Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01018/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Motorola Mobility LLC
Appellee
Profectus Technology LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PROFECTUS TECHNOLOGY LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD., HUAWEI 

TECHNOLOGIES USA, INC., HUAWEI DEVICE 

USA, INC., FUTUREWEI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Defendants

DELL INC., APPLE INC., SAMSUNG 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, LLC, 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 

MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC, HEWLETT-PACKARD 

COMPANY, HEWLETT-PACKARD DEVELOPMENT 

COMPANY, L.P.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1016, 2015-1018, 2015-1019

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Texas in Nos. 6:11-cv-00474-MHS, 

6:11-cv-00674-MHS, 6:11-cv-00676-MHS, Judge Michael 

H. Schneider.

______________________ 

Decided: May 26, 2016

______________________ 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 1 Filed: 05/26/2016
2 PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 

 THOMAS C. WRIGHT, Cunningham Swaim, LLP, Dallas, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented 

by STEVEN EDWARD ROSS, Ross IP Group PLLC, Dallas, 

TX.

 LAUREN B. FLETCHER, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale 

and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, argued for defendant-appellee 

Apple Inc. Also represented by WILLIAM F. LEE, KEVIN M.

YURKERWICH; BRITTANY BLUEITT AMADI, Washington, DC.

 AHMED JAMAL DAVIS, Fish & Richardson, P.C., Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees Samsung 

Telecommunications America, LLC, Samsung Electronics 

America, Inc. Also represented by MICHAEL J. MCKEON;

JOHN STEPHEN GOETZ, New York, NY.

 ROGER FULGHUM, Baker Botts, LLP, Houston, TX, for 

defendant-appellee Dell Inc. Also represented by MICHAEL 

HAWES, TAMMY PENNINGTON RHODES. 

 JONATHAN E. RETSKY, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellee Motorola Mobility LLC. 

Also represented by KURT A. MATHAS, IVAN MICHAEL 

POULLAOS; ANDREW RYAN SOMMER, Washington, DC.

 NICKOLAS BOHL, Feinberg Day Alberti & Thompson 

LLP, Menlo Park, CA, for defendants-appellees HewlettPackard Company, Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Also represented by MARGARET ELIZABETH DAY. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge REYNA.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge MOORE.

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 2 Filed: 05/26/2016
PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 3

Profectus Technology LLC (“Profectus”) appeals a district court’s claim construction order and grant of summary judgment of non-infringement. The patent-in-suit is 

directed to a mountable digital picture frame for displaying digital images. Profectus asserted certain of the 

patent claims against manufacturers and sellers of tablet 

computer devices. After construing the term “mountable,” 

the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement on grounds that the accused devices do not 

satisfy the “mountable” limitation. On appeal, Profectus 

argues that the district court erred in its claim construction of “mountable” and improperly resolved disputes of 

material fact at summary judgment. We discern no error 

in the district court’s claim construction or grant of summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the district

court. 

BACKGROUND

Profectus owns U.S. Patent No. 6,975,308 (the “’308 

patent”). The ’308 patent discloses a mountable digital 

picture frame for displaying still digital images. The 

specification discusses how a user can display digital 

images on a wall or desktop similar to conventional 

photographs. ’308 Patent cols. 1–2 ll. 52–36. For example, Figure 1 shows a wall-mountable picture frame

mounted to a wall, while Figure 4 shows a mountable 

frame resting on a flat surface.

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 3 Filed: 05/26/2016
4 PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 

The ’308 patent has 31 claims, including independent 

claims 1 and 29. The patent claims “[a] stand alone and 

mountable picture display for displaying still digital 

pictures.” See ’308 Patent cols. 7–8 ll. 61–8 (claim 1), col. 

10 ll. 7–22 (claim 29). Claims 1 and 29 recite the limitation that is relevant to this appeal: “a mountable picture 

frame adapted to digitally display at least one still image 

thereon.” 

In September 2011, Profectus brought suit in the 

Eastern District of Texas against a large number of 

manufacturers and sellers of tablet computer devices, 

alleging infringement of independent claims 1 and 29 and 

dependent claims 2 and 4–9 of the ’308 patent.1 Profectus 

accused devices with features that Profectus purported 

made the devices “mountable” picture frames. 

