Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-01446/USCOURTS-caDC-07-01446-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Core Communications, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 5, 2008 Decided July 8, 2008

No. 07-1446

IN RE: CORE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

PETITIONER

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus 

to the Federal Communications Commission

Michael B. Hazzard argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was Joseph P. Bowser.

Joseph R. Palmore, Deputy General Counsel, argued the

cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Matthew B.

Berry, General Counsel, Richard K. Welch, Acting Deputy

Associate General Counsel, and Nandan M. Joshi, Counsel.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The Federal Communications

Commission (FCC) has twice failed to articulate a valid legal

justification for its rules governing intercarrier compensation for

telecommunications traffic bound for Internet service providers

(ISPs). In March 2000, this court vacated and remanded the

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Commission’s first attempt at a justification. In May 2002, we

rejected its second attempt, in that case remanding without

vacating because we thought there was a “non-trivial likelihood”

the Commission would be able to state a valid legal basis for its

rule.

No such justification has been forthcoming. Core

Communications, Inc., which is injured by the FCC’s rules, has

filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order

compelling the Commission to explain the legal authority upon

which the rules are based, on pain of vacatur if it fails to do so

within a fixed time. This is Core’s second petition seeking such

relief. We dismissed its first in 2005, “without prejudice to

refiling in the event of significant additional delay.” That delay

has now come to pass. It has been three years since we

dismissed Core’s first petition and six years since we remanded

the case to the FCC to do nothing more than state the legal

justification for its rules. At this point, the FCC’s delay in

responding to our remand is egregious. 

We therefore grant the writ of mandamus sought by Core

and direct the FCC to explain the legal basis for its ISP-bound

compensation rules within six months of the date of the oral

argument in this case. There will be no extensions of that

deadline. The rules will be vacated on the day after the

deadline, unless the court is notified that the Commission has

complied with our direction.

I

Our opinion in In re Core Communications, Inc., 455 F.3d

267 (D.C. Cir. 2006), sets forth much of the background

necessary to understand how this case arrived at its current

juncture, and we therefore borrow liberally from that exposition.

As we explained in Core, before high-speed broadband

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connections (such as cable modem and digital subscriber line

(DSL) service) became widely available, consumers generally

gained access to the Internet through “dial-up” connections

provided by local telephone companies. Under the dial-up

method, a consumer uses a line provided by a local exchange

carrier (LEC) -- usually an incumbent local exchange carrier

(ILEC) -- to dial the local telephone number of an Internet

service provider (ISP), which then connects the call to the

Internet. Typically, the ISP does not subscribe to the ILEC, but

instead subscribes to another LEC -- a competitive local

exchange carrier (CLEC) -- that interconnects with the

incumbent. Accordingly, a consumer who dials up to the

Internet usually obligates an originating ILEC to transfer the call

to a CLEC, which then delivers the call to the ISP. Core is a

CLEC. See id. at 270.

How this call is paid for is at the center of Core’s dispute

with the FCC. Section 251(b)(5) of the Communications Act of

1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,

requires LECs to “establish reciprocal compensation

arrangements for the transport and termination of

telecommunications.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5). Under a

reciprocal compensation arrangement, “[w]hen a customer of

carrier A makes a local call to a customer of carrier B, and

carrier B uses its facilities to connect, or ‘terminate,’ that call to

its own customer, the ‘originating’ carrier A is ordinarily

required to compensate the ‘terminating’ carrier B for the use of

carrier B’s facilities.” SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 490 (3d

Cir. 2005) (citing Global NAPs, Inc. v. FCC, 247 F.3d 252, 254

(D.C. Cir. 2001)); see In re Core, 455 F.3d at 270.

If ISP-bound traffic were governed by § 251(b)(5),

reciprocal compensation arrangements would be required for the

ILEC-to-CLEC hand-off just described, and ILECs would be

required to compensate CLECs -- like Core -- for completing

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1

Section 201 provides, in relevant part:

(a) It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in

interstate . . . communication by wire or radio to furnish

such communication service upon reasonable request

therefor; and, in accordance with the orders of the

Commission, in cases where the Commission . . . finds such

action necessary or desirable in the public interest, to

establish . . . charges applicable thereto and the divisions of

such charges . . . . 

(b) All charges . . . for and in connection with such

communication service, shall be just and reasonable . . . .

47 U.S.C. § 201.

their customers’ calls to ISPs. In 1996, however, the FCC

construed the “reciprocal compensation arrangements” provision

of § 251(b)(5) to “apply only to traffic that originates and

terminates within a local area.” Implementation of the Local

Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,

11 FCC Rcd 15,499, 16,013, ¶ 1034, 1996 WL 452885 (1996).

And in its 1999 Declaratory Ruling, the Commission concluded

that dial-up calls to an ISP for connection to the Internet are

non-local, and thus that § 251(b)(5) is inapplicable. See

Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Inter-Carrier Compensation

for ISP-Bound Traffic, 14 FCC Rcd 3689, 1999 WL 98037

(1999) (“Declaratory Ruling”). Instead, the FCC concluded that

ISP-bound calls constitute interstate traffic, subject to FCC

jurisdiction under § 201 of the Act.1

 See Implementation of the

Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of

1996, Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 16 FCC

Rcd 9151, 9152, ¶ 1, 2001 WL 455869 (2001) (“ISP Remand

Order”) (construing the Declaratory Ruling). 

