Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-18-02826/USCOURTS-ca8-18-02826-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William P. Barr
Respondent
Mirna Villegas Rendon
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 18-2826

___________________________ 

Mirna Villegas Rendon, also known as Mirna Rendon Villegas

 Petitioner

v.

William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States

 Respondent

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

____________ 

Submitted: October 18, 2019

 Filed: March 12, 2020 

____________ 

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Mirna Villegas Rendon petitions for review of a final order of removal issued 

by the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”), following her appeal from an 

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) removal order denying her applications for asylum and 

withholding of removal. We deny the petition for review.

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I.

Rendon, a native and citizen of Mexico, first entered the United States without 

inspection as a teenager in the late 1980s. She claims that she most recently 

reentered the United States in 2004 when returning from a roughly seven-month trip 

to Mexico by pretending to be asleep as the passenger in a vehicle crossing the 

border. 

On April 24, 2017, Rendon was convicted in Minnesota for fifth degree 

possession of a controlled substance, specifically methamphetamine and tramadol,

in violation of Minnesota Statute section 152.025, subdivision 2(1). Thereafter, the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Rendon a notice to appear before 

an IJ, charging her with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because 

she was an alien present in the United States without admission or parole and under 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) because she was an alien convicted of a controlled 

substance offense. The notice to appear did not specify the time or date of the 

proceedings. 

Rendon then filed a motion to terminate the removal proceedings. In this 

motion, she argued that her crime was not a controlled substance offense for 

immigration purposes and that she had entered the United States legally in 2004. 

After a contested removability hearing in August 2017, the IJ issued an oral decision 

finding that Rendon failed to meet her burden of proof regarding the manner of her 

entry into the United States and therefore sustained the charge of inadmissibility 

under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). But in September 2017, the IJ issued a written decision 

declining to sustain the controlled substance removal charge under 

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 

At another hearing in November 2017, the IJ declined a request by Rendon to 

terminate removal proceedings by granting her military “parole in place.” Rendon 

claimed she qualified based on her 2007 marriage to a man who had served in the 

United States Navy and been discharged in 1992. Rendon also testified about past 

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sexual abuse she suffered as a child in Mexico, and her current husband testified that 

their family was reliant on Rendon. 

Then, in February 2018, the IJ issued a decision sustaining the removal 

charges and denying the applications for relief and protection. The IJ reconsidered 

her September 2017 decision regarding the controlled substance charge, reversed 

position, and instead sustained that charge. The IJ also found that Rendon’s 

application for asylum was time barred because it was not filed within one year of 

her arrival and that this untimeliness was not excused by extraordinary or changed 

circumstances. Finally, the IJ found that Rendon was ineligible for withholding of 

removal on the basis of past or future persecution. 

Rendon appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA. While the appeal was pending, 

Rendon also filed a motion to remand, arguing that her notice to appear was defective 

under the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. ---, 138 S. Ct. 

2105 (2018). The BIA dismissed the appeal and denied the motion to remand. 

Rendon petitions this court for review of the BIA’s dismissal. The BIA’s 

decision was the final agency decision, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i), and we 

have jurisdiction to consider the appeal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).1

1

Rendon argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira establishes that 

the IJ never had jurisdiction over her case because her notice to appear did not 

include the time and place of her removal proceedings. We rejected this 

interpretation of Pereira in Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Pereira

had nothing to say about when an [IJ] obtains jurisdiction over an alien’s removal 

proceedings.”).

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II.

A.

Rendon first asserts that her state drug conviction under Minnesota Statute 

section 152.025 does not constitute grounds for removal because the Minnesota 

statute is overbroad and indivisible. 

“We review the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence on the record as a 

whole and will uphold its factual findings unless [Rendon] demonstrates that the 

evidence [s]he presented not only supports a contrary conclusion but compels it.” 

Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 

marks omitted and emphasis omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “We 

review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo.” Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 

749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011). “To the extent the BIA adopted the findings or reasoning 

of the IJ, we consider the two decisions together.” Fuentes-Erazo, 848 F.3d at 852. 

