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Parties Involved:
Association of Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico Army Chapter
Petitioner
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 16, 2004 Decided June 15, 2004

No. 03-1321

ASSOCIATION OF CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS,

PUERTO RICO ARMY CHAPTER,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Daniel M. Schember argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioner.

James F. Blandford, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief were David M. Smith, Solicitor, and William R. Tobey,

Deputy Solicitor. David M. Shewchuk, Attorney, entered an

appearance.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This case is before the court for a

second time. See Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico

Army Chapter v. FLRA, 269 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

(‘‘ACT I’’). After the Department of Defense (‘‘the Agency’’)

had disapproved Provision 2 of a collective bargaining agreement as contrary to law under the Federal Service Labor–

Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 et seq.,

(hereafter, ‘‘collective bargaining law’’), the Association of

Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico Army Chapter (‘‘the Union’’), filed a negotiability appeal with the Federal Labor

Relations Authority (‘‘FLRA’’) pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

§ 7105(a)(2)(E). FLRA agreed with the Agency that Provision 2 was contrary to law and therefore nonnegotiable under

5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(1), concluding that Provision 2 expenditures were not authorized by the Travel Expenses Act, 5

U.S.C. §§ 5701, et seq. See Ass’n of Civilian Technicians,

Puerto Rico Army Chapter, 56 F.L.R.A. 807 (2000). The

court reversed, holding that the Travel Expenses Act was

irrelevant, see ACT I, 269 F.3d at 1116, and remanded the

case for FLRA to address two issues presented by the Union,

namely that Provision 2 expenditures are authorized (1) generally by the collective bargaining law, ‘‘and therefore by the

law that generally authorizes agency expenditures,’’ id. at

1115, 1117–18; or (2) specifically as an ‘‘appropriate arrangement[ ]’’ under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3) for employees injured as

a result of the Agency’s exercise of the management right to

cancel leave and ‘‘assign work’’ under 5 U.S.C.

§ 7106(a)(2)(B). Id. at 1118. On remand, in again ruling that

Provision 2 was contrary to law, FLRA addressed the first

issue but not the second.

I.

Congress has declared in the collective bargaining law that

‘‘labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil

service are in the public interest.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a). The

collective bargaining law therefore protects the rights of

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federal employees to form or join or refrain from joining any

labor organization, id. § 7102, and imposes on federal agencies and labor organizations a duty to bargain collectively in

good faith. Id. § 7116(a)(5), (b)(5). It also excludes certain

management rights of an agency from inclusion in negotiations, see id. § 7106(a), but requires an agency to bargain

over the procedures by which these management rights are

exercised, id. § 7106(b), including negotiating ‘‘appropriate

arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any [management] authority.’’ Id. § 7106(b)(3). It

generally requires that federal agencies and labor organizations bargain in good faith over the terms and conditions of

employment, unless a bargaining proposal is inconsistent with

an existing federal law, rule, or regulation. See id.

§§ 7103(a), 7114, 7116, 7117(a). Thus, if a collective bargaining provision is inconsistent with federal law, see id.

§ 7117(a)(1), or excessively interferes with management’s

rights, see id. § 7106, the provision is nonnegotiable.

Under Provision 2 of the proposed collective bargaining

agreement, the Union seeks reimbursement for its members’

out-of-pocket losses resulting from the Agency’s cancellation

of previously approved leave. The provision provides:

Once leave has be[en] approved and the employer

has a compelling need to cancel the previously approved leave, the employer agrees not to subject the

employee to a loss of funds expended in planning of

the leave (i.e. hotel reservations, airline tickets, etc.).

The employee will demonstrate the unavoida[bility]

of the loss of funds.

ACT I, 269 F.3d at 1113–14. Because Provision 2 requires

the disbursement of appropriated funds, the question before

FLRA was whether such disbursement is authorized by law.

