Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-17-20725/USCOURTS-ca5-17-20725-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dalton Logistics, Incorporated
Appellee
Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company
Appellee
Hess Corporation
Appellee
Universal Truckload, Incorporated
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-20725

UNIVERSAL TRUCKLOAD, INCORPORATED, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

DALTON LOGISTICS, INCORPORATED; HESS CORPORATION; 

HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING COMPANY, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

Before DAVIS, STEWART, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

Universal Truckload appeals an adverse judgment following a jury trial.

Because Universal Truckload fails to demonstrate reversible error, we 

AFFIRM. 

I.

Appellee Dalton Logistics is a shipping broker. Dalton spearheads its

clients’ large-scale shipments of heavy-duty freight such as oil-field equipment 

and rigs. Two of Dalton’s former clients—Helmerich & Payne International 

Drilling Co. and Hess Corporation—are co-appellees in this appeal. H&P and 

Hess hired Dalton to coordinate the transportation of disassembled oil rigs. 

Dalton outsourced the trucking to appellant Universal Truckload. Dalton owed 

Universal Truckload $1.9 million for the trucking services it provided. Dalton 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 3, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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never paid Universal Truckload for its services and Universal Truckload sued 

Dalton, H&P, and Hess. 

On the surface, this case seems simple: Party A provided shipping 

services to Party B, and Party B never paid. But many of the key issues in this 

case turn on another part of the story. In response to Universal Truckload’s 

lawsuit, Dalton counterclaimed, alleging that Universal Truckload had 

promised to purchase Dalton but never fully finalized the deal, instead 

stringing Dalton along for over a year. Dalton says that it entered into the 

shipping contracts with H&P and Hess entirely at Universal Truckload’s 

direction and that Universal Truckload had even told Dalton not to pay the 

debt owed to Universal Truckload on these projects. Dalton complains that it 

spent all of its cash—burning every last asset—at Universal Truckload’s 

direction with constant assurances that the purchase would soon be finalized.

Dalton’s legal theory, successful at the district court, was promissory estoppel: 

Dalton spent millions in reliance on the ultimately broken promise that 

Universal would take over soon. The facts comprising Dalton’s counterclaim 

are detailed below. 

In March of 2013, Dalton lost a lucrative contract. Without that

business, Dalton struggled financially. Dalton’s executives had to decide 

whether they should restructure the entire company to stay afloat or take the 

profits and unwind the company completely. Dalton’s executives settled on the 

latter. President Dick Meredith and Vice President of Operations Jack Robison

planned to take their profits, close their operations in North Dakota, and 

return to Texas. As part of closing shop, Dalton contacted Universal

Truckload, whom they regularly worked with, and told Universal Truckload to 

take its trucks out of North Dakota because Dalton would no longer be needing 

them. However, instead of taking the trucks back, Universal Truckload’s 

president, Marc Limback, expressed interest in buying Dalton. Dalton was 

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open to the idea but told Universal Truckload that the deal would need to 

happen quickly because Dalton lacked the cash sufficient to last long on its 

own. 

Dalton, who had “already shut [the] company down,” “cranked it back 

up” at Universal Truckload’s request. Universal Truckload sent Dalton an 

Indication of Interest Letter and then Don Cochran, president of Universal

Truckload’s parent company, and Limback came to North Dakota in April to 

see Dalton’s operations in person. Dalton claims that since the initial 

conversation regarding purchasing Dalton, Limback and Cochran were in 

near-constant communication with Dalton about the purchase, routinely 

giving assurances that a deal would be finalized soon. 

On May 31, 2013, Universal Truckload officers met with Dalton officers 

in Detroit, Michigan. Dalton alleges that at this meeting, it reminded 

Universal Truckload that time was of the essence considering Dalton’s 

dwindling financial resources. Dalton alleges that Universal Truckload 

responded to this with an offer to buy Dalton for $25 million, but Universal 

Truckload claims that this agreement was never made. 

Shortly after the May 31 meeting, Universal Truckload became 

embroiled in internal political upheaval. A new merger left the old officers—

who had promised to purchase Dalton—at odds with the new officers—who 

allegedly did not want the deal. Dalton claims that it continued to remind 

Cochran that it was running low on cash and needed the deal done quickly and 

that Cochran continually reassured Dalton that the deal was almost finalized. 

These assurances that the deal would eventually work out allegedly continued 

for months, all while Dalton continued to deplete its resources to keep the 

company operational for Universal Truckload’s promised buyout. 

In August 2013, Dalton sent financial statements to Universal

Truckload. Three weeks later, Universal Truckload sent Dalton an Asset 

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Purchase Agreement offering $10.3 million upfront with a potential two-year 

earn-out totaling $24.3 million. Dick Meredith called Cochran to object to the 

new terms and Cochran agreed that this was not the deal Universal Truckload 

and Dalton had struck in May. Cochran assured Dalton that he would be able 

to get the executives at Universal Truckload to agree to get something done. 

In early 2014, Cochran allegedly urged Dalton to “[i]ncrease [its] 

revenue” by “getting outside help, other cranes, other trucks and so forth, to be 

able to . . . help us do more rigs.” Dalton did not have enough cash to pay 

Universal Truckload for trucks so Universal Truckload increased Dalton’s 

credit limit and provided the trucks on credit. 

Eventually, after eighteen months, Universal Truckload executives 

overruled Cochran, demanded Dalton repay the $1.9 million, and called 

Dalton’s bond. At this point, Dalton had no money to repay Universal 

Truckload as it had been paying to keep the company afloat for over eighteen 

months. Dalton, which was valued at $5.7 million in April of 2013, now had 

no assets, and instead owed Universal Truckload $1.9 million. 

