Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02345/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02345-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent
Anita Dona Uli
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

Michael B. Mukasey has been appointed Attorney General of the United

States, and is substituted as respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 43(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2345

___________

Anita Dona Uli, * 

* 

Petitioner, * 

* Petition for Review of an Order of

v. * the Board of Immigration Appeals.

* 

Michael B. Mukasey,1

 Attorney * 

General of the United States. *

* 

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: March 14, 2008

Filed: July 18, 2008

___________

Before BYE, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Anita Dona Uli, a Christian native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review

of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("the Board") affirming an

immigration judge's (IJ) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal

and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. For the reasons discussed below,

we deny the petition.

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I. Background

Uli last entered the United States on November 26, 2002, as a nonimmigrant

visitor. In January 2003, she filed an application for asylum, and one year later,

removal proceedings began. Uli was charged with being removable, pursuant to

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 237(a)(1)(B), as an alien who

remained in the United States for a time longer than permitted. At a hearing on

February 4, 2004, Uli conceded removability. 

On March 4, 2005, she filed an updated application for asylum. Uli appeared

at an additional hearing on April 8, 2005, where she testified in support of her

application for relief. Uli testified that she was born and raised in Jakarta, Indonesia.

As a Catholic, Uli and her family attended church every week on Wednesdays and

Sundays, and the church she attended was only about 200 meters from her family's

home.

 Uli claims religious persecution as a ground for relief. The factual backdrop

to Uli's asylum application includes the May 1998 Indonesian riots. Uli testified that

during these riots, her family home was burned. Early in the morning on the day her

home was burned, Uli smelled smoke and saw hundreds of Muslim people walking

down the street shouting. Uli's mother took her and her sister to a hiding place under

a nearby bridge; while hiding Uli watched her house burn. In addition to Uli's family

home, her church was also destroyed in a fire. Uli testified that she and her sister

stayed under the bridge where their mother had taken them until six o'clock that night.

Uli's mother returned to the family home to save important papers and to help Uli's

father and brother keep rioters away from the children's hiding place under the bridge.

Uli testified that during this day of rioting, her mother saw other people being

abused. Her father was beaten during the incident and, afterwards, went insane. Her

brother was stabbed in the stomach during the riots and has never fully recovered from

the wound. Following these events, none of Uli's family members went to the hospital

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or saw a doctor for treatment. Uli testified that, as far as she knows, the police did not

come to the neighborhood during the riots, made no arrests and conducted no

investigation. 

After the riots, according to Uli's testimony, her family remained in the same

location and rebuilt their house. Uli testified that she has heard that new threats were

made in 2003 to burn the house. Because Uli's church had burned down, she attended

various other churches. She recalls seeing cars vandalized while she attended church.

In addition to religious persecution based upon the riots, Uli also requests relief

based on sexual harassment that she suffered in Indonesia. She testified that she was

sexually assaulted, including being groped on the street. Once while on an elementary

school bus, Uli awoke with the Muslim conductor of the bus grabbing and touching

her breasts. Uli was not wearing Muslim garb at the time, and she believed that she

was targeted because she is Christian. In 2000, while on a college trip, she stayed in

a room with two other people and she woke up with a Muslim man on top of her—she

kicked him off. Uli was the only Christian girl on this trip. Uli also testified that she

suffered sexual harassment from her work supervisor in 2001. Uli made no formal

complaint but instead had her brother and father drive her to work for protection. Uli

had heard that her cousin was raped and that the police merely sent her cousin home.

Uli did not include either the sexual harassment or her brother's and father's riot

related injuries in her original asylum application.

Uli has made two trips to the United States. First, in February 2001, she came

with her parents. Uli traveled with a visitor's visa, and she did not tell anyone at the

consulate about her problems in Indonesia. Although Uli had a six-month visa, she

and her parents decided to return to Indonesia after one month in the U.S. to attend to

her brother. Uli accompanied her parents back to Indonesia to help them travel. In

November 2002, Uli returned to the United States —this time for her sister's wedding.

As before, she did not mention fears to the consulate when getting her second visa.

