Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03053/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03053-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marlon Marshall
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 31, 1997 Decided January 6, 1998 

No. 96-3053

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MARLON MARSHALL,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cr00201-01)

Robert S. Becker, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the brief for appellant.

Michael W. Wright, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John 

R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and M. Evan Corcoran,

Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

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Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Marlon Marshall appeals his 

conviction for distributing more than five grams of crack 

cocaine. Marshall argued to the district court that the government's disclosure of evidence during trial was untimely 

under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

On appeal, he argues that the district court abused its 

discretion when it declined to suppress the evidence or declare a mistrial. We conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion, and consequently affirm Marshall's conviction.

I. Background

A. The Offense

The Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") believed 

Marlon Marshall was a drug dealer, and orchestrated a 

controlled drug transaction to catch him in the act. Under 

the supervision of a DEA Special Agent, a confidential informant attempted to contact Marshall by calling what the 

informant claimed was Marshall's pager number. Marshall 

returned several of these pages. During one telephone conversation, which was recorded on audiotape, Marshall agreed 

to sell the informant approximately 42 grams of crack for 

$1,350. Marshall and the informant further agreed to conduct the transaction at a McDonald's restaurant in the District of Columbia. The transaction, which was recorded on 

videotape, took place as planned: Marshall handed the informant a french fry box containing crack, and the informant 

gave him $1,350 cash in return.

At the government's request, the informant attempted to 

arrange another transaction with Marshall. The informant 

contacted Marshall again by using the same pager number. 

This time, Marshall agreed to sell the informant 62 grams of 

crack for $1,750. Marshall drove a dark-colored, four-door 

Buick to the designated location, but did not go through with 

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lance vehicle in the area. (At trial, a witness testified that 

Marshall told his companion to "put the s--- back in the car 

because the place is too hot for me.")

Marshall was indicted for distributing more than 5 grams 

of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 

841(b)(1)(B)(iii). The district court ordered Marshall to be 

detained pending trial.

B. The Trial

During voir dire examination, defense counsel announced 

that the defense might call Sabrina Shorter as a witness. 

This name was familiar to the government: when Marshall 

returned the informant's pages, caller identification equipment revealed that he had done so on at least one occasion 

from Ms. Shorter's residence. Also, before trial had commenced, the government retrieved records which revealed 

that Ms. Shorter had visited Marshall when he was incarcerated and awaiting trial. Significantly, the government turned 

over the caller identification records to the defense before 

trial, but did not disclose the jail visitation records.

In his opening statement, defense counsel raised a defense 

of misidentification. He told the jury that Marshall was not 

the person seen selling drugs on the videotape. He also said 

that the government had no evidence to link Marshall to any 

of the phones from which the informant's pages had been 

returned:

The evidence is going to show that though phone calls 

are placed repeatedly to a pager number, that there are 

no records or anything from the United States to say 

that that was Mr. Marshall's pager. The evidence is 

going to show that those phone calls were made back in 

response to those pages and they got phone numbers 

from the places where those phone calls came from. 

They've got this caller I.D. system so that if you get a 

phone call you can see who is calling you. Look at the 

number. The evidence is going to show that those phone 

calls came in from places not associated with Mr. Marshall, from homes where the people don't know Mr. 

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Marshall, because Mr. Marshall is not the person who 

made those phone calls. That's what the evidence is 

going to show here, ladies and gentlemen. The evidence 

is going to show Marlon Marshall is not the person who 

sold the drugs on May 16th, 1994.

Marshall's lawyer also claimed that the government would 

offer no evidence linking Marshall to the pager number called 

by the informant, and asserted that the evidence would show 

"nothing to corroborate" Marshall's alleged involvement with 

drug dealing.

The first government witness to testify at trial was Frank 

Suarez, the DEA agent who supervised the informant who 

arranged the drug transactions at issue. After Agent Suarez 

finished testifying, the government notified the court that it 

wanted to introduce Marshall's previously undisclosed jail 

visitation records into evidence. Such records were relevant, 

the government explained, because they showed that Marshall knew Sabrina Shorterthis fact, of course, supported 

the proposition that Marshall had returned a page from Ms. 

