Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07150/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07150-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
District of Columbia
Appellee
Christol English
Appellant
Kevin McConnell
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 15, 2011 Decided July 1, 2011

 Reissued August 26, 2011

No. 09-7150

CHRISTOL ENGLISH, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

 OF THE ESTATE OF JASON TAFT,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND KEVIN MCCONNELL,

DETECTIVE, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,

 IN BOTH HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01337)

Gregory L. Lattimer argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellees. With him on the brief were Peter J. Nickles,

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Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna

M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor.

Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: A jury found for the District of

Columbia government and a detective of the Metropolitan Police

Department (“MPD”) (together, “the government”), in this case

alleging a section 19831

 claim for the use of excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment and common law claims for

assault and battery. Appellant, as personal representative of her

brother’s estate, sued to recover damages for the shooting death

of her brother by the detective, and she contends on appeal that

she did not receive a fair trial. The principal issue concerns the

district court’s rulings on the inadmissibility of portions of an

internal MPD report regarding the altercation between the

detective and appellant’s brother. A related issue involves a

violation of the pretrial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 26. 

Specifically, appellant contends that the district court’s

evidentiary rulings allowed the government to maintain a

“contrived” defense that the detective’s actions were

constitutionally permissible while denying her the ability to

refute it. Appellant’s Br. 29. We find no abuse of discretion by

the district court. The record reveals that it properly excluded

those parts of the report likely to confuse the jury and unfairly

prejudice the government. We conclude that the government

failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(E) by not supplementing the

medical expert’s disclosure to reflect an interview with the

1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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detective on which the expert intended to rely at trial, but that

the violation was harmless and so the district court’s refusal to

strike the expert’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 

Accordingly, because appellant’s other claims of error and her

bias claim are unpersuasive, we affirm.

I.

According to Detective Kevin McConnell’s testimony at

trial, late on the night of August 3, 2007 he was driving on Good

Hope Road in Southeast Washington, D.C. when he observed an

altercation inside a carry-out restaurant. As he pulled over to the

curb, he saw a man pulling on the door separating the customer

area from the kitchen. McConnell, dressed in plainclothes but

displaying his badge on a chain around his neck, entered the

carry-out and announced, “Police.” Tr. Nov. 16, 2009 p.m., at

85. The man — who turned out to be Jason L. Taft — walked

up to McConnell “aggressively,” prompting McConnell to push

Taft backwards. Id. at 86. Taft responded: “Why did you hit

me, Officer?” Id. at 40. McConnell told him he was under

arrest, after which a lengthy and violent struggle ensued during

which the two men “went down to the ground several times,” id.

at 87, took turns attempting to gouge each other’s eyes out, and

exchanged bites. Then McConnell put Taft in a “Full Nelson”

hold, from which Taft managed to break free, and Taft began to

run for the door. McConnell attempted to grab him by the

collar, but Taft ducked, and McConnell flipped over and hit his

head on the concrete pavement. By this point — several

minutes into the brawl — McConnell was “completely gassed

out” and having trouble breathing. Id. at 88. With McConnell

still on his knees, Taft approached, placed his arms around his

neck, and told him, “I’m going to choke you out, motherfucker.” 

Id. at 89. Taft placed the full weight of his body on

McConnell’s carotid arteries, restricting the flow of blood to his

brain, and McConnell began to black out. As McConnell was

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trying to push Taft off him, McConnell pulled out his nine

millimeter service pistol and pulled the trigger. McConnell

could not hear anything besides a “click,” and his vision was

coming and going. Id. He felt Taft’s weight lift off him, but he

thought Taft was “still there,” id. at 90, and squeezed the trigger

two more times. 

An internal MPD investigation by Sergeant Scott Gutherie

of the Internal Affairs Bureau Force Investigations Branch

concluded that the first shot fired by Detective McConnell — in

the midst of a struggle over the gun — was “not only objectively

reasonable, but was also in response to an actual attack that

could have resulted in the death of Detective McConnell.” The

report concluded, however, that the second and third shots —

fired while Taft was running away — “were not fired during an

actual or threatened attack,” but only during a “perceived

attack.” FIT Rpt. 23-24. The report, called the Force

Investigation Team Report or FIT Report, summarized findings

based on review of statements by Detective McConnell and

various witnesses who were present during part or all of the

altercation, and the available physical evidence, electronic

communications, and medical reports. Based on this review, the

FIT Report concluded that at the end of an extended violent

confrontation, Detective McConnell began to lose consciousness

and shot Taft in the thigh. Taft — whose posthumous

toxicology test revealed a bodily fluid alcohol content of 0.12 to

0.21% — then separated himself from Detective McConnell and

ran toward the street, at which point Detective McConnell —

still disoriented — fired two shots, one of them missing, the

other striking Taft in the back. Taft later died from this second

gunshot wound. Accordingly, the FIT Report concluded that the

two shots, while perhaps “objectively reasonable,” violated an

MPD policy allowing the use of deadly force only during an

“actual or threatened attack that is imminent.” Id. at 23; see

MPD General Order 901.07:V:D. The Use of Force Review

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Board, to whom Sergeant Gutherie submitted his findings,

