” in the defendCase: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-2663 11

ants’ disclosure. Id. at 488. Because both witnesses later 

submitted affidavits adopting the contents of the attorney’s 

letter, we determined that the disclosure substantially complied with Rule 26(a) and that any shortcomings in the defendants’ disclosure were harmless.

Like the defendants in Jenkins, Mr. Novak’s expert witnesses have submitted affidavits that appear to remedy most 

of the substantive deficiencies in Mr. Novak’s initial disclosure.7 Mr. Novak attached these affidavits as exhibits to his 

response to the defendants’ motion to exclude. Nevertheless, 

this remedial step does not in any way cure Mr. Novak’s earlier noncompliance with Rule 26. Unlike the situation in Jenkins, where the main deficiency was the absence of signatures, here Mr. Novak’s initial disclosure failed to comply 

with almost every requirement of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Although 

Jenkins indicates that a court may excuse minor errors in a 

Rule 26(a) disclosure, the case hardly suggests that a district 

court can, or should, allow parties to make late attempts at 

remedying a disclosure which is in almost complete noncompliance with Rule 26(a).8 Jenkins cannot be read as condoning disclosures that fall short of Rule 26(a) in significant 

ways. It was merely a determination, under our highly def7 Notably, these affidavits still failed to provide a statement regarding 

the witnesses’ compensation, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B)(vi).

8 Unlike the present case, moreover, the defendants’ disclosure in Jenkins

v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2007), although lacking witness signatures, was still timely submitted in accordance with the district court’s 

disclosure deadline. See id. at 486.

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
12 No. 14-2663

erential standard of review, that the district court had acted 

within its discretion.

Mr. Novak’s untimeliness and lack of compliance with 

the substantive provisions of Rule 26 would have placed the 

University in a very difficult position in preparing its motion 

for summary judgment. The University had the right to depose the experts and to seek out rebuttal experts, a task that 

would have been impossible within the time constraints set 

by the district court. That court therefore acted well within 

its discretion in refusing to accept Mr. Novak’s untimely and 

incomplete submission.9

9 Mr. Novak also contends that the University’s reply in support of its 

motion to exclude his expert witnesses violated Southern District of Illinois Rule 7.1(c). That rule provides, in part, that “[r]eply briefs are not 

favored and should be filed only in exceptional circumstances” and that 

the “party filing the reply brief shall state the exceptional circumstances.” Local Rule 7.1(c) (emphasis omitted). Mr. Novak contends that the 

defendants’ reply brief should have been stricken because it failed to address the issues that the University said it would address when they 

sought leave to file a reply.

Mr. Novak’s argument need not detain us long. “[D]istrict courts are 

entitled to considerable deference in the interpretation and application of 

their local rules.” Hunt v. DaVita, Inc., 680 F.3d 775, 780 n.2 (7th Cir. 

2012). “[U]nless the district court enforces (or relaxes) the rules unequally as between the parties, the decision to overlook any transgression of 

the local rules is left to the district court’s discretion.” Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 2013) (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Mr. Novak does not allege that the district 

court applied Local Rule 7.1(c) in an uneven manner. Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Novak’s motion 

to strike.

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-2663 13

B.

We turn to Mr. Novak’s contention that the district court 

erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants. A 

district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de 

novo. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014). In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under 

both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must 

show: (1) that he suffers from a disability as defined in the 

statutes, (2) that he is qualified to participate in the program 

in question, and (3) that he was either excluded from participating in or denied the benefit of that program based on his 

disability. Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 

2005). The Rehabilitation Act further requires that a plaintiff 

show that the program in which he was involved received 

federal financial assistance. Id. at 810 n.2; see also 29 U.S.C. 

§ 794(a).

An ADA or Rehabilitation Act plaintiff may prove his 

case through either direct or indirect proof of discrimination. 

Rothman v. Emory Univ., 123 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1997). 

