Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04195/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04195-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rene Gonzalez-Lerma
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED . United States Court o1 A?~.::...:; 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RENE GONZALEZ-LERMA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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OEC 111995 

PATRICK FISHEB - Clerlt 

No. 94-4195 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 91-CR-170G) 

David J. Schwendiman, Assistant United States Attorney, Salt Lake 

City, UT (Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney, Salt 

Lake City, UT, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff/Appellee. 

Jenine M. Jensen, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, CO 

(Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), 

for Defendant/Appellant. 

Before EBEL, and McKAY, Circuit Judges and COOK,* Senior District 

Judge. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant appeals his sentence of 20 years imprisonment following his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to 

* The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior District Judge for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-4195 Document: 01019280403 Date Filed: 12/11/1995 Page: 1 
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). On appeal, defendant argues: (1) The sentencing judge's failure to comply 

strictly with certain procedures mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 851 in 

enhancing his sentence based on a prior drug conviction rendered 

the enhancement illegal; and (2) the failure of defendant's counsel to request a continuance in anticipation of future amendments 

to the sentencing guidelines--amendments that may have enabled the 

judge to reduce defendant's sentence--deprived him of his Sixth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. We affirm. 

FACTS 

Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent 

to distribute in violation of Section 841(a) (1) in October 1992. 

At the sentencing hearing following conviction, the government 

sought to enhance defendant's mandatory minimum sentence to 20 

years pursuant to Section 841(b) (1) (A), which permits enhancement 

when the defendant has been convicted of a prior felony drug offense.1 However, Section 851 requires that certain procedural 

conditions be met before enhancing a sentence, including ·the requirement that the judge inform the defendant that he may 

challenge the prior conviction for sentencing purposes and that, 

if he chooses not to challenge the prior conviction before a sentence is imposed, he may not thereafter raise such a challenge. 

At the sentencing hearing, defendant sought and obtained a continuance to research the validity of the prior conviction and to 

determine whether it could be challenged under Section 851(b) for 

1 Defendant was convicted on June 13, 1988 of possession of onehalf gram of cocaine. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4195 Document: 01019280403 Date Filed: 12/11/1995 Page: 2 
enhancement purposes.2 Defendant ultimately concluded that there 

were no grounds to challenge the earlier conviction. The judge, 

however, considered the enhancement "a very very improper kind of 

thing" under the circumstances because the prior conviction relied 

upon for the enhancement was only possession of one-half gram of 

cocaine. Judge Greene therefore refused to enhance the sentence, 

finding that the government failed to comply with Section 851 by 

not filing a timely notice. The prosecution then appealed. 

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the 

government's Section 851 notice was both timely and adequate. See 

U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1484-86 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 114 S. Ct. 1862 (1994). The court remanded the case to 

the district court, ordering Judge Greene to vacate the sentence 

and to resentence in accordance with the opinion. Id. at 1486. 

At resentencing, Judge Greene remained reluctant to enhance 

defendant's sentence, but followed the Tenth Circuit's order. 

Judge Greene did not again inform the defendant of his opportunity 

to challenge the conviction as required by Section 851(b). Judge 

Greene concluded the hearing by stating: 

The only hope I can suggest if Congress should determine to change the minimum mandatory law and make 

[the change] retroactive, and some proposals would have 

it, that could be an ultimate impact and relief. 

It's no promise by this court, it's just an observation of something that could happen and might be 

something to cause this defendant to have some hope in 

that regard. 

2 Early in the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel recognized 

that defendant was "entitled under Section 851 to a hearing regarding the accuracy and veracity of that prior conviction" and 

that if he did not challenge the conviction prior to sentencing, 

"any objection or any argument that I have as to that prior conviction" would be waived. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4195 Document: 01019280403 Date Filed: 12/11/1995 Page: 3 
Some twenty days after resentencing, President Clinton signed 

amendments to the criminal code under the Violent Crime Control 

and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 

1796.3 Among the enactments was an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(f)--the so-called mandatory minimum safety valve provision--

which allows judges to impose a sentence below the statutory 

minimum sentence when the defendant meets certain criteria. Defendant argues on appeal that his attorney--in light of Judge 

Greene's comments--deprived him of effective assistance of counsel 

by failing to seek a continuance of the hearing until after the 

amendments took effect. 

I. The Validity of the Sentence Enhancement 

Defendant first argues that his enhancement is invalid because Judge Greene failed to comply strictly with Section 851(b) 's 

procedural requirements by not informing defendant of his 

opportunity to challenge the prior conviction upon resentencing. 

The legality of a sentence presents a question of law which we 

review de novo. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at 1484. 

