Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00800/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00800-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kaleb McIntosh
Plaintiff
Cameron Jibril Thomaz
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KALEB MCINTOSH,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAMERON JIBRIL THOMAZ,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-00800-JCS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING DISMISSAL PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kaleb McIntosh brings this case against Defendant Cameron Jibril Thomaz, an 

entertainer perhaps better known by his stage name Wiz Khalifa. The undersigned separately 

granted McIntosh’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and now reviews the sufficient of 

McIntosh’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons discussed below, 

the undersigned recommends that McIntosh’s complaint be DISMISSED without leave to 

amend as frivolous, for failure to state a claim, and for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.

This case will be reassigned to a United States district judge for all further proceedings,

including action on the recommendation of this report.1 McIntosh may file an objection to this 

report no later than May 28, 2019.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Where a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is granted leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis, courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims which: 

(1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 

 

1 Because Thomaz has not been served or appeared, the undersigned lacks consent of all parties 

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See generally Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure provides that a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint that lacks such statement fails to state a claim 

and must be dismissed.

In determining whether a plaintiff fails to state a claim, the court assumes that all factual 

allegations in the complaint are true. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th 

Cir. 1995). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as true is 

inapplicable to legal conclusions [and] mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The pertinent 

question is whether the factual allegations, assumed to be true, “state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Thus, to meet this requirement, the 

complaint must be supported by factual allegations. Id. Moreover, although courts generally must 

accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true even if they appear to be unlikely, the Supreme Court 

has made clear that a complaint may be dismissed as “frivolous” under § 1915 where it is based on 

“fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (superseded by statute 

on other grounds as recognized in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Where the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, as is the case here, courts must 

“construe the pleadings liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. 

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “A district court should not dismiss a 

pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 

complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203−04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). 

Further, when it dismisses the complaint of a pro se litigant with leave to amend, “the district court 

must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the 

litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Id. (quoting Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Without the benefit of a statement of deficiencies, the pro se litigant 

will likely repeat previous errors.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)).

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III. ANALYSIS

McIntosh’s allegations are facially implausible. McIntosh alleges that a well known 

entertainer has embedded a radio frequency device under McIntosh’s skin to track his location. 

1st Am. Compl. (“FAC,” dkt. 6) at ECF p. 4.2 The alleged device also “takes pictures and 

sexually assaults and causes pain,” emits “radio waves . . . into [McIntosh’s] brain,” causes 

McIntosh to have dreams of Thomaz stalking him, and “tell[s] McIntosh to become a 

homosexual.” Id. at ECF pp. 5, 9–10. McIntosh alleges that Thomaz “stalks [McIntosh] in the 

shower and kisses [him] on the mouth every second,” among other allegations of sexual assault. 

Id. at ECF p. 6. The complaint references well known but generally discredited conspiracy 

theories involving “Free Masons,” “the Illuminati,” and “Satanic” messages in popular music. See 

id. at ECF p. 4. McIntosh alleges that Thomaz is “interfering with [McIntosh’s] recruitment into 

the Navy and attempting to monitor military operations through [McIntosh] along with several 

others such as Demi Lovato, Aubrey Drake Graham, Kanye West, Katy Perry, Ariana GrandeButera, Gilbert Milam Jr, Kevin Gilyard, Tonee Hayes, Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, and 

potentially several other Free Masons.” Id. at ECF p. 10.3 The Court also notes that McIntosh has 

filed similar complaints against a number of other public figures, with a common theme of 

McIntosh’s disapproval of the defendants’ videos on YouTube. See generally McIntosh v. 

Grande-Butera, No. 3:18-cv-07758-WHA (N.D. Cal.); McIntosh v. Pham, No. 3:19-cv-00243-

WHA (N.D. Cal.); McIntosh v. Webster, No. 3:19-cv-00801-RS (N.D. Cal.). At least in the 

absence of allegations of clear underlying facts to support such conclusions, the undersigned finds 

McIntosh’s allegations—of a conspiracy of entertainers, politicians, and other public figures to 

control McIntosh’s mind for sexual purposes through devices unknown to current technology—to 

be “fanciful,” and subject to dismissal as “frivolous.” See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.

 

2 This report uses the page numbers assigned by the Court’s ECF filing system in citations to 

McIntosh’s first amended complaint.

3 While some of McIntosh’s other allegations, such as Thomaz allegedly using cannabis 

performing songs with lyrics that McIntosh considers objectionable, are not so inherently fanciful 

to warrant disregarding them, as far as the undersigned is aware those allegations provide no basis 

for a private civil right of action under any federal law. McIntosh also alleges that “[t]here of have 

been prior motions for copyright infringement for” one of Thomaz’s songs, but does not allege 

that McIntosh himself owns the copyright purportedly infringed or that he was in any way affected 

by the purported infringement. See FAC at ECF p. 5.

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As a separate and sufficient basis for dismissal, McIntosh’s complaint asserts no claim—

and alleges no conduct that would support a claim—giving rise to a private right to bring a civil

action in federal court. All of the statutes that McIntosh cites fall within either Title 18 of the 

United States Code, defining federal criminal law, or the California Penal Code, defining 

California criminal law. The statutes that McIntosh cites can be enforced by the government, but 

not by a private individual. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 284 (1979) 

(discussing the rare circumstances where courts will imply a private right of action to enforce 

criminal laws). To the extent that McIntosh seeks to bring claims under Title 18 or the California 

Penal Code, those claims should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted.

Finally, even if McIntosh’s far-fetched allegations were taken as true and could perhaps 

support a claim for battery, sexual assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or some 

other personal injury tort, such claims arise under state law, not federal law. Federal courts have 

limited jurisdiction and may hear only cases where Congress has granted jurisdiction by statute. 

Two commonly invoked jurisdictional statutes are 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“federal question 

jurisdiction”) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (“diversity jurisdiction”). Federal question jurisdiction 

encompasses cases that “arise under” the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See

28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case “arises under” federal law when federal law creates the cause of action 

or the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on some construction of federal law, 

see Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002), which is not the 

case for the state law tort doctrines that might be implicated by McIntosh’s allegations. Diversity 

jurisdiction requires that no plaintiff in the case live in the same state as any defendant, and that 

the amount of money at issue is more than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. McIntosh has not 

alleged that he and Thomaz reside in different states. The Court therefore lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over the tort claims that might conceivably be raised by McIntosh’s complaint, and the 

undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed on that basis.

Although courts dismissing a complaint under § 1915 must generally permit leave to 

amend “unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

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amendment,” see Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212, McIntosh’s allegations are sufficiently fanciful that no 

amendment could cure the defects described above. The undersigned therefore recommends that 

leave to amend be DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that McIntosh’s complaint 

be DISMISSED without leave to amend. McIntosh may file an objection no later than May 28, 

2019.

Dated: May 14, 2019

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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