Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cr-01240/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cr-01240-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth Douglas Murray
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Kenneth Douglas Murray, 

Defendant. 

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CR09-1240-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant Kenneth Douglas Murray is charged with possession of child pornography

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(5)(B) and 2256. He has filed two motions to suppress.

One motion seeks to suppress all evidence obtained by means of a search warrant executed

at his home on November 2, 2007. Dkt. #27. The other motion seeks to suppress statements

made by Defendant during questioning at his home on the same day. Dkt. #26. The motions

have been fully briefed, and an evidentiary hearing was held on March 4, 2010. For reasons

that follow, the Court will deny both motions.

I. Motion to Suppress the Search Warrant.

On October 31, 2007, Special Agent Diedre Gotjen of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation presented a 53-paragraph affidavit to United States Magistrate Judge Michelle

H. Burns. On the basis of the affidavit, Judge Burns signed a search warrant authorizing the

FBI to search Defendant’s house located at 3975 South Hollyhock Place, Chandler, Arizona.

The warrant authorized agents to seize computers, computer devices, papers, and other

materials that may be related to the possession of child pornography. Dkt. #43-1.

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1

 Defendant’s motion to suppress initially asserted that, under Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154 (1978), the search warrant was based on reckless or misleading information.

Defendant chose not to pursue this argument at the evidentiary hearing, instead asserting that

Agent Gotjen’s affidavit failed to establish probable cause. 

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The search warrant was executed early on the morning of November 2, 2007. The

details of the search will be discussed in part II of this order. Defendant’s computer was

seized, and on it were found multiple images of child pornography.

Defendant argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause

because the evidence contained in Agent Gotjen’s affidavit was stale. Defendant also

contends that the affidavit contained insufficient information regarding sources relied on by

the FBI, and that the categories of items covered by the warrant were overly broad.1

 

A. Legal Standards.

To be valid under the Fourth Amendment, search warrants must be supported by

probable cause. In assessing the existence of probable cause, “[t]he task of the issuing

magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the

circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238

(1983). “[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a

‘substantial basis for concluding’ that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238-39 (quoting Jones

v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (ellipses and brackets omitted)). The Court must remember

that a “fair probability” does not amount to “certainty or even a preponderance of the

evidence,” and that the Court must not “flyspeck” the affidavit through de novo review. U.S.

v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). The magistrate judge’s

determination “should be paid great deference.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. 

B. Agent Gotjen’s Affidavit.

“‘All data necessary to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant must

be contained within the four corners of a written affidavit given under oath.’” Gourde, 440

F.3d at 1067 (quoting U.S. v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174, 175 (9th Cir. 1971)). The information

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that follows is taken from the affidavit submitted by Agent Gotjen to Magistrate Judge Burns.

See Dkt. #43-1.

On July 10, 2006, the Dutch National Police (“DNP”) conducted an investigation that

targeted a bulletin board system known to be involved in the distribution of child

pornography. While examining the bulletin board, the DNP observed a link that included

four files available for download. The DNP downloaded the files and found that each

contained more than 100 images of child erotica and child pornography. Agent Gotjen’s

affidavit described in detail six photographs from the files. The descriptions included the

positions of the minor females and the portions of their bodies that were the focus of the

photographs, leaving no doubt that the images constituted child pornography.

 Agent Gotjen explained in the affidavit that she is a member of the FBI Innocent

Images Task Force, Sexual Assault, Felony Enforcement Team in Phoenix, Arizona. She

stated that she had reviewed the four files downloaded by the DNP, including the six

photographs described in the affidavit, and found the files to contain child pornography.

The affidavit explained that the DNP’s investigation found that the four files were

distributed from the website www.filehd.com, a domain registered to a company named File

HD in Uden, Netherlands. The DNP contacted File HD and obtained the Internet Protocol

(“IP”) addresses, as well as the dates and times, of individuals who downloaded or attempted

to download the four files. 

