Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05223/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05223-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
Appellant
United States Department of Justice
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 16, 2014 Decided April 1, 2014 

No. 12-5223 

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:11-cv-00592) 

David L. Sobel argued the cause for the appellant. 

Melanie T. Sloan and Anne L. Weismann were on brief. 

Steve Frank, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued 

the cause for the appellee. Stuart F. Delery, Assistant 

Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and 

Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, were on brief. 

Before: HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges. 

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In 2004, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) opened a 

wide-ranging public corruption investigation into the activities 

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2 

of former lobbyist Jack Abramoff. The investigation yielded 

21 guilty pleas or convictions by jury. Two of those 

convicted, Tony Rudy and Michael Scanlon, once served as 

senior aides to Tom DeLay—the former Majority Leader of the 

United States House of Representatives. During the 

multi-year investigation, the FBI never acknowledged whether 

DeLay himself was a subject of inquiry. In August 2010, 

however, DeLay announced that the United States Department 

of Justice (DOJ) had informed him it had decided not to bring 

criminal charges against him related to the Abramoff scandal. 

Shortly after DeLay’s announcement, Citizens for 

Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) filed a 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking various 

types of documents related to the FBI’s investigation of 

DeLay. After the FBI declined to produce the documents, 

CREW filed suit against the DOJ (the agency encompassing 

the FBI). The district court granted summary judgment to the 

DOJ, concluding that the requested documents were 

categorically exempt from disclosure under Exemptions 7(A) 

and 7(C) and that, in the alternative, portions of the requested 

documents were also exempt under Exemptions 3, 7(D) and 

7(E). Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 870 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2012). We now reverse 

and remand. The DOJ has not met its burden of justifying 

categorical withholding under Exemption 7(A) or 7(C) and has 

not adequately explained the basis for withholding portions of 

the requested documents under Exemptions 3, 7(D) and 7(E). 

I 

A. Legal Framework 

FOIA provides that every government agency, “upon any 

request for records which (i) reasonably describes such records 

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and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules . . . , shall 

make the records promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(3)(A). Certain information is exempt from 

disclosure. Of primary relevance here, “records or 

information compiled for law enforcement purposes” are 

exempt, 

but only to the extent that the production of such law 

enforcement records or information (A) could 

reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement 

proceedings, . . . [or] (C) could reasonably be 

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 

personal privacy . . . . 

Id. § 552(b)(7). 

 FOIA “was enacted to facilitate public access to 

Government documents” and “was designed to ‘pierce the veil 

of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light 

of public scrutiny.’” Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 

(1991) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 

(1976)). Because of FOIA’s “goal of broad disclosure,” the 

Supreme Court has “insisted that the exemptions be ‘given a 

narrow compass.’” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 

1265 (2011) (quoting Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 

U.S. 136, 151 (1989)); accord FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 

630 (1982) (“FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly 

construed.”). FOIA’s “limited exemptions do not obscure the 

basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant 

objective of the Act.” Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water 

Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (quoting Rose, 

425 U.S. at 361). 

 The agency bears the burden of establishing that a claimed 

exemption applies. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for 

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Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989); Elec. Frontier 

Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, 739 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see 5 

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The agency may carry that burden by 

submitting affidavits that “describe the justifications for 

nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that 

the information withheld logically falls within the claimed 

exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary 

evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” 

Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 

Agency affidavits sometimes take the form of a “Vaughn 

index,” see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 

but there is “no fixed rule” establishing what such an affidavit 

must look like, ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 432 (D.C. Cir. 

2013). “[I]t is the function, not the form, of the index that is 

important.” Keys v. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 349 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987); see generally Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 

141, 145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (explaining functions of Vaughn 

index). 

 At times, the FOIA litigation process threatens to reveal 

“the very information the agency hopes to protect” and 

therefore it may be necessary for the agency affidavit to 

contain only “brief or categorical descriptions” of the withheld 

information. ACLU, 710 F.3d at 432; see also Judicial Watch, 

449 F.3d at 146. In such circumstances, “the government 

need not justify its withholdings document-by-document; it 

may instead do so category-of-document by 

category-of-document, so long as its definitions of relevant 

categories are sufficiently distinct to allow a court to determine 

whether the specific claimed exemptions are properly applied.” 

Gallant v. NLRB, 26 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quotation 

marks and ellipsis omitted); accord Crooker v. Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 789 F.2d 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 

1986). Categorical treatment, however, may be used “[o]nly 

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when the range of circumstances included in the category 

‘characteristically support[s] an inference’ that the statutory 

requirements for exemption are satisfied.” Nation Magazine 

v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

(quoting Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 177 

(1993)); accord Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 776 

(“[C]ategorical decisions may be appropriate and individual 

circumstances disregarded when a case fits into a genus in 

which the balance characteristically tips in one direction.”); 

Roth v. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1183–84 (D.C. Cir. 

2011). 

B. Factual and Procedural Background 

 On October 19, 2010, after DeLay had announced that he 

was not going to be criminally charged as a result of the 

Abramoff investigation, CREW wrote to the FBI requesting 

any witness statements, investigation reports, 

prosecution memoranda, and [FBI] 302 reports 

related to the FBI’s and DOJ’s investigation of 

[DeLay]. This includes, but is not limited to, the 

FBI’s and DOJ’s investigation of relationships 

between Mr. DeLay and Christine DeLay, Dani 

DeLay, Jack Abramoff, Edwin Buckham, Tony Rudy, 

Michael Scanlon, Susan Hirshmann, the Alexander 

Strategy Group, the National Center for Public Policy 

Research, eLottery, Inc., the U.S. Family Network, 

Americans for a Republican Majority PAC 

(“ARMPAC”), Texans for a Republican Majority 

PAC (“TRMPAC”), and/or the Commonwealth of the 

Northern Marianas Islands. 

