Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04134/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael George
Appellant
Salt Lake County
Appellant
J. Gary Sheets
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEJ.fimted States Court or Appcsb Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

J. GARY SHEETS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a governmental 

subdivision of the State of Utah; and 

MICHAEL GEORGE, individually and 

as Salt Lake County Investigator, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

JAN 1 0 1995 

PATRICK FISHER -- Clerk 

No. 93-4128 

93-4134 

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No.89-C-676-J} 

Kent B. Linebaugh (Jennie B. Huggins with him on the brief} of 

Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown, & Dunn, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Patricia J. Marlowe, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney (David E. 

Yocum, Salt Lake County Attorney, with her on the brief} Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellants. 

Before KELLY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, District 

Judge. t 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

In No. 93-4134, Defendants-Appellants, Salt Lake County and 

Michael George, appeal a $650,000 judgment on a jury verdict and 

in No. 93-4128, they appeal a $77,896.93 judgment for attorney's 

t The Honorable G.T. Van Bebber, United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 1 
fees entered against them. They contend that the district court 

erred by (1) refusing to hold Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action 

time-barred under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(3), (2) denying 

Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for judgment as a matter 

of law, (3) refusing to admit into evidence two books and 

newspaper articles, (4) denying Defendants' motion for remittitur, 

(5) denying Defendants' motion for new trial, and (6) granting the 

Plaintiff unreasonable attorney's fees. Our jurisdiction arises 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 

Background 

On October 15, 1985, two bombs exploded in Salt Lake City. 

One killed Steve Christensen, a former employee and executive of 

Coordinated Financial Services ("CFS"). The other killed Kathy 

Sheets, the wife of Gary Sheets, chairman of the board and 

president of CFS. These events generated a great deal of media 

interest. 

A few weeks after Kathy Sheets' death, the police asked Gary 

Sheets for a copy of his wife's diary. According to Salt Lake 

City Detective Jim Bell, this was a common practice. Aplee. App. 

at 144. Gary Sheets read his wife's diary. Believing that the 

diary would remain confidential, Gary Sheets voluntarily turned 

the diary over to Detective Bell. Detective Bell testified that 

he could not recall whether he had assured Mr. Sheets the contents 

of the diary would remain confidential. Aplt. App. at 115. Salt 

Lake City Detective Ken Farnsworth testified, however, that he had 

told Mr. Sheets that the diary would remain confidential and 

-2-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 2 
communicated this message orally to those working on the case. 

Aplt. App. at 187; 193. 

Copies of the diary were distributed to the investigators and 

detectives assigned to the case, one of whom was the Defendant, 

Salt Lake County Investigator Michael George. At trial, Mr. 

George testified that he reviewed the diary, photocopied certain 

excerpts, and made thorough notes of the diary's entries for his 

files. 

In January 1987, Mark Hoffman pleaded guilty to the murders 

of Steve Christensen and Kathy Sheets. Once Mr. Hoffman was 

sentenced to prison, the criminal investigation of the bombings 

ended. The investigative file, including the diary, was then 

archived, making it available for public inspection. 

At that time, the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office had an 

unwritten policy that permitted its employees to speak to members 

of the press about their cases once an investigation closed, as 

long as the officers treated members of the press in an evenhanded 

fashion. Aplt. App. at 131. Pursuant to this policy, Mr. George 

met with three people who were writing books about the Hoffman 

murders, including his good friend Robert Lindsey. When he met 

with Mr. Lindsey, he allowed him to examine his file box of notes. 

Mr. George testified that this box may well have contained the 

photocopies and handwritten notes he had taken from the diary. By 

contrast, Mr. George did not provide the other authors with access 

to his files. Instead, those authors asked him questions and he 

responded, often referring to his notes. Mr. George destroyed his 

note files before the publication of Mr. Lindsey's book. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 3 
All three authors published books about the Hoffman murders. 

Mr. Lindsey's book was the only one, however, to contain direct 

quotations from Kathy Sheets' diary. On June 2, 1989, Mr. Sheets 

filed suit against Salt Lake County and various prosecutors and 

police officers asserting state and federal violations, including 

a claim for constitutional invasion of privacy. On December 4, 

1990, Mr. Sheets amended his complaint to add a § 1983 claim 

against the County, Mr. George, and Salt Lake County Attorney 

Theodore Cannon. Only Mr. George and the County remained as 

Defendants throughout the trial. At the close of the Plaintiff's 

case, Defendants moved to dismiss, in reality a motion for 

judgment as a matter of law, Fed. R. Civ. P. SO(a), which the 

district court denied. 

