Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02937/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02937-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
The matter of the search of Kitty's East
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

In re: THE MATTER OF THE SEARCH 

OF KITTY'S EAST, 735 E. Colfax 

Avenue, Denver, Colorado, 

KITTY'S EAST, 

Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee. 

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PI L~ 0 

U<1ited Stflur. ~,, of Appc:•1• Tenth Circuit 

JUN 7 19i0 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2937 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. Criminal Action No. 88-774 M) 

Michael w. Gross (Arthur M. Schwartz with him on the brief), 

Denver, Colorado, for Movant-Appellant. 

Michael J. Norton, Acting United States Attorney (Catharine M. 

Goodwin, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee. 

Before* LOGAN and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, District 

Judge. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

*- The Honorable Howard c. Bratton, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2937 Document: 01019857228 Date Filed: 06/07/1990 Page: 1 
This case.comes to us on appeal from the .district court's 

denial of the motion of Kitty's East (Kitty's) for return of 

property under Fed. R. Crim. P. 4l(e). The procedural posture 

requires that we first consider our jurisdiction to decide this 

appeal. 

apply 

Because we find that we have jurisdiction, that we should 

Rule 4l(e) as it was revised after the district court's 

decision, and that the seizures from Kitty's were lawful and do 

not unreasonably deprive Kitty's of its property, we affirm the 

decision, although upon a different analysis than that expressed 

by the district court. 

Kitty's is an establishment engaged in providing "adult 

entertainment." As part of its business, Kitty's sells, rents, 

and exhibits so-called ''adult" books, magazines, films, and 

videotapes. On June 30, 1988, federal agents served two warrants 

on Kitty's. Warrant 88-774M (the national warrant) sought 

materials in connection with violations of 18 u.s.c. §§ 1462, 1465 

(interstate transportation, distribution, and sale of obscene 

materials), § 371 (conspiracy), and§ 1956 (money laundering). 

Warrant 88-765M (the local warrant) was issued as part of a local 

investigation under§§ 1462, 1465. 

On July 11, 1988, Kitty's filed a motion in the district 

court for return of property pursuant to Rule 4l(e). After an 

evidentiary hearing, the district court found both the local and 

national warrants to be overbroad. The court also found, however, 

that the officers executing the warrants relied on their terms in 

-- .good faith. -and ~hat~the~e~were no indications of overbreadth on 

-the face of the warrants. The court therefore ruled that the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2937 Document: 01019857228 Date Filed: 06/07/1990 Page: 2 
property sei2ed was-not subject to the exclusionary rule, and it 

denied Kitty's motion for return of the property. 

Kitty's has appealed the district court's denial of its 

motion. In response the government challenges the district 

court's jurisdiction to entertain Kitty's Rule 4l(e) motion in the 

first place and disputes the court's findings of overbreadth. 

Alternatively, of course, it defends the district court's good 

faith finding under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 

I 

We first note that Rule 4l(e) has undergone significant 

revision since the district court's decision, which changes 

significantly impact this appeal. The current version of the rule 

provides as follows: 

"A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or 

by the deprivation of property may move the districtcourt for the district in which the property was seized 

for the return of the property on the ground that such 

person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. 

The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact 

necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion 

is granted, the property shall be returned to the 

movant, although reasonable conditions may be imposed to 

protect access and use of the property in subsequent 

proceedings. If a motion for return of property is made 

or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after 

an indictment or information is filed, it shall be 

treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12." 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 4l(e) (as amended) (emphasis added); see 124 

F.R.D. 397, 407-08 (1989). Before amendment, the rule provided 

for return of property only if it was illegally seized and 

required automatic suppression of any property returned. See 124 

F.R.D. at 426-27. The amendments took "effect on December 1, 1989 

and ..• govern all proceedings in criminal cases thereafter 

commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in 

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Appellate Case: 88-2937 Document: 01019857228 Date Filed: 06/07/1990 Page: 3 
er iminal- .cases .then_- pending." Id. at ~399 . 1 We will., apply the 

1989 amendments to the instant_case and rely upon prior Rule 4l(e) 

jurisprudence only to the extent it retains vitality in light of 

these substantive revisions. 

