Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02953/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02953-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Stephanie Hives
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHANIE HIVES,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-2953-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born September 30, 1966, applied on January 22, 2009 for DIB and on January 

13, 2009 for SSI, alleging disability beginning December 1, 2007. Administrative Transcript 

(“AT”) 39, 238-44, 314. Plaintiff alleged she was unable to work due to knee and lower back 

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pain, asthma, posttraumatic stress, anxiety, and depression. AT 24-25. In a decision dated April 

19, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 AT 18-31. The ALJ made the 

following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through March 31, 2013.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since December 1, 2007, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: obesity, 

asthma, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and personality 

disorder.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work 

as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can 

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch 

and crawl. She cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She 

should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, gases, and dusts, and 

cannot work around hazards. She can perform simple and detailed 

tasks with occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors and 

the public.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

7. The claimant was born on September 30, 1966 and was 41 years 

old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the 

alleged disability onset date.

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English.

9. The transferability of job skills is not material to the 

determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational 

Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not 

disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferrable job skills. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from December 1, 2007, through the date of 

this decision.

AT 20-31. 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) improperly assessed the medical opinion evidence when determining plaintiff’s 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”); (2) failed to properly consider the impact of plaintiff’s 

obesity at step five of the sequential evaluation; (3) improperly found plaintiff’s testimony less 

than fully credible; and (4) improperly discounted the third party lay witness report of Samantha 

Earnshaw, plaintiff’s case manager.

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III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ did not Err in Weighing the Medical Opinion Evidence in the Record

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion evidence in the 

record when determining plaintiff’s RFC. More specifically, she asserts that the ALJ improperly 

gave “little weight” to the opinions of Dr. Weil, Dr. Williams Moller, and Dr. Scarmon, “some 

weight” to the opinion of Dr. Garfinkel, and “significant weight” to the opinions of Dr. Diagle 

and Dr. Ochitill. 

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The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

1. Dr. Weil

On June 22, 2006, Dr. Weil, an examining psychologist, issued a report regarding her 

psychiatric examination of plaintiff to determine whether plaintiff was permanently disabled 

pursuant to the California State Workers’ Compensation guidelines in connection with a

psychologically traumatic event that plaintiff experienced while at work on July 22, 2005. AT 

350-66. The examination consisted of a clinical interview, a review of plaintiff’s medical 

records, and psychological testing. AT 351. Based on the examination, Dr. Weil diagnosed 

plaintiff with posttraumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and assessed her with a 

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Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 65, indicating mild-to-moderate difficulty in 

social occupational functioning. AT 359-60. Dr. Weil further noted that her findings indicated 

that plaintiff was “experiencing mild-to-moderate levels of emotional distress.” AT 360. Based 

on these findings, Dr. Weil determined that plaintiff had been totally temporarily disabled from 

July 22, 2005, and that “her psychiatric condition will have reached the permanent and stationary 

status and maximum medical improvement by November 1, 2006” with appropriate treatment. 

AT 361-62. With regard to functional limitations, Dr. Weil opined that plaintiff had “mild to 

moderate” limitations in her abilities to comprehend and follow instructions and to perform 

simple and repetitive tasks. AT 363. She further opined that plaintiff had “slight to moderate 

impairment” in her abilities to maintain a work pace appropriate to a given workload, to perform 

complex or varied tasks, to relate to other people beyond giving and receiving instruction, and to 

accept and carry out responsibility for direction, control, and planning. AT 364. Finally, Dr. 

Weil opined that plaintiff had a “slight” impairment in her ability to influence people. Id.

The ALJ provided the following reasons for assigning “little weight” to Dr. Weil’s 

opinion:

First, this opinion concerns the claimant’s functioning during an irrelevant time 

period. Specifically, the evaluation was made six months prior to the date that the 

claimant alleges disability. Second, the evaluation was made to assess disability 

under a California workers’ compensation claim, rather than under the meaning of 

a disability under the Social Security Act. Also Dr. Weil’s opinion is inconsistent 

with more recent findings of treating sources that indicate that the claimant’s

psychiatric condition is well controlled.

AT 28-29 (citations to the record omitted). For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that 

this reasoning was sufficient to support the ALJ’s determination regarding Dr. Weil’s opinion.

Dr. Weil issued her opinion on June 22, 2006, almost a year and a half prior to plaintiff’s 

alleged disability onset date of December 1, 2007. AT 350. Moreover, Dr. Weil noted in her 

opinion that plaintiff’s mental impairments would cause only a temporary disability and opined, 

“with reasonable medical probability, that [plaintiff’s] psychiatric condition will have reached 

permanent and stationary status and maximum medical improvement by November 1st, 2006.” 

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AT 361. Thus, Dr. Weil’s opinion indicates that the timespan it covered predated plaintiff’s 

alleged onset date by over a year.2 While the ALJ appears to have incorrectly noted how far prior 

to the alleged onset date Dr. Weil’s opinion was issued, it does not diminish the ALJ’s proper use 

of the fact that Dr. Weil’s opinion addressed a time span predating plaintiff’s alleged onset date as 

a reason for assigning less weight to Dr. Weil’s opinion. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Medical opinions that predate the alleged onset of 

disability are of limited relevance.”).

