Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02007/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Fox
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

' . / 

P U B L I S H 

I~ THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF.AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

f\f:/.\Y 9 1990 

ROBERT L . .HOECKER _ . Clerk 

v. 

'JOHN FOX, 

No. 88-:;?007 

) . 

Detendant-Appellant. ) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. NO. 87-CR-377) 

-David M. Conner, Assistant U. s. Attorney, Denver, Colorado 

(Michael J. Norton, United States Attorney, and James K. Bredar, 

Assistant U. s~ Attorney, Den~er, Colorado, were also on the 

brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Mark J. Rosenblum .. , Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, 

Colorado (Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, Denver, 

Colorado, was also on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, GARTH* and MCKAY, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

*The Honorable Leonard I. Garth, United-States Circuit Judge for 

the Third Circuit~ sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 1
) 

Defendant-appellant John Fox (Fox) appeals his conviction of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 

cocaine, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846 (Count I) , and of 

interstate travel for the purpose of promoting unlawful activity, 

in vioJation of the Travel Act, 18 u.s.c. § 1952 (Count VI). On 

appeal, Fox asserts that: ( 1) the district court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress evidence seized at "his arrest; (2) the 

evidence is insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction; (3) 

the district court erred in refusing to give Fox's tendered jury 

instruction concerning the difference between a conspiracy and a 

buyer-seller relationship; and, (4) the government failed to prove 

a "business enterprise" within the meaning of the Travel Act. 

I. Factual Background 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

jury's verdict, United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1429 

(10th Cir. 1985), ·cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986), the record 

shows these facts: 

In August 1987 Irene Jassick informed agents of the United 

States Drug Enforcement .Administration (DEA) that certain 

associates of hers were engaged in the distribution of cocaine in 

the Denver area. (R. IV, at 35-37.) Jassick agreed to cooperate 

with DEA agents and was registered as a DEA informant. Over the 

course of the next three and a half months, with Jassick's 

assistance, DEA agents conducted an investigation into alleged 

cocaine dist~ibution by John Moresco and John Dente, Fox's codefendants. Jassick purchased cocaine from Moresco and Dente on 

three occasions while under the supervision of DEA agents. (Id. 

at 38.) Those drug sales were the basis of three substantive 

counts against Moresco and Dente. 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 2
Sometime during October 1987, DEA agents asked Jassick to 

determine whether Moresco and Dente were interested in purchasing 

a large quantity of cocaine from a supposed acquaintance of hers, 

who would in fact be a DEA agent. (Id. at 40-41.) Moresco 

reportedly was interested in making such a purchase, and agreed to 

meet Jassick's acquaintance. Eventually, Jassick set up a meeting 

between the two men. 

On November 25, 1987, Moresco, Jassick, and DEA undercover 

agent Robert Castillo met at a Denny's Restaurant in Denver. (R. 

v, at 52.) Castillo was working in an undercover capacity, posing 

as a Mexican national interested in selling cocaine. Jassick was 

wearing a radio transmitter which was monitored by DEA agents 

Musso and Topper in a car parked at a motel adjacent to the 

restaur~nt. (Id. at 53.) The agents had a recording device in 

their car, but because of background noise and equipment failure, 

they were unable successfully to record the conversation. (Id. at 

155-56.) 

Castillo is fluent in Spanish and he and Moresco conducted 

the first part of their meeting in Spanish. (Id. at 86.) Moresco 

told Castillo that he and his associate were interested in 

purchasing two kilograms of cocaine, and that they had 

approximately $16,000 available to purchase one kilogram 

immediately. (Id.) Moresco then indicated that he worked with an 

associate with whom he divided sales territory, and that their 

present source of supply was an individual in Los Angeles. (Id . 

. at 87.) Castillo then offered to sell Moresco two kilograms of 

cocaine. (Id. at 88.) At that point, the defendant-appellant, 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 3
John Fox, entered the restaurant and joined the conversation. 1 

(Id. ) 

Agent Castillo testified that Moresco introduced Fox, while 

Fox was sitting there right in front of Castillo, as "his 

associate whci was responsibie for the southern part of Denver in 

the coke traffic." Fox took no exception to this statement. (Id. 

at 88.) After Castillo informed Fox of his earlier offer to 

Moresco, the following exchange occurred, according to Castillo: 

Q Then what happened? 

A Well, then Mr. Fox also advised me they had present 

$16,000 for one kilo of cocaine. I then advised 

him to purchase a couple. We then agreed we would 

wait a couple of weeks. 

