Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00032/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00032-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arturo Aguilar
Plaintiff
Mark Melkonian
Defendant
Melkonian Enterprises, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTURO AGUILAR, individually and

on behalf of all other similarly

situated,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

MELKONIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., and

MARK MELKONIAN,

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-00032 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

CERTIFICATION OF MANDATORY

CLASS AND APPROVAL OF

SETTLEMENT STIPULATION

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a class action ERISA case brought by Plaintiff

Arturo Aguilar on behalf of participants and beneficiaries of the

Melkonian Enterprises Inc. Employees’ Pension Plan (“Money

Purchase Plan”) and the Melkonian Enterprises Inc. Employees’

Profit Sharing Plans (“Profit Sharing Plan”)(collectively “the

Plans”) against Melkonian Enterprises and Mark Melkonian. The

complaint alleges that the Plans suffered substantial losses due

to Defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty. 

The parties have entered into a Joint Stipulation of

Settlement. Under the terms of the Settlement, the parties moved

for approval of the settlement under Rule 23(e) and for

conditional certification of a mandatory class for settlement

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purposes under Rule 23(b)(1) and/or 23(b)(2). These motions were

granted on October 17, 2006, class notice was approved, a

schedule for the mailing of class notice was set, and a final

settlement approval hearing was scheduled for January 22, 2006. 

(See Doc. 43.) 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Melkonian is a family owned company in Sanger that grows,

processes, dehydrates, and sells dried fruits. Mark Melkonian

became president in 1997. Mark Melkonian and Melkonian

Enterprises were the designated fiduciaries of the plan for all

relevant time periods. The named Plaintiff, a former Melkonian

employee for over 38 years, was a participant in the Plans. 

It is alleged that Defendants’ failure to prudently invest

the assets of the Plans caused the Money Purchase Plan to lose

over $1.4 million in assets (40%) of its value, and the Profit

Sharing Plan to lose over $1 million in assets (48%) of its

value. As an example, this caused Mr. Aguilar’s Money Purchase

Plan account to lose almost $60,000 and his Profit Sharing Plan

to lose almost $57,000. Specifically, it is alleged that the

losses were due to (1) Defendants’ failure to monitor the

activities of the Plans’ investment advisor, (2) investment of

the assets in risky high-technology and internet mutual funds,

and (3) engaging in risky margin trading. 

In addition, Defendants terminated the Money Purchase Plan

on July 1, 2001. It is alleged that Defendants failed to give

participants adequate written notice of the termination. 

Defendants deny the allegations.

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It is undisputed that approximately 90% of the assets

invested in the Plans belonged to members of the Melkonian

family. As explained below, those individuals are to be excluded

from the Class. The remaining approximately 10% of the assets

belonged to the approximately 50 other participants/

beneficiaries in the Plans, those who make up the proposed Class.

The lawsuit was filed January 6, 2005, alleging (1) breach

of fiduciary duty with respect to both Plans and (2) failure to

provide adequate notice of termination of the Money Purchase

Plan. 

Defendants tendered the defense of this action to its

insurer, Fireman’s Fund. In February 2005, Fireman’s Fund denied

the tender. (Doc. 37, Ex. B, Defendant’s Suppl. Brief, at 1.) 

Defendants spent eight months seeking retraction of the tender

denial. In October 2005, Fireman’s Fund partially retracted its

denial and agreed to accept the tender of defense only as to

Melkonian Enterprises Inc., under reservation of rights, and only

as to the Second Claim for Relief (failure to provide adequate

notice of termination). (Id. at 2.) 

After a settlement conference before the magistrate judge,

the parties agreed that settlement would be in their mutual best

interest. In addition to the settlement between the parties to

this action described in detail below, Fireman’s Fund agreed to

contribute $95,000 toward the settlement of this action. (Id.)

Rosenthal & Company LLC (“Rosenthal”) was retained to, among

other things, mail the Notice of Class Action Settlement and

Notice of Final Settlement Hearing (the “Notice”). (Decl. of

John Keane, Doc. 45 at ¶¶ 1-2.) Defendants provided to Rosenthal

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The January 9, 1999 cut off date represents the 1

point beyond which the applicable six year statute of limitations

would bar any actions on behalf of participants and beneficiaries

holding assets prior to that date. 

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a computerized list of 51 individuals who are or were

beneficiaries of the Pension Plan and the Profit Sharing Plan

from January 6, 1999 through October 2, 2006. (Id. at ¶3.)

