Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00670/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00670-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Sandra Leah Helton
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SANDRA LEAH HELTON, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 06-0670-C

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, :

Commissioner of Social Security, 

:

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1383(c)(3), seeking

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying her claim for supplemental security income benefits. The parties have

consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings in this Court. (Doc. 23 (“In accordance

with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this

case consent to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all

proceedings in this case . . . and order the entry of a final judgment, and

conduct all post-judgment proceedings.”); see also Doc. 24 (order of

reference)) Upon consideration of the administrative record, plaintiff's

proposed report and recommendation, the Commissioner's proposed report and

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 1 of 16
1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall

be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Doc. 23 (“An appeal from a judgment

entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of Appeals for

this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of this district

court.”))

2

recommendation, and the parties' arguments at the July 12, 2007 hearing

before the Magistrate Judge, it is determined that the Commissioner's decision

denying benefits should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this decision.1

Plaintiff alleges disability due to bipolar disorder, a personality disorder

and lumbar degenerative disc disease. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

made the following relevant findings:

3. The claimant has an impairment or a combination of

impairments considered “severe” based on the requirements in

the Regulations 20 CFR § 416.920(b).

4. These medically determinable impairments do not meet

or medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, Regulation No. 4.

5. The undersigned finds the claimant’s allegations

regarding his (sic) limitations are not totally credible.

6. The undersigned has carefully considered all of the

medical opinions in the record regarding the severity of the

claimant’s impairments (20 CFR § 416.927).

7. The claimant is 35 years old, a “younger individual

between the ages of 18 and 44".

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 2 of 16
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[8.] The claimant has an 8th grade or “limited” education.

[9.] The claimant has the following residual functional

capacity: light work.

[10.] Based on vocational expert testimony, the claimant’s past

relevant work as a convenience store cashier did not require the

performance of work-related activities precluded by her residual

functional capacity (20 CFR § 416.965).

[11.] Based on vocational expert testimony, the claimant’s

medically determinable impairments do not prevent the claimant

from performing her past relevant work.

[12.] The claimant was not under a “disability” as defined in

the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of the

decision (20 CFR § 416.920(e)).

(Tr. 28-29) The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision (Tr. 4-6) and

thus, the hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security.

DISCUSSION

In all Social Security cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving

that she is unable to perform her previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d

1001 (11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden,

the examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective medical

facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence

of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education and work history. Id. at 1005.

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 3 of 16
2 This Court's review of the Commissioner's application of legal principles,

however, is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

4

Once the claimant meets this burden, it becomes the Commissioner's burden

to prove that the claimant is capable, given her age, education and work

history, of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which

exists in the national economy. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th

Cir. 1985).

The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that she can

perform her past relevant work as a convenience store cashier, is supported by

substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla

and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91

S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). "In determining whether substantial

evidence exists, we must view the record as a whole, taking into account

evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision."

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).2

Although the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability

to return to her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has

an obligation to develop a full and fair record. Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 4 of 16
3 As recognized in the ruling, use of this test is likely to be “fallacious and

insupportable” because “[w]hile ‘delivery jobs,’ ‘packaging jobs,’ etc., may have a common

characteristic, they often involve quite different functional demands and duties requiring varying

abilities and job knowledge.”

4 The Dictionary of Occupational Titles' descriptions can be relied upon to define

the job as it is usually performed in the national economy.

5

578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). Social Security Ruling 82-61

recognizes three possible tests for determining whether or not a claimant

retains the capacity to perform her past relevant work. They are as follows:

1. Whether the claimant retains the capacity

to perform a past relevant job based on a broad

generic, occupational classification of that job,

e.g., "delivery job," "packaging job," etc.3

 

 

 2. Whether the claimant retains the capacity

to perform the particular functional demands and

job duties peculiar to an individual job as he or

she actually performed it. 

3. Whether the claimant retains the capacity

to perform the functional demands and job duties

of the job as ordinarily required by employers

throughout the national economy.4

Under § 404.1520(e) of the Commissioner's regulations, a claimant will be

found to be "not disabled" when it is determined that he retains the residual

functional capacity to perform the actual functional demands and job duties of

a particular past relevant job or the functional demands and job duties of the

occupation as generally required by employers throughout the national

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 5 of 16
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economy. SSR 82-61.

In this case, the ALJ relied upon test three above to determine that the

claimant can perform her past relevant work as a convenience store cashier.

