Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-10731/USCOURTS-ca5-09-10731-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tony Eugene Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

REVISED MAY 6, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-10731

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

TONY EUGENE DAVIS

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before KING, JOLLY, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Defendant–appellant Tony Eugene Davis appeals the sentence of 24

months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release imposed following

the revocation of his supervised release. Davis contends that remand for

resentencing is warranted because there is a reasonable probability that, but for

the district court’s consideration of an incorrect advisory sentencing range, he

would have received a lesser sentence. On plain error review, we affirm.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 2, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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 Davis’s conviction for armed bank robbery was under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), a 1

Class B felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(2).

2

I. BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2009, the vehicle in which Davis was traveling as a

passenger was stopped for a traffic violation in Walker County, Texas. Davis,

a convicted armed bank robber, was five months into a five-year term of 1

supervised release. Noticing that the vehicle’s three occupants appeared

nervous and were providing inconsistent stories, the officer who initiated the

stop obtained Davis’s permission to search the vehicle, which was registered in

Davis’s name. The search revealed a loaded model Cf-200, Hi-Point .380 caliber

pistol in a briefcase on the rear passenger seat. Davis admitted that the

briefcase belonged to him. Also in the vehicle were several notes on colored

paper that read:

This is a robbery. I want all of your big bills. No ink spots. No

transmitters. Please hurry. I will shoot you. Have a nice day. (

These notes were found throughout the car, including one in a bank bag, another

in the glove compartment, and yet another in Davis’s wallet. Davis was arrested

for being a felon in possession of a firearm, a third-degree felony under Texas

law, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04 (Vernon 2003), and was later indicted in

Texas state court.

The district court held a hearing on July 15, 2009, to determine whether

Davis’s supervised release should be revoked. Davis’s probation officer testified

that Davis did not have permission to be in Texas on the day of the traffic

stop—Davis had arranged to live in Arkansas upon release from prison and was

required to inform his probation officer before leaving the state, which he had

not done. The probation officer also testified that the terms of Davis’s

supervision prohibited him from committing any new federal, state, or local

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 Because Davis’s conviction was for a Class B felony, the district court could impose

2

a prison term of up to three years upon revocation of supervised release. 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The statute also allows the district court to impose additional supervised

release following revocation in the amount of “the original term of supervised release, less any

term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” Id. § 3583(h).

Because Davis’s original term of supervised release was five years, his maximum term of

supervised release, if the maximum term of imprisonment were imposed, would be two years.

3

offenses and from possessing a firearm. The district court found, after hearing

this testimony, that Davis had violated the conditions of his supervised release.

A Supervised Release Violation Report prepared by the probation office

indicated that Davis had a criminal history category of II and had committed a

Grade A violation of the conditions of supervised release. Under the advisory

policy statements (the “policy statements”) in Chapter 7 of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), these factors yielded an advisory range

of imprisonment of 15 to 21 months. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL § 7B1.4(a) (2009) (“U.S.S.G.”). The statutory maximum punishment for

Davis’s violation was three years of imprisonment plus two years of supervised

release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (h). At the revocation hearing, Davis’s 2

counsel represented that the 15 to 21 month advisory range was correct and

requested that Davis receive a sentence within that range. After hearing Davis’s

allocution, the district court imposed 24 months of imprisonment to be followed

by two years of supervised release. The district court commented to Davis:

You weren’t on supervised release for five months before you got

rearrested. . . . You didn’t give [reintegration] a chance. Within five

months you were already out of the district, and then you are

carrying a gun and have this note that looks like you are doing some

more armed robberies. And I don’t need to hear any argument from

you. I have heard plenty from you.

The parties now agree that the 15 to 21 month advisory range was

incorrect. Davis’s violation was in fact a Grade B violation under the policy

statements because the firearm found in Davis’s briefcase, a pistol, is not the

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 A Grade A violation includes “conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, or local offense 3

punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that . . . (iii) involves possession of

a firearm or destructive device of a type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a).”

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(iii). Section 5845(a) includes shotguns, rifles, and machine guns, but

specifically excludes “pistol[s] . . . having a rifled bore.” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), (e).

 We explained the significance of the policy statements in McKinney:

4

There are no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised

release; instead, the sentencing guidelines include policy statements concerning

the revocation of supervised release. Section 7B1.4(a) [of the policy statements]

provides advisory imprisonment ranges for defendants whose terms of

supervised release have been revoked. The sentencing ranges are based on both

the defendant’s criminal history and the severity of the defendant’s supervised

release violation.

