Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02303/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02303-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Sacramento
Defendant
Donna Dell
Defendant
Department of Industrial Relations
Defendant
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
Defendant
Helix Electric, Inc.
Plaintiff
Public Works Compliance Program
Defendant
John Rea
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HELIX ELECTRIC, INC.,

NO. CIV. 05-2303 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS

ENFORCEMENT, an agency of the

State of California;

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS, an agency of the

State of California; DONNA

DELL, an individual in her

capacity as Labor Commissioner

of the State of California;

JOHN REA, an individual in his

capacity as Acting Director of

the Department of Industrial

Relations of the State of

California; COUNTY OF

SACRAMENTO, PUBLIC WORKS

COMPLIANCE PROGRAM,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Helix Electric,

Inc.’s (“Helix”) motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining

defendants from releasing the home addresses of Helix’s employees

to defendant Public Works Compliance Program (“PWCP”) pursuant to

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1 The court will consider PWCP’s rebuttal and exhibits

attached thereto because new factual issues were raised in

Helix’s reply as a result of a discovery order issued by the

Magistrate Judge on Jan. 11, 2006. PWCP did not have an

opportunity to respond to new factual allegations made by

plaintiff in its opposition papers.

2

Labor Code Section 1776(e). The court heard oral argument on the

motion on January 27, 2006. For the reasons set forth below,

plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Helix is a non-union electrical contractor that performs

both public and private work projects throughout the state of

California. (Decl. of Arthur Geller in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for a

T.R.O. & Prelim. Inj. (“Geller Decl.”), executed Nov. 22, 2005, ¶

2). Helix is currently performing work as a subcontractor on a

public works project within the County of Sacramento known as the

Juvenile Hall Expansion and Modifications Project. (Id. ¶ 3). 

PWCP represents itself as a joint labor-management committee

(“LMC”) established pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 175a. (Decl. Of

Kevin Abram in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Abram

Decl.”), executed Jan. 5, 2006, ¶ 1). PWCP is funded by the

Sacramento Electrical Construction Industry Labor-Management

Cooperation Committee (the “LMCC”), which was established by the

National Electrical Contractors Association (“NECA”) and the

International Brotherhood of Workers (“IBEW”). (Id. ¶ 7). 

However, neither NECA nor IBEW instructs PWCP as to its job

duties or directs the work that PWCP performs. (Id.) PWCP

reports on a monthly basis to the LMCC. (Deposition of A.C.

Steelman attached as Exh. 2 to Declaration of Roberta D. Perkins

in Supp. of PWCP’s Rebuttal to Pl.’s Reply1 (“Steelman Dep.”),

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filed Jan. 24, 2006, 14:5-7). PWCP was formed for the purpose of

monitoring public works construction projects within its

jurisdiction, and implements this purpose, in part, by educating

labor and management as to their rights and responsibilities with

respect to public works projects. (Id. ¶ 3). 

In or around September 2005, PWCP sent a request to the

County of Sacramento pursuant to Labor Code § 1776(e), requesting

copies of Helix’s certified payroll records which include the

addresses of Helix’s employees. (Geller Decl. ¶ 4). In or

around October 2005, Helix sent a letter to the Deputy County

Counsel for the County of Sacramento, contesting the validity of

PWCP’s status as a joint LMC and requesting that the County

refuse to turn over employee addresses to PWCP. (Decl. of

Richard M. Freeman in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for a T.R.O. & Prelim.

Inj. (“Freeman Decl.”), executed Nov. 21, 2005, ¶ 2). In

response, the Deputy County Counsel informed Helix that the

County intended to comply with PWCP’s request and that prevention

of the release of employee addresses would require a court order. 

(Id. ¶ 3). 

On November 22, 2006, Helix filed a motion for a temporary

restraining order and order to show cause regarding entry of a

preliminary injunction. The County did not oppose the motion for

entry of the temporary restraining order, and the court granted

plaintiff a temporary restraining order. Defendants Division of

Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSA”) and PWCP have filed

oppositions in response to plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary

injunction.

/////

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Helix contends (1) that PWCP is not a joint LMC; (2) that

compliance monitoring is not within the scope of permissible

activities of an LMC; (3) that Labor Code § 1776(e) is preempted

by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”); and (4) that Labor

Code § 1776(e) violates the Equal Protection Clause. Helix

further contends that it and its employees will suffer

irreparable injury if the certified payroll records, including

employee addresses, are released to PWCP. 

