Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00043/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00043-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tommy Henderson
Petitioner
Michael Martel
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY HENDERSON, No. 2:12-CV-0043-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MICHAEL MARTEL,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this

case is before the undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final

judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the court are petitioner’s amended petition

for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 15), respondent’s answer (Doc. 22), and petitioner’s traverse

(Doc. 23).

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/ / /

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I. BACKGROUND1

Petitioner was convicted of oral copulation by force and attempted solicitation of

a crime, and was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 11 years in state prison. The

conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in a reasoned decision issued by the

California Court of Appeal on July 8, 2008. The state court offered the following procedural

history:

2

In the initial trial of this matter, a jury deadlocked on whether

defendant Tommy Henderson committed an act of forcible oral copulation,

and acquitted him of the remaining charged offenses; it convicted him of a

lesser offense of attempting to bribe the victim. On retrial, a second jury

convicted him of forcible oral copulation. Based on his substantial

criminal history, Judge White sentenced him to the upper term for forcible

oral copulation. Judge Balonon, who presided over the first trial,

subsequently designated the attempted bribery conviction as the principal

term, imposed the upper sentence based in part on his prior unsatisfactory

performance on probation and parole, then imposed a full consecutive

sentence for the sexual offense based on its occurrence at a different time

and place and on defendant’s criminal background. Neither of the trial

judges found any mitigating circumstances. 

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

The events underlying the conviction for oral copulation took place

in March 1996. The victim testified at both trial that defendant

approached her parked car, took control of it at gunpoint, forced her to

orally copulate him several times while he drove, and eventually pushed

her out of the car (which the police found abandoned the next day). 

Although the victim had rinsed out her mouth after the attack, swabs taken

that night eventually were subjected to DNA analysis in 2003, resulting in

a tentative DNA match with defendant (later confirmed in 2004). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 1

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

In subsequent consolidated appeals, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a 2

June 24, 2010, trial court order correcting an error in the original sentence with instructions to

prepare a corrected abstract of judgment with respect to petitioner’s conviction for attempted

solicitation.

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Defendant testified at both trials. Each time, he asserted that his

encounter with the victim was a consensual trade of sex for drugs. She

drove him to a parking lot, where she orally copulated him. He ejaculated

in her mouth despite having assured her that he would not. This angered

her and she jumped out of the car. He slid over to the driver’s seat and

drove off in order to retain the benefit of the proposed deal without parting

with his product. 

* * *

As defendant was awaiting his first trial, the attorney of his

cellmate notified detectives that defendant had been talking to the cellmate

about wanting to prevent the victim from testifying. A detective went to

the jail (with the permission of the attorney) to interview the cellmate. 

The cellmate told the detective that defendant had begun to talk about the

pending charges against him, expressing concern that the DNA evidence

and the testimony of the witness would lead to his conviction. He stated

his willingness to pay $4,000 for someone to get rid of the victim (out of

an inheritance that he was anticipating), and that he was trying to get in

touch with his son to arrange this. He mentioned learning the address of

the victim from discovery documents. The detective told the cellmate that

regardless of the result of this information, there would not any form of

benefit in exchange to the cellmate in his own pending case. (Footnote

omitted). The cellmate nonetheless was willing to work with the detective

(stating at trial that he was feeling regret about the death in the case in

which he was involved, and wanted to prevent harm from happening to

someone else). 

In his second meeting with the detective, the cellmate agreed to

wear a recording device when he returned to their cell. (Footnote

omitted). Because defendant had been having trouble contacting his son

about silencing the victim, the cellmate told him about a fictitious “hit

man” named “Slim,” whom defendant’s daughter could arrange to contact. 

A deputy posing a Slim met at the jail with defendant and recorded

their conversation (again, the jury heard the tape of this meeting). The

decoy was unable to get defendant to incriminate himself; in fact,

defendant broke off the parlay and returned to his cell. After covering a

microphone in their cell with a pack of cards. Defendant told his cellmate

that he had met with Slim and intended to have his daughter contact Slim

again. The cellmate obtained a phone number to use from the detective,

written on a small piece of paper that the cellmate left on the cell’s

windowsill. The cellmate was not sure what happened to the piece of

paper. 

On two occasions when defendant’s daughter visited him at the

jail, she copied identifying information about the victim from a court

document that defendant pressed against the glass. After he had met with

Slim, defendant told her to pass the identifying information on to her

brother, who would be dealing with Slim. Slim later called her directly,

however. Having misplaced the written information about the victim, she

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told him what she could remember on it. The police arrested her and

searched her home, finding another paper on which she had also copied the

information about the victim. 

