Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03639/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03639-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven Anderson
Appellee
Crown Cork & Seal Company
Appellant
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Appellee
Leroy Kirchner
Appellee
Alvin L. McColley
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3639

___________

Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc., *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

International Association of Machinists *

and Aerospace Workers, The AFL-CIO; *

Alvin L. McColley; Leroy Kirchner; *

Steven Anderson, Individually and as *

representatives of a defendant class *

of retirees, *

* Appeal from the United States

Defendants - Appellees, * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

---------------------------------- *

*

International Association of *

Machinists and Aerospace Workers, *

The AFL-CIO, *

*

Counter Claimant - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc., *

*

Counter Defendant - Appellant. *

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
-2-

___________

Submitted: April 12, 2007

Filed: September 18, 2007

___________

Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Crown Cork and Seal Company appeals from the District Court's orders

dismissing Crown's declaratory judgment claims brought under the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Labor Management Relations Act

(LMRA) and granting summary judgment to the International Association of

Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM or the Union) on its counterclaim seeking

to compel arbitration under LMRA. We reverse the summary judgment and dismiss

the remaining issues on appeal.

In 1990, Crown, a manufacturer of packaging materials, acquired the metal

division of Continental Can Company and that division's manufacturing plants. Over

the preceding years, Continental and IAM had negotiated successive collectively

bargained Master Agreements covering the employment relationship between

Continental and its hourly employees. Crown has since bargained with IAM at the

represented facilities. Pursuant to the Master Agreements, Crown committed to

provide certain health benefits to eligible retirees.

In 2003, Crown announced its unilateral decision to modify the retiree health

plans for all those employees who retired before April 1, 2002. (Those who retired

after that date were covered by a different health plan.) The changes, effective August

1, 2003, included premium sharing, increased deductibles and out-of-pocket limits,

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
-3-

decreased coverage for hospitalization, elimination of coverage for some dependents,

and increases to lifetime benefits.

On June 6, 2003, before the effective date of the modifications, Crown filed suit

in the District Court seeking declaratory relief in two counts. Count One was brought

against IAM under LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), seeking a declaration that Crown's

unilateral modification of the retiree health plans did not violate the relevant Master

Agreements. Count Two was brought under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), against

IAM and a class represented by three named retirees and sought a declaration that the

health plans could be modified as proposed without violating ERISA.

On July 1, 2003, IAM filed a grievance under the Master Agreements to protest

the changes to the retiree health plans. Crown refused to arbitrate the grievance. The

Union then moved the District Court to dismiss Crown's claims and filed a

counterclaim under LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), asking the court to compel arbitration.

On January 20, 2004, the District Court dismissed Crown's ERISA count for

failure to state a claim. That dismissal took the named retirees out of the suit. As to

Count One, the court exercised its discretion and elected not to assert jurisdiction over

the LMRA declaratory judgment claim, dismissing that count as well. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201(a) ("any court . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any

interested party seeking such declaration" (emphasis added)). IAM's arbitration

counterclaim remained, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on

a joint stipulation of facts. The District Court (the case had now been reassigned to

a different judge) denied both motions, concluding that IAM did not have standing to

represent the retirees. The District Court allowed the Union ninety days to amend its

counterclaim or to substitute parties to remedy the standing problem and avoid

dismissal. IAM then secured the written consent of 653 of 927 eligible retirees (or

surviving spouses) to represent them in binding arbitration, after which the parties

amended their pleadings and renewed their cross-motions for summary judgment. On

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
1

No one has explained what health plan would have covered any Crown

employee who retired between March 31, 1993, and April 30, 1993, but that is of no

consequence to the resolution of this appeal.

-4-

September 25, 2006, the court granted the Union's motion and denied Crown's and

ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute. Crown appeals both of the dismissals and

the summary judgment. 

We begin with Crown's challenge to the District Court's summary judgment

decision on the arbitrability of the Union's grievance. We review de novo the decision

to grant summary judgment. Because the cross-motions were filed on a joint

stipulation of facts, the only issue is whether IAM is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

As we have said, Continental and Crown negotiated a series of Master

Agreements with IAM over the years that included corresponding health plans for

retirees. For reasons not explained in the record, the 1981 health plan, amended in

1988, applied to all Continental retirees when Crown acquired Continental's metal

division in 1990, regardless of their retirement dates and notwithstanding that there

were any number of Master Agreements and corresponding retiree health plans before

1981. Continental retirees continued to be covered by the 1981 health plan after the

acquisition until Crown's unilateral change on August 1, 2003, as did Crown retirees

who were represented by IAM postacquisition and who retired by March 31, 1993.