Defendants then put on their case, and sought to offer into 

evidence excerpts from the other authors' books as well as 

newspaper articles about Kathy and Gary Sheets. The Plaintiff 

objected to admission of these exhibits on grounds that they were 

irrelevant. The district court sustained the objection, but 

excluded the evidence on grounds of lack of foundation. At the 

close of all the evidence, Defendants moved for judgment as a 

matter of law. Id.; Aplt. App. at 341. 

The jury returned a verdict of $650,000 in favor of Mr. 

Sheets. Defendants then filed motions for judgment as a matter of 

law, Fed. R. Civ. P. SO(b), new trial, and remittitur. Aplt. App. 

at 81-82. The district court denied each of these post-trial 

motions. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 4 
Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees and 

other costs. Defendants filed objections, and the district court 

entered an order awarding Mr. Sheets $77,896.93 in attorney's 

fees. 

Discussion 

I. Statute of Limitations 

Defendants initially contend that the district court erred by 

refusing to bar Mr. Sheets' § 1983 action under the two-year 

statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(3), 

which purports to apply specifically to § 1983 actions. We have 

previously held, however, that in enacting Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-

28(3), the Utah legislature exceeded its authority and as such 

this section is invalid. Arnold v. Duchesne County, 26 F.3d 982, 

989 (lOth Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3161 

(Aug. 25, 1994) (No. 94-358). Instead, a four-year statute of 

limitations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25{3) governs § 1983 

actions. See id. at 985. Since Mr. Lindsey's book was published 

in August 1988, and Mr. Sheets filed suit within four years of 

this date, Mr. Sheets' § 1983 claim was not barred under the 

applicable statute of limitations. 

II. Denial of Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law 

Defendants claim that the district court erred by denying 

their motions for judgment as a matter of law. We review de novo 

the district court's denial of Defendants' motions for judgment as 

a matter of law. See F.D.I.C. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 

1070, 1079 (lOth Cir. 1994). To overturn the denial, "we must 

-5-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 5 
conclude that 'viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom point but one way, in favor of the moving party.'" Id. 

(quoting Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 467 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 898 (1990)). 

Defendants first argue that Mr. Sheets had no legitimate 

expectation of privacy in his wife's diary, claiming that he gave 

it to the authorities without any restrictions on its use. They 

further argue that the Plaintiff produced insufficient evidence of 

proximate cause to warrant submission of the issue to the jury and 

insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Mr. George 

intentionally violated Mr. Sheets' right of privacy. We disagree. 

A. Expectation of Privacy 

Cases involving the constitutional right of privacy address 

two distinct interests: "[o]ne is the individual interest in 

avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the 

interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 

decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). Here, 

we are concerned only with the former of these interests. We have 

held that "[d]ue process ... implies an assurance of 

confidentiality with respect to certain forms of personal 

information possessed by the state." Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 

836, 839 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

Information falls within the ambit of constitutional 

protection when an individual has a "legitimate expectation 

that it will remain confidential while in the state's possession." 

-6-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 6 
Id. The legitimacy of this expectation depends, "at least in 

part, upon the intimate or otherwise personal nature of the 

material which the state possesses." Id. If an individual has a 

legitimate expectation of confidentiality, then "[d]isclosure of 

such information must advance a compelling state interest which, 

in addition, must be accomplished in the least intrusive manner." 

Id. {citing Denver Policemen's Protective Assoc. v. Lichtenstein, 

660 F.2d 432, 435 {lOth Cir. 1981)). Defendants do not contend 

that there was any compelling state interest in warranting 

disclosure and we believe that whether the diary was to be kept 

confidential as well as whether the material is sufficiently 

personal to be subject to protection were questions for the jury 

to resolve based upon the evidence. 

Defendants have mischaracterized the issue. Plaintiff does 

not claim an interest in avoiding disclosure of his deceased 

wife's general feelings and thoughts, rather he claims an interest 

in avoiding disclosure of things personal to him, such as his 

wife's written perceptions of their marriage. Upon review of Mrs. 

