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Parties Involved:
Tork T. Rodgers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 23, 2015

Decided October 26, 2015

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1265

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TORK T. RODGERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 14-cr-30088-NJR-1

Nancy J. Rosenstengel,

Judge.

O R D E R

Tork Rodgers pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised 

release. He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is 

frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Rodgers 

opposes the motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the 

nature of the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to 

involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our discussion 

to the issues identified in that brief and in Rodgers’ response. See United States v. Bey, 748 

F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Rodgers had driven from his home in Missouri to a motel in Illinois to meet a 

woman he connected with online. Things went well until his date joked about having a 

gun, which prompted Rodgers to show her a magazine of ammunition from one of his 

bags. Although he never displayed a gun or threatened her, the woman was alarmed

and decided to alert the police. Telling Rodgers that she was leaving briefly to buy 

condoms, she instead called police to report that the man in Room 321 had a gun. 

Rodgers went to the lobby looking for his date and was pointed out to waiting 

police officers by the desk clerk. Rodgers identified himself, and a computer search 

revealed an outstanding arrest warrant. After executing that warrant the police asked if 

Rodgers wanted his belongings from the room, and he blurted, “Man, I got a pistol up 

there.” Police found a Hi-Point handgun and two magazines in his luggage.

Counsel tells us that Rodgers does not want his guilty plea set aside, and Rodgers 

does not contradict that assertion in his Rule 51(b) submission. Counsel thus properly 

omits any discussion about the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of the 

plea. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Konczak, 

683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012).

Counsel advises that he reviewed the district court’s guidelines calculations but 

could not identify even a colorable claim of error. Rodgers disagrees, contending in his 

Rule 51(b) submission that a claim that the district court erred in assigning his base 

offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A) rather than § 2K2.1(a)(7) would not be 

frivolous. The district court concluded that the base offense level is 14 under 

§ 2K2.1(a)(6)(A) because Rodgers is a “prohibited person” as described in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.3. Rodgers points to Application Note 4, which 

explains that the base offense level of 12 provided in § 2K2.1(a)(7) for situations not 

addressed in the other subsections often applies to persons who illegally transported

guns across state lines. See id. cmt. n.4. This potential argument would be frivolous, 

however, as § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A) specifically applies to persons charged under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g), as Rodgers was; that he also took his gun across state lines is irrelevant.

Rodgers also points to Amendment 189 of the guidelines, effective November 1, 

1989, which did provide a base level of 12 for prohibited persons under § 922(g). But 

§ 2K2.1 has been amended several times since 1989, and courts use the version in effect 

at the time of sentencing (unless to do so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). 

See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a), (b)(1); United States v. Woodard, 744 F.3d 488, 497 (7th Cir. 2014).

The district court correctly used the version in effect at the time of sentencing, which had 

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not been amended in any material way since Rodgers committed the crime. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1 Historical Note. 

Rodgers further contends that an appellate claim asserting that the district court 

should have subtracted 8 offense levels under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2) would not be 

frivolous. Under § 2K2.1(b)(2), the offense level would have been reduced to 6 if Rodgers 

possessed the handgun and ammunition “solely for lawful sporting purposes or 

collection” and “did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use” the weapon

or ammunition. See generally United States v. Gresso, 24 F.3d 879–80 (7th Cir. 1994)

(discussing application of § 2K2.1(b)(2)).

But to argue that the district court should have applied this provision to Rodgers 

would be frivolous. Rodgers had the burden to prove his eligibility for the reduction, 

see Gresso, 24 F.3d at 880, yet he did not introduce any evidence from which the district 

court could have found that he possessed the gun and ammunition solely for sporting 

purposes or collection. During allocution Rodgers asserted that he had possessed the 

gun for target practice and thus should receive the benefit of § 2K2.1(b)(2). Rodgers was 

not under oath, however, and neither did he offer any other evidence to back up his 

assertion. See United States v. Sainz-Preciado, 566 F.3d 708, 711–14 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting 

that defendant’s unsworn version of events during allocution was not evidence that 

would meet his burden); United States v. Anderson, 632 F.3d 1264, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(noting that district court need not assign any weight to defendant’s unsworn statements

at sentencing). Whether § 2K2.1(b)(2) applies turns on the circumstances, including the 

type of gun, where and how it was possessed or used, and the defendant’s criminal 

history. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.6; United States v. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d 1022, 1028 (7th 

