Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-01071/USCOURTS-caDC-04-01071-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Librarian of Congress
Respondent
Program Suppliers
Intervenor
Public Broadcasting Service
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 8, 2005 Decided May 31, 2005

No. 04-1070

PROGRAM SUPPLIERS,

APPELLANT

v.

LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS,

APPELLEE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

04-1071

Appeals of an Order of the

Librarian of Congress

Gregory O. Olaniran argued the cause for appellant

Program Suppliers. With him on the briefs was Michael E.

Tucci.

Timothy C. Hester argued the cause for appellant Public

Broadcasting Service. With him on the briefs were Ronald G.

Dove, Jr., and Paul Greco.

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 1 of 15
2

Mark S. Davies, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Peter

D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and William G. Kanter,

Deputy Director. Anne M. Murphy, Attorney, entered an

appearance.

Robert Alan Garrett argued the cause for intervenors Joint

Sports Claimants, et al. With him on the brief were John I.

Stewart, Jr., Michael L. Lazarus, L. Kendall Satterfield, and

Victor J. Cosentino. James L. Cooper and Philip R. Hochberg

entered appearances.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Two parties—Program Suppliers

and Public Broadcasting Service—appeal the Librarian of

Congress’s order distributing 1998 and 1999 copyright royalty

payments among classes of claimants in accordance with the

recommendation of a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel.

Because the Librarian’s order survives our exceptionally

deferential standard of review, we affirm.

I.

Cable system operators (CSOs) make most of their money

by convincing subscribers to buy their cable services, which

typically consist of many channels. CSOs get their channels in

two ways. First, they contract to carry cable networks, such as

ESPN or CNN, that sell their programming only to CSOs.

Second, they retransmit signals broadcast by over-the-air

stations, such as independent television stations, public

broadcasting stations, or affiliates of broadcast networks like

ABC or CBS.

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 2 of 15
3

Under section 111 of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976,

Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2550, CSOs, assuming they fulfill

certain requirements irrelevant to the issues before us, commit

no copyright violations when they retransmit broadcast signals

to their subscribers. 17 U.S.C. § 111. In return for these

retransmission privileges, CSOs pay royalty fees into one or

more of three related funds maintained by the Register of

Copyrights. These funds compensate copyright owners for the

distant retransmission of non-network programming, i.e.,

retransmission that reaches viewers beyond the range of the

signal broadcast. See Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. Copyright

Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

(explaining that Congress focused on distant retransmission

because “the local retransmission by cable television of a local

broadcast merely duplicates programming that is already

available in an area” and on non-network programming because

network programming “theoretically is available across the

country [and thus] is not adversely affected even though it is

also available on cable”). The Librarian of Congress distributes

each year’s funds to copyright owners. See 17 U.S.C. §

111(d)(2)-(3) (2003); but see Copyright Royalty and

Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat.

2341 (2004) (altering the statutory framework for future

proceedings).

Ideally, copyright owners agree on the proportional

distribution of funds. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4). If they fail to

reach agreement, then the statute provides a process for sharing

the pie—a process that typically takes place in two stages. In

Phase I, royalties are distributed among classes of claimants: a

percentage goes to Program Suppliers, the copyright owners of

movies and syndicated shows; a percentage goes to the National

Association of Broadcasters (NAB), which represents copyright

owners of news programs; and so forth. In Phase II, royalties

are distributed within each class: Program Suppliers’ share, for

example, gets split among Paramount Pictures, Twentieth

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 3 of 15
4

Century Fox Film Corporation, and other individual claimants.

For both phases, the adjudicative process is the same. In the

version of the statute applicable to this case, the process begins

with the Librarian appointing an ad hoc Copyright Arbitration

Royalty Panel. 17 U.S.C. § 802(a)-(b) (2003). Consisting of

three arbitrators, this “CARP” hears evidence and submits a

report to the Librarian recommending a particular distribution.

Id. § 802(c)-(f). The CARP “shall act on the basis” of the record

and precedent, including prior decisions by the Librarian, other

CARPs, and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (a body that

adjudicated royalty disputes under an earlier version of the

statute). Id. § 802(c).

