Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02670/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02670-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Dewaine Kidd
Petitioner
M. Mullin
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARK DEWAINE KIDD, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

HEIDI M. LACKNER,1

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-2670-TLN-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a judgment of conviction entered 

against him on February 7, 2011, in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of assault 

with a deadly weapon and personal infliction of great bodily injury, with various sentence 

enhancements. He seeks federal habeas relief on the grounds that the trial court violated his 

federal constitutional rights through jury instruction error. Upon careful consideration of the 

record and the applicable law, the court finds that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief 

must be denied. 

 1

 Previously named as respondent was M. Mullin. The court now substitutes in the 

correct respondent, the Warden of the Sierra Conservation Center, where petitioner is presently 

incarcerated. “A petitioner for habeas corpus relief must name the state officer having custody of 

him or her as the respondent to the petition.” Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 

360 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. ' 2254). See also Smith v. Idaho, 392 F.3d 

350, 355-56 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of conviction on 

appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the following 

factual summary: 

A jury convicted defendant Mark Dewaine Kidd of assault with a 

deadly weapon and found true an enhancement allegation that 

defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. 

The trial court also found additional enhancement allegations true 

and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 12 years in state 

prison. 

Defendant now contends the trial court erred in failing to 

adequately instruct the jury on the definition of great bodily injury. 

He argues the error requires reversal of his conviction on the great 

bodily injury enhancement. 

We conclude the trial court did not commit instructional error. We 

will affirm the judgment. 

BACKGROUND 

While at an AM/PM store, defendant got into an argument with 

Esteban Gonzalez and Gonzalez's friends. Defendant punched 

Gonzalez twice. Gonzalez and his friends kicked and punched 

defendant while he was on the ground. At some point, defendant 

stabbed Gonzalez in the back, inflicting a wound that was threequarters of an inch long and one-quarter inch wide. Gonzalez was 

taken to the hospital, where the wound was closed with two staples. 

At that time Gonzalez rated his pain level as “above a ten” on a 

scale from one to ten. By the time of trial it was “about a seven.” 

Among other things, the People charged defendant with assault 

with a deadly weapon (a knife) (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) FN1 

– count one), further alleging that defendant personally inflicted 

great bodily injury in the commission of that offense (§ 12022.7, 

subd. (a)), and also charged him with battery resulting in the 

infliction of serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d) – count two). 

FN1. Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

Video and audio recordings of the incident were played for the jury, 

but key moments, including the moment of the stabbing, were not 

picked up or could not be clearly discerned. The People took the 

position that defendant stabbed Gonzalez after Gonzalez and his 

friends had stopped their assault on defendant, and while Gonzalez 

was going back into the store. But the defense position was that 

defendant stabbed Gonzalez in self-defense while Gonzalez and his 

friends kicked and punched defendant on the ground, and that 

Gonzalez did not realize he had been stabbed until later. 

 

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While discussing jury instructions, the trial court indicated that it 

would give, among other things, CALCRIM No. 875 [assault with 

deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury], 

CALCRIM No. 3160 [great bodily injury], and CALCRIM No. 925 

[battery causing serious bodily injury]. Regarding the alternative 

language available under CALCRIM 875, the trial court said it 

would include the definition of great bodily injury. Defense 

counsel had no objection to the inclusion of the great bodily injury 

definition in CALCRIM No. 875 and did not propose any clarifying 

instruction. 

Consistent with CALCRIM No. 875, the trial court instructed the 

jury as follows: 

“The defendant is charged in count one with assault with a deadly 

weapon other than a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 245 

sub[division] [a] subparagraph 1. To prove that the defendant is 

guilty of this crime the People must prove that, one, the defendant 

did an act with a deadly weapon other than a firearm that by its 

nature would directly and probably result in the application of force 

to a person; two, the defendant did that act willfully; three, when 

the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would lead a 

reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would directly 

and probably result in the application of force to someone; four, 

when the defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply force 

with a deadly weapon other than a firearm to a person; and five, the 

defendant did not act in self-defense. [¶] . . . [¶] 

“Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical 

injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm. 

A deadly weapon other than a firearm is any object, instrument, or 

weapon that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one that is used in 

such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or 

great bodily injury.” 

Consistent with CALCRIM No. 3160, the trial court further 

instructed the jury: 

“If you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in count one, 

you must then decide whether the People have proved the 

additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great 

bodily injury on [the victim] in the commission of that crime. 

“Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical 

injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm . . 

. .” 