II 

Initially we must address our jurisdiction to hear this 

appeal. A party dissatisfied with the ruling on a Rule 4l(e) 

motion may immediately appeal only under certain circumstances 

outlined by the Supreme Court in DiBella v. United States, 369 

U.S. 121 (1962). The Court held that an unsuccessful movant may 

advance an interlocutory appeal only if the motion (1) is "in no 

way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant" and 

(2) is "solely for return of property." Id. at 131-32. 2 

This circuit has consistently held that there is no 

prosecution in esse until an arrest is made or an indictment or 

information is issued. Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. United States 

(In re Search of 6455 s. Yosemite), 897 F.2d 1549, 1554-55 (10th 

1 Despite the fact that Rule 4l(e) is a rule of criminal 

procedure and that the provision on the effective date of the 1989 

amendments refers to "proceedings in criminal cases," Rule 4l(e) 

is applicable when there are no criminal proceedings pending. 

Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. United States (In re Search of 6455 s. 

Yosemite), 897 F.2d 1549, 1553-54 (10th Cir. 1990); Floyd v. 

United States, 860 F.2d 999, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Furthermore, we believe that the limitation on application of the 

1989 amendments to proceedings pending on December 1, 1989, only 

''insofar as just and practicable" presents no obstacle to their 

application to the case at bar. 

2 The Supreme Court enunciated these conditions primarily to 

restrict interlocutory appeals to "final" decisions in order to 

minimize the disruption of ongoing criminal proceedings. See 

DiBella, 369 U.S. at 124, 126. Of course, an unsuccessful movant 

may wait until the end of an ensuing prosecution and appeal after 

final judgment. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2937 Document: 01019857228 Date Filed: 06/07/1990 Page: 4 
Cir. 1990): First Nat'l Bank v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 865 F.2d 

- 217,. 221 (10th Cir. 1989): Gottone v. United States, 345 F.2d 165, 

165 (10th Cir. 1965). In the instant case, although a grand jury 

has been empaneled, no indictment has been returned against either 

Kitty's or its parent corporation. Therefore, there is no 

prosecution in esse with respect to Kitty's. 

DiBella's second condition for interlocutory appeal requires 

that the Rule 4l(e) motion be solely for the return of property. 

In DiBella, the Court made a distinction between true motions for 

return of property and motions for suppression dressed as motions 

for return of property. By amending the rule to preclude 

suppression as a de facto result of returning the property, the 

Court has made every Rule 4l(e) motion into one solely for the 

return of property. Illegality of a search for purposes of Rule 

4l(e) and the scope of the exclusionary rule have been separated 

by the 1989 amendments. See Blinder, Robinson, 897 F.2d at 1554: 

Amendments to Fed. R. Crim. P., Rule 4l(e) committee note at 30, 

124 F.R.D. at 428 [hereinafter Committee Note to 1989 Amendment]. 

Because there is no prosecution in esse against Kitty's, and 

because the Rule 4l(e) motion must be viewed as one solely for the 

return of property, we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 

III 

The government challenges the jurisdiction of the district 

court to entertain Kitty's Rule 4l(e) motion. We have held that 

entertaining a preindictment Rule 4l(e) motion is an exercise of 

.,e.qui_table .. jur·isdiction. which should be .undertaken with "caution 

. and.restraint." Floyd v. United States, 860 F.2d 999, 1003 (10th 

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Appellate Case: 88-2937 Document: 01019857228 Date Filed: 06/07/1990 Page: 5 
-Cir. -1-988) p· Accordingly, we. have stated. two conditions that must 

· be satis-fied,. before.-a. district court may- assume jurisdiction over 

a preindictment Rule 4l(e) motion: a movant must demonstrate that 

being deprived of actual possession of the seized property causes 

"irreparable injury," and must be otherwise without adequate 

remedy at law. Id. 

