Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-91-01338/USCOURTS-caDC-91-01338-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Water Works Association
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 16, 1993 Decided December 6, 1994

No. 91-1338

AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

No. 91-1343

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN WATER AGENCIES;

AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION;

LEAD INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, INC.;

INTERVENORS

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Erik D. Olson argued the cause and filed the briefsfor petitioner NaturalResources Defense Council

in 91-1343.

Kenneth A. Rubin argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner American Water Works

Association in 91-1338.

Ronald M. Spritzer, Attorney, United States Department ofJustice, argued the cause for respondent

in 91-1343. With him on the brief was Steven Neugeboren, Attorney, United States Environmental

Protection Agency.

StevenNeugeboren, Attorney, United States Environmental Protection Agency, argued the cause for

respondent in 91-1338. With him on the brief was Ronald M. Spritzer, Attorney, United States

Department of Justice.

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*The Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d). 

Hunter L. Prillaman argued the cause for intervenors American Water Works Association and

Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies. With him on the brief were Kenneth A. Rubin, Robert

J. Saner, II, and Rebecca Burke.

Jane Luxton argued the cause for intervenor Lead Industries Association, Inc. On the brief were

Edwin H. Seeger and Kurt E. Blase.

Lois J. Schiffer, Attorney, United States Environmental Protection Agency, entered an appearance

for respondent in 91-1338.

Before GINSBURG and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The American Water Works Association and the Natural

Resources Defense Councilseparately petition for review of the Environmental Protection Agency's

final rule under the Safe Drinking Water Act promulgating a national primary drinking water

regulation for lead. The NRDC challenges the EPA's decisions (1) establishing a treatment technique

instead of a maximum contaminant level (MCL) for lead; (2) setting an extended compliance

schedule; and (3) declining to regulate transient noncommunity water systems. The AWWA

challenges (4) the EPA's inclusion of water lines owned by others in the definition of distribution

facilities under the "control" of a public water system, and thus subject to the lead line replacement

regulations. The Association argues that (a) the agency failed to provide notice and an opportunity

to comment on its broad definition of control; (b) the definition is impermissibly vague; and (c) the

EPA's interpretation unreasonably expands the agency's jurisdiction under the statute.

We grant in part and deny in part the NRDC's petition, as follows: the EPA is not required

by the Act to set an MCL for lead at the tap, and the compliance schedule is not contrary to the

statute, but the agency's explanation for its decision not to regulate transient noncommunity water

systems is inadequate. We grant the AWWA's petition because the EPA failed to provide adequate

notice that it might adopt a broad definition of control. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the

EPA for a proper explanation of its noncommunity water systems policy and to provide an

opportunity for public comment upon the definition of "control" it purported to adopt as part of the

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rule under review.

I. BACKGROUND

The Safe Drinking Water Act requires the EPA to promulgate drinking water regulations

designed to prevent contamination of public water systems. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b). A national

primary drinking water regulation (NPDWR) is one that specifies for a contaminant with an adverse

effect upon human health either an MCL or a treatment technique, and establishesthe procedures and

criteria necessary to ensure a supply of drinking water that complies with that MCL or treatment

technique. 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1). An NPDWR is an enforceable standard applicable to all public

water systems nationwide. In most of the NPDWRs promulgated to date the EPA has set an MCL

for the particular contaminant being regulated. The EPA has the authority, however, to specify a

treatment technique in lieu of an MCL if the Administrator finds that it is not "economically or

technologicallyfeasible" to determine the level ofthe particular contaminant in a public watersystem.

42 U.S.C. § 300f(1)(C)(ii).

It is particularly difficult to determine the level oflead in a public watersystem. Less than one

percent of all public water systems draw source water containing any lead. Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking: Drinking Water Regulations; Maximum Contaminant Level Goals and National

Primary Drinking Water Regulationsfor Lead and Copper, 53 Fed. Reg. 31,516, 31,526-27 (1988).

Instead, most lead enters a public water system through corrosion of service lines and plumbing

materials containing lead, such as brass faucets and lead solder connecting copper pipes, that are

privately owned and thus beyond the EPA's regulatory reach under the Act. System-wide

measurement is made still more difficult because the degree to which plumbing materials leach lead

varies greatly with such factors asthe age of the material, the temperature of the water, the presence

of other chemicalsin the water, and the length oftime the water isin contact with the leaded material.

