Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00274/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00274-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sandra Judith Castaneda Cisneros
Defendant
Edel Felix Castro
Defendant
Fermin Lozano Gonzalez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Carlos Garcia Weldon
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

MELANIE L. ALSWORTH

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

CARLOS GARCIA WELDON, 

SANDRA JUDITH CASTANEDA 

CISNEROS, EDEL FELIX CASTRO, AND

FERMIN LOZANO GONZALEZ,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:19-CR-00274 NONE SKO

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: June 15, 2020

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto

This case is set for status conference on June 15, 2020. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until further 

notice.” Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this Court’s declaration of judicial emergency under 18 

U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s 

judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after 

May 2, 2021.

1

 This and previous General Orders, as well as the declarations of judicial emergency,

were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

 

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

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concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofCase 1:19-cr-00274-JLT-SKO Document 49 Filed 06/11/20 Page 2 of 5
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justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 2 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through defendants’ counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 15, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until 

November 16, 2020, and to exclude time between June 15, 2020, and November 16, 2020, under 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) On February 4, 2020, the government produced (either directly to defense counsel 

and/or made available for inspection and copying) discovery associated with this case which 

includes investigative reports, financial records, and other documents totaling more than 20,000 

pages. On or about May 11, 2020, the government received additional documents from the 

agency that are being reviewed for discoverable material. The government anticipates 

completing a review of these documents and producing any supplemental discovery to defense 

by July 15, 2020. 

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to complete a review of the 

discovery in this matter (including any supplemental discovery sent by the government), to 

conduct their investigations and research related to the charges, to consult with their respective 

clients, to discuss potential resolutions with their respective clients, and to otherwise prepare for 

trial.

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 15, 2020 to November 16, 

2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants’ request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: June 9, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ MELANIE L. ALSWORTH

MELANIE L. ALSWORTH

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: June 9, 2020 /s/ Preciliano Martinez

PRECILIANO MARTINEZ

Counsel for Defendant

CARLOS GARCIA WELDON

Dated: June 9, 2020 /s/ Mark Coleman

MARK COLEMAN

Counsel for Defendant

SANDRA JUDITH CASTANEDA CISNEROS

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Dated: June 9, 2020 /s/ Arturo Hernandez

ARTURO HERNANDEZ

Counsel for Defendant

EDEL FELIX CASTRO

Dated: June 11, 2020 /s/ Curtis Rodriguez

CURTIS RODRIGUEZ

Counsel for Defendant

FERMIN LOZANO GONZALEZ

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 11, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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