Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-17-15983/USCOURTS-ca9-17-15983-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Byers
Appellee
Farris Day
Appellee
Jaime Famoso
Appellee
Willie Franklin
Appellee
Joshua Harold
Appellee
Karl Merhoff
Appellee
Time Opitz
Appellee
Charles Ridgeway
Appellee
Dan Thatcher
Appellee
Walmart Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES RIDGEWAY; JAIME 

FAMOSO; JOSHUA HAROLD;

RICHARD BYERS; DAN THATCHER;

WILLIE FRANKLIN; TIME OPITZ;

FARRIS DAY; KARL MERHOFF,

Plaintiffs-Appellees/

Cross-Appellants,

v.

WALMART INC., DBA Wal-Mart 

Transportation LLC,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 17-15983

 17-16142

D.C. No.

3:08-cv-05221-SI

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 6, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed January 6, 2020

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2 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Eugene E. Siler,*

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Siler

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by

Judge O’Scannlain

SUMMARY**

Class Action / California Employment Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment 

awarding tens of millions of dollars in damages in a class 

action brought by Wal-Mart California truck drivers alleging 

employment-related claims.

The case was initially filed in state court by four truck 

drivers. Wal-Mart removed the suit to federal court, and the 

parties agreed to a stay until the California Supreme Court 

issued Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 273 P.3d 

513 (Cal. 2012) (holding that employers must make meal 

and rest breaks available, but do not have to ensure that 

employees take such breaks). After the stay was lifted, 

plaintiffs filed their fourth amended complaint and dropped 

some initial plaintiffs while adding new class plaintiffs. The 

district court certified the new class, granted partial 

summary judgment to plaintiffs on their minimum wage 

* The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 3

liability claims, and eventually conducted a jury trial and 

entered judgment.

The panel held that Wal-Mart raised no reversible error.

The panel rejected Wal-Mart’s claim that the district 

court erred by failing to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The 

panel held that the district court correctly concluded that the 

case presented an Article III case or controversy because two 

lead plaintiffs remained in the action after the stay was lifted.

The panel rejected Wal-Mart’s claims that plaintiffs 

should not have been awarded damages for layovers, rest 

breaks, and inspections. Specifically, the panel held that the 

district court correctly concluded that, under California law, 

time drivers spent on layovers was compensable if Wal-Mart 

exercised control over the drivers during those breaks. The 

panel further held that a comprehensive review of the WalMart pay manual demonstrated that it unambiguously 

required drivers to obtain preapproval to take a layover at 

home, and therefore, the district court did not err in granting 

partial summary judgment on this issue to plaintiffs. The 

panel also held that the district court correctly determined 

that Wal-Mart’s written policies, if applied as written, 

resulted in Wal-Mart exercising control over employees 

during mandated layovers as a matter of California law. The 

panel held that the district court properly instructed the jury 

on layovers. The panel also held that there was sufficient 

evidence for the jury to find that Wal-Mart had exercised 

control over its drivers. The panel rejected Wal-Mart’s 

contention that the Federal Aviation Administration 

Authorization Act preempted California law governing 

layovers. The panel also affirmed the district court’s 

judgment awarding damages to plaintiffs for rest breaks and 

inspections.

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4 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

The panel held that the district court did not err in 

certifying a class and allowing representative evidence as 

proof of classwide damages – including plaintiffs’ expert Dr. 

Phillips’ testimony and sample.

On cross-appeal, plaintiffs argued that the district court 

erred in denying liquidated damages. The panel held that the 

district court did not err in finding that Wal-Mart acted in 

good faith and with a reasonable belief in the legality of its 

action, and therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of 

liquidated damages.

Judge O’Scannlain concurred in the majority’s opinion, 

except for Part II.B.1.b. Judge O’Scannlain did not agree 

with the majority’s conclusion that the district court 

correctly granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs 

when it found that Wal-Mart’s written pay policies 

necessarily establish that the company “controlled” drivers 

during layovers. In his view, the jury should have been 

allowed to decide the meaning of these ambiguous policies 

and the extent to which the policies actually “control” what 

drivers may do and where they may go.

COUNSEL

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. (argued) and Lauren M. Blas, 

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, California; 

Rachel S. Brass and Joseph A. Gorman, Gibson, Dunn & 

Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, California; James H. Hanson, 

Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C., 

Indianapolis, Indiana; for Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 5

Michael Rubin (argued) and Matthew Murray, Altshuler 

Berzon LLP, San Francisco, California; Lawrence M. 

Artenian and Laura E. Brown, Wagner Jones Kopfman & 

Artenian LLP, Fresno, California; Jacob M. Weisberg, Law 

Office of Jacob M. Weisberg, Fresno, California; Stanley 

Saltzman, Marlin & Saltzman LLP, Agoura Hills, 

California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

OPINION

SILER, Circuit Judge:

Long-haul truckers perform a vital service in the nation’s 

economy. No wonder then, that Wal-Mart, among the 

world’s largest retail companies, employs hundreds of truck 

drivers. Still, over a decade ago, drivers in California felt 

that Wal-Mart did not pay them properly in accordance with 

California law. So they sued in a class action. After a 

sixteen-day trial, the jury agreed with Wal-Mart on most 

issues. On some claims, however, the jury sided with the 

class of truckers and awarded tens of millions of dollars in 

damages.

Now, Wal-Mart asks this panel to erase that judgment. 

Wal-Mart contends that the district court erred at every step 

along the way—in concluding that it had jurisdiction, in 

certifying a class, in interpreting California minimum wage 

law, in allowing expert testimony, and in providing jury 

instructions.

But it is improper for this court to play armchair district 

judge. In the end, while Wal-Mart makes some compelling 

points, Wal-Mart raises no reversible error. Additionally, 

the district court properly concluded that liquidated damages 

are not owed under California law because Wal-Mart 

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6 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

demonstrated that it acted in good faith and with a reasonable 

belief in the legality of its conduct. Accordingly, we 

AFFIRM.

I. Background

A. The Original Lawsuit, the Stay, and the Named 

Plaintiffs

More than a decade ago, four truck drivers sued WalMart in Alameda County Superior Court claiming Wal-Mart 

violated state meal and rest break laws. Those drivers 

worked out of several distribution centers in California that 

served as hubs through which Wal-Mart delivered items 

across the western United States. As part of their job, 

truckers would travel a wide range of routes, to different 

locations, hauling different freight. And, by industry 

standards, the truckers were paid well—an average of $300 

per day and between $80,000 and more than $100,000 

annually.

Still, drivers claimed that they were not receiving 

adequate minimum wage pay. Wal-Mart paid truckers 

through what it called an activity-based pay system. That 

system included pay for (1) mileage, (2) tasks that 

constituted “activity,” such as arriving and departing a 

facility, as well as hooking a new trailer to the truck, and 

(3) hourly wages of fourteen dollars per hour for limited 

events like time spent waiting at a store or supplier, delays 

due to inclement weather, or delays caused by a truck 

breakdown.

Wal-Mart removed the suit to federal court. 

Subsequently, the parties agreed to stay the suit while the 

California Supreme Court considered an issue that would 

affect the truckers’ claims. Three years later, in Brinker 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 7

Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 273 P.3d 513 (Cal. 

2012), the California Supreme Court ruled that an employer 

must make meal and rest breaks available, but employers did 

not have to ensure that employees took such breaks.

Consequently, the stay was lifted. Just one problem: it 

was unclear if any of the named plaintiffs remained in the 

lawsuit. Of the four original plaintiffs, two had died during 

the stay, one had lost interest in pursuing the case, and class 

counsel had concerns about the fourth plaintiff’s ability to 

adequately represent the class.

Thus, plaintiffs’ counsel asked the court to order WalMart to turn over information about potential class members 

so that counsel could determine the identity of new plaintiffs 

and class representatives. Wal-Mart objected, arguing that 

without an adequate plaintiff, the district court did not have 

jurisdiction. Citing the “unique circumstances” of the case, 

and noting that information about putative class members 

would serve purposes other than finding new plaintiffs, the 

district court granted plaintiffs’ motion.

After obtaining new information from Wal-Mart, 

plaintiffs’ counsel found new named plaintiffs and filed an 

amended complaint. Under plaintiffs’ theory, Wal-Mart did 

not pay drivers for time spent under the company’s control—

such as during layovers, rest breaks, and inspections—in 

violation of California law. Plaintiffs filed their fourth 

amended complaint in 2013, seeking damages, restitution, 

and statutory penalties under California law.

B. Class Certification

Next, plaintiffs moved to certify a class. They argued 

that all Wal-Mart drivers in California after October 10, 

2004, were subject to the same written pay policies. 

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8 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

Additionally, plaintiffs contended that common issues 

predominated over any individual issues because there were 

only “minor variations” among the class members.

Wal-Mart objected. It argued that huge variations 

among truckers’ locations, routes, and duties could lead to 

differences in pay, so individual issues infected the class, 

making certification inappropriate.

The district court agreed with plaintiffs and certified the 

class.

C. Pre-Trial Partial Summary Judgment for Plaintiffs

Then, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. 

Plaintiffs argued that Wal-Mart did not pay drivers for all 

job duties, required drivers to take rest breaks without pay, 

and “controlled” drivers during ten-hour layover periods, 

entitling drivers to minimum wage pay.

The district court granted partial summary judgment as 

to plaintiffs’ minimum wage liability claims. The district 

court found that under Wal-Mart’s pay policy—if applied as 

written—drivers were not paid separately for some activities 

and that those activities “may not properly be built in or 

subsumed into the activity pay component of Wal-Mart’s 

pay policies.” The court also held that, under the policy, 

drivers were subject to Wal-Mart’s “control”—as defined by 

California law—during layovers. Thus, the district court 

found that Wal-Mart must pay minimum wages during those 

times. Although the district court found that Wal-Mart’s 

policies described practices that would violate California 

law, the court presented to the jury the factual question of 

whether Wal-Mart had implemented those policies.

