Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03082/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03082-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Olabimpe M. Olejiya
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 2014 Decided June 10, 2014 

No. 12-3082 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

OLABIMPE M. OLEJIYA, ALSO KNOWN AS BIM,

ALSO KNOWN AS BIMPE, 

APPELLANT

No. 12-3090 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

OLUYINKA AKINADEWO, ALSO KNOWN AS OLU BLACK,

ALSO KNOWN AS OLU DUDU, ALSO KNOWN AS OLU, 

APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:11-cr-00150) 

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Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant Akinadewo. Richard Seligman, 

appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellant Olejiya. 

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender was on brief. Tony 

Axam Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an 

appearance. 

Anne Y. Park, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the 

cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States 

Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Suzanne G. Curt and Bryan 

G. Seeley, Assistant United States Attorneys were on brief. 

Before: HENDERSON and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Olabimpe 

Olejiya and Oluyinka Akinadewo both pleaded guilty to one 

count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud based on their 

participation in a scheme that involved opening fraudulent 

bank accounts in the name of unwitting individuals, funding 

the accounts with fraudulent checks and wire transfers and 

withdrawing funds before the accounts’ fraudulent nature was 

detected. They now raise parallel challenges to their 

sentences, claiming that the district court erred in calculating 

their respective United States Sentencing Guidelines offense 

levels by (1) improperly applying an aggravated role 

enhancement of three levels for Olejiya and four for 

Akinadewo, see U.S.S.G § 3B1.1, and (2) failing to make the 

factual findings necessary to support a 12-level increase for 

both based on the amount of intended loss involved in the 

conspiracy, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm the district court’s judgments. 

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I. Background 

As admitted by Olejiya and Akinadewo in their plea 

proceedings, the conspiracy lasted from April 2007 to 

December 2007. The conspiracy’s goal—enriching its 

members—was achieved by the following overt acts. On 

September 12, 2007, two checking accounts were opened at 

E*Trade via the internet, using the name, birthdate and social 

security number of A.S. A.S., however, was unaware of the 

accounts and had given no one permission to use his personal 

information. In the following months, members of the 

conspiracy transferred $109,200 from A.S.’s legitimate 

account at the Armed Forces Bank to the two fraudulent 

E*Trade accounts set up in his name and withdrew over 

$50,000 of that amount before the fraud was detected. 

Moreover, beginning as early as July 2007, numerous calls 

from a cell phone belonging to Akinadewo were made to both 

Armed Forces Bank and E*Trade in an apparent effort to 

monitor accounts. Akinadewo did not have a legitimate 

account at either bank. On October 6 and 8, 2007, Akinadewo 

used a debit card associated with one of the fraudulent E*Trade 

accounts to purchase twelve money orders, each worth $500, 

from a Walmart in Landover Hills, Maryland. On October 7, 

2007, Olejiya purchased four $500 money orders from three 

Walmart stores in Laurel, Bowie and Landover Hills, 

Maryland. 

Another fraudulent checking account in the name of 

A.S.—this one at Branch Banking and Trust (BB&T)—was 

opened via the internet on August 25, 2007. Although 

Akinadewo did not have an account at BB&T, six calls were 

made to the bank from his phone during the time of the 

conspiracy. On September 11, 2007, Akinadewo made an 

initial deposit of $50 in the account at a BB&T branch in the 

District of Columbia. Three days later, he made another $50 

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deposit at a Maryland branch. On October 3, 2007, using an 

ATM in Silver Spring, Maryland, Akinadewo deposited a 

$20,000 check, drawn on one of the fraudulent E*Trade 

accounts, into the fraudulent BB&T account. The next day, 

he attempted to repeat the maneuver with a $30,000 check 

drawn on one of the E*Trade accounts but it bounced. All 

told, members of the conspiracy successfully withdrew over 

$30,000 from the BB&T account by cashing checks drawn on 

the account and making ATM withdrawals. 