The remaining Crown employees who retired before April 1, 2002, received benefits

under either the April 30, 1993–April 1, 1999, health plan or the April 1,

1999–April 1, 2002, health plan, depending upon when they retired.1

 The June 1,

2002 (retroactive to April 1, 2002)–June 1, 2005, health plan covered those who

retired between those dates. The 2002–2005 Master Agreement is of collateral

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
2

A housekeeping note: The material language in the documents we discuss in

this appeal, except as otherwise noted, is virtually the same among the relevant

versions, with only minor differences that do not affect the substance. For the sake

of simplicity and clarity, we will limit our quoting of specific language to the

documents entitled Master Agreement Between Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc.

And The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers AFL-CIO

April 30, 1993 through March 31, 1996 (hereinafter, 1993 Master Agreement);

Benefits for Employees and Their Eligible Dependents Established Pursuant to an

Agreement between Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. and International Association

of Machinists and Aerospace Workers April 30, 1993 (hereinafter, Description of

Benefits); and Your Life Insurance and Health Care Benefits During Retirement

Established pursuant to the collective Bargaining Agreement between Continental Can

Company, USA, Inc. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace

Workers, AFL-CIO Effective April 1, 1981– And as amended August 1, 1988

(hereinafter, Retiree Health Benefits Plan).

-5-

relevance to this appeal, as we will explain, but those who retired with the health plan

referenced in that Master Agreement are not affected by this case.2

The applicable Master Agreements set out a detailed grievance procedure that

culminates in binding arbitration of an unresolved grievance, which is defined as "any

difference between the Local Management and the Union or employees as to the

interpretation or application of, or compliance with, [the Master] Agreement

respecting wages, hours, or conditions of employment." 1993 Master Agreement art.

13, sec. 13.1. Crown contends that the Union and Crown (or its predecessor) agreed

only to arbitrate disputes between the company and active employees, not retirees who

are no longer represented by the Union. We do not disagree with that statement, as

far as it goes. "[R]etirees are neither 'employees' nor bargaining unit members."

Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404

U.S. 157, 176 (1971). And while there is a presumption of arbitrability in labor

disputes if the parties have so agreed, we have concluded that retirees are "outside the

collective bargaining relationship." Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 752 F.2d

1293, 1298 (8th Cir.) (holding that retirees were not required to exhaust grievance

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
-6-

procedures before seeking judicial determination of benefits), cert. denied, 471 U.S.

1102 (1985); cf. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, 404 U.S. at 181 n.20 (noting that

union's representation of retirees in labor negotiations under LMRA is permitted but

not mandatory). In this case, however, a grievance by definition includes a

"difference between [Crown] and the Union . . . as to the interpretation or application

of, or compliance with" the Master Agreements. With the express consent of most of

the retirees, the Union is the party seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute over

retiree health benefits, not the retirees themselves. We conclude that the language of

the Master Agreements in this case is sufficient to show that Crown did in fact agree

to arbitrate with the Union alone—the entity that has brought the grievance here at

issue.

The District Court looked to the 2002–2005 Master Agreement to decide the

arbitrability issue because it was the agreement in effect when the Union filed the

grievance on behalf of the retirees in 2003. The court said, "Although prior

agreements may be relevant to determine the scope or extent of benefits to which the

retirees may be entitled, or the extent to which the company can unilaterally change

the benefits, the dispute is premised on the agreement in effect at the time of the filing

of the [grievance]." Mem. & Order of Sept. 25, 2006, at 17. Because the District

Court determined that the dispute arose under the 2002–2005 Master Agreement, the

court failed, as the Union concedes, to "expressly analyze the question of whether the

parties' dispute is arbitrable under the expired" Master Agreements (although IAM

believes that the court's "analysis of the arbitrability issue necessarily supports (and,

indeed, would require) the conclusion that the parties' dispute is arbitrable under the

expired contracts"). Br. of Appellees at 14. The grievance in question arose under the

expired Master Agreements, not the 2002–2005 Master Agreement, and it is those

expired agreements that must be construed to decide the arbitrability issue.

