Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03306/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03306-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alexandria Clinic, P.A.
Intervenor
Minnesota Licensed Practical Nurses Association
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3306

___________

Minnesota Licensed Practical Nurses *

Association, *

*

Petitioner, *

*

v. *

* Petition for Review of an Order of

National Labor Relations Board, * the National Labor Relations Board.

*

Respondent, *

*

Alexandria Clinic, P.A., *

*

Intervenor on Appeal. *

___________

Submitted: October 21, 2004

Filed: May 11, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, MAGILL and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

The Minnesota Licensed Practical Nurses Association (“the Union”) petitions

for review of a National Labor Relations Board decision overruling Board precedent

and holding that the Union violated Section 8(g) of the National Labor Relations Act,

29 U.S.C. § 158(g), by unilaterally delaying the commencement of a strike beyond

the time disclosed in the ten-day notice mandated by § 8(g). As a result of this ruling,

Appellate Case: 03-3306 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/11/2005 Entry ID: 1901505
1

An e-mail from the Union advisor to the nurses explained: “we can go at 8:00

[on Friday, September 10]; or just have everyone go to lunch and not come back; or

work as usual on Friday, but not show up for Urgent Care Saturday -- and have them

wondering about Monday (when no one will come to work)!”

-2-

twenty two striking nurses lost their status as protected employees, and their health

care employer did not violate the Act by terminating them. Like two other circuits,

we agree with the Board’s new interpretation of the plain meaning of § 8(g).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. 

The Union is the certified collective bargaining representative of nurses

employed by the Alexandria Clinic, a health care organization serving a large area in

west-central Minnesota. In August 1989, after months of unsuccessful bargaining,

the Clinic announced that it would implement its final offer. In response, the nurses

voted to strike. The Union gave the ten days’ written notice required by § 8(g),

advising the Clinic that the strike would commence at 8:00 a.m. on September 10,

1999. However, the Union secretly advised the nurses that they could delay the

commencement of the strike up to 72 hours.1

 The Clinic posted a notice that it would

remain open and continue patient care despite the strike. The strike leaders decided

that the bargaining unit nurses should report for duty on September 10 and walk off

the job at noon. They did not notify the Clinic of this plan. 

On the morning of September 10, temporary replacement nurses hired by the

Clinic reported before 8:00. Fourteen bargaining unit nurses also reported for duty

without warning. The Clinic responded by having the replacements wait in a lounge

area so as not to disturb the patients. The bargaining unit nurses left just before noon,

again without warning the Clinic or their supervising physicians. Eight other nurses

not on duty that morning later joined the strike. Patient care was not affected, as the

replacement nurses were present to take over at noon on September 10. Citing the

strike delay without notice, the Clinic fired the striking nurses for engaging in

unlawful activity. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge held that the Union

Appellate Case: 03-3306 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/11/2005 Entry ID: 1901505
-3-

did not violate § 8(g) and therefore the Clinic committed an unfair labor practice by

discharging the nurses. A divided Board reversed. Alexandria Clinic, 339 NLRB No.

162 (2003).

Congress enacted § 8(g) in 1974, when it extended the Act to cover non-profit

health care facilities, “to give the health care institutions sufficient advance notice of

a strike or picketing to permit timely arrangements for continuity of patient care.”

339 NLRB No. 162 at 3. Section 8(g) provides in relevant part:

A labor organization before engaging in any strike . . . at any health care

institution shall, not less than ten days prior to such action, notify the

institution in writing . . . . The notice shall state the date and time that

such action will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended

by the written agreement of both parties.

