Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02856/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02856-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Cox
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

DAVID COX, 

v. 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

ti.UG 1 198G 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) . No. 87-2856 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-86-1629-A) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Bob Burke, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

William S. Price, United States Attorney, and William Lee Borden, 

Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District 

Judge.* 

*The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-2856 Document: 01019830653 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff-appellant appeals the district court's entry of 

judgment in favor of the United States on November 30, 1987, after 

directing a verdict in its favor on November 16, 1987. 

Plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act (FTCA), 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, for injuries he 

sustained when he struck an unmarked speed bump while riding his 

mo-ped on property owned and operated by the United States Corps 

of Engineers near Lake Eufaula, Oklahoma. Plaintiff contended 

that the United States was negligent in constructing and marking 

the speed bump, and that its negligence proximately caused his 

injuries. 

The action was tried to the court on November 16, 1987. At 

the conclusion of plaintiff's case-in-chief, the United States 

moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4l(b). 

It asserted that it could not be held liable for plaintiff's 

injuries under Oklahoma's recreational use statute, Okla. Stat. 

tit. 2, § 1301-315 (1981). T~e recreational use statute limits a 

landowner's or lessee's liability for injuries that occur on 

property provided to the public for recreational purposes. The 

district court agreed that Oklahoma's recreational use statute 

applied to the United States and shielded it from liability under 

the circumstances. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2856 Document: 01019830653 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 2 
Plaintiff's only argument on appeal regarding Oklahoma's 

recreational use statute1 is that the statute should not be 

applied to the United States. Plaintiff apparently concedes that 

if the United States could invoke the shield of Oklahoma's 

recreational use statute, it properly did so under the 

circumstances of this case. 

The basis of plaintiff's argument is that under the language 

of Oklahoma's recreational use statute, which is contained in the 

Forestry Code, "persons" who make property available to the public 

for recreational purposes are shielded from liability. In the 

definitional section of the Forestry Code, a "person" is defined 

as "any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, organization 

or any combination thereof, whether or not incorporated." Okla. 

Stat. tit. 2, § 1301-102 (1981). Thus, plaintiff argues, the 

United States is not a "person" within the meaning of the Oklahoma 

recreational use statute and cannot invoke the statute's 

protections. We do not agree. 

The FTCA sets forth the circumstances under which the United 

States may be sued, and "[t]he terms of the government's consent 

1 In addition to his argument regarding the recreational use 

statute, plaintiff argues in his brief on appeal that the 

discretionary function exception to the FTCA does not deprive the 

court of subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Although 

the United States apparently raised the issue of the discretionary 

function exception to the district court in one or more prior 

motions, it did not move for a directed verdict on that basis. 

Our review of the transcript of the oral motion and the court's 

oral ruling thereon, with which the court sua sponte supplemented 

the record on appeal, see 10th Cir. R. 11.1.1., reveals that the 

only ground asserted by the United States, and relied on by the 

court in directing the verdict, was the shield of the Oklahoma 

recreational use statute. Therefore, since the applicability of 

the discretionary function exception is not before this court for 

review, we will not consider that issue. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2856 Document: 01019830653 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 3 
to be sued define the court's jurisdiction." Ewell v. United 

States, 776 F.2d 246, 248 (10th Cir. 1985). The FTCA only permits 

suits against the United States "under circumstances where the 

United States, if a private person, would be liable to the 

claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or 

omission occurred." 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b). 

Plaintiff does not contend that a private person would not be 

shielded from liability under Oklahoma's recreational use statute 

under the facts of this case. Under the FTCA, if a private person 

would be shielded from liability under the statute, the United 

States must also be shielded. Plaintiff's argument that "[t]he 

Oklahoma Legislature did not intend to limit the liability of the 

Federal Government on public lands made available by the 

government for recr_eation," (Brief of Appellant at 5) is not 

relevant to the question of whether the United States is liable to 

plaintiff here. Congress, not the Oklahoma Legislature, 

determined the scope of the federal government's tort liability 

when it enacted the FTCA. This and other courts have applied the 

same rationale in holding that the United States may invoke the 

protection of a recreational use statute. See Ewell, 776 F.2d at 

248-49 (Utah); O'Neal v. United States, 814 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th 

Cir. 1987)(0ragon); Proud v. United States, 723 F.2d 705, 706-07 

(9th Cir.)(Hawaii), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); Mandel v. 

United States, 719 F.2d 963, 966-67 (8th Cir. 1983)(Arkansas); cf. 

Klepper v. City of Milford, 825 F.2d 1440, 1444 n.5 (10th Cir. 

1987)(Kansas)(stating in dicta that regardless of the recreational 

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Appellate Case: 87-2856 Document: 01019830653 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 4 
use statute's intent, the federal government's liability would be 

the same as that of a private individual). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2856 Document: 01019830653 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 5