Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01231/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01231-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Silvia Ochoa-Gonzalez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1231

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska.

Silvia Ochoa-Gonzalez, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 22, 2009

Filed: March 25, 2010

___________

Before COLLOTON and BENTON, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL,1

 District Judge.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Silvia Ochoa-Gonzalez was arrested following an immigration enforcement

operation. She moved to suppress her incriminating statements on the ground that

they were obtained in violation of her Miranda rights. The district court granted the

motion in part and denied it in part. Ochoa-Gonzalez entered into a conditional plea

agreement, pleading guilty to aggravated identity theft, but preserving the right to

appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. In addition to addressing

the motion to suppress, she also argues that a recent Supreme Court decision

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invalidates her guilty plea. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court

reverses and remands.

I.

Over 200 armed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents raided

the Swift Packing Plant in Grand Island, Nebraska. They detained Ochoa-Gonzalez

along with about 300 other employees. The agents examined her Mexican passport,

which displayed her real name of “Silvia Ochoa-Gonzalez.” They were suspicious

because some of the stamps appeared to be missing letters, and the “ADIT” stamp —

virtually always for one year — was for one year and one day. Questioned about the

stamp, Ochoa-Gonzalez first insisted that it was genuine, issued by immigration

officials. The interviewing agent told her to “tell me the truth” and eventually she

admitted that the stamp was fake. 

She was then transferred to Agent Carmen Morales for further processing as an

illegal alien. Agent Morales first asked, “What is your full and complete name?”

Ochoa-Gonzalez replied (in Spanish) that “what [the ICE agents] were doing wasn't

right, that [Ochoa-Gonzalez] knew the stamp was false, but that if [Agent Morales]

had children, [she] would know that you would do anything in order to keep your

family and to provide for them.” Morales then interrupted Ochoa-Gonzalez and told

her to cooperate with the process, which she did, crying. 

Ochoa-Gonzalez was moved to Iowa where she was interviewed the next day

by another ICE agent. Ochoa-Gonzalez then made several incriminating statements.

Later in the day, she was given her Miranda rights and refused to speak further

without counsel.

Ochoa-Gonzalez was charged with one count of aggravated identity theft, 18

U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), and four counts of possession of a forged passport. She moved

to suppress her statements, invoking Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79

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(1966). The district court held that Ochoa-Gonzalez was in custody beginning when

the first ICE agent told her to “tell the truth,” and that her statements to the first ICE

agent and the statements the next day in Iowa should be suppressed. However, the

district court held that the statements by Ochoa-Gonzalez to Agent Morales, despite

the custodial circumstances, were in response to routine booking questions, and

should not be suppressed. 

Ochoa-Gonzalez then entered into a conditional plea agreement, pleading guilty

to one count of aggravated identity theft, but preserving her right to appeal the

suppression issue. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the other four

counts in the indictment. Ochoa-Gonzalez, in her petition to plead guilty and at the

plea hearing, stated that she knew that the ADIT number on her passport belonged to

a real person, but did not learn this until “the discovery process.” She did not contend

at the plea hearing that such knowledge was an element of aggravated identity theft,

nor did she preserve the right to appeal that issue. On January 21, 2009, she was

sentenced to 24 months.

 II.

Ochoa-Gonzalez argues that her guilty plea should be set aside in light of the

Supreme Court’s decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1886 (2009).

In Flores-Figueroa, the Court held that in order to be convicted of aggravated identity

theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), the defendant must know that the identity stolen

belongs to a real person. Id. at 1894. Ochoa-Gonzalez objects that her guilty plea was

based on a misunderstanding of this material element. 

Because she did not make this argument in the district court, this Court reviews

only for plain error. See United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir. 2001).

A defendant who does not object to a Rule 11 error “has the burden to satisfy the plain

error rule” of Rule 52(b). United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). “The plain

error principle applies even when, as here, the error results from a change in the law

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that occurred while the case was pending on appeal.” United States v. Pirani, 406

F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). “[B]efore we can correct an error not raised

at trial, ‘there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.’

If all three conditions are met, we may remedy the error only if it ‘seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” United States v.

Lovelace, 565 F.3d 1080, 1087 (8th Cir. 2009) citing Johnson v. United States, 520

U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

A guilty plea is constitutionally valid only to the extent that it is voluntary and

intelligent. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). A plea is not

intelligent “unless a criminal defendant first receives real notice of the true nature of

the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due

process.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To this end, Rule 11(b)(1)(G) of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a defendant be adequately informed

of and understand “the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading.”

In Bousley, the defendant argued, in part, that his guilty plea was involuntary

because he was misinformed about the elements of an offense (the Supreme Court

having clarified the elements of the offense after his conviction). Id. at 616-18, citing

Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). The Court stated: “Petitioner

contends that the record reveals that neither he, nor his counsel, nor the court correctly

understood the essential elements of the crime with which he was charged. Were this

contention proved, petitioner's plea would be . . . constitutionally invalid.” Id. at

618-19. The Court further noted that “This type of claim can be fully and completely

addressed on direct review based on the record created at the plea colloquy.” Id. at

622. 

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The relevant portion of Ochoa-Gonzalez’s plea colloquy is: 

THE COURT: And then do you further agree that on August 24th, 2005,

in Nebraska, the document that you had, that the actual number actually

belonged to somebody else?