Furthermore, Dr. Weil’s opinion was issued for the purpose of determining whether 

plaintiff was disabled under California’s workers’ compensation guidelines, not the Social 

Security Act. Medical opinions issued to assess claims under California’s workers’ compensation 

guidelines are not conclusive for determining disability in a social security case. Macri v. Chater, 

93 F.3d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 846 

F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)) (“[T]he California Guidelines for Work Capacity are not 

conclusive in a social security case . . . .”). While an ALJ may draw inferences logically flowing 

from a medical opinion issued under the workers’ compensation guidelines, Macri, 93 F.3d at 

544, many of the functional areas identified in Dr. Weil’s opinion were not directly translatable to 

those considered in a social security case. For instance, Dr. Weil opined on plaintiff’s abilities to 

influence people, to relate to other people beyond giving and receiving instruction, and to make 

generalizations, evaluations, or decisions without immediate supervision, all of which are not 

mental functional considerations under the Social Security Act. Accordingly, the ALJ also 

properly relied on the fact that Dr. Weil’s opinion used evaluation standards different from those 

used to assess disability under the Social Security Act in support of his decision to assign lesser 

weight to that opinion.

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2 Moreover, plaintiff indicates in her motion and in the record that she sought to amend her 

alleged onset date to February 3, 2012. AT 328. While the ALJ still rendered his decision based 

on plaintiff’s original alleged onset date, had the plaintiff’s proposed amended onset date been 

used, it would have further bolstered the ALJ’s determination regarding the weight he gave to Dr. 

Weil’s opinion as it would have covered a period over five years prior to that proposed date.

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was still erroneous despite the fact that Dr. Weil’s 

opinion did not cover the relevant period and was made for purposes of workers’ compensation 

because the ALJ improperly determined that Dr. Weil’s opinion was not supported by the mental 

health records. More specifically, plaintiff asserts that the mental health records the ALJ 

referenced in support of his decision actually supported Dr. Weil’s findings, therefore meaning 

the ALJ could not legitimately use this evidence to support his reasoning. However, even 

assuming, without deciding, that these mental health records did not actually support the ALJ’s 

reasoning, such error would have been harmless. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th 

Cir.1990) (harmless error analysis applicable in judicial review of social security cases); Molina 

v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“we may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on 

account of an error that is harmless”). As noted above, the ALJ gave two other specific and 

legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Weil’s opinion that were supported by substantial 

evidence. Those reasons alone were a sufficient basis to support the weight the ALJ assigned to 

Dr. Weil’s opinion. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

Moreover, even had the ALJ given controlling weight to the functional limitations opined 

by Dr. Weil, they would not have supported a finding that plaintiff was disabled. Indeed, Dr. 

Weil opined that plaintiff had no more than “mild to moderate” limitations with regard to any 

area of mental functioning. AT 363-64. Furthermore, Dr. Weil opined that plaintiff’s mental 

disability that “[f]uture employment in the open labor market should be consistent with 

[plaintiff’s] emotional, cognitive, and social deficits covered in this report in the eight areas of 

work function. . . . [Plaintiff] should be given the opportunity to return to work in an environment 

where she feels safe and secure.” AT 365. Accordingly, even had the ALJ erred in weighing Dr. 

Weil’s opinion, such an error would have been harmless because Dr. Weil’s opinion, even if it 

were given controlling weight, would not have supported a finding that plaintiff was disabled 

within the meaning of the Act.

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2. Dr. Williams Moller

On October 25, 2012, Dr. Williams Moller, one of plaintiff’s treating psychologists, 

completed a check-box questionnaire with regard to the impact plaintiff’s mental impairments

had on her workplace functioning. AT 474-81. Therein, Dr. Williams Moller determined that 

plaintiff met a number of criteria indicating that she had an organic mental disorder, psychotic 

disorder, affective disorder, anxiety-related disorder, and personality disorder. AT 474-80. She 

further opined that plaintiff had a “marked” restriction in activities of daily living, meaning she 

was significantly impaired in this fashion at least two-thirds of the time. AT 481. She also found 

that plaintiff had an “extreme” restriction in her ability to interact appropriately with supervisors, 

coworkers, and the public. Id. In addition, Dr. Williams Moller opined that plaintiff would 

“often” exhibit deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace resulting in a failure to 

complete tasks in a timely manner. Id. Finally, Dr. Williams Moller determined that plaintiff 

would have “continual” episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like 

settings. Id.

The ALJ gave the following reasons for finding that Dr. Williams Moller’s opinion was 

entitled to “little weight”:

Dr. Williams Moller has provided few, if any, clinical findings, observations, or 

objective testing to support her opinion. Indeed, Dr. Williams Moller states that 

the claimant has shown symptoms of depression in the past, but admits that she 

does not “at the present.” Further, Dr. Williams Moller’s opinion is inconsistent 

with her therapy notes, which document that the claimant was able to interact 

appropriately with her during sessions. Additionally, the claimant was able to 

resume biweekly visits with her teenage daughter. Most telling, however, is Dr. 