declined to adopt them and concluded that all three shots were

justified. But Inspector Dierdre Porter, the director of MPD’s

Disciplinary Review Branch, disagreed with the Board and

wrote a referral letter to the assistant chief of MPD’s

Professional Development Bureau recommending the

termination of Detective McConnell’s employment in view of

his policy violation with respect to the use of deadly force

against Taft; a final decision on that recommendation was

pending at the time of trial.

Prior to trial, the government moved to exclude both the

FIT Report and Inspector Porter’s letter. During an in limine

hearing on the motion, the district court heard testimony from

Sergeant Gutherie and Inspector Porter about the procedures and

conclusions of the use of force investigation and

recommendations. The district court ruled that it would not

allow into evidence either the FIT Report or Inspector Porter’s

letter recommending Detective McConnell’s termination,

reasoning that the witness statement summaries would not “tell[]

any different story than the evidence we’re going to hear in this

courtroom about exactly what happened,” and because the

conclusions about the policy violation were “not involved with

deciding the constitutional question of the reasonableness of

force.” Tr. Nov. 16, 2009 a.m., at 27. The district court

explained that although the FIT Report might “at some minimal

level be admissible,” its admission would be “hedged about with

jury instructions,” would likely cause confusion between the

issues before the jury and those before the MPD’s internal

disciplinary trial board, and would result in a “trial within a trial

about the whole District of Columbia disciplinary system.” Id.

at 28. Appellant could, nonetheless, seek to have parts of the

FIT Report admitted into evidence if the door were opened “by

some argument or some evidence that is used in the trial.” Id.

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At trial, appellant, through counsel, adduced undisputed

eyewitness testimony from individuals who were in the carryout that at least by the time Detective McConnell fired his

second and third shots, Taft was moving away from him. These

witnesses were also interviewed in connection with MPD’s

internal investigation and their statements made part of the FIT

Report. Appellant also called Sergeant Gutherie to testify about

his investigation. During a bench conference, the district court

ruled that Detective McConnell’s admissions, as recounted in

the FIT Report, could be admitted in evidence, but that appellant

had failed to provide a reason for admitting information relating

to the factual basis for Sergeant Gutherie’s findings and

conclusions. Nonetheless, appellant proceeded to question

Sergeant Gutherie at length about the evidence he had

examined.2

In defense, the government called two expert witnesses. The

first, Dr. Richard Restak, an expert in neuropsychiatry, testified

generally about the effect of restricted oxygen flow to the brain

on perceptive and cognitive functioning, aided by an in-court

demonstration by Detective McConnell of the chokehold in

which he claimed Taft had held him. Dr. Restak explained that

in such situations, individuals are overtaken by a primitive fear

of death; their sense of perception and comprehension is

diminished; and their sense of hearing may also be diminished. 

2

 When re-called by the government, Sergeant Gutherie

testified about an inconsistent statement by one of appellant’s

witnesses regarding the number of shots fired by Detective McConnell

and Taft’s position relative to Detective McConnell at the time the

shots were fired. Over appellant’s objection, the district court initially

allowed this testimony for purposes of impeachment. Upon

reconsideration, the district court struck the testimony and instructed

the jury not to consider it.

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On direct examination, the government asked no questions, and

Dr. Restak gave no opinion, specific to the facts of this case,

relying only on his general expertise. On cross-examination,

appellant observed that Dr. Restak had not testified to his

opinion of the case-specific circumstances even though his

pretrial report had provided such an opinion on the basis of his

review of the FIT Report, suggesting perhaps that Dr. Restak’s

opinion was somehow adverse to the government’s case. On redirect, the government asked Dr. Restak for his case-specific

opinion, and over appellant’s objection, Dr. Restak opined that

Taft’s chokehold on Detective McConnell “interfered with his

mentation, his cognitive functioning, and that this, just to put it

into a nugget, into a sentence, is what happened.” Tr. Nov. 17,

2009 p.m., at 122. 

