Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-mc-80350/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-mc-80350-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dorothy Coan
Defendant
Shelby Hansen
Defendant
Union Bank of California 401(k) Plan
Plaintiff

Document Text:

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re:

DOROTHY COAN

Subpoena Enforcement Matter

UNION BANK OF CALIFORNIA 401(K)

PLAN,

Interpleader Plaintiff,

 v.

SHELBY HANSEN and DOROTHY COAN,

Interpleader Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-80350 MISC SI

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

COMPEL

On January 12, 2007, the Court heard argument on interpleader defendant Dorothy Coan’s

motion to compel compliance with five subpoenas and one subpoena duces tecum. Having considered

the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby

GRANTS Coan’s motion to compel.

BACKGROUND

Decedent Frank Coan, the son of interpleader defendant and movant Dorothy Coan (“Coan”),

was a participant in the Union Bank of California 401(k) Plan (“Plan”). The value of Frank Coan’s Plan

account (the “Fund”) is currently $623,813.96, and is to be distributed to his beneficiary. Upon his

death, the Plan’s administrative committee determined that the Fund should be paid to interpleader

defendant Shelby Hansen, Frank Coan’s ex-wife, based on a beneficiary designation that Frank Coan

allegedly made in 1968. After the Plan’s determination, Coan made a claim to the Plan for the Fund,

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 1 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1Since that May ruling, no party to date has sought a ruling from Judge Fenner on the standard

of review to be applied or on the admissibility of evidence outside the administrative record. 

2

asserting that she was the proper beneficiary. The Plan denied Coan’s claim and her appeal. The Plan

then initiated an interpleader action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri,

naming Coan and Hansen as interpleader defendants. 

Subsequently, the Plan filed a motion with Judge Gary Fenner, the district judge presiding over

the Missouri action, seeking to be discharged from the action. In May, 2006, Judge Fenner granted the

motion, holding that “[b]ecause the Plan is a neutral stakeholder asserting no claim to the disputed funds,

it is entitled to be discharged from this action.” Smith Decl., Ex. C at 4. In opposing the Plan’s motion,

Coan argued “that the Plan is not entitled to a full discharge because it has discoverable information

needed by Coan to properly litigate her claims.” Id. at 3. The court rejected her argument, holding that

“Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 provides a comprehensive process for obtaining discovery from third parties to a

lawsuit. To the extent that further discovery is available to Coan, it would be available whether or not

the Plan is discharged from the instant suit.” Id. at 3-4. The court also stated in a footnote: “The Plan

argues that, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (‘ERISA’), Coan is not

entitled to further discovery. [] However, the Court need not resolve this issue in the instant Motion.”

Id. at n.2.1

On October 24, 2006, Coan served six notices for deposition, on the Plan and five of its

employees(collectively, the “Subpoenaed Third Parties”). On October 25, 2006, Coan served subpoenas

on each of the six at their place of business in San Francisco. The subpoena served on the Plan

commanded both appearance at a deposition and production of documents, see Smith Decl., Ex. E; the

other five subpoenas only commanded appearance at depositions, see id., Exs. F-J. The subpoenas were

issued from this Court, and the depositions were scheduled for November 6 and 7, 2006. 

On October 31, 2006, the Subpoenaed Third Parties served a written objection to all six of the

subpoenas, Smith Decl., Ex. K, and subsequently refused to comply with the subpoenas. The

Subpoenaed Third Parties objected to the subpoenas primarily on the ground that such discovery was

not permissible under ERISA, which they argue governs the underlying dispute. See id. 

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 2 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2The Court GRANTS the Third Parties’ motion for administrative relief seeking leave to file

surreply papers. (Docket No. 13) The Court also GRANTS Coan’s request to take judicial notice of the

documents filed in, and issued by, the Missouri district court in the underlying case. Smith Decl., Exs

A-J.

3

The parties subsequently met and conferred, and on December 7, 2006, Coan filed the instant

motion seeking to compel compliance with the subpoenas, and for sanctions.2

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(1)(c), any party may serve a subpoena commanding

a nonparty "to attend and give testimony or to produce and permit inspection and copying of"

documents. The subpoena is subject to the relevance requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).

See The Rutter Group, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial 11-831 (1996). Thus, the subpoena may

command the production of documents which are "not privileged" and are "relevant to the subject

matter" or "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." See Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(1). 

Under Rule 45, a person commanded to produce documents may serve a written objection to the

subpoena. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B). After a written objection has been made, the party serving

the subpoena may not have access to the requested documents absent a court order, but may at any time

move for an order to compel document production. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (any party may

upon "reasonable notice" request an order compelling discovery or disclosure).

