Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35559/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35559-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Trucking Associations, Inc.
Amicus Curiae
Jeremy Brinker
Appellee
FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.
Appellant
Jon Leighter
Appellee
Dennis McHenry
Appellee
Oregon Trucking Associations, Inc.
Amicus Curiae
Edward Slayman
Appellee
David Spicer
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD SLAYMAN; DENNIS

MCHENRY; JEREMY BRINKER; JON

LEIGHTER; DAVID SPICER,

individually and on behalf of all

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE

SYSTEM, INC., DBA Fedex Home

Delivery, Inc.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-35525

D.C. Nos.

3:05-cv-01127-HZ

3:07-cv-00818-HZ

OPINION

EDWARD SLAYMAN; DENNIS

MCHENRY; JEREMY BRINKER; JON

LEIGHTER; DAVID SPICER,

individually and on behalf of all

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE

SYSTEM, INC., DBA Fedex Home

Delivery, Inc.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-35559

D.C. Nos.

3:05-cv-01127-HZ

3:07-cv-00818-HZ

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2 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 6, 2014—Portland, Oregon

Filed August 27, 2014

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Stephen S. Trott,

and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

SUMMARY*

Oregon Law

The panel reversed the Multidistrict Litigation Court’s

grant of summary judgment to FedEx Ground Package

System, Inc., its denial of plaintiff FedEx drivers’ motion for

partial summary judgment, and its certification of plaintiffs’

classes insofar as they sought prospective relief in two class

actions alleging that FedEx drivers in Oregon were

employees rather than independent contractors.

The panel held under Oregon law that plaintiff FedEx

drivers were employees as a matter of law under both the

right-to-control and economic-realities tests. The panel

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 3

remanded to the district court with instructions to enter

summary judgment for plaintiffs on the question of

employment status. The panel also held that one of the

classes lacked Article III standing to seek prospective relief,

and the other class’s claims for prospective relief became

moot before the Multidistrict Litigation Court certified the

class.

COUNSEL

Mark. A. Friel, Steve Douglas Larson, Scott Alden Shorr

(argued), Stoll Berne, Portland, Oregon, for PlaintiffsAppellants/Cross-Appellees.

Jonathan Hacker (argued), O’Melveny & Myers LLP,

Washington, D.C.; Anton Metlitsky, O’Melveny & Myers

LLP, New York, New York; Robert Schwartz and Scott

Voelz, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California,

for Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Richard Pianka, Arlington, Virginia, for Amici Curiae

American Trucking Associations, Inc. and Oregon Trucking

Associations, Inc.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

As a central part of its business, FedEx Ground Package

System, Inc. (“FedEx”), contracts with drivers to deliver

packages to its customers. The drivers must wear FedEx

uniforms, drive FedEx-approved vehicles, and groom

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4 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

themselves according to FedEx’s appearance standards. 

FedEx tells its drivers what packages to deliver, on what

days, and at what times. Although drivers may operate

multiple delivery routes and hire third parties to help perform

work on those routes, they may do so only with FedEx’s

consent.

FedEx contends its drivers are independent contractors

under Oregon law. Plaintiffs, two classes of FedEx drivers in

Oregon, contend they are employees. We agree with

plaintiffs.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Named plaintiffs, former FedEx drivers, represent two

classes comprising approximately 363 individuals who were

full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in Oregon at any time

between 1999 and 2009. Plaintiff class members worked for

FedEx’s two operating divisions, FedEx Ground and FedEx

Home Delivery. FedEx Ground deals primarily with

business-to-business deliveries, while FedEx Home Delivery

deals primarily with residential deliveries. The differences

between the two divisions do not matter to this appeal.

FedEx characterizes its drivers as independent

contractors. FedEx’s Operating Agreement (“OA”) governs

its relationship with the drivers. The OA’s “Background

Statement” provides:

[T]his Agreement will set forth the mutual

business objectives of the two parties . . . but

the manner and means of reaching these

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 5

results are within the discretion of the

[driver], and no officer or employee of FedEx

. . . shall have the authority to impose any

term or condition on [the driver] . . . which is

contrary to this understanding.

A provision of the OA, titled “Discretion of Contractor to

Determine Method and Means of Meeting Business

Objectives,” states:

[N]o officer, agent or employee of FedEx . . .

shall have the authority to direct [the driver]

as to the manner or means employed . . . . For

example, no officer, agent or employee of

FedEx . . . shall have the authority to prescribe

hours of work, whether or when the [driver] is

to take breaks, what route the [driver] is to

follow, or other details of performance.

FedEx’s relationship with its drivers also is governed by

various policies and procedures prescribed by FedEx.

1. Job Requirements

The OA requires FedEx drivers to pick up and deliver

packages within their assigned “Primary Service Area[s].” 

Drivers must deliver packages every day that FedEx is open

for business and must deliver every package they are assigned

each day. They must deliver each package within a specific

window of time negotiated between FedEx and its customers. 

