Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02211/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02211-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ron Davis
Respondent
Christopher Vargas
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER VARGAS,

Petitioner,

v.

RON DAVIS, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 2:14-cv-2211 KJM CKD P (TEMP)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction 

entered against him on October 18, 2011, in the Sacramento County Superior Court on two counts 

of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years. He seeks federal 

habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) 

the trial court committed sentencing error; (3) the trial court violated his rights in failing to 

modify or drop the charges against him; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s

verdict. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned 

recommends that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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I. Background

In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary:

A jury found defendant Christopher Vargas guilty of committing a 

lewd act upon his 11–year–old stepson J.D. (count one) and upon 

his 12–year–old stepson G.D. (count two). (Pen. Code, § 288, 

subd. (a).)1 The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate 

term of eight years in state prison, consisting of the middle term of 

six years on count one, and a consecutive two years on count two.

Defendant appeals, contending his trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to request a jury instruction on the defense of accident with 

respect to count two because there was substantial evidence he 

touched G.D.'s penis while they both were sleeping. He also asserts 

the trial court abused its discretion by relying on circumstances in 

aggravation that were not supported in the record to justify 

imposition of the middle term on count one. To the extent he was 

required to object to the trial court's reliance on such factors to 

preserve the issue on appeal, defendant asserts he was denied his 

right to effective assistance of counsel. 

We shall conclude there is no evidence to support an instruction on 

the defense of accident, and in any event, defendant was not 

prejudiced by counsel's failure to request such an instruction 

because the jury was properly instructed on the issue that would 

have been presented by such an instruction. We shall further 

conclude defendant forfeited his claim of sentencing error by failing 

to object below, and even assuming his trial counsel was ineffective 

in failing to object, remand is unnecessary because it is not 

reasonably likely the trial court would have imposed the lower term 

had counsel raised a timely objection. Accordingly, we shall affirm 

the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. 

The Prosecution

In March 2011, defendant lived with his wife and her three 

children. On March 23, 2011, 11–year–old J.D. went to sleep at 

approximately 8:30 p.m. When he woke up later that night, 

defendant was kneeling next to his bed, and defendant's hand was 

touching J.D.'s penis over his pajamas. Defendant was moving his 

hand in a circular motion. When defendant saw J.D. was awake, he 

put their dog on J.D.'s bed and left the room.

 

1

 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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The next morning J.D. told his mother what had happened, and she 

told him to act like nothing had happened until defendant left for 

work. After defendant left, J.D.'s mother summoned her other 

children, told them what J.D. had said about defendant touching 

him, and asked whether anything like that had ever happened to 

them. Her daughter A.D. immediately said no, but her then 17–

year–old son G.D. said defendant may have done something similar 

to him when he was younger. At that point, their mother called the 

police.

On March 25, 2011, G.D. was questioned by a detective during a 

Special Assault Forensic Evaluation (SAFE) interview. During that 

interview, G.D. discussed an incident that occurred in 

approximately 2005, when he was about 12 years old and his 

mother was dating defendant. He and defendant were watching 

television in J.D.'s room. G.D. was lying on J.D.'s bed, and 

defendant was sitting in a chair next to the bed. G.D. fell asleep, 

and when he woke up a little while later, defendant's hand was 

inside G.D.'s boxer shorts, touching his penis. Defendant was 

moving his hand up and down. When G.D. moved a little, 

defendant removed his hand. About five minutes later, defendant 

again placed his hand inside G.D.'s boxer shorts and touched G.D.'s 

penis. At that point, G.D. got up, told defendant, “[Y]ou're sick, 

leave me alone, I'm telling my mom.” G.D. went into his own 

bedroom, and defendant followed, asking G.D. what was wrong. 

When G.D. accused defendant of touching his penis, defendant told 

him he must have been dreaming. 

At trial, G.D. told a somewhat different story. He testified he and 

defendant were watching television in J.D.'s bedroom. G.D. was 

lying on J.D.'s bed, and defendant was sitting on the edge of the 

bed. G.D. fell asleep, and when he awoke about an hour later, 

defendant was laying next to him on the bed. Defendant had his 

hand on G.D.'s penis, inside his boxer shorts. Defendant's hand 

may have been moving a little. At that point, G.D. got up and told 

defendant, “You're sick. I'm going to my bedroom.” Defendant 

woke up, followed J.D. out of the room, and asked him what was 

wrong. When G.D. accused defendant of touching G.D.'s penis, 

defendant said something like, “It might have been an accident, but 

I don't think it happened. It might have been a dream.”

When asked about the differences between his statements during 

the SAFE interview and his testimony at trial, G.D. said he did not 

accurately portray the incident during the SAFE interview because 

he was “upset” and “had a lot of thoughts going through [his] 

mind.” G.D. also stated, “I don't believe it was done purposefully 

to me. I think the night I said it happened to me it was accidentally. 

I think we were both sleeping, and his hand accidentally . . . fell on 

me right there in my private area.”

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B. 

