Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02299/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02299-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dana Deegan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of North Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-2299

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of North Dakota. 

Dana Deegan, *

*

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: December 9, 2008

Filed: May 25, 2010

___________

Before COLLOTON, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Dana Deegan pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to second-degree murder,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 1153. The district court1

 sentenced Deegan to

121 months’ imprisonment, which was the bottom of the advisory guideline range.

Deegan appeals the sentence, and we affirm.

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I.

Deegan is a member of the Three Affiliated Tribes. On October 20, 1998,

Deegan secretly gave birth to a baby boy in the bathroom of her home on the Fort

Berthold Indian Reservation. The baby was alive and breathing when he was

delivered. Deegan had kept her pregnancy hidden, and no other adult was present at

the time of the delivery. Deegan’s three other minor children were in the home, but

they were unaware of the birth. 

Approximately two hours after delivering her son, Deegan fed, cleaned, and

dressed him, and then placed him in a basket. She then left the house with her three

other children, intentionally leaving the baby alone without food, water, or a

caregiver. Deegan did not return to her home for approximately two weeks. When

she returned, she found the baby dead in the basket where she had left him. She put

his remains in a suitcase, and deposited the suitcase in a rural ditch area near her

residence.

On November 4, 1999, a man working on a fence line found the suitcase

containing the baby’s remains. He reported the discovery to law enforcement, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) commenced an investigation. In March 2004,

Deegan voluntarily submitted a DNA sample to the FBI. Nearly three years later, in

February 2007, the FBI completed mitochondrial DNA analysis on the Deegan sample

and confirmed that Deegan was the mother of the deceased baby. When Deegan was

interviewed by the FBI in late February 2007, she falsely claimed that the baby was

stillborn. Interviewed a second time in May 2007, Deegan repeated the false story and

provided a written statement to that effect. 

Later during the May 2007 interview, however, Deegan admitted that her earlier

statements were false and acknowledged that the baby had been born alive. She stated

that she intentionally left him alone in her home, knowing that he would die. When

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asked why she did so, Deegan responded that she was unable to care for a fourth child,

neither she nor her common-law husband were employed, and her husband spent what

little money they did have to purchase drugs.

On June 6, 2007, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging Deegan

with first-degree murder and making false statements to the FBI. Deegan pled not

guilty to both charges. On November 11, 2007, Deegan entered into a written plea

agreement with the government, in which she agreed to plead guilty to one count of

second-degree murder. In the factual portion of the agreement, Deegan acknowledged

that the baby was born alive and breathing when she delivered him, and that she

unlawfully and with malice aforethought caused his death by leaving him alone in the

house for approximately two weeks. On November 30, 2007, the government filed

an information charging Deegan with second-degree murder.

On December 10, 2007, Deegan pled guilty to second-degree murder. At the

plea hearing, the district court noted that the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time

of Deegan’s offense provided for an advisory sentence of eight to ten years’

imprisonment for second-degree murder. The court advised Deegan that based on

“what little information” it had about the offense at the plea hearing, the court was

“not comfortable” with a range of eight to ten years, because the terms of

imprisonment for other defendants convicted of second-degree murder “were not even

close to that range.” The court remarked that there were a number of provisions in the

advisory guidelines “that would justify an upward departure.” 

In an order filed on January 22, 2008, the court formally notified the parties that

it was “contemplating an upward departure from the applicable Sentencing Guideline

range,” based on USSG § 5K2.8, which provides for an increased sentence where “the

defendant’s conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim.”

The court expressed its view that Deegan’s conduct “was unusually heinous, cruel,

and brutal,” but stated that it would await review of the presentence investigation

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report (“PSR”), psychological evaluations, and a review of relevant case law before

making a final decision on sentencing.

Applying the 1997 sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, the

PSR recommended an advisory sentencing range of 121 to 151 months’

imprisonment, which corresponded to a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history

category of I. The total offense level represented a base offense level of 33, USSG §

2A1.2 (1997), a two-level upward adjustment for knowledge of a vulnerable victim,

id. § 3A1.1(b), and a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, id.

§ 3E1.1(a), (b). Deegan objected to the two-level vulnerable-victim adjustment,

arguing that there had been no factual finding that the infant was vulnerable, and that

she had not admitted as much in the plea agreement.

Following preparation of the PSR, both parties submitted sentencing

memoranda to the court. Deegan again objected to the two-level vulnerable-victim

adjustment. She also urged the court to vary from the advisory guidelines and

sentence her to probation or to a very short period of incarceration. She based her

argument for leniency on what she described as her “psychological and emotional

condition” at the time of the offense, her history as a victim of abuse, and the fact that

she acted impulsively, among other reasons.

As support, she submitted a report prepared by Dr. Phillip Resnick, an expert

in “neonaticide.” “Neonaticide” is a term coined by Resnick to describe the killing

of an infant within the first twenty-four hours following birth. See Susan Hatters

Friedman et al., Child Murder by Mothers: A Critical Analysis of the Current State of

Knowledge and a Research Agenda, 162 Am. J. Psychiatry 1578, 1578 (2005). The

report addressed what Resnick viewed as an “extraordinary number of mitigating

circumstances,” and expressed the opinion that a prison sentence was not necessary

to deter other women from committing neonaticide. The report concluded that

Deegan suffered from an extensive history of abuse throughout her childhood and as

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an adult, suffered from major depression and dissociation at the time of the homicide,

acted impulsively in leaving her baby alone, presented a very low risk of reoffending,

and did not merit a lengthy prison sentence, especially because other women

convicted in state court of committing similar offenses were usually sentenced to no

more than three years in prison. 

At the sentencing hearing on May 18, 2008, the district court adopted the

sentencing guideline calculation in the PSR. The court agreed with the probation

office that the vulnerable-victim enhancement was warranted, and that Deegan’s

advisory range was 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment. Finally, after calling Dr.

Resnick to testify about his report and hearing arguments from counsel and testimony

from Deegan herself, the court sentenced Deegan to 121 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, Deegan argues that the sentence of 121 months’ imprisonment is

unreasonable, because the advisory guideline for second-degree murder is not based

on empirical data and national experience, and because the sentence imposed is

greater than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing set forth

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). As we understand Deegan’s brief on appeal, she argues

that the district court committed both procedural and substantive errors when

imposing sentence. Deegan raised no procedural objection in the district court, so we

consider her claims of procedural error under the plain-error standard, United States

v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 945 (8th Cir. 2008), which requires as conditions for relief that

Deegan show an obvious error that affected her substantial rights and seriously

affected the fairness, integrity, or reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). No objection was required to preserve Deegan’s

substantive claim that the sentence imposed is unreasonably long with regard to

§ 3553(a), United States v. Wiley, 509 F.3d 474, 476-77 (8th Cir. 2007), but we review

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).

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II.

A.

Deegan appears to raise four alleged procedural errors at sentencing. One is

that the district court “failed on the record to engage in any meaningful discussion

whatsoever of the § 3553(a) factors.” The Supreme Court in Gall explained that a

sentencing court “must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for

meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” 552

U.S. at 50. Deegan did not object to the adequacy of the district court’s explanation

or request any elaboration. On plain error review, we conclude that the explanation

is not obviously inadequate.

As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he appropriateness of brevity or

length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon

circumstances.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). “The law leaves

much, in this respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.” Id. “[A] district

court is not required to provide a ‘full opinion in every case,’ but must ‘set forth

enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and

has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United

States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356).

Sentencing courts need not “categorically rehearse the § 3553(a) factors on the record,

as long as it is clear that the court considered those factors.” United States v.

Hernandez, 518 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 2008). Nor have we required district courts

to make specific findings on the record about each § 3553(a) factor. Perkins, 526 F.3d

at 1110. “[A]ll that is generally required to satisfy the appellate court is evidence that

the district court was aware of the relevant factors.” Id.

The district court in this case said plenty to avoid an obvious shortcoming under

a plain error standard of review. The court twice stated that it had “carefully

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considered” the § 3553(a) factors, even remarking that it had “spent many, many days

and nights thinking about this case.” The court listed nearly all of the § 3553(a)

factors on the record. Dr. Resnick, the expert who reported on Deegan’s

psychological condition, structured his testimony at the sentencing hearing around

many of the § 3553(a) factors, and cross-examination highlighted other statutory

factors. The court heard all of this testimony and took it into account. The court read

Resnick’s written report, which was explicit in its reference to the § 3553(a) factors,

“at least three times.” The court twice stated that it had carefully reviewed the PSR,

the parties’ sentencing memoranda, the psychological evaluation of Deegan by

another doctor, the many letters of support filed on her behalf, and the DVD

presentation by her family. See United States v. Henson, 550 F.3d 739, 743 (8th Cir.

2008) (observing that the presentence report contains extensive information regarding

the factors under § 3553(a)). 

In explaining why it chose a sentence of 121 months’ imprisonment rather than

a greater punishment, the court acknowledged that Deegan’s life had not been “easy,”

and that it had been plagued with physical abuse and sexual abuse. Referring back to

its statement at the plea hearing that it was likely to impose a sentence above the

advisory range of eight to ten years, the court observed that Resnick’s report and

testimony were “helpful and insightful,” and that the court had gained “far better

insight” into the case after reviewing the report. The court told Deegan that it had

“real compassion for [her] and [her] family and what [she had] gone through,”

including the fact that she had three children and that her brother had been murdered.

The court said that it “underst[ood] why [Deegan] took the steps that she did in 1998,”

and that “under the circumstances,” a sentence under the 2007 guidelines in effect at

the time of sentencing, i.e., 19.5 to 24.5 years’ imprisonment, would not have been

fair.

But the court also thought a lesser sentence would not be sufficient, explaining

that it must “ensure that justice is done,” and that it could not “ignore the fact that

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there was an innocent life that was lost.” The court remarked that justice in this case

probably “lies between the extremes of public opinion,” and that the advisory range

of 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment was reasonable for “a case of this nature.”

This discussion is sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review and to

ensure the public that Deegan’s case was given fair consideration. In the face of this

record, which shows a district judge deliberating at length over a difficult case, and

even changing his tentative conclusion between the plea hearing and the sentencing

hearing, we cannot agree with our dissenting colleague that the district court

“exercised no discretion.” Post, at 62. Deegan has not established plain error that

would require a remand for a more elaborate statement of reasons.

B. 

Deegan also argues that the court procedurally erred by treating the advisory

guidelines as mandatory. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. This contention is based on an isolated

statement by the district court at the sentencing hearing, to which Deegan lodged no

objection: 

In this case, the sentencing guidelines provide for a sentence range of

121 to 151 months. That’s 10 to 12-and-a-half years. I’m required to

impose those guidelines that were in effect in October of 1998. If the

guidelines that were in effect today were imposed, your sentence would

be in the range of 19-and-a-half to 24-and-a-half years.

(S. Tr. at 60) (emphasis added). 

The court evidently misspoke when it used the word “impose” (rather than

“consider”), because the record as a whole makes clear that the court understood its

discretion to sentence outside the advisory guideline range. There is no reason to

believe that the district court applied the guidelines as mandatory, and if Deegan had

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We disagree with the dissent that the district court’s description of the chosen

sentence as “reasonable” demonstrates that the court applied an impermissible

presumption of reasonableness to the advisory guideline sentence, post, at 44, or that

the court misunderstood its duty under § 3553(a) to select a sentence that is

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of

§ 3553(a)(2). Post, at 50. As in United States v. Vaughn, 519 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir.

2008), where the sentencing court said it was to impose a “reasonable sentence,” there

is no plain error, because the record as a whole shows that the court followed the

proper procedure under Gall. 

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objected at sentencing to the word “impose,” we are confident that the court would

have corrected itself. Elsewhere, the court clearly explained that it was aware of its

discretion to vary from the advisory guideline range:

I’m also familiar with the recent decisions from the United States

Supreme Court in the cases of Gall and Kimbrough which have

established that district court judges around the country in the federal

system have discretion to impose nonguideline sentences or variances

from the sentencing guidelines. And I’m equally aware of my authority

and my discretion to impose a nonguideline sentence.

. . . . 

. . . I’m aware of my discretion and authority to impose a

nonguideline sentence or to depart from the guidelines. I have chosen

in this case to impose a guideline sentence. I’m not going to exercise my

discretion and depart and impose a nonguideline sentence because I

believe that the sentencing range that’s been provided for in the

sentencing guidelines in this particular case is reasonable.

(S. Tr. 56, 58-59) (emphases added). On Deegan’s contention that the district court

treated the guidelines as mandatory, there is no plain error warranting relief.2

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C.