Rosenthal utilized various means to contact all 51 individuals on

the list. In the end, there remain three class members with

known bad addresses and for whom good addresses could not be

found, as well as one individual for whom no address was ever

provided or found. Rosenthal also set up a call center to answer

any potential questions class members might have about the

settlement. As of December 18, 2006, the date of the filing of a

declaration by Rosenthal’s general manager, no calls had been

handled by the call center and no objections to the settlement

had been received.

A. Summary of the Settlement.

Class Definition: All participants in and beneficiaries of

both Plans from January 9, 1999 through the date of the 1

preliminary approval hearing order in this action, excluding

Dennis Melkonian, Douglas Melkonian, Mark Melkonian, Susan

Melkonian (also known as Marla Sloan), Victoria Melkonian, and

Violet Melkonian. 

Relief Provided by the Settlement: Defendants will pay

Plaintiffs $295,000. Of this, $210,000 will go directly to the

plan participants/beneficiaries. Specifically, $189,000 of the

$210,000 will be allocated to the breach of fiduciary duty claim,

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while $21,000 will be allocated to the failure to notify claim. 

$75,000 of the $295,000 total settlement will go to Plaintiffs’

counsel as an award of attorney’s fees, while $10,000 will go

directly to the named Plaintiff in the form of a class

representative payment to compensate him for his service to the

Class. 

Plaintiffs believe the settlement will provide certainty to

all parties and will avoid further delay and litigation expenses.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Certification of a Mandatory (non-opt-out)

Class for Settlement. 

Plaintiffs request certification of the Class under Rule

23(a) as defined (see above). Specifically, Plaintiffs request

certification as a mandatory class under either Rule 23(b)(1) or

(b)(2). 

1. Rule 23(a) Requirements.

Certification of a class of plaintiffs is governed by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), which states in pertinent

part that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as

representative parties on behalf of all.” As a threshold matter,

in order to certify a class, a court must be satisfied that 

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable (the "numerosity"

requirement); (2) there are questions of law or fact

common to the class (the "commonality" requirement);

(3) the claims or defenses of representative parties

are typical of the claims or defenses of the class (the

"typicality" requirement); and (4) the representative

parties will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class (the "adequacy of

representation" requirement).

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In re Intel Secs. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104 at 112 (N.D. Cal.

1981)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). 

a. Numerosity.

There are 51 individuals who are believed to be former and

current participants in the Plans. Courts have routinely found

the numerosity requirement satisfied when the class comprises 40

or more members. Ansari v. New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 114

(S.D.N.Y. 1998). Numerosity is also satisfied where joining all

Class members would serve only to impose financial burdens and

clog the court’s docket. In re Intel Secs. Litig. 89 F.R.D. at

112. Here, the joinder of approximately 51 individual

participant/ beneficiaries with essentially identical claims to

that of the proposed class representative would only further clog

this court’s already overburdened docket. 

b. Commmon Questions of Fact and Law.

Commonality exists when there is either a common legal issue

stemming from divergent factual predicates or a common nucleus of

facts resulting in divergent legal theories. Hanlon v. Chrysler

Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the potential

Class members’ claims are essentially identical to one another

and to that of Mr. Aguilar. All allege that Defendants breached

their fiduciary duties by imprudently investing the assets of the

plan. 

c. Typicality.

Typicality is satisfied if the representative’s claims arise

from the same course of conduct as the class claims and are based

on the same legal theory. See e.g., Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51

F.3d 1449, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the named Plaintiff’s

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claims are typical of the class claims because all focus on the

alleged imprudent investment practices and on the failure to

provide adequate notice of the Plan merger. 

d. Fair & Adequate Representation.

The final Rule 23(a) requirement is that the class

representative fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class. This requirement has two parts. First, the

representative’s attorney must be “qualified, experienced, and

able to conduct the litigation.” In re United Energy Corp. Solar

Power Modules Tax Shelter Inv. Secs. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 251, 257

(C.D. Cal. 1998). Second, the suit must not be “collusive” and

the named Plaintiff’s interests must not be “antagonistic to the

class.” Id. 

All requirements are satisfied here. Plaintiffs’ counsel,

Daniel Feinberg, is experienced in the field of ERISA class

action litigation. He has been practicing in the field of

employee benefits law for more than 15 years. (Feinberg Decl.,

Doc. 33, at ¶3.) He is an accomplished writer and instructor on

the subject of employee benefits law, and has served as a

mediator and a Special Master in ERISA-related matters. (Id. at

¶¶ 3-4.) 

In addition, Mr. Aguilar’s interests are completely aligned

with those of the class. His interest is in maximizing their

recovery. Although Mr. Aguilar is receiving an additional

$10,000, this appears to be reasonable to compensate him for the

time and expense he devoted to pursuing this case.

