Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05250/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05250-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Virginia L. Ferrara
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 1994 Decided May 19, 1995

Nos. 93-5233 & 93-5250

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

v.

VIRGINIA L. FERRARA, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OF THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD 

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO,

APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92cv02869)

Douglas Letter, Attorney, U.S. Department ofJustice, withwhomAssistant Attorney General Frank

W. Hunger and Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, were on the briefs, for

appellant/cross-appellee United States of America. Thomas M. Bondy, John C. Hoyle, and Barbara

L. Herwig entered appearances for the United States.

William W. Taylor, III, with whom Mark W. Foster, Norman L. Eisen, and Tom Udall were on the

brief, for appellee/cross-appellant Ferrara.

Before SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: Acting in her official capacity as the Chief Counsel of the

Disciplinary Board of the New Mexico Supreme Court, appellee Virginia Ferrara charged "John

Doe," an attorney licensed to practice law by the New Mexico Supreme Court, with violating New

Mexico's Rules ofProfessionalConduct based on his activities while employed as an Assistant United

States Attorney in Washington, D.C. In this action, the United States seeks both an injunction

preventing Ms. Ferrara from taking further action against Mr. Doe and a declaratory judgment that

the Constitution's Supremacy Clause prohibits her from taking any adverse action against attorneys

employed by the United States Department of Justice based on the performance of their federal

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duties. District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson dismissed the complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction over Ms. Ferrara. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Conduct Giving Rise to the Dispute

In 1988, while employed by the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia,

Mr. Doe represented the United States in a murder prosecution brought in the D.C. Superior Court.

On a number of occasions, Mr. Doe or the detective investigating the case allegedly communicated

with the suspect, Darryl Smith, without the permission of Mr. Smith's attorney. The Government

claims that all the contacts were initiated by Mr. Smith and that Mr. Doe's supervisors at the United

States Attorney's Office authorized him to receive Mr. Smith's calls.

Mr. Smith was subsequently indicted for murder. His attorney charged prosecutorial

misconduct and asked the Superior Court to suppressstatements made byMr. Smith to Mr. Doe and

his investigator. The court refused to suppress the statements, but it did find that Mr. Doe had

violated a D.C. rule of professional conduct prohibiting lawyers from communicating with a party

known to be represented by counsel without that counsel's consent, and it referred the issue to the

District of Columbia Bar Counsel's Board on Professional Responsibility for its consideration of

disciplinary action.

B. The New Mexico Proceedings

Congressrequiresthat Assistant United States Attorneys, as well as other attorneys employed

by the Department of Justice, be licensed to practice law by a State, territory, or the District of

Columbia, but not necessarily by the jurisdictions in which they practice. Department of Justice

Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-132, § 3(a), 93 Stat. 1040, 1044

(1979); Department of Justice Appropriation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 204(a), 101 Stat.

1329-8, 1329-15 (1987); 28 U.S.C. § 517 (1988). During the relevant period, Mr. Doe was licensed

to practice law by New Mexico but not by the District of Columbia. The D.C. Board on Professional

Responsibility determined that, although Mr. Doe practiced in the D.C. court system, it lacked

jurisdiction to discipline him. As a consequence, it referred the matter to Ms. Ferrara in Albuquerque,

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New Mexico, in her capacity as Chief DisciplinaryCounsel of the DisciplinaryBoard of the Supreme

Court ofNew Mexico ("DisciplinaryBoard"), which wasresponsible for overseeing the New Mexico

Bar.

On August 22, 1990, Ms. Ferrara filed charges with the Board in which she alleged that Mr.

Doe had engaged in conduct that violated the professional standards required by New Mexico and

the District of Columbia. The New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct provide that

[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the

representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in

the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by

law to do so.

N.M. Rules Prof. Conduct § 16-402 (1986). In addition, the Rules specifically provide that

[a] lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary

authority of this jurisdiction although engaged in practice elsewhere.

Id. § 16-805 (1986).

Mr. Doe, who was represented by the United States, removed the proceeding to the U.S.