Once the CARP finishes its report, the Register advises the

Librarian whether to adopt it, and the Librarian “shall adopt” the

report unless he “finds that the determination is arbitrary or

contrary to the applicable [statutory] provisions.” Id. § 802(f).

If the Librarian rejects the report, he examines the record and

allocates the funds himself. Id. The Librarian’s decision “may

be appealed [to this court] by any aggrieved party who would be

bound by the determination.” Id. § 802(g). (Although the

parties in this case style their papers as petitions for review, the

statute’s use of the word “appeal” controls, so we treat the

“petitions” as appeals.)

This case involves the Phase I distribution of roughly $216

million in royalties for 1998 and 1999. For the first time since

the 1990-92 royalty distribution, the copyright owners failed to

agree on the Phase I distribution. The Librarian accordingly

appointed a CARP to split the royalties among the following

groups: Program Suppliers, Joint Sports Claimants (JSC),

Public Television Claimants (PTV), NAB, Music Claimants,

Canadian Claimants, Devotional Claimants, and NPR. The last

two parties settled with the others, leaving the CARP with six

claims to reconcile. The remaining parties submitted reams of

evidence, including updated versions of two reports, the Nielsen

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 4 of 15
5

study and the Bortz survey, that the last Phase I CARP (the

“1990-92 CARP”) and that CARP’s predecessor, the Copyright

Royalty Tribunal, had used in making awards. 

Presented to the CARP by Program Suppliers, the Nielsen

study measures what cable subscribers watch. It does this by

tracking a random set of cable-subscribing households and

recording the viewing choices of individual household members.

Aggregating this information, the study’s authors estimate how

total viewing distributes across different types of programming.

The authors found that viewers watching cable retransmissions

of distant signals in 1998 spent 59.1% of their time watching

movies/syndicated shows (Program Suppliers’ programming),

16.5% watching public television (PTV programming), 14.4%

watching news (NAB programming), 9.4% watching sports (JSC

programming), and .6% watching other programming. The

1999 Nielsen numbers showed a similar distribution.

The Bortz survey, supplied by JSC, measures what CSOs

perceive as the relative market value of different types of

programming. Researchers interview a sample of CSOs and ask

how, if they had to negotiate for the right to retransmit broadcast

signals distantly, they would allocate a fixed budget among

different types of programming. As compared to the Nielsen

study, Bortz gave a far higher value to sports and a far lower

value to movies/syndicated shows and public television.

Specifically, CSOs surveyed in 1998 said they would allocate

39.7% to movies and syndicated shows, 2.9% to public

television, 14.8% to news programs, 37% to sports, and the rest

to devotional and Canadian signals. The 1999 Bortz survey

produced similar results.

Critical to one of the two issues we face here, Bortz’s

methodology had two anti-PTV biases. First, the researchers

excluded from the otherwise random sample all CSOs that carry

only public television stations, thus leaving out those CSOs that

might be expected to assign the highest relative value to PTV.

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 5 of 15
6

Second, when interviewing CSOs that distantly retransmit only

commercial signals, the researchers did not list public television

as a type of programming. Accordingly, none of these CSOs

assigned any value to public television, though they might have

done so if asked. Although this second bias had occurred in

earlier Bortz surveys, the first affected no Bortz survey prior to

1998.

In addition to the Nielsen and Bortz studies, the parties

submitted other evidence, including evidence identifying

relevant changes since 1992, the year of the last CARP award.

For purposes of this appeal, three changes merit mention. 

First, WTBS, a superstation as defined in 17 U.S.C. §

119(d)(9), which generated roughly 45% of all section 111

royalties in 1992, became a cable network in 1998. With the

elimination of WTBS and another commercial superstation from

the broadcast station pool, the relative Nielsen viewing shares

for Program Suppliers (whose programming was featured

heavily on WTBS) fell significantly, and the relative viewing

shares for PTV rose to roughly four times their 1992 level. 

Second, cable networks developed more shows that

resembled PTV programming, especially PTV’s signature

children’s programs. This competition from “look-alike” cable

networks may have affected PTV’s value compared to

commercial broadcast stations, which faced less content

competition from cable networks.

