Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03261/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03261-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Douangmala Lang
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH Uaifed[ I L E D . Te':.. Cci::u1{ Appea!J 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 1 2 1996 

TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER. 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

No. 95-3260, 95-3261 

SOUPHAPHONE LANG and 

DOUANGMALA LANG, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. Nos. 94-CR-10121-01 and 02) 

T. Lynn Ward, Hershberger, Patterson, Jones & Roth, L.C., Wichita, Kansas, for DefendantAppellant Souphaphone Lang. · 

Ron W. Paschal, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant Douangmala Lang. 

David M. Lind (Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Assistant 

United States Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before PORFILIO, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

PORFILIO, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-3261 Document: 01019279283 Date Filed: 04/12/1996 Page: 1 
Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang were convicted after a jury 

trial of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), carrying or using a firearm 

during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and aiding and abetting each other's criminal 

conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal, Souphaphone and 

Douangmala Lang raise three common issues. The Langs challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting their firearm convictions, 

the district court's denial of their joint motion to suppress, and 

the two-level enhancement each received in their sentences for 

obstruction of justice. We reverse both Souphaphone and Douangmala 

Lang's 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions, but remand for resentencing 

for the district court to determine the applicability of the twolevel special offense characteristic enhancement of U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b) (1) to the facts of this case. We affirm the district 

court's denial of the Langs' joint motion to suppress, and also 

affirm the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice imposed 

against both defendants pursuant to U.'S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 1 

1 Although filed separately, these cases are joined only for the purpose of their 

disposition. 

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I. 

Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang were arrested as a result of 

the FBI's Violent Crime Task Force's surveillance of a mobile home 

in Wichita, Kansas, on November 29, 1994. The Task Force conducted 

the surveillance because they believed Fongyxmany Phommachanh was 

staying at the mobile home. The Task Force began its surveillance 

at 9:18 a.m. on November 29. The surveillance team consisted of 

five agents distributed among four different vehicles. FBI Special 

Agent Daniel Jablonski led the surveillance from one vehicle, with 

Detective Mitchell Mervosh and Officer Blake E. Mumma riding 

together in a second vehicle, FBI Special Agent Charles G. 

Pritchett in a third vehicle, and Detective Danny Parker in a 

fourth vehicle. The impetus for the surveillance of the mobile 

home was the Task Force's belief Mr. Phommachanh could be located 

there. The Task Force possessed information the mobile home was a 

frequent gathering place or hangout for Asian gang members with 

whom Mr. Phommachanh was associated. Mr. Phommachanh was wanted 

for questioning in connection with three armed robberies occurring 

in the Wichita metropolitan area between September and November 

1994. 

First, the Task Force believed Mr. Phommachanh was involved in 

the September 22, 1994 armed robbery at a Sonic Drive-In restaurant 

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where he had once worked. Two Asian men wearing ski masks had 

entered the restaurant, discharged a firearm, and robbed the cash 

register. The Task Force concluded a former employee was involved 

because the details of the crime suggested some insider knowledge. 

A witness, a Sonic employee who had previously worked with Mr. 

Phommachanh, identified him as one of the two perpetrators based on 

his voice and mannerisms. 

Second, Mr. Phommachanh was also a suspect in another robbery 

at a different Sonic Drive-In restaurant on October 12, 1994. The 

methods employed by the robbers were similar to those used in the 

first offense. Again, two Asian men with their faces disguised by 

ski masks entered the establishment, threatened the employees by 

discharging a firearm, and fled with the cash from the register. 

In addition, ballistics revealed the same .32 caliber gun was used 

to commit both robberies. 

Third, the Task Force sought to question Mr. Phommachanh about 

the November 8, 1994 robbery of the Mandarin Restaurant during 

which one of its proprietors, Barbara Sun, was murdered. Three or 

four armed Asian males perpetrated the third robbery. The Task 

Force's information concerning Mr. Phommachanh's possible 

participation in the Mandarin Restaurant robbery came from his 

mother, Kanha Pommachanh. Mrs. Pommachanh was working at Wesley 

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Hospital as a housekeeper when Barbara Sun was brought there. Mrs. 

Pommachanh overheard several people talking about the Mandarin 

robbery, Ms. Sun's murder, and how four Asian males were suspects. 

She feared her son might be involved. Mrs. Phommachanh reached 

this conclusion because her son had left home between two and three 

months previously and she had not seen him since. She also 

believed her son might be involved with a gang and feared the 

Mandarin Restaurant robbery/murder was part of a gang war. 

Mrs. Phommachanh contacted the police, and Detective Mervosh 

interviewed her at the hospital on November 14. Following the 

interview at the hospital, Mr. Phommachanh telephoned his mother 

and asked her for $400 to assist in moving either his friend's car 

or trailer. Mrs. Phommachanh called Brad Cary, a member of the 

gang unit of the Wichita Police Department, whom she knew from her 

work at the hospital. Mrs. Phommachanh told Officer Cary of her 

son's request for money. He suggested Mr. Phommachanh might use 

the money to leave Wichita. After her phone conversation with 

Officer Cary, Mrs. Phommachanh determined not to give her son the 

$400. 