Shorter's residence. Defense counsel responded that the jail 

visitation records should be excluded from evidence because 

they had not been timely disclosed as required by Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. In relevant part, that rule 

states:

Upon request of the defendant the government shall 

permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph 

books, papers, documents, ... or copies or portions 

thereof, which are within the possession, custody or 

control of the government, and which are material to the 

preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended 

for use by the government as evidence in chief at the 

trial....

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C). Also, as Marshall pointed out, 

the government is under a continuing duty to turn over 

evidence subject to disclosure under Rule 16 that it discovers 

before or during trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c).

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The district court adjourned for a long weekend without 

resolving the dispute over the admissibility of the jail visitation records. During the recess, the parties filed motions 

addressing whether a records custodian from the District of 

Columbia Department of Corrections would be permitted to 

testify about the jail visitation records. In its motion, the 

government also sought to introduce additional evidence resulting from an investigation that the government had conducted during the trial: (1) pager records indicating that the 

pager number called by the informant was registered to 

Marshall; (2) the pager itself; and (3) Prince George's County, Maryland ("P.G. County") police records indicating that an 

officer had stopped Marshall in the same Buick that Marshall 

used during the second, aborted drug transaction. Marshall 

opposed the introduction of this additional evidence, again 

citing Rule 16.

The government explained how it had come to discover this 

additional evidence during trial. After Agent Suarez completed his testimony, the prosecutor instructed him to conduct 

further investigation. As a result, Agent Suarez looked "in 

more detail" at some of Marshall's prior arrest records in 

P.G. County. He discovered that Marshall had a P.G. County 

arrest record under a different name, and contacted the P.G. 

County officer who had arrested him previously. That officer 

confirmed that Marshall was driving the Buick when the P.G. 

County arrest took place, and brought the pager (which had 

been confiscated during that arrest) with him to court. 

Agent Suarez then used the serial number from the pager to 

obtain records from the pager company.

After the four-day adjournment, the district court ruled on 

the disputed evidence. The court concluded that the records 

should have been turned over "at least after opening statement." However, it then held that Marshall was not prejudiced by the late disclosure of the records, and declined to 

exclude them. As a result of this ruling, the parties agreed 

to stipulate that Marshall knew Sabrina Shorter, and that she 

had visited him on two dates in November and December of 

1995.

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With respect to the P.G. County records concerning the 

Buick, the district court criticized the government for "sloppy 

police work [and] insufficient investigation," but found that its 

decision to conduct an additional investigation in the middle 

of the trial was not a product of bad faith. Accordingly, the 

court found no violation of Rule 16, and permitted the P.G. 

County officer to testify that he had stopped Marshall in the 

Buick. (The officer, however, did not testify that he had 

arrested Marshall.)

The district court excluded testimony concerning pager 

records that revealed that Marshall was responsible for the 

pager number, and excluded the pager as well. When making this ruling, the district court noted that the government 

had promised not to introduce the pager records in its casein-chief. Finally, the district court denied Marshall's alternative motion for a mistrial.

The jury found Marshall guilty of distributing more than 

five grams of crack cocaine. The district court subsequently 

sentenced him to 135 months of incarceration.

II. Discussion

A. Materiality

Rule 16(a)(1)(C) mandates disclosure of certain evidence 

which is (1) "material to the preparation of the defendant's 

defense" or (2) "intended for use by the government as 

evidence in chief at the trial." The district court ruled that 

the disputed evidence in this case was "material to the 

preparation of [Marshall's] defense," and thus potentially 

subject to disclosure under prong one of Rule 16(a)(1)(C). 

We agree.

The government takes issue with the district court's conclusion that the disputed evidence was "material" under Rule 16. 

