Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-07134/USCOURTS-ca13-14-07134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee
Jack Sucic
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JACK SUCIC,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-7134

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 13-0158, Judge William Greenberg.

______________________ 

Decided: February 16, 2016

______________________ 

KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter 

Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for claimant-appellant.

RENEE GERBER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHNER, JR.,

MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR.; DAVID J. BARRANS, BRIAN D.

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GRIFFIN, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALLACH.

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

Jack Sucic, a veteran, seeks an early effective date for 

a grant of service-connected disability compensation. The 

U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims determined 

that the Board of Veterans’ Appeals did not err in denying 

Mr. Sucic’s request for an earlier effective date. For the 

reasons set forth below, we reverse the determination of 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Sucic served honorably in the United States Marine Corps from July 1973 to October 1984. In June 1992, 

Mr. Sucic filed a claim for a nervous condition and posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). The Department of 

Veterans Affairs’ (“VA”) regional office denied the PTSD 

claim in December 1992. J.A. 14–15. Three months later, 

in March 1993, Mr. Sucic submitted a statement via VA 

Form 21-4138, informing the VA that he had been receiving treatment for an ongoing nervous condition since 

March 1985. J.A. 16. In that submission, Mr. Sucic noted 

that he had received treatment at a VA medical center in 

Columbia, Missouri. Mr. Sucic did not formally appeal 

the regional office’s 1992 decision on his PTSD condition, 

and that decision became final in December 1993. 

Subsequent to December 1993, Mr. Sucic obtained the 

assistance of a non-attorney veterans support group and 

appealed a regional office decision concerning several 

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SUCIC v. MCDONALD 3

claims for compensation that were unrelated to his PTSD

claim. In the appeal, Mr. Sucic also raised the PTSD 

service connection issue. In a July 1995 decision, the 

Board of Veterans’ Appeals (the “Board”) referred the 

PTSD issue to the regional office for “appropriate action.”

The veteran has further contended that service 

connection is warranted for post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD). Service connection for this disability was denied in a December 1992 rating action with notice in January 1993 and no 

disagreement received thereafter. Such issue was 

not developed for appellate review and no action 

by the Board is warranted. It is referred to the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) for appropriate action. 

J.A. 18–22 (emphases added). The Board also instructed 

two specific tasks to the regional office: obtain copies of 

the treatment records from the medical center in Columbia, Missouri, and afford Mr. Sucic an opportunity to 

receive a surgical exam for a non-combat shrapnel 

wound.1 The Board informed Mr. Sucic that “[n]o action 

is required of the veteran or his representative until they 

receive further notice.” J.A. 20–21. The regional office, 

however, took no further action on the referral of the 

PTSD claim, and Mr. Sucic did not receive notice or 

otherwise hear from the regional office about the referral. 

 

1 As directed by the Board, the regional office obtained a VA hospital discharge summary from the medical 

center in Columbia, Missouri, showing that Mr. Sucic had 

been hospitalized from March to April 1993 for diagnoses 

involving alcohol and cannabis abuse, with no other 

psychiatric disorder identified. J.A. 68–69, 73. The VA

made no specific factfinding concerning the discharge 

summary in connection with Mr. Sucic’s PTSD disability

claim. 

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In January 2003, Mr. Sucic filed another statement in 

support of his PTSD claim. After reviewing the statement, the VA considered the claim reopened with new 

evidence. In 2008, the VA awarded Mr. Sucic a disability 

rating of 100% for his PTSD with an effective date of 

January 2003. J.A. 3. 

In 2008, Mr. Sucic filed a claim for an earlier effective 

date for his PTSD disability, which resulted in appeals 

before the Board and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the “Veterans Court”). In the appeal before 

the Veterans Court, Mr. Sucic and the government filed a 

joint motion to remand on grounds that the Board had

failed to adequately address whether the PTSD claim was 

left pending by the 1995 referral. J.A. 3. 

On remand, Mr. Sucic argued that the effective date 

for his PSTD disability should be 1992 because his statement submitted on VA Form 21-4138 in March 1993 

triggered his first 1992 claim for a PTSD disability. Mr. 

