Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01431/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01431-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bret S. Klein
Appellant
Donice Neal
Appellee
Gale Norton
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

BRET S. KLEIN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

DONICE NEAL; GALE NORTON, Attorney 

General of the State of Colorado, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

,FILED llal&ecl states c.n "'~.,,_. APPEALs- T•tll Cirelllt 

JAN 1 7 1995 

PATRICK FISHER - Clerk 

No. 94-1431 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 94-M-731) 

Submitted on the Brief:* 

Bret S. Klein on the brief pro se. 

Appellees did not file a brief. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 94-1431 Document: 01019290259 Date Filed: 01/17/1995 Page: 1 
Bret S. Klein, appearing pro se, brings this appeal 

challenging the district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus 

petition. The district court dismissed the petition because Mr. 

Klein failed to carry his burden of overcoming a procedural bar to 

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by demonstrating 

either cause and prejudice for his default or that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice would occur if we did not address the 

merits of his claim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

The facts, briefly stated, are as follows. In 1986, Mr. 

Klein was charged with burglary and theft in Colorado state court. 

Due to his prior record, he was subject to habitual criminal 

charges. In March of that year, Mr. Klein entered into a plea 

agreement whereby he would plead guilty to felony theft in 

exchange for dismissal of the burglary charge and non-prosecution 

of the habitual criminal charges. The plea was accepted and 

sentence imposed on July 10, 1986. 

In April 1991, almost five years after he pled guilty to the 

1986 theft charges, Mr. Klein filed a motion in Colorado state 

court pursuant to Rule 35(c) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, claiming his 1986 plea of guilty was the product of 

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ineffective assistance of counsel.l Mr. Klein alleges he only 

accepted the plea agreement because his lawyer "would not do any 

investigation or attempt to forulate [sic] and prepare any type of 

defense." In September 1991, the Colorado state court held an 

evidentiary hearing on Mr. Klein's claim and ultimately rejected 

it as untimely under § 16-5-4022 and, in the alternative,3 as nonmeritorious. 

Mr. Klein appealed this determination to the Colorado Court 

of Appeals who affirmed the decision to deny relief, albeit solely 

on the basis that Mr. Klein's motion was untimely. The court did 

1 In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 u.s. 52 (1985), the Supreme Court 

extended the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984), which analyzed claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel, to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

during a guilty plea. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58; accord Laycock v. 

New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

2 Subsection (1) of the statute provides, inter alia, a threeyear limitations period within which an individual must commence a 

collateral attack upon non-class 1 felonies, which includes felony 

theft. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(1) (1986). Moreover, 

although the statute contains an exception for "justifiable excuse 

or excusable neglect," the Rule 35(c) court expressly found this 

exception inapplicable, finding Mr. Klein's claim of ignorance of 

the statute's existence insufficient to constitute excusable 

neglect. 

3 At the time of the Rule 35(c) hearing, it was an open 

question of law in Colorado whether a Rule 35(c) motion 

constituted a "collateral attack" for purposes of applying § 16-5-

402. This uncertainty prompted the Rule 35(c) court to make 

alternative rulings in this case by holding that if a Rule 35(c) 

motion was a collateral attack, then it was untimely; however, if 

it was not a collateral attack, and thus not untimely, then Mr. 

Klein was still not entitled to relief on the merits. Subsequent 

to the disposition by the Rule 35(c) court, the Colorado appeals 

court, and eventually the Colorado Supreme Court, held the phrase 

"collateral attack," as used in§ 16-5-402, included Rule 35(c) 

motions. See People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 431 (Colo. 1993); 

People v. Robinson, 833 P.2d 832 (Colo. App. 1992). 

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not reach the alternative disposition on the merits. See People 

v. Klein, No. 91CA1786 (Colo. App. Mar. 25, 1993) (unpublished 

opinion). After Mr. Klein's petition for review by writ of 

certiorari was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, he filed the 

present petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 

The sole claim presented in his federal petition is whether he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel during his plea 

negotiations and plea. 