It notes first that all of the disputed evidencethe jail 

visitation records, the P.G. County records, the pager recordstends to incriminate Marshall. It then reads the term 

"material" in Rule 16 to refer to "evidence that is favorable 

and helpful to a defendant's defense, not as evidence that 

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impeaches or rebuts his defense." Govt. Br. at 35 n.15; see 

also id. at 22 n.10. Stressing that the disputed evidence in 

this case is not "helpful" or "exculpatory," id.; the government concludes that such evidence is not subject to disclosure 

as "material" under Rule 16.

The plain language of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) does not support the 

government's interpretation. This rule covers evidence which 

is material "to the preparation of the defendant's defense." 

(emphasis added). The government ignores the words we 

have just italicized, reading the rule to refer to evidence 

which is "favorable or helpful to a defendant's defense." See 

Govt. Br. at 35 n.15. The rule as written does not compel the 

conclusion that inculpatory evidence is immune from disclosure. Inculpatory evidence, after all, is just as likely to assist 

in "the preparation of the defendant's defense" as exculpatory 

evidence.1In other words, it is just as important to the 

preparation of a defense to know its potential pitfalls as it is 

to know its strengths.

Take the facts of this case as an example: the government 

says it had no obligation under Rule 16 to disclose the jail 

visitation records to the defense because the records were not 

exculpatory. Defense counsel, flying blind, asked Agent Suarez on cross-examination if he had any information connecting 

Marshall to any of the returned phone calls. He received the 

unexpected and perhaps damaging answer that the agent 

"now believe[d] that ... at least one address [on the list of 

names connected with the returned phone calls] is in fact 

connected with Mr. Marshall." With the jail visitation records in hand, counsel would have known to avoid this minefield.

Additionally, we note that the discovery obligations mandated by Rule 16 "contribute[ ] to the fair and efficient 

__________

1 The Supreme Court recently clarified the meaning of the phrase 

"material to the preparation of the defendant's defense." The 

phrase "authorizes defendants to examine government documents 

material to the preparation of their defense against the Government's case-in-chief...." United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 

1480, 1485 (1996).

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administration of criminal justice by providing the defendant 

with enough information to make an informed decision as to 

plea." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee note to 1974 

amendment. The government's interpretation of Rule 16 is 

at loggerheads with this policy. If the government is excused 

from its obligation to disclose incriminating evidence (and 

does not intend to introduce such evidence during its case-inchief), the defense must make any pre-trial plea decisions 

without knowing the true strength of the government's evidence.

To support its reading of Rule 16, the government unpersuasively points to isolated language from our prior opinions. 

We have observed that the government must disclose Rule 16 

evidence only if such evidence "enable[s] the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor." United 

States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d 158, 164 n.4 

(D.C. Cir. 1992)), cert. denied sub nom. Terrell v. United 

States, 117 S. Ct. 993 (1997). But this language does not 

mean that inculpatory evidence may never be material. To 

the contrary, a defendant in possession of such evidence may 

"alter the quantum of proof in his favor" in several ways: by 

preparing a strategy to confront the damaging evidence at 

trial; by conducting an investigation to attempt to discredit 

that evidence; or by not presenting a defense which is 

undercut by such evidence.

The government also reads one of our opinions as requiring 

evidence to be "materially exculpatory" to be subject to 

disclosure under Rule 16. See Govt. Br. at 22 n.10. The 

government misreads that opinion. In United States v. 

Lloyd, we said that evidence is material under Rule 16 "as 

long as there is a strong indication that it will play an 

important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or rebuttal." 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although we 

used the phrase "materially exculpatory" in Lloyd, 992 F.2d 

at 351, we did so by way of illustration, not limitation. We 

did not, as the government urges, articulate a rule of general 

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application that exculpatory evidence alone is subject to Rule 

16 disclosure. In any event, we see no reason why inculpatory evidence could not serve the functions mentioned in Lloyd 

as well as exculpatory evidence, and the government has not 

articulated any such reason.

B. Evidence the Government Acquired During Trial

As we explained above, the government began a new line of 

investigation after its first witness had testified. That investigation bore fruit: among other things, the government 

discovered that Marshall had been arrested in P.G. County in 

the same Buick he had used during the second, aborted drug 

transaction in this case. Here, Marshall challenges the district court's decision to permit the P.G. County officer to 

testify that he had stopped Marshall in the Buick.