We have recognized that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final 

order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed 

a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2),” including a controlled substance 

offense. Brikova v. Holder, 699 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(C)). This criminal alien review bar precludes our review of the 

agency’s decision, “save for questions of law or constitutional claims.” Id. at 1008 

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D)). We have jurisdiction to consider whether 

Rendon is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) due to her drug 

conviction because that involves an issue of statutory interpretation and is therefore 

a question of law. See Waldron v. Holder, 688 F.3d 354, 359 (8th Cir. 2012). 

To determine whether a state drug conviction is grounds for removal, we are 

required to apply the “categorical approach” and compare the elements of the state 

offense with the elements of removable offenses defined by federal law. Martinez 

v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2018). Under this approach, we assume 

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that the state conviction rested on only the least of the acts criminalized by the state 

statute, and then we “determine whether that state statute fits within the removable 

offense identified by federal law.” Id. at 1070. A state statute is considered 

overbroad when it criminalizes more conduct than the removable offense, and a 

conviction under such a statute does not categorically make the offender removable. 

Id. at 1070. 

If a state statute is overbroad, we must determine whether the statute is 

divisible, meaning we ask whether it includes multiple, alternative elements that 

create several different crimes. Id. If so, we may then apply the modified categorical 

approach and “seek to determine, based on a limited class of judicial records, the 

crime of which the alien was convicted. . . . [I]f the elements of the offense of 

conviction fit within the removable offense, the alien is removable.” Id. 

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an alien is removable for 

violating a state law relating to a controlled substance as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). The Government concedes that Minnesota 

Statute section 152.025 is overbroad because it prohibits the possession of more 

substances than the controlled substances listed in the schedules referenced by § 802; 

so we will examine whether the statute is divisible. 

A statute is divisible if the specific controlled substance underlying the 

conviction must be an element of the possession offense, not merely an alternative 

means of committing the offense. See Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. ---, 136 S. 

Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016). The Minnesota statute here provides that “[a] person is guilty 

of controlled substance crime in the fifth degree . . . if . . . the person unlawfully 

possesses one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance.” Minn. Stat. § 

152.025, subd. 2(1). These controlled substances are classified under state 

Schedules I through IV in Minnesota Statute section 152.02.

We agree with the BIA that the identity of the controlled substance is an 

element of the possession offense in the Minnesota statute, and therefore the statute 

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is divisible. Our examination of a similar Missouri controlled substance statute in 

Martinez v. Sessions is instructive in analyzing Minnesota’s statute. 893 F.3d 1070-

73. In Martinez, a Missouri statute made it a crime to “possess with intent 

to . . . deliver . . . a controlled substance.” Id. at 1070. “A separate 

section . . . defined ‘controlled substance’ with reference to five drug 

schedules . . . .” Id. The petitioner in Martinez argued that the statute was 

indivisible because “the different controlled substances represent[ed] different ways 

or means of committing a single offense.” Id. We concluded, however, that the 

statute was divisible because the “identity of the controlled substance is an element 

of the offense.” Id. at 1072-73. We based our conclusion on a review of Missouri 

state law, particularly on the fact that Missouri courts allowed for separate 

convictions under the Missouri controlled substance statute for two different types 

of controlled substances. See id. at 1071.

Similar to our analysis in Martinez, Minnesota’s case law and statutory text

also demonstrate that the identity of the controlled substance is an element of the 

possession offense. For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that an 

individual can be convicted of seven different counts of fifth degree drug possession 

where the individual possessed seven different controlled substances at the same 

time. State v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (imposing 

seven fifth degree controlled substance convictions for possession of hashish and six 

different kinds of steroids). We have considered separate convictions for different 

types of controlled substances persuasive evidence that the identity of a substance is 

an element of the crime. Martinez, 893 F.3d at 1071. 

The statutory text also supports the BIA’s finding that the statute is divisible. 