(Id. at 89). Fox then advised Castillo about a beeper system, a 

"system they would use, him and Mr. Moresco, to communicate with 

each other. 112 (Id.) Agent Musso testified that Fox left the 

1 

Agents Musso and Topper observed Fox enter the restaurant, 

but from their vantage point they could not see whether he 

att·ended the meeting. (Id. at 54.) Agent Topper later testified 

that they had never seenFox before. (Id. at 161-62.) The agents 

subsequently identified Fox through his license plate number. 

( Id. at 56-57.} 

2 

Agent Castillo testified as follows: 

Mr. Fox had suggested that before they made any 

purchases, that he would first like to see the package, 

meaning the two kilos of cocaine, and would like to take 

a sample of that package, and I said that would be no 

problem at all. 

However, I would then want, before the packages 

were observed by Mr. Fox, I would like to see the money. 

It was then agreed that we would then meet at a 

pre-arranged location when the transaction was to occur. 

I would then introduce a second undercover agent as my 

cousin who I identified as only David. 

He would then go with Mr. Fox to another location, 

supposedly where the packages would be. I would stay 

with Mr. Moresco at a location where he had already 

showed me the money. 

(Footnote cont'd on next page} 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 4
restaurant in the company of Moresco and that they engaged in a 

brief conversation before departing separately. (Id. at 55.) 

On November 30 Moresco telephoned agent Castillo ~nd told him 

that he and Fox could not make the purchase as planned, saying 

' 

they had been· robbed of $25,000 that they had accumulated to 

purchase the cocaine. (Id. at 137-38.) Moresco indicated that he 

had only $8,000 left, which he would use for smaller cocaine 

purchases from someone else. (Id. at 92.) Castillo testified 

that Moresco said he needed a week or two to raise the funds 

necessary to proceed with the transaction. (Id.) Moresco 

testified, however, that he had lied about the theft, and that 

neither Moresco nor Fox ever intended to do business with Castillo 

because they suspected he was an undercover agent, and because 

they didn't have enough money to purchase two kilograms of 

cocaine. 3 

(footnote continued:) 

Supposedly at that point Mr. Fox would be allowed 

to see the package, allegedly see a sample in which he 

would notify Mr. Moresco through a beeper system. 

At that time I was supposed to deliver the money--

excuse me--I was supposed to receive the money from Mr. 

Moreseco and in turn Mr. Fox was supposed to receive the 

packages from the individual identified as David. 

(R. Vat 89-90.) 

3 

Moresco testified as follows: 

We agreed to sit and listen to this fellow knowing full 

well that there was something wrong there, and we kad no 

intention of ever doing anything with him •••• 

Q: Well, you had the meeting, though, right? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And then the meeting broke up and isn't it the case that 

Mr. Fox contacted you and told you he didn't want to have 

anything to do with this Roberto [agent Castillo], and he 

didn't want to go into the transaction? 

A: That's- totally correct, and I think that he didn't have 

to tell me that. We already knew.that. We went there not to 

(Footnote cont'd on next page) 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 5
Prior to the November 25 meeting, the DEA agents were unaware 

of Fox's association with Moresco; their investigation had focused 

exclusively on Moresco and Dente. ( Id • at 8 2-9 5 ; 161-6.2 • ) 

Moresco testified, however, that during the three months prior to 

the November 25 meeting at the Denny's restaurant, he and Fox met 

on two or three occasions to sell each other small quantities of 

cocaine. (Id. at 118-19.) The two men executed these drug 

transactions, typically involving no more than half an ounce of 

cocaine, to ensure that they each had a sufficient supply of 

cocaine to meet the needs of their customers. (td. at 119.) 

Moresco also testified that Fox accompanied him to Las Vegas on 

two occasions prior to December 1, 1987, to gamble and to purchase 

cocaine from their supplier, Steve Boubon. (Id. at 121-24; 132.) 

He and Fox pooled their money so that he could purchase a larger 

quantity of cocaine. (Id. at 121-24.) Fox never had any direct 

contact with Boubon, however, and did not receive his share of the 

cocaine from Moresco until they had returned to Denver. Id. 

On December 1, 1987, DEA agents followed John Dente to Las 

Vegas, Nevada, expecting him to purchase a significant quantity of 

cocaine. Agent Musso had met with Dente in Denver, in an 

undercover capacity, and arranged to accompany him to Las Vegas to 

' 

purchase twelve ounces of cocaine from Steve Boubon. (Id. at 57-

59.) The sale took place as planned, in the Riviera casino, and 

agents promply arrested Dente and Boubon. (Id. at 63-64.) A 

(footnote continued:) 

do any business with him in the first place. We just went 

there to see what he had to say. 

(R. Vat 138.) 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 6
consensual search of Boubon's room revealed approximately one and 

one-half kilograms of cocaine. (Id. at 64.) 