After each delivery, drivers must use an electronic scanner to

send data about the delivery to FedEx. FedEx does not

require drivers to follow specific delivery routes. However,

FedEx tells its managers to design and recommend to its

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6 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

drivers routes that will “reduce travel time” and “minimize

expenses and maximize earnings and service.”

FedEx does not expressly dictate working hours, but it

structures drivers’ workloads to ensure that they work

between 9.5 and 11 hours every working day. If a driver’s

manager determines that the driver has more work than he or

she “can reasonably be expected to handle” in a 9.5- to 11-

hour day, the manager may reassign part of the driver’s

workload to other drivers. Drivers are compensated

according to a somewhat complex formula that includes perday and per-stop components. Drivers are expected to arrive

at their delivery terminals each morning, and they are not

supposed to leave the terminal until all of their packages are

available for pick-up. FedEx instructs managers to make sure

that drivers properly fill out their paperwork and prepare their

packages for delivery. Each terminal sets a time by which all

drivers must return at the end of the day. If drivers want their

trucks loaded by FedEx’s package-handlers, they must leave

their trucks at the terminal overnight.

The OA gives FedEx the authority to “reconfigure” a

driver’s service area upon five days’ written notice. Drivers

have the right to propose a plan to avoid reconfiguration,

“using means satisfactory to FedEx.” FedEx “may, in its sole

discretion,” reject a plan that does not “provide reasonable

means to continue” the driver’s service area. Should a

driver’s service area be reconfigured in such a way that the

driver gains customers, FedEx may reduce that driver’s pay

to compensate other drivers who lost customers in the

reconfiguration.

FedEx trains its drivers on how best to perform their job

and to interact with customers. The OA provides that, during

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 7

the first 30 days of the contract term, FedEx “shall . . .

familiarize [drivers] with various quality service procedures

developed by FedEx.” The OA requires drivers to conduct

themselves “with integrity and honesty, in a professional

manner, and with proper decorum at all times.” They must

“[f]oster the professional image and good reputation of

FedEx.”

A driver’s managers may conduct up to four ride-along

performance evaluations each year, “to verifythat [the driver]

is meeting the standards of customer service” required by the

OA. Managers are supposed to observe and record small

details about each step of a delivery, including whether a

driver uses a “dolly or cart” to move packages, demonstrates

a “sense of urgency,” and “[p]laces [his or her] keys on [the]

pinky finger of [his or her] non-writing hand” after locking

the delivery vehicle. After finishing a ride-along evaluation,

managers are supposed to give immediate feedback to

drivers about the quality of their work. FedEx contends

in this litigation that this feedback constitutes mere

recommendations that drivers are free either to follow or

disregard.

Drivers must follow FedEx’s “Safe Driving Standards.” 

These standards prohibit illegal conduct such as “[d]riving

while under the influence of alcohol or drugs” and “[u]sing a

motor vehicle in the commission of a felony.” They also

forbid some legal conduct, including “driving a motor vehicle

in a speed exhibition, contest or drag race” and “[c]arrying

passengers not authorized by FedEx.”

The OA allows drivers to operate more than one vehicle

and route, but only “with the consent of FedEx” and only if

“consistent with the capacity of the [driver’s] terminal.” 

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8 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

Drivers may also hire third parties to help perform their work. 

Third-party helpers must be “qualified pursuant to applicable

federal, state and municipal safety standards and

[FedEx’s] Safe Driving Standards.” They must be “fully

trained” and must “conform fully” with the OA. Drivers “in

good standing” under the OA may assign their rights and

obligations to replacement drivers, but any such replacement

must be “acceptable to FedEx.”

Drivers enter into the OA for an initial term of one, two,

or three years. At the end of the initial term, the OA provides

for automatic renewal for successive one-year terms if neither

party provides notice of their intent not to renew. The OA

may be terminated (1) by the parties’ mutual agreement;

(2) for cause, including a breach of any provision of the OA;

(3) if FedEx stops doing business or reduces operations in all

or part of the driver’s service area; or (4) upon thirty days’

written notice by the driver. The OA requires drivers to

submit claims for wrongful termination to arbitration.

2. Equipment and Appearance Requirements

FedEx requires its drivers to provide their own vehicles. 

Vehicles must not only meet “all applicable federal, state and

municipal laws and regulations,” but also must be specifically

approved by FedEx. The OA allows FedEx to dictate the

“identifying colors, logos, numbers, marks and insignia” of

the vehicles. All vehicles must be painted “FedEx white,” a

specific shade of Sherwin-Williams paint, or its equivalent. 

They must be marked with the FedEx logo and “maintained

in a clean and presentable fashion free of body damage and

extraneous markings.” FedEx requires vehicles to have

specific dimensions, and all vehicles must also contain

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 9

shelves with specific dimensions. FedEx requires that a

“typical package van” have

two [shelves] per side, full length of the body. 

