Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01758/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01758-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
AES Raptor, LLC
Appellee
Garlock Equipment Company
Appellant
Brent E. Smith
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BRENT E. SMITH, AES RAPTOR, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1758

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Missouri in No. 5:13-cv-00104-GAF, 

Judge Gary A. Fenner.

______________________ 

Decided: August 23, 2016

______________________ 

 DAVID LOUIS MARCUS, Bartle & Marcus LLC, Kansas 

City, MO, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. Also represented by DONNA DENISE MASHBURN CHAPMAN, Mashburn 

Law Office, LLC, Lee’s Summit, MO.

 PAUL SMITH, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 

Minneapolis, MN, argued for defendant-appellant. Also 

represented by GLENNA GILBERT, LAURIS A. HEYERDAHL. 

______________________ 

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2 SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY

Before O’MALLEY, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from a jury verdict finding Garlock 

Equipment Company (“Garlock”) liable for infringement 

of the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,240,431 (the 

“’431 Patent”), and awarding damages for lost profits and 

reasonable royalties. Garlock moved for judgment as a 

matter of law on both findings. The district court denied 

Garlock’s motions and proceeded to issue an injunction 

prohibiting infringing activities involving the accused 

products. Garlock now appeals the district court’s denial 

of its motions for judgment as a matter of law and the 

district court’s injunction order. For the reasons set forth 

below, we reverse the district court’s denial of judgment as 

a matter of law regarding infringement. Because the 

accused devices do not infringe the asserted claims of the 

’431 patent, we vacate the jury award of damages and the 

district court’s injunction order. 

BACKGROUND

A brief review of the patented technology, the accused 

products, and the procedural background of the district 

court litigation is helpful to understanding the present 

appeal. 

The Patent in Suit

The ’431 patent claims a fall-arresting safety device 

typically used to prevent a worker from falling off a roof. 

’431 patent, at Abstract. Generally, the device works such 

that a worker’s fall causes an “arrestor arm” to swing 

down and connect with the ground, gripping the ground 

and halting the worker’s fall. Id. The figures below show 

the device in the raised/resting (left) and engaged (right) 

position, where the arm swings down to connect with the 

ground. The worker is usually connected via a tether to 

the ring 32 at the left of each image. 

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SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY 3

’431 patent, at Figs. 3 and 4.

The ’431 patent contains independent claims 1 and 5, 

which are both at issue in this suit. Claim 1 reads as 

follows: 

1. An apparatus adapted for use on an elevated 

surface, and for arresting the fall of a person from 

the surface, the apparatus comprising:

an apparatus support defining lateral and longitudinal extents,

an arrestor assembly connected to said apparatus 

support, and further comprising:

an arrestor arm fully contained within the extents, pivotally mounted to the support at a 

first end, and presenting a free second end, 

wherein the arm is shiftable between a raised 

non-engaged position and a lowered engaged 

position, and a gravitational moment-force 

acts upon the arm at the second end,

a gripping plate fully contained within the extents, and secured to the second end, wherein 

the plate is spaced from the surface in the 

non-engaged position, and bears upon, so as to 

grip, the surface in the engaged position

a bias member drivenly coupled to the arm 

and generating a second force greater than the 

gravitational moment-force so as to normally 

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4 SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY

retain the second end in the non-engaged position, and

a tether configured for connection to said person, connected to the arm, and operable to 

transmit an additional force to the arm when 

the person undergoes a fall from the surface, 

such that the additional and gravitationalmoment forces cooperatively overcome the 

second force and cause the arm to shift to the 

engaged position, thereby arresting the fall.

’431 patent, at col. 7, l. 38-col. 8, l. 7 (emphasis added). 

The primary claim limitation at issue with respect to 

claim 1 is that the apparatus include a tether.

