Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04114/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04114-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Kiehn
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNI'I'BD STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 S 1993 

DAVID KIEHN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-4114 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 88-C-107-S) 

E.W. Pike (Peter Stirba of Stirba & Hathaway, Salt Lake City, 

Utah, with him on the briefs) of Anderson, Pike & Bush, Idaho 

Falls, Idaho, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Carlie Christensen (David J. Jordan, United States Attorney, with 

her on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Salt Lake 

City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY, SETH, and BBBL, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-4114 Document: 010110163952 Date Filed: 01/28/1993 Page: 1 
David Kiehn, the Appellant, brought a negligence action 

against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(FTCA), 28 U. S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988 & Supp. II 1990 ) , for 

personal injuries sustained when he fell from a cliff in Dinosaur 

National Monument. Kiehn appeals the district court's ruling 

which dismissed his negligent failure to warn claim for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Kiehn also appeals the district 

court's finding that the government's negligent rescue effort on 

his behalf was not a proximate cause of his injuries. For the 

reasons stated below, we affirm the district court's ruling in 

part and reverse in part, holding that under the discretionary 

function exception of the FTCA, we lack subject matter 

jurisdiction over both the negligent failure to warn claim and the 

negligent rescue claim. 

I 

The material facts of this case 

David Kiehn was employed by Hatch River 

are largely undisputed. 

Expeditions (Hatch) to 

lead commercial rafting trips on the Green River in Dinosaur 

National Monument . Hatch was a National Park Service (NPS) 

concessionaire, paying a fee to the NPS to allow it to take 

patrons rafting through Dinosaur National Monument. 

On June 22, 1985, while taking a group of Hatch customers on 

a rafti ng trip, Davi d Kiehn beached the rafts and led the rafting 

party on a short hike to a rock formation to view Indian 

petroglyphs. The petroglyphs were near Little Rainbow Park, a 

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remote area of Dinosaur National Monument. While climbing up the 

face of the sandstone fonnation, David Kiehn fell approximately 

eight to ten feet into a crevice, landing on the back of his head, 

neck and shoulders.

1 

Kiehn suffered a serious head injury in the fall. Two of the 

rafters, Mike Gibbons and R.J. Stephenson, went for help while 

Richard Fisher, a Hatch rafting guide and licensed emergency 

medical technician (EMT), attempted to stabilize Kiehn. Gibbons 

hailed a rafting party on the river, urgently explaining the 

accident and necessity of contacting a park ranger. The rafting 

party continued downstream where it met Ranger Van Cott who they 

informed of the accident. The time was approximately 12:20 p.m., 

roughly twenty minutes after the accident. 

Ranger Van Cott made radio contact with Ranger Ricketts who 

then went to the accident scene to investigate. Upon arrival at 

the scene, Ranger Ricketts determined that emergency air 

evacuation was necessary. Via radio contact with Park 

Headquarters, an Air Life helicopter was summoned from St. Mary's 

Hospital in Grand Junction, Colorado, at approximately 2:00 p.m. 

Ranger Close, an EMT, was sent by Park Headquarters to the 

accident site in order to assist with the evacuation. 

1 The record and oral argument before this court indicate that 

Kiehn followed a trail to the rock fonnation but the trail ended 

before reaching the petroglyphs. Kiehn decided to climb up the 

face of the rock formation rather than take an alternate route to 

the petroglyphs that did not require climbing the rock face. 

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The helicopter arrived at approximately 3:00 p.m., at which 

time Kiehn was secured to a backboard and lowered from the rock 

ledge. In an effort to reduce potential brain swelling due to the 

head injury, Nurse Bagshaw, who accompanied the Air Life 

helicopter, administered Decadron to Kiehn. The helicopter left 

the accident scene at approximately 4:15 p.m .. Shortly before the 

helicopter landed at the hospital, Kiehn suffered a ventricular 

tachycardiac dysrhythmia caused by brain stem herniation which 

resulted from swelling of the brain. Although emergency 

neurosurgery saved Kiehn's life, he suffered some permanent brain 

damage due to the brain stem herniation. 