Before Musso left Denver, Jass·ick had informed him that 

Moresco was also planning to purchase cocaine from the same 

supplier, Steve Boubon. (Id. at 57-59.) Therefore, after 

discovering the cocaine in Boubon's room, the DEA agents suspected 

that Boubon had expected to meet at least one other customer in 

Las Vegas, possibly Moresco.· Shortly thereafter, agents located 

Moresco's truck in the parking lot next to the casino, and saw Fox 

playing the slot machines inside the casino n'ear the "Sportsbook" 

where they had just arrested Boubon. (Id. at 67.) After several 

hours of surveillance, Fox and Moresco were arrested in the hotel 

parking lot. (Id .. at 71-72.) A search revealed that Fox was 

carrying approximately $19,600 in cash. (Id. at 72.) 4 Moresco 

later testified that although he did not have specific plans to 

purchase cocaine on.this particular trip, he was planning to 

introduce Fox to Steve Boubon, and Boubon had previously agreed to 

the introduction. (Id. at 127-28; 141-42.) He further testified 

that the purpose of the planned introduction was to permit Fox to 

do business directly with Boubon in the future. (Id. at 141-42.) 

Fox was charged in two counts of a six-count Indictment. His 

co-defendants, Moresco and Dente, were named in the same two 

counts and, in addition, were charged with four substantive drugrelated offenses in the remaining counts. After pleading guilty 

to two charges, but prior to sentencing, Moresco agreed to testify 

against Fox in return for immunity from further prosecution and in 

4 

Testimony at the suppression hearing indicates that Fox was 

carrying $19,100 in cash. (R. II at 12.) 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 7
the hope of a lighter sentence. (Id. at 136.) The record does 

not reflect Dente's fate. Fox was convicted of both counts after 

a jury trial, and sentenced to seven years on Count I 

(conspiracy), 21 months on Count VI (the Travel Act violation), 

and following these concurrent terms, three years' supervised 

release. This appeal followed. 

II. The Motion to Suppress 

Fox first argues that the district court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress the evidence (the money) seized at his 

warrantless arrest because the arresting officers lacked probable 

cause. We disagree. 

Fox does not challenge the officers' authority to conduct a 

warrantless search of his person incident to a lawful arrest, see 

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981); Michigan v. 

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979), or their authority to seize 

evidence of a crime discovered by such a search. Thus, the 

admissibility of the evidence derived from Fox's arrest depends 

solely on the lawfulness of the arrest. 

The warrantless arrest here was valid only if at the time of 

the arrest the agents had probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 

89, 91 (1964). Probable cause exists where "the facts and 

circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of 

which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient 

to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [arrestee] had 

committed or was committing an offense." Id. Probable cause must 

be judged in light of the ''totality of the circumstances" at the 

time of the arrest. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 

(1976). "The amount and quality of information necessary for 

probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is neither greater nor 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 8
less than that needed for a magistrate to validly issue a warrant, 

but is significantly less than what is necessary to prove an 

accused's guilt." United States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 486 

(10th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). 

Because the determination that probable cause exists is a 

predominantly factual analysis, we will not disturb the trial 

court's finding of probable cause unless, viewing all the evidence 

presented at trial in the light most favorable to the government, 

the court's finding is clearly erroneous. United States v. 

Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 561 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. 

A_lonso, 790 F.2d 1489, 1496 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. 

Gagnon, 635 F.2d 766, 769 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 

1018 (1981). Here we hold that there was no error in the trial 

court's finding of probable cause. 

The district court found that the federal drug agents who 

arrested Fox in Las Vegas had probable cause to believe that he 

had conspired to engage in criminal activity, namely possession 

with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine. (R. II at 

42-43.) The court relied on the following facts known to the 

arresting officers: (1) Fox's participation in the November· 25 

meeting at the Denny's Restaurant in Denver; (2) Moresco's 

introduction of Fox as the partner "of one of the individuals 

involved in the transaction," and that "his assignment was the 

south part of Denver"; (3) the availability of Fox's $16,000 for 

the purchase of cocaine; and, (4) the discussioD of Las Vegas as 

the place of physical transfer where Moresco would generally 

receive cocaine from his Los Angeles transactions. (Id.) We are 

persuaded that the totality of these circumstances, viewed in the 

light_ most favorable to the government, supports the district 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 9
court's finding that the agents had probable cause to arrest Fox, 

and therefore that the search incident to that arrest was lawful. 

III. Sufficiency_ of the Evidence 

Fox next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove 

that he knowingly and willfully joined in•a conspiracy to - possess 

with the intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine. 5 Fox 

maintains that the evidence, at most, shows that he was involved 

in a series of separate and distinct transactions, not a single 

conspiracy with a common objective. 

