Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01514/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01514-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy A. Berryhill
Defendant
Rosali Denise Bryant
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSALI DENISE BRYANT,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL,

1

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-01514-DMR 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPLICATION FOR AWARD OF 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES PURSUANT TO 

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

Re: Dkt. No. 26

Plaintiff Rosali Bryant moves the court pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act 

(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, for an award of attorneys’ fees after securing a remand to the Social 

Security Administration (“SSA”) on September 3, 2019. See Bryant v. Berryhill, No. 18-01514-

DMR, 2019 WL 4168911 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019). Andrew Saul, the Commissioner of Social 

Security, opposes the motion. For the reasons given below, the court grants Bryant’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bryant applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits on July 31, 2014. The 

SSA denied her application on October 9, 2014 and again on reconsideration on March 2, 2015. 

She then appealed to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who found Bryant not disabled on 

March 6, 2017. The Appeals Council denied Bryant’s request for review on February 23, 2018. 

She then filed this action, seeking judicial review on numerous grounds.

After review of both parties’ motions for summary judgment and the administrative record, 

the court granted Bryant’s motion in part on September 3, 2019 and remanded the case to the SSA 

for further proceedings. Bryant, 2019 WL 4168911, at *14. In its order, the court found that the 

ALJ had erred in rejecting the lay witness testimony of Jeannie Smith and Sean Nunez of Napa 

1 Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for his predecessor, Nancy A. 

Berryhill, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

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Valley Support Services and Bryant’s mother by failing to give germane reasons for disregarding 

their observations of Bryant, as required by law. Id. at *9-11. As to Smith and Nunez, the ALJ 

gave three reasons for giving them “little weight.” On review, the court concluded that two of the 

three reasons were “merely statements of the law” and by themselves did not amount to “germane 

reasons” to discount those witnesses’ observations of Bryant. Id. at *10. Regarding the third 

reason, the court found that it “ha[d] little basis in the record and is not germane to these 

witnesses.” Id.

The ALJ also gave “little weight” to Bryant’s mother’s statement, asserting that her 

observations “do not outweigh the accumulated medical evidence” regarding Bryant’s limitations 

and that her statement “lacks substantial support from objective findings in the record, which 

demonstrates good daily activities including the claimant’s ability to work and attend school.” Id. 

On review, the court concluded that these reasons did not satisfy the Ninth Circuit standard for 

giving “little weight” to Bryant’s observations. Id.

The court also considered Bryant’s arguments that the ALJ erred in assessing her 

credibility and determining that she does not meet or equal a mental impairment listing. As to 

credibility, the court concluded that “[c]ritical parts of these issues are tied to the ALJ’s evaluation 

of the lay witness statements, which provide further detail about how Bryant’s impairments impact 

her ability to work and the extent of her limitations, about which the court has already found 

error.” Id. at *12. Therefore, the court refrained from analyzing the ALJ’s credibility finding and 

held that “it makes sense on remand for the ALJ to reevaluate the credibility determination upon 

reevaluation of the lay witness statements.” Id. 

With respect to the mental impairment listings, the Commissioner conceded that the ALJ 

incorrectly applied an outdated version of the regulations but argued that any error was harmless. 

The court found that Bryant’s argument regarding the listings “relies heavily on the statements by 

lay witnesses Jeannie Smith and Sean Nunez.” Id. at *14. Given the ALJ’s error as to those 

statements, the court concluded that it “cannot determine whether the ALJ’s error in applying the 

incorrect version of the listings was harmless” and did not reach the merits of the argument, but 

held that “[o]n remand, the ALJ must reevaluate whether Bryant meets or equals Listings 12.04 

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and 12.06 using the applicable version of the regulations.” Id.

Bryant timely filed the pending application for attorneys’ fees. [Docket No. 26.] 

II. EAJA

The EAJA provides for an award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in cases seeking 

judicial review of federal agency action:

[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall 

award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other 

expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases 

sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency 

action, brought by or against the United States in any court having 

jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of 

the United States was substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). “Thus, eligibility for a fee award in any civil action requires: (1) that 

the claimant be a ‘prevailing party’; (2) that the Government’s position was not ‘substantially 

justified’; (3) [and] that no ‘special circumstances make an award unjust.’” Comm’r v. Jean, 496 

U.S. 154, 158 (1990).

