Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02659/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02659-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Harvey Gridley
Petitioner
James D. Hartley
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL HARVEY GRIDLEY,

Petitioner, No. 2: 08-cv-2659 MCE KJN P

vs.

JAMES D. HARTLEY, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a former state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition 1

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2005

conviction for forcible oral copulation (Cal. Penal Code § 288a(c)(2)) and forcible lewd acts on a

child (Cal. Penal Code § 288(b)(1)). Petitioner was sentenced to six years. 

This action is proceeding on the original petition filed November 6, 2008, raising

two claims: 1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of uncharged acts; 2) jury

instruction error. (Dkt. No. 1.) After carefully reviewing the record, the undersigned

recommends that the petition be denied.

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II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court defined

the operative review standard in a habeas corpus action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Justice O’Connor’s opinion for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the

court. There is a dichotomy between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the

Supreme Court, and an “unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 405. “Contrary to” clearly

established law applies to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite

that of the Supreme Court on a point of law; or (2) if the state court case is materially

indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is

opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Id. at 407-08. It is this prong of the AEDPA standard of review which directs deference be paid

to state court decisions. While the deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point

is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of

law....[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 410-

11 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002).

“Clearly established” law is law that has been “squarely addressed” by the United

States Supreme Court. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008). Thus, extrapolations of

settled law to unique situations will not qualify as clearly established. See e.g., Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006) (established law not permitting state sponsored practices to

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inject bias into a criminal proceeding by compelling a defendant to wear prison clothing or by

unnecessary showing of uniformed guards does not qualify as clearly established law when

spectators' conduct is the alleged cause of bias injection).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority, in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002). 

Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An unreasonable error is

one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has occurred. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). Moreover, the established Supreme Court authority

reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional principles, or other controlling federal law,

as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules binding only on federal courts. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. at 9.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

When reviewing a state court’s summary denial of a claim, the court “looks

through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned decision. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234

F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

A. Claim 1

Petitioner alleges that the admission of uncharged acts violated his right to due

process. In particular, pursuant to California Evidence Code § 1108, the trial court admitted

testimony from three female relatives of petitioner who claimed they had been molested by

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 Cal. Evid. Code § 1108 provides, in relevant part, “In a criminal action in which the 2

defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another

sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not

inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1108(a). 

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petitioner in the past. Petitioner argued that the testimony from these witnesses was prejudicial 2

and cumulative.

There is no Supreme Court precedent prohibiting the use of uncharged sexual

offenses to prove propensity. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n. 5 (1991) (“Because we

need not reach the issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due

Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes' evidence to show propensity to commit a

charged crime.”); Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that

because the Supreme Court has “expressly reserved the question of whether using evidence of the

defendant's past crimes to show that he has a propensity for criminal activity could ever violate

due process,” the state court “did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in

determining that the admission of evidence of Larson's criminal history did not violate due

process” (citations omitted)). 

Moreover, both the Ninth Circuit and California Supreme Court have expressly

held that admission of prior sexual offense evidence under California Evidence Code § 1108

does not violate due process. See Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2008)

(admission of propensity evidence pursuant to Section 1108 against a defendant charged with

rape did not violate his clearly established due process rights); People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th

903, 917 (1999) (admission of prior sex offenses pursuant to Section 1108 did not deny

defendant due process).

For the reasons stated above, admission of petitioner’s prior uncharged

misconduct did not violate his right to due process. After conducting an AEDPA review, the

undersigned recommends that this claim be denied.

//// 

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B. Claim 2

Petitioner argues that the trial court misinstructed the jury regarding the use of

prior uncharged acts. The California Court of Appeal denied this claim for the reasons stated: 

Defendant objects to the trial court's giving of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, which

explains the use of evidence of prior uncharged sexual offenses, arguing the

instruction violated his due process rights.FN3 We evaluate instructional error by

examining jury instructions as a whole and determining whether there is a

reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood the instructions in the manner

suggested by the defendant. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 677; People v.

Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 662-663.)

FN3. As defendant did not object to the instruction at trial, we initially

address forfeiture. The dichotomy of defendant's forfeiture argument

defies logic. If, as defendant argues, raising the argument he raises here

would have been futile because the Supreme Court had recently rejected

the argument in People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1016

(Reliford), then we must also reject the argument, as we are bound by the

Supreme Court's decision. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court

(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) And if, as defendant also argues, he is making

a different argument than the argument addressed in Reliford, then he

should have raised it in the trial court. Nevertheless, although defendant

failed to object to the giving of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, we may review his

claims to determine if his substantial rights were affected. (Pen.Code, §

1259.) Thus, we address and dispose of his arguments.

