Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cr-00181/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cr-00181-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Francis Donnelly
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The underlined information is in dispute for the Franks test, discussed later.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JAMES FRANCIS DONNELLY,

Defendant.

 /

No. CR 05-0181 SI

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO

SUPPRESS AND FOR EVIDENTIARY

HEARING

Defendant’s motions to suppress and for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438

U.S. 154 (1978) came on regularly for hearing on June 27, 2005. Having considered the papers and pleadings

filed by the parties, and the arguments of counsel, the motions are DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2004, MichaelAllan, anagentwithImmigrationand Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),

received a phone call from an anonymous male who reported he had personal information that James F.

Donnelly was engaged in child sex tourism. Allan took notes on “post-its” during the conversation but the postits have since been destroyed and only the typed reports of the investigation and a draft affidavit are currently

available forreview. On November 18, 2004, three days after the call, Allan drafted an initial report including

the basic facts asserted by the caller. See Swanson Decl., Ex. A (Summary/Description Screen). The initial

report provided the following information:1

The caller indicated that he knew an individual by the name of James F. Donnelly who kept a

scrapbook of pictures of naked boys and had thousands of images of naked children on his

computer. The caller also stated that Donnelly travels on a regular basis to Thailand in order

to have sex with young boys and that he is in a circle of friends which includes Walter

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SCHIRRA III, who travels forthe same reason. The caller provided a San Francisco address

and telephone number for Donnelly but would not provide any contact info. for himself.

Investigation confirmed Donnelly’s address and phone number as well as frequent travel to

Thailand. Subsequent investigation uncovered the name of an additional suspect who has

traveled with Donnelly in the past on two separate occasions. That individual is David Roger

RYAN also residing in San Francisco.

On November 19, 2004, the day after the initialreport was written, Allanadded additionalinformation

and details to the report. Specifically, Allanadded informationabout the caller’s motivationfor contacting ICE.

See Swanson Decl. Exhibit C. According to Allan’s second report, the caller had seen a newspaper article

about the recent arrest of Walter Schirra. The article reported that Schirra was arrested for potential

involvement with child sex tourismand mentionedthe ICE. The caller reported that he was “disgusted” by what

he had seen in Donnelly’s apartment but did not know who to contact prior to reading the article. Id. Shortly

after completing the second report, Allan began drafting an affidavit. The affidavit was last modified on

December 13, 2004. In late December, Allan was transferred to another office and Agent Fletes became the

agent on Donnelly’s case. 

Investigation confirmed Donnelly’s name, address, and age, as well as the fact the Donnelly had

traveled to Thailand on at least four prior occasions and stayed for approximately one month each time. Law

enforcement conducted no independent surveillance of Donnelly within the U.S. or in Thailand. The agents

reviewed Donnelly’s and Schirra’s phone records and had access to Schirra’s home, e-mail, and personal

effects. However, investigative inquiries did not reveal any connection between Donnelly and Schirra. As part

of the investigation, the agents placed a “look-out” in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System II

(“TECS II”) that provided an alert if Donnelly traveled outside the United States. On February 14, 2005,

Fletes queried TECS II and was alerted that Donnelly had left the United States with the intent to travel to

Thailand for approximately one month. 

At some point in February of 2005, Fletes used Allan’s draft affidavit as a starting point for his own

affidavit to secure a warrant. Fletes copied portions of Allan’s reports directly into the affidavit. Fletes then

called Allan to confirm that the information in his affidavit was accurate. Allan confirmed that the information

was accurate. 

Fletes’s affidavit contains three details regarding the phone call with the anonymous caller that are not

specifically included in the first two investigative reports. First, the Fletes affidavit states thatDonnelly “travels

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to Thailand approximately two times a year for about a month at a time”; the report states thatDonnelly travels

to Thailand “on a regular basis.” Second, the affidavit states that the caller was Donnelly’s “friend”; the reports

states that the caller “knew” Donnelly. Third, the affidavit states that Donnelly travels to Thailand to “engage

in illicit sexual activity with minor males approximately (10) to fourteen (14) years old”; the report states that

Donnelly travels to Thailand to “engage in illicit sexual conduct with young minor males. . .” Def. Mot. at 15.

