Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-70276/USCOURTS-ca9-14-70276-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Roberto Carlos Silva-Pereira
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERTO CARLOS SILVA-PEREIRA,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 14-70276

Agency No.

A095-743-748

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted January 4, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed July 7, 2016

Before: J. Clifford Wallace and Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain,

Circuit Judges and Marilyn L. Huff,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

* The Honorable Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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2 SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied a petition for review brought byRoberto

Carlos Silva-Pereira, a former Salvadoran professional soccer

player and deputy to a Salvadoran congressman, holding that

he was statutorily barred from asylum and withholding of

removal relief under the serious nonpolitical crime bar, and

did not qualify for protection under the Convention Against

Torture. 

The panel held that the evidence did not compel the

conclusion that Silva was credible. The panel further held

that substantial evidence supported the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ determination that Silva was ineligible for asylum

and withholding of removal under the serious nonpolitical

crime bar, because there was probable cause to believe that

Silva was complicit in the murders in Guatemala of three

Salvadoran representatives to the Central American

Parliament. 

The panel held that it need not decide whether the law of

the case doctrine applies to administrative proceedings in the

immigration context, because even assuming it does, neither

the immigration judge nor the Board explicitly decided the

serious nonpolitical crime issue before the final round of

decisions.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 3

The panel affirmed the Board’s denial of protection under

the Convention Against Torture, because Silva never asserted

any fear of torture in Nicaragua, the country he designated for

removal, and to which the IJ ultimately ordered removal. 

The panel declined to consider the Board’s determination

that Silva failed to demonstrate a likelihood of torture in El

Salvador, the alternate country of removal, because such a

challenge does not relate to “the proposed country of

removal,” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

COUNSEL

Guatam Jagannath (argued), and Emily Abraham, Social

Justice Collaborative, Oakland, California, for Petitioner.

Timothy G. Hayes (argued), Trial Attorney; Cindy S. Ferrier,

Assistant Director; Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant

Attorney General, Civil Division; Office of Immigration

Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C., for Respondent.

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OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

Wemust decide whether substantial evidence supports the

determination of the Board of Immigration Appeals that this

petitioner is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal

to Nicaragua and whether he qualifies for deferral of removal

under the Convention Against Torture.

I

A

Roberto Carlos Silva-Pereira is a Salvadoran citizen and

national, and was a professional soccer player in El Salvador

until around 2000. Following his retirement, he entered the

construction business in El Salvador with his wife. His

companies bid for government construction contracts, which

regularly yielded 30–40% profit. Earnings from these

contracts placed Silva among El Salvador’s wealthiest

individuals. Silva denied he ever bribed government officials

to secure such contracts.

Silva reports that he became involved in Salvadoran

politics in 2000, when he became a member of the Frente

Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional Party

(“FMLN”). In 2006, however, Silva changed parties when he

was elected a deputy to Congressman Gonzales Lovo, a

member of the Partido de Conciliación Nacional (“PCN”). 

Silva testified that although some members of the FMLN

resented his switch to the PCN, he thought both parties had a

shared ideology opposing the then-ruling Alianza

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 5

Republicana Nacionalista party (“ARENA”), which Silva

believed to be corrupt.

Roughly six months after Silva assumed office as

Congressman Lovo’s deputy, the Salvadoran legislature held

hearings about allegations that Silva engaged in money

laundering and bribery of government officials through his

construction business. At those hearings, the Salvadoran

Attorney General presented evidence that Silva acquired

approximately $1.6 million in illicit assets between 2004 and

2006 from contracts acquired through bribery. According to

Silva, the charges were brought because the AttorneyGeneral

believed him to be a “stumbling block” to the ARENA party.

Ultimately, 82 out of El Salvador’s 84 legislators voted to

suspend Silva’s legislative immunity. The voting majority

included all three parties and 9 out of 10 members of Silva’s

own PCN party, with the exception of Congressman Lovo

who chose to abstain. The legislator who acted as a

prosecutor in Silva’s case also abstained. Silva claims that

the legislature’s landslide vote was orchestrated by ARENA

and motivated by a desire to secure aid from the United States

by demonstrating an active fight against corruption.

After the legislature revoked Silva’s immunity, a

Salvadoran court held hearings in January 2007 to determine

whether the evidence against Silva supported the issuance of

a warrant for his arrest. Silva was represented by counsel at

these hearings, but submitted a note through his attorneys

telling the court that he was too sick to attend. The court

issued a warrant for Silva’s arrest on January 25, 2007. Silva

left El Salvador sometime during this period.

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Around the time Silva’s legislative immunity was

suspended, Silva’s wife and mother-in-law were also arrested

on corruption charges connected to their role in Silva’s

construction businesses. His mother-in-law was acquitted. 

After being convicted of some charges and acquitted of

others, Silva’s wife was sentenced to seven years in prison. 

