Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00715/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00715-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gaile Edwards
Counter Claimant
Mayflower Transit, LLC
Cross Defendant
United Van Lines, LLC
Counter Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED VAN LINES, LLC and 

MAYFLOWER TRANSIT, LLC, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

GAILE EDWARDS, as an individual 

and DOES 1-10, 

 Defendants. 

_____________________________/ 

No. Civ. S-07-715 RRB DAD 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

The matter before the court is United Van Lines, LLC and 

Mayflower Transit, LLC’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with a 

court order. Defendant Gaile Edwards (“Edwards”) opposes the 

motion. For the reasons stated below, the court DENIES the 

motion.1

 

1 Inasmuch as the court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

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I. BACKGROUND 

On August 10, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that the cross-complaint 

was untimely and/or because the claims alleged therein were preempted by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 

49 U.S.C. § 14706 (“Carmack Amendment”). Docket at 11. On 

October 4, 2007, Plaintiffs’ motion was granted in part and 

denied in part, and Edwards was given thirty-days to amend her 

cross-complaint to allege a claim under the Carmack Amendment. 

Docket at 16. Edwards failed to do so. On January 14, 2008, 

Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

Docket at 20. On January 23, 2008, Edwards sought leave to 

amend her cross-complaint. Docket at 22. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Rule 41(b) 

Rule 41(b) provides in relevant part: “If the plaintiff 

fails to prosecute or to comply with . . . a court order, a 

defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against 

it.” “[W]hen a plaintiff fails to amend his complaint after the 

district judge dismisses the complaint with leave to amend, the 

dismissal is typically considered a dismissal for failing to 

 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

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comply with a court order rather than for failing to prosecute 

the claim.” Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 986 

(9th Cir. 1999). In the Ninth Circuit, involuntary dismissal 

under Rule 41(b) may be proper where a plaintiff, given the 

opportunity to amend or be dismissed, does nothing. Edwards v. 

Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004). “[I]n 

order for a court to dismiss a case as a sanction, the district 

court must consider five factors: ‘(1) the public’s interest in 

expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 

(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 

merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.’” 

Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990. Dismissal is appropriate where at 

least four factors support dismissal or at least three factors 

“strongly” support dismissal. Id. Dismissal under Rule 41(b) 

is a sanction, to be imposed only in “extreme circumstances.” 

Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 

1996). 

1. The Public’s Interest in Expeditious Resolution of 

 Litigation 

This factor supports dismissal, but not strongly. “[T]he 

public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always 

favors dismissal,” but the court determines precisely when a 

particular delay “interferes with docket management and the 

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public interest.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he 

pertinent question . . . is not simply whether there has been 

any, but rather whether there has been sufficient delay or 

prejudice to justify a dismissal of the plaintiff’s case.” 

Nealey v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S. A., 662 F.2d 

1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1980). Here, while the more than two-month 

delay has interfered with docket management, it has not done so 

such that there has been significant delay or prejudice to 

justify dismissal. 

2. The Court’s Need to Manage Its Docket 

 This factor also supports dismissal, but, again, not 

strongly. The court “is in the best position to determine what 

period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes 

unmanageable.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 400 

(9th Cir. 1998). Here, while Edwards’ delay has impeded the 

efficient management of the court’s docket by requiring 

unnecessary time and resources to be devoted to matters 

unrelated to the merits of this case, it has not rendered the 

court’s docket unmanageable. 

3. The Risk of Prejudice to Defendants from Delay 

A presumption of prejudice arises from a failure to 

prosecute, and this factor weighs in favor of dismissal, as 

well. Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 400-01. “When considering 

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prejudice to the defendant, the failure to prosecute diligently 

is sufficient by itself to justify a dismissal, even in the 

absence of a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant from 

the failure. . . . The law presumes injury from unreasonable 

delay. However, this presumption of prejudice is a rebuttable 

one and if there is a showing that no actual prejudice occurred, 

that factor should be considered when determining whether the 

trial court exercised sound discretion.” In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 

1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994). “[W]here a plaintiff has come 

forth with an excuse for his delay that is anything but 

frivolous, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to 

show at least some actual prejudice. If he does so, the 

plaintiff must then persuade the court that such claims of 

prejudice are either illusory or relatively insignificant when 

compared to the force of his excuse. At that point, the court 

must exercise its discretion by weighing the relevant factorstime, excuse, and prejudice.” Id. at 1453. Although the court 

finds Edwards’ excuse inadequate, thereby deeming it unnecessary 

for Plaintiffs to show actual prejudice, the court nonetheless 

finds that this factor does not weigh strongly in favor of 

dismissal given the duration of the delay and the prejudice 

alleged by Plaintiffs, i.e., the delay has prevented the prompt 

resolution of this matter. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991 (“[T]he 

pendency of the lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial itself 

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to warrant dismissal . . ., provided the prejudice is not 

compounded by ‘unreasonable’ delays.”). Here, Plaintiffs have 

not argued that the passage of time is leading to any losses, 

nor have Plaintiffs argued that the delay has impaired their 

ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the 

rightful decision of the case. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1453 

(prejudice usually takes two forms-loss of evidence and loss of 

memory by a witness, and whether the prejudice is significant 

will depend on whether the plaintiff’s actions impair the 

defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with 

the rightful decision of the case). Accordingly, this factor 

weighs in favor of dismissal, but not strongly. 

4. The Policy Favoring Disposition of Cases on their Merits 

The public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 

merits always weighs against dismissal. Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 

399; Yourish, 191 F.3d at 992. Here, Plaintiffs have not 

advanced any arguments as to why public policy would not favor 

resolution of this action on the merits. 

5. The Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives 

This factor also weighs against dismissal, particularly 

since the court has not considered or tried less drastic 

alternatives to dismissal. See Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 401. In 

the Ninth Circuit, “[e]specially when a case is still young 

[referring to a case that was not quite a year old], ‘a district 

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court must consider . . . less drastic alternative sanctions’ 

before dismissing.” Raiford v. Pounds, 640 F.2d 944, 945 (9th 

Cir. 1981). “The district court abuses its discretion if it 

imposes a sanction of dismissal without first considering the 

impact of the sanction and the adequacy of less drastic 

sanctions.” Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 131 

(9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, 

because the court has not attempted or tried less drastic 

alternative sanctions to dismissal, such as warning Edwards of 

the possibility of dismissal for violating the court’s order or 

allowing Edwards additional time to amend her cross-complaint, 

this factor weighs against dismissal. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 

992 (allowing a party to replead is a less drastic alternative 

to dismissal if that party has disobeyed a court order by 

failing to file an amended complaint within the time period 

allowed by the court); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 

F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (less drastic alternatives to 

dismissal under Rule 41(b) include allowing further amended 

complaints or allowing additional time).

In sum, because only three factors slightly support 

dismissal, dismissal of the cross-complaint pursuant to Rule 

41(b) is inappropriate. 

// 

// 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES the motion. 

Edwards has ten-days from service of this order to file her 

proposed amended cross-complaint.2

 The court cautions Edwards 

that any further delays in this regard could result in 

dismissal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2008. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

 

2

 Under Rule 15, “leave shall be freely given when justice 

so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “‘[T]his policy is “to be 

applied with extreme liberality.’” Owens v. Kaiser Found. 

Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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