Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00032/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00032-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frank X. Chavez
Respondent
Anthony Dela Cruz Gabay
Petitioner

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTHONY DELA CRUZ GABAY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

HEIDI M. LACKNER,1

Respondents. 

No. 2:13-cv-0032-LKK-AC 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of 

habeas corpus was filed on December 28, 2012.2

 

Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that 

it was filed after the statute of limitations expired. ECF No. 12. Petitioner opposed the motion on 

April 11, 2013, ECF No. 14, and respondent filed a reply on April 25, 2013, ECF No. 16. 

Resolution of the motion to dismiss turns on the availability of statutory as well as gap tolling 

during the time period in which petitioner was pursuing state habeas corpus relief. For the 

 

1

 Respondent Lackner is substituted for Frank X. Chavez pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure since Warden Lackner is the current custodian of petitioner. 2

 All filing dates referenced herein are based on the use of the prison mailbox rule. See Houston 

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (establishing prison mailbox rule); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 

1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the mailbox rule to both state and federal filings by 

incarcerated inmates). 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 1 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends granting the motion to dismiss. 

I. Procedural History 

Petitioner challenges his 2008 convictions for multiple counts of committing a lewd and 

lascivious act on a child under the age of fourteen. ECF No. 1. He was convicted following a 

jury trial in the Sacramento Superior Court and sentenced to 60 years to life. Id. at 1-2. 

On February 15, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review on 

direct appeal. See Lodged Doc. No. 4. Petitioner then filed a series of state habeas corpus 

petitions which are relevant to resolution of the pending motion to dismiss. 

Petitioner first attempted to file a state habeas corpus petition with the California Court of 

Appeal. See Lodged Doc. No. 5 (bearing an original file stamp dated 3-18-11 which is struck 

through by hand along with a notation indicating it was returned). On March 18, 2011 the habeas 

petition was returned to petitioner because it was not signed and because it was directed to the 

wrong court. ECF No. 15 at 19-20 (letter from California Court of Appeal explaining 

deficiencies). On March 25, 2011 petitioner re-filed a habeas corpus petition in the California 

Court of Appeal that was denied on April 7, 2011. See Lodged Doc. No. 5, 6. 

On April 11, 2011 petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme 

Court that was a duplicate of that filed in the California Court of Appeal. See Lodged Doc. No. 7. 

The California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition on September 21, 2011. See Lodged 

Doc. No. 8. 

Petitioner then filed a nearly identical state habeas petition in the Sacramento Superior 

Court on November 7, 2011. Lodged Doc. No. 9. On December 9, 2011, the Superior Court 

denied this petition finding that it was untimely filed. Lodged Doc. No. 10 (citing In re Robbins, 

18 Cal.4th 770, 811-812, 812 fn. 32 (1998); and In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 774-775 (1993)). 

On May 21, 2012 petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition complete with exhibits in 

the Sacramento Superior Court. Lodged Doc. No. 11. The claims raised in this petition conform 

to the grounds presented in the instant federal habeas corpus petition. Compare Lodged Doc. No 

11 with ECF No. 1. The Superior Court denied the state habeas petition on June 26, 2012, once 

again citing to In re Robbins and In re Clark. Lodged Doc. No. 12. 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 2 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

Petitioner then filed another habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal on 

July 5, 2012 which was denied on July 13, 2012. Lodged Doc. Nos. 13, 14. 

On July 18, 2012 petitioner filed his last state habeas corpus petition with the California 

Supreme Court. In a postcard denial, the California Supreme Court rejected the habeas petition 

on December 12, 2012. Petitioner then commenced the present action seeking federal habeas 

corpus relief. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

Section 2244(d) (1) of Title 28 of the United States Code contains a one year statute of 

limitations for filing a habeas petition in federal court. The one year clock commences from 

several alternative triggering dates which are defined as “(A) the date on which the judgment 

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing ... is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted 

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court ... and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Although petitioner often confuses the law concerning the start date of the statute of limitations 

with case law regarding equitable tolling, he essentially argues that two potential triggering dates 

apply to his case. See ECF No. 14 at 3 (arguing for “equitable tolling” based on a state created 

impediment). 