Claim 5 recites: 

5. An apparatus for arresting a fall of a person 

comprising: 

a vehicle having a vehicle structure and tires for 

placement on a roof surface;

An arrestor assembly connected to the vehicle 

structure, shiftable between a raised position and 

a lowered position, and further including,

an arrestor arm spaced away from the roof 

surface in the raised position, the arrestor 

arm being biased in the raised position by an 

arm support, and

an engagement plate connected to the arrestor 

arm, the engagement plate being spaced from 

the roof surface and adjacent to the vehicle 

structure when in the raised position and the 

engagement plate engaging the roof surface in 

the lowered position;

an internal cable defining a first end and a 

second end, the first end being coupled to the 

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SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY 5

arrestor assembly to communicate a force to 

the arrestor assembly, wherein the force causes 

the arm to shift to the lowered position; 

a cable passage fixedly connected to the vehicle structure and including an angle mount 

defining a cross sectional opening leaving a 

maximum diameter through which the internal cable is entrained; and

a cable connector member connected to the 

second end of the internal cable and disposed 

adjacent the mount opposite the arm, presenting a lateral dimension greater than the diameter, so as to limit cable travel in one 

direction and cooperatively define the nonengaged position, and configured for removable attachment to at least one safety cable opposite the internal cable.

Id. at col. 8, ll. 14-44 (emphases added). The primary 

limitation at issue with respect to claim 5 is the requirement that the arrestor assembly and the arm be shiftable 

to a lowered position.

The Accused Products

Plaintiffs Brent E. Smith and AES Raptor, LLC (collectively, “Smith”) sued Garlock for infringement of claims 

1 and 5 based on Garlock’s sales of the Multi-Man and the 

Twin-Man, two fall-arresting devices. The Twin-Man is 

more portable and restrains only two workers, while the 

Multi-Man is capable of restraining more workers. Appellant Br. at 3 n.3. Both the Multi-Man and the Twin-Man 

use an arm that digs into the ground to halt a worker’s 

fall. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 1018, 1024. 

Smith alleges that the Multi-Man infringes claim 5 of 

the ’431 patent. In the Multi-Man design, an arrestor 

arm with a gripping piece at the bottom slides linearly 

along an axis to dig the gripping piece into the ground. 

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SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY 7

J.A. 1018. The force causing the rotation comes from a 

tether connected to the falling worker, depicted in line 62

at the right of each figure. 

Procedural History

Smith sued Garlock in February 2013 for infringement of the ’431 patent. After holding a Markman hearing, the district court issued a claim construction order on 

February 14, 2014. The court held that the terms “shift” 

and “shift to” mean “pivot” and “pivot to,” respectively.

Following the claim construction order, Garlock 

moved for summary judgment of noninfringement regarding the accused Multi-Man product. Garlock argued that 

the arrestor arm in the Multi-Man device was capable 

only of sliding, and thus could not “pivot,” as required by 

the court’s claim construction. Appellant Br. at 5. 

The district court noted that Smith’s expert, James 

Kernell, Esq., offered testimony of infringement regarding 

every limitation of claim 5. Finding that Mr. Kernell’s 

testimony demonstrated the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact regarding infringement by the MultiMan device, the district court denied Garlock’s summary 

judgment motion.

The litigation proceeded to trial. Following trial, the 

jury found that the Multi-Man infringed claim 5 of the 

’431 patent and that the Twin-Man infringed claim 1 of 

the ’431 patent. J.A. 1. The jury proceeded to award 

Smith $322,484.94 in lost profits, in addition to reasonable royalties equal to 4.75% of the total sales for each 

device. J.A. 6.

Garlock then moved for judgment as a matter of law 

that the Multi-Man and Twin-Man do not infringe the 

asserted claims of the ’431 patent. Garlock also moved for 

judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative for a 

new trial, on damages. The district court denied Garlock’s motions. 

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8 SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY

Garlock then moved for an additional stay of the

judgment, pending appeal, beyond the 14 days prescribed 

in FRCP 62(a). J.A. 38. Smith did not oppose Garlock’s

request, but Smith requested that the court enjoin Garlock from continuing to sell the Multi-Man and Twin-Man 

products. The district court granted both Garlock’s motion to stay the judgment and Smith’s request for an 

injunction. J.A. 40. 

Garlock now appeals. 

DISCUSSION

Garlock argues that the district court erred in denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law regarding 

noninfringement and damages. Garlock further contends 

that the district court erred in entering the injunction 

order. For the reasons below, we hold that the district 

court erred in denying Garlock’s motion for judgment as a 

matter of law of nonfringement regarding the asserted 

claims. As a result, we also vacate the jury award of 

damages and the district court’s injunction order. 