On November 3, 2007, the name, birthdate and social 

security number of another unwitting individual, U.J., were 

used to open another BB&T checking account via the internet. 

That account was funded with $8,000 transferred from yet 

another fraudulent account, this one opened with Charles 

Schwab in the name of A.S. According to Olejiya, on 

November 30, 2007, he contacted Akinadewo and informed 

him that another conspirator, Samuel Akinleye, was willing to 

cash a check written on the fraudulent BB&T account in the 

name of U.J. Akinadewo then met up with Olejiya and 

Akinleye, wrote a $4,000 check to Akinleye and signed U.J’s 

name. Akinadewo instructed Akinleye to cash the check and 

return the money to Akinadewo, which Akinleye did in 

exchange for a portion of the proceeds. During his plea 

colloquy, Akinadewo denied any recollection of writing the 

check on November 30, 2007, instead stipulating more 

generally that “during the time period of the conspiracy, [he] 

had access to checks in others’ names, and provided some of 

these checks to co-conspirators to either cash or deposit.” 

4/20/12 Tr. 30–31. 

All told, the conspiracy resulted in actual losses of 

$90,987.48 before the fraud was detected, which amount 

includes all of the funds withdrawn from the fraudulent 

accounts. When the funds that passed through the fraudulent 

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accounts are added, the intended loss of the conspiracy totals 

$363,939.76. 

On May 13, 2011, a grand jury returned a one-count 

indictment charging Olejiya and Akinadewo with conspiracy 

to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 

1349. On March 22, 2012, Olejiya entered a plea of guilty. 

Olejiya’s presentence report (PSR) calculated his Guidelines 

range at 41-51 months, based on a criminal history category of 

II and an offense level of 21. The offense level included a 

3-level enhancement, to which Olejiya objected, for his role as 

a “manager or supervisor.” See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). It also 

included a 12-level increase for an intended loss from the 

offense greater than $200,000, to which Olejiya objected solely 

on fairness grounds, asking the district court to grant a variance 

from the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G). At the 

sentencing hearing, the district court found that Olejiya 

qualified for the 3-level aggravated role enhancement and the 

12-level increase and sentenced him to 35 months’ 

imprisonment.1

 He timely appealed. 

Akinadewo pleaded guilty on April 20, 2012. His PSR 

calculated the applicable Guidelines range at 41-51 months, 

based on a criminal history category of II and an offense level 

of 21. Akinadewo’s offense level included a 4-level 

enhancement for his role as an “organizer or leader,” see 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), and a 12-level increase for the loss 

amount, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G). Like Olejiya, 

Akinadewo objected to the aggravated role enhancement and 

made a similar “fairness” objection to the loss amount. At the 

 1

 The district court sentenced Olejiya to a six-month concurrent 

term on one count of misuse of a passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1544, which charge resulted from Olejiya’s attempt to flee to 

Canada to avoid prosecution. 

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sentencing hearing, the district court found that Akinadewo 

qualified for the 4-level aggravated role enhancement and the 

12-level increase and sentenced him to 46 months’ 

imprisonment. He timely appealed. 

II. Aggravated Role 

Olejiya and Akinadewo both argue that the district court 

erred by enhancing their respective offense levels by three and 

four points for their aggravated roles in the offense. “In 

reviewing a sentencing decision, we address purely legal 

questions de novo, accept the district court’s factual findings 

unless they are clearly erroneous, and give ‘due deference’ to 

that court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts.” United 

States v. Saani, 650 F.3d 761, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The 

district court’s fact-specific determination that a defendant was 

an “organizer or leader” or a “manager or supervisor” warrants 

due deference, see United States v. Quigley, 373 F.3d 133, 138 

(D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Yeh, 278 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. 

Cir. 2002), a standard which reflects “the recognition that the 

district courts should be afforded some flexibility in applying 

the guidelines to the facts before them,” United States v. Kim, 

23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also United States v. 

