Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02105/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02105-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. Stenzel
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

} 

v. ) 

) 

ROBERT A. STENZEL, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

"FILED 1s 

Ualtecl States court of Appe8 Tenth Circult 

MAR 0 3 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

-Clerk 

No. 94-2105 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CR-94-3-JB) 

Judith A. Rosenstein, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Tara c. Neda, Assistant u.s. Attorney (John J. Kelly, United 

States Attorney, and James T. Martin, Assistant u.s. Attorney, on 

the brief) Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY, LOGAN and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-2105 Document: 01019281770 Date Filed: 03/03/1995 Page: 1 
Defendant Robert A. Stenzel appeals his convictions under the 

Assimilative Crimes Act for concealing his identity, disorderly 

conduct, failure to exhibit evidence of financial responsibility, 

and failure to exhibit evidence of vehicle registration.1 On 

appeal, he asserts that the court (1) violated his Sixth Amendment 

right to a jury trial, (2) erred in not recusing itself, and 

(3) violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 

counsel because his attorney was not allowed to make a closing 

argument. He also argues (4) that the evidence was insufficient 

to convict him on the disorderly conduct and concealing identity 

charges. 

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the government as we must, are as follows. Defendant and his nephew 

drove to the Wyoming entrance of Kirtland Air Force Base to visit 

the Atomic Museum. Airmen Christopher Woodard and Martin Herrera 

were on duty at that entrance with responsibility to control 

entry. Defendant's vehicle did not have a base decal, nor did 

defendant have base affiliation; therefore, Woodard informed 

defendant that to obtain a base pass, he needed to produce proof 

of insurance, the vehicle registration and his driver's license. 

When defendant stated he did not have those documents, Woodard 

refused him entrance to the base and, apparently acting in accord 

1 Defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 7 (Special Maritime 

and Territorial Jurisdiction) and 13 (Assimilative Crimes Act) 

which provide for federal jurisdiction for state crimes committed 

on certain federal property. Defendant was charged with violating 

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-22-3, 30-20-1, 66-5-229(C) and 66-3-13, 

respectively. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2105 Document: 01019281770 Date Filed: 03/03/1995 Page: 2 
with a base regulation, made further requests to see identification. Defendant responded with profanities, and drove onto the 

base without authorization. Woodard then called for assistance. 

Meanwhile, after driving a short distance defendant returned to 

the entrance, where Woodard again asked to see his driver's 

license and other identification. Defendant refused and continued 

using profane language. 

Herrera observed some of this activity and offered to assist. 

He also requested defendant's identification; defendant refused, 

responding with profane language. When Sergeant Ernesto Rojas 

arrived in response to Woodard's call for assistance he parked his 

vehicle in a manner to block defendant's exit; he also addressed 

defendant, twice asking him to identify himself. When defendant 

refused, the three airmen pulled defendant from his vehicle after 

telling him that he was being placed under arrest for failure to 

identify himself. Defendant was struggling during the removal, 

and Rojas "thought he was going to hit me with his elbow." II R. 

54; see also id. at 58, 73, 97. 

Defendant continued to resist the officers. Woodard testified that defendant "got belligerent and started fighting." Id. 

at 24. Woodard and Herrera stated that when defendant attempted 

to strike Rojas with his elbow, Rojas pulled him to the ground and 

handcuffed him with their help. Defendant's verbal assault continued as he kicked and screamed while lying handcuffed on the 

ground. The record reflects conflicting testimony as to the 

measures taken by the officers to subdue defendant. Rojas 

obtained the additional assistance of Airman Jack Pranaitis to 

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Appellate Case: 94-2105 Document: 01019281770 Date Filed: 03/03/1995 Page: 3 
transport defendant to the law enforcement desk and placed him 

temporarily in a holding cell. Defendant received five citations, 

during which he continued his argumentative and profane language; 

he was then returned to the base entrance and released. 

Before trial the government dismissed a citation for 

resisting, evading or obstructing an officer, in violation of N.M. 

Stat. Ann. § 30-22-1, the only charge that carried a statutory 

penalty in excess of six months imprisonment. The district court 

denied defendant's request for a jury trial, ruling that if convicted on the remaining four charges that defendant's prison 

sentence would not exceed six months. Defendant was convicted on 

those counts and sentenced to six months probation and a total of 

thirty dollars in fines. 