With respect to the first potential triggering date, the parties agree that petitioner’s 

conviction became final for purposes of the AEDPA on July 13, 2010, following the expiration of 

time to seek certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). The statute of limitations commenced on the next day and expired one year later 

on July 13, 2011, absent any statutory or equitable tolling. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 

1243 (9th Cir. 2001) (using the anniversary date method for calculating the statute of limitations). 

 Petitioner’s proposed alternate triggering date for the statute of limitations is based on the 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 3 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

respondent’s failure to release his trial transcripts to him in October 2011. See ECF No. 1-1 at 4 

(affidavit of petitioner); ECF No. 14 at 4 (argument based on a state created impediment); ECF 

No. 17 (affidavit of Deanna Laura Gabay indicating date of mailing).3 Petitioner’s sister mailed 

his trial transcripts to the prison on or about October 15, 2011. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. After several 

inquiries about the location of his trial transcripts, petitioner was finally able to sign a release 

form and obtain his transcripts from his correctional counselor on December 19, 2011. Id.; see 

also ECF No. 15 at 31 (copy of inmate release form). Thus, petitioner was denied access to his 

trial transcripts to research his legal issues for a maximum total of 65 days.4 See ECF No. 14 at 4. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), the statute of limitations may commence from the “date 

on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 

determined that this alternate start date applies when the petitioner “show[s] a causal connection 

between the unlawful impediment and his failure to file a timely habeas petition.” See Bryant v. 

Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 

1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In the instant case, petitioner fails to demonstrate the requisite causal connection for two 

separate reasons. First and foremost, petitioner lacked access to his trial transcripts from April 

2010 until October 2011 based solely on his own decision to have appellate counsel mail them to 

his sister rather than the prison. See ECF No. 1-1 at 3 (affidavit of petitioner indicating his 

instructions to appellate counsel). Secondly, petitioner’s lack of access to his trial transcripts did 

not prevent him from filing state habeas corpus petitions challenging his convictions. In fact, 

petitioner was able to file a total of three separate state habeas petitions before he obtained his 

trial transcripts in December 2011. Therefore, the record belies petitioner’s assertion that his lack 

 

3

 There is a discrepancy in the dates provided by petitioner compared with those provided by his 

sister, Deanna Laura Gabay. While petitioner indicates that he requested his sister to mail his 

trial transcripts to him in prison in October 2011, his sister indicates that the date was October 

2010. In an abundance of caution, the court will assume that the date provided in the sister’s 

affidavit is a typo and will assume the date used by petitioner is correct. 

4

 Although there is no indication when the prison actually received the trial transcripts from 

petitioner’s sister, the court will use October 15, 2011 as the putative date of receipt. 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 4 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

of access to his trial transcripts was a state created impediment causing his untimely filing.5 

For all of these reasons, the undersigned rejects petitioner’s request for an alternate start 

date and finds that the statute of limitations commenced on July 14, 2010 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 6 

 B. Statutory Tolling 

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 

531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). An application is pending during the time that “a California petitioner 

‘completes a full round of [state] collateral review,’” so long as there is no unreasonable delay in 

the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as 

recognized by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curium) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193–194 (2006); Carey v. 

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 222–226 (2002). The statute of limitations is not tolled from the time 

when a direct state appeal becomes final to the time when the first state habeas petition is filed 

because there is nothing “pending” during that interval. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

 

5

 Petitioner’s argument stands on firmer ground as it relates to equitable tolling, which is 

discussed infra. 6

 Even using the date the alleged impediment was lifted as the latest possible triggering date of 

the statute of limitations, the petition is still untimely. Assuming arguendo that the statute of 

limitations commenced on December 20, 2011, the day after the impediment was lifted, the 

petition was still filed more than one year later, i.e. on December 28, 2012. Petitioner is not 

entitled to any statutory tolling during that one year period because his habeas petition filed on 

May 21, 2012 was deemed untimely filed. See Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). The 

subsequent habeas petitions filed in the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme 

Court were both denied without citation to authority. Under Ylst v. Nunnamaker, 501 U.S. 797 

(1991), the federal court looks through these silent denials to the last reasoned state court decision 

which in this case is the Superior Court’s determination that the petition was untimely. As a 

result, petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling during this entire round of state habeas 

review. 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 5 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was filed in the California Court of Appeal on 

March 25, 2011, tolling the statute 254 days after the commencement of the limitations period. 7 

The statute remained tolled through September 21, 2011, when the California Supreme Court 

denied petitioner’s second state habeas petition. See Lodged Doc. Nos. 5-8. 

