Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05434/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05434-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Labor
Appellant
UtahAmerican Energy, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 15, 2011 Decided July 24, 2012

No. 10-5434

UTAHAMERICAN ENERGY, INC.,

APPELLEE

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01791)

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney. 

J. Michael Klise argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief was Thomas C. Means. 

Before: TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: UtahAmerican Energy brought this action

against the Department of Labor under the Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking documents

related to government investigations of a collapse at one of its

mines. The Department invoked a number of FOIA exemptions,

some of which UtahAmerican did not contest. The district court

granted summary judgment for the Department on the

uncontested exemptions, but it ruled in favor of UtahAmerican

on the disputed exemptions and ordered it to produce documents

covered by those exemptions. The court also ordered the

Department to produce documents that were the subject of an

earlier-filed FOIA suit that was pending before another district

court.

The Department appealed, asserting that the district court

erred in rejecting its defenses under, inter alia, FOIA Exemption

7(A), and in ordering the release of the documents at issue in the

other litigation. During the pendency of this appeal, the

Department’s defense under Exemption 7(A) has become moot

because its basis for asserting that exemption has disappeared,

thus requiring it to produce many of the contested documents

that were protected by 7(A) alone. It has also become apparent

that most of the remaining documents are independently

protected by another exemption, Exemption 7(C), that the

district court ruled was applicable to this case. Finally, we

conclude that the court should have left disposition of the

balance of the remaining documents to the court hearing the

earlier-filed suit.

I

In August 2007, a collapse at the Crandall Canyon Mine in

Utah trapped and eventually killed six miners. In the days that

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followed, three rescue workers were killed in a subsequent

collapse as they attempted to reach the victims. The Department

of Labor (DOL) conducted two separate inquiries following the

incident: the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA),

a component agency of DOL, undertook an investigation to

determine the causes of the collapse and to ascertain whether

any laws or regulations had been violated; and DOL set up an

Independent Review Team (IRT) to investigate MSHA’s own

conduct in the events leading up to and following the collapse. 

Both investigations resulted in published reports now available

to the public. The MSHA report recommended various

regulatory sanctions against the mine’s owners and operators,

and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Utah opened a criminal

investigation into the matter.

UtahAmerican Energy owns the Crandall Canyon Mine

through a subsidiary. In September 2007, it filed a FOIA

request with MSHA, seeking all documents related to the

Crandall Canyon Mine. MSHA provided a partial response that

included some requested material and asserted various statutory

exemptions regarding other documents and records. MSHA also

asserted, however, that because of the broad scope of

UtahAmerican’s request, it had not had time to complete a

search for all responsive material. On October 17, 2008,

UtahAmerican filed a FOIA suit to compel MSHA to complete

the search and to produce responsive material, see Compl.,

UtahAmerican Energy, Inc. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin.,

No. 08-01780 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2008). Those proceedings

remain ongoing.

Previously, in August 2008, UtahAmerican had filed a

separate FOIA request with the Department of Labor, MSHA’s

parent agency. That request, in relevant part, sought transcripts

of all interviews conducted by the IRT, as well as all other

materials referenced in the IRT’s final report. On October 20,

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2008 -- three days after it brought its first lawsuit against

MSHA -- UtahAmerican brought the instant suit against the

Labor Department to compel production of those and other

requested documents. Soon thereafter, the Department

responded with a Vaughn index indicating that it was

withholding the IRT interview transcripts in full pursuant to,

inter alia, FOIA Exemptions 5, 7(A), and 7(C). J.A. 97-158; see

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (exempting records that would not be

“available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the agency”),

(7)(A) (exempting law enforcement records, the production of

which “could reasonably be expected to interfere with

enforcement proceedings”), (7)(C) (exempting law enforcement

records, the production of which “could reasonably be expected

to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”);

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The

Department noted, however, that it had not searched for material

that was already the subject of UtahAmerican’s earlier request

to MSHA. This included “transcripts of the interviews

conducted by . . . MSHA’s investigation team.” UtahAmerican

Energy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 700 F. Supp. 2d 99, 105 (D.D.C.

2010); see Decl. of George M. Fesak ¶¶ 9-10 (J.A. 43-45). The

parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, with

UtahAmerican opposing the Department’s withholding of both

the IRT and MSHA interview transcripts. 