District Court for the District of New Mexico pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442, which permits a federal

officer to remove a civil suit or criminal prosecution brought against him in a state court for actions

taken under color of his office to the federal court in the district in which the state action is pending.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988). The New Mexico Disciplinary Board moved for a remand to the

state forum. In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D.N.M. 1992). Finding that it lacked jurisdiction

under section 1442, the district court granted the motion. Id.

The court provided two alternative reasons why section 1442 did not provide federal

jurisdiction over the charges brought by Ms. Ferrara against Mr. Doe. First, it noted that section

1442 applies only to "civil actions" or "criminal prosecutions" and determined that the disciplinary

proceedings were regulatory in nature and did not qualify as either. Id. at 481-84. Second, it found

that to remove a case under section 1442, the movant must allege a colorable federal defense; and

it ruled that Mr. Doe's defenses to the disciplinary action (including his argument that the

Constitution's Supremacy Clause prevented New Mexico from enforcing ethical rules inconsistent

with a federal prosecutor's duties) "[we]re not supported by law." Id. at 484.

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C. The Present Proceedings

Following the remand of the Doe disciplinary proceedingsto New Mexico, the United States

brought suit against Ms. Ferrara, in her official capacity, in the District Court for the District of

Columbia. In this action, it sought both an injunction prohibiting her from proceeding with the

prosecution of Mr. Doe and a declaration that the Supremacy Clause prohibits her from taking any

action against a Department of Justice employee for the performance of his duties consistent with

federal law. The Government argued, as did Mr. Doe in the removal proceeding, that the Supremacy

Clause prevents state officials from regulating the conduct of federal prosecutors when such

regulation would conflict with their federal duties.

Ms. Ferrara moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over

her, that the venue was improper, that the Government was collaterally estopped from making its

SupremacyClause argument as a result of the New Mexico district court decision, and that the court

should abstain pending the outcome of the New Mexico disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Doe.

United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 966 (D.D.C. 1993). Although Judge Johnson

determined that Ms. Ferrara's venue, collateral estoppel, and abstention arguments were meritless,

she granted the motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 967-68 & n.3.

The United States now appeals, renewing its Supremacy Clause claim and arguing that the

district court did, in fact, have personal jurisdiction over Ms. Ferrara. Ms. Ferrara cross-appeals,

claiming that the court erred by failing to recognize the merits of her collateral estoppel and

abstention arguments. Because we agree that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Ms.

Ferrara, we will address neither the issuesraised by her in her cross-appeal nor the SupremacyClause

argument advanced by the Government.

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A. "Minimum Contacts" Analysis

A personal jurisdiction analysis requires that a court determine whether jurisdiction over a

party is proper under the applicable local long-arm statute and whether it accords with the demands

of due process. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. Verlag, 536 F.2d

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429, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1976). As there is no applicable federal long-arm statute, jurisdiction over Ms.

Ferrara must be determined by reference to District of Columbia law. Edmond v. United States

Postal Service General Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The District of Columbia

Code provides, in relevant part, that

(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,

who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's

(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia....

D.C. Code Ann. § 13-423 (1981).

With limited exceptions, the Code's "transacting any business" clause has been interpreted to

provide jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Due Process Clause. Hummel v. Koehler, 458

A.2d 1187, 1190 (D.C. App. 1983); see also Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1050 n.13

(D.C. Cir. 1984). Consequently, the statutory and constitutional jurisdictional questions, which are

usually distinct, merge into a single inquiry here.

A court's jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies the demands of due process when there are

"minimumcontacts" between the defendant and the forum"such that the maintenance ofthe suit does

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he defendant's

conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that he should reasonably anticipate

being haled into court there." World-Wide VolkswagenCorp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Ferrara because any

connection between her disciplinary actions and the District arose from Mr. Doe's unilateral acts and

did not reflect an intent on her part to determine how prosecutions were to be conducted there.

Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. at 967-68. The Government contends that this was error for two reasons: (1)

Ms. Ferrara's actions had a direct effect in the District of Columbia sufficient in itself to permit

jurisdiction over her; and (2) the New Mexico Supreme Court, which Ms. Ferrara represents, had

created "continuing obligations" between itself and the District.