(See Tr. 27 (“Based upon the undersigned’s review of the medical evidence

and evaluation of the claimant’s symptoms, the Administrative Law Judge

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light

work activity. To determine if the claimant can perform her past relevant work,

the Administrative Law Judge obtained the testimony of Ms. Jody P. Skinner,

who testified as an impartial vocational expert. Ms. Skinner testified that the

claimant’s past relevant work was performed at the light level of exertion and

the semiskilled level of ability. The Administrative Law Judge asked the

vocational expert to consider that the claimant’s testimony was credible

together with the limitations set out in Exhibits 5-F and 6-F and testify if an

individual could perform any of the claimant’s past work. Ms. Skinner testified

that a hypothetical individual would be able to perform the claimant’s past

work as a convenience store cashier. She testified that Dr. Fletcher’s report[]

indicates she would not be able to stand for long periods of time but that could

be accommodated in a cashier position.”))

Section 404.1520(e) of the Commissioner's regulations requires a

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 6 of 16
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review and consideration of a plaintiff's residual functional capacity and the

physical and mental demands of the past work before a determination can be

made that the plaintiff can perform his past relevant work. Social Security

Ruling 82-62 provides that evaluation under § 404.1520(e) "requires careful

consideration of the interaction of the limiting effects of the person's

impairment(s) and the physical and mental demands of his . . . PRW to

determine whether the individual can still do that work." See also Lucas v.

Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1574 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) (to support a conclusion

that a claimant "is able to return to her past work, the ALJ must consider all

the duties of that work and evaluate her ability to perform them in spite of her

impairments").

The RFC to meet the physical and mental demands of jobs a

claimant has performed in the past (either the specific job a

claimant performed or the same kind of work as it is customarily

performed throughout the economy) is generally a sufficient

basis for a finding of "not disabled." 

 

...

The decision as to whether the claimant retains the functional

capacity to perform past work which has current relevance has

far-reaching implications and must be developed and explained

fully in the disability decision. Since this is an important and,

in some instances, a controlling issue, every effort must be made

to secure evidence that resolves the issue as clearly and

explicitly as circumstances permit. 

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 7 of 16
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Sufficient documentation will be obtained to support the

decision. Any case requiring consideration of PRW will contain

enough information on past work to permit a decision as to the

individual's ability to return to such past work (or to do other

work). Adequate documentation of past work includes factual

information about those work demands which have a bearing on

the medically established limitations. Detailed information

about strength, endurance, manipulative ability, mental demands

and other job requirements must be obtained as appropriate.

This information will be derived from a detailed description of

the work obtained from the claimant, employer, or other

informed source. Information concerning job titles, dates work

was performed, rate of compensation, tools and machines used,

knowledge required, the extent of supervision and independent

judgment required, and a description of tasks and

responsibilities will permit a judgment as to the skill level and

the current relevance of the individual's work experience.

SSR 82-62. In finding that a claimant has the capacity to perform a past

relevant job, the decision of the Commissioner must contain among the

findings, a finding of fact as to the claimant's residual functional capacity, a

finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past

job/occupation, and a finding of fact that the claimant's residual functional

capacity would permit a return to the past job or occupation. Id.

In this case, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting

evidence of a severe bipolar disorder causing marked limitations on her ability

to work and in failing to give determinative weight to the opinion of a certified

nurse practitioner. While the Court cannot find that the ALJ erred in failing to

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 8 of 16
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give determinative weight to the opinion of a certified nurse practitioner, see,

e.g., Hardin v. Barnhart, 468 F.Supp.2d 238, 249 & 250 (D. Mass. 2006)

(“The hearing officer properly afforded little weight to the opinions of

Hardin’s nurse practitioner, Karen Caddell. . . . A ‘treating source’ is defined

as a ‘physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source’ who treats

the claimant. . . . Similarly, ‘medical opinions’ are defined as ‘statements from

physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources.’ . . . As

such, Nurse Caddell is not a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable

medical source as defined by the Regulations. . . . Thus, Nurse Caddell was not

a treating source, and her opinion was not entitled to greater weight.”); Nichols

v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 260 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1065

& 1066 (D. Kan. 2003) (“Ms. Heller, standing alone as a nurse practitioner, is

not an acceptable medical source. The ALJ was therefore not required to apply

the treating source rule when weighing her opinions. Plaintiff asserts, however,

that the Medical Source Statement was also signed by Dr. Thompson, who is

a licensed physician. Plaintiff thus argues that the opinion contained in the

Medical Source Statement came from an ‘acceptable medical source,’ and the

ALJ was required to give it controlling weight. The Court does not agree. . .

