Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01651/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01651-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Appellant
Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC
Appellant
Summit 6, LLC
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SUMMIT 6, LLC,

Plaintiff-Cross Appellant

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, 

LLC,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2013-1648, -1651

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Texas in No. 11-CV-0367, Judge Reed 

O'Connor.

______________________ 

Decided: September 21, 2015

______________________ 

THEODORE STEVENSON, III, McKool Smith, P.C., Dallas, TX, argued for plaintiff-cross appellant. Also represented by DOUGLAS AARON CAWLEY, PHILLIP AURENTZ,

RICHARD ALAN KAMPRATH; JOEL LANCE THOLLANDER,

JOHN BRUCE CAMPBELL, GRETCHEN CURRAN, KATHY 

HSINJUNG LI, Austin, TX; BRADLEY WAYNE CALDWELL, 

Caldwell, Cassady & Curry, Dallas, TX.

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2 SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

CARTER GLASGOW PHILLIPS, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellants. Also represented by JOSEPH GUERRA, RACHEL HEATHER TOWNSEND. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, REYNA, and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges.

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a final judgment entered on a jury 

verdict in a patent case. The jury found the asserted 

claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,765,482 (“the ’482 patent”) not 

invalid and infringed. The jury awarded Appellee-Cross 

Appellant Summit 6, LLC (“Summit”) $15 million in 

damages. The parties raise various issues relating to the 

proper legal framework for evaluating reasonable royalty 

damages in the patent infringement context. Also before 

us are questions regarding claim construction, infringement, invalidity, and the admissibility of expert testimony. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The ’482 Patent

Summit is the owner by assignment of the ’482 patent, entitled “Web-based Media Submission Tool.” The 

’482 patent relates to the processing of digital content, 

such as digital photos. ’482 patent at col. 1 ll. 11-14. The 

invention “provides an improved web-based media submission tool” that includes “several unique and valuable 

functions.” Id. at col. 2 ll. 7-8. The embodiment described 

in the specification focuses on a tool used to submit photos 

to a website. Id. at col. 2 ll. 44-60, col. 3 ll. 55-64. This 

embodiment is described as software that allows a user to 

place the photo into a website form either by dragging and 

dropping the photo from the user’s computer or by using a 

mouse click within the website. Id. at col. 3 ll. 20-48. 

Among other things, the ’482 patent teaches a web-based 

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media submission tool with “a variable amount of intelligent pre-processing on media objects prior to upload.” Id.

at col. 2 ll. 16-17. 

The “intelligent preprocessing” taught by the ’482 patent includes the “ability to control the width and height 

of the media object identifier and the ability to preprocess 

the media objects in any number of ways prior to transporting to a second location.” Id. at col. 4 ll. 53-56. The 

patent describes this process in detail:

[T]he [invention] may resize the image, (i.e., increase or decrease its size as defined by either 

physical dimensions, pixel count, or kilobytes). 

Compression, for example, is a type of sizing. The 

[invention] may also change the image’s file format, . . . change the quality setting of the image, 

crop the image or change the aspect ratio, add text 

or annotations, encode or combine . . . the media 

object, or enhance the media object by changing 

image values, for example, relating to contrast or 

saturation.

Id. at col. 4 ll. 57-67. 

Summit asserted independent claim 38 and dependent claims 40, 44-46, and 49 at trial. Claim 38 recites: 

38. A computer implemented method for preprocessing digital content in a client device for 

subsequent electronic distribution, comprising:

a. initiating, by said client device, a transfer of 

digital content from said client device to a server 

device, said digital content including one or more 

of image content, video content, and audio content;

b. pre-processing said digital content at said client 

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processing parameters being provided to said client device from a device separate from said client 

device, said one or more pre-processing parameters controlling said client device in a placement 

of said digital content into a specified form in 

preparation for publication to one or more devices 

that are remote from a server device and said client device; and

c. transmitting a message from said client device 

to said server device for subsequent distribution 

to said one or more devices that are remote from 

said server device and said client device, said 

transmitted message including said pre-processed 

digital content.

Id. at col. 13 l. 56-col. 14 l. 14 (emphases added to relevant terms). 

B. Procedural History

On February 23, 2011, Summit sued Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Telecommunications America 

LLC (collectively, “Samsung”), Research in Motion Limited, Research in Motion Corp. (collectively, “RIM”), 

Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”), and other defendants asserting infringement of the ’482 patent. Summit asserted 

that the process of sending photographs via the multimedia messaging service (“MMS”) as used by smartphones 

and tablets designed, manufactured, and sold by Samsung 

infringes the ’482 patent. 

In the district court, the parties disputed the proper 

meaning of fourteen claim terms. As relevant to this 

appeal, the parties disputed the proper meaning of “publiCase: 13-1651 Document: 3-2 Page: 4 Filed: 09/21/2015
SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 5

cation/publishing” and “receiving”/“provided to.”1 Samsung contended that “publication” should be construed to 

mean “making the digital content publicly available (e.g. 

posting the digital content on a web page)” in order to 

differentiate the term from “transmitting” and “distribution.” Summit argued that publication requires no construction and, if it does, it should be “sharing.” Regarding 

the “receiving”/“provided to” terms, Samsung argued that 

claim 38 required the active receipt of the pre-processing

parameters during the operation of the claimed method. 

