Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03724/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03724-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bradley Joe Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Donald E. O'Brien, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3724

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Northern

v. * District of Iowa.

*

Bradley Joe Davis, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 24, 2007

 Filed: November 20, 2007

___________

Before COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Bradley Davis appeals the district court's1

 denial of his petition to vacate or

correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Davis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than fifty grams of

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(viii).

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Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (holding that after examining

the record and concluding that an appeal would be wholly without merit, counsel may

file a brief informing the court of any point that arguably might support an appeal, and

request permission to withdraw).

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Davis had no plea agreement and at the plea hearing, admitted that he was responsible

for the distribution of between fifty and 500 grams of methamphetamine. The

government responded that it could prove that Davis was responsible for much more

than 500 grams–in excess of forty pounds of the drug. During his plea colloquy,

Davis acknowledged that he was facing a maximum forty-year term of imprisonment,

and the court informed Davis of the severe sentencing possibilities before he entered

his plea.

Following the guilty plea, the probation office completed Davis's Presentence

Investigation Report and determined that he was responsible for 24.48 kilograms of

methamphetamine. Davis objected to this calculation. At the sentencing hearing, the

government witnesses testified about Davis's involvement in the conspiracy. The

district court eventually concluded that for sentencing purposes, Davis was

responsible for 14.95 kilograms of methamphetamine. Accordingly, the base offense

level was calculated at thirty-six, and after adjustments, Davis's total offense level was

set at thirty-three. The resulting sentencing range was 235-293 months imprisonment.

The district court sentenced Davis to 240 months. On direct appeal, counsel submitted

an Anders2

 brief challenging the drug-quantity issue, and we affirmed in an

unpublished decision, finding that the district court did not clearly err in relying on the

testimony of witnesses to determine drug quantity at the sentencing hearing. United

States v. Davis, 22 F. App'x 654, 655 (8th Cir. 2001) (Davis I).

Davis filed this § 2255 motion alleging various things, but the two issues

certified for appeal are two alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Davis contends that counsel failed to adequately advise him of the sentencing

implications of pleading guilty, specifically that he might receive a longer sentence

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

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because he might be held accountable for more than 500 grams of methamphetamine.

Davis also alleges that counsel improperly briefed the drug-quantity issue on direct

appeal. By affidavit, Davis's trial and appellate counsel stated that he informed Davis

of the statutory and sentencing guideline ranges before Davis pleaded guilty. Counsel

also pointed out in the affidavit that he included the drug-quantity issue in the Anders

brief. The district court denied the § 2255 petition, finding that counsel's actions were

within the bounds of an objective standard of reasonableness, and that in any event,

Davis could not establish prejudice.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court's denial of § 2255 relief de novo. Williams v.

United States, 452 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2248

(2007). To show ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea,

Davis must establish: (1) counsel's performance fell below the Strickland3

 standard of

reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors,

the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but would have proceeded to trial. Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985).

Davis cannot establish either prong of Hill because the record reflects that he

was adequately advised of the possible sentencing consequences of pleading guilty.

Not only did counsel advise him of the statutory minimum and maximum sentences,

but on the record, the district court also explained that the maximum sentence was

forty years, and that the mandatory minimum was five years. A defendant is not

constitutionally entitled to more advice than this. United States v. Granados, 168 F.3d

343, 345 (8th Cir. 1999).

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Further, the government explained at the plea hearing that it could prove Davis

was responsible for more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. Davis now contends

that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known the government would try to

attribute more than forty pounds of methamphetamine to him, but it is evident that the

government explained this very fact to Davis at his plea hearing. So even if defense

counsel's performance was somehow deficient by giving Davis a faulty sentencing

prediction, Davis cannot establish that but for this error, he would not have pleaded

guilty, but instead proceeded to trial. He was given all of the relevant information,

and chose to plead guilty anyway. Davis therefore cannot establish Hill prejudice.

474 U.S. at 59.

Davis's second ineffective assistance allegation concerns the drug calculation

issue on direct appeal. A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to the

effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Bear Stops v. United States, 339

F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 2003). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, Davis must demonstrate deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In this case, it is clear that counsel did

preserve the drug-quantity issue, and raised it on appeal, albeit in an Anders brief.

Davis's argument in this regard is novel; he asserts that although counsel submitted

an Anders brief, counsel effectively conceded that the drug-quantity issue was not

frivolous because he fully briefed the issue. Accordingly, counsel should not have

asked to withdraw under Anders because there was a nonfrivolous appellate issue.

Adding to the novelty of the argument, Davis contends that the Davis I panel also did

not treat the issue as frivolous because the court ruled against Davis on the merits of

the issue, rather than merely dismissing the issue as frivolous. Because the issue was

not frivolous, and was not treated as frivolous by either counsel or the court, Davis

argues that the court violated his due process rights by ultimately allowing counsel to

withdraw.

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On the other hand, there are numerous cases where counsel raised an issue in

an Anders brief, we rejected the issue on the merits, and granted the motion to

withdraw. E.g., United States v. Perales, 487 F.3d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 2007); United

States v. Alatorre, 207 F.3d 1078, 1079 (8th Cir. 2000). This procedure may be a

technical violation of Anders, but nothing more. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. If a court

gratuitously reviews an arguably frivolous issue on the merits instead of simply

dismissing the case, a defendant is getting more process than he is due, rather than

less. And to the extent that this ineffective assistance of counsel issue has morphed

into the question of whether Davis's due process rights were denied because the Davis

I panel incorrectly applied Anders, we agree with the government that this issue was

not contained within the certificate of appealability and is not properly before us.

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Even if we accept4

 the premise upon which Davis proceeds, he cannot prevail

due to the rigors of Strickland's prejudice prong. There is no probability that the

outcome of Davis's direct appeal would have been any different had counsel not asked

to withdraw pursuant to Anders. Generally, when counsel submits an Anders brief,

the court independently reviews the record for any nonfrivolous issue. Anders, 386

U.S. at 744 (noting that it is the duty of the court, not counsel, to review the record

and ultimately decide whether the case is wholly frivolous). If the court finds a

nonfrivolous issue, it will direct counsel to more fully brief the issue. Cf. United

States v. Phillips, 390 F.3d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that we denied the

Anders motion to withdraw and directed counsel to more fully brief two issues). By

his own argument, Davis concedes that his appellate counsel fully briefed the drugquantity issue. His only complaint concerns the motion to withdraw. The court's

usual remedy when confronted with a nonfrivolous issue in an Anders brief–order

counsel to more fully brief the issue–was already accomplished in this case.

Accordingly, Davis cannot establish prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court. 

______________________________

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