Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07076/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07076-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee
Maurice C. Sullivan
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MAURICE C. SULLIVAN,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7076

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-283, Judge Alan G. Lance, Sr.

______________________ 

Decided: March 8, 2016

______________________ 

KENNETH DOJAQUEZ, Bluestein, Nichols, Thompson & 

Delgado, LLC, Columbia, SC, argued for claimantappellant.

MELISSA BAKER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., 

CLAUDIA BURKE; DAVID J. BARRANS, MARTIN JAMES 

SENDEK, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

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2 SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD

Before REYNA, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge. 

Maurice C. Sullivan appeals from a decision of the 

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) 

affirming the decision of the Board of Veterans Appeals 

(“Board”) concluding that the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (“VA”) had satisfied its duty to assist Mr. Sullivan 

with his request to reopen his claim. Because the Veterans Court misconstrued 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(3), we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Sullivan, a veteran, filed a claim for serviceconnected benefits for back and neck injuries. In connection with his claim, Mr. Sullivan testified at a hearing 

before the VA. In particular, he testified that he sought 

treatment in 1984 for back and neck pain at a VA medical 

facility in Asheville, North Carolina, but that the doctors 

found nothing wrong with his back and neck. The VA 

denied Mr. Sullivan’s claim, finding that the medical 

evidence of record did not establish service-connection for 

his injuries. Ten years later, Mr. Sullivan submitted new 

evidence and sought to reopen his claim. The Board 

denied the request to reopen, finding the newly submitted 

evidence was not material. The Board also determined 

that the VA had satisfied its duty to assist Mr. Sullivan in 

obtaining identified and available evidence. 

Mr. Sullivan appealed to the Veterans Court. There, 

he argued for the first time that the VA failed to satisfy 

its duty to assist because it had not obtained his medical 

records from the Asheville VA facility (“Asheville medical 

records”). The Veterans Court concluded that the VA’s 

duty to assist claimants in securing records only extends 

to potentially relevant records. The Veterans Court found

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SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD 3

that the Asheville medical records were not “potentially 

relevant records that would aid [Mr. Sullivan] in reopening his claim,” and thus affirmed the Board’s determination that the VA had satisfied its duty to assist. Joint 

Appendix (“J.A.”) 15.

Mr. Sullivan appeals, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c).

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review Veterans Court decisions is 

limited by statute. We may review legal questions, including the validity of any statute or regulation or any 

interpretation thereof. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). We may set 

aside any regulation or interpretation thereof if we find it: 

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of 

statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in 

violation of a statutory right; or (4) without observance of 

procedure required by law. Id. § 7292(d)(1); Wanner v. 

Principi, 370 F.3d 1124, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We may 

not review factual determinations or application of law to 

fact, except to the extent an appeal presents a constitutional issue. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). Whether the Veterans Court exceeded its jurisdiction is a question of law

that we review de novo. Bonner v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 

1323, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Wanner, 370 F.3d at 1128.

I.

Mr. Sullivan first argues that the Veterans Court 

erred in construing 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(3) to impose a 

relevance standard for VA medical records before triggering the VA’s duty to assist a claimant in obtaining such 

records. Although Mr. Sullivan recognizes that the underlying statute, 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, includes a relevance

condition in the VA’s statutory duty to assist in obtaining

VA medical records, he argues that the VA adopted a 

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4 SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD

broader duty in promulgating 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(3). 

Mr. Sullivan argues that this regulatory expansion of the 

VA’s duties was permissible because § 5103A authorizes 

“the Secretary [to] provid[e] such other assistance . . . as 

the Secretary considers appropriate.” Appellant Br. 12–

13 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(g)). 

