Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01398/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01398-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason T. Procknow
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐1398

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JASON T. PROCKNOW,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:13‐cr‐00053‐wmc‐1 — William M. Conley, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2015 — DECIDED APRIL 27, 2015

____________________

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. Defendant‐Appellant Jason Prock‐

now pleaded guilty to one count of theft of government

money, 18 U.S.C. § 641, and one count of aggravated identify

theft, id. § 1028(a)(1), related to his filing of fraudulent tax

returns claiming refunds. Procknow appeals the denial of his

motion to suppress, having reserved the right to do so in his

plea agreement. Procknow moved to suppress (1) evidence

obtained after police officers’ warrantless entry into his hotel

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
2 No. 14‐1398

room following his arrest in the hotel lobby, and (2) evidence

obtained by grand jury subpoena following the withdrawal

of Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) administrative sum‐

monses requesting the same information. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In connection with Procknow’s motion to suppress, a

magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing, which

included the live testimony of seven witnesses, and recom‐

mended factual findings. After receiving objections from

both sides, the district court adopted the majority of the

magistrate’s recommended findings. Unless noted, the facts

set out below are derived from those adopted by the district

court.  

On August 29, 2011, at about 5:45 p.m., a Wisconsin pro‐

bation officer phoned the Eagan, Minnesota, Police Depart‐

ment (“EPD”) requesting assistance in apprehending Prock‐

now, who had absconded approximately four months earlier

while serving a term of supervised release imposed by a

Wisconsin state court. Wisconsin authorities had received

information that Procknow and his girlfriend, Jennifer Van

Krevelen, might be staying at the Extended Stay America

hotel in Eagan. The EPD received Procknow’s photograph, a

description of his car, information about Procknow’s crimi‐

nal history—including a conviction for attempted murder—

and a warning that there was a high risk Procknow would

run from the police.  

Shortly after receiving the probation officer’s phone call,

a squad of EPD officers traveled to the hotel and asked the

front‐desk clerk, Christopher Schuelke, if Procknow was

staying at the hotel. Schuelke could not locate Procknow’s

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14‐1398 3

name in the registry because Procknow—in violation of

Minnesota law and hotel policy—failed to register at the

time of check‐in. The officers asked about Van Krevelen, and

Schuelke responded that she was registered and staying in

room 315. Three officers went to room 315, where they saw a

magnetic sign on the door frame announcing, “PET

INSIDE.” The officers knocked on the door and received no

response, although they heard someone or something mov‐

ing inside the room. Based upon the sign on the door, the

officers assumed a dog was in the room making the noise

they heard.

The officers exited the hotel and returned to their cars.

Some of the officers had driven away when one of the offic‐

ers radioed that he thought he had just seen Procknow’s car

pull into the hotel lot. By the time all of the officers returned,

the EPD had run the Wisconsin license plate of the car and

confirmed that the car was registered to Procknow. Two of‐

ficers approached Procknow’s car and found Van Krevelen

standing alone.

Another officer, Matt Ondrey, approached the hotel’s

double entrance doors. As Ondrey opened the outer door, he

came face‐to‐face with Procknow. Ondrey asked Procknow

to come outside. Procknow instead wheeled and ran through

the hotel lobby; Ondrey pursued, ordering him to stop. As

Procknow neared an interior door, Ondrey fired his taser,

causing Procknow to lurch into the door and tumble onto

the ground. By the time Procknow had been handcuffed and

placed in a sitting position in the hotel lobby by Ondrey and

two other officers, Procknow had been tased three times,

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
4 No. 14‐1398

was bleeding from facial cuts, and had some newly‐broken

teeth.1 In a search incident to arrest, the officers obtained

from Procknow a credit card in the name of “Trevor Coon.”

Paramedics were called, and they took Procknow to the hos‐

pital, accompanied by Ondrey. The officers also arrested

Van Krevelen for harboring a fugitive.