Tann, 532 F.3d 868, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (due deference 

standard survives United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 

(2005)). 

The Guidelines provide for an increase in the offense level 

if the defendant played an aggravated role in the offense: 

(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a 

criminal activity that involved five or more 

participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 

levels. 

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(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but 

not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity 

involved five or more participants or was otherwise 

extensive, increase by 3 levels . . . . 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. We consider several factors in applying the 

aggravated role enhancement, including 

the exercise of decision making authority, the nature 

of participation in the commission of the offense, the 

recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a 

larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of 

participation in planning or organizing the offense, 

the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the 

degree of control and authority exercised over others. 

Id. cmt. n.4; see also United States v. Graham, 162 F.3d 1180, 

1185 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (although factors distinguish 

between 3- and 4-level enhancement, they are relevant to 

whether any aggravated role enhancement applies). No single 

factor is dispositive. Graham, 162 F.3d at 1185; see also 

United States v. Brodie, 524 F.3d 259, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 

United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

A. Olejiya 

Olejiya argues that the district court erred in applying the 

“manager or supervisor” enhancement because he did not 

exercise “control” over criminally liable subordinates. The 

defendant must manage or supervise one or more other 

participants in the criminal activity—not simply the property 

or assets of the conspiracy, as, according to Olejiya, the district 

court concluded—in order to warrant an aggravated role 

enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. We have said that 

“[a]ll persons receiving an enhancement [under § 3B1.1] must 

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exercise some control over others.” Graham, 162 F.3d at 

1185; accord United States v. Clark, 747 F.3d 890, 896 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014); United States v. Smith, 374 F.3d 1240, 1250 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004). We elaborated on this statement in Quigley, 

explaining that “[w]e understand the concept of ‘control’ or 

‘authority,’ implicit in the notion of ‘management’ or 

‘supervision,’ to connote some sort of hierarchical 

relationship, in the sense that an employer is hierarchically 

superior to his employee.” 373 F.3d at 140.2

During Olejiya’s sentencing hearing, the district court 

heard testimony from Special Agent Spencer Brooks of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He explained that 

conspirators in this type of bank fraud play different roles. 

High-level participants typically control the fraudulent bank 

accounts, checkbooks and debit cards and are responsible for 

funding the accounts. Low-level participants—often referred 

to as “runners”—are typically recruited by high-level 

participants to do the front-line work of cashing fraudulent 

checks. In exchange, the runners receive a small portion of 

the proceeds. Agent Brooks testified that, consistent with this 

model, Olejiya recruited runners, including Samuel Akinleye 

and Okorie Awa, to the conspiracy. Awa was caught on 

camera cashing three fraudulent checks in the amounts of 

$3,000, $4,500 and $5,500 and Agent Brooks testified that, 

according to Awa, Olejiya gave Awa the checks, told him to 

cash them and paid him between $500 and $1,000 for his 

 2

 One judge of this Court has noted tension between Graham’s 

suggestion that “control” is required for an aggravated role 

enhancement and the fact that control is but one of several 

non-dispositive factors listed in the application notes. See Clark, 

747 F.3d at 897–99 (Randolph, J., concurring). We need not 

explore that tension here, however, because the district court 

correctly concluded that both Olejiya and Akinadewo exercised 

control over other participants. 

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effort. The district court credited Agent Brooks’ testimony 

and concluded that, although Olejiya was not the kingpin, he 

was also not merely a runner but instead at least a manager or 

supervisor.

Seeing no error in the district court’s factual findings and 

granting due deference to the district court’s application of the 

Guidelines to the facts, we agree that Olejiya was a manager or 

supervisor. By recruiting others to the scheme, Olejiya 

ensured that he would not perform the risky task of cashing a 

fraudulent check but would instead superintend underlings 

who performed the task at his behest. His recruitment of 

Akinleye and Awa satisfies one of the application note factors 

and his supervision of Awa’s check-cashing demonstrates the 

existence of others, including decision-making authority and 

control exercised over others. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. 