The Defense

Defendant did not testify at trial. During closing argument, his trial 

counsel argued the incident involving J.D. never happened, and that 

J.D. must have dreamed it. J.D.'s mother (defendant's wife) 

testified that a week or so after the alleged incident, J.D. asked her 

if he would get into trouble if it was just a dream.

With respect to G.D., defendant's trial counsel argued any touching 

was not intentional, noting G.D.'s testimony that defendant 

appeared to have been sleeping at the time the incident occurred, 

and G.D.'s belief that the touching was accidental.

People v. Vargas, No. C070027, 2013 WL 4506768, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2013).

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 

859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court 

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precedent “may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state 

court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 

F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen 

a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] 

Court has not announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) 

(citing Parker v. Matthews, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012)). Nor may it be 

used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal 

Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct. Id. Further, 

where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of an issue, it cannot be said that there is 

“clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 

(2006).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

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must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a 

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 

(1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but 

does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

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a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could 

have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” 562 U.S. at 102. The petitioner bears “the burden to 

demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner raises several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After setting 

forth the applicable legal principles, the court will evaluate these claims in turn below.

1. Applicable Legal Principles

The clearly established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

that set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that (2) the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is 

constitutionally deficient if his or her representation “fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness” such that it was outside “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

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criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 562 at 

104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). A reviewing court is required to make every effort “to 

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 107 (same). 

Reviewing courts must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is in 

addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in all 

significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). This presumption of reasonableness means that the court must “give 

the attorneys the benefit of the doubt,” and must also “affirmatively entertain the range of 

possible reasons [defense] counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 792.

“The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations 

omitted). Thus, in federal habeas proceedings involving “claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, . . . AEDPA review must be “‘“doubly deferential”’” in order to afford “both the state 

court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. Daniel, ___U.S.___, ___, 135 

S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013)). 

As the Ninth Circuit has recently acknowledged, “[t]he question is whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Bemore v. 

Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1173 (2016) (quoting

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Richter, 562 U.S. at 105). See also Griffin v. Harrington, 727 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was 

unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell below 

Strickland’s standard.”) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101).

2. Failure to Request Jury Instruction on Defense of Accident

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request 

a jury instruction on the defense of accident with respect to the count involving G.D. He argues 

that the trial evidence reflected he may have touched G.D. while he was sleeping or in the process 

of waking up, and he notes that G.D. testified he thought the touching was accidental. (ECF No. 

1 at 5, 16, 19.)2 Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel’s failure to request such a jury 

instruction was prejudicial because, without it, the jury might not have realized that “if petitioner 

touched G.D. by accident, he did not have the requisite criminal intent and he had to be found not 

guilty of the nonforcible child molestation charge of which G.D. was the alleged victim.” (Id. at 

20.) He claims that the absence of an instruction on accident might have prevented the jury from 

fully considering his defense that the touching was accidental. (Id.)

 Petitioner raised this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal and in a petition 

for review filed in the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Lod. Docs. 5, 9.) The petition for 

review was summarily denied. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 10.) In the last reasoned decision on this 

claim, the California Court of Appeal ruled as follows:

Defendant's Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Failing to 

Request an Instruction on the Defense of Accident Because 

There Was No Evidence Defendant Accidentally Touched G.D., 

and Even If There Was, Defendant Was Not Prejudiced by 

Counsel's Failure

Defendant contends he “was denied his right to the effective 

assistance of counsel under the United States and California 

Constitutions when his trial attorney failed to request an instruction 

on the defense of accident” as to count two, which involved G.D. 

According to defendant, such an instruction was warranted because 

“there was substantial evidence that [he] touched [G.D.'s] penis by 

 

2

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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accident while they were both sleeping.” Defendant asserts he was 

prejudiced by counsel's failure because “the jury was not told by the 

trial court that if [defendant] touched [G.D.] by accident, he did not 

have the requisite criminal intent . . . .” We are not persuaded.

To prevail on his ineffective assistance claim, defendant must show 

both (1) that counsel's performance fell below a standard of 

reasonable competence, and (2) that counsel's shortcomings 

resulted in prejudice. (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 

569.) Defendant has done neither. As we shall explain, there is no 

evidence to support an instruction on the defense of accident, and 

even if there was, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure 

to request such an instruction because the jury was properly 

instructed on the issue which would have been presented to the jury 

by the omitted instruction.

Section 26 provides in part:

“All persons are capable of committing crimes except those 

belonging to the following classes: [¶] ... [¶]

“Three - Persons who committed the act . . . charged under an 

ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.

“Four - Persons who committed the act charged without being 

conscious thereof. 

“Five–Persons who committed the act . . . charged through 

misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil 

design, intention, or culpable negligence.” 

The defense of accident appears in CALCRIM No. 3404, which 

explains the defendant is not guilty of the charged offense if he 

acted “without the intent required for that crime, but acted instead 

accidentally.”

