Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05023/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Drug Enforcement Administration
Appellee
Lee Paige
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 12, 2011 Decided January 17, 2012

No. 11-5023

LEE PAIGE,

APPELLANT

v.

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cv-00644)

Ward A. Meythaler argued the cause for the appellant.

Helen L. Gilbert, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Tony West, 

Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen Jr., United 

States Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney, were with her 

on brief. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States 

Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #11-5023 Document #1352797 Filed: 01/17/2012 Page 1 of 16
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant 

Lee Paige (Paige) appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the United States Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) on claims he brought under the Privacy

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. For the reasons 

set forth below, we affirm the district court.

I. FACTS

Paige is a special agent in the DEA’s Orlando District 

Office. On Friday, April 9, 2004,1

With Paige’s knowledge, one of the parents in attendance 

video-recorded Paige’s presentation—including the accidental 

discharge—on a mini-DV cassette tape (Mini-DV). The 

video was over one hour long and was the only videorecording of Paige’s presentation. The parent turned the 

Mini-DV over to the DEA agents who arrived on the scene

that night. Later that night, Robert Patterson, another DEA 

he spoke to a group of 

about fifty children and parents at a community center in 

Orlando, Florida. At the time, Paige was an undercover agent 

who also often spoke to schools and other organizations to 

educate the public about the dangers of illegal drugs. During

the presentation, Paige displayed his DEA-issued firearm

while discussing gun safety and telling the audience that 

firearms should be handled only by professionals like himself. 

His firearm accidentally discharged and he shot himself in the

thigh. 

 1 The facts come from Paige’s amended complaint and the 

materials the parties submitted in support of their respective 

motions for summary judgment. All dates referred to herein are in 

2004 unless otherwise noted. 

USCA Case #11-5023 Document #1352797 Filed: 01/17/2012 Page 2 of 16
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special agent from the Orlando District Office, copied the 

Mini-DV onto a VHS tape. 

The DEA Office of Inspections (IN), headquartered in 

Arlington, Virginia, is responsible for investigating all 

shooting incidents involving DEA personnel. Upon receiving 

notification of a shooting, IN determines whether to

immediately dispatch inspectors from IN headquarters to

investigate the shooting or to delegate the investigation to the 

local DEA office. On April 12, after receiving notice of the 

shooting involving Paige, IN informed Steve Collins, the 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge in the Orlando District 

Office, that it did not intend to send inspectors to Orlando. IN 

also asked Collins to send IN a copy of the video-recording. 

That same day, Collins gave the Mini-DV and the VHS to 

Peter Gruden, a DEA supervisor in the Orlando District 

Office. Collins instructed Gruden to mail the VHS to IN per 

its request; Gruden mailed the VHS to IN later that week. On 

April 14 or 15, IN decided to send two inspectors from 

headquarters to investigate the shooting because an agent had 

been injured and because of concern about adverse publicity 

resulting from the incident. 

Sometime during the week of April 12, Gruden directed 

technical personnel at the Orlando District Office to make “a 

few” additional copies of the Mini-DV. Def.’s Mot. Summ.

J., Ex. 11, Paige v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. CV 

01:06-644, at 114 (D.D.C. May 16, 2008).2

 2 The DEA technician who made the copies stated in his 

deposition that Gruden requested four copies of the Mini-DV. 

The copies were 

made on compact discs (CDs). The video appearing on the 

CD was four minutes, nine seconds (4:09 video) in duration

and it depicted only the accidental discharge portion of the 

Mini-DV. Gruden provided the 4:09 video to several 

individuals. He sent one copy to William Lutz, the head of 

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the DEA Firearms Training Unit at Quantico, Virginia.3 

Gruden also sent copies to two friends, DEA Special Agents

Steven Derr and Rick Bendekovic. Gruden gave another copy 

to Kevin Scully, then a DEA agent in the Orlando District 

Office, but Scully returned the video to Gruden the same day 

Gruden gave it to him.

