Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01290/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01290-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albemarle Corporation & Subsidiaries
Appellant
Calgon Carbon (Tianjin) Corporation Limted
Appellee
Calgon Carbon Corporation
Cross-Appellant
Ningxia Huahui Activated Carbon Company Limited
Appellant
Norit Americas, Inc.
Cross-Appellant
United States
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ALBEMARLE CORPORATION & SUBSIDIARIES, 

NINGXIA HUAHUI ACTIVATED CARBON 

COMPANY LIMITED,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

SHANXI DMD CORPORATION, BEIJING PACIFIC 

ACTIVATED CARBON PRODUCTS CO., LTD., 

CHERISHMET INC., NINGXIA GUANGHUA 

CHERISHMET ACTIVATED CARBON CO., LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

UNITED STATES, CALGON CARBON 

CORPORATION, NORIT AMERICAS, INC.,

Defendants-Cross-Appellants

CALGON CARBON (TIANJIN) CORPORATION 

LIMTED,

Defendant

______________________ 

2015-1288, 2015-1289, 2015-1290

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:11-cv-00451-TCS, Chief Judge Timothy C. 

Stanceu.

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2 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

______________________ 

Decided: May 2, 2016

______________________ 

JILL A. CRAMER, Mowry & Grimson, PLLC, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented 

by JEFFREY S. GRIMSON, KRISTIN HEIM MOWRY, SARAH M.

WYSS. 

GREGORY S. MENEGAZ, DeKieffer & Horgan, PLLC, 

Washington, DC, representing plaintiff-appellee Shanxi 

DMD Corporation, argued for all plaintiffs-appellees. 

FRANCIS J. SAILER, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP, Washington, DC, for plaintiffsappellees Beijing Pacific Activated Carbon Products Co., 

Ltd., Cherishmet Inc., Ningxia Guanghua Cherishmet 

Activated Carbon Co., Ltd. Also represented by KAVITA 

MOHAN, MARK PARDO, ANDREW THOMAS SCHUTZ. 

CLAUDIA BURKE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-cross-appellant United 

States. Also represented by ANTONIA RAMOS SOARES, 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY; SHELBY ANDERSON, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, United States 

Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

ROBERT ALAN LUBERDA, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendants-cross-appellants

Calgon Carbon Corporation, Norit Americas, Inc. Also 

represented by JOHN M. HERRMANN, DAVID A. HARTQUIST. 

 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 3

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

The Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) selected 

two exporters, Jacobi Carbons AB (“Jacobi”) and Calgon 

Carbon (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. (“CCT”), to individually examine in the third administrative review of an antidumping 

order. Commerce assigned both exporters de minimis 

dumping margins. Rather than using the “expected 

method” of averaging those de minimis margins to calculate a separate rate for non-examined exporters Ningxia 

Guanghua Cherishmet Activated Carbon Co., Ltd. (“Cherishmet”),1 Shanxi DMD Corp. (“Shanxi”), and Ningxia 

Huahui Activated Carbon Company Ltd. (“Huahui”),2

Commerce continued to apply the rates it had assigned 

those exporters in the second, immediately preceding 

administrative review. The Court of International Trade 

(“CIT”) held that Commerce’s use of prior dumping margins was impermissible with respect to Cherishmet and 

Shanxi but permissible with respect to Huahui. We 

affirm with respect to Cherishmet and Shanxi and reverse 

and remand with respect to Huahui. In each case, Commerce has failed to justify using the rate from the prior 

administrative review. 

 

1 Consistent with Commerce, we treat Cherishmet 

and Beijing Pacific Activated Carbon Products as one 

entity, which we refer to as “Cherishmet.” 

2 We refer to appellants Albemarle Corporation & 

Subsidiaries and Ningxia Huahui Activated Carbon 

Company Ltd. together as “Huahui.”

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4 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

BACKGROUND

I 

When merchandise is sold in the United States at less 

than fair value, Commerce is authorized by statute to 

impose antidumping duties. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673. These 

duties are equal to the dumping margin, the amount by 

which the price of the merchandise in the exporting 

country (“normal value”) exceeds the price of the merchandise in the United States (“export price” or “U.S. 

price”). See id. §§ 1673e(a)(1), 1677b(a)(1), 1677a(a);3

Changzhou Wujin Fine Chem. Factory Co., v. United 

States, 701 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Under the 

statute, Commerce is generally charged with determining 

individual dumping margins for each known exporter. 19 

U.S.C. § 1677f–1(c)(1). When it is “not practicable” to 

determine individual margins for each exporter, the 

statute provides that Commerce may limit its examination to a “reasonable number of exporters” that either 

constitute a statistically representative sample of all 

known exporters or account for the largest volume of the 

subject merchandise from the exporting country. Id.

§ 1677f–1(c)(2). 

In proceedings involving non-market economy countries, including China, Commerce presumes that exporters are state-controlled, and assigns them a single statewide dumping rate. Changzhou, 701 F.3d at 1370; 19 

C.F.R. § 351.107(d). This presumption is rebuttable; an 

exporter that demonstrates sufficient independence from 

 

3 On June 29, 2015, the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (2015), 

went into effect. The Act makes a number of changes to 

the antidumping duty laws, none of which is relevant to 

this case. 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 5

state control may apply to Commerce for a different rate. 

