Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00620/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00620-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stanley Fishman
Plaintiff
Mel Clayton Ford
Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Stanley Fishman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Mel Clayton Ford, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-0620-PHX-LOA

ORDER

This matter arises on the Court's review of the file. On March 23, 2007, Plaintiff

filed a pro se Complaint against Defendant Mel Clayton Ford. (docket # 1) 

I. Procedural History

On April 13, 2007, the Court concluded that Plaintiff's Complaint failed to

comply with Rule 8(a), FED.R.CIV.P., was unintelligible and provided only conclusions with

no factual allegations to support the Complaint. The Court ordered, among other things, that

Plaintiff amend his Complaint in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and LRCiv 7.1.

(docket # 6) Thereafter, the only change Plaintiff made to his timely-filed Amended

Complaint was to write “Relif (sic) is to get paid.” (docket # 8) Again, the Court ordered

Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint in compliance with Rule 8(a), FED.R.CIV.P.,

and LRCiv 7.1 which shall contain a short and plain statement of his factual and legal

allegations against the Defendant, specify the Court’s jurisdictional basis, and clarify the civil

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rights or other federal or state statute(s) upon which Plaintiff is relying to support his

claim(s). (docket # 10 at 2-3)

On April 27, 2007, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis. (docket # 9) On May 4, 2007, Plaintiff expressly consented in writing to

magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). (docket # 11)

On May 4, 2007, Plaintiff timely filed his Second Amended Complaint which

barely provides sufficient information to understand the basis of Plaintiff’s claim. (docket

# 13) In view of Plaintiff's pro se status, the district court construes his pleadings liberally.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, "[p]ro se litigants must [still] follow

the same rules of procedure as other litigants." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987) The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Mel Clayton Ford (“Defendant”), a

well-known local new and used car dealership, “has taken my van and car . . . and have

refused to return my van or car or give me my money for them” (Id. at 1) The Second

Amended Complaint does not set forth a specific jurisdictional statute. The pro se Plaintiff,

however, attempted to comply with the Court’s April 27, 2007 order which required a

statement of the basis for federal jurisdiction by writing in the Second Amended Complaint

the “only Court I could possibly get a fair trial is in Federal Court. This is why I am filing

this [lawsuit] in Federal Court.” (Id.)

II. Standard for Reviewing Complaint

The district court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who

have been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,

27 (1992); Jones v. Social Sec. Admin., 2007 WL 806628 (E.D. Cal. 2007). Title 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) provides that the district court "shall dismiss a case at any time if it determines

that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is legally frivolous within the meaning

of § 1915 “where it lacks any arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.1984). Moreover,

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1

 Rule 12(h)(3) provides:

(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court

lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.

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pursuant to Rule 12(h), FED.R.CIV.P., a district court must dismiss an action whenever it

appears that the district court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Pursuant to Rule

12(h)(3),1

 the Court will consider as a threshold matter whether it has subject-matter

jurisdiction. 

A. Subject-matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack inherent or general

subject matter jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178,

182-183 (1936); A-Z International v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003). Federal

courts can only adjudicate those cases in which the United States Constitution and Congress

authorize them to adjudicate. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

The presumption is that federal courts lack jurisdiction over civil actions, and the burden to

establish the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. A district court has a

duty to sua sponte establish subject-matter jurisdiction over the action before it. United

Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004); Feldman

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 2003). “No matter how tantalizing a problem

may be, a federal [] court cannot scratch intellectual itches unless it has jurisdiction to reach

them.” Director, OWCP v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 853 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir.1988). 

III. Analysis

There is nothing in the Second Amended Complaint to suggest a violation of

any federal law or Plaintiff’s rights under the federal constitution. Nowhere in the Second

Amended complaint did Plaintiff cite a federal statute or constitutional provision. It only

alleges that Defendant has “taken away my civil rights.” (docket # 13 at 1) If Plaintiff is

attempting to bring a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he fails. 