Third, in 1992 Congress passed the Cable Television

Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Pub. L. 102-385,

106 Stat. 1460, which, among other things, required CSOs to

carry a certain number of local broadcast signals from both

public television and commercial stations. See Turner

Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630-32 (1994)

(describing the Act’s relevant provisions). These so-called

“must-carry rules” caused CSOs to significantly increase

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 6 of 15
7

carriage of partially distant PTV signals (i.e., PTV signals that

CSOs carry to both subscribers within the signals’ original

broadcast range and subscribers outside that range). At the same

time, between 1992 and 1998, CSO carriage of distant PTV

signals (i.e., PTV signals carried only to subscribers outside the

signals’ original range) declined. 

With this and much more evidence in hand, the CARP

recommended a distribution for the 1998 and 1999 royalties in

the three funds at issue. For the largest of these funds—the only

one we need discuss for purposes of this case—the CARP

recommended the following distribution of 1998 royalties:

37.8% to Program Suppliers; 35.8% to JSC; 14% to NAB; 5.5%

to PTV; 4% to Music Claimants; and 1.8% to Canadian

Claimants. The CARP decided on a similar distribution for the

1999 royalties.

Following the earlier CARP’s approach, the 1998-99 CARP

based this distribution on how it thought the market would value

the different programming types relative to each other in the

absence of a compulsory licensing system. This CARP differed

from the 1990-92 CARP, however, in its assessment of relative

market value. The 1990-92 CARP recognized that the Bortz

survey “focused more directly than any other evidence . . . [on]

relative market value” but found certain aspects of the survey

problematic. Most notably, the 1990-92 CARP believed that

because Bortz only looked at demand for types of programming

among CSOs, Bortz did not fully represent the relative market

value of these types since that value would turn on both the

supply of and the demand for programming. Based on this and

other concerns, the 1990-92 CARP also relied on Nielsen.

Departing from that approach, the 1998-99 CARP relied almost

exclusively on Bortz, giving two reasons for its new approach.

First, it revisited the 1990-92 CARP’s concerns about Bortz and

found them unwarranted, particularly given new evidence

introduced by the parties. Addressing the 1990-92 CARP’s

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 7 of 15
8

concern that Bortz measured only demand, for example, the

CARP relied on evidence showing that “the supply of

programming remains the same, irrespective of the price.”

Accordingly, to determine relative market value the CARP only

needed to look at the demand side of the market represented by

Bortz. Second, the CARP explained that its apparent departure

from precedent continued an adjudicatory trend of relying less

on Nielsen and more on Bortz. In allocating 1983 royalties, the

Copyright Royalty Tribunal concluded that “the Nielsen Study

has features to it that . . . have led us to give it far greater weight

than any other piece of evidence.” 51 Fed. Reg. 12,792, 12,808

(Apr. 15, 1986). By comparison, in distributing 1989 royalties,

the Copyright Royalty Tribunal recognized that “both surveys

[are] essentially valid and relevant,” 57 Fed. Reg. 15,286,

15,299 (Apr. 27, 1992), and the 1990-92 CARP moved even

further from Nielsen, finding that Bortz “is . . . focused more

directly than any other evidence” on “relative market value.”

According to the 1998-99 CARP, its decision to ditch the

Nielsen study represented a logical extension of this pattern of

increased dependence on Bortz.

The CARP thus allocated awards based on Bortz except

where it found specific problems with Bortz’s methodology.

Most notably, these problems occurred with regard to PTV’s

award, due to Bortz’s two anti-PTV biases. Although the CARP

found itself “unable to quantify the adjustments that are needed

to remove the anti-PTV biases from Bortz,” it was “comfortable

establishing the PTV Bortz share . . . for both 1998 and 1999 as

the ‘floor’” for PTV’s award.

