Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04448/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04448-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy A. James
Plaintiff
San Francisco Unified School District
Defendant

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TIMOTHY A. JAMES, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, 

Defendant.

CASE NO. 18-cv-04448-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 9 

On July 23, 2018, plaintiff Timothy A. James, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against 

defendant San Francisco Unified School District (the “District”) alleging retaliation in violation of 

(1) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 12203(a); and (2) the Fair 

Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. Section 215(a)(3). (Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 21-27.) 

Generally, James alleges that in his role as a moderate/severe special education teacher, he 

endured harassment and abuse by a student as well as his supervisor, who pressured him not to 

report the student’s behavior and that when the behavior escalated and James did report it, the 

District retaliated against him. 

Now before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss James’s complaint for failure to 

state a claim.1

 (Dkt. No. 9 (“Motion”).) Having carefully considered the pleadings and the papers 

submitted, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion 

to dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE James’s claims. Thus, James may file an 

amended complaint. 

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 The Court has reviewed the papers submitted by the parties in connection with 

defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court has determined that the motion is appropriate for 

decision without oral argument, as permitted by Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 78. See also Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the hearing set for October 2, 2018 is VACATED. 

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I. BACKGROUND

James worked for the District as a “moderate/severe Special Education teacher and case 

manager [at James Denman Middle School] for two academic years.”2 (Compl. ¶ 6.) He received 

a Right-to-Sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) dated April 

19, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) 

James alleges as follows: 

During James’s employment he “suffered severe emotional, mental[,] and physical abuse 

from his immediate supervisor and employer, which resulted in several trips to the ER, more than 

six consecutive months of psychological therapy, over one month [of] disability leave, 

termination[,] and almost cost [him] his life.” (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) 

During James’s first year of employment at James Denman Middle School, a student 

repeatedly attacked him, resulting in bruising, scrapes, sprained joints, and mild abrasions. (Id. 

¶¶ 8-9.) In response, James’s supervisor told him not to report the incidents. (Id. ¶ 8.) By the 

following school year, the same student had grown to be five to six inches taller and forty pounds 

heavier than James. During the second school year, the student also “br[ought] a gun clip into . . . 

James’s classroom[,] . . . br[oke] two staff members’ fingers, assault[ed] a blind woman in a 

wheelchair, raise[d] scissors to the secretary’s face/throat and br[ought] tremendous harm to . . . 

James.” (Id. ¶ 11.) 

In the fall of 2016, the same student’s acts of aggression and assault began to escalate and 

become more frequent. (Id. ¶ 12.) In response, James filed an incident report in October 2016 

followed by a grievance against his supervisor in November 2016. (Id.) Because of James’s 

October 2016 report, the District removed his classroom support staff. (Id. ¶ 13.) Following his 

November 2016 grievance, James “endure[d] heinous acts of retaliation and harassment.” (Id.) 

Following another attack by the same student, James was placed on disability leave from 

November 2016 to January 2017. (Id. ¶ 14.) During this time, James endured continued 

harassment and “was forced to violate work restriction, travel to his worksite and maintain case 

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 James’s employment spanned academic years 2015-2016 and 2016-2017. (Compl. 

¶¶ 9-10.) 

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file compliance.” (Id.) When James returned to his position on January 5, 2017, he “continued to 

experience retaliation and hardship.” (Id. ¶ 15.) James continued to inform District officials of his 

poor working conditions with no relief, and “the District disregarded [his] many attempts to 

engage them.” (Id. ¶ 16.) In February and March 2017, James “sent out more complaints to 

District personnel regarding his declining mental health, his continued harassment, and ongoing 

retaliation to which he received no response and a heightened level of harassment from his 

supervisor.” (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) 

One day after James had filed a complaint in March 2017, the District launched a 

“malicious investigation,” attacking James’s character and publicly embarrassing him. (Id. 

¶ 18.) During this investigation, James was “denied contractual rights and professional courtesies 

that would typically precede” an investigation. (Id.) 

James did not receive “any verified or credible form of notice regarding his termination 

and has received several conflicting reasons as to why he [had] been terminated – each reason 

invalid in and of itself.” (Id. ¶ 27.) For several months after James’s termination of employment, 

the District “continued to defame his person with unsolicited verifiable fictitious reports and 

harassment.” (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) Defendant acted in bad faith and “intentionally acted on knowledge 

submitted in doctor notes and grievances to reinforce and demonstrate similar behaviors known to 

cause [James] harm.” (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) The District also “is in violation of [the FLSA] by fact of 

their actions preceding . . . James’s termination.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Specifically, the district failed to 

provide a “valid or credible form of notice regarding [his] termination” and provided only 

conflicting and invalid reasons for his termination. (Id. ¶ 27.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal for failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 

1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1988)). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its 

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face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face 