Kiehn filed a negligence action against the United States in 

the United States District Court for the District of Utah under 

the FTCA. Kiehn alleged that the United States was negligent in 

failing to warn Kiehn of the unstable condition of sandstpne rock 

formations and negligent in its rescue effort. The United States 

filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) motion to dismiss both claims for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed 

the failure to warn claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

based upon both the discretionary function exception of the FTCA 

and the Utah Limitation of Landowner Liability Act, Utah Code Ann . 

§§ 57-14-1 through 57-14-7 (1953). It did not, however, dismiss 

the negligent rescue claim, concluding instead that: (1) the NPS 

owed Kiehn a duty to provide rescue services based upon terms set 

forth in the concession permit; and (2) "[o]nce such 

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responsibility was assumed, the government undertook a duty to 

perform those services in a non-negligent manner." 

At trial, the district court found the government negligent 

for failing to provide a backboard to the accident scene in a 

timely manner. By 1:00 p.m., District Ranger Wieszczyk at Park 

Headquarters knew of the emergency and that a backboard was 

recommended, but failed to send an available backboard and also 

failed to iimnediately dispatch Ranger Close who was an EMT. The 

court determined that this negligence delayed Kiehn's arrival to 

the hospital. If a backboard had arrived sooner, Kiehn could have 

been readied for evacuation, thus reducing the time that the 

helicopter waited on the ground while Kiehn was prepared for his 

evacuation. 

The district court concluded, however, that NPS negligence 

was not the proximate cause of Kiehn's injuries. Kiehn "failed to 

provide evidence to establish that an earlier arrival at the 

hospital could have prevented the [brain stem] herniation and 

averted permanent brain damage," thus the court entered judgment 

in favor of the government. 

Kiehn appeals alleging the trial court erred in granting the 

government's motion to dismiss the negligent failure to warn claim 

and appeals the court's decision regarding lack of proximate 

cause. The government contends that the district court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction for both the negligent failure to warn 

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claim and the negligent manner of rescue claim. The government 

further contends that if subject matter jurisdiction does exist 

for the negligent rescue claim, the government did not breach a 

duty of care and if negligence by the government is found, that 

negligence was not the proximate cause of Kiehn's injuries. 

II 

Subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA for both the 

failure to warn claim and the negligent rescue claim is a 

threshold jurisdictional question which must be resolved before 

addressing the merits of Kiehn's allegations. Johnson v. United 

States, Dep't of Interior, 949 F.2d 332, 335 (10th Cir. 1991). 

This matter is subject to de nova review. Daniels v. United 

States, 967 F.2d 1463, 1464 (10th Cir. 1992). 

The FTCA waives the federal government's sovereign immunity 

when United States employees are negligent in the scope of 

employment "under circumstances where the United States, if a 

private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with 

the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 

u.s.c. § 1346(b). This broad waiver of sovereign immunity is 

limited by the discretionary function exception which states that 

the waiver of immunity does not apply to "[a]ny claim based 

upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 

perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 

agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the 

discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis 

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added). The question before this court is the scope of the 

d . . f . . 2 iscretionary unction exception. 

In determining the scope of the discretionary function 

exception, the Tenth Circuit applies the two-step test set forth 

by the Supreme Court in Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U. S. 531 

(:i..988). See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1537-

38 (10th Cir. 1992 ) ; Johnson, 949 F.2d at 336; Zumwalt v. United 

States, 928 F.2d 951, 953 (10th Cir. 1991); Boyd v. United States 

ex rel. U.S. Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 881 F.2d 895, 897 (10th Cir. 

1989). The first step of the Berkovitz test requires this court 

to determine whether the challenged conduct "involves an element 

of judgment or choice," in which case it is discretionary and 

falls within the language of the exception, or whether it involves 

"a federal statute, regulation, or policy [that) specifically 

prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow," in which 

case the exception does not apply. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 . 

