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Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued June 20, 1997 Decided August 29, 1997 

No. 97-3006

IN RE: SEALED CASE

Consolidated with 

No. 97-3007

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95ms00446) 

(No. 95ms00447)

-

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: This case arises out of a grand 

jury investigation into the firing of White House travel office 

employees. The Office of Independent Counsel obtained 

grand jury subpoenas for notes of a conversation between a 

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now-deceased White House official and his private attorney. 

The attorney and his law firm moved in district court to 

quash the subpoenas, claiming successfully that the notes 

were protected by the attorney-client privilege and by the 

work-product privilege. Because we think the district court 

read both privileges too broadly, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings.

Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege applies to grand jury proceedings. Fed. R. Evid. 501, 1101(c) & (d). The parties agree 

that the communications at issue would be covered by the 

privilege if the client were still alive. The Independent 

Counsel, however, argues that the client's death calls for a 

qualification of the privilege. We agree.

Rule 501 provides that "the privilege of a witness ... shall 

be governed by the principles of the common law as ... 

interpreted by the courts ... in the light of reason and 

experience." Fed. R. Evid. 501; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 

116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996). We take this to be a mandate to 

the federal courts to approach privilege matters in the way 

that common law courts have traditionally addressed any 

issueobserving precedent but at the same time trying, 

where precedents are in conflict or not controlling, to find 

answers that best balance the purposes of the relevant doctrines.

Courts have generally assumed that the privilege survives 

death. See Simon J. Frankel, "The Attorney-Client Privilege 

After the Death of the Client," 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 45, 47 

(1992) (citing cases). Modern evidence codes often provide 

that the personal representative of a deceased client may 

assert the privilege. See Restatement (Third) of the Law 

Governing Lawyers § 127 Reporter's Note, comment c (Proposed Final Draft, March 29, 1996) ("Restatement"). And 

courts have applied the privilege after death in both grand 

jury proceedings and criminal trials. See, e.g., John Doe 

Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990); Peo

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ple v. Pena, 198 Cal. Rptr. 819, 829 (Ct.App.2d 1984); State v. 

Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. 1981).

Yet most judicial references to the persistence of the 

privilege after death appear to have occurred only as the 

prelude to application of a well recognized exceptionfor 

disputes among the client's heirs and legatees.1 See Frankel, 

supra, at 58 n.65 (95% of cases examined (380 out of 400) 

were testamentary disputes). Thus holdings actually manifesting the posthumous force of the privilege are relatively 

rare. See McCormick on Evidence § 94, at 348 ("the operation of the privilege has in effect been nullified in the class of 

cases where it would most often be asserted after death."). 

And such cases as do actually apply it give little revelation of 

whatever reasoning may have explained the outcome.

The Supreme Court's decision in Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 

394 (1897), is cited for the proposition that the privilege 

survives death. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 125 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir. 1942). In fact, 

however, Glover is simply a typical case that asserts the 

general principle of the privilege's survival after death, but 

finds it inapplicable to disputes among persons "claiming 

under the client." 165 U.S. at 407. Even the Court's endorsement of the privilege's survival in ordinary circumstances was rather tepid. It observed that "such communications might be privileged if offered by third persons to 

establish claims against an estate," id. at 406, and quoted 

Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387, 393, 68 Eng. Rep. 558, 560 

(1851), which stated only that "the privilege does not in all 

cases terminate with the death of the party," and belongs to 

__________

1 The exception applies only when the parties are claiming 

"through the client," not when a party claims against the estate. 

Some have justified the exception as furthering the client's intent, 

while others have explained that in a will contest, the question of 

who may assert the privilege cannot be resolved without resolving 

the merits of the claims, and thus it is preferable to permit neither 

to assert the privilege. See 2 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 

Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 197, at 377-78 (2d ed. 1994). As 

neither justification bears on our analysis, we need not choose 

between them.

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"parties claiming under the client as against parties claiming 

adversely to him." Id., quoted in Glover, 165 U.S. at 407. 

Compare Cal. Evid. Code § 954, comment (1997) ("[T]here is 

little reason to preserve secrecy at the expense of excluding 

relevant evidence after the estate is wound up and the 

representative is discharged."). In short, there is little by 

way of judicial holding that affirms the survival of the privilege after death, and the framing of the posthumous privilege 

as belonging to the client's estate or personal representative 

both suggests that the privilege may terminate on the winding up of the estate and reflects a primary focus on civil 

litigation.2

Although courts often cite as axiomatic the proposition that 

the privilege survives death, commentators have, with one 

distinguished exception, generally supported some measure of 

post-death curtailment. The exception, Wigmore, proclaimed 

that there was "no limit of time beyond which the disclosures 

might not be used to the detriment of the client or of his 

estate." 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2323, at 630-31 

(McNaughton Rev. 1961). But others have sharply criticized 

his view. The most emphatic statement is that of Wright & 

Graham, who wrote, "One would have to attribute a Pharaohlike concern for immortality to suppose that the typical client 

has much concern for how posterity may view his communications." 24 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5498, at 484 (1986); 

see also Restatement § 127, comment d ("Permitting such 

disclosure would do little to inhibit clients from confiding in 

__________

2 Our dissenting colleague evidently reads the provisions allowing the personal representative of the deceased to claim the privilege as implying that the privilege survives death without exception 