Deegan also contends that the district court committed procedural error by

considering the advisory guideline range that applied to Deegan’s offense under the

2007 sentencing guidelines. Deegan committed the offense in 1998, and the court

calculated her advisory range according to the 1997 guidelines, which were in effect

at the time of the offense. The court apparently followed the rule that application of

the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing would violate the Ex Post Facto

Clause, see United States v. Bell, 991 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1993); USSG § 1B1.11(b),

although the endurance of that rule is an open question in this circuit after United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), now that the guidelines are merely a starting

point that a court must consult and take into account. See United States v. Anderson,

570 F.3d 1025, 1033 n.7 (8th Cir. 2009) (assuming, without deciding, that the Ex Post

Facto Clause applies to a district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines after

Booker); compare, e.g., United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006)

(holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate Ex

Post Facto Clause after Booker), with United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1098-

1101 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (disagreeing with Demaree).

Although the court used the 1997 guidelines as the initial starting point, it also

discussed the advisory range that would apply under the 2007 guidelines. The court

observed that if Deegan had been sentenced under the 2007 guidelines, her advisory

sentence would have been almost twice as long as the sentencing range under the 1997

guidelines. The court also noted that if Deegan had been convicted of voluntary

manslaughter rather than second-degree murder, then her advisory range under the

2007 guidelines would be roughly the same range as the advisory range for seconddegree murder under the 1997 guidelines. With this background, the court concluded:

I guess what I’m trying to say is that if we used guidelines today, the

sentence would be double what you’re currently looking at, and I don’t

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think that’s fair under the circumstances. But when I reflect upon what

a voluntary manslaughter charge carries under the current guidelines and

what second degree murder carries under the guidelines that existed in

1998, I believe that those are reasonable guidelines for a case of this

nature.

Deegan did not object to the district court’s reference to the 2007 guidelines,

and we see no obvious error in the court’s consideration of that information. Now that

the guidelines are merely advisory, district courts are free to vary from the advisory

range “based solely on policy considerations,” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.

85, 101 (2007) (internal quotation omitted), or to sentence within the advisory range

based on policy considerations. The 2007 guidelines simply represent another policy

view – different from the view embodied in the 1997 guidelines – of the appropriate

sentence under § 3553(a) for second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter in a

run-of-the-mine case. The court was free to consider that view as part of its analysis

of the appropriate sentence for Deegan under § 3553(a). There was no plain

procedural error.

D.

Deegan’s remaining procedural argument is that the district court erred by

assuming that the advisory guideline for second-degree murder was the product of

empirical data and national experience. She points to this excerpt from the district

court’s comments at sentencing:

We have sentencing guidelines in the federal system that are designed to

ensure that sentences are consistent and uniform throughout the country

for people that commit this type of crime with the same type of criminal

history that you have. The sentencing guidelines have been in effect for

almost 20 years, and they are designed to provide some honesty in

sentencing and to achieve some consistency in the federal system, and

they’re based upon an analysis of hundreds of thousands of cases. Every

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In its Fifteen Year Report, the Commission explained that murder was one of

the offenses for which the original Commission, “either on its own initiative or in

response to congressional actions, established guideline ranges that were significantly

more severe than past practice.” See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Fifteen Years of

Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal Criminal Justice

System is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform 47 (2004). The report further

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year there are hundreds of thousands of cases that – in which defendants

are sentenced around the country, and the Sentencing Commission

compiles all that data and they try to develop sentencing guidelines that

are fair and are reasonable. 

Deegan did not object to these comments at sentencing, and we see no obvious error

that warrants relief.

Insofar as Deegan argues that the court procedurally erred by “selecting a

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,” see Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, we disagree. The

court’s discussion of the guidelines was an accurate statement about the general

purpose and methodology behind the sentencing guidelines. See generally USSG Ch.

1, Pt. A, intro. comment. The court never suggested that the Sentencing Commission

based the guideline on an analysis of hundreds of thousands of “neonatacide” cases,

or that Deegan’s offense was a typical fact pattern for second-degree murder.

The district court may have believed that the second-degree murder guideline

considered in Deegan’s case was based on empirical data and national experience, but

Deegan has not shown that this premise would have been incorrect. Citing United

States v. Grant, No. 07-242, 2008 WL 2485610, at *4-5 (D. Neb. June 16, 2008),

Deegan argues that amendments to the murder guidelines promulgated in 2002, 2004,

2006, and 2007 were not based on empirical data and national experience. But

whatever the merits of that position, these amendments say nothing about how the

Sentencing Commission established the 1997 guideline for second-degree murder, on

which Deegan’s advisory range was based.3

 

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observed that for violent crimes, “the Commission was careful to ensure that average

sentences . . . at least remained at current levels, and it raised them where the

Commission was convinced that they were inadequate.” Id. at 68. It explained that

“[f]or murder and aggravated assault, the Commission felt that past sentences were

inadequate since these crimes generally involved actual, as opposed to threatened,

violence.” Id. Nothing in these statements is inconsistent with an assumption that the

second-degree murder guideline was based on empirical data and national experience,

although the data and experience may have led the Commission to conclude that the

average sentence should be increased.

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Even with respect to the 1997 guideline, moreover, the district court simply

treated the advisory guideline range as an initial starting point, while determining the

final sentence after consideration of all of the § 3553(a) factors taken as a whole.

There is no showing that an erroneous assumption about the underlying basis for the

second-degree murder guideline drove the determination of Deegan’s sentence.

In sum, Deegan has not identified an obvious procedural error at sentencing.

The district court correctly calculated the advisory guideline range, allowed the parties

to present evidence and argument regarding the sentence to be imposed, recognized

its discretion to impose a sentence outside the advisory range, considered all of the §

3553(a) factors, determined the final sentence based on those factors, and adequately

explained its rationale.

III.

A.

We also conclude that Deegan’s sentence at the bottom of the advisory

guideline range is substantively reasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness

of the sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, see Gall, 552 U.S. at

41, cognizant that “it will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court

sentence – whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range – as

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substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir.

2009) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted). While many critics of the mandatory

federal sentencing system believed that the guidelines resulted in excessive terms of

imprisonment, the post-Booker system is not a one-way ratchet in favor of leniency.

A district judge who favors a tough sentence is entitled to the same degree of

deference as a district judge who opts for a lesser punishment.

Where, as here, a sentence imposed is within the advisory guideline range, we

typically accord it a presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Harris, 493

F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2007). The presumption “simply recognizes the real-world

circumstance that when the judge’s discretionary decision accords with the

Commission’s view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of

cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 350. But even

if we do not apply such a presumption here, on the view that Deegan’s offense is not

a “mine run” second-degree murder, the district court did not abuse its considerable

discretion by selecting a sentence of 121 months’ imprisonment. 

The record in this case includes evidence in aggravation and mitigation. As the

district court observed in its presentencing order, a court reasonably could view

Deegan’s offense as “unusually heinous, cruel, and brutal,” and deserving of harsh

punishment. She left a newborn baby alone in a basket in an empty house without

food and water for two weeks until the child died. Deegan countered with testimony

from an expert who believes, among other things, that women who commit

“neonaticide” are unlikely to reoffend, and that harsh punishment of such an offender

is unlikely to deter others from committing the same offense. Deegan also presented

evidence of her troubled personal history and family circumstances, and of course we

share our dissenting colleague’s condemnation of violence against American Indian

women.

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Deegan’s mitigating evidence convinced the district court that a sentence of

more than ten years, which the court had contemplated at the time of the guilty plea,

was greater than necessary to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. But we are

firm in our view that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to

impose a more lenient sentence. Whatever the deterrent effect of this sentence,

general or specific, and whatever Deegan’s personal history, the court was entitled to

consider the need for the sentence imposed to “reflect the seriousness of the offense,

to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). The district court was justified in saying that it could not

“ignore the fact that there was an innocent life that was lost,” and that there was a

“need to ensure that justice is done.” The court believed that justice in this case “lies

between the extremes of public opinion,” and that may be so. There likely are those,

like Deegan’s expert, who believe that a term of imprisonment is unnecessary, and

there may be others who feel that no term of imprisonment is too long for one who

murders a helpless infant in this manner. We need only determine whether the district

court’s middle ground is a permissible choice. Applying a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard, we conclude that the sentence of 121 month’s imprisonment is

reasonable with regard to § 3553(a).

B.

Our dissenting colleague contends that Deegan’s sentence is unreasonably long,

and that we should direct the district court to impose a shorter term of imprisonment.

We believe that such a disposition would be inconsistent with the substantial

deference now owed to the judgments of the sentencing courts. Cf. United States v.

Burns, 577 F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Bright, J., concurring) (asserting

that Gall “puts the discretion at sentencing in the district court, just where it should

be, with due regard for the guidelines and the statutes relating to the goals of

sentencing. Appellate courts are not sentencing courts.”). The guidelines are advisory

only, and we “must review all sentences – whether inside, just outside, or significantly

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outside the Guidelines range – under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall,

552 U.S. at 41. The question is not whether the former mandatory guideline system

would have called for a downward departure below the mandatory guideline range,

cf. post, at 38-41, but whether the district court’s sentence of 121 months’

imprisonment is reasonable in light of the statutory considerations described in §

3553(a).

To support its conclusion that the district court’s chosen sentence was

unreasonably harsh, the dissent cites a case involving a student at North Dakota State

University (“NDSU”) who was prosecuted in North Dakota state court and sentenced

to probation. The record of this case includes almost nothing about the NDSU case.

Defense counsel stated that his summary, recounted by the dissent, post, at 56, was

drawn from a newspaper article. The district court surely did not abuse its discretion

by failing to conform Deegan’s federal sentence to a North Dakota state court case

about which no evidence was presented.

We disagree, moreover, with the dissent’s contention that the district court

should have considered the “disparity” between Deegan’s sentence and the sentence

that may have been imposed if Deegan, like the NDSU student, had been prosecuted

in state court. Post, at 56-57, 59, 65-66. This argument contradicts the well-settled

proposition that “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants

with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(6), refers only to disparities among federal defendants. It would have been

error for the district court to consider potential federal/state sentencing disparities

under § 3553(a)(6). United States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 807-08 (8th Cir. 2006)

(“Unwarranted sentencing disparities among federal defendants remains the only

consideration under § 3553(a)(6) – both before and after Booker.”); United States v.

Deitz, 991 F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1993) (“If, at the time of sentencing, federal courts

were to take into consideration a potential state sentence based upon similar statecharged offenses, the Sentencing Commission’s goal of imposing uniformity upon

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4

Even if two different sentences had been imposed in federal court, moreover,

one district judge has no obligation after Booker to follow the decision of another

district judge. Cf. post, at 41 & n.25. District judges now are permitted to apply their

own policy views when determining what punishment is sufficient for a particular

offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009)

(per curiam); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007), and there

inevitably will be some disparity in the sentencing of similarly-situated offenders.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 263 (“We cannot and do not claim that use of a ‘reasonableness’

standard will provide the uniformity that Congress originally sought to secure.”).

-17-

federal sentences for similarly situated defendants would be impeded, not

furthered.”).4

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not commit

plain procedural error, and the court’s sentence of 121 months’ imprisonment is not

substantively unreasonable with regard to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judgment of the

district court is affirmed.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. 

This case concerns the crime of neonaticide, which is the killing of a newborn

child on the first day of life. This crime is practically unknown in the federal courts.

Neonaticide is a crime relating to family and domestic concerns and, thus, federal

courts do not generally deal with these crimes. Indeed, excluding habeas cases, my

research has disclosed only one other reported federal case discussing and deciding

a neonaticide crime. See United States v. Tom, 494 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d

and remanded to 327 F. App’x 93 (10th Cir. 2009).

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5

As a federal judge, I had never heard of the term “neonaticide” nor encountered

a case of neonaticide until this case. From reading the record, I daresay the same lack

of knowledge existed in the district court personnel until neonaticide was explained

by Dr. Phillip Resnick. The defense counsel, William D. Schmidt of Bismarck, North

Dakota, an assistant public defender, should be commended for his research on the

subject and in bringing Dr. Resnick to testify about neonaticide.

This judge has read and reviewed several hundred federal sentencing cases. Of

those, the procedure and sentence here is among the most grossly wrong and unfair

that I have ever encountered. The result: a harsh, discriminate, and improper sentence

upon an American Indian woman living on a reservation. The conduct of the district

court in this case and the majority’s affirmance violates every sentencing principle

enunciated by the Supreme Court after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

This one of a kind sentence by a federal sentencing judge, not a state judge as

would be the usual case, occurred only by reason of the defendant’s residence on an

Indian reservation in North Dakota. I justify the length of this dissent on the basis that

every aspect of the sentencing procedure and the substance of the sentence deserves

careful examination. This federal court on appeal should not approve a prison

sentence for this reservation crime which this judge believes is unfair and improper

under the law and facts.

