Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-05444/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-05444-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rocky D. Raynor
Defendant
Working Dirt LLC
Defendant

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WORKING DIRT LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

ROCKY D. RAYNOR, 

Defendant. 

Case No.: 16-cv-5444 YGR

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND 

REMANDING ACTION TO STATE COURT;

DENYING MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME AS 

MOOT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 3, 11, 12 

Defendant Rocky D. Raynor, Jr. in a pro se capacity removed this case from the Superior 

Court for the County of San Mateo where it was pending as an unlawful detainer action against 

defendant. Defendant filed a notice of removal on September 23, 2016 (Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 

1 (“NOR”)), claiming to invoke this Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 

1443(1). Defendant concurrently moved to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 3.) On October 3, 

2016, plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to state court. (Dkt. No. 4.) Defendant did not 

respond in opposition and plaintiff likewise did not file any reply. On October 18, 2016, plaintiff 

filed a motion to shorten time. (Dkt. No. 12.) 

Presently before the Court are defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff’s 

motion to remand the case to superior court, and plaintiff's motion to shorten time. The Court having 

reviewed the papers,1

 and for the reasons set forth below, GRANTS defendant’s application to 

proceed in forma pauperis and GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to remand. Plaintiff's motion to shorten 

time is therefore DENIED AS MOOT. 

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 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 

finds that this motion is appropriate for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the Court 

VACATES the hearing set for November 8, 2016. 

Case 4:16-cv-05444-YGR Document 13 Filed 10/20/16 Page 1 of 4
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United States District Court 

Northern District of California

I. Defendant’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Defendant’s application to proceed in forma pauperis adequately alleges his poverty. 

Defendant is not employed and his monthly expenses are the same as his nominal fixed monthly 

income. He does not own a home. Therefore, defendant qualifies for in forma pauperis status, and 

his application is GRANTED. 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand 

Plaintiff argues that remand is appropriate on two separate and independent bases, namely 

that: (a) the notice of removal was untimely; and (b) plaintiff has not established any basis for 

subject matter jurisdiction. The Court agrees that remand is warranted on both accounts and 

addresses each in turn.

a. Timeliness of Removal 

The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1446, governs timeliness of removal and provides in 

pertinent part: 

The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed 

within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or 

otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for 

relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 

days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial 

pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served 

on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. 

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Failure to file a timely notice of removal waives a defendant’s right to remove. 

Cantrell v. Great Republic Ins. Co., 873 F.2d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, if defendant did not 

file the notice of removal within 30 days of service of summons, the notice of removal is untimely 

and the action should be remanded. 

Plaintiff argues, and the record shows, that defendant filed the notice of removal more than 30 

days after he was served with summons. Specifically, defendant was served with summons and 

complaint by personal service on July 15, 2016. To be timely under 28 U.S.C. section 1446(b), 

therefore, defendant’s notice of removal would have to have been filed in federal court no later than 

August 14, 2016. However, defendant did not file the notice of removal until more than a month later 

Case 4:16-cv-05444-YGR Document 13 Filed 10/20/16 Page 2 of 4
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United States District Court 

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on September 23, 2016. Because defendant did not timely file the notice of removal, he waived his 

right to remove, and the action is due to be remanded on this basis alone. 

b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Remand is also appropriate because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this 

action. A defendant in state court may remove an action to federal court so long as the action could 

have originally asserted subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removing defendant 

has the burden of proving the basis for the federal court’s jurisdiction. Nishimoto v. FederamanBachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 1990). Removal statutes are strictly construed 

against removal. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941); Takeda v. 

Northwestern Nat’l. Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1985). 

In this case, the defendant argues that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on a 

federal question. The “well-pleaded complaint” rule requires a federal question to be presented on 

the face of a complaint at the time of removal for federal question jurisdiction to exist. Duncan v. 

Stuetzel, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). An anticipated federal defense is not sufficient to 

confer jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (under the “well-pleaded 

complaint” rule, a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense); see also Wayne v. 

DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d. 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002) (existence of a defense based on 

federal law is insufficient to support jurisdiction). Here, however, the complaint asserts only one 

state law claim for unlawful detainer, and does not present any federal question. Defendant also does 

not appear to raise a federal defense, and he therefore cites 28 U.S.C. section 1443(1) as a basis for 

removal.2

 (See NOR.) 

28 U.S.C. section 1443(1) permits the removal of certain “civil rights cases.” A petition for 

removal under section 1443(1) must satisfy a two-part test: (1) “the petitioner must assert, as a 

defense to the [action], rights that are given to them by explicit statutory enactment protecting equal 

racial civil rights;” and (2) the “petitioners must assert that the state courts will not enforce that 

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 Defendant also cites 28 U.S.C. sections 1350 and 1441 as bases for removal, but then 

presents no argument in support thereof. (See NOR.) He therefore does not meet his burden to show 

removal was appropriate under these alternative theories. 

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right,” with “reference to a state statute or constitutional provision that purports to command the state 

courts to ignore the federal rights.” Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Defendant argues that he will raise a defense to the unlawful detainer action pursuant to his 

equal rights based not on race but on other constitutionally guaranteed rights he claims are protected 

by 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985. (See NOR.) Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent 

undoubtedly limit removal under section 1443(1) to only cases where it is predicated upon racial

discrimination. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788-92 (1966) (“we conclude that the phrase ‘any 

law providing for equal civil rights’ must be construed to mean any law providing for specific civil 

rights stated in terms of racial equality.”); Patel, 446 F.3d at 998-99, supra. Defendant has therefore 

failed to establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1443(1) or 

otherwise. 

Accordingly, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction, and plaintiff’s motion to 

remand is GRANTED. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 3) and 

plaintiff’s motion to remand (Dkt. No. 11) are GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion to shorten time (Dkt. 

No. 12) is DENIED AS MOOT. 

This Order terminates this case. The Clerk of the Court is directed to REMAND this action to 

the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 This terminates Dkt. No. 3, 11, and 12. 

Dated October 20, 2016. 

 _______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 4:16-cv-05444-YGR Document 13 Filed 10/20/16 Page 4 of 4