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Parties Involved:
Harold Lacy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2740

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,   

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

HAROLD LACY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 14‐cr‐20073 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 12, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 17, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and

PETERSON, District Judge.

PETERSON, District Judge. Harold Lacy pleaded guilty to a

federal charge of heroin distribution. The district court sen‐

tenced Lacy to 168 months of incarceration, consecutive to

any sentence he might receive on state‐court charges that

                                                   Of the Western District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

Case: 15-2740 Document: 25 Filed: 02/17/2016 Pages: 8
2 No. 15‐2740

were pending at the time of his federal sentencing. Lacy ul‐

timately received a lengthy sentence on the state charges,

and he now appeals the federal court’s imposition of a con‐

secutive sentence as an abuse of discretion. But Lacy waived

his right to appeal any aspect of his sentence, and thus we

must dismiss Lacy’s appeal, despite our reservations about

the way in which the consecutive sentence was imposed

here.

BACKGROUND

Lacy was indicted on one count of distribution of heroin,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Because of his prior drug

convictions, Lacy faced a maximum term of incarceration of

30 years. On March 20, 2015, Lacy entered into a written plea

agreement, in which he agreed to plead guilty and waive his

appeal rights, subject to limited exceptions. For its part, the

government agreed to: (1) allow Lacy to cooperate and, if

appropriate, recommend a reduction for substantial assis‐

tance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1; and (2) recommend a sentence

at the low end of the advisory guideline range. During the

colloquy at his plea hearing, Lacy acknowledged that he un‐

derstood his appeal rights and that he agreed to waive them

as part of the negotiations to receive the benefit of the gov‐

ernment’s promises.

At sentencing, the government made good on its promis‐

es, recommending that Lacy receive a sentence at the bottom

of the guideline range and moving for a 10 percent down‐

ward departure for Lacy’s substantial assistance. Thus, as

expected, the government recommended that Lacy receive a

sentence of 168 months.

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No. 15‐2740 3

But the sentencing hearing included a surprise: at the

close of its presentation, the government asked that Lacy’s

federal sentence run consecutive to any sentence that he

would receive for then‐pending state‐court charges. The

prosecutor made the request “as a courtesy” to the prosecu‐

tor of the state charges:  

The only additional thing I was going to add is

the State’s Attorney—there’s a pending case in

Macon County right now, and the State’s At‐

torney has asked us to ask you to run the sen‐

tences consecutive. Now, as a matter of policy, I

generally don’t ask that. I typically ask the last

judge in time to do so; however, as a courtesy

to a fellow prosecutor, I’m relaying their re‐

quest to you. That was the only thing I wanted

to add to this.

Dkt. 17, at 52. The district court adopted the government’s

recommendations and sentenced Lacy to 168 months, to be

served consecutive to any state sentence imposed in three

state‐court cases. Lacy’s trial counsel made a record of his

objection to the imposition of a consecutive sentence without

specifying the grounds for his objection.

Lacy eventually pleaded guilty to one of the state charg‐

es, for which he received a sentence including a 20‐year term

of incarceration. The other state charges were dismissed.

Lacy now appeals the federal court’s imposition of a consec‐

utive sentence.

ANALYSIS

A criminal defendant may waive his right to appeal as

part of a plea agreement, provided that the waiver is clear

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4 No. 15‐2740

and unambiguous. United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962, 971

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 498 (2014) (citing cases). A

knowing and voluntary appeal waiver is enforceable and

bars appellate review. United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 615, 619

(7th Cir. 2004). Lacy does not contend that his waiver was

not knowing and voluntary; indeed, such an argument

would be futile in light of the thorough colloquy the magis‐

trate judge conducted at the change of plea hearing.

Lacy’s principal argument is that the plea agreement does

not specifically address the concurrent/consecutive issue,

and thus the waiver does not foreclose his appeal of the con‐

secutive aspect of his sentence. As a general rule, ordinary

contract law principles govern plea agreements, Hurlow v.

United States, 726 F.3d 958, 964 (7th Cir. 2013), and we will

“interpret the terms of the agreement according to the par‐

ties’reasonable expectations and construe any ambiguities in

the light most favorable to [the defendant].” United States v.

Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation and inter‐

nal quotation marks omitted).

Lacy’s problem is that his appeal waiver is unambiguous

and very broad. Lacy’s appeal waiver provides, in relevant

part:

[T]he defendant knowingly and voluntarily

waives the right to appeal any and all issues re‐

lating to this plea agreement and conviction

and to the sentence, including any fine or resti‐

tution, within the maximum provided in the

statutes of conviction, and the manner in

which the sentence, including any fine or resti‐

tution, was determined, on any ground what‐

ever, in exchange for the concessions made by

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No. 15‐2740 5

the United States in this plea agreement, unless

otherwise stated in this paragraph. The waiver

in this paragraph does not apply to a claim of

involuntariness or ineffective assistance of

counsel.