At trial, defendant, through his counsel, requested that the trial 

court instruct on the defense of unconsciousness in the language of 

CALCRIM No. 3425, which reads in pertinent part: “The defendant 

is not guilty of _________________ <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) 

acted while legally unconscious. Someone is legally unconscious 

when he or she is not conscious of his or her actions. [Someone 

may be unconscious even though able to move.] [¶] 

Unconsciousness may be caused by (a blackout[,]/ [or] an epileptic 

seizure [,]/ [or] involuntary intoxication[,]/ [or] sleepwalking [,]/ or 

_________________ <insert a similar condition> ).” The trial 

court declined defendant's request, concluding there was no 

substantial evidence to support such an instruction. Defendant does 

not appeal that ruling. Rather, he contends his trial counsel was 

ineffective for not requesting an instruction on the defense of 

accident because “there was substantial evidence that [defendant] 

touched [G.D.'s] penis by accident while they were both sleeping.”

Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines “sleep” as “the 

natural periodic suspension of consciousness during which the 

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powers of the body are restored . . . .” (Merriam–Webster's 

Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2006) p. 1171, col. 2, italics added.) 

Where the evidence shows the conscious mind of the accused 

ceased to operate and his actions were “‘controlled by the 

subconscious or subjective mind,’” the jury should be instructed as 

to the legal effect of such unconsciousness. (People v. Freeman

(1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 110, 118; People v. Roerman (1961) 189 

Cal.App.2d 150, 161; see People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 

717 [“An unconscious act within the contemplation of the Penal 

Code is one committed by a person who because of somnambulism 

[(an abnormal condition of sleep in which motor acts, such as 

sleepwalking are performed)], a blow on the head, or similar cause 

is not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be 

deemed volitional”], overruled on another ground in People v. 

Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165, & disapproved on another 

ground in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12; 

People v. Ferguson (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1083). Indeed, 

CALCRIM No. 3425 (Unconsciousness) lists “sleepwalking” as 

possible cause of a defendant's unconsciousness. Thus, if anything, 

evidence defendant was sleeping when he reached inside G.D.'s 

boxer shorts and touched G.D.'s penis gave rise to a defense of 

unconsciousness, not accident.

As defendant points out, courts have described the affirmative 

defense of accident as “a claim that the defendant acted without 

forming the mental state necessary to make his actions a crime.” 

(People v. Gonzales (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 390, disapproved 

on other ground in People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th at 998, fn. 

3.) While it is true that a person who does an act without being 

conscious thereof does so “without forming the mental state 

necessary to make his actions a crime,” it is apparent from section 

26 that the Legislature did not consider acts committed by a person 

without being conscious thereof to be accidents. Section 26 

separately delineates acts committed without being conscious 

thereof and acts committed through misfortune or accident. Had 

the Legislature intended that acts committed without the defendant 

being conscious thereof to be considered accidents, there would be 

no need to separately delineate a defense of unconsciousness. 

In any event, defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure 

to request the instruction because the jury was properly instructed 

that to find defendant guilty of committing a lewd act on a child 

under 14 it would have to conclude, inter alia, that defendant 

willfully touched G.D.'s penis with the intent of arousing himself or 

G.D. (See People v. Jones (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1303, 1314, 

disapproved on other grounds in People v. Anderson, supra, 51 

Cal.4th at p. 998, fn. 3.) The trial court instructed the jury, pursuant 

to CALCRIM No. 1110, that to find defendant guilty of the crime 

of committing a lewd act upon a child, it had to find defendant 

“willfully touched any part of a child's body . . . [¶] . . . with the 

intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or 

sexual desires of himself or the child . . . .” “Willfully” was 

properly defined for the jury as meaning “willingly or on purpose.”

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Given the jury's verdicts, it is clear, beyond credible argument, that 

the jury necessarily rejected the evidence adduced at trial that 

would have supported a finding that defendant's accident defense 

(meant to establish that he acted accidentally, and thus, without the 

requisite criminal intent, when he slipped his hand inside G.D.'s 

boxer shorts and touched his penis), thus, implicitly resolving the 

question of that defense adversely to defendant. (See People v. 

Jones, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1315–1316.)

Consequently, defendant cannot establish he was prejudiced by trial 

counsel's failure to request an instruction on the defense of 

accident, and his ineffective assistance claim fails.

Vargas, 2013 WL 4506768, at *2-4.

This court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on 

accident. As explained by the state court, petitioner’s jury was instructed that in order to find 

petitioner guilty on counts one and two, it must find that he willfully (defined as “willingly or on 

purpose”) touched any part of a child’s body. (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 104-05.) 

Petitioner’s trial counsel argued during closing argument that petitioner committed the acts while 

he was in the process of waking up and that his actions were not intentional. (Reporter’s 

Transcript on Appeal (RT), Vol. II, at 369-72.) The guilty verdict on the count involving G.D. 

reflects that the jury rejected petitioner’s argument that his actions were accidental and decided,

instead, that he acted “willingly or on purpose.” In light of the jury’s decision that petitioner did 

not touch G.D. by accident, a jury instruction explaining what the verdict should be if petitioner 

“committed the act . . . by accident” would not have led to a different result. 

The decision of the California Court of Appeal with respect to this claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel is not unreasonable and is certainly not “so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief.

