Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_15-cv-00218/USCOURTS-akd-3_15-cv-00218-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Irene Catalone
Defendant
Jim Crawford
Plaintiff
Paul Dauphinais
Defendant
District 18 of the Alaska Republican Party
Plaintiff
Aaron Downing
Plaintiff
Mark Fish
Defendant
Ron King
Defendant
Kenneth Kirk
Defendant
Vance Sanders
Defendant
David Thompson
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 

DAVID THOMPSON; AARON DOWNING; 

JIM CRAWFORD; and DISTRICT 18 of the 

ALASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

PAUL DAUPHINAIS, in His Official 

Capacity as the Executive Director of the 

Alaska Public Offices Commission; and 

MARK FISH, IRENE CATALONE, RON 

KING, KENNETH KIRK, and VANCE 

SANDERS, in Their Official Capacities as 

Members of the Alaska Public Offices 

Commission, 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:15-cv-00218-TMB 

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiffs David Thompson, Aaron Downing, Jim Crawford, and District 18 of the Alaska 

Republican Party (“District 18”) bring this lawsuit against Defendants Paul Dauphinais, Mark 

Fish, Irene Catalone, Ron King, Kenneth Kirk, and Vance Sanders (collectively, “Defendants” or 

“the State”) to challenge the constitutionality of four provisions of Alaska’s campaign finance 

laws under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1

 The Court called this matter for bench trial 

on April 25, 2016. The parties concluded their arguments and presentations of evidence on May 

                                                            

1

 Dkt. 1 (Compl.); Dkt. 46 (First Am. Compl.). 

Case 3:15-cv-00218-TMB Document 148 Filed 11/07/16 Page 1 of 26
2 

3, 2016,2 and subsequently submitted post-trial briefs.3 Having carefully considered the 

pleadings, exhibits, trial testimony, arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the Court 

makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.4 

II. BACKGROUND 

In 1996, the Alaska Legislature enacted Chapter 48 SLA 1996 for the purpose of 

“substantially revis[ing] Alaska’s campaign finance laws in order to restore the public’s trust in 

the electoral process and to foster good government.” Chapter 48 SLA 1996 was based on a 

ballot initiative drafted by Michael Frank and certified by Lieutenant Governor Fran Ulmer, and 

established, among other things, $500 annual limits on the amount an individual could contribute 

to a candidate for state office or to a group that was not a political party, as well as aggregate 

limits on the dollar amount a candidate could accept from political parties or individuals who 

were not residents of Alaska. None of the contribution limits were indexed for inflation. 

Chapter 48 SLA 1996 became effective January 1, 1997. 

In 2003, the Alaska Legislature modified Alaska’s campaign finance laws by enacting 

Chapter 108 SLA 2003. Chapter 108 SLA 2003 relaxed some of the campaign contribution 

limits set by Chapter 48 SLA 1996, including by raising the amount an individual could 

contribute to a political candidate or group that was not a political party from $500 to $1,000, 

annually. Chapter 108 SLA 2003 became effective September 14, 2003. 

                                                            

2

 Dkt. 125. 

3

 Dkt. 129 (re-filed at Dkt. 139 with working hyperlinks); Dkt. 131; Dkt. 140; Dkt. 143. The 

parties have also submitted notices of supplemental authorities, in accordance with D.Ak. L.R. 

7.1(i)(1)[B]. See Dkt. 145; Dkt. 147. 

4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 

Case 3:15-cv-00218-TMB Document 148 Filed 11/07/16 Page 2 of 26
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Three years later, 73 percent of Alaska voters voted in favor of Ballot Measure 1, which 

proposed revising Alaska’s campaign finance laws to lower the amount an individual could 

contribute to a political candidate or group that was not a political party back to $500 per year. 

The $500 base limits became effective December 17, 2006. 

Plaintiffs in this case are individuals and a subdivision of a political party who 

contributed or attempted to contribute the maximum dollar amount permitted under Alaska’s 

current campaign finance laws, as established by the above session laws and initiatives. 

Downing is an Alaska resident who, in 2015, contributed $500 to the campaign of mayoral 

candidate Larry DeVilbiss and to the campaign of state house candidate George Rauscher, the 

maximum contribution amounts permitted under Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b). Crawford is an 

Alaska resident who, in 2015, contributed $500 to the campaign of mayoral candidate Amy 

Demboski and to the Alaska Miners’ Association Political Action Committee, the maximum 

contribution amounts permitted under Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b). Thompson is a Wisconsin 

resident and brother-in-law to Alaska State Representative Wes Keller who, in 2015, attempted 

to make a $500 contribution to Keller’s campaign, but was unable to do so because the campaign 

had already received the maximum dollar amount it could accept from nonresidents under 

Alaska Stat. 15.13.072(e)(3). And District 18 is a subdivision of the Alaska Republican Party 

that was limited to a $250 contribution to Amy Demboski’s mayoral campaign, the maximum 

amount that it was permitted to contribute under the aggregate limit on the dollar amount a 

campaign can accept from a political party set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(d)(4). 