On re-cross, appellant asked Dr. Restak about the basis of

his opinion. Dr. Restak responded that it was based on his

review of witness statements in the FIT Report, and on his

interview and examination of Detective McConnell on October

22, 2009, even though his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(a)(2) expert disclosure (dated September 25, 2009) did not

mention an in-person interview and examination of Detective

McConnell and the notice was not supplemented by the

government to reflect the October interview. Appellant

questioned Dr. Restak about this discrepancy. Dr. Restak agreed

that in preparing the September 25, 2009 disclosure he had

relied on the FIT Report, and appellant began describing parts

of the report, which Dr. Restak, following along, confirmed. 

The district court allowed this recitation to continue, over the

government’s objection, until appellant began to discuss the

“discrepancies and all of those other things that are in the

report” — an apparent reference to Sergeant Gutherie’s factual

findings and conclusions — at which point the district court

sustained the government’s objection. Id. at 130. 

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When appellant persisted in this line of questioning, the

district court excused the jury and stated that it surmised that

appellant was “trying to get [Dr. Restak] to quote the thought

process of Sergeant Gutherie,” and that those thought processes

and opinions were “not coming into evidence.” Id. at 133. 

Appellant argued that she should be allowed to use the FIT

Report in its entirety to question the basis for Dr. Restak’s

opinion, and, further, that “his whole testimony ought to be

stricken” because the required expert disclosure either was not

filed or was incomplete. Id. at 134, 137. The district court

informed appellant: “You may not make reference to the

discrepancies portion of the FIT Report, you may not make

reference to the opinions of Sergeant Gutherie. You may use

whatever is in the report that constitutes statements of Detective

McConnell about the choke hold, or of anybody else who saw

the choke hold.” Id. at 138. Thereafter, Dr. Restak, indulging

a hypothetical from appellant, opined that someone who shot

another person for no reason would likely be severely

emotionally disturbed, although not necessarily cognitively

impaired as he believed Detective McConnell had been. When

the government attempted to ascertain whether Dr. Restak found

Detective McConnell to be emotionally disturbed based on his

interview, the district court sua sponte precluded this line of

questioning.

The government’s second expert witness was G. Patrick

Gallagher, an expert in police policies and training related to the

use of force and other areas. When Gallagher began discussing

his work on national standards and internal affairs

investigations, the district court called the parties’ counsel to the

bench and warned the government that Gallagher’s testimony,

if it continued, “is going to open the door to that FIT Report.” 

Id. at 154. The government thereafter declined to ask Gallagher

any more questions and he was excused as a witness. 

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Additionally, the government played for the jury, over

appellant’s objection, tape recordings of telephone calls from

individuals in and near the carry-out reporting the altercation

and requesting police assistance. After closing arguments,

instructions, and deliberation, the jury found for the government,

rejecting appellant’s excessive force and assault and battery

claims. Appellant appeals.

II.

Appellant contends that the district court erred in refusing

to admit into evidence in their entirety the FIT Report and

Inspector Porter’s letter recommending termination of Detective

McConnell’s employment, and thus denied her a fair trial. The

trial record suggests that appellant sought to use the FIT

Report’s conclusion that Detective McConnell violated MPD

policy when he fired his second and third shots at Taft in support

of the excessive force claim. This is confirmed by appellant’s

brief on appeal. The district court excluded portions of the FIT

Report relating to the conclusion that the detective had violated

MPD policy out of concern it would cause the jury to confuse

the policy violation issue — not implicated in the trial — with

the separate question of whether Taft’s constitutional rights were

violated because McConnell’s actions were objectively

unreasonable under the circumstances. Appellant maintains that

excluding this portion of the FIT Report prevented her from

refuting the government’s defense that Detective McConnell’s

conduct was objectively reasonable, a defense she characterizes

as “unequivocally inconsistent” with the content of the FIT

Report and Inspector Porter’s recommendation. Appellant’s Br.

31. 

Our review of the district court’s evidentiary rulings is for

abuse of discretion. See Whitbeck v. Vital Signs, 159 F.3d 1369,

1372 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The district court has broad discretion in

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ruling on evidentiary matters when “weigh[ing] the extent of

potential prejudice against the probative force of relevant

evidence.” Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.3d 625,

633 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, a district court’s decision to

exclude evidence due to the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant

to Federal Rule of Evidence 4033

 that is “based on an

understatement of the probative value,” or a “miscalculation of

the danger of unfair prejudice,” is “subject to reversal.” 

Henderson v. George Washington Univ., 449 F.3d 127, 133

(D.C. Cir. 2006). Even when the district court has abused its

discretion, reversal is appropriate only upon a concomitant

finding that the error affected appellant’s “substantial rights.” 

