Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03160/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03160-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Burlington Northern Railroad Company
Appellee
Robert E. Hatfield
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT E. HATFIELD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED Ualted 8..,_ COIII1 ~Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 2 9 1995 

PATRICK FISHER - Clerk 

No. 94-3160 

v. 

BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD 

COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 89-1529-PFK) 

Timothy J. King of Speth, King & Riedmiller, Wichita, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Phillip R. Fields, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, District 

Judge.* 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

This is an interlocutory appeal of a decision by the United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas granting partial 

summary judgment to the Defendant railroad, based on federal preemption of the railroad's duty to provide safe road crossings under Kansas common law. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1292(b) and affirm the decision of the district court. 

* The Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Senior United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3160 Document: 01019279651 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 1 
I. BACKGROUND 

On September 29, 1987, a truck driven by Plaintiff Robert E. 

Hatfield ("Hatfield"), collided with Defendant Burlington Northern 

Railroad's ("Burlington") train at the Haverhill Road crossing in 

Butler County, Kansas. Hatfield brought this action against Burlington alleging, inter alia, that Burlington was negligent in 

failing to install active warning devices at the crossing. Burlington contended that Hatfield's state law negligence claim based 

on a failure to provide active warning devices was preempted by 

the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C. § 434, and by 

regulations promulgated thereunder in the Manual on Uniform Traffie Control Devices for Streets and Highways ("MUTCD"), 23 C.F.R. 

§ 655.601 et seg. 

The relevant chronological events .were as follows: 

5/1/72 

7/23/81 

2/84 

1/8/85 

5/1/85 

9/29/87 

Kansas Department of Transportation ("KDOT") first inventoried the Haverhill Road crossing; 

KDOT conducted an on-site inspection of the crossing, 

but did not recommend any improvements; 

KDOT updated its information on the crossing and placed 

it on the improvement list for fiscal year 1985; 

Federal Highway Administration ("FHA") authorized preliminary engineering on the Haverhill Road crossing 

project, including the complete design and drawing of 

plans for the installation of active traffic control 

devices, and further advised that up to $1,800 (or 90% 

of the estimated preliminary engineering costs) had been 

obligated for such preliminary engineering; 

KDOT conducted an on-site inspection of the crossing, 

including preliminary engineering (at a federally reimbursable cost of $619.17), and, as a result of that inspection, scheduled the crossing for improvements; 

Accident occurred; 

-2-

Appellate Case: 94-3160 Document: 01019279651 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 2 
12/11/87 Butler County officials sent a letter to KDOT agreeing 

to participate in the installation of signals at the 

crossing; 

12/28/87 KDOT approved a project to install signals at the crossing, and supplied the railroad with copies of an agreement and plans to install such signals; 

3/2/88 Funds were obligated by the federal government; 

3/11/88 KDOT authorized Burlington to order the materials necessary for the signals--but cautioned against installation until agreements were complete; 

3/14/88 Funds were approved by the Federal Highway Administration; 

3/21/88 KDOT authorized Burlington to begin work on installation 

of the signals at the crossing; 

3/22/89 KDOT issued a notice of acceptance of the improvement; 

3/91 Final federal payment for project of $31,169 was made, 

including preliminary engineering ($619.17), construction engineering ($611.15), and construction 

($29,938.68). 

In Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 757 F. Supp. 1198 (D. 

Kan. 1991) ("Hatfield I"), the district court acknowledged that 

the FRSA could preempt state negligence law, id. at 1201, but held 

that federal preemption would not occur on a project until there 

was an agreement as to the "type of warning device to be installed" as a federally reimbursable crossing improvement, id. at 

1207-08. The district court held that such an agreement did not 

occur until, at the earliest, December 28, 1987, when the KDOT 

formally approved the project. Id. Thus, Hatfield's negligence 

claim, based on the events of September 29, 1987, was held not to 

be preempted by the FRSA. Id. Burlington appealed that decision 

as an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

-3-

Appellate Case: 94-3160 Document: 01019279651 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 3 
In Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 958 F.2d 320 (lOth 

Cir. 1992) ("Hatfield II"), we reversed the district court, holding that preemption was not to be applied selectively on a case by 

case basis, but instead absolved all railroads of complying with 

duties imposed by state law as to safety devices at crossings as 

of the adoption of the MUTCD in 1983. Hatfield petitioned for 

certiorari, and the Court retained the case to be considered in 

conjunction with another case pending before the Supreme Court, 

CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood. 

In CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993), 

the Supreme Court held that the promulgation of the MUTCD, by itself, did not give rise to preemption. Id. at 1739-40. Instead, 

the Court held that preemption is predicated on 23 C.F.R. 

§§ 646.214(b) (3) and (4), and is based on participation of federal 

resources in the installation of the warning devices. Id. at 

1740-41. The Court then vacated our decision in Hatfield II, and 

remanded the case for further consideration in view of its decision in Easterwood. Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 113 S. 

Ct. 1940 ( 1993) ("Hatfield III") . 

On remand, in Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 1 F.3d 1071 

(lOth Cir. 1993) ("Hatfield IV"), we applied the Supreme Court's 

decision to the case before us and held that once a crossing becomes a project for federally reimbursable improvement and federal 

resources "significantly" participate in the project, then, as of 

that moment, state negligence law is preempted regarding the issue 

of the safety of the crossing control devices. Id. at 1072. We 

held that significant federal participation did not necessarily 

-4-

Appellate Case: 94-3160 Document: 01019279651 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 4 
require the expenditure of money, but could also involve the expenditure of other federal resources such as time and expertise. 

Id. Because we found that a factual question remained as to 

whether and when the federal government participated significantly 

in the Haverhill Road crossing project, we remanded the case to 

the district court for this specific determination. Id. at 1072-

73. 

The district court reviewed the factual evidence submitted by 

the parties and granted summary judgment to Burlington, finding 

preemption as of January 8, 1985, when the federal government 

committed up to $1,800 in engineering assistance for preliminary 

engineering for the project. Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 

84 8 F. Supp. 158, 158-59 (D. Kan. 1994) ("Hatfield V") . Because 

this predated the accident, Hatfield's state negligence claim was 

held to have been preempted by federal law. Id. Hatfield 

appealed, and the case is before us again on an interlocutory 

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

II. DISCUSSION 

The narrow issue before us in this case is whether the district court properly applied the substantive law of Easterwood and 

Hatfield IV in deciding that there was significant federal participation in the installation of active warning devices at the 

Haverhill Road crossing prior to Hatfield's accident so as to 

preempt Burlington's common law duty to Hatfield to maintain the 

crossing. It is undisputed that federal funds were committed to 

preliminary engineering and that this engineering was completed 

prior to Hatfield's accident. It is also undisputed that federal 

-5-

Appellate Case: 94-3160 Document: 01019279651 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 5 
funds were not committed to actual construction of the warning 

devices until after the accident. Thus, the question is whether 

the commitment of federal resources for, and completion of, preliminary engineering constitutes significant federal participation 

so as to bring about preemption of state law.l 

In Hatfield IV, we stated that "significant" federal participation requires "more than a casual financial connection" between the federal government and the project. 1 F.3d at 1072. 

However, we also made it clear that federal financial participation may include utilization of non-cash resources, such as federally funded personnel resources, and that federal participation 

may occur at any point in the project, including the planning 

stage. Id. Thus, we must look at the Haverhill Road crossing 

project broadly--from its planning inception to its construction 

completion--in determining when significant federal participation 

first occurred. 