Sucic also argued that the Board’s 1995 referral recognized the significance of his March 1993 submission. The 

Board rejected those arguments: 

The Board has reviewed the record but finds no 

document during the intervening period between 

the final December 1992 [regional office] decision 

and the date the [regional office] received the Veteran’s petition to reopen his claim on January 24, 

2003, which could be construed as either an informal or formal claim for service connection for 

PTSD or any other diagnosed psychiatric disorder.

J.A. 78. The Board concluded that the reference to PTSD 

in its 1995 referral was “misplaced” and that the regional 

office had “reviewed the issue, determined that there was 

no claim and, therefore, had no action to take.” J.A. 76. 

 On September 5, 2012, the Board issued its remand 

determination and denied Mr. Sucic’s entitlement to an 

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SUCIC v. MCDONALD 5

earlier effective date on grounds that he failed to submit 

evidence of PTSD within the appeal period subsequent to 

the regional office’s 1992 decision. J.A. 66–81. 

Mr. Sucic appealed the Board’s remand determination

to the Veterans Court on January 16, 2013. J.A. 1–5. On 

appeal, Mr. Sucic argued that a referral by the Board 

necessarily meant that he had submitted a proper claim 

in 1995, and that the VA’s inaction on his pending claim 

amounted to a procedural error. Mr. Sucic asserted that 

because the VA committed procedural error, his claim is 

not final and is not adjudicated until the VA corrects the 

procedural error. AG v. Peake, 536 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008). The Veterans Court disagreed, finding that 

because Mr. Sucic had not submitted new or material 

evidence before 2003, the Board’s decision was final and 

there was no claim pending. The Veterans Court also 

determined that under 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995), the regional office was not required to adjudicate the Board’s 

referral because that section governed “remands” and not 

referrals. 

Mr. Sucic appeals. We have jurisdiction under 38 

U.S.C. §§ 7292(a), (c). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review in this case is limited. We review de novo legal determinations by the Veterans Court. 

Prenzler v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d 392, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

We have jurisdiction over all relevant questions of law, 

including interpretations of constitutional and statutory 

authority. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). We set aside any 

decision by the Veterans Court that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, 

privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 

authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory 

right; or without observance of procedure required by law. 

Id. Except as to constitutional issues, we cannot review 

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challenges to a factual determination or challenges to a 

law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular 

case. Id. § 7292(d)(2). 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Sucic argues that the referral by the 

Board obligated the VA to extend Mr. Sucic certain procedural safeguards, including a duty to investigate the 

claim, review evidence, and make a determination on the 

claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995). Mr. Sucic argues that 

the regional office’s inaction following the referral

amounted to procedural error because no action was 

taken and his claim was left pending with no adjudication. Finally, Mr. Sucic argues that the VA’s instruction 

for him not to take any action until he heard back from 

the VA prevented him until 2003 from submitting any 

additional evidence in support of an earlier effective date, 

and is further indication of an open, pending claim. 

The government concedes that the regional office did 

not review or consider Mr. Sucic’s referred PTSD claim

until January 2003. The government asserts that the 

regional office took no action because there was no evidence in the record of a pending PTSD claim. 

The government argues that Mr. Sucic confuses the 

duties assumed by the VA pursuant to a “remand,” as 

opposed to a “referral,” by the Board. The government 

asserts that 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995) applies to remands 

only and not referrals. As such, the regulation requires

the Board to specify the action to be taken by the regional 

office on remand, but it is silent as to any procedural 

safeguards under referrals. 

We hold that the VA committed procedural error by

failing to take action on the claim that was referred to it 

by the Board. The failure denied Mr. Sucic an opportunity to develop the record, and the failure left pending and 

un-adjudicated his claim for an earlier effective date. 

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SUCIC v. MCDONALD 7

We find persuasive Mr. Sucic’s arguments that the referral by the Board raised procedural safeguards that the 

VA failed to implement. In 2011, the VA amended § 19.9, 

leaving the provision on remands materially the same, 

while adding a new subsection for referrals:

Referral. The Board shall refer to the agency of 

original jurisdiction for appropriate consideration 

and handling in the first instance all claims reasonably raised by the record that have not been 

initially adjudicated by the agency of original jurisdiction, except for claims over which the Board 

has original jurisdiction.

