Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01228/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01228-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Association of Local Television Stations, Inc.
Amicus Curiae for Petitioner
Federal Communications Commission
Appellee
National Association of Broadcasters
Amicus Curiae for Petitioner
Newspaper Association of America
Amicus Curiae for Petitioner
Tribune Company
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 31, 1997 Decided January 16, 1998 

No. 97-1228

TRIBUNE COMPANY,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

________

Consolidated with

No. 97-1229

________

Appeals from Orders of the 

Federal Communications Commission

________

Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for appellant, with 

whom Mark D. Schneider, Katherine L. Adams, Gary D. 

Mitchell, and Charles J. Sennet were on the briefs.

Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, Federal 

Communications Commission, argued the cause for appellee, 

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with whom William E. Kennard, General Counsel at the time 

the brief was filed, and C. Grey Pash, Jr., Counsel, were on 

the brief.

John F. Sturm, Richard E. Wiley, James R. Bayes, James 

J. Popham, Henry L. Baumann, and Jack N. Goodman were 

on the brief for amici curiae Association of Local Television 

Stations, Inc., et al.

Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE, and GARLAND, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Appellant challenges the Federal Communication Commission's refusal to grant it a permanent waiver, or at least a temporary waiver pending 

the outcome of future rulemaking, of its daily newspaper 

cross-ownership rule. We affirm.

I.

Tribune Company, which publishes the Sun-Sentinel newspaper in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, agreed to merge with 

Renaissance Communications Corporation, the owner of six 

television station licenses, including WDZL(TV) in Miami, 

Florida,1subject to the FCC's approval of the transfer of 

those licenses to Tribune. The Commission, however, determined that WDZL's Grade A contour 2

encompassed the 

entire Fort Lauderdale community; therefore, WDZL and 

the Sun-Sentinel were in the same primary market, and the 

daily newspaper cross-ownership rule prohibited their common ownership. The Commission nevertheless granted Trib-

__________

1 The other stations are: KTXL(TV), Sacramento, CA; WTICTV, Hartford, CT; WXIN(TV), Indianapolis, IN; WPMT(TV), 

York, PA; and KDAF(TV), Dallas, TX.

2 Grade A contour is a measure of signal field strength. The 

Commission has said that the boundary of the Grade A contour is 

set where a good picture may be expected to be available for at 

least 90% of the time at the best 70% of receiver locations. See 

Clarksburg Publ'g Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 516 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 

1955).

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une a temporary waiver of its rule, which allowed Tribune to 

take possession of the WDZL station license (the merger was 

consummated on March 25, 1997). But it required that 

Tribune divest itself of that license or the Sun-Sentinel

before March 22, 1998, one year from the date of the FCC's 

order.

The relevant portion of the Commission's daily newspaper 

cross-ownership rule provides that "[n]o license for [a] ... TV 

broadcast station shall be granted to any party ... if such 

party directly or indirectly owns, operates or controls a daily 

newspaper and the grant of such license will result in [t]he 

Grade A contour of a TV station ... encompassing the entire 

community in which such newspaper is published." 47 C.F.R. 

§ 73.3555(d)(3) (1996). The Commission has explained that 

its rule rests on the twin goals of promoting viewpoint 

diversity and economic competition. See Multiple Ownership 

of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second 

Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1074 (1975). Its constitutionality was unanimously upheld by the Supreme Court in 

FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting 

(NCCB), 436 U.S. 775 (1978). The Court observed that under 

the Act's public interest standard, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 

309(a) (1994), it was well within the Commission's domain to 

pursue "the First Amendment goal of achieving 'the widest 

possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' " NCCB, 436 U.S. at 795 (quoting Associated 

Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). It held that in 

light of the "physical scarcity," id. at 799, of the broadcast 

spectrum, the rule did not violate the First Amendment 

rights of newspaper owners because "there is no 'unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the 

right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.' " Id.

(citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 

(1969)). Nor did it matter that the administrative record 

before the Commission did not conclusively establish that the 

rule would in fact increase viewpoint diversity in the local 

communications market; the agency's predictive judgment 

was enough because it was based on its expert knowledge. 

NCCB, 436 U.S. at 796-97.

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Tribune acknowledged that the FCC's cross-ownership rule 

would prohibit it from owning both media outlets. But it 

argued before the Commission that the South Florida mass 

media market, encompassing Dade (Miami), Broward (Ft. 

