Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03648/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03648-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martin Martinez-Noriega
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3648

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska.

Martin Martinez-Noriega, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 18, 2004 

Filed: August 1, 2005

___________

Before COLLOTON, LAY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Martin Martinez-Noriega pled guilty to a charge of possession with intent to

distribute cocaine, and the district court1

 sentenced him to a term of 151 months’

imprisonment. Martinez-Noriega contends that the district court’s computation of

the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines violated his plea agreement with

the United States. He also seeks to raise a claim based on the Supreme Court’s

decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We affirm.

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-2-

I.

On November 27, 2002, Omaha police officers executed a search warrant at

Martinez-Noriega’s residence and seized more than 200 grams of powder cocaine and

$5,503 in cash. A grand jury returned an indictment charging one count of possession

with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1),

and one count of criminal forfeiture directed at the seized currency. MartinezNoriega then entered into a plea agreement with the government, in which he agreed

to plead guilty to the drug trafficking offense and forfeit any claim to the currency.

With regard to the sentence to be imposed according to the sentencing

guidelines, paragraph 10 of the agreement provided that “[p]ursuant to Rule

11(c)(1)(C), Fed. R. Crim. Pro., the parties hereby agree that you should be held

responsible beyond a reasonable doubt for at least 200 grams but less than 300 grams

of cocaine and, therefore, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2D1.1, the defendant’s base offense

level is 20.” (Add. at 4). The agreement also stated that “the parties agree that you

have not met the criteria for an aggravating role but neither do you meet the criteria

for a mitigating role.” (Add. at 1). There was no reference in the agreement to

Martinez-Noriega’s criminal history category under Chapter 4 of the guidelines, or

to any potential adjustment to his offense level as a “career offender” under USSG

§ 4B1.1.

Prior to the sentencing hearing, the United States Probation Office prepared a

pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR recommended that because

Martinez-Noriega had sustained two prior felony drug convictions, the court should

apply an offense level of 32 pursuant to the career offender guideline, USSG

§ 4B1.1(b)(C), less three levels for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to USSG

§ 3E1.1(b). Martinez-Noriega objected, arguing that because his plea agreement

stipulated that “the defendant’s base offense level is 20,” and did not refer to USSG

§ 4B1.1, the court was precluded from applying the career offender guideline. The

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-3-

district court disagreed, and computed Martinez-Noriega’s offense level as

recommended by the probation office. The court thus found a sentencing range of

151-188 months, and imposed a sentence at the bottom of that range.

II.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) provides that the government

and a defendant may enter into a plea agreement specifying that the government will

“agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of

the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy

statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a recommendation or

request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement).” The parties in

this case designated that paragraph 10 of the plea agreement, relating to “the

defendant’s base offense level,” was “[p]ursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C).” Thus, unlike

a case involving an agreement of the non-binding variety under Rule 11(c)(1)(B),

e.g., United States v. Gomez, 326 F.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 2003), once the district court

accepted the Martinez-Noriega plea agreement, it was bound to apply the

recommendation concerning a base offense level. The dispute in this case concerns

only how paragraph 10 of the plea agreement should be interpreted, and we review

the district court’s interpretation and enforcement of a plea agreement de novo.

United States v. DeWitt, 366 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2004). 

As noted, paragraph 10 states that “the parties hereby agree that you should be

held responsible beyond a reasonable doubt for at least 200 grams but less than 300

grams of cocaine and, therefore, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, the defendant’s base

offense level is 20.” The career offender guideline, which the district court ultimately

applied to determine Martinez-Noriega’s offense level, provides (with exceptions not

applicable here) that “if the offense level for a career offender from the table in this

subsection is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, the offense level

from the table in this subsection shall apply.” USSG § 4B1.1(b). In MartinezAppellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-4-

Noriega’s case, the offense level under the career offender guideline was greater than

the offense level otherwise applicable. Thus, Martinez-Noriega argues that because

the “base offense level” under § 2D1.1 would be rendered inapplicable if the career

offender enhancement of § 4B1.1 were applied, the existence of a specific stipulation

concerning the base offense level necessarily implied that his offense level would be

computed without regard to § 4B1.1. 