Changzhou, 701 F.3d at 1370. A separate rate, sometimes 

referred to as the “all-others” rate, is assigned to all nonindividually examined exporters (“separate respondents”)

when Commerce limits its examination to fewer than all 

known exporters. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(1)(B)(i)(II); 

Changzhou, 701 F.3d at 1370. 

Typically, as discussed below, this separate or allothers rate is calculated by averaging the rates of the 

individually examined exporters. Non-selected parties 

can request individual examination pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677m(a), but Commerce is not obligated to grant such 

requests. Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Doc. No. 

103–316 (1994) [“SAA”], reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

4040, 4201 (“Commerce may decline to analyze voluntary 

responses because it would be unduly burdensome.”); 

Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co., v. United States 

(“Bestpak”), 716 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Here, 

Commerce determined that all of the parties to this 

appeal were entitled to separate rates. The central issue 

concerns the calculation of those separate rates for Cherishmet, Shanxi, and Huahui. As noted earlier, rather 

than using the average of the rates calculated for the 

individually examined exporters during the third administrative review, Commerce used the rates applied to 

Cherishmet, Shanxi, and Huahui in the previous administrative review. 

II

The underlying proceedings involve an initial investigation followed by three administrative reviews of imports of “certain activated carbon” from the People’s 

Republic of China, which encompasses “powdered, granular, or pelletized carbon product[s] obtained by ‘activating’ 

with heat and steam various materials containing carCase: 15-1290 Document: 7-2 Page: 5 Filed: 05/02/2016
6 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

bon.” Notice of Antidumping Order: Certain Activated 

Carbon from the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 

20,988, 20,988 (Apr. 27, 2007). In the initial investigation

in 2007, Commerce individually investigated only the two 

largest volume exporters, Jacobi and CCT. Commerce 

determined that appellant Huahui and appellees Cherishmet and Shanxi were entitled to separate rates. 

After receiving several requests for review of the initial antidumping order, Commerce conducted a series of

three administrative reviews. In the first review in 2009, 

Jacobi and CCT were selected as individual respondents, 

and Commerce granted Cherishmet’s request to be individually examined as a voluntary respondent. Certain 

Activated Carbon from the People’s Republic of China: 

Notice of Preliminary Results of the Antidumping Duty 

Administrative Review and Extension of Time Limits for 

the Final Results, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,317, 21,318 (May 7, 

2009). In the second review in 2010, Jacobi and Huahui 

were individually examined, while CCT, Cherishmet, and 

Shanxi were given separate rates. Certain Activated 

Carbon from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results 

and Partial Rescission of Second Antidumping Duty 

Administrative Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,208, 70,208, 

70,209–10 (Nov. 17, 2010). Commerce assigned Jacobi a 

rate of $0.11/kg and Huahui a rate of $0.44/kg. It calculated the separate rate by averaging those individual 

margins, resulting in a separate rate of $0.28/kg, which 

was applied to Cherishmet and Shanxi. 

In the third and final review in 2011, which is the 

subject of this appeal, Commerce individually examined 

Jacobi and CCT. Certain Activated Carbon from the 

People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Partial 

Rescission of the Third Administrative Antidumping Duty 

Administrative Review [“Final Results”], 76 Fed. Reg. 

67,142, 67,142 (Oct. 31, 2011). Cherishmet, Shanxi, and 

Huahui were held entitled to a separate rate. Huahui 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 7

submitted a request to be individually examined as a 

voluntary respondent, but Commerce denied its request. 

In the Final Results, Commerce determined that Jacobi 

and CCT, the individually examined respondents, were 

not dumping, and assigned them de minimis margins.4 

The question was whether these de minimis rates should 

be averaged and applied to the separate respondents. 

As discussed in detail below, 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5) 

governs Commerce’s calculation of separate rates. Under 

the statute, when all individually examined exporters are 

assigned de minimis margins, the “expected method” is 

for Commerce to calculate the separate rate by taking the 

average of the de minimis margins assigned to the individually examined respondents. See SAA, at 4201. If 

Commerce determines that following the expected method 

would not be feasible or would result in margins that 

would “not be reasonably reflective of potential dumping 

margins” for the separate respondents, Commerce may 

use “other reasonable methods.” Id. 

Rather than following the “expected method” of averaging the de minimis margins calculated for the individually examined respondents here, Commerce calculated 

separate rates for Huahui, Cherishmet, and Shanxi by

continuing to apply the margins it had assigned them

during the previous period of review—Huahui was given 

$0.44/kg, the same rate it was assigned when individually 

examined during the second review, and Cherishmet and 

Shanxi were given $0.28/kg, the same separate rate that 

was calculated during the second review by averaging the 

rates for the individually examined respondents. Com-

 

4 In administrative reviews, Commerce considers 

any margin of less than 0.5% of U.S. sales price to be de 

minimis. 19 C.F.R. § 351.106(c). Here, Commerce assigned Jacobi and CCT margins of $0.00/kg. 