So we are faced with this question: Should we remand the case to the District

Court to analyze the arbitrability issue under the expired Master Agreements? It is

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
-7-

usually not the function of the appellate court "in the first instance to construe

collective-bargaining contracts and arbitration clauses, or to consider any other

evidence that might unmistakably demonstrate that a particular grievance was not to

be subject to arbitration." AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643,

651–52 (1986). Crown has suggested remand as a possibility, although not a

preference, and the Union is opposed to remand. We believe remand would be

inefficient and unnecessary. The parties submitted a joint stipulation of the material

facts, the record is complete, and our review of the legal conclusions is de novo in any

event. In these circumstances, we believe it is appropriate for us to decide the

question of arbitrability under the expired Master Agreements. 

Arbitration is a matter of contract, and "a party cannot be required to submit to

arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." United Steelworkers

v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). Crown contends that

it did not agree to arbitrate the dispute in question because the Master Agreements

under which the dispute arose are no longer in force, and the agreements to arbitrate

found therein are likewise expired. But the Supreme Court has explained that it has

not held "that termination of a collective-bargaining agreement automatically

extinguishes a party's duty to arbitrate grievances arising under the contract." Nolde

Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 251

(1977). The presumption of arbitrability in labor law jurisprudence will survive a

terminated contract, such as the expired Master Agreements in this case, where the

parties have failed to negate the presumption "expressly or by clear implication." Id.

at 255. 

The Supreme Court has since instructed, however, that the conclusion of the

Court in Nolde Bros. regarding the postexpiration presumption of arbitrability "was

limited by the vital qualification that arbitration was of matters and disputes arising

out of the relation governed by contract." Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501

U.S. 190, 204 (1991). Otherwise, "parties to a collective-bargaining agreement would

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
3

After oral argument, the Union submitted to the Court a letter under Rule 28(j)

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (Citation of Supplemental Authorities)

citing a 2004 decision from the Eighth Circuit that discusses a distinction between

procedural arbitrability and substantive arbitrability. IAM's counsel raised the issue

at oral argument, but we do not find such an issue in the Union's brief. We will not

consider an argument that is raised for the first time either at oral argument or in a

28(j) letter. Twin Cities Galleries, LLC v. Media Arts Group, Inc., 476 F.3d 598, 602

n.1 (8th Cir. 2007) (oral argument); Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 905 (8th

Cir. 1994) (28(j) letter). In any event, the distinction referred to is not relevant here.

-8-

be presumed to intend that any dispute arising between them years or even decades

after the expiration of the agreement would be arbitrable." Chauffeurs, Teamsters &

Helpers, Local Union 238 v. C.R.S.T., Inc., 795 F.2d 1400, 1404 (8th Cir.) (en banc)

(quoting Local 703, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Kennicott Bros., 771 F.2d 300, 303 (7th

Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). As relevant here, the Union's

grievance over Crown's unilateral modification of the retiree health plans arises under

the Master Agreements, and survives the expiration of those agreements, if the

benefits under those health plans were "accrued or vested under the agreement."

Litton Fin., 501 U.S. at 207. So to decide the question of arbitrability, we must first

determine whether the retirees' health benefits vested before the Master Agreements

expired, that is, whether Crown's unsatisfied obligation to provide such benefits was

"already fixed under the contract[s]." Id. at 206.

That brings us to a peripheral matter that must be resolved before we can

proceed. "[T]he question of arbitrability—whether a collective-bargaining agreement

creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance—is undeniably an

issue for judicial determination." AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649.3

 But "in deciding

whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court

is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims." Id. The Union insists

that we cannot decide whether retiree health benefits under the Master Agreements

have vested because to do so we have to reach the merits. But the Supreme Court

since its decision in AT&T Technologies has acknowledged that a court cannot avoid

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
-9-

its duty to decide whether a dispute is arbitrable merely because doing so will require

the court "to interpret a provision of a bargaining agreement." Litton Fin., 501 U.S.

at 209. The Union cites to some cases where courts have managed to decide the

question of arbitrability without getting to the merits, and urges us to do so here. Of

course, there are as well any number of cases that follow the Litton Financial

teachings, where courts have addressed the merits of an underlying dispute in order

to determine arbitrability. We see no way to avoid examining and interpreting

language in the Master Agreements (including the documents they incorporate) in

order to determine if the retiree health benefits vested under the terms of those

agreements such that Crown cannot undertake to unilaterally modify the retiree health

plans, notwithstanding that deciding the vesting issue answers the question that would

otherwise go before the arbitrator. In this case, we believe that "the judicial

responsibility to determine arbitrability takes precedence over the general rule to avoid

consideration of the merits of a grievance." Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1 v.

