Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00751/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00751-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronnie Harvell
Petitioner
Louis Winn
Respondent

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ronnie Harvell, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Louis Winn, 

Respondent.

No. CV-12-00751-TUC-RCC (CRP)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Ronnie Harvell, who is currently an inmate at the Federal Correctional 

Institution in Terre Haute, Indiana,1

 (see Doc. 17), has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2241 (Doc. 1) challenging the denial of his parole. 

Respondent has filed a Return and Answer (Doc. 16) requesting that the Petition be 

dismissed. For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, dismiss and deny the Petition. 

BACKGROUND

 On July 13, 1994, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Court”) 

sentenced Harvell to a term of probation for simple assault. (Answer, p. 2 n. 2 (citing 

Exh. F, p. 4)). Thereafter, on April 25, 1995, the D.C. Court sentenced Harvell to an 

 

1

 Because Harvell was incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona, when he filed his Petition, this Court retains jurisdiction to consider the Petition. 

See Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990)(“jurisdiction attaches on the initial 

filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change.”) (citation omitted). 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 1 of 14
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

aggregate term of three to nine years in prison for burglary in the second degree and 

possession of cocaine. (Answer, p. 1 (citing Exh. A); see also Answer, p. 2 (citing Exh. 

B) (Harvell committed the burglary offense in 1994 and the drug offense in 1991)). The 

District of Columbia Board of Parole (“D.C. Board”) paroled Harvell on October 29, 

1997, with a full term date of April 23, 2003. (Response, p. 2 (citing Exh. C)). 

 On June 11, 1998, the D.C. Board issued a warrant charging Harvell with, inter 

alia, failure to obey all laws and failure to report arrest to probation officer. (Answer,, p. 

2 (citing Exh. E) (the warrant was filed as a detainer because Harvell was in custody)). 

On November 6, 1998, the D.C. Court revoked Harvell’s probation for simple assault and 

sentenced him to 180 days in jail. (Answer, p. 2 (citing Exh. G)). On February 25, 1999, 

the D.C. Court sentenced Harvell to consecutive terms of 5 to 15 years for burglary, first 

degree; 4 to 12 years for burglary, second degree; and 4 to12 months for violating the 

Bail Reform Act, along with a concurrent term of 180 days for domestic assault. 

(Answer, p. 2 (citing Exh. H)). In sum, the D.C. Court sentenced Harvell to an aggregate 

term of 28 years. (Answer, p. 2 (citing Exh. F, p. 5)). 

 In June 2009, Harvell appeared for a parole hearing. (See Answer, Exh. J). Parole 

was denied and a parole reconsideration hearing was scheduled 36 months later. (See

Answer, Exh. M; Answer, Exh. J, p.5). Harvell challenges that decision. 

 Although Harvell’s sentences were imposed by the D.C. Court, the U.S. Parole 

Commission (“Commission”) made the parole determination in this case. That is because 

Congress, under the National Capitalization Revitalization and Self–Government 

Improvement Act of 1997 (“Revitalization Act”), has mandated that the federal Bureau of 

Prisons (“BOP”) be responsible for the custody and care of felons sentenced to 

incarceration pursuant to the D.C. Code. See Pub.L.No. 105–33 § 11201, 111 Stat. 251 

(1997) (codified at D.C. Code § 24-101). The Revitalization Act also transferred 

paroling authority from the D.C. Board to the U.S. Parole Commission (“Commission”). 

Id. 

Between 1998 and 2000, the Commission adopted a revised version of the D.C. 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 2 of 14
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

parole regulations that had been in effect since 1987 (“the 2000 Commission 

Guidelines”). See Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Sellmon 

v. Reilly, 551 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.D.C. 2008). However, due to subsequent litigation raising 

ex post facto concerns, the Commission promulgated a rule that application of the 1987 

D.C. Board Guidelines (“the 1987 D.C. Guidelines”) applied to any offender who 

committed his crime between March 4, 1985 (the effective date of the 1987 D.C. 