By this suit, Plaintiffs challenge four distinct parts of Alaska’s campaign finance laws 

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Each challenged provision is discussed 

individually below. In relief, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that each of the challenged 

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provisions are unconstitutional, a permanent injunction prohibiting the State from enforcing the 

challenged provisions, and full reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. This 

civil action arises under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

III. ANALYSIS 

It is well established that the First Amendment protects political association as well as 

political expression.5 It is equally well established that laws which limit the amount of money a 

person may give to a candidate or campaign organization intrude upon both of those First 

Amendment interests,6 as a contribution serves both “as a general expression of support for the 

candidate and his views” and “to affiliate a person with a candidate.”7 But because 

“contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expression,”8 laws which 

regulate political contributions, as opposed to political expenditures, are subject to “a lesser but 

still ‘rigorous standard of review.’”9

 Under that standard of review, “state contribution limits 

                                                            

5 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam); accord McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 

1434, 1441 (2014); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically 

universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free 

discussion of governmental affairs.”). 

6 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23; Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 741–42 (9th Cir. 2015). 

7 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21. 

8 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20 (“A limitation 

upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political 

committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 

communication.”). 

9 McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1444 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29); accord Thalheimer v. City of 

San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011) (“While expenditures and contributions are 

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will be upheld if (1) there is adequate evidence that the limitation furthers a sufficiently 

important state interest, and (2) if the limits are ‘closely drawn.’”10 The State bears the burden of 

establishing both prongs of the constitutional inquiry.11

After Citizens United, what constitutes a sufficiently important state interest to support 

limits on campaign contributions has narrowed. Now, the prevention of quid pro quo corruption, 

or its appearance, is the only state interest that can support limits on campaign contributions.12 

“That Latin phrase captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money,”13 or 

“‘dollars for political favors.’”14 Campaign finance laws that pursue other objectives, such as 

reducing the amount of money in politics, restricting the political participation of some in order 

to enhance the relative influence of others, or targeting the general gratitude a candidate may feel 

toward those who support him or his allies, “impermissibly injects the Government ‘into the 

debate over who should govern’” and thus cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.15

                                                            

different modes of political speech, it is the distinct nature of contributions that lessens the First 

Amendment rights of donors, and strengthens the government’s regulatory power.”). 

10 Lair, 798 F.3d at 742 (quoting Montana Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1092 

(9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).

11 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452 (2014) (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t 

Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000)). 

12 558 U.S. at 359; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441; Lair, 798 F.3d at 746–47 n.7 (“But 

to the extent Citizens United left that question open, McCutcheon confirmed that quid pro quo 

corruption of its appearance are the only interests that can support contribution restrictions.”). 

13 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359). 

14 Id. (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)). 

15 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (quoting Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 

Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011)); see also Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1119 (recognizing that 

Citizens United “narrowed the scope of the anti-corruption rationale to cover quid pro quo 

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a. Counts One and Two: Individual-to-Candidate and Individual-to-Group 

Base Limits 

Plaintiffs first challenge the provisions of Alaska’s campaign finance laws that prohibit 

an individual from contributing more than $500 per year to a candidate for political office and to 

a group that is not a political party.16 They argue that the $500 individual-to-candidate and 

individual-to-group base limits set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b) are not closely drawn to 

further the sufficiently important state interest of combating quid pro quo corruption or its 

appearance. 

i. Sufficiently important state interest 

As part of that argument, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants did not present adequate 

evidence at trial to establish that Alaska’s $500 base limits further the sufficiently important state 

interest of combating quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The Court disagrees. 

At trial, the State put forward evidence that the risk of quid pro quo corruption or its 

appearance in Alaska politics and government is both actual and considerable. To start, Dr. 

Gerald McBeath, a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Alaska Fairbanks 

who was qualified as an expert in this case on the topic of Alaska state and local politics and 

government, identified several factors that make Alaska highly, if not uniquely, vulnerable to 

corruption in politics and government. The first of these factors is legislative size. Alaska has 

the second smallest legislature in the United States and the smallest senate, with only twenty 

senators. As Dr. McBeath explained at trial, that means that just ten votes can stop a legislative 

action such as an oil or gas tax increase from becoming law. Consequently, the incentive to buy 

                                                            

corruption only, as opposed to money spent to obtain influence over or access to elected 

officials” (quoting another source)). 

16 Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b)(1). 

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a vote, and the chances of successfully doing so, are therefore higher in Alaska than in states 

with larger legislative bodies. A second factor is Alaska’s almost complete reliance on one 

industry for a majority of its revenues. The percentage of Alaska’s budget generated by 

royalties, taxes, and revenues from oil and gas is the highest among all of the oil and gas 

producing states in the United States. In fact, it is exponentially greater: typically 85 to 92 

percent in Alaska compared to less than 50 percent for every other state. Another factor making 

Alaska susceptible to corruption in politics and government is its small population coupled with 

its vast size. According to Dr. McBeath, these characteristics make enforcement of campaign 

finance laws much more challenging, as it limits both the number and abilities of watchdog 

organizations. 

In addition to Dr. McBeath’s testimony, the public officials who appeared at trial, 

regardless of whether they were called by Plaintiffs or the State, uniformly testified that they 

experienced and observed pressure to vote in a particular way or support a certain cause in 

exchange for past or future campaign contributions while in office. Defense witness David 

Finkelstein, a former Alaska state representative who served from 1989 to 1996 testified that 

“there was an inordinate influence from contributions on the actions of the legislature,” and that 

legislators would often mention which interest groups had contributed large amounts to their 

campaigns or to their party during closed-door caucus meetings over whether particular bills 

would move forward. He further testified that “it inevitably would affect [his] vote if [he’d] 

received a thousand dollars or stacks of thousand dollar[ ] checks, from one side and not the 

other.” Defense witness Charles Wohlforth, who served two terms as a member of the 

Anchorage Assembly from 1993 to 1999, similarly testified that “the system was rigged by 

money[ed] interests and that too frequently the decisions of the assembly were controlled by 

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those interests and their desires, based on the kind of contributions they would make.” And Eric 

Croft, who is currently a member of the Anchorage Assembly and who previously served in the 

state legislature for ten years, testified at trial that although he has never been directly asked for a 

political favor in exchange for a contribution, he has experienced situations where “it [was] clear 

that if you don’t vote the way somebody wants, you’re not going to get their continued 

contribution.” 

Witnesses for the Plaintiffs also provided evidence that some large contributors expect 

political favors in exchange for their contribution.17 Senator John Coghill testified that on one 

occasion during the legislative session, he was approached in the hallway of the State Capitol by 

a lobbyist demanding that Senator Coghill vote a certain way, saying “This is why we gave to 

you. Now we need your help.” Senator Coghill refused, and those represented by that lobbyist 

never made a contribution to Senator Coghill again. Bob Bell testified that during his tenure on 

the Anchorage Assembly in the 1990s, an oil executive offered to hold a fundraiser for him if he 

would publicly support a private prison project in South Anchorage. When Bell refused to 

support the project, the oil executive held a fundraiser for his opponent instead.

Beyond this testimony, the State presented evidence about the widely publicized VECO 

public corruption scandal, in which approximately ten percent of the Alaska Legislature, 

including state representatives Vic Kohring, Pete Kott, and Beverly Masek, were directly 

implicated for accepting money from Bill Allen and VECO, Allen’s oilfield services firm, in 

                                                            

17 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (“Spending large sums of money in connection with 

elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official 

duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption.”). 

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exchange for votes and other political favors.18 A surveillance video from the VECO 

investigation introduced at trial showed Kohring in a Juneau hotel room asking Allen and Rick 

Smith, another VECO official, for help with his (Kohring’s) $17,000 debt. In the video, Kohring 

accepts a relatively small cash payment from them in response to his request, and then, in the 

same exchange, asks Allen and Smith what he can do for them on oil tax legislation that was 

then pending before the Alaska Legislature. After being criminally charged, Kohring wrote a 

newspaper column in which he stated that other legislators were no better than he was and were 

unfairly critical of him because he got caught. 

The State also introduced at trial a Government Ethics Center study commissioned by the 

Alaska State Senate in 1990 in which the Government Ethics Center surveyed Alaska legislators, 

public officials, and lobbyists as to the image of and the public trust in the Alaska Legislature. 

The study concluded that “that things are not what they should be” and that “[t]he reputation and 

image of the legislature is unacceptably low.” Of particular relevance to this case, the survey 

results showed that 24 percent of lobbyists surveyed believed that “about half” or more of 

Alaska’s legislators could “be influenced to take or withhold some significant legislative action . 

. . by campaign contributions or other financial benefits provided by lobbyists and their 

employers,” and that 40 percent of legislators surveyed believe that very few members of the 

public had a sufficiently high degree of trust and confidence in legislators’ integrity.19

                                                            

18 Kohring, Kott, and Masek were all part of a larger group of Alaska legislators who referred to 

themselves as the “Corrupt Bastards Club” after a patron at a Juneau bar called some of the 

legislators who received large VECO contributions “corrupt bastards.” 

19 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo 

arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of 

the opportunities inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.”). 

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 Taking all of the testimony and other evidence together, the Court finds that Defendants 

have made an adequate showing that the risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance in 

Alaska politics and government from large campaign contributions is pervasive and persistent.20 

Quid pro quo corruption, or even its appearance, undermines public trust in the electoral process 

and government. Having concluded that the $500 base limits set forth in 15.13.070(b) further 

Alaska’s sufficiently important interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, 

the Court turns to the question of whether those $500 limits are “closely drawn” to further that 

interest. 

ii. Closely drawn 

In determining the constitutionality of Alaska’s $500 base limits, Plaintiffs contend that 

the Court should apply the two-part, multi-factor “closely drawn” test articulated by the Supreme 

Court in Randall v. Sorrell21 rather than the test laid out by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 

Eddleman.

22 Plaintiffs’ position, however, is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Lair.23 

In Lair, the Ninth Circuit considered whether and to what extent Randall abrogated Eddleman’s 

                                                            

20 See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395 (2000) (“[T]here is little reason to 

doubt that sometimes large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and 

no reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters.”); see also 

Zimmerman v. City of Austin, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, No. 1:15-CV-628-LY 

(W.D. Tex. July 20, 2016) (finding base limit furthered the City of Austin’s interest in 

preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance where the City of Austin presented 

evidence that there was a “widespread” perception that economic interests had “inordinate 

influence” over the Austin City Council). 

