Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_15-cv-00080/USCOURTS-ared-2_15-cv-00080-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Quinn
Plaintiff
C V Rivera
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

MICHAEL QUINN PETITIONER 

Reg. #44373-037 

 

VS. 2:15CV00080 BSM/JTR 

 

C V RIVERA, Warden, 

Warden, FCC - Forrest City Low RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

 This Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to Chief 

United States District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all 

or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) 

specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be 

received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this 

Recommendation. The failure to timely file objections may result in waiver of the 

right to appeal questions of fact. 

I. Background 

Pending before the Court is a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus filed by Petitioner, Michael Quinn (“Quinn”). Doc.1. He argues that his 

federal sentence has not been properly adjusted under the Sentencing Guidelines. 

Case 2:15-cv-00080-BSM Document 11 Filed 01/29/16 Page 1 of 7
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Before addressing Quinn’s habeas claim, the Court will review the relevant 

procedural history of the case. 

 On June 9, 2009, Quinn was arrested by Maryland authorities on state 

charges. Doc. 5-1 at 1. On June 11, 2009, he was released on bond. Id. 

 The same day he made bond, a federal arrest warrant was issued based on a 

criminal complaint that charged Quinn with being a felon in possession of a 

firearm. United States v. Quinn, D. Md. Case No. 1:09mj02166. The federal charge 

was based on the same alleged criminal conduct supporting the state charges.1 Doc. 

5-1 at 14. 

 On August 4, 2009, Quinn was arrested on the federal warrant, and, after his 

initial appearance before a United States Magistrate Judge in the United States 

District Court for the District of Maryland, he was detained and remanded to the 

custody of the United States Marshal’s Service (“USMS”). Quinn was 

subsequently charged by Indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm 

and possessing materials used to manufacture a controlled substance. United States 

v. Quinn, D. Md. Case No. 1:09CR00442 (“Quinn I”). 

 On August 17, 2010, a federal jury convicted Quinn of: (1) being a felon in 

possession of a firearm; and (2) possessing materials used to manufacture a 

 1

 On July 14, 2009, the state case was nolle prossed. Doc. 5-1 at 1. 

Case 2:15-cv-00080-BSM Document 11 Filed 01/29/16 Page 2 of 7
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controlled substance. On October 19, 2010, he was sentenced to 77 months, and 

remanded to the BOP to serve his sentence.2 Doc. 5-1 at 27. 

 On October 6, 2011, Quinn was indicted, in the United States District Court 

for the District of Maryland, on charges of a racketeering conspiracy. United States 

v. Quinn, D. Md. Case No. 1:11CR00547 (“Quinn II”). On April 16, 2013, he 

entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to “96 months [in the BOP] to run 

concurrent with [the] sentence imposed in [Quinn I].” Doc. 5-1 at 37. Quinn did 

not appeal his sentence in Quinn II or pursue § 2255 relief. 

 The BOP then calculated a single aggregate term for the so-called 

“concurrent overlap” sentences in Quinn I and Quinn II. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c) 

(requiring the BOP to treat multiple concurrent sentences “for administrative 

purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.”). The total length of the 

aggregate sentence resulting from running the 77-month sentence in Quinn I

(imposed on October 19, 2010) concurrent with the 96-month sentence in Quinn II

(imposed on April 16, 2013) was a sentence of 126 months and 6 days, with a “full 

term date” of April 25, 2021. After giving Quinn 444 days of prior custody credit 

(for his time in pretrial custody before the imposition of his first sentence in Quinn 

I), and, projecting the good-time credits he was expected to earn, his “satisfaction 

date” was calculated to be September 29, 2018. 

 2

 On July 10, 2012, the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction in Quinn I. United States v. Quinn, 487 Fed. 

Appx. 787 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 

Case 2:15-cv-00080-BSM Document 11 Filed 01/29/16 Page 3 of 7
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 Quinn initiated this § 2241 habeas action on June 3, 2015.3 Doc. 1. He 

argues that his 96-month sentence in Quinn II is entitled to an “adjustment” under 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1), which should reduce that sentence from 96 months to 48 

months. Doc. 1 at 4. 

 Respondent argues that: (1) Quinn’s claim is not cognizable in a § 2241 

habeas action; and (2) he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Doc. 5. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that this habeas 

action be dismissed, without prejudice. 

II. Discussion 

 Quinn argues that, under § 5G1.3(b)(1), his 96-month sentence in Quinn II

should be credited with the entire amount of time that he was detained or 

incarcerated before the sentence in Quinn II was imposed.4

 Based on Quinn’s 

calculation, his 96-month sentence in Quinn II should have been adjusted by the 

 3

 When he initiated this action, Quinn was a prisoner in the FCI in Forrest City. On December 7, 2015, 

Quinn filed a change of address indicating that he had been transferred to FCI Fort Dix in New Jersey. Doc. 9. 

However, this transfer in no way affected this Court’s continuing jurisdiction over this case. The proper respondent 

in a habeas action is the petitioner’s “immediate custodian” at the time of filing. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 

426 (2004). Moreover, a petitioner’s post-filing transfer does not generally defeat § 2241 jurisdiction. See Mujahid 

v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Foster, 4 Fed. Appx. 605, 607 n.3 (10th Cir. 

2001) (unpublished); White v. Lamanna, 42 Fed. Appx. 670 (6th Cir. 2002). 4

 A federal sentence commences when it is imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Moreover, it is the BOP, not the 

sentencing court, which has the authority to calculate the award of “credit” against a federal sentence. See 18 U.S.C. 

