Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35517/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35517-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alaska Forest Association
Amicus Curiae
Alaska Forest Association, Inc.

Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Association
Appellee
Cascadia Wildlands
Appellee
Center for Biological Diversity
Appellee
Defenders of Wildlife
Appellee
Greenpeace, Inc.
Appellee
Natural Resources Defense Council
Appellee
Organized Village of Kake
Appellee
Harris Sherman

Sierra Club
Appellee
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council
Appellee
State of Alaska
Appellant
The Boat Company
Appellee
Tom Tidwell

Tongass Conservation Society
Appellee
United States Department of Agriculture

United States Forest Service

Tom Vilsack

Wrangell Resource Council
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE; THE

BOAT COMPANY; ALASKA

WILDERNESS RECREATION AND

TOURISM ASSOCIATION; SOUTHEAST

ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL;

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL; TONGASS CONSERVATION

SOCIETY; GREENPEACE, INC.;

WRANGELL RESOURCE COUNCIL;

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY; DEFENDERS OF

WILDLIFE; CASCADIA WILDLANDS;

SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE; UNITED STATES

FOREST SERVICE; TOM VILSACK, in

his official capacity as Secretary of

Agriculture; HARRIS SHERMAN, in

his official capacity as Under

Secretary of Agriculture of Natural

Resources and Environment; TOM

TIDWELL, in his official capacity as

Chief, USDA Forest Service,

Defendants,

No. 11-35517

D.C. No.

1:09-cv-00023-

JWS

OPINION

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2 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

ALASKA FOREST ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendant,

and

STATE OF ALASKA,

Intervenor-Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 30, 2012—Anchorage, Alaska

Filed March 26, 2014

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea;

Dissent by Judge McKeown

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 3

SUMMARY*

National Forest Rules

The panel reversed the district court’s order, which

invalidated a 2003 United States Department of Agriculture

regulation temporarily exempting the Tongass National

Forest in Alaska from application of the 2001 Roadless Area

Conservation Rule.

The panel held that in its 2003 Record of Decision, the

Department of Agriculture articulated a number of legitimate

grounds for temporarily exempting the Tongass Forest from

the 2001 Roadless Rule. The panel concluded that these

grounds and the Department of Agriculture’s reasoning in

reaching its decision were neither arbitrary nor capricious. 

The panel remanded to the district court to decide whether a

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement is required in

the first instance.

Judge McKeown dissented, and would affirm the district

court’s decision because the administrative record does not

support the USDA’s decision in 2003 to discard its previous

position and temporarily exempt the Tongass from the

Roadless Rule. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

COUNSEL

Thomas E. Lenhart, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Alaska Attorney General, Juneau, Alaska, for IntervenorDefendant–Appellant.

Nathaniel S.W. Lawrence, Senior Attorney, Natural

Resources Defense Council, Olympia, Washington; Thomas

S. Waldo, Earthjustice, Juneau, Alaska, for PlaintiffsAppellees.

Katherine Wade Hazard, Attorney, United States Department

of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division,

Washington, D.C., for Defendants.

Julie A. Weis, Haglund Kelley Jones & Wilder, LLP,

Portland, Oregon, for Intervenor-Defendant and Amicus

Curiae.

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

When a federal agency decides to change its rules to

allow roads to be built through a federal forest it had

previously ruled be preserved roadless, what reasons are

sufficient to justify that change?

The United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)

decided to change its rules to allow roads to be built through

an Alaskan forest the USDA had previously ruled should be

preserved roadless. We are called on to determine whether

the USDA’s stated reasons for its change to such rules were

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 5

sufficient, and the rule change valid, or arbitrary and

capricious, and the rule change invalid.

The district court held invalid, as arbitrary and capricious,

a 2003 USDA regulation that temporarily exempts the

Tongass National Forest (“Tongass”) from application of the

2001 Roadless Area Conservation Rule (“Roadless Rule”).1,2

The State of Alaska appeals that order.

We reverse the district court’s order because, in its 2003

Record of Decision (“ROD”), the USDA articulated a number

of legitimate grounds for temporarily exempting the Tongass

from the Roadless Rule. These grounds and the USDA’s

reasoning in reaching its decision were neither arbitrary nor

capricious.

I. Background

Various environmental organizations and Alaskan

villages brought an action against the USDA and the United

States Forest Service and several government officials

1

68 Fed. Reg. 75136-1 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt.

294).

2 The Roadless Rule prevents all construction in unroaded portions of

inventoried roadless areas, and “would establish national direction for

managing inventoried roadless areas, and for determining whether and to

what extent similar protections should be extended to uninventoried

roadless areas.” The final Roadless Rule included prohibitions on timber

harvest, road construction and reconstruction except for projects that

already had a notice of availability of an Environmental Impact Statement

(“EIS”) published in the Federal Register prior to the Roadless Rule’s

publication in the Federal Register. 66 Fed. Reg. 3244-01 (Jan. 12, 2001)

(to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294). There are many such exempted

projects. These exempted projects are not in dispute here.

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6 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

challenging a 2003 Forest Service rule which temporarily

exempts the Tongass from the Roadless Rule. The State of

Alaska and the Alaska Forest Association intervened as

Defendants.

Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Defendants

opposed Plaintiffs’ motion and filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment. The district court granted Plaintiffs’

motion and denied Defendants’ motion, entering an order

setting aside the Tongass Exemption, reinstating the 2001

Roadless Rule as to the Tongass, and vacating all previouslyapproved Tongass area timber sales that were in conflict with

the Roadless Rule. Only the State of Alaska now appeals.3

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment. N. Idaho Cmty. Action Network v. United States

Dep’t of Transp., 545 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008). This

action arises under the Administrative Procedures Act

(“APA”), which provides for judicial review of final agency

action. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. Under the APA, a court may

set aside agency actions only if such actions are “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Under this standard of review, an “agency must examine

the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for

its action.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc.

