Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-14-06206/USCOURTS-ca10-14-06206-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gordon C. Reid
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

GORDON C. REID, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 14-6206 

(D.C. No. 5:12-CV-01416-M) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

I. BACKGROUND 

Federal prisoner Gordon C. Reid appeals from the dismissal of his complaint 

against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for damages he 

allegedly sustained from another prisoner assaulting him on September 22, 2010. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand. 

The complaint alleged the United States was negligent in failing to prevent the 

assaults. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

September 28, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 14-6206 Document: 01019497690 Date Filed: 09/28/2015 Page: 1 
- 2 - 

the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. It determined the complaint was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), which 

provides that an FTCA claim is “forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the 

appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues.” 

 Mr. Reid filed his administrative tort claim with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) on 

November 19, 2012. He admitted in district court that he did so after the statutory twoyear deadline, but he argued the deadline should be equitably tolled. The court 

determined Mr. Reid’s lack of diligence precluded equitable tolling. It also rejected his 

related argument for equitable estoppel. 

 We note the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 

135 S.Ct. 1625 (2015), holding that § 2401(b)’s time limits are nonjurisdictional and 

therefore subject to equitable tolling. The district court’s decision preceded Kwai Fun 

Wong. It adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, which assumed 

that equitable tolling and equitable estoppel applied, analyzed those issues, and found that 

Mr. Reid had failed to present sufficient evidence to justify equitable relief from § 

2401(b).1

II. DISCUSSION 

 In light of Kwai Fun Wong, the timeliness of Mr. Reid’s administrative tort claim 

under § 2401 is a nonjurisdictional issue, enabling him to seek equitable relief. He 

attempted to do so in the district court, where both parties submitted evidence on this 

 1

 On August 24, 2015, Mr. Reid moved for an extension of time to file a reply 

brief. On August 26, 2015, we granted the motion. As of the date of filing this Order 

and Judgment, the clerk’s office has not received a reply brief from Mr. Reid. 

Appellate Case: 14-6206 Document: 01019497690 Date Filed: 09/28/2015 Page: 2 
- 3 - 

issue. The proper procedural motion to dismiss was not a Rule 12(b)(1) motion but rather 

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 56(a) motion for summary judgment. 

Because the parties presented evidence beyond the pleadings, we consider the 

Government’s motion and the district court’s order as one for summary judgment. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the 

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as 

one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”); see also Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United 

States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[b]ecause the applicability of the 

equitable tolling doctrine often depends on matters outside the pleadings, it is not 

generally amenable to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and its decision 

to deny equitable tolling for an abuse of discretion. See Harms v. IRS, 321 F.3d 1001, 

1006 (10th Cir. 2003). We view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Zisumbo v. Ogden Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2015 WL 5172860, at *5 (10th Cir. 

Sept. 4, 2015). “[A]lthough our review [in a summary judgment case] is de novo, we 

conduct that review from the perspective of the district court at the time it made its 

ruling, ordinarily limiting our review to the materials adequately brought to the attention 

of the district court by the parties.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 

(10th Cir. 1998). The materials before the district court in this case were the affidavit of 

Mr. Reid and the declaration of Deborah Locke, a BOP attorney at the Federal Transfer 

Appellate Case: 14-6206 Document: 01019497690 Date Filed: 09/28/2015 Page: 3 
- 4 - 

Center in Oklahoma City, and the exhibits accompanying both of them. ROA at 79-102, 

115-369. 

A. Equitable Relief 

1. Equitable tolling 

Under “long-settled equitable-tolling principles, generally a litigant seeking 

equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his 

way.” Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134, 1150 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotations and 

citations omitted). 

In district court, Mr. Reid filed an affidavit in opposition to the Government’s 

motion to dismiss. In it he asserts that prison officials prevented or interfered with his 

filing a timely claim because they (1) placed him in administrative segregation on April 

23, 2012, which blocked access to his legal documents and limited his ability to do legal 

research; (2) refused to answer his requests for Form 95, which he understood from BOP 

publications was required to file his claim; and (3) denied him access to his personal 

property, which contained information that would have enabled him to file his claim. 

ROA at 79-88. He repeats these points in his appellate brief. 