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8 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

merce does not contend that employing the expected 

method would be unfeasible. Instead, Commerce determined that the expected method would result in margins 

that would not be reasonably reflective of the separate 

respondents’ actual dumping, explaining primarily that 

its policy was to exclude de minimis margins from all 

separate rate calculations: “We agree with Petitioners 

that [Commerce] should not diverge from the practice of 

excluding zero and de minimis margins when calculating 

the separate rate margin.” Memorandum to the File, 

through Ronald K. Lorentzen from Christian Marsh re: 

Issues and Dec. Mem. for the Final Results of the Third 

Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, dated Oct. 24, 

2011, at 5 [“Memorandum”], available at J.A. 100992. 

III

Huahui, Cherishmet, and Shanxi challenged Commerce’s separate rate calculations in the CIT. Albemarle 

Corp. v. United States (“Albemarle I”), 931 F. Supp. 2d 

1280 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013). The exporters argued that 

Commerce’s calculations were unreasonable because they 

were based exclusively on non-contemporaneous data, and 

asserted that Commerce failed to adequately explain its 

departure from the “well-established premise that the 

Final Results of a proceeding should be based solely on 

the facts on the record in that proceeding.” Id. at 1290. 

The CIT remanded and ordered Commerce to reconsider 

the margin it assigned to Cherishmet and Shanxi, explaining that the

$0.28/kg margin was not based on data pertaining 

to any pricing behavior that occurred in the third 

[period of review]. Nor was it based on any data 

pertaining to these respondents; instead, Commerce reverted to a margin it determined in another review for other respondents. This margin 

does not reflect commercial reality with respect to 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 9

[Shanxi or Cherishmet], and is, in that sense, arbitrary. 

Id. at 1291. With respect to Huahui, the CIT “reserve[d] 

any decision on whether the margin assigned [] was 

permissible. Commerce may or may not decide to assign 

Huahui a different margin based on other decisions it 

makes upon remand.” Id. at 1293.

On remand, cross-appellant Calgon Carbon Corporation (“CCC”), the parent company of CCT and a United 

States competitor of Cherishmet, Shanxi, and Huahui, 

petitioned Commerce to reopen the administrative record 

and collect additional data from the separate respondents

to support its position that those companies should be 

assessed dumping duties. Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, Albemarle Corp. v. U.S., 

Consol. Ct. No. 11-00451 at 21 (Jan. 9, 2014) [“Final 

Remand Redetermination”], available at J.A. 101177. 

Commerce declined, stating, “we do not have the resources to individually review more than two respondents.” Id. Commerce recalculated the separate rates for 

Cherishmet and Shanxi, “follow[ing] the [CIT’s] logic, 

under protest, to its natural conclusion,” and averaging 

the de minimis margins assigned to the individually 

examined respondents in the third review. Id. at 13. This

resulted in de minimis margins for Cherishmet and 

Shanxi. With respect to Huahui, Commerce “decline[d] to 

reconsider Huahui’s dumping margin” and continued to 

assign the previous rate of $0.44/kg. Id. at 22. 

Following the Final Remand Redetermination, the 

CIT, having retained jurisdiction, affirmed Commerce’s 

redeterminations and the dumping margins assigned to

all exporters. Albemarle Corp, Ningxia Huahui Activated 

Carbon Co. v. United States (“Albemarle II”), 27 F. Supp. 

3d 1336, 1352 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014). While following the 

CIT’s instructions on remand, Commerce continued to 

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10 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

view its original determinations as being correct. With 

respect to Cherishmet and Shanxi, the CIT reiterated 

that Commerce’s initial decision to carry forward the prior 

dumping margins was impermissible. It explained that 

Commerce’s assertion that the previous margins were 

contemporaneous and reasonably reflective of actual 

margins was “factually incorrect when viewed in the 

context of the record evidence of the third review.” Id. at 

1344. The CIT explained that “no data on the record 

demonstrated that the pricing behavior of [Cherishmet 

and Shanxi] matched the pricing behaviors of the mandatory respondents in the previous review.” Id. Instead, 

using contemporaneous data from the third review for the 

individually examined respondents resulted in a “reasonable reflection of the potential dumping margin” that 

Cherishmet and Shanxi “would have been assigned in the 

third review, had they been examined.” Id. at 1344–45

(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations 

omitted). 

With respect to Huahui, the CIT affirmed Commerce’s 

decision to not recalculate the $0.44/kg margin previously 

assigned, holding that Commerce’s method was reasonable because it “relie[d] on data that were specific to 

Huahui’s sales and factors of production,” unlike the rate 

that had been carried over for Cherishmet and Shanxi. 

Id. at 1348. The CIT recognized that the data were 

derived from the previous period of review but concluded 

that Commerce’s decision to choose “specificity to Huahui 

over contemporaneity” was reasonable. Id. 

Huahui appeals. The government and CCC crossappeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(5). 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 11

DISCUSSION

I 

We review decisions of the CIT concerning Commerce’s antidumping determinations by applying the 

same standard of review used by the CIT. Bestpak, 716 

F.3d at 1377; Changzhou, 701 F.3d at 1374. Commerce’s 

determination will be set aside if it is arbitrary and 

capricious or not supported by substantial evidence. 