A. Prevailing Party Status

To be deemed the prevailing party under the EAJA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) 

as a factual matter, the relief sought by the lawsuit was in fact obtained as a result of having 

brought the action, and (2) there was a legal basis for the plaintiffs’ claim.” Andrew v. Bowen, 837 

F.2d 875, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). There is no dispute that Bryant qualifies as a 

prevailing party because her suit secured a remand of the SSA’s final administrative decision. See

Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An applicant for disability benefits 

becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed 

and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded.”).

B. Substantial Justification

The government’s position is substantially justified if the government proves that it has a 

“reasonable basis in law and fact.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)); accord Yang v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 213, 

217 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). This analysis focuses on “the particular issue on which the 

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claimant earned remand” and not on whether the government’s ultimate determination was 

substantially justified. Hardisty, 592 F.3d at 1078 (citation omitted). “The ‘position of the United 

States’ includes both ‘the position taken by the United States in the civil action’ as well as the 

agency’s action or inaction ‘upon which the civil action is based.’” Gardner v. Berryhill, 856 F.3d 

652, 656 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D)); accord Andrew, 837 F.2d at 878 

(“[t]he term ‘position’ includes the underlying agency action and the legal position of the United 

States during litigation.” (citation omitted)). 

The Commissioner asserts that the government took a substantially justified position in its 

determination that Bryant should not receive disability benefits because the ALJ’s treatment of the 

lay witnesses’ statements had a reasonable basis in law and fact. The Commissioner addresses 

each of the reasons offered by the ALJ to discount the lay witnesses’ statements, arguing that 

“some evidence in the record” supports those reasons. The Commissioner also notes the existence 

of Ninth Circuit authority that purportedly supports the position that the ALJ gave germane 

reasons for rejecting Bryant’s mother’s testimony. Opp’n 4-5. Specifically, in giving Bryant’s 

mother’s statement “little weight,” the ALJ stated in part that her “observations . . . do not 

outweigh the accumulated medical evidence.” Bryant, 2019 WL at 4168911, at *10. The 

Commissioner cites Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005), in which the Ninth 

Circuit held that “[i]nconsistency with medical evidence” is a germane reason for discrediting the 

testimony of lay witnesses. According to the Commissioner, “[e]ven if inconsistency with 

medical evidence was not a sufficient reason in this case, controlling case law makes clear that it 

can be a proper basis, and therefore the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s mother’s statement had a 

reasonable basis in law.” Opp’n 4.

The court finds that the government’s position was not substantially justified. This action

was remanded to the SSA because the ALJ failed to satisfy well-established precedent that 

requires an ALJ to take into account “[l]ay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms or how an 

impairment affects the claimant’s ability to work.” That precedent also makes clear that to 

disregard such evidence, an ALJ “must give reasons that are germane to each witness.” See

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see Bryant, 2019 WL 

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4168911, at *10 (discussing then-applicable Social Security Ruling). While the Ninth Circuit held 

in Bayliss that “[i]nconsistency with medical evidence” is a germane reason to discount lay 

witness testimony, 427 F.3d at 1218, it is distinguishable from the present case. In Bayliss, the 

plaintiff argued that the ALJ “improperly rejected aspects of testimony provided by her friends 

and family members” because he “accepted the testimony . . . that was consistent with the record 

of [the plaintiff’s] activities and the objective evidence in the record” and “rejected portions of 

their testimony that did not meet this standard.” 427 F.3d at 1218. The court found that

“[i]nconsistency with the record” was a germane reason to reject certain testimony, because the 

ALJ’s “rejection of certain testimony was supported by substantial evidence.” Id. In contrast, the 

ALJ here did not explain or identify inconsistencies between Bryant’s mother’s statement and the 

medical evidence; instead, he concluded that “[o]verall, [Bryant’s mother’s] statement lacks 

substantial support from objective findings in the record, which demonstrates good daily activities 

including the claimant’s ability to work and attend school.” Bryant, 2019 WL 4168911, at *10. 

