Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-72099/USCOURTS-ca9-12-72099-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Argueta Pena
Petitioner
Katharine J. Galston
Amicus Curiae
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM ARGUETA PENA,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-72099

Agency No.

A205-379-126

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

August 26, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed September 28, 2015

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Johnnie B.

Rawlinson, Circuit Judges and Sharon L. Gleason,* District

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

* The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

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SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a petition for

review of a decision by an immigration judge affirming an

asylum officer’s negative credible fear determination in

expedited removal proceedings.

The panel held, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), that

this court lacks jurisdiction to review an IJ’s negative credible

fear determination in expedited removal proceedings. 

The panel rejected petitioner’s argument that the

jurisdiction-stripping provision unconstitutionally deprives

him of any forum in which to bring a procedural due process

challenge to the expedited removal proceedings, because

there exist exceptions to the restriction on judicial review,

including limited habeas proceedings to establish that an

individual is not an alien, is a permanent resident, is a refugee

or asylee, or was not the subject of an expedited removal

order, and an avenue in criminal reentry proceedings to

collaterally attack a prior removal order. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PENA V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

Rex S. Heinke and Katharine J. Galston, Akin Gump Strauss

Hauer & Feld LLP, Los Angeles, California; Saurish

Bhattacharjee (argued), McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Los

Angeles, California, Pro Bono Amicus Curiae Counsel for

Petitioner.

Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, Ernesto H. Molina, Jr., Assistant Director, Sabatino

F. Leo, Trial Attorney, and Tim Ramnitz (argued), United

States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of

Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

William Argueta Pena (Pena), a native and citizen of El

Salvador, petitions for review of a decision by an immigration

judge affirming the decision of the asylum officer during

expedited removal proceedings. We dismiss the petition for

lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

In March, 2012, Pena entered the United States without

documentation by wading across the Rio Grande River in

Texas. Within days, the United States initiated expedited

removal proceedings.

During Pena’s initial interview with the border patrol

agent, he indicated that he came to the United States to live

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with his mother and to work. He answered that he did not

fear harm if returned to El Salvador. However, Pena

subsequently wrote a statement asserting that he was afraid of

returning to El Salvador and wished to seek asylum. As a

result, Pena was referred to an asylum officer, who conducted

a “credible fear interview.”1 Following the interview, the

asylum officer concluded that Pena had not shown a credible

fear of persecution, and that he was ineligible for asylum or

other relief.

Pena requested review of the asylum officer’s decision by

an Immigration Judge. In response, Pena was given a form

titled “Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge,” which was

read and explained to Pena in Spanish, and provided, in part:

You may be represented in this proceeding, at

no expense to the government, by an attorney

or other individual authorized and qualified to

represent persons before an Immigration

Court. If you wish to be so represented, your

attorney or representative should appear with

you at this hearing. . . .

Pena appeared without an attorney before the Immigration

Judge. At the outset of the hearing, the judge asked, “Now

initially I note that you are of course in court this morning by

yourself. Did you intend to have an attorney or anybody be

1 An alien in expedited removal proceedings is referred to an asylum

officer for a “credible fear interview” if he indicates to the border patrol

agent “an intention to apply for asylum” or “a fear of persecution.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If the alien demonstrates a “credible fear of

persecution” to the asylum officer, “the alien shall be detained for further

consideration of the application for asylum.” Id. at § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).

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PENA V. LYNCH 5

present in court today to represent you or to help you?” Pena

responded, “No, no, that’s fine.” At the conclusion of the

hearing, the judge affirmed the determinations made by the

asylum officer, finding that Pena had not established a

credible fear of persecution on a protected ground. The judge

informed Pena that the decision was final and could not be

appealed.

Despite the judge’s advisal, Pena appealed to the Board

of Immigration Appeals. The Board dismissed the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction as provided in the governing regulation. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C)

2

; 8 C.F.R.

 

2

 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C) provides:

Except as provided in subparagraph (B)(iii)(III)

[hearing before Immigration Judge], a removal order

entered in accordance with subparagraph (A)(i)

[inadmissibility] or (B)(iii)(I) [lack of credible fear] is

not subject to administrative appeal, except that the

Attorney General shall provide by regulation for

prompt review of such an order under subparagraph

(A)(i) against an alien who claims under oath, or as

permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746

of Title 28, after having been warned of the penalties

for falsely making such claim under such conditions, to

have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence,

to have been admitted as a refugee under section 1157

of this title, or to have been granted asylum under

section 1158 of this title.

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§ 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).3 Pena filed a pro se Motion for Stay

of Removal and a timely Petition for Review with this court.4

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We determine our own jurisdiction de novo. See Bolanos

v. Holder, 734 F.3d 875, 876 (9th Cir. 2013). We also review

constitutional claims de novo. See Coronado v. Holder,

759 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended.