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). If the facts alleged do not support a reasonable inference of liability, stronger than a mere 

possibility, the claim must be dismissed. Id. at 678–79. Mere “conclusory allegations of law and 

unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 

F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004). Pro se pleadings must satisfy the same standard even though 

courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally. See Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 

(9th Cir. 1995). The “pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a 

defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Retaliation in Violation of the ADA 

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies & Timely Filing 

A plaintiff bringing a cause of action under the ADA must “exhaust her EEOC 

administrative remedies before seeking federal adjudication of her claims.” EEOC v. Farmer 

Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1004). Moreover, claims of retaliation under the ADA, are 

subject to the timely filing of suit. 42 US.C. § 2000e-(5)(f)(1). In short, a plaintiff who receives a 

right-to-sue notice from the EEOC must file his lawsuit within 90 days of receipt of such notice. 

Id.

James advises that while the right-to-sue notice was dated April 19, 2018, the postmark 

was April 23, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1-1; Dkt. No. 10 (“Opp.”) at ECF 13.)3

 Ninety days from the 

postmark is Sunday, July 22, 2018. James filed his complaint with this Court the next business 

day on July 23, 2018. (See Compl.) Even assuming the shortest delivery period, the earliest that 

James could have received the right-to-sue notice was the day after it was post-marked, on April 

24, 2018. Given this additional information, which should be alleged in any amended complaint, 

James would have timely filed his complaint within 90 days of his receipt of the notice. 

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 The Court refers to ECF pagination with respect to James’s opposition to defendant’s 

motion to dismiss to avoid confusion of multiple and conflicting page numbers. 

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2. Establishment of a Claim of Retaliation Under the ADA

To establish a claim of retaliation in violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that 

“(1) . . . he or she engaged in or was engaging in activity protected by the ADA, (2) the employer 

subjected him or her to an adverse employment decision, and (3) . . . there was a causal link 

between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 

1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); see also Thomas v. 

City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004)); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Here, the only issue 

is whether the allegations of the complaint support the first element. 

Section 11203(a) of the ADA provides: “No person shall discriminate against any 

individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter

or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. §12203(a) (emphasis 

supplied). Thus, like Title VII, which provides the framework for analyzing ADA claims, 4 the 

question arises which is the “act or practice made unlawful by this chapter” of which James 

opposed. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997) (“An employer can violate 

the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII in either of two ways: ‘(1) if the [adverse employment 

action] occurs because of the employee’s opposition to conduct made unlawful employment 

practice by the subchapter, or (2) if it is in retaliation for the employee’s participation in the 

machinery set up by Title VII to enforce its provisions.’”) (internal citations omitted) (additions in 

original). Thus, an employee engages in an activity protected by the ADA by (i) opposing an 

employment practice that is unlawful under the ADA, or (ii) participating in an investigation, 

proceeding, or hearing under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). 

Here, James appears to allege that he engaged in protected activities by (1) filing an 

incident report related to a student’s physical aggression, (2) filing a grievance against his 

supervisor related to the supervisor’s handling of the student’s aggression, and (3) making 

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ADA retaliation claims of plaintiff alleging retaliation for his request for accommodation of a 

disability). 

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complaints to the District regarding “his declining mental health, his continued harassment, and 

ongoing retaliation . . . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 17.) James has not alleged how he believes that these 

allegations implicate the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). For instance, James argues that “his 

mention of disability leave, psychological [and physical] therapy, and bodily injuries are related to 

alleged disability . . . .” (Opp. at 7 (addition in original).) However, James has not alleged that he 

was either denied any of the rights afforded to him by the ADA or that he participated in any 

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the ADA. Without more, it is not apparent how any of 

these “filings” or “complaints” related to an employment practice that is unlawful under the ADA. 

James’s reliance on three cases is inapposite. First, James points to Sumner v. United 

States Postal Serv. for the proposition that “[c]ourts have accepted informal protests of 

discriminatory employment practices as protected activity.” (Opp. at 6.) However, this case 

addresses a former employee’s claims of racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title 

VII, not the ADA. See 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990). James also cites to Sias v. City 

Demonstration Agency and Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp. in support of his argument that 

“the burden of proof does not rest with the [p]laintiff; nor does the [p]laintiff need to establish” 

“facts indicating the basis for [p]laintiff’s grievance against his supervisor, as well as facts 

showing that the complaints opposed any alleged unlawful practices . . . to be awarded ADA 

protections.” (Opp. at 7 (citing Sias, 588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1969); Drinkwater, 904 F.2d 853, 866 

(3d Cir. 1990).) These cases deal with claims of retaliation for opposition to alleged acts of racial 

discrimination, again in violation of Title VII, and claims of retaliation for opposition to alleged 

hostile work environment due to sexual harassment in violation of New Jersey state law. See Sias, 

588 F.2d at 693; Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 854. 

As set forth above, James has not alleged that he has engaged in an activity that is 

protected by the ADA or that he has participated in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing 

under the ADA upon which the alleged retaliation was based. 

