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Parties Involved:
Troy K. Conrad
Appellant
Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-15679

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 9:13-cv-80050-KLR

TROY K. CONRAD, 

 Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

 Respondent - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(September 8, 2016)

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Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and SILER,* Circuit Judges.

SILER, Circuit Judge:

In 2003, Florida prisoner Troy Conrad was convicted of second-degree 

murder and attempted second-degree murder. Ten years later, he filed the instant 

habeas proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting that his Sixth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when his trial 

counsel failed to object to a portion of the jury instructions on self-defense. 

Conrad argues that the forcible-felony provision of the instructions was circular, 

confusing, and misleading, and that it impermissibly negated his sole defense at 

trial—a self-defense justification. 

The magistrate judge found no error in the provision of the forcible-felony 

instruction and recommended that Conrad’s petition be denied. The magistrate 

judge further concluded that even if the instruction were erroneous, any error 

would not constitute fundamental error on appeal and therefore was not prejudicial

under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The district 

court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations. Conrad now 

appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We 

AFFIRM.

 * Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

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BACKGROUND

The State of Florida’s (“the State”) indictment alleged that on January 21, 

2002, Conrad shot with a firearm Edgar Padilla, who ultimately died from his 

complications, and Carmelite Lefevre, who survived. The State charged Conrad 

with second-degree murder with a firearm and attempted second-degree murder 

with a firearm, both in violation of Florida law. During Conrad’s 2003 trial, the 

State theorized that Conrad, a drug addict, killed Padilla, his dealer, in an effort to 

obtain crack cocaine. It further alleged that Conrad attempted to kill Lefevre 

because she had witnessed Padilla’s murder. 

At trial, Conrad admitted shooting Padilla and Lefevre but asserted that he 

did so only in self-defense. He explained that he regularly purchased cocaine from 

Padilla, who had threatened that if Conrad “play[ed] with” Padilla’s money, Padilla 

would shoot him. Conrad testified that on the day of the shootings, he wanted to 

buy crack cocaine but owed Padilla approximately two hundred dollars for past 

purchases. When he paged Padilla that morning, Conrad possessed only twenty 

dollars, but he assured Padilla that he would repay the remainder of his debt by that 

afternoon. Padilla responded that if Conrad failed to produce the money, Padilla 

would “bust a cap” in Conrad—that is, shoot him. In Conrad’s mind, Padilla’s 

threat was not baseless: he knew that Padilla sometimes carried a gun wrapped in 

a towel and was a member of a violent gang. 

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Later that day, Padilla arrived at Conrad’s home unannounced and 

demanded the money. When Conrad told him that he did not have it, Padilla 

became angry, grabbed Conrad by the shirt, and yelled at him to get the money or 

else Padilla would “bust a cap.” Conrad observed that Padilla had a towel with 

him at the time; he assumed that Padilla’s gun was wrapped inside the towel. 

Padilla then placed Conrad in the back seat of Padilla’s car and handed the 

towel to Lefevre, who was seated in the front passenger seat. Conrad recognized 

Lefevre, who had been present during previous drug transactions with Padilla. 

Conrad agreed to ask his mother for the money that Padilla demanded. When she 

refused, Padilla became livid. Conrad stated that he nodded off in the car and 

awoke to Padilla’s holding a gun. He heard Padilla say to Lefevre, “I ought to off 

this cracker.” At this time, Lefevre was holding the towel. Believing he was about 

to be killed, Conrad reached forward, grabbed the gun from Padilla, and fired four 

times. 

After firing the last shot, Conrad scrambled to his house, told his girlfriend 

to hide, and smeared ketchup onto his body so that he could pretend to be dead if

Padilla retaliated. He maintained that he had no time to think at the time of the 

shooting but simply acted in fear for his life. When police arrived, Conrad 

willingly came out of his house but did not disclose that he had shot Padilla and 

Lefevre. Instead, he told the officers that a rival drug dealer had shot them. At 

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trial, Conrad emphasized that when he grabbed Padilla’s gun, he believed that 

there was also a gun wrapped in the towel that Lefevre was holding and that he had 

no time to hesitate or think. 