In Greater New Orleans Artificial Kidney Center, 240 NLRB 432, 435-36 (1979), the

Board held that a union does not violate § 8(g) by unilaterally delaying the start of a

strike “between 12 and 72 hours . . . where there is at least 12 hours advance notice

given to the employer of the postponement.” In rejecting a contrary “restrictive”

interpretation of § 8(g), the Board relied on legislative history, not the plain meaning

of the statute. The Senate report to the 1974 amendments stated:

It is not the intention of the Committee that a labor organization shall be

required to commence a strike or picketing at the precise time specified

in the notice; on the other hand, it would be inconsistent with the

Committee’s intent if a labor organization failed to act within a

reasonable time after the time specified in the notice. Thus, it would be

unreasonable, in the Committee’s judgment, if a strike or picketing

commenced more than 72 hours after the time specified in the notice.

In addition . . . if a labor organization does not strike at the time

specified in the notice, at least 12 hours notice should be given of the

actual time for commencement of the action.

S. REP. NO. 93-766 at 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3946, 3949.

Appellate Case: 03-3306 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/11/2005 Entry ID: 1901505
-4-

Though not previously questioned by the Board, the rule adopted in Greater

New Orleans was rejected by the two circuits that have considered it. In NLRB v.

Washington Heights-West Harlem-Inwood Mental Health Council, Inc., 897 F.2d

1238, 1247 (2d Cir. 1990), the court denied enforcement of an unfair labor practice

order because the union had violated § 8(g); the court declined to rely on legislative

history “to depart from the straightforward unambiguous language of the statute

requiring the Union to specify in writing the date and time it would strike.” In

Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 317 F.3d 316, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2003),

the court refused to enforce an unfair labor practice order because the union violated

§ 8(g) by unilaterally delaying the strike three days, expressly rejecting the Board’s

reliance on Greater New Orleans:

The meaning of [§ 8(g)’s] mandatory language could not be plainer or

the Congress’s intent in enacting it clearer. The notice must provide ten

days notice of a strike specifying the day and time it is to occur. . . .

Although the [union’s first notice] provided adequate notice of a strike

to commence on April 29, as it turned out the strike did not begin until

three days after that date; the extension [notice], on the other hand,

accurately identified the date of the strike but did not afford the requisite

ten days’ notice. . . . 

. . . If the Congress had intended to allow either party to extend

the notice unilaterally, it could easily have said so -- but it did not.

Instead, the Congress carved out but a single express exception -- when

both parties consent in writing -- an exception that would be

unnecessary if either party could unilaterally extend the notice at will.

In this case, the Board concluded that the Union violated § 8(g) and therefore

the Clinic did not commit an unfair labor practice for two reasons. First, the Union

did not satisfy the “substantial compliance” requirements of Greater New Orleans

because it did not give the Clinic at least twelve hours notice of when the delayed

strike would begin. Second, ruling more broadly, the Board majority expressly

overruled Greater New Orleans and joined the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit

in holding that the plain language of § 8(g) bars a union from unilaterally extending

Appellate Case: 03-3306 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/11/2005 Entry ID: 1901505
2

The Board majority declined to consider two issues as not presented by the

facts of this case -- whether a de minimis delay in the start of a strike would violate

§ 8(g), and whether “the traditional doctrine of equitable estoppel” might apply where

the strike was postponed by an unanticipated emergency and the employer

“unreasonably declined to grant an extension.” Alexandria Clinic, 339 NLRB No.

162 at 6 n.17. We likewise do not consider these issues because we agree with the

Board that the disruptive four-hour delay in this case was not de minimis.

-5-

the date and time of the strike as disclosed in the union’s ten-day notice. “In our

view,” the Board explained, “by relying on the legislative history to find that

unilateral extensions of strike notices were permissible, the Board in Greater New

Orleans effectively rewrote the third sentence of Section 8(g) to make its

requirements discretionary rather than mandatory.” 339 NLRB No. 162 at 4.2

 That

alternative holding is the focus of the Union’s appeal. 

