Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05080/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05080-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lewis Aaron Cook
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court qf Appeals Tenth Circuit 

l~OV O 5 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES coURT oF APPEALS Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LEWIS AARON COOK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-5080 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-107-001-E) 

Jeffrey D. Fischer of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

James L. Swartz, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. Graham, 

United states Attorney, with him on the brief), for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and ALDISERT,* Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge, 

United states Court of Appeals for the Third circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 1 
Lewis Aaron Cook was convicted by a jury of two counts of 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1988), and of maintaining a place for the 

purpose of distributing controlled substances in violation of 21 

u.s.c. § 856(a) (1988). He was sentenced to twenty years and ten 

months. Mr. Cook appeals both his conviction and sentence, citing 

numerous errors below. We affirm. 

In July 1989, the Tulsa Police Department investigated Mr. 

Cook's involvement with drugs. On July 25, Officer Mark McCrory 

of the Tulsa Police initiated a controlled drug buy from Mr. Cook 

by a confidential informant. Immediately thereafter, Officer 

McCrory obtained a search warrant for Mr. Cook's apartment. The 

police searched his apartment that evening and arrested and 

charged him with state narcotics violations. He was released on 

bond pending a preliminary hearing in state court scheduled for 

August 24. On August 21, the police again searched Mr. Cook's 

residence, arrested him along with Yvonne Cross, and charged him 

with additional state narcotics offenses. Pursuant to 

conversations between Officer McCrory, Officer Mark Siebert of the 

Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the United 

States Attorney's Office, a federal investigation was initiated. 

Based on the drug trafficking underlying the state charges, Mr. 

Cook was indicted on September 6, and charged with federal 

narcotics violations. on September 8, Mr. Cook, out on bond 

again, was arrested in his car along with Ruth Ann Zachary and 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 2 
Patricia Swimp by federal and state law enforcement personnel. 

His state charges were dismissed later that month over his 

objection. 

I. 

Mr. Cook first argues that the dismissal of his state charges 

and the subsequent prosecution of this case in federal court 

violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United 

States Constitution. He contends that he was denied due process 

when his prosecution under an applicable federal statute subjected 

him to a harsher penalty than prosecution under the applicable 

state statute would have. He also contends that the federal 

prosecution denied him equal protection because the government 

prosecuted Ms. Zachary for the same conduct in state court, even 

though she was arrested along with Mr. Cook on September 8. 

We recently held that a defendant's due process rights are 

not violated by the federal government's decision to prosecute 

under a federal, rather than state, statute, notwithstanding the 

harsher penalties. United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 596 

(10th Cir. 1991); accord United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455, 461 

(D.c. Cir. 1991). Mr. Cook has made no showing of prosecutorial 

vindictiveness, see United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380-81 

& n.12, or arbitrary classification based on an unjustifiable 

standard such as sex, race, or religion, see Bordenkircher v. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 3 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). We therefore conclude that his 

due process rights were not violated. 

We likewise find no merit in Mr. Cook's argument that his 

Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection was violated by the 

decision to prosecute him, and not Ms. Zachary, under a federal 

statute. Absent a showing of discriminatory purpose and effect, 

Mr. Cook does not state an equal protection claim. Wayte v. 

United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 & n.10 (1985); United states v. 

Brown, 859 F.2d 974, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The difference in 

treatment between Mr. Cook and Ms. Zachary can be explained by his 

more extensive participation in cocaine trafficking. Our review 

of the record indicates that Ms. Zachary's participation was 

limited to throwing the cocaine out the car window when Mr. Cook 

handed it to her and ordered her to do so. Numerous officers 

identified Mr. Cook as a "major," "high ranking" cocaine 

trafficker. Rec., vol. II, at 15-16. Because the prosecutor did 

not discriminate between Ms. Zachary and Mr. Cook on the basis of 

an unconstitutional distinction, see United States v. Batchelder, 

442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979); Brown, 859 F.2d at 977, the 

prosecution of Mr. Cook under the federal statute does not offend 

the Equal Protection Clause. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 4 
II. 

Mr. Cook next challenges the sufficiency of the affidavit in I 

support of the search warrant issued on July 25, alleging that it 

contained insufficient facts to sustain a probable cause 

determination. Specifically, he argues that the failure of the 

affiant, Officer McCrory, to test the substance bought by the 

confidential informant is fatal to the affidavit's sufficiency. 