Additionally, authorities successfully prosecuted a former

mayor, Mario Osorto, for forging documents that facilitated

Silva’s government contracts. Osorto was an ARENA party

member and also a member of the Central American

Parliament (“PARLACEN”). As with Silva, the Salvadoran

legislature voted to suspend Osorto’s legislative immunity in

December 2006. Osorto was sentenced to four years in

prison.

B

Subsequently, in the United States, Silva was

apprehended by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”) near his girlfriend’s home in California in October

2007. When investigators knocked on the door, Silva fled on

foot, jumping fences and hiding in bushes before being

arrested. Following his arrest, Silva conceded removability

but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture. He declined to

designate a country of removal, so the immigration judge

(“IJ”) designated El Salvador, Silva’s home country, as the

country of removal.

1

At his initial immigration hearings before the IJ in

Florence, Arizona, Silva described several incidents of

violence allegedly perpetrated against him by Salvadoran

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 7

officials. First, he asserted that the leader of ARENA’s

legislators threatened him at gunpoint for accusing ARENA

of corruption. Second, Silva alleged he suffered violence at

the hands of Salvadoran police after visiting his wife in prison

in El Salvador. According to Silva, he visited his wife in

October 2006 and took pictures with his cell phone of injuries

she allegedly sustained while incarcerated. Silva testified that

upon leaving the prison, police stopped the car in which he

was riding with his ten-year-old son and his driver. 

According to Silva, the police hit him with a rifle, forcibly

took the phone, and threatened his son at gunpoint.

Third, Silva testified that roughly one week after this

assault, police entered his house without a warrant and again

assaulted him and frightened his children. Silva claimed he

was unable to attend the arrest warrant hearings in El

Salvador as a result of injuries from this incident. When

government counsel pointed out that based on Silva’s

testimony, the alleged encounter in his home took place more

than three months before the arrest warrant hearings, Silva

claimed he had actually been beaten an additional time by

“four people dressed as police” in January 2007.

Silva failed to report any of these incidents in his asylum

application to the Department of Homeland Security. When

asked why he failed to mention the incidents involving the

police outside his wife’s prison and in his home, Silva said he

forgot to report them to his attorney. He also claimed that

“[his] problem is very complex” and he worried that other

Salvadoran detainees would “steal [his] declaration” and beat

him.

On cross-examination, government counsel also

questioned Silva about his alleged departure date from El

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8 SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH

Salvador. Silva testified that he crossed the Texas border in

early January 2007 after spending only six hours or so in

Guatemala and a handful of days in Mexico. When

government counsel pointed out that this timeline was

inconsistent with the entry date to the United States that Silva

reported in his asylum application, Silva testified that he

actually exited El Salvador several weeks later than he

initially indicated. Silva subsequently admitted that he

allowed his attorneys to tell a Salvadoran judge that he was

too sick to attend the arrest warrant hearings when in fact he

was fleeing the country.

2

Several experts hired by Silva testified that they believed

the Salvadoran corruption charges were likely linked to

Silva’s opposition to the ARENA party. One of these

experts, a private investigator named Tom Parker, also

presented a tape-recorded conversation in which Adolfo

Torrez, a close confidant of the ARENA-affiliated president,

told Silva he could make the charges against Silva and his

wife disappear for a price of $500,000. When Torrez’s offer

became public, the ARENA partywithdrew its support for the

AttorneyGeneral because he knew about Torrez’s actions but

failed to investigate. Torrez subsequently died of a gunshot

wound. Parker speculated that Torrez was murdered, though

other reports on the forensic evidence indicate that Torrez

committed suicide.

The IJ also heard testimony from Silva’s brother, who

stated that Silva was protected by two bodyguards during his

time as a legislator. Following such testimony, the IJrecalled

Silva and asked him whether his bodyguards were present

during the incidents he recounted in which police assaulted

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 9

him outside the prison and at his home. Silva testified that

only one bodyguard was present during each incident because

they took turns every twenty-four hours. He also asserted

that the bodyguard present during both incidents was

unarmed and was also beaten by police.

3

In August 2008, the IJ rendered his first decision,

concluding Silva was non-credible and denying his

applications. In so finding, the IJ noted discrepancies

between Silva’s testimony and his asylum application

concerning his exit date from El Salvador. The Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed, finding that the IJ’s

limited discussion—and especially his focus on the date

discrepancies—was inadequate to sustain the credibility

determination.

C

Following remand, the IJ conducted additional hearings

between May and September 2009. During this time, the

government introduced evidence that in addition to his crimes

in El Salvador, Silva had also been charged with conspiracy

to commit murder in Guatemala.

1

Exhibits and testimony at the second round of hearings

established that in February 2007, three Salvadoran

representatives to the Central American Parliament were

found murdered in a charred van outside Guatemala City. 

Among the murdered PARLACEN representatives was

Eduardo D’Aubuisson, the son of ARENA’s founder and the

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brother of Roberto D’Aubuisson, Jr., one of ARENA’s

current leaders. Later inquiry by international investigators

concluded that the representatives were likely carrying $5

million and twenty kilograms of cocaine.