-18-

In the view of this judge, the procedure followed and the imposition of a tenyear-plus prison sentence on Ms. Deegan, a young American Indian woman,

represents the most clear sentencing error that this dissenting judge has ever seen.5

For reversal, the dissent relies on the following Supreme Court cases: Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), Koon

v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), and the holdings in United States v. AlvizoTrujillo, 521 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Greene, 513 F.3d 904

(8th Cir. 2008). See also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91, 96, 109 (2007)

(discussing and commenting on sentencing procedure and stating the greatest respect

to variance from guidelines when particular case is outside the “heartland”).

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-19-

I.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTIONS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary of Contentions

Ms. Deegan’s crime consisted of a special sort of homicide called

“neonaticide,” well documented in medical and legal literature, which describes the

conduct of a parent, ordinarily the mother, who is often suffering from depression or

other mental illness causing the death of an infant child within twenty-four hours of

birth. 

First, Ms. Deegan’s conduct as neonaticide does not now, nor has it ever, come

within the “run-of-the-mine” guidelines for second-degree murder, the charge to

which Ms. Deegan pleaded guilty. But the district court mistakenly believed that this

case fell within the second-degree murder guidelines. Thus, the sentence imposed was

procedurally gross error. 

Second, the district court presumed that the guidelines were reasonable. This

is plain error. 

Third, because this case is outside the heartland of second-degree murder cases,

the district court’s 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis was flawed at its beginning, and this

case required imposition of a sentence completely apart from the guidelines and under

§ 3553(a). This the district court did not do.

Fourth, analysis of the § 3553(a) factors demonstrates that Ms. Deegan’s

sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court’s approach to sentencing

served to elevate a guidelines sentence above an individualized assessment of the facts

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and circumstances of this case. Each error compounded the next one and these

mistakes require reversal and remand.

Finally, the failure to follow proper sentencing procedures and methodology led

to a highly excessive sentence for Ms. Deegan. Her crime requires a different

approach than taken by the district court and approved by the majority.

B. Standard of Review

I express my disagreement with the majority’s application of plain error in

reviewing this sentence. In my view, defense counsel preserved the errors argued on

appeal.

The majority asserts:

On appeal, Deegan argues that the sentence of 121 months’

imprisonment is unreasonable, because the advisory guideline for

second-degree murder is not based on empirical data and national

experience, and because the sentence imposed is greater than necessary

to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing set forth in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). As we understand Deegan’s brief on appeal, she

argues that the district court committed both procedural and substantive

errors when imposing sentence. Deegan raised no procedural objection

in the district court, so we consider her claims of procedural error under

the plain-error standard. United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 945 (8th

Cir. 2008) which requires as conditions for relief that Deegan show an

obvious error that affected her substantial rights and seriously affected

the fairness, integrity, or reputation of judicial proceedings. United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). We review the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).

Maj. op. at 5. 

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-21-

Further, the majority reviews the following under the plain error standard: (a)

the district court’s failure to meaningfully discuss the § 3553(a) factors, id. at 6; (b)

treating the advisory guidelines as mandatory, id. at 9; (c) procedural error by

applying the 2007 Guidelines to the instant offense, id. at 10; and (d) applying the

second-degree murder guidelines to “this type of crime.” Id. at 11.

Comparing the sentencing transcript with Ms. Deegan’s brief establishes that

these errors were asserted in the district court and raised on appeal. At sentencing,

defense counsel, in responding to the prosecutor’s recommendation for a guideline

sentence of 121 months, asserted that: (a) the guideline sentence was far greater than

necessary (Sent. Tr. 46-47); (b) such a sentence was not warranted under the § 3553(a)

factors (Sent. Tr. 46-52); (c) a guideline sentence would result in a sentencing

disparity as compared to a neonaticide sentence imposed in a North Dakota state court

(Sent. Tr. 50-53); and (d) a variance, a non-guideline sentence, should be imposed

after proper consideration of the § 3553(a) factors (Sent. Tr. 55-56, 59). The district

court clearly recognized the request of defense counsel when the court said, “The

request in this case is for the imposition of a variance or a nonguideline sentence to

be imposed in accordance with 18 USC Section 3553(a).” Sent. Tr. 56 (emphasis

added).

The contentions raised on appeal, see Appellant’s Brief at 19-24, that the

sentence was “unreasonable,” “greater than necessary,” and that a guideline sentence

should not apply to Ms. Deegan, were the same arguments raised before the district

court.

Defense counsel should not need to say more to preserve error in a criminal

sentence. Ms. Deegan requested a non-guideline sentence and stated reasons in

support of that recommendation. When defense counsel asserted that the prosecutor’s

recommendation called for a sentence that was flawed and excessive, and requested

a lesser sentence, the sentencing issue should be considered fully preserved. See Rita,

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6

The dissent recognizes that in the usual case where the crime is in the heartland

of the guidelines, the claim that the court did not fully consider the § 3553(a) factors

will be plain error unless the defendant objects to the sentencing judge’s analysis of

the § 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 945 (8th Cir.

2008); Alvizo-Trujillo, 521 F.3d at 1018. But here we have a distinctly different

situation. This crime did not fit the guideline because it was outside the heartland.

The request by defense counsel here was for “a nonguideline sentence to be imposed

in accordance with 18 USC Section 3553(a).” Sent. Tr. 56. Moreover, the

circumstances here squarely come within 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which states that

“[i]n the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall impose an

appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes set forth in [§ 3553]

subsection (a)(2).”

Thus, when Ms. Deegan requested a non-guideline sentence, and the sentencing

judge denied the request and imposed a guideline sentence, nothing further needed to

be said to preserve the error. The failure to sentence completely outside the

guidelines, in light of the record here, should be reviewed as preserved error.

-22-

551 U.S. at 345 (error raised), 351 (sentencing procedures discussed); but see United

States v. Bain, 586 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2009).

To state that matters raised by Ms. Deegan should be considered as plain error

is incorrect. But in any event, the procedural and substantive mistakes here are great

and require reversal under any standard of review–plain error or preserved error.6

As will be discussed more fully, the prosecutor mistakenly told the sentencing

judge: 

The United States believes that the Sentencing Commission took into

account these type of events, these type of crimes when it put together

sentencing guidelines such as exist in the 1997 edition. Given that fact,

Your Honor, we believe that a guideline sentence would effectively meet

the requirements of Section 3553, all of those goals of sentencing.

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7

Dr. Resnick, the expert who examined Ms. Deegan, testified that he had

reviewed FBI reports, family and medical records, and an interview with Mr. Hale and

had not found any major contradictions. In other words, the supporting documents in

the case “substantiated Ms. Deegan’s version of what had gone on in her life.” Sent.

Tr. 16.

-23-

Sent. Tr. 43 (emphasis added). The sentencing judge adopted and echoed that

principle in imposing a guideline sentence of ten years and one month (121 months)

imprisonment, echoing a resounding “yes” to this incorrect advice as the court said the

guidelines are for people like you who “commit this type of crime with the same type

of criminal history that you have.” Sent. Tr. 59. And further adding, “I’m required

to impose those guidelines . . . .” Id. Such statements imply more than a presumption

that the guidelines apply to Ms. Deegan and constitute plain error. Thus, there exists

plain error in sentencing procedure leading to an excessive, improper, and unfair

sentence. See Alvizo-Trujillo, 521 F.3d at 1018. 

II.

BACKGROUND

To understand the errors in sentencing, this case requires a full accounting of

Ms. Deegan’s life. All of the facts discussed below were before the district court at

the sentencing hearing and were not disputed by the government.7

A. Childhood Abuse

Ms. Deegan’s life is marked by a history of extensive and cruel abuse. Her

alcoholic father beat her on an almost daily basis and dominated every aspect of life

in the Deegan family. Ms. Deegan reported having out-of-body experiences during

the beatings, as if she was watching herself being assaulted from outside of her body.

Some of the beatings were so severe that her father kept her home from school to

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8

In today’s world we speak of similar conduct as a form of torture–water

boarding. The abuse this child suffered is almost beyond imagination. 

-24-

avoid reports to Child Protective Services. She and her siblings were eventually

removed from her parents’ house due to the abuse, placed in a variety of foster homes,

and periodically returned to her parents’ house. While in foster care, Ms. Deegan was

separated from her siblings where she experienced physical abuse from some of her

foster family members. In conversation with Dr. Resnick, Ms. Deegan said, “I think

I will be forgiven [by my maker]. I’ve lived my hell throughout my childhood.” Add.

2, p.12 (Resnick Report).

Ms. Deegan also suffered extensive and cruel sexual abuse. At five years of

age, her father’s drinking buddies began sexually abusing her. By age nine, five or

six perpetrators had forced her to participate in oral, vaginal, and anal sex. One of the

perpetrators held her head under water several times to make her submissive and

threatened her so she would not disclose the abuse.8

 At age eleven, the sexual abuse

ended when Ms. Deegan finally disclosed the abuse to her mother. Her father

responded by beating her for being a “slut and allowing it to happen.” Add. 2, p. 5

(Resnick Report).

Ms. Deegan spent much of her childhood caring for and protecting her six

younger siblings. Her siblings reported that she frequently suffered physical abuse in

their stead. As an adult the abuse continued and Ms. Deegan protected her siblings

from her father’s alcoholic, depressive, and abusive states. On one occasion, her

father attacked her while she was pregnant with her second child. She jumped through

a window to escape. Add. 2, p. 7 (Resnick Report).

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9

FBI reports support Ms. Deegan’s account of the extensive abuse she suffered.

Mr. Hale acknowledged in an interview with the FBI that he had physically,

emotionally, and verbally abused Ms. Deegan on a regular basis. Mr. Hale further

acknowledged that he was a bad husband, Ms. Deegan was a good woman, and Ms.

Deegan had done a good job raising their children without his assistance.

10Ms. Deegan’s medical records document this injury:

7/29/97: Twenty-four year old patient comes in to evaluate injuries

sustained in an altercation with her boyfriend last night. She is 37 weeks

pregnant. She wishes to press charges. Her boyfriend was inebriated.

Her boyfriend was with another woman. A brutal fight ensued ending

up with the patient being thrown out on the gravel with her left leg

extended at a considerable angle and this caused a major injury we are

now inspecting. The pregnancy seems to be unaffected. Diagnosis:

Multiple contusions and abrasions. Hip ligament strain left, moderately

severe. (She had her baby two days later.)

-25-

B. Abuse from Shannon Hale

At age fifteen, Ms. Deegan began a relationship with Shannon Hale, the son of

one of her foster parents. Mr. Hale continued the abuse. On one occasion, after Mr.

Hale physically assaulted her, Ms. Deegan was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for

thirty days to receive assistance for the domestic violence she had endured. She bore

four children fathered by Mr. Hale, including the infant victim in this case. 

After Ms. Deegan’s third child was born, she became depressed. At this time

in her life, Mr. Hale was physically abusing her two to three times per week, forcing

her to have sexual intercourse with him, and refusing to care for their children.9

 He

was not present at any of the births or to take Ms. Deegan home after the deliveries

of the children. Mr. Hale continued abusing Ms. Deegan throughout their

relationship, including during her pregnancies. Prenatal care records document that

two days before she delivered their third child, Mr. Hale choked her and threw her

onto gravel, causing injuries that persisted for several months.10

Appellate Case: 08-2299 Page: 25 Date Filed: 05/25/2010 Entry ID: 3667845
Add. 2, p.16 (Resnick Report).

11Greek mythology, as related by Homer in the Odyssey, tells the tale of Scylla

and Charybdis and provides an apt metaphor of Ms. Deegan’s dire circumstances.

The story relates that two sea monsters, Scylla and Charybdis, guarded the Strait of

Messina between Sicily and Calabria in Italy and gave sailors inescapable threats–pass

close to Scylla and be eaten by the monster, or veer to the other side closer to

Charybdis and be sucked in and destroyed by a whirlpool. S.H., Butcher and A. Lang,

The Odyssey of Homer 199-200 (MacMillan & Co. 1922) (1879). In today’s

vernacular, Ms. Deegan’s choice was between a “Rock and a Hard Place.”

-26-

Despite the abuse, Ms. Deegan did not leave Mr. Hale permanently because he

repeatedly assured her that he would reduce his drinking and stop abusing her. Ms.

Deegan reported that she sometimes went to live with her parents when the abuse was

most severe, but then her father would physically and verbally abuse her. Ms. Deegan

also explained that she did not feel that she could leave Mr. Hale because of her

relationship with his mother. Ms. Deegan reported that Mr. Hale’s mother “seemed

to make things okay,” caused her to feel safe, and encouraged her to stay with Mr.