FinalRule: Maximum Contaminant Level Goals and National Primary Drinking Water Regulations

for Lead and Copper, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,460, 26,463-66, 26,473-76 (1991). Indeed, lead levels in

samples drawn consecutively from a single source can vary significantly. Id. at 26,473-76.

Measurement difficulties aside, treatment is made problematic because chemicals added to the

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drinking water supply in order to reduce the corrosion of pipes can increase the levels of other

contaminants subject to MCLs. Id. at 26,486-87.

Recognizing the peculiar difficulty of establishing an MCL for lead in public water systems,

the EPA proposed regulations that distinguish between control of lead in source water and control

of lead due to corrosion. First, the EPA proposed an MCL for lead in source water, to be measured

at the point where the water enters the distribution system. Second, the EPA proposed to require a

treatment techniquean "optimal corrosion control treatment" supplemented with a program of

public educationto be tailored specifically by each public watersystemin such a wayasto minimize

lead contamination in drinking water without increasing the level of any other contaminant to the

point where it violates the NPDWR for that substance. 53 Fed. Reg. at 31,537-38.

The EPA solicited comments on this two-part monitoring and treatment proposal and on

several alternatives that it was not then proposing. One such alternative was to require each public

water system to replace the lead service lines it owns or controls that, after treatment to reduce

corrosion, still contribute a significant amount of lead to tap water. Id. at 31,546, 31,547-48. Under

this approach the EPA would erect a "rebuttable presumption" that the public water system "owns

or controls and therefore can replace, the lead components up to the wall of the building served."

53 Fed. Reg. at 31,548.

In the final rule the EPA abandoned its two-part monitoring and treatment proposal in favor

of a rule under which all large watersystems must institute corrosion control treatment, while smaller

systems must do so only if representative sampling indicates that lead in the water exceeds a

designated "action level." 56 Fed. Reg. at 26,550 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.81(d) & (e)).

The agency also adopted a schedule that allows a public water system five or more years to comply

with the regulation, depending upon the number of persons it serves, see id. at 26,480 (codified at

40 C.F.R. § 141.81(a)); see also id. at 26,479-80, 26,494-97. The EPA required larger systems to

come into compliance sooner than smaller systems because they are generally more sophisticated

technically and have a greater impact upon the purity of drinking water; also the states, which are

responsible for implementing the regulation, would benefit from experience gained with larger

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systems before reviewing treatment plans for smaller systems. The EPA exempted from the rule all

transient noncommunity public water systems, such as those in restaurants, gasstations, and motels.

40 C.F.R. § 141.80(a)(1).

Unlike the proposed rule, the finalrule requires each public watersystemto replace each year

at least 77 of the lead service lines it controls that when tested exceed a designated action level. 40

C.F.R. § 141.84(b) & (d). A public water system is said to "control" a service line if it has

authority to set standards for construction, repair, or maintenance of the line,

authority to replace, repair, or maintain the service line, or ownership of the service

line.

40 C.F.R. § 141.84(e). The rule establishes a presumption that the public water system controls

every service line up to the wall of the building it serves; the system can rebut the presumption only

by demonstrating that its control is limited by state statute, local ordinance, public service contract,

or other legal authority. 40 C.F.R. § 141.84(e). A public water system that controls only part of a

service linemust replace the portion under its control and must offer to replace the remaining portion,

although not necessarily at the system's expense. 40 C.F.R. § 141.84(d).

II. ANALYSIS

Together the petitioners raise four challenges to the EPA'sfinalrule, which we review under

the familiar framework ofChevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, 467 U.S. 837

(1984). Where the "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," we must give

effect to its "unambiguously expressed" intent; but where the Congress has been silent or its

statement is ambiguous, we will defer to the EPA'sinterpretation ifit isreasonable in view ofthe text,

the structure, and the underlying purpose of the statute. Id. at 842-43; see also American Mining

Congress v. United States EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

A. MCL For Lead at the Tap

The NRDC first contends that, because it is economically and technologically feasible to

ascertain the level of lead in water, the Safe Drinking Water Act requires that the EPA set an MCL

for lead. See 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(7). Further, because the tap is the

delivery point to the user of a public water system, the NRDC concludes that the MCL must be set

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at the tap.