38 C.F.R. § 19.9(b) (2011) (emphasis added). The plain 

language of the new regulation recognizes that a referral 

is made to address pending un-adjudicated claims and 

requires the Board to direct the regional office to give the

claim “appropriate consideration,” without specifying the 

action to take. 

The government is correct that § 19.9(b) did not exist 

in 1995 when the referral was made. During the noticeand-comment process leading to the adoption of § 19.9(b), 

the VA indicated in the Federal Register that the rationale for providing a new separate subsection for referrals was to codify the Board’s pre-2011 practice 

concerning referrals: 

We proposed to amend 38 C.F.R. § 19.9(b) to articulate the Board’s practice of referring to the 

AOJ for appropriate action unadjudicated claims 

that have been reasonably raised by the record, 

except for claims over which the Board has original jurisdiction. . . . The final rule we are adopting 

by this rulemaking merely codifies the Board’s referral practice in regulation.

76 Fed. Reg. 17,545 (Mar. 30, 2011). 

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In view of the foregoing, the VA is incorrect that the 

1995 referral required no action and that its failure to 

review the referred claim was not procedural error. Prior 

to 2011, 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995) spoke to “remands,” but 

not “referrals,” and it required the Board to dictate the 

exact action for the regional office to take on remand. 38 

C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995). The regulation was amended to 

codify the Board’s practice as to referrals, which were 

made with no explicit statement of action to be taken 

because the matter was considered pending and the 

precise action necessary to adjudicate the pending claim 

was a first instance decision by the agency. 

The VA’s pre-2011 practice concerning referrals is also reflected in the decisions of the Veterans Court. The 

Veterans Court has concluded that a referred claim is the 

recognition of an un-adjudicated claim requiring initial 

adjudication by the regional office before the Board has 

jurisdiction. Godfrey v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 398, 409 (Vet. 

App. 1995) (recognizing the need for a regional office to 

adjudicate a pending claim later referred to it). According 

to the Veterans Court, and as we have recognized, unlike 

remands, referrals do not provide specific instructions to 

the regional office because the regional office must take 

action to adjudicate the claim before it can be properly 

reviewed by the Board. See, e.g., Brown v. West, 203 F.3d 

1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (describing the affirmative 

actions taken by a regional office after receiving a 1991 

referral for “appropriate consideration” of a claim). 

The government argues that Mr. Sucic was required 

to submit a formal claim in writing in order for a pending 

claim for adjudication to exist. This is not correct. As we 

explained in Reeves, and as reflected in the regulations in 

effect in 1995, “any communication” can qualify as an 

informal claim. Reeves v. Shinseki, 682 F.3d 988, 993 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Rodriguez v. West, 189 F.3d 1351, 

1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). A writing need only demonstrate 

intent to apply for benefits and identify the particular 

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SUCIC v. MCDONALD 9

benefits sought. Id. As the VA concedes, the record does 

not reflect what occurred in the 1995 hearing, apart from 

the Board’s recognition of Mr. Sucic’s arguments for an 

earlier effective date for PTSD compensation and the 

Board’s resulting referral for “appropriate action” on that 

claim. That Mr. Sucic did not submit any evidence subsequent to that hearing is justifiable given the Board’s 

notice to him not to take any further action on his pending claim. 

Veterans and other claimants are entitled to due process during VA proceedings. Sprinkle v. Shinseki, 733 

F.3d 1180, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). A 

claim for benefits remains pending until the claim is 

finally adjudicated. 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c). A claim is

considered pending if the VA fails to notify the claimant of 

the denial of the claim or of the right to appeal an adverse 

decision. Adams v. Shinseki, 568 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) (citing Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002) (en banc)). “If a claim is left pending without a 

final adjudication, the claim may be addressed when a 

subsequent claim is adjudicated by the VA, in which case 

the effective date for any resulting award of benefits will 

be the effective date applicable to the earlier claim.” 