If the conduct involves discretionary judgment under the 

first step of Berkovitz, then we must apply the second step, which 

requires this court to "determine whether that judgment is the 

2 This exception "marks the boundary between Congress' 

willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and 

its desire to protect certain governmental activities from 

exposure to suit by private individuals. " United States v. S.A . 

Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S . 797, 808 (1984). We have deemed it appropriate to interpret 

exceptions to the FTCA narrowly. Miller v. United States, 710 

F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); see 

Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953). 

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kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to 

shield." Id. The exception protects only those discretionary 

actions or decisions which are "based on considerations of public 

policy." Id. at 537. The purpose is to "prevent judicial 

'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions 

grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the 

medium of an action in tort." Id. at 536-37 (quoting Varig 

Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814). 

A. 

We will first analyze Kiehn's failure to warn claim under the 

Berkovitz test to determine whether the claim meets the 

discretionary function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign 

inununity. 

The decision whether or not to post warning signs at Dinosaur 

National Monument is clearly discretionary as it "involves an 

element of judgment or choice." There is no statute, regulation 

or agency policy requiring the NPS to warn visitors of potential 

dangers, or more specifically, requiring the NPS to place signs 

which warn people that scaling sandstone cliffs may be dangerous. 

In fact, the only NPS policy referred to in the record indicates 

that signs should "minimally intrude upon the natural or historic 

setting," apparently leaving the application of this policy to NPS 

discretion. United States Dept . of the Interior National Park 

Service, Management Policies, Ch. 9:11 (Dec. 1988). Therefore, 

nothing directed NPS's decision concerning the type or manner of 

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warnings to provide. Compare with Zumwalt, 928 F.2d a t 954 (where 

general guidelines in the Park Service Management Policies was 

deemed to allow Park Service discretion i n implementing safety 

improvements) . Without evidence in the record that Dinosaur 

National Monument followed some policy or statutory directive on 

warning signs, there is nothing to indicate that the decision not 

to place warnings near the petroglyphs was anything but discretionary. This satisfies the first prong of Berkovitz. 

The next question under the Berkovitz analysis is whether the 

decision not to place warnings at the petroglyphs was based on 

considerations of public policy. Kiehn argues that the 

government's failure to warn him of dangers after encouraging him 

to take customers to the petroglyphs does not implicate social, 

economic or political policy judgment and, therefore, we should 

follow the Tenth Circuit decision in Boyd by holding that the 

failure to warn claim is not barred by the discretionary function 

exception of the FTCA. We disagree. 

In Boyd, the plaintiff's husband was snorkeling in a 

reservoir when he was struck and killed by a motor boat. The 

plaintiff sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers who had 

control over the reservoir, claiming that the United States 

negligently "failed to warn swiimners that boats were permitted in 

the area . " Boyd, 881 F . 2d at 896. This court held that although 

it was a discretionary decision by the Army Corps to not zone this 

area of the lake and leave its use unrestricted, the "failure to 

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warn swirraners of dangerous conditions in a popular swirraning area 

does not implicate any social, economic, or political policy 

judgments with which the discretionary function exception properly 

is concerned." Id. at 898. 

Although Boyd is similar to the case at hand in some 

respects, it does not stand for the proposition that all failure 

to warn claims are outside the scope of the discretionary function 

exception. Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955. Instead, the Berkovitz test 

requires this court to determine whether the government's failure 

to warn was part of a policy decision. In this determination, we 

find the Zumwalt and Johnson decisions persuasive. 

In Johnson, Ben Johnson was hiking a nontechnical route in 

Grand Teton National Park when he got lost and wandered into 

difficult terrain. In attempting a descent, Johnson fell and 

suffered serious injuries. Before Johnson could be rescued he 

died on the mountain from hypothermia. One of the claims brought 

against the United States was that the government failed to warn 

Johnson of the dangers involved in climbing mountains. This court 

held that unlike Boyd, "the record here indicates the Park 

Service's decision not to place additional warnings in the Teton 

Range, whether explicit or implicit, was part of the overall 

policy decision to limit governmental regulation of climbing .... " 

Johnson, 949 F.2d at 338. Since the overall decision to minimally 

regulate climbing was a discretionary policy decision, the 

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component decision to not post warnings was also protected by the 

discretionary function exception. Id. 

