Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01054/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01054-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Moe Aman
Appellant
Dillon Companies, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MOE AMAN, f/k/a Mohamed Aman, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

DILLON COMPANIES, INC., a Kansas 

corporation, d/b/a King Soopers, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

Nos. 14-1461 & 15-1054 

(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-02973-JLK) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Moe Aman filed suit against his former employer, Dillon Companies, Inc. 

d/b/a King Soopers (“King Soopers”), advancing numerous discrimination and 

retaliation claims. The district court granted King Soopers summary judgment as to 

some claims and judgment as a matter of law as to the remainder. Aman appeals. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I

 Aman began working as a produce clerk at King Soopers store #5 in 2006. 

Jack Ruby was the store manager, Don Gordy was the produce manager, and Chris 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

April 15, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 1 
2 

Bateson was the assistant produce manager. On May 7, 2007, Gordy deliberately 

slammed a produce cart into Aman, injuring his back. Gordy was terminated because 

of the incident. Aman was out of work for several weeks, during which time he 

received workers’ compensation benefits. 

 After returning from the injury, Aman continued to work in the produce 

department subject to medical restrictions. In October 2007, a physician concluded 

that Aman had reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) and imposed 

permanent restrictions. An independent medical examination likewise suggested a 

permanent restriction of no lifting greater than thirty pounds. 

 In April 2008, King Soopers determined that Aman’s permanent restriction 

rendered him unable to continue working as produce clerk. Effective May 11, it 

reclassified him to the service desk, a position with a substantially lower rate of pay. 

In response, Aman requested a leave of absence, but was informed he was ineligible 

for leave because King Soopers had a position he could fill despite his restrictions. 

After learning of the reclassification and his ineligibility for leave, Aman reported 

that he had been harassed and discriminated against throughout his time working at 

the store. 

 Aman was scheduled to work at the service desk from May 13 through May 

17, 2008. He called in sick for each of those days, but did not speak to any of his 

direct supervisors. Aman also called into the store on May 17 to report that he would 

be out sick for the entire next week, when he was scheduled to work from May 20 to 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 2 
3 

23. Ruby terminated Aman on May 27 for being absent without leave. Additional 

facts relevant to particular issues raised on appeal will be discussed infra. 

 Aman filed suit against King Soopers on November 15, 2011, advancing 

numerous claims. The district court granted King Soopers’ motion for summary 

judgment on several claims. The remaining claims proceeded to trial. At the close of 

all evidence, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of King 

Soopers and dismissed the case. Aman timely appealed. 

II

Aman appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his wrongful 

discharge in violation of public policy claim. We review the grant of summary 

judgment de novo. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th 

Cir. 2009). A party is entitled to summary judgment only if, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Id. 

Aman claims that King Soopers violated Colorado law by terminating him in 

retaliation for exercising his workers’ compensation rights. Although it was not the 

basis for the district court’s decision, King Soopers argues that Aman’s claim is timebarred. A claim for wrongful discharge accrues upon termination and is subject to a 

two-year limitations period. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a); Williams v. 

Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 361 P.3d 1075, 1077 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied, No. 

15SC445, 2015 WL 7423588 (Colo. Nov. 23, 2015). Aman was terminated on May 

27, 2008. He filed suit on November 15, 2011, more than two years later. 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 3 
4 

Aman does not substantively respond to the timeliness argument. Instead, he 

contends King Soopers waived this affirmative defense by failing to raise it in a 

motion for summary judgment. A statute of limitations defense may be waived if it 

is not pled. Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 2003). But 

King Soopers pled that Aman’s claims were time-barred in its answer. And the fact 

that King Soopers did not rely on the statute of limitations in its motion for summary 

judgment is not dispositive. Rather, “[w]e may affirm on any ground adequately 

presented to the district court, or on a ground not raised in the district court provided 

that the record is sufficiently clear [and] both parties had an adequate opportunity to 

develop the record on the issue.” Griffith v. Colo., Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 

1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1994). Whether to do so is committed to our discretion. 

