Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03099/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03099-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Manuel De Jesus Ventura
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 5, 2008 Decided May 15, 2009 

No. 07-3099 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

MANUEL DE JESUS VENTURA, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 04cr00288-01) 

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Laura G. Quint, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance. 

Justin E. Dillon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Elizabeth 

Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: ROGERS, BROWN, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

USCA Case #07-3099 Document #1181005 Filed: 05/15/2009 Page 1 of 18
2 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Appellant Manuel De Jesus 

Ventura challenges the sentence imposed for his crime of 

entering the United States after being deported for a felony 

conviction. Ventura argues that his prior conviction was not a 

“crime of violence,” as the district court found, but was 

instead an “aggravated felony,” which triggers a less severe 

sentencing range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 

We agree, vacate, and remand for resentencing in light of the 

correct range. 

I.

 Ventura, a citizen of El Salvador, first entered the United 

States illegally in 1997 and was deported within a month. He 

returned to the United States illegally in 1999 and while here 

committed the crime that is at the center of this case. In 2000, 

the Commonwealth of Virginia charged Ventura with 

felonious abduction in violation of VA. CODE § 18.2-47, 

which prohibits unlawfully seizing or detaining another 

person. Ventura pleaded nolo contendere. The Virginia court 

found him “guilty as charged in the indictment.” Tr. of Plea 

Colloquy at 17, Commonwealth v. Hernandez-Chacon, No. 

98623 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 18, 2000),1 and sentenced him to 

eighteen months in prison. When the immigration authorities 

learned Ventura had reentered the country illegally, they 

deported him again in November 2002. 

 Ventura soon returned to the country and to his criminal 

ways. In 2004 the D.C. Superior Court sentenced him to six 

years in prison for, among other crimes, armed assault with 

 

1

 Although the defendant in the Virginia case was named “Mario 

Hernandez-Chacon,” and the defendant here is named “Manuel De 

Jesus Ventura,” the parties assure us that the two are in fact the 

same person. 

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3 

intent to commit robbery. While Ventura was serving that 

sentence, federal authorities realized he was once again in the 

country illegally. The government charged him with the crime 

of reentering the United States after having been deported 

following conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2).2

 The aggravated felony was the 

Virginia abduction. Ventura pleaded guilty. 

The district court sentenced Ventura on March 7, 2005. 

The central dispute at sentencing was the calculation of the 

appropriate Guidelines range. The base offense level for the 

crime of unlawful reentry is 8. See U.S. SENTENCING 

GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.S.G.) § 2L1.2(a) (2004). The 

Guidelines direct the court to apply the greatest of several 

possible increases based on the criminal conviction that 

preceded the defendant’s deportation. If the defendant was 

convicted of an “aggravated felony,” the court applies an 

eight-level increase. Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). Because Ventura 

pleaded guilty to reentering the country after conviction for an 

aggravated felony, he did not contest the eight-level increase. 

But some aggravated felonies are also “crimes of violence,” 

which instead trigger a sixteen-level increase under the 

Guidelines. Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The government’s 

presentence investigation report (PSR) concluded that 

Ventura’s Virginia conviction was one of those crimes. 

Ventura disputed the PSR’s conclusion, arguing that his 

aggravated felony conviction was not a crime of violence. 

 

2

 Section 1326(a) provides that “any alien who (1) has been denied 

admission, excluded, deported, or removed . . . and thereafter (2) 

enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United 

States . . . shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more 

than 2 years, or both.” An alien “whose removal was subsequent to 

a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony . . . shall be 

fined under such Title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). 

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Reading United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), to 

relieve him of the need to make a specific finding about the 

applicable Guidelines range, the district judge saw no need to 

resolve this dispute. Instead, the court weighed the various 

factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced Ventura 

to 93 months’ imprisonment, a sentence within the applicable 

Guidelines range had the court expressly found that Ventura 

was convicted of a crime of violence. Ventura appealed, and 

we reversed, explaining that under Booker “sentencing courts 

remain obligated to calculate and consider the appropriate 

guidelines range.” United States v. Ventura, 481 F.3d 821, 

823 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Because the district court had 

“expressly eschewed making a specific finding as to the 

guidelines range applicable to Ventura,” id., we remanded for 

it to do so. On remand, the district court concluded that the 

Virginia conviction was for a crime of violence and applied a 

sixteen-level increase to Ventura’s base offense level. The 

resulting sentencing range was 77 to 96 months.3

 The court 

sentenced Ventura to 84 months’ imprisonment, to be served 

after the six-year D.C. Superior Court sentence and to be 

followed by three years’ supervised release. Ventura appeals. 

