Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02593/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02593-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
General Motors Corporation
Appellee
Gregory Allen Harvey
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH .FILED 

Umted States Court of Appeal<> Tenth Circuit "' 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR2 5jggg 

ROBERT L. HOECKER TENTH CIRCUIT 

GREGORY ALLEN HARVEY, by and 

through his legal guardian, 

LYLE DEAN HARVEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 87-2593 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. CIV. 86-0071-B) 

· Clerk 

Jack R. Gage of Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

(Michael B. Moore of Cartwright, Slobodin, Bokelman, Borowsky, 

Wartnick, Moore & Harris, Inc., San Francisco, Cali fornia, wi th 

him on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Andrew Langan, of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois (Thomas G. 

Gorman of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, Wyoming, and John T. 

Hickey, Jr. of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois, with him on 

the brief), for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BRORBY, Circuit Judge, and SAFFELS,* 

District Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Dal e E. Saffels, United States District Judge for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 1 
This product liability case involves claims for enhanced 

personal injuries suffered by Gregory Allen Harvey (Harvey) when 

the 1979 Chevrolet Corvette in which he was riding crashed on a 

rural Wyoming road. Harvey sued General Motors Corporation (GM), 

claiming that the ttT-Top" latch of the vehicle was defective and 

caused Harvey's ejection from the vehicle and consequent injuries. 

Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, 28 u.s.c. 

§ 1332 (1966 & Supp. 1988). The case was tried to a jury on 

theories of strict liability and negligence. The jury awarded no 

damages. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P~ 59{a), Harvey filed a Motion 

for a New Trial on damages. The trial court denied the motion. 

Harvey appeals the Judgment entered on the verdict and the Order 

Denying the Motion for a New Trial. Our jurisdiction vests 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (Supp. 1988). We AFFIRM. 

Facts 

On July 6, 1985, Harvey and a friend, Christopher Schade, 

drove Harvey's 1979 Chevrolet Corvette on a road south of Hanna, 

Wyoming. Harvey and Schade had been drinking and Schade had been 

smoking marijuana sometime during the day. Traveling at an 

excessive rate of speed, they carne upon sheep in the road. Schade 

swerved, and lost control of the vehicle. The Corvette rolled off 

the road and was "totaled." During the rollover, the Corvette's 

T-Top roof panels separated from the vehicle. Harvey, who was not 

wearing a seat belt, was ejected from the vehicle. He sustained 

severe bodily injuries that resulted in an ampu~ated leg and brain 

damage. At trial, Harvey presented unchallenged evidence that his 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 2 
medical bills were $185,140. His unchallenged lost wages for 

1985, 1986 and 1987 were $76,196. His expert economist, although 

challenged, testified that the present value of Harvey's future 

lost earnings and fringe benefits was $1,537,634, and that the 

present value of Harvey's future cost of attendant care was 

$1,017,693. Additionally, the record presents evidence of loss o f 

enjoyment of life, pain and suffering, and permanent debilitation. 

The trial court instructed the jury on Harvey's theory o f 

enhanced injuries: that a design defect which does not cause an 

accident does not subject a manufacturer to liability for the 

entire damage, but subjects it to liability only for injuries 

caused over and above those which would have occurred without t h e 

defective design. The jury found: the vehicle was manufactured 

in a defective condition, was unreasonably dangerous to the 

consumer or user, and reached Harvey without substantial change in 

condition; and the defective condition was a proximate cause of 

Harvey's injuries. The jury further found that GM was negligent 

and its negligence was a proximate cause of Harvey's injuries. 

The jury found Harvey negligent as well, and found that his 

negligence also was a proximate cause of the injuries. The jury 

apportioned total fault to Harvey and GM at fifty percent each and 

awarded no damages. 

I. 

Harvey contends that 

that the jury found multiple 

New Trial 

the jury verdict was inconsistent in 

liability and proximate causation 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 3 
against GM, and yet awarded Harvey zero damages. He argues that 

the jury should have returned a dollar damage figure, even if it 

found Harvey 100 percent at fault and 100 percent negligent, and 

that the result demonstrates the jury was confused or consciously 

disregarded the instructions of the trial court. The trial court 

viewed the verdict as consistent with the proposition that Harvey 

did not establish the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to 

the defective design of the Corvette. We affirm the trial court's 

ruling. 

We review the trial court's denial of Harvey's Motion for a 

New Trial under an abuse of discretion standard. A district court 

has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion for a 

new trial. Patty Precision Products Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. 

Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1251 (lOth Cir. 1988) (citing Whiteley v. OKC 

Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1058 (lOth Cir. 1983)). Review is limited 

to whether the district court's refusal to set aside the jury's 

verdict constituted a manifest abuse of its discretion. Karns v. 

Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1456 (lOth Cir. 1987). See also 

Suggs v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 833 F.2d 883, 887 (lOth 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1732 (1988) ("[t]he decision 

of a trial court to grant or deny a motion for a new trial will 

only be overturned on appeal upon a showing of a 'clear abuse of 

discretion,'" (quoting Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453, 1461 

(lOth Cir. 1987)). 

Although Harvey cites Hopkins v. Coen, 431 F.2d 1055, 1059 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 4 
. . .. . . ' .. '.. .. '·'. .. ~ .... . 