While a nonparty may challenge a subpoena duces tecum via written objection, a deposition

subpoena may only be challenged by moving to quash or modify the subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3)(A), or by moving for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c). See 9-45

Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 45.30 (2006) (“The written objection procedure is available only for

a subpoena commanding production or inspection . . . .”). A motion to quash or modify “must be made

promptly,” allowing it to “be heard and granted before the scheduled deposition.” See The Rutter

Group, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial 11:2288 (2006) (emphasis in original). Under Northern

District Local Rule 37-2, a party moving to compel discovery must "detail the basis for the party's

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 3 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3As a preliminary matter, the Subpoenaed Third Parties’ failure to appear for the noticed

depositions is not excused merely by having served a written objection to the subpoenas. As discussed

above, according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a written objection may excuse compliance

with a subpoena duces tecum; it does not, however, excuse compliance with a deposition subpoena. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B). Objections to a deposition subpoena must be voiced either by moving to

quash or modify the subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3)(A), or by moving

for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c). 

Here, the Subpoenaed Third Parties did not move to quash or modify the subpoenas, nor did they

move for a protective order. They merely issued a written objection to the subpoenas, then refused to

show up for the depositions. Their actions thus violated the Federal Rules. The only sanctions available

for such a failure to comply with a subpoena are a contempt order, or attorneys’ fees and costs associated

with bringing a motion to compel compliance. See The Rutter Group 11:2460. Coan does not seek a

contempt order; attorneys’ fees are discussed below. 

4

contention that it is entitled to the requested discovery and show how the proportionality and other

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) are satisfied." See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (requiring that

when determining the appropriateness of discovery requests courts should consider whether the

discovery is duplicative or overly burdensome and whether the burden and expense of discovery

outweighs the benefit). The court has discretion to determine whether to grant a motion to compel. See

Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987). 

DISCUSSION

The Subpoenaed Third Parties argue that the information sought is, as a matter of law, irrelevant

to the proceedings in the Missouri district court, and therefore is not discoverable under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). The Court cannot agree.3

The Subpoenaed Third Parties argue that the Plan at issue here is governed by ERISA, and that

under ERISA, the Missouri court will review the Plan’s determination only for abuse of discretion.

“When [an ERISA] plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine

eligibility for benefits, that determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Gatti v. Reliance

Standard Life Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2005). Where the court determines “that the

Administrative Committee did not have such discretion under [an ERISA plan],” the court

“determine[s], de novo, the proper beneficiary.” Bankamerica Pension Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821,

827 (9th Cir. 2000). This standard of review holds true in interpleader actions, where the plan is no

longer a party. See, e.g., id. According to the Subpoenaed Third Parties, the Plan at issue here gave the

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 4 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

administrative committee complete discretion to determine the beneficiaries of the Fund, and the

Missouri district court is therefore tasked with reviewing the Plan’s decision to award the Fund to

Hansen only for abuse of discretion.

The Third Parties argue that, consequently, theMissouri court will only review the administrative

record. In both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, “[w]hen reviewing a denial of benefits by an administrator

who has discretion under an ERISA-regulated plan, a reviewing court must focus on the evidence

available to the plan administrators at the time of their decision and may not admit new evidence or

consider post hoc rationales.” King v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 998-99 (8th

Cir. 2004) (quoting case);see McKenzie v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 41 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1994) (a

district court conducting a review of an ERISA plan’s findings for abuse of discretion, “may review only

evidence which was presented to the plan trustees or administrator.”). According to the Subpoenaed

Third Parties, the Missouri district court is thus limited to reviewing the administrative record. Coan,

according to the Subpoenaed Third Parties, has already been provided with the complete administrative

record; any additional discovery is therefore unnecessary and would only produce evidence irrelevant

to the Missouri district court’s limited inquiry. 

However, the Subpoenaed Third Parties’argument assumes determinations of fact and law which

have not been made, and which this Court cannot make. First, the Subpoenaed Third Parties assume that

the Missouri district court will apply ERISA law in analyzing this dispute. As far as this Court can

determine, the Missouri district court has as yet reached no such conclusion. Coan contends here that

ERISA may not apply, as many of the documents and events at issue in the underlying dispute arose

prior to the inception of ERISA. According to Coan, pre-ERISA California law and federal common

law may therefore apply to some aspects of the dispute. In the interest of judicial economy and

consistency, it would be inappropriate for this Court to determine whether ERISA governs the dispute

pending in Missouri. 