We reject Martinez-Noriega’s argument because we find it inconsistent with

the structure of the sentencing guidelines. Cf. 11 Williston on Contracts § 30:20, at

219 (4th ed. 1999) (“Where the subject matter of the contract between the parties lies

in an area covered by federal law, they necessarily adopt, as a portion of their

agreement, the applicable provisions of the particular Act of Congress.”). The

“Application Instructions” for use of the guidelines set forth nine sequential steps to

be followed by the sentencing court in applying the provisions of the guidelines

manual. The second step calls for the court to “[d]etermine the base offense level .

. . contained in the particular guideline in Chapter Two.” USSG § 1B1.1(b). The

next three steps direct the court to apply adjustments from Chapter Three of the

guidelines. The sixth step then states that the court should “[d]etermine the

defendant’s criminal history category as specified in Part A of Chapter Four,” and

“[d]etermine from Part B of Chapter Four any other applicable adjustments.” USSG

§ 1B1.1(f) (emphasis added). These adjustments from Part B include the enhanced

offense levels for career offenders pursuant to USSG § 4B1.1. 

The guidelines contemplate, therefore, that even when a defendant ultimately

is subject to an adjustment pursuant to the career-offender guideline, the court will

first compute the defendant’s “base offense level” under Chapter Two of the

guidelines. By stipulating to a base offense level of 20 pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1,

the parties in this case definitively resolved the determination called for by step two

of the application instructions, § 1B1.1(b), but they did not address whether an

adjustment applied at step six of the process, § 1B1.1(f), pursuant to USSG § 4B1.1.

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-5-

The terminology of the guidelines supports this view. “Base offense level” is

a term of art used in Chapter Two of the guidelines. Chapter Two pertains to “offense

conduct,” and the chapter is organized by offenses. “Each offense has a

corresponding base offense level and may have one or more specific offense

characteristics that adjust the offense level upward or downward.” USSG Ch. 2,

intro. comment. (emphasis added). The “base offense level” may be increased or

decreased according to adjustments prescribed by Chapters Two and Three of the

guidelines. 

Chapter Four, by contrast, relates to “Criminal History and Criminal

Livelihood.” When a defendant qualifies as a “career offender,” § 4B1.1 does not

establish a “base offense level.” Instead, notwithstanding imprecise use of

terminology reflected in some of our cases, see post at 10-11, it sets an “offense

level” that will apply if it is greater than the “offense level” otherwise applicable –

that is, the “offense level” that otherwise would apply based on the “base offense

level” of Chapter Two, increased or decreased by specific offense characteristics and

adjustments from Chapter Two and Chapter Three. See, e.g., United States v.

LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 753-54 (1997) (explaining that the Sentencing Commission

sought to implement 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) “by promulgating the ‘Career Offender

Guideline,’ which created a table of enhanced total offense levels to be used in

calculating sentences for ‘career offenders.’ . . . [The Guideline] assigns the

appropriate offense level based on the so-called ‘offense statutory maximum.’”)

(emphases added); United States v. Zimmer, 299 F.3d 710, 721 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The

district court applied the otherwise applicable adjusted base offense level of 40 and

not the applicable career offender offense level of 37.”); United States v. Gomez, 271

F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Because the offense level enhanced by the career

offender provision is greater than the base offense level, the career offender offense

level controls.”); United States v. Collins, No. 03-4966, 2005 WL 1427431, at * 6

(4th Cir. June 20, 2005) (“Even if the judge had sentenced Collins at a base offense

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-6-

level of twelve, the application of the career offender enhancement still would have

increased his total offense level to a thirty-two.”) (emphasis in original).

By securing an agreement that “pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1,” the “base offense

level” is a certain number, a defendant has solidified where he will start in Chapter

Two of the guidelines, but he has not protected himself against adjustments in

Chapter Four. A defendant, of course, is uniquely qualified to know his own criminal

history. If he perceives a risk that his offense level may be enhanced under Chapter

Four once the probation office has completed its thorough investigation of his

criminal history, then he may seek to negotiate an understanding about the criminal

history provisions. But he should not take comfort in an agreement that only resolves

the “base offense level” under Chapter Two, because it does not bind the court with

respect to Chapter Four. Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying the

career-offender guideline to Martinez-Noriega.