As given, CALJIC No. 2.50.01 states: “Evidence has been introduced for the

purpose of showing that the Defendant engaged in a sexual offense on one or

more occasions other than that charged in this case. [¶] ‘Sexual offense’ means a

crime under the laws of a state or of the United States that involves any of the

following: any conduct made criminal by Penal Code Section 288(a). The

elements of this crime are set forth elsewhere in these instructions .[¶] If you find

that the Defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but are not

required, to infer that the Defendant had a disposition to commit sexual offenses.

If you find that the Defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required

to infer, that he was more-he was likely to commit and did commit the crime or

crimes of which he is accused. [¶] However, if you find by a preponderance of the

evidence that the Defendant committed a prior sexual offense, that is not

sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the

charged crimes. If you determine an inference properly can be drawn from this

evidence, this inference is simply one item for you to consider, along with all the

other evidence, in determining whether the Defendant has been proved guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged. [¶] Unless you are otherwise

instructed, you must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.”

Defendant contends that because the jury was instructed that other crimes need be

proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50.01,

the prosecution's burden of proof as to the charged crimes was reduced from the

required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of his Fourteenth

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Amendment due process rights. We reject his argument.

The California Supreme Court upheld CALJIC No. 2.50.01 against constitutional

attack in Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 1016. The Supreme Court found no

constitutional error in the 1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, finding it

correctly stated the law and did not lower the prosecution's burden of proof or

mislead the jury as to the limited purpose of the prior crimes evidence. (Reliford,

supra, at pp. 1009, 1016.)

The jury in this case was instructed with the 2002 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01,

which is identical to the 1999 version in its explanation of the law on permissive

inferences and the burden of proof, but also includes the cautionary statement:

“[I]f you determine an inference properly can be drawn from this evidence, this

inference is simply one item for you to consider, along with all the other evidence,

in determining whether the Defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of the crime charged.” As noted by the Supreme Court, this statement

provides additional guidance on the permissible use of other-acts evidence and

“reminds the jury of the [beyond-a-reasonable-doubt] standard of proof for a

conviction of the charged offenses.” (Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1016.)

Although defendant claims Reliford is flawed, it is dispositive of his claim. (Auto

Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455 [decisions of the

California Supreme Court are binding upon courts of appeal and trial courts in this

state].) Defendant also attempts to distinguish his argument from that rejected in

Reliford by arguing: “[Defendant] does not contend that under CALJIC No.

2.50.01 the prior act evidence alone may lead to a conviction, but that in

combination with other evidence it may do so. This more limited use of evidence

proven by less than a reasonable doubt is as constitutionally infirm as a conviction

based solely on prior act evidence proven under a relaxed standard.”

Defendant's attempt to distinguish Reliford, however, is unavailing. As explained

in Reliford, “[n]othing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary

determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense....” (Reliford,

supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1016.)

Defendant insists it is a violation of due process for the jury to use the

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to make the preliminary determination

whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense. He argues this is

unconstitutional because “[t]he jury should be instructed that any and all evidence

used by the jury as evidence that the defendant is guilty must be proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.” He is wrong.

The California Supreme Court has long held that prior crimes need only be proved

by a preponderance standard. (People v. Lisenba (1939) 14 Cal.2d 403, 429-430

[prior crime need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be admitted to show

intent for current crime]; People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 187, fn. 15

[“Although a person charged with crime cannot be convicted thereof unless he is

proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, other uncharged offenses introduced to

show the existence of some element of the charged crime need only be proved by

a preponderance of substantial evidence”]; People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d

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953, 965 [collateral facts need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt]; People

v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 763-764 [preponderance of the evidence

standard proper for proving prior crimes during guilt phase]; People v. Carpenter

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 380-383 [prior crimes used to prove intent may be

established by a preponderance of the evidence].)

Indeed, defendant's contention was rejected in both People v. Medina, supra, 11

Cal.4th 694 and People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312. The discussion in

Medina begins with the premise that a criminal defendant has a due process right

to have each fact necessary to conviction proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The

court explained, however, that “facts tending to prove the defendant's other crimes

... are deemed mere ‘evidentiary facts' that need not be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt as long as the jury is convinced, beyond such doubt, of the truth

of the ‘ultimate fact’ of the defendant's knowledge or intent.” (Medina, supra, at p.