Sheets' diary and the record, a jury could easily find that the 

diary contained information about Mr. Sheets that only a spouse 

would know and that such information was both intimate and 

personal to Mr. Sheets. Moreover, Mr. Sheets' and Detective 

Farnsworth's testimony that both parties considered the diary to 

be confidential, leads us to conclude that there was ample 

evidence for a jury to conclude that Mr. Sheets legitimately 

expected his wife's diary to remain confidential while in the 

hands of the police. See Aplt. App. at 187-88; 229. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 7 
The fact that Mr. Sheets did not author the information does 

not prohibit him from having a distinct privacy interest in the 

dissemination of information written about the personal aspects of 

his life. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 

U.S. 425, 458 (1977) ("This expectation is independent of the 

question of ownership of the materials .... "). Our analysis of 

one's expectation of privacy in this area focuses upon the nature 

of the material opened to public view, see Nilson v. Layton City, 

No. 94-4077, 1995 WL 3759, slip op. at 5-6 (lOth Cir. January 6, 

1995), not on the individual who penned the pages on which this 

information appears. 

Arguably, the information is not extremely sensitive in 

nature, in other words, the facts revealed in the diary about Mr. 

Sheets are not particularly controversial or embarrassing. 

However, information need not be embarrassing to be personal and 

whether it is sufficiently personal to be protected is, in this 

case, a legitimate question for the jury. We find that 

information conveyed to one's spouse or that one's spouse has 

observed about one's character, marriage, finances, and business 

to be personal in nature and subject to a reasonable expectation 

of privacy.l Mrs. Sheets' diary entries about her husband and 

their marital relationship are certainly as personal as medical 

1 Though the common law tort of invasion of privacy does not 

control the federal constitutional claim, we find that the tort, 

as defined by § 6520 of the Restatement, provides some guidance as 

to what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy. Accordingly, we note that the information revealed from Kathy 

Sheets' diary did not involve a matter of public concern, and its 

public disclosure could be considered highly offensive to the 

reasonable person. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D 

(1977). 

-8-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 8 
and certain financial records, which courts have placed within the 

ambit of constitutional protection. See United States v. 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) 

(medical records); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 5 v. 

Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 1987) (financial 

records) . 

The fact that Detective Bell could not recall whether he had 

initially assured Mr. Sheets of the diary's confidentiality does 

not negate both Mr. Sheets and Detective Farnsworth's testimony 

that an understanding of confidentiality did exist. In addition, 

the very nature of the item--a diary, a place traditionally 

reserved for the recording of private thoughts--which was given to 

the police for the specific purpose of aiding their investigation, 

bolsters Mr. Sheets' claim that he expected the item to remain 

confidential. 

Defendants contend that Mr. Sheets could not have expected 

the diary to remain confidential, considering the many 

investigators who had access to the diary. Defendants gloss over 

a crucial point. To turn a diary over to a limited group for what 

one perceives to be a limited and proper purpose is quite 

different than inviting publication of the material. 

Finally, although this point is conceded by Defendants, we 

find no compelling state interest in Mr. George's disclosure of 

the diary excerpts to Mr. Lindsey. We have found, for example, 

"compelling state interest" in the disclosure of confidential 

statements police officers made for investigative files. See 

Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 436. The files in Lichtenstein were 

-9-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 9 
discoverable because the state's interest in ascertaining the 

truth in a criminal proceeding in addition to defendants' rights 

to exculpatory evidence outweighed the officers' legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the files. Id. In this case, 

Defendants have supplied no such compelling interest in the 

dissemination of Mrs. Sheets' diary to Mr. Lindsey. 

B. Proximate Cause 

Defendants also claim that Mr. Sheets failed to establish Mr. 

George as the proximate cause of Mr. Sheets' injury. We again 

must disagree. After hearing the evidence at trial, the jury 

concluded that Mr. George was responsible for disseminating the 

diary excerpts to Mr. Lindsey. Nonetheless, Defendants claim that 

there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to hold Mr. 

George accountable as the proximate cause of Mr. Sheets' privacy 

violation. 