We review the entire record in the light most favorable to 

the government to determine whether the evidence, both direct and 

circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be 

drawn therefrom, is such that a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 

Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 959 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 908 

(1987); United States v. Hooks, 780 .F.2d 1526, 1529-31 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986). In a conspiracy trial, 

however, "caution must be taken that the conviction not be 

obtained 'by piling inference upon inference.'" United States v. 

Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1974) (quoting Direct Sales 

Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943). "The evidence, 

when viewed in its entirety, must generate more than a mere 

suspicion of guilt, and where such evidence is equally consistent 

with both guilt and innocence the conviction cannot be sustained." 

Id. 

5 

The district court denied Fox's motion for a judgment of 

acquittal as to Count I, the conspiracy count, at the close of the 

government's case. 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 10
The evidence in a conspiracy prosecution must show that two 

or more persons agreed to violate the law, that the defendant knew 

at least the essential objectives of the conspiracy, and that the 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of it. United 

States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

U.S. __ , 109 S. Ct. 99 (1988). To establish Fox's membership 

in the conspiracy, the government must sufficiently prove that he 

had a "unity of purpose or a common design and understanding" with 

his co-conspirators to possess with intent to distribute and to 

distribute cocaine. United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1431 

(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986); United 

States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 581-82 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985). We have held that the agreement may 

be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, Kendall, 

766 F.2d at 1431; United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 964 

(10th Cir. 1978), but the evidence must demonstrate "the essential 

element of interdependence" among the co-conspirators. Dickey, 

736 F.2d at 582 ("each alleged coconspirator must depend on the 

successful operation of each 'link' in the chain to achieve the 

common goal."). Where several separate transactions are involved, 

as here, we must determine whether each co-conspirator's 

activities "constituted essential and integral steps toward the 

realization of a common, illicit goal." United States v. Brewer, 

630 F.2d 795, 799 (10th Cir. 1980). 

We have held that "proof of the existence of a buyer-seller 

relationship, without more, is inadequate to tie the buyer to a 

larger conspiracy II United States v. McIntyre, 836 F. 2d 

467, 471 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Watson, 594 

F.2d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir.), cert •. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979)). --11 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 11
One who merely purchases drugs or other property from a 

conspirator does not thereby become a member of the conspiracy. 

The reason is that guilt remains individual and personal, even as 

respects conspiracies, and is not a matter of mass application. 

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). Mere association 

with conspirators, even with knowledge of their involvement in 

crime, is insufficient to prove participation in their conspiracy. 

Dickey at 585; Kendall at 1432. 

Fox relies heavily on United States v. McIntyre. There we 

reversed a conspiracy conviction because the evidence did not 

establish that the defendant shared a "common goal" with his 

alleged coconspirators to possess and distribute cocaine. 836 

F.2d at 471-472. The governm~nt relied essentially on evidence of 

the defendant's conversation with a government informant in which 

he disclosed that his former sources in Tulsa were unavailable, 

that he had a source in Oklahoma City; that the couple made a 

subsequent purchase of cocaine from another source; that 

defendant used $75 of his money and $300 the informant gave him 

for that purchase; and that the defendant gave the informant some 

of the cocaine and kept the remainder. The government also relied 

on two other instances in which the defendant purchased cocaine 

from other sources and shared it with the informant and others. 

We held that this evidence did not reveal a common goal of the 

defendant with the informant or the various sellers to possess and 

distribute cocaine; there was no indication that the defendant was 

making a profit or distributing cocaine when he merely shared his 

purchases with his friends present at the time of sale. 836 F.2d 

at 471. · We noted that the evidence in McIntyre failed to 

establish the essential element of interdependence, i.e., that 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 12
each alleged coconspirator must depend on the operation of each 

link in the chain to achieve the common goal. 836 F.2d at 471. 

Here, however, the government points to significant evidence 

in support of its argument that Fox knowingly and willingly joined 

in a conspiracy. First, there was evidence that Moresco and Fox 

regularly met during the Fall of 1987 to discuss drug transactions 

and, on at least three occasions, executed drug transactions for 

the purpose of maintaining a suitable inventory of cocaine for 

distribution; that Moresco and Fox periodically traveled together 

to Las Vegas to buy cocaine from their supplier, Steve Boubon; 

that they pooled their money so that Moresco could make large 

purchases of cocaine at a favorable price; that Fox knew the 

purpose of these trips to Las Vegas--and, by implication, the 

object of the alleged conspiracy--and Fox received his share of 

the cocaine upon their return to Denver. The government argues 

that this evidence demonstrates an ongoing relationship, or an 

ongoing course of conduct between Fox, Moresco and Boubon with but 

a single unlawful purpose: to purchase and distribute cocaine. 

