Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00830/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00830-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Board of Prison Terms
Respondent
Carlos Jimenez
Petitioner
Arnold Schwarzenegger
Respondent

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS JIMENEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-830 MHP (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Carlos Jimenez, a prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed this

pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now

before the court for consideration of the merits of the pro se habeas petition. For the reasons

discussed below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Carlos Jimenez was convicted in Los Angeles County Superior Court of second

degree murder and was found to have used a firearm in the commission of the offense. He

was sentenced to a term of 17 years to life in 1985. His habeas petition does not concern that

conviction directly, but instead focuses on a February 27, 2003 decision by a panel of the

Board of Prison Terms (now known as the Board of Parole Hearings ("BPH")) finding him

not suitable for parole. 

The BPH identified several factors in support of its determination that Jimenez was

not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to

public safety if he was released. The factors identified included the circumstances of the

murder, Jimenez's prior criminal history, his unstable social history, his insufficient

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participation in self-help programming, and his inadequate parole plans. The specifics

regarding the crime and the circumstances supporting the finding of unsuitability are

described in the Discussion section later in this order.

Jimenez sought relief in the California courts. The Los Angeles County Superior

Court denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2004 in a reasoned order. Resp. Exh.

F. The California Court of Appeal denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus in a short

but reasoned order. Resp. Exh. G. The California Supreme Court summarily denied his

petition for review. Resp. Exh. H. 

Jimenez then filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court construed

Jimenez's federal petition for writ of habeas corpus to allege two cognizable claims: (1) his

right to due process was violated because there was not sufficient evidence to support the

BPH's decision and (2) his right to due process was violated because the BPH has an antiparole bias in considering inmates for parole. Respondent filed an answer. Petitioner filed a

traverse. Upon the court's request, supplemental materials were filed regarding a subsequent

parole consideration. The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because Jimenez is in

custody and the challenged action occurred at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad. 

Soledad is in Monterey County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84,

2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not

dispute that state court remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency Of Evidence Claim

1. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support A Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process

in the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442

U.S. 1 (1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the

entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. Id. at 1128 (quoting

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Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and

assures that 'the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. at 457). The some evidence standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law

in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

A critical issue in parole denial cases concerns the BPH's use of evidence about the

murder that led to the conviction. Three Ninth Circuit cases provide the guideposts for

applying the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard on this point: Biggs v. Terhune,

334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, 461 F.3d 1123, and Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.

2007). Biggs explained that the value of the criminal offense fades over time as a predictor

of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful

balancing and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on

an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment,

runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a

due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs upheld the initial denial of a parole

release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, but cautioned that “[o]ver time . . . , should Biggs continue to demonstrate

exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because

of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his

liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916. Next came Sass, which criticized the Biggs statements

as improper and beyond the scope of the dispute before the court: "Under AEDPA it is not

our function to speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129. Sass determined that the parole board is not precluded from relying on unchanging

factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the parole applicant's preoffense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id. at 1129 (commitment offenses in

combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support denial of parole at

subsequent parole consideration hearing). Recently, Irons determined that due process was

not violated by the use of the commitment offense and pre-offense criminality to deny parole

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for a prisoner 16 years into his 17-to-life sentence. Irons emphasized that all three cases

(Irons, Sass and Biggs) in which the court had "held that a parole board's decision to deem a

prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comports with

due process, the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of

years required by his sentence." Irons, 479 F.3d at 665; see e.g., id. at 660 (inmate in 16th

actual year of his 17-to-life sentence). 

The message of these three cases is that the BPH can look at immutable events, such

as the nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to predict that the

prisoner is not currently suitable for parole even after the initial denial (Sass), but the weight

to be attributed to those immutable events should decrease over time as a predictor of future

dangerousness as the years pass and the prisoner demonstrates favorable behavior (Biggs and

Irons). Sass did not dispute the principle that, other things being equal, a murder committed

50 years ago is less probative of a prisoner's current dangerousness than one committed 10

years ago. Not only does the passage of time in prison count for something, exemplary

behavior and rehabilitation in prison count for something according to Biggs and Irons. 

Superintendent v. Hill's standard might be quite low, but it does require that the decision not

be arbitrary, and reliance on only the facts of the crime might eventually make for an

arbitrary decision.