The government argues that the district court erred in 

holding an evidentiary hearing on the Rule 4l(e) motion because 

(1) Kitty's failed to prove irreparable injury, and (2) an 

evidentiary hearing on the merits of a Rule 4l(e) motion is 

inappropriate unless the movant alleges ''outrageous government 

conduct." We disagree and affirm the district court's exercise of 

jurisdiction, although with some modifications. 

The district court did not err when it failed to cite 

outrageous government conduct to justify its hearing. In Floyd we 

noted that Rule 4l(e) requires only an allegation that the search 

or seizure was unlawful, not that the government's conduct 

exceeded unlawfulness and rose to the level of callousness or 

outrageousness. 860 F.2d at 1003. This conclusion is bolstered 

by the 1989 amendments to Rule 4l(e). Under the former rule, the 

movant had to allege an "unlawful search and seizure." Under the 

current form of the rule, however, the movant need only allege a 

"deprivation of property" by the government. See Committee Note 

to 1989 Amendment, at 28, 124 F.R.D. at 426. 

The district court held that the imminence of an indictment 

based on· the ·seized·· .·materials constituted irreparable injury 

sufficient for its exercise .. of jurisdiction, relying on the 

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citation. in Floyd, 860 F. 2d. at. 1006, to .. Pieper v. UnLted States, 

- 604. F.2d 1131, 1134 _ (8th Cir •. 1979) (imminent indictment 

sufficient injury for exercise of equitable jurisdiction). But in 

Floyd the citation to Pieper was merely to illustrate that 

"irreparable harm refers to circumstances in which a Rule 4l(e) 

movant cannot wait for a legal remedy, thus justifying the court's 

equitable jurisdiction." Floyd, 860 F.2d at 1006. The Eighth 

Circuit has since rejected the proposition that imminent 

indictment is injury sufficient to invoke Rule 4l(e) jurisdiction, 

Kiesel Co. v. Householder (In re Search of 4801 Flyer Ave.), 879 

F.2d 385, 388-89 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 

(1990), and this circuit has also recently held that "the mere 

threat of imminent indictment does not establish irreparable 

injury as required for a motion under Rule 4l(e)," Blinder, 

Robinson, 897 F.2d at 1557. 

Kitty's has asserted another harm, however: It argues that 

the postponement or denial of the exercise of First Amendment 

rights may constitute irreparable injury, that the seizure of 

videotapes from its store prohibited or at least impaired the 

exercise of such a right, and that, therefore, the district court 

did not err in exercising its equitable jurisdiction to review 

this prior restraint. 3 To support its argument, Kitty's cites 

such political speech cases as Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 

3 At least some of the materials seized at Kitty's were 

videotapes. These are presumptively protected by the First 

Amendment. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 

928-29 (1989)~' While it is true that obscenity is not protected 

speech, there has not yet been a conclusive judicial determination 

of the obscenity of the videotapes seized in the search. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2937 Document: 01019857228 Date Filed: 06/07/1990 Page: 7 
(1976), and National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 

432 U.S. 43 ( 1977). Al.though the_ interests of the commercial 

speech at issue here may not equate with those of political 

speech, we agree that the special protections of the First 

Amendment justified the exercise of equitable jurisdiction in this 

case. 4 

It is axiomatic that the timing of speech is often crucial to 

its impact and that prior restraints are presumptively 

unconstitutional. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373-74 & n.29; Bantam 

Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1963). The promise 

of review of a prior restraint at some indefinite, future time 

does not meet constitutional requirements. See,~' Heller v. 

New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973} (after seizure pursuant to 

proper warrant, prompt judicial determination of obscenity on the 

merits necessary to preserve First Amendment rights); Freedman v. 

Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 ( 1965) ( "Any restraint imposed in 

advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must 

similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the 

shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial 

resolution."}; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489 (1965) 

(federal injunction of state law enforcement appropriate when 

delay of state adjudication may chill political speech). Because 

a prior restraint must be reviewed on the motion of the party 

4 In its analysis, the Supreme Court has not distinguished 

between political and commercial speech when it has held that any 

prior restraint must be followed by prompt judicial review. See 

--National -Socialist ... Party, 432, U.S. at 44, and Dombrowski v. 

Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489 (1965} (both citing Freedman v. 

Mary.land,_380 U.S. 51 (1965} (censorship of obscene films must be 

promptly reviewed on the merits)}. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2937 Document: 01019857228 Date Filed: 06/07/1990 Page: 8 
restrained at .the.earliest poin~-~compatible .wikh sound judicial 

resolution," ,Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59, we find the district 

court's decision to exercise its equitable jurisdiction proper. 

IV 

A 

The district court, after finding the warrants overbroad, 

denied Kitty's motion on the basis of the United States v. Leon, 

468 U.S. 897 (1984), good-faith exception to the exclusionary 

rule. Leon applies only to motions to suppress and their 

equivalents. Under Rule 4l(e) as it existed when the district 

court made its ruling, return of property was also a de facto 

suppression; hence reference to Leon was proper. Under the rule 

as it now exists, however, suppression and return of property are 

separate and distinct inquiries. See Blinder, Robinson, 897 F.2d 

at 1557-58; Committee Note to 1989 Amendment, at 30, 124 F.R.D. at 

428. Consequently, Leon is no longer applicable to Rule 4l(e) 

motions. Therefore, we must consider the government's challenge 

to the district court's determinations that the warrants were 

overbroad, which is subject to de novo review in this court. 

United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988). 

B 

Paragraph A of the local warrant authorized seizure of 

eighteen named videotapes, the contents of which were described in 

detail in the affidavit presented to the magistrate and attached 

to the warrant. The district court held Paragraph B to be 

~ove&b~oad-because it.-.authorized seizure of materials-the obscenity 

.of which .. had not been deter.mined by a judiciaLoff icer. Paragraph 

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Appellate Case: 88-2937 Document: 01019857228 Date Filed: 06/07/1990 Page: 9 
.-B authorized seizure of: 

~'video cassette tapes with black and white covers 

similar. in appearance and displayed in the same 

proximity to those listed above, of which the principal 

subject matter is: urination (urolagnia}, fisting, and/ 

or piercing which, considered as a whole, appeal to the 

prurient interest in sex and which have no serious 

literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 

IR. tab 5, at 25. With regard to the paragraph B videotapes, the 

affidavit described in detail the appearance of the "black and 

white" covers of the videos, the location of the video display 

case in which they were stored, the cost of the videos (up to 

thirty dollars more than other videos in the store} and the 

precise definitions of "urination," "fisting," and "piercing." 

Kitty's argues that this seizure violated the rule of Marcus 

v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961), that no material 

presumptively protected by the First Amendment may be seized 

unless a neutral judicial officer has focused "searchingly on the 

question of obscenity." Kitty's also argues that the warrant 

unconstitutionally failed to describe with sufficient 

particularity the videotapes to be seized under paragraph B. 

Kitty's correctly observes that "the constitutional requirement 

that warrants must particularly describe the 'things to be seized' 

is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the 

basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain." 

Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). We must therefore 

address the issues whether the magistrate focused searchingly on 

the question of the obscenity of the paragraph B videotapes and 

·· ·whether paragraph B,-,,..in ,con.junction- with the affidavit, contained 

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Appellate Case: 88-2937 Document: 01019857228 Date Filed: 06/07/1990 Page: 10 
a description of sufficient partlcularit~_to pass constitutional 

muster. 

The officers executing the local warrant were not left to 

their own devices in determining which videotapes they should 

seize as obscene and which subjects were most offensive. The 

local warrant listed eighteen named videotapes and described in 

detail, though not by name, other seizable videotapes. This case 

therefore differs from Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 

(1979). In Lo-Ji, the Supreme Court held invalid a general search 

warrant issued by a magistrate who then accompanied the police to 

the bookstore to make on-the-spot determinations of obscenity. 