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By its terms, § 1983 does not create any substantive rights. Rather, it provides

a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Alright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266

(1994). Section 1983 allows individuals to recover for deprivations of constitutional rights

that occur under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled

on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by persons acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). 

 “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the

defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and

made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”

McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “It is firmly

established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the

position given to him by the State. Thus, generally, a public employee acts under color of

state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant

to state law.” Id. (citing West, 487 U.S. at 49-50). In Parratt, the Supreme Court noted that

defendant-prison officials unquestionably satisfied the color-of-state-law requirement

because they “were, after all, state employees in positions of considerable authority.” Parratt,

451 U.S. at 535-536. Assuming arguendo that Defendant or its employee violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional right to be free from an unlawful seizure of Plaintiff’s property, it is not

reasonable to believe that such employee meets the under-color-of-state-law requirement.

Thus, it does not appear that federal-question jurisdiction exists in this case under § 1983.

If the Second Amended Complaint is intended to allege tort claims for

intentional or negligent conduct or a breach-of-contract claim under state law, Plaintiff’s

claim fails for lack of complete diversity of citizenship. Federal subject-matter jurisdiction

under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) requires complete diversity of citizenship and an amount

in controversy in excess of $75,000. With a few exceptions, subject-matter jurisdiction is

premised upon diversity of citizenship at the time of filing the complaint. Grupo Dataflux v.

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2

 That section provides in full:

Transfer to cure want of jurisdiction

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title or an

appeal, including a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or filed

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Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004); Newman-Green, Inc. v.

Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989). A corporation is a citizen of the state where it

is incorporated and the state of its principle place of business and (2) partnerships and limited

liability companies are citizens of every state in which one of their members or partners

resides. Title 28 U.S.C. §1332(c); Indus. Tectonics v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th

Cir. 1990); Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Market Place, L.L.C., 350 F.3d 691, 692

(7th Cir. 2003). 

Assuming the property exceeds $75,000, there is nothing in the Second

Amended Complaint to suggest that Defendant is an out-of-state corporation. In today’s

computer internet world, one can click on www.cc.state.az.us and review the Arizona

Corporation Commission’s records for Mel Clayton Ford, Inc. and determine that its current

address is 1550 E. Camelback Road in Phoenix, that it was originally incorporated as an

Arizona corporation in 1948, was formerly known as Mel Clayton Ford and Read Mullan

Motor Company, and that it is presently in good standing with the Arizona Corporation

Commission. Furthermore, Plaintiff identifies his current address on the first page of the

Second Amended Complaint as a Phoenix residential address. (docket # 13 at 1) Since it

appears that Mel Clayton Ford is incorporated in Arizona with its principle place of business

in Phoenix and that Plaintiff resides in Phoenix, there is no diversity of citizenship between

the parties. Thus, federal subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) is lacking.

Unfortunately for the pro se Plaintiff, there is no statutory mechanism for the

Court to transfer this case to state court. McLaughlin v. ARCO Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426

(3d Cir. 1983) (where subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking, the district court is required to

dismiss and has no authority to transfer to state court, especially absent a colorable federal

claim to which a state claim can be appended). Title 28 U.S.C. § 16312

 is inapplicable

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with such a court and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court

shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such

court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed

or noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed

for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in

or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.

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because “‘[t]his provision [was] broadly drafted to allow transfer between any two Federal

courts.’” Id. at 428-429 (citation omitted)(emphasis in original). Also Title 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c) provides the district court limited authority to remand actions to state court if such

actions were “removed from a State court” and “the district court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a) and (c). Since this lawsuit was not initially removed from

state court, this provision is inapplicable. Thus, this Court has no authority to transfer this

action to the Maricopa County Superior Court.

In light of the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s lawsuit, without

prejudice to it being brought in state court, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). 

According,

IT IS ORDERED that this lawsuit is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

DATED this 14th day of May, 2007.

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