Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01194/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01194-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kathy Mendoza-Powers
Respondent
Thomas Glen Wyrick
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS GLEN WYRICK,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS, Acting

Warden,

Respondent.

 

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1:05-cv-1194 OWW GSA HC

ORDER RE: PETITION FOR

HABEAS CORPUS

BACKGROUND STATEMENT

Petitioner, Thomas Glen Wyrick, is a state prisoner

challenging a 2004 parole denial. He alleges that the California

Board of Parole Hearings acted arbitrarily in denying him parole

resulting in the denial of due process and violating his liberty

interest in parole. Petitioner argues there was no evidence to

support the denial. In the alternative, Petitioner claims that

the denial was based on a static factor, the commitment fence, as

the sole basis for the denial. 

On September 10, 2007, Magistrate Judge Beck issued Findings

and Recommendations recommending that the petition for writ of

habeas corpus be granted, that parole denial be reversed, and

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ordering the California Department of Corrections to release

Petitioner, with credit for time served past the August 24, 2004,

parole denial. 

Respondent timely filed objections, alleging the Court

improperly applied the sum-evidence standard in reaching its

decision; that the District Court improperly re-weighed the

evidence before the Board; and erroneously recommended an

unavailable remedy. Respondent further objects to the Findings

and Recommendations that the Parole Board authority cannot rely

on immutable factors after the passage of time. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has fully considered, de novo, the petition,

Respondent’s opposition, the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations, and Respondent’s objections pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Under the AEDPA, a habeas

corpus petition will only be granted if the underlying claim

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or result in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). 

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), to determine

whether a State Court’s factual determination is “unreasonable” a

Federal Court “cannot simply consider whether [it] would have

reached a different outcome on the same record.” Edwards v.

LaMarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2007). “Only if the

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evidence is ‘too powerful to conclude anything but’ the contrary”

should a Federal Court grant relief. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545

U.S. 231, 265 (2005). By “clearly established Federal law” under

§ 2254(d)(1) is meant, the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the State

Court renders its decision. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412 (2000). Whether the State Court’s decision was “contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

Federal law, is measured by whether the State Court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a

question of law or if the State Court decides a case differently

from the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Williams, at p. 413. This means a Federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the State Court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from the Court’s decisions, but

unreasonably applies the principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case. Williams, at p. 413. 

A Federal Court may not issue the writ simply because it

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant State

Court decision applied clearly established Federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable. Williams, at p. 411. A Federal Court making

the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

State Court’s application of clearly established Federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Williams at p. 409. Petitioner has

the burden of establishing the decision of the State Court is

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of United

States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321,

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1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Petitioner asserts that where a controlling State Court

decision fails to address several of Petitioner’s claims, a

Federal habeas court will independently review the record to

determine whether the State Court decision was “objectively

unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003). 

Petitioner relies on rules of Federal precedent that,

although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth

Circuit precedent remains relevant, persuasive authority in

determining whether a State Court decision is objectively

reasonable. Himes v. Thompson, supra, 336 F.3d at 853. 

Respondent invokes application of the “some-evidence” standard to

review the denial of parole. Respondent contends that the “someevidence standard” has not been clearly established by the United

States Supreme Court as the standard to review a denial of

parole. Although Respondent’s argument was advanced by Judge

Kleinfeld in his dissent from the denial of a petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc in Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846,

853-54 and in Culverson v. Davison, 237 Fed.Appx. 174 (9th Cir.

2007), as well as other District Courts, see, e.g., Sesma v.

Hernandez, 2007 WL 3243853 (S.D. Cal. 2007); it nonetheless

remains the law of this Circuit, that the “some-evidence”

standard applies and the District Court is bound to follow Ninth

Circuit precedent as persuasive authority. Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statements in Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms,

461 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2006) and Irons are dicta,

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nonetheless, the District Courts of this Circuit are required to

follow the dicta of the Ninth Circuit. See Barapind v. Enomoto,

400 F.3d 744, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2005). Despite Respondent’s

contention that the Irons panel misconstrued Biggs and Sass by

suggesting that it was a “holding,” the dicta is strong and is

binding on the District Court. 

A parole release determination is not subject to all of the

due process protections of an adversary proceeding. Greenholtz

v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 422 U.S. 1, 12

(1979). Because setting a minimum term is not part of a criminal

prosecution, the full panoply of rights due a Defendant in such a

proceeding is not constitutionally mandated, even when a

protected liberty interest exists. Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board,

825 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987). At a State Parole Board

proceeding, the only process to which an inmate is due is: (1)

the inmate must receive advance written notice of a hearing;

Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; (2) the inmate must be afforded an

“opportunity to be heard,” Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at 16; and (3) if

the inmate is denied parole, the inmate must be told why “he

falls short of qualifying for parole.” Greenholtz at p. 16. In

determining whether the “some-evidence” standard is met, the

Court need not examine the entire record, independently assess

the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh the evidence; rather,

the Court must determine whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion of a disciplinary board. 

Superintendent, Mass. Correc. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56

(1958). 

