Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06724/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06724-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael A. Cannon
Defendant
Michael Chertoff
Defendant
Stella Gelfer
Plaintiff
Emilio Gonzalez
Defendant
Robert S. Mueller
Defendant
David N. Still
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STELLA GELFER,

Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, as Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security, EMILIO

GONZALEZ, Director of U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services, ROBERT S.

MUELLER, Director of Federal Bureau of

Investigation, MICHAEL A. CANNON,

Section Chief, National Name Check Program

Section Records Management Division Federal

Bureau of Investigation, DAVID N. STILL,

District Director of USCIS San Francisco

District Office,

Respondents. /

No. C 06-06724 WHA

ORDER GRANTING 

IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART RESPONDENTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

This order sustains subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency inaction in the form of a

delay in ruling on an individual’s adjustment of status application. Jurisdiction is lacking,

however, to compel respondents to reach a particular outcome on petitioner’s application. 

As such, respondents’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Pro se petitioner Stella Gelfer is a citizen of Canada who has been lawfully residing and

working in the United States on an H1-B visa since May 20, 2001. On January 5, 2005, she

submitted an I-485 application to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”) for adjustment to lawful permanent residence status. On May 2, 2005, petitioner

Case 3:06-cv-06724-JL Document 17 Filed 03/22/07 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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had an adjustment-of-status interview and was told that the USCIS submitted her data to the

FBI for a security “name check.” Her case was “continued” pending “security clearances” and

“further review” (Pet. ¶¶ 10–13, Exh. C).

Petitioner has since made numerous inquiries on her application but to no avail. 

On August 22, 2005, for example, petitioner questioned the USCIS about her application’s

status. In response, the USCIS informed her that it was “still waiting for a security check on

[her] case from the FBI” and was unable to proceed with adjudication until the check was

complete. Additionally, petitioner attended three separate “InfoPass” appointments “in an effort

to expedite her case.” Petitioner’s husband sent respondent David Still, San Francisco Director

of the USCIS, a letter inquiring about petitioner’s application and received no response. 

Petitioner’s husband also contacted Congressman Pete Stark concerning the application. 

Petitioner’s husband received a letter back from the FBI stating that petitioner’s name check

was “currently in a pending status,” but did not give a time frame for adjudication. Petitioner

alleged that the delay of her application has resulted in harmful restrictions on her ability to

work, travel and apply for United States citizenship (Pet. ¶¶ 13–18, Exh. D, I).

Petitioner filed this action on October 30, 2006, asserting jurisdiction under the

Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. 1331. 

Petitioner sought an order requiring respondents (1) to adjudicate petitioner’s application, and

(2) to provide her with a notice of approval of her application.

Respondents assert that a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to grant relief

under the APA. It is well established, however, that a district court has subject-matter

jurisdiction over any sufficiently stated claim for relief under the APA. See Norton v. S. Utah

Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63–65 (2004). To invoke jurisdiction under the APA, a

petitioner must show that (1) an agency had a nondiscretionary duty to act and (2) the agency

unreasonably delayed in acting on that duty. Ibid.; 5 U.S.C. 555(b), 701(a)(2). Once a

petitioner has proven a right to relief under the circumstances, it is the reviewing court’s duty to

“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 555 U.S.C. 706(1).

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United States District Court

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“[T]here is a difference between the [USCIS’s] discretion over how to resolve an

application and the [USCIS’s] discretion over whether it resolves an application.” Singh v. Still,

__ F. Supp. 2d __, 2006 WL 3898174, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2007). As in Singh, respondents

concede that they have a “nondiscretionary duty to process” petitioner’s application under

8 U.S.C. 1255(a) (Reply 2).

The issue raised by respondents’ motion, therefore, is whether petitioner has properly

alleged an unreasonable delay in adjudicating her application. Respondents argue that the

USCIS has full discretion over when it makes a decision to approve or deny an application. 

As such, no amount of delay in this process is subject to a district court’s review. This order

disagrees.

Allowing the respondents a limitless amount of time to adjudicate petitioner’s

application would be contrary to the “reasonable time” frame mandated under 5 U.S.C. 555(b)

and, ultimately, could negate the USCIS’s duty under 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(5). Singh, 2006 WL

3898174 at *3. Instead, this order finds that respondents have a statutorily prescribed duty to

adjudicate petitioner’s application “within a reasonable time” under 5 U.S.C. 555(b), while

giving wide berth to an agency’s determination as to what time period is reasonable. 

See Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 932 (D.N.M. 1999).

“What constitutes an unreasonable delay in the context of immigration applications

depends to a great extent on the facts of the particular case.” Id. at 934. Here, respondents

fail to show that the delay of petitioner’s application is reasonable as a matter of law. 

Simply asserting that the USCIS is awaiting the results of an FBI name check does not

explain why petitioner’s application has been stagnant for the past two years. See Singh,

2006 WL 3898174 at *3. Respondents do not point to a single action taken during that period

of time to further the processing of petitioner’s application or a reason why petitioner’s

application is particularly troublesome. See id. at *4. As in Yu, this order does not find

respondents’ more than two-year delay in the adjudication of petitioner’s application reasonable

as a matter of law. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 935. On this motion to dismiss, it is premature to consider

the exact sources of the delay to determine whether the delay was actually unreasonable under

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the circumstances. If the delay is found to be unreasonable after a full consideration of the

surrounding facts, this Court will then have a duty to “compel” respondents to adjudicate the

application by a deadline certain. See 5 U.S.C. 706(1). 

Insofar as petitioner seeks relief under the APA or mandamus requiring respondents to

approve her application, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to compel the USCIS to perform such

an act. As discussed above, a district court’s jurisdiction lies only where the action the

petitioner seeks to compel is nondiscretionary. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 65 (“a court can compel

an agency to act, but has no power to specify what the action must be”). This order finds that

Section 1255 specifically commits the decision on whether to approve or deny an application

for adjustment to the discretion of the Attorney General. As such, this Court has no authority to

compel a specific outcome for petitioner’s application. Respondents’ motion to dismiss the

portion of petitioner’s mandamus and APA claim seeking an order to compel respondents to

provide petitioner with a notice of approval of her application is GRANTED.

Relief under mandamus and the APA are virtually equivalent when a petitioner seeks to

compel an agency to act on a nondiscretionary duty. Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt,

105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997). In light of their similarities and by finding jurisdiction under

the APA, this order need not address whether mandamus jurisdiction exists in the context of

petitioner’s claim. See Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1473

(D. Mass. 1984).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, respondents’ motion to dismiss the portion of petitioner’s

APA claim seeking an order to compel respondents to adjudicate her application is DENIED. 

Additionally, respondents’ motion to dismiss the portion of petitioner’s mandamus and APA

claims seeking an order to compel respondents to provide petitioner with a notice of approval of

her application is GRANTED. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The initial case management conference will occur on APRIL 12, 2007 AT 11:00 A.M.

Please file a joint case management statement no later than APRIL 5, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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