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 

 

3

 The Alaska Forest Association filed an amicus brief in support of the

State of Alaska, but did not file its own notice of appeal. Neither the

USDA nor the Forest Service appealed.

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 7

An agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency

fails to consider an important aspect of a problem, if the

agency offers an explanation for the decision that is contrary

to the evidence, if the agency’s decision is so implausible that

it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or be the

product of agency expertise, or if the agency’s decision is

contrary to the governing law. Id.

An “initial agency interpretation,” however, “is not

instantly carved in stone”; the agency “must consider varying

interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing

basis[.]” Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand

X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (quoting

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984)). To prevent a claim it

was acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner, where an

agency changes its policy, the agency must show awareness

that it is changing a policy and give a reasoned explanation

for the adoption of the new policy. FCC v. Fox Television

Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009). The agency does not

always have to “provide a more detailed justification than

what would suffice for a new policy.” Id. at 515. But the

Supreme Court cautioned judges not to determine whether

“the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for

the old one,” just whether the policy is permissible under the

statute and “the agency believes it to be better.” Id. The

Court emphasized: “the fact that an agency had a prior stance

does not alone prevent it from changing its view or create a

higher hurdle for doing so.” Id. at 519. “[A] court is not to

substitute its judgment for that of the agency and should

uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s

path may reasonably be discerned.” Id. at 513–14 (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

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8 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

Contrary to the district court’s finding that the USDA

acted arbitrarily and capriciously, we find that the USDA

clearly acknowledged the 2003 ROD is inconsistent with its

previous Roadless Rule and gave a reasoned explanation for

the change.

III. Discussion

The USDA clearly acknowledged that the 2003 ROD,

which excluded the Tongass from the Roadless Rule, is

inconsistent with its previous Roadless Rule, which included

the Tongass. The USDA’s ROD stated that,

In State of Alaska v. USDA, [ 3:01-CV-00039-

JSK] the State of Alaska and other plaintiffs

alleged that the roadless rule violated a

number of Federal statutes, including the

Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation

Act of 1980 (ANILCA)

. . . .

The Alaska Lawsuit alleged that USDA

violated ANILCA by applying the

requirements of the roadless rule to Alaska’s

national forests [including the Tongass]. 

USDA settled the lawsuit by agreeing to

publish a proposed rule which, if adopted,

would temporarily exempt the Tongass from

the application of the roadless rule (July 15,

2003, 68 FR 41865), and to publish a separate

advance notice of proposed rulemaking (July

15, 2003, 68 FR 41864) requesting comment

on whether to permanently exempt the

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 9

Tongass . . . from the application of the

roadless rule.

68 Fed. Reg. 75136.

Furthermore, the USDA gave a reasoned explanation for

the change which may “reasonably be discerned.” Fox

Television, 556 U.S. at 513–14. The USDA’s ROD explained

that it created the Roadless Rule exemption to cease

litigation,4 meet timber demand, and decrease socioeconomic

hardships on isolated Alaskan communities.

A. Ending the Alaska Litigation

The ROD’s preamble highlighted that the “roadless rule

has been the subject of a number of lawsuits in Federal

district courts in Idaho, Utah, North Dakota, Wyoming,

Alaska, and the District of Columbia.” 68 Fed. Reg. 75136. 

The ROD explained that the district court of Wyoming had

even permanentlyenjoined implementation of the rule, telling

the USDA that it “must start over” with its roadless

rulemaking.

4 The dissent claims that we have “side-stepped the primary justification

that Alaska claims as the basis for the rule change: complying with the

operative statutes” including ANILCA and the Tongass Timber Reform

Act of 1990 (“TTRA”). We examine the agency’s reasons for

promulgating the ROD—not an intervener’s assertion made in litigation. 

As the dissent points out, the ROD does not say that the USDA

promulgated the rule to comply with ANILCA or the TTRA. However,

what is determinative to establish the USDA’s reasons for the rule change

are the USDA’s statements in the ROD that it promulgated the rule to

remove the threat of litigation that sought to establish the roadless rule

violated ANILCA or the TTRA.

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10 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

The ROD detailed this ongoing litigation because, when

it started roadless rulemaking, it had decided it would take

numerous factors into consideration, including litigation. The

ROD then drew on these facts and gave a detailed explanation

of the reason for change in the rule:

Why is USDA Going Forward With This

Rulemaking?

. . .

(3) litigation over the last two years. Given

the great uncertainty about the

implementation of the roadless rule due to the

various lawsuits, the Department has decided

to adopt this final rule, initiated pursuant to

the settlement agreement with the State of

Alaska.

Id. at 75137–38. The USDA also explained that, “Given the

pending litigation, the [USDA] believes it is prudent to

proceed with a decision on temporarily exempting the

Tongass from prohibitions in the [R]oadless [R]ule.” Id. at

75142. Finally, the ROD concluded, “[f]or the reasons

identified in this preamble” the USDA decided to exempt the

Tongass from the Roadless Rule. Id. at 75144. These stated

reasons in the ROD’s preamble clearly and repeatedly

identify a reasoned explanation for the changed policy: a

strategy to attempt to end the constant and continuous

litigation stemming from the 2001 Roadless Rule.

Simply promulgating a rule pursuant to a settlement is not

necessarily “arbitrary or capricious.” We can “reasonably

discern” that the USDA became worried about the amount of

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 11

resources it was expending to defend the Roadless Rule and

that the Roadless Rule might5violate ANILCA. Thus, the

USDA promulgated the Roadless Rule exemption to conserve

resources and avoid a potential negative litigation outcome

(i.e., a final binding decision from a circuit court permanently

enjoining the application of the Roadless Rule). By

promulgating the Roadless Rule exemption, the USDA

stopped litigation that may have resulted in a court-ordered

permanent injunction against the application of the Roadless

Rule in several states. The USDA’s ROD, on the other hand,

is a solution that does not “foreclose options regarding future

rulemaking” and allows the Roadless Rule to continue to

exist in many other areas of Alaska and the country.

