Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01522/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01522-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ally Financial Inc.
Plaintiff
Michael G. Peters
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLY FINANCIAL INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL G. PETERS,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-1522-TLN-KJN

ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Presently pending before the court is plaintiff Ally Financial Inc.’s (“plaintiff” or “Ally”)

motion for entry of a default judgment against defendant Michael G. Peters, who is the only 

named defendant in this action. (ECF No. 19.)1 After defendant initially failed to oppose 

plaintiff’s motion in accordance with Local Rule 230, the court vacated the hearing on the motion 

and provided defendant with an additional opportunity to oppose plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 

21.) Subsequently, defendant again failed to oppose the motion by the required deadline.

After carefully considering the written briefing, the court’s record, and the applicable law, 

the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion. 

 

1 All parties who appeared in the action have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States 

Magistrate Judge for all purposes, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (ECF No. 23.) 

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BACKGROUND

The background facts are taken from plaintiff’s operative verified complaint, unless 

otherwise noted. (See Complaint, ECF No. 2 [“Compl.”].) Defendant was the president of 

Central Valley Buick, Olds, Pontiac-GMC, Inc. (“Central Valley”), a car dealership in Manteca, 

California. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-6, 8.) Ally (and/or its predecessors and assignors) provided financing to 

Central Valley pursuant to three loan agreements, which also provided Ally with a security 

interest in Central Valley’s personal property: (a) the Wholesale Agreement and General Security 

Agreement; (b) the Revolving Line of Credit Agreement; and (c) the Commercial Equipment 

Loan and Security Agreement (collectively, the “Loan Agreements”). (Compl. ¶¶ 2-3, 9-15, Exs. 

A-D.) Additionally, pursuant to a written guaranty (the “Guaranty”), defendant himself 

personally guaranteed full payment of all of Central Valley’s debts to Ally, together with all 

costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees incurred by Ally in connection with any default. (Compl. ¶¶ 

16-18, 26, 30, Ex. E.)

Ultimately, Central Valley defaulted on its obligations under the Loan Agreements, and 

consistent with those agreements, Ally demanded payment in full and surrender of all collateral. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 19-20, 27.) Subsequently, Central Valley voluntarily surrendered the collateral to 

Ally pursuant to a Voluntary Surrender Agreement, which was executed by defendant in his 

capacity as president of Central Valley and acknowledged by defendant in his capacity as a 

guarantor of Central Valley. (Compl. ¶ 21, Ex. F.) Thereafter, Ally disposed of the collateral in a 

commercially reasonable manner, and, after deducting its costs and expenses of disposing of the 

collateral, Ally applied the proceeds to the amounts due to Ally from Central Valley under the 

Loan Agreements, leaving a deficiency of $506,954.29 as of July 15, 2015, exclusive of any 

attorneys’ fees and costs. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-23, 29.) Although Ally has on several occasions

demanded that defendant pay the deficiency pursuant to the Guaranty, defendant failed to do so. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 24, 27-28, Ex. G.) 

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Based on the above, plaintiff commenced this action alleging a single claim for breach of 

personal guaranty against defendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-30.)2 In the complaint, plaintiff sought 

damages (together with interest and other charges as allowed by contract), costs, and attorneys’ 

fees. (See Complaint at 6, “Prayer.”) After defendant was properly served with process and 

failed to appear in the action, the Clerk of Court, upon plaintiff’s request, entered defendant’s 

default. (ECF Nos. 13-14, 18.) The instant motion for entry of default judgment followed. (ECF 

No. 19.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party 

against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend 

against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant’s default does not 

automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 

238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 

(9th Cir. 1986)). Instead, the decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies 

within the district court’s sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 

1980). In making this determination, the court considers the following factors: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether the default was due 

to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

As a general rule, once default is entered, well-pled factual allegations in the operative 

complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 

v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. 

Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); accord Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 

 

2

The complaint invoked the court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, because plaintiff and 

defendant are citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

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285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, although well-pled allegations in the complaint 

are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, 

and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. 

of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 

(9th Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating 

that a defendant does not admit facts that are not well-pled or conclusions of law); Abney v. 

Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“[A] default judgment may not be 

entered on a legally insufficient claim”). A party’s default does not establish the amount of 

damages. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. 

