Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08087/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deepwater Investments, Limited
Appellee
Jackson Hole Ski Corporation
Appellant
Paul M. McCollister
Appellant

Document Text:

• .; tLtiP 

Uni ld StRt~f {,oqrt of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT APR 12 1990 

DEEPWATER INVESTMENTS, LIMITED, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JACKSON HOLE SKI CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

DEEPWATER INVESTMENTS, LIMITED, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JACKSON HOLE SKI CORPORATION; and 

PAUL M. MCCOLLISTER, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

:ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 88-2474 

) (D.C. No. 88-0048-B) 

) ( D. Wyo.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-8087 

) (D.C. No. 88-0048-B 

) ( D. Wyo. ) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-8087 Document: 01019971278 Date Filed: 04/12/1990 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument . 

The parties have been advised that the court was considering 

summary dismissal of these appeals for lack of appellate 

jurisdiction. 

On August 19, 1988, the district court entered an order 

granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Deepwater 

Investments, Ltd. (Deepwater) and denying the motion to amend the 

answer and counterclaim filed by defendant-appellant Jackson Hole 

Ski Corp. (JHSC). The order advised the parties that the court 

intended to order specific performance of the contract at issue 

and directed Deepwater to submit an appropriate order of specific 

performance within sixty days. The order further provided that 

JHSC would have thirty days after service of the proposed specific 

performance order in 

the court would hold 

appropriate remedy. 

which to file objections thereto, and that 

a hearing if necessary to fashion an 

JHSC filed a notice of appeal from the court's order on 

August 19, 1988, without waiting for the district court to enter 

an actual order of specific performance. The notice of appeal was 

docketed as No. 88-2474. We subsequently directed the parties to 

submit briefs on whether the district court's order of 

August 19, 1988, was a final, appealable order. Contemporaneously 

with our order, Deepwater and JHSC petitioned the court to stay 

consideration of the merits of appeal No. 88-2474 for a period of 

thirty days following entry of an order for specific performance 

by the district court. By order dated October 19, 1988, we 

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Appellate Case: 89-8087 Document: 01019971278 Date Filed: 04/12/1990 Page: 2 
deferred ruling on the parties' joint application for stay until 

we ruled on the jurisdictional issue. 

On March 20, 1989, JHSC filed a motion seeking a partial 

remand of appeal No. 88-2474 so that the district court could 

enter an order for specific performance. JHSC informed this court 

that the district court believed that it was without jurisdiction 

to enter the specific performance order due to the pending appeal. 

But see Century Laminating, Ltd. v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563, 567 

(10th Cir.)("a district court retains jurisdiction if the notice 

of appeal is untimely filed or refers to a non-appealable order"), 

cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 987 (1979). We granted the motion for 

partial remand on April 10, 1989. 

On September 26, 1989, the district court entered an order 

for specific performance. The court also entered an order 

granting Deepwater's motion to add Paul M. Mccollister as a party 

defendant, and sua sponte entering summary judgment against Mr. 

Mccollister. On October 10, 1989, within ten days of the court's 

orders of September 26th, JHSC filed a motion seeking 

reconsideration of those orders, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(e), and seeking a stay of the orders pending resolution of any 

possible appeals, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62. (As grounds for 

its request for stay, JHSC also cited Fed. R. App. P. 8 which 

clearly does not apply to a district court.) 

Before the district court ruled on JHSC's motion for 

reconsideration and for stay, JHSC and Mccollister filed a notice 

of appeal from the September 26th orders. That notice was 

docketed as appeal No. 89-8087. A few days later, JHSC filed a 

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Appellate Case: 89-8087 Document: 01019971278 Date Filed: 04/12/1990 Page: 3 
motion to stay appeal No. 88-2474 for a period of thirty days 

following the district court's ruling on defendant's Rule 59 

motion. JHSC and Mccollister also filed an emergency motion in 

appeal No. 89-8087 seeking a stay of the district court's order of 

specific performance pending resolution of the appeal, pursuant to 

Fed. R. App. P. 8. 

We granted the request for a stay of the specific performance 

order on October 25, 1989, and also directed the parties to submit 

briefs on the issue of whether the notice of appeal in case No. 

89-8087 was premature due to the pending Rule 59 motion. 

We now address the jurisdictional issues presented in these 

two appeals. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, "courts of appeals 

. have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the 

district courts " A final decision is one that "'ends the 

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 

but execute the judgment.'" Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 

U.S. 463, 467 (1978)(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 

229, 233 (1945)). JHSC contends that the district court's order 

of August 19, 1988, at issue in appeal No. 88-2474, is a final 

decision because the order specifically described the remedial 

decree that would be entered thereafter. We do not agree. 

A review of the district court's orders of August 19, 1988, 

and September 26, 1989, reveals that the earlier order clearly was 

not final. JHSC itself described the later order as "practically 

determin[ing] the rights of the parties.'' Appellants' Docketing 

Statement, Appeal No. 89-8087 at 4. A notice of appeal filed from 

a nonfinal order is premature. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8087 Document: 01019971278 Date Filed: 04/12/1990 Page: 4 
In Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 

1988), we noted that when a party files a notice of appeal from a 

nonfinal order that has become final before we act to dismiss the 

appeal, "we will consider the appeal on its merits rather than 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. . In such cases generally 

we will consolidate or companion the earlier appeal with any 

subsequent appeals arising out of the same district court case." 