Whitbeck, 159 F.3d at 1372 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 61).

First, as appellant points out, contrary to the government’s

position, the FIT Report and Inspector Porter’s letter are nonhearsay party admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence

801(d)(2)(D).4 It is undisputed that Sergeant Gutherie and

3

 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or

by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.

FED. R. EVID. 403.

4

 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) provides that a

statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is:

a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a

matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made

during the existence of the relationship[.]

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Inspector Porter were acting within the scope of their

employment by the District of Columbia government, one of the

defendants in this case — at the time they prepared and

submitted them. The government responds, without citation to

authority, that the documents are not party admissions because

the District government did not “adopt or ratify” them and the

findings were not “final.” Appellees’ Br. 23. The plain text of

Rule 801(d)(2)(D) requires neither adoption nor ratification but

only that the statement is offered “against a party,” FED. R.

EVID. 801(d)(2), and it is “by the party’s agent or servant

concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or

employment, made during the existence of the relationship,”

FED.R.EVID. 801(d)(2)(D); see Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303,

309-10 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Consequently, the FIT Report and the

letter recommending termination of employment are District

government admissions that were admissible at trial against it

and Detective McConnell in his official capacity, see Wilburn v.

Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Second, appellant is partially correct that the documents

were admissible against all defendants — including Detective

McConnell in his individual capacity — because they are

covered by the public records exception to the hearsay

exclusion. This exception provides, inter alia, that records,

reports, or statements setting forth “factual findings resulting

from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by

law” are admissible “unless the sources of information or other

circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” FED. R. EVID.

803(8)(C). The district court found that the FIT Report’s factual

basis was sufficiently reliable under Rule 803(8)(C), noting that

“although it’s based on double, triple hearsay and stale hearsay

at that,” the court was satisfied that it does not “tell any different

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).

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story than the evidence we’re going to hear in this courtroom

about exactly what happened.” Tr. Nov. 16, 2009 a.m., at 27. 

Sergeant Gutherie’s report was based on his own factual

investigation, and the Supreme Court has held that Rule 803(8)

does not “draw some inevitably arbitrary line between the

various shades of fact/opinion that invariably will be present in

investigatory reports.” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S.

153, 169 (1988). Rather, “‘reports . . . setting forth . . . factual

findings’” are admissible, including those portions of the reports

containing opinions rather than facts. Id. (quoting FED.R.EVID.

803(8)(C)). Consequently, the FIT Report falls within the

public records exception to the hearsay rule. Inspector Porter’s

letter does not, because she based her recommendation only on

having “reviewed the investigative [FIT R]eport,” not her own

factual investigation, and Rule 803(8) “bars the admission of

statements not based on factual investigation.” Id.

The government’s suggestion that the FIT Report is not a

Rule 803(8) public record because it was an “‘interim report

subject to revision and review,’” Appellees’ Br. 21, fails because

the report itself was final, and whether or not its author’s

superiors chose to adopt it is irrelevant under Rule 803(8). 

There is no suggestion that Sergeant Gutherie had any intention

to revise his report after he submitted it to the Use of Force

Review Board. True, the review board disagreed with his

finding of a MPD policy violation and concluded that Detective

McConnell’s use of deadly force was within MPD policy and

justified. But Inspector Porter overturned this conclusion and

recommended termination of Detective McConnell’s

employment based on the findings and conclusions in the FIT

Report. The fact that the FIT Report had not been finally

adopted or ratified by higher MPD authority prior to trial is

irrelevant to whether it is a Rule 803(8) public record. See In re

Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475,

1481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In re Korean Air Lines involved the

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investigation by the International Civil Aviation Organization

(“ICAO”) of the incident in which a civilian airliner was shot

down by Soviet military aircraft. The ICAO’s governing

council directed the organization’s Secretary General to

investigate and prepare a report on the incident. 932 F.2d at

1481-82. Once the Secretary General submitted his final report,

however, the governing council chose not to endorse it. What

mattered, the court held, was not whether the agency chose to

adopt the report, but whether the preparer was “acting in the

capacity of a public official when he conducted ‘an investigation

made pursuant to authority granted by law.’” Id. at 1482

(quoting Rule 803(8)(c)). Consequently, the investigative

report, even though it was not adopted by the overseeing board,

was nonetheless a Rule 803(8) public record. Id. Likewise here,

as Sergeant Gutherie was acting pursuant to his official duty and

his report was sufficiently final, the FIT Report satisfies these

requirements and is therefore not excluded by the hearsay rule.

