Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01845/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01845-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Linda Berkery
Appellant
Wissahickon School District Board of Directors
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-1845

___________

LINDA BERKERY,

 Appellant

v.

WISSAHICKON SCHOOL DISTRICT 

BOARD OF DIRECTORS, As it is presently 

constituted and as it was constituted 

on 10/17/13 (WSB); YOUNG K. PARK; 

JANICE SINGER; CHARLES MCINTYRE; 

MARJORIE A. BROWN; BARBARA P. MOYER; 

SETH E. GRANT; BURUNDA PRINCE-JONES; 

RICHARD P. STANTON; BARBARA ULLERY; 

JUDITH M. CLARK; DR. CHRISTOPHER MARCHESE; 

WADE COLEMAN; CATHERINE ROSSI; 

WISSAHICKON SCHOOL DISTRICT(WSD);

WADE T. COLEMAN, Individually and 

as transportation liason, WSD; CATHERINE ROSSI, 

Individually & as director of personnel, WSD;

MARIE E. CARSILLO, Individually & 

as Director of Transportation, WSD

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 14-cv-05265)

District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 5, 2015

Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 7, 2015)

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___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Linda Berkery appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellees’ motion to 

dismiss. For the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

The procedural history of this case and the details of Berkery’s claims are well 

known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s thorough memorandum opinion, and 

need not be discussed at length. Briefly, Berkery, who worked as a driver of a school 

van, was suspended without pay for three days. In her complaint, Berkery alleged that 

her suspension violated her due process and equal protection rights and was in retaliation 

for her exercise of her First Amendment rights. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss 

which the District Court granted. It also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over Berkery’s state law claims. Berkery filed a notice of appeal. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s order 

granting the motion to dismiss de novo. Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 

(3d Cir. 2010). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation omitted). It 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 15-1845 Document: 003112094397 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/07/2015
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is not enough for a plaintiff to offer only conclusory allegations or a simple recital of the 

elements of a claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Berkery argues that her suspension violated her due process rights because she did 

not receive notice or a hearing. Berkery was entitled to notice of the charges against her, 

an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to give her side of the story. 

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985). In her complaint, 

Berkery admitted that she spoke with her supervisor, Appellee Carsillo, on September 9, 

2013, and Carsillo expressed her concerns that Berkery’s route could be driven in less 

time than Berkery took to drive it. A few days later, they discussed the issue again. 

Carsillo subsequently left Berkery a series of notes concerning the time for the route and 

her sign-in time. On October 16, 2013, a union representative told Berkery that Carsillo 

wanted to see her. Carsillo then told Berkery that there would be a meeting the next day 

at the Central Office to discuss the issue. 

Berkery met with the president of her union as well as another representative 

shortly before the meeting. Berkery admitted that Carsillo and Coleman presented their 

allegations and evidence against her at the meeting and that she responded by denying the 

allegations. She was also asked to describe her interactions with her passenger’s family 

and a school aide as well as anything unusual that had happened that week during her 

route. Thus, according to her own allegations, Berkery had notice of the hearing, an 

explanation of the evidence against her, and the opportunity to give her side of the story. 

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We agree with the District Court that Berkery cannot state a claim for the denial of due 

process.

Berkery also alleged that Appellees caused injury to her reputation. To state a 

claim that she was deprived of her liberty interest in her reputation, Berkery must allege a 

stigma to her reputation plus the deprivation of another right or interest. Hill v. Borough 

of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006). If a public employer publishes a 

defamatory impression of an employee in connection with a termination, the employee

has been deprived of a liberty interest and is entitled to a name-clearing hearing. See id. 

The District Court correctly noted that Berkery failed to allege any defamatory statements 

on which her claim was based. She merely claimed that Appellee Carsillo “repeat[ed] 

her false version of facts to her office staff.” On appeal, Berkery still does not give 

details of any false statements made about her. Rather, she argues that she will need to 

engage in discovery because false statements are usually made in secret. We agree with 

the District Court that Berkery has not stated a claim of a deprivation of a liberty interest 

in her reputation.

Berkery asserted that Appellees violated her First Amendment rights by retaliating 

against her for her speech. To state a claim of retaliation under the First Amendment as a 

public employee, Berkery must allege that her speech was both protected by the First 

Amendment and was a substantial or motivating factor in her employer’s adverse action. 

Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., --- F.3d ---, No. 14-3509, 2015 WL 5167011, at *9 (3d 

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Cir. Sept. 4, 2015). For the speech to be protected, it must involve a matter of public 

concern and the employee must speak as a citizen and not an employee. Id. 

Again, Berkery does not specify what speech of hers caused her suspension. She 

claims that she cannot remember all of her conversations with her passenger’s family and 

the school aide. Moreover, she denies that she ever made the statements implied by a 

hypothetical question at the hearing – Appellee Coleman allegedly asked Berkery if it 

would be appropriate for Berkery to discuss with the school aide whether a late arrival 

would interfere with her passenger’s schooling. Appellee Rossi purportedly questioned a 

conversation Berkery had with the passenger’s grandfather.1 In her complaint, Berkery

described the speech at issue as “normal and ordinary conversations” with her 

passenger’s grandfather and the arrival aide at the school. Berkery has not sufficiently 

alleged that the speech at issue involved a matter of public concern. See id. (“[S]peech 

that relates solely to mundane employment grievances does not implicate a matter of 

public concern.”) The District Court did not err in dismissing her claim of a First 

Amendment violation.

Berkery also sought to raise an equal protection claim as a “class of one.” 

However, she admits that such a claim by a public employee is foreclosed by the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 

 

1

In her rebuttal to the Personnel Performance Report summarizing the hearing, Berkery 

admitted telling her passenger’s guardian that because of her later start time, she was not 

getting her passenger to school on time. “The reason I told him that is that it happens to 

be true.” Compl. Ex. G at 3.

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591 (2008). We cannot, as Berkery requests, give weight to the dissenting opinion in 

Engquist.

Berkery also argues that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to grant 

her leave to amend her complaint. When a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to 

state a claim, the District Court must permit a curative amendment unless an amendment 

would be futile. Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2013). 

Here, the District Court determined that any amendment by Berkery would be futile. We 

agree. As noted above, Berkery admits that she cannot state what false statements were 

allegedly made about her and cannot remember what speech of hers purportedly led to 

her suspension. Thus, she admits that she cannot cure the deficiencies in her First 

Amendment and stigma-plus claims. Moreover, the allegations in her complaint establish 

that she received due process with respect to her suspension, and she admits that her 

equal protection claim fails as a matter of law. No amended factual allegations could 

give life to those claims.

For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will 

affirm the District Court’s order.2

 

2 Because we have determined that Berkery’s allegations fail to state a claim, we need not 

reach Appellees’ argument that her claims should be dismissed for her failure to properly 

grieve them under the collective bargaining agreement by submitting them to arbitration.

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