See U.S. Const. Art. I., § 9, cl. 7; 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a). While

acknowledging that the collective bargaining law does not ‘‘by

itself’’ authorize the Agency to spend money, the Union again

argued before FLRA on remand that ‘‘where Congress generally has authorized an agency to expend appropriated funds

for agency operations, the collective bargaining law authorUSCA Case #03-1321 Document #828793 Filed: 06/15/2004 Page 3 of 13
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izes expenditures to implement contract provisions that are

not otherwise contrary to law.’’ Petitioner’s Supplemental

Statement on Remand at 1 & n.1, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico Army Chapter, 2003 WL 190510, 58

F.L.R.A. 318 (2003); see also ACT I, 269 F.3d at 1115. In

other words, ‘‘[t]he collective bargaining law creates new

agency obligations which general agency appropriations may

be used to meet.’’ Petitioner’s Supplemental Statement on

Remand at 1; see also ACT I, 269 F.3d at 1115. The Union

also renewed its position that Provision 2 is alternatively

authorized as an ‘‘appropriate arrangement[ ]’’ under 5 U.S.C.

§ 7106(b)(3), arguing that ‘‘Agency payment of employees’

unavoidable out-of-pocket losses incurred in reliance on the

[A]gency’s grant of leave, subsequently revoked, is a narrowly-tailored remedy for harm inflicted TTT by an [A]gency’s

exercise of its right to TTT [cancel leave and assign work].’’

Petitioner’s Supplemental Statement on Remand at 3.

On the first remanded issue, FLRA concluded that neither

the text of the collective bargaining law, see 5 U.S.C.

§ 7101(a), nor its legislative history provides express or implied authorization for the Agency’s expenditure of appropriated funds for Provision 2 reimbursements. In finding no

express authority, it relied on Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &

Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 104 (1983) (‘‘BATF’’), in

which the Supreme Court stated that ‘‘there is no reference

in the statute or the legislative history to travel expenses and

per diem allowances.’’ In finding that the collective bargaining law also does not provide implicit authorization for such

reimbursements, FLRA relied on this court’s statement in

ACT I that Provision 2 reimbursements do not concern

employees ‘‘traveling on official business,’’ 269 F.3d at 1116,

and concluded that, unlike the disputed provisions in National Treasury Employees Union and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 26 F.L.R.A. 497, 498 (1987) (‘‘NTEU’’), and

National Federation of Federal Employees and General Services Administration, 24 F.L.R.A. 430, 432–33 (1986)

(‘‘GSA’’), Provision 2 does not involve ‘‘official business.’’

FLRA thus rejected the Union’s argument that under NTEU

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and GSA, the Agency has discretion to use funds appropriated for general operations for Provision 2 reimbursements.

Then, instead of turning to the second remanded issue,

whether Provision 2 is authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3)

as an ‘‘appropriate arrangement[ ],’’ FLRA examined whether

there was other statutory authorization for Provision 2 reimbursements by looking to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–79, 113

Stat. 1212, 1216–17 (1999) (‘‘2000 Appropriations Act’’). Cf.

ACT I, 269 F.3d at 1116–17. FLRA concluded that the 2000

Appropriations Act does not expressly authorize Provision 2

reimbursements. Further, assuming the applicability of the

‘‘necessary expense doctrine,’’ which requires that an expenditure be reasonably necessary or reasonably related to or

make a direct contribution to carrying out an authorized

function, see United States General Accounting Office, Office

of the General Counsel, 1 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 4–14 to 4–22 (2d ed. 1991) (‘‘Principles’’); 71

Comp. Gen. 527, 528 (1992); 63 Comp. Gen. 422, 427–28

(1984); 42 Comp. Gen. 226, 226 (1962), FLRA concluded that

the appropriation for ‘‘Operation and Maintenance’’ for the

Army National Guard in the 2000 Appropriations Act does

not implicitly authorize Provision 2 reimbursements, because

the Union had failed to show that such reimbursements would

make ‘‘any contribution to the Agency’s authorized purposeTTTT’’ Alternatively, FLRA concluded that Provision 2

reimbursements are prohibited by 5 U.S.C. § 5536, which

bars payment to a federal employee of ‘‘additional pay or

allowance’’ beyond that fixed by law for the service or duty.