To support its primaryproposition, theGovernment relies exclusivelyonCalder v. Jones, 465

U.S. 783 (1984). In Calder, the Supreme Court held that a California court had jurisdiction over a

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Florida writer and editor in a libel action arising out of an article concerning a California celebrity that

was published in a national journal. Id. at 784-86. The Court determined that about 600,000 copies

of the publication were sold in California, id. at 785, and that jurisdiction was proper based on the

"effects" inCalifornia oftheir Florida-based conduct. Id. at 789-90. In so ruling, the Court observed

that the defendants' allegedly tortious actions were "expressly aimed" at California; that they knew

that the article "would have a potentially devastating impact" on its subject in California, id. at 789;

and that, under these circumstances, they should have anticipated being "haled into court" in that

State. Id. at 790. The Court concluded that "[a]n individual injured in California need not go to

Florida to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury

in California." Id.; see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75 (1984)

(jurisdiction proper even absent physical contact with forum where defendant's efforts were

"purposefully directed" toward residents of another State).

The Government likens Ms. Ferrara to the Calder defendants. It argues that Ms. Ferrara has

not only acted on the basis of activities that occurred in the District of Columbia but also seeks to

regulate the activities of the United States and Mr. Doe in the District, which is where the brunt of

the harm will be suffered.

Ms. Ferrara maintains that the more relevant precedent is provided by cases in which an

agreement is reached by parties residing in one jurisdiction before one of them moves away and

attempts to bring suit in a new forum. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), a Pennsylvania

resident established a trust instrument naming a Delaware trust company as trustee. Id. at 238. She

then moved to Florida, where she remained untilshe died a number of years later. Id. at 239. Some

of her heirs subsequently attempted to sue the trustee, among others, in a Florida court. Id. at 240-

41. The Supreme Court found there was no jurisdiction in Florida because "[t]he cause of action in

this case is not one that arises out of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum State."

Id. at 251. The Court emphasized that the trustee performed no acts in Florida and that that State

had no relationship to the underlying trust agreement until the original trust settlor moved there. Id.

at 252.

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In World-Wide Volkswagen, a New York couple purchased a car from a New York

automobile dealer. 444 U.S. at 288. The following year, while driving to their new home in Arizona,

they suffered an accident in Oklahoma, where they attempted to bring suit against the New York

dealer and its New York-based distributor, whose sales were limited to dealerslocated in New York,

New Jersey, and Connecticut. Id. at 288-89. The Court noted that it was foreseeable that the

purchasers might drive the car to Oklahoma, but found the foreseeability that they might be harmed

there an insufficient basis for conferring jurisdiction over the dealer and distributor. Id. at 298.

Quoting Hanson, the Court reaffirmed that the "unilateral activity of those who claim some

relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum

State." Id.

Ms. Ferrara stresses that any connection between the District of Columbia and herself was

proximately caused byMr. Doe's unilateral decision to use his New Mexico license there. She argues

that Calder does not apply here because the Calder defendants chose to establish their contact with

California. In her view, the most important fact in this case is that her investigation of the misconduct

would have no effect in the District of Columbia but for Mr. Doe's unilateral decision to practice law

here.

We agree with Ms. Ferrara but believe her analysis fails adequately to describe the precise

jurisdictional problem in this case. In Calder, the plaintiff wasliving and working in California at the

time the defendants wrote and published the article that they knew would cause him injury in that

State. The critical difference between this case and Calder is that here the relationship between Mr.

Doe and the New Mexico Disciplinary Board that gave rise to the litigation predated Mr. Doe's

unilateral decision to practice law in the District of Columbia. That relationship imposed certain

professional obligations on Mr. Doe that he was obliged to observe as long as he held himself out as

licensed to practice law by the State of New Mexico, regardless of his domicile.

