Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05556/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05556-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtis James Carter
Petitioner
Roy A. Castro
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 All citations to “ex.” are to the exhibits lodged with the court by the respondent.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 CURTIS JAMES CARTER,

Petitioner,

 v.

 ROY A. CASTRO, et al.,

Respondent. /

No. C 02-5556 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted.

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has not filed an optional traverse. The

case is ready for decision.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of first degree burglary, second degree burglary, receiving

stolen property, and conspiracy to commit burglary. Ex. 3 (opinion of the California Court of

Appeal) at 1.1

 He also was convicted of counterfeiting and drug offenses, and of

possession of burglary tools and ammunition. Ex. 1 (clerk’s transcript on appeal) at 351-56

(verdict forms). He was sentenced to sixteen years in prison. The California Court of

Appeal affirmed petitioner’s convictions, but reduced his sentence by one year. Ex. 3 at 25. 

The California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s petition for review. Petitioner

also filed state habeas petitions, all of which were denied.

Petitioner does not dispute the following relevant facts, which are taken from the

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opinion of the California Court of Appeal. 

In February 1997, Detective Gene McManus of the Del Norte county Sheriff’s

department, in conjunction with Sergeant Steve Morris of the same agency, began

an investigation into burglaries that were being committed throughout Del Norte

County. Appellants became suspects in these offenses after several persons, who

insisted on anonymity, informed the officers that appellants had been committing

burglaries of both commercial and residential properties in the late night and early

morning. Based on information obtained from interested citizens and observations

made during surveillance of appellants’ residences, a search warrant was obtained

for each of the appellants’ residences, as well as a shop appurtenant to appellant

Nolan’s home. During the searches, a total of approximately $150,000 in stolen

property was retrieved, including a backhoe, appliances (refrigerator, washer, dryer),

power tools, construction equipment, and supplies.

Ex. 3 at 1-2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

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federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1041. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a

state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d

1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present

clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness;

conclusory assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1041;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion, in this case that of the

California Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991);

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to include in his motion to

suppress grounds that the search warrant was a general warrant, was issued without

probable cause, and was obtained in bad faith. He also contends that counsel should have

contended that the officers conducting the search grossly exceeded the scope of the

warrant and that their conduct in executing the warrant was unreasonable. Pet.,

attachment at 1. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

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counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to prevail on a Sixth

Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective

standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second,

he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that

"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

When this general rule is applied to a claim that counsel should have moved to

suppress, petitioner must show that “(1) the overlooked motion to suppress would have

been meritorious, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached

a different verdict absent the introduction of the unlawful evidence.” Ortiz-Sandoval v.

Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003). The court will apply the same analysis here,

where counsel did move to suppress but did not raise some grounds which petitioner

believes would have caused the motion to be granted. The first order of business, then, is

to consider whether any of the grounds that petitioner claims his counsel should have

raised would have succeeded. 

1. Scope and reasonableness

Petitioner contends that counsel should have moved to suppress on grounds that

“law enforcement officers grossly exceeded the scope of the search warrant and the

conduct of the officers who executed the warrant was unreasonable.” 

Whether a search or seizure is constitutionally “reasonable” depends not only on the

existence of probable cause but also depends "on how it is carried out." Tennessee v.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) (emphasis in original). The reasonableness test established

in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989), for cases involving police use of excessive

force in making stops or arrests, applies to the manner in which the police conduct any

search or seizure, including limited detentions, and to forms of police conduct other than

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 On February 28th, officers recorded 300 items seized from the storage shed. On

March 1st, officers recorded 39 items seized from the living room, 5 from the kitchen, 4 from

the bedroom, 15 from the attic, and 77 from the back shed. Pet., attached ex. C, Seized

Property Receipts, 1-55. Petitioner contends that the fact that only thirty-one were introduced

at trial shows that the extent of the search was unreasonable; but of course this indicates only

how many items the prosecution thought it useful to introduce, not how many actually were

evidence of a crime. 

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the use of force. See Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The totality of the particular circumstances of each case must be considered. See

Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner contends that the officers’ conduct was unreasonable because they spent

two days searching the property and because they excluded petitioner’s wife and children

from it for that time. In light of the fact that the officers seized over 800 items, it was

reasonable to spend two days on the petitioner’s property,2

 and, given that spending two

days on the search was reasonable, it was reasonable to exclude the occupants of the

house from the scene for that time – it would not be practical to have the occupants

attempting to go about their daily lives while such an extensive search was ongoing, even

leaving aside considerations such as the possibility that they would tamper with the

evidence. 