United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 844 (10th Cir. 2012). We have identified 

several factors relevant in considering an alternative ground: “[1] whether the 

ground was fully briefed and argued here and below; [2] whether the parties have had 

a fair opportunity to develop the factual record; and [3] whether, in light of factual 

findings to which we defer or uncontested facts, our decision would involve only 

questions of law.” Id. (quotation omitted). Although the timeliness issue was not 

briefed below, the other two factors counsel in favor of King Soopers. Accord id. 

(absence of first factor not conclusive). We exercise our discretion to affirm the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment because Aman’s wrongful discharge 

claim was untimely. 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 4 
5 

III

 Aman challenges the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on 

four claims: (1) hostile work environment; (2) termination on the basis of race; (3) 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) retaliation; and (4) Title VII retaliation. 

We review a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. Murphy 

Oil USA, Inc. v. Wood, 438 F.3d 1008, 1012 (10th Cir. 2006). Judgment as a matter 

of law is granted “only if all of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, reveals no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the 

nonmoving party.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 

2012) (quotation omitted). 

A

Aman claims he suffered a hostile work environment due to his race. To 

succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that “the 

workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment 

and create an abusive working environment.” Morris v. City of Colo. Springs, 666 

F.3d 654, 664 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). We examine the “totality of the 

circumstances, and consider such factors as the frequency of the discriminatory 

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 

performance.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 5 
6 

Aman brings hostile work environment claims under both Title VII and 42 

U.S.C. § 1981. Under Title VII, an employee must file a charge with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of the 

discriminatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).1

 And he must file a civil 

complaint under § 1981 within four years of the alleged conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1658; 

Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1152 (10th Cir. 2008). The parties 

agree that Aman filed his EEOC charge on March 13, 2009, and thus he may 

challenge conduct occurring on or after May 17, 2008, under Title VII. And he filed 

his federal complaint on November 15, 2011, and thus he may challenge conduct 

occurring on or after November 15, 2007, under § 1981.2

 

Under certain circumstances, hostile work environment claims may rely in part 

on conduct that occurred outside the limitations period. “[A]s long as an act 

contributing to a hostile work environment took place” within the limitations period, 

“a court may consider the complete history of acts comprising that hostile work 

environment.” Duncan v. Manager, Dep’t of Safety, 397 F.3d 1300, 1308 (10th Cir. 

2005) (quotation omitted). But to consider pre-limitations period conduct, those acts 

 1

 The parties agree that Aman filed a complaint with a state agency as required 

to trigger the 300-day limitations period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 

2

 Aman argues that King Soopers waived any timeliness argument as to the 

hostile work environment claim because it failed to cross appeal the district court’s 

summary judgment ruling indicating that the claim was timely. But King Soopers 

obtained judgment in its favor on Aman’s hostile work environment claims, and 

“seeks no relief which was not granted it in the court below and properly may raise 

any issue which was there considered even though it asserts that the court was in 

error.” Emerson v. Labor Inv. Corp., 284 F.2d 946, 949 (10th Cir. 1960). 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 6 
7 

must comprise “part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice” that 

continued into the limitations period. Id. (quotation omitted). “[A] series of alleged 

events comprises the same hostile environment where the pre- and post-limitations 

period incidents involved the same type of employment actions, occurred relatively 

frequently, and were perpetrated by the same managers.” Id. at 1309 (quotation and 

alteration omitted). 

Aman cites to three instances in which racial slurs were used against him. He 

testified that Gordy called him an “African monkey” and an “African lion,” and that 

Bateson called him a “lazy African.” He also asserts that one of his co-workers heard 

Gordy state that he did not like black people. Aman also relies heavily on the Gordy 

assault. All of these incidents occurred before November 15, 2007, and thus fall 

outside of the limitations periods. 

Aman further cites to a litany of facially neutral conduct that occurred after he 

returned to work following his injury—some of which occurred within the limitations 

periods. “[F]acially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of racial animus 

sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in 

the context of other, overtly racially-discriminatory conduct.” Hernandez v. Valley 

View Hosp. Ass’n, 684 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation and alterations 

omitted). Such conduct may support a hostile work environment claim if “a jury, 

viewing the evidence in context, reasonably could view all of the allegedly harassing 

conduct as the product of racial hostility.” Id. (quotation and alterations omitted). 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 7 
8 

