Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-10013/USCOURTS-ca9-09-10013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Angel Rosas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 09-10011 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No. v. 

4:02-cr-01016-JMRMIGUEL ANGEL ROSAS, CRP

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 09-10013

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  4:08-cr-00123-JMRM CRP IGUEL ANGEL ROSAS,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John M. Roll, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 10, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed July 27, 2010

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Sidney R. Thomas, and

N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith

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COUNSEL

Christina M. Cabanillas, Assistant United States Attorney for

the District of Arizona, argued the cause for the appellee and

was on the briefs. Elizabeth Adair Strange, Assistant United

States Attorney for the District of Arizona, filed the briefs.

Diane J. Humetewa, United States Attorney for the District of

Arizona, also was on the briefs.

Stanton Bloom, of Tucson, Arizona, argued the cause for the

defendant-appellant and filed the briefs.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

A defendant may be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 3146 for

failure to appear if he is convicted of a federal crime, released

pending sentencing, and then does not attend the sentencing

hearing for the initial conviction. The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the “Guidelines”) instructs that, rather

than calculating the recommended sentences for failure to

appear and the underlying conviction separately, the district

court should account for failure to appear by enhancing the

sentence for the underlying conviction pursuant to Guidelines

§ 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice and Guidelines § 3C1.3 for

commission of an offense while on release. In addition to

using the defendant’s failure to attend the original sentencing

hearing as the basis for these two enhancements, the district

court may also use it as grounds for denying the defendant a

reduction for acceptance of responsibility under Guidelines

§ 3E1.1. Such a sentence does not (1) violate the defendant’s

constitutional rights to due process and protection from double jeopardy, or (2) constitute impermissible double counting

under the Sentencing Guidelines.

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Miguel Angel Rosas (“Rosas”) was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. He was later

convicted of failure to appear at his sentencing hearing on the

drug convictions. The district court sentenced Rosas to 63

months’ imprisonment, 53 months for the drug convictions

and 10 months for failure to appear.

On appeal, Rosas claims that the sentence imposed by the

district court violated his constitutional rights. Rosas raises

three constitutional claims: (1) the district court engaged in

impermissible double-counting in violation of the Fifth

Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy by imposing

two Guidelines sentencing enhancements and denying him

one reduction on the basis of the same conduct—his failure to

appear for sentencing on his 2002 drug conviction; (2) he was

deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law

because he did not receive notice that he could be subject to

an increased term of imprisonment for failing to appear at

sentence; and (3) the district court enhanced his sentence

beyond the statutory maximum for the crime based upon facts

that were not submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000). Rosas also argues that the rule of lenity

applies here and raises non-constitutional challenges to his

sentence. Specifically, he claims that the district court erred

in denying him an acceptance of responsibility reduction and

a mitigating role reduction under the Guidelines.

II. FACTS

Rosas became involved in the drug transaction, for which

he was convicted, when he accepted the offer of his coworker, Donald Simms, to transport a load of marijuana for

$10 per pound. On January 15, 2002, Rosas, Simms, and

another participant, Jessie Tatum, drove together to a Tucson

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restaurant to meet two potential buyers to arrange for the sale

of 250 pounds of marijuana; the buyers were an undercover

Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agent and a confidential source. At the meeting, Simms provided the agent a

“sample” of marijuana, and the parties agreed to a purchase

of 250 pounds of marijuana at a price of $500 per pound,

totaling $125,000.

The next day, Rosas, Simms, and Tatum again drove

together to meet the buyers. Simms then went with the DEA

agent to a separate location to make sure that the buyers had

the money. Once Simms was presented with a bag containing

$100,000 in cash, he called Tatum and instructed him to have

Rosas deliver the drugs to a predetermined drop-off point.

Rosas drove a truck to Simms’ house, where he helped load

it with the marijuana. Rosas then drove it to the drop off

point, while Tatum and Simms followed in a separate vehicle.

Upon arrival at the drop location, DEA agents attempted to

arrest the group; Simms and Rosas fled on foot and escaped.

Rosas was not arrested until May 29, 2002. At that time,

Rosas was indicted for Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to

Distribute Marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

Although Rosas did not enter into a plea agreement, he

pleaded guilty and cooperated with the authorities. Rosas was

released on $15,000 bond on June 17, 2002. On March 19,

2003, the day before a state court sentencing for possession

of a narcotic drug for sale (and two weeks before federal sentencing on these charges), Rosas fled to Mexico. At some

later point in time, Rosas returned to the United States. On

December 3, 2007, he was again arrested for possession of

marijuana for sale. A federal grand jury indicted Rosas for

failure to appear in violation of U.S.C. § 3146. He pleaded

guilty. The failure to appear conviction and the underlying

2002 drug conviction cases were consolidated for sentencing.