1. The Union first argues that the Board’s new interpretation of § 8(g) is

contrary to congressional intent as reflected in the legislative history on which

Greater New Orleans relied. The general rule is clear: “If a statute’s meaning is

plain, the Board and reviewing courts ‘must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress.’” Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398

(1996), quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843

(1984). But as the 5-4 decision in Holly Farms illustrates, determining the plain

meaning of a provision in the federal labor laws can be a dicey task. Like the Board

majority, we are inclined to agree with the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit that

§ 8(g) unambiguously precludes unilateral extensions of the commencement of a

strike. The last sentence provides that “notice, once given, may be extended by the

written agreement of both parties.” As the D.C. Circuit explained in Beverly, 317

F.3d at 321, “Instead [of allowing unilateral extensions] the Congress carved out but

a single express exception . . . . This is a case where the canons of avoiding

surplusage and expressio unius are at their zenith because they apply in tandem.” 

On the other hand, the contemporaneous legislative committee reports are

strong evidence that at least the principal sponsors of § 8(g) intended the Board to

Appellate Case: 03-3306 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/11/2005 Entry ID: 1901505
-6-

apply a reasonableness standard to the question at hand; the Senate report even

suggested the specific 12 hour-72 hour rule adopted in Greater New Orleans. The

Supreme Court has given less emphasis to legislative history in recent years,

recognizing that it is frequently an unreliable indicator of congressional intent. But

only Justice Scalia has consistently objected to “the recent practice of relying upon

legislative material to provide an authoritative interpretation of a statutory text.”

Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 622 (1991) (Scalia, J.,

concurring). Responding for the other eight Justices in Mortier, Justice White refused

to disregard legislative history altogether, acknowledging only that “a committee of

Congress cannot take language that could only cover ‘flies’ or ‘mosquitoes,’ and tell

the courts that it really covers ‘ducks.’” Id. at 611 n.4. 

Even if this legislative history casts doubt on the Board’s interpretation of

§ 8(g)’s plain meaning, the Union’s statutory argument does not prevail. “[I]f the

statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the

court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the

statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The Supreme Court “will uphold a Board rule

as long as it is rational and consistent with the Act . . . . even if it represents a

departure from the Board’s prior policy.” NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,

494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990); see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991). Here,

the Board bolstered its analysis of the statute’s plain meaning by explaining that its

new interpretation of § 8(g) effectuates the policy underlying the statute -- to protect

patient health care -- and eliminates “the kind of needless uncertainty and

concomitant litigation generated [by] the imprecise and ambiguous ‘substantial

compliance’ standard of Greater New Orleans.” Alexandria Clinic, 339 NLRB No.

162 at 5. We uphold the Board’s construction of § 8(g).

2. The Union next argues that, even if the Union violated § 8(g) by unilaterally

extending the time to strike without notice to the Clinic, the individual nurses did not

lose their protected status. The Union reasons that § 8(d) of the Act only denies

protected status to an employee who strikes “within the appropriate period specified

Appellate Case: 03-3306 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/11/2005 Entry ID: 1901505
-7-

in subsection (g),” the “period specified” in § 8(g) is the ten days after notice is given,

so § 8(d) applies only to unlawful strikes prior to the date and time contained in the

§ 8(g) notice, not strikes that commence after that time. If the twenty two nurses did

not lose their protected status, the argument concludes, the Clinic committed an unfair

labor practice by discharging them for engaging in an economic strike.

The Board rejected this contention:

As made clear in Section 8(g), the “appropriate period” is the waiting

period after a notice that gives the date and time for a strike. Obviously,

if there is no notice, there can be no lawful strike. Concededly, in the

instant case, there was a notice and the employees did not strike within

the period set by the notice. However, the employees did strike

thereafter, and there was no notice with respect to that strike. . . . In

sum, the strike was without notice, and it was therefore unlawful.

* * * * * 

. . . [T]his conclusion results in the nurses losing their protected

employee status under Section 8(d) for engaging in an unlawful strike,

and subjects them to lawful discharge.

Alexandria Clinic, 339 NLRB No. 162 at 6 (emphasis in original). Assuming § 8(d)

is silent or ambiguous on this issue, the Board has reasonably construed the statute.

