Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02179/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02179-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles De Rosa
Respondent
Victor Pianka
Petitioner

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Victor Pianka, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles De Rosa, 

Respondent. 

No. CV-14-02179-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 On October 1, 2014, Petitioner Victor Pianka filed a pro se petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241. Doc. 1. On October 13, 2016, Magistrate 

Judge Michelle Burns issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) that the Court 

dismiss the petition under the doctrine of prudential exhaustion. Doc. 43. Petitioner filed 

objections (Doc. 47), and Respondents did not file a response. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court will adopt Judge Burns’s recommendation. 

I. Background. 

Judge Burns provided the following summary of Petitioner’s administrative 

proceedings and habeas corpus petition: 

 Petitioner, a native of Poland and lawful permanent resident, was 

taken into ICE custody on June 7, 2013 and placed in removal proceedings 

under Section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (Doc. 

41.) Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear, alleging that he is deportable 

because he is a citizen of Poland, not a citizen of the United States, and on 

July 18, 2012, he was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia in 

Maricopa County Superior Court. (Id.) 

Case 2:14-cv-02179-DGC Document 50 Filed 12/20/16 Page 1 of 6
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 On December 30, 2013, Petitioner appeared for a bond hearing 

before an Immigration Judge (IJ). Petitioner testified that he had obtained 

United States citizenship through his father, Adam Kostewicz, and that the 

record before the court showing that Mr. Kostewicz was neither his 

biological father nor his adoptive father was based on “fraudulent 

findings.” (Id.) 

 The IJ found that “based on the evidence of record, [Petitioner] ha[d] 

not met his burden” of establishing that he had derived citizenship from Mr. 

Kostewicz or from Petitioner’s biological mother, who had naturalized after 

Petitioner’s 18th birthday. (Id.) 

 

Most recently, on July 25, 2016, Respondents submitted a status 

report to update the Court regarding Petitioner’s current custody status. 

(Doc. 42.) Respondents state that a bond hearing was conducted on May 

11, 2016 pursuant to Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Petitioner was represented at the hearing by an appointed qualified 

representative. The IJ set Petitioner’s bond at $35,000. Petitioner has not 

yet posted bond and is still in ICE custody. Petitioner, through his 

appointed qualified representative, has appealed the IJ’s bond determination 

to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Briefs were due to the BIA 

on August 1, 2016. 

 Regarding Petitioner’s removal status, Respondents state that 

Petitioner was previously ordered removed. Petitioner was then appointed 

counsel, appealed the removal order, and requested that the removal case be 

remanded to the IJ to be re-litigated with the assistance of counsel. The BIA 

granted the motion to remand on October 31, 2014, and the removal and 

relief case was reheard on various dates from December 17, 2014 through 

June 12, 2015. Petitioner was represented by his appointed qualified 

representative during the remanded proceedings. On September 1, 2015, the 

IJ denied all relief and ordered Petitioner removed. Petitioner appealed to 

the BIA. The appeal has been fully briefed and is awaiting the BIA’s 

decision. 

 In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner argues that 

under Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, ICE lacks jurisdiction to detain him as an 

alien. See Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Specifically, Petitioner argues that under Flores-Torres, ICE lacks 

jurisdiction to detain him as an alien because he acquired derivative 

citizenship through his stepfather, Adam Dostewicz, whom Petitioner 

asserts is his birth father. 

Case 2:14-cv-02179-DGC Document 50 Filed 12/20/16 Page 2 of 6
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Doc. 43 at 1-3. 

A. Petitioner’s Objections to the Characterizations of His Case. 

 Petitioner makes several objections to Judge Burns’s description of his case. First, 

he argues that Judge Burns “only mentions that he brought the claim of citizenship 

through his father and then mentions that the IJ made a finding. . . . omit[ing] that 

Petitioner had a claim of citizenship through three ways but that the IJ only determined 

two of them.” Doc. 47 at 1. Petitioner appears to be alleging that Judge Burns 

incorrectly represents that the IJ considered Petitioner’s claims. See also id. at 4. 

Additionally, Petitioner objects to Judge Burns mentioning “that Respondent’s Status 

Update attempts to detail petitioner’s bond status and about appointed counsel . . . 

because bond is irrelevant to the fact that petitioner is a United States Citizen in 

Immigration detention[,]” and because Petitioner’s counsel has an alleged “conflict of 

interest.” Id. at 2.1

 Whether the IJ adequately considered all of Petitioner’s claims and 

whether Petitioner’s appointed counsel in his administrative hearings has a conflict of 

interest are not issues before this Court. Rather, these are issues that Petitioner may raise 

before the BIA and on appeal to the Ninth Circuit once the BIA has made a final 

determination in his case.2

 

 The only issue before this Court is whether it should exercise jurisdiction over 

Petitioner’s claim, and, if so, whether Petitioner’s claim that he is a U.S. citizen has 

merit. To the extent that Petitioner’s citizenship is being actively considered in separate 

administrative hearings, the existence and status of these hearings are relevant to the 

Court’s decision. Additionally, as an individual must be in custody in order to bring a 

habeas petition, Petitioner’s bond hearing and his continuous detention by ICE are also 

relevant. The Court finds no meaningful error in Judge Burns’s case description. 