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 9

D. Wal-Mart’s Pre-Trial Motions

After discovery concluded, Wal-Mart made several 

pretrial motions. First, it argued that the case could not 

proceed on a classwide basis based on variations in the 

routes, daily tasks, and duties of each driver. The district 

court denied the motion.

Second, Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment on the 

minimum wage claims. It argued that the Federal Aviation 

Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”) preempted

California law. Again, the district court denied the motion.

Third, Wal-Mart moved to exclude Dr. G. Michael 

Phillips from providing expert testimony about classwide 

damages. Phillips said he could “estimate how much time 

[truckers] spent performing various activities[,] and then, 

under various assumptions, . . . estimate dollar equivalent 

values for such time.” The district court also denied WalMart’s motion to exclude, ruling that Wal-Mart’s issue with 

Phillips’s proposed testimony went toward “weight rather 

than . . . admissibility.”

E. Trial and Jury Instructions

The trial occurred in 2016, focusing on plaintiffs’ 

minimum wage claims for eleven separate activities from 

October 2004 to October 2015.

Among the jury instructions, the district court issued a

California minimum wage instruction stating:

“Wages” includes all amounts for labor 

performed by an employee, whether the 

amount is calculated by time, task, piece, 

commission, or some other method. The rate 

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10 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

of the minimum wage is set forth in 

Instruction No. 13.

The Court has previously found that WalMart’s 2008 driver pay manual states that no 

pay is earned for certain tasks. Such a policy, 

if enforced or applied, does not comply with 

California’s minimum wage laws. A policy 

that does not compensate directly for all time 

worked does not comply with California 

Labor Codes, even if, averaged out, it would 

pay at least minimum wage for all hours 

worked. Therefore, if Wal-Mart applied the 

policy as it is stated in the driver pay manual, 

such that no pay was earned for certain tasks, 

then it did not comply with California’s 

minimum wage law. Wal-Mart may, 

however, pay drivers for certain tasks 

through activity codes that include those 

tasks.

What is stated in any pay plan or written 

policy does not itself establish whether 

someone was paid the minimum wage. 

Rather, plaintiffs must still prove that, in 

accordance with the pay policy, the class 

members in fact were not paid for certain 

tasks. Plaintiffs have the burden to prove 

their claims.

The court also instructed the jury about layovers:

Plaintiffs claim that Wal-Mart owes them 

unpaid wages for time spent during 10-hour 

“layovers” at the end of a shift. Plaintiffs 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 11

claim that Wal-Mart owes them the 

difference between the layover fee paid by 

Wal-Mart and the wages that plaintiffs claim 

should have been paid according to the 

minimum wage rate required by state law.

Under California law, employers must pay 

employees at least the minimum wage per 

hour for all hours worked. “Hours worked” is 

defined as “the time during which an 

employee is subject to the control of an 

employer, and includes all the time the 

employee is suffered or permitted to work, 

whether or not required to do so.” The level 

of the employer’s control over its employees, 

rather than the mere fact that the employer 

requires the employee’s activity, is 

determinative.

The Court has previously found that the 

policies stated in Wal-Mart’s driver pay 

manuals subjected drivers to Wal-Mart’s 

control during layover periods. Under 

California law, the drivers must be paid for 

all of the time that they were subject to WalMart’s control. Therefore, if plaintiffs prove 

by a preponderance of the evidence that WalMart applied the policy as it is stated in the 

driver pay manuals, then plaintiffs are 

entitled to the amount of additional pay that 

will bring Wal-Mart’s payment for each 10-

hour layover up to the amount of the 

minimum wage that was applicable at that 

time.

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12 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

You must limit your calculations to wages for 

layovers that occurred during the period 

beginning on October 10, 2005 and ending on 

October 15, 2015.

The court further gave the following damages 

instruction:

If you find for the plaintiffs on the plaintiffs’ 

minimum wage claim, you must determine 

the plaintiffs’ damages. The plaintiffs have 

the burden of proving damages by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Damages 

means the amount of money that will 

reasonably and fairly compensate the 

plaintiffs for any injury you find was caused 

by Wal-Mart, in accordance with these 

instructions.

It is for you to determine what damages, if 

any, have been proved.

Your award must be based upon evidence and 

not upon speculation, guesswork or 

conjecture.

In instances where Wal-Mart did not 

maintain records of the number of times 

certain work duties were performed or the 

amount of time it took class members to 

perform those duties, the plaintiffs can satisfy 

their burden of proof if they produce 

sufficient evidence to show the amount and 

extent of that work as a matter of just and 

reasonable inference. Wal-Mart may dispute 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 13

the reasonableness of the inference to be 

drawn from the plaintiffs’ evidence.

The jury, seemingly confused about the instruction on 

layovers, asked a question, seeking a “definition regarding 

Wal-Mart’s control during layover period.” In response, the 

court instructed the jury as follows:

There is no clear definition of control in the 

California Labor Code. The cases from the 

California courts have stated that the level of 

the employer’s control over its employees, 

rather than the mere fact that the employer 

requires the employees activity, is 

determinative. To determine if a driver was 

subject to Wal-Mart’s control during the 

layover, you must determine whether the 

driver was able to use that time effectively for 

his or her own purposes.

I will give you two examples from other 

cases. These involve different factual 

situations, and they may be helpful to you as 

guidance only. They may be helpful to you as 

analogies. The facts in those cases were 

different from these facts. But here are the 

two examples.

When an employer directs, commands or 

restrains an employee from leaving the 

workplace during his or her lunch hour and 

thus prevents the employee from using the 

time effectively for his or her own purposes, 

the employee remains subject to the 

employer’s control.

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14 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

And here is the second example. When 

agricultural worker employees were required 

by their employer to meet at designated 

places to take the employer’s buses to work 

and were prohibited from taking their own 

transportation, the employees were subject to 

the control of the employer, although they 

could read on the bus or perform other 

personal activities.

Wal-Mart called the supplemental instruction one it 

“c[ould] live with” because it was “a fair compromise.” 

Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for WalMart on seven of the eleven tasks in dispute, and for 

plaintiffs on four issues. The jury awarded $44,699,766 for 

layovers, $3,961,975 for rest breaks, $2,971,220 for pre-trip 

inspections, and $2,971,220 for post-trip inspections.

The district court denied plaintiffs’ post-trial motion for 

liquidated damages and civil penalties. And the court denied 

Wal-Mart’s motions for a new trial and for judgment as a 

matter of law. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Wal-Mart raises multiple issues, claiming each 

constitutes reversible error. First, it claims the district court 

erred by failing to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Second, 

it contends that it was error to award damages to plaintiffs 

based on layovers, rest breaks, and inspections. Third, it

argues that the district court erred in certifying a class. We

affirm the district court on all assertions of error raised by 

Wal-Mart.

Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal. They contend that the 

district court erred by denying liquidated damages to 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 15

plaintiffs as required under California law. We disagree. As 

a result, we affirm on the issue of liquidated damages.

A. Jurisdiction After Stay Was Lifted

1. Active Case or Controversy

We review the district court’s ruling on jurisdiction de 

novo. Smith v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 570 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th 

Cir. 2009).

The district court correctly concluded that this case 

presented an Article III case or controversy because two lead 

plaintiffs remained in the action after the stay was lifted.

Wal-Mart argues that any “case or controversy” 

disappeared because, after the stay was lifted, no named 

plaintiff remained to represent the class. Thus, Wal-Mart 

contends the case was moot when the stay was lifted.

Wal-Mart is partially correct. When the stay was lifted, 

two of the named plaintiffs had died, one of the named 

plaintiffs indicated that he might no longer be interested in 

litigating the matter, and plaintiffs’ counsel was concerned 

about whether the fourth named plaintiff could represent the 

class. And, at that time, the class had not yet been certified, 

so the putative class members were not parties to the case. 

See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 

(2013). But not all named plaintiffs were gone. Two named 

plaintiffs remained parties to the action when the stay was 

lifted.

The cases Wal-Mart cites in support of its position are 

unavailing. For instance, Reed v. Bowen is easily 

distinguished from this case because, in Reed, the district 

court had already determined that the named plaintiffs were 

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16 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

not adequate representatives because they had no stake in the 

outcome of the litigation. 849 F.2d 1307, 1311 (10th Cir. 

1988). Since no adequate named plaintiffs remained in 

Reed, the district court held that the case was moot and 

refused to certify the class. Id. That is not the case here. 

The district court never found the two remaining named 

plaintiffs inadequate, and both remaining named plaintiffs 

continued to have a stake in the outcome of the litigation 

after the stay was lifted.

Moreover, Wal-Mart would be correct had the remaining 

plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims before the 

putative class was certified. See Employers-Teamsters 

Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Tr. Fund v. Anchor Cap. 

Advisors, 498 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2007). But lethargy 

does not constitute voluntary dismissal when the lethargic 

plaintiff continues to have an active dispute with the 

defendant. Here, plaintiffs continued to have live 

controversies with Wal-Mart despite one plaintiff’s lack of 

enthusiasm and counsel’s concern about the other. The 

district court correctly refused to dismiss this case for lack 

of jurisdiction.

2. Abuse of Discretion

We do not address whether the district court abused its 

discretion by permitting pre-certification discovery because 

Wal-Mart does not argue the issue. In its opening brief, WalMart argues only that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

issue the pre-certification discovery order. When an 

appellant fails to clearly and distinctly raise an argument in 

its opening brief, this court considers the argument 

abandoned. McKay v. Ingleson, 558 F.3d 888, 891 n.5 (9th 

Cir. 2009). As a result, any argument that the district court 

abused its discretion in allowing pre-certification discovery 

was waived.

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 17

B. Liability for Damages Arising from Layovers, Rest 

Breaks, and Inspections

Wal-Mart claims that plaintiffs should not have been 

awarded damages for layovers, rest breaks, and inspections. 