(other than the standard testamentary one). See Dissent at 3. But 

the inference is far from clear. Vesting the privilege in the 

personal representative is plainly consistent with its terminating at 

the winding up of the estate, when its function of protecting the 

decedent's transmission of his or her property to the intended 

beneficiaries, free from claims based on statements to counsel, has 

run its course. Such vesting does not remotely suggest concern 

over anyone's criminal responsibility.

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their lawyers") 3; 1 McCormick on Evidence § 94, at 350 (4th 

ed. 1992) (terminating the privilege at death "could not to any 

substantial degree lessen the encouragement for free disclosure"); 2 Mueller & Kirkpatrick § 199, at 380 ("Few clients 

are much concerned with what will happen sometime after 

the death that everyone expects but few anticipate in an 

immediate or definite sense").

Presumably depending on their confidence in their judgments as to the residual chilling effect on clients, commentators have proposed a range of substitute rules. Some have 

embraced Learned Hand's view that the privilege should not 

apply at all after death, see, e.g., ALI Proceedings, 1942, 

quoted in 24 Wright & Graham § 5498, at 485; 1 McCormick 

on Evidence § 94, at 350, while the American Law Institute 

has suggested a general balancing test, proposing that

a tribunal be empowered to withhold the privilege of a 

person then deceased as to a communication that bears 

on a litigated issue of pivotal significance. The tribunal 

could balance the interest in confidentiality against any 

exceptional need for the communication. The tribunal 

also could consider limiting the proof or sealing the 

record to limit disclosure.

Restatement § 127, comment d.

The justification for the attorney-client privilege has largely been an instrumental one, resting on a belief that it greatly 

facilitatesperhaps is essential tothe provision of legal 

advice. Such assistance "can only be safely and readily 

availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure." Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 

(1888). In addition, some have spoken of privacy concerns, 

see Frankel, supra, at 53-54 & nn.41-45 (citing commentators), but it seems fair to say that these have played at best a 

secondary role. In any event, because the privilege obstructs 

the truth-finding process, it is, we have said, to be narrowly 

__________

3 Drafts of portions of the Restatement (Third) of the Law 

Governing Lawyers, including § 127, have been tentatively approved by the American Law Institute's Council and membership 

but have not yet been finally adopted.

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construed. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean 

Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

The object, presumably, is to maximize the sum of the 

benefits of confidential communications with attorneys and 

those of finding the truth through our judicial processes. 

Even if the focus were solely on truth-seeking, dispensing 

with the privilege altogether would presumably have negative 

results. Any rule qualifying the privilege may in at least 

some cases (once it is adopted) cause some clients to confide 

less in their attorneys; the communication that is stillborn 

can never be disclosed. And abrogation of the privilege 

would clearly impair the provision of legal services. Except 

to the extent that limits on the privilege actually chill the 

hoped-for communications, however, its application renders 

judicial proceedings less accurate.

Wright & Graham's supposition that favoring survival of 

the privilege after death requires imputing a "Pharaoh-like 

concern" to clients may be a bit of an exaggeration. But it is 

surely true that the risk of post-death revelation will typically 

trouble the client less than pre-death revelation. The question is how much less, and the answer seems likely to depend 

on the context. On one side, criminal liability will have 

ceased altogether. Civil liability, on the other hand, characteristically continues, and the same impulses that drive people 

to provide for their families in life clearly create a motive to 

preserve their estates thereafter.4In the middle are reputational concerns. To the extent that concern over reputation 

arises from an interest in the sort of treatment a person will 

receive from othersranging from mundane matters such as 

__________

4 The impulse would also apply to a corporation with which a 

decedent has been involved, but the privilege there would characteristically belong to the corporation. See, e.g., Diversified Industries, 

Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 n.5 (8th Cir. 1977). Thus rules 

regarding termination of the privilege on the biological death of the 

client are largely irrelevant. For a discussion of the privilege and 

organizational successors, see 24 Wright & Graham § 5499; 2 

Mueller & Kirkpatrick § 200; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (corporate bankruptcy trustee controls and therefore may waive the privilege). 