B. Retaliation in Violation of the FLSA 

To establish a claim of retaliation under Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA, a plaintiff must 

allege that (1) he engaged activity protected by the FLSA; (2) he suffered an adverse employment 

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decision; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse 

employment action. See Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 103 F.Supp.2d 1180, 

1184 (N.D. Cal. 2000). Protected activity includes filing a complaint or instituting a proceeding 

“under or related to” the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). “Complaints filed ‘under’ the FLSA 

are those complaints provided for in the Act, i.e., those complaints filed with the Department of 

Labor or the federal court as specified in the Act. Complaints that are not ‘under’ the FLSA but 

are ‘related to’ it, on the other hand, are those complaints filed outside of court and the 

Department of Labor that relate to the subject matter of the FLSA . . . .” Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 

F.3d 997, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 1999). The FLSA provides protections for workers including 

minimum wage, maximum hours, and child labor protections. See 29 U.S.C. § 206, 207, 212. 

As noted above, James appears to allege that he engaged in protected activities by (1) filing 

an incident report related to a student’s physical aggression, (2) filing a grievance against his 

supervisor related to the supervisor’s handling of the student’s aggression, and (3) making 

complaints to the District regarding “his declining mental health, his continued harassment, and 

ongoing retaliation . . . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 17.) James also alleges that the District has violated the 

FLSA “by fact of their actions preceding [his] termination.” (Id. ¶ 26.) James further alleges that 

defendant failed to provide a “valid or credible form of notice regarding [his] termination” and 

that he received several conflicting and invalid reasons for his termination. (Id.) 

Again, it is not clear how James believes that these allegations implicate the FLSA.5 See

29 U.S.C. § 206, 207, 212. James does not allege that his complaints or grievance related to wage 

or hour rights or child labor claims. (Id.; see also Compl.) James avers that “as acknowledged in 

the clarifying terminology applicable to the Section in question, [p]laintiff need not engage in a 

related wage rights or child labor claim to be granted protection under Section 15(a)(3).” James 

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 Section 15(a)(3) prohibits the “discharge or . . . any other manner [of] discriminat[ion] 

against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be 

instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in 

any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.” 29 U.S.C. § 

215(a)(3) (emphasis supplied). 

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does so without reference to a citation for the “clarifying terminology,” and so the Court assumes 

that he is referring to the definitional provisions of the FLSA. These definitions do not abrogate 

Section 15(a)(3)’s limitation protecting only those employees who suffered discharge or 

discrimination because he or she “has filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any 

proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified . . . in any such proceeding.”6 29 

U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, James’s conclusion that the District “acted in 

violation” of the FLSA is insufficient to state a claim of such a violation. See Adams, 355 F.3d at 

1183 (holding that mere “conclusory allegations of law . . . are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

dismiss”). Accordingly, James has not alleged that he has filed a complaint or instituted or caused 

to be instituted any proceeding under or related to the FLSA or has testified in any such 

proceeding. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss and 

DISMISSES James’s complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. As noted, in addition to the substantive 

allegations, James shall include allegations regarding the timeliness of his complaint. 

The Court advises plaintiff that a Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which contains helpful 

information about proceeding without an attorney, is available in the Clerk’s office or through the 

Court’s website, http://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se. 

The Court also advises plaintiff that additional assistance may be available by making an 

appointment with the Legal Help Center. There is no fee for this service. To make an 

appointment with the Legal Help Center in San Francisco, Plaintiff may visit the San Francisco 

Courthouse, located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 15th Floor, Room 2796, San Francisco, 

California, 94102, or call 415/782-9000 (ext. 8657). To make an appointment with the Legal Help 

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 The Court is similarly unpersuaded by James’s argument that because the Section 

15(a)(3) “states that it is a violation for any person to discharge . . . because such employee has 

filed any complaint . . . the protection applies to all employees for an employer even in instances 

in which the employee’s work and the employer are not covered by the FLSA,” as it ignores the 

rest of the statutory language. (Opp. at 10 (emphasis in original).) 

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Center in Oakland, plaintiff may visit the Oakland Courthouse, located at 1301 Clay Street, 4th 

Floor, Room 470S, Oakland, California, 94612, or call 415/782-8982. The Help Center’s website 

is available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/helpcentersf. 

To the extent that James has a basis for filing an amended complaint, he must do so by 

Friday, October 26, 2018. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of the complaint with 

prejudice. Defendant shall file a response fourteen (14) days after the filing. 

This Order terminates Docket Number 9. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 27, 2018 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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