The district court’s in limine ruling excluding the FIT

Report and Inspector Porter’s letter was without prejudice,

inviting appellant to seek to use portions of the FIT Report if the

door was “opened to its use by some argument or some evidence

that is used in the trial.” Tr. Nov. 16, 2009 a.m., at 28. 

Appellant accepted that invitation and sought to get the contents

of the FIT Report into evidence through questioning of Sergeant

Gutherie and Dr. Restak at trial. The district court allowed

appellant to use Detective McConnell’s statements in the FIT

Report (as party admissions) and further allowed extensive

questioning of Sergeant Gutherie and Dr. Restak about the

witness statements and other evidence relied on in the FIT

Report. Thus, appellant elicited Sergeant Gutherie’s findings

that: (i) Taft was shot twice, once in the thigh and once in the

back; (ii) at the time of the initial gunshot, Taft and Detective

McConnell were in contact with one another; and (iii) the fatal

gunshot into Taft’s back occurred when Taft was between six

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and fifteen feet away from McConnell. The only part of the FIT

Report that appellant was barred from introducing was the

portion containing Sergeant Gutherie’s conclusions that at the

time Detective McConnell fired the fatal shot he was no longer

under a real attack, but merely a perceived attack, and that this

conduct violated MPD policy concerning the use of deadly

force. 

For several reasons it seems clear that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in drawing this line based on its balance

of the probative value of the FIT Report against the danger of

confusion and unfair prejudice. First, as the district court

concluded, the excluded portions of the FIT Report — and all of

Inspector Porter’s letter — were of little assistance to the jury

because they were cumulative of the live witness testimony to

be offered, and in fact offered, at trial. Indeed, the government

never suggested during trial that Detective McConnell was

under a real threat of attack at the time he fired the fatal shot. 

All of the eyewitness testimony indicated that Taft was moving

away from Detective McConnell when he fired the final two

shots. The government’s defense, through the testimony of

Detective McConnell and Dr. Restak, focused on the cognitive

deficiency Detective McConnell allegedly suffered at the time

of the fatal shot as a result of the chokehold by Taft. Sergeant

Gutherie’s conclusion that the attack at that point was only

perceived and not real was thus cumulative of the undisputed

evidence at trial. 

Second, Sergeant Gutherie’s conclusion that Detective

McConnell violated MPD policy was irrelevant to the question

before the jury because although “police enforcement practices

. . . vary from place to place and from time to time” the Supreme

Court observed that “the . . . protections of the Fourth

Amendment are [not] so variable.” Whren v. United States, 517

U.S. 806, 815 (1996). Moreover, appellant appears to ignore

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that admission of the FIT Report in its entirety could have

undermined her section 1983 excessive force claim. The FIT

Report reserves judgment on the constitutional question of

whether Detective McConnell’s actions were objectively

reasonable “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Indeed, the FIT Report

even acknowledges that Detective McConnell’s actions “might

be considered objectively reasonable.” FIT Rpt. 23. But the

FIT Report explained that the MPD holds its officers to a higher

standard than that required by the Constitution: in addition to

being objectively reasonable at the time, an officer’s use of

deadly force must be in response to “an actual or threatened

attack that is imminent and could result in death or serious

bodily injury.” Id. at 24 (quoting MPD General Order

901.07:V:D:1). So, even if a reasonable officer in Detective

McConnell’s position at the time would have felt compelled to

use deadly force, the officer could still have violated MPD

policy if he was mistaken about being under actual or threatened

lethal attack. The FIT Report concluded that even if Detective

McConnell’s actions were objectively reasonable, the final two

shots “were not fired during an actual or threatened attack,” and

thus violated MPD policy. Id. at 23-24. To the extent this

conclusion has any bearing on the constitutional claim, it could

hinder, rather than help, appellant’s case.

The government further maintains that under District of

Columbia law, violations of MPD General Orders are irrelevant

to appellant’s assault and battery claims, citing Evans-Reid v.

District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930, 936 (D.C. 2007); Karriem

v. District of Columbia, 717 A.2d 317, 322 (D.C. 1998). 

Appellant offers no argument to the contrary, instead

maintaining, without record citation, that during trial the

government put the policy violation in issue by denying that it

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occurred, but this alleged denial is nowhere to be found in the

record on appeal.