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extension of credit to more subtle ones such as how one will 

be greeted at social eventsit ends with death. But there 

are aspects of after-death reputation that will concern a 

person while alivethe value to surviving family of being 

related to (say) an honorable and distinguished person, and 

the value of one's posthumous reputation simpliciter (the pure 

Pharaoh effect). In the sort of high-adrenalin situation likely 

to provoke consultation with counsel, however, we doubt if 

these residual interests will be very powerful; and against 

them the individual may even view history's claims to truth as 

more deserving. To the extent, then, that any post-death 

restriction of the privilege can be confined to the realm of 

criminal litigation, we should expect the restriction's chilling 

effect to fall somewhere between modest and nil.

The costs of protecting communications after death are 

high. Obviously the death removes the client as a direct 

source of information; indeed, his availability has been conventionally invoked as an explanation of why the privilege 

only slightly impairs access to truth. American Bar Association's Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence, quoted in 8 Wigmore § 2299, at 579. Thus the fewer, 

and the more questionable the remaining sources (e.g., because of witnesses' interest or bias), the greater the relative 

value of what the deceased has told his lawyer. Although 

witness unavailability alone would not justify qualification of 

the privilege, we think that unavailability through death, 

coupled with the non-existence of any client concern for 

criminal liability after death, creates a discrete realm (use in 

criminal proceedings after death of the client) where the 

privilege should not automatically apply. We reject a general 

balancing test in all but this narrow circumstance.

In rejecting two rather ambiguous limitations for privilegesthe so-called "control-group" qualification of the 

attorney-client privilege, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 

449 U.S. 383 (1981), and a "balancing" test for the 

psychotherapist-patient privilege, Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 

S. Ct. 1923 (1996)the Supreme Court observed, "An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results 

in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better 

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than no privilege at all." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393; Jaffee, 

116 S. Ct. at 1932. Accordingly, to the extent that the commentators may be read as urging some sort of generalized 

balancing test for posthumous limitation of the privilege, we 

disagree. We thus embrace the arguments for such an exception only within the discrete zone of criminal litigation. 

While we believe that a case-by-case balancing is appropriate 

within that realm, we see no basis for any further exception 

(apart of course from the long-established exception for litigation among those claiming under the decedent).

Even such a discrete exception, of course, complicates what 

the lawyer must tell an anxious client about the confidentiality of a prospective conversation. But in assessing that 

incremental complication, we recognize that even now any 

belief in an absolute attorney-client privilege is illusory. See 

Edna S. Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the 

Work-Product Doctrine 3 (1997) ("Many communications that 

clients and lawyers mistakenly believe are privileged in fact 

are not."). First, even communications made in confidence in 

the search for legal advice are unprotected if they relate to 

future illegality (the "crime-fraud exception"). See Wright & 

Graham § 5501. The dissent contends that a client can be 

certain whether his communications will fall under the crimefraud exception, but this underestimates its slipperiness. We 

have acknowledged that "there may be rare cases ... in 

which the attorney's fraudulent or criminal intent defeats a 

claim of privilege even if the client is innocent," In re Sealed 

Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997), citing In re 

Impounded Case (Law Firm), 879 F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (3d 

Cir. 1989), which indeed applies the exception in the face of 

client innocence. And the exception applies not only to 

crimes and fraud, but to other intentional torts. See In re 

Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applies to 

"crime, fraud or other misconduct"); see also Irving Trust 

Co. v. Gomez, 100 F.R.D. 273, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (communications unprotected where client who wrongfully deprived 

another of use of his bank funds reasonably should have 

known that such conduct constituted "fraud or any other 

intentional tort"); Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503, 505 

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(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (no protection where communication in furtherance of intentional infliction of emotional distress).

There is also the ubiquitous exception for litigation between 

persons claiming under the decedentalthough in many contexts (including most imaginable conversations about the 

White House travel office firings) the improbability of its 

application would be readily apparent at the outset of the 

client-lawyer communication. Although this exception is 

sometimes justified as reflecting the decedent's likely intent, 

see note 1 supra, it does not perfectly track that idea; a 

decedent might want to provide for an illegitimate child but at 

the same time much prefer that the relationship go undisclosed. Further, in some states the privilege does not survive 

the winding up of an estate, Cal. Evid. Code § 954, and in 

others it may not do so, see Restatement § 127, Reporter's 

Note, comment c; 24 Wright & Graham § 5498, at 485.5

Finally, even courts applying the privilege to bar statements 

of a decedent from a criminal trial have acknowledged that a 

defendant might in some cases have a constitutional right to 

offer statements that exonerate him. John Doe Grand Jury 

Investigation, 562 N.E.2d at 71-72 (privilege survives death 

except where mandated by constitutional considerations); 

State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218, 220 (S.C. 1981) (court upholds 

exclusion of communications, saying that the defendant was 

denied not the right to establish his defense but merely "the 

license to fish into privileged communications"). Compare 

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (state interest in 

anonymity for juvenile offender cannot trump defendant's 

right of confrontation).