But Aman fails to provide evidence from which a reasonable juror could 

conclude that the facially neutral events which occurred within the limitations period 

were part of “the same actionable hostile work environment practice” that he claims 

began prior to his injury. Duncan, 397 F.3d at 1308 (quotation omitted). Several of 

the incidents Aman cites are wholly unrelated to his pre-limitations period work 

environment. For example, many relate to claimed procedural irregularities that 

occurred in connection with his termination. And several alleged actions happened 

after Aman had been terminated and thus could not have contributed to a hostile work 

environment. See Hirase-Doi v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 782 (10th 

Cir. 1995), superseded on other grounds by Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 

775 (1998) (a plaintiff “may only rely on evidence relating to harassment of which 

she was aware during the time that she was allegedly subject to a hostile work 

environment”). 

Similarly unfounded is Aman’s argument that his reclassification to the service 

desk contributed to a hostile work environment. The same is true as to his claims 

regarding management’s doubts about the severity of his pain and employees’ 

mockery of his injury. These allegations did not involve the same type of 

employment actions as the pre-limitations period racial comments or Gordy assault. 

Nor—with one exception discussed infra—did they involve the same employees as 

the pre-limitations period conduct. And his reclassification occurred approximately 

one year after the more serious incident involving Gordy. Thus, his reclassification 

does not satisfy any of the relevant factors. See Duncan, 397 F.3d at 1309. 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 8 
9 

The only connection between pre- and post-limitations period conduct we can 

discern is that Bateson allegedly refused to shake Aman’s hand on his first day of 

work at store #5 and called Aman a “lazy African” on a single occasion outside the 

limitations period, and was one of the employees who doubted the severity of 

Aman’s pain within the limitations period. Even assuming that Bateson’s single 

racial comment and handshake slight should be included in the analysis, we conclude 

that the isolated Bateson incidents are not sufficient for a jury to find Aman was 

subject to a hostile work environment. Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th 

Cir. 1994) (“Instead of sporadic racial slurs, there must be a steady barrage of 

opprobrious racial comments” to support a hostile work environment). Regardless, 

this single incident of harassment occurring within the limitations period is 

insufficient to tie the claim back to prior harassment by the same employee. See 

Holmes v. Utah, Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 483 F.3d 1057, 1063-64 (10th Cir. 

2007). 

Focusing on the potentially timely actions, the vast majority of Aman’s 

proffered evidence does not suggest racial discrimination generally, nor that his 

reassignment and termination were motivated by race. Bolden, 43 F.3d at 551 

(“General harassment if not racial or sexual is not actionable.”). He likewise fails to 

demonstrate that his co-workers’ doubts about the severity of his injury were raciallydriven, or that they were severe or pervasive. Because Aman has not demonstrated a 

workplace sufficiently “permeated with [racially] discriminatory intimidation, 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 9 
10 

ridicule, and insult,” Morris, 666 F.3d at 664 (quotation omitted), we affirm the 

district court’s dismissal of Aman’s hostile work environment claim. 

B

 We consider Aman’s claim of termination on the basis of race under the 

burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 

802-06 (1973). Under this framework, Aman carries the initial burden of 

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. EEOC v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 

790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007). The burden then shifts to King Soopers to provide a 

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate him. Id. If it does 

so, the burden shifts back to Aman to show that King Soopers’ stated reason is 

pretextual. Id. The parties agree that Aman satisfied his prima facie obligation, and 

King Soopers responded that it legitimately fired him for being absent without leave. 

Thus, the parties’ sole dispute on this claim is whether Aman advanced sufficient 

evidence of pretext.3

 

A plaintiff may establish pretext by showing “such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 

 3

 Aman briefly argues that he was not given an opportunity to respond to the 

district court’s reliance on employee testimony suggesting that King Soopers does 

not permit racial discrimination. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (providing that a court 

may enter judgment as a matter of law “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue 

during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally 

sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue”). In its oral ruling, the 

district court references King Soopers’ stance on discrimination. But we do not read 

the court’s decision as relying on this testimony. Instead, the court held that Aman 

had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that race was a factor in his 

termination—an issue that was fully litigated. 