Subsequently, Mrs. Phommachanh and her husband visited the 

Task Force office at FBI headquarters and talked to Detective 

Mervosh and Agent Jablonski at their request. At the office, the 

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Phommachanhs viewed a series of pictures in an attempt to identify 

possible gang members, and Mrs. Phommachanh talked further of her 

fear of her son's involvement in criminal activity and his request 

for money. 

Armed with this information, the Task Force began its 

surveillance of the mobile home hoping to find Mr. Phommachanh. 

The Task Force agents had a mug shot and a physical description of 

Mr. Phommachanh. All was quiet until 12:18 p.m. when a red 

Chevrolet S-10 Blazer arrived at the mobile home. An unidentified 

Asian male left the Blazer and entered the residence. After 

spending about four minutes inside, the same unidentified Asian 

male and another unidentified Asian male left the home, returned to 

the Blazer and began to drive away. 

Agent Jablonski, who was between fifty and seventy yards from 

the mobile home, could not positively identify the man during the 

approximately ten seconds he could observe him on each trip between 

the mobile home and the Blazer. He believed, however, the 

unidentified male who got into the passenger seat of the Blazer was 

their suspect, Mr. Phommachanh. Consequently, he ordered the other 

Task Force agents to pursue the Blazer. Agent Jablonski pulled up 

alongside the Blazer and attempted to visually compare the mug shot 

of Mr. Phommachanh, which he had in his possession, with the facial 

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Appellate Case: 95-3261 Document: 01019279283 Date Filed: 04/12/1996 Page: 6 
features of the vehicle's passenger. After concluding the 

passenger was in fact Mr. Phommachanh, Agent Jablonski ordered the 

Blazer be stopped and pulled in front of the Blazer at a traffic 

light. The other Task Force vehicles surrounded the Blazer to 

prevent its escape. The Task Force agents had no other reason to 

stop the Blazer except for the fact they believed the passenger was 

Mr. Phommachanh. 

After the Blazer was stopped, Detective Mervosh and Officer 

Mumma pulled in behind the vehicle. They noticed the passenger 

making frequent furtive movements at his feet either in an attempt 

to retrieve or hide something. Detective Mervosh moved to the 

driver's side of the vehicle, while Officer Mumma simultaneously 

proceeded to the passenger's side. Both police officers directed 

the Blazer's occupants to exit, face, and place their hands on the 

vehicle in front of them. After the suspects complied with this 

request, both Detective Mervosh and Officer Mumma conducted a 

standard pat down search for weapons. Detective Mervosh's suspect, 

the driver, later identified as Souphaphone Lang, had no weapons or 

other contraband on his person. However, Officer Mumma's pat down 

search of the passenger, later identified as Douangmala Lang, 

revealed a suspicious bulge protruding from the suspect' s left 

front pants pocket. 

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Officer Mumma asked the man what was in his pants pocket, and 

the passenger replied, "money." Officer Mumma asked the man's 

permission to examine the "money" and received consent. To ensure 

the passenger clearly understood his question, Officer Mumma 

repeated his request, this time looking the passenger directly in 

the eyes. Again, the man gave his consent. Officer Mumma removed 

the rolled-up plastic bag and discovered what appeared to be 

cocaine inside. Contemporaneously, Officer Mumma noticed what he 

also believed to be cocaine in plain view on the floorboard next to 

the passenger's seat. 

Either during or immediately following his pat down search, 

Officer Mumma asked the passenger his name. The suspect replied: 

"Joe Lang." Later, the man produced identification confirming his 

identity was Douangmala Lang. At this point, the Task Force agents 

realized they had mistaken Douangmala Lang for Fongyxmany 

Phommachanh. Souphaphone Lang also produced identification 

demonstrating his identity. 

After conferring among themselves, and telephoning an 

Assistant United States Attorney, the Task Force agents placed both 

Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang under arrest based on the cocaine 

found on Douangmala Lang's person an~ in plain view in the Blazer. 

The agents searched the Blazer after arresting both brothers, and 

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.found two additional plastic bags of cocaine tucked underneath the 

passenger seat of the vehicle. Both Souphaphone and Douangmala 

Lang cooperated with the police and gave statements implicating 

themselves and Mr. Phommachanh for cocaine possession and 

distribution. 

After obtaining these statements, along with the other 

evidence from the Blazer, the Task Force agents received a search 

warrant for the mobile home. The search warrant was executed the 

same day, November 29, at approximately 3:00 p.m. During their 

search of the premises, Task Force agents discovered a loaded .12 

gauge shotgun underneath the couch in the living room, cocaine 

residue on a plate in the kitchen, and some additional cocaine 

inside a sock in a dresser drawer in one of the mobile home's 

bedrooms. Eight people were inside the mobile home at that time. 

Mr. Phommachanh was arrested, and the other people were taken in 

for questioning. Mr. Phommachanh gave a statement to the police 

admitting giving cocaine to the Lang brothers for them to 

distribute, and his involvement in the two armed robberies at the 

Sonic Drive-In restaurants. 

Initially, Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang were indicted along 

with Mr. Phommachanh on the drug and fire arms charges . Mr. 