California Code of Regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs.

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§§ 2402(a) and (b) provide the following regarding inmate

suitability for parole: 

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether

the life prisoner is suitable for release on parole. 

Regardless of the length of time served, a life

prisoner shall be found unsuitable for a denied parole

if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released

from prison. 

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable

information available to the panel shall be considered

in determining suitability for parole. Such

information shall include the circumstances of the

prisoner’s social history; past and present mental

state; past criminal history, including involvement in

other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented;

the base and other commitment offenses, including

behavior before, during and after the crime; past and

present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of

treatment or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely be

released to the community; and any other information

which bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release. 

Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a

pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability. 

In addressing the some-evidence standard, Irons held that a

finding that the crime was cruel or vicious provided “some

evidence” and that the commitment offense standing alone, was a

sufficient basis to determine Petitioner unsuitable because the

offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrated an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering and the

motive for the crime was inexplicable or very trivial in relation

to the offense. Irons upheld the State Court’s application of

the some evidence standard. 505 F.3d at 852-53. The Ninth

Circuit addressed Irons’ argument, as here, that, even if there

is “some evidence” to support a finding of unsuitability for

parole under the applicable California regulations, Cal. Code

Regs. Title 15 § 2402(c)(1)(d)-(e), the Parole Board’s reliance

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on an immutable factor to deny him parole violated due process by

finding, a continued reliance in the future on an unchanging

factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment, all of which runs contrary to the rehabilitative

goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation. Citing, Biggs at p. 916-17 (emphasis added). 

Biggs recognized that the Parole Board’s sole reliance on the

gravity of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment,

justified denial of parole initially, over time, should a

prisoner continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence

of rehabilitation, denying parole simply because of the nature of

the offense and prior conduct “would raise serious questions

involving his liberty interest in parole.” Biggs at 916. 

In Sass, the Ninth Circuit held that denying parole to an

individual in reliance on the offense of commitment did not

violate due process. 461 F.3d at 1129. Specifically, the Parole

Board’s “reliance on the ‘gravity’ of the second degree murder of

which Sass was convicted, in combination with prior incidents of

unlawful conduct, provided a sufficient basis for the Board to

deem Sass unsuitable for parole.” The Court went on to say

“because the murder Sass committed was less callous and cruel

than the one committed by Irons, and because Sass was likewise

denied parole in spite of exemplary conduct in prison and

evidence of rehabilitation, “our decision in Sass precludes us

from accepting Irons’ due process argument or otherwise affirming

the District Court’s grant of relief.” 

The Sass court then turned to the cases finding

unsuitability for parole solely on the basis of the commitment

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offense and distinguished where the decision was made before the

inmate had served the minimum number of years required by his

sentence. In Biggs, Sass, and Irons, the Petitioners had not

served the minimum number of years to which they had been

sentenced by the time of the challenged parole decision by the

Board. Biggs at 912; Sass at 1125; Irons at 853-54. 

 The Board’s Decision. 

Here, the Board of Prison Terms, at a hearing of which

Petitioner was given notice, at which he was heard, and given an

explanation why he was not suitable for parole, found Petitioner

“not yet suitable for parole, posing an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison.” The denial was one year. The Board found and stated

several reasons for the denial of parole. 

1. The most important, “your level of insight into the

commitment offense, coupled with the severity of the commitment

offense.” The vulnerable victim two years of age, struck

multiple times in the stomach causing a ruptured intestines which

caused death. Obvious lack of regard for life and suffering of

the child because of the fashion in which he was struck. A very

small child struck by a 32-year-old man with his hand in an

attempt to keep her quiet to stop her from crying. [Immutable

factors - past conduct.] 

2. The level of Petitioner’s insight which is “disturbing”

in that in 2004, Petitioner “paint[ed] [him]self as the victim

and that your only mistake was that you struck this child, that

you didn’t call 9-1-1.” [Present conditions about Petitioner’s

current state of mind, state of denial or rationalization, and

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misperception of his role and accountability.]

Petitioner did not acknowledge he never should have touched

the child to begin with. Petitioner did not admit he used too

much force, that he was angry, that he was upset the child was

crying. Some of that was heard from Petitioner’s attorney but

the panel found Petitioner had “not yet developed appropriately

this level of insight.” [Past conduct.]

3. Petitioner has not sufficiently participated in selfhelp programs. Recognizing the most recent psychological report

dated April 6, 2001, supports release, scoring the inmate’s

potential for future violence is low on all three risk assessment

tools. [Present factor regarding rehabilitation.]

4. The panel considered Petitioner’s stable social

history, one prior conviction for misdemeanor drunk driving under

the influence of alcohol, which seemed to be aberrant behavior in

terms of the inmate’s history. The inmate had long-term

employment, no other prior criminal history, all of which were

acknowledged. [Favorable factors - past conduct.]