Jones v. Shinseki, 619 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

(citing Adams, 568 F.3d at 960; Myers v. Principi, 16 Vet. 

App. 228, 236 (2002)).

We reverse the Veterans Court’s decision denying Mr. 

Sucic’s claim for an earlier effective date for his PTSD 

disability compensation and remand for further findings 

and determinations on the effective date for his PTSD 

claim.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Mr. Sucic. 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JACK SUCIC,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-7134

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 13-0158, Judge William Greenberg.

______________________ 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

“[H]ard cases[] make bad law.” N. Sec. Co. v. United 

States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 

So do bad facts. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) 

(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“‘[B]ad facts make bad law.’”). 

In this appeal, the majority chooses humanity over unarguable fact and settled authority. The concern for humanistic values is admirable, but it is not the law which 

binds us. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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2 SUCIC v. MCDONALD

I.

This appeal concerns Jack Sucic’s claim for an earlier 

effective date for the grant of service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). The majority holds 

that the United States Department of Veterans Affairs 

(“VA”) “committed procedural error by failing to take 

action on [Mr. Sucic’s PTSD] claim that was referred to it” 

by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) in 1995. Maj. 

Op. at 6–7. 

The majority’s conclusion suffers from two critical defects. First, the majority predicates its holding on a fact 

that the record does not support—i.e., that a pending 

claim existed for the VA to resolve. The Board held, and 

the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Court”) affirmed, that the Board’s referral 

alone did not transform Mr. Sucic’s PTSD matter into a 

pending claim;1 rather, in the absence of new material 

evidence submitted by Mr. Sucic pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5108 (2012),2 the Board found that the VA had no duty 

to act on the referral. See J.A. 75–76 (Board’s decision); 

see also J.A. 4–5 (Veterans Court’s decision). We have no 

occasion to revisit that determination, which involves the 

application of law to the facts of the case. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2) (“Except to the extent that an appeal under 

 

1 A “pending claim” describes “[a]n application, 

formal or informal, which has not been finally adjudicated.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c) (2012). Unless otherwise noted, 

I cite the 2012 version of the VA’s regulations because the 

Board issued the decision under review in September of 

that year. J.A. 66. As explained below, the VA has since 

amended its regulations.

2 “If new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim which has been disallowed, 

[the VA] shall reopen the claim and review the former 

disposition of the claim.” 38 U.S.C. § 5108. 

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SUCIC v. MCDONALD 3

this chapter presents a constitutional issue, the Court of 

Appeals may not review (A) a challenge to a factual 

determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as 

applied to the facts of a particular case.”); see Comer v. 

Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Whether a 

veteran has raised a particular claim is a factual determination, outside the purview of our appellate authority.” 

(citations omitted)); Ellington v. Peake, 541 F.3d 1364, 

1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he interpretation of the contents of a claim for benefits [is] a factual issue over which 

we d[o] not have jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).

Second, the majority’s conclusion disregards the presumption of regularity that attaches to veterans proceedings. “The presumption of regularity supports official acts 

of public officers. In the absence of clear evidence to the 

contrary, the doctrine presumes that public officers have 

properly discharged their official duties.” Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the Board properly 

found, even if the passage in its 1995 decision that referred the PTSD matter to the VA “created some kind of 

duty,” the “presumption of regularity” attached such that 

the Board could “assume that the [VA] reviewed the issue, 

determined that there was no claim and, therefore, had no 

action to take.” J.A. 76. That conclusion seems particularly sound in the absence of any evidence to the contrary 

from Mr. Sucic.

The majority’s substitution of its own factual findings 

in place of the Board’s will have significant consequences. 

For example, the majority’s holding transforms the 

Board’s referral of Mr. Sucic’s PTSD matter into an informal claim.3 In so doing, the majority has created an 

 

3 The VA recently amended its regulations “to require that all claims governed by VA’s adjudication regulations be filed on standard forms prescribed by the [VA], 

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4 SUCIC v. MCDONALD

unknown class of claims that promises a log jam at the 

VA. Our servicemen and women who “risked both life and 

liberty in their military service to this country” deserve a 

system that expeditiously resolves their claims, not one 

encumbered by rules created through judicial fiat. Sneed 

v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

II.