Guatemalan authorities initially arrested four Guatemalan

police officers whom they believed carried out the murders in

cooperation with a drug gang. Two weeks after being taken

into custody, however, these four officers were gunned down

inside a Guatemalan prison, prompting the Guatemalan

government to seek out assistance from the FBI and a task

force sponsored bythe United Nations called the International

Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (“CICIG”). 

Guatemalan authorities subsequently charged and convicted

a number of individuals for involvement in these killings,

including a Guatemalan congressman namedManuelCastillo. 

Phone records showed Castillo placed calls to both the

corrupt police and the drug gang involved in the hit on

D’Aubuisson and his companions. Castillo was sentenced to

203 years in prison.

During Castillo’s trial, Guatemalan authorities offered

evidence that Silva cooperated with Castillo and the drug

gang in planning the killings. Correspondingly, the

Guatemalan government filed a separate indictment against

Silva, indicating that Silva acted as the “intellectual author”

behind the Guatemalan murders. Specifically, the indictment

accuses Silva of planning the murders with Castillo and

various gang members at a series of meetings in El Salvador

and Guatemala. Those allegations were corroborated during

Castillo’s trial by an eyewitness witness known as “Judas,”

currently under government protection in El Salvador.

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 11

Silva’s experts questioned the legitimacy of the

Guatemalan charges, and offered varying theories as to why

Guatemala would target Silva specifically. One expert, a

journalist named Lafitte Martine Fernandez-Rojas who wrote

a popular book about the PARLACEN murders, speculated

that Guatemalan officials actually ordered the hit and

conspired to prosecute Silva to help ARENA hide the party’s

connection to drug dealing. Another expert stated his belief

that Silva was a “fall guy” used by Guatemalan officials to

distance themselves from allegations of drug trafficking.

2

Following this second round of hearings, the IJ issued an

oral decision granting Silva asylum but denying Silva

withholding of removal or protection under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). In so holding, the IJ concluded

that the BIA’s previous decision left him no choice but to find

Silva credible. Upon review, the BIA vacated the IJ’s

decision and remanded the case again, noting that it had

merely instructed the IJ to “provid[e] further explanation,”

not accept Silva’s credibility without question. The BIA also

directed the IJ to make a specific determination concerning

Silva’s eligibility for protection under the CAT if necessary.

D

Following the second remand, the government argued to

the IJ that Silva was statutorily barred from seeking asylum

or withholding of removal because there were serious reasons

to believe Silva committed money laundering in El Salvador

and conspiracy to commit murder in Guatemala. The IJ

agreed and declared Silva ineligible for asylum and

withholding of removal, but sought additional evidence

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related to Silva’s CAT claim. During this time, the IJ trying

Silva’s case retired and the case was reassigned to a new

judge.1

1

In the next round of hearings, Silva’s experts testified in

support of his CAT claim that he would be tortured or

executed in El Salvador because Roberto D’Aubuisson, Jr., a

high-powered leader of ARENA and son of the party’s

founder, would seek retribution for his brother’s murder. 

Silva’s experts acknowledged that ARENA no longer

controlled the presidency in El Salvador, but insisted that

ARENA continues to exert control over many aspects of the

government. Silva’s experts also argued that Silva would

likely not survive being jailed in Guatemala.

2

In March 2013, the IJ issued a decision denying Silva’s

application for deferral of removal under the CAT and

reiterating that he was ineligible for asylum and withholding

1 During this period, Silva also changed counsel multiple times. The

attorney representing Silva for the first two rounds of proceedings

withdrew after he received anonymous threats subsequent to Silva being

granted temporary asylum. Silva’s next attorney withdrew after

participating in the initial hearings following the second remand, citing a

“fail[ure] to cooperate” on Silva’s part. Silva claimed she misrepresented

her abilities, lied to him, and refused to work because of a fee dispute. A

third attorney withdrew after one appearance having learned about the

threats to Silva’s first attorney, prompting Silva to file a seventeen-page

attorney misconduct complaint. A fourth set of attorneys ultimately

represented Silva through the remainder of proceedings, partly on a pro

bono basis since many of Silva’s assets had been frozen by Salvadoran

authorities.

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 13

of removal. Before issuing his decision, however, the IJ

inquired whether Silva wished to reconsider his decision

declining to specify a preferred country of removal. Silva

indicated he wished to designate Nicaragua as his country of

removal. The IJ granted Silva’s request, and designated El

Salvador as the alternate country of removal.

Considering Silva’s claims on the merits, the IJ concluded

that Silva was ineligible for asylum and withholding of

removal because there were serious reasons for believing he

committed serious nonpolitical crimes in both El Salvador

and Guatemala. The IJ also found Silva to be non-credible

after concluding Silva’s explanation for failing to report his

violent interactions with police in his asylum application was

highly implausible. Additionally, the IJ pointed out that Silva

admitted to having lied to the Salvadoran court, and found

that Silva failed to produce relevant evidence corroborating

his story about the attacks. Finally, the IJ held that Silva had

not met his burden under CAT because he had not

demonstrated he would likely be tortured in either El

Salvador or Guatemala.

