Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-22-13928/USCOURTS-ca11-22-13928-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Bell
Appellant
Wesley Lee Cook
Appellee
Laura H. Dunn
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13928

____________________

WESLEY LEE COOK, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID BELL, 

Officer, Individually and official capacity as a member of the 

Lakeland Police Department, 

LAURA H. DUNN, 

as Personal Representative for the 

Estate of Paul Patrick Dunn, 

Defendants-Appellants,

PAUL DUNN et al., 

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 1 of 11
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13928

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-03051-TPB-SPF

____________________

Before WILSON, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Officer David Bell and the Estate of Officer Paul Dunn appeal the district court’s order denying summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. After careful review and with the benefit 

of oral argument, we affirm in part and dismiss in part for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

On December 28, 2015, the Appellee, Wesley Lee Cook, had 

an argument with his girlfriend, Shannon Wood. As Wood was 

leaving the house, Cook grabbed her cell phone and backpack, so 

she left without them. Wood went to a nearby convenience store 

1 “[F]or summary judgment purposes, our analysis must begin with a description of the facts in the light most favorable to the [non-movant].” Lee v. Ferraro, 

284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002). We accept these facts for summary-judgment purposes only. See Cox Adm’r US Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 

1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994).

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 2 of 11
22-13928 Opinion of the Court 3

and called the police. Officers Dunn and Bell both responded to 

the call and went to meet Wood at the convenience store. Wood 

told the officers that Cook was a former law enforcement officer 

and that he had guns in the house. Dunn and Bell then went to 

Wood’s house to speak with Cook—both to retrieve Wood’s phone 

and bag, and to make sure there was not a domestic violence situation on hand. 

Dunn got out of his car and approached Wood’s front door. 

Bell, who arrived in a separate car, also went to the front door. 

Dunn knocked on the door. Bell testified that Dunn announced 

himself as police; Cook recalls hearing no such identification. The 

entrance to the house was what Bell described as a “fatal funnel,” 

meaning that there were walls on both sides of the door such that 

the officers could not stand to either side of the door—only directly 

in front of it. The officers, therefore, “backed up to a safe position” 

near the corner of the attached garage. Dunn took up post at the 

corner of the garage, “on the 90 where he’s facing the door.” Bell 

was positioned next to Dunn in the driveway, and he testified that 

he could not see the door. Cook, who had been sleeping but woke 

up to Dunn’s knocking, grabbed his (licensed) gun from the 

nightstand and walked to the front door. By the time he got to the 

door, the knocking had stopped. Cook stood inside to the left of 

the door, where a strip of 6–8-inch-wide windows ran the full 

height of the door and began to unlock the door. Bell heard the

sound of the door handle moving and asked Dunn, “what is he doing? Is he fucking with the door?” Dunn turned around to look at 

Bell and said, “I don’t know,” then turned back to the door, yelled

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 3 of 11
4 Opinion of the Court 22-13928

“Gun!” and drew his firearm. “The next thing [Bell] kn[e]w,” shots 

were fired. Bell then realized he could not get past Dunn (towards 

the door) “because of the stance that [Dunn] took between the wall 

and the Explorer,” so Bell started running around the Explorer instead. As he ran around the SUV, Bell radioed out “Shots fired,” 

and he heard a second volley of shots ring out. By the time he 

reached the far side of the SUV, Bell had drawn his gun and could 

see Cook standing in the doorway, naked, with a gun held loosely 

in his right hand, pointed down towards the ground. Bell ordered 

Cook to drop the gun, but he stopped when he heard Dunn giving 

the same command so that only one voice would be yelling. Cook 

complied and dropped his gun, and then he collapsed to the 

ground. Another officer who had arrived in the interim began rendering aid to Cook, who was bleeding from multiple gunshot 

wounds. Cook was taken to the hospital where he underwent surgery; he ultimately lost his left eye and suffered other permanent 

injuries. Cook’s blood-alcohol level was .28 at the time of the 

shooting, and he admitted that his intoxication, stress, and injuries 

all could have impaired his memory. 