This case is more similar to those in which we have found the 

requisite hierarchical relationship, see, e.g., Brodie, 524 F.3d at 

270–71; United States v. Wilson, 240 F.3d 39, 46–47 (D.C. Cir. 

2001); Kelley, 36 F.3d at 1129, than it is to those in which the 

defendant was “simply a barnacle clinging to the outer hull of 

middle management,” Graham, 162 F.3d at 1184. 

B. Akinadewo 

Akinadewo also argues that the district court erred in 

applying the “organizer or leader” enhancement because he did 

not exercise control over other conspirators. Akinadewo’s 

argument is considerably weaker than Olejiya’s. Akinadewo 

stipulated that he had access to the scheme’s checkbooks and 

provided checks to co-conspirators to either cash or deposit, 

making him the sort of high-level participant that relies on 

runners to take the risks. Akinadewo also made several initial 

deposits to fund the fraudulent accounts and numerous calls 

were made from his cell phone to the banks used in the scheme, 

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from which the district court inferred that he was keeping tabs 

on the various accounts. Although Akinadewo contends that 

he was merely the account manager, there is ample evidence 

that he controlled other participants. At Akinadewo’s 

sentencing hearing Agent Brooks testified that, according to 

Awa, Akinadewo supervised one of Awa’s trips to cash a 

fraudulent check by following in another car; after Olejiya had 

collected the money from Awa, Olejiya gave it to Akinadewo. 

Agent Brooks also testified that on one occasion—the one 

disputed in the plea colloquy—Akinadewo wrote a check to 

Akinleye for him to cash; Akinleye did so and returned the 

money to Akinadewo in exchange for a portion of the 

proceeds. The district court credited Agent Brooks’ 

testimony and found that there was “compelling evidence” that 

Akinadewo was an organizer or leader. At bottom, 

Akinadewo asks us to draw an inference from this evidence 

other than the inference reasonably drawn by the district court 

but, even if Akinadewo’s preferred inference (that he merely 

managed the accounts) were plausible, we would nonetheless 

defer to the district court’s reasonable application of the 

Guidelines. See Yeh, 278 F.3d at 15. 

III. Loss Amount 

The Guidelines provide that, for certain crimes, the 

offense level is to be increased based on the amount of “loss” 

involved in the offense, which is defined as “the greater of 

actual loss or intended loss.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) & cmt. 

n.3. The loss amount is one part of the defendant’s relevant 

conduct that—in the case of jointly undertaken criminal 

activity—includes “all reasonably foreseeable acts and 

omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken 

criminal activity.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Because “the scope 

of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant . . . 

is not necessarily the same as the scope of the entire 

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conspiracy,” id. cmt. n.2, “the Guidelines expressly require 

sentencing courts to determine the scope of each defendant’s 

conspiratorial agreement.” United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 

175, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see United States v. Childress, 58 

F.3d 693, 722–24 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “[W]e have not hesitated 

to remand for resentencing when the district court has failed to 

make these individualized findings.” United States v. 

Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (collecting 

cases). 

The district court increased both Olejiya’s and 

Akinadewo’s offense levels by twelve points to reflect the 

amount of intended loss involved in the entire 

conspiracy—$363,939.76. They now contend that the district 

court failed to comply with the “strict procedural mandate,” 

Childress, 58 F.3d at 722, to support the increase by making 

particularized factual findings regarding the scope of their 

conspiratorial agreement. 

