Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01161/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01161-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Quentin Leeaaron Tidwell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1161

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Quentin Leeaaron Tidwell

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: January 11, 2016

Filed: July 1, 2016

____________

Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Quentin Tidwell pleaded guilty to a February 2012 charge that he conspired to

distribute more than 280 grams of crack cocaine. The mandatory minimum sentence

for that offense is 120 months in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). At his

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February 20, 2013, sentencing, the district court determined that Tidwell’s advisory 1

guidelines range was 135 to 168 months and sentenced him to 135 months in prison. 

In October 2013, the government filed a motion to reduce Tidwell’s sentence below

the 120-month mandatory minimum due to substantial assistance he provided after

sentencing. See Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 35(b)(4). The district court granted the 30%

reduction recommended by the government and reduced Tidwell’s sentence to 94

months in prison.

In February 2014, Tidwell filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his

sentence, alleging that the district court committed proceduralsentencing error when

it assigned three criminal history points to a 1992 conviction because the conviction

fell outside the 15-year limitation period in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e). After a thorough

inquiry, the district court agreed, vacated Tidwell’s sentence, and ordered

resentencing under § 2255 on a date after November 1, 2014, the effective date of

Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782, which would retroactively lower Tidwell’s

base offense level by two levels if Congress did not disapprove. See United States

v. Thomas, 775 F.3d 982, 982-83 (8th Cir. 2014).

A revised PSR, prepared prior to the January 2015 resentencing, reduced

Tidwell’s base offense level consistent with Amendment 782, did not assign criminal

history points for his 1992 conviction, but did assign three points for a September

2013 Arkansas conviction for possession with intent to deliver ecstasy and cocaine,

firearm offenses, and misdemeanor animal cruelty, charges arising from Tidwell’s

February 16, 2012, arrest. At the resentencing hearing, the main issue was whether

criminal history pointsshould be assessed for this 2013 conviction. The district court

concluded the conviction counted, granted the government’s renewed motions for a

The Honorable D.P. Marshall, Jr., United States DistrictJudge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas.

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substantial assistance reduction, applied the same 30% reduction to the bottom of

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Tidwell’s revised guidelines range, and resentenced him to 84 months in prison. 

Tidwell appeals the revised sentence, arguing the district court committed procedural

sentencing error in counting the 2013 conviction as a “prior sentence” under

§ 4A1.2(a)(1). We affirm.

On appeal, Tidwell argues, as he did in the district court, that the 2013

conviction should not be counted for two reasons: (1) it was imposed after his

original sentencing, and (2) the conduct underlying that conviction was relevant

conduct to the drug conspiracy offense of conviction. On the first issue, the

government argues the district court correctly applied Pepper v. United States, 562

U.S. 476 (2011), in concluding that a conviction imposed after the originalsentencing

but before resentencing may be taken into account. On the second issue, the

government concedes that the firearm and drug-trafficking conduct underlying

Tidwell’s 2013 conviction was relevant conduct but argues the misdemeanor animal

cruelty conviction “had nothing to do with the conspiracy indictment” and should

have been assessed two criminal history points. The government also argues that any

procedural error was harmless because the 120-month mandatory minimum was

greater than the maximum of the revised advisory range Tidwell urges, and therefore

“the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months was the guidelines sentence, and

thus the appropriate point from which to depart downward” for his substantial

assistance. United States v. Diaz, 546 F.3d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 2008), applying

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). 

The district court rejected Tidwell’s contentions, concluding that Pepper

authorized looking “anew” at Tidwell’s criminal history, including a post-originalBecause the court vacated Tidwell’s original sentence and conducted a de 2

novo resentencing, the government needed to file pre-sentence substantial assistance

motions under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), rather than renew its prior

post-sentence Rule 35(b)(4) motion. 

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sentencing conviction. The court found that Tidwell’s conduct underlying the 2013

conviction was not relevant conduct because it involved different drugs and occurred

after the end of the drug conspiracy alleged in the indictment. The court determined

that 30% was an appropriate reduction for Tidwell’s substantial assistance. See

United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1131 (8th Cir. 2007) (a sentence below the

mandatory “minimum must be based exclusively on assistance-related

considerations”). Applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court

determined that it would depart from the bottom of the revised guidelines range. 