STANDARD

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show

either: “(1) a combination of probable success on the merits and

the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious

questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in

[its favor].” Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.,

Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2001). “These two

formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the

required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability

of success decreases.” Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th

Cir. 1998). Under either formulation of the test, a plaintiff

must still demonstrate a significant threat of irreparable

injury. Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 762

F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985).

ANALYSIS 

A. Irreparable Harm

Plaintiff contends that Helix and its employees will suffer

irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not issued

“since the PWCP will have then received the home addresses of

Helix’s employees.” (Pl.’s Mot. for a T.R.O. & Prelim. Inj.

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(“Pl.’s Mot.”), filed Nov. 22, 2005, at 19). Plaintiff argues

that PWCP and “its union backed entities” will be free to

disseminate and utilize this information without any monitoring

by plaintiff. (Id.) Specifically, Helix asserts that defendant

PWCP will improperly use the employee addresses it obtains to

organize a union, harass and solicit non-union employees, post

the addresses of the non-union employees in newspapers or trade

publications, or sell them to other solicitors. (Pl.’s Reply in

Supp. of a T.R.O. & Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Reply”), filed Jan 20,

2006, at 12). These arguments fail to demonstrate a significant

threat of irreparable injury.

The disclosure of employee addresses does not, by itself,

amount to irreparable injury to plaintiff or plaintiff’s

employees. The injury that plaintiff is concerned with is the

harassment or intimidation of its employees by a union seeking to

organize these employees. IBEW, the union whose potential

actions plaintiff is concerned with, is not a party to this

action. The injury plaintiff asserts in its motion could only

occur if and after PWCP disclosed those names and addresses to

the union. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that PWCP’s purpose in

seeking this information is to gain information for the union to

aid in organization efforts. Nor has plaintiff presented any

evidence substantiating its allegations that PWCP “serves at the

bidding of the IBEW and its Local 340 located in Sacramento.” 

(Pl.’s Mot. at 9). At this juncture, the potential for injury to

the plaintiff or its employees is wholly speculative. 

“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury.” 

Colorado Rive Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 849

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2 Moreover, even if plaintiff provided supported this

argument with evidence, the potential injury may be redressed. 

Section 158 of the National Labor Relations Act makes it unlawful

for a labor organization or its agents “to restrain or coerce

employees in the exercise” of the right to organize as well as

the right to refrain from organizing. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (West

2005).

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(9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, plaintiff has not satisfied its

burden for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.2 

For these reasons, plaintiff has not demonstrated a

likelihood of irreparable harm if the court does not enjoin the

release of its employees home address. As such, plaintiff’s

motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

B. Merits of Plaintiff’s Claims

Although the court has found that plaintiff has not

satisfied the requisite showing of a likelihood of irreparable

harm in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, for the purpose

of completeness, the court will address issues related to the

probability of plaintiff’s success on the merits.

1. PWCP’s Status as a Joint Labor Management Committee

Helix contends that PWCP is not entitled to the certified

payroll records because it is not a valid joint LMC formed

pursuant to § 175a of the National Labor Relations Act. 

Specifically, Helix argues that PWCP is not registered with any

federal or state agency and is not registered with the California

Secretary of State. Helix also presents evidence that in PWCP’s

formal application to the State of California to act as a labor

compliance program, the supporting documentation indicates that

it consisted of one investigator; Helix asserts that a joint LMC

cannot consist of one person. 

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Section 175a of the NLRA sets forth the applicable standards

regarding the formation of industrywide LMCs. Section 175a

provides that LMCs are “organized jointly by employers and labor

organizations representing employees in that plant area or

industry” and are “established for the purpose of improving labor

management relationships, job security, organizational

effectiveness, enhancing economic development or involving

workers in decisions affecting their jobs . . . .” 29 U.S.C. §

175a. The statute imposes no further requirements for the

formation of a joint LMC. Nor does federal case law impose

additional requirements. Therefore, the only clear requirements

to form a valid LMC pursuant to § 175a are (1) joint organization

by labor and management groups; and (2) formation for one of the

enumerated purposes. As such, there is no requirement that a

joint LMC register with a particular state or federal agency or

entity. Nor is there a requirement regarding the number of

members in a valid joint LMC. 