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This appeal arises out the sentencing hearing conducted in

that consolidated case.

Before Rosas fled the country, a Presentence Investigation

Report (“PSR”) had been completed in anticipation of his

upcoming sentencing. That PSR made findings and recommendations regarding Rosas’s sentencing on the two drug

convictions, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, which carried a

statutory maximum of 40 years on each count. The Guidelines

base offense level for a violation of these statutes involving

100 kilograms of marijuana is 26. The PSR found Rosas eligible for a two level “safety valve” reduction, Guidelines

§ 5C1.2, and a three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Guidelines § 3E1.1. This resulted in a total offense

level of 21. After calculating the total offense level and

Rosas’s Criminal History Category, the PSR arrived at a

Guidelines range of imprisonment from 37 to 46 months. 

After Rosas’s arrest in December of 2007, a second PSR

was prepared for his sentencing (the “2008 PSR”). The 2008

PSR reflects the significant consequences for Rosas’s failure

to appear and flight from the jurisdiction. The PSR calculated

a base offense level of 24 for the 2002 drug charges,1 and

again found him eligible for a two level “safety valve” reduction pursuant to Guidelines § 5C1.2. However, because of

Rosas’s flight from custody, the PSR calculated (1) a two

level enhancement for obstruction of justice, pursuant to

Guidelines § 3C1.1; (2) a three level enhancement for commission of an offense while on release, pursuant to Guidelines

§ 3C1.3 and 18 U.S.C. § 3147; and (3) no reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to Guidelines § 3E1.1. The

1The 2008 PSR calculated the base offense level for a drug transaction

involving 80 to 100 kilograms of marijuana. The PSR provides no explanation for this change from the 2002 PSR—which calculated the base

offense level for a drug transaction involving over 100 kilograms of marijuana. However, as no objection was raised to this discrepancy and as it

favors the Defendant, we see no reason to address it. 

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2008 PSR recommended no reduction for acceptance of

responsibility, because Rosas’s “failure to appear outweigh[ed] his guilty plea and [was] inconsistent with affirmative acceptance of responsibility and genuine remorse.” The

2008 PSR calculated his total offense level to be 27, resulting

in a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months imprisonment. The

2008 PSR recommended a punishment of 70 months imprisonment, a $300 special assessment, a $15,000 fine, and 5

years supervised release. Of that total term, 60 months were

attributable to the 2002 drug conviction and another 10

months to the failure to appear conviction. 

Rosas lodged numerous objections to the PSR. Relevant to

this appeal, Rosas argued that (1) he should not have received

an enhancement for both obstruction of justice, Guidelines

§ 3C1.1, and commission of an offense while on release,

Guidelines § 3C1.3, as those two enhancements punish the

same behavior and enhancing for both constitutes double

counting; (2) even if that does not constitute double counting,

a statutory sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147

does not apply—rather, the statute under which he was convicted, § 3146, encompasses the field—and, therefore, he

should not have received an enhancement under Guidelines

§ 3C1.3; (3) he should have received an acceptance of responsibility reduction, Guidelines § 3E1.1; and (4) he should have

received a mitigating role reduction, Guidelines § 3B1.2. The

Probation Office declined to amend the PSR as to these

issues.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court agreed with

most of the PSR. The court did grant Rosas’s request for a 1

level downward departure based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors.

The court then sentenced Rosas to 53 months for the 2002

drug crimes and a consecutive 10 months for the failure to

appear, for a total of 63 months in prison. The court ordered

that Rosas pay the $300 special assessment, but waived the

$15,000 fine.

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Challenges to the Nature of the Sentencing

Rosas’s failure to appear for sentencing and flight from the

jurisdiction was considered as relevant conduct at numerous

points in his 2008 sentencing calculation. We must decide

whether any of those calculations was in error and if the

cumulative affect of the enhancements violated Rosas’s constitutional rights. We review de novo (1) the district court’s

interpretation of the Guidelines, United States v. Tankersley,

537 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008), and (2) claims that the

sentence is unconstitutional, United States v. Mercado, 474

F.3d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 2007).