Samsung contended that the receipt of the pre-processing

parameters must occur during the operation of the method. Summit argued that the receipt of pre-processing

parameters required ongoing activity, but could also 

encompass the receipt of the pre-processing parameters 

prior to the commencement of the claimed method.

On May 21, 2012, the district court issued an order 

construing the disputed claim terms. Regarding “publication,” the district court agreed with Samsung and construed the term to mean “making publicly available.” The 

district court declined to construe the “receiving”/“provided to” terms, finding that the terms required 

no construction. RIM settled thereafter. 

On October 22, 2012, Samsung filed a motion for 

summary judgment of non-infringement. The district 

court denied Samsung’s motion as to literal infringement, 

finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 

whether Samsung’s products perform the recited preprocessing step. The court granted other aspects of Samsung’s motion, finding that prosecution history estoppel 

1 The “receiving”/“provided to” terms include “receiving . . . from a remote device,” “received from a device 

separate from a client device,” and “provided to said client 

device by a device separate from said client device.”

 

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bars application of the doctrine of equivalents to the preprocessing step. Soon thereafter, Facebook settled.2 

Samsung was then the only remaining defendant.

Beginning on March 29, 2013, the district court held a 

six-day jury trial. During trial the parties presented 

competing evidence regarding the provision of preprocessing parameters to the client device. Summit 

contended that receipt of the pre-processing parameters 

during the operation of the method was not required. 

Summit’s expert, Dr. Mark Jones, testified that even if 

active receipt during the operation of the method is required, Samsung phones receive parameters when phones 

are reflashed or when software updates are provided. 

Samsung’s expert, Dr. Earl Sacerdoti, explained that 

active receipt of the parameters is required and the preprocessing parameters are not provided to any accused 

Samsung device during any pre-processing operations. 

On the “publication” limitation, Summit contended 

that Samsung’s accused devices prepare the images for 

“publication.” Summit’s expert, Dr. Jones, explained that 

when an image is resized in Samsung phones, the digital 

content is placed in a form in preparation for both transmission and publication. Samsung’s expert, 

Dr. Sacerdoti, explained that any alterations to the image 

during the MMS process are done to meet carrier transmission requirements for message size limits, not to 

prepare the message for publication.

Summit then presented evidence of damages through 

its expert Mr. Paul Benoit. Mr. Benoit explained that 

Samsung would have agreed in a hypothetical negotiation 

2 Facebook was also accused of infringing U.S. Patent No. 6,895,557 (“the ’557 patent”). The ’482 patent is 

a continuation of the ’557 patent.

 

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to pay Summit $0.28 per phone to provide the infringing 

features on their phones over the life of the patent. 

Mr. Benoit acknowledged that he relied on a methodology 

not previously used or published in peer-reviewed journals. Samsung’s expert, Mr. Christopher Martinez, 

testified that because infringement takes place at the 

software level, no company would agree to pay a running 

royalty on a phone. He testified that a proper royalty 

would be a $1.5 million lump sum. He based this conclusion on two license agreements. 

After the close of Summit’s case-in-chief, Samsung 

presented evidence that it asserted showed that the ’482 

patent is invalid over U.S. Patent No. 6,038,295 

(“Mattes”). At trial, the parties agreed that the basic 

operation of the system disclosed in Mattes included 

taking a picture, pre-processing the picture, and transmitting the picture to a server over a wireless network. 

Summit’s expert, Dr. Jones, testified that Mattes fails to 

disclose the pre-processing step of claim 38 because the 

imaging device does not “know” that a photo has met the 

server’s specification when the photo is transmitted. 

Dr. Jones further testified that the limitations of claims 

40 and 46 were similarly not disclosed by Mattes. 

The jury returned a verdict on April 5, 2013, finding 

the five asserted claims of the ’482 patent not invalid and 

infringed. The jury awarded Summit $15 million in 

damages. The jury indicated on the verdict form that this 

was a lump sum award. 

The parties filed post-trial motions. The district court 

granted Samsung’s pre-verdict motion for judgment as a

matter of law (“JMOL”) of no direct infringement and 

denied all other pre-verdict motions. The district court 

denied all of Samsung’s post-verdict motions except its 

motion to reduce prejudgment interest. 

The parties timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Claim Construction

On appeal, the parties dispute whether the asserted 

claims of the ’482 patent require that pre-processing

parameters be provided to the client device during the 

computer-implemented method for pre-processing digital 

content or whether it can occur prior to operation of the 

method. Samsung argues that the district court erred in 

declining to construe the term “being provided to” as used 

in claim 38 because this term requires the provision of the 

pre-processing parameters during the operation of the 

method. Samsung contends that this ongoing activity is 

compelled not only by the language of the claim, but also 

by the language of other claims and the prosecution 

history. 

Summit asks that we conclude Samsung waived the

argument that “being provided to” requires that the preprocessing parameters be provided to the device during 

the operation of the method. In the alternative, Summit 

argues that there is no evidence to support Samsung’s 

proposed limitation on the claim language. Summit 

contends that “being provided to” is not a verb requiring 

ongoing activity, but instead a phrase functioning as an 

adjective that describes a characteristic of “said . . . parameters.” 

