Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01221/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01221-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven Mayberg
Defendant
Ben McLain
Defendant
Frank Enepi Sisneroz
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK ENEPI SISNEROZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEVEN MAYBERG, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

1:07-cv-01221-LJO-SMS-PC

ORDER TREATING 12(b)(6) MOTION AS

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORDER FOR THE PARTIES TO SUBMIT

FURTHER BRIEFING AND EVIDENCE 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Frank Enepi Sisneroz (“plaintiff”) is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the

complaint on August 21, 2007. (Doc. 4.) On August 29, 2007, the court screened plaintiff’s

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and found that it states a cognizable claim for

relief under section 1983 against defendants Mayberg and McLain (“defendants”) for violation of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 7.) On October 17, 2007, the court

ordered the U.S. Marshal to serve process upon defendants. (Doc. 10.) On March 17, 2008,

defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 13.)

On June 2, 2008, plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 20.) On June 12,

2008, defendants filed a reply to plaintiff’s opposition. (Doc. 21.)

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28 Civil detainees are not prisoners within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1

1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000).

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II. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, a civil detainee defined pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code §

6600 et seq., is currently detained at the Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”) in Coalinga,

California, where the events at issue allegedly occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants Steven 1

Mayberg (Executive Director of Department of Mental Health) and Ben McLain (Acting

Executive Director of CSH). Plaintiff alleges as follows: Plaintiff’s family bought him a laptop

computer which he received at CSH on September 2, 2006. Plaintiff was required to sign an

agreement to comply with CSH’s Administrative Directive No. 654 (“AD 654") which

established guidelines for individual owned laptop computers. On February 23, 2007, the 

Department of Police Services (“DPS”) at CSH conducted a hospital-wide search and searched

plaintiff’s living area and his laptop computer. There was no evidence of misuse found in

plaintiff’s laptop. On February 28, 2007, CSH implemented a moratorium on the purchase of

individual owned computer equipment and software previously allowed by AD 654. Under the

moratorium, CD-RWs became contraband because of infractions by a few individuals at CSH. 

The moratorium memorandum stated that the disposition of existing individual owned equipment

would be discussed with the Patient Advisory Council for determination of further policy

direction. Officers of the DPS took most of plaintiff’s CD-RWs, even though plaintiff had

complied with the rules and the terms of the agreement. The CSH administration told Patient

Representatives that all laptop computers would be taken away by the end of 2007 under a new

program in which patients at CSH would be forced to send their personal laptop computers

home. Plaintiff claims that defendants have violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff requests injunctive relief through a court order enjoining the

CSH administration from taking his laptop computer, or in the alternative, compensatory

damages for loss of his computer, accessories, and legal data. 

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III. RULE 12(d) - CONVERSION OF 12(b)(6) MOTION

Under Rule 12(d), on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), if matters outside the pleadings are

presented to and not excluded by the court the motion must be treated as one for summary

judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). All parties must be given a reasonable

opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion. Id. “[A] represented party

who submits matters outside the pleadings to the judge and invites consideration of them has

notice that the judge may use them to decide a motion originally noted as a motion to dismiss,

requiring its transformation to a motion for summary judgment.” Olson v. Idaho State Bd. Of

Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment. Defendants and plaintiff have both submitted exhibits outside of the

complaint for the court’s consideration in support of their arguments regarding the motion to

dismiss. (D’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exh A; P’s Opposition to MTD, Exh A-J.) 

Defendants have submitted a Memorandum dated February 7, 2008 which was issued by the

Executive Director of CSH, and plaintiff attached thirty-three pages of exhibits to his opposition

to defendants’ motion to dismiss, including declarations, memorandums, receipts, a patient

complaint, summonses, and hospital records. Id. 

Defendants refer to authority allowing the court to take judicial notice of facts outside the

pleadings on a motion to dismiss without converting it to a motion for summary judgment. (D’s

RJN at 2:2-6.) Indeed, on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court may take

judicial notice of facts outside the pleadings including records and reports of administrative

bodies and matters of public record. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282

(9th Cir.1986), overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501

U.S. 104, 111 (1991) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the court has discretion to rely on all

extraneous evidence submitted by the parties in ruling on the motion, in which case the motion to

dismiss is converted to a summary judgment motion. Kearns v. Tempe Technical Institute, Inc.

110 F.3d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, in this instance, the court shall treat defendants’

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motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and all parties hereby notified shall be granted an opportunity to present all material

that is pertinent to the motion for the court’s consideration. 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The parties are notified that defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on March 17,

2008, is converted to a motion for summary judgment; and

2. Within thirty days of the date of service of this order, defendants shall file further

briefing and evidence for the court’s consideration in ruling on the motion for

summary judgment;

3. Plaintiff's response is due within thirty days of the date defendants file their

briefing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 11, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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