THE DEFENDANT: Could you please repeat the question?

THE COURT: I didn't ask it very well. Do you agree that the number

that was on your passport, the ADIT number, actually was someone

else's number?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I didn't know.

THE COURT: But in any event, you knew it was not yours. Is that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

MR. VANDERSLICE [attorney for defendant]: And Judge, if you might

notice on the petition, we wrote that Ms. Ochoa-Gonzalez now knows

that that number is to a real person. She didn't – at the time she didn't

know whose number it was, whether it went to a real person or not, but

through the discovery process, we've learned that that – that number

actually belonged to a real person, which I think is a material element for

aggravated identity theft.

THE COURT: What would the evidence be in that respect?

MR. RUSSELL [Assistant U.S. Attorney]: That the ADIT number was

a number of a – of a true individual. For purposes of this hearing, that

individual's initials are O.V.G. That – that alien number was assigned to

O.V.G. by ICE prior to August 24th of 2005. That would be what the

evidence would show.

THE COURT: Do you agree that it's an element of the offense that she

knew that it was assigned to a real person?

MR. RUSSELL: No, she does not have to know it was assigned to a real

person. I believe Eighth Circuit case law indicates that she needs to know

the number was not hers and that it was assigned to a real person at some

point. But I don't believe she needs to know that.

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MR. VANDERSLICE: And I think actually, Judge, there was just a

decision on that, I think with – 

. . . . 

THE COURT: All right. Now, you were saying that there is just a recent

Eighth Circuit case establishing that?

MR. VANDERSLICE: There is, Judge, and we would agree with what

Mr. Russell said. This number went to a real person.

THE COURT: And she has acknowledged as much.

MR. VANDERSLICE: Yes.

THE COURT: I think I've hit them. Ms. Ochoa, do you have any

questions or any matters that you want to address before we go any

further?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Do you still want to plead guilty on this conditional

basis?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Based on the record created at Ochoa-Gonzalez’s plea colloquy, neither OchoaGonzalez, nor her counsel, nor the court understood that her knowledge that the ADIT

number belonged to another person was an essential element of aggravated identity

theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Ochoa-Gonzalez’s plea was thus not intelligent,

and is therefore constitutionally invalid. It was plain error for the district court to

accept Ochoa-Gonzalez’s plea. This error affected her substantial rights, as well as

the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. In light of Flores-Figueroa,

Ochoa-Gonzalez’s plea was not intelligent. Her conviction is reversed, and the case

remanded.

III.

As to the suppression issue, this court reviews a district court’s findings of fact

for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola,

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270 F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir. 2001). Because this issue is likely to arise on remand, this

court addresses it here.

Miranda warnings must be given before a suspect’s statements made during

custodial interrogation may be admitted into evidence. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.

Here, the district court held that the statements Ochoa-Gonzalez made to Agent

Morales were made while she was in custody. Therefore, these statements must be

suppressed if made in response to interrogation.

Ochoa-Gonzalez argues that because of the facts that (1) she admitted to the

first ICE agent that her ADIT stamp was false, and (2) another ICE agent told Agent

Morales in English and within earshot of Ochoa-Gonzalez that she had a “false ADIT

stamp,” Ochoa-Gonzalez reasonably believed that her conversation with Agent

Morales was part of the same interrogation, and thus that her statements were a

product of a single custodial interrogation.

Interrogation includes not only express questioning by an officer, but also any

words or actions that “police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from the suspect.” Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 417 (8th

Cir. 2000) citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). In particular,

asking a routine booking question is not interrogation under Miranda. See, e.g.,

Pennsylvania v. Muniz 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (plurality opinion); United States

v. Brown, 101 F.3d 1272, 1274 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d

180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391-92 (8th

Cir.1985).

A request for routine information necessary for basic identification

purposes is not interrogation under Miranda, even if the information

turns out to be incriminating. Only if the government agent should

reasonably be aware that the information sought, while merely for basic

identification purposes in the usual case, is directly relevant to the

substantive offense charged, will the question be subject to scrutiny.

Brown, 101 F.3d at 1274 (quoting McLaughlin, 777 F.2d at 391-92).

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In this case, Agent Morales asked Ochoa-Gonzalez, “What is your full and

complete name?” This question was a “request for routine information necessary for

basic identification purposes.” Because Ochoa-Gonzalez’s name was never in doubt,

her name was not directly relevant to the substantive offense in this case. Therefore,

Agent Morales’s question was not interrogation under Miranda.

A related theme of Ochoa-Gonzalez’s argument is that her statements to Agent

Morales were involuntary. In United States v. McGlothen, 556 F.3d 698, 700-01 (8th

Cir. 2009), the defendant made a spontaneous, incriminating statement in response to

a routine booking question after being arrested but before receiving Miranda

warnings. This court held that the defendant’s statement was voluntary, not in

response to interrogation, and thus admissible. Id. at 701-02. The district court here

found that “there is no reason to think that these statements were involuntary,” a

finding that is not clearly erroneous. Ochoa-Gonzalez’s spontaneous statements to

agent Morales were voluntary and not in response to interrogation, and should not be

suppressed.

IV.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case remanded for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

______________________________

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