Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-03417/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-03417-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Argent Mortgage Company, L.L.C.
Defendant
Maria Litinetsky
Plaintiff
Yakov Litinetsky
Plaintiff
West Coast Servicing, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YAKOV LITINETSKY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WEST COAST SERVICING, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-03417-DC-SCR 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

(Doc. No. 5)

This matter came before the court on December 17, 2024 for a hearing on Plaintiffs’ ex 

parte application for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. No. 5.) Attorney Jessica Galletta

appeared by video on behalf of Plaintiffs Yakov and Maria Litinetsky. Attorney Brian Paino

appeared by video on behalf of Defendant West Coast Servicing, Inc. No appearance was made 

on behalf of Defendant Argent Mortgage Company, L.L.C. For the reasons explained below, 

Plaintiffs’ application for a temporary restraining order will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

On December 9, 2024, Plaintiffs Yakov and Maria Litinetsky filed this action against 

Defendants West Coast Servicing, Inc., (“WCS”) and Argent Mortgage Company, LLC 

(“Argent”), alleging various claims arising out of a mortgage loan secured by Plaintiffs’ property.

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege as follows.

Plaintiffs primarily reside at and own the property located at 400 Squaw Creek Road, 

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Units 721 and 723, Olympic Valley, CA 96146 (the “property”). (Doc. No. 1 at 6, ¶ 22.) Around 

October 2005, Plaintiffs obtained financing in the amount of $155,380 from Defendant Argent. 

(Id. at ¶ 23.) The loan was secured by the property. (Id.). In 2009, Plaintiffs received a letter from 

Defendant Argent indicating that their loan had been “charged off.” (Id. at ¶ 24.) For the 

following fifteen years, Plaintiffs received no communication regarding the loan or subsequent 

collection attempts from any entity. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 26.) Plaintiffs understood the charge-off letter 

and lack of further communication to mean that they owed nothing more and that the loan would 

not accrue further interest. (Id. at ¶ 26.) 

In August 2024, Defendant WCS recorded a notice of default stating Plaintiffs owed 

nearly $300,000 and warning that if the loan was not repaid, their property was subject to a 

foreclosure sale. (Id. at 7, ¶ 29.) At this point, Plaintiffs learned that Defendant WCS had begun 

servicing the loan. (Id. at ¶ 27.) On November 24, 2024, Defendant WCS recorded a notice of 

trustee’s sale and indicated it sought a total payment of $442,020 on the loan.

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(Id. at ¶ 30.) A 

foreclosure sale is currently scheduled to take place on December 18, 2024. (Id.)

In support of its opposition to Plaintiffs’ application for a temporary restraining order, 

Defendant WCS offers a different version of events regarding the loan’s history. Defendant WCS 

alleges it acquired the servicing rights to the loan from Veripro Solutions, Inc. (“Veripro”) on 

May 31, 2024. (Doc. No. 11 at 3, ¶ 9.) Defendant WCS states that according to its record, Veripro 

made efforts dating back to March 2013 to reach Plaintiffs via telephone. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Defendant 

WCS also attaches letters that were purportedly sent from Veripro to Plaintiffs informing them 

that interest would accrue on the loan until the balance was paid in full. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

Defendant WCS alleges that on or around June 14, 2024, they sent Plaintiffs eight copies 

1 Plaintiffs request that the court take judicial notice of the Notice of Default and Notice of 

Trustee’s Sale that were recorded in the Placer County Recorder by Defendant WCS. (Doc. No. 

5-4 at 2.) Pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 201(b), a court may take judicial notice of a fact 

if it is “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). If a fact is “generally known” or 

“can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned,” it is “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)–(2). Courts 

regularly take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record. See Reyn’s Pasta 

Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request 

for judicial notice will be granted.

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of Notices of Transfer of Servicing Rights to various addresses associated with Plaintiffs. (Id. at 

¶ 10.) Defendant WCS states it executed a Substitution of Trustee on August 16, 2024, and 

appointed ZBS Law, LLP, as the substitute trustee under the Deed of Trust. (Id. at 5, ¶ 19.)

