Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01972/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01972-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Geoffrey B. Rhoads
Appellant
Nicole Rhoads
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE: GEOFFREY B. RHOADS, NICOLE RHOADS,

Appellants

______________________ 

2015-1972

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 12/498,709. 

______________________ 

Decided: May 4, 2016

______________________ 

 WILLIAM CONWELL, Digimarc Corp., Beaverton, OR, 

for appellants. 

 THOMAS W. KRAUSE, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for 

appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by AMY J.

NELSON, BRIAN RACILLA, LORE A. UNT. 

______________________ 

Before O'MALLEY, CLEVENGER, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.

CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge. 

Geoffrey and Nicole Rhoads (collectively “Rhoads”) 

appeal the decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(“the Board”) affirming the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8 

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2 IN RE: RHOADS

of Rhoads’ U.S. Patent Application No. 12/498,709 (“the 

’709 Application”). For the reasons below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Rhoads’ ’709 Application, titled “Methods and systems 

for cell phone interactions,” was filed July 7, 2009 and 

claims priority to a provisional application filed April 14, 

2009. The ’709 Application is directed to methods and 

systems for implementing cell phone control over various 

external devices such as thermostats or parking meters. 

The invention allows a user to take a picture with their 

cell phone camera of a device they would like to control. 

After the device is identified by information captured in 

the picture (such as a digital watermark), the user can 

control the device via an interface on their cell phone that 

uses the picture of the device as a graphical user interface 

(“GUI”). For example, Figure 6 shows a captured image of 

a thermostat displayed on the screen of a cell phone: 

’709 Application at Figure 6. 

When the user touches the region of the screen 64 or 

66, the cell phone transmits commands to the thermostat 

to increment or decrement, respectively, the temperature.

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IN RE: RHOADS 3

’709 Application at ¶ 44. In this example, a “SET 

TEMPERATURE” graphic is also displayed while the 

command to the thermostat is pending, to be replaced by 

a “confirmatory message” when the command has been 

successfully completed. See id. 

The only claim at issue in this appeal is claim 8.1 

Claim 8 reads as follows (bracketed letters added for ease 

of reference):

8. A method comprising:

[a] through a user interface on a user’s cell 

phone, receiving an instruction relating to 

control of a device, the user interface being presented on a screen of the cell phone 

in combination with a cell phone-captured 

image of the device;

[b] transmitting electronic information 

from the cell phone, destined for the device, to cause the device to execute said instruction;

[c] signaling information corresponding to 

the instruction, to the user, in a first fashion while the instruction is pending; and

[d] signaling information corresponding to 

the instruction, to the user, in a second, 

different fashion once the cell phone receives a signal sent by the device, said 

signal indicating that the instruction has 

been successfully performed.

 

1 Rhoads challenges only the rejection of claim 8, 

and does not challenge the rejection below of claims 1-7 or 

25. Appellant’s Br. at 3.

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4 IN RE: RHOADS

During prosecution of the ’709 Application, on November 22, 2011, the Examiner issued a final office action 

rejecting claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over 

U.S. Patent Publication 2009/0237546 to Bloebaum et. al. 

(“Bloebaum”) in view of U.S. Patent Publication

2007/0108287 to Davis (“Davis”)2 and in further view of 

U.S. Patent Publication 2003/0073412 to Meade 

(“Meade”). 

Bloebaum discloses a system in which a cell phone 

captured image of a device is sent to a server for identification, after which the server returns to the cell phone a 

series of possible actions or tasks that may be performed 

on or with that device. Bloebaum at ¶ 56. The user can 

then select an action or task, causing the server to return 

to the cell phone a list of steps or actions required to 

complete the task. For example, Figure 4 of Bloebaum 

depicts an embodiment wherein the user (1) took a picture 

of car tire, (2) the server returned a series of tasks such as 

“change the tire, check tire inflation, etc.,” (3) the user 

selected “change the tire,” and (4) the server returns a list 

of tasks associated with changing a tire that are displayed 

on the user’s cell phone (e.g. “Remove jack from trunk,” 

“Loosen lugnuts [sic]”). See Bloebaum at ¶¶ 69-70. 