They should be 24" (-1", +3") deep with a 1"

to 2" pitch and a front lip not to exceed 2"

height. Top shelf to bottom of roof or roof

bow should be 24" minimum. The lower shelf

lip to the bottom of the top shelf should be

24" (+/- 3/4"). Aluminum is the preferred

material, however marine grade plywood is

acceptable.

Managers may refuse to let drivers work if their vehicles do

not meet these requirements.

Drivers must provide maintenance at their own expense

and must “bear all costs and expenses incidental to operation”

of the vehicle. Drivers authorize FedEx to pay for vehicle

licensing, taxes, and fees, and to deduct these costs from the

drivers’ pay. The OA gives FedEx

such exclusive possession, use, and control of

the [vehicle as] required by . . . applicable

regulations, but [FedEx]shall have no right or

authority . . . to operate the [vehicle] for any

purpose (except for incidental yard movement

and positioning) unless the [vehicle] is driven

either by [the driver] or by an operator

engaged by [the driver].

The OA requires that while vehicles are “in the service of

FedEx,” they must be used “exclusively for the carriage of

the goods of FedEx . . . and for no other purpose.” Drivers

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10 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

may use their vehicles “for other commercial or personal

purposes when [they are] not in the service of FedEx,” but

only if all “identifying numbers, marks, logos and insignia”

are removed or covered.

FedEx offers a “Business Support Package,” which

provides drivers with uniforms, scanners, and other necessary

equipment. FedEx deducts the cost of the equipment from

drivers’ pay. Purchase of the package is ostensibly optional,

but more than 99 percent of drivers purchase it. The scanners

that drivers must use to send delivery information to FedEx

are not readily available from any other source.

The OA requires drivers to comply with personalappearance standards and to wear a FedEx uniform

“maintained in good condition.” The required uniform

includes a uniform shirt with the FedEx logo, uniform pants

or shorts, dark shoes and socks, and, if the driver chooses to

wear a jacket or cap, a uniform jacket and cap with the FedEx

logo. Drivers must keep their “personal appearance

consistent with reasonable standards of good order as . . .

promulgated from time to time by FedEx.” Drivers must be

“clean shaven, hair neat and trimmed, free of body odor.” 

Managers may refuse to let drivers work if they are

improperly dressed or groomed.

B. Procedural History

This consolidated appeal involves two class actions

originally filed in the District of Oregon: Slayman v. FedEx

Ground Package System, No. 12-35525, and Leighter v.

FedEx Ground Package System, No. 12-35559. The basis for

both cases is plaintiffs’ claim that “FedEx improperly

classified its drivers as independent contractors, thereby

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 11

forcing them to incur business expenses and depriving them

of benefits otherwise owed to employees” under Oregon law. 

Except where the differences matter to our holding, we do not

distinguish between the two cases.

The Slayman plaintiffs brought claims for (1) illegal

deductions from wages under Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610,

(2) fraud, (3) rescission of the OA, and (4) declaratory relief. 

The Leighter plaintiffs brought claims for (1) illegal

deductions from wages under Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610,

(2) rescission of the OA, (3) declaratory relief, (4) injunctive

relief, (5) unpaid overtime under Or. Rev. Stat. § 653.261 and

Or. Admin. R. 839-020-0030, and (6) unpaid wages. The

named plaintiffs in Slayman are Edward Slayman, Dennis

McHenry, and Jeremy Brinker. The named plaintiffs in

Leighter are Jon Leighter and David Spicer. All the named

plaintiffs except Leighter had stopped driving for FedEx

before the complaints were filed. Leighter stopped driving

for FedEx two months after the Leighter complaint was filed.

Between 2003 and 2009, similar cases were filed against

FedEx in approximately forty states. The Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these FedEx cases,

including Slayman and Leighter, for multidistrict litigation

(“MDL”) proceedings in the District Court for the Northern

District of Indiana (“the MDL Court”). Plaintiffs moved for

class certification. They represented to the MDL Court that

their claims would rely only on “common proof applicable to

members of the class as whole.” The MDL Court certified

classes in both Slayman and Leighter, except for plaintiffs’

claims for rescission of the OA. The MDLCourt certified the

Slayman plaintiffs’ damages claim under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and their claim for declaratory relief

under Rule 23(b)(2). The MDL Court certified the Leighter

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12 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

plaintiffs’ damages claims as two subclasses under Rule

23(b)(3) and their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief

under Rule 23(b)(2).

Plaintiffs in all the MDL cases moved for partial

summary judgment, seeking to establish their status as

employees as a matter of law. In most cases, FedEx crossmoved for summary judgment. However, FedEx did not

move for summary judgment in either Slayman or Leighter. 

The MDL Court denied nearly all of the MDL plaintiffs’

motions for summary judgment and granted nearly all of

FedEx’s motions. In Slayman and Leighter, the MDL Court

granted summary judgment sua sponte to FedEx, holding that

plaintiffs were independent contractors as a matter of law.