The information collected by the DNP was forwarded to the United States Department

of Justice. Analysis conducted by the FBI found that IP address 130.13.104.126, as assigned

on May 20, 2006, had downloaded all four of the child-pornography-containing files. An

FBI search conducted through the American Registry of Internet Numbers revealed that the

IP address was registered to Qwest Communications. On March 14, 2007, an administrative

subpoena was issued to Qwest Communications for information related to the IP address as

assigned on May 20, 2006. In response, Qwest disclosed that the IP address, on that date and

at the time the files were downloaded, was assigned to Defendant Kenneth D. Murray at 3975

South Hollyhock Place, Chandler, Arizona.

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With this information in her possession, Agent Gotjen undertook to verify that

Defendant actually resided at the address provided by Qwest. Agent Gotjen conducted

surveillance of the house in September of 2007. She observed a vehicle parked in the

driveway. A check on the vehicle’s license plate through the Arizona Motor Vehicle

Division revealed that the vehicle was registered to Kenneth D. Murray at the South

Hollyhock address. A driver’s license query for Kenneth D. Murray also disclosed that he

resided at the South Hollyhock address. A query of Maricopa County property information

revealed that Kenneth D. Murray had purchased the South Hollyhock residence in 1998.

On September 17, 2007, a further query of Qwest revealed that the telephone number

previously provided by Qwest as belonging to Kenneth D. Murray was still active. On

October 26, 2007, Agent Gotjen placed a ruse phone call to Kenneth Murray. Murray

confirmed during the call that he still received bundled phone, cable, and Internet services

from Qwest. An additional inquiry of Qwest on October 29, 2007, confirmed that Kenneth

Murray received uninterrupted Internet Service at his residence from May 20, 2006 through

October 3, 2007. 

On the basis of Agent Gotjen’s knowledge, training, and experience, as well as the

experience of other FBI agents with whom Agent Gotjen had spoken, the affidavit stated that

computer files or remnants of such files can be recovered months or even years after they

have been downloaded onto a hard drive. Even when such files have been deleted, they can

be recovered months or years later using readily-available forensic tools. The affidavit

explained that when a person deletes a file on a home computer, the data contained in the file

does not actually disappear. Rather, the data remains on the hard drive until it is overwritten

by new data. Therefore, deleted files or even remnants of deleted files may reside in free

space or slack space – that is, space on the hard drive that is not allocated to an active file.

The affidavit noted that a computer’s operating system may also keep a record of deleted data

in a “swap” or “recovery” file. 

Based on Agent Gotjen’s experience and the experience of other agents, the affidavit

further stated that computer data can be stored on a variety of systems and storage devices

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including hard drives, floppy disks, CD-ROMs, DVDs, PDAs, multi-media cards, memory

sticks, optical disks, printer buffers, smart cards, memory calculators, electronic dialers,

Bernoulli drives, or electronic notebooks. The affidavit further stated, based on the

experience and training of Agent Gotjen and other agents, that several characteristics are

generally found to exist in individuals who collect child pornography. The majority of

individuals who collect such pornography are persons with a sexual attraction to children.

The majority of such individuals collect sexually explicit materials, which may consist of

photographs, magazines, motion pictures, videotapes, books, computer graphics, or digital

or other images. A majority of these individuals also collect child erotica, which consists of

images or text that do not rise to the level of child pornography, but which nonetheless fuel

their sexual fantasies regarding children. 

Agent Gotjen also explained on the basis of her training and experience, as well as the

training and experience of other agents, that the majority of individuals who collect child

pornography rarely dispose of their sexually explicit materials, and may go to great lengths

to conceal and protect their collections from discovery, theft, and damage. They almost

always maintain their collections in the privacy of their homes or other secure locations. 

On the basis of this information, Agent Gotjen requested a warrant to search for and

seize computer hardware and associated materials that she believed would contain some or

all of the photographs described in the warrant and that were downloaded on May 20, 2006.

Judge Burns reviewed the affidavit and signed the search warrant on October 31, 2007. The

warrant was executed on November 2, 2007. To date, the government has found thousands

of pornographic images on Defendant’s computer, including child pornography and at least

one photograph from the files downloaded from the Netherlands on May 20, 2006.