The analytic flaw in the Government's reasoning is that it evaluates the disciplinary

proceedings against Mr. Doe without due consideration of this preexisting relationship. Under the

terms of that relationship, the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed to license Mr. Doe but reserved

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the right to discipline him should he later be found to have violated its rules. As noted above, those

rules specifically provide that licensees practicing law out of state continue to be subject to the

Disciplinary Board's authority. Given her responsibilities as the Board's Chief Counsel, Ms. Ferrara

had an obligation to the State and to other members of the New Mexico Bar to uphold its standards

by investigating charges of professional misconduct committed by a member, wherever the

misconduct might occur.

As the district court correctly noted, Ms. Ferrara's purpose in initiating proceedings against

Mr. Doe was to uphold the ethical standards of the New Mexico Bar, not to set standards for or

direct the behavior of prosecutors in the District of Columbia. See Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. at 968.

Thus, unlike the Calder defendants, her actions were not "expressly aim[ed]" at the forum, and their

effects on the District ofColumbia were, at most, incidental. See id. at 967-68. Nor could she expect

to be haled before a court in the District merely because proceedings initiated by her in New Mexico

in the discharge of her duties as an officer of the Supreme Court of that State might affect a member

of the New Mexico Bar who had chosen to practice in the District.

The United States argues, nevertheless, that the New Mexico Supreme Court has created

"continuing obligations" between itself and the District of Columbia that will support a finding of

minimumcontacts betweenMs. Ferrara and the forumthat are sufficient to support jurisdiction. This

claim is based on a passage in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), in which the

Supreme Court refers to the creation of "continuing obligations" between a defendant and residents

of a forum. Id. at 476. The Government points out that even though Mr. Doe is a resident of the

District, he must provide the New Mexico Bar with updated personal information, including his place

of employment, and remit an annual license fee. It contends that these administrative contacts may

be considered in assessing whether the District has personal jurisdiction over Ms. Ferrara, a point that

she contests on the basis that these obligations have no relation to her personally.

Assuming arguendo that contacts between the District of Columbia and the New Mexico

Supreme Court may be attributed to Ms. Ferrara because she acts as an agent for that body, the

continuing administrative obligations cited by the United States are not of the kind that the Supreme

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Court had in mind in Burger King. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that

it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of

businessistransacted solely by mail and wire communications acrossstate lines, thus

obviating the need for physical presence within a State inwhich businessis conducted.

So long as a commercial actor's efforts are purposefully directed toward residents of

another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical

contact can defeat personal jurisdiction there.

471 U.S. at 476 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, for example, the Court has

held that a Nebraska insurance association that solicited the membership of Virginia residents bymail

and established continuing obligations with them could be regulated by a Virginia State agency.

Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950).

It should be noted that the Court based its findings of jurisdiction in Burger King and

Travelers Health on qualitatively significant contacts with the forum State. In the first case, it

observed that the appellee, a Michigan resident who had entered into a franchise agreement by mail

with Burger King's Florida headquarters, had accepted "the long-term and exacting regulation of his

business from Burger King's Miami headquarters" and that his breach of his contractual obligations

to make paymentsin Miami "caused foreseeable injuriesto the corporation in Florida." Burger King,

471 U.S. at 480. In the latter case, the Court noted that Travelers Health had created continuing

obligations with respect to Virginia residents and had availed itself ofthe Virginia courtsto seek their

enforcement. Travelers Health, 339 U.S. at 648.

These cases have little in common with the one at hand. Mr. Doe's continuing obligation to

report his whereabouts to the New Mexico Supreme Court and to pay his annual dues was not the

result of the latter's pursuit of contacts within the District of Columbia; rather, the obligation was

undertaken by him before his unilateral decision to move to the District. Nor has the New Mexico

Supreme Court sought the "benefits and protections" ofthe District'slaws. The Court cannot be said

to have availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the District merely because it did not

end its relationship with Mr. Doe when he moved there.

Finally, theGovernment contendsthat Ms. Ferrara established the requisiteminimumpersonal

contact with the District of Columbia when she sent a letter to a District-based Justice Department

official stating her refusal to withdraw the disciplinary charges. The Government fails to mention,

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however, that the letter was in reply to a Justice Department request that the charges be dropped.