Defendant WCS further alleges it sent monthly statements each month between July 2024 and 

November 2024. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Defendant WCS asserts that as of November 19, 2024, the total 

amount due on the loan was $442,020.22. (Id. at 4, ¶ 16.) Defendant WCS alleges in early 

November 2024, it received a “Demand” letter from Plaintiffs dated November 6, 2024,

apparently in response to the Notice of Default recorded by Defendant WCS months earlier on 

August 19, 2024. (Id. at 5, ¶ 23.) Defendant WCS asserts that the property in question is used as a 

rental property, rather than a primary residence. (Id. at ¶ 25.) 

Plaintiffs now bring the following claims: (1) breach of contract – third party beneficiary

against Defendant WCS; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against 

Defendant Argent; (3) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692, the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act

(“FDCPA”) against Defendant WCS; (4) California Civil Code § 2924.17(a) against all 

Defendants; (5) violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41 against Defendant Argent; and (6) violation of 

the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., against 

all Defendants. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 35–77.)

Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief seeks: judgment entered in Plaintiffs’ favor and against 

Defendants; an order requiring Defendants to show cause as to why they should not be enjoined 

during the pendency of this action; a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent 

injunction; damages, disgorgement, and injunctive relief; compensatory damages, special 

damages, damages for emotional distress, attorneys’ fees and costs; and exemplary damages 

sufficient to punish and deter future misconduct. (Id. at 14.) 

On December 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the pending ex parte application for a temporary 

restraining order to prevent a foreclosure sale of the property. (Doc. No. 5.) The court

subsequently set a briefing schedule and set the matter for a hearing to take place on December 

17, 2024. (Doc. No. 8.) Defendant WCS filed their opposition to Plaintiffs’ application, a 

declaration in support thereof, and a request for judicial notice of various exhibits on December 

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13, 2024.2(Doc. Nos. 10–12.) On December 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their reply thereto.3(Doc. 

No. 14.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo and to prevent 

irreparable harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose 

Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). The standard governing the issuing 

of a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a 

preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 

n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to 

demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm 

in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Ctr. for 

Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must 

establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary 

injunction.’”); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2009). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a showing on all four of these 

2 Defendant WCS requests that the court take judicial notice of (1) the property grant deed, 

recorded in Placer County; (2) various filings from Plaintiffs’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases; (3) 

Notice of Default and Election to Sell, recorded in the Placer County Recorder; and (4) a property 

tax bill issued by Placer County for Plaintiffs’ property. (Doc. No. 12.) As noted above, pursuant 

to Federal Rules of Evidence 201(b), a court may take judicial notice of a fact if it is “not subject 

to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). If a fact is “generally known” or “can be accurately 

and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” it is “not 

subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)–(2). Courts regularly take judicial notice 

of court filings and other matters of public record. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, 442 F.3d at 746 n.6. 

Therefore, Defendant WCS’s request for judicial notice will also be granted.

3 Plaintiffs filed several objections in response to Defendant WCS’s declaration and attached 

exhibits. (Doc. No. 13.) In deciding whether to issue a temporary restraining order, the court may 

rely on exhibits, declarations, and affidavits, and the evidence relied upon is not subject to the 

same evidentiary standard as applied at summary judgment or trial. See Johnson v. Couturier, 572 

F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Plaintiffs objections to Defendant WCS’s proffered 

evidence are denied.

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prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[a] preliminary injunction is appropriate when a 

plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of 

hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,” assuming the other two elements of the Winter test 

are met. Id. at 1132, 34–35 (citation omitted). Under this “sliding scale” test, “a stronger showing 

of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Id. at 1131. The party seeking the 

injunction bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 

1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 

(9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm 

sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a 

prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). Finally, an injunction is “an extraordinary remedy 

that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 

The likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor. See Disney 

Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff bears the burden of 

demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims or, at the very least, that 

“serious questions going to the merits were raised.” All. for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. 

“Because Plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction, they ‘must establish that the law and facts 

clearly favor [their] position, not simply that [they are] likely to succeed.’” LA All. for Hum. Rts. 

v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 14 F.4th 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs filed the present application for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the 

foreclosure sale of the property five business days before the scheduled sale on December 18, 

2024.

Pursuant to Eastern District of California Local Rule 231(b), the court “will consider 

whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an earlier 

date without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief by motion for temporary restraining 

order.” If the court finds that there was “undue delay in seeking injunctive relief” the court may 

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deny the requested temporary restraining order on those grounds alone. L.R. 231(b). 

Here, Defendant WCS recorded the Notice of Default in the Office of the Placer County 

Recorder on August 19, 2024. (Doc. No. 5-4 at 6.) As Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged at the 

hearing on the pending application, Plaintiffs would have received the Notice of Default by mail 

shortly after it was recorded informing them the loan on the property was in default. At the latest, 

Plaintiffs were aware that the loan on the property was in default since at least November 6, 2024, 

when Plaintiffs sent Defendant WCS a demand for loan documents and clarifications via mail. 

(Doc. No. 11-1, at 2.) Indeed, at the December 17, 2024 hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated they 

had no reason to doubt the authenticity of the copy of the demand letter Defendant WCS provided 

to the court in connection with its opposition to the pending application. 

Defendant WCS issued a Notice of Trustee’s Sale on November 20, 2024, 29 days before 

the sale was scheduled to take place on December 18, 2024. Despite this, Plaintiffs did not seek a 

temporary restraining order to enjoin the foreclosure until the afternoon of December 11, 2024, 

five business days before the sale. If Plaintiffs had valid legal arguments to enjoin the foreclosure 

sale of the property, they should have promptly raised them upon receiving notice of the sale at 

the latest. See Standard v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-1797-PSG-JPR, 2015 WL 

12696037, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015). 

In their filings and at the hearing, Plaintiffs did not claim they had inadequate notice of 

the sale. Plaintiffs also provided no explanation as to the delay in seeking an injunction to prevent 

the sale. Plaintiffs therefore fail to demonstrate that their considerable delay was excusable. 

Consequently, the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ last-minute application for relief contradicts 

their allegations that they would suffer irreparable injury if the foreclosure sale is allowed to 

happen as scheduled. See Wilkinson v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 2:24-cv-01416-TLN-AC, 2024 

WL 2330542, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2024) (denying plaintiffs’ application for a temporary 

restraining order solely based on Local Rule 231(b) because plaintiffs waited until four business 

days prior to the foreclosure sale despite having ample notice of the sale); Sewell v. Franklin 

Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 2:24-cv-1788-TLN-DB, 2024 WL 3203328, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 

2024) (denying plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining order solely based on Local 

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Rule 231(b) because plaintiff failed to explain why he did not seek injunctive relief prior to a few 

hours before the foreclosure sale of his property); Mammoth Specialty Lodging, LLC v. We-KaJassa Inv. Fund, LLC, No. 10-cv-0864-LKK-JFM, 2010 WL 1539811, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 

2010) (denying plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining order solely based on Local 

Rule 231(b) because plaintiff did not seek an injunction to prevent the foreclosure sale until four 

business days prior); Standard, 2015 WL 12696037, at *1 (plaintiffs’ application for a temporary 

restraining order denied solely due to dilatory timing because plaintiffs waited until two days 

before the foreclosure sale to seek an injunction despite having ample notice of the sale); Fivefold 

Props. Dunnegan LLC v. Toorak Cap. Partners LLC, No. 8:24-cv-00958-SVW-JDE, 2024 WL 

3009327, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2024) (finding the plaintiff delayed in seeking emergency relief 

where it waited until two days prior to a foreclosure sale to seek an injunction). Because of 

Plaintiffs’ undue delay in seeking injunctive relief without adequate explanation, the court will 

exercise its discretion to deny Plaintiffs’ ex parte application for a temporary restraining order. 

See L.R. 231(b).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs’ ex parte application for a temporary 

restraining order (Doc. No. 5) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 17, 2024 ___________________________

Dena Coggins

United States District Judge

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