21 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (plurality opinion). 

22 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). 

23 798 F.3d at 747. 

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“closely drawn” analysis.24 Applying Miller v. Gammie,

25 it found that “there simply was no 

binding Randall decision on that point,”26 and that the district court’s decision to apply Randall’s 

“closely drawn” analysis to the contribution limits at issue in that case was therefore legal 

error.27 The Court will therefore determine the constitutionality of Alaska’s campaign 

contribution laws using Eddleman’s “closely drawn” test. 

Under Eddleman’s “closely drawn” test, limits on contributions are “closely drawn” if 

they “(a) focus narrowly on the state’s interest, (b) leave the contributor free to affiliate with a 

candidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass sufficient resources to wage an effective 

campaign.”28 In conducting that tailoring analysis, a court must be “mindful that the dollar 

amounts employed to prevent corruption should be upheld unless they are ‘so radical in effect as 

to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice beyond the level 

of notice, and render contributions pointless.’”29

Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute and the Court agrees with Defendants that the base limits 

set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b) leave an individual free to affiliate with a candidate. 

Plaintiffs do, however, dispute that Alaska’s $500 base limits focus narrowly on Alaska’s 

                                                            

24 Id. at 745–48; see also Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1204–06 (9th Cir. 2012). 

25 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

26 Lair, 798 F.3d at 747; accord Lair, 697 F.3d at 1204 (“Randall is not binding authority 

because there was no opinion of the Court.”). 

27 Lair, 798 F.3d at 748; accord Lair v. Motl, No. CV 12-12-H-CCL, 2016 WL 2894861, at *4 

(May 17, 2016) (noting Eddleman “provides the overall analytical framework” for evaluating the 

constitutionality of a contribution limit). 

28 Lair, 798 F.3d at 742 (quoting Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092). 

29 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397). 

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interest in the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. They further claim that 

the State has failed to prove that the $500 base limits allow candidates, particularly challengers 

in competitive races, to amass sufficient resources to run effective campaigns. The Court 

addresses each claim in turn. 

1. Focus narrowly 

Citing Frank’s testimony as to why and how he selected $500 as the individual-tocandidate and individual-to-group contribution limit amounts for his ballot initiative back in the 

1990s, Plaintiffs contend that the $500 individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group 

contribution limits were put in place for impermissible purposes other than preventing quid pro 

quo corruption or its appearance, and that the State therefore cannot show that those limits satisfy 

the first part of Eddleman’s “closely drawn” test. But Plaintiffs’ argument forgets that Ballot 

Measure 1, which established the current $500 base limits and which was approved by a 73 

percent margin of Alaska voters, explicitly contemplated an anticorruption purpose. 30 Indeed, 

the statement in support of the successful initiative included in the Alaska Division of Elections 

voter information packet stated as follows: 

Corruption is not limited to one party or individual. Ethics should be not only bipartisan but also universal. From the Abramoff and Jefferson scandals in 

Washington D.C. to side deals in Juneau, special interests are becoming bolder 

every day. They used to try to buy elections. Now they are trying to buy the 

legislators themselves. 

Plaintiffs also argue that the $500 base limits impermissibly restrict their free speech and 

associational rights because Defendants have not shown that a higher contribution limit, such as 

                                                            

30 Contra Motl, 2016 WL 2894861, at *7 (holding base limits at issue in that case “could never 

be said to focus narrowly on a constitutionally-permissible anti-corruption interest because they 

were expressly enacted to combat the impermissible interests of reducing influence and leveling 

the playing field”). 

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a $750 or $1,000 limit (or even a $500 limit indexed for inflation), would be ineffective at 

preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. That argument, however, misunderstands 

both the Court’s role in assessing and the State’s task in proving the constitutionality of a 

contribution limit. In Buckley, the Supreme Court rejected an overbreadth claim that the $1,000 

contribution limit at issue in that case was “unrealistically low” because “much more than that 

amount would still not be enough to enable an unscrupulous contributor to exercise improper 

influence over a candidate or officeholder.”31 In rejecting the claim, the Buckley Court adopted 

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia’s observation that “[i]f it is satisfied that some 

limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling 

might not serve as well as $1,000.”32 The law instead requires “a fit that is not necessarily 

perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose 

scope is in proportion to the interest served.”33 In the context of this case, that means that the 

State need not prove that $500 is the highest possible contribution limit that still serves to 

prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, but rather that the challenged $500 

contribution limits further that interest and also permit candidates to “amas[s] the resources 

necessary for effective advocacy.”34

                                                            

31 424 U.S. at 30. 

32 Id. (“Such distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to 

differences in kind.”); see also Randall, 548 U.S. at 248 (explaining a court “cannot determine 

with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute’s legitimate 

objectives”). 

33 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456. 

