Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05034/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05034-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
437-51 West 13th Street LLC
Not party
Liron Realty, Inc.
Not party
Romanoff Equities, Inc.
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

437-51 WEST 13TH STREET LLC, 

LIRON REALTY, INC.,

Plaintiffs

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5034

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:11-cv-00374-NBF, Senior Judge Nancy B. 

Firestone. 

______________________ 

Decided: March 10, 2016

______________________ 

MARK F. (THOR) HEARNE II, Arent Fox, LLP, Clayton, 

MO, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

MEGHAN SUE LARGENT. 

EMILY M. MEEKER, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by JOHN C. CRUDEN. 

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2 ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.

BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

The High Line is an elevated “linear park” in New 

York City that runs along the west side of Manhattan 

from Gansevoort Street to 34th Street. The park, which is 

used for walking, jogging, and other recreational purposes, occupies the elevated viaduct of a former railway line. 

In 2005, the elevated viaduct was converted to a public 

recreational trail under the authority of the National 

Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-49. In this takings 

action, the appellant, Romanoff Equities, Inc., contends 

that the conversion of the railway property to a trail 

entailed a taking of its property without just compensation. The Court of Federal Claims held, on summary 

judgment, that the conversion did not result in a taking of 

Romanoff’s property. We agree with the analysis of the 

trial court and therefore affirm.

I 

In 1932 the New York State Realty and Terminal 

Company granted an easement to the New York Central 

Railroad Company (“the New York Central”), an affiliated 

entity, to allow for the construction and maintenance of 

an elevated railroad corridor on the west side of Manhattan adjacent to Tenth Avenue. The purpose of the elevated railroad was to replace the ground-level railroad then 

in use, in order to eliminate dangerous grade-level road 

crossings. The easement covered a roadway that ran 

above the street level and was wide enough for a rail line 

and associated stations. 

The elevated railroad was constructed and operated 

for approximately 50 years. It ceased operations in the 

mid-1970s. By 1982 Conrail, then the successor to the 

New York Central, had removed the stations and tracks 

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ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US 3

along the roadway. Various other uses for the property 

were considered, such as a highway or a waste disposal 

service, but were not implemented. In 1989, the owners 

of property along the viaduct initiated an adverse abandonment proceeding before the Interstate Commerce 

Commission (the predecessor to the United States Surface 

Transportation Board), seeking to have the easement 

declared abandoned. In 1992, the Commission ruled that

an abandonment of the easement would be declared if the 

property owners filed a bond to cover demolition costs, but 

no such bond was filed.

In 1999, Romanoff acquired certain property that was 

traversed by the viaduct and was subject to the easement. 

At that time, no determination had been made as to 

whether the viaduct would be removed or used for some 

other purpose. Subsequently, a non-profit entity began 

urging that the viaduct be converted to use as a public 

space, subject to possible reactivation as a rail line. 

Following negotiations with the City and the railroad 

company’s successors, including Conrail and CSX, the 

Surface Transportation Board in 2005 issued a Certificate 

of Interim Trail Use for the elevated right of way. Based 

on that authority, the viaduct was converted into the 

High Line Park.

In 2011, Romanoff filed suit in the Court of Federal 

Claims. Romanoff principally contended that the easement originally granted to the railroad did not authorize 

the use of the rail corridor for park purposes. For that 

reason, Romanoff argued that the conversion of the railroad viaduct into a park constituted an appropriation of 

Romanoff’s property by the United States for which 

Romanoff was constitutionally entitled to be compensated.

The Court of Federal Claims rejected Romanoff’s 

claim. The court relied on the broad language of the 

original easement granted to the New York Central. The 

language in question grants the railroad and “its succesCase: 15-5034 Document: 54-2 Page: 3 Filed: 03/10/2016
4 ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US

sors and assigns forever, the permanent and perpetual 

rights and easements” within the described area, “together with the exclusive use of the portion of the parcels of 

land herein described . . . for railroad purposes and for 

such other purposes as the Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, may from time to time or at any time or 

times desire to make use of the same.” (emphasis added). 

The court held that the broad grant of the easement 

“for such other purposes” as the railroad company and its 

successors desired to make of it, was broad enough to 

encompass the use of the property for a park. As a result, 

the court held, the easement did not terminate when the 

railroad company and its successors no longer used the 

property for railroad purposes. The court therefore concluded that Romanoff had no property rights that were 

terminated or impaired by the construction and maintenance of the High Line Park on the site where the railroad had previously operated. The court also rejected 

Romanoff’s argument that the easement had been abandoned when the railroad company ceased using it for 

railroad purposes, and that all rights in the property had 

reverted to Romanoff before the Surface Transportation 

Board authorized its conversion into and use as a park.

