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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Guessinia Verners
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LAROAN F. VERNERS I 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FILED . United States Court of Appca.J Tenth Circuit STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

PUBLISH 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 11 1995 

PATRICK FISHEll 

Clerit 

No. 94-5029 

No. 94-5030 

GUESSINIA VERNERS also known as 

Guessinia Holland, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Nos. 93-CR-01-C and 93-CR-01-2-C) 

MartinS. Pinales (Edmund J. McKenna with him on the brief) of 

Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, Cincinnati, Ohio, for 

Defendant-Appellant Laroan F. Verners (94-5029). 

C. W. Hack, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant Guessinia 

Verners a/k/a Guessinia Holland (94-5030). 

Allen J. Litchfield, Assistant United States Attorney (Steven C. 

Lewis, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 94-5030 Document: 01019282766 Date Filed: 04/11/1995 Page: 1 
Before HENRY and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS,* Senior 

District Judge. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

The appellants, mother and son, were convicted of various 

drug-related offenses and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Both 

Verners were convicted of one count of possession of a controlled 

substance (cocaine base) with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), (b) (1) (a); 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) 

(distribution or manufacturing near a school); 18 U.S.C. § 2 

(aiding and abetting) ; and of one count of maintaining a place for 

the purpose of manufacturing a controlled substance, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 856 (a) (1) (the "crack-house" statute). In addition, Laroan Verners was convicted of use of a firearm during and 

in relation to a federal drug trafficking crime, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). The Verners challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence for all of these counts. (Although Mrs. Verners does 

not specifically challenge her conviction for aiding and abetting, 

she does challenge the underlying facts which support this conviction. In light of this ambiguity, we have addressed the 

sufficiency of the evidence for this conviction.) Mr. Verners 

also challenges the calculation of the amount of cocaine base used 

to determine his sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. 

Finally, Mrs. Verners contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in failing to grant her motion for a separate trial. 

* Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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The government has demonstrated the following facts. On 

January 5, 1993, a team of law enforcement officers from the City 

of Tulsa, Oklahoma, executed a search warrant at the home of 

Guessinia Verners. Laroan Verners had used the house as his 

residence at one time, still visited the house regularly, and 

still gave the address as his residence. He used his former 

bedroom in the house to store some of his possessions, although it 

appears that he did not sleep there. In the bedroom associated 

with Mr. Verners, police found digital scales, razor blades, cut 

(a substance used to dilute the purity of cocaine) , large amounts 

of cash, two handguns -- one loaded, one unloaded -- and ammunition. No fingerprints were found on either gun. The police also 

found towels and baggies containing small amounts of cocaine in 

this bedroom. In the closet, some clothes, identified as being 

similar or identical in appearance to clothes worn by Mr. Verners, 

were found; the bedroom also contained boxes of record albums 

belonging to Laroan Verners. The police also found some receipts 

and business records belonging to Mr. Verners, including a notebook alleged to be a drug ledger. 

The other main items of evidence in this case were found in 

the kitchen. Inside the microwave were spatters which were tested 

and revealed to contain cocaine. In the cabinet a pyrex cup was 

found containing a large "cookie" of cocaine base, or "crack" 

cocaine, weighing over 100 ounces. Boxes of baking soda and 

plastic baggies were also found. Taken as a whole, the evidence 

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strongly indicated that powder cocaine was being converted in the 

microwave to cocaine base, then weighed and bagged for 

distribution. However, no evidence of an actual sale was introduced. In fact, the only other evidence of involvement with drugs 

by either Laroan or Guessinia Verners were statements (overheard 

by the police) that were made at the time of the search by Mrs. 

Verners to her daughters. After being informed that cocaine had 

been found in the microwave and that she should consider consulting an attorney, Mrs. Verners was overheard to say, "The phone 

rang just before they found the stuff in the microwave. They got 

a phone call. Who knew about that besides us?", or words to that 

effect. She also apparently asked her daughters to whom they 

might have talked who could have tipped off the police. 

"In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we review 

the record de novo, ... and ask only whether, taking the evidence -- both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom -- in the light most 

favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. 

Urena, 27 F.3d 1487, 1489 (lOth Cir.) (citations and internal 

quotations omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 455 (1994). We 

review each conviction in turn. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, a reasonable jury could find that Laroan Verners 

possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it. In order to 

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support a conviction for possession with intent, the government 

must prove knowing possession of a controlled substance, with 

intent to distribute. Possession need not be actual, but may be 

constructive. United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881-82 

(lOth Cir. 1987). Since the defendant was not at the house when 

the drugs were confiscated, the government relied on a constructive possession theory. "In order for an individual constructively to possess property, he must knowingly hold the power and 

ability to exercise dominion and control over it. . With 

regard to narcotics, we have defined constructive possession as 

'an appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the drug.'" Id. 

at 881 (quoting United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (lOth 

Cir. 1982) (internal citations omitted)). The evidence was sufficient to meet this test. Laroan Verners plainly continued to 

exercise dominion and control over his bedroom and enjoyed 

unfettered access to the kitchen. A jury could reasonably infer 

that he had constructive possession of the cocaine found in these 

two rooms. 