DISCUSSION

Appropriateness of the Entry of Default Judgment under the Eitel Factors

1. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 

judgment is not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff militates in favor of granting 

a default judgment. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff would face 

prejudice if the court did not enter a default judgment, because plaintiff would be without another 

recourse against defendant. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor favors the entry of a default 

judgment.

2. Factors Two and Three: The Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claim and 

the Sufficiency of the Complaint

The court considers the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim and the sufficiency of the 

complaint together because of the relatedness of the two inquiries. The court must consider 

whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim on which plaintiff may 

recover. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Here, plaintiff 

has adequately alleged that defendant incurred the above-mentioned payment obligations to Ally 

by executing the Guaranty, and that defendant has breached the Guaranty by failing to pay the 

amounts due to Ally pursuant to the Guaranty, despite numerous requests for payment by Ally. 

As such, the complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for breach of personal guaranty and has merit. 

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Therefore, the second and third Eitel factors favor the entry of default judgment. 

3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action

Under the fourth factor cited in Eitel, “the court must consider the amount of money at 

stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 

1176-77; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. 

Cal. 2003). In this case, plaintiff seeks over $500,000.00 from defendant. Although not an 

insignificant amount, a potentially large payment obligation was plainly contemplated when 

defendant personally guaranteed the payment obligations of an automobile dealership. 

Furthermore, failure to honor such a personal guaranty is a serious matter, because Ally relied on 

the personal guaranty to extend credit to Central Valley. Therefore, the sum of money at stake 

does not in itself preclude the entry of a default judgment. 

4. Factor Five: The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The court may assume the truth of well-pled facts in the complaint (except as to damages) 

following the clerk’s entry of default, and defendant has not appeared to dispute any such facts. 

Thus, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists. See, e.g., Elektra 

Entm’t Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in 

a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is 

no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists”); accord Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 

F.R.D. at 500; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Accordingly, the fifth Eitel factor favors 

the entry of default judgment.

5. Factor Six: Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect

In this case, there is no indication in the record that defendant’s default was due to 

excusable neglect. Defendant was not only served with the complaint, but also the request for 

entry of default, the motion for default judgment, and the court’s order providing an additional 

opportunity to oppose that motion. (ECF Nos. 13, 14, 19-8, 22.) Indeed, despite having been 

provided with multiple opportunities to appear and defend his interests, defendant apparently 

declined to do so. Accordingly, the sixth Eitel factor favors the entry of a default judgment.

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6. Factor Seven: The Strong Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

Favoring Decisions on the Merits

“Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 

F.2d at 1472. However, district courts have concluded with regularity that this policy, standing 

alone, is not dispositive, especially where a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action. 

PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. 

Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Accordingly, although the court is cognizant of the policy 

in favor of decisions on the merits—and consistent with existing policy would prefer that this 

case be resolved on the merits—that policy does not, by itself, preclude the entry of default 

judgment.

In sum, upon consideration of all the Eitel factors, the court concludes that plaintiff is

entitled to a default judgment against defendant. All that remains is a determination of the 

specific relief to which plaintiff is entitled. 

Terms of the Judgment to Be Entered 

After determining that a party is entitled to the entry of default judgment, the court must 

determine the terms of the judgment to be entered. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment 

requests an award of damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, which were also requested in the 

complaint.

Damages

The damages requested by Ally are essentially the deficiency that remains to be paid by 

defendant on Central Valley’s Loan Agreements pursuant to the Guaranty. In support of its 

request for damages, Ally submitted the July 1, 2016 affidavit of Stephen Todd Soukop, a risk 

analyst employed by Ally, which provides a detailed itemization and computation of the damages 

claimed. (See ECF Nos. 19-5, 19-6.) In brief, the affidavit shows that, as of July 1, 2016, the 

balance due under the Loan Agreements is $722,079.06; the expenses incurred in disposing of the 

collateral amount to $93,277.96; and the proceeds from disposition of the collateral amount to 

$308,402.73, thereby resulting in a deficiency of $506,954.29. ($722,079.06 + $93,277.96 -

$308,402.73 = $506,954.29.) The calculations appear correct and reasonable based on the 

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detailed itemization provided, and defendant has not contested them. Because defendant was 

obligated to pay the deficiency pursuant to the Guaranty, and has breached his obligation in that 

regard, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to $506,954.29 in damages.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

As noted above, the Guaranty requires defendant to personally pay all costs, expenses, and 

attorneys’ fees incurred by Ally in connection with any default by Central Valley. (See Compl. 