During claim construction, the parties submitted proposals for the term “mountable.” Profectus proposed that 

“mountable” should be interpreted as “capable of being 

mounted,” while Defendants argued that the correct 

interpretation is “having a support for affixing on a wall 

or setting on a desk or table top.” On January 3, 2014, 

the district court issued a provisional claim construction 

order, construing the term to mean “having a feature 

designed for mounting.” J.A. 10. The parties submitted 

1 Profectus initially sued a large number of defendants, and settled or dismissed its claims against many of 

them. The following parties are subject to this appeal: 

Apple Inc., Dell Inc., Hewlett-Packard Company, HewlettPackard Development Company, L.P., Motorola Mobility 

LLC, Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Samsung 

Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). 

 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 4 Filed: 05/26/2016
PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 5

additional briefing on claim construction after entry of the 

provisional claim construction order. 

On April 17, 2014, the district court issued a new 

claim construction order, construing “mountable” to mean 

“having a feature for mounting.” The district court observed that “mountable” appears in every independent 

claim, and noted that the parties did not dispute that a 

mounting feature is not a preferred embodiment. The 

district court concluded that “the picture frame or display 

must have some intrinsic mounting feature—not just a 

feature that could potentially render the frame or display 

capable of being mounted.” Profectus Tech. LLC v. 

Huawei Techs. Co., No. 6:11-cv-474 (Lead Case), 2014 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53157, at *13–15 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 

2014) (emphasis in original). The district court did not 

require that the mounting feature include all components 

needed to mount the frame or display, noting that even 

the “wall-mountable preferred embodiment” required use 

of an additional component (e.g., nails) to mount the 

frame to a wall. Id. at *15. 

Following the district court’s claim construction order, 

Defendants moved for summary judgment of noninfringement on grounds that the accused devices do not 

satisfy the “mountable” limitation. On September 8, 

2014, the district court granted the summary judgment 

motion. On September 15, 2014, the district court entered 

final judgment in favor of Defendants. 

Profectus appeals. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the ultimate construction of a 

claim term. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 

S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). The construction of patent claim

terms involves findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

District court factual findings based on the intrinsic 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 5 Filed: 05/26/2016
6 PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 

record are considered legal issues that are reviewed de 

novo, while factual findings relying on extrinsic evidence 

are reviewed for clear error. Id.; see also Akzo Nobel 

Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 811 F.3d 1334, 1339 

(Fed. Cir. 2016). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous if, 

despite some supporting evidence, we are left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made.” Insite Vision, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 783 F.3d 853, 

858 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 

Among the facts that we review for clear error include 

“[u]nderstandings that lie outside the patent documents 

about the meaning of terms to one of skill in the art or the 

science or state of the knowledge of one of skill in the art.” 

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 

1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Legal error arises when a court 

relies on extrinsic evidence that contradicts the intrinsic 

record. See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. 

N. Am. Corp., 790 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

We review a grant of summary judgment in accordance with the law of the regional circuit, here the Fifth 

Circuit. Ineos USA LLC v. Berry Plastics Corp., 783 F.3d 

865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Fifth Circuit reviews de 

novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Id.

(citing Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 

(5th Cir. 2007)).

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

Profectus argues that the district court erred in construing “mountable” to mean “having a feature for mounting.” Profectus asserts that the correct construction is 

“capable of being mounted.” We disagree. 

Profectus contends that requiring a feature for mounting is an additional limitation unsupported in the record. 

Profectus points to claims 13 and 31, which recite a “wall 

mountable display” whereby mounting occurs through the 

frame, not the display itself. ’308 Patent col. 5 ll. 44–47. 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 6 Filed: 05/26/2016
PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 7

Profectus argues that one of ordinary skill in the art 

would understand that the claims contemplate a “picture 

frame” or “picture display” that is mountable through the 

use of other components or structures. Profectus cites 

display 12 of Figure 1 to illustrate characteristics, features, and components (e.g., light weight, low profile, 

certain frame dimensions, attachment apparatuses, and 

nails or screws) that render the display mountable. ’308 

Patent col. 4 ll. 26–28, col. 5 ll. 45–47, col. 6 ll. 21–23. 

