Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02243/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02243-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sheldon Lynn Bryant
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2243

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Sheldon Lynn Bryant, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 15, 2006

 Filed: May 9, 2006

___________

Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

The government appeals the sentence of thirty months’ imprisonment imposed

by the district court on Sheldon Lynn Bryant, arguing that it is unreasonable. We

vacate the sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

Bryant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. In his plea agreement, Bryant

admitted that, beginning as early as August 2001 and continuing until July 18, 2003,

he was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and that the conspiracy

involved more than fifty grams of cocaine base. Law enforcement officials identified

Bryant as a mid-level dealer in this conspiracy, and he admitted that he was the

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primary supplier for one buyer, selling him cocaine base on nearly a daily basis for

approximately two years. 

The district court found that Bryant’s total offense level was twenty-seven, his

criminal history category was I, and the applicable sentencing guideline range was

thus between seventy and eighty-seven months. Neither party challenges this

calculation on appeal. At the sentencing hearing, Bryant’s counsel argued that Bryant

had been drug-free for nine months, had a supportive family, and an insignificant prior

criminal history. Sent. Tr. at 3. The court then told Bryant that he would be sentenced

to thirty months’ imprisonment to “give [him] enough time to go through the drug

treatment program.” Sent. Tr. at 4. The district court also stated that “based on

[Bryant’s] previous good record and the fact that [he has] for a period of nine months

been drug-free, [it was] going to go much below the” guideline range. Id. The

government objected to this variance and timely filed this appeal.

When there is no dispute about the applicable guideline range, the issue we

examine on appeal is whether the sentence imposed is “reasonable” in light of the

factors articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997,

1003 (8th Cir. 2005). We review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir. 2005). A discretionary

sentencing ruling may be unreasonable if a sentencing court fails to consider a

relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight

to an improper or irrelevant factor, or commits a clear error of judgment by arriving

at a sentence outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.

Haack, 403 F.3d at 1004.

A sentence within the guideline range is presumed to be reasonable. United

States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005). Sentences deviating from the

guideline range can be reasonable so long as the judge offers appropriate justification

under the factors specified in Section 3553(a). United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d

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479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006). The further the district court varies from the presumptively

reasonable guideline range, the more compelling the justification based on the 3553(a)

factors must be. United States v. McMannus, 436 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2006). An

extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances. Dalton,

404 F.3d at 1029. 

The thirty month sentence imposed in this case represents a fifty-seven percent

downward variance from the bottom of Bryant’s advisory guideline range. We are

mindful that the appropriate degree of sentencing reduction cannot be calculated with

mathematical precision, and there is a range of reasonableness available to the district

court in any given case. United States v. Saenz, 428 F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (8th Cir.

2005). Nevertheless, the record in this case does not support such a drastic reduction

from the guideline range.

The district court, in sentencing Bryant, offered only a brief reference to

Bryant’s “previous good record” and the fact that he had remained drug-free for nine

months. While we do not require a rote recitation of each § 3553(a) factor, the court

should explain both the decision to vary and the extent of the variance. United States

v. Gatewood, 438 F.3d 894, 896 (8th Cir. 2006). The district court presumably

intended Bryant’s drug rehabilitation and limited criminal history to be relevant to

“the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). In light of

the other Section 3553(a) factors, however, such as the nature and circumstances of

the offense, the need of the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to

provide just punishment, the applicable guideline range, and the need to avoid

unwarranted sentencing disparities, the history and characteristics of Bryant do not

justify a thirty-month sentence in this case.

The applicable guideline range already reflected two significant reductions of

Bryant’s sentence due to his limited criminal history. First, the statutory mandatory

minimum sentence of 120 months did not apply. Sent. Tr. at 4. Second, his criminal

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history category of I was used to arrive at the guideline range of seventy to eightyseven months. Because his limited criminal history had already been accounted for

in this way, it was unreasonable for the district court to use that criminal history as

justification for an extraordinary variance such as this one. See Claiborne, 439 F.3d

at 481 (holding that a limited criminal history does not justify a sixty percent

reduction when that criminal history has already eliminated an otherwise applicable

mandatory minimum sentence); United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir.

2006) (“[I]f the district court’s departure is based merely on a lack of criminal history,

the significant divergence from the guideline range would be unreasonable.”).

Similarly, while we join with the district court in commending Bryant for

remaining drug-free during the nine months preceding the sentencing hearing, that

drug-free status is not an extraordinary factor sufficient to justify such a large

variance. As we held in United States v. Rogers, “remaining drug-free, while

commendable, [is] not extraordinary or atypical.” 400 F.3d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 2005).

“[W]ithin the framework of an advisory guideline scheme designed to reduce

unwarranted sentence disparities among similar defendants,” Saenz, 428 F.3d at 1162,

it is unreasonable for such a large variance to be made based simply on Bryant’s

limited criminal history and nine months of drug-free living. Although these factors

might well be sufficient to justify some variance from the presumptively reasonable

guideline range, they do not justify a fifty-seven percent variance from the

presumptively reasonable guideline range. The sentencing guidelines are indeed no

longer mandatory, but they continue to be guideposts that must be respected, lest we

see a return to the unwarranted sentencing disparities that resulted in the adoption of

the guidelines themselves. 

The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court for

resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

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