Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05160/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05160-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy Dean Burns
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

fJ.m..J ..... Court ot' Appeals Tenth eireuit 

JUN (: 31991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 90-5160 

BILLY DEAN BURNS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Nos. 89-C-704-E & 89-CR-79-E) 

Submitted on the Briefs. 

Billy Dean Burns, pro se. 

Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, and Catherine J. Depew, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, ~, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

~, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-5160 Document: 01019297906 Date Filed: 06/03/1991 Page: 1 
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Defendant-appellant Billy Dean Burns, a prisoner at the 

Federal Correctional Institution in El Reno, Oklahoma, appeals the 

denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2255. We affirm. 1 

In 1965, defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of second 

degree burglary in Kansas state court. He was sentenced to five 

to ten years' imprisonment and was paroled in May 1974. On 

September 8, 1981, while imprisoned for a different offense, 

defendant received a Certificate of Discharge relating to the 1965 

convictions. This certificate states all civil rights lost by 

operation of law upon commitment, including but not limited to the 

right to vote, the right to hold public office, and the right to 

serve on a jury, are restored. 

Defendant was charged with forgery in Oklahoma state court on 

November 10, 1978. On November 22, 1978, he was charged in 

federal district court with conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute amphetamine. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 

five years' imprisonment on both charges. He was released from 

federal custody on September 19, 1984. Defendant returned to 

federal custody, however, following an arrest on December 19, 

1984. He was discharged from federal custody on March 14, 1986. 

On June 4, 1987, a federal grand jury returned the one-count 

indictment in this case charging defendant with receipt and 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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'• 

possession of a firearm after a former conviction of a felony in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(l). The indictment states: 

On or about January 6, 1987, in the Northern 

District of Oklahoma, defendant BILLY DEAN BURNS, having 

been convicted on or about September 29, 1965, in the 

14th Judicial District of the State of Kansas, 

Montgomery County, Kansas, of burglary in the second 

degree, a felony, did knowingly and unlawfully receive 

and possess in commerce or affecting commerce a 

firearm . . . . 

On August 21, 1987, the government filed an information to 

enhance the range of punishment under section 922(g)(l) pursuant 

to 18 u.s.c. § 924(e)(l). The information claimed defendant had 

three previous convictions by a court for a violent felony and/or 

a serious drug offense, including the three 1965 burglary 

convictions in Kansas state court and the 1978 drug conviction in 

federal district court. Defendant pleaded guilty to the charge 

against him. The court sentenced him to twenty years' 

imprisonment without parole but later reduced this sentence to 

fifteen years' imprisonment without parole. 

Defendant filed a motion pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2255 to 

vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. He asserted four 

grounds for relief: (1) the indictment failed to properly state 

the elements of an offense and the 1965 burglary convictions were 

improperly considered for sentence enhancement pursuant to section 

924(e)(l) because defendant's civil rights had been fully restored 

in relation to these convictions; (2) the sentence enhancement was 

improper because the 1965 convictions were for commercial burglaries, which do not trigger the enhancement provisions of section 

924(e)(l); (3) the enhancement was improper because the 1965 

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convictions were adjudicated simultaneously; and (4) the counsel 

for defendant was ineffective. 

In an order entered March 2, 1990, the district court 

required the government to further brief defendant's claim that 

the 1965 convictions were improperly used to enhance his sentence 

pursuant to section 924(e)(l) because his civil rights had been 

fully restored in relation to these convictions. The court found 

defendant's other arguments were without merit. 

On July 3, 1990, the district court again considered whether 

defendant's sentence had been improperly enhanced. The court 

concluded the 1965 convictions were properly used to enhance 

defendant's sentence pursuant to section 924(e)(l) because 

defendant was still under state firearms restrictions at the time 

he was arrested for violating section 922(g)(l). Defendant timely 

appeals this decision. 

Defendant's voluntary plea of guilty is an admission of all 

facts and that judgment is not subject to collateral attack. See 

Davis~ United States, 392 F.2d 291 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

393 u.s. 986 (1968). Defendant is not foreclosed, however, from 

claiming his sentence was improperly enhanced. See United States 

~Clawson, 831 F.2d 909, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

488 u.s. 923 (1988). 

We review this question of statutory interpretation de novo. 

See Boise City Farmers Co-op~ Palmer, 780 F.2d 860, 866 (lOth 

Cir. 1985). The statute under which defendant was charged, 18 

u.s.c. § 922(g)(l), makes it unlawful for any person "who has been 

convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for 

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a term exceeding one year" to possess a firearm. The provision 

under which the court enhanced defendant's sentence, section 

924(e)(1), states that a person who is convicted under section 

922(g)(1) and has three previous convictions for a violent felony 

or a serious drug offense shall be imprisoned for not less than 

fifteen years without parole. 

Section 924(e)(2)(B) defines a "violent felony" as any crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that 

falls within certain statutory categories. A "crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" is defined in 18 

u.s.c. § 921(a)(20): 

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be 

determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction 

which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a 

person has been pardoned or has had civil rights 

restored shall not be considered a conviction for 

purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, 

expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly 

provides that the person may not ship, transport, 

possess, or receive firearms. 