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2

Section 251(g) provides, in relevant part:

On and after [the date of enactment of the

Telecommunications Act of 1996], each local exchange

carrier . . . shall provide exchange access, information

access, and exchange services for such access to

interexchange carriers and information service providers in

accordance with the same equal access and

nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and

obligations (including receipt of compensation) that apply

to such carrier on the date immediately preceding [the date

of enactment] under any . . . regulation, order, or policy of

the Commission, until such restrictions and obligations are

explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed by the

Commission after [the date of enactment].

In March 2000, this court held that the Commission had

inadequately explained its determination that ISP-bound traffic

is non-local. See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 7-8

(D.C. Cir. 2000). The FCC, we said, had failed to “provide an

explanation why th[e] [end-to-end] inquiry is relevant to

discerning whether a call to an ISP should fit within the local

call model . . . or the long-distance model.” Id. at 5. We

vacated and remanded the Declaratory Ruling, directing the

FCC to justify its determination. Id. at 9.

In 2001, the FCC responded to our decision in Bell Atlantic

with the ISP Remand Order. Once again, the Commission

concluded that calls delivered to ISPs are not subject to the

reciprocal compensation obligations of § 251(b)(5). See ISP

Remand Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9154, ¶ 3. But this time, rather

than base its conclusion on a determination that ISP-bound calls

are non-local and hence not subject to § 251(b)(5), the

Commission relied on a different statutory section, 47 U.S.C. §

251(g).2

 See id. at 9153, ¶ 1. According to the FCC, § 251(g)

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47 U.S.C. § 251(g).

was intended to exclude the kinds of traffic enumerated in that

subsection, specifically “exchange access, information access,

and exchange services for such access,” from the reciprocal

compensation requirement of § 251(b)(5). Id. at 9166-67, ¶ 34

(quoting § 251(g)). And it found that calls made to ISPs located

within the caller’s local calling area fall within those enumerated

categories -- specifically, that they constitute “information

access.” Id. at 9171, ¶ 42. Those calls, the FCC concluded, are

thus not subject to § 251(b)(5), but are instead subject to the

FCC’s regulatory authority under § 201. See id. at 9152-53, ¶ 1;

id. at 9165, ¶ 30; id. at 9175-81, ¶¶ 52-65.

The FCC next sought “to establish an appropriate cost

recovery mechanism for delivery of this [ISP-bound] traffic.”

Id. at 9154, ¶ 4. The Commission concluded that “the existing

intercarrier compensation mechanism . . . , in which the

originating carrier pays the carrier that serves the ISP, has

created opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and distorted the

economic incentives related to competitive entry into the local

exchange and exchange access markets.” Id. at 9153, ¶ 2. And

it announced that it was issuing -- in tandem with its ISP

Remand Order -- a notice of proposed rulemaking to consider

whether the Commission should replace existing intercarrier

compensation schemes with a “bill-and-keep” regime. Id.; see

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Developing a Unified

Intercarrier Compensation Regime, 16 FCC Rcd 9610, 2001

WL 455872 (2001) (“NPRM”). Under such a regime, “neither

of two interconnecting networks charges the other for

terminating traffic that originates on the other network. Instead,

each network recovers [its costs] from its own end-users.” ISP

Remand Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9153 n.6. Thus, in the typical

scenario discussed above, the originating ILEC would recover

its costs from the customer who initiated the call, while the

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CLEC would recover its costs from the ISP customer to which

it delivered the call.

Although the FCC issued the NPRM looking toward a

bill-and-keep regime, the Commission nonetheless deemed it

“prudent” not to switch immediately “to a new compensation

regime that would upset the legitimate business expectations of

carriers and their customers.” Id. at 9186, ¶ 77. It therefore

adopted “an interim intercarrier compensation regime for

ISP-bound traffic that serves to limit, if not end, the opportunity

for regulatory arbitrage, while avoiding a market-disruptive

‘flash cut’ to a pure bill and keep regime.” Id. at 9186-87, ¶ 77.

The interim regime, the FCC said, “will govern intercarrier

compensation for ISP-bound traffic until we have resolved the

issues raised in the intercarrier compensation NPRM.” Id. at

9187, ¶ 77. According to the FCC, this would be “a three-year

interim intercarrier compensation mechanism for the exchange

of ISP-bound traffic.” Id. at 9199, ¶ 98 (emphasis added).

