Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02360/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02360-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jay Todd Hessman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2360

___________

United States of America, *

 * 

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa

Jay Todd Hessman, * 

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 14, 2007

Filed: July 20, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, MELLOY and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Jay Todd Hessman was convicted at a jury trial of conspiracy to manufacture

and distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine after having been previously

convicted of a felony drug offense. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 846.

He was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Hessman asserts that

the district court1

 erred in: denying his motion to dismiss based upon the Speedy Trial

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161; its handling of government hearsay testimony; admitting

evidence of prior convictions; refusing a jury instruction offered by Hessman; failing

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to grant a downward departure at sentencing; and applying an enhancement for prior

drug convictions. We affirm.

I.

The indictment in this case was filed on October 24, 2002, Hessman was

arraigned on November 15, 2002, and trial was scheduled for January 6, 2003. After

several motions to continue were granted, trial was scheduled for March 24, 2003,

however on March 3, 2003, Hessman filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from

his residence pursuant to a search warrant, and the trial was again continued. The

district court granted the motion to suppress, and on May 9, 2003, the district court

granted the motion of the United States to continue the trial to allow it to pursue an

interlocutory appeal. On June 1, 2004, this court reversed the district court and found

that the evidence was not subject to suppression. See United States v. Hessman, 369

F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2004). The certified judgment from this court was received and

docketed by the district court on August 16, 2004. On September 8, 2004, Hessman

moved to continue the trial to allow him to petition the Supreme Court of the United

States for writ of certiorari with respect to this court’s decision on the suppression

issue. The district court granted the motion for continuance and excluded the period

of September 8, 2004, to the date of trial for Speedy Trial purposes. The order also

instructed the parties to “notify the court when a ruling was issued on Hessman’s

petition for certiorari.”

On January 10, 2005, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of

certiorari and so notified the clerk of this court. Hessman v. United States, 543 U.S.

1072 (2005); see Sup. Ct. R. 16(3) (“Whenever the Court denies a petition for a writ

of certiorari, the Clerk will prepare, sign, and enter an order to that effect and will

notify forthwith counsel of record and the court whose judgment was sought to be

reviewed.”). On January 20, 2005, the clerk of this court mailed to the district court

a memorandum and a copy of the Supreme Court order. However, the district court

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never received this communication nor did counsel for the United States or Hessman

advise the district court of the Supreme Court’s action.

On March 11, 2005, the counsel for Hessman filed a motion in the district court

seeking leave to withdraw. The filing of this motion apparently prompted the district

court to investigate the status of Hessman’s certiorari petition, and the court

discovered that the petition had been denied two months earlier. On March 14, 2005,

the district court entered an order granting the motion of Hessman’s attorney for leave

to withdraw, setting trial to begin on May 16, 2005, and finding that the time from

September 8, 2004, until May 16, 2005 was excluded for Speedy Trial purposes. The

trial was subsequently continued and began on November 10, 2005. It is undisputed

that the time period from March 14, 2005, to the date of trial, is excluded for Speedy

Trial purposes.

On May 13, 2005, Hessman filed a motion alleging that the Speedy Trial Act

had been violated and that the excludable time period related to his Supreme Court

petition ended on January 11, 2005. By order entered on June 16, 2005, the district

court denied the motion to dismiss finding that time period from January 11, 2005, to

March 11, 2005, the date the court learned of the action of the Supreme Court, is

excludable as “delay resulting from any interlocutory appeal.” See 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(1)(E). The district court further found that the parties had a court-ordered

duty to advise the district court of any action by the Supreme Court and that both

parties had failed to do so. On November 7, 2005, Hessman proceeded to trial and

was convicted on November 10, 2005.

II.

With respect to the appeal of Speedy Trial issues, we review the district court’s

findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.

