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Parties Involved:
Donald Ray Dean
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PQBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DONALD RAY DEAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

. FILED 

Unated States Court of Ap~.:~~ 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 0 8 1996 

PATRICK FISii:Z:l Cieri~ 

No. 94-1561 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-186-B) 

Gregory C. Graf, Assistant United States Attorney (Henry L. Solano, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Glen R. Anstine, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR, Senior 

District Judge.* 

O'CONNOR, Senior District Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-1561 Document: 01019277295 Date Filed: 02/08/1996 Page: 1 
* The Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

2 

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The defendant, Donald Ray Dean, was charged and convicted of 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 922 (g) (1). He appeals from the district court's order 

denying his motion to bifurcate the offense for trial. Though not 

raised below, Dean also asserts that the trial court erred in 

admitting evidence regarding the underlying nature of defendant's 

prior felony convictions; and in permitting the government to make 

reference to Dean's prior criminal history during trial and in 

closing argument. We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm the trial court in all respects. 

I. Background 

The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are as follows: 

Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to bifurcate the 

prosecution on the charge of felon in possession with a firearm 

into two separate proceedings: before the jury considered 

defendant's prior convictions, it should first determine the 

existence of the other elements of the offense. The district court 

denied the motion. 

On the first day of trial, defendant stipulated to the 

admissibility of government's exhibits 1-4, which were certified 

copies of each of defendant's four prior felony convictions. 

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Defendant did not request that the exhibits be redacted to remove 

any references to the specific nature of the offenses. Nor did 

defendant offer to stipulate only to the existence of his prior 

convictions. 

In his opening statement at trial, defense counsel 

specifically referred to the nature of the prior convictions: 

Mr. Graf has told you that Exhibits 1 through 4 

have been admit ted already. The Court told you 

that also. And those are the documents that show 

Mr. Dean's prior convictions. Those documents will 

show you that he's been convicted of attempted 

murder back in 1976 in Texas, for which he drew a 

term of probation. He possessed an unlawful weapon 

in 1979 and was charged with that and got two years 

on that. He was involved in an aggravated assault 

in 1984. He served time on that. And he did -- he 

was in possession of a weapon in 1993. Because of 

his background and because of his record, he was 

charged with that and convicted. 

I will tell you that all of those documents show 

and will show you when you get to see them that he 

pled guilty to all those. There was no trial. He 

pled guilty to those. But he is here today saying 

to you, through me, I didn't do this one. I did 

those other four, I didn't do this one. 

(Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 13-14.) 

The defense attorney, during closing argument, asked the jury 

to closely examine the copies of the judgments: 

[J] ust as Mr. Graf said, they have a four-time 

convicted felon. As I said in my opening -- and 

you' 11 see it, and I encourage you to read it 

carefully, it's small print. I do encourage you to 

4 

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read each of the judgments, because you'll come to 

find out that Mr. Dean pled guilty. 

(Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 13-14.) The jury returned a verdict of guilty. 

Defendant timely appeals. 

II. Discussion 

We review~ nQYQ the district court's denial of defendant's 

request to bifurcate the offense for trial. United States v. 

Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1993). 

While this circuit has not previously considered the precise 

nature of the bifurcation issue raised by the defendant in this 

case, his argument has been rejected by the four circuits that have 

addressed the question. ~' United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219 

(3rd Cir.) , cert. denied, u.s. 115 S . Ct . 18 3 5 ( 19 9 5 ) ; 

United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1993); United States 

v. Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. 

113 S. Ct. 2984 (1993); United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24 

(1st Cir. 1989). 

In Collamore, the district court granted the defendant's 

motion to bifurcate the elements of the charge of possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon. In reversing the district court, the 

court of appeals reasoned: 

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First, when a jury is neither read the statute 

setting forth the crime nor told of all the 

elements of the crime, it may, justifiably, 

question whether what the accused did was a crime. 

The present case is a stark example. Possession of 

a firearm by most people is not a crime. A juror 

who owns or who has friends and relatives who own 

firearms may wonder why [the defendant's] 

possession was illegal. Doubt as to the 

criminality of [the defendant's] conduct may 

influence the jury when it considers the possession 

element. 

Collamore, 868 F.2d at 28. 

In a similar vein, the court in Barker stated that a 

bifurcation order "removes an element of the crime from the jury's 

consideration, prevents the government from having its case decided 

by the jury, and changes the very nature of the charged crime." 1 

F.3d at 959. The reasoning of the foregoing circuits is 

persuasive. We hold that the district court did not err in denying 

the defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial. 

Defendant, for the first time on appeal, urges that the trial 

court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence regarding the 

number and nature of defendant's prior felony convictions. When a 

defendant stipulates to the admissibility of evidence at trial, 

without objection, the circuit court reviews only for plain error. 

United States v. Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411, 1416 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

~ ~ Qnited States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 875 (lOth Cir. 1995) 

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(the failure to object to the admissibility of evidence is a waiver 

absent plain error) . 

Although defendant at trial stipulated to the existence, 

number, and underlying nature of his previous four felony 

convictions, he now takes the position that the trial court 

committed plain error in allowing him to enter into such a 

stipulation. He claims that he was denied a fair trial because the 

evidence of his past convictions may have prejudiced the jury. 