At bottom the NRDC and the EPA disagree over the meaning of the word "feasible" as it

applies to ascertaining the level of lead in drinking water. The NRDC argues that the Congress

clearly expressed its intent that "feasible" be understood to mean "physically capable of being done

at reasonable cost"; accordingly it argues that the EPA's rule is contrary to the plain meaning of the

statute. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. For its part, the EPA does not dispute that it is "feasible"

to monitor lead under the definition advanced by the NRDC; instead the agency interprets "feasible"

to mean "capable of being accomplished in a manner consistent with the Act." The agency argues

that if public water systems were required to comply with an MCL for lead, they would have to

undertake aggressive corrosion controltechniquesthat might reduce the amount oflead leached from

customers' plumbing but would also increase the levels of other contaminants. The EPA argues that

because the Congress apparently did not anticipate a situation in which monitoring for one

contaminant, although possible, is not conducive to overall water quality, it impliedly delegated to

the agency the discretion to specify a treatment technique instead of an MCL.

We agree with the EPA that the meaning of "feasible" is not as plain as the NRDC suggests.

Although we generally assume that the Congress intends the words it uses to have their ordinary

meaning, see Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S.

137, 149 (1984), case law is replete with examples of statutes the ordinary meaning of which is not

necessarilywhat the Congressintended. See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S.

974, 980 (1986) (EPA's interpretation of unclear statute held rational though not the "more natural

interpretation"); American Mining Congress, 824 F.2d at 1185-86. Indeed, where a literal reading

of a statutory term would lead to absurd results, the term simply "has no plain meaning ... and is the

proper subject of construction by the EPA and the courts." Chemical Manufacturers Association

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985). If the meaning of "feasible"

suggested by the NRDC is indeed its plain meaning, then this is such a case; for it could lead to a

result squarely at odds with the purpose of the Safe Drinking Water Act.

The Congress clearly contemplated that an MCL would be a standard by which both the

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quality of the drinking water and the public water system's efforts to reduce the contaminant could

be measured. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(5). Because lead generally enters drinking water from

corrosion in pipes owned by customers of the water system, an MCL for lead would be neither;

ascertaining the leveloflead in water at the meter (i.e. where it entersthe customer's premises) would

measure the public water system's success in controlling the contaminant but not the quality of the

public's drinking water (because lead may still leach into the water from the customer's plumbing),

while ascertaining the level of lead in water at the tap would accurately reflect water quality but

effectively hold the public water system responsible for lead leached from plumbing owned by its

customers.

We must defer to the EPA's interpretation of "feasible" if it isreasonable, Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 842-43, and we think that it is. A single national standard (i.e., an MCL) for lead is not suitable

for every public water system because the condition of plumbing materials, which are the major

source of lead in drinking water, varies acrosssystems and the systems generally do not have control

over the sources of lead in their water. In this circumstance the EPA suggests that requiring public

water systemsto design and implement custom corrosion control plans for lead willresult in optimal

treatment of drinking water overall, i.e. treatment that deals adequately with lead without causing

public water systems to violate drinking water regulations for other contaminants. 56 Fed. Reg.

26,487.

Viewing the Act as a whole, we cannotsaythat the statute demonstrates a clear congressional

intent to require that the EPA set an MCL for a contaminant merely because it can be measured at

a reasonable cost. In light of the purpose of the Act to promote safe drinking water generally, we

conclude that the EPA's interpretation of the term "feasible" so as to require a treatment technique

instead of an MCL for lead is reasonable.

B. Compliance Schedule

We turn next to the NRDC's contention that the compliance schedule promulgated by the

EPA is contrary to the statutory injunction that NPDWRs "shall take effect 18 months after the date

of their promulgation." 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(10). According to the petitioner, in "ordinary

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English" the phrase "shall take effect" means "shall be fully implemented and enforced against public

water systems." Therefore, we are told, the meaning of the statute is plain and the EPA's

interpretation to the contrary should be struck down, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, with the result

that the rule must be fully implemented within eighteen months of when it was promulgated.