763, quoting People v. Lisenba, supra, 14 Cal.2d at pp. 430-431.) The court found

no compelling reason to reconsider the longstanding preponderance rule. (Medina,

supra, at p. 764.) Noting that the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the

Federal Rules of Evidence, has adopted the preponderance standard for such

evidence, the court in Carpenter reaffirmed that rule. (Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th

at pp. 380-383, citing Huddleston v. United States (1988) 485 U.S. 681, 687 fn. 5,

690 [99 L.Ed.2d 771, 781], Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171,

175-176 [97 L.Ed.2d 144, 152-153]; and Dowling v. United States (1990) 493

U.S. 342, 347-348 [107 L.Ed.2d 708, 717, 718].)

Finally, defendant relies on Gibson v. Ortiz (9th Cir.2004) 387 F.3d 812, to

support his contention that CALJIC No. 2.50.01 is unconstitutional. Such reliance,

however, is misplaced. In Gibson, the jury was instructed, using CALJIC No.

2.50.1 and the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, and told that if it found, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had committed a prior sexual

offense, it could infer that he had a disposition to commit such offenses and that

he was likely to and did commit the charged offenses. The Ninth Circuit held that

the two instructions, read together, instructed the jury that it could find the

defendant guilty based solely on facts it found true merely by a preponderance of

the evidence. Although the jury was given other instructions on the burden of

proof, it was not told how those instructions should be harmonized with CALJIC

Nos. 2.50.1 and 2.50.01. (Gibson v. Ortiz, supra, at pp. 822-823.) Gibson is

inapposite. The Gibson court reviewed the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01,

which lacked the cautionary language contained in the 2002 version given in this

case and approved by Reliford. (See Gibson, supra, at pp. 817-819.) This

distinction was noted in the recent Ninth Circuit case, Hassinger v. Adams (9th

Circ. July 23, 2007, No. 06-15445 [WL 2095340] ), which distinguished Gibson

on this ground and found the cautionary language, in conjunction with the proper

reasonable doubt instruction, adequately addressed the constitutional concerns in

Gibson. Moreover, Gibson addressed the interplay between the former version of

CALJIC No. 2.50.01 and CALJIC No. 2.50.1-yet, as discussed infra, the court did

not give CALJIC No. 2.50.1 in this case. Additionally, we are bound by the

California Supreme Court's decision in Reliford, which unlike Hassinger, Gibson

notably fails to discuss or cite, over any federal circuit court decision, even on

federal issues. (See People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86.)

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Since we find no error with respect to the giving of CALJIC No. 2 .50.01, we

need not address defendant's claim of prejudice.

Respondent’s Lodged Document 2, pp. 13-19.

The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause is violated if

the trial court fails to properly instruct the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent until

proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004).

Thus, due process “requires the prosecution to prove every element charged in a criminal offense

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 820 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on

other grounds by Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 866 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing In re Winship, 397

U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). “Any jury instruction that ‘reduce[s] the level of proof necessary for the

Government to carry its burden ... is plainly inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted

presumption of innocence.’” Gibson, 387 F.3d at 820 (alterations in original) (quoting Cool v.

United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972)).

As noted by the California Court of Appeal, the California Supreme Court found

that the 2002 version of CALJIC 2.50.01 passed constitutional muster. People v. Reliford, 29

Cal. 4th 1007 (2003). Challenges to the constitutionality of the 2002 version of CALJIC No.

2.50.01 have been rejected by numerous federal courts in unpublished opinions on the basis that

“the 2002 version is materially different, as it includes an explicit admonition that the evidence

of a prior sexual offense is not, by itself, sufficient to convict the defendant of the charged

crimes.” Abel v. Sullivan, No. 08-55612, 2009 WL 1220761, * 3 (9th Cir. 2009); see e.g., Soto

v. Adams, 2010 WL 1286877, *11-12 (E.D.Cal. March 29, 2010) (2002 version); Barreto v.

Martel, 2010 WL 546586, *10-12 (N.D.Cal. Feb.10, 2010) (2002 version). In addition, the

instruction given in this case cautions the jury that the defendant must be proved guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of the charged offenses. (Clerk’s Transcript at 37-38.) For these reasons, the

undersigned finds that the denial of this claim by the California Court of Appeal was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. This claim should be

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denied.

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 9, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

gri2659.157

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