 

2 Appellant and ’709 Application co-inventor Geoffrey B. Rhoads is one of the named inventors of Davis.

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Bloebaum, Fig. 4.

Bloebaum describes other examples of “objects” that 

Bloebaum’s system can identify by various means and 

provide instructions for, including a faucet, a cake (i.e. to 

provide baking instructions), and a car radio or other 

appliance. See Bloebaum at ¶¶ 64-66, 73-74. Bloebaum 

however does not disclose sending information from a cell 

phone to a device to control the device, instead relying on

the user to complete the tasks. Bloebaum also does not 

disclose signaling to the user that an action performed on 

a device has been successfully completed. 

For those features of claim 8, the Examiner relied on 

Davis and Meade. Davis discloses a system in which a 

reader device (such as a camera-equipped phone) uses 

images or other digital watermark information to identify 

a device, receive control instructions for the device from a 

server, and then remotely control the device with instructions issued by the reader device. See Davis at ¶¶ 97-99. 

Meade discloses a system in which a mobile computing 

device, such as a cell phone or PDA, can be used to reCase: 15-1972 Document: 29-2 Page: 5 Filed: 05/04/2016
6 IN RE: RHOADS

motely control various other devices. See Meade at Abstract. The cell phone in Meade stores content (e.g. music 

or video files) and user preferences about a device (e.g.

favorite TV or radio stations) that can be manually or 

automatically transmitted to and from devices (such as a

TV or radio) via a wireless connection between them. See 

e.g. Meade at ¶¶ 31-35. 

The Examiner further found that a person of ordinary 

skill would be motivated to modify Bloebaum to receive 

electronic device control instructions per Davis, and 

transmit electronic device control instructions per Meade, 

thereby providing a system in which a cell phone could be 

used to control various appliances. The Examiner also 

reasoned that “the combination of Bloebaum with Davis 

and Meade as described is a combination of known elements by known methods with no change in respective 

function, and the combination would have yielded nothing 

more than predictable results.” J.A. 125.

Rhoads appealed the final rejection of claim 8 to the 

Board, providing three reasons they believed the Examiner’s findings were wrong. First, Rhoads argued that the 

“instruction” limitation in claim 8 requires that the “instruction” is a command sent to and executed by the 

external device, whereas the “instruction” in Bloebaum is 

performed manually by the user. Second, Rhoads argued 

that Bloebaum failed to teach the “signaling” limitations

(i.e. limitations [c] and [d]) because Bloebaum did not 

disclose two different fashions of signaling indicating that 

an instruction was pending or performed. Finally, Rhoads 

took issue with the Examiner’s explanation for the reason 

to combine the references, arguing that Meade alone met 

the “stated ambition” provided by the Examiner and thus 

there would be no need to combine Meade with the other 

references. Rhoads also argued that the Examiner’s 

recitation that “the combination involves known elements, 

with no change in function, and with nothing more than 

predictable results” was unsupported by facts. 

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IN RE: RHOADS 7

The Board however adopted and affirmed the Examiner’s findings and reasoning on claim 8 without further 

explanation. J.A. 005. On request for rehearing, the 

Board rejected Rhoads’ contention that Bloebaum failed to 

teach the “signaling” limitations of claim 8 (i.e. elements 

[c] and [d]), finding no error in the Examiner’s holding

that Bloebaum, Davis, and Meade met those limitations. 

J.A. 012. This appeal followed, and we have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Board’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo 

and its findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 

1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Gartside, 203 

F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Substantial evidence is 

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion. See In re Applied 

Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

“[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions 

from the evidence does not prevent an administrative 

agency’s finding from being supported by substantial 

evidence.” Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 

U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).

With respect to claim construction, intrinsic evidence 

and the ultimate construction of the claim are reviewed 

de novo. See Teva Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. v. 

Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). Underlying 

factual determinations concerning extrinsic evidence are 

reviewed for substantial evidence. Id. In patent examinations, claims in an application are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the 

specification. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 

1990). 