[1] When sentencing a defendant for both an underlying

offense and an obstruction offense—such as § 3146, failure to

appear at sentencing—the Guidelines group the sentences

together and account for the obstruction offense by imposing

a two level enhancement to the underlying offense level,

under Guidelines § 3C1.1. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 cmt. n.8. By committing an obstruction offense,

a defendant has also committed an offense while on release,

potentially subjecting the defendant to an additional consecutive sentence under § 3147. We must decide whether a sentence enhancement pursuant to § 3147 may be applied to a

defendant when the only offense committed while on release

was a violation of § 3146, failure to appear, an issue of first

impression in this circuit. Therefore, if we find that § 3147

applies to those sentences where the only offense committed

while on release is the failure to appear, Rosas was properly

subject to two sentencing enhancements: (1) a two level

enhancement under Guidelines § 3C1.1; and (2) a three level

enhancement under Guidelines § 3C1.3. We hold that a defendant convicted of the offense of failure to appear may be subject to a sentence enhancement (on his underlying conviction)

under § 3147, for committing an offense while on release.

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[2] “The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is

always its plain language.” Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.

Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation

omitted). “The plain meaning governs unless a clearly

expressed legislative intent is to the contrary, or unless such

plain meaning would lead to absurd results.” Dyer v. United

States, 832 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

The text of the statute at issue provides that: 

A person convicted of an offense committed while

released under this chapter shall be sentenced, in

addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense to

. . . a term of imprisonment of not more than ten

years of the offense is a felony . . . . A term of

imprisonment imposed under this section shall be

consecutive to any other sentence of imprisonment.

18 U.S.C. § 3147. “Section 3147 clearly and unambiguously

mandates that the courts impose additional consecutive sentences on persons convicted of crimes they commit while

released on bond.” United States v. Kentz, 251 F.3d 835, 840

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 322,

323 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 3C1.3. In this case, Rosas committed an obstruction

offense, failure to appear for sentencing, while on bond. The

statute contains no exception for § 3146 violations or for violations that, by their nature, can only be committed while on

bond (such as failure to appear). “There is nothing exceptional

about the statute, nor is it vague or ambiguous. The language

is plain and the meaning is clear. Our statutory construction

inquiry, therefore, is at an end.” United States v. Patterson,

820 F.2d 1524, 1526 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Burlington N.

Railroad Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454 (1987)).

The § 3147 enhancement unambiguously applies to Rosas.

[3] We note that four other circuits “have held that the

plain language of the relevant statutes mandates application of

the § 3147 enhancement to the offense of failure to appear in

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violation of § 3146.” United States v. Dison, 573 F.3d 204,

207 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing sister circuit opinions: United

States v. Clemendor, 237 F. App’x 473 (11th Cir. 2007) (per

curium) (unpublished); United States v. Fitzgerald, 435 F.3d

484 (4th Cir. 2006); and United States v. Benson, 134 F.3d

787 (6th Cir. 1998)). As to Rosas’s claim that the rule of lenity dictates a different result, we agree with our sister circuits

that, in the face of such unambiguous statutory language, the

rule of lenity does not apply here. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (“Absent ambiguity, the rule of

lenity is not applicable to guide statutory interpretation.”); see

also Dison, 573 F.3d at 208 (Fifth); Clemendor, 237 F. App’x

at 477-78 (Eleventh); United States v. Fitzgerald, 435 F.3d at

486-87 (Fourth); and Benson, 134 F.3d at 788 (Sixth).

[4] Contrary to Rosas’s assertion, a district court does not

violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause by

accounting for a defendant’s failure to appear conviction by

enhancing the sentence for the underlying conviction for

obstruction of justice and commission of an offence while on

release. Nor does the court’s additional denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction render the sentence unconstitutional. “With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a

single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than

prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459

U.S. 359, 366 (1983). Here the legislature established a maximum sentence of ten years and Rosas’s sentence falls far short

of that mark, therefore Rosas’s constitutional claim must fail.

[5] Further, the district court did not engage in impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. We have held that

the Sentencing Commission understands double counting and

“expressly forbids it where it is not intended.” United States

v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 894 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United

States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204, 208 (4th Cir. 1992)). Here,

the Guidelines allow for failure to appear to provide the basis

for two enhancements, obstruction of justice and commission

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of an offense while on release. Finally, denying Rosas a

reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility on the basis of his

failure to appear did not constitute double counting “because

the acceptance provision constitutes a sentencing benefit

which a defendant may be entitled to receive. The fact that a

defendant may fail to receive the reduction does not result in

an additional enhancement.” United States v. Rutledge, 28

F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the district court

did not engage in impermissible double counting.