PWCP is funded by the Sacramento Electrical Construction

Industry Labor-Management Cooperation Committee (the “LMCC”),

which is comprised of NECA, a management organization, and IBEW,

a labor union. (Sacramento Electrical Construction Industry

Labor-Management Cooperation Trust Agreement, attached at Exh. 1

to PWCP’s Rebuttal to Pl.’s Reply (“Trust Agreement”), filed Jan.

24, 2006, at 1). On June 1, 1990, NECA and IBEW entered into a

cooperation trust agreement in order to form the LMCC pursuant to

29 U.S.C. § 175a. (Id. at 1, 26). In March 2002, the Board of

Directors of the LMCC passed a resolution authorizing the opening

of an additional bank account in the name of the PWCP. (Abram

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3 The balance of the board of trustees has traditionally

been three management and three labor. (Steelman Dep. 34:3-9). 

However, for the past year, management has had only one trustee

because management has not yet appointed replacement trustees. 

(Steelman Dep. 34:1-2). This does not affect the voting process

of the LMC because the Trust Agreement provides for unit voting,

which allows the management trustee to continue to act as if

three members were present. (Trust Agreement at 16).

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Decl. ¶ 7). The PWCP is a subdivision of the LMCC, which is

governed by a committee of trustees. (Steelman Dep. 10:18-11:1). 

The trustees hold regular monthly meetings, at which the PWCP

routinely reports. (Steelman Dep. 14:5-7). The LMCC board of

trustees is made up of equal representation of management and

labor. (Sacramento Electrical Construction Industry LaborManagement Cooperation Trust Agreement, attached at Exh. 1 to

PWCP’s Rebuttal to Pl.’s Reply (“Trust Agreement”), filed Jan.

24, 2006, 14-15).3 Therefore, the Sacramento Electrical

Construction Industry Labor-Management Committee, and PWCP as a

subdivision of the LMC, meets the requirement of having been

organized jointly be a management organization, NECA, and a labor

organization, IBEW.

The Trust Agreement provides that the Sacramento Electrical

Construction Industry Labor-Management Cooperation Committee is

established pursuant to § 175a. (Trust Agreement at 1). The

excerpts of the Trust Agreement submitted by the parties do not

specifically state that the LMCC was established for one of the

listed purposes set forth in § 175a; nor do the excerpts provide

explanation of any specific purpose contemplated in formation of

the LMCC. However, Helix has not presented any evidence that the

LMCC was not formed for one of the purposes set forth in § 175a. 

As such, the court cannot find that plaintiff would likely

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4 Additionally, the California Department of Industrial

Relations has recognized PWCP’s status as a joint LMC formed

pursuant to § 175a. (Exh. 1 to Decl. of Roberta D. Perkins in

Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Perkins Decl.”), executed

Jan. 6, 2006). The Department of Industrial Relations found that

it was proper for PWCP to intervene in a review of a civil wage

and penalty assessment with respect to work performed by Helix

Electric, Inc. on the California State University

Telecommunications Infrastructure Upgrade Project. Id.

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prevail on its argument that the LMCC, and PWCP as a subdivision

of the LMCC, is not a proper joint labor-management committee

formed pursuant to § 175a. 

For the reasons set forth above,4 plaintiff has not

demonstrated probable success on the merits based upon its

argument that PWCP is not a valid LMC. 

2. Permissible Activities of Joint Labor Management

Committees

Helix contends that the function of PWCP exceeds the

permissible purposes of an LMC as provided in § 175a. 

Specifically, Helix argues that “PWCP’s purpose is to monitor and

harass non-union contractors such as Helix in the hopes of

organizing Helix or disrupting its operations thereby decreasing

competition.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 8). Helix asserts that compliance

monitoring is not a permissible activity of a joint LMC. 

PWCP was formed for the purpose of monitoring public works

construction projects within its jurisdiction. (Abrams Decl. ¶

3). Part of the duties of the PWCP is to educate labor and

management as to their rights and responsibilities with respect

to public work projects. (Id.) While these specific purposes

and functions are not enumerated in § 175a, the monitoring and

enforcement of prevailing wage laws and other industry

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requirements serves the broader purposes of the federal statute. 

In passing § 175a, Congress issued a Statement of Purpose. One

of the Congress’ purposes in passing § 175a was “to study and

explore ways of eliminating potential problems which reduce the

competitiveness and inhibit the economic development of the . . .

industry.” Section 6(b) of Pub. L. 95-524. Congress also sought

“to enhance the involvement of workers in making decisions that

affect their working lives;” and “to expand and improve working

relationships between workers and managers.” Id.