Profectus references a dictionary definition of the common 

suffix “-able” as “capable of, fit or worthy of.” MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary 3 (10th ed. 1995). Profectus asserts that the district court erred in reading in 

certain preferred embodiments to exclude devices that can 

be mounted through the use of external components. 

Profectus maintains that its proposed construction is 

not overbroad because the claim language limits what 

type of devices are mountable. Profectus argues that the 

claims are directed to “displaying digital pictures,” which 

means that Profectus’s proposed construction of “capable 

of being mounted” cannot include any product capable of 

being mounted to a wall or tabletop. According to Profectus, the digital-picture limitation confines the invention 

only to mountable displays of still digital pictures. 

Profectus argues that its proposed construction comports 

with plain and ordinary meaning, citing Thorner v. Sony 

Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

to emphasize that terms like “mountable” should be given 

their plain and ordinary meaning.

Defendants argue that the district court’s claim construction is supported by the intrinsic record. Each 

asserted claim recites “stand alone” together with 

“mountable,” indicating to a skilled artisan that those 

terms describe the claimed invention as a single unit for 

mounting because both terms modify “picture display” 

and “picture frame.” Defendants contend that the picture 

display and frame must be “mountable” and “stand 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 7 Filed: 05/26/2016
8 PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 

alone.” Defendants point to the background of the ’308 

patent, which teaches that “[t]he present invention relates to digital picture displays and more particularly to 

wall mounted or table top picture frames for displaying 

digital images.” ’308 Patent, col. 1 ll. 14–16. Defendants 

argue that every disclosed embodiment of the claimed 

picture display and picture frame bears an intrinsic 

feature for mounting; no embodiment requires external 

components due to lack of an intrinsic feature for mounting. Defendants assert that the district court did not read 

in a preferred embodiment because it required that the 

frame have features for mounting, while still permitting 

other external features to facilitate mounting. Defendants note that by revising its provisional claim construction from “designed for mounting” to “having a feature for 

mounting,” the district court recognized that the picture 

display or frame must have a feature for use in mounting 

the device. According to Defendants, that a device is

capable of mounting does not make it “mountable.” 

We hold that the district court properly construed 

“mountable” to mean “having a feature for mounting.” 

The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary 

and customary meaning, which is the meaning that the 

term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at 

the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 

F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations 

omitted). Claim language must be viewed in light of the 

specification, which is the “single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics 

Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 

1996)). In accordance with Phillips, we first look to the 

actual words of the claims and then read them in view of 

the specification. See Akzo Nobel Coatings, 811 F.3d at 

1339–40 (citations omitted). Although courts are permitted to consider extrinsic evidence (e.g., expert testimony, 

dictionaries, treatises), such evidence is generally of less 

significance than the intrinsic record. Phillips, 415 F.3d 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 8 Filed: 05/26/2016
PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 9

at 1317 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 

F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Extrinsic evidence may 

not be used “to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1324. 

“The construction that stays true to the claim language 

and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of 

the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” 

Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 

1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

When read in view of the specification, the claims do 

not permit the expansive construction proposed by Profectus. The term “mountable” is a modifying word in the 

claims: “mountable picture display” (claims 1, 13, 22, 29, 

31); “mountable picture frame” (claims 1, 22, 29); “wall 

mountable” (claims 6, 13, 22, 31); “desk top mountable” 

(claims 6, 22). Absent from the claims are words that 

embrace broader meaning, such as “capable of,” “adapted 

to,” or “configured to.” The claim language is tailored to, 

characterizes, and delimits the claimed “picture frame” 

and “picture display.” 

The specification confirms the district court’s understanding that being mountable requires having a feature 

for mounting. In every embodiment disclosed in the 

specification, the picture display or frame includes a 

feature for mounting the device to a wall or on a tabletop. 