A. The Operation of Section 851 

Congress enacted Section 851 as a measure of protection 

against Section 841's harsh sentence enhancement mechanisms. u.s. 

v. Novey, 922 F.2d 624, 628 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 

3 President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control Act on September 13, 1994. The act's provisions took effect on September 

23, 1994. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4195 Document: 01019280403 Date Filed: 12/11/1995 Page: 4 
1234 (1991). Section 851(a) (1) imposes a jurisdictional requirement, granting the district court jurisdiction to enhance a 

defendant's sentence only when "the United States attorney files 

[before trial or entry of a guilty plea] an information with the 

court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or 

counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous 

convictions to be relied upon." Section 851(a) (1). See U.S. v. 

Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 882 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 972 

(1991) . 

Once the prosecution has filed a timely notice of its intention to enhance a defendant's sentence if convicted, Section 

851(b) requires the judge at the sentencing hearing to engage in a 

colloquy with the convicted defendant before enhancing his sentence. Specifically, Section 851(b) provides: 

Affirmation or denial of previous conviction 

(b) If the United States attorney files an information under this section, the court shall after conviction but before pronouncement of sentence inquire of 

the person with respect to whom the information was 

filed whether he affirms or denies that he has been . 

previously convicted as alleged in the information, and 

shall inform him that any challenge tq a prior conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may 

not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. 

The judge therefore must offer the defendant the opportunity to 

challenge the prior conviction before it can be used for enhancement purposes. 

B. The Sentencing Judge's Compliance with Section 851(b) 

The government argues on appeal that Judge Greene's failure 

to further inform defendant of his opportunity to challenge the 

prior conviction upon resentencing is harmless error and does not 

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invalidate defendant's sentence. Defendant, however, argues that 

harmless error analysis does not apply to Section 851(b). 

This Court has held that harmless error analysis does not 

apply to the prosecutor's failure to comply with Section 851(a) 

because the provision serves as a jurisdictional requirement. See 

Wright, 932 F.2d at 882 (lOth Cir. 1991). Section 851(b), 

however, is not jurisdictional, but instead simply imposes 

procedural prerequisites that the court must follow before it may 

enhance a defendant's sentence. 

Because Section 851(b) is not jurisdictional, we are not 

foreclosed from applying a harmless error analysis to Judge 

Greene's failure to further inform defendant of his opportunity to 

challenge the prior conviction upon resentencing.4 Fed R. Crim. 

Pro. 52(a) provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or 

variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." We consider a non-constitutional error harmless "unless 

it had a 'substantial influence' on the outcome or leaves one in 

'grave doubt' as to whether it had such effect." U.S. v. Flanagan, 34 F.3d 949, 955 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

4 In holding the harmless error test applicable to a judge's 

failure to engage in the Section 851(b) colloquy, we join several 

of our sister circuits. Other courts have upheld enhancements 

despite the judge's failure to comply with Section 851(b) in 

situations where the defendant affirmed that he was the defendant 

convicted of the prior offense and where any challenge to the 

prior conviction would have been futile. See U.S. v. RomeroCarrion, 54 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Flores, 5 F.3d 

1070, 1082 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2691 (1994); 

U.S. v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 

113 S. Ct. 2446 (1993); U.S. v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 902-03 (5th 

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1664 (1993); u.s. v. Housley, 

907 F.2d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Weaver, 905 F.2d 

1466, 1482 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Sikes v. U.S., 

498 u.s. 1091 (1991). 

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When applying the harmless error test to a Section 85l(b) 

issue, we must keep in mind that the purpose of the provision is 

to ensure that a defendant's waiver of his rights to challenge his 

prior convictions is made knowingly and voluntarily. See Novey, 

922 F.2d at 628 n.4 (citation omitted). In the present case, we 

find Judge Greene's failure to further inform defendant of his opportunity to challenge the prior conviction upon resentencing to 

be harmless because defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

rights to challenge his prior conviction at the first sentencing 

hearing. Defendant at that hearing researched whether he could 

challenge the conviction and concluded no grounds existed upon 

which he could challenge it, thereby affirming that he was the 

individual convicted of the prior offense being used to enhance 

his sentence and that it was a valid conviction for sentencing 

purposes. Defendant clearly understood his rights under Section 

851(b) to challenge the prior conviction as he requested a continuance to research whether it could be used for enhancement 

purposes. Furthermore, the fact that he decided no grounds existed upon which he could challenge his prior conviction indicates 

that any challenge at the second hearing would have been futile. 

Because Judge Greene's failure to comply with Section 85l(b) was 

harmless, we affirm defendant's sentence enhancement. 

