Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca1-07-02001/USCOURTS-ca1-07-02001-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent
Iftikhar H. Shah
Petitioner

Document Text:

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(C)(2), Attorney General Michael *

B. Mukasey is substituted for former Attorney General Alberto

Gonzales as respondent.

Of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. **

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 07-2001

IFTIKHAR H. SHAH,

Petitioner, 

v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, *

Respondent. 

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER

OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

LYNCH, Circuit Judge,

MERRITT, Senior Circuit Judge, **

and Howard, Circuit Judge.

Kevin R. Murphy, on brief for petitioner.

Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil

Division, Terri J. Scadron, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, Civil Division, on brief for respondent.

July 10, 2008

Case: 07-2001 Document: 0011102818 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/10/2008 Entry ID: 5261573
 The Notice to Appear (NTA) alleges that Shah entered the 1

United States on or about June 2, 1991, while Shah’s brief argues

that he entered the United States on or about December 27, 1989.

However, in his Request for Asylum, Shah indicated that he did not

leave Pakistan until 1991. Because the date Shah entered the

United States is not relevant to the legal issues before us and

because Shah presents conflicting dates, we will accept the date of

entry as alleged in the NTA for the purposes of this appeal. 

 On March 1, 2003, the relevant functions of the INS were 2

reorganized and transferred to the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS). 

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MERRITT, Senior Circuit Judge. The petitioner, Iftikhar H.

Shah, a native of Pakistan and citizen of Canada, seeks judicial

review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA upheld the Immigration Judge’s

(IJ) denial of Shah’s motion to reopen his removal order, which was

issued in absentia when he failed to appear for his scheduled

hearing. Shah argues that he never received notice of his hearing

before the IJ. Finding no basis for overturning the order, we deny

the petition.

I. Background

On or about June 2, 1991, Shah entered the United States as a

non-immigrant F-1 student with authorization to remain in the

United States for a temporary period not to exceed December 31,

1993. Shah applied for asylum in July 1996 by filing an 1

application with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).2

In support of his application, Shah claimed that he had suffered

persecution in Pakistan because he had been associated with the

Case: 07-2001 Document: 0011102818 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/10/2008 Entry ID: 5261573
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Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Peoples Youth Organization

(PYO). He described the persecution in his Request for Asylum and

in testimony. Shah alleged that he had been expelled from the

party, that arrest warrants had been issued against him, and that

if he was returned to Pakistan he would be arrested, detained, or

killed. Based upon these threats, Shah claimed he held a wellfounded fear of future persecution.

On October 17, 2001, the DHS informed Shah that his case had

been referred to an immigration judge because his testimony was

deemed not credible due to internal inconsistencies and a lack of

detail. On December 3, 2001, a NTA dated October 31, 2001, was

sent by regular mail to the address that Shah had provided to his

asylum officer, 59 Breckinridge St., Palmer, MA, 01069. The NTA

charged that Shah had overstayed his visa and was subject to

removal pursuant to section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA). The NTA required Shah to attend a hearing

before an immigration judge on February 20, 2002. Shah failed to

appear at the hearing. Accordingly, the IJ ordered Shah to be

removed from the United States to Pakistan, in absentia.

In April 2006, Shah filed a motion to reopen his case on the

basis that he had never received notice of the original hearing

because his attorney had failed to inform him of the hearing date.

Shah indicated that he was in Canada at the time the NTA was

served. On August 25, 2006, the IJ denied the motion to reopen

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based on the following findings: (1) the NTA had never been

returned to the DHS as having been undelivered, (2) the removal

order was mailed to the same address and that order was also never

returned, and (3) Shah had been granted Canadian citizenship which

made him ineligible for political asylum because he “firmly

resettled in Canada.” Shah timely appealed to the BIA.

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. It noted that Shah

acknowledged that he had departed the United States for Canada

during the pendency of his removal proceedings. Consequently, it

found that he was barred from filing a motion to reopen based upon

8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), which reads: “[a] motion to reopen . . .

shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of

removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or

her departure from the United States.” In the alternative, the BIA

affirmed the IJ’s decision because it found that Shah had failed to

show that he did not receive notice of the hearing in accordance

with section 239(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). The BIA

considered Shah’s new argument on appeal – that the NTA was

addressed incorrectly – but it found that Shah had failed to submit

any evidence that supported that assertion. Rather, all the

evidence before the BIA, including the NTA, contained the proper

address and was certified as having been sent by regular mail to

Shah. Accordingly, the BIA dismissed the appeal. Shah petitions

for review of the denial of the motion to reopen. 

