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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Donald Ray Young
Appellant

Document Text:

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is *

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(B).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 3, 2010*

Decided March 4, 2010

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 09-3277

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DONALD RAY YOUNG, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 06-CR-332

Charles N. Clevert, Jr.,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

In this criminal case, Donald Ray Young appeals from a district court order that

granted a government motion to reduce his sentence for substantial assistance, see FED. R.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-3277 Document: 13 Filed: 03/04/2010 Pages: 2
No. 09-3277 Page 2

CRIM. P. 35(b)(2), and argues that district court erred by refusing to consider the disparity

between crack and powder cocaine sentences. We affirm.

Young pleaded guilty in 2007 to knowing and intentional distribution of 50 or more

grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to ten years’

imprisonment followed by 5 years’ supervised release. In May 2009, the government filed a

motion to reduce Young’s sentence based on his substantial assistance to the government. 

At the hearing, Young argued that the court should also consider the disparity between

crack and powder cocaine sentences. The district court stated that it could not consider the

disparity. It granted the government's motion and reduced Young’s sentence by 20

months.

We have recently addressed the matter in United States v. Shelby, 584 F.3d 743, 749-50

(7th Cir. 2009), which held that, once district courts decide to grant a Rule 35(b)(2)

substantial-assistance motion, they may not then consider the factors articulated in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), including any disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences. 

Young urges us to reconsider the matter, but concedes that Shelby controls. We recently

denied rehearing and rehearing en banc in Shelby, and Young offers no argument not

considered in that case. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order.

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