Phommachanh was also indicted with several other defendants in a 

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related case involving the armed robberies. 2 The district court 

conducted a joint hearing regarding the two related cases and heard 

testimony concerning Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang's motion to 

suppress among other issues. After the hearing, the court denied 

Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang's joint motion to suppress in a 

written memorandum and order. 

The court concluded there was no evidence presented during the 

suppression hearing to indicate the stop was pretextual. The court 

held the agents stopped the Blazer for the purpose of questioning 

Mr. Phommachanh about the Sonic Drive-In and Mandarin robberies. 

Therefore, the court framed the issue as "whether the Task Force 

had objective justification to stop Phommachanh to question him." 

The court concluded the agents had a reasonable and objective 

belief Mr. Phommachanh was implicated in the three crimes. 

The court determined the agents' misidentification of 

Douangmala Lang as Fongyxmany Phommachanh was also reasonable. The 

court rejected the argument Detective Mervosh was familiar with 

Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang based on his previous arrest of 

Souphaphone on November 17 depriving the agents of a good faith 

mistake of identity. The court reasoned Agent Jablonski, not 

2 Ultimately, Mr. Phommachanh reached a plea agreement with the government and was 

not tried with Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang. 

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Detective Mervosh, decided to stop the Blazer; therefore, Detective 

Mervosh's individual familiarity with Souphaphone Lang was 

irrelevant to this decision. Further, Detective Mervosh had not 

seen either Douangmala Lang or Mr. Phommachanh prior to the stop. 

In turn, Agent Jablonski had not seen any of the three men in 

question prior to the November 29 incident. The court specifically 

found, "the physical characteristics of Phommachanh and Douangmala 

are similar and the mug shot of Phommachanh available to Agent 

·Jablonski on November 29 looks very much like Douangmala Lang." 

The court concluded Officer Mumma's pat down search of 

Douangmala Lang was reasonable under the circumstances, and also 

held Douangmala Lang voluntarily consented to the search of his 

left front pants pocket, which resulted in the initial discovery of 

cocaine. The court found the agents did not improperly exceed the 

scope of their initial stop because everything the agents did until 

they could confirm Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang's identities was 

reasonable under the circumstances. The court concluded the 

agents' actions were justified because of their legitimate belief 

the passenger of the vehicle was Mr. Phommachanh, a potentially 

dangerous individual wanted for questioning in two armed robberies 

:., 

and a robbery/murder. Finally, the court concluded the cocaine 

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found by Officer Mumma on the passenger side floorboard of the 

Blazer was in plain view. 

In addition, the district court twice rejected the Langs' 

arguments there was insufficient evidence to support their 

convictions for carrying or using a firearm in connection with a 

drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At 

sentencing, the district court enhanced both Souphaphone and 

Douangmala Lang's sentences by two-levels pursuant to U.s. s. G. 

§ 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. The court specifically found 

both brothers committed perjury when they testified at trial. 

II. 

Initially, Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang argue the 

government presented insufficient evidence to support their 

convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) for carrying or using a 

firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The . 12 gauge 

shotgun was discovered by the police during their search of the 

mobile horne under the couch in the front room, and no evidence was 

ever offered that either Souphaphone or Douangmala Lang brandished, 

held, or even touched the firearm in conjunction with any drug 

trafficking activities. The Langs assert the evidence arrayed 

against them is insufficient to support a conviction under Bailey 

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v. United States, u.s. 116 S . Ct . 50 1 ( 19 9 5 ) . The 

government agrees the evidence was insufficient to sustain a 

conviction under Bailey, but argues the case must be remanded to 

the district court for resentencing so it may consider the Langs' 

possession of a dangerous weapon during a drug trafficking crime 

for the two-level enhancement available pursuant to U.s. S. G. 

§ 2Dl.l(b) (1). 

We review sufficiency of evidence claims by viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. United 

States v. Jones, 49 F.3d 628, 632 (lOth Cir. 1995). "The court 

must 'determine whether any reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting United 

States v. Coslet, 987 F.2d 1493, 1495 (lOth Cir. 1993)); United 

States v. Ricbard, 969 F.2d 849, 856 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 506 

u.s. 887 (1992). We make this determination on appeal by 

examining all the direct and circumstantial evidence contained in 

the record and the reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence. 

United States v. Leopard, 936 F.2d 1138, 1140 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

We begin our analysis by deciding whether the new rule 

announced in Bailey applies to Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang. In 

Gri££itb v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the Supreme Court held, 

"a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be 

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applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on 

direct review or not yet final with no exception for cases in which 

the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. at 

328; see also Powell v. Nevada, u.s. I 114 S.Ct. 1280, 1283-

84 (1994). Because both Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang's appeals 

were pending on direct review when Bailey was decided, and Bailey 

announced a new rule of criminal law, it applies here. 