Under the direct method, a plaintiff must present either direct evidence of discrimination or circumstantial evidence 

that creates a “convincing mosaic” of discrimination. Winsley 

v. Cook Cnty., 563 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the indirect method, a plaintiff 

must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting evidence that (1) he is disabled, (2) he is qualified to 

participate in the program, (3) he suffered an adverse action, 

and (4) nondisabled students were treated more favorably. 

Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 685 (7th Cir. 2014). 

If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the burden 

then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nonCase: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
14 No. 14-2663

discriminatory reason for any alleged adverse action toward 

the plaintiff. Id. Upon articulating such a reason, the defendant “is entitled to summary judgment unless the claimant 

can present sufficient evidence that the [defendants’] proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.” Steinhauer v. 

DeGolier, 359 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 2004).

As the district court noted, the parties dispute only two 

of the three elements of the cause of action: whether 

Mr. Novak was qualified for the doctoral program and 

whether his exclusion from the program was on the basis of 

his disability. There is no dispute over whether Mr. Novak 

suffers from a disability. The district court determined that 

Mr. Novak’s claim failed under both the direct and indirect 

methods of proof. Because Mr. Novak contends that he 

should prevail under both methods, we will analyze his 

claims under both methodologies.

1.

Under the direct method, Mr. Novak attempts to prove 

discrimination by attacking two of the reasons offered by his 

professors for failing his various Day 3 submissions. First, he 

attacks Dr. Smith’s critique that his Day 3 submissions failed 

to adequately identify “gaps in the literature” by attempting 

to show that Dr. Smith had not consistently applied this criterion in grading other students. Second, he points out that 

Dr. Shrock had made no effort to read his prior Day 3 submissions, and, consequently, had faulted him based on a criterion that he had satisfied in a prior submission. He further 

notes that neither Dr. Mallette nor Dr. Smith had told 

Dr. Shrock to read his prior Day 3 submissions. 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-2663 15

This evidence is insufficient to support a finding that 

Mr. Novak was discriminated against because of his PTSD. 

At the very most, this evidence, if believed by a trier of fact, 

would show that there were lapses in the professors’ assessment methodology that might have resulted in unfairness to Mr. Novak. Any inference of discriminatory intent 

would be unreasonable in light of the undisputed evidence 

that the University repeatedly had accommodated his PTSD, 

and, as the district court put it, had “bent over backward[s] 

to give him opportunities and assistance beyond those required by department policy” in an effort to help him pass 

his Preliminary Examination.10

Mr. Novak has failed to create a convincing mosaic of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the defendants had discriminated against him because of his disability. Accordingly, his claim fails under the direct method.

2.

Although we have grave doubts as to whether 

Mr. Novak can make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the indirect method, we will pretermit 

any definitive discussion of this point because we think it is 

very clear that he has not established that the reason given 

by the University and its faculty for his termination from the 

doctoral program can be characterized as pretextual. See 

Steinhauer, 359 F.3d at 484. We do note, however, that the 

district court, in determining that there was insufficient evi10 R.67 at 13.

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
16 No. 14-2663

dence that Mr. Novak was a qualified individual, relied 

heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Regents of the 

University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), a substantive due process case in which the Supreme Court stated 

that judges may not override a “genuinely academic decision” “unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or 

committee responsible did not actually exercise professional 

judgment.” Id. at 225. Courts of appeals have been careful 

not to import this formulation of the deference owed to academic decisions when analyzing allegations under the discrimination statutes. Although such a formulation rests comfortably in the context of substantive due process analysis, 

the Supreme Court has noted specifically that such a formulation applies only to “legitimate academic decision[s]” and 

that academic decisions that are discriminatory are not legitimate. Univ. of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) 

(emphasis in original); see also id. at 190. Our own case law 

has long acknowledged that “Congress did not intend that 

institutions of higher learning enjoy immunity from the Nation’s antidiscrimination statutes.” Vanasco v. Nat’l-Louis 

Univ., 137 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Davis v. 

