Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55672/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55672-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Los Robles Regional Medical Center
Appellee
SEIU United Healthcare Workers-West
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE

WORKERS-WEST,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

LOS ROBLES REGIONAL MEDICAL

CENTER,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 13-55672

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-09387-

R-SH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 6, 2015*

Pasadena, California

Filed December 3, 2015

Before: Harry Pregerson, Barrington D. Parker, Jr.

**

,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge for the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 1 of 18
2 SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR.

SUMMARY***

Labor Law

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment

and vacated its order dismissing a petition to compel

arbitration under Section 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act.

Service Employees International Union, United

Healthcare Workers-West, and Los Robles Regional Medical

Center were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. 

The Union sought arbitration of a grievance objecting to

the Medical Center’s reorganization of its engineering

department.

The panel held that the Union’s petition to compel

arbitration was not barred by Section 301’s six-month statute

of limitations because the limitation period did not begin to

run until the Medical Center officially replied to the Union’s

letter demanding arbitration. Reading the record in the light

most favorable to the Union, the non-moving party, the panel

concluded that an earlier email from the Medical Center did

not “make it clear” that the Medical Center refused to

arbitrate because the Union did not request arbitration until

after the email was sent. The panel concluded that the

Medical Center’s delay in responding to the Union’s letter

demanding arbitration must be considered a violation of good

faith because the five-month delay was a period of time

nearly equal to the entire six-month limitation period.

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 2 of 18
SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR. 3

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment and remanded for further proceedings. It vacated

the district court’s award of costs for reconsideration in light

of the reversal of summary judgment.

COUNSEL

Bruce A. Harland, Monica T. Guizar, and Jacob J. White,

Weinberg, Roger, & Rosenfeld, PC, Los Angeles, California,

for Petitioner-Appellant.

Paul Ramsey Beshears, Ford & Harrison, LLP, Atlanta,

Georgia; Michelle B. Abidoye, Ford & Harrison, LLP, Los

Angeles, California for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Service Employees International Union, United

Healthcare Workers-West (the Union) appeals the district

court order granting summary judgment to Los Robles

Regional Medical Center (the Medical Center) and dismissing

the Union’s Petition to Compel Arbitration under Section 301

of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

The district court ruled that the Union’s September 20,

2012 Petition to Compel Arbitration was time barred by

Section 301’s six-month statute of limitations. The district

found that the limitations period started to run on December

2, 2011, when the Medical Center emailed an “unequivocal,

express rejection of the union’s request for arbitration.” 

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 3 of 18
4 SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR.

Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. Exber, Inc., 994 F.2d 674, 676 (9th

Cir. 1993). The Union disputes that Medical Center’s

December 2, 2011 email “[made] it clear” that the Medical

Center refused to arbitrate. Id. at 676. The Union argues that

Section 301’s six-month limitation period did not begin to run

until the Medical Center officially replied on June 22, 2012,

to the Union’s January 17, 2012 letter demanding arbitration.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse

the grant of summary judgment, vacate the district court’s

order dismissing the Petition to Compel Arbitration, and

remand to the district court for further proceedings. We also

vacate the award of costs in light of our reversal of summary

judgment.1

I.

A. The Dispute

The Union and the Medical Center were parties to a

Collective Bargaining Agreement (the Agreement) effective

January 21, 2011, through March 31, 2014. The Medical

Center campus pertinent to this litigation is located in

Thousand Oaks, California.

Edwin Valdez, the Union’s representative, filed a

grievance on October 5, 2011, objecting to the Medical

Center’s reorganization of the engineering department. The

Medical Center’s reorganization eliminated four Stationary

Engineer positions and created the new bargaining unit of

1 The costs of this appeal are taxed against the Medical Center. See Fed.

R. App. P. 39(a)(3).

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 4 of 18
SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR. 5

Boiler Attendant.2 The four former Stationary Engineers

were re-designated as Boiler Attendants, which resulted in a

significant cut to their pay. The grievance alleged violations

of articles 32,3 44,4 and 605 of the Agreement.

The Union alleged that the Medical Center violated the

Agreement because the reorganization: (1) resulted in loss of

wages to its members; (2) was retaliatory because of the

engineers’ safety complaints; and (3) was made during a

period that was covered by the Agreement.

