Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02998/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02998-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Borough of Windber
Appellee
Brian Miller
Appellee
Daniel Schrader
Appellee
Michael John Sheliga
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 23-2998 

___________ 

MICHAEL JOHN SHELIGA, 

 Appellant 

v. 

BOROUGH OF WINDBER; 

BRIAN MILLER, Windber Borough Police Officer; 

DANIEL SCHRADER, Former Windber Borough Police Officer 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-00139) 

District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

on December 11, 2024 

Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 12, 2024) 

____________________________________ 

Case: 23-2998 Document: 35 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/12/2024
2

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

In June 2023, Michael Sheliga filed suit against Windber Borough (in SomersetCounty, 

Pennsylvania); Brian Miller, a Windber Borough police officer; and Daniel Schrader, a 

former Windber Borough police officer, based on four separate incidents, the first three in 

December 2022, and the remaining one in June 2019. He alleged that an Officer Balderas 

threated him with arrest for canvassing door to door without having obtained a permit required by a Windber Borough ordinance; that Miller threatened to arrest him for disorderly 

conduct for going door to door; that Miller threatened to arrest him if he further criticized 

Windber Borough; and that he was detained and later cited by an Officer Schrader when 

he spoke critically of the officer. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. 

While the motion to dismiss was pending, Sheliga filed a “Motion for a Temporary 

Restraining Order [‘TRO’] and Preliminary Injunction [‘PI’],” which related to the first 

two claims in his complaint. ECF No. 15. He sought injunctive relief against Windber Borough and Miller “in order to engage in political speech with potential voters, including 

speech about the upcoming Windber Borough Municipal Elections while door to door canvassing.” Id. at 1; see also ECF Nos. 15-2, 18 (describing the desire to engage in “political 

speech in Windber Borough including speech about the November 7th 2023 election and 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 23-2998 Document: 35 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/12/2024
3

the Windber Borough town council races”). He wished to be able to engage in that conduct 

“without Officer Miller arresting [him], and without Corporal Balderas arresting or citing 

[him] for not seeking the prior permission of Windber Borough.” ECF No. 18 at 2. Related 

to both claims, he argued that Windber Borough clearly cannot require a permit or prior 

permission under Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), and that he cannot be arrested for door-to-door canvassing. The 

defendants opposed the motion. 

The District Court held a hearing on the motion. Testifying were Sheliga, Miller, Balderas, the Windber Borough Chief of Police, two people who had called the police about 

Sheliga’s activities, and another person who had spoken with Miller about Sheliga repeatedly coming to her door. The District Court also viewed video footage of Sheliga's interactions with the Windber Borough police.

After the hearing, at which Balderas admitted both that he had told Sheliga that he 

needed a permit to go door to door and that he was mistaken about that, and at which the 

Chief of Police testified that there is no ordinance or policy that an individual must obtain 

such a permit, Sheliga stated that he was not “advocat[ing] for a TRO (or PI)” relating to 

any ordinance requirement because he “fe[lt] it more likely than not that agents of Windber 

Borough ... were simply wrong when they informed [him] of a Borough ordinance.” ECF 

No. 26 at 1.

The District Court, treating the motion as seeking a preliminary injunction, denied it 

“without prejudice,” based on “reasons set forth in [an] accompanying [m]emorandum.” 

ECF No. 31 at 32. Given the testimony at the hearing about the absence of an ordinance 

Case: 23-2998 Document: 35 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/12/2024
4 

regulating door-to-door canvassing and Sheliga’s statement that he was not pursuing an 

injunction related to such an ordinance, the District Court denied as moot Sheliga’s request 

relating to Windber Borough’s alleged ordinance. Considering Sheliga’s request based on 

Miller’s threats to arrest him, the District Court ruled that Sheliga failed to show a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable harm. Additionally, the District Court stated 

that, “[a]ssuming, arguendo, that Sheliga has shown that he will suffer irreparable harm 

without a preliminary injunction, the Court also concludes that the principles of comity 

counsel in favor of denying Sheliga’s motion under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 

(1971).”1

 ECF No. 31 at 22. Sheliga appeals.2 

The first question is whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. In his motion and 

during the District Court hearing, Sheliga stated that he sought a TRO, and an order denying a request for a TRO is not appealable. See Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 956 F.3d 

156, 159 (3d Cir. 2020); Louis Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 573 (3d Cir. 1991). However, we can look “beyond terminology” to the actual effect of the order sought to determine whether a motion is better construed as requesting a TRO or a preliminary injunction. 