C. The Affidavit Established Probable Cause.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that Magistrate

Judge Burns had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability that

evidence of child pornography would be found through the search warrant. The affidavit

provided considerable detail concerning the investigation conducted by the DNP, including

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the date on which the investigation commenced, the nature of the four files discovered by the

DNP on a bulletin board, the website from which the four files were distributed, the company

that owned the website, and the company’s location in the Netherlands. The affidavit

disclosed that information collected by the DNP, including the four files, were delivered to

the Department of Justice. The four files were reviewed by experts at DOJ and by agent

Gotjen herself, and were found to contain child pornography.

The affidavit further explained that analysis of the information provided by the DNP

revealed that a particular IP address had downloaded the four files on May 20, 2006. The

FBI conducted an investigation of this address, ultimately finding that it was assigned to

Defendant. The FBI’s investigation confirmed that Defendant in fact resided at the physical

address shown for the IP address and had used the IP address at that location on May 20,

2006. 

This information left little doubt that Defendant had downloaded the four files on

May 20, 2006. The Court has no difficulty concluding that this evidence established a high

likelihood that Defendant had received and possessed the child pornography contained in the

four files. 

Defendant’s primary argument is that the evidence was stale by October 31, 2007, the

date of Agent Gotjen’s affidavit. Some 17 months had passed since the four files were

downloaded to Defendant’s IP address. Defendant contends that there was no reasonable

basis for believing that any child pornography was still in Defendant’s possession or would

be located through a search of his residence and computer. 

As the Ninth Circuit repeatedly has recognized, however, expert opinion may be

presented in a search warrant affidavit and may provide valuable context for conducting the

“fair probability” inquiry. See Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1073 (“The details provided on the use

of computers by child pornographers and the collector profile strengthen [the inference that

child pornography will still be in the collector’s possession] and help provide context for the

fair probability” inquiry[.]) (internal quotations and citations omitted); U.S. v. Hay, 231 F.3d

630, 636 (9th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that the collector profile “form[ed] the basis upon which

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the magistrate judge could plausibly conclude that those files were still on the premises”);

U.S. v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is well established that expert

opinion may be presented in a search warrant affidavit.”). Agent Gotjen’s expert opinion,

based on her training and experience and the training and experience of other FBI agents,

established that child pornography images downloaded to a computer can remain for an

extended period of time, even years. This is true even if the images are deleted by the

computer user. The reliability of such opinions has been acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit:

Thanks to the long memory of computers, any evidence of a crime was almost

certainly still on [defendant’s] computer, even if he had tried to delete the

images. FBI computer experts, cited in the affidavit, stated that even if graphic

image files have been deleted these files can easily be restored. In other

words, [defendant’s] computer would contain at least the digital footprint of

the images. 

Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1071 (quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted); see also U.S. v.

Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the nature of the crime involving child

pornography, as set forth in the affidavit, “provided ‘good reason[]’ to believe the

computerized visual depictions downloaded by Lacy would be present in his apartment when

the search was conducted ten months later”).

Agent Gotjen also provided expert opinion that collectors of child pornography rarely

dispose of their sexually explicit materials. The Ninth Circuit has relied on similar FBI

expertise to note that collectors of child pornography “act like ‘pack rats’ because they have

difficulty obtaining images of child pornography. As such, they are inclined to download

and keep such images for a long period of time, and they rarely, if ever, dispose of their

sexually explicit materials. This profile tracks the collector profiles that supported a finding

of probable cause in other cases in this circuit and others.” Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1072

(quotation marks omitted); see also Lacy, 119 F.3d at 746 (“[T]he affiant explained that

collectors and distributors of child pornography value their sexually explicit materials highly,

‘rarely if ever’ dispose of such material, and store it ‘for long periods’ in a secure place,

typically in their homes.”); U.S. v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 75 (2nd Cir. 2005) (same). 