EPD officer John Collins and two other officers remained

at the hotel. Collins looked through the windows of Prock‐

now’s car and saw a scanner or copier. He reviewed the

Wisconsin warrant and saw that Procknow’s conviction un‐

derlying the supervised‐release violation involved forgery.

Collins returned to the front desk, informed Schuelke that

both of the known occupants of room 315 had been arrested,

and asked Schuelke if hotel management wanted police as‐

sistance. Collins, then a 12‐year veteran of the EPD, knew

the hotel manager, Adam Scheler, and knew that hotel man‐

agement had asked the EPD to help eject any remaining oc‐

cupants in prior incidents at the hotel that resulted in arrests.

Schuelke phoned Scheler repeatedly for instructions. Scheler

told Schuelke that Van Krevelen and Procknow were no

longer welcome at the hotel, and their stay was being termi‐

nated. Scheler instructed Schuelke to pass this information

onto the EPD officers and ask the officers to collect the dog

                                                 

1 Procknow filed a civil suit against the arresting officers in federal court

in Minnesota, alleging, inter alia, claims of excessive force. Among the

allegations levied by Procknow was that, during the course of the arrest,

one of the officers “dropped his knee onto the back of Procknow’s head,”

and said to Procknow—who was wearing a Green Bay Packers shirt—

“Welcome to Minnesota Vikings territory.” Procknow v. Curry, 26 F.

Supp. 3d 875, 879 (D. Minn. 2014). On March 3, 2015, a jury returned a

verdict in favor of the officers.

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14‐1398 5

believed to be in room 315 and ensure that there were no

other occupants in the room. (It is EPD policy for officers to

secure abandoned dogs and take them to Eagan’s animal

control center.)

Collins and the other two EPD officers re‐approached

room 315, knocked, and announced their presence. The of‐

ficers were armed with an animal catch pole (a four‐foot

pole with a steel noose at the end) and a carbine rifle, be‐

cause they had been told (apparently by Van Krevelen) that

the dog’s name was “Spike,” which led them to presume

that the dog might be “some type of ... pitbull or larger,

somewhat ferocious dog.”2 No one answered the door, so

the officers used a hotel key card to enter the room. The of‐

ficers did not see any people, but they saw Spike—who

turned out to be a young, Labrador Retriever mix—walking

freely about the room. As one might expect from a dog com‐

prised in large part of Labrador, Spike had a friendly and

docile temperament. See Am. Kennel Club, The Labrador Re‐

triever, available at http://www.akc.org/dog‐breeds/labrador‐

retriever/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). Despite one officer’s con‐

fession to being “not a huge fan of dogs,” Spike’s amiable

demeanor won over the officers, which resulted in aban‐

donment of their plan to use the animal catch pole.

The officers entered the room and walked to the win‐

dows to ensure that there were no other occupants. In plain

                                                 

2 Perhaps the officers were thinking of “Spike,” the fierce bulldog antag‐

onist from the Tom and Jerry television series. See Spike Bulldog, Tom and

Jerry Wikia, available at

http://tomandjerry.wikia.com/wiki/Spike_Bulldog (last visited Apr. 10,

2015).

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
6 No. 14‐1398

view, the officers saw an electric typewriter, “paperwork all

over the place,” and a credit card issued in the name of

“Smith.” The visible paperwork included financial forms

bearing a variety of names, dates of birth, and social security

numbers. One officer photographed the room, while another

found Spike’s leash. Taking only Spike and the leash, the of‐

ficers left the room and sealed it. The officers took Spike to

the city kennel, then applied for and received search war‐

rants for the hotel room and Procknow’s car.  

