Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50404/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50404-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Irma Reyes-Solosa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

IRMA REYES-SOLOSA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50404

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-04061-GT-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Gordon Thompson, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 5, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed July 30, 2014

Before: Ronald M. Gould and N.R. Smith, Circuit Judges,

and Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Gould

*

 The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge for the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, sitting by

designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a post-revocation sentence imposed

consecutively to the defendant’s criminal sentence for illegal

reentry.

The defendant contended that the district court’s

continuance of her revocation hearing for about three weeks

until after she was sentenced in her criminal case was

erroneous because she requested and was denied immediate

revocation sentencing. 

Because Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2) covers postrevocation sentencing procedures and has a timing provision,

the panel did not look to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 in assessing

whether the revocation sentencing was timely.

The panel held that a district court can continue postrevocation sentencing for a reasonable time to consider a

supervised releasee’s sentence in the underlying criminal

proceeding as part of evaluating the supervised release

releasee’s breach of trust, and that the approximately threeweek continuance was not unreasonable under Rule 32.1

The panel concluded that the twelve-month postrevocation sentence is not substantively unreasonable.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA 3

COUNSEL

RoryT. McHale, Federal Defenders of San Diego, San Diego,

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jason M. Wandel (argued), Special Assistant United States

Attorney; Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney; Bruce R.

Castetter, Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Irma Reyes-Solosa appeals her twelve-month postrevocation sentence imposed consecutively to her six-month

criminal sentence for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326. The district court continued Reyes-Solosa’s

revocation hearing for about three weeks until after she was

sentenced in her criminal case. Reyes-Solosa contends that

the district court’s continuance was in error because she

requested and was denied immediate revocation sentencing. 

She also challenges the substantive reasonableness of her

twelve-month post-revocation sentence. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I

On May 8, 2013, border patrol agents found Reyes-Solosa

near the Calexico West Port of Entry in California. After

Reyes-Solosa said that she was a citizen of Mexico and did

not have documentation allowing her to be in the United

States, the agents arrested her. On June 6, 2013, Reyes-

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4 UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA

Solosa was charged with violating the terms of her supervised

release by illegally reentering the United States in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

At Reyes-Solosa’s revocation hearing on July 24, 2013,

the district court said that it would continue the hearing until

after Reyes-Solosa was sentenced in her criminal case: “I

intend [to] continue the matter until after August the 8th

because the sentence that I impose will be consecutive. 

Without doing that, I would have nothing with which to make

it consecutive.” The district court reiterated that it required

“the underlying case be decided first, so if a consecutive

sentence is forthcoming, it has something with which to be

consecutive.” Defense counsel then told the district court that

Reyes-Solosa was prepared to admit to the violation and

requested immediate sentencing. The district court responded

that “whatever we do, we can do just as easily on the 9th or

10th of August.” Defense counsel objected, which the district

court noted, and the revocation hearing was continued until

August 12, 2013.

At her revocation hearing on August 12, 2013, ReyesSolosa admitted violating the terms of her supervised release. 

Defense counsel requested a three-month sentence,

consecutive to the six-month sentence Reyes-Solosa received

in her criminal case. The district court stated that it had

considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the

rules of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 in its

formulation of a sentence. The district court observed that for

a Class B violation and a criminal history category of II, the

Sentencing Guidelines range was six to twelve months and

that the probation office recommended a consecutive twelvemonth sentence.

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UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA 5

The district court then reviewed Reyes-Solosa’s criminal

history report. Noting Reyes-Solosa’s 2009 illegal reentry,

for which she received sixty days imprisonment and one year

of supervised release; her 2011 illegal reentry, for which she

received six months imprisonment and three years of

supervised release from the district court; and her 2013 illegal

reentry, for which she received six months imprisonment and

one year of supervised release, the district court explained:

I see no alternative in this case but to clearly

say that she ha[s] violated not only my trust,

but I think the trust of the government of the

United States. [I] tried to go along with her,

. . . [the] problems that she has had, [but] it is

just too much to absorb in the fact that she has

three prior violations.

The district court revoked Reyes-Solosa’s supervised release

and sentenced her to twelve months imprisonment

consecutive to the six-month sentence she had received for

her 2013 illegal reentry, with no additional term of supervised

release. Defense counsel objected to the sentence on grounds

of substantive and procedural unreasonableness.

II

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and

application of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 657 F.3d 896, 900 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2011). The parties dispute whether Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32 or 32.1 governs the district court’s

continuance of Reyes-Solosa’s revocation hearing. ReyesSolosa contends that Rule 32 applies to post-revocation

sentencing, requiring the district court to “impose sentence

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6 UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA

without unnecessary delay.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1). 

