Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01467/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01467-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terry L. Carlson
Appellee
Thomas Wayne Evenstad
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Magistrate

Judge Raymond L. Erickson, Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1467

___________

Thomas Wayne Evenstad, *

*

Petitioner - Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Terry L. Carlson, *

*

Respondent - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 25, 2006

Filed: November 30, 2006

___________

Before BYE, ARNOLD and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Wayne Evenstad was convicted in Minnesota state court of first and

third degree criminal sexual conduct for the rape of eighteen-year-old H.S.

Evenstad’s direct appeal and petition for post-conviction relief were denied. Evenstad

appealed the denial of his petition to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which was

denied. He next petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court, which denied his petition

for review. He thereafter petitioned the federal district court1

 for habeas relief under

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In Minnesota, evidence of prior bad acts is typically referred to as Spreigl

evidence, from the landmark Minnesota Supreme Court case of State v. Spreigl, 139

N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1967). A witness testifying to said bad acts is called a Spreigl

witness. Spreigl evidence is governed by Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b).

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28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court dismissed the petition. This court granted a

certificate of appealability on two issues. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm

the district court.

I

On March 19, 1999, Evenstad was convicted of raping H.S. Evenstad and H.S.

both participated in a telephone “chat line” service which permitted users to exchange

telephone messages. After hearing several of Evenstad’s outgoing messages over the

course of several weeks, H.S. contacted Evenstad and made plans to meet him. He

picked her up from her aunt’s home, drove her to his home, and sexually assaulted

her. After the assault, H.S. began leaving messages on the “female side” of the chat

line to find other women who had been assaulted by Evenstad. As a result of her

inquiry, two Spreigl2

 witnesses stepped forward: A.M.-1 and A.M.-2. The trial court

ruled this testimony admissible and both witnesses testified at Evenstad’s trial about

prior sexual misconduct by Evenstad, after he met them through chat lines.

Evenstad was found guilty by a trial jury. In a subsequent petition for postconviction relief, Evenstad argued he was entitled to relief as: 1) he had evidence

A.M.-2 presented false trial testimony; and 2) the government violated his due process

rights by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83 (1963). 

The post-conviction court held a hearing to address Evenstad’s claims. At the

hearing, Evenstad presented testimony from Karen Whalen. She testified her son had

dated A.M.-2’s best friend Tammy. Over the state’s hearsay objection, Whalen

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Under the Ranier test, a new trial is warranted if: 1) the evidence was not

known to the defendant or his counsel at the time of the trial; 2) the evidence could

not have been discovered through due diligence before trial; 3) the evidence is not

cumulative, impeaching or doubtful; and 4) the evidence would probably produce an

acquittal or a more favorable result. Ranier, 566 N.W.2d at 695 (emphasis added). 

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testified she heard A.M.-2 say her trial testimony was false. She also testified she did

not call the police or inform anyone about this statement prior to speaking with

defense investigators. 

Evenstad also called another witness, J.A. During the police investigation of

Evenstad, J.A. reported Evenstad raped her and the state originally charged him based

on those accusations. At the post-conviction hearing, J.A. testified about a

photographic lineup conducted by Officer Beth Roberts, the officer assigned to

investigate Evenstad. J.A. claimed Officer Roberts conducted an untaped

photographic lineup with her and, after J.A. pointed to the wrong photograph, Officer

Roberts directed her to Evenstad’s photograph. Officer Roberts then conducted the

taped lineup during which J.A. identified Evenstad. Throughout the investigation,

J.A. provided several contradictory statements to both defense investigators and

Officer Roberts. Ultimately, J.A. recanted her story and those charges against

Evenstad based on her accusations were dropped. J.A. did not testify at trial and

evidence of her identification of Evenstad was not presented at trial. Evenstad’s trial

counsel acknowledged J.A. had “significant credibility problems.” At the postconviction hearing, J.A. admitted she had lied to the police about Evenstad during the

investigation.