Titlbach, 339 F.3d 692, 698 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

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 Under the Speedy Trial Act, a defendant’s trial must commence within 70 days of the

latter of the filing of the indictment or the defendant’s arraignment. 18 U.S.C. §

3161(c)(1); United States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085, 1091 (8th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S.Ct. 2345 and 127 S.Ct. 46 (2006). Delays occasioned by continuances

granted on motion of the defendant are excluded from the 70 day period. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(8). Where the rights of a defendant under the Speedy Trial Act are violated,

the indictment must be dismissed. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). However, “the burden is

on the defendant to show his right to a speedy trial has been violated.” United States

v. Cordova, 157 F.3d. 587, 599 (8th Cir. 1998).

In this case, 24 days of the 70 day Speedy Trial period elapsed from the date of

Hessman’s arraignment to December 9, 2002, the date of the filing of Hessman’s first

motion to continue trial. Another 23 days elapsed from August 16, 2004, the date the

district court received the certified judgment from this court with respect to the

interlocutory appeal until September 8, 2004, the date on which Hessman filed a

motion for continuance in order to allow him to seek certiorari on the suppression

issue. Therefore, a total of 47 days elapsed, with 23 days remaining of the 70 day

Speedy Trial time limit. The parties agree that Speedy Trial tolling resumed on

September 8, 2004.

Hessman asserts that Speedy Trial Act tolling ended on January 10, 2005 when

the Supreme Court denied certiorari. If so, the Speedy Trial time period expired on

February 2, 2005. The United States argues that tolling continued until March 11,

2005, thus, no Speedy Trial Act violation occurred.

Although the district court found excludable the time period which began on

September 8, 2004, as delay occasioned by an interlocutory appeal, see 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(1)(E), and the parties have characterized the delay in this same fashion, the

time period in question is more accurately described as “[a]ny period of delay

resulting from a continuance granted by any judge . . . at the request of the defendant

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That the delay in question is more accurately characterized as occasioned by

a continuance granted at the request of the defendant is exemplified by the fact that

although Hessman obtained the continuance on September 9, 2004, he did not file his

petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court until November 19, 2004, over two

months later. Hessman has not explained the reason for this delay. 

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or his counsel.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A); United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246,

248 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1987) (Speedy Trial Act excludes periods of delay resulting from

a continuance granted at the request of the defendant).2

 

On August 4, 2004, we denied Hessman’s petition for rehearing with respect

to our judgment reversing the district court’s grant of Hessman’s motion to suppress.

While Hessman could have moved for a stay of the mandate pending his filing of a

petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, he elected not to do so. See Fed.

R. App. P. 41(d)(2) (a party may move to stay the mandate pending the filing of

petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court; absent good cause, the stay may not

exceed 90 days unless the party who obtained the stay files a petition for the writ and

so notifies the clerk of the court of appeals; the mandate must issue immediately when

a copy of a Supreme Court order denying the petition for writ of certiorari is filed);

Sup. Ct. R. 13 (a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a

United States court of appeals is timely when filed within 90 days from the date of

denial of rehearing). Thus, upon the receipt of our certified judgment on August 16,

2004, the district court was again vested with jurisdiction and could proceed. United

States v. Arrelano-Garcia, 471 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 2006) (the district court is

without jurisdiction to act until the mandate is received from the court of appeals); see

also United States v. Scalf, 760 F.2d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1985) (an application to

seek certiorari has no effect on the finality of an appellate decision unless the mandate

of the court is stayed or withdrawn).