While some of these exceptions are within the client's 

control, that cannot be said of all. Thus a lawyer who tells 

his client that the expected communications are absolutely 

and forever privileged is oversimplifying a bit. (Given the 

likely impatience of the client with what may seem legalistic 

detail, the oversimplification may be justifiable; we need not 

__________

5 The record reveals nothing of the status of the decedent's 

estate in this case, and the Independent Counsel makes no claim 

based on its status.

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say.) Accordingly the incremental uncertainty introduced by 

this exception is hardly devastating. And admission of an 

exception limited to post-death use in criminal proceedings 

produces none of the murkiness that persuaded the Court in 

Upjohn and Jaffee to reject the limitations proposed there.

Even in the realm of criminal proceedings (including grand 

jury proceedings), this exception should apply only to communications whose relative importance is substantial. Thus, the 

statements must bear on a significant aspect of the crimes at 

issue, and an aspect as to which there is a scarcity of reliable 

evidence. Where there is an abundance of disinterested 

witnesses with unimpaired opportunities to perceive and unimpaired memory, there would normally be little basis for 

intrusion on the intended confidentiality. This should limit 

release to contexts where not only is the risk of chilling effect 

slight but keeping the communications secret would be quite 

costly. Cf. In re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d 550, 577 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (need shown where "it is likely that the subpoenaed 

materials contain important evidence and ... this evidence, 

or equivalent evidence, is not practically available from another source").

Review by the district court in camera may play a role in 

application of this exception. Where the proponent has offered facts supporting a good faith reasonable belief that the 

materials may qualify for the exception (a standard plainly 

met here by the Independent Counsel), the district court 

should in its sound discretion examine the communications to 

see whether they in fact do. See United States v. Zolin, 491 

U.S. 554, 570-72 (1989). To the extent that the court finds an 

interest in confidentiality, it can take steps to limit access to 

these communications in a way that is consonant with the 

analysis justifying relaxation of the privilege.6 See 2 Mueller 

& Kirkpatrick § 199, at 380-81.

__________

6

In considering the interest in confidentiality, the court may in 

appropriate circumstances protect innocent third parties from disclosure as well. Here, of course, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)'s provision of secrecy for grand jury proceedings gives 

additional protection.

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Work-Product Privilege

The work-product privilege created by Hickman v. Taylor, 

329 U.S. 495 (1947), may in some cases protect more material 

than the attorney-client privilege, because it "protects both 

the attorney-client relationship and a complex of individual 

interests particular to attorneys that their clients may not 

share." In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 

The "opinions, judgments, and thought processes of counsel" 

are generally protected, and the person seeking them must 

show extraordinary justification. Id. at 809-10. For relevant, nonprivileged facts, however, their being embodied in 

work product merely shifts the standard presumption in favor 

of discovery, so that they are discoverable where the person 

seeking discovery satisfies the standard of Rule 26(b)(3) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a showing of "substantial need" and "the inability to obtain the 

substantial equivalent of the information ... from other 

sources without 'undue hardship.' " Id. at 809 n.59 (identifying that language as an expression of Hickman's "adequate 

reasons" formula).7

The district court found that the notes were protected by 

the work-product privilege because they "reflect the mental 

impressions" of the attorney. In Upjohn Co. v. United 

States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Court observed that "[f]orcing 

an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses' 

oral statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to 

reveal the attorney's mental processes." Id. at 399. But the 

Court did not decide whether factual elements embodied in 

such notes should be accorded the virtually absolute protection that the privilege gives to the attorney's mental impressions. Id. at 401. Indeed, its reasoning seems to presuppose 

that such notes are analytically divisible; in refraining from 

__________

7 Because of this apparent identity between the common law 

standard and that of Rule 26(b)(3), it appears to make little difference whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3) merely 

makes Rule 26 applicable to the procedure of litigation over grand 

jury subpoenas or also defines the substance of the privilege. See 

In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 808 n.49.

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formulation of a specific test, the Court said that the notes in 

question represented either communications protected by the 

attorney-client privilege (which was applicable, in contrast to 

the present case) or mental impressions protected by workproduct privilege. Id.; see also United States v. Paxson, 861 

F.2d 730, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that Upjohn did not 

formulate a test for factual matter embodied in lawyer's notes 

on conversations with witnesses and finding in the case before 

it no "strong showing" of necessity). 

In In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1988), a party 

asked Securities and Exchange Commission lawyers on deposition for their recollections of witness interviews. Citing 

Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401-02, we said that "[a]s the work 

product sought here is based on oral statements from witnesses, a far stronger showing is required than the 'substantial need' and 'without undue hardship' standard applicable to 

discovery of work-product protected documents and other 

tangible things." Sealed Case, 856 F.2d at 273. And in Allen 

v. McGraw, 106 F.3d 582, 607-08 (4th Cir. 1997), the court 

upheld the privilege as to the contested portion of an attorney's memo of an interview, observing that those portions 

"tend[ed] to indicate the focus of [the lawyer's] investigation, 

and hence, her theories and opinions regarding this litigation." See also Cox v. Administrator, U.S. Steel, 17 F.3d 

1386, 1422 (11th Cir. 1994).

