Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-18-02781/USCOURTS-ca3-18-02781-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wayne A. Fahie
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 18-2781

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

v.

WAYNE A. FAHIE,

Appellant

______________

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT 

OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

(D.C. Criminal No. 3-17-cr-00037-002)

District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

May 18, 2020

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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PHIPPS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: May 28, 2020)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.

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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Appellant Wayne A. Fahie’s counsel (“Counsel”) moves for permission to 

withdraw from representing Fahie on appeal, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967). Counsel asserts that Fahie’s appeal raises no nonfrivolous issues. Fahie pled 

guilty to two counts in a criminal information in the District Court for the Virgin Islands: 

one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846, and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, pursuant to 21 

U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Fahie was sentenced to sixty months’ imprisonment, a $200 special 

assessment, 400 hours of community service, and a four-year term of supervised release. 

He filed a timely appeal. For the reasons addressed below, we will grant Counsel’s 

motion and affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The charges stemmed from Fahie’s involvement in a drug smuggling scheme with 

Roy E. Hodge, III, his co-defendant. On July 30, 2017, United States Customs and 

Border Protection agents observed Hodge and Fahie, a Cape Air employee, repeatedly 

entering and exiting a men’s bathroom at the airport in St. Thomas. Becoming 

suspicious, the agents detained and questioned Hodge. Upon confronting him, he shared 

his cell phone with the agents. A search of the cell phone revealed a series of text 

messages between Hodge and Fahie, while a search of Hodge’s suitcase revealed four 

brick-shaped objects that tested positive for cocaine. 

Following the discovery of cocaine in Hodge’s suitcase, the agents took Fahie into 

custody. A K-9 narcotics dog alerted to the presence of narcotics on Fahie’s person. The 

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agents inspected Fahie’s passport and cell phone to confirm his contact with Hodge. 

After the agents confirmed that Fahie was in contact with Hodge, both men were arrested 

and charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute four kilograms or more of 

cocaine and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine. 

On February 1, 2018, Fahie entered a straight plea1in the District Court for the 

Virgin Islands to the conspiracy and possession counts. At the change of plea hearing, 

Fahie admitted to the factual predicates for the crime. The District Court accepted 

Fahie’s guilty plea. 

On July 11, 2018, Fahie received a sentence of sixty months’ imprisonment (the 

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment), followed by a four-year term of supervised 

release. The District Court determined that the safety valve provision found in in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(f) was unavailable to Fahie. The District Court also imposed 400 hours of 

community service and a $200 special assessment on Fahie. 

On August 9, 2018, Fahie filed a timely notice of appeal. On July 29, 2019, 

Counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to the standards set forth in Anders v. California. 

Fahie has not filed a brief. 

II. JURISDICTION

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

1 A straight plea is a plea entered without the benefit of a plea agreement.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate counsel must “support his client’s appeal to the best of his ability.” 

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. However, if an attorney representing an indigent criminal 

defendant finds that an appeal would be wholly frivolous, Anders delineates the process 

in which an attorney may request to withdraw from continued representation. Id.

Pursuant to Anders, counsel requesting to withdraw must satisfactorily show the court 

that they have “scoured the record [for] appealable issues” and “explain why the issues 

are frivolous.” United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000). The court 

then engages in a two-part inquiry: “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled [Third 

Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2’s] requirements;

[2]

and (2) whether an independent 

review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 

296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). If an appeal is judged to be wholly frivolous, 

this Court must “grant trial counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without 

appointing new counsel.” Id. (quoting 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a)). On the other hand, “[i]f 

the panel finds arguable merit to the appeal, or that the Anders brief is inadequate to 

assist the court in its review, it will appoint substitute counsel, order supplemental 

briefing and restore the case to the calendar.” L.A.R.109.2(a).

2 Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) provides in relevant part that: 

“[w]here, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that the appeal 

presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a motion to withdraw and 

supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), which must be 

served upon the appellant and the United States[.]”

