Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17131/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17131-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
E. K. McDaniel
Appellee
Nevada Attorney General
Appellee
Antonio Orpiada
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTONIO ORPIADA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

E. K. MCDANIEL; NEVADA

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 12-17131

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-00013-

RCJ-VPC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 12, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed May 7, 2014

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould,

Circuit Judges, and Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge McKeown

* The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

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2 ORPIADA V. MCDANIEL

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an

untimely 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition.

Petitioner sought to apply the prison mailbox rule to

render timely his § 2254 petition, which was three days late. 

The panel held that, because Nevada has rejected the prison

mailbox rule for the filing of state habeas corpus petitions, the

state petition was not “properly filed” and petitioner was not

entitled to tolling until the date that the state district court

filed the pro se state habeas petition, not the day that

petitioner delivered the petition to prison officials for mailing.

COUNSEL

Jonathan M. Kirshbaum (argued), Research and Writing

Specialist; Rene L. Valladares, Federal Public Defender; John

C. Lambrose, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Vegas,

Nevada, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jeffrey M. Conner (argued), Deputy Attorney General;

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City,

Nevada, for Respondents-Appellees.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ORPIADA V. MCDANIEL 3

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

This case raises the familiar question of whether a

prisoner timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

federal court. For Antonio Orpiada, an inmate in Nevada

State prison, the answer hinges on whether the prison mailbox

rule applies to the filing of his state habeas corpus petition for

the purpose of triggering statutory tolling of the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) limitations

period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (1996). If the mailbox

rule does apply, as Orpiada asserts, his state petition is

deemed filed on the date he delivered the petition to prison

officials for mailing. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262,

1268 (2000), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 

If, however, the rule does not apply, the tolling period began

on the date the state court clerk received Orpiada’s state

petition, and the filing of the federal petition exceeds the oneyear limitations period by three days. See Artuz v. Bennett,

531 U.S. 4, 8–9 (2000).

The combination of Supreme Court and Nevada precedent

offers no wiggle room on the answer. We are bound by the

Supreme Court’s directive to apply state procedural law to

determine whether Orpiada’s habeas petition was properly

filed, including when it was deemed filed. See id. Nevada

has squarely rejected the prison mailbox rule for the filing of

its state habeas corpus petitions. Gonzales v. State, 53 P.3d

901, 904 (Nev. 2002). Unfortunately for Orpiada, so too

must we in assessing his petition and AEDPA tolling. 

Consequently, we conclude that Orpiada’s federal petition is

time barred.

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4 ORPIADA V. MCDANIEL

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Following trial in Nevada, a jury convicted Orpiada of

two counts of attempted murder and other related offenses. 

The parties agree that Orpiada’s conviction became final on

June 2, 2005. On February 6, 2006, the state district court

filed Orpiada’s pro se state habeas corpus petition. Orpiada

signed and dated the petition and certificate of service by

mail on February 2, 2006. The state trial court denied the

petition. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the trial

court’s decision by order dated December 10, 2010, and then

issued its remittitur on January 5, 2011.

On that same day, January 5, 2011, Orpiada mailed a pro

se federal habeas corpus petition to the United States District

Court in Nevada. After the district court granted Orpiada’s

motion for assignment of counsel, counsel filed an amended

petition on May 4, 2011. The district court ruled that the

amended petition did not relate back to his original pro se

petition. The district court then held that the amended

petition was untimely because a total of 368 nontolled days

had elapsed after Orpiada’s conviction became final,

exceeding the one-year AEDPA limitations period.1 The

district court determined that the prison mailbox rule did not

1 The limitations period began to run on June 2, 2005, ninety days after

the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed Orpiada’s conviction. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Sup. Ct. R. 13(1). Two hundred forty-nine

days elapsed between June 2, 2005 and February 6, 2006, the date the

district court determined marked the beginning of the tolling period under

§ 2244(d)(2). The limitations period then resumed running upon issuance

of remittitur on January 5, 2011. One hundred nineteen nontolled days

then elapsed between January 5, 2011 and May 4, 2011, the filing of the

amended federal petition. Therefore, the district court counted a total of

368 nontolled days.

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ORPIADA V. MCDANIEL 5

apply to Orpiada’s state petition because Nevada does not

apply the rule to its state habeas filings.

ANALYSIS

The operative question for determining the timeliness of

Orpiada’s petition is whether the prison mailbox rule applies

to the filing of his Nevada state habeas corpus petition for

purposes of calculating tolling of the AEDPA limitations

period. We have yet to address this precise question

regarding Nevada state law.2

AEDPA provides a one-year limitations period for a state

prisoner to apply for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056,

1058 (9th Cir. 2010). The limitations period is tolled during

the time in “which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). As the Supreme Court explained:

[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its

delivery and acceptance are in compliance

with the applicable laws and rules governing

filings. These usually prescribe, for example,

the form of the document, the time limits

upon its delivery, the court and office in

2

In a case where timeliness was not an issue, we noted that the mailbox

rule does not apply to Nevada habeas filings. See Koerner v. Grigas,

328 F.3d 1039, 1043 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[B]ecause Nevada does not

recognize a ‘prison mailbox rule’ for post-conviction petitions, [the

petition] was not filed under Nevada law until actually received by the

clerk of court.” (citation omitted)).