Guidelines), and August 4, 1998 (the last day the D.C. Board exercised parole release 

authority) (“Sellmon Rule”). See 74 Fed.Reg. 34688 (July 17, 2009) (interim rule, 

effective August 17, 2009) and 28 C.F.R. § 2.80(o) (November 13, 2009) (final rule); 

(see also Answer, p. 3 n.3). 

 Additionally, in 1991, the Board published a “policy guideline” (not a codified 

regulation) which contained further guidance on the definitions of terms found in the 

1987 guidelines. This 1991 Policy Guideline remained in effect from the date it was 

issued on December 16, 1991, until October 23, 1995, when the Board issued new policy 

guidelines. Because Harvell committed his burglary offense during this period, the 

Commission applied the 1991 Policy Guideline to his case. (Answer, p. 3 n. 3). 

 On June 18, 2009, the Commission conducted Harvell’s initial parole hearing 

under the Commission’s 2000 Guidelines. (Answer, p. 3 & Exh. J). However, thereafter, 

the Executive Reviewer reevaluated Harvell’s case pursuant to the 1987 D.C. 

Guidelines.2

 (Answer, Exh. J, p. 4). The Executive Reviewer first computed Harvell’s 

 

2

 The 1987 D.C. Guidelines require calculation of a Total Point Score based on the 

inmate’s “Salient Factor Score” which takes into account six pre-incarceration factors: 

(1) prior convictions and adjudications; (2) prior commitments of more than 30 days; (3) 

age at the commission of current offense; (4) recent commitment-free period; (5) status of 

prisoner at time of current offense; and (6) history of heroin or opiate dependence. 

Sellmon, 551 F.Supp. 2d at 70. After calculation of the Salient Factor Score, other preincarceration and post-incarceration factors, including “negative institutional behavior”, 

are taken into account to arrive at the Point Assignment Grid Score, also referred to as the 

Total Point Score. Sellmon, 551 F.Supp. 2d at 70-71. At bottom, the Point Assignment 

Grid Score indicated the risk level presented by each inmate. See id. If the Total Point 

Score was three or more at the initial hearing, parole would ordinarily be denied and the 

inmate would be continued for a rehearing. Id. at 71; see also Answer, p. 3 n. 3. 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 3 of 14
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Salient Factor Score taking into account Harvell’s prior convictions (1 point for three 

prior convictions), prior commitments (1 point for 1 prior commitment), age at the time 

of the offense (1 point for being 25 years old with less than 5 prior commitments), recent 

commitment-free periods (0 points), status at time of current offense (0 points), and 

opiate dependence (1 point for no history of opiate dependence). (Id.). Harvell’s Salient 

Factor Score was determined to be 4 points, “using the factors for the computations of the 

salient factor score as outlined in the [1987] DC regulations.” (Id.). Harvell’s Salient 

Factor Score placed him in the “Moderate” risk group. See Sellmon, 551 F.Supp. 2d at 

70. The Executive Reviewer continued with the calculation as follows: 

Using the point Assignment Grid for Initial Hearings, he would receive 2 

points for the salient factor score. In Section 1, he would not receive a 

point for the current offense involving a felony in which he caused, 

attempted to cause or threatened to cause the death or serious bodily injury 

to another individual or possessed a weapon. In section 2, he would receive 

a point for negative institutional adjustment since he received 6 countable 

infractions within 3 years of the parole eligibility date. Harvel[l] had oneClass I report for Assault, three-Class II reports for fighting, one-Class II 

report for assault (did not qualify under definitions for Class I) and oneClass II report for threatening bodily harm. He received the last report in 

February 2009. In section 3, the score would not be reduced for sustained 

program achievement. Harvell had not participated in programs. The total 

grid score for the initial hearing is 3. The DC regulations state that for a 

grid score of 3, parole should be denied and a rehearing scheduled within 

12 months. 

(Answer, Exh. J, p. 4). 

