Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-06598/USCOURTS-ca4-07-06598-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Bustos
Appellee
Henry Dargan McMaster
Appellant
William White
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOSE BUSTOS, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM WHITE, Warden of Broad  No. 07-6598

River Correctional Institution;

HENRY DARGAN MCMASTER,

Attorney General of South Carolina,

Respondents-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.

(3:06-cv-00368-HMH)

Argued: January 31, 2008

Decided: March 28, 2008

Before WILKINSON and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and

Liam O’GRADY, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote

the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge O’Grady joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: William Edgar Salter, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South CaroAppeal: 07-6598 Doc: 42 Filed: 03/28/2008 Pg: 1 of 8
lina, for Appellants. Margaret A. Chamberlain, Greenville, South

Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Henry D. McMaster, Attorney

General, John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Donald

J. Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South

Carolina, for Appellants. 

OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge: 

William White, Warden of Broad River Correctional Institution,

and Henry D. McMaster, Attorney General of South Carolina, appeal

a district court order granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus to

Jose Bustos. We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor

of the State. 

I.

Bustos is an inmate at the Broad River Correctional Institution in

Columbia, South Carolina. Bustos was indicted by a Pickens County

grand jury on five counts of trafficking a controlled substance and one

count of possession of a firearm during commission of a violent

crime. In August 1997, he pled guilty to all charges and received one

sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment, a consecutive prison term of

five years, a concurrent prison term of ten years, and a $200,000 fine.

Bustos did not appeal his convictions or sentences. 

In October 1997, Bustos filed an application for post-conviction

relief ("PCR"), which he amended twice to add additional claims. Following a hearing, Bustos was denied relief and his application was

dismissed with prejudice. After a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Johnson v. State, 364 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1988) (per curiam), was

filed on Bustos’s behalf,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court denied

certiorari. 

1

Johnson provides that counsel must follow the procedures outlined in

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in order to withdraw in a

meritless appeal of a PCR denial. 

2 BUSTOS v. WHITE

Appeal: 07-6598 Doc: 42 Filed: 03/28/2008 Pg: 2 of 8
In October 2001, Bustos filed a "Motion for Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus" with the Pickens County Clerk of Court. J.A. 164.

Bustos subsequently filed another PCR application, and then filed an

amended application in December 2002. A South Carolina trial judge

dismissed Bustos’s petition for writ of habeas corpus for several procedural reasons2

 but found that his pending PCR application should

be amended to include the grounds alleged in his habeas petition. 

The State of South Carolina then filed its return to the pending

PCR application, arguing that the application should be summarily

dismissed because it was barred as successive, see S.C. Code Ann.

§ 17-27-90 (2003), and because it was untimely under the one-year

statute of limitations governing PCR actions, see S.C. Code Ann.

§ 17-27-45(A) (2003). The state trial judge summarily dismissed all

but two of Bustos’s claims for the reasons advanced by the State. The

remaining claims were that Bustos’s trial counsel incorrectly advised

him that if he pled guilty he would be eligible for parole and he would

not be deported after serving his sentence. 

At a hearing regarding these claims, Bustos’s wife testified that

Bustos had told her that he believed he was eligible for parole and

would not be deported. Bustos testified that his trial counsel had

advised him that he would be parole eligible if he pled guilty and that

deportation would be waived since he was married to an American

citizen. He also testified that he would not have pled guilty had he

realized that he would not in fact be paroled and that he would likely

be deported after serving his sentence. Bustos’s trial counsel refuted

Bustos’s testimony, testifying that he never made any representations

to Bustos regarding parole eligibility or deportation. 

A South Carolina trial judge ("the PCR court") dismissed Bustos’s

application. Crediting the testimony of Bustos’s trial counsel and discrediting that of Bustos and his wife, the PCR court found that "trial

counsel did not advise [Bustos] about either parole eligibility or

2The court ruled that Bustos had failed to allege that he had exhausted

all other available remedies and that his allegations could not be raised

in a habeas petition in state circuit court because they were cognizable

under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, S.C. Code Ann.

§§ 17-27-10 to -160 (2003). 