Standard of Review

On issues not unique to patent law, we review district 

court decisions on motions for judgment as a matter of 

law under the law of the regional circuit. Sulzer Textil 

A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

The Eighth Circuit reviews de novo a district court’s 

decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. 

Shaw Group, Inc. v. Marcum, 516 F.3d 1061, 1064 (8th 

Cir. 2008). 

Under Eighth Circuit law, “[j]udgment as a matter of 

law is only appropriate where the evidence adduced at 

trial is entirely insufficient to support the verdict.” Shaw 

Grp., Inc. v. Marcum, 516 F.3d 1061, 1064–65 (8th Cir. 

2008). Thus, we may not set aside the district court’s 

judgment in this case “unless there is a complete absence 

of probative facts to support the verdict and only speculaCase: 15-1758 Document: 56-2 Page: 8 Filed: 08/23/2016
SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY 9

tion supports the verdict.” Id. While the standard to set 

aside a jury verdict is unquestionably high, in the present 

case we find the standard satisfied.

Multi-Man Infringement

Garlock argues on appeal that the district court erred 

in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law on 

the Multi-Man infringement issue. Specifically, Garlock 

asserts that Smith did not present substantial evidence 

that the following limitation of claim 5 was met:

[A]n internal cable defining a first end and a second end, the first end being coupled to the arrestor assembly to communicate a force to the 

arrestor assembly, wherein the force causes the 

arm to shift to the lowered position[.]

’431 patent, at col. 8, ll. 28-32. Garlock contends that this

claim limitation specifically requires the arm, and not 

another portion of the arrestor assembly, to pivot because 

the language reads “the force causes the arm to shift”. 

In response, Smith contends that while “there was 

conflicting evidence at trial as to how the ‘pivot’ limitation 

of claim 5 could be met,” such evidentiary disputes are 

precisely the type of instance in which we must defer to 

the jury verdict. Smith further argues in the alternative 

that “claim 5 is satisfied so long as a pivotal movement is 

involved in the operation of the arrestor arm.” Appellee 

Br. at 18-20 (emphasis added). 

A patent claim is literally infringed only if the accused 

device embodies each limitation of the asserted claim. 

Research Plastics, Inc. v. Fed. Packaging Corp., 421 F.3d 

1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The absence of a single limitation in the asserted claim thus 

defeats literal infringement. Id. Expert testimony that 

fails to show how the accused device meets a particular 

limitation cannot constitute substantial evidence supportCase: 15-1758 Document: 56-2 Page: 9 Filed: 08/23/2016
10 SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY

ing a finding of literal infringement. See Johns Hopkins 

Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 543 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

In support of its infringement allegations, Smith

submitted Mr. Kernell as an expert to explain how the 

Multi-Man performs each limitation of claim 5 of the ’431 

patent. On cross examination, Garlock focused on demonstrating that the Multi-Man does not satisfy the claim 

limitation “wherein the force causes the arm to shift to 

the lowered position.” In particular, Garlock asked Mr. 

Kernell to explain how the Multi-Man arm “pivots.” The 

following exchange is exemplary of the dialogue between 

Garlock’s counsel and Mr. Kernell on this point: 

A: That pulley rotates and pivots to drive that 

arm down into the surface, and that is the pivotal 

movement of that arm.

Q: So it’s your opinion that this arm pivots?

A: Yes. The entire assembly, that pivoting of that 

arm around that pulley that is my opinion.

Q: I’m not asking about the entire assembly. 

We’re talking about the arm. This item says the 

arm pivots. This arm does not pivot, does it?

A: No. That’s not correct. That is not my opinion. 

If you look at the claim language, you’re taking 

something out of context. In the claim language it 

says the arrestor assembly has this pivoting motion with the arm, and it is the pivoting around 

that pulley that causes the arrestor assembly to 

shift or pivot between the raised position and the 

lowered position. 

Q: Sir, back to our infringement definition. Each 

and every element of the patent claim must be included in the product; and as to Claim 5, the Multi-Man does not – Multi-Man’s arm does not pivot, 

and therefore, it does not infringe, correct?

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SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY 11

A: No. That’s not correct. 