 Although the 1987 D.C. Guidelines generally provide for a reconsideration 

hearing in 12 months for an inmate with Harvell’s total point score, the Executive 

Reviewer noted that the Guidelines allow for a departure: 

Based on the date of the offense, the regulations allow for the addition of 1 

point to the grid score for negative institutional [sic] that occurred 3 years 

prior to the parole eligibility date. As a result, the misconduct reports he 

received prior to January 9, 2005 were not considered. In addition, the 

point would have been added to the score for the Class I assault. The 

additional 5 reports were not a factor in the receipt of the point. Prior to the 

three-year cut-off, Harvell had 26 misconduct reports since he was 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 4 of 14
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

transferred to the BOP in October 2000. There is no information as to his 

conduct while in DOC custody. Of the 26 reports, 5 were assault, 4 were 

threats, 5 were for fighting, and 4 were for refusing an order. The 

remainder were all Class II reports, but minor in nature. It should be noted 

that 4 months prior to the hearing, he received a misconduct report for 

assault. The Commission does not have copies of the misconduct reports or 

DHOs. The examiner discussed the infractions with him at the hearing and 

the summary indicates he admitted the violations. The reviewer’s 

assessment of the class levels was based on the available information. 

 The DC regulations allow for a departure based on repeated or 

serious disciplinary infractions and the need for programming. Although 

Harvell needs programs to remain crime-free, he has mental health issues 

that have precluded him from program participation. Since his move to 

Coleman, he has been medication compliant and has improved. Since he 

has improved, he may be able to participate in the programs prior to his 

next hearing. Harvell stated that his offenses in the community were 

committed primarily to support his drug abuse. It is recommended that the 

Commission depart from the 12-month rehearing guideline to the 36 

months recommended by the examiner. 

(Id.). 

 The Commission, which stated in its Notice of Action that it was “applying the 

[1987] D.C. Guidelines”, essentially adopted the Executive Reviewer’s calculations. 

(Answer, Exh. M; see also Answer, Exh. J, p. 5) The Commission found Harvell’s 

Salient Factor Score was 4 and grid score was 3, and that under the Guidelines, parole 

should be denied for a grid score of 3. (Answer, Exh. M; see also Answer, Exh. J, p.5). 

Consistent with the Executive Reviewer’s recommendation, the Commission went on to 

depart[] from the rehearing guidelines due to your history of repeated 

serious negative institutional behavior. Since your transfer to the BOP in 

October 2000, you have received 26 disciplinary reports. You have 

multiple reports for assault, fighting and making threats to others. In 

addition, within 4 months of this hearing, you were found guilty of assault 

by the DHO. These reports show the Commission that you are either 

unwilling or unable to control your behavior which makes you a serious 

risk when you are released to the community. 

 Prior to your reconsideration hearing, you should participate in the 

Challenge program or other similar programs such as anger and stress 

management. In addition, you should continue to participate in counseling 

and remain medication complaint. You should also maintain clear conduct. 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 5 of 14
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Answer, Exh. M; see also Answer, Exh. J, p. 5). The Commission scheduled a 

reconsideration hearing in 36 months. (Answer, Exh. M). 

DISCUSSION

 Harvell raises two Grounds for relief. He first asserts that the Commission 

violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution by miscalculating his Salient 

Factor Score and Total Grid Score. He contends that the Commission erroneously 

considered all of the disciplinary infractions he committed while in BOP custody, rather 

than only considering the infractions he committed within three years of his parole 

eligibility date. (Ground I). He also argues that the Commission should not have added a 

point to his Total Grid Score for negative institutional behavior because the BOP 

disciplinary hearing rules do not afford the right to have an attorney at disciplinary 

hearings and do not prove the right to file an appeal within three days of the receipt of the 

disciplinary hearing decision. (Id.). 

 In Ground II, Harvell asserts that the Commission violated the Ex Post Facto 

Clause of the U.S. Constitution by applying the Commissioner’s 2000 Guidelines instead 

of the 1987 D.C. Guidelines to his case. (Ground II). He contends that the Commission 

failed to apply the 1991 Guideline that states that only infractions committed within three 

years of the parole eligibility date will be considered as negative institutional behavior. 