3

The BIA thereafter dismissed Silva’s appeal, largely

adopting the reasoning of the IJ. The BIA agreed that there

were serious reasons to believe that Silva was involved in the

Guatemalan murders because the charging documents alleged

specific facts and were likely the product of a genuine fight

against corruption. The BIA also concluded that there were

serious reasons to believe Silva committed a serious

nonpolitical crime in El Salvador. In so holding, the BIA also

upheld the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, pointing to

Silva’s lie to the Salvadoran court, his failure to report

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incidents of police violence, and his lack of corroborating

evidence. Finally, the BIA upheld the IJ’s determination

denying Silva’s CAT claim.

Silva timely petitioned for review.

II

“We review ‘denials of asylum, withholding of removal,

and CAT relief for substantial evidence and will uphold a

denial supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative

evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” Huang v.

Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotingGarciaMilian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2013)). The

agency’s “findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Thus, in order to

reverse the BIA, “we must determine that the evidence not

only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it—and also

compels the further conclusion that the petitioner meets the

requisite standard for obtaining relief.” Huang, 744 F.3d at

1031 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision while

adding its own reasons, this court reviews both decisions.” 

Vahora v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2011); see

also Shrestha v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2013)

(observing that “[w]hen the BIA conducts its own review of

the evidence and law rather than adopting the IJ’s decision,”

we review only the BIA’s decision “except to the extent that

the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted”).

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 15

III

Silva first argues that the record does not support the

BIA’s conclusion that there are serious reasons to believe that

he participated in the murder of D’Aubuisson and his

companions in Guatemala, or engaged in bribery and money

laundering in El Salvador. In so arguing, Silva contends that

the IJ erred in finding him non-credible.

Because Silva’s application for relief was submitted after

May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act governs his case. Pub. L.

No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); see Shrestha v. Holder,

590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). The REAL ID Act

states in relevant part:

Considering the totality of the circumstances,

and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may

base a credibility determination on . . . the

inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or

witness’s account, the consistency between

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral

statements. . . , the internal consistency of

each such statement . . . and any inaccuracies

or falsehoods in such statements, without

regard to whether an inconsistency,

inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant

factor.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also id. §§ 1231(b)(3)(C)

(adopting this standard for withholding of removal),

1229a(c)(4)(C) (all other relief). “Under the REAL ID Act,

there is no presumption that an applicant for relief is credible,

and the IJ is authorized to base an adverse credibility

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determination on ‘the totality of the circumstances’ and ‘all

relevant factors.’” Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152–53

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The

Act explicitly names factors such as “the inherent

plausibility” of the applicant’s account, “consistencybetween

[his] written and oral statements,” and the “consistency of

such statements with other evidence of record.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, “these statutory factors are

not exhaustive,” and “the agency can look to relevant preREAL ID Act factors, such as the ‘level of detail of the

claimant’s testimony.’” Bingxu Jin v. Holder, 748 F.3d 959,

964 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040). 

“[O]nly the most extraordinary circumstances will justify

overturning an adverse credibility determination.” Id.

(quoting Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040). Nonetheless, “an

adverse credibility determination cannot be based on

complete speculation and conjecture.” Singh v. Lynch,

802 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2015). Instead, an IJ must

provide “specific and cogent reasons” supporting such a

determination with reference to “specific instances in the

record.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044.

A

In upholding the IJ’s decision, the BIA first agreed with

the IJthat Silva’s failure to mention in his asylum application

incidents of police violence that occurred outside the prison

and at his home in his asylum application was a significant

omission that justified an adverse credibility finding. Silva

has pointed us to no evidence that compels a contrary

conclusion.

Although it is true that “mere omission of details is

insufficient to uphold an adverse credibility finding,” Lai v.

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 17

Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Singh v.

Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2005)), an adverse

credibility determination may be supported by omissions that

are not “details,” but new allegations that tell a “much

different—and more compelling—story of persecution than

[the] initial application,” Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969,

974 (9th Cir. 2011). For instance, in Zamanov, we concluded

that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s adverse

credibility determination where a petitioner’s asylum

application failed to mention three incidents in which police

interrupted his participation in various political activities,

arrested him, and beat him. Id. at 972. We noted that these

omissions “materially altered” his account of persecution by

connecting government persecution to his political activity,

and thus “went to the core of his alleged fear of political

persecution” as our pre-REAL ID act case law required. Id.

at 973–74.