Monitoring and enforcing prevailing wage laws help serve the

broad purposes of a § 175a joint LMC. The purpose of the

prevailing wage law is to benefit and protect workers on public

works projects. Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry, 1 Cal. 4th

976, 987 (1992). By monitoring prevailing wage laws and

informing workers on public works projects that their employer

may not be complying with these laws, an LMC is “enhancing the

involvement of workers in making decisions that affect their

working lives” by giving workers more information about their

rights and the realities of their current employment. Further,

the general objective of prevailing wage laws also 

subsumes within it a number of specific goals: to

protect employees from substandard wages that might be

paid if contractors could recruit labor from distant

cheap-labor areas; to permit union contractors to

compete with nonunion contractors; to benefit the

public thought the superior efficiency of well-paid

employees; and to compensate nonpublic employees with

higher wages for the absence of job security and

employment benefits enjoyed by public employees. 

 

Id. Monitoring and enforcement of the prevailing wage laws

promotes competition within the industry because one of the goals

of prevailing wage laws is to permit union and non-union

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contractors to compete for public works projects. Compliance

with prevailing wage laws therefore promotes more competition

within the industry. Finally, ensuring compliance with

prevailing wage laws also improves working relationships between

workers and managers because prevailing wage laws prevent

employers from paying substandard wages to workers; monitoring

and enforcing an employers’ compliance ensures that workers are

paid a proper wage.

Compliance monitoring efforts are not specifically

enumerated in § 175a. However, allowing joint LMCs to function

with the purpose of monitoring and enforcing compliance with

state prevailing wage laws does not expand the scope of

permissible activities. Rather, enforcement of prevailing wage

laws is merely a specific implementation of the broader purposes

for which § 175a was enacted. As such, plaintiff has not

demonstrated probable success on the merits based on its

contention that PWCP functioned outside the permissible scope of

purposes and activities of an LMC. 

3. Preemption by the National Labor Relation Act

Helix contends that California Labor Code § 1776(e) pits

union employers against non-union employers, impermissibly

interferes with the jurisdiction of the NLRB, and alters the

balance of power between labor and management. Based upon these

assertions, Helix argues that California Labor Code § 1776(e) is

preempted by the NLRA under the doctrines of Garmon and Machinist

preemption. 

Federal preemption under either the Garmon or Machinists

doctrine applies only to legislation that affects protected union

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activities or affects the relationship between unions and

employers. PWCP is not a union. Plaintiff has not presented

evidence to demonstrate that PWCP is controlled by a union. 

Section 1776(e) provides federally recognized LMCs access to

certified payroll records of contractors on public works

projects. Cal. Lab. Code § 1776(e). This section also

authorizes LMCs to file civil actions to collect unpaid

prevailing wages and benefits dues. Id. Section 1776(e) does

not implicate activities prohibited or protected by §§ 7-8 of the

NLRA or alter the balance of power between management and labor. 

Rather, § 1776(e) empowers non-governmental parties to aid in the

enforcement of California’s wage and hour laws. Id. This type

of conduct is not covered by the NLRA and thus, is not preempted.

a. Garmon Preemption

When state law conflicts with federal labor law under the

NLRA, it is preempted by the federal scheme. In Garmon, the

Supreme Court reversed a California state court’s award of

damages to a business being picketed by labor unions. San Diego

Building Trades Council et al. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246

(1959). The Garmon Court considered the narrow question of

whether the “California court had jurisdiction to award damages

arising out of peaceful union activity.” Id. at 239. The Court

held that the state court exceeded its proper jurisdiction and

that the state court action was preempted by §§ 7-8 of the NLRA. 

Id. at 246. 

The Court’s analysis turned on the possibility and

prevention of conflict between federal and state laws. Id. at

242-44. The Court examined the creation of the NLRB as an

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administrative agency charged with enforcement of the

comprehensive federal statutory scheme. Id. Because the NLRB is

a regulatory body, “judicial concern has focused on the nature of

the activities which the States have sought to regulate.” Id. at

243. In contrast, when the activity is either protected under §

7 of the NLRA or prohibited by § 8, state jurisdiction will be

preempted. Id. Further, activities that fall within the

penumbra of §§ 7-8 are also preempted. Id. at 245-46. 

