Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03943/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03943-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William J. Dixon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3943

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

William J. Dixon, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 7, 2005

Filed: December 29, 2005 

___________

Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

William J. Dixon appeals the 108-month prison sentence the district court1

imposed after he pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously

convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (10-year maximum prison

term). He maintains that the district court violated Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.

2531 (2004), by enhancing his sentence based on judge-found facts. The government

argues that the appeal should be dismissed, noting that Dixon executed a written plea

agreement in which he specifically waived his right to “appeal or otherwise challenge

Appellate Case: 04-3943 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/29/2005 Entry ID: 1991049
-2-

the constitutionality or legality of the Sentencing Guidelines,” and generally agreed

not to appeal his sentence on any ground unless the sentencing court departed upward

or imposed “a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum” or “in violation of law

apart from the Sentencing Guidelines.”

We enforce this appeal waiver. At the guilty-plea hearing, the district court

discussed the waiver with Dixon, ensuring that Dixon was pleading guilty voluntarily,

and Dixon does not challenge the validity of the plea agreement on appeal. The

constitutional challenge falls within the scope of the waiver, and no miscarriage of

justice would result from enforcing the waiver. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d

886, 889-92 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997 (2003). Dixon offers two

arguments to avoid the appeal waiver: first, that his pre-Blakely plea agreement could

not have waived “rights that he didn’t know existed prior to the Blakely decision,” and

second, that his appeal is permitted by the waiver’s language, as the challenged

enhancements – which were based on judge-found facts – resulted in a sentence “in

violation of law apart from the Sentencing Guidelines” and “in excess of the statutory

maximum” under Blakely. Both arguments are unavailing. See United States v.

Young, 413 F.3d 727, 729-30 (8th Cir. 2005) (where pre-Blakely agreement stated

“defendant agrees not to appeal or otherwise challenge the constitutionality or legality

of the Sentencing Guidelines,” holding that Blakely challenge to sentencing

enhancements made pursuant to judge-found facts came within waiver’s scope; also

rejecting argument that after Blakely, top of Guidelines range constitutes “statutory

maximum”).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

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Appellate Case: 04-3943 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/29/2005 Entry ID: 1991049