The EPA, on the other hand, contendsthat the plain meaning of the statute is that the agency

cannot impose the requirements of an NPDWR upon public water systems any earlier than eighteen

months after promulgation. According to the agency, the Congress included the 18-month provision

in the Act not in order to force the agency to adopt a hasty implementation schedule but in order to

"constrain[ ] the Agency's authority under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d), to

make rules effective 30 days after their publication in the FederalRegister." 56 Fed. Reg. at 26,494-

95.

We start, as usual, with the terms of the statute. The spare mandatethat NPDWRs "shall

take effect eighteen months after the date of their promulgation"is in our view considerably less

clear on its face than the NRDC suggests. As we only recently noted, depending upon the context,

"take effect" can mean either "take legal effect" (as the EPA here suggests), or "produce results" (as

the NRDC suggests). See Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Natural

Resources Defense Council v. Browner, 22 F.3d 1125, 1137-40 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Because we must

examine the effective date provision in its statutory context in order to determine which meaning the

Congress intended, we cannot say that either the NRDC's or the EPA'sreading is the uniquely "plain

meaning" of the provision.

Turning to that context, we see first that the effective date provision refers only to drinking

water regulations, not to their implementation and enforcement. The Act defines an NPDWR as a

regulation that (1) applies to public water systems; (2) identifies a contaminant that could adversely

affect human health; (3) specifies either an MCL or a treatment technique to control the contaminant;

and (4) contains criteria and procedures, such as operating and maintenance standards, to assure a

reasonably safe drinking water supply. 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1). An NPDWR does not, however, set an

implementation schedule or enforcement proceduresfor the MCL or treatment technique it specifies.

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On the contrary, the Act requires the States, which have primary enforcement responsibility, to

promulgate regulations to implement and enforce the NPDWRs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-2, 300g-3.

Clearly, therefore, the Congress contemplated that the date upon which a drinking water regulation

takes effect under 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(10) would not necessarily be the date upon which the

regulation will be implemented or enforced. See, e.g., Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (law may have delayed effect).

Second, the 18-monthprovisionapplies equallyto alldrinkingwaterregulations, whetherthey

promulgate a treatment technique or an MCL. Although it may be reasonable to assume that an MCL

can be implemented and enforced 18 months after promulgation, we doubt that the Congress

expected that each state could in 18 months approve the various treatment plans submitted by all the

public water systems in the state; promulgate and implement enforcement regulations; grant

exemptions and variances for public water systems that cannot comply with the NPDWR; and

establish a reporting mechanism, which must be designed on a site-by-site basis in order to minimize

exposure to the contaminant in drinking water without adversely affecting the public water system's

compliance with other MCLs or treatment techniques. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-2, 300g-4, 300g-5,

40 C.F.R. §§ 142.4-142.19; see also 56 Fed. Reg. at 26,487 (describing factorsto take into account

in designing treatment technique), 26,494-95 (describing actions by public water systems and States

necessary to implement treatment technique). Compressing these activities into 18 months could

compromise effective treatment for lead; it is surely not unreasonable, therefore, for the EPA to

interpret the 18-month provision so as to prefer the Act's overall goal of safe drinking water over a

hasty implementation and enforcement schedule. Accordingly, we conclude that the EPA's

interpretation of the 18-month provision is reasonable.

C. Transient Non-community Water Systems

The NRDC next challengesthe EPA's decision not to apply the NPDWR for lead to transient,

non-communitywatersystems(defined asthose that serve fewer than 25 individualsregularly forsix

months per year). See 56 Fed. Reg. at 26,478. The NRDC claims that this limitation is in direct

conflict with the requirement of the Act that NPDWRs "shall apply to each public water system in

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each State." 42 U.S.C. § 300g (with certain exceptions not relevant here). The NRDC asserts that

transient, non-community water systemssuch as those at restaurants, motels, and parksare

"public watersystems" within the meaning ofthe Act, which defines a public watersystemas one that

provides "piped water for human consumption" regularly to at least twenty-five individuals or to at

least fifteen service connections. 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4). As a corollary, the NRDC contends that any

exemption from an NPDWR must be made pursuant to the variance or exemption provisions of the

Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-4, 300g-5.