III.

In a letter filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j),

Martinez-Noriega raised the possible applicability to his case of the Supreme Court’s

decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), which was pending when

this case was submitted. Booker held that the Sixth Amendment precludes a

sentencing judge from imposing a sentence under the mandatory federal sentencing

guidelines that exceeds the punishment that could be imposed based solely on facts

admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (other than

prior convictions). Id. at 756. As a remedy, the Court declared that the sentencing

guidelines are effectively advisory in all cases. Id. at 757.

Martinez-Noriega did not challenge the constitutionality or mandatory nature

of the guidelines in the district court. Thus, assuming arguendo that he may raise a

Booker claim for the first time by way of a Rule 28(j) letter, we review the claim for

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-7-

plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549-50

(8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Because the district court determined the applicable

sentencing range pursuant to the career-offender guideline, which applies based on

the defendant’s prior convictions, this case involves no violation of the Sixth

Amendment. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction)

which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the

facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the

defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v.

Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005). In light of Booker, however, the

district court’s imposition of sentence did involve non-constitutional error, because

the district court applied the mandatory guidelines, while Booker subsequently held

that the guidelines are only advisory. The question presented by the supplemental

filing, therefore, is whether the district court’s application of a mandatory sentencing

guideline range to Martinez-Noriega is a plain error warranting relief.

As our court reiterated in Pirani, plain error review is governed by the four-part

test set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993). See also

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997). In order to warrant

correction, there must be an error, that is plain, that affected the defendant’s

substantial rights, and that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67. The first two

factors – an error that is plain – are satisfied here. See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550.

However, to demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights, the defendant

also must demonstrate that there was “a ‘reasonable probability,’ based on the

appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would have received a more

favorable sentence.” Id. at 552.

We do not believe that Martinez-Noriega has demonstrated such a probability.

Although he was sentenced at the low end of the applicable guideline range, a lowend sentence is insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that a more

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-8-

favorable sentence would have been imposed absent the mandatory guidelines. Id.

at 553. The district court did not indicate that it thought the sentence imposed was

unreasonable, or that it would have imposed a lesser sentence if not bound by the

guidelines. The record as a whole does not show any other basis to establish a

reasonable probability of a more lenient sentence under an advisory guideline regime.

To the contrary, the undisputed presentence report shows that Martinez-Noriega was

a career offender under the guidelines, that he scored 15 points and qualified for

criminal history category VI even without regard to his career-offender status, and

that he was twice deported from the United States in 1996 and 2001 after felony

convictions, only to reenter illegally and commit another felony drug offense after

each removal. (PSR ¶¶ 38-46). Therefore, we conclude that Martinez-Noriega has

not demonstrated a plain error warranting relief under Rule 52(b) as applied in Pirani.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

LAY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

C Booker Challenge to Martinez-Noriega’s Sentence 

Although I am bound by our en banc decision in United States v. Pirani, 406

F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), I write separately to voice my agreement with Judge Bye’s

thoughtful concurrence and dissent in Pirani, 406 F.3d at 562. 

A panel of this court must engage in pure speculation when reviewing these

sentences, based upon often-scant lower court records which reveal little about the

district judge’s inclinations in any given case. It is indeed better to vacate and

remand the majority of these cases to the judge who can say with surety what he or

she would have done in light of Booker, rather than having appellate courts engage

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-9-

in such guesswork. The failure or willingness of a district judge to consider a thenimaginary universe should not determine whether a defendant’s sentence is

reconsidered after Booker. 

C Application of the Career Offender Guideline

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding on the plea agreement issue.

The district court resolved this case by relying on United States v. Gomez, 326 F.3d

971 (8th Cir. 2003), which the majority (and Martinez-Noriega) rightly pointed out

is different than the case at bar. In Gomez, the defendant complained that the

prosecutor promised to use a base offense level of 32. Id. at 974. When the

sentencing court applied the career offender enhancement and raised Gomez’s base

offense level, this court found no error because the “sentencing stipulations in the

plea agreement were clearly stated to be nonbinding on the sentencing court.” Id. at

975. Moreover, Gomez had clearly “proffered cooperation and acceptance of

responsibility in bad faith,” and therefore his claim that he had been wrongly induced

into pleading guilty was ill-received. Id. These key facts are not present in the case

at bar, so Gomez is not analogous. It was error for the district court to rely on Gomez

for the proposition that, as a matter of law, Martinez-Noriega’s plea agreement did

not foreclose application of the career offender guideline. 