Hale for the children’s sake. Ms. Deegan feared that if she left Mr. Hale, his mother,

a prominent member of the Indian community, would acquire custody of her

children.11

When Ms. Deegan learned she was pregnant with a fourth child (the child

victim), she did not believe she was really pregnant. Ms. Deegan reported she had not

developed a plan for coping with the birth of a fourth child because she had put the

pregnancy out of her mind. She had previously suffered three miscarriages. She

reported feeling so depressed that she could barely take care of herself and her three

children.

Ms. Deegan’s state of despair and depression was not merely the result of the

physical, verbal, and sexual abuse she suffered. Ms. Deegan lived in extreme poverty

and isolation. Both Ms. Deegan and Mr. Hale were unemployed. Ms. Deegan

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-27-

sustained herself and her family on food stamps and whatever money she could

acquire to provide food for her young children: ages one, two, and five. When Ms.

Deegan obtained any money, Mr. Hale took it and bought methamphetamine. 

Dr. Resnick explained why Ms. Deegan stayed with Mr. Hale before the

homicide of her fourth child: 

1) Ms. Deegan was raised in a home in which she saw her father

repeatedly beat her mother. This aberrant model of marriage was

all she knew.

2) Ms. Deegan feared that if she left Shannon Hale she would lose

her relationship with the Hale family. . . . Irene Hale encouraged

her to stay with Shannon so her children would have a father.

3) Ms. Deegan had virtually no financial resources. Shannon Hale

used any available money for his alcohol and methamphetamine

addiction. Irene Hale at least made sure that Ms. Deegan had

groceries so she could feed her daughters and herself.

4) Based on Ms. Deegan’s foster care experience, she knew that

leaving one family situation sometimes resulted in a worse

situation rather than an improvement.

5) As is common in men who batter their wives, Shannon Hale told

Ms. Deegan that he would not assault her again and promised to

control his drinking and use of illegal drugs.

6) Ms. Deegan did not have a viable alternative to staying with

Shannon Hale. If she took her daughters to live in her parental

home, she and her daughters would be subjected to physical and

emotional abuse by her father. No shelter for battered women was

available in her area.

7) Ms. Deegan was fearful that if she left Shannon, Irene Hale, who

enjoyed an excellent reputation in the community, would take her

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-28-

daughters away from her. . . . Caring for her three daughters was

the most important thing in her life. She feared that if Shannon

Hale attempted to raise her three young daughters, they would not

be safe because of his methamphetamine addiction and his

demonstrated propensity for physical abuse. 

8) Ms. Deegan feared that if she sought counseling for her marital

problems, she might lose her daughters’ custody.

9) On the prior occasions when Ms. Deegan sought help from

individuals and institutions, they failed to assist or protect her. 

Add. 2, p. 20-21 (Resnick Report).

C. The Birth Circumstances 

On October 20, 1998, at twenty-five years of age, alone in her mobile home

with her three children, Ms. Deegan went into labor with her fourth child. She

endured the labor alone, did not tell anyone she was in labor, and delivered the child

herself. She reported not feeling anything physically from the labor and that she had

assisted the infant to breathe when he was born. Ms. Deegan cleaned, diapered, and

fed her child. She then put clothes on him, placed him in a basket, and left him in the

home alone. When asked why she left her child in the home alone, she replied:

I couldn’t take anymore. I couldn’t handle it. I had everything on my

shoulders. I couldn’t even help myself. I had nobody to help me. I had

no job, no nothing. I had all my babies to care for, a welfare mom. I had

the feeling of being worthless. What could I do? I was overwhelmed

and depressed. I didn’t want to live through any of it anymore. I didn’t

want to be there anymore, as a spouse, as a mother, as a daughter.

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12Essentially, Ms. Deegan gave the same characterization of the circumstances

to the FBI:

Deegan stated that Shannon Hale was drinking heavily and using large

amounts of drugs including methamphetamine. He was frequently gone

for days or weeks at a time. Neither Deegan nor Hale were working, and

she was having difficulty finding money to feed her children. What little

money she did manage to find, Hale would take and use for drugs.

Deegan essentially was the sole provider and care giver for herself and

her three children. She felt that having another child to care for was

more than she could handle. So, she left Baby Doe alone to die because

she felt she could not care for another child under the circumstances.

Add. 2, p. 17 (Resnick Report).

-29-

Add. 2, p. 11 (Resnick Report).12 Ms. Deegan returned to her home approximately

two weeks later. Ms. Deegan put her son’s body in a suitcase and placed the suitcase

in a ditch near her home. The body was discovered approximately one year later. 

With an understanding of the background of Ms. Deegan and the circumstances

surrounding the infant’s death, I turn to a discussion of neonaticide. 

III.

NEONATICIDE

Forty-three years ago, psychiatrist Dr. Phillip Resnick became interested in the

topic of parents causing the death of their children. He has written nearly 100 articles,

several on neonaticide and infanticide, and frequently presents and lectures on this

subject. Every year he teaches a course on neonaticide for the American Psychiatric

Association. He is considered the foremost neonaticide expert in this country.

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13See Drescher-Burke, K., Krall, J., and Penick, A., Discarded infants and

neonaticide: A review of the literature, Berkeley, CA: National Abandoned Infants

Assistance Resource Center, University of California at Berkeley, 4-5 (2004).

14Id.

15See Janet Ford, Note, Susan Smith and Other Homicidal Mothers – In Search

of the Punishment that Fits the Crime, 3 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 521, 538 (1996).

-30-

As defined by Dr. Resnick: 

[N]eonaticide is simply the killing of a newborn infant on the first day

of life. It’s actually a term that I coined in an article I wrote in 1969

where I was distinguishing that type of killing of a baby, which has very

different characteristics, from the killing of a baby who is older or a

child. And so neonaticide has universally been accepted now as a

particular phenomenon when the baby is killed the first day of life.

Sent. Tr. 16. 

Dr. Resnick and other scholars explain the circumstances that lead to this tragic

crime. Such a mother is often in an overwhelming state of desperation at the time of

her infant’s birth and lacks adequate resources to mentally handle the situation of

delivering a child.13 She often conceals and denies her pregnancy, lacks insight into

the situation, shows poor judgment, is cognitively immature with limited intelligence,

and lacks sufficient coping skills.14 “[The] commonly reported profile [of a homicidal

mother] describes a woman usually in her twenties, who grew up or currently lives in

poverty, is under-educated, has a history of abuse (both physical and sexual), remains

isolated from social supports, has depressive and suicidal tendencies, and is usually

experiencing rejection by a male lover at the time of the murders.”15 

“Although the majority of women who commit neonaticide do not have any

long-term psychological pathologies, it is likely that often they experience abnormal

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16See Drescher-Burke, et al., supra note 9, at 5.

17See Ford, supra note 11, at 538.

-31-

mental functioning during their pregnancies.”16 “During a homicidal episode,

therefore, a mother may view a child as a mere extension of herself rather than as a

separate being. A mother’s suicidal inclinations may often transform into filial

homicide. In other words, killing her children may be much like killing herself.”17

In preparing to testify, Dr. Resnick conducted a six-hour interview of Ms.

Deegan and reviewed the relevant FBI, medical, psychiatric, and school records. He

diagnosed Ms. Deegan with suffering or having suffered from the following three

psychiatric disorders:

Major Depressive Disorder, recurrent, severe, without psychotic features

at the time of the homicide, now in partial remission. 

. . . . 

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, chronic.

This diagnosis is supported by Ms. Deegan’s history of exposure to

multiple traumatic events as a child of physical and sexual abuse. At the

time she had intense feelings of helplessness, horror, and the fear of

dying. . . . 

Dysthymic Disorder

This diagnosis is based on the fact that during Ms. Deegan’s childhood

she had a depressed mood for most of the day for more days than not for

several years. Her depression was manifested by overeating, insomnia,

low self esteem, and feelings of hopelessness.

Add. 2, p.13 (Resnick Report). Dr. Resnick explained that at the time Ms. Deegan

delivered her infant, she was severely depressed, overwhelmed by the state of her life,

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18Dissociation is “like an out-of-body experience” wherein the integrative

functions of the mind are dissociated from perception and experience. Sent. Tr. 35.

-32-

and “simply did not have the psychological resources to care for a fourth child.” Sent.

Tr. 36.

Dr. Resnick further testified that women who commit neonaticide are unable

to cope with the pregnancy and endure great pain at the expense of keeping the child’s

birth a secret:

[Such women] are willing to put themselves through a great deal of

anguish. They often will deliver the baby with no anesthesia, no pain

relief, no emotional support. They’ll stifle their screams, and that is how

intensely important it is for them not to have their family, who may be

in the house, actually know that they’re pregnant and having a baby. 

Sent. Tr. 33.

The manner in which Ms. Deegan delivered her child conforms with other

women’s acts of neonaticide. Ms. Deegan gave birth to the infant in the shower and

kept the birth a secret. She coped with the pain of childbirth by dissociating.18 Dr.

Resnick explained that just as Ms. Deegan had endured sexual assaults as a child by

having out-of-body experiences, she used dissociation to separate herself from the

intense pain of delivering the infant. 

Dr. Resnick also addressed Ms. Deegan’s belief that she was not pregnant. Dr.

Resnick explained that, as is common in cases of neonaticide, Ms. Deegan neither

planned for the killing of the infant or for the caring of the infant. As he succinctly

stated, “They just put it out of their minds.” Sent. Tr. 28-29. Dr. Resnick further

testified that in Ms. Deegan’s case, it was particularly easy for her to convince herself

that she was not pregnant because she had previously miscarried three times and had

experienced regular menstrual spotting during her prior pregnancies. Dr. Resnick

Appellate Case: 08-2299 Page: 32 Date Filed: 05/25/2010 Entry ID: 3667845
19Ms. Deegan left the infant fifty yards from her home. 

20When questioned as to why she placed the infant so close to her home, Ms.

Deegan replied, “I wanted the baby close to me and I did not want to let him go.”

Add. 2, p. 12 (Resnick Report).

21North Dakota enacted a Safe Haven Law in 2001. See N.D.C.C. § 50-25.1-15.

-33-

explained that even though Ms. Deegan may have known she was pregnant, she may

have made the assumption that she might miscarry or just did not accept that she was

truly pregnant. 

Dr. Resnick also testified that the manner in which Ms. Deegan carried out the

neonaticide indicated that it was an impulsive act. He explained, unlike one who

hides evidence of a crime, Ms. Deegan left her infant in a place where he “might have

been discovered and she would be caught.” Sent. Tr. 29.19 Dr. Resnick explained that

such conduct is not what one would expect from someone who is planning to take

another’s life and seeks to “get away with it.” Sent. Tr. 29. He further explained that

despite her psychological inability to cope with raising the child, Ms. Deegan still

sought to keep the infant close to her home because of her emotional attachment to

him.20 Dr. Resnick reasoned, “had it been other circumstances, [Ms. Deegan] would

have cherished the baby.” Sent. Tr. 30. 

Finally, Dr. Resnick testified that Ms. Deegan did not have a significant support

system from her family and community. She lived in a mobile home in a rural area

of North Dakota. She lacked the financial resources to leave her abusive and troubled

family life. Ms. Deegan did not have outreach services with which she could have

received assistance, nor were there shelters for victims of domestic violence. At the

time of her actions, North Dakota did not yet have a Safe Haven Law, whereby

parents could bring a child for which they felt unable to provide care.21 Further,

individuals and institutions had consistently failed Ms. Deegan when she needed help.

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It is apparent from Ms. Deegan’s background and the expert testimony in this

case that every adverse factor that may play some role in neonaticide was suffered to

an advanced degree by Ms. Deegan. As the dissent shows below, the district court

made two critical errors in evaluating the record. First, the court thought the

guidelines applied to this case. Second, the court recognized this testimony but failed

to properly apply this important evidence in imposing its sentence. 

IV.

REVIEW OF SENTENCING

A. Inapplicability of second-degree murder guidelines

Ms. Deegan’s crime of neonaticide was a unique sort of homicide and

completely unlike the usual and ordinary killings that constitute second-degree murder

under federal law. As I have already observed, federal courts do not ordinarily deal

with these types of cases, which may be grist for the mills of state courts. Only

because this neonaticide occurred on an Indian reservation does this case become one

of federal jurisdiction. There exists no basis in the statements of the Sentencing

Commission or in reviewing federal appellate second-degree murder cases to conclude

that the crime of neonaticide comes within the federal second-degree murder

sentencing guidelines.

First, consider the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the goals of the United

States Sentencing Commission. It is axiomatic that the Sentencing Reform Act,

through the imposition of mandatory guidelines, worked a sea-change in federal

sentencing. But even then, Congress recognized that the goals of certainty and

uniformity must in some instances yield to unique circumstances:

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These provisions introduce a totally new and comprehensive

sentencing system that is based upon a coherent philosophy. They rely

upon detailed guidelines for sentencing similarly situated offenders in

order to provide for a greater certainty and uniformity in sentencing. 