34 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 

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What is more, the State did elicit testimony at trial indicating that the $500 individual-tocandidate and individual-to-group limits are, in fact, likely more effective at furthering the 

State’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance than a hypothetical $750 

or $1,000 limit. Professor Richard Painter, whom the Court qualified as an expert in government 

ethics and institutional corruption with an emphasis on campaign finance reform, explained that 

lower contribution limits are often more effective at decreasing the risk of quid pro quo 

arrangements or their appearance because they make a candidate less dependent upon an 

individual or group of individuals for financial support, especially in a state like Alaska where 

the cost of campaigns for state or municipal office are relatively low. Lower limits often 

increase the donor base and decrease the impact of an individual contribution, thus making it 

easier for a candidate to decline a contribution contingent upon the performance of a political 

favor. Consistent with Professor Painter’s expert testimony, Croft testified that the higher the 

contribution limit, “it’s harder and harder to turn that down.” 

Finally, with respect to the individual-to-group contribution limit, the Court finds that 

Defendants have made the appropriate showing that Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b)’s individual-togroup limit focuses narrowly on the State’s interest in reducing the risk of quid pro quo 

corruption or its appearance, as it works to keep contributors from circumventing the $500 

individual-to-candidate base limit. The Supreme Court in McCutcheon affirmed that the anticircumvention interest originally recognized in Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont35

remains valid after Citizens United.

36 Alaska’s campaign finance laws define a “group” as “two 

                                                            

35 539 U.S. 146 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 

36 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456; accord Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1125 (“[T]here is nothing in 

the explicit holdings or broad reasoning of Citizens United that invalidates the anticircumvention interest in the context of limitations on direct candidate contributions.”). 

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or more individuals acting jointly who organize for the principal purpose of influencing the 

outcome of one or more elections and who take action the major purpose of which is to influence 

the outcome of an election.”37 Under Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(c), a group that is not a political 

party may contribute up to $1,000 per year to a candidate. Without the $500 individual-to-group 

limit, an individual could make unlimited donations to a group, $1,000 of which could then be 

passed on to the candidate—double the individual-to-candidate limit. 

2. Amassing sufficient resources to effectively campaign 

In addition to their argument that the $500 base limits set forth in Alaska Stat. 

15.13.070(b) do not focus narrowly on the State’s interest in avoiding actual or apparent quid pro 

quo corruption, Plaintiffs argue that those limits are unconstitutionally low under the third prong 

of Eddleman’s “closely drawn” test. While it is certainly true that a contribution limit that is too 

low “could itself prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness it seeks to promote,”38 the 

Supreme Court in Buckley specifically rejected the contention that $1,000, or any other amount, 

was a constitutional minimum below which legislatures could not regulate.39 It instead held that 

courts should determine “the outer limits of contribution regulation by asking whether there was 

any showing that the limits were so low as to impede the ability of candidates to ‘amas[s] the 

resources necessary for effective advocacy.’”40 In making that determination, the Ninth Circuit 

has instructed courts to “look at all dollars likely to be forthcoming in a campaign, rather than the 

                                                            

37 Alaska Stat. 15.13.400(8)(A). 

38 Randall, 548 U.S. at 248–49 (“[C]ontribution limits that are too low can also harm the 

electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against 

incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.”). 

39 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). 

40 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). 

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isolated contribution” and to “consider factors such as whether the candidate can look elsewhere 

for money, the percentage of contributions that are affected, the total cost of a campaign, and 

how much money each candidate would lose.”41

In this case, Plaintiffs claim that the $500 base limits set forth in Alaska Stat. 

15.13.070(b) are not closely drawn because they do not allow candidates in Alaska, and in 

particular challengers in competitive races, to amass the resources necessary for effective 

advocacy. But Plaintiffs’ evidence does not show that Alaska’s $500 base limits are “‘so radical 

in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice 

beyond the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.’”42 Michael Gene Pauley, a 

campaign manager and consultant whom the Court qualified as an expert in Alaska political 

campaigns, testified that he considers Alaska’s $500 base limits to be too low because they are 

not indexed for inflation, because the cost of campaigns is generally increasing, and because the 

limits are annual in nature. Pauley further testified that most challengers in Alaska do not enter 

political races in the off year. Plaintiffs also offered the testimony of Senator Coghill, who 

testified that he has always been able to raise sufficient funds to run an effective campaign, but 

that it was “just harder” under the current $500 limits than under the $1,000 limits because “the 

lower limits do cause you to have to go broad.” In other words, it requires more work. 

Plaintiffs also called Clark Bensen, a consultant and a former director of political analysis 

for the Republican National Committee whom the Court qualified as an expert “in the area of 

analyzing campaign finance data for the purpose of determining whether contribution limits 

permit candidates to amass the resources that they need to mount effective campaigns,” to testify 

                                                            

41 Lair, 798 F.3d at 742 (quoting Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (internal citations omitted)). 

42 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397). 

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at trial. Based on his analysis of campaign finance data for the State of Alaska, Bensen opined 

that the $500 base limits set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b) are unconstitutionally low because 

candidates in competitive campaigns often spend more than they raise and because those 

candidates would be able to raise more money if the $500 limits were instead $750 or $1,000. 

The Court, however, does not find Bensen’s testimony to be credible. At trial, Mr. Bensen 

acknowledged that his analysis was based on exaggerated estimates and therefore flawed. He 

stated, “I didn’t do a very sophisticated analysis . . . . It’s not like I didn’t do it, but I didn’t do it 

well, shall we say, or completely.” 