The majority commits a different error in affirming the district court. It

resolves this case by first examining the structure of the sentencing guidelines and

determining what the “guidelines contemplate.” Majority opinion at 4. From there

it derives the meanings of the terms to which the parties agreed. Id. at 5 (“By

securing an agreement to a ‘base offense level,’ a defendant has solidified where he

will start in Chapter Two of the guidelines, but he has not protected himself against

adjustment in Chapter Four.”). 

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
2

Martinez-Noriega did not allege that the district court’s “computation” was in

error. See majority opinion at 1. 

-10-

This analytical approach is backwards. Settled law governing the interpretation

of plea agreements requires us to ask first what the parties contemplated pursuant to

contract law principles. Contract law compels this court to either enforce an offense

level of twenty or void the entire agreement as contrary to express public policy. 

C The Parties’ Intent as Derived From the Generally Prevailing

Meaning of the Phrase “Offense Level” in the Career Offender

Guideline

Martinez-Noriega alleges that the district court erroneously interpreted the

parties’ plea agreement when it held that the provision in paragraph ten of the

agreement, which bound the court to apply U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (2003), did not in any

way preclude the court from sentencing Martinez-Noriega as a career offender,

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.2

When a dispute arises over the meaning of a plea agreement, the court must

“discern the intent of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the agreement

when viewed as a whole.” United States v. Taylor, 258 F.3d 815, 819 (8th Cir. 2001)

(italics and internal citations omitted). This analysis requires consideration of what

the parties reasonably knew or understood at the time they entered into the agreement.

See Rest. (Second) of Contracts § 202 cmt. b; United States v. Cosimi, 2005 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 8900 at *19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Where a term used in the plea agreement

has a “generally prevailing meaning,” that meaning controls unless a different

intention is clearly manifested. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(3)(a).

Trade usage of a term is also highly relevant to a determination of the parties’

intended meaning. Id. at § 202(5) (“Wherever reasonable, the manifestations of

intention of the parties to a promise or agreement are interpreted as consistent with

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-11-

each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage

of trade.”). 

For at least fifteen years, the generally prevailing meaning of the career

offender guideline in the Eighth Circuit has been that it set a “base offense level.”

See, e.g., United States v. Light, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8043 at *13 (“Under

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B), the Armed Career Criminal provision, his base offense

level was 33.”); United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2004) (reinstated

May 6, 2005) (“As a career offender Mohr’s base offense level was 34 . . . .”); United

States v. Warren, 361 F.3d 1055, 1056 (8th Cir. 2004) (opinion by J. Colloton, who

now pens the majority opinion) (“the district court applied a base offense level of 37

under the career-offender guideline”); United States v. Peltier, 276 F.3d 1003, 1005

(8th Cir. 2002) (“[a]s a career offender, Peltier’s base offense level was 34”); United

States v. Beltran, 122 F.3d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[a]s a career offender,

Beltran was subject to a base offense level of 34”); United States v. MendozaFigueroa, 65 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“a career offender is assigned

a high base offense level”); United States v. Ford, 918 F.2d 1343, 1350 (8th Cir.

1990) (“the guidelines . . . permit a court to reduce a career offender’s base offense

level by two points if the career offender accepts responsibility”). 

Nor is the Eighth Circuit the only jurisdiction in which the career offender

guideline is customarily assumed to set a “base” offense level. The majority of our

sister circuits follow the same practice. See United States v. Jones, 2005 U.S. App.

LEXIS 14558 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Without a Career Offender finding, Jones’s base

offense level would have been 12 . . . . Because of the Career Offender finding,

however, the district court applied a base offense level of 32 . . . . [T]he Career

Offender guideline required the district court to change Jones’s base offense level in

accordance with a table, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), which sets a defendant’s base

offense level . . . .”); United States v. Hawkins, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11159 at *3

(7th Cir. 2005) (“and his base offense level as a career offender was 32. See U.S.S.G.