Once the magistrate identified an item 

instructed the police to seize all 

as obscene, he 

similar items. 

then 

The 

determination of what constituted a "similar" item was, however, 

left 

327. 

under 

solely to the discretion of the executing officers. Id. at 

In contrast, in the instant case the videotapes to be seized 

paragraph B were specifically identified by all but title; 

subject matter, appearance, price, and location were detailed in 

the warrant and attached affidavit. The description in the 

warrant was more specific than those approved in similar cases by 

two other circuits. See Sequoia Books, Inc. v. McDonald, 725 F.2d 

1091, 1093 (7th Cir.) (nine named magazines plus magazines, 

movies, and videotapes containing depictions of certain specified 

sex acts), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984); In re Property 

Belonging to Talk of the Town Bookstore, Inc., 644 ~.2d 1317, 1319 

·,.,.,, (-9th- Cir,.- 1981.) .. (-books., . .;magazines ,.:~"and f i.lms ... depicting specific 

--sex acts described in affidavits attached to warrant). 

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- ,Regarding .. whether the ... magistrate .. was able . to focus 

searchingly,eneugh ondthe-obscenity-0f the.unnamed videotapes, we 

observe that the magistrate was presented with affidavits 

describing eighteen videotapes, each of which was deemed by him to 

be obscene. Each of these eighteen videotapes was enclosed in a 

black and white cover; each was chosen from the same display area; 

each was priced significantly above the general price of 

videotapes at Kitty's; each had as its primary subject fisting, 

urolagnia and/or piercing. We do not think it unreasonable for 

the magistrate to conclude, based on the descriptions of the 

eighteen named videotapes, that there was probable cause to 

believe that other videotapes identical in appearance to those 

reviewed, available in the same display area, and having the same 

subject matter, were equally obscene. Although ordinarily it 

would be preferable to identify the videotapes by name and include 

in the affidavit descriptions of the specific contents of each 

videotape, under the circumstances of this case we do not deem the 

failure to do so constitutionally fatal, particularly given that 

this was a seizure to secure evidence and not a seizure for the 

purposes of suppressing or destroying the allegedly obscene 

material. 5 See Heller, 413 U.S. at 492. 

S Kittr's has not alleged, and no evidence has indicated, that 

the seizure netted all copies of the films in question, thereby 

transforming the seizure into a total censorship of the .films in 

question. The Supreme Court has held that such a showing is the 

burden of the movant. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 

875 n.6 (1986}. Testimony at the hearing indicated that the 

officers seized no more than two copies of all but one film, and 

only three copies of that film. V R. 75. 

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We also reject . Kitty's conten.tion that ... the magistrate's 

iAclusion, of the definition oe obscenity_in the last clause of 

paragraph B unconstitutionally delegated the determination of 

obscenity to the executing officers. Based on the descriptions in 

the affidavit, it was reasonable for the magistrate to conclude 

that videotapes similar to the eighteen reviewed by the federal 

agents were obscene. The overabundance of caution that led him to 

include in paragraph B the definition of obscenity could not 

expand the limits of the search beyond materials already deemed by 

him to be obscene. Accord Sequoia Books, 725 F.2d at 1093. A 

determination of obscenity by the executing officers based on 

their own views of community morality could only narrow an already 

constitutionally valid warrant. 

C 

The district court held that Paragraph C of the national 

warrant, which authorized seizure of various business records 

dating back to January 1, 1983, was overbroad in that it allowed 

seizure of materials that substantially predated the effective 

date of the money laundering statute being enforced. In addition, 

the court held that the scope- of the government's investigation of 

obscenity, which covered only the year 1988, could not support 

such a seizure. Kitty's argues that the language of paragraph C 

of the warrant was also overbroad in that it did not provide 

sufficient guidance to the officers regarding which business 

records were seizable and which were not. 6 Kitty's alleges that 

6 Paragraph C authorized seizure of: 

Continued to next page 

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the officers .. aeized most or all of the business records on the 

.premises.7 

First, while the language of the warrant is broad, we hold 

that it is not fatally so when read in the common sense fashion 

required by United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). 