II

Romanoff’s principal argument on appeal is that the 

1932 easement granted to the New York Central was 

limited to railroad use and did not authorize the successors of the New York Central to use the property for other 

purposes, such as a park. That argument fails in light of 

the sweeping breadth of the easement grant. The easement was specifically not limited to the use of the property for railroad purposes, but stated that the property 

could be used “for railroad purposes and for such other 

purposes as the Railroad Company, its successors and 

assigns, may from time to time or at any time or times 

desire to make use of the same.” As the Court of Federal 

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ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US 5

Claims held, it is not possible to read that language as 

limiting the easement to railroad purposes when it says, 

explicitly, that the easement applies not only if the property is used “for railroad purposes,” but also if it is used 

“for such other purposes” as the railroad company and its 

successors and assigns may desire.

A 

Romanoff makes several arguments in support of its 

effort to escape the broad language of the easement grant, 

but none is persuasive. 

First, Romanoff argues that under New York law, an 

easement is limited to the uses contemplated by the 

parties when the easement was granted.1 Romanoff 

contends that the parties contemplated only that the 

property would be used for railroad purposes and that the 

easement cannot be construed to permit the use of the 

property for non-railroad purposes such as a park.

The problem with Romanoff’s argument is that in determining the purpose for which an easement is granted, 

New York law requires that the intent of the parties be 

determined based on the language of the grant. See Dowd 

v. Ahr, 583 N.E.2d 911, 913 (N.Y. 1991) (“Easements by 

express grant are construed to give effect to the parties’ 

intent, as manifested by the language of the grant.”); 

Edge Mgmt. Consulting, Inc. v. Blank, 807 N.Y.S.2d 353, 

368-69 (App. Div. 2006) (the terms of an agreement are 

the best evidence of the parties’ intent). In this case, the 

language of the grant is not limited to railroad purposes, 

but expressly includes other purposes for which the 

 

1 “Property interests rely on the law of the state 

where the property is located,” Mildenberger v. United 

States, 643 F.3d 938, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2011), so in this case 

we look to New York law to interpret the scope of the 

grant.

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6 ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US

grantee or its successors may desire to use the property. 

Limiting the scope of the easement to the purposes revealed by the granting instrument is therefore of no help 

to Romanoff.2

Romanoff cites a number of cases for the proposition 

that the scope of an easement is limited to the purposes 

contemplated by the parties at the time of the agreement 

that created the easement. In each of those cases, however, the easement was limited to a specific purpose. None 

of the granting instruments contained language such as 

the language found in the easement at issue in this case, 

which not only does not limit the purpose for which the 

easement is granted, but explicitly states that the purposes extend to any purpose for which the grantee and its 

successors wish to use the property.

Romanoff’s next argument is that the trial court’s ruling as to the scope of the easement is at odds with the 

purpose of the easement, as determined from the entire 

10-page granting document. Romanoff points out that 

 

2 In its briefs, Romanoff quotes (nine times) the 

statement by the trial judge that “the parties at the time 

the easement was granted could not foresee use of the 

corridor for a public trail and park” as support for its 

contention that the parties to the easement did not intend 

the easement to be used for non-railroad purposes. In 

fact, however, the court’s comment was directed to the 

quite different point that in light of the breadth of the 

grant, it did not matter that the specific purpose of use for 

a public trail and park was not in the parties’ contemplation, as is clear from the full text of the court’s statement 

(“Moreover, having agreed to allow the Railroad, its 

successors and assigns to use the corridor for any lawful 

purpose, it is irrelevant that the parties at the time the 

easement was granted could not foresee use of the corridor for a public trail and park.”).

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ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US 7

much of the document relates to the details of the proposed railroad use of the property, and the reference to 

other uses is found in only a single sentence. Romanoff 

states that upon reading the entire document, “it is impossible to honestly conclude Realty Company and New 

York Central Railroad intended the 1932 Easement to 

grant New York City the right to use the property for 

anything it ‘desired.’” The problem with that argument is 

that New York City is clearly a “successor” to the New 

York Central,3 and the document plainly authorizes such 

a successor to use the property “for such other purposes 

[as it may] desire to make use of the same.” Thus, the 

text of the granting document is exactly contrary to 

Romanoff’s argument that such a reading is “impossible.” 

