Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cr-00184/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cr-00184-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kyle Edwards
Defendant
Kyle Richard Edwards
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Kyle Richard Edwards,

Defendant.

No. CR-19-00184-001-TUC-JGZ (LCK)

ORDER 

Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Statements made to law enforcement 

officers. Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Lynette Kimmins’ Report and 

Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the District Court deny Defendant’s 

Motion. Defendant has filed an objection. After an independent review of the parties’ 

briefing and of the record, the Court concludes that Defendant was subjected to a 

custodial interrogation, but that after terminating the first interview, Defendant 

voluntarily re-engaged with law enforcement and waived his Miranda rights. The Court 

will therefore adopt Judge Kimmins’ recommendation to deny Defendant’s Motion to 

Suppress Statements in part, suppressing statements made in the first interview, but 

allowing all statements given after the Miranda warnings. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, this Court 

“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[T]he district judge must review 

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the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but 

not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 

banc) (emphasis omitted). District courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . 

. of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 

(1985). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 

1121; Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003). 

DISCUSSION

I. Background

The following facts are adopted from the R&R and reproduced here, with only 

slight addition or modification. Defendant Kyle Edwards is charged with distribution of 

child pornography and knowing access with intent to view child pornography. (Doc. 1.) 

Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent (SA) Jeffrey Armstrong learned that 

fifteen files qualifying as child pornography had been downloaded by an IP address 

associated with Defendant. (RT 10/3/19 at 8.)1

SA Armstrong obtained a search warrant for Defendant’s home, which was 

executed on May 31, 2016. (Id. at 10; Ex. 9.)2 Federal agents were accompanied by local

law enforcement wearing uniforms and tactical vests, and driving a marked patrol 

vehicles with lights activated. (RT 10/3/19 at 11-12, 56, 57.) Just as the warrant became 

valid at 6 a.m., SA Armstrong approached Defendant’s home with a Marana police 

officer and rang the doorbell twice. (Id. at 11, 12, 18.) There were between twelve and 

fifteen armed agents (plus four non-agents) present for execution for the warrant, and 

they arrived in approximately ten vehicles. (Id. at 17, 56, 61, 113.) They brought as 

many agents as possible to streamline the intensive search. (Id. at 17-18, 114-15.)

Defendant was startled awake by loud pounding, and he answered the front door. 

(RT 11/7/19 at 19.) He was wearing only shorts or boxer briefs. (Id. at 19-20.) SA 

1

“RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcripts of the evidentiary hearing, which the 

Court refers to by date. (Docs. 44, 58.)

2

 The cited exhibits were provided by the government and admitted at the hearing. 

The government’s exhibits duplicate all Defendant’s exhibits upon which the Court 

relies. (Docs. 54, 55.)

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Armstrong spoke with Defendant and informed him they had a warrant to search his 

home. (RT 10/3/19 at 20, 64, 87.) SA Armstrong detained Defendant and escorted him 

to the driveway while his roommate was located. (Id. at 21, 63; RT 11/7/19 at 20.) The 

“entry team” had their weapons drawn as they approached the house, but SA Armstrong’s 

weapon was holstered. (RT 10/3/19 at 20, 22.) Defendant saw a battering ram, about ten 

agents in full tactical gear including guns, and five or six police vehicles blocking the 

driveway. (RT 11/7/19 at 20, 21, 22.) Four agents entered to find Defendant’s 

roommate, Justin Losado. (Id.)

Losado testified he was awoken by armed agents at his bedroom door and told to 

get on the floor. (RT 10/3/19 at 98-99.) Losado recalled being kept on the living room 

couch in handcuffs for 20-40 minutes. (Id. at 99, 100, 102.) Subsequently, agents 

removed the handcuffs, he put on pants, and an agent took him to the back patio, where 

he was later interviewed. (Id. at 23-25, 64, 101; Ex. 15.) He had no contact with 

Defendant during this time period. (Id. at 103; RT 11/7/19 at 23.) SA Armstrong 

intentionally separated the occupants so they could not influence one another. (RT 

10/3/19 at 26.) Defendant was not left alone in his home while the warrant was being 

executed. (Id. at 65.) SA Robert McCarthy testified that, if a suspect is present at an 

unsecured search warrant scene, an agent will remain with him; he cannot roam around 

freely. (Id. at 117; RT 11/7/19 at 6-8, 11.) 