{6th Cir. 1970), for the proposition that where a verdict is 

inconsistent the granting of a timely motion for a new trial is 

not discretionary but is mandatory, the case does not alter our 

review, particularly i~ view of our holding that the verdict is 

consistent. Hopkins dictates a result on given facts. In 

applying the proper standard of review, we look to the nature of 

the ruling appealed rather than the nature of the contentions 

raised. We will not disturb the trial court's denial of a motion 

for a new trial absent a showing of abuse of discretion. 

Harvey contends on appeal, as he did at the trial level 

unsuccessfully, that the verdict is inconsistent with the jury's 

answers to the special interrogatories. 1 The general 

1 The Verdict and Special Interrogatories reads as follows: 

We, the jury, duly empaneled and sworn in this 

case, do find by a preponderance of the evidence, as 

follows: 

A. Strict Liability Claims 

1. Was the 1979 Corvette manufactured in a defective 

condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or 

user? 

YES X NO 

2. Did the 1979 Corvette reach the ultimate consumer 

without substantial change in the condition in which the 

defendant, General Motors Corporation, manufactured it? 

YES X NO 

3. Was the allegedly defective condition of the 1979 

Corvette a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, 

Gregory Allen Harvey? 

YES X NO 

4. Was the plaintiff Gregory Allen Harvey at fault? 

YES X NO 

5. Was the fault, if any, of the plaintiff Gregory 

Allen Harvey a proximate cause of his injuries? 

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rule 

.· ....... :. :,_ ....... . 

Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 5 
regarding a court's role in evaluating the jury's verdict is the 

same under Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (special verdict) and Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 49{b) (general verdict with interrogatories). In either 

instance, the trial court has a duty to try to reconcile the 

answers to the case to avoid retrial. Regarding Rule 49(a), 

Wright and Miller explain as follows: 

YES X NO 

6. Considering all of the fault at 

percent, what percentage of the total 

attributable to each of the following: 

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION (0% to 100%) 

GREGORY ALLEN HARVEY (0% to 100%) 

TOTAL 

B. Negligence 

1. was the 

negligent? 

YES 

Claims 

defendant 

X 

General Motors 

NO -----

one hundred 

fault was 

50 % 

50 % 

100 % 

Corporation 

2. Was the negligence, if any, of defendant General 

Motors Corporation a proximate cause of plaintiff 

Gregory Allen Harvey's injuries? 

YES X NO -----

3. Was the plaintiff Gregory Allen Harvey negligent? 

YES X NO 

4. was the negligence, if any, of plaintiff Gregory 

Allen Harvey a proximate cause of his injuries? 

YES X NO 

5. Considering all of the negligence at one hundred 

percent, what percentage of the total negligence was 

attributable to each of the following: 

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION (0% to 100%) 50 % 

GREGORY ALLEN HARVEY (0% TO 100%) -so-% 

TOTAL: 100 % 

C. Damages 

1. Without considering the percentages of fault found 

in your answers to Questions A6 and B5, what sum of 

money, if any, would fairly compensate Gregory Allen 

Harvey for damages directly resulting from the accident? 

$ -0- . 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 6 
It is the duty of the court to attempt to harmonize the 

answers, if it is possible under a fair reading of them. 

"Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's 

answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must 

be resolved that way." In determining whether there is 

inconsistency in the jury•s findings, the findings are 

to· be · construed in the light of the ·surrounding 

circumstances and in connection with the pleadi ngs, 

instructions, and issues submitted. 

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2510, at 

515-17 (1971) {footnotes omitted) (q~oting Atlantic & Gulf 

Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 u.s. 355, 364 

(1962)}. 

Likewise, when submitting a general verdict and 

interrogatories under Rule 49(b), both the trial and appellate 

courts have a duty to reconcile the two if any seeming conflict 

arises. "It is the duty of the court to reconcile the two if 

reconciliation is possible." Wright & Miller, § 2513, at 528-29. 

In Schaafsma v. Morin Vermont Corp., 802 F.2d 629, 635 {2d Cir. 

1986}, the Second Circuit elaborated on this principle as follows: 

In fairness to trial courts and in order to 

preserve parties' Seventh Amendment rights, appellate 

courts "struggle" to find a way of reconciling seemingly 

inconsistent interrogatory answers and verdicts: 

,.,Where there is a view of the case that makes the 

jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, 

they must be resolved that way.'" [Julien J.] Studley , 

[Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 407 F.2d 521, 527 (2d Cir. 

1969)] (quoting Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. 

Ellerman Lines, 369 u.s. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 

L.Ed.2d 798 (1962)}; see Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 

New York, 783 F.2d 319,~5 (2d Cir. 1986); Davis v. 

West Community Hospital, 755 F.2d 455, 465 (5th Cir • 

. 1985); Cote v. Estate of Butler, 518 F.2d 157, 161 (2d 

Cir. 1975); cf. Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 88-92 

(lst Cir. 1984) (discuss1ng reconciliation of 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 7 
(. 

inconsistent general verdicts). 

are logically incompatible is it 

court not to grant a new trial. 

B Saturnus, 512 F.2d 660, 662-64 

Stone v. City of Chicago, 738 

1984). 

Only when jury verdicts 

error for the district 

Bernardini v. Rederi A/ 

(2d C1r. 1975}: see 

F.2d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 

There is no question that the trial and appellate courts must 

attempt to reconcile rather than look for inconsistency in 

verdicts when such a question arises. 

The reconciliation of the jury•s responses, however, is not 

merely to one another, but to the entire case. "Where there is a 

view of the case that makes the jury•s answers to special 

interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way." 

Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, 369 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added). But 

see Bass v. Dehner, 103 F.2d 28, 34 (lOth Cir.}, cert. denied, 308 

u.s. 580 (1939) { 111 Presumptions and intendments will not be 

indulged to establish a contradiction, it being the duty of the 

court to reconcile or harmonize the special findings or answers to 

special interrogatories with each other, if it can reasonably be 

done,•u (quoting 64 C.J. S 964, at 1176) (emphasis added)). More 

recently, in Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Zinke & Trumbo, Ltd., 791 

F.2d 1416, 1425 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 1007 {1986), 

we reconciled the jury•s verdict on each separate cause of action 

to the case rather than to one another. 

In denying Harvey's Motion for a New Trial, the trial judge 

reconciled the verdict and special ·interrogatories with jury 

instruction No. 15. Instruction No. 15 reads: 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 8 
In this case plaintiff alleges that the Corvette's 

design--spe.cifically the design of the latching 

mechanism on the T-Top roofs--enhanced plaintiff's 

injuries by increasing their severity. A design defect 

which does not cause an accident does not subject the 

manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the 

defendant manufacturer would be liable for that portion 

of the injury caused by the defective design over and 

above the injury that probably would have occurred as a 

result of the impact or collision absent the defe9tive 

design. If you find that the defendant is liable to the 

plaintiff, the defendant manufacturer is in no event 

liable to compensate the plaintiff for any damages or 

injuries which wouid have occurred as a result of the 

collision if the T-Top roof panel had stayed in place. 

The trial judge reasoned that the verdict of the jury was 

consistent with the proposition that Harvey did not establish the 

extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design 

of the Corvette, as follows: 

Although certain evidence of damages was introduced at 

trial essentially unchallenged, the jury may have found 

that those were "damages or injuries which would have 

occurred as a result of the collision if the T-Top roof 

panel had stayed in place." Thus, the damage award is 

not inadequate on its face. 

Order Denying Motion for New Trial. The trial court further 

concluded that the verdict and answers to special interrogatories 

were not inconsistent, and did not indicate that the jury was 

confused or that it abused its power. 

In reviewing the trial court's action, we perceive no error. 

First, the trial court did not err in determining that the ~~rdict 

was not inconsistent. Cases addressing inconsistent verdicts 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 9 
present circumstances where the verdict is contrary to any proper 

reading of the instructions. In Cheney v. Moler, 285 F.2d 116 

(lOth Cir. 1960), this court reversed the trial court's denial of 

a motion for a new trial. In Cheney, plaintiff sued ·defendant for 

injuries sustained in a fight. Defendant counterclaimed for his 

injuries. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the 

complaint and against the defendant on the counterclaim. Even 

though plaintiff lost an ear as a result of the fight, the jury 

awarded no damages. On appeal, this court considered the several 

combinations of verdicts which could have been consi stent with the 

applicable law and the facts, and determined that the verdicts 

rendered did not fall within any of the reconcilable results. 

Although Harvey argues that Cheney is on "all fours" with the 

instant case, we view it as distinguishable. In Cheney the 

plaintiff's case was not submitted to the jury on the theory of 

enhanced damages. Unlike the verdict in Harvey, the verdicts in 

Cheney could not be reconciled with the instructions. Although 

Cheney sets an example of a proper reversal based on 

inconsistency, it does not apply to reverse the ruling herein. 

Second, the cas e law cited by Harvey does not persuade us 

that the trial court misperceived the law. Citing Fox v. Ford 

Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (lOth Cir. 1978), Harvey argues that the 

finding of proximate cause under the strict liability count 

necessitates a damage award. We are not persuaded by his 

argument. In Fox, plaintiffs brought actions for wrongful death 

under Wyoming law. They alleged three theories of liability: 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 10 
t. 

negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. On appeal, 

the central question was whether the Ford Motor Company could be 

held liable for the deaths caused when a car of its manufacture 

was struck head-on by a vehicle crossing the center line. In Fox, 

we determined that Wyoming probably would follow the 

crashworthiness doctrine; that a manufacturer owes a duty to 

persons using its motor vehicles t6 take such precautions in their 

design and manufacture as to prevent injuries that can be 

reasonably foreseen. We further held that the jury could find 

that the absence of shoulder harnesses in the rear passenger 

compartment, lack of energy-absorbing materials in the backs of 

the front seats, and the fact that the seat belts were set at the 

wrong angle created an unreasonable risk of injury. .In sum, we 

held in Fox that the trial court did not err in deciding that 

Wyoming would adopt the majority rule of crashworthiness if called 

upon to consider it. 

The section of the Fox opinion on which Harvey relies 

addresses apportionment of damages. In Fox, we decided that 

Wyoming would adopt the rule stated in Larsen v. General Motors 

Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968): 

[T]he manufacturer should be liable for that portion of 

the damage or injury caused by the defective design over 

and above the damage or injury that probably would have 

occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent 

the defective design. 

This language is identical to the trial court's language in the 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 11 
•• •• •. - ... ....--v...._ .. ~ ...... -.. ... ·-····'' ' •' .• '.~ ... - .... ~~-'''•. ' ,'. ···-~-:.s. .... · ........ ,. -~~ ..... '!. •• 

instant case in instruction No. 15. In Fox we went on to explain: 

Generally this duty to prove so-called enhanced 

damages is simply a part of the .plaintiff•s 

responsibility t~ prove proximate cause, that is, that 

the defendant ~n such a case is liable only for those 

damages which are within the orbit of risk created by 

him, but Ford would have us say that the plaintiffs were 

required to prove with specificity the injuries which 

flowed specifically from its deficiencies. 