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2. Certification as a Mandatory Class under Rule

23(b)(1) or (b)(2).

Once the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied,

a class may be certified only if the class action satisfies the

requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and/or (b)(3). Here, the

parties seek certification of a mandatory class under either Rule

23(b)(1) and/or (b)(2). 

a. Rule 23(b)(1).

Under Rule 23(b)(1) a class may be maintained if “the

prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members

of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying

adjudications with respect to individual members of the class

which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the

party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to

individual members of the class which would, as a practical

matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not

parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede

their ability to protect their interests.” 

Here, either prong can be satisfied. Defendants’ allegedly

unlawful conduct applied to the Plans as a whole. If individual

members pursued litigation independently, there would be a risk

of inconsistent results. In addition, a determination in one

case that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the Plan

beneficiaries would be dispositive of other cases. There is no

suggestion that all proposed class members are not similarly

situated. Moreover, under ERISA, although plan participants and

beneficiaries have a statutory right to bring actions for breach

of fiduciary duty, any recovery belongs to the plan as a whole. 

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Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 472 U.S. 134, 140 (1985). 

Here, although each plan participant will have a different

proportional interest in the outcome, based on each individual’s

history and account balance, the alleged unlawful activity still

affects the class as a whole. See In re Syncor Erisa Litigation,

227 F.R.D. 338, 346 (C.D. Cal. 2005)(“A classic example of a Rule

23(b)(1)(B) action is one which charges a breach of trust by an

indenture trustee or other fiduciary similarly affecting the

members of a large class of beneficiaries, requiring an

accounting or similar procedure to restore the subject of the

trust.”). 

It is appropriate to certify ERISA actions such as this one

as mandatory (non-opt-out) classes because the risk of

inconsistent decisions is considerable. See Rankin v. Rots, 220

F.R.D. 511, 522-23 (E.D. Mich. 2004); In re IKON Office Solutions

Inc. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 94, 102 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 

b. Rule 23 (b)(2).

Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule

23(b)(2) which permits the maintenance of a class action

(assuming Rule 23(a) is also satisfied) if “the party opposing

the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally

applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final

injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with

respect to the class as a whole.” 

Here, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants violated

ERISA, an injunction enjoining Defendants’ acts or practices that

violate ERISA, and an injunction requiring the removal of Mark

Melkonian as plan fiduciary and imposing an independent

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fiduciary. Rule 23(b)(2) is properly used as a vehicle in

similar ERISA actions. See Becher v. Long Island Lighting Co.,

164 F.R.D. 144, 153-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)(certifying class under

23(b)(2) where plaintiffs sought injunctive relief “compelling

the defendants to credit the class member for years of service

prior to their withdrawals of employee contributions and to award

all such credits in the future”); see also Stoetzner v. U.S.

Steel. Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1990) (certification

under 23(b)(2) appropriate where plaintiffs sought entitlement to

benefits and alleged defendants breached their fiduciary duty by

denying benefits); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 596

(E.D. Wash. 1986) (certifying under 23(b)(2) class of plaintiffs

seeking declaration that vested benefits were improperly

terminated).

The class can be certified under both Rule 23(b)(1) and/or

(b)(2).

B. Class Notice & Administration.

1. The Notice Provided Was Appropriate.

The notice defined the class, described the nature of the

action and the proposed settlement (including the attorney’s fees

and class representative fee), explained the procedure for

submitting claims, informed potential class members about the

timing of the final approval hearing, and explained that they may

object to the settlement. 

The notice was translated into Spanish and mailed in both

English and Spanish to all potential class members for whom

addresses could be found.

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C. Approval of the Settlement.

In reviewing the settlement, although it is not a court’s

province to “reach any ultimate conclusions on the contested

issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the dispute,

a court should weigh the strength of the plaintiff’s case, the

risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further

litigation, the stage of the proceedings, and the value of the

settlement offer. Chemical Bank v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d

1268, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992). The court should also watch for

collusion between class counsel and defendants. Id. 

According to the complaint, the Plans lost approximately

$2.4 million as a result of Defendants’ allegedly wrongful

conduct. The settlement provides that $210,000 will be

distributed among Class Members. Although, at first glance, the

overall recovery appears modest, it is undisputed that

approximately 90% of the assets invested in the Plans were owned

by members of the Melkonian family, who are excluded from the

Class. Accordingly, assuming the $2.4 million loss figure is

correct, only a proportional loss of approximately $240,000 is

attributable to the assets held by the Class. In this light, the

$210,000 settlement represents a recovery of approximately 87.5

cents to the dollar. This is a sizeable recovery. 