It is clearthat thissingle, responsive mailing cannot constitute the "meaningful" contact, BurgerKing,

471 U.S. at 472, or "substantial connection" between the defendant and the forum state, McGee v.

Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), that is required for jurisdiction. Even if this

communication were sufficient to satisfy due process, it would nonetheless fail to meet the

requirements of the D.C. long-arm statute. The scope of its otherwise broad "transacting any

business" clause islimited by the rule that contact with a federal instrumentality located in the District

will not give rise to personal jurisdiction. Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene

Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. App. 1976) (en banc). As the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia has noted,

[t]o permit our local courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose

sole contact with the District consists of dealing with a federal instrumentality not

only would pose a threat to free public participation in government, but also would

threaten to convert the District of Columbia into a national judicial forum.

Id.

B. Ms. Ferrara as Proxy for the State of New Mexico

As an alternative to its contention that there were sufficient contacts between Ms. Ferrara and

the District of Columbia to establish jurisdiction, the Government argues that due process

considerations are inappropriate in this instance. This claim rests on two assertions: First, it is not

necessary to show the existence of minimum contacts in order to obtain jurisdiction over the State

of New Mexico because the Supreme Court held, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,

323-24 (1966), that a State is not a "person" under the Due Process Clause and thus is not entitled

to its protection. Second, because Ms. Ferrara is being sued in her official capacity, she should be

treated as if she were the State for purposes of due process considerations. Given these premises,

the Government maintains that the existence of minimum contacts is not relevant to the question of

jurisdiction in this case.

We need not determine whether a State officialsued in his official capacity should be treated

as if he were the State for jurisdictional purposes because the United States could not have

established jurisdiction over the State of New Mexico in the District of Columbia regardless of

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whether due process considerations are relevant to the inquiry. The District's long-arm statute

providesfor jurisdiction over a non-resident "person" who transacts businessthere. D.C. Code Ann.

§ 13-423(a)(1). Therefore, in order to establish jurisdiction over New Mexico under the

Government's alternative theory, the State must qualify as a person within the meaning of the statute

despite the Government's contention that it is not a person under the Due Process Clause.

The Supreme Court has counseled that, "in common usage, the term"person' does not include

the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it." Will v.

Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (finding that State not a "person" for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because application to States not "clearly indicated") (internal brackets

omitted). The D.C. long-arm statute defines "person" to include

an individual, his executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a

corporation, partnership, association, or anyother legalor commercialentity, whether

or not a citizen or domiciliary of the District of Columbia and whether or not

organized under the laws of the District of Columbia.

D.C. Code Ann. § 13-421 (1981). Although a State could plausibly fall within the term "legal or

commercial entity," such a reading would be awkward and, at best, is not "clearly indicated."

Furthermore, because a State could not under any circumstances be domiciled in the District or

organized under its laws, the statute's text affirmatively implies that a State is not a "person" for its

purpose.

The Government itself does not appear to have any great confidence in its alternative basis

for claiming jurisdiction. It chose to name Ms. Ferrara rather than the State of New Mexico as the

defendant, its briefs fail to address the problem of the D.C. long-arm statute's application to States,

and it conceded at oral argument that it must establish personal jurisdiction over Ms. Ferrara in order

to maintain its suit. We also find it instructive that our research has failed to discover a single case

in which the United States has named a State as the defendant in a suit brought by it in the District

of Columbia. The United States, of course, has agents in all fifty States; and we doubt that its

inability to sue a State in thisforum willwork any real hardship on the Federal Government or hinder

its ability to administer justice.

III. CONCLUSION

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The United States cannot establish jurisdiction over Ms. Ferrara in the District of Columbia

because she lackssufficient contacts with the forum to satisfy the demands of due process. Treating

this case as one against the State of New Mexico would not solve the jurisdictional problem because

the State is not subject to the District'slong-armstatute. Consequently, the order of the district court

dismissing the Government's suit is

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring: It certainly seems anomalous to conclude that in a

lawsuit of this naturebrought against a state official at the seat of government by the United States

in vindication of its constitutional prerogativesthe district court is incapable of exercising

"personal" jurisdiction over the defendant. Perhaps hoping to capitalize on this perception, the

government, in its presentationsto us, has attempted to frame its dispute as effectively one with New

Mexico itself, or at least its Supreme Court. But as the majority properly points out, the only named

defendant in the complaint is Ferrara. And although she is named in her official capacity as the New

Mexico Supreme Court's chief disciplinary counsel, the government must nevertheless establish the

district court'sjurisdiction over her person. Echevarria-Gonzalez v. Gonzales-Chapel, 849 F.2d 24,

29 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424-25 (D.C.