Weidner, 596 F.2d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1979). Indeed, our recent 

decision in Blasdel v. Northwestern University, 687 F.3d 813 

(7th Cir. 2012), carefully deals with this important distinction. See id. at 815–17. The distinction between the proper 

treatment of academic decisions in the discrimination context versus the substantive due process context has been recognized as well by our sister circuits and at least one state 

jurisdiction. See Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents for 

Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001); Wynne v. 

Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1991) (en 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-2663 17

banc); Palmer Coll. of Chiropractic v. Davenport Civil Rights 

Comm’n, 850 N.W.2d 326, 338−39 (Iowa 2014).

Although the Ewing formulation has been determined to 

be inappropriate in cases based on the Nation’s discrimination statutes, we also have recognized, continually, the significant costs associated with “heavy-handed” judicial intrusion into internal academic decisions. N.R. Doe v. St. Francis 

Sch. Dist., 694 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2012). In Blasdel, we noted at some length the nature of those costs. See 687 F.3d at 

815–16. Some are practical; academic judgments often rest on 

necessarily “subjective judgments about academic potential.” Nat’l-Louis Univ., 137 F.3d at 968; see also Namenwith v. 

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 769 F.2d 1235, 

1243 (7th Cir. 1985). Other considerations are rooted in the 

values of the First Amendment. See Blasdel, 687 F.3d at 816 

(quoting Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1980)); see 

also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Academic institutions are in no way 

exempt from our discrimination laws. Nor are there separate 

and more lenient standards for them. But, when assessing 

the evidence in such cases, courts must understand the nature and mission of the institutions and evaluate the evidence accordingly.

We turn now to the matter of pretext. The University and 

its faculty give a simple, direct reason why Mr. Novak’s participation in its doctoral program was terminated: he had 

failed to pass his preliminary examination—a prerequisite 

for further participation in the program. To show that this 

reason is pretextual, Mr. Novak must demonstrate that this 

reason constitutes a mistrutha lie on the part of the defendants. “Pretext means...a phony reason for some action. 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
18 No. 14-2663

Thus, the question before us is not whether the [University’s] stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the 

[University] honestly believed the reasons it has offered to 

explain the discharge.” Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 

1000 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).11

Mr. Novak points to several perceived faults in the faculty’s methodology. None of those alleged faults suggest anything other than an error in the course of a faculty member’s 

evaluation of the student’s work. Any lapse hardly supports 

the inference that the faculty members were involved in 

something other than a bona fide professional enterprise 

throughout the course of their assessment. There is no evidence that the faculty members’ grading of Mr. Novak’s Preliminary Examination was anything other than an honest, 

professional evaluation of his potential for the particular 

program in which he was enrolled. In other words, the evidence of record is insufficient to support a finding that the 

professors’ stated reasons for failing Mr. Novak’s various 

Day 3 submissions were deliberately false—a mask for a decision based on discriminatory grounds.12 Indeed, the record 

11 See also Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. 13–2313, slip op. at 12 (7th Cir. 

Nov. 19, 2014); Bates v. City of Chicago, 726 F.3d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 2013); 

Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 901–02 (7th Cir. 2010); McGowan 

v. Deere & Co., 581 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2009); Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 

773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007).

12 Mr. Novak does not contend that the Preliminary Examination is an 

illegitimate or unnecessary requirement of the C&I doctoral program. 

Nor does Mr. Novak dispute that, under C&I departmental policy, students are subject to expulsion from the doctoral program after twice failing any component of the Preliminary Examination.

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-2663 19

here shows that the defendants afforded Mr. Novak many 

accommodations to ensure that his disability did not interfere with his having a fair opportunity to meet the University’s standards for this particular program. On this basis, the 

district court correctly determined that the University’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.13

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

13 Because we have affirmed on the merits, we need not address the University’s argument that we ought to affirm because Mr. Novak failed to 

comply with Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

Case: 14-2663 Document: 37 Filed: 02/10/2015 Pages: 19