Lauderdale), and Palm Beach counties, was sufficiently diverse and competitive so as to obviate any need to apply the 

rule in this case. Tribune identified 23 separately owned 

television stations, 69 radio stations operated by 49 different 

owners, 7 daily newspapers published by 6 different owners, 

15 weekly community newspapers, and in excess of 250 

magazines, specialty publications, and consumer journals all 

serving the South Florida market. It counted 35 cable 

systems providing an average of 62 channels of programming 

in the market, and claimed that cable television subscription 

rates in each county was above 60%. It showed that approximately 85% of all households owned a VCR; it also speculated that many had access to the Internet. And, in light of 

certain advertising, subscription, and audience share data, it 

argued that the rule clearly was not needed to encourage 

economic competition. Tribune claimed that the public would 

be disserved by strict enforcement of the rule, because it 

could exploit synergies arising from the common ownership of 

both print and broadcast news departments to enhance programming so as to compete more effectively with other South 

Florida news programs. For these reasons, Tribune sought a 

permanent waiver of the rule.

The Commission was unpersuaded. Its established waiver 

policy, set forth in the FCC's 1975 Second Report and Order, 

provides in relevant part that the Commission will consider 

waiving the rule "where, for whatever reason, the purposes of 

the rule would be disserved by divestiture." In re Applications of Stockholders of Renaissance Communications Corp. 

and Tribune Co. (Renaissance Communications), FCC 

97-98, 1997 WL 131036 at ¶ 34 (Mar. 21, 1997). As broad as 

this language may appear, the Commission has consistently 

interpreted it to allow for waiver only in "exceptional circumstances." Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC,

46 F.3d 1154, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1995). A permanent waiver of 

the rule has been granted only twice. In both instances, the 

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beneficiary was permitted to reacquire a media outlet in 

financial distress; in effect, the Commission granted waivers 

to permit a rescue.3 According to the FCC, Tribune failed to 

show the sort of extraordinary circumstances that would meet 

this test. Even if Tribune were correct in asserting there 

were a number of competing media voices in the South 

Florida market, the FCC believed its primary concern of 

ensuring diverse viewpoints from antagonistic sources was 

unaffected. The Commission thought Tribune's economic 

competition evidence similarly unexceptional. And, the public 

benefits Tribune promised were hardly unique; they would 

exist in virtually all like combinations. If a waiver were 

granted on that basis, the rule would be meaningless.

The Commission determined that to the extent Tribune 

called into question the validity of the rule itself or the FCC's 

waiver policy, its arguments should be addressed in the 

broader context of a rulemaking; they were inappropriate in 

a restricted licensing proceeding. Presumably anticipating 

this response, appellant asked, in the alternative, that it be 

granted, in effect, a temporary waiver until such time as the 

Commission completed a rulemaking proceeding to review its 

cross-ownership rule or its waiver policy in light of the 

changes Tribune identified (which would have extended for a 

longer period than the temporary waiver it was ultimately 

granted). The FCC declined, apparently because it thought 

such action would be inconsistent with prior practice and 

because Knight-Ridder, Inc., publisher of the Miami Herald

(which competes with the Sun-Sentinel), was opposed. See 

Renaissance Communications at ¶¶ 56 n.50, 57.

In response to appellant's claim that the cross-ownership 

rule was unconstitutional as applied to Tribune, the FCC 

pointed to NCCB and the viewpoint diversity rationale that 

case endorsed. Tribune implored the FCC to consider 

whether the scarcity rationale underlying that decision was 

still valid in light of the proliferation of media sources, but the 

Commission declined, noting that "nothing in the subsequent 

__________

3 The Commission explained that even temporary waivers of 

the kind Tribune received are granted in "relatively rare circumstances." Renaissance Communications at ¶ 44 n.34.

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decisions of the courts" suggested that the rule was unconstitutional. Renaissance Communications at ¶ 51. We agreed 

to hear Tribune's appeal on an expedited basis so that 

Tribune would have time to effect an orderly divestiture in 

the event of an adverse decision.

II.

The Commission's primary objections to appellant's case 

are jurisdictional. The Commission contends that because 

the Communications Act only allows applicants whose license 

transfer application is denied to appeal one of its orders in 

our court, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(3) (1994), and it granted Tribune's application (albeit subject to condition), we must dismiss 

Tribune's appeal. Even were we to determine that that 

section is not a bar to the appeal, Tribune, the Commission 

also argues, failed to comply with the FCC's administrative 

exhaustion requirement set forth in its rules. See 47 C.F.R. 

