Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06126/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06126-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe Luis Saucedo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

Uniud States Court of Appea.15 Tenth Circuit 

NOV 13 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

JOE LUIS 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 91-6126 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

SAUCEDO, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No, CR-88-275-R) 

William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

F. Michael Ringer, Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma (Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and ANDERSON, District 

Judge.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant, Joe ~uis Saucedo, appeals his Sentencing 

Guidelines sentence, following his guilty plea to possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute. 21 u.s.c.s 841(a)(l). 

* The Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Senior United States 

District Judge, District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 1 
Defendant contends that the district court erred by (I) 

considering conduct other than that for which he was convicted in 

imposing a three-level upward adjustment for a managerial or 

supervisorial role in the offense, u.s.s.G. § 3B1.l(b); (II) 

imposing a two-level upward adjustment for possession of a firearm 

during the commission of the offense without any evidence that he 

had the requisite scienter, id.§ 2Dl.l(b)(l); and (III) including 

certain quantities of drugs in the base offense level calculation 

without any evidence that they were part of a common plan or 

scheme. Id.§ 2Dl.l(a)(3). The government contends that 

defendant waived these issues by failing to object, and, in any 

event, the district court properly applied the guidelines. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3742(a)(2). 

This case has an unusual procedural background, an 

understanding of which is necessary to our decision. On January 

5, 1989, defendant was indicted on twenty-four counts relating to 

narcotics trafficking, conspiracy and operating a criminal 

enterprise. On February 27, 1989, defendant pled guilty to count 

20 which charged that, on or about November 16, 1988, he and a 

codefendant possessed 780 grams of cocaine with intent to 

distribute. On April 10, 1989,. defendant filed objections to the 

presentence report1 alternatively with a motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea. On June 2, 1989, the district court allowed 

1 Defendant's objections to the presentence report included the 

errors assigned in this appeal. See IR. doc. 116 at 5-13. 

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defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and enter a plea of not 

guilty because his lawyer failed to advise him properly on the 

application of the sentencing guidelines to his offense. 

Jury trial commenced on June 14, 1989, and two days later, on 

June 16, 1989, the district court granted defendant leave to 

withdraw his not guilty plea and plead guilty to count 20. The 

record indicates that defendant waived the ten-day notice of the 

presentence report. IR. doc. 145. The earlier presentence 

report was revised, and neither defendant nor his counsel 

expressed any objections to the report. 2 On June 20, 1989, 

2 The transcript from the June 1989 sentencing hearing reveals 

the following colloquy between the district judge, defense counsel 

and defendant: 

Court: Counsel, have you had a chance to review the most 

recent presentence report? 

Defense counsel: Yes, we have, your honor, both the 

defendant and we [sic] have done it and there are no 

modifications or alterations which we would request at this 

time. 

Court: Mr. Joe Luis Saucedo, is there anything you want to 

say before I pass sentence? 

Defendant: Yes, sir. I'd like to say that I know I did 

wrong, I'm sorry. I just want to start a new life the right 

way. 

II R. at 4-5. See also III R. (presentence report). 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 3 
defendant was sentenced to 130 months, 3 and the remaining counts 

of the indictment were dismissed. 

On August 2, 1990, defendant filed a prose motion to vacate, 

set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2255, 

raising four separate grounds for relief. 4 Defendant asserted, 

inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel based on his 

counsel's erroneous estimate of a two-to-six-year sentence, and 

counsel's failure, despite defendant's request, to appeal the 

sentence. IR. doc. 202 at 6. Following an evidentiary hearing, 

the district court found that defense counsel failed to advise 

defendant of his right to appeal, and defendant was unaware of it 

until the time for filing a notice of appeal had passed. IR. 

doc. 231 at 2-3. On March 19, 1991, the district court 

simultaneously vacated defendant's sentence of June 20, 1989, and 

reimposed it exactly as previously entered, and informed the 

3 The sentence reflected a total offense level of 31, which 

included a base offense level of 28 based on an equivalent of 3.3 

kilograms of cocaine, u.s.s.G. § 2Dl.l(a)(3), a two-point upward 

adjustment for possession of a firearm, id.§ 2Dl.l(b)(l), a 

three-point upward adjustment for a managerial or supervisorial 

role in criminal activity involving five or more persons, id. 

§ 3Bl.l(b), and a two-point downward adjustment for acceptance of 

responsibility. Id.§ 3El.l. Defendant's criminal history 

category was I. Therefore, his guideline range was 108 to 135 

months. See III R. 1111 15-26. 

