Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01318/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01318-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Does 1-100
Appellee
Fourteen Unknown Agents
Appellee
Matthew Garth
Appellee
Austin Ray
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

AUSTIN RAY,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MATTHEW GARTH, Special Agent; 

FOURTEEN UNKNOWN AGENTS; 

DOES 1-100,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 15-1318

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-01658-LTB)

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

 Pro se plaintiff Austin Ray sued IRS Special Agent Matthew Garth, 14 unknown 

agents, and Does 1-100 seeking relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for violations of procedural and 

substantive due process and equal protection. 

 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. 

P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

October 7, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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Mr. Ray filed his complaint on August 3, 2015. He alleged that (1) defendants 

deprived him of his property when they executed a search warrant at his tax preparation 

business on April 6, 2010, and seized tax preparation equipment and related items, (2) he 

was entitled to a pre- and post-deprivation hearing, and (3) the seizure left him without 

access to tax returns and he therefore could not timely file corrected returns to avoid 

indictment for tax crimes on April 10, 2014. He requested suppression of all evidence 

seized in United States v. Ray, No. 14-cr-00147-MSK-2 (D. Colo., filed Apr. 10, 2014), 

and compensatory and punitive damages. 

The district court dismissed the complaint as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). It determined that (1) suppression of evidence would be an improper 

remedy, noting that Mr. Ray has filed a motion to suppress in his criminal proceeding; (2) 

the risk of removal, concealment, or destruction of the property justified postponement of 

notice and hearing until after seizure, citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 

416 U.S. 663, 678 (1974); and (3) Mr. Ray has not alleged that any of his property is 

subject to destruction or forfeiture, and his argument about his inability to access tax 

returns and make corrections to evade indictment should be made in his criminal case and 

not in a Bivens action. 

 We review the dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for 

abuse of discretion. McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1997). As 

the district court did, we interpret Mr. Ray’s pro se complaint liberally. See Haines v. 

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Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). In doing so, we agree with the district court that 

the complaint must be dismissed as legally frivolous. 

First, nowhere in his complaint or his brief to this court does Mr. Ray indicate how 

the procedure afforded for his motion to suppress would be inadequate to address any 

property deprivation. His complaint therefore fails to state a procedural due process 

claim. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled in part on other 

grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 

Second, the complaint also fails to state an equal protection claim because it does 

not allege facts showing disparate treatment. See Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 

656 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2011); Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1172-73 (10th 

Cir. 2011). 

Third, the complaint equates the substantive due process claim with the procedural 

due process claim and otherwise does not allege facts showing executive government 

action that “can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a 

constitutional sense,” Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 837 (1998), under any 

case authority. It therefore fails to state a substantive due process claim. 

Finally, in Ingram v. Faruque, 728 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2013), this court pointed 

out the Supreme Court’s reluctance to authorize actions under Bivens, especially when, as 

here, there is an “alternative, existing process for protecting the interest” alleged. Id. at 

1243-44.

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 We dismiss this appeal as frivolous and impose a strike under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). See Jennings v. Natrona Cty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780-81 

(10th Cir. 1999). We deny Mr. Ray’s request to proceed in forma pauperis; he is 

therefore responsible for immediate payment of the unpaid balance of his appellate filing 

fee. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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