Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02318/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02318-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Honest Tea, Inc.
Defendant
Sarah A. Salazar
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SARAH A. SALAZAR, on behalf of 

herself and all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

HONEST TEA, INC., 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-02318-KJM-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Sarah A. Salazar (“plaintiff” or “Ms. Salazar”) filed this putative class 

action against defendant Honest Tea, Inc. (“defendant” or “Honest Tea”), alleging that its Honey 

Green Tea label is misbranded in violation of several federal and California laws. This matter is 

before the court on defendant’s Motion to Stay Discovery pending a ruling on defendant’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 67). Def.’s Mot. Stay Disc., ECF No. 67 (“Mot. Stay”). 

Plaintiff opposes the motion. Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Stay Disc., ECF No. 79 (“Opp’n”). The court 

held a hearing on the matter on September 25, 2015, at which L. Timothy Fisher, Yeremey 

Krivoshey, and Annick Persinger appeared for plaintiff; Travis Tu, Pro Hac Vice, and Tammy 

Webb appeared for defendant. As explained below, the court DENIES defendant’s Motion to 

Stay Discovery. 

Case 2:13-cv-02318-KJM-EFB Document 86 Filed 10/28/15 Page 1 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

I. BACKGROUND 

The First Amended Complaint alleges that statements on several of Honest Tea’s 

labels do not satisfy the Food and Drug Administration’s requirements for nutrient content 

claims, as adopted by California law. See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-28, ECF No. 32. Ms. Salazar 

allegedly relied on the unauthorized nutrient content claims in deciding to purchase Honest Tea’s 

Honey Green Tea, and was misled by the misrepresentations. See id. ¶¶ 3, 54, 65, 73. 

Based on evidence obtained during the deposition of Ms. Salazar, Honest Tea filed 

a combined Motion for Summary Judgment and to Stay Discovery on July 14, 2015. ECF No. 

67. Honest Tea’s Motion for Summary Judgment is directed at Ms. Salazar’s individual claims 

rather than the claims of the purported class, and is directed solely to the issue of reliance. See 

3/5/15 Tr., Fisher Decl., Ex. 1, at 7:12-7:15, ECF No. 79-1. Ms. Salazar filed an Opposition to 

both motions on August 13, 2015. Opp’n, ECF No. 79. Honest Tea replied on September 18, 

2015. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 82 (“Reply”). 

This order pertains solely to defendant’s Motion to Stay Discovery. The court will 

adjudicate the merits of defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a separate order. 

II. DISCUSSION 

District courts have wide discretion in controlling discovery. Little v. City of 

Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit has not provided guidance on 

evaluating a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion, other 

than affirming that district courts may grant such a motion for good cause. See, e.g., id. 

(affirming district court’s decision to stay discovery pending resolution of motion for summary 

judgment); Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s 

grant of protective order staying discovery pending resolution of motion to dismiss), as amended 

on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc, (Apr. 17, 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (“The 

court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from . . . undue burden or 

expense . . . .”). 

“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does [sic] not provide for automatic or 

blanket stays of discovery when a potentially dispositive motion is pending.” Mlejnecky v. 

Case 2:13-cv-02318-KJM-EFB Document 86 Filed 10/28/15 Page 2 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

Olympus Imaging Am., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-02630 JAM KJN, 2011 WL 489743, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 7, 2011). “Indeed, district courts look unfavorably upon such blanket stays of discovery,” 

id., because delaying or prolonging discovery can create unnecessary litigation expenses and case 

management problems, Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 261, 263 

(M.D.N.C. 1988). In evaluating a motion to stay, a court “inevitably must balance the harm 

produced by a delay in discovery against the possibility that the motion will be granted and 

entirely eliminate the need for such discovery.” Id.; see White v. E-Loan, Inc., No. C 05-02080 

SI, 2006 WL 2850041, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2006); GTE Wireless, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 192 

F.R.D. 284, 289 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 

District courts in this circuit frequently apply variations of a two-pronged test in 

deciding whether to stay discovery. Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 489743, at *6 (collecting cases); Seven 

Springs Ltd. P’ship v. Fox Capital Mgmt. Corp., No. S-07-0142 LKK GGH, 2007 WL 1146607, 

at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007), as amended, (Apr. 19, 2007). “First, the pending motion must be 

potentially dispositive of the entire case . . . .” Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 489743, at *6. The court 

may, for example, stay discovery when it is convinced that the plaintiff will be unable to state a 

claim for relief. See, e.g., B. R. S. Land Investors v. United States, 596 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 

1979) (per curiam); Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1981). “Second, the court 

must determine whether the pending, potentially dispositive motion can be decided absent 

additional discovery.” Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 489743, at *6. “Discovery should proceed if either 

prong of the test is not met.” Id. 

The parties dispute the appropriate standard for the first prong of the two-pronged 

test. In Wood and B.R. S. Land Investors, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court may stay 

discovery when it is “convinced” that the plaintiff will be unable to state a claim for relief. Wood, 

644 F.2d at 801; B.R. S. Land Investors, 596 F.2d at 356. Relying on Wood, Ms. Salazar 

contends that a stay is only appropriate when a court is “convinced” that the dispositive motion 

will be granted. Opp’n at 20 (quoting Wood, 644 F.2d at 801; citing Seven Springs, 2007 WL 

1146607, at *2 (requiring the moving party to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that it 

will prevail on the merits of its dispositive motion)); accord Wenger, 282 F.3d at 1077. Honest 

Case 2:13-cv-02318-KJM-EFB Document 86 Filed 10/28/15 Page 3 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

Tea focuses on GTE Wireless, a case from the Southern District of California, which interprets 

Wood and B.R.S. Land Investors as simply describing one situation in which a stay of discovery 

may be appropriate, rather than declaring a binding standard for all motions to stay discovery. 

192 F.R.D. at 286. The court in GTE Wireless states that a district court must only “. . . take a 

preliminary peek at the merits of the allegedly dispositive motion to see if on its face there 

appears to be an immediate and clear possibility that it will be granted.” Id. (emphasis in 

original) (quoting Feldman v. Flood, 176 F.R.D. 651, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1997). Honest Tea argues 

that the court should stay discovery while it considers the pending motion for summary judgment 

because “Salazar has conceded that she does not actually possess the claims asserted in the [First 

Amended Complaint],” id. at 18, the summary judgment motion can be decided without 

additional discovery, and staying discovery would conserve resources. Id. at 2, 18-19. 

The court need not resolve the parties’ dispute about the applicable standard under 

the first prong of the test, because under either the “clear and convincing” standard or the 

“immediate and clear possibility” standard, Honest Tea has not demonstrated that a stay of 

discovery is appropriate. After taking a “preliminary peek” at the merits of Honest Tea’s 

underlying summary judgment motion, the court finds Ms. Salazar’s deposition testimony does 

not appear to show she did not in fact rely on the alleged nutrient content claims. Because there 

is not an “immediate and clear possibility” that defendant’s motion will dispose of the entire case, 

defendant has not demonstrated good cause. See Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 489743, at *6 (“Discovery 

should proceed if either prong of the test is not met.”). The court finds that the possibility that 

summary judgment will be granted does not justify the harms produced by delaying discovery. 

See Simpson, 121 F.R.D. at 263. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders that Honest Tea’s Motion to Stay 

Discovery pending resolution of its Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 67) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October 27, 2015. 

Case 2:13-cv-02318-KJM-EFB Document 86 Filed 10/28/15 Page 4 of 4