The government responds that Rule 32.1 governs revocation

hearings, including post-revocation sentencing, which must

be held “within a reasonable time.” See id. R. 32.1(b)(2).

We have said that “sentencing procedures for probation

and supervised release violations are primarily governed by

Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, not

Rule 32.” United States v. Leonard, 483 F.3d 635, 638–39

(9th Cir. 2007). More recently, we reiterated that Rule 32.1

primarily governs post-revocation sentencing and that we

look to Rule 32 “to the extent Rule 32.1 is silent” on a

particular issue. United States v. Whitlock, 639 F.3d 935, 940

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Leonard, 483 F.3d at 638–39).

Here, Rule 32.1 is not silent on the subject of timing. It

contains an express timing provision for the revocation

hearing, which should be held “within a reasonable time.” 

See Fed R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2). Although the opening clause

setting the time for the revocation hearing does not explicitly

refer to post-revocation sentencing, the same section provides

that a person must have “an opportunity to make a statement

and present any information in mitigation.” Id. R.

32.1(b)(2)(E). This part of the section gives a supervised

releasee the right to allocute at the revocation hearing.

1 A

supervised releasee’s right to allocute logically relates to

post-revocation sentencing. Because Rule 32.1(b)(2) covers

post-revocation sentencing procedures and has a timing

1 This language was added to Rule 32.1 after amendment in 2005 aimed

at giving the supervised releasee an express right to allocution at postrevocation sentencing. See Whitlock, 639 F.3d at 940.

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UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA 7

provision, we do not look to Rule 32 in assessing whether the

sentencing here was timely.

2

See Whitlock, 639 F.3d at 940.

The district court’s continuance of Reyes-Solosa’s

revocation hearing for about three weeks until after

sentencing took place in her criminal case was reasonable

under Rule 32.1. Where district courts see the same

defendant multiple times, it is important for our criminal

justice system that the district court be able to impose a postrevocation sentence based on breach of the court’s trust that

is distinct from the underlying criminal violation. This

conforms with the Sentencing Commission’s comment that

a post-revocation sentence should be imposed consecutively

to a criminal sentence: the “sanction for the violation of trust

should be in addition, or consecutive, to any sentence

imposed for the new conduct.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b), introductory cmt.

There are fundamental reasons why this makes sense. 

Post-revocation sentencing relates back to the procedure in

2 Reyes-Solosa relies on United States v. Carper, 24 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.

1994), which had language suggesting that Rule 32.1 did not cover postrevocation sentencing. It is true that in Carper we said: “Rule 32.1 does

not address sentencing, but only procedures for modifying or revoking

supervised release . . . . Rule 32.1 thus governs the decision of whether or

not to revoke supervised release, while Rule 32 governs the decision of

what sentence to impose.” Id. at 1159–60. However, we do not find this

language from Carper persuasive. For one thing, it predated the 2005

amendment to Rule 32.1 that explicitly gave a supervised releasee the

right to allocution at the revocation hearing, which is decidedly part of

sentencing. Also, whether one would have characterized the statement in

Carper as dictum at the time, it is clear that our later circuit law, after the

2005 amendment to Rule 32.1, has made explicit that post-revocation

sentencing is a part of Rule 32.1’s procedures. See Whitlock, 639 F.3d at

940; Leonard, 483 F.3d at 638–39.

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8 UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA

which the court previously imposed a sentence. In most

cases, conduct causing a revocation of supervised release will

necessarily involve a breach of trust between the releasee and

the court that imposed the supervised release conditions. A

defendant has been given release, but only on condition of

maintaining certain behavior. Breach of those conditions is

a serious breach of trust with the court that allowed release

and set those conditions for release. The betrayal of trust

warrants strong and independent corrective action. This is

especially true when, as here, the defendant violates

supervised release by committing the same offense that led to

the imposition of supervised release in the first place. See

United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“A violator who, after committing an offense and being

placed on supervised release for that offense, again commits

a similar offense is not only more likely to continue on that

path, but also has demonstrated to the court that the violator

has little respect for its command. Because the district

court’s trust in the violator’s ability to coexist in society

peacefully has been broken to a greater degree than if the

violator had committed a minor offense of a dissimilar nature,

greater sanctions may be required to deter future criminal

activity.”). A district court imposing a post-revocation

sentence maywant to defer the revocation hearing to consider

the entire picture, including the sentence imposed for the

underlying crime that caused the revocation.

Here, Reyes-Solosa has repeated illegal reentry violations

in her criminal history that contributed to the district court’s

determination on breach of trust. The district court had seen

Reyes-Solosa in 2011, when it imposed the supervised release

term violated in this case, and considered her two other illegal

reentry violations. There is no evidence in the record that the

district court continued the revocation hearing in order to

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UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA 9

punish Reyes-Solosa for her 2013 illegal reentry violation. 