In Bailey, the Court attempted "to clarify the meaning of 

'use' under § 924 (c) (1) ." Bailey, 116 S.Ct. at 505. 3 The Court 

unanimously held"§ 924(c) (1) requires evidence sufficient to show 

an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that 

makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate 

offense." Id. In its discussion of its new test, the Court 

"briefly describe [d] some of the activities that fall within 

'active employment' of a firearm, and those that do not." Id. at 

508. The Court included, "brandishing, displaying, bartering, 

striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a 

firearm," id., among those activities constituting active 

3 The statute also prohibits "carrying" a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 

The government has never alleged either Souphaphone or Douangmala Lang ever carried the 

shotgun in this case, so this aspect of the statute does not apply. Compare United States v. 

Farris,_ F.3d __, 1996 WL 82490, at *3 (11th Cir., March 13, 1996) (discussing what 

constitutes carrying a firearm for§ 924(c) purposes after Bailey); United States v. RiascosSuarez, 73 F.3d 616, 622-24 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). 

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employment. In contrast, the Court concluded the "mere possession 

of a firearm by a drug offender, at or near the site of a drug 

crime or its proceeds or paraphernalia" or "the inert presence of 

a firearm, without more, is not enough to trigger § 924 (c) (1)." 

Id. Additionally, the Court also determined the meaning of "use" 

excluded the situation "where an offender conceals a gun nearby to 

be at the ready for an imminent confrontation." Id. Further, 

besides the examples discussed by the Court, the facts of the two 

cases before the Court are also instructive. The Court concluded 

the discovery of a firearm inside a bag in one defendant's locked 

car trunk, and the analogous discovery of an unloaded, holstered 

firearm in a locked footlocker in another defendant's bedroom 

closet were both insufficient to demonstrate active employment 

under the Court's new definition. Id. at 509. 

Since the Court decided Bailey, this court has only addressed 

the applicability of § 924(c) (1) on one occassion. United States 

v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (lOth Cir. 1995). In Wacker, we vacated 

the § 924(c) (1) convictions of several defendants and remanded one 

defendant's case for a new trial before a jury properly instructed 

pursuant to Bailey. Id. at 1463-65. Firearms discovered in a bag 

in the rear camper shell of one defendant's truck, and in a file 

cabinet in another defendant's home, were held not to be actively 

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employed in the defendants' marijuana harvesting and distribution 

operation. Id. at 1460-65. 

In the instant case, the . 12 gauge shotgun was discovered 

underneath the couch in the front room of the mobile home. 

Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang were arrested in their Blazer 

several miles from the mobile home, and the Task Force agents only 

found the shotgun when searching the residence pursuant to a 

warrant after both Langs were in custody. Under these 

circumstances, there is no way either Lang can be said to have 

actively employed the shotgun in relation to any drug trafficking. 

The situation here is most analogous to a mere possession of a 

firearm near a drug site or drug paraphernalia, which the Court 

specifically concluded did not qualify as a "use" within the 

meaning of the statute. Accordingly, we hold the government failed 

to present sufficient evidence to convict either Souphaphone or 

Douangmala Lang under Bailey's reinterpretation of 18 U.S. C. § 

924 (c) (1) • 

However, our inquiry does not end with the conclusion 

sufficient evidence was not presented to support these convictions. 

Instead of contesting the sufficiency of evidence issue, the 

government argues these two cases must be remanded to the district 

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court for resentencing so it can consider the applicability of a 

two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b) (1). We agree. 

Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang were charged under 

§ 924 (c) (1); therefore, the district court was precluded from 

enhancing their base offense levels by two-levels pursuant to 

§ 2Dl.l(b) (1) because of the Sentencing Guidelines' prohibition on 

double counting. The Guidelines provide: 

18 U.S.C. §§ 844(h), 924(c), and 929(a) provide mandatory 

minimum penalties for the conduct proscribed. To avoid 

double counting, when a sentence under this section is 

imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying 

offense, any specific offense characteristic for 

explosive or firearm discharge, use, or possession is not 

applied in respect to such underlying offense. 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 comment. (backg'd). The specific offense 

characteristic at issue here falls squarely within this provision. 

See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 59 F.3d 138, 139-40 (lOth Cir.) 

("[A] sentencing court cannot enhance a defendant's sentence for a 

robbery under the Guidelines by reason of his use of a firearm if 

the defendant has been separately convicted and is being sentenced 

under§ 924(c) for using the firearm in the commission of the same 

robbery. To do so would impermissibly double count contrary to the 

language and policy of the Sentencing Guidelines."), cert. denied, 

116 S . Ct . 58 0 ( 19 9 5) . However, vacating the Langs' § 924 (c) 

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convictions pursuant to Bailey eliminates this prohibition. 4 We 

have previously held this enhancement may be imposed at sentencing 

after a defendant has been acquitted of a§ 924(c) charge. United 

States v. Martinez, 979 F.2d 1424, 1433-34 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. 

denied, 507 U.S. 1022 (1993); United States v. Eagan, 965 F.2d 887, 

892 (lOth Cir. 1992). We find no persuasive reason to treat an 

appellate reversal on sufficiency of evidence grounds any 

differently. In fact, the two circuits who have addressed this 

precise issue following Bailey have determined a remand for 

resentencing was appropriate. United States v. Fennell, F.3d 

, 1996 WL 91616, at *1 (D.C. Cir., March 4, 1996) (per curiam); 

United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The 

prohibition against applying the two level enhancement is no longer 

applicable, because the firearm sentence on Count 4 has been set 

aside."). Therefore, we hold when a defendant's conviction under 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is reversed on sufficiency of evidence grounds 

on appeal, the case is subject to remand for resentencing to 

4 In Bailey, the Court specifically recognized U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l) allowed an 

enhancement when a firearm was possessed during a drug trafficking offense, a broader category 

of cases than the definition of "use" adopted by the Court. Bailey v. United States,_ U.S. 