It advances numerous theories in support of its contention 

and urges reversal. We address each in turn.

1. Award of Damages for Layovers

Wal-Mart advances four arguments in support of its 

contention that damages should not have been awarded for 

unpaid layovers. First, it argues that layovers are not 

compensable as a matter of law because Wal-Mart cannot 

legally control an employee while he is on a legallymandated break. Second, it contends that, even if layovers 

could be compensable, layovers are not compensable here 

because Wal-Mart did not exercise control over the truckers 

on layovers. Third, it claims that the district court erred 

when instructing the jury. Fourth, it argues that the FAAAA

preempts California law.

a. Compensability of Layovers Under California Law

The district court correctly concluded that, under 

California law, time drivers spent on layovers is 

compensable if Wal-Mart exercised control over the drivers 

during those breaks.

Under California and federal law, truckers must take 

breaks. 13 Cal. Code Regs. § 1212.5(a); 49 C.F.R. 

§ 395.3(a)(1). During mandatory breaks, drivers may take 

“sleeper berth” time or “off duty” time. 13 Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 1212(g)(1)(A); 49 C.F.R. § 395.1(g)(1)(i). But the drivers 

are specifically not “on duty” or “driving”—two other 

distinct categories under state and federal law—during 

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18 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

breaks. 13 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 1201(u)(4), 1213(c); 

49 C.F.R. §§ 395.2, 395.8(b). What’s more, time spent on 

layovers cannot be interrupted; otherwise, the ten-hour rest 

period begins anew. 13 Cal. Code Regs. § 1212(g)(1)(A); 

49 C.F.R. § 395.1(g)(1)(i).

So, must workers be compensated for time spent on 

legally mandated breaks? Wal-Mart says no. It says that 

surely the law cannot require a driver to be compensated for 

periods when state and federal law compel drivers not to 

work.

Wal-Mart’s argument has logical appeal, but it does not 

follow California law. In California, an employer must pay 

minimum wages whenever it controls the employee. See

8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11090. And there is no reason to think 

that, as a matter of law, an employer cannot exercise control 

of a trucker even when the driver is taking a legallymandated break.

Here, the district court identified the appropriate legal 

standard. The district court determined that “California law 

. . . requires an additional inquiry: whether the employer 

exercised control.”

In sum, whether an employee deserves pay in California 

turns on whether the employer exercised control over the 

employee, not whether the employee is actively working. 

Thus, Wal-Mart’s argument on this point fails.

b. Control, Partial Summary Judgment, and Factual 

Sufficiency

Next, Wal-Mart contends that even if layover time is 

compensable under California law, it did not exercise control 

over the truckers here. This contention can be divided into 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 19

two primary issues. First, the parties dispute whether the

district court erred in granting partial summary judgment for 

plaintiffs. Second, Wal-Mart argues that there is insufficient 

evidence to support a finding that it applied these policies in 

a manner that controlled employees during layovers.

i. Partial Summary Judgment Based on Wal-Mart’s 

Pay Policy

Wal-Mart argues that the district court erred by granting 

partial summary judgment to plaintiffs when the court found 

that Wal-Mart’s policies, as written, would constitute control 

over employees during layovers. We review the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Vasquez v. 

County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2003).

(a) Meaning of Wal-Mart’s Pay Manual

Initially, we consider the meaning of the relevant 

provisions in Wal-Mart’s pay manual. Wal-Mart argues 

that—under a correct reading—the pay manual only 

“create[s] a requirement to seek prior approval to obtain the 

$42 for a layover taken at home.” Wal-Mart contends that 

the pay manual does not require employees to seek approval 

to go home during layovers but instead requires drivers to 

seek preapproval to obtain the $42 inconvenience payment.

In support of its position, Wal-Mart cites a single 

provision of the 2008 Driver Reference and Pay Manual. 

The layover provision says:

LO – Layover Time:

A layover is earned when taking a mandatory 

DOT break and is not paid in conjunction 

with any other type of pay. The intent is to 

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20 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

pay Drivers for layovers taken in the tractor 

cab.

• Any exceptions must be approved prior to 

the Layover by the GTM, including:

o Drivers taking a layover at his/her 

residence

o Drivers taking a layover not required 

by hours of service rules

Read in isolation, this provision could support WalMart’s argument. Its meaning is sufficiently ambiguous that, 

if this provision stood alone, interpretation might have been 

a jury question.

But a more comprehensive review of the Wal-Mart pay 

manual demonstrates that it unambiguously required drivers 

to obtain preapproval to take a layover at home. For 

instance, Wal-Mart’s pay manual provides that a break may 

be taken at home “[o]nly after receiving approval from a 

member of Transportation management.” The manual also 

states that taking an “[u]nauthorized break at home” is 

“unacceptable and may lead to immediate termination.” 

These provisions make no mention of the $42 inconvenience 

fee and instead require drivers to seek preapproval before 

choosing to take a break at home. Thus, when read 

comprehensively and in context, Wal-Mart’s written policy 

clearly prohibits drivers from taking a layover at home 

unless they receive prior approval. Wal-Mart’s argument to 

the contrary lacks textual support.

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 21

(b) District Court’s Finding on Control as a Matter of 

Law

Next, we consider whether the district court erred when 

it found that, as a matter of law, the written policies in WalMart’s pay manual would amount to an exercise of control 

over drivers during layover periods if implemented as 

written. We conclude that the district court correctly 

determined that Wal-Mart’s written policies constituted 

control as a matter of California law.

Employers in California must pay at least minimum 

wages to employees for all hours worked, 8 Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 11090, including all the time in which an employer 

exercises control over the employee, Morillion v. Royal 

Packing Co., 995 P.2d 139, 143–45 (Cal. 2000). An 

employee “does not have to be working during that time to 

be compensated.” Id. at 143. California courts construe 

worker-protection laws liberally “with an eye to promoting 

such protection.” Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior 

Court, 273 P.3d 513, 527 (Cal. 2012).

What constitutes control in California is not so clear, but 

caselaw provides underlying principles. Although an 

employer may place some constraints on an employee’s 

movement during breaks, control exists if the employer goes 

too far. See Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc., 385 P.3d 823, 

832 (Cal. 2016). Thus, an employer may restrict an 

employee from traveling more than five minutes away from 

the worksite during a ten-minute break because if she does, 

she will be unable to return to the worksite before the break 

ends. Id. But control may exist if a worker, although off 

duty, remains on call. Id. 832–33. And if employees face 

disciplinary action for not responding to an employer during 

rest breaks, the employer may be exercising control. 

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22 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

Madera Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Madera, 682 P.2d 

1087, 1088–92 (Cal. 1984).

Moreover, control may exist even when employees are 

permitted to perform personal activities if the employer 

imposes meaningful restrictions on the employee. For 

instance, control was found even when employees were 

permitted to read for leisure or sleep while being forced to 

travel on a company bus to a worksite. Morillion, 995 P.3d 

at 146–47.

In short, the question of control boils down to whether 

the employee may use break or non-work time however he 

or she would like. Augustus, 385 P.3d at 832; Mendiola v. 

CPS Sec. Sols., Inc., 340 P.3d 355, 360 (Cal. 2015) (“When 

an employer directs, commands or restrains an employee 

from leaving the work place and thus prevents the employee 

from using the time effectively for his or her own purposes, 

that employee remains subject to the employer’s control.”). 

Even so, this case-specific approach focuses on the level of 

the employer’s control on employees, not necessarily 

whether the employer requires certain activities. Mendiola, 

340 P.3d at 360; Morillion, 995 P.2d at 146.

Here, the mere fact that Wal-Mart requires its employees 

to take layovers—as it must, by law—does not indicate that 

Wal-Mart exercised control over drivers during breaks. 

Rather, the relevant consideration is the level of control that 

Wal-Mart exerted over its employees during layovers.

Thus, we look back to the text of the policy. As noted, 

the written policy required drivers to gain preapproval from 

management before taking a layover at home. The manual 

also required drivers to record the break at home and the 

approving manager on the trip sheet. Finally, drivers could 

be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 23

“immediate termination,” for taking an unauthorized layover 

at home.

Analogous case law supports a finding of control here. 

Wal-Mart’s written policy is similar to the policies that were 

found to establish employer control in Morillion, 995 P.2d 

139, and Bono Enterprises, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 38 Cal. Rptr. 

2d 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), disapproved on other grounds 

by Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 927 P.2d 

296 (Cal. 1996).

In Morillion, employees were required to meet at a 

designated departure point at a set time to ride the 

employer’s buses to work. 995 P.2d at 147. Employees 

were prohibited from using their own cars and were 

subjected to verbal warnings and lost wages if they used 

personal vehicles to travel to work. Id. The California 

Supreme Court found that control existed because—even if 

the employers could engage in limited activities like sleeping 

or reading while on the bus—employees “were foreclosed 

from numerous activities in which they might otherwise 

engage if they were permitted to travel to the fields by their 

own transportation.” Id. at 146.

While Wal-Mart’s policy did not contain as strong 

indicia of control as in Morillion, the same logic applies. 

Wal-Mart’s policy restricted drivers’ freedom of movement 

and prevented drivers from making a unilateral decision to 

spend layovers at home without preapproval. Wal-Mart 

employees may have been free to leave the truck and engage 

in personal activities during layovers, but they could not go 

home. This foreclosed drivers from numerous activities in 

which they might otherwise engage while on layovers. As a 

result, employee liberty and freedom of movement was 

controlled by Wal-Mart.

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Similarly, in Bono, employees were prohibited from 

leaving the employer’s premises during meal periods, even 

though they were relieved of their duties. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 

at 551–54. The California Court of Appeal found that 

employees were under the employer’s control during these 

periods because the policy “prevent[ed] the employee from 

using the time effectively for his or her own purposes.” Id.

at 553–54.

Here, Wal-Mart’s policy established similar restrictions. 