4

 Finally, according to Gruden’s

deposition, at Collins’s request, he sent a copy of the 4:09 

video to the DEA Miami Field Division Management.5

On April 16, an IN program analyst at IN headquarters 

opened a file for the Paige investigation (IN file). The file

was retrievable by Paige’s name.6

The two IN inspectors traveled to Orlando on April 19 

and returned to IN headquarters on April 21. While in 

Orlando, the IN inspectors obtained the Mini-DV from 

Gruden. At some point after returning to IN headquarters, 

It consisted of two parts: a 

correspondence file (maintained by the IN program analyst) 

and an investigative file. The investigative file included the 

evidence gathered by Gruden and the IN inspectors.

 3 Along with the 4:09 video, Gruden sent Lutz a copy of a DEA 

form Gruden had prepared detailing Paige’s accidental discharge. 

The form, entitled “Report of Shooting,” recited that it was to be 

submitted to the Firearms Training Unit and to IN.

4 Scully later gave a different copy of the 4:09 video to Kevin 

Clark, a DEA special agent in the Tampa District Office. 

5

 Within a few months of the accidental discharge, a copy of the 

4:09 video was sent via interoffice mail to the DEA firearms 

training office in Miami. 

6 The IN program analyst labeled the file “IN-GB-04-032S / SA 

Lee Paige.” “IN” stands for Office of Inspections; “GB” is the

Orlando District Office designator; “04” are the last two digits of 

the fiscal year; “032” is the assigned number of the case; and “S” 

signifies that the investigation is a shooting. “SA” stands for 

Special Agent. 

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they also received the VHS Patterson made the night of the

shooting. One of the IN inspectors also had additional copies 

of the Mini-DV made on digital video discs (DVDs) after 

returning to IN headquarters. The DVDs were 23 minutes, 34 

seconds in length and were included in the IN file. One of the 

IN inspectors also had a copy of the Mini-DV made with the 

accidental discharge portion excised; it was given to the 

parent who had made the original video-recording of Paige’s 

presentation. 

In late April and early May, Paige’s accidental discharge 

was reported in the press. The reports stated that a DEA 

agent had shot himself in the leg but Paige was not identified 

by name. A version of the 4:09 video began to appear on 

internet websites and on the DEA’s internal e-mail system 

(known as Firebird) at some point between April 2004 and 

early March 2005. The DEA Office of Professional Review 

(OPR) conducted a one year long investigation into the 

release of the 4:09 video on the internet and on Firebird but

was unable to determine who released it.

7

Paige filed suit against the DEA in April 2006, alleging

the disclosure of the 4:09 video violated the Privacy Act and 

the FTCA. After completing discovery, Paige moved for 

partial summary judgment and the DEA moved for summary 

judgment on all claims. On December 29, 2010, the district

court granted summary judgment to the DEA. Paige v. U.S. 

Drug Enforcement Admin., No. CV 1:06-644, 2010 WL 

7758769 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2010). The court held that Paige 

failed to establish the elements of his Privacy Act claim—

specifically, that the 4:09 video was retrieved from a system 

of records and that the disclosure was intentional or willful. 

 7 During its investigation, OPR was able to recover the 4:09 

videos sent to Derr, Bendekovic and the DEA firearms training 

office in Miami. 

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Id. at *2-*9. The court also concluded that Paige’s FTCA

claim failed because he did not establish all of the elements 

under Florida law for the tort of invasion of privacy by public 

disclosure of a private fact. Id. at *9-*11. Paige timely 

appealed. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. Maydak v. United States, 630 F.3d 166, 

174 (D.C. Cir. 2010). “Summary judgment is appropriate 

only where there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact’ 

and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, ‘the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law.’ ” Id. (quoting McCready v. Nicholson, 

465 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (summary judgment is 

required “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial”). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is 

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” McCready, 465 F.3d at 7 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

A. Privacy Act

Under the Privacy Act, “[an] individual may bring a civil 

action against [any] agency” that “fails to comply with 

any . . . provision of [the Privacy Act] . . . in such a way as to 

have an adverse effect on [the] individual.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(g)(1)(D). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff must 

establish that “(1) the agency violated a provision of the 

[Privacy] Act, (2) the violation was ‘intentional or willful,’ 5 

U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4), and (3) the violation had an ‘adverse 

effect’ on the plaintiff, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D).” Maydak, 

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630 F.3d at 178. Based on the record before us, Paige’s

Privacy Act claim fails because it lacks the first element. 