Williams Moller’s report in April 2012 that the claimant had resumed work 

performing home health care for two clients. Although this work did not continue, 

the claimant did not stop working due to her impairments. Rather, those jobs 

ended due to the deaths of the clients. Moreover, the claimant reported that she 

was hoping to find other work “soon.”

AT 28 (citations to the record omitted).

The ALJ appropriately discounted Dr. Williams Moller’s opinion on the basis that her

treatment notes provide few clinical findings, observations, or objective test results to support her 

opinion. While Dr. Williams Moller’s treatment notes show that she treated plaintiff over an 8-

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month period and that she held over a dozen therapy sessions with plaintiff in that time, they do 

not show that Dr. Williams Moller conducted any clinical testing of plaintiff’s psychiatric 

impairments or made any distinct observations or findings that would support the extreme 

limitations and mental complications she provided in her opinion. See AT 486-88. In particular, 

Dr. Williams Moller opined that plaintiff exhibited signs of an organic mental disorder without 

further explanation and without any clinical support from her own treatment records or other 

records she had reviewed. See AT 474, 486-88. Furthermore, as the ALJ noted, Dr. Williams 

Moller qualified many of her findings by stating that plaintiff had experienced them in the past, 

but was not experiencing them at that time. AT 475, 477. Finally, the ALJ also appropriately 

noted the significance of the fact that Dr. Williams Moller stated in her treatment notes that 

plaintiff had been working as a home health care worker for two separate clients and stopped that 

work due to circumstances not resulting from plaintiff’s mental impairments. These notes 

conflicted with Dr. Williams Moller’s opinion that plaintiff experienced “continual” episodes of 

deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings. In sum, the ALJ properly relied 

on the lack of objective medical evidence supporting Dr. Williams Moller’s opinion to find that it 

was entitled to reduced weight. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“The incongruity between Dr. Nachenberg’s Questionnaire responses and her medical records 

provides an additional specific and legitimate reason for rejecting Dr. Nachenberg’s opinion of 

[the claimant’s] limitations.”).

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ erred at step three of the sequential analysis because he 

did not adopt the opinion of Dr. Williams Moller that plaintiff’s mental impairments met or 

equaled the requirements of Listing 12.06 and Listing 12.08. However, for the reasons discussed 

above, the ALJ properly accorded little weight to this physician’s opinion. The ALJ considered 

in his decision whether plaintiff’s impairments met the criteria for both Listing 12.06 and Listing 

12.08 based on the evidence in the record and properly found that substantial evidence showed 

that they did not meet or equal the criteria for either listing. AT 23-24. Accordingly, the ALJ did 

not err in his consideration of Dr. Williams Moller’s opinion, or the medical evidence more 

generally, at step three.

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3. Dr. Scarmon

Dr. Scarmon issued a one-page physical medical assessment of plaintiff’s ability to 

perform work-related activities on November 7, 2012. AT 484. Therein, he diagnosed plaintiff 

with chronic back pain, severe hypertension, and obesity. Id. Based on these diagnoses, Dr. 

Scarmon opined that plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry no more than 5 pounds and stand 

and/or walk between 1 and 2 hours total in an 8-hour workday, and for no more than half an hour 

at a time. Id. He further opined that plaintiff could sit for between 1 and 2 hours total in an 8-

hour workday, and for no more than 15 to 30 minutes without interruption or having to change 

positions. Id. Dr. Scarmon also opined that plaintiff could never bend, climb, balance, stoop, 

crouch, kneel, crawl, reach, handle, push or pull, and could only occasionally engage in handling 

activities. Id. 

The ALJ assigned “little weight” to Dr. Scarmon’s opinion for the reasons that follow:

First, Dr. Scarmon only examined the claimant on two occasions in October 2012. 

Thus, no treating relationship has been established. Second, his examinations 

reveal few, if any, objective clinical findings, aside from obesity and pain of the 

low back with range of motion, to support his opinion. Moreover, his clinical 

notes do not establish a severe medically determinable impairment to account for 

all of these limitations. Specifically, there is no medically determinable 

impairment to account for his proposed limitations in reaching, handling, or 

feeling. Although he states she cannot sit for more than a few minutes at a time, 

his clinic notes are devoid of any complaints of sitting or any discussion of 

standing and walking difficulties. Dr. Scarmon apparently relied quite heavily on 

the subjective report of symptoms and limitations provided by the claimant, and 

seemed uncritically to accept as true most, if not all, of what the claimant reported. 

Yet, as explained in elsewhere in this decision, there exist good reasons for 

questioning the reliability of the claimant’s subjective complaints.

AT 28 (citation to the record omitted).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assigning reduced weight to Dr. Scarmon’s opinion 

because he incorrectly determined that he was not plaintiff’s treating physician. However, even 

assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ erred in drawing such a conclusion regarding Dr. 

Scarmon’s opinion, such an error was harmless because the ALJ still provided specific and 

legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Scarmon’s opinion that would have been sufficient even 

had the ALJ found Dr. Scarmon to be a treating physician. See Curry, 925 F.2d at 1129; Molina, 

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674 F.3d at 1111; Graham v. Astrue, 385 F. App’x 704, 706 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (citing 

Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)) (“The ALJ erroneously questioned 

whether Dr. Nelson was a treating source, but the error was harmless because the ALJ 

nonetheless applied the correct legal standard.”).