Dkt. 16‐2, at 22. By its terms, the appeal waiver applies to any

and all issues relating to Lacy’s sentence or the manner in

which it was determined, so long as the sentence fell within

the prescribed statutory maximum.

The waiver’s broad sweep includes the substantive issue

that Lacy raises here: whether the district court abused its

discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence. The sentence

Lacy received falls plainly within the statutory maximum,

which would have been 30 years in light of Lacy’s criminal

history. Lacy’s argument runs head‐on into our decision in

United States v. Aslan, 644 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 2011), where

we held that the decision to impose a consecutive sentence

falls easily within the scope of a similarly worded appeal

waiver. We have recognized several due process limitations

on appeal waivers, United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–

93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2864 (2014), but Lacy does

not invoke any of those. Because the issue Lacy raises on ap‐

peal is within the scope of the waiver he entered, and be‐

cause the appeal does not raise due process concerns, appel‐

late review is barred. Id.

Lacy’s second argument is that the government breached

the plea agreement by recommending that Lacy’s federal

sentence run consecutive to his anticipated state sentence.

Lacy argues that the consecutive sentence effectively im‐

posed a 408‐month term of incarceration, far above the low

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6 No. 15‐2740

end of the guideline range, which was 188 months before the

downward departure for substantial assistance.

Because Lacy did not raise this argument before the dis‐

trict court at sentencing, we review the matter for plain error.

United States v. Rachuy, 743 F.3d 205, 209 (7th Cir. 2014), reh’g

and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, (Apr. 23, 2014), cert. de‐

nied, 135 S. Ct. 249 (2014). “Under the plain‐error standard,

we will reverse the district court’s sentencing determination

only when we find: (1) an error or defect (2) that is clear or

obvious (3) affecting the defendant’s substantial rights

(4) and seriously impugning the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Goodwin,

717 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2013).

Despite Lacy’s contention to the contrary, the government

honored its plea agreement promises. The government did

recommend a sentence at the low end of the guideline range.

Lacy acknowledges that the plea agreement is silent with re‐

spect to whether his sentence would run consecutively or

concurrently; the government did not make any express or

implied promises regarding this issue. “Although the gov‐

ernment must fulfill any express or implied promise made in

exchange for a guilty plea, the parties’ rights under the plea

agreement are limited to those matters upon which they ac‐

tually agreed.” Hallahan, 756 F.3d at 974 (quoting United

States v. Williams, 102 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 1996)). The gov‐

ernment did not breach the plea agreement, and thus there

was no plain error in the district court’s sentencing Lacy un‐

der the agreement.  

Lacy’s third argument is that the plea agreement is void

because of a mutual mistake of fact. But Lacy has waived

this argument by waiting until his reply brief to raise it. See

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No. 15‐2740 7

United States v. Matchopatow, 259 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2001).

Besides, Lacy’s mutual mistake argument is ill conceived be‐

cause there was no mutual mistake of existing fact. Grun v.

Pneumo Abex Corp., 163 F.3d 411, 421 (7th Cir. 1998). Neither

side knew what would happen in Lacy’s state cases. But even

if both sides were surprised by the length of his state sen‐

tence, a surprising, unanticipated future event does not es‐

tablish a mutual mistake of fact.1

Lacy’s appeal of his sentence is foreclosed by his waiver,

and thus we must dismiss the appeal. Nevertheless, the con‐

secutive sentence gives us pause. Lacy’s state crime was un‐

related to his federal heroin conviction, so we would not

question the substantive decision to impose a consecutive

sentence. But the impetus for the consecutive sentence—

extending a courtesy to a state prosecutor—was not a proper

sentencing consideration for the district court, as the United

States acknowledged at oral argument. The district court had

the discretionary authority under Setser v. United States, 132

S. Ct. 1463, 1473 (2012), to impose the consecutive sentence,

but the court should have explained how doing so would

advance the considerations set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In

cases like this one, where a pending state sentence has yet to

be determined, a district court should consider whether the

decision to impose a consecutive sentence is better left to the

                                                  1 Lacy may not appreciate the import of the mutual mistake argu‐

ment. If a contract were based on a mutual mistake, the remedy would

be to void the agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 406 F.3d 485, 488

(7th Cir. 2005) (“When a contract is rescinded, the parties are put back

where they were before there was a contract ... . A plea agreement is the

same.” (internal citations omitted)). But the relief Lacy seeks is only to

vacate the consecutive aspect of his sentence, not to void the plea agree‐

ment, which would be followed by a new plea or, perhaps, a trial.

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state court judge who will know what that future sentence

will be.  

Appeal DISMISSED.

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