A. Olejiya 

The Government contends that Olejiya waived any 

challenge to the loss amount by affirmatively conceding below 

that he was responsible for the full amount of the intended loss 

involved in the conspiracy. Olejiya contends that he, at most, 

forfeited the issue. “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make 

the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional 

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quotation marks 

omitted). “Forfeiture occurs when silence on the part of the 

appealing party has prevented examination by the trial court 

and our review is for plain error.” United States v. Laslie, 716 

F.3d 612, 614 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “By contrast, waiver is intentional, and 

extinguishes an error so that there is no review, because the 

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defendant has knowingly and personally given up the waived 

right.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We believe that 

Olejiya’s repeated and emphatic concessions, made in written 

submissions and at sentencing, constitute a knowing and 

intentional waiver. 

As noted, the PSR calculated Olejiya’s offense level as 21, 

which included a 12-level increase to reflect the full amount of 

intended loss involved in the conspiracy. In his supplemental 

sentencing memorandum, Olejiya conceded that the PSR’s 

Guidelines calculation was correct as to the applicable loss 

amount. See Appendix for Appellants (App.) 113 (“The PSR 

[] quite correctly . . . adds 12 levels . . . .”). He argued, 

however, that the Guidelines “unfairly dictate consideration of 

intended loss amounts.” Id. At Olejiya’s sentencing hearing, 

the prosecutor noted his uncertainty whether Olejiya was 

disputing the Guidelines calculation or simply asking for a 

downward variance from the applicable range. See 10/11/12 

Sent. Tr. 9–10.3

 After the district court inquired, defense 

counsel repeated his concession that “the probation office 

correctly calculated the guidelines and that under the 

guidelines they can and perhaps should take into account the 

intended loss.” Id. at 10. Although defense counsel pressed 

the argument that “the way the guidelines work in these fraud 

cases . . . [is] not fair,” he repeated that Olejiya was “not 

disputing that under the guidelines, the court can add 12 

points.” Id. at 12; see also id. at 78 (“Can you legally accept 

that? Of course you can. I have admitted that from Day One. 

. . . I can’t appeal it.”). As a result of these concessions, the 

 3 See generally Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) 

(noting difference between “procedural error” of court’s failure to 

calculate Guidelines range properly and sentence’s “substantive 

reasonableness”). 

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district court treated the loss amount as undisputed. Id. at 56, 

96. 

 

We recently held that a defendant who conceded the 

propriety of a sentencing enhancement in a plea agreement and 

at sentencing waived any challenge to the enhancement 

because he 

did not merely fail to object to the enhancement; his 

decision not to challenge the enhancement was 

deliberate. Starting with his plea agreement and 

continuing through filings and arguments at his 

sentencing hearing, [he] affirmed that the district 

court should use the enhancement in calculating his 

Guidelines range. His focus was elsewhere, on 

persuading the court to sentence him outside of the 

Guidelines. 

Laslie, 716 F.3d at 614; see also United States v. Jackson, 346 

F.3d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding waiver where defendant 

conceded applicability of enhancement in letter to sentencing 

court and at sentencing hearing). So too here. Although, 

unlike Laslie, Olejiya did not plead guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement, he nonetheless conceded that the PSR correctly 

calculated his Guidelines range. He instead focused his 

efforts on persuading the court to sentence him below that 

range. 

Whether or not there was a strategic purpose for Olejiya’s 

concession is irrelevant so long as it was indeed a knowing and 

intentional decision and not a mere oversight: “Even if we 

could determine counsel’s reasons for the concession, the 

District Court was entitled to rely” on it. United States v. 

Moore, 703 F.3d 562, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Moore held that a 

defendant who objects to the PSR’s Guidelines calculation but 

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subsequently withdraws the objection has waived the 

opportunity to raise it on appeal. Id. at 571–72; accord United 

States v. Robinson, 744 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2014); United 

States v. Bowers, 743 F.3d 1182, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Venturella, 585 F.3d 1013, 1018–19 (7th Cir. 