The detective in charge of the sting ordered a search of defendant’s

cell on the night of the daughter’s arrest. The police seized defendant’s

Bible, which contained a piece of paper bearing Slim’s name and the

phone number that the detective had given the cellmate; the handwriting

was not the detective’s. They also seized documents from defendant’s

papers that had information about the victim corresponding to that found

in his daughter’s possession, as well as a two-page investigative report

prepared for the defense that apparently only included her name and her

husband’s. 

* * *

Before the first trial, the prosecution moved to exclude evidence

that it believed the defense intended to introduce regarding the victim’s

January 2005 arrest for being drunk in public, which resulted when the

police had discovered the now-married victim kissing an old friend in the

back seat of a car after they had been drinking in a bar. The prosecution

noted it had not received any written notice of the intent to introduce

evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct. . ., and that it was more

prejudicial than probative. . . . The defense responded with a formal

motion to admit the evidence. The motion noted that the car had been

parked outside a grocery store, and that the victim had told a detective in

the case at bar that she had never informed her husband of the arrest, for

which reason she did not want it revealed at trial (although she ultimately

spoke to him about it as a result). The defense argued that the incident

indicated her willingness to engage in less-than-circumspect behavior in

public, and was also relevant to her veracity. Judge Balonon granted the

motion to exclude the evidence except in connection with the attempted

bribery of the victim. As a result, defendant was permitted to testify that

he knew the details of the incident, which made him believe that she

would be receptive to an inducement not to testify in order to keep her

husband from learning of the circumstances of the arrest. Defendant also

asserted his belief that the incident showed the victim’s “promiscuous”

character and her lack of honesty. (Footnote omitted). 

Before the start of the second trial, the defense renewed its motion

to introduce this evidence, reiterating the points previously presented

without embellishment about the incident’s relevance to the victim’s

veracity and willingness to act inappropriately in public (to overcome any

presumption on the part of a jury that a woman would not behave in this

manner). Judge White found the comparison between performing a sex

act in public and kissing in public nine years later too attenuated to

provide any insight on the victim’s likely behavior in 1996, and her initial

failure to tell her husband about the arrest insufficiently mendacious to

reflect on her capacity to tell the truth. Judge White therefore denied the

motion to admit the incident for any purpose without prejudice in the event

of new evidence. 

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach

petitioner’s claim under its “re-litigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

Under § 2254(d)(1), federal habeas relief is available only where the state court’s decision is

“contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. Under both

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standards, “clearly established law” means those holdings of the United States Supreme Court as

of the time of the relevant state court decision. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)

(citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 412) . “What matters are the holdings of the Supreme Court, not

the holdings of lower federal courts.” Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc). Supreme Court precedent is not clearly established law, and therefore federal habeas

relief is unavailable, unless it “squarely addresses” an issue. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742,

753-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 28 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2008)). 

For federal law to be clearly established, the Supreme Court must provide a “categorical answer”

to the question before the state court. See id.; see also Carey, 549 U.S. at 76-77 (holding that a

state court’s decision that a defendant was not prejudiced by spectators’ conduct at trial was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court’s test for determining prejudice

created by state conduct at trial because the Court had never applied the test to spectators’

conduct). Circuit court precedent may not be used to fill open questions in the Supreme Court’s

holdings. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 74. 

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a

majority of the Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A

state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by

the Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently

than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040,

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1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 520 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams, suggested

that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court either

unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an erroneous

or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

75-76 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot necessarily be found

even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly erroneous. 

See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. This is because “[t]he gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Id. at 75.

As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal law, where a state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal habeas relief is nonetheless

unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052 n.6.

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

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the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts the following claims: (1) the seizure, and later use at trial, of

materials obtained from a search of his jail cell as a pre-trial detainee violated his Fourth

Amendment rights; (2) the introduction at trial of materials seized from his jail cell while a pretrial detainee violated the attorney-client privilege and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; 

(3) the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of a prosecution witness; (4) the trial

court erred in excluding proffered impeachment evidence; (5) the evidence was insufficient to

establish the use of force; and (6) “illegal sentence.” 

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

In Stone v. Powell, the United States Supreme Court held that “where the State

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state

prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in

an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). 

Thus, a Fourth Amendment claim can only be litigated on federal habeas where petitioner

demonstrates that the state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim;

it is immaterial whether the petitioner actually litigated the Fourth Amendment claim. Gordan v.

Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990). The issue before this court is whether petitioner had a

full and fair opportunity in the state courts to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, not whether

petitioner actually litigated those claims, nor whether the state courts correctly disposed of the

Fourth Amendment issues tendered to them. See id.; see also Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d

1308 (9th Cir. 1994). 

