Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03075/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03075-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald E. Lukens
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 21, 1997 Decided June 3, 1997 

No. 96-3075

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DONALD E. LUKENS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cr00041)

Harvey J. Volzer argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellant.

William J. Corcoran, Senior Counsel, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee, with 

USCA Case #96-3075 Document #276228 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 1 of 4
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, was on 

the brief.

Before: GINSBURG, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellant Donald Lukens appeals from a judgment of conviction of one count of bribery 

and one count of conspiracy to engage in bribery. He 

contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence 

relating to bribery charges on which he had previously been 

acquitted. We reject his argument and affirm his convictions.

BACKGROUND

Appellant Donald Lukens is a former United States Congressman from Ohio. In February 1995, he was charged in a 

five-count indictment. Count 1 charged him with conspiracy 

to accept bribes while acting as a public official. Counts 2-5 

charged him with accepting bribes on certain specific dates. 

The case was tried before a jury in October 1995. The jury 

returned a verdict of not guilty on counts 3-5 and announced 

that it was unable to reach a verdict as to counts 1-2. The 

district court declared a mistrial as to counts 1-2.

In March 1996, another indictment was filed, recharging 

Lukens with the two counts on which the first jury was 

unable to reach a verdict. At this second trial, the prosecution presented evidence relating to the payments to Lukens 

that had been the basis for counts 3-5 of the original indictment. As it had in the first trial, the government contended 

that the payments in question were overt acts in furtherance 

of the conspiracy charged in Count 1. Lukens objected to this 

at trial. He claimed that the first jury's acquittal of him on 

counts 3-5 collaterally estopped the government from presenting evidence at the second trial of the payments that 

formed the basis of those counts. The district court rejected 

his argument and admitted the evidence. Lukens makes the 

same argument on appeal.

The events giving rise to the indictments took place in 

1990. In that year Congressman Lukens cashed four checks 

from John Fitzpatrick and one check from Henry Whitesell. 

Fitzpatrick and Whitesell were officials at the Cambridge 

USCA Case #96-3075 Document #276228 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 2 of 4
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Technical Institute ("CTI"), an educational institution in Ohio 

that the United States Department of Education was investigating at the time the checks were cashed. Lukens claimed 

at trial that these checks were given to him to help his 

struggling re-election campaign. The government claimed 

that the checks were bribes to get Lukens to attempt to 

persuade the Department of Education to cease its investigation of CTI.

ANALYSIS

Lukens's argument is simple. The Double Jeopardy 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall 

"be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 

of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 

U.S. 436, 444 (1970), holds that the Double Jeopardy Clause 

incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In order to 

prevail on a double jeopardy collateral estoppel motion a 

defendant must establish that the "issue whose relitigation he 

seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding." Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990). 

Lukens argues that when the first jury acquitted him of 

Counts 3-5 it "actually decided" that he had not conspired to 

accept bribes in June, August, and September 1990. The 

government therefore should have been collaterally estopped 

from using evidence of those payments at Lukens's second 

trial.

We disagree. Lukens has not "demonstrate[d] that the 

issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually 

decided in the first proceeding." Dowling, 493 U.S. at 350; 

United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

The jury in the first trial acquitted Lukens of the bribery 

charges in Counts 3-5. That jury therefore "actually decided" only that as to these payments the government was not 

able to prove all of the elements of the bribery charge beyond 

a reasonable doubt. We cannot say for certain which part of 

the charge the jury believed the government did not adequately prove. Looking at the evidence that was presented 

in the case, however, it is clear that the jury did not base its 

finding on a belief that the payments were never made. 

USCA Case #96-3075 Document #276228 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 3 of 4
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Lukens admitted that the payments were made, but claimed 

that they were loans rather than bribes. See Ashe, 397 U.S. 

at 444 ("Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based 

upon a general verdict ... a court [must] examine the record 

of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, 

evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude 

whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon 

an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.") (internal quotations omitted).

The government's use of the evidence of the three payments in the second trial was not inconsistent with the first 

jury's findings. The government was not relitigating the 

question whether the payments were independently illegal. 

It argued rather that these payments were overt acts in 

furtherance of the charged conspiracy. It also used the 

evidence to establish the background pattern of the relationship between Lukens and his alleged co-conspirators. An act 

need not be independently illegal in order to qualify as an 

overt act for the purposes of a conspiracy charge. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) ("The overt act, 

without proof of which a charge of conspiracy cannot be 

submitted to the jury, ... need not be itself a crime."); 

United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1404 (D.C. Cir.) 

("Clearly many acts that are by themselves perfectly legal 

may constitute overt acts manifesting participation in an 

illegal conspiracy."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988). It 

need only be an "act to effect the object of the conspiracy." 

18 U.S.C. § 371. The first jury never decided that the 

payments in question did not satisfy this definition. The 

district court did not err, therefore, in admitting evidence of 

those payments in the second trial. See United States v. 

Irvin, 787 F.2d 1506, 1514-16 (11th Cir. 1986) (allowing 

acquitted conduct to be used as evidence of overt act for 

conspiracy charge); United States v. Garza, 754 F.2d 1202, 

1209 (5th Cir. 1985) (same).

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, we reject Lukens's collateral 

estoppel argument and affirm his convictions.

USCA Case #96-3075 Document #276228 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 4 of 4