_, 116 S.Ct. 501, 509 (1995); see also United States v. Gary, 14 F.3d 304, 317 n. 11 (1st Cir. 

1996). 

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determine the applicability of the enhancement found at U.S.S.G. 

§ 2Dl.l(b) (1) to the facts of each particular case. 

On remand, the district court must determine whether either 

Souphaphone or Douangmala Lang possessed a firearm in connection 

with their drug trafficking activities within the meaning of the 

guidelines. "The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was 

present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was 

connected with the offense." U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l comment. (n.3). 

Initially, the government bears the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the gun was proximate to the 

drug offense. United States v. Earls, 42 F.3d 1321, 1326 (lOth 

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1800 (1995). The government 

must present evidence demonstrating "that a temporal and spatial 

relation exited beween the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, 

and the defendant." United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1449 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2558 (1995) (quoting United 

States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982 (lOth Cir. 1993)). If the 

government meets its burden, the onus shifts to the defendant to 

"show it is 'clearly improbable' that the weapon was related to the 

offense." Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1449; United States v. Jackson, 11 

F.3d 953, 956 (lOth Cir. 1993). We explicitly offer no opinion 

whether the enhancement is applicable here. That determination is 

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appropriately made by the district court in the first instance on 

remand after a sentencing hearing. We note only the analysis of 

whether Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang possessed the shotgun may 

differ based on the individual circumstances linking the firearm to 

each defendant. 

III. 

In addition, both Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang appeal the 

district court's denial of their joint motion to suppress. They 

argue the Task Force's actions beginning with the initial stop and 

proceeding through the different searches leading to their arrest 

violated the Fourth Amendment and necessitated the suppression of 

all the resulting evidence as the fruit of a poisonous tree. We 

agree with the district court no Constitutional violation occurred 

here. 

In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's 

ruling. United States v. Marchant, 55 F.3d 509, 512 (lOth Cir.}, 

cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 260 (1995}. The district court's factual 

findings underpinning the denial of the motion are accepted unless 

clearly erroneous. United States v. Little, 60 F.3d 708, 712 (lOth 

Cir. 1995}; United States v. Flores, 48 F.3d 467, 468 (lOth Cir.}, 

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cert. denied, 116 s.ct. 122 (1995). A reviewing court must remain 

"mindful that at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the credibility 

of the witnesses and the weight given the evidence, as well as the 

inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom, are matters for the 

trial judge." United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 876 (lOth 

Cir. 1994); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1406 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). However, the ultimate determination of the 

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo. 

Little, 60 F.3d at 712; Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 876. 

To begin with, Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang challenge the 

Task Force's initial stop of the Blazer. The Langs argue the Task 

Force lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Blazer assuming Mr. 

Phommachanh actually had been a passenger in the vehicle. 

Our prior cases have identified three distinct types of 

police-citizen encounters. In United States v. Madrid, 30 F.3d 

1269 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 527 (1994), we stated: 

The first involves the voluntary cooperation of a citizen 

in response to non-coercive questioning. The second is 

a Ter~ v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 

889 (1968), stop, involving only a brief, non-intrusive 

detention and frisk for weapons when officers have a 

reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed a 

crime or is about to do so. The third encounter is the 

arrest of the defendant. 

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• 

Id. at 1275 (citing United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1516 

(lOth Cir. 1993)). This case falls within the second category and 

must be evaluated under Terry. In that decision, the Court 

concluded, to justify "the particular intrusion the police officer 

must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 

taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, 

reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The 

Court cautioned, however, a police officer was not entitled to rely 

on "his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'." Id. 

at 27. The conduct of the officers is judged by an objective 

standard taking the totality of the circumstances and information 

available to the officers into account. Id. at 21-22. 

A Terry stop is evaluated under a two-part analytical 

framework. First, we ask whether the stop was justified at its 

inception. Second, our inquiry focuses on whether the stop was 

reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 

the interference in the first place. United States v. Gregory, __ _ 

F.3d , 1996 WL 118269, at *3 (lOth Cir. March 18, 1996); United 

States v. Brown, 24 F.3d 1223, 1226 n. 2 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

In the instant case, we conclude there are four reasons the 

Task Force possessed sufficient information to raise a reasonable 

suspicion Mr. Phommachanh was involved in the two Sonic Drive-In 

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robberies and the Mandarin Restaurant robbery/murder. First, the 

Task Force believed the nature of the Sonic Drive-In robberies 

implicated an employee or former employee, and Mr. Phommachanh had 

previously worked at the first restaurant robbed. Second, a 

witness to the first robbery identified Mr. Phommachanh as one of 

the perpetrators based on his voice and mannerisms. Third, the 

similarity of the two crimes and ballistics evidence linked the two 

Sonic Drive-In robberies indicating to the Task Force both were 

committed by the same people. Fourth, the information the Task 

Force learned from Mrs. Phommachanh that she feared her son was 

involved in gang activities and might also specifically be involved 

in the Sonic Drive-In and Mandarin robberies served to confirm the 

Task Force's existing information suggesting Mr. Phommachanh' s 

involvement . 5 The combination of all this information was 

sufficient to give the Task Force reasonable suspicion justifying 

an investigatory stop of the Blazer to question Mr. Phommachanh. 

s Souphaphone Lang argues when she testified at the suppression hearing Mrs. 