Second, even if ERISA applies, the Subpoenaed Third Parties presume that the Missouri district

court will find that the Plan at issue here gave the administrative committee complete discretion to

determine the beneficiaries of the Fund, and that the Missouri district court is therefore tasked with

reviewing the Plan’s decision only for abuse of discretion. Again, the Missouri district court has yet to

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 5 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

make any such determination, and it would be inappropriate for this Court to do so. Determination of

the level of discretion a plan gives an administrative committee requires a fairly comprehensive review

of the plan documents, and is often subject to dispute. In Bankamerica Pension Plan v. McMath, 206

F.3d 821, 827-28 (9th Cir. 2000), for example, the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s

determination that the plan at issue there gave discretion to the administrative committee. Furthermore,

even if a plan at issue gives complete discretion to the administrative committee, if the administrative

committee “utterly fails to follow applicable procedures,” or has a demonstrated conflict of interest, then

de novo review will apply. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 2006).

Coan argues that the Abatie rule would apply in this case. Only the Missouri district court can resolve

this issue and determine the standard of review it will apply to the underlying dispute over the Fund; it

would be inappropriate for this Court to make this very important determination or speculate as to the

Missouri court’s ultimate holding. 

Finally, even if the Missouri district court were to determine that it should only review the Plan’s

decision for abuse of discretion, there remains a dispute over whether the discovery at issue here might

lead to evidence which the Missouri court would consider relevant. As discussed, in such a situation,

the “reviewing court must focus on the evidence available to the plan administrators at the time of their

decision and may not admit new evidence or consider post hoc rationales.” King, 414 F.3d at 998-99

(quoting case); see also McKenzie, 41 F.3d at 1316 (a district court conducting a review of an ERISA

plan’s findings for abuse of discretion, “may review only evidence which was presented to the plan

trustees or administrator.”). The Subpoenaed Third Parties contend that they have “disclosed and

delivered to both interpleader defendants the entire Administrative Record reviewed by the Plan in

making its beneficiary determination.” Opp. at 9:13-15 (citing Sheppard Decl. ¶ 7). The Missouri court,

they argue, will be limited to reviewing the same “Administrative Record,” and therefore no additional

discovery is necessary. 

There is a dispute, however, over whether the “Administrative Record” produced in fact contains

all of the “evidence available to the plan.” Coan points out, for example, that the Plan’s denial of Coan’s

appeal relied in part on the fact that “the beneficiary designation Mr. Coan completed and submitted was

properly distributed pursuant to the terms of a predecessor to the Plan . . . .” Macey Decl., Ex. 6 at 6

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 6 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4The Court notes that the Subpoenaed Third Parties refused to meet and confer with regard to

these objections. According to their own Opposition, “counsel for the Third Parties did not think it

productive at that time to discuss ways to limit the scope of Coan’s discovery requests based on the

7

(emphasis added). According to Coan, however, the “Administrative Record” does not contain any of

the Plan predecessor documents. If such documents were in fact considered by the Plan in making its

determination, such documents would be considered by the Missouri district court, even if it should only

conduct a limited, abuse of discretion review. See King, 414 F.3d at 998-99; McKenzie, 41 F.3d at 1316.

The subpoena duces tecum at issue here seeks, among other documents, those predecessor documents.

Thus, even if the Missouri court conducts only a limited review under ERISA, the discovery sought here

may lead to relevant evidence that has not already been produced. 

In sum, production of the “Administrative Record” does not necessarily obviate the need for

additional discovery. The Missouri district court may ultimately conduct a de novo review of the Plan’s

beneficiary determination, in which case the court would not be limited to evidence already produced.

Furthermore, even if the Missouri court reviews the Plan’s decision only for abuse of discretion, the

subpoenas at issue may lead to discovery of relevant evidence that was not produced with the

“Administrative Record.” 

In order to avoid the need for the parties to return to this distant location again at a later date, this

Court will assume, only for purposes of the instant dispute, that the Missouri court will conduct a de

novo review of the Plan’s determination such that discovery beyond the administrative record would be

appropriate, and on that basis will order that the discovery sought go forward. The Court will, however,

STAY this order until January 26, 2007, to allow the Third Parties the opportunity, should they so desire,

to seek guidance from the Missouri court concerning its view of the scope of allowable discovery. (This

stay is of such limited duration because of the impending February 16, 2006 discovery cutoff.) This

Court will, of course, cooperate with any such guidance. 

Apart from the ERISA discovery limitation argument rejected above, the Subpoenaed Third

Parties also argue that (1) the document requests in the subpoena on the Bank are overbroad and unduly

burdensome; (2) the subpoenas seek information that is “potentially privileged”; and (3) that the time,

date and location of the depositions were unreasonable and unduly burdensome.4 With respect to their

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 7 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

additional objections because the Third Parties intended to stand on their ERISA-based objections

regardless of any resolution with Coan of their other objections.” Opp. at 14:8-12. The Third Parties

now request the opportunity to “meet and confer further with counsel for Coan to resolve their other

objections to the Subpoenas should this Court ultimately determine on this motion that additional

discovery should take place.” Id. at 14:12-15.