As the Eighth Circuit has noted, "there is a practical margin of 

flexibility permitted by the constitutional requirement for 

Continued from previous page 

"[a]ny business, financial and/or accounting 

records from January 1, 1983, to present, involving the 

receipt, transfer, comingling and/or expenditure- of 

proceeds, funds, or assets, for, by, between, or on 

behalf of [13 named business entities] or any employee, 

agent, owner, or subsidiary of the above named 

companies, including but not limited to [5 named 

individuals] including but not limited to documents with 

respect to a financial institution, such as deposits, 

withdrawals, transfers between accounts, exchange of 

currency, loans, extensions of credit, purchase or sale 

of any stock, bond, certificates of deposit, or any 

other monetary instrument, or any record of other 

payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a 

financial institution of any such funds, including 

records or copies of any coin or currency of the United 

States, travelers checks, personal checks, bank checks, 

money orders, or investment securities, or local, state 

or federal tax records." 

IR. tab 2, attachment 2, at 2-3. 

7 It is not clear whether Kitty's also objects to the seizure of 

documents pursuant to paragraph B of the national warrant. 

Paragraph B authorized seizure of documents concerning the 

acquisition, sale, shipment, rental, display, etc., of the 

videotapes named in the warrant's first paragraph. To the extent 

that Kitty's is arguing that this paragraph is overbroad, we 

reject the argument. We note that this is not an instance, like 

that described in United States v. Guarino, 610 F. Supp. 371, 376 

(D.R.I. 1984), in which the officers were told to seize records 

relating to obscene materials, but those materials had not been 

identified nor judicially determined to be obscene. In the 

instant case, a magistrate had found probable cause to believe the ., c--named- ,videotapes- were obscene. They .. were. clearly identified in 

the warrant. The officers executing the warrant had only to .... select those documents. that referred in the specified manner to 

the listed videotapes. 

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- .particularity .in the descr-iption of items to be seiZ.f!d." United 

-States. v •. Davis,. 542 F.2d 74.3.,- 745. (8th .Cir.), cert. denied, 429 

U.S. 1004 (1976). 

The supporting affidavit recites sufficient evidence to 

constitute probable cause to believe that the entities specified 

in paragraph C were engaging in a conspiracy to transport and sell 

obscene materials and to launder money. Evidence of conspiracy is 

often hidden in the day-to-day business transactions among the 

involved entities; therefore, it seems reasonable that the 

government would need to examine the documentation of these 

transactions to investigate a conspiracy. 

There is no question, however, that the warrant's language 

approaches the very thin line between the comprehensiveness 

necessary to effective law enforcement and a failure of 

particularity which permits law officers to engage in a "general, 

exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New 

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). Paragraphs B, c, E, and F of 

the warrant describe virtually every kind of document that 

ordinarily might be found in a business such as Kitty's. Kitty's 

argues on the strength of our opinions in Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 

F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1985), and United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 

592, 600-06 (10th Cir. 1988), that this warrant is, therefore, 

impermissibly broad. 

This warrant is more particular than those at issue in Leary 

or Voss. In Leary and Voss the warrants contained a similar 

· . --laundl'y lisb of· types of~-,documents and author-ized seizure of all 

described documents having to do with specified federal statutes. 

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But,. in Lea.ry we. suggested that further restrictions on the scope 

of the sear.ch:-:.-:-such as. a date restriction or a_ restriction based 

on references to specified companies allegedly involved in the 

criminal activity or a restriction based on a certain product or 

transaction--might have rendered the warrant sufficiently 

particular to be constitutional. 846 F.2d at 604. Such 

restrictions were clearly incorporated into the instant warrant. 

Because the executing officers could not, in compliance with 

the warrant, seize any and all business records on Kitty's 

premises, but rather were restricted to those referring to certain 

products, certain businesses or individuals, and certain time 

periods, we hold that the provisions of the national warrant were 

not facially overbroad. These restrictions are sufficient to 

allow executing officers, acting in good faith, "to distinguish 

between items that may and may not be seized." Leary, 846 F.2d at 

602. 8 

With regard to the date restriction of the warrant, we hold 

that the trial court erred in ruling it overbroad. The money 

laundering statute, 18 u.s.c. § 1956, had an effective date in 

1986, and, therefore, documents predating that year could not form 

the basis of a money laundering violation. But the other charges 

specified in the warrant--conspiracy and interstate 

8 Kitty's has introduced a list of documents seized by the 

government which it asserts exceed the warrant. Since the 

government has apparently complied with all of Kitty's requests 

for copies of documents seized, see IV R. 8-9; V R. 101-02, we 

will not order return of any of these documents. See Committee 

Note to .1989 Amendment, at 29-31, 124 F.R.D. at 427-:29. We do not 

here intend to preclude Kitty's from rearguing the issue in a 

later motion for suppression of anything seized that in fact is 

not authorized by the warrant. 

