Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02540/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02540-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel Bray
Petitioner
D. Runnels
Respondent

Document Text:

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL BRAY,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2540 MCE PAN P

vs.

D. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2000 conviction on

three counts of lewd conduct with a child under 14 and one count of failing to register as a sex

offender. See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 288(a), 290(g)(2). Petitioner was sentenced to three

consecutive terms of 75 years to life, one consecutive term of 25 years to life, plus three five year

enhancements and six one year enhancements. Cal. Pen. Code §§ 288(a), 290(g), 667(a), (b).

In his November 25, 2002 petition, petitioner seeks relief on the ground that the

minimum constitutional criteria for use of a prior sex-related incident as disposition evidence

were not met in this case. (Petition at 15.)

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Samuel Bray, No. C037432 (May 30, 2002), a copy of which is

attached as Exhibit B to Respondent’s Answer, filed January 31, 2003.

2

Petitioner filed a direct appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate

District struck three 1-year enhancements but otherwise affirmed the judgment in a reasoned

opinion. (Ex. B, Answer.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 

(Ex. C, Answer.) The court denied review without comment. (Ex. D, Answer.) Petitioner did

not seek habeas relief in state court.

FACTS1

In the summer of 1998, Brittany was nine years old. 

[Petitioner] was her mother's boyfriend. About three or four times

a week, [petitioner] would spend the night with Brittany, her

mother, and her brothers.

Approximately two weeks to a month after [petitioner] first

started spending the night, Brittany went into her mother's bedroom

and found [petitioner] there alone. [Petitioner] touched her chest

under her clothes.

On a second occasion, [petitioner] touched Brittany on her

chest under her clothes when he came upon her alone in the

kitchen.

On yet another occasion, as she was leaving the house,

Brittany's mother asked Brittany to bring [petitioner] a cup of

water. When she brought the water to [petitioner] in the bedroom,

he made Brittany feel his private part.

One time, [petitioner] also kissed Brittany and put his

tongue in her mouth. And on many occasions, [petitioner] touched

her breasts and vagina on top of her clothes. Some of the

touchings occurred when Brittany would share the bed with her

mother and [petitioner].

Brittany's mother broke off her relationship with

[petitioner] in September or October of 1998, when [petitioner] put

his fist through a door during an argument.

* * *

At trial, Brittany testified about the molestations, her

mother's relationship with [petitioner], and her disclosure of the

incidents to her teacher and brother.

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3

Brittany's fourth and fifth grade teacher testified regarding

Brittany's disclosure in December 1998 that [petitioner] had been

"bothering her," which prompted the teacher to contact a counselor. 

She also described how Brittany had changed from an outgoing,

lively child in the fourth grade to a quieter, more serious child in

the fifth grade.

Brittany's mother described the circumstances of her

involvement with [petitioner], and Brittany's disclosure to her that

[petitioner] had touched her.

David Love, a family therapist, testified as an expert on

child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). [The

court discussed] the details of Mr. Love's testimony in connection

with [petitioner’s] challenges to it.

The prosecution also called a police officer, who was

present during an interview of Brittany by a social worker in

January 1999. The interview, in which Brittany recounted the

touching incidents, had been videotaped and was played to the jury.

Another police officer, responsible for tracking sex

offender registrations, testified that [petitioner] did not register on

his birthday in October 1998, as required, and that when

interviewed in Oklahoma in June 2000, [petitioner] admitted that

he had not registered.

Lawanna -- another molestation victim -- and her mother,

Elizabeth, testified about the molestations that led to [petitioner’s]

conviction in 1982. Lawanna testified that when she was 6 or 7

years old, [petitioner] was her mother's boyfriend and lived with

them for two to three years. [Petitioner] initially molested her by

rubbing her legs and kissing her on the ear and mouth. [Petitioner]

then began touching her breasts on top of her clothes. One time,

[petitioner] also touched Lawanna's vagina under her clothes. At

the same time, he caused her to put her hand inside his pants and

made her rub his penis. On another occasion, [petitioner] came

into the kitchen in his robe, pushed Lawanna to her knees, and tried

to force his penis into her mouth. She kept her mouth tightly

closed, and [petitioner] stopped when Lawanna's mother called

him. At a subsequent time, [petitioner] put Lawanna on the bed in

her mother's bedroom, pulled down his pants and her panties, and

put his penis in her vagina. And yet another time, when Lawanna's

cousin was spending the night, [petitioner] came into the room,

pulled Lawanna's pajamas up and her panties down, turned her

over on her stomach, got on top of her, and started "humping" her.

Lawanna's mother, Elizabeth, described how she woke up

one night, got out of bed, and saw [petitioner] in Lawanna's room

lying on top of her. [Petitioner] appeared to hear Elizabeth and

came out of the room. When Elizabeth asked [petitioner] what he

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4

was doing in her daughter's room, he said he was checking on

Lawanna's water bed.