In October 2011, an EPD detective met with IRS special

agent Steven Kuntsman, and turned over to Kuntsman all of

the documents and other evidence seized pursuant to the

search warrants. Among the documents and evidence seized

were blank IRS W‐2 forms, blank and partially completed

IRS tax forms, lists of businesses and their IRS employer

identification numbers, 21 prepaid debit cards (of the sort

issued for tax refunds) in the names of different people, plus

completed and blank application forms for an organization

called “Professional Legal and Economic Associates” (or

“PLEA”). The application forms ask for, among other things,

the applicant’s full name, date of birth, social security num‐

ber, driver’s license number, and prison release date.  

In November 2011, Kuntsman applied for and received a

search warrant for a United Parcel Service (“UPS”) box in

Minneapolis, Minnesota, which had been listed on some of

the forms found in the hotel room. IRS agents tracked down

and interviewed a homeless man who Procknow had paid to

open the UPS box. In May 2012, Kuntsman sent administra‐

tive summonses to several financial institutions requesting

information about accounts held by Procknow and suspect‐

ed victims and aliases. During a one‐week period in June of

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14‐1398 7

2012, the following three events occurred in rapid succes‐

sion: a grand jury in the Western District of Wisconsin is‐

sued a subpoena to Procknow’s bank requesting all account

information for Procknow;3 Kuntsman retracted the admin‐

istrative summonses, returned all documents he had re‐

ceived pursuant to the summonses, and destroyed all copies

made of that evidence; and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the

Western District of Wisconsin sent a letter to the IRS inform‐

ing the agency that the office was conducting an investiga‐

tion against Procknow and requesting that an IRS agent be

assigned to the investigation. On July 23, 2012, the IRS

agreed to the request, and on February 1, 2013, the IRS sent a

letter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, transmitting the case and

officially recommending prosecution.

Later in 2013, the grand jury returned an indictment, and

then a superseding indictment, charging Procknow with 22

counts of making false claims against the United States, 18

U.S.C. § 287, five counts of theft of government money, id.

§ 641, and five counts of aggravated identify theft, id.

§ 1028(a)(1). According to the presentence report, these

charges related to Procknow’s scheme to fraudulently obtain

the personal identifying information of at least 40 individu‐

als and use the information to prepare and file fraudulent

tax returns and claim fraudulent refunds. Procknow created

“PLEA,” a sham organization, and mailed PLEA applica‐

tions to inmates across the country claiming to help “inmates

                                                 

3 In April 2011, the same bank had alerted local and federal authorities of

suspicious activity in Procknow’s account. According to the bank, at

least five different federal tax refunds in three different names (not

“Procknow”) had been deposited into Procknow’s account.

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
8 No. 14‐1398

seek legal assistance for both criminal and civil actions,” and

offering inmates two free magazine subscriptions simply for

filling out and returning the application to Procknow’s UPS

box in Minneapolis. Using the personally identifiable infor‐

mation gleaned from the PLEA applications, Procknow filed

tax returns claiming fraudulent refunds totaling $124,302.00,

of which $42,646.78 was disbursed into Procknow’s personal

bank accounts or in the form of prepaid debit cards sent to

Procknow.  

On September 13, 2013, Procknow moved to suppress all

evidence discovered as a result of EPD officers’ entry into

the Extended Stay hotel room, as well as evidence obtained

using the grand jury subpoenas. After a hearing, the magis‐

trate judge issued a report to the district judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)–(C), proposing findings and recom‐

mending that the motion be denied. The district court

adopted the majority of the proposed findings and denied

the motion. Procknow thereafter entered a conditional guilty

plea to two counts of the superseding indictment, preserving

his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. The

district court sentenced Procknow to three years of impris‐

onment and three years of supervised release, and ordered

restitution in the amount of $42,646.78.

II. DISCUSSION

Procknow contends that the district court erred in deny‐

ing his motion to suppress because the EPD’s initial warrant‐

less entry into Extended Stay room 315 violated his Fourth

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14‐1398 9

Amendment rights.4 Procknow argues that he had a legiti‐

mate expectation of privacy in the room because he was a

guest of Van Krevelen, the registered occupant of the room.