. There is no evidence in the record indicating that Ms. Heller was working

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 9 of 16
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closely under the supervision of Dr. Thompson or that she had consulted with

Dr. Thompson during the course of Plaintiff’s treatment. Moreover, there is

nothing in the record indicating that Plaintiff was ever seen or treated by Dr.

Thompson. Finally, there is nothing in the Medical Source Statement

indicating that it was based on any evaluation conducted by Dr. Thompson as

required by 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(6) (1999). As noted above, that regulation

requires the report of an interdisciplinary team to contain more than just the

signature of the acceptable medical source-it requires the report to contain the

evaluation of the acceptable medical source. Here, the record show[s] only the

co-signing of the report by Dr. Thompson. The mere co-signing of the report

does not create an interdisciplinary team within the meaning of the regulation.

Consequently, the opinions contained in the Medical Source Statement can

only be attributed to Ms. Heller. As a nurse practitioner, she is not an

acceptable medical source, and the ALJ was not required to give her opinions

controlling weight. Instead, the ALJ had discretion to determine what weight

to give Ms. Heller’s opinions based on all the evidence before him.”), the

Court does find that it cannot affirm the decision denying benefits because

there is not substantial support in the record for the determination that Helton

can perform the mental demands of her past relevant work as a convenience

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 10 of 16
5 The Commissioner’s regulations specifically provide that the PRTF or functional

analysis contained therein must be completed before an ALJ makes the determination about

whether a mental impairment is severe or not severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(d)(1) & (2) (2007)

(“After we rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from your impairment(s), we will

determine the severity of your mental impairment(s). (1) If we rate the degree of your limitation

in the first three functional areas [activities of daily living; social functioning; and concentration,

persistence, or pace] as ‘none’ or ‘mild’ and ‘none’ in the fourth area [episodes of

decompensation], we will generally conclude that your impairment(s) is not severe, unless the

evidence otherwise indicates that there is more than a minimal limitation in your ability to do

basic work activities . . . . (2) If your mental impairment(s) is severe, we will then determine if it

meets or is equivalent in severity to a listed mental disorder.”). 

11

store cashier. In fact, the evidence explicitly establishes that plaintiff has

carried her burden of proving that she cannot perform her past relevant work

as a convenience store cashier.

Although the plaintiff in this case has some physical limitations as a

result of low back problems (see, e.g., Tr. 122-151 & 177-181), this is “at

bottom” a mental impairment case (see Tr. 153-176, 182-199 & 211-219). To

be sure, in recognition of plaintiff’s bipolar and personality disorders the ALJ

in this case followed the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Moore v.

Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005) and incorporated into his decision

the Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”) mode of analysis. See id.

at 1214.5

 In fact, with respect to the degree of functional limitation resulting

from plaintiff’s bipolar disorder, the ALJ’s functional analysis tracks that of

the non-examining, reviewing physician, Dr. Donald Hinton. (Compare Tr. 26-

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 11 of 16
6 Because the ALJ rejected the mental residual functional capacity assessment

completed by the nurse practitioner in this case (compare Tr. 28 with Tr. 214-215), he relied

solely upon Hinton’s PRTF to perform the analysis required by Moore, supra.

7 The hypothetical posed to the VE upon which the ALJ relies to establish that

plaintiff can perform her past work as a convenience store cashier is based “the facts found in

Exhibits 5F and 6F[,]” (Tr. 246; see also Tr. 247 (response by VE)) Exhibit 6F was Dr.

Raymond Fletcher’s March 10, 2005 physical examination of the claimant, same establishing

plaintiff’s ability to perform the requirements of light work with some limitations (Tr. 177-179),

and Exhibit 5F was Dr. Kimberly Whitchard’s March 3, 2005 mental evaluation of plaintiff in

which the psychologist diagnosed a bipolar disorder and a personality disorder (Tr. 175). As part

of her evaluation of the plaintiff, Whitchard did not complete a mental residual functional

capacity assessment. Not surprisingly, therefore, in response to the ALJ’s hypothetical, the VE

focused upon plaintiff’s physical ability to perform her past relevant work. (Tr. 247 (“Q And

why do you reach your conclusion that way? A 6F from Dr. Fletcher indicates a physical

demand work level of light, which is what she was performing before. She’ll need to not stand

for prolonged periods of time but that could be accommodated in a cashier position.”)) 

8 See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1242 n.11 (11th Cir. 2004)

(“Nonexertional limitations or restrictions affect an individual’s ability to meet the other

demands of jobs and include mental limitations, pain limitations, and all other physical

limitations that are not included in the seven strength demands.”). 