The FCC’s interim regime has four provisions particularly

relevant to Core. Of these, the most important are the “rate

caps,” which establish a gradually declining maximum rate that

a carrier (typically, a CLEC) can charge another carrier

(typically, an ILEC) for delivering a call to an ISP. Id. at 9187,

¶ 78. As an adjunct to the rate caps, the Commission also

established a “mirroring rule,” which provides that the rate caps

on ISP-bound traffic apply only if the ILEC also offers to charge

the CLEC the same capped rate to terminate local traffic that

originates on the CLEC’s network. Id. at 9193-94, ¶ 89. The

other two provisions are “growth caps,” which impose a limit on

the total number of ISP-bound minutes for which a carrier can

receive intercarrier compensation, and a “new markets rule,”

which denies intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic in

markets where the carrier was “not exchanging traffic pursuant

to [an] interconnection agreement[] prior to adoption” of the

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Order. Id. at 9191, ¶ 86; id. at 9188-89, ¶ 81. See generally In

re Core, 455 F.3d at 273-74.

In WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002),

we reviewed the ISP Remand Order. Our opinion, issued on

May 3, 2002, rejected the FCC’s conclusion that § 251(g)

authorizes it to carve out ISP-bound calls from the requirement

of § 251(b)(5). See id. at 430. “Because that section is worded

simply as a transitional device,” we held, the FCC cannot rely

on § 251(g) to exclude ISP-bound calls from the scope of §

251(b)(5). Id. Section 251(g), we said “does not provide a basis

for the Commission’s action.” Id. at 434. 

This time, however, we did not vacate the FCC’s order.

Nor did we “address petitioners’ attacks on various interim

provisions devised by the Commission.” Id. at 430. Instead,

because we thought that there might “well be other legal bases

for adopting the rules chosen by the Commission for

compensation between the originating and the terminating LECs

in calls to ISPs,” we merely remanded to the Commission for

further proceedings, thus leaving the interim rules in effect. Id.;

see id. at 434. 

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 authorizes any

telecommunications carrier to petition the FCC to “forbear from

applying any regulation or any provision” of the Act. 47 U.S.C.

§ 160(a). On July 14, 2003, Core filed a petition asking the FCC

to forbear from applying the four interim provisions of the ISP

Remand Order. On October 8, 2004, the Commission granted

Core’s petition in part and denied it in part. The FCC granted

the request to forbear from enforcing the growth caps and new

markets rule, but denied Core’s petition with respect to the rate

caps and mirroring rule. Core then sought review in this court,

asking us to reverse the FCC’s partial denial of its petition for

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3

In the same opinion, we also denied a request by a group of

ILECs to reverse the FCC’s partial grant of Core’s forbearance

petition. In re Core, 455 F.3d at 270, 280-83.

forbearance. We denied Core’s request and upheld the

Commission’s decision. In re Core, 455 F.3d at 270, 275-80.3

Meanwhile, the FCC still had not responded to the

WorldCom remand. In June 2004, after two years had passed

without a response, Core petitioned this court for a writ of

mandamus. In its August 2004 response, the FCC argued that

mandamus was premature because “Commission staff recently

completed and forwarded to the Chairman of the FCC a draft

order addressing the WorldCom remand.” Resp. of FCC to Pet.

for Writ of Mandamus at 1 (Aug. 19, 2004). It further argued

that the delay was “not as long as the egregious delays that

historically have been found to warrant mandamus relief.” Id.

at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). “When this Court has

found the mandamus remedy to be appropriate,” the FCC stated,

“it generally has been confronted with delays of at least three

years.” Id. 

Based on this response, we deferred consideration of the

mandamus petition and directed the FCC to advise us, at 90-day

intervals, “of its progress in responding to the remand in

WorldCom.” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., No. 04-1179 (D.C.

Cir. Nov. 22, 2004). On March 4, 2005, FCC counsel reported

that the Commission had just released a “Further Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking [FNPRM] in the Intercarrier

Compensation docket in which it has been seeking, among other

things, to adopt permanent rules to succeed the interim

intercarrier compensation regime for Internet-bound traffic that

this Court reviewed in WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC.” Supp. Status

Report at 1 (Mar. 4, 2005). Based on the FCC’s representations

regarding the draft order and FNPRM, we denied Core’s

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4

The FCC also disagreed with Core’s contention that forbearance

would return ISP-bound traffic to a reciprocal compensation regime,

stating that, if “the Commission were to forbear from the rate

regulation preserved by section 251(g), there would be no rate

regulation governing the exchange of traffic currently subject to the

access charge regime.” 22 FCC Rcd at 14,126, ¶ 14. 

mandamus petition in May 2005, “without prejudice to refiling

in the event of significant additional delay.” In re Core

Commc’ns, Inc., No. 04-1179 (D.C. Cir. May 24, 2005). 

A year later, in April 2006, there was no word from the

FCC on the fate of the draft WorldCom order and no release of

permanent rules in response to the FNPRM. Core then filed a

second forbearance petition with the Commission, again asking,

among other things, for the FCC to forbear from applying the

(remaining) interim rules that carve out ISP-bound traffic from

the obligation to pay reciprocal compensation. The Commission

rejected Core’s petition, Petition of Core Communications, Inc.

for Forbearance from Sections 251(g) and 254(g) of the

Communications Act and Implementing Rules, 22 FCC Rcd

14,118, 2007 WL 2159638 (2007),4

 and Core has appealed that

decision. The case is currently on this circuit’s docket.