State law is not preempted by the NLRA, however, when the

activity regulated by a state is a “peripheral concern of the

Labor Management Relations Act” or when the regulated conduct

touches interests “deeply rooted in local feeling and

responsibility.” Id. at 244. When the conduct at issue is

violent or an imminent threat to public order, such conduct falls

within a state’s regulatory jurisdiction because of the

compelling state interest in preservation of the peace. Id. at

247. The Garmon doctrine was designed to ensure the conformity

of national labor policy and avoid conflict with varying state

laws. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. v. San Diego Cty. Dist. Council of

Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, (1978). Although state regulation

concerning labor-management relations is generally preempted

under Garmon, the doctrine does not “support an approach which

sweeps away state-court jurisdiction over conduct traditionally

subject to state regulation.” Id. at 219. 

In the instant case, § 1776(e) is concerned with the

enforcement of state wage and hour laws. The enforcement of

California’s prevailing wage laws is not actually or arguably

protected by §§ 7-8. It is well settled that wages and

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prevailing wage laws are a subject of traditional state concern. 

WSB Elec., Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1996)

(holding that regulation of wages per se is not within ERISA’s

coverage and is not subject to its broad preemption clause). 

Therefore, Garmon preemption does not apply to § 1776(e). 

b. Machinists Preemption

When state action shifts the balance of power between labor

and management or frustrates the federal purpose behind the NLRA,

that action is preempted. Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment

Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 154 (1976). In Machinists, the

employer and the employees negotiated a collective-bargaining

agreement outlining the terms and conditions of employment. Id.

at 133-34. After ratification of the agreement the employer

began unilaterally altering the terms and conditions of

employment. Id. at 134. Soon after, the union adopted a

resolution preventing union members from volunteering for or

accepting overtime. Id. The employer filed an action with the

NLRB charging the union with a violation of § 8(a) of the NLRA

but the charge was dismissed as the conduct did not violate the

Act. Id. at 135. The employer also filed an action with the

state labor relations board which found that refusing to work

overtime was not “arguably protected under § 7 or arguably

prohibited under § 8.” Id. The state board believed it was not

preempted from exercising its authority and ordered the union and

its members to stop their refusals to work overtime. Id. at 136.

The Machinists Court recognized a range of protected

activities not explicitly regulated by the NLRA. Id. at 141.

Such activities are circumscribed by the legislative purpose

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underlying the Act. Id. at 149-50. The Court surveyed the

extent to “which federal labor policy and the federal [Labor

Relations] Act have pre-empted state regulatory authority to

police the use by employees and employers of peaceful methods of

putting economic pressure upon one another.” Id. The Court held

that neither the NLRB nor states may regulate the use of economic

weapons or the types of economic pressure that may be brought to

bear and used by either party in collective bargaining

negotiations. Id. at 146-47. Thus, the state labor board’s

action was preempted.

In this case, § 1776(e) is concerned with the enforcement of

prevailing wage laws and does not impermissibly regulate the

economic weapons available to either employers or unions. 

Section 1776(e) simply provides another enforcement mechanism to

ensure that workers on public work projects are paid the

prevailing wage. Therefore, Machinists preemption does not apply

to § 1776(e). 

 c. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer

Helix relies heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in

Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 422 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2005), to

argue that § 1776(e) is preempted by the NLRA. At issue in

Lockyer was a statute passed by the California Legislature

forbidding “the recipient of a grant of state funds” from using

those funds to attempt to influence its employees to support or

oppose a union. Id. at 977. The Lockyer court stated that the

statute was “regulatory in nature” and not “focused on the police

power, state procurement concerns, or local economic needs.” 

Lockyer, supra, 422 F.3d at 977. 

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The court found that the law impermissibly “chill[ed]

employer speech on the merits of unionism” and effectively ended

employer attempts to defeat union organizing. Id. at 978. 

Section 8(c) of the NLRA “explicitly protects the right of

employers to express their views about unions and union

organizing.” Id. at 982. Thus, the statute plainly and

impermissibly conflicted with the federal scheme of regulation,

particularly § 8(c) of the NLRA, and was thus preempted under

Garmon. Id. 

The court also found that the statute took an economic

weapon away from management and shifted the balance of power

toward unions. Id. at 988. The court noted that behind a facade

of labor-management neutrality, the California law actually

forced employers to take a position of neutrality rather than a

position of opposition to labor. Id. at 978. Therefore, since

the statute altered the balance of power between labor and

management it was also preempted by Machinists. Id. 

Lockyer is distinguishable from the statute and facts

involved in this case. Labor Code § 1776(e) does not prevent

employers or unions from exercising rights granted by the LMRA. 

