Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01111/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01111-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ernesto Chaides
Petitioner
Hector Rios
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNESTO CHAIDES,

Petitioner,

v.

HECTOR RIOS, Warden

Respondent.

 /

1:09-cv-01111-DLB (HC)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING CLERK

OF COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN

FAVOR OF RESPONDENT

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

In the instant petition, Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff

arbitrarily and capriciously abused its discretion by forcing him to identify a release residence

which he claims prevented him from being considered for designation to a Residential Re-entry

Center (RRC) for a period of twelve months. He also claims that he was denied skills

development programming pursuant to the Second Chance Act and he was never considered for

RRC placement. Petitioner also raises various challenges regarding his ability to participate in

programming within the BOP. 

Respondent filed an answer on December 17, 2009. (Court Doc. 15.) Petitioner did not

file a traverse. On March 8, 2010, Respondent submitted a supplement to the answer. (Court

Doc. 19.) 

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DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Venue

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the

United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Writ of habeas corpus relief is available if a federal

prisoner can show he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Whether the Court has subject matter to hear

Petitioner’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 will be discussed below. In addition, pursuant to

§ 2241, venue is proper in this case because Petitioner was confined at the United States

Penitentiary in Atwater, California, at the time he filed the instant petition. Hernandez v.

Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9 Cir.2000). th

II. Placement in RRC

Petitioner first argues that the BOP has abused its discretion by forcing him to use a

relocation address for release which prevents him from being considered for RRC placement for

twelve months. Petitioner further contends that he has never been considered for RRC

placement. On April 9, 2008, the President signed into law the “Second Chance Act of 2007,”

which required the BOP to modify 28 C.F.R. section 570.21 of the regulations (see 18 U.S.C. §

3624(c)(6), to ensure that the determination as to placement in an RRC be conducted in

accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3621(b) and it be determined on an individual basis,. Pub.L. 110-

199, 122 Stat. 657 (2007). 

In Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180 (9 Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit held that the th

former 28 C.F.R. section 570.21 was invalid as inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. section 3621(b). The

regulations were later amended and now state, “Inmates may be designated to community

confinement as a condition of pre-release custody and programming during the final months of

the inmate’s term of imprisonment, not to exceed twelve months.” Inmates are considered for

pre-release community confinement “in a manner consistent with 18 U.S.C. section 3621(b),

determined on an individual basis, and of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of

successful reintegration into the community, within the time frames set forth in this part.” 18

C.F.R. § 570.22. 

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In sum, the BOP has discretionary authority to transfer an inmate to an RRC at any time,

after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. section 3621(b), and has a separate and

distinct obligation to consider an inmate for transfer to an RRC for up to twelve months prior to

the inmate’s release date, after considering the factors set forth in section 3621(b). Rodriguez v.

Smith, 541 F.3d at 1184-1185. 

The response by Harrell Watts, Administrator National Inmate Appeals (dated April 28,

2009), to Petitioner’s administrative grievance recognizes the amendments to the regulations set

forth in the Second Change Act of 2007. (Petition, at 17 .) Mr. Watts sets forth the applicable 1

law regarding placement in an RRC, and states “[i]nmates are ordinarily considered for RRC

placement between 17 and 19 months prior to release. Your [Petitioner] projected release date is

December 25, 2010, and you will be reviewed for RRC placement within the next few months.” 

(Id.) 

Petitioner contends his rights were violated under section 3621(b) because he “has never

been considered for RRC placement, throughout his term of imprisonment.” (Petition, at 3.) 

There is no entitlement to an immediate consideration for placement to an RRC, as it within the

discretion of the BOP. To this end, Petitioner attaches a response by Correctional Counselor

Blackwell indicates that it has been determined that 180 days is sufficient time to accommodate

Petitioner’s release needs, and he will be further evaluated 17 to 19 months prior to his release

date. Respondent has submitted evidence that Petitioner was again evaluated for RRC placement

on January 29, 2010, and Petitioner was recommended for a 150 to 180-day placement. (Exhibit

1, to Supplemental Response.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that he has not been evaluated for

RRC placement is without merit. 

III. Programming Pursuant to Second Chance Act

Petitioner requests that this Court order the BOP to “implement pre-release programming

with incentives” under the Second Chance Act. Petition at 11. Petitioner lacks standing to raise

such challenge because there has been no injury to him. 