In early 1985, after the FHA authorized $1,800 for preliminary engineering, KDOT conducted an on-site inspection, including 

preliminary engineering, at a cost of $619.17 in federal funds, 

1 We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. 

AT&T, 22 F.3d 1527, 1529 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 655 

(1994); Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., 

Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth Cir. 1990). "Summary judgment is 

appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.'" Universal, 22 F.3d at 1529 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c)). If there is no genuine issue of material fact in 

dispute, then we next determine if the district court correctly 

applied the substantive law. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 94-3160 Document: 01019279651 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 6 
and scheduled the crossing for installation of federally funded 

active warning devices. This process involved federal personnel 

resources and the selection of federally mandated active warning 

devices pursuant to 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b) (3). All of these 

events occurred prior to Hatfield's accident. 

Hatfield argues that $619.17 is not significant when compared 

with the overall cost of the project, $31,169. However, we do not 

believe that proportionality to overall costs is the sole touchstone in determining the significance of a federal financial commitment. Instead, we believe that the financial commitment must 

be such that it shows a clear federal intent to require a federally approved warning device at the crossing in question, backed 

up by the actual expenditure of federal resources of more than a 

casual or de minimis nature, and specifically directed toward the 

ultimate installation of the improved warning devices at that 

crossing. The government participation was significant by that 

standard. The expenditure of $619.19 in government funds is more 

than de minimis or insignificant. Furthermore, the government 

made a clear commitment to a project to upgrade this particular 

crossing with a federally approved crossing device--a project to 

which Burlington was expressly excused from contributing funds. 

See 23 C.F.R. § 646.210(b) (1); Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1741. 

At that point in time--when the government committed to preliminary engineering--both the financing of the improvement 

project and its direction and control were removed from Burlington. The federal government had expended significant resources 

-7-

Appellate Case: 94-3160 Document: 01019279651 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 7 
and control of the project had passed to state or local authorities. Therefore, this seems to be the appropriate moment to declare that railroad liability under state law for the adequacy of 

the traffic control devices at the crossing should be preempted. 

Hatfield argues that Easterwood impliedly held that preliminary engineering does not trigger preemption because the FRSA 

funded project in Easterwood was arguably further along than the 

one before us. In Easterwood, the federal government had set 

aside funds for actual construction of the project, but later reallocated the funds to another project because the city failed to 

perform needed alterations to the roadway involved. Easterwood, 

113 S. Ct. at 1741-42. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that 

the railroad's duty was not preempted because the project was 

terminated, and the planned active warning devices were never 

actually installed. Id. In Easterwood, the government expended 

funds at the intersection in question for motion detector devices; 

however, this equipment was installed as part of the improvement 

of an adjacent intersection, and the federal expenditure was 

attributed to that adjacent intersection. Even though the motion 

detectors could have been used by crossing devices at either 

intersection, they were not installed as part of a project to 

improve the intersection in question. Thus, in Easterwood, there 

were no federal funds expended explicitly for the crossing in 

question, either for planning or installation. Thus, Easterwood 

is simply a case where no expenditure of federal resources had 

ever occurred on the crossing in question and, hence, preemption 

never occurred. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 94-3160 Document: 01019279651 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 8 
• 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that FRSA preemption 

takes place when the federal government (1) commits itself, 

through a significant event or events, to a project to install 

active warning devices, and (2) expends significant federal resources on such a project. In the case of the Haverhill Road 

crossing, the federal government committed itself to the installation of active warning devices through the authorization of 

preliminary engineering and the subsequent selection of active 

warning devices for the crossing. We believe these events were 

sufficiently significant to constitute a federal commitment to 

install active warning devices at the crossing. The federal government expended $619.17, as well as federal personnel resources 

on the project. We believe this constitutes significant federal 

resources. The project was ultimately completed with the installation of active warning devices at the Haverhill Road Crossing. 

Accordingly, we hold that Burlington's common law duty to Hatfield 

to maintain the Haverhill Road crossing was preempted by the FRSA 

at the time of the accident in question. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the decision of the district court dismissing 

Hatfield's common law tort claim against Burlington, for failure 

to provide a safe crossing, as preempted by the FRSA. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 94-3160 Document: 01019279651 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 9