Indeed, the ALJ properly determined that the objective medical findings in Dr. Scarmon’s 

own treating notes did not support certain limitations he opined. The ALJ correctly observed that 

Dr. Scarmon’s opinion that plaintiff had limitations in reaching, handling, and feeling. See AT 

467-68 (noting only that plaintiff was obese, had hypertension, and exhibited medical issues 

relating to her back and knees). Similarly, the ALJ properly determined that Dr. Scarmon’s 

findings did not support the extreme limitations he opined with regard to plaintiff’s ability to sit. 

See id.

Furthermore, the ALJ also properly reasoned that Dr. Scarmon’s opinion appeared to rely

on plaintiff’s subjective statements regarding the extent of her symptoms and limitations. The 

physical limitations Dr. Scarmon opined largely reflected those alleged by plaintiff, but did not 

generally reflect the other medical evidence in the record, including his own treatment findings. 

For reasons discussed in more detail below, the ALJ correctly discounted plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints regarding the intensity of her symptoms and limitations. Accordingly, there existed 

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s assignment of diminished weight to Dr. Scarmon’s 

opinion based on his apparent uncritical acceptance of plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Bayliss 

v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding substantial evidence supported the

ALJ’s rejection of a treating physician’s opinion because that opinion “was not supported by 

clinical evidence and was based on [the claimant’s] subjective complaints”).

In sum, these reasons provided by the ALJ were specific and legitimate, were supported 

by substantial evidence from the record, and would have been sufficient grounds for assigning 

little weight to Dr. Scarmon’s opinion had the ALJ acknowledged him as one of plaintiff’s 

treating physicians. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 

2004) (upholding ALJ’s rejection of treating physician’s opinion “because it was in the form of a 

checklist, did not have supportive objective evidence, was contradicted by other statements and 

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assessments of [the claimant’s] medical condition, and was based on [the claimant’s] subjective 

descriptions of pain”); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 

ALJ properly discounted a treating physician’s functional recommendations that “were so 

extreme as to be implausible and were not supported by any findings made by any doctor,” 

including the treating physician’s own findings). Accordingly, even if the ALJ had erred in 

considering Dr. Scarmon’s opinion as that of a non-treating physician, such an error was harmless 

and remand is not warranted on that basis.

4. Dr. Garfinkel

Dr. Garfinkel, an examining physician, performed a complete internal medicine evaluation 

of plaintiff on March 16, 2009. AT 414-20. As a result of this examination, Dr. Garfinkel noted 

that plaintiff exhibited largely normal physical findings. AT 415-17. Based on those findings, he 

diagnosed plaintiff with posttraumatic stress disorder, major depression, hypertension that was 

well controlled with medication, and a history of asthma and chronic bronchitis with a currently 

normal examination. AT 417-18. With regard to plaintiff’s ability to perform physical workrelated functions, Dr. Garfinkel opined that plaintiff could lift or carry 50 pounds occasionally 

and 25 pounds frequently, stand or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and sit for 6 hours in 

an 8-hour workday. AT 418. He further opined that plaintiff should avoid noxious fumes and 

other pulmonary irritants and that she had no postural, manipulative, visual, or communicative 

limitations. Id.

In support of his determination that Dr. Garfinkel’s opinion was entitled to “some 

weight,” the ALJ noted that his opinion was consistent with the medical evidence in the record 

showing that plaintiff’s symptoms were well controlled, but that his RFC assessment was too 

generous in light of plaintiff’s credible subjective complaints indicating that she was somewhat 

more limited. AT 26.

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ should have assigned no weight to Dr. Garfinkel’s opinion 

because there was no evidence in the record showing that plaintiff’s symptoms were well 

controlled. More specifically, plaintiff argues that her medical records developed both before and 

after Dr. Garfinkel’s opinion show that her blood pressure generally rose and fell dramatically, 

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therefore indicating that her symptoms were not well controlled. However, the medical records 

regarding the impact of plaintiff’s physical impairments indicate to the contrary. Indeed, 

plaintiff’s medical records from throughout the relevant period showed that plaintiff had normal 

cardiovascular results and was generally asymptomatic of any cardiopulmonary diseases upon 

examination. E.g., AT 372, 376, 385, 387, 471. In short, plaintiff fails to identify any evidence 

regarding plaintiff’s physical impairments or functional limitations that plausibly calls into 

question the ALJ’s assignment of some weight to Dr. Garfinkel’s opinion.