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Uli's older sister, Artati Triani Steward, also testified on her behalf. Steward,

now a Christian Scientist, came to the United States in 1999 and is a permanent

resident through marriage. Uli's sister testified that her brother had tried to obtain a

visa and had been unable to, and her parents remained there because of their son.

Steward recounted the problems that her family had experienced during the May 1998

riots, including the damage to their church and her brother's injury. She also testified

that she was aware that Uli had been sexually harassed in Indonesia. Steward stated

that she had made two return trips to Indonesia, once in 2002 and again in 2004 when

she stayed for three weeks in her family home. Steward knew of no harm to her family

since 1998 but said that there had been threats to burn the family home again.

On October 11, 2005, the IJ issued a decision finding Uli removable as charged,

denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT protection, and

granting her voluntary departure. The IJ did not find Uli's evidence credible. The IJ

based this credibility determination on the absence of critical fact allegations from

Uli's first asylum application and asylum interview. Uli did not mention sexual abuse

nor did she mention the injuries suffered by her father and brother during the 1998

riots in her initial application. The IJ found that, in light of Uli's credibility issues, she

needed to present corroborating evidence and that she did not. 

The IJ also questioned Uli's subjective fear in returning to Indonesia because

she had come to the United States in 2001 stayed one month and returned to

Indonesia. Additionally, Uli's sister, who is also a Christian, made two trips back to

Indonesia in recent years apparently without incident. The IJ stated further that even

if Uli had established some level of past persecution, circumstances have changed

substantially since 1998. The IJ noted that the 1998 riots affected many societal

groups, not exclusively religious, and violence in Jakarta has not approached that level

since that time. Because Uli's asylum claim failed, the IJ found necessarily that the

petition for withholding of removal also failed. The IJ also stated there was no

evidence of torture for the CAT claim. The IJ then granted voluntary departure.

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Uli did not raise her CAT claim in her brief on appeal and therefore has

abandoned the issue. See Anderson v. Larson, 327 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2003)

(failure to raise or discuss an issue in the briefs is deemed to be an abandonment of

the issue).

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On May 10, 2007, the Board, while not endorsing all aspects of the IJ's

decision, affirmed the decision of the IJ and dismissed the appeal. The Board did find

some merit with the issues raised by Uli on appeal—in particular, her contention that

the IJ erred in basing its adverse credibility finding on her reluctance to recount her

sexual harassment experience. The Board noted that supplementing an initial asylum

application does not lead directly to an adverse credibility finding. The Board then

stated that even taking Uli's testimony as true, the Board still agreed with the IJ that

she had not demonstrated eligibility for relief. 

The Board found that Uli's "major problems" occurred during Indonesia's 1998

riots and that the record indicated that since the time of that civil unrest, the situation

in Indonesia had improved. Citing the 2004 Department of State International

Religious Freedom Report, two other Department of State reports on Indonesia, and

the 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—all submitted by the

government—the Board found that the record indicated that the population in

Indonesia enjoys a high degree of religious freedom, Christians make up almost nine

percent of the population and Catholics make up three percent, and religious attacks

continue to decline. The Board acknowledged that Uli had endured unfortunate

experiences, but found that they did not rise to the level of past persecution. The

Board concluded that, while it did not endorse all aspects of the IJ's opinion, the IJ

reached the correct result. Accordingly, the Board dismissed the appeal and ordered

that Uli be permitted to voluntarily depart. Uli then filed this petition for review. 

II. Discussion

Uli challenges the Board's denial of her application for asylum and withholding

of removal.2

 Uli argues that because the IJ and the Board applied an incorrect legal

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standard, we must remand the case for further consideration under the correct

standard. 

We review the Board's legal determinations de novo, according substantial

deference to the Board's interpretation of the statutes and regulations it administers.

Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 516 (8th Cir. 2007). "A denial of asylum is

reviewed for abuse of discretion; underlying factual findings are reviewed for

substantial support in the record." Id. We must uphold an IJ's factual determinations

if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record

considered as a whole. Id.

"Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the

United States . . . irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum . . . ." 8

U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). To qualify for asylum, the applicant must establish that he or she

is a refugee as defined in the statute. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13. Pursuant to section

101(a)(42) of the INA, a refugee is "any person who is outside any country of such

person's nationality . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or

unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . ." 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 

"If past persecution is established, an alien will be presumed to possess a well

founded fear of future persecution and the burden shifts to the government to show

by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions in the applicant's country have

changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well founded fear of being

persecuted if he or she were to return." Hasalla v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 799, 803 (8th

Cir. 2004). 

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If an applicant attempts to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution

without having shown past persecution then "an alien must show the fear is both

subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable . . . To overcome the BIA's finding

that [the applicant] lacked a well-founded fear of persecution, [the applicant] must

show the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could

fail to find the requisite fear of persecution." Ghasemimehr v. I.N.S., 7 F.3d 1389,

1390 (8th Cir. 1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

"Persecution is the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one's person

or freedom, on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion." Regalado-Garcia v. I.N.S., 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir.

2002). Persecution is an extreme concept and "[l]ow-level intimidation and

harassment alone do not rise to the level of persecution." Makatengkeng v. Gonzales,

495 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Berte v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 993, 996 (8th

Cir. 2005)).

First, Uli claims that the Board erred by not reversing the IJ's adverse credibility

determination. The Board's decision, however, did not rely on the IJ's credibility

analysis and, in fact, rejected it. The Board assumed Uli's testimony was credible. The

IJ based its adverse credibility determination on Uli's omitting sexual harassment from

her initial asylum application. The Board corrected the IJ by stating it would treat Uli's

testimony as true. Therefore, the Board did not err with respect to the credibility

determination because it assumed Uli's account to be credible.

Second, Uli argues that the Board erred by not specifically addressing whether

she had established past persecution. The Board's opinion, in determining Uli's

eligibility for asylum, had to proceed according to the analytical framework of 8

C.F.R. § 1208.13. Sholla v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 2007). When an

applicant for asylum alleges past persecution by state officers on account of a

protected ground, the allegation raises the threshold question of whether she has met

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her burden of proof to establish past persecution, which would entitle her to the

presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id. If the administrative

opinion we are reviewing ignores the initial step of determinating past persecution,

generally we will remand that case to the Board to make a determination as to past

persecution and apply the correct legal standard. Id. 

Here, although the Board was less than explicit in its discussion of past

persecution, we conclude that we need not remand the case on this issue. The Board

did not explicitly state that Uli's experience during the May 1998 riots amounted to

past persecution, instead the Board stated that her "major problems" took place during

the riots. However, a later portion of the opinion implies that the Board found, or

assumed, Uli's experience during the riots did constitute past persecution. We draw

this inference from the Board's discussion of Uli's sexual harassment claims—"the

other problems cited [the sexual harassment claims] by the respondent, while

unfortunate, simply do not rise to the level of past persecution." Here, the Board

indicates that it was aware of the threshold question of whether Uli established past

persecution and that as to the events during the riots, unlike the sexual harassment

claims, Uli had established past persecution. 

The Board specifically found Uli's sexual harassment allegations did not

constitute past persecution. We have stated that "[p]ersecution is the infliction or

threat of death, torture, or injury to one's person or freedom, on account of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

Regalado-Garcia, 305 F.3d at 787. "[P]ersecution is an extreme concept and does not

include low-level intimidation and harassment. Even minor beatings or limited

detentions do not usually rise to the level of past persecution." Lengkong v. Gonzales,

478 F.3d 859, 863 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). We

conclude that the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and that the

conduct Uli describes does not rise to the level of extreme conduct contemplated by

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"persecution" within the meaning of the INA. The record evidence does not compel

the opposite finding. 

Third, Uli argues that the Board improperly failed to shift the burden of proving

a fundamental change in circumstances to the government. Uli argues that if the Board

did implicitly find that Uli had established past persecution on account of the 1998

riots, it was then required to shift the burden to the government to show a fundamental

change in circumstances. Under our case law, "[i]f past persecution is established, an

alien will be presumed to possess a well founded fear of future persecution and the

burden shifts to the government to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

conditions in the applicant's country have changed to such an extent that the applicant

no longer has a well founded fear of being persecuted if he or she were to return."

