Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50436/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50436-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
El Paso Independent School District
Appellee
M.L. as next friend of A.L.
Appellant

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50436

Summary Calendar

M.L. AS NEXT FRIEND OF A.L.,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

EL PASO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:08-cv-00076-KC

Before KING, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant A.L., through his mother M.L., appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(“IDEA”) as moot and the district court’s order allowing the El Paso Independent

School District (“EPISD”) to reevaluate him without his mother’s consent. For

the following reasons, we AFFIRM. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 9, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 09-50436

 The free appropriate public education that a disabled student is entitled to receive 1

under the IDEA must be tailored to the student’s need through an individual educational

program, which is “a written statement prepared at a meeting attended by a qualified

representative of the school district, a teacher, the child’s parents or guardians, and, when

appropriate, the child himself.” Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d

245, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). “In Texas, the persons charged with preparing an [individual

educational program] are known collectively as an Admissions, Review and Dismissal

Committee.” Id. 

2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant is a student in the EPISD where he was identified as a student

with a speech impairment. Because of his impairment, an Admission, Review,

and Dismissal Committee (“ARD Committee”) determined that Appellant

required, among other things, sixty minutes of speech-language pathology

services a week. 

1

In 2006, Appellant’s mother, M.L., received a letter which informed her

that the school district was experiencing a shortage of qualified speech

therapists and that, as a consequence, some of Appellant’s speech therapy

sessions had been missed. The letter also stated that EPISD would convene an

ARD Committee to determine the frequency and duration of any compensatory

services required for the missed sessions. EPISD admits that no such ARD

Committee meeting was held after this letter and that Appellant has not been

provided with such services. 

On October 5, 2007, an ARD Committee met to conduct its annual review

of Appellant’s individual educational program, as well as Appellant’s progress

under that program. Appellant’s individual educational program was tailored

to his specific speech needs (“speech-IEP”). After reviewing Appellant’s progress,

the ARD Committee determined that Appellant was no longer speech disabled

and, therefore, no longer eligible for special education services. M.L. disagreed

with the committee’s determination and requested an additional evaluation of

Appellant. The committee agreed and recessed the meeting until October 22,

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No. 09-50436

3

2007. M.L. did not raise the issue of compensatory speech services at this

meeting. 

The ARD Committee reconvened on November 1, 2007, after canceling the

October 22 meeting due to the unavailability of Appellant’s counsel. Although

Appellant’s counsel was aware of the meeting, neither M.L. nor Appellant’s

counsel attended the meeting. The ARD Committee reviewed its previous

decision and again concluded that Appellant was no longer speech disabled and

that he no longer needed speech therapy services. The committee also concluded

that EPISD should conduct an additional full individual evaluation (“FIE”) of

Appellant in order to determine whether Appellant suffered from Attention

Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). M.L. refused to give her consent to the

additional FIE, and, because of her refusal, EPISD was barred by the IDEA from

conducting the additional evaluation. 

Although the ARD Committee had postponed its meeting until November

1 at the request of Appellant’s counsel, Appellant, through his mother M.L., did

not wait for the November 1 meeting to occur before initiating administrative

proceedings against EPISD. On October 10, 2007, Appellant filed a due process

compliant (“Due Process Complaint”) with the Texas Education Agency (“TEA”),

and the TEA assigned a Special Education Hearing Officer (“Hearing Officer”)

to hear Appellant’s complaint. After receiving Appellant’s complaint, EPISD

attempted to settle with Appellant by making several unsuccessful offers, which

included an offer to provide Appellant with one hour of compensatory services

for each hour he missed. Appellant did not accept any of EPISD’s offers.

Asserting that its settlement offers had provided Appellant with all the relief he

requested, EPISD moved to dismiss Appellant’s Due Process Complaint as moot.

EPISD also filed a counterclaim, seeking permission to reevaluate Appellant for

ADHD without M.L.’s consent. The Hearing Officer granted EPISD’s motion to

dismiss, finding that EPISD’s settlement offers had mooted Appellant’s

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No. 09-50436

2

 EPISD also brought a Third-Party Complaint that sought attorney’s fees from

Appellant’s counsel. Finding that Appellant’s counsel continued to litigate Appellant’s claims

after they became frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation, the district court awarded

EPISD attorney’s fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II). The district court’s award of

attorney’s fees was separately appealed and docketed under Case No. 09-50841. Itis not before

us here.

 The district court did not decide whether EPISD’s settlement offers mooted 3

Appellant’s complaint. Because we find that the district court did not err in dismissing

Appellant’s complaint based on the fact that he was no longer speech disabled, we do not reach

the issue of whether EPISD’s settlement offers were sufficient to moot Appellant’s complaint.

4

complaint. The Hearing Officer denied EPISD’s counterclaim, holding that 20

U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(i) prohibited any reevaluation of Appellant because the

school district had already evaluated Appellant once in 2007 and M.L. refused

to consent to an additional evaluation.

Aggrieved by the Hearing Officer’s dismissal, Appellant filed a complaint

in the district court, requesting reinstatement of his Due Process Complaint, and

EPISD filed a counterclaim, seeking permission to reevaluate Appellant without

M.L.’s consent. EPISD again asserted that Appellant’s complaint was moot; 2

however, instead of solely relying on its settlement offers, EPISD also argued

that Appellant’s complaint was mooted by the fact that Appellant was no longer

speech disabled. The district court agreed with EPISD’s speech-disability

argument and dismissed Appellant’s complaint as moot. EPISD also moved for

summary judgment on its counterclaim, and the district court granted its

motion. This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint

as moot and in granting EPISD’s motion for summary judgment on its

counterclaim. Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM. 