Second, the evidence shows that Fox attended and actively 

participated in the November ·25 meeting with Moresco, agent 

Castillo, and the confidential informant, Irene Jasick. There 

Moresco said to Castillo, in Fox's presence and without objection 

by him, that Fox was his associate responsible for the southern 

part of Denver in the ''coke traffic." At that meeting, according 

to agent Castillo, Fox expressed his readiness to purchase one 

kilogram of cocaine for $16,000, described how he and Moresco 

conducted their drug trafficking business in the Denver area, and 

discussed an elaborate scheme to carry out an eventual purchase. 

Although the only testimony about the conversation came from agent 

13 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 13
Castillo, 6 the jury was entitled to believe him. It is not our 

function to assess the credibility of the witnesses on appeal; 

that task is reserved for the juty. United States v. · Twilligear, 

460 F.2d 79, 82 (10th Cir. 1972). 

Finally, there was evidence that Fox traveled to Las Vegas 

with Moresco on December 1, 1987. The government ·points to 

Moresco's testimony that the purpose of that trip was to introduce 

Fox to Boubon, so that the two men could deal with each other 

directly, and argues that the jury could reasonably infer from 

that testimony that such a meeting would further the common 

purpose of the conspiracy. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, as_we must, we believe the government proved that 

Moresco and Fox had formed a tacit agreement to violate the 

federal narcotics laws. The evidence supports the conclusion that 

Fox and Moresco, acting together and with the cooperation of their 

coconspirator Steve Boubon, conspired to purchase cocaine in Las 

Vegas with the intent to transport it to Colorado for 

distribution. See United States v. Doran, 882 · F.2d 1511, 1527 

(10th Cir. 1989). We are persuaded that the evidence sufficiently 

establishes the necessary interdependence among the coconspirators. The scheme for distributing cocaine for profit in 

Denver depended for its success on the successful achievement of 

6 

Neither the informant, Ms. Jasick, nor . the defendant 

testified. Moresco's testimony is of limited value because 

neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney significantly 

explored this area. It was not until his cross-examination that 

Moresco first testified about the meeting, and then he testified 

only about his subsequent phone call to Castillo advising him that 

he could not go through with the deal because someone had stolen 

$25,000 from him. 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 14
several integrated steps, including regular meetings between Fox 

and Moresco in Denver, the pooling of their resources to purchase 

drugs, and the several wholesale cocaine purchases from Boubon in 

Las Vegas. Although much of the evidence is circumstantial, by 

their very nature conspiracies are often provable only by 

circumstantial evidence. See,~' Glasser v. United States, 315 

U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 855 

n.12 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

(1989). 

U.S. 110 s. Ct. 348 

Fox argues that the several transactions he conducted with 

Moresco, prior to the November 25 meeting, fail to establish a 

conspiratorial relationship. At best, Fox says, the evidence 

shows the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between Fox and 

Moresco which, by itself, is insufficient to tie him to a larger 

conspiracy. See McIntyre, 836 F.2d at 471; Watson, 594 F~2d at 

1337. Fox argues that the government has failed to show any 

interdependence among these separate transactions, or any 

relationship other than the prior association of Fox and' 

Moresco -- between these transactions and the alleged November 25 

co·nspi rator ial agreement. We disagree. The evidence we have 

reviewed earlier gives ample support instead for a conclusion that 

Fox did knowingly join and participate in the cocaine conspiracy. 

Finally, Fox argues that even if the meeting at Denny's is 

interpreted as showing an agreement, or part of a larger 

agreement, the phone call five days later from Moresco to Castillo 

constituted a withdrawal from any proposed conspiracy. We 

disagree. "In order to withdraw from a conspiracy an individual 

must take affirmative action, either making a clean breast to the 

authorities or communicating his withdrawal in a manner reasonably 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 15
calculated to reach his co-conspirators." United States v. 

Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 

1076 (1978). "The burden of establish1ng withdrawal is on the 

defendant." Id. Fox's presence with Moresco in Las Vegas on 

December 1 belies his claim of withdrawal on the previous day, and 

we are unpersuaded that there was proof that Fox made any serious 

attempt to renounce his participation in the overall conspiracy. 

In any event, even an effective withdrawal would exonerate Fox 

only for future crimes the remaining conspirators might commit. 

United States v. Gonzalez, 797 F.2d 915, 916-17 (10th Cir. 1986). 

We are convinced that the evidence, direct and 

circumstantial, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 

were sufficient to support Fox's conviction for conspiracy to 

possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine, as 

charged in Count One. 

IV. The Defendant's Separate Transaction Instruction 

Fox argues further that the trial judge erred in refusing to 

give his tendered instruction on his defense theory that what "the 

evidence proved amounted to a series of separate transactions, not 

a conspiracy." Appellant's Opening Brief at 10. Defendant cites 

United States v. McIntyre, 836 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1987), and 

United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986), inter alia, and says the law of 

conspiracy is confusing and that looking at the evidence as a 

whole, there was a critical question whether the scenario 

presented amounted to a conspiracy or a series of separate 

transactions. Id. at 12. 