We have since reiterated the rule explained in Zamanov

several times. For instance, in Alvarez-Santos v. INS, we

upheld the BIA’s adverse credibility determination where an

applicant failed to mention a violent incident supporting his

two previous asylum applications. 332 F.3d 1245, 1248–49

(9th Cir. 2003). At the conclusion of his direct testimony, the

applicant mentioned for the first time that masked men

associated with a guerrilla group who had sent him

threatening letters came to his house, caught him, and stabbed

him in the shoulder. Id. at 1249. We held that it was “simply

not believable that an applicant for asylum would fail to

remember” the experience of being attacked and stabbed

which precipitated his flight from his home country. Id. at

1254. Likewise, in Kin v. Holder, we held that a petitioner’s

failure to mention that he had been beaten by police after

participating in a political rally constituted substantial

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evidence to support an adverse credibility finding, because

these allegations were not “trivial details” but allegations

“crucial to establishing they were persecuted for their

political opinion.” 595 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010).

Here the BIA reasonably concluded that Silva’s failure to

mention his altercations with police were not details, but

instead “significant events of alleged police misconduct that

would have supported his applications for relief.” In his

asylum application, Silva stated only that the prosecution for

corruption in El Salvador aimed at himself and his familywas

actually a form of persecution for Silva’s outspoken criticism

of ARENA. At his immigration hearing, however, Silva

reported for the first time that police brutally beat him outside

his wife’s prison and again in his home—incidents which he

claims left him with permanent injuries and provoked

extreme psychological trauma in his children. Moreover,

Silva testified that when he asked the police why they were

pointing a gun at his son, they told him it was “because of

your political opinion [and] because you’re always talking.” 

These are not trivialities, but “pivotal event[s]” that were

“crucial to establishing” that Silva actually suffered

persecution as a result of his political opinion. See AlvarezSantos, 332 F.3d at 1254; Kin, 595 F. 3d at 1057.

Likewise, Silva’s explanation for omitting these events

from his application for asylum “is not persuasive enough to

compel the conclusion that the omissions were immaterial.” 

Kin, 595 F.3d at 1057. Before testifying about the altercation

with police outside his wife’s prison, Silva explained that

such incident was not included in his asylum application

because he “forgot” to mention it to his attorney. Silva later

stated that he did not previously report his altercations with

police because “[his] problem is very complex” and because

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 19

he worried other Salvadoran detainees might beat him and

“steal [his] declaration.” Yet as the IJ and the BIA both

concluded, it is “simply not believable” that Silva would fail

to remember such “dramatic incident[s]” so closely related to

his asylum claim. See Alvarez-Santos, 332 F.3d at 1254. We

also agree with the agency that it strains belief to conclude

that Silva would fear accusing unnamed police officers of

misconduct when his initial asylum application accused

ARENA’s highest ranking officials of wrongdoing and

corruption. Such circumstances clearly distinguish Silva’s

case from instances in which we have found the BIA’s

credibility determination based on an omission to be

unsupported. See Lai, 733 F.3d at 974 (holding an adverse

credibility determination was not supported where a claimant

“gave a plausible and compelling explanation for the

omission”).

Silva argues that various documents submitted several

years after his testimony compel the conclusion that the

agency’s credibility determination is mistaken. But as the

BIA noted, many of these documents were based only on

Silva’s own assertions or otherwise insufficient to corroborate

his version of events. For instance, Silva submitted an

evaluation from a psychologist who examined him more than

four years after his alleged encounters with police, and whose

findings were based entirely on Silva’s own account of past

events. Likewise, the reports Silva submitted from two

physicians indicate only that Silva was seen for chest pain

and various other conditions roughly two years after the

violent incidents with police are said to have occurred. Silva

also points to a statement attributed to his driver which

supports his claims that he was beaten outside his wife’s

prison. Yet the BIA found this report inconsistent with

statements by Silva’s brother that Silva was always

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accompanied by bodyguards, and also pointed to Silva’s

failure to provide any corroborating evidence from his son

whom police allegedly threatened—now aged 16 or

17—despite the fact that several other family members

testified on Silva’s behalf. Because the record does not

compel the conclusion that the agency’s assessment of this

evidence was mistaken or that “such corroborating evidence

[was] unavailable,” we decline to reverse the IJ’s credibility

determination on this basis. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4); see also

Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1047–48.

B

In addition to Silva’s failure to report incidents of alleged

persecution by the police, the IJ and the BIA also noted

discrepancies in Silva’s testimony regarding his entry date

into the United States. In his asylum application, Silva said

he left El Salvador on January 7, 2007, and that he arrived in

the United States on February 1, 2007. However, after the

government’s attorney pointed out that this exit date was

irreconcilable with Silva’s reported timeline in traveling to

the United States, Silva then stated he actually left El

Salvador on January 22, 2007.

Silva argues that this date discrepancy is insufficient on

its own to support an adverse credibility determination, as the

BIA concluded on its first remand. We are inclined to agree. 

However, “when inconsistencies that weaken a claim for

asylum are accompanied by other indications of dishonesty

. . . an adverse credibility determination may be supported by

substantial evidence.” Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061,

1067 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the IJ and the BIA clarified that

Silva’s varying testimony on this point was significant not for

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 21

its own sake, but instead because it related directly to Silva’s

efforts to avoid criminal charges.