Subject to exceptions not relevant here, the Privacy Act 

prohibits a federal agency8 from “disclos[ing] any record 

which is contained in a system of records by any means of 

communication to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). The 

parties agree that the Mini-DV, the VHS, the 4:09 video and 

the DVDs are all “record[s]”9

 8 The Privacy Act applies to “any executive department, military 

department, Government corporation, Government controlled 

corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the 

Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or 

any independent regulatory agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) 

(incorporating definition of “agency” at 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1)). 

and that the relevant “system of 

records” is the IN file of the investigation of Paige’s 

accidental discharge (designated IN-GB-04-032S / SA Lee 

Paige). The parties also agree that the version of the video of 

Paige’s accidental discharge that was disclosed on the internet 

and on Firebird is the 4:09 video made at Gruden’s request 

from the Mini-DV sometime during the week of April 12, 

9 Under the Privacy Act, a “record” is: 

any item, collection, or grouping of information about an 

individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not 

limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical 

history, and criminal or employment history and that contains 

his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other 

identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a 

finger or voice print or a photograph[.]

5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4); see also Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d

915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“As long as [a] tape contains a means 

of identifying an individual by picture or voice, it falls within the 

definition of a ‘record’ under the Privacy Act.”).

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2004. The parties do not agree, however, that the 4:09 video 

is a “record . . . contained in a system of records” under

section 552a(b). 

The Privacy Act defines a “system of records” as: 

a group of any records under the control of any 

agency from which information is retrieved by the 

name of the individual or by some identifying 

number, symbol, or other identifying particular 

assigned to the individual[.]

5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5). “A system of records exists only if the 

information contained within the body of material is both 

retrievable by personal identifier and actually retrieved by 

personal identifier.” Maydak, 630 F.3d at 178 (emphasis in 

original; internal quotation marks omitted). To violate section 

552a(b), then, a disclosure generally must result from an 

individual’s having “actually retrieved” the information from 

the system of records in which it is contained. Armstrong v. 

Geithner, 608 F.3d 854, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Bartel 

v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[Section 

552a(b)] prohibits nonconsensual disclosure of any 

information that has been retrieved from a protected record.”). 

To begin with, Paige argues that the 4:09 video was 

copied from a record contained in a system of records, that is, 

the Mini-DV. But the Mini-DV was not a covered record at 

the time the 4:09 video was copied from it because the 

information on the Mini-DV was not retrievable by Paige’s 

name or other personal identifier, to wit: it was neither labeled 

nor filed by Paige’s name or other personal identifier, and 

Paige has offered no evidence that information on the MiniDV “was actually retrieved by [a] personal identifier” while 

in Gruden’s possession. Maydak, 630 F.3d at 178 (emphasis 

in original; internal quotation marks omitted); see also Henke 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 

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1996) (the definition of a “system of records” “suggest[s] 

strongly that a group of records should generally not be 

considered a system of records unless there is actual retrieval 

of records keyed to individuals”).

Paige argues that an IN file, and therefore a “system of 

records,” was created automatically when IN was notified of 

Paige’s accidental discharge and that every item Gruden had 

in his possession that related to Paige’s accidental 

discharge—including the Mini-DV—was contained in this 

“system of records.” But Henke makes clear that “retrieval 

capability is not sufficient to create a system of records.” Id.