Changzhou, 701 F.3d at 1374; see also SKF U.S.A., Inc. v. 

United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“We 

review [Commerce’s] decision under the Administrative 

Procedure Act and any other applicable law.”). The 

question of whether Commerce’s statutory interpretation

accords with law is guided by the two-part test articulated 

in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). See Bestpak, 

716 F.3d at 1377; Nan Ya Plastics Corp., v. United States, 

810 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We have acknowledged “Commerce’s special expertise” in antidumping 

cases and have “accorded substantial deference to its 

construction of pertinent statutes.” SKF, 254 F.3d at 

1028 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations 

omitted). 

II

Under the statute, Commerce normally calculates the 

separate rate by averaging the “dumping margins established for exporters and producers individually investigated, excluding any zero and de minimis margins.” 19 

U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(A); Changzhou, 701 F.3d at 1372. 

The statute provides an exception, however, for situations 

like the present one where all individually examined

respondents receive de minimis margins. In that case, 

Commerce “may use any reasonable method to establish 

the estimated all-others rate for exporters and producers 

not individually investigated, including averaging the 

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12 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

estimated weighted average dumping margins determined for the exporters and producers individually investigated.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(B). The Statement of 

Administrative Action, legislative history that is “recognized by Congress as an authoritative expression concerning the interpretation and application of the Tariff Act 

under 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d),” Bestpak, 716 F.3d at 1373, 

explains that when all individually examined respondents 

are assigned de minimis margins, 

The expected method in such cases will be to 

weight-average the zero and de minimis margins . . . provided that volume data is available. 

However, if this method is not feasible, or if it results in an average that would not be reasonably 

reflective of potential dumping margins for noninvestigated exporters or producers, Commerce 

may use other reasonable methods. 

SAA, at 4201 (underscoring added).5 The SAA thus 

makes clear that under the statute, when all individually 

 

5 The full text of the relevant SAA section reads as 

follows: 

(2) All Others Rate

Recognizing the impracticality of examining 

all producers and exporters in all cases, Article 9.4 

of the Antidumping Agreement permits the use of 

an all others rate to be applied to non-investigated 

firms. To implement the Agreement, section 

219(b) of the bill adds section 735(c)(5)(A) to the 

Act which provides that the all others rate will be 

equal to the weighted-average of the individual 

dumping margins calculated for those exporters 

and producers that are individually investigated, 

exclusive of any zero and de minimis margins, and 

any margins determined entirely on the basis of 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 13

examined respondents are assigned de minimis margins, 

Commerce is expected to calculate the separate rate by 

taking the average of those margins. Commerce may use 

“other reasonable methods,” but only if Commerce reasonably concludes that the expected method is “not feasible” or “would not be reasonably reflective of potential 

dumping margins.” Id. 

It is true, as the government points out, that 19 

U.S.C. § 1673d applies on its face only to investigations, 

not periodic administrative reviews.6 See Amanda Foods 

 

the facts available. Currently, in determining the 

all others rate, Commerce includes margins determined on the basis of the facts available. 

Section 219(b) of the bill adds new section 

735(c)(5)(B) which provides an exception to the 

general rule if the dumping margins for all of the 

exporters and producers that are individually investigated are determined entirely on the basis of 

the facts available or are zero or de minimis. In 

such situations, Commerce may use any reasonable method to calculate the all others rate. The 

expected method in such cases will be to weightaverage the zero and de minimis margins and 

margins determined pursuant to the facts available, provided that volume data is available. However, if this method is not feasible, or if it results 

in an average that would not be reasonably reflective of potential dumping margins for noninvestigated exporters or producers, Commerce 

may use other reasonable methods. 

SAA, at 4201 (underscoring added). 

6 The statute also explicitly applies only to market 

economy proceedings, but Commerce has adopted it in 

non-market economy proceedings as well, see Bestpak, 716 

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14 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

(Vietnam) Ltd. v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 

1290 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010). But the statutory framework 

contemplates that Commerce will employ the same methods for calculating a separate rate in periodic administrative reviews as it does in initial investigations. See 19 

U.S.C. § 1675(a) (amended 2016) (In conducting periodic 

administrative reviews, Commerce is required to “determine the dumping margin” to calculate “the amount of 

any antidumping duty,” just as it must do in initial investigations).7 Indeed, for this reason Commerce itself has 

found the statute’s methodology applicable in periodic 

 

F.3d at 1374, and the government does not contend that 

the calculation of the separate rate should be any different in light of the non-market economy here. 

7 Although the government contends that the SAA 

applies only to investigations and not administrative 

reviews, the text of the SAA is to the contrary. The 

section of the SAA from which the quoted excerpt above 

was taken refers to the calculation of dumping margins 

“for all producers and exporters of merchandise who are 

subject to an antidumping investigation or for whom an 

administrative review is requested.” SAA, at 4200 (emphasis added). And the treaty that gave rise to the statutory provisions addressed in the SAA states that the 

provisions governing the determination of individual 

dumping margins when there are large numbers of exporters and producers apply to reviews as well as investigations. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 

11.4, Apr. 15, 1994, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1, at 1455, 

1868 U.N.T.S. 201 (“The provisions of Article 6 regarding 

evidence and procedure shall apply to any review carried 

out under this Article”), referring to Article 6.10; see also 

id. at art. 9.4. 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 15

administrative reviews as well as initial investigations, as 

it did in this case. See Memorandum, at 4. 

