Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03041/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03041-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kendrick Albert Cicero
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 2, 2000 Decided June 16, 2000

No. 99-3041

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Kendrick Albert Cicero, a/k/a Kenny,

a/k/a Albert Kenrich Cicero,

a/k/a Paul Haynes,

a/k/a Diamond,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cr00633-01)

---------

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No. 99-3029

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Ian A. Thorne,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cr00422-02)

(No. 91cr00633-01)

---------

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

for appellants. With him on the briefs was Evelina J.

Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender.

John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the briefs was Wilma A. Lewis,

U.S. Attorney. Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Sentelle,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Kendrick Cicero and Ian Thorne

filed separate appeals presenting the same questions: Must a

prisoner whose conviction became final before April 24,

1996--the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996--raise any challenge to his conviction or to his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2255, within

one year of the effective date of the Act? If so, is that time

limitation subject to equitable tolling? And if it is, then is

either appellant entitled to such tolling based upon the equity

of his case?

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We hold first that a prisoner whose conviction became final

prior to April 24, 1996 must have filed his s 2255 motion

within one year of that date. Further, we hold that regardless whether this limitation is subject to equitable tolling--a

question we need not decide today--the cases before us do

not warrant such relief.

I. Background

Prior to the effective date of the AEDPA a prisoner could

challenge his conviction or sentence as a violation of the

Constitution of the United States by filing a motion under 28

U.S.C. s 2255 at almost any time. See Mickens v. United

States, 148 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 1998). As amended by that

Act, paragraph six of s 2255 now limits the time in which a

prisoner may bring such a motion as follows:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion

under this section. The limitation period shall run from

the latest of--

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the movant was prevented from making a

motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.

Messrs. Cicero and Thorne ask us to excuse the tardiness

of their motions on the ground that they were impeded from

timely filing their s 2255 motions by government actions

beyond their control. They do not, however, claim that the

Government acted unlawfully.

A. Cicero's Case

Mr. Cicero was convicted in 1992 of possession with intent

to distribute and of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841 and 846. He received concurrent sentences of 240 months of incarceration and five years

of supervised release, as well as a fine and a special assessment. Mr. Cicero appealed and this court affirmed his

convictions. See United States v. Cicero, 22 F.3d 1156 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 905 (1994).

Mr. Cicero states that he began working on a motion

challenging his conviction and sentence in 1996. His work

was interrupted several times that year, however. In October 1996, Mr. Cicero was stabbed by another inmate; he

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spent five days in the hospital and was then placed in

protective segregation for an unspecified period. During this

time, Mr. Cicero had access to the prison library for only one

hour approximately every three weeks. On April 14, 1997,

prison officials packed Mr. Cicero's possessions, including his

legal papers, in anticipation of his transfer to a different

facility. He did not arrive there and regain his possessions

until June 20.

Mr. Cicero signed and mailed his s 2255 motion on July 24,

1997. The district court clerk's office received it on July 28.

The district court dismissed Mr. Cicero's motion as untimely

because he had failed to file it before expiration of the one

year grace period running from the effective date of the

AEDPA. Mr. Cicero appeals, claiming he was prevented

from timely filing by acts of the Government, that is, of prison

officials, beyond his control.

B. Thorne's Case

Mr. Thorne was convicted in 1991 of possession with intent

to distribute and of conspiracy to distribute and to possess

with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

ss 841 and 846. He was sentenced to 151 months of incarceration and five years of supervised release, and on appeal

we affirmed his conviction. See United States v. Thorne, 997

F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

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Mr. Thorne states that in November 1995, after several

unsuccessful attempts to obtain from his attorney discovery

materials and other documents related to his case, he petitioned the district court to compel their release. In March

1996 the district court ordered Mr. Thorne's attorney to

provide him with a copy of his case file, and Mr. Thorne

submitted a motion seeking the transcript of argument in the

appeal of his codefendant. In December 1996 the court

denied Mr. Thorne's request for the transcript, reasoning that

the appeal was a matter of public record and Mr. Thorne had

not demonstrated that he could not otherwise obtain a copy of

the transcript.