J.A. 2104-05. Notably, Mr. Kernell did not answer the 

question of whether the Multi-Man’s arrestor arm itself 

pivoted. Mr. Kernell instead testified that there was 

some pivoting motion involved in the arrestor assembly as 

a whole, and that this motion was sufficient to satisfy the 

claim limitation requiring that the arm itself pivot. See 

id.

Garlock also presented its own expert, Dr. Elliot 

Stern, who testified that the Multi-Man does not infringe

claim 5 because the arrestor arm does not pivot. 

[I]n questioning whether it literally infringes it 

must have each and every claim element . . . . for 

one example . . . . ‘The force causes the arm to 

shift to the lowered position.’ The [c]ourt’s definition of shift is to pivot. Mechanically one of ordinary [skill] in the art could clearly understand a 

pivot to be a rotational motion or an angular displacement about a point or a pin, which is often 

called the pivot; and, as such, the Multi-Man does 

not pivot. The arm slides in a guide. There is no 

fixed end and free end of the arm and it has a linear motion. It doesn’t rotate about the pin.

J.A. 2370. Dr. Stern emphasized that the arm itself

cannot pivot because its movement is restricted to sliding 

within the guide. 

Smith contends that the disputed claim limitation

does not require the arrestor arm itself to move, but 

instead only requires that pivotal movement be involved 

in the operation of the arrestor arm. Specifically, Smith 

argues that because the “Multi-Man cart’s use of a pulley 

satisfied Claim 5 of the ’431 Patent, there was no need for 

the arrestor arm to rotate.” Appellant Br. at 26. Smith’s

argument is belied by the actual language of the disputed 

limitation:

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12 SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY

[A]n internal cable defining a first end and a second end, the first end being coupled to the arrestor assembly to communicate a force to the 

arrestor assembly, wherein the force causes the 

arm to shift to the lowered position[.]

’431 patent, at col. 8, ll. 28-32 (emphasis added). The 

claim limitation unambiguously requires “the arm,” and 

not some other component of the assembly, to “shift.” 

Because the parties do not appeal the correctness of the 

district court’s construction of “shift” to mean “pivot,” we 

do not reach this issue.1 Thus, applying the district 

 

1 In a single footnote in its brief, Smith contends 

that “[w]hile Plaintiffs disagree with this construction, as 

the prevailing parties below, they lack standing to appeal 

the district court’s claim construction order.” Appellee Br. 

at 7 n.3 (citing Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott 

Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Smith then 

stated in an isolated sentence that “if this Court is inclined to reverse the district court’s entry of judgment, it 

also should reverse the district court’s claim construction 

order and hold that the phrase ‘shift to,’ as used in claim 

5, must be given its common and ordinary meaning in any 

retrial of this matter.” Id. Smith’s comment is appealing 

on its face; the plain meaning of the term “shift” does 

seem different from the term “pivot.” We nonetheless do 

not have occasion to address whether the district court’s 

claim construction was proper because Smith has failed to 

present any argument on appeal beyond their single 

conclusory statement that we “should reverse the district 

court’s claim construction.” See SmithKline Beecham 

Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 

2006) (holding that when “a party includes no developed 

argumentation on a point . . . we treat the argument as 

waived”).

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SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY 13

court’s claim construction, the plain language of the claim 

requires the arrestor arm itself to rotate. Upon our 

review of the record, we see no evidence that could support Smith’s allegation that the arrestor arm of the MultiMan meets this claim limitation. 

Our prior decision in Johns Hopkins controls the present dispute. In Johns Hopkins, we considered infringement of a claim to a method for mechanically fragmenting 

blood clots to prevent occlusion of blood vessels. Id. at 

1343. The patent described a “fragmentation cage” that 

first expands to conform to the inner walls of a vein. Id. 

 

Smith is also incorrect to assert that Novartis barred 

Smith from advancing its claim construction arguments 

on appeal. In Novartis, we held as follows:

[A] party who prevails on noninfringement has no 

right to file a “conditional” cross-appeal to introduce new argument or challenge a claim construction, but may simply assert alternative grounds in 

the record for affirming the judgment. It is only 

necessary and appropriate to file a cross-appeal 

when a party seeks to enlarge its own rights under the judgment or to lessen the rights of its adversary under the judgment. 