Relying on Diaz, it concluded that the 120-month mandatory minimum was the

lowest possible starting point. The court therefore imposed an 84-month sentence,

30% below the 120-month mandatory minimum. 

(1) We have not previously considered whether a district court may include a

conviction imposed after initial sentencing in determining a defendant’s criminal

history category at his resentencing. Tidwell urges us to follow the First Circuit’s

reasoning in United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 850 (1999). In that case, the First Circuit vacated the initial sentence and

remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court considered a conviction

imposed during the intervening period to be a “prior sentence” under U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(a)(1). The First Circuit reversed. Tidwell relies on the Court’s statement

that “the most sensible reading is that the guidelines’ reference to ‘prior sentence’

means, in this context, a sentence which is prior to the original sentence which was

vacated and remanded only for resentencing.” Id. at 35. 

We decline to apply this reasoning because the “context” in this case is

distinguishable. Tidwell was not resentenced on remand from this court. Rather, the

district court granted him a de novo resentencing as post-conviction relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. The First Circuit’s reasoning was based in part on its restrictive

“mandate rule.” Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d at 35. We take a less restrictive approach in

construing the scope of our mandate when we remand for resentencing. See United

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States v. Pepper, 570 F.3d 958, 963-64 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’d on this ground, rev’d on

other grounds, Pepper, 562 U.S. at 506-07. Even more significantly, when a

resentencing is not the result of an appellate court remand, “a district court

proceeding under § 2255 may vacate the entire sentence so that the district court can

reconfigure the sentencing plan to satisfy the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Parker, 762 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation and

alterations omitted). Finally, Ticchiarelli was decided in the mandatory guidelines

era. Under the advisory guidelines regime now in place, even if Tidwell’s 2013

conviction was not a “prior sentence” for purposes of § 4A1.2(a)(1), the district court

could “justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or

eventsthat occurred subsequent to the originalsentencing proceedings.” Pepper, 562

U.S. at 504 (quotation omitted).

In conducting the de novo resentencing, the district court applied the guidelines

in effect at the time of resentencing, not at the time of the original sentencing. This

was clearly correct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii); United States v. Polanco, 53

F.3d 893, 898 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1021 (1996). At that time, 3

Tidwell’s 2013 conviction was plainly a “prior sentence,” that is, “a sentence imposed

prior to sentencing on the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.1); see

United States v. Flowers, 995 F.2d 315, 317 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, J.) (“in

calculating criminal history . . . the Guidelines do not focus on when the crimes were

committed. . . . They make no exception for a prior sentence imposed for a crime that

took place after the crime currently before the sentencing judge.”). Thus, there was

no procedural error in counting the 2013 conviction as a prior sentence under

§ 4A1.2(a)(1). 

In the 2003 PROTECT Act, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(1), which 3

provides “that when re-sentencing after appellate remand, a district court should

apply the Guidelines that were in place prior to the appeal.” United States v. Bordon,

421 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2005). However, this limited exception to

§ 3553(a)(4) does not apply to a district court’s de novo resentencing under § 2255.

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(2) “When calculating criminal history points, a sentencing court isto consider

‘any sentence previously imposed . . . for conduct not part of the instant offense,’

defined as conduct other than ‘relevant conduct’ under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.” United

States v. Pinkin, 675 F.3d 1088, 1090 (8thCir. 2012), quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1)

& comment. (n.1). “We review ‘prior sentence’ and ‘relevant conduct’

determinations for clear error, remembering thatsuch a determination isfact-intensive

and well within the district court’s sentencing expertise and greater familiarity with

the factual record.” United States v. Hernandez, 712 F.3d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 2013)

(quotation omitted).

