Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-05905/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-05905-31/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
Defendant
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
Defendant
John Mannick
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN MANNICK,

Plaintiff, No. C 03-5905 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING RELIEF 

FROM JUDGMENT

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, 

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Before the court is the motion of defendants Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and

Kaiser Foundation Hospitals for relief from judgment based on clerical error, under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). In the alternative, they seek relief from judgment under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Having read the parties’ papers and carefully

considered their arguments, and the relevant legal authorities, and good cause appearing,

the court hereby GRANTS the motion.

Plaintiff John Mannick filed this action on December 31, 2003, alleging denial of

access to public accommodations, in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and

California law. He sought injunctive relief and damages. Following a series of settlement

conferences, the parties agreed in July 2005 to settle the injunctive relief portion of the

case. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted the parties’ signed settlement and proposed consent

decree to the court, and the consent decree was signed and entered on September 20,

2005. 

Case 4:03-cv-05905-PJH Document 366 Filed 09/21/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Attachment A to the consent decree set forth the scope of and timing of the agreed

injunctive relief. Defendants subsequently discovered that the version of Attachment A that

was appended to the consent decree was not the version that the parties had agreed upon. 

Defendants now seek an order substituting the agree-upon version for the as-filed version. 

They contend that this relief is warranted under either Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b)(6). 

The court finds that relief is warranted under either rule. Rule 60(a) provides that clerical

mistakes in judgments may be corrected by the court at any time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). 

Plaintiff contends that this rule is inapplicable because it applies only to clerical errors by

the clerk or the court. 

While the court was able to locate no Ninth Circuit authority holding that Rule 60(a)

is or is not limited as plaintiff argues, it does appear that other circuits have applied the rule

to clerical errors by parties. See Matter of West Texas Marketing Corp., 12 F.3d 497, 503-

04 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Warner v. Bay St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1976)

(mistakes correctable by Rule 60(a) are “not necessarily made by the clerk”); Pattiz v.

Schwartz, 386 F.2d 300, 303 (8th Cir. 1968) (mistakes by parties correctable by Rule

60(a)).

Here, the court finds that the consent decree entered by the court was not the

settlement agreed to by the parties, because the attachment setting forth the agreed

injunctive relief did not accurately reflect the settlement. The inclusion of the incorrect

version of Attachment A appears to have been a clerical error on the part of plaintiff’s

counsel. Thus, modifying the consent decree by substituting the correct version of

Attachment A is warranted, in order to correct that clerical error.

Rule 60(b)(6) provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment or

order for “any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b)(6). While Rule 60(b)(6) should be liberally applied to accomplish justice, it

also should be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from

taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment. Accordingly, a party who

moves for such relief “must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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that prevented him from proceeding with . . . the action in a proper fashion.” In re

International Fibercom, Inc., __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2610892, *5 (9th Cir., Sept. 12, 2007)

(citations and quotations omitted).

 Defendants have demonstrated both injury and circumstances beyond their control

that prevented them from seeking relief more quickly. The injury lies in the fact that one (of

several) bases for finding defendants in contempt of court for failing to meet certain

deadlines in the consent decree was that defendants failed to complete the access ramp in

the patient discharge area within nine months of entry of the consent decree, as required

by the as-filed version of Attachment A. However, the as-agreed version of Attachment A

allowed defendants six months beyond the date of approval of the construction documents

by OSHPD (or nine months from entry of the consent decree if no OSHPD approval was

required). As OSHPD approval was required, defendants should not have been found in

contempt for failing to complete the work within nine months after the entry of the consent

decree.

Defendants have also shown circumstances beyond their control that prevented

them from seeking relief more quickly. At the time the terms of the consent decree were

negotiated, defendants were represented by the law firm of Thelen Reid and Priest LLP. 

Shortly after entry of the consent decree, defendants added new counsel, the law firm of

Nixon Peabody LLP, and the Thelen firm filed a notice of withdrawal of representation. 

Four months later, defendants filed a notice of substitution of counsel, substituting the law

firm of Seyfarth Shaw LLP for Nixon Peabody. Based on these changes in representation,

the Seyfarth firm was unaware that the incorrect version of Attachment A had been

included with the proposed consent decree when it was submitted to the court. 

Plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied because defendants waited two

months after discovering the error. However, the evidence submitted by defendants shows

that once the Seyfarth attorneys became aware of the error, they attempted to obtain the

agreement of plaintiff’s counsel to modifying the consent decree. Despite the fact that the

Seyfarth attorneys made clear to plaintiff’s counsel that they did not intend for the

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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modification to alter in any way their obligations under the consent decree, plaintiff’s

counsel refused to agree to the modification, necessitating the filing of the present motion.

The court finds that defendants have established good cause for the delay in seeking relief.

In accordance with the foregoing, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion. A

“revised” version of the consent decree, incorporating the as-agreed version of Attachment

A, shall be submitted (not e-filed) for the court’s approval no later than September 26,

2007. 

The hearing on the motion, previously set for Wednesday, September 26, 2007, is

VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:03-cv-05905-PJH Document 366 Filed 09/21/07 Page 4 of 4