The matter was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b} (1}, who recommended the petition be dismissed 

because the Colorado Court of 

adequate and independent state 

Appeals' ruling 

ground, thereby 

rested on an 

constituting a 

procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review. The magistrate 

judge further found Mr. Klein had failed to make a sufficient 

showing to override the application of a procedural bar. Over Mr. 

Klein's objection, the district court agreed and dismissed the 

petition. The district court thereafter issued a certificate of 

probable cause and this appeal ensued. 

DISCUSSION 

In determining whether the magistrate judge, and the district 

court, properly concluded this claim was procedurally barred, we 

must resolve two issues. First, does the Colorado Court of 

Appeals' ruling constitute an "adequate" ground for disposition 

"independent" of federal law? If so, then has Mr. Klein made a 

sufficient showing of either "cause and prejudice" or that a 

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"fundamental miscarriage of justice" would occur so as to allow us 

to reach the merits of his claim. 

A. 

1. 

It is now beyond cavil that the adequate and independent 

state ground doctrine is fully applicable to federal court review 

of habeas corpus petitions. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 

81, 87 (1977); Brecheen v. Reynolds, ___ F.3d ---' 1994 WL 

562159, at *6 (lOth Cir. Oct. 14, 1994). "A state court's finding 

is deemed to be 'adequate' if it is applied 'evenhandedly'; that 

is, if it is '"'strictly or regularly followed.'"'" Brecheen, at 

*6 (citations omitted). "A state court's finding is considered 

'independent if it is separate and distinct from federal law.'" 

Id. 

In this case, construing Mr. Klein's pro se pleadings 

liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per 

curiam), he appears to claim § 16-5-402 is not an "adequate" state 

ground because "there was reason for confusion or uncertainty" 

with regard to the application of the statute. While we agree 

with Mr. Klein that this statute has a tortured history,4 we do 

4 In 1983, the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated the 

predecessor statute to§ 16-5-402 because subsection 2(d), which 

creates an exception for excusable neglect, was not part of the 

statute at that time. The absence of an exception of this type 

led the Colorado Supreme Court to find the statute violative of 

the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process. 

See Colorado v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345, 354 (Colo. 1983). In 1989, 

after the statute was amended to add subsection 2(d), the Colorado 

Supreme Court construed the amended statute to contain "a grace 

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not agree with his conclusion that this implies the statute is an 

inadequate basis on which to rest a procedural bar. Although 

phrased as a challenge to the adequacy of the statute, Mr. Klein's 

argument is really that the Rule 35(c) court did not have the 

benefit of the Colorado Supreme Court's decisions defining what 

constitutes "excusable neglect" and therefore a remand is 

necessary. We are not persuaded. 

The Colorado Supreme Court's decisions in Wiedemer and 

Heitzman, which defined "excusable neglect" under § 16-5-

402(2) (d), did not alter the definition of those terms, thereby 

resulting in sporadic and uneven application of this statutory 

exception across similarly situated individuals; rather, those 

cases were simply judicial interpretations expounding on the 

meaning of that statutory exception. Therefore, while Mr. Klein 

is correct in his understanding of the law that uneven 

application of that statute by the state courts would preclude 

reliance on it as a procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review 

because it is not an "adequate" ground we discern no uneven 

application of§ 16-5-402(2) (d) by the Colorado courts across "the 

vast majority of cases." Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1190 

(lOth Cir. 1991) (noting that a state procedural ground is 

period within which persons convicted of offenses prior to the 

lengths of time specified as limitations periods might 

nevertheless challenge their convictions without regard to the 

statutory exceptions." People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689, 693 

(Colo. 1989). Then, in 1993, the Colorado Supreme Court issued 

two decisions expounding the parameters of what constitutes 

"excusable neglect" under subsection 2(d). See People v. 

Heitzman, 852 P.2d 443, 448 (Colo. 1993) (citing discussion in 

companion case of Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 441-42). 

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adequate as long as it is applied regularly and evenhandedly in 

the vast majority of cases), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1213 (1992). 

Therefore, we find this ground is in fact "adequate" to support 

application of a procedural bar. 

2. 

