Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01392/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01392-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randy Abercrombie
Appellant
City of Catoosa, Oklahoma
Appellee
Mayor Curtis Conley
Appellee
Police Chief Benny Dirck
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

RANDY ABERCROMBIE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Fl LED 

Unire'<i S!~t,l;i (p_~rc ~f Af,peals 

f emb C!:·.'.J.m 

FIB l G 1990 

ROBERT L. I-IOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 86-1392 

CITY OF CATOOSA, OKLAHOMA; 

MAYOR CURTIS CONLEY; and 

POLICE CHIEF BENNY DIRCK, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Nortpern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 84-C-55-B} 

Earl w. Wolfe, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Walter D. Haskins (Joseph A. Sharp and John H.T. Sheridan, of 

Best, Sharp, Thomas, Glass & Atkinson, with him on the brief), 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff, Randy Abercrombie, brought suit in the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

against the City of Catoosa, Mayor Curtis Conley, and Police Chief 

Benny Dirck, alleging two counts: (1) a conspiracy in violation 

of 42 u.s.c. § 1985(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 arising out of alleged 

intimidation and retaliation against him because of his testimony 

in an unrelated case in federal court; and (2) a claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of a property interest without due 

process of law and for interference with plaintiff's first 

amendment rig~ts arising from the removal of plaintiff from the 

wrecker rotation logs used to make wrecker referrals by the City 

of Catoosa police dispatchers. Plaintiff appeals from the 

district court's grant of summary judgment for the City and Mayo,r 

Conley on both counts of plaintiff's complaint and for the police 

chief Dirck on Count I, and from the district court's grant of 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Dirck. 

The facts leading to this appeal are as follows. Plaintiff 

was the owner of a wrecker business in Catoosa, Oklahoma. The 

police chief of Catoosa, defendant Benny Dirck, was in charge of 

determining which wreckers _in the city would receive the police 

department's wrecker referrals made for third parties. From 

November 1981 until March 1982, plaintiff received·all the wrecker 

referrals from.the police. 

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that when he appeared to 

testify in federal court in February 1982 as a witness in a suit 

against the City of Catoosa, Mayor Conley told him that he "had 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 2 
better stay away from [plaintiff's attorney] Wolfe." He also 

alleges that subsequently he was approached by police chief Dirck, 

who asked him, "How is business?" When plaintiff replied that his 

business was "[d)oing real well," Dirck allegedly stated, "You do 

know I can control your business?" After testifying in that case, 

plaintiff no longer was given all the wrecker referrals from the 

police. Instead, the referrals were rotated between plaintiff and 

another wrecker. 1 

Subsequently, plaintiff campaigned on behalf of a mayoral 

candidate who challenged the incumbent Mayor Conley. After his 

candidate lost the election, plaintiff was removed from the 

wrecker rotation log used by the police dispatchers and therefore 

no longer received any wrecker referrals from the police. 

Plaintiff brought suit in the district court against the City 

of Catoosa, Mayor Curtis Conley, and Police Chief Benny Dirck. 

The district court granted all defendants summary judgment on 

plaintiff's first count of conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1985(2) and 1986. That court also granted defendants Conley 

and the City of Catoosa summary judgment on plaintiff's second 

count under 28 u.s.c. § 1983 for deprivation of a property 

interest and first amendment retaliation. Thus, the only issue 

that survived summary judgment was the Section 1983 claim against 

Dirck. On that claim, a jury found for plaintiff, awarding him 

$7,500 on his property deprivation claim, $125,000 on his first 

amendment claim, and $50,000 in punitive damages. After the jury 

1 During the times relevant to this case, there were only two 

qualified wreckers in or near the City of Catoosa, including 

plaintiff's wrecking business. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 3 
reached its verdict, the district court granted Dirck judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict. 

I. 

CONSPIRACY UNDER SECTIONS 1985(2) AND 1986 

We review the summary judgment orders de~, applying the 

same legal standard used by the district court under Rule 56(c) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). Summary 

judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and. 

judgment as a matter of law." 

the moving party is entitled to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When 

applying this standard, we are to examine the factual record and 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

party opposing summary judgment. Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 

858 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1988). However, the nonmoving party 

may not rest upon his pleadings; the party must set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 

The district court held, and we agree, that plaintiff has not 

established the existence of a conspiracy, which is a prerequisite 

to ·a claim under Sections 1985(2) and 1986. Section 1985(2) 

specifically requires the existence of "two or more persons" who 

"conspire.'' Section 1986, which provides an action for neglecting 

to prevent a violation of Section 1985, is premised upon the 

existence of a valid Section 1985 claim. Wright v. No Skiter, 

Inc., 774 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir. 1985). 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 4 
In support of his conspiracy claim, plaintiff alleged that 

when he went to federai court to testify in an unrelated case, he 

was approached by Mayor Conley, who told him that he had "better 

stay away from [plaintiff's attorney] Wolfe." He also alleges 

that he subsequently was approached by Dirck, who told him, "You 

do know I can control your business?" 