II.

On appeal, the Union’s overarching contention is that

FLRA failed to consider Congress’s general authorization of

appropriations for the Agency in the context of the collective

bargaining law. According to the Union, because Congress

requires the Agency to conduct its operations in accordance

with the collective bargaining law, reasonably necessary expenses, which are authorized by general appropriations such

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as in the 2000 Appropriations Act, include expenditures to

carry out negotiated contract terms that are negotiable under

the collective bargaining law. FLRA responds that neither

the collective bargaining law nor the 2000 Appropriations Act

authorizes the expenditure of funds to reimburse civilian

employees for travel and recreational expenses forfeited when

the Agency cancels previously approved leave, and regardless, such expenditures are prohibited by 5 U.S.C. § 5536.

A few preliminary observations guide our analysis. The

Union has not argued that express authorization exists for

Provision 2 reimbursements under federal law. Rather, it

contends that implicit authorization for Provision 2 reimbursements may be found either pursuant to the collective

bargaining law in conjunction with the 2000 Appropriations

Act or pursuant to the 2000 Appropriations Act. As the

collective bargaining law is FLRA’s own enabling statute and

the court would owe ‘‘considerable deference’’ to FLRA’s

interpretation of it, see BATF, 464 U.S. at 97, the court in

ACT I remanded the case for FLRA to determine whether

implicit authorization for Provision 2 reimbursements could

be found either (1) through the ‘‘official business’’ test recognized by the Supreme Court in BATF, 464 U.S. at 107 n.17,

and by FLRA in NTEU, 26 F.L.R.A. at 498 and GSA, 24

F.L.R.A. at 432–33, because Provision 2 reimbursements are

sufficiently within the interest of the Agency to constitute

‘‘official business’’ and as such, such reimbursements are

implicitly authorized under the 2000 Appropriations Act; or

(2) through 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3), because Provision 2 is an

‘‘appropriate arrangement[ ] for employees adversely affected

by the exercise of TTT [management’s] authority’’ to cancel

leave and ‘‘assign work’’ and as such, the reimbursements are

implicitly authorized under the 2000 Appropriations Act. See

ACT I, 269 F.3d at 1118. Another approach for finding

implicit authorization of Provision 2 reimbursements not addressed in the court’s remand, but which FLRA addressed on

remand, and as to which the court would owe no deference to

FLRA’s interpretation, see Ass’n of Civilian Technicians,

Tony Kempenich Memorial Chapter 21 v. FLRA, 269 F.3d

1119, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (‘‘Tony Kempenich’’), would be

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based on the ‘‘necessary expense doctrine’’ through which

Provision 2 reimbursements might be found to be authorized

under the 2000 Appropriations Act.

We first examine FLRA’s interpretation of the collective

bargaining law, then turn to its interpretation of the 2000

Appropriations Act, and finally address its alternative ruling

on 5 U.S.C. § 5536.

A.

In rejecting the Union’s reliance on NTEU and GSA for

the proposition that the collective bargaining law, in conjunction with general appropriations laws, implicitly authorizes

Provision 2 reimbursements, FLRA took the position that

Provision 2 ‘‘does not involve the Agency’s exercise of discretion in determining whether these expenses concern ‘official

business.’ ’’ Although the court generally owes deference to

FLRA’s interpretation of the collective bargaining law, see

BATF, 464 U.S. at 97 & n.7; Patent Office Prof’l Ass’n v.

FLRA, 47 F.3d 1217, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 5 U.S.C.

§§ 706(2)(A), 7123(c), FLRA must ‘‘provide a rational explanation for its decision.’’ FDIC v. FLRA, 977 F.2d 1493, 1496

(D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). In

addressing the first remanded issue, FLRA has not done so.