Cir. 1991). For this reason, I concur in the court's determination that the district court lacks personal

jurisdiction over the defendanteven though she is being sued not as a person, but as an

instrumentality ofstate government, and even though it isthe United Statesthat has brought the suit.

This outcome might well be attributed to the inadequacy of the personal jurisdiction doctrine

to account for the circumstances of this case. That doctrine, at least as it has developed to this point,

does not allow for consideration of the one aspect of this case which might be thought particularly

significantthat this case presents a legal dispute between governments within the federal system.

The very notion of personal jurisdiction strikes me as inapplicable to this sort of case, especially in

light of the Supreme Court's determination that a state is not a "person" within the meaning of the

Due Process Clause, SouthCarolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966), a proposition that

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compelsthe conclusion that there is no constitutionalrequirement of personaljurisdiction over a state

defendant. Cf. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702

(1982) ("The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not fromArt. III, but from the

Due Process Clause.... It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty,

but as a matter of individual liberty."). Still, I think we have no choice but to follow the doctrine as

laid down, even though it has been formulated with an eye to disputes between private parties. It

admits of no grounds for distinguishing this suit on the basis urged by the United States, i.e., the

governmental nature of the parties and their relationship as sovereign participants in the federal

system.

We have been provided, in thisregard, with no principled groundsfor distinguishing this case

from a suit byDoe himself, or by any private party seeking to enjoin a state officialfrom revoking any

sort of state authorization (such as a driver's license) based on events within the forum state and

having consequences there. The government does not contend that personal jurisdiction could be

asserted under those hypotheticalfacts. Instead, it emphasizes that, in this case, it is the United States

that has brought suit. But the government does not explain why this makes a difference. The

government does not claim, for instance, that the United States is free to sue any state in any federal

district. Nor does it offer any legal grounds for approaching the question of personal jurisdiction

differently when suit is brought by the United States in the District of Columbia district court. The

government, in other words, urges usto adopt a holding limited to the specific facts of this case"a

restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669

(1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). But it is not doctrinally sound to look to the plaintiff in determining

whether jurisdiction is appropriate against the defendant. The intuitive reasonableness of allowing

the federal government to sue a state in the District ofColumbiawhich, of course, the United States

can do when it brings suit within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtis not by itself

enough, and I am unable to envision a rule of decision based on considerations acknowledged in the

precedents that control.

* * * *

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There is one point, however, on which I do not agree with the majority. I do not read the

D.C. long-arm statute to bar service of summons upon a state. Section 13-421 of the D.C. Code

provides for asserting personal jurisdiction over "any ... commercial or legal entity." This language,

I think, can only be read to include states within its ambit. Granted, the definition does not actually

include the word "state," but a state is certainly a "legal entity." I think the court overreads Will v.

Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989), in which the Court determined that the word

"person" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not include a state. The rule of interpretation therein

adopted principally reflected the Will Court's concern about readily attributing to Congress an

intention to impose monetary liability on the states. Here, by contrast, we have a purely procedural

statute. Any constitutional concerns, if present at all, are certainly far less weighty. More important,

I think it isincorrect to read Will to require courtsto engage in linguistic contortionsto avoid finding

statutory coverage ofstates. And it is only through such contortions that one can construe the phrase

"any ... legal entity" not to include a state.

My disagreement with the majority over the interpretation of D.C. Code § 13-421 is

inconsequential, however, since as I have already indicated I believe that the law requires that

personal jurisdiction be established against Ferrara as the named defendant. And I agree with the

majority that Ferrara's contacts with the District of Columbia have not been sufficient to justify the

exertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over her person.

USCA Case #93-5250 Document #124502 Filed: 05/19/1995 Page 14 of 14