(emphasis added); see also Maydak, 630 F.3d at 178. Here, 

no system of records existed from which information was in 

fact retrieved by Paige’s name or other personal identifier 

until the IN program analyst opened the IN file at IN 

headquarters on April 16.

At some point between April 19 and April 21, Gruden 

gave the Mini-DV to the IN inspectors who then placed the 

Mini-DV in the IN file. Upon its inclusion in the IN file, the 

Mini-DV was then contained in a system of records because 

the IN file was both “retrievable by personal identifier and 

actually retrieved by personal identifier.” Id. (emphasis in 

original; internal quotation marks omitted). By then, 

however, the 4:09 video had already been copied from the 

Mini-DV. And disclosure of the 4:09 video was not 

prohibited under the Privacy Act simply because the Mini-DV 

subsequently became a “record which is contained in a system 

of records.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b); see Armstrong, 608 F.3d at 

859-60 (disclosure of information contained in record within 

agency’s system of records not prohibited where retrieval 

occurred before record became part of agency’s system of 

records). Furthermore, there is no evidence that a copy of the 

4:09 video was made from the Mini-DV after the latter was 

placed in the IN file. 

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Moreover, the record reflects that the 4:09 video itself 

was not “contained in a system of records.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(b). Only three versions of the accidental discharge 

video were included in the IN file: the original Mini-DV, the

VHS and the DVDs created at the request of one of the IN 

inspectors. Although the OPR inspector responsible for 

investigating the disclosure of the accidental discharge video 

stated in his deposition that Gruden told him the 4:09 video 

was sent to IN, he later corrected his statement, declaring that 

there was “no indication that a 4:09 version of the video 

footage of S[pecial] A[gent] Lee Paige shooting himself was 

ever placed in the Office of Inspections file IN-GB-04-32S.” 

Decl. of Kent Reinke, Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 42, Paige v. 

United States Drug Enforcement Admin., No. CV 1:06-644 at 

2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2008).

In addition, at no point was the 4:09 video retrievable or 

retrieved by Paige’s name or other identifying particular, the 

sine qua non of a “system of records.” Id. The 4:09 video 

was unmarked and bore no notation indicating its contents.

Gruden used a file number for documents and items related to 

Paige’s accidental discharge different from that assigned by 

the IN program analyst and without Paige’s name or other 

personal identifier.10

 10 Gruden used file number “GFAO-04-9020” and titled the file 

“Assaults/Threats/Shootings.” See Pl.’s Mot. Partial Summ. J., Ex. 

1, Paige v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. CV 01:06-644, at 

17-22, 24-25 (D.D.C. May 16, 2008).

While Paige is correct that the 

“assignment of a number to the IN file . . . [is] not a 

requirement to the existence of a system of records,” 

Appellant’s Br. at 26, he has offered no evidence that the file

Gruden maintained was retrievable or retrieved by Paige’s 

name or other personal identifier.

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Paige’s reliance on Maydak v. United States, supra, is 

misplaced. In that case, we concluded that a box containing 

unmarked photographs of prisoners “may be” a system of 

records because the records (i.e. the photographs) were in fact 

retrieved by a personal identifier: the prisoner’s image. 

Maydak, 630 F.3d at 178. Here, however, neither the 4:09 

video nor the Mini-DV was retrieved by Paige’s name or 

other personal identifier. Granted, the 4:09 video contains

personally identifying information—namely, Paige’s video 

image—but it was neither “retrievable by” nor “actually 

retrieved by” Paige’s image. Id. (emphasis in original; 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Henke, 83 F.3d at 

1460. Paige’s reading would eviscerate the “system of 

records” limitation, which applies to several Privacy Act 

provisions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), by 

making any record containing personally identifying 

information, regardless whether it is retrievable or actually

retrieved by that information, a covered record. See

McCready, 465 F.3d at 11 (agency only “held accountable 

under Privacy Act provisions tied to a system of records

requirement for records it can easily retrieve consistent with 

its day-to-day practice of information management—records 

found within a ‘system of records’ ”). 