The government counters that Procknow did not have a le‐

gitimate expectation of privacy due to his status as an ab‐

sconder from supervised release who failed to register for

the hotel room, in contravention of Minnesota law and hotel

policy, in order to evade law enforcement.  

The question of whether a search is reasonable pursuant

to the Fourth Amendment “turns in large part on the extent

of [a defendant]’s legitimate expectations of privacy.” United

States v. White, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, No. 13‐2943, 2015 WL 1323343, at

*3 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 2015). We have recently had occasion to

consider the legitimate expectations of privacy of parolees,

which may be “significantly diminished” but not necessarily

eliminated by their conditions of parole. Id. at *4; see also

United States v. Walton, 763 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The

government rightly points out that Walton’s expectation of

privacy was reduced due to the fact he was a parolee. But

the Supreme Court has expressly declined to hold that a pa‐

rolee categorically has no expectation of privacy in any con‐

text.” (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 n.2

(2006))). However, we see no need to delve into the issue of

whether, as a general matter, a fugitive hiding from law en‐

                                                 

4 The search warrant that EPD officers later obtained for the room was

based in large part upon materials the officers saw during their initial,

warrantless entry into the room. Procknow contends that the legality of

the warrants is dependent upon the legality of the officers’ initial, war‐

rantless entry into the room—a contention we accept for the purposes of

this appeal.

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
10 No. 14‐1398

forcement has any legitimate expectation of privacy in a ho‐

tel room in which he is staying as an unregistered guest.

This is because any legitimate expectation of privacy Prock‐

now may have had in the hotel room was extinguished

when he and Van Krevelen were justifiably ejected from the

hotel following their arrests and prior to the officers’ entry

into the room.

“A hotel room can clearly be the object of Fourth

Amendment protection as much as a home or an office.”

Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966). “Fourth

Amendment protection, however, is dependent on the right

to private occupancy of the room since at the conclusion of

the rental period, the guest has completely lost his right to

use the room and any privacy associated with it.” United

States v. Akin, 562 F.2d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1977) (quotation

omitted). “[C]ourts recognize that motel and hotel tenancy is

ordinarily short‐term. If the tenancy is terminated for legiti‐

mate reasons, the constitutional protection may vanish.” Fin‐

sel v. Cruppenink, 326 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2003); see United

States v. Molsbarger, 551 F.3d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Justifi‐

able eviction terminates a hotel occupant’s reasonable expec‐

tation of privacy in the room.”); United States v. Allen, 106

F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Once ‘a hotel guest’s rental pe‐

riod has expired or been lawfully terminated, the guest does

not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel

room.’” (quoting United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d

Cir. 1987))); United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295–96

(8th Cir. 1986) (holding that after a suspect was justifiably

ejected from his hotel room for disorderly behavior, he “no

longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel

room”). “At the conclusion of the occupancy period, the ho‐

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14‐1398 11

tel manager may enter the room or consent to its search.”

Akin, 562 F.2d at 464.

The district court found that “hotel staff determined that

Procknow and Van Krevelen were no longer welcome and

terminated their stay.” We review this factual finding for

clear error. See White, 2015 WL 1323343, at *2. Procknow con‐

tends that the “evidence is equivocal” as to whether the ho‐

tel terminated their stay, noting that Schuelke, the front‐desk

clerk, contradicted the testimony of Scheler, the hotel man‐

ager, and the EPD officers on this point. However, both the

district judge and the magistrate judge thoroughly evaluated

the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and we

find no basis to disturb the district court’s factual finding

that the hotel terminated Procknow’s and Van Krevelen’s

occupancy. See United States v. Terry, 572 F.3d 430, 434–35

(7th Cir. 2009).

Moreover, we find that the termination of their occupan‐

cy—“ejection,” as it is known in Minnesota, Minn. Stat.

§ 327.73—was justified pursuant to Minnesota law. Minneso‐

ta innkeepers may eject “a guest or other person who ...

causes or threatens to cause a disturbance,” id.

