Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01090/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01090-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Autry
Defendant
Sundar Bains
Defendant
Collins
Defendant
S. Garcia
Defendant
Basant Sidhu
Plaintiff
Sanjesh Singh
Plaintiff
Stacey Singh
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BASANT SIDHU, SANJESH

SINGH,

NO. CIV. S-09-1090 LKK/DAD

Plaintiffs,

v.

O R D E R

SHERIFF'S DEPUTY S. GARCIA,

SHERIFF'S DEPUTY AUTRY,

SHERIFF'S DEPUTY COLLINS,

STACEY SINGH, aka STACEY KAUR,

SUNDAR BAINS,

Defendants.

 /

I. BACKGROUND

On April 21, 2009, plaintiffs Sanjesh Singh (“Mr. Singh”)

and Mr. Singh’s mother, Basant Sidhu (“Sidhu”), filed a

complaint against three sheriff deputies, Garcia, Autry, and

Collins (“sheriff deputy defendants”), Mr. Singh’s former wife,

Stacey Singh (“Ms. Singh”), and Ms. Singh’s uncle, Sundar Bains

(“Bains”). Plaintiffs alleged that the sheriff deputy defendants

conducted an illegal search of their residence. Compl. ¶ 13.

Plaintiffs brought claims arising out of this illegal search

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Plaintiffs also alleged that Ms. Singh and Mr. Bains made 1

a false report to the sheriff’s department and brought a claim

against both for “aiding and abetting” the allegedly illegal search

conducted by the sheriff deputy defendants. 

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against the sheriff deputy defendants under 42 U.S.C. Section

1983 and under state law.1

On June 30, 2009, the court issued a status (pretrial

scheduling) order in this case. The order stated that, “No

further joinder of parties or amendments to pleadings is

permitted except with leave of court, good cause having been

shown. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604

(9th Cir. 1992).” Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order, Dkt. No.

22, at 2. Discovery closed on June 1, 2010. Id. at 5.

On May 20, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to

file a first amended complaint. Dkt. No. 39. Plaintiffs sought

to add three theories of liability against the sheriff deputy

defendants under Section 1983. The court determined that

plaintiffs’ proposed amendment was futile, and their motion was

denied.

On June 9, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary

judgement. Pl.’s MSJ, Dkt. No. 44. The motion argued that, inter

alia, based on the sheriff deputy defendants’ testimony that

“there was no valid emergency/exigent circumstances allowing for

the entry and search of plaintiffs’ residence.” Id. at 3. The

motion further states that because defendants’ answer “does not

assert an affirmative defense of exigent circumstances as a

valid and applicable exception to the warrant requirement” the

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Because the motion for leave to amend the answer is brought 2

only by the sheriff deputy defendants, the Singh and Bains answer

is not discussed. Thus, all references are to the sheriff deputy

defendants documents.

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issue is waived. Id. 

On June 14, 2010, the sheriff deputy defendants filed a

motion to modify the scheduling order for leave to amend their

answer. Def.’s Mot. to Amend, Dkt. No. 54. The motion states 2

that these defendants’ “never intended to raise the defense of

exigent circumstances . . . and no warrant was required based on

the emergency doctrine.” Id. at 1-2. Rather, these defendants

argue that they have always maintained that the emergency

exception to the warrant requirement applies to the search at

issue in this case. Id. at 2. Accordingly, they seek to amend

their answer to contain the defense of the emergency exception

to the warrant requirement. These defendants also have presented

evidence that plaintiffs have been aware of this defense as late

as November 18, 2009.

II. STANDARD ON A MOTION TO AMEND 

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)

The Federal Rules provide that leave to amend pleadings

“shall be freely given when justice so requires Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, however,

“demonstrating that justice requires amendment becomes

progressively more difficult . . . as litigation proceeds toward

trial.” Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.), cert.

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denied, U.S. , 119 S.Ct. 405 (1998), abrogated, on other

grounds, Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 159

F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, subsequent to a scheduling order

prohibiting further amendment, the moving party must demonstrate

“good cause.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d

604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). Once a final pretrial order has been

entered, “modifications are allowed ‘only to prevent manifest

injustice.’” Byrd, 137 F.2d at 1331-32 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

16(e)).

