Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07061/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymone K. Bain
Appellant
Davis, Bain & Associates, Inc.
Appellant
Estate Of Michael Joseph Jackson
Appellee
MJJ Productions, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 6, 2013 Decided May 13, 2014

No. 12-7061

RAYMONE K. BAIN AND DAVIS, BAIN & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

APPELLANTS

v.

MJJ PRODUCTIONS, INC. AND ESTATE OF MICHAEL JOSEPH

JACKSON,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-00826)

Joseph M. Creed argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs were Steven M. Pavsner and Levi S. Zaslow.

Henry W. Asbill argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the briefs were Jennifer Bradley Lichter, Howard L.

Weitzman, and Jeremiah T. Reynolds. Ryan J. Watson entered

an appearance.

Before: BROWN and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 1 of 13
2

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: In December 2003, the late

entertainer Michael Jackson retained Davis, Bain & Associates,

Inc., to act as his public relations firm. One of the firm’s

founders, Raymone Bain, began serving as a spokesperson and

publicist for Jackson, later becoming his general manager. In

May 2009, Ms. Bain and her firm (collectively, Bain) sued

Jackson and his production company, MJJ Productions, Inc.,

claiming to be owed substantial sums for various services

rendered. Those services included arranging the release of a

25th anniversary edition of Jackson’s album, Thriller, generally

recognized to be the best-selling album in history. The

defendants (collectively, MJJ) moved to dismiss, relying

principally on a December 2007 release agreement signed by

Jackson and Bain. In the release agreement, Bain broadly

relinquished any claims against Jackson and his business

entities. The district court granted summary judgment in favor

of MJJ, holding that the release agreement precluded Bain’s

claims.

Five months later, Bain moved for relief from judgment

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2). Rule 60(b)(2)

allows for relief based on “newly discovered evidence that, with

reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to

move for a new trial.” The “newly discovered evidence” cited

byBain was an April 2008 letter from Jackson to Bain, in which

Jackson stated that he had no awareness of, and had never

signed, the release agreement on which the district court had

grounded its grant of summary judgment. The district court

denied the Rule 60(b)(2) motion. Because we find no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s ruling that Bain failed to

exercise reasonable diligence in seeking out the April 2008

letter, we affirm.

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 2 of 13
3

I.

According to the complaint, in May 2006, Bain and Jackson

entered into a Personal Services Agreement. The agreement

authorized Bain to incorporate a new company (the Michael

Jackson Company) on Jackson’s behalf, and appointed her the

new company’s president and chief operating officer. As

compensation, she would receive a “10% Finder’s fee of any

Agreement(s) entered into by Michael Jackson, or the Michael

Jackson Company, generated by, or due to the direct efforts of

Bain and/or Bain’s contacts.” J.A. 31. Bain alleged that she

initiated a number of such projects, for which she claims to be

owed compensation amounting to at least $44 million. Bain

brought suit against MJJ in federal district court, invoking the

court’s diversity jurisdiction. 

MJJ moved to dismiss the complaint based on a “Payment

and Release Agreement” (the Release) signed by Bain in

December 2007, which MJJ claimed absolved it of liability

under the Personal Services Agreement. The Release provided

that Jackson would render a payment to Bain in the amount of

$488,820.05, as “full and final satisfaction of any [and] all

monies, known or unknown, to be owed to you by the Jackson

Parties with respect to any and all agreements whether verbal or

written that you may have entered into with the Jackson Parties

from the beginning of time until December 27, 2007.” J.A. 104. 

One week after MJJ filed its motion to dismiss, Jackson

unexpectedly died.

In opposing dismissal, Bain argued that the Release was

defective due to fraud in the inducement, misrepresentation, and

mistake. Bain also contended that the Release was facially

ambiguous, permitting consideration of parol evidence to

interpret the contract. Bain asserted that she intended to

discharge claims for past debts and liabilities, not claims

concerning future work or deals yet to be finalized. In addition,

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 3 of 13
4

Bain expressed doubt about the authenticity of Jackson’s

signature on the Release. Finally, she requested the opportunity

to conduct discovery to support her challenges. 

Because the defendants’ motion to dismissrelied on matters

outside the pleadings—namely, the Release—the district court

converted the motion into one for summary judgment. The

court granted both sides additional time to supplement the

record with “all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” 

J.A. 274-75. Bain’s attorney filed an affidavit under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), stating that, if permitted by the

court, Bain would conduct discovery concerning Jackson’s

intent in the Release and the authenticity of his signature.