After being escorted to the driveway, and once law enforcement had located 

Losado, Defendant testified he was herded under escort to the master bathroom, passing 

Losado, who was wearing handcuffs. (RT 11/7/19 at 23, 25.) Defendant testified he was 

seated on the floor, while SAs Armstrong and McCarthy testified that Defendant sat on 

the edge of the tub. (Id. at 31, 118; RT 11/7/19 at 24.) SA Armstrong was leaning against 

the counter, and Defendant testified that the door to the six foot-by-six-foot room was 

essentially blocked by agents. (RT 10/3/19 at 31; RT 11/7/19 at 25, 27.) SA Katherine 

Gamble also was present. (Ex. 2 at 2.) Defendant remained in only his boxer shorts 

because no one offered to allow him to get dressed. (RT 10/3/19 at 65-66; RT 11/7/19 at 

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23, 26.) Defendant could hear a lot of activity happening outside the bathroom, but it 

was quiet inside the room. (RT 11/7/19 at 39-40.) Agents conducted Defendant’s 

interview in the bathroom in two parts, with a short break in-between.

a. First Set of Statements

The first recorded interview lasted just over thirty minutes, ending at 6:43 a.m. (Id.

at 44; Ex. 2 at 43.) Defendant was not informed of Miranda rights prior to questioning. 

(Ex. 2.) 

At the outset of the recorded interview, SA Armstrong spent 5 minutes asking

Defendant biographical questions, his phone number and email, occupation (HVAC 

technician), criminal history (essentially none), and education (completed 11th grade).

Defendant coherently answered the questions. (Ex. 2 at 2-8.) The agent then stated, 

“Like I told you, we received information about a child molestation complaint.”3 (Id. at 

9.) When Defendant asked whether the complaint pertained to him, the SA replied, “I 

don’t know. That’s why I’m here.” (Id. at 10.) Defendant agreed to keep speaking with 

the agents because, as he informed them, he wanted to know why they were in his home. 

(Id.) SA Armstrong then informed Defendant, “I’m telling you I don’t have an arrest 

warrant for you. Okay? You’re free to leave. Okay? But, we do have a search warrant,” 

and Defendant reiterated that he wanted to know whether the search warrant pertained to 

him or his roommate. (Id. at 11.) Before proceeding with questioning, SA Armstrong

again told Defendant that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. (Id. at 11-12; RT 

10/3/19 at 39-40.) Defendant stated that he understood he was not under arrest and 

acknowledged that he did not feel he was being held. (Ex. 2 at 12-13.) 

Defendant then answered several questions about his internet account and 

computer. (Ex. 2 at 18-21.) When SA Gamble asked how Defendant used his laptop, 

Defendant asked if she could be replaced with a male agent. (Id. at 21.) SA Gamble left 

and was replaced by SA McCarthy, who testified that he was not wearing a tactical vest. 

3

 The agent did not and does not have evidence that Defendant was suspected of 

molestation. (RT 10/3/19 at 59-60, 69.) 

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(RT 10/3/19 at 115.) Defendant testified that the door was closed after SA Gamble left 

the room and was not left open until he was released to go; audio reflects the door closing 

at that time. (Ex. 1; RT 11/7/19 at 32.)

Defendant told the agents that he used his laptop to look at pornography, and the 

agents asked him numerous questions about his searches, the material he looked at, and 

the computer used. (Ex. 2 at 22-33.) When SA Armstrong asked about Defendant’s 

phone, Defendant asked if he could text his boss to let him know he would be late. (Id. at 

34.) SA Armstrong acknowledged Defendant would need to get to work and stated, “in 

just a minute” and “we’ll probably be done shortly.” (Id.) Defendant was in possession 

of his boss’s keys and he was concerned and embarrassed that his boss might show up 

while the police were present. (RT 11/7/19 at 28-29.) Defendant’s work phone was 

subject to the search warrant (Ex. 9); SA Armstrong was concerned that, if given access, 

Defendant could have tried to destroy evidence on the phone. (RT 10/3/19 at 73, 89; RT 

11/7/19 at 13-14.) 