4 Defendant filed an earlier prose motion pursuant to 28 

u.s.c. § 2255, on February 9, 1990, alleging that his guilty plea 

was not knowing and voluntary, and the firearms and role in the 

offense adjustments were erroneous. IR. doc. 185 at 6-7. The 

district court denied defendant's sentencing guidelines claims as 

procedurally barred by the failure to take a direct appeal. IR. 

doc. 196 at 4-5. The district court rejected defendant's claim 

that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Id. at 5-6. 

Defendant did not appeal this decision. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 4 
defendant of his right to appeal. The record indicates that the 

district court acted solely by its order filed March 19, 1991. 

Defendant's appeal of his March 19, 1991, sentence is now before 

us. 

The district court's remedy in granting defendant's§ 2255 

motion was designed to put defendant back into the position he 

would have been had counsel perfected a timely notice of appeal. 

See United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 554, 557 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Therefore, we must look back to the June 1989 sentencing hearing 

to determine whether defendant adequately preserved the alleged 

sentencing errors for appeal. After specific inquiry by the 

district court, neither defense counsel nor defendant objected to 

the presentence report5 which was the basis for the district 

court's imposition of a 130 month sentence. 

"Normally, failure to alert the trial court to an error 

precludes review of that same issue by this court." United States 

v. Frederick, 897 F.2d 490, 494 (10th Cir.) (citing United States 

v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971, 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 

860 (1986)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 171 (1990). See also United 

States v. Rios-Ramirez, 929 F.2d 563, 566 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991) 

5 See supra note 2. While a prose pleading is entitled to 

liberal construction, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972), defendant's§ 2255 motion did not allege ineffective 

assistance of counsel due to defense counsel's failure to object 

to the presentence report. Cf. Beasley v. Mccotter, 798 F.2d 116, 

118 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (petitioner's claim that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to litigate alleged deprivation of 

constitutional rights did not preserve issue for appeal of 

counsel's ineffectiveness in adequately advising petitioner prior 

to guilty plea), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1039 (1987). 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 5 
(defendant who fails to draw district court's attention to 

u.s.s.G. § 6Al.3, which provides procedure for resolving 

sentencing factors in dispute, waives issue of noncompliance with 

§ 6Al.3 on appeal). However, "[p]lain errors or defects affecting 

substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought 

to the attention of the court." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 

Defendant's failure to object to the presentence report precludes 

us from considering the merits of defendant's claims unless such 

claims constitute plain error. 

"[T]he plain-error exception to the contemporaneous-objection 

rule is to be 'used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in 

which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.'" United 

States v. Young. 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. 

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)). In order to invoke the 

exception, the error must be "particularly egregious," id. 

(quoting Frady. 456 U.S. at 163), as well as "obvious and 

substantial." United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1254 

(10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See also United States v. 

Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 1991). "We will, 

however, apply the plain error rule less rigidly when reviewing a 

potential constitutional error." Jefferson, 925 F.2d at 1254 

(citations omitted). 

I 

Defendant first contends that the district erred by 

considering conduct other than that for which he was convicted in 

imposing a three-level upward adjustment for a managerial or 

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supervisorial role in the offense. The guidelines provide for a 

three-level enhancement if, "[b]ased on the defendant's role in 

the offense, .•. the defendant was a manager or supervisor 

and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or 

was otherwise extensive . " U.S. S .G. § 3Bl. 1 (b). In United 

States v. Pettit, 903 F.2d 1336 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 197 (1990), we held that "the plain language of the 

Guidelines§ 3Bl.1 requires that the sentencing court focus on the 

'defendant's role in the offense,' rather than other criminal 

conduct." Id. at 1341. See also United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 

1456, 1464 (10th Cir. 1990) ("the defendant's role is considered 

only in relation to the offense of conviction, we do not look at 

all to relevant conduct"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 990 (1991). 

Thus, under Pettit, the adjustment is proper only if "defendant 

maintained a (managerial or supervisorial] role in the transaction 

on which his conviction is based," United States v. Mourning, 914 

F.2d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 1990), and only if the criminal activity 

for which defendant was convicted involved five or more 

participants. Reid, 911 F.2d at 1464-65; United States v. Lanese, 

890 F.2d 1284, 1293 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 2207 

(1990). 