S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221 (emphasis

added). Likewise, the Sentencing Commission instructs that:

The sentencing court must select a sentence from within the guideline

range. If, however, a particular case presents atypical features, the Act

allows the court to depart from the guidelines and sentence outside the

prescribed range.

U.S.S.G. ch.1, pt. A, intro cmt. n.2 (1997) (emphasis added). Thus both Congress and

the Commission contemplated that not every crime would fall within the ambit of the

guidelines. 

The presentence report is lamentable in this regard. Despite the seemingly

obvious fact that neonaticide is an unusual crime in federal court, the presentence

report makes no mention that this is an “atypical” case. Even more distressing, the

presentence report fails to indicate much in the way of the abusive circumstances Ms.

Deegan faced during her childhood and at the time she gave birth to the infant victim.

These circumstances, detailed so graphically in this dissent, were simply not a part of

the presentence report, which asserted that no factors warranted departure from the

guidelines. 

Far worse than the omissions from the presentence report were the prosecutor’s

statements at sentencing, which lack any basis in fact or law, about the applicability

of the guidelines to Ms. Deegan’s conduct. At sentencing, Ms. Deegan’s counsel

requested a non-guideline sentence. But the prosecutor mistakenly informed the

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district court that the Sentencing Commission took this type of crime into

consideration in adopting the guidelines for second-degree murder:

MR. HOCHHALTER: Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor, the

United States Sentencing Commission was in existence back as early as

the late eighties and certainly at the time of this event, and certainly at

the time of events across the country where, as Dr. Resnick has pointed

out, this has been occurring for many years. The United States believes

that the Sentencing Commission took into account these type of events,

these type of crimes when it put together sentencing guidelines such as

exist in the 1997 edition. Given that fact, Your Honor, we believe that

a guideline sentence would effectively meet the requirements of Section

3553, all of those goals of sentencing.

Sent. Tr. 42-43 (emphasis added). After this statement, defense counsel again urged,

to no avail, that a guideline sentence was far greater than necessary. 

Despite defense counsel’s request, the district court determined – entirely

without precedent – that the guidelines apply to “this type” of crime and that it

believed application of the guidelines was “reasonable.” The court stated:

Well, I have carefully reviewed the presentence report, and I adopt

the factual findings and the sentencing guideline calculations spelled out

in that presentence report that establish that this offense carries a total

adjusted offense level of 32, a criminal history category of 1.

. . . .

We have sentencing guidelines in the federal system that are

designed to ensure that sentences are consistent and uniform throughout

the country for people that commit this type of crime with the same type

of criminal history that you have. The sentencing guidelines have been

in effect for almost 20 years, and they are designed to provide some

honesty in sentencing and to achieve some consistency in the federal

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system, and they’re based upon an analysis of hundreds of thousands of

cases. Every year there are hundreds of thousands of cases that – in

which defendants are sentenced around the country, and the Sentencing

Commission compiles all that data and they try to develop sentencing

guidelines that are fair and are reasonable.

In this case the sentencing guidelines provide for a sentence range

of 121 to 151 months. That’s 10 to 12-and-a-half years. I’m required to

impose those guidelines that were in effect in October of 1998.

. . . . 

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it’s my judgment,

Ms. Deegan, that you shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of

Prisons to be imprisoned for a period of 121 months. I am agreeing with

the Government’s recommendation in this case and adhering to the

guidelines because I believe that they are reasonable.

Sent. Tr. 55, 59, 60-61 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the district court’s belief,

no basis exists to place neonaticide within the mine-run guidelines for second-degree

murder.

The foundation statements for application of the sentencing guidelines in this

case amounted to error of great proportions. Once Dr. Resnick’s report became

known, a modicum of research by any of the persons engaged in the sentencing

process would have easily disclosed that the guidelines did not contemplate crimes

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22The majority claims, “The [district] court never suggested that the Sentencing

Commission based the guideline on an analysis of hundreds of thousands of

‘neonaticide’ cases, or that Deegan’s offense was a typical fact pattern for seconddegree murder.” Maj. op. at 12. The record does not support such an interpretation.

I emphasize again the district court’s statement: “We have sentencing guidelines in

the federal system that are designed to ensure that sentences are consistent and

uniform throughout the country for people that commit this type of crime with the

same type of criminal history that you have.” Sent. Tr. 59 (emphasis added).

23Koon was superseded on other grounds by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)

(providing for de novo review of departures). See also Rita, 551 U.S. at 361 (Stevens,

J., concurring). But of course, de novo review no longer applies after United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

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such as Ms. Deegan’s.22 An obligation to inform the judge of the applicable

sentencing procedures and law rested on the prosecutor.

In the seminal case of Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996),23 the Court

explained that the then-mandatory guidelines carve out a “heartland” of typical cases

and the Court provided an approach for delineating which cases fall within that

heartland. Koon concerned the well-publicized conduct of Los Angeles police

clubbing an arrestee, Rodney King, with their police batons. Id. at 86-87. In Koon,

the applicable guidelines called for a sentencing range of 70 to 87 months’

imprisonment for the convicted police officers. Id. at 89. The district court granted

a downward departure for several reasons, which the Ninth Circuit rejected. United

States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994). The police officers petitioned for

certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Koon, 518 U.S. at 91. 

In the process of reviewing the sentence, the Court explained the difference

between ordinary or typical guideline cases and the “unusual” one: 

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A district judge now must impose on a defendant a sentence falling

within the range of the applicable Guideline, if the case is an ordinary

one.

. . . . 

The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each

guideline as carving out a ‘heartland,’ a set of typical cases

embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.

When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a

particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct

significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider

whether a departure is warranted. 

. . . . 

The Commission, in turn, says it has formulated each Guideline to apply

to a heartland of typical cases. Atypical cases were not “adequately

taken into consideration,” and factors that may make a case atypical

provide potential bases for departure.

Id. at 92-94 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court noted that because of Mr. King’s provocative behavior, the

guidelines should not apply. Id. at 105. The Court quoted the district court’s analysis

of heartland cases:

However, the convicted offenses fall under the same Guideline Sections

that would apply to a jailor, correctional officer, police officer or other

state agent who intentionally used a dangerous weapon to assault an

inmate, without legitimate cause to initiate a use of force.

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24This December 8, 2008, letter is on file in this writer’s office. This writer

provided copies to the panel.

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The two situations are clearly different. Police officers are always

armed with ‘dangerous weapons’ and may legitimately employ those

weapons to administer reasonable force. Where an officer’s initial use

of force is provoked and lawful, the line between a legal arrest and an

unlawful deprivation of civil rights within the aggravated assault

Guideline is relatively thin. The stringent aggravated assault Guideline,

along with its upward adjustments for use of a deadly weapon and bodily

injury, contemplates a range of offenses involving deliberate and

unprovoked assaultive conduct. The Guidelines do not adequately

account for the differences between such ‘heartland’ offenses and the

case at hand.

Id. at 102-03 (quoting Koon v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 769, 787 (C.D. Cal. 1993)).

Applying this rationale, whether Ms. Deegan’s conduct fell outside the

heartland and therefore was not contemplated by the sentencing guidelines depends

on whether her conduct significantly differed from the norm. “The norm” is certainly

not what we have here–an American Indian woman so beset by the serious problems

in her life she cannot cope with another child, cannot think with logic, and believes

she has no alternative but to run away and abandon her newborn child. Tragic yes,

typical no!

Is that just this writer’s assumption? What is in and what is out of the

heartland? To determine whether the Commission contemplated neonaticide by a

mother in its guidelines for second-degree murder, this writer inquired of the

Sentencing Commission. The response from Glenn Schmitt, Director of the Office

of Research and Data for the United States Sentencing Commission, is of great

interest:24

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We reviewed 157,000 federal criminal cases sentenced since June 2006

(the date when our records became stored electronically, which enables

us to review them more quickly than when they were stored off-site in

paper). We found 605 cases in which the guideline providing for the

highest punishment as either murder (2A1.1), 2nd degree murder

(2A1.2), voluntary manslaughter (2A1.3), or involuntary manslaughter

(2A1.4). Of these, the offender was a woman in 51 cases. We’ve gone

back into each of the 51 cases and reviewed them in light of your

inquiry.

. . . . 

In only one case did we find facts that meet the definition of neonaticide.

In that case a 26-year-old mother gave birth to a child (her fourth) at

home. She cleaned him, diapered[] him[,] dressed him, and fed him.

She then placed him in a basket and left eh [sic] house with her other

three children leaving the baby alone for two weeks. She testified that

she knew the baby would die. When she returned and found him dead,

she placed him in a suitcase and placed the suitcase in a ditch near her

residence on an Indian reservation where it was discovered. 

. . . . 

. . . As you can see from this analysis, cases like this are exceedingly rare

in the federal system. . . .

Mr. Schmitt’s letter reflects that the Sentencing Commission was unable to locate

another case of neonaticide besides the present case, which it described. Similarly,

my research of non-habeas, federal appellate second-degree murder cases from 1975

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25I briefly mentioned the Tom case in my introduction. In Tom, on appeal after

reversal and remand in United States v. Tom, 494 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2007), the

Tenth Circuit affirmed a variance from the second-degree murder guideline range of

168-210 months to 70 months’ imprisonment for a boyfriend who assisted in the

killing of his 15-year-old girlfriend’s son. 327 F. App’x at 94. This teenager gave

birth in the bathroom of her mother’s trailer on the Navajo Reservation, pleaded guilty

to first-degree murder, and was sentenced to 44 months’ probation. 327 F. App’x at

99. It is worthy of special note that this crime was committed on an Indian reservation

and the defendants were sentenced in a federal district court.

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to the present discloses only one other clear case of neonaticide, with a drastically

lesser sentence than that imposed on Ms. Deegan.25

Further, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), makes clear that the district

court erred in imposing a guideline sentence. In Rita, the Court reaffirmed that the

Sentencing Commission intended for the guidelines to apply to the typical case but not

to cases outside the “heartland.” See Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (“[The judge] may hear

arguments by prosecution or defense that the Guidelines sentence should not apply,

perhaps because (as the Guidelines themselves foresee) the case at hand falls outside

the ‘heartland’ to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply,

USSG § 5K2.0[.]”). As the Court further explained, in a run of the mine case, the

“Guidelines [ ] seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in

practice.” Id. at 350. Therefore, “[a]n individual judge who imposes a sentence

within the range recommended by the Guidelines thus makes a decision that is fully

consistent with the Commission’s judgment in general.” Id.

Rita establishes that no neonaticide case was considered in developing the

guidelines. The Court in Rita stated that the Commission employed an empirical

approach when developing the guidelines by examining tens of thousands of

sentences. Id. at 349. The paucity of reported federal cases illustrates that neonaticide

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26In describing Rita, the Court in Gall stated, “we held that when a district

judge’s discretionary decision in a particular case accords with the sentence the United

States Sentencing Commission deems appropriate ‘in the mine run of cases,’ the court

of appeals may presume that the sentence is reasonable.” 552 U.S. at 40 (quoting

Rita, 551 U.S. at 351).

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cases were not included in the sampling. Thus, a neonaticide case clearly falls outside

the “heartland” for second-degree murder sentences. Moreover, because neonaticide

is not accounted for by the guidelines, a guideline sentence is not “a decision that is

fully consistent with the Commission’s judgment in general.” See id. at 350.

When the prosecutor asserted, “[t]he United States believes that the Sentencing

Commission took into account these types of events,” Sent. Tr. 43, it is obvious that

he had done no legal or other research on the matter. Yes, the Sentencing

Commission examined second-degree murder cases when it formulated the guidelines

for that offense. But that certainly does not mean the Commission contemplated

neonaticide when formulating a sentencing range for second-degree murder offenses.

The prosecutor’s incorrect statement became an error of law when the judge

agreed that a guideline sentence needed to be applied. The judge believed that the

guideline sentence in this particular case was “reasonable” because “[the guidelines]

are designed to provide some honesty in sentencing and to achieve some consistency

in the federal system, and they’re based upon an analysis of hundreds of thousands of

cases.” Sent. Tr. 59. The judge stated that the guidelines apply “for people that

commit this type of crime with the same type of criminal history that you [Ms.

Deegan] have.” Id. (emphasis added). But this conclusion is wrong.

In Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), the Court affirmed the sentencing

principles described in Rita.26 The Court made clear that a district court should begin

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all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guidelines range and

that the guidelines apply in “mine run” cases. Gall, 552 U.S. at 40, 49. This case falls

so far from the heartland of guideline sentencing that it is a complete stranger to

crimes ordinarily charged and considered as second-degree murder. As such, the

district court significantly erred in sentencing when it concluded that the guidelines

provided a “reasonable” sentence for neonaticide.