520 F.3d at 428 (internal citations omitted).

 Before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), this court would uphold sentences 5

imposed upon revocation of supervised release unless “in violation of law or plainly

unreasonable.” United States v. Stiefel, 207 F.3d 256, 258 (5th Cir. 2000). This court has not

4

type of firearm that would support a more serious Grade A violation. The 3

correct advisory range was therefore only 6 to 12 months. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).

Davis contends that the district court’s consideration of an incorrect advisory

range provides a basis to vacate his sentence and order resentencing. Davis

concedes that because he did not raise this objection in the district court, plain

error review applies.

II. THE LEGAL STANDARD

A district court may impose any sentence upon revocation of supervised

release that falls within the statutory maximum term allowed for the revocation

sentence, but must consider the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and

the policy statements before doing so. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); United States v.

McKinney, 520 F.3d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 2008). Had Davis properly preserved his 4

objection to the 15 to 21 month advisory range, we would review to determine

whether the sentence imposed was unreasonable or “plainly unreasonable.” See

United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 792 (5th Cir. 2007). Because Davis did not 5

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yet decided, in the wake of Booker, whether this standard remains appropriate or whether

Booker’s standard of review for initial sentences, “unreasonableness,” applies with equal force

to review of sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release. See United States v.

Jones, 484 F.3d at 792; United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 2005). Because

this case involves plain error, which imposes a more deferential standard of review, we need

not resolve this issue.

5

object to the 15 to 21 month advisory range in the district court, however, we

review under a more deferential standard for plain error. United States v. Davis,

487 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 2007).

To establish plain error, an appellant must show a forfeited error that is

clear or obvious and that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United

States, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009). Ordinarily, an error affects

substantial rights only if it “‘affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)); see

also Davis, 487 F.3d at 284. If the appellant makes this showing, “the court of

appeals has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be

exercised only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429 (quoting Olano,

507 U.S. at 736).

In the sentencing context, we have held that an appellant can show an

impact on substantial rights—and therefore a basis for reversal on plain error

review—where the appellant can show a reasonable probability that, but for the

district court’s error, the appellant would have received a lower sentence.

United States v. Garcia–Quintanilla, 574 F.3d 295, 303–04 (5th Cir. 2009). We

have specifically applied this rule where the district court considered an

incorrect advisory range under the Guidelines for an initial sentence, United

States v. John, 527 F.3d 263, 284–85 (5th Cir. 2010), and in a number of

unpublished cases have done the same where, as here, the district court

considered an incorrect advisory range under the policy statements for a

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 Pre-Booker, our standard for evaluating an error’s effect on substantial rights was

6

whether, “if the case were remanded, the trial judge could reinstate the same sentence.”

United States v. Ravitch, 128 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1997). Some of our cases have questioned

whether Ravitch might continue to apply post-Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 516

F.3d 285, 289 n.28 (5th Cir. 2008). Although we do not appear to have definitively determined

since Price which standard applies, more recent cases have embraced the “reasonable

probability” standard and have not referenced Ravitch. See, e.g., John, 597 F.3d at 284–85;

United States v. Jones, 596 F.3d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 2010). We need not decide the present

status of Ravitch here because remand is unavailable under either test. The parties do not

dispute that the district court could reimpose the 24 month sentence on remand and we

conclude that even if a “reasonable probability” were shown that Davis’s sentence would have

been lower, the error in this case is not the type that we should exercise our discretion to

correct.

6

sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. See United States v.

Jimenez, No. 08-11175, 2010 WL 445620, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 2010) (per

curiam); United States v. Arkadie, 344 F. App’x 966, 967 (5th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam); United States v. Soliz, 344 F. App’x 900, 902 (5th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam). This is consistent with the rule in other circuits. See, e.g., United

States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding, in the revocation

context, that “an error [i]s prejudicial only if there is a reasonable probability

that the defendant would have received a lighter sentence but for the error”).6

As the appellant, Davis bears the burden of establishing reasonable probability.

Garcia–Quintanilla, 574 F.3d at 303.

III. ANALYSIS

The parties do not dispute that the error in the advisory range that the

district court considered was clear and obvious. The issues are whether that

error affected Davis’s substantial rights under the “reasonable probability” test,

and if so, whether the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings,” Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429 (internal

quotation marks omitted), such that we should exercise our discretion to remand

for resentencing. Davis contends that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for the district court’s consideration of the incorrect range, his sentence

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 Davis raised the arguments as to overlap and gap for the first time in his reply brief.