Universal Truckload sued Dalton, H&P, and Hess to recover the unpaid 

bills. It brought the same claims against each defendant, alleging breach of 

contract, breach of quasi-contract, and breach of a sworn account. It argued 

that all defendants were liable for Dalton’s debt under theories of equitable 

subrogation, agency, and ratification. Dalton counterclaimed alleging breach 

of contract and, in the alternative, promissory estoppel.

Hess moved for summary judgment on all of Universal Truckload’s 

claims against it. The district court granted Hess’s motion and determined that 

Universal Truckload’s breach of contract claim failed as a matter of law 

because Universal Truckload failed to present any evidence that Hess 

consented to the terms of a shipping contract with Universal Truckload. 

Universal Truckload’s other claims against Hess also failed as Universal 

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Truckload “failed to cite, nor [could the district court find], a single case holding 

that a shipper is liable to a carrier of freight without some sort of contract 

existing between the parties.” 

Universal Truckload’s claims against H&P were partially dismissed at

summary judgment. On H&P’s motion, the district court dismissed Universal

Truckload’s claims alleging H&P was liable to Universal Truckload for the 

loads Universal Truckload subcontracted out. The remaining claims—

regarding the loads Universal Truckload moved itself—proceeded to trial. At 

the close of a week-long trial, the jury found that Universal Truckload had no 

contract with H&P, and therefore, Universal Truckload could not recover from 

H&P. 

All of Universal Truckload’s claims against Dalton, and Dalton’s 

crossclaims against Universal Truckload, proceeded to a jury trial. The jury 

found that Dalton should recover under a promissory estoppel theory. Dalton 

was awarded $5.7 million in reliance damages—the difference between the 

amount of cash it had on hand before Universal Truckload’s promise and the 

“zero” balance in its bank account when Universal Truckload called its bond.

The jury awarded Universal Truckload the $1.9 million in freight charges that 

Dalton owed. The court, however, concluded that the $1.9 million was incurred 

in reliance on Universal Truckload’s promises and therefore awarded Dalton a 

$1.9 million offset against Universal Truckload’s breach of contract claim. 

II.

Universal Truckload raises four issues on appeal, asking this court to: 

(1) reverse the judgment for Dalton because there was not sufficient evidence 

to support Dalton’s claim of promissory estoppel; (2) reverse the district court 

determination that the $1.9 million awarded to Universal Truckload for breach 

of contract be offset because it was entered solely in reliance on Universal

Truckload’s promise; (3) reverse the judgment in favor of H&P and award 

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Universal Truckload the freight charges for Universal Truckload’s 

transportation of H&P’s freight; and (4) reverse the grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Hess and award Universal Truckload the freight charges 

owed by Hess.1

A.

The jury awarded $5.7 million to Dalton. After the jury verdict, 

Universal Truckload sought a JMOL reversing that award. The district court 

denied that motion and now Universal Truckload asks this court to reverse the 

district court’s denial of the JMOL, in effect reversing the jury verdict. 

Universal Truckload advances three arguments for reversal. First, Universal 

Truckload asserts that it never promised to purchase Dalton. Second, even if 

it did promise to purchase Dalton, Universal Truckload claims Dalton’s 

reliance on the promise was unreasonable. And third, even if Dalton had a 

viable promissory estoppel theory, Universal Truckload contends that there 

was insufficient evidence that Dalton spent $5.7 million in reliance on 

Universal Truckload’s promise. Because there was sufficient evidence to 

conclude Universal Truckload made a promise, Dalton reasonably relied on the 

promise to its detriment, and that reliance caused Dalton $5.7 million in 

damages, we affirm the district court’s denial of the JMOL and the jury verdict 

on Dalton’s promissory estoppel claim. 

The parties contest the standard of review applicable to the challenge of 

the denied JMOL. Universal Truckload argues that it preserved this issue in 

 

1 We have subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the amount in 

controversy is over $75,000 and the parties are diverse. Plaintiff-Appellant Universal 

Truckload is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. 

Defendants-Appellees are all citizens of other states. Dalton is a Texas corporation with its 

principal place of business in Texas. Hess is a Delaware corporation with its principal place 

of business in New York. And H&P is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

business in Oklahoma. 

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the district court through its Rule 50(a) motion and renewed Rule 50(b) motion. 

It therefore asks this court to review its arguments de novo. See Foradori v. 

Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that this court reviews 

“de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, 

applying the same standard as the district court” (quoting Int’l Ins. v. RSR 

Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 296 (5th Cir. 2005)). However, in its Rule 50(a) motion, 

Universal Truckload did not challenge any promissory estoppel theories. Its 

Rule 50(a) motion pertained to: insufficient evidence of a valid contract, 

insufficient evidence of benefit-of-the-bargain damages, and insufficient 

evidence of reliance damages. After the verdict, in its Rule 50(b) motion, 

Universal Truckload raised arguments about promissory estoppel. But, we 

have explained that a “Rule 50(b) motion is technically only a renewal of the 

Rule 50(a) motion,” and therefore, the movant “cannot assert a ground that 

was not included in the original motion.” In re Isbell Records, Inc., 774 F.3d 

859, 867 (5th Cir. 2014) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1985)). 

Dalton correctly asserts that Universal Truckload’s arguments that a promise 

was not made or reasonably relied upon, raised for the first time in the Rule 

50(b) motion, are not preserved. We therefore review them for plain error. See 

Seibert v. Jackson Cty., 851 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2017). 