In October 2007, Core filed its second mandamus petition,

which is now before us. It asks that we compel the FCC to enter

an order, within 60 days, responding to our WorldCom remand

with an explanation of the legal basis for the rules that exclude

ISP-bound calls from the reciprocal compensation requirement

of § 251(b)(5). Core further requests that we vacate those rules

if the FCC does not issue such an order.

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5

See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC

(“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he statutory

commitment of review of FCC action to the Court of Appeals, read in

conjunction with the All Writs Act, affords this court jurisdiction over

claims of unreasonable Commission delay.” (citation omitted)); id. at

79 (“Congress has instructed statutory review courts to compel agency

action that has been unreasonably delayed. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).”); see

also In re American Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 414

(D.C. Cir. 2004); In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C.

Cir. 2000); In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d

545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (“The

Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may

issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective

jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”).

II

Core seeks a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1651(a), to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld

or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (Administrative

Procedure Act). This court’s jurisdiction and authority to grant

that request are undisputed.5

 Our consideration of any

mandamus petition “starts from the premise that issuance of the

writ is an extraordinary remedy, reserved only for the most

transparent violations of a clear duty to act.” In re Bluewater

Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000). There is, of

course, no doubt that the FCC has a “clear duty” to respond to

our WorldCom remand. “In the case of agency inaction,”

however, “we not only must satisfy ourselves that there indeed

exists such a duty, but that the agency has ‘unreasonably

delayed’ the contemplated action.” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. §

706(1)). The central question in evaluating “a claim of

unreasonable delay” is “whether the agency’s delay is so

egregious as to warrant mandamus.” Telecommunications

Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 79

(D.C. Cir. 1984). We consider that question below.

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A

“There is no per se rule as to how long is too long to wait

for agency action.” In re American Rivers & Idaho Rivers

United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In TRAC, we

outlined six factors relevant to the analysis. We cautioned that

those factors are not “ironclad,” but rather are intended to

provide “useful guidance in assessing claims of agency delay.”

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. The first and most important factor is

that “the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed

by a ‘rule of reason.’” Id. The remaining five are:

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other

indication of the speed with which it expects the

agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory

scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3)

delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of

economic regulation are less tolerable when human

health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should

consider the effect of expediting delayed action on

agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5)

the court should also take into account the nature and

extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the

court need not “find any impropriety lurking behind

agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is

‘unreasonably delayed.’”

In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545,

549 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). 

Both Core and the FCC dutifully address the six TRAC

factors individually, each party drawing different conclusions.

See Pet’r Br. 19-27; FCC Br. 13-23. But while those factors are

not unimportant here, we must begin by noting that the

procedural posture of this case is different from that of most of

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6

See, e.g., American Rivers, 372 F.3d 413; Mashpee Wampanoag

Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United

Mine Workers, 190 F.3d 545; Action on Smoking & Health v.

Department of Labor, 100 F.3d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Barr

Labs., 930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991); In re Monroe Commc’ns Corp.,

840 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

this circuit’s unreasonable delay cases. TRAC, and all of the

cases cited by the parties that employ its methodology, involved

delay by agencies in concluding their own rulemakings or in

responding to requests by private parties to take administrative

action.6

 The problem that confronts us here is different. In this

case, we are faced with the agency’s failure -- for six years -- to

respond to our own remand. In so doing, the agency has

effectively nullified our determination that its interim rules are

invalid, because our remand without vacatur left those rules in

place. Moreover, until the FCC states its explanation for its

interim rules in a final order, Core cannot mount a challenge to

those rules. In this way, the FCC insulates its nullification of

our decision from further review. But a federal court has

authority to issue a writ of mandamus to “prevent the frustration

of orders previously issued.” Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC

(“PEPCO”), 702 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1983). And

“[b]ecause the statutory obligation of a Court of Appeals to

review on the merits may be defeated by an agency that fails to

resolve disputes, a Circuit Court may resolve claims of

unreasonable delay in order to protect its future jurisdiction.”

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 76; see American Rivers, 372 F.3d at 419

(“[T]he primary purpose of the writ in circumstances like these

is to ensure that an agency does not thwart [the court’s]

jurisdiction by withholding a reviewable decision.”). 

Two precedents are most relevant to our disposition of this

case. The first is PEPCO, 702 F.2d 1026, a pre-TRAC case in

which we held that the ICC had unreasonably delayed the

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disposition of PEPCO’s challenge to the lawfulness of railroad

freight charges. Five years earlier we had remanded PEPCO’s

challenge to the Commission for further consideration, in

response to which the Commission reopened the proceedings,

then began an entirely new hearing, and then reopened the

proceedings again. Id. at 1029-30. Relying on “our inherent

power to construe the mandate of our earlier decision,” we

reviewed the “question whether PEPCO’s right to a timely

decision from the Commission ha[d] been violated.” Id. at

1032. We concluded that it had. Noting that “[a]gain and again

the Commission has promised to expedite this matter, but

without delivering,” we ordered the Commission to reach a final

decision on PEPCO’s challenge within 60 days. Id. at 1035.

