Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-10713/USCOURTS-ca5-09-10713-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeremy Alexander Goncalves
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

REVISED AUGUST 25, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-10713

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JEREMY ALEXANDER GONCALVES,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant Jeremy Alexander Goncalves appeals his sentence of thirtythree months’ incarceration for his convictions of passing counterfeit notes and

for using a falsely altered military discharge certificate. Goncalves argues that

the district court miscalculated his sentence under the United States Sentencing

Commission Guidelines Manual (the “Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). For the

following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 3, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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In August 2007, Goncalves received a bad-conduct discharge from the

United States Army. After his discharge, Goncalves returned to his hometown

of Ludlow, Massachusetts, where he applied for work with Bell Helicopter. Bell

is located in Hurst, Texas. As part of his application, Goncalves emailed Bell an

altered copy of his certificate of discharge from the Army. In the certificate of

discharge, Goncalves indicated that he received an honorable discharge from the

Army, served in special forces for over two years, and last held the rank of

captain. All of these assertions were false. Goncalves also fraudulently

represented to Bell in accompanying documents that he had graduated from the

University of Massachusetts and was currently employed with Northeast

Utilities.

Based on Goncalves’s representations, Bell hired Goncalves, paying for

him and his family to move to Texas. Goncalves began work for Bell in May

2008. However, as part of its own hiring investigation, Bell subsequently

learned that Goncalves had fraudulently altered his certificate of discharge from

the Army and lied about his educational and work background. Bell terminated

Goncalves in June 2008.

In August 2008, Goncalves attempted to purchase a dirt bike through the

Internet from Wilfredo Mendieta for $2,100. When Goncalves and Mendieta met

for the purchase, Goncalves handed Mendieta what appeared to be twenty-one

$100 bills. However, Mendieta later told authorities that he thought that the

bills “felt funny,” so he had them inspected with a counterfeit detection pen.

Some of the bills were revealed to be counterfeit. Mendieta turned the bills over

to police, where the bills were conclusively identified as counterfeit federal

reserve notes, many bearing the same serial number.

Texas state police officers subsequently identified Goncalves as the

purchaser of the dirt bike and arrested him. After his arrest, Goncalves

admitted to the officers that he had used counterfeit notes to purchase the dirt

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bike from Mendieta. Goncalves further stated that he had entered into an

arrangement with a Nigerian man in France whom Goncalves had met on the

Internet. According to Goncalves, the Nigerian man had agreed to send

Goncalves counterfeit notes that he would first use to make purchases of items,

and that he would then sell at a profit. The scheme then involved Goncalves

sending the Nigerian man thirty percent of any profits earned from the scheme.

Goncalves later stated to federal officials that he had received a package in the

mail containing the fraudulent notes that he used to purchase the dirt bike.

Federal officials performed a note history on the counterfeit bills used in

Goncalves’s fraudulent purchase of the dirt bike. The note history revealed that

someone had used an additional twenty $100 counterfeit bills with the same

serial numbers to purchase a home-theater system from Circuit City. A

subsequent investigation revealed that Goncalves had used the additional

fraudulent bills to purchase the home-theater system.

Goncalves pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of Uttering

Counterfeit Obligations of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472, and

one count of Using Falsely Altered Military Discharge Certificate, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 498 & 2. Prior to sentencing, a United States Probation Officer

submitted a Presentence Report (PSR), which calculated that Goncalves’s

Guidelines range of imprisonment was twenty-seven to thirty-three months.

Goncalves objected to the recommended Guidelines sentence calculation

in the PSR. First, Goncalves argued that his offenses should have been grouped

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), which allows for grouping of offenses that

“involve substantially the same harm.” Such a grouping would have resulted in

a two-level reduction in his Guidelines sentence. Goncalves also argued that the

PSR improperly applied § 2B5.1(b)(5), which applies a two-level enhancement

if any conduct relevant to the offense occurred outside the United States. The

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district court overruled both objections and sentenced Goncalves to thirty-three

months’ incarceration, which was at the top of the calculated Guidelines range.

Goncalves now appeals his sentence and reiterates the objections he made

at sentencing.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Harris, 597 F.3d 242, 250 (5th Cir. 2010). For properly

preserved claims, we review the court’s application and interpretation of the

Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Rodriguez, 602 F.3d 346, 362 (5th Cir.