The post-conviction court denied relief, concluding Evenstad’s newly acquired

evidence — Whalen’s testimony alleging A.M.-2 had testified falsely—did not

warrant a new trial. In doing so it relied on the test for newly acquired evidence

articulated in State v. Fedor, 628 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), which

applies the test from Ranier v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997).3

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Under the Larrison test, a new trial is warranted if: 1) the court is reasonably

satisfied the testimony given by a material witness is false; 2)without the testimony,

the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and 3) the party seeking the new

trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given, and was unable to

meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87-88

(emphasis added). 

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conviction court found Whalen’s testimony was “impeaching and doubtful evidence”

and concluded, even if true, the testimony would not have changed the outcome of the

trial because A.M.-2 was only one of two Spreigl witnesses. The post-conviction

court also found no Brady violation as, even if suppressed, the “one piece of

evidence”—the alleged prompting of J.A.—would not have changed the outcome of

the trial. 

Evenstad appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which rejected his

allegations of error and affirmed the post-conviction court. The state court of appeals

found the post-conviction court erred by using the Ranier test. It determined the

proper test should have been the test articulated in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d

82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928), as adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v.

Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 584-85 (Minn. 1982) and Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d

437 (Minn. 2002).4

 The basis for this finding was its re-characterization of Evenstad’s

claim as one of false trial testimony rather than newly discovered evidence. The state

appeals court concluded, however, the post-conviction court’s error was harmless, as

the fourth prong of the Rainier test was similar to the second prong of the Larrison test

and the result would have been the same had the less-stringent Larrison test been

applied. It also affirmed the post-conviction court’s determination there was no Brady

violation as the alleged improper prompting of J.A. was not material. They found

there was not a reasonable probability, had this evidence not been suppressed, that the

jury would have believed the two Spreigl witnesses were also improperly prompted

by Officer Roberts to identify Evenstad. Evenstad’s subsequent petition for review

to the Minnesota Supreme Court was denied. 

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Evenstad filed for federal habeas corpus relief alleging several claims including

the evidence of false trial testimony and the Brady violation. The district court

dismissed the petition. We granted a certificate of appealability limited to Evenstad’s

claims that: 1) A.M.-2 testified falsely; and 2) the state withheld exculpatory evidence

regarding J.A.’s prompted identification in violation of Brady.

II

Our review of Evenstad’s claims is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In the interests of finality and

federalism, federal courts are constrained by AEDPA to exercise only a “limited and

deferential review of underlying state court decisions.” Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d

748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003). The court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus with

respect to any issue decided by the Minnesota state courts unless the decision “was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Liggins v. Burger, 422 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2005). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if the state

court either “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth [by the

Supreme Court]” or “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from

a decision of [the Supreme] Court” and nevertheless arrives at a different result. 

Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). A decision is an “unreasonable

application of” federal law if it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but

applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” Id. Furthermore,

as the Supreme Court has clarified: “[E]ven if the federal habeas court concludes that

the state court decision applied clearly established federal law incorrectly, relief is

appropriate only if that application is also objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 793. A

state court decision involves “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

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Although Evenstad makes the superficial argument he is entitled to relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), he does not attempt to rebut the factual findings of either state

court, nor does he identify which findings are objectionable. His sole complaint is

with the courts’ application of state law. We therefore limit our review to whether

Evenstad is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

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the evidence presented in the state court proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), only

if it is shown that the state court’s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy

support in the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Boyd v. Minnesota, 274 F.3d 497, 501

n.4 (8th Cir. 2001). 

A

Evenstad first argues the state courts below erred in their treatment of Ms.