Similarly, in Zumwalt this court held that the 

function exception barred a negligent failure 

against the United States. The plaintiff in Zumwalt 

discretionary 

to warn claim 

was injured 

when he fell into an unmarked cave near the Balconies Cave Trail 

in Pinnacles National Monument. In reaching our holding, we found 

"the absence of warning signs was part of the overall policy 

decision to maintain the Trail in its wilderness state [and 

by] choosing to mark the Trail and place warnings in a 

corresponding pamphlet, [the NPS] undertook a balancing of social, 

economic, and political policies. " Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955. 

"The decision to leave the Trail in its wild state, whether 

explicit or implicit, related directly to the overall scheme set 

out in the Management policies" which provided for hands-off 

administration of wilderness areas to protect their "primeval 

character." Id. at 955, 953 n . 3. As in Johnson, the decision not 

to post warnings was a component of a larger policy decision which 

was protected by the discretionary function exception. Id. at 

955. 

The present case is similar to Johnson and Zumwalt, in that 

the "decision not to place additional warnings [at the petroglyph 

site) , whether explicit or implicit, was part of the overall 

policy" objective set forth in the NPS Management Policies of 

carefully using signs so as to minimize their intrusion upon the 

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1 d h . . . 3 area's natura an istoric setting. Johnson, 949 F.2d at 338; 

see Zumwalt, 955 F.2d at 955 . The NPS Management Policies are 

strengthened by "the fundamental purpose of monuments 

[which] is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 

objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment 

of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them 

unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 16 u.s.c. 

§ 1 ( 1988) . Therefore, the NPS decision not to place warning 

signs at the petroglyphs was a component of an overall policy 

decision to protect the area's natural scenery. 

The facts that justified the result in Boyd are not present 

in this case. In Boyd, the Army Corps' failure to warn swimmers 

of known dangerous conditions at a popular swimming locale was not 

part of the policy decision to leave the area unzoned and its use 

unrestricted. In fact there were no public policy considerations 

3 The NPS Management Policy on signs states as follows: 

Signs will be carefully planned and designed to fulfill 

their important role in conveying an appropriate park 

image and in providing infonnation and orientation to 

visitors. Each park will have an approved parkwide sign 

plan that will establish criteria based on that park's 

unique resources and values. Entrance and other key 

signs will be distinctively designed to reflect the 

character of the park. 

Signs will be held to the minimum number, size, and 

wording required to serve their intended functions, so 

as to minimally intrude upon the natural or historic 

setting. They will be placed where they do not 

interfere with park visitors' enjoyment and appreciation 

of park resources .... 

Management Policies at Ch. 9:11 . 

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involved in Boyd that would support the government's decision not 

. 4 to warn swimmers. 

The decision not to post warning signs in remote areas of a 

national monument inherently requires a balancing of public policy 

objectives, such as resource allocation, visitor safety and scenic 

preservation. 5 Rather than spoil the land's natural scenery with 

numerous warning signs, the NPS chose to have its permitted 

concessionaires warn employees and customers of potential hazards 

such as climbing rock formations. This court will not secondguess the NPS's decision to play an unobtrusive role in dispensing 

warnings by leaving the task to its . 6 permittee. Under the 

cirumstances of this case, we will not assume a nonpolicy decision 

4 Although not addressed by the parties, Smith v. United 

States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976), is another Tenth Circuit 

opinion which found that a negligent· failure to warn claim did not 

meet the discretionary function exception. In Smith, as in Boyd, 

the failure to warn was not part of a larger policy objective and 

the circumstances were such that it would be difficult to 

understand what policy factors could have been considered in 

choosing not to warn the public. The record in Smith, in fact, 

showed the decision not to warn was "not related to any policy 

decision, but to [a perceived] lack of need for warning there . " 

Id. at 877 n.5. 