Precisely what activity constitutes ‘‘official business’’ is a

context-specific determination that requires an evaluation of

factors that Congress has determined FLRA is well suited to

do. See BATF, 464 U.S. at 97. It is clear that the term has

some elasticity. The Supreme Court acknowledged in BATF

that its conclusion that ‘‘federal agencies may not be required

under [the ‘official time’ provision in 5 U.S.C.] § 7131(a) to

pay the travel expenses and per diem allowances of union

negotiators does not, of course, preclude an agency from

making such payments upon a determination that they serve

the convenience of the agency or are otherwise in the primary

interest of the GovernmentTTTT’’ 464 U.S. at 107 n.17.

FLRA itself has construed the term ‘‘official business’’ pragmatically, concluding that the appropriate inquiry is whether

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the provision is ‘‘sufficiently within the interest of the United

States so as to constitute official business.’’ See NTEU, 26

F.L.R.A. at 498; GSA, 24 F.L.R.A. at 432–33. Yet on

remand FLRA relied on the court’s statement in ACT I that

Provision 2 ‘‘does not necessarily even involve canceled travel,

and it certainly does not address official business.’’ 269 F.3d

at 1116. When read in context, it is clear that the court was

referring to the fact that Provision 2 does not relate to official

travel, i.e., ‘‘travel expenses, personal, official, or otherwise,’’

to which the Travel Expenses Act would apply. That is a

different question than whether Provision 2 reimbursements

would be authorized under the ‘‘official business’’ standard.

At no point on remand did FLRA evaluate whether Provision 2 might or might not constitute ‘‘official business’’ within

the meaning of the BATF footnote and its own precedent. It

did not address the Union’s argument that the collective

bargaining law, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7106(b)(3), 7114, being itself

sufficiently within the interest of the United States, see id.

§ 7101, creates ‘‘official business’’ that would not be ‘‘official

business’’ in the absence of the law. Neither did it address

the implications of its previous rulings in NTEU and GSA

that the Agency could exercise its discretion to use appropriated funds for union-use of government telephones for labormanagement relations. See NTEU, 26 F.L.R.A. at 498;

GSA, 24 F.L.R.A. at 433. Nor did it address whether for

reasons of adequate staffing, retention, recruitment, or morale, for example, such reimbursements might advance the

Agency’s interests or convenience.

In addition, FLRA failed to address at all the second

remanded issue in ACT I, namely whether Provision 2 reimbursements would be authorized as an ‘‘appropriate arrangement[ ]’’ under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3) and therefore implicitly

authorized under the 2000 Appropriations Act. If Provision 2

reimbursements are not authorized by law, Provision 2 will be

deemed inconsistent with federal law under 5 U.S.C.

§ 7117(a)(1), which bars negotiation on matters ‘‘inconsistent

with any Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation.’’ Provision 2, however, may constitute an ‘‘appropriate

arrangement[ ]’’ if it is intended to be an arrangement for

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employees adversely affected by management’s exercise of its

rights, and does not ‘‘excessively interfere[ ]’’ with the exercise of management rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a). Nat’l

Ass’n of Gov’t Employees, 21 F.L.R.A. 24, 29–33 (1986); see

also U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Office of the Chief Counsel, IRS

v. FLRA, 960 F.2d 1068, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Am. Fed’n

of Gov’t Employees, ALF–CIO, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d

1183, 1185–88 (D.C. Cir. 1983). To make that determination

FLRA would need to address (1) whether employees have

been adversely affected, (2) by a management decision, and if

so, (3) whether reimbursement of resulting monetary losses

are likely to interfere excessively with management rights.