The record demonstrates that following the legislature’s

revocation of Silva’s immunity, a Salvadoran court held

hearings beginning on January 18, 2007, to determine

whether a warrant for Silva’s arrest ought to be issued. Silva

testified that he instructed his attorneys to submit a note to the

judge stating that he was too ill to attend the proceedings

because of the beating he sustained by police when they

searched his home. When DHS pointed out that Silva had

previously testified that this incident took place roughly three

months before the court hearings, Silva claimed that he had

been beaten an additional time by individuals dressed as

police in January 2007. The government then asked Silva to

explain how he was both too injured to attend the arrestwarrant hearings but well enough to flee El Salvador on

January 22 as he had just indicated. Silva first responded by

saying he was “just hurt” and “not totally in a grave state.” 

After the government lawyer repeated the question multiple

times, however, Silva admitted that he planned to and did flee

El Salvador on January 22, and that his statement to the court

that he was too ill to attend was fraudulent. We have held on

numerous occasions that the “[a]dmission of prior dishonesty

can support an adverse credibility determination.” Don v.

Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007); see also

Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1065 (“It strains credulity to hold that the

evidence presented at the asylum hearing compels us to find

Kaur believable for the sole reason that she admitted to being

a liar.”). The IJ did not err in finding Silva non-credible on

a such basis here.

In his opening brief, Silva’s attorney admits that Silva

intentionally lied to the Salvadoran court, but contends that

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the lie was justified “to escape a sham trial at a puppet court.” 

But the record does not compel that conclusion. Although

some of Silva’s experts asserted that it is “virtually

impossible to get a fair trial in El Salvador,” they also

recognized that justice can be had—an assertion further

supported bythe fact that Silva’s mother-in-law was acquitted

of all charges against her, and his wife acquitted of several. 

Moreover, Silva’s appeal to possible corruption in the

Salvadoran justice system does nothing to explain why Silva

testified to the IJ that he was too sick to attend the hearings

until inconsistencies in his own testimony forced him to

admit he was lying. See Don, 476 F.3d at 742 (observing that

a petitioner’s argument that he lied to Sri Lankan police out

of fear for his safety “d[id] not explain why Don provided

different dates to the asylum officer and to the IJ”). The

agency’s credibility determination was valid.

IV

Silva next argues that the BIA erred in concluding that

there are serious reasons to believe that he committed two

serious nonpolitical crimes—conspiracy to murder

D’Aubuisson and his companions in Guatemala and money

laundering and bribery in El Salvador. Once again, we

review the BIA’s conclusion for substantial evidence. See Go

v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2011). 

A

An individual is ineligible for asylum and withholding of

removal where “there are serious reasons for believing that

the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (asylum),

1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (withholding of removal); see also 8C.F.R.

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 23

§ 1208.16(d)(2). We have interpreted “serious reasons for

believing” as “tantamount to probable cause.” Go, 640 F.3d

at 1052; see also Matter of E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA

2012).

In finding Silva ineligible for asylum and withholding of

removal, the BIA determined that there are serious reasons

for believing that Silva conspired with others to murder

D’Aubuisson and the other PARLACEN delegates in

Guatemala. Silva does not contest that the Guatemalan

murders were serious nonpolitical crimes, nor did he make

any such argument to the BIA. Thus, the only question

before us in relation to this issue is whether there are “serious

reasons for believing” Silva was complicit in these killings. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203,

1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (noting that a “ [p]etitioner

will . . . be deemed to have exhausted only those issues he

raised and argued in his brief before the BIA.”).

As both the IJ and the BIA noted, the Guatemalan

indictment provides strong reason to believe that Silva was

involved in the PARLACEN murders, not least because it

alleges specific facts connecting Silva to the crime. The

indictment accuses Silva of planning the murders with

Castillo’s gang contacts at a series of meetings—one inside

a restaurant allegedly owned by Osorto, the mayor who was

convicted of corruption for assisting Silva in obtaining

government contracts, and a second meeting at a car wash in

Guatemala. Moreover, the indictment’s allegations were

corroborated by “Judas,” an eyewitness whom the

Guatemalan court deemed credible. Judas testified in no

uncertain terms that he witnessed Silva meet with various

gang members, and that Silva planned the murder of

D’Aubuisson and his companions at those meetings. What is

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more, Judas asserted that the murders were occasioned by

Silva’s desire for political and financial revenge against

ARENA—the same theory that supported the Guatemalan

government’s conviction of Castillo for ordering the killings. 

Such evidence is certainly sufficient to constitute probable

cause—a “fair probability” that Silva was involved in the

murders. See United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069

(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 246 (1983)).

Silva argues that the probable cause standard we

articulated in Go is inapposite because unlike the petitioner

in that case, Silva did not affirmatively admit to participating

in the murders. See Go, 640 F.3d at 1053. But there is no

question that Go’s standard can be met without an explicit

admission of guilt, as other courts have rightly recognized.