Because the CARP had no satisfactory direct measure of

PTV’s 1998/1999 relative value, it determined PTV’s award by

assessing whether circumstances warranted a change in the 5.5%

award PTV had received in 1992. Noting that “Nielsen studies

can serve as a tool for assessing changed circumstances

whenever the Bortz study can not be used,” the CARP observed

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 8 of 15
9

that since 1992 PTV’s relative Nielsen ratings had risen

dramatically—in fact, almost quadrupled. The CARP stated that

this change, which it thought stemmed from WTBS’s

conversion from a broadcast station to a cable network, “by

itself, might militate in favor of raising PTV’s award.” Based

on several other factors, however, the CARP found that this

increase in viewing shares did not mean that PTV’s relative

market value had also increased. First, PTV’s 1998-99 Bortz

share had remained virtually identical to its 1992 Bortz share,

suggesting a “rational inference” that CSOs “perceived no value

enhancement in increased PTV viewing share.” Second, PTV’s

increased competition from look-alike cable networks likely

diminished the value of PTV signals relative to other broadcast

stations, which faced less competition from cable networks.

Third, the growth in PTV’s relative Nielsen viewing shares must

have resulted from increased carriage of partially distant PTV

signals—an increase that in turn stemmed from the new mustcarry rules. According to the CARP, this change demonstrated

no increase in relative market value, particularly since carriage

of distant PTV signals, more valuable to CSOs than partially

distant signals, had decreased since 1992.

In sum, because the CARP found “no persuasive evidence

that PTV’s relative value has significantly either increased or

decreased since 1990-92,” it awarded PTV exactly the same

percentage PTV received in 1992, i.e., 5.5%. This was the only

percentage the CARP left constant. Compared to the 1991-92

distribution, it gave a much lower relative award for 1998 to

Program Suppliers (37.8% as opposed to 55%) and higher

relative awards to JSC (35.8% as opposed to 29.5%) and NAB

(14% as opposed to 7.5%).

When the CARP’s determination went to the Librarian, both

Program Suppliers and Public Broadcasting Service

(PBS)—which represents virtually all PTV

claimants—challenged the proposed distribution. Program

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 9 of 15
10

Suppliers objected that the CARP had relied exclusively on

Bortz and not at all on Nielsen. For its part, PBS argued that the

CARP should have found that changed circumstances justified

an increased PTV award. Finding neither argument convincing,

the Librarian followed the Register’s recommendation and

adopted the CARP’s proposed distribution. 69 Fed. Reg. 3606

(Jan. 26, 2004). Program Suppliers and PBS now appeal.

II.

Under the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553,

§ 810, 90 Stat. at 2598, this court reviewed decisions of the

Copyright Royalty Tribunal under standard Administrative

Procedure Act principles. Intending this court to conduct an

even more deferential review, Congress passed the Copyright

Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107

Stat. 2304, giving us “jurisdiction to modify or vacate a decision

of the Librarian only if [we] find[], on the basis of the record

before the Librarian, that the Librarian acted in an arbitrary

manner.” 17 U.S.C. § 802(g) (2003). As we explained in

National Association of Broadcasters v.Librarian of Congress,

146 F.3d 907, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1998), this new standard of review

“is significantly more circumscribed” than traditional APA

review. “[W]e will set aside a royalty award,” we held in that

case, “only if we determine that the evidence before the

Librarian compels a substantially different award.” Id. Under

this “exceptionally deferential” standard, we “will uphold a

royalty award if the Librarian has offered a facially plausible

explanation for it in terms of the record evidence.” Id. When

reviewing the Librarian’s statutory interpretation, we employ the

usual Chevron standard. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v.

Librarian of Congress, 176 F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Program Suppliers’ Appeal

Program Suppliers are unhappy because the Librarian, in

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 10 of 15
11

allocating most awards, accepted the CARP’s decision to rely

solely on the Bortz survey and not at all on the Nielsen study.

According to Program Suppliers, this violated the statutory

scheme, departed inexplicably from precedent, and at the very

least occurred without sufficient notice. We find these

arguments meritless. 