The district court held that the USDA’s rationale of

providing “legal certainty” was “implausible” because all the

temporary rule did was generate more litigation later and thus

prolong the uncertainty. But this is merely post hoc ergo

propter hoc analysis. Further, nowhere does the ROD state

that the purpose of the Roadless Rule exemption is to create

“legal certainty.” Of course, no settlement provides a “legal

certainty” of no future litigation, even as between the parties,

5 The settlement between the USDA and Alaska has boilerplate language

stating that by entering into the settlement agreement the USDA did not

agree with Alaska’s interpretation of ANILCA. This boilerplate is akin

to recitations in standard settlement agreements that payor does not

acknowledge liability simply by paying money to payee. But that

language is not very relevant to determining the agency’s reason for the

rule change; the settlement exists to end the litigation. As the ROD states,

the USDA promulgated the Roadless Rule exception to end litigation. 

Actions speak louder than words.

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12 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

much less as to nonparties.6 The ROD states the purpose of

the exemption was to cease current on-going litigation that

was draining the USDA’s limited resources and which may

have resulted in a negative outcome, similar to the negative

outcome the USDA had experienced in Wyoming. The

settlement agreement agreed to by the USDA did end the

2001 litigation by the State of Alaska.

The dissent claims that promulgating the roadless rule to

end the Alaska and Tongass litigation is arbitrary and

capricious because the USDA had promulgated the 2001

Roadless Rule to reduce nation-wide litigation costs. Dissent

at 26–27. As is plain, it had not quite ended litigation, at least

in Idaho, North Dakota, Wyoming, Alaska, and the District of

Columbia. All of these lawsuits were prompted by the 2001

Roadless Rule; each action sought to invalidate it. So, as the

Supreme Court has instructed, an agency can change its

policy. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515–19. The ROD states,

“The Wyoming District Court’s setting aside of the roadless

rule with the admonition that the Department ‘must start

over’ represents” a changed circumstance warranting the

ROD.768 Fed. Reg. at 75144. In the face of such instruction

by a federal court it is reasonable for an agency to re-think its

6

Just ask a circuit judge whether he or she ever sees an appeal of a

sentence arrived at in a plea agreement.

7 Beyond litigation, the USDA also gave another detailed explanation of

why it abandoned its 2001 decision that nation-wide regulation was

preferable. The USDA decided that “given factors unique to Southeast

Alaska, “the socioeconomic costs to local communities of applying the

roadless rule’s prohibitions to the Tongass . . . warrant[s] treating the

Tongass differently from the national forests outside Alaska.”.” 68 Fed.

Reg. at 75139.

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 13

rule and, as the dissent characterizes it, “bow[] to pressure.”8

Dissent at 27.

Further, our district court examined the USDA’s decision,

and this litigation, retrospectively. The dissent makes this

mistake as well.9 The dissent seems to imply that the USDA

did not need to end litigation because it turned out well for

the USDA in Wyoming, eight years after the Alaskan

settlement was made. Dissent at 20 (citing Wyoming v.

USDA, 661 F.3d 1209, 1272 (10th Cir. 2011) for the

proposition that the Tenth Circuit had upheld the 2001

Roadless Rule). The dissent later argues that the ROD

created more litigation than it resolved. Dissent at 25–26

(citing a 2005 regulation and a 2006 case). But such an

analysis second guesses the USDA’s decision based on 20/20

hindsight. Agencies are not soothsayers, and litigation is an

uncertain art. These post-settlement results on appeal and

new cases occurred two-to-eight years after the USDA

promulgated the ROD. Absent any showing of corruption,

we must presume the government was acting in good faith to

avoid further negative outcomes such as the unreversed

Wyoming district court judgment telling the USDA to start

over.

With the help of that 20/20 hindsight it is debatable

whether the USDA was correct in choosing to settle the

8 Surely the dissent does not mean to suggest that promulgating a rule in

light of a federal district court’s order is an arbitrary and capricious act

of “bowing to pressure.”

9

Ironically, the dissent criticizes the USDA’s reason of promulgating

the ROD to settle litigation based on hindsight and its reason of meeting

timber demand (discussed infra part § III.B) based on too much foresight.

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14 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

Alaska lawsuit in the way it did and to think that such a

settlement would remove legal uncertaintymay be debatable. 

But whether the USDA was correct in its prediction of what

the future might bring is not the correct question; it is

important to apply the correct standard of review to the ROD. 

This court’s duty is not to determine whether the exemption

was the best or correct way to avoid litigation, or even

whether the litigation should be ended, but merely to decide

whether such litigation-ending policy is permissible and “the

agency believe[d] it to be better.” Fox Television, 556 U.S.

at 515. In 2003, the USDA was faced with Alaska’s lawsuit

and the District Court of Wyoming’s ruling and could not

predict what future litigation would bring. The USDA’s

actions in settling the lawsuit and its reasoned explanation in

the ROD supports the finding that the USDA believed that

promulgating theTongass exception would decrease litigation

over the Roadless Rule. Under Fox Television’s deferential

standard, the USDA’s ROD is not “arbitrary and capricious.”