On May 7, 2010, the district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the

unambiguous language of the Release barred Bain’s claims. See

Bain v. Jackson, 783 F. Supp. 2d 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2010). The

court rejected Bain’s contentions that the Release was voidable

due to fraud in the inducement or mistake. Id. at 17-18. The

court also denied Bain’s requests for discovery. Id. at 18 n.4. 

Bain did not appeal the district court’s grant of summary

judgment against her.

On October 4, 2010, Bain moved for relief from judgment

based on “newly discovered evidence,” pursuant to Rule

60(b)(2). The “newly discovered” evidence cited in support of

the motion was an April 24, 2008, letter faxed from Jackson to

Bain. The letter stated:

I have never terminated your services nor did I null and

void any of your Agreements. I know nothing about a

release form. I neither authorized or signed the same. 

Therefore, I am authorizing you to continue to

communicate with Mr. Yakoob regarding the Sultan’s

property in Las Vegas, and to continue your role as my

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 4 of 13
5

General Manager and President/COO of The Michael

Jackson Company. 

 J.A. 414.

In an accompanying affidavit, Bain explained that she had

received the letter “in connection with the work Mr. Jackson

expected me to continue to perform on his behalf.” Bain Aff. ¶

4. Bain now says that the letter referenced “the Sultan’s

property” because, at the time, Jackson had been searching for

a permanent residence and had expressed interest in a property

owned by the Sultan of Brunei. When Jackson inquired about

the property in early 2008, Bain raised the issue of the Release. 

Jackson responded with the April 2008 letter. 

According to Bain’s affidavit, an unnamed consultant who

worked for the Michael Jackson Companyhad taken a collection

of files from Bain’s office, and those files included the April 24,

2008, letter. The consultant had been handling real estate

matters for Jackson. When the consultant completed his

responsibilities in 2008, he “boxed up the information regarding

properties and took that information home with him, including

the file on the Sultan of Brunei’s property,” which contained the

April letter. Bain Aff. ¶ 4. The consultant returned the box of

files to Bain in “late June, or early July, 2010,” after Jackson’s

death, and after the district court’s entry of summary judgment. 

Id.

Bain stated that she “did not know the April 24, 2008, letter

was in this box, or that it was in the Sultan of Brunei’s file,” and

she did not examine the contents of the box until late August

2010. Id. ¶ 5. When she opened the Sultan’s file, she

discovered the letter, which “had been misfiled . . . in a file

labeled, ‘The Sultan of Brunei Finance.’” Id. She furtherstated:

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 5 of 13
6

Not in my wildest imagination did I suspect that a box

containing documents relating to real properties would

contain any material relating to my relationship or

employment with Mr. Jackson before this Court. I

knew I had correspondence from Mr. Jackson, but I

could not find it. I made a diligent search of all the

records and files in my office. I did not know, nor was

I able to look in the Sultan of Brunei’s file, which was

in the possession of the consultant. I looked for this

file for months, spending many, many hours looking

into all of the files which were in my office, but it was

no where [sic] to be found. 

Id.

On June 7, 2012, the district court denied Bain’s Rule

60(b)(2) motion. Bain v. Jackson, No. 09-826, Mem. Op. &

Order (D.D.C. June 7, 2012). The court based its denial on two

independent grounds. First, the court held that, because Bain

knew about Jackson’s April 2008 letter at the time of trial, the

letter could not be considered “newly discovered” evidence

within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(2). Id. at 4. Second, the court

held that Bain failed to exercise “due diligence” in attempting to

discover the letter. Id. at 4-5. The court explained that Bain

made no reference to the letter in any filings, and thus “cannot

be said to have conducted due diligence in attempting to procure

it.” Id. at 5. 

II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) sets forth various

grounds upon which a party may obtain relief from a judgment. 

Rule 60(b)(2) allows for relief based on “newly discovered

evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(2). A district court considering a motion for relief from

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 6 of 13
7

judgment under Rule 60(b) must “strike a ‘delicate balance

between the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant

command of a court’s conscience that justice be done in light of

all the facts.’” Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841

F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (alteration in original)

(quoting Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d

572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (some internal quotation marks

omitted). The trial judge, “who is in the best position to discern

and assess all the facts, is vested with a large measure of

discretion in deciding whether to grant a Rule 60(b) motion.”

Id. We thus review the denial of a Rule 60(b)(2) motion for

abuse of discretion, but we consider underlying legal issues de

novo. Marino v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 685 F.3d 1076,

1080 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Here, we disagree with the district

court’s first ground for denying Bain’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion,

but we affirm on the basis of the district court’s second ground.

A.