SA McCarthy informed Defendant they were investigating child pornography and 

Defendant stated, “[t]hat’s what I assumed from what he was saying earlier.” (Ex. 2 at 

36.) Defendant explained, at the hearing, that he made that connection due to the 

questions about the internet. (RT 11/7/19 at 50, 52.) Defendant admitted that some child 

pornography “just kind of came up” during an internet search. (Ex. 2 at 36.) When 

agents informed him that the law enforcement search would reveal what Defendant had 

looked for online and that he should therefore “just be honest with” them so that they 

could “kind of deal with it,” he said, “I know I should probably get a – like a lawyer or 

something.” (Id. at 39.) Defendant went on to state that he needed help, that he didn’t 

think it was right and did not like it, and it’s not who he is. (Id.) SA Armstrong 

attempted to clarify if Defendant was requesting a lawyer or wanted to continue speaking 

with them and reminded him that he was not under arrest, was free to leave, and could go 

to work. (Id. at 40-41.) SA McCarthy persisted, “You wanna take a break we take a 

break. You wanna be done be done. You wanna talk we’ll talk.” (Id. at 41.) When SA 

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Armstrong asked what Defendant meant when he mentioned an attorney, Defendant 

stated that he didn’t know if he needed an attorney, and then stated that he should 

probably have one. (Id. at 42.) The agent ended the interview. (Id.) At that time, SA 

Armstrong believes he told Defendant he was free to leave but that is not included in his 

report. (RT 10/3/19 at 94-95.) SA Armstrong left the room to check on the status of the 

search warrant. (Id. at 120.) 

SA McCarthy remained in the room with Defendant. He testified that the door 

was at least part way open at that time, but Defendant stated that the door remained 

closed. (Id. at 77, 120; RT 11/7/19 at 32.) Defendant testified that he stood to leave but 

was told he would have to wait. (RT 11/7/19 at 33-34, 59.) SA McCarthy testified that 

he did not inform Defendant that he was free to go; however, Defendant did not ask or try 

to leave. (Id. at 9, 11, 15, 76-77.) 

Defendant then initiated a conversation about wanting help, and SA McCarthy 

talked to him about options such as an EAP program through work. (Ex. 3 at 3; RT 

10/3/19 at 121-22.) SA McCarthy did not initiate any conversation and the only 

discussion was about counseling. (RT 10/3/19 at 122; RT 11/7/19 at 9-10.) Defendant 

testified he was crying during this break and throughout both interviews. (RT 11/7/19 at 

34, 65-66.) SA McCarthy did not witness Defendant crying during the first interview or 

the seven-minute break. (Id. at 75-76.) After several minutes, Defendant asked SA 

McCarthy to have SA Armstrong return. (Ex. 3 at 3; RT 10/3/19 at 121, 122.) 

b. Second Set of Statements

SA Armstrong returned to the bathroom seven minutes after the first interview was 

terminated. (RT 10/3/19 at 44-45.) SA McCarthy stated for the second recording that, 

during the break, Defendant expressed concern that he would not get help and the agent 

suggested contacting the EAP program at work. (Ex. 3 at 3; RT 10/3/19 at 123-24.) SA 

McCarthy noted that Defendant asked to have SA Armstrong return, and Defendant 

confirmed those statements as an accurate summary of what had occurred during the 

unrecorded period. (Ex. 3 at 3; RT 10/3/19 at 123-24.) 

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SA Armstrong informed Defendant he was not under arrest and could go to work, 

and provided Defendant with a statement of his Miranda rights. (Ex. 3 at 2.) SA 

Armstrong informed Defendant he would have to complete a Miranda waiver if he 

wanted to reinitiate an interview without an attorney. (Id.) Defendant stated, “so-yeah 

you concluded, um, I don’t need a lawyer.” (Id. at 3.) SA Armstrong responded, “you’re 

telling me that, right?”; Defendant answered, yes. (Id.)

4

 

SA Armstrong read Defendant a Statement of Rights, and Defendant stated that he 

understood and did not need to look at the form. (RT 10/3/19 at 47; Ex. 3 at 4.) SA 

Armstrong then read Defendant the waiver portion of the form. (Ex. 3 at 4-5.) The 

standard form uses the language “taken into custody.” (Ex. 7.) SA Armstrong changed 

the language to state that Defendant was detained at 6 a.m. that morning, and he testified 

that Defendant was briefly detained at the time the agents initially entered the house. (Ex. 

3 at 5; RT 10/3/19 at 48, 82-83, 125.)

Defendant then initiated the following discussion:

Mr. Edwards: Does this mean I can never get a lawyer?

S.A. Armstrong: No, no, no, no, not at all. Not at all.