See United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir.

2006). There is no evidence in the record that the district

court imposed the twelve-month post-revocation sentence

“solely, or even primarily, based on the severity of the new

criminal offense underlying the revocation.” See Simtob,

485 F.3d at 1063; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b), introductory cmt. (noting that “at

revocation the court should sanction primarilythe defendant’s

breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree,

the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal

history of the violator”). There is also no suggestion that

continuing the revocation hearing would create an indefinite

delay. Cf. United States v. Pagan-Rodriguez, 600 F.3d 39, 42

(1st Cir. 2010).

Under these circumstances, the district court’s decision to

continue the revocation hearing for about three weeks for

consideration of Reyes-Solosa’s criminal sentence was not

unreasonable.3 Nor was it unreasonable for the district court 

3

In her brief, Reyes-Solosa contends that the grant of a continuance

“exceeded the court’s statutory sentencing authority under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3584.” The district court, Reyes-Solosa argues, is “not authorized to

manipulate the sentencing order for the sole purpose of giving himself or

herself – and not the other district judge – the power to decide whether the

sentences will run concurrent or consecutive.” At oral argument, ReyesSolosa also cited our court’s recentruling in United States v. Montes-Ruiz,

745 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 2014), contending that the district court is not

permitted to “sua sponte continue their hearings . . . to . . . circumvent the

court’s ruling in Montes-Ruiz.”

We reject this argument. Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) in MontesRuiz, we held that a federal court cannot impose a consecutive (or

concurrent) sentence to a non-existent federal term. 745 F.3d at 1292. In

doing so, we clarified that the Supreme Court’s decision in Setser v.

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10 UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA

to want to continue the revocation hearing for a reasonable

time, here a few weeks, so that its sentence on revocation

could follow and be consecutive to the sentencing on the

underlying crime.

In light of the sound reasons why a court may wish to

continue a sentencing hearing on revocation to follow

sentencing in the underlying crime, the sole issue under the

language of Rule 32.1 is whether the revocation hearing is

held “within a reasonable time.” We hold that a district court

can continue post-revocation sentencing for a reasonable time

to consider a supervised releasee’s sentence in the underlying

criminal proceeding as part of evaluating the supervised

releasee’s breach of trust. In this case, the district court’s

approximately three-week continuance was not unreasonable

under Rule 32.1.4

United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012), which permitted prospective federal

sentencing to anticipated, but not-yet-imposed state sentences, did not

disturb circuit precedent prohibiting prospective federal sentencing to

anticipated, but not-yet-imposed federal sentences, a question left open by

the Supreme Court. See Montes-Ruiz, 745 F.3d at 1292; see also Setser,

132 S. Ct. at 1471 n.4.

Neither 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) nor Montes-Ruiz address the issue of

when a district court may continue a revocation hearing. A federal court

cannot impose a sentence consecutive to a federal sentence that does not

exist, but that was not done here. Reyes-Solosa’s argument that the

district court’s continuance here offends Montes-Ruiz has no foundation

in that opinion. Moreover, granting a continuance of a revocation hearing

for a reasonable time in order to consider a criminal sentence is not an

improper manipulation of the sentencing rules.

4 Because we conclude that a continuance of about three weeks is

reasonable under Rule 32.1, we also conclude that there is no due process

violation. See United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1260–61 (9thCir.

2008) (“We hasten to say that a reasonable time for proceeding to a

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UNITED STATES V. REYES-SOLOSA 11

III

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984,

993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The district court reviewed

Reyes-Solosa’s criminal history and her three prior illegal

reentry offenses, including her most recent offense resulting

in a breach of the district court’s trust. Reyes-Solosa’s

twelve-month post-revocation sentence is at the high end, but

within the Guidelines range for a Grade B violation within

criminal history category II, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), and is

not substantively unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the

circumstances. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 993.

AFFIRMED.

full-scale criminal trial is not the same as a reasonable time for revocation

proceedings, and therefore Speedy Trial Clause authority should not be

applied in revocation proceedings as if it were directly controlling. But

even pursuing the Speedy Trial analogy, we must underline the huge

disparity between the four-month delay in this case versus the eight-year

delay that led to dismissal in [United States v. Mendoza, 525 F.3d 836 (9th

Cir. 2008), amended and superseded by 530 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008)]. 

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992), stated that the

lower courts generally have agreed that post-accusation delay starts to

become serious enough to trigger Speedy Trial analysis as it approaches

one year.”).

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