Our recent decision in United States v. Wacker, F.3d. 

1995 WL 757896 (lOth Cir. Dec. 26, 1995), provides us guidance on 

this issue. There, the defendant, Lipp, was charged with being a 

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S. C. 

§ 922(g) (1). Lipp objected to the admission of the journal entries 

of conviction and offered to stipulate to the fact of his prior 

convictions. When the government refused to accept the 

stipulation, the district court overruled Lipp • s objection and 

allowed the government to introduce the journal entries into 

evidence. On appeal, Lipp argued that the trial court's ruling was 

an abuse of discretion. 

In analyzing Lipp • s argument, we first distinguished our 

earlier decision in United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003 (lOth 

Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978). 

7 

There, we 

Appellate Case: 94-1561 Document: 01019277295 Date Filed: 02/08/1996 Page: 7 
determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

refusing a defendant's request to strike from the indictment and 

keep from the jury all references to his previous felony 

convictions. 560 F.2d at 1006. Recognizing that a prior felony 

conviction is an essential element of the offense, we held that 

"the government is not required to accept such [a stipulation] and 

may insist upon proving all essential elements of its case." ~ 

In Brinklow, the defendant had "proposed that [the] jury 

instructions specify only those essential elements of the crime 

other than that of a previous felony conviction and that the jury 

be instructed that there were additional necessary elements with 

which they did not need to be concerned." 560 F.2d at 1006. In 

sharp contrast, the defendant in Wacker did not seek to keep from 

the jury the fact of his felony status, but only the nature and 

underlying circumstances of his prior crimes. 1995 WL 757896 at 

*13. We deemed this distinction was "significant." .Iii... 

We noted that the majority of circuits that have considered 

the issue have held that evidence concerning the nature of the 

predicate crime in a felon in possession prosecution is irrelevant 

and prejudicial. ~at *14. Consequently, such evidence should 

be excluded if possible by use of a redacted record, stipulation, 

affidavit, or other similar technique whereby the jury is informed 

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only of the ~ of a prior felony conviction, but not of the 

nature and substance of the conviction. Judge Ebel, writing for 

the panel, stated: 

Today we hold that where a defendant offers to 

stipulate as to the existence of a prior felony 

conviction, the trial judge should permit that 

stipulation to go to the jury as proof of the 

status element of section 922(g) (1), or provide an 

alternate procedure whereby the jury is advised of 

the fact of the former felony, but not its nature 

or substance. ~ Tavares, 21 F.3d [1,] at 4 

(citing other non-prejudicial alternatives) . 

Correspondingly, in those situations where the 

defendant is willing to concede the existence of 

the prior felony conviction, the trial judge should 

ordinarily preclude the government from introducing 

any evidence as to the nature and substance of the 

conviction, as the probative value of this 

additional information generally will be 

overshadowed by its prejudicial effect under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 

Lipp' s proposed stipulation did not 

attempt to keep from the jury the fact that he was 

a convicted felon, nor did it seek to preclude the 

jury from deciding the prior conviction element of 

the crime. Rather, the stipulation sought only to 

limit the prejudice that would result from the jury 

being informed that Lipp had been convicted of 

murder and possession with intent to distribute 

marijuana. The government offered Lipp's prior 

convictions for the sole purpose of proving the 

status element of section 922 (g) (1), and because 

the proffered stipulation would have satisfied this 

element, the additional prejudicial information 

regarding the nature of Lipp's prior crimes should 

have been excluded under Rule 403. 

Id..... at 14-15. 

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The court concluded that the trial court had abused its 

discretion by admitting the journal entries of conviction into 

evidence. Here, in contrast to the defendant in Wacker, Dean did 

not proffer a stipulation which sought to present to the jury only 

the fact that he had a prior felony conviction. Instead, he 

stipulated to admission of the four journal entries, which set 

forth the nature and substance of defendant's prior convictions. 

Defendant did not seek to redact from the judgments the specific 

references to the nature and substance of the convictions. 

Moreover, defense counsel, in his opening statement to the jury, 

enumerated the nature, plea dispositions, and penalties of 

defendant's prior convictions. 

"Plain errors are those errors that when viewed against the 

entire record •seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United States v. Wynne, 993 

F.2d 760, 766 (lOth Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Bowser, 

941 F. 2d 1019, 1021 (lOth Cir. 1991) (quoting Qnited States v. 

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15-16, (1985))). To constitute plain error, the 

district court's mistake must have been both obvious and 

substantial. Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1050 (lOth Cir. 

1995). The substantiality requirement of the plain error rule 

"embodies a requirement that the defendant prove prejudice 

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attributable to the error." United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 

1500, 1521 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, u.s. I 116 s . Ct . 218 

(1995) . 

