Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01279/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01279-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jessie Cachu
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSIE CACHU,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-1279 DAD

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.1 

For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and denied in part, the 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) is reversed, and the matter is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 11, 2011, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability beginning on

June 30, 2010. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 103.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, (id. at 122-

 

1

 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See Dkt. Nos. 6 & 7.)

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26), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 129-34.) Plaintiff requested a hearing and a hearing was 

held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on March 22, 2013. (Id. at 16-49.) Plaintiff 

was represented by an attorney and testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. at 16-17.) 

In a decision issued on May 16, 2013, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.

at 115.) The ALJ entered the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2015. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since June 30, 2010, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et 

seq).

3. The claimant has the following medically severe combination of

impairments of (sic) depression, anxiety, carpal tunnel syndrome, 

mild cervical impingement syndrome of the right shoulder, 

myofascial sprain/strain of the cervical spine and thoracic spine and 

bilateral elbows and bilateral wrists, chronic bronchitis, a history of 

gastroesophageal reflux disease, a history of dysphagia, recurrent 

major depression, rotator cuff tendonitis of the bilateral shoulders, 

adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, carpal 

tunnel syndrome of the left wrist, cubital tunnel syndrome of the 

left elbow, and a somatization disorder. 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work 

as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that the claimant can 

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, is limited to no more than 

frequent pushing and pulling overhead or frequent reaching

overhead with the bilateral upper extremities; the claimant must 

avoid concentrated exposure, meaning continuous or protracted 

exposure, to pulmonary irritants and hazards; and the claimant is 

limited to no more than frequent face-to-face interaction with the 

public, supervisors and co-workers, although the claimant can work 

in close proximity or along-side people without difficulty. 

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a 

senior administrative assistant. The work does not require the 

performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from June 30, 2010, through the date of this 

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f)). 

(Id. at 105-14) (citations to exhibits omitted). 

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On March 26, 2014, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s May 16, 2013 decision. (Id. at 1-3.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on May 26, 2014. 

LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

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Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 

to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If 

not, the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

In her pending motion plaintiff asserts the following two principal errors: (1) in denying

plaintiff’s request for review the Appeals Council failed to properly evaluate new, material 

medical opinion evidence; and (2) the ALJ improperly rejected “other source” opinions. (Pl.’s 

MSJ (Dkt. No. 13) at 6-31.

2

) 

I. New Evidence

After the ALJ issued his decision on May 16, 2013, plaintiff submitted to the Appeals 

Council the July 11, 2013 “COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION,” and 

“PSYCHIATRIC REVIEW TECHNIQUE,” of examining physician, Dr. Robert L. Morgan. (Tr. 

at 1868-80.) Plaintiff also submitted to the Appeals Council the July 24, 2013 

“QUESTIONNAIRE” completed by treating physician, Dr. Donald Rossman. (Id. at 1864-65.) 

Although the March 26, 2014 “NOTICE OF APPEALS COUNCIL ACTION” does not 

specifically discuss the contents of these medical opinions, it did state that the Appeals Council 

considered Dr. Morgan and Dr. Rossman’s opinions in deciding not to review the ALJ’s May 16, 

2013 decision. (Id. at 1, 4.) 

A claimant’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) is “the most [the claimant] can still 

do despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); 20 C.F .R. § 416.945(1). The 

assessment of RFC must be “based on all the relevant evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 

Id. “When, as here, ‘the Appeals Council considers new evidence in deciding whether to review 

 

2

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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a decision of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of the administrative record, which the district 

court . . . must consider when reviewing the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision for 

substantial evidence.’” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Brewes 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012)). See also Palomares v. 

Astrue, 887 F.Supp.2d 906, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“new evidence considered but rejected by the 

Appeals Council is properly a part of the record before a reviewing court”).

Here, the ALJ found at step three of the sequential evaluation that plaintiff’s impairments 

did not meet or equal any of the listing impairments because there was “no . . . medical source 

opinion stating that [plaintiff’s] impairments are listing-level in severity.” (Tr. at 106.) In his 

July 11, 2013 opinion, however, examining physician Dr. Morgan opined that plaintiff was 

“presenting on assessment . . . with meeting criteria,” for Listing 12.04. (Id. at 1875, 1878.) Dr. 

Morgan also opined that plaintiff had a “marked” degree of limitation in her activities of daily 

living, in maintaining social functioning and in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. 

(Id. at 1880.) Dr. Morgan found that plaintiff’s ability to maintain regular attendance, complete a 

normal workday, and interact with co-workers and the public, was markedly impaired. (Id. at 

1876.) It was Dr. Morgan’s opinion that the “[l]ikelihood is high,” of plaintiff’s “emotional 

deterioration in work-like environment,” and that plaintiff had “been disabled since the point in 

time that she initially applied for Disability.” (Id.) Although plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. 