BUSTOS v. WHITE 3

Appeal: 07-6598 Doc: 42 Filed: 03/28/2008 Pg: 3 of 8
deportation possibilities with regard to his charges" and therefore that

"trial counsel’s performance did not fall below reasonable professional standards." J.A. 252. The court also rejected Bustos’s assertion

that he would not have pled guilty but for trial counsel’s alleged misadvice. Again, a Johnson petition for writ of certiorari was filed on

Bustos’s behalf, and the South Carolina Supreme Court denied the

petition.

On February 16, 2006, Bustos filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in federal district court naming Warden William White of

Broad River Correctional Institution and South Carolina Attorney

General Henry D. McMaster (together, "the State") as respondents

and advancing several claims. In the only claim relevant to our disposition of the present appeal, Bustos alleged that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because counsel

"failed to . . . fully inform petitioner" that he would be ineligible for

parole if he pled guilty ("the parole ineligibility advice claim"). J.A.

273. The government moved for summary judgment, arguing that

parole eligibility was only a collateral consequence of a guilty plea

and thus counsel could have been constitutionally ineffective only by

affirmatively misadvising Bustos that he would be eligible, which the

state court properly found that he did not do. 

After the case was referred to him, a magistrate judge determined

that if Bustos was ineligible for parole at the time he pled guilty, then

defense counsel’s failure to advise Bustos of that fact constituted ineffective assistance and the PCR court holding otherwise "was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). The magistrate

judge, citing decisions of this court, reasoned that "parole ineligibility

is considered a direct consequence of a guilty plea, and counsel has

an affirmative duty to advise his client of this fact." J.A. 328 (citing

Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973); Bell v.

North Carolina, 576 F.2d 564, 565 (4th Cir. 1978); and Chapman v.

Angelone, 187 F.3d 628, 1999 WL 511062 (4th Cir. 1999) (per

curiam) (unpublished table decision)). The magistrate judge concluded, however, that whether Bustos was eligible for parole at the

time he pled guilty, or rather, whether he became ineligible only some

time after he pled guilty, could not be determined on the summary

4 BUSTOS v. WHITE

Appeal: 07-6598 Doc: 42 Filed: 03/28/2008 Pg: 4 of 8
judgment record. The magistrate judge therefore recommended that

summary judgment be denied on the parole ineligibility advice claim.

The State objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. As is relevant here, the State emphasized that in determining,

under the AEDPA,3 whether a state court decision is "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law," a court considers only holdings of the United States Supreme

Court, and the State contended that "there is no United States

Supreme Court precedent requiring counsel to advise on parole eligibility." J.A. 338. 

Considering the State’s objections, the district court noted that

although the Supreme Court had not addressed whether a paroleineligible defendant must be advised of his parole ineligibility before

pleading guilty, the Fourth Circuit had concluded that such a defendant must be so advised. On that basis, the district court ruled that

counsel’s "failure to inform Bustos that he was ineligible for parole

was contrary to clearly-established federal law and unreasonable."

Bustos v. White, 2007 WL 914229, at *6 (D.S.C. 2007). The court

also concluded that Bustos was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance because Bustos testified that he would not have pled guilty

had he known he was not eligible for parole. See id. at *7. Based on

that analysis, the district court issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus, directing the State to either release Bustos or retry him within

180 days. See id.

II.

The State maintains that the district court erred in granting Bustos

relief on the parole ineligibility advice claim when Supreme Court

law did not clearly establish that his attorney was constitutionally

deficient in failing to inform him that he was parole ineligible. We

agree.4

3The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 

4The government also contends that the parole ineligibility advice

claim was procedurally defaulted and that Bustos’s habeas petition was

not timely filed. Because we decide this appeal on the basis discussed

above, we do not address these issues though we note that there is a substantial question of waiver by the State of the procedural default. 

BUSTOS v. WHITE 5

Appeal: 07-6598 Doc: 42 Filed: 03/28/2008 Pg: 5 of 8
The Sixth Amendment requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel

for his defence," U.S. Const. Amend. VI, and that such assistance be

effective, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In

order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Bustos

must demonstrate "that counsel’s performance was deficient" and that

"the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. To

demonstrate inadequate performance, Bustos "must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" measured by "prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. To

demonstrate prejudice, Bustos "must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. That burden

would require Bustos to establish "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

59 (1985). 

