Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01417/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01417-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Exxel/Atmos, Inc.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
United Steelworkers of America
Intervenor

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 9, 1998 Decided June 26, 1998

No. 97-1417

Exxel/Atmos, Inc.,

Petitioner

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

United Steelworkers of America,

Intervenor

Consolidated with

No. 97-1418

On Petitions for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of Orders of the National Labor

Relations Board

Vincent J. Apruzzese argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioner.

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David A. Fleischer, Senior Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on

the brief were Linda Sher, Associate General Counsel, and

Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel.

Margaret A. Gaines, Supervisory Attorney, entered an appearance.

Daniel M. Kovalik argued the cause for intervenor United

Steelworkers of America. With him on the brief were Laurence Gold, David Silberman, and James Coppess.

Before: Wald, Sentelle, and Randolph, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: These are petitions by Exxel/Atmos, Inc. to review, and cross-petitions by the National Labor

Relations Board to enforce, two orders issued in June 1997.

The Board issued the first of its orders on remand from our

decision in Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243 (D.C.

Cir. 1994). The second order dealt with events in late 1994

and early 1995, after the remand.

Exxel is a small New Jersey company manufacturing nongas aerosol delivery systems. In September 1990 the company voluntarily recognized the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of

its production and maintenance employees. Nine months

later, in May 1991, Exxel refused the union's request to

bargain. The Board found that Exxel had thereby violated

s 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29

U.S.C. s 158(a)(1) & (5). See Exxel-Atmos, Inc. ("Exxel I"),

309 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1024 (1992). Among other things, it

ordered Exxel to cease and desist from refusing to bargain

with the union and affirmatively "to recognize, meet and

bargain collectively in good faith" with the union upon request. Id. at 1024, 1033. This court upheld the Board's

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findings of violations of the Act and enforced the cease and

desist order, but--on the basis of longstanding precedent in

this circuit--we refused to enforce the bargaining order and

remanded the case to the Board for a "clear explanation" of

"why a bargaining order, as opposed to the cease and desist

order standing alone, was justified in this case." Exxel/Atmos, 28 F.3d at 1248-49; see Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, No.

93-1108 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 1994) (enforcing Board's order in

part and remanding case in part).

The Board responded by reaffirming the bargaining order

in a June 1997 supplemental decision. See Exxel-Atmos,

Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (June 5, 1997). On the same date,

the Board issued another decision and order finding the

company guilty of additional unfair labor practices. On December 7, 1994, after our remand, Ronald Lemke, Exxel's

President, gave a speech to the production and maintenance

employees in which he explained the procedure for decertifying the union and informed the employees that Exxel was

obligated to bargain with the union unless it was decertified.

Exxel also gave each of its employees a cash Christmas bonus

of $100 during the week of December 23. On January 10,

Exxel, pointing to signed letters to the Board from some

employees indicating that they no longer wished to be represented by the union, canceled all bargaining sessions with the

union, then scheduled for early 1995. Employees filed a

decertification petition on January 26, and thereafter Exxel

took the position that it was under no obligation to bargain

until a decertification election had been held. The Board

concluded that Lemke's speech, the Christmas bonus, and

Exxel's refusal to bargain violated s 8(a)(1) and (5) of the

Act. See Exxel-Atmos, Inc. ("Exxel II" ), 323 N.L.R.B. No.

158, slip op. at 3 (June 5, 1997). As a remedy, the Board

again, inter alia, ordered Exxel both to cease and desist from

refusing to bargain and affirmatively to bargain with the

union upon request. See id.

I

We shall deal first with the Board's decision in Exxel II,

and Lemke's speech. Employer speech or conduct violates

s 8(a)(1) if it "interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerce[s] emUSCA Case #97-1417 Document #362587 Filed: 06/26/1998 Page 3 of 13
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ployees" in their decision whether to decertify the union. 29

U.S.C. s 158(a)(1). On the other hand, the "expressing of

any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,

whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not

constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if

such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or

promise of benefit." 29 U.S.C. s 158(c).

The Board's explanation for finding a s 8(a)(1) violation in

Lemke's speech consists of the following (323 N.L.R.B. No.

158, slip op. at 2):

In his unsolicited speech, the Respondent's president,

Lemke, provided the unit employees with instructions on

how to decertify the Union. In doing so, the Respondent

unlawfully instigated the decertification petition among

its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.*

_______

* Weisser Optical Co., 274 NLRB 961 (1985), and cases cited

therein.