(Ground II). 

 Respondent argues that both of Harvell’s claims fail. 

EX POST FACTO CLAIM. The Court addresses Harvell’s Ex Post Facto claim at the 

outset, because the determination of which regulations were applied by the Commission 

factor into resolution of both of his claims for relief. 

 The Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits “enactments which, 

by retroactive operation, increase the punishment for a crime after its commission.” 

Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249 (2000). A retroactively applied parole regulation or 

guideline violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it creates “a significant risk of increasing 

[the petitioner’s] punishment.” Id. at 255; see also id. at 251 (in the parole context, the 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 6 of 14
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

question is whether the law at issue “creates a significant risk of prolonging [petitioner’s] 

incarceration.”)). 

 Harvell argues that the Commission applied the 2000 Guidelines, instead of the 

1987 D.C. Guidelines, to deny him parole because he believes that parole would have 

been granted under the 1987 D.C. Guidelines. To support his argument, Petitioner relies 

on the D.C. Board 1991 Policy Guideline, which applies to the 1987 D.C. Guidelines and 

which provides that only infractions committed within three years of the parole eligibility 

date should be considered as “negative institutional behavior.” (Petition, p. 4). Harvell 

claims that instead of following the 1991 Policy Guideline, the Commission “used 26 

disciplinary reports that Petitioner had received since [his] transfer to the BOP in October 

2000. In addition, they also used a disciplinary infraction which happen[ed] within four 

months of [his] parole hearing.” (Id.). He argues that he would have been granted parole 

had the Commission used the proper guidelines. (Id.). 

 The 1991 Policy Guideline was promulgated “[t]o define criteria and parameters 

for determining the applicability of descriptive terminology used in the [1987] Parole 

Guidelines for release decisionmaking and to facilitate consistency in Guideline 

application.” (Answer, Exh. P, p. 1). The 1991 Policy Guideline explained, in pertinent, 

part that “‘Negative Institutional Behavior’” in initial parole consideration cases meant: 

(1) one Class I Offense for murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, armed robbery, or first 

degree burglary at any time during the minimum sentence; (2) one Class I Offense during 

the twelve months preceding the hearing or during the last half of the minimum sentence 

up to a period of three years, whichever is longer; or (3) two Class II Offenses during the 

twelve months preceding the hearing or during the last half of the minimum sentence up 

to a period of three years, whichever is longer. Answer, Exh. P. 

 The Hearing Summary reflects the Executive Reviewer’s recommendation and 

calculation under the 1987 D.C. Guidelines and the Commission’s adoption of same. 

(Answer, Exh. J, pp. 4-5). The Executive Reviewer is clear that Harvell “would receive a 

point for negative institutional adjustment since he received 6 countable infractions 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 7 of 14
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

within 3 years of the parole eligibility date”, which included a Class I assault, three class 

II reports for fighting, one Class II report for assault, and one Class II report for 

threatening bodily harm.” (Answer, p. 4 (emphasis added)). Elsewhere in the Hearing 

Summary, the Executive Reviewer pointed out that the point for negative institutional 

adjustment “would have been added to the score for the Class I assault[]”, alone. (Id.). 

The record is clear that the Commission applied the same grid score arrived at by the 

Executive Reviewer. (Answer, Exh. M; see also Answer, Exh. J, p. 5). In doing so, the 

Commission stated that it was “applying the DC Board of Parole hearing guidelines to 

[Harvell’s] case.” (Answer, Exh. M; see also Answer, Exh. J, p. 5). Consistent with the 

1987 D.C. Guidelines, the Commission denied parole because Harvell had a total grid 

score of 3. (Answer, Exh. M; see also Answer, Exh. J, p. 5) 

 Harvell instead focuses on the Commission’s reference to his 26 infractions 

committed while in BOP custody. However, the record is clear that the Commission did 

not consider all 26 infractions in making the determination to deny parole. (See Answer, 

Exh. M; Answer, Exh. J, p. 5). Instead, the Commission only considered the 26 

disciplinary reports for the Commission’s departure from the rehearing guidelines in 

scheduling a rehearing in 36 months rather than 12 months. (Answer, Exh. M; Answer 

Exh. J, p. 5). 

