Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-03-03241/USCOURTS-ca10-03-03241-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stacie K. Crass
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 12 2005 

TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

V. 

No. 03-3241 

(D.C. No. 02-CR-10182-01-JTM) 

(Kansas) 

STACIE K. CRASS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

Stacie Crass pled guilty to one count of illegal use of a communication 

device to facilitate the commission of a felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 

Based on a total offense level of 29 and criminal history category of II, Ms. 

Crass' sentencing guidelines range was 97 to 121 months of imprisonment. 

Because the statutory maximum penalty for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) is 

• This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court 

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order 

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

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four years, Ms. Crass' guideline range was capped at forty-eight months pursuant 

to U .S.S.G. § 5G 1.1 (a). The district court sentenced Ms. Crass to twenty-one 

months incarceration, departing downward from the guidelines sentence on two 

grounds: ( 1) exceptional post-offense rehabilitation and (2) diminished capacity 

as a result of her unmedicated bi-polar condition. The government appeals. We 

reverse in part and remand for resentencing. 

After noticing some suspicious activity involving a Jeep and a Pontiac, 

police officers stopped the Jeep, which was driven by Ms. Crass, for traffic 

violations. Jonas Crass, her husband, was a passenger in the Jeep. After citing 

Ms. Crass for traffic infractions, officers asked for consent to search the vehicle. 

When Ms. Crass refused, the officers summoned a drug dog, which alerted to the 

outside of the Jeep. Mr. and Ms. Crass were placed in custody and transported to 

police headquarters. During a police interview, Mr. Crass admitted to selling two 

pounds of marijuana to Robert Rotramel the evening of the traffic stop. The 

Pontiac was located later and two pounds of marijuana were found inside. 

Ms. Crass confirmed her husband's version of events. She also informed 

the police there was approximately one-half pound of methamphetamine at her 

house, left there by her husband's friend, Robert Montoya, who commonly sold 

methamphetamine. The officers obtained a waiver to search the Crasses' home 

and discovered 67 .04 grams of actual methamphetamine on the premises. Ms. 

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Crass subsequently pled guilty to one count of illegal use of a communication 

device to facilitate the commission of a felony. In sentencing her, the district 

court departed downward to a sentence of twenty-one months incarceration. 

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 

738 (2005), sentencing courts could depart from the applicable guideline range in 

criminal cases if "the court [ found] that there exist[ ed] an aggravating or 

mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 

consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(b)(l). In a pre-Booker review of a sentencing departure, we apply 

the four steps outlined in United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (10th 

Cir. 2003). 1 First, we ascertain whether the court set forth its specific reasons for 

departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(A); id. § 3553(c)(2). Second, we consider, de 

nova, "whether the factors the district court relied upon advance the objectives set 

forth in section 3553(a)(2)" and ensure that the court's reliance on those factors 

did not violate any specific prohibition in the guidelines. Jones, 332 F.3d at 

1299. Third, we determine, de nova, whether the factors the district court relied 

'Ms. Crass argued in a FED. R. APP. P. 28U) letter that we should conduct a 

reasonableness review pursuant to United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 73 8 (2005), 

and affirm her sentence. This court does not consider arguments raised for the 

first time in 28U) letters. See United States v. Sanchez-Cruz, 392 F.3d 1196, 1201 

(10th Cir. 2004) ( declining to consider Blakely argument first raised in a 28U) 

letter); United States v. Lindsey, 389 F.3d 1334, 1335 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (same). 

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upon are "authorized under section 3553(b )" and "justified by the facts of the 

case." Id. at 1299-1300 (citations omitted). Finally, we review the degree of 

departure for reasonableness and do not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Id. 

at 1300. 

In its Statement of Reasons, the district court concluded that Ms. Crass' 

conduct fell sufficiently outside the applicable guideline heartland to warrant 

downward departures. The court satisfied the requirement of setting forth its 

reasons for departure with the following specific reasons: (1) Ms. Crass' 

"exceptional rehabilitative efforts" and (2) her "diminished capacity at the time 

the offense was committed." Aplt. App., vol. I at 115. The government does not 

contend the factors relied on by the district court would never be valid grounds 

for a departure. It asserts instead that the factors are not justified by the record in 

this case. We agree insofar as the departure was based on exceptional postoffense rehabilitative efforts. 

The government points out that "post-offense rehabilitation is accounted for 

in the context of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 

3E 1.1, comment. (n.1 (g)), and thus may not serve as a basis for departure unless it 

is present to an exceptional degree." United States v. Benally, 215 F .3d 1068, 

1075 (10th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Whitaker, 152 F.3d 1238, 1240 

(10th Cir. 1998) ("post-offense rehabilitation can only be an appropriate ground 

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for downward departure if the efforts are of a magnitude that the defendant's 

situation cannot be considered typical of those where an acceptance of 

responsibility adjustment is granted"). Thus, we must determine whether the 

record supports the court's conclusion that Ms. Crass' rehabilitation was 

sufficiently exceptional to warrant a departure from the mandatory guidelines. 