The text tells us nothing. It merely recites the Board's

conclusion that the speech was "unlawful." The Board's

rationale, therefore, must be contained in the footnote suggesting that Lemke's speech was indistinguishable from the

employer conduct condemned in Weisser Optical and "the

cases cited therein."

In Weisser Optical, the Board found a s 8(a)(1) violation

because the company provided more than "ministerial aid" to

its employees in filing a decertification petition. A company

official had asked an employee to initiate and solicit signatures for a decertification petition among the rank-and-file,

"explaining that he wanted to rid the [company] of the

Union." 274 N.L.R.B. at 961. When the employee agreed,

the official gave him a booklet containing instructions and

sample language to be used in gathering evidence of employee interest. See id. The employee then apparently abandoned the idea, so management approached a second employee "about getting something started." Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). After a meeting at which the company

expressed its belief that no "third party" was needed to work

out any differences the employees might have with the comUSCA Case #97-1417 Document #362587 Filed: 06/26/1998 Page 4 of 13
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pany, the first employee immediately began soliciting signatures for a decertification petition. See id. The petition

arrived at the Board only a few days later. See id. Such

"unsolicited involvement with the showing of interest petition," held the Board, "constituted far more than ministerial

aid" and hence violated s 8(a)(1) of the Act.

The "cases cited therein," in Weisser Optical that is, turn

out to be only one case--Silver Spur Casino, 270 N.L.R.B.

1067 (1984).1 There, the employer had suggested to an

employee--at work and in phone calls to her at her home--

that a decertification petition ought to circulate among the

employees. See id. at 1071-72. The employer provided her

with language to use in the petition, approved a draft, told the

employee how to circulate it and among whom, gave her

instructions on getting it signed and dated, and told her

where to send it. See id. When a different employee

approached the employer with concerns about a union, the

employer provided similar assistance for a second petition.

See id. at 1072. The employer then mailed both petitions to

the Board. See id. The ALJ held that the employer's

actions violated s 8(a)(1) because they "constitute[d] far more

than the mere ministerial aid such as the Board might not

find unlawful." Id. The Board upheld the ALJ's conclusion,

stating that the employer "unlawfully encouraged and assisted the employees in repudiating the Union." Id. at 1067.

Neither Weisser Optical nor Silver Spur help to explain the

Board's conclusion in this case. Whatever the precise meaning of "ministerial aid," neither decision goes so far as to hold

that an employer violates s 8(a)(1) merely through state-

__________

1 Weisser Optical also contained citations to Texas Elec. Coop.,

197 N.L.R.B. 10 (1972), and Craftool Mfg. Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 634

(1977). The Board cited those cases, however, not to explain when

an employer violates s 8(a)(1) by assisting employees in filing a

decertification petition, but rather to support its statement that

reliance on a tainted decertification petition is no defense to a

withdrawal-of-recognition charge. See Weisser Optical, 274

N.L.R.B. at 962.

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ments informing employees of the decertification process.

The Board explicitly rejected such a reading of s 8(a)(1) in

Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 306 N.L.R.B. 408 (1992).

The employer there had called a meeting and pointed out the

disadvantages of switching to a union-proposed pension plan.

See id. at 408. In response to employee questions about how

to get rid of the union, the employer gave the employees

general information about the decertification process and the

location of the Board's office, adding that any decertification

petition "would have to be filed soon." Id. The Board

thought the employer's statements caused concern among the

employees and triggered the filing of a decertification petition. See id. at 410. Even so, it held that this did not make

the statements unlawful under s 8(a)(1). "It is clear that,

under Section 8(c), an employer may lawfully furnish accurate

information ... if it does so without making threats or

promises of benefits.... Otherwise lawful statements do not

become unlawful ... [under s 8(a)(1) ] merely because they

have the effect (intended or otherwise) of causing employees

to abandon their support for a union." Id. at 409-10 (footnotes omitted). The employer's motive and the actual effect

of its statements are irrelevant. See id. at 409. Instead, "the

test is whether the employer's statements may reasonably be

said to have tended to interfere with employees' exercise of

their Section 7 rights." Id. (footnote omitted); see also

Lucky 7 Limousine, 312 N.L.R.B. 770, 804 (1993).