Rossman, did not opine that plaintiff was disabled, he did opine that plaintiff could do “no more 

than sedentary work.” (Id. at 1864.)

The ALJ’s May 16, 2013 decision, however, found that plaintiff had the residual 

functional capacity to perform light work, with some exceptions, including frequent face-to-face 

interactions with the public, supervisors and co-workers. (Id. at 106.) In this regard, the ALJ’s 

RFC determination is contradicted by the opinions of Dr. Morgan and Dr. Rossman. See Burrell, 

775 F.3d at 1139 (“we review all the evidence submitted to the Appeals Council as if it had been 

before the ALJ”). 

Moreover, as noted above, Dr. Morgan was an examining physician and Dr. Rossman was 

a treating physician. The weight to be given to medical opinions in Social Security disability 

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cases depends in part on whether the opinions are proffered by treating, examining, or 

nonexamining health professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 

(9th Cir. 1989). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating 

source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant . . . .” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

This is so because a treating doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and 

observe the patient as an individual. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285; Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 

1063 (9th Cir. 1990). The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician may be 

rejected only for clear and convincing reasons, while the opinion of a treating or examining 

physician that is controverted by another doctor may be rejected only for specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. Here, neither 

the Appeals Council, nor the ALJ in his May 16, 2013 decision, offered a specific or legitimate 

reason for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Morgan or Dr. Rossman. 

Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment in her favor with respect to this 

claim. 

II. Other Source Opinions

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ impermissibly rejected the opinions of Robert Dickman 

and Joseph Ambrose, chiropractors who examined plaintiff and provided opinions. (Pl.’s MSJ 

(Dkt. No. 13) at 12-18.) 

An ALJ may afford less weight to the opinion of a chiropractor because he or she is not an 

acceptable medical source but is instead classified as an “other source.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1513(d)(1), 416.913(d)(1) (chiropractors are not acceptable medical sources but other 

sources). Nonetheless, the opinions and evidence from other sources, such as chiropractors, are 

important and must be evaluated by the ALJ. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013-14 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (the ALJ erred by failing to recognize “other source that can provide evidence about 

the severity of a claimant’s impairments and how it affects the claimant’s ability to work”); SSR

06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *3 (“Opinions from these medical sources, who are not technically 

deemed ‘acceptable medical sources’ under our rules, are important and should be evaluated on 

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key issues such as impairment severity and functional effects, along with the other relevant 

evidence in the file.”).

Accordingly, the ALJ may only reject evidence from an “other source,” such as a 

chiropractor, if the ALJ gives a germane reason for doing so. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); Bain v. Astrue, 319 Fed. Appx. 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2009)3; Petty v. 

Colvin, 954 F.Supp.2d 914, 926 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“An ALJ is free to discount testimony from 

other sources, but as the Commissioner concedes, he must give reasons germane to each witness 

for doing so.”).

Here, the ALJ afforded “little weight” to Mr. Ambrose’s opinion because he was “not an 

acceptable medial source,” and because his opinion was “contradicted by the orthopedist’s 

opinion.” (Tr. at 110.) The ALJ also afforded “little weight” to Mr. Dickman’s opinion because 

he too was “not an acceptable medical source,” and his opinion was “contradicted by the 

orthopedist’s,” as well as because Mr. Dickman ascribed limitations to plaintiff which were 

“heavily dependent on the claimant’s subjective report of her abilities.” (Id.) 

Inconsistency with a medical source opinion is a germane reason to afford less weight to 

an “other source” opinion. See Ball v. Colvin, 607 Fed. Appx. 709, 710 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(inconsistency with “contemporaneous medical evidence” is a germane reason); Hubble v. 

Astrue, 467 Fed. Appx. 675, 677 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The ALJ is entitled to give greater weight to 

opinions from ‘acceptable medical sources’ . . . and his conclusion that the other sources were 

more credible was not unreasonable.”).

4

 

Here, the ALJ in his decision the ALJ gave recognized, germane reasons for discounting 

the other source opinions offered by plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment is denied as to this claim.

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3

 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 

36-3(b).

4

See fn. 3, above. 

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SCOPE OF REMAND

With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award 

benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded 

under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 

to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even where all the conditions for the “credit-as-true” rule are met, 

the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates 

serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act.” Id. at 1021. See also Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.,, 775 F.3d

1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain 

and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).

Here, the record has not been fully developed and further administrative proceedings 

would serve a useful purpose. Accordingly, this matter will be remanded for further proceedings. 

On remand, the ALJ shall consider and evaluate the opinion of examining physician Dr. Robert L. 

Morgan rendered on July 11, 2013 and the opinion of treating physician Dr. Donald Rossman

rendered on July 24, 2013.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 13) is granted in part and 

denied in part;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 16) is granted in 

part and denied in part;

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3. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed for the reasons indicated above; and

4. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Dated: September 4, 2015

DAD:6

Ddad1\orders.soc sec\cachu1279.ord.docx

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