The district court found that neither Exemption 5 nor

Exemption 7(A) supported withholding the IRT transcripts,

UtahAmerican, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 106-10, and it therefore held

that the Labor Department was required to “disclose the IRT

interview material it has withheld under Exemptions 5 and

7(A),” id. at 110. But the Department had also invoked other

FOIA exemptions that the court found UtahAmerican did not

dispute. Id. at 106-07 & n.6. One of these was Exemption

7(C). Id. at 104. Accordingly, the court held that the

Department was “entitled to withhold information under FOIA

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Exemption[] . . . 7(C),” and it granted the Department’s motion

for summary judgment as to that defense. Id. at 110. Here is the

confusing part, which we address more fully below: the

Department asserted that some of the IRT transcripts were

covered by Exemptions 5, 7(A), and 7(C) -- so it is unclear

whether the court actually ordered that those transcripts be

disclosed.

As to the MSHA transcripts, the court initially agreed with

the Department that it should not resolve the applicability of

FOIA to those documents because litigation regarding them was

currently pending before a different district judge. 

UtahAmerican, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 103 n.2, 106 n.5. Seven

months later, however, the court changed course, finding

“[u]pon further reflection” that “the issue of whether DOL

fulfilled its obligations under FOIA is properly before this court

and is distinct from MSHA’s own obligations.” Reconsideration

Order at 2 & n.1, No. 08-1791 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2010). Without

resolving the merits of any of the Department’s specific

exemption claims, the court held that DOL had essentially

defaulted by not providing a Vaughn index explaining its

reasons for withholding the MSHA transcripts. Finding DOL’s

explanation -- that the materials were the subject of another

FOIA suit before another judge -- to be inadequate, the court

ordered production of the MSHA transcripts.

DOL filed a timely notice of appeal with respect to both the

IRT and MSHA transcripts. As to the IRT transcripts, the

Department contended that the district court erred in finding that

they were not protected from disclosure by Exemption 5 or

Exemption 7(A); it also notes that the court found some of them

to be covered by Exemption 7(C). As to the MSHA transcripts,

the Department argues that the court abused its discretion by

addressing a matter pending before another judge, and then

ordering that the Department disclose the transcripts without

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permitting it to argue that they were covered by various

exemptions.1

 We discuss the IRT transcripts in Part II and the

MSHA transcripts in Part III.

II

The Department of Labor invoked FOIA Exemption 7(A)

as grounds for withholding the entirety of the transcripts of the

testimony of all 59 witnesses interviewed by the IRT. For 47

out of the 59 witnesses, Exemption 7(A) was the only exemption

invoked as grounds for withholding the transcripts in full. 

(Other exemptions were invoked for withholding specific

portions of those transcripts.) Exemption 7(A) authorizes

agencies to withhold records “compiled for law enforcement

purposes” if release of such records “could reasonably be

expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7)(A). In support of its claim to Exemption 7(A)

protection, the Department argued that release of the IRT

transcripts would interfere with the U.S. Attorney’s criminal

investigation of the collapse at the Crandall Canyon Mine, as

well as with ongoing civil enforcement proceedings. The

district court rejected this argument, holding that Exemption

7(A) did not protect the transcripts from disclosure.

Some time after the oral argument in this appeal,

UtahAmerican’s subsidiary reached a plea agreement with the

government regarding violations of federal mine safety laws at

Crandall Canyon. Thereafter, the Labor Department advised us

that “Exemption 7(A) is no longer needed to protect any civil or

criminal investigation,” and it moved to dismiss that portion of

1

The Department argues that the MSHA transcripts are in fact

subject to several FOIA exemptions. Because we agree that the issue

was not properly before the district court, we do not consider whether

those exemptions apply.

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its appeal. DOL Mot. at 4 (Apr. 19, 2012). UtahAmerican did

not oppose the motion to dismiss. UtahAmerican Resp. at 1

(Apr. 20, 2012). Accordingly, the appeal is moot with respect

to the application of Exemption 7(A), and we will vacate that

part of the district court’s decision. See Humane Soc’y of U.S.

v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 181, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United

States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). The IRT

transcripts of the testimony of the 47 witnesses as to which the

Department invoked no other exemption must now be

produced -- except to the extent that any partial redactions are

supported by other FOIA exemptions that were upheld by the

district court and not litigated on this appeal.2

That leaves still to be considered the IRT transcripts of the

12 remaining witnesses. See DOL Mot. at 4-5.3

 We directed the

parties to address those documents by post-argument

submissions. See Order (Apr. 27, 2012). In their submissions,

the Labor Department asserts -- and UtahAmerican disputes --

that the transcripts of the 12 witnesses’ testimony are protected

by FOIA Exemption 5, which allows agencies to withhold

“inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which

would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in

litigation with the agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). See DOL

Resp. at 4 (May 4, 2012); UtahAmerican Resp. at 3 (May 9,

2012); see also Fesak Decl. ¶¶ 26-27 (J.A. 53-54). The

Department’s Exemption 5 argument is based on an “accident

2

In the district court, DOL invoked Exemptions 6 and 7(C) as

grounds for redacting portions of the transcripts. Because the court

granted summary judgment in favor of the Department with respect to

those exemptions, see UtahAmerican, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07, they

continue to apply.