When reviewing the validity of a search warrant, we must 

determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances 

presented in the affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial basis 

for finding a fair probability that contraband or other evidence 

of a crime would be found in the place to be searched. Illinois 

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); United States v. Parrish, 925 

F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1991). Officer McCrory's affidavit 

indicates that he had been watching Mr. Cook's residence for 

approximately seven days prior to the search. McCrory noticed 

considerably more activity at the apartment during the night than 

he observed during the day. The affidavit states that McCrory was 

contacted by a man who said he knew of an apartment that was used 

as a place to sell cocaine and that he had seen several people 

purchase cocaine at this location. This confidential informant 

directed Officer McCrory to Mr. Cook's apartment, which McCrory 

recognized as one about which he and other officers had received 

information concerning cocaine transactions. The confidential 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 5 
informant offered to participate in a controlled buy of cocaine at 

the apartment. Officer McCrory searched the informant for money 

and drugs, and upon ascertaining that he had neither, gave him 

twenty dollars and watched him enter Mr. Cook's apartment. Upon 

the confidential informant's return, Officer McCrory again 

searched him for money and drugs. Officer McCrory did not find 

the twenty dollars, but he did find a white rock that appeared to 

be cocaine. The confidential informant reported that he saw more 

white rocks in the apartment that appeared to be cocaine, and 

stated that the occupants of the apartment told him he could 

return to buy cocaine at any time. The affidavit also stated that 

Officer McCrory had been trained to recognize controlled 

substances at the Tulsa Police Academy and the Drug Enforcement 

Agency's Basic School of Narcotic Investigation. Finally, the 

affidavit indicated that Officer McCrory had made approximately 

forty arrests for offenses involving· cocaine. 

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that 

substantial grounds existed for believing that cocaine could be 

found in Mr. Cook's apartment. Although Officer McCrory did not 

conduct a field test on the substance that the confidential 

informant brought to him from Mr. Cook's apartment, he had been 

trained to recognize cocaine and had been personally involved in 

numerous cocaine arrests. Moreover, Officer McCrory was able to 

control and observe the circumstances under which the confidential 

informant obtained the substance, and he had the benefit of the 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 6 
informant's opinion that the substance was cocaine. A magistrate 

is entitled to rely on the expert opinions of officers when 

supporting factual information is supplied in the affidavit. See 

United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 409 (10th Cir. 1986) 

("Courts frequently have relied on the expert opinion of officers 

in determining where contraband may be kept."); United States v. 

Wood, 695 F.2d 459, 464 (10th Cir. 1982); cf. United States v. 

Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 1988) (expertise of 

trained narcotics officer to be considered in determining 

necessity of warrantless search based on exigency). Given Officer 

McCrory's experience and training, along with the controlled 

circumstances surrounding the buy, there was a substantial basis 

for concluding that the substance was cocaine and that more would 

be found in Mr. Cook's apartment. To require chemical testing of 

the cocaine prior to the issuance of a search warrant under the 

circumstances present in this case would be to ignore the Supreme 

Court's admonition that we "'not invalidate warrant(s] by 

interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than common 

sense, manner.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (quoting United states v. 

Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)). 

III. 

Mr. Cook next contends that the testimony of co-defendant 

Yvonne Cross, who had pled guilty, was inherently contradictory, 

and that the trial court therefore erred in admitting it. Mr. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 7 
Cook had supplied cocaine to Ms. Cross with whom he had been 

living for about a month prior to their arrest. She served as a 

lookout while Mr. Cook dealt cocaine out of his apartment. Mr. 

Cook once had her test cocaine he purchased for resale. As part 

of her plea bargain, Ms. Cross agreed to cooperate with the 

government and to testify against Mr. Cook. When called to the 

stand, however, she initially refused to testify against him and 

then did so only grudgingly and under threat of contempt. On 

cross-examination, she maintained that her prior testimony had 

been a lie and that she felt pressured by the government. On 

redirect, Ms. Cross again recanted her initial testimony. The 

district court denied Mr. Cook's motion to strike Ms. Cross' 

testimony. 