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II. Discussion

 On appeal, Shah challenges the BIA’s denial of the motion to

reopen on the ground that he was outside the United States when the

NTA was sent and that it should have been sent to his attorney.

“Where, as here, ‘the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s ruling, but

also discussed some of the bases for the IJ’s opinion, we review

both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions.’” Lin v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d

4, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Zheng v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 30, 33

(1st Cir. 2007)). We review the BIA’s denial of the motion to

reopen for abuse of discretion and will reverse “only if the BIA

‘misread the law’ or acted ‘in an arbitrary or capricious

fashion.’” Fesseha v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 13,20 (1st Cir. 2003)

(quoting Carter v. INS, 90 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1996)). “We defer

to the factual determinations made by the BIA if they are based on

‘reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.’” Aragon-Munoz

v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Ymeri v.

Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2004)).

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.34(b)(1), “[a] motion to reopen . . .

shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of

removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or

her departure from the United States.” See also Aguilar v.

Gonzales, 475 F.3d 415, 418 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the

petitioner’s motion to reopen was withdrawn under 8 C.F.R. §

1003.23(b)(1) because the regulation is mandatory and the

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 The full text of this sections reads: 3

Any alien who, after written notice required under

paragraph (1) or (2) of section 239(a) has been provided

to the alien or the alien’s counsel of record, does not

attend a proceeding under this section, shall be ordered

removed in absentia if the Service establishes by clear,

unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the written

notice was so provided and that the alien is removable

(as defined in subsection (e)(2)). The written notice by

the Attorney General shall be considered sufficient for

purposes of this subparagraph if provided at the most

recent address provided under section 239(a)(1)(F).

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).

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petitioner had departed the United States after filing the motion

to reopen). Shah departed the United States in June 2000 and filed

a motion to open his prior deportation proceedings in July 2006.

There is no question that at that time, he continued to reside in

Canada. Shah is therefore barred from filing a motion to reopen

under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.34(b)(1).

Additionally, there is substantial evidence to support the

BIA’s finding that Shah failed to meet his burden of demonstrating

that he did not receive the NTA. “An alien’s failure to appear at

a scheduled immigration hearing results in mandatory entry of an in

absentia removal order if the government establishes that written

notice of the hearing was given and that the alien is removable as

charged.” Aragon-Munoz, 520 F.3d at 85. A NTA that is sent to the

most recent address provided by the alien is sufficient written

notice to satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) . Id.; see also 8 3

U.S.C. § 1229(c) (“Service by mail under this section shall be

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sufficient if there is proof of attempted delivery to the last

address provided by the alien . . . .”). If the alien fails to

provide the government with his most recent address, then notice is

not required before the in absentia order may be issued. AragonMunoz, 520 F.3d at 85. 

In order to reopen his proceedings, Shah relies upon 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), which provides that an in absentia order can

be rescinded at any time if the alien can demonstrate that he did

not receive notice of the hearing. The alien bears the burden of

demonstrating that he did not receive the notice. Id. at 86.

The BIA and the IJ found that Shah failed to meet his burden

of demonstrating that he did not receive the NTA. That conclusion

was supported by more than substantial evidence. Shah’s original

Request for Asylum listed a Brooklyn, New York address. However,

Shah made hand-written edits on the asylum application on December

1, 1999. One of those edits was the replacement of the prior

address entry with the following: 59 Breckinridge St., Palmer, MA,

01069. Both the BIA and the IJ found that the NTA contained the

proper address – 59 Breckinridge St. – and was certified to have

been sent by regular mail to that address. Further, as the IJ

noted, the NTA was never returned to the DHS as having been

undeliverable. Additionally, we note that Shah has provided no

affirmative evidence, other than his own vague assertions, of where

he was located when the NTA was sent. While he argues on appeal

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that he was outside the United States and consequently all notices

should have been sent to his attorney, he failed to submit any

evidence that would indicate that he provided the Attorney General

with a written record of the change in his address. See AragonMunoz, 520 F.3d at 86 (finding that the petitioner failed to

demonstrate that notice was never received when he did not

introduce any affirmative evidence of where he was living when the

NTA was mailed). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion

in denying the motion to reopen. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the petition is denied.

 

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