During this incident, Bell never saw Cook step out of the 

house, advance towards the officers, or point his gun at the officers. 

Indeed, all of the blood from Cook’s wounds was inside the house, 

not outside. And the Lakeland Police Department investigators 

who handled this police-involved shooting determined there was 

no evidence that Cook had ever exited his home. Cook testified 

that, while he could not say with certainty that Dunn never spoke, 

Cook did not hear anyone give any commands, did not hear anyone 

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 4 of 11
22-13928 Opinion of the Court 5

say “gun,” and did not hear anyone identify himself as police. Bell, 

for his part, did not testify that Dunn gave any warnings or commands before he opened fire. 

Cook filed suit asserting multiple claims against Officers 

Dunn and Bell, along with other defendants who are not present in 

this appeal. He sued Dunn for excessive force and unlawful seizure 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II) and for assault and battery 

under Florida law (Count VII). As to Bell, Cook raised one claim 

for failure to intervene under § 1983 (Count III). 

On January 9, 2020, Dunn was killed in a motorcycle accident. On Cook’s unopposed motion, the personal representative 

of Dunn’s estate eventually substituted for Dunn as defendant.

After discovery, the Appellants moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.2 The district court held 

two hearings on the motion and ultimately entered an order denying qualified immunity. In the order, the district court found that 

there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Dunn 

violated Cook’s constitutional rights and whether Bell had an opportunity to intervene. The district court also concluded that 

Cook’s “right to be free from the use of deadly force while nonresistant in his own home was clearly established at the time of the 

shooting.” This timely appeal followed.

2 The motion also raised other, unrelated arguments as to the other defendants. This appeal only addresses the qualified immunity issues as to Bell and 

Dunn.

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 5 of 11
6 Opinion of the Court 22-13928

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review jurisdictional issues de novo. Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A., 25 F.4th 843, 848 (11th Cir. 2022).

This Court also reviews de novo an order denying summary 

judgment based on qualified immunity. See Helm v. Rainbow City,

Alabama, 989 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2021). “When considering 

a motion for summary judgment, including one asserting qualified 

immunity, ‘courts must construe the facts and draw all inferences 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and when conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, [they must] 

credit the nonmoving party’s version.’” Feliciano v. City of Miami

Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006)). “Summary judgment is 

appropriate if ‘the evidence before the court shows that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” McCullough v. Antolini, 

559 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 

52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)).

III. ANALYSIS

We have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal. See Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 

1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020). This Court usually has jurisdiction to 

review the decisions of a district court “only where the district 

court has disposed of all claims against all parties.” Hudson v. Hall, 

231 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As 

one exception to that general rule, we may hear “an interlocutory 

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 6 of 11
22-13928 Opinion of the Court 7

appeal of the denial of qualified immunity where the disputed issue 

is whether the official’s conduct violated clearly established law.” 

Hudson, 231 F.3d at 1293 (quoting Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 

1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000)). We may also hear appeals that raise 

mixed questions of law and fact. English v. City of Gainesville, 75 

F.4th 1151, 1155–56 (11th Cir. 2023). But we lack jurisdiction to 

hear an interlocutory appeal that asks only “whether the district 

court erred in determining that there was an issue of fact for trial 

about the defendant’s actions or inactions which, if they occurred, 

would violate clearly established law.” Id. In other words, we lack 

interlocutory jurisdiction “where the only issues appealed are evidentiary sufficiency issues.” Id. 

Our two Appellants stand on different footing. Dunn, for his 

part, presents a purely legal issue on appeal. He argues, in sum, 

that even when we accept Cook’s version of events, “[t]here was no 

materially similar case predating the shooting that would have put 

Dunn on notice that his actions were unconstitutional.” Because 

this challenge lies at the heart of the legal question of clearly established law, we have jurisdiction to hear Dunn’s interlocutory appeal.3 See Hudson, 231 F.3d at 1293.