§ 1.110 (1996).

We start with the statute. In Mobile Communications 

Corporation of America v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir.), 

cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 81 (1996), we decided that when the 

Commission grants an application subject to some condition 

which the applicant did not request, the application has been 

denied for purposes of § 402(b). In that case, the applicant, 

Mtel, had sought a license that would have been awarded 

without charge under then-applicable law. Before the FCC 

ruled on Mtel's application, Congress amended the Communications Act to require that successful applicants pay for their 

licenses, so the Commission imposed a charge. We said that 

Mtel's application was properly viewed as being for a free

license rather than a license subject to any condition. By 

awarding a license subject to a condition of payment, the 

FCC in effect denied that application.

The Commission would have us limit Mobile Communications to those instances where there has been a change in law 

while an application is pending, but we do not see why that is 

a principled distinction. We were concerned generally that 

by "interpreting an application as one for a license subject to 

any condition of the Commission's choosing [we] would permit 

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the Commission to foreclose judicial review of a de facto 

denial by couching its decision as an approval subject to some 

intolerable condition." Mobile Communications, 77 F.3d at 

1404. Here, Tribune sought to acquire control of the WDZL 

license while being allowed to retain ownership of its SunSentinel newspaper on a permanent basis. The Commission's order does not permit it to do so. Tribune may hold 

both assets temporarily, but must divest itself of one of its 

media outlets before March 22, 1998. Therefore, Tribune's 

application was denied for purposes of § 402(b)(3).4

Turning to the more troublesome exhaustion argument, the 

Commission's rule provides, in pertinent part:

Where the Commission without a hearing grants any 

application in part, or with any privileges, terms, or 

conditions other than those requested ... the action ... 

shall be considered as a grant of such application unless 

the applicant shall ... reject[ ] the grant as made. 

[Where the applicant seeks reconsideration], the Commission will vacate its original action ... and set the 

application for hearing ... .

47 C.F.R. § 1.110 (1996). We have squarely held that "[t]he 

plain language of § 1.110 implies an exhaustion requirement" 

that "does not allow applicants first to accept a partial grant, 

yet later to seek reconsideration of its conditions." Central 

Television, Inc. v. FCC, 834 F.2d 186, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Tribune contends, drawing on the logic of Mobile Communications' holding, that § 1.110 is not applicable because its 

__________

4 Tribune comes before us as both appellant and petitioner, 

having appealed the Commission's order in case No. 97-1228 pursuant to § 402(b), and having petitioned for review of that order in 

case No. 97-1229 pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). As we have said 

before, "the provisions for judicial review contained in §§ 402(a) and 

402(b) are mutually exclusive," Friedman v. FCC, 263 F.2d 493, 494 

(D.C. Cir. 1959), so that a claim directed to the same matters may 

be brought only under one of the two provisions. See Freeman 

Eng'g Assocs. v. FCC, 103 F.3d 169, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Having 

decided that Mobile Communications establishes that § 402(b)(3) is 

the proper avenue of review when the Commission grants an 

application subject to an unasked for condition, we dismiss the 

petition in No. 97-1229.

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application was really denied. But § 1.110, unlike § 402(b), 

is written to specifically deal with a conditional grant and it 

could not be clearer that it covers the present case. Just 

because a partial grant is a denial for purposes of § 402(b)(3) 

does not mean that the same reasoning applies to § 1.110. 

Indeed, we said in Mobile Communications, 77 F.3d at 1404, 

that "a party whose license application has been denied by 

approval subject to conditions (other than ones requested by 

the applicant) must normally comply" with § 1.110. Requiring a party who wishes to protest a conditional grant to seek 

rehearing before the Commission does not jeopardize that 

applicant's rights to appeal as did the Commission's preMobile Communications construction of § 402(b)(3).

Tribune also argues that it would have been futile for it to 

have sought reconsideration in this case. We have recognized 

that § 1.110 does not bar review where appellant can show 

futility, Central Television, 834 F.2d at 191 n.11, although we 

have also cautioned that "[f]utility should not lightly be 

presumed." Washington Ass'n for Television and Children 

v. FCC, 712 F.2d 677, 682 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Mobile 

Communications, 77 F.3d at 1404, we said that the basic 

reason for § 1.110's exhaustion requirement was to protect 

"the Commission's interest in crystallizing its position prior to 

review." Of course it follows that reconsideration would be of 

no purpose if the Commission's position is already "crystallized." That conclusion is in accord with our decisions in 

Omnipoint Corporation v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 635 (D.C. Cir. 