The court’s instructions to the jury discussed the law governing self-defense 

as a legal defense to murder and attempted murder. As to the forcible-felony 

exception to the self-defense justification, the court explained:

[T]he use of force likely to cause death or great bodily 

harm is not justified if you find, one, Troy Conrad was 

attempting to commit, committing or escaping after the 

commission of an aggravated battery and/or aggravated 

assault . . . .

Neither party objected to this instruction. 

The jury found Conrad guilty of second-degree murder of Padilla and 

attempted second-degree murder of Lefevre. The court denied Conrad’s motion 

for a new trial and sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment for the seconddegree murder conviction and a concurrent fifteen-year term for the attempted 

second-degree murder conviction. The state appellate court affirmed Conrad’s 

convictions. 

After his initial efforts to obtain post-conviction relief failed, Conrad filed a 

second post-conviction motion in state court, asserting for the first time that 

counsel’s failure to object to the forcible-felony instruction constituted ineffective 

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assistance. The court denied Conrad’s motion, and the Florida Fourth District 

Court of Appeal affirmed. 

Conrad then filed this § 2254 action in federal court, maintaining that he was 

denied effective assistance in light of his trial counsel’s failure to object to the 

forcible-felony instruction. A magistrate judge recommended that Conrad’s 

petition be denied without a hearing. The district court adopted the magistrate’s 

report and recommendation over Conrad’s objection. Conrad appealed to this

court, and we granted a certificate of appealability as to whether the district court 

erred in rejecting Conrad’s claim. 

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of review

“We review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of a habeas corpus 

petition.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010). We also review de 

novo a district court’s legal conclusions and its resolution of mixed questions of 

law and fact. Wellons v. Warden, 695 F.3d 1202, 1206 (11th Cir. 2012). Because 

Conrad’s petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Conrad must 

establish not only that his Sixth Amendment claim is meritorious, but also that the 

state court’s adjudication of that claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

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established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Madison v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 

1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court has explained,

The pivotal question [in a § 2554(d) claim] is whether the 

state court’s application of the Strickland standard was 

unreasonable. This is different from asking whether 

defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s 

standard. Were that the inquiry, the analysis would be no 

different than if, for example, this Court were 

adjudicating a Strickland claim on direct review of a 

criminal conviction in a United States district court. 

Under AEDPA, though, it is a necessary premise that the 

two questions are different. For purposes of 

§ 2254(d)(1), “an unreasonable application of federal 

law is different from an incorrect application of federal 

law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S. Ct. 

1495, 1498 (2000). A state court must be granted a 

deference and latitude that are not in operation when the 

case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011). 

Conrad, therefore, confronts a “difficult” burden. Id. at 105. “The standards 

created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two 

apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions 

were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that 

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counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.; see also Hill v. Humphrey, 

662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Under AEDPA, our review of a 

final state habeas decision is greatly circumscribed and is highly deferential to the 

state courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The merits of Conrad’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim are “squarely 

governed” by Strickland, 466 U.S. 668; see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390, 

120 S. Ct. 1495, 1497 (2000). Pursuant to Strickland, Conrad must demonstrate 

that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that “the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish ineffectiveness, 

Conrad “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To establish prejudice, he must demonstrate “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

But because AEDPA deference also governs Conrad’s claims, he must prove 

not only a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome, but that no 

reasonable jurist could have reached the state court’s conclusion. If fair-minded 

jurists could disagree as to that decision’s soundness, the state court’s application 

of Strickland cannot be said to be unreasonable, and AEDPA precludes the grant of 

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habeas relief. Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 703 F.3d 1316, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 

2013) (en banc). 

As Conrad has failed to satisfy Strickland’s first prong, we need not reach 

the second prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“[T]here is no reason for a 

court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of 

the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”). We find that 

Conrad’s ineffective-assistance claim is unpersuasive. 

II. The relevant statute and the effect of Giles

Conrad maintains that the state court’s decision was “contrary to” or 

unreasonably applied Strickland. See § 2254(d)(1). He asserts that the state court 

“misunderstood its own law” in its rejection of his ineffective-assistance claim. 

According to Conrad, the forcible-felony instruction is proper only where the 

defendant has committed an independent forcible felony other than the one for 

which he claims self-defense. 

The instruction at issue is based on Florida Statute § 776.041(1) (2002), 

which provides:

The [self-defense] justification described in the preceding 

sections of this chapter is not available to a person who:

(1) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping 

after the commission of, a forcible felony . . . .