The Agreement provides for a three-step sequential

process for resolving employment grievances. At Step 1, the

Union must file its grievance in writing with the Medical

Center. The Medical Center must respond in writing, and the

2 The Medical Center claims that California Code of Regulations, Title

8, § 781 forced the reorganization of the engineering department and the

creation of the new position of Boiler Attendant. This portion of the

California Code of Regulations was last amended in December 31, 1974. 

An email message concerning the safety of the Medical Center’s boilers

from a Union field representative on February 14, 2011, brought

California Code of Regulations, Title 8, § 781 to the attention of the

Medical Center.

3 Article 32 of the Agreement states: “This Agreement shall be effective

January 21, 2011 and shall remain in full force and effect without change,

addition, or amendment through March 31, 2014.”

4 Article 44.1 of the Agreementstates: “Neither [the Medical Center] nor

the Union shall discriminate against an employee based on Union

Activity.”

5 Article 60 of the Agreement pertains to wages. In particular, Article

60.1 grants the employer discretion for wage increases, but requires the

Medical Center to notify the Union, as well as to meet and confer about

proposed wage changes.

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 5 of 18
6 SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR.

parties may schedule a Step 1 meeting to address the

grievance. If the grievance is not resolved at Step 1, the

Union may then move to Step 2 by written request. Again,

the Medical Center must respond in writing, and the parties

may schedule a Step 2 meeting to address the grievance. If

the grievance is not resolved at Step 2, then the grievance

may be sent to arbitration at Step 3. The Union is required to

notify the Medical Center in writing of its intention to

arbitrate. The Medical Center may agree to arbitrate, and the

Agreement provides procedures for selecting a

mutually-agreeable arbitrator.

On October 24, 2011, Valdez inquired whether the

Medical Center would be willing to move the grievance

directly to arbitration, which would mean jumping straight to

Step 3 of the Agreement’s grievance process. That same day,

Jonathan Berke, the Medical Center’s Labor Relations

Director, denied Valdez’s request, claiming that the Union

did not provide information explaining how its claim was

grievable and arbitrable. Berke stated that the matter was not

grievable and was precluded from arbitration pursuant to

Article 22 of the Agreement, which excludes the Medical

Center’s staff reduction decisions from arbitration.

The following day, October 25, Valdez met with Berke

and Patrick Smith, the Medical Center’s Director of Facilities

Management, but the parties were unable to resolve the

October 5 grievance during this meeting. Smith later

described this October 25 event as “our Step-1 meeting.”

On November 9, 2011, Smith informed Valdez via a

formal letter on the Medical Center’s letterhead, delivered

electronically, that the grievance was “not subject to the

grievance and arbitration procedure of [the Agreement]”

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 6 of 18
SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR. 7

because it was covered by Article 22, Reduction in Staff, and

not Articles 32, 44, and 60. This series of events corresponds

with Step 1 of the Agreement’s grievance process.

On November 28, 2011, Valdez requested that the

Medical Center continue to follow the terms of the

Agreement’s grievance process and hold a Step 2 meeting

with the Union. Berke refused to meet with Valdez. On

December 2, 2011, Berke emailed Valdez, stating, “I am

declining to process this grievance as this matter is neither

grievable nor arbitrable.” On December 15, 2011, Valdez

sent an email to Berke stating, “[I]f you are refusing to

schedule a step II meeting, we have no choice but to . . . move

this matter to the next step (arbitration).” In response, Berke

again declined to process the grievance that day.

Following the grievance process procedure, in a letter

dated January 17, 2012, Valdez notified Berke that the Union

appealed the grievance to Step 3—arbitration. With this

notice, Valdez included an additional allegation that the

Medical Center violated Article 41 of the Agreement by not

providing notice and an opportunity to bargain with the

Union before changing the job description of the bargaining

unit.

Five months then passed with no response from the

Medical Center.

The Medical Center finally responded on June 22, 2012. 

Paul Beshears, counsel for the Medical Center, sent a letter to

Kristina Hillman, counsel for the Union, advising the Union

that the Medical Center had not changed its position and

would not arbitrate the grievance based on the express

language in Article 22 of the Agreement.

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 7 of 18
8 SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR.