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Given the expert opinions provided in Agent Gotjen’s affidavit, Magistrate Judge

Burns reasonably found a “fair probability” that child pornography images would still be on

Defendant’s computer 17 months after he downloaded them from the Netherlands site.

Although this period is longer than the ten-months addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Lacy

and the four months addressed in Gourde, the durability of pornographic images once

downloaded to a computer, when combined with the propensity of collectors to retain the

material indefinitely, supported Judge Burns’ conclusion. Other courts have reached similar

conclusions. See U.S. v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 2008) (information

not stale despite being years old because special agent attested that those who download child

pornography tend to retain images for years and use computers to augment and store

collected images); U.S. v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2006) (information not stale

despite being years old because pedophiles are likely to hoard images of child pornography

in their homes for extended periods of time).

The Court also notes that this investigation had international origins, arising in the

Netherlands, being transmitted to the Department of Justice, and ultimately being forwarded

to the FBI in Phoenix for final investigation. The investigation by the DNP was commenced

in July of 2006. After the pornographic images had been found, downloaded, and analyzed,

and the source had been traced to a Netherlands company, the information was forwarded

to the United States. Agent Gotjen’s affidavit notes that administrative subpoenas were

issued in the United States in March of 2007, ultimately revealing Defendant’s IP address.

Agent Gotjen conducted further investigations in September and October of 2007 to confirm

that Defendant resided at the physical location identified with the IP address. Although the

necessary length of international, multi-agency investigations cannot justify the use of stale

evidence, the Court notes that this does not appear to be a case simply of slow law

enforcement. Between March and October of 2007, agents in the United States analyzed

DNP information, searched the American Registry of Internet Numbers, served

administrative subpoenas, conducted physical surveillance of Defendant’s premises, checked

Arizona driver’s license, vehicle registration, property ownership, and telephone information,

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and made further inquiries of Qwest Communications. These efforts ultimately led to a clear

and probative indication that Defendant had in fact downloaded the four files, containing

more than 400 photographs, on May 20, 2006. Agent Gotjen’s expertise and that of other

agents, as recounted in the affidavit, established a fair probability that the images were still

in Defendant’s possession in October of 2007. Considering the totality of the circumstances

and affording appropriate deference to Judge Burns’ determination, the Court concludes that

the search warrant should not be suppressed for lack of probable cause.

D. Defendant’s Cases.

Defendant relies heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s 1991 decision in Weber to argue that

Agent Gotjen’s affidavit failed to establish probable cause. But Weber concerned hard-copy

child pornography sent through the mail, not Internet child pornography downloaded to

computers. 923 F.2d at 1340. Weber thus lacked the significant long-term retention capacity

of computers, a factor that contributed significantly to the Ninth Circuit’s finding of probable

cause in Gourde. 440 F.3d at 1071 (stating that “these images were almost certainly

retrievable from his computer if he had ever received or downloaded them”). 

Defendant also relies heavily on United States v. Greathouse, 297 F.Supp. 2d 1264

(D. Or. 2003). The district court in Greathouse concluded that child pornography evidence

became stale after one year unless accompanied by evidence of additional criminal activity.

Id. at 1273. Greathouse, however, was also decided before the Ninth Circuit’s en banc

decision in Gourde. Greathouse concluded, apparently without support from the search

warrant affidavit, that computer equipment becomes obsolete very quickly and Internet

images downloaded by a computer user may therefore be lost through computer upgrades.

Gourde, by contrast, looked to the expert opinion contained in the search warrant affidavit,

which noted that images downloaded to computers are retained for an extended period of

time. 440 F.3d at 1071. In this case, Agent Gotjen expressed her expert opinion, and that

of other FBI agents, that digital images are retained in a computer’s memory, intentionally

or unintentionally, for years. The Court concludes that this evidence provided a substantial

basis for Judge Burns’ finding of a fair probability. The Court cannot conclude that the

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possibility of frequent computer upgrades, relied on by the court in Greathouse, is so great

as to defeat fair probability in this case. Even those who frequently upgrade computers do

so only every two or three years. Moreover, older computers often are retained in the home

or office and continue to store an extensive digital memory. In light of Agent Gotjen’s expert

opinion that digital images can be retained for years, the Court cannot rely on its own view

of computer upgrades to conclude that Defendant was unlikely to have retained digital

images for 17 months. The affidavit in this case provided a substantial basis for Judge Burns

to conclude that Defendant likely retained some or all of the more than 400 images he

downloaded from the Netherlands on May 20, 2006. 