5. Dr. Diagle and Dr. Ochitill

Dr. Diagle, an examining psychiatrist, conducted a complete psychiatric evaluation of 

plaintiff on March 14, 2009 consisting of a review of plaintiff’s medical records and an 

independent psychiatric examination. AT 407-12. Based on this evaluation, Dr. Diagle 

diagnosed plaintiff with posttraumatic stress disorder, partially treated; history of cocaine abuse, 

in recent treatment and remission; history of hepatitis C and hypertension; severe psychosocial 

stressors; and a GAF score of 60. AT 411. Dr. Diagle noted that plaintiff “is now doing the 

things necessary to recover” and that he was “confident that [plaintiff] will be able to [be] 

reemployed in a new career sometime in the future.” Id. He further noted that he “expect[ed] 

reasonable recovery and reemployment within the next year.” AT 412. With regard to plaintiff’s 

ability to carry out mental work-related tasks, Dr. Diagle opined that plaintiff was “slightly 

limited” in her abilities to follow detailed and complex instructions, to relate and interact with 

supervisors, coworkers, and the public, and to associate with day-to-day work activity. Id. He 

further opined that plaintiff was “moderately” limited in her ability to adapt to the stresses 

common to a normal work environment, and “slightly to moderately limited” in her ability to 

maintain concentration and attention, persistence and pace. Id.

On April 7, 2009, Dr. Ochitill, a non-examining physician, issued an RFC assessment 

regarding the impact of plaintiff’s mental impairments. AT 422-24. Therein, Dr. Otchitill opined 

that plaintiff had moderate limitations regarding her abilities to carry out detailed instructions, to 

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods of time, to complete a normal 

workweek without interruption, to interact with the public, to adapt to changes in the workplace. 

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AT 422-23. 

The ALJ gave both Dr. Diagle’s and Dr. Ochitill’s opinions “substantial weight” because 

they were generally consistent with one another and with the clinical findings elsewhere in the 

record demonstrating that plaintiff had good control of her symptoms. AT 27. Plaintiff asserts 

that this determination was erroneous with regard to Dr. Diagle because he agreed with plaintiff’s 

treating physicians in diagnosing plaintiff with posttraumatic stress disorder, therefore requiring 

the ALJ to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s treating physicians’ 

opinion in favor of his opinion. With respect to Dr. Ochitill, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ could 

not properly rely on his opinion because he did not conduct his own independent examination and 

did not provide his own diagnosis of plaintiff’s impairments.

Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Diagle’s opinion did not contradict the opinions of plaintiff’s 

treating physicians simply because he also diagnosed her with posttraumatic stress disorder is not 

well taken. Dr. Diagle based his opinion on independent clinical findings that differed from 

plaintiff’s treating physicians and opined that plaintiff had mental limitations less severe than 

those found in the medical opinions the ALJ discounted. Indeed, Dr. Diagle’s clinical findings 

differed with those of plaintiff’s treating physicians in a number of ways, including the GAF 

score he assessed, and were based on psychiatric testing that differed from that used by plaintiff’s 

treating physicians. E.g., compare AT 407-12 with AT 350-66. Just because he diagnosed 

plaintiff with posttraumatic stress disorder as her treating physicians had does not mean his 

clinical findings did not otherwise differ from those on which the treating physicians’ opinions 

were based. Accordingly, the ALJ had to provide only specific and legitimate reasons for 

discounting the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The 

ALJ’s reliance on the conflicting opinion of Dr. Diagle, which was based on that physician’s own 

independent clinical findings, was one such specific and legitimate reason. See id.; Andrews, 53 

F.3d at 1041 (an examining physician’s opinion can constitute substantial evidence when it “is 

based on independent clinical findings”). Furthermore, as the ALJ determined, Dr. Diagle’s 

opinion was generally consistent with the objective medical findings in the record, thus lending 

further support to the ALJ’s decision to assign it greater weight. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

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404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a 

whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion.”).

Similarly, the ALJ was permitted to assign greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Ochitill. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ could not give credence to his opinion because he completed an RFC 

assessment without providing a diagnosis of plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments. 

However, Dr. Ochitill did indicate such a diagnosis by noting at the beginning of his opinion that 

plaintiff’s impairments fell within the anxiety-related disorders considered under Listing 12.06. 

AT 422. Furthermore, because Dr. Ochitill’s opinion was supported by both Dr. Diagle’s similar 

RFC opinion and the medical record as a whole, the ALJ was permitted to assign greater weight 

to it over those of plaintiff’s treating physicians. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 

2002) (“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial 

evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in 

the record.”); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although the contrary 

opinion of a non-examining medical expert does not alone constitute a specific, legitimate reason 

for rejecting a treating or examining physician's opinion, it may constitute substantial evidence 

when it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record.”).

B. The ALJ did not err in Considering Plaintiff’s Obesity at Step Five

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not properly considering the impact of her 

obesity at step five of the sequential analysis. Specifically, she asserts that the ALJ failed to 

consider the effect plaintiff’s obesity had on her ability to balance, stoop, and crouch, despite 

finding that her obesity was a severe impairment at step two. She contends further that the ALJ 

failed to provide any limitations based on obesity in the hypotheticals he posed to the vocational 

expert during the administrative hearing in this matter, therefore making his reliance on the 

vocational expert’s testimony in making his step five determination erroneous. These arguments 

are not well taken.