For its part, the EPA claims (on brief) that it decided not to impose the NPDWR for lead

upon transient, non-community systems because lead poses a significant health risk onlywith chronic

exposure. This is consistent with long-standing agency practice. See 40 Fed. Reg. 59,566 (1975)

(stating that MCLs are "based on the potential health effects of long-term exposure"); 52 Fed. Reg.

25,694-95 (1987) (excluding transient systems from certain regulations because they pose no

"long-term health risk"); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.61(a) & (c), 141.62(a) (with exception of nitrate

and nitrite, MCLs applied only to community and non-transient, non-community systems). For

factual and policy support of its decision, the EPA cites its previous documentation that lead in

drinking water poses adverse health effects only with chronic exposure, see, e.g., Environmental

Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978); the administrative burden of

regulating the large number of transient, non-community systems; the absence of any appreciable

public health benefit from doing so; and the inability of the generally unsophisticated owners of such

systems to comprehend and comply with complex drinking water regulations. See Comment

Response Document for the August 18, 1988 Proposed Lead and Copper Rule, Response to

Comment 1061-46B.

Be that as it may, the EPA concedes that in adopting the final rule it failed adequately to

explain its basis for excluding transient, non-community systems from the NPDWR for lead.

Nonetheless, the agency suggests that the rule not be vacated but instead that the court should

remand the record in order for the agency to try again.

That the agency has a long-standing policy of excluding transient systemsfrom NPDWRsfor

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1

In so doing, we express no view upon the issue discussed but not decided by the panel in

Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994), viz., whether the court has authority to remand

a case without vacating the agency order under review. In its opening brief the NRDC asked the

court to "strike down" the exemption of transient non-community water systems; in reply to the

EPA's request that we remand the record to the agency for an adequate explanation of its

decision, the petitioner suggests instead that we "should remand the rules with instructions that

EPA cover" transient non-community systems. The petitioner does not argue, however, that the

court is without authority to remand the case without vacating the rule, and we therefore have no

occasion to resolve that question. 

non-acute contaminants is clear; that it inadvertently failed to document its decision to treat lead

pursuant to this policy is also clear. See Response to Comment 1061-46B: (although "lead can pose

acute toxic effects, such effects only occur at extremely high exposure levels (give an indication of

how high must be) which are not found in drinking water (explain what we mean by this. Do we

mean that the concentrations found in drinking water in the past have not been high enough, or is it

more that the levels would have to be so high that we would never expect to see them in water)").

Because the agency's error is apparently a technical one, and we think it more likely than not that the

agency can justifyits exemption decision when it gets down to trying, vacatur would be unnecessarily

disruptive to the exempted industries. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,

988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Rather than vacate the exemption, therefore, we remand this

matter to the EPAfor a more detailed justification ofits decision to exclude transient, non-community

water systems from compliance with the drinking water regulation for lead.1

D. Definition of Control

Finally, we consider the AWWA's challenge to the agency's criteria for determining whether

a water system service line is under the "control" of the system operator, and thus subject to the lead

service line replacement regulations. Although public water systems generally own only that part of

the service line that underlies public property, 56 Fed. Reg. at 26,503, the EPA established in itsfinal

rule a rebuttable presumption that the public water system "controls" the water service line up to the

wall of the building unless the system (1) does not own the line; and neither (2) has the authority to

replace, repair, or maintain the service line, nor (3) hasthe authorityto set standardsfor construction,

maintenance, or repair of the line. 56 Fed. Reg. at 26,504, 26,553 (codified at 40 C.F.R. §

141.84(e)).

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The AWWA contends first that the definition of "control" in the finalrule was not prefigured

in the proposed rule and therefore that the public did not have notice of and opportunity to comment

upon it, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c). For its part, the

EPA points out that it stated in its notice of proposed rulemaking that the agency was considering

adopting a lead service line replacement requirement under which it would establish a presumption,

rebuttable only by invoking a statute, ordinance, or contract to the contrary, that a public water

system owns or controls the line up to the wall of the building it serves. 53 Fed. Reg. at 31,548. The

agency's definition of control in the final rule, it argues, merely states "in slightly more precise terms

the alternative discussed in the [notice of proposed rulemaking]."