See id. Rendon argues that the statute cannot be divisible because the controlled 

substances are listed in a separate statutory section. We have recognized that where 

“a phrase is defined in a separate statutory section, that provides textual support that 

the definition is a list of means by which [an] element may be committed.” United 

States v. McFee, 842 F.3d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). But “[t]here is no universal rule that listings in a separate section 

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automatically are means rather than elements.” Martinez, 893 F.3d at 1072. For 

example, in Martinez, we explained that when a defined phrase is prefaced with the 

word “any” rather than “a,” the phrasing suggests that the statute created only one 

offense with several means set forth in the definition because the word “any” 

includes “all.” Id. In contrast, subdivision 2(1) of section 152.025 prefaces 

“controlled substance” with “a,” indicating the phrase is limited to one substance per 

offense. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1). The text of the statute and the case law 

here establish that the agency did not err in finding that the identity of the substance 

is an element rather than a means. Therefore, the statute is divisible.2

Because the statute is divisible, we apply the modified categorical approach 

and “determine, based on a limited class of judicial records, the crime of which the 

alien was convicted” and whether the “offense of conviction fit[s] within the 

removable offense.” Martinez, 893 F.3d at 1070. Rendon’s guilty plea petition 

states that she pleaded guilty to the charge in the state court complaint—fifth degree 

possession of a controlled substance, specifically methamphetamine. 

Methamphetamine is a federally controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), 

Schedules II(c), III(a)(3). Thus, Rendon’s state drug conviction under Minnesota 

Statute section 152.025 constitutes grounds for removal. 

Rendon also argues that, because she is not removable for a controlled 

substance offense, we should remand her case to allow her to apply for cancellation 

of removal. Because the BIA properly applied the modified categorical approach to 

find that Rendon is removable, she is not eligible for cancellation of removal. See 

United States v. Ramirez-Jimenez, 907 F.3d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 2018) (noting that 

“an alien convicted of [a drug offense] is not eligible for cancellation of removal”). 

2

Because the statutory text and Minnesota case law are sufficient to support 

a finding that the statute is divisible, we need not reach Rendon’s objection to the 

BIA’s finding that Minnesota’s pattern jury instructions also support the statute’s 

divisibility.

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B. 

 

Rendon next argues that because the BIA erred in finding she did not legally 

enter the United States in 2004, she is not subject to removal under

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Rendon asserts that she demonstrated through credible 

testimony that she entered the United States by pretending to be asleep in a car, 

which may qualify as a legal admission under Matter of Quilantan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 

285 (BIA 2010). The BIA, however, did not reach the issue of whether Rendon’s 

claimed manner of entry was legal but simply agreed with the IJ that Rendon’s 

testimony was not sufficiently persuasive to establish that she did in fact enter the 

United States in the manner she claimed, pointing to inconsistencies and vagueness 

in her account. Therefore, Rendon’s argument is simply a “challenge to the [BIA’s

and] IJ’s discretionary and fact-finding exercises cloaked as a question of law.” See 

Mocevic v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2008) (concluding that an argument 

that the BIA committed legal error by determining that petitioner did not meet his 

burden of proof was actually a question of fact as to how the BIA and IJ weighed 

the evidence). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review this claim under the criminal

alien bar. See id. at 816-17.

C. 

The BIA also did not err in dismissing Rendon’s appeal of the IJ’s denial of 

her asylum and withholding of removal claims.3 Again, the criminal alien bar 

precludes our review of the BIA’s decision on Rendon’s applications for asylum and 

withholding of removal “save for questions of law or constitutional claims.” 

Brikova, 699 F.3d at 1008.

3

Rendon’s Convention Against Torture claim was mentioned in Rendon’s 

“Statement of the Issues Presented for Review” section but was not supported with 

any argument, reasoning, or citation to authority in her opening brief. Thus, we 

deem this claim to be waived. See, e.g., Lemus-Arita v. Sessions, 854 F.3d 476, 479 

n.2 (8th Cir. 2017).

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First, Rendon argues that the BIA erred in holding that she did not qualify for 

the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to the one-year deadline for filing an 

asylum application. The BIA agreed with the IJ’s finding that, although Rendon had 

experienced trauma as a child, she did not establish that this trauma prevented her 

from filing for asylum in a timely fashion. Rendon argues that whether a petitioner 

has presented facts sufficient to qualify for this exception is a predicate legal 

determination that we may review despite the criminal alien bar. Rendon effectively 

admits, however, that this is a factual determination regarding the severity of 

Rendon’s mental illness and disability, which we lack jurisdiction to review. See

Bin Jing Chen v. Holder, 776 F.3d 597, 601 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that we lack 

jurisdiction under the criminal alien bar to review whether a petitioner 

“demonstrated changed circumstances that would provide an exception” to the oneyear asylum filing deadline). 