In her declaration, Ms. Locke contests many of Mr. Reid’s factual assertions. But 

in its appellate brief, the Government states that summary judgment would not be 

appropriate if resolution of the tolling issue turned on these facts. Aplee. Br. at 23 n.6. It 

points out, however, that during the 19 months from September 22, 2010, the date Mr. 

Reid’s claim accrued, to April 23, 2012, the record lacks evidence that Mr. Reid pursued 

Appellate Case: 14-6206 Document: 01019497690 Date Filed: 09/28/2015 Page: 4 
- 5 - 

his claim or that any circumstances prevented him from doing so. The Government 

suggests this is enough to deny equitable tolling. 

Mr. Reid’s inaction during the first 19 months may be a factor in the equitable 

tolling analysis, but litigants often file late in a limitations period, and § 2401(b) allowed 

Mr. Reid 24 months to file his administrative claim. Mr. Reid’s tolling claim calls for 

looking at the circumstances as a whole and balancing the equities accordingly. See

Tosco Corp. v. Koch Industries, Inc., 216 F.3d 886, 894 (10th Cir. 2000). In other words, 

the facts alleged in Mr. Reid’s affidavit are relevant to the tolling issue, and the 

Government’s concession that the roadblocks alleged there are not amenable to summary 

judgment points to a remand for further consideration. 

2. Equitable estoppel 

To establish equitable estoppel against the government, “(1) the party to be 

estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct will be acted upon or 

must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has the right to believe that it was so 

intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the 

former’s conduct to his injury.” Tsosie v. United States, 452 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 

2006) (quoting Lurch v. United States, 719 F.2d 333, 341 (10th Cir. 1983)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must make a showing of “affirmative 

misconduct” on the part of the government. Id. 

Mr. Reid argued in district court that he should be allowed to proceed under the 

doctrine of equitable estoppel, alleging that prison officials gave him BOP publications 

instructing him that he must file his administrative claim only on Form 95 when, in fact, 

Appellate Case: 14-6206 Document: 01019497690 Date Filed: 09/28/2015 Page: 5 
- 6 - 

he could have used alternative written notice for his claim. ROA at 80-81, 83. He also 

attached to his affidavit four exhibits—BOP publications—all stating that he “must 

complete a Standard Form 95.” ROA at 88-98. The Government argues that the prison 

officials’ failure to provide Form 95 to Mr. Reid does not amount to the “affirmative 

misconduct” required for equitable estoppel. Aplee. Br. at 26. But that argument does 

not address Mr. Reid’s claim that he was misled into thinking he had to use Form 95. 

Mr. Reid states in his affidavit that he relied on the BOP instructions. The Government’s 

pointing to his access to legal materials via computer research that would have provided 

complete instructions is not a convincing antidote in light of his understandable reliance 

on official BOP documents. 

* * * * 

The magistrate judge recommended dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. She nonetheless considered and rejected the 

nonjurisdictional equitable relief arguments. The Supreme Court in Kwai Fun Wong

held that the time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) is nonjurisdictional. Because the 

parties submitted evidence outside the pleadings, the Government’s motion to 

dismiss the complaint should be considered as a motion for summary judgment. In 

its brief, the Government concedes that factual assertions in Mr. Reid’s affidavit in 

support of equitable relief are not amenable to summary judgment, but it argues that 

his lack of diligence for 19 months of the two-year limitations period is enough for us 

to affirm. Aplee. Br. at 23 & n.6. Although the magistrate judge’s Report and 

Recommendation relies on this point, it does so only in part, and it is not clear 

Appellate Case: 14-6206 Document: 01019497690 Date Filed: 09/28/2015 Page: 6 
- 7 - 

whether the district court would have denied equitable tolling on this ground alone. 

Under these circumstances, we reverse and remand for further consideration, 

including whether an evidentiary hearing is in order. 

B. Jurisdiction Under § 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(6) 

For the first time on appeal, the Government argues lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction because Mr. Reid’s “proferred Amended Complaint” did not adequately 

plead negligent or wrongful government action “under circumstances where the United 

States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of 

the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). When Mr. Reid 

filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss, he also moved for leave to file the Amended 

Complaint. The district court did not rule on that motion. Under these circumstances, the 

district court should determine the status of the Amended Complaint in the first instance 

and address the Government’s argument as appropriate. 

III.CONCLUSION 

We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 

grant Mr. Reid’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT, 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 14-6206 Document: 01019497690 Date Filed: 09/28/2015 Page: 7