Although the standard becomes progressively more stringent

as the litigation proceeds, the Circuit has explained that the

same four factors are pertinent to resolution of a motion to

amend: (1) the degree of prejudice or surprise to the non-moving

party if the order is modified; (2) the ability of the nonmoving party to cure any prejudice; (3) the impact of the

modification on the orderly and efficient conduct of the case;

and (4) any degree of willfulness or bad faith on the part of

the party seeking the modification. See Byrd, 137 F.3d at 1132

(citing United States v. First Nat=l Bank of Circle, 652 F.2d

882, 887 (9th Cir. 1981)). The burden is on the moving party to

show that consideration of these factors warrants amendment. See

id.

Prejudice to the opposing party is the most important

factor to consider in determining whether a party should be

granted leave to amend. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d

1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990)(citing Zenith Radio Corp. v.

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Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1971)).

Prejudice may be found where additional discovery would be

required because the new claims are based on different legal

theories. See Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1387-88 (citing Priddy v.

Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 1989)).

While delay alone is insufficient to deny amendment, undue

delay is a factor to be considered. See Morongo Band of Mission

Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming

district court’s denial of motion for leave to amend to add new

claims made two years into litigation). Pertinent to

consideration of this factor is whether the moving party knew or

should have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment

in the original pleading. See Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1388 (citing

E.E.O.C. v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988)).

III. ANALYSIS

The main focus of this case is whether the sheriff deputy

defendants properly entered plaintiffs’ house. Defendants’

answer states they “deny that they did not have a proper

exception to the warrant requirement and further deny they

violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.” Answer, Dkt.

No. 11 at 2. Moreover, the fifth affirmative defense alleges

that defendants’ “acted in good faith and did not directly or

indirectly perform any acts whatsoever which would constitute a

violation of any rights possessed by plaintiffs.” Id. at 7. 

While the words “emergency doctrine” are not specifically

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provided in defendants’ answer, it is clear that they have

asserted their contention that there was a proper exception to

the warrant requirement. Combining this statement with the fifth

affirmative defense, one can reasonably conclude that the acts

of good faith referred to a proper exception to the warrant

requirement, such as the emergency doctrine.

In addition to the language of the answer, there is

sufficient evidence that plaintiffs had notice that defendants

were invoking the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant

requirement. Each of the defendants testified as to their belief

of an emergency exception to the search warrant requirement.

While there appeared to be some effort to conflate the exigent

circumstances and emergency doctrine by plaintiff’s counsel

during the depositions, defendants repeatedly stated they

thought it was the emergency doctrine which justified their

entry into plaintiff’s house. For example, Autry testified, “I

do not believe that this [situation] falls under an exigent

circumstances [sic]. I feel this was an emergency situation that

arose after we got on the scene.” Decl. of Kathleen Williams in

Supp. of Mot. to Amend, Ex. B (Autry Dep.). 

In considering the four factors for a motion to amend, the

degree of prejudice is the court’s main concern. In this case,

there is no prejudice to the non-moving party because plaintiffs

had ample notice of defendants’ belief that their actions were

justified based on the emergency doctrine. This information can

be inferred from the answer and was directly stated in all

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sheriff deputy defendants’ testimony. Because plaintiffs had

notice of this alleged justification, there is no burden on them

in terms of conducting supplemental discovery. 

The court finds that amendment of the sheriff deputy

defendants’ complaint is not necessary to assert a defense of

the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. This is

especially so given the advance notice plaintiffs have had of

the defense. According, the sheriff deputy defendants’ motion is

denied. Nonetheless, these defendants may bring a defense of the

application of the emergency exception to the warrant

requirement.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders that the

sheriff deputy defendant’s motion to modify the scheduling order

to amend their answer, Dkt. No. 54, is DENIED, because an

amendment is not required for defendants’ to argue that the

emergency exception to the warrant requirement applies.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 6, 2010.

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