Cir. 1999). In similar circumstances—a hidden gun and readily accessible ammunition 

possessed by a defendant who said nothing about a sporting use when he was found 

with a gun at a location not suitable for sporting—reviewing courts have upheld a 

sentencing judge’s finding that the defendant had not proved that he possessed a gun 

solely for sport or collection. See id. at 1028–29 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that guns were 

found hidden behind towels and sheets in a bathroom closet and under mattress in 

bedroom); United States v. Riley, 376 F.3d 1160, 1171–72 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that 

defendant was found with gun across state line from location of shooting range where 

he purportedly had used gun the previous evening); United States v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 

1302, 1308–09 (10th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that defendant’s possession of ammunition 

with handguns undercut assertion that guns were possessed solely for sport or 

collection). Rodgers, moreover, displayed his ammunition to his date in a manner that 

cannot be characterized as part of a “sporting” use, which renders frivolous his 

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suggestion that he should have benefitted from § 2K2.1(b)(2). See Gresso, 24 F.3d at 881 

(stressing that use other than for sport eliminates availability of reduction even if gun or 

ammunition was acquired for sport); United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 

1989) (upholding district court’s finding that defendant who acquired and used gun for 

hunting but then fired it randomly throughout his house after quarreling with his wife 

was ineligible for reduction).

Rodgers, in his Rule 51(b) submission, also contends that a challenge to the 2 

criminal-history points he received for a trespass conviction in Georgia in 2012 would 

not be frivolous. For that crime Rodgers was sentenced to 60 days’ imprisonment, the 

threshold for assessing 2 criminal-history points instead of 1. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b). 

Rodgers was released from jail early, and in his view this conviction should have 

counted for only 1 point (which would have reduced his criminal-history score from 5 to 

4 but not affected his criminal-history category). This potential argument is frivolous; the 

sentence pronounced, not the time served, determines criminal-history points. U.S.S.G. 

§ 4A1.2 cmt. n.2; United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1215 (7th Cir. 1993). 

Counsel also considers but rejects as frivolous a possible claim that Rodger’s 

prison sentence is unreasonably long. The district court discussed several factors from 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the goals of deterring Rodgers and others from committing 

more crimes, avoiding an unwarranted disparity between his prison sentence and those 

imposed in other cases, and imposing punishment no greater than necessary. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a), (a)(2)(B), (a)(6). And although, as both counsel and Rodgers note, the 

judge did not address on the record all aspects of the defendant’s arguments in 

mitigation, the judge was not required to. See United States v. Johnson, 643 F.3d 545, 549

(7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that sentencing court need not expressly respond to 

defendant’s every argument, but only principal arguments sufficient to merit 

discussion).

Counsel’s principal argument in mitigation was that Rodgers should receive a 

shorter sentence because, according to counsel, an outstanding warrant for his arrest in 

Virginia will make the defendant ineligible to serve the final months of his sentence in a 

halfway house. Yet the district judge did address this argument on the record by noting 

that the warrant already was seven years old and that whether Virginia would execute it 

was speculative. Rodgers personally proposed other grounds in mitigation during 

allocution, but he principally focused on his mental health, his military record, and his 

purported ignorance of the law prohibiting his possession of a gun. The judge addressed 

each of these on the record, and she was not required to recite—as Rodgers 

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assumes—specific Chapter 5 guidelines. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.3 (mental and emotional 

conditions); 5H1.11 (military service). The district judge also noted on the record that 

Rodgers had denied knowing he could not possess a firearm. And though the judge did 

not explicitly address on the record Rodgers’ contention about § 2K2.1(b)(2), that 

contention was too feeble to merit discussion. Ultimately the judge imposed the 

guidelines minimum, and a prison term within the properly calculated guidelines range 

is presumptively reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v.

Smith, 721 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 2013). Counsel and Rodgers have not identified a reason 

to disregard this presumption, and neither have we.

Rodgers’ final contention in his Rule 51(b) submission is that a potential challenge 

to the conditions of his supervised release based on United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705

(7th Cir. 2014), would not be frivolous. But, as required by Siegel, see id. at 707, the judge 

did explicitly justify on the record each condition of supervised release under the

pertinent sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d); 3553(a). Further, none of the 

conditions of Rodgers’ supervised release are like those we have found to be 

problematic. See generally United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015); United States 

v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015); Siegel, 753 F.3d 705. Thus any challenge to the 

conditions of Rodgers’ supervised release would be frivolous. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

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