Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03196/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03196-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent
Lamonte L. Purifoy
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LAMONTE L. PURIFOY,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3196

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-0752-14-0185-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: October 4, 2016

______________________ 

PHILIP CHARLES STERNHELL, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for 

petitioner. 

ALEXIS J. ECHOLS, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., SCOTT 

D. AUSTIN. 

______________________ 

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2 PURIFOY v. DVA

Before O’MALLEY, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge.

Lamonte L. Purifoy appeals a final order by the Merit 

Systems Protection Board affirming the Agency’s decision 

to remove him from his position over two charges of 

extended unauthorized absence. The Board’s order reversed an administrative judge’s reinstatement of 

Mr. Purifoy following a 40-day suspension. Because the 

Board’s analysis improperly omitted relevant Douglas

factors and discarded the AJ’s credibility determinations

without an adequate rationale, we vacate the Board’s 

judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

BACKGROUND

In 2013, Mr. Purifoy missed two days of work as a 

housekeeping aid in a VA medical center in Milwaukee, 

Wisconsin without authorization. Later that same week, 

he sought treatment for substance abuse from the VA 

facility where he worked. He was admitted and transferred to Madison, Wisconsin for treatment. While Mr. 

Purifoy verbally informed his VA supervisor that he 

would miss work, he did not fill out leave paperwork. Nor 

did he inform his parole officer that he would miss upcoming supervision visits. After Mr. Purifoy missed these 

visits, his parole officer issued a warrant for his arrest. 

Mr. Purifoy contacted his parole officer by phone and 

explained that he had been admitted to a VA medical 

center for substance abuse treatment, but she refused to 

withdraw the warrant and told Mr. Purifoy to report to 

Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility (“MSDF”) of the 

Wisconsin Department of Corrections. 

Mr. Purifoy agreed to enter a substance abuse treatment at MSDF as an alternative to revocation of his 

parole. He entered the program, but was terminated after 

an altercation with another inmate. After his involveCase: 15-3196 Document: 39-2 Page: 2 Filed: 10/04/2016
PURIFOY v. DVA 3

ment in the substance abuse treatment program ended, 

he remained as an inmate at MSDF for 38 more days. 

Following his release on November 4, 2013, Mr. Purifoy 

returned to work. Shortly afterwards, the Agency removed him from employment as a penalty for his unexcused absences.

I.

The Agency first sent Mr. Purifoy a notice of proposed 

removal, drafted on July 29, 2013, while he was still at 

MSDF. The Agency charged him with one count of extended unauthorized absence beginning April 4, 2013. 

Mr. Purifoy responded, and the Agency rescinded the first 

notice letter. It then issued a second notice on October 8, 

2013, with two counts of unauthorized absence. The first 

charge concerned Mr. Purifoy’s absence from April 4 to 5, 

2013, and the second charge concerned his absence due to 

his incarceration at MSDF, starting on May 7, 2013, and 

continuing through October 8, 2013. 

On October 29, 2013, the Agency issued a decision 

removing Mr. Purifoy from his position effective November 15, 2013. Mr. Purifoy appealed the removal decision 

to the Merit Systems Protection Board.

II.

An AJ held an in-person hearing to review Mr. Purifoy’s case. See Purifoy v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 

No. CH-0752-14-0185-I-1, 2014 WL 6387880 (M.S.P.B. 

Nov. 13, 2014). Over the course of the day-long hearing, 

Mr. Purifoy not only testified, but also litigated the case 

pro se, cross-examining the government’s four witnesses. 

The AJ sustained the Agency’s first charge against 

Mr. Purifoy—his failure to report to work on April 4 and 

5, 2013—in full. But she sustained the second charge—

his absence while at MSDF—only in part. J.A. 14. 

On the second charge—Mr. Purifoy’s six-month absence from May 7, 2013 until his return to work on NoCase: 15-3196 Document: 39-2 Page: 3 Filed: 10/04/2016
4 PURIFOY v. DVA

vember 7, 2013—the AJ found that the Agency had failed 

to prove that Mr. Purifoy’s absences while at MSDF prior 

to termination from the treatment program were unexcused. The AJ explained that Mr. Purifoy had “signed an 

agreement consenting to enter a substance abuse treatment program at MSDF as an alternative to revocation of 

his parole.” J.A. 16. She found that “the primary purpose 

of his stay at MSDF was to undergo substance abuse 

treatment.” J.A. 17. Moreover, the AJ found that Mr. 