12

27 with Tr. 192)6 However, in questioning the vocational expert (“VE”) during

the administrative hearing on July 12, 2006, the ALJ neither makes mention

of Hinton’s PRTF7

 nor did he incorporate any mental limitations8 in the

hypothetical posed. The ALJ’s wholesale failure to incorporate any mental

limitations in the hypothetical posed to the VE and/or his failure to incorporate

Hinton’s PRTF and mental residual functional capacity analysis into the

hypothetical constitutes reversible error. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d

1561, 1562 (11th Cir. 1985) (“‘[U]nless there [is] vocational expert testimony

concerning the availability of jobs for a person with the claimant’s educational

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 12 of 16
13

level, work skills and experience and physical [and mental] limitations, the

decision of the ALJ, based significantly on the expert testimony, would be

unsupported by substantial evidence.’”); cf. Querido v. Barnhart, 344

F.Supp.2d 236, 243 (D. Mass. 2004) (“At Querido’s hearing, a vocational

expert, Albert Sadella [] was asked by the Administrative Law Judge to

consider a hypothetical claimant of Querido’s age, education, and work

experience, who could perform light exertional work with no concentrated

exposure to dust, smoke, gases, or airborne pulmonary irritants, and who was

limited by functional restrictions contained in Dr. Gonzalez’s report of

November 6, 2001. [] In his report, Dr. Gonzalez had observed ‘moderate’

limitations in Querido’s ability to relate to others, to carry out daily activities,

to understand, carry out, and remember instructions, to respond to customary

work pressures, and to perform complex and varied tasks, and ‘mild’

limitations in her ability to respond appropriately to supervision and coworkers and to perform simple and repetitive tasks. [] The Administrative Law

Judge asked the vocational expert whether this hypothetical claimant would be

able to perform any of the work performed by Querido in the past.”). 

It is clear to the Court that had the ALJ incorporated Hinton’s PRTF

analysis and mental residual functional capacity assessment into the

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 13 of 16
9 “Receives cash from customers or employees in payment for goods or services

and records amounts received[.]” Id. (emphasis supplied).

10 “Operates cash register to itemize and total customer’s purchases in grocery,

department, or other retail store[.]” Id. (emphasis suppplied). 

11 “Serves customer of fast food restaurant: Requests customer order and depresses

keys of multicounting machine to simultaneously record order and compute bill.” Id. (emphasis

supplied).

14

hypothetical posed to the VE, the VE, like a disability examiner in this case

(Tr. 95), would have responded that plaintiff is unable to perform the mental

requirements of her past work as a convenience store cashier given Hinton’s

finding that plaintiff’s contact with the general public should be infrequent (Tr.

198). Based not only upon the DOT descriptions of cashier jobs most similar

to that of a convenience store cashier, that is, DOT 211.462-010,9

 211.462-

014,10 and 311.472-010,11 but common sense as well, it is clear that work as a

convenience store cashier requires the ability to engage in frequent contact

with the general public (see Tr. 95 (RFC limitation that rules out job of cashier

as actually performed and as performed in the national economy is infrequent

contact with the general public)). Because nothing in the medical records

contradict this limitation found by Hinton and the ALJ did not reject same, the

Court determines that this limitation conclusively carries the plaintiff’s burden

of establishing that she cannot perform the mental demands of her past

relevant work as a convenience store cashier. Cf. Hackett v. Barnhart, 395

Case 1:06-cv-00670-C Document 25 Filed 07/27/07 Page 14 of 16
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F.3d 1168, 1171-1172 (10th Cir. 2005) (“With regard to her mental limitations,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff ‘retains the attention, concentration, persistence

and pace levels required for simple and routine work tasks.’ [] She can perform

work under general supervision, ‘but needs to work in a low stress

environment and avoid direct contact with the general public and have only

occasional interaction with co-workers.’ [] Plaintiff is moderately restricted in

‘following work rules and responding to supervision.’ [] At step four the ALJ

also determined that Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work as a

checker/cashier, wedding coordinator, adult health aide, occupational therapist,

or director of occupational therapy.”). On remand, therefore, the ALJ must

satisfy his burden of establishing that other jobs exist in the national economy

which plaintiff can perform given her physical and mental impairments and

limitations. 

CONCLUSION

The Court ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying plaintiff benefits be reversed and remanded pursuant to

sentence four of § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct.

2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) makes the plaintiff

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a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239

(1993), and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over this matter.

DONE and ORDERED this the 27th day of July, 2007.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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