Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01703/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01703-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alejandro A. Garcia
Appellant
John Mathes
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1703

___________

Alejandro A. Garcia, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

John Mathes, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 14, 2006

Filed: February 1, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Alejandro Garcia (Garcia) applied for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, arguing the exclusion of evidence showing medical malpractice was an

intervening and superseding cause of his victim’s death violated due process. The

district court1

 denied Garcia’s application. We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

Garcia and three other men attacked Daniel Hernandez Gonzales (Hernandez).

As Hernandez attempted to escape, Garcia shot Hernandez four times. Hernandez was

taken to a hospital for medical care, without which he would have died. As a result

of the gun-shot wounds and surgeries, Hernandez contracted Adult Respiratory

Disease Syndrome, a serious condition that required Hernandez to be placed on a

ventilator. While still on the ventilator, a nurse accidentally cut a small hole in

Hernandez’s tracheotomy tube. A trauma surgeon removed and attempted to replace

the tracheotomy tube, however, the tracheotomy tube could not be replaced due to

Hernandez’s swollen neck. Hernandez died of asphyxiation. 

Garcia was charged in Iowa state court with first-degree murder. At trial,

Garcia intended to argue he was not guilty because the removal of Hernandez’s

tracheotomy tube was an intervening and superseding cause of Hernandez’s death.

In support, Garcia designated an expert witness, Dr. Lawrence Repsher (Dr. Repsher).

Dr. Repsher was prepared to testify (1) Hernandez received inappropriate medication

that worsened his condition; and (2) removing Hernandez’s tracheotomy tube was

“outrageous,” “completely irrational,” and the proximate cause of Hernandez’s death.

However, Dr. Repsher would not have testified that removing Hernandez’s

tracheotomy tube was the sole proximate cause of Hernandez’s death. 

Before Garcia’s trial, the Iowa trial court excluded Dr. Repsher’s testimony,

concluding removal of the tracheotomy tube was not the sole proximate cause of

Hernandez’s death, and thus Dr. Repsher’s proffered testimony was irrelevant. Garcia

waived his right to a jury trial, and the court found “beyond a reasonable doubt that

[Garcia’s] act of shooting [Hernandez] was a proximate cause of, and resulted in,

[Hernandez’s] death.” Garcia was convicted of first-degree murder. The Iowa Court

of Appeals reversed Garcia’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding the

trial court erred in excluding Dr. Repsher’s testimony. State v. Garcia, Nos.

1999-541, 9-802, 98-2089, 2000 WL 204214, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2000)

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(unpublished). The Supreme Court of Iowa, sitting en banc, vacated the decision of

the Iowa Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, reasoning “the

trial court properly ruled that evidence of malpractice, even if it was ‘outrageous’ as

[Dr. Repsher] testified, was inadmissible. No reasonable fact finder could conclude

the medical treatment was the sole proximate cause of death.” State v. Garcia, 616

N.W.2d 594, 599 (Iowa 2000) (en banc).

After the denial of Garcia’s application for state post-conviction relief, Garcia

applied for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied

relief and granted a certificate of appealability. Garcia appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION

“In an appeal of a habeas [application], we review the district court’s findings

of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” Engesser v. Dooley, 457

F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2006) (alteration and quotation omitted), petition for cert.

filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___, (U.S. Dec. 5, 2006) (No. 06-8274). “An application for a

writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted . . . unless the adjudication of the

claim . . . resulted in a decision that . . . involved an unreasonable application of[]

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “[A]n unreasonable application of [the Supreme

Court’s] precedent” occurs “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule

from [the Supreme Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts.” Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) (O’Connor, J.). To be unreasonable, the state

court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “must have been more than incorrect

or erroneous.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). Rather, the

application “must have been objectively unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation

omitted).

 

In the habeas context, “[q]uestions regarding admissibility of evidence are

matters of state law.” Rousan v. Roper, 436 F.3d 951, 958 (8th Cir.) (quotation

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omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 68 (2006). “A federal issue is raised only where trial

errors infringe on a specific constitutional protection or are so prejudicial as to amount

to a denial of due process.” Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 F.3d 1010, 1018 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 725 (2006). “The [applicant] must show that the alleged

improprieties were so egregious that they fatally infected the proceedings and

rendered his entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Rousan, 436 F.3d at 958-59 (quotation

omitted). 

Garcia cites Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1988), and Pennsylvania

v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987), to prove clearly established federal law guarantees

criminal defendants “the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the

determination of guilt.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56. The Supreme Court has described

the right of criminal defendants to offer testimony as one of “the most basic

ingredients of due process of law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967)

(citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). “[T]he Constitution guarantees

criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”

Holmes v. South Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (2006) (quoting

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). 

Garcia argues the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal

law by excluding evidence showing medical malpractice was an intervening and

superseding cause of Hernandez’s death. Trial courts may exclude defense evidence

on grounds the evidence is “repetitive . . . , only marginally relevant[,] or poses an

undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues” without violating the

Constitution. Id. at 1732 (quotation omitted). Under Iowa law, “for an intervening

act to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility for homicide, the intervening act

must be the sole proximate cause of death.” Garcia, 616 N.W.2d at 597 (citing State

v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 1995)). Dr. Repsher conceded removing

Hernandez’s tracheotomy tube was not the sole proximate cause of Hernandez’s death.

Thus, the state court concluded Dr. Repsher’s opinion that removing the tracheotomy

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tube was the proximate cause of Hernandez’s death was irrelevant. The exclusion of

such irrelevant evidence was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law nor did it render Garcia’s trial fundamentally unfair. See

Abston v. Ryan, 120 F. App’x 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (affirming

the denial of a habeas application, which argued the exclusion of evidence showing

medical malpractice was a superseding cause of the victim’s death violated due

process, because the applicant failed to show the medical malpractice was “the sole

cause of death” as required by Arizona law). 

III. CONCLUSION

We decline to consider Garcia’s remaining arguments, which were neither

included in the habeas application nor included in the certificate of appealability.

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Garcia’s habeas application. 

______________________________

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