3

There are a total of 14 such transcripts; two witnesses were

interviewed twice.

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investigation privilege” that this court has recognized in certain

instances. See Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir.

1963); United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 799

(1984).

We need not decide whether Exemption 5 extends to the

transcripts of the 12 remaining witnesses. As the Labor

Department points out, it appears that the district court granted

summary judgment in its favor as to another exemption for

records compiled for law enforcement purposes, FOIA

Exemption 7(C), a ruling that UtahAmerican has not appealed. 

See DOL Resp. at 3 (May 4, 2012); Oral Arg. Recording at 9:08-

:32.4

 There is no doubt that in the district court the Department

claimed Exemption 7(C) protection for the entirety of the

transcripts of the 12 witnesses. See Fesak Decl. ¶¶ 26-27, 38

(J.A. 53-54, 59-60) (declaring that the same IRT transcripts are

covered in their entirety by Exemptions 5 and 7(C)); Vaughn

Index at 12-59 (J.A. 108-55). And there is likewise no doubt

that the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

Department on its Exemption 7(C) defenses. UtahAmerican,

700 F. Supp. 2d at 110.

The confusing part is that, although the court ruled that the

Department of Labor was “entitled to withhold information

under FOIA Exemption[] . . . 7(C),” it also ruled that the

Department must “disclose the IRT interview material it has

withheld under Exemptions 5 and 7(A).” Id. Because the

transcripts of the 12 witnesses are in the crosshairs of both

4

Unlike 7(A), Exemption 7(C) does not require a showing that

production of the law enforcement records could reasonably be

expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. Instead,

Exemption 7(C) protects against production that “could reasonably be

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). 

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rulings, it is unclear whether the court actually intended to order

the Department to disclose them. UtahAmerican maintains that

the court did so intend. See UtahAmerican Resp. at 4 (May 9,

2012). But if that were what the court intended, it would appear

the court acted without warrant: the government, after all, “need

prevail on only one exemption.” ACLU v. Dep’t of Defense, 628

F.3d 612, 623 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court

insofar as it may be construed as directing the Labor Department

to disclose the IRT transcripts that are protected by Exemption

7(C). On remand, the court may clarify its order. If the court

did not intend to order disclosure of those transcripts, that will

be the end of the matter. However, if the court did intend to

order disclosure, and if it renews that order, then it must explain

why the order is consistent with the court’s grant of summary

judgment regarding Exemption 7(C). In that event, the

Department will be free to appeal again on the grounds of both

Exemption 5 and Exemption 7(C).

III

We next address the district court’s order to disclose the

MSHA transcripts. The documents at issue are transcripts of

interviews that MSHA conducted and then shared with the IRT. 

See Fesak Decl. ¶ 25 (J.A. 52-53). Those documents are also

the subject of a separate FOIA suit that UtahAmerican had

earlier filed against MSHA before another federal judge in the

District of Columbia. See Compl., UtahAmerican, No. 08-

01780 (Oct. 17, 2008).

The district court in this case initially agreed with the

Department that it should not address the MSHA transcripts

because “this material is already the subject of an earlier FOIA

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suit plaintiff brought against MSHA.” UtahAmerican, 700 F.

Supp. 2d at 106 n.5. The court further elaborated that:

For reasons unknown to the Court, plaintiff declined to

notice these two cases as related even though they arise

from the same factual events and share common issues

of fact and law, and thus appear to fall within the

definition of ‘related’ cases under the Local Rules of

Civil Procedure. . . . Notwithstanding such a failure,

UtahAmerican, amazingly, invites this Court to study

subtle differences between the litigation positions it

took in these two separate cases because it believes

those differences may impact the outcome of this

case. . . . Judicial efficiency alone would militate

against that curious request.

Id. at 103 n.2. Seven months later, however, the court

reconsidered the issue and concluded that the status of the

transcripts was properly before it, notwithstanding the other

litigation. The court then held that the Department had

defaulted by not providing it with a Vaughn index that explained

the reasons for withholding the MSHA transcripts. Without

resolving the merits of the Department’s specific exemption

defenses, the court ordered production of the MSHA transcripts. 