Having failed to request a stay of the mandate, Hessman filed for an open-ended

continuance from the district court so his prosecution would be stayed while he sought

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This court routinely mails copies of letters from the Supreme Court advising

of the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari to the district court solely as a matter

of courtesy. Such was the case with the January 20, 2005 memorandum from the

clerk of this court to the clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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certiorari. This motion was granted and both parties were ordered to notify the district

court when a ruling was made on the petition. There is no rule requiring the Clerk of

the Supreme Court to officially notify the district court of the action of the Supreme

Court with respect to a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the court of

appeals. However, Supreme Court Rule 16(3) does require the Supreme Court Clerk

to notify counsel “forthwith” of the Supreme Court’s grant or denial of certiorari,

therefore the district court was justified in ordering Hessman and the United States to

notify the court when a ruling was issued on the petition.3

 This order was entirely

appropriate under the circumstances and was not objected to by Hessman. While “[a]

defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial,” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527

(1972), we find that the requirements of the order of continuance which was granted

at Hessman’s request were appropriate. See United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482,

1489 (11th Cir. 1997) (in speedy trial context, finding significant that defendant did

not object to terms of order of continuance).

The record does not explain why the district court did not receive the courtesy

notice from the clerk of our court advising of the Supreme Court’s action. Whatever

the explanation, that the communication was not received is of no import in view of

the fact that neither the Supreme Court nor this court was required to advise the

district court of the disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari. Since neither the

United States nor Hessman notified the district court of the disposition of the petition

as ordered by the district court, we agree that the excludable delay occasioned by the

continuance granted at Hessman’s request did not end until March 11, 2005, when the

district court learned of the denial of the petition “by mere happenstance.” Since

another excludable period began on March 14, 2005, and continued until trial, no

Speedy Trial Act violation occurred. 

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III.

Hessman also asserts trial error. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. United States v. Durham, 470 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 2006). At trial, the

United States presented the testimony of two witnesses, Jamie Carlson and Travis

Kicklighter, relating out of court statements by others, to which Hessman objected as

inadmissible hearsay. Specifically, Carlson testified that Kicklighter told him that he

cooked methamphetamine with Hessman and that Kicklighter and Hessman used

methamphetamine together, and Kicklighter testified that Hessman told him that

Hessman had stabbed himself in the leg in a Fort Dodge, Iowa, hotel room. In

countering Hessman’s hearsay objections, the United States argued that these out-ofcourt statements were not hearsay but were statements against Hessman made by coconspirators “during the course and in the furtherance of the conspiracy.” See Fed.

R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 

The district court conditionally allowed the statements, following the procedure

outlined in United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978) (the district

court may conditionally allow testimony as to the statement of an alleged coconspirator subject to later proof, by a preponderance of independent evidence, that

the declarant was a co-conspirator). After the testimony was conditionally presented,

the district court found both statements to be inadmissible as not in furtherance of the

conspiracy. The district court overruled Hessman’s motion for mistrial and, continuing

to follow the Bell procedure, instructed the jury to disregard the testimony in

question. See id. (where the court determines that the government has failed to carry

its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made

by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, the court will give a cautionary

instruction to the jury to disregard the statement where such an instruction will suffice

to cure any prejudice).

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On appeal, Hessman does not argue that the procedure approved in Bell was not

followed by the district court nor does he identify any other alleged error in the district

court’s handling of this testimony. Instead, he asks that the en banc court overrule

Bell. However, as Hessman implicitly concedes, this panel remains bound by Bell.

 See United States v. Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004) (a panel of the

circuit court may not overrule circuit precedent); United States v. Wilson, 315 F.3d

972, 973-74 (8th Cir. 2003) (only the court en banc can overrule circuit precedent).

To the extent Hessman asks that this case be heard en banc and that the en banc court

overrule Bell, we find that Hessman has failed to request hearing en banc in the

manner and in the time required by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the

rules of this court. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(b), (c) (a party may petition for a hearing

en banc no later than the date when the appellee’s brief is due); 8th Cir. R. 35A (a

party seeking an en banc proceeding must file 21 copies of a petition for hearing en

banc). 

Hessman also asserts that the district court committed error in admitting

evidence of three prior drug-related convictions. Prior to trial, via motion in limine,

Hessman asked that the United States be prohibited from referring to, or offering into

evidence, any prior conviction of the defendant. At trial, over Hessman’s objection,

the district court admitted evidence as to three prior state court drug convictions.