And consistent with CALCRIM No. 925, the trial court instructed: 

“The defendant is charged in count two with battery causing serious 

bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 243 sub[division] 

[d]. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime the People 

must prove that, one, the defendant willfully and unlawfully 

touched [the victim] in a harmful or offensive manner; two, [the 

 

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victim] suffered serious bodily injury as a result of the force used; 

and three, the defendant did not act in self-defense. [¶] . . . [¶] 

“ . . . A serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of 

physical condition. Such an injury may include but is not limited to 

loss of consciousness, concussion, bone fracture, protracted loss or 

impairment of function of any bodily member or organ, a wound 

requiring extensive suturing and serious disfigurement.” 

During deliberations, the jury twice requested clarification 

regarding great bodily injury and serious bodily injury. In the first 

request, the jury asked for “[b]etter instructions on [the definition of 

great bodily injury] [a]s related to Count one, Special Findings, 

True or Not True.” Without objection by counsel, the trial court 

responded: “In response to your question, Jury Instruction No. 875 

located at pages 22 and 23 of your Jury Instruction packet defines 

the elements of Assault With a Deadly Weapon (Penal Code section 

245(a)(1)) charged in Count One. [¶] Jury Instruction No. 3160 

located at page 24 of your Jury Instruction packet defines the 

elements of Infliction of Great Bodily Injury (Penal Code section 

12022.7(a)) charged as an additional allegation to Count One. 

‘Great bodily injury’ excludes injuries that are transitory or shortlived.” 

In the second request, the jury asked for “[a] clearer distinction 

between Great Bodily harm and serious bodily harm. [¶] Is either a 

greater harm or are both the same.” Again without objection from 

counsel, the trial court responded: “Determining whether a victim 

has suffered harm amounting to great bodily injury or serious 

bodily injury are both questions of fact for the jury. [¶] ‘Great 

bodily injury’ is defined in Jury Instruction No. 3160 on page 24 of 

your jury instruction packet and as further clarified in the Court's 

Response to your Request # 1. [¶] ‘Serious bodily injury’ is 

defined in Jury Instruction No. 925 on page 25 of your jury 

instruction packet.” 

The jury convicted defendant on count one, assault with a deadly 

weapon, and found the enhancement allegation true that he 

personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. But the jury 

hung on count two, battery resulting in the infliction of serious 

bodily injury, and the trial court declared a mistrial on that count. 

In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that defendant had 

a prior strike and a prior serious felony conviction. (§§ 667, 

subds.(a), (b)-(i), 1170.12.) The trial court sentenced defendant to 

an aggregate of 12 years in state prison. 

People v. Kidd, No. C068136, 2013 WL 4047048 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., Aug. 8, 2013). 

 After the California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s judgment of conviction, he filed 

a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 5. On October 23, 

2013, the Supreme Court summarily denied that petition. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 6. 

///// 

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II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S.___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010); 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

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be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 2 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S.___,___,131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 

S. Ct. at 786-87. 

///// 

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. This 

presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for 

the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

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 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. This court “must determine what arguments or theories ... 

could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 786. The petitioner bears “the burden 

to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims

 On appeal in state court, petitioner raised a single claim that the trial court erred in failing 

to adequately instruct the jury on the definition of great bodily injury. Kidd, 2013 WL 4047048, 

at *3. In his petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court, petitioner claimed that the 

California jury instructions defining great bodily injury and serious bodily injury were in conflict 

and gave the false impression that they represented different levels of harm, when in fact they 

represented the same level of harm. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 5. In the petition before this court, 

petitioner articulates three separate claims for relief. However, they all revolve around the trial 

court’s jury instructions on the definition of “great bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” and 

essentially track the claims petitioner raised in the California courts. In light of this, the court will 

construe petitioner’s three separate claims as one overall challenge to the trial court’s jury 

instructions on “great bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury,” and will analyze the claims 

accordingly. 

///// 

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 Petitioner’s first ground for relief is stated as follows: “‘great bodily injury’ and ‘serious 

bodily injury’ are equivalent terms in violation of the Apprendi error of the United States 

Constitution, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.” ECF No. 1 at 5.3

 Petitioner notes that the 

jurors asked several questions about the difference between “great bodily injury” and “serious 

bodily injury,” and he argues that they should have been “informed that the terms were meant to 

represent an equivalent level of harm.” Id. at 6. 

 In his second ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court’s jury instructions on 

great bodily injury and serious bodily injury violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments because giving both CALCRIM 3160 [the jury instruction on the definition of 

“great bodily injury”] and 925 [the jury instruction on the definition of “serious bodily injury”] 

gave the jury the “false impression” that “great bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” 

represent different levels of harm.” Id. at 8-9. Petitioner argues that this misconception was 

“exacerbated by the [trial] court’s responses to the jury’s questions.” Id. He complains that the 

trial court simply referred the jurors back “to the same [CALCRIM] definitions that were 

confusing to the jury in the first place.” Id. at 8-9. 