 “Upon a denial of parole, the 1987 [D.C.] Guidelines specified that a rehearing 

was ‘ordinarily’ to be scheduled within ‘a set number of months depending on the type of 

offense committed and the number of years remaining in the maximum sentence.’” 

Goodall v. Billingsley, 2013 WL 3343658, *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2013) (citing Brown v. 

United States Parole Comm’n., 2003 WL 194206 *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 28, 2003) (citing 

D.C. Mun. Regs. Tit 28 ''104.4-104.9 (1987))). However, the D.C. Board “could depart 

from this recommendation and ‘order a parole reconsideration date it determine[d] to be 

appropriate.’” Id. (quoting Brown, 2003 WL 194206 at *4 (citing D.C. Mun. Regs. Tit. 

28 '104.11)); see also Sellmon v. Reilly, 561 F.Supp.2d 46, 52 n.4 (D.D.C. 2008) 

(Sellmon II) (recognizing that the D.C. Board has “more flexibility in setting rehearing 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 8 of 14
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

dates than it did in determining whether to grant or deny parole.”); Brown, 2003 WL 

194206 at 4 (“Thus, the regulations only suggest a time when a parole reconsideration 

hearing should take place and do not mandate that the rehearing be held in a certain 

number of months.”). 

 Additionally, in April 1992, the Board adopted a Policy Guideline (“1992 Policy 

Guideline”) addressing the establishment of parole reconsideration hearings. Goodall,

2013 WL 3343658 at *6; see also http://www.justice.gov/uspc/documents/parole-policyguidelines.pdf at pp. 51-56 (text of 1992 Policy Guideline). The aim of the 1992 Policy 

Guideline was to “eliminate any interpretation that the Board is restricted to using the 

specific aggravating and mitigating factors listed” in the 1987 D.C. Guidelines with 

regard to scheduling parole reconsideration hearings. 

http://www.justice.gov/uspc/documents/parole-policy-guidelines.pdf at p. 51. “[T]he 

1992 Policy [Guideline]...replaced the 1991 Policy [Guideline] to the extent it had 

addressed reconsideration hearings. Goodall, 2013 WL 3343658 at *6 (citing Sellmon II, 

561 F.Supp.2d at 52). Under the 1992 Guidelines, “the Board could, ‘in its discretion,’ 

schedule a rehearing date later than the date prescribed in the 1987 Guidelines.” Id. 

(citing 1992 Policy Guideline at 'VI(A)(2)). The 1992 Policy Guideline provided a nonexhaustive list of aggravating factors justifying scheduling a reconsideration hearing 

outside the prescribed time period, including that: “[t]here has been repeated or 

extremely serious negative institutional behavior[]”; or “[t]here has been opportunity but 

little/no effort made toward rehabilitation/preparation for remaining crime-free if 

returned to the community[]; or “[t]he offender poses a serious threat to self or others and 

adequate resources are not available in the community.” 1992 Policy Guideline at 

'VI(A)(2)(g)-(i). The 1992 Policy Guideline does not restrict the time period when 

considering “negative institutional behavior”. Under the 1992 Policy Guideline, the 

Board was required to specify each aggravating factor in support of a departure. Id. at 

'VII(A)(1). 

 In Harvell’s case, the Executive Reviewer recommended departure from the 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 9 of 14
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

guidelines in setting a rehearing date “based on repeated or serious disciplinary 

infractions and the need for programming, “noting Harvell’s multiple infractions since his 

2000 transfer to BOP custody and the fact that until recently, his mental health issues had 

“precluded him from program participation.” (Answer, Exh. J, p. 4). In its decision, the 

Commission stated it departed from rehearing guidelines “due to [Harvell’s] history of 

repeated serious negative institutional behavior. Since your transfer to the BOP in 

October 2000, you have received 26 disciplinary reports. You have multiple reports for 

assault, fighting and making threats to others. In addition, within 4 months of this 

hearing, you were found guilty of assault by the DHO. These reports show the 

Commission that you are either unwilling or unable to control your behavior which 

makes you a serious risk when you are released to the community.” (Answer, Exh. M). 