I 

We first consider whether defendant had a constitutional 

right to a jury trial when he was charged with multiple petty 

offenses but was assured that the aggregate penalty would not 

exceed six months imprisonment. This is an issue we review de 

novo. United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1514 (lOth Cir. 

1991) . 

Article III of the Constitution provides for a jury trial in 

all cases (except charges of impeachment) . The Supreme Court has 

held, however, that this provision does not apply to "petty crimes 

or offenses." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). In 

Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989), the Court 

concluded that a driving under the influence of alcohol offense 

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Appellate Case: 94-2105 Document: 01019281770 Date Filed: 03/03/1995 Page: 4 
carrying a maximum six-month prison term and a fine of no more 

than $1,000 was petty, not requiring a jury trial. 

After Blanton, a panel of this court considered a case 

closely analogous to the one before us now. In it a defendant was 

charged with several misdemeanor crimes committed on a military 

base, none of which permitted incarceration for more than six 

months, but if consecutive sentences were imposed carried a 

potential for two years imprisonment and up to $2,000 in fines. 

The district court, as here, refused a demand for a jury trial, 

promising that in no event would it sentence the defendant to more 

than six months imprisonment. After conviction on all counts the 

court imposed concurrent sentences that required no more than ten 

days imprisonment and probation for the remainder of a six-month 

period. We upheld the denial of a jury trial against a constitutional challenge. See Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1512. We cannot 

meaningfully distinguish that case, and so affirm the district 

court's denial of a jury trial in the instant case. Although one 

judge on this panel dissented in Bencheck, we deny defendant's 

proposal that we request review by the in bane court. 

II 

Defendant argues that the district judge erred in not 

recusing himself from defendant's trial; this issue we review for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 

(lOth Cir. 1992). 

The applicable statute governing recusal provides that: 

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United 

States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in 

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2105 Document: 01019281770 Date Filed: 03/03/1995 Page: 5 
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: 

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; 

28 U.S.C. § 45S(a), (b) (1). This statute is intended lito promote 

public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.ll 

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 

(19 88) . 

The goal of section 45S(a) is to avoid even the 

appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a 

reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts 

that would give him an interest in the litigation then 

an appearance of partiality is created even though no 

actual partiality exists. 

Id. (quoting Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., v. Liljeberg, 796 

F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986)). liThe test is whether a reasonable 

person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about 

the judge's impartiality.ll Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 

(lOth Cir. 1987). This objective standard requires a factual 

basis for questioning the judge's impartiality. United States v. 

Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

We have held that under either 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455, the 

party seeking recusal must act in a timely fashion to request 

recusal. Willner v. University of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1023, 1028 

(lOth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031 (1989); Singer v. 

Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 

1028 (1985). Defense counsel never requested recusal. The only 

exchange that even mentioned possible bias was as follows: 

Q. And that's the Wyoming gate at Kirtland where this 

incident allegedly occurred, is that correct? 

A. Yes, ma'am. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2105 Document: 01019281770 Date Filed: 03/03/1995 Page: 6 
THE COURT: For the record, I'm well acquainted 

with the base. I was stationed there years ago and I 

have also recently been the Honorary Commander of the 

Air National Guard, so I know what it is. 

MS. ROSENSTEIN: I was unaware of that, Your Honor. 

Does the Court feel that that would be an apparent 

conflict? 

THE COURT: No, I said I'm acquainted with the 

base. 

MS. ROSENSTEIN: Okay. 

II R. 18. This dialogue does not constitute a request for 

recusal, nor did counsel otherwise develop on the record any basis 

for disqualification of the judge. Because the defendant made no 

timely objection the recusal issue was not preserved for appeal. 

III 

Defendant argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 

was violated when his attorney was denied the opportunity to 

present closing argument. Because defendant made no contemporaneous objection preserving this issue for appeal, we review for 

plain error. United States v. Martinez, 974 F.2d 589, 590 (5th 

Cir. 1992). 