 

1

 Petitioner also alleges that “counsel was erroneously appointed through multiple due process violations.” Doc. 47 at 3. He does not provide any factual support or explanation as to how appointment of counsel violated his due process rights. 

2

 Petitioner argues that fraud claims were presented to the IJ, but not considered. 

Doc. 47 at 4. Additionally, Petitioner notes that he has already brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his administrative proceedings. Id. at 6. 

Case 2:14-cv-02179-DGC Document 50 Filed 12/20/16 Page 3 of 6
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. Petitioner’s Objections to the Legal Conclusions of Judge Burns. 

 In his habeas petition, Petitioner argues that under Flores-Torres, ICE lacks 

jurisdiction to detain him because he is a U.S. citizen. Ordinarily, an individual who has 

been issued a final administrative removal order may only appeal that order to the circuit 

court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252; Flores, 548 F.3d at 710 (9th Cir. 2008). If the alien claims to be 

a U.S. citizen and the circuit court determines that a genuine issue of material fact exists, 

the circuit court will transfer the matter to the district court. § 1252(b)(5)(B). In line 

with this rule, where an individual has received a final administrative removal order, he 

may not bring a habeas petition before a district court challenging his detention based on 

allegations that he is a U.S. citizen. Carrillo-Lozano v. Stolc, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 

(D. Ariz. 2009) (“Because the immigration tribunals have already issued a final removal 

order, the Court cannot rule on Petitioner’s challenge to his detention on the basis of his 

nationality without directly implicating the final order of removal.”). 

Judge Burns recognized, however, that under Flores-Torres an individual who has 

not yet received a final administrative removal order may challenge his detention through 

a habeas petition. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction 

to consider this case, Judge Burns found that “Flores-Torres does not require the Court to 

exercise jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim – the Court can exercise its discretion to 

decline jurisdiction and require prudential exhaustion before reaching the merits.” 

Doc. 43 at 4. Citing to factors set out by the Ninth Circuit, Judge Burns concluded that 

the Court should exercise this discretion. Id. (citing Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812 (9th 

Cir. 2007)). Petitioner objects to this finding “that Petitioner still has to exhaust his 

remedies.” Id. at 5. 

 While “only an ‘alien’ is required to exhaust administrative remedies under the 

INA[,]” Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2008), “the judicially 

created, prudential exhaustion doctrine [is] applicable to all habeas petitions filed under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241,” Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Tapia v. 

DeRosa, No. CV-12-02393-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL 6512489, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 12, 2013) 

Case 2:14-cv-02179-DGC Document 50 Filed 12/20/16 Page 4 of 6
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(dismissing habeas petition alleging petitioner is a U.S. citizen unlawfully detained by 

ICE under the doctrine of prudential exhaustion).3

 

Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes 

agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a 

proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the 

deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative 

review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to 

preclude the need for judicial review. 

Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The Court agrees with Judge Burns that, considering the above criteria, prudential 

exhaustion should be required in this case. The exact issue Petitioner is asking the Court 

to decide – whether he is a citizen of the United States – is currently being decided in an 

administrative proceeding pending before the BIA, which has expertise in determining 

matters of citizenship and immigration. The BIA has access to an extensive record, 

including a decision from the IJ and full briefing from the parties. Claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel notwithstanding, Petitioner is also represented by counsel before the 

BIA, in contrast with his pro se status here. The BIA is in a better position to make a 

determination on Petitioner’s nationality. 

 Additionally, relaxation of the exhaustion requirement would encourage deliberate 

bypass of the administrative scheme, as any individual with a citizenship claim could 

immediately file a habeas petition in federal district court challenging the legality of his 

confinement by ICE without having to wait for administrative determination of his status. 

 3

 “‘The Constitution is violated when a person with a non-frivolous claim to U.S. 

citizenship is deported without receiving a judicial determination of that claim.’” Iasu v. 

Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 

1140 (9th Cir. 2005)). Petitioner, however, will have an opportunity to appeal the final 

administrative determination of his nationality to the Ninth Circuit, securing a judicial 

determination of his claim before he is deported. 

Case 2:14-cv-02179-DGC Document 50 Filed 12/20/16 Page 5 of 6
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Finally, the IJ and BIA will not have an opportunity to remedy any incorrect 

determinations concerning the nationality of individuals if the issue may immediately be 

considered by the district court without administrative exhaustion. True, the Ninth 

Circuit has expressed concern “that an individual who asserts a non-frivolous claim of 

citizenship can be detained during immigration proceedings – which, for Torres, has 

already lasted over two years – without habeas review.” Flores-Torres, 548 F.3d at 712. 

But a district court may always decline to require prudential exhaustion in an appropriate 

case. 

 Petitioner’s claim is currently awaiting final determination by the BIA. If the BIA 

reverses the IJ’s ruling, this habeas proceeding will be unnecessary. If, in contrast, the 

BIA upholds the ruling, Petitioner may appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Should the Ninth 

Circuit find a genuine issue of material fact concerning Petitioner’s nationality, the case 

will be referred to a district court for a new determination of his nationality claim. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns’s R&R (Doc. 43) is accepted. 

2. The Petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is denied. 

 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action. 

 Dated this 19th day of December, 2016. 

Case 2:14-cv-02179-DGC Document 50 Filed 12/20/16 Page 6 of 6