 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 10 
11 

proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 

find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the 

asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 

1280 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 

Aman suggests pretext because he adhered to King Soopers’ sick policy by 

calling in sick for five consecutive scheduled shifts from May 13 to 17, 2008; and 

again for the entire week of May 20 to 23 after a night crew foreman told him he did 

not need to call every day. Because the absences were excused, he contends that they 

could not support termination. But Aman conflates King Soopers’ call-in procedure 

with its process for excusing absences. The evidence shows that although any 

member of management can accept a sick call, only the store manager, or in his 

absence, the assistant store manager, may excuse an absence. Aman did not contact 

his direct supervisor, the store manager, or the assistant store manager between May 

11 and June 2, 2008. Thus, evidence that Aman spoke to appropriate individuals 

when calling in does not undermine King Soopers’ position that Aman was 

terminated for unexcused absences. 

Similarly, Aman argues that he was entitled to take leave for the time he was 

absent and notes that Ruby was aware he was planning to see a doctor. But King 

Soopers’ policy requires an employee to submit a written request for leave in excess 

of five days. And, absent exceptional circumstances, the request must be approved 

before the leave begins. Aman admitted that he was aware of these policies and 

knew he had not been approved for leave. 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 11 
12 

 Aman also identifies inconsistencies in King Soopers’ stated justifications for 

his termination. He notes that on two occasions King Soopers mis-identified the 

dates Aman did not call in sick, and suggests management wavered between stating 

he was fired for “excessive absenteeism” and stating he “quit without notice.” But 

neither of these observations undermines King Soopers’ consistent assertion that 

Aman was terminated because he did not come to work between May 11 and the date 

he was fired. In particular, the terms “excessive absenteeism” and “quit without 

notice” are related—an employee explained that numerous consecutive unexcused 

absences would be described as having quit without notice. The descriptive 

variations are thus “simply too minor to give rise to an inference of pretext.” Hardy 

v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd., 185 F.3d 1076, 1081 (10th Cir. 1999). 

 Finally, Aman argues that Ruby should have retroactively excused his 

absences when Aman submitted a note from his doctor on June 2, 2008. He contends 

that rejection of this note demonstrates pretext because Ruby testified both that he 

did not expect Aman to bring in a note before June 2, and that Aman should have 

brought the note in sooner. He also contends that Ruby did not provide any reason 

for declining to excuse Aman’s absences. However, Aman ignores the portions of 

Ruby’s testimony in which Ruby stated that Aman should have contacted him or the 

assistant store manager sooner regardless of when Aman brought the doctor’s note in. 

We do not discern any inconsistency in Ruby’s testimony on this point. And, as 

noted supra, Ruby provided a legitimate reason for the termination: Aman did not 

comply with the policy requiring prior approval for leave of more than five days. 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 12 
13 

Considering all of this evidence together, we agree with the district court that 

Aman did not provide a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that King 

Soopers’ stated reason for firing him was pretextual.4

C 

Aman claims both ADA and race-based retaliation. If an employee cannot 

provide direct evidence of retaliatory motive, he may rely on the McDonnell Douglas 

burden-shifting framework described supra. See Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 

659 F.3d 987, 998 (10th Cir. 2011). Under the first step in this framework, the 

employee must make out a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: “(1) she 

engaged in protected [conduct], (2) a reasonable employee would have considered the 

challenged employment action materially adverse, and (3) a causal connection 

existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Daniels v. 

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 638 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see 

also Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999).5 

 4

 Aman further claims that Ruby and Stephanie Bouknight offered different 

accounts of the termination decision. In support of this argument he cites to evidence 

from the summary judgment record. We cannot consider this evidence in our 

analysis. See McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“Evidence not admitted at trial cannot be used in a review of the district court’s 

[ruling on a motion for] judgment as a matter of law.”). 

5

 For a Title VII or § 1981 retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove that the 

desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action. Univ. 

of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013); Davis v. Unified Sch. 

Dist. 500, 750 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that the “standards are the 

same” for Title VII and § 1981 claims). It not clear whether an ADA retaliation 

claim requires “but for” or “motivating factor” causation. See Doe v. Bd. of Cty. 