2010). A district court’s factual findings, which we review for clear error, must

be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. “‘A factual finding is

not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record read as a

whole.’” United States v. McMillan, 600 F.3d 434, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2010)

(quoting United States v. Krenning, 93 F.3d 1257, 1269 (5th Cir. 1996)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. No Error for Not Grouping the Offenses under § 3D1.2(d)

Goncalves first argues that the district court erred by failing to group his

two convictions under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. Specifically, Goncalves argues that

because § 3D1.2(d) lists both of the crimes for which he was convicted in a list

of offenses “to be grouped,” the court erred in finding that the Guideline did not

apply.

Section 3D1.2 states that “[a]ll counts involving substantially the same

harm shall be grouped together into a single Group.” The section then sets forth

four different categories of offenses that “involve substantially the same harm

within the meaning of this rule.” The only such category at issue here is that

contained in subsection (d), which applies in the following circumstance:

When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total

amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or

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some other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is

ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written

to cover such behavior.

Id. Subsection (d) further sets forth three categories of Guidelines that cover

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certain offenses and how those offenses are treated under § 3D1.2(d). The first

category lists Guidelines covering offenses that “are to be grouped” under the

subsection. Id. The second category lists Guidelines covering offenses that are

specifically excluded from grouping under the subsection. Finally, the third

category states that multiple counts of unlisted offenses must be determined on

a case-by-case basis. Id.; see also United States v. Salter, 241 F.3d 392, 394 (5th

Cir. 2001).

The Guidelines covering Goncalves’s two offenses are found on the same

line of the first category of § 3D1.2(d). Because § 3D1.2(d) states that offenses

in this list “are to be grouped” under the subsection, Goncalves argues that a per

se rule exists regarding their grouping. However, we have held that “grouping

 In relevant part, the Guideline provides as follows: 1

All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into

a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same harm within the

meaning of this rule:

(a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or

transaction.

(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or

transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting

part of a common scheme or plan.

(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific

offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to,the guideline applicable

to another of the counts.

(d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total

amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some

other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing

or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such

behavior.

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2.

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is not mandatory or automatic simply because a defendant is charged with an

offense that falls under a guideline listed in § 3D1.2(d).” United States v.

Lopez–Urbina, 434 F.3d 750, 763 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Solis,

299 F.3d 420, 459–60 (5th Cir. 2002)). Rather, an offense covered by a Guideline

in the first category is only “susceptible to grouping under that subsection.” Id.

No per se rule exists.

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When deciding what criteria to consider when determining whether

grouping is appropriate under the first category of offenses in § 3D1.2(d), we look

to the Guideline’s Commentary. See United States v. Patterson, 962 F.2d 409,

416 (5th Cir. 1992). Application Note 6 of the Commentary states that “[c]ounts

involving offenses to which different offense guidelines apply are grouped

together under subsection (d) if the offenses are of the same general type and

otherwise meet the criteria for grouping under this subsection.” U.S.S.G.

§ 3D1.2 cmt. n.6. The Application Note further states that “[t]he ‘same general

type’ of offense is to be construed broadly.” Id.

Goncalves argues that his offenses are of the “same general type” because

they are both acts of fraud and involve economic loss. However, these

similarities alone are insufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Brisson, 448 F.3d

989, 992 (7th Cir. 2006) (convictions for bank fraud and fraud against the United

States were not “of the same general type” simply because they were “economic

offenses arising out of the failed ownership of the hotel”). Furthermore, such

similarities are all that exist between the two offenses. One of the offenses for

which Goncalves was convicted took place in August 2008 and involved the

 Goncalves switches course in his reply brief and argues that his position is not for a 2

per se rule under § 3D1.2(d), but that the district court erred by not considering § 3D1.2 at all.

However, this new position is belied by the language in his original appellate brief arguing

that § 3D1.2(d) sets forth a per se rule. It is also belied by the paragraph of the PSR to which

Goncalves specifically objected before the district court, which discusses § 3D1.2 in detail and

concludes that grouping is inappropriate.

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purchase of private property with counterfeit bills. The other offense took place

in May 2007 and involved the alteration of a military certificate of discharge in

order to deceive a company into hiring him. The crimes involve different

schemes, different objectives, and different victims, and they took place at

different times. They are thus not of “the same general type.” See United States

v. Ballard, 919 F.2d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding no error when the district

court did not group two crimes falling under the same enumerated Guideline in

§ 3D1.2(d) when the crime involved two separate victims, two separate vehicles,

and two separate events); Brisson, 448 F.3d at 992 (offenses not of the same

general type under § 3D1.2(d) when they involved, inter alia, different victims).