The “expected method” under the statute makes sense 

in light of the general assumption underlying the statutory framework. Here, the individually examined respondents account for a majority of the market during the 

relevant period, and are representative at the very least 

in terms of aggregate volume. The government argues 

that “the possibility exists that the pricing behavior of the 

largest exporters [selected for individual examination]

may not reflect the pricing behavior of smaller exporters,” 

Br. of United States at 23–24, but there is no evidence 

here that the largest exporters are not representative. 

The very fact that the statute contemplates using data 

from the largest volume exporters suggests an assumption that those data can be viewed as representative of all 

exporters. The statute assumes that, absent such evidence, reviewing only a limited number of exporters will 

enable Commerce to reasonably approximate the margins 

of all known exporters. As the CIT has explained, “[t]he 

representativeness of the investigated exporters is the 

essential characteristic that justifies an ‘all others’ rate 

based on a weighted average for such respondents.” Nat’l 

Knitwear & Sportswear Ass’n v. United States, 15 C.I.T.

548, 559 (1991). Thus the government’s repeated argument that “no record evidence demonstrated that the 

separate rate respondents engaged in pricing behavior 

similar to Jacobi or CCT,” Br. of United States at 24, is 

backwards. The burden is not on the separate respondents to show that their dumping is the same as that of the 

individually examined respondents. Rather, Commerce

must find based on substantial evidence that there is a 

reasonable basis for concluding that the separate respondents’ dumping is different. 

There is no contention here that the expected method 

is not feasible. The questions therefore are (1) whether 

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16 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

Commerce properly determined that the expected method

(utilizing the average of the margins calculated for the 

examined respondents) “would not be reasonably reflective of potential dumping margins” for Cherishmet, Shanxi, and Huahui; and (2) if so, whether Commerce’s chosen 

method of carrying forward their margins from the previous review was “reasonable.” 

III

Commerce primarily seeks to justify its approach on 

the ground that there is a policy against using de minimis 

margins to calculate separate rates. See Memorandum, at 

4 (“We agree with Petitioners that [Commerce] should not 

diverge from the practice of excluding zero and de minimis margins when calculating the separate rate margin.”)

(emphasis in original). The government contends that 

this is reasonable because the statute disfavors using zero 

or de minimis rates as a general matter. We disagree. 

It is true that when there are non-de minimis margins 

assigned to individually examined respondents, the 

statute instructs Commerce to calculate the separate rate 

by averaging the margins assigned to the individually 

examined respondents, “excluding any zero and de minimis margins.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(A). But it is equally clear that when all individually examined respondents 

are assigned de minimis margins, Commerce has no 

similar mandate to routinely exclude zero or de minimis 

margins. Congress has spoken directly to this precise 

situation in § 1673d(c)(5)(B), and the SAA unambiguously 

provides that the expected method to calculate the separate rate in such circumstances is to average the individually examined respondents’ de minimis margins. See 

SAA, at 4201. 

The government cannot contend that methodology

employing de minimis margins is disfavored when Congress has unmistakably explained that it is, in fact, 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 17

preferred.8 The government’s policy simply cannot be 

distilled from the statute in this context, and Commerce’s 

insistence on using its hostility to de minimis rates as the 

driving force behind its methodology is on its face arbitrary and capricious. Indeed, counsel for the government 

admitted at oral argument that Commerce would have 

used $0.05/kg, which CCT was assigned in the preliminary results of the third review, as the separate rate if 

one of the two individually examined respondents had 

been assigned that rate in the final review. See Oral Arg. 

at 44:30–40. This demonstrates the arbitrariness of 

Commerce’s approach. 

Commerce also seeks to justify its approach on the 

ground that Commerce has a legitimate interest in allocating its own limited resources.9 While this interest is 

 

8 “Simply put, when a statutory provision specifically lists ‘averaging the [zero and de minimis] estimated 

weighted average dumping margins determined for the 

exporters and producers individually investigated’ as the 

sole provided example of a ‘reasonable method to establish the estimated all-others rate’ when all mandatory 

respondents’ margins are zero or de minimis, 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1673d(c)(5)(B), it is impermissible to interpret this 

provision as expressing a preference against the use of 

such methodology in such situations. This must particularly be the case when the [SAA] expressly states that the 

allegedly disfavored methodology is in fact ‘[t]he expected 

method in such cases.’” Amanda Foods, 714 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1291 (citations omitted). 

9 See, e.g., Torrington v. United States, 68 F.3d 

1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[A]gencies with statutory 

enforcement responsibilities enjoy broad discretion in 

allocating investigative and enforcement resources.”).

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18 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

certainly relevant, it alone is not sufficient to render an 

otherwise unreasonable methodology reasonable. 