GKN Aerospace N. Am., Inc., 431 F.3d 624, 628 (8th Cir. 2005). We will, then, take

up the question of vesting.

There are several provisions in the Master Agreements that preclude vesting in

this case. The article denominated "Insurance" incorporated by reference the revised

"Group Insurance Agreement" into the Master Agreements, and Crown agreed to

continue those group insurance agreements "without modification for the life of" the

Master Agreements—all of which have since expired. 1993 Master Agreement art.

21. A "clause expressly limiting the duration of the retirement health benefits . . . to

the duration of the Master Agreement . . . [is] inconsistent with an intent to vest health

benefits for life." John Morrell & Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l

Union, 37 F.3d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1105 (1995).

Likewise, a coordination-of-benefits clause that appears in the Description of Health

Benefits (a part of the Master Agreements) is "inconsistent with vesting." Id. That

provision allows for a reduction in health benefits based on eligibility for benefits

under another group health insurance plan, including Medicare. "[T]he Plan cannot

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
-10-

be interpreted to provide vested rights for prior retirees in one provision and to take

such rights away in another." Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 836 F.2d 1512,

1519 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting and affirming Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 647

F. Supp. 1109, 1127 (E.D. Mo. 1986)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989). Finally,

the following blanket reservation of rights to Crown to unilaterally modify or

terminate the retiree health plans, set forth in the Retiree Health Benefits Plan under

the heading "Future of The Plan," is fatal to any vesting argument: "Continental hopes

and expects to continue the Plan indefinitely, but reserves the right to change or

terminate it in the future, subject naturally, to any outstanding contractual

agreements." Retiree Health Benefits Plan at 52. This is a clear reservation of rights

to do what Crown has done—modify the retiree health plans that were bargained for

under expired Master Agreements. Where there is no "affirmative indication of

vesting" in the collectively bargained agreement, "an unambiguous reservation-ofrights provision is sufficient without more to defeat a claim that retirement welfare

plan benefits are vested." Stearns v. NCR Corp., 297 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir. 2002),

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1160 (2003).

IAM has directed us to no terms in the Master Agreements that explicitly vest

retiree health benefits. But the Union asserts that language in the Master Agreements

does show that the parties intended these benefits to vest. First, IAM argues that this

language under the paragraph "Termination of Coverage" in the Retiree Health

Benefits Plan shows an intent to vest benefits because it promises coverage "until

death":

Your personal coverage continues until your death. Your Dependent

spouse's coverage continues after your death until the earlier of his or her

death or remarriage. Your Dependent children's coverages continue after

your death until the earlier of the date any such child is no longer a

Dependent as defined or the date your Dependent spouse's coverage

stops.

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
-11-

Retiree Health Benefits Plan at 48. This is not explicit vesting language, and in any

case, it is inconsistent with the reservation-of-rights clause quoted above, which

controls. See Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that

the Court had previously held that retirees' burden to prove vesting of welfare benefits

"was not met by the employer's promise to provide welfare benefits 'until death of

retiree' where the employer had expressly reserved the right to terminate or amend the

plan"). Likewise, the cap on "lifetime benefits" set out in the health plans is a limiting

provision, hardly an intent to vest benefits for life. IAM also suggests that the tenyear continuous-service minimum requirement to qualify for postretirement health

benefits means that such benefits were "worked towards or accumulated over time"

and therefore were accrued. Br. of Appellees at 31. We disagree. The minimum

service that an employee must have to be eligible to retire with health benefits is not

the set-point for vesting of those health benefits after retirement. 

Finally, the Union directs our attention to the Description of Benefits dated

April 30, 1993, which was part of the 1993 Master Agreement and applied to

employees and retirees alike, for another reservation-of-rights provision that,

according to IAM, is ambiguous and therefore does not preclude vesting:

Crown expects to continue these plans indefinitely, but reserves the right

to amend, modify, or discontinue the plans at any time subject to, and

within the framework of, applicable federal legislation and subject to any

outstanding contractual agreements.