B. Timber Demand

The USDA also explained that the Roadless Rule

exception was being promulgated to increase timber

production to meet predicted future demand. The agency

decided that while 2001 timber demand could be satisfied

with the Roadless Rule in effect, the Roadless Rule, if

continued, would result in unacceptable consequences. The

ROD states that,

The last three years represent a significant

aberration from historical harvest levels. The

1980–2002 average harvest was 269 MMBF,

and in no year prior to 2001 did the harvest

level fall below 100 MMBF. . . . In light of

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 15

this historical performance, the 124 MMFB

low market estimate is not an unreasonable

expectation for the coming decade,

particularly if the current slump is merely a

cyclical downturn.

68 Fed. Reg. at 75141. Thus, the USDA examined historical

averages spanning twenty-two years, looked at the last three

years of low demand data as a significant aberration, and

determined that a “low market” historical estimate was a

valid prediction of the future. The USDA has recognized

expertise and discretion in predicting timber demand. See

Friends of the Bow v. Thompson, 124 F.3d 1210, 1219 (10th

Cir. 1997) (Forest Service could discount studywith technical

defects based on its “substantial expertise” on the “relevant

issues” of timber demand); Se. Conference v. Vilsack,

684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The Forest Service

has discretion to make predictions of market demand” for

timber.). It is certainly reasonable for the agency to

determine that a higher market estimate from twenty-two

years of data is preferable to a lower market estimate based

upon demand in a short cyclical downturn, even for a “shortterm”10

rule. The economy could return to pre-downturn

figures even in a short time span.11 As the Supreme Court has

instructed, we defer to agency expertise and should not

10 The 2003 Roadless Rule exemption does not have an “expiration

date.” The ROD states the exemption will last until a final rule is

promulgated, however long that may take. As yet, no final rule has been

promulgated. Thus this “short-term” rule has lasted over a decade.

11 In fact, as soon as 2002 the State of Alaska was selling timber in

quantities above its projected harvest—and at what the State of Alaska

claims is an unsustainable level—to help bridge the gap between national

forest harvest and local industry needs.

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16 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

“substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency.” Fox

Television, 556 U.S. at 513. Further, we do not have to

determine whether the USDA chose the best method for

predicting demand so long as the method is neither arbitrary

nor capricious. Id. at 515; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

The plaintiffs argue that using the low market scenario of

124 MMBF appears far too optimistic in light of the

depressed demand from 2001 to 2003, and the dissent attacks

the USDA’s decision as “speculation.” Dissent at 30. But we

do not require agencies to be constant pessimists that may not

promulgate a future rule—even a “short-term” future

rule—based upon the opinion that the economy will improve

and demand for timber will rise. Further, it is reasonable for

the USDA to decide that even a potentially “short-term” rule

could last long enough for the economy to make a marked

improvement, which would result in rapidly changing nearterm demand. Promulgating a rule that is meant to last at

least several years on the basis of extensive historical

averages and increased economic experience from the years

2001–2003 is not “arbitrary and capricious.”

C. Socioeconomic Hardships

Another reason for the USDA’s promulgation of the ROD

was because of its appreciation of the socioeconomic

hardships created by the Roadless Rule.12

12 The dissent states that one of the reasons the USDA went forward

with the rule was “roadless values” and such a reason is also arbitrary and

capricious. Dissent at 24–25. With respect, that is a misreading of the

ROD. The USDA weighted roadless values in the ROD. But in its

explicit statement “Why is the USDA Going Forward With This

Rulemaking?”, the USDA never stated it was promulgating the rule

because of roadless values. Instead, the ROD weighed roadless values as

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 17

The USDA’s ROD explains that “impacts of the roadless

rule on local communities in the Tongass are particularly

serious. Of the 32 communities in the region, 29 are

unconnected to the nation’s highway system. Most are

surrounded by marine waters and undeveloped National

Forest System land.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 75139. The Roadless

Rule would condemn these communities to continued

isolation. Recognizing these unique circumstances, “the

abundance of [other Tongass] roadless values,” and “the

socioeconomic costs to local communities of applying the

roadless rule’s prohibitions to the Tongass, all warrant

treating the Tongass differently from the national forests

outside of Alaska.” Id. The ROD states that this conclusion

is consistent with the extensive 1997 Tongass Forest Plan. 

This is a reasoned explanation based on observable conditions

and the USDA’s expertise. It may not be the decision the

dissent would make, but it is not arbitrary and capricious.

The dissent argues that the ROD is arbitrary and

capricious because the ROD was a temporary rule based on

long-term predictions and did not identify any new facts to

justify a change in policy. Dissent at 20–21. But as

discussed above, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the

USDA to use long-term, rather than short-term, data to

promulgate a ROD, the expiration date of which was, and is,

unknown. Further, as also discussed above, there was a

change that forced the USDA to re-examine prior information

a reason for not exempting the Tongass from the 2001 Roadless Rule

against reasons for doing so, and found the roadless values in the Tongass

so abundant as not to require further protection. However, if “roadless

values” is an independent reason for promulgating the ROD, then it is well

within the discretion and expertise of the USDA to determine whether

roadless values are abundant or not, even without the 2001 Roadless Rule.

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18 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

and request new comments—changed legal circumstances

caused by pending litigation and a different economic

outlook. The USDA reexamined its prior policy and used its

expertise to decide the socioeconomic hardships the 2001

Roadless Rule put on the unique and isolated communities of

Southeast Alaska were no longer acceptable. This evaluation

was not arbitrary and capricious, and the dissent cannot use

the fact that the USDA had a prior policy as a reason to make

it so. See Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 519 (“the fact that an

agency had a prior stance does not alone prevent it from

changing its view or create a higher hurdle for doing so”).

IV. Conclusion

The USDA’s reasons for promulgating the 2003 ROD are

neither arbitrary nor capricious. The agency acknowledges

that it has changed its previous policy of not exempting the

Tongass from the Roadless Rule, and it has given reasoned

explanations for the change based on litigation, changes in

economic predictions, and previously found socioeconomic

costs.