To the extent that (1) and (2) are undisputed, inasmuch as

Union members will, absent reimbursement, incur out-ofpocket losses as a result of management’s recall decision

pursuant to its right under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(2)(B) to cancel

leave and to ‘‘assign work,’’ the conclusion as to (3) may turn

on a variety of considerations, including, for example, whether

or not there is a cap on the amount of individual expenditures

or a limited period of time for covered expenditures so as not

to chill ‘‘excessively’’ management’s exercise of its rights in

response to the needs of the Guard. But if Provision 2’s outof-pocket losses are directly caused by the Agency’s exercise

of its management rights, it is possible to view that reimbursement as not for purely personal expenses, but rather for

an ‘‘appropriate arrangement[ ]’’ to compensate civilian technicians harmed by the exercise of management rights. The

‘‘appropriate arrangement[ ]’’ determination, moreover, will

inform FLRA’s analysis of whether Provision 2 reimbursements are for or related to ‘‘official business’’ if they advance

the Agency’s interests or convenience.

B.

Had FLRA addressed the second remanded issue, there

might have been no occasion for it to interpret the 2000

Appropriations Act. The one member of FLRA who addressed the issue concluded that Provision 2 was not an

‘‘appropriate arrangement[ ],’’ and were such a conclusion

adequately explained, that, absent express congressional auUSCA Case #03-1321 Document #828793 Filed: 06/15/2004 Page 9 of 13
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thorization for such reimbursements, would presumably be

the end of the matter. In any event, upon de novo review, for

the court owes no deference to FLRA’s interpretation of the

appropriations act, see Tony Kempenich, 269 F.3d at 1121,

the court is unable to determine on the basis of the present

administrative record whether Provision 2 reimbursements

are implicitly authorized under the 2000 Appropriations Act.

FLRA acknowledged on remand that 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a),

which provides that ‘‘[a]ppropriations shall be applied only to

the objects for which the appropriations were madeTTTT,’’

does not require that every authorized expenditure be expressly authorized in an appropriations act. See Ass’n of

Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico Army Chapter, 2003 WL

190510, at *9, 58 F.L.R.A. 318 (2003) (citing 1 Principles,

supra, at 4–15). Under the ‘‘necessary expense doctrine,’’ the

Comptroller General has opined that expenditures not explicitly authorized in an appropriations act may nonetheless be

lawful. See 6 Comp. Gen. 619, 621 (1927); 1 Principles,

supra, at 4–15 to 4–16. In rejecting the Union’s reliance on

the 2000 Appropriations Act as implicitly authorizing the use

of appropriated funds to carry out negotiated agreements,

FLRA concluded that ‘‘reimbursement of such personal expenses TTT is neither reasonably necessary nor relevant to

maintaining the Agency’s operations that necessitated the

cancellation of leave.’’ Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Puerto

Rico Army Chapter, 2003 WL 190510, at *9. It is not,

however, self-evident under the ‘‘necessary expense doctrine,’’

which FLRA assumed applied without deciding, that use of

the Agency’s appropriations for Provision 2 reimbursements

would be unlawful. Whether for reasons of adequate staffing,

retention, recruitment, or morale, for example, Provision 2

reimbursements could make a ‘‘contribution’’ to carrying out

an authorized function, such as ‘‘assign[ing] work.’’ See 5

U.S.C. § 7106(a)(2)(B). Deciding that question would require

additional information both about the Agency’s function with

regard to the Guard and about the expenditures authorized in

the 2000 Appropriations Act for Agency operations and maintenance. FLRA noted on remand that neither party had

addressed the applicability of the 2000 Appropriations Act,

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nor whether the Agency uses funds appropriated for the

Guard’s operations and maintenance for operations related to

civilian Guard technicians. See Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico Army Chapter, 2003 WL 190510, at *8 n.5.