 In his third ground for relief, petitioner claims that his petition presents sufficient grounds 

for review by the California Supreme Court under Rule 8.500(b) of the California Rules of Court. 

Id. at 10. He argues that “the problem inherent in giving both [CALCRIM-3160 and 925] is 

likely to recur throughout the trial courts in the state” and that until the state court “steps in to 

require that the jury be told the definitions represent an equivalent level of harm, confusion about 

the instructions will continue.” Id. at 11. 

 As explained above, petitioner’s jury convicted him on count one of assault with a deadly 

weapon and found the enhancement allegation true that he personally inflicted “great bodily 

injury” on the victim. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count two (battery resulting in 

the infliction of “serious bodily injury”) and the trial court declared a mistrial on that count. In 

his three claims before this court, petitioner is arguing, in essence, that the trial court’s error in 

 3

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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instructing the jury on the terms “great bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” rendered his 

trial fundamentally unfair because the instructions erroneously suggest that the terms “great 

bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” represent different levels of harm. He suggests that if 

the jury had been advised that the terms actually represent equivalent levels of harm, it would 

have found him not guilty of the great bodily injury enhancement on count one, given that it 

acquitted him of inflicting serious bodily injury, as alleged in count two. On appeal, petitioner 

argued that: 

[t]he jury’s inability to agree that Mr. Kidd committed serious 

bodily injury shows that it treated great bodily injury as a different 

level of harm; if great and serious bodily injuries are supposed to be 

equivalent, shouldn’t the result have been the same? 

Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 5 at 5. Petitioner makes the same argument in the petition before this court. 

 1. State Law Decision

 Rejecting petitioner’s argument on this claim, the California Court of Appeal reasoned as 

follows: 

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to adequately 

instruct the jury on the definition of great bodily injury. He 

acknowledges that the instructions given were in accordance with 

CALCRIM and that he did not object to them, but he asserts his 

claim is not forfeited because the instructional error affected his 

substantial rights (§ 1259) and prejudiced him. He claims the 

instructions incorrectly suggested that great bodily injury and 

serious bodily injury are not equivalent, the jury questions indicated 

confusion on that point, and the trial court's responses exacerbated 

the jury's confusion and reinforced that great bodily injury and 

serious bodily injury are different. He says if the jury had known 

that great bodily injury and serious bodily injury are equivalent, and 

it could not agree unanimously on count two that he inflicted 

serious bodily injury, the jury also could not have agreed 

unanimously that the wound constituted great bodily injury on 

count one. 

We conclude that even if defendant's contention is not forfeited, he 

does not establish instructional error. 

Although courts have indicated that serious bodily injury “‘is the 

essential equivalent’” of great bodily injury (see, e.g., People v. 

Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 117), it is nonetheless true that great 

bodily injury and serious bodily injury have different statutory 

definitions. For the section 12022.7 enhancement alleged in count 

one, great bodily injury is defined in section 12022.7, subdivision 

(f) as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” And for the 

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section 243, subdivision (d) offense charged in count two, serious 

bodily injury is defined in section 243, subdivision (f)(4) as “a 

serious impairment of physical condition” and includes specific 

examples. The CALCRIM instructions accurately state the 

applicable statutory definitions of great bodily injury and serious 

bodily injury, and the trial court responded to the jury questions by 

referring the jury back to the approved CALCRIM instructions. 

The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the law. To the 

extent defendant wanted additional clarifying instructions, it was 

incumbent upon him to ask the trial court for them, but he did not 

do so. We conclude there was no error. 

Kidd, 2013 WL 4047048, at *3. 

 2. Applicable Law

 In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional claim. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72; Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 

F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury 

instruction “cannot be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but 

must violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Cupp v. 

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). To prevail on such a claim petitioner must demonstrate 

“that an erroneous instruction ‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

process.’” Prantil v. State of Cal., 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Darnell v. 

Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1987)). In making its determination, a reviewing court must 

evaluate the challenged jury instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a 

component of the entire trial process.’” Id. (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th 

Cir. 1984)). 