The inapplicability of the second-degree murder guidelines to this case requires

reversal and remand. The district court should not have applied a guideline sentence

because this is not a “mine run” case. Instead, the district court should have focused

significant attention on the § 3553(a) factors. As detailed in the following section,

Rita explains that the appropriateness of a district court’s § 3553(a) analysis depends

on the circumstances of the case. 551 U.S. at 356. The circumstances here require a

detailed and thorough analysis of the statutory sentencing factors, which the

sentencing judge failed to do.

The majority reasons that Ms. Deegan’s sentence is proper even if the case is

not a run-of-the-mine case. Maj. op. at 14. That approach is wrong. Ms. Deegan’s

crime is not a run-of-the-mine case. The district court erred at the first step of the

sentencing procedure. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 350-51. Based on Rita and Gall, the

district court erred in sentencing Ms. Deegan, and her sentence must be vacated.

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B. Presumption of Reasonableness

The district court stated it was “required” to impose the guidelines that were in

effect in 1998. Sent. Tr. 59. This amounts to a presumption and more that the

guideline is reasonable. The further comment, “I am agreeing with the Government’s

recommendation in this case and adhering to the guidelines because I believe that they

are reasonable[,]” in effect presumed the guidelines sentence was reasonable. Sent.

Tr. 61. Such an approach is plain error in this circuit. See Alvizo-Trujillo, 521 F.3d

at 1018 (stating that language that such a presumption applies is “a significant

procedural error”); Greene, 513 F.3d at 907. 

Rita makes clear that “[i]n determining the merits of these arguments [that the

guidelines should not apply], the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal

presumption that the guidelines sentence should apply.” 551 U.S. at 351 (emphasis

added). Further, as stated in Greene, the district court’s mandate is not to impose a

“reasonable” sentence, but “to impose ‘a sentence sufficient, but not greater than

necessary, to comply with the purposes’ of § 3553(a)(2).” 513 F.3d at 907 (quoting

United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006)).

C. Section 3553(a)

I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the district court did not err in

considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 

In discussing sentencing procedure, the Court in Rita observed that the

sentencing court must give reasons for the sentence “in the typical case.” 551 U.S. at

356-57. Importantly, the Court adds:

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The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to

write, what to say, depends upon circumstances.

. . . . 

In the present context, a statement of reasons is important. The

sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court

that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis

for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority. . . .

Circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision

upon the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a

proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional

mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case

before him is typical.

Id.

As explained, Ms. Deegan’s crime was not “the typical case.” Therefore, the

district court could not just rely upon the Sentencing Commission’s reasoning that the

guideline sentence is a proper one. Instead, the district court needed to consider all

of the § 3553(a) factors and make an individualized assessment based on the facts

presented. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50. 

The § 3553(a) factors include:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed–

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

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(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment

in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available; 

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for–

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the

applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines– 

. . . . 

(5) any pertinent policy statement– 

. . . . 

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar

conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). With respect to § 3553(a), the sentencing judge made these

comments at the sentencing hearing:

The request in this case is for the imposition of a variance or a

nonguideline sentence to be imposed in accordance with 18 USC Section

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3553(a). And I am very familiar with each and every one of those

sentencing factors that I’m required to consider in every case. And

believe me, I’ve carefully considered them in this case.

. . . .

In this case I have spent considerable time reflecting not only on

the presentence report, but on the sentencing memorandums of the

parties. I’ve carefully reviewed Dr. Peterson’s psychological evaluation

that I ordered. I’ve carefully reviewed Dr. Resnick’s report. I’ve read

it over at least three times. I’ve read every letter that was submitted in

this case, letters of support. I have reviewed the DVD that was shown

here in the courtroom several times. I’ve considered the testimony of Dr.

Resnick today and the arguments of counsel.

And I was very impressed with Dr. Resnick’s report and his

testimony here today. To me it was helpful and insightful, and I have

real respect for his opinions. He has – he’s a nationally renowned

specialist who has testified in some of the most famous cases that we

have experienced here in the United States. And his report was a very

reasonable, insightful report, and I have far better insight into what went

on in this case after reviewing Dr. Resnick’s report than I ever had at the

time that I took a change of plea from Ms. Deegan.

And I certainly have a much better understanding today as to all

the contributing factors and stressors that existed in her life back in 1998.

And I know that you haven’t had an easy life, Ms. Deegan. I know that

it was plagued with physical abuse and sexual abuse, both at the hands

of your father and the hands of the father of your children.

. . . .

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And believe me, I have real compassion for you and your family

and what you have gone through. . . .

But I also need to ensure that justice is done, and I don’t know if

anybody knows what justice is in this case. I reflected upon Mr.

Hochhalter’s [the prosecutor’s] comment in his brief that justice lies

between the extremes of public opinion, and that’s probably a pretty fair

assessment of where things lie in this case.

But after careful review of this entire record, I have in this case –

and I’m aware of my discretion and authority to impose a nonguideline

sentence or to depart from the guidelines. I have chosen in this case to

impose a guideline sentence. I’m not going to exercise my discretion

and depart and impose a nonguideline sentence because I believe that the

sentence range that’s been provided for in the sentencing guidelines in

this particular case is reasonable. . . .

Sent. Tr. 56-59.

The majority finds this a satisfactory analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. I do not.

The district court demonstrates familiarity with the sentencing record, but offers no

analysis of the record as it relates to the statutory factors. 

To be sure, the district court states, “I have carefully considered all of the

factors.” But this statement does not constitute an “explanation” for why a ten-year

sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (stating

a failure to “adequately explain” a chosen sentence is significant procedural error).

A “statement of reasons” explaining a particular sentence is not equivalent to stating

“I have considered all of the factors.” As explained in Rita, “[i]n the present context

[§ 3553(a) analysis], a statement of reasons is important. The sentencing judge should

set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’

arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking

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27I recognize that § 3553(a) does not “insist” upon a full opinion in every case,

Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, but in a case like this, which presents circumstances far outside

the ballpark of normal cases, see Rita, 551 U.S. at 365 (Stevens, J., concurring), the

district court’s explanation for imposing a ten-year sentence is insufficient. Here we

have unstated “considerations” but almost nothing more.

28Furthermore, applying the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing may

be unconstitutional. See Maj. op. at 10.

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authority.” 551 U.S. at 356.27 In my view, the district court never justified its

sentence under § 3553(a). It becomes so very plain that the district court made the

choice of a guideline sentence. However, it must follow that if the guidelines do not

apply to Ms. Deegan’s non-heartland crime, the court needed to explain its sentence

with respect to every factor under § 3553(a) in order to arrive at a proper sentence.

The district court’s “reasons” for imposing this sentence are wholly inadequate.

The district court states, “I cannot ignore the fact that there was an innocent life

that was lost, but believe me, I understand why you took the steps that you did. . . .”

Sent. Tr. 60. This seems to be a “reason” for the sentence. But every neonaticide

causes the death of a newborn child. That statement alone cannot justify this ten-year

sentence.

The district court states, “I don’t know if anybody knows what justice is in this

case,” but justice is reflected by the brief of the prosecutor that “justice lies between

the extremes of public opinion. . . .” Sent. Tr. 58. Wrong! Public opinion should not

factor into a sentence. The factors are those in section 3553(a). Public opinion is not

disclosed by the record in this case.

The district court states it was “obligated to apply the [1998] guidelines,” and

also noted that if it applied the 2008 Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, Ms.

Deegan’s sentence “would be in the range of 19-and-a-half to 24-and-a-half years.”

Sent. Tr. 55, 59-60. Wrong! The faulty underlying premise of both comments is that

the guidelines contemplated neonaticide.28 

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The other “reason” offered by the district court for its sentence is the belief that

a guideline sentence is reasonable. This is simply not supported by the law. As

previously discussed, this is not a mine-run case to which the second-degree murder

guidelines apply. In other words, the district court could not simply “rest[] his

decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a

proper sentence. . . .” Rita, 551 U.S. at 357. Unfortunately, the district court did

exactly that in sentencing Ms. Deegan. 

But even more erroneous, in finding the guidelines “reasonable,” the district

court stood sentencing procedure on its head. As explained in Greene, a district

court’s job is not to impose a “reasonable” sentence. 513 F.3d at 907. The district

court’s job is to impose a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply

with the purposes of § 3553(a). Id. Reasonableness is the appellate standard of

review in judging whether a district court has accomplished that task. Id. Analysis

of the § 3553(a) factors demonstrates the unreasonableness of Ms. Deegan’s ten-year

sentence.

1. Circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the defendant

This dissent amply describes the nature and circumstances of the offense and

the history and characteristics of the defendant. This factor favors leniency. The

district court never explained how the nature and circumstances of the offense and

history and characteristics of Ms. Deegan supported its determination that a ten-year

sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary. 

2. Deterrence and recidivism

As to deterrence, Dr. Resnick testified that incarcerating Ms. Deegan would not

likely deter other individuals from committing neonaticide. He explained that

deterrence was unlikely for several reasons, including:

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[T]hat since Ms. Deegan’s crime, safe haven laws have been passed in

all 50 states, and now if a woman feels overwhelmed by a baby, whether

she’s a teenager or whatever, she can drop that baby off at a hospital or

a police station, no questions asked, and not have to kill the baby. And

there have been more than a thousand drop-offs since those laws have

begun to be passed in 1999.

Secondly, when a women [sic] commits neonaticide, most of the

cases it is a teenager. Actually, the mean age for neonaticide in the

United States is age 19, and most of these young women are . . . willing

to put themselves through a great deal of anguish. 

. . . .

And women who are willing to put themselves through that I don’t

think are going to be significantly influenced by whether someone is

sentenced to ten years or two years or probation.

Sent. Tr. 33-34.

As to recidivism of Ms. Deegan, Dr. Resnick stated:

Ms. Deegan presents an extremely low risk that she would commit any

further conduct which was criminal in nature. With regard to harming

a future baby, that’s a nonissue because Ms. Deegan has had a tubal

ligation. She’s not going to have any more babies.

With regard to other criminal conduct, Ms. Deegan has been a

law-abiding citizen her entire life, has no juvenile offenses, no adult

offenses, not an alcohol or drug abuser, which is associated with

criminality, has shown considerable remorse for what she has done, and

is no longer in the desperate situation that she was in October 1998,

where she was abused, overwhelmed, did not feel that she could care for

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the baby, didn’t feel she could keep her babies – her three existing

children safe if she was overwhelmed with another baby.

And the one follow-up study which has been done in women who

have killed newborn children shows that most of them go on to marry

and be good mothers, and that suggests that this is a crime which is

based upon circumstances as opposed to bad character in the perpetrator.

And in Ms. Deegan’s case, we have an example of where she has

already in the nine years between the act and being brought to trial, has

already demonstrated the quality of being a good mother, so rather than

have to prognosticate, we have a nine-year period where we can show

that she has got her life together, been a good mother, and not been a risk

to the community.

Sent. Tr. 31-32. Dr. Resnick added:

[In spite of the abuse to Ms. Deegan], she has been a devoted, caring

mother and made every effort to protect her children, raise her children

to be good citizens so that – you know, there are occasions when there’s

what’s called a cycle of violence where children who are abused go on

to abuse their children. Not all mothers do that, but some do, and Ms.

Deegan has taken a protective role and made sure that her children are

well cared for.

Sent. Tr. 32.

As this testimony shows, the evidence before the district court overwhelmingly

established that incarcerating Ms. Deegan would not deter others from committing

neonaticide and that Ms. Deegan would not commit future crimes.

As with the first sentencing factor, the district court never addressed what role

deterrence and recidivism played in its ten-year sentence. Thus appellate review

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seems limited to noting that (1) this factor favors leniency; and (2) the district court

never expressly discussed this factor. 

3. Seriousness of offense

Of course neonaticide is a serious offense–as is any offense causing loss of life.

Dr. Resnick provided some interesting background as to how other governments look

at neonaticide.

There are 26 countries that have a particular law called an infanticide

statute. This exists in Canada. It exists in England. It exists in

Australia. And these countries have recognized that a woman taking a

young baby is sometimes due to psychiatric factors, and finding them

guilty of murder just does not comport with their sense of justice. So the

persons found guilty of infanticide, rather than murder, have the

equivalent sentence of voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder. And

in England, most of these women who are found guilty of infanticide are

placed on probation. They’re not considered a danger to the community.

Sent. Tr. 30.

Despite all of the reasons given by defense counsel, the prosecutor and court’s

sole reason (besides reliance on the guidelines) for imposing a ten-year prison

sentence was the tragic death of the infant. While it is tragic that a life was lost, that

is the nature of any neonaticide. That alone is not sufficient to justify this sentence.