III. DISCUSSION

Amicus contends that we have jurisdiction to consider this

petition because the jurisdiction-stripping provision in

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) unconstitutionally deprives Pena of

any forum in which to bring his procedural due process

challenge to the expedited removal proceeding. Specifically,

Pena seeks to challenge his removal on the basis that the

judge’s failure to elicit a knowing and voluntary waiver of

 

3

 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) provides:

Ifthe immigration judge concurs with the determination

of the asylum officer that the alien does not have a

credible fear of persecution or torture, the case shall be

returned to the Service for removal of the alien. . . . The

immigration judge’s decision is final and may not be

appealed.

4 After the Government filed its response to Pena’s pro se Informal

Brief, we appointed amicus curiae counsel (Amicus), who has ably

represented Pena before this court.

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Pena’s right to counsel violated his due process rights. But

we can’t get there from here because we lack jurisdiction.5

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996 (the statute) strictly cabins

judicial review of final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(1). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (2)(A). No court

may review a direct challenge to an expedited removal order,

with a few exceptions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i–iv)

(“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . the

determination made under section 1225(b)(1)(B) of this title,

. . . except as provided in subsection (e) of this section . . .”);

see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (providing for interviews

of aliens by asylum officers and a determination of credible

fear of persecution as part of expedited removal proceedings).

One exception to the restriction on judicial review allows

for limited habeas corpus proceedings to establish that the

individual is not an alien, is a permanent resident, is a refugee

or asylee, or was not the subject of an expedited removal

order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2); see also Garcia de Rincon

v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.

2008). Additionally, we have held that in criminal cases, a

“defendant charged [with criminal reentry] has a due process

right to collaterally attack his removal order because the

removal order serves as a predicate element of his

conviction.” United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195,

1201 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotations

omitted). Pena’s “removal order was issued pursuant to

§ 1225(b)(1),” and none of these “strictly limited” exceptions

5 Because we resolve this case on the basis of our lack of jurisdiction,

we need not, and do not address the government’s argument premised on

our recent decision in Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2015).

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apply. Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1139 (citation omitted). 

Pena has not filed a habeas petition, and there has been no

criminal reentry case filed against him. Therefore, “we lack

jurisdiction to review any constitutional or statutory claims

related to the underlying removal order in this case” because

no claim listed in the statutory exceptions was raised. Id.

(citation omitted).

In Garcia de Rincon, we reiterated that we lack

jurisdiction to hear a collateral challenge like Pena’s to an

expedited removal order. We clarified that although 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D) “re-vests courts with jurisdiction to review

constitutional claims” (such as due process claims predicated

on right to counsel), that re-vestment does not extend to the

review of expedited removal orders. Id. at 1138. Rather,

§ 1252(a)(2)(A) “strictly circumscribes the scope of review

of expedited removal orders to the grounds enumerated in

§ 1252(e).” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In turn,

§ 1252(e) “only permits review of expedited removal orders

in a habeas corpus petition, and even then the review is

limited” to three inquiries: whether the petitioner is an alien,

was ordered removed under the expedited removal section, or

can prove lawful admission for permanent resident status. Id.

at 1138–39.

Our sister circuits have rejected the same argument made

by Pena. In Shunaula v. Holder, 732 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2013),

the petitioner attempted to enter the United States and was

removed via expedited removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(1). See id. at 144–45. Four months later, the

petitioner entered the United States illegally and remained. 

See id. at 145. After the government initiated removal

proceedings against him, the petitioner raised five specific

due process challenges to his initial expedited removal

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PENA V. LYNCH 9

proceeding. See id. Shunaula argued that notwithstanding

the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(2)(A), due

process required that he be afforded an avenue for review of

the expedited removal order. See id. at 146. The Second

Circuit held that because the government was not seeking to

use the expedited removal as an element of a criminal

offense, but rather to establish inadmissibility, there was no

basis “to override the jurisdictional bar erected by

§ 1252(a)(2)(A) . . .” Id. at 147. The Second Circuit joined

every other circuit to have considered the issue and

determined that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the

petitioner’s challenges to the expedited removal order. See

id.; see also Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329–30 (7th Cir.

2010); Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir.

2007).

Both the Supreme Court and this Circuit have suggested

that a litigant may be unconstitutionally denied a forum when

there is absolutely no avenue for judicial review of a claim of

constitutional deprivation. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,

603 (1988) (explaining that a “serious constitutional question

. . . would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any

judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.”)

(emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Flores-Miramontes v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the petitioner’s

ability to petition for a writ of habeas corpus provides a

judicial forum to seek relief). Because the jurisdictionstripping provisions of the statute retain some avenues of

judicial review, limited though they may be, Pena has not

been unconstitutionally denied a judicial forum. See FloresMiramontes, 212 F.3d at 1136.

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IV. CONCLUSION

We lack jurisdiction to review Pena’s challenge to his

expedited removal proceedings in view of the jurisdictionstripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A). The statute

does not deprive Pena of any forum to challenge his

expedited removal proceedings. Although the available

avenues of review provide no relief for Pena in the

administrative context, the fact remains that avenues of

review exist, thereby defeating Pena’s claim of

unconstitutionality. See Flores-Miramontes, 212 F.3d at

1136.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

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