In United States v. Riles,. 928 F. 2d 339 ( 10th Cir. 1991), we 

interpreted the same version of the guidelines at issue in Pettit 

as requiring the sentencing court to consider all relevant conduct 

in determining whether a defendant is entitled to a downward 

adjustment for a mitigating role in the offense pursuant to 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 7 
u.s.s.G. § 3Bl.2. Id. at 343. Contrary to our holding in Pettit, 

we held that "in deciding whether the defendant played a minimal 

or minor role •.• in a drug offense, a sentencing court properly 

considers his role in all distributions which are part of the same 

pattern of conduct." Id. Riles and Pettit are fundamentally at 

odds and lack any principled distinction. 6 We see no reason why 

all relevant conduct should be considered for a mitigating role 

downward adjustment, but not for an aggravating role upward 

6 The Ninth Circuit has stated that its consideration of 

offense specific conduct in mitigating role adjustments while 

considering all relevant conduct in aggravating role adjustments 

"furthers the goals of sentence uniformity and proportionality." 

United States v. Lillard, 929 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991). The 

Lillard court reasoned that "[a] defendant who is part of a large 

drug conspiracy but convicted only of possession, should not be 

rewarded for his participation in the conspiracy by receiving a 

lighter sentence than one who was convicted of possession but had 

no connections to a larger scheme .•. [while] a defendant, who 

is a leader of a drug operation but is only convicted of 

possession, should receive a harsher sentence through§ 3Bl.1 than 

his codefendant, the errand boy." Id. Any tendency that the 

Ninth Circuit's distinction between aggravating and mitigating 

role adjustments has to further the goals of uniformity and 

proportionality does not necessarily mean that our opposite 

distinction thwarts these goals. Indeed, by permitting all 

relevant conduct to be considered in determining mitigating role 

adjustments, Riles, 928 F.2d at 343, we insure that the "errand 

boy" who is caught with the drugs and convicted of possession may 

still receive a mitigating role adjustment for his minor role in 

the larger conspiracy. We respectfully point this out only to 

amplify the hollow ring of such anecdotal policy justifications 

for admittedly erroneous distinctions. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 8 
adjustment. 7 

Notwithstanding Riles, Pettit was the law of this circuit 

with respect to the scope of conduct that may be considered in 

determining aggravating role adjustments pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1. Riles, which addressed mitigating role adjustments 

pursuant to§ 3B1.2, did not, nor could not, overrule Pettit. See 

United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 710 n.3 (10th Cir. 

1990) (three-judge panel cannot overrule circuit precedent). 

Indeed, Riles does not even cite Pettit, much less discuss its 

contrary analysis in determining role in the offense adjustments. 

Pettit is squarely on point as to the specific guideline and 

relevant facts at issue in the case before us. A district court, 

unable to distinguish Pettit, would be compelled to follow it. 

Id. at 709. 

Subsequent to Pettit, the Sentencing Commission amended the 

Introductory Commentary to Chapter 3,· Part B, stating, in relevant 

part, that "[t]he determination of a defendant's role in the 

offense is to be made on the basis of all conduct within the scope 

of section 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) ... and not solely on the 

basis of elements and acts in the count of the conviction." 

United States Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual, Ch.3, Pt.B, 

intro. comment., at 3.5 (Nov. l990). This amendment was effective 

November 1, 1990. Id. App.C, 11 345, at C.189. Under the 

7 In light of the November 1990 amendment, see infra, Riles 

appears to be consistent with the intent of the Sentencing 

Commission to consider all relevant conduct for both mitigating 

and aggravating role in the offense adjustments. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 9 
amendment, a sentencing court may consider the underlying scheme, 

as opposed to merely the offense of conviction, in determining 

role in the offense adjustments. See United States v. Caballero, 

936 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("section 3Bl [in light of 

amendment] allows the sentencing judge to look to the contours of 

the underlying scheme itself rather than mere elements of the 

offense charged") (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

The amendment clearly alters the analysis we adopted in Pettit. 8 

Generally, a court is required to apply the guidelines, 

including "any pertinent policy statement issued by the 

Commission," that are in effect on the date the defendant is 

sentenced. 18 u.s.c. §§ 3553(a)(5), (a)(4). See also United 

States v. Brunson, 907 F.2d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1990). Here, the 

sentence from which defendant appeals was imposed in March 1991. 

Although the March 1991 sentencing court merely reimposed the 

sentence exactly as it had been imposed in June 1989, our 

appellate jurisdiction results from the March 1991 sentencing. 

