Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02908/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02908-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darrow Boggiano
Plaintiff
City of San Francisco
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARROW BOGGIANO

Plaintiff, No. C 05-2908 PJH

v. ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, AMEND

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff filed her original complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis on

July 18, 2005. On August 30, 2005, this court entered an order sua sponte dismissing

plaintiff’s complaint because the federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. §

1985(3) were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court held that plaintiff

could file an amended complaint if she could allege facts showing why the statute of limitations

for the § 1983 and § 1985 claims should be equitably tolled. 

Plaintiff filed her amended complaint on September 23, 2005. Having reviewed that

complaint, the court dismisses without leave to amend because plaintiff has failed to allege

facts sufficient to support the application of equitable tolling. 

This court must look to California law to determine under what circumstances the

doctrine of equitable tolling may apply. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.

2004). Tolling is appropriate where the record shows (1) timely notice to the defendant in

filing the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to defend against

the second claim; and, (3) good faith and reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff. 

Collier v. City of Pasadena, 142 Cal. App. 3d 917, 924-926 (1983); see also Daviton v.

Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1137 (2001) (describing Collier as “the
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

most oft-quoted formulation of California's law” on equitable tolling). 

Here, plaintiff suggests that tolling is appropriate based on a prior action she

commenced in October 2002 in this court against a multitude of defendants including the City

and County of San Francisco. Boggiano v. Kapoor et al, case no. 02-05644. She implies

that that action is sufficiently related so as to have put the City on notice of the present action

and give the City an opportunity to prepare a defense. 

Plaintiff has likely met the first equitable tolling element, timely notice to the defendant

in filing the original claim, because she filed that first action before the statute of limitations

expired. With respect to the second element, it is not clear to this court that plaintiff has

alleged facts that sufficiently address whether the City would be without prejudice in gathering

evidence to defend against the present complaint. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5

F.3d 1273, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1993) (courts must apply the three-prong test). 

However, even assuming that the City was not prejudiced, equitable tolling is not

appropriate because plaintiff has not alleged any explanation for how her delay in filing the

new complaint against the City is “reasonable conduct.” Daviton, 241 F.3d at 1137. The

earlier action against the City was dismissed and the case was terminated on April 13, 2004. 

Boggiano v. Kapoor et al, case no. 02-05644. Plaintiff has made no allegations that

adequately address the reasonableness element with respect to her delay of more than a year

before commencing the present action against the City. See Ervin v. County of Los Angeles,

848 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1988) (year and a half wait to file second claim unreasonable

and not in good faith as a matter of law), and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1014 (1989). 

If anything, plaintiff’s decision to initiate the present action on July 18, 2005, appears to

have been prompted by this court’s dismissal on July 1, 2005, of an action against certain

other defendants concerning the same underlying facts and general allegations. See

Boggiano v. Art Kapoor Realty, Inc. Et al, case no. 04-03054. Plaintiff has also not alleged

any explanation as to why she did not bring the present claims in the action initiated in October

2002. See Del Percio v. Thornsley, 877 F.2d 785, 786 n. 1 (9th Cir.1989). 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Although plaintiff’s pro se status has been taken into account, there comes a point at

which the deficiencies in a plaintiff’s case are legally intractable. See Washington v. Garrett,

10 F.3d 1421, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that plaintiff was proceeding pro se, but

holding nonetheless that “the equitable tolling doctrine is not appropriate in cases . . . of

‘garden variety’ neglect.”).

In short, plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts in her amended complaint to cure

the defects of her original complaint and make out a case for equitable tolling. Accordingly,

plaintiff’s federal claims are barred by the statute of limitations and will be dismissed. 

As the § 1983 and § 1985 claims are dismissed, this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims asserted in the complaint and the entire

complaint must be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2005

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge