Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00502/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00502-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charter Communications, Inc.
Defendant
Eric W. Rund
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC W. RUND,

Plaintiff, CIV. NO. S-05-0502 FCD GGH 

vs.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendant. ORDER

 /

Previously pending on this court’s law and motion calendar for January 18, 2007

was defendant’s motion to compel mental examination of plaintiff pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 35. 

Gregory Cheng appeared telephonically for defendant. Larry Baumbach appeared telephonically

for plaintiff. Having heard oral argument and reviewed the parties’ joint statement filed January

11, 2007, the court now issues the following order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action against his former employer Charter Communications,

Inc., for employment discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination, breach of contract,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent

supervision, and failure to accommodate physical or mental disability or medical condition. 

Pertinent to the instant dispute are plaintiff’s causes of action for intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. He alleges “pain and suffering, and extreme and severe mental

Case 2:05-cv-00502-FCD-GGH Document 56 Filed 01/30/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

anguish and emotional distress; he has incurred and will continue to incur medical expenses for

treatment by psychotherapists and other health professionals ....” which has caused him to “suffer

a loss of earnings and other employment benefits and job opportunities.” (Compl., ¶¶ 42, 47.) 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., ¶¶ 42, 43, 47.)

On November 13, 2006, the district court modified the scheduling order to permit

the parties to file the instant motion.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff is refusing to undergo a mental exam, claiming that negligent infliction

of emotional distress is simply a negligence claim, and intentional infliction of emotional distress

involves the issue of whether the act is intentional or reckless. He now claims he has not alleged

or undergone treatment from any mental care providers. He also asserts that he has not tendered

any healthcare provider as an expert on the issue of his emotional distress, has not alleged any

specific psychiatric injury. His declaration, attached to the joint statement, states that any

emotional distress he suffered has now resolved.

LEGAL STANDARDS

“[I]n order for a party seeking to compel a psychiatric examination under Rule 35

to establish that the other party’s mental condition is ‘in controversy’ within the meaning of the

Rule, the moving party must show more than that the party in question has claimed emotional

distress.” Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 97 (S.D. Cal.1995); accord, Ford v. Contra

Costa County, 179 F.R.D. 579, 580 (N.D.Cal. 1998). Before a mental examination is compelled,

in addition to a bare claim for mental distress, the moving party should demonstrate one or more

of the following: 

1) a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of

emotional distress; 2) an allegation of a specific mental or

psychiatric injury or disorder; 3) a claim of unusually severe

emotional distress; 4) plaintiff’s offer of expert testimony to

support a claim of emotional distress; and/or 5) plaintiff’s

concession that his or her mental condition is ‘in controversy’

within the meaning of Rule 35(a).

Case 2:05-cv-00502-FCD-GGH Document 56 Filed 01/30/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As Judge Aaron noted, only one published opinion in the Ninth Circuit prior to Turner 5

addressed the IME issue – Smedley v. Capps, Staples, Ward, Hastings & Dodson, 820 F. Supp.

1227 (N.D. Cal.1993). The Smedley court granted defendants’ motion for mental examination,

solely because of plaintiff’s bare claim of emotional distress. As the Turner court observed, the

Smedley court reached its conclusion without analysis or citation to authority. Turner, 161

F.R.D. at 93. Accordingly, this court relies on the careful analysis set forth in Turner.

3

Turner, 161 F.R.D. at 95. 1

Cases which involve little more than garden variety allegations of past emotional

distress ordinarily are not sufficient to require a mental exam. Sabree v. United Broth. of

Carpenters & Joiners, 126 F.R.D. 422, 426 (D. Mass. 1989) (finding that although complaint

contained specific claims for emotional distress under state law, plaintiff’s mental condition was

not at issue); Benchmaster, Inc. v. Kawaelde, 107 F.R.D. 752, 754 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (proffering

rationale that psychiatrist could aid only in determining present emotional disturbance). Mental

exams are generally not allowed absent specific facts demonstrating emotional state will be at

issue. See, e.g., Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 296, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1983)

(plaintiff had designated testifying psychiatric experts and had received psychiatric care). 

Claims for past emotional distress at best permit the court discretion whether to

allow a Rule 35 exam. Hodges v. Keane, 145 F.R.D. 332, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The

determination is made on a case by case basis. See, e.g., Ziemann v. Burlington County Bridge

Com’n, 155 F.R.D. 497, 501 (D.N.J. 1994) (considering, inter alia, alleged injury and whether

claim is ongoing); Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (considering resort to

psychiatric or psychological counseling). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has raised specific facts demonstrating that he is not now placing his

emotional state in controversy, as opposed to presenting a claim for historical temporary,

“ordinary” distress. He states that he has not undergone treatment for emotional or psychological

reasons, and that any emotional trauma has resolved. He indicates that he is not claiming to

suffer any specific psychiatric injury. He states that he will not present any expert testimony

Case 2:05-cv-00502-FCD-GGH Document 56 Filed 01/30/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In other words, plaintiff has not established, or even hinted at, how a present day mental 2

examination would rebut claims of historical, ordinary distress. While an extraordinary claim of

past distress might be rebutted by a present day forensic psychiatric examination, plaintiff has

conceded that no such extraordinary distress is claimed.

4

about his mental condition unless defendant is permitted to conduct a mental exam. Rund Decl.

Accordingly, an independent medical examination is not appropriate. 

Key to the undersigned’s decision is plaintiff’s abandonment of any claim for

serious psychological/psychiatric injury. Such a claim is not realistically possible in the absence

of medical proof, i.e., records testified to by the appropriate medical personnel. Plaintiff made it

crystal clear that he has not sought medical treatment, and would not be presenting any medical

evidence concerning emotional injury.

Thus, defendant is left to argue that a mental examination is still necessary to test,

by present day mental examination, the historical allegations of ordinary distress that a

reasonable person would endure if the liability actions challenged by plaintiff are true. However,

this argument is oxymoronic. For example, there is no doubt that the ordinary person would

suffer temporary distress if he were unlawfully terminated from employment he otherwise

desired to retain. There is no need to conduct a mental examination, or have medical personnel

testify to such, for the very reason that such distress is normal and understandable by the lay

factfinder. That is, if the jury finds that defendant acted as plaintiff alleges, the concomitant

ordinary distress is almost a given. Expert testimony would be inadmissible. Fed. R. Ev. 702

(expert testimony must assist the trier of fact in understanding evidence beyond the ken of most

lay persons). Any impeachment vis-a-vis the expected level of distress in this case would

necessarily have to be historical and of the lay variety as well. Only if a plaintiff were claiming 2

distress/injury that is out of the ordinary, which would have to be supported by medical 

\\\\\

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-00502-FCD-GGH Document 56 Filed 01/30/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 While plaintiff’s concession may also be the death knell for an intentional infliction of 3

emotional distress, such a finding should be left to summary judgment or to the trier of fact. As

discussed at hearing, it is possible to conceive of outrageous actions naturally causing a good

deal of temporary emotional distress regardless of whether it is proven by medical evidence.

 Defendant does not suggest that there is some liability reason to take a present day

4

mental examination. Defendant has solely focused on the remedial aspects of the case.

5

evidence, would a mental examination by defendant be necessary to counter or affirm such

claims.

3

Rather than accept plaintiff’s firm concession of not presenting any medical

evidence regarding distress, and not claiming more than a routine amount of temporary emotional

upset, defendant expresses a desire to perversely up the ante and possibly establish such

extraordinary distress through its mental examination. Or, perhaps there is some ulterior motive

in outing some irrelevant psychiatric skeleton from plaintiff’s closet. In either event, the court

4

will not issue a mental examination order to satisfy idle curiosity, or manipulative desires, of a

party.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to compel Rule 35 mental examination, filed December

19, 2006, is denied for the reasons set forth in this order.

DATED: 1/30/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:076

Rund0502.R35.wpd

Case 2:05-cv-00502-FCD-GGH Document 56 Filed 01/30/07 Page 5 of 5