The MDL Court remanded Slayman and Leighter to the

district court to resolve the drivers’ rescission claims, for

which class certification had not been granted. The district

court granted summary judgment to FedEx on those claims

and entered final judgment. Plaintiffs timely appealed,

challenging only the MDL Court’s denial of their partial

motion for summary judgment and its grant of summary

judgment to FedEx. FedEx conditionally cross-appealed,

arguing that if we reverse the MDL Court’s grant of summary

judgment to FedEx, we should also reverse the MDL Court’s

class-certification decisions.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s decision whether

to grant summary judgment, viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Fichman v. Media

Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008). “A grant of

summary judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no genuine

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 13

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d

1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a)). We review the district court’s class-certification

decisions for abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale

Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 2011).

III. Discussion

A. Certification to the Oregon Supreme Court

As an initial matter, plaintiffs request that we certify the

question of their status to the Oregon Supreme Court. We

decline to do so “because ‘controlling precedent’ is available

to guide us.” Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 F.3d 943, 958

(9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). This case does not raise an

unsettled question of substantive state law. It simply requires

us to apply legal tests that Oregon courts have applied many

times in prior cases. See Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035,

1037 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Summary Judgment on Employment Status

The MDL Court granted summary judgment to FedEx,

holding that plaintiffs are independent contractors as a matter

of law. Plaintiffs argue that, at a minimum, summary

judgment for FedEx was inappropriate. They argue further

that the district court should have granted their motion for

partial summary judgment because they are employees as a

matter of law. We agree that plaintiffs are employees as a

matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the MDL Court and

remand to the district court with instructions to enter

summary judgment for plaintiffs on the question of

employment status.

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14 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

The parties agree that Oregon law controls this dispute. 

Plaintiffs’ claims under Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610 are governed

by Oregon’s right-to-control test. See Cejas Commercial

Interiors, Inc. v. Torres-Lizama, 316 P.3d 389, 396 (Or. Ct.

App. 2013). The Leighter plaintiffs’ claims for unpaid

overtime under Or. Rev. Stat. § 653.261 and Or. Admin. R.

839-020-0030 are governed by Oregon’s economic-realities

test. Id. at 397.

We conclude that summary judgment for plaintiffs is

appropriate in this case. The facts are largely undisputed. 

FedEx and plaintiffs agree that their working relationship is

controlled by the OA and FedEx’s policies and procedures. 

They dispute only the extent to which those documents give

FedEx the right to control its drivers. In Oregon, the meaning

of a contract such as the OA is a question of law, unless it is

ambiguous and there is “competing extrinsic evidence” from

which a jury could resolve the ambiguity in favor of either

party. Dial Temp. Help Serv., Inc. v. DLF Int’l Seeds, Inc.,

298 P.3d 1234, 1236–37 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). Here, much of

the OA is not ambiguous. To the extent it is ambiguous, the

extrinsic evidence supports a conclusion that FedEx has the

right to control its drivers. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to FedEx, we conclude that plaintiffs are

employees under both the right-to-control and economicrealities tests.

1. Right-to-Control test

Oregon’s right-to-control test requires courts to weigh

four factors: “(1) direct evidence of the right to, or exercise

of, control; (2) the furnishing of tools and equipment; (3) the

method of payment; and (4) the right to fire.” Stamp v. Dep’t

of Consumer & Bus. Servs., 9 P.3d 729, 731 (Or. Ct. App.

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 15

2000). We address each factor in turn, considering only

evidence applicable to all class members.

a. Direct Evidence of the Right to Control

Direct evidence of the right to control is the most

important factor under Oregon law. See Great Am. Ins. Co.

v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 475 P.2d 415, 418 (Or. 1970); Stamp,

9 P.3d at 734–35. FedEx argues that the OA creates an

independent-contractor relationship. Oregon law is clear that

a contract’s recitation of an independent-contractor

relationship is not dispositive. See Schaff v. Ray’s Land &

Sea Food Co., 45 P.3d 936, 941 (Or. 2002); Wallowa Valley

Stages, Inc. v. Oregonian Publ’g Co., 386 P.2d 430, 433 (Or.

1963). What matters is what the contract, in actual effect,

allows or requires. See Jenkins v. AAA Heating & Cooling,

Inc., 421 P.2d 971, 972 (Or. 1966). The OA and FedEx’s

policies and procedures unambiguously allow FedEx to

exercise a great deal of control over the manner in which its

drivers do their jobs. Therefore, this factor strongly favors

plaintiffs.

First, FedEx can and does control the appearance of its

drivers and their vehicles. FedEx controls its drivers’

clothing from their hats down to their shoes and socks. It

requires drivers to be “clean shaven, hair neat and trimmed,

[and] free of body odor.” FedEx’s detailed appearance

requirements clearly constitute control over its drivers. Cf.

Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., No. 12-56589, 2014 WL

2695534, at *7 (9th Cir. June 16, 2014) (finding right to

control under California law where a delivery company

controlled “‘every exquisite detail’ of the drivers’

appearance, including the ‘color of their socks’ and ‘the style

of their hair’”); Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,

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16 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

592 F.3d 853, 859 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding, under Missouri

law, that FedEx’s appearance requirements “show the extent

of FedEx’s control” over drivers’ work). Further, FedEx

requires drivers to paint their vehicles a specific shade of

white, to attach FedEx decals, and to keep their vehicles

“clean and presentable [and] free of body damage and

extraneous markings.” These requirements go well beyond

those imposed by federal regulations. See 49 C.F.R.

§ 390.21. FedEx dictates the vehicles’ dimensions, including

the dimensions of their “package shelves” and the materials

from which the shelves are made. Managers may prevent

drivers from working if they are improperly dressed or

groomed, or if their vehicles do not meet specifications.

Second, FedEx can and does control the times its drivers

can work. The OA does not allow FedEx to set its drivers’

specific working hours down to the last minute, but it is clear

from the OA that FedEx has a great deal of control over their

hours. FedEx structures drivers’ workloads so that they have

to work 9.5 to 11 hours every working day. FedEx argues

that, because drivers can hire helpers to do their work for

them, they are free to complete a full day’s work in less than

9.5 hours. But managers may adjust drivers’ workloads to

ensure that they never have more or less work than can be

done in 9.5 to 11 hours. Drivers are not supposed to leave

their terminals in the morning until all of their packages are

available, and they must return to the terminals no later than

a specified time. If drivers want their vehicles loaded, they

must leave them at the terminal overnight. The combined

effect of these requirements is substantially to define and

constrain the hours that FedEx’s drivers can work. See

Bowser v. State Indus. Accident Comm’n, 185 P.2d 891, 895,

899 (Or. 1947) (finding employee status where a log-hauler

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 17

could not load his truck before or after the time when the

employer’s loading crew arrived or left).

Third, FedEx can and does control aspects of how and

when drivers deliver their packages. It assigns each driver a

specific service area, which it “may, in its sole discretion,

reconfigure.” It tells drivers what packages they must deliver

and when. It negotiates the time window for deliveries

directlywith its customers. Compare Salem Decorating Ctr.,

Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 840 P.2d 739, 742 (Or.

Ct. App. 1992) (finding that installers were employees where

their employer negotiated contracts with customers), with

Pam’s Carpet Serv., Inc. v. Emp’t Div., 613 P.2d 52, 55 (Or.

Ct. App. 1980) (finding that installers who “negotiate[d]

directly with the customer” were independent contractors). 

The OA requires drivers to comply with “standards of

service,” including requirements to “[f]oster the professional

image and good reputation of FedEx” and to “conduct all

business activities with . . . proper decorum at all times.”

FedEx notes that there are details of its drivers’ work that

it does not control. For instance, it does not require drivers to

follow specific routes or to deliver packages in a specific

order. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to

FedEx, it does not require drivers to follow managers’

recommendations after ride-along evaluations. But the rightto-control test does not require absolute control. See

Rubalcaba v. Nagaki Farms, Inc., 43 P.3d 1106, 1109 (Or.

2002) (noting that the Oregon Supreme Court has found

employee status despite “mixed” evidence of control); Castle

Homes, Inc. v. Whaite, 769 P.2d 215, 217 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)

(finding employee status where the employer “did not, in fact,

exercise control over many of the details of [the employee’s]

work, [but] did exercise control in certain significant

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18 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

respects”). FedEx’s lack of control over some parts of its

drivers’ jobs does not counteract the extensive control it does

have the right to exercise.

FedEx argues that it controls its drivers only with respect

to the results it seeks, not the manner in which drivers achieve

those results. See Great Am. Ins. Co., 475 P.2d at 417 (“The

test of right to control does not refer to the right to control the

results of the work but rather to the right to control the

manner and means of accomplishing the result.”). We agree

with FedEx that “results,” reasonably understood, refers in

this context to timely and professional delivery of packages. 

Some but not all of FedEx’s requirements go to the “results”

of its drivers’ work so understood. Most obviously, no

reasonable jury could find that the “result” sought by FedEx

includes “every exquisite detail” of the delivery driver’s

fashion choices and grooming. Ruiz, 2014 WL 2695534, at

*7; see id. n.5. And no reasonable jury could find that the

“results” FedEx seeks include having all of its vehicles

containing shelves built to exactly the same specifications. 

Other aspects of FedEx’s control—such as limiting drivers to

a specific service area with specific delivery locations—also

are not merely control of results under Oregon law.

In Bowser, the Oregon Supreme Court found that “a log

hauler furnishing his own truck and hauling logs for [a

logging] company” was an employee of the company. 185

P.2d at 891–92. The court emphasized that the company told

its haulers to deliver specific loads to specific locations. It

held that the company’s control over “what load [its drivers]

are going to take . . . strongly tends to establish the

relationship of employer and employee.” Id. at 898. The

Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed Bowser in Rubalcaba,

which involved a hauler who transported vegetables for a

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 19

farmer. The hauler owned his own truck and could work for

other farms. 43 P.3d at 1107–08. Nevertheless, the court

held that the farmer had the right to control the hauler,

finding the case “virtually identical” to Bowser. Id. at 1111. 