Next, Romanoff argues that the use of the term “such” 

in the granting document limits the uses of the easement 

to railroad uses. The argument is that the term “such” is 

a limiting term that constrains the “other purposes” for 

which the easement can be used to railroad purposes. As 

an example of the limiting nature of the word “such,” 

Romanoff offers the sentence “My sister doesn’t particu-

 

3 Romanoff briefly contends that New York City is 

not a “successor” to the New York Central, even though 

the property rights of the railroad were conveyed through 

several successors and ultimately to the City. Romanoff’s 

contention is that when a right-of-way easement is granted to a railroad and the railroad’s successors and assigns, 

the class of successors and assigns is limited to successor 

railroads. The case on which Romanoff relies for that 

proposition, however, was one in which the easement was 

specifically limited to railroad purposes. Where, as here, 

the easement is not limited to railroad purposes, there is 

no logical reason to construe the term “successor” to be 

limited to a railroad corporation with a franchise to 

operate the railway line, as Romanoff contends. 

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8 ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US

larly enjoy talking with such people,” where the word 

“such” is limited to a group of people already identified. 

While the term “such” can have a limiting effect in 

some settings, it does not have that effect in the context of 

the 1932 easement. There, context makes it quite clear 

that the word “such” is used to mean “any” or “whatever,” 

and is not limiting. The phrase “for such other purposes 

as the Railroad Company . . . may . . . desire” means “for 

any purposes” or “for whatever purposes” the Railroad 

Company may desire, as in the sentence “You may invite 

your classmates, your roommates, and such other friends 

as you choose.” In that setting the reference to “such 

other friends” is clearly not limited to classmates and 

roommates. Moreover, as the government aptly notes, 

this reading would result in the pertinent clause permitting the use of the property “for railroad purposes and 

such other railroad purposes,” an interpretation that 

would be nonsensical.4

B 

Stepping back from analysis of the language of the 

easement, Romanoff makes the broader argument that 

New York law does not recognize a “general easement” 

that would permit the property in question to be used for 

any purpose. Romanoff does not point to any authority 

 

4 The term “such” is clearly used, elsewhere within 

the 1932 easement deed, to mean “any” or “whatever.” 

For example, the deed gives the New York Central “the 

right, upon reasonable notice, to enter at reasonable 

hours in and upon the building, buildings or other structures above or below the Easement Area as to the particular parcel or parcels affected by said changes and to place 

therein such temporary shoring and blocking as may be 

reasonably required in making said changes.” (emphasis 

added).

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ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US 9

that stands for that proposition. Instead, Romanoff cites 

New York cases that simply stand for the proposition that 

the scope of an easement is limited to the specific use for 

which it is granted. Those cases do not stand for the 

proposition that an easement granted for any purpose for 

which the grantee wishes to use it would be unenforceable 

in New York.

In fact, the closest New York case suggests the opposite. That case, Missionary Society of the Salesian Congregation v. Evrotas, 175 N.E. 523 (N.Y. 1931), involved 

what the court called an “unusually broad” easement over 

the plaintiff’s property. The easement granted not only 

rights of ingress and egress, but also permitted “a free 

and unobstructed use of the described land for passage of 

horses and vehicles of every kind and ‘for all other lawful 

purposes.’” Id. at 524. The court held that the easement, 

“being in general terms, . . . must be construed to include 

any reasonable use to which the land may be devoted. . . . 

The only limitation is that all the uses must be lawful.” 

Id. The court added that “[w]hen the terms of a grant are 

doubtful, the grantee may take the language most strongly in its favor.” Id. 

That decision of the New York Court of Appeals clearly signals that the New York courts will enforce easements by their terms and that a very broad easement, 

although “unusual,” is not void simply because it extends 

not only to the specific purposes named in the easement, 

but to “all other lawful purposes.” See also Phillips v. 

Jacobsen, 499 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (App. Div. 1986) (“easement granted in general terms must be construed to 

include any reasonable use to which it may be devoted, 

provided the use is lawful and one contemplated by the 

grant”); Morgan v. Bolsan Realty Corp., 369 N.Y.S.2d 544, 

546 (App. Div. 1975) (“A grantor of an easement may 

convey or retain that which he desires. In other words, he 

may create an extensive or a limited easement.”).

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10 ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US

In a context similar to this case, the New York Appellate Division recognized that when the conveyance of an 

easement is between related parties, it is not surprising 

for the grantor to give extensive rights to the grantee. 

Morgan, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 546. The fact that the grantor 

and grantee in this case were affiliated parties thus 

provides an additional reason for upholding the easement 

in accordance with the broad terms of the deed. 