Tidwell argues that the conduct underlying his 2013 conviction was relevant

conduct because it “occurred around the same time as the offense of conviction,”

included drug and related firearmoffenses, and nothing in the record “suggests a clear

stop date to the conspiracy.” But that is not the governing standard. Even when the

offense of conviction is a drug conspiracy, and a prior conviction was for a drugrelated offense committed during the conspiracy period, the question is whether the

prior conduct was a “severable, distinct offense,” and relevant factors include

“temporal and geographical proximity, common victims, common scheme, charge in

the indictment, and whether the prior conviction is used to prove the instant offense.” 

Pinkin, 675 F.3d at 1091 (quotation omitted). Here, the indictment alleged a

conspiracy ending “on or about February 7, 2012,” the day before it was filed. The

Arkansas state offenses were committed on February 16. While there was temporal

and presumably geographical proximity, the federal indictment charged Tidwell with

four substantive drug distribution counts for conduct occurring between February

2010 and May 2011. This suggeststhat his February 2012 conduct wasseverable and

distinct. As this 2012 conduct occurred afterthe alleged conspiracy period, it clearly

was not “used to prove the instant offense.” And as the district court noted, the 2013

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conviction involved different drugs and “a time gap.” In these circumstances, there

was no clear error.4

As we conclude the district court committed no procedural sentencing error in

counting the 2013 conviction as a “prior sentence” in determining Tidwell’s criminal

history category, we decline to consider the government’s alternative contention that

any error was harmless. We affirm the district court’s January 12, 2015, judgment.

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The parties in this case negotiated a plea agreement in which they stipulated

to a two-level enhancement in Tidwell’s offense level “for possessing a dangerous

weapon in connection with the offense” pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). According

to the government, that enhancement was based on the firearms that were a subject

of Tidwell’s September 11, 2013, conviction. In other words, in negotiating the plea

agreement, the parties intended the firearms and drug trafficking conduct underlying

the 2013 conviction to be considered relevant conduct. At resentencing, Tidwell

5

received three criminal history points for the 2013 conviction. At the resentencing

hearing, the district court specifically asked the government whether the 2013

conviction was relevant conduct to the offense of conviction. The Assistant United

States Attorney who appeared on behalf of the government was filling in for the

Assistant United States Attorney who had prosecuted this case, and told the court it

was not. But that was not correct. 

The government’s “concession” on appeal was ill-advised, and we give it no 4

consideration. The government ignored the clear error standard of review and our

well-established multi-factor standard for analyzing relevant conduct issues. 

Tidwell was also convicted of misdemeanor animal cruelty on September 11,

5

2013. The government submits that this conviction was not contemplated asrelevant

conduct under the plea agreement, but the district court did not resolve this factual

dispute. 

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The indictment in this case charged a conspiracy that occurred “through

February 7, 2012.” The 2013 conviction was based on conduct that occurred nine

days later, on February 16, 2012, the date on which Tidwell was arrested on the

federal charges. The parties expressly negotiated a plea agreement that included

relevant conduct occurring after the end date of the conspiracy, which they are free

to do. See United States v. Manzano-Huerta, 809 F.3d 440, 444 (8th Cir. 2016)

(“Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and are interpreted according to general

contract principles.”) (quoting Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.

1994)). “When a guilty plea is induced by an agreement, the government must abide

by its terms.” United States v. Lovelace, 565 F.3d 1080, 1087 (8th Cir. 2009). To

count this conviction for purposes of calculating Tidwell’s criminal history category

at the resentencing risks violating USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1) and comment. (n. 1). I would

accept the parties’s agreement on this issue, because I think the record supports it. 

The district court considered the proper factors in determining whether the

2013 conviction wasrelevant conduct, but relied on misinformation in applying them. 

When the district court granted Tidwell’s § 2255 motion and ordered resentencing,

itfound the previous criminal history error (the one that warranted resentencing in the

first instance) was not harmless “because the Court can’t say how it would have

weighed the information or exactly what sentence it would have imposed.” Similarly,

I would give the district court the opportunity to decide what sentence it would

impose given the correct information about the terms of the original plea agreement

regarding relevant conduct. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

______________________________

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