Indeed, the Union’s interpretation would immunize the striking nurses from the

consequences of their unlawful activity, contrary to the Board’s obligation to enforce

compliance with the Act. See Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 NLRB 514, 518 (1963).

3. Finally, the Union argues that it would be manifestly unjust to apply the

Board’s new interpretation of § 8(g) retroactively because the Union and the nurses

justifiably relied on the Board’s decision in Greater New Orleans in deciding to delay

their strike by four hours. In the last fifty years, retroactivity has become a complex

subject. See generally Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). In considering this

issue, we note first that the Board ruled on an unfair labor practice charge, which is

Appellate Case: 03-3306 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/11/2005 Entry ID: 1901505
-8-

an adjudicatory not a rule-making function. The Board does not abuse its substantial

discretion in dealing with this and other § 8(g) disputes on a case-by-case basis. See

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947). Adjudication is a “form of

administrative action where retroactivity is not only permissible but standard.”

Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 221 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).

When the Board announces a new rule in one case and then applies that rule

retroactively in another case, the result resembles the adoption and application of

quasi-legislative agency rules, a process that was subjected to retroactivity limitations

in Bowen. For this reason, this court and others have considered whether retroactive

application of a new rule to other pending cases would be manifestly unjust,

examining whether the losing party relied on established Board policy, whether the

Board abruptly changed that policy, and the severity of the penalty imposed on the

losing party. See Ryan Heating Co. v. NLRB, 942 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1991);

Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390-91 (D.C. Cir.

1972). But in this case, the Union objects to the retroactive application of a new rule

in the very case in which the rule is adopted. We know of no case in which a circuit

court has precluded the Board from applying a new rule of decision to the parties to

the dispute being adjudicated. Moreover, the case was filed by the Board’s general

counsel seeking back pay for the discharged nurses -- in effect, a damage remedy.

The employer defended, arguing that the nurses engaged in unlawful strike activity

which justified their discharge. That defense prevailed. To nonetheless award the

nurses damages because they relied in good faith on “bad law” would be

extraordinary. Adoption of such a principle might well have an unfortunate impact

on the incentive of other parties and their attorneys “to advance contentions requiring

a change in the law.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967). 

Assuming without deciding that the standard set forth in Ryan Heating applies

to the case in which a new rule is adopted, we have no difficulty concluding that the

Union has failed to satisfy that standard. The reliance issue would be more difficult

if the strike had been delayed 12 to 72 hours and the Union had given at least twelve

Appellate Case: 03-3306 Page: 8 Date Filed: 05/11/2005 Entry ID: 1901505
-9-

hours written notice of the delay, the unilateral extension upheld in Greater New

Orleans. Instead, the Union delayed the strike a disruptive one-half day with no

notice of the delay. Prior to this case, the Board had never upheld this tactic. See

Operating Engineers Local No. 3 (Washoe Medical Center), Case No. 32-CG-47,

NLRB General Counsel Advice Mem. (Feb. 5, 2001) (“the Board has not yet

developed rules concerning delays of less than 12 hours”). And in this case, the

Board held as an alternative ground that the Union’s four-hour delay without notice

did not satisfy the “substantial compliance” requirements of Greater New Orleans.

Alexandria Clinic, 339 N.L.R.B. No. 162, at 2, 7. Thus, the nurses and the Union did

not rely on established Board policy, and the Board’s decision to apply its new

interpretation of § 8(g) in this case was not manifestly unjust. See Cedar Valley

Corp. v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1211, 1221 (8th Cir. 1992). 

The nurses engaged in a strike in violation of § 8(g), thereby lost their

protected status by reason of § 8(d), and were lawfully discharged by their employer.

The individual nurses may have acted in good faith in relying upon unsound advice

from the Union and its legal counsel. But that does not justify rewarding their

unlawful activity by imposing a back pay and reinstatement remedy on their

employer, whose conduct was entirely lawful. The petition for review is denied.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-3306 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/11/2005 Entry ID: 1901505