Whalen’s post-conviction testimony. He does not claim the state suppressed this

evidence or knew or should have known about this evidence. Instead, he argues both

state courts erred in their application of state law and these errors constitute due

process violations: 1) the post-conviction court erred in relying on the Ranier test; and

2) the Minnesota Court of Appeals erred in determining this reliance was harmless

error. He claims relief under both 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).5

 Like the district court, we lack authority to review the Minnesota state courts’

interpretation and application of state law, for “federal habeas corpus relief does not

lie for errors of state law . . . [and] it is not the province of a federal habeas court to

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to

deciding whether the decisions by the Minnesota courts were “contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has

emphasized the phrase “Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” refers to

“the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions,” and has cautioned

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Most circuits, including this one, absent a finding the government knowingly

sponsored false testimony, require a petitioner seeking a new trial to show the jury

would have “probably” or “likely” reached a different verdict had the perjury not

occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Ogle, 425 F.3d 471, 472 (7th Cir. 2005); United

States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Lofton, 233

F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying “probably” standard to newly discovered

evidence, but recognizing that a more lenient “might” standard would apply if the

evidence is a witness recantation); United States v. Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 217

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that § 2254(d)(1) “restricts the source of clearly established law to this Court’s

jurisprudence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Therefore, it is not

enough for Evenstad to argue the Minnesota state courts misapplied state law. To

obtain habeas relief, Evenstad must be able to point to the Supreme Court precedent

he thinks the Minnesota state courts acted contrary to or applied unreasonably. See

Buchheit v. Norris, 459 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of habeas

petition where the appellant did not “point to a Supreme Court precedent that he

thinks the [Arkansas] state courts acted contrary to or unreasonably applied”); see also

Owsley v. Bowersox, 234 F.3d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000) (“To obtain habeas relief,

[the petitioner] must therefore be able to point to a Supreme Court precedent that he

thinks the Missouri state courts acted contrary to or unreasonably applied. . . . The

petitioner’s claims must be rejected because he cannot provide us with any Supreme

Court opinion justifying his position.”). We find Evenstad has not met this burden. 

Here Evenstad does not provide us with any Supreme Court authority

supporting his position. He concedes the prosecution did not actually know A.M.-2’s

trial testimony was false. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether

a due process violation occurs if a conviction is based on perjured testimony which

was unknown to the prosecution at the time of trial. See Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S.

1067 (1995) (Stevens, J. dissenting); Drake v. Portuondo, 321 F.3d 338, 345 n.2 (2d

Cir. 2003); see also Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 530 (7th Cir. 1999).

Furthermore, there is a circuit split regarding which standard applies in federal cases

dealing with these facts.6

 When the federal circuits disagree as to a point of law, the

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(1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 106 (2d Cir. 1999); United States

v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571,

576-77 (8th Cir. 1996); and United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir.

1979). Other circuits, like the Minnesota courts, apply a “possibility” standard

granting relief whenever the discovery “might” have produced an acquittal. See, e.g.,

United States v. Roberts, 262 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Willis,

257 F.3d 636, 643 (6th Cir. 2001); and United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 178

(3d Cir. 1989) (implicitly adopting Larrison).

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law cannot be considered “clearly established” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See

Tunstall v. Hopkins, 306 F.3d 601, 611 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding where the federal

circuits disagree “it is difficult to say the [state] court’s decision is contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law”). 

As the magistrate judge correctly noted, the majority of circuits, including ours,

absent a finding the prosecutor knew of perjured testimony, require the petitioner to

show the false testimony “would be likely to result in an acquittal.” United States v.

Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 576-77 (8th Cir. 1996). Even if this was clearly established

federal law, Evenstad does not claim the state courts’ decisions were contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, this law. In fact, Evenstad does not want the

state courts to apply the predominant federal standard. Instead he desires this court

to reverse his conviction because he claims the Minnesota Courts of Appeals

unreasonably applied state law when it did not remand his case to the post-conviction

court for application of the Larrison test—a less-stringent test than that employed by

this court. Because of our limited authority under AEDPA, this is something we are

not permitted to do. Evenstad’s claims boil down to an issue of Minnesota state law

and his attempt to recast the issue in a constitutional light is unavailing. 

As there is no clearly established federal law on this issue, this court cannot

conclude either state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

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B

Evenstad next contends the state suppressed evidence that J.A. was directed by

Officer Roberts to pick Evenstad from a photographic lineup in violation of Brady.