While the ultimate determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a question of law, it is based on 

several underlying factual findings, including the differCase: 15-1972 Document: 29-2 Page: 7 Filed: 05/04/2016
8 IN RE: RHOADS

ences between the claimed invention and the prior art. 

See In re Baxter Int'l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 

2012) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 

(1966)). The scope and content of the prior art, and the 

existence of a reason for a person of ordinary skill to 

combine references, are determinations of fact that we 

review for substantial evidence. See In re Mouttet, 686 

F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Constr. Equip. Co., 

665 F.3d 1254, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Rhoads generally raises the same three 

arguments that were raised to the Board. The PTO responds that the Board’s conclusion that claim 8 would 

have been obvious is supported by substantial evidence 

and correct as a matter of law. As addressed below, we 

find Rhoads’ arguments unpersuasive and thus affirm the 

decision of the Board finding claim 8 obvious over the 

combination of Bloebaum, Davis, and Meade. 

A 

Rhoads argues that the “instruction[s]” in Bloebaum 

are instructions to the user about how to control a device

(e.g. instructions for changing a tire might begin with 

“Remove jack from trunk”). But according to Rhoads, the 

“instruction[s]” in claim 8 are defined as instructions to a 

device that control said device (e.g. an “increase temperature” instruction sent to a thermostat). Rhoads thus 

argues that Bloebaum cannot support a prima facie case 

of obviousness.

We disagree. Rhoads points to elements [b], [c], and 

[d] of the claims as evidencing a narrow construction of 

the term “instruction” that limits the “instruction” to only 

data that a device can execute. But a plain reading of 

element [b] suggests otherwise: “transmitting electronic 

information from the cell phone, destined for the device, 

to cause the device to execute said instruction.” The claim

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IN RE: RHOADS 9

language thus suggests that the “instruction” can be a 

more abstract construct used to represent control of a 

device (e.g. “turn up the volume,” “turn down the temperature,” etc.), which is then converted or instantiated into 

“electronic information” for transmission to the device. 

Nothing in the claim language requires or even suggests 

that the “instruction” is itself limited to the electronic 

information. 

Moreover, the specification broadly uses the term “instruction” to refer both to electronic commands sent to a 

device and to human-readable interface elements. Compare ’709 Application at ¶ 50 (“After the user has issued 

an instruction via the cell phone, the command is relayed 

to the thermostat as described above”) with ¶ 52 (“The 

server returns UI instructions, optionally with status 

information for that meter (e.g., time remaining; maximum allowable time). These data are displayed on the cell 

phone UI, e.g., overlaid on the captured image of the cell 

phone, together with controls/instructions for purchasing 

time”). Thus, the broadest reasonable construction, 

consistent with the specification, of the term “instruction” 

in claim 8 includes both electronic commands sent to a 

device and human-readable commands shown on a user

interface. 

With that understanding of “instruction,” we turn to 

Rhoads’ argument about Bloebaum. We agree with the 

PTO that Rhoads’ argument misconstrues the basis for 

the Examiner’s (and thus the Board’s) holding. The 

Examiner found that while Bloebaum disclosed receiving 

and displaying “instruction[s]” relating to a device, 

Bloebaum failed to disclose transmitting electronic information to the device to execute those “instruction[s].” 

Contrary to Rhoads’ argument however, that does not end 

the inquiry and require reversal, because the Examiner 

made clear that he relied on Davis and Meade for transmitting electronic information to the device to cause the 

device to execute the “instruction.” Rhoads does not 

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10 IN RE: RHOADS

appear to dispute that holding at least with respect to

Meade. See Appellant’s Br. at 23.3 Thus, Bloebaum’s lack 

of ability to transmit and execute “instructions” on a 

remote device does not undermine the Board’s conclusion.

B 

Rhoads argues that neither Bloebaum nor Meade discloses elements [c] or [d], which Rhoads refers to as the 

“signaling” limitations. Specifically, Rhoads argues that 

Bloebaum fails to disclose element [c], “signaling” to the 

user “in a first fashion while the instruction is pending,”4 

and Meade fails to disclose element [d], signaling to the 

user in a “second, different fashion” when the “instruction 

has been successfully performed.” 