In support of the $500 base limits set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b), Defendants 

called expert witnesses Thomas Begich and John-Henry Heckendorn to provide their opinions as 

to whether Alaska’s current contribution limits interfere with a candidate’s ability to amass the 

resources necessary for effective advocacy.43 Begich is a political consultant with extensive 

experience working, consulting, and volunteering for Alaska campaigns. Heckendorn is also a 

political consultant who served as the political director for the Alaska Democratic Party in 2014 

and now co-owns a political and commercial communications firm with offices in Anchorage 

and Juneau. Begich and Heckendorn both testified that candidates, whether challengers or 

incumbents, can run effective campaigns under the current limits and, to use Begich’s words, 

“have done so.” As an example, Begich cited Matt Claman’s campaign for state house in 2014 

in which Claman was able to raise upwards of $110,000 under the current contribution limits. 

Begich and Heckendorn also testified that the candidate who raises the most money does 

not necessarily win the election. Heckendorn explained at trial that in 2012, three of the eight 

competitive state senate races and seven of the fourteen competitive state house races were won 

                                                            

43 The Court qualified both Begich and Heckendorn as experts on political campaigns in Alaska. 

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by the candidate who raised less money than his opponent—“almost a 50/50 split in terms of 

campaigns that raise more money being successful and campaigns that raised less money being 

successful.” According to Begich, this is because a number of factors other than the amount of 

money available to a candidate influence a candidate’s success and ability to run an effective 

campaign, including demographics, the quality of the candidate, and the cost of the candidate’s 

campaign. 

To this end, Begich and Heckendorn took issue with Plaintiffs’ testimony that the cost of 

campaigns is increasing. Begich testified that while the cost of certain parts of a campaign may 

be increasing, it is not, in fact, getting more expensive to run campaigns: “[T]he cost of a 

campaign depends on the technology you apply, and those costs change. So you can’t use a 

direct period of inflation to reflect that.” Heckendorn testified that evolution in fundraising 

techniques and in social media and digital advertising has significantly improved both the costefficiency and effectiveness of campaigns, particularly at the local level. Consistent with this 

testimony, defense witness Croft testified that the production and dissemination of video 

advertising has “gotten much simpler and cheaper” since his first campaign back in 1996. 

Finally, Begich and Heckendorn testified that Alaska’s campaign contribution limits do 

not, as Plaintiffs claim, favor incumbents over challengers, nor do the limits prevent challengers 

from running effective campaigns. Their opinions are bolstered by the results of the most recent 

Alaska primary elections, in which Alaska voters dispatched seven incumbents from the Alaska 

Legislature.44

                                                            

44 Nathaniel Herz & Devin Kelly, Incumbents Feel Sting of Voters in Alaska Primary Election 

(Aug. 24, 2016), available at https://www.adn.com/slideshow/visual/photos/2016/08/16/alaskavotes-in-2016-primary-election/. 

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In light of the above evidence, the Court finds that in the period since the current $500 

base limits became effective, candidates for state elected office, including challengers in 

competitive races, have been able to raise funds sufficient to run effective campaigns. The Court 

therefore holds that the $500 base limits set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b) further the 

sufficiently important interest in reducing the risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, 

and are neither “too low” nor “too strict”45 so as to run afoul of the First Amendment. 

b. Count Three: Nonresident Aggregate Limit 

Plaintiffs next challenge the provision of Alaska’s campaign finance laws that prohibits 

an individual seeking the office of state representative, municipal office, or office other than 

governor, lieutenant governor, or state senator from accepting more than $3,000 per year from an 

individual who is not a resident of Alaska.46 Plaintiffs challenge the nonresident aggregate limit 

set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.072(e)(3) under both the First Amendment and the equal 

protection and privileges or immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

In evaluating the constitutionality of Alaska’s aggregate nonresident limit, Plaintiffs 

claim the Court should apply strict scrutiny because the aggregate limit, once reached for a 

candidate, prevents all other nonresidents from contributing any amount to that particular 

candidate. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue strict scrutiny applies in light of their equal protection 

challenge. Plaintiffs’ first argument for strict scrutiny fails under the Supreme Court’s opinion in

Beaumont.

47 In Beaumont, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a strict level 

of scrutiny should apply to a statute banning political contributions from certain sources, 

                                                            

45 Randall, 548 U.S. at 248. 

46 Alaska Stat. 15.13.072(a); Alaska Stat. 15.13.072(e)(3). 

47 539 U.S. at 161–62. 

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explaining that “the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the political activity at issue 

to effective speech or political association” and that “restrictions on political contributions have 

been treated as merely ‘marginal’ speech restrictions subject to a rather complaisant review 

under the First Amendment.”48

Nor can Plaintiffs obtain strict scrutiny of the nonresident limit set forth in Alaska Stat. 

15.13.072(e)(3) by invoking equal protection. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia in Wagner v. Federal Election Commission rejected this “doctrinal gambit” in clear 

and uncertain terms: 

Although the Court has on occasion applied strict scrutiny in examining equal 

protection challenges in cases involving First Amendment rights, it has done so 

only when a First Amendment analysis would itself have required such scrutiny. 