Joint Appendix (JA) 51. Three days later, the FBI responded, 

stating that, because the requested records involved third 

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parties, they were generally exempt from disclosure and could 

not be released absent express authorization from each third 

party, proof of the third party’s death or a “clear demonstration 

that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the personal 

privacy interest and that significant public benefit would result 

from the disclosure of the requested records.” JA 107. The 

FBI’s response also included the disclaimer—in FOIA terms, a 

“Glomar response,” see Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 

F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Phillippi v. CIA, 655 F.2d 1325 

(D.C. Cir. 1981)—that the response “should not be considered 

an indication of whether or not records responsive to your 

request exist in FBI files.” JA 107. After exhausting its 

administrative remedies, CREW filed suit against the DOJ in 

district court. 

 The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In 

support of its motion, the DOJ submitted a declaration from 

David Hardy, Section Chief of the Record/Information 

Dissemination Section, Record Management Division, of the 

FBI (“Hardy Declaration” or “Declaration,” reprinted at JA 

18–49). The Hardy Declaration recited the FBI’s policy of 

issuing a Glomar response to requests for records involving 

third parties. However, “[i]n light of the acknowledgment of 

a pending lobbying investigation related to Jack Abramoff,” it 

“pierced the Glomar veil and admitted the existence of records 

potentially responsive to plaintiff’s request.” Hardy Decl. 31–

32. It explained the methodology by which the FBI searched 

for responsive documents and identified two categories of 

responsive documents located. 

The first category includes FD-302s, forms used by FBI 

agents “to record information which they obtain through 

witness interviews, . . . grand jury subpoenas, proffer 

agreements and immunity statements, and from other federal 

agencies.” Id. at 19. More specifically, 

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FD-302s contain, in the aggregate, detailed 

descriptions of names, addresses, telephone numbers 

of witnesses and other third parties, information, 

leads, and other valuable investigative information 

supplied by various sources and third-parties 

interviewed jointly by the FBI and Other Government 

Agencies (“OGAs”) during the course of their 

investigation. In addition, responsive FD-302s 

contain information regarding forensic analysis, 

information regarding grand jury proffer and 

immunity statements, and information exchanged 

between the FBI and OGAs. 

Id. at 20. The FBI’s search for responsive documents turned 

up an unspecified number of FD-302s dating from June 2004 to 

October 2009. The second category of responsive documents, 

investigative materials, “includes derivative communications 

and reports analyzing the evidence obtained.” Id. at 21. The 

Hardy Declaration explained that “[a] derivative 

communication . . . describes (verbatim or in summary) the 

contents of the original evidentiary record, how it was 

obtained, and how it relates to the investigation.” Id. at 21–

22. The Declaration did not specify how many responsive 

documents in this category were identified.1

 The Hardy Declaration asserted that all responsive 

documents were categorically exempt under Exemption 7(A), 

see id. at 16–19, 22, and Exemptions 6 and 7(C), see id. at 24–

30. It also invoked Exemptions 2, 3, 7(D) and 7(E) to 

 1

 CREW’s request also sought prosecution memoranda but the 

Hardy Declaration stated that no such memoranda were found in the 

FBI’s case file. The FBI’s search also turned up responsive public 

source documents like newspaper clippings but CREW has not 

sought disclosure of this material. 

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withhold portions of the responsive material. Id. at 22–24, 

30–31. The Declaration asserted that “due in particular to the 

inextricably intertwined and interrelated nature of the 

documents at issue here, no information is segregable and 

releasable at this time.” Id. at 17; accord id. at 22. 

 The district court agreed with the DOJ in every respect. 

With regard to Exemptions 6 and 7(C), the district court found 

that, despite his public acknowledgment of the investigation, 

DeLay retained a substantial privacy interest in preventing 

disclosure of the contents of the investigative files. Citizens 

for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 870 F. Supp. 2d at 79–80. 

The district court found little countervailing public interest. 

Although it “acknowledge[d] that there may be some public 

interest in the investigative materials and reports,” it found that 

“this minimal public interest does not outweigh the substantial 

privacy interests of Mr. DeLay and other third parties in the 

contents of the documents.” Id. at 81. It therefore held that 

“the ‘balance . . . tips in’ favor of exemption” and the DOJ 

“properly categorically withheld the records pursuant to 

Exemptions 6 and 7(C).” Id. at 81–82 (quoting Nation 

Magazine, 71 F.3d at 893) (omission in district court order). 

As for Exemption 7(A), the district court found that “[n]ot 

only is the investigation still ongoing . . . , but ‘[t]here are 

several outstanding convictions and sentencing proceedings 

. . . which have not yet been completed.’” Id. at 82 (quoting 

Hardy Decl. 17). It found that disclosure of the requested 

records would interfere with those proceedings by identifying 

sources, potential witnesses and third parties under 

investigation, uncovering the government’s trial strategy and 

notifying individuals who remained under investigation. Id.

at 82. Accordingly, it held that categorical withholding was 

also appropriate under Exemption 7(A). Id. at 82–83. 

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Finally, the district court accepted the DOJ’s alternative 

grounds for withholding portions of the requested records 

under Exemptions 2, 3, 7(D) and 7(E). See id. at 83 

(Exemption 2, internal FBI telephone and fax numbers), 83–84 

(Exemption 3, certain grand jury materials), 84–85 (Exemption 

7(D), identities of confidential informants and information that 

could reveal their identities), 85 (Exemption 7(E), information 

that would reveal law enforcement procedures and techniques). 

CREW timely appealed. 

II 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. 

Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mex., 740 F.3d 

195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2014). We first address the DOJ’s 

categorical withholding claims under Exemptions 7(C) and 

7(A), then briefly address the DOJ’s claims under Exemptions 

3, 7(D) and 7(E). 

A. Exemption 7(C) 

As noted, FOIA exempts from disclosure “records or 

information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only 

to the extent that the production of such law enforcement 

records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to 

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). CREW does not dispute that the 

requested records were “compiled for law enforcement 

purposes.” Our task, then, is “to balance the [] privacy 

interest against the public interest in disclosure.” Nat’l 

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Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 

(2004); accord Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 776.2

Privacy Interest: DeLay has two potential privacy 

interests at stake. The first is his interest in avoiding the 

stigma of having his name associated with a criminal 

investigation. “[I]ndividuals have an obvious privacy interest 

cognizable under Exemption 7(C) in keeping secret the fact 

that they were subjects of a law enforcement investigation.” 

Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 894; see also People for the 

Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 

No. 12-5183, 2014 WL 982875, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 14, 

2014); Schrecker v. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 666 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir. 

1990). If a FOIA request is made for FBI investigative 

records regarding a particular individual, the FBI’s mere 

acknowledgment that it possesses responsive records 

associates the individual named in the request with suspected 

criminal activity and therefore a Glomar response may be 

appropriate. See Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 893 (collecting 

cases); see also PETA, 2014 WL 982875, at *3. The FBI 

evidently believed this was such a case when it initially issued 

a Glomar response to CREW’s request. A Glomar response, 

however, is “permitted only when confirming or denying the 

existence of records would itself ‘cause harm cognizable under 

an FOIA exception.’” Roth, 642 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Wolf v. 

CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (additional quotation 

marks omitted). In August 2010, DeLay made public 

 2 Similarly, Exemption 6 applies to “personnel and medical 

files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(6). We focus here on Exemption 7(C) because it provides 

broader privacy protection than Exemption 6 and thus “establishes a 

lower bar for withholding material.” ACLU, 655 F.3d at 6; see 

Favish, 541 U.S. at 165–66; Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756. 

USCA Case #12-5223 Document #1486393 Filed: 04/01/2014 Page 10 of 31
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statements confirming the fact that he had been, but was no 

longer, under investigation. He explained the extent of his 

cooperation with the investigation and announced the DOJ had 

decided not to charge him. DeLay’s obvious privacy interest 

in keeping secret the fact that he was the subject of an FBI 

investigation was diminished by his well-publicized 

announcement of that very fact. See Kimberlin v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 139 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (prosecutor’s 

public acknowledgment that he was subject of disciplinary 

proceedings “undoubtedly does diminish his interest in 

privacy: the public already knows who he is, what he was 

accused of, and that he received a relatively mild sanction”); 

Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 896 (politician waived right to 

have his name redacted from responsive documents regarding 

events he publicly discussed); cf. ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 

428–32 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Glomar response inappropriate 

where CIA sought to prevent disclosure of whether it had 

intelligence interest in drone strikes but its official public 

statements had made clear its interest). Because DeLay’s 

public statements confirmed he had been under investigation, 

the FBI’s acknowledgment that it had responsive records 

would not itself cause harm by confirming that fact, rendering 

a Glomar response inappropriate. The FBI apparently came 

to that conclusion itself when it “pierced the Glomar veil and 

admitted the existence of records potentially responsive to 

plaintiff’s request.” Hardy Decl. 31–32. 

Although DeLay’s action lessened his interest in keeping 

secret the fact that he was under investigation, he retained a 

second, distinct privacy interest in the contents of the 

investigative files. We made that clear in Kimberlin, noting 

that, although a prosecutor who had publicly acknowledged he 

was the subject of a disciplinary investigation retained little 

privacy interest in keeping the fact of the investigation secret, 

he “did not, merely by acknowledging the investigation and 

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making a vague reference to its conclusion, waive all his 

interest in keeping the contents of the [disciplinary] file 

confidential.” 139 F.3d at 949; cf. Ray, 502 U.S. at 175–76 

(although disclosure of interview summaries containing highly 

personal information constitutes only de minimis invasion of 

privacy if identities of interviewees are unknown, “the 

invasion of privacy becomes significant when the personal 

information is linked to particular interviewees”). CREW 

does not dispute that DeLay retains some privacy interest in the 

particulars of the investigation but instead contends that such 

interest is not sufficient to support categorical withholding. 

See Reply Br. of Appellant 11–12, No. 12-5223 (D.C. Cir. June 

17, 2013). And although DeLay, as a public official at the 

time, “may have a somewhat diminished privacy interest,” 

public officials “‘do not surrender all rights to personal privacy 

when they accept a public appointment.’” Quinon v. FBI, 86 

F.3d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Bast v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also 

Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 949; Fund for Const. Gov’t v. Nat’l 

Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 

DeLay’s privacy interest in the contents of the investigative 

files is not insubstantial.3

Public Interest: On the other side of the scale sits a 

weighty public interest in shining a light on the FBI’s 

investigation of major political corruption and the DOJ’s 

 3

 DeLay is not the only one with a privacy interest in the 

contents of the investigative files. Other third parties may be 

mentioned therein, including many of the other individuals listed in 

CREW’s FOIA request. They have a substantial privacy interest in 

preventing disclosure of their names in law enforcement files. See 

Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 894; Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767. The 

same is true of witnesses, informants and investigating agents who 

may also be mentioned. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166; Roth, 642 

F.3d at 1174; Schrecker, 349 F.3d at 666. 

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ultimate decision not to prosecute a prominent member of the 

Congress for any involvement he may have had. “[T]he only 

relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis [is] the 

extent to which disclosure of the information sought would 

‘she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its statutory 

duties’ or otherwise let citizens know ‘what their government 

is up to.’” Dep’t of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) 

(quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773); accord Bibles v. 

Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 519 U.S. 355, 355–56 (1997) (per 

curiam). That is, the relevant public interest is not to find out 

what DeLay himself was “up to” but rather how the FBI and 

the DOJ carried out their respective statutory duties to 

investigate and prosecute criminal conduct. See Quinon, 86 

F.3d at 1231. 

The DOJ contends that CREW has posited no public 

interest and therefore categorical withholding is appropriate 

because “[s]omething . . . outweighs nothing every time.” Br. 

of Appellee 10, No. 12-5223 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2013) 

(quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 

873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). But there is considerably more 

than nothing on the public interest side of the scale. 

“[M]atters of substantive law enforcement policy . . . are 

properly the subject of public concern,” Reporters Comm., 489 

U.S. at 766 n.18, and disclosure of the requested records would 

likely reveal a great deal about law enforcement policy, see 

Favish, 541 U.S. at 172 (in addition to significant public 

interest, requester must “show the information is likely to 

advance that interest”). Disclosure of the FD-302s and 

investigative materials could shed light on how the FBI and the 

DOJ handle the investigation and prosecution of crimes that 

undermine the very foundation of our government. As the 

DOJ itself explained, the requested records relate to “a 

wide-ranging public corruption investigation as part of [the 

FBI’s] ongoing efforts to root out systemic corruption within 

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the highest levels of government.” Hardy Decl. 12. 