The government argues that Mr. Sullivan waived this 

argument because he did not raise it before the Veterans 

Court. We read the Veterans Court’s opinion to find a 

relevance requirement both in 38 U.S.C. § 5103A and in 

38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). The Veterans Court cited both the 

statute and regulation immediately before its sentence 

stating that “the Secretary’s duty to secure records extends only to potentially relevant records.” J.A. 14. And 

after that sentence the Veterans Court cited both the 

statute and cases that discuss the regulation as well as 

the statute. The Veterans Court’s legal interpretation is 

properly before us even though Mr. Sullivan did not 

contest the point before that court. See Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc), superseded in other respect by statute, as recognized in Morgan 

v. Principi, 327 F.3d 1357, 1359–64 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“. . . 

[38 U.S.C. § 7292(a)] does not require that the issue of 

validity or interpretation have been contested in the 

[Veterans Court], or even raised below as an issue in the 

case, so long as the [Veterans Court’s] decision . . . depended on a particular elaboration of a statute or regulation (in the case of an interpretation issue). Significantly, 

Congress did not adopt language requiring that the issue 

have been ‘presented’ to the [Veterans Court].”); see also 

Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 530 (2002) 

(review permissible where issue was either pressed or 

passed on); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 

(1992) (explaining that requirement is in the disjunctive).

The government also asserts that Mr. Sullivan’s argument challenges only factual determinations or the 

application of law to fact—namely whether the VA satisCase: 15-7076 Document: 31-2 Page: 4 Filed: 03/08/2016
SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD 5

fied its duty to assist—and therefore argues that we lack 

jurisdiction to consider this issue. We disagree. Our 

jurisdiction extends to review of any interpretation of a 

regulation relied on by the Veterans Court in rendering 

its decision. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). The Veterans 

Court explicitly stated that “the Secretary’s duty to secure 

records extends only to potentially relevant records.” 

J.A. 14. In holding that the Board did not err in finding 

that the VA satisfied the duty to assist, the Veterans 

Court found “that the appellant’s hearing testimony did 

not adequately identify any potentially relevant records 

that would aid him in reopening his claim.” J.A. 15. 

While we cannot review the Veterans Court’s application 

of the relevant legal standard to the facts of the case, it is 

within our jurisdiction to determine whether these statements demonstrate a misunderstanding by the Veterans 

Court of the standard set out in § 3.159(c)(3). 

Turning to the interpretation of § 3.159(c)(3), we 

agree with Mr. Sullivan that under the plain language of 

this regulation, the VA’s duty to assist extends to providing assistance to obtain all “VA medical records or records 

of examination or treatment at non-VA facilities authorized by VA” if adequately identified by a claimant. “In 

construing a statute or regulation, we begin by inspecting 

its language for plain meaning.” Meeks v. West, 216 F.3d 

1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “[W]e attempt to give full 

effect to all words contained within that statute or regulation, thereby rendering superfluous as little of the statutory or regulatory language as possible.” Glover v. West, 

185 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

Here, the plain language of the regulation is dispositive. Section 3.159(c)(3) states (with disputed language in 

italics): 

(c) VA’s duty to assist claimants in obtaining evidence. Upon receipt of a substantially complete 

application for benefits, VA will make reasonable 

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6 SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD

efforts to help a claimant obtain evidence necessary to substantiate the claim. In addition, VA 

will give the assistance described in paragraphs 

(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) to an individual attempting 

to reopen a finally decided claim. 

. . . 

(3) Obtaining records in compensation 

claims. In a claim for disability compensation, VA will make efforts to obtain the 

claimant’s service medical records, if relevant to the claim; other relevant records 

pertaining to the claimant’s active military, naval or air service that are held or 

maintained by a governmental entity; VA 

medical records or records of examination 

or treatment at non-VA facilities authorized by VA; and any other relevant records 

held by any Federal department or agency. The claimant must provide enough information to identify and locate the 

existing records including the custodian or 

agency holding the records; the approximate time frame covered by the records; 

and, in the case of medical treatment records, the condition for which treatment 

was provided. 

38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(3) (emphasis added). 