After [petitioner] left for work the next morning, Lawanna

told her mother the details of what had happened when [petitioner]

was in her bedroom. Elizabeth called a social worker. She also

reported [petitioner] to the police.

[Petitioner] testified, denying that he had molested

Lawanna or that he told Elizabeth or anyone else that he did. But

he admitted that a jury had convicted him of molesting Lawanna in

1982, and that he was required to register as a sex offender. He

admitted that he had failed to register in October 1998.

[Petitioner] also denied touching or molesting Brittany, or

kissing her on the lips. Although [petitioner] testified that he had

spent three or four nights a week at Brittany's house, he said that

Brittany never spent the night in bed with her mother and him. 

[Petitioner] recalled that once Brittany's mother had Brittany bring

him a glass of water. But [petitioner] testified that he was never

left alone with Brittany.

[Petitioner] also called the police officer who witnessed

Brittany's interview with the social worker. The officer testified

about a discrepancy regarding the mother's statements, as well as

his efforts to locate [petitioner] at his own mother's house

thereafter. [Petitioner] then called his own mother and sister to

dispute the officer's version of events regarding whether the police

searched the house.

The jury convicted [petitioner] on the three counts of lewd

acts with a child under the age of 14 and the count of failing to

register as a sex offender, but acquitted him of the count of

continuous sexual abuse of a child.

[Petitioner] waived jury trial on the prior convictions, and

the court found that the prior conviction allegations were true as

charged in counts 2, 3, 4, and 5.

(People v. Samuel Bray, slip op. at 3-4; 5-8.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

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II. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of Cal. Evidence Code § 1108. 

Petitioner claims that under state law, Cal. Evidence Code § 1108 should be interpreted as

requiring expert testimony to prove petitioner had a disposition to commit sexual assaults. 

The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for review on August

14, 2002, without comment. The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision of the

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. The

state court rejected this claim as follows:

[Petitioner] explains: [T]he use of evidence of past conduct

authorized under section 1108 is to show disposition. This is a

psychological trait, and as such is subject to the normal

foundational requirement for any subject of expert testimony.” 

[Petitioner] concludes: “[T]here was a lack of foundational

evidence in the form of expert testimony to show that [petitioner]

actually ha[d] any such disposition.”

[Petitioner] cites no authority that Evidence Code section

1108 requires such a foundation. Instead, he draws a parallel to the

statute regarding sexually violent predators, which requires expert

opinion that the defendant has a mental disorder. (Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 6600, subds. (a)(1), (c), (3).) [Petitioner] argues that the

“foundational requirement for section 1108 evidence should be no

different.”

This contention has no merit. There is no parallel between

the language of Evidence Code section 1108 and the statute

governing commitment proceedings for sexually violent predators. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, et seq.) The sexually violent predator

statute expressly requires that before a commitment petition may

be filed, two psychiatrists or psychologists evaluate the defendant

and agree that he or she has a diagnosed mental disorder that is

likely to lead to acts of sexual violence without appropriate

treatment and custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (d).) By

contrast, Evidence Code section 1108 is devoid of any mention of

expert testimony as a predicate to the admissibility of evidence of

other sex offenses. Instead, the narrowly drawn statute provides an

exception to the general inadmissibility of evidence of a person’s

character to prove conduct on a specified occasion (Evid. Code §

1101) by allowing evidence “of another sexual offense or offenses.

. . if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [Evidence Code]

section 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).) It does not also

authorize expert testimony. It is not for this court to insert a

requirement into Evidence Code section 1108, which the

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Legislature has chosen to omit. (See Civ. Proc. Code, § 1858.) 

“[C]ourts do not sit as councils of revision, empowered to rewrite

legislation in accord with their own conceptions of prudent public

policy.” (United States v. Rutherford (1979) 442 U.S. 544, 555 [61

L.Ed.2d 68, 78].)

Indeed, the expert testimony that [petitioner] proposes to

require under Evidence Code section 1108 might very well

constitute error if permitted. In People v. McFarland (2000) 78

Cal.App.4th 489, 493, the court held that Evidence Code section

1108 “does not authorize an expert to render an opinion about the

defendant’s sexual propensity during the prosecution’s case-inchief.” There, the defendant was charged with annoying or

molesting a child under section 647.6, which required proof that

his conduct was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual

interest in the victim. (People v. McFarland, supra, 78

Cal.App.4th at p. 494.) A psychiatrist testified for the prosecution

that the defendant had a mental disorder and opined that the

defendant was motivated by an abnormal or sexual interest in

children when he touched the child victim. (Id. at pp. 492-493 &

fn.2.) The court said the witness had offered “an expert opinion on

the ultimate issue that [defendant] harbored an unnatural or

abnormal sexual interest” in a child victim (id. at p. 495, original

italics), and rejected the notion that opinion testimony regarding

character is made admissible by Evidence Code section 1108. 