Novartis, 375 F.3d at 1339. Accordingly, we dismissed as 

improper the prevailing party’s cross-appeal concerning 

the claim construction, precisely because that party 

prevailed before the district court. Thus, while Smith 

could not have filed a cross appeal in this case concerning 

the claim construction, Smith could have asserted “alternative grounds in the record for affirming the judgment.” 

Because Smith did not raise any such alternate grounds 

on appeal, we cannot address the correctness of the district court’s claim construction.

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14 SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY

After expanding, the cage rotates to break up the thrombotic material. Id. at 1343-44. 

The asserted claims required a “fragmentation member” to “expand[] to conform to the shape and diameter of 

the inner lumen.” Id. at 1346. The district court instructed the jury that this limitation meant the fragmentation member “remained in contact with the inner lumen 

in three dimensions along its length and width.” Id. The 

accused infringing device was an S-shaped device that, 

while resting, contacted the walls of the vein in only two 

places, but could rotate like a corkscrew and thus contact 

the “inner lumen” in multiple dimensions. Plaintiff’s 

expert opined that the S-wire “expanded and adjusted to 

remain in contact with the inner lumen in three dimensions along its length and width.” Id. at 1346. After trial, 

the jury found that the accused device infringed the claim. 

Id. at 1344. Defendant then moved for judgment as a 

matter of law of noninfringement, and the district court 

denied defendant’s motion. Id.

On appeal, we held that the testimony from Plaintiff’s

expert was not credible, because the expert failed to

address the requirement that the fragmentation member 

remain in contact with the lumen in three dimensions 

before rotation and because it was impossible for the 

accused device to meet the “expand to conform” limitation 

while not rotating. Id. Thus, we held that the expert 

testimony could not constitute substantial evidence that 

the accused infringing device met this limitation. Id. We 

accordingly reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement. Id.

Here, Mr. Kernell’s testimony on Multi-Man infringement is similarly not credible. Mr. Kernell testified 

that the pulley in the arrestor assembly performed the 

requisite rotating and pivoting motion, and “that is the 

pivotal movement of that arm.” J.A. 2104-05. Such 

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SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY 15

testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence that the 

arrestor arm itself pivots. Instead, the only relevant

evidence of record appears to indicate that the Multi-Man

does not have an arm that is capable of rotational movement. According to Dr. Stern’s unrebutted testimony, the 

Multi-Man arm only “slides” along a linear axis. 

J.A. 2370. 

The present case does not involve a simple “battle of 

the experts,” wherein the fact finder must weigh the 

merits of the competing expert testimony. Here, the 

record does not evidence a disagreement between the 

experts as to whether the arrestor arm is pivoting. In 

light of the absence in the record of any evidence that 

could support the jury’s verdict of infringement, we must 

reverse the district court’s denial of Garlock’s motion for 

judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether the 

Multi-Man infringes claim 5. See The Shaw Group v. 

Marcum, 516 F.3d 1061, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding 

that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where

there is a “complete absence of probative facts and only 

speculation supports the verdict”). 

Twin-Man Infringement

Garlock next argues that the district court erred in 

denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding noninfringement of claim 1. Garlock contends 

that the jury verdict of infringement must be reversed

because there is no evidence that the Twin-Man meets the 

claim limitation requiring a tether. Appellant Br. at 29.

Smith responds that there is substantial evidence 

demonstrating that Garlock sold, or at least offered for 

sale, the Twin-Man with a tether. 

We agree with Garlock that there is no competent evidence of record regarding whether the tether limitation is 

met. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district 

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16 SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY

court denying Garlock’s motion for judgment as a matter 

of law of noninfringement concerning claim 1.

First, we consider whether Garlock sold the TwinMan with a tether; then we consider whether Garlock 

offered for sale the Twin-Man with a tether. Smith argued that Garlock sold the Twin-Man with a tether because its sister companies and distributors, Garlock East 

and Garlock Chicago, sold units with a tether. 

In its Complaint, Smith alleged that Garlock directly 

infringes claim 1 of the ’431 patent. Direct infringement 

under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) requires a patentee to prove that 

an accused infringer committed “all acts necessary to 

infringe the patent, either personally or vicariously.” 

Aristocrat Tech. Aust. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 709 

F.3d 1348, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Acts 

of a subsidiary company are not imputed to a parent 

company unless evidence supports “piercing the [corporate] veil.” United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 

(1998). 