Phommachanh explained she never told Detective Mervosh she thought her son was specifically 

involved in the Sonic Drive-In and Mandarin robberies, but simply feared her son's participation 

in criminal and gang activities generally. This certainly represents a fair reading of Mrs. 

Phommachanh' s testimony. However, our standard of review requires us to view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the district court's ruling. Accordingly, we must accept Detective 

Mervosh's contrary testimony Mrs. Phommachanh specifically mentioned she feared her son was 

involved in these three robberies. 

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In addition, the Langs argue the Task Force's mistake of 

Douangmala Lang as Mr. Phommachanh was not reasonable. Souphaphone 

and Douangmala Lang argue two of the members of the Task Force 

possessed additional relevant information which should have 

assisted them in recognizing Douangmala was not Mr. Phommachanh. 

On November 17, twelve days prior to the incident, Souphaphone Lang 

was interviewed by Detective Mervosh who took a personal and family 

history of him during the interview where he learned Souphapone had 

a brother named Douangmala. Further, Officer Mumma participated in 

a stop of a vehicle where Mr. Phommachanh was a passenger 

approximately six to eight months earlier. The Langs argue this 

additional information renders the mistake of identity 

unreasonable. 

The evidence is uncontroverted that Agent Jablonski made the 

decision to stop the Blazer on his own without discussing it with 

the other members of the Task Force . Although the Task Force 

members did commonly pool information about the cases they were 

working on, nothing in the record even suggests Agent Jablonski was 

privy to the additional information attributable to Detective 

Mervosh or Officer Mumma. We are unpersuaded by the Langs' 

argument all the information known to one of the Task Force agents 

is attributable to Agent Jablonski absent some evidence they 

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communicated the specific information to him so it factored into 

his decision-making process. What is at issue here is whether 

Agent Jablonski's mistake of identity was reasonable under the 

circumstances; and, as the district court pointed out, he had no 

contact with and had never seen Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang or 

Mr. Phommachanh prior to November 29. 

Further, the Langs argue the mistake of identity was 

unreasonable because of the physical dissimilarities between 

Douangmala Lang and Mr. Phommachanh. Agent Jablonski had both a 

mug shot and a description of Mr. Phommachanh which described him 

as between 5'3" and 5'6" in height, and weighing 140 to 150 pounds, 

with a shaved head or a closely cropped hairstyle and facial hair. 

In contrast, Douangmala Lang was between 5'10" and 6'0" tall, 

weighed 160 to 190 pounds, and had a different hairstyle. These 

descriptions are patently different. However, Agent Jablonski 

testified he had approximately ten seconds to observe Douangmala 

Lang on his two trips between the mobile home and the Blazer from 

a distance of fifty to seventy yards. He also observed Douangmala 

Lang by driving alongside the Blazer and making a visual comparison 

between the mug shot pictures and the physical features of the 

vehicle's passenger. The brief time period and the difficulty of 

identifying someone in a moving vehicle must be taken into 

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consideration in evaluating the reasonableness of Agent Jablonski's 

mistake. In addition, the district court specifically found the 

mug shot picture of Mr. Phommachanh "looked very much like 

Douangmala Lang. " Agent Jablonski had the best opportunity to 

compare Douangmala Lang's facial features with the mug shot. His 

opportunity to compare Douangmala Lang's height and weight to the 

suspect's was hindered by the limited time period he saw him 

walking to and from the Blazer, and Douangmala Lang's seated 

position in the vehicle. Under the totality of the circumstances, 

we cannot conclude Agent Jablonski's misidentification of 

Douangmala Lang as Mr. Phommachanh was unreasonable. Accordingly, 

we hold the Task Force possessed sufficient justification to stop 

the Blazer. 

Next, the Langs contend the scope of the stop and the ensuing 

searches exceeded the Task Force's justification for the stop. 

Under Ter~'s second prong, the duration and extent of the seizure 

must be evaluated based upon "the circumstances which justified the 

interference in the first place." Ter~, 392 U.S. at 20. After 

the Blazer was stopped, both Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang were 

ordered to get out of their vehicle and subjected to pat down 

searches for weapons. The question is whether these actions are 

objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 

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We have previously noted: "Since police officers should not 

be required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, 

they are 'authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably 

necessary to protect their personal safety and maintain the status 

quo during the course of [a Terry] stop.'" United States v. Perdue, 

8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (lOth Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. 

Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985) (alterations in original)). The 

Task Force agents' actions in this case were entirely consistent 

with this principle. It was reasonable for the Task Force to 

conduct a pat down search because they legitimately believed 

Douangmala Lang was Mr. Phommachanh. Mr. Phommachanh was a suspect 

in two armed robberies and a robbery/murder. It was reasonable for 

the Task Force to believe he and his traveling companion, who 

himself was a potential accomplice in the robberies, might be armed 

and dangerous. The Task Force's decision to conduct a pat down 

search was reasonable to protect the agents' personal safety. In 

Perdue, we approved the officers' actions of executing the Terry 

stop .with their weapons drawn and ordering the suspect to exit his 

car and lie down on the ground "as a means of neutralizing the 

potential danger." Id. at 1462-63. The Task Force's actions here 

were less intrusive and equally reasonable under the circumstances. 

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The Langs argue, however, once Douangmala informed Officer 

Mumma he was Joe Lang and Detective Mervosh recognized Souphaphone, 

the Task Force should have stopped to check the Langs' identities. 

We disagree. First, Detective Mervosh's recognition of Souphaphone 

Lang is irrelevant to determining Douangmala Lang's identity. 

Second, while there is a factual dispute about when Douangmala Lang 

told Officer Mumma he was Joe Lang, we see no need to resolve it 

because there is no question Douangmala Lang's identity was not 

confirmed until after the completion of the pat down search. It is 

unreasonable to expect officers to stop a pat down search of a 

suspect they reasonably believe may be armed and dangerous simply 

based on the suspect's unconfirmed statement of his identity. 

Under these circumstances, we believe Officer Mumma acted properly 

by completing his pat down search of Douangmala Lang prior to 

seeking his identification to determine his identity. 

Individually, Douangmala Lang challenges Officer Mumma's pat 

down search which disclosed the cocaine. 6 Initially, he contends 

once Officer Mumma concluded the bulge in his left front pants 

pocket was not a weapon he should have stopped the search. 

6 Souphaphone Lang also raises this issue. In response, the government argues 

Souphaphone Lang lacks Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search of his brother. 

Our disposition of the issue renders Souphaphone Lang's argument moot, so we need not address 

his standing. 

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However, the Supreme Court has held a police officer may seize 

nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective pat down 

search permitted by Terry. Minnesota v. Nickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 

, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993). The Court reasoned: 

If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer 

clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes 

its identity immediately apparent, there has been no 

invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already 

authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the 

object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be 

justified by the same practical considerations that 

inhere in the plain view context. 

Id. at 2137 (citations and footnote omitted) . Under Nickerson, 

Officer Mumma's discovery of the plastic bag of cocaine in 

Douangmala Lang's pocket was reasonable because there is no 

evidence he did anything more intrusive than a simple pat down 

search. 

However, in this case, the search does not stand or fall based 

on Nickerson because Officer Mumma twice asked for and received 

Douangmala Lang's consent to search his pocket. A search is 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if voluntary consent is given 

to the police before the search. The voluntariness of a consent to 

search is examined under the totality of the circumstances with the 

government bearing the burden of proof. United States v. McCurdy, 

40 F.3d 1111, 1119 (lOth Cir. 1994). "The 'government must show 

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that there was no duress or coercion, express or implied, that the 

consent was unequivocal and specific, and that it was freely and 

intelligently given.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Zapata, 997 

F.2d 751, 758 (lOth Cir. 1993); see also United States v. MelendezGarcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053-54 (lOth Cir. 1994). The district court 

concluded, based on Officer Mumma's testimony, Douangmala Lang 

voluntarily consented to the search of his left front pants pocket. 

Douangmala Lang has offered nothing to disturb this finding on 

appeal, and our review of Officer Mumma's testimony supports the 

district court's conclusion. 

Finally, Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang assert Officer 

Mumma's discovery of the cocaine on the passenger's side of the 

Blazer's floorboard does not meet the requirements of the plain 

view exception. Law enforcement authorities may seize contraband 

in plain view without a warrant if three conditions are met: (1) 

the law enforcement authorities are lawfully in a position from 

which they may view the object; (2) the object's incriminating 

character is immediately apparent; and, (3) the authorities have 

a lawful right of access to the object. Nickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 

2136-37; United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 822 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 562 (1993); United States v. Corral, 970 

F.2d 719, 723 (lOth Cir. 1992). The Langs argue the first and 

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third factors have not been established in this case. Souphaphone 

and Douangmala Lang assert the Task Force agents initial stop of 

the Blazer was improper so they were not lawfully in a position to 

view the cocaine on the vehicle's floorboard. We have already 

concluded the stop of the Blazer was appropriate. Further, the 

Langs argue the cocaine was underneath the passenger seat on the 

floorboard and therefore not within plain view. Unfortunately, the 

Langs offer no specific evidence demonstrating the truth of their 

assertion to contradict Officer Mumma's testimony he spied the 

cocaine on the floorboard in front of the passenger seat through 

the open passenger door while frisking Douangmala Lang. We hold 

the cocaine first discovered in the Blazer by Officer Mumma falls 

within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 

In summary, we conclude the district court properly denied 

Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang's motion to suppress. The Task 

Force agents possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the Blazer; 

Agent Jablonski's mistake of Douangmala Lang as Fongyxmany 

Phommachanh was reasonable; the pat down searches of Souphaphone 

and Douangmala Lang were justified as a reasonable precautionary 

measure to ensure the Task Force agents' safety; the search did not 

exceed the scope of the initial impetus for the investigatory stop; 

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.. 

and Officer Mumma discovered the initial cocaine found in the 

Blazer within plain view. 