The district court first held that Bain’s knowledge of

Jackson’s April 2008 letter at the time of trial precluded the

grant of Rule 60(b)(2) relief. In the court’s view, “‘evidence

cannot be newly discovered’” for purposes of Rule 60(b)(2) “‘if

it was known to the party at the time of trial.’” Mem. Op. at 4

(quoting Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 555 F. Supp. 2d 61,

68 (D.D.C. 2008)). We disagree.

It is true that Bain “knew” of the letter at the time of trial in

the sense that she then knew of its existence. In the view of MJJ

and the district court, awareness of evidence during trial

necessarily compels denying relief under Rule 60(b)(2),

regardless of the evidence’s availability at that time. Evidence

known to a party at trial, MJJ argues, cannot qualify as “newly

discovered” in a post-judgment motion. MJJ emphasizes one

definition of “discover”: “to obtain for the first time sight or

knowledge of.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 7 of 13
8

647 (3d ed. 1986). “Discover,” however, can also mean “to

detect the presence of,” i.e., to “find,” id.; or “to make known or

visible,” i.e., to “expose,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

Dictionary 357 (11th ed. 2011); see also Webster’s New

International Dictionary 647 (2d ed. 1947) (similar definitions). 

Under those definitions, evidence that was lost, hidden, or

unavailable during trial could qualify as “newly discovered

evidence” when later found, even if the evidence was known to

the movant at the time of trial.

We think that understanding better squares with the purpose

and operation of Rule 60(b)(2) than one in which mere

awareness of evidence would forever preclude its consideration

as “newly discovered.” If awareness of evidence alone were

automatically to foreclose its treatment as “newly discovered,”

evidence known to a party could never form the basis of Rule

60(b)(2) relief even if it had been unavailable during trial or

summary judgment proceedings due to circumstances entirely

beyond the party’s control. For instance, if critical documentary

evidence were known to have existed at one time but had been

presumed by all to have been destroyed in a natural disaster, a

party would have no ability to seek relief from judgment even if

the pivotal document were later discovered unexpectedlyto have

been moved before the disaster and to have survived in an

unanticipated place. See Serio v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 266 F.2d

418 (5th Cir. 1959). We perceive no basis for concluding that

Rule 60(b)(2) categorically precludes the grant of relief in such

situations, with no consideration given to the particular

circumstances. Rather, Rule 60(b), while respecting “the

sanctity of final judgments,” allows that “justice be done in light

of all the facts.” Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1138 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

No decision of this Court suggests that mere awareness of

evidence during trial, standing alone, categorically precludes

later treating the evidence as “newly discovered” under Rule

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 8 of 13
9

60(b)(2). Nor, to our knowledge, has any other court of appeals

so held. MJJ cites the observation of the First Circuit in one

decision that, “[i]n order for evidence to be newly discovered,

the party seeking a new trial must be unaware of the existence

of the evidence before or during the trial.” Parrilla-Lopez v.

United States, 841 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1988). In that case,

however, the court did not rely on the movant’s mere awareness

of the evidence. The court instead explained that the movant

knew of the evidence but chose not to “present[] [it] to the

district court because of [his] conscious decision on trial

strategy.” Id. Evidence intentionally withheld, the court

reasoned, “is not grounds for a new trial.” Id. Whereas the First

Circuit based its decision on a movant’s tactical decision to

withhold evidence accessible to him, here the district court held

that a movant’s awareness of evidence automatically precludes

relief under Rule 60(b)(2), regardless of the evidence’s

availability. We find that to be an unduly constricted

understanding of “newly discovered evidence” for purposes of

Rule 60(b)(2).

B. 

While awareness of evidence, standing alone, does not

categorically preclude considering the evidence to be “newly

discovered” under Rule 60(b)(2), a party’s unannounced

awareness of evidence can affect the assessment of whether it

exercised the “reasonable diligence” contemplated by the Rule. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). The district court held that Bain “failed

to exercise due diligence in seeking out the 2008 letter” because

Bain knew of the letter’s existence but made no mention of the

letter in any submission to the court. Mem. Op. at 4-5. The

district court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.

According to Bain’s recital of the relevant events, the “newly

discovered” evidence at issue—the April 2008 letter—had been

faxed by Jackson to Bain in April of that year. The copy of the

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 9 of 13
10

letter submitted by Bain thus bears facsimile time-stamps. The

necessary implication is that at least one copy other than the one

in Bain’s possession had been in existence: the original letter. 

As Bain herself points out, that “original was presumably within

the possession, custody or control of Mr. Jackson’s Estate.” And

as Bain further observes, “[c]ounsel for [the Jackson Parties]

should have had . . . a copy of this document in their possession

since April, 2008.” Bain Aff. ¶ 3. In such circumstances, even

if the faxed copywas believed lost, missing, or destroyed, a party

exercising reasonable diligence should have sought to obtain the

original from the defendants, either by requesting the court’s

assistance or directly contacting the defendants. See Yachts Am.,

Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 656, 662 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

(affirming denial of Rule 60(b)(2) motion based in part on

movant’s failure to seek an alternate copy of a document from

the government, the adverse party). 