Certain charges included in the affidavit apply only to minors between the age of 12 and 16 years old. Id. at

16; see 18 U.S.C. 2423 (b), (f) (addressing violations set forth in Chapter 109A). All three of these

statements in Fletes’s affidavit were included in Allan’s original draft affidavit. In his affidavit, Fletes changed

the term “a few times a year,” as included in Allen’s draft affidavit, to “approximately two times a year.” 

Fletes and Allan’s affidavits both contained the caller’s statement that Donnelly was part of a group of

approximately six friends who travel to Thailand to have sex with minors, as well as information on Schirra’s

indictments for attempted travel in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct,

possession of child pornography, and receipt of pornography. See Swanson Decl., Ex. H at 4. Information

that the officers’ investigations had failed to establish a connection between Donnelly and Schirra was not

included in either the draft or final affidavits. On March 7, 2005, Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero issued

a search warrant for Defendant’s residence, limited to evidence of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and (e)

– travel with the intent to engage in sexual activity with a minor. On March 9, 2005, Fletes filed a second

application and affidavit for a search warrant relying on the fruits of the initialsearch. The second warrant

allowed the agents to search for child pornography. On March, 9, 2005, the government filed criminal

complaints against Donnelly and sought a warrant for his arrest. The complaintsrely on evidence seized in both

searches. 

Defendant movesto suppressthe evidence seized under both warrants, contending that the anonymous

tip lacked corroboration, making the search warrant affidavit insufficient on itsface. Defendant also argues that

the search warrant affidavit was inaccurate in detail and omitted critical information, entitling defendant to a

hearing under Franks v. Delaware. Plaintiff opposes both motions.

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DISCUSSION

1. Probable cause/anonymous tips

Search warrants must be supported by affidavits establishing probable cause. Probable cause is

defined as “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 238 (1983). In reviewing the validity of the warrant, a court is limited to the information and

circumstances contained within the four corners of the underlying affidavit. United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d

775, 778 (9th Cir. 1985). A magistrate judge’s issuance of a warrant is reviewed for “clear error,” and the

warrant should be upheld as long as the magistrate judge had a “substantial basis for concluding that probable

cause existed based on the totality ofthe circumstances.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984);

United States v. Mendonsa, 989 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 1993).

When determining if any tip is adequate to establish probable cause under the totality of the

circumstances test, the tip: (1) must include a “range of details,” (2) cannot simply describe easily observed

facts and conditions, but must predict the suspect’s future movement, and (3) must be corroborated by

independent police observation. United States v. Morales, 252 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 1991); Gates, 462

U.S. at 245. An informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are highly relevant in determining the

value of an informant’s report, as are the quantity and quality of the informant’s information. However, these

are not “separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case,” but rather are simply

“closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is

‘probable cause’ to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at

230; Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

Anonymous tips pose unique Fourth Amendment concerns. Because “an anonymous tipster cannot

be held accountable if he or she provides inaccurate information and police cannot assess the tipster’s

reputation,” “something more” than the anonymous tip alone is required to “establish reasonable suspicion that

criminal activity is afoot.” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000); United States v. Morales, 252 F.3d at

1074. (“As the Supreme Court explained in Alabama v. White, in order for an anonymous tip to have sufficient

‘indicia of reliability’ to serve as the basis for a Terry stop, the tip must include a ‘range ofdetails,’ and it must

predict future actions by the suspect that are subsequently corroborated by the police.”) Magistrates are

granted significant latitude in making probable cause determinations and are free to assess the totality of the

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circumstances from all the facts before them. 

 

2. Sufficiency of search warrant

Defendant argues that the warrant lacks probable cause fortwo main reasons. First, defendant argues

that law enforcement had no basis for asserting that the information supplied by the informant was reliable

because the caller failed to provide a significant “range of detail” or to provide any specific information as to

Donnelly’s future actions. Second, defendant argues that, because the government failed to undertake any

independent observation ofDonnelly and instead relied solely upon the confirmationofpublicly available details

and a travel pattern that could be both innocent and legal, the warrant lacked the independent police

corroboration required. 