Wal-Mart’s layover policy imposed constraints on employee 

movement such that employees could not travel freely and 

avail themselves of the full privileges of a break. For 

instance, if Wal-Mart’s policies were applied as written, 

drivers may have been free to take a shower or go to a movie

while on layovers, but drivers were not free, without 

receiving permission, to go home to see a pet, to eat a meal 

at their kitchen table, or to watch television in their own 

living room.

The dissent argues that the manual’s limitation on a 

driver’s ability to take a layover at home may not constitute 

control as a matter of California law because Wal-Mart’s pay 

manual provides an exception that permits employees to take 

layovers at home with permission. See Dis. Op. at 52. In 

support of that position, the dissent cites Bono for the 

proposition that control may not exist when an employer 

requires employees to “ma[ke] prior arrangements” to 

engage in certain activities. See id. at 52. It is true that WalMart’s policy permits drivers to take layovers at home with 

permission. Even so, we are aware of no per se rule under 

California law that control will not be found when an 

employer creates an exception for employees who receive 

prior approval to engage in otherwise restricted activities.

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 25

Again, the relevant inquiry under California law on 

control is whether an employee was permitted to use their 

time as he or she would like. And here, Wal-Mart’s written 

policy prohibited drivers from taking layovers at home 

without permission. This is not a case where Wal-Mart 

simply required workers to take lunch or a short break at a 

certain location. Instead, Wal-Mart required drivers to 

receive permission to enjoy one of the most fundamental 

privileges that all employees enjoy—the autonomy to go 

home when they are not working. In sum, the nature of the 

restriction matters, and Wal-Mart’s restriction requiring 

drivers to receive permission before taking a ten-hour 

layover at home prevented drivers from independently 

choosing to use their time spent on layovers at their own 

leisure.

Even so, Wal-Mart says its policy did not amount to 

control under California law. It says control occurs when 

employers erect prohibitions on employee conduct, not 

when employers impose additional burdens on employees. 

And, according to Wal-Mart, the policy simply required 

employees to ask permission to take a layover at home, it did 

not outright ban such conduct.

But the prohibition-burden distinction advanced by WalMart finds no support in California law. The key question is 

whether the employee may use the time spent on layovers 

for his or her own purposes, not whether the provisions are 

classified as prohibitions or burdens. If Wal-Mart’s policies 

directed, commanded, or restrained employee conduct, such 

that drivers were not free to spend layover time as they saw

fit, then control existed. Nor, for that matter, does WalMart’s prohibition-burden distinction find support in the 

facts of this case. In requiring its drivers to seek permission, 

rather than merely provide notification, before taking a 

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26 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

layover at home, Wal-Mart reserved the right to decline such 

requests. By retaining that power, Wal-Mart’s policy 

established more than a mere “burden.”

Additionally, Wal-Mart argues that drivers were free to 

leave their trucks as much as they wanted while on layovers, 

and many of them did. So, Wal-Mart argues that the district 

court erred because the question of whether Wal-Mart 

controlled the physical location of drivers on layovers was a 

disputed question of fact. But the district court did not 

determine that Wal-Mart in fact controlled the physical 

location of drivers on layovers. All the district court said 

was that the policy, if applied as written, amounted to 

control. The district court submitted the question of whether 

Wal-Mart in fact applied the written policy to the jury. As 

such, Wal-Mart was permitted to make the argument that it

did not in fact control the physical location of its drivers at 

trial—notwithstanding the district court’s partial summary 

judgment ruling on the written policy.

In conclusion, the district court correctly concluded that 

Wal-Mart’s policies, if applied as written, resulted in WalMart’s exercising control over employees during mandated 

layovers. Whether the written policies constituted control 

was a question of law that the district court had the authority 

to resolve at the summary judgment stage. Wal-Mart’s 

written policy gave the company control over whether 

drivers could go home during a layover period. 

Additionally, drivers that took an unauthorized layover at 

home were subject to disciplinary action, including potential 

termination. As such, Wal-Mart’s policy dictated what 

drivers could do on layovers and restricted employees from 

complete freedom of movement during breaks. As a result, 

the district court correctly concluded that Wal-Mart’s 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 27

written policy—if implemented as written—constituted 

control under California law.

ii. Jury Instructions

We next consider whether the district court committed 

reversible error based on the jury instructions pertaining to 

layovers. The district court properly instructed the jury 

because the initial instruction on layovers and the 

supplemental instruction in response to a jury question—

when viewed as a whole—fairly and accurately covered the 

issues, correctly stated the law, and were not misleading or 

prejudicial.

In reviewing jury instructions, we do not employ a lineby-line examination. Instead, we use a practical approach, 

focusing on whether “in the light of the issues and viewed as 

a whole,” the instructions “were complete, clear, correct, and 

adequate.” Mueller v. Auker, 700 F.3d 1180, 1193 (9th Cir. 

2012). So long as the instructions “fairly and adequately 

cover the issues presented, correctly state the law, and are 

not misleading,” no error will have occurred. Brewer v. City 

of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000).

Wal-Mart argues that the district court’s initial 

instruction on layovers was prejudicial and requires reversal. 

The district court instructed the jury, in relevant part, that 

“[t]he [c]ourt has previously found that the policies stated in 

Wal-Mart’s driver pay manuals subjected drivers to WalMart’s control during layover periods.” Contrary to WalMart’s assertion, this instruction was not erroneous. As 

discussed above, the district court correctly found that WalMart’s pay manuals, if applied as written, subjected drivers 

to Wal-Mart’s control during layover periods. Both on 

summary judgment and in its instruction to the jury, the 

district court limited its finding of control to the language of 

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28 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

the pay manuals alone. The district court never told the jury 

that Wal-Mart’s conduct in fact amounted to control.

The district court properly left to the jury the question of 

whether Wal-Mart had in fact applied its written layover 

policy. Later in the initial layover instruction, the court 

informed the jury that “if plaintiffs prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that Wal-Mart applied the policy as it is 

stated in the driver pay manuals, then plaintiffs are entitled 

to the amount of additional pay that will bring Wal-Mart’s 

payment for each 10-hour layover up to the amount of 

minimum wage that was applicable at that time.” (emphasis 

added). This part of the instruction provided an accurate 

statement of the applicable legal standard and instructed the 

jury that it was for them to decide whether Wal-Mart had 

applied its written policies as stated in the driver pay manual. 

As a result, the district court’s initial layover instruction—

when viewed as a whole—fairly and adequately covered the 

issues, was not misleading, and accurately stated the law and 

the district court’s earlier summary judgment ruling.

Still, even if the initial layover instruction was erroneous, 

the supplemental instruction that was issued in response to a 

jury question provided an accurate statement of the law and 

cured any defects in the initial instruction. The jury question 

sought a “definition regarding Wal-Mart’s control during 

layover periods.” In response, the district court correctly 

informed the jury that “[t]here is no clear definition of 

control in the California Labor Code,” but that, “cases from 

California courts have stated that the level of the employer’s 

control over its employees, rather than the mere fact that the 

employer requires the employees[’] activity, is 

determinative.” The court went on, saying, “[t]o determine 

if a driver was subject to Wal-Mart’s control during the 

layover, you must determine whether the driver was able to 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 29

use that time effectively for his or her own purposes.” 

(emphasis added). Thus, the supplemental instruction 

correctly stated California law on the doctrine of control and 

informed the jurors that it was their responsibility to 

determine whether Wal-Mart controlled its drivers during 

layovers.

Ultimately, the initial jury instruction on layovers, paired 

with the supplemental jury instruction on control under 

California law, provided a complete, clear, accurate, and 

adequate statement of the applicable law on layovers. The 

district court accurately informed the jury that it had 

previously found that the provisions in Wal-Mart’s pay 

manual would subject drivers to Wal-Mart’s control. Still, 

the district court’s instructions made clear that it was for the 

jury to decide whether Wal-Mart implemented the written 

policies. As a result, the district court committed no error 

when instructing the jury on layovers.

iii. Factual Sufficiency

Now, we address Wal-Mart’s next grievance regarding 

layovers: How, on this record, were drivers subject to WalMart’s control during layovers? Wal-Mart argues that there 

was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that Wal-Mart 

had exercised control over its drivers. We disagree.

Fact finding is normally left to the jury. U.S. Const. 

amend. VII. This court will not typically disturb a jury’s 

factual findings. See Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified 

Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001). When 

substantial evidence supports the verdict, it should be 

upheld. Id. And all that substantial evidence requires is 

“evidence adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if 

it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the 

same evidence.” Id.

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Wal-Mart urges this court to overturn the jury’s verdict. 

To that end, Wal-Mart notes that trial evidence showed that 

some drivers slept in hotels or at home during layovers, some 

went to the movies, a few went to restaurants, or took long 

walks, and others visited family or went sightseeing. WalMart says that hardly amounts to control.

If that were the only evidence in the record, Wal-Mart 

might be right. But the record also contained substantial 

countervailing evidence that a reasonable jury could have 

credited. Several drivers testified that they understood that 

they were required to sleep in the truck on layovers and were 

supposed to seek permission to sleep elsewhere. 

Additionally, drivers testified that they were under the 

impression that they were not allowed to consume alcohol, 

could not carry a personal weapon, had to seek authorization 

to have a guest in the tractor, and were not allowed to have 

a pet in the cab during a layover. That evidence is enough 

to support a finding that Wal-Mart controlled drivers on 

layovers.

Wal-Mart points to conflicting evidence that was 

presented at trial, but that is not dispositive. It is “within the 

province of the jury” to hear disputed testimony and resolve 

inconsistencies. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 

1135 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, the jury was responsible for 

weighing conflicting evidence and reaching a factual 

conclusion.

Additionally, Wal-Mart’s argument that factors such as 

prohibitions on alcohol use and having pets in the cab should 

not have been considered is inconsistent with California law. 

See Mendiola, 340 P.3d at 360 (finding that employer 

restrictions on “nonemployee visitors, pets, and alcohol use” 

were relevant to determining control).