The Commission also indicated that “[p]rior to your reconsideration hearing, you should 

participate in the Challenger program or other similar programs such as anger and stress 

management. In addition, you should continue to participate in counseling and remain 

medication compliant. You should also maintain clear contact.” (Id.). 

 “The decision to deny parole and the decision to postpone a reconsideration 

hearing are two distinct determinations” and “the obligation to schedule a reconsideration 

hearing is ‘independent’ of the decision to grant or deny parole....” Goodall, 2013 WL at 

3343658 at *11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As discussed above, 

under the 1992 Policy Guideline the Commission could, in its discretion, depart from the 

prescribed rehearing date. 1992 Policy Guideline, 'VII(A)(2). See also Sellmon II, 561 

F.Supp.2d at 52 n.4; Goodall, 2013 WL 3343658 at *3. The record reflects that the 

Commission complied with the Guidelines applicable to Harvell by specifying the 

reasons for its departure. Further, there is no showing on this record that the Commission 

considered factors that were inappropriate. See Marshall v. Reilly, 2014 WL 6066163, 

*3-*4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2014) (holding there was no ex post facto violation where the 

Commission did not consider institutional infractions older than 3 years in computing 

petitioner’s guidelines or as a reason for denial of parole; instead, the Commission relied 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 10 of 14
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

on infractions outside the 3-year period for setting a rehearing date of 36 months rather 

than 12 months.). 

 On the instant record, neither the Commission’s decision denying parole, nor its 

decision to schedule a rehearing date of 36 months are in contravention of the regulations 

and Guidelines applicable to Harvell. Because the Commission in fact applied the 1987 

D.C. Guidelines, and 1991 and 1992 Policy Guidelines, there is no violation of the Ex 

Post Facto Clause and the Court should grant Respondent’s request to dismiss 

Petitioner’s Ex Post Facto claim as moot. (See Answer, p. 9) (requesting dismissal as 

moot)). 

DUE PROCESS CLAIM. To determine whether a due process violation has occurred, 

“[w]e first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has 

been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed...were constitutionally 

sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, __, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861 (2011) (there is no 

right under the U.S. Constitution to parole). “In the parole context, a prisoner alleging a 

due process claim must demonstrate the existence of a protected liberty interest in parole, 

and the denial of one or more of the procedural protections that must be afforded when a 

prisoner has a liberty interest in parole.’” Rogers v. Winn, 2014 WL 1669099, *2 (D.Ariz. 

April 28, 2014) (quoting Rosenkrantz v. Marshall, 444 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1077 

(C.D.Cal.2006)), adopted, 2014 WL 2585087 (D. Ariz. June 10, 2014) “A 

constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole will be found if the statutory scheme 

uses mandatory language that creates a presumption that parole will be granted if certain 

designated findings are made.” Rogers, 2014 WL 1669099 at 3. In this case, any liberty 

interest in parole “must emanate from...District of Columbia law.” Ellis, 84 F.3d 1413, 

1420 (D.C.Cir. 1996). 

 Harvell cannot prevail on a due process claim because “[t]he D.C. parole scheme 

does not employ mandatory language[]”, but instead only grants the parole board 

discretion to determine an inmate’s eligibility for release. Rogers, 2014 WL 1669099 at 

*3 (citing Ellis, 84 F.3d at 1420); see also Thomas v. Veach, 501 F.3d 832, 836-37 (“the 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 11 of 14
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

District of Columbia's parole statute does not contain mandatory language creating an 

expectancy of release that rises to the level of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 

Indeed, the law is well established that the D.C. statutory scheme does not create any 

liberty interest in parole.”) (citations omitted); Goodall, 2013 WL 3343658 at *12 (the 

1987 D.C. Guidelines did not create a liberty interest in parole); Hunter v. United States 

Parole Comm’n., 2011 WL 4528469, *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2011) (same). “Because no 

liberty interest is at stake, the [Commission] did not violate the due process clause in 

denying [Harvell’s] parole and extending his rehearing by 36 months.” Thomas, 501 

F.3d at 837. 