Program Suppliers’ statutory argument fails for a simple

reason: the statute nowhere requires the CARP to rely on the

Nielsen study or any other direct evidence of viewing. Indeed,

Congress quite consciously provided “very little substantive

guidance” to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, Christian

Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Copyright RoyaltyTribunal, 720

F.2d 1295, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and to the CARPs that

succeeded it, Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 146 F.3d at 927. As

the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary explained,

Congress did “not include specific provisions to guide the

Copyright Royalty [Tribunal] in determining the appropriate

division among competing copyright owners of the royalty fees

collected from cable systems.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 97

(1976); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 146 F.3d at 927

(observing that “our past decisions make clear that the Congress

delegated to the Tribunal (and now to the Librarian, the Register

and the Panel) responsibility for developing the criteria by

which claims are to be assessed”). Because Congress identified

no criteria for allocating awards, we must give the Librarian’s

approach “controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious,

or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see also

Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 146 F.3d at 924. We detect nothing

either arbitrary or capricious about using relative market value

as the key criterion for allocating awards. Indeed, it makes

perfect sense to compensate copyright owners by awarding them

what they would have gotten relative to other owners absent a

compulsory licensing scheme. Nor did the CARP act

unreasonably in declining to rely on Nielsen for direct evidence

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 11 of 15
12

of viewing, as Bortz adequately measured the key criterion of

relative market value. Moreover, as the CARP put it, Bortz

“subsumes inter alia all viewing data that a CSO might consider

when assessing relative value of programming groups.” In

short, the Librarian’s approach falls well within his broad

authority.

Turning to Program Suppliers’ second argument, we have

no doubt that the CARP departed from precedent. Indeed, the

Librarian never claims otherwise, and for good reason: the

1990-92 CARP relied on both Bortz and Nielsen, as had the

Copyright Royalty Tribunal in earlier decisions. And as

Program Suppliers point out, the Librarian mentioned in a 2001

order—albeit an order related to a Phase II proceeding where

Bortz could not be used—“that actual measured viewing of a

broadcast program is significant to determining the marketplace

value of that program.” 66 Fed. Reg. 66,433, 66,447 (Dec. 26,

2001). But as the Librarian explained in this case, and as

counsel for Program Suppliers acknowledged at oral argument,

the CARP “may deviate from what the [Copyright Royalty

Tribunal] or prior CARPs have done provided that it provides a

reasoned explanation.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 3615. Here, as the

Librarian recognized, the CARP not only “continued a trend

from prior decisions that placed less and less reliance on the

weight to be accorded the Nielsen study,” but also gave a

detailed, reasoned explanation for why it was doing so. See id.

The CARP found that record evidence—such as testimony that

the supply of programming types was unaffected by

price—undercut the basis for the 1990-92 CARP’s decision not

to rely solely on the Bortz survey. Having given satisfactory

reasons for rethinking the 1990-92 CARP’s concerns about

Bortz, the CARP was free to rely exclusively on that survey.

Finally, as to Program Suppliers’ argument that the CARP

unlawfully failed to give notice of its intent to abandon Nielsen,

the Librarian points out that prior Phase I decisions by the 1990-

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 12 of 15
13

92 CARP and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal signaled

dwindling reliance on Nielsen and increased reliance on Bortz.

Even assuming lack of notice, however, we see nothing wrong

with the CARP’s action. While due process may require that

parties receive notice and an opportunity to introduce relevant

evidence when an agency changes its legal standard, Hatch v.

FERC, 654 F.2d 825, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the CARP made no

such change. Like the 1990-92 CARP, it relied on relative

market value. Its approach differed only in how it credited

different types of evidence of relative market value. Program

Suppliers cite no case, nor are we aware of one, holding that due

process requires agencies to give advance notice of what

evidence they intend to credit.

Program Suppliers’ remaining arguments require little

attention. They complain that the CARP lacked substantial

evidence to reduce their award from the 1990-92 level. Even

were we to apply a substantial-evidence standard of review, but

see Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 146 F.3d at 918 (suggesting

that the standard is even more deferential), the CARP had

sufficient evidence to justify weighing Bortz and Nielsen

differently than did the 1990-92 CARP. Program Suppliers’

assertion that the CARP failed to reckon explicitly with a

tangential piece of evidence likewise fails. Even making the

doubtful assumption that the omission was error, it was

harmless, as the evidence was “never tendered for anything

more than corroborative evidence of evidence upon which the

Librarian chose not to place great reliance,” Beethoven.com LLC

v. Librarian of Congress, 394 F.3d 939, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

PBS’s Appeal

PBS’s challenge presents a closer question. According to

PBS, the CARP erred in concluding that no changed

circumstances since 1992 affected PTV’s relative market value.