The items seized also were within the scope of the warrant -- the court’s comparison

of the warrant and the list of items seized shows that of the six-hundred and fifty-five

different kinds of items seized, there were only fifteen that could reasonably be argued not

to fit within the warrant. This was not sufficient to show that the manner of search was

unreasonable. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999) (Fourth Amendment does

not require that every police action while inside a home be explicitly authorized by the

warrant to qualify as within its scope, though police actions must be “related to the

objectives of the authorized intrusion.”).

Addition of these grounds to the motion to suppress would have not have caused it

to succeed, so counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise them. 

///

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2. General Warrant

Petitioner contends that the warrant lacked particularity and thus was an

impermissible general warrant. The Warrants Clause of the Fourth Amendment requires

search warrants to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched and the persons or

things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The particularity requirement protects the

individual from a general, exploratory rummaging of his or her belongings by limiting the

officer's discretion and by informing the person subject to the search what items the officers

executing the warrant can seize. United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir.

1997). 

A warrant is plainly invalid under the Fourth Amendment if it provides no description

of the property to be searched or seized. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 (2004)

(warrant was invalid because, in the section for listing the property to be seized, it

described the house rather than the items in it). Where the misdescription of the items to

be seized is fundamental (e.g., the warrant describes the house rather than the items in it),

the warrant is so obviously defective that a search pursuant to it must be regarded as

warrantless and presumptively unreasonable. See id. at 558-59. However, “[t]he

prohibition of general searches is not to be confused with the demand for precise ex ante

knowledge of the location and content of evidence related to the suspected violation.” 

United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2004).

The warrant authorized seizure of the following:

“All types of electric tools, hand tools, construction equipment, construction supplies,

household fixtures or appliances, electric generators/inverters, computer equipment,

firearms, ammunition, spot lighting equipment, game animals or any part thereof,

two way radios, radio scanners, tools specifically used for entry to or removal of

property from locked buildings. Methamphetamine, drug use paraphernalia, any

indicia that tends to show possession or control of the premises.” 

Pet., attached ex. A.

This warrant describes with particularity the items to be seized. Petitioner seems to

imply that the warrant lacks particularity because it uses the words “all types.” However,

the general words are themselves sufficiently particular. The reference to “all types” does

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not render the warrant general. See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1348 (10th Cir

1997) (warrant for “[a]ll types of firearms required to be registered with the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms” not overbroad). 

The warrant lists items that corresponded with items that the affiant had been

informed were stolen during a series of burglaries. This is in sharp distinction to the

warrant in the case petitioner cites in support of his assertion that the warrant was

insufficiently specific. In the case he relies on, the warrant authorized seizure of “any

papers, things or property of any kind relating to previously described crime.” United States

v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 590 (2nd Cir. 1987). The court held that the warrant was overly

broad because it was “all in general boilerplate terms, without either explicit or implicit

limitation on the scope of the search.” Id. at 593 (emphasis in original). The court held that

the lack of limitations on the kind of evidence sought gave the searching officers an

impermissible level of discretion. Id. The warrant at issue here, however, was not

composed of boilerplate language, but rather contained explicit limitations on the scope of

the search. The warrant limits the search to specified categories of items, all of which fall

within the description of the items reported by confidential informants to have been taken in

burglaries. Thus, a motion to suppress on the grounds that the warrant lacked particularity

and constituted an illegal general warrant would not have been meritorious.

3. Probable cause and bad faith of applicant

The Attorney General is correct that defense counsel did challenge the warrant and

affidavit on these grounds. See ex. 1 (clerk’s transcript on appeal) at 96-122 (motion to

suppress and points and authorities in support of it). Counsel obviously was not ineffective

in failing to raise these contentions, because he did. 

4. Summary

Raising the grounds which petitioner claims should have been included in the motion

to suppress would not have changed the outcome. It thus was not ineffective assistance

for counsel to fail to raise them. Because counsel was not ineffective, the state appellate

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courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established United States Supreme Court authority. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2006.

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.02\CARTER556.RUL2

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