To be subject to disclosure under Rule 16(a), evidence must 

be "within the possession, custody or control of the government." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C). Put another way, the 

government cannot be required to disclose evidence that it 

neither possesses nor controls. See, e.g., United States v. 

Pinto, 905 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1990). In this case, it is not 

disputed that the government turned over the P.G. County 

records to the defense as soon as it discovered them. Thus 

there is no violation unless the term "government" as used in 

Rule 16 encompasses local law enforcement offices, such as 

the P.G. County Police Department. There is ample authority that it does not. See, e.g., United States v. Brazel, 102 

F.3d 1120, 1150 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 79 (1997); 

United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 n.5 (7th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2528 (1997). We therefore hold that 

the United States did not violate Rule 16 when it failed to 

turn over evidence it neither possessed nor controlled. See 

also United States v. Cannington, 729 F.2d 702, 712 (11th 

Cir. 1984) ("[A] party cannot produce what it doesn't have.").

We hasten to add that our ruling is not an invitation for the 

United States to engage in gamesmanship in discovery matters. To the contrary, a prosecutor may not sandbag a 

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dence to repose in the hands of another agency while utilizing 

his access to it in preparing his case for trial." Brazel, 102 

F.3d at 1150 (quoting United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 

1265, 1272 (5th Cir. 1977)). Under such circumstances, that 

evidence is "plainly within [the prosecutor's] Rule 16 'control.' " Id. In this case, there is no evidence that the 

government purposely ambushed the defense when it proffered the P.G. County records during trial. Indeed, the 

district court specifically found that the government had not 

acted in bad faith, and this determination is not challenged on 

appeal.

We need not address the pager records and pager, which 

the government also uncovered in the investigation it conducted during trial: Marshall could not have been prejudiced 

by the discovery of these items because they were never 

introduced into evidence.

C. Evidence the Government Acquired Before Trial

The government acknowledges that prior to trial it possessed records showing that Sabrina Shorter had visited 

Marshall in jail, and that it did not disclose them to the 

defense until after the government's first witness completed 

his testimony. Was the government obligated under Rule 16 

to disclose the records earlier than that? Our answer is 

"yes."

Even before trial commenced, the government probably 

should have realized that the jail visitation records were 

"material to the preparation of [Marshall's] defense" under 

Rule 16(a)(1)(C). It knew then that Sabrina Shorter could 

play a significant role in its case-in-chief; caller identification 

equipment revealed that one or more of the informant's calls 

were returned from her residence. It also knew or should 

have known that the jail visitation records mentioning Ms. 

Shorter would "bear[ ] some abstract logical relationship to 

the issues in the case." Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d at 164 n.4 

(citation omitted). And, as we have discussed above, the fact 

that the evidence was incriminating did not relieve the government of its Rule 16 obligations.

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From the government's perspective, the materiality picture 

came into even sharper focus during voir dire examination, 

when the defense identified Sabrina Shorter as a potential 

witness. At that point, the government knew it had records 

relating to a person the defense had just identified as a 

potential witness. That fact alone plainly triggered the government's disclosure obligations under Rule 16. The defense 

counsel's opening statement, telling the jury that the government would present no evidence linking Marshall to the 

phone numbers from which the informant's pages had been 

returned, shows that the disclosure came too late. The 

government knew the statement was not true. The jail 

records in its possession provided this link, yet it waited until 

Agent Suarez had completed his testimony to disclose the 

records. By waiting too long to disclose the jail visitation 

records, the government violated its disclosure obligations 

under Rule 16.

It does not follow, however, that the district court abused 

its discretion by failing to impose any sanctions as a result of 

the violation. The district court has wide discretion in imposing a sanction if it finds that Rule 16 has been violated. The 

court may grant a continuance; prohibit the violating party 

from introducing the evidence at issue; or "enter such other 

order as it deems just under the circumstances." Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 16(d)(2). A trial judge should impose "the least 

severe sanction that will accomplish the desired result

prompt and full compliance with the court's discovery orders." United States v. Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 

1982); see also United States v. Gee, 695 F.2d 1165, 1169 (9th 

Cir. 1983).