7

We note that although we need not consider these arguments because they are raised for the

first time in his reply brief, we have discretion to do so. See United States v. Aguirre–Villa,

460 F.3d 681, 683 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]his Court will not ordinarily consider arguments

raised for the first time in a reply brief.”); Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 373 n.22

(5th Cir. 2001) (noting that although issues not raised in initial brief are normally waived, we

have discretion to decide the issue). We have decided to do so here. We note that the

Government had the opportunity to address these issues on the merits at oral argument and

has not argued that we should disregard these issues for being raised for the first time in a

reply brief.

 Davis does not challenge the adequacy of the district court’s reasons for varying 8

upward from the incorrect advisory range.

7

would have been lower. He argues that a reasonable probability can be inferred

because the district court considered the higher, incorrect range in weighing the

§ 3553(a) factors and reaching its sentence determination; because there is no

overlap between the correct 6 to 12 month advisory range and incorrect 15 to 21

month range; and because there is a significant gap between the correct range

and the 24 month sentence actually imposed. He also contends that the error 7

in this case seriously affects the fairness or integrity of the proceedings, and

therefore is of the type that we should exercise our discretion to remand. The

Government, pointing out that the district court imposed a sentence above the

high end even of the incorrect range and commented on the severity of Davis’s

offense, counters that Davis has not met his burden of showing a reasonable 8

probability that his sentence would have been lower absent the district court’s

consideration of the incorrect range, and that even if Davis could meet this

burden, this is not the type of circumstance in which remand would be

appropriate.

A. Whether Davis Has Shown a “Reasonable Probability”

We are not convinced that Davis has met his burden of establishing a

reasonable probability that the district court’s consideration of an incorrect

advisory range affected his sentence, as is required to satisfy the “substantial

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 We recognize, however, that although the district court was not obliged to follow the

9

advisory range or accord it any particular weight—and there is no specific evidence in the

record that it did so—advisory ranges often provide a “frame of reference” for a district court’s

sentencing decisions, United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006), and such

ranges are one factor that a district court must consider in its § 3553(a) analysis, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). Although the district court’s actions in the present case make clear that it intended

to impose a sentence above the applicable advisory range, it is not equally clear that the court

would have imposed the same sentence had it considered the lower, correct advisory range.

Most notably, the district court never stated that it would have imposed the same sentence

regardless of the advisory range. Cf. United States v. Lemus-Gonzalez, 563 F.3d 88, 94 (5th

Cir. 2009) (finding no reasonable probability where the district court considered both the

correct and incorrect ranges and stated that it would have imposed the same sentence in any

event); United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v.

Tzep–Mejia, 461 F.3d 522, 526–27 (5th Cir. 2006) (same). We are hesitant, however, to

conclude that Davis can meet his burden simply by pointing to a clear error in the record and

asking us to infer, without more, that prejudice resulted. Cf. Jimenez, 2010 WL 445620, at

*2 (“By itself, the district court’s erroneous selection of the incorrect guideline range [wa]s not

8

effect” prong of the plain error test. The record amply demonstrates that in

determining Davis’s post-revocation sentence, the district court placed great

weight on the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding Davis’s violations

of the conditions of his supervised release and concluded that the violations

merited a significant punishment. The district court noted that Davis was only

five months into a five-year sentence of supervised release; was outside the state

in which he was required to remain; was in possession of a firearm; and was

carrying a bank bag and printed notes that strongly suggested that he intended

to resume the same activities for which he initially had been convicted and

imprisoned. Commenting on the seriousness of the violations, the district court

imposed a 24 month sentence, higher even than the top end of the incorrect

advisory range. The court, in short, had ample independent bases for imposing

the sentence that it did, and Davis has cited no statements in the record to

indicate that the court—which was required only to consider the advisory range

indicated by the policy statements and was permitted to impose any sentence

within the statutory maximum when determining the sentence—relied on the

incorrect advisory range in determining his sentence.9

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enough to demonstrate that the ‘substantial rights’ prong of the plain error test [wa]s

satisfied.”); United States v. Gonzalez, 253 F. App’x 387, 388 (5th Cir. 2007) (same).