Mr. Edwards: Just right now. Just –

S.A. Armstrong: You – you can get one right now if you want.

Mr. Edwards: Just right now –

S.A. Armstrong: This is just a –

Mr. Edwards: It just means I can talk to you without a lawyer present;

right?

S.A. Armstrong: Right. We need your permission to do so. And this

form gives us the permission to – to resume our interview. That’s all that

form does.

. . . .

4

 Defendant later testified that he believed the agents made the choice that he did 

not need a lawyer because he requested one during the first interview and he wasn’t 

allowed to leave. (RT 11/7/19 at 36, 62.)

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S.A. McCarthy: With that, Kyle, it’s like he said, to answer your

question, it doesn’t waive your rights to get an attorney at any point. It’s just

because you asked for one, we can’t discuss further, even if it’s –

Mr. Edwards: Well, does this really help you guys out?

S.A. McCarthy: We’re not looking to help us out. Just if you want to

talk and tell us what’s going on, then we’re here to listen, and we can – but

for us to like engage in that conversation, we have to have this.

S.A. Armstrong: Right.

S.A. McCarthy: But you can get a lawyer later. You can have a lawyer

now. You can get two questions into our further talks and change your mind.

I mean, it’s whatever you’re comfortable with. I mean because you . . . You

called – you called him back in here. So, it’s just whatever you want to do.

But we can’t – we can’t proceed further without it, but we don’t have to

proceed further either. So . . .

(Ex. 3 at 5-7.) Defendant then signed the waiver form. (Id. at 8; Ex. 7.) Defendant later 

testified that he didn’t really listen to the Miranda waiver because he had been denied a 

lawyer already. (RT 11/7/19 at 62.) 

In response to further questioning, Defendant made several incriminating 

statements. (Ex. 3 at 8-15.) About ten minutes into the recording, Defendant began 

crying, which is audible on the recording. (Ex. 1; RT 10/3/19 at 52-53, 127.) Defendant 

stood up only one time, to get a tissue. (RT 11/7/19 at 11.) Defendant asked to text work 

before his phone was taken. (Ex. 3 at 12-13.) The agents agreed they would let him text 

work and get numbers off his phone, and SA McCarthy stated that he would ask to have 

Defendant’s phone prioritized for return to him. (Id. at 13.) After providing a few more 

incriminating answers, Defendant stated that he did not want to talk anymore, and the 

agents terminated the second interview. (Id. at 14-15; RT 10/3/19 at 51.) Defendant 

testified that he felt he could end the interview because he had given the agents what they 

wanted. (RT 11/7/19 at 63, 68.) The second interview lasted from 6:50 to 7:07 a.m. (Ex. 

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3 at 2, 16.) Both agents testified that they did not promise Defendant anything or threaten 

him (RT 10/3/19 at 52, 127); Defendant provided no contradictory testimony.

SA Armstrong allowed Defendant to get numbers from his phone and Defendant 

left for work. (Id. at 51-52; RT 11/7/19 at 13, 39.) When Defendant left, agents were still 

conducting the search. (RT 10/3/19 at 53.)

At the suppression hearing, Defendant testified that agents told him where to go, 

and he was always under escort. (RT 11/7/19 at 32.) He did not believe the statements 

that he was free to go due to his confinement, the fact that there were so many agents in 

the house, he was sitting on the floor of the bathroom being interrogated by two agents 

blocking the door, agents twice denied his request to contact his boss, he remained in his 

underwear throughout the interviews with no offer to get dressed, and his vehicle was 

blocked-in by law enforcement. (Id. at 27, 32-33, 66-67, 72-73.)

II. Analysis

Defendant asserts three objections to the R&R’s recommendation that the Motion 

to Suppress statements be denied: (1) Defendant’s interview took place in a policedominated, custodial environment; (2) the pre-Miranda statements and continued policedominated atmosphere tainted the voluntariness of his second interview, negating the 

effect of the Miranda warnings then given; (3) Defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights 

was invalid because it was not knowingly or intelligently given. 

a. Custodial Interview

The Government is precluded from using statements arising from custodial 

interrogation absent the provision of warnings outlining the person’s rights. Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). To determine whether a person was in custody, “the 

ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 

movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 

U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). The 

Court must look at the totality of circumstances and decide whether a reasonable person 

would “have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” 

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Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).

