Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00636/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00636-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Chertoff
Respondent
Department of Homeland Security
Respondent
Alberto Gonzales
Respondent
Mark Maynard
Petitioner
David O. Streiff
Respondent

Document Text:

1

Bill Bateman is no longer the Warden of the Perry County

Correctional Center. Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, David O. Streiff, as

Warden of that facility, is substituted for Bateman as a proper

Respondent in this action.

The Court also notes that Respondents have urged this Court to

dismiss Defendants Gonzales and Chertoff, but have failed to provide

any argument or authority as to why such action should be taken (Doc.

18, p. 1 n.1). To the extent that Respondents’ assertion can be

construed as a motion, it is DENIED. 

2

Petitioner has been in the actual custody of David O. Streiff,

Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center in Uniontown, Alabama. 

“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present

physical custody with the United States, he should name his warden as

respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement.” 

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MARK MAYNARD, : 

Petitioner, : 

v. : 

CIVIL ACTION 06-0636-WS-M 

ALBERTO GONZALES, : 

MICHAEL CHERTOFF,

WARDEN DAVID O. STREIFF,1 : 

Respondents. : 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Mark Maynard, a

citizen and native of Guyana, who has been detained by the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (Doc. 1).2 This action has been

referred for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c) and is now ready for

consideration. The record is adequate to determine Petitioner's

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claims; no evidentiary hearing is required. It is recommended

that the instant petition be dismissed.

In his petition, Petitioner asserts that he entered this

country on December 17, 1979 as a legal resident (Doc. 1). 

Maynard stated that he was taken into custody by agents of the

U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter

ICE), on May 18, 2006, pursuant to a finding by an Immigration

Judge that he should be removed from this country and repatriated

to Guyana (Doc. 1, p. 4). Petitioner maintains that he has been

detained for too long and that such detention is improper (id. at

pp. 5-6). Maynard seeks release from custody (id. at p. 6). 

Petitioner filed this action on October 6, 2006 (Doc. 1).

Respondents subsequently filed a Response, stating that

Petitioner is being detained because of his own actions (Doc.

11). More specifically, Respondents assert that, following the

deportation order, Maynard filed a habeas petition which is now

pending before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (id.

at pp. 4-5); additionally, Petitioner filed a motion to stay

which was granted (id. at p. 5). Respondents argue that

Petitioner’s continued confinement is proper in light of his

motion to stay and that this action should be dismissed (id. at

pp. 7-14). 

The evidence of record demonstrates that Petitioner has

admitted that he was convicted of robbery first and second

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Though Petitioner states that he was convicted of burglary third

degree, Respondents argue—and evidence seems to support the

argument—that Petitioner was actually convicted of burglary first

degree (Doc. 11, p. 2 and Doc. A, p. 9). 

4

The Court notes that 8 U.S.C. § 1231, entitled “Detention and

removal of aliens ordered removed,” states, in pertinent part, as

follows: 

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered removed

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section,

when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney

General shall remove the alien from the United

States within a period of 90 days (in this

section referred to as the "removal period").

(B) Beginning of period

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degree, burglary in the third degree,3 and displaying a firearm

and was sentenced to seven-to-fourteen years imprisonment in a

New York State prison (Doc. 1, p. 4). Following an evidentiary

hearing, a U.S. Immigration Judge found that Petitioner was not a

U.S. Citizen and should be deported to Guyana (see Doc. 11,

Exhibit A, p. 7). Subsequently, Maynard filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Southern District of New York,

challenging his removal; that court determined that it did not

have jurisdiction and transferred the action to the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit (Doc. 11, Exhibits D, E). On June

5, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay with the Appellate

Court which was granted (Doc. 11, Exhibit G, p. 4).

The United States Supreme Court, in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001), held that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers

jurisdiction on federal courts to entertain actions such as this. 

In interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231,4 the Zadvydas Court held that

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The removal period begins on the latest of the

following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes

administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially

reviewed and if a court orders a stay

of the removal of the alien, the date

of the court's final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined

(except under an immigration process),

the date the alien is released from

detention or confinement.

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in

detention during such extended period if the

alien fails or refuses to make timely application

in good faith for travel or other documents

necessary to the alien's departure or conspires

or acts to prevent the alien's removal subject to

an order of removal.

8 U.S.C.A. § 1231. 

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the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a

period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal

from the United States. It does not permit indefinite

detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. The Court went on to

hold that “six months [was] a presumptively reasonable period of

time to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation” pursuant

to § 1231. See Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1051 (11th

Cir. 2002). The Zadvydas Court further stated, however, that “an

alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 

In Akinwale, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that

the six-month-period “must have expired at the time [the

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Petitioner’s] petition was filed in order to state a claim under

Zadvydas.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. The Akinwale Court also

noted that the six-month-period could be interrupted by a

petitioner’s motion for a stay of deportation or removal; this

interruption would necessarily include whatever time was needed

for the court, to which such motion had been made, to rule. 

Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 n.4. 

The evidence shows that Maynard has delayed the removal

process by filing a motion to stay and that his actions have led

to his continued detention. As such, Petitioner cannot prove

that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. The

Court finds that Maynard’s continued detention is not improper

under 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1)(C).

Therefore, it is recommended that this action be dismissed

and that judgment be entered in favor of Respondents Alberto

Gonzales, Michael Chertoff, and David O. Streiff and against

Petitioner Mark Maynard.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

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(5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set

out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which

provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original

brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred

to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 2nd day of May, 2007.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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