Disclosure of the records would likely reveal much about the 

diligence of the FBI’s investigation and the DOJ’s exercise of 

its prosecutorial discretion: whether the government had the 

evidence but nevertheless pulled its punches. Indeed, we have 

repeatedly recognized a public interest in the manner in which 

the DOJ carries out substantive law enforcement policy 

(whether or not that interest outweighs any privacy interest at 

stake in a given case). See, e.g., ACLU, 655 F.3d at 12–13 

(public interest in DOJ’s use of and justification for 

warrantless cell phone tracking); Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 948–

49 (public interest in DOJ disciplinary proceedings); 

Dunkelberger v. Dep’t of Justice, 906 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 

1990) (public interest both in whether FBI agent participated in 

scheme to entrap public official and in manner in which agent 

was disciplined); Bast, 665 F.2d at 1255 (public interest in 

DOJ decision not to prosecute federal judge for alleged 

misconduct); see also Ray, 502 U.S. at 178 (public interest in 

“knowing whether the State Department has adequately 

monitored Haiti’s compliance with its promise not to prosecute 

returnees”); PETA, 2014 WL 982875, at *6, *8 (public interest 

in how National Institutes of Health decides whether to 

investigate complaints of animal abuse and misappropriation 

of research funds and how it conducts investigations); Multi Ag 

Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., 515 F.3d 1224, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 

2008) (public interest in determining whether Department of 

Agriculture “is catching cheaters and lawfully administering 

its subsidy and benefit programs”); Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 

92 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recognizing, in dicta, public interest “in 

knowing that a government investigation itself is 

comprehensive”). 

That the investigation implicated a public official as 

prominent as the former Majority Leader of the House of 

Representatives further raises the stakes. See Kimberlin, 139 

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F.3d at 949 (court may consider “the rank of the public official 

involved and the seriousness of the misconduct alleged” in 

conducting Exemption 7(C) balancing); see also Jefferson v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 284 F.3d 172, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Beck v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Stern, 

737 F.2d at 93–94. Although the DOJ’s actions in this case 

may reflect only one data point regarding the performance of 

its statutory duties, cf. Boyd v. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 

388 (D.C. Cir. 2007), it is a significant one: It may show 

whether prominent and influential public officials are 

subjected to the same investigative scrutiny and prosecutorial 

zeal as local aldermen and little-known lobbyists. We do not 

accept the DOJ’s contention that there is no public interest in 

examining the FBI’s investigation of, and the DOJ’s decision 

not to charge, the former House Majority Leader for his alleged 

involvement in one of the most significant political corruption 

scandals in recent memory. 

The DOJ’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. 

First, it contends that “the identity of individuals who appear in 

law enforcement files would virtually never be ‘very probative 

of an agency’s behavior or performance’ and would serve a 

significant public interest only if ‘there is compelling evidence 

that the agency . . . is engaged in illegal activity.’” Br. of 

Appellee 35 (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc., v. SEC, 926 F.2d 

1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). As we have explained, 

however, SafeCard “is one in a long line of FOIA cases 

holding that disclosure of the identities of private citizens 

mentioned in law enforcement files constitutes an unwarranted 

invasion of privacy.” Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 896 

(emphasis in original) (collecting such cases). Here, however, 

the DOJ does not seek to withhold only the identities of private 

citizens; it seeks to withhold every responsive document in 

toto. Although SafeCard may authorize the redaction of the 

names and identifying information of private citizens 

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mentioned in law enforcement files, it does not permit an 

agency “to exempt from disclosure all of the material in an 

investigatory record solely on the grounds that the record 

includes some information which identifies a private citizen or 

provides that person’s name and address.” Id.; see also 

Schrecker, 349 F.3d at 666 (explaining that SafeCard rule 

applies to names and identifying information); Mays v. DEA, 

234 F.3d 1324, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (investigative details is 

“a category presumably distinct from, and potentially far 

broader than” personal information). 

Next, the DOJ leans on the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Favish, which held that, if an Exemption 7(C) 

privacy interest exists, “the usual rule that the citizen need not 

offer a reason for requesting the information [is] inapplicable” 

and therefore “the exemption requires the person requesting 

the information to establish a sufficient reason for the 

disclosure.” 541 U.S. at 172. Accordingly, in cases where 

“the public interest being asserted is to show that responsible 

officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the 

performance of their duties, the requester must establish more 

than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure.” Id. at 174. 

Favish was such a case, see id. at 160–61, 173, but this is not. 

CREW alleges no impropriety on the part of the FBI or the 

DOJ;4

 it has nonetheless established a sufficient reason for 

 4

 At argument, counsel for the DOJ suggested that CREW 

seeks disclosure not to further the purposes of FOIA but rather to 

smear DeLay on its website. Recording of Argument 21:01 (D.C. 

Cir. Jan. 16, 2014). That accusation does not affect our inquiry: 

“[W]hether disclosure of a private document under Exemption 7(C) 

is warranted must turn on the nature of the requested document and 

its relationship to ‘the basic purpose of [FOIA] to open agency action 

to the light of public scrutiny,’ rather than on the particular purpose 

for which the document is being requested.” Reporters Comm., 489 

U.S. at 772 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 372) (additional quotation 

USCA Case #12-5223 Document #1486393 Filed: 04/01/2014 Page 16 of 31
17 

disclosure independent of any impropriety: “‘[M]atters of 

substantive law enforcement policy are properly the subject of 

public concern,’ whether or not the policy in question is 

lawful.” ACLU, 655 F.3d at 14 (quoting Reporters Comm., 

489 U.S. 766 n.18) (ellipsis omitted).5

 Whether government 

impropriety might be exposed in the process is beside the 

point. See id. (“Whether the government’s [] policy is legal or 

illegal, proper or improper, is irrelevant to this case.”). There 

is, then, a significant public interest to be weighed. 