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Defendant's second argument is that the attorney who represented him at his resentencing performed ineffectively in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by not requesting 

--in light of Judge Greene's comments suggesting a possible future 

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change in the law--a continuance until after the passage of the 

Violent Crime Act amendments. We review legal claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de UQYQ. U.S. v. Jiminez, 928 F.2d 

356, 361 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991). 

The well-established test for ineffective assistance of 

counsel requires that a defendant show: (1) counsel's performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the 

result would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). See also U.S. v. King, 936 F.2d 

477, 480 (lOth Cir.) (stating that the defendant must show: (1) 

counsel's performance was 11 deficient 11 ; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1008 

(1991). Because we conclude that defendant's prior attorney did 

not act unreasonably, we need not consider the second element of 

the Strickland test. 

There is a strong presumption that an attorney's conduct 

11 falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.11 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Judicial scrutiny is 

highly deferential, and 11 every effort [should] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 

conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. 11 Id. In all, the 

court's role is to decide defendant's claim by judging the 11 reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the 

particular case, viewed as of the time of the counsel's conduct 11 

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and determine whether the counsel's acts or omissions were "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. 

at 690. 

Counsel's assistance is not ineffective simply because counsel fails to base its decisions on laws that might be passed in 

the future. In Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1981), 

the defendant was convicted of selling heroin two months before 

the state court held in another case that submission reports used 

to convict the defendant were inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 908. 

The court distinguished the failure of an attorney to be aware of 

prior controlling precedent--which might render counsel's assistance ineffective--from the failure of an attorney to foresee 

future developments in the law. Citing another Fifth Circuit decision, Cooks v. U.S., 461 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1972), the court 

concluded that: 

counsel's inability to foresee future pronouncements 

which will dispossess the Court of power to impose a 

particular sentence which is presently thought viable 

does not render counsel's representation ineffective, 

nor does a plea later become invalid because it is 

predicated upon advice correct at the time, but later 

proved to be erroneous by reason of a subsequent decision. . . Clairvoyance is not a required attribute of 

effective representation. 

642 F.2d at 908 (quoting Cooks, 461 F.2d at 532) (omission and 

emphasis in original) . 

In the present case, defendant's counsel did not act outside 

the range of reasonable professional assistance at resentencing by 

not seeking a continuance. Considering the attorney's perspective 

at the time of sentencing, it was not only unclear when the 

amendments would take effect, but also uncertain whether they 

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would take effect at all. Further, it is not at all clear that 

the district court even had Pub. L. No. 103-322 in mind when it 

advised defendant that if Congress should, at some future-date, 

determine to change the mandatory minimum law, that it might make 

the change retroactive. Defendant faults his former counsel not 

for failing to find existing law, but for failing to predict future law. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that clairvoyance is 

not a required attribute of effective representation.5 Furthermore, we can foresee defendant's theory creating an ominous situation in which every attorney whose client faces sentencing would 

attempt to delay sentencing each time lawmakers debate a new 

statute or amendment. This is an outcome that we cannot allow. 

5 Defendant analogizes to several cases which, he suggests, stand 

for the proposition that attorneys should act in accordance with 

anticipated laws. One of these cases, however, involved a situation where the attorney misinterpreted existing law. See Strader 

v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 64-65 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding ineffective assistance when counsel grossly misinformed his client about 

parole eligibility dates before accepting a plea) . Defendant also 

refers to a recent case where the attorney moved to reschedule 

sentencing until after Section 3553(f)--the same provision that 

defendant argues his counsel should have anticipated in the 

present case--took effect as indicating the actions of a reasonable attorney. United States v. Singh, No. 93-CR-931, 1994 WL 

510053 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 16, 1994). In Singh, however, the defendant was to be sentenced on September 13, 1994--three days after 

the President signed the crime bill but a week before its provisions took effect. Defendant's attorney moved to adjourn his 

sentencing until after the amendments took effect. Id. at *1. In 

contrast in the present case, the passage of the crime amendments 

was not imminent at the time that defendant was sentenced. Instead, defendant was sentenced 20 days before the President made 

any commitment to sign the amendments. In any event, the court in 

Singh was only concerned about the defendant's motion for a continuance and nothing in Singh suggests that defendant's counsel 

would have rendered ineffective assistance if he had not sought a 

continuance. 

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CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, we hold that the sentencing judge's failure to 

engage in the Section 851(b) colloquy upon resentencing was harmless and that defendant's counsel at the resentencing did not 

perform unreasonably when he failed to seek to continue the sentencing until after enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law 

Enforcement Act of 1994. Therefore, we AFFIRM defendant's sentence. 

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