Id. at 787. We declined Ford•s invitation, and explained: 

We fail t o see any difference between this type of 

case and the other case in which two parties, one 

passive, the other active, cooperate in the production 

of an injury. Each one•s contribution in a causal sense 

must be established. Damages may be apportioned between 

the two causes if there are distinct harms or a 

reasonable basis for determining the causes of injury: 

Restatement of Torts, Second, § 433A. 

!d. at 787 (emphasis added). In our view, Fox does not tell us 

that a finding of causation necessitates an award of damages. 

Rather, Fox permits apportionment of damages if there are distinct 

harms or there is a reasonable basis fo! determining the causes of 

injury. 

Under Wyoming law, an enhancement instruction should not even 

be given unless the injuries are capable of logical, reasonable, 

or practical division. Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 

1123, 1131 (Wyo. 1978). By the manner in which the plaintiff 

structured his case, he postulated that the injuries were 

divisible. Harvey does not claim error in the giving of 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 12 
instruction No. 15, which defines plaintiffs' theory of recovery 

for enhanced injuries. Furthermore, the court instructed the jury 

on the plaintiff's burden of proof and the consequence of his 

failure to meet his burden. 2 Under the instructions and based on 

the record, the jury could have determined that plaintiff failed 

to prove the extent of enhanced injuries. 

Failure to prove enhanced damages has occurred in other cases 

as well. In Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 812-13 

(lOth Cir. 1981) (applying Colorado law), this court held that 

plaintiffs failed, as an essential part of a cause of action based 

on crashworthiness doctrine, to show enhancement of injury where 

the medical witness testified that he could not ascertain the 

cause of plaintiff's injury with any degree of medical certainty. 

I n so holding, we stated that expert testimony was required in 

2 Instruction No. 5 reads as follows: 

The burden is on the plaintiffs in a civil action, 

such as this, to prove every essential element of their 

claim by a preponderance of the evidence. If the proof 

should fail to establish any essential element of the 

plaintiffs' claim by a preponderance of the evidence in 

the case, the jury should find for the defendant. 

To establish by· a preponderance of the evidence 

means to prove that something is more likely so than not 

so. In other words, a preponderance of the evidence in 

the case means such evidence as, when considered and 

compared with that opposed to it, has more convincing 

force, and produces in your minds belief that what 1s 

sought to be proved is more likely true than not true. 

In determining whether any fact in issue has been 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence in the case , the jury may, unless otherwise instructed, consider the 

testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have 

called them, and all exhibits received in evidence, 

regardless of who may have produced them. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 13 
order for the jury to avoid pure speculation as to enhancement of 

injury. "The jur~ was ••• left to decide a question which the 

expert said he could not answer." Id. at 813. In the instant 

case, plaintiff presented evidence that ejection from the vehicle 

was the cause of plaintiff's injury. What was never established, 

however, was that the injuries were over and above those which 

would have been sustained had the T-Top remained in place and had 

Harvey remained inside the vehicle. On this point experts 

testified that either the difference was impossible to assess, o r 

the damage could have been worse had Harvey remained inside the 

vehicle in his unrestrained condition during the crash. 

Consequently, the jury reasonably could have determined that 

plaintiff's case failed because a finding of enhanced damages 

could not be made other than on speculation. 

Harvey also relies heavily upon Shipp v. General Motors 

Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985), for the proposition that the 

jury's finding that General Motors' defective product was a 

proximate cause necessitates a damage award. Shipp does not 

support Harvey's argument for two reasons: (1) Shipp was decided 

under Texas law, not Wyoming law; and (2) we read our opinion in 

Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (lOth Cir. 1978), in a 

different light than did the Fifth Circuit in ShiPE· 

In seeking to persuade us that the verdict was inconsistent, 

- Harvey also misplaces reliance upon Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. 

Zinke & Trumbo, Ltd., 791 F.2d 1416, 1425 (l Oth Cir.), cert . 

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.... . .... -·.. ~ .. ............ ... . .. . . .. -· .... •' .. 

denied, 479 u.s. 1007 (1986}. In Diamond Shamrock, the jury 

returned verdicts in favor of plaintiff on its contract claim and 

in favor of defendants on their negligence claim. This court held 

that the verdicts were not inconsistent and should not have been 

set aside because the trial involved separate causes of action and 

the relationship of the parties was not legally identical with 

regard to each cause of action. In so holding, we gave two 

examples of inconsistency, neither of which applies herein: 

In those cases where the several causes of action are 

identical and defended on the same ground, a verdict for 

the plaintiff on one cause of action and for the 

defendant on another is inconsistent. Further, i f two 

causes of action are of such a nature that recovery can 

be had only as to one, verdicts in favor of a plaintiff and against the defendants on both causes of action are 

inconsistent. 