Lemke's speech did not offend this standard. Lemke, and

hence Exxel, doubtless intended to do more than merely

make a public service announcement. It is fair to assume

they hoped the employees would act on the information. But

Lee Lumber makes the motivation of the employer irrelevant.

As to the content of the speech, the part with which the

Board took issue simply informed Exxel's employees that a

decertification procedure existed for employees who decided

they no longer wanted to be represented by a union.2 For all

__________

2 The Board focused on the following portion of Lemke's

speech:

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we know, the employees were already aware of this. After

briefly (and accurately) explaining the procedure, Lemke said

that anybody "who wants more information ... can call the

Labor Board to get more details about how to file for [a

decertification] election." J.A. 61. He also left copies of the

Board's address and phone number in the meeting room.

Before concluding, Lemke told the employees, "The decision

about whether to file a petition with the Labor Board for a

Decertification Election is entirely up to you. The Company

will not take any action against anyone because he has or has

not signed a petition." J.A. 61. We presume the Board saw

something coercive or threatening in these statements, but

we are unable to detect anything of the sort. Unlike the

employers in Weisser Optical and Silver Spur, who arguably

pressured individual employees to participate in the decertification process, Lemke delivered his speech to Exxel's employees collectively. Moreover, his statements were remarkably similar to those in Lee Lumber, doubtless because an

attorney for the company wrote the speech. Short of saying

nothing at all, it is hard to see how Lemke could have been

more careful about not interfering with the employees' free

__________

What if we don't want a union? Is there anything we can do

about it? Yes. The Labor Board has a procedure called a

Decertification Election. This would allow the employees to

vote, in a secret ballot election, on whether you truly want the

union to represent you. The Board will conduct a Decertification Election if 30% of the employees take or send a petition to

the Labor Board stating that they do not want the union to

represent them. Anybody who wants more information about

this procedure can call the Labor Board to get more details

about how to file for an election. I will leave copies of the

Labor Board's address and telephone number here in this

room. I want to say as clearly as I possibly can that the

Company intends to comply with the law and with the court's

order [in Exxel I]. The decision about whether to file a

petition with the Labor Board for a Decertification Election is

entirely up to you. The Company will not take any action

against anyone because he has or has not signed a petition.

J.A. 61.

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choice and yet still informed them of the availability of the

decertification procedure.

At any rate, since the Board chose not to explain why it

believed the speech constituted "unlawful instigation," its

citation to a clearly distinguishable precedent is not enough to

warrant sustaining its conclusion that Exxel violated

s 8(a)(1).

II

On the Wednesday or Thursday before Christmas 1994,

each employee received from Exxel a $100 bill contained in a

greeting card signed by Exxel's management. The Board,

pointing out that the " 'Christmas bonus' was related to the

increased sales performance of [Exxel's] employees in 1994,"

found that the bonus "constitutes wages, and as such, is a

proper subject for collective bargaining." Exxel-Atmos, 323

N.L.R.B. No. 158, slip op. at 3. Exxel did not bargain with

the union before awarding the bonus and so the Board

concluded that the company violated s 8(a)(1) and (5). See

id.3

The Board's conclusion lacks substantial evidence. The Act

requires employers to bargain collectively with unions over

"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. s 158(d). A "Christmas bonus ... becomes an element of wages and, therefore, a term and

condition of employment that cannot be altered unilaterally"

if it is "tied to other remuneration and paid regularly over an

extended period." International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local

1466 v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The bonus

here was not tied to the wages of the employees. It was

linked neither to seniority nor to each employee's individual

__________

3 Notably, the Board did not rest its conclusion that the Act

was violated on a finding that Exxel presented the bonus with the

intent of demonstrating to its employees "that the Union was

irrelevant," or as part of a "concerted strategy to weaken and

discredit the union in the eyes of the employees." Microimage

Display Div. of Xidex Corp. v. NLRB, 924 F.2d 245, 253 (D.C. Cir.

1991) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Such a finding would

be subject to a very different analysis.