Section 3.159(c) explains that the “VA will make 

reasonable efforts to help a claimant obtain evidence 

necessary to substantiate the claim.” The regulation also 

explicitly states that the VA will provide the assistance 

described in subsection (c)(3) to individuals “attempting to 

reopen a finally decided claim,” which is the context in 

which Mr. Sullivan’s present appeal arises. See 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.159(c). Section 3.159(c)(3) then identifies four categories of records that the VA will provide assistance in 

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SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD 7

obtaining in connection with compensation claims: (1) the

claimant’s service medical records, if relevant to the claim; 

(2) other relevant records pertaining to the claimant’s 

active military, naval or air service that are held or maintained by a governmental entity; (3) VA medical records 

or records of examination or treatment at non-VA facilities authorized by VA; and (4) any other relevant records 

held by any Federal department or agency. The VA knew 

how to indicate when it was limiting its duty to assist to

obtaining relevant records only, which it did by including 

the term “relevant” as a modifier for three of the four 

categories of records identified in § 3.159(c)(3). But with 

respect to “VA medical records or records of examination 

or treatment at non-VA facilities authorized by VA,” the 

modifier “relevant” is notably absent. Because “we attempt to give full effect to all words contained within that 

statute or regulation,” Glover, 185 F.3d at 1332, meaning 

should be given to the VA’s choice to impose a relevancy 

standard on the VA’s duty to assist in obtaining certain 

categories of records, as well as its choice to not impose 

such a standard on VA medical records. We will not read 

in a relevancy standard where the VA left it out. Cf., 

Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994) (quoting 

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)) (“Where 

Congress includes particular language in one section of a 

statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 

is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 

and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”)

The underlying statute, § 5103A, does not direct a 

contrary result. Although the statute clearly imposes a 

relevancy standard on the disputed records, see 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5103A(c)(1)(B) (extending duty to assist to obtaining 

“[r]ecords of relevant medical treatment or examination of 

the claimant at Department health-care facilities . . .”), it 

further provides that “[n]othing in [§ 5103A] shall be 

construed as precluding the Secretary from providing 

such other assistance under subsection (a) to a claimant 

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8 SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD

in substantiating a claim as the Secretary considers 

appropriate,” 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(g). Thus, the statute 

permits the VA to provide additional assistance to claimants beyond that required by § 5103A, and the VA did so 

with respect to VA medical records when it promulgated 

§ 3.159(c)(3). 

Moreover, the veteran benefits system is a uniquely 

pro-claimant system. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 

1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, the VA’s decision to expand

its duty to assist in certain limited circumstances by 

promulgating § 3.159(c)(3) is a reasonable interpretation 

of the statutory directive that “[n]othing in [§ 5103A] 

shall be construed as precluding the Secretary from 

providing such other assistance under subsection (a) to a 

claimant in substantiating a claim as the Secretary 

considers appropriate.” 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(g).

Because we find no ambiguity in the language of 

§ 3.159(c)(3), we give no weight to the regulatory history 

cited by the government. But even considering the regulatory history, we do not find it compelling. The government cites a statement in the regulatory history that 

prefaces the duty to assist in obtaining VA medical records with the term “relevant.” See 38 C.F.R. Part 3, Duty 

to Assist; Notice of proposed rulemaking, 66 Fed. Reg. 

17834, 17836 (April 4, 2001). The regulatory history 

provides no further insight or explanation as to why the 

regulation lacks this relevancy standard. It is clear from 

a review of the plain language of § 3.159(c)(3), as promulgated by the VA, that the regulation does not impose a 

relevancy standard on the VA’s duty to provide assistance

in obtaining VA medical records.

We are mindful, however, that the context of the 

entire regulation is relevant to construing regulatory 

language. See Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki, 713 F.3d 112, 

115 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The VA’s duty to assist is not unlimited, and subsection (d) to § 3.159 provides an important 

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SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD 9

limitation on the VA’s duty to assist. Specifically, it 

provides that the “VA will refrain from providing assistance in obtaining evidence for a claim if the substantially 

complete application for benefits indicates that there is no 

reasonable possibility that any assistance VA would 

provide to the claimant would substantiate the claim.” 38 

C.F.R. § 3.159(d). While the Veterans Court did not rely 

on this provision in affirming the Board’s determination 

that the VA had satisfied its duty to assist, it may consider this provision in conjunction with the requirements of 

§ 3.159(c)(3) on remand.