See United States v. John, 597 F.3d at 285 (finding effect on substantial rights where 10

the 108 month sentence was imposed after the district court considered an incorrect advisory

range of 97 to 121 months rather than 70 to 87 months; specifically noting that “it is not

apparent from the record that John would have received an above-Guidelines sentence of 108

months if the district court had applied [the correct range]”); United States v. Munoz-Ortenza,

563 F.3d 112, 116 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding effect on substantial rights where the 41 month

sentence was imposed after the district court considered an incorrect advisory range of 41 to

51 months rather than 6 to 12 months); United States v. Gonzalez–Terrazas, 529 F.3d 293, 298

(5th Cir. 2008) (finding effect on substantial rights where the 57 month sentence was imposed

after the district court considered an incorrect advisory range of 57 to 71 months rather than

24 to 30 months); United States v. Sanchez, 527 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding effect

on substantial rights where the district court rendered a 60 month sentence rather than a 21

to 27 month sentence after failing to consider a proposed Guideline); United States v. Price,

516 F.3d at 289 (finding effect on substantial rights where 110 month sentence imposed after

the district court considered an incorrect advisory range of 110 to 120 months rather than 92

to 115 months; concluding that although the sentence rendered was within the correct range,

9

Davis contends that we may infer such reliance because the correct and

incorrect advisory ranges did not overlap and because there is a significant gap

between the correct 6 to 12 month range and the 24 month sentence actually

imposed. Davis is correct that we have been willing, in previous cases, to infer

reliance where the sentence imposed fell within an incorrect advisory range that

did not overlap with the correct advisory range, see United States v. John, 597

F.3d at 286, or when even where there was some overlap, if the gap between the

correct advisory range and the sentence actually imposed was significant, see

United States v. Price, 516 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2008). But none of the cases

that Davis cites—and none of the “overlap” or “gap” cases that this court has

located—involved facts similar to those in the present case, in which the district

court imposed a sentence above even the top end of the incorrect advisory range

while commenting on the seriousness of the offense. To the contrary, in each of

the cases that Davis cites, the court imposed a sentence within the incorrect

range and made no comments to suggest that an above-range sentence would be

appropriate. In these cases, unlike Davis’s, the record created a strong 10

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“a 92-month sentence is substantially lower than a 110-month sentence”); United States v.

Dentler, 492 F.3d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding effect on substantial rights where the 240

month sentence was imposed after the district court considered an incorrect advisory range

of 210 to 262 months rather than 140 to 175 months); United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355,

364 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding effect on substantial rights where the 21 month

sentence was imposed after the court, applying then-mandatory Guidelines, considered an

incorrect range of 21 to 27 months rather than 10 to 16 months).

10

inference that the district court would in fact have imposed a lower sentence had

it considered the correct advisory range.

The facts of Davis’s case are very similar to those that we addressed in

United States v. Jimenez, 2010 WL 445620, at *2, which, though unpublished,

provides persuasive authority. In Jimenez, the district court incorrectly

determined, in a revocation hearing, that the advisory range of imprisonment

under the policy statements was 12 to 18 months. Id. at *1. The correct range

was 6 to 12 months. Id. The district court ultimately imposed a sentence of 36

months, the statutory maximum for the violation at issue. Id. at **1–2. We

concluded that “[b]y itself, the district court’s erroneous selection of the incorrect

guideline range [wa]s not enough to demonstrate that the ‘substantial rights’

prong of the plain error test [wa]s satisfied,” given that the district court had

“supported its upward departure from the guidelines by noting Jimenez’s

absconding from justice for 18 months and the drug treatment opportunity that

a 36 month term would afford.” Id. at *2. We held that on these facts, “Jimenez

ha[d] failed to demonstrate that there [wa]s a ‘reasonable probability’ he would

have received a different term of imprisonment but for the guideline calculation

error.” Id. Here, as in Jimenez, the district court imposed a sentence above even

the incorrect advisory range and supported this variance with reasons reflecting

the gravity of the offense. Considering the record and our case law, we are

skeptical that Davis has met his burden of showing a reasonable probability

that, but for the district court’s consideration of the incorrect advisory range, his

sentence would have been lower.

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 Because we do not decide whether Davis has established a reasonable probability 11

that the district court’s consideration of an incorrect advisory range affected his substantial

rights, we do not reach the Government’s argument that we should accord less scrutiny to

sentences imposed after consideration of incorrect policy statement ranges than incorrect

Guidelines ranges. The Government contends that the policy statements, even post-Booker,

do not (or should not) carry as much weight as the Guidelines in sentencing determinations.

Our circuit has not addressed this question, nor has any other of which we are aware.