Hasalla, 367 F.3d at 803. Again here, as above, the Board did not explicitly lay out

the distinct parts of the regulatory framework. The government argues that the Board

implicitly shifted the burden to the government by using evidence that had been

submitted by DHS to rebut the presumption that Uli had a reasonable fear of future

persecution. We agree. 

Uli brings to our attention a recent Board decision, Matter of D-I-M, in which

the Board remanded an asylum case to the IJ because "[t]he Immigration Judge did not

explicitly apply the presumption and failed to shift the burden of proof to the DHS to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent can avoid future

persecution by relocating to another part of Kenya . . . [i]nstead, the Immigration

Judge concluded, without specific references to the voluminous background materials

in the record, that the respondent could safely relocate to a metropolitan area of

Kenya." 24 I. & N. Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 2008). Unlike Matter of D-I-M, the Board here

made specific references to the materials in the record and those materials were

submitted by DHS. Therefore, although a more explicit discussion of the regulatory

framework and burden shifting is preferable, we conclude that the Board did shift the

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Uli's father and brother were injured during the riots, but the record does not

contain evidence that they have since been harmed.

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burden to DHS to rebut the presumption that Uli had a reasonable fear of future

persecution by relying on DHS evidence. 

Uli also argues that the Board's reliance on isolated and conclusory statements

about changed country conditions in the country reports was erroneous. However, as

we recently held in Lengkong, a similar case, evidence of changed country conditions

in country reports rebut the presumption of well-founded fear of persecution in

Indonesia. Lengkong, 478 F.3d 859. In Lengkong we held that there was substantial

evidence in the record to support the Board's denial of an asylum claim of Christian

petitioners in Indonesia based on events surrounding the 1998 riots because country

reports in the record showed conditions improved and, also, petitioner's children still

lived in Indonesia. Id. at 863. In an alternative holding we stated that: 

[e]ven if the petitioners had established past persecution, the record

contains substantial evidence supporting the BIA's finding that the

petitioners did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution due to the

change in circumstances in Indonesia. The country information provided in

the record notes that Protestantism is one of the five recognized faiths in

Indonesia, that the Indonesian government is making considerable progress

in reducing interreligious violence and prosecuting those involved, and that

interreligious tolerance and cooperation are increasing. Although the record

also shows that such violence still exists in Indonesia, we agree with the IJ's

statement that the general tenor of the reports is that the government is

making progress in promoting religious freedom and trying to bring to

justice various attackers and has done so in many case[s]. In addition, the

petitioners' adult children, who are also Christian, continue to live in

Indonesia without incident–a fact that further undermines the petitioners'

claim of future persecution. 

Id. This case is similar—Uli is an Indonesia Christian who was harmed during the

May 1998 riots, and her parents and brother still live in Indonesia.3

 We have stated

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that "[t]he reasonableness of a fear of persecution is diminished when family members

remain in the native country unharmed, and the applicant himself had not been singled

out for abuse." Krasnopivtsev v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 832, 839 (8th Cir. 2004). 

We conclude that the record evidence does not compel a reversal. The Board

assumed Uli to be credible and that she faced persecution in 1998 but found DHS

successfully rebutted the presumption of a reasonable fear of future persecution

because conditions for Christians have improved in Indonesia, and Uli's family still

lives there safely. Although the Board could have been more explicit about shifting

the burden to the government, the Board's reliance on the government's evidence in

rebutting the presumption of a fear of future persecution is sufficient in this case.

Therefore, the Board did not err in denying Uli's asylum application.

Finally, we conclude that the Board did not err in denying Uli's request for

withholding of removal. 

An alien may not be removed if the alien shows there is a clear probability

that his life, or freedom would be threatened in [the alien's] country because

of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group or political opinion. The standard for withholding of removal, a clear

probability of persecution, is more rigorous than the well-founded fear

standard for asylum. An alien who fails to prove eligibility for asylum

cannot meet the standard for establishing withholding of removal. 

Turay v. Ashcroft, 405 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Because Uli did not meet the standard for asylum, she perforce has not met

the higher standard required for withholding of removal.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we deny the petition for review.

______________________________

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