Purifoy had notified his supervisor at the VA on several 

occasions that he would be absent for treatment. After 

his first absence on April 4 and 5, Mr. Purifoy called his 

third level supervisor to inform him that he would be in 

Madison, Wisconsin for treatment, and that he would be 

absent from work. Id. His supervisor replied with verbal 

approval of his leave request. As the AJ explained, the 

supervisor “told the appellant to ‘go take care of that,’ but 

that the appellant ‘had something’ coming for the two 

days he did not call in to report he would be absent.” J.A. 

12. Then, when Mr. Purifoy entered MSDF, he again told 

one of his supervisors that he would be absent. His 

supervisor testified that he responded, “I’m familiar with 

that. Take care of yourself. You need to take care of 

yourself first, . . . but you also need to see your supervisor 

and fill out the proper paperwork.” J.A. 727. Mr. Purifoy 

did not submit leave paperwork with his employer. Even 

so, the AJ found that the Agency failed to prove that 

Mr. Purifoy’s absences while seeking treatment at MSDF 

were unexcused. In turn, the AJ found that the Agency’s 

charge of unexcused absence for six months was not 

wholly supported by substantial evidence. 

The AJ also found that the Agency successfully proved 

part of its second charge: the 38 days after Mr. Purifoy’s 

treatment program was terminated. J.A. 14–18. The AJ 

explained that, following an altercation with another 

inmate, MSDF terminated Mr. Purifoy’s treatment and

sentenced him to a disciplinary separation. J.A. 12. 

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PURIFOY v. DVA 5

Mr. Purifoy remained at MSDF for 38 days after termination. J.A. 17. As such, the AJ found that the Agency had 

sustained its charge of unexcused absence for those 38 

days. 

The AJ next analyzed the Agency’s penalty in light of 

the mitigation factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans 

Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 307–08 (1981), to determine if Mr. Purifoy’s removal was reasonable. The AJ 

determined the penalty to be unreasonable and reduced it 

to a 40-day suspension. 

The Agency had argued that the severity of Mr. Purifoy’s conduct and his past disciplinary record justified 

removal, but the AJ found that, to the contrary, both of 

those factors mitigated in favor of Mr. Purifoy. The AJ 

explained that Mr. Purifoy’s absence “was less severe 

than the six months absence the Agency had originally 

charged,” and that this was his first disciplinary offense. 

J.A. 19.

The AJ examined the remaining Douglas factors and 

found that each weighed in favor of mitigation. The AJ 

found that Mr. Purifoy’s duties as a housekeeping aid did 

not involve supervision or fiduciary duties, or place him in 

a prominent public role. She also noted that his work 

performance was rated as excellent and worthy of a 

performance award. The AJ further found that appellant 

was not on clear notice that his absence would result in 

severe discipline. The AJ additionally found that Mr. 

Purifoy’s potential for rehabilitation was high, as he went 

to great lengths to notify his Agency of his whereabouts 

and, since his release from MSDF, had continued to 

participate in treatment for substance abuse without 

relapse. Finally, the AJ commented that “[i]t is ironic 

that the appellant’s enrollment, with the agency’s blessing, in a substance abuse program conducted by the 

agency ultimately led to his removal by the agency.” 

J.A. 20. The AJ thus determined that, in light of the 

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6 PURIFOY v. DVA

reduced charge and the mitigating factors concerning 

Mr. Purifoy’s absence, the maximum reasonable penalty 

in light of the sustained charges was a 40-day suspension. 

J.A. 21. 

III.

The government petitioned the Board for review. The 

Board reversed the AJ and reinstated the Agency’s original penalty of removal. Purifoy v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. CH-0752-14-0185-I-1, 2015 WL 3630677 

(M.S.P.B. June 11, 2015). The Board first reviewed the 

two charges the Agency brought against Mr. Purifoy and

left the AJ’s judgment undisturbed, even though it did not 

affirmatively agree with the AJ’s reduction of the second 

charge down from six months to 38 days. It explained 

that “the penalty of removal was appropriate even if the 

second charge was proven only in part.” Id. at ¶ 6. 

The Board then analyzed some, but not all, of the 

Douglas factors. It found that, contrary to the findings of 

the AJ, most of the factors weighed against Mr. Purifoy. 