[6] So long as these enhancements do not raise a defendant’s total sentence to a term longer than the statutory maximum, the conduct upon which these enhancements are based

need not have been submitted to a jury. See Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). In order to bring an

Apprendi claim, the defendant must show that “the actual sentence imposed [is] longer than the maximum sentence” for the

crime of conviction. United States v. Ellis, 241 F.3d 1096,

1104 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, Rosas faced a statutory maximum

of 40 years for each of the two drug offenses and 10 years for

his failure to appear. Because his actual sentence falls far

below that (at a little over five years), he cannot make out an

Apprendi claim.

[7] Finally, we reaffirm this Circuit’s position that a PSR

gives pre-sentence notice, satisfying both constitutional due

process requirements and the Guidelines notice requirement.

Kentz, 251 F.3d at 840. The Ninth Circuit recognizes a notice

requirement for enhancements under § 3147 as calculated in

Guidelines § 3C1.3. Id. (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 3C1.3, comment. (backg’d)). “[T]his is a presentence requirement rather than a pre-release requirement.”

2

Id. at 841 (emphasis in original). A PSR satisfies that requirement. Id. at 840. Rosas admits that he signed a PSR stating

2Having found this a pre-sentence requirement, rather than pre-release

requirement, Rosas’s argument that he did not understand the 2002 PSR,

which he signed, is moot. 

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the conditions of release and appearance. We recognize that

the Government stipulated that Rosas was not advised of the

consequences of failing to appear at sentencing (for reasons

unclear on this record). However, both parties concede that

Rosas signed the PSR, which constitutes sufficient notice as

a matter of law. Id. Therefore, we find that Rosas received

sufficient notice of the potential consequences of his decision

not to appear for his original sentencing hearing.

B. Challenges to the Application of the Guidelines

The district court denied offense level reductions for acceptance of responsibility and having a mitigating role in the

criminal activity. Having held the application of these assessments constitutional above, we now review the court’s application of these Guidelines to Rosas’s case.

When reviewing a district court’s sentencing for error, “we

first consider whether the district court committed significant

procedural error, then we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984,

993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Because Rosas makes no challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we

review only for significant procedural error in the district

court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines. We

review “the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing

Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of [the] case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear

error.” United States v. Kimbrew, 406 F.3d 1149, 1151 (9th

Cir. 2005). “A district court’s decision about whether a defendant has accepted responsibility is a factual determination

reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d

1269, 1284 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration omitted) (quoting

United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 853 (9th Cir.

2002)). The district court’s determination about whether a

defendant was engaged in a mitigating role is also reviewed

for clear error. See Cantrell, 433 F.3d at 1283-84 (applying

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the clear error standard to its review). Under the clear error

standard of review, we give the district court a great degree

of deference, reversing only if we come to a “definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Easley

v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (quoting United

States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

(1948)). We hold that the district court did not clearly err in

its denial of an offense level reduction for (1) acceptance of

responsibility; and (2) involvement in the criminal activity in

a mitigating role.3

1. Acceptance of Responsibility

[8] A defendant may receive a decrease in his total offense

level when the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of

responsibility for his offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 3E1.1 (emphasis added). However, “[c]onduct

resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or

Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates

that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in

which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may

apply.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1, cmt. n.4.

Thus, Rosas’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3146, by itself,

renders the district court’s decision to deny an acceptance of

responsibility reduction reasonable absent an extraordinary

case. 

[9] Of course, Rosas believes that he has an extraordinary

case. In support of his position, he presented medical documents and letters to the district court during sentencing. Rosas

attempted to show that he left for Mexico because his grand3The government argues that Rosas failed to challenge the district

court’s application of the Guidelines at sentencing. Where the appealing

party fails to raise an issue at sentencing, we review for plain error. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). However, because we find that Rosas’s claims fail

under the clear error standard of review, we decline to reach this issue. 

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father was ill and was calling for Rosas, the only one capable

of managing the family ranch. These facts, while not irrelevant, do not change the fact that his flight was voluntary and

that he had not accepted the responsibility for, and consequences of, his actions. Therefore, the court’s denial of an

acceptance of responsibility reduction was not clearly erroneous.

2. Mitigating Role

[10] In order to qualify for a mitigating role reduction, a

defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a minimal or minor participant in the criminal activity. United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1181

(9th Cir. 2006). “It is not enough that [Rosas] was less culpable than [his] co-participants, or even that [he] was among the

least culpable of the group, because a minimal or minor participant adjustment under § 3B1.2 is available only if [Rosas]

was ‘substantially’ less culpable than [his] co-participants.”

United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1283 (9th Cir.

2006). 