We first address the issue of waiver. To avoid waiver, 

a party’s argument at trial and the appellate level should 

be consistent. Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 

F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We find that Samsung 

has argued throughout this action that the claimed provision of pre-processing parameters must be performed as 

an active step of the claimed method. Samsung’s argument on this issue has been sufficiently consistent to 

negate a finding of waiver. For these reasons, we conclude that Samsung has not waived its argument. We 

now turn to the merits of the claim construction dispute. 

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Claim construction is generally a matter of law that 

we review de novo, but it may have underlying factual 

determinations that are reviewed for clear error. Teva 

Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837 

(2015). The process of construing a claim term begins 

with the words of the claims. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 

F.3d 1303, 1312-14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Vitronics

Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.

1996). However, the claims “must be read in view of the 

specification, of which they are a part.” Phillips, 415 F.3d 

at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 

52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 

370 (1996)). Additionally, the doctrine of claim differentiation disfavors reading a limitation from a dependent

claim into an independent claim. See InterDigital 

Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 690 F.3d 1318,

1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Although courts are permitted to 

consider extrinsic evidence, like expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises, such evidence is generally of less 

significance than the intrinsic record. Phillips, 415 F.3d 

at 1317 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 

F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Extrinsic evidence may 

not be used “to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1324.

While the parties focus on the words “being provided 

to,” the surrounding language of the claim is instructive. 

The relevant limitation of claim 38 requires:

b. pre-processing said digital content at said client 

device in accordance with one or more preprocessing parameters, said one or more preprocessing parameters being provided to said client device from a device separate from said client 

device, . . . ; 

’482 patent at col. 14 ll. 1-5 (emphasis added). We find 

that “being provided to” is not used as a verb in claim 38, 

but instead is a part of a phrase that conveys information 

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about the “pre-processing parameters.” In this claim, the 

pre-processing parameters are “being provided to” the 

client device from a second device. Id. This is not a step 

in the claimed method. It is, instead, a phrase that 

characterizes the claimed pre-processing parameters. The 

use of the term “said” indicates that this portion of the 

claim limitation is a reference back to the previously 

claimed “pre-processing parameters.” See Baldwin 

Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1343 

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that claims using the term “said” 

are “anaphoric phrases, referring to the initial antecedent 

phrase”). That the pre-processing parameters come from 

a second device is merely a characteristic of the parameters. It is not a step of the method, nor does it require 

current or ongoing activity.

Further, the district court did not err in declining to 

construe the term. While the court must resolve actual 

disputes regarding the proper scope of a claim term, O2 

Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 

1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008), restating a settled argument 

does not create an actual dispute within the meaning of 

O2 Micro, Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 

626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010). At the claim construction stage, the district court rejected Samsung’s 

argument that ongoing activity is required—the heart of 

the parties’ disagreement—and declined to further construe the term because it was a “straightforward term” 

that required no construction. J.A. 45. “Being provided 

to” is comprised of commonly used terms; each is used in 

common parlance and has no special meaning in the art. 

Because the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed 

claim language is clear, the district court did not err by 

declining to construe the claim term. 

Samsung contends that the district court read a limitation out of claim 38 by refusing to construe this term. 

Samsung argues that by failing to limit the claim to active 

receipt of the pre-processing parameters, the district court 

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effectively read the “being provided to” language out of 

the claim. We disagree. That the pre-processing parameters are on the client device and that they have come from 

a second device must be proved, just like any other limitation. The claim term “being provided to,” however, does 

not limit the claim to the provision of pre-processing 

parameters only during the operation of the method. 

Samsung argues that other claims use language that 

clearly indicates temporal activity and concludes that the 

“being provided to” term must indicate present and ongoing activity. Samsung suggests that claims 36, 37, and 

51, use language that indicates a past activity. ’482 

patent at col. 13 ll. 21-22 (“pre-processing parameters that 

were provided to said client device . . .”), col. 13 ll. 45-46 

(“pre-processing parameters that were provided to said 

client device . . . ”), col. 14 ll. 49-50 (“pre-processing parameters that have been provided to . . .”). Yet, other 

claims use language indicating that the provision must 

occur during the operation of the claimed method. Id. at 

claim 26, col. 9 ll. 23-24 (“receiving pre-processing parameters from a remote device . . . ”), claim 12, col. 10 ll. 43-44 

(“receiving pre-processing parameters from a remote 

device . . . . ”). Neither of these sets of claims, however,

provides an indication of what the applicants intended 

when they chose the phrase “being provided to,” and the 

plain meaning of this term does not clearly delineate the 

temporal limitation Samsung suggests. 

Samsung points to the prosecution history to support 

its position, arguing that amendments to other claims 

show that claim 38 requires ongoing activity during 

operation of the method. This argument misinterprets 

the prosecution history. During prosecution, the applicant presented claims reciting “previously received preprocessing parameters” in the third limitation of each 

claim. J.A. 25153-56 (claims 16, 23, and 26). The examiner rejected these claims as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112 para. 2. The examiner stated:

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The step of “pre-processing” in claims 16, 23, and 

26 recite “previously received pre-processing parameter.” [sic] Since the claims are not shown 

[sic] any previously received parameter prior to 

the “pre-processing” step, such language is indefinite.