The second precedent is Radio-Television News Directors

Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000), a case that cites

TRAC but does not address its six factors individually. See id.

at 272. Radio-Television began as a challenge to the FCC’s

personal attack and political editorial rules, which had been the

subject of a petition to rescind since 1980. In 1997, the

Commission decided (by an equally divided vote) not to repeal

the rules, but it offered no affirmative justification for that

decision. On appeal in 1999, we held that, “[w]ithout a clear

explanation for the rules, the court is not in a position to review

whether they continue to serve the public interest.” RadioTelevision News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 184 F.3d 872, 875 (D.C.

Cir. 1999). “Accordingly, rather than enjoining enforcement of

existing rules that the FCC might be able to justify,” we

“remand[ed] the case for the FCC to further explain its decision

not to repeal or modify them.” Id. That, we said, would put the

court “in a position to test the FCC’s rationale” should “a further

challenge be made to the FCC’s decision on remand.” Id.

Nine months later, the FCC had taken no action, and the

petitioners filed a petition for mandamus. The FCC responded

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7

Although our remand in Radio-Television had expressly stated

that “the FCC need act expeditiously,” 184 F.3d at 889, timeliness is

implicit in every remand by this court, see PEPCO, 702 F.2d at 1034

(“[O]ur remand in the earlier appeal to this court implicitly included

the understanding that the Commission would respond to our mandate

in a timely manner.”); cf. 47 U.S.C. § 402(h) (providing that, on

remand from this court, “it shall be the duty of the Commission . . . to

forthwith give effect” to the judgment of the court (emphasis added)).

by issuing an order temporarily suspending the rules for 60 days.

That order, we held, was “not responsive to the court’s remand.”

Radio-Television, 229 F.3d at 271. It did not provide a

justification for the rules, and “simply ha[d] the effect of further

postponing a final decision by the Commission.” Id. Noting

that “[t]he court has afforded repeated opportunities for the

Commission to take final action,” and that “[d]espite its filings

suggesting to the court that something would happen, the

Commission, once again, has done nothing to cure the

deficiencies of which it has been long aware,” we issued “a writ

of mandamus directing the Commission immediately to repeal

the personal attack and political editorial rules.” Id. at 272. 

The similarities between PEPCO and Radio-Television on

the one hand, and this case on the other, are clear. It is now

seven years since the FCC put in place the interim rules that it

said would last only three. It is now six years since we held, for

the second time, that the FCC’s legal justification for the rules

was invalid and remanded for the agency to provide a valid

justification. During all this time, the FCC has proceeded -- as

it did in PEPCO and Radio-Television -- to enforce rules for

which it has articulated no lawful basis. In PEPCO, we issued

the writ when the ICC failed to respond to our remand within

five years. In Radio-Television, we did so when the FCC failed

to respond within just nine months.7

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8

See also Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 750

F.2d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding a five-year delay unreasonable);

Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150,

1157-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding a three-year delay unreasonable).

As noted above, the first TRAC factor is that “the time

agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a ‘rule of

reason.’” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. PEPCO and Radio-Television

make clear that the FCC’s delay in responding to our WorldCom

remand is anything but reasonable, and that factor is decisive

here. Indeed, we have several times found similar delays

unreasonable even when the requests for action came from

private parties. For example, in MCI Telecommunications Corp.

v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1980), from which TRAC

derived its “rule of reason” standard, we found the FCC’s fouryear delay in determining a just and reasonable tariff to be

unreasonable. Id. at 325. And in American Rivers, we found

that FERC’s delay of six years in responding to a petition was

“nothing less than egregious.” 372 F.3d at 419.8

In the words of the fifth TRAC factor, it is also clear that

Core has been “prejudiced by delay.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80.

For seven years -- since the ISP Remand Order established the

interim rules -- Core has been subject to rate caps that it

estimates “result in rates 300-400% lower than other § 251(b)(5)

intercarrier compensation rates.” Pet’r Br. 14. It has been

subject to those caps notwithstanding that this court has found

invalid the only statutory basis the FCC has articulated to

support them. The FCC’s brief suggests that Core’s concerns

have less urgency because “[i]ncreasingly, end users are not

using dial-up connections to connect to the Internet, but, rather,

cable modem, DSL, and other broadband platforms.” FCC Br.

17 (emphasis omitted). Perhaps this makes Core’s concerns less

urgent to the FCC, but it makes them no less urgent to Core. As

discussed in Part II.B below, Core is seeking relief not only for

USCA Case #07-1446 Document #1126053 Filed: 07/08/2008 Page 16 of 26
17

the future, but for the period since 2001, when dial-up access to

the Internet was not yet as outmoded as the slide rule.