"Where there is evidence in the record supporting his theory, 

a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to an instruction to 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 16
the jury concerning his theory of defense and failure to so 

instruct is reversible error." United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 

850, 858 (10th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Hopkins, 744 

F.2d 716, 717 (10th Cir. 1984) (en bane}. However, the trial 

judge is given considerable discretion in tailoring and 

formulating the instructions. ~, United States v. Nolan, 551 

F.2d 266, 274-75 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977). 

The court need not follow the exact language of a defense 

instruction as long as the court's instructions correctly state 

the law and fairly and adequately cover the issues presented. 

United States v. Pack, 773 F.2d 261, 267 (10th Cir. 1985); United 

States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d at 858; United States v. Nolan, 551 

F.2d 266, 274-75 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977). 

Here we are satisfied that the charge as a whole adequately 

instructed the jury, taking defendant Fox's theory into account. 7 

The charge covered the essential requirements for a finding of 

conspiracy here; this contrasted with acts amounting only to 

separate transactions. Instruction 17 stated plainly the 

essentials of the conspiracy that was charged from at least 

August 1, 1987, until approximately December 5, 1987, Moresco, 

Fox, Dente and Boubon did knowingly conspire and combine to 

knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute and 

to distribute cocaine. 

Instruction 20 defined a conspiracy as a combination of two 

or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose. It stated 

further "mere similarity of conduct among various persons, and the 

7 

The pertinent instructions are reproduced in the Appendix to 

this opinion. 

17 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 17
fact that they may have associated with each other, and may have 

assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does 

not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy." 

The court also charged the jury that what the evidence "must show 

beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to establish proof that a 

conspiracy existed, is that the members in some way or manner, or 

through some contrivance, positively or tacitly came to a mutual 

understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan." 

Moreover, Instruction 21 made it clear that "a person who has 

no knowledge of a conspiracy, but happens to act in a way which 

furthers some object or purpose of the conspiracy, does not 

t~ereby become a conspirator." It stated that before a conspiracy 

could be found, the evidence "must show beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the conspiracy_was knowingly formed, and that the Defendant, 

or other person who is claimed to have been a member, willfully 

participated in the unlawful plan, with the intent to advance or 

further some object or purpose of the conspiracy." 

The instructions covered the point made in Kendall, 766 F.2d 

at 1432, that neither the defendant's "knowledge alone nor his 

mere association with the conspirators, however, is enough to 

convict him of conspiracy." Association alone would not be 

enough, under the charge given, for conviction of conspiracy; it 

was required instead that the conspiracy was knowingly formed and 

that the defendant willfully participated in the unlawful plan. 

Viewing the charge as a whole, we believe the jury was 

adequately instructed. See United States v. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537, 

1542 and n.3 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding sufficient instructions 

similar to those given in the instant case, although a specific 

buyer-seller type instruction was requested); United States v. 

18 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 18
\. 

Lively, 803 F.2d 1124, .1128-29 (11th Cir. 1986} (same). But see 

United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317, 1320-23 (7th Cir. 1987}; 

United States v. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d 631, 636 (8th Cir. 1981). 

"[T]he sufficiency of the instructions is not determined by giving 

or not giving particular instructions, but rather by viewing the 

instructions as a whole." United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 

105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980). In sum, we 

hold there was no reversible error committed by the trial judge in 

refusing to give the tendered instruction. 

V. The Travel Act Violation 

Fox finally argues that the evidence does not support his 

conviction under the Travel Act, 18 u.s.c. § 1952 (1988), and 

therefore that the district court erred in refusing to grant his 

motion for judgment of acquittal on that count at the close of the 

government's case. He says that the government proved only 

sporadic, casual involvement in an unlawful activity, a series of 

separate transactions, instead of a continuous course of unlawful 

conduct, and therefore that the evidence fails to establish the 

requisite "business enterprise." See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(l} 

(1988); United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1434 (10th Cir. 

1985}, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986). 

· Fox was charged in Count Six of the indictment with willfully 

and knowingly traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to 

"promote, carry on and facilitate the promotion and carrying on of 

an unlawful activity, to wit: the business enterprise of 

distributing cocaine," in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1952 (1988) 8 

8 

18 U.S.C. § 1952 provides in pertinent part: 

(Footnote cont'd on next page) 

19 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 19
and 18 u.s.c. § 2 (1982). At the close of the government's case, 

Fox unsuccessfully moved for judgment of acquittal as to Count 

Six, arguing as he does here, that the government failed to 

establish the existence of a business enterprise within the 

meaning of the Travel Act. 