On July 31, 2012, Bruce Harland, counsel for the Union,

responded by letter to the Medical Center. The Union’s July

31, 2012 letter informed the Medical Center that the Union

was complying with the grievance process outlined in Article

40 of the Agreement and that the June 22 letter from the

Medical Center was the “first official communication . . .

after the Union demanded arbitration” in which the Medical

Center informed the Union that it would not arbitrate. The

Union’s July 31 letter also identified a “pattern . . . whereby

the employer claims that the Union’s grievance lacks merit,

and then refuses to arbitrate.” The Union’s July 31 letter

urged the Medical Center to “let an arbitrator determine

whether or not the employer violated the Agreement, just as

the parties have bargained for.”

B. Proceedings before the District Court

On September 20, 2012, the Union filed its Petition to

Compel Arbitration (Petition) in the Superior Court of

California, County of Ventura.

On November 1, 2012, the Medical Center filed a notice

to remove the Petition from the Superior Court of California

to the Federal District Court for the Central District of

California as a matter arising under federal law, Section 301

of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

On November 27, 2012, the Union filed its Petition in

federal court, alleging that the grievance was arbitrable. On

February 15, 2013, the Medical Center filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment arguing that (1) the Union’s Petition was

barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) the matter is not

arbitrable under the terms of the Agreement.

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 8 of 18
SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR. 9

On March 18, 2013, the Union’s Petition and the Medical

Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment were heard before

the district court. The district court granted the Medical

Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment against the Union

and dismissed the Union’s Petition.

Citing Exber, 994 F.2d at 676, the district court identified

December 2, 2011, as the date upon which the Medical

Center “unequivocally and expressly rejected the Union’s

request to arbitrate,” thus triggering the accrual of time for

the six-month statute of limitations. Therefore, the district

court determined that the triggering date resulted in the

Union’s Petition being time barred when filed on September

20, 2012, more that three months after the statute of

limitations closed on June 2, 2012. The district court did not

address whether the matter is arbitrable under the terms of the

Agreement. On April 1, 2013, the district court entered

judgment against the Union. The Union timely appealed.

II.

We review a district court’s denial of a petition to compel

arbitration de novo. Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d

1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008). We also review de novo a district

court’s determination of when a cause of action accrues and

whether a claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Oja v.

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.

2006). We review with deference the factual findings of a

district court. Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2005).

We also review a grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Travelers Cas. &Sur. Co. of Am. v. Brenneke, 551 F.3d 1132,

1137 (9th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a district court’s grant of

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 9 of 18
10 SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR.

summary judgment, we affirm only if the record, when “read

in light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveals no

genuine issue of material fact and establishes that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Int’l Ass’n

of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Aloha

Airlines, Inc., 776 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1985).

III.

The parties in this case agree that the Petition is properly

brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Neither party disputes that

a claim for a petition to compel arbitration under Section 301

has a six-month statute of limitations. Teamsters Union

Local 315 v. Great W. Chem. Co., 781 F.2d 764, 769 (9th Cir.

1986). The dispute between the parties centers on when that

six-month period commenced. The Union argues the sixmonth period commenced on June 22, 2012. The Medical

Center argues that the period commenced on either October

24, December 2, or December 15, 2011.

“As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies,

federal labor policy requires . . . use of the contract grievance

procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of

redress.” Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652

(1965). The intent of Congress in passing Section 301 was to

encourage mutually agreed upon grievance procedures

between parties to “promote a higher degree of responsibility

upon the parties to such agreements . . . thereby promot[ing]

industrial peace.” Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am.

Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l, AFL-CIO, 370 U.S.

254, 263 (1962) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st

Sess. 17). “That policy can be effectuated only if the means

chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 10 of 18
SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR. 11

a collective bargaining agreement is given full play.” Id.

(citing United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.

564, 566 (1960)). This goal is embodied in Article 40.2 of

the Agreement which states that “[a]ll grievances must be

presented at the proper steps.”

We have held that the Section 301 statute of limitations

can start to run before the completion of a collective

bargaining agreement’s grievance process. Exber, 994 F.2d

at 675–76. The Exber court held that “for an employer to

‘make it clear’ that it refuses to arbitrate and, therefore, to

start the statute of limitations running, an unequivocal,

express rejection of the union’s request for arbitration must

be communicated to the union. Constructive notice is not

sufficient.” Id. at 676.