Petitioner is not entitled to additional statutory tolling during the pendency of his next two 

state habeas corpus petitions filed in the Sacramento Superior Court because they were explicitly 

found to be untimely filed. See Lodged Doc. Nos. 9-12; see also Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408 (2005); Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that a California state 

court’s citation to In re Robbins is a clear ruling on timeliness). Furthermore, under Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991), the later unexplained orders by the California Court of Appeal 

and the California Supreme Court are also deemed to rest on the Superior Court’s untimeliness 

determination. Therefore, the statute of limitations re-started on September 22, 2011 with 111 

days remaining. Absent any additional tolling, the statute of limitations expired on January 10, 

2012.8 

B. Gap Tolling 

Statutory tolling continues during the intervals between a lower court's decision in postconviction proceedings and the proper filing of a new petition or a notice of appeal in a higher 

court, so long as the filing is deemed timely under state law. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 

(2006). Petitioner argues that he is entitled to gap tolling during the interval between the denial 

of his second state habeas petition by the California Supreme Court on September 21, 2011 and 

the filing date of his third state habeas petition in the California Superior Court on November 7, 

2011. While this 47 day interval is not considered an unreasonable delay between filings, 

 

7

 The court notes that petitioner’s initial attempt at filing his habeas petition in the California 

Court of Appeal on March 18, 2011 does not toll the statute of limitations because it was not 

“properly filed.” See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. at 8. In fact, it was rejected for filing and 

returned to petitioner. See ECF No. 15 at 19-20. 

8

 A state habeas corpus petition filed after the expiration of the federal statute of limitations does 

not revive it. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, all of 

petitioner’s state habeas corpus petitions filed in 2012 do not toll the statute of limitations because 

it had already expired by the time they were filed. 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 6 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

petitioner’s claim for gap tolling fails for a separate reason. Petitioner commenced a new round 

of review by filing his third habeas corpus petition in the Sacramento Superior Court which raised 

entirely different grounds for relief. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 

that the application for state habeas corpus relief was not pending between the end of the first 

round of petitions and the commencement of a second round filed in a lower court raising 

different claims). As a result, petitioner ceased to have any state habeas corpus petition pending 

once the California Supreme Court denied his second state habeas corpus petition. He is 

therefore not entitled to any gap tolling between September 21, 2011 and November 7, 2011. 

Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to gap tolling between the Sacramento Superior 

Court’s denial of his third state habeas petition on December 9, 2011 and the filing of his next 

state habeas petition on May 21, 2012. However, this 164 day delay in filing his next state habeas 

corpus petition was deemed an unreasonable delay by the Sacramento Superior Court. Compare 

Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that Banjo’s delay of 146 days 

between the first and second petitions filed in the superior court was unreasonable); Chaffer v. 

Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that delays of 101 and 115 days between 

filings were unreasonable and therefore not entitled to interval tolling); Velasquez v. Kirkland, 

639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that interval delays of 81 days and 92 days between 

filings was unreasonable). Since the Sacramento Superior Court deemed his fourth state habeas 

corpus petition unreasonably delayed and therefore untimely as a matter of state law, there was 

nothing pending between December 9, 2011 and May 21, 2012. Compare Evans, 546 U.S. 189 

(holding that an unexplained delay of at least six months between California Court of Appeal’s 

denial of state habeas petition and the filing of a notice of appeal from that decision in the 

California Supreme Court could not be “reasonable” under state law and thus not timely filed for 

the purposes of tolling the federal statute of limitations). 

For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that petitioner be denied gap tolling for 

the intervals between his second and third as well as third and fourth state habeas corpus 

petitions. This renders his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition untimely filed absent any additional 

equitable tolling. 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 7 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

C. Equitable Tolling 

 1. Lack of Access to Trial Transcripts 

A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA's one-year statute of 

limitations only if the petitioner shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing. See Holland 

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir.2009). An 

“extraordinary circumstance” has been defined as an external force that is beyond the inmate’s 

control. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is “reasonable diligence,” not “maximum feasible diligence.” See 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 2565; see also Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010). In this 

case, petitioner alleges that the 65 day period in which he was denied access to his trial transcripts 

was an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control that justifies equitable tolling. See Lott v. 