The majority also finds that the Veterans Court erred 

in its interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995). Maj. Op. 

7–9. Our precedent requires a different conclusion.

Mr. Sucic generally contends that the Veterans Court 

erred in its interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995) by 

finding that the regulation governs Board remands only; 

 

regardless of the type of claim or posture in which the 

claim arises.” See Standard Claims and Appeals Forms, 

79 Fed. Reg. 57,660, 57,660 (Dep’t of Veterans Affairs 

Sept. 25, 2014) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pts. 3, 19, 20). 

The VA’s amended regulations took effect on March 24, 

2015, and the Federal Register notice does not state that 

the amended regulations have retroactive effect. Id. 

Thus, claims filed before that date remain subject to the 

VA’s former regulations, which contain two provisions 

addressing informal claims: 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a), which 

concerns “original informal claim[s] and requires the 

informal claim [to] identify the benefit sought and indicate an intent to apply for one or more benefits,” and 38 

C.F.R. § 3.157(b)(1), which is “directed to an informal 

claim to increase or reopen a previous compensation 

determination and permits a medical report to be considered [as] an informal claim when the report relates to a 

disability for which service connection has previously 

been established.” MacPhee v. Nicholson, 459 F.3d 1323, 

1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks, 

brackets, footnote, and citations omitted).

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SUCIC v. MCDONALD 5

instead, he argues that the regulation also applies to 

referrals. Appellant’s Br. 5–11. In so doing, he does not 

address the regulation’s text and attempts to elevate 

other sources above the provision’s express terms. See id. 

That approach ignores the framework under which we 

must interpret regulations.

In construing a regulation, we first consider “its plain 

language” and “terms in accordance with their common 

meaning.” Lockheed Corp. v. Widnall, 113 F.3d 1225, 

1227 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). “In doing so, the 

court considers ‘the text of the regulation as a whole, 

reconciling the section in question with sections related to 

it.’” Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 782 F.3d 

1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Lengerich v. Dep’t of 

the Interior, 454 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). If the 

regulation contains “clear and unambiguous” terms, “then 

no further inquiry is usually required.” Id. (citing Roberto 

v. Dep’t of the Navy, 440 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

Mr. Sucic’s preferred interpretation finds no support 

in the clear and unambiguous terms of 38 C.F.R. § 19.9

(1995). Titled “Remand for further development,” the 

regulation states in relevant part that under certain 

circumstances “the Board shall remand the case to 

the . . . [VA], specifying the action to be undertaken.” 38 

C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995) (emphasis added). The title and the 

text of the regulation confirm that it addresses remands 

only. See id. The regulation does not mention referrals, 

still less does it address the obligations placed upon the 

VA if the Board makes a referral. We would have to 

rewrite the regulation to find that its terms address 

referrals. As judges, we may not legislate or regulate. 

See, e.g., Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 

1246, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“‘This Court is empowered to 

rewrite neither statutes nor regulations, however unwise, 

nor does it have the information base nor expertise to do 

so effectively.’” (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & 

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6 SUCIC v. MCDONALD

Dry Dock Co. v. Garrett, 6 F.3d 1547, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 

1993))).

That “remand” and “referral” do not share a common 

meaning further supports the Veterans Court’s interpretation. The Veterans Court has found that remands and 

referrals address “distinct concepts,” with Board remands 

“appropriate whe[n] proper evidentiary development has 

not been completed” and referrals “appropriate when [a] 

newly raised claim is not in administrative appellate 

status.” Locklear v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 311, 316 n.3 

(2011) (citation omitted). Moreover, a Board referral does 

not afford the same protections as a remand because, 

unlike a remand, the Board need not ensure VA compliance with a referral. Reyes v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 370, 

379 (2007) (discussing referral obligations); Stegall v. 

West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998) (discussing remand 

obligations). These authorities confirm that the Veterans 

Court properly declined to find that 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 

(1995) extends to referrals. J.A. 4.