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 31

In sum, the jury’s factual finding, that Wal-Mart 

exercised control over its drivers under California law, is 

supported by substantial evidence. As a result, we will not 

disturb its determination.

c. Preemption

Lastly, we consider Wal-Mart’s contention that the 

FAAAA preempts California law. The FAAAA expressly 

preempts state laws “related to a price, route, or service of 

any motor carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 14051(c)(1). Wal-Mart 

argues that the district court’s ruling would require 

companies to pay minimum wages for layovers in 

California—something that surely affects prices, routes, and 

services.

But we can quickly dispense with that argument. In Dilts 

v. Penske Logistics, LLC, this court held that the FAAAA

does not preempt California meal and rest break laws. 769 

F.3d 637, 647 (9th Cir. 2014). Wal-Mart argues that Dilts

does not control because here, unlike in Dilts, “an actual 

conflict between state and federal law” exists. As plaintiffs 

point out, however, California law and federal law do not 

conflict here because federal law says nothing about states 

requiring employers to pay workers that are under the 

employer’s control while on break. Like the meal and rest 

break laws in Dilts, California laws governing layovers “do 

not set prices, mandate or prohibit certain routes, or tell 

motor carriers what services that they may or may not 

provide, either directly or indirectly.” 769 F.3d at 647. 

Thus, “even if employers must factor [state wage and hour 

laws] into their decisions about the prices they set, the routes 

that they use, or the services that they provide,” the FAAAA

does not preempt those laws. Id. at 646. As such, no 

preemption exists here.

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32 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

2. Award of Damages for Rest Breaks and Inspections

Plaintiffs were also awarded damages for not being paid 

minimum wages during rest breaks and inspections. After 

considering California law, we conclude that the district 

court judgment on damages for rest breaks and inspections 

must be affirmed.

Wal-Mart claims that it does not owe damages for failure 

to pay minimum wages for rest breaks and inspections—

after all, drivers made more than $80,000 per year, and some 

made six-figure salaries. Thus, Wal-Mart claims that no 

matter how many hours that drivers worked, they must have 

received minimum wages based on total compensation.

Moreover, Wal-Mart contends that its system did pay 

drivers for rest breaks and inspections. According to WalMart, these tasks were built in to the pay plan because rest 

breaks and inspections occurred during an hour when the 

driver was already compensated above minimum wage and 

the tasks were “directly related” to other tasks for which the 

drivers received compensation.

Plaintiffs say otherwise. The drivers say that they 

received pay for certain specific activities, and rest breaks 

and inspections were excluded. They note that, under 

California law, all time worked must be accounted for in the 

compensation scheme. In other words, an employer is not 

permitted to take a worker’s entire salary—even if it is six 

figures—and divide it by the number of hours worked to 

ensure that minimum wage was paid for all activities. So, 

plaintiffs say, if Wal-Mart paid truckers for some activities, 

but not specifically for rest breaks and inspections, it 

violated California minimum wage law.

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Wal-Mart’s argument may have some logical appeal, but 

it lacks support in California law. In California, “[t]he 

averaging method utilized by the federal courts for assessing 

a violation of federal minimum wage law does not apply.” 

Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 314, 323 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2005). As mentioned in the layover context, 

an employer must pay an employee for all “hours worked,” 

including “the time during which an employee is subject to 

the control of an employer.” 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11090.

Plaintiffs argue that Wal-Mart’s pay structure 

impermissibly averaged a trucker’s pay within a single hour,

when it should have provided separate compensation for rest 

periods. See Bluford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 216 Cal. App. 

4th 864, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). Under California law, 

plaintiffs are correct.

A brief review of Wal-Mart’s pay manual is instructive. 

Wal-Mart used an activity-based pay system that 

compensated drivers for (1) miles driven, (2) “activity pay,” 

which included arriving at a location, departing, and hooking 

a new trailer to the truck, and (3) hourly pay for limited 

events like waiting at a store or supplier, delays due to 

inclement weather, or delays caused by a truck breakdown. 

Wal-Mart argues that pay for rest breaks and inspections was 

subsumed into activity pay because rest breaks and 

inspections were performed in conjunction with other 

activities that were included in activity pay.

But Wal-Mart may not meet rest period or inspection 

payment requirements by “borrowing” from other 

compensation sources, such as an hourly rate or mileage 

payment. See id. Indeed, arguments that a pay plan includes 

in its calculation “the time [employees] spent taking rest 

breaks . . . misinterpret[s] California law.” Vaquero v. 

Stoneledge Furniture LLC, 9 Cal. App. 5th 98, 114 (Cal. Ct. 

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34 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

App. 2017). For instance, in Vaquero, the California Court 

of Appeal ruled an employer’s compensation system failed 

to properly pay for rest periods when the system “did not 

include any component that directly compensated sales 

associates for rest periods.” Id.

That is not to say that Wal-Mart could never incorporate 

payments for multiple tasks in activity codes. And we need 

not decide as much. Here, all the district court found was 

that California law prohibited Wal-Mart from subsuming 

time spent on rest breaks and inspections into the “activity 

pay” component of the pay structure because that would not 

separately pay workers for all the time worked.

For example, if, in a given hour, a trucker drove for fortyfive minutes and was paid a mileage rate that would 

otherwise meet the state’s minimum wage requirement for a 

full hour, Wal-Mart may not have that driver take a fifteenminute break and provide no additional compensation for the 

break just because that driver had already received a

minimum wage in the first forty-five minutes of the hour. 

That would constitute improper borrowing and averaging 

under California law. Bluford, 216 Cal. App. 4th at 872;

Armenta, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 323.

No doubt, sometimes several tasks like rest breaks and 

inspections could fall under a general provision in the pay 

plan. But, to comply with California law, Wal-Mart would 

have to pay drivers for certain activity codes that include 

those tasks. Here, the pay manual is silent on rest breaks and 

inspections.

Next, Wal-Mart takes aim at the jury instructions on pay 

for rest breaks and inspections. As in the layover context, 

the district court commented on the permissibility of the 

policy stated in Wal-Mart’s pay manual, but left to the jury 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 35

the factual question of whether Wal-Mart in fact applied its 

pay policy with respect to rest breaks and inspections. WalMart says it was prejudiced by the jury instructions.

But Wal-Mart’s argument fails because the challenged 

instructions were not misleading. Instruction No. 17’s 

statement that Wal-Mart’s policy did “not separately specify 

pay for rest breaks” was accurate. Wal-Mart does not 

dispute that the pay manual was silent on pay for rest breaks. 

Moreover, the instruction directed the jurors to find for 

plaintiffs only if they found (1) “that class members took rest 

breaks,” and (2) “that Wal-Mart applied the policy as it is 

stated in the driver pay manuals, such that minimum wage 

was not earned for rest breaks.” (emphasis added). 

Additionally, Instruction No. 15 informed the jury that a 

written plan or policy “does not itself establish whether 

someone was paid minimum wage,” and that “plaintiffs must 

still prove” that Wal-Mart failed to pay minimum wages. 

That instruction also specified that Wal-Mart could “pay 

drivers for certain tasks through activity codes that include 

those tasks.” As a result, considered in totality, the jury 

instructions on rest breaks were neither erroneous nor 

prejudicial because the court correctly informed the jury that 

plaintiffs had to prove that Wal-Mart failed to pay minimum 

wages for rest breaks.

Wal-Mart’s challenge to the jury instructions on pay for 

inspections also fails. Wal-Mart claims that the court’s 

instructions were prejudicial because they referred to prior 

court orders, which suggested that the court had already 

determined that Wal-Mart violated the law. But, while the 

court did correctly inform the jury that it had found that the 

pay manuals violated California wage laws, the court also 

informed jurors that it was their responsibility to determine 

whether Wal-Mart had in fact applied the policies as written. 

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36 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

As a result, when considered in totality, the jury instructions 

on inspections provided an accurate statement of the law.

Lastly, Wal-Mart argues that the court erred by failing to 

include language—based on Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2—that 

an employer need not pay for tasks that are “directly related” 

to other compensable tasks. The relevant statutory language 

provides that employees “shall be compensated for rest and 

recovery periods and other nonproductive time separate 

from any piece-rate compensation,” with “nonproductive 

time” defined as “time under the employer’s control, 

exclusive of rest and recovery periods, that is not directly 

related to the activity being compensated on a piece-rate 

basis.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(a)(1). But the district court 

did not err by refusing to include this instruction because, as 

the district court noted, the Code section with the “directly 

related” language did not take effect until January 1, 2016, 

after the close of the class period.

C. Class Certification and Damages

Wal-Mart further argues that plaintiffs’ classwide 

damages proof ran outside of what the law allows. Indeed, 

Wal-Mart argues that plaintiffs’ expert on damages—Dr. 

Phillips—should not have been permitted to testify at all, and 

in any event, that his testimony failed to show classwide 

damages.

Representative evidence is nothing new. Courts allow it 

in certain circumstances, but plaintiffs do not have free rein 

in using such evidence. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 

Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046–49 (2016). Thus, we 

must decide whether representative evidence was properly 

used in this case.

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 37

Initially, Wal-Mart attacks Phillips because it says his 

methodology was improper and his conclusions were not 

representative. Wal-Mart says that truckers differed on how 

much time they spent on rest breaks, completing inspections, 

and on layovers. Wal-Mart contends that these variations 

mean that plaintiffs cannot use representative testimony to 

prove the elements of their case, including damages.

The portion of Wal-Mart’s attack that focuses on liability 

is unpersuasive. As we have already discussed, substantial 

evidence supported the jury’s finding that Wal-Mart was 

liable for not paying minimum wages in accordance with 

California law. Wal-Mart continues to dispute this by 

pointing to the range of activities that truckers engaged in 

while on layovers. But that evidence was submitted to the 

jury, and the jury found for plaintiffs on the issues of pay for 

layovers, rest breaks, and inspections. Once the jury found 

that Wal-Mart owed minimum wages to drivers for layovers, 

rest breaks, and inspections, the varying amount of time 

truckers spent doing these tasks went to the question of 

damages.