For instance, in Khouzam v. Holder, 361 F.3d 161, 166

(2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit relied on an Egyptian

arrest warrant and police reports to conclude that there were

“serious reasons for believing” that a petitioner had

committed a murder in that country. In so concluding, the

court reasoned that, just as in Silva’s case, the documents

submitted were sufficient to establish probable cause because

they suggested a possible motive for the killing and offered

specific allegations supporting the charge—that the

petitioner’s fingerprints were found at the scene, that he was

seen wearing a bloody shirt that was later recovered, and that

eyewitnesses said he had an injured hand. Id. Silva contends

that Khouzam is distinguishable because the charges in that

case were supported by circumstantial evidence rather than

eyewitness testimony. But that difference is beside the point. 

Even assuming that the quantum of evidence in Silva’s case

differs from the evidence at issue in Kouzam, Silva has

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pointed to no evidence that “compel[s] the conclusion that

probable cause was lacking.” Go, 640 F.3d at 1053. Absent

such a showing, the BIA’s determination must be upheld.

Silva also argues that the IJ improperly ignored the

testimony of Fernandez-Rojas and Silva’s other experts that

the charges against Silva were pretextual and that the

PARLACEN murders were in fact perpetrated by the

Guatemalan government to cover up drug dealing. But the

agency was within its discretion to reject these alternate

theories. See Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705

n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (observing that an IJ is “not required to

adopt as true all of the facts” upon which an expert witness

based his opinion where the IJ states “specific reasons in the

record why the testimony was insufficient to establish” facts

necessary to grant relief).

Here, both the BIA and the IJ found that evidence in the

record suggests that although there is corruption in

Guatemala, there have been improvements especially related

to that government’s investigation of the PARLACEN

murders, making it unlikely that the charges against Silva

were pretextual. For instance, the BIA noted that in response

to the murder of the police officers who carried out the

PARLACEN killings,theGuatemalan government sought the

assistance of the FBI to help bring those responsible to

justice. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Guatemala

has convicted not only numerous gang members implicated

in the murders, but also Manuel Castillo, himself a

Guatemalan official. Likewise, the BIA observed that the

reliability of the CICIG report upon which Silva’s experts

based their conclusions was at least questionable since the

report’s principal author has herself since been implicated in

corruption and stripped of immunity by CICIG. One may

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certainly disagree with the agency’s assessment of the

evidence or believe such evidence “cast[s] a reasonable doubt

on [Silva’s] guilt.” Khouzam, 361 F.3d at 166. But that is a

far cry from “compel[ling] a finding that [Silva] was framed”

or that probable cause is lacking. Id.

Because the Guatemalan charges provide a sufficient

basis upon which to conclude that Silva is ineligible for

asylum and withholding of removal, we need not reach

Silva’s challenges to the BIA’s alternate conclusion that there

are serious reasons for believing that Silva committed a

second serious nonpolitical crime by engaging in bribery and

money laundering in El Salvador. Silva is ineligible for

asylum and withholding of removal.

B

Silva next argues that even assuming his possible

involvement in the Guatemalan murders renders him

ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal, the agency

should have been forbidden from reaching this conclusion

under the law of the case doctrine.

The law of the case doctrine “generally preclude[s]

[courts] from reconsidering an issue previously decided by

the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” 

Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703,

715 (9th Cir. 1990). However, we have previously observed

that “it is doubtful that federal courts have the authority to

extend the law of the case doctrine” to administrative

proceedings. Lockert v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 867 F.2d 513,

518 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Biltmore Forest Broadcasting

FM, Inc. v. FCC, 321 F.3d 155, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting

that “the law of the case doctrine is of uncertain force in the

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 27

context of administrative litigation”); but see Stacy v. Colvin,

No. 13-36025, 2016 WL 3165597, at *1 (9th Cir. June 7,

2016) — F.3d — (holding that the law of the case doctrine

applies to social securityadministrative remands from federal

court). That reticence makes sense in the context of

immigration proceedings, because both the BIA and the IJ

have explicit legal authority to reconsider their own decisions

sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The Board may at any

time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in

which it has rendered a decision.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)

(“An Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion at

any time . . . reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she

has made a decision, unless jurisdiction is vested with the

Board.”). Indeed, we are aware of only one circuit that has

held that the law of the case doctrine applies to immigration

proceedings. See Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 998 (7th

Cir. 2006) (interpreting the law of the case doctrine as

forbidding a new IJ from reconsidering a petitioner’s

credibility where that issue exceeded the scope of the BIA’s

instructions on remand). For the purposes of this appeal,

however, we need not decide whether the law of the case

doctrine applies in the immigration context, because even

assuming it does, the doctrine provides no help to Silva.