Second, Rendon argues that she is eligible for withholding of removal because 

she is a member of four particular social groups that the Mexican government is 

unwilling or unable to protect. “Eligibility for withholding of removal requires 

proof . . . that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened” due to “persecution 

on account of . . . membership in a particular social group.” Hounmenou v. Holder, 

691 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir. 2012). We have concluded that “persecution” requires

harm inflicted either by “a country’s government or by people . . . the government 

is unable or unwilling to control.” Edionseri v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th 

Cir. 2017). Regardless of whether Rendon demonstrated her membership in a 

particular social group, the BIA and IJ held that Rendon did not demonstrate that the 

Mexican government was unwilling or unable to protect her. This is a question of 

fact, requiring review of the BIA’s weighing of the evidence regarding the Mexican 

government’s ability and desire to protect certain groups. See Gutierrez-Vidal v. 

Holder, 709 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Whether a government is unable or 

unwilling to control private actors is a question of fact . . . .” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review this claim under the criminal

alien bar.

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D.

Rendon also argues that the IJ abused its discretion by rejecting her motion to 

terminate in order to pursue military parole in place and that the BIA erred by failing 

to consider the matter on appeal. Pursuant to a United States Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (“USCIS”) policy, a former member of the United States 

Armed Forces, such as Rendon’s husband, may request parole in place adjudication 

on behalf of a spouse. Discretionary Options for Military Service Members, 

Enlistees, and Their Families, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (last 

updated Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/military/discretionary-optionsmilitary-members-enlistees-and-their-families. “Though we ordinarily review only 

the BIA’s decision, we also review the IJ’s decision as part of the final agency action 

if the BIA adopted the findings or the reasoning of the IJ.” Etenyi v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 

1003, 1006 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA’s reasoning 

mirrors the IJ’s on this issue, so we will review the reasoning of both decisions. We 

review the BIA’s affirmance and the IJ’s refusal to terminate removal proceedings 

for an abuse of discretion. Hanggi v. Holder, 563 F.3d 378, 381-84 (8th Cir. 2009); 

Shaikhs v. INS, 181 F.3d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 1999).

First, we are persuaded by the IJ’s reasoning for rejecting Rendon’s motion to 

terminate based on military parole in place. The IJ reasoned that Rendon was 

properly in removal proceedings and “it would be essentially up to DHS” whether 

“they would wish to exercise prosecutorial discretion to let the proceedings be 

terminated in order for respondent to pursue the parole in place.” As we noted in 

Hanggi, an IJ may terminate removal proceedings only under two regulatory 

provisions—8 C.F.R. § 1238.1(e), which applies if an alien has been convicted of 

certain criminal offenses, and 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f), which applies to aliens who have 

filed an application or petition for naturalization. 563 F.3d at 384; see also Matter 

of S-O-G- & F-D-B- Respondents, 27 I&N Dec. 462, 466 (A.G. 2018). Rendon does 

not seek termination under 8 C.F.R. § 1238.1(e), and she does not argue or present 

evidence that she has filed a Form N-400, as is required for an application or petition 

for naturalization. See Hanggi, 563 F.3d at 384 (noting that “a naturalization petition 

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(Form N-400) cannot be filed until the applicant has been lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence”). Because neither of these provisions applies, the IJ did not 

abuse its discretion in declining to terminate removal proceedings.

Second, contrary to Rendon’s assertion, the BIA did in fact consider her

motion to terminate removal proceedings and acknowledged that Rendon requested 

termination in order to pursue parole in place with the USCIS. The BIA addressed 

the motion by stating that it lacked “jurisdiction over a decision to grant parole” and 

therefore “decline[d] to terminate the proceedings.” In other words, the BIA upheld 

the IJ’s decision because the basis for the termination request—that is, allowing the 

DHS to determine whether Rendon is entitled to parole in place—is not a recognized 

ground for which an IJ may terminate removal proceedings. See Hanggi, 563 F.3d 

at 383-84. Because the BIA correctly agreed with the IJ that whether to terminate 

proceedings was based on a decision about the applicability of military parole in 

place that was left to the DHS’s discretion, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 

declining to terminate the proceedings.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is denied.

______________________________

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