At the close of evidence, the district court started to 

announce its findings of fact and conclusions of law~ Defense 

counsel immediately interjected her desire to renew certain 

motions, and also asked the district court to review an exhibit 

which she then handed to the judge. A brief dialogue followed 

between defense counsel and the district court about documented 

proof of defendant's insurance. After that exchange the district 

court announced its findings and conclusions. The record reflects 

no announcement denying closing argument nor any specific request 

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by defense counsel to argue. Defense counsel admitted choosing 

"not to interrupt the [c]ourt again." I R. doc. 14; Appellant's 

Brief in Chief at 21. 

A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel 

includes the right to present closing argument. Herring v. New 

York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975). This guarantee, like other constitutional rights, may be waived. A waiver must be knowing and 

intentional, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled on other grounds, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), 

but a defendant may not fail to object to perceived error and 

thereby invite a court to commit error. The narrow issue before 

us is then whether defense counsel effectively waived the right to 

present oral argument. We conclude that she did. 

Defense counsel's willingness and ability to interrupt and 

renew motions as the court began rendering judgment indicates that 

her silence concerning closing argument might reasonably be viewed 

as a strategic choice made at the close of the trial. Considering 

the brevity of the case and the clarity of the legal and factual 

issues, this was a reasonable tactic. United States v. Davis, 993 

F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1993). Further, counsel acknowledged specifically deciding not to interrupt the court to request argument. 

We have found no cases imposing an affirmative duty on a court to 

offer counsel the opportunity to argue their case. Although we 

would prefer that the court discuss the proceedings with counsel 

and inquire whether argument is desired, we hold, like the Fifth 

Circuit in Martinez, 974 F.2d at 591-92, on the record before us 

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Appellate Case: 94-2105 Document: 01019281770 Date Filed: 03/03/1995 Page: 8 
that there was no error, and that defense counsel knowingly 

decided to forgo closing argument.2 

IV 

Finally, defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient 

to sustain his convictions for disorderly conduct and concealing 

identity. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution and affirm if any reasonable trier of fact could 

have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

The statute applicable to the disorderly conduct charge 

provides: "Disorderly conduct consists of: engaging in violent, 

abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or 

otherwise disorderly conduct which tends to disturb the peace." 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-1(A). New Mexico courts have held this 

provision constitutional because it criminalizes only speech that 

"tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace." State v. 

James M., 806 P.2d 1063, 1066 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting 

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)), cert. 

denied, 807 P.2d 227 (1991). In applying this statute law 

enforcement officers are required to have a "higher tolerance for 

offensive conduct and language." James M., 806 P.2d at 1067 

(citing State v. Wade, 667 P.2d 459, 461-62 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)). 

The record contains sufficient evidence to convict defendant 

of this charge. The prosecution witnesses all testified that they 

2 Although it does not alter our analysis, the district court 

also refused defense counsel's belated request to supplement the 

record with a written summation. We believe a grant of the 

request to supplement might have eliminated this issue on appeal. 

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perceived defendant's actions as a physical threat to Rojas. The 

few inconsistencies in the recollections of Herrera, Rojas and 

Woodard do not detract from their basic account that defendant was 

either struggling with Rojas or attempting to hit him with his 

elbow. Defendant's nephew's version of the incident acknowledges 

that defendant turned toward Rojas just before he was wrestled to 

the ground by the officer. The district court found credible the 

airmen's testimony. It found most compelling the corroborating 

testimony of Sergeant Hummel, who was not personally involved but 

heard and observed most of the encounter. 

Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

convict him of concealing identity. The statute provides: 

Concealing identity consists of concealing one's 

true name or identity, or disguising oneself with intent 

to obstruct the due execution of the law or with intent 

to intimidate, hinder or interrupt any public officer or 

any other person in a legal performance of his duty or 

the exercise of his rights under the laws of the United 

States or of this state. 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-3. Defendant argues that he was upset and 

confused by the requests for identification. The overwhelming 

evidence, however, was that he responded with profanity and 

recalcitrance to multiple requests that he produce some identification. A person genuinely puzzled by those requests surely 

would have queried the officers rather than responding belligerently. The record contains sufficient evidence for the district 

court to reasonably conclude defendant violated both statutes. 

AFFIRMED. 

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