Pursuant to the limits on federal habeas review of a state conviction, when a habeas petitioner’s constitutional claim has been "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings," we may not grant

relief unless the state court’s adjudication "resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). A state court’s

decision is contrary to clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)

when it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth"

by the United States Supreme Court or "confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme

Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state

court’s decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies

it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case." Id. at 407. Factual determinations made by the state court "shall be presumed to be

correct," and "[t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the

6 BUSTOS v. WHITE

Appeal: 07-6598 Doc: 42 Filed: 03/28/2008 Pg: 6 of 8
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006). 

The claim at issue in this appeal is that because Bustos was ineligible for parole, Bustos’s attorney was constitutionally ineffective for

failing to advise him of his parole ineligibility before he pled guilty.

Neither the district court nor Bustos point us to any Supreme Court

precedent clearly establishing the proposition that an attorney’s representation is constitutionally deficient when he fails to alert a defendant considering pleading guilty that he will not be eligible for parole.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically declined to address that

very question. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 ("We find it unnecessary to

determine whether there may be circumstances under which erroneous advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel . . . ."); see also id. at 56

("We have never held that the United States Constitution requires the

State to furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility

in order for the defendant’s plea of guilty to be voluntary."). 

The Supreme Court has held that a judge accepting a guilty plea

must determine that the defendant fully understands the consequences

of the guilty plea. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44

(1969). Bustos does not deny, however, that defense counsel’s failure

"to ascertain and advise [his client] of the collateral consequences of

a guilty plea" does not constitute ineffective assistance. United States

v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 8 (4th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, citing Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973),

Bustos maintains that parole ineligibility is a "‘direct consequence[ ]’"

of a guilty plea, and thus that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him of it. Id. at 1365-66 (stating in dicta that parole ineligibility is a direct consequence of a guilty plea and thus that the

defendant must be made aware of it before he can validly plead

guilty). 

What Bustos fails to appreciate, however, is that it is Supreme

Court precedent, and not Fourth Circuit precedent, to which we look

in applying the AEDPA standard of review. See Williams, 529 U.S.

at 381-82; id. at 390 n.15 (explaining that to justify grant of habeas

relief under the AEDPA, the law with which the decision conflicts

"must be ‘clearly established’ by [the Supreme] Court alone."). And,

BUSTOS v. WHITE 7

Appeal: 07-6598 Doc: 42 Filed: 03/28/2008 Pg: 7 of 8
no Supreme Court precedent establishes that parole ineligibility constitutes a direct, rather than a collateral, consequence of a guilty plea.

Indeed, the majority of circuits deciding the issue have concluded that

parole ineligibility is only a collateral consequence. See United States

v. United States Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d

908, 915 (2d Cir. 1990); Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545,

1549 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that "the requirements of Rule 11 [of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] do not encompass the

court’s failure to inform a defendant of his ineligibility for parole

since parole eligibility is a collateral rather than a direct consequence

of a guilty plea"); Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 1984)

("The details of parole eligibility are considered collateral rather than

direct consequences of a plea, of which a defendant need not be

informed before pleading guilty." (citations omitted)), aff’d, 474 U.S.

52 (1985); Armstrong v. Egeler, 563 F.2d 796, 800 (6th Cir. 1977)

(holding that due process does not require that a defendant be

informed of his parole ineligibility before pleading guilty); Trujillo v.

United States, 377 F.2d 266, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that a

defendant need not be advised of his parole ineligibility before entering a guilty plea because "eligibility for parole is not a ‘consequence’

of a plea of guilty, but a matter of legislative grace" and thus "noneligibility for parole is not a ‘consequence’ of a plea of guilty" but

rather "a consequence of the withholding of legislative grace" (internal quotation marks omitted)). For all of these reasons, we conclude

that there is no basis for determining that the state court decision was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. We therefore reverse the district court’s

conditional grant of a habeas writ and remand to the district court for

entry of judgment in favor of the government.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

8 BUSTOS v. WHITE

Appeal: 07-6598 Doc: 42 Filed: 03/28/2008 Pg: 8 of 8