Plaintiffs assert that the settlement is fair because “it is

not clear by any means that Plaintiff would prevail at trial and

be awarded a greater sum of money than the Stipulation awards to

the class.” (Doc. 32 at 15.) A review of the nature of the

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claims and of Defendants’ potential defenses supports such a

conclusion. 

1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

Plaintiffs’ first claim is that Defendants violated their

fiduciary duty of prudence by, among other things, (1) failing to

adequately monitor their Quick & Reilly broker’s activities, (2)

failing to adequately review the Plans’ investments or investment

strategy, and (3) investing the Plans’ assets in risky hightechnology and internet mutual funds. Plaintiff also alleges

that Defendants violated their fiducuary duty of diversification

under ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), causing substantial loss to the

Plans, by investing almost exclusively in equities. Finally,

Plaintiffs assert that the Plans’ investments were

disproportionately concentrated in high risk technology and large

capitalization growth mutual funds. 

Defendants dispute all of these allegations, emphasizing

that the prudence of a fiduciary is measured by the “prudent

person” standard, which judges the fiduciary’s actions

objectively, based on how a person, experienced or familiar with

the matter at hand, would act. See Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d

270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984). The prudent person standard normally

focuses on the process the fiduciary undertakes to make

investment decisions, judged at the “time of the decision” rather

than in hindsight. Id. 

Here, Defendants assert that Mark Melkonian “reasonably

enlisted, consulted and relied upon investment advice from Quick

& Reilly.” (Doc. 37, Ex. B at 4.) In addition, Defendants

believe that expert testimony would show that many pension

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fiduciaries were investing regularly and significantly in

technology stocks during 1999 and 2000 and that “it would have

been imprudent not to so invest.” (Id.) Specifically,

Defendants assert that:

While the balances in the plans decreased from their

respective peaks, those decreases were not due to

Defendants’ imprudent investments. The stock market

plunged significantly in 2000 after many of these

purchases were made. Expert testimony will demonstrate

that the decline was not reasonably forecast or

anticipated by prudent investors. Many plans lost

money. The decline in the plans’ balances, in large

part, was due to losses that would normally be expected

due to the effects of the stock market during the

relative time frame.

(Id.)

Defendants also dispute the amount of the alleged loss. 

Specifically, Defendants maintain that the Plans’ assets

increased greatly shortly before they lost value and that a

significant reason for the increase was the nature of the

allegedly imprudent investments. (Id. at 4-5.) In fact,

Defendants assert that, overall, the assets grew by about

$600,000 after Mark Melkonian took over as fiduciary. (Id. at

5.) 

The substantial relative value of the settlement, coupled

with the strength of Defendant’s arguments against liability,

support a conclusion that the settlement is fair with respect to

the first claim for relief. 

2. Failure to Provide Proper Notice of Plan

Amendment.

Plaintiffs’ second claim is for failure to provide proper

notice of the Pension Plan’s termination and merger into the

Profit Sharing Plan. Plaintiffs allege that the merger violated

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ERISA § 204(h), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h). Again, Defendants deny the

allegations. 

In 1998, Retirement Plan Consultants, the third-party

administrator for the Plans since 1996, recommended to Melkonian

Enterprises that it should terminate the Pension Plan and merge

it into the Profit Sharing Plan in order to provide additional

flexibility to the company regarding contributions and to reduce

administrative costs. (Doc. 37, Ex. B at 6.) At a Board of

Directors meeting held on May 30, 2001, the Directors of

Melkonian Enterprises agreed to terminate the Pension Plan

effective July 1, 2001 and to merge the assets into the Profit

Sharing Plan. Also on May 30, 2001, Melkonian Enterprises

executed a 15-day Notice of Intent to Terminate the Pension Plan

effective July 1, 2001. (Id. at 6-7.) According to Defendants,

it was the general practice of Melkonian Enterprises to

distribute such notices to employees with their paychecks. The

notice was distributed to non-employees by mail. The next

paydate after the May 30, 2001 meeting was June 1, 2001, followed

by pay dates June 8, 2001 and June 15, 2001. All employees

signed for their paychecks on these dates. (Id. at 7.) 

Defendant maintains that 15 days of notice was all that was

required under ERISA. ERISA was amended by the Economic Growth

and Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2001 (“EGTRRA”). The

amendments applied to plan amendments taking effect on or after

June 7, 2001, but implementing regulations were not promulgated

until 2003. Accordingly, those plans with amendments taking

effect between June 7, 2001 and the issuance of the regulations

in 2003 are considered to be in compliance with EGTRRA if the

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plan administrator makes a “reasonable, good faith effort to

comply with those requirements.” 68 Fed. Reg. 17277, 17290 (Apr.