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-12-

§ 4B1.1(b)-(c)”); United States v. Lancaster, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13215 at *9

(11th Cir. 2005) (“Lancaster’s status as a career offender set his base offense level at

37”); United States v. Curtis, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10852 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating

that the district court “calculated Curtis’s base offense level on the basis of . . . career

offender status” and noting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) instructs “that the offense level be

set at the greater of either the offense level for a career offender under § 4B1.1 or the

offense level otherwise applicable”); United States v. Burhoe, 409 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir.

2005) (“his base offense level was computed to be 32 based on his career offender

status . . . . See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1; 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)); United States v. ValenzuelaQuevedo, 407 F.3d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 2005) (“under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the

appropriate base offense level was 37”); United States v. Schlifer, 403 F.3d 849, 851

(7th Cir. 2005) (“Under the career offender guideline, Schlifer’s base offense level

increased to 32 and his criminal history category was VI regardless. U.S.S.G. §

4B1.1”); United States v. MacKinnon, 401 F.3d 8, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2005) (“MacKinnon

was a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. MacKinnon’s resulting base

offense level as calculated in the PSR was 37 . . . .”); United States v. Hondo, 366

F.3d 363, 364 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Inclusion of these convictions qualified Hondo as a

career offender under section 4B1.1 of the Guidelines, which . . . also increased the

base offense levels for both the felon in possession of a firearm charge and the drug

charge.”); United States v. Heard, 359 F.3d 544, 547 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Guideline

§ 4B1.1(b) . . . mandates a base offense level of (at least) 34 when . . .”); United

States v. Chingman, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1810 at **15 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Under the

career offender provisions, the forty-year maximum period would have corresponded

to a base offense level of 32 (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)), which would then have been

reduced by three points for acceptance of responsibility, lowering the offense level

to 31.”); United States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 724, 726 (4th Cir. 2003) (“the district

court found that Lawrence was a de facto career offender and departed from the

previously calculated offense level of 22 to the base offense level of 32 for a career

offender. The combination of criminal history category VI and a base offense level

of 32 resulted in . . . .”); United States v. Carter, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 22747 at **4

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
3

Of course, any ambiguity in § 4B1.1 must be construed in Martinez-Noriega’s

favor. “Where a plea agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities are construed against

the government.” United States v. Thompson, 403 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005)

(citing United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)); see also

Rest. (Second) of Contracts § 206 (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of

a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which

operates against the party who supplies the words . . . .”); Andis, 333 F.3d at 890

-13-

(3d Cir. 2003) (“The career offender guideline increased the defendant’s base offense

level to 32 which, when reduced by three levels for Carter’s acceptance of

responsibility, resulted in a criminal offense level of 29.”). 

These citations from the Eighth Circuit and other circuits cannot be passed off

as the mere “imprecise use of terminology.” Majority opinion at 5. The welldocumented and entrenched understanding of the phrase “offense level” in the career

offender guideline runs contrary to the majority’s claim that “§ 4B1.1 does not

establish a ‘base offense level.’” Id. According to the prevailing meaning and

custom of usage in this jurisdiction and others, §§ 2D1.1 and 4B1.1 have both been

understood to set an “offense level,” which is commonly called a “base” offense level

under both guidelines. The only difference is that the base offense level in § 4B1.1

supplants the base offense level in § 2D1.1 if career offender status applies to the

defendant. The totality of the various adjustments and departures then leads to the

defendant’s “total” offense level.