Universal Truckload’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the $5.7 million jury verdict was preserved in its Rule 50(a) motion 

and renewed in its Rule 50(b) motion. It is therefore reviewed de novo. Streber 

v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 730 (5th Cir. 2000). However, the standard under 

which it is reviewed is itself deferential to the trial court, drawing “all 

reasonable inferences and resolv[ing] all credibility determinations in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Foradori, 523 F.3d at 485; see also id. 

(noting that “unless there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a 

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reasonable jury to find as the jury did” this court must uphold the verdict

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Seibert, 851 F.3d at 434–35.

1.

Under the Erie doctrine, this court must apply substantive state law in 

diversity jurisdiction cases. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 

Here, the parties agree that Texas law applies. The elements of promissory 

estoppel in Texas are: “(1) a promise, (2) reliance thereon that was foreseeable 

to the promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment.” 

J.D. Fields & Co. v. U.S. Steel Int’l, 690 F. Supp. 2d 487, 503–04 (S.D. Tex. 

2009); see also MetroplexCore, L.L.C. v. Parsons Transportation, Inc., 743 F.3d 

964, 977 (5th Cir. 2014). Universal Truckload’s first argument goes directly to 

prong one: that there was no promise made. 

Dalton argues that Universal Truckload promised to purchase Dalton on

May 31, 2013. Universal Truckload argues the promise never happened, and 

that Dalton’s own actions make that clear. At trial, Dalton’s president 

admitted that for nearly two years after the alleged promise was made 

Universal Truckload never sent Dalton any paperwork formalizing the 

agreement and Dalton did not ask for any written agreement. And though

Dalton says that an initial payment of $18 million was promised at the May

meeting and due in August 2013, there is no evidence that Dalton ever 

complained about not receiving a past due payment. Universal Truckload 

asserts that Dalton’s consistent failures to enforce or formalize the alleged 

promise prove that a promise was never made.

In contrast, Dalton points to Universal Truckload’s post-promise 

conduct. The record on appeal shows that Universal Truckload’s leadership 

had a “running dialog” about the takeover with Dalton leadership for over a 

year. Universal Truckload repeatedly asked Dalton to “hang in there,” and 

assured Dalton that it would “get something done.” Universal Truckload even 

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went so far as to “float[] alternative deal structures” and instruct “Dalton not 

to repay the $1.9 million of debt it had incurred at Universal Truckload’s 

behest” and “[k]eep [those] dollars” because the parties would “finalize the 

dollars at closing.” Dalton maintains that this post-promise conduct, coupled 

with the initial promise in the May 2013 meeting, was more than enough

evidence for a jury to conclude that Universal Truckload had promised to 

purchase Dalton. 

We considered similar facts in MetroplexCore. There, an engineering 

firm bid for a contract to build a passenger rail line in Houston. 743 F.3d at 

968. The lead contractor repeatedly assured MetroplexCore, the plaintiff, that 

it would be included in the project if the defendant’s bid got accepted. Id. at 

970. The defendant regularly reassured MetroplexCore by saying “our 

commitment to you is still in play,” “we are still committed to MetroplexCore

being on the management team,” and “we are going to live up to our 

commitment to you,” among other reassurances. Id. at 970–71. When 

MetroplexCore was not included in the project, it sued the lead contractor for 

reliance damages based on its promise. Id. at 971. We held that these 

numerous, specific statements constituted actionable promises, and 

accordingly reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the 

defendant. Id. at 982. 

The reassurances made here seem at least as strong as those made in 

MetroplexCore. The reassurances given were just as continuous, numerous,

and specific. Despite Dalton’s lack of action to formalize the promise, the jury 

was presented with sufficient evidence to find a promise occurred. The district 

court did not plainly err by denying the JMOL and upholding the jury’s verdict. 

2.

Universal Truckload’s second argument, also reviewed for plain error, is 

that Dalton’s reliance on the promise was not reasonable. In support, 

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Universal Truckload primarily relies on the “Indication of Interest” (IOI) it 

sent to Dalton. The IOI expressed Universal Truckload’s interest in 

purchasing Dalton, but it stated that the agreement was “only an indication of 

interest and is not intended to be legally binding.” The IOI explained that 

Universal Truckload would enter into a binding contract to purchase Dalton 

only after the fulfillment of certain conditions: the completion of due diligence, 

the lack of any materially adverse change in Dalton’s business, and approval 

by Universal Truckload’s board of directors. Because the conditions laid out in 

the IOI were never completed, Universal Truckload insists that Dalton’s 

reliance on the alleged oral promise was unreasonable. We disagree. 

Universal Truckload relies on the Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 

2018). In JPMorgan, the relying party had signed a binding letter of intent 

that contradicted the terms of the oral promise it allegedly relied on. Id. at 

651. The Supreme Court of Texas held that reliance on the oral promise was 

unreasonable because it directly contradicted the written contract and the 

relying party was aware of other red flags that made reliance unreasonable. 

Id. at 660. Universal Truckload claims that JPMorgan’s holding should apply 

here: Dalton received the IOI and “should have viewed [a certain] series of 

events as a red flag warranting further investigation” in light of “the amount 

of money involved in the transaction” and the “ambiguous nature of [the 

defendant’s] assurance.” Id. at 655 (second alteration in original) (quoting 

Lewis v. Bank of Am. NA, 343 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2003)).

However, this case differs from JPMorgan in at least three crucial ways. 

