Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-16166/USCOURTS-ca9-08-16166-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donna Hoffman
Appellant
Memorial Medical Center
Appellee
Kent Tonnemacher
Appellee
Unknown Physicians
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONNA HOFFMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 08-16166

KENT TONNEMACHER, M.D.; D.C. No.

UNKNOWN PHYSICIANS,  CV-04-05714-AWIDefendants, DLB

and OPINION

MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Anthony W. Ishii, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 8, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed January 21, 2010

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Susan P. Graber, and

Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

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COUNSEL

Kevin G. Little, Fresno, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

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Lara M. Krieger, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP, Los

Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellee.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Donna Hoffman sued Defendant Memorial Medical Center under the Emergency Medical Treatment and

Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), after

an emergency room physician failed to diagnose her bacterial

infection. The district court granted in part and denied in part

Defendant’s pretrial motion for summary judgment, and the

surviving claim went to trial. The jury deadlocked, and the

district court declared a mistrial. Subsequently, the district

court allowed Defendant to file another summary judgment

motion which, this time, the court granted. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges the propriety of allowing this successive summary judgment motion. We hold that the district court has

discretion to entertain successive motions for summary judgment and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

this instance.1

Plaintiff went to Defendant’s emergency room by ambulance at about 11 p.m. on May 22, 2003, complaining of

fever, chills, hyperventilation, cough, congestion, pain, numbness in her hands, nausea, and vomiting. Dr. Kent Tonnemacher, who worked in the emergency room, examined her and

found that she had a fever of 102.3 degrees. Plaintiff reported

that her temperature had been 106 degrees earlier in the day.

1Plaintiff also appeals the grant of summary judgment, two modifications of the pretrial order to allow the addition of a new expert witness and

the later substitution of a different witness, and two evidentiary rulings.

We address those issues separately in a memorandum disposition filed this

date, reversing the grant of summary judgment and one evidentiary ruling

and affirming as to the other issues. 

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Plaintiff informed Dr. Tonnemacher of her medical history,

which included a splenectomy and a heart murmur. Dr. Tonnemacher ordered chest X-rays and a urinalysis, both of

which were negative, but he did not order other tests such as

a blood culture or a complete blood count. Dr. Tonnemacher

diagnosed fever and viral bronchitis with a differential diagnosis of possible pneumonia. He discharged Plaintiff with a

prescription for an oral antibiotic. 

The following afternoon, Plaintiff returned to the emergency room in much worse condition. The emergency room

doctor diagnosed bacterial sepsis and immediately hospitalized Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s sepsis progressed to systemic inflammatory response syndrome, and she developed serious

complications. Plaintiff survived, but doctors had to amputate

six of her toes. Plaintiff was discharged after two months in

the hospital. 

Plaintiff sued Defendant for violation of EMTALA and

both Defendant and Dr. Tonnemacher2 for medical malpractice. Defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment,

which the district court denied under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(f). After further discovery, Defendant moved

again for summary judgment, which the district court granted

in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s surviving claim alleged

that Dr. Tonnemacher’s screening examination constituted

disparate treatment in violation of EMTALA because it failed

to comply with Defendant’s EMTALA policy.

At trial, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law

at the close of the evidence. The district court denied the

motion. The jury deadlocked, and the district court declared

a mistrial. After the mistrial, Defendant moved for modification of the pretrial order. The district court modified the order

to allow Defendant to add a new expert witness and to file

2Dr. Tonnemacher settled with Plaintiff shortly before trial, and he is

not a party to this appeal. 

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another summary judgment motion. The district court then

granted Defendant’s summary judgment motion on the

ground that Plaintiff could not show a genuine issue of material fact with respect to causation. Plaintiff timely appeals.

[1] We have held, relying on Supreme Court guidance in

the realm of qualified immunity, that a district court may permit successive motions for summary judgment on qualified

immunity. Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.

1997). We have also assumed the propriety of successive

motions for summary judgment outside the context of qualified immunity. See Cable & Computer Tech. Inc. v. Lockheed

Sanders, Inc., 214 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2000) (analyzing

grant of summary judgment on promissory estoppel claim

after district court granted earlier summary judgment motion

on contract claim); Preaseau v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,

591 F.2d 74, 79-80 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that, after

removal of diversity case to federal court, the federal court

may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial

of summary judgment motion by state court). Many of our

sister circuits have held that district courts may permit successive motions for summary judgment. Narducci v. Moore, 572

F.3d 313, 324 (7th Cir. 2009); Lexicon, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co.

of Am., Inc., 436 F.3d 662, 670 n.6 (6th Cir. 2006); Sira v.

Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 68 (2d Cir. 2004); Fenney v. Dakota,

Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 718 (8th Cir. 2003);

Enlow v. Tishomingo County, 962 F.2d 501, 506-07 (5th Cir.

1992). Joining those circuits, we now hold explicitly that district courts have discretion to entertain successive motions for

summary judgment, independent of whether the motions

involve qualified immunity. 

[2] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not limit the

number of motions that may be filed. Indeed, the version of

Rule 56 that was in effect when the district court modified the

pretrial order stated that a motion for summary judgment

could be filed “at any time” after certain events. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a), (b) (2007). Rule 56 was amended in December 2009

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expressly to allow a district court to control the timing of

motions for summary judgment. It now states that its default

limits on the timing of such motions “apply unless . . . the

court orders otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). And the Advisory Committee Notes on the amendment observe that

“[s]cheduling orders tailored to the needs of the specific case,

perhaps adjusted as it progresses, are likely to work better

than default rules.” Rule 56, then, does not bar successive

motions. 