§ 327.73(1)(a)(2), or “violates any federal, state, or local laws,

ordinances, or rules relating to the hotel,” id. §

327.73(1)(a)(5), or “violates a rule of the hotel that is clearly

and conspicuously posted at or near the front desk and on

the inside of the entrance door of every guest room,” id. §

327.73(1)(a)(6). Procknow’s decision to flee from Officer

Ondrey led to Procknow’s dramatic and violent arrest in the

hotel lobby, which undoubtedly caused a disturbance in

contravention of § 327.73(1)(a)(2) and hotel policy posted at

the front desk, printed on the registration card, and provid‐

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
12 No. 14‐1398

ed in a brochure given to all guests. Procknow’s failure to

register at check‐in and his failure to register his vehicle

likewise contravened Minnesota law, see id. § 327.10, as well

as posted hotel policy. Officers informed hotel staff of

Procknow’s and Van Krevelen’s arrests, thus informing hotel

staff that the duo was suspected of violating the law, in con‐

travention of § 327.73(1)(a)(5) and posted hotel policy. In

short, hotel management had ample grounds to eject Prock‐

now and Van Krevelen, and the officers were aware of this

fact.

Procknow contends that any ejection was not effective

under Minnesota law at the time that the officers entered

room 315 because the hotel had not yet refunded the ad‐

vance online‐payment Procknow and Van Krevelen made

for the room. See id. § 327.73(1)(b) (“If the guest has paid in

advance, the innkeeper shall tender to the guest any unused

portion of the advance payment at the time of removal.”).

The only published authority addressing the Minnesota inn‐

keepers’ statute in this context has ignored the refund provi‐

sion. See Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1295–96; State v. Perkins, 588

N.W.2d 491, 492–93 (Minn. 1999). Although the refund pro‐

vision likely would be relevant in a civil action brought by

Procknow or Van Krevelen against the hotel seeking a re‐

fund of the unused portion of the advance payment, we do

not find it relevant in the present context. There is no evi‐

dence that the EPD officers were aware that the room had

been prepaid (as opposed to payable at check‐out) or that

the hotel had failed to refund the credit card used to pay for

the room at the time the hotel terminated their occupancy.

Instead, the facts found by the district court adequately

demonstrate that the officers reasonably believed that Prock‐

now and Van Krevelen had been justifiably ejected, and this

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14‐1398 13

is sufficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. See United

States v. Richards, 741 F.3d 843, 850 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Even

without actual authority, however, a warrantless search may

still be permissible if consent is obtained from a third‐party

with apparent authority. When determining whether an in‐

dividual has apparent authority to consent, the court em‐

ploys an objective standard; officers may conduct a search

without a warrant if they ‘reasonably (though erroneously)

believe’ that the person consenting had authority over the

premises.” (citations omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez,

497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990))).

Thus, Procknow’s and Van Krevelen’s justifiable ejection

(or at least the officers’ reasonable belief on this point) extin‐

guished any legitimate expectation of privacy Procknow

may have had in room 315, and authority (or apparent au‐

thority) to consent to entry into room 315 thereby reverted to

the hotel. See Molsbarger, 551 F.3d at 811; Finsel, 326 F.3d at

907; Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1295–96; Akin, 562 F.2d at 464. The

district court found that, after the ejection, hotel manage‐

ment asked the EPD officers to enter room 315 for the pur‐

pose of clearing the room of the dog and any other unregis‐

tered occupants. This finding—while not necessary to our

holding since Procknow’s expectation of privacy had van‐

ished—was not clearly erroneous. We conclude that the dis‐

trict court did not err in denying Procknow’s motion to sup‐

press the evidence obtained from the hotel room.5

                                                 

5 We do not need to reach the government’s alternative argument that

the officers’ entry into the hotel room was a legitimate exercise of the

police’s “community caretaking” function, a doctrine which we have

heretofore “limited ... to automobile searches.” Sutterfield v. City of Mil‐

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
14 No. 14‐1398

We now turn to Procknow’s contention that the district

court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence

obtained by grand jury subpoena, which Procknow contends

was tainted by the earlier IRS administrative summonses.