No cases cited by the majority disprove my claim as to the generally prevailing

meaning of “offense level” in § 4B1.1. The majority cites LaBonte, Zimmer, Gomez,

and Collins, see majority opinion at 5, to support its position. However, the quoted

language from these cases does not preclude or contradict the concept of a “base”

offense level in § 4B1.1. In light of the plethora of cases declaring that § 4B1.1

imposes a “base offense level,” any cases cited by the majority to demonstrate the

contrary only prove an ambiguity, at best.3

 Nor does the majority’s reliance on

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
(“any ambiguities” in plea agreements “will be read against the Government and in

favor of a defendant’s appellate rights”); Cosimi, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8900, at *18

(“plea agreements, which are drafted by the Government, are construed strictly

against the government”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Even if the majority’s flimsy distinction between a “base offense level” and an

“offense level” is correct, the majority’s holding should not be applied retrospectively

to Martinez-Noriega, whose plea agreement was clearly negotiated during an era

when the career offender guideline was presumed to set a “base” offense level that

supplanted the “base” offense level designated in Chapter Two of the guidelines.

-14-

Williston on Contracts, majority opinion at 4, aid its cause; of course the parties

adopted the “applicable provisions of the guidelines.” Id. This does not help us

resolve the obvious contradiction between the majority’s construction of § 4B1.1 and

the construction which has generally prevailed across the nation.

Lastly, the majority’s holding is just an impractical solution. The distinction

between a “base offense level” under Chapter Two, and a plain “offense level” under

Chapter Four, is derived from the same guideline text that has produced this circuit’s

fifteen-year practice of referring to the career offender’s “base” offense level. In this

sense, the utility and viability of the majority’s proffered distinction has already been

foretold; it is empirically denied. 

The prevailing meaning of the phrase “offense level” in the career offender

guideline suggests that when the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) and

Martinez-Noriega agreed to a “base offense level,” they were agreeing to preclude the

application of the career offender guideline, which supplants the base offense level

specified in the plea agreement. Accordingly, I dissent.

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-15-

C Public Policy Considerations

In my view, the district court never should have accepted this one-sided, openended plea agreement; it should have forced the AUSA to negotiate fairly with

Martinez-Noriega from the start, by specifying clearly the meaning of the term “base

offense level,” the sentencing range at issue, and any as-yet-unresolved factors to

which the parties would not stipulate (e.g., criminal history). 

A contract is unenforceable, or even void, where it runs contrary to public

policy. See McBrearty v. U.S. Taxpayers Union, 668 F.2d 450, 450-51 (8th Cir.

1982); 15-79 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.1 (2004). The guidelines articulate

several policy statements governing the quality and specificity of plea agreements

which must be satisfied before a court of law can approve the agreement. See

U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 (listing standards for acceptance of plea agreement). Stipulations

to plea agreements are likewise held to certain standards. See U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4.

Stipulations are supposed to identify, with “meaningful specificity,” a “sentencing

range.” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(a)(3) (emphasis added). The stipulation must also explain

why that sentencing range is “appropriate.” Id. The commentary following this

policy statement further admonishes that plea agreements “must fully and accurately

disclose all factors relevant to the determination of a sentence.” Id. at cmt.

(emphasis added). The policy statements contained in the guidelines are “well

defined and dominant,” and are not merely ascertained “from general considerations

of supposed public interests.” W.R. Grace & Co. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766

(1983) (citations omitted). The AUSA should be intimately familiar with these

policies. 

The plea agreement in this case lacked “meaningful specificity” and full and

accurate disclosure of all relevant sentencing factors because it did not identify

Martinez-Noriega’s criminal history, much less propose a sentencing range. If the

Government is allowed to omit criminal history and a sentencing range, the parties

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
4

The majority implies that since the defendant “is uniquely qualified to know

his own criminal history,” it is his or her responsibility to “seek to negotiate an

understanding about the criminal history provisions.” Majority opinion at 5. But this

assumes that defendants are aware of the career offender guideline and how it works,

and that defendants understand the difference between a “base offense level” and an

“offense level” – a preposterous series of assumptions indeed, considering that this

circuit, for over a decade, has apparently missed the distinction made by the majority

in this case. At any rate, it is not the defendant’s burden to establish that he or she is

a career offender; it is the Government’s burden. 

-16-

are not forced to discuss the implications that criminal history might have upon the

ultimate sentence. This means the Government is essentially inducing defendants

into making plea agreements before they are fully informed as to what will happen

to them if they plead guilty versus what will happen to them if they proceed to trial.