[3] Furthermore, we have held that, in effect, the possibility

of summary judgment remains on the table even after a district court has denied a summary judgment motion because

that order is “subject to reconsideration by the court at any

time.” Dessar v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 353

F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1965). Thus, the denial of summary

judgment does not preclude a contrary later grant of summary

judgment. Consequently, allowing a party to file a second

motion for summary judgment is logical, and it fosters the

“just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of suits. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 1. Nevertheless, we are conscious of the potential for

abuse of the procedure and reiterate here that district courts

retain discretion to “weed out frivolous or simply repetitive

motions.” Knox, 124 F.3d at 1106.

[4] In holding that district courts have discretion to permit

successive motions for summary judgment, we join at least

five of our sister circuits. Narducci, 572 F.3d at 324; Lexicon,

Inc., 436 F.3d at 670 n.6; Sira, 380 F.3d at 68; Fenney, 327

F.3d at 718; Enlow, 962 F.2d at 506-07; see also Fernandez

v. Bankers Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 569 (11th Cir.

1990) (“Two motions for summary judgment may be ruled

upon in the same case . . . .”); Williamsburg Wax Museum,

Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (“A subsequent motion for summary judgment based

on an expanded record is always permissible.”). We adopt the

sound view, expressed by several of those circuits, that a successive motion for summary judgment is particularly approHOFFMAN v. TONNEMACHER 1287

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priate on an expanded factual record. See, e.g., Kovacevich v.

Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 835 (6th Cir. 2000) (“District

courts may in their discretion permit renewed or successive

motions for summary judgment, particularly when the moving

party has expanded the factual record on which summary

judgment is sought.”); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 530

(7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“A renewed or successive summary judgment motion is appropriate especially if . . . [there

is] the availability of new evidence or an expanded factual

record . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

[5] We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to permit a successive summary judgment motion. In this

case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing

Defendant to file another summary judgment motion after the

mistrial. The deposition of an expert witness after the deadline

for pretrial summary judgment motions, the testimony at trial,

and the addition of a new expert witness after the mistrial

expanded the factual record beyond what it had been at the

time of the pretrial summary judgment motion. 

Plaintiff argues, however, that the final summary judgment

motion relied on a factual record identical to that underlying

Defendant’s unsuccessful motion for judgment as a matter of

law. Because the standard for summary judgment “mirrors”

that for judgment as a matter of law, Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986), Plaintiff invites us to

consider the motion for judgment as a matter of law to be

equivalent to a motion for summary judgment. 

We need not and do not decide whether a motion for judgment as a matter of law should be generally deemed a summary judgment motion for purposes of determining whether

a subsequent summary judgment motion is permissible.3 The

3We note, however, that we have elsewhere stated that “Rule 50(a)(2)

is not intended as an alternative mechanism for obtaining summary judgment.” McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 423 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.

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district court modified the pretrial order after the mistrial to

allow Defendant to add a new expert witness. The new witness’ testimony expanded the factual record, even though that

testimony was not, as it turned out, critical to the summary

judgment motion. 

[6] Furthermore, even if the motion for judgment as a matter of law were equivalent to a summary judgment motion,

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that entertaining the successive

summary judgment motion was an abuse of the district court’s

discretion. Allowing a successive summary judgment motion

potentially can save all concerned the far greater expenses of

a trial. We decide, in the related memorandum disposition

filed this date, that the district court’s grant of summary judgment was erroneous in this case, but the denial of a summary

judgment motion does not necessarily prove that the district

court should have refused to allow Defendant to file it in the

first place. 

[7] Nor was the grant of summary judgment for Defendant

—erroneous though it was—legally incompatible with the

denial of Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.

A district court that denies a motion for judgment as a matter

of law is deemed to have reserved the legal questions raised

by the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Whether there is sufficient evidence to create an issue for the jury is a question of

law. Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th

Cir. 2003). Thus, the district court’s denial of Defendant’s

motion for judgment as a matter of law did not constitute a

decision as a matter of law that a genuine issue of material

fact existed. 

2005). Of course, under Plaintiff’s theory, in a case like this one in which

a pretrial motion for summary judgment has been made, a motion for

judgment as a matter of law would, itself, constitute a successive summary

judgment motion. But whether it does or not is also a question we need

not decide. 

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[8] The district court’s decision to allow Defendant to file

another motion for summary judgment after the mistrial

required the district court first to modify the pretrial order.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s modification of a pretrial order. Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex

Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 719 (9th Cir. 2004). A district court may

modify a pretrial order “only to prevent manifest injustice.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). If the district court concluded that summary judgment might be appropriate, the court could properly

find that it would be a manifest injustice to require a party to

defend itself in a second trial without the opportunity to move

first for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (noting “due regard . . . for the rights of

persons . . . to demonstrate in the manner provided by [Rule

56], prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual

basis”). 

[9] For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court

did not abuse its discretion by modifying the pretrial order to

allow Defendant to file a summary judgment motion after the

mistrial.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED

for further proceedings.4 The parties shall bear their own costs

on appeal.

4

In a separate memorandum disposition filed this date, we reverse the

district court’s grant of summary judgment and one evidentiary issue and

affirm on certain other issues. 

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