There is consequently no case in which the Supreme Court has employed strict 

scrutiny to analyze a contribution restriction under equal protection principles.49

                                                            

48 Id. (explaining that “degree of scrutiny turns on the nature of the activity regulated”); see also 

Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding contribution limits, even 

those that operate as a ban, not subject to strict scrutiny); Vannatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 

1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (nothing the Ninth Circuit “has applied less-than-strict, rigorous scrutiny to 

total restrictions on contributions”). 

49 793 F.3d 1, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. FEC, 136 S. Ct. 895 (2016); 

see also Wagner v. FEC, 854 F. Supp. 2d 83, 95 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 717 

F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“If strict scrutiny were to apply to equal-protection claims in the 

area of campaign contributions, it would lead to the anomalous result that a statutory provision 

could survive closely drawn scrutiny under the First Amendment, but nevertheless be found to 

violate equal-protection guarantees because of its impingement upon the very same rights.”); 

Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an equal protection claim was 

“no more than a First Amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing” and was thus 

“subsumed by, and co-extensive with” the First Amendment claim); John E. Nowak, Ronald D. 

Rotunda & J. Nelson Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law (1978) (“It is generally 

unnecessary to analyze laws which burden the exercise of First Amendment rights by a class of 

persons under the equal protection guarantee, because the substantive guarantees of the 

Amendment serve as the strongest protection against the limitations of these rights.”). 

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Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims are not subsumed by their First 

Amendment claim,50 their equal protection claim fails because Alaska residents and nonresidents 

are not similarly situated with respect to state elections.51 Plaintiffs’ privileges and immunities 

claim fails for a similar reason; the right to make a contribution to a candidate running of office 

in another state does not “bear[ ] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.”52

 Turning to the First Amendment challenge, Plaintiffs stated in their summary judgment 

papers and at oral argument on the parties’ summary judgment motions that they are challenging 

the “common unconstitutional denominator of the discriminatory aggregation of nonresident 

contributions” that Alaska Stat. 15.13.072(a) and (e)(3) impose upon nonresident contributors, 

but not the $3,000 aggregate limit amount itself. They argue that Defendants “presented no 

evidence of a nexus between residency and quid pro quo corruption or its appearance,” and that 

Alaska’s nonresident aggregate contribution limit is unconstitutional under McCutcheon and 

Vannatta.

53 The Court disagrees. 

In McCutcheon, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a provision of the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 

                                                            

50 Wagner, 793 F.3d at 33 (“But in a case like this one, in which there is no doubt that the 

interests invoked in support of the challenged legislation classification are legitimate, and no 

doubt that the classification was designed to vindicate those interests rather than disfavor a 

particular speaker or viewpoint, the challengers ‘can fare no better under the Equal Protection 

Clause than under the First Amendment itself.’”). 

51 See Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(stating an equal protection claim “fails ab initio” without evidence that similarly situated 

persons are treated differently). 

52 Council of Ins. Agents & Brokers v. Molasky-Arman, 522 F.3d 925, 934 (9th Cir. 2008). 

53 Plaintiffs argue that the nonresident limit is also unconstitutional under Whitmore v. FEC, 68 

F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, does not consider Whitmore on point. 

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2002, that limited how much money a contributor could contribute in total to all political 

candidates or committees under the First Amendment. Noting that a court must be “particularly 

diligent in scrutinizing the law’s fit” in the context of an aggregate limit,54 the Court found “a 

substantial mismatch between the Government’s stated objective and the means selected to 

achieve it”55 and consequently struck down the aggregate limit at issue in that case. But even as 

it struck down the provision, the plurality opinion recognized that aggregate limits, when 

appropriately tailored, can further an anticorruption interest.56

In Vannatta, the Ninth Circuit considered the constitutionality of an Oregon ballot 

measure which prohibited state candidates from using or directing any contributions from out-ofdistrict residents and penalized candidates when more than ten percent of their total “funding” 

came from such individuals.57 It held that the measure “fail[ed] to pass muster under the First 

Amendment,” in large part because the measure “ban[ned] all out-of-district donations, 

regardless of size or any other factor that would tend to indicate corruption” and because the 

appellants were “unable to point to any evidence which demonstrates that all out-of-district 

contributions lead to the sort of corruption discussed in Buckley.”58 The decision does not 

                                                            

54 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458. 

55 Id. at 1446. 

56 Id. at 1450 (“[W]e do not doubt the compelling nature of the ‘collective’ interest in preventing 

corruption in the electoral process. But we permit Congress to pursue that interest only so long 

as it does not unnecessarily infringe an individual’s right to freedom of speech; we do not 

truncate this tailoring test at the outset.”). 

57 151 F.3d at 1218. 

58 Id. at 1221. 

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suggest, as Plaintiffs claim, that any campaign finance law that limits the dollar amount a 

candidate may accept from nonresidents runs afoul of the First Amendment as a matter of law. 