Because the attachments to the petition are not numbered, the Court refers to the pagination as reflected on

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the Court’s Case Management Electronic Filing System.

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To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show: (1) he has suffered

an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the

defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision. Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9 Cir. 2005) (Internal quotation th

marks omitted). For an injury to be “particularized,” it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal

and individual way.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n. 1 (1992). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that prisoner’s may have standing to challenge a lack of

particular programs if participation in such programs may result in early release consideration. 

See e.g. Serrato v. Clark, 486 F.3d 560, 566 (9 Cir. 2007) (holding an inmate had standing to th

challenge BOP decision to eliminate boot camp, participation in which may have resulted in

early release); Cort v. Crabtree, 113 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9 Cir. 1997) (“A prisoner’s right to th

consideration for early release is a valuable one that we have not hesitated to protect.”). The

plain language of the Second Act Statute which provides for residential drug programming

specifically prohibits a “reduction of the term of imprisonment.” See Section 231, PL 110-199,

April 9, 2008, 122 Stat 657 (2007). Thus, because there is no possibility that access to any

programming contemplated by the Second Chance Act could impact the fact or duration of

Petitioner’s confinement, he does not have standing to challenge such programs. 

IV. Educational Programs

Petitioner’s challenge relating to assistance in obtaining a General Education

Development Certificate is moot because Petitioner has already earned his High School

Equivalency Diploma.

The case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Federal Constitution deprives the

Court of jurisdiction to hear moot cases. Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70

104 S.Ct. 373, 374-75 (1983); NAACP., Western Region v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346,

1352 (9th Cir. 1984). A case becomes moot if the “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or

the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478,

481, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183 (1984). The Federal Court is “without power to decide questions that

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cannot affect the rights of the litigants before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246,

92 S.Ct. 402, 406 (1971) per curiam, quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227,

240-241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463-464 (1937). To satisfy the Article III case or controversy

requirement, a litigant “must have suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a

favorable judicial decision.” Iron Arrow, 464 U.S. at 70, 104 S.Ct. at 375; Simon v. Eastern Ky.

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1617, 1924 (1976); NAACP, Western Region,

743 F.2d at 1353.

Petitioner indicates that at the time of filing the instant petition, he was participating in

the GED program. Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s claim, programming was readily available

to him. Moreover, Respondent submits evidence that Petitioner completed the GED program. 

Attachment 1, to Answer, SENTRY Print-Out, Inmate History - Education at 1. 

V. Release Gratuity

Petitioner requests for the “maximum allowed money from the BOP” apparently referring

to a release gratuity some inmates are eligible for and for assistance in obtaining identification. 

These claims are not yet ripe for review. The ripeness doctrine “is [intended] to prevent the

courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract

disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial

interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete

way by the challenging parties.” Abott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967). 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes “the Supreme Court announced a three-pronged test for ripeness of

an administrative challenge [which considers]: (1) whether delayed review would cause hardship

to the plaintiffs’ (2) whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further

administrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from further factual development

of the issues presented.” Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 341 F.3d 961

(9 Cir. 2003) (relying on Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998)). th

The BOP offers inmates a Release Preparation Program and addresses issues such as

gratuity procedures and how to obtain government issued identification. See, generally,

www.bop.gov, Program Statement 5325.06, Release Preparation Program Institution

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(03/04.2002) and Program Statement 5873.06, Release Gratuities, Transportation, and Clothing

(08/06/2003). In this instance, Petitioner does not indicate whether he has requested and been 2

denied a release gratuity or an increase in whatever gratuity may be deemed appropriate. See

generally, Petition. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated any present or imminent harm and awaiting judicial

review until the issue is ripe will not cause hardship to him. Because there has been no finding

by the BOP regarding Petitioner’s eligibility for a release gratuity, the Court would certainly

benefit from the BOP making its determination prior to its review. If the determination is made

that Petitioner is ineligible, then any available judicial review of that determination would be

based on the development of the facts upon which the agency based its decision. Accordingly,

this claim is not yet ripe for review and must be dismissed.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 13, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This Court takes judicial notice of BOP Program Statements, which are available at the BOP’s website

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(www.bop.gov) pursuant to Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See U.S. Thornton, 511 F.3d 1221, 1229

n.5 (9 Cir. 2008) (taking judicial notice of BOP Program Statement on Patient Care).

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