The FCC urges us to stay our hand until the conclusion of

its ongoing rulemaking proceeding “in which it is considering

comprehensive, industry-wide reforms to the system of

intercarrier compensation.” FCC Br. 1. “[T]his broad

rulemaking,” we are told, “will, among other things, address the

issues raised by this Court’s remand in WorldCom, Inc. v.

FCC.” Id. Indeed, counsel suggests that the Commission is on

the brink of concluding its rulemaking and responding to our

remand. We have heard this refrain before.

Seven years ago, in April 2001, the Commission issued an

NPRM that announced its intention to promulgate a

comprehensive regime to supersede what it said would be only

a “three-year” interim regime under the ISP Remand Order. 

See NPRM, 16 FCC Rcd 9610. In August 2004, in response to

Core’s first mandamus petition, the FCC advised us that

“Commission staff recently completed and forwarded to the

Chairman of the FCC a draft order addressing the WorldCom

remand.” Resp. of FCC to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus at 1 (Aug.

19, 2004). In light of this advice, we deferred consideration of

the petition and ordered status reports. In its March 2005 status

report, the FCC further advised that it had just issued a “Further

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Intercarrier

Compensation docket in which it has been seeking, among other

things, to adopt permanent rules to succeed the interim

intercarrier compensation regime for Internet-bound traffic that

this Court reviewed in WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC.” Supp. Status

Report at 1 (Mar. 4, 2005). On further inspection, it appears that

the FNPRM in question contained only a single, footnote

reference to the WorldCom order: “In this proceeding, the

Commission hopes to address the compensation regime for all

types of traffic, including ISP-bound traffic.” Further Notice of

USCA Case #07-1446 Document #1126053 Filed: 07/08/2008 Page 17 of 26
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Proposed Rulemaking, Developing a Unified Intercarrier

Compensation Regime, 20 FCC Rcd 4685, 4694 n.48, 2005 WL

495087 (2005) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, on that hope we

denied the petition, “without prejudice to refiling in the event of

significant additional delay.” In re Core, No. 04-1179 (May 24,

2005).

More than three years later, when “significant additional

delay” had indeed transpired, Core filed the instant petition.

Then, one business day before we heard oral argument in this

case, FCC counsel informed us that the Commission had issued

an order adopting an interim cap on the support that certain

telecommunications carriers can receive from the Universal

Service Fund. Quoting a press release from the FCC’s Wireline

Competition Bureau calling the order “‘a crucial first step’

toward ‘comprehensive reform’ not only of Universal Service

but also of intercarrier compensation,” counsel stated: “Now

that the Commission has capped payments from the fund, the

Commission can ‘move forward expeditiously on

comprehensive reform’ of intercarrier compensation.” FCC

Rule 28(j) Letter, May 2, 2008 (quoting Press Release, FCC,

Interim Cap Clears Path for Comprehensive Reform (May 2,

2008)). But the Commission order that the press release touts

does not mention comprehensive reform of intercarrier

compensation, let alone the specific problem of ISP-bound

traffic. Rather, it refers only to “comprehensive reform of highcost universal service support.” High-Cost Universal Service

Support, 45 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 3, ¶ 4, 2008 WL

1930572 (2008). And in any event, it is now far too late for the

Commission to be taking a “first step,” even if it is a “crucial”

one.

On the day of oral argument, the FCC made yet another

last-minute declaration of imminent action. Counsel informed

the court -- for the first time -- that the Chairman of the FCC had

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19

authorized him to represent that “the Chairman fully intends to

do everything he can to respond to the WorldCom remand within

six months.” Oral Arg. Recording at 22:18-23:03. The

Chairman will attempt, counsel advised, to “achieve broadbased comprehensive intercarrier compensation reform within

six months,” and “WorldCom would be part of that.” Id. While

this representation is welcome, the Chairman’s doing

“everything he can” may not suffice, as he may not be able to

enforce his will on his fellow Commissioners. In any event, the

representation is not enforceable unless backed up by issuance

of the writ. At some point, promises are no longer enough, and

we must end the game of “administrative keep-away.”

American Rivers, 372 F.3d at 420. 

In granting the writ of mandamus, we do not second-guess

the FCC’s policy judgment to pursue a comprehensive solution

to the problem of intercarrier compensation. See Action on

Smoking & Health v. Department of Labor, 100 F.3d 991, 994

(D.C. Cir. 1996). But as we said in MCI, in response to a

similar plea by the FCC to allow it to continue in effect rates

that had been found unsupported pending the issuance of

“comprehensive procedures”: “[T]here must be some limit to

the time tariffs unjustified under the law can remain in effect .