3 Because have jurisdiction to hear Dunn’s appeal of the Fourth Amendment 

claim, we also have jurisdiction over his appeal of Florida state-law immunity 

on Cook’s state-law claim, which tracks the same analysis. See Butler v. Gualtieri, 41 F.4th 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Florida’s sovereign immunity law 

provides qualifying government officials with immunity from both suit and 

liability.” (citing Florida Highway Patrol v. Jackson, 288 So. 3d 1179, 1185 (Fla. 

2020)); English, 75 F.4th at 1156–57.

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 7 of 11
8 Opinion of the Court 22-13928

Bell, however, has raised the type of “evidentiary sufficiency” issue that we lack jurisdiction to hear in an interlocutory 

appeal. He argues, for example, that he “was not in a position to 

observe and evaluate Dunn’s use of force,” and that he “had no reasonable opportunity to intervene.” These are factual questions, not 

legal ones. For this reason, we lack jurisdiction to hear Bell’s interlocutory appeal and, therefore, we dismiss the appeal as to Bell. See 

English, 75 F.4th at 1155–56.

We turn, then, to Dunn’s appeal. Dunn argues that the 

district court erred in denying him qualified immunity because, in 

his view, it was not clearly established that his conduct violated 

Cook’s Fourth Amendment rights. “Qualified immunity offers 

complete protection for government officials sued in their 

individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 

(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982)). By imposing liability only for violations of clearly 

established law, the defense of qualified immunity “balances two 

important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable 

when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield 

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 

perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

231 (2009).

To qualify for this immunity, an officer “must first prove that 

he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when 

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 8 of 11
22-13928 Opinion of the Court 9

the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 

1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 

1487 (11th Cir. 1991)). Once “the defendant establishes that he was 

acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee, 

284 F.3d at 1194. “To overcome a qualified immunity defense, the 

plaintiff must make two showings.” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 

1311 (11th Cir. 2019). First, “the plaintiff must establish that the 

defendant violated a constitutional right.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 

496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007). Second, “the plaintiff must 

show that the violation was clearly established.” Id. Courts are 

“permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of 

the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 

236).

“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a 

right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 202 (2001)). The defendant must have fair notice of his conduct’s unconstitutionality, derived from one of the following 

sources: (1) obvious clarity; (2) broad holdings or statements of 

principle in case law that are not tied to particularized facts; or (3) 

fact-specific judicial precedents that are not readily distinguishable. 

Id. at 1350–51. “The critical inquiry is whether the law provided 

[the officer] with ‘fair warning’ that his conduct violated the [the 

plaintiff’s rights].” McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 9 of 11
10 Opinion of the Court 22-13928

2007) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). In this Circuit, only the “decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the 

highest court of the pertinent state (here, the Supreme Court of 

Florida) can clearly establish the law.” Id. at 1237.

“[I]n the end, we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383

(2007). “[A]t the summary judgment stage,” however, “once we 

have determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences 

in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record, the reasonableness of the officer’s actions . . . is a pure question 

of law.” Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(cleaned up and citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8).

As the district court explained, when we take the facts in the 

light most favorable to Cook (as we are bound to do at this stage),

Cook was doing nothing more than standing inside his own doorway when Dunn opened fire on him. Viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to Cook, he was not suspected of having committed a felony, nor was he fleeing from officers or advancing towards them in a threatening way. As the district court observed, 

perhaps trial will reveal evidence that supports the officers’ claim 

that the force Dunn used was necessary, reasonable, and appropriate—and therefore did not violate Cook’s rights—but that is a question for a jury to resolve, not this court. We cannot say at this procedural stage that Dunn is entitled to qualified immunity on Cook’s 

excessive force claim.

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 10 of 11
22-13928 Opinion of the Court 11

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order as to 

Dunn.

AFFIRMED in part and DISMISSED in part.

USCA11 Case: 22-13928 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 11 of 11