Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00314/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00314-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rudy Preston Maes
Petitioner
Arnold Schwarzenegger
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RUDY PRESTON MAES, ) 1:06-cv-00314-LJO-TAG HC

) 

Petitioner, ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE 

) PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

) 

v. ) ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE TO BE

) FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________) 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se on a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. sec. 2254.

The instant petition was filed on March 21, 2006. (Doc. 1). Petitioner alleges that he was

convicted in the Kern County Superior Court July 2, 1997 and, as part of a plea bargain, was

sentenced to a term of thirty-four years to life. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Petitioner does not allege that he ever

appealed his conviction or sentence. Petitioner now raises three claims: (1) the sentence was illegal

under state law because a prior “strike” conviction was not a “strikeable” offense; (2) the sentence

enhancement was illegal under current United States Supreme Court law; and (3) Petitioner’s

constitutional rights were violated under Miranda and because he was mentally incompetent at the

time of trial. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-6). 

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary review

of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears

from the face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules

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Governing § 2254 Cases; Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.1990). Otherwise, the Court

will order Respondent to respond to the petition. Rule 5 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. A

preliminary review of the Petition reveals that Petitioner may not have exhausted his state court

remedies and may also have filed his Petition beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations

period. Petitioner’s two claims do appear at this point to state cognizable constitutional claims.

I. Exhaustion.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.

1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state

remedies requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order

to give the State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners'

federal rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the

opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.

If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied

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him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not

only in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his

federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims

were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000).

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must

make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of

federal courts, even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882,

889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control

resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir.

1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that

the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal

standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

 It does not appear to the Court that Petitioner has presented any of his three claims in the

California Supreme Court. Although Petitioner attaches correspondence from the California

Supreme Court regarding his apparent attempt to file a habeas corpus petition in that court, the

correspondence from the Clerk of the Supreme Court clearly indicates that the Court did not file the

document, but rather, held it pending receipt of additional materials that it does not appear Petitioner

ever submitted. Moreover, Petitioner does not provide any documentation supporting a conclusion

that the California Supreme Court ever considered or issued a ruling on Petitioner’s submission. 

If Petitioner has not presented his claims for federal relief to the California Supreme Court,

the Court must dismiss the petition. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 107 F.3d 756, 760

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court

cannot consider a petition that is entirely unexhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 521-22; 

Calderon, 107 F.3d at 760. Accordingly, it appears to the Court that it must dismiss this petition as

being completely unexhausted. However, if Petitioner has information that shows that he has

exhausted any of the three claims in the instant petition, he should provide that information in his

response to this Order to Show Cause. If he has no such evidence, the Court will recommend that

the petition be dismissed for lack of exhaustion.

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II. Statute of Limitations.

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may raise the statute of limitations sua sponte

and dismiss the petition on those grounds. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-44 (9th Cir. 2001)

(indicating that once a petitioner is given adequate notice and opportunity to respond to allegations

that his petition is subject to dismissal pursuant to AEDPA's statute of limitations, petitioner has the

burden of providing an adequate response).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on March 21, 2006; thus, it is subject to the provisions of the

AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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Here, Petitioner asserts that he was convicted on July 2, 1997, and does not allege that he

ever filed a direct appeal. Therefore, the judgment became final for purposes of the AEDPA oneyear statute of limitations when the state deadline expired for filing his appeal. Kapral v. United

States, 166 F.3d 565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999)(if petitioner does not appeal a state court judgment, the

conviction becomes final on the date on which the time for filing such an appeal expired); see also 

Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp 1057, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2001). In California, a conviction becomes

final sixty days after the superior court proceedings have concluded. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 31(d);

Lewis, 173 F.Supp.2d at 1060. Thus, Petitioner’s conviction would have become final on August

31, 1997. Petitioner would then have one year from August 31, 1997, or until August 31, 1998, in

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. The instant case was filed on March 21,

2006, more than seven years after the statute of limitations would have expired. Thus, unless

entitled to applicable tolling, the petition is untimely.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (the Court held that a petitioner is normally entitled to one

“full round” of collateral review in state court without federal interference. While the “full round” is

properly in progress, the AEDPA’s one-year statute is tolled.). Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th

Cir. 2003) cert. denied by Welch v. Carey, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3930 (June 1, 2004). 

Petitioner apparently attempted to file a state habeas petition in the California Supreme

Court. However, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s letter to Petitioner, the state high court

received Petitioner’s documents on January 26, 2006. Petitioner does not indicate that he filed any

other state habeas petitions. Accordingly, even if the January 26, 2006 petition had been properly

filed under AEDPA, it would not have availed Petitioner since the statute of limitations would have

already run some seven years earlier. 

///

///

///

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 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Accordingly, Petitioner is HEREBY ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why the instant petition

for writ of habeas corpus should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies and as

untimely under the AEDPA. Petitioner is granted thirty (30) days in which to file a written response. 

If Petitioner fails to timely file a response to this Order to Show Cause, or if the response fails to

adequately address the issues set forth in this Order to Show Cause, Petitioner is advised that this

Court will issue Findings and Recommendations that the Petition be DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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