In re Arthur Treachers Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.7 (3d Cir. 1982) (quotation marks omitted). And we conclude that what Sheliga sought in fact was a preliminary 

injunction. A TRO is limited in duration and may be issued without notice to the other 

1 The District Court’s alternative holding was based on events that occurred after Sheliga’s 

interactions with Miller and Balderas. The Police Chief arrested him for disorderly conduct 

when a resident called about Sheliga pounding on doors, and Sheliga was later charged 

with harassment relating to the same incident during a preliminary hearing in state court. 

2

 He also asks to submit video exhibits played during the District Court hearing. 

Case: 23-2998 Document: 35 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/12/2024
5 

party. Id. at 1153; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Sheliga instead sought an order that was 

“designed to accord or protect some or all of the substantive relief sought by the complaint

in more than a [temporary] fashion.” In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 392 

(3d Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Sheliga presented a motion for a preliminary injunction, the denial of which we 

can ordinarily review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) “for an abuse of discretion, an error of 

law, or a clear mistake in the consideration of proof.” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 

369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 

We cannot, however, review all of the order denying relief in this case. As we noted, 

Sheliga sought, inter alia, relief relating to canvassing door to door before the November 

2023 election to discuss issues relevant to that event. But any request for injunctive relief 

relating to that past election is moot, so we must dismiss this appeal to the extent Sheliga 

challenges the ruling as it relates to that request. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 

77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that “[i]f developments occur during the course 

of adjudication that . . . prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the 

case must be dismissed as moot”). We also do not consider issues that Sheliga chooses not 

to pursue or fails to raise. See 3d Cir. Doc. No. 15-2 at 14 (explaining that he does not 

contest the resolution of the claim against Balderas); see also M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that a party forfeits 

any argument that he does not raise in his opening brief). 

Sheliga focuses only on the claim against Miller, asserting that he was (and is) entitled 

to injunctive relief against him. But, as to that claim, Sheliga did not demonstrate that he 

Case: 23-2998 Document: 35 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/12/2024
6

was entitled to a preliminary injunction. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 

that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 

7, 20 (2008). Upon review, we agree with the District Court that Miller did not show that 

he is likely to suffer harm in the absence of injunctive relief. In particular, he did not show 

that he faced a real and immediate threat that he would be arrested merely for engaging in 

door-to-door canvassing. In arguing the contrary, Sheliga focuses on Miller’s telling him 

“You can’t be knocking on doors.” See, e.g., 3d Cir. Doc. Nos. 15-2 at 23, 26-1 at 28. But, 

in the context of the testimony and video evidence, which we have reviewed,3 we do not 

believe that Sheliga risks arrest by merely knocking on doors and discussing his views.

Like the District Court, we come to that conclusion regarding the likelihood of harm after 

considering how and why Miller interacted with Sheliga (including, inter alia, the evidence 

that Miller was responding to police reports that Sheliga was scaring others and acting 

disorderly and that Miller made statements to Sheliga because of the complaints from others); Sheliga’s admission that no one had told him that he would be arrested strictly for 

engaging in speech about the then-upcoming election; and Miller’s, Balderas’s, and the 

Chief of Police’s testimony that they never told him that he would be arrested for door-todoor canvassing about the election.

3 We grant Sheliga’s motion, supported by evidence from opposing counsel, to accept and 

review the videos that were played at during the hearing in the District Court that do not 

appear to be available through the District Court docket.

Case: 23-2998 Document: 35 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/12/2024
7

Accordingly, to the extent that we have jurisdiction over this appeal, we will affirm the 

District Court’s order. We will otherwise dismiss this appeal. Sheliga’s requests for injunctive and other relief (except for the request that we consider the videos, see supra n.3) are 

denied. 

Case: 23-2998 Document: 35 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/12/2024