With respect to Bloebaum and element [c], Rhoads 

simply asserts in a conclusory fashion that nothing in 

Bloebaum teaches that limitation but fails to provide any 

further argument or explanation. See Appellant’s Br. at 

 

3 Rhoads uses a somewhat misleading ellipsis to 

suggest that the Examiner conceded that Davis did not 

transmit electronic information to the device to cause the 

device to execute an instruction. See Appellant’s Br. at 22. 

That is not accurate. The Examiner found that Davis did 

disclose that function, but that Davis did not disclose 

signaling to the user that an instruction had been successfully performed. A123; see also Davis at ¶ 97 (“In applications where the object is a machine, the object reference 

may also facilitate remote control and remote updating of 

control instructions for the machine.”). 

4 Rhoads also argues that Bloebaum does not disclose element [d], which the PTO appears to concede by 

noting that the Board’s conclusion was based only on 

Bloebaum disclosing element [c]. Appellee’s Br. at 21-22.

We thus assume for the sake of argument that the Board 

relied on Bloebaum only for element [c].

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IN RE: RHOADS 11

18, 22. Assuming for the sake of argument that Rhoads 

did not waive this argument for failure to sufficiently

develop it on appeal,5 we would still affirm the Board’s 

holding on this point. The Examiner found this limitation 

met by Bloebaum’s disclosure that in response to the 

selection of a particular action from the displayed list of 

possible tasks, the server in Bloebaum will return to the 

cell phone a list of steps and/or items needed to complete 

the task, i.e. “instruction[s],” which are displayed to the 

user while the user is performing the task, i.e. while the 

“instruction” is pending. J.A. 191. Rhoads does not 

provide any explanation for why a reasonable mind might 

not accept as adequate this support for the conclusion 

that Bloebaum discloses element [c]. Thus, substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s finding with respect to 

Bloebaum and element [c].

Turning to element [d], Rhoads argues that Meade 

does not teach signaling to the user that an instruction

has been successfully performed. Rhoads agrees that 

Meade discloses two-way bi-directional communication 

between a cell phone and a device, but argues that Meade

fails to disclose a specific signal that an instruction to a 

device has been successfully executed. Appellant’s Reply 

Br. at 13. 

We disagree. As an initial matter, it is of course the 

case that a “reference must be considered not only for 

what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly 

suggests.” In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

(quoting In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179 (CCPA 1979)). 

 

5 See e.g. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex

Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding an 

argument waived because “mere statements of disagreement with the district court as to the existence of factual 

disputes do not amount to a developed argument.”)

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12 IN RE: RHOADS

Here, even Rhoads does not dispute that “[t]here’s no 

theoretical limit to the sorts of information that might be 

conveyed” by the bi-directional communications link in 

Bloebaum. We are thus skeptical of Rhoads’ suggestion 

that a skilled artisan in 2009 would not understand to 

implement a confirmation message when a remote command has been successfully executed, a common feature 

of two-way bi-directional computer communications long 

before the filing of the ’709 Application. See e.g. Christopher S. Yoo, Protocol Layering and Internet Policy, 161 U. 

Pa. L. Rev. 1707, 1743 (2013) (noting that the Internet’s 

primary transport protocol since 1983, “Transmission 

Control Protocol” or “TCP,” expects a confirmation message for every packet sent). After all, “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an 

automaton.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 

421 (2007). 

We find the disclosures in Meade sufficient to support 

the examiner’s conclusion. The Examiner found that 

Meade discloses embodiments where the cell phone shows 

the content available to be played on a device (e.g. a list of 

songs or videos), and further found that the cell phone can 

send an instruction to the remote device to play a particular piece of content. See e.g. Meade at ¶¶ 49, 70-71. 

Meade further discloses an embodiment where a user 

selects from their cell phone a radio program they wish to 

play on an audio device; if the program is not available, 

the cell phone informs the user when the program will be 

available. Id. at ¶ 61. We agree with the PTO that the 

disclosure in Meade would fairly suggest to one of skill in 

the art that “signals are sent between the cell phone and 

the device, and that the cell phone monitors performance 

by the device and receive [sic] signals regarding the 

same.” Appellee’s Br. at 22. Based on these disclosures, 

we conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s finding that Meade discloses element [d] of claim 

8.