This is wrong. I am not suggesting that the Government must actually reach

agreement on every factor that could impact a sentence; an AUSA can certainly

identify a factor critical to sentencing, warn the defendant clearly that the factor may

increase the severity of the defendant’s sentence such that it could effectively nullify

the benefit of the plea deal, and state clearly that no agreement has been reached

between the parties as to that term. But if the Government is going to make plea

agreements and stipulations, it must be forthcoming and identify “all factors relevant

to the determination of a sentence,” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4 at cmt., especially the

detrimental effect that one’s criminal history may have upon a sentencing range.4

 The

AUSA opined that he must always leave terms open in a plea agreement because he

is never 100 percent certain of what pre-trial services will uncover about a given

defendant. That argument fails miserably. First, the guidelines anticipate this

scenario and instruct the drafter of the stipulations to identify “all areas of agreement,

disagreement, and uncertainty that may be relevant to the determination of a

sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4 cmt.; see also id. at § 6B1.4(b). “Full disclosure” is the

objective. Id. at cmt. If the AUSA was not 100 percent sure of what pre-trial services

would uncover about Martinez-Noriega, the plea agreement should have identified

those remaining areas of uncertainty that could have impacted Martinez-Noriega’s

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-17-

sentence. Of course, in this case the AUSA’s argument is disingenuous at best

because (1) the AUSA admitted in open court that he could have verified MartinezNoriega’s criminal history if he felt like it, and (2) Martinez-Noriega argued in his

brief and at oral argument that the AUSA knew his criminal history and the

Government did not dispute this. Most importantly, the AUSA’s justification fails

because it does not explain why an AUSA must wait to obtain the contents of a presentence report (PSR) until after a defendant is induced into pleading guilty. 

The system does not have to work this way. It makes little sense to craft a plea

agreement before knowing the important information relevant to sentencing. Under

the present scheme, defendants are commonly presented with some new factor (after

pleading guilty) that was not discussed in the plea negotiations and which inevitably

lengthens the sentence. Making plea deals before the AUSA possesses all the

information is a problematic tactic that almost always inures to the benefit of the

AUSA, who is highly unlikely to admit that an augmented sentence would be

improper. 

The AUSA in this case failed to justify his poor handling of this case. I doubt

that a solid justification exists because the practice is at odds with an AUSA’s duty

to the Government. As the Third Circuit has said,

Our criminal justice system is bottomed on several unwavering

principles. One of those principles was recognized long ago by Justice

Sutherland when he stated that a prosecuting attorney “is the

representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a

sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as

its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal

prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.

As such, [a prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the

servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape

or innocence suffer. [One] may prosecute with earnestness and

vigor–indeed, [one] should do so. But, while [a prosecutor] may strike

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-18-

hard blows, he [or she] is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much

[the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to

produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to

bring about a just one.”

Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 451 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Berger v. United States,

295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935), overruled on other grounds by Stirone v. United States,

361 U.S. 212 (1960)). Likewise, an AUSA has a duty to refrain from improper

methods calculated to produce plea agreements based on less than full and fair

disclosure. 

Because the AUSA failed to handle this case in a forthcoming manner,

confusion and an appeal resulted. The AUSA’s conduct contributed directly to an

unnecessary usurpation of judicial resources and federal revenue. Such inefficiencies

will continue unless this court and our sister jurisdictions require plea agreements to

conform to the express public policy of the guidelines. There is no reason why plea

agreements cannot contain clear, full and accurate disclosures of factors relevant to

sentencing, including a good faith recommendation on the sentencing range which

the Government seeks. Doing so would obviate the need for a great number of

criminal sentencing appeals. 

This court’s refusal to intervene and stop the AUSA’s tactics is deeply

troubling. The district court’s sentence should be vacated and this matter remanded

for re-sentencing pursuant to a base offense level of 20 and the district court should

be instructed not to apply the career offender guideline. In addition, because plea

agreements such as the one agreed to here are contrary to public policy, this court

should hold that from this point forward, district courts must require plea agreements

to (a) fully and accurately disclose all factors relevant to the determination of a 

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630
-19-

sentence, and (b) identify an appropriate sentencing range with meaningful

specificity. 

For the above-stated reasons, I dissent.

 ______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-3648 Page: 19 Date Filed: 08/01/2005 Entry ID: 1934630