Romanoff next contends that even if the broad language of the easement were enforceable when the easement was granted, it became more limited by virtue of the 

parties’ conduct in the more than 50 years that followed 

the execution of the grant. According to Romanoff, because the New York Central and its successors used the 

viaduct exclusively for railroad purposes during that

period, the actual use of the property must be regarded as 

having defined the scope of the easement. 

The cases on which Romanoff relies in support of this 

argument involve easements of ambiguous scope. In 

Onthank v. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad Co., 71 N.Y. 194 (1877), cited by Romanoff, the 

easement was “for the purpose of laying down and keeping in repair an iron pipe or conductor.” The defendant 

installed a two-inch pipe; ten years later the defendant 

removed that pipe and replaced it with a four-inch pipe. 

Although the original grant did not specify where the 

grantee could lay the pipe or how large it could be, the 

court held that once the grantee “selected the place where 

it would exercise its easement thus granted in general 

terms, what was before indefinite and general became 

fixed and certain, and the easement could not be exercised 

in any other place.” The scope of the grant thus became 

fixed through the actions of the parties, and the grantee 

was not allowed to replace the original pipe with a larger 

one, even though the original grant did not specify a 

width. The same is true of the later decision in Dowd v. 

Ahr, 583 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991).

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ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US 11

In those cases, the courts applied the familiar principle that the parties’ course of conduct under an ambiguous agreement is evidence of the parties’ understanding of 

the scope of that agreement. That principle has no application here, as there is no ambiguity in the scope of the 

easement. The fact that the property was used for railroad purposes for some period of time after the grant does 

not suggest that the parties understood that the express 

right to use the property for other purposes would be 

forfeited by its longstanding use for railroad purposes.

C 

Finally, Romanoff argues that the trial court’s holding 

as to the scope of the easement is “contrary to the understanding of every party,” including the railroad, the 

landowners, and New York City. Romanoff points in 

particular to the fact that before converting the viaduct 

into a park, New York City sought easements from the 

landowners to allow the viaduct to be used as a park. 

Such steps would not have been necessary, according to 

Romanoff, if the City had believed that the original easement gave it the right to convert the viaduct into a park. 

The simple answer to that argument is that New York 

City likely sought such express easements in the hope of 

avoiding litigation such as this case, and that it reasonably expected that the easements would be granted because of the value the High Line Park would add to the 

properties that abutted it.

III

Romanoff’s final argument is that the 1932 easement 

had terminated before the viaduct was converted into a 

park, and that the easement had reverted to the original 

owners and their successors, including Romanoff. Because the property ceased being used for rail purposes in 

the early 1980s, Romanoff contends that there was no 

easement for Conrail to convey to its successors, including 

the City of New York.

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12 ROMANOFF EQUITIES, INC. v. US

This argument, like others made by Romanoff, depends on Romanoff’s flawed assumption that the easement was limited to rail use in the first place. Because 

the easement was not so limited, Conrail’s cessation of 

rail operations on the viaduct did not terminate its rights 

under the easement. While Conrail, or any successor, 

could have terminated the easement by abandoning any 

interest in the property altogether, Conrail never did so. 

Instead, Conrail expressed its interest in maintaining its 

rights in the property, which it ultimately passed on to 

the City as its successor. There being no indication of 

abandonment by Conrail or its successor, the easement 

did not terminate at any time as a matter of law.

Moreover, under New York law “abandonment does 

not result from nonuse alone, no matter how long”; it

requires proof that the owner of the easement intended to 

abandon it and committed some overt act or failure to act 

indicating that the owner does not claim or retain any 

interest in the easement. Janoff v. Disick, 888 N.Y.S.2d 

963, 966 (App. Div. 2009); see also Gerbig v. Zumpano, 

165 N.E.2d 178, 180-81 (N.Y. 1960); DeJong v. Abphill 

Assocs., 504 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (App. Div. 1986). As the 

trial court pointed out, Romanoff offered no evidence of 

such intent or acts of abandonment. Romanoff points to 

statements by several courts that the rail use was abandoned, but not that the easement was abandoned. Romanoff’s claim of abandonment is therefore unsupported.

In sum, the easement granted to the New York Central in 1932 was broad enough to encompass the use of 

the viaduct for a trail and park. Nothing was done to 

terminate that easement. Accordingly the trial court 

properly held that Romanoff did not at any time acquire a 

property interest in the viaduct easement that was taken 

by the United States and for which Romanoff is entitled to 

compensation. 

AFFIRMED

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