J.A. 25179. In response, the applicant amended the first 

limitation of these claims to recite “receiving preprocessing parameters . . . ,” thus showing the receipt of 

the parameters referenced in the third limitation and 

creating the proper basis for receipt of the “previously 

received parameters.” This does not preclude prior receipt as to either these claims, or to claim 38, which was 

subsequently added. 

Finally, Samsung argues that the preamble is limiting 

because it “provides context essential to understanding 

the corresponding steps in the body of the claim” because 

it is the only part of the claim that refers to the advance 

over the prior art. Appellants’ Opening Br. at 41. Samsung concludes that because the preamble is limiting, 

provision of the parameters must happen during the preprocessing step. We disagree that the preamble here is 

limiting. Generally, a preamble is not limiting. Symantec 

Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1288 

(Fed. Cir. 2008). For example, “[p]reamble language that 

merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention 

is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.” 

Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021, 

1023-24 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Samsung 

does not contend that the preamble to claim 38 is necessary to provide antecedent basis or that the applicant 

placed clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution. 

See Pacing, 778 F.3d at 1024 (“Because the preamble 

terms . . . provide antecedent basis for and are necessary 

to understand positive limitations in the body of claims 

. . . , we hold that the preamble to claim 25 is limiting.”). 

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Moreover, the preamble to claim 38 is duplicative of the 

limitations in the body of the claim and merely provides 

context for the limitations. See Symantec, 522 F.3d at 

1288-89.

In sum, the district court properly rejected Samsung’s 

argument that the “being provided to” language of claim 

38 requires that the pre-processing parameters are provided to the client device during operation of the claimed 

method. We affirm the district court’s denial of the motion for new trial based on claim construction.

B. Infringement

After the jury returned its verdict finding the five asserted claims of the ’482 patent not invalid and infringed, 

the district court denied Samsung’s pre-verdict JMOL of 

no indirect infringement. 

Samsung argues that the jury’s verdict on indirect infringement is not supported by substantial evidence 

because Samsung’s accused phones do not pre-process “in 

preparation for publication.” Samsung argues that under 

the district court’s constructions, Summit was required to 

show that Samsung’s accused phones modify a digital 

image in preparation for making the image publicly 

available. Samsung argues that Summit failed to make 

such a showing. We disagree. 

A denial of a motion for JMOL is not unique to patent 

law, and thus, we apply the law of the regional circuit, 

here the Fifth Circuit. Transocean Offshore Deepwater 

Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 

1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Under Fifth Circuit law, a 

district court’s decision on a motion for JMOL is reviewed 

de novo, reapplying the JMOL standard. Ford v. Cimarron Ins. Co., Inc., 230 F.3d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Omnitech Int’l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1322-23 

(5th Cir. 1994)). JMOL is appropriate when a party has 

been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally suffiCase: 13-1651 Document: 3-2 Page: 13 Filed: 09/21/2015
14 SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

cient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for 

that party on that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). 

The jury heard evidence from Summit’s expert, 

Dr. Jones, that Samsung’s accused devices perform the 

methods of the asserted claims. Dr. Jones explained that 

the carriers dictate image height and width resolution 

parameters to maintain image quality in preparation for 

publication. J.A. 6128-29, 7282-83. Dr. Jones also explained that the pre-processing performed by Samsung’s 

phones is in preparation for publication. J.A. 7283. 

Dr. Jones outlined the difference between preparing for 

transmission and preparing for publication. J.A. 6149-50. 

Dr. Jones noted that if the pre-processing were only for 

transmission, Samsung could use an “extremely low 

JPEG quality parameter” that “would likely look terrible 

at the end but it would be quite small.’’ J.A. 7283. 

Samsung’s expert, Dr. Sacerdoti, admitted that the 

source code contained in each of the phones has a configurable maximum file size as dictated by the carriers. 

J.A. 7001. Dr. Sacerdoti agreed with Dr. Jones that the 

carrier requirements for image resolution were related to 

how an image is viewed on the screen. J.A. 7000. He also 

agreed that the carrier requirements for image resolution 

were not transmission requirements. Id. 

Both parties were fully heard on this issue, and there 

exists legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable 

jury to find for Summit on this issue. This evidence 

supports the jury’s verdict finding that Samsung’s accused devices perform the methods of the asserted claims. 

Thus, the district court did not err in denying Samsung’s JMOL with respect to infringement. 

C. Invalidity

At trial, Samsung argued that the ’482 patent was invalid as anticipated by the prior art reference Mattes. 

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ed claims of the ’482 patent not invalid and infringed, the 

district court denied Samsung’s pre-verdict JMOL of 

invalidity. 

Samsung argues that the evidence does not support 

the jury’s verdict that the ’482 patent is not invalid. 

Samsung argues that it presented clear and convincing 

evidence of invalidity. We disagree.