Procknow argues that the IRS acted in bad faith because it

issued the administrative summonses for the sole purpose of

furthering a criminal investigation. The government re‐

sponds that, because it is undisputed that there was no De‐

partment of Justice referral in effect when the summonses

were sent, the use of administrative‐summons power for

criminal investigation was proper. To understand these ar‐

guments, some background is necessary.

In 1978, the Supreme Court decided that the IRS may not

validly issue an administrative summons (also known as a

“civil summons”) for the sole purpose of a criminal investi‐

gation, even if the criminal investigation had not yet been

referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. United

States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317 (1978). In 1982,

Congress amended the statute governing administrative

summonses in two ways. First, Congress added a section

providing that the IRS may issue summonses for “the pur‐

pose of inquiring into any offense connected with the ad‐

ministration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” 26

                                                 

waukee, 751 F.3d 542, 555 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 478 (2014). We

note, though, that it would seem to be a peculiar result if officers were

prohibited from assisting a hotel in removing an abandoned dog from

the premises. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 343.29(1) (providing that a peace officer

“may remove, shelter, and care for any animal ... not properly fed and

watered, or provided with suitable food and drink in circumstances that

threaten the life of the animal”).

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14‐1398 15

U.S.C. § 7602(b). Second, Congress dictated when the IRS’s

administrative‐summons authority ends: “No summons

may be issued under this title ... with respect to any person

if a Justice Department referral is in effect with respect to

such person.” Id. § 7602(d)(1).  

A majority of circuits have held “that the IRS may validly

issue a summons pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602, as amended

in 1982, for the sole purpose of a criminal investigation,” and

the 1982 amendment to § 7602 established a bright‐line rule

that “the IRS’s authority to issue summonses for the purpose

of investigating any offense relating to the tax code is extin‐

guished only when the investigation is referred to the De‐

partment of Justice.” Scotty’s Contracting & Stone, Inc. v. Unit‐

ed States, 326 F.3d 785, 788–89 (6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cas‐

es). In 1990, prior to consideration of the issue by many other

circuits, we noted: “There is some debate as to whether this

‘solely criminal purpose’ ground discussed in LaSalle sur‐

vived the 1982 amendments to § 7602, and specifically the

addition of § 7602(b). ... [W]e need not, and do not, resolve

this debate here.” United States v. Michaud, 907 F.2d 750, 752

n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); compare id. at 754 n.1 (Coffey, J.,

concurring) (stating that the holding in LaSalle was unaffect‐

ed by the 1982 amendment to § 7602), with id. at 757 (Posner,

J., dissenting, joined by three other judges) (stating that the

court should find that the 1982 amendment to § 7602 estab‐

lished a bright‐line rule that “[b]efore referral, the IRS is free

to use the summons procedure to investigate potential crim‐

inal liability”). Later, we cited Michaud in support of the

statement that the IRS “cannot use its summons authority if

its only purpose is to gather evidence for a criminal investi‐

gation.” United States v. Berg, 20 F.3d 304, 309 n.6 (7th Cir.

1994).  

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
16 No. 14‐1398

Procknow relies upon Michaud and Berg to argue that

“whether or not the civil summonses were issued prior to

the DOJ referral is not the only relevant inquiry—a more

important inquiry is whether the civil summonses were is‐

sued for the sole purpose of a criminal investigation or pros‐

ecution.” Meanwhile, the government contends that “[t]he

best reading of Section 7602 is the one adopted by the major‐

ity of circuits and urged by the dissenters in Michaud,”

which is to say, “[a]s long as no Justice Department referral

is in effect, the use of administrative summons power for

criminal investigation is proper.” But before we wade fur‐

ther into this murky issue, we pause to consider what might

await us on the other side—i.e., what remedy is available to

Procknow if we were to find that the administrative sum‐

monses were improperly issued.