The Travel Act defines unlawful activity to include "any 

business enterprise involving narcotics or controlled 

substances." 18 u.s.c. § 1952(b)(l). In Kendall, we held that 

the term "business enterprise" means a continuing course of 

conduct, rather than sporadic casual involvement in a proscribed 

activity. 766 F.2d at 1434 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 

U.S. 808, 811 n.6 (1971)); see also United States v. Peveto, 881 

F.2d 844, 861 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 

348 (1989). The legislative history of section 1952 makes clear 

that individual or isolated drug transactions in interstate 

commerce cannot be the predicate to a Travel Act violation. See 

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Racketeering Enterprises--Travel or 

Transportation, H.R. Rep. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 

reprinted in 1961 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2664, 2666 

("individual or isolated violations would not come within the 

(footnote continued:) 

(a) Whoever travels 

uses any facility 

including the mail, 

. . . 

in interstate or -foreign commerce or 

in interstate or foreign commerce, 

with intent to --

(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry 

on, or facilitate the promotion, management, 

establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, 

and thereafter. performs or attempts to perform any of 

the acts specified in subparagraphs ... (3), shall be 

fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more 

than five years, or both. 

(b) As used in this section, "unlawful activity" means 

(1) any business enterprise involving .•• narcotics or 

controlled substances ••.. 

20 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 20
scope of this bill since they do not constitute a continuous 

course of conduct so as to be a business enterprise."). 

We have.already reviewed in detail the government's evidence 

against Fox in connection with his conspiracy conviction. There 

was evidence that Fox regularly met with Moresco to carry on drug 

transactions; that Fox and Moresco traveled from Colorado to Las 

Vegas on several occasions, including December 1, 1987, to meet 

with and purchase quantities of cocaine from their supplier, Steve 

Boubon; and that Moresco and Fox pooled their money to purchase 

large quantities of cocaine at a favorable price for eventual 

distribution in Colorado. We believe that the record supports an 

inference that Fox and Moresco were engaged in a continuing 

business enterprise of purchasing and reselling cocaine for 

profit, and that they traveled in interstate commerce for the 

purpose of carrying on that unlawful activity. Furthermore, we 

are persuaded that there is sufficient evidence from which a jury 

could reasonably infer that Fox's involvement in the interstate 

I 

transportation of narcotics was continuous rather than merely 

"sporadic" or "casual." 

Fox's reliance on United States v. Bates, 840 F.2d 858 (11th 

Cir. 1988), is misplaced. In Bates, the evidence showed only a 

single, uncompleted act and was otherwise inconclusive: "Mr. 

Bates' car's odometer showed 30,000 more miles than the average 

car its age; Mr. Bates was carrying approximately $1,400 in cash; 

traces of cocaine were found in a concealed compartment in the 

glove box; Mr. Bates made the highly ambiguous statement: 

'[t]his is the first time I carried the weapon and the cocaine.'" 

For seemingly obvious reasons, the court held that the evidence 

failed to prove that the defendant was involved in an enterprise 

21 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 21
constituting a continuous course of drug trafficking. Id. at 863. 

It rejected the government's argument that a single act involving 

the transportation of narcotics can constitute the requisite 

business enterprise. Id. at 862-63. And in any event, the 

evidence showed that the defendant was stopped in the midst of his 

travel and therefore could not perform any illegal acts following 

the interstate travel as required by 18 u.s.c. § 1952(a). Id. at 

862. 

Here the record supports the inference that Fox and Moresco 

engaged in a continuous course of unlawful conduct, rather than 

only a sporadic casual involvement in a proscribed activity. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, as we must, we believe a reasonable jury could 

conclude from the testimony at trial, and the reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom, that Fox was guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of violating the Travel Act or of aiding and 

abetting its violation. Accordingly, the district court did not 

err in denying Fox's motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count 

Six of the indictment. 

AFFIRMED. 

22 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 22
A P P E N D I X 

The pertinent portions of the district court's instructions 

to the jury concerning conspiracy were as follows: 

Instruction 17. The indictment in this case reads 

as follows: Count I, the grand jury charges that: From 

at least August 1st, 1987, until approximately December 

5th, 1987, the exact dates unknown to the grand jury, in 

the State and District of Colorado, and elsewhere, the 

defendants John Moresco, John Fox, John Dente, and Steve 

Lee Boubon, an unindicted co-conspirator, did knowingly, 

willfully and unlawfully· conspire, combine, confederate, 

cooperate and agree with each other and other persons 

both known and unknown to the grand jury to knowingly 

and intentionally possess with intent to distribute and 

to distribute cocaine, a controlled substance listed in 

Schedule II, Title 21, United States Code, Section 812, 

in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 

84l(a)(l). 