We have held if "competent evidence [is] introduced, even 

though conflicting, the question[] of ... proximate cause must 

be left to the jury." Key v. Liquid Energy Corp., 906 F.2d 500, 

505 (lOth Cir. 1990). Mr. Lindsey testified that there were three 

possible sources of the diary information: Detectives Farnsworth, 

Cannon, and George. Mr. Farnsworth denied giving the information 

to Mr. Lindsey. Mr. Cannon testified that he did not have a copy 

of the diary nor did he keep meticulous notes based on the diary. 

Mr. George, on the other hand, testified that he made photocopies 

and took exact notes from the diary, that he kept these excerpts 

in his files, that he was very good friends with Robert Lindsey, 

-10-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 10 
and that he let Mr. Lindsey look through his files. We deem this 

to be ample evidence for a jury to conclude that Mr. George 

proximately caused the invasion of Mr. Sheets' privacy. 

Defendants additionally claim that Mr. George cannot be 

considered the proximate cause of Mr. Sheets' § 1983 violation 

because he did not intentionally cause Mr. Lindsey to use the 

diary excerpts in the book. Defendants misconstrue the meaning of 

proximate cause. A defendant is the proximate cause of a 

plaintiff's injury if the injury a natural consequence of 

defendant's actions. Id. Since the jury surmised that Mr. George 

was responsible for disseminating the information to Mr. Lindsey, 

Mr. George was indeed the proximate cause of Mr. Sheets' injury. 

C. Insufficient Evidence of Intentional Conduct 

Defendants contend that the Plaintiff failed to prove that 

Mr. George intentionally violated his constitutional right, as 

required by the court's instruction to the jury. According to 

Defendants, Plaintiff established mere negligence. We disagree. 

The district court instructed the jury to find that 

Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy 

only if Mr. George "intentionally committed the acts which 

violated Plaintiff's constitutional right." See Aplee. Supp. App. 

at 172. The court further instructed that "specific intent to 

deprive Plaintiff of a constitutional right" is not necessary; 

instead, "it is sufficient if Plaintiff can prove that a Defendant 

intentionally committed the acts which resulted in the violation 

of Plaintiff's constitutional right.• Id. Defendants did not 

-11-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 11 
object to these jury instructions, and they are not at issue. 

Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

verdict, as we must, see Brown v. McGraw-Edison Co., 736 F.2d 609, 

612-13 (lOth Cir. 1984), we find that sufficient evidence was 

profferred at trial for the jury to conclude that Mr. George 

intentionally, as opposed to negligently, disclosed the diary 

information to Mr. Lindsey. 

Defendants advanced several additional arguments to the 

district court in support of their motion to dismiss, including 

that Mr. Sheets was a public figure both as a result of his 

position in the Mormon Church as well as a result of a federal 

prosecution for which he was acquitted. In this appeal, however, 

Defendants only briefed and argued that the lower court erred 

"because plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 

murdered wife's diary which he gave to the Salt Lake City Police 

Department without any restrictions . . . and because plaintiff 

had insufficient evidence of proximate cause to warrant submission 

to the jury." Aplt. Br. at 22. Although we are not persuaded by 

any of the points presented to the district court, a party who 

chooses not to brief a particular point, ordinarily is deemed to 

have waived the contention on appeal. McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 

986 F.2d 401, 407 (lOth Cir. 1993); Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 

1237, 1244 (lOth Cir. 1984); Whitehead v. Salyer, 346 F.2d 207, 

209 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1965). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's 

denial of Defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 12 
III. Admission of Evidence 

Defendants claim that the trial court erred by excluding the 

books and newspaper articles Defendants tried to introduce into 

evidence. "A district court possesses considerable discretion in 

governing the presentation of evidence, and its decisions will not 

be disturbed absent manifest injustice to the parties" and clear 

abuse of discretion. Comcoa. Inc. v. NEC Tels .. Inc., 931 F.2d 

655, 663 (lOth Cir. 1991}; Orth v. Emerson Elec. Co., 980 F.2d 

632, 639 (lOth Cir. 1992}. 

When Defendants sought to introduce excerpts from the other 

authors' books and various newspaper articles into evidence, the 

Plaintiff objected on the grounds of relevance. The court 

sustained the objection, but based the exclusion on lack of 

foundation. Establishing foundation is the process whereby a 

proponent of a piece of evidence identifies or authenticates the 

evidence, usually with the testimony of a witness. See Edward W. 

Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 51, at 123 (3d ed. 1984}. Here, 

the authenticity of the books and articles had been stipulated in 

the pretrial order. The evidentiary foundation for these 

documents was thus established. Consequently, the district court 

erred by excluding the evidence for lack of foundation. 

The district court was correct, however, in sustaining the 

Plaintiff's objection. Defendants failed to connect the books and 

the newspaper articles to Mrs. Sheets diary. See Fed. R. Evid. 

402. Hence, they did not establish the evidence's relevance nor a 

basis for its admission. Therefore, the court's only error was 

basing the exclusion on lack of foundation, instead of relevance. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 13 
We may affirm the district court's evidentiary ruling, despite the 

fact its conclusion was based on incorrect grounds. See In re 

Slack-Horner Foundries Co., 971 F.2d 577, 579-80 (lOth Cir. 1992) 

("' [T]rial court's decision will be affirmed if the record reveals 

another ground which supports the decision.'") (quoting Scivally 

v. Time Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 101, 103 (lOth Cir. 1983)). Because we 

find grounds to support the district court's exclusion of this 

evidence, we affirm its evidentiary ruling. 

IV. Remittitur 

Defendants claim that the trial court erred by failing to 

grant their motion for remittitur. The trial court's denial of a 

motion for remittitur is entitled to considerable deference on 

appeal. We will not disturb this determination absent a gross 

abuse of discretion. Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 

1460 (lOth Cir. 1987). We will only find an abuse of discretion 

if the jury award is "'so excessive ... as to shock the judicial 

conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that passion, 

prejudice, corruption or another improper cause invaded the trial 

.... '" Id. (quoting Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 228 (lOth 

Cir. 1962)). Because determination of damages is traditionally a 

jury function, Whitley v. OKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1058 (lOth 

Cir. 1983), and the jury's award of $650,000 does not shock our 

conscience, we affirm the trial court's denial of remittitur. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 14 
V. New Trial 

Defendants claim that the district court erred by denying 

their motion for new trial. We review the district court's denial 

of defendants' motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. 

Hinds v. General Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1046 (lOth Cir. 

1993). We will reverse the denial of a motion for a new trial 

only if the trial court "made a clear error of judgment or 

exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances." 

Id. Defendants have wholly failed to establish any bases for a 

new trial. Hence, we affirm the district court's denial of 

defendants' motion for new trial. 

VI. Attorney's Fees 

Defendants claim that the district court's award of 

attorney's fees was unreasonable. We review the district court's 

award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff for abuse of discretion. 

Post Office v. Portee, Inc., 913 F.2d 802, 811 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

We will find the underlying factual findings reversible only if 

they are clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Supre v. 

Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff has the burden of proving in the first instance the 

extent and reasonableness of requested attorney's fees with 

meticulous and contemporaneous time records. See Mares v. Credit 

Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1210 (lOth Cir. 1986). This was 

done, and the district court made the adjustments it deemed 

appropriate. Indeed, having seen the work of these attorneys, the 

district court is in a unique position to determine an appropriate 

-15-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 15 
fee. This is especially true in the absence of any evidence to 

the contrary. Defendants failed to proffer any evidence that the 

rates or hours claimed by Mr. Sheets' attorneys or the court's 

adjustments were unreasonable. Defendants simply argue that the 

fees were duplicative and exorbitant in nature. Because 

Defendants have failed to substantiate these allegations with 

evidence or otherwise, they waived their right to an evidentiary 

hearing and consequently may not now challenge the district 

court's determination that the number of hours expended were 

reasonable. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892 n.5 (1984). 

Defendants also claim that the district court abused its 

discretion by halving the amount Plaintiff's counsel charged, 

since this total included time spent on the case not directly 

involving Mr. George and Salt Lake County. We find, however, the 

court's determination to be reasonable. See. e.g., Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). Hence, we affirm the 

district court's award of $77,896.33 in attorney's fees. 

AFFIRMED. 

-16-

Appellate Case: 93-4134 Document: 01019290284 Date Filed: 01/10/1995 Page: 16