 

3

 The district court calculated this range by starting with the base 

offense level of 8 for unlawful reentry. It added 16 levels for 

conviction of a crime of violence (bringing the level to 24) then 

subtracted 2 levels for acceptance of responsibility (producing a 

final offense level of 22). The court then looked to the PSR to 

determine Ventura’s criminal history category. The PSR calculated 

eleven criminal history points based on Ventura’s prior convictions, 

placing him in criminal history category V. The district court 

therefore looked to the intersection between offense level 22 and 

criminal history category V on the 2004 Guidelines sentencing 

table to find the specified range of 77 to 96 months. 

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II.

 The question we must decide under the Sentencing 

Guidelines is whether Ventura’s Virginia conviction for 

abduction was for a crime of violence, as the district court 

concluded, or for an aggravated felony, as Ventura contends. 

If it was a crime of violence, the sixteen-level enhancement 

was appropriate. If not, the court should have applied the 

eight-level enhancement for aggravated felony convictions, 

and Ventura’s Guidelines sentencing range would have been 

only 33 to 41 months.4

A. 

 Distinguishing between the two can be a complicated 

task. The commentary to the sentencing guideline for 

unlawful reentry, which controls our interpretation, see 

Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993), defines 

“crime of violence” as 

murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, 

forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a 

minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension 

of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any offense under 

federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, 

 

4

 Had the district court determined that Ventura’s past conviction 

was only an aggravated felony, it would have calculated the 

sentencing range by starting with the same base offense level of 8. 

The court would then have added 8 levels for conviction of an 

aggravated felony and subtracted 2 levels for acceptance of 

responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 14. Using the 

PSR’s conclusion as to criminal history, the court would have 

looked to the intersection of offense level 14 and criminal history 

category V on the 2004 Guidelines sentencing table. The specified 

range is 33 to 41 months. 

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attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 

the person of another. 

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). A sentencing court 

applying this definition immediately encounters an obstacle: 

there is no uniformly accepted meaning of any of the listed 

crimes—a consequence of the federalism principles that have 

shaped criminal law in the United States. 

The Supreme Court confronted this problem in Taylor v. 

United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), when it was asked to 

determine for sentencing purposes under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), whether a defendant had 

been convicted of a “violent felony.” That statute defines 

“violent felony” in the same way the Guidelines define “crime 

of violence”—by listing qualifying crimes and elements of 

crimes. Among the crimes listed in the Armed Career 

Criminal Act is “burglary.” Noting that “the criminal codes of 

the States define burglary in many different ways,” Taylor, 

495 U.S. at 580, the Court reasoned that Congress could not 

have intended the length of a sentence to turn on the 

definition of burglary in the state of conviction. “That would 

mean that a person convicted of unlawful possession of a 

firearm would, or would not, receive a sentence enhancement 

based on exactly the same conduct, depending on whether the 

State of his prior conviction happened to call that conduct 

‘burglary.’” Id. at 590–91. Because the statute must be 

uniformly applied, the Court held that the only appropriate 

definition of “burglary” is “the generic sense in which the 

term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.” Id. at 

598. Most states define “burglary” to include three common 

elements. Thus “a person has been convicted of burglary” in 

the generic sense “if he is convicted of any crime, regardless 

of its exact definition or label, having [these three] basic 

elements.” Id. at 599. 

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 Once it has identified the generic crime, the sentencing 

court must determine whether a defendant was convicted of 

that crime. To answer that question, the Court in Taylor

adopted what it called a “formal categorical approach” 

restricted to the express language of the statute under which 

the defendant was convicted. Id. at 600. It directed the district 

court on remand to determine whether the statute under which 

the defendant was convicted required proof of the three 

elements of generic burglary. If so, the defendant was 

convicted of burglary, which is a violent felony for purposes 

of the Armed Career Criminal Act. But under some statutes, 

conviction is possible without proving each of those three 

elements. In those circumstances, the Court allowed that a 

sentencing court may modify the categorical approach by 

conducting a limited inquiry into the particular facts of the 

defendant’s conviction to determine if he was nevertheless 

convicted of generic burglary. For example, a defendant is 

convicted of the generic crime if the jury instructions require 

a finding of all the elements of the generic crime. See id. at 

602. 