All three of the above cases involved interviews conducted 

as part of a litigation-related investigation. (Our Sealed Case, 

858 F.2d 268, in addition involves unrecorded recollections of 

interviews and was thus not within the coverage of Rule 

26(b)(3).) Accordingly, as Allen reasoned, the facts elicited 

necessarily reflected a focus chosen by the lawyer. Here the 

interview was a preliminary one initiated by the client. Although the lawyer was surely no mere potted palm, one would 

expect him to have tried to encourage a fairly wide-ranging 

discourse from the client, so as to be sure that any nascent 

focus on the lawyer's part did not inhibit the client's disclosures.

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Accordingly, unless the general possibility that purely factual material may reflect the attorney's mental processes 

(either in questioning or in recording) is enough to shroud all 

lawyers' notes in the super-protective envelope reserved by 

Rule 26(b)(3) for "mental impressions," we think such material should be reachable when true necessity is shown. Where 

the context suggests that the lawyer has not sharply focused 

or weeded the materials, the ordinary Rule 26(b)(3) standard 

should apply.

Our brief review of the documents reveals portions containing factual material that could be classified as opinion only on 

a virtually omnivorous view of the term. We cannot therefore accept the district court's conclusion that they are protected in their entirety.

* * *

We reverse and remand the case to the district court to 

reexamine the documents in light of this opinion. The documents may be redacted so that the grand jury receives only 

those portions that are protected by neither the attorneyclient nor the work-product privilege.

So ordered.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: * Offered no persuasive 

reason to depart from the common law's posthumous protection of the attorney-client privilege and appreciating its importance in encouraging "full and frank communication" by 

clients with their lawyers, I would affirm the district court's 

judgment that the privilege protects the attorney's notes of 

his conversation with his now-deceased client. I therefore 

need not consider whether the notes are attorney work 

product.

I

Finding its first expression in the courts of Elizabethan 

England, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 

1961), and accepted in the courts of the United States from 

the earliest days of the republic, see, e.g., Chirac v. Reinicker,

24 U.S. 280, 294 (1826), the attorney-client privilege is the 

oldest privilege for confidential communications known to the 

common law. Extending well beyond protecting the interests 

of clients, the privilege "encourage[s] full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and 

administration of justice." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 

U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Fully informed lawyers participating in 

the legal system as officers of the court sharpen the adversary process, thus improving the quality of judicial decisionmaking and the development of the law. By encouraging 

individuals to consult lawyers and disclose to them candidly 

and fully, the attorney-client privilege also allows the nation's 

legal profession to help individuals understand their legal 

obligations and facilitate their voluntary compliance with 

them. Such voluntary compliance is particularly important to 

a free society which neither has nor should want sufficient 

law enforcement resources to search out and punish every 

violation of every law. See id.; see also Trammel v. United 

__________

*

In order to preserve the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings, 

selected portions of this dissent have been deleted from the published opinion.

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States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); In the Matter of a John Doe 

Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Mass. 1990).

The attorney-client privilege recognizes that sound legal 

advice does not "spring from lawyers' heads as Athena did 

from the brow of Zeus," In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 

(D.C. Cir. 1984), but instead depends "upon the lawyer's 

being fully informed by the client." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 

Although on occasion the attorney-client privilege can "ha[ve] 

the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder," Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976), 

courts sustain the privilege in individual cases to accomplish 

its larger systemic benefitsthe greater law compliance and 

fairer judicial proceedings resulting from the "sound legal 

advice [and] advocacy" the privilege promotes. Upjohn at 

389.

Like the spousal, priest-penitent, and psychotherapistpatient privileges, the attorney-client privilege is " 'rooted in 

the imperative need for confidence and trust.' " Jaffee v. 

Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1996) (quoting Trammel, 445 

U.S. at 51). As the Supreme Court recognized more than a 

century ago, the assistance of counsel "can only be safely and 

readily availed of when free from the consequences or the 

apprehension of disclosure." Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 

464, 470 (1888). Because individuals frequently seek legal 

counsel concerning embarrassing, disgraceful, or criminal 

conduct, "the mere possibility of disclosure" of communications about such subjects may "impede development of the 

confidential relationship," Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928, thereby 

eroding the substantial benefits to the justice system afforded 

by well-informed legal counsel. Lawyers who have represented clients in sensitive matters know the key words to full 

disclosure:

I cannot represent you effectively unless I know everything. I will hold all our conversations in the strictest of 

confidence. Now, please tell me the whole story.

Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the common law 

has protected the attorney-client privilege after a client's 

death. See, e.g., Hart v. Thompson's Executor, 15 La. 88, 93 

(1840) (upholding privilege after client's death); SIMON GREEN

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LEAF, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 310 (1850) (privilege 

not affected by death of client). Other than in testamentary 

disputes, for which there exists a well-established and independently justified exception not applicable to the case before 

us, see, e.g., Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 406-08 (1897), 

both state and federal courts have consistently followed the 

common law rule, whether the privilege is claimed in civil 

litigation, see, e.g., United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334 

(9th Cir. 1977); Baldwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 125 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir. 1942); People v. Pena, 198 

Cal. Rptr. 819, 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Lamb v. Lamb, 464 

N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Bailey v. Chicago, 

Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 179 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 

1970), or in criminal proceedings, see, e.g., State v. Macumber,

544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976); John Doe Grand Jury 

Investigation, 562 N.E.2d at 72; People v. Modzelewski, 611 

N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Cooper v. State, 661 

P.2d 905, 907 (Okla. 1983); State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218, 

219 (S.C. 1981); see also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2323 & n.2 

(citing additional cases). Incorporated in the model codes of 

evidence, see id. § 2292 n.2 (quoting Uniform Rule of Evidence § 26(1)); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 209(c)(i) 

(1942), adopted by the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee, 

see 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 521 

(discussing Standard 503), and codified by at least twenty 

state legislatures, see, e.g., GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A.

SALZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE 

STATES § 24.2 (1992) (citing 19 state codes); CAL. EVID. CODE

§ 953 (West 1995), the common law rule admits "no exception" that outside the testamentary context, the attorneyclient privilege survives the client's death. RESTATEMENT 

(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); see also id. (citing additional 

authorities); EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 234 (3d ed. 1997) ("The 

duration of the privilege, once it attaches, persists unless the 

lawyer is released by the client. Upon the death of the client, 

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no release is possible. Hence death should seal the lawyer's 

lips forever.").

Although rarely articulated, the rationale underlying the 

common law rule makes sense. By preserving the privilege 

after the client's death, the law ensures that the privacy 

afforded those who confide in counsel extends to those who 

would otherwise take their secrets to the grave. The common law rule thus encourages individuals to seek legal advice, 

bringing the benefit of such consultation to themselves, the 

legal system, and society. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 ("As a 

practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, 

the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it 

would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice."). As 

Wigmore explains:

The subjective freedom of the client, which it is the 

purpose of the privilege to secure ..., could not be 

attained if the client understood that, when the relation 

ended or even after the client's death, the attorney could 

be compelled to disclose the confidences, for there is no 

limit of time beyond which the disclosures might not be 

used to the detriment of the client or of his estate.

8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2323.

II

Justifiably unwilling to embrace the Independent Counsel's 

call for wholesale abrogation of the privilege in federal criminal cases after a client's death, the court today adopts a 

balancing test under which posthumous availability of the 

privilege turns on an ex post facto assessment of the evidence's importance, a test that neither party to this litigation 

advocates and that, notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, Maj. Op. at 3-4, represents a dramatic departure from 

the common law rule. The court cites no cases supporting its 

new rule, relying instead on views of commentators never 

accepted by any court or legislature. See, e.g., 24 CHARLES 

ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 

AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5498 (1986 & Supp. 1997); Maj. 

Op. at 4-5. The court sees particular significance in a draft 

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revision of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 

Lawyers supporting a posthumous exception to the common 

law rule. Maj. Op. at 5. The Restatement, however, candidly acknowledges that "no court or legislature has adopted" 

such an exception. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127, cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). 

The court also observes that the common law rule is most 

often stated in cases involving the testamentary exception and 

that "holdings actually manifesting the posthumous force of 

the privilege are relatively rare." Maj. Op. at 3. These 

observations prove nothing. Such holdings appear rarely not 

because judicial recognition of a posthumous privilege is 

"tepid," id. at 3, but because situations where the attorneyclient privilege is challenged after a client's death occur 

rarely. Most significantly, in all but one reported case where 

the attorney-client privilege was challenged after a client's 

death, courts have upheld the privilege, even where the result 

denied critical information to the trier of fact. See, e.g., John 

Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d at 72 (attorney 

could not be compelled to testify about what deceased client 

told him prior to committing suicide, even though the testimony might have brought an end to murder investigation); 

Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086 (trial court properly excluded 

testimony of two attorneys that a person other than the 

defendant had confessed to them of committing the murder 

for which defendant was tried); see also Simon J. Frankel, 

The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of the Client,

6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 65 (1992). But see Cohen v. 

Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 693 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) 

(where testimony sought did not contain "scandalous and 

impertinent matter which would serve to blacken the memory" of the deceased client, and where need for testimony is 

"clearly established," court could compel attorney to testify).