Finally, as our cases have explained, accuracy and 

fairness must be Commerce’s primary objectives in calculating a separate rate for cooperating exporters. See 

Bestpak, 716 F.3d at 1379 (“An overriding purpose of 

Commerce’s administration of antidumping laws is to 

calculate dumping margins as accurately as possible.”); 

Gallant Ocean (Thailand) Co., v. United States, 602 F.3d 

1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (a rate must be a “reasonably 

accurate estimate of the respondent’s actual rate”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); SNR Roulements v. United States, 402 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (“Antidumping laws intend to calculate antidumping duties on a fair and equitable basis.”); Rhone Poulenc, 

Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 

(the “basic purpose of the statute” is to “determin[e] 

current margins as accurately as possible”); see also Nan 

Ya, 810 F.3d at 1344–45 (accuracy represents a “reliable 

guidepost[] for Commerce’s determinations,” and a determination is “accurate” if it is “supported by substantial 

evidence”). 

IV 

We therefore turn to Commerce’s other justifications 

for its approach. We first address Commerce’s methodology with respect to Cherishmet and Shanxi. Cherishmet 

and Shanxi were not individually examined in either the 

second or third reviews. In the second review, they were 

assigned a separate rate based on the simple average of 

the dumping margins calculated for the individually 

examined respondents, Jacobi and Huahui, which resulted in a dumping margin of $0.28/kg. In the third review, 

Commerce individually examined Jacobi and CCT, ultimately assigning them both de minimis margins. But 

Commerce continued to apply the $0.28/kg margin to 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 19

Cherishmet and Shanxi as their separate rate in the third 

review. 

There is no evidence that supports Commerce’s determination that averaging the de minimis margins 

assigned to the individually examined respondents in the 

third review would have resulted in margins for Cherishmet and Shanxi that would not have been reflective of 

their actual dumping margins. Commerce had no data 

specific to Cherishmet or Shanxi from either the second or 

third review. And Commerce in fact assumed that the 

examined respondents were reasonably representative of 

Cherishmet and Shanxi during the second review, as 

Commerce calculated the separate rate by averaging the 

margins of the individually examined respondents from 

that review. 

Having assumed that the individually examined respondents were reasonably representative of Cherishmet 

and Shanxi in the second review, Commerce lacked any 

basis to reverse course and conclude that Cherishmet and 

Shanxi were somehow different in the third review. 

Commerce did not collect any additional information 

regarding Cherishmet or Shanxi, nor was there any 

evidence that would indicate different exporting behavior. 

In fact, one of the two individually examined exporters, 

Jacobi, was examined in both the second and third reviews. And in both reviews Commerce selected the individually examined respondents pursuant to the same 

method of examining the largest volume exporters. In the 

second review, Jacobi’s rate was used to calculate the 

rates for Cherishmet and Shanxi, but was found nonrepresentative in the third review. The government offers 

no explanation as to why Cherishmet and Shanxi were no 

longer reasonably represented by the individually examined respondents in the third review, while they had been 

in both reviews prior. Commerce’s conclusion was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence. AccordCase: 15-1290 Document: 7-2 Page: 19 Filed: 05/02/2016
20 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

ingly, we affirm the CIT with respect to Cherishmet and 

Shanxi. 

V 

We next consider Huahui. Unlike Cherishmet and 

Shanxi, Commerce did have information specific to 

Huahui because Huahui was one of the individually 

examined respondents in the second review. Huahui was 

assigned an individual dumping margin of $0.44/kg in the 

second review, significantly higher than the $0.11/kg 

margin assigned to Jacobi, the other individually examined respondent during that review, and the $0.00/kg 

rates assigned to the individually examined respondents 

in the third review. For this reason, Commerce did have 

substantial evidence to support its conclusion that simply 

averaging the de minimis rates assigned to Jacobi and 

CCT in the third review might not reasonably reflect 

Huahui’s potential dumping margin during the third 

period. Commerce was therefore entitled to use “other 

reasonable methods” under the statute. SAA, at 4201; 19 

U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(B). The question here is whether 

Commerce’s chosen method of carrying forward Huahui’s 

data from the second period of review to the third was 

reasonable. We conclude that it was not. 

In assessing the reasonableness of Commerce’s methodology, our analysis is guided by the statute’s manifest 

preference for contemporaneity in periodic administrative 

reviews. Under the statute, Commerce is obligated to 

review an antidumping duty order if requested “[a]t least 

once during each 12-month period beginning on the 

anniversary of the date of publication” of the order. 19 

U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (1999) (amended 2016). Commerce 

must commence a review within six months of any request. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1999) (amended 

2016). The purpose of periodic administrative reviews is 

to reassess dumping margins previously calculated in 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 21

light of data made available during the intervening period 

since the antidumping order was issued. See Union Steel 

v. United States, 713 F.3d 1101, 1103, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 

2013); Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 346 F.3d 

1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Unlike investigations, which consider “overall pricing 

behavior” to “determine the appropriateness of imposing 

an antidumping duty order” in the first place, administrative reviews begin with “an antidumping duty order 

already in place,” and typically employ methodology that 

“permits greater specificity” to “further[] the transactional 

accuracy interests” at the core of the review process. 

Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1108. Thus, when it comes to 

administrative reviews, “it is reasonable for the agency to 

look for more accuracy [than in the initial investigation], 

which it achieves in some measure through monthly 

averaging.” Id. 