The Court later applied this “modified” categorical 

approach in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). In 

that case the defendant had pleaded guilty to violating a 

statute that was, by its categorical terms, broader than generic 

burglary. The Court found it proper to look to the charging 

document, the plea agreement, and the transcript of the plea 

colloquy to determine whether the defendant “necessarily 

admitted” the elements of the generic offense. Id. at 26. These 

documents offer the same certainty about the conviction as 

the hypothetical jury instructions discussed in Taylor. By 

contrast, the Court found it improper to rely on police reports 

supporting the criminal complaint because the defendant had 

not admitted the conduct described in those reports. Id. at 22–

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23. The reports therefore could not show that the defendant 

was unambiguously convicted of generic burglary. 

 We have used the strict categorical approach of Taylor

and the modified categorical approach of Shepard to apply 

other sentencing statutes and guidelines that, like the Armed 

Career Criminal Act, define relevant terms by providing a list 

of crimes and elements. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d 

1085 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (applying Taylor to the career offender 

guideline’s definition of “crime of violence”); United States v. 

Andrews, 479 F.3d 894 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying Taylor to 

the firearms offense guideline’s definition of “crime of 

violence”). We now apply these approaches to determine 

whether Ventura was convicted of a crime of violence when 

the Virginia court accepted his plea of nolo contendere to 

felonious abduction. 

 

 At sentencing, the government offered two separate 

reasons for the court to find that Ventura’s abduction 

conviction was for a “crime of violence” under the 

Guidelines. First, it argued that the Virginia statute conforms 

to the generic definition of “kidnapping,” a listed crime under 

the guideline for unlawful reentry. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 

Alternatively, the government argued that Ventura’s plea of 

nolo contendere led to a conviction of one of the guideline’s 

listed criminal elements—namely, the use of force. The 

district court agreed with the government on both points, and 

Ventura challenges both conclusions on appeal. 

 If Ventura is correct that the district court should have 

applied the eight-level increase for aggravated felonies, rather 

than the sixteen-level increase for crimes of violence, we must 

again remand this case for resentencing because “failing to 

calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range” is 

a “significant procedural error,” Gall v. United States, 128 S. 

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Ct. 586, 597 (2007); see also United States v. Tann, 532 F.3d 

868, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (appellate court must “determine 

whether the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines 

range and remand for resentencing if it did not”). Whether 

Virginia’s abduction statute fits the generic definition of 

“kidnapping” is a question of law, which we review de novo. 

See United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056, 1062 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 

1997). By contrast, we give “due deference” to the district 

court’s application of law to fact in deciding whether Ventura 

was necessarily convicted of a crime of violence as a result of 

his nolo plea, applying an intermediate standard between clear 

error and de novo review. See Tann, 532 F.3d at 874. 

B.

 We must first consider whether the Virginia statute under 

which Ventura was convicted describes the generic crime of 

“kidnapping” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The Virginia statute 

provides: 

Any person, who, by force, intimidation or deception, 

and without legal justification or excuse, seizes, takes, 

transports, detains or secretes the person of another, with 

the intent to deprive such other person of his personal 

liberty or to withhold or conceal him from any person, 

authority or institution lawfully entitled to his charge, 

shall be deemed guilty of “abduction” . . . . The terms 

“abduction” and “kidnapping” shall be synonymous in 

this Code. 

VA. CODE § 18.2-47(A). Although Virginia deems any 

violation of this statute “kidnapping,” state labels do not 

control our inquiry under the Guidelines. See Taylor, 495 U.S. 

at 599. Rather, as Taylor requires, we must identify the 

elements of generic kidnapping and determine whether 

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Virginia’s statute conforms to those elements or applies more 

broadly. 

Taylor instructs us to determine the elements of 

kidnapping that are common to most states’ definitions of that 

crime. See id. at 598. The parties agree that nearly every state 

kidnapping statute includes two common elements: (1) an act 

of restraining, removing, or confining another; and (2) an 

unlawful means of accomplishing that act. So, for example, 

the Virginia abduction statute applies to a person who “seizes, 

takes, transports, detains or secretes the person of another,” 

VA. CODE § 18.2-47(A), if that seizure or taking is carried out 

“by force, intimidation or deception,” id.