As will be discussed below, although JHSC filed another appeal 

arising from the same district court case, that appeal is a 

nullity because it was filed while a Rule 59 motion was pending in 

the district court. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount 

Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982). Furthermore, the Rule 59 motion 

rendered the orders of September 26, 1989, nonfinal for purposes 

of appellate jurisdiction. See Chapman v. Continental Ill. Nat'l 

Bank & Trust Co., No. 88-1509, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. 

Sept. 22, 1989)(1989 WL 109445). 

The district court's docket sheet reflects that the district 

court has not ruled on JHSC's outstanding Rule 59 motion. 

Therefore, the court's order for specific performance is not 

final, and our statements in Lewis, above, do not apply. We must 

dismiss the appeal in No. 88-2474 for lack of jurisdiction since 

the order appealed from is not a final decision pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. § 1291. 

We turn now to appeal No. 89-8087. The law is 

well-established that an effective notice of appeal cannot be 

filed from a judgment while a timely motion seeking to alter or 

amend that judgment is still pending in the district court. See 

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Appellate Case: 89-8087 Document: 01019971278 Date Filed: 04/12/1990 Page: 5 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4); Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 109 S. Ct. 

987, 990 (1989); Griggs, 459 U.S. at 61. JHSC acknowledged this 

fact the very day it filed its notice of appeal in case No. 

89-8087. In its motion for stay of appeal No. 88-2474, dated 

October 17, 1989, JHSC said: "the merits of those orders [entered 

September 26, 1989,] cannot be considered on appeal until after 

the Court below rules on the Rule 59(e) motion for 

reconsideration." Notice of Motion and Motion for Stay at 3-4. 

Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) provides: 

If a timely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: 

... (iii) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 

judgment; or (iv) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the 

time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 

of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying 

any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before 

the disposition of any of the above motions shall have 

no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within 

the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order 

disposing of the motion as provided above. No 

additional fees shall be required for such filing. 

We have held that "[t]he requirements of Rule 4(a)(4) are 

'mandatory and jurisdictional,' and we are not empowered to 

override a congressional mandate on the ground that it is 

inconveniently and mechanically applied." Chapman, slip op. at 

6-7. 

The notice of appeal in No. 89-8087 "was not merely 

defective; it was a nullity .. In short, it is as if no 

notice of appeal were filed at all. And if no notice of appeal is 

filed at all, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to act." 

Griggs, 459 U.S. at 61. We, therefore, must dismiss the appeal in 

No. 89-8087 for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8087 Document: 01019971278 Date Filed: 04/12/1990 Page: 6 
Finally, we must address the fate of the stay of the district 

court's order for specific performance that we entered on 

October 25, 1989. Deepwater contends that the stay must be 

vacated because we lack jurisdiction ove r the appeals and, 

therefore, lack jurisdiction to enter a stay pursuant to 

Fed. R. App. P. 8. JHSC and Mccollister, on the other hand, argue 

that even if we lack jurisdiction over the appeals, we have 

jurisdiction to enter a stay of the district court's specific 

performance order pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

62(g), 28 u.s.c. § 1292(a)(l), and 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 

We agree with Deepwater and are not persuaded by the 

arguments of JHSC and Mccollister. First, Rule 8 of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure is not an independent grant of 

jurisdiction; it presupposes a valid appeal. See Century 

Laminating, Ltd., 595 F.2d at 569. Second, Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(g) 

does not confer any jurisdiction on us to enter a stay of a 

district court order; it merely provides that Rule 62 does not 

limit any power an appellate court might otherwise have to stay 

proceedings during the pendency of an appeal. 

Third, the district court's specific performance order is not 

an interlocutory order appealable under § 1292(a)(l), since it 

"granted appellee[] the relief [it] requested and did not 

contemplate any further action by the court." Martinez v. 

Sullivan, 874 F.2d 751, 753 (10th Cir. 1989). Moreover, even if 

the order were interlocutory, JHSC and Mccollister still would 

have to comply with Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) to appeal the order. 

Martinez, 874 F.2d at 753. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8087 Document: 01019971278 Date Filed: 04/12/1990 Page: 7 
Finally, JHSC and Mccollister have not shown that they are 

entitled to a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 

staying the district court's specific performance order. Among 

the conditions a party must satisfy before a court may issue a 

writ of mandamus are 

that the party seeking issuance of the writ have no 

other adequate means to attain the relief he desires, 

and that he satisfy "the burden of showing that [his] 

right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and 

indisputable.'" 

Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 

(1976}(citation omitted). 

403 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b), a district court may "stay 

the execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judgment pending 

the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a 

judgment made pursuant to Rule 59 II Furthermore, a 

district court "may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an 

injunction during the pendency of the appeal" from an 

interlocutory or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies 

an injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). 

When JHSC and Mccollister filed their emergency motion for 

stay with this court, they said that JHSC had filed a motion with 

the district court for stay of the specific performance order, but 

that the district court judge was on an extended trip abroad and 

would not be able to rule on the motion before the time for 

specific performance came due. We have stayed the operation of 

the specific performance order to date. JHSC and Mccollister may 

seek a further stay of the order from the district court pursuant 

to Rule 62. Since JHSC and Mccollister have "other adequate means 

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Appellate Case: 89-8087 Document: 01019971278 Date Filed: 04/12/1990 Page: 8 
to attain the relief [they] desire[]," Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403, 

issuance of a writ of mandamus would be inappropriate at this 

time. 

The appeals in cases No. 88-2474 and No. 89-8087 are 

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. The stay of the order of the 

district court entered on September 26, 1989, in case No. 

88-0048-B in the United States District Court for the District of 

Wyoming is VACATED. 

The mandates shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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