We therefore must determine—considering the grievance

process that parties must to follow under the

Agreement—when the Union requested arbitration, and when

the Medical Center unequivocally and expressly rejected that

request. The Union generallyfollowed the three-step process,

initiating Step 1 by filing a written grievance on October 5,

2011. The parties negotiated by email about whether the

Union’s complaint fell within the terms of the Agreement’s

grievance procedures. The parties held a Step 1 meeting on

October 25, 2011. After that meeting did not resolve the

grievance, the Union requested a Step 2 meeting in writing. 

The Medical Center responded on December 2, 2011, stating

that it was “declining to process this grievance” because it

believed “this matter is neither grievable nor arbitrable.” The

Union wrote back to the Medical Center on December 15,

2011, “[I]f you are refusing to schedule a step II meeting, we

have no choice but to appeal and move this matter to the next

step (arbitration).” That same day, the Medical Center

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 11 of 18
12 SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR.

refused the Union’s request, and, under the terms of the

Agreement, the refusal to schedule the meeting meant that the

Medical Center denied the grievance at Step 2. Then, as

promised, the Union sent a written request to arbitrate on

January 17, 2012, which stated, “The [grievance] is hereby

moved to Step 3 and referred to arbitration for final and

binding resolution.”

The district court ruled that the Medical Center’s

December 2, 2011 email was “an unequivocal, express

rejection of the union’s request for arbitration” under Exber,

994 F.2d at 676, starting the six-month statutory period. We

recognize that the Union initially sought to bypass Steps 1

and 2 of the grievance process by requesting on October 24,

2011 that the Medical Center move the matter directly to Step

3 arbitration. After that point, however, the parties engaged

in Step 1 and Step 2 of the grievance process, as noted above. 

We construe this record in favor of the Union, as we must on

summary judgment, and conclude the Union made its Step 3

request for arbitration in its January 17, 2012 letter.

Because the Union did not request arbitration until

January 17, 2012, the Medical Center’s December 2, 2011

email could not have been an express rejection of the Union’s

Step 3 request for arbitration. The Medical Center responded

to the Union’s request in a June 22, 2012 letter, stating it

“will not arbitrate this matter.” Thus, contrary to the district

court’s ruling, the June 22, 2012 letter was the Medical

Center’s unequivocal, express rejection of the Union’s Step

3 request for arbitration. As a result, the statute of limitations

began to run that day, on June 22. Exber, 994 F.2d at 675-76. 

The Union filed its Petition in state court within six months

of June 22, 2012, so the district court erred in concluding the

Petition was untimely.

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 12 of 18
SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR. 13

Notably, the Medical Center delayed for five months in

responding to the Union’s letter demanding arbitration, from

January 17 to June 22, 2012. During that period the Union

awaited a response to its January 17 letter requesting

arbitration of its grievance regarding the retaliatory

elimination of four Stationary Engineer jobs and the creation

of a lower paid Boiler Attendant position. The contents of the

Medical Center’s eventual response letter hardlymerited such

a delay as the response letter merely reiterated, “The

Hospital’s position has not changed from what it

communicated to the Union on November 9, 2011.” Rather

than delaying five months, the Medical Center could have

responded promptly to the Union’s letter, likely eliminating

the need for litigation regarding the application of the Section

301 statute of limitations. See Great W., 781 F.2d at 766

(“[I]t is important that [arbitration] be promptly invoked and

promptly administered . . . [A]ll need to know where they

stand.”).

Reading the record in the light most favorable to the

Union as we must, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 776 F.2d at 815,

it is plausible that the Medical Center, forecasting a dispute

over the statute of limitations for this grievance, made a

conscious decision to wait six months from the December 15,

2011 email exchange with the Union before responding to the

Union’s January 17 letter. Under this theory, waiting until

June 22 to respond had the potential effect of rendering any

effort by the Union to compel arbitration time-barred.

When passed, Section 301 carried with it “a

congressional mandate to the federal courts to fashion a body

of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising

out of labor contracts.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,

471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985) (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 13 of 18
14 SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR.

Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957)). As the Supreme Court

remarked in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., a suit

“caused by an alleged breach of an employer’s obligation

embodied in a collective bargaining agreement . . . closely

resembles an action for breach of contract cognizable at

common law.” 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.7 (1966).