We may reverse an evidentiary ruling only if we find that the 

district court abused its discretion~ United States v. Temple, 

862 F.2d 821, 822 (10th Cir. 1988). Under Rule 601 of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence, "every person is competent to be a witness 

except as otherwise provided in these rules." Mr. Cook cites 

nothing in support of his contention that a witness who gives 

contradictory testimony is incompetent to testify. Moreover, we 

have recently refused to characterize as incompetent a witness 

whose testimony was inconsistent. United States v. Bedonie, 913 

F.2d 782, 799 (10th Cir. 1990) (pointing to the regressive nature 

of an evidentiary analysis that fuses credibility with 

competency), cert. denied, 111 S. ct. 2895 (1991). "Rule 601 

-8-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 8 
represents the culmination of the modern trend which has converted 

questions of competency into questions of credibility while 

'steadily moving towards a realization that judicial determination 

of the question of whether a witness should be heard at all should 

be abrogated in favor of hearing the testimony for what it is 

worth.'" 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence§ 

601[05], at 601-40 (1991) (quoting Comment, Witnesses Under Article 

VI of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 Wayne L. Rev. 

1236, 1250 (1969)). In Bedonie, we recognized that the evolution 

of the law in the area of witness competency has resulted in 

federal rules that deem virtually all persons competent as long as 

they have personal knowledge of the facts about which they 

testify. 913 F.2d at 799. 

Although Ms. Cross' testimony was contradictory at times, it 

purported to relate to circumstances within her personal 

knowledge. And while the testimony of a drug abuser may be 

suspect for a number of reasons, drug abuse alone does not render 

a witness incompetent. See United states v. Smith, 692 F.2d 658, 

660-61 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983); 

United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir. 1978) (drug 

use goes to credibility not competency). It was thus properly 

left to the jury to determine which version of the facts Ms. Cross 

recounted was true, or to reject her testimony as entirely 

incredible. See Bedonie, 913 F.2d at 801. We therefore conclude 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 

-9-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 9 
the testimony of Ms. Cross and by allowing the jury to determine 

her credibility. 

IV. 

We find no merit in Mr. Cook's argument that the district 

court committed reversible error when it refused his request for 

special instructions with regard to the testimony of Ms. Cross and 

Ms. Swimp. We review the jury instructions in light of the record 

as a whole to determine whether they provided the jury with the 

requisite understanding of the issues presented at trial and the 

legal standards applicable to those issues. Big Horn Coal Co. v. 

Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1271 (10th cir. 1988). 

Mr. Cook first challenges the court's refusal to charge the jury 

with an instruction pertaining to "reluctant witnesses." Mr. Cook 

does not develop his "reluctant witness" instruction argument in 

his brief, nor did he suggest to the district court any language 

for such an instruction. Both Ms. Cross and Ms. Swimp testified 

and ultimately answered all questions asked of them, although both 

witnesses were, at times, less than cooperative. We conclude that 

the district court did not commit reversible error in refusing a 

"reluctant witness" instruction. 

Mr. Cook next argues that the district court's refusal to 

instruct the jury about the particular infirmities of a drug 

addict's testimony denied him a fair trial. The transcript of the 

-10-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 10 
charging conference reveals that the government objected to the 

portion of Mr. Cook's proposed instructions that read: 

"An addict has a constant need for supply of drugs and 

for money to support his and her habit and also may have 

abnormal fear of imprisonment in which his or her supply 

of drugs might be cut off. These are special 

circumstances which you may consider in weighing 

testimony of this kind." 

Rec., vol. VI, at 544. 

While "[a)s a general rule, prudence dictates the giving of 

an addict instruction whenever the prosecution has relied upon the 

testimony of a narcotics addict," whether refusal to so instruct 

is reversible error depends on the particular facts of each case. 

Smith, 692 F.2d at 661. In Smith, the district court declined to 

give an instruction containing essentially the same language 

proffered by Mr. Cook where the government offered the testimony 

of an informer-addict. Id. at 659-60. Although we pointed to the 

desirability of giving such an instruction when the witness was a 

drug abuser, we held that the court did not err in its refusal 

because it gave instructions concerning accomplice, 

immune-informant, and felon testimony, along with a general 

credibility instruction. Id. at 661. In addition, we noted that 

the witness' addiction was explored extensively at trial. Id. 