 But the parties dispute whether generic kidnapping 

requires anything more than these two elements. The 

government argues that it does not. Ventura contends that a 

majority of states, tracking the Model Penal Code, require one 

of several “nefarious purposes” to distinguish kidnapping 

from less serious crimes, and that the generic definition 

should therefore include this element. See Br. of Appellant at 

10 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL 

LAW § 18.1(e) (2d ed. 2003)). In support of his argument, 

Ventura points to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that generic 

kidnapping requires a nefarious purpose. See United States v. 

Gonzalez-Perez, 472 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007). The 

government counters with citations to two Fifth Circuit 

decisions rejecting this requirement. See United States v. 

Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d 790, 791 (5th Cir. 2007); United 

States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d 310, 318 (5th Cir. 

2007). 

 To resolve the dispute, we look to state kidnapping 

statutes, the District of Columbia’s statute, and the federal 

kidnapping provision. Many jurisdictions separate kidnapping 

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offenses into simple and aggravated forms or grade them as 

first and second degree. Because our task is to determine the 

meaning of “kidnapping” in any form or degree, we look to 

all offenses termed kidnapping by the various criminal codes. 

 A bare majority of jurisdictions define “kidnapping” to 

include a criminal purpose beyond the mere intent to restrain 

the victim. Twenty-two states require what Ventura terms a 

“nefarious purpose.”5

 Some of these states list only the 

nefarious purposes included in the Model Penal Code: to hold 

the victim for ransom or reward, to use the victim as a shield 

or hostage, to facilitate the commission of a felony or 

subsequent flight, to inflict bodily injury on or terrorize the 

victim or another person, or to interfere with the performance 

of a government or political function. See MODEL PENAL 

CODE § 212.1. Other states include additional qualifying 

purposes, such as intent to sexually assault the victim or to 

hold the victim in involuntary servitude. But each requires 

that a defendant act with one of the specified purposes before 

the crime is deemed “kidnapping.” In addition to these 

twenty-two, five other states also impose a heightened intent 

requirement but do not use the nefarious purpose construct.6

 

5 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1304(A); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-11-

102(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 783; FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1); 

HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-720(1); IND. CODE § 35-42-3-2; IOWA 

CODE § 710.1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3420; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 

§ 509.040(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.349; MINN. STAT. 

§ 609.25(1); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.110(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-

313; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:1; N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:13-1(a)–

(b); N.M. STAT. § 30-4-1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39(a); N.D. CENT.

CODE § 12.1-18-01(1); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901(a); S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-19-1 to -1.1; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2405; 

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-201. 

6 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-1 (requiring, at minimum, intent 

to confine victim secretly); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 26 

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 Seventeen states require no heightened intent but include 

alternative aggravating conduct or circumstances that must be 

shown for a crime to constitute kidnapping. Seven of these 

states employ nearly identical formulations. Each requires that 

the defendant act with a nefarious purpose, hold the victim 

where he or she is not likely to be found, or subject the victim 

to a substantial risk of serious physical harm (in some states 

by using or threatening to use deadly force).7

 Five more states 

likewise require either a nefarious purpose or an alternative 

element of severity: in two states, substantial risk of serious 

physical harm;8

 in two others, carrying the victim from one 

place to another or taking a vulnerable victim;9 and in one, 

moving the victim a substantial distance or across state lines, 

holding the victim for a substantial period of time, subjecting 

the victim to involuntary servitude or a risk of bodily injury, 

or taking a child without parental consent.10 In the remaining 

 

(requiring, at minimum, intent to confine victim secretly, to send 

victim outside Commonwealth, or to hold victim to involuntary 

servitude); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.225–.235 (requiring intent to 

interfere substantially with victim’s liberty); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-

26-1 (requiring, at minimum, intent to confine or imprison victim 

secretly or forcibly or to transport victim out of state); WIS. STAT. 

§ 940.31(1) (requiring intent to cause secret confinement or 

imprisonment of victim, to carry victim out of state, or to hold 

victim to involuntary servitude). 

7 See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-40(2), -43, -44; ALASKA STAT. 

§ 11.41.300(a)–(b); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-91, -92, -94; ME.

REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 301(1); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.00, 

.20, .25; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20.01(2), .03–.04; WASH. REV.

