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Parties Involved:
State of Rhode Island
Intervenor for Respondent
State of Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management
Respondent
W. Michael Sullivan
Respondent
Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 7, 2008 Decided May 2, 2008

No. 07-1235

WEAVER'S COVE ENERGY, LLC,

PETITIONER

v.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

MANAGEMENT AND W. MICHAEL SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF

THE RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

MANAGEMENT,

RESPONDENTS

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,

INTERVENOR

______

Consolidated with 07-1238

______

On Petition for Review of the Inaction of the Rhode Island

Department of Environmental Management

______

Bruce F. Kiely argued the cause for petitioner. With him on

the briefs were G. Mark Cook and Adam J. White.

Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney

General's Office of Commonwealth of Massachusetts, argued

the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Martha

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Coakley, Attorney General, Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General,

Attorney General’s Office of the State of Rhode Island, Paul J.

Roberti, Assistant Attorney General, Terence J. Tierney, Special

Assistant Attorney General, Patty Allison Fairweather, Marisa

A. Desautel, and Susan B. Wilson, Attorneys, and Alan I. Baron.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Weaver’s Cove Energy, LLC

(WCE) applied to the Rhode Island Department of

Environmental Management (RIDEM) and the Massachusetts

Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) for

“certifications” that its proposed dredge-and-fill operations

would comply with the Clean Water Act. When a year had

passed without the state agencies having issued final

determinations one way or the other, WCE petitioned this court

for review of their inaction, seeking a declaration that the States

had “waived” their right to deny the requested certifications.

Instead, we must dismiss the petitions for want of a case or

controversy under Article III of the Constitution of the United

States.

I. Background

WCE wants to build a liquefied natural gas (LNG) import

terminal in Massachusetts. In order to render the facility

operational, WCE will have to dredge parts of the Taunton River

in Massachusetts and of Mount Hope Bay in Rhode Island.

WCE needs several permits before it can proceed with the

project, including, as relevant here, a dredge-and-fill permit

from the Army Corps of Engineers issued pursuant to § 404 of

the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1344. WCE’s 2004

application for that permit is pending. So, too, is WCE’s

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*

Whether WCE needs a § 401 certification from the RIDEM in

order to obtain a permit from the Army Corps is uncertain. WCE

asked the RIDEM to approve its proposed dredging, but the

regulations of the Army Corps provide that, unlike an application for

filling, an application for dredging does not require a § 401

certification. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d), 325.1(d). The RIDEM

nonetheless maintains that WCE must obtain a § 401 certification in

order to dredge, and we assume as much for the purpose of this case.

WCE's application to the MassDEP concerns both dredging and

filling, so it is undisputed that WCE needs a § 401 certification from

the MassDEP.

application to the United States Coast Guard for a letter of

recommendation certifying that the waterway near the terminal

is suitable for LNG marine traffic. See 33 C.F.R. § 127.009.

Under § 401(a)(1) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1), an

applicant for any federal permit that “may result in any

discharge into the navigable waters” of the United States - such

as a dredge-and-fill permit from the Army Corps - “shall provide

the ... permitting agency a certification from the State in which

the discharge originates ... that any such discharge will comply

with the applicable provisions” of the Act. For the State to

participate in the regulatory process, it must act expeditiously:

“[I]f the State ... fails or refuses to act on a request for

certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall not

exceed one year) after receipt of such request, the certification

requirements ... shall be waived with respect to such Federal

application.” Id.

In early 2004 WCE submitted applications for § 401

certifications to the RIDEM and the MassDEP.*

 When two

years had passed without the MassDEP deciding whether

WCE’s application was “administratively complete,” 310

C.M.R. § 4.04(2)(b)(1), WCE amended its application; the

MassDEP accepted the application as complete in December

2006. Meanwhile, the RIDEM had informed WCE that its

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application was incomplete eight months after its submission;

WCE submitted an updated application in January 2006 and, at

the RIDEM’s request, continued to submit additional

information until May 2007.

In June 2007, the MassDEP announced it would stay its

review of WCE’s application pending the Coast Guard’s

resolution of WCE’s application. Shortly thereafter the RIDEM

said it would “continue its review” of WCE’s application but

would “consider and review ... all applicable findings of the ...

Coast Guard.” WCE then filed petitions in this court for review

of the state agencies’ failure to act upon its applications. Later

in 2007 the RIDEM preliminarily denied and the MassDEP

preliminarily granted WCE’s certification. Each decision is the

subject of a pending appeal within the issuing state agency. 

II. Analysis

WCE filed the present petitions for review pursuant to §

19(d)(2) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(2), which

grants this court “exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for

the review of an alleged failure to act by a ... State

administrative agency acting pursuant to Federal law to issue,

condition, or deny any permit required under Federal law ... for

a facility subject” to the Natural Gas Act, here the proposed

LNG terminal. Although WCE petitions for review of the state

agencies’ failure to act, it does not ask for a remand directing the

state agencies to act, see 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(3); nor would such

a remand have any effect, for the state agencies have already

acted. Rather, it asks this court for a declaration that each state

agency, by failing to act upon WCE’s application within one

year of its submission, has waived its right to deny the requested

certification.