1996), where we held that it would have been futile to raise an 

issue on rehearing under § 405 of the Communications Act 

where the FCC was "wedded" to its procedures and Chadmoore Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 113 F.3d 235, 239-40 

(D.C. Cir. 1997), where we seemed to suggest that reconsideration under that same section was futile because the Commission was firmly entrenched in its position (one judge disagreed on the facts, but did not challenge the principle).

On the other hand, in Action for Children's Television v. 

FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (the case upon which 

we relied in Central Television in establishing that § 1.110 

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contains a futility exception), we said that reconsideration 

would not be futile if a novel factual issue exists, or if an 

agency's views on a particular legal issue had not generally 

been made known. We thought the same thing in Noel 

Foods v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 1113, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1996), where 

the NLRB "betrayed no awareness" of an issue in its decision. In short, we think that Mobile Communications sums 

it up well; to show that reconsideration would have been 

futile, an appellant must show that the Commission has left 

no doubt about its position. It was suggested (but only at 

oral argument) that the exhaustion requirement, because it 

provides for a hearing before an ALJ, should be limited to 

those cases in which there is a factual dispute. Yet the 

Commission does not interpret its regulation in that manner 

and we see no reason why it should. It may not be apparent 

when an applicant wishes to challenge a condition whether 

factual evidence is needed or not. And even if only legal or 

policy arguments are presented, it surely is not inappropriate 

for the Commission to insist that the arguments be presented 

first to an ALJ, who would then present to the Commission a 

recommended decision. Accordingly, we are obliged to examine appellant's arguments and the Commission's treatment of 

them, both in this case and others, to determine whether it 

would have been futile for Tribune to have complied with the 

Commission's administrative exhaustion requirement. We 

must determine whether the FCC has taken a hard and fast 

position, or whether appellant had a decent chance of convincing the FCC on rehearing. Paradoxically, the more persuasive appellant's argument, the worse off it may be with 

respect to exhaustion.5

III.

Tribune essentially makes two arguments. It argues (with 

the support of amici Newspaper Association of America, 

__________

5 The Commission's counsel suggests that appellant's failure to 

comply with § 1.110 prevents us from reviewing any of Tribune's 

claims. But we think that if it would have been futile for Tribune to 

have sought reconsideration of any particular claim, that claim may 

be severed from the rest and heard.

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Association of Local Television Stations, and National Association of Broadcasters) that the "factual and legal foundations" 

supporting the daily newspaper cross-ownership rule have 

been irreparably shaken by the dramatic changes in the 

media marketplace over the last two decades. Since there 

has been a proliferation of media outlets, it can no longer be 

said that those outlets are scarce, and therefore the rule 

should no longer be applied to applicants, or at least not 

Tribune. Tribune alternatively claims that the Commission 

arbitrarily denied Tribune a procedural alternativea longer 

temporary waiverthat it had recently offered to a similarly 

situated applicant. We think that it would have been useless 

for Tribune to seek reconsideration of the former, but not the 

latter of those arguments.

* * * *

Tribune presents its dispute with the cross-ownership rule 

in three different forms: as a challenge to the rule, as a 

challenge to the Commission's waiver policy, and as an "as 

applied" challenge. But whichever way the argument is 

made, the Commission clearly and repeatedly demonstrated 

that it would apply its rule, as upheld by the Supreme Court 

in NCCB, in this adjudicatory license transfer proceeding; if 

the rule is to be reconsidered, it must be in a rulemaking 

proceeding. Renaissance Communications at ¶¶ 50, 51. It 

can hardly be said that Tribune had a realistic chance to 

convince the FCC otherwise on rehearing, and reconsideration, then, would have been futile. We therefore consider 

each variation of Tribune's argument.

First, it is claimed that the Commission is obliged to 

reconsider its cross-ownership rule or at least to not apply it 

in this case. The Commission, as we noted, refused to do so 

in the context of an adjudicatory licensing proceeding. Tribune (perhaps because of time constraints imposed by the 

merger) did not ask the Commission to initiate a new rulemaking procedure, so it can hardly appeal the Commission's 

refusal to do so. And it is hornbook administrative law that 

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lenge to a regulation, adopted pursuant to notice and comment, in an adjudication or licensing proceeding. See P.