Comm’rs, 613 F. App’x 743, 747 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (noting that 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 13 
14 

 Aman asserts that he participated in protected conduct by complaining of 

discrimination. Specifically, when he was informed in early May 2008 that he was 

ineligible for leave because King Soopers had a position available for him, Aman 

complained both of previous racial harassment and argued that he was entitled to 

leave due to his injury, which resulted from his co-worker’s assault. But Aman did 

not provide evidence from which a jury could find causation. Aman asserts that a 

jury could infer causation based on the temporal proximity between his complaints 

and his termination. We have held that temporal proximity of approximately one 

month can be sufficient to establish causation. See Trujillo v. PacifiCorp, 524 F.3d 

1149, 1157 n.5 (10th Cir. 2008). And the district court accepted the temporal 

proximity as sufficiently probative to demonstrate a prima facie case on these two 

claims at the summary judgment stage. 

But we have repeatedly “recognized that evidence of temporal proximity has 

minimal probative value in a retaliation case where intervening events between the 

employee’s protected conduct and the challenged employment action provide a 

legitimate basis for the employer’s action.” Twigg, 659 F.3d at 1001-02; Maestas v. 

Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[E]vidence of intervening events 

tend[s] to undermine any inference of retaliatory motive and weaken the causal link.” 

(citation omitted)). As discussed supra, after asserting his complaints Aman missed 

____________________________ 

several courts have applied the “but for” causation standard in assessing ADA 

claims); Wesley-Dickson v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 586 F. App’x 739, 745 

n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (noting that the “but-for standard might apply to . . . 

ADA retaliation claim[s]”). Because we conclude that Aman cannot prevail even 

under the lower motivating factor standard, we will assume it applies. 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 14 
15 

numerous days of work without contacting the individuals authorized to excuse his 

absences. And he offers no other basis on which to infer that his termination was 

retaliation for his complaints. We thus conclude he fails to make out a prima facie 

case that he was terminated in retaliation for his complaints regarding his disability 

and race.6

 Under these circumstances, his retaliation claims fail.7 

IV

Aman also appeals the district court’s decision to exclude evidence related to 

treatment of allegedly similarly situated employees. “We review evidentiary rulings 

for an abuse of discretion, and pay deference to the trial court’s familiarity with the 

case and experience in evidentiary matters.” Elm Ridge Expl. Co. v. Engle, 721 F.3d 

1199, 1213 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “We reverse only if the district 

court’s conclusion is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or manifestly unreasonable or 

when we are convinced that the district court made a clear error of judgment or 

exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). To establish the relevance of the excluded evidence, Aman was required to 

show that he was similarly situated to the comparable employees. McGowan v. City 

of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 2006). Comparator employees must have 

 6

 We conclude that Aman has not made out a prima facie case, and so do not 

reach his argument regarding the pretext step in the McDonnell Douglas framework. 

We note, however, that we have already concluded supra that Aman did not submit 

evidence sufficient to conclude that King Soopers’ legitimate reason for his 

termination was pretext. 

7

 Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Aman’s claims, we need 

not consider his arguments regarding the availability of punitive damages. See 

Stewart v. Adolph Coors Co., 217 F.3d 1285, 1289 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000). 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 15 
16 

engaged in “conduct of comparable seriousness in order for their disparate treatment 

to be relevant.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Aman proffered evidence regarding three other employees who were 

disciplined but not terminated for excessive absenteeism. It was within the district 

court’s discretion to conclude that none of these employees’ misconduct was 

comparable to Aman’s. Although the comparator employees were disciplined for 

calling in sick too frequently over the course of their employment, none of the 

employees were absent for a consecutive span of days approaching the bloc Aman 

missed. 

V

Finally, Aman challenges the district court order requiring that he post an 

appeal bond. King Soopers did not move to enforce the bond, and thus argues the 

issue is moot. An issue is moot unless “granting a present determination of the issues 

offered will have some effect in the real world.” See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. 

Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1110 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation and 

emphasis omitted). We agree that the issue is now moot because the appeal has been 

decided without Aman posting the bond, and a decision from this court would have 

no practical effect. Because mootness is a jurisdictional issue, see id. at 1109, we 

dismiss Aman’s appeal of the bond order, which was assigned docket number 15-

1054. 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 16 
17 

VI

 We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Aman’s appeal as to the bond 

order is DISMISSED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 15-1054 Document: 01019603340 Date Filed: 04/15/2016 Page: 17