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets

the criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to

answer the question, "'some evidence' of what?"

2. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A

first degree murder conviction yields a base term of 25 years to life and a second degree

murder conviction yields a base term of 15 years to life imprisonment. See In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 92 (2005); Cal. Penal

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Code § 190. The upshot of California's parole scheme described below is that a release date

normally must be set unless various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is substantial. 

A BPH panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in

respect to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the

Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole

release dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the

panel "shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration

for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b). 

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."1

 The

regulation also provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is

suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be

found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(a). The panel may consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of

crimes. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For example, for second degree murders, the matrix

of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years to a high of 19, 20, or 21 years,

depending on some of the facts of the crime. Some prisoners estimate their time to serve

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based only on the matrix. However, going straight to the matrix to calculate the sentence

puts the cart before the horse because it ignores critical language in the relevant statute and

regulations that requires the prisoner first to be found suitable for parole.

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's

expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71. Under state law, the matrix is not reached unless and until the

prisoner is found suitable for parole. Id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) ("[t]he

panel shall set a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). The

California Supreme Court's determination of state law in Dannenberg is binding in this

federal habeas action. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can

alone support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the 

prisoner is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements

of the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative

analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time,

to fix a date for the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he

nature of the prisoner's offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole"

but might violate due process "where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be

considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction

for that offense"). 

 3. Some Evidence Supports The BPH's Decision In Jimenez's Case

The BPH identified several factors supporting its decision to find Jimenez unsuitable

for parole, i.e., the circumstances of the murder, his criminal history, his unstable social

history, his insufficient participation in beneficial self-help programming and his inadequate

parole plans. The California Court of Appeal upheld the decision in a reasoned order,

stating that some evidence had to support the decision and found that some evidence did

support the decision: "While some factors weigh in petitioner's favor in determining

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suitability for parole, the failure to complete substance abuse programs and his inability to

show a realistic plan for release meet the 'some evidence' standard for court review of the

decision of the Board of Prison Terms." Resp. Edh. G. Because the California Court of

Appeal's decision is the last reasoned decision, that is the decision to which § 2254(d)

applies. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). 

a. Commitment Offense

The facts of the crime were described in the California Court of Appeal decision on

the criminal appeal and the probation officer's report, which a BPH commissioner read into

the record:

At about 1:00 a.m. on January 28th, 1983, Ricardo and Virginia Sanchez were

awakened by a loud banging on the door of their bedroom where they and their three

children lay sleeping. The door was broken and Mr. and Mrs. Sanchez saw two men

standing in the hallway. One of the men, later identified as [Jimenez], held a gun. He

asked for Jose and Mr. Sanchez replied that no one named Jose lived there. The

armed man asked for Jose again and again was told that there was no Jose living there. 

The two men then left the residence and Mr. Sanchez went to the kitchen and obtained

a knife. There was a knock at the front door, and Mr. Sanchez threw the knife behind

a piece of furniture in the living room. As he opened the front door, he was shot in the

abdomen. Mrs. Sanchez ran to the door and saw the man, whom she later identified

as the man with the gun, [Jimenez], running away. Mr. Sanchez died 10 minutes later

as a result of the gunshot wound. Ballistics tests confirmed that the bullet removed

from Mr. Sanchez's body was fired by a handgun belonging to Mrs. Martha Mankiller,

the grandmother of Donald Maestas . . . the person who had accompanied [Jimenez]

during the crime. Maestas resided with his grandmother and mother, Lanita . . .

Maestas in a home directly behind the Sanchez residence. [Jimenez] visited his friend

Maestas and his mother there often. . . . 

[Jimenez] explains that he had been in an argument with some guys who were drunk. 

One of the guys took a swing at him and hit Mrs. Maestas in the mouth, cutting her

lip. Then over the next month, they continued to see these guys and they were telling 

. . . defendant to get off their block. He went to the victim's residence to tell him to

stay off his back. He just wanted to scare him, did not intend to shoot anyone. When

the victim opened the front door, he lunged at [Jimenez] with a knife so he shot him.

RT 6-8; see also Resp. Exh. B. Jimenez later told his correctional counselor that his crime

was not gang-related. RT 9. Jimenez denied that he went back to the house because Maestas

had urged him to go back and finish the business. RT 30-31. 

A circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability for parole is that "the prisoner

committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner." 15 Cal. Code

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Regs. § 2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in determining whether that circumstance

exists are that there were multiple victims, "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder," "[t]he victim was abused, defiled

or mutilated during or after the offense," "[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering," and "[t]he motive for

the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(c)(1). The BPH considered a circumstance proper under California law. 

The BPH considered the circumstances of the murder and concluded that the

circumstances of it showed that Jimenez was unsuitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger if released. RT 36. The BPH stated that the motive for the

crime was inexplicable and it was "carried out in a fashion that demonstrates a lack of regard

for the life [of Sanchez] and suffering of" Sanchez's wife and three children who were in the

room when Sanchez was shot. RT 37. 

There was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the circumstances of the

commitment offense tended to show unsuitability. There was evidence that the victim was

shot while in the presence of his wife and children, after he had been woken up by Jimenez

and Maestas moments earlier. The evidence also supported the determination that the motive

was inexplicable: Sanchez was not the person Jimenez was in search of and was shot for no

apparent reason. Jimenez's characterization of the event as a "de minimus second degree

murder," Traverse, p. 14, grossly and offensively underestimates the severity of the crime,

however. While the murder in this case did not appear to be significantly worse than other

second degree murders, and therefore may not alone support the denial of parole, it was not

the sole basis for the parole denial; the BPH relied on several other factors to determine that

Jimenez was not suitable for parole. 

 b. Pre-Incarceration History

The BPH is to consider all relevant and reliable information in determining suitability

for parole. The information to be considered includes the prisoner's "past criminal history,

including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented." 15 Cal.

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Code Regs. § 2402(b). The BPH also may consider an unstable social history as tending to

show unsuitability for parole. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(3). On the other side of the

equation, circumstances tending to indicate suitability include the absence of a juvenile

record "of assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of personal

harm to victims," a stable social history, and the absence of a significant history of violent

crime. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d).

The BPH considered circumstances proper under California law in finding that

Jimenez's criminal history tended to show he was unsuitable for parole. Although he was

only 18 years old when he murdered Sanchez, Jimenez had already had numerous entries in

his criminal record. Starting when he was age 14, Jimenez had ten arrests as a juvenile for

abusing driving privileges, alcohol use and possession, crimes against property (including

grand theft, burglary and vandalism), possession of an illegal weapon, being drunk and/or on

drugs, prowling at night and violating probation. He had been placed in a juvenile camp

twice and murdered Sanchez after he had just completed a six-month stay in custody for not

complying with terms of probation. Sanchez was in custody at a juvenile facility when he

was arrested for the murder of Sanchez. See Resp. Exh. B; RT 10-11. His adult criminal

history consisted of an arrest for grand theft auto (which was not prosecuted), being a minor

in possession of alcohol (with no disposition shown) and auto theft (with no disposition

shown. RT 11. He also had four outstanding traffic warrants even though he never held a

valid driver's license. RT 11. He had been in juvenile correctional camps twice and had

been on probation – showing that he did not profit from prior attempts to correct his

criminality. See RT 11, 37. There was sufficient evidence to support the BPH's reliance on

Jimenez's prior criminality as tending to show that he was not suitable for parole.

Closely related to Jimenez's criminal activity was his unstable social history, most

notably a significant substance abuse problem. In the years before the murder, he had used

alcohol, sniffed paint and glue, and used marijuana, LSD and PCP. RT 10-12. Jimenez

stated in 1985 that he had been drinking about three cases of beer a week for the last three or

four years, that he sniffed glue and paint every 3-4 days for a year when he was 13, and had

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tried marijuana and PCP but did not like them. Resp. Exh. B, p. 10. Jimenez had dropped

out of school between the 7th and 9th grade. RT 12. (He obtained a GED once he was in

prison in 1998, however, and had even taken some college courses. RT 20.) Jimenez also

had been in a street gang before his imprisonment since about age 12 or 13. See RT 26, 29. 

Jimenez's history of substance abuse, dropping out of high school and gang membership

provided some support for the BPH's reliance on his unstable social history as tending to

show unsuitability for parole. 