Ex. E.) Thus, pursuant to the express terms of the Guaranty, plaintiff is entitled to an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs. The only question is whether the amount of requested attorneys’ fees 

and costs is reasonable.

Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees in the amount of $59,581.95, which represents an 

unadjusted lodestar amount computed by multiplying counsel’s hourly rate by the time spent on 

this matter. Plaintiff does not request any multipliers or enhancements.

With respect to hourly rates, three attorneys and one paralegal billed plaintiff for work 

involving this matter: (1) attorney Duane Geck, who has 31 years of practice experience and 

billed at an hourly rate of $382.50; (2) attorney Donald Cram, who has 26 years of experience and 

billed at an hourly rate of $292.50; (3) attorney Eleanor Roman, who has 20 years of experience 

and billed at an hourly rate of $265.50; and (4) paralegal Shan Li, who obtained her paralegal 

certificate in 2009 and billed at an hourly rate of $130.50. The court finds that these hourly rates 

are reasonable in light of prevailing market rates for this type of work performed in the 

Sacramento Division of the Eastern District of California. 

Plaintiff’s attorneys spent a total of 198.9 hours working on this matter. (See Declaration 

of Eleanor M. Roman, ECF No. 19-2 [“Roman Decl.”] ¶ 18.) At first blush, the number of hours 

spent may appear to be excessive in a matter where a defendant simply failed to appear. 

However, upon closer inspection, that characterization is not accurate under the circumstances of 

this case. 

As an initial matter, as explained in the Roman Declaration, significant attorney time was 

spent on Central Valley’s default long before this action was even filed. Upon Central Valley’s 

default, Ally was required to take numerous steps to protect its collateral, including, but not 

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limited to, conducting investigations, intervening in a state court action implicating the collateral 

to protect Ally’s rights from other creditors, having a receivership on Central Valley’s assets set 

aside, preparing for litigation against Central Valley, negotiating the voluntary surrender of 

Central Valley’s assets, and ultimately disposing of such assets. After ascertaining that a 

deficiency existed, Ally also attempted to obtain, via defendant’s counsel at the time, voluntary 

payment of the deficiency from defendant pursuant to the Guaranty. Moreover, after this action 

was filed, Ally was required to expend significant efforts over several months to locate and serve 

defendant with process. (See Roman Decl. ¶¶ 9-17.) Because defendant agreed to pay all costs, 

expenses, and attorneys’ fees incurred by Ally in connection with Central Valley’s default, Ally is 

entitled to collect fees for all of the above-mentioned work in this breach of guaranty action.

Furthermore, a careful review of Ally’s counsel’s billing records reveals that the time was 

reasonably spent, that such time was actually billed to Ally, and that the overwhelming majority 

of work was performed by the attorney with the lowest hourly rate, Eleanor Roman, who billed at 

an hourly rate of $265.50, as noted above. (Roman. Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. A.)

Additionally, to the extent that defendant may take issue with any particular item of work 

billed for, or the time spent on such work, defendant had an opportunity to appear and contest 

Ally’s fee request, but elected not to do so. 

Therefore, the court finds that Ally is entitled to its requested amount of $59,581.95 in 

attorneys’ fees.

Finally, Ally seeks $3,284.20 in costs. Such costs consist of filing fees and fees paid to 

process servers for the extensive efforts made to locate and serve defendant with process. 

Because the costs were reasonably incurred, the court finds that they should be awarded.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED. 

2. Judgment is entered in plaintiff’s favor and against defendant.

3. Plaintiff is awarded $506,954.29 in damages; $59,581.95 in attorneys’ fees; and 

$3,284.20 in costs, for a total of $569,820.44, with post-judgment interest accruing at 

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the applicable legal rate. 

4. Plaintiff shall forthwith serve a copy of this order on defendant by U.S. mail at his

last-known address, and shall file a proof of service on the docket. 

5. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 11, 2016

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