A party challenging the validity of a patent must establish invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. See 

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 

2242 (2011). Anticipation is a factual question that we 

review for substantial evidence when appealed from a 

jury verdict. SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 

1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013). A claim is anticipated only if 

each and every element is found within a single prior art 

reference, arranged as claimed. See NetMoneyIN, Inc. v. 

VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

The jury heard evidence from Summit’s expert, 

Dr. Jones, that at least one element of each asserted claim 

was missing from that reference. At trial, Dr. Jones 

focused his testimony regarding the prior art Mattes 

patent on the pre-processing requirements of the ’482 

patent. Specifically, Dr. Jones testified that Mattes fails 

to disclose limitation (b) of claim 38: “one or more preprocessing parameters controlling said client device in a 

placement of said digital content into a specified form.” 

Dr. Jones testified that in Mattes it is the server—not the 

client device—that contains the software for preprocessing the image and that Mattes does not disclose 

performing the image analysis on the client device. 

J.A. 7271, 7273. 

The jury heard expert testimony from both sides. The 

jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence, and we 

have no cause to disturb it. Thus, the district court did 

not err in denying Samsung’s JMOL with respect to 

invalidity. 

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D. Expert Testimony

Samsung appeals the district court’s denial of Samsung’s JMOL motion to exclude Mr. Benoit’s testimony. 

Samsung contends that Mr. Benoit’s analysis fails the 

standards set forth by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). First, Samsung 

argues that Mr. Benoit’s methodology was unpublished, 

created specifically for this litigation, and never before 

employed by Mr. Benoit or by another expert. Second, 

Samsung argues that Mr. Benoit’s “premise . . . that a 

feature’s use is proportional to its value” was incorrect 

and contradicted by other expert testimony. DefendantAppellant’s Opening Br. at 6. Third, Samsung questions 

the reliability of Mr. Benoit’s use of surveys because 

Mr. Benoit is not a survey expert and failed to take the 

basic steps required of a secondary expert who purports to 

give an opinion based on a third party’s survey. 

Summit responds that Mr. Benoit’s analysis was not 

“novel and untested” because it was within the framework 

of Georgia–Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.

Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Summit contends that 

Mr. Benoit was not a secondary expert, but a primary 

expert, because he “simply used Samsung’s surveys in his 

Georgia-Pacific analysis.” Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant’s Br. 

at 51. 

Whether proffered evidence is admissible at trial is a 

procedural issue not unique to patent law, and we therefore review the district court’s decision to admit expert 

testimony under the law of the regional circuit, here the 

Fifth Circuit. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 

1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Bose Corp. v. JBL, 

Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). The Fifth

Circuit reviews the admissibility of expert testimony for 

abuse of discretion. Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am.

Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 561 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Vogler v. 

Blackmore, 352 F.3d 150, 154 (5th Cir. 2003)). The quesCase: 13-1651 Document: 3-2 Page: 16 Filed: 09/21/2015
SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 17

tion here, therefore, is whether the district court abused 

its discretion in deciding that Summit’s expert testimony 

was admissible. We conclude that it did not. 

In Daubert, the Supreme Court set out the requirements for admissibility of expert testimony. 509 U.S. 579

(1993). The Supreme Court stated that the trial judge 

plays a “gatekeeping role,” id. at 597, which “entails a 

preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or 

methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 

valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology 

properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at 592–

93. The Court emphasized that the focus “must be solely 

on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions 

that they generate.” Id. at 595. This admissibility assessment, while a flexible one, may consider the following 

factors: (1) whether the methodology is scientific 

knowledge that will assist the trier of fact; (2) whether the 

methodology has been tested; (3) whether the methodology has been published in peer-reviewed journals; (4) 

whether there is a known, potential rate of error; and (5) 

whether the methodology is generally accepted. Id. at 

591-95. 

The admissibility of expert evidence is also governed 

by Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 

“Rule 702 was amended in response to Daubert and cases 

applying it, including Kumho Tire.” Micro Chem., 317 

F.3d at 1391 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 

U.S. 137, 150 (1999)). Rule 702 states: 

A witness who is qualified as an expert by 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 

issue;

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18 SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles 

and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 703 states:

An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in 

the case that the expert has been made aware of 

or personally observed. If experts in the particular 

field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts 

or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they 

need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be 

inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may 

disclose them to the jury only if their probative 

value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion 

substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 

Fed. R. Evid. 703. 

Under these rules, a district court may exclude evidence that is based upon unreliable principles or methods, 

legally insufficient facts and data, or where the reasoning 

or methodology is not sufficiently tied to the facts of the 

case. See, e.g., Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150 (the gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the particular facts of the 

case); i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 854 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010) (stating that “Daubert and Rule 702 are safeguards against unreliable or irrelevant opinions, not 

guarantees of correctness”). But the question of whether 

the expert is credible or the opinion is correct is generally 

a question for the fact finder, not the court. Apple Inc. v. 

Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2014), 

overruled en banc in part not relevant here, Williamson v. 

Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

Indeed, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of 

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SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 19

contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden 

of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 

attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 

U.S. at 596.