The parties do not dispute that certain of Garlock’s

separately incorporated “sister” companies, Garlock 

Chicago and Garlock East, have sold the Twin-Man with a 

tether. J.A. 2179, 2243. Garlock states, however, that it 

does not itself sell the Twin-Man unit with a tether. We 

note that Smith does not present any affirmative evidence, such as any invoices or receipts, of such sales by 

Garlock. Moreover, Smith did not produce any evidence 

to support a theory of piercing the corporate veil. In the 

absence of such evidence, we cannot hold Garlock liable 

for the sales of its sister companies. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 

at 62. Therefore, we hold that the evidence at trial could

not support a finding that Garlock itself sold, either 

directly or vicariously, an infringing device. 

We next consider Smith’s argument that Garlock offered for sale the Twin-Man with a tether. A party offers 

to sell an infringing product when it communicates a 

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SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY 17

“willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify 

another person in understanding that his assent to that 

bargain is invited and will conclude it.” MEMC Elec. 

Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon, Inc., 420 

F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

Garlock advertised the Twin-Man, formerly called the 

Single Man, in the following image: 

J.A. 999. The image states a price (“starting at only 

$1400”), shows a man connected via a tether to the TwinMan product, and provides Garlock’s contact information 

for the purchase of the product.

Smith argues that Garlock’s advertisement constitutes an offer for sale. Mr. Kernell testified that this 

advertisement and other marketing materials constituted 

an offer for sale. J.A. 2084-85. Mr. Kernell also referenced the fact that the Twin-Man could not be used 

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18 SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY

without the tether and pointed to a section of the instruction manual showing a tether attached to the unit. J.A. 

2107-09.

In general, advertisements are not considered offers 

for sale, but are instead merely solicitations for offers. As 

specified in the Second Restatement of Contracts:

Advertisements of goods by display, sign, handbill . . . are not ordinarily intended or understood 

as offers to sell. The same is true of catalogues, 

price lists and circulars, even though the terms of 

some suggested bargains may be stated in some 

detail. 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26, Comment 

b. Accordingly, we have noted that “contract law traditionally recognizes that mere advertising and promoting 

of a product may be nothing more than an invitation for 

offers, while responding to such an invitation may itself 

be an offer.” Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 

F.3d 1041, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, “[g]enerally, it is 

considered unreasonable for a person to believe that 

advertisements and solicitations are offers that bind the 

advertiser.” Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576, 

1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Group One and Mesaros therefore 

indicate that Garlock’s general advertisement does not 

constitute an offer to sell the Twin-Man with a tether. 

Smith argues that the present case is akin to 3D Systems, Inc. v. Aarotech Laboratories, Inc., 160 F.3d 1373 

(Fed. Cir. 1988), wherein we held that price quotations 

could constitute an offer for sale. In Aarotech, the accused 

infringers sent price quotations for an allegedly infringing 

device directly targeted at potential customers. Id. at 

1376. Noting that such price quotations “generat[ed] 

interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee,” we held that the 

price quotations constituted an offer for sale. Id. at 1379. 

Here, Smith has produced only evidence that Garlock 

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SMITH v. GARLOCK EQUIPMENT COMPANY 19

issued a general advertisement for its Twin-Man product, 

which showed use with a tether, with no reference to the 

Twin-Man and tether being offered for sale collectively. 

Smith’s reliance on Aarotech is therefore misplaced. 

Smith has produced no evidence that Garlock issued price 

quotations to specific customers for the sale of the TwinMan with a tether. 

We therefore conclude that there was no evidence in 

the record upon which the jury could have found that the 

accused Twin-Man device met the limitation of claim 1 

requiring use of a tether. Accordingly, we reverse the 

judgment of the district court denying Garlock’s motion 

for judgment as a matter of law concerning noninfringement of claim 1. 

CONCLUSION

As discussed above, the district court erred in denying 

Garlock’s motion for judgment as a matter of law that the 

Multi-Man and Twin-Man products do not infringe the 

asserted claims of the ’431 patent. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court concerning infringement of the asserted claims. Because the accused 

devices do not infringe, we vacate the jury award of 

damages and the district court’s injunction order. 

REVERSED-IN-PART AND VACATED-IN-PART

COSTS

No costs.

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