5 In contrast, "[o]rdinary discretion, such as that exercised 

by a government agent in driving his automobile 'on a mission 

connected with his official duties,' is not the kind of discretion 

that the exception was designed to shield." Daigle, 972 F.2d at 

1538 (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 1275 

(1991}} . 

6 In King v. United States Forest Service, 647 F. Supp. 20, 21 

(N.D. Cal. 1986), with facts similar to the present case, the 

district court held that it was a "policy decision [for the Forest 

Service] to leave warnings and other public informational tasks to 

its permittee." Plaintiffs failure to warn claim was, therefore, 

dismissed under the discretionary function exception. See also 

Taylor v . United States, 668 F. Supp. 1302, 1304 {W.D. Mo. 1987). 

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unless the record shows something to the contrary. See, e.g., 

Johnson, 949 F . 2d at 338; Weiss v. United States, 889 F . 2d 937, 

939-40 (10th Cir. 1989). As recently stated by the Supreme Court, 

[w]hen established governmental policy, as expressed or 

implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, 

allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it 

must be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in 

policy when exercising that discretion. For a complaint 

to survive a motion to dismiss, it must allege facts 

which would support a finding that the challenged 

actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to 

be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime. 

Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1274-75 (1991) . Kiehn has not overcome 

h . . 7 tis presumption. 

The lack of record evidence describing an analysis of public 

policy factors in the NPS decision not to post warnings is 

inunaterial. This court has previously held that it is unnecessary 

for government employees to make an actual "conscious decision" 

regarding policy factors. Johnson, 949 F.2d at 339. In fact, we 

have found it "irrelevant whether the alleged failure to warn was 

a matter of 'deliberate choice,' or a mere oversight:" Allen v. 

United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1422 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987) , cert. 

7 The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the burden of persuasion 

in FTCA cases, holding that while the "plaintiff bears the burden 

of persuading the court that it has subject matter jurisdiction 

under the FTCA's general waiver of immunity[,] ... the burden of 

proving the exception [to the FTCA] lies with the government. " 

Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1992). 

While the reasoning of Prescott may be suspect in light of 

Gaubert, it does not alter our results since under Prescott, a 

plaintiff's claim must be facially outside the discretionary 

function exception to survive a motion to dismiss and Kiehn does 

not satisfy that burden. Prescott, 973 F.2d at 701-02 ; see 

Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1542 n.11 . 

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denied, 484 U.S . 1004 (1988 ) . The failure to consider some or all 

critical aspects of a discretionary judgment does not make that 

judgment less discretionary and does not make the judgment subject 

to liability. 

Kiehn relies upon Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th 

Cir. 1986), to support his argument that once the NPS recommended 

the petroglyphs as an area of interest, NPS had a duty to warn 

which was nondiscretionary. 8 We reject Kiehn's argument and find 

Mandel a narrow holding and distinguishable from the present case . 

In Mandel, park rangers recommended a swimming hole to the 

plaintiff. When the plaintiff dove into the river, he struck his 

head on a submerged rock and broke his neck. The park rangers 

knew the river had submerged rocks and several people had been 

killed or injured diving into the river. The Eighth Circuit found 

that the NPS violated its own safety policy, and had a duty to 

warn the plaintiff. Id. at 967-68. 

Unlike Mandel, no legal duty to warn arose in the present 

case by encouraging Kiehn to visit the petroglyphs. It was not 

foreseeable that Kiehn would choose to climb the rock face rather 

than take the safer route which was available . Nothing in the 

8 The NPS recommended visits to the petroglyphs by taking Kiehn 

to the petroglyph site during an orientation trip. Furthermore, 

the Operation Standards of the Concession Permit between the NPS 

and Hatch requires Hatch to provide "education and information 

services" and specifically refers to "interpretive hikes and 

talks." 

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record indicates the government suggested that Kiehn take the 

route he did. The risks Kiehn took when he decided to climb the 

rock formation were inherent and obvious . We will not hold that 

by merely encouraging the visitation of a · site, the government 

somehow made its decision on posting warnings any less 

discretionary. The United States often encourages individuals to 

visit areas of interest which lie within federal lands and we will 

not use this as the sole basis for tort liability. Furthermore, 

the district court found that ~he NPS delegated the responsibility 

to warn to its concessionaires, and the record shows that Hatch 

warned its employees not to climb rock formations. 