/ / /

/ / /

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The court agrees with respondent that, because the record establishes that the state

court heard and considered petitioner’s Fourth Amendment argument, federal habeas relief is

unavailable on this claim. See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). 

B. Sixth Amendment and Privilege Claims

In addressing this claim on direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal stated:

This leaves defendant’s motion to dismiss and suppress because

the seizures interfered with is right to counsel. Defense counsel had

argued at the hearing that the officers investigating the underlying crime

could have had access to the investigator’s report through the department’s

record system, and the detective’s failure to seize the items for a

magistrate’s review rather than his own resulted in a violation of the

attorney-client privilege because the information to which he had access

must be imputed to the prosecution. The court did not dispute that it

would have been preferable to have a magistrate review the folder rather

than the detective, and that there was a violation of defendant’s right to

effective counsel in this search and in the seizure of the investigator’s

report. However, in its review of the report, the court did not find

anything that would have a negative impact on the defense of the

underlying crime or counsel’s effectiveness. Given the absence of any

prejudice (the trial court expressly crediting the detective’s claim that he

did not recall any of the information he had scanned or impart it to the

prosecution), dismissal was not necessary, nor suppression of anything

other than the already sealed report (and the direction to remove it from

the records system). 

The court agrees with respondent that the state court’s rejection of this claim was

neither contrary to nor based on an unreasonable application of applicable federal law. In

Weatherford v. Bursey, the Supreme Court held that, under the Sixth Amendment, the attorneyclient privilege protects communications between the defendant and his attorney from intrusion

by the government. See 429 U.S. 545 (1997). Intrusion is improper only where it results in

substantial prejudice to the defendant. See United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir.

2003). Mere intrusion without substantial prejudice is insufficient. See id. at 1069. Substantial

prejudice occurs where the prosecution uses protected information to gain an unfair advantage. 

See id. Here, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the prosecution gained any unfair

advantage. Specifically, the state court determined that the detective’s testimony that he did not

impart the contents of the seized report to the prosecution was credible, and petitioner has not

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met his burden of producing clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that this

finding is correct. 

C. Cross-Examination Claim

 Petitioner contends that the trial court impermissibly limited his crossexamination of his cellmate. The state court addressed this claim as follows:

At the outset of cross-examining the cellmate, the defense attorney

began questioning him about his motivation for his coming forward and

making a statement to the police about the murder in which he was

involved. After the cellmate said that he wanted to tell the truth and

receive punishment commensurate with his limited involvement, defense

counsel asked in a sidebar for permission to establish the extent of the

cellmate’s complicity in the murder to show that it was more than

marginal and therefore counter any impression that the cellmate had

cooperated with the police in his own murder case only on altruistic

grounds. The prosecutor opposed the request as exceeding the scope of

issues relevant in the present proceedings. The trial court agreed with the

prosecutor. Defense counsel also unsuccessfully sought to obtain

permission to establish inconsistencies between the initial statement of the

cellmate to the police in the murder case and the actual facts to impeach

the cellmate’s veracity. 

* * *

Defendant contends that this restriction on his cross-examination

of the witness violated his constitutional rights. A court’s informed

exercise of its discretion to restrict cross-examination on issues that are

repetitive, marginal, confusion, or unduly prejudicial does not violate any

trial rights under the constitution except where the restriction would leave

the jury with a significantly different impression of the credibility of the

witness. (citations omitted). 

There were significant challenges raised to the cellmate’s veracity

even without the excluded matters. He admitted having several previous

convictions for crimes directly reflecting his dishonesty, as well as his

pending crime reflecting at least a readiness to do evil. The jury was also

aware that by the time of trial he had an expectation that his cooperation

would earn him good will in his own case. The extent to which he may

have been dishonest with the police in the murder case, or the extent to

which he acted out of self-interest in cooperating in the case, were only

cumulative at the margins of matters already before the jury. We therefore

conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion, which did not

violate any constitutional right. 

/ / /

/ / /

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The state court’s decision was neither contrary to nor based on an unreasonable

application of established law. Under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, a criminal

defendant has the right to effective cross-examination. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

673 (1986). Effective cross-examination requires that the defense be allowed to expose a

witness’s bias and motivation to lie. See id. at 678-79. The trial court must allow questioning on

an issue if the proposed testimony could leave a reasonable jury significantly different impression

of the witness’s credibility. See id. at 680. Here, as the state court observed, the proposed

testimony was cumulative of other evidence already before the jury, and would not have left a

significantly different impression of the cellmate’s credibility. Therefore, the state court

correctly concluded that the trial did not err by excluding the proposed cross-examination. See

Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). 