9, 2003). 

Prior to EGTRRA, only 15 days notice was required prior to

the effective date of a plan amendment. Subsequent to EGTRRA,

the general period of advanced notice was changed to 45 days. 

However, the 15 day period still applied to “small plans.” Id.

at 17282. A small plan is defined as a plan that the plan

administrator reasonably expects to have fewer than 100

participants who have accrued benefits under the plan. Id. at

17283. According to this definition, Defendants assert that the

Melkonian Plans would have qualified as small plans and that the

15 day notice was reasonable. 

Finally, Defendants point out that EGTRRA only provides a

remedy for notice violations where the violation is egregious,

such as where a failure is either intentional or constitutes a

failure to provide most of the individuals with most of the

information they are entitled to receive. See id. at 17288-89;

see also Doc. 37, Ex. B. at 9. Defendants maintain that there is

no evidence of an egregious violation. 

Again, although only $21,000 of the $210,000 settlement is

allocated to the second claim for relief, this figure is fair

given the arguments Defendant could raise in opposition to

liability. 

3. Attorneys Fee Award. 

The settlement awards Plaintiffs counsel $75,000 in

attorneys fees. A district court should award a reasonable

attorney’s fee in “common fund cases,” and “has the discretion to

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The court may also enhance the lodestar with a 2

multiplier to compensate counsel for various factors, including

the novelty of the questions involved in the litigation, the

legal skill necessary to achieve the results obtained, and

whether the fee is fixed or contingent upon success. See Kerr v.

Screen Extras Guild, inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). 

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use the lodestar method or the percentage of the fund method in

common fund cases.” See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings

in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 109 F.3d 602, 607 (9th Cir.

1997). This “common fund doctrine” has been applied in ERISA

class action litigation. Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 290 F.3d 1043

(9th Cir. 2002). 

Under the percentage approach, the “benchmark” in the Ninth

Circuit is 25 percent. See e.g., Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz

Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). Fifty

percent is viewed as an upper limit, while cases falling between

20 and 40 percent of the gross monetary settlement have been

approved. See Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F.

Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1995) and cases cited therein. Here, the

$75,000 fee award, which is 25.4% of the total gross settlement,

is reasonable under the percentage approach. 

Under the lodestar method, the court must multiply the

reasonable hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Here, as 2

set forth in detail in the declaration of Class Counsel Daniel

Feinberg (Doc. 48), six individuals at Class Counsel’s firm spent

over 342 hours on the case through December 18, 2006. The

following table summarizes the hours billed by each individual

and their usual billing rate:

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Dan Feinberg 105.35 Sharholder $495.00 $52,148.25

Vincent Cheng 214.05 Associate $295.00 $63,144.75

Ana deAlba 18.90 Law Clerk $180.00 $3,402.00

Martin Sul 1.20 Law Clerk $180.00 $216.00

Mai Ha 1.95 Law Clerk $180.00 $351.00

Eve Goldstein- 

 Siegel

1.15 Paralegal $150.00 $172.50

Total $119,434.50

The hours expended are reasonable. Class counsel spent

nearly two years investigating and researching this case,

obtaining and reviewing extensive documentation obtained through

a Freedom of Information Act request and through discovery. 

Class counsel also participated in two depositions, numerous

witness interviews, and a lengthy settlement conference. 

Thereafter, the parties conducted additional negotiation sessions

and Class counsel spent numerous hours developing a distribution

formula. (See Feinberg Decl. at ¶12.) 

The hourly rates used to calculate the lodestar are also

reasonable. The one hourly rate which at first glance appears

high, the $495/hour charged by Dan Feinberg, is supported by the

fact that several state courts have awarded him fees based on

that hourly rate. (Id. at ¶10.) Even if his rate were reduced

to $395/hour, this would only reduce the lodestar by $10,535, for

a total of have awarded him an hourly The total lodestar of

$108,899.50, which is still more than the $75,000 requested under

the settlement.

//

//

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As a component of the $75,000 attorney’s fee, Class Counsel

requests reimbursement of a total of $5,264.04 in costs, set

forth in Exhibit F to the declaration of Class Counsel. The

costs listed therein are reasonable, as is the total cost

request.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) The Class, as proposed, is certified under both Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and/or 23(b)(2); and

(2) The Settlement is approved as fair and reasonable.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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