The Court will not grant such an opportunity. The Third Parties should have met and conferred

with respect to all of their objections – not just their favored objection – when they had the chance. As

the Third Parties are undoubtedly aware, this dispute has already forced the Missouri court to twice

extend the discovery deadline. Allowing piecemeal resolution of this dispute will only cause further

delay. 

8

first objection, the Subpoenaed Third Parties have not made any substantive objections to specific

discovery requests. A party objecting to discovery requests must state specific facts in support of the

objection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b). The Subpoenaed Third Parties did not identify how each discovery

request is overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive; they merely provided one general objection to all

six subpoenas. See Smith Decl., Ex. K at 3 (“The Subpoenas, including the document requests contained

in the subpoena to the Plan, are overly broad and unduly burdensome.”). In their Opposition, the Third

Parties now provide a substantive objection to one of the specific discovery requests, Document Request

number 21, as an “illustration” of the problems with all of the requests. 

Though it need not do so, considering the Third Parties’ failure to provide a specific objection

in the first instance, and their failure to adequately meet and confer, the Court will consider their

objection to Document Request number 21. Number 21 seeks “[e]ach document relating to the Union

Bank Profit Sharing Retirement Plan.” Smith Decl., Ex. E. The Third Parties argue that this request is

overbroad, as it would include all documents “pertaining to every past or present beneficiary of that plan

and, conceivably, its successor plans.” Opp. at 14:26-28. The Court agrees. Document Request number

21 shall therefore be limited, as counsel for Coan suggested at the hearing, to those documents

comprising the Union Bank Profit Sharing Retirement Plan.

With respect to the Third Parties’ privilege objection, where discovery requests are objected to

because they seek privileged information, the objecting party must submit, with its objections, a

privilege log identifying the nature ofthe document, and may submit affidavits regarding the document’s

confidential nature. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2). The Third Parties failed to do so, and instead only

stated, generally, that the subpoenas “potentially call for information protected by the attorney client

privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, the trade secret privilege and/or the rights of privacy of

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 8 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

persons or entities other than the litigants or decedent in this litigation.” Smith Decl., Ex. K at 3. This

general assertion of privilege is insufficient. This ruling does not, however, preclude the Third Parties

from raising any privilege-related objections in the course of complying with the subpoenas, including

during the depositions.

As to the Third Parties’ final objection, the Court again notes that the Third Parties failed to

provide meaningful objections to any specific subpoena. The Third Parties merely objected that the

“times, dates and locations set for the noticed depositions and production of documents are unreasonable

and unduly burdensome.” Id. In their Opposition, the Third Parties now provide a single specific

objection, claiming that the subpoena served on Paulette Leahy for a deposition in San Francisco violates

the distance limitation of Rule 45(b) because she resides and works in San Diego. Again, though the

Court need not do so, it will consider this specific objection. Pursuant to Rule 45(e), referencing Rule

45(c)(3)(A)(ii), adequate cause to not comply with a deposition subpoena exists where the subpoena

“requires a person . . . to travel to a place more than 100 miles from the place where that person resides,

is employed or regularly transacts business in person . . . .” The Third Parties have failed to present

evidence that Ms. Leahy does not “regularly transact[] business in person” in or near San Francisco.

Unless and until the Third Parties present such evidence, via declaration or otherwise, Ms. Leahy is not

excused from complying with the subpoena. 

Finally, both parties seek attorneys’ fees and costs associated with bringing or defending this

motion. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a motion to compel is granted, the court shall

require the party whose conduct necessitated the motion to pay the moving party the reasonable expenses

incurred in making the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, unless it finds the opposition was

“substantially justified” or other circumstances make such award “unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A).

As discussed above, see supra note 3, the proper procedure by which the Third Parties should have

challenged the subpoenas was either a motion to quash or modify pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 45(c)(3)(A), or a motion for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c). Simply submitting a

written objection to the subpoenas did not excuse their appearance at the noticed depositions.

Consequently, Coan was forced to bring the instant motion to compel. Bringing a motion normally

requires filing two sets of papers – the motion and a reply; opposing a motion normally requires filing

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 9 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

only one set. The Court therefore GRANTS Coan’s request for sanctions, in an amount roughly

equivalent to the additional expense of filing two sets of papers rather than one, in this case, $3,000.00.

See Westheimer Decl. ¶ 5; Supp. Westheimer Decl. ¶ 3; Smith Decl. ¶ 16. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS interpleader

defendant Dorothy Coan’s motion to compel compliance with the six subpoenas and for sanctions (with

the limitation of the scope of Document Request number 21 discussed above). The Court also GRANTS

Coan’s request for sanctions, in the amount of $3,000.00. The Court STAYS this order for a period of

two weeks, until January 26, 2007. (Docket No. 1)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-mc-80350-SI Document 19 Filed 01/12/07 Page 10 of 10