For example, for wall mounting, the specification teaches 

that “[f]rame 10 includes an attachment apparatus 28 

which may include hooks, clips, anchors, or equivalents as 

is known in the art for attaching a picture or other device 

to a wall.” ’308 Patent col. 5 ll. 45–47. For desk or tabletop mounting, the specification explains that “[f]rame 50 

includes a stand 52 and a bar 54 for securing stand 52 to 

frame 50.” ’308 Patent col. 6 ll. 18–20. The specification 

does not disclose a bare embodiment in which the picture 

display or picture frame lacks a feature for mounting. By 

noting that the picture display or frame must have some 

intrinsic mounting feature, the district court correctly 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 9 Filed: 05/26/2016
10 PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 

recognized, consistent with the claim language and specification, that the picture display or frame must include

something that may be used for mounting the device. We 

agree with the district court that Profectus’s dictionary 

definition does not inform the analysis. We see no reason 

to depart from the intrinsic record. See, e.g., Cambrian 

Sci. Corp. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 617 F. App’x 989, 993 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court’s claim construction without addressing arguments on extrinsic 

evidence because “the intrinsic evidence fully determines 

the proper construction of the contested claim term”).

Profectus maintains that requiring a mounting feature reads in a preferred embodiment. We disagree. 

Profectus fails to pinpoint in the intrinsic record where 

the patent contemplates a situation where no mounting 

features exist. The district court’s construction does not 

preclude the use of external components or accessories; 

the construction requires merely that a feature exist with 

the claimed picture display or picture frame for mounting. 

Such a construction does not read out the adjoining claim 

terms and still requires the mountable object to be digital 

picture displays or digital picture frames. The district 

court did not improperly limit the scope of the invention 

through claim construction. 

Profectus cites Thorner to support its proposed claim 

construction. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1369 (holding that 

“flexible” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning 

and reversing the construction of “capable of being noticeably flexed with ease”). In Thorner, we reversed the 

district court’s claim construction on the basis that the 

district court imported an erroneous term of degree. See 

id. Unlike Thorner, the district court here imposed no 

such term, leaving open what types of features could be 

sufficient to be deemed “mountable.” See Profectus, 2014 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53157, at *15 (rejecting that a feature 

be “designed for” mounting, but also noting “the mounting 

feature [need not] include all components needed to 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 10 Filed: 05/26/2016
PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 11

mount the frame or display”). Hence, Thorner supports 

the district court’s claim construction. 

We affirm the district court’s claim construction for 

the term “mountable.” 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Based on its claim construction for the term “mountable,” the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. Profectus appeals the grant of summary 

judgment on grounds that there exists a genuine dispute 

that the accused devices satisfy the “mountable” limitation. Profectus also contends that the court failed to draw 

factual inferences in its favor as the non-movant. 

The infringement inquiry asks if an accused device 

contains every claim limitation or its equivalent. Papst 

Licensing GmbH & Co. KG v. Fujifilm Corp. (In re Papst 

Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litig.), 778 F.3d 1255, 

1260 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if, after drawing all factual inferences 

in favor of the non-movant, “the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

To show that the accused devices meet the “mountable” limitation, Profectus advances two arguments. First, 

Profectus contends that the district court erred by not 

permitting a jury to consider whether the size, shape, 

lightweight nature, and thinness of the accused devices 

are features for mounting. Profectus maintains that they 

are because they make the accused devices readily 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 11 Filed: 05/26/2016
12 PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 

mountable with external accessories, in particular docking stations.2 

Second, Profectus argues that the jury should have 

been permitted to consider whether the communication/charging (“communication ports”) of the accused 

devices are features for mounting. Profectus points to 

brochures and other marketing materials that advertise 

the accused devices alongside the docking stations as 

evidence that the communication ports, when used in 

combination with the docking stations, are features for 

mounting. Profectus argues that the district court failed 

to view this evidence in the light most favorable to it as 

the non-movant when granting summary judgment of 

non-infringement. 

We agree with the district court that under the proper 

construction, there exists no genuine dispute of material 

fact that the communication ports and the cited physical 

characteristics of the accused devices do not meet the 

“mountable” limitations. The district court properly 

concluded that the communication ports are features for 

power, data, and communication, and not inherent features for mounting. That an external component can 

utilize a communication port to help prop an accused 

device does not convert the port into an inherent feature 

for mounting. Indeed, there is no evidence that, standing 

alone, the communication ports make the accused devices 

mountable for viewing, as, for example, set out in Figure 4 

of the patent. As the brochures and unrebutted expert 

testimony showed, the docking station has a design that 

works to support the accused devices, and that solely 

connecting the docking station to the communication port 

2 Profectus concedes that its infringement theory 

involving docking stations does not apply to HewlettPackard. Appellant’s Br. at 26 n.4. 