Id. at 1425 . The instant case is far removed from the examples in 

Diamond Shamrock. Harvey sought recovery for enhanced injuries on 

both negligence and strict liability theories. The jury found 

multiple proximate causes on both theories and found Harvey at 

fault under both theories. We agree with the trial court that the 

verdict of the jury in awarding no damages is consistent with the 

proposition that the plaintiff did not establish the extent of 

enhanced injuries, if any, attributable to the defective design of 

the T-Top on the Corvette. Consequently, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court's denial of Harvey's Motion for a 

New Trial. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 15 
II. Harvey's Negligence 

A. Schade's blood sample 

Harvey contends the trial court erred when it allowed 

testimony about the driver's blood-alcohol level. Harvey's 

argument is without merit. First, the blood sample was obtained 

in a criminal investigation pursuant to a Wyoming Highway 

Patrolman's belief at the hospital that Harvey would not survive 

and the driver, Schade, could be charged with a violation of 

Wyoming law. In Wyoming, if the facts give rise to a charge of 

vehicular homicide or the potential for such a charge, an 

investigating officer may order the drawing of blood for 

laboratory analysis. Van Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056, 1058 

(Wyo. 1979). 

Further, the evidence entered this case through stipulation 

of the parties, which reads as follows: 

With respect to the blood samples taken from both 

Christopher Schade and Gregory Allen Harvey which were 

both tested for alcohol and/or ethanol content, the 

parties waive all objections regarding foundation as to 

the circumstances surrounding the taking of the blood 

samples. In addition the parti es, through counsel, 

specifically stipulate and agree that the referenced 

blood samples were taken by duly authorized persons 

using proper sterile equipment; that the blood samples 

were properly labeled and preserved; that the care and 

transportation of the blood samples were proper; that 

the identities of the persons processing the blood 

samples are known to the attorneys for the parties; and 

the reports made with respect to the blood alcohol 

contents of the blood samples were made pursuant to a 

duty imposed by law or required by the _nature of the 

office of the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program and/or of 

the Memoria·l Hospital of Carbon County, Wyoming. 

'-. -16-

Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 16 
Further, we are not persuaded by Harvey's argument that the 

stipulation merely goes to foundation. 3 The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting the test results into evidence. 

B. Dr. Wingeleth's testimony 

Harvey next argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

in permitting Dale Wingeleth, Ph.D., to testify as an expert 

witness on behalf of GM. Harvey states that Wingeleth was listed 

by GM as a lay witness and used at trial as an expert. The 

record, however, does not support Harvey's argument. By order of 

the trial court prior to trial, the court limited Dr. Wingeleth's 

testimony to "foundational testimony relative to the blood test 

performed upon Chris Schade." GM offered into evidence Dr. 

Wingeleth's gas chromatograph test results. Harvey objected to 

admission of the test results on foundational grounds, stating: 

MR. MOORE: Your Honor , we would object, there's 

been no foundation that the test was done accurately. 

There's been no expert opinion that the test results 

which are shown there are reliable, and there can be 

none since Mr. Wingeleth was not designated as an expert 

witness in this case and has not been asked and should no~ be able to be as'ked ---eiperttestimony. We also 

obJect for the reasons we previously stated with respect 

to the blood sample which I won't repeat. 

(Emphasis added.) The trial judge admitted the exhibits into 

evidence with the following comments: 

3 Because the taking of Schade's blood sample was for purposes 

of criminal investigation, we do not address Harvey's argument 

that the physician/patient privilege applies to exclude the 

evidence. See McCormick on Evidence , § 99 at 247 (3d ed. 1984). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2593 Document: 01019593251 Date Filed: 04/25/1989 Page: 17 
THE COURT: I'm sure Dr. Wingeleth's testimony 

comes as no surprise to you, you are fully aware of it. 

The objections on the ground of surprise are overruled. 

I think there's a sufficient foundation for these ·reports. The objections are overruled and the exhibits 

are received. 

After the test results were admitted into evidence, counsel for GM 

examined Dr. Wingeleth without further objection regarding the 

contents of the admitted documents. Counsel for Harvey then 

cross-examined him. In our view, the testimony did not exceed the 

court's pretrial order and the ruling did not constitute an abuse 

of discretion. 

c. Harvey's rebuttal toxicologist 

Harvey next asserts the trial court abused its discretion in 

refusing the testimony of his rebuttal toxicologist, Dr. Verdeal. 

Harvey claims that Dr. Wingeleth, "an unnoticed expert for G.M.," 

testified that Schade was substantially impaired by marijuana, and 

that the court should have permitted Harvey to call Dr. Verdeal to 

rebut Dr. Wingeleth's gas chromatograph; readouts. GM asserts that 

Dr. Verdeal was not a proper rebuttal witness because the evidence 

of Schade's drug use was no surprise to Harvey. GM states that in 

the pretrial memorandum and at pretrial conference, GM disclosed 

its intention to use the evidence. GM notes that although 

Harvey's general counsel announced in opening statement: "They 

[GM] will even try to show ~e Sc~ade] had been using marijuana. 

And we will disprove that totally," Harvey did not endorse Dr. 

Verdeal as an expert witness, did not list her as a trial witness, 

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and did not offer her for a pretrial deposition. 

In refusing to permit Harvey to call Dr. Verdeal, the trial 

court observed: 

The question is whether or not this is surprise. 

The issue is why didn't you endorse this person as an 

expert and give the substance of the testimony at the 

final pretrial conference when you knew of these issues 

that were going to arise. 

I can't believe that you were surprised by 

think you knew exactly what Wingeleth was going 

even if you didn't depose him, you certainly 

fate of the testimony. 

. . . . 

this. I 

to say 

knew the 

I think you should have endorsed this witness as an 

expert witness and I think that it comes as a surprise 

to the defendant and the defendant has had no 

opportunity to depose this witness. The rules, I don't 

think, bend that far. The objection to the offer of 

proof is sustained. 