When determining plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ properly weighed and considered the

evidence in the record regarding plaintiff’s obesity and the impact it had on her ability to perform 

workplace functions. Plaintiff appears to suggest that this was not the case because the ALJ did 

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not specifically discuss how plaintiff’s obesity contributed to the symptoms caused by the mild 

degenerative changes in plaintiffs back shown by certain x-ray results in the record. However, 

the ALJ’s decision clearly shows that he considered the entire record when determining plaintiff’s 

RFC, AT 24, which included objective clinical findings regarding plaintiff’s obesity and other 

impairments and opinion evidence interpreting that evidence and drawing conclusions regarding 

the effect plaintiff’s impairments had on her ability to perform individual workplace functions, 

including her abilities to balance, stoop, and crouch. As discussed above, the ALJ properly 

considered and weighed this opinion evidence in drawing his RFC conclusion that served the 

basis for his step five determination. Plaintiff has not set forth, and there is no evidence in the 

record of, any functional limitations resulting from or exacerbated by her obesity that the ALJ 

failed to consider. Similarly, the hypotheticals the ALJ posed to the vocational expert during the 

administrative hearing incorporated all of the limitations and restrictions that comprised the 

ALJ’s appropriately-arrived-at RFC determination. Accordingly, the ALJ’s use of the vocational 

expert’s testimony in response to those hypotheticals was not in error. See Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument “that the ALJ should have 

included obesity in the hypothetical to the vocational expert” because “[t]he ALJ presented all of 

[plaintiff’s] limitations and restrictions supported by the record to the vocational expert”).

C. The ALJ’s Adverse Credibility Determination was not Erroneous

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by determining that plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms was not entirely 

credible. This argument is not well taken.

The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the 

ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., 

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an 

explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be 

supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”).

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In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR 55406-

01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and 

effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. 

Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek 

treatment for an allegedly debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ 

in determining whether the alleged associated pain is not a significant non-exertional impairment. 

See Flaten v. Secretary of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part, 

on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 

1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 

(9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the 

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” 

Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the ALJ provided the following extensive discussion regarding his reasons in 

support of his adverse credibility determination:

The claimant’s allegations of physical difficulties are inconsistent with clinical

indications that her condition is relatively controlled. Despite alleging breathing 

difficulties, physical examinations of the chest have revealed no significant 

findings. Admittedly, the claimant has required emergency care for breathing 

difficulties; however, it is noted that this hospitalization coincided with a time 

when the claimant was short of her Albuterol inhalers. Otherwise, the claimant 

testified that she continues to smoke seven to ten cigarettes per day despite 

multiple clinical warnings to stop smoking.

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Despite allegations of weight problems with joint pains, physical examinations 

have routinely revealed no significant findings with little, if any, mention of leg 

swelling or edema. In fact, the claimant demonstrated normal gait and full 

strength in all extremities during an internal medicine evaluation.

These allegations are inconsistent with the minimal conservative treatment the 

claimant has received. The claimant has not required any referrals to orthopedic or 

respiratory specialists. She has not [had] frequent changes in pain medications, 

required physical therapy, surgery, steroid injections, use of a TENS unit, 

chiropractic adjustments, respiratory intubations, frequent changes in inhaled 

medications, the use of a breathing machine, supplemental oxygen or any other 

alternative measures to control her symptoms.

The claimant’s allegations of an inability to sustain any work activity are 

inconsistent with her ongoing attempts to seek and obtain employment since her 

alleged onset date. For example, in Mach 2009, she told consultative psychiatric 

examiner Dr. Daigle that she was looking for employment in computers or other 

office work. In 2010, the claimant worked full time as a monitor at a women’s 

shelter in 2010 [sic] for a couple of months. She helped with showers, meals, 

clean up and checking property. She stated she was unable to continue this work 

because it was too stressful. However, she does not state that this work was too 

physically demanding. The record further documents that she worked as a home 

health aide for two different clients in early 2012 and this work ended because of 

the deaths of her clients, not because of her mental or physical conditions.

These allegations are also inconsistent with her activities. The record shows she is 

able to care for herself. She is able to cook meals for herself and her roommates. 

She washes dishes, sweeps, mops, does laundry, and makes shopping lists. She is 

able to go out alone, attends meetings, handles her bills, money and food stamps, 

and rides the bus. Clearly, the above activities are consistent with the 

determination of an ability to perform light work activity. Although the claimant 

may not be able to perform heavier type exertional activities, an inability to 

perform to [sic] medium and heavy work does not preclude all work activity.

The claimant’s allegations are inconsistent with the medical opinion of examining 

internist Joseph Garfinkel, M.D., which indicates that she has considerable workrelated abilities despite her impairments.

. . .

The claimant’s allegations of mental functioning difficulties are inconsistent with 

her cursory and sporadic attempts in seeking treatment. The claimant’s 

documented mental health care history includes a March 4, 2009 intake 

assessment; a March 23, 2009 medication service plan meeting; an October 28, 

2010 intake assessment and examination; and a November 22, 2010 examination. 

She did not seek treatment again until January 2012 when she began outpatient 

counseling until August 2012. SSR 96-7p indicates that had the claimant 

genuinely felt debilitating symptoms, it would have been more likely that she 

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would have more diligently sought and maintained the appropriate treatment.