An agency fulfills the notice requirement of the APA if it "provide[s] sufficient factual detail

and rationale for the rule to permit interested parties to comment meaningfully." Florida Power &

Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In most cases, if the agency then

alters its course in response to the comments it receives, little purpose would be served by a second

round of comment. The test we have developed for deciding whether a second round of comment

is required in a particular case is whether the final rule promulgated by the agency is a "logical

outgrowth" of the proposed rule. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management v. EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 28

(D.C. Cir. 1992); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 546-47 (D.C.

Cir. 1983). We apply that standard functionally by asking whether "the purposes of notice and

comment have been adequately served," Fertilizer Institute v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir.

1991), that is, whether a new round of notice and comment would provide the first opportunity for

interested parties to offer comments that could persuade the agency to modify its rule.

The EPA referred often in the notice of proposed rulemaking to the scope of control exerted

by a public water system but it never once treated "control" as a term of art or otherwise in need of

definition. On the contrary, in discussing a public water system's control over lead service lines, the

agency allowed that private "ownership and/or control" of a service line is a limitation upon its

authority without so much as a suggestion that private ownership might not preclude a public water

system from having "control" over a service line. Consider:

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A further complication of the pipe replacement issue isthat ownership and/or control

of the service line often is split between the public water system and the property

owner....

...

EPA believesthat, in general, its authority to require replacement ofservice lines and

other connections ends where the water supplier ownership or control of the lines

end. The EPA has conducted a limited study of some large cities, which indicates that

these water suppliers generally limit maintenance on water pipes to those portions

they own. However, several cities have authority to enter private property to perform

work on water lines under special circumstances; in such cases the property owner

is generally billed for the work performed.

...

EPA also solicits information on the extent of the authority of public water systems

over lead service lines and connections under State law and local ordinances.

53 Fed. Reg. at 31,535-36. If it does not necessarily imply the contrary, this passage certainly gives

no affirmative indication that the EPA was contemplating that a public water system might be said

to control a service line merely because it hasthe authority (but not the obligation) to set construction

standards or to repair.

There is a further reason to believe that the AWWA, which commented extensively upon the

lead service line replacement program, was not asleep at the switch when it failed to comment upon

the scope of a public water system's control over service lines. Seven months before the EPA

published its notice of proposed rulemaking, the Georgia Supreme Court had interpreted the

definition of a "public water system" under that state's Safe Drinking Water Actwhich is identical

to the definition in the federalstatuteas confining the regulatory authority to portions ofthe service

line not underlying private property. See Bass v. Ledbetter, 363 S.E.2d 760, 761 (Ga. 1988). Yet

the EPA said nothing in the notice of proposed rulemaking about the Georgia case, which was then

the only authority to have considered the definition of a public water system. In these circumstances

it was quite reasonable for the regulated industry not to perceive any doubt on the EPA's part that

its control over a service line ends at the private property line.

Because we find that the interested parties could not reasonably have "anticipated the final

rulemaking from the draft [rule]," Anne Arundel County v. EPA, 963 F.2d 412, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1429 (9th Cir. 1988)),

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we conclude that the EPA failed to provide adequate notice that it would adopt a novel definition of

control. Accordingly, we vacate the rule insofar as it deems privately owned lead service lines to be

within the "control" of a public watersystemfor the purpose of obligating the systemto replace them.

The AWWA also contendsthat the EPA's expansive definition of "control" would extend the

agency's reach beyond its lawful grasp under the Safe Drinking Water Act, and that the definition is

impermissibly vague in that it seemsto require watersuppliersto enter private property but "does not

indicate if it is intended to create a right of entry." Because we vacate the rule for lack of public

notice, we need not reach these substantive issues. See, e.g., National Family Planning v. Sullivan,

979 F.2d 227, 240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Solite Corp. v. EPA, 952 F.2d 473, 499-500 & n.13 (D.C.

Cir. 1991).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition ofthe NRDC insofar asit challenges both the

EPA's decision to require a treatment technique in lieu of an MCL for lead and the compliance

schedule for public water systems. We remand the matter to the EPA for a better explanation of its

transient, non-community water systems policy, and such further action asit maywish to take in light

of our holding that the agency failed to provide adequate notice of how it would define "control."

So ordered.

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