First, the letter of intent at issue in JPMorgan was a binding contract signed 

by both parties. The IOI that Universal Truckload sent Dalton is expressly 

nonbinding. Second, the letter of intent in JPMorgan included a clause

disclaiming any oral agreements. Id. at 650–51. Universal Truckload’s IOI 

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does not. And third, the letter of intent in JPMorgan directly contradicted the 

oral promise, and Universal Truckload’s IOI does not. The Supreme Court of 

Texas explained in JPMorgan, “there is no direct contradiction if a reasonable 

person can read the writing and still plausibly claim to believe the [oral] 

representation.” Id. at 659. The conditions laid out in the IOI explain what 

would need to happen if Universal Truckload was to enter a contract to 

purchase Dalton. But the jury did not find in favor of Dalton on a contract 

theory. Dalton succeeded on a promissory estoppel theory, which requires the 

absence of a contract. See Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1965) 

(explaining that promissory estoppel exists to furnish a remedy for “reasonable 

reliance upon an otherwise unenforceable promise” (emphasis added)). The 

IOI’s discussion of contractual prerequisites does not directly contradict the 

oral promise that Universal Truckload would purchase Dalton.2

Universal Truckload was of course free to use the IOI as evidence that 

the oral promise was not reasonably relied upon. But the jury was also free to 

weigh all the evidence presented and conclude to the contrary. Between 

Universal Truckload’s initial promise to acquire Dalton on May 31 and

Limback’s and Cochran’s repeated promises over the ensuing months that they 

would “make it work,” the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to 

conclude that despite the IOI, Dalton’s reliance was reasonable. The district 

court did not plainly err by denying the JMOL and upholding the jury’s finding.

 

2 In a letter submitted to the court under Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, Universal Truckload points this court to Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. v. Carduco, 

Inc., 583 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. 2019), a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Texas. Universal 

Truckload argues that “Carduco is relevant legally and factually to Universal [Truckload]’s 

position.” In Carduco ̧ the court determined that reliance was not reasonable when factual 

“red flags” would prompt a party to exercise diligence before relying on oral assurances. 

However, like JPMorgan, the facts of Carduco differ significantly from the facts before us in 

this case. The promisee in Carduco relied on a promise despite “the [Agreement] he signed 

expressly” providing that the promisor “was under no such obligation.” Id. at 563. 

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3.

In its final argument challenging the district court’s denial of its JMOL, 

Universal Truckload contends that the district court erred by not vacating the 

jury’s $5.7 million judgment in Dalton’s favor. Universal Truckload explains

that even if this court concludes that a promise was made and reasonably 

relied upon, there is insufficient evidence to support the award of $5.7 million. 

We review the denial of the JMOL de novo, but “all reasonable inferences and 

. . . all credibility determinations [are viewed] in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” Foradori, 523 F.3d at 485. 

The disputed damage award hinges on the parties’ differing conceptions 

of the dates Universal Truckload “broke” its promise. The parties agree that

Dalton’s reliance began on May 31, 2013, when the alleged promise was made. 

But because there can be no reasonable reliance after a clear repudiation of a 

contract, Universal Truckload asserts that any reasonable reliance ended on 

August 27, 2013, when it offered to purchase Dalton for a lower amount of 

money. See Conner v. Lavaca Hosp. Dist., 267 F.3d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 2001) 

(holding that there could be no reasonable reliance on a contract following its 

repudiation). Because Dalton was worth $5.7 million on May 31 and on August 

27, Universal Truckload claims the evidence does not support any reliance 

damages. 

However, Universal Truckload’s argument suffers from two fatal flaws. 

First, it misunderstands the “promise” at issue, and therefore it miscalculates 

the relevant date range. Universal Truckload acts as if the promise from which 

Dalton’s claim arises was a specific promise to purchase Dalton for $25 million. 

But Dalton’s promissory estoppel claim rests on a much broader promise: 

Universal Truckload’s promise to purchase Dalton at all. The reassurances 

that Dalton and Universal Truckload would strike a deal, and that eventually 

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Dalton would be purchased, continued long after Universal Truckload made a 

lower offer in August 2013. 

Second, Universal Truckload misreads the case law. Connor holds that 

reliance on a contract is not reasonable after the other party unequivocally 

repudiates its obligations. 267 F.3d at 436. Here, there is no contract at issue, 

and therefore there is nothing Universal Truckload could have “unequivocally 

repudiated.” Connor does not require reliance damages to stop in August 2013, 

because the promise at issue was not clearly broken until a much later date—

when Universal Truckload expressly told Dalton it would not be purchasing 

the company at all and required Dalton to repay the $1.9 million. 

Dalton presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of $5.7 

million. At the time Dalton was preparing to shut its doors in May of 2013, the 

evidence indicates Dalton’s valuation was $5.7 million. This is supported by 

“testimony from multiple witnesses—including Universal [Truckload] 

witnesses.” And when it finally became clear that Universal Truckload had no 

intention of purchasing Dalton, Dalton had no assets. As the jury found that 

Dalton stayed in business because it relied on Universal Truckload’s promise, 

there was more than enough evidence for the jury to award $5.7 million in 

damages. We affirm the district court’s denial of Universal Truckload’s JMOL

and affirm the jury verdict in Dalton’s favor on its promissory estoppel claim 

and damages award. 

B.