Finally, Paige relies on our decision in Bartel v. FAA, 

supra, in an attempt to avoid the retrieval requirement. In 

Bartel, we created a narrow exception to the retrieval 

requirement if an agency employee responsible for creating a 

covered record later discloses information contained therein 

based on his personal knowledge of the records and without 

actually retrieving it from the agency’s system of records. 

Bartel, 725 F.2d at 1407-11. We made clear in Bartel, 

however, that the exception to the actual retrieval requirement 

was tied to “the factual context of th[at] case,” id. at 1409

(emphasis in original), and we have subsequently declined to 

extend the exception beyond the Bartel facts. See Armstrong, 

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608 F.3d at 859-60. Gruden—who arguably “retrieved” the 

4:09 video from the Mini-DV—did not “order[] the 

investigation which resulted in the [creation of the 4:09 

video], ma[k]e a putative determination of wrongdoing based 

on the investigation, [or] disclose[] that putative 

determination.” Bartel, 725 F.2d at 1411; see also 

Armstrong, 608 F.3d at 860. Furthermore, there is no 

evidence in the record before us that anyone involved in the 

IN investigation at IN headquarters disclosed the 4:09 video,

thus making the exception inapplicable. 

Although no violation of section 552a(b) occurred,11

 11 Paige asserts violations of other Privacy Act provisions on 

appeal, but he failed to raise them in the district court. “[W]hile 

review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo, this court 

reviews only those arguments that were made in the district court, 

absent exceptional circumstances.” Potter v. District of Columbia, 

558 F.3d 542, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2009). We find no exceptional 

circumstances here. See Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & 

Co., 958 F.2d 416, 419 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (listing exceptional 

circumstances). 

the 

DEA’s handling of the 4:09 video fell short of the Privacy 

Act’s “design . . . to prevent . . . such actions as the 

publicizing of information of a sensational or salacious nature 

or of that detrimental to character or reputation.” Bartel, 725 

F.2d at 1411 n.15 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The widespread circulation of the accidental 

discharge video demonstrates the need for every federal 

agency to safeguard video records with extreme diligence in 

this internet age of iPhones and YouTube with their 

instantaneous and universal reach. The DEA’s treatment of 

the video-recording—particularly the creation of so many 

different versions and copies—undoubtedly increased the 

likelihood of disclosure and, although not an abuse of a 

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system of records, is far from a model of agency treatment of 

private data. 

B. Federal Tort Claims Act

Paige’s second claim is based on the FTCA which 

provides that the United States is liable for the negligence of a 

federal employee acting in the course of his employment to 

the same extent that a “private person[] would be liable to the 

claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act 

or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see Hornbeck 

Offshore Transp., LLC v. United States, 569 F.3d 506, 508 

(D.C. Cir. 2009). The law of the local jurisdiction—in this 

case, Florida—determines if an FTCA claim lies. See 

Hornbeck Offshore Transp., 569 F.3d at 508 (“We look to the 

law of the local jurisdiction . . . to determine whether there is 

a local private party analog to [a plaintiff’s] claim[].”).

Florida law recognizes an invasion of privacy tort by public 

disclosure of a private fact and the Florida Supreme Court—

looking to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) 

§ 652D (1977)—defines the elements of the tort as “[1] the 

publication, [2] of private facts, [3] that are offensive, and [4]

are not of public concern.” Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 

549 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (Fla. 1989). Paige satisfies neither the 

“private facts” nor the “not of public concern” elements.12

The invasion of privacy tort by publication of a private 

fact “applies only to publicity given to matters concerning the 

private, as distinguished from the public, life of the 

individual.” Restatement § 652D cmt. b. No liability attaches 

“for giving further publicity to what [a] plaintiff himself 

leaves open to the public eye.” Id.; see Spilfogel v. Fox 

Broad. Co., 433 Fed App’x 724, 725-26 (11th Cir. 2011) (no 

liability for publishing public facts about an individual). 