Description of Benefits at 66. The Union relies on a case from the Third Circuit in

support of its argument that this provision is ambiguous. See Alexander v. Primerica

Holdings, Inc., 967 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1992). But the Alexander court selectively parsed

the reservation-of-rights clause in that case to find the ambiguities, and the primary

sources of ambiguity that the Third Circuit identified are not present in the Crown

provision reprinted above. Of course, we are not bound by decisions of the Third

Circuit, but we do not in any event find Alexander to be persuasive authority because

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
4

The Union also points out that the unambiguous provision found in the Retiree

Health Benefits Plan did not appear until 1974. But IAM does not dispute that the

oldest plan under which retirees are receiving benefits is the 1981 health plan, which

does include the reservation-of-rights clause.

-12-

of differences in language between the two clauses. IAM cannot create an ambiguity

simply by saying that it thinks the reservation-of-rights clause can be read to mean

something different from Crown's interpretation of the same clause. And even if the

clause in the Description of Benefits were ambiguous, an ambiguous reservation of

rights does not mean the benefits in the expired health plan are vested; IAM would

still have to show an intent to vest, and as we have explained, it cannot do so when the

relevant documents are considered as a whole. To the extent the Union is asserting

that the reference to "outstanding contractual agreements" makes the reservation-ofrights clause in the Retiree Health Benefits Plan ambiguous as well, the same analysis

applies.4

 

In sum, we hold that the retiree health benefits negotiated between Crown and

the Union did not vest before the Master Agreements expired, and so did not survive

the expiration of those agreements. The presumption of arbitrability that normally

applies in the labor law context therefore does not apply here, as the agreements to

provide retiree health benefits are outside the scope of the agreements to arbitrate. We

hold that the parties did not agree to arbitrate this dispute and that the District Court

erred in granting summary judgment to the Union and ordering arbitration of Crown's

unilateral modification of pre-2002 retiree health plans.

This brings us to Crown's claims for declaratory judgment under LMRA and

ERISA, the dismissal of which Crown also appeals. In resolving the question of

arbitrability, we have held as a matter of law that there are no contractual agreements

to vest retiree health benefits to be found in any of the relevant Master Agreements

in this case. Under ERISA, vesting of welfare (such as health) benefits—unlike

pension benefits—is not statutory, so "[a]n employer offering welfare benefits may

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
-13-

unilaterally modify or terminate benefits at the employer's discretion, so long as the

employer has not contracted an agreement to the contrary." Hughes v. 3M Retiree

Med. Plan, 281 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 2002). Because the benefits are not vested by

contract, Crown did not violate the terms of either the expired Master Agreements or

ERISA by unilaterally modifying the retiree health plans.

Our legal conclusions would "continue to govern the same issues" in the

District Court if we were to reverse the dismissals of Crown's declaratory judgment

claims and remand for decisions on the merits. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,

618 (1983). Because it is "implicitly settled" that Crown may unilaterally modify the

retiree health plans at any time, the District Court would be foreclosed—even if we

were to reverse the dismissals and remand for decisions on the merits—by the law of

the case from declaring that Crown's unilateral modification of the plans violated

either the expired Master Agreements or ERISA. Jones v. United States, 255 F.3d

507, 510 (8th Cir. 2001) ("All issues decided by an appellate court become the law of

the case. This rule extends not only to actual holdings but also to all issues implicitly

settled in prior rulings." (citation omitted)). Determining whether the District Court

abused its discretion in dismissing the LMRA declaratory judgment count under 28

U.S.C.§ 2201(a) or whether the court erred in dismissing the ERISA declaratory

judgment action for failure to state a claim would change nothing. "When the

affirmance or reversal of an order made in the course of the proceeding would make

no difference in respect of the controversy on the merits, the appellate court will not

determine whether it was decided erroneously . . . ." Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. v.

Beecher, 150 F.2d 394, 398 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 781 (1946). As

explained above, before we could resolve the arbitrability issue, we first had to decide

the vesting issue. Our decision that the retiree health benefits did not vest before the

Master Agreements expired now makes it impossible for us to grant any further relief

on Crown's additional issues on appeal, regardless of how we might decide them. 

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823
-14-

The summary judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is

remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Crown on the question of

arbitrability. The claims on appeal regarding the District Court's dismissal of Crown's

declaratory judgment counts are dismissed.

_____________________________

Appellate Case: 06-3639 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/18/2007 Entry ID: 3352823