Mr. Thorne further states that he had been working on his

s 2255 motion with a "jailhouse lawyer" named Muhammad

Al'Askari, and that their progress was halted when Mr.

Al'Askari was placed in segregation some time prior to April

24, 1997. Mr. Thorne's legal papers were packed and stored

with Mr. Al'Askari's possessions during the period of his

segregation, which ended early in June. Mr. Thorne gave his

s 2255 motion to prison officials for mailing on June 11 and

the motion was filed in the district court on June 24. The

district court dismissed Mr. Thorne's motion as untimely

because it was submitted more than one year after the

effective date of the AEDPA. Mr. Thorne requested reconsideration and asked the court equitably to toll the time

limitation. The court declined, stating that although the time

limitation in s 2255 is subject to equitable tolling, Mr. Thorne

had not alleged facts that would warrant tolling in his case.

On appeal Mr. Thorne argues that the time limitation in

s 2255 is subject to equitable tolling and that tolling is

warranted in his case.

II. Analysis

We consider first application of the time limitation in

s 2255 to a prisoner whose conviction became final before the

effective date of the AEDPA. We address this issue de novo.

See Moore v. United States, 173 F.3d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir.

1999). Second, we consider whether, assuming the time limit

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in s 2255 is subject to equitable tolling, it should be tolled in

the cases before us.

A. One Year Grace Period

We need not linger long over the first issue. The parties

agree, as do our sister Circuits, that a prisoner whose conviction became final before the AEDPA was enacted has a one

year grace period from the date of enactment in which to file

a motion under s 2255. See Rogers v. United States, 180

F.3d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1999); Mickens v. United States, 148

F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1998); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109,

112 (3d Cir. 1998); Brown v. Angelone, 150 F.3d 370, 374-75

(4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1006

(5th Cir. 1998); Brown v. O'Dea, 187 F.3d 572, 576-77 (6th

Cir. 1999); O'Connor v. United States, 133 F.3d 548, 550 (7th

Cir. 1998); Moore v. United States, 173 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th

Cir. 1999); United States v. Valdez, 195 F.3d 544, 546 (9th

Cir. 1999); United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 746

(10th Cir. 1997); Goodman v. United States, 151 F.3d 1335,

1337 (11th Cir. 1998). This unanimity of view reflects, no

doubt, that without such a grace period a prisoner convicted

before the effective date of the AEDPA, when there was no

time limitation for filing a s 2255 motion, would be denied a

reasonable time within which to bring a claim before losing

the right to do so. See Flores, 135 F.3d at 1003-06. In any

event, the grace period expired on April 24, 1997. See

Rogers, 180 F.3d at 355; Mickens, 148 F.3d at 148; Villegas

v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467, 469 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1999); Towns v.

United States, 190 F.3d 468, 469 (6th Cir. 1999); Moore, 173

F.3d at 1135; Simmonds, 111 F.3d at 746; but cf. Morton,

134 F.3d at 112 (grace period expires April 23, 1997); Angelone, 150 F.3d at 375-76 (same); O'Connor, 133 F.3d at 550

(same); Valdez, 195 F.3d at 546 (same); Goodman, 151 F.3d

at 1337 (same); United States v. Jones, 963 F. Supp. 32, 34-

35 (D.D.C. 1997) (same).

Although Messrs. Cicero and Thorne were entitled to the

benefit of the grace period, neither appellant filed his s 2255

motion within the period allowed. Their motions will be

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deemed timely, therefore, only if that time limitation may be

equitably tolled in their cases.