 Moreover, Alaska Stat. 15.13.072 is distinguishable from the provisions at issue in 

McCutcheon and Vannatta. In particular, unlike the provision at issue in McCutcheon, Alaska 

Stat. 15.13.072(a) and (e)(3) do not limit the total amount of money an individual can contribute 

during an election cycle. Rather, Alaska Stat. 15.13.072 is directed at the amount of out-of-state 

money a candidate for state or municipal office may accept;59 once the nonresident aggregate 

limit is reached, a nonresident retains the ability to contribute to a political party or other group 

that supports the candidate. And unlike the measure at issue in Vannatta, Alaska Stat. 15.13.072 

does not ban all nonresident contributions.60

 More importantly, and unlike the defendants in those cases, Defendants in this case did 

produce evidence at trial establishing a nexus between the prevention of quid pro quo corruption 

or its appearance and the nonresident aggregate limit set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.072. At trial, 

Dr. McBeath testified that the unique combination of Alaska’s small population, geographic 

isolation, and great natural resources make it extremely dependent on outside industry and 

interests. He explained that because it is enormously expensive to develop Alaska’s natural 

resources and because that amount of capital is not available locally, Alaska is dependent on 

outside firms to invest in the infrastructure and provide the labor necessary to extract its natural 

resources. He further testified that such dependency makes Alaska especially vulnerable to 

                                                            

59 Contra McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1461 (“For our purposes here, it is enough that the 

aggregate limits at issue are not directed specifically to candidate behavior.”). 

60 See Vannatta, 151 F.3d at 1221 (noting challenged measure “bans all out-of-district donations, 

regardless of size or any other factor that would tend to indicate corruption”). 

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exploitation by outside industry and interests, citing the Alaska Syndicate as an early example of 

such exploitation.61

 In addition to Dr. McBeath’s testimony, Professor Painter opined that Alaska’s 

nonresident aggregate limit furthers the State’s interest in avoiding actual or apparent quid pro 

quo relationships. Citing the number of foreign and out-of-state corporations involved in natural 

resource extraction in Alaska and the fact that profits from that extraction are often sent out of 

state, Professor Painter explained that the interests of those corporations are frequently in conflict 

with the interests of Alaska residents who absorb the externalities of extraction while only 

getting some of the monetary benefits. He further testified that natural resource extraction rarely 

can be accomplished without the cooperation of government, and that natural resource extraction 

firms can and do exert pressure on their employees to make contributions to state and municipal 

candidates. 

 Based on that evidence, the Court concludes that the State has presented adequate 

evidence that the nonresident aggregate limit set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.072(a) and (e)(3) 

furthers Alaska’s sufficiently important interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its 

appearance in two ways. First, the nonresident aggregate limit furthers the State’s anticorruption 

interest directly by avoiding large amounts of out-of-state money from being contributed to a 

single candidate, thus reducing the appearance that the candidate feels obligated to outside 

interests over those of his constituents. Second, the nonresident aggregate limit discourages 

circumvention of the $500 base limit and other game-playing by outside interests, particularly 

                                                            

61 The Alaska Syndicate was formed in 1906 by J.P. Morgan and the Guggenheim Family and 

came to control vast amounts of Alaska’s natural resources, including the Kennecott Copper 

Mine. Between 1906 and 1938, it is estimated that the Syndicate, as put by Dr. McBeath, 

“pulled out of Alaska a couple of hundred million dollars . . . and left precious little behind 

them.” 

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given APOC’s limited ability and jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute out-of-state violations 

of Alaska’s campaign finance laws. 

 Whether Alaska’s nonresident aggregate limit is closely drawn to further the State’s 

anticorruption interest remains an open question. As explained above, Plaintiffs’ challenge to 

Alaska Stat. 15.13.072(a) and (e)(3) does not raise that issue, and the Court has not evaluated, 

and has no opinion on, the provision’s fit. 

c. Count Four: Political Party Aggregate Limit 

Finally, Plaintiffs challenge the provision of Alaska’s campaign finance laws that 

prohibits a political party, including any subordinate unit of that group, from contributing more 

than $5,000 per year to a candidate seeking municipal office. As with Count III, Plaintiffs 

clarified in their summary judgment papers and at oral argument that they are not claiming that 

the $5,000 limit is unconstitutionally low, but rather are challenging the “unconstitutional 

concept of discriminatory aggregation of party components” that Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(d)(4), 

together with Alaska Stat. 15.13.400(15), imposes on political parties. Plaintiffs, however, have 

not explained how Alaska’s political party aggregate limit interferes with First Amendment free 

speech and associational freedoms. A subordinate unit of a political party chooses to affiliate 

with the party, and Alaska’s campaign finance laws treat political parties more favorably, not 

less favorably, than individuals or groups that are not a political party.62

IV. CONCLUSION 

When this case was first filed, the Court was skeptical that Defendants would be able to 

defend any of the provisions of Alaska’s campaign finance laws at issue in this case. But, for the 

                                                            

62 Compare Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(d), with Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b) and Alaska Stat. 

15.13.070(c). 

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reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendants have presented adequate evidence that the 

$500 base limits set forth in Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b) further the sufficiently important state 

interest of preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance and that those limitations are 

closely drawn to that end; that the $3,000 nonresident aggregate limit set forth in Alaska Stat. 

15.13.072 furthers the sufficiently important state interest of preventing quid pro quo corruption 

or its appearance; and that the political party aggregate limit does not trigger First Amendment 

concerns, at least under Plaintiffs’ theory of the case. Accordingly, the challenged provisions of 

Alaska’s campaign finance laws are upheld as constitutional. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 7th day of November, 2016. 

/s/ Timothy M. Burgess 

TIMOTHY M. BURGESS 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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