This court has recognized that estimating a reasonable royalty is not an exact science. The record may support a range of reasonable royalties, rather than a single 

value. Likewise, there may be more than one reliable 

method for estimating a reasonable royalty. Apple, 757 

F.3d at 1315. A party may use the royalty rate from 

sufficiently comparable licenses, value the infringed 

features based upon comparable features in the marketplace, or value the infringed features by comparing the 

accused product to non-infringing alternatives. Id. A 

party may also use what this court has referred to as “the 

analytical method,” focusing on the infringer’s projections 

of profit for the infringing product. Lucent Techs., 580 

F.3d at 1324. 

All approaches have certain strengths and weaknesses, and, depending upon the facts, one or all may produce 

admissible testimony in a particular case. Because each 

case presents unique circumstances and facts, it is common for parties to choose different, reliable approaches in 

a single case and, when they do, the relative strengths 

and weaknesses of each approach may be exposed at trial 

or attacked during cross-examination. That one approach 

may better account for one aspect of a royalty estimation 

does not make other approaches inadmissible.

In sum, while all approximations involve some degree 

of uncertainty, the admissibility inquiry centers on 

whether the methodology employed is reliable. Daubert, 

509 U.S. at 589-595. A distinct but integral part of that 

inquiry is whether the data utilized in the methodology is 

sufficiently tied to the facts of the case. Kumho Tire, 526 

U.S. at 150. Hence, a reasonable or scientifically valid 

methodology is nonetheless unreliable where the data 

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20 SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

used is not sufficiently tied to the facts of the case. See, 

e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 

F.3d 51, 78-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (granting a new trial 

because damages testimony relied upon licenses that were 

not comparable and therefore not relevant). Likewise, 

ideal input data cannot save a methodology that is 

plagued by logical deficiencies or is otherwise unreasonable. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 (the court must 

make “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning 

or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 

valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology 

properly can be applied to the facts in issue) (emphasis 

added). But where the methodology is reasonable and its 

data or evidence are sufficiently tied to the facts of the 

case, the gatekeeping role of the court is satisfied, and the 

inquiry on the correctness of the methodology and of the 

results produced thereunder belongs to the factfinder.

To estimate a reasonable royalty rate in this case, 

Mr. Benoit started by estimating that the carriers pay 

Samsung $14.15 to include a camera component in Samsung’s phones. J.A. 6372. To arrive at this estimate, 

Mr. Benoit used Samsung’s annual reports, internal cost 

and revenue spreadsheets, and interrogatory responses to 

determine that the camera component accounted for 6.2% 

of the phone’s overall production cost. J.A. 6374. Accordingly, he attributed 6.2% of Samsung’s revenue from 

selling each phone—i.e., $14.15—to the camera’s functionality. J.A. 6374.

To apportion the camera-related revenue further, 

Mr. Benoit estimated the percentage of camera users who 

used the camera to perform the infringing methods rather 

than for other purposes. To do this, he relied on surveys

commissioned by Samsung in the ordinary course of its 

business and on another survey he found on his own. J.A. 

6374-75. The surveys were conducted by J.D. Power and 

Associates, Pugh Research, Forrester, and ComScore. 

J.A. 6375. Using the surveys, Mr. Benoit estimated that

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at least 65.3% of camera users used the camera regularly 

to capture only photos rather than video. J.A. 6377-79. 

He calculated that at least 77.3% of those users who 

captured only photos shared the photos, and that at least 

41.2% of those users who shared the photos did so by 

MMS rather than by email or web storage. J.A. 6379-84. 

Lastly, Mr. Benoit observed that 100% of those photos 

shared by MMS were resized. J.A. 6384. Multiplying 

these percentages together, Mr. Benoit thus estimated 

that at least 20.8% of camera users utilized the camera 

for the infringing features rather than for other camerarelated features. 

Based on these usage statistics, Mr. Benoit concluded 

that 20.8% of Samsung’s $14.15 revenue for including the 

camera component in each phone—i.e., $2.93—was due to 

the infringing features. J.A. 6386. Using Samsung’s 

annual reports to estimate its profit margins and capital

asset contributions, Mr. Benoit concluded that $0.56 of 

the $2.93 revenue was profit attributable to the infringement. J.A. 6386-89.

Mr. Benoit testified that to determine a reasonable 

royalty at a hypothetical negotiation, the parties would 

focus on allocating the $0.56 benefit Samsung gained by 

utilizing the patented features. Mr. Benoit testified that 

the negotiation would concern the entire $0.56 benefit 

because Samsung had no non-infringing alternatives, and 

the entire benefit was therefore incremental profit from 

using the patent. J.A. 6390. Mr. Benoit testified that 

because neither party had a stronger negotiating position, 

the parties would have split the $0.56 evenly to derive a 

reasonable royalty of $0.28 per device. J.A. 6389-91, 

6395. Mr. Benoit cited three academic articles and the 

Nash Bargaining Solution to support his theory of an even 

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22 SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

split.3 Based on the per-device royalty and on the number 

of infringing devices sold by Samsung, Mr. Benoit estimated that a hypothetical negotiation would have resulted in a reasonable royalty of $29 million. J.A. 6398. 