The jury awarded Universal Truckload $1.9 million from Dalton arising 

from Dalton’s unpaid shipping bill. But Universal Truckload waived its right 

to a jury on the question of whether that $1.9 million was spent in reliance on 

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Universal Truckload’s promise to purchase Dalton.3 Under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 49(a)(3), “the [district] court may make a finding on [any] 

issue” on which a party has waived its right to a trial by jury. The district 

court found that the $1.9 million debt Dalton owed Universal Truckload was 

entered into entirely in reliance on Universal Truckload’s promise of 

eventually purchasing Dalton. Therefore, the damages were offset, and Dalton 

did not need to pay Universal Truckload $1.9 million. Universal Truckload 

challenges the district court’s finding. “[I]mputed factual findings under Rule 

49 are reviewed for clear error.” Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 282 (5th Cir. 

2014).

Universal Truckload contends that the district court clearly erred 

because Dick Meredith—Dalton’s owner—conceded at trial that it owed 

Universal Truckload the $1.9 million. At trial, Meredith was asked, “If [the]

jury determines that Universal Truckload is owed [the] $1.9 million, who 

should pay for it?” To which Meredith responded, “Dalton should pay for it.” 

Universal Truckload claims that this seals the deal. Because the jury 

determined Dalton breached the contract, Dalton owes Universal Truckload 

$1.9 million. 

However, this issue is not as open and shut as Universal Truckload 

believes it to be. Whether Dalton breached its contract with Universal

Truckload—the question the jury answered—is separate from the question the 

district court answered. The district court found that Dalton entered into the 

$1.9 million contract solely in reliance on Universal Truckload’s promise, and 

 

3 Prior to trial, Universal Truckload and Dalton had stipulated that $1.9 million was 

the amount owed. Universal Truckload objected to the question of whether the debt was 

entered into in reliance on Universal Truckload’s promises being submitted to the jury. It 

argued that that question was unnecessary because the question of offsetting the $1.9 million 

could be sorted out later after the jury verdict on the reliance damages and breach of contract 

claims was settled. 

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therefore the damages offset each other. And it is that finding that Universal 

Truckload appeals. Meredith’s statement at trial that “Dalton should pay” the 

$1.9 million was not a response to this separate question. Meredith’s 

statements at trial were in response to a line of questioning about which party, 

Dalton, H&P, or Hess, would owe Universal Truckload the $1.9 million if the 

jury found breach of contract. Meredith’s answer indicated only that Dalton, 

and not H&P or Hess, could be on the hook for that money. It did not foreclose

the finding that the $1.9 million contract was entered into in reliance on 

Universal Truckload’s promise. 

If Universal Truckload, instead of being the lender itself, had encouraged 

Dalton to borrow $1.9 million from a third party, these damages would be 

included in a straightforward reliance damage calculation. See Mistletoe 

Express Serv. v. Locke, 762 S.W.2d 637, 638–39 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, 

no writ) (explaining that a promisor is liable for any debts that a promisee

incurred as a foreseeable consequence of the promise). At trial, Cochran, one 

of Universal Truckload’s witnesses, admitted that Dalton would not have 

incurred this debt if it closed in April 2013. And as determined above, Dalton 

kept its doors open solely in reliance on Universal Truckload’s promise that it 

would eventually purchase Dalton.4 Therefore, Dalton entered this $1.9 

million debt in reliance on Universal’s promise. 

What makes this case appear tricky is that Universal Truckload wears 

two hats: it is both the promisor and the lender. But this does not affect our 

analysis. As a lender, Universal Truckload is entitled to $1.9 million from 

Dalton under breach of contract. And as a promisor, Universal Truckload owes 

Dalton $1.9 million because Dalton incurred this debt in reliance on Universal

 

4 There is also evidence in the record that in April 2014, when Dalton had the money 

to pay this debt, Universal Truckload encouraged it to keep the cash to “keep [Dalton] going.” 

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Truckload’s promise. The district court did not clearly err in finding that the 

$1.9 million arose out of Dalton’s reliance on Universal Truckload’s promise 

and therefore, it did not err in offsetting the damages. We affirm the district 

court. 

C.

Universal Truckload also appeals the judgment in favor of H&P. H&P 

contracted with Dalton to broker transport of two disassembled oil rigs from 

Texas to North Dakota. Dalton retained Universal Truckload to transport the 

freight. Universal Truckload moved a part of the freight itself and 

subcontracted out the transportation of the remainder. When Dalton failed to 

pay Universal Truckload for its services, Universal Truckload sued Dalton and 

H&P, arguing both parties were on the hook for the unpaid bill. 

H&P prevailed in the district court. Universal Truckload and H&P filed

competing motions for summary judgment. The district court denied Universal

Truckload’s motion and granted H&P’s in part, dismissing Universal

Truckload’s claim that H&P was liable to Universal Truckload for the 

subcontracted loads. The remaining question of H&P’s liability for the loads 

Universal Truckload transported itself went to the jury. The jury rejected 

Universal Truckload’s contract theory and found that H&P was not liable to 

Universal Truckload. After the verdict, Universal Truckload moved for a 

JMOL and the district court denied its motion. Universal Truckload now 

challenges: (1) the decision to send the contract question to the jury, (2) the 

denial of Universal Truckload’s motion for summary judgment, and (3) the 

grant of summary judgment to H&P. We affirm the district court on all three 

issues.5 

 

5 Carried with this case is H&P’s motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

H&P argues this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to decide two of Universal Truckload’s 

claims against H&P. H&P first claims that we lack appellate jurisdiction to review Universal 

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1.