In our view, this issue arose due to Harvey's trial strategy. We 

perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. 

D. Imputed negligence 

Harvey argues that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it gave a jury instruction allowing the jury to impute the 

negligence of the driver, Schade, to the passenger, Harvey. The 

giving or refusal to give tendered jury instruct ions in a 

diversity action, as here, is governed by federal law and rules. 

Brownlow v. Aman, 740 F.2d 1476, 1490 (lOth Cir. 1984); Achin v. 

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Begg Tire Center, 694 F.2d 226, 228 {lOth Cir. 1982). An 

instruction is properly given if supported by competent evidence. 

Brownlow, 740 F.2d at 1490. However, a determination of the 

substance of a jury instruction in a diversity case is a matter of 

state substantive law. Id. 

Instruction No. 26 reads as follows: 

If you find that the driver, Chris Schade, was 

negligent in his operation of the Corvette, then you may 

consider whether this negligence should be imputed to 

the plaintiff. Schade 1 s negligence may be imputed to 

Harvey if you find that Harvey exercised actual control 

over the operation of the vehicle at the time of the 

accident. In order to exercise actual control, it is 

not necessary that Greg Harvey actually operated the 

vehicle. You may find that Harvey had some degree of 

actual control over the operation of the vehicle if you 

find that Harvey gave instructions to Schade and 

directed Schade as to his operation of the vehicle. 

Harvey argues that the instruction was improper because the case 

presented no evidence of actual control or joint economic 

enterprise as is required under Wyoming law. Our review of 

Wyoming law reveals no definition of the term ttactual control 11 • 

Harvey also cites Martinez v. Onion Pacific R.R. Co., 714 F.2d 

1028, 1032 (lOth Cir. 1983), for the following proposition: 

A driver's negligence under Wyoming law cannot be 

imputed to a passenger unless the conduct of the 

passenger had a material bearing upon the driver's 

operation of the car at the time of the accident. 

Likewise, we find no definition of "material bearing. 11 

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Our reading of Palmeno v. Cashen, 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1981), 

Porter v. Wilson, 357 P.2d 309 {Wyo. 1960), and Edwards v. Harris, 

397 P.2d 87, 90 {Wyo. 1964), however, persuades us that the trial 

judge in the instant case did not abuse his discretion in giving 

the challenged instruction. In Palmeno, the trial court found 

t hat the passenger had no control over the vehicle in which she 

was riding at the time her injuries occurred, and refused to 

impute the negligence of the driver to her. On appeal, the 

Wyoming Supreme Court stated: 

The law in this state is well settled that 

imputation of a driver's negligence will not occur 

unless the spouse-owner-passenger had actual control 

over the vehicle at the time of the accident. Porter v. 

Wilson, Wyo. 1960, 357 P.2d 309; Edwards v. Harris, Wyo. 

1964, 397 P.2d 87; Hume v. Mankus, Wyo. 1965, 401 P.2d 

703; Mooneyham v. Kays, Wyo. 1965, 405 P.2d 267. The 

trial judge fou nd that appellee had no control over the 

vehicle in which she was riding at the time her i njuri es 

occurred. There is substantial evidence in the record, 

as we have previously outlined, to support that finding; 

thus we must uphold it. Since appellee was found to 

have had no control over the vehicle, the trial judge•s 

determination not to impute Mr. Cashen's negligence , as 

driver, to her was correct. 

Palmeno, 627 P.2d at 166. In Edwards, 397 P.2d at 90 , the Wyoming 

Supreme Court held that ownership alone does not form a basis for 

imputing negligence. The case makes clear that in deciding the 

propriety of giving an instruction on the imputation of 

negligence, the passenger's giving of direction and suggestions as 

to the operation of the vehicle are factors to consider. 

Consistent with Edwards, Porter holds that the negligence of a 

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husband who was driving a vehicle was not imputable to his wife 

who was a passenger in the vehicle, where the husband was in 

physical and actual possession of the vehicle, was driving as he 

desired without instruction or suggestion from anyone, and his 

wife, who owned the vehicle, had no actual control whatever over 

the vehicle. 

In the instant case, contrary to the facts in Porter, there 

was evidence that the passenger initiated the "test-drive," 

encouraged the driver, Schade, to drive the Corvette faster than 

the speed limit, and wanted the driver to "see what the car 

[would] do... There is evidence that Schade may have been driving 

the car at a speed in excess of 100 miles per hour immediately 

prior to the accident. These actions create a question of fact 

for the jury whether Harvey legally controlled Schade's operation 

of the vehicle. We are not persuaded that the trial court abused 

its discretion in giving instruction No. 26 permitting the jury to 

impute Schade's negligence to Harvey. 

E. Blood-alcohol levels 

Harvey next argues the trial court erred in refusing to give 

his requested instruction on the presumptions governing bloodalcohol levels under Wyoming law. The instruction which Harvey 

tendered provided in part as follows: 

Defendant alleges that, at the time of the 

accident, · Gregory Allen Harvey and Chris Schade were 

under the influence of alcoholic beverages. The 

defendant further alleges that Chris Schade was 

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operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 

alcohol. 

In order 

intoxication, 

presumptions. 

to 

the 

determine the degree of a person's 

law engages the following 

If at the time a chemical analysis was performed, 

there was an amount of five one-hundredths of one 

percent (0.05%) or· less of alcohol in a person's blood, 

it shall be presumed that the person was not under the 

influence of alcohol. 

