Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03452/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03452-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lloyd T. Swanson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3452

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Lloyd T. Swanson, *

 *

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 15, 2010

Filed: July 6, 2010

___________

Before MELLOY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Lloyd T. Swanson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court1

 sentenced

Swanson to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment. Swanson appeals the district

court’s application of a four-level sentencing enhancement after finding Swanson

possessed the firearm in connection with another felony. See United States

Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(6). We affirm. 

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I. 

 During a search incident to a lawful traffic stop, police discovered a Glock .40

caliber firearm in Swanson’s car between the driver’s seat and center console, with the

butt of the gun in a visible position. The gun was loaded, had a live round in the

chamber and was later found to be stolen. Before towing the car, police searched

Swanson’s vehicle further and discovered numerous packs of More Brand cigarettes

(a brand commonly used for smoking PCP), an empty sandwich baggie box, a black

super-mini scale, a silver proscale, and a black paper bag containing two baggies, each

containing a dropper. Police then searched Swanson incident to arrest and discovered

a vial in his coat pocket. Swanson admitted to police that the vial contained PCP, but

stated the drugs were for personal use only. A police officer at the scene also smelled

the vial and recognized the odor of PCP. No testing was performed, and no lab

reports exist confirming the vial contained PCP.

Swanson was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, a violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He pleaded guilty to the charge, but at the

time no plea agreement was in place. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)

recommended a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), because the

possession of the firearm was “in connection with” the PCP possession, a felony under

Missouri law. Swanson objected to the PSR’s recommendation to apply the

enhancement, arguing that “in connection with” requires the Government prove the

firearm “facilitated or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense” and that

the government failed to do so.

Swanson again objected to the enhancement at the sentencing hearing. He

claimed proximity and closeness were the only bases for any facilitation finding and

those alone were not sufficient for the four-level enhancement. Swanson also claimed

that he had begun carrying the firearm for self-protection after being shot on a

separate occasion. The district court rejected these claims, stating:

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Now, it’s pretty obvious to me that he had that gun there to facilitate

possession and/or distribution of PCP. Why else would he have a gun?

Was he going target shooting?

****

I understand your position, but I’m going to find that [] the four-point

[sic] enhancement that he had possession of that gun to facilitate the

possession of and the potential to facilitate and protect himself because

he had drugs. Now, the argument might be different if he just had the

gun, period, but he had guns and drugs in a car, and I think the four

points [sic] holds.

The district court then applied the four-level sentencing enhancement and sentenced

Swanson to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment, a sentence within the adjusted

Guidelines range.

On appeal, Swanson makes two arguments. First, Swanson argues the district

court failed to apply the proper standard when determining whether he possessed the

firearm “in connection with” another felony offense. Alternatively, he argues that the

facts of this case are not sufficient for such a determination.

II.

We review the district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo and its

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703, 704 (8th

Cir. 2009).

Under § 2K2.1(b)(6), when a defendant possesses a firearm “in connection with

another felony offense,” the offense level increases by four levels. U.S.S.G. §

2K2.1(b)(6). Application Note 14(A) clarifies that a defendant possessed a firearm

“in connection with” the felony offense if the firearm “facilitated, or had the potential

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 Swanson correctly argues that the enhancement does not automatically apply

when a defendant possesses guns and drugs in public as it did in Regans because of

the addition of Application Note 14(A) and our court’s subsequent different treatment

of drug trafficking and possession cases. Still, the court in the present case did not

automatically apply the enhancement, it made a specific finding. Further, we decided

Smith after the addition of 14(A) and affirmed Regans’s analysis of the impact of

concurrent possession of drugs and firearms in public for possession cases. 

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of facilitating, another felony offense.” Id. § 2K2.1(b)(6) cmt. n.14(A). We have

stated that to apply the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement in drug possession cases, the

district court must make a finding that the gun facilitated or had the potential to

facilitate the drug possession. See United States v. Fuentes Torres, 529 F.3d 825, 827

(8th Cir. 2008); see also Blankenship, 552 F.3d at 706 (remanding because the district

court specifically stated no connection between the gun and the drugs was necessary

for the enhancement). In the instant case, the district court applied the proper

standard, explicitly finding that Swanson’s possession of the firearm in the car either

facilitated or had the potential to facilitate his possession of the PCP. Swanson’s first

argument, therefore, is without merit.

If the district court does find that the possession of a firearm facilitated or had

the potential to facilitate a drug possession “it will rarely be clearly erroneous.”

Fuentes Torres, 529 F.3d at 827. To facilitate the crime of drug possession, the

defendant must possess the gun with the purpose or effect of facilitating the drug

possession, and the connection cannot be just spatial or coincidental. United States

v. Dalton, 557 F.3d 586, 589 (8th Cir. 2009). This standard may be met when a

defendant concurrently possesses drugs and a firearm while in public, like in a car.

See United States v. Smith, 535 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2008) (“‘[W]hen a drug user

chooses to carry his illegal drugs out into public with a firearm, there are many ways

in which the weapon can facilitate the drug offense and dangerously embolden the

offender.’”) (quoting United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 1997)).2

We have also recognized the use of guns to protect a defendant’s drugs as a manner

of facilitating drug possession offenses, even when the defendant asserts the gun was

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for self-protection. See Fuentes Torres, 529 F.3d at 826. The inference that a firearm

is for protection of drugs is allowable when the amount of drugs is more than residue.

Cf. Smith, 535 F.3d at 885. 

Thus, the district court did not clearly err in determining Swanson’s possession

of the firearm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the PCP possession because

Swanson had the firearm and PCP in public, with him in his car. The gun and PCP

were both within his immediate reach and it was permissive for the district court to

determine they were purposefully together and not close in proximity as a matter of

coincidence. 

Finally, Swanson argues that the Government did not prove the vial actually

contained PCP, and therefore the enhancement cannot apply. Swanson cites the lack

of a lab report proving the vial contained PCP. However, Swanson provides no legal

support for the position that a lab report is required. Moreover, Swanson admitted the

vial contained PCP, and an officer reported that the vial smelled of PCP and was

located with PCP paraphernalia. We conclude this is sufficient to satisfy the

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for factual findings for sentencing

determinations. See United States v. Azure, 596 F.3d 449, 453 (8th Cir. 2010)

(Government’s burden).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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