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See Williams v. State, 901 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that 

the instruction concerning situations when the defense of justifiable use of force is 

unavailable is drawn from Fla. Stat. § 776.041); see also Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 

(Crim.) 3.6(f).

In 2002—the year prior to Conrad’s trial—the Florida Court of Appeal

addressed a jury instruction that arose from this statute. Giles v. State, 831 So. 2d 

1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), held that the forcible-felony instruction is proper 

only where the forcible felony is a separate and independent one. Giles was 

convicted of aggravated battery after a fight with his opponent in a poker game 

resulted in Giles hitting the man in the mouth with a brick. Id. at 1264. The trial 

court instructed the jury, “The use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily 

harm is not justifiable if you find that the defendant was attempting to commit, 

committing or escaping after the commission of an aggravated battery.” Id. 

Accordingly, the court’s jury instruction on self-defense provided:

The defendant would be justified in using force not likely 

to cause death or great bodily harm against [the victim] if 

the following two facts were proved.

Number one, the defendant must have reasonably 

believed that such conduct was necessary to defend 

himself against [the victim’s] imminent use of unlawful 

force against the defendant. 

Number two, the use of unlawful force by [the victim] 

must have appeared to the defendant ready to take place.

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The use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily 

harm is not justifiable if you find that the defendant was 

attempting to commit, committing or escaping after the 

commission of an aggravated battery.

Id. at 1265. 

The Florida Court of Appeal deemed this instruction erroneous, finding it 

“reasonably calculated to confuse or mislead the jury.” Id. (quoting Barton 

Protective Servs., Inc. v. Faber, 745 So. 2d 968, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)); 

see also Wadman v. State, 750 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (noting 

that a trial court “should not give instructions which are confusing, contradictory, 

or misleading”). Giles held that the self-defense instruction was “misleading and 

confusing such that the effect was to negate Giles’ only defense to the charge of 

aggravated battery.” Id. (citing Davis v. State, 804 So. 2d 400, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 2001) (deeming it fundamental error to give an inaccurate and misleading 

instruction where the effect of that instruction is to negate a defendant’s only 

defense); Harris v. State, 570 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 

(instructing that the trial court should give a complete and accurate instruction so 

as not to negate the defendant’s theory of self-defense)). 

Giles noted that although aggravated battery is indeed a forcible felony, the 

Florida statute’s plain language reflects that it applies “only under circumstances 

where the person claiming self-defense is engaged in another, independent 

‘forcible felony’ at the time.” 831 So. 2d at 1265 (citing Perkins v. State, 576 So. 

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2d 1310 (Fla. 1991) (holding that cocaine trafficking was not a forcible felony so 

as to preclude the defense of self-defense when the killing occurred during an 

attempt to traffic in cocaine)). That is, “[t]he instruction is normally given in 

situations where the accused is charged with at least two criminal acts, the act for 

which the accused is claiming self-defense and a separate forcible felony.” Id. at 

1265 (citations omitted). 

Though Giles committed only one act, the instruction conveyed that the act 

that Giles sought to justify—the alleged aggravated battery—precluded a finding 

of justification. “Essentially, the jury was instructed that [Section] 776.041(1) 

would apply to preclude a self-defense claim, when it is claimed that the acts with 

which the defendant is charged are themselves committed in appropriate selfdefense.” Id. at 1266. Therefore, even if the jury determined that Giles threw the 

brick in self-defense, his action was nonetheless unjustifiable because the act itself 

was a forcible felony. This reading of the statute is erroneous, the court said. 

Instead, “the proper test for determining the applicability of the instruction is not 

whether the self-defense act itself could qualify as a forcible felony, but whether, at 

the time of the self-defense, the accused was engaged in a separate forcible 

felonious act.” Id. at 1266 (citing Perkins, 576 So. 2d at 1311). Therefore, the 

trial court’s instruction was “circular and confusing to the jury such that it basically 

negated Giles’ defense.” Id. (citations omitted). 

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III. Giles’ progeny and application to Strickland 

Conrad argued to the state court that he was denied effective assistance of 

counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to the forcible-felony instruction in 

light of Giles. He maintains that because Giles predated his trial, his counsel 

should have known that the forcible-felony instruction did not apply and thus 

should have objected. 