 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 12 Filed: 05/26/2016
PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 13

does not provide adequate support. See, e.g., J.A. 448–50, 

656, 677, 769. 

Conversely, there is no evidence that the communication ports are developed as inherent features for mounting the devices on a wall or tabletop. To conclude 

otherwise could render any digital display device susceptible to infringement to the extent an external object can 

be used to grasp onto any feature of the device that is not 

related to mounting. This approach to infringement is 

inapposite to the district court’s construction of “having a 

feature for mounting,” but is consistent with Profectus’s 

proposed construction (“capable of being mounted”), which 

was rejected by the district court in the claim construction 

process. Under the court’s construction, the feature must 

be a standalone inherent feature in the device. It is not 

enough that the feature is “just a feature that could 

potentially render the frame or display capable of being 

mounted.” Profectus, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53157, at *15 

(emphasis in original). Here, no reasonable jury could 

find that because the communication port is incidentally 

capable of being used in conjunction with an external 

docking port to prop a device on a tabletop, the “mountable” limitation is met. See, e.g., Novatek, Inc. v. Sollami 

Co., 559 F. App’x 1011, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Anything 

with adequate force can be ‘removable,’ but such unbounded interpretation of the term flounders on the 

shoals of reality. No reasonable jury would find ‘removable’ as construed by the district court to read on Novatek’s 

accused device.”). 

Although certain intrinsic physical features may combine to aid in mounting with external components, as the 

district court found, those features must be for mounting

to meet the claim limitations. Hence, while the accused 

devices are capable of mounting by exploiting the communication ports and being easy to prop up due to their size

and weight, we conclude that those characteristics do not 

make the accused devices mountable as claimed and fail 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 13 Filed: 05/26/2016
14 PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

features for mounting (or their equivalents) are present 

within the accused devices. There is no genuine dispute 

of fact that the accused devices were conceived apart from 

external accessories like docking stations: the docking 

stations were designed to work with the accused devices 

(not that the devices were designed to have features for 

mounting to the docking stations). Unrebutted testimony 

showed that the shape of the accused devices had little to 

do with the ability to mount the devices on docking stations. J.A. 1218. Rather, if the accused devices remained 

upright, it is because the docking stations created an 

environment to prevent featureless devices from toppling 

over. 

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly construed the term 

“mountable.” In addition, the district court correctly 

concluded that no genuine dispute of material fact exists, 

and that Defendants are entitled to judgment of noninfringement as a matter of law. The judgment of the 

district court is therefore affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 14 Filed: 05/26/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PROFECTUS TECHNOLOGY LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD., HUAWEI 

TECHNOLOGIES USA, INC., HUAWEI DEVICE 

USA, INC., FUTUREWEI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Defendants

DELL INC., APPLE INC., SAMSUNG 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, LLC, 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 

MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC, HEWLETT-PACKARD 

COMPANY, HEWLETT-PACKARD DEVELOPMENT 

COMPANY, L.P.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1016, 2015-1018, 2015-1019

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Texas in Nos. 6:11-cv-00474-MHS, 

6:11-cv-00674-MHS, 6:11-cv-00676-MHS, Judge Michael 

H. Schneider.

______________________ 

MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I agree with the majority that the district court correctly construed the term “mountable” as “having a feaCase: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 15 Filed: 05/26/2016
2 PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 

ture for mounting.” Because I think Profectus has proffered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 

whether the communication ports are a feature for mounting, I would vacate summary judgment of noninfringement as to Apple, Dell, Motorola, and Samsung.1

On a motion for summary judgment, a district court 

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

non-movant, and draw all reasonable inferences and 

resolve all doubts over factual issues in favor of the nonmovant. Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 