Defendant contends the government did not prove he had been 

previously convicted of three violent felonies or serious drug 

offenses and therefore his sentence should not have been enhanced 

pursuant to section 924(e)(1). He argues the three 1965 

convictions listed in the information were not violent felonies 

within the statutory definition because the Certificate of 

Discharge relating to these convictions restored his civil rights 

without expressly stating defendant could not possess a firearm. 

The government asserts these convictions were properly used as the 

basis for enhancing defendant's sentence because Kansas law 

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prohibited defendant from possessing a firearm at the time of the 

instant offense. 

Courts interpreting section 922(g)(1) have held that in 

determining whether a state has restored a convicted felon's 

privilege to possess a firearm, one must look to the whole of 

state law rather than simply to the certificate granting the 

restoration of civil rights. See, ~, United States ~McLean, 

904 F.2d 216, 218-19 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 203 

(1990); United States~ Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 

1990). But see United States~ Erwin, 902 F.2d 510, 512-13 (7th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 161 (1990). These courts have 

held an individual may be charged under section 922(g)(1) if he 

could not legally possess a firearm in the state in which he was 

previously convicted. See McLean, 904 F.2d at 219; Cassidy, 899 

F.2d at 549-50. 

For example, the defendant in Cassidy was released from 

prison after serving his sentence for trafficking in marijuana. 

899 F.2d at 544. He received a "Restoration of Civil Rights" 

certificate from the Ohio Adult Parole Authority restoring the 

rights he had forfeited because of that conviction. The 

certificate did not expressly limit the defendant's right to possess a firearm. The defendant later was charged under section 

922(g)(1). The prior drug conviction was the predicate offense 

for this charge. Id. The court noted Ohio law prohibits an 

individual who has been convicted of a drug offense from 

possessing a firearm. Because the defendant was prohibited from 

possessing a firearm in Ohio as a result of the prior drug 

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conviction, the court determined the state had not restored the 

defendant's right to possess a firearm. The court concluded the 

prior drug conviction could therefore serve as a predicate offense 

for the charge under section 922(g)(1). Id. at 549-50. 

In reaching this result, the court in Cassidy reviewed the 

legislative history of the Firearm Owners Protection Act, Pub. L. 

No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, which included the current version of 

section 922(g). Based on the legislative history, the court in 

Cassidy found Congress intended courts to look to the whole of 

state law to determine whether a felon's civil rights have been 

restored for purposes of section 921(a)(20). Id. at 548. The 

court concluded: 

It is axiomatic that if we must look to the whole 

of state law in order to determine whether a 

felon's civil rights have been restored, as opposed 

to looking only to an order or certificate, we must 

also look to the whole of state law in order to 

determine if his firearms privileges have been 

expressly restricted. 

Id. at 546. 

The district court applied the analysis utilized by the court 

in Cassidy in concluding defendant's sentence was properly 

enhanced under section 924(e)(1). Under this approach, 

"restoration" is essentially read to mean the act of restoring 

rights under the whole of state law, not merely under the terms of 

the document, if any, announcing the restoration. See Cassidy, 

899 F.2d at 548-49. Kansas prohibits an individual from 

possessing a firearm with a barrel less than twelve inches long 

within five years of his or her release from imprisonment for a 

felony. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4204(b) (Supp. 1990). The district 

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court found defendant was subject to this restriction when he 

committed the instant offense on January 6, 1987. The court 

concluded the 1965 convictions were violent felonies within the 

meaning of sections 921(a)(2) and 924(e)(2)(B) because defendant 

was subject to a firearms disability at the time he committed the 

present offense. 

We agree with the result reached by the district court. 

Defendant received a document purporting to restore the civil 

rights he forfeited as a result of the 1965 burglary convictions. 

Although this document purported to restore all civil rights 

plaintiff lost because of the 1965 convictions, it in fact did not 

restore plaintiff's right to possess firearms. Compare Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 21-4615 (1988) (providing that upon conviction of a felony, 

one loses the right to vote, hold public office, or sit on a jury, 

but not mentioning the right to possess firearms) and Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 22-3722 (Supp. 1990) (providing the civil rights lost by 

operation of law may be restored once the sentence is discharged) 

with Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4204(b) (Supp. 1990) (prohibiting felons 

from possessing certain firearms within five years of release). 

When defendant received the document in September 1981, he 

was incarcerated. Defendant remained incarcerated until September 

19, 1984. He returned to prison following an arrest in December, 

1984 and remained there until March 14, 1986. Section 21-4204(b) 

therefore prohibited defendant from possessing a firearm until 

March 1991. Looking to the whole of state law, we conclude 

defendant was still subject to the firearms disability found in 

section 21-4204(b) at the time of his current conviction despite 

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the language in the Certificate of Discharge. His right to 

possess a firearm was never effectively restored following the 

1965 convictions. Those convictions therefore qualify as "violent 

felonies" under sections 921(a)(20) and 924(e)(2)(B) and can serve 

as a basis for enhancing defendant's sentence pursuant to section 

924(e)(l). We AFFIRM. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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