 Davis points to our statement in United States v. Price, 516 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 12

2008), that remand is required whenever the error “clearly affected [the] defendant’s

sentence.” (internal quotation marks omitted). But this language was drawn from United

States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 365 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), in which, under the then11

B. Whether We Should Exercise Discretion to Remand

We need not decide whether Davis has met his burden of showing

reasonable probability, however, because assuming without deciding that he has,

the error in this case is not the sort that we should, on plain error review,

exercise our discretion to remedy. Davis violated his supervised release only 11

five months into a five-year sentence. He was found outside the state in which

he was required to remain and was in possession of a firearm. He was carrying

a bank bag and printed notes that strongly suggested that he intended to resume

the same activities for which he initially had been convicted and imprisoned. On

this record, we decline to conclude that the district court’s imposition of a

sentence of 24 months of imprisonment and two years of supervised

release—particularly where a statutory maximum of 36 months of imprisonment

and two years of supervised release was an available punishment—“seriously

affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Davis resists this conclusion, arguing that our precedent requires remand

whenever an appellant can show a reasonable probability that an unpreserved

error affected the sentence. But, as we observed in United States v. Ellis, 564

F.3d 370, 378 (5th Cir. 2009), “the case law on this point is [not as] settled or as

categorical as language in some cases might make it seem.” In United States

12

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mandatory Guidelines, the district court imposed a 21 month sentence, which was within an

incorrect range of 21 to 27 months and significantly higher than the 10 to 16 month range.

In Villegas, the error in fact had a clear effect on the sentence—the Guidelines were

mandatory, and the district court made no statement on the record of any intention to depart

from the Guidelines. Here, by contrast, it is not clear that the error had any effect on the

sentence; there is not necessarily even a reasonable probability that it did so. We also note

that Price and Ellis share a writing judge—suggesting that we should resist the temptation

to overread Price to categorically require remand wherever a reasonable probability of a lesser

sentence is found.

12

v. John, 597 F.3d at 286–88, we analyzed the relevant case law and concluded

that in this circuit, “whether a sentencing error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings is dependent upon the

degree of the error and the particular facts of the case.” The factual

circumstances under which we have granted remand have typically involved

disparities between the correct range and the sentence actually imposed that

were more severe than that presented here. More importantly, these cases have

involved facts that strongly suggest that the district court would have imposed

a lesser sentence had it considered the correct sentence. See, e.g., id. (remanding

because the 108 month sentence imposed was significantly above the 70 to 87

month advisory range and district court had shown no intention of imposing an

above-Guidelines sentence); Price, 516 F.3d at 289 (remanding because the gap

between the 110 month sentence imposed and the 92 month low-end of the

correct range was significant, and because the district court’s actions suggested

that it would in fact have sentenced at the low end of the correct range); United

States v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 712, 717 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (remanding

because the 76 month sentence imposed, which was within the incorrect 70 to

87 month advisory range, was substantially higher than the correct 30 to 37

month range).

These cases also are not the only applicable precedent. We have held, in

at least one case that predates these cases, that we may decline to remand when

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13

we are persuaded that the error, though plain, did not yield a result that

seriously affects the fairness or integrity of the proceedings. In United States v.

Jones, 489 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2007), we concluded that although the district

court had improperly based its 23 month upward departure on the appellant’s

lengthy arrest record, remand was not required, even if there was a reasonable

probability that the appellant’s sentence would have been less had the district

court not considered the arrest record, because “the error did not seriously affect

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” We noted

in particular that the sentence was supported by the facts that the appellant,

who pled guilty in these proceedings to possession of firearms by a felon, had

been found with a gun little more than a week after a state court felony

conviction and had a long, troubling history with guns. Id.

In short, although some of our sentencing precedent “has been generous

with remand,” we have also recognized and acted on the proposition that “[n]ot

every error that increases a sentence need be corrected by a call upon plain error

doctrine.” Ellis, 564 F.3d at 378. The plain error test requires both a showing

of effect on the appellant’s substantial rights and an effect on the fairness or

integrity of the proceedings before this court may exercise its discretion to

remedy the error. Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429. If, as Davis asserts, every error

affecting substantial rights affects the fairness or integrity of the proceedings,

this would “effectively dispense[ ]” with the final prong of the plain error test,

and with it, “our discretion.” John, 597 F.3d at 291 (Smith, J., dissenting); see

also Ellis, 564 F.3d at 378 (“[E]ven if an increase in a sentence be seen as

inevitably ‘substantial’ in one sense it does not inevitably affect the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial process and proceedings.”). To conclude

that the 24 month sentence imposed in this case “casts [serious] doubt upon the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings”—a sentence that is

well within the statutory maximum and was rendered after Davis was found

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14

violating numerous terms of his supervised release and apparently planning a

return to his prior criminal activities—would “drain[ ] all content from the

doctrine of plain error.” Ellis, 564 F.3d at 379. Accordingly, we decline to

exercise our discretion to remand for resentencing.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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