Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07087/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Susan Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SUSAN WILLIAMS, individually and ) 

as personal representative of the ) 

estates of Larry Dean Williams, ) 

Justin Dean Williams, and Michael ) 

Ray Williams, and as next friend ) 

of LACI WILLIAMS, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

. ' , . ' ' . 

_:j; -~- ·''--!. :....1 ;.'-'\.~---· -~ -- ... M. ':w.""" l -O J7t0j.' ... ---- ' u ~"''·"'" ,..., ~ .. ~ ,.: . ,r,,._ ' . " 'Te:,t.i ..._)L,._ \;l ' 

FEB 1 4: i992 

ROBERT L. HOECKEP.. 

Clerk 

v. ) 

) 

No. 91-7087 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D . C. No . CIV-91-007-S) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Mark Green, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

John Raley, United States Attorney, and Ralph F. Keen, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Eastern District of Oklahoma, Muskogee, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Chief Judge. 

The parties have agreed that this case may be submitted for 

decision on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 

Appellate Case: 91-7087 Document: 010110222567 Date Filed: 02/14/1992 Page: 1 
34.1 . 2. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral 

argument. 

The trial court dismissed plaintiff Susan Williams' suit 

against the United States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

holding that a federal flood control statute, 33 u.s.c. S 702c, 

immunizes the government from suit. We reverse and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

The facts of the case are largely undisputed. In June 1989, 

Ms. Williams' husband and two sons went fishing in the Verdigris 

River downstream of the Newt Graham Lock and Dam 18 of the 

McClellen-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System. The Navigation 

System, including this lock and dam, is operated by the United 

States Corps of Engineers (COE). At the ti.me in question, the 

dam's tainter gates were releasing approximately 12,000 cubic feet 

of water per second. This water posed no threat to the fishermen. 

In the course of moving a tug or tow boat with barges through the 

lock headed downstream, the lock operator released an additional 

6,000 cubic feet per second of water across the original water 

flow. Ms. Williams' husband and two sons were swept away and 

drowned. 

Ms. Williams sued the United States, alleging failure to warn 

the decedents adequately of the impending release of the 6,000 

cubic feet of water per second to move boats through the lock. 

The government moved for dismissal based on lack of subject matter 

-2~ 

Appellate Case: 91-7087 Document: 010110222567 Date Filed: 02/14/1992 Page: 2 
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. To support 

this motion, the government submitted the affidavit of a COE 

hydraulic engineer regarding the flow of water through the dam and 

lock on the date at issue. On this evidence, the trial court 

found that the government was immune from liability under the 

Flood Control Act ("the Act"), 33 u.s.c. S 702c, and it granted 

the government's motion to dismiss. 

We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

de novo . Redmon ex rel. Redmon v. United States, 934 F.2d 1151, 

1155 (10th Cir. 1991). The issue before us is therefore whether 

or not the record establishes governmental immunity under 33 

U.S.C. S 702c. 1 

The Supreme Court construed the immunity provision in United 

States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986), holding that the government 

has broad immunity when it acts to control flood waters. The 

court stated that "[t]he Act concerns flood control projects 

designed to carry floodwaters. It is thus clear from S 702c's 

plain language that the terms 'flood' and 'flood waters' apply to 

all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control 

project for purposes of or related to flood control •.. II 

at 605. This court applied the James analysis in Boyd v. United 

States ex rel. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 881 F.2d 895 

1 The relevant part of the Act provides that "[n]o liability of 

any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any 

damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place." 

_3..;. 

Appellate Case: 91-7087 Document: 010110222567 Date Filed: 02/14/1992 Page: 3 
(10th Cir. 1989), holding that the government is immune from prosecution if there is a "requisite nexus" or "necessary link between 

flood control activities and injuries sustained ... " Id. at 

900. For the purpose of deciding Boyd, we explicitly assumed that 

the lake in question "was created by the COE for flood control 

purposes." Id. at 899. Neither James nor Boyd considers what we 

find to be the threshold question in the instant case: Is there 

"a flood control project" that triggers the Act? Only if this 

question is answered affirmatively can we proceed to the issue of 

a nexus between flood control activities and the injury. 

Other circuit courts have not explicitly defined "flood 

control project," but their analyses in similar cases begin by 

considering the character and purpose of the dam or levee 

involved. In finding that a lake was a flood control project, the 

Ninth Circuit cited the statute pursuant to which a dam was built 

and the fact that the COE monitored the lake's water level daily. 

McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989). (We note an unpublished 

decision following McCarthy, in which plaintiffs have petitioned 

for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Hiersche v. United States, 

No. 89-35416 (9th Cir. May 14, 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 

u.s.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1991) (No. 91-774).) The Third 

Circuit used the same indicia to find a flood control project in 

Dawson v. United States, 894 F.2d 70, 71 (3d Cir. 1990). The 

Eighth Circuit also relied on the statutory basis for building a 

dam in finding that "[f]lood control was an essential component of 

-4-· 

Appellate Case: 91-7087 Document: 010110222567 Date Filed: 02/14/1992 Page: 4 
the multiple purpose project" that expanded the lake in which an 

injury had occurred. DeWitt Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 

878 F.2d 246, 247 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , 110 

S. Ct. 1318 (1990). The Fifth Circuit examined the purpose of 

dredging a flotation channel in finding that the channels, and 

therefore their dredging, "were inescapably part of a flood 

control project." Mocklin v. Orleans Levee Dist., 877 F.2d 427, 

430 (5th Cir. 1989). See also Fryman v. United States, 901 F.2d 

79, 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , 111 S. Ct. 295 

(1990) (endorsing broad governmental immunity for injuries such as 

drowning where flood-control project and activities increase probability of their occurrence). 