The determination that a state court judgment rested on an 

"adequate" ground, however, only resolves half of the issue. The 

next question is whether the decision rested on an "independent" 

ground. Because it is unclear whether Mr. Klein challenges this 

issue 

anyway. 

(1989)' 

on appeal, and because of his pro se status, we address it 

The magistrate judge applied Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 

to the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision, and found the 

state court's decision clearly indicated its reliance on state 

law, namely § 16-5-402, and not federal law, thereby constituting 

an independent ground for its decision. While we agree with this 

conclusion, we believe the existing case law mandates a somewhat 

different analysis. 

In Harris, the Supreme Court held "a procedural default does 

not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or 

habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in 

the case 'clearly and expressly' states that its judgment rests on 

a state procedural bar." Id. at 263 (citations and internal 

quotations omitted) . The so-called "Harris presumption" embodies 

the notion that unless the state court judgment under review 

clearly and expressly indicates the court was relying on state law 

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as the basis for its decision,5 a claim will be presumed to have 

been decided as a matter of federal law and therefore not 

procedurally barred on federal habeas corpus review. This 

presumption, however, assumes the existence of an ambiguity ab 

initio as to whether the state court's decision relied on state or 

federal law; the presumption thus serves as a useful tool for 

deciding whether the state court relied on an "independent" 

ground. If, however, the state court decision does not even 

fairly appear to rest on federal law or to be interwoven with 

federal law, then application of the Harris presumption is 

unwarranted. In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), the 

Supreme Court stated " [a] predicate to the application of the 

Harris presumption is that the decision of the last state court to 

which the petitioner presented his federal claims must fairly 

appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with 

federal law." Id. at 735. 

Coleman thus clarifies that the Harris presumption is 

applicable if, and only if, the predicate question of whether the 

state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal 

law is first answered in the affirmative. If so, such that the 

5 In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991), the Supreme Court 

made it clear that if the last state court to render a judgment on 

a claim did so in a cursory or unexplained manner, then the 

federal habeas corpus courts are to apply a "look through" rule, 

which essentially looks past the last state court decision to the 

last reasoned state court decision. That then becomes the 

decision to be reviewed by the federal habeas corpus court. See 

id. at 803-06; see also Brecheen, at *11. In this case, the.last 

reasoned state court decision is that of the Colorado Court of 

Appeals. 

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state court decision could arguably be read as relying on both 

state and federal law, then application of the Harris presumption 

dictates the claim is not procedurally barred (i.e., the decision 

should be presumed to rest on federal law and is therefore not an 

"independent" ground) unless there is a clear indication by the 

state court to the contrary (i.e., a plain statement that it was 

relying on state law as the basis for the decision) . 

Coleman succinctly describes why the Harris presumption works 

in practice. 

[I]n the majority of cases in which a state court 

decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law 

or to be interwoven with such law, and the state court 

does not plainly state that it is relying on an 

independent and adequate state ground, the state court 

decision did not in fact rest on an independent and 

adequate state ground. We accept errors in those small 

number of cases where there was nonetheless an 

independent and adequate state ground in exchange for a 

significant reduction in the costs of inquiry. 

The tradeoff is very different when the factual 

predicate does not exist. In those cases in which it 

does not fairly appear that the state court rested its 

decision primarily on federal grounds, it is simply not 

true that the 'most reasonable explanation' is that the 

state judgment rested on federal grounds. 

Id. at 737. Overriding concerns of federalism demand this result 

as "[t]here is little that the federal courts will gain by 

applying a presumption of federal review in those cases where the 

relevant state court decision does not fairly appear to rest 

primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with such law, and 

much that the States and state courts will lose." Id. at 740. 

Application of these principles to this case demonstrates we 

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need not reach the question of whether the Harris presumption 

applies. The decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals does not 

contain even a scintilla of evidence suggesting the court relied 

on federal law. There is no reference to any form of federal law, 

be it constitutional, statutory or decisional, in the opinion, and 

as such, the predicate to the Harris presumption has not been 

satisfied. The only references to legal authority are to Colorado 

statutory and decisional law. We therefore find the Colorado 

Court of Appeals' decision, which was the last reasoned state 

court decision in this case, rested exclusively on state law, 

entirely "independent" of federal law. The magistrate judge was 

thus correct in concluding Mr. Klein's ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim was subject to a procedural bar, and we will not 

reach the merits of his claim unless he carries his burden of 

overriding the procedural bar. 

