Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03981/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03981-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Essex Management Corporation
Plaintiff
Suzanne M. Relander
Defendant

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ESSEX MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SUZANNE M. RELANDER, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 16-cv-03981-EDL 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO REMAND; ORDER GRANTING 

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS AND REASSIGNING CASE 

On July 14, 2016, Defendant Suzanne M. Relander (“Defendant”) filed a notice of removal 

of this unlawful detainer case—originally filed by Plaintiff against Defendant in San Mateo 

County Superior Court on April 7, 2016—as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis 

(“IFP Application”). As the Parties have not yet consented to this Court’s jurisdiction, the Court 

issues this Report and Recommendation and reassigns this case to a district judge. For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court grants Defendant’s IFP Application and recommends remanding this 

matter to state court. 

Defendant’s IFP Application adequately alleges her poverty. Defendant is employed as a 

dispatcher in Redwood City, CA. Her gross salary is $1900 per month, and her net salary is $1650 

per month. She has no other income. She does not own a home, own an automobile, or have a 

bank account. She owns $40 in cash. Her monthly expenses total $2,195. Accordingly, 

Defendant qualifies for in forma pauperis status, and her IFP Application is granted. 

However, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case and the case should be 

remanded. “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought 

in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 

removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the 

district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If 

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United States District Court 

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at any time before final judgment, it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 

the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] the 

removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 

1992) (citations omitted). Thus, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to 

the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always 

has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id.; see also Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 

443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). Removal jurisdiction may be based on diversity of citizenship 

or on the existence of a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. However, a case may be removed 

based on the existence of a federal question only when that federal question appears on the face of 

the properly pleaded complaint. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); 

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002) (“The wellpleaded-complaint rule has long governed whether a case “arises under” federal law for purposes 

of § 1331.”); see also Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.”). 

Here, the face of the complaint referenced in the Notice of Removal asserts only one state 

law claim for unlawful detainer. Because this complaint does not provide any basis for removal, 

the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Notice of Removal at Ex. 

A (Complaint for Unlawful Detainer). To the extent that Defendant may have raised federal law 

issues in an answer in state court, those issues do not provide a basis for removal. 

 Further, removal of the action was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which requires 

that an action be removed within thirty days of service or thirty days after it becomes ascertainable 

that the action could be removed. The underlying state court complaint was filed on April 7, 

2016. Defendant was necessarily served with the complaint by at least May 23, 2016, which is 

when she filed an answer. However, she did not remove until July 14, 2016, more than thirty days 

later, and nothing in the interim changed the nature of the complaint or made it any more or less 

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removable than it was on the date it was served or answered. Even taking into consideration the 

leniency afforded to pro se litigants, there is no explanation or excuse given for Defendant’s 

failure to timely remove, and remand is appropriate on this basis as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 

(removed case may be remanded to state court based on a “defect” in the removal procedure). 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends remanding this case to San Mateo 

County Superior Court. Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this 

recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Civil Local Rule 72-3. Failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 20, 2016 

 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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