We begin our analysis as these other circuit courts have, 

with the dam and lock themselves, and with the understanding that 

"Congress clearly sought to ensure beyond doubt that sovereign 

immunity would protect the Government from 'any' liability associated with flood control." James at 608. In adopting this 

analysis, we explicitly reject the approach that the government 

and trial court took when they asked first and foremost whether 

the water involved in the injury was floodwater, either at the 

moment of injury or at any prior time. Immunity under the Act as 

interpreted in James depends not on the character or origin of the 

water, but on the purpose of the project and the nature of the 

activity creating the nexus with the injury. In the words of the 

James opinion, "The Act concerns flood control projects designed 

to carry floodwaters." James at 605 (emphasis added). 

-s--

Appellate Case: 91-7087 Document: 010110222567 Date Filed: 02/14/1992 Page: 5 
An approach that elevated the character of the water over the 

purpose of the dam or levee would lead to absurd results. For 

example, a drop of water at the head of the Colorado River that 

was impounded in or that passed through a flood control project 

would thereby become floodwater, and would immunize the government 

from all liability for injury caused by that drop of water or any 

water with which it commingled, all the way from the headwaters to 

the Gulf of Mexico. By this approach the government would also be 

immune from liability for injuries caused by any activities taking 

place downstream of a flood control project, no matter what the 

activities and how negligently performed. This logic would 

provide immunity without analysis beyond finding the drop of water 

passing through a flood control project. There is no evidence in 

this record or in the cases cited that Congress intended the Flood 

Control Act to sweep so broadly or be applied so indiscriminately. 

Although James has been criticized for overreaching with its focus 

on the facility, see Fryman, 901 F.2d at 81 (positing absurd 

results at the fringes of the purpose-of-the-facility analysis), 

we apply its logic as clearly superior to and more rational than 

the proposed alternative. 

Examining the record before us, we look first for evidence in 

the record that the dam and lock are a flood control project 

triggering the Act. The government relied almost exclusively on 

the affidavit of a COE hydraulic engineer on this point. This 

reliance is misplaced, however, as the affidavit contains a flat 

-6~ 

Appellate Case: 91-7087 Document: 010110222567 Date Filed: 02/14/1992 Page: 6 
statement that "the lock and dam .. . has [sic] no flood control 

capabilities." (Copley Aff. 1 6 (emphasis added).) 

The statutes pursuant to which the facility was built do not 

support finding this to be a flood control project, because they 

refer in the disjunctive to projects built for navigation or flood 

control. River and Harbor Act, 33 u.s.c . S 603a (1988) (amended 

1945) (emphasis added): Flood Control Act of 1950, 33 U.S.C. S 

701£-2 (1988) (referring to "river, harbor, Q.f: flood-control 

works") (emphasis added). The rules and regulations governing 

public use of the waters at issue here actually support a conclusion contrary to the government's argument, because they refer not 

to flood waters or flood control, but to "navigable reservoir 

areas" (36 C.F.R. § 311 (1971) (replaced 1973 by 36 C. F.R. S 

327)), "water resource development projects" (id.), and a "navigation system" (33 C.F.R. S 207.275 (1991)). Finally, the statutory 

list of projects subject to federal flood control regulations does 

not include this facility . 33 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1991). The 

federal government has thus apparently decided to regulate the 

facility as a navigation system rather than as a flood control 

project. 

On this record, we conclude that the dam and lock, which by 

the government's admission have "no flood control capabilities, " 

were built for navigation, not flood control . This facility 

therefore does not trigger the Flood Control Act. 

_7.:. 

Appellate Case: 91-7087 Document: 010110222567 Date Filed: 02/14/1992 Page: 7 
The COE affidavit describes facilities upstream of this lock 

and dam as "flood control projects," and characterizes the water 

that caused the injury in this case as originating partly from 

" flood control releases from upstream projects." (Copley Aff. 1 

6.) Projects upstream of the facility in question might qualify 

to trigger the Act if the proper record were made, but the mere 

presence of a qualifying project upstream of the injury would not 

immunize all governmental activities downstream. There must not 

only be a qualifying project to trigger the Act, but there must 

also be a nexus between the operation of that project and the 

downstream injury to invoke immunity. 

While the record in this case (based on the bald but 

unrefuted affidavit of the COE) establishes that the upstream 

facilities are qualifying projects, there is no evidence whatever 

that the activity causing the injury--the increased release of 

water moving the boat and barges through the lock--was in any way 

connected with the upstream projects. 2 The government's mere 

assertion that the water in which plaintiff's decedents drowned 

had passed through upstream flood control facilities is 

insufficient to invoke immunity; in fact, under the analysis 

described here, it misses the boat entirely. 

We hold that the record before us fails to trigger the Flood 

Control Act, and as a result, the government does not have the 

2 In the record before us, neither party seriously contends 

that the boats were moved through the lock in the interest of 

flood control. 

-8-= 

Appellate Case: 91-7087 Document: 010110222567 Date Filed: 02/14/1992 Page: 8 
benefit of immunity through the Act. We therefore hold that 

subject matter jurisdiction lies with the trial court, which may 

proceed to examine the merits of this case. 

We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

-9~ 

Appellate Case: 91-7087 Document: 010110222567 Date Filed: 02/14/1992 Page: 9