The source of the proposed instruction is the provision of Wyoming 

statutory law commonly known as the 11 drunk-driving statute." In 

Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1047 

(Wyo. 1978), the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the presumptions 

of the cited statute apply only to criminal actions. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Harvey's 

proposed instruction~ 

F. Harvey's drinking and driving habits 

Finally, as to negligence, Harvey argues that the trial court 

erroneously allowed testimony of Harvey's drinking and driving 

habits. By pretrial order, the court ruled that Harvey's driving 

habits were inadmissible, "except that defendant may introduce 

otherwise admissible evidence of Harvey's driving on the date of 

the accident in order to show a course of conduct." At trial, GM 

presented testimonial evidence that within two hours of the 

accident, Harvey drove 50 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. residential zone. 

GM also presented evidence that on the date of the accident, 

Harvey began drinking alcoholic beverages at 10:30 in the morning, 

and that between 5:00 and 6:00 in the evening he appeared to be 

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under the influence of alcohol. Almost one hour after the 

accident, Harvey's blood-alcohol level was .171 percent, and GM's 

expert testified that at the time of the accident, Harvey's bloodalcohol level was "very close to .192%.'' Harvej objected to the 

evidence on relevancy grounds. He now argues the trial court 

erred in admitting evidence of the passenger's pre-accident 

conduct. We are not persuaded by his argument. 

To support his argument, Harvey cites Meller v. Heil Co., 745 

F.2d 1297 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 (1984), and 

Shields v. Carnahan, 744 P.2d 1115 (Wyo. 1987). Both of these 

cases are easily distinguished from the case now before the court. 

Meller is a wrongful-death product-liability action against the 

manufacturer of a dump truck bed assembly for damages resulting 

from the death of plaintiff's husband while he performed routine 

maintenance on the truck. In Meller the trial court refused to 

permit defendant to elicit testimony that at the death scene 

police discovered two hashish pipes containing marijuana residue 

in the decedent's rucksack. Defendant sought to admit the hashish 

pipes, claiming that they were probative of the decedent's life 

expectancy and that they impeached the prior testimony of the 

plaintiff. The trial court excluded the pipes, concluding that 

their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger 

of unfair prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403. We agreed, and 

observed that there was no medical foundation for the claim, the 

pipes were of questionable value as impeachment material, and it 

appeared that defendant sought to introduce the pipes for the 

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specific purpose of arousing juror sentiment against the decedent. 

Contrary to the facts of the instant case, the facts of Meller 

demonstrate no nexus between the challenged evidence and the 

issues properly before the jury. 

Shields is a medical-malpractice action. Plaintiff alleged 

that defendant failed to properly treat and advise her after she 

was injured in an automobile accident. At trial, the court 

permitted evidence that prior to the accident, plaintiff was on a 

late-night trip with a man who was not her husband. The Wyoming 

Supreme Court held that evidence regarding plaintiff's activities 

before the automobile accident was irrelevant to the issue of 

malpractice, and its admission prejudiced plaintiff. Unlike the 

instant case, the pre-accident "conduct" was totally unrelated to 

the issues in the lawsuit. 

In our view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

permitting the testimony of Harvey's reckless conduct prior to the 

rollover. Even as a passenger, Harvey had a duty to exercise 

reasonable care for his own safety. Sanders v. Pitner, 508 P.2d 

602, 605 (Wyo. 1973). Evidence of his recklessness, both as to 

excessive drinking and unsafe driving, was relevant to the 

question of Harvey's own negligent encouragement of and 

participation in this tragic escapade. 

III. Chevrolet Rollover Tests 

Harvey asserts the trial court erred when it admitted into 

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evidence a videotape of 1983 Chevrolet Malibu rollover tests. He 

argues that the out-of-court experiment was improperly admitted 

into evidence because it was not sufficiently similar to the 

accident at issue. After reviewing the record, we are not 

persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 

the evidence. 

During the testimony of one of GM's experts, Kenneth 

Orlowski, the trial court admitted a scientific study by Mr. 

Orlowski relating to general principles of occupant motion, or 

kinematics~ in rollover accidents. The videotape was entitled 

"Rollover Crash Tests--The Influence of Roof Strength on Injury 

Mechanics. 11 Mr. Orlowski's study involved a series of full-scale 

rollover crash tests conducted at the General Motors Proving 

Grounds using instrumented anthropomorphic dummies, without 

restraints, in 1983 Chevrolet Malibus. The film depicted a series 

of 1983 Chevrolet Malibu sedans on a "cradle 11 being pushed 

sideways down a track. The cars were "launched" when they reached 

the end of the track at a speed of 32 m.p.h. The high-speed 

photos show the roll sequence from various vantage points, and 

also the two front seat dummies from a camera mounted in the back 

seat. 

The trial court ruled that the videotape of some of the 

scenes of the eight rollover tests was admissible for the limited 

purpose of showing "general principles of vehicle dynamics and 

occupant kinematics ...• " In so ruling, the court stated: 

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.... ~· ......................... ,.,\ ..•. ·-~~-· ... ··-·····~-~ -... .. . ......... ... . , ... ·.- .. 

[T]his exhibit is admissible unless it is a 

misrepresent~tion or something that is passed off as a 

test of the Corvette itself and it's clear to the court 

that this isn't meant to duplicate or replicate the 

accident in the case. 