CODE §§ 9A.40.010–.030. 

8 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.01; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-

13-303 to -305. 

9 See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-301 to -302; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 

§§ 14:44–:45. 

10 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-301 to -302. 

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five states in this category, the statutes include no nefarious 

purpose element, mandatory or optional, but do require an 

additional element of severity.11

 Finally, six states, the District of Columbia, and the 

federal government define “kidnapping” to require nothing 

more than intentional and unlawful—that is, by force, 

intimidation, or deception—restraint of the victim.12 These 

jurisdictions require neither heightened intent nor any 

aggravating conduct or circumstance. Virginia is in this 

category. 

 Our review of these kidnapping statutes leads us to 

conclude that a conviction under the Virginia statute is not by 

itself a conviction of generic kidnapping. The Virginia statute 

outlaws conduct far broader and less serious than the generic 

definition of the crime. The most common approach defines 

kidnapping to include a particular nefarious purpose. And the 

majority approach requires some kind of heightened intent 

beyond the mere intent to restrain the victim’s liberty. Most 

critically, a substantial majority of jurisdictions—forty-four 

out of fifty-two—require some additional element of intent or 

severity. Virginia’s abduction statute encompasses both 

generic kidnapping and less serious offenses, leaving it to 

other statutes and the discretion of sentencing judges to tailor 

 

11 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (kidnapper must move victim from 

one place to another); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-40(a) (same); MD.

CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-502 (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-

5-302(1) (kidnapper must hold victim in a place of isolation or use 

or threaten to use physical force); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14 (victim 

must be a child under sixteen). 

12 See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a); D.C. CODE § 22-2001; IDAHO CODE 

ANN. § 18-4501; MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-53; NEV. REV. STAT. 

§ 200.310; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 741; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-910; 

VA. CODE § 18.2-47. 

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punishment based on the severity of the offense. Compare

VA. CODE § 18.2-47(A) (providing that abduction, by default, 

is a Class 5 felony, punishable by one to ten years’ 

imprisonment), with VA. CODE § 18.2-48 (providing that 

abduction with a nefarious intent is a Class 2 felony, 

punishable by twenty years’ to life imprisonment), and VA.

CODE § 18.2-48.1 (providing that abduction by a prisoner or 

escaped prisoner is a Class 3 felony, punishable by five to 

twenty years’ imprisonment). Thus, under the strict 

categorical approach outlined in Taylor, Ventura was not 

convicted of the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of 

applying U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 

C. 

 Because a conviction for felonious abduction in Virginia 

does not necessarily entail conviction of all the elements of 

generic kidnapping, we may look beyond the statute to 

determine, under the modified categorical approach used in 

Shepard, whether Ventura was nonetheless convicted of a 

crime of violence. The district court concluded under 

Shepard’s approach that Ventura was convicted of a crime of 

violence by virtue of his nolo contendere plea. We disagree. 

 The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Ventura by an 

indictment that tracked the broad language of the abduction 

statute: “On or about the 27th day of August, 2000, in the 

County of Fairfax, [Ventura] did feloniously abduct [the 

victim] with the intent to deprive her of her personal liberty.” 

Tr. of Plea Colloquy at 5, Hernandez-Chacon, No. 98623. By 

its terms, this charge includes nothing that would transform 

Ventura’s conviction into one for generic kidnapping. It does 

not contain the same allegations as the Commonwealth’s 

factual proffer, recited as part of the plea colloquy, which 

describes a crime that amounts to generic kidnapping. In the 

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proffer the prosecutor alleged that Ventura had approached a 

sixteen-year-old girl outside the supermarket where she 

worked. After staring at the girl and attempting to engage her 

in conversation, Ventura asked her to come with him. She 

declined. Ventura then grabbed the girl, pinned her against a 

wall, and put his hand between her legs. The girl kicked 

Ventura and broke away; he then grabbed her by the arm and 

pulled her into an alley. After another struggle, she broke free 

and returned to the supermarket to call the police. These 

proffered facts include two allegations that, if admitted, would 

mean that Ventura was convicted of generic kidnapping as 

that term is used by most states: removal of the victim from 

one place to another and intent to sexually assault, inflict 

bodily injury on, or terrorize the victim. 