Therefore, the date defendant was sentenced, for purposes of 

determining the applicable version of the guidelines, is March 

1991. Because we have determined en bane that, in light of the 

November 1990 amendment to the commentary, relevant conduct may be 

considered in determining a§ ~Bl.1 adjustment, see supra note 8, 

8 We have reconsidered Pettit in light of the November 1990 

amendment and presented this issue to the en bane court. The 

court has voted unanimously that, in light of the amendment, a 

sentencing court may consider conduct other than that for which 

the defendant was convicted in determining aggravating role 

adjustments pursuant to u.s.s.G. § 3Bl.1. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 10 
under the law in effect at the time defendant was sentenced, there 

was no error. 

Notwithstanding the general rule that we apply the guidelines 

in effect at the date of sentencing, "the ex post facto clause 

prohibits retroactive application of a changed guideline if the 

change disadvantages the defendant." United States v. Underwood, 

938 F.2d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991). In Underwood, the defendant 

committed his offense prior to the November 1989 amendment to 

u.s.s.G. § 1B1.3 (relevant conduct), which eliminated a finding of 

scienter in determining, inter alia, specific offense 

characteristics. We applied the pre-amendment guidelines in 

determining whether he should receive a two-level enhancement 

pursuant to§ 2D1.l(b)(l) (possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a drug trafficking offense). Id. at 1089-90. We 

reasoned that application of the post-amendment guidelines would 

violate the ex post facto clause, despite the fact that this 

circuit had not previously held that a finding of scienter was 

required for a firearms enhancement. Id. 

The November 1990 amendment at issue here did not change the 

actual text of U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.1, but rather merely amended the 

commentary. Indeed, the actual text of§ 3Bl.1 is the same now as 

it was in November 1988 when defendant committed his offense. 

However, the commentary is "essential in correctly interpreting 

and uniformly applying the guidelines on a national basis." 

United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1561 (10th Cir.) 

(citations omitted), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 88 (1990). See also 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 11 
Brunson, 907 F.2d at 1120; United States v. Smith, 900 F.2d 1442, 

1447 (10th Cir. 1990). A stated purpose of the commentary is to 

"interpret the guideline or explain how it is to be applied." 

U.S. S. G. § lBl. 7. The commentary has "the force of policy 

statements" and provides guidance to courts in discerning the 

intent of the drafters similar to that provided by legislative 

history. Id., comment. Because we "must ... interpret the 

guidelines in a way that most likely reflects the intent of the 

Commission," United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 611 (9th 

Cir. 1991), we are bound by the commentary unless it cannot be 

·1 d "th th t f th "d 1· 9 reconci e wi e express erms o e gui e ine. Th ere f ore, 

because the amended commentary interprets§ 3Bl.1 contrary to 

Pettit, the November 1990 amendment represents a change in the 

10 law. 

We reach this conclusion despite the Sentencing Commission's 

expressed intent that the purpose of the amendment was to 

"clarif[y] the conduct that is relevant to the determination of 

Chapter Three, Part B ... II Guidelines Manual, App.C, ,r 345, 

9 Although Pettit interpreted the "plain language" of§ 3Bl.1 

as limiting the scope of conduct that may be considered to the 

offense of conviction while the amended commentary states that all 

relevant conduct may be considered, the plain language of§ 3Bl.1 

does not preclude the interpretation afforded by the amended 

commentary. See Riles, 928 F.2d at 343 (interpreting§ 3Bl.2 as 

permitting consideration of relevant conduct other than that for 

which the defendant was convicted). 

10 The Fifth Circuit's distinction between an amendment to the 

commentary and an amendment to a guideline, see United States v. 

Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016, 1021 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990), is inapplicable 

when the amended commentary compels an interpretation of the 

guideline contrary to the pre-amendment interpretation. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 12 
at C.189. Generally, when amendments merely clarify pre-existing 

guidelines, "their retrospective application presents no ex post 

facto issue." United States v. Restropo, 903 F.2d 648, 656 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Courts frequently consider 

clarifying amendments to discern the Sentencing Commission's 

intent as to application of the pre-amendment guideline. See, 

~, United States v. Urbanek, 930 F.2d 1512, 1514-15 (10th Cir. 

1991); United States v. Walker, 930 F.2d 789, 793 (10th Cir. 

1991); United States v. Irvin, 906 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 

1990); Restropo, 903 F.2d at 656; United States v. AguileraZapata, 901 F.2d 1209, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Smith, 887 F.2d 104, 107-08 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. 

Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 816 (1990); United States v. Guerro, 863 F.2d 245, 250 (2d 

Cir. 1988). However, when we are required to overrule precedent 

in this circuit in order to interpret the guideline consistent 

with the amended commentary, we cannot agree with the Sentencing 

Commission that the amendment merely clarified the pre-existing 

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guideline. 11 See Guerro, 863 F.2d at 250 (Sentencing Commission's 

statement that amendment was intended to clarify guideline "cannot 

be accepted as conclusive" because such a result "would enable the 

Commission to make substantive changes in the guise of 

clarification"). See also Early v. United States, No. 90-8126, 

11 In Caballero, the D.C. Circuit held that because the November 

1990 amendment was not intended to change the law, it could be 

applied in determining whether the defendant was entitled to a 

mitigating role adjustment even though defendant's sentence was 

imposed prior to the effective date of the amendment. 936 F.2d at 

1299 n.8. The court reached this conclusion despite its prior 

decision limiting pre-amendment aggravating role adjustments to 

offense specific conduct. United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 

921, 925-26 (D.C. Cir. 1989). However, Caballero is not 

inconsistent with our reasoning because the court was not required 

to overrule Williams, an aggravating role case, in order to 

interpret the mitigating role adjustment consistent with the 

amended commentary. Further, the amendment's interpretation of 

the mitigating role adjustment benefitted rather than 

disadvantaged the defendant, thereby removing any ex post facto 

concern. 

In Lillard, the Ninth Circuit held that all relevant conduct could 

be considered in determining an aggravating role adjustment when 

the offense was committed prior to the November 1990 amendment. 

929 F.2d at 503. The court had distinguished its previous holding 

that only offense specific conduct could be considered in 

determining mitigating role adjustments. See United States v. 

Zweber, 913 F.2d 705, 708 (9th Cir. 1990). Although the Zweber 

court cited aggravating role cases from other circuits and 

indicated that its reasoning extended to aggravating role 

adjustments, id. at 709, the Lillard court dismissed this as 

dicta. Lillard, 929 F.2d at 503. Accordingly, the court did not 

have to address the potential ex post facto issue. The present 

case is distinguishable from Lillard because we can not write off 

our holding in Pettit as dicta. 

The Fifth Circuit has held its ·preamendment interpretation of 

aggravating role adjustments, which limited the scope of conduct 

to "the transaction on which [the] conviction is based," Mourning, 

914 F.2d at 705, to be consistent with the amended commentary by 

effectively broadening its definition of "transaction" to 

encompass relevant conduct. See United States v. Mir, 919 F.2d 

940, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). In so doing, the court 

avoided the ex post facto issue. We decline to, perform such 

judicial sleight of hand and make constitutional issues disappear. 

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1991 WL 95180 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1991) (White, J., dissenting from 

denial of cert.) ("[a] majority of the Courts of Appeal have 

applied •.. an amendment [to the commentary to sentencing 

occuring prior to the amendment] when it clarified, but did not 

substantially change, the operation of the existing guideline") 

(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Circuit courts are 

empowered to determine whether sentences are imposed in accordance 

with the law and whether the guidelines have been properly 

applied. 18 u.s.c. § 3242(f). Our jurisdictional grant of 

authority necessarily implies that our interpretation of a 

guideline has the force of law until such time as the Sentencing 

Commission or Congress changes the actual text of the guideline. 

The Sentencing Commission's post hoc clarification of its intent 

does not invalidate our pre-amendment interpretation of the 

guideline. The November 1990 amendment is a substantive change to 

§ 3Bl.1 in this circuit, thereby impl-icating the ex post facto 

clause. 

The ex post facto clause prohibits Congress from enacting any 

law which, inter alia, "changes the punishment, and inflicts a 

greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 

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committed. 1112 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). 

Accord Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987). "[C]entral to 

the ex post facto prohibition is a concern for 'the lack of fair 

notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases 

punishment beyond what was when the crime was consummated.'" 

Miller, 482 U.S. at 430 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 

(1981)). In order for a law to be ex post facto: 

first, the law must be retrospective, that is it must apply 

to events occuring before its enactment; and second, it must 

disadvantage the offender affected by it •••• [N]o ex post 

facto violation occurs if a change does not alter substantial 

personal rights, but merely changes modes of procedure which 

do not affect matters of substance. 

Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

We recognize the retrospective application of u.s.s.G. 

§ 3Bl.1. Defendant's offense occurred in November 1988, two years 

12 We recognize that "[t]he ex post facto clause is a limitation 

upon the powers of the Legislature." Marks v. United States, 430 

U.S. 188, 191 (1977). Nonetheless, we have no trouble applying it 

to an act by the Sentencing Commission. Although the Sentencing 

Commission was established "as an independent commission in the 

judicial branch of the United States," 18 u.s.c. § 991(a), the 

Supreme Court has recognized that "the Commission ••• is an 

independent agency in every relevant sense." Mistretta v. United 

States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989). Further, "the Commission is 

fully accountable to Congress, which can revoke or amend any or 

all of the Guidelines as it sees fit either within the 180-day 

waiting period, or at any time." Id. at 393-94 (internal citation 

omitted). See also 28 u.s.c. § 994(p). Courts have uniformly 

recognized that the ex post facto clause prohibits a retroactive 

application of a sentencing gu~deline where it would disadvantage 

the defendant. See Underwood, 938 F.2d at 1090; United States v. 