2009). The initial objection is significant because it 

demonstrates that the defendant did not simply overlook the 

issue. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 

1204–07 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing distinction between 

waiver and forfeiture in similar case); cf. Olano, 507 U.S. at 

733. Although Olejiya did not withdraw an initial objection, 

we nevertheless think it plain that he was aware of the relevant 

conduct issue and simply chose not to contest it. The 

Government’s sentencing memorandum—under a bold-faced 

heading labeled “Enhancement . . . for Loss Amount”—cited 

Childress for the proposition that only conduct reasonably 

foreseeable to the defendant can be attributed to him at 

sentencing. App. 86–87. And at the sentencing hearing, the 

district court made a point of clarifying that Olejiya’s 

acceptance of the loss amount calculation in his sentencing 

memorandum was indeed a knowing concession that no 

procedural error had occurred. See 10/11/12 Sent. Tr. 9–10. 

Just as “[t]his court does not allow parties to reopen issues 

waived by stipulation at trial . . . , we will not review a belated 

challenge on an issue a party agreed not to dispute in 

sentencing proceedings below.” Laslie, 716 F.3d at 615 

(citing United States v. Harrison, 204 F.3d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir. 

2000)); cf. United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647, 658 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994) (defendant waived argument that crack cocaine 

found in cigarette package should not have been considered in 

calculating Guidelines offense level after conceding opposite 

below). Olejiya waived any argument that the district court 

committed procedural error. 

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B. Akinadewo 

 As noted, Akinadewo did not raise the loss attribution 

issue below. The Government contends that he waived his 

challenge to the loss amount by conceding that the Guidelines 

were correctly calculated. We assume without deciding that 

Akinadewo merely forfeited the issue because we conclude 

that he cannot establish plain error. See Tann, 532 F.3d at 

872. 

 On plain-error review, the defendant bears the burden of 

demonstrating that any error was prejudicial. Olano, 507 U.S. 

at 734. In the sentencing context, that burden is “slightly less 

exacting than it is in the context of trial errors.” United States 

v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, the 

defendant must “offer some reason to suspect that the District 

Court’s error likely resulted in an incorrect sentence.” United 

States v. Williams, 358 F.3d 956, 966 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

Akinadewo has not done so. 

 The Government’s “Flow of Funds” chart, as Akinadewo 

concedes, explicitly links him to $126,200 in stolen funds—a 

$109,200 wire transfer from A.S.’s legitimate Armed Forces 

Bank account to two fraudulent E*Trade accounts and a 

$17,000 check drawn on another legitimate account and 

deposited in the fraudulent Charles Schwab account. 4

 

Although that amount is less than the $200,000 necessary for 

the 12-level enhancement, Akinadewo has given us no reason 

to believe the district court would likely reach a different 

sentence. As discussed, Akinadewo played a supervisory role 

 4 Akinadewo deposited a $20,000 check and attempted to 

deposit another $30,000 check, both drawn on the fraudulent 

E*Trade accounts. He also purchased $6,000 in money orders 

using a debit card associated with the E*Trade accounts. 

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in the scheme and had access to the checkbooks for the 

fraudulent accounts. From the numerous calls made from 

Akinadewo’s cell phone (or his sister’s) to all of the banks 

involved in the scheme, the district court inferred that 

Akinadewo was checking the balances on the accounts. It was 

therefore “reasonably foreseeable” to Akinadewo that more 

than $200,000 in fraudulent funds was in fact held in those 

accounts and thus involved in the conspiracy. U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); see United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 

1036–37 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (relying in part upon defendant’s 

“regular and constant communications with Mr. Franklin about 

the quantity of PCP on the street” to establish conspiracy’s 

entire amount was foreseeable by, and therefore attributable to, 

defendant). Because the balance in the fraudulent accounts 

formed the basis for the district court’s loss calculation, we 

have no reason to think that the district court would attribute a 

lower amount to Akinadewo on remand. See Childress, 58 

F.3d at 724 (no plain error where it is not “reasonably likely 

that the district court would have assigned [defendant] a 

different and lower base offense level if it had made the 

requisite findings”). 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the 

district court. 

 So ordered.

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