STRAUSS, ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 657 

(9th ed. 1995) (agency is bound by its substantive rules unless 

validly amended or rescinded); Consumer Energy Council of 

Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (APA 

contemplates that a substantive rule would be amended or 

repealed by rulemaking under APA).

We have suggested (in dicta) that where an agency is 

confronted with an undisputable indication that its rule is 

illegal, either because of the reasoning of a Supreme Court 

decision or intervening legislation, it may be entitled, indeed 

obliged, to decline to apply it. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 

FCC (AT&T), 978 F.2d 727, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1993).6 Appellant 

would have us treat its claim as coming within the AT&T

exception because the legalitythe constitutionalityof the 

cross-ownership rule was based on the scarcity doctrine, and 

the Supreme Court has obliquely suggested it might reconsider that doctrine on the FCC's "signal ... that technological 

developments have advanced so far that some revision of the 

system of broadcast regulation may be required." FCC v. 

League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 n.11 (1984). That 

possibility is simply not in the same ballpark as a clear 

manifestation that the rule, without any further inquiry, is 

illegal. It may well be that faced with a rulemaking petition 

the FCC would be thought arbitrary and capricious if it 

refused to reconsider its rule in light of persuasive evidence 

that the scarcity rationale is no longer tenable. See American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 

1987); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 

Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).7

__________

6 We suggested in that unusual event the agency would presumably issue a notice of proposed revocation of the rulewhich 

would essentially go into effect immediately.

7 The scarcity doctrine has been the subject of "intense criticism," see, e.g., Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 

723, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J., dissenting from denial of 

rehearing en banc); many have questioned its continuing validity.

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And the Supreme Court's suggestion that it might reconsider 

the scarcity doctrine on the FCC's "signal" in League of 

Women Voters may impose an implicit obligation on the 

Commission. Congress, since 1987, expressly forbad the 

Commission (in appropriations legislation) from reconsidering 

its daily newspaper cross-ownership rule, but it has now 

directed the FCC to review all of its media ownership rules, 

including the one in question, at least biennially. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-104, § 202(h), 

110 Stat. 56, 111-12 (1996). Still, whether the Commission is 

obliged to reconsider its rule can be raised to this court only 

on review of a Commission denial of a rulemaking petition.

Appellant's next formulation is that the Commission was 

obligated to reconsider its waiver policy in the licensing 

proceeding. Appellant relies on two of our prior cases, 

Meredith Corporation v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 

and Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1992), in which 

we held that an FCC policy could be challenged in an 

adjudicatory or license proceeding. Appellant's difficulty is 

that its claim and supporting evidence calls into question not 

just the FCC's waiver policy, but the continuing validity of an 

underlying rationale justifying the cross-ownership rule itselfthe scarcity doctrine. As the Commission points out, if 

the FCC were to grant waivers on the grounds appellant 

suggests, virtually all like combinations would also be entitled 

to a waiver, and nothing would remain of the rule. Changes 

in the media marketplace are not unique to South Florida. 

Neither of the cases appellant relies upon involved an implicit 

attack on a rule adopted under the APA.

Finally, Tribune argues that the rule, as applied to Tribune, is unconstitutional. But the so-called "as applied" challenge is, like appellant's challenge to the FCC's waiver policy, 

really no different than a challenge to the rule. It is as 

apparent to us as it was to the Commission that Tribune is 

not presenting a unique "as applied" case. Again, the evidence Tribune presents is not particular to the South Florida 

market; most, if not all, of the country's media markets have 

experienced similar growth. In any event, in upholding the 

rule in NCCB, the Supreme Court did so by relying, in part, 

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on the Commission's predictive judgment, based on experience, that it was unrealistic to expect diversity from commonly owned entities. The Commission apparently is still wedded to that judgment, see Renaissance Communications at 

¶¶ 47, 51, and nothing in the subsequent decisions of the 

Court have called the constitutional validity of that judgment 

into question. Nor are we free to "reexamine the scarcity 

doctrine in this case on this record," as Tribune asks. The 

Supreme Court has told the lower federal courts in no 

uncertain terms that we are to leave the overruling of its 

opinions to the Court itself. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 

S. Ct. 275, 284 (1997); see also United States v. $639,558, 955 

F.2d 712, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1992). We are stuck with the 

scarcity doctrine until the day that the Supreme Court tells 

us that the Red Lion no longer rules the broadcast jungle.