In sum, we affirm the district court's holding that Kiehn's 

failure to warn claim falls within the discretionary function 

exception of the FTCA. Therefore, we dismiss the claim for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. Since our decision is based upon 

interpretation of federal law, it is unnecessary for this court to 

interpret the Utah Limitation of Landowner Liability Act which the 

district court also utilized in reaching its decision. 

B. 

We next address the negligent manner of rescue claim to 

determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists under the 

FTCA. Once again, this requires application of the two-part 

Berkovitz test. After reviewing the record, we hold that the 

decision to render emergency aid was not discretionary, but the 

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manner in which aid was rendered involved the type of 

discretionary decisions protected by the FTCA. 

The decision whether to render emergency assistance when NPS 

employees learned of Kiehn's accident was not a matter of judgment 

or choice. Under the terms of the Concession Permit's Operation 

Pl an, the NPS agreed to render such service if needed. 9 

Furthermore, an Emergency Medical Services Guideline discussed in 

the record provides that the NPS "will provide a level of 

emergency medical services commensurate with the area needs." 

Thus, it was not within the discretion of Dinosaur National 

Monument employees to decide whether or not to provide emergency 

assistance to Kiehn after his accident. The decision was required 

by contract and by NPS guidelines. If Kiehn's claim was that the 

NPS was negligent in failing to provide emergency medical service, 

then clearly his claim would not be barred by the discretionary 

function exception. 

The analysis must continue, however, because Kiehn's 

negligence claim is not based upon whether a rescue took place, 

but is based upon the manner in which the rescue was conducted. 10 

9 The Operation Standards of the Concession Permit contains a 

clause which states that "[i]n the event of an emergency requiring 

helicopter or other types of evacuation, arrangements will be made 

for the rescue service by Dinosaur National Monument and the 

concessioner shall assume financial responsibility for said rescue." 

10 The district court took a different view and held that 

"[o]nce such responsibility [to render rescue services] was 

assumed, the government undertook a duty to perform those services 

in a non-negligent manner." By reaching this conclusion, the 

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Thus the threshold question becomes whether the government's 

method of rescue is protected by the discretionary function 

exception. 

It is uncontroverted that there are no standards for the 

Dinosaur National Monument employees to follow in this instance. 

I n Barton v . United States, 609 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1979), we 

held that " if a government official in performing his statutory 

duties must act without reliance upon a fixed or readily 

ascertainable standard, the decision he makes is discretionary and 

within the exception of the Tort Claims Act." See also Johnson , 

949 F.2d at 338; Miller, 710 F . 2d at 656. As in the above cases, 

Dinosaur National Monument employees were performing their duty 

without guidance from any "ascertainable standard."11 This court 

will not impose a standard of "reasonable care" upon Dinosaur 

National Monument employees once it is determined that they were 

required to act. Such an imposition would result in trying the 

United States for negligence without first addressing the 

threshold question of whether the decisions made during the rescue 

operation are protected 

exception. 

under the discretionary function 

district court avoided the issue of whether the manner of rescue 

was discretionary, and instead, undertook a negligence analysis. 

11 Not unlike Daigle, 972 F. 2d at 30, and Allen, 816 F.2d at 

1421, Kiehn is principally arguing that the park rangers " could 

have done a better job" (emphasis added) in rescuing him after the 

accident, but Kiehn fails to show that the rangers contravened a 

statutory, policy, or regulatory directive. 

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Our decision that the manner of rescue was discretionary is 

in line with the Supreme Court decision in Varig Airlines. In 

Varig Airlines, plaintiffs brought a FTCA action against the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for negligently implementing 

a safety design certification program after certified planes 

caught on fire during flight . The Supreme Court found that acts 

by FAA employees in executing the certification program according 

to FAA directives were protected by the discretionary function 

exception since the employees were empowered to make judgments. 

Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820. The Varig Airline decision 

reconfirmed an earlier Supreme Court opinion which held nthat acts 

of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in 

accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.n 

Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36; see Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 811-13 . 

Not unlike Varig Airlines, Dinosaur National Monument employees in 

the present case were executing an emergency evacuation as 

required and making discretionary decisions in the process. This 

was simply not a case where the acts and decisions by Dinosaur 

National Monument personnel were mandated by regulat9ry directive 

and thus not discretionary. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 542-43. 

It is not enough that the rescue operation involved 

discretionary judgment; the second step of the Berkovitz analysis 

requires us to determine whether that judgment was grounded in 

social, economic, or political policy. 

Appellate Case: 91-4114 Document: 010110163952 Date Filed: 01/28/1993 Page: 19 
We are aided again in 

facts similar to the present 

our analysis by Johnson, which had 

case. In Johnson, one of the 

plaintiff's claims was that the NPS was negligent in its response 

to a mountain climbing accident. In applying the second prong of 

Berkovitz, this court found that a search and rescue decision 

"inherently involves the balancing of safety objectives against 

such practical considerations as staffing, funding and minimizing 

government intrusion." Johnson, 949 F.2d at 339. 

As in Johnson, emergency rescue operations at Dinosaur 

National Monument naturally involve considerations of public 

policy. Limited staff and financial resources requires an 

assessment of each situation as it arises, balancing the potential 

need for assistance with the resources available. Rangers make 

split-second policy judgments in handling emergencies and in 

directing an organized response. A review of the record indicates 

numerous instances where decisions made by rangers after learning 

of the accident were probably based upon consideration of such 

factors as limited personnel and resources, difficulty in 

corranunicating with the accident site, lack of knowledge on the 

specifics of the accident, the remoteness of the accident site and . 

numerous other potential factors upon which we will not speculate. 

The fact that an emergency air evacuation was not ordered sooner 

or that in hind sight a backboard should have been sent to the 

accident site is irrelevant. It is not the court's role to second 

guess the discretionary decisions of federal employees when such 

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decisions necessarily take into account a myriad of potential 

1 , f 12 po icy actors. 

Unlike Johnson, the record in this case does not contain any 

evidence that the park rangers actually based their decisions upon 

any policy considerations. But as we stated earlier, it is not 

necessary that such policy factors be consciously weighed in 

making discretionary decisions. See, e.g., Johnson, 949 F.2d at 

339. 

Even if park rangers were negligent in their decisions during 

the emergency rescue, our analysis would not change. "Factual 

issues concerning negligence are irrelevant to the threshold issue 

whether the officials' actions are shielded from liability by the 

discretionary function exception." Johnson, 949 F.2d at 340. 

"The discretionary function applies even when the discretionary 

acts themselves constitute negligence." Flynn v. United States, 

902 F.2d 1524, 1530 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Daniels, 967 F.2d 

at 1465; Allen, 816 F.2d at 1421; Barnson v. United States, 816 

F.2d 549, 553 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987). 

This may seem like a harsh result to Kiehn, but a plaintiff may 

only sue the United States government when sovereign inmrunity does 

not bar the claim. Congress waived sovereign irranunity when it 

implemented the FTCA and allowed plaintiffs to bring tort actions 

12 Nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that under 

circumstances such as this, the government's actions and decisions 

were grounded in policy. See Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1274-75. 

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against the United States, but in doing so, Congress expressly 

protected discretionary acts and decisions "whether or not the 

discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) . 

It is the holding of this court that Kiehn's claim of 

negligence in the government's rescue operation is barred by the 

discretionary function exception of the FTCA. Since we lack 

subject matter jurisdiction over this claim, it is not necessary 

for us to review issues of negligence or proximate cause. 

In conclusion, we AFFIRM the district court order dismissing 

Kiehn's failure to warn claim for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction based upon the discretionary function exception of 

the FTCA. We REVERSE the district court on the negligent manner 

of rescue claim, holding that the claim should have been dismissed 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the discretionary 

function exception of the FTCA. 

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