Those allegations are insufficient to establish a conspiracy. 

A civil conspiracy requires the combination of two or more persons 

acting in concert. Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 609 (10th Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985). Plaintiff has not 

e~tablished, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, a 

meeting of the minds or agreement among the defendants. Plaintiff 

merely has alleged two isolated statements, one by Conley and one 

by Dirck. Without any evidence of communication between Dirck and 

Conley, there is nothing to give rise to the inference that they 

conspired. See Richardson v. City of Indianapolis, 658 F.2d 494, 

500 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982). Thus, the 

district court was correct in concluding that there is no genuine 

issue of material fact concerning the existence of a conspiracy. 

Accordingly, it was proper to dismiss the first· count of 

plaintiff's complaint on summary judgment. 2 

2 Although raised below, it appears that plaintiff has abandoned 

a claim under Section 1985(3). The ~istrict court found, and we 

agree, that plaintiff has not shown some racial or otherwise 

class-based animus, as required by that section. See United 

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v-:-Scott, 463 

U.S. 825, 834-835 (l983); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 

102 (1971). 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 5 
II. 

PLAINTIFF'S SECTION 1983 CLAIM 

The second count of plaintiff's complaint alleged that the 

defendants violated Section 1983 by depriving plaintiff of a 

property right without due process of law and by retaliating 

against him for the exercise of his first amendment rights. The 

district court dismissed plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against 

the City and the mayor on summary judgment. That court found that 

there were no allegations linking the mayor to the decision to 

remove plaintiff from the wrecker rotation logs and that the 

decision by Dirck was not a sufficient custom or policy to make 

the City liable. Although plaintiff lists the liability of the 

City and the mayor as an issue on appeal, he failed to argue this 

issue in his appellate brief or at oral argument. Therefore, we 

conclude that plaintiff has waived this issue. See Jordan v. 

Bowen, 808 F.2d 733, 736 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925 

(1987); Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 1984); 

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4). 

On appeal, plaintiff has focused instead on the grant of 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Dirck. Upon 

review of a judgment n.o.v., we must consider the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Zimmerman 

v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 

1988). A judgment n.o.v. "may not be granted unless the evidence 

points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences 

which may sustain the position of the party against whom the 

motion is made." Miller v. City of Mission, Kan., 705 F.2d 368, 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 6 
373 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting Symons v. Mueller Co., 493 F.2d 972, 

976 (10th Cir. 1974)). 

A. Due Process/Property Interest 

Plaintiff's first Section 1983 claim is that he was deprived 

of a property interest without due process of law. Specifically, 

he claims that pursuant to Oklahoma's wrecker statute he has a 

propert1 interest in continued wrecker referrals that Dirck denied 

him without due process. After careful examination of Oklahoma's 

wrecker statute, we agree. 

In order for someone to have a property interest in a 

benefit, he "must have more than an abstract need or desire for 

it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He 

must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See also 

Richardson v. City of Albuquerque, 857 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 

1988); Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 793 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Property interests "arise from sources such as state statutes, 

local ordinances, established rules, or mutually explicit 

understandings.'' Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1437 (10th 

Cir. 1988). In th£s case, the existence of a property right is an 

issue of state law. See Conaway, 853 F.2d at 793; Dickeson, 844 

F.2d at 1438 n.5. Thus, we must examine Oklahoma's wrecker 

statute and decide whether it creates a property right. 

The starting point of our analysis is Okla. Stat. tit. 47, 

§ 955, which provides in pertinent part: 

' Each officer of the Department [of Public Safety] shall 

carry a list of the holders of current Class A wrecker 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 7 
operator licenses in the district of the officer, and 

shall use the services of the Class A licensed wrecker 

operator whose location is nearest to the vehicle to be 

removed in all instances specified under subsections 

(1), (2), (3) and (4) of this section. The requests for 

services may be alternated among all such licensed 

wrecker operators who are located within a reasonable 

radius of each other .•.. In cities of less than 

fifty thousand (50,000) population, all such licensed 

wrecker operators located near or in the city limits of 

such cities shall be considered as being equal distance 

and shall be called on an equal basis as nearly as 

possible. (Emphasis added.) 