* * * *

Tribune's second main argument, that the Commission 

behaved in an arbitrary and capricious manner by not staying 

the running of the divestiture period until a rulemaking to 

review the daily newspaper cross-ownership rule was completed, is its most compelling.8 Two Commissioners in fact 

endorsed this course of action in separate statements. As 

Tribune points out, the Commission previously followed a 

closely analogous course of action in In re Applications of 

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., and the Walt Disney Company, 11 

F.C.C.R. 5841 (1996). In that case, the FCC approved the 

transfer of a radio license to a company that owned a 

newspaper in the same primary market, subject to an order 

to divest one of the assets within a year. Appellant is, of 

course, subject to the same condition. Yet in Capital Cities,

the Commission at the same time began a review of its daily 

newspaper/radio cross-ownership waiver policy. See id. at 

5851; see also In the Matter of Newspaper/Radio Cross-

__________

8 We note that Tribune devoted only one paragraph in a 58 

page brief to making this argument, which barely survives our 

requirement that a parties' arguments be sufficiently developed lest 

waived.

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Ownership Waiver Policy, 11 F.C.C.R. 13003 (1996) (notice of 

inquiry seeking comment on that policy). When it became 

clear that the proceeding to reexamine the waiver policy 

would not be completed until after the 12 month period had 

expired, the Commission granted Disney's request to defer 

the divestiture date until six months from the issuance of the 

effective date of the FCC's action in that proceeding. The 

Commission apparently denied Tribune's request for what 

would be in effect a temporary waiver pending the outcome of 

a rulemaking concerning its daily newspaper/television crossownership rule in this case because such course of action 

would be somehow inconsistent with prior practice, Renaissance Communications at ¶ 57, and because Knight-Ridder, 

Tribune's competitor, opposed it. Id. at ¶ 56 n.50.

Unfortunately for appellant, we are foreclosed from considering its claim that the Commission's inconsistent treatment 

of the two cases reflects arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking, because we do not think that reconsideration of this 

specific challenge would have been futile. The Commission's 

answer as to why it granted a temporary waiver pending the 

completion of a rulemaking in Capital Cities, but did not in 

Tribune's case, seems inexplicable. We agree with appellant 

that the Commission "essentially ignored" this portion of 

Tribune's argument. We can only speculate why the Commission did not give this issue the care it deserved. It 

appears that before the FCC, as before us, Tribune did not 

make this claim its focus; Tribune directs us to only three 

pages of its approximately 400 page application to show that 

it made the argument before the Commission. Had Tribune 

sought reconsideration, the Commission's attention surely 

would have been squarely drawn to the issue. We thus, given 

the logic of appellant's argument and the FCC's inadequate 

response, do not see how we can conclude that reconsideration would have been futile.

We are not unsympathetic to Tribune's position. Amici

filed a petition for rulemaking seeking repeal of the daily 

newspaper cross-ownership rule (after the Commission's order in the Tribune proceeding). The government's counsel 

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told us at oral argument that the Commission plans, pursuant 

to the requirement imposed by the Telecommunications Act 

of 1996, to review its cross-ownership rule in the near future. 

But the Commission subsequently informed us that it does 

not expect a review to begin until the summer or the fall of 

1998. It seems a shame for Tribune not to be given the same 

relief as Disney in Capital Cities. Still, Tribune could have 

protected itself by seeking reconsideration. Or, had it filed a 

petition for rulemaking at the same time that it filed its 

transfer application, the Commission might have been more 

willing to consider Tribune's temporary waiver alternative. 

Tribune did not pursue either option, perhaps because, as the 

Commission suggests, to challenge the FCC's original decision would have jeopardized its merger agreement with Renaissance. Whatever Tribune's reason may have been, the 

Commission is entitled to preserve the "finality of its decisions." Central Television, 834 F.2d at 190-91.

* * * *

The Commission's order is affirmed. Tribune's petition for 

review in No. 97-1229 is denied, and the portion of its appeal 

for which reconsideration would not have been futile is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

So ordered.

USCA Case #97-1228 Document #323828 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 15 of 15