IV. 

Finally, Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang challenge their 

sentences. Specifically, both Langs argue the district court erred 

by imposing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l after finding Souphaphone and 

Douangmala Lang committed perjury when they testified at their 

trial. 

We review the factual findings supporting the application of 

a particular Sentencing Guideline provision for clear error. 

United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 440 (lOth Cir. 1995), 

petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (Feb. 23, 1996). In so 

doing, we give due deference to the district court's factual 

findings based on its observation of the testimony given at trial 

including the demeanor of the witnesses. United States v. Yost, 24 

F.3d 99, 106 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement 

if the defendant willfully attempts or succeeds in obstructing or 

impeding the administration of justice. U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l. The 

application notes make clear ucommitting, suborning, or attempting 

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to suborn perjury" is conduct sufficient to trigger this 

enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l (n.3 (b)). "A defendant commits 

perjury if he gives false testimony under oath concerning a 

material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, 

rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory." 

United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1132 (lOth Cir. 1995) (citing 

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, ___ , 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116 

(1993)). 

In the instant case, the presentence reports for both 

Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang recommended a two-level enhancement 

for an obstruction of justice. Both presentencing reports 

concluded the brothers committed perjury when they testified at 

trial. Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang objected to the 

recommendation, but after holding a sentencing hearing, the 

district court agreed with the probation office and imposed the 

U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l enhancement. 

On appeal, Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang argue the district 

court erred on two grounds. First, the Langs assert the court 

failed to make the requisite specific factual findings they 

willfully committed perjury to impede the administration of 

justice. They contend the court only made a general statement 

finding Souphaphone and Douangmala Lang's testimony perjurious. 

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Second, the Langs maintain they did not commit perjury. Instead, 

they characterize the differences in their testimony from the Task 

Force agents as merely a factual dispute. The Langs argue they 

were improperly punished simply for exercising their right to 

testify on their own behalf. We conclude these arguments are 

without merit. 

In Dunnigan, the Supreme Court explained a sentencing court 

"must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary 

to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or 

an attempt to do the same .... " Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1117. 

Since the Court's decision, we have elaborated the type of findings 

required: 

We do not mean to imply the district court must recite 

the perjurious testimony verbatim. The district court 

must generally identify the testimony at issue from his 

or her trial notes or memory and it is sufficient if such 

testimony is merely described in substance so that when 

we review the transcript we can evaluate the Dunnigan 

findings of the elements of perjury against an identified 

line of questions and answers without having simply to 

speculate on what the district court might have believed 

was the perjurious testimony. 

United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1574 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 115 S.Ct. 2628 (1995). The district court complied with 

Dunnigan and Massey in this instance. For Souphaphone Lang, the 

district court focused on the defendant's testimony he did not know 

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there was any cocaine in the Blazer until after he was arrested and 

his denial of knowledge about the cocaine found inside a rolled 

pair of socks in his dresser drawer in his bedroom. Similarly, for 

Douangmala Lang, the court specified his testimony he planned to 

take the cocaine and dispose of it in the river as a favor for Mr. 

Phommachanh. The court's focus on this specific testimony it 

considered perjurious was sufficient to allow us to review the 

substance of its finding, which is all that is required by Dunnigan 

and its progeny in this circuit. The court' s findings are 

favorably compared with those instances where we have previously 

held a sentencing court's findings were not specific enough. 

Compare United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891, 898 (lOth Cir. 1993) 

("The record does not contain a specific finding that independent 

of the jury verdict, defendant committed perjury. Nor does it 

suggest what particular testimony the district court found 

untrue."); United States v. Hansen, 964 F.2d 1017, 1020 (lOth Cir. 

1992) ("[T]he district court's finding that both it and the jury 

may not have believed the defendant's testimony stops well short of 

a finding that the defendant perjured himself. Further, the trial 

court's statement as to finding the defendant untruthful was not in 

specific regards to any testimony given by the defendant."). 

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The Langs characterize any discrepancies or inconsistencies in 

their testimony in comparison to the Task Force agents' and their 

prior inculpatory statements as merely a factual dispute 

insufficient to warrant a finding of perjury. We disagree. Our 

review of the record convinces us both Souphaphone and Douangmala 

Lang knowingly lied on the witness stand during their trial. Like 

the district court, we find much of their trial testimony at the 

least highly inconsistent and at the most preposterous. We reject 

the Langs' assertion they received the two-level enhancement simply 

because they decided to testify on their own behalf. Accordingly, 

we conclude the district court properly enhanced Souphaphone and 

Douangmala Lang's sentences pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR 

RESENTENCING. 

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