We hold that all of the USDA’s reasons are acceptable

under the APA. However, even had we found that some of

the USDA’s reasons were arbitrary and capricious, our scope

of review requires affirmance if any of the reasons given are

not arbitrary and capricious. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v.

Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974)

(reversing the district court’s holding that an agency decision

was arbitrary and capricious while agreeing with the district

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 19

court’s analysis as to one of the agency’s reasons as being, in

fact, arbitrary and capricious).13

The USDA’s reasons for the exemption are entirely

rational, and the ROD should be upheld. Because the district

court decided the USDA’s reasons for exempting the Tongass

from the Roadless Rule were arbitrary and capricious, it did

not reach the question whether the USDA should have

performed a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. 

13 In Bowman, motor carriers filed applications with the Interstate

Commerce Commission (“Commission”) to conduct general commodities

operations between points in the United States. Bowman, 419 U.S. at 283. 

The applicants submitted evidence that the applicants’ service was

required for public convenience, and the existing carriers submitted

evidence that the existing carriers’ service was satisfactory and no new

carriers were needed. Id. at 285. The Commission granted three of the

applications. Id. at 283. The Commission found that the existing carriers’

evidence did not rebut the applicants’ evidence that more carriers were

needed because the existing carriers’ evidence (1) related to short periods

of time or specific shippers and (2) the studies represented service

provided by the existing carriers after the Commission had noticed the

hearing. Id. at 287. The existing carriers brought an action in the district

court to suspend, enjoin, and annul the order as arbitrary and capricious. 

Id. at 283. A three-judge district court invalidated the order as arbitrary

and capricious. Id. The district court held that the Commission had

applied inconsistent standards because the evidence was based on the

same study periods. Id. at 287. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court

reversed and remanded. Id. at 284. The Supreme Court agreed with the

district court’s conclusion of arbitrary and capriciousness as to the

Commission’s first reason and found there was no basis for the

Commission to distinguish the evidence based on the short time period

because all the evidence was based on short periods of time and particular

shippers. Id. at 288. Then the Supreme Court found that the

Commission’s second reason regarding the studies was a rational basis on

which to distinguish the evidence. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court

upheld the Commission’s finding that the existing carriers did not rebut

the applicant’s evidence of fitness and public need for new carriers.

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20 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

Because we reverse the district court’s findings, we remand

the case to the district court to decide whether a Supplemental

Environmental Impact Statement is required in the first

instance.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Irespectfully dissent. After extensive public comment, in

2001 the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”),

acting through the United States Forest Service, adopted the

Roadless Area Conservation Rule. Special Areas; Roadless

Area Conservation (“Roadless Rule” or “Rule”), 66 Fed. Reg.

3244, 3253 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt.

294). The Rule specifically applied to Alaska’s Tongass

National Forest (the “Tongass”), which is by far the nation’s

largest forest. The Ninth Circuit reversed a preliminary

injunction enjoining the USDA from implementing the

Roadless Rule nationally, and the Tenth Circuit upheld the

Rule. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094,

1126 (9th Cir. 2002), partially abrogated on other grounds by

Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th

Cir. 2011); Wyoming v. USDA, 661 F.3d 1209, 1272 (10th

Cir. 2011).

In an about-face, the USDA decided in 2003 to

temporarily exempt the Tongass from the Roadless Rule,

pending the USDA’s adoption of a final, permanent rule,

which the agency never actually promulgated. Special Areas;

Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the Tongass

National Forest,Alaska (“Tongass Exemption”), 68 Fed. Reg.

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 21

75,136 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294). 

That monumental decision deserves greater scrutiny than the

majority gives it. Our precedent demands a “thorough,

probing, in-depth review” of the USDA’s decision, not a

cursory quick look. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2003). In an extensive,

well-reasoned decision, the district court held that the

Tongass Exemption is arbitrary and capricious. I agree. 

Tellingly, the USDA did not appeal this decision, leaving

only the State of Alaska before us now.

The majority fails to adequately probe the record for a

reasoned justification for the USDA discarding its previous

position—adopted only two years earlier—to apply the

Roadless Rule to the Tongass. Of course agencies may

change their positions over time, and over administrations,

but they cannot completely reverse course lightly. Rather, the

USDA must have “good reasons” for the policy and it must

“believe[] it to be better.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations,

556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); see id. at 515–16 (“[I]t is not that

further justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy

change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for

disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were

engendered by the prior policy.”). Contrary to the majority’s

contention, Maj. Op. at 7, where, as here, a “new policy rests

upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its

prior policy,” the agency must “provide a more detailed

justification than what would suffice for a new policy created

on a blank slate.” Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515. That

justification is missing here.

In assessing the USDA’s proffered reasons, the majority

entirely side-steps the main rationale that Alaska provides

for the rule change: complying with the operative statutes,

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22 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of

1980 (“ANILCA”), 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., and the

Tongass Timber Reform Act of 1990 (“TTRA”), 16 U.S.C.

§ 539d, which amended ANILCA. The reasons the majority

does provide—legal uncertainty, timber demand, and

socioeconomic hardships—are unsupported bythe record and

thus are insufficient to uphold the USDA’s decision.

I would affirm the district court’s decision because the

administrative record does not support the reasons for the rule

change that the USDA gave in its Tongass Exemption Record

of Decision (“ROD”). See Tongass Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg.

75136; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (“It is

well-established that an agency’s action must be upheld, if at

all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.”).

I. THE USDA DID NOT REST ITS RULE CHANGE ON

COMPLIANCE WITH ANILCA AND TTRA

Alaska principally argues that, in viewing the ROD as a

whole, the “USDA’s primary legal concern in pursuing this

rulemaking was to comply” with ANILCA and TTRA. The

majority’s analysis omits this issue entirely, stating without

further discussion that applying the Roadless Rule to the

Tongass “might violate ANILCA.”1 Maj. Op. at 10–11.