It is not disputed that the population of Catoosa was less than 

50,000 at the times relevant to this case and that plaintiff was a 

Class A licensed wrecker operator. 

Plaintiff contends that the City of Catoosa was bound by the 

requirements in Section 955. He relies chiefly on Okla. Stat. 

tit. 47, § 952(D), which at the relevant time provided: 

Wrecker or towing services provided by an operator at 

the request of a political subdivision of this state 

shall be provided in accordance with the provisions and 

regulations adopted pursuant thereto applied to wrecker 

or towing services contained in Section 955 of this 

title, unless otherwise regulated by the governing body 

of the political subdivision. 

Plaintiff argues, and we agree, that because the City of Catoosa, 

which indisputably is a political subdivision, did not "otherwise 

regulate[]" wrecker referrals, it was bound to follow Section 955 

when making such referrals. 

Defendant responds, and the district court held, that Section 

952.(D) merely requires the Department of Public Safety to follow 

the requirements in Section 955 when a political subdivision makes 

a request to the Department of Public Safety f9r wrecking 

services. We disagree with this statutory interpretation for a 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 8 
number of reasons. 3 First, the clear language of Section 952(D) 

appears to apply to any wrecker services provided "at the request 

of a political subdivision." There is nothing in the language of 

Section 952(D) that would limit it only to requests made by a 

political subdivision to the Department of Public Safety and 

exclude requests made ~ya political subdivision directly to the 

operator of the wrecker services. We should not write into a 

statute a limiting clause that was not put there by the 

legislature. Second, we have not seen any evidence or citations 

to the record indicating that political subdivisions ever request 

wrecker referrals from the Department of Public Safety. Third, 

the district court's interpretation of Section 952(D) appears to 

make that section superfluous because Section 955 by its language 

would bind the Department of Public Safety when it made wrecker 

referrals regardless of whether or not it was made at the request 

of a political subdivision. Fourth, the last clause in Section 

952(D) states that the requirements in Section 955 apply "unless 

otherwise regulated by the governing body of the political 

subdivision." If the district court was correct that S~ction 

952(D) applies only to the Department of Public Safety, that 

clause would produce the strange result that political 

subdivisions could dictate the procedures that the state 

Department of Public Safety is bound to follow. For these 

3 We recognize that some deference generally is accorded district 

court judges when they are interpreting the law of the state in 

which they sit. Although we do not question that "local judge 

rule" here, we do note that the amount of deference in a case of 

pure statutory construction, as here, may be less than in a case 

involving interpretation of state case law. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 9 
reasons, we conclude that Section 952(0) did require the City of 

Catoosa to make wrecker referrals on an equal basis as nearly as 

possible and thus created a property interest in wrecker 

referrals in favor of the plaintiff. 

B. First Amendment 

Plaintiff's next Section 1983 claim is that Dirck retaliated 

against him for the exercise of his first amendment rights. 

Specifically, he alleges that he no longer was given referrals 

because of his support for a mayoral candidate. We find that the 

district court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 

this claim was improper. 

The district court dismissed the entire Section 1983 claim 

because it found that plaintiff did not have a property right in 

continued wrecker referrals. But, as noted above, plaintiff did 

have a property right in equal referrals. Furthermore, the 

Supreme Court has held a property right is not requi~ed for a 

first amendment retaliation claim. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 

U.S. 593 (1972). See also Dickeson, 844 F.2d at 1440. In Perry, 

the Supreme Court stated that "even though a person has no 'right' 

to a valuable governmental benefit ,and even though the government 

may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some 

reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a 

benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally 

protected interests especia~ly, his interest in freedom of 

speech." 408 U.S. at 597. See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 10 
(1976); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 11-5 at 781 (2d 

ed. 1988). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary 

judgment against all defendants on plaintiff's first count and 

against defendants Mayor Conley and the City of Catoosa on 

plaintlff's second count. We REVERSE the district court's grant 

of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiff's Section 

1983 claim against defendant Dirck and we REMAND for reinstatement 

of the jury verdict. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1392 Document: 01019964405 Date Filed: 02/16/1990 Page: 11