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6 ORPIADA V. MCDANIEL

which it must be lodged, and the requisite

filing fee.

Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8 (citations and footnote omitted).

These “mechanical rules that are enforceable by the

clerks” are “‘condition[s] to filing’” that must be met for an

application to be properly filed, in contrast to conditions

“which go to the ability to obtain relief” that do not affect

whether the petition is properly filed. Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, 414–15, 417 (2005). In Pace, the Supreme

Court clarified that even state time limits subject to judicially

reviewable exceptions are filing conditions that impact

whether a state petition is “properly filed” and eligible for

tolling. 544 U.S. at 417 (“[T]here is an obvious distinction

between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a

petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition, and the

type of ‘rule of decision’ procedural bars at issue in Artuz,

which go to the ability to obtain relief.”).

Consequently, to determine whether Orpiada’s state postconviction petition for relief is a “properly filed” application

that is eligible for tolling we look to Nevada state filing

requirements. See Campbell, 614 F.3d at 1060 (“Tolling . . .

is not appropriate for a petition that is untimely under state

law, because such a petition is [not properly filed].”). The

state district court clerk stamped Orpiada’s state petition as

filed on February 6, 2006, which would mean that Orpiada’s

federal petition was three days late. Orpiada contends that,

under the prison mailbox rule, his petition was eligible to

begin tolling the AEDPA limitations period on February 2,

2006—the day he turned it over to prison authorities for

mailing. Under the latter scenario, Orpiada’s federal petition

would be timely.

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ORPIADA V. MCDANIEL 7

Unfortunately for Orpiada, Nevada law sinks his claim. 

Although Nevada applies the prison mailbox rule to state

notices of appeal filed by pro se prisoners, it has expressly

rejected application of the rule to state post-conviction relief

petitions. See Gonzales, 53 P.3d at 903–04. In Gonzales, the

Supreme Court of Nevada considered the rationale underlying

the mailbox rule, and decided that policy considerations were

not compelling enough in the habeas corpus context to

warrant application of the rule. 53 P.3d at 903. The court

reasoned that prisoners have ample time to file postconviction petitions despite the “‘vagaries of the prison mail

system,’” in contrast to the shorter time period for notices of

appeal. Id. It also noted that some late petitions may be

forgiven by a showing of good cause and prejudice. Id. at

903–04.

Orpiada argues that application of the prison mailbox rule

is controlled by federal law without regard to state procedural

rules, pointing to Ninth Circuit cases that applied the prison

mailbox rule to state petitions for AEDPA tolling. This

argument is unavailing. We have not applied the prison

mailbox rule for AEDPA tolling where, as here, the petition

is mailed in a state that expressly rejects the mailbox rule for

its state habeas petition filings.

Other cases applying the prison mailbox arise from

convictions in California—a state that does not reject the

prison mailbox rule and which has indeterminate rather than

fixed time limitations for filing habeas petitions.3See Carey

 

3

 Situations in which state courts have not considered the mailbox rule

because there is no fixed filing deadline do not offer a useful analog or

precedent. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Artuz, 402 F.3d 111, 113–16 (2d Cir.

2005) (applying the mailbox rule to a New York coram nobis petition

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8 ORPIADA V. MCDANIEL

v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222 (2002); see, e.g., Porter v.

Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In determining

when a pro se state or federal petition is filed, the ‘mailbox’

rule applies.”). Orpiada argues that these cases involving

California petitions are applicable because California has not

expressly adopted the mailbox rule for its habeas corpus

petitions. The trouble with Orpiada’s argument is that

Nevada has expressly rejected the mailbox rule and it is

Nevada, not California or other state law that controls.

Our sister circuits are in accord with our approach. See

Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir. 2003)

(declining to apply the mailbox rule to a post-conviction Ohio

petition because the Ohio Supreme Court has expressly

rejected the rule); Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1140–41

(10th Cir. 2003) (noting that the mailbox rule does not apply

to post-conviction petitions in Oklahoma based on state law);

cf. Richards v. Thaler, 710 F.3d 573, 576–79 (5th Cir. 2013)

(concluding that, because Texas courts changed to recognize

the mailbox rule for post-conviction filings, the federal courts

accordingly would apply it to state petitions filed in Texas);

Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1002–06 (7th Cir. 2012)

(applying the mailbox rule to a post-conviction petition filed

in Wisconsin based on Wisconsin law).

We note that tolling for petitioners relying on the prison

mail system under the doctrine of equitable tolling remains

available if the circumstances—such as prison official

interference with the mail—warrant relief. See Holland v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). However, Orpiada raised

while noting, “New York State prescribes no deadline for coram nobis

petitions, [and thus] New York State courts will never have occasion to

decide whether the prison mailbox rule should apply to them.”).

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ORPIADA V. MCDANIEL 9

no such special circumstances here. Orpiada’s federal

petition is time barred.

AFFIRMED.

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