Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02031/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02031-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albert Billinger
Plaintiff
Yates
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT BILLINGER,

Plaintiff,

v.

YATES,

Defendant.

1:14-cv-02031-BAM (PC) 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

(ECF No. 31)

Plaintiff Albert Billinger (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis in 

this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. On April 9, 2015, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 

first amended complaint with leave to amend. (ECF No. 25.) Thereafter, on April 20, 2015, the 

Court appointed counsel Rebecca A. Weinstein-Hamilton for the limited purpose of investigating 

the claim, then drafting and filing an amended complaint within 90 days. The Court’s order 

provided that counsel’s limited appointment would terminate when Plaintiff’s amended complaint 

was filed or when counsel filed a notice that an amended complaint would not be appropriate. 

(ECF No. 28.) On June 23, 2015, counsel filed a notice that an amended complaint would not 

appropriate. (ECF No. 29.) 

On June 25, 2015, the Court terminated the appointment of limited-purpose counsel and 

directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within thirty days. (ECF No. 30.) On the same 

date, Plaintiff filed a motion for the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff requests a new attorney to 

Case 1:14-cv-02031-BAM Document 33 Filed 07/14/15 Page 1 of 2
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amend his case. Plaintiff also reportedly believes that former counsel will continue to get paid 

while Plaintiff remains in prison. (ECF No. 31.) 

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. 

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require an attorney to 

represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for 

the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1816 (1989). However, in 

certain exceptional circumstances the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel 

pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the court will seek 

volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether 

Aexceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on

the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.@ Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s motion does not provide any basis warranting the appointment of counsel 

or demonstrating the required exceptional circumstances. Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff is 

not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations which, if proved, would entitle 

him to relief, his case is not exceptional. Critically, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court 

cannot make a determination that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. 

Insofar as Plaintiff believes that his former counsel was receiving payment for her 

services, he is mistaken. Plaintiff’s counsel was selected from the Court’s pro bono attorney 

panel and she voluntarily agreed to the appointment. In other words, counsel was not paid for pro 

bono services. 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff=s motion for the appointment of counsel is HEREBY 

DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-02031-BAM Document 33 Filed 07/14/15 Page 2 of 2