Universal Truckload contends on appeal that the district court judge, not 

the jury, should have decided whether H&P was contractually liable to 

Universal Truckload. Universal Truckload asserts that the only question 

 

Truckload’s arguments about the jury question because Universal Truckload’s notice of 

appeal was premature. Universal Truckload appeals from “[t]he District Court’s Order of 

October 30, 2017 (the final judgment),” but final judgment was not entered against H&P until 

December 1, 2017. H&P argues that this premature notice of appeal deprives this court of 

jurisdiction. United States v. Cooper, 135 F.3d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining a timely 

notice of appeal is necessary to exercise appellate jurisdiction). However, FirstTier Mortgage 

Co. v. Investors Mortgage Insurance, 498 U.S. 269, 274 n.4 (1991), says that “a premature 

notice of appeal relates forward to the date of entry of a final ‘judgement’ . . . when the ruling 

designated in the notice is a ‘decision’ for purposes of [Rule 4(a)(2)].” 

In a case similar to the one before us, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that because “all 

of the claims had been decided as to all of the parties effectively ending the litigation on the 

merits” and the final judgment appealed from “would have been appealable if immediately 

followed by the entry of judgment on all counts of the complaint,” the notice of appeal fell 

“directly within the language of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 4(a)(2)” and the notice of 

appeal was considered timely. Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assoc. Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (11th 

Cir. 1994). So here too. On October 30, when the district court entered final judgment on 

some of the issues, all questions regarding H&P had been resolved by the jury or ruled on by 

the court. Therefore, the notice of appeal falls within the language of Rule 4(a)(2) and we read 

the first designation of Universal Truckload’s notice of appeal broadly to encompass the jury 

verdict and JMOL in H&P’s favor. Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610, 616 (5th Cir. 2010) 

(explaining that this court “generously interpret[s] the scope of the appeal”). 

H&P correctly contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the district court’s 

denial of a motion for summary judgment. We have previously said that “this court has 

jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the district court’s legal conclusions in denying summary 

judgment, but only if it is sufficiently preserved in a Rule 50 motion.” Feld Motor Sports, Inc. 

v. Traxxas, L.P., 861 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 2017). While Universal Truckload did make a 

Rule 50 motion re-urging the arguments made at the summary judgment stage, it specifically 

designated the denial of summary judgment for appeal. We interpret Feld Motor Sports to 

require not only that a Rule 50 motion is made, but also that the Rule 50 motion’s disposition, 

not the denial of summary judgment, is what is appealed from. Despite the error in its notice 

of appeal, however, Universal Truckload could have been spared by our broad reading of the 

first designated order in its notice of appeal. Because Universal Truckload’s first designation 

includes the denial of its JMOL, in which the summary judgment arguments were re-urged, 

we are not jurisdictionally precluded from reviewing, through the JMOL, the arguments that 

relate to denial of summary judgment. However, we do not reach the merits of this issue for 

another reason. Universal Truckload has forfeited this issue because its brief is silent on the

denial of summary judgment and the JMOL. United States v. Martinez, 263 F.3d 436, 438 

(5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a party forfeits an issue if it fails to adequately brief it). We 

therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the JMOL regarding H&P. 

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remaining after the presentation of evidence was the effect of bills of lading

Universal Truckload gave to H&P when it dropped off shipments. And because 

the effect of a legal instrument is a question of law, Universal Truckload 

contends that the district court erred by sending this question to the jury. 

Grohman v. Kahlig, 318 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Tex. 2010) (“A trial court commits 

error if it submits a question of law to the jury.”); see also Tri-State Petroleum 

Corp. v. Saber Energy, Inc., 845 F.2d 575, 581–82 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The 

interpretation of a contract is a question of law . . . .”). Because Universal 

Truckload did not make a timely objection below, we review this issue for plain 

error. Jimenez v. Wood Cty., 660 F.3d 841, 844–45 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).6

H&P disagrees with Universal Truckload’s claim that the only relevant 

question was the effect of the bills of lading. It contends that an issue of fact—

the parties’ intent to be bound—remained. See Foreca, S.A. v. GRD Dev. Co.,

758 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex. 1988) (“In some cases, of course, the court may 

decide, as a matter of law, that there existed no immediate intent to be bound. 

This case, however, is not such a case. The evidence as to the intent of the 

parties is disputed.”). At trial, Universal Truckload conceded that it did not 

contact H&P before the transport of the rigs, that it did not send H&P a 

contract for the transportation of the rigs, and that it never told H&P that the 

bills of lading would function as a contract between the parties. Universal

Truckload’s business records, also presented at trial, indicated that Universal 

Truckload always intended Dalton to be responsible for paying for the 

 

6 Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party objecting to an 

improper jury charge to (1) make a proper timely objection to the jury instructions, and (2) 

show that the instructions were legally erroneous. At the close of evidence, the district court 

judge asked the parties whether there were any objections to the jury questions. One of the 

jury questions asked “Did [H&P] contract for Universal Truckload to transport portions of 

rig 517 and 524?” Universal Truckload did not object to this question and therefore we review 

its claim for plain error. Jimenez, 660 F.3d at 844–45.

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shipments. Corey Lawyer, H&P’s construction manager, also testified at trial

about its understanding that the bills of lading function as receipts to show 

delivery, and not as contracts for payment obligations. While Universal 

Truckload was free to argue to the jury that the bills of lading were a clearly 

binding contract, the jury was presented with evidence that called into 

question whether a true “meeting of the minds” occurred. The intent of the 

parties to be bound is an essential element of an enforceable agreement and is 

often a question of fact, as it appears to be here. See id. at 746.