(People v. McFarland, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 495.) The

Court concluded that while Evidence Code section 1108,

subdivision(a), allows “‘evidence of the defendant’s commission

of another sexual offense or offenses,’” expert opinion about the

defendant’s sexual propensity “went far beyond any description of

prior offenses authorized” by that provision. (People v.

McFarland, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 495.)

[The court concluded] that nothing in Evidence Code

section 1108 authorizes, let alone requires, expert testimony that

[petitioner] had a sexual mental disorder.

(People v. Bray, slip op. at 18-20.)

A state court's evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless the

ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory

provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process.

See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20

(9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a federal court cannot disturb a state court's decision to admit

evidence on due process grounds unless the admission of the evidence was “arbitrary or so

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prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355,

1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Mancuso v.

Olivarez, 292 F. 3d 939, 956 (2002) (a writ of habeas corpus will be granted for an erroneous

admission of evidence “only where the ‘testimony is almost entirely unreliable and ... the

factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due

account of its shortcomings.’" (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983)). In

addition, in order to obtain habeas relief on the basis of evidentiary error, petitioner must show

that the error was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). In order to

grant relief, the habeas court must find that the error had "'a substantial and injurious effect' on

the verdict." Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at

623). 

Under Ninth Circuit law, the admission of “other acts” evidence violates due

process only if there were no permissible inferences the factfinder could have drawn from the

evidence. See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1993) (question is “whether any

inferences relevant to a fact of consequence may be drawn from each piece of the evidence, or

whether they lead only to impermissible inferences about the defendant's character”); Jammal,

926 F.2d at 920 ("[e]vidence introduced by the prosecution will often raise more than one

inference, some permissible, some not; we must rely on the jury to sort them out in light of the

court's instructions"). See also United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001)

(evidence of prior similar crimes “will only sometimes violate the constitutional right to a fair

trial, if it is of no relevance, or if its potential for prejudice far outweighs what little relevance it

might have”). 

In LeMay the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held there is nothing fundamentally

unfair about allowing propensity evidence so long as protections, such as those provided under

Federal Rule of Evidence 403, remain in place to ensure that devastating evidence of little

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 Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 2

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.”

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probative value will not reach the jury. Id., 260 F.3d at 1026. There is no exclusive list of 2

factors that courts should evaluate in determining whether to admit evidence of a defendant’s

prior acts of sexual misconduct. Rather, judges should consider factors relevant to individual

cases, such as (1) the similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged; (2) the closeness in time of

the prior acts to the acts charged; (3) the frequency of the prior acts; (4) the presence or lack of

intervening circumstances and (5) the necessity of the evidence beyond the testimony already

offered at trial. LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028; Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258,

1268 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998)). “A

court should pay 'careful attention to both the significant probative value and the strong

prejudicial qualities' of that evidence." LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Glanzer, 232 F.3d at

1268). 

Here, the prior crimes evidence against petitioner was relevant to the charged

crimes. Thus, to the extent petitioner challenges the use of the prior sexual offenses violated his

due process rights (petition at 15), his claim should fail. 

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court “has never expressly held that it

violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in

conformity therewith, or that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for other

purposes without an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to such

purposes.” Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds

by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly left

open this question. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5 (“Because we need not reach the

issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it

permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime”). 

Petitioner has provided no Supreme Court authority for his novel idea that courts are required to

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support this disposition evidence by expert testimony. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of

this claim was not contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent.

Further, any error in admitting this evidence did not have “a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993). See also Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990)(admission of

prior acts of misconduct to prove intent did not violate due process). There was direct evidence

against petitioner, consisting of the victim’s testimony (RT 272-330), the victim’s teacher’s

testimony (RT 250-65) and the testimony of the victim’s mother (RT 449-67.) Law enforcement

officer Duane Cantwell testified he was present during the social worker’s interview with the

victim. (RT 373.) 

Any threat of improper prejudice flowing from the testimony was mitigated by

the trial court’s instructions directing the jury to that if they found petitioner had committed a

prior sexual offense, the jury may, but was not required to, infer petitioner had a disposition to

commit sexual offenses. (RT 687-88.) The jury was further instructed that if the jury found

petitioner had this disposition the jury may, but was not required to, infer that he was likely to

commit and did commit the crimes for which he was accused. (RT 688.) However, the jury was

cautioned that if the jury found he committed a prior sexual offense, that finding by itself was not

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the charged crimes. (RT

688.) The jury was instructed that the weight and significance of the evidence, if any, was for the

jury to decide. (RT 688.) In addition, at the time certain evidence was admitted for a limited

purpose, the jury was cautioned that evidence could not be considered for any other purpose. 

(RT 685.) The jury was reminded that this evidence could not be considered for any purpose

except the limited purpose for which it was admitted. (RT 685.) The jury is presumed to have

followed these instructions. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 196-97 (1997); United

States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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For the foregoing reason, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 7, 2006.

004;001; bray2540.157

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