Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-02220/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-02220-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cynthia Allocco
Plaintiff
Ralph Allocco
Plaintiff
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Defendant

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1

 Under Arizona law, punitive damages cannot be awarded without an award of

compensatory damages. Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 806 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1991).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cynthia Allocco and Ralph Allocco, wife

and husband,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a

foreign corporation, 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 01-2220-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Plaintiff Cynthia Allocco (“Allocco”) requests that the Court exercise its discretionary

authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b) and grant a request for a jury trial

(Doc. # 111). For the following reasons, the Court will deny Allocco’s motion.

I. Background

For the first trial, both parties, Allocco and Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance

Company (“MetLife”), stipulated to waive their right to a jury in the September 22, 2003

Joint Proposed Pretrial Order (Doc. #46). Judge Roslyn Silver ruled the first trial in

Allocco’s favor on December 8, 2004 in the amount of $50,000 in punitive damages and $0

in compensatory damages (Doc. # 62).1

 MetLife subsequently inquired into the validity of

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this award. The Court amended the judgment on December 15, 2004, reallocating the award

amount to $20,000 in compensatory and $30,000 in punitive damages. Both parties appealed

to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the Court and “remand[ed] to the Chief

Judge of the District of Arizona for a new trial before a different district judge” (Doc. # 106).

The Ninth Circuit found, inter alia, that it was not apparent how the damages, in light of the

reallocation, correlated to the underlying factual findings. The Ninth Circuit also made clear

that they have confidence in Judge Silver’s ability to remain impartial, but remanded to a

different judge in the “interest of the appearance of fairness to the parties.”

Both parties acknowledge the Court’s discretion under Rule 39(b) to order a jury trial.

Allocco requests that the Court use this discretion and 1) disregard the joint stipulation by

both parties and 2) permit the trial to be heard before a jury on remand. As a basis for her

request, Allocco claims that, even through the Ninth Circuit ordered the trial remanded to a

different judge, any judge “down the hall” from Judge Silver will not be able to “view the

matter with an entirely clean slate.”

II. Legal Standard

Rule 39(b) provides:

(b) When No Demand Is Made. Issues on which a jury trial is

not properly demanded are to be tried by the court. But the court

may, on motion, order a jury trial on any issue for which a jury

might have been demanded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b).

This rule gives the Court discretion to order a jury trial. With respect to the failure

of a party to file a timely demand pursuant to Rule 38, the “discretion is narrow . . . and does

not permit a court to grant relief when the failure to make a timely demand results from an

oversight or inadvertence.” Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239 F.3d

1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying

request for jury demand when plaintiff erroneously calculated demand deadline) (quoting

Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1983)). Thus, the Court must deny an

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untimely request for a jury trial unless the plaintiff can make a showing beyond mere

inadvertence. Id. With respect to instances where a party explicitly waives the right to a

jury, this discretion is broad. “Under all the decisions where the right to demand a jury has

been waived, the trial court is vested with a broad degree of discretion in determining

whether a jury trial shall nonetheless be granted.” Hazelrigg v. Am. Fid. & Cas. Co., 241

F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1957). 

III. Discussion

Rule 39(b) is applicable here because a jury “might have been demanded” in the initial

trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b). By filing the joint stipulation, Allocco explicitly acknowledged

and waived her right to a jury. Once this right is waived, “it is not revived by a reversal on

appeal or by the grant of a new trial” but is “within the discretion of the trial court under Rule

39(b).” 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2321 (2008).

Furthermore, because Allocco’s request does not involve an untimely demand, the Court has

broad discretion.

In exercising its discretion under Rule 39(b) motion, the Court can consider many

factors, such as whether new issues have been found, see In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742 (D.C.

Cir. 1977) (allowing jury trial after initially waived because the defendants raised a new

defense), mistake on the part of one party, see Chanofsky v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 530

F.2d 470 (2nd Cir. 1976) (allowing jury trial after initially waived because the plaintiff had

agreed to waive his rights on the mistaken fact that he was submitting the matter for

determination for summary judgment and not a final decision on the facts), and change of

circumstances, see Ernst v. Jewel Tea Co., 13 F.R.D. 234 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (allowing jury trial

after initially waived because the circumstances and conditions prevailing at the time plaintiff

waived her rights had substantially changed). In addition, the Fifth and Eleven Circuits have

identified five factors that are particularly helpful in evaluating a Rule 39(b) motion: 1)

whether the issues are best tried to a jury; 2) whether granting the motion would result in a

disruption of the Court's or adverse party’s schedule; 3) the prejudice to the adverse party;

4) the length of the delay in requesting a jury trial; and 5) the reason for movant's tardiness

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2

 Under similar facts, the First Circuit denied a request for a jury trial on remand after

the right was initially waived stating that “[w]e think this should especially be the rule when

a trial has been completed jury-waived. Otherwise, a party who came to regret his decision

to stipulate to a bench trial could saddle an adversary who joined his stipulation with the

unfair burden of a second trial.” Hanlon v. Providence College, 615 F.2d 535, 539 (1st Cir.

1980).

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in requesting a jury trial. Daniel Intern. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 916 F.2d 1061,

1064 (5th Cir.1990); Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464

U.S. 936 (1983).

Allocco argues that the circumstances of the original trial and reasons for remand are

sufficient grounds for the Court to exercise its discretion and grant the Rule 39(b) motion.

More specifically, Allocco argues that, even through the Ninth Circuit remanded for a new

trial, she will not actually receive a new trial if it is held before a different judge in the same

courthouse. Allocco does not believe that such a judge will be able to ignore the amount of

the verdict in the original trial.

Considering the particular circumstances of this case and the factors commonly

considered by other courts, Allocco’s argument for a jury trial is not compelling. The

remanded trial does not involve a new issue. In fact, it does not differ from the first trial

where Allocco explicitly waived her right to a jury. Similarly, there has been no change in

circumstances, nor any alleged mistake on the part of Allocco. Neither is Allocco helped by

applying the factors commonly used by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits to the present facts.

No factor clearly weighs in Allocco’s favor. In fact, some weigh strongly against the

granting of a jury trial. This case does not now, on remand, contain any issue that would be

better tried to a jury. The degree of prejudice to MetLife would be significant because it

would require reformulating their defense for a new type of trial.2

 

Finally, the reason underlying Allocco’s request for a jury trial is not compelling. The

Court disagrees with Allocco’s contention that she will not retrieve a fair trial from a

different judge. Nor does the Court accept Allocco’s implication that the Ninth Circuit’s

action of remanding to a different district court judge suggests the inability of other judges

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in the same building to conduct a new and fair trial. To grant Allocco’s request on this basis

would be to accept the proposition that judges cannot be impartial, a proposition that would

undercut our system of justice.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Request for Trial by Jury (Doc. # 111) is DENIED.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2008.

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