Similarly, the claimant’s allegations are inconsistent with the mild findings that 

treating sources have noted upon mental status examination. The claimant has also 

reported improvement with psychiatric medications. Therapy notes reveal that she 

made good progress with therapy and medication.

Moreover, her general credibility is questioned in that symptom magnification was 

confirmed by psychological testing in 2006. Dr. Weil noted that the claimant’s 

scores on the Beck Depression Inventory, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 

Inventory, and Millon Behavioral Medicine Diagnostic Inventory were high in 

relationship to her presentation and clinical examination. Dr. Weil noted her 

exaggeration of symptoms.

The claimant’s mental allegations are inconsistent with the medical opinion of 

examining psychiatrist Bradley Diagle, M.D. . . .

. . .

The claimant’s allegations are partially supported by her prescriptions for 

psychiatric medications. The claimant’s allegations are also partially supported by 

a global assessment of functioning (GAF) score as low as 45, which corresponds 

to serious symptoms or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school 

functioning. However, the therapist who gave the claimant this low GAF score 

otherwise noted that the claimant has intact memory, intact abstraction, and linear 

though process. Accordingly, while the claimant may experience some 

psychiatric-based symptoms, the weight of the evidence indicates that she is 

nonetheless able to perform a wide range of unskilled work.

AT 25-27 (citations to the record omitted).

First, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s impairments were well controlled with 

medication and that the relatively conservative treatment she received undermined her credibility. 

These were clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s subjective claim that her 

impairments caused her to be disabled. Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 

1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (a condition that can be controlled or corrected by medication is not 

disabling for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits under the Act); Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that a favorable response to 

conservative treatment undermines complaints of disabling symptoms); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 

742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have previously indicated that evidence of conservative treatment 

is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.”); Fair v. 

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Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). The record demonstrates that the treatment provided

by plaintiff’s treating physicians largely consisted of a medication regimen and psychological 

counseling, which generally kept plaintiff’s symptoms under control, and recommendations that 

she eat a low-fat diet, lose weight, and stop smoking. E.g., AT 319, 414, 445-48 463, 486-88. 

There is no evidence in the record indicating that plaintiff’s physicians recommended more 

intensive treatment or even referred plaintiff to a specialist for purposes of determining that such 

treatment would be necessary. While plaintiff did receive emergency hospital treatment for 

breathing difficulties in 2009, as the ALJ highlighted, this was a short-lived incident resulting 

from plaintiff having run out of her Albuterol medication. AT 447. The record indicates that

plaintiff did not suffer a similar episode after she had been provided a nebulizer and that her 

breathing complications had largely ceased. See AT 416, 467.

Plaintiff argues that it was improper for the ALJ to rely on the fact that plaintiff received 

conservative treatment under the circumstances presented by this case because it is clear that 

plaintiff could not have afforded better treatment than what she received given her unstable 

housing situation and her reliance on county-provided treatment. While plaintiff is correct that a 

claimant’s inability to pay for or otherwise obtain a particular course of treatment cannot serve as 

a basis for using the absence of that treatment against the claimant, Orn, 495 F.3d at 638, there is 

no evidence in the record here that plaintiff was unable to obtain a more effective course of 

treatment due to a lack of medical insurance, an ability to pay, or her financial situation more 

generally. Indeed, plaintiff’s treating records indicate that she received both mental and physical 

medical care throughout the course of the relevant period. Furthermore, as discussed above, the 

treatment recommendations her physicians made and the course of treatment she ultimately 

underwent consisted largely of a regime of medications and psychological counseling that 

adequately controlled her symptoms. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s testimony alleging disability conflicted with her conservative 

course of treatment and the fact that that treatment adequately controlled her symptoms.

/////

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The ALJ also appropriately determined that plaintiff’s reported activities during the 

relevant period, including a brief period of work as an in home care worker, undermined her 

claims that her impairments were totally disabling. “While a claimant need not vegetate in a dark 

room in order to be eligible for benefits, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when the 

claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a 

work setting . . . . Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be 

grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a 

totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations and quotation marks 

omitted); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ properly considered 

claimant’s ability to care for her own needs, cook, clean, shop, interact with her nephew and 

boyfriend, and manage her finances and those of her nephew in the credibility analysis); Morgan 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s determination regarding 

claimant’s ability to “fix meals, do laundry, work in the yard, and occasionally care for his 

friend’s child” was a specific finding sufficient to discredit the claimant’s credibility). 

Here, plaintiff stated that she is able to cook meals for herself and her roommates, wash 

dishes, sweep, mop, and do laundry. AT 47, 51-52, 409, 414. Furthermore, plaintiff testified that 

she briefly worked two different full-time jobs during the relevant period; one as an in home 

caretaker for two individuals, and the other as a monitor at a homeless shelter, where she prepared 

meals, cleaned up dormitories, and helped clients with showering. AT 47-49. While plaintiff 

also testified that she quit her job at the shelter due to the mental stress it caused her, AT 96, the 

fact that she was able to perform the physical requirements of that job indicated that she is less 

physically restricted than what she alleged elsewhere in her testimony. Accordingly, there existed 

substantial evidence in the record from which the ALJ could permissibly draw the conclusion that 

plaintiff’s daily activities conflicted with her statements regarding the extent of her physical 

impairments, therefore damaging her overall credibility.