The government contends that, under the totality of the circumstances test, the warrant provided the

magistrate with a substantialbasis forfinding probable cause. Specifically, the caller’s reliability was supported

by the fact that the tip was related by a witness who claimed personal knowledge of defendant’s criminal

behavior and who described seeing a scrapbook and pictures on the defendant’s computer while in the

defendant’s home. In addition, the government points out that law enforcement confirmed that the caller

provided accurate public information, such asthe defendant’s name and address, as well as accurate non-public

information about the defendant’s past travelpatterns. It also argues that all public details were independently

confirmed by law enforcement and that by describing defendant’s pattern of regular travel to Thailand, the

informant correctly predicted the defendant’s future travel activity, establishing the caller’s credibility and

making Donnelly’s otherwise innocent behavior criminally suspicious.

Applying Gates, J.L., White, and Morales, the Court finds that although this is a close case, there is

probable cause under the totality of these circumstances. Under Gates, the corroboration ofinnocent details

alone can establish probable cause if the innocent activity is suspicious enough in light of the tip. The officers

here independently confirmed not only that the caller was correct about Donnelly’s name and address, but that

Donnelly had traveled to Thailand in the past for approximately month-long periods of time. Independent

investigation also revealed that Donnelly was on a trip to Thailand for an approximately one month stay in

February of 2005, just prior to the request for a warrant. In addition, while regular travelto Thailand may be

innocent, it is also consistent with child sex tourism: Special Agent Fletes asserted in his affidavit thatThailand

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2As part of the totality of the circumstances test, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “opinion and

conclusion of an experienced agent regarding a set offacts are properly a factorin the probable cause equation

under Gates.” United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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is recognized as a popular destination forindividuals interested in child sex tourism and is known for its failure

to arrest or punish individuals engaged in sex tourism.2 

The caller’s first-hand knowledge and reasonable and verifiable motivation for reporting Donnelly

strengthen the informer’s credibility. The caller told agent Allan that he had personally seen a scrapbook and

computer images ofthousands ofnaked boys and thathe knewthatDonnelly traveled to Thailand to participate

in sex with young boys. The Court may consider a law enforcement agent’s evaluation of details provided by

an anonymous caller, and Special Agent Fletes asserts that maintenance of scrapbooks, photo albums and

computer images is consistent with law enforcement profiles of pedophiles and child sex tourists. Likewise,

the fact that the caller accurately cited a newspaper article thatmentioned ICE in connection with the arrest of

Schirra helped establish context as to why the caller reported Donnelly.

Accordingly, the motion to suppress based on lack of probable cause in the affidavit supporting the

search warrant is DENIED.

3. Good faith exception

Under the good faith exception, even if a warrant is not based on probable cause, the evidence need

not be suppressed if an officer relies on the warrant in “good faith.” See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,

922-23, n. 24 (1984). Evidence will not be suppressed when the magistrate, not the officer, errs. Mendosa,

989 F.2d at 369. However, information provided to the magistrate must be truthful “in the sense that the

information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 165.

Evidence should be suppressed only if:(1) the magistrate has abandoned his detached and neutral role, (2) the

officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit, or (3) the officers could not have “harbored an

objectively reasonable belief that probable cause existed.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. It is the government’s

burden to demonstrate that the officers’ reliance on an invalid warrant was reasonable. See Center Art

Galleries, 875 F.2d at 752. 

Defendant arguesthatagent Fletes was reckless because the warrant included informationthathe knew

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 Discussed in the Franks section, below.

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orshould have known was false and misleading, and that under such circumstances no reasonable agent would

have attached significance to the anonymous caller’sstatements. Specifically, defendant points to three alleged

false or misleading statements3and one omission (the failure to inform the magistrate that investigation had not

established a link between Donnelly and Schirra). The government argues that there is no evidence that the

agents were reckless or dishonest and that defendant should not benefit if the magistrate judge incorrectly

determined that the agents had sufficiently corroborated the anonymous tip.