As discussed at length in the opinion, the ALJ’s statement about Bryant’s activities and 

functioning “ha[d] little basis in the record” and “minimize[d] the extent to which Bryant required 

accommodations to work and attend school.” See id. Therefore, contrary to the Commissioner’s 

argument, the ALJ’s treatment of Bryant’s mother’s statement did not have a “reasonable basis in 

law.” The ALJ’s failure to provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting the lay witnesses’ 

statements impacted this court’s ability to analyze Bryant’s credibility and listings arguments, thus 

necessitating further proceedings and delaying the determination of Bryant’s claim. The Ninth 

Circuit has stated that it “will be only a decidedly unusual case in which there is substantial 

justification under the EAJA even though the agency’s decision was reversed as lacking in 

substantial evidence in the record.” Decker v. Berryhill, 856 F.3d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(ellipses omitted) (quoting Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation 

omitted)). Under these circumstances, the court finds that the government’s position was not 

substantially justified and no special circumstances appear to make an award unjust. Therefore, 

Bryant is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under the EAJA.

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III. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

When awarding a party attorneys’ fees pursuant to the EAJA, the court must determine the 

reasonableness of the fees sought. Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). This 

inquiry generally entails determining “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 

(1983)). An award may be reduced if the movant provided inadequate documentation of the fees 

requested, the hours spent by counsel were unreasonable, or the movant achieved “limited 

success” in the litigation. Id. at 1146-47 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34, 436-37).

The Commissioner does not contest the statutorily mandated hourly rate adjusted for cost 

of living by which Bryant calculates her attorneys’ fees -- $201.60 per hour in 2018 and $204.25

per hour in 2019.

2

 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1148. Nor does the 

Commissioner dispute the reasonableness of the hours requested by co-counsel David J. Linden. 

However, the Commissioner asserts that counsel Ralph Wilborn failed to exercise proper billing 

judgment and seeks compensation for “unreasonably excessive hours to work on this routine 

Social Security disability case.” Opp’n 7. According to the Commissioner, Wilborn spent too 

much time reviewing the administrative record as well as the record in this case, researching the 

mental impairment listings, and drafting the reply brief. The Commissioner asserts that Wilborn 

has considerable experience handling Social Security disability cases in federal court and argues 

that “[f]or such an accomplished practitioner of Social Security disability law, this case was quite 

simple, and did not warrant 42.5 hours of work to write two briefs.” Id. The Commissioner cites 

a laundry list of cases in which other courts have reduced Wilborn’s fee requests and contends that 

the court should award Bryant no more than $7,309.59 in attorneys’ fees for both Linden and 

Wilborn. Id. at 7-8, 10 n.5.

“Social security cases are fact-intensive and require a careful application of the law to the 

testimony and documentary evidence, which must be reviewed and discussed in considerable 

2 Bryant contends that the statutory maximum hourly rate under the EAJA for work performed in 

2019 is $204.25, but the hourly rate for that time period is actually $205.25. See

https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last visited May 4, 2020). 

The court awards the hourly fee requested by Bryant.

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detail.” Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Notwithstanding the 

Commissioner’s argument that this case was “quite simple,” Bryant challenged the ALJ’s decision 

on numerous grounds and the court remanded the matter for further proceedings on three of those 

grounds.

Moreover, although “a district court will always retain substantial discretion in fixing the 

amount of an EAJA award,” Jean, 496 U.S. at 163, a reduction of fees greater than 10 percent 

requires “specific” and “persuasive” reasons from opposing counsel. Moreno v. City of 

Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (allowing a small reduction of no more than a 10 percent at the 

court’s discretion). The Commissioner’s request would result in a nearly 30 percent reduction in 

the amount of fees requested by Bryant’s counsel and appears to be based solely on defense 

counsel’s opinion about the amount of time that Wilborn should have spent on the case. 

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts should generally “defer to the winning 

lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Id. at 

1112. Having carefully reviewed the time entries, the court finds that the number of hours claimed 

are not excessive. [See Docket Nos. 27-1 (Linden Decl., Nov. 25, 2019); 27-2 (Wilborn Decl., 

Nov. 25, 2019).] Accordingly, it awards Bryant $10,040.19, representing $8,977.82 for 44.5 hours 

of work by Wilborn and $1,062.37 for 5.25 hours of work by Linden. The court also concludes 

that Bryant is entitled to fees incurred in preparing the reply brief for this motion. Jean, 496 U.S. 

at 161. Bryant’s request for $1,225.50 for six additional hours of work on this fees motion is 

reasonable. [See Docket No. 29-1 (Wilborn Decl., Dec. 17, 2019).] 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Bryant’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees is granted in the 

amount of $11,265.69.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2020

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

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