Traditionally, “courts have [] been much less likely to find that an interrogation in 

the suspect's home was custodial in nature,” because “[t]he element of compulsion that 

concerned the Court in Miranda is less likely to be present where the suspect is in 

familiar surroundings.” United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In certain scenarios, however, where the familiarity of the home is converted into a 

police-dominated environment, a reasonable person “may not feel that he can 

successfully terminate the interrogation if he knows that he cannot empty his home of his 

interrogators until they have completed their search.” Id. (“If a reasonable person is 

interrogated inside his own home and is told he is ‘free to leave’ where will he go? The 

library? The police station? He is already in the most constitutionally protected place on 

earth. To be ‘free’ to leave is a hollow right if the one place the suspect cannot go is his 

own home.”) The Ninth Circuit has highlighted several non-exhaustive factors to 

consider when conducting a fact-intensive inquiry into whether an interview conducted 

within the home was custodial: 

(1) the number of law enforcement personnel and whether 

they were armed; (2) whether the suspect was at any point 

restrained, either by physical force or by threats; (3) whether 

the suspect was isolated from others; and (4) whether the 

suspect was informed that he was free to leave or terminate 

the interview, and the context in which any such statements 

were made.

Id. at 1084. 

Here, there is no question that Defendant was not read his rights at the outset of 

questioning. Upon reviewing all briefing, transcripts, and audio recordings in this case, 

the Court does not agree that law enforcement’s statements that Defendant was free to go 

ultimately outweighed the other factors tending to show that Defendant was in a custodial 

environment during his interview. After collecting Defendant’s biographical 

information, SA Armstrong informed Defendant numerous times that he was free to leave 

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and that they did not have an arrest warrant for him, and specifically asked Defendant to 

confirm that he did not feel that law enforcement was holding him there.5 These 

statements by law enforcement weigh against a finding of custody, and “greatly reduce[]

the chance that a suspect will reasonably believe he is in custody.” Id. at 1087. But just 

as in United States v. Craighead, additional facts lead the Court in this case to conclude 

that Defendant “could have reasonably believed he was not free to leave, notwithstanding 

that SA [Armstrong] told him he was.” Id. at 1087-89; see also United States v. Salabye, 

623 F. Supp. 2d 2010 (D. Ariz. 2009) (applying the Craighead analysis where defendant 

was twice told he was free to leave and concluding the interview was custodial); United 

States v. Eller, No. 16-CR-8207, 2020 WL 58589 (D. Ariz. Jan. 6, 2020) (same;

concluding that even if defendant had been told he was free to leave, such statements 

were belied by the facts that it was early in the morning, defendant had no vehicle, 

defendant could not return to apartment during the search, and it was cold outside).

In Craighead, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant had been subjected 

to a custodial interrogation where eight law enforcement officers from three different 

agencies armed and in protective gear arrived at the defendant’s residence at 8:40 a.m., 

and where two officers escorted defendant, free from handcuffs, to a storage closet for 

20-30 minutes of questioning, during which time defendant sat on a box or chair and one 

officer stood in front of the door. The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion even though 

the agent in that case told the defendant at the outset that he was not under arrest, that he 

would not be arrested that day regardless of what information he provided, that his 

statements were voluntary, and that he was free to leave. 539 F.3d 1073.

In this case, Defendant was woken up in his boxers or shorts at 6 a.m. by 

approximately 18 armed law enforcement officers at his door in full tactical gear, who 

had arrived in 5 to 10 vehicles, and who had parked so as to obstruct Defendant’s 

driveway. After being detained outside while some of the officers entered his home, he 

5

 SA Armstrong testified that he additionally informed Defendant that he was free 

to leave before turning on the audio recording. (RT 10/3/19 at 92-93.) Defendant, in his 

testimony, did not deny or confirm SA Armstrong’s statement.

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was “herded” back inside the residence, past his roommate in handcuffs, whom he was 

not permitted to speak to, and into a 6-foot by 6-foot bathroom, where he took a seat on 

the floor or the rim of the tub. Throughout the duration of the first interview, the door 

was “cracked” open, and one agent stood by the door while the other stood directly in 

front of Defendant. These facts, which by and large mirror those found in Craighead, tip 

the remaining three Craighead factors—number of armed officers, restraint by force or 

coercion, and isolation from others—in favor of a finding of custody.