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C 

Finally, Rhoads argues that the Board failed to articulate a sufficient reason to combine Bloebaum, Davis, and 

Meade. We disagree.

First, Rhoads points to the Examiner’s statement that 

a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been 

motivated to combine Bloebaum, Davis, and Meade and 

“thereby provid[e] an appliance control system in which a 

computing device is configured for controlling various 

appliances.” J.A. 125. Rhoads argues that this “stated 

ambition” is flawed because Meade alone is capable of 

that functionality, and thus, there would be no reason to 

combine Bloebaum with Meade and Davis. Rhoads’ 

argument however mischaracterizes the basis for the 

Examiner’s conclusion.

The Examiner found that a skilled artisan would be 

motivated to modify Bloebaum with Meade and Davis so 

that the instructions shown on the cell phone in 

Bloebaum could be transmitted as electronic information 

to a device to cause the device to execute the instructions 

(rather than the user having to manually execute the 

instructions). J.A. 193. Indeed, Meade itself teaches that 

remote control of electronic devices is advantageous and 

thus provides a motivation to combine Davis and Meade 

with Bloebaum. See e.g. Meade at ¶ 138 (“Foremost, a 

mobile computing device becomes the master of appliances in its environment, controlling content and user preferences”); see also In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002) (reason to combine references may be found 

within the references themselves). The phrase that 

Rhoads quotes as the “stated ambition” is simply a statement describing the system resulting from the combination, and not (as Rhoads contends) the Examiner’s sole 

explanation of the reason to combine Bloebaum with 

Davis and Meade.

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14 IN RE: RHOADS

Second, Rhoads takes issue with the Examiner’s finding that “the combination of Bloebaum with Davis and 

Meade as described is a combination of known elements 

by known methods with no change in respective function, 

and the combination would have yielded nothing more 

than predictable results.” Rhoads argues in response to 

this statement that because the third and fourth claim 

elements are missing from the cited art, the art cannot be 

combined in the proposed fashion. Appellant’s Br. at 33. 

As we have upheld the Board’s holding that the prior art 

discloses each element of claim 8, we reject this argument

as well. 

Third, Rhoads argues that it would be impossible to 

modify Bloebaum with Davis and Meade because 

Bloebaum is limited to physical or manual control of 

devices. We disagree. Rhoads’ argument is based on an 

overly narrow reading of Bloebaum’s disclosure. The fact 

that Bloebaum discloses (as one example) instructions for 

fixing a faucet does not limit the disclosure of Bloebaum 

to only devices susceptible to manual control, because it is 

clear that Bloebaum “fairly suggests” more than that. See 

Baird, 16 F.3d at 383. Bloebaum consistently refers to 

the devices for which it provides instructions with the 

generic term “object,” indicating that the invention is not 

limited in the manner suggested by Rhoads. See e.g.

Bloebaum at Figure 1 & ¶ 49 (“Using the camera 13, the 

user of the wireless telephone 10 captures an image of an 

object 40”). For example, Bloebaum discloses providing 

instructions for control of a car radio (id. at ¶ 73), which is 

exactly the kind of electronic device that would be compatible with the Davis or Meade systems. See e.g. Davis at 

¶ 97 (“Consider examples where the object is a robot, 

portable or desktop computer, consumer electronic device 

(e.g., television, stereo component, etc.), telephone, embedded computer on board a vehicle or some other machine, appliance, etc.”) (emphasis added); Meade at ¶ 26 

(“An appliance control system of the present invention 

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IN RE: RHOADS 15

enables a mobile computing device, such as a personal 

digital assistant, to control appliances like televisions, 

radios, printers, etc.”) (emphasis added).

Therefore, we find that substantial evidence supports 

the Board’s conclusion that a skilled artisan would be 

motivated to combine Bloebaum, Davis, and Meade to 

achieve the invention of claim 8.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we affirm the Board’s conclusion that claim 8 would have been obvious over Bloebaum 

in light of Davis and Meade. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs.

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