As is axiomatic under Brady, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either

to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

prosecution.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691(2004) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at

87). The government must disclose any evidence both “favorable to an accused” and

“material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Brady rule

applies to evidence which “impeaches the credibility of a government witness,” Dye

v. Stender, 208 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 2000), whether or not the accused has

specifically requested the information. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34

(1995). Evidence favorable to the accused is material “if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 433-34 (quoting United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S 667, 682 (1985)). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.

In determining the materiality of impeachment evidence, this court considers

both the strength of the evidence at issue and the importance of the witness in

establishing the defendant’s guilt. See Clay v. Bowersox, 367 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th

Cir. 2004) (finding no materiality as the impeachment value was negligible where the

witness’s credibility had already been attacked on cross examination and, although the

witness’s testimony was “unquestionably important” to the state’s case, the most

damaging evidence came from other witnesses); Lingle v. Iowa, 195 F.3d 1023,

1026-27 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding the suppressed impeachment evidence was not

material, in part because the conviction was not based solely on the potentially

impeached witness’s testimony). 

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As a threshold matter, the state argues materiality is a question of fact which is

entitled to a presumption of correctness. This court has found, however: “A state

court’s determination regarding materiality under Brady is a mixed question of law

and fact which is not entitled to the presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).” Cornell v. Nix, 976 F.2d 376, 382 (8th Cir. 1992).

Here, Evenstad argues evidence of the J.A. incident was suppressed, was plainly

favorable to him, and was material as, had it been disclosed, there was a reasonable

probability the result of the trial would be different. He argues the evidence was

material, as it would have had significant impeachment value as to Officer Roberts.

He argues “the withheld evidence would have effected the credibility of virtually

every one of the state’s witnesses.” He essentially argues, because J.A. testified her

identification of Evenstad at the photographic lineup was improperly prompted by

Officer Roberts, it follows the same misconduct occurred in the other lineups

conducted by Officer Roberts (those of A.M.-1 and A.M.-2).

The threshold issue here is whether the evidence of Officer Robert’s alleged

improper prompting of J.A. is material. The district court found it is not material and

we agree. The record indicates J.A. was a problematic witness with significant

credibility issues. She recanted her allegations against Evenstad prior to trial, leading

the state to drop those charges against Evenstad based on her allegations. Neither the

state nor the defense called J.A. as a witness at trial. Defense counsel acknowledged

J.A. had “significant credibility problems.” The first time J.A. testified was before the

post-conviction court regarding her allegation that Officer Roberts improperly

prompted her identification of Evenstad. During this testimony, J.A. admitted she had

lied several times throughout the investigation. Because of these credibility problems,

the strength of such evidence becomes severely compromised.

The only value the “improper prompting” evidence could have is to impeach

Officer Roberts. She did conduct photographic lineups with A.M.-1 and A.M.-2 and

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testified at trial about these identifications. However, both A.M.-1 and A.M.-2

provided separate testimony about their identifications of Evenstad, who argues

Officer Roberts was a “key witness,” as she was the only police officer to testify.

Although her testimony was undoubtedly important, it does not follow her

impeachment would have changed the outcome of the trial. Officer Robert’s role was

secondary and Evenstad’s conviction was not based solely on her testimony.

Furthermore, A.M.-1 and A.M.-2, as Spreigl witnesses, were also secondary

witnesses. Evenstad was convicted for his rape of H.S. He does not argue, and the

record does not show, this evidence would have in any way impacted the state’s case

against him for the rape of H.S. Based on the weak impeachment value of the

evidence and the limited impact the evidence could have had on the case against

Evenstad, we determine such evidence is not material under Brady. Because we so

find, we need not consider whether or not it was suppressed. Thus, we agree with the

district court there was no Brady violation. 

III

We affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief and dismissal of Evenstad’s

§ 2254 petition.

______________________________

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