Balancing: The DOJ contends—and the district court 

agreed—that the balance categorically tips in favor of 

non-disclosure. We think, however, that the district court 

drastically understated the public interest when it 

“acknowledge[d] that there may be some . . . minimal public 

interest” at stake. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in 

Wash., 870 F. Supp. 2d at 81. As the foregoing discussion 

demonstrates, there are substantial interests on both sides of the 

scale. Yet a categorical approach is appropriate only if “a 

 

marks omitted); accord Bibles, 519 U.S. at 355–56. “In other 

words, the public interest side of the balance is not a function of the 

identity of the requester . . . .” Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. 

FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Multi Ag Media 

LLC, 515 F.3d at 1231 n.2 (“Although [the requester] may not want 

the information to check up on the government itself, the use for 

which the requestor seeks the information is not relevant for 

purposes of determining the public interest under FOIA Exemption 

6.”). 

5

 Even Favish recognized as “significant the asserted public 

interest in uncovering deficiencies or misfeasance in the 

Government’s investigations.” 541 U.S. at 173. It simply held 

that the requester had not made a sufficient showing to substantiate 

his claim of impropriety. Id. at 175. In contrast, CREW has made 

a sufficient showing to establish the public interest in disclosure of 

matters of substantive law enforcement policy. 

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18 

case fits into a genus in which the balance characteristically

tips in one direction.” Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 776 

(emphasis added); accord Landano, 508 U.S. at 177; Roth, 642 

F.3d at 1183–84; Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 893. In 

Kimberlin, we considered whether a categorical approach was 

appropriate where the interests to be balanced were a 

prosecutor’s right to privacy regarding the substance of 

disciplinary proceedings against him and the public interest in 

examining the DOJ’s internal disciplinary process. 139 F.3d 

at 948–49. In light of the parties’ apparent agreement that a 

categorical approach was inappropriate, we stated that “we 

may assume for purposes of this opinion that the balance of 

interests relating to the disclosure of material in [a disciplinary] 

file will not so often tip toward withholding that a categorical 

rule against disclosure is appropriate.” Id. at 948–49. We 

endorsed a “case-by-case balancing” approach that considers 

“the rank of the public official involved and the seriousness of 

the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 949. We think a similar 

approach should be followed here. The privacy interests in 

the two cases are comparable and the public interest here is 

even stronger. Information about the FBI’s and the DOJ’s 

investigation of major, wide-ranging public corruption is more 

likely to shed light on how the agencies are performing their 

statutory duties than a discrete internal disciplinary 

proceeding. Although a substantial privacy interest is at stake 

here, in light of the similarly substantial countervailing public 

interest, the balance does not characteristically tip in favor of 

non-disclosure. 

We do not hold that the requested information is not 

exempt under Exemption 7(C). We simply hold that a 

categorical rule is inappropriate here. As CREW 

acknowledged at argument, it is likely that some of the 

requested information ultimately will be exempt from 

disclosure. Recording of Argument 23:15. For instance, the 

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19 

names and identifying information of third parties contained in 

investigative files are presumptively exempt. Schrecker, 349 

F.3d at 666; SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206. Much of the 

information sought might also be withheld under one of the 

exemptions discussed infra. But that does not justify the 

blanket withholding of all responsive documents. Nation 

Magazine, 71 F.3d at 896. On remand, the DOJ must attempt 

to make a more particularized showing as to what documents 

or portions thereof are exempt. The district court must then 

weigh what information may be withheld under Exemption 

7(C) and whether any information is reasonably segregable and 

may be disclosed. 

B. Exemption 7(A) 

FOIA also exempts from disclosure “records or 

information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only 

to the extent that the production of such law enforcement 

records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to 

interfere with enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7)(A). Exemption 7(A) reflects the Congress’s 

recognition that “law enforcement agencies ha[ve] legitimate 

needs to keep certain records confidential, lest the agencies be 

hindered in their investigations or placed at a disadvantage 

when it [comes] time to present their case.” NLRB v. Robbins 

Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978). As earlier 

noted, there is no dispute that the requested records were 

compiled for law enforcement purposes. To justify 

withholding, the DOJ must therefore demonstrate that 

“disclosure (1) could reasonably be expected to interfere with 

(2) enforcement proceedings that are (3) pending or reasonably 

anticipated.” Mapother v. Dep’t of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1540 

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasis omitted). 

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20 

The DOJ identifies the relevant enforcement proceedings 

as follows: 

There are several outstanding convictions and 

sentencing proceedings in the lobbying investigation 

related to Abramoff and others which have not yet 

been completed. These include, but are not limited 

to, the sentencing hearings of Tony Rudy, Todd 

Boulanger and Kevin Ring. At least until the 

above-described cases and all related criminal 

investigations are completed, the FBI will consider 

the documents responsive to plaintiff’s request to be 

in an open and pending status, as premature release of 

any of this information would have a harmful effect 

on these pending matters, which will be described in 

further detail below. 

Hardy Decl. 17 (footnote omitted). The Declaration goes on 

to explain how disclosure of the requested records would 

interfere with these proceedings: revealing the identities of 

potential witnesses and subjecting them to harassment, 

disclosing direct and circumstantial evidence, identifying third 

parties also under investigation and uncovering the 

government’s trial strategy. See id. at 18. We take the DOJ 

to be relying on two types of enforcement proceedings: (1) 

the specifically-invoked “sentencing hearings of Tony Rudy, 

Todd Boulanger and Kevin Ring” and (2) “all related criminal 

investigations.” We address each type of proceeding in turn. 

 The first set of proceedings does not justify withholding 

because the sentencing hearings—and appeals—of Rudy, 

Boulanger and Ring are no longer “pending or reasonably 

anticipated.” Exemption 7(A) is temporal in nature. Robbins 

Tire, 437 U.S. at 230–32; see also North v. Walsh, 881 F.2d 

1088, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Disclosure of the information 

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21 

[the requester] seeks cannot interfere with parts of the 

enforcement proceeding already concluded.”). We therefore 

“require a law enforcement agency invoking the exception to 

show that the material withheld ‘relates to a concrete 

prospective law enforcement proceeding.’” Juarez v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 518 F.3d 54, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Bevis v. 