Further, the jury charge—“Did [H&P] contract for Universal Truckload 

to transport portions of rig 517 and 524”—is language taken directly from the 

Texas Pattern Jury Charges. The charge does not ask the jury to construe the 

effect of the bills of lading, but instead asks the jury to weigh the facts and 

determine whether H&P and Universal Truckload intended the bills of lading

to be an enforceable contract. The district court did not plainly err by sending 

this question to the jury. 

2.

Universal Truckload’s final argument regarding H&P is that the district 

court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to H&P on the 

outsourced loads. We review this de novo. Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 

F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016). Universal Truckload paid subcontractors, but 

never got paid by Dalton. And, under a theory of equitable subrogation, 

Universal Truckload claims H&P should pay the subcontractors’ bill. Because

Universal Truckload’s arguments fail as a matter of law, the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment was proper. 

Universal Truckload argues that it should have prevailed on its theory 

of equitable subrogation because it has non-voluntarily paid a debt—payment 

to subcontractors—that H&P was “primarily liable for” and that “in equity” 

H&P should have paid. “Equitable subrogation is the legal fiction through 

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which a person or entity, the subrogee, is substituted, or subrogated, to the 

rights and remedies of another by virtue of having fulfilled an obligation for 

which [another] was responsible.” Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Vesta Fire Ins., 173 

F.3d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1999). It applies when “one person, not acting 

voluntarily, has paid a debt for which another was primarily liable and which 

in equity should have been paid by the latter.” Frymire Eng’g Co. v. Jomar 

Int’l, Ltd., 259 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Mid-Continent Ins. v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins., 236 S.W.3d 765, 774 (Tex. 2007)). 

Universal Truckload’s argument fails, however, because Universal

Truckload’s payment to the subcontractors was not actually non-voluntary, nor 

was H&P “primarily liable” for the payment. In Frymire, a subcontractor 

installed a faulty valve that caused damage to a property when a water line 

ruptured. Id. The subcontractor’s insurance company paid for it, but then sued 

the valve manufacturer to recover this cost. Id. The valve manufacturer was 

liable because the damage was caused by the valve manufacturer’s error 

through no fault of the subcontractor and therefore “in equity should have been 

paid by” the manufacturer. Id.

Here, Universal Truckload, on its own initiative, entered into a contract 

with third-party motor carriers to move a portion of H&P’s freight. The 

contract specifically provided that the motor carriers would be paid by 

Universal Truckload. Unlike in Frymire, where the subcontractor was 

supplied with a faulty valve, no error of another party created Universal

Truckload’s obligation to the subcontractor. Universal Truckload created its 

own, independent contractual obligation to pay the subcontractor. And, as the 

district court noted: “Universal [Truckload] specifically conditioned its contract 

with the motor carriers seeking payment exclusively from Universal

Truckload. Payment under such circumstances cannot be characterized as 

involuntary.” Because Universal Truckload’s payment to the subcontractors 

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was voluntary, Universal Truckload’s equitable subrogation argument fails as 

a matter of law and was properly dismissed by the district court. 

D.

Finally, Universal Truckload appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to Hess. The relationship between Universal Truckload 

and Hess resembles that of Universal Truckload and H&P. Hess is an oil and 

gas producer who has drilling operations in North Dakota. As part of its 

operations, Hess moves its rigs from one site to another. Hess entered into a 

contract with Dalton to coordinate the move of some of Hess’s rigs. Dalton then 

entered into a subcontract with Universal Truckload to provide the trucks for 

Hess’s move. Hess was not a party to the subcontract. Hess paid Dalton in 

full, but Dalton did not pay Universal Truckload. Universal Truckload sued 

Hess, as well as Dalton, to recover on the unpaid bills. Hess moved for 

summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for the unpaid bills. The 

district court agreed, granted Hess’s motion for summary judgment, and 

Universal Truckload appealed. Because there is no contractual relationship 

between Hess and Universal Truckload, we affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment.

Universal Truckload advances two legal theories supporting Hess’s 

liability. First, Universal Truckload claims that Hess is contractually 

obligated to pay Universal Truckload for its services. Second, Universal 

Truckload argues that North Dakota’s statutes and common law entitle 

Universal Truckload to recovery from Hess because Hess was the consignor of 

the loads.7 Both arguments fail. 

 

7 Both Universal Truckload and Hess brief this issue under North Dakota law because 

all interaction between the two companies took place in North Dakota. As this case is before 

this court on diversity jurisdiction, and both parties agree North Dakota law applies, we 

interpret and apply North Dakota law here.

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1.

Universal Truckload’s first argument, that Hess is contractually 

obligated to pay Universal Truckload what Dalton owes, is unsupported by the 

record. The contracts at issue are: a Master Service Agreement between 

Dalton and Hess that Universal Truckload was not a party to and an 

agreement between Dalton and Universal Truckload that Hess was not a party 

to. As the district court correctly found, “there is no evidence that Hess ever 

knew of, received, accepted, or assented to the terms of any shipping contract 

with Universal [Truckload].”

Acknowledging no formal contract, Universal Truckload claims that bills 

of lading delivered to Hess at the time of shipment contractually bind Hess and 

Universal Truckload. However, Universal Truckload does not adequately 

demonstrate this on appeal. The sole support for its contention that there are 

binding bills of lading is a citation to two hundred pages of the record. This 

portion of the record purportedly contains bills of lading between the two 

companies, but the cited page span includes numerous bills of lading between 

multiple companies. Universal Truckload does not point to a single bill of 

lading that was for a shipment to Hess relevant to this case. We have no 

obligation to “sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s 

opposition to summary judgment.” Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th 

Cir. 1994) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 & n.7 (5th 

Cir. 1992)). Therefore, the alleged bills of lading referenced in Universal

Truckload’s brief are insufficient to support Universal Truckload’s argument. 