McAllister, 927 F.2d 136, 138 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 

No. 90-8101, 1991 WL 95123 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1991); United States v. 

Morrow, 925 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lam 

Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. 

Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1041-42 (1st Cir. 1990); United States 

v. Swanger, 919 F.2d 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); United 

States v. Worthy, 915 F.2d 1514, 1515 n.7 (11th Cir. 1990); 

Suarez, 911 F.2d at 1021-22. 

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prior to the amendment. Moreover, the amendment clearly affects 

"matters of substance." Application of§ 3B1.l(b) consistent with 

the amended commentary leads to a three-level increase in 

defendant's offense level, thereby increasing the guideline range 

from 78 - 97 months to 108 - 135 months. See Miller, 482 U.S. at 

433-35 (amended state sentencing guideline increasing the 

presumptive sentence constituted substantive change); United 

States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[b]ecause 

amended§ 1B1.3 may increase [defendant's] punishment, the 

amendment is not simply a change in procedure which does not 

affect a matter of substance"). See also Devine v. New Mexico 

Dep't ·of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339, 343 n.6 (10th Cir. 1989) 

(recognizing "effect on-actual prison time as the decisive factor 

in evaluating the constitutionality of retroactively applied 

changes in • • • sentencing laws"). 

The change in the law must also disadvantage defendant in 

order to be ex post facto. Prior to the amendment, Pettit was the 

law in this circuit regarding the scope of conduct that a 

sentencing court may consider in determining an aggravating role 

adjustment. The November 1990 amendment clearly disadvantages 

defendant as compared to the pre-amendment interpretation of 

§ 3B1.1 recognized in Pettit .. In the past, our cases have gone 

only this far. Finding that the amendment disadvantages the 

defendant, we have held that the defendant is entitled to an 

application of the law at the time the offense was committed. See 

Underwood, 938 F.2d at 1090; United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 17 
1450, 1452 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, No. 91-5183, 1991 

WL 142754 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1991). In the present case, however, the 

fact that the amendment disadvantages defendant does not compel 

the conclusion that defendant is disadvantaged relative to the law 

in effect at the time he committed his offense. Pettit was not 

decided until May 1990, while defendant committed his offense 

eighteen months earlier in November 1988. 

However, we interpret§ 3B1.1, at the time of defendant's 

offense, consistent with Pettit. See United States v. Padilla, 

No. 89-2179, 1991 WL 209102, at *l (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 1991) 

(defendant committed offense in September 1988 and was sentenced 

prior to Pettit; court remanded for reconsideration of§ 3B1.1 

adjustment "in light of requirements of Pettit"). Pettit was 

based on the "plain language" of section§ 3B1.1, and this 

language remained constant. Further, the commentary to§ 3B1.1 

remained constant until November 1, 1990. Several other circuits 

interpreted§ 3B1.1, prior to the amendment, as limiting the scope 

of conduct that may be considered to the offense of conviction. 

See Mourning, 914 F.2d at 704-05; United States v. Tetzlaff, 896 

F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Williams, 891 

F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Lanese, 890 F.2d at 1293. 

Although the Sentencing Commis~ion has since clarified its 

intended meaning of§ 3B1.1 contrary to Pettit, we are unwilling 

to abandon our reasoning in Pettit in order to interpret§ 3B1.1, 

as of November 1988, consistent with the November 1990 amendment. 

As stated earlier, the amendment represents a substantive change 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 18 
in the law. Because the November 1990 amendment disadvantaged 

defendant relative to the law in effect at the date of his 

offense, we are required to apply the pre-amendment interpretation 

of§ 3Bl.1. Underwood, 938 F.2d at 1090; Smith, 930 F.2d at 1452 

n.3. 

The record indicates and the government concedes that the 

district court considered conduct of defendant other than that for 

which he was convicted. Appellee's Brief at 29. The only 

allegations in the presentence report supporting the§ 3Bl.l(b) 

adjustment are that "defendant was involved in importing drugs, 

recruiting drivers, selling drugs, and returning the proceeds to 

his father." III R. 1 17. To permit this broad formulation of 

defendant's conduct to support a§ 3Bl.l(b) adjustment contravenes 

our pre-amendment interpretation of this guideline because 

defendant was not convicted of importing, transporting or selling 

drugs, but rather he was convicted of possession with intent to 

sell. 