 Moreover, Harvell is mistaken when he argues that in denying parole, the 

Commission considered all of the disciplinary infractions he committed while in BOP 

custody. As discussed above, in denying Harvell parole, the Commission only 

considered the disciplinary infractions Harvell committed within three years of his parole 

eligibility date, as allowed under the 1991 Policy Guideline. The Commission considered 

infractions outside that period only when scheduling a reconsideration hearing. The 

Commission may, in its discretion, postpone a reconsideration hearing and nothing in the 

applicable guideline limits the Commission’s consideration of negative institutional 

behavior when scheduling a reconsideration hearing. See Goodall, 2013 WL at 3343658 

at *11 (“the obligation to schedule a reconsideration hearing is ‘independent’ of the 

decision to grant or deny parole....”).

 Nor can there be any due process violation because the BOP procedures governing 

disciplinary hearings did not conform to the procedures employed by a D.C. prison. The 

U.S. Supreme Court had held that for prison disciplinary proceedings to comport with the 

demands of the Due Process Clause, the inmate must be afforded: (1) written notice of 

the disciplinary charges at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing; (2) a neutral and 

detached hearing body; (3) an opportunity to present evidence and call witnesses; (4) an 

opportunity to have non-attorney representation when the inmate is illiterate or the 

disciplinary proceeding involves complex issues; and (5) a written statement provided by 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 12 of 14
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the fact finder of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision. Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Further, according to Respondent, BOP regulations 

also provide that an inmate is entitled to a staff representative at the disciplinary hearing 

and to a written copy of the decision. (Answer, p. 9 (citations omitted)); see also 28 

C.F.R. '541, et seq. Harvell does not challenge the fact that each of the Wolff

requirements was met and that he was afforded the rights provided under the BOP’s 

regulations. “Since the procedures employed by BOP disciplinary proceedings fully 

satisfy due process requirements, reliance on the outcomes of those proceedings is fully 

justified by parole adjudicators.”3

 Hunter, 2011 WL 4528469 at *7. See also Rogers,

2014 WL 1669099 at *2 (Commission’s consideration of disciplinary infractions 

adjudicated under BOP regulations rather than under the old D.C. Department of 

Corrections regulations “did not violate due process...because there is no liberty interest 

in parole under D.C. law.”). 

 Finally, although “[t]here is some authority for the proposition that exceptionally 

arbitrary governmental conduct may in itself violate the due process clause, whether or 

not a liberty or property interest is at stake”, Thomas, 501 F.3d at 837, (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted), the record reflects that the Commission complied with the 

guidelines applicable to Harvell and set forth rational reasons for its decision; thus, the 

Commission’s decision was not arbitrary. 

CONCLUSION

 Because the Commission employed the appropriate guidelines in making its parole 

determination, Harvell’s Ex Post Facto claim is moot. Moreover, Harvell is unable to 

show that his right to due process has been violated. 

RECOMMENDATION

 

3

 The Hunter court also noted that under the Revitalization Act, D.C. inmates 

transferred to the BOP “‘shall be subjected to any law or regulation applicable to person [sic] committed for violations of laws of the United States consistent with the sentence 

imposed.’ See D.C. Code '24-101(a) and (b)....Thus, as the BOP was vested with the 

legal custody of the D.C. Code offenders, they too are subject to the disciplinary regulations of the BOP.” Hunter, 2011 WL 4528469 at *7 n. 7. 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 13 of 14
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, dismiss and deny Harvell’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS 

after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond 

to another party’s objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from 

the District Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following 

case number: CV 12-751-TUC-RCC.

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the 

issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. 

denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). 

 Dated this 30th day of January, 2015. 

 

 

 

Case 4:12-cv-00751-RCC Document 18 Filed 02/03/15 Page 14 of 14