To the extent these conclusions in the FIT Report were at all

relevant, as appellant contends, the district court still did not

abuse its discretion in ruling that this relevance was outweighed

by the likelihood of confusing the jury and unfair prejudice to

the government. Although as a matter of law the alleged MPD

policy violation has no bearing on the Fourth Amendment

analysis, it would be far less clear to a jury. One could readily

imagine an argument to the jury oversimplifying the matter to

suggest that the prior finding of a policy violation was

inconsistent with the constitutional defense presented at trial —

in fact, appellant makes precisely such an argument on appeal:

“[T]heir prior statements are unequivocally inconsistent with the

positions that the trial court allowed the District to take in this

litigation.” Appellant’s Br. 31. Even without such prodding, a

jury informed of the alleged policy violation and the specific

finding that the attack was perceived but not real at the time of

the fatal gunshot might assign greater weight to these

conclusions — appearing, as they do, in an official MPD report

— than the Fourth Amendment analysis allows. The district

court could reasonably be concerned that this would cause “big

time” confusion of the issues, and preventing such confusion

would require the admission of the conclusions to be “hedged

about with jury instructions” and necessitate a “trial within a

trial about the whole District of Columbia disciplinary system.” 

Tr. Nov. 16, 2009 a.m., at 28. Appellant succeeded in getting

substantial evidence before the jury concerning whether the

detective’s conduct was unreasonable. Considering the tenuous

relevance of the excluded portions of the FIT Report, appellant

fails to show the district court’s line-drawing regarding what

portions were inadmissible was an abuse of discretion. See

Brooks v. Chrysler Corp., 786 F.2d 1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1986);

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see also Maddox v. Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1418 (9th Cir.

1986).

III.

Appellant more persuasively contends that the government

violated Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

by failing to supplement its initial expert disclosure to reflect

that Dr. Restak had personally interviewed and examined

Detective McConnell.

Prior to trial, on October 8, 2009, the government turned

over to appellant a September 25, 2009 letter from Dr. Restak as

his expert disclosure pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(a)(2). The letter stated, in pertinent part, that based on Dr.

Restak’s review of the FIT Report and its attachments, he was

of the view that “Detective McConnell was choked and

threatened with death,” causing temporary hypoxia and partial

loss of consciousness, which in turn “would seriously impair his

cognitive functioning.” At trial, on direct examination, the

government did not ask Dr. Restak any case-specific questions,

but only general questions based on hypotheticals and also on

Detective McConnell’s in-court demonstration of Taft’s

chokehold. Dr. Restak testified that in his opinion the sort of

chokehold Detective McConnell demonstrated would likely

cause serious cognitive impairment. On cross-examination,

appellant asked Dr. Restak to confirm that he had not been asked

case-specific questions on direct examination even though he

had provided a case-specific opinion in his expert report. Dr.

Restak — who quibbled separately with the characterization of

his letter as a “report,” suggesting it was less formal than that —

confirmed that he did have an opinion on what happened here

and expressed some surprise that he had not been asked for his

opinion during direct examination. On redirect, the government

asked for the case-specific opinion, and Dr. Restak explained his

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opinion was “along the lines of what I described” generally: the

chokehold “interfered with [Detective McConnell’s] mentation,

his cognitive functioning.” Tr. Nov. 17, 2009 p.m., at 122. 

On re-cross, appellant inquired as to the basis for Dr.

Restak’s case-specific opinion. Dr. Restak replied it was based

on the FIT Report, the attachments thereto and on his interview 

and examination of Detective McConnell. Appellant, apparently

surprised by the revelation that an in-person interview had taken

place, requested Dr. Restak’s notes from that meeting, which

were turned over, and further ascertained that Dr. Restak did not

submit an additional report to government counsel after his

meeting with Detective McConnell for production to appellant. 

Appellant then questioned Dr. Restak at length about the

contents of the FIT Report on which he relied for his opinion in

the September 25, 2009 report but did not inquire about the

interview. The district court sustained the government’s

objection when appellant began to inquire about the portion of

the FIT Report containing Sergeant Gutherie’s conclusions. 

When appellant nonetheless persisted in this line of questioning,

the district court excused the jury and held a bench conference. 

Appellant argued first, that because Dr. Restak had read and

relied on the entire FIT Report, appellant should be able to ask

about the entire FIT Report, and second, that because Dr. Restak

“never issued a report . . . [but was] allowed to testify” and the

government had failed to supplement the expert disclosure to

reflect Dr. Restak’s interview and examination of Detective

McConnell, Dr. Restak’s testimony should be stricken. Id. at

132; see id. at 134, 137, 138. The district court denied the

motion, ruling that appellant had “waived that” objection,

referring to appellant’s previous withdrawal of her pretrial

objection to the sufficiency of Dr. Restak’s initial Rule 26(a)(2)

disclosure. Id. at 138; see id. at 135-36.