The district court's misapplication of§ 3B1.1 results in 

obvious and substantial error. Failure to consider this issue 

would result in a manifest injustice given the effect that the 

§ 3Bl.l(b) adjustment has on defendant's overall prison term. 

Plain error is present when th~ record indicates that the sentence 

was imposed based on erroneous interpretation of the law. See, 

~, Jefferson, 925 F.2d at 1259 (sentence imposed under 

erroneous belief that district court had no discretion to consider 

downward departure was plain error); United States v. Smith, 919 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 19 
F.2d 123, 125-26 (10th Cir. 1990) (fine exceeding applicable 

guideline range was plain error when record was silent as to 

whether the court intended upward departure). Moreover, "the 

imposition of an illegal sentence constitutes plain error." 

United States v. Wainwright, 938 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991) 

(citing United States v. Vance, 868 F.2d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 

1989)). An "illegal sentence" is one which, inter alia, "'the 

judgment of conviction did not authorize.'" Id. (quoting United 

States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954)). 

In the present case, the judgment of conviction did not 

authorize an aggravating role adjustment pursuant to§ 3Bl.l(b) 

because there is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant 

was a manager or supervisor in the criminal activity for which he 

was convicted or that five or more people were involved in that 

activity. Further, the application of the post-amendment 

interpretation of§ 3Bl.1 violates the ex post facto clause. See 

United States v. McCall, 915 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1990) ("ex 

post facto violation ..• might be plain error"); United States 

v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 420 (5th Cir. 1977) (ex post facto 

violation can be noticed under plain error doctrine), cert. 

denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). Given our relaxed standard in the 

plain error analysis when revi~wing a potential constitutional 

error, Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1254, we hold that the district court's 

consideration of defendant's role in conduct other than that for 

which he was convicted was plain error. 

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II 

Defendant next asserts that the district court erred by 

imposing a two-level upward adjustment for possession of a firearm 

during the commission of the offense without any evidence that he 

had the requisite scienter. The guidelines prescribe a two-level 

increase in the base offense level for drug trafficking offenses 

"[i]f a dangerous weapon ... was possessed during commission of 

the offense." u.s.s.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l). The commentary to§ 2D1.1 

states that "[t]he adjustment [for weapons possession] should be 

applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable 

that the weapon was connected with the offense." Id., comment. 

(n.3). 

Defendant contends that the§ 2D1.l(b)(l) adjustment is based 

on the erroneous finding that the house where the weapon was found 

was maintained by defendant. See III R. 1 17. In fact, the house 

was maintained by the codefendant. 13 • According to defendant, no 

record evidence indicates that he had any knowledge that the 

weapon was in the house or that the weapon was being used during 

the commission of a drug trafficking offense. 

The government does not dispute that defendant neither owned 

the gun nor maintained the residence where the gun was found. 

13 The record supports defendant's contention. Specifically, 

defendant's address is listed in the presentence report as "510 K 

S.W., Childress, Texas 79201," III R. 1, while the location where 

the weapon was discovered is listed as "6201 South Klien, 

[Oklahoma City]." Id. ,r 7. The indictment charges that the 6201 

South Klien address is the residence of the codefendant, 

defendant's brother, IR. doc. (Indictment Jan. 5, 1989) at 20 

(count 22). Further, the presentence report indicates that the 

codefendant admitted ownership of the weapon. III R. 11 8. 

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Rather, the government argues that "all acts or omissions that 

were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan 

as the offense of conviction," should be considered, see u.s.s.G. 

§ 1B1.3(a)(2), and that possession rather than ownership is the 

critical inquiry in determining the applicability of 

§ 2D1.l(b)(l). The government relies on United States v. Goddard, 

929 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1991), which affirmed an adjustment 

pursuant to§ 2D1.l(b)(l) in a drug conspiracy conviction based on 

a coconspirator's possession of a firearm. Goddard is 

distinguishable because there the defendant knew that his 

codefendant possessed a weapon during the course of the 

conspiracy, albeit not necessarily at the time of his arrest. Id. 

at 549 (defendant's sentence increased "because of his knowing and 

voluntary complicity with the possessor of the gun where he knew 

the gun was present and it was connected to the conspiracy"). 

Therefore, Goddard does not control. 

