Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-24-01754/USCOURTS-ca3-24-01754-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C. Foreman
Appellee
J. Freeman
Appellee
J. Hall
Appellee
W.L. James
Appellee
Knox
Appellee
Joel Glaston Muir
Appellant
D.K. Smith
Appellee
Thomas
Appellee
John E. Wetzel
Appellee

Document Text:

BLD-041 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 24-1754 

___________ 

JOEL GLASTON MUIR, 

 Appellant 

v. 

JOHN E. WETZEL; MR. J. HALL; MR. J. FREEMAN; MR. D.K. SMITH; 

MR. C. FOREMAN; MR. W.L. JAMES; MR. THOMAS; MR. KNOX 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-04459) 

District Judge: Honorable Kai N. Scott 

____________________________________ 

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

November 26, 2024 

Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: December 11, 2024) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 24-1754 Document: 15 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/11/2024
2 

Joel Muir appeals the District Court’s order granting the Appellees’ motion for 

summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District 

Court’s order. 

The procedural history of this case and the details of Muir’s claims are well known 

to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s memorandum order, and need not be 

discussed at length. Briefly, Muir, a Pennsylvania prisoner, claimed that a former prison 

policy regarding how legal mail was handled violated his constitutional rights. After the 

District Court dismissed Muir’s claims based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 

Appellees moved for summary judgment on his remaining claim that his First 

Amendment rights were violated.1

 The District Court concluded that Appellees were 

entitled to summary judgment on that claim because Muir had not provided any evidence 

that his legal mail was actually read. Muir filed a timely notice of appeal. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise de novo review 

over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. See Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of 

Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011). A party moving for summary judgment must 

show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To determine whether the movant 

has satisfied this burden, “we view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the 

1

 The District Court granted Appellees’ motion as unopposed, but, on appeal, we vacated 

the District Court’s order and granted Appellees’ motion to remand the matter. See C.A. 

No. 21-3145. 

Case: 24-1754 Document: 15 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/11/2024
3 

light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 

533 (3d Cir. 2017). 

The now-discontinued legal mail policy provided that privileged mail would be 

opened in front of the inmate and inspected for contraband. The mail would be 

photocopied, and the copies given to the inmate. The mail would then be sealed in an 

opaque envelope and secured with evidence tape before being deposited in a locked 

receptacle. Prison officials did not have access to the receptacle; only a private vendor 

did. The policy also provided that the processing of the privileged mail would be 

recorded on video. Under the policy, an inmate could later request access to the sealed 

mail which would then be opened in his presence again per the policy. An inmate could 

also request that the privileged mail be retrieved and maintained in an evidence locker in 

the security office. See Inmate Mail and Incoming Publications Policy, DC-ADM 803 

(effective October 3, 2018-April 5, 2019). 

In his brief, which we will consider as his opposition to possible summary action, 

Muir argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees 

because by turning over his privileged mail to a third-party, they breached his attorneyclient privilege without his consent. Muir cites to our decision in Jones v. Brown, 461 

F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006), to support his argument. In Jones, we concluded that a 

temporary policy that allowed prison officials to open privileged mail outside the 

presence of the inmate infringed on the inmates’ right to freedom of speech. We noted 

that this practice chilled the inmates’ expression regardless of the prison officials’ claims 

that they would not read the mail. Id. at 359. Here, however, the privileged mail was 

Case: 24-1754 Document: 15 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/11/2024
4 

opened in Muir’s presence. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974) (noting 

that “[a]s to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way 

constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such 

communications, since the inmate’s presence insures that prison officials will not read the 

mail”). Muir also contends that the Constitution obliges prison officials “to take 

additional measures to ensure that legal mail remains unread.” See Fontroy v. Beard, 559 

F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, the prison officials did take such additional 

measures: the mail was sealed and secured in a locked container. 

Muir appears to be arguing that his First Amendment right to communicate was 

chilled by the storage of the privileged mail outside of his presence by a private vendor. 

As noted above, however, after being copied, the privileged mail was sealed in an opaque 

envelope and placed in a locked container. Muir has failed to submit any evidence that 

his privileged mail could (or would) have been obtained from the third party by prison 

officials and read after it was sealed and placed in the locked receptacle. 

The District Court did not err in granting Appellees’ motion for summary 

judgment. Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in 

the appeal. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth 

by the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third 

Circuit I.O.P. 10.6. 

Case: 24-1754 Document: 15 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/11/2024