E. Overbreadth.

Defendant complains that the search warrant was over broad because it included

letters, diaries, cameras, film, photographs of minors, address books, mailing lists, and

documents related to Defendant’s ownership of the residence. Dkt. #27 at 9. But when a

portion of a search warrant is overly broad, federal courts generally invalidate only the overly

broad portion and suppress evidence seized pursuant to that portion. See, e.g., U.S. v.

Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1153-62 (10th

Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Timley, 443 F.3d 615, 620 (8th Cir. 2006). Defendant has identified no

evidence that was seized pursuant to the allegedly over broad portions of the search warrant

he has identified. The key evidence in this case – multiple images of child pornography –

were found on Defendant’s computer. Given the facts set forth in Agent Gotjen’s affidavit,

the Court cannot conclude that the portion of the search warrant authorizing seizure of

Defendant’s computer was overly broad.

F. Good Faith Exception.

The Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained under a facially valid search

warrant, which is later found to be invalid, is admissible if the executing officers acted in

good faith and had an “objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.”

U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). For all of the reasons outlined above, the Court

concludes that objectively reasonable law enforcement officers would find probable cause

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to believe that Defendant was in possession of child pornography on the date of the search,

and that the search warrant therefore was valid. The investigation had carefully pinpointed

Defendant as the individual who downloaded child pornography on May 20, 2006, at the

South Hollyhock residence. The expertise and training of the law enforcement officers

confirmed that collectors of child pornography rarely dispose of it, and that images

downloaded to a computer persist for years. Because the agents were about to search the

physical residence where the images had been downloaded, they could believe, on an

objectively reasonable basis, that child pornography would be found. Thus, even if the Court

were to conclude that the evidence in this case was too stale to support probable cause, the

motion to suppress would be denied on the basis of the good faith exception.

II. Motion to Suppress Defendant’s Interview.

The search warrant was executed on the morning of November 2, 2007. Defendant

was interviewed by Agent Gotjen and City of Phoenix Police Detective Chris Curley during

the course of the search. Defendant makes three arguments. First, Defendant contends that

the interview was custodial and that he should have been given a Miranda warning. Second,

Defendant contends that he stated, several times, that he did not want to answer questions.

He argues that the officers should have ceased their questioning when he made these

statements. Third, Defendant contends that his statements were not voluntary.

A. The Interview.

The following facts are based on testimony presented at the March 4, 2010 evidentiary

hearing, including credibility determinations. The Court heard testimony from Agent Gotjen,

Detective Curley, and Defendant. The following facts are also based on the audio recording

of the November 2, 2007 interview.

Agent Gotjen and the other officers arrived at Defendant’s house at 6:45 a.m. on

November 2, 2007. Ten federal agents, two police officers, and one photographer were

present to execute the search. All of the law enforcement personnel were dressed in casual

clothing, but each wore a ballistic vest that read either “FBI” or “Police.” Each officer

carried a sidearm. No marked police cars were visible at the house.

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2

 In his motion to suppress, Defendant asserted that he was handcuffed by the officers.

Dkt. #26. His counsel withdrew this assertion at the evidentiary hearing on March 4, 2010.

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Six to eight officers approached Defendant’s front door, knocked, and announced their

presence. The agents had their guns drawn. The agent at the front of the line was pointing

his gun into Defendant’s house. The other agents had their guns pointed at the ground.

