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Parties Involved:
Alexander Kluball
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐2087

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ALEXANDER KLUBALL,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 15‐cr‐124 — James D. Peterson, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 13, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

FEINERMAN, District Judge.

*

FEINERMAN, District Judge. Alexander Kluball was sen‐

tenced to 120 months’ imprisonment for transporting a 17‐

year‐old girl across state lines with the intent that she engage

in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421. The only issue

                                                  * Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

Case: 16-2087 Document: 21 Filed: 12/13/2016 Pages: 8
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on appeal is whether the district court violated Kluball’s due

process right to be sentenced based on accurate information

by finding that his mental health history suggested that fur‐

ther treatment would be unlikely to have a “lasting impact”

on his ability to refrain from further criminal conduct. There

was no due process violation, and so the district court’s judg‐

ment is affirmed.

In pleading guilty, Kluball admitted that he drove to Ten‐

nessee to pick up a 17‐year‐old girl he had met on Facebook,

brought her to his apartment in Wisconsin, advertised her

online for sex acts, and escorted her to several prostitution en‐

gagements in the Madison area. The probation office calcu‐

lated an advisory guidelines range of 121 to 151 months’ im‐

prisonment, but because the statutory maximum under

§ 2421 is ten years, Kluball’s advisory guidelines term became

120 months. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) (“Where the statutorily

authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of

the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized

maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”).

The presentence investigation report provided the only

factual information before the district court regarding

Kluball’s mental health history. The report chronicled

Kluball’s struggle with mental illness and associated behav‐

ioral problems since early childhood. His diagnoses included

oppositional defiant disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder, bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and

depression. Kluball received counseling and was hospitalized

several times, and he was treated with an array of drugs, in‐

cluding Adderall, Depakote, Eskalith, Fluoxetine, lithium,

Prozac, Remeron, Ritalin, Seroquel, Strattera, Valium, Zoloft,

Zydis, and Zyprexa. None of the treatments succeeded, at

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No. 16‐2087 3

least for very long. Kluball was kicked out of twenty‐one day‐

care facilities as a child, expelled from high school, discharged

from the military with an other‐than‐honorable discharge due

to misconduct, and fired from multiple jobs due to various

transgressions. Kluball threatened to kill his parents with a

baseball bat as a child, threatened to stab his foster parents

and to attack his foster brother with a meat cleaver as a teen‐

ager, and threatened others with a concealed weapon as an

adult.

Kluball did not object to the presentence report’s descrip‐

tion of his mental health history or offer evidence to under‐

mine or augment it. The district court adopted the report’s

findings at sentencing, as it was entitled to do. See United

States v. Sonsalla, 241 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2001). The court

imposed the guidelines term of 120 months. In so doing, the

court remarked:

I think the bottom line here is that when I

look at the records of Mr. Kluball’s troubles,

there is no diagnosis of a mental illness here that

really relieves Mr. Kluball of responsibility. He

is a person who is upsettable, is sometimes vio‐

lent. He’s defiant. And all of these things are dif‐

ficulties and maybe things that are amenable to

some kind of treatment, but I don’t see any di‐

agnosis here that really makes me feel like I

should consider Mr. Kluball’s culpability for

this very calculating kind of criminal act that he

committed here to be alleviated. He’s responsi‐

ble for what he did despite the fact that he has a

history of problems that may involve mental

health issues.

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The bottom line here is that Mr. Kluball has

proven himself to be very dangerous. Even after

these things came to light, he’s posting pictures

on Facebook showing his guns. He’s manifestly

at risk of self‐harm. But if we were to look at this

pattern here and find Mr. Kluball’s fascination

with guns and his defiant behavior, I think

you’d have to conclude, as I do, that he really is

a dangerous person and that the protection of

the public is a factor that has to drive the sen‐

tence in a significant way.

... [T]he bottom line here is that not only is

he dangerous, I think his history suggests that

there is no structure or treatment that realisti‐

cally suggests that it’s going to have any ... last‐

ing impact on Mr. Kluball’s ability to conform

himself to, let alone lawful behavior, just safe

behavior. I think that—I’m left only with the

conclusion that there is only incarceration

which provides the kind of level of structure

that Mr. Kluball can succeed in and that keeps

the public safe.

As Kluball acknowledges, a sentencing judge may con‐

sider whether mental health treatment will succeed in reduc‐

ing the defendant’s dangerousness or propensity to commit

further crimes. The governing statute, in fact, requires the

judge to consider “the need for the sentence imposed ... to

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). As we have explained, “incapacitation

(physically preventing the defendant from committing crimes

on ‘the outside,’ by imprisoning him) is an authorized factor

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No. 16‐2087 5

for a judge to consider in determining the length of a prison

sentence.” United States v. Kubeczko, 660 F.3d 260, 262 (7th Cir.