 The question, then, is whether the factual proffer is 

within the limited set of evidence that we may look to under 

Shepard’s modified categorical approach. The government 

argues that it is, because by entering a nolo plea Ventura 

admitted the truth of this factual proffer and, therefore, the 

elements of generic kidnapping.13 The government maintains 

that the pleading defendant admits the truth of any facts 

alleged by the prosecution. But this argument misconstrues 

the effect of a nolo plea under Virginia law. In Virginia, a 

defendant who pleads nolo contendere admits only the truth 

of the charge—that is, the crime charged in the indictment. 

 

13 The government’s argument has varied throughout this case. In 

its sentencing memorandum, the government argued that Ventura 

was necessarily convicted of generic kidnapping. At the sentencing 

hearing, the government abandoned this theory and argued instead 

that Ventura was necessarily convicted of the use of force—a listed 

element under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The distinction is ultimately 

unimportant: both arguments depend on whether Ventura was 

necessarily convicted of the proffered facts, and we conclude he 

was not. 

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See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Va. 

1998) (“[B]y entering a plea of nolo contendere, the 

defendant ‘implies a confession . . . of the truth of the 

charge . . . .’” (first omission in original)). Thus Ventura was 

necessarily convicted of any facts charged in the Virginia 

indictment. But that indictment charged only that Ventura 

abducted the victim with the intent to deprive her of personal 

liberty. Like the abduction statute itself, that description 

embraces conduct that does not amount to generic 

kidnapping. 

Ventura’s nolo plea admitted nothing about the narrower 

description of the crime offered by the Commonwealth at the 

plea colloquy. Rather, his counsel confirmed that by pleading 

nolo contendere Ventura signaled only that he was “not 

contesting the charge.” Tr. of Plea Colloquy at 16, 

Hernandez-Chacon, No. 98623. And the judge found Ventura 

“guilty as charged in the indictment.” Id. at 17 (emphasis 

added). At no point did Ventura, his counsel, or the judge 

confirm the truth of the facts as stated by the Commonwealth 

in its proffer. The judge was not required to accept those facts 

to convict Ventura. Indeed, the judge might have inferred that 

Ventura was pleading nolo contendere because he had 

violated the abduction statute but had not done all that the 

government alleged.

On this record, we cannot conclude that Ventura was 

convicted of the facts alleged in the Commonwealth’s proffer. 

To hold otherwise would conflict with “Taylor’s demand for 

certainty when identifying a generic offense,” Shepard, 544 

U.S. at 21. “[I]f the indictment or information and jury 

instructions show that the defendant was charged only with 

[the elements of the generic crime],” the government may use 

the conviction as a sentencing enhancement because the jury 

could only convict if it found the defendant guilty of those 

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elements. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. And when a defendant who 

pleads guilty “adopt[s]” the government’s factual statement, 

he is necessarily convicted of those facts. Shepard, 544 U.S. 

at 20. But in Shepard the Court refused to hold that a 

defendant pleading guilty is also convicted of any facts stated 

in a police report accompanying the criminal complaint. See 

id. at 22. It compared the report to the transcript of a jury trial 

showing testimony about the critical facts: neither document 

demonstrates with certainty that the defendant was convicted 

of those facts. See id. 

Likewise, the record here does not permit us to say with 

the requisite certainty that Ventura was necessarily convicted 

of the elements of generic kidnapping—or the use of physical 

force. Even under the modified categorical approach, he was 

not convicted of a crime of violence. 

III. 

 Virginia’s abduction statute does not conform to the 

generic crime of kidnapping. Under the strict categorical 

approach outlined in Taylor, Ventura’s prior conviction under 

that statute is not a conviction of kidnapping. Furthermore, 

Ventura did not admit facts amounting to generic kidnapping 

through his plea of nolo contendere, and the judge who 

accepted his plea did not find him guilty of such facts. Even 

under the modified categorical approach of Shepard, he was 

not convicted of kidnapping or of the use of force. For these 

reasons, we conclude that Ventura has not been convicted of a 

crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 

Accordingly, he was subject to an eight-level increase, rather 

than a sixteen-level increase, under the Federal Sentencing 

Guidelines. Because the district court erred in calculating the 

advisory sentencing range, we vacate and remand for 

resentencing. The district court is not required to impose the 

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sentence the Guidelines recommend, but it must consider that 

sentence before rejecting it. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). 

So ordered. 

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