When Defendant answered the door, he was asked to step outside. He complied, and

remained outside the front of the house, seated on a bench, while six to eight officers

conducted a security sweep of the residence. While in front of his house, Defendant was

accompanied by one or two officers. He was not restrained.2

Defendant sat in front of his house for approximately 20 minutes while agents secured

the residence. Defendant was dressed in a t-shirt, gym shorts, and slippers. When it was

apparent he was cold, one of the officers went into the house and retrieved additional

clothing for Defendant. Agent Gotjen told Defendant the agents were conducting a security

sweep of the house and that he was not under arrest.

After the security sweep was concluded, Agent Gotjen, Detective Curley and the other

officers took off their ballistic vests. Officer Curley wore a t-shirt and blue jeans, Agent

Gotjen was dressed in casual clothing, and none of the other officers was in uniform. All

weapons were holstered. Detective Curley moved his weapon to his ankle where it was not

visible under his trousers.

Agent Gotjen told Defendant that she would like to explain what they were doing,

provide him with a copy of the search warrant, and ask him some questions. Defendant

voluntarily accompanied Agent Gotjen to the back patio of his home where the officers had

placed a card table and three chairs. Defendant sat at the table with Agent Gotjen and

Detective Curley during the interview. No other law enforcement officers were present in

the vicinity of the interview or in the backyard. Photographs placed in evidence during the

evidentiary hearing show that Defendant has a relatively large backyard, covered in grass.

The card table and chairs were located on a covered patio in the backyard. 

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Detective Curley recorded the interview of Defendant. A transcript of the recording

was provided to the Court. See Dkt. #39-1. In addition, the Court listened to the full

interview on a DVD provided by the government. Defense counsel stated he had no

objection to the transcript or the DVD.

Defendant works as a quality engineer at Orbital Sciences. His testimony during the

evidentiary hearing reflected that he is composed and articulate, and appears to be well

educated. Both officers testified that Defendant was alert and calm during the interview, and

that he did not appear to be impaired in any manner. During the interview, Defendant was

clothed in a t-shirt and trousers. 

The interview started at 7:05 a.m. Agent Gotjen explained that the officers were there

to execute a search warrant and said: “You are not under arrest and your [sic] free to leave

at any time.” Dkt. #39-1 at 2. Agent Gotjen told Defendant they were going to record the

interview. Id. at 3. She then said again: “As I explained to you earlier, you are not under

arrest. Were [sic] here to execute the, a search warrant. Ah, on your premises. You are free

to leave at any time.” Id.

Agent Gotjen provided Defendant with a copy of the search warrant. He took

approximately five minutes to read it. No questions or comments were made during this fiveminute period. After Defendant had reviewed the search warrant, Agent Gotjen and

Detective Curley began asking Defendant questions. Early in the conversation, Defendant

said: “I don’t have anything to say.” He then followed this immediately by stating: “I think

that’s the best answer. I don’t have anything to say.” Id. at 6. The agents continued their

questioning. Several minutes later, Detective Curley asked Defendant when he had last

downloaded child pornography. Defendant asked if he had to answer that kind of a question.

Detective Curley said “You don’t have to answer anything.” He then added: “Like I said,

you’re not under arrest.” When Defendant said it seemed like he should not be responding

to these questions, Detective Curley replied: “That’s up to you. This is just your opportunity

to tell your side of it.” Id. at 13. 

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Defendant proceeded to answer questions, eventually admitting that he possessed

child pornography for his own personal gratification. Later in the interview, Agent Gotjen

again told Defendant that he was free to leave. Defendant ultimately did elect to leave his

home. He dressed for work and left while the officers were still conducting the search. He

agreed with the officers that they would leave a key under the doormat and depart through

the side gate.

Defendant’s interview concluded at 7:42 a.m. The entire interview thus lasted 37

minutes. When the five-minute period during which Defendant was reviewing the search

warrant is subtracted, the questions and answers lasted 32 minutes. 

As reflected in the recording of the interview, Agent Gotjen and Detective Curley

conducted themselves in a polite and friendly manner. They were not commanding or

authoritative in their tone. Both officers testified that no threats were made and no coercion

was used, nor were promises made to induce Defendant’s cooperation. 

