Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01300/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01300-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clarence Joseph Hayes
Petitioner
Derrick Ollison
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARENCE JOSEPH HAYES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-1300 FCD EFB P

vs.

DERRICK OLLISON, Warden,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner without counsel seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent moves to dismiss upon the grounds that petitioner failed to exhaust

available state remedies and the abstention doctrine. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For

the reasons explained below, the court finds that petitioner has not exhausted available state

remedies with respect to the claims in his federal petition and, therefore, this action must be

dismissed.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections based on a March

30, 1999, conviction of violating sections 459, 288a(c), 211, 289(a), 261(a)(2) of the California

Penal Code. Petition at 2. The trial court enhanced petitioner’s sentence based on allegations

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that petitioner previously had been convicted of violent felonies. See Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 667.61(d)(4), (e)(6). Petitioner appealed the judgment, alleging that the trial court erred as

follows: (1) by finding that petitioner’s conviction of burglary in Nevada could be used to

enhance his sentence; (2) by permitting the prosecutor to amend the information to add a

previously undiscovered conviction of a violent felony after the jury was discharged; (3) by

imposing consecutive sentences for the burglary and sexual assault counts; (4) by imposing

restitution in an amount to be determined by the Office of Revenue Recovery; (5) by imposing a

statutory restitution requirement in an amount that petitioner cannot pay; (6) by admitting

evidence at trial of a prior rape petitioner committed; (7) by failing to give a limiting instruction

with respect to evidence of the prior rape; (8) by failing to instruct the jury that to consider the

prior rape, they must find by a preponderance of the evidence that it was committed; (9) by

failing to instruct the jurors that they must agree unanimously on the facts in order to find as true

petitioner’s prior burglary convictions; (10) by instructing the jury that a victim’s request that an

alleged rape perpetrator use a condom does not, by itself, constitute consent; (11) by creating an

improper mandatory presumption when it instructed the jury on burglary using CALJIC No.

14.59; (12) by reading the information to the jury at the beginning of trial. Lodged Doc. 1. On

July 1, 2002, the appellate court affirmed the convictions, stayed the sentence on the burglary

conviction and remanded to the trial court with directions to re-try the allegation that petitioner’s

Nevada burglary conviction constitutes a prior violent felony conviction that could be used to

enhance petitioner’s sentence. Lodged Doc. 1 at 33. 

On July 30, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 

Lodged Doc. 2. He sought review of the appellate court’s disposition of claim 2 (as listed

above) and its decision to permit retrial of the Nevada burglary enhancement. Lodged Doc. 2. 

He also claimed that his sentence was excessive under the Eighth Amendment and under the

California Constitution. Lodged Doc. 2. On September 19, 2002, the petition for review was

granted but consideration of the issues was deferred pending the outcome in a different case in

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which the court was to consider an issue related to petitioner’s case. Lodged Doc. 3. On April

5, 2004, after the California Supreme Court decided the other case, it dismissed the review

granted in petitioner’s case. Lodged Doc. 4.

On October 15, 2004, the trial court re-tried the sentencing issue as directed by the

appellate court and resentenced petitioner to 25 years to life on the second count of which

petitioner had been convicted, and a consecutive 77 years in prison on the remaining counts. 

Lodged Doc. 5, at 38-41. Petitioner immediately appealed. That appeal is still pending.

On June 13, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court. In

it, he alleges the following: (1) there was insufficient evidence to find that his 1998 rape

conviction was a prior violent felony that could be used to enhance his sentence; and (2) counsel

was ineffective by failing to object to using the 1998 rape conviction to enhance his sentence.

II.

THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT

A district court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless “the applicant

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,” or unless there is no State

corrective process or “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the

rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion

requirement by presenting the “substance of his federal habeas corpus claim” to the state courts. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971) (no exhaustion where the petitioner presented

operative facts but not legal theory to state courts); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995)(to exhaust a claim, a state court “must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are

asserting claims under the United States Constitution”). A claim is unexhausted if any state

remedy is available. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999) (petitioner must seek

discretionary review from state court of last resort); Roberts v. Arave, 874 F.2d 528, 529 (9th

Cir. 1988)(no exhaustion where state supreme court referred petitioner’s appeal of trial court’s

denial of post-conviction relief to lower appellate court and petitioner failed to appeal lower

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court’s disposition of that appeal to state supreme court). A federal court must dismiss without

prejudice a habeas action in which the petition contains only unexhausted claims. Picard, 404

U.S. at 278.

A. Analysis

For a California prisoner to exhaust, he must present his claims to the California Supreme

Court on appeal in a petition for review or in post-conviction in a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 223, 2139-40 (2002) (describing California’s habeas

corpus procedure); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (to exhaust, prisoner

must present claims on appeal to California Supreme Court in a petition for review). Petitioner

did not present the claims in his federal petition to the California Supreme Court in his petition

for review. He has not shown that he presented them to that court in a habeas petition, either. 

Therefore, the claims plainly are unexhausted and the petition must be dismissed without

prejudice. The court need not consider the abstention doctrine because petitioner’s failure to

exhaust is clear and dispositive. 

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that respondent’s August 10, 2006, motion

to dismiss be granted and that this action be dismissed without prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 17, 2007.

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