Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01409/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01409-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
PPG Industries, Inc.
Appellant
Valspar Sourcing, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Appellant

v.

VALSPAR SOURCING, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1406, 2016-1409

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

95/001,950, 95/001,951.

______________________ 

Decided: February 9, 2017 

______________________ 

EDWARD ANTHONY FIGG, Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & 

Manbeck, P.C., Washington, DC, argued for appellant. 

Also represented by RACHEL ECHOLS. 

MATTHEW A. SMITH, Turner Boyd LLP, Redwood City, 

CA, argued for appellee. Also represented by ESHA

BANDYOPADHYAY, KAREN IRENE BOYD. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

Case: 16-1409 Document: 5-2 Page: 1 Filed: 02/09/2017
2 PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. v. VALSPAR SOURCING, INC. 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

These consolidated appeals arise from final decisions 

by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) on inter 

partes reexaminations of two patents, in which there was 

no pending district court litigation at the time the reexaminations were initiated and decided. The reexamination requestor (PPG) appealed to this court in accordance 

with 35 U.S.C. §§ 141 and 315 (pre-AIA), and the prevailing party (the Patent Owner, Valspar) took the position 

that PPG had no standing to appeal the PTAB decisions 

because there was no Article III case or controversy. 

Valspar thereafter filed an infringement suit on related 

patents in the Minnesota District Court, but argues that 

Article III standing must exist at the time of filing the 

appeal of the PTAB decisions.

The panel requested additional briefing, and such 

briefing was duly received from both parties on November 

15, 2016. With its brief, Valspar included a unilateral 

Covenant Not To Sue with respect to the two patents that 

are the subject of the PTAB decisions:

[Valspar] covenant[s] not to sue PPG Industries, 

Inc. or any of its subsidiaries or customers (collectively, “PPG”) for infringement of any claim of 

[U.S. Patent No. 7,592,047] or [U.S. Patent No. 

8,092,876] as of the date of this Covenant Not To 

Sue based on PPG’s manufacture, importation, 

use, sale and/or offer for sale of any currently existing products or use of methods and of prior existing products or prior use of methods.1

Letter from Appellee Valspar Sourcing, Inc., Ex. 5, Nov. 

15, 2016, Dkt. 39. Valspar stated that it maintained its 

position that PPG does not have standing to appeal, but 

 

1 Signed for Valspar Sourcing, Inc. and The Valspar 

Corporation.

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PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. v. VALSPAR SOURCING, INC. 3

that whatever our ruling on standing, PPG’s appeal had 

become moot as a result of the Covenant Not To Sue. In 

view of the concurrent filings and the unilateral nature of 

the covenant, we requested and received additional briefing directed to the question of mootness and vacatur.

We conclude that PPG did have standing to file this 

appeal, but that the controversy as to the patented subject 

matter is mooted by the Covenant Not To Sue. Accordingly, we vacate the decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal 

Board, and dismiss this appeal.

I 

STANDING

The evidence presented by PPG demonstrates that it 

possessed more than a “general grievance concerning” 

these patents, sufficient to show “a particularized, concrete interest in the patentability” of the subject matter, 

as discussed in Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni 

Research Foundation, 753 F.3d 1258, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 

2014). The evidence shows that: (1) by the time PPG filed 

its notice of appeal in this case, it had already launched a 

commercial can-interior coating for the beverage can 

industry;2 and (2) PPG had received at least one inquiry 

from a customer suggesting that Valspar intended to 

pursue infringement litigation against PPG related to its 

can-interior coating.3 At a minimum, this evidence establishes that PPG had a legitimate concern that its manufacture and sale of its can-interior coating would draw an 

infringement action by Valspar. PPG’s concern proved 

warranted when Valspar subsequently filed an infringement action on related patents. See Valspar Corp. v. PPG 

 

2 Letter from Appellant PPG Industries, Inc., Ex. B, 

¶ 2, Nov. 15, 2016, Dkt. 40.