 12 Because Paige does not satisfy these elements, we do not 

address whether he satisfies the others.

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The 4:09 video contained no private facts. The 

accidental discharge occurred in a public place—the Callahan 

Neighborhood Center13

 13 The Callahan Neighborhood Center was open to the public at 

the time Paige gave his presentation. 

—and Paige knew he was being

video-recorded. Accordingly, the publication of the 4:09 

video merely gave “further publicity to what [Paige] himself 

le[ft] open to the public eye.” Restatement § 652D cmt. b; see

Spilfogel, 433 Fed App’x at 725-26 (publication of video of 

plaintiff’s arrest on public street did not disclose private facts 

because video did not relate to plaintiff’s family unit, health 

or well-being); Heath v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 

1145, 1148-49 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“[a] photograph taken in a 

public place is not private” and publication thereof does not 

disclose private facts); see also Restatement § 652D cmt. b

(listing as private facts “[s]exual relations,” “family quarrels,”

“many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses,”

“most intimate personal letters” and “most details of a man’s 

life in his home”). Even though certain facts about the 

accidental discharge were not publicized before the disclosure 

of the 4:09 video—including Paige’s name, likeness and what 

he said immediately before the accidental discharge—these 

facts were nonetheless public because Paige’s presentation 

was itself public. See Spilfogel, 433 Fed App’x at 725-26 (no 

invasion of privacy by giving publicity to individual’s identity 

and conduct occurring in public); Restatement § 652D cmt. b 

(individual’s privacy not invaded “when the defendant gives 

publicity to a[n] . . . activity in which the plaintiff is engaged 

in dealing with the public”). Paige is likely correct that the 

4:09 video depicts the accidental discharge more graphically 

than a newspaper article, but the invasion of privacy tort 

“focuses on the matter being published,” not the medium in 

which is it published. Heath, 732 F. Supp. at 1149 n.9 

(emphasis in original). 

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Paige’s FTCA claim also fails because the accidental 

discharge was a matter of public concern. “[T]he requirement 

of lack of public concern is a formidable obstacle” and 

matters of legitimate public concern are generally those 

matters that are considered “newsworth[y].” Cape Publ’ns, 

Inc., 549 So. 2d at 1377 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Paige was acting as a DEA special agent when he spoke at the 

Callahan Community Center and his speech was therefore of 

public concern. See e.g., Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, 

Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 789 (Ariz. 1989) (“[T]he public has a 

legitimate interest in the manner in which law enforcement 

officers perform their duties.”). That the accidental discharge 

received media coverage even before the disclosure of the

4:09 video supports the conclusion that the occurrence was 

one of public concern. See Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 

So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“Within the scope 

of legitimate public concern are matters customarily regarded 

as ‘news.’ ”).14

 14 The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that in determining 

whether a matter is of public concern, the issue is whether the 

matter “ ‘generally, as opposed to the specific identity contained 

within it, involved a matter of [public concern].’ ” Cape Publ’ns, 

Inc., 549 So. 2d at 1379 (quoting The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 

U.S. 524, 536-37 (1989)). The identity of an individual involved in 

a matter of public concern is also a matter of public concern unless 

a private fact about him is involved. Compare Woodard v. Sunbeam 

Television Corp., 616 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) 

(identity of school bus driver with criminal record constituted

matter of public concern because “public had a right to know that 

many school bus drivers had criminal records” and driver’s 

criminal record was public fact) with Doe v. Univision Television 

Grp., Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (although 

news story about problems with plastic surgeries performed abroad 

was matter of public concern, identity of patient not matter of 

public concern because patient’s involvement was private fact). As 

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to the DEA.

So ordered.

 

discussed above, Paige’s role in the accidental discharge was a 

public fact. Accordingly, the 4:09 video—including Paige’s 

likeness—was a matter of public concern.

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