Defendant testified that he was shocked and intimidated by the arrival of a large

number of armed law enforcement officers at his house early in the morning. He testified

that the officers awoke him from sleep when they knocked loudly on the front door. He

further testified that he did not feel free to leave because there were officers in his house

conducting a search. 

B. Legal Standard.

In United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit

addressed a question of first impression: “Under what circumstances under the Fifth

Amendment does an interrogation by law enforcement officers in the suspect’s own home

turn the home into such a police-dominated atmosphere that the interrogation becomes

custodial in nature and requires Miranda warnings?” Id. at 1077. Craighead noted that a

suspect is considered “‘in custody’ for purposes of Miranda if the suspect has been ‘deprived

of his freedom of action in any significant way.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). “To determine whether the suspect was in custody, we first

examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. We then ask

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whether a reasonable person in those circumstances would have felt he or she was not at

liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Id. (internal citation and quotations

omitted). 

This Court recently identified nine factors discussed by the Ninth Circuit in

determining whether an interrogation is custodial. These include (1) the number of law

enforcement personnel and whether they were armed; (2) whether the suspect was at any

point restrained, either by physical force or by threats; (3) whether the suspect was isolated

from others; (4) whether the suspect was informed that he was free to leave or terminate the

interview and the context under which any such statements were made; (5) the language used

to summon the individual; (6) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence

of guilt; (7) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (8) the duration of the detention;

and (9) the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual. U.S. v. Salabye, 623

F.Supp.2d 1010, 1013 (D. Ariz. 2009) (citing Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1085; U.S. v. Kim, 292

F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Court will consider each of these factors.

1. The search of Defendant’s home included a large number of law enforcement

officers. Ten federal agents, two state police officers, and a photographer arrived in the early

morning hours of November 2, 2007. The officers wore vests that identified themselves as

FBI or police, and each carried a weapon. The weapons of the six to eight officers who

initially entered Defendant’s home were drawn. The presence of such a large number of law

enforcement officers, with weapons drawn, would intimidate any citizen, whether guilty or

innocent, and weighs in favor of finding that Defendant’s interview was custodial.

2. Defendant was not restrained. He was not placed in handcuffs, nor was he

enclosed in a room. No physical force or threats were used during the course of the search

or Defendant’s interview. This is in contrast to Craighead, where the suspect was taken to

a small storage room, the door was closed, and an armed police officer wearing a ballistic

vest stood silently in front of the door, looking at the suspect, and did not participate in the

interview. 539 F.3d at 1086.

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3. Defendant was not isolated from others. In Craighead the suspect was physically

separated from the Air Force officer who had been sent to provide him emotional support.

Id. at 1087. In Salabye, the suspect was physically separated from his family. 623 F.Supp.2d

at 1014. Defendant in this case lived alone. He stated during his interview that he rarely had

visitors. He was not separated by the officers from other individuals who could provide

comfort or assistance.

4. Defendant was informed three times during the 32-minute interview that he was

free to leave. He was told twice that he was not under arrest. He was also told that he did

not have to answer any questions. The recording of the interview reveals that these

statements were made in a straightforward, candid manner, not in a tone that sought to

minimize their importance. Agent Gotjen also testified credibly that she told Defendant

before the interview that he was not under arrest.

5. Agent Gotjen summoned Defendant to the interview by stating that she would like

to explain to him why the officers were there, show him a copy of the search warrant, and

ask him questions. Defendant voluntarily accompanied her to the backyard for the interview.

No threat, promise, or coercion was used to secure Defendant’s participation in the interview.

6. Defendant was not confronted with evidence of his guilt. He was permitted to read

the search warrant, which contained the facts recited in part I of this order, but Agent Gotjen

and Officer Curley did not confront Defendants with evidence of his guilt during their

questioning and did not use such evidence in an attempt to elicit statements from Defendant.