4. Family ties

While the guidelines do not ordinarily consider matters such as family ties, such

a consideration is permissible under § 3553(a). Rita, 551 U.S. at 364-65 (Stevens, J.,

concurring). The defense presented and the court received as evidence a DVD relating

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to the Deegan family. In that presentation, Ms. Deegan’s younger sister related that

Ms. Deegan protected her small siblings against the vicious abuses which their father

sought to inflict.

Also Ms. Deegan’s children exhibited their Native Indian regalia made by Ms.

Deegan. The youngest child described Ms. Deegan as smart, pretty, and elegant.

In her allocution, Ms. Deegan spoke of her children’s needs for her:

I’ve written a letter I’d like to read to you. [Judge], with respect

to the Court, my family and my community, I am humbly addressing you

today asking for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines,

not for my own sake, but for the sake of my daughters. They are at the

age where they need me most now. I have spent my life trying to protect

them from all [ ] that I had to endure. They need me to guide them, to

love them and help them get through this difficult time, and to continue

to help them grow to be grown good women.

Sent. Tr. 54.

Instead of the prosecutor acknowledging that the children’s needs can play a

role in reducing a federal sentence, he justified the guideline sentence saying, “[T]he

punishment that comes to those siblings as well comes at the hand of the defendant.

Basically her choice is what has caused all of this.” Sent. Tr. 53. With respect to

these comments, I offer this observation as to the laying of blame. There is plenty of

blame to go around. Ms. Deegan’s father is dead. But what blame should be placed

on Mr. Hale who did not support the children he fathered and consistently abused Ms.

Deegan? And what about the failures of society to assist Ms. Deegan in her travail?

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When it comes to blame, Dr. Resnick’s report needs to be recalled:

a) When Ms. Deegan reported being the victim of sexual abuse to

her mother at age 11, she reasonably expected protection from

further abuse. Instead, she received a beating from her father for

“whoring.”

b) After being removed from her parents by the Child Protective

Service, Ms. Deegan reasonably expected protection from further

abuse. Instead, she was later returned to her parents and suffered

further physical abuse from her father. Furthermore, while in

some foster homes, she was physically abused.

c) When Ms. Deegan became a foster daughter to Irene Hale, she

reasonably expected to be safe from physical abuse. Instead, she

was physically abused by Irene’s son, Shannon Hale.

d) When Ms. Deegan participated in joint therapy sessions with

Shannon Hale in his substance abuse treatment, she reasonably

expected Shannon’s behavior to improve. Instead, Shannon beat

her for “running her mouth.”

e) When Ms. Deegan filed for a restraining order against Shannon

Hale, she reasonably expected protection. Instead, a court officer

took Shannon home to their trailer drunk.

Add. 2, p. 21 (Resnick Report).

Indeed, the great improvement in lifestyle by Ms. Deegan after escaping her

abusive home meant a better life for her family. Did the prosecutor or the district

court give any weight to that accomplishment? No! Yet that factor lends strong

support to a lenient prison sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 59 (stating that the district

court gave this factor “great weight”). 

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5. Promoting respect for the law and avoiding disparity

A district court should consider whether a sentence promotes respect for the law

and consider the need to avoid unwarranted disparity among defendants who have

been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6).

The sentencing record reveals that defense counsel informed the court of

another neonaticide crime in the State of North Dakota, but committed by a young

woman, off the Indian reservation and, thus, subject to North Dakota state laws. As

the defense counsel described the case:

There was an NDSU student who gave birth to a child, wrapped

the baby up, stuck the child under a bed, and then ultimately disposed of

the child, very similar kinds of situations here. That person got three

years probation. Now, granted, certainly there are always differences in

every case, but my point, Your Honor, is that if this had happened

perhaps off the reservation, the consequences or at least the potential

consequences are significant. And in disparity situations. I don’t think

you can operate in a vacuum, that you’re dealing simply with disparities

in the federal system. I think you have to look at what goes on.

Sent. Tr. 51.

The prosecutor stated:

Your Honor, just to clarify, I think counsel suggested that [the] [

] case in Cass County was three years probation. I’m wondering if it was

three years prison term that was the sentence in that case. I’m not

positive, but I believe it was a prison term.

Sent. Tr. 52-53.

Also, Dr. Resnick informed the court that women who plead guilty to

neonaticide are “infrequently sentenced to more than three years in prison.” Add. 2,

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29See Carol A. Brook, Racial Disparity Under the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, 35 Litigation, 15, 19 (Fall 2008) (explaining that sentencing policies that

contribute to unwarranted disparity affect the efficaciousness of the goals of the

criminal justice system).

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p. 24 (Resnick Report). These are all state sentences and, as observed by the majority,

ordinarily state sentences are not germane to showing disparities in sentencing.

But here, we ought to consider the difference in sentence between (1) Ms.

Deegan, a woman living in North Dakota and generally subject to state and tribal

laws, except as to some aspects of federal law because of her residency on an Indian

reservation, and (2) a North Dakota woman who committed a neonaticide crime off

the reservation. 

As the court said in Gall, quoting with approval the reasoning of the district

court:

the unique facts of Gall’s situation provide support for the District

Judge’s conclusion that, in Gall’s case, “a sentence of imprisonment may

work to promote not respect, but derision, of the law if the law is viewed

as merely a means to dispense harsh punishment without taking into

account the real conduct and circumstances involved in sentencing.”

Gall, 552 U.S. at 54 (citations omitted).

This statement echoes the situation here. What respect should be given to

federal criminal law which imposed a harsh punishment for this woman’s crime on the

reservation, when compared to the lenient sentence upon a woman off the reservation

for this special crime of neonaticide? I submit that the sentence here promotes

disrespect for the law and the judicial system.29 

In this regard, a letter from Ms. Deegan’s sister to the court before sentencing

becomes relevant and significant:

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Our family has endured depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress

disorder [PTSD]. Our childhood home was a war zone; there were some

good times of laughter and love, but one never knew when an attack of

rage and violence was about to happen.

Our family has taken great lengths to reconcile the pain and scars that

have been left on our souls. Understanding the intergenerational

historical trauma of our American Indian Grandfathers and

Grandmothers that came before us, has helped my family to forgive and

love our father, knowing that he too suffered. Non-Indian people may

not easily internalize this sense of loss and powerlessness so deeply

ingrained by American Indian people still today. The cultural

deprivations and discriminations of our people merely because of our

heritage has contributed to the psychological deficits that Dana, at that

particular low time in her life, was unable to overcome. I fear that these

same cultural factors may also contribute to harsher penalties of an

already oppressed woman.

. . . . 

She was then as she is now, only trying to survive while caring for her

daughters. She has spent her adult life trying to protect her children from

a life she had to endure. If Dana is sentenced to prison, it is yet another

tragedy, this time in the name of justice, that her daughters will be

victims too.

R. at 29 (attachment to Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum, sealed in the district

court) (emphasis added).

Reading this letter should give us all pause. How many of us can really

comprehend the misery of Ms. Deegan’s situation as described in this record? None

of these matters made any difference to the district court when sentencing under the

guidelines. I ask what respect should be given to this guideline sentence?

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The sentence here is unjust, excessive, and treats a woman on the reservation

disparately with a woman off the reservation. Does this disparity not indicate another

example of unfair treatment of an American Indian living on a reservation?

In summary, with respect to § 3553(a) the district court committed several

errors. The district court believed the that the guidelines were “reasonable” and that

they applied to Ms. Deegan. Wrong! This is not a mine run case. 

The district court’s § 3553(a) analysis was wholly insufficient considering the

circumstances of this case. The statute and the Supreme Court require a statement of

reasons, which in this case was not satisfied by the district court’s statement that it

“considered” the statutory factors. 

The district court expressly relied on the Commission’s view of an appropriate

sentence, but the Commission never considered neonaticide. Examination of the

record in light of the § 3553(a) factors shows the substantive unreasonableness of Ms.

Deegan’s sentence.

Finally, the district court never explained how this ten-year sentence comports

with the most crucial aspect of sentencing: that a sentence be sufficient, but not greater

than necessary to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a). Instead, the court imposed

an almost mechanical sentence based on its erroneous view that the guidelines applied

to “this type of crime.”

D. Guideline Sentence as Virtually Mandatory

The reader may wonder how an experienced prosecutor and a well-regarded

district judge could err so grievously in the imposition of this sentence. Justice

Souter’s separate opinion in Rita may suggest the answer:

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30See also Brook, supra note 29, at 18 (“[T]he gravitational pull of the

guidelines remains strong.”).

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What works on appeal determines what works at trial, and if the

Sentencing Commission’s views are as weighty as the Court says they

are, a trial judge will find it far easier to make the appropriate findings

and sentence within the appropriate Guideline, than to go through the

unorthodox factfinding necessary to justify a sentence outside the

Guidelines range.

Rita, 551 U.S. at 391 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).30 Moreover, as

Justice Stevens commented, “I am not blind to the fact that, as a practical matter,

many federal judges continued to treat the Guidelines as virtually mandatory after our

decision in Booker.” Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring). 

I ask isn’t that precisely describing the sentencing procedure and comments

here?

The majority stresses discretion by the district court. Maj. op. at 15. But the

sentencing judge did not exercise his discretion. He merely adopted the

recommendation of the prosecutor for a guideline sentence. Rather than consider the

specific facts and circumstances in this case, the district court imposed a guideline

sentence. This court addressed the limits of “discretion” in the pre-guideline case of

Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973) (en banc). 

Woosley arose thirty-seven years ago when appellate courts almost never

reviewed the district court sentence. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).

The relevant facts are as follows. A sincere and religiously motivated member of

Jehovah’s Witnesses had refused a conscientious objector classification in the

Selective Service draft and had refused to report for induction. 478 F.2d at 140. The

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sentencing judge in Woosley recognized the defendant “as a fine young man.” Id.

However, the judge gave him the maximum sentence under the law (five years)

pursuant to the judge’s policy of always imposing the maximum penalty to men who

refused induction into the military. See id. at 140, 143. That sort of sentence was

imposed regardless of the underlying circumstances as to each defendant.

The Woosley court said, “we deal with a predetermined sentence resting upon

a policy followed by the trial judge. . . . A mechanical approach to sentencing [that]

plainly conflicts with the sentencing guidelines announced by the Supreme Court. .

. .” 478 F.2d at 143 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

Here, rather than looking at the law espoused by the Supreme Court and truly

considering what sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary, the court

imposed the guideline sentence. It blindly followed the government’s belief “that the

Sentencing Commission took into account these type of events, these type of crimes

when it put together sentencing guidelines. . . .” Sent. Tr. 43. Interestingly, the

district court observed that Ms. Deegan’s life had not been easy and he expressed

compassion for what she had gone through. But the judge disregarded the specific

circumstances of her crime and imposed the guideline sentence. This case was out of

the “heartland” and did not fall within the guidelines sentence structure. Despite that,

the district court failed to exercise its discretion in imposing a sentence. 

In Woosley, the court observed that the great majority of individuals committing

a similar crime received probation, not a jail sentence. 478 F.2d at 147. Here the

judge gave no consideration to the plea for a lenient sentence, even though that matter

was brought to his attention by defense counsel and Dr. Resnick. The sentence in this

case manifests a gross abuse of discretion.

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The Woosley en banc court concluded the opinion with this language, which I

suggest is very pertinent to this case:

We find it difficult to conceive of a situation offering more

compelling circumstances to justify leniency than that in the instant case.

. . . .

The broad and unreviewable discretion possessed by federal district

courts in matters of sentencing does not extend to the meting out of

punishment manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the crime and

the character of the criminal.

Id. at 147-48. Although in a different time and relating to a different crime, the two

cases have parallels.

Yes, this judge stands by the view that district courts should exercise discretion

in sentencing. But that discretion is not unfettered. United States v. Burns, 577 F.3d

887, 897 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Bright, J., concurring). The record here makes

clear that the district judge exercised no discretion but merely agreed with and adopted

the government’s recommendation and applied the guideline sentence. This amounted

to grievous, gross error.

VII.

REMEDY

A simple remand for resentencing will not do. This neonaticide crime is a novel

one in the federal courts. As I have noted, I have never seen a crime as completely out

of the “heartland” as this one. As such, this court should provide the district court

with guidance. In Woosley, the circuit court remanded the sentence to the district

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court with special instructions, including one for the court to consider “changed

family circumstances which may disclose additional considerations dictating leniency

of treatment.” 478 F.2d at 148. Moreover, pending disposition of the en banc appeal,

this court released Woosley from prison on his personal recognizance. Id. at 140 n.2.

In Ms. Deegan’s circumstances, I suggest that (1) she be immediately released

from prison pending disposition of this appeal and resentencing; (2) the district court

reconsider the creation of a sentencing disparity between two North Dakota women

who both committed neonaticide; and (3) the district court consider imposing a new

sentence to time served in prison. 