Here, the district court gave a general credibility instruction 

that stated: 

-11-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 11 
"In deciding what the facts are, you must consider 

all the evidence. In doing this, you must decide which 

testimony to believe and which testimony not to believe. 

You may disbelieve all or any part of any witness' 

testimony. In making that decision, you may take into 

account a number of factors including the following: 

1. Was the witness able to see, or hear, or know 

the things about which that witness testified? 

2. How well was the witness able to recall and 

describe those things? 

3. What was the witness' manner while testifying? 

4. Did the witness have an interest in the 

outcome of this case or any bias or prejudice 

concerning any party or any matter involved in 

the case? The testimony of a witness who 

provides evidence against a defendant for 

personal advantage must be considered with 

great care. You must decide whether the 

credibility of the witness' testimony was 

affected by his personal interest. 

5. How reasonable was the witness' testimony in 

light of all the evidence in the case? 

6. Was the witness' testimony contradicted by 

what that witness had said or done at another 

time, or by the testimony of other witnesses, 

or by other evidence? In deciding whether or 

not to believe a witness, keep in mind that 

people sometimes forget things. You need to 

consider therefore whether a contradiction is 

an innocent lapse of memory or an intentional 

falsehood, and that may depend on whether the 

contradiction concerns an important fact or 

only a small detail. 

7. Was the witness's testimony bolstered by the 

fact he or she had said essentially the same 

thing on more than one occasion? If so, it 

may be reason for you to believe the testimony 

of that witness. 

''These are some of the factors you may consider in 

deciding whether to believe testimony. 

"The weight of the evidence presented by each side 

does not necessarily depend on the number of witnesses 

-12-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 12 
testifying on one side or the other. You must consider 

all the evidence in the case, and you may decide that 

the testimony of a smaller number of witnesses on one 

side has greater weight than that of a larger number on 

the other. 

"All of these are matters for you to consider in 

finding the facts." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 37 at 8-9. The jury received an additional 

instruction relating to the testimony of Ms. Swimp: 

"The testimony of an admitted perjurer should 

always be considered with caution and weighed with great 

care." 

Id. at 10. 

Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the 

failure to give the addict instruction proffered by Mr. Cook was 

not reversible error. The drug abuse of both Ms. Cross and Ms. 

Swimp was revealed to the jury, and the district court gave a 

general credibility instruction alerting the jury to the potential 

for untrue testimony to gain personal advantage. See Smith, 692 

F.2d at 661. The jury was therefore alerted to the possible 

k f th t t wea ' ' t . 1 nesses o e es imony in ques ion. In assessing the 

1 It is apparent from Mr. Cook's argument to the district court 

and on appeal that he was primarily concerned with the witnesses' 

ability to comprehend events while they were impaired. However, 

the language of his proffered instruction, and of the instructions 

discussed in the cases he cites, see Hendricks, 476 F.2d at 780; 

United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 

United States v. Griffin, 382 F.2d 823, 828-29 (6th Cir. 1967), 

predicates a drug abuser's untrustworthiness on her need to 

continue her habit. The cases he relies on also are 

distinguishable because in each instance the addict-witness was a 

-13-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 13 
credibility of Ms. Cross and Ms. swimp, the jury may have 

considered the direct evidence gathered during Mr. Cook's arrests 

that corroborated her accounts. See Virgin Islands v. Hendricks, 

476 F.2d 776, 779 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Collins, 472 

F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 

(1973). 

v. 

Mr. Cook next contends that the district court erred in 

adopting the probation officer's estimate of the quantity of drugs 

involved in his offense. Although he admits it is proper under 

the Sentencing Guidelines for the court to estimate the amount of 

cocaine attributable to his activities, see United States v. 

Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

111 s. ct. 2066 (1981); United States v. Havens, 910 F.2d 703, 705 

(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. ct. 687 (1991), he argues 

that it was error to base this estimation on the testimony of Ms. 

Cross, because of her lack of credibility. 

The government must prove the drug quantity by a 

preponderance of the evidence. See Easterling, 921 F.2d at 1077; 

United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d. 1456, 1462 (10th Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 990 (1991). We review this determination 

under a clearly erroneous standard, and we will not disturb it 

unless it has no support in the record, or unless after reviewing 

paid informant. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 14 
all the evidence we are firmly convinced that an error has been 

made. Easterling, 921 F.2d at 1077; see United states v. 

Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (10th cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. 

ct. 3302 (1990). We defer to the district court when reviewing 

the credibility of witnesses on whose testimony it relies in 

making its factual findings. 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e) (1988); see 

United States v. Florentino, 922 F.2d 1443, 1445 (10th Cir. 1990) 

(quoting 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e)). We have held that the use of 

estimates is permissible only if the information underlying the 

estimates possesses a minimum indicia of trustworthiness. 

Easterling. 921 F.2d at 1077. 

The probation officer testified at the sentencing hearing 

that he relied on information provided by Ms. Cross on three 

different occasions to determine that Mr. Cook sold between 

$1000-$2000 worth of cocaine daily. 2 Ms. Cross' testimony in this 

regard was consistent throughout the proceedings. Moreover, she 

previously had relayed the same information in an interview with 

the Assistant United States Attorney, and had attested to the 

2 The probation officer used the minimum estimation of $1000 

and multiplied it by 25, the number of days Ms. Cross had lived 

with Mr. Cook and had aided him in his cocaine trafficking. By 

estimating that each crack cocaine transaction cost $30, the 

probation officer arrived at a base level of 34. The officer also 

testified that he used as a measuring stick the amount of cash 

seized from Mr. Cook during his three arrests, which was 

approximately $2,000. These are appropriate methods by which to 

estimate the magnitude of Mr. Cook's cocaine business. See United 

States Sentencing Comm'n Guidelines Manual§ 2D1.4, Application 

Note 2 (1990). 

-15-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 15 
veracity of her presentence report, containing the same figures. 

Ms. Cross was quite familiar with Mr. Cook's drug trafficking. We 

conclude that the district court's factual determination is 

supported by the record and that the information upon which the 

court relied contains sufficient indicia of reliability. See 

United states v. Frondle, 918 F.2d 62, 64-65 {8th Cir. 1990) 

(rejecting argument that testimony of co-defendant government 

witness was insufficient evidence), cert. denied, 111 s. ct. 1400 

{1991); United States v. Phillippi, 911 F.2d 149, 151 n.3 {8th 

cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 111 s. ct. 702 (1991); cf. Reid, 

911 F.2d at 1459-62 (district court's reliance on coconspirators 

estimate of cocaine quantity was proper); Easterling, 921 F.2d at 

1077-78 (proper for district court to rely on information 

contained in interview of buyers of defendant's cocaine to 

estimate drug quantity); United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530, 

1538 {10th Cir. 1990) (proper to rely on financial record of 

cocaine sales partially corroborated by buyers). 

VI. 

Finally, Mr. Cook argues that the district court erred in 

relying on the testimony of Ms. Swimp to enhance his base offense 

level for obstruction of justice. We review a court's decision to 

enhance a sentence for obstruction of justice for clear error when 

the issue raised concerns a determination of fact. See United 

states v. Mccann, 940 F.2d 1353, 1360 {10th Cir. 1991); United 

-16-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 16 
States v. Urbanek, 930 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Enhancement is warranted if the defendant attempts "to obstruct or 

impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, 

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense." United states 

Sentencing Comm'n Guidelines Manual§ 3Cl.1 (1990). Application 

Note 3(d) to§ 3Cl.1 lists as an example of obstructing justice 

throwing away a controlled substance during the course of an 

arrest. Id. Ms. Swimp testified at trial that as the police were 

attempting to overtake Mr. Cook's car, he handed a bottle to Ms. 

Zachary and ordered her to throw it out the window, which she did. 

The bottle was later retrieved by the police and found to contain 

cocaine. This activity indisputably amounts to an obstruction of 

justice under the Guidelines. Mr. Cook argues, however, that this 

factual determination was not supported by the requisite indicia 

of reliability because Ms. Swimp should not have been believed. 

As we stated previously, we accord considerable deference to the 

district court's credibility determinations in sentencing 

proceedings. In this instance, the court chose to believe Ms. 

Swimp's narrative. The court's enhancement decision was supported 

by the record and was not clearly erroneous. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

-17-

Appellate Case: 90-5080 Document: 010110096875 Date Filed: 11/05/1991 Page: 17