I think that this video would assist the Court 

and jury in understanding the testimony of Mr. Orlowski 

as well as the general principles of vehicle dynamics 

and occupant kinematics as well as the pattern of injury 

mechanics and the occupant motion patterns. 

Before permitting the jury to view the test film, the trial court 

cautioned ·the jury that the test film was not to be considered a 

re-creation of the Harvey accident. The court stated: 

THE COURT: Members of the jury, there will now be 

displayed to you Defendant's Exhibit DD-2. In viewing 

this film, the Court has admitted it because it thinks 

that it would be helpful to you in understanding the 

oral testimony of Mr. Orlowski as well as the general 

principles of vehicle dynamics and occupant kinematics 

in patterns of injury mechanics to which Mr. Orlowski 

has testified. 

But let me point out to you and instruct you that 

this involves a Chevrolet Impala [sic] with a solid 

roof, not a 1978 T-top Corvette, and you are not to 

ignore the distinctions between this demonstrative 

evidence and the actual event that is the subject matter 

of this action. You must make allowances for the 

differences between the actual event and the 

demonstrative evidence." 

The trial court could not have given a more clear limiting 

instruction. 

:.. 

Harvey relies on two cases to support his contention that the 

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trial court erred in admitting the evidence: Jackson v. Fletcher, 

647 F.2d 1020 (lOth Cir. 1981), and Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 

750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985}. Neither of these cases persuades us 

that . the trial court abused its discretion iri admitting the 

evidence. Jackson is a personal injury suit for damages sustained 

in an automobile which was demolished following a collision with a 

tractor-trailer driven by defendant and owned by his employer. In 

Jackson, we held that testimony based upon experiments conducted 

by defendants' experts should not have been admitted because the 

circumstances of the experiment were different from those of the 

actual accident. The Jackson holding, however, clearly is limited 

to experiments which purport to simulate actual events and to show 

the jury what presumably occurred at the scene of the accident. 

In Jackson, defendants' experts sought to disprove plaintiff's 

expert testimony that the truck did not stop at the stop sign 

which faced it. The re-creation of the accident was conducted with 

a vehicle of a grossly different weight, a different engine size, 

and presumed facts some of which were in dispute at trial. In 

short, the "experiment'' in Jackson was an enactment of defendant's 

theory of defense, presuming facts favorable to defendant. The 

"experiment" was introduced into evidence to disprove plai ntiff's 

theory of liability. In the instant case, the experiment was 

conducted as an expert's research project independent of the case, 

and was introduced to assist the jury in understanding the 

expert's relevant testimony. 

Furthermore, in Jackson we differentiated the circumstances 

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surrounding our holding from those presented here: 

In our case the experiment was not primarily to 

demonstrate physical principles which can be 

demonstrated on some occasions without a suggestion 

arising that the experiment simulates actual events. 

Millers' National Insurance Co., Chicago, Ill. v. 

Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93 (lOth Cir. 1958); 

Brandt v. French, 638 F.2d 209 (lOth Cir. 1981). Where 

experiments such as this are not based on the facts, 

however, it must be made clear to the jury that the 

evidence is admitted for a limited purpose •••• Where, 

however, an experiment purports to simulate actual 

events and to show the jury what presumably occurred at 

the scene of the accident, the party introducing the 

evidence has a burden of demonstrating substantial 

similarity of conditions. They may not be identical but 

they ought to be sufficiently similar so as to provide a 

fair comparison. Barnes v. General Motors Corp., [547 

F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1977)]. 

Id. at 1027. In the instant case there is no question that the 

results of the experiment were not introduced to recreate the 

accident. Furthermore, the court gave a clear limiting 

instruction. Jackson does not apply to paint error in the instant 

case. 

Likewise, Shipp does not apply to demonstrate the existence 

of error. In Shipp the trial court admitted into evidence 

plaintiff's exhibits demonstrating a drop test of a 1976 TransAm 

and excluded GM's film illustrating unrestrained occupant movement 

in a rollover accident. "The admission of such demonstrative 

evidence is within the trial court's sound discretion and will not 

be disturbed on appeal absent 'abuse.'" Shipp, 750 F.2d at 427. 

In Shipp the court did not perceive abuse in either the admission 

of plainti~f's evidence or the exclusion of defendant's evidence, 

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.. noting that the trial court balanced defendant's evidence under 

Fed. R. Evid. 403 and determined that a limiting instruction would 

not defuse an improper influence of the evidence. The Shipp court 

further stated: "Rule 403 determinations are often inextricably 

bound with the facts of a particular case and thus will not be 

disturbed absent a showing of 'clear abuse.'" Id. at 427. 

Contrary to what Harvey argues, the disposition in Shipp does not 

apply herein to render the trial court's ruling abusive. 

properly excluded in one context is not automatically 

Evidence 

admitted 

erroneously in a separate context. In our view, the trial court 

in the instant case did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

evidence to help the jury understand the expert testimony. 

IV. Damages 

H~rvey argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

granting GM's Motion in Limine and thereby prohibiting Harvey from 

introducing into evidence a family photo of Harvey, his wife, and 

their child. At the time of the accident, Harvey was separated 

from his wife. At the time of trial, a divorce was pending. The 

suit contained no claim for loss of consortium or support. The 

trial court made the determination that the danger of prejudice 

outweighed the probative value of the proposed exhibit. For the 

same reasons set forth previously regarding balancing, we perceive 

no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. 

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For the reasons stated herein, we hold the trial court did 

not err in ruling on the matters presented in this appeal. 

AFFIRMED. 

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