1 The majority dismisses the need to explore this argument further

because it was presented by Alaska, not the agency that promulgated the

decision on review. Maj. Op. at 9, n.4. Yet the USDA is not before us

now, and this is the key argument made on appeal by Alaska, which is

defending the Tongass Exemption.

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 23

The ROD provides no support for Alaska’s proposition

or the majority’s conjecture. In initially adopting the

Roadless Rule, the USDA took the position that such a rule

would not violate ANILCA and TTRA. As Alaska

acknowledges, in the ROD the “USDA did not explicitly

reverse its legal conclusion about whether applying the

Roadless Rule to the Tongass violates ANILCA or TTRA.”

In fact, the USDA neither explicitly nor implicitly

changed its position on complying with these statutes. The

ROD makes no reference to ANILCA and TTRA as a basis

for the USDA’s decision. Rather, the ROD merely recounts

the factual history of the USDA’s settlement in Alaska’s

earlier legal dispute, stating: “The Alaska lawsuit alleged that

USDA violated ANILCA by applying the requirements of the

roadless rule to Alaska’s national forests. USDA settled the

lawsuit by agreeing to publish a proposed rule which, if

adopted, would temporarily exempt the Tongass from the

application of the roadless rule . . . .” Tongass Exemption,

68 Fed. Reg. at, 75,136 (emphasis added). Even the

settlement agreement explicitly provided that it “shall not be

evidence of any agreement by any party to any allegations

raised by any other party in the case . . . .”

In responding to public comments on the import of

ANILCA, the ROD explained that the statute, as amended by

TTRA, should allow for considerations other than timber

demand. Tongass Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,142. It

directed the Secretary of Agriculture to seek to provide a

supply of timber meeting market demand “consistent with

providing for the multiple use and sustained yield of all

renewable forest resources, and subject to appropriations,

other applicable laws, and the requirements of the National

Forest Management Act.” Id. The ROD stated that the

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24 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

USDA “considered carefully” the statutes and that the

Exemption was “consistent” with ANILCA. Id. But

significantly, the USDA did not state that the statute

mandated an exemption. Id.

Alaska has no basis to bootstrap its allegations from a

prior suit to impose a theory or obligation on the USDA that

the agency did not adopt or articulate. Yet this unsupported

statutory theory permeates Alaska’s entire argument on

appeal. Consequently, the district court correctly determined

that the ROD did not include compliance with ANILCA and

TTRA as an express rationale for the Tongass Exemption.

II. THEUSDA’S JUSTIFICATIONSFOR THERULECHANGE

FALL SHORT

Beyond statutory compliance, Alaska argues that the

USDA provided four main reasons for the Tongass

Exemption: (i) legal uncertainty, (ii) timber demand,

(iii) socioeconomic costs, and (iv) roadless values.2 To

properly assess the ROD, we must ask whether—in light of

all the proffered justifications—the record supports the

USDA’s rationale for excluding the Tongass from the

Roadless Rule’s reach.

According to the ROD, the USDA in part adopted the

Tongass Exemption because it “best implement[ed] the letter

2 Apart from the four main justifications listed in the ROD, Alaska offers

a number of other reasons to justify the USDA’s position reversal,

including that the USDA never gave a full explanation for why it initially

applied the Roadless Rule to Alaska. Alaska’s effort falls flat, however,

because the USDA did not proffer these explanations and the record does

not support them.

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 25

and spirit of congressional direction along with public values,

in light of the abundance of roadless values on the Tongass,

the protection of roadless values already included in the

Tongass Forest Plan, and the socioeconomic costs to local

communities of applying the roadless rule’s prohibitions.” 

Tongass Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,142. The record

contradicts the USDA’s rationale for finding an exemption

necessary or believing it to be the “best” option in light of

legal uncertainty, timber demand, socioeconomic costs, and

roadless values.

A. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY

The ROD stated that the Tongass Exemption would

reduce the “great uncertainty about the implementation of the

roadless rule due to the various lawsuits.” Tongass

Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,138. The USDA’s stated aim

was not to “end[] the Alaska litigation,” as the majority

asserts, see Maj. Op. at 9, but to mitigate legal uncertainty. 

The district court’s conclusion captures the disingenuity of

the USDA’s explanation and the majority’s uncritical

acceptance of its rationale: “In light of the fact that the

Tongass Exemption was promulgated as a temporary

exemption and the Forest Service agreed to engage in further

rulemaking addressing the Tongass and Chugach in a ‘timely

manner,’ the USDA’s rationale that adoption of the

temporary Tongass exemption would provide legal certainty

is implausible.”

Unsurprisingly, the temporary rule and the attempted

repeal of the Roadless Rule generated more litigation and

prolonged the legal uncertainty—a foreseeable consequence

of promulgating a permanent rule, granting a temporary

exemption, and then attempting to repeal the permanent rule. 

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26 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

See Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless

Management, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,654 (May 13, 2005) (to be

codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294) (repealing the Roadless Rule

nationwide in favor of a “State petitions” process); California

ex rel. Lockyer v. USDA, 459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 909, 912 (N.D.

Cal. 2006) (striking down the repeal for violating the National

Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act). 

Critical here is not that additional litigation ultimatelyensued,

but that a temporary change was unlikely to address the legal

uncertainty surrounding the Roadless Rule’s implementation

when the USDA reversed course. That the rule change was

“initiated pursuant to the settlement agreement with the State

of Alaska,” as the majority emphasizes, does nothing to

support a claim that the temporary change would reduce this

uncertainty. See Maj. Op. at 10. In the ROD, the USDA

even acknowledged that the temporary rule would not

“foreclose options regarding the future rulemaking” for the

permanent statewide rule, Tongass Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg.

at 75138, making clear that it viewed the temporary rule as

just that.