There is no basis to simply assume that the underlying facts or calculated dumping margins remain the same 

from period to period. “[I]f the facts remained the same 

from period to period, there would be no need for administrative reviews.” Shandong Huarong Mach. Co. v. United 

States, 29 C.I.T. 484, 490–91 (2005). Thus Commerce 

itself has explained that “it is well established and upheld 

practice that the Department must base its decisions on 

the record of the administrative proceeding before it in 

each review.” Issues and Decision Memorandum for the 

Final Results in the Second Antidumping Duty Order 

Administrative Review of Diamond Sawblades and Parts 

Thereof from the Republic of Korea, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,524, 

cmt. 4 (June 18, 2013).10 In short, as we have previously 

 

10 See also, e.g., Qingdao Sea-Line Trading Co., v. 

United States, 766 F.3d 1378, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (In 

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22 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

recognized, “there is a clear congressional intent” that 

administrative reviews “be as accurate and current as 

possible.” Allegheny, 346 F.3d at 1373 (emphasis added). 

The legislative history “emphasized the importance of 

using current information with respect to making determinations. ‘The Committee intends that the Authority 

and the ITC should always use the most up-to-date information available.’” Freeport Minerals Co. (Freeport 

McMoran, Inc.) v. United States, 776 F.2d 1029, 1032 

(Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-317, at 77

(1979)).11 

 

determining what constitutes the “best available information” for calculating normal values in administrative 

reviews of non-market economies, “Commerce generally 

selects, to the extent practicable, surrogate values that 

are publicly available, are product-specific, reflect a broad 

market average, and are contemporaneous with the 

period of review.”) (emphasis added); Home Meridian Int’l, 

Inc. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1289, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(“Commerce gave considerable weight to contemporaneity, 

as the Court of International Trade recognized Commerce 

often does when comparing contemporaneous surrogate 

values with non-contemporaneous market economy purchases.”); Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United 

States, 618 F.3d 1316, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Commerce 

argued that certain survey data was the best available 

because it presented “a broad market average, specific to 

the input in question, exactly contemporaneous with the 

period of review.”) (emphasis added) (alterations omitted). 

11 Commerce appears to suggest that it is somehow 

less important to use contemporaneous data in administrative reviews than in investigations because in administrative reviews, unlike investigations, prior period data is 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 23

In light of this established doctrine, it is not open to 

Commerce to argue that prior review data is reliable 

simply because it is “temporally proximate.” Br. of United 

States at 13, 25. The government’s rationale contravenes 

this fundamental premise of periodic administrative 

reviews that each “administrative review is a separate 

exercise of Commerce’s authority that allows for different 

conclusions based on different facts in the record.” Qingdao, 766 F.3d at 1387. That the prior rates were near in 

time cannot in and of itself justify their use in a subsequent review. 

To be sure, there are at least two circumstances 

where use of data from a prior period may be reasonable. 

But neither prevails here. First, there are situations 

where there is evidence that the overall market and the 

dumping margins have not changed from period to period. 

Thus in Atar S.R.L. v. United States, we upheld Commerce’s use of surrogate data from a prior review period 

in calculating an exporter’s constructed value profit cap 

because the record demonstrated that the market had not 

meaningfully changed between periods. 730 F.3d 1320, 

1327 (Fed. Cir. 2013). But that is not the case here. This 

is not a situation in which there was any consistency with 

respect to the dumping margins of the individually examined respondents throughout the reviews. For both 

parties that were individually examined in more than one 

review here, the numbers demonstrate a significant 

decline in dumping margins. For example, Jacobi’s margin decreased from 61.95% in the initial investigation to 

18.19% in the first review, and then again from $0.11/kg 

in the second review to $0.00/kg in the third. CCT’s 

 

available. See Memorandum, at 5. But the availability of 

prior information provides no basis for using noncontemporaneous data in each administrative review. 

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24 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

margin also significantly decreased from 69.54% in the 

initial investigation to 14.51% in the first review, and 

then again to a de minimis margin in the third review. 

There was also a significant decrease in the financial 

ratios used in calculating the normal values between the 

second and third reviews, which, all other things being 

equal, suggests a decline in overall dumping. Thus if 

anything, the history here is one of generally declining 

dumping margins, and Commerce had no reason to believe that Huahui’s margin would not have similarly 

declined. 

Second, as the government points out, in the Adverse 

Facts Available (“AFA”) context, where Commerce is 

allowed to consider deterrence as a factor,12 we have 

upheld Commerce’s use of data from a previous administrative review. We have explained that when an exporter 

is not cooperating, “Commerce is permitted to use a 

‘common sense inference that the highest prior [dumping] 

margin is the most probative evidence of current margins.’” KYD, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.3d 760, 766 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010) (quoting Rhone Poulenc, 899 F.2d at 1190). In 

other words, Commerce may presume that “a prior dumping margin imposed against an exporter in an earlier 

administrative review continues to be valid if the exporter 

fails to cooperate in a subsequent administrative review.” 

Id. at 767; see also Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. 