In Michaud, the remedy under consideration was quash‐

ing the summonses. 907 F.2d at 751. This remedy does not

advance Procknow’s cause because all of the administrative

summonses were withdrawn and all evidence received from

the summonses was returned or destroyed. Procknow in‐

stead argues that the appropriate remedy here is to suppress

all evidence derived from grand jury subpoenas issued after

the administrative summonses.

“[T]he federal exclusionary rule, which forbids the use of

evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth

Amendments, does not extend to violations of statutes and

regulations.” United States v. Kontny, 238 F.3d 815, 818 (7th

Cir. 2001); see United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755 (1979)

(holding that the failure of an IRS agent to follow IRS elec‐

tronic surveillance regulations did not require suppression

of tape recordings in prosecution of taxpayer). However,

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14‐1398 17

“[i]n theory,” a “valid argument for suppression” could be

made if the government’s use of “administrative measures

that do not require probable cause ... undermin[ed] the

Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement.” United

States v. Utecht, 238 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). Procknow

offers just such an argument (i.e., “Agent Kuntsman used an

IRS civil summons to circumvent probable cause and due

process requirements”), but the record does not contain facts

to support it. Procknow offers no basis to disturb the district

court’s finding that “Procknow did not ... prove any actual

misuse of information obtained from these summonses” (or,

as stated by the magistrate judge, “[t]he IRS obtained no in‐

formation from the summonses”).  

Utecht, and every other case relied upon by Procknow

which contemplates suppression as a remedy, did so in the

context of suppressing evidence directly derived from admin‐

istrative summonses. Here, since all evidence directly de‐

rived from the summonses was returned or destroyed,

Procknow must claim, as he does, that “the information ob‐

tained from improperly issued civil summonses taints the

evidence obtained from the subsequent grand jury subpoe‐

nas.” But merely claiming the evidence is tainted does not

make it so. The record simply contains no indication that the

grand jury subpoenas were in any way affected by the evi‐

dence derived from the administrative summonses. Indeed,

Procknow failed to subpoena IRS agent Kuntsman—the

most likely source of information on this topic—to appear at

the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. And

Procknow offers no challenge to the grand jury subpoenas in

isolation. Cf. United States v. R. Enters., 498 U.S. 292, 300

(1991) (“[T]he law presumes, absent a strong showing to the

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18
18 No. 14‐1398

contrary, that a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of

its authority.”).

Even if we were to insist upon a showing of probable

cause in this situation, the government has shown that, prior

to the issuance of the administrative summonses or the

grand jury subpoenas, the authorities had adequate probable

cause to believe Procknow was involved in stolen‐identity

refund theft. The authorities had a wealth of information on

this score obtained (legally, as we have just held) from the

search of Procknow’s hotel room, as well as the April 2011

suspicious‐activity report by Procknow’s bank of five depos‐

its into Procknow’s account of tax refunds in three different

names. We cannot say that the use of the withdrawn admin‐

istrative summonses circumvented any probable cause re‐

quirement or otherwise violated Procknow’s constitutional

rights. Accordingly, even if the IRS issued the summonses in

contravention of § 7602, suppression of the evidence derived

from the grand jury subpoenas would not be the appropriate

remedy. See Caceres, 440 U.S. at 754–55 (“In view of our con‐

clusion that none of respondent’s constitutional rights has

been violated here, either by the actual recording or by the

[IRS’s] violation of its own regulations, our precedents en‐

forcing the exclusionary rule to deter constitutional viola‐

tions provide no support for the rule’s application in this

case.”).

We conclude that the district court did not err in denying

Procknow’s motion to suppress. The district court’s judg‐

ment is AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-1398 Document: 38 Filed: 04/27/2015 Pages: 18