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When trial resumed, appellant reviewed Dr. Restak’s notes

on his interview and examination of Detective McConnell, and

then asked a series of questions related to Dr. Restak’s opinion

and credibility, but unrelated to his interview of Detective

McConnell. On further re-direct, the government sought to

inquire whether, during the interview, Dr. Restak found

Detective McConnell to be suffering from an emotional

disturbance, as appellant’s hypothetical had suggested. The

district court sua sponte precluded this line of questioning.

Rule 26(a)(2) requires a party to disclose to the other parties

six pieces of information concerning an expert witness,

including

 (i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will

express and the basis and reasons for them;

 (ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming

them;

 (iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or

support them;

 (iv) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all

publications authored in the previous 10 years;

 (v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous

4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by

deposition; and

 (vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the

study and testimony in the case.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 

Appellant contends the government violated Rule 26(a)(2)

in two respects: by failing to make a proper expert disclosure

and by failing to supplement the disclosure to reveal the expert’s

interview and examination of Detective McConnell on which he

would rely in testifying at trial. As regards the first, appellant

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maintains that, because Dr. Restak considered his letter to be a

memorandum to himself, not a formal report, the government

failed to make a proper expert disclosure pursuant to Rule

26(a)(2). In the absence of any authority for the premise that the

label the expert himself applies to his submission controls the

analysis of the sufficiency of a Rule 26(a)(2) disclosure,

however, the proper question is whether the disclosure complies

with the rule’s substantive requirements. In this regard,

assuming appellant’s first claim of error is not waived because

it addresses a different point, the substance of Dr. Restak’s

testimony plainly fell within the scope of the statement

contained in his disclosure, which offered a detailed opinion that

Detective McConnell experienced serious cognitive difficulties

as a result of being choked and threatened with death. The third

paragraph of the report also contains general opinions about the

functioning of the brain, both under normal conditions and when

frontal and temporal lobes are damaged. Viewed as a whole, the

report provides the required “complete statement of all

opinions” offered at trial by Dr. Restak. FED. R. CIV. P.

26(a)(2)(B)(i); see R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC,

606 F.3d 262, 270-71 (6th Cir. 2010). 

The government’s Rule 26 disclosure fails, however, as

appellant contends, to provide the full “basis . . . [and] data or

other information considered by the witness” in forming his

opinions. FED.R.CIV.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). At trial, Dr. Restak

stated that after submitting his initial report of September 25,

2009 to the government, he interviewed Detective McConnell

on October 22, 2009 and this interview was one of the bases for

his case-specific expert opinion. Rule 26 requires parties to file

a supplemental disclosure reflecting “[a]ny additions or

changes” to the required Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosures, and thus

the government was required to file a supplement reflecting this

additional basis for Dr. Restak’s opinion. FED. R. CIV. P.

26(e)(2); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(E). Yet no supplement

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was ever provided to appellant reflecting that Dr. Restak’s

testimony would also rely on an in-person interview, a clear

violation of this duty to supplement. 

The government’s response that it did not violate Rule 26’s

duty to supplement is unpersuasive. Its claim that appellant has

forfeited the objection by failing to raise it in a timely manner in

the district court is belied by the record, which reflects that

while appellant may have waived her pretrial objection to the

facial sufficiency of the initial Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosure, she

promptly objected to the government’s failure to supplement the

report after she learned of Dr. Restak’s interview of Detective

McConnell for the first time on re-cross. Its suggestion this

court may not reach the issue because the Rule 26(a)(2) report

was never made part of the record in the district court relies on

Carter v. George Washington University, 387 F.3d 872, 877

(D.C. Cir. 2004), which is inapposite. Carter concerned a

district court’s grant of summary judgment based on medical

records and other evidence that was not part of the record. Here,

although the Rule 26(a)(2) disclosure was never formally filed

in the district court, its sufficiency was formally brought into

issue during trial and appellant quoted from it at some length

when cross-examining Dr. Restak and referred to it repeatedly

in making the objection to the district court. Because the

disclosure was “treated as part of the record in this case” by the

district court, the document is properly part of the record on

appeal. Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743

F.2d 932, 945 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The government’s further

suggestion that it was not required to supplement the Rule

26(a)(2) disclosure because it did not elicit Dr. Restak’s casespecific opinion on direct examination ignores not only that it

produced Dr. Restak’s case-specific opinion in the Rule 26(a)(2)

disclosure it did make to appellant, but also that it brought out

his case-specific opinion on redirect, even if “only out of

necessity — to counteract the plaintiff’s insinuation during

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cross-examination that his unexpressed opinion specific to the

case was unfavorable to the defendants,” Appellees’ Br. 50. Dr.