The indictment then alleges that certain overt acts 

were committed by members of the alleged conspiracy, in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. All in violation of 

Title 21, United States Code, Section 846. 

Instruction 20. A conspiracy is a combination of· 

two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish 

some unlawful purpose,. or to accomplish some lawful 

purpose by unlawful means. 

So, a conspiracy is a kind of partnership in 

criminal purposes, in which each member becomes the 

agent of every other member. The gist of the offense is 

a combination or agreement to disobey, or to disregard, 

the law. 

Mere similarity of conduct among various persons, 

and the fact that they may have associated with each 

other, and may have assembled together and discussed 

common aims and interests, does not necessariiy 

establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. 

However, the evidence in the case need not show 

that the members entered into any express or form~l 

agreement, or that they directly, by words spoken or in 

writing, stated between themselves what their object or 

purpose was to be, o~ the details thereof, or the means 

by which the object or purpose was to be accomplished. 

What the evidence in the case must show beyond a 

reasonable doubt, in order to establish proof that a 

conspiracy existed, is that the members in some way or 

manner, or through some contrivance, positively or 

i 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 23
-, 

tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to 

accomplish a common and unlawful plan. 

The evidence in the case need not establish that 

all the means or methods set forth in the indictment 

were agreed upon to carry out the alleged conspiracy, 

nor that all means or methods, which were agreed upon, 

were actually used or put into operation, nor that all 

of the persons charged to have been members of the 

alleged conspiracy were such. 

What the evidence in the case must establish beyond 

a reasonable doubt is that the alleged conspiracy was 

knowingly formed, and that one or more of the means or 

methods described in the indictment were agreed upon to 

be used, in an effort to effect or accomplish some 

object or purpose of the conspiracy, as charged in the 

indictment, and that two or more persons, including one 

or more of the accused, were knowingly members of the 

conspiracy, as charged in the indictment. 

Instruction 21. One may become a member of a 

conspiracy without full knowledge of all the details of 

the conspiracy. On the other hand, a person who has no 

knowledge of a conspiracy, but happens to act in a way 

which furthers some object or purpose of the conspiracy, 

does not thereby become a conspirator. 

Before the jury may find that a defendant, or any 

other person, has become a member of a conspiracy, the 

evidence in the case must show beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the conspiracy was knowingly formed, and that the 

Defendant, or other person who is claimed to have been a 

member, willfully participated in the unlawful plan, 

with the intent to advance or further some object or 

purpose of the conspiracy. 

(VI R. 249-50, 251-53.) 

ii 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 24
No. 88-2007 - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOHN FOX 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

Regrettably I must dissent from the court's judgment in this 

case. I do not disagree with any of the court's opinion except 

Section IV dealing with the trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction concerning separate transactions. It 

clearly was defendant's central theory of the case in the conspiracy count. I consider it controlling because, in my view, the 

failure to give the instruction when requested in this case is 

reversible error. 

As I understand the court's opinion, it does not deny that 

the law in this circuit recognizes that a legitimate defense to a 

conspiracy charge is that the relationship consisted of a series 

of independent tr9nsactions lacking agreement to engage in the 

overall conduct comprising the elements of a unified conspiracy. 

United States v. McIntyre, 836 F.2d 467, 471 (10th Cir. 1987); 

United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 13426 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986); United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 

1330, 1337 (10th Cir. 1979). Nor do I understand the court to 

- reject defendant's claim that the evidence in this case would support such a theory and corresponding instruction. The court 

merely concludes that the instructions given were adequite because 

they are a correct statement of the law of conspiracy. 

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 25
I do not quarrel with the notion that the instructions on 

conspiracy were correct so far as they went. However, in the complex area of conspiracy law, the defendant was entitled to more. 

He was entitled to one of the many subsets of conspiracy instructions more clearly informing the jury of his theoryo Indeed, as 

the court notes, even in this case the trial court gave one subset 

of instruction concerning "similarity of conduct," "association," 

and "assembling together" as a way of contrasting it for clarity's 

sake with the general positive statement of what conspiracy is. 

Majority opinion at 17-18 (discussing Instruction 20). For the 

same reasons that defendant was entitled to that instruction 

(cited with approval by the court), I believe it was error not to 

give a requested instruction on a "series of transactions." 

Indeed, I consider it more compelling than the merely "associating 

together" or "similarity of conduct" instructions because the 

"series of transactions" are more likely to be confused ~ith a 

true conspiracy in the minds of the jury--because they are, in 

fact, "deals." I believe the court has tacitly acknowledged that 

giving the instruction would not have been error; I believe refusing it was error. I would reverse. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-2007 Document: 010110285106 Date Filed: 05/09/1990 Page: 26