Dep’t of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The 

proceeding must remain pending at the time of our decision, 

not only at the time of the initial FOIA request. Sussman v. 

U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

Thus, reliance on Exemption 7(A) may become outdated when 

the proceeding at issue comes to a close. See Coastal States 

Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 870 (D.C. Cir. 

1980) (“There is no reason to protect yellowing documents 

contained in long-closed files.”); see also August v. FBI, 328 

F.3d 697, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Maydak v. Dep’t of Justice, 

218 F.3d 760, 763–64 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Senate of Puerto Rico 

v. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 580–81 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

Since the DOJ filed its Declaration in August 2011, Rudy, 

Boulanger and Ring have all been sentenced. See United 

States v. Rudy, No. 06-cr-00082-ESH (D.D.C. April 20, 2012); 

United States v. Boulanger, No. 09-cr-00025-RWR (D.D.C. 

Oct. 14, 2011); United States v. Ring, 08-cr-00274-ESH 

(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2011). Only Ring appealed and this Court 

affirmed his conviction more than one year ago. See United 

States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013). The 

cases are closed—not pending or contemplated—and therefore 

are not proceedings with which disclosure may interfere. See 

Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 232; North, 881 F.2d at 1100.6

 6

 When asked at argument, counsel for the DOJ raised for the 

first time one other proceeding: Fraser Verrusio’s appeal of his 

February 10, 2011 conviction on charges stemming from the 

Abramoff investigation, the appeal of which remains pending in this 

Court. See United States v. Verrusio, No. 11-3080 (argued Nov. 12, 

USCA Case #12-5223 Document #1486393 Filed: 04/01/2014 Page 21 of 31
22 

The second type of proceeding, ongoing at least in August 

2011, consists of “all related criminal investigations.” Hardy 

Decl. 17; see also id. at 13 (referring to “continuing large 

public corruption investigation”). The district court cited that 

language in finding that “the investigation [is] still ongoing.” 

Citizens for Responsibility in Wash., 870 F. Supp. 2d at 82, and 

the DOJ makes passing reference to the district court’s finding 

in its brief, Br. of Appellees 49. To be sure, an ongoing 

criminal investigation typically triggers Exemption 7(A): 

“[S]o long as the investigation continues to gather evidence for 

a possible future criminal case, and that case would be 

jeopardized by the premature release of that evidence, 

Exemption 7(A) applies.” Juarez, 518 F.3d at 59; see also 

Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1114 (“The enforcement proceedings 

need not be currently ongoing; it suffices for them to be 

reasonably anticipated.” (quotation marks omitted)). But a 

combination of factors leaves us with considerable uncertainty 

about whether a criminal investigation in fact continues to this 

day. The first is the vague nature of the DOJ’s mention of 

ongoing investigations, especially when coupled with its 

reliance on other specifically enumerated proceedings. The 

second is the passage of time: It has been over 30 months 

 

2013). The DOJ’s Declaration does not reference this proceeding 

even though Verrusio had been convicted six months, and was 

sentenced three weeks, before the Declaration was filed. See 

United States v. Verrusio, No. 09-cr-00064-RWR. Moreover, the 

DOJ neglected to mention the Verrusio appeal when it filed its brief 

in this Court even though by that time the Rudy, Boulanger and Ring 

proceedings had all come to a close. See Br. of Appellees (D.C. Cir. 

May 15, 2013). The DOJ has therefore forfeited the argument. 

See Roth, 642 F.3d at 1181 (contention raised for first time at oral 

argument is forfeited); cf. Maydak, 218 F.3d at 764–68 (discussing 

general rule that agency must assert all exemptions in district court 

proceeding and limited exceptions thereto). 

USCA Case #12-5223 Document #1486393 Filed: 04/01/2014 Page 22 of 31
23 

since the DOJ filed its Declaration and many more since the 

events underlying the investigation took place. Third, when 

asked at argument about ongoing proceedings, counsel cited 

only the Verrusio appeal, no ongoing investigation. 

Recording of Argument 10:04. 

Categorical withholding is often appropriate under 

Exemption 7(A). Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 236 (“Congress 

did not intend to prevent the federal courts from determining 

that, with respect to particular kinds of enforcement 

proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory 

records while a case is pending would generally ‘interfere with 

enforcement proceedings.’”). In such a case, an agency may 

satisfy its burden of proof “by grouping documents in 

categories and offering generic reasons for withholding the 

documents in each category.” Maydak, 218 F.3d at 765. We 

have held, however, that 

if it wishes to adopt the generic approach, [an agency] 

has a three-fold task. First, it must define its 

categories functionally. Second, it must conduct a 

document-by-document review in order to assign 

documents to the proper category. Finally, it must 

explain to the court how the release of each category 

would interfere with enforcement proceedings. 

Bevis, 801 F.2d at 1389–90. As to the third task, although we 

give deference to an agency’s predictive judgment of the harm 

that will result from disclosure of information, see Ctr. for 

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927–28 

(D.C. Cir. 2003), it is not sufficient for the agency to simply 

assert that disclosure will interfere with enforcement 

proceedings; “it must rather demonstrate how disclosure” will 

do so. Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1114; see Campbell v. Dep’t of 

USCA Case #12-5223 Document #1486393 Filed: 04/01/2014 Page 23 of 31
24 

Health & Human Servs., 682 F.2d 256, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 

The DOJ has made no such demonstration here. 