 “When considering an allegedly erroneous jury instruction in a habeas proceeding, an 

appellate court first considers whether the error in the challenged instruction, if any, amounted to 

‘constitutional error.’” Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Calderon 

v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If so, the court then considers whether the error was 

harmless.” Id. See also Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). To 

determine whether the error was harmless, a reviewing court considers whether the error had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict.” Calderon v. Coleman, 525 

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U.S. 141, 147 ((1998). “If we are in grave doubt as to whether the error had such an effect, the 

petitioner is entitled to the writ.” Morris, 273 F.3d at 833 (internal quotations and citation 

omitted). 

 3. Analysis

 The court will first address petitioner’s reference to “Apprendi” in his first ground for 

relief, and his citations to California law in support of his third ground for relief. In Apprendi v. 

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires any fact other than a prior conviction that 

“increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” to be “submitted to 

a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. Petitioner has failed to explain 

or to demonstrate how the trial court’s instructions to the jury in this case violate the Apprendi

holding. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on any claim based on the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Apprendi. 

 With regard to petitioner’s third ground for relief, a federal writ is not available for 

alleged error in the interpretation of application of state law. Wilson, 131 S. Ct. at 16; Estelle, 

502 U.S. at 67. Accordingly, whether or not the California Supreme Court’s decision not to grant 

review of petitioner’s jury instruction claims violated state law or the California Rules of Court is 

not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus action. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on any 

claim based on state law or court rules. 

 Petitioner’s federal constitutional claim is that the trial court’s jury instructions, including 

the trial judge’s response to the jury’s questions, violated his right to due process. For the reasons 

expressed by the California Court of Appeal, the trial court’s jury instructions on “great bodily 

and injury” and “serious bodily injury,” did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. 

The instructions tracked California law and there is no evidence that the jury applied the 

challenged jury instructions in a way that violated the federal Constitution. Mere speculation as 

to why the jury decided to acquit petitioner on count two, when it found him guilty on count one, 

is insufficient to demonstrate federal constitutional error. 

///// 

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 Petitioner has also failed to show that the trial court’s response to the jury’s questions 

violated his right to due process. A trial judge enjoys “wide discretion” in responding to a 

question from the jury. Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2003). See also 

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 860 (9th Cir. 1999) (trial judges have “substantial 

latitude in tailoring jury instructions”); Wilson v. United States, 422 F.2d 1303, 1304 (9th Cir. 

1970) (“The necessity, extent and character of additional instructions are matters within the sound 

discretion of the trial court.”). To obtain habeas relief following an erroneous response to a jury's 

request for clarification, a petitioner must show that: (1) the response was an incorrect or 

inaccurate application of state law; (2) constitutional error resulted; and (3) the error was not 

harmless. See Morris, 273 F.3d at 833. 

 In this case, the trial court’s response to the jury’s questions was not incorrect or 

inaccurate under state law. Moreover, the fact that petitioner’s jurors asked no further questions 

after receiving a response to their second question and were able to reach a unanimous verdict 

indicates that they were satisfied with the court’s answer and that it cleared up their confusion. 

There is also no competent evidence that the trial court’s answers violated the federal constitution 

or had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. Under these circumstances, 

the trial judge’s responses did not violate the due process clause. 

 It is true that “[w]hen a jury makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them 

away with concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946). 

However, where, as here, the trial judge “respond[s] to the jury’s question by directing its 

attention to the precise paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its 

inquiry,” and the jury asks no followup question, a reviewing court can presume “that the jury 

fully understood the judge’s answer and appropriately applied the jury instructions.” Waddington 

v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 196 (2009) (quoting Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234) (there is no 

constitutional violation where trial judge responds to the jury's question by directing its attention 

to the paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answered its inquiry); United 

States v. McCall, 592 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1979) (where the district court’s original 

instructions were a correct statement of the law and “generally addressed the jury’s question 

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. . . ,” the court’s re-reading of its original instructions in response to the question was not 

reversible error); United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 1979) (where a deliberating 

jury asked, “[Does] aiding and abetting after the fact constitute a violation of the law?” and the 

district court, in response, “reinstructed the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting, and . . . 

specifically invited them to ask further questions should the need arise,” the court “acted well 

within [its] discretion”); Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141, 145-46 (7th Cir. 1982) (where the “entire 

jury charge clearly and correctly stated the controlling law,” and the trial court responded to a 

jury question by saying only, “Consider all of the instructions carefully,” the “trial court’s 

response was sufficiently specific to clarify the jury’s confusion”). 

 The decision of the California Court of Appeal denying petitioner’s jury instruction claims 

is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the legal principles set forth above. It is 

certainly not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 

S. Ct. at 786-87. The state court record does not support petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s 

jury instructions on the meaning of the terms “great bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” 

violated petitioner’s right to due process. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas 

relief. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

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1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: June 20, 2016. 

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