The prior criminality and unstable social history might not alone support the denial of

parole, but they could be considered as part of the bigger picture when deciding whether

Jimenez was suitable for parole. "Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish

unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b).

c. In-Prison Behavior

The BPH is allowed to consider a great range of relevant and reliable information,

such as the prisoner's social history and mental state. 15 Cal. Code Regs. 2402(b). The BPH

may consider as a circumstance tending to indicate suitability for parole the prisoner's

institutional activities that "indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon

release." 15 Cal. Code § 2402(d)(9). 

The BPH found that Jimenez had insufficiently participated in beneficial self-help

programming. RT 38. The BPH identified specifically Jimenez's insufficient participation in

substance abuse prevention programs. RT 38. 

As noted in the preceding section, Jimenez had a serious substance abuse problem

before he was incarcerated. It did not end with incarceration: in 1993 -- eight years into his

sentence -- he had received a CDC-115 rule violation report for being under the influence of

a controlled substance. RT 22; Resp. Exh. D (disciplinary sheet). Jimenez had participated

in 1992 in an Alcoholics Anonymous program but did not agree with the program. He had

just started back into the AA program about a month before his parole hearing in 2003. RT

16-18. His brief foray into AA in 1992 followed by a disciplinary write-up the following

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year for being under the influence indicated that he didn't have his substance abuse problem

under any sort of control then. And he was only one month into AA – and that had been a

meeting every other Saturday morning – at the time of his 2003 hearing. See RT 16. The

psychological report for Jimenez included a psychiatric diagnosis of substance abuse in

institutional remission and antisocial personality disorder by history, and noted that a return

to substance abuse and the gang culture presented risk factors which may be precursors to

violence if Jimenez was paroled. See RT 26. Jimenez stated he had been free from gangs

and substance abuse for ten years as of the 2003 hearing. RT 28. He had not, however,

followed the recommendation at the last parole consideration hearing in 1997 to participate

in self-help, AA and/or NA, and take advantage of any therapy offered. See RT 19. The

BPH's determination that Jimenez's failure to sufficiently participate in beneficial self-help

programming and need for further participation was a proper circumstance to consider and

was well-supported in the record. 

The BPH's consideration of and reliance on Jimenez's inadequate participation in

beneficial self-help programming and need for further programming was not improper.

Section 2402(b) specifically allows the BPH to consider a great range of relevant and reliable

information, such as the prisoner's social history and mental state. 

In his traverse, Jimenez appears to protest that the state cannot force him to do a

religious-based program such as AA or NA. Traverse, p. 3. He did not assert any religious

objection to AA or NA at his parole hearing in 2003; to the contrary, he said he was

participating in AA and did not object to the 12-step program. There are alternatives to the

AA and NA programs at prison to address substance abuse problems. The BPH will not be

faulted for failing to inform Jimenez of them when he has not mentioned to the panel any

religious objection to the programs. If Jimenez does not want to participate in AA or NA on

First Amendment grounds, he has the opportunity to explore other avenues of addressing his

substance abuse problem. 

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d. Inadequate Parole Plans

The prisoner's parole plans can be considered by the BPH. Among the circumstances 

listed as tending to show suitability are the existence of realistic plans for the release or the

development of marketable skills that can be put to use upon release. See 15 Cal. Code

Regs. § 2402(d)(8). Section 2402(b) allows the BPH to consider “any other information

which bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release.”

The BPH noted that Jimenez "has no parole plans essentially. He says he'll live with

his mother in one report and with his cousin in another, and there are no letters to support

either of those choices. He also has no work or job offers." RT 38-39. The BPH did note

that he had marketable skills, however, referring to his vocational training in machine shop,

air conditioning and refrigeration, and his ongoing training in drafting. RT 38-39. Jimenez

admitted he had no current written offer for a residence or job. RT 13-15. Jimenez's attorney

stated that Jimenez had not worked on parole plans because he realized he was not going to

receive a parole date. RT 33-34. 

There was some evidence to support the BPH's reliance on the absence of adequate

parole plans. This is another factor that alone could not support the denial of parole but

could be considered as one part of the overall picture that showed Jimenez was not suitable

for parole. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

e. There Was Enough Evidence To Support The Decision 

There was some evidence to support the determination that Jimenez's commitment

offense, pre-incarceration criminality and unstable social history, inadequate self-help

programming regarding substance abuse, and inadequate parole plans made him unsuitable

for parole at the 2003 hearing. These circumstances could be considered alone as well as

cumulatively in determining parole suitability. "Circumstances which taken alone may not

firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding

of unsuitability." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b).