Turning to Mr. Sucic’s specific arguments, he alleges 

that 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995) applies to the Board’s 1995 

referral of the PTSD claim because a 2011 amendment to 

the regulation reflects the VA’s “clear” intent to afford the 

same protections to referrals and remands, consistent 

with the Board’s “long-standing practice.” Appellant’s Br. 

7–8 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (2011); Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals: Remand or Referral for Further Action; Notification of Evidence Secured by the Board and Opportunity for 

Response, 76 Fed. Reg. 17,544, 17,544 (Dep’t of Veterans

Affairs Mar. 30, 2011) (“2011 Notice”) (to be codified at 38 

C.F.R. pts. 19 and 20)). The sources cited do not demonstrate Veterans Court error.

With respect to 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (2011), Mr. Sucic does 

not address whether the VA meant for the amended 

regulation to apply retroactively to 1995 when the Board 

referred his PTSD matter. See generally Appellant’s Br. 

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SUCIC v. MCDONALD 7

Assuming for a moment that it did, neither the amended 

regulation’s text nor the notice accompanying its promulgation offers support. The amended regulation defines 

“remand” and “referral” separately. See 38 C.F.R. 

§ 19.9(a) (defining remand), (b) (defining referral) (2011). 

Notably, the amended regulation does not extend the 

same protections to remands and referrals. Id. § 19.9(a)–

(b) (2011) (explaining that the Board must remand undeveloped factual issues that are “essential for a proper 

appellate decision,” whereas it will refer other issues to 

the VA for “appropriate consideration”). Had the VA

wanted to treat these distinct instructions as coterminous, 

it would have promulgated an overlapping regulation.

Similarly, the 2011 Notice does not support the proffered interpretation. The 2011 Notice “provide[s] guidance as to what action the Board must take when it 

discovers an unadjudicated claim in the record”—i.e., it 

refers the matter to the VA. 76 Fed. Reg. at 17,547 (emphasis added). However, the 2011 Notice does not address 

what action the VA must take upon receipt of a referral, 

nor does it mention the protections that the VA must 

afford to the veteran when it receives a referral. See id. 

Thus, the 2011 Notice does not support Mr. Sucic’s argument that 38 C.F.R.§ 19.9 (1995) covers referrals.

Finally, Mr. Sucic alleges that the Veterans Court’s 

decision in Godfrey v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 398 (1995),

confirms that 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995) “was not limited to 

remands.” Appellant’s Br. 11.4 In particular, Mr. Sucic 

 

4 Mr. Sucic also alleges that the Veterans Court’s 

“misinterpretation . . . is further demonstrated by the fact 

that the decision in Godfrey was made in March 1995 and 

the Board decision which made the referral [on his PTSD 

matter] was made in July 1995.” Appellant’s Br. 11. The 

temporal proximity of the decisions reveals only that the 

Veterans Court and the Board decided them four months 

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8 SUCIC v. MCDONALD

contends that Godfrey held that the VA must adjudicate a 

claim referred to it by the Board, just as the VA must 

when the Board remands a matter to it. Id. at 8–9. The 

Veterans Court did not reach that conclusion in Godfrey. 

Instead, it found that 38 C.F.R. § 19.182(a) (1991)5—the 

precursor to 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1995)—did not apply to 

referred claims, only remands. Godfrey, 7 Vet. App. at 

409. Accordingly, the Veterans Court found that the 

Board properly referred the claim to the VA “without 

additional specific instructions.” Id. Thus, Godfrey is 

inapposite.

III.

It is a pleasant thing that a veteran will receive additional consideration about when his benefits should 

accrue. It is lamentable that the majority reaches that 

result at the expense of settled legal principles. 

 

apart; it does not answer whether one controls the outcome in the other.

5 The regulation at issue in Godfrey stated that 

[w]hen, during the course of review, it is determined that further evidence or clarification of the 

evidence or correction of a procedural defect is essential for a proper appellate decision, the section 

of the Board shall remand the case to the agency 

of original jurisdiction, specifying the further development to be undertaken.

38 C.F.R. § 19.182(a) (1991).

Case: 14-7134 Document: 35-2 Page: 17 Filed: 02/16/2016