The DOJ explains that, in August 2011, there was a 

wide-ranging public corruption investigation pending and that 

the release of the requested records could disclose to 

individuals under investigation the identities of potential 

witnesses, the content of the government’s evidence and trial 

strategy and the focus of the investigation. Hardy Decl. 16, 

18–19. We have often found that similar concerns justify 

withholding under Exemption 7(A). In the typical case, 

however, the requested records relate to a specific individual or 

entity that is the subject of the ongoing investigation, making 

the likelihood of interference readily apparent. See, e.g., 

Juarez, 518 F.3d at 58; Swan v. SEC, 96 F.3d 498, 499 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 

312 (D.C Cir. 1988); see also Boyd, 475 F.3d at 386 

(documents relating to requester Boyd exempt where 

disclosure would reveal details of ongoing investigation of 

individuals “related to, controlled by, or influenced by Boyd” 

(alterations omitted)). Here, by contrast, the documents 

requested relate to DeLay, who is no longer under 

investigation; he was told more than three years ago that he 

would not be charged. Thus, assuming some individuals do 

remain under investigation, the relevant question is whether 

any of the responsive records, which are primarily about 

DeLay, would disclose anything relevant to the investigation 

of those individuals. Given the “intertwined and interrelated 

nature of the documents at issue,” Hardy Decl. 17, the answer 

may well be yes. But without more information about the 

degree of overlap, we cannot say that the circumstances 

“‘characteristically support an inference’” that disclosure 

would interfere with any pending enforcement proceeding. 

Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 893 (quoting Landano, 508 U.S. 

at 177) (alteration omitted); see also Mapother, 3 F.3d at 

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25 

1542–43 (recognizing potential for interference similar to that 

described here but nevertheless remanding for district court to 

review documents and decide in first instance whether 

disclosure would prejudice government’s case). 

Moreover, although the DOJ identifies two distinct 

categories of documents—FD-302s and investigative 

materials—it never explains how the specific risks entailed in 

premature disclosure of one category of document might differ 

from risk of disclosure of the other. See Campbell, 682 F.2d 

at 263–64 (“If a direct relationship between an active 

investigation and withheld information constituted a sufficient 

predicate for the invocation of Exemption 7(A), the Court in 

Robbins Tire would not have examined the special risks 

entailed in premature disclosure of statements of prospective 

witnesses in NLRB proceedings, the particular kind of records 

at issue in that case.”); see also Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 236 

(“Exemption 7 was designed to eliminate ‘blanket exemptions’ 

for Government records simply because they were found in 

investigatory files . . . .”). Without more “specific information 

about the impact of the disclosures,” we “cannot determine 

that, as a matter of law, disclosure ‘could reasonably be 

expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.’” 

Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1114. 

For these reasons, the DOJ has not met its burden to 

warrant categorical withholding. Once again, we do not hold 

that the requested information is not exempt. On remand, the 

DOJ must clarify whether a related investigation is in fact 

ongoing and, if so, how the disclosure of documents relating to 

DeLay would interfere with it. Of course, this is not to say the 

DOJ must recite the names of subjects under continuing 

investigation or otherwise disclose information that would 

jeopardize the investigation. We simply require the DOJ to be 

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26 

more specific about the existence vel non of such an 

investigation. 

C. Exemptions 3, 7(D) and 7(E) 

In the alternative, the DOJ briefly invoked—and the 

district court even more briefly approved—withholding a 

portion of the requested records under Exemptions 3, 7(D) and 

7(E).7

 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 870 F. 

Supp. 2d at 83–85. The DOJ’s Declaration, however, lacks 

the “reasonably specific detail” required to carry its burden of 

establishing that each exemption applies, Larson, 565 F.3d at 

862, and fails to “give the reviewing court a reasonable basis to 

evaluate the claim of privilege,” Judicial Watch, Inc., 449 F.3d 

 7

 It is unclear from the district court order whether it held that 

the DOJ could withhold all responsive records under one of these 

exemptions or some combination of them, or whether each applies 

only to certain categories of documents. Compare Citizens for 

Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 870 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (“In any 

event, I find that defendant can properly withhold the records 

pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 2, 3, 7(D), and 7(E).”), and id. at 85 

(finding “the information” supplied by confidential sources exempt 

under Exemption 7(D) but not specifying whether “the information” 

includes all responsive records), with id. at 83 (only internal 

telephone and fax numbers exempt under Exemption 2), and id. at 84 

(only “information that defendant seeks to withhold pursuant to Rule 

6(e)” exempt under Exemption 3). To the extent the district court 

held that any of these exemptions categorically exempts all 

responsive documents, we think that holding was error. For the 

reasons discussed infra, the DOJ has not met its burden of 

demonstrating that the circumstances “‘characteristically support an 

inference’” that Exemption 3, 7(D) or 7(E) applies. Nation 

Magazine, 71 F.3d at 893 (quoting Landano, 508 U.S. at 177) 

(alteration omitted). CREW does not challenge the district court’s 

holding regarding the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 2, which was 

expressly limited to internal FBI telephone and fax numbers. 

USCA Case #12-5223 Document #1486393 Filed: 04/01/2014 Page 26 of 31
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at 146 (quoting Gallant, 26 F.3d at 172–73). The Declaration 

never specifies how many responsive documents exist and 

makes no attempt to link each exemption to specific 

documents. Moreover, the explanation for the applicability of 

each exemption is inadequate. To aid the parties—and district 

court—on remand, we briefly highlight the shortcomings of 

the record before us. 

Exemption 3: FOIA exempts matters “specifically 

exempted from disclosure by statute,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), 

including a disclosure violative of Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 6(e), which provides for the secrecy of grand jury 

proceedings. See Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Grp. Ltd. v. United 

States, 534 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Fund for Const. 

Gov’t, 656 F.2d at 867–68. “Rule 6(e) applies if the disclosed 

material would ‘tend to reveal some secret aspect of the grand 

jury’s investigation,’ including ‘the identities of witnesses or 

jurors, the substance of testimony, the strategy or direction of 

the investigation,’ or ‘the deliberations or questions of jurors.’” 

Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 582). The DOJ cites 

Exemption 3 to withhold “the names of potential grand jury 

witnesses and interview statements pertaining to signed proffer 

agreements and immunity statements, which could be used as 

evidence before a Federal Grand Jury.” Hardy Decl. 24; see 

also id. at 20 (“Exemption 3 is asserted to protect information 

contained in the FD-302s which identifies specific records that 

may be subpoenaed by a Federal Grand Jury.”). 