The weight to be attributed to the commitment offense and pre-conviction criminality

may fade over time as a predictor of current dangerousness, but the rate at which those facts

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fade as predictors slows down when the prisoner does not demonstrate rehabilitation. Here,

Jimenez's pre-incarceration criminality had substantial links to substance abuse and he had

received a disciplinary write-up for substance abuse (albeit a decade before the 2003

hearing), yet he had failed to follow the previous panel's recommendation that he participate

in some self-help programming. Jimenez's inexplicable shooting of a man he woke from his

sleep, plus his criminal history, plus his unstable social history plus his insufficient

programming in substance abuse prevention, plus his inadequate parole plans provided some

evidence to support the BPH's view that he is not suitable for parole and would present a

danger to society if released on parole even though he had already been in prison 18 actual

years since his 17-to-life sentence was imposed. 

The California Court of Appeal's decision focused on his failure to complete

substance abuse programs and his inability to show a realistic plan for release met the "some

evidence" standard. Resp. Exh. G. That court's rejection of his insufficient evidence claim

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Superintendent v. Hill some

evidence standard. He is not entitled to the writ on this claim.

B. Biased Decision-Maker Claim

Jimenez next claims that the BPH has violated his right to due process by adopting an

"anti-parole policy." Petition, p. 5. He contended that parole has been granted on "only

approximately 200 dates out of over 11,000 hearings." Id. at 5. The court understood this to

be a biased decision-maker claim. 

A "'fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' . . . This applies

to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts." Withrow v. Larkin, 421

U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (citations omitted) (combination of investigative and adjudicative

functions does not necessarily show a biased decision-maker); see also Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 480, 489 (1972) (due process requires neutral and detached decision-maker for

parole revocation hearing). 

Jimenez's claim fails. Jimenez offers no evidence in support of his assertions. He has

not shown actual bias by any of the individual commissioners on the BPH panel. Indeed, he

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and his attorney declined to object to the panel at the hearing. See RT 3-4. And his

unsupported assertion that parole was granted 200 out of 11,000 times actually contradicts

the assertion that there is a flat no-parole policy. Parole may not be the norm, but that does

not mean that no one is ever found suitable. 

Jimenez cites to a district court decision in the Eastern District of California regarding

the alleged no-parole policy of Governors Wilson and Davis. Even if one accepts as true that

those governors had a no-parole policy, Jimenez has received another parole consideration

hearing before a panel that was not composed of members appointed by either Governor

Wilson or Governor Davis. Jimenez had a subsequent parole consideration hearing on July

28, 2005, at which he was again found not suitable for parole. The panel consisted of

commissioner Margarita Perez and deputy commissioner Diane Lushbough. Perez was

appointed by Governor Schwarzenegger and Lushbough was "not a Governor-appointee." 

Supplemental Material, Remy Decl., p. 1. (Docket # 12.) Thus, even if Jimenez could prove

his allegation that his 2003 hearing was conducted under a no-parole policy in violation of

his right to due process, he has already received the remedy to which he would be entitled: a

new hearing before an unbiased board. Cf. O'Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422-23 (9th

Cir. 1990) (denying relief if a new panel at a new hearing would reach the same outcome). 

California's governorship is not a static institution that continues on one course regardless of

the inhabitant of the office. The alleged bias against parole held by Governors Wilson and

Davis cannot be attributed to Governor Schwarzenegger unless the latter does something to

adopt that alleged policy. Jimenez offers no evidence that Schwarzenegger has adopted his

predecessors' policies with regard to parole. Each Governor is entitled to separate

consideration vis-a-vis his parole policy. The writ will not issue on the biased decisionmaker claim.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied on the merits. The clerk shall close

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2007 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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1. The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the

prisoner has an unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual

offense, the prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;

and negative institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances

tending to show suitability for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social

history, signs of remorse, a stressful motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered

from battered woman's syndrome, lack of criminal history, the present age reduces the

probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or developed

marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

NOTE

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