In Daubert, The Supreme Court has delineated certain factors to assist courts in evaluating the foundation 

of a given expert’s testimony, while carefully emphasizing

the non-exhaustive nature of these factors. Suggested 

considerations include whether the theory or technique 

the expert employs is generally accepted, whether the 

theory has been subjected to peer review and publication,

whether the theory can and has been tested, whether the 

known or potential rate of error is acceptable, and whether there are standards controlling the technique’s operation. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “[t]here is no 

formula, and the court must judge admissibility based on 

the particular facts of the case.” Wells v. SmithKline 

Beecham Corp., 601 F.3d 375, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2010). 

The Supreme Court has called the inquiry envisioned 

by Rule 702 a “flexible one” and indicated that these 

factors may be considered, but are not exhaustive. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. The Fifth Circuit has held expert 

testimony admissible even though multiple Daubert

factors were not satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. 

Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 269-71 (5th Cir. 2000). Still, the 

Supreme Court has warned that we must not “deny the 

importance of Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement. The 

objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability 

and relevancy of expert testimony.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 

at 152.

3 On appeal, Samsung does not challenge 

Mr. Benoit’s use of Nash Bargaining. 

 

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In this case, Mr. Benoit’s damages methodology was

based on reliable principles and was sufficiently tied to 

the facts of the case. Mr. Benoit first estimated Samsung’s economic benefit from infringement by specifically 

focusing on the infringing features and by valuing those

infringing features based on Samsung’s own data regarding use and on its own financial reports outlining production costs and profits. Mr. Benoit then envisioned a 

hypothetical negotiation in which the parties would have 

bargained for respective shares of the economic benefit, 

given their respective bargaining positions and alternatives to a negotiated agreement. Mr. Benoit’s methodology was structurally sound and tied to the facts of the case. 

That Mr. Benoit’s methodology was not peer-reviewed 

or published does not necessitate its exclusion. We recognize that the fact-based nature of Mr. Benoit’s damages

testimony made it impractical, if not impossible, to subject the methods to peer review and publication. But 

“[p]ublication . . . is not a sine qua non of admissibility,” 

and “in some instances well-grounded but innovative 

theories will not have been published.” Daubert, 509 U.S. 

at 593. Consequently, “[w]here an expert otherwise 

reliably utilizes scientific methods to reach a conclusion, 

lack of textual support may go to the weight, not the 

admissibility of the expert’s testimony.” Knight v. Kirby 

Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 354 (5th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Samsung argues that Mr. Benoit’s “premise . . . that a 

feature’s use is proportional to its value” was incorrect 

and contradicted by expert testimony. DefendantAppellant’s Opening Br. at 6. But as we noted in Lucent, 

“an invention used more frequently is generally more 

valuable than a comparable invention used infrequently” 

and “frequency of expected use and predicted value are 

related.” 580 F.3d at 1333. There is no dispute that use 

of the claimed invention is relevant under Georgia-Pacific: 

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24 SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

Georgia-Pacific factor 11 looks at use of the invention and 

at evidence probative of the value of that use. Here, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in determining 

that Mr. Benoit’s methodology, involving the correlation 

of use with value, was not unreliable. 

Samsung’s argument that Mr. Benoit was unqualified 

to rely on survey data compiled by third parties is also not 

persuasive. As the district court held, Mr. Benoit need 

not be a survey expert to testify about the information 

compiled by third-party surveys, so long as the information is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 

the field to form opinions upon the subject.

To the extent Mr. Benoit’s credibility, data, or factual 

assumptions have flaws, these flaws go to the weight of 

the evidence, not to its admissibility. Once an expert has 

been qualified, the trial court’s gatekeeping inquiry 

focuses on the expert’s methodology and on whether the 

methodology is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case. 

Where the methodology is sound and the evidence relied 

upon is sufficiently related to the case, disputes over the 

expert’s credibility or over the accuracy of the underlying 

facts are for the jury. See i4i, 598 F.3d at 852. Here, 

Samsung cross-examined Mr. Benoit and, ultimately, the 

jury evaluated Mr. Benoit’s opinions. 

In sum, Samsung has not shown that the district 

court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Benoit to 

testify regarding his apportionment methodology. 

E. Damages

In its JMOL motion, Samsung argued that the jury’s 

damages award of $15 million is not supported by substantial evidence. Samsung now argues that Mr. Benoit’s 

analysis was flawed and that it should not have been 

admitted, and therefore cannot support the damages 

verdict. Samsung also argues that the Facebook and RIM 

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SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 25

settlement agreements cannot support the damages 

award because they are not sufficiently comparable. 

Samsung argues there was no testimony at trial indicating that the Facebook license was comparable or relevant 

in any way to what a reasonable royalty would have been

in this case. Further, Samsung argues that the RIM 

license, alone, is insufficient to support the jury’s damages 

award. Thus, Samsung concludes that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s damages award. We 

disagree. 

35 U.S.C. § 284 provides that upon a finding of infringement, “the court shall award the claimant damages 

adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no 

event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of

the invention by the infringer.” This court has held that a 

reasonable method for determining a reasonable royalty is 

the hypothetical negotiation approach, which “attempts to 

ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have 

agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement 

just before infringement began.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. 

Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

Samsung is correct that Summit failed to present evidence that the Facebook license was comparable or relevant to calculating a reasonable royalty in this case. 

Because neither Summit’s brief nor our independent 

review of Mr. Benoit’s testimony shows otherwise, we do 

not address the Facebook license further.

The damages evidence presented by Summit at trial 

included Mr. Benoit’s testimony regarding the apportionment methodology and the RIM license agreement. In its 

brief, Samsung conflates the issue of whether the RIM 

license should have been excluded with whether the 

license supported the jury’s damages verdict. See Appellants’ Op. Br. at 65-67. Samsung does not challenge the 

admission of the RIM license, and we therefore consider 

only the issue of whether substantial evidence supports 

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26 SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

the jury’s verdict, in view of the RIM license and 

Mr. Benoit’s testimony.

Mr. Benoit’s testimony and the RIM license supported 

the jury’s damages verdict. Mr. Benoit testified that the

RIM license conveys rights to the ’482 patent and that 

both RIM and Samsung are similarly situated because 

both sell camera phones containing the accused MMS 

functionality. J.A. 6394, 6482-83. The jury also heard 

evidence regarding the royalty amount in the RIM license 

and about Samsung’s sales volume in comparison to 

RIM’s. J.A. 6394-95. The RIM license was therefore 

sufficiently relevant to a hypothetical negotiation, and in 

conjunction with Mr. Benoit’s testimony, it provided 

substantial evidence supporting the jury’s damages 

verdict.

We agree with the district court that the jury verdict 

was supported by sufficient evidence and tied to the facts 

of this case. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial 

of Samsung’s motion for judgment as a matter of law of no 

damages.

F. Lump Sum

Summit cross-appeals, challenging the district court’s 

determination that the jury verdict represents an amount 

of a lump-sum license through the life of the patent and 

compensates Summit for both past and future infringement. Summit argues that the jury’s award cannot be a 

lump sum through the life of the patent because the 

relevant evidence, arguments, and instructions, and the 

verdict form were all limited to damages for past infringement. Summit also argues that its equitable claim 

for future damages is not an issue for the jury. Thus, 

Summit concludes that it is entitled to recover damages 

for future infringement. We disagree.

This court has not directly addressed whether a jury 

can award lump-sum damages through the life of the 

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SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 27

patent. We have, however, permitted such relief. In 

Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 

1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the district court rejected the 

defendant’s argument that the jury’s damages award was 

necessarily a lump-sum award intended to compensate 

the patentee for past and future infringement, reasoning 

that the evidence at trial provided no way of knowing 

what the jury actually did. Telcordia, 592 F. Supp. 2d 

727, 747 n.8 (D. Del. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 

612 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010). When the defendant 

appealed the district court’s order granting the patentee 

equitable relief in the form of an ongoing royalty, this 

court affirmed, reasoning that the court did not abuse its 

“broad discretion” in interpreting the verdict form because 

the verdict form was ambiguous, neither party had proposed the jury’s exact $6.5 million award, and it was 

“unclear whether the jury based its award on a lump-sum, 

paid-up license, running royalty, some variation or combination of the two, or some other theory.” Telcordia, 612 

F.3d at 1378. 

Similarly, in Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, 

Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 35-38 (Fed. Cir. 2012), this court vacated and remanded the district court’s denial of supplemental damages for infringement after the verdict but 

before final judgment was entered because the court had 

failed to explain its reasons for denying such damages. 

This court rejected the defendant’s argument that the 

patentee’s supplemental damages request was properly 

denied because the jury had necessarily awarded a lumpsum license for all past and future infringement. Id. at 

38. This court noted that “nothing in the record would 

support” that conclusion because “the parties limited their 

damages arguments to past infringement rather than 

projected future infringement” and the “jury’s verdict did 

not indicate that the award was meant to cover future use 

of [plaintiff’s] patents[.]” Id. at 35. 

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28 SUMMIT 6, LLC v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

In this case, the district court properly denied Summit’s request for an ongoing royalty because the jury 

award compensated Summit for both past and future 

infringement through the life of the patent. Samsung’s 

expert, Mr. Martinez, testified that a lump-sum award 

was appropriate. J.A. 7089-90. He also testified regarding the weight the jury should give the license agreements 

introduced into evidence, all of which were lump-sum 

licenses. Moreover, Summit’s expert, Mr. Benoit, admitted that a lump-sum award would compensate Summit 

through the life of the patent. J.A. 6452, 6479-80. When 

the jury returned its verdict, it indicated on the verdict 

form that the award was a lump sum by writing “lump 

sum” on the verdict form. We see no basis to disturb the 

district court’s determination and hold that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Summit’s 

request for an ongoing royalty.

III. CONCLUSION

For each of the reasons stated above, we affirm the 

district court’s claim construction of “being provided to,” 

affirm the infringement and invalidity verdicts, affirm the 

district court’s determination regarding the admissibility 

of Summit’s damages expert’s testimony, affirm the 

district court’s determination regarding the damages 

award, and affirm the determination of the district court 

that Summit is not entitled to a running royalty. 

AFFIRMED

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