Because this Court finds that the warrant was supported by probable cause, the good faith exception

need not be called into play to deny the motion to suppress. Alternatively, this Court would find that in the

event the warrant was insufficiently supported, the officers executing it acted in good faith. However, since the

good faith exception is not an appropriate remedy ifthe magistrate judge, in issuing the warrant, was misled by

information in the affidavit that an officer knew or should have known would materially alter the determination

of probable cause, it is necessary to evaluate the issue of the officers’ allegedly false or reckless statements.

This is addressed below.

 

4. Request for Franks hearing

To be entitled to a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a substantialpreliminaryshowing that a false

statement or omission was knowingly orrecklessly made and that the statement or omission was material and

necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-6 (1978); see also;

United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding thatmaterialomissions qualify under the

Franks test), rev’d on other grounds, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Specifically, a party is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing under Franks if the party makes a substantial preliminary showing that: (1) a false statement was

included in the affidavit for the federal warrant; (2) the false statement was made knowingly and intentionally,

or with reckless disregard for the truth; and ( 3) the false statement was necessary to the federal magistrate's

finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-6. A non-conclusory “substantial preliminary showing”

of these facts entitles the defendant to an evidentiary hearing. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S.C. at 2684-

85. If, “when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there

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remains sufficientcontent in the warrant affidavit to support a finding ofprobable cause, no hearing is required.”

Franks, 438 U.S. at 172. The test applies to intentional omissions as well as false statements. United States

v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Here, defendant seeks a Franks hearing because of three “misstatements,” based on differences in

language between the initial reports and the final affidavit, and one omission. The first “misstatement” is that

the initial report states that Donnelly travels to Thailand “on a regular basis,” while the affidavit states that

Donnelly “travels to Thailand approximately two times a year for about a month at a time.” The second is that

the affidavit states that Donnelly travels to Thailand to “engage in illicit sexual activity with minor males

approximately (10) to fourteen (14) years old,” while the report states only that Donnelly travels to Thailand

to “engage in illicit sexualconduct with young minormales.” The third “misstatement” is that the affidavit states

that the caller was Donnelly’s “friend,” while the reports states that the caller “knew”Donnelly. The omission

is that in the affidavit, the officers included information about Schirra’s arrest and conviction and reported that

the caller stated that Donnelly was part of a group of friends including Schirra who traveled to Thailand, but

the affidavit did notstate that the officers’ investigative work had failed to establish a link between Schirra and

Donnelly through phone records or travel plans. 

The Court finds that none of this amounts to the “substantial showing” required to warrant a hearing

under Franks. The “misstatements” are not inconsistencies, but rather differences in specificity between the

information in the initial report and the affidavit. It is worth noting that the draft affidavit, prepared by Special

Agent Allanwithin a month ofthe anonymous telephone call, contained all ofthe more specific informationnow

characterized as “misstatements.” Defendant’s argument at the hearing on these motions was that Special

Agent Fletes deliberately exaggerated the amount ofdetail available when putting together his finalaffidavit, but

this argument is undermined by the fact that these details had already been included in Special Agent Allan’s

draft affidavit which had been in the file for months. The differences, which are of degree only, are not material

to the issuance of the warrant.

Nor does the alleged omission change the equation. Defendant contends that, although the affidavit

does report the caller’s statement that defendant claimed to be part of a sex-tourism group which included

Walter Schirra, it omitted to state that investigation of Schirra had produced no written records showing that

defendant and Walter Schirra traveled to Thailand together or telephoned each other. In the first place, the

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caller had not said that defendant and Schirra traveled together. More broadly, the fact that the connection to

Schirra was not established would not have materially altered the probable cause analysis engaged in by the

magistrate judge. Leaving the Schirra connection aside, there was sufficient information to provide a

“substantialbasis for concluding that probable cause existed based on the totality ofthe circumstances.” United

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.

The Court finds that defendant has not made a sufficiently substantial preliminary showing to warrant

a Franks hearing, and the motion for such a hearing is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the execution of the March 7, 2005 search

warrant, and the fruits thereof, or alternatively to conduct a Franks hearing, is DENIED. This matter is set

for a further status/trial setting conference on Friday, July 8, 2005 at 11:00 a.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2005 

_________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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