3. Failure to Call G.D. as a Trial Witness

Petitioner claims that he was denied “due process, his right to present a defense, to compel 

witnesses for the defense, and effective assistance of counsel” when his trial counsel failed to call 

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G.D. as a defense witness. He states that G.D. could have “impeach[ed] or contradict[ed]” the 

testimony of J.D. (ECF No. 1 at 32.) Specifically, petitioner claims that G.D. would have 

testified that J.D. told him he did not believe his allegations against petitioner were accurate but 

that he did not want to change his story because he was afraid his biological father would be 

“mad at him” if he did. (ECF No. 1 at 8, 32.) 

In support of this claim, petitioner has attached a letter signed by G.D. on April 27, 2012, 

wherein G.D. states that petitioner touched him accidentally and that anything he told police to 

the contrary was a “lie.” He further states that “when my brother [J.D.], thought that it may have 

been a dream by asking, “If it was a dream, will I get in trouble,” and then confirmed it wasn’t 

true by saying, “My dad will be mad if I tell the truth, (meaning his biological dad) I then came 

clean about the lie I had told on Mr. Vargas.” (Id. at 42.) (emphasis in original.) Petitioner notes 

that Christina Vargas, the victims’ mother, testified that approximately a week and a half after the 

touching incident, J.D. asked her, “If it was a dream, will I get in trouble?” (RT at 295.) 

During his trial testimony, J.D. was asked by petitioner’s trial counsel whether he 

remembered telling his mother that he thought the touching incident was “probably a dream” but 

that he was afraid she and his biological father would be “mad at him” and that “everything was 

ruined.” (Id. at 133.) J.D. responded that he did not remember having this conversation. (Id.) 

Later, petitioner’s trial counsel asked Christina Vargas whether J.D. had made these statements to 

her, or whether J.D.’s biological father had said anything to J.D. about the touching incident. The 

trial court sustained objections to these questions and they were never answered. (Id. at 295, 

302.) Petitioner refers to all of this testimony, apparently in an attempt to support his claim that 

G.D. could have established that J.D. thought the touching incident was simply a dream but was 

afraid to change his story because he thought his biological father would be mad at him. (ECF 

No. 1 at 32.) Petitioner argues, “it is reasonably probable that with the mother’s statements, the 

counsel’s questioning of an interview that [J.D.] did not recall and the expected testimony of 

[G.D.] (age 18 at the time of trial) the jury would have found the inconsistencies of [J.D.’s] 

testimony and the pattern of the witnesses testimony to be unjust to bring a guilty verdict.” (Id. at 

32-33.)

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Petitioner explains that G.D. was “available and expected to testify” for the defense, but 

that trial counsel failed to call him. (Id. at 33.) He argues that G.D.’s testimony was “crucial” 

because the prosecutor “strategized to discredit Christina Vargas’ testimony to the jury.” (Id.) 

Petitioner contends that there was no reasonable tactical reason for trial counsel’s failure to call 

G.D. as a witness. 

Petitioner also informs the court that he retained his trial counsel, who had limited 

experience, with the understanding that a more senior attorney from the same law firm would “be 

at the defendant’s table during the trial to monitor and assist” trial counsel. (Id. at 34.) However, 

this promised assistance never materialized and petitioner’s counsel handled the trial on his own. 

(Id. at 34-35.) Petitioner states that he would not have agreed to retain trial counsel if he had 

known that counsel would not be assisted by a more experienced attorney. (Id. at 35.) He also 

states that his trial counsel was ill with the flu during trial and had to move for a one day 

continuance. (Id.) 

Essentially, petitioner is claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 

failing to call G.D. as a trial witness because G.D. could have: (1) provided support for his 

Christina Vargas’ testimony that J.D. expressed some doubts about his original accusations 

against petitioner; and (2) could have impeached J.D.’s testimony that the touching was 

intentional. Petitioner also appears to be claiming that his attorney’s inexperience, standing 

alone, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.3 

a. Exhaustion 

It does not appear that petitioner exhausted this ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 

state court. The arguments petitioner makes in support of this claim were not raised on appeal, in 

his petition for review, or in his habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court. 

 

3

 The court notes that G.D. testified for the prosecution and was cross-examined by petitioner’s 

trial counsel. During that cross-examination, counsel explored G.D.’s opinion that petitioner’s 

actions were accidental. He also explored the differences between G.D.’s trial testimony and his 

original statements to the police. (See, e.g., RT at 204-12, 215, 224.) Counsel did not, however,

ask G.D. about the topics petitioner now suggests in his claim before this court. Because G.D. 

was a trial witness, the court will analyze this claim as a failure by trial counsel to effectively 

cross-examine G.D. and not a failure to call G.D. as a witness.

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Generally, a state prisoner must exhaust all available state court remedies either on direct 

appeal or through collateral proceedings before a federal court may consider granting habeas 

corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A state prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by 

fairly presenting his claim to the appropriate state courts at all appellate stages afforded under 

state law. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th 

Cir. 2004). However, an application for a writ of habeas corpus “may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the 

State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Even assuming arguendo that petitioner’s third claim for relief is 

unexhausted, this court will recommend that it be denied on the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(2).

b. Background

The state court record reflects the following: Christina Vargas was asked by petitioner’s 

trial counsel whether J.D. ever told her “that he may have dreamt the entire matter.” (RT at 295.) 