The government also provided sufficient evidence of Laroan 

Verners's intent to distribute. One of the investigating officers 

testified that the amount of cocaine recovered was in excess of an 

amount which might be possessed for personal use. (In fact, the 

amount was estimated to be equivalent to 2,000 dosage units.) 

Coupled with the presence of scales, razor blades, cut, guns and 

ammunition, large amounts of cash, and the notebook in Laroan 

Verners's bedroom, the large amount of cocaine and the baggies 

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found in the kitchen provided ample evidence for a jury to conclude that Mr. Verners was involved in the distribution of drugs. 

The case against Guessinia Verners for possession with intent 

to distribute is far weaker and presents a close question. 

Although there is ample evidence that she had knowledge of the 

presence of the drugs in the kitchen and sufficient evidence to 

show constructive possession of these drugs, there is little, if 

any, evidence of her intent to distribute. The government did 

not, for example, offer any evidence that she actively participated in either the manufacture or distribution of the drugs. 

The government suggests that her statements evidenced her 

intent to distribute. By showing knowledge of the "stuff" in the 

kitchen, the statements do tend to show acquiescence in the drug 

activities. However, on their own, the statements do not evince 

an intent to distribute. The government bolstered this theory 

with evidence that Mrs. Verners knowingly benefitted from the drug 

operation. For example, the government introduced testimony that 

the Verners' home contained some nice furnishings. The government 

also established that she was paying substantial amounts of cash 

for an addition to the home that was being constructed. Although 

the government did not prove that the money to pay for these 

improvements was derived from drug sales, Mrs. Verners was not 

employed at the time and no alternative source of income was 

identified. 

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This evidence is simply insufficient to support a conviction 

for possession with intent to distribute.l At best, this evidence 

shows that she had the intent to aid and abet her son. 

To be guilty of aiding and abetting a crime, the 

defendant must willfully associate h[er]self with the 

criminal venture and seek to make it succeed through 

some action on [her] part. The government must prove 

more than mere presence at the scene of the crime even 

if coupled with knowledge that the crime is being committed. However, participation may be established by 

circumstantial evidence, and the evidence may be of 

"relatively slight moment." 

United States v. Esoarsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1470 (lOth Cir. 1991) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted), cert. denied, 112 

s. Ct. 882 (1992). Although the evidence against Mrs. Verners is 

admittedly of "relatively slight moment," we think a reasonable 

jury could infer from the circumstances that Mrs. Verners was 

making an active effort to conceal the existence of the drugs in 

the kitchen. The jury could also infer that she was knowingly 

benefitting from the drug activities occurring in the house. 

Thus, although we must reverse the conviction for the underlying 

crime of possession with intent to distribute, we affirm the 

conviction for aiding and abetting.2 

1 Because we are overturning this conviction, we must 

necessarily reverse Mrs. Verners's conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 

860(a) as well. This section, which penalizes the commission of a 

drug offense within 1,000 feet of a school, is essentially a 

sentence enhancement provision for the principal drug offense. 

2 Since we find that Mrs. Verners is not guilty of the underlying crime, it is apparent that Laroan Verners cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting her. One cannot aid and abet an 

aider and abetter, nor can one aid and abet oneself. See United 

States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1086 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (One 

element of aiding and abetting is "commission of the substantive 

offense by someone else."). Although this will be unlikely to 

affect his sentence (because we are upholding Mr. Verners's 

conviction on the underlying offense) , we nevertheless are 

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On the charge of maintaining a residence for the purpose of 

manufacturing drugs under the so-called "crack-house statute," 21 

U.S.C. § 856(a) (1), the evidence is sufficient only to convict 

Laroan Verners. Section 856(a) (1) makes it unlawful to "knowingly 

open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing, 

distributing, or using any controlled substance." This circuit 

has rarely addressed this statute. In United States v. Williams, 

923 F.2d 1397 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 925 (1991), 

we stated that in order to convict someone of violating this 

statute, the government must "prove that the defendant (1) knowingly (2) opened or maintained a place (3) for the purpose of 

manufacturing by repackaging, distributing, or using any controlled substance." Id. at 1403 (citing United States v. Onick, 

889 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1989)). Although Williams broke the 

statute down into three separate elements, it did little to 

elaborate on its meaning. In particular, there are two terms in 

the statute which, although not downright ambiguous, are imprecise 

and require some explanation.3 

The first such term is "maintain." In United States v. 

Williams, we found that, where the "place" in question is a 

remanding to the district court for possible resentencing. 

3 This statute has survived at least three challenges for being 

unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Lancaster, 968 

F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Clavis, 956 

F.2d 1079, 1094 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Edwards v. 

