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Parties Involved:
Dennis Hall
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2002 Decided April 8, 2003

No. 02–3034

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT

v.

DENNIS HALL,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00435–01)

Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellant. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,

United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr., and Daniel M. Cisin, Assistant United States

Attorneys, were on brief.

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

for the appellee.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-3034 Document #742706 Filed: 04/08/2003 Page 1 of 7
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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit Judge,

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The United

States appeals the district court’s grant of a new trial to

Dennis Hall. The district court determined that Hall’s counsel’s failure to timely file a motion for a new trial constituted

‘‘newly discovered evidence’’ under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1)

supporting its grant of Hall’s new trial motion. United States

v. Hall, Crim. No. 98–435–LFO, at 4 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2002)

(mem.) (Appendix (App.) Tab I). The United States argues

that the district court erred because the newly discovered

evidence that provides the basis for a new trial motion must

have been in existence at the time of trial and the ‘‘evidence’’

on which Hall’s motion is based occurred following trial. We

agree and therefore reverse the district court.

I.

This is the second time we have reviewed the district

court’s grant of a new trial to Hall. See United States v.

Hall, 214 F.3d 175 (D.C. Cir. 2000). His conviction of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g) and of possession of marijuana in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 844(a) resulted from a jury verdict returned on

May 5, 1999. During trial, Hall had objected to the government’s closing argument claim that Hall’s counsel had ‘‘played

the race card’’ and requested that the jury be instructed to

disregard the remark. The trial court deferred ruling on

Hall’s objection until ‘‘after we have a verdict.’’ Hall’s trial

counsel waited until May 14, 1999, the seventh business day

after the verdict, before moving for an extension of time to

file a motion for a new trial. The district court did not rule

on the requested extension until June 3, 1999 when it granted

the extension request nunc pro tunc, extending the deadline

to file a new trial motion until June 10, 1999. Id. Hall

subsequently moved for a new trial and on October 1, 1999

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the district court granted Hall’s motion. The United States

appealed.

We reversed, explaining that FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(2)’s

seven-day time limit1

 is jurisdictional. Hall, 214 F.3d at 178.

Under Rule 33(b)(2), we held, the district court has jurisdiction to rule on a motion for a new trial only if the motion is

made no later than seven days after the verdict unless the

district court grants an extension before the seven-day limit

expires. Id. Because Hall failed to timely file a new trial

motion and the district court did not extend Hall’s deadline

within the seven-day period, we concluded that the district

court lacked jurisdiction to grant Hall’s new trial motion. Id.

We reversed and remanded for sentencing. Hall was subsequently sentenced and he then filed an appeal.

While his appeal was pending, Hall filed a second new trial

motion. App. Tab F. This time, he asserted that the district

court had jurisdiction to grant his motion based on ‘‘newly

discovered evidence.’’ Id. at 4–7. Rule 33(b)(1) permits a

motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence if

made ‘‘within 3 years after the verdict.’’ FED. R. CRIM. P.

33(b)(1). Hall’s newly discovered evidence was his discovery

of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his

counsel’s failure to timely file a new trial motion. App. Tab

F.

The district court agreed, concluding that Hall’s complaint

about his counsel’s post-trial mistake gave it jurisdiction

under Rule 33(b)(1) to consider, and grant, his motion. App.

Tab. I at 4. Rejecting contrary decisions from the fourth,

fifth and ninth circuits,2 id. at 3, and citing dictum from our

1 ‘‘Any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other

than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 7 days after the

verdict or finding of guilty, or within such further time as the court

sets during the 7–day period.’’ FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(2).

2 These courts held that ‘‘information supporting an ineffective

assistance claim is not ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Rule 33 and,

therefore, that a motion for a new trial predicated on ineffective

assistance of counsel must be brought, if at all, within seven days of

judgment regardless of when the defendant becomes aware of the

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decision in United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d 1033, 1037 (D.C.

Cir. 1997), that there the court had ‘‘no need to endorse [the

other circuits’] rule,’’ the district court concluded that we

would not bar a Rule 33(b)(1) motion based on an ineffective

assistance claim so long as ‘‘Hall did not TTT know the facts

supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the

time of trial.’’ App. Tab. I at 3. Because the error occurred

‘‘after trial, when Hall was no longer present and able to

observe counsel’s actions,’’ the trial judge declared, information about the error was ‘‘ ‘newly discovered evidence,’ not

known to Hall at the time of trial.’’ Id. at 3–4. Having

satisfied itself of its jurisdiction, it then held that the prosecutor’s comments during trial were unfairly prejudicial, making

Hall’s motion meritorious. Id. at 5–9. It further declared its

intention ‘‘to grant the defendant’s motion for a new trial

upon remand of jurisdiction from the Court of Appeals.’’ Id.

at 9. On our remand of Hall’s then pending appeal, United

States v. Hall, No. 01–3017 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 12, 2002), the

district court granted Hall’s motion. United States v. Hall,

Crim. No. 98–435–LFO (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2002) (App. Tab J).

The United States now appeals that order.

II.

Although we ordinarily review an order granting a new

trial for abuse of discretion, here we consider de novo the

purely legal question before us, namely whether the fact that

Hall’s counsel failed to timely move for a new trial, a fact Hall

first ‘‘learned of’’ when we reversed the trial court’s grant of

the untimely motion, constitutes newly discovered evidence

under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1). Torres, 115 F.3d at 1035;

United States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir.

1993). FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 provides two jurisdictional bases

facts which suggested [a defendant’s] attorney’s performance may

have been constitutionally inadequate.’’ United States v. Smith, 62

F.3d 641, 648–49 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Hanoum,

33 F.3d 1128, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1068

(1995); United States v. Ugalde, 861 F.2d 802, 807–09 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1097 (1989).