As set forth above, she said “yes,” and explained that, about a week and a half after the incident, 

J.D. asked her, “if it was a dream, will I get in trouble?” (Id.) She also testified that sometimes 

J.D. had trouble distinguishing dreams from events that had actually occurred. (Id. at 297-98.) 

Trial counsel asked Ms. Vargas several times whether J.D.’s father had said anything to him 

about the touching incident. (Id.) Objections to these questions were all sustained. (Id. at 295, 

302.) Ms. Vargas also testified that J.D.’s description of the touching incident changed in several 

particulars over time. (Id. at 297.) In addition, G.D. told her that his initial statements to the 

police about petitioner touching him inappropriately were “a misrepresentation.” (Id. at 300.) 

Vargas agreed that, approximately a week and a half after petitioner’s arrest, J.D. and G.D. started 

“backing off” their original statements to police. (Id. at 317.) 

G.D. testified that petitioner touched him inappropriately several years prior to the 

incident with J.D. (Id. at 180.) He described that incident in some detail. (Id. at 185-87, 188-93.) 

However, he also testified that his statements to the police describing this incident were not true.

Specifically, he stated:

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It wasn’t – I don’t believe it was true, because the day it happened, 

or the day my little brother told me, you know, I had a lot of – a lot 

of thoughts going through my mind, and I was upset. 

(Id. at 188.) He testified that petitioner would never “purposely do something like that to me.” 

(Id. at 207.) He also testified that he now believed the touching was an accident and that he had 

mischaracterized to the police what had happened. (Id. at 209-11.) He stated:

. . . I don’t think it was purposely done. I think it was accidental. 

We were both sleeping, and his hand accidentally fell on me right 

there.

(Id. at 215.) 

During closing argument, petitioner’s trial counsel argued that J.D. may have simply 

dreamed that petitioner touched him inappropriately, as evidenced by his statements to his mother 

and the fact that he sometimes had trouble distinguishing dreams from reality. (Id. at 373-74, 

378.) Counsel emphasized the ways in which J.D.’s description of the touching incident changed 

over time. (Id. at 375-76.) He noted that G.D. also eventually recanted his initial accusations. 

(Id. at 374.) 

c. Analysis

After a thorough review of the record, including the testimony set forth above, this court 

concludes that petitioner has failed to demonstrate his trial counsel’s decision not to crossexamine G.D. about J.D.’s questions or statements to his mother and/or to G.D. “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness” or was outside “the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. It is possible that counsel believed 

G.D.’s answers would have been inadmissible, cumulative, or unhelpful to the defense. The court 

notes, in this regard, that virtually all of this information came before the jury through the 

testimony of Christina Vargas. Petitioner has failed to overcome the strong presumption that 

counsel’s decision not to cross-examine G.D. about the subjects suggested by petitioner was a 

reasonable tactical decision and sound trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90 

(reasonable tactical decisions, including decisions with regard to the presentation of the case, are 

“virtually unchallengeable”); United States v. Opplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1071-72 (9th Cir.1998), 

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) ( per 

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curiam ) (a decision not to call a witness based upon sound logic and tactics does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel); Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir.1991) (a 

tactical decision not to call a particular witness cannot form the basis of a ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, even if the defendant disagrees with the decision). 

Nor has petitioner demonstrated that trial counsel’s actions resulted in prejudice. By 

virtue of the testimony described above, petitioner’s jury learned that both J.D. and G.D. partially 

recanted their allegations against petitioner after his arrest. They were told that J.D. suggested the 

whole thing might have been a dream and that sometimes he could not distinguish dreams from 

reality. All questions about whether J.D.’s father had spoken to him about the molestation were 

blocked by the trial judge. Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability the 

result of the proceedings would have been different if G.D. had been asked whether J.D. told his 

mother the molestation incident might have been a dream but was afraid to change his story 

because his biological father might be upset. 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s lack of experience, 

standing alone, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. As respondent points out, “[i]t is 

well established that an ineffective assistance claim cannot be based solely on counsel's 

inexperience.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. 

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 (1984) (Supreme Court rejected an ineffective assistance claim based 

on allegations that the appointed trial attorney was young, that his principal practice was in real 

estate, and that this was his first jury trial). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, petitioner is 

not entitled to habeas relief on his third claim for relief.

4

 

/////

/////

 

4

 Although petitioner also alleges that his rights to due process, to present a defense, and to 

compel witnesses for the defense were violated, his allegations solely concern trial counsel’s 

deficient performance. Trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine G.D. about J.D.’s statements did 

not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair, prevent him from presenting his defense, or 

prevent him from calling witnesses in his defense. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief 

on any such claim.