There is a very good reason why no case law supports my 

colleagues' new balancing test: unless clients know before 

consulting their lawyers exactly what information the privilege protectsknowledge denied by the court's balancing 

testfew will confide candidly and fully. After this decision, 

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lawyers will have to add an important caveat to what they 

advise their clients about confidentiality:

I cannot represent you effectively unless I know everything. I will hold all our conversations in the strictest of 

confidence. But when you die, I could be forced to 

testifyagainst your interestsin a criminal investigation or trial, even of your friends or family, if the court 

decides that what you tell me is important to the prosecution. Now, please tell me the whole story.

Because clients so advised will not know whether their confidences will be protected, they will be less likely to disclose 

sensitive or potentially inculpatory information. "If the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served," said the 

Supreme Court in Upjohn, "the attorney and client must be 

able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393. 

As the Court put it, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which 

purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." 

Id. Consistent with this reasoning, federal courts uniformly 

hold that where applicable, the attorney-client privilege, unlike qualified privileges, see, e.g., In Re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d 

550 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (dealing with executive privilege and 

requiring specific demonstration of evidence's importance to 

grand jury investigation and unavailability from other 

sources), cannot be overridden by a showing of need. See, 

e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. 

of Ariz., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989) (conditional 

protection of work product doctrine "cannot logically be extended to support an unavailability exception to the attorneyclient privilege"); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 

510 (2d Cir. 1979) (attorney-client privilege is unqualified); 

MURL A. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 2.01, at 

2-7 to 2-8 (citing cases and noting that "once the privilege 

has been held applicable, information protected thereunder 

may not be the subject of compelled disclosure regardless of 

the need or good cause shown"). For the same reasons and 

citing Upjohn, the Supreme Court, in the case of the psyUSCA Case #97-3007 Document #292927 Filed: 08/29/1997 Page 19 of 24
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choanalyst privilege, rejected a balancing test which, like the 

one the court adopts today, turned in large part on the 

importance of the information sought by the prosecution: 

"Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial 

judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the 

patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for 

disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege." 

Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.

My colleagues characterize the absolute nature of the 

attorney-client privilege as "illusory." Maj. Op. at 8. Pointing to the testamentary exception and to the well-accepted 

proposition that statements relating to future illegality find 

no protection in the attorney-client privilege, they suggest 

that their new exception, limited to criminal proceedings after 

the client's death, will likewise not weaken the privilege. 

Both the testamentary exception and the exclusion of statements of future criminality, however, differ significantly from 

the balancing test the court adopts today. In those two 

situations, clients know up front with certainty that the 

statements they make are unprotected by the privilege. Beyond those two clear situations, clients and their lawyers 

cannot predict whether a client's statement might some day 

relate to a criminal investigation, much less whether a court 

applying my colleagues' balancing test will subsequently decide that the information "bear[s] on a significant aspect of 

the crimes at issue." Id. at 10. Because of this uncertainty, 

the court's balancing test produces precisely the same "murkiness that persuaded the Court in Upjohn and Jaffee to reject 

the limitations proposed there." Id. at 10.

The court believes its balancing test will not damage the 

attorney-client privilege because people are generally indifferent to the effect posthumous disclosures of confidences 

could have on their reputations. This assumption of the 

unimportance of posthumous reputation, however, runs counter to the rationale underlying the common law rule. See 

Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of the 

Client at 61-63 & n.91. It also defies both common sense and 

experience. From Andrew Carnegie's libraries to Henry 

Ford's foundation, one need only count the schools and uniUSCA Case #97-3007 Document #292927 Filed: 08/29/1997 Page 20 of 24
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versities, academic chairs and scholarships, charitable foundations, research institutes, and sports arenaseven Acts of 

Congressbearing the names of their founders, benefactors, 

or authors to understand that human beings care deeply 

about how posterity will view them. Evidence of concern for 

surviving friends and family likewise abounds: people write 

wills, convey property, buy life insurance, invest for their 

children's education, and make guardianship arrangements to 

protect the interests of loved ones. Prominent public officials 

restrict access to their papers to protect reputations. Of 

course, such concerns may not influence every decision to 

confide potentially damaging information to attorneys. But 

because these concerns very well may affect some decisions, 

particularly by the aged, the seriously ill, the suicidal, or 

those with heightened interests in their posthumous reputations, I cannot accept the court's assumption that the 

attorney-client relationship will not suffer if the privilege is 

limited after a client's death. I agree with the Supreme 

Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "to disclose information 

given to [an attorney] by a client in confidence, even though 

such disclosure might be limited to the period after the 

client's death, would in many instances ... so deter the client 

from 'telling all' as to seriously impair the attorney's ability to 

function effectively." John Doe Grand Jury Investigation,

562 N.E.2d at 71.

The facts of the present case vividly illustrate the value a 

person can place on reputation.