Before changing its position, the USDA determined that

maintaining the Roadless Rule in the Tongass would lower

lawsuit-related costs. The USDA’s 2000 final environmental

impact statement (“FEIS”) stated that the Roadless Rule was

“needed” in part because of “[n]ational concern over roadless

area management continu[ing] to generate controversy,

including costly and time-consuming appeals and litigation”

from proposals to develop the roadless areas. The FEIS

concluded that the selected “Tongass Not Exempt” alternative

would result in the “[g]reatest savings in appeals and

litigation costs.” Similarly, in 2001 the USDA “decided that

the best means to reduce this conflict [wa]s through a national

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 27

level rule,” i.e. the Roadless Rule. Roadless Rule, 66 Fed.

Reg. at 3,253.

The agency then completely reversed its position in 2003,

stating without explanation that the Tongass Exemption

would reduce legal uncertainty. The USDA did not address

the predicted increase in litigation costs, nor did it

acknowledge that carving out the Tongass from the Roadless

Rule’s reach likely would set off another litigation firestorm. 

The USDA failed to provide a “more detailed justification”

for this blatant internal inconsistency and reversal of position,

and no rationale that the USDA articulated suggests that it

had a basis to believe at the time that a temporary exemption

would create greater legal certainty. See Fox Television,

556 U.S. at 515, 516. After advocating for a national rule to

bring uniform application, the USDA bowed to pressure to

exempt the Tongass and upended uniformity. The district

court rightly rejected the USDA’s legal uncertainty rationale

as “implausible.” The majority erroneouslycontends that this

determination constituted post hoc analysis, Maj. Op. at 11,

despite the district court’s clear examination of whether the

reasons the USDA provided when it implemented the rule

change logically supported the position reversal at that time.

B. TIMBER DEMAND AND TTRA

The second proffered rationale—that the USDA

promulgated the Tongass Exemption to meet predicted future

timber demand—also lacks support in the record. We have

recognized that “TTRA was written to amend ANILCA by

eliminating its timber supply mandate” and to make the goal

of meeting timber demand contingent on other additional

criteria. Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Ass’n v.

Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 730–31 (9th Cir. 1995); see also

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28 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

16 U.S.C. § 539d(a) (subordinating the aim of meeting timber

demand to “appropriations, other applicable law, and the

requirements of the National Forest Management Act of

1976,” and “to the extent consistent with providing for the

multiple use and sustained yield of all renewable forest

resources”). Importantly, “TTRA envisions not an inflexible

harvest level, but a balancing of the market, the law, and

other uses, including preservation.” Alaska Wilderness

Recreation, 67 F.3d at 731.

Without mentioning TTRA or acknowledging that

Congress specifically crafted the statute to accommodate

competing goals, the majority states that the Tongass

Exemption “was being promulgated to increase timber

production to meet predicted future demand.” Maj. Op. at 14. 

The ROD concluded that “the roadless rule prohibitions

operate as an unnecessary and complicating factor limiting

where timber harvesting may occur,” Tongass Exemption,

68 Fed. Reg. at 75141, but it did not explain why its cited

facts regarding the potential long-term variability of the

timber market supported a temporary exemption. The ROD

recognized that, according to FEIS projections, “50 million

board feet [(“MMBF”) of timber] could be harvested annually

in the developed areas along the existing road system in the

Tongass.” Id. at 75,140. The FEIS for the Roadless Rule

estimated in 2000 that this harvest would not support all of

the timber processing facilities in the region. Id. However,

as the ROD pointed out, the FEIS based these projections on

a long-term market demand estimate of 124 million board

feet that had proven several times greater than the actual

market demand of subsequent years: “[T]he low market

scenario [of 124 MMBF] appears optimistic in light of the 48

MMBF of Tongass National Forest timber harvested in 2001,

the 34 MMBF harvested in 2002, and the 51 MMBF

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 29

harvested in 2003 . . . .” Id. at 75,141.3 In short, the facts in

the administrative record unequivocally showed a depressed

timber demand. The Roadless Rule decision concluded that

the available timber under contract provided “enough timber

volume to satisfy about 7 years of estimated market demand.” 

Roadless Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3,255. Based on the record,

the timber demand did not support the Tongass Exemption.

The agency failed to give adequate reasons for adopting

the temporary exemption, particularly given the USDA’s

acknowledgment that the intervening years had shown timber

demand was even lower than had been expected. It simply

stated that timber demand in recent years was below longterm historical averages and speculated that this level could

have been due to a mere cyclical downturn. This rationale

failed to take account of the FEIS’s explicit conclusion that

available timber was sufficient to meet near-term demand.4

Although the rationale that the majority proposes, that it

would be reasonable for the agency to employ long-range

data over short-term trends, may be plausible, see Maj. Op. at

15, the agency itself never proffered such a rationale or

otherwise provided an explanation for its evasive treatment of

the low timber demand. To reiterate, its use of timber

demand data need not be proven prescient with the benefit of

time. Where it fails is in providing logical support for the

 

3

 Market forces, not the Roadless Rule, explain these levels, given that

the Roadless Rule did not go into effect in the Tongass due to various

injunctions, see Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1006–07 (recounting history oflegal

challenges to the Roadless Rule), and due to the Tongass Exemption.

4 During the 2003 rulemaking on the Tongass Exemption, the Forest

Service found that no significant factual developments arose since the

Roadless Rule that justified another EIS and accordingly relied on the

FEIS prepared for the Roadless Rule. 68 Fed. Reg. at 75141.

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30 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

rule change when it was made. Thus, the USDA’s long-range

speculation justifying a near-term solution is at odds with the

facts in the record.