The approximately 18 officers in Defendant’s home would have caused a 

reasonable person to “believe that the large number of officers was brought for the 

purpose of preventing his departure,” and the facts here suggest that the officers, in 

conducting their search and occupying the driveway, had “fill[ed] the home such that 

there [we]re no police-free rooms or spaces to which the suspect may [have] retreat[ed] 

should he [have] wish[ed] to terminate the interrogation.” Id. at 1084-85. The officers 

here were armed and in tactical gear, such that “[a] reasonable person in [Defendant’s] 

position would feel that his home was dominated by law enforcement agents and that 

they had come prepared for a confrontation.” Id. at 1085. 

Defendant was also restrained and isolated from others. Law enforcement never

handcuffed Defendant or otherwise forcefully restrained him, but “[r]estraint amounting 

to custody may also be inferred where law enforcement officers permit the suspect to 

move around the house for brief periods but insist on escorting and monitoring him at all 

times.” Id. (citing additional cases from other jurisdictions). Defendant was chaperoned 

for the entirety of the search and brought into a bathroom with two agents where they 

spoke to him with the door nearly or completely shut. Although “in many cases, when 

law enforcement agents conduct an in-home interrogation while conducting a lawful 

search of the home, physical control of the suspect will be necessary to preserve evidence 

and protect the safety of the agents,” “[t]he fact that these precautions may be necessary 

to the success of the lawful search does not lessen their tendency to make a reasonable 

person believe he is in custody.” Id. at 1986. 

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Moreover, even though Defendant was not handcuffed, his roommate was—which 

Defendant saw before he was led into the bathroom by law enforcement, and which

would have undercut the notion that Defendant was, in fact, free to go. Defendant was 

kept isolated from his roommate for the duration of the search. See id. at 1087 (“it is 

difficult to see how Craighead was free to leave if he was, apparently, not free to invite 

others into the storage room of his own house”). Again, though it was necessary to keep 

Defendant apart from his roommate for purposes of the investigation, that the separation 

was necessary does not negate the feeling impressed upon a reasonable person in 

Defendant’s shoes that he was being kept apart from his roommate, who was detained in 

physical restraints, and that he was therefore not truly free to leave. And shortly before 

being confronted with information that law enforcement was, in fact, investigating 

Defendant for accessing child pornography, law enforcement asked Defendant whether 

he had a smart phone. Defendant confirmed that he had an iPhone, and asked to use it to 

in order to text work to say that he would be late. SA Armstrong replied, “[i]n—in just a 

minute, like I said.” When Defendant pressed that he had to let his employer know, SA 

Armstrong replied, “Yeah. We’ll—we’ll probably be done shortly.” (Ex. 2 at 34.) The 

inability to use his phone to contact others, while again, necessary for the investigation, 

isolated Defendant all the more, and would have given a reasonable person the 

impression that law enforcement was in control. Given the centrality of cell phones in 

everyday life, Defendant understandably might have felt reluctant to head elsewhere 

without his. Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1089 (“Craighead testified that he did not want to 

leave his house entirely, because he did not want to leave the officers alone with his 

belongings . . . .”).

Finally, though the master bathroom might be viewed as less isolating than the 

“storage room in the back of the house” where the interrogation in Craighead took place, 

id. at 1088-89, the bathroom is still more isolating than “a suspect’s kitchen, living room, 

or bedroom,” where a “suspect might take comfort in the familiar surroundings of the 

home and” which might “decrease the sensation of being isolated in a police-dominated 

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atmosphere.” Id. at 1088; see also United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 

2002) (“isolating the defendant from the outside world . . . largely neutralizes the 

familiarity of the location as a factor affirmatively undermining a finding of coercion”); 

cf. United States v. Murray, 696 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1054-55 (D. Ariz. 2010) (applying 

Craighead and concluding that interview was not custodial even though over ten officers 

entered the home with weapons drawn where interview was conducted in defendant’s 

“rather spacious backyard”).

Additional facts in this case detract from the force of law enforcement’s 

admonitions that Defendant was free to leave, especially when considered in light of the 

totality of the circumstances just described. Immediately preceding law enforcement’s 

statements that Defendant was free to go and not under arrest, SA Armstrong informed 

Defendant that the officers were there with a search warrant to investigate a child 

molestation case, and asked Defendant if he would be willing to discuss the case. 