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transportation, distribution, and sale of obscene materials, 18 

u.s.c. §§ 371, _ 1462, 1465--all had a five~year statute of 

limitations, 18 u.s.c. § 3282, which allowed for prosecution of 

violations dating back to 1983. The affidavit provided probable 

cause to believe that the thirteen named business entities were 

involved in violations of all of these provisions. 

We share the district court's concern that the surveillance 

and federal investigation covered only 1988. We cannot, however, 

as a practical matter limit the scope of the seizure to documents 

from that year. The affidavit provided probable cause to suspect 

illegal activity prior to 1985. We see nothing inherently 

unreasonable in the choice of the statute of limitations as a date 

restriction on the scope of the warrant. Accordingly, we hold 

that the scope of the warrant with regard to age of documents was 

not improper. 

V 

The new wording of Rule 4l(e) requires us to consider not 

only the lawfulness of the search and seizure, but also whether 

Kitty's is aggrieved by a deprivation of its property, despite the 

legality of the search. See Blinder, Robinson, 897 F.2d at 1557-

58. A movant must demonstrate that retention of the property by 

the government is unreasonable in order to prevail on a Rule 4l(e) 

motion. 

"[R]easonableness under all of the circumstances must be 

the test when a person seeks to obtain the return of 

property. If the United States has a need for the 

property in an investigation or prosecution, its . _rstention.of_the property generally is. reasonable. But, 

if the United States' legitimate interests can be 

satisfied even if the property is returned, continued 

retention of the property would become unreasonable." 

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Committee Note to 1989 Amendment, at 30, 124 F.R.D. at 428. 

Kitty's has failed to demonstrate that it is aggrieved by an 

unreasonable retention of the property. With regard to the 

videotapes seized, Kitty's has made no argument that the seizure 

has precluded all exhibition or rental of the videotapes in 

question. Kitty's First Amendment rights are not sufficiently 

infringed by the government's seizure for evidence of a few copies 

of a limited number of videotapes to be "aggrieved" under Rule 

4l(e). Cf. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 490-93 (1973) 

(government may seize limited number of books to preserve as 

evidence without prior adversary hearing); and Fort Wayne Books, 

Inc. v. Indiana, 109 s. Ct. 916, 928-29 (1989) (must be adversary 

hearing before censoring books or films). Further, return of the 

videotapes would pose too great a risk of loss of potential 

evidence. As the Supreme Court has noted, "such films may be 

compact, readily transported for exhibition in other 

jurisdictions, easily destructible, and particularly susceptible 

to alteration by cutting and splicing critical parts of film." 

Heller, 413 U.S. at 493. We hold, therefore, that the 

government's retention of no more than two evidentiary copies of 

each film is reasohable and does not "aggrieve" Kitty's under Rule 

4l(e) . 9 

Testimony at the hearing revealed that the government has 

returned copies of any business documents requested by Kitty's. 

9 This de.termination ... is .. subject to r:eview .. and .modification by the 

district court in t-he event that Ki tty's- introduces evidence that 

-the government's seizure has totally precluded dissemination of 

the films in question. See Heller, 413 U.S. at 492-93. 

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. Under these cir.cumst~mces .. we do .. not see how .... the . government's 

retention of.original documents aggrieves Kitty's •. we conclude, 

therefore, that Kitty's is not entitled to the return of the 

documents retained by the government. 

Accordingly, the district court's denial of Kitty's motion 

for return of property was proper. 

AFFIRMED. 

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