Bain emphasizes her search of her own files to locate the

letter. But while Bain’s examination of her own files may bear

on the assessment of reasonable diligence, it does not end the

inquiry. Bain’s efforts to find her own copy of the letter did not

relieve her of all responsibility to undertake reasonable efforts to

obtain the original letter (or a separate copy) from Jackson, his

estate, or his counsel. And by failing to apprise the district court

of the letter, Bain denied the court any opportunity to assist with

locating it. See Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d

1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding lack of due diligence

because movant knew certain documentation was missing but

“made no attempt to explicitly include it in the discovery

process”); Lans v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6

(D.D.C. 2000) (denying Rule 60(b)(2) relief because movant

“should have notified the Court and the defendants as to [the

evidence’s] potential existence and requested time to locate it”).

Bain contends that she adequately sought the district court’s

assistance by requesting the court to permit discovery about the

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 10 of 13
11

circumstances surrounding the Release, including the

authenticity of Jackson’s signature on the Release. But even if

she framed the scope of her intended discovery with sufficient

breadth to encompass Jackson’s April 2008 letter, there is a

material distinction between generally seeking discovery, on one

hand, and specifically mentioning the letter, on the other. Under

Rule 56(d), “a court may deny a motion for summary judgment

or order a continuance to permit discovery if the party opposing

the motion adequately explains why, at that timepoint, it cannot

present by affidavit facts needed to defeat the motion.” Strang

v. U.S. Arms Control &Disarmament Agency, 864 F.2d 859, 861

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (second emphasis added). In making that

determination, courts consider whether the movant offers

“specific reasons demonstrating the necessity and utility of

discovery to enable her to fend off summary judgment.” Id. In

our view, a reasonably diligent party seeking to oppose summary

judgment and convince a court to permit additional discovery

would ordinarily mention specific evidence it seeks that would

support its position. That is especially the case concerning

evidence a party considers to be as pivotal as Bain contends is

the case with Jackson’s April 2008 letter. Had she alerted the

court to the existence of the letter, she would have materially

strengthened her case in opposition to the grant of summary

judgment and in favor of an opportunity to conduct discovery. 

Bain, however, ultimately offers no justification for her

failure to mention the 2008 letter to the district court, to seek the

court’s assistance in locating a copy, or to ask the defendants for

any copy in their possession. Nor does she suggest that any such

efforts to locate the letter could not have borne fruit. See In re

Hope 7 Monroe St. Ltd. P’ship, 743 F.3d 867, 873-74 (D.C. Cir.

2014). In those circumstances, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that Bain failed to exercise reasonable

diligence.

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 11 of 13
12

The circumstances of this case are far afield from those in

Serio v. Badger Mutual Insurance Company, on which Bain

heavily relies. The Rule 60(b) motion in Serio concerned

inventory records that had been inadvertently left outside a

factory’s fire-proof safe on the night the factory was destroyed

by a fire. 266 F.2d at 419. Some months later, the factory owner

discovered that an employee had moved the inventory records

into a storage room outside of the factory a few days before the

fire, where they had survived unscathed. Id. at 420. The Fifth

Circuit rejected the argument that the owner’s failure to search

for the records amounted to a lack of due diligence. Id. at 420-

21. In Serio, the inventory records were presumed to be

destroyed, and there was no reason to suppose that there existed

any additional copies. Here, by contrast, Bain’s own copy of the

letter was presumed to be missing rather than destroyed, and

there was every reason to suppose that there existed at least one

additional copy. The fact that Bain attempted to search her own

files—whereas the owner in Serio evidently undertook no

search—thus is of little assistance to her. The district court

committed no abuse of discretion by looking beyond Bain’s

efforts in searching her own files and considering whether she

mentioned the letter to the court or sought its assistance in

locating the evidence.

* * * * *

We affirm the district court’s judgment denying relief under

Rule 60(b)(2). Bain now, for the first time, also attempts to

invoke alternative Rule 60(b) grounds for relief, alleging

misconduct by the defense pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) and error on

the part of her prior counsel pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). Because

those arguments were not presented to the district court in the

first instance, we decline to entertain them. See Potter v. District

of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“‘It is well

settled that issues and legal theories not asserted at the District

Court level ordinarily will not be heard on appeal.’”) (quoting

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 12 of 13
13

District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C.

Cir. 1984)). 

 So ordered.

USCA Case #12-7061 Document #1492685 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 13 of 13