Wal-Mart’s argument is more compelling on the issue of 

damages. It argues that, given the broad range of 

experiences among drivers, Phillips’s testimony and other 

evidence could not prove classwide damages. For example, 

some truckers took shorter rest breaks than others. Some 

inspections took longer than others. Variation abounded.

It is true that “the ‘amount of damages is invariably an 

individual question,’” but that “does not defeat class action 

treatment.” Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 824 

F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Yokoyama v. 

Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 

2010)). Time and time again, this court has reaffirmed the 

principle that the need for individual damages calculations 

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38 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

does not doom a class action. Id.; Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. 

Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014); Leyva v. Medline 

Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013); Yokoyama, 

594 F.3d at 1094. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tyson 

Foods “has not disturbed our precedent.” Vaquero, 824 F.3d 

at 1155. Thus, to the extent that Wal-Mart argues that 

different damages calculations require reversal, we reject 

that argument based on our precedent. Still, plaintiffs must 

prove their damages. So next we address whether plaintiffs 

proved damages through representative evidence.

Tyson Foods serves as a starting point for our analysis. 

There, employees claimed their employer owed overtime 

pay for time employees spent donning and doffing protective 

gear. 136 S. Ct. at 1043. Of course, it might take one 

employee longer to put on protective gear than others. So 

how could one determine how much overtime the employer 

owed each employee? That’s where representative evidence 

came into play. Id. at 1046. In Tyson Foods, the Supreme 

Court allowed class members to use representative evidence 

to prove their claims, even though some individual issues 

might arise. Statistical examples, the Court explained, are a 

means of proving a case. Id. Of course, representative 

evidence and statistical evidence are not always proper. 

These types of evidence are only permissible when “the 

evidence is reliable in proving or disproving the elements of 

the relevant cause of action.” Id.

Wal-Mart argues that Phillips’s testimony fails under 

Tyson Foods because the testimony is not something that 

“could have sustained a reasonable jury finding as to hours 

worked” if the drivers had brought individual actions. See 

id. at 1046–47. That’s so, according to Wal-Mart, because

the named plaintiffs testified to varying hours during which 

they took rest breaks and completed inspections. For 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 39

example, Plaintiff Gonzalez testified his inspections took 

between seven and ten minutes. Thus, Wal-Mart asks how 

Gonzalez could have used Phillips’s fifteen-minute average 

if Gonzalez had brought an individual action. Wal-Mart 

contends that he could not have, so the representative 

evidence fails.

Not exactly. First, Tyson Foods tells us that 

representative evidence “include[s] employee testimony, 

video recordings,” and expert studies. 136 S. Ct. at 1043. 

So testimony from Wal-Mart drivers can amount to 

representative evidence. See Pierce v. Wyndham Vacation 

Resorts, Inc., 922 F.3d 741, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2019) 

(approving of employee testimony as a form of 

representative evidence in a wage and hour collective 

action); Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 860 F.3d 389, 401 (6th 

Cir. 2017) (holding that Tyson Foods did not limit 

representative evidence to studies). Here, many plaintiffs 

testified about the length of their rest breaks and inspection 

time. In a class action, testimony alone may serve as the 

basis for classwide damages.

Wal-Mart argues that there is no reason to think the 

testimony from plaintiffs was representative, but it does not 

tell us why. And if Wal-Mart believed the testimony was 

not perfectly representative, its recourse was to present that 

argument to the jury. Indeed, Wal-Mart did argue to the jury 

that it couldn’t properly extrapolate from plaintiffs’ 

representative evidence to the hundreds of absent class 

members, and the jury rejected that position. Ultimately, as 

the district court held, Wal-Mart’s problem with Phillips’s 

testimony went to weight, not to admissibility.

Second, there is no reason to think that Gonzalez or other 

plaintiffs with shorter rest breaks or inspections times could 

not use the evidence submitted by Phillips if they had 

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40 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

brought individual actions. Wal-Mart says such plaintiffs 

“would have no reason to rely on an assumption” about rest 

breaks “because they had their own evidence.” But why not? 

Phillips’s testimony would strengthen and corroborate all 

plaintiffs’ claims that they were not paid when they should 

have been.

Wal-Mart’s position would mean that anytime an 

individual plaintiff testified about an estimate of how long 

he or she worked and was not paid, representative samples 

would be improper. That cannot be squared with Tyson

Foods, which included time variants “alleged to be upwards 

of 10 minutes a day” among class members. Id. at 1047.

Representative evidence may include the testifying 

plaintiffs, who provided ample evidence for a fifteen-minute 

average rest break. The use of Phillips’s sample is consistent 

with Tyson Foods, because each individual plaintiff could 

have used that information in an individual action. Id. at 

1046–47.

Nor does Phillips’s testimony present any 

methodological flaw. Phillips based his information on WalMart’s own electronic payroll data, questionnaires from 

forty random members of the class, hard copies of payroll 

documents, data from 1,200 DOT inspections, a driver log 

database, a trip detail database, a GPS database, and more. 

Wal-Mart had ample opportunity to cross-examine Phillips, 

call its own expert, or present other evidence. In the end, the 

jury credited the evidence presented by plaintiffs. And 

because this is a case in which “a representative sample is 

‘the only practicable means to collect and present relevant 

data’” to show damages, such representative evidence was 

properly admitted. Id. at 1046 (quoting Manual of Complex 

Litigation § 11.493, p. 102 (4th ed. 2004)).

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 41

For instance, consider layovers. For those, Phillips 

simply took Wal-Mart’s data showing when each class 

member was paid $42 for the layover and subtracted that 

from what Wal-Mart would have paid if drivers received 

minimum wages. Phillips calculated damages based on 

“every individual class member for whom [he] had 

electronic records.” In other words, Phillips’s damages 

calculation as to layovers entailed little to no extrapolation—

it involved looking at records for each class member. Yes, 

Wal-Mart argues that it did not “control” drivers during 

layover periods because drivers could—and did—engage in 

many types of activities. But that point goes to liability, not 

damages.

As for inspections, all agree that pre-trip and post-trip 

inspections occurred each workday. The DOT requires such 

inspections. Thus, Phillips could determine how many 

inspections were done by simply counting each day that each 

class member drove for Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart notes that 

Phillips testified about an average fifteen-minute inspection 

time, but argues that nothing supported that number. For 

instance, drivers may have taken five minutes or seven 

minutes to complete inspections. According to Wal-Mart, 

nothing in the data—or representative testimony—provides 

an answer.

Wal-Mart’s argument misses the mark. Drivers need not 

prove that they all took the same time to complete required 

inspections. All that is required is enough representative 

evidence to allow a jury to draw a reasonable inference about 

the unpaid hours worked. Id. at 1047–49. Here, plenty of 

evidence supported the fifteen-minute determination. For 

example, the jury considered evidence from forty class 

member deponents, a Wal-Mart training video, and WalMart manager depositions. Phillips testified that he used the 

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42 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

depositions and surveys of class members to get the average 

of fifteen-minute inspections. Not only that, but Phillips 

calculated how much Wal-Mart would owe for each single 

minute per inspection. Thus, the jury did not have to accept 

Phillips’s fifteen-minute inspection calculation. But the jury 

had ample evidence to do so. Again, Phillips’s sample was 

concerned with the amount of damages, “not the fact that 

damages are due.” Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 915 

(9th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).

The same is true for rest breaks. Despite variations, 

which are common in class action damage calculations, 

introduction of the representative sample and representative 

testimony was proper because plaintiffs had no other 

practicable way to prove how much Wal-Mart owed them. 

Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046–48. And plenty of evidence 

supported the jury’s conclusion.

In the end, the district court properly admitted 

representative testimony and the representative sample. 

Wal-Mart’s quarrel with the jury’s finding on liability is 

misplaced. The jury weighed evidence presented by the 

parties and found for plaintiffs on layovers, rest breaks, and 

inspections. Phillips’s sample, surveys, Wal-Mart’s data, 

and testimony from the named plaintiffs provided ample 

evidence regarding the extent of classwide damages. Thus, 

the district court did not err in certifying a class and allowing 

representative evidence as proof of classwide damages—

including Phillips’s testimony and sample.

D. Cross Appeal on Liquidated Damages

In a cross appeal, plaintiffs argue that the district court 

erred in denying liquidated damages. Under California law, 

aggrieved employees are entitled to liquidated damages 

when an employer is found to have unlawfully withheld 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 43

wages, unless the defendant employer shows it acted in good 

faith and with a reasonable belief in the legality of its 

conduct. Cal. Lab. Code § 1194.2. Thus, the question is 

whether Wal-Mart can show good faith and a reasonable 

belief in the legality of its conduct. When considering this 

question, the district court did not limit Wal-Mart to the 

evidence it presented at trial. Instead, the district court 

allowed Wal-Mart to present information that was not before 

the jury and determined that Wal-Mart need not pay 

liquidated damages.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in considering 

post-trial declarations that amounted to hearsay from 

witnesses that plaintiffs did not get to cross-examine. But 

plaintiffs cite no authority that such evidentiary rules apply. 

And limiting review to only evidence presented at trial 

would require defendants to anticipate losing at trial by 

presenting their good faith and reasonableness arguments for 

potential post-trial liquidated damages motions. We reject 

that position.

The district court concluded that Wal-Mart acted 

reasonably and in good faith. As to good faith, the district 

court determined that Wal-Mart believed its pay policy 

complied with California minimum wage law. For example, 

the court noted that Wal-Mart drivers were among some of 

the highest paid drivers in the industry. The court also 

concluded that Wal-Mart had low attrition rates and paid 

discretionary pay when drivers unexpectedly fell short of 

daily averages. And for seven activities, the jury found in 

Wal-Mart’s favor. Additionally, Wal-Mart eventually 

changed its pay policies to comply with California law. 