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B. Sentencing Error 

In his second claim for relief, petitioner argues that the trial court committed sentencing 

error and abused its discretion when it “used alleged circumstances in aggravation that were not 

supported by the record to justify imposition of the middle term of imprisonment on the Count I 

non-forcible child molestation conviction.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Specifically, petitioner claims that 

the evidence introduced at his trial did not support a finding that the count involving J.D. 

“disclosed a high degree of cruelty, viciousness and callousness, and that the crimes involved 

violent conduct.” (Id. at 23, 25-26.) He argues:

In the present case, [petitioner] was only charged and convicted of a 

violation of section 288, subdivision (a). This is a child molestation 

offense committed without violence. In addition, there no evidence 

that [petitioner] used any violence during commission of either 

offense. Further, [petitioner] had scored a zero on the Static 99, 

indicating he was not a danger to commit further offenses. Thus, 

any finding that the crime involved acts of violence, or that 

[petitioner] was a danger to society, was simply not supported by 

the record.

(Id. at 26.) Petitioner further claims that if an objection was required to preserve this issue on 

appeal, his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to his sentence on the 

count involving J.D. (Id. at 7, 27-30.)

1. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Petitioner’s claims in this regard were not raised on direct appeal, in his petition for 

review, or in his habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court. (See Resp’t’s Lod. Docs. 

5, 9, 11.) Accordingly, they appear to be unexhausted. However, this court will recommend that 

these claims be denied on the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

As set forth above, the California Court of Appeal ruled, in part, that petitioner forfeited 

his sentencing claim because his trial counsel failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to his 

sentence at the time it was imposed. Respondent argues the state court’s finding of waiver based 

on the lack of a contemporaneous objection constitutes a state procedural bar precluding this 

court from addressing the merits of petitioner’s sentencing claim. (ECF No. 15 at 29). 

State courts may decline to review a claim based on a procedural default. Wainwright v. 

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977). As a general rule, a federal habeas court “‘will not review a 

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question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law 

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” 

Calderon v. United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). The state rule is only “adequate” if it is 

“firmly established and regularly followed.” Id. (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 

(1991)). See also Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F 3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[t]o be deemed 

adequate, the state law ground for decision must be well-established and consistently applied.”) 

The state rule must also be “independent” in that it is not “interwoven with the federal law.” Park 

v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 

1040-41 (1983)). Even if the state rule is independent and adequate, the claims may be heard if

the petitioner can show: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged 

violation of federal law; or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50. 

Respondent has met his burden of adequately pleading an independent and adequate state 

procedural ground as an affirmative defense. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Petitioner does not 

deny that his trial counsel failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to his midterm sentence on 

count one. Although the state appellate court proceeded to address petitioner’s sentencing claim 

on the merits, it also expressly held that the issue was waived on appeal because of defense 

counsel’s failure to object at trial. Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of asserting specific 

factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of California’s contemporaneous-objection 

rule as unclear, inconsistently applied or not well-established, either as a general rule or as 

applied to him. Bennet, 322 F.3d at 586; Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 

2002). Petitioner’s claim of sentencing error therefore appears to be procedurally barred. See

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 747; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Paulino v. Castro, 371 

F.3d 1083, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that there was cause 

for his procedural default or that a miscarriage of justice would result absent review of the claims 

by this federal habeas court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748; Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 

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957-58 (9th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, even if this claim were not procedurally barred, for the 

following reasons it lacks merit and should be denied. 

2. State Court Decision

The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s sentencing claims on direct appeal, 

largely on state law grounds. The court reasoned as follows:

Defendant Forfeited His Claim of Sentencing Error by Failing 

to Object Below; and, Even Assuming His Trial Counsel Was 

Ineffective in Failing to Object Below, Defendant Was Not 

Prejudiced by Counsel's Failure

Defendant contends “[t]he trial court abused its discretion when it 

used alleged circumstances in aggravation that were not supported 

by the record to justify imposition of the middle term of 

imprisonment” on count one. Acknowledging his failure to object

to the court's reliance on the challenged circumstances below, 

defendant further asserts that “if an objection was required[,] . . . 

[he] was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.” As 

we shall explain, defendant forfeited his claim by failing to object 

below, and even assuming his trial counsel was ineffective, he was 

not prejudiced by counsel's failure.

The sentencing options available for a defendant convicted of 

committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years are 

prison terms of three, six, or eight years. (§ 288, subd. (a).) In 

pronouncing sentence, the trial court is required to “select the term 

which, in the court's discretion, best serves the interests of justice.” 

(§ 1170, subd. (b).) We review the trial court's sentencing decisions 

under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. 

Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) A trial court abuses its 

discretion if it relies upon circumstances that are not relevant to the 

decision or that otherwise constitute an improper basis for the 

decision. (Ibid.)

As a preliminary matter, we find defendant forfeited his claim by 

failing to object to the trial court's reliance on the challenged 

circumstances in aggravation below. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 

Cal.4th 331, 353.) Assuming for argument's sake that counsel 

performed ineffectively at sentencing, remand is unnecessary 

because defendant has not shown it is reasonably probable the court 

would have chosen the lower term had counsel raised a timely 

objection. (See People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 569.)