C. SOCIOECONOMIC COSTS

TheROD’s discussion of the Exemption’s socioeconomic

impact on local communities in the Tongass, particularlywith

respect to job losses and road and utility needs, is similarly

flawed. The ROD relied on the FEIS, which “estimated that

a total of approximately 900 jobs could be lost in the long run

in Southeast Alaska due to the application of the roadless

rule.” Tongass Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75137 (emphasis

added). The ROD’s use of this estimate was arbitrary and

capricious for two reasons. First, the estimate applied to

long-term job losses, and the ROD failed to relate it to the

short-term duration of the explicitly temporary Tongass

Exemption. Second, the ROD did not consider the dramatic

post-2000 decline in timber demand. The USDA based its

FEIS job loss estimate on the assumption that the Roadless

Rule would cause a reduction of 77 MMBF per year in timber

harvesting that no longer held true in 2003. Yet, as explained

above, between 2000 and 2003 timber harvests dropped

dramatically due only to market demand. The USDA failed

to account for these factual omissions, which the majority

may not backfill for the USDA now. See Bowman Transp.,

Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285

(1974) (“The court is not empowered to substitute its

judgment for that of the agency.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see Maj. Op. at 17–20. While the majority

emphasizes the socioeconomic costs imposed by the isolation

of local communities in the Tongass, see Maj. Op. at 16, the

USDA provides no explanation for how a temporary rule

change would alter the economic outlook for these

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 31

communities. Because the record does not support the job

loss rationale provided in the ROD and because the USDA

did not take into account reduced timber demand and the

short-term nature of the rule change when it was adopted, the

district court correctly found the socioeconomic cost

justification arbitrary and capricious.

The record also belies the USDA’s position in the ROD

that the Roadless Rule would have significant negative

impacts on meeting road and utility needs in the Tongass. 

The Roadless Rule maintained the Secretary of Agriculture’s

discretion to approve Federal Aid Highways, if the project

was “in the public interest,” or if it maintained the purpose of

the land and “no other reasonable and prudent alternative

exist[ed].”5 Roadless Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3256. Regarding

state roads, the FEIS concluded in 2000 that “in the

reasonably foreseeable future, construction of State highways

through inventoried roadless areas in Alaska may not be an

issue,” because “none of the [proposed State] transportation

corridors identified in [the Tongass Land and Resource

Management Plan] have received serious local or State

support, and none are on any approved project lists.” The

ROD did not identify any new road proposals that suggested

a need for the Exemption.6 The USDA failed to explain why

road considerations warranted a temporary exemption given

the lack of any potential road construction on the horizon.

5 Even without the Roadless Rule, the Secretary’s decision to approve

such highways is discretionary. See 23 U.S.C. § 317(b).

6 The agency’s Supplemental Information Report (“SIR”) for the

Tongass Exemption specifically stated that “no new information has come

to light that would alter the expectations of major roads or transportation

corridors or associated economic impacts estimate[d] in the Roadless

[Rule] FEIS . . . .”

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32 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

Nor did the ROD explain the basis for the USDA’s new

position that the Roadless Rule would impact utility corridors

in southeastern Alaska. The Roadless Rule specifically

permits construction of utility lines, along with the necessary

vehicles and heavymotorized equipment. See Roadless Rule,

66 Fed. Reg. at 3,258, 3,272. The FEIS concluded that the

nationwide utility corridor impacts “would be minimal” and

it did not identify any impacts in southeastern Alaska. The

ROD’s reliance on utility needs is at odds with the evidence. 

Moreover, as with its conclusion regarding road construction,

the USDA failed to explain in the ROD why a temporary

exemption was necessary when the agency could not point to

any utility projects that it might affect.

D. ROADLESS VALUES

7

In the ROD, the USDA stated that it had “determined that,

at least in the short term, the roadless values on the Tongass

are sufficiently protected under the Tongass Forest Plan and

that the additional restrictions associated with the roadless

rule are not required.”8 Tongass Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg. at

75,138. This posture, a reversal of the position the USDA

7 Roadless values include high quality or undisturbed soil, water, and air;

sources of public drinking water; diversity of plant and animal

communities; habitat for threatened, endangered, and sensitive species;

varieties of dispersed recreation; reference landscapes; and traditional

cultural properties and sacred sites. Roadless Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3,245.

8 The majority asserts that the USDA did not express roadless values as

a reason for the rule change. Maj. Op. at 16, n.12. However, as the

quoted ROD text reveals, the USDA did expressly factor into its rationale

its view that the roadless values were sufficiently protected. See also

Tongass Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,142.

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ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 33

adopted in the Roadless Rule,9also is the kind of policy

judgment—on what is “enough” protection—that cannot be

readily deemed right or wrong. The agency’s ultimate policy

decision on whether sufficient roadless value protection

existed is necessarily linked to its reasoning on timber

demand, community impact, and other factors, which are

unsupported by the record. At bottom, the USDA failed to

provide a logical explanation for its complete position

reversal.

III. THE USDA’S ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS

In the rulemaking context, an error is “harmless only

where the agency’s mistake clearly had no bearing on the

procedure used or the substance of decision reached.” 

Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th

Cir. 1992). Several of the USDA’s key rationales underlying

the ROD “run[] counter to the evidence before the agency, or

. . . [are] so implausible that [they] could not be ascribed to a

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” 

Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. McAllister, 666 F.3d 549, 555

(9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

USDA failed to account for relevant facts in the FEIS and the

SIR that plainly contradicted the substance of the ROD’s

conclusions. Therefore, the ROD cannot overcome the

harmless error hurdle.

I respectfully dissent.

9 The USDA’s position also expressly contradicts Ninth Circuit

precedent determining that “the Roadless Rule provide[s] greater

substantive protections to roadless areas than the individual forest plans

it superseded.” Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1014 (citing Kootenai Tribe,

313 F.3d at 1110, 1124–25).

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