Defendant agreed, amidst law enforcement’s statements that he could go, expressing that 

he had just woken up and wanted to clarify who the officers were investigating—him or 

his roommate—and learn more about why the officers were there. (Ex. 2 at 9-13). Only 

much later in the conversation, after law enforcement had denied Defendant access to his 

phone, did SA Armstrong disclose the actual reason that law enforcement was in 

Defendant’s home, stating that law enforcement had come to investigate “inappropriate” 

pornography on Defendant’s computers, later specifying child pornography—

prepubescent, clearly underage. (Id. at 36-38.) At this point, Defendant confessed to 

having viewed images of child pornography. 

Although law enforcement’s initial misleading statement that they had a warrant to 

investigate evidence of child molestation, and SA Armstrong’s later clarification, once 

Defendant had already detailed his computer use, that law enforcement had information 

that he had child pornography on his computers, were not so unduly coercive as to render 

Defendant’s statements involuntary, they may have compelled Defendant to speak where 

he otherwise might not have chosen to. Courts have found relevant the extent to which a 

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defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt when determining whether an 

interrogation was custodial. See United States v. Bassignani, 575 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 

2009) (“We have found a defendant in custody when the interrogator adopts an 

aggressive, coercive, and deceptive tone.”); United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d at 974. Here, 

Defendant was seated in his bathroom with two law enforcement agents, the door closed,

while 16 others searched through his home and electronic devices as he was questioned, 

and SA Armstrong informed Defendant that they were there to investigate inappropriate 

photos on site. Standing alone, law enforcement’s statement would not have made the 

interview custodial, but taken as part of the totality of the circumstances, it had some 

tendency to make the encounter more so rather than less so. 

Overall, the circumstances here warranted warning Defendant of his rights. He 

had been led to a bathroom in his underwear or shorts just after 6 a.m. by two agents, 

while sixteen others searched his home. His roommate, as far as he knew, was in 

handcuffs with other agents, kept apart from him. Although told at the outset of the 

conversation with two agents in a small bathroom that he was “free to go,” it is unclear 

where Defendant would have even gone at that hour, should he have otherwise felt 

comfortable actually leaving. The alternative was to remain seated in the bathroom not 

speaking to the agents monitoring his activity—an option that was not affirmatively

presented during the interrogation. Defendant’s statements made during the first 

custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings will therefore be suppressed.6

6

 The R&R distinguishes Craighead on two bases: 1) the fact that in Craighead,

the defendant knew that there were multiple law enforcement agencies present and might 

not have felt like the free-to-leave sentiment from one agency would be shared with the 

others who might be inclined to stop him, and 2) the fact that here, Defendant expressed a 

desire to go to work and eventually did. The first basis gives insufficient weight to the 

many other similarities between this case and Craighead, which Craighead also relied on 

in reaching its conclusion that a reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to 

terminate the interrogation and leave: police presence in the home, restraint through 

monitoring and confinement in a closet, isolation from others, etc. As to the second basis, 

the fact that Defendant eventually terminated the interview, the Court does not agree that 

this proves Defendant felt he was free to go. Defendant departed only after a second 

interview in which he gave a full confession. That he asked for his phone during the first 

interview to text work about being late demonstrates that Defendant did not actually feel 

free to get up and leave for work on time, and the fact that law enforcement denied even 

this request would indicate all the more to a reasonable person that law enforcement was 

in control. Notably, between the first and second interviews, Defendant remained in the 

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b. Voluntary Statements Made in Second Interview

Defendant objects to the admission of the statements made during the second 

interview on two related bases: 1) that the involuntariness of the statements made during 

the first interview necessarily tainted the voluntariness of the second set of statements, 

negating the effect of the Miranda warnings, and 2) that Defendant’s waiver of his 

Miranda rights was invalid because it was not given knowingly or intelligently. The 

Court concludes that statements made during the second interview are admissible. 

“A prior coerced confession can ‘taint’ a subsequent one.” Bradford v. Davis, 923 

F.3d 599, 616 (2019) (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310 (1985)) (emphasis in 

original). “[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial 

statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant 

a presumption of compulsion.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314. Rather, “[a] subsequent 

administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned 

statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of 

the earlier statement.”

7

 Id.; see also Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 

2002) (noting that a statement may be voluntarily made but still be given in violation of 

Miranda).

A suspect’s confession is involuntary where, taking into consideration all 

bathroom with an agent positioned between Defendant and the door. 