To the extent that FLRA looked to 10 U.S.C. § 1053a as

support for its conclusion that Provision 2 reimbursements

are not implicitly authorized by the 2000 Appropriations Act,

its reliance was misplaced. Under 10 U.S.C. § 1053a(a),

military personnel may receive reimbursement for ‘‘travel and

related expenses TTT incurred by the member as a result of

the cancellation of previously approved leave when the leave

is canceled in connection with the member’s participation in a

contingency operation and the cancellation occurs within 48

hours of the time the leave would have commenced.’’ FLRA

ignored, however, that military personnel do not enjoy the

collective bargaining rights accorded to civilian employees

under the collective bargaining law for the terms and conditions of their employment. Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 7114

with 10 U.S.C. § 976; see Ass’n of Civilian Technicians,

Wichita Air Capitol Chapter v. FLRA, 360 F.3d 195, 196

(D.C. Cir. 2004). Congress, consequently, must enact specific

laws to provide military personnel any employment rights or

benefits, including reimbursement for such out-of-pocket losses. See 10 U.S.C. § 976(c)(2). FLRA thus failed to consider

adequately the Union’s argument that, by parity of reasoning,

Provision 2 reimbursements are statutorily authorized because the collective bargaining law lends a similar congressional imprimatur to conditions of employment resulting from

collective bargaining agreements.

C.

FLRA’s alternate holding that Provision 2 reimbursements

are barred by 5 U.S.C. § 5536 is likewise flawed. Section

§ 5536 prohibits the receipt by federal employees with statutorily fixed salaries of ‘‘additional pay or allowance TTT for

any other service or duty’’ without specific authorization.

The plain text of § 5536 limits its reach to payment for ‘‘other

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service or duty’’ falling within a federal employee’s duties for

which compensation is fixed by Congress. The Supreme

Court explained in Stansbury v. United States, 75 U.S. 33, 37

(1868), of § 5536’s predecessor, 5 U.S.C. § 70 (1842), that

‘‘[t]he law was passed to remedy an evil which had existed, of

detailing officers with fixed pay to perform duties outside of

their regular employment, and paying them for it, when the

government was entitled, without this double pay, to all their

services.’’ See also Mullett v. United States, 150 U.S. 566,

569–70 (1893); United States v. Johnson, 173 U.S. 363, 372–

81 (1899); Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134, 145–46

(1917).

Congress’s concern with ‘‘additional pay or allowance’’ is

not implicated by negotiation of a ‘‘condition of employment’’

under the collective bargaining law, see 5 U.S.C. § 7114, to

reimburse civilian employees for out-of-pocket losses incurred

as a result of the Agency’s exercise of a management right.

See id. § 7106(a)-(b). Upon recall, Union members will receive their regular fixed compensation for service to the

Guard; the question is not whether they will receive additional pay for ‘‘other service or duty,’’ but whether they must

absorb unavoidable monetary losses caused by the Agency’s

recall. There was no suggestion in Stansbury that reimbursement of expenses incurred as a result of employment is

prohibited by § 5536; indeed, the actual expenses had been

paid in that case. 75 U.S. at 34–35, 36. Counsel for FLRA

conceded at oral argument that the Agency has discretion to

negotiate reimbursements for personal expenses such as uniform allowances, certain health benefits, and personal travel

expenses associated with transporting the employee to the

work site upon recalling the employee’s leave. FLRA’s view

that Agency reimbursement of such personal expenses is not

‘‘additional pay or allowance’’ prohibited under § 5536 weakens its reliance on § 5536 in concluding that Provision 2

reimbursements are barred and, therefore, nonnegotiable under the collective bargaining law.

Because FLRA’s decision on remand failed to provide an

adequate explanation of its decision on the first remanded

issue and failed altogether to address the second remanded

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issue, we grant the petition and remand the case to FLRA.

This time on remand FLRA shall, if it adheres to its conclusion on the first remanded issue in ACT I, provide an

explanation in accordance with the guidance provided by this

opinion and in light of any further arguments of the Union or

the Agency on remand. In addition, in order to avoid another

remand in the event the Union petitions for review of FLRA’s

adherence to its original position on the first remanded issue,

FLRA shall also determine whether Provision 2 is an ‘‘appropriate arrangement[ ]’’ under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3).

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