The DOJ bears the burden of “demonstrating some ‘nexus 

between disclosure and revelation of a protected aspect of the 

grand jury’s investigation.’” Lopez v. Dep’t of Justice, 393 

F.3d 1345, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Senate of Puerto 

Rico, 823 F.2d at 584). But we are told only that the requested 

documents contain information that “could be used as evidence 

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28 

before a Federal Grand Jury” or “may be subpoenaed by a 

Federal Grand Jury” and therefore that “any such disclosure 

would clearly violate the secrecy of the Grand Jury 

proceedings.” Hardy Decl. 20, 24 (emphases added). This 

conclusory explanation is insufficient. “[T]here is no per se

rule against disclosure of any and all information which has 

reached the grand jury chambers,” Lopez, 393 F.3d at 1349, let 

alone any and all information which “could” reach the grand 

jury, see In re Sealed Case, 192 F.3d 995, 1001–03 (D.C. Cir. 

1999) (per curiam); Wash. Post Co. v. Dep’t of Justice, 863 

F.2d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Stolt-Nielsen Transp. 

Grp. Ltd., 534 F.3d at 732 (“[T]he government may not bring 

information into the protection of Rule 6(e) and thereby into 

the protection afforded by Exemption 3, simply by submitting 

it as a grand jury exhibit.”). Although we do not doubt that 

some of the requested records may fall under Exemption 3, the 

DOJ has not yet supplied sufficient information for a court to 

make that determination. Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 

584; see Lopez, 393 F.3d at 1349–51. 

Exemption 7(D): FOIA also exempts records or 

information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the 

extent disclosure of such records “could reasonably be 

expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source” or 

“information furnished by a confidential source.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7)(D). The DOJ cites this exemption to “protect the 

identities of, and information received from, individuals who 

provided information to the FBI during the course of the . . . 

investigation.” Hardy Decl. 21. Unlike Exemption 7(C), 

Exemption 7(D) does not require balancing. Roth, 642 F.3d at 

1184; Davis v. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 

1992). It does, however, require a showing that the source is a 

confidential one. See Landano, 508 U.S. at 172 (“[T]he 

question is not whether the requested document is of the type 

that the agency usually treats as confidential, but whether the 

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29 

particular source spoke with an understanding that the 

communication would remain confidential.”). “[I]t is not 

enough for the agency to claim that all sources providing 

information in the course of a criminal investigation do so on a 

confidential basis.” Roth, 642 F.3d at 1184; see Landano, 508 

U.S. at 180–81. Yet that is essentially what the DOJ has done 

by stating, in the alternative and without specific explanation, 

that all of its sources “were interviewed either under express 

confidentiality and/or under circumstances from which an 

assurance of confidentiality may be implied.” Hardy Decl. 

21; see also id. at 30–31 (explaining how informants provide 

information during the course of “an investigation,” with no tie 

to this investigation). Such boilerplate will not do. See 

Billington v. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F.3d 581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 

2000) (“This bald assertion that express assurances were given 

amounts to little more than recitation of the statutory standard, 

which we have held is insufficient.”); Campbell v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 34–35 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting 

assertion that express assurances of confidentiality were given 

where declarant demonstrated no basis for knowledge of 

alleged fact); Computer Prof’ls for Soc. Responsibility v. 

Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (description of 

“the manner in which an agency ‘routinely’ handles 

information is not sufficient to establish an implied assurance 

of confidentiality as to any particular source”). To invoke 

Exemption 7(D) on remand, the DOJ must either “present 

probative evidence that the source did in fact receive an 

express grant of confidentiality,” Campbell, 164 F.3d at 34 

(quotation omitted), or “‘point to more narrowly defined 

circumstances that . . . support the inference’ of 

confidentiality.” Roth, 642 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Landano, 

508 U.S. at 179). 

Exemption 7(E): FOIA also exempts records or 

information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the 

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30 

extent release of such records “would disclose techniques and 

procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, 

or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement 

investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could 

reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). The DOJ cites Exemption 7(E) “to 

protect procedures and techniques used by FBI [agents] during 

the investigation.” Hardy Decl. 21; accord id. at 31. This 

near-verbatim recitation of the statutory standard is inadequate. 

We are not told what procedures are at stake. (Perhaps how 

the FBI conducts witness interviews? Or how it investigates 

public corruption?) Nor are we told how disclosure of the 

FD-302s or investigative materials could reveal such 

procedures. (Are the procedures spelled out in the 

documents? Or would the reader be able to extrapolate what 

the procedures are from the information contained therein?) 

Although Exemption 7(E) sets a “low bar for the agency to 

justify withholding,” Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 42 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011), the agency must at least provide some explanation 

of what procedures are involved and how they would be 

disclosed. See id. (FBI sought to withhold “details about 

procedures used during the forensic examination of a computer 

by an FBI forensic examiner” (quotation marks omitted)); 

Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (IRS sought to withhold information setting forth 

“settlement strategies and objectives, assessments of litigating 

hazards, and acceptable ranges of percentages for settlement” 

(quotation marks and alteration omitted)); Morley v. CIA, 508 

F.3d 1108, 1128–29 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (CIA sought to withhold 

information revealing procedures for conducting security 

clearances and background investigations).8

 8

 Twice the DOJ asserted that disclosure of the requested 

records “could enable the targets of these techniques to avoid 

detection or develop countermeasures to circumvent the ability of 

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III 

The DOJ has not met its burden to justify categorical 

withholding under Exemption 7(A) or 7(C). Nor has it 

provided sufficient detail at this stage for a court to determine 

whether a portion of the requested records may be withheld 

under Exemption 3, 7(D) or 7(E). Summary judgment for the 

defendant is therefore reversed and the case is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 So ordered.

 

the FBI to effectively use important law enforcement techniques.” 

Hardy Decl. 21, 31. We note some disagreement whether the “risk 

of circumvention” requirement applies to records containing 

“techniques and procedures” or only to records containing 

“guidelines.” See Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, 740 F.3d at 

204 n.4. We need not pursue that issue, however, because the 

antecedent questions of what techniques and procedures are involved 

and how they could be disclosed have not been answered 

sufficiently. 

USCA Case #12-5223 Document #1486393 Filed: 04/01/2014 Page 31 of 31