At sentencing, the trial court received into evidence the probation 

report, the prosecution's statement in aggravation, a letter in 

aggravation from J.D., and testimony in support from defendant's 

family and friends. The probation report listed four circumstances 

in aggravation: the crime involved acts disclosing a high degree of 

cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; the manner in which the crime 

was carried out indicates planning; defendant took advantage of a 

position of trust as the victims' stepfather/mother's boyfriend; and 

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defendant engaged in violent conduct, which indicates a danger to 

society. Defendant contends there was no evidence the crime 

involved acts that disclosed a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or 

callousness or that he engaged in violent conduct.

In addition to the challenged circumstances, the probation report 

noted the manner in which the crimes were carried out indicates 

planning, and defendant took advantage of a position of trust. 

Defendant does not challenge the trial court's reliance on those 

circumstances in aggravation, and they are well supported in the 

record. Defendant waited until the victims were asleep before 

touching them, which indicates planning, and his position as J.D.'s 

stepfather and G.D.'s mother's boyfriend shows defendant took 

advantage of a position of trust. As defendant points out, the report 

also cites two factors in mitigation; however, the trial court 

discounted those circumstances at sentencing, stating: “The Court 

has seen the mitigating facts here that the defendant has no criminal 

record of conduct, but the Court's sentencing the defendant for a 

particularly old case in regard to Count One.”5The court 

continued, “defendant has led a generically productive life, and this 

is his first criminal conviction. But then you look at the 

aggravating factors . . . . [¶] This is a matter where as to Count 

One, the appropriate thing is to sentence the defendant to the 

midterm, which is six years in state prison.” The court also 

emphasized the circumstance of defendant's position of trust, 

stating, “the harm that [defendant's conduct] does to that family unit 

is apparent to the Court with the position that one of the victims has 

taken in front of the Court, in front of the jury, and today at 

sentencing.”6

On this record, we find it is not reasonably probable the trial court 

would have imposed a lesser sentence had it known it could not rely 

on the challenged circumstances. Thus, even assuming defendant's 

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the challenged 

circumstances, defendant was not prejudiced by the error. 

Accordingly, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails.

Vargas, 2013 WL 4506768, at *4-5.

3. Analysis

Petitioner’s federal habeas challenge to the trial court’s decision to sentence him to the 

middle term on count one essentially involves an interpretation of state sentencing law. As 

 

5

 It appears the court was referring to count 2 as the “old case,” but erroneously stated “Count 

One” because the conduct that forms the basis of count one (J.D.) occurred in 2011, while the 

conduct that forms the basis of count two (G.D.) occurred in approximately 2005.

6

 At trial, G.D. testified that it appeared defendant was asleep when he touched G.D. and, thus, 

he believed the touching was accidental. At the sentencing hearing, G.D. said he believed 

defendant “is most definitely innocent” and that the “whole thing was accidental.”

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explained above, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court 

determinations on state law questions.” Wilson, 562 U.S. at 5 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-

68). This federal habeas court is bound by the state court’s interpretation of state law. Bradshaw, 

546 U.S. at 76; Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993). So long as a sentence 

imposed by a state court “is not based on any proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel and 

unusual, racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the penalties for violation of 

state statutes are matters of state concern.” Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th 

Cir. 1976). Thus, “[a]bsent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication 

of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 

461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner has failed to show that his sentence of the middle term for 

committing a lewd and lascivious act on J.D. is fundamentally unfair. 

Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing 

hearing should also be rejected. The Strickland standards apply in the context of noncapital 

sentencing proceedings. Daire v. Lattimore, 812 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2016). See also Glover v. 

United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-04 (2001). However, as noted by the California Court of 

Appeal, the trial judge’s remarks at sentencing reflect that he would not have imposed a lesser 

sentence on count one even if petitioner’s trial counsel had made the argument that two of the 

factors in aggravating did not apply. Specifically, the judge tended to discount the mitigating 

factor of “no criminal record of conduct” because petitioner’s molestation of G.D. had simply 

gone undetected. The judge also appeared to be troubled by the impact of petitioner’s actions on 

G.D., who originally told his mother that petitioner touched him inappropriately but changed his 

story over time and ultimately testified at the sentencing hearing that the molestation was 

accidental and that petitioner was innocent. As noted by the California Court of Appeal, the trial 

judge stated, “[t]he fact that the victims care for this defendant who served for years as their 

father figure and actual provider just underscores from the Court’s perspective the psychological 

harm that’s done by this particular type of offense, lewd acts with a minor.” (RT at 406.) 

The conclusion of the California Court of Appeal that the sentencing judge would not 

have imposed a shorter sentence even if petitioner’s trial counsel had objected to the aggravating 

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factors of cruelty and violence is not unreasonable, given the judge’s comments at the sentencing 

hearing. Trial counsel’s failure to raise a meritless objection to petitioner’s sentence does not 

constitute ineffective assistance. See Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citing Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985)) (an attorney’s failure to make a 

meritless objection or motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel)); see also

Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009) (counsel’s failure to object to 

testimony on hearsay grounds not ineffective where objection would have been properly 

overruled); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (“the failure to take a futile action 

can never be deficient performance”). 