690 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The record evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Profectus, raises a genuine dispute over whether the Appellees’ 

communication ports are a feature for mounting. Each 

accused device, commonly referred to as a tablet, has a 

compatible dock on which the tablet can be mounted and 

stay upright. Each accused device also has a communication port on the bottom, which connects to the compatible 

dock’s connector when the tablet is mounted. To mount a 

Samsung tablet to its dock, Samsung’s 2011 Series 7 Slate 

User Guide instructs a user to align the connector on the 

dock with the communication port on the bottom of the 

tablet, and connect them. J.A. 1307. Apple’s iPad user 

guide discloses using an iPad as a picture frame “while 

charging it in an iPad Dock.” J.A. 1261. The record 

includes testimony that the docks are designed to mate 

with the ports in the accused devices and that the tension 

between the two connectors holds the tablet in place on 

the dock. J.A. 1217–18. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that the communication ports, 

which fit to the dock’s connectors, are features for mounting.

1 Because HP’s products at issue do not have a 

communication port, I agree that summary judgment of 

non-infringement is appropriate as to HP.

 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 16 Filed: 05/26/2016
PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 3

The majority relies on the following undisputed facts

for its position that summary judgment was appropriate: 

(i) the ports can be used without the docks, namely, for 

power, data, and communication, (ii) there was no evidence that the communication ports were developed as 

inherent features for mounting, and (iii) solely connecting 

the docking station to the communication port does not 

provide adequate support. Maj. Op. at 12–13. These facts 

do not call for summary judgment.

First, the construction does not require having a feature that is exclusively for mounting. The fact that the 

communication ports can be used for charging does not 

mean they cannot serve additional functions. Indeed, 

Appellees admit that the communication ports have at 

least two features. Appellees’ Br. 3 (“[The] ports are 

features for charging and transferring information . . . .”

(emphasis added)). Here, the record on summary judgment includes evidence that the communication ports 

function to charge, transfer information, and mount the 

accused devices on the docking station. See, e.g., 

J.A. 1217–18, 1261, 1307. This creates a genuine issue of 

fact regarding whether the communication ports are a 

feature for mounting and thus I would not have affirmed 

the grant of summary judgment.

Second, the manufacturers’ intent behind the design 

or purpose of the communication ports is irrelevant to the

question of infringement, and the district court properly 

eliminated the requirement that the feature must be 

“designed for” mounting. Apparatus claims “recite features of an apparatus either structurally or functionally.” 

In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 

Intent behind a product design is not an element of direct 

infringement for an apparatus claim. The majority’s 

reliance on the fact that the accused devices were “conceived apart from external accessories” and not “designed 

to have features for mounting” is inconsistent with the 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 17 Filed: 05/26/2016
4 PROFECTUS TECH. LLC v. HUAWEI TECHS. CO., LTD. 

district court’s construction, which eliminated the “designed for” requirement. Maj. Op. at 14. 

Finally, the majority places significant weight on the 

fact that the communication ports, standing alone, do not 

make the accused devices mountable for viewing. The 

specification expressly contemplates the use of additional 

parts to achieve mounting, such as screws or 

nails. ’308 patent, col. 5 ll. 45–47. And the district court 

allowed for additional elements or structures to be used to 

achieve mounting. Profectus Tech. LLC v. Huawei Techs. 

Co., Ltd., No. 6:11-cv-474, 2014 WL 1575719, at *4 (E.D. 

Tex. Apr. 17, 2014) (“[T]he Court does not go so far as to 

require that the mounting feature include all components 

needed to mount the frame or display.”). The Appellees 

argue that Profectus’ expert conceded that he had done no 

mechanical analysis on how much of the weight of the 

device is supported by the rest of the dock as opposed to 

the particular connector. Appellees’ Br. 40 (citing 

J.A. 490:8–13). However, the district court’s construction 

neither requires such mechanical analysis nor that the 

feature be “a standalone inherent feature,” Maj. Op. at 13. 

Determining whether the communication ports are features for mounting, and the extent or degree to which 

they serve this function, is for the finder of fact. 

“[T]he weighing of the evidence[] and the drawing of 

legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not 

those of a judge . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent

from the majority’s affirmance of summary judgment as 

to Apple, Dell, Motorola, and Samsung. 

Case: 15-1018 Document: 11-2 Page: 18 Filed: 05/26/2016