Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01095/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01095-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Joseph Nathaniel Martinez
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH NATHANIEL MARTINEZ

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-1095-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff Joseph Nathaniel Martinez commenced this social security action on May 1, 

2014. (ECF No. 1.) On September 24, 2015, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment in part, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, remanded the 

action for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and 

entered judgment for plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 19, 20.) 

Presently pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the 

Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (ECF No. 21.) The Commissioner filed an opposition to 

the motion, and plaintiff filed a reply brief. (ECF Nos. 22, 23.) After carefully considering the 

parties’ briefing, the court’s record, and the applicable law, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion 

for EAJA fees.

Case 2:14-cv-01095-KJN Document 24 Filed 02/05/16 Page 1 of 5
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The EAJA provides, in part, that: 

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall 

award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and 

other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to 

subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than 

cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of 

agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court 

having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the 

position of the United States was substantially justified or that 

special circumstances make an award unjust.

A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within 

thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an 

application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party 

is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this 

subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement 

from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in 

behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at 

which fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall also 

allege that the position of the United States was not substantially 

justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was 

substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record 

(including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by 

the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in 

the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.

The court, in its discretion may reduce the amount to be awarded 

pursuant to this subsection, or deny an award, to the extent that the 

prevailing party during the course of the proceedings engaged in 

conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final 

resolution of the matter in controversy. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)-(C). 

Here, the Commissioner does not dispute that plaintiff is a prevailing party, because he 

successfully obtained a remand for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993). Furthermore, plaintiff’s application 

for EAJA fees is timely, because it was filed within thirty days of final judgment in this action.

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 The term “final judgment” for purposes of the EAJA “means a judgment that is final and not 

appealable....” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G). The court entered judgment for plaintiff on 

September 24, 2015. (ECF No. 19.) The judgment became a non-appealable “final judgment” 60 

days later on November 23, 2015. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (providing that the notice of 

appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after entry of the judgment if one of the parties is 

the United States, a United States agency, or a United States officer or employee sued in an 

official capacity). Accordingly, plaintiff was required to file an application for EAJA fees no 

later than 30 days after the “final judgment,” i.e., by December 23, 2015. Plaintiff’s December 

18, 2015 application is therefore timely. 

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The Commissioner also does not attempt to show that the government’s position was 

substantially justified. (ECF No. 22.) See Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(holding that claimant is entitled to attorneys’ fees unless the government shows that its position 

“with respect to the issue on which the court based its remand was ‘substantially justified’”). 

Finally, the court finds that there are no other special circumstances that would make an award of 

EAJA fees unjust. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to an award of fees pursuant 

to the EAJA.

The EAJA directs the court to award a reasonable fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). In

determining whether a fee is reasonable, the court considers the reasonable hourly rate, the hours 

expended, and the results obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990); 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 

1998). In this case, plaintiff seeks $ 6,173.79 in attorney’s fees for Mr. Koenig’s work and 

$3,611.14 for Ms. Jones’ work on the prosecution of the action for a total award of $9,784.93. 

(ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff does not seek any additional fees for the time his counsel spent drafting 

and submitting his reply to the Commissioner’s opposition to the present motion (ECF No. 23 at 

4) despite being entitled to do so. See Jean, 496 U.S. 154.

The Commissioner has not challenged plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates of $190.06 for 

2014 and $189.68 for 2015, which is equal to the hourly rate for EAJA fees published on the 

Ninth Circuit’s website for of $190.06 for 2014, and sixty cents under the published hourly rate of 

$190.68 for 2015. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 

(9th Cir. 2005); Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6. 

However, the Commissioner objects to the reasonableness of the time plaintiff’s counsel 

spent on various tasks and activities. In particular, the Commissioner objects to eleven time 

entries between November 13, 2014, and January 8, 2015, which state that Mr. Koenig worked

13.4 hours and Ms. Jones worked 19.0 hours on the plaintiff’s opening brief for a total of 32.4 

hours. (ECF Nos. 21 at 8,13; 22 at 3.) The Commissioner contends that 15 hours would have 

been a more reasonable amount of time to complete the necessary work on that brief, and 

provides no further reasons for its objection. (ECF No. 22.) 

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The Administrative Transcript in this case was over 1,200 pages with more than 1,000 

pages of medical records, which is a somewhat larger record than usual for this type of case. (See

Administrative Transcript 204-1239.) In addition, plaintiff’s briefing provided specific page 

citations to that large and somewhat cumbersome record, made cogent legal arguments, and, as 

the undersigned noted in the remand order, correctly identified the relevant law and applied it in a 

manner that demonstrated that he was entitled to the relief he sought. (ECF No. 19 at 6.) Given 

the benefit of plaintiff’s briefing to the court and the size of the record, and after having 

independently reviewed the entries challenged by the Commissioner, the court finds the amount 

of time plaintiff’s counsel spent on the contested entries to be reasonable. The Commissioner 

does not challenge the remaining entries claimed by plaintiff’s counsel,

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and after review, the 

court finds the remaining entries to be reasonable as well. 

Finally, in light of the fact that plaintiff obtained a favorable judgment remanding the case 

for further administrative proceedings, the court concludes that the requested amount of fees is 

consistent with the result obtained. Therefore, the court awards plaintiff his EAJA attorneys’ fees

in the requested amount of $9,784.93. 

Plaintiff’s motion papers do not include an executed assignment of EAJA fees to 

plaintiff’s counsel, nor do they suggest that such an assignment may have been executed. 

However, if the government ultimately determines that plaintiff does not owe a federal debt that 

qualifies for offset, and if plaintiff’s counsel provides the government with sufficient evidence of 

an executed assignment of EAJA fees to plaintiff’s counsel, payment may be made in the name of 

plaintiff’s counsel. Otherwise, the $9,784.93 in EAJA fees and expenses are awarded to plaintiff 

and not to plaintiff’s counsel. See Astrue v. Ratliffe, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010).

 

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The Commissioner states that 34.1 hours would be a reasonable amount of hours for the entire 

case. (ECF No. 21 at 8.) It appears that the Commissioner’s 34.1 figure was derived by taking 

the total of 51.5 hours claimed by plaintiff’s counsel and subtracting the 17.4 hours the 

Commissioner alleges were improperly spent researching and writing plaintiff’s opening brief.

(ECF Nos. 21 at 6; 22 at 3.) The Commissioner does not seem to contest the amounts of time 

plaintiff’s counsel claims was spent with regard to the other entries for which plaintiff seeks 

attorneys’ fees. Therefore, the court construes the Commissioner’s silence on these remaining 

entries as a concession that the hours attributed to them were reasonable.

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Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the EAJA (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $9,784.93 pursuant to the 

EAJA, with payment to be made according to the terms outlined in this order. 

3. This order resolves ECF No. 21.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2016

 

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