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performance. And, perhaps most telling, there is no evidence

that Exxel had ever paid such a bonus to its employees in the

past. See id. (Christmas bonus found to be "a part of the

employees' wages" where it was "a regular practice going

back some forty years"); 5 Theodore Kheel, Labor Law

s 19.04, at 19-18 to -19 (1997) (cases finding bonuses to be

wages "have primarily relied on the regularity of the payment

over a sufficient period of time"); Sykel Enters., Inc., 324

N.L.R.B. No. 171, slip op. at 3-4 (Nov. 7, 1997) (crucial

question in determining whether Christmas bonus constitutes

wages is whether employer's pattern of paying bonus in past

has justified employees' expectations that they could count on

receiving it as part of wages in future as well).

In short, the record plainly shows that the bonus was a

seasonal gift. The previous Christmas, Exxel had hosted a

buffet luncheon party for its employees. The next year it

gave them cash because it was the first year Exxel had

turned a profit. That did not transform the $100 bonus into

"an integral part of [Exxel's] wage structure." Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 165, 166-67 (1951).

III

This brings us to Exxel's refusal to bargain with the union

in early 1995. In enforcing the Board's cease and desist

order in Exxel I, we ordered Exxel to "[c]ease and desist

from ... [w]ithdrawing recognition from and refusing to meet

and bargain collectively with" the union. Exxel/Atmos, Inc.

v. NLRB, No. 93-1108 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 1994) (enforcing

Board's order in part and remanding case in part). It was

"utterly clear" that our order put Exxel under an affirmative

obligation to bargain with the union as of November 30, 1994,

the date our mandate issued. Caterair Int'l v. NLRB, 22

F.3d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1994).4 Even so, Exxel did next to

__________

4 An affirmative bargaining order and an order requiring an

employer to "cease and desist" from refusing to bargain do not have

the same consequences. Under settled Board practice, only the

former carries with it a decertification bar, preventing the employer

from challenging the union's majority status for a reasonable period

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nothing. It held no bargaining sessions with the union in the

weeks leading up to January 10. And when on that date

Exxel learned of an impending decertification effort on the

part of some of its employees--it is unclear whether Exxel

knew exactly how many employees supported the effort, but

it is clear that no decertification petition had been filed at

that time--it promptly canceled all planned bargaining sessions with the union, including one scheduled for the next

day. We acknowledge that under some circumstances an

employer may suspend bargaining if it "can show, by 'clear,

cogent and convincing' evidence, either that the union has lost

majority support or that the employer has a reasonable, goodfaith doubt of continuing majority support." Microimage

Display Div. of Xidex Corp. v. NLRB, 924 F.2d 245, 253

(D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). We also recognize that

Exxel twice requested by letter, once on January 10 and

again on January 30, that the Board inform it whether a

majority of Exxel's employees had petitioned for decertification, and that the Board refused the request. But none of

this excused Exxel from complying with our order. Exxel

should have bargained with the union as soon as was practically possible following the issuance of our mandate. At the

very least, it should have gone ahead with the scheduled

bargaining sessions until January 26, when a formal decertification petition was filed. See, e.g., St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v.

NLRB, 871 F.2d 137, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Allied Indus.

Workers, Local Union No. 289 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 881

(D.C. Cir. 1973); NLRB v. New Assocs., 35 F.3d 828, 833-35

(3d Cir. 1994). Exxel's refusal to do so constituted a direct

violation of our order and hence was clearly unlawful.

As a remedy for Exxel's recalcitrance, the Board once

again issued a bargaining order. Relying on our decision in

Exxel I, the company argues that the Board failed to justify

the bargaining order. But there is an essential difference

between the two cases: here, Exxel never contested the

propriety of the bargaining order in the proceedings before

__________

of time. See, e.g., Exxel/Atmos, 28 F.3d at 1248; Caterair, 22 F.3d

at 1121-22 & n.4.

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the Board. Accordingly, under s 10(e) of the Act, Exxel

waived any right it had to object to the order before this

court. See 29 U.S.C. s 160(e) ("No objection that has not

been urged before the Board ... shall be considered by the

court...."); Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456

U.S. 645, 666 (1982) (failure to "object[ ] to the Board's

decision in a petition for reconsideration or rehearing ...

prevents consideration of the question by the courts"); Quazite v. NLRB, 87 F.3d 493, 497-98 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (refusing to

consider employer's argument that Board did not adequately

explain need for bargaining order because employer did not

raise objection before Board). It is of no moment that the

Board neglected to invoke s 10(e) in its brief to this court.