B. Equitable Tolling

Unless the Congress has provided otherwise, courts generally apply a rebuttable presumption that a statute of limitation is subject to equitable tolling. See Irwin v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). Although

most of the circuits that have considered the questions have

concluded that s 2255 is a statute of limitation and that it is

subject to equitable tolling, see Kapral v. United States, 166

F.3d 565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999); Harris v. Hutchinson, No. 99-

6175, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6170, at *13 (4th Cir. Apr. 4,

2000); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999);

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Calderon), 128 F.3d

1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978

(10th Cir. 1998); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269,

1271 (11th Cir. 1999); cf. also Moore, 173 F.3d at 1134

(holding s 2255 is statute of limitation in case where equitable tolling was not at issue), the Seventh Circuit has questioned this conclusion even while applying it to a petition filed

under s 2254, see Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 598 (7th

Cir. 1999) (in view of "express tolling provisions [of 28 U.S.C.

s 2244(d)(1)] it is unclear what room remains for importing

the judge-made doctrine of equitable tolling"), and at least

one district court has disagreed entirely, see Giles v. United

States, 6 F. Supp. 2d 648, 649 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (concluding

that s 2255 is a limit on jurisdiction of court, not a statute of

limitations, and therefore is not subject to equitable tolling).*

The circuits holding that s 2255 is subject to equitable

tolling have announced some general principles for determin-

__________

* Some of the cited cases consider whether a court may equitably

toll the time limitation in 28 U.S.C. s 2254, which applies to postconviction motions filed by state prisoners. Courts have generally

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ing whether the facts in a particular case justify tolling the

limitation. Equitable tolling, which is to be employed "only

sparingly" in any event, see Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, has been

applied in the context of the AEDPA only if " 'extraordinary

circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible

to file a petition on time." See Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288. In

the last-quoted case the court equitably tolled the time limit

in s 2244(d)(1) because the prisoner's lead counsel had withdrawn from the representation after accepting employment in

another state and his successor as counsel was unable to use

his work product. See also Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (equitably tolling time limit where prisoner submitted petition for mailing five days before deadline

and petition was returned to him after deadline had passed).

The Fifth Circuit has suggested several circumstances in

which equitable tolling is not warranted. The prisoner's

ignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the legal process

will not excuse his untimely filing, nor will a lack of representation during the applicable filing period. See Fisher, 174

F.3d at 714-15; Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th

Cir. 1999). In addition, the court will not relieve a petitioner

who has sat upon his rights. See Coleman v. Johnson, 184

F.3d 398, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1999).

As it turns out, we need not decide today whether s 2255 is

subject to equitable tolling because neither Mr. Cicero nor

__________

applied the same analysis to the time limitations in s 2254 and

s 2255. See Flores, 135 F.3d at 1002 n.7 ("Because of the similarity

of the actions under sections 2254 and 2255, they have traditionally

been read in pari materia where the context does not indicate that

would be improper"); but cf. Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226

(10th Cir. 1998) (noting that unlike s 2255, s 2254 is tolled for time

spent pursuing post-conviction relief in state court, and suggesting

that "the apparently firm deadline of April 24, 1997, in [United

States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737 (10th Cir. 1997)] is appropriate

only for motions ... under s 2255"); Paige v. United States, 171

F.3d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Hoggro for proposition that

equitable tolling is available in s 2254 cases but not in s 2255

cases).

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Mr. Thorne has alleged such "extraordinary circumstances"

as to warrant equitable tolling in any event.

1. Cicero's Case

Mr. Cicero claims that he first learned of the one year

limitation in the AEDPA in October 1996 when he filed a

s 2255 motion while he was in protective segregation. He

continued work on the s 2255 motion he had begun earlier

that year, although he was hampered by reduced access to

the prison law library due to his segregation. His work was

interrupted from April 14 until sometime in June 1997 while

he was separated from his legal papers during a transfer

between prisons--an interruption caused by prison officials

whose conduct was beyond his control. Mr. Cicero concedes

that his transfer and incidental separation from his papers

were not unlawful, and therefore do not implicate s 2255

p 6(2). He asserts, nonetheless, that the time to file should

be tolled because the Government's action--rather than his

own inaction--caused him to miss the filing deadline.