To begin, we note that although literally true, it is slightly 

misleading to say that the district court imposed no sanction 

for the government's Rule 16 violation. Because the court 

deferred its ruling on the admissibility of the jail records 

during its adjournment period, the defense received what 

amounted to a four-day continuance to ponder how it would 

confront that evidence. Ordinarily, a continuance is the 

preferred sanction for a discovery delay because it gives the 

defense time to alleviate any prejudice it may have suffered 

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from the late disclosure. See United States v. EucedaHernandez, 768 F.2d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 1985).

Marshall complains that a continuance was not a sufficient 

sanction here because the jail visitation records disproved 

comments he had already made to the jury in his opening 

statement. He says it was "extremely damaging" to his case 

to have his lawyer promise something in his opening statement which turned out to be false. Marshall's argument, 

then, amounts to this: the district court should have excluded 

the evidence to keep the jury from thinking that the defense 

had told it a lie.

We reject this argument. To persuade us to reverse a 

conviction due to the government's discovery violation, an 

appellant must demonstrate that the violation prejudiced his 

substantial rights. United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 

69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1037 (1992). 

Marshall has not done so here. Marshall's attorney may not 

have known that Sabrina Shorter had visited him in jail, but 

Marshall did. He knew that his counsel's statement"those 

phone calls came in from places not associated with Mr. 

Marshall, from homes where the people don't know Mr. 

Marshall, because Mr. Marshall is not the person who made 

those phone calls"was false. Thus, to the extent Marshall 

suffered any prejudice because the government was able to 

disprove this false statement, the defendantnot the governmentis to blame. To the extent the government's Rule 16 

violation caused Marshall any prejudice, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion by in effect giving the defense a 

continuance to regroup and reconsider its trial strategy.

Before us, Marshall argues that trial counsel told the jury 

that the government would not be able to link Marshall to the 

returned telephone calls "in reliance on [trial counsel's] reasonable belief that the government had fully complied with 

Rule 16." Marshall Br. at 14. But Rule 16 does not prevent 

the government from introducing any new evidence after a 

trial begins; indeed, Rule 16 itself contemplates that evidence 

may be disclosed "during trial." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c). 

Knowing that the government might legitimately acquire and 

introduce new evidence during trial, the defense knew that 

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there was a risk in telling the jury that the government would 

not link Marshall to the phone numbers from which the 

informant's pages were returned. This fact supports our 

conclusion that any prejudice Marshall suffered was selfinflicted.

Finally, we note that although Rule 16 gives trial judges 

the option of suppressing evidence as a result of the government's discovery violations, such a severe sanction would 

seldom be appropriate whereas herethe trial court finds 

that the government's violation did not result from its bad 

faith and that a less drastic remedy (such as a continuance) 

will mitigate any unfair prejudice. Such a sanction would 

have been particularly inappropriate in this case because the 

effect of the disputed evidence was to disprove a statement 

that the defendant knew to be false. If the district court had 

accepted Marshall's invitation in this case to suppress the jail 

visitation records as a result of the government's discovery 

violation, that ruling would have subverted one of Rule 16's 

goals: "contributing to an accurate determination of the issue 

of guilt or innocence." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee note to 1974 amendment. As we have said before, "there 

is ... no right to deceive a jury as to the true facts." 

McCrory, 930 F.2d at 70.

III. Conclusion

Marshall's remaining arguments do not warrant extended 

discussion. For essentially the same reasons already stated, 

we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

when it denied Marshall's motion for a mistrial. We also 

reject as insufficiently developed Marshall's cursory arguments concerning the government's disclosure of a surveillance report and certain tape recordings. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 28(a)(6); United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 262 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994). Finally, our decision in United States v. Holton,

116 F.3d 1536, 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1997), forecloses Marshall's 

argument that mandatory minimum sentences for the distribution of crack cocaine violate the equal protection clause of 

the Fifth Amendment.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Marshall's conviction.

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