Regardless of the above suggestion, what judicial or societal harm can come

from a remand? The process of remanding for resentencing goes on every day in the

federal courts.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Ms. Deegan’s case cries out for justice and a reversal. The guideline sentence

for second-degree murder does not apply to her crime of neonaticide. Ms. Deegan has

suffered enough. I will not put my imprimatur on this harsh sentence, which reeks

with error in the sentencing process. Ms. Deegan has suffered immense cruelty at the

hands of her father, his male friends, and the father of her children. Now her lifetime

of travail becomes magnified by an unjust and improper prison sentence. Her

sentence of ten years’ incarceration rests on a misreading or ignorance of the law.

For almost the first time in a federal appeal, this court addresses the fairness of

a sentence imposed on a woman on the Indian reservation whose prior life has been

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31 The probation officer said that no factors warranted a departure. Rev. PSR

¶ 63 (“None”); see also supra at 18-19. The prosecutor said “a guideline sentence is

the right choice.” Sent. Tr. 53; see also supra at 19. The district court said “I’m

required to impose those [1998] guidelines . . . I am agreeing with the Government’s

recommendation . . . and adhering to the guidelines because I believe that they are

reasonable.” Sent. Tr. 59, 61; see also supra at 19-20. But the guidelines do not

apply to neonaticide. 

 

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a “hell” and where the punishment ignores the needs of her children, who were the

objects of her protection in committing a tragic crime.

In essence, the issue in this case is whether the district court imposed a sentence

under § 3553(a). The majority says it did. Maj. op. at 13-14. I believe the answer is

a resounding No! The problem with the majority’s analysis is that the very words of

the actors in the sentencing process seem to disagree.31

In mine run cases, the guidelines account for § 3553(a), see Rita, 551 U.S. at

350-51, which lessens the need for extensive discussion of the § 3553(a) factors. The

Sentencing Commission never incorporated the § 3553(a) factors into a guideline that

applies to the crime of neonaticide; thus Ms. Deegan’s guideline sentence cannot

embody the § 3553(a) factors. Because the sentencing court could not properly rely

on the guidelines, Ms. Deegan’s sentence required a full analysis of these statutory

sentencing factors.

The majority relies on mine run cases for the proposition that district court

judges need not say much about the sentencing factors. See Maj. op. at 6-7 (citing

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (mine run perjury, obstruction of justice,

making false statements); United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2008)

(mine run conspiracy to commit bribery); United States v. Hernandez, 518 F.3d 613

(8th Cir. 2008) (mine run possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute);

United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2008) (mine run revocation of

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supervised release); United States v. Henson, 550 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2008) (mine run

felon in possession)). But Ms. Deegan’s case is not a mine run case. This court

should not sanction this guideline sentence nor the cursory discussion of the § 3553(a)

factors. 

The majority relies on the district court’s presentence order to conclude that a

court “could” reasonably view Ms. Deegan’s offense as “unusually heinous, cruel, and

brutal.” Maj. op. at 14. According to the majority, this characterization of Ms.

Deegan’s actions demonstrates the substantive reasonableness of her sentence. But

the district court ultimately rejected the characterization on which the majority relies.

The “heinous, cruel, and brutal” language in the district court’s presentence order

simply recites U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8, on which the district court contemplated, but

rejected, a sentencing departure. See Maj. op. at 3-4. Importantly, the presentence

order contemplating the departure was issued before the district court or any

participants in the sentencing process knew any substantial amount of information

about Ms. Deegan’s background and about neonaticide. The majority’s revival of

“heinous, cruel, and brutal” does not reflect the views of the district court, nor those

of a leading expert on neonaticide, and I strongly dispute that characterization of Ms.

Deegan. 

The majority criticizes the dissent for comparing Ms. Deegan’s case to that of

another North Dakota neonaticide. Maj. op. at 16-17. The majority asserts that

almost nothing is known about the other North Dakota neonaticide that was

committed by an NDSU student. True, the details underlying her crime are not part

of the sentencing record. But a comparison of these women’s circumstances from the

record, in light of Dr. Resnick’s discussion of the § 3553(a) factors as related to

neonaticide, strongly indicates that Ms. Deegan is entitled to a lenient sentence,

similar to that of the NDSU student. And if the information before the judge and the

testimony of Dr. Resnick was insufficient, it should have been a red flag to investigate

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further to determine whether the circumstances of the NDSU case were comparable

to those of Ms. Deegan. 

In any event, what we do know about the other North Dakota neonaticide

supports overturning Ms. Deegan’s harsh sentence. Both women committed

neonaticide. Both did so in North Dakota. But Ms. Deegan committed her crime on

a reservation and landed in federal court. Dr. Resnick reported that most women

receive sentences of not longer than three years’ incarceration, see Add. 2, p. 24

(Resnick Report), and the NDSU student received three years’ probation. On this

record, there is no just reason for the sentencing disparity between these two women.

As I previously asked, what respect should be given to federal criminal law which

imposed a harsh punishment for Ms. Deegan’s crime committed on the reservation,

when compared to the lenient sentence upon a woman off the reservation? Might an

informed observer say: just another injustice by the United States which Indians must

suffer.

The comparison of these two cases relates not to whether a federal court should

rely on state sentences, but is an issue of unfairness and injustice to an Indian woman

living on a reservation as compared to a woman not living on a reservation. The

majority may say different laws apply. The difference here rests not on the law, but

on the mistakes and misjudgment by a federal court as shown by the record.

I firmly believe that in these United States, through its courts or otherwise, Ms.

Deegan will receive Equal Justice Under the Law.

 This case also lifts the curtain on the terrible abuse suffered by Ms. Deegan as

a young child and young woman on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North

Dakota. Unfortunately, her suffering is not an isolated instance. The pervasive and

terrible abuse of women and children occurs on every Indian reservation in this

country. I address that matter in the Appendix to this dissenting opinion.

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APPENDIX TO DISSENT

LIFTING THE CURTAIN ON ASSAULTS AGAINST WOMEN AND

CHILDREN IN INDIAN COUNTRY

In the dissent, I raise the question: where were the government and social

agencies during the many instances of physical, verbal, and sexual abuse suffered by

Ms. Deegan as a child and young adult, as well as her younger sisters and mother?

This dissent in part has examined the root cause, abuse after abuse after abuse

suffered by Ms. Deegan, that underlies the tragic death of the infant victim. Is that

abuse isolated to the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation or symptomatic of an existing

situation in all of Indian country?

Coincidentally, in examining the background of assault and abuse in this case,

a revealing and pertinent article about violence and sexual assault in Indian country

appeared in a popular legal publication. The article entitled, Strange Justice in Indian

Country, appeared in the National Law Journal of September 28, 2009. It reads in

part:

Conditions in this obscure country, as reported by sources ranging

from Amnesty International to a U.S. Senate committee, are appalling.

One in three women will be raped in her lifetime. Half the reported

murders and 72% of child sex crimes are never prosecuted. Ninety

percent of sexual assaults on native women are committed by men from

the dominant ethnic groups. The nation’s highest courts regularly

reverse convictions based solely on the defendant’s race.

This country is not Sudan, Rwanda or Kosovo during ethnic

cleansing. Rather, this is the state of law enforcement today on the 310

Indian reservations that are home to nearly a million Native American

citizens of the United States.

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32Maze of Injustice: The Failure to Protect Indigenous Women from Sexual

Violence in the USA, Amnesty International USA 2 (2007).

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“Indian Country” – the federal government’s name for the 54

million acres of reservation lands in the United States–is larger than

Minnesota or Utah. The layers of social ills on most

reservations–alcohol and drug abuse, unemployment, malnutrition and

chronic disease–are a well-documented national shame. But the failure

of the U.S. government to provide equal legal protection to victims of

serious crimes, who happen to be Native American, is just bizarre.

. . . .

The treatment of native peoples is one of the darkest chapters in

American history. Although nothing can be done to change that history,

extending basic legal protections to residents of Indian country, equal to

those enjoyed by their fellow citizens, is a modest goal.

As the dissent notes, the abuse and beatings perpetrated upon Ms. Deegan as

a child and young woman by her father, his friends, Mr. Hale, and others, although

known by some officials of tribal institutions, were never investigated, prosecuted, nor

the subject of correction. Ms. Deegan as an Indian woman does not stand alone as a

victim of abuse.

Violence against American Indian women is a pervasive problem. Federal

government studies consistently show that American Indian women are more likely

to be subject to sexual violence than other women in the United States.32 In fact,

American Indian women are more than two-and-a-half times more likely to be raped

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33Id.; see also Amy Radon, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The

Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. Mich. J. L. Reform

1275, 1280-81 (2004) (“[F]or every 1,000 American Indian females, 23.2 were

victims of intimate violence. This rate of victimization was nearly double that of

African Americans (11.2 for every 1,000), triple that of whites (8.1 per 1,000), and

twelve times the victimization rate of Asian Americans (1.9 per 1,000).”).

34Maze of Injustice: The Failure to Protect Indigenous Women from Sexual

Violence in the USA, Amnesty International USA 2 (2007).

35Id. at 5.

36Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law

Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 455, 457 (2005).

37Id.

38Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 Kan. J. L. &

Pub. Pol’y 121, 123 (2004). 

39Id. at 124.

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or sexually assaulted than other women.33 More than one out of every three American

Indian women will be raped during their lifetime.34 

American Indian women are not only more likely to be raped and sexually

assaulted, but are also more likely to suffer a higher degree of additional physical

violence during those assaults. While 30 percent of the general population of United

States women report suffering physical injuries in addition to a rape, 50 percent of

American Indian women report such injuries.35 American Indian women are also

more likely to be a victim of a rape with a weapon.36 While 11 percent of all reported

rapes involve the use of a weapon, 34 percent of female American Indian rapes

involve a weapon.37

Notably, survivors of such brutal rapes and assaults suffer physically,

emotionally, and spiritually.38 American Indian women who have been sexually

assaulted report higher rates of depression, alcoholism, drug abuse, and suicidal

ideation.39

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40U.S. Dep’t of Justice, American Indians and Crime, v (Dec. 2004).

41Id. at iv.

42Id. at v.

43U.S. Dep’t of Justice, American Indians and Crime, 15 (1999).

44Id.

45Maze of Injustice: The Failure to Protect Indigenous Women from Sexual

Violence in the USA, Amnesty International USA 2 (2007). 

46Id. at 1.

47Id. at 2 (quoting Juana Majel, National Congress of American Indians, and

Karen Artichoker, Cangleska, Inc.-Sacred Circle). As this report explains, “interviews

with survivors, activists and support workers across the USA suggest that available

statistics greatly underestimate the severity of the problem. In the Standing Rock

Sioux Reservation, for example, many of the women who agreed to be interviewed

could not think of any Native women within their community who had not been

subjected to sexual violence.” Id.

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In addition to pervasive and damaging sexual violence, American Indians are

more likely to be victims of all violent crimes than any other race.40 In fact, American

Indians experience a per capita rate of violence twice that of other United States

residents.41 The same is true for American Indian women, who are over two times

more likely to be victims of violence.42

American Indian children are often victims of abuse. One American Indian

child out of 30 is subject to abuse or neglect.43 American Indian children are

approximately twice as likely to be victims of child abuse than the general population

of children.44

Sadly, violence and abuse on Indian reservations are likely greater than depicted

in these statistics. It is widely-accepted that reports of abuse and violence on Indian

reservations are under reported.45 Although “[v]iolence against women is one of the

most pervasive human rights abuses[,] [i]t is also one of the most hidden.”46 “Most

Indian women do not report such crimes because of the belief that nothing will be

done.”47

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48Reproduced with the permission of the State Historical Society of North

Dakota and its publication, North Dakota History: Journal of the Northern Plains,

Vol. 69, front cover (2002).

49Id. at back cover.

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Pictures occasionally speak louder than words. The attached illustration48

depicts a young American Indian girl in native dance regalia and emphasizes to the

reader the importance of protecting “the integral parts of [Indian] life.”49 The high

risks of violence to which American Indian women and children are exposed to on

their reservations requires urgent action by federal agencies, tribal personnel, and

other social services, and they should do all in their power to stop this terrible and

continuing abuse. 

I conclude with this comment. The violence against women and children on

Indian reservations is a national scandal. It must be addressed not only as a criminal

matter but as a societal concern. If the violence against Ms. Deegan had been stopped,

even as late as her association with Mr. Hale, and, if she had been given moral and

societal assistance in raising the three children in her family, this crime of neonaticide

might never have occurred. The deterrence to such a crime, as here, will not be

attained by imposing a harsh punishment on Ms. Deegan. The problems of preventing

assault and abuse against women and children in Indian country need illumination,

and immediate steps must be taken to stop this terrible and wrongful conduct.

______________________________

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