Section 10(e) "speaks to courts, not parties," and the Board

cannot waive its jurisdictional requirements simply by neglecting to mention them before us. EEOC v. FLRA, 476

U.S. 19, 23 (1986) (per curiam).5

The petition for review in No. 97-1417 is granted in part

and denied in part. Enforcement of the Board's order is

denied on the speech and bonus questions in No. 97-1417.

The remainder of the Board's order in No. 97-1417 is enforced. The petition for review in No. 97-1418, and the

Board's cross-application for enforcement, are dismissed. See

note 5, supra.

So ordered.

__________

5 Because we enforce the Board's June 5, 1997, bargaining

order in Exxel II, there is no need for us to consider whether the

Board's supplemental opinion adequately supported the original

bargaining order issued by the Board in Exxel I. The two bargaining orders are effectively identical.

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Sentelle, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join without reservation in the Court's conclusion that under section 10(e) of the

Act, 29 U.S.C. s 160(e), we lack jurisdiction to review the

second bargaining order. I write separately to express my

hope (probably a vain one) that the Board will not find in our

declining any suggestion that we consider the reasoning in its

supplemental opinion adequate to support the extraordinary

remedy invoked in its original bargaining order in Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Exxel,

we reiterated to the Board the well established law of this

Circuit that the issuance of a bargaining order is an extraordinary, "somewhat punitive," remedy which "has the effect of

ensconcing the union as the employees' exclusive bargaining

representative and therefore carries with it the potential of

infringing upon employees' Section 7 rights." 28 F.3d at 1248

(citing Caterair Int'l v. NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114, 1122 (D.C. Cir.

1994)). Therefore, "we have time and again required the

Board to explain that it has balanced the often competing

interests of union protection and employee choice before

issuing a bargaining order." Exxel, 28 F.3d at 1248 (citing,

inter alia, Caterair, 22 F.3d at 1123). On remand, instead of

complying with its duty to balance, the Board, continuing in

the rogue behavior which we have noted time and again,

simply declared the appropriateness of its original remedy,

incredibly stating as its sole basis its prior decision in Caterair Int'l, 322 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (Aug. 27, 1996).

Lest there be any doubt, the Board's Caterair is the very

decision which we reversed, noting that we were ordering the

Board for the sixth time to cease engaging in its contumacious behavior. See Caterair, 22 F.3d at 1123. Once again,

our orders and admonitions to the Board seem to have fallen

on deaf ears. Not only does it continue to engage in precisely

the process we have condemned in the past, but even cites in

support of this recalcitrant behavior the Caterair decision for

which we condemned it.

As I have previously suggested, I think we have been

overly gentle in our line of cases, including Caterair, rejecting

the Board's facile imposition of the extraordinary bargaining

orders remedy. See Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp. v.

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NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle, J.,

concurring). In no other area of our enlightened democratic

society would we permit an elitist bureaucracy to deprive

citizens of their rights as free actors on the theory that they

might have been so deceived by others of differing interests

that they cannot by their free choice determine their best

interests, but must be subjugated to the decision of an

administrative agency. Id. While we can conceive of a

commission regulating corporations tossing out the election of

a corporate board based on deceit practiced against the

shareholders, no one has ever suggested that such a commission could then impose indefinitely on the shareholders an

unelected board, on the rationale that shareholder votes

thereafter would be the product of "tainted" decisionmaking.

We might even imagine an election of a public official being

overturned because of fraud, but it is surely inconceivable

that a board or commission could then impose its own choice

of congressman, senator, or governor because of some continuing taint. Nonetheless, the NLRB persists in its elitist

belief that those of the working class cannot be trusted to

reject deceit on their own, and that, therefore, their benevolent big brother must watch after them.

Were we not bound by stare decisis, I would find few if any

circumstances under which I would uphold a bargaining

order. However, I recognize that this Court is bound by

precedent. The time has long since come for the Board to

recognize not only the constraints of precedent, but its statutory and constitutional duty to obey the law as interpreted by

the courts. Under 29 U.S.C. s 160, this Court has jurisdiction to review the orders of the Board. On at least seven

occasions we have exercised that jurisdiction to tell the Board

that its routine imposition of remedial bargaining orders is

contrary to law. See cases collected in Lee Lumber, 117 F.3d

at 1461; Exxel, 28 F.3d at 1248. Eight is enough.

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