The ALJ further reasoned that plaintiff’s testimony generally conflicted with the medical 

evidence in the record. This too was a factor the ALJ was permitted to consider in support of his

adverse credibility determination. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (“Although lack of medical 

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evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can 

consider in his credibility analysis.”). For instance, plaintiff testified that she had pain in her back 

and knees that markedly restricted her ability to sit, bend, lift, and squat, AT 58-60, 82, but Dr. 

Garfinkel’s examination notes show that she had a normal gait, normal range of motion, negative 

straight leg raise testing, and normal strength, sensation, reflexes, and coordination.3 AT 416-17. 

Similarly, plaintiff claimed that she suffered from extensive psychiatric symptoms, but the 

objective findings from the psychological tests conducted by the examining physicians indicated 

that her mental impairments were not so limiting. E.g., AT 408-12.

Plaintiff contends that it was improper for the ALJ to refer to her smoking habit as a 

reason to undermine her credibility because it is likely that she was so addicted to cigarettes that 

she continued smoking even in the face of her breathing problems. In support of this argument, 

plaintiff cites to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., where the Court indicated that an ALJ’s consideration of a claimant’s continued smoking 

habit as a reason to support an adverse credibility determination may be improper in certain 

circumstances. 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009). However, in that case, like here, the ALJ 

had provided multiple bases for discounting the claimant’s testimony that all had ample support 

from the record. Id. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “the ALJ’s 

reliance on [the claimant’s] continued smoking, even if erroneous, amount[ed] to harmless error.” 

Id. Therefore, even assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ erred by using plaintiff’s smoking 

as a basis for disbelieving her testimony, it would be harmless in light of the other valid reasons 

the ALJ provided in support of his credibility determination.

/////

 

3

Plaintiff contends that the fact that she exhibited normal gait and strength during that 

examination in 2009 is of little relevance because she proposed to amend her alleged onset date to 

February 3, 2012. However, the only evidence plaintiff points to in support of an amended onset 

date is a March 11, 2013 letter sent from her counsel to the ALJ stating that plaintiff would be 

“willing to amend her alleged onset date to February 3, 2012.” AT 328. There is no evidence 

that plaintiff ever actually amended her alleged onset date. Furthermore, the ALJ’s decision was 

based on the initial alleged onset date of December 1, 2007. AT 31. Therefore, these objective 

medical findings fell well within the relevant period considered by the ALJ.

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In sum, the ALJ provided multiple clear and convincing reasons in support of his adverse 

credibility determination that were amply supported by the record.4 Therefore, the ALJ did not 

err in finding plaintiff’s testimony less than fully credible.

D. The ALJ did not err in Considering Samantha Earnshaw’s Third Party Report

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to describe what, if any, weight he 

accorded to the third party report provided by Samantha Earnshaw.

“[L]ay witness testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects 

ability to work is competent evidence, and therefore cannot be disregarded without comment.” 

Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 

918-19 (9th Cir. 1993) (friends and family members in a position to observe a plaintiff’s 

symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify to condition). “If the ALJ wishes to 

discount the testimony of the lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each 

witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. Nevertheless, the ALJ is not required “to discuss every 

witness’s testimony on a individualized, witness-by-witness basis.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. 

Indeed, while the applicable regulations require “the ALJ to consider testimony from family and 

friends submitted on behalf of the claimant,” they “do not require the ALJ to provide express 

reasons for rejecting testimony from each lay witness.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 

404.1545(a)(3)). “Rather, if the ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony by one 

witness, the ALJ need only point to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a different 

witness.” Molina, 674 at 1114.

When the ALJ provides clear and convincing reasons for discounting a claimant’s 

testimony and the third-party lay witness’s testimony is similar to the claimant’s testimony, the 

ALJ’s reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony may also constitute germane reasons for 

rejecting the third-party lay witness’s testimony. Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Molina, 674 at 1114. Furthermore, even when the ALJ 

 

4 Because the reasons discussed above are sufficient to support the ALJ’s adverse credibility 

determination, the court declines to consider the ALJ’s remaining reasons for discounting 

plaintiff’s credibility.

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errs by failing to explain his or her reasons for disregarding a layperson’s testimony, such error is 

harmless if that layperson’s testimony largely reflects the limitations described by the claimant 

and the ALJ provides clear and convincing reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony, 

because the layperson’s testimony in such a circumstance is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination in the context of the record as a whole.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122 

(quotation marks omitted).

Here, the ALJ summarized the third-party statement of Samantha Earnashaw in detail, 

clearly indicating that he considered the information. AT 25. Moreover, Samantha Earnshaw’s 

report essentially echoed plaintiff’s own testimony and, as discussed above, the ALJ already 

provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony, which are 

equally germane to this third-party testimony. As such, any error in not explicitly re-stating, or 

incorporating by reference, the reasons given for discounting plaintiff’s testimony with respect to 

this third party statement was harmless and remand is not warranted. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1115-22.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: January 28, 2016

11 hives2953.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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