Under the pre-November 1989 guidelines, a finding of scienter 

is required to support an adjustment under§ 2D1.l(b)(l), while 

under the present guidelines "scienter is not required; simple 

possession alone will suffice for a firearms enhancement." 

Underwood, 938 F.2d at 1090 (citations omitted). Specifically, 

for cases arising under the pr~-November 1989 guidelines, "a 

defendant who personally possesses a firearm during a drug offense 

is subject to the§ 2D1.l(b)(l) adjustment only if he knowingly 

possessed the weapon or if he was criminally negligent in his 

unwitting possession." Id. See also United States v. Burke, 888 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 22 
F.2d 862, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Defendant's offense occurred 

in November 1988. The ex post facto clause requires us to apply 

the pre-November 1989 guidelines because the present guidelines 

eliminate the government's burden of proving scienter. Underwood, 

938 F.2d at 1090. Thus, the government was required to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that defendant knew or had reason to 

know that the weapon was used in the commission of the offense. 

Defendant's knowledge or lack thereof is a factual issue, 

which we would review under a clearly erroneous standard, had 

defendant properly objected at sentencing. See United States v. 

McFarlane, 933 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1991). However, defendant 

did not raise this issue at sentencing; therefore, he has waived 

it. A factual dispute concerning the applicability of a 

particular guideline, not brought to the attention of the district 

court, does not rise to the level of plain error. See United 

States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir.) ("[q]uestions of fact 

capable of resolution by the district court upon proper objection 

at sentencing can never constitute plain error"), cert. denied, 

111 S. Ct. 2032 (1991). 

A rule requiring a defendant to raise alleged factual 

inaccuracies in a presentence report before the district court in 

order to preserve the issue on.appeal is consistent with Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32(c)(3) governing disclosure of presentence reports. 

The district court is required "to afford the defendant and the 

defendant's counsel an opportunity to comment on the report" and 

may, in its discretion, allow the defendant "to introduce 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 23 
testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual 

inaccuracies •... " Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A). If factual 

inaccuracies in the presentence report are alleged, the district 

court is required to "make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or 

(ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the 

matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing." 

Id. 32(c)(3)(D). Thus, when a defendant properly raises the 

disputed factual issues in the district court, a record sufficient 

to permit adequate review is thereby developed. On the other 

hand, when a defendant fails to raise the issue below, we have no 

factual record by which to review the application of the 

guidelines. See Padilla, No. 89-2179, 1991 WL 209102, at *2 

(failure to challenge factual inaccuracy of presentence report at 

sentencing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A) waives right to 

challenge it on appeal). See also United States v. Soliman, 889 

F.2d 441, 445 (2d Cir. 1989). We hold that defendant's failure to 

raise this issue before the district court constitutes a waiver of 

the issue on appeal. Cf. United States v. Pilgrim Mkt. Corp., No. 

91-1591, 1991 WL 169289, at *7-8 (1st Cir. Sept. 5, 1991) 

(defendant's failure to object to§ 3B1.3 adjustment for abuse of 

trust waived issue on appeal); United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 

1390, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1990) (defendant's failure to object at 

sentencing to§ 3Cl.1 adjustment for obstruction of justice waived 

issue on appeal). 

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III 

Defendant's final contention is that the district court erred 

in including certain quantities of drugs in the base offense level 

calculation without any evidence that they were part of a common 

plan or scheme. A sentencing court may aggregate the quantity of 

drugs involved in the count to which the defendant pled guilty 

with the quantity of drugs involved in the counts dismissed as 

long as the transactions involved in the dismissed counts were 

part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as to 

the count to which defendant pled guilty. United States v. Ruth, 

No. 90-3167, 1991 WL 185468, at *l (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1991); 

Rutter, 897 F.2d at 1562. See also u.s.s.G. § 1B1.3, comment. 

(backg'd). Whether the transactions involved in the dismissed 

counts were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or 

plan as the count to which defendant pled guilty is a "factintensive inquiry," United States v. Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 

1129 (10th Cir. 1991), that must be raised at sentencing pursuant 

to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 in order to preserve the issue for appeal. 

Because defendant's dispute is entirely factual, he waived the 

issue by failing to object at sentencing, and it does not 

constitute plain error. See United States v. Macias, 930 F.2d 

567, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1991) (d~fendant's failure to object to 

narcotics used in determining base offense level waived issue on 

appeal). 

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Appellate Case: 91-6126 Document: 010110097322 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 25 
We REMAND to the district court with instructions to VACATE 

defendant's sentence and resentence him consistent with this 

opinion. 

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