Even if we were to look past Universal Truckload’s insufficient briefing 

and comb through the record, there is nothing in the record that indicates the 

prepared bills of lading were actually given to Hess. Dalton’s president, Dick 

Meredith, testified in his deposition that “there [is] no way of knowing” on 

many bills of lading whether it was a shipment for Hess, H&P, or one of 

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Universal Truckload’s other clients. He also explained that bills of lading are 

often prepared exclusively for payroll and not actually given to the receiver.

He testified that one could not know on the face of the bill of lading whether it 

had been given to the recipient. Thus, the district court correctly determined

that because “there is no evidence that Hess ever knew of, received, accepted, 

or assented to the terms of any bill of lading” Universal Truckload’s breach of 

contract claim fails. 

2.

Universal Truckload’s second theory of recovery also falls short. 

Universal Truckload claims that even without an express contract between 

Hess and Universal Truckload, Hess is liable for the unpaid shipping costs 

under North Dakota law. Universal Truckload contends that specific 

provisions of the North Dakota Century Code “codified the common law 

doctrine that the consignor and consignee remain liable to the carrier absent a 

contrary agreement.” 

The relevant provisions of the Century Code are as follows: 

§ 8-05-02. Consignor liable for freightage: The consignor 

of freight is presumed to be liable for the freightage, but if the 

contract between the consignor and the carrier provides that the 

consignee shall pay it and the carrier allows the consignee to take 

the freight, the carrier cannot afterwards recover the freightage 

from the consignor.

§ 8-05-03. Consignee liable for freight: The consignee of 

freight is liable for the freightage if the consignee accepts the 

freight with notice of the intention of the consignor that the 

consignee should pay it.

N.D. Cent. Code §§ 8-05-02, -03. As Universal Truckload understands it, 

section 8-05-02 controls here because Hess is the “consignor” and must pay 

Universal Truckload’s freight charges, because there existed no “contract 

between the consignor (Hess) and the carrier (Universal [Truckload]) that 

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provides that” another party should pay. Universal Truckload also argues that 

under section 8-08-03 Hess was the “consignee” and because Hess accepted the 

shipment, Hess must pay for it. 

Hess disputes this reading of the statute and explains that these 

provisions were intended to allocate liability between three separate parties: a 

“consignor” (the sender), a “consignee” (the recipient), and a carrier. That is 

not the type of transaction at issue in this case. Here, we have Dalton (a 

carrier) who subcontracted a service from Universal Truckload (a third-party 

subcontractor) to ship goods to and from a single entity—Hess. In this case, 

Hess is the consignor and the consignee. These sections cannot be read to

establish liability in favor of a third-party subcontractor such as Universal

Truckload, as they do not even contemplate the existence of such a third party. 

Contrary to Universal Truckload’s contention, these provisions do not create a 

default rule that the consignee is always liable to the party who delivers goods. 

Universal Truckload cites a single case it believes supports its reading 

of North Dakota law: E.W. Wylie Corp. v. Menard, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 

1994).8 Universal Truckload contends that Wylie established a common law 

rule that carriers may seek payment from either the consignor or consignee. 

But Wylie expressly reached the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court of 

North Dakota explained that the appellant in Wylie “overstate[d] the common 

law” when it argued that a consignor and consignee of shipped goods are 

 

8 In Wylie, Menard, a consignee/receiver, purchased lumber from IKA, a 

consignor/shipper. Id. at 397. The contract between IKA and Menard established that IKA 

would pay the freight charges to the carrier. Id. IKA then contracted with a carrier, E.W. 

Wylie Corp., to transport the lumber, and the contract provided that IKA would pay. Id. 

Menard paid IKA, but IKA never paid Wylie. After Wylie unsuccessfully sought payment 

from IKA, it attempted to recover from Menard. Id. The Supreme Court of North Dakota 

held that Menard was not liable to Wylie for IKA’s unpaid bills because there was no contract 

between Wylie and Menard and there was a contract between Wylie and IKA. Id. at 397, 

406. 

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always jointly and severally liable for a carrier’s freight charges. Id. at 397. 

“[B]ecause liability for payment of freight charges is largely a matter of 

contract, any common law presumption about responsibility for freight costs 

may be rebutted by evidence that the parties intended something else.” Id. at 

399. In Wylie, the “something else” was a contract between the carrier and the 

consignor that expressly stated the consignor would pay the carrier. Id. Here, 

it is the contract between Universal Truckload and Dalton that expressly 

states Dalton would pay Universal Truckload. Even if there were a common 

law presumption regarding the obligation of a consignee to pay a third-party 

contractor that it has no contractual relationship with, the contract between 

Universal Truckload and Dalton would rebut that presumption. 

Nothing in the North Dakota common law or Code allows Universal 

Truckload to overcome its lack of contractual agreement with Hess. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

Hess’s favor. 

III.

The district court correctly denied the JMOL asking the court to reverse 

the jury’s finding that Dalton was entitled to $5.7 million in reliance damages 

under promissory estoppel. Further, the district court correctly concluded that 

the $1.9 million breach of contract damages in Universal Truckload’s favor 

should be offset because the debt arose from reliance on Universal Truckload’s 

promise. Finally, the district court also correctly determined that neither H&P 

nor Hess was liable for the shipping charges Universal Truckload incurred.

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment in full. 

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