As stated above, counsel’s performance is deficient when it falls below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and is “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance.” Johnson v. Sec’y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 928 

(11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). The “test has nothing to do with what the 

best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would 

have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have 

acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.” Waters v. Thomas, 

46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). Conrad 

must therefore establish that “no competent counsel would have taken the action 

that his counsel did take.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc). Here, the required “objective inquiry,” Castillo v. Fla. Sec’y 

of DOC, 722 F.3d 1281, 1285 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013), entails asking “whether any 

reasonable lawyer could have elected not to object for strategic or tactical reasons,” 

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not whether “the actual defense counsel was . . . subjectively motivated by those 

reasons.” Id. 

According to Conrad, the two charges for which he stood trial—seconddegree murder and second-degree attempted murder—were not separate, 

independent felonies. Instead, he portrays his shooting of Lefevre and Padilla as 

part of the same transaction, a unified attempt at self-defense. 

Conrad acknowledges that he was charged with two felonies for which he 

claimed self-defense, while the Giles defendant confronted only one charge. 

However, he characterizes this fact as “a distinction without a difference” because 

he claimed self-defense as to both charges, which were related to victims acting in 

concert in the same chain of events. Conrad submits that the forcible-felony 

instruction was confusing and misleading, as he was not charged with any felony 

other than those to which self-defense provided a complete defense. 

The State responds that Conrad’s counsel should not have been expected to 

know that that the forcible-felony instruction did not apply, as the Florida Supreme 

Court did not amend its standard jury instructions to reflect the Giles principle until 

2006, three years after Conrad’s trial. See In re Std. Jury Instructions in Criminal 

Cases (No. 2005-4), 930 So. 2d 612, 614 (Fla. 2006) (mem.) (instructing courts to 

give the forcible-felony instruction “only if the defendant is charged with more 

than one forcible felony” pursuant to Giles). Instead, during Conrad’s 2003 trial, 

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Florida’s jury instructions indicated that the forcible-felony instruction was proper 

where the defendant claiming self-defense was engaged in another independent 

forcible felony. The allegations against Conrad reflected exactly these 

circumstances, as Conrad was charged with two distinct felonies. 

The State’s reasoning is persuasive. The instruction was not erroneous 

according to Florida law at the time of the trial. We have observed that 

“[r]easonably effective representation cannot and does not include a requirement to 

make arguments based on predictions of how the law may develop.” Spaziano v. 

Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1039 (11th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (citations 

omitted); see also Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1359 (11th Cir. 1995) (“To be 

effective within the bounds set by Strickland, an attorney need not anticipate 

changes in the law.”).

What is more, though Giles represents the genesis of the court’s reasoning 

regarding the forcible-felony instruction, that case did not address the precise issue 

at hand here—that is, the application of the instruction when a defendant claims 

self-defense as to more than one victim. The Florida Court of Appeal confronted

the issue only in Shepard v. Crosby, 916 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)—

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which was decided two years after Conrad’s trial. Whatever Shepard’s effect, 

counsel was not deficient in failing to raise the case.1 

Florida precedent indicates that trial counsel’s failure to object to standard 

jury instructions that had not been invalidated by the Florida Supreme Court do not 

render counsel’s performance deficient. Therefore, Conrad has not satisfied 

Strickland’s performance prong. The district court did not err by dismissing 

Conrad’s petition for habeas relief.

CONCLUSION

Because Conrad was charged with more than one forcible felony, the 

magistrate judge and the district court determined that the forcible-felony 

instruction was not improper. We agree. Because the provision of the forciblefelony instruction at Conrad’s trial comported with Florida law at the time of the 

trial, Conrad’s trial counsel did not violate constitutional standards. We therefore 

conclude that the district court’s finding was not an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 

AFFIRMED.

 1 Shepard provides scant background information and sheds little light on the issue before us. 

Florida courts have called Shepard’s precedential value into question. See, e.g., Martinez v. 

State, 933 So. 2d 1155, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“As [this] extremely brief opinion[] 

reveal[s] very little, if anything, regarding the analysis performed or articulate[s] the facts upon 

which [it is] based, we conclude that [it] . . . [is] of no precedential value.” (citing Shepard, 916 

So. 2d 861)). Accordingly, our analysis does not rely upon Shepard. 

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