. . . Otherwise, the regulatory scheme Congress has crafted

becomes anarchic . . . .” 627 F.2d at 325. We are also, as

always, “acutely aware of the limits of our institutional

competence in [a] highly technical area,” Grand Canyon Air

Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and

loath to “interfere with the agency’s internal processes,” United

Mine Workers, 190 F.3d at 553. But what Core asks us to do is

neither technical nor intrusive. Core does not ask the FCC to

promulgate any particular rule or policy; it asks only that the

Commission state the legal authority for the current rule that

refuses Core the right to reciprocal compensation. Either the

FCC has such authority or it does not. If the FCC believes it has

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20

authority, it should not take six years to put its rationale in

writing. Even if the Commission ultimately decides to include

ISP-bound traffic in a more comprehensive scheme, it still must

have statutory authority to do so. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (“[A]n

administrative agency’s power to regulate . . . must always be

grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.”). Stating

that rationale now should not impede the FCC’s broader

rulemaking project. 

B

The FCC urges us, in the event we do not reject Core’s

mandamus request outright, to defer a final resolution until this

circuit rules on Core’s appeal of the FCC’s denial of its second

forbearance petition. In that petition, Core asked the FCC to

forbear from applying the interim rules that cap its

compensation. On appeal, Core intends to argue not only that its

forbearance petition should have been granted, but that it was

“deemed granted” by operation of law because the FCC did not

deny the petition until after the statutory deadline had passed.

See 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) (providing that any forbearance petition

“shall be deemed granted if the Commission does not deny” it

within the specified time period). Core further intends to argue

that, as a consequence, compensation for ISP-bound traffic is no

longer governed by the interim intercarrier compensation rules,

but is instead governed by § 251(b)(5)’s reciprocal

compensation regime. 

Although the Commission believes Core’s position lacks

merit and intends to oppose its appeal of the denial of

forbearance, FCC counsel argues that we should defer

consideration of mandamus until that appeal is decided. If Core

were to prevail in its forbearance appeal, counsel argues, the

Commission could no longer apply the interim compensation

USCA Case #07-1446 Document #1126053 Filed: 07/08/2008 Page 20 of 26
21

rules and Core’s problem would be solved. Because mandamus

is an extraordinary remedy, available only if a party has “no

other adequate means to attain the relief [it] desires,” Allied

Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980), the FCC

contends that we should not consider issuing the writ unless and

until the alternative of a forbearance appeal is foreclosed.

But Core’s appeal of the denial of forbearance is not an

adequate means to attain the relief it seeks. As Core explains,

forbearance offers only prospective relief: forbearance by the

Commission “from applying” the interim rules in the future. 47

U.S.C. § 160(a). Core, however, seeks retroactive relief as well.

In the late 1990s -- prior to the FCC’s carve-out of ISP-bound

traffic -- Core entered into contracts with various ILECs that

provided reciprocal compensation for the ISP-bound traffic that

Core terminated. The ISP Remand Order capped Core’s

compensation at lower levels. 

Core maintains that only the grant of a writ of mandamus

will make it whole by making retroactive relief available. If we

compel the FCC to state its legal justification for the interim

rules, and if that justification is not forthcoming or is invalid, we

will vacate those rules. Core argues that this will mean there

never was any lawful justification for the caps on its

compensation: i.e., that “the FCC has enforced an ultra vires

compensation regime since 2001.” Pet’r Reply Br. 2. And that

result, Core contends, will entitle it to retroactive compensation

under its pre-existing contracts with the ILECs. FCC counsel

does not deny this contention, saying only that it is a “very

complex question . . . which I can’t really speak to.” Oral Arg.

Recording at 20:33. We thus cannot conclude that Core’s

appeal of the FCC’s denial of forbearance offers an adequate

alternative means of attaining the relief Core desires.

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22

9

The Telecommunications Act requires the FCC to “forbear from

applying any regulation or any provision [of the Act] . . . to a

telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service” if it

determines that:

(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not

necessary to ensure that the . . . regulations . . . in

connection with that telecommunications carrier or

telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are

not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory;

(2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not

necessary for the protection of consumers; and

(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation

is consistent with the public interest.

47 U.S.C. § 160(a); see In re Core, 455 F.3d at 277.

We also note that the resolution of an appeal from the

FCC’s denial of forbearance regarding the interim compensation

rules will not vindicate this court’s own interest in seeing that its

mandate is honored. That mandate was to explain the legal basis

for those rules so that their validity could ultimately be

evaluated. An appeal from the denial of forbearance, by

contrast, looks at the reasonableness of the FCC’s determination

of three quite different issues.9 The additional point Core

intends to raise, that its petition must be “deemed granted”

pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), is likewise unrelated to the

FCC’s legal authority for its interim intercarrier compensation

scheme.

C

There remains only the question of the content of the writ

that we will issue. Core asks us to direct the FCC to promulgate

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23

an order that explains the statutory authority for its interim rules,

and to vacate those rules if the FCC does not issue such an order

within 60 days. Although Core urges us to impose a 60-day

deadline, it is clear that obtaining a fixed deadline is Core’s

foremost concern. Oral Arg. Recording at 28:56-29:35. 