D. Impeachment Evidence Claim

Petitioner next contends that the trial court impermissibly excluded evidence that

would have impeached the victim. The state court addressed this claim as follows:

Defendant predictably contends that the evidence of the

circumstances surrounding the victim’s 2005 arrest was of such

monumental probative value in resolving the credibility contest between

his version of events and the victim’s that Judge White’s exclusion of it

was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his constitutional right to

present a defense. Neither of these propositions is correct. (footnote

omitted). 

We will not belabor defendant’s argument involving the manner in

which Judge White exercised his discretion. It does not amount to

anything more than an effort to view the facts differently, without

establishing that Judge White’s resolution was beyond the bounds of

reason. That the victim wound up in the back seat of an old flame’s car,

kissing him when in a state of what was apparently advanced inebriation

provides little if any insight on her willingness to orally copulate a total

stranger in order to obtain drugs nine years earlier. Her reluctance to

inform her husband of the arrest similarly does not give any indication of

whether she would be likely to lie when directly asked about it in court or

elsewhere. Moreover, determining the exact nature of the circumstances

under which the drunken stolen kisses took place would have led the

proceedings down an extensive rabbit trail after this minuscule prey. The

potential of prejudice to the prosecution from having the jury view the

victim as dissolute for reasons having nothing to do with the material

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issues at trial has the greater weight in the balance. We accordingly

decline to find any abuse of discretion in the ruling. 

As for defendant’s inevitable claim that the ordinary application of

our rules of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to present a

defense, this is true only where it results in the evisceration of a defense,

or where a rule mandates the general exclusion of a category of evidence

on an arbitrary basis rather than as the result of an individualized exercise

of discretion. (citations omitted). Neither circumstance is present.

 

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not

available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law, such as the ruling to

exclude evidence at issue here. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d

805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,

377 (1972). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). Because federal habeas

relief does not lie for state law errors, a state court’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal

habeas relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due

process. See Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2000); Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d

971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); see

also Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1994). To raise such a claim in a

federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of

justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396 F.2d 293, 294-95

(9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

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In this case, the court finds that the state court’s denial of this claim was neither

contrary to nor based on an unreasonable application of these standards. As the state court

observed, the proffered impeachment was distant in time, would have confused the jury with a

significant side-trial, and was potentially prejudicial to the prosecution. On this record,

particularly given the dubiousness of the proffered evidence’s tendency to impeach the victim,

the state court reasonably concluded that excluding the evidence did not result in a complete

miscarriage of justice.

E. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Claim

Petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish the use of force. 

When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus relief is

available if it is found that, upon the record of evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Under Jackson, the court 3

must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on habeas. See

id. It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and

to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. “The question is not

whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether rational jurors

could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th

Cir. 1991); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1993). The federal habeas court

determines sufficiency of the evidence in the context of the substantive elements of the criminal

offense, as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

Even though Jackson was decided before AEDPA’s effective date, this expression 3

of the law is valid under AEDPA’s standard of federal habeas corpus review. A state court

decision denying relief in the face of a record establishing that no rational jury could have found

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would be either contrary to or an unreasonable

application of the law as outlined in Jackson. Cf. Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir.

2004) (denying habeas relief on sufficiency of the evidence claim under AEDPA standard of

review because a rational jury could make the finding at issue). 

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The court finds that the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to

nor based on an unreasonable application of these standards. As respondent notes, there was

evidence that petitioner brandished a firearm to gain entry into the victim’s car. There was also

evidence that petitioner held the gun to the victim’s head and forced her to orally copulate him. 

A rational jury could certainly find from this evidence that petitioner committed the crime by

means of force, violence, duress, or fear of immediate bodily injury. See People v. Griffin, 33

Cal.4th 1015 (2004); see also People v. Iniquez, 7 Cal.4th 847 (1994). 

F. “Illegal Sentence” Claim

Petitioner contends that his sentence was imposed in violation of state law

governing what may be counted for purposes of sentence enhancements. As respondent correctly

notes, and as discussed above, federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the

interpretation or application of state law. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the

court has considered whether to issue a certificate of appealability. Before petitioner can appeal

this decision, a certificate of appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P.

22(b). Where the petition is denied on the merits, a certificate of appealability may issue under

28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The court must either issue a certificate of

appealability indicating which issues satisfy the required showing or must state the reasons why

such a certificate should not issue. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Where the petition is dismissed

on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability “should issue if the prisoner can show: (1)

‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling’; and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.’” Morris v. Woodford, 229 F.3d 775,

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780 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000)). 

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that issuance of a certificate of appealability is not

warranted in this case. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 15) is

denied; 

2. The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file. 

DATED: September 29, 2015

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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