A. Appellant’s Complaint

The district court found that Appellant’s complaint was moot because he

was no longer speech disabled. Whether a case is moot is a question of law that 3

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No. 09-50436

 Appellant’s complaint in the district court sought reinstatement of his Due Process 4

Complaint, which requested that EPISD provide the following forms of relief: (1) notice to M.L.

of any changes to Appellant’s speech-IEP; (2) speech services as required by Appellant’s

speech-IEP; (3) compensatory speech services; and (2) an ARD committee meeting to develop

goals for Appellant’s compensatory speech therapy services. Because Appellant is no longer

speech disabled, his speech-IEP is no longer applicable and he no longer requires any speech

therapy services; therefore, Appellant’s claims are moot. See Bd. of Educ. of Downers Grove

Grade Sch. Dist. No. 58 v. Steven L., 89 F.3d 464, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that a

complaint regarding a student’s IEP was mooted by the fact that the IEP was no longer

applicable to the student). The request for “compensatory” speech therapy for an impediment

that no longer exists does not present a “live” case or controversy. 

 In his brief, Appellant argues that he continues to be classified as speech impaired 5

and continues to receive speech therapy pursuant to the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(j) (stating that “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted [under the IDEA,]

the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement”). Appellant asserts that

these facts show that his complaint is not moot. These facts, however, just show that EPISD

is abiding by the IDEA’s requirement that Appellant remain in his then-current educational

placement during the pendency of this litigation; they do not show that the district court erred

in finding that Appellant was no longer speech disabled. 

5

we review de novo. Bayou Liberty Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 217 F.3d

393, 396 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 189 (5th

Cir. 1989)). We find that the district court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s

complaint as moot. 

4

Appellant argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint

because he did not have an opportunity to contest whether he was speech

disabled. This contention is erroneous because Appellant had the opportunity

to contest this fact in the district court; instead of contesting it, Appellant simply

remained silent—he offered no argument in rebuttal nor any evidence to

contradict EPISD’s assertion that he was no longer speech disabled. 

5

Appellant also argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction to

consider whether he was speech disabled because the issue was not raised and

litigated before the Hearing Officer. The district court considered the issue of

Appellant’s speech disability because Appellant’s case would be moot if he was

not speech disabled. The question of mootness is a jurisdictional matter, Bailey

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No. 09-50436

 In his brief, Appellant did not argue that his claims were saved by any exception to 6

the doctrine of mootness. As a consequence, all such arguments are waived. See Jason D.W.

ex rel. Douglas W. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 205, 210 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998)

(“[F]ailure to provide any legal or factual analysis of an issue . . . waives that issue.”). 

6

v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987), and “a federal court always

has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction,” United States v. Ruiz, 536

U.S. 622, 628 (2002). Because the question of mootness is jurisdictional, it can

be raised at any time by any party or by the court sua sponte. See Bailey, 821

F.2d at 278. Accordingly, even in IDEA cases, a party may raise facts that

render a case moot at anytime, even if those facts were not raised or litigated in

the administrative proceedings that preceded litigation in federal court. See

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 (1988) (finding that a student’s claim for relief

under the Education of the Handicapped Act, which is now the IDEA, was

mooted by a fact that was raised for the first time on appeal); Pamela R. ex rel.

Thomas R.W. v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 130 F.3d 477, 479 (1st Cir. 1997);

Malkentzos v. DeBuono, 102 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1996). Therefore, the district

court had jurisdiction to consider whether Appellant was speech disabled

because that fact was determinative of the court’s own jurisdiction. See Ruiz,

536 U.S. at 628. 

Because Appellant has failed to raise any grounds for reversing the district

court’s dismissal of his complaint, we find that the district court did not err in

dismissing Appellant’s complaint as moot. 

6

B. EPISD’s Counterclaim

Appellant argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear

EPISD’s counterclaim because the counterclaim was mooted by the fact that 20

U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(i) no longer applied as bar to any reevaluation. Section

1414(a)(2)(B)(i) prohibits school districts from reevaluating students “more

frequently than once a year, unless the parent” agrees otherwise. At the time

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No. 09-50436

 The only exception to this general rule, which is inapplicable to the present dispute, 7

is found in 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(3), which states, “informed parental consent need not be

obtained if the local educational agency can demonstrate that it had taken reasonable

measures to obtain such consent and the child’s parent has failed to respond.” 

7

the district court made its decision, more than a year had passed since

Appellant’s last evaluation, which means § 1414(a)(2)(B)(i) no longer applied as

a bar to EPISD’s requested reevaluation. Because § 1414(a)(2)(B)(i) no longer

applied, Appellant asserts that EPISD did not need M.L.’s consent to conduct its

reevaluation and, therefore, EPISD’s counterclaim was moot. Appellant’s

assertion is incorrect. Under the IDEA, before any reevaluation of a student can

occur, a “local education agency [must] obtain informed parental consent.” 20 7

U.S.C. § 1414(c)(3). If a parent refuses to give consent, a school district must

obtain an order allowing it to conduct the evaluation without parental consent.

Shelby S. ex rel. Kathleen T. v. Conroe Indep. Sch. Dist., 454 F.3d 450, 454-55

(5th Cir. 2006). Therefore, given M.L.’s continued refusal to consent to any

reevaluation of Appellant, the fact that § 1414(a)(2)(B)(i) no longer applied did

not moot the school district’s counterclaim because the school district was still

barred by § 1414(c)(3) from reevaluating Appellant without an administrative

or judicial order. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court had

jurisdiction over EPISD’s counterclaim because the claim was not mooted by §

1414(a)(2)(B)(i)’s inapplicability. M.L. makes no challenge to the substance of

the court’s order requiring reevaluation.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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