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for a motion for a new trial—if a motion is made: ‘‘grounded

on newly discovered evidence TTT within 3 years after the

verdict or finding of guilty’’ or ‘‘within 7 days after the verdict

or finding of guilty, or within such further time as the court

may fix during the 7–day period.’’ FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b);3

United States v. Marquez, 291 F.3d 23, 26–28 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 123 S. Ct. 329 (2002); Hall, 214 F.3d at 177. Rule

33(b)(2) having been foreclosed, the district court had jurisdiction to grant Hall’s motion only if his trial counsel’s error

constitutes newly discovered evidence under the Rule.

Hall alleges as the basis of his motion his post-trial discovery of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district

court discussed the circuit split regarding the treatment of

ineffective assistance evidence as ‘‘newly discovered evidence’’

under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1). Some circuits have held that

ineffective assistance evidence does not constitute ‘‘newly

discovered evidence’’ under the Rule in view of the purpose of

including newly discovered evidence as a basis for a new trial

motion, that is, to afford relief if evidence later surfaces

directly affecting proof of guilt or innocence. United States

v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 648–49 (4th Cir. 1995); United States

v. Hanoum, 33 F.3d 1128, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 514 U.S. 1068 (1995); United States v. Ugalde, 861

F.2d 802, 807–09 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1097 (1989).

These courts conclude that whether counsel was ineffective at

trial sheds no light on the defendant’s guilt or innocence;

accordingly, it should not be the basis for a Rule 33(b)(1)

motion. Ugalde, 861 F.2d at 807–09. On the other hand, the

Tenth Circuit has held that ineffective assistance evidence

may be the basis of a new trial motion based on newly

discovered evidence so long as the evidence is truly ‘‘newly

discovered’’—i.e., so long as the facts relevant to counsel’s

deficiency were ‘‘not known to the defendant until after trial.’’

United States v. Johnson, 12 F.3d 1540, 1548 (10th Cir. 1993);

3 We note that on December 1, 2002 Rule 33 was amended as

part of a general restyling of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. The changes were intended to be ‘‘stylistic only.’’ FED.

R. CRIM. P. 33 advisory committee’s note.

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see also United States v. Kladouris, 739 F. Supp. 1221, 1225–

27 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (citing United States v. Brown, 476 F.2d

933, 935 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam)).4

 None of these

cases, however, discusses the crucial issue in this case—

whether ‘‘evidence’’ that does not exist until after trial can be

‘‘newly discovered evidence’’ under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1).

We have previously held that under Rule 33, ‘‘to justify a

new trial, ‘newly discovered evidence’ must have been existence at the time of trial.’’ Lafayette, 983 F.2d at 1105. In

Lafayette we held that evidence that a police officer who

testified at trial against the defendants began using drugs

after trial was not ‘‘newly discovered evidence.’’ Id. As we

explained, ‘‘[e]vents and transactions occurring after the trial

obviously could not have been the subject of testimony at the

trial,’’ and, accordingly, such events would have had no effect

on the trial’s outcome and should not be the basis for vacating

the conviction. Id. The Seventh Circuit has used the same

reasoning. United States v. Bolden, 355 F.2d 453, 461 (7th

Cir. 1965) (evidence that witness was convicted of counterfeiting following defendant’s trial ‘‘was not evidence that was in

existence at the time of the defendant’s trial and therefore did

not constitute evidence upon which a new trial could be

based’’), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012 (1966); see also United

States v. Welch, 160 F. Supp. 2d 830, 833 (N.D. Ohio 2001).5

4 Even though the court in Kladouris cited our Brown decision

to support its view that a newly discovered ineffective assistance

claim can support a new trial motion under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1),

we have since clarified that the Brown language specifically relied

on was dictum. Torres, 115 F.3d at 1036 (explaining relevant

Brown language was dictum because Brown had neither moved for

new trial nor raised ineffective assistance of counsel claim on

appeal).

5 Some courts follow the same approach to Rule 59 and Rule

60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Rivera v.

M/T Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 1988) (evidence of

results of post-trial investigation was not newly discovered evidence

because results did not exist at time of trial); Davis v. Jellico Cmty.

Hosp., Inc., 912 F.2d 129, 135 (6th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff’s death after

final judgment was not ‘‘newly discovered evidence’’ under either

Rule 59 or 60(b)); see also Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845

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Hall’s counsel’s failure to move for a new trial within the

seven-day time period required by Rule 33(b)(2), ‘‘evidence’’

Hall claims he ‘‘discovered’’ only after trial, did not occur, of

course, until after trial.

Nothing in the cases cited by Hall or relied on by the

district court permitting evidence of ineffective assistance of

counsel to support a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence suggests a different result because they reviewed defense counsel’s performance either during trial or

pre-trial. Torres, 115 F.3d at 1034 (language barrier between

counsel and defendant at trial is basis for ineffective assistance of counsel challenge); United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d

130, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (alleged government agent’s conversations with defendant and defense counsel regarding trial

strategy and agent’s theft of relevant and important documents constitutes sixth amendment violation). We thus conclude that the district court committed legal error in granting

Hall’s motion for a new trial based on conduct that did not

occur until after trial.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

judgment.

So ordered.

F.2d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir. 1988) (evidence of involvement in conspiracy to overthrow foreign government six months after trial not

‘‘newly discovered evidence’’); Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F. Supp. 915,

922 (W.D. Va. 1987) (death of injured party after judgment not

‘‘newly discovered evidence’’), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on unrelated grounds, certifying questions to Supreme Court of Virginia, 877

F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989); Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 590

F. Supp. 875, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (findings in related litigation

made after final judgment not ‘‘newly discovered evidence’’), aff’d,

768 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985); 12 MOORE’S

FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.42[3] (3d ed. 1997).

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