For the law of the case doctrine to bar reconsideration of

an issue, “the issue in question must have been decided

explicitly or by necessary implication in the previous

disposition.” United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 763 F.3d

1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Lummi

Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000)). Silva

admits that neither the IJ nor the BIA explicitly decided

whether he was ineligible for asylum and withholding of

removal on the basis of the serious nonpolitical crimes bar

before the final round of decisions. Nonetheless, he argues

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that the IJ and the BIA “found by necessary implication” in

their earlier decisions that the bar did not apply. We disagree.

In its first decision, the IJ denied Silva asylum and

withholding of removal on the basis of its adverse credibility

determination. The BIA reversed and remanded, stating that

the IJ’s focus on the discrepancies in dates relating to Silva’s

departure from El Salvador was inadequate to sustain the

credibility determination. Subsequently, the IJ issued a

second decision granting Silva asylum, based in large part on

his erroneous view that the BIA’s previous ruling required

that he find Silva credible. We doubt that this decision held

by “necessary implication” that the serious nonpolitical

crimes bar did not apply, since we find no evidence that the

IJ was ever presented with or actually considered that issue. 

See Lummi Nation, 763 F.3d at (noting that “law of the case

acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually

considered and decided by the first court” (quoting United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan for Hourly-Rated

Employees of ASARCO, Inc., 512 F.3d 555, 564 (9th Cir.

2008))); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067

(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that an issue was not decided by

necessary implication where it “had never been considered or

decided by any court”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th

ed. 2009) (defining “necessary implication” as “[a]n

implication so strong in its probability that anything to the

contrary would be unreasonable”). Yet even assuming the

IJ’s second decision addressed the serious nonpolitical crimes

bar by “necessary implication” insofar as it granted Silva

asylum, the BIA reversed the IJ’s decision and once more

remanded the case. Moreover, nowhere in BIA’s second

decision do we find any indication that it considered and

rejected the applicability of the bar, or that it granted any

form of relief suggesting the bar did not apply. To the

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 29

contrary, the BIA’s decision returned the matter to the IJ with

explicit instructions to conduct further inquiry to determine

whether Silva was actually entitled to asylum or any other

form of relief. Silva’s law of the case argument is meritless.

V

Although Silva is ineligible for asylum and withholding

of removal under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) and

1231(b)(3)(B)(iii), he maystill seek deferral of removal under

the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a); see also Go, 640 F.3d

at 1053. To succeed in obtaining such relief, a petitioner

must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she

would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of

removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (emphasis added); see

also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) (applying this standard to deferral

of removal). Such language plainly requires that a petitioner

must demonstrate he will likely suffer torture in the country

to which he is actually ordered removed “as opposed to an

alternative country of removal.” She v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958,

965 (9th Cir. 2010) (examining identical language as

contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)); see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 1240.10(f) (contrasting the IJ’s power to designate “the

country of removal” with the IJ’s ability to identify multiple

“alternative countries of removal”) (emphasis added).

At his initial immigration hearing, Silva decided not to

designate a country of removal, prompting the IJ initially

assigned to Silva’s case to designate El Salvador as the

country of removal in accordance with the relevant statute. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) (establishing the process for

determining the country to which an alien who has been

residing in the United States shall be removed). 

Subsequently, that IJ retired, and a new IJ took over Silva’s

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case and conducted hearings on Silva’s CAT claim. At the

conclusion of these hearings, this IJ inquired on his own

initiative whether Silva wished to reconsider his decision to

forego designating a country of removal. After consulting

with counsel, Silva requested that Nicaragua be designated as

his country of removal. The IJ obliged, and ultimately

ordered that Silva be removed to Nicaragua as the primary

country of removal, or alternatively to El Salvador.

Silva appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA and contested

the IJ’s determination that he failed to meet his burden under

CAT. However, Silva’s arguments focused exclusively on

the likelihood that he will suffer torture in either El Salvador

or Guatemala. At no point did Silva argue to the BIA, nor

has he argued to us, that he would likely suffer torture if

removed to Nicaragua—“the proposed country of removal.” 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Because this issue is unexhausted,

we have no power to review it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1);

Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en

banc) (holding that an alien is “deemed to have exhausted

only those issues he raised and argued in his brief before the

BIA”); see also Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th

Cir. 2011) (“A petitioner must specify the issues he intends

to raise on appeal; a ‘general challenge to the IJ’s decision’

will not suffice.’” (quoting Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927,

930 (9th Cir. 2004))). The BIA’s order commanding Silva’s

removal to Nicaragua stands.2

2 We note that Silva also challenges the BIA’s determination that he has

not demonstrated a likelihood that he would be tortured inEl Salvador, the

alternate country of removal. Because this challenge does not relate to

“the proposed country of removal,” which is properly the focus of Silva’s

CAT claim, we do not review it at this time. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2);

She, 629 F.3d at 965 n.7. However, should El Salvador ultimately become

the proposed country of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(C), we fully

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SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH 31

VI

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.

expect that the BIA will grant a motion to reopen Silva’s application such

that we may consider his challenge to this aspect of the BIA’s

determination. Cf. She, 629 F.3d at 965.

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