Restak’s case-specific opinion was not admitted subject to any

limiting instruction, and the government points to no authority

for the proposition that an expert opinion elicited on re-direct

examination is exempt from the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2). 

An expert opinion is an expert opinion. 

Nonetheless, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

declining to strike Dr. Restak’s testimony, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), because the government’s

failure to supplement its disclosure was harmless, see id. As

was made clear through re-cross-examination, Dr. Restak had

reached his opinion before he had interviewed Detective

McConnell and the interview did not change that opinion.

Appellant thus suffered no unfair prejudice. Upon learning of

the interview during re-cross, appellant received Dr. Restak’s

notes from his interview of Detective McConnell and reviewed

them. Inasmuch as Dr. Restak’s opinion was stated in the

September 25, 2009 disclosure, appellant’s questioning focused

on the materials Dr. Restak had reviewed for that opinion and

asked no questions concerning the interview. Moreover,

assuming sanctionable conduct, the striking of Dr. Restak’s

entire testimony, as appellant sought, would have imposed a

sanction that exceeded the discovery violation. See Outlet v.

New York, 837 F.2d 587, 591 (2d Cir. 1988); cf. Webb v. District

of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 972 (DC. Cir. 1998). On appeal,

appellant does not suggest how the trial proceedings would have

been different had there been a timely supplemental disclosure

and there is no basis from which to conclude that the Rule

26(a)(2)(E) violation affected appellant’s substantial rights. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 61; see Whitbeck, 159 F.3d at 1375. 

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IV.

Appellant’s other grounds for reversal of the judgment for

the government are unpersuasive. 

First, appellant contends that the district court erred in

admitting recordings of contemporaneous telephone calls

reporting the altercation at the carry-out and requesting

assistance — to emergency (911) and non-emergency (311)

numbers — because they were irrelevant. Regardless of

whether Detective McConnell or Taft “were aware of the

contents of the 311 or 911 recordings,” Appellant’s Br. 52, the

recordings provide highly probative contemporaneous

eyewitness accounts reflecting the scene that Detective

McConnell encountered and the struggle with Taft that ensued. 

Just as appellant presented live eyewitness testimony at trial to

provide accounts of the incident, the government was properly

allowed to play these recordings in order to provide other

accounts.

Second, to the extent appellant now maintains that the

danger of unfair prejudice from playing the recordings

outweighed their probative value under Federal Rule of

Evidence 403, noting the “yelling and screaming” on the

recordings, Appellant’s Br. 52, this objection is forfeited

because appellant failed to raise it in the district court. See

United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Although appellant offers that “the district court cut off

Appellant’s attempt to be heard on the issue,” Appellant’s Reply

Br. 17-18, the record shows that appellant was cut off only after

being afforded ample opportunity to raise a Rule 403 objection. 

At first, appellant simply lodged the objection without “stating

the specific ground of objection” as required by Federal Rule of

Evidence 103(a)(1). The district court inquired as to the basis

for appellant’s objection, and appellant responded, “Relevance

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and materiality.” Tr. Nov. 17, 2009 a.m., at 49. The district

court overruled the objection and, as appellant had already taken

two bites at the apple, the district court cut off appellant’s

attempt at a third. Having afforded appellant a full opportunity

to state the basis for the objection, and appellant having

referenced neither Rule 403 nor a danger of unfair prejudice, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to hear

further argument on the matter.

Third, appellant contends that in these rulings and in two

incidents that occurred outside the jury’s earshot, the district

court judge exhibited such bias as to deny appellant a fair trial. 

But appellant has not shown that the district court’s conduct

“reveal[s] such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to

make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510

U.S. 540, 555 (1994). The challenged rulings were not an abuse

of discretion and demonstrated no such bias. In one incident

complained of, the district court called the parties’ counsel to the

bench and warned government counsel that a line of questioning

of its expert witness on police policies and procedures could

“open the door” to admission of the FIT Report. Tr. Nov. 17,

2009 p.m., at 154. This guidance appears to have been offered

in order to clarify the district court’s evidentiary ruling on the

FIT Report, and it constituted a sound exercise of discretion, not

impermissible bias. In the other incident, while the district court

and appellant’s counsel were discussing — the transcript

suggests somewhat heatedly — the use of the FIT Report in

cross-examining Dr. Restak, the district court likened counsel to

a church minister due to his perceived inability to modulate his

voice. Counsel took exception to the comment, and on appeal

appellant suggests it was racially tinged. The record on appeal

is bereft of evidence the district court’s difficulties with

appellant’s counsel sprang from any racial attitude or affected its

judgments or its conduct before the jury or in any other way

deprived appellant of a fair trial.

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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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