[11] We hold that the district court’s consideration of

Rosas’s failure to appear at his 2002 sentencing hearing was

not improper. “[T]he amended guidelines permit district

courts to consider all relevant conduct, including collateral

conduct beyond the charged offense.” United States v. Webster, 996 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1993). Relevant collateral

conduct includes all purposeful acts committed “in the course

of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that

offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3. 

[12] The district court properly considered Rosas’s 2008

failure to appear conviction. The district court concluded that

Rosas fled, because Rosas believed that he would not be

caught and, therefore, would not have to take responsibility

for his actions. Because the court found that the conduct associated with Rosas’s 2008 failure to appear conviction was

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related to an attempt to avoid responsibility for the earlier

offense, the district court did not err in considering that conduct.4

[13] Finding that consideration of Rosas’s failure to appear

was not error, we now must determine whether the district

court abused its discretion when it found that Rosas was not

a minor participant in the crime. The mitigating role reduction

is a “determination that is heavily dependent upon the facts of

the particular case.” United States v. Duran, 189 F.3d 1071,

1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 3B1.2, cmt. (backg’d)). 

In making its determination regarding Rosas’s role in the

criminal enterprise, the court looked to Rosas’s conduct in

comparison to that of Simms and Tatum. Before the sentencing proceeding, the district court reviewed the PSR, Rosas’s

objections, sentencing memoranda from both the government

and Rosas, seventy pages of DEA reports relating to the criminal activity, and letters on behalf of Rosas submitted by

defense counsel, Rosas himself, and other individuals. The

district court also allowed extensive argument from the parties

and invited input from the Probation Department. While the

court recognized that Rosas’s conduct was less culpable than

that of Simms or Tatum, it did not find that Rosas’s conduct

was so much less that he was entitled to a mitigating role

reduction.

[14] The district court based its finding on Rosas’s “entire

involvement in the case.” Consistent with Cantrell, the court

recognized that “you can have three people who have varying

4Rosas also claims that the district court considered drug activity he

engaged in after he failed to appear at the 2002 sentencing hearing. We

recognize that the district court’s language was ambiguous and perhaps

inarticulate, when it commented about “not only [Rosas’s] past and future

involvement in drugs . . . .” However, upon his objection to consideration

of his involvement in drugs after 2002, the district court clarified its position when it expressly stated that it would not consider any later drug

charge. 

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degrees of culpability but who all play major roles.” The district court found that Rosas (1) was the driver and loader of

the truck, (2) was responsible for the drug load, (3) knew

where the drugs were being kept, and (4) fled after the bust

went awry. Given the district judge’s extensive review, we are

not left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed.” The district court’s ruling was not clearly

erroneous.

Rosas argues that the district court erred, because it compared his conduct with that of Simms and Tatum but did not

consider other unknown participants in the drug chain, including “the source of the marijuana, distributers, packagers, sellers, etc.” Rosas relies on United States v. Rojas-Millan, 234

F.3d 464, 472 (9th Cir. 2000), which stated that “the district

court should have evaluated [the defendant’s] role relative to

all participants in the criminal scheme for which he was

charged.”

However, as Rojas-Millan recognizes, defendants are not to

be compared to the hypothetical “average participant.” Id. at

473. In Rojas-Millan, the defendant was stopped as he carried

drugs from a supplier in Los Angeles to a distributor in Reno;

he was, apparently, nothing more than a courier. Id. at 468.

The defendant and his passenger were charged with possession with intent to distribute, conspiracy to possess with intent

to distribute, and interstate travel in aid of racketeering. Id. at

467. The district court found that the defendant was not entitled to a mitigating role reduction, because he was not substantially less culpable than the passenger of the car. Id. at

472. We reversed, requiring the district court to first determine whether it had “sufficient evidence of [the supplier’s

and distributor’s] existence and participation in the overall

scheme,” id. at 474; and, if so, to then determine whether the

defendant was substantially less culpable than “other likely

actors, such as the alleged Los Angeles supplier and the Reno

distributor,” id. at 473-74. 

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[15] The facts here are unlike those found in Rojas-Millan.

There exists little to no evidence concerning criminals supplying the marijuana to Rosas, Simms, and Tatum. Further,

Rosas, Simms, and Tatum were more than mere couriers, they

were traffickers, who set up their own deals and supplied the

buyers directly from their stores. Every drug trafficking

defendant could point to an unknown network preceding them

in the drug trade. Such an argument will normally be ineffective when considering whether the defendant is entitled to a

mitigating role reduction.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the

district court.

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