Finally, at least one California district court previously 

found claims parallel to those presented here to be 

preempted by the FAAAA. Ortega v. J.B. Hunt Transport, 

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44 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

Inc., No. 2:07-cv-08336-BRO-SH, 2014 WL 2884560, at 

*5–6 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2014), vacated and remanded, 694 

F. App’x 589 (9th Cir. 2017). While we reject that 

interpretation, as did the court below, Ortega lends some 

credibility to Wal-Mart’s assertion of good faith.

Still, plaintiffs argue that Wal-Mart failed to meet its 

burden. They contend that the key inquiry is not whether 

Wal-Mart had generally laudable pay practices. Instead, 

plaintiffs say that the proper inquiry is whether Wal-Mart 

acted in good faith and with reasonable belief in the legality 

of its actions based on its employment practices pertaining 

to layovers, rest breaks, and inspections, not general pay 

practices. That is because the statute says an employer must 

show that the “act or omission giving rise to the action was 

in good faith.” Cal. Lab. Code § 1194.2(b). Thus, plaintiffs 

contend that most of what the district court relied on—

including Wal-Mart’s general pay practices—was not 

relevant to whether Wal-Mart acted in good faith and with a 

reasonable belief as to pay for layovers, rest breaks, and 

inspections.

But here—even if the district court relied on some 

irrelevant information—there is enough evidence to support 

the district court’s finding that Wal-Mart acted in good faith 

and with a reasonable belief in the legality of its actions. 

Several Wal-Mart pay practices indicate an effort, albeit an 

imperfect one, to comply with California law. And the 

bounds of permissible conduct were, at least during the class 

period, somewhat murky. As the district court noted, even 

though some California cases are instructive, those cases are 

not conclusive on whether Wal-Mart’s pay policies were 

reasonable under California law. For example, there is no 

clear definition of what constitutes employer control under 

California law. As a result, we cannot say that Wal-Mart did 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 45

not act with a reasonable belief in the legality of its actions, 

even though we affirm the finding for plaintiffs on liability.

In sum, the district court did not err in finding that WalMart acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the 

legality of its action, and we affirm its determination as to 

liquidated damages.

III. Conclusion

Wal-Mart and plaintiffs propose several bases for 

reversal in this admittedly complex case, but ultimately none 

holds water. Following over a decade of litigation, a robust 

motions practice, and a sixteen-day trial, we conclude that 

the judgment should stand.

Appellees’ motion for judicial notice of certain materials 

from the legislative history of two provisions of the 

California Labor Code is GRANTED and the district court 

is AFFIRMED.

O’SCANNLAIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part:

I concur in all of the majority’s opinion except for Part 

II.B.1.b, in which the court affirms the finding of liability 

against Wal-Mart for its failure to compensate drivers for 

time spent during layover periods. Specifically, I cannot 

agree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court 

correctly granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs 

when it found that Wal-Mart’s written pay policies 

necessarily establish that the company “controlled” drivers 

during their layover breaks. In my view, the jury should 

have been allowed to decide the meaning of these ambiguous 

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46 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

policies and the extent to which the policies actually 

“control” what drivers may do and where they may go.

For the reasons expressed herein, I respectfully dissent 

from the “layover periods” portion of the majority’s opinion.

I

As required by both state and federal law, Wal-Mart’s 

long-haul truck drivers must take ten-hour breaks—socalled “layovers”—between each of their driving shifts. See 

49 C.F.R. § 395.3(a)(1); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1212.5(a). 

During this time, drivers formally are not on duty, and 

they may not drive or perform other work for Wal-Mart. 

See 49 C.F.R. §§ 395.2, 395.8(b); Cal. Code Regs. 

tit. 13, §§ 1201(u)(4), 1213(c). Trucks are equipped with 

sleeper berths to allow drivers to rest during their layovers, 

though testimony in this case indicates that drivers actually 

spent time performing a variety of activities including 

visiting family, exercising, eating, golfing, or even visiting 

casinos.

One of the principal claims in this case is that, under 

California law, Wal-Mart was required—but failed—to pay 

drivers minimum wage during their layover periods. The 

validity of that claim ultimately turns on whether Wal-Mart 

exercised “control” over its drivers during such periods, 

within the meaning of California employment law. If so, 

Wal-Mart needed to pay drivers minimum wage for their 

layover time; if not, no compensation was required. See Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 8 § 11090(2)(G). At summary judgment, the 

district court found that, at least as a matter of written policy, 

Wal-Mart did purport to control its drivers during their 

layovers. The court entered partial summary judgment in the 

plaintiffs’ favor on this issue, finding that “the policies in 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 47

[Wal-Mart’s] Driver Pay Manuals subjected drivers to WalMart’s control during layover periods.”

In light of this ruling, at trial the issue of whether WalMart was required to pay its drivers during layover periods 

was reduced to the question of whether Wal-Mart actually 

implemented these written policies. In its jury instructions, 

the court restated its finding of fact that the policies 

expressed in the pay manuals “subjected drivers to WalMart’s control during layover periods” and instructed the 

jury to find in favor of the plaintiffs if they proved “that WalMart applied the [layover] policy as it is stated in the driver 

pay manuals.” If it believed Wal-Mart did indeed apply its 

own written policies, the jury was instructed to award pay to 

compensate the plaintiffs for the full length of each 10-hour 

layover period.

Ultimately, the jury found that Wal-Mart owed drivers 

more than $44 million in unpaid wages for layover time.

II

The core problem with the jury’s finding is that the 

district court’s earlier entry of partial summary judgment 

short-circuited the entire layover-periods question. 

Although Wal-Mart’s written pay policies might be 

understood to assert control during layover periods, that was 

a genuinely disputed question of fact, which should have 

been presented to the jury to decide. By instead answering 

that question itself, the district court prejudiced Wal-Mart in 

its ability to defend the lawfulness of its own company 

policies and practices.

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48 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

A

Under California law, an employer must pay minimum 

wage for all time “during which an employee is subject to 

the control of an employer.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, 

§ 11090(2)(G). Under this test, an employee “does not have 

to be working during that time to be compensated.” 

Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 995 P.2d 139, 143 (Cal. 

2000). Even during a break period, an employee might 

remain under control of his or her employer if the employer 

imposes requirements that prevent the employee from 

spending “truly uninterrupted time” at his or her pleasure. 

Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc., 385 P.3d 823, 833 (Cal. 

2016). While an employer may freely impose reasonable 

restraints like requiring employees to remain on site during 

short breaks, it must compensate employees for break 

periods if it imposes more severe restrictions that effectively 

prevent the employee from spending the time as he or she 

might wish, such as by requiring the employee to remain oncall or preventing him or her from leaving the worksite for 

extended periods of time. See id. at 832–34.

Against this backdrop, the district court ruled that the 

terms of Wal-Mart’s 2008 pay manual necessarily

established the company’s control over drivers during their 

layover periods. Such manual, however, says very little 

about what a driver may or may not do during a layover. 

The parties agree that Wal-Mart paid drivers a $42 

“inconvenience fee,” at least for layovers they spent in the 

sleeper berths of their trucks and away from home. The pay 

manual reinforces this payment but says little else about how 

a layover must be spent. The manual specifies that layover 

time is “not paid in conjunction with any other type of pay,” 

but instead is a standalone pay category “inten[ded] . . . to 

pay Drivers for layovers taken in the tractor cab.” The 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 49

manual further emphasizes that drivers “will not be 

compensated for a DOT [layover] break if any portion of it 

is taken at home.” In addition to forgoing the $42 payment, 

in order to “take a [layover] at home” a driver must receive 

a manager’s prior approval, safely and securely park his or 

her tractor and trailer, and record the break at home (and the 

manager’s approval) on his or her time sheet. Taking an 

unauthorized layover at home is prohibited and “may lead to 

immediate termination.”

Altogether, then, Wal-Mart’s written policy establishes 

essentially two relevant restrictions on drivers’ layover time: 

(1) they will receive a $42 payment only if the layover is 

spent “in the tractor cab,” and (2) if they wish to take the 

layover at home, they must receive a manager’s approval and 

lock the truck in a safe location. The district court and the 

majority seize on these basic restrictions to conclude that, 

because drivers were not completely free to spend their 

layovers at home without management approval, they must 

have been subject to Wal-Mart’s control during that time. 

But none of these requirements establishes control as a 

matter of California law.

1

First, there can be no serious argument that the offer to 

pay drivers $42 for a layover taken in the truck constitutes 

“control” over them.

The $42 payment is simply a gratuitous offer on WalMart’s part—what the company asserts is a benefit to 

alleviate the inconvenience of spending a layover in the 

driver’s truck. That benefit is not paid when the driver 

instead chooses to spend the layover in a more convenient 

location like his or her home, a friend’s house, a hotel, or 

elsewhere. We have previously recognized that employers 

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50 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

in California are free to impose such reasonable limitations 

on benefits like this. In Rodriguez v. Taco Bell Corp, for 

example, we recently held that Taco Bell did not exert 

control over its employees by offering them a discounted 

lunch, but only if they ate in the store itself. 896 F.3d 952, 

956 (9th Cir. 2018). We explained that employees were free 

to forgo the meal discount and eat their lunch anywhere else; 

the fact that the restaurant required them to stay onsite to 

receive the gratuitous benefit did not inhibit their freedom of 

choice. See id. at 956–57. The same is true about the $42 

inconvenience fee here.

2

Second, the manual’s limitations on a driver’s ability to 

spend a layover at home do not, as a matter of law, establish 

“control.”

The majority suggests that these restrictions effectively 

direct where drivers are required to be during their layover 

periods. It analogizes Wal-Mart’s policy to two cases in 

which employers were found to have exercised control by 

requiring their employees to spend downtime at specified 

locations. See Maj. Op. at 23–24. In Bono Enterprises, Inc. 

v. Bradshaw, for example, the California Court of Appeal 

held that an employer was required to compensate its 

employees during lunch breaks in which the employees were 

prohibited from leaving the worksite. See 32 Cal. App. 4th 

968, 975–76 (1995), disapproved on other grounds by 

Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 927 P.2d 296 (Cal. 