As such, and since the statute of limitations poses no bar

to the Union’s claims, we consider whether the parties to a

collective bargaining agreement acted in accordance with the

principles of good faith performance required by the common

law of contracts. See Scribner v. Worldcom, Inc., 249 F.3d

902, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (remarking that Commentary on the

Second Restatement of Contracts “provide[s] that [g]ood faith

performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes

faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency

with the justified expectations of the other party. . . . [and]

that [s]ubterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good

faith in performance even though the actor believes his

conduct to be justified”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Good faith performance principles must apply here,

considering that Congress codified the duty of employers to

act in “good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other

terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an

agreement, or any question arising thereunder” in the

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)

(emphasis added). Indeed, our court established the sixmonth statute of limitations for Section 301 in part by looking

to the duties and procedures of the NLRA. See Great W.,

781 F.2d at 768–69.

We consider the “federal policies at stake and the

practicalities of litigation” in deciding this matter. Id. at 768

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 14 of 18
SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR. 15

(quoting DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,

171–72 (1983)). As Justice Goldberg reminded us, “[I]n this

Court’s fashioning of a federal law of collective bargaining,

it is of the utmost importance that the law reflect the realities

of industrial life and the nature of the collective bargaining

process.” Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 358 (1964)

(Goldberg, J., concurring in the result).

At summary judgment, the Medical Center’s five-month

delay in responding to the Union’s January 17, 2012 letter

must be considered a violation of good faith. The Medical

Center’s five-month delay was a period of time nearly equal

to the entire six-month statute of limitations, a period

designed “to accommodate a balance of interests” in labor

disputes, not simply as an artificial clock for an employer to

run out while stonewalling a union’s attempt to follow a

grievance procedure. Great W., 781 F.2d at 769 (quoting

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169).

In Great Western the Ninth Circuit also noted that “it is

important that [arbitration] be promptly invoked and

promptly administered—important to the named parties and

especially important to the aggrieved employee union

member, and to those in management who have had direct

relationships with the grievant. They all need to know where

they stand.” Id. at 766. Our court observed, “A long period

of controversy and conflict can be a serious burden, both for

the grievant and for the management, and can poison the

relationship between the contracting parties that the contract

was designed to establish and preserve.” Id.

In this case, the Union invoked arbitration within the

timeline of the Agreement and faithfully followed the

grievance procedure. It was the delay of more than five

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 15 of 18
16 SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR.

months by the Medical Center, a length of time nearly as long

as the statute of limitations itself, that resulted in a

contentious dispute over summary judgment. Rather than

making a good faith attempt to address the merits of the

dispute, the Medical Center “poison[ed] the relationship

between the contracting parties.” Id.

In deciding this matter we are required to read the record

“in [the] light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Int’l

Ass’n of Machinists, 776 F.2d at 815. We are mindful that

Article 40.2 of the Agreement states that “[a]ll grievances

must be presented at the proper steps.”6

We hold that it is a breach of the duty of good faith

performance under Section 301 for an employer to fail to

respond within a reasonable time to a union’s communication

which seeks to abide by a grievance process set forth in a

collective bargaining agreement. Only an “unequivocal,

express rejection of the union’s request for arbitration” will

start the six-month limitations period under Section 301. 

There is no such thing as constructive notice of an employer’s

refusal to arbitrate; if an employer offers varying responses

to a request to arbitrate, its responses do not constitute an

unequivocal, express rejection. Exber, 994 F.2d at 676. It

was not reasonable for the Medical Center to wait in silence

for more than five months following the Union’s letter

6

Indeed, failing to follow the steps of the Agreement’s grievance

procedure can result in the dismissal of a union’s petition to compel

arbitration. See, e.g., Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers of

Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 501 F.2d 258, 262–63

(9th Cir. 1974) (affirming the dismissal of a petition to compel arbitration

because, “[a]s a general rule, employees must attempt to exhaust the

grievance and arbitration procedures established by the bargaining

agreement before seeking judicial enforcement of their rights”).

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 16 of 18
SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR. 17

demanding arbitration, and then claim in litigation that the

Union missed the statute of limitations. See Appendix A.

We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also

vacate the award of costs for reconsideration in light of our

reversal of summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

54(d)(1).

REVERSED and REMANDED in part; and

VACATED in part.

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 17 of 18
(293 of 425)

18 SEIU V. LOS ROBLES REG’L MED. CTR.

APPENDIX A

 Case: 13-55672, 12/03/2015, ID: 9777982, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 18 of 18