2011) (citing § 3553(a)(2)(C)). This is so even if the defendant’s

difficulties refraining from criminal conduct result from men‐

tal illness. See ibid. (rejecting the proposition that “there is any

impropriety in lengthening a sentence because of concern—

whether based on mental illness, addiction, or anything else

that may weaken a person’s inhibitions against committing

crimes—that the defendant is likely to commit further crimes

upon release”); United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785, 793 (7th

Cir. 2007) (“In this case, there is evidence that [the defendant]

was being treated for mental illness at the time he committed

his crimes, and so the court may determine that the only way

to truly incapacitate [the defendant] is a heavy prison sen‐

tence.”). True, a sentencing judge may find a defendant’s

mental illness to be a mitigating rather than an aggravating

factor, or both mitigating and aggravating. See United States

v. Annoreno, 713 F.3d 352, 358 (7th Cir. 2013); Miranda, 505 F.3d

at 792. But the degree to which mental illness is deemed miti‐

gating or aggravating, and the weight accorded that factor,

lies within the sentencing judge’s broad discretion. See United

States v. Warner, 792 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Ultimately,

it falls on the district court to weigh and balance the various

factors and to make an individualized assessment based on

the facts presented.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);

United States v. Beier, 490 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The

statute does not attach weights to these factors, thus leaving

the sentencing judge with enormous latitude ... .”).

Although Kluball does not dispute these principles, he

contends that the record at sentencing did not permit the dis‐

trict court to conclude that “his history suggests that there is

no structure or treatment that realistically suggests that it’s

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going to have any ... lasting impact on [his] ability to conform

himself to ... lawful behavior ... .” This flaw in the district

court’s reasoning, Kluball says, violated his due process

rights.

“A convicted defendant has a due process right to be sen‐

tenced on the basis of accurate information.” United States v.

Melendez, 819 F.3d 1006, 1012 (7th Cir. 2016). Additionally,

“due process requires that sentencing determinations be

based on reliable evidence, not speculation or unfounded al‐

legations.” United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 394, 400 (7th Cir.

2010); see also United States v. England, 555 F.3d 616, 622 (7th

Cir. 2009). To show a violation of this right, “a defendant must

demonstrate that the information before the court was inac‐

curate and that the court relied on this inaccurate infor‐

mation.” United States v. Katalinich, 113 F.3d 1475, 1484 (7th

Cir. 1997).

Kluball does not and cannot make that showing. The facts

set forth in the presentence report amply support the district

court’s conclusion that treatment is unlikely to have a “lasting

impact” on Kluball’s ability to refrain from criminal conduct.

Kluball has been hospitalized every few years throughout his

life and treated with various medications; he has received

counseling; and he has spent time in various structured envi‐

ronments, including special education classes, juvenile deten‐

tion, and the military. Despite these many medical and envi‐

ronmental interventions, Kluball has consistently engaged in

dangerous and unlawful behavior. It was well within rea‐

son—and certainly not an abuse of discretion—for the district

court to take Kluball’s history into account and draw the con‐

clusion that further mental health treatment is unlikely to suc‐

ceed in enabling him to conform to societal norms.

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No. 16‐2087 7

Kluball is wrong to liken this case to Bradley and England,

where the district judges engaged in impermissible specula‐

tion when imposing sentence. In Bradley, the sentencing judge

“made a prediction about future conduct based on rank spec‐

ulation about other, multiple instances of deviant behavior”

of which there was no record evidence. 628 F.3d at 401. In Eng‐

land, the sentencing judge’s “unsupported speculation” was

that the defendant would have committed the crime of at‐

tempted murder had he been released on bond. 555 F.3d at

623.

The district court here engaged in no such speculation. To

the contrary, the court’s finding that treatment was unlikely

to have a “lasting impact” on Kluball was reasonably based

on the fact, which he does not dispute, that he has throughout

his life suffered from mental illness, endangered those around

him, and engaged in criminal conduct, notwithstanding his

being afforded mental health treatment and placed in struc‐

tured environments. Sentencing routinely requires the judge

to make predictions about the defendant’s future conduct

and, in particular, his ability to lead a law‐abiding life. See

United States v. Boroczk, 705 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Nei‐

ther the district court nor the various doctors who testified or

provided input at sentencing were blessed with a crystal ball

to predict [the defendant’s] future behavior. In the absence of

such certainty, the district court simply weighed the evidence

before it and concluded that the risk of future crimes was a

factor in favor of a lengthy sentence.”); United States v. Neary,

552 F.2d 1184, 1193 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that “evaluation of

the character of the defendant and a prediction of future con‐

duct [are] matters which are traditionally left to wide discre‐

tion of a sentencing court”). Such predictions do not violate

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due process where, as here, they reasonably follow from ac‐

curate information in the sentencing record. See United States

v. Lucas, 670 F.3d 784, 792–93 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a due

process claim comparable to the claim brought here); United

States v. Morales, 655 F.3d 608, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).

AFFIRMED

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