1996). Likewise, in Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., the 

California Supreme Court held that an employer controlled 

its employees by requiring them to meet at a designated 

place and then ride employer-provided buses to the fields in 

which they worked. 995 P.2d at 147. The California 

Supreme Court held that, even though employees could pass 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 51

the time on the bus as they saw fit (for example by reading 

or sleeping), they were still under the employer’s control 

during that time, because they “were foreclosed from 

numerous activities in which they might otherwise engage if 

they were permitted to travel . . . by their own 

transportation,” such as dropping their children at school, 

stopping for breakfast before work, or running other errands. 

Id. at 146.

The limited restrictions expressed in Wal-Mart’s pay 

manual are a far cry from those in Bono or Morillion. In 

both Bono and Morillion, the employees were prohibited 

from being anywhere other than a location specifically 

directed by the employer. Here, by contrast, Wal-Mart’s pay 

manual says almost nothing about where drivers can go or 

what they can do during a layover. At most, the policy 

places certain restrictions on a driver’s ability to pass the 

layover at home. Such restrictions hardly amount to the sort 

of control recognized in Bono or Morillion. First, it is not 

clear that (as the majority suggests) Wal-Mart’s pay manual 

prevents drivers from even visiting their homes. If drivers 

take any portion of their layover at home, they don’t get the 

$42 convenience fee. But it is not clear that the policy 

generally requiring authorization prior to “taking” a layover 

at home, also means drivers needed permission to visit a 

nearby home even briefly, for example to eat a meal or 

change clothes. More to the point, the policy says nothing 

at all about a driver’s freedom to spend layover time 

anywhere else. The majority points to nothing in the policy 

that would preclude a driver from visiting a friend, going to 

see a movie, going to a bar or restaurant, shopping, running 

errands, and so forth. Unsurprisingly, drivers testified at trial 

that they did—and that they understood they were permitted 

to do—exactly these sorts of things during layovers.

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52 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

Moreover, the majority glosses over the fact that WalMart’s pay manual expressly allows employees to take their 

breaks at home as well, so long as they receive prior 

approval. Requiring approval before engaging in certain 

activities does restrict employees’ ability to do those 

activities in some way. But it hardly prevents them. Again, 

the contrast to Bono and Morillion is instructive. In both 

cases, employers enforced policies that simply prohibited—

without any apparent exception—employees from straying 

from their directed areas. See Morillion, 995 P.2d at 141 & 

n.1; Bono, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 978 n.4. Indeed, in Bono the 

court wrote that the employer would not have exerted control 

over its employees if had permitted them to “ma[ke] prior 

arrangements” to leave the worksite for lunch. See 32 Cal. 

App. 4th at 978 n.4. The court observed that the lack of such 

a policy was “extremely significant” to its conclusion that 

the on-site lunch breaks required compensation. Id. Here, 

in direct contrast, the manual expressly informs drivers that 

they may spend breaks at home, so long as they receive prior 

approval and secure the truck while they will be away.

Just as in Bono, the availability of a policy allowing 

drivers to make prior arrangements to spend a layover at 

home should be “extremely significant” to our interpretation 

of the pay manual and the extent to which it purports to 

control drivers’ activities. But instead of actually grappling 

with how such a policy might reduce the degree to which the 

manual restrains drivers’ ability to go home, the majority 

instead quickly dismisses its relevance because the manual 

implicitly “reserved [Wal-Mart’s] right to decline” a driver’s 

request to take a layover at home. Maj. Op. at 25–26. The 

manual itself says nothing about the grounds on which such 

a request might be declined. Yet, the majority appears to 

assume the worst, simply asserting that Wal-Mart’s 

authority to decline a driver’s request means that the policy 

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 53

necessarily imposed “more than a mere ‘burden’” on drivers’ 

ability to take a layover at home—with no explanation for 

why that is so or, more importantly, how we know it from 

the face of the policy alone. See id. at 26. At summary 

judgment, the manual’s failure to make clear the extent of 

the burden imposed by the pre-approval rule should have 

weighed against granting summary judgment, and instead 

allowed this open question to go to the jury. See infra Part 

II.B.

In the end, the majority’s interpretation of Wal-Mart’s 

pay manual rests on a sweeping and simplistic proposition: 

any policy that “restrict[s] employees from complete 

freedom of movement during breaks” is sufficient to show 

“control” under California law. Maj. Op. at 26–27. 

Unfortunately, the majority does not cite a single case that 

actually supports such a broad rule, and the text of the 

manual hardly demonstrates the sort of strict location control 

at issue in the only cases upon which the majority relies.

B

Because Wal-Mart’s pay manual says so little about what 

drivers may or may not do during layovers, it leaves a great 

deal of room for interpretation. In attempting to parse this 

scant guidance at summary judgment, the district court was 

required to draw all reasonable inferences in Wal-Mart’s 

favor. See Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 934 F.3d 901, 

906 (9th Cir. 2019). Instead, the court seems to have drawn 

every inference against Wal-Mart and assumed that the most 

restrictive reading of the manual must be true.1

 Perhaps a 

1 For example, the majority asserts that summary judgment was 

proper because it is “aware of no per se rule under California law that 

control will not be found when an employer creates an exception for 

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54 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

reasonable factfinder could agree with the district court that 

the manual could be construed as a company policy of 

strictly controlling drivers’ whereabouts during layover 

periods. But the text of the manual itself does not compel 

such a conclusion.

1

In deciding this contested issue against Wal-Mart, the 

court effectively took from the jury one of the most critical 

questions in this case: what was Wal-Mart’s official policy 

regarding what drivers were permitted to do during layover 

periods? Notably, testimony in this case shows that many 

drivers understood company policy to be broadly 

permissive, allowing them to do “whatever [they] want[ed]” 

during layovers. But the court significantly limited the 

jury’s own consideration of how permissive Wal-Mart 

policy was by instructing them that at least the company’s 

official written policy violated California law, and that WalMart was liable if it followed such policy.

employees who receive prior approval to engage in otherwise restricted 

activities.” Maj. Op. at 24. But such observation flips the burden at 

summary judgment on its head. In defending against summary judgment 

on this issue, Wal-Mart was certainly not required to show that its 

interpretation of the manual is necessarily correct as a matter of law. 

Rather, summary judgment should not have been granted unless the 

plaintiffs could show that Wal-Mart’s interpretation was wrong as a

matter of law—a conclusion that even the majority seems to recognize 

is not supported under California law. Regardless whether there is a “per 

se rule” under California law that Wal-Mart’s view will necessarily 

prevail, such view is one with which a reasonable factfinder could 

agree—and thus this is a genuinely disputed question that should have 

been decided by the jury at trial. See Rookaird v. BNSF Ry. Co., 908 

F.3d 451, 459 (9th Cir. 2018).

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RIDGEWAY V. WALMART 55

It is not difficult to see how this ruling prejudiced WalMart. Wal-Mart should have had the opportunity to 

persuade the jury that the pay manual (and company policy 

generally) placed only minimal restraints on drivers’ activity 

or whereabouts during layovers. Instead, Wal-Mart was 

forced to accept that its manual announced unlawful policies 

and then attempt to convince the jury that it had implemented 

practices that conflicted with those policies in material ways. 

In essence, Wal-Mart could win only by showing that it 

ignored its own company standards.2

2

Nor did the court eliminate the prejudice by offering a 

supplemental jury instruction on the definition of “control” 

under California law, as the majority suggests. See Maj. Op. 

28–29. Perhaps confused as to whether the court’s summary 

judgment ruling had already declared Wal-Mart to be liable 

on the layover claims, the jury asked the court to clarify the 

“definition regarding Wal-Mart’s control during layover 

periods.” In response, the court told the jury that there “is 

no clear definition of control” under California law, but that 

the key was whether “the driver was able to use that time 

effectively for his or her own purposes.” The court gave two 

examples, notably both from cases in which courts found 

employer control (once again, Bono and Morillion). The 

court gave no counterexamples from a case in which control 

2 The prejudice is especially obvious if one considers the situation 

of a juror who read the manual and found its policies not to be overly 

restrictive. Nonetheless, such a juror would have been told that, if WalMart actually followed the manual, then it had violated California law. 

Even though such a juror found Wal-Mart’s written policies to be 

perfectly permissive, Wal-Mart would lose unless it could persuade him 

or her that, in practice, the company was even more lenient with drivers.

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56 RIDGEWAY V. WALMART

was lacking, nor did it offer any possible limitations to the 

cases’ holdings.

This supplemental instruction might have given the jury 

more detail on what “control” means under California law, 

but it did nothing to correct its earlier instruction that such 

control is necessarily demonstrated by Wal-Mart’s written 

policy. Thus, the jury was still left to decide only whether 

Wal-Mart deviated from that policy in a way that materially 

lowered the extent to which it controlled drivers. If the jury 

simply decided that Wal-Mart followed its policy as written, 

the precise definition of control was beside the point because 

its command was already clear: impose liability. This was 

error.

III

In sum, while I join the majority in all other respects, I 

must conclude that the district court erred in granting partial 

summary judgment against Wal-Mart on the meaning of 

Wal-Mart’s written pay policies. Such a conclusion can be 

supported only by drawing every inference against WalMart—exactly the opposite of the court’s task at summary 

judgment. The limited text of Wal-Mart’s policies says very 

little about what drivers may do during their layover periods, 

and it does not remotely demonstrate the degree of control 

found sufficient in other California cases. On this scant 

evidence, the district court should have left for the jury the 

critical task of determining the extent of control exerted by 

Wal-Mart’s layover policies and practices.

I would reverse the judgment against Wal-Mart to such 

extent and remand for a new trial on the “layover periods” 

issue.

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