The farmer “exercised a degree of control over the system for

loading its product into the trucks.” Id. The farmer’s

“harvesting crew” loaded haulers’ trucks and “directed . . .

haulers to the field that was being harvested and indicated

where to take the produce that had been loaded.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). The court wrote, “As in Bowser,

there [is] no suggestion that [the hauler] here had any choice

over which load he was going to take.” Id.

In contrast to the facts in Bowser and Rubalcaba, a

heating company’s salespeople in Jenkins “were free to keep

such hours, work such territory, and make as many or as few

calls as they saw fit.” 421 P.2d at 972. The Oregon Supreme

Court held on these facts that the salespeople were

independent contractors. Id. Similarly, the Oregon Supreme

Court held in Schaff that a company’s salespeople were

independent contractors where they “determin[ed] when and

how to work” and “selected and established their own

routes.” 45 P.3d at 938; see also Avanti Press, Inc. v. Emp’t

Dep’t Tax Section, 274 P.3d 190, 192 (Or. Ct. App. 2012)

(holding that a saleswoman was an independent contractor

where she “set her own work schedule and decided how

frequently to visit customers”).

FedEx treats its drivers more like the haulers in Bowser

and Rubalcaba than like the salespeople in Jenkins and

Schaff. FedEx requires its drivers to load and unload

packages at FedEx terminals every working day. It assigns

each driver a specified service area and tells drivers where in

their service area to deliver packages. As in Bowser and

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20 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

Rubalcaba, FedEx drivers have no control over which

packages they deliver. This “strongly tends to establish the

relationship of employer and employee.” Rubalcaba, 43 P.3d

at 1111 (quoting Bowser, 184 P.2d at 898) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Stamp, 9 P.3d at 731 (finding right

to control where the employer “directed when and where” the

employee worked); HDG Enters. v. Nat’l Council on Comp.

Ins., 856 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that

providing “work orders, blueprints and specifications” was

control over the manner of floor installers’ work (emphasis

omitted)).

Like the Oregon Supreme Court in Bowser and

Rubalcaba, we can find “no difference at all between [FedEx

drivers’] actual situation in so far as control is concerned and

the situation of one hired to drive a [delivery] truck . . .

owned and operated by [FedEx].” Rubalcaba, 43 P.3d at

1109 (quoting Bowser, 185 P.2d at 898) (internal quotation

marks omitted). According to FedEx, the primary difference

is that it gives drivers “entrepreneurial opportunities”—the

ability to take on multiple routes and vehicles and to hire

third-party helpers—that are inconsistent with employee

status. FedEx relies not on Oregon law for this argument, but

on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in FedEx Home Delivery v.

National Labor Relations Board, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir.

2009). In FedEx Home Delivery, a divided panel of the D.C.

Circuit reversed an agency decision that FedEx drivers were

employees. Id. at 495. The majority “shift[ed the] emphasis

away from the unwieldy control inquiry,” asking instead

“whether the putative independent contractors have

significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.” Id.

at 497 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted). It held that the evidence “favoring a finding the

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 21

[drivers] are employees [was] clearlyoutweighed byevidence

of entrepreneurial opportunity.” Id. at 504.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision in FedEx Home Delivery,

even if correct, has no bearing on this case. There is no

indication that Oregon has replaced its longstanding right-tocontrol test with the new entrepreneurial-opportunities test

developed by the D.C. Circuit. Instead, Oregon cases

indicate that entrepreneurial opportunities do not undermine

a finding of employee status when a company must consent

to its workers’ exercise of those opportunities. In Blaine v.

Ross Lumber Co., 355 P.2d 461 (Or. 1960), the Oregon

Supreme Court found that the plaintiff was an employee

where he “could hire a driver, though apparently only with

[the employer’s] consent.” Id. at 465. And in Collins v.

Anderson, 596 P.2d 1001 (Or. Ct. App. 1979), the Oregon

Court of Appeals found that a worker was an employee where

his choice of helper was “subject to the approval of the

employer.” Id. at 1003; cf. Or. Drywall Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l

Council on Comp. Ins., 958 P.2d 195, 197–98 (Or. Ct. App.

1998) (finding a general contractor had no right to control

subcontractors who “were free to hire their own workers”

without the contractor’s consent).

The entrepreneurial opportunities available to FedEx’s

drivers are equivalent to those in Blaine and Collins. The OA

allows drivers to operate more than one vehicle or route only

if FedEx consents, and only if doing so is “consistent with the

capacity of the [driver’s] terminal.” Drivers must be “in good

standing” in order to assign their contractual rights, and any

replacement driver must be “acceptable to FedEx.” Nothing

in the OA limits FedEx’s discretion to withhold consent to

additional vehicles or routes, or to decide whether a

replacement driver is “acceptable.” James Primm, a Division

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22 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

Vice President for FedEx, testified in his deposition that any

driver seeking to use a helper must get approval to do so. 