It disagreed with the AJ about the seriousness of the 

charge, finding that the 40-day absence “remain[ed] a 

serious charge,” even though the charge was reduced from 

the original charge brought by the Agency. Id. at ¶ 8. It 

also found that Mr. Purifoy’s absence weighed against 

mitigation, even though he lacked a disciplinary record. 

It reversed the AJ’s finding that Mr. Purifoy was not on 

clear notice that his continued absence from work would 

result in severe discipline, finding instead that 

Mr. Purifoy’s third-level supervisor sufficiently notified 

him that his absence from work would result in severe 

discipline. And it found that “the agency’s chosen penalty, which is entitled to deference, is also consistent with 

the table of penalties.” Id. at ¶ 10. The Board also considered Mr. Purifoy’s job performance and “s[aw] no 

reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings 

concerning [Mr. Purifoy’s] brief, but good, work history.” 

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PURIFOY v. DVA 7

Id. at ¶ 11. The Board further noted that Mr. Purifoy’s 

seeking treatment for a disabling condition had been 

considered to be a mitigating factor. But the Board 

agreed with the Agency that “this factor was not significantly mitigating as the appellant was not fully pursuing 

rehabilitation for his problem.” Id. at ¶ 11. The Board 

thus found that the Agency’s penalty of removal was 

reasonable and reversed the AJ’s decision. 

Mr. Purifoy appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION

We review a final decision of the Board to determine 

whether it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule or regulation 

having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Malloy v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

578 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

Agencies taking an adverse action against an employee bear the burden to establish that an employee’s 

charged conduct occurred, that it affected the efficiency of 

the service, and that “the penalty imposed was reasonable 

in light of the relevant factors set forth in Douglas.” 

Malloy, 578 F.3d at 1356 (citing 5 M.S.P.R. at 307–08). 

The Douglas factors are a non-exhaustive set of considerations that the Board must independently assess when 

relevant to determine whether a penalty was reasonable. 

Id. 

Neither party challenges the sustained charges on 

appeal. Mr. Purifoy argues, however, that the Board’s 

treatment of the mitigation analysis under the Douglas

factors was inadequate. We agree. Even though the 

Board was required to consider each relevant Douglas 

factor, it failed to properly consider two factors relevant 

here. Specifically, the Board (1) did not consider the 

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8 PURIFOY v. DVA

adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to 

deter similar misconduct in the future, and the Board

(2) erred in its analysis of the potential for the employee’s 

rehabilitation. See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305–06. 

Turning to the alternative sanctions factor, the Board 

did not address this factor in the context of the lesser 

sustained 40-day absence. It should have done so. The 

Board is tasked with independently considering “the 

adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to 

deter such conduct in the future by the employee or 

others.” Id. at 306. While the Board noted that the 

Agency’s penalty fell within the range of penalties provided in the table of penalties (i.e., 14-day suspension to 

removal), it did not discuss the adequacy of lesser sanctions for the 40-day absence. Although we have repeatedly recognized that the Board need not consider all the 

Douglas factors, it must consider the relevant ones. Nagel 

v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 707 F.2d 1384, 1386–

87 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The factor is plainly relevant here, as 

the AJ had determined that the Agency’s removal of 

Mr. Purifoy was too severe, and that a 40-day suspension 

would adequately punish his absence and deter similar 

conduct in the future. Additionally, the Agency chose the

penalty of removal based on charges of a six-month absence. After the AJ reduced the six-month charge to 40

days, the Board should have evaluated this Douglas factor 

before sustaining the Agency’s action. The Board thus 

erred when it did not consider whether lesser sanctions 

would have been adequate in Mr. Purifoy’s case. 

Turning to the rehabilitation factor, we determine 

that the Board erred by substituting its own finding for 

the AJ’s opposite one without adequate rationale. The AJ 

had found that Mr. Purifoy’s potential for rehabilitation 

was high: 

The record further reflects the fact that [Mr. Purifoy] cares about his job and has a good potential 

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PURIFOY v. DVA 9

for rehabilitation. He went to great lengths and 

took all available measures to notify his agency of 

his whereabouts. And though he did not complete 

the program at MSDF, he has continued to participate in treatment and has not suffered a relapse.

J.A. 20. The AJ made these findings in view of 

Mr. Purifoy’s live testimony and his extensive pro se 

cross-examination of the government’s witnesses. The AJ 

heard Mr. Purifoy testify under oath that he attends 

Alcoholics Anonymous meetings three days a week and 

that he has not suffered relapse since his removal. 