United States, 298 F.3d 1330, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

We have upheld this presumption because “if it were not 

so, the [exporter], knowing of the rule, would have pro-

 

12 As Nan Ya makes clear, Commerce has greater 

latitude in determining dumping margins when dealing 

with AFA determinations, because other considerations 

such as deterrence appropriately play a role. See 810 F.3d 

at 1348. 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 25

duced current information showing the margins to be 

less.” KYD, 607 F.3d at 766 (emphasis in original). 

Commerce is thus permitted to infer from the exporter’s 

lack of cooperation that its dumping has not decreased 

since the previous review. But the current situation is 

quite different. 

Huahui is not a non-cooperating party. To the contrary, Huahui specifically requested leave to be individually 

examined as a voluntary respondent under 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677m(a), or alternatively to submit additional supplementary data, but Commerce denied both requests. “A 

presumption used to encourage some companies to submit 

more accurate information may not reasonably be transposed onto companies which are expressly prevented from 

submitting more accurate information.” Amanda Foods, 

714 F. Supp. 2d at 1294. 

VI

Nonetheless, the government argues that Commerce’s 

reliance on data from the previous period was reasonable

as to Huahui for two additional reasons. 

First, the government argues that Commerce’s method was reasonable in light of Huahui’s “history of dumping” over the course of the administrative proceedings

here. Br. of United States at 24. While evidence of dumping from previous administrative reviews is relevant and 

may inform Commerce’s methodology, in itself it is not 

sufficient to demonstrate that Huahui’s dumping continued, let alone that it continued at the same rate. 

Second, the government argues that it was reasonable 

to carry over Huahui’s old rate because there were no 

data on record specific to Huahui in the third review. As 

we described earlier, Commerce has significant authority 

to make administrative decisions regarding the allocation 

of its own limited resources. See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. 

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26 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

United States, 68 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1995). But as 

we have explained, Commerce may not justify “the absence of evidence by invoking procedural difficulties that 

were at least in part a creature of its own making.” 

Bestpak, 716 F.3d at 1378. It was unreasonable in this 

case for Commerce to choose to limit its review to the two 

largest volume exporters, refuse to collect additional data 

from Huahui, and then draw inferences adverse to 

Huahui based on the lack of data available in the record. 

See Albemarle I, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 (“The available 

data pertaining to the [period of review] for the third 

review were limited by [Commerce’s] decision to individually examine only two mandatory respondents. . . . Commerce made this determination despite its general 

statutory obligation to examine all respondents for which 

a review was requested.”). 

While it is clear that 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 does not require Commerce to calculate individual margins for every 

known exporter in all instances, it is equally clear that 

Commerce has at its disposal broad authority to gather

information, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677f-1(a), (b); 1675(a), 

including from separate respondents. On at least one 

prior occasion, Commerce has reopened the administrative record and collected additional information from 

separate respondents when all individually examined

respondents were assigned de minimis margins. See 

Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd. v. United States, 774 F. 

Supp. 2d 1286, 1289–90 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2011). When it 

did, it found that the separate respondents, like the 

individually examined respondents, were not dumping. 

See id. 

The availability of updated information from Huahui

and its request to submit such information here suggest 

that simply applying the old rate in the third period of 

review was not reasonable. Commerce had available 

additional quantity and value data, which would not have 

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ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US 27

required elaborate antidumping calculations, but rather 

could have served as a basis for Commerce to make approximate comparisons of Huahui’s export price. See, e.g.,

Amanda Foods, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 1289–90, n.8. What is 

more, as Commerce acknowledged at argument, Commerce already had at least partial data specific to 

Huahui’s factors of production on record because Huahui 

was a supplier to Jacobi, and Huahui’s information had 

already been collected as part of Jacobi’s individual examinations. See Oral Arg. at 12:24–12:52. Commerce had at 

least partial information regarding Huahui’s contemporaneous normal value, and the ability to gather information 

as to U.S. sales price. 

To be clear, we are not suggesting that Commerce was 

required to either individually examine Huahui or assign 

it a de minimis margin. Rather, what was necessary was

some evidence, for example, by a sampling process, that 

Huahui’s earlier data continued to be reasonably reflective of its current practice. Far from suggesting that 

Huahui’s old data would continue to be reasonably reflective here, the current record suggests that normal values 

decreased and dumping margins declined between the 

second and third reviews generally. It was unreasonable 

under these circumstances for Commerce to reassign 

Huahui in the third review its rate calculated during the 

second review rather than take the average of the de 

minimis margins assigned to Jacobi and CCT. 

VII

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the CIT with 

respect to Cherishmet and Shanxi, and reverse with 

respect to Huahui. We hold that Commerce could not on 

this record utilize data from the previous review. Rather, 

Commerce, having declined to collect additional information, was required to follow the “expected method” of 

utilizing the de minimis margins of the individually 

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28 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION v. US

examined respondents from the contemporaneous period. 

The case is remanded to the CIT so that it may issue 

appropriate instructions to Commerce. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND

REMANDED-IN-PART

COSTS

Costs to Cherishmet, Beijing Pacific Activated Carbon 

Products, Shanxi, Albemarle, and Huahui. 

Case: 15-1290 Document: 7-2 Page: 28 Filed: 05/02/2016