Finally, even if the two offenses were “of the same general type,” a review

of Goncalves’s PSR demonstrates that the offense level for either crime was not

“determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or loss.” U.S.S.G.

§ 3D1.2(d). The PSR recommended only a one-level increase for the amount in

question for Goncalves’s counterfeiting conviction, and the amount of harm or

loss was not at issue for his material alteration offense except to calculate

restitution. In addition, Goncalves has not shown that his offense level has been

calculated pursuant to Guidelines written to cover “behavior [that] is ongoing or

continuous in nature.” Id. Goncalves’s alteration of a military document was a

discrete event, as was the purchase of a home-theater system with the use of

counterfeit bills. Thus, the offenses do not “otherwise meet the criteria for

grouping under” § 3D1.2(d).

Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s decision not to group

the offenses for sentencing purposes.

B. No Error in Applying § 2B5.1(b)(5)

Goncalves next argues that the district court erred by applying the

sentence enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(5) to his conviction for passing

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counterfeit notes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. This subsection of the

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Guidelines allows for a two-level increase in a sentence “[i]f any part of the

offense was committed outside the United States.” U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(5).

Goncalves argues that the district court erred in two ways when applying

§ 2B5.1(b)(5). First, he contends that the district court erred as a matter of law

by applying § 2B5.1(b)(5) to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 472 because the

Guideline applies only to convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 470. Alternatively, he

argues that there is insufficient evidence from which to find that part of the

relevant conduct took place outside the United States. We find no merit in

either contention.

1. No Legal Error

Goncalves first argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by

applying § 2B5.1(b)(5) to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 472. This is because,

Goncalves asserts, the enhancement applies only to international counterfeiting

offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 470. Specifically, Goncalves points to the

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 That statute provides: 3

Whoever, with intent to defraud, passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts

to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or with like intent brings into the United States

or keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or

altered obligation or other security of the United States, shall be fined under

this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 472.

 This statute provides: 4

A person who, outside the United States, engages in the act of--

(1) making, dealing, or possessing any counterfeit obligation or other

security of the United States; or 

(2) making, dealing, or possessing any plate, stone, analog, digital, or

electronic image, or other thing, or any part thereof, used to counterfeit

such obligation or security,

if such act would constitute a violation of section 471, 473, or 474 if committed

within the United States, shall be punished as is provided for the like offense

within the United States.

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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.

104-132, § 807(h), 110 Stat. 1214, 1310, which states that “the Commission shall

amend the sentencing guidelines prescribed by the Commission to provide an

appropriate enhancement of the punishment for a defendant convicted under

section 470 of title 18 of such Code.” Because AEDPA § 807(h) refers only to 18

U.S.C. § 470 and not to 18 U.S.C. § 472, Goncalves argues that any application

of § 2B5.1(b)(5) goes beyond Congress’s intent.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), the Sentencing Commission is vested with the

authority to promulgate Guidelines that are “consistent with all pertinent

provisions of any Federal statute.” Accordingly, “Congress has delegated to the

Commission ‘significant discretion in formulating guidelines’ for sentencing

convicted federal offenders.” United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)

(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 377 (1989)). Based on this

discretion and authority, “the Sentencing Commission has the power and the

duty not only to interpret specific provisions of federal statutes regulating

criminal punishment . . . but also to establish . . . standards designed to promote

uniform and rational federal sentencing.” United States v. Lauer, 148 F.3d 766,

769 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367–70). Accordingly, we

have held that the Commission may enact Guidelines that are not inconsistent

with federal law but which are broader than a congressional directive when the

Commission evinces a clear intent to do so. See United States v. Dale, 374 F.3d

321, 330 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005). Goncalves

has failed to show how applying § 2B5.1(b)(5) to 18 U.S.C. § 472 would be

inconsistent with federal law or an abuse of the Commission’s discretion. Thus

we do not find the Commission exceeded its authority in doing so.

18 U.S.C. § 470.

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Nevertheless, Goncalves further argues that our holding in Dale otherwise

forecloses the application of § 2B5.1(b)(5) to 18 U.S.C. § 472. In Dale, we held

that the Sentencing Commission had not exceeded its authority by including

non-federally insured entities in a Guideline when the statute authorizing the

Guideline’s promulgation mentioned only federally insured financial institutions.