7

 A plurality in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S 600 (2004), acknowledged the logic 

that, involuntarily made or not, “[u]pon hearing warnings only in the aftermath of 

interrogation and just after making a confession, a suspect would hardly think he had a 

genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so believing once the police began to 

lead him over the same ground again.” Id. at 613. But the Ninth Circuit identified the 

holding in Seibert as, “when a law enforcement officer interrogates a suspect but does not 

give a Miranda warning until after obtaining a confession or an incriminating statement, 

a court in deciding whether to suppress a subsequent, postwarning confession must 

determine whether the warning was deliberately withheld.” United States v. Williams, 

435 F.3d 1148, 1160 (2006) (emphasis added). Defendant does not argue that law 

enforcement deliberately withheld warnings until after his first confession and the record 

does not support that contention. 

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circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or psychological 

coercion or by inducement so that the suspect’s will was overborn. See United States v. 

Coutchavlis, 260 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001). Courts consider the following factors 

when deciding whether a statement was involuntarily made: “the youth of the accused, 

his intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the 

length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of 

physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.” United States v. 

Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Defendant’s 

statements made during the first interview were not involuntary. The first interview 

lasted only 30 minutes. See id. at 1028 (“Even if we assume that the interrogation lasted 

all day . . . coercion typically involves far more outrageous conduct”). Although 

Defendant had no prior experience with the criminal justice system, he was 31, gainfully 

employed, rented a home, and owned a car—suggesting that he was a relatively stable 

adult. (Ex. 2 at 2-3, 5-6.) Defendant was not physically restrained or coerced, and was 

offered water. And though the officers made one misrepresentation at the outset of the 

interview, they were not unduly aggressive or coercive. See Haswood, 350 F.3d at 1029 

(“Even misrepresentations by law enforcement, while reprehensible, do not necessarily 

evidence coercive conduct.”); Ortiz v. Uribe, 671 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 

interrogation techniques of the officer must be ‘the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the 

sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal 

processes of the States.’”) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433-34 (1986)).

Moreover, though Defendant’s second interview occurred very shortly after the 

first, in the same room with the same officers, the interview was at his own request, and 

his statements were made after law enforcement issued effective Miranda warnings, 

which Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived. A waiver of rights, as well as of 

counsel after invoking that right, is knowing and voluntary if, under the totality of the 

circumstances, the waiver is “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right 

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being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran, 475 U.S. 

at 421; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-85 (1981) (“an accused . . . having 

expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 

interrogation . . . unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, 

or conversations with the police”). The government bears the burden of proving a valid 

waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 

(1986).

Here, law enforcement concluded the first interrogation when Defendant 

expressed interest in speaking with an attorney. SA Armstrong left the bathroom to join 

the other agents in Defendant’s home. As confirmed by Defendant, during the sevenminute period after SA Armstrong left, SA McCarthy and Defendant spoke about a 

program that might be available through Defendant’s employer to help Defendant, 

presumably with the issues stemming from his computer usage. Defendant on his own 

volition, without any coercion or pressure from law enforcement, asked SA McCarthy to 

call SA Armstrong back to the room. Once SA Armstrong had returned, he immediately 

provided Defendant with a written copy of his Miranda rights and read the rights out loud 

to Defendant. 

Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that he knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his rights, arguing that Defendant’s questions following the 

presentation of the waiver statement and the time that elapsed before Defendant signed 

the form evidenced confusion on Defendant’s part. Defendant did, at first, ask whether 

the form meant that he could never have an attorney. But SA Armstrong clearly and 

repeatedly responded that Defendant had the right to an attorney—then, and in the 

future—that law enforcement would not speak to him further if he did not give them 

permission to do so without an attorney present, and that Defendant was at liberty to ask 

for an attorney further into the conversation if Defendant changed his mind about 

speaking with law enforcement. At that point, Defendant signed the waiver. See North 

Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (holding that a written waiver is strong 

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proof of its validity). The Court finds that Defendant’s waiver was knowing and 

voluntary, and will therefore deny Defendant’s Motion to Suppress as it pertains to 

statements made during the second interrogation post warnings. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 59) is ADOPTED in 

part, as to the exclusion of the second set of statements.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Statements 

(Doc. 19) is GRANTED in part, as to statements made in the first interview without 

warnings, and DENIED in part, as to statements made in the second interview following 

acknowledgement of warnings.

Dated this 27th day of March, 2020.

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