Mr. Cicero's conviction became final in 1994. He had from

then until April 24, 1997 to prepare a s 2255 motion. Although he has identified several impediments to his work on

the motion during the last six months of the grace period, Mr.

Cicero has not suggested that he was prevented from working

on the motion at any time before that period. In Miller, 141

F.3d at 978, the court considered whether to toll the time

limitation in s 2244(d) for a state prisoner who was convicted

in 1993 and in 1995 was transferred to a private correctional

institution that did not have the law books relevant to his

case. It was not until the prisoner was returned to a state

institution, after the one year grace period had expired, that

he learned of the time limitation. Id. Because the prisoner's

lack of access to legal materials from 1995 to 1997 "[did] not

explain [his] lack of pursuit of his federal claims before the

transfer," the Tenth Circuit did not toll the time limitation.

Mr. Cicero, too, had ample time in which to complete his

motion. Although his work may have been interrupted during the final months of the grace period, we cannot say that

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Mr. Cicero presents such "extraordinary circumstances" as to

warrant equitable tolling.

2. Thorne's Case

Mr. Thorne also argues that his s 2255 motion was untimely for reasons beyond his control. He began work on his

motion in 1995; his work was delayed in part by the district

court's lengthy consideration of his requests for documents,

the last of which the court resolved in December 1996. In

the spring of 1997, however, Mr. Thorne unfortunately gave

his legal papers to a jailhouse lawyer whose placement in

segregation separated Mr. Thorne and his papers from some

time before the expiration of the one year grace period until

after the filing deadline had passed.

The district court declined to toll the limitation for Mr.

Thorne because "[t]here has been no showing here that the

defendant diligently pursued the filing of his motion." The

Court explained its reasoning as follows:

It is unclear when [Mr. Al'Askari] was placed in administrative segregation. For example, [Mr. Al'Askari]

may have been placed in administrative segregation just

prior to [the deadline], or shortly before that date. It is

not clear what, if any, action the defendant took to have

the papers returned to him. Moreover, the defendant

has not stated why he did not request an extension of

time from the Court within which to file his motion.

Mr. Thorne acknowledges that he never asked the prison

officials to return his legal documents, but he claims that such

a request would have been futile because one inmate was not

permitted to retrieve the property of another after it had

been packed up due to a segregation order. He did not file a

motion for an extension of time, he says, because he was

unaware that he could do so. Mr. Thorne argues that before

dismissing his motion as untimely the district court should

have sought additional information regarding what steps he

might have taken to regain possession of his papers. He asks

us either to toll the time limitation or at least to remand his

case to the district court for further factfinding.

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Mr. Thorne has not given us sufficient reason to take either

step. He was not prejudiced by the district court's delay in

deciding his requests for documents, as the court ruled upon

his motions well in advance of the deadline for filing his

s 2255 motion. Further, he entrusted Mr. Al'Askari with his

legal documents at his peril. See, e.g., Paige v. United States,

171 F.3d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1999) (equitable tolling not available to prisoner whose petition, prepared by an inmate in a

different prison, was delayed in mail); Henderson v. Johnson,

1 F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (equitable tolling

denied to prisoner to whom fellow inmate had fraudulently

represented that he had timely filed petition for him). We

agree with the district court, therefore, that Mr. Thorne has

not alleged any circumstances surrounding the untimeliness

of his s 2255 motion so compelling as to warrant tolling the

time limit.

III. Summary and Conclusion

Prisoners whose convictions became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA had until April 24, 1997 to file a

motion for relief under s 2255. We do not decide whether

this limitation is generally subject to equitable tolling because

even if it is we would not toll the limitation in either of the

cases before us. The judgments of the district court are

therefore

Affirmed.

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