The state agencies raise numerous objections to the

petitions. They contend WCE lacks a cause of action; the court

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lacks the power to grant the requested relief; the petitions are

barred by equitable estoppel and by the Eleventh Amendment to

the Constitution of the United States; the petitions are

impermissible collateral attacks upon decisions of the Army

Corps; and WCE’s argument fails on the merits. 

We reach none of the States’ arguments, for we conclude

sua sponte that WCE does not have standing to sue the States;

the court therefore lacks jurisdiction over WCE’s petitions. As

the Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing

contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have

suffered an injury in fact - an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized;

and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.

Second, there must be a causal connection between the

injury and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,

and not the result of the independent action of some third

party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as

opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)

(citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).

WCE asserts in its brief that its standing is “self-evident,

because it is the applicant for a Section 401 Water Quality

Certification before [the state agencies]: it is the ‘object of the

action (or forgone action) at issue’” [Pet. Br. at 24] (quoting

Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899-900 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).

The state agencies’ inaction, however, cannot support WCE’s

standing because WCE does not claim to have been injured by

it. On the contrary, WCE’s theory of the case is that it benefited

from the agencies’ inaction; that is, the agencies, by failing to

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issue timely rulings on WCE’s applications, waived their rights

to deny the certifications WCE seeks.

By what, then, is WCE really aggrieved? We see three

possibilities, but none supports WCE’s standing to sue the state

agencies. The first is not a legally cognizable injury; the second

was not caused by the state agencies; and the third would not be

redressed by the remedy WCE seeks.

The first is the denial of a § 401 certification by a state

agency. At present, however, neither agency has made a final

decision on WCE’s application; the RIDEM issued an initial

denial and the MassDEP issued an initial grant, but each

decision is the subject of a pending administrative appeal. 

Even a final adverse decision would not support WCE’s

standing, however, because WCE’s claim is that the States have

waived their right to deny a certification. By WCE’s own lights,

that is, any denial of its application for a § 401 certification

would be too late in coming and therefore null and void.

Logically, a petitioner cannot challenge an action as “an

invasion of a legally protected interest” and simultaneously

contend the action is of no legal significance. If either state

agency ultimately denies WCE a § 401 certification, then WCE

may argue to the Army Corps that the denial is void. If the

Army Corps disagrees, then WCE may challenge its decision in

court. 

Second, WCE might be challenging the anticipated decision

of the Army Corps to deny a dredge-and-fill permit on the

ground that the Army Corps is bound by a State’s refusal to

issue a § 401 certification. The denial of a dredge-and-fill

permit would undoubtedly be a legally cognizable injury. That

injury, however, would be caused by the Army Corps, which is

not a respondent here, not by the state agencies, which are the

respondents. A’s injuring B does not create a case or

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controversy between B and C. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard

D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973).

At argument counsel for WCE suggested a third possibility:

The state proceedings themselves are causing WCE injury by

delaying the Army Corps’ consideration of its application for a

dredge-and-fill permit. According to counsel, the Army Corps

refuses to consider WCE’s application until the state agencies

have completed their rounds, and a declaration by this court that

the States have waived their rights under § 401 would cause the

Army Corps to process its application without delay.

This suggestion is closer to the mark, for an agency’s delay

in processing an application may constitute a legally cognizable

injury, see, e.g., Va. State Corp. Comm’n v. FERC, 468 F.3d

845, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt

Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004). Even if

the Army Corps’ delay in processing WCE’s § 404 application

constitutes an injury, however, that injury would not be

redressed by our declaring the States waived their right of

approval. The States would be without authority to issue a

certification decision binding upon the Army Corps, but they

would still, WCE concedes, have authority to issue a decision

the Army Corps could consider. Thus, the only effect of such a

declaration would be to advise the Army Corps that it would not

be bound by a State’s denial of a § 401 certification. The record

indicates, however, that such a declaration would not alter the

Army Corps’ timetable for acting upon WCE’s application for

a § 404 permit. 

In July 2007, the MassDEP requested and the Army Corps

granted an extension to December 15 last for the State to act

upon WCE’s request for a § 401 certification. The MassDEP

issued its initial grant of the certification on December 14.

According to the state agencies, the Army Corps’ decision to

grant an extension demonstrates the Army Corps has already

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concluded the one-year clock under § 401 began to run in

December 2006, and this suit is an impermissible collateral

attack upon that decision. In response WCE concedes the

extension was lawful but claims it was not an interpretation of

§ 401; rather, it demonstrated the Army Corps is willing to

exercise its discretion to accept an untimely certification. Cf.

Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1993)

(holding the EPA has the discretion to consider an untimely

certification by a state agency). 

Assuming WCE’s characterization is correct – an issue we

do not decide – it only goes to show WCE’s claimed injury is

not redressable by a court. If the Army Corps has already

indicated its willingness to exercise its discretion to accept an

untimely certification, then it hardly seems likely the Army

Corps will pass upon WCE’s permit application until the States

issue their final decisions, regardless whether those decisions are

binding upon the Army Corps. Our declaring that the Army

Corps is not bound by the States’ final decisions, that is, would

not make it “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that

[WCE’s] injury will be redressed,” i.e., by spurring the Army

Corps into action. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

III. Conclusion

In sum, WCE has not shown an injury caused by the state

agencies that likely would be redressed by the declaration it

seeks. We are therefore without jurisdiction over its petitions

for review, which are, accordingly,

Dismissed.

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