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IV. ANALYSIS

We are satisfied that the brief submitted by Counsel contains a “conscientious 

examination of the record” for issues of arguable merit and Counsel has therefore

fulfilled the requirements set forth in Anders. As we have previously stated, “[i]t is well 

established that a criminal defendant’s unconditional, knowing and voluntary plea of 

guilty waives all non-jurisdictional issues.” Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162, 165 (3d 

Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Here, the District Court clearly had jurisdiction pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. No appealable issue exists with respect to jurisdiction. 

As Counsel noted, there is also no appealable issue as to the validity of the plea. 

Based on the record before us, we are satisfied that the district court complied with the 

constitutional requirements and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. A criminal 

defendant’s guilty plea is considered valid if entered into “knowing[ly], voluntar[ily], and 

intelligent[ly].” United States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 236, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation 

omitted). To ensure the validity of a plea, the district “court must address the defendant 

personally in open court.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The district court must inform and 

ensure the defendant understands his rights, the nature of the charges, and the direct 

implications of entering a plea. United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202-03 (3d 

Cir. 2006) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)). 

To challenge the validity of his guilty plea, Fahie has the burden of showing that 

the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and the constitutional 

requirements enumerated in Boykin have not been satisfied. Counsel found no basis to 

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support an argument that Fahie’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent. Our 

review of the plea hearing transcript reveals that the District Court followed all of the 

requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. At the change of plea hearing, 

Fahie informed the District Court that he had enough time to discuss with his counsel the 

charges against him, the potential maximum and minimum penalties, the applicable 

Sentencing Guidelines, and the consequences of entering a straight plea to the Second 

Amended Information. Fahie stated he was satisfied with the representation of his 

counsel. He indicated he understood his constitutional rights, which he waived. He also 

stated he was entering the plea voluntarily and that he had not been coerced or threatened 

to do so. Further, Fahie admitted to the factual basis for the plea. We therefore agree 

with Counsel’s conclusion that the record shows that Fahie’s plea was knowingly and 

voluntarily made.

With respect to sentencing, a reviewing court must determine whether the sentence 

was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 

558, 566-67 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). We review both procedural and substantive 

reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 

207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). Since the sentence imposed by the district court was both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable, such review is not a basis for appeal.

An appellate court first reviews a district court’s sentence for “no significant 

procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50-51 (2007); see also United 

States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). When imposing a sentence, a district 

court must correctly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, entertain any variances or 

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departures, and consider all the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. 

Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2008).

In this case, the District Court correctly calculated the Guidelines range. Fahie’s 

base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 was 28. The offense level was adjusted 

to 25, based on a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a 

sentencing range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. Fahie faced a mandatory minimum 

term of imprisonment of sixty months, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).

However, if Fahie satisfied the criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), commonly 

referred to as the safety valve provision, the mandatory minimum sentence would not 

apply. The record shows that the District Court determined that the mitigating effect of 

the safety valve provision was inapplicable to Fahie. Fahie entered a straight plea and 

provided no assistance to the government. At the sentencing hearing, Fahie’s counsel 

agreed that the safety valve provision was inapplicable to Fahie. No variances were 

sought, no departure motions were made, and the District Court considered each of the 

§ 3553(a) factors. Since the District Court followed the three-step procedure, no 

procedural error existed. 

If a sentence is found to be procedurally reasonable, a court will next look to its 

substance. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. A sentence will be deemed substantively reasonable 

“unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on [the 

defendant] for the reasons the district court provided.” Id. at 568. Here, after going 

through the correct procedural steps, the District Court imposed a sixty-month term of 

imprisonment, the lowest sentence possible due to the mandatory minimum. Viewing the 

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record as a whole, we find the sentence substantively reasonable. Since the sentence was 

both procedurally and substantively reasonable, any challenge to it would be meritless. 

V. CONCLUSION

After reviewing the record, we agree with Counsel that that there are no 

nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we will grant Counsel’s motion to withdraw 

and affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction. Pursuant to 3d Cir. L.A.R. 

109.2(b), Counsel is also relieved of the obligation to file a petition of certiorari in the 

Supreme Court of the United States.

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