J.A. 816. Not only did the AJ observe Mr. Purifoy on the 

stand, but also the AJ had ample opportunity to observe 

Mr. Purifoy and his condition when he cross-examined 

witnesses, including his parole officer, his supervisor, and 

the Medical Center Director at the VA Medical Center in 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Although the Board noted that it “s[aw] no reason to 

disturb the administrative judge’s findings concerning the 

appellant’s brief, but good, work history,” it nevertheless 

reversed the AJ’s ultimate finding on Mr. Purifoy’s potential for rehabilitation. The Board found that this factor 

weighed against mitigation because, in the Board’s view 

of the paper record, Mr. Purifoy was “not fully pursuing 

rehabilitation for his problem.” Purifoy, 2015 WL 

3630677, ¶ 11. But this bare conclusion gives insufficient

consideration of, and deference to, the AJ’s findings. 

“The MSPB must afford special deference to the presiding official’s findings respecting credibility where the 

presiding official relies expressly or by necessary implication on the demeanor of the witnesses.” Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 768 F.2d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As we 

recognized in Haebe v. Department of Justice, “the MSPB 

is not free to overturn an administrative judge’s demeanor-based credibility findings merely because it disagrees 

with those findings.” 288 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 

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10 PURIFOY v. DVA

2002). This requirement “derived from the substantial 

evidence standard expressed by the Supreme Court in 

Universal Camera v. National Labor Relations Board,” Id.

(citing 340 U.S. 474, 487–88 (1951)), where the Court 

recognized that “evidence supporting a conclusion may be 

less substantial when an impartial, experienced [administrative judge] who has observed the witnesses and lived 

with the case has drawn conclusions different from the 

Board’s.” Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 496. 

The government contends that this rule does not apply here because nothing in the AJ’s opinion suggests that 

her credibility determinations were based on demeanor. 

But our case law requires deference not only when an AJ’s 

credibility determinations explicitly rely on demeanor but 

also when they do so “by necessary implication.” Jackson, 

768 F.2d at 1331. Even if demeanor is not explicitly 

discussed, assessing a witness’s credibility involves consideration of various factors, including a witness’s demeanor.1 

The AJ’s findings about Mr. Purifoy’s propensity for 

rehabilitation are necessarily intertwined with issues of 

credibility and an analysis of his demeanor at trial, and 

they deserved deference from the Board. See Haebe, 288 

F.3d at 1299. The AJ necessarily made demeanor-based 

credibility findings in assessing, for example, the credibility of Mr. Purifoy’s testimony that he attends AA meetings three times per week and has been sober for one year 

and five months, from the time of his first two-day ab-

 

1 For example, model civil jury instructions list demeanor as one of many factors for a jury to consider in 

determining the credibility of witnesses. E.g. Sixth 

Circuit Pattern Jury Inst. 1.07 (instructing a jury to: “Ask 

yourself how the witness acted while testifying. Did the 

witness appear honest? Or did the witness appear to be 

lying?”). 

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PURIFOY v. DVA 11

sence through the time of his hearing. Indeed, the AJ’s 

findings that Mr. Purifoy “cares about his job and has a 

good potential for rehabilitation,” and that “he has continued to participate in treatment and has not suffered a 

relapse,” J.A. 20, are findings based, at least in part, on 

Mr. Purifoy’s credibility and demeanor as both a witness

and an advocate at the hearing. The Board must afford 

these findings “special deference.” By dismissing the AJ’s 

findings without explanation, the Board failed to afford 

these findings the “special deference” required by law. 

Jackson, 768 F.2d at 1331. 

Mr. Purifoy also challenges the Board’s analysis with 

respect to two other Douglas factors: 1) the nature and 

seriousness of Mr. Purifoy’s offense, and 2) the clarity 

with which Mr. Purifoy was properly on notice of any 

rules he violated or warned about the conduct in question. 

We see no legal error in the Board’s analysis of these 

factors. Nor do we find the Board’s conclusion on these 

factors unsupported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, as “[s]election of an appropriate penalty 

must . . . involve a responsible balancing of the relevant 

factors in the individual case,” we encourage the Board to 

revisit its analysis of these factors alongside all other 

relevant Douglas factors on remand. See Douglas, 

5 M.S.P.R. at 306. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Board and 

remand for the Board to consider Mr. Purifoy’s case in 

light of the relevant Douglas factors, consistent with this 

opinion. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

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