B. 

A habeas corpus petitioner may excuse a procedural default by 

demonstrating either "cause for the default and actual prejudice 

as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or that 

failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice." Brecheen, at *16; see also Coleman, 501 

u.s. at 750. 

1. 

The "cause and prejudice" exception is conjunctive, requiring 

proof of both cause and prejudice. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 

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U.S. 478, 496 (1986); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 

n.43 (1982). "[T]he existence of cause for a procedural default 

must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts 

to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray, 477 U.S. at 

488. Examples of such objective factors include a showing that 

the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably 

available to counsel, or that "'some interference by officials'" 

made compliance impracticable. Id. (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 16 (1984), and citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 

(1953)). 

Applying this standard, it is apparent Mr. Klein's assertions 

he is not a lawyer and he was unaware of this statute's existence 

are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute "cause." See 

Cornman v. Armantrout, 959 F.2d 727, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1992) 

(citing cases for the propositions that neither below-average 

intelligence, pro se status or lack of formal legal training 

constitute "cause") .6 Therefore, the magistrate judge properly 

concluded Mr. Klein may not avail himself of this exception. 

Furthermore, because Mr. Klein has failed to demonstrate "cause," 

we need not assess the "prejudice" component of the inquiry. 

6 To be sure, Cornman dealt with "cause" to overcome a claim of 

abuse of the writ, not "cause" to overcome a procedural default. 

The Supreme Court, however, has equated the "cause and prejudice" 

standards applicable to procedural defaults with the "cause and 

prejudice" standards applicable to successive and abusive 

petitions. See Sawyer v. Whitley, ___ U.S. ___ , 112 S. Ct. 2514, 

2518 (1992). 

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2. 

In the alternative, Mr. Klein contends the exception for a 

"fundamental miscarriage of justice" is applicable. To come 

within this very narrow exception, the petitioner must 

"supplement[] his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of 

factual innocence." Brecheen, at *9 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 

113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993)). The inquiry must focus on actual or 

factual innocence, as opposed to legal innocence. See Brecheen, 

at *9. Moreover, an adequate showing of the applicability of this 

exception does not establish an entitlement to relief; rather, 

such a showing is merely "a gateway through which a habeas 

petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred claim considered 

on the merits." Id. at *9 (emphasis in original) (citing Herrera, 

113 S. Ct. at 862). The exception is intended for those rare 

situations "where the State has convicted the wrong person of the 

crime .... [Or where] it is evident that the law has made a 

mistake." Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. 2519-20. 

Mr. Klein argues this exception is applicable because he 

allegedly maintained his innocence up to and including the time he 

pled guilty to the charges which led to his incarceration, and he 

entered his plea only after threats and poor legal advice by his 

attorney. But during Mr. Klein's Rule 35(c) hearing, the state 

trial court expressly found "repeated incidents in the record 

showing acknowledgements of guilt by defendant," while at the same 

time finding Mr. Klein's allegations of his counsel's misconduct 

simply not credible. These findings are supported by the record, 

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and accordingly, they are entitled to a presumption of correctness 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 

1516 (lOth Cir. 1991) (discussing the presumption of correctness 

and stating "we treat a state court finding regarding credibility 

as a finding of fact"). Accordingly, Mr. Klein has fallen far 

short of making a sufficient showing of actual innocence to 

overcome his procedural default. 

In sum, while we recognize many litigants perceive that the 

disposition of claims because of procedural noncompliance seems 

unfairly harsh and picayune, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 

"the significant harm to the States that results from the failure 

of federal courts to respect [a state's procedural rules]." 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Concerns of federalism and comity 

dictate that the federal courts give the same respect to a state's 

procedural rules as is given to federal procedural rules. Id. at 

751. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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