Specifically, the district court ruled that evidence as to Hessman’s convictions on

March 30, 2000, for possession of methamphetamine, and on March 24, 1997, for

possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver and manufacturing a controlled

substance, were admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).

Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a prior bad act such as a

conviction may not be offered solely to prove the defendant’s criminal

propensity but is admissible if it is relevant to a material issue, such as

intent, and if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence, more

probative than prejudicial, and similar in kind and close in time to the

charged offense. The requirement to balance probative value and

prejudice is found in Rule 403 . . . [W]e construe Rule 404(b) as a rule

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of inclusion and have frequently upheld the admission of prior drug

convictions in cases where the defendant denied committing the charged

drug offense. 

 United States v. Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

Evidence of Hessman’s March 2000 and two 1997 drug convictions was

relevant to the issue of Hessman’s knowledge and intent, both elements of the charged

offense. United States v Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 894 (8th Cir.) (prior convictions for

possessing and distributing drugs are relevant under Rule 404(b) to show knowledge

and intent to commit a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs) cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.

492 (2005). The convictions are also similar in kind and close in time to the charged

conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine from March through May 2000, for

which Hessman was tried. See id. (four-year interval found to be “well within the

bounds of admission”) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 847 (8th Cir.

2002)). Further, the district court instructed the jury that the evidence of Hessman’s

prior convictions should be considered only with respect to the issues of knowledge

and intent, thus minimizing the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v.

Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 810 (8th Cir. 2006) (limiting instruction found to cure

whatever unfair prejudice defendant may have suffered by admission of Rule 404(b)

evidence); United States v. Lothridge, 332 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2003) (limiting

instruction that evidence of prior convictions could only be used to decide whether

defendant had requisite knowledge and intent diminished danger of unfair prejudice

arising from admission of such evidence).

Hessman also asserts that the district court erred in refusing to give his

proposed instruction on reasonable doubt. Hessman’s proposed instruction, in

addition to containing the language contained in the Eighth Circuit’s Model Criminal

Jury Instruction § 3.11 (2000), included the following language taken from Iowa

criminal jury instructions:

But, if, after a full and fair consideration of all the evidence or lack of

evidence produced by the State you are not firmly convinced of the

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defendant’s guilt, then you have a reasonable doubt and you should find

the defendant not guilty.

Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions, Instruction 110.10 (Iowa Bar Assoc. 2004). 

The court refused to give Hessman’s requested instruction and instead gave the

model instruction. Because the instruction given by the district court has been

specifically upheld by this court, we summarily reject Hessman’s argument. United

States v. Mallen, 843 F.2d 1096, 1101-02 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Risken,

788 F.2d 1361, 1371 (8th Cir. 1986) (instruction consistent with Eighth Circuit Model

Criminal Jury Instruction § 3.11 upheld).

IV.

Hessman also asserts sentencing error. “The correct application of the

guidelines is a question of law subject to de novo review, while a factual

determination of the sentencing court is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.”

United States v. Tirado, 313 F.3d 437, 440 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

Hessman argues that the district court erred in declining to afford him

downward departures based upon his exceptional family circumstances, acceptance

of responsibility, and his rehabilitation since the date of the offense. “The

discretionary denial of a motion for downward departure is unreviewable unless the

[district] court failed to recognize its authority to depart.” United States v. Vasquez,

433 F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir. 2006) cert. denied, ____ S.Ct.____, 2007 WL 1854154

(June 29, 2007) (quoting United States v. Andreano, 417 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir.

2005) cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1118 (2006),. Hessman does not allege that the district

court did not recognize its authority to depart, and our review of the record reveals

that the court indeed recognized that it possessed such authority but declined to

exercise it. Accordingly, the district court’s refusal to depart downward is

unreviewable.

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Hessman also asserts that the district court erred in sentencing him based upon

a drug quantity determined by the court by applying a preponderance of the evidence

standard, rather than following the jury’s finding as to drug quantity, which was based

upon a reasonable doubt determination. 