 The Veterans Court erred in its interpretation of

§ 3.159(c)(3). Because § 3.159(c)(3) expanded the VA’s 

duty to assist to include obtaining VA medical records 

without consideration of their relevance, we reverse the 

Veterans Court’s affirmance of the Board’s decision for 

being predicated on the wrong legal standard.

II.

We next consider Mr. Sullivan’s argument that the 

Veterans Court exceeded its jurisdiction by making factual findings in the first instance.1 Specifically, 

Mr. Sullivan alleges that the Veterans Court made a 

factual finding that the Asheville medical records were 

not relevant, an issue he asserts the Board never considered. While we held above that relevancy is not required 

under § 3.159(c)(3), we nonetheless address Mr. Sullivan’s 

secondary argument because the same issue regarding 

 

1 Mr. Sullivan alternatively argues that the Veterans Court applied the wrong standard for determining 

relevance, asking us to overturn our decision in Golz v. 

Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2010). But as 

Mr. Sullivan acknowledged in his reply brief, as a panel, 

we are bound by this court’s prior decision in Golz. 

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10 SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD

the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction could arise on remand 

during consideration of § 3.159(d). 

As we have explained in a prior review of the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction: 

[A]ppellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for 

initial fact finding. Thus, the Supreme Court has 

held that when a court of appeals reviews a district court decision, it may remand if it believes 

the district court failed to make findings of fact 

essential to the decision; it may set aside findings 

of fact it determines to be clearly erroneous; or it 

may reverse incorrect judgments of law based on 

proper factual findings; “[b]ut it should not simply 

[make] factual findings on its own.” 

Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 

(quoting Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 

709, 714 (1986)) (alterations in original). The Veterans 

Court has recognized its limitation in this regard. See 

Webster v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 155, 159 (1991) (“Because we are a Court of review, it is not appropriate for us 

to make a de novo finding, based on the evidence . . . .”)

The government argues that the Veterans Court did 

not engage in factfinding because the Board is presumed 

to have considered all evidence before it. The government 

also argues that we lack jurisdiction over this issue, 

insisting that its consideration requires us to make a 

factual comparison between the Veterans Court’s opinion 

and the Board’s opinion. 

But the government contradicts itself, also stating

that “[t]he Veterans Court determined, based on 

Mr. Sullivan’s own testimony, that [the Asheville medical 

records] could not be relevant to his claim for service 

connection because the treating doctors found nothing 

wrong with him. Such a determination is the quintessential factual determination.” Respondent Br. 24 (emphasis 

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SULLIVAN v. MCDONALD 11

added) (internal citation omitted). We agree with this

characterization and conclude that the Veterans Court 

engaged in factfinding regarding the relevance of 

Mr. Sullivan’s Asheville medical records, which were not 

discussed by the Board. Such factfinding is improper for 

a court of appeals such as the Veterans Court. 

On remand, we urge the Veterans Court to be mindful 

of its jurisdictional limits and refrain from engaging in 

factfinding when applying the proper statutory and 

regulatory framework as outlined in this opinion.

CONCLUSION

We hold that § 3.159(c)(3) extends the VA’s duty to 

assist to obtaining sufficiently identified VA medical 

records or records of examination or treatment at non-VA 

facilities authorized by VA, regardless of their relevance. 

The duty to assist, however, is not unlimited; in evaluating whether the duty to assist is satisfied, the Veterans 

Court may consider the limitations on the duty to assist 

set forth in § 3.159(d).

Because the Veterans Court relied on the wrong legal 

standard in affirming the Board’s determination that the 

duty to assist was satisfied, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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