Similarly, Daniel Sullivan, FedEx’s founder and CEO until

January 2007, testified in his deposition that FedEx may

refuse to let a driver take on additional routes or sell his route

to a third party. Whether FedEx ever exercises its right of

refusal is irrelevant; what matters is that the right exists. See

Jenkins, 421 P.2d at 973 (“As long as [the right to control]

exists, it is of no consequence that the employer may not have

exercised it.”).

b. Other Factors

In light of the powerful evidence of FedEx’s right to

control its drivers, none of the remaining right-to-control

factors sufficiently favors FedEx to allow a holding that

plaintiffs are independent contractors. See Great Am. Ins.

Co., 475 P.2d at 418 (identifying evidence of the right to

control as the “primary” factor); Stamp, 9 P.3d at 734–35

(holding that where “the right to control factor indicate[d] an

employment relationship” and the other factors were neutral,

“the right to control factor [was] dispositive”).

The second factor, the furnishing of tools and equipment,

slightly favors FedEx. FedEx’s drivers provide their own

vehicles and are not required to get other equipment from

FedEx. On the other hand, the vast majority of drivers do get

their other equipment from FedEx. Indeed, the drivers’

scanners are not readily available from other sources. 

Numerous Oregon cases find employee status even though

the employee provides his or her own vehicle or tools. E.g.,

Rubalcaba, 43 P.3d at 1111; Great Am. Ins. Co., 475 P.2d at

418; Blaine, 355 P.2d at 465; Bowser, 185 P.2d at 891;

Stamp, 9 P.3d at 734.

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 23

The third factor, method of payment, is neutral. FedEx

pays its drivers according to a complicated scheme that

includes fixed and variable components and ties payment to,

among other things, packages, stops, and the ratio of driving

time to deliveries. This payment method cannot easily be

compared to either hourly payment (which favors employee

status) or per-job payment (which favors independentcontractor status). See Stamp, 9 P.3d at 734 (holding that

where payment is not hourly or per-job, the method of

payment is a neutral factor).

The last factor, right to terminate, slightly favors FedEx. 

Workers who can be terminated only for cause may

nonetheless be employees. See Giltner v. Commodore

Contract Carriers, 513 P.2d 541, 542 (Or. Ct. App. 1973)

(finding employee status where employer could fire employee

for breach of “duties or obligations”). However, “[t]he fact

that a party could terminate a contract only for bona fide

reasons of dissatisfaction” supports a finding of independentcontractor status. Or. Drywall Sys., 958 P.2d at 198. An

arbitration clause in a contract is evidence against an

unqualified right to terminate. Bob Wilkes Falling, Inc. v.

Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 878 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Or. Ct.

App. 1994). Here, the OA contains an arbitration clause and

does not give FedEx an unqualified right to terminate. 

FedEx’s right under the OA to terminate its drivers, while

broad, is somewhat constrained. FedEx may terminate a

driver for any “breach[] or fail[ure] to perform . . . contractual

obligations,” which would cover, for example, any failure to

act “with proper decorum at all times.” We conclude that this

factor does not favor FedEx enough to allow a finding that its

drivers are independent contractors. See Giltner, 513 P.2d at

542.

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24 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

c. Summary

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

FedEx, we conclude that the OA grants FedEx a broad right

to control the manner in which its drivers perform their work. 

The first and most important factor of the right-to-control test

thus strongly favors employee status. The other three factors

do not strongly favor either employee status or independentcontractor status. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs are

employees as a matter of law under Oregon’s right-to-control

test. See Rubalcaba, 43 P.3d at 1111; Stamp, 9 P.3d at 733.

2. Economic-Realities Test

Plaintiffs also are employees under Oregon’s economicrealities test. The economic-realities test is broader than the

right-to-control test, covering “situations where the worker is

not directed or controlled by the employer but, nevertheless,

as a matter of economic reality, depends on the employer.” 

Cejas, 316 P.3d at 394. In Cejas, the court applied the

economic-realities test by looking to a number of different

factors designed to determine whether a company formally or

functionally “controls the terms and conditions of the

worker’s employment.” Id. at 399. FedEx, as we have

already held, controls the terms and conditions of plaintiffs’

employment. FedEx’s drivers are a permanent and important

part of its business. They work every day FedEx delivers

packages, for 9.5 to 11 hours per day. They are overseen by

FedEx-employed managers, who evaluate their job

performance and may refuse to let them work. Therefore,

they are also employees under the economic-realities test. 

See id. at 398–400.

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 25

C. FedEx’s Cross-Appeal

FedEx cross-appeals the MDL Court’s class-certification

decisions on two grounds. First, FedEx argues that the named

plaintiffs, who no longer work for FedEx, cannot seek

prospective relief on behalf of current FedEx drivers. 