In assessing Ms. Crass' post-offense rehabilitation, the district court relied 

on two reports, one from the Women's Recovery Center of Central Kansas and 

one from the Wichita Area Sexuality Assault Center. The former, entitled 

"Footprints Program Progress Report," detailed that Ms. Crass had "been using 

some type of substance for approximately twenty years, with only brief periods of 

abstinence." Aplt. App., vol. I at 51. Ms. Crass' counselor noted that she attends 

weekly group counseling and at least three weekly twelve-step meetings. Id. The 

report stated that Ms. Crass was becoming less self-centered, improving her 

parenting skills, gaining empathy for her peers, and working on avoiding 

manipulative patterns. Id. at 51-52. The report concluded: "If [Ms. Crass] 

continues to make recovery a priority and work on her core issues, she has a good 

chance of succeeding in recovery. Her prognosis is currently Fair to Guarded." 

Id. at 52. The Wichita Area Sexual Assault Center letter added that Ms. Crass 

"has been attending support group and one-on-one crisis counseling sessions." Id. 

at 53. In support group, she "has participated and provided valuable insight to 

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members. In one-on-one crisis counseling sessions, she is making many 

discoveries about the link between addiction and sexual violence." Id. 

The district court's decision to depart downward on Ms. Crass' sentence 

was based on her "complete detoxification and her recovery from continuing drug 

addiction," id. at 100, and, indeed, Ms. Crass' post-offense behavior has been 

laudable. The government, however, emphasizes that Ms. Crass' participation in 

the substance abuse program was ordered as a condition of her pre-trial release. 

Id. at 24. Moreover, Ms. Crass was instructed to "refrain from any use of 

alcohol" or other controlled substances. Id. She was subject to random drug and 

alcohol testing and screening, and she was told that: 

[a] violation of any of [her] conditions of release may result in the 

immediate issuance of a warrant for [her] arrest, a revocation of release, an 

order of detention, and a prosecution for contempt of court and could result 

in a term of imprisonment, a fine, or both. 

Id. at 25. The Women's Recovery Center of Central Kansas' "Client Guidelines 

and Behavioral Expectations" required all clients to "be completely drug free 

during treatment ... Use of alcohol or other drugs of any kind is prohibited." Id. 

at 11. A violation of the Women's Recovery Center guidelines would "result in 

an Administrative Discharge." Id. 

In sum, Ms. Crass was released on the condition that she participate in an 

inpatient or outpatient substance abuse therapy and counseling program and be 

subject to random drug and alcohol screening. She has certainly complied with 

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the formal requirements of the program; she has attended her family and group 

counseling sessions and she has remained drug free and sober. Nonetheless, Ms. 

Crass' s post-arrest behavior reflects little more than her compliance with the 

conditions of her release and the requirements of the Women's Recovery Center. 

See Benally, 215 F.3d at 1076, 1077 (reversing downward departure where 

defendant's "post-arrest sobriety reflects little more than his compliance with the 

conditions of his release to a half-way house"). This was simply not enough 

under the mandatory guidelines regime which existed pre-Booker. 2 The 

acceptance of responsibility guideline, U .S.S.G. § 3E 1.1 cmt. n.1 (g), specifically 

contemplates an adjustment for post-offense rehabilitative effort, and Ms. Crass 

received that adjustment. Absent "additional evidence or explanation as to why 

[Ms. Crass'] rehabilitative efforts went beyond that contemplated by U.S.S.G. § 

3El.1," id., we must hold that the district court's three-level downward departure 

2

Compare United States v. Kapitzke, 130 F .3d 820, 823-24 (8th Cir. 1997) 

( approving a downward departure for extraordinary post-offense rehabilitation 

where defendant had voluntarily entered sex offender and chemical dependency 

treatment before he was aware that federal charges would be filed against him; 

"attended some type of therapy or support group almost every night"; "received 

excellent progress reports"; submitted reports that the director of the sex offender 

treatment plan was "extremely impressed" with his efforts and believed that 

defendant had "a high probability of success"; submitted reports that his chemical 

dependency counselor "had never seen a client work harder" than defendant in 

seven years and that defendant's prognosis was "very good"; and submitted a 

report from his physician that he had "shown an extraordinary desire to recover 

from all of his addictions, as well as an 'extraordinary willingness to do whatever 

necessary to achieve that end'"). 

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for her post-arrest behavior was not justified by the facts of this case. 

Because we reverse on the basis of the post-offense rehabilitation departure 

and must remand for resentencing in any event, we need not decide whether the 

district court's departure on the basis of diminished capacity was warranted. See 

United States v. Cano-Silva, No. 03-4059, 03-4108, 2005 WL 698983, at *6 

(10th Cir. Mar. 28, 2005) (reversing on one ground and remanding for 

resentencing in light of Booker without addressing second ground). Ms. Crass' 

resentencing proceeding should be conducted pursuant to the Supreme Court's 

decision in Booker. The district court may determine anew whether Ms. Crass 

was entitled to a downward departure under the guidelines and then "take account 

of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals" in imposing her sentence. 

Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764; see also Cano-Silva, 2005 WL 698983, at *6. 

We REVERSE the decision to depart downward based on extraordinary 

post-arrest rehabilitation and REMAND to the district court with orders to vacate 

the sentence and resentence Ms. Crass consistent with Booker. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

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