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim of 

sentencing error or on his related claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

C. Trial Court’s Failure to Modify or Drop Charges

In his final ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court “neglected to exercise its 

power to modify or drop charges under Penal Code §1118.1 after hearing the case and adding a 

lesser included offense on the jury instructions after determining there was no evidence to support 

the charges.”

7

 (ECF No. 1 at 36.) Petitioner contends that the trial judge improperly denied his 

motion to “dismiss Penal Code 288 from the jury instructions due to a lack of evidence as 

supported by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution.” 8 (Id.) Petitioner also argues there was “no testimony, nor any substantial evidence 

 

7

 Cal. Penal Code § 1118.1 provides:

In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or 

on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and 

before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the 

entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses 

charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the 

court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or 

offenses on appeal. If such a motion for judgment of acquittal at 

the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution is not granted, 

the defendant may offer evidence without first having reserved that 

right.

8

 As set forth above, petitioner was charged with two counts of committing lewd or lascivious 

acts on a minor, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288.

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introduced to justify a 288 took place to support judgement [sic] on either count.” (Id. at 37-38.) 

He contends that the evidence, at most, supported a charge of “simple battery.” (Id. at 38.) 

Petitioner requests that the “verdict be reversed to the lesser included offense of simple battery 

(Penal Code 242) or acquittal on both counts.” (Id. at 39.)

Respondent argues that petitioner’s claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion 

for acquittal under Cal. Penal Code § 1118.1 is unexhausted. Even assuming the claim is 

unexhausted, it should be denied. As set forth above, a claim based on a violation of a state 

statute is not cognizable in federal habeas. Estelle, 501 U.S. at 67-68. Petitioner’s claim that the 

trial court violated state law in denying his motion for acquittal, which is solely a matter of state 

concern, should be denied. See Jones v. Hedgpeth, No. EDCV 08-1353 JHN (FFM), 2011 WL 

7563886, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011) (challenge to trial court’s failure to grant motion of 

acquittal under § 1118.1 not cognizable in federal habeas action because it involves solely a 

matter of state law).

Petitioner also appears to be raising a claim that the evidence introduced at his trial is 

insufficient to support his conviction on counts one and two. This claim was arguably raised by 

petitioner in his habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court. (See Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 

11 at “page 6 of 12.”) The Supreme Court denied that habeas petition with citations to In re 

Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 (1953), and In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 (2947). (Respondent’s 

Lod. Doc. 12.) Respondent argues the Supreme Court’s citations to In re Dixon and In re Lindley

constitutes a state procedural bar precluding this court from addressing the merits of petitioner’s 

claim of insufficient evidence. (ECF No. 15 at 37.) This court will assume petitioner’s claim of 

insufficient evidence is not barred and will address it on the merits. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 

520 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1997) (a reviewing court need not invariably resolve the question of 

procedural default prior to ruling on the merits of a claim if procedural bar issues are more 

complex than the merits issues presented); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 

2002) (same).

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

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charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There is sufficient evidence to support a 

conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[T]he dispositive question under 

Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 318). Put another way, “a reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground 

of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos 

v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2, *4 (2011).

In conducting federal habeas review of a claim of insufficient evidence, “all evidence 

must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Ngo v. Giurbino, 651 F.3d 

1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). “Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences 

to draw from the evidence presented at trial,” and it requires only that they draw “‘reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Coleman v. Johnson,___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 

2060, 2064 (2012) ( per curiam ) (citation omitted). “‘Circumstantial evidence and inferences 

drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.’” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 

(9th Cir.1995) (citation omitted).

“A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus faces a heavy burden when challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due process grounds.” 

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). In order to grant relief, the federal habeas 

court must find that the decision of the state court rejecting an insufficiency of the evidence claim 

reflected an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. 

Ngo, 651 F.3d at 1115; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 & n.13. Thus, when a federal habeas court 

assesses a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a state court conviction under AEDPA, “there 

is a double dose of deference that can rarely be surmounted.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 

964 (9th Cir. 2011). The federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in reference 

to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983.

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After reviewing the state court record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, this 

court concludes that there was sufficient evidence introduced at petitioner’s trial to support his 

convictions for committing lewd and lascivious conduct. There was significant evidence 

supporting petitioner’s convictions on both of the counts against him through the testimony of 

both victims and their mother. It is true that there was also evidence that the victims recanted

their original allegations, or at least called them into question. However, the question in this 

federal habeas action is not whether there was evidence from which the jury could have found for 

the petitioner. Rather, in order to obtain federal habeas relief on this claim, petitioner must 

demonstrate that the state courts’ denial of relief was an objectively unreasonable application of 

the decisions in Jackson and Winship to the facts of this case. Specifically, he must show that no 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the counts against him beyond a 

reasonable doubt and that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury’s decision. 

Petitioner has failed to make this showing. Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief 

on his claim of insufficient evidence.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing 

/////

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Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

Dated: May 6, 2016

Dmou8(2);vargas2211.hc(du)

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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