7. The physical surroundings of the interrogation were not confining. Defendant was

located in his rather spacious backyard, sitting on a covered patio with the two officers at a

card table. Defendant was not confined in a small storage room with an armed guard at the

door as in Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1086, nor in the cab of a truck with a uniformed and armed

officer as in Salabye, 623 F.Supp.2d at 1013. No other law enforcement officers were

present or visible in Defendant’s backyard, and neither interviewing officer was in uniform.

Other officers were searching Defendant’s residence during the course of the interview, but

they were not visible from the patio. Moreover, “[t]he element of compulsion that concerned

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the Court in Miranda is less likely to be present where the suspect is in familiar

surroundings.” Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1083.

8. Defendant’s interview lasted 32 minutes. This is considerably shorter than the two

hours and thirty-seven minutes of questioning in Salabye. 623 F.Supp.2d at 1014. Prior to

the interview, Defendant sat in front of his house for 20 minutes while the house was

secured, but the time between the arrival of the officers and the end of Defendant’s interview

was less than one hour.

9. As noted above, no pressure was applied to detain Defendant. He was told at least

three times that he was free to leave. He was told repeatedly that he was not under arrest.

He was told that he did not have to answer any questions. Ultimately, Defendant did choose

to leave, departing the residence while law enforcement officers were still completing the

search. 

Considering all of these factors, the Court concludes that Defendant was not in

custody. Although the first factor – the number of law enforcement officers and the fact that

they were armed – weighs in favor of this being a custodial interrogation, the remaining eight

factors weigh against such a conclusion. Defendant was not restrained, pressure and

coercion were not applied, the interview occurred in his open backyard, only two officers

were present during the interview, they were not in uniform, their guns were not drawn,

Detective Curley’s weapon was not visible, Defendant was not confronted with evidence of

guilt, he was told repeatedly he could leave, he was told he did not have to answer questions,

the questioning lasted 32 minutes and was conducted in a calm and courteous manner. The

Court cannot conclude that a reasonable person in these circumstances would have felt that

he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave.

C. Defendant’s Statements That He Had Nothing To Say.

Defendant contends that he invoked his right to remain silent when he informed Agent

Gotjen and Detective Curley that he had nothing to say, that their questioning should have

stopped when he invoked this right, and that the balance of the interview should therefore be

suppressed. But Miranda rights, including the right to remain silent, apply only to custodial

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interrogations. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1990). If a suspect is not in

custody, “then his attempts to invoke his right to remain silent and his Miranda right to

counsel are ineffective.” U.S. v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 1998); U.S. v.

LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that a person cannot invoke his

Miranda rights anticipatorily, but can only do so in custodial interrogation); U.S. v. Pettiford,

295 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that a defendant could not invoke Miranda

protections until he was in custody); U.S. v. Drake, 934 F.Supp. 953 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding

that defendant could not invoke his Miranda rights because he was not in custody); see also

U.S. v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 256 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant’s reference to his

lawyer during an interview could not be an invocation of his Miranda rights because he was

not in custody). As noted above, Defendant’s interview by Agent Gotjen and Detective

Curley was not custodial.

Defendant was told that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave. He was

told he did not have to answer any questions. Had he wished to remain silent, he could have

stopped answering questions or left the premises as he eventually did. The Court cannot

conclude that Defendant’s constitutional rights were violated because he first stated that he

had nothing to say, but then chose to remain and answer questions.

D. Voluntariness.

Defendant argues that his statements should be suppressed because they were not

voluntary. In deciding whether statements are involuntary, “[t]he test is whether, considering

the totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or

psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect’s will was overborne.”

U.S. v. Leon-Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Haynes v. Washington,

373 U.S. 503, 513-514 (1963)). For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the

interview of Defendant was not coercive. His statements made during the calm, 32-minute

interview in his backyard were not the result of his will being overborne.

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IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant

(Dkt. #27) is denied.

2. Defendant’s motion to suppress statements made during his interview

(Dkt. #26) is denied. 

Excludable delay pursuant to U.S.C. § 18:3161(h)(1)(D) is found to commence on

January 7, 2010 for a total of 62 days. 

DATED this 9th day of March, 2010.

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