3 Id. at Ex. A, ¶¶ 2–3.

Case: 16-1409 Document: 5-2 Page: 3 Filed: 02/09/2017
4 PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. v. VALSPAR SOURCING, INC. 

Indus., Inc., No. 0:16-cv-01429 (D. Minn. filed May 23, 

2016).

PPG’s standing thus differs from the scenario we 

faced in Consumer Watchdog. Unlike Consumer Watchdog, PPG is and was “engaged in . . . activity involving 

[the patented subject matter] that could form the basis for 

an infringement claim,” and has “other connection[s] to 

the [patents] or the claimed subject matter,” Consumer 

Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1261, sufficient to “have a particularized, concrete stake in the outcome of the reexamination,” id. at 1262. This stake is enhanced by the “estoppel 

provisions contained within the inter partes reexamination statute.” Id. This is sufficient to establish PPG’s 

standing to appeal the Board’s decision. 

PPG also stresses the statutory appeal paths for judicial review of PTAB decisions. It is unlikely that the 

legislative intent was, by silence, to limit appeals from 

PTAB decisions to parties then in litigation in the district 

court. In any event, as we recognized in Consumer 

Watchdog, although the immediacy and redressability 

requirements for Article III standing can be relaxed when 

Congress accords a procedural right to a litigant—e.g., the 

right to appeal an administrative decision—the “requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.” Id. at 1261 

(quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 

(2009)). 

II

MOOTNESS

We conclude that Valspar’s Covenant Not To Sue, although tardily and unilaterally provided, has mooted these 

proceedings on appeal. The Court has made clear that 

“[i]f a judgment has become moot, this Court may not 

consider its merits, but may make such disposition of the 

whole case as justice may require.” Walling v. James V. 

Case: 16-1409 Document: 5-2 Page: 4 Filed: 02/09/2017
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. v. VALSPAR SOURCING, INC. 5

Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944) (citing United States 

v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U.S. 466, 477–478 (1916); Heitmuller v. Stokes, 

256 U.S. 359, 362–363 (1921); Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 

U.S. 216, 218 (1923)). The breadth of Valspar’s Covenant 

Not To Sue, absolving PPG (and its subsidiaries and 

customers) of any possible infringement of the subject 

matter of these patents, necessitates our conclusion that 

the case is moot. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 

S. Ct. 721, 728–29 (2013) (affirming dismissal of case as 

moot where covenant not to sue left it “hard to imagine a 

scenario that would potentially infringe [Nike’s trademark] and yet not fall under the Covenant” (alteration in 

original) (citation omitted)); Powell v. McCormack, 395 

U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (“Simply stated, a case is moot when 

the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack 

a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”).

It was Valspar’s unilateral action as prevailing party 

that resulted in the mootness of these appeals. “A party 

who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is 

frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought not in 

fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment. The same 

is true when mootness results from unilateral action of 

the party who prevailed below.” U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. 

v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994) (footnote 

and citations omitted); accord Hamburg-Amerikanische, 

239 U.S. at 478 (“[T]he ends of justice exact that the 

judgment below should not be permitted to stand when, 

without any fault of the [petitioner], there is no power to 

review it upon the merits.”). Under these circumstances, 

we conclude that vacatur would be “most consonant to 

justice.” U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 24 (quoting HamburgAmerikanische, 239 U.S. at 478). 

Case: 16-1409 Document: 5-2 Page: 5 Filed: 02/09/2017
6 PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. v. VALSPAR SOURCING, INC. 

CONCLUSION

The Final Decisions of the PTAB in Reexaminations 

Nos. 95/001,950 and 95/001,951 are VACATED, and 

appeals No. 16-1406 and 16-1409 are DISMISSED. 

COSTS

Taxable costs in favor of PPG.

Case: 16-1409 Document: 5-2 Page: 6 Filed: 02/09/2017