As we noted above, in an effort to stave off Core’s request,

FCC counsel represented that the Commission’s Chairman

intends to achieve comprehensive intercarrier compensation

reform within six months. Such reform, counsel advised, would

include a response to our WorldCom remand. We will give the

Chairman a chance to meet that schedule, and will direct the

Commission to issue its explanation by November 5, 2008 -- six

months from the day that representation was made. 

We agree with Core, however, that this must be the end of

the Commission’s delay. The first time we determined that the

rationale for the rules was invalid, in Bell Atlantic, we vacated

as well as remanded. 206 F.3d at 9. In less than a year, the FCC

issued a new order with a new rationale. When we concluded in

WorldCom that the FCC’s second rationale was also invalid, we

plainly had authority to vacate again. See 5 U.S.C. § 706

(stating that a reviewing court shall “set aside” agency action

found to be “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or

limitations, or short of statutory right”); see also Allied-Signal,

Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51

(D.C. Cir. 1993). Instead, we chose only to remand, believing

that there was a “non-trivial likelihood” that the Commission

would be able to state a valid legal basis for its rules.

WorldCom, 288 F.3d at 434; see Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 151

(noting that, when there is a “serious possibility that the

Commission will be able to substantiate its decision on remand,”

we may remand without vacating). This time, there was no

prompt response -- only six years of promises and further delay.

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24

Having repeatedly, and mistakenly, put our faith in the

Commission, we will not do so again. If the FCC cannot, within

six months, explain its legal authority for the interim rules, we

can only presume that this is because there is in fact no such

authority. Under those conditions, vacatur is indicated. See

Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 150-51. Accordingly, the rules will

be vacated on November 6, 2008, unless the court is notified

that the Commission has complied with our direction before that

date. 

III

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the writ of mandamus

and direct the FCC to respond to our 2002 WorldCom remand by

November 5, 2008. That response must be in the form of a final,

appealable order that explains the legal authority for the

Commission’s interim intercarrier compensation rules that

exclude ISP-bound traffic from the reciprocal compensation

requirement of § 251(b)(5). No extensions of this deadline will

be granted. The rules are hereby vacated on November 6, 2008,

unless the court is notified that the Commission has complied

with our direction before that date. This panel of the court will

retain jurisdiction over the case to ensure compliance with our

decision. See MCI, 627 F.2d at 325.

So ordered.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join the court’s 

well-reasoned opinion. The circumstances that occasion 

today’s decision lead me to question the wisdom of the openended remand without vacatur. In WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, we 

opted for such a remedy after concluding that the Federal 

Communications Commission (“FCC”) had issued an order 

without establishing statutory authorization. 288 F.3d 429, 

434 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The FCC ignored our request for a 

better explanation of its statutory authority, and six years later 

we are forced to clean up a mess we helped create. There is a 

lesson here. 

Remand without vacatur is common in this circuit, 

especially after our decision in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993). But experience suggests that this remedy 

sometimes invites agency indifference. See Natural Res. Def. 

Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1262–64 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(Randolph, J., concurring) (“A remand-only disposition is, in 

effect, an indefinite stay of the effectiveness of the court’s 

decision and agencies naturally treat it as such.”); Kristina 

Daugirdas, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A 

New Judicial Remedy for Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 

N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 301–05 (2005) (describing instances of 

multi-year delay). Today’s decision is a case in point. After 

waiting in vain for the FCC to respond to WorldCom of its 

own volition, we are forced to resort to the “extraordinary 

remedy” of mandamus to compel the agency to act. In re 

Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000). I 

join in today’s decision to break out the big stick, but I hope 

that in the future we will take greater care to avoid putting 

ourselves in situations where doing so is necessary. 

In writing separately, I do not address the disputed 

legality of remand without vacatur under the Administrative 

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Compare Checkosky v. 

SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 462–66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (separate opinion 

USCA Case #07-1446 Document #1126053 Filed: 07/08/2008 Page 25 of 26
2 

of Silberman, J.) (declaring the practice lawful), and Sugar 

Cane Growers Co-op v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 98 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (same), with Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 490–93 (separate 

opinion of Randolph, J.) (declaring the practice unlawful), 

and Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 758 (D.C. 

Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (same). I simply urge 

future panels to consider the alternatives to the open-ended 

remand without vacatur. See, e.g., A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. 

Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (remanding 

without vacatur but ordering a rule “vacated automatically” 

absent adequate justification from the agency within 90 days); 

Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 817–18 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 

(remanding without vacatur but ordering “complet[ion of] the 

new rule-making process within 120 days of the issuance of 

this opinion”); Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 

855, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (vacating regulations 

but inviting “a motion to delay issuance of the mandate”); 

Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 374 F.3d 1363, 1374–75 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004) (Randolph, J., concurring) (“It is easy to forget that 

when we vacate and remand, as we are doing here, there will 

be a safety valve. The agency, and any intervenors on its side, 

will have the opportunity to file post-decision motions 

demonstrating why an unlawful order or rule should remain in 

place during proceedings on remand.”) (citing U.S. Tel. Ass’n 

v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 

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