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding to the district court to determine whether 

prisoner’s denial of access to his legal files justified equitably tolling the statute of limitations). 

As respondent points out, even if granted equitable tolling for this time period, the statute of 

limitations would have expired on March 15, 2012. This would render the instant federal habeas 

petition more than nine months late. The court therefore finds that even assuming equitable 

tolling is appropriate, but still not enough to save petitioner’s federal habeas petition from being 

untimely filed. 

 2. Actual Innocence 

 The U.S. Supreme Court has recently agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the “actual 

innocence” exception applies to the AEDPA's statute of limitations. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 

133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “[A] 

credible claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable exception to AEDPA's limitations 

period, and a petitioner who makes such a showing may pass through the Schlup gateway and 

have his otherwise time-barred claims heard on the merits.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 932. Under Schlup 

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), a petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to 

bring him “within the ‘narrow class of cases ... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 8 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

justice.’” 513 U.S. at 314–15 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)). Evidence of 

innocence must be “so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial 

unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new 

evidence....” Id. at 327. Schlup additionally requires a petitioner “to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, 

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence— that was not presented at trial.” 

Lee v. Lambert, 653 F.3d at 937–38. 

 In his federal habeas corpus application, petitioner alleged as ground five for relief that he 

was actually innocent because “at least one of the alleged victim(s) had multiple sexual 

encounters with their own brother and it had happened over a period of time, and was ‘ongoing.’” 

ECF No. 1 at 26. Petitioner attached copies of police reports documenting the investigation of 

molestation by the victim’s brother as well as petitioner himself. ECF No. 1-1 at 9-119. 

Petitioner asserts that he “is innocent of the charged crimes against him, and if the jury would 

have had the evidence of the brother committing the charged acts, petitioner would not of [sic] 

been found guilty.” ECF No. 14 at 11. 

The discovery documents provided by petitioner in support of his actual innocence 

demonstrate that one of the victim’s brothers separately admitted to police that he had sexual 

intercourse with his sisters Erica and Katrina. ECF No. 1-1 at 13. However, during the 

investigation into the brother’s acts of molestation, one of the victims, Erica Doe, also disclosed 

inappropriate touching by her uncle, Anthony Gabay. Id. at 18. This victim “stated that her uncle 

and her brother did not sexually abuse her during the same time period.” Id. at 48. Therefore, 

two separate criminal prosecutions were initiated. Petitioner not only admitted in a phone sting to 

molesting one of the victims, but he also wrote a letter of apology to this victim admitting the acts 

for which he was accused. See ECF No. 1-1 at 122. While petitioner concedes that he “made 

some statements under duress that he committed acts against ‘one’ of the alleged victims,” he 

does not dispute that the apology letter was written in his own hand without any prompting from 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 9 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

police as to what to say in it. See ECF No. 14 at 8-9 (arguing his verbal confession was false 

because it was induced by the police officer’s threats to take away his own children). 

Even assuming the documents attached to the petition constitute “new evidence,” they do 

not come close to meeting Schlup’s standard that it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted petitioner in light of all the evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. As 

the trial court explained in denying state habeas relief on grounds that this alleged third party 

culpability evidence was improperly excluded from trial, 

“[t]his was not a case of identity; rather, there were three victims of 

sexual crimes in this case, two of whom were petitioner’s nieces 

and the third of whom was the niece of petitioner’s wife. All three 

victims knew petitioner well and testified about multiple sexual 

violations committed by petitioner on them. There was no doubt 

that these three victims were accusing petitioner, in particular, of 

having committed crimes against them. The issue was not ‘who’ 

committed sex offenses against them, but ‘if’ petitioner had 

committed sex offenses against them. Whether one of them was 

additionally molested by her own brother was irrelevant to whether 

petitioner had committed acts upon her.” 

ECF No. 15 at 29 (order denying habeas relief). For this reason, petitioner is not entitled to 

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations based on his assertion of actual innocence. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to dismiss be 

granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections, 

he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to 

which issues. Where, as here, the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds, a certificate of 

appealability “should issue if the prisoner can show: (1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling’; and (2) ‘that jurists of 

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right.’” Morris v. Woodford, 229 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Slack v. 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 10 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Any response to the objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 3, 2014 

Case 2:13-cv-00032-LKK-AC Document 18 Filed 01/03/14 Page 11 of 11