As part of its verdict, the jury responded to a written question posed by the

court by finding that 5 grams or more but less than 50 grams of actual (pure)

methamphetamine was involved in the conspiracy. At sentencing, the district court

determined that the United States had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that

the defendant was accountable for 9.8 grams of actual methamphetamine and 480.69

grams of methamphetamine mixture as reflected in the presentence report. This

yielded a base offense level of 32. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines

Manual, § 2D1.1(a)(3)(c)(4) (Nov. 1998).

In sentencing Hessman, the district court properly acknowledged that the

government had the burden of proving drug quantity by a preponderance of the

evidence. United States v. Marshall, 411 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The

government bears the burden of proving drug quantity by a preponderance of the

evidence.”); United States v. Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 821 (8th Cir. 2004)

(sentencing court is required to find drug quantity by a preponderance of the

evidence). Further, “[t]he district court can impose a sentence based on a higher drug

quantity determination than the jury’s finding so long as the sentence does not exceed

the statutory maximum of the convicted offense.” United States v. Johnston, 353 F.3d

617, 625 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Based upon the jury’s finding that 5 to 50

grams of methamphetamine were involved in the conspiracy, coupled with Hessman’s

prior drug conviction, the statutory sentencing range was 10 years to life

imprisonment. Because the 360 month sentence, imposed by the district court, was

within this statutory sentencing range, no error occurred. Id.; see also United States

v. Titlbach, 300 F.3d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 2002) (sentence of 88 months, less than the

statutory maximum for the crime, did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights.)

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Hessman further contends that the district court erred by finding that he

qualified as a career offender by virtue of the two 1997 drug convictions. Hessman

argues that these convictions should be considered related and should not count

separately under the provisions of USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2), which states that prior

sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted separately, but prior sentences

imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sentence.

 

Prior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that

were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for

the first offense prior to committing the second offense). Otherwise,

prior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that

(A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part of a single common

scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing.

USSG § 4A1.2, comment. (n. 3).

“In assessing whether the offenses were part of a single common scheme or

plan, we consider (1) the time period, (2) the participants, (3) the victims, (4) the

motive, (5) the modus operandi, (6) the location, (7) the offenses, (8) whether a

common investigation uncovered the offenses and (9) whether the defendant jointly

planned the offenses.” United States v. Lynch, 477 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2007).

Evidence presented at trial revealed that Hessman was charged with possession

of marijuana with intent to deliver in Dickinson County, Iowa, on April 17, 1996, after

Hessman was stopped while driving a pickup truck, which contained approximately

six ounces of pre-packaged marijuana. On May 5, 1996, Hessman was charged in

Emmet County, Iowa, with manufacturing a controlled substance, “black tarry”

marijuana, in a residence. Although Hessman disputed the circumstances of the May

5, 1996 charge, the district court, as was its right, disbelieved his testimony. See

United States v. Mugan, 441 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir.) (district court disbelieved

witness’s testimony, and this credibility determination is entitled to deference), cert.

denied, 127 S.Ct. 191 (2006). These charges were prosecuted as separate cases. On

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 March 24, 1997, Hessman pled guilty to and was convicted of each charge. He was

sentenced to separate but concurrent sentences.

The district court’s finding that the two convictions are unrelated as defined by

USSG § 4A1.2 is amply supported by the evidence. The offenses occurred on

different dates, and Hessman was arrested for the first offense prior to committing the

second. Further, the offenses occurred at different locations and in different counties.

The first offense involved the possession of packaged marijuana, while the second

involved “cooking” marijuana to create a derivative. The second offense involved

participants that were not involved in the first. The two offenses were discovered

through separate investigations by different law enforcement organizations. Finally,

while the two offenses resulted in convictions which occurred on the same date, the

cases were not consolidated and retained separate case numbers.

V.

 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

______________________________

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