Reconsideration Order at 2-3 & n.3 (J.A. 533-34).

The district court was right in staying its hand the first time. 

We are, of course, mindful that a “district court’s decision

[whether] to decline jurisdiction in favor of an ongoing

proceeding is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Handy v. Shaw,

Bransford, Veilleux & Roth, 325 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

But we conclude that the court abused that discretion when it

ordered the government to release the MSHA transcripts. Cf. W.

Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 730,

732 (5th Cir. 1985) (vacating an injunction when the district

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court “should have stayed, dismissed, or transferred [the

plaintiff’s] action” because a related case was already pending

in another federal court).

The usual “rule in this circuit has been that ‘[w]here two

cases between the same parties on the same cause of action are

commenced in two different Federal courts, the one which is

commenced first is to be allowed to proceed to its conclusion

first.’” Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Ragonese, 617 F.2d

828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting, inter alia, Speed Prods. Co.

v. Tinnerman Prods., Inc., 171 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1948));

see Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety

Comm’n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (acknowledging

that “‘[o]rdinarily, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of a

controversy should be allowed to proceed with it without

interference from other courts under suits subsequently

instituted’” (quoting Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp. v. U.S.

Indus. Chems., Inc., 140 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1944))), rev’d on

other grounds, 445 U.S. 375 (1980). To be sure, the decisions

recognizing the first-in-time rule note that “equitable

considerations” may weigh against applying it in particular

cases. Handy, 325 F.3d at 350; Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Sec.

Nat’l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But no such

considerations have been asserted in this case.

The reasons for the rule are manifest. As we have

explained, “[c]onsiderations of comity and orderly

administration of justice dictate that two courts of equal

authority should not hear the same case simultaneously.” Wash.

Metro., 617 F.2d at 830. “‘Sound judicial administration

counsels against separate proceedings, and the wasteful

expenditure of energy and money incidental to separate

litigation of identical issues should be avoided.’” Handy, 325

F.3d at 349 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Columbia Plaza, 525

F.2d at 626); see id. (“In the case of parallel litigation in two

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federal district courts, the ‘general principle is to avoid

duplicative litigation.’” (quoting Colo. River Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))). 

The rationale for allowing the first court to proceed to its

disposition is fully applicable here: we should not expend

judicial resources -- and potentially produce contradictory

decisions -- by allowing the same FOIA plaintiff multiple bites

at the apple. See Beck v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 88-3433, 1991

WL 519827, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1991) (declining to rule on

a FOIA request for certain documents because those documents

overlapped with documents sought in a suit filed in another

court, and “a decision not to defer jurisdiction to [that court]

would require preparation of duplicate summary judgment

motions arguing the propriety of the exemptions [the

government] has asserted and duplicate consideration of those

motions”). UtahAmerican is litigating against both a component

(MSHA) and its parent agency (DOL), seeking orders from two

different judges directing the production of the same documents. 

Were both claims to proceed, the respective district courts would

be required to duplicate their efforts. Moreover, the twin claims

could generate contradictory results that could, in turn, generate

dueling appeals. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for

UtahAmerican conceded that if the other district court were to

determine that the MSHA transcripts were covered by a

particular exemption, UtahAmerican would “be back up here

before you again, sitting at a different table.” Oral Arg.

Recording at 31:00-:25.

The problem we have identified is particularly acute in

FOIA cases, where multiple components of the same agency

may withhold the same documents on the same grounds, thus

potentially generating multiple lawsuits and appeals raising the

same issues. We see no reason to permit FOIA litigation to

proceed down that path. Nor do we see any reason to permit one

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court to preempt another in the same district from resolving an

issue that was first raised in the other’s courtroom. We will

therefore reverse the judgment with respect to the MSHA

transcripts.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we reach the following

disposition: First, we dismiss as moot those portions of the

appeal that relate to Exemption 7(A), and vacate those parts of

the district court’s decision that address that exemption. The

Department of Labor must now produce the IRT transcripts of

the 47 witnesses as to which it invoked no exemption other than

7(A), except to the extent that any partial redactions are

supported by other FOIA exemptions that were upheld by the

district court and not litigated on this appeal. Second, we

reverse the judgment of the district court insofar as it may be

construed to direct the Department to disclose the IRT

transcripts of the remaining 12 witnesses that are protected by

Exemption 7(C). Third, we reverse the district court’s judgment

with respect to the MSHA transcripts. Finally, we remand the

case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

So ordered.

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