PBS perceives two specific problems: that the CARP chose an

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 13 of 15
14

inappropriate methodology and that its application of this

methodology was flawed. 

Like the Librarian, we have no serious problem with the

CARP’s choice of methodology. Though the CARP could have

explained its reasoning better, its basic approach makes sense.

It began by recognizing that it had no direct measure of PTV’s

relative market value: the Bortz study contained anti-PTV

biases whose effect it could not precisely calculate, and no other

evidence reliably demonstrated PTV’s value. The CARP thus

decided to assess relative market value based upon whether

circumstances had changed since 1992, when the prior CARP

allocated 5.5% to PTV. To be sure, in considering this question,

the CARP explicitly stated that it could look at shifts in Nielsen

viewing shares, but it never suggested that it would rely

exclusively on such shifts. This left the CARP free to examine

other evidence, such as changes in the cable network market and

in the regulatory situation. Moreover, and contrary to PBS’s

argument, we see no theoretical problem with the CARP’s

decision to compare PTV’s 1992 and 1998/1999 Bortz numbers

as part of its changed circumstances evaluation. Although flaws

in the 1998/1999 Bortz surveys rendered them, standing alone,

unusable for identifying PTV’s precise relative market value, the

CARP could still compare them with past Bortz surveys to

evaluate whether overall circumstances had changed. 

The CARP’s application of its otherwise sound

methodological approach is more troubling. Though

recognizing the dramatic increase in PTV’s Nielsen viewing

shares—an increase that stemmed largely from superstation

WTBS’s disappearance from the pool of broadcast signals—the

CARP nonetheless found no changed circumstances, in part

because PTV’s 1998/1999 Bortz numbers were the same as in

1992. As PBS points out, however, the CARP acknowledged

that one of the two anti-PTV flaws in Bortz—the exclusion from

the survey sample of CSOs carrying only public television

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 14 of 15
15

signals—was for all practical purposes new to the 1998/1999

Bortz surveys. Accordingly, if “true” Bortz valuation (i.e.,

Bortz valuation absent all biases) had remained the same in 1992

and 1998/1999, then due to the new bias, one would have

expected Bortz numbers to decrease in 1998/1999. Put another

way, unless some increase had occurred in the true Bortz

valuation, the numbers should not have remained constant.

Indeed, the CARP recognized as much, stating that “the lack of

increase in PTV’s Bortz share,” as opposed to the increase in its

Nielsen viewing share, “might be explained partially” by the

new bias. Yet the CARP still used the parity of PTV’s 1992 and

1998/1999 Bortz numbers to conclude that no changed

circumstances had occurred. 

Though viewed in isolation, the CARP’s reliance on the

parity of Bortz numbers seems problematic, the CARP relied on

additional factors to conclude that circumstances had in fact not

changed since 1992. Specifically, the CARP pointed to the rise

of PTV’s look-alike cable network competitors, the regulatory

changes that led to an increase in CSOs’ partially distant

carriage of PTV signals, and the decrease in CSOs’ distant-only

carriage of PTV signals—all factors that convinced the CARP

that the growth in PTV’s Nielsen viewing shares stemmed from

factors other than an increase in PTV’s relative market value.

Particularly given our exceptionally deferential standard of

review, we think these factors provide a “facially plausible

explanation,” Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 146 F.3d at 918, for

the CARP’s conclusion of no changed circumstances. Put

differently, because the evidence does not “compel[] a

substantially different award,” id., we have no basis for setting

aside the Librarian’s decision to accept the CARP’s

recommendation.

The Librarian’s decision is affirmed.

So ordered.

USCA Case #04-1071 Document #897180 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 15 of 15