Rather, § 1776(e) allows wage compliance monitoring by an

independent organization, industrywide joint LMCs. Id. Unlike

the statute in Lockyer, the statute at issue in this case

concerns enforcement of California’s wage and hour laws, a

traditional exercise of state police power. The statute in this

case does not affect either employers or unions, but grants joint

LMCs the right to access employee addresses from files of the

awarding state entity, the DLSE or the Division of Apprenticeship

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5 Helix similarly relies on NLRB precedent, Tech. Service

Solutions, 332 NLRB No. 100, slip op. (2000), to support its

contention that § 1776(e) impermissibly infringes on the

jurisdiction of the NLRB and is therefore preempted by Garmon. 

(Pl’s Mot. at 14). The Technology Services NLRB panel found that

an employer has no obligation to provide the addresses of its

employees to a union. (Id. at 3). In this case, however, Helix

is under no obligation to provide a union with the addresses of

its employees. At issue in this case is Helix’s opposition to

the release of certain employees addresses by a government agency

to a joint labor-management committee, an issue not raised in

Technology Services.

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Standards. Cal. Lab. Code § 1776(e). Therefore, Helix’s

reliance on Lockyer is misplaced.5

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff has not

demonstrated probable success on the merits based upon its

argument that § 1776(e) is preempted by the National Labor

Relations Act. 

4. Equal Protection Clause

Finally, Helix contends that § 1776(e) violates the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because no rational

relationship exists between the special advantage given to LMCs

and any legitimate state interest. Because this case involves

“social and economic policy,” and neither targets a suspect class

nor impinges upon a fundamental right, the statute is valid so

long as there is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that

could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v.

Beach Communication, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). “Using such

rational-basis review, a statute is presumed constitutional, and

‘the burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement

to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.’” 

Manauskas v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). “Where there

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are ‘plausible reasons’ for [legislative] action, ‘our inquiry is

at an end.’” Rui One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137,

1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Beach Communication, Inc., 508 U.S.

at 313-14.) 

Section 1776(e) provides LMCs access to certified payroll

records of contractors on public works projects, including

employee addresses. Cal. Lab. Code § 1776(e). Section 1776(e)

was passed because “union representatives and joint labormanagement committees [were] unable to determine when contractors

[were] misclassifying and underpaying skilled workers in

violation of prevailing wage laws.” Assembly Committee on

Appropriations Report on SB 588, Ex. 4 to Decl. of Matthew S.

McConnell in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for a T.R.O. & Prelim. Inj.

(“McConnell Decl.”), executed Nov. 22, 2005). Further, because

the “DLSE [had] only 20 field investigators and six auditors in

the public works unit,” the state agency could not adequately

enforce the prevailing wage laws. Id.

The State of California has a legitimate interest in

regulating wages and employment conditions. Rui One Corp. v.

City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1150 (9th Cir. 2004). Enforcement

of these regulations is also a legitimate state interest. See

City of Long Beach v. Dep’t. of Insus. Relations, 34 Cal. 4th

942, 949 (2004). 

The Legislature has declared that it is the public

policy of California to vigorously enforce minimum

labor standards in order to ensure employees are not

required or permitted to work under substandard

unlawful conditions and to protect employers who comply

with the law from those who attempt to gain competitive

advantage at the expense of their workers by failing to

comply with minimum labor standards.

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Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The overall

purpose of the prevailing wage law is to protect and benefit

employees on public works projects.” Id. 

Because state agencies could not adequately enforce

prevailing wage laws alone, (Assembly Committee on Appropriations

Report on SB 588, Ex. 4 to McConnell Decl.), the Legislature

granted LMCs access to employee addresses for individuals working

on public works projects. Cal. Lab. Code. § 1776(e). The

release of employee addresses could reasonably help LMCs in their

enforcement effort because it would allow LMCs to contact workers

upon finding violations in the records and potentially maintain a

civil action on their behalf. It is certainly “plausible” that

the Legislature specifically released the information to LMCs

because, by definition, LMCs represent both labor and management,

and therefore, release of the information will not unfairly

benefit one over the other. It is also “plausible” that the

Legislature found that the ability of LMCs to contact employees

could aid them in the enforcement of the California’s wage and

hour laws on public works projects, a subject of traditional and,

at the very least, legitimate state concern. Therefore, §

1776(e) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion

for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 24, 2006

 /s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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