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Parties Involved:
District of Columbia
Appellee
Melvin Yates
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided April 11, 2003

No. 02-7127

MELVIN YATES,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

–————

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(00cv0208)

–————

On Motion for Summary Affirmance and

Motion for Summary Reversal

–————

Karl W. Carter, Jr. was on the motion for summary reversal for appellant.

Arabella W. Teal, Interim Corporation Counsel, Charles L.

Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and James C. McKay,

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-7127 Document #743528 Filed: 04/11/2003 Page 1 of 4
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Jr., Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on the motion for summary affirmance for appellees.

Before: RANDOLPH, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: This case is here on cross-motions for summary disposition. Melvin Yates brought this appeal pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) from an order of a magistrate judge

dismissing his complaint against the District of Columbia, and

others. See Yates v. District of Columbia, 224 F. Supp. 2d 68

(D.D.C. 2002). The complaint alleged that Yates had been

employed as a guidance counselor in a public school, that his

performance was not properly rated, and that he was wrongly

terminated for incompetence. His termination, Yates

claimed, ‘‘violated his constitutional rights to due process and

was a taking of property without due process of law.’’ The

complaint invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which, together with its

jurisdictional implementation (28 U.S.C. § 1343), treats the

District of Columbia as a State and gives the district courts

jurisdiction over civil actions to ‘‘redress the deprivation,

under color of any State law, TTT of any right, privilege or

immunity secured by the Constitution of the United

StatesTTTT’’ See Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir.

1994).

The case presents a few procedural tangles. Although the

parties do not complain, the magistrate judge did not set

forth the judgment on a separate document as Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 58 requires. Recent amendments to the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, not in effect when this

appeal was taken, make clear that such a violation of Rule 58

will not affect the validity of an appeal from that judgment or

order. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)(B). This is essentially the

result the Supreme Court reached in Bankers Trust Co. v.

Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978) (per curiam), for non-conforming

judgments, when–as here–the appellee does not object. See

Diamond v. McKenzie, 770 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per

curiam). We therefore have appellate jurisdiction. The next

problem arises from the magistrate judge’s ordering the

action dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter

USCA Case #02-7127 Document #743528 Filed: 04/11/2003 Page 2 of 4
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jurisdiction, on the grounds that Yates had no property right

in continued employment and suffered no deprivation of

property without due process. 224 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71.

Despite the magistrate judge’s description, her ruling did not

rest on lack of jurisdiction. It was a decision on the merits.

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), established that even

meritless claims are to be dismissed on the merits rather than

for lack of jurisdiction. There is yet another problem. The

defendants had moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

pursuant to Rule 12(b), FED. R. CIV. P. (or in the alternative,

for summary judgment). But Rule 12(b) was inapplicable:

the defendants had already answered the complaint. The

motion therefore should have been for judgment on the

pleadings under Rule 12(c). A further problem arose when

the parties submitted, and the magistrate judge considered,

matters outside the pleadings. This had the effect of converting the Rule 12 motion, whether it was under Rule 12(b)(6) or

Rule 12(c), into a motion for summary judgment. The resulting order therefore must be treated as a grant of summary

judgment under Rule 56, although the magistrate judge treated the motion for summary judgment as moot, 224 F. Supp.

2d at 72. See Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 708 (D.C.

Cir. 1977).

This brings us to the merits of the appeal. Yates maintains

that he had a property interest in continued employment

arising from the school board’s evaluation procedures. See

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–79 (1972); Washington Teachers’ Union v. Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 774, 779–80

(D.C. Cir. 1997). But even if he did, he suffered no deprivation of substantive due process. ‘‘[O]nly the most egregious

official conduct’’ rises to the level of a substantive due process

violation. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846

(1998); see City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community

Hope Found., No. 01–1269, 2003 WL 1477301, at *7 (U.S.

Mar. 25, 2003); Tri County Indus., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Silverman v. Barry,

845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Yates claims the school

board acted irrationally and arbitrarily in evaluating his job

performance, in disciplinary actions against him, and in termiUSCA Case #02-7127 Document #743528 Filed: 04/11/2003 Page 3 of 4
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nating his employment. But the record is to the contrary.

All that appears is a ‘‘rational connection’’ between the school

board’s actions and its legitimate interest in providing students a competent educational staff. Harrah Indep. Sch.

Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198–99 (1979); see Comm. of

U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,

943–44 (D.C. Cir. 1988). We see nothing in the record that

amounts to abusive executive action of constitutional proportions. See County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8. Yates

pursued his claim through several steps of the grievance

procedure but when a hearing was scheduled, he did not show

up. The hearing went forward, his union presumably represented him nonetheless and lost. Yates reached the end of

the administrative line, although he was absent from the final

step. Our decision rejecting Yates’ substantive due process

claim will therefore be on the merits, compare Tri County,

104 F.3d at 460, as in actuality was the magistrate judge’s

decision.

In opposing summary disposition Yates may also have been

thinking that he suffered a lack of procedural due process.

But the collective bargaining agreement between the Board

of Education and the Washington teachers’ union contained

grievance procedures incorporating the basic elements of

constitutional due process: notice and the opportunity to be

heard. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Yates

simply failed to take advantage of all the process due him.

Furthermore, the complaint contains no allegation that the

grievance procedures were inadequate and Yates did not raise

such a claim before the magistrate judge. See Marymount

Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

We therefore affirm on the ground that there were no

genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants were

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Jenkins v.

Washington Convention Ctr., 236 F.3d 6, 8 n.3 (D.C. Cir.

2001).

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