See Dale, 374 F.3d at 330. In addition, because the Commission stated in the

Background commentary of the Guideline that it was implementing “in broader

form” the instruction to the Commission in the relevant statute, the Commission

had “indicate[d] that [it was] exercising its authority to define an offense beyond

a specific directive of Congress.” Id. (citing United States v. Soileau, 309 F.3d

877, 881 (5th Cir. 2002)).

Goncalves argues that the Commission never demonstrated its intent to

implement § 807(h) of AEDPA “in broader form” in the Background commentary

to § 2B5.1(b)(5). Specifically, Goncalves points to the “Reason for Amendment”

section of the Guidelines, which states that the amendment adding § 2B5.1(b)(5)

to the Guidelines was to “address[] section 807(h) of [AEDPA]” and “to provide

an appropriate enhancement for a defendant convicted of an international

counterfeiting offense under 18 U.S.C. § 470.” U.S.S.G. App. C. Amendment

554. Because the “Reason for Amendment” does not specifically identify 18

U.S.C. § 472, Goncalves argues that § 2B5.1(b)(5) should not apply to it.

We find Goncalves’s arguments unconvincing. Both the plain language of

the Guideline and its commentary demonstrate that the Commission clearly

intended to include 18 U.S.C. § 472 as an offense subject to § 2B5.1(b)(5). First,

the Guideline is titled “Offenses Involving Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the

United States,” which includes 18 U.S.C. § 472 by its plain language. See

§ 2B5.1. Moreover, the § 2B5.1 commentary specifically states that the

Guideline applies to 18 U.S.C. § 472. See U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1 cmt. It is well settled

that a Guideline’s commentary “is authoritative unless it violates the

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Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous

reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).

Finally, while the Commission does not specifically state that it intends

to implement AEDPA “in broader form” in its “Reason for Amendment,” the

absence of such language is not dispositive in determining how a Guideline

should apply. The Seventh Circuit has noted that the circumstances

surrounding the passage of § 2B5.1(b)(5) “suggest that the Commission knew

that its enhancement applied to more sections of the United States Code than

the section specifically noted by Congress.” United States v. Hernandez, 325

F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2003). The court noted that in the “Reason for

Amendment” in the Guideline’s Background commentary, the Commission

stated that it was “addressing” Congress’s directive in § 807(h) of AEDPA when

it promulgated § 2B5.1(b)(5), which evinced a broader legislative intent than

simply “implement[ing]” the directive. See id. at 814–15 (quoting U.S.S.G. App.

C, Amendment 554). Together with the plain language of the Guideline and its

authoritative commentary, the court concluded that the Commission clearly

intended § 2B5.1(b)(5) to apply to 18 U.S.C. § 472. See id.

We find the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning persuasive. Accordingly, we hold

the district court committed no legal error in applying § 2B5.1(b)(5) to

Goncalves’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 472.

2. No Factual Error

Goncalves next argues that there was insufficient evidence for the district

court to find that part of the relevant conduct underlying his conviction took

place outside of the United States, thus making § 2B5.1(b)(5) inapplicable.

Goncalves acknowledges that it is his own admission that forms the basis for the

district court’s finding of fact on this issue. However, Goncalves argues that his

repeated lies and misrepresentations to state and federal officials make him an

unreliable witness, and he thus lacks sufficient credibility to be taken seriously.

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We find that it is Goncalves’s instant argument that cannot be taken

seriously. “Credibility determinations are peculiarly within the province of the

trier-of-fact . . . .” United States v. Sarasti, 869 F.2d 805, 807 (5th Cir. 1989).

Consequently, we will not disturb a district court’s credibility determination

made at sentencing. See id. According to his PSR, Goncalves admitted to the

police that he had conspired with someone outside the United States to use

counterfeit bills to purchase items and then sell them at a profit. Goncalves has

never denied that he made this admission, nor did he present any evidence

showing where else the money may have come from. Moreover, the fact that the

district court found other statements by Goncalves to be untrue does not

foreclose a determination that in at least one situation—particularly where it

appears to be against his own interest to do so—Goncalves told the truth. A

defendant’s own admission may be competent evidence when making a finding

of fact, even when that defendant is also convicted of fraud. See, e.g., United

States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 287–88 (5th Cir. 2002); see also United States

v. Puckett, 505 F.3d 377, 387 (5th Cir. 2007).

Given Goncalves’s own admission that part of his crime took place outside

the United States, we do not find the district court’s finding of fact on this issue

to be clearly erroneous.

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court’s judgment and sentence are, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.

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