Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00126/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00126-15/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jaziz Cea
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION TO CONTINUE AND EXCLUDE TIME UNDER 

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

ROSANNE L. RUST

CHRISTINA McCALL

Assistant United States Attorneys

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JAZIZ CEA,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-126 MCE

STIPULATED REQUEST TO CONTINUE 

HEARING AND EXCLUDE TIME PERIODS 

UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

DATE: July 9, 2020

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

This case is set for a status hearing regarding trial setting on July 9, 2020. Counsel for the 

defendant requests that the Court continue the hearing until July 23, 2020 and the government does not 

object. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California “until further notice.” Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this Court’s 

declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s 

Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district 

judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 2, 2021.

1

 This and previous General Orders, 

as well as the declarations of judicial emergency, were entered to address public health concerns related 

to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

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concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, 618, and 620 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the 

case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing 

Furlow to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public 

emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt 

proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofCase 2:19-cr-00126-TLN-CKD Document 116 Filed 07/07/20 Page 2 of 5
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justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).2 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status hearing regarding trial setting. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(noting any pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 9, 2020. ECF No. 111.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 23, 

2020, and to exclude time between July 9, 2020, and July 23, 2020, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), 

B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes thousands of pages of documents, including documents subject to the Protective Order, 

electronically imaged devices, and video and audio files. The discovery also includes child sex 

abuse images and videos stored at the FBI, which have been made available for defense 

inspection and review. All of the discovery in this case has been either produced directly to 

counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to prepare for trial, including 

considering the filing of additional motions. Further, defense counsel also has personal or 

familial obligations, including a scheduled vacation, that impacts his availability between July 9, 

2020, and July 23, 2020. 

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence, and it would deny the defendant continuity of counsel.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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declarations of judicial emergency, and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an 

ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in this case because:

• The trial involves witnesses with high-risk factors, such as age, medical conditions, 

etc. The government’s mental health expert witness is over the age of 60, placing 

him at higher risk of serious complications if he were to contract the coronavirus 

causing COVID-19, and the expert witness would need to observe the defendant’s 

testimony and the defense expert’s testimony in person to testify in rebuttal. 

• Three of the witnesses will need to travel from Southern California and one witness 

will need to travel from Texas.

• The trial in this case cannot be conducted by videoconferencing (or telephone 

conferencing if videoconferencing is not reasonably available) pursuant to General 

Order 614 (CARES Act). 

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 9, 2020 to July 23, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

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Dated: July 7, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ ROSANNE L. RUST

ROSANNE L. RUST

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: July 7, 2020 /s/ DOUG BEEVERS

DOUG BEEVERS

Counsel for Defendant 

JAZIZ CEA

ORDER

The Court has read and considered the parties’ Stipulation to Continue Hearing and Exclude 

Time Periods Under Speedy Trial Act. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, plus the continuing 

outbreak of the novel coronavirus known as COVID-19 (and related General Orders of this Court and 

guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and state and local health officials), 

collectively demonstrate facts that provide good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the 

Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

The Court further finds that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best 

interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; and (ii) failure to grant the continuance would 

result in a miscarriage of justice, given continuity of defense counsel, the continuing outbreak of the 

novel coronavirus in the Eastern District of California and beyond, and the necessary steps being taken 

to avoid further transmission of the virus. Time is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act between July 9, 

2020 and July 23, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 7, 2020

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