5. Petitioner needed to participate in continued self-help

and to continue to delve into the causative factors for his

participation in the life crime and to develop an appropriate

level of insight to not only understand what led him to commit

the crime, but to develop the skills so that something like this

will never happen in the future. “Until further progress is made

in this area, [Petitioner] continues to remain unpredictable and

a potential threat for re-offense.” [Attributing present risk to

Petitioner’s failure to achieve full understanding and acceptance

of responsibility for his lethal conduct.]

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6. The panel found that Petitioner had appropriate parole

plans; numerous offers of residence, places of employment,

marketable skills having completed a landscape course in prison. 

Petitioner was commended for his no-discipline record in the

institution; that he acquired his AA degree; maintained a high

TABE score; completed Vocational Landscape training; participated

in on-going substance abuse therapy and Lifer Support Group,

Process Group, Personal Growth Seminar, and ongoing Emergency

Management Institute Program; participated in his religion;

received work reports in a variety of locations; served as a

clerk in the shoe factory and the PIA Furniture Factory; served

in the Canteen; in the Knitting Mill; and in Main Education. 

7. These positive factors were found not to outweigh the

factors of unsuitability; also offset the support of the former

attorney for Petitioner; were offset by the Santa Ana Police

Department’s and Orange County District Attorney’s Office’s

response to the Cal. Pen. C. § 3042 notices that they are opposed

to a finding of parole suitability. 

8. Petitioner’s use of the word “accident” to describe his

crime reflect a manifest absence of insight into his actions,

which were intentional in striking the child in an effort to keep

her quiet. The Petitioner’s use of the term “accident” “goes to

the heart of our issue, that there are lots of mistakes that you

made, but the very first one was how you reacted to the child’s

crying and it continued and went down hill from there.” Finding

that Petitioner was not the victim and that Petitioner was like

every other inmate who committed - caused the death of another

individual. The sentence was not 15 years, it was 15 years to

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life. 

Finally, the Board recognized that “that doesn’t mean you’re

never going to get paroled. You’re doing all of the right things

in prison and I could foresee a parole date in your future.” The

Chair specifically stated “But we, again, just did not feel today

that you are [sic] the appropriate the level of insight into what

happened and why it happened.” 

This constitutes more than “some evidence,” these findings

constitute more than reliance on the immutable factor of

Petitioner’s crime and his prior conduct. The Parole Board

specifically found that an insufficient level of present

recognition and understanding by Petitioner of his role and

responsibility in the crime and an absence of full acceptance of

responsibility for the murder. The Board found that a lack of

insight has still been demonstrated by Petitioner. This evidence

is not “too powerful to conclude anything but ‘the contrary.’” 

The Findings and Recommendation in effect substitute the

Federal Court’s judgment in evaluating Petitioner’s statements to

the Board during the parole hearing and the Board’s concern that

Petitioner had not developed the requisite level of insight into

or sufficiently participated in self-help programs to eliminate a

risk to society from his release. The Board was critical of

Petitioner’s position before the Parole Board that his crime of

commitment was an accident and that Petitioner was a victim. 

Petitioner’s conduct and the words communicated by himself and

through his attorney to the Board at the hearing constitute more

than “some evidence” from which a credibility determination and

substantive decision was made by the Parole Board. 

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The remedy recommended by the Findings and Recommendations,

that the petition be granted and the Board of Prison Terms

ordered to vacate its decision denying parole and to release

Petitioner and to credit him to the date of the parole hearing

are not consonant with California Supreme Court authority, In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 658 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.

980 (2003). In that case, the California Supreme Court

specifically held:

If a decision’s consideration of the specified factors

is not supported by some evidence in the record and

thus, is devoid of a factual basis, the Court should

grant the Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus and should order the Board to vacate its

decision denying parole and, thereafter, to proceed in

accordance with due process of law. 

Respondent maintains that if the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is granted, Petitioner’s remedy is a new parole

determination hearing before the Board of Prison Terms in which

Petitioner shall be afforded due process. 

Petitioner rejoins that this contention is “absurd and

compounds the irreparable harm already accrued to Mr. Wyrick.” 

Citing, California Penal Code § 3041(b): “The Panel or the Board

sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it determines

that the gravity of the current convicted offense . . . is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy

period of incarceration for this individual . . . .” Petitioner

argues that no amount of further review by the Board can produce

a different result and “[B]ecause any term so set, and his

prescribed parole term, have elapsed, Mr. Wyrick should be

discharged from all custody, or at least, as the Magistrate Judge

determined, released from prison on parole while the Board

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calculates his correct prison term and credits applicable toward

parole.” 

California law does not authorize the remedy articulated by

the Findings and Recommendations or by Petitioner. The granting

of parole to a person sentenced to an indeterminate term upon a

conviction of murder, is subject to review by the Governor of

California. California Penal Code § 3041.2. Further, in

contradiction to Petitioner’s suggestion, the denial of parole

was a one year denial, and it was specifically stated that upon

achieving the requisite level of insight and further

participation in self-help programs, the Board Chairperson

opined: “I could foresee a parole date in your future.” 

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, the Findings and

Recommendations are NOT ADOPTED. The petition for habeas corpus

is DENIED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Respondent and

against Petitioner. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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