3585(b); United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333–35 (1992). 

 A sentencing court, however, has the authority, under § 5G1.3(b)(1), to effectively fashion a sentence that 

accounts for time already served on a prior undischarged sentence by adjusting the sentence. “If . . . a term of 

imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction [under § 

1B1.3(a)] the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed as follows: (1) the court shall adjust the sentence for 

any period of imprisonment already served on the undischarged term of imprisonment if the court determines that 

such period of imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the [BOP]; and (2) the sentence for the 

instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the remainder of the undischarged term of imprisonment.” 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the adjustment has the practical effect of making a sentence 

“retroactively concurrent” with a prior undischarged sentence. 

Case 2:15-cv-00080-BSM Document 11 Filed 01/29/16 Page 4 of 7
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sentencing court to approximately 48 months. Doc. 1 at 4. Quinn claims that this 

was discussed by the parties at his sentencing hearing and the sentencing court 

announced its intent to do so.5

 There is nothing in the Judgment and Commitment Order in Quinn II that 

reflects a § 5G1.3(b)(1) sentencing adjustment. Doc. 5-1 at 36-41, 69-72. More 

importantly, even if Quinn is correct that the sentencing court intended to adjust 

his sentence in Quinn II, but mistakenly failed to do so, it is well established that 

habeas relief under § 2241 is not the proper remedy. See Majeed v. Walton, 2015 

WL 4594157, *4 (S.D. Ill. July 30, 2015) (“The argument that the sentencing court 

misapplied (or failed to apply) U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 is not cognizable in a § 2241 

petition.”); Gravel v. Fox, 2014 WL 4676497, *9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014) (“this 

court has no authority [under § 2241] to correct or adjust petitioner's sentence 

under § 5G1.3. Motions to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court.”); Gravitt v. Veach, 229 F. App’x 417, 418-

19 (7th Cir. 2007) (inmate’s contention that the sentencing court “misapplied” § 

5G1.3 “attacks the imposition, not the execution, of his federal sentence” and must 

be brought under § 2255 or on direct appeal); Savage v. Zickefoose, 446 Fed. 

 5

 Because Quinn did not appeal his sentence, no transcript of the sentencing hearing was prepared. In 

response to an inquiry from the BOP, the court reporter emailed that “[t]he judge [in Quinn II] sentenced Mr. Quinn 

to 96 months to run concurrent with the sentence [in Quinn I] . . . [t]he judge stated it would be 19 months more than 

[the sentence in Quinn I].” Doc. 5-1 at 74. The Assistant United States Attorney in Quinn II emailed the BOP noting 

that the plea agreement in the case was a “C-plea (agreed by the parties and the Court) sentence to run concurrent to 

his sentence in [Quinn I] imposed on 10/19/10. A handwritten note on the plea agreement says that incarceration for 

that offense dated back to 8/4/09.” Doc. 5-1 at 76. 

Case 2:15-cv-00080-BSM Document 11 Filed 01/29/16 Page 5 of 7
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Appx. 524, 525-26 (3d Cir. 2011) (inmate must proceed under § 2255, not § 2241, 

with claims that the sentencing court should have adjusted his sentence under § 

5G1.3(b)). 

 In substance, Quinn’s argument that the sentencing court did not properly 

apply a sentencing adjustment under § 5G1.3(b)(1) is a challenge to the validity of 

his sentence which must be made in a § 2255 motion filed with the sentencing 

court. See Lopez-Lopez v. Sanders, 590 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2010). A federal 

court in the district of incarceration can entertain a § 2241 habeas petition 

challenging the validity of a sentence only if “it also appears that the remedy by [§ 

2255] motion [to the sentencing court] is inadequate or ineffective to test the 

legality of his detention.” § 2255(e) (emphasis added). 

 As previously noted, Quinn did not appeal his sentence in Quinn II or file a 

§ 2255 motion in the sentencing court. While filing such a motion now may be 

deemed untimely, this does not render that remedy “inadequate” or “ineffective” so 

as to allow Quinn to utilize § 2241 to challenge his sentence. Hill v. Morrison, 349 

F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2003) (to establish inadequacy or ineffectiveness, a 

prisoner must demonstrate “more than a procedural barrier to bringing a § 2255 

petition,” such as “allow[ing] the one year statute of limitations ... to expire). Thus, 

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Quinn has not demonstrated the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of his § 2255 

remedy in the sentencing court.6

 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this § 2241 habeas action. 

III. Conclusion 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT the 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED, and the case be dismissed, 

without prejudice. 

 Dated this 29th day of January, 2016. 

 

 __________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 6

 Finally, Quinn appears to concede in his papers that the BOP has correctly calculated his sentences as 

they are reflected in his Judgment and Commitment Orders. Doc. 6 at 3 (“petitioner makes it clear that the BOP 

cannot correct this issue and that it must be corrected by the Court.”). Insofar as Quinn may be asserting a § 2241 

habeas claim that the BOP has improperly calculated his sentences, it should be dismissed, without prejudice, due to 

his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Mathena v. United States, 577 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2009). 

While Quinn has filed four grievances contesting his sentence calculation, he has not pursued any appeals to the 

higher tiers of the BOP administrative remedy program. Doc. 5-1 at 5, 48; see also 28 C.F.R. § 542.10-15 

(explaining the steps in the administrative remedy program). 

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