Although I concede that no single 

case can prove the utility of maintaining the privilege beyond 

a client's death, this case seems a particularly inappropriate 

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one in which to abrogate the common law's posthumous 

protection of the attorney-client privilege.

The court suggests that because it limits its balancing test 

to criminal cases and because criminal liability ceases with 

death, its test will not chill client communications with their 

lawyers. Maj. Op. at 6-7. But clients often reveal to their 

lawyers much more than information about their own criminal 

liability: they may disclose information that could expose 

friends, family, or business associates to criminal culpability

which does not terminate with the client's deathas well as 

information that could damage their own reputations. The 

possible release of such information could chill the attorneyclient relationship just as seriously as the release of information about the client's own criminal liability.

The court claims that unless the privilege terminates at the 

client's death, information will be lost that could have been 

sought from the client while alive. Id. at 7. The common 

law rule, however, long ago determined that the benefits the 

legal system gains through recognizing the privilege posthumously outweigh whatever damage might flow from denying information to the factfinder in a particular case. Further balancing on a case by case basis will undermine the 

privilege. Moreover, if limiting the scope of the privilege 

deters "full and frank" attorney-client communication, as the 

common law assumes, who can say that in the absence of the 

privilege information later sought in criminal proceedings 

would have been shared with counsel in the first place? As 

the Supreme Court explained in the psychotherapist privilege 

context, "[w]ithout a privilege, much of the desirable evidence 

to which litigants ... seek access ... is unlikely to come into 

being." Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929; see also Salzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA.

L. REV. 597, 610 (1980) ("The privilege creates a zone of 

privacy in which an attorney and client can create information 

that did not exist before and might not exist otherwise.") 

Clients will be particularly reluctant to share critical information with their lawyers in cases where both the client's death 

and the possibility of criminal investigation are foreseeable. 

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Perhaps this is such a case, for at oral argument, the deceased's lawyer told us:

Nor can I see any way to limit the Court's "information 

loss" argument to cases in which the client has died. Witnesses unable to remember facts, incompetent to testify, or 

beyond the court's process likewise deny relevant information 

to the factfinder. Yet neither the Independent Counsel nor 

this court suggests that we abrogate the attorney-client privilege to fill in these evidentiary gaps. The unavailability of a 

witness likewise does no greater harm to the factfinding 

process than an available witness who testifies inaccurately. 

Again, no one would suggest that we call upon attorneys to 

corroborate or correct their clients' every statement. The 

reason is simple: accepting that some information may be 

lost to a factfinder, we insulate the attorney-client relationship from the prospect of these intrusions in order to promote 

the " 'confidence and trust,' " Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 

(quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51), necessary for the relationship to work and to afford society its benefits. See Admiral 

Insurance Co., 881 F.2d at 1494 ("Any inequity in terms of 

access to information is the price the system pays to maintain 

the integrity of the privilege."). Neither the court nor the 

Independent Counsel has offered any convincing reason why 

a client's death should be treated differently than these other 

circumstances.

At the end of its discussion of the attorney-client privilege, 

the court suggests that district courts could protect clients' 

interests by ordering that their lawyers' testimony be kept 

confidential. Maj. Op. at 10. But evidence essential to the 

prosecution's case at trial cannot ultimately remain confidential. In any event, the privilege's fundamental purpose is to 

encourage clients to share information with their lawyers, not 

to maintain the information's confidentiality. Qualified promises of confidentiality"Don't worry, if I am compelled to 

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reveal what you tell me, the court will make sure that no one 

hears it other than the U.S. Attorney and the federal grand 

jury"are unlikely to encourage worried clients to make 

candid and full disclosures to their attorneys.

III

The court's decision too readily dismisses the continuing 

vitality of the common law rule in the states. "It is appropriate to treat a consistent body of policy determinations by 

state legislatures as reflecting both 'reason' and 'experience.' " Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930 (quoting Funk v. United 

States, 290 U.S. 371, 376-81 (1933)). The fact that the 

common law's posthumous recognition of the privilege outside 

testamentary disputes appears to have been embraced by 

every state that has codified the privilegeand remains the 

law in those that have notcounsels against casting it aside 

simply because the Independent Counsel and a few commentators question its usefulness. That the common law rule was 

likewise adopted by the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee, as well as by the committees who drafted the Model Code 

of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, reinforces 

the conclusion that " 'reason' and 'experience' " support posthumous protection of the attorney-client privilege. Id.; Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 & n.6 (8th Cir. 

1981) (Supreme Court Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 

503(c) useful "as a source for defining the federal common law 

of attorney-client privilege").

Because the court's balancing test strikes a fundamental 

blow to the attorney-client privilege and jeopardizes its benefits to the legal system and society, I respectfully dissent.

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