After examining the record, we conclude that the trial court 

did not commit plain error in allowing the defendant to stipulate 

not only to the fact of his prior felony convictions, but also to 

the nature and substance of his convictions. Defendant has made no 

showing that the trial court's admission of the prior convictions 

was an error "affecting substantial rights." To the extent that 

defendant is claiming that the "prejudice" which he has suffered is 

the conviction itself, he misinterprets the focus of the prejudice 

analysis that we conduct under plain error review. "Our analysis 

centers not on the outcome of the trial -- conviction or acquittal 

-- but rather on the fairness and integrity of the proceedings 

themselves." United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1525 (lOth Cir. 

1995), cert. denied, S. Ct. I 1995 WL 686316 (1996) . 

Dean's attorney incorporated the stipulation into his theory 

of the defense: counsel specifically argued to the jury that it 

was entitled to draw an inference that Dean did not commit the 

instant offense because he had not pled guilty, whereas in his 

prior offenses he had always pled guilty. The defense chose to 

include the judgment and conviction orders as an integral part of 

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its trial strategy. Strategic choices of attorneys are given great 

deference. The court will not question sound tactical decisions of 

trial counsel. High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988 (11th Cir. 1987). Trial 

strategies necessarily evolve without the benefit of hindsight. 

Accordingly, we afford a high level of deference to the 

reasonableness of counsel 1 s performance in light of all the 

circumstances at the time. Lopez v. Shanks, 10 F.3d 810 (lOth Cir. 

1993) . 

Dean next asserts that the government 1 s 11 repeated reference 11 

to the defendant 1 s criminal history during the presentation of 

evidence and during closing argument was plain error. Again, 

defendant failed to lodge any objection at trial; therefore, we 

review only for plain error. united States v. Patterson, 20 F.3d 

809 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, u.s. I 115 s. Ct. 128 (1994) I 

united States v. Ratchford, 942 F.2d 702, 705 (lOth Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 502 u.s. 1100 (1992). 

Specifically, defendant takes issue with the prosecutor 1 s 

remarks in his initial closing argument, when he stated: 

But I ask you to recall what the defense told you 

in their opening statement. They started off, and 

they admitted to you that the defendant had these 

prior convictions. And I think you 1 ll recall one 

of the first things that they said was well, yes he 

had a conviction in 1976 for it was almost 

flippant in the way it was presented to you --

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attempted murder but he got probation for that . . 

. that probation was revoked, and he was sentenced 

to two years in prison. [I]n 1979, two years after 

that particular probation revocation, he was 

possessing a short-barreled firearm. Basically the 

same type of offense you see before you today. 

That he does have a 1984 conviction for aggravated 

assault . And in 1993 has a conviction for 

possessing a weapon. 

(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 9.) Defendant also objects to the following 

statements made by the prosecutor in his rebuttal argument: 

But I submit to you ladies and gentlemen, when you 

look at his four prior convictions, all for 

felonies, all for crimes of violence or possessing 

a firearm, and now he's up to No. 5, and I submit 

to you when all of the other ones were in state 

court, and now he has moved into the major leagues, 

he's in federal court, that will provide you with 

some insight as to why he may be pleading not 

guilty in this case. 

And when you break it down to something that a sixyear-old can understand, when you tell somebody 

what this case is about, you tell them that you 

have an individual who has been convicted of four 

crimes involved with firearms, and because he's on 

his fifth -- he was on probation at the time of the 

offense. 

And then he asked you why he would plead not guilty 

and roll the dice. I submit to you that you can 

draw some inferences of why he won't do that with 

the record he had and the fact that he's on 

probation. That's a reason why he pled not guilty. 

(Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 21, 27.) 

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In order to make an appropriate assessment whether the 

prosecutor's remarks exceeded permissible bounds, "the reviewing 

court must not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor's remarks, 

but must also take into account defense counsel's opening salvo." 

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). " [I] f the 

prosecutors remarks were •invited, • and did no more than respond 

substantially in order to 'right the scale, • such comments would 

not warrant reversing a conviction." ld.... 

Viewing the prosecutor • s remarks in context, we find his 

comments in closing argument did not constitute plain error. The 

prosecutor's statements were made in response to statements made by 

defense counsel. In his initial closing argument the prosecutor 

was in fact simply repeating, or recapping, what the defense 

attorney had already said in his opening statement. The defendant 

in his closing argument invited the government's rebuttal argument 

by asking the jury to speculate as to why the defendant pled not 

guilty in this case but guilty in his previous cases. A prosecutor 

is afforded considerable latitude to reply to an argument raised by 

his opposing advocate. United States v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 803 

(lOth Cir. 1980). 

The prosecutor did not unduly emphasize the defendant's prior 

convictions during presentation of the evidence. The only mention 

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of the prior convictions by the prosecutor during the government's 

case-in-chief was at the time he offered into evidence government's 

exhibits 1-4, the certified copies of the judgment and conviction 

orders. These exhibits were not published to the jury until after 

closing arguments and the jury began deliberations. The government 

properly curtailed its use of the prior crimes evidence; it did not 

"parade" Dean's convictions before the jury or "exploit them in any 

prejudicial fashion." ~U.S. v. Wacker, 1995 WL at *16. .k..f...._ 

United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 

(government presented evidence of defendant's prior convictions on 

five separate occasions) . We conclude that the prosecutor's 

references to Dean's prior convictions did not constitute plain 

error. 

AFFIRMED. 

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