Therefore, FedEx argues, we should reverse the MDLCourt’s

certification of plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and

declaratory relief. Second, FedEx argues that we should

reverse the MDL Court’s certification of all of plaintiffs’

claims if we rely on individualized evidence in reversing the

MDL Court’s grant of summary judgment to FedEx.

1. Plaintiffs’ Ability to Seek Prospective Relief

In both Slayman and Leighter, the MDL Court certified

the named plaintiffs’ claims for damages under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and their claims for prospective

relief under Rule 23(b)(2). FedEx argues that the named

plaintiffs cannot represent the classes certified under Rule

23(b)(2). FedEx does not object to the named plaintiffs’

representation of the Rule 23(b)(3) classes.

FedEx argues that the named plaintiffs, as former FedEx

drivers, lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief. 

“In a class action, the plaintiff class bears the burden of

showing that Article III standing exists.” Ellis, 657 F.3d at

978. Standing requires that (1) “the plaintiff suffered an

injury in fact,” (2) “the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged conduct,” and (3) “the injury is likely to be

redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Standing exists if at least one named

plaintiff meets the requirements.” Id.

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26 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

“When evaluating whether [the standing] elements are

present, we must look at the facts as they exist at the time the

complaint was filed.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v.

Lomax, 471 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis and

internal quotation marks omitted). Named plaintiffs who

were not FedEx drivers at the time the complaint was filed

lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief

because they “would not stand to benefit from” such relief. 

Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th

Cir. 2006); see Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571,

623 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S.

Ct. 2541 (2011). However, any named plaintiff who was a

FedEx driver at the time the complaint was filed did have

standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief. See Dukes,

603 F.3d at 623. Because none of the Slayman class’s named

plaintiffs worked for FedEx at the time the complaint was

filed, the Slayman class lacked Article III standing to seek

prospective relief. See id. On the other hand, the Leighter

class had standing to seek prospective relief because one of

its named plaintiffs, Jon Leighter, was a FedEx driver at the

time the complaint was filed.

Leighter, however, stopped driving for FedEx in August

2007, almost two years before the MDL Court’s classcertification decision. Leighter was the only named plaintiff

with standing to seek prospective relief. When he stopped

driving for FedEx, his claims for prospective relief became

moot because he could no longer benefit from such relief. 

See Walsh, 471 F.3d at 1037. Under these circumstances, the

Leighter class’s claims for prospective relief should not have

been certified. See Kuahulu v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 557

F.2d 1334, 1336–37 (9th Cir. 1977). “It is . . . true that a

class action is not automatically moot because the named

representative’s claim is moot.” Id. at 1336. If the district

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SLAYMAN V. FEDEX 27

court certifies a class before the plaintiff’s claim becomes

moot, “mooting the putative class representative’s claim will

not moot the class action.” Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc.,

653 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011); see Sosna v. Iowa,

419 U.S. 393, 399–403 (1975). But where, as here, the

plaintiff’s claim becomes moot before the district court

certifies the class, the class action normally also becomes

moot. Kuahulu, 557 F.2d at 1336–37; see Bd. of Sch.

Comm’rs of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129 (1975)

(per curiam).

An exception to this rule exists for claims that “are so

inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even

enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before

the proposed representative’s individual interest expires.” 

Pitts, 653 F.3d at 1090 (quoting Cnty. of Riverside v.

McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991)) (internal quotation mark

omitted). Such claims are “capable of repetition, yet evading

review,” and thus do not become moot. Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). In the absence of any evidence

that FedEx terminated Leighter’s employment after the

complaint was filed, his claims were not “transitory” or

“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See id. at 1091

(defining a “transitory” claim as one that “would evade

review,” either “by its very nature” or “by virtue of the

defendant’s litigation strategy”).

We therefore hold that the Slayman class lacked Article

III standing to seek prospective relief, and the Leighter

class’s claims for prospective relief became moot before the

MDL Court certified the class. Therefore, we reverse the

MDL Court’s certification of plaintiffs’ class claims for

prospective relief.

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28 SLAYMAN V. FEDEX

2. Reliance on Individualized Evidence

FedEx argues that we should reverse the MDL Court’s

certification of all of plaintiffs’ claims if we “rel[y] on

individualized (rather than classwide) evidence to reverse the

MDL [C]ourt’s grant of summary judgment.” Our decision

does not rely on any individualized evidence. FedEx’s

argument is therefore unavailing.

Conclusion

We hold that plaintiffs in both class actions are employees

as a matter of law under Oregon’s right-to-control and

economic-realities tests. Accordingly, we reverse both the

MDL Court’s grant of summary judgment to FedEx and its

denial of plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. 

We remand to the district court with instructions to enter

summary judgment for plaintiffs on the question of

employment status. We reverse the MDL Court’s decision to

certify plaintiffs’ classes insofar as they seek prospective

relief. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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