United States, 112 S. Ct. 2979 (1992); United States v. Milani, 

739 F. Supp. 216, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 

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residence, the defendant must have a "substantial connection" to 

the home and must be more than a "casual visitor" in order to 

satisfy this element. 923 F.2d at 1403. Where the defendant 

lives in the house, this element is normally easily proved. 

Onick, 889 F.2d at 1431. However, the question of what constitutes "knowingly maintaining" becomes more complicated when the 

defendant does not reside where the drugs are. This question has 

been considered by the Eleventh Circuit. 

Acts evidencing such matters as control, duration, 

acquisition of the site, renting or furnishing the site, 

repairing the site, supervising, protecting, supplying 

the food to those at the site, and continuity are, of 

course, evidence of knowingly maintaining the place 

considered alone or in combination with evidence of 

distributing from that place. 

United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir.), cert. 

denied sub nom., Edwards v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2979 (1992). 

In this case, Mrs. Verners lived at the residence continuously for 

a long period and clearly exercised dominion and control over it. 

Although she did not pay rent (the house was owned by her exhusband) , she had phone service under her name and she had 

arranged to put an addition on the house. Thus, she definitely 

knowingly maintained the place. 

Laroan Verners also exercised dominion and control over the 

house, or at least over his bedroom. He had lived there and continued to use the bedroom to store many of his personal belongings 

and business-related items. He had a key to the house and came 

and went as he pleased. He was far from a casual visitor. His 

actions also fit within the meaning of the word "maintain." 

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The more complex question is whether, as the government 

contends, Laroan and Guessinia Verners maintained this residence 

"for the purpose of" manufacturing cocaine base. While we have 

yet to address this issue, our fellow circuits have examined in 

this context the contours of the term "for the purpose of." In 

United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth 

Circuit held that "purpose" was synonymous with "objective," 

"intention," and "aim." Id. at 189-90. Furthermore, to be convicted under 856(a) (1), the defendant must personally have the 

"specific purpose"; it is not "sufficient for others to possess 

it." Id. However, the purpose of manufacturing cocaine need not 

be the sole purpose for which the "place" is used. "Had Congress 

intended convictions under § 856 to be limited to those who open 

or maintain facilities having cocaine manufacturing as their sole 

purpose, it would have said so. Such a narrow construction . 

would eviscerate the statute . . " United States v. Roberts, 

913 F.2d 211, 220 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom., Preston 

v. United States, 500 U.S. 955 (1991). On the other hand, manufacturing, distributing, or using drugs must be more than a mere 

collateral purpose of the residence. Thus, "[t]he 'casual' drug 

user does not run afoul of this prohibition because he does not 

maintain his house for the purpose of using drugs but rather for 

the purpose of residence, the consumption of drugs therein being 

merely incidental to that purpose." 

968 F.2d 1250, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

United States v. Lancaster, 

We think it is fair to say, 

at least in the residential context, that the manufacture (or 

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distribution or use) of drugs mus. be at least one of the primary 

or principal uses to which the house is put. 

The Seventh Circuit has drawn upon a business analogy to 

interpret the term "for the purpose of" within the context of § 

856(a) (1). In the recent case of United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 

463 (7th Cir. 1993), that court held "one way to tell whether a 

defendant had the requisite mental purpose under (a) (1) is to 

decide whether he acted as a supervisor, manager, or entrepreneur" 

in the drug enterprise, as opposed to someone who merely "facilitated the crime." Id. at 466-67. We agree that the "crackhouse" statute was designed to punish those who use their property 

to run drug businesses -- hence, the more characteristics of a 

business that are present, the more likely it is that the property 

is being used "for the purpose of" those drug activities prohibited by§ 856(a) (1). Evidence that a place is being used to run 

such a business might include: investment in the tools of the 

trade (~, laboratory equipment, scales, guns and ammunition to 

protect the inventory and profits); packaging materials (baggies, 

vials, gelcaps, etc.); financial records; profits (either in the 

form of cash or in expensive merchandise); and the presence of 

multiple employees or customers. 

Under either of these tests, the government has provided 

sufficient evidence against Laroan Verners and insufficient evidence against Guessinia Verners. Because Mr. Verners was apparently not sleeping at the house, it appears that one of his 

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primary purposes in maintaining his place in the home was as a 

base of operations to run a drug manufacturing and distributing 

business. The vast majority of the equipment, records, and money 

associated with the drug enterprise were found in the room which 

was under his control, indicating that he was the "manager" of the 

enterprise. 

In contrast, there is no evidence that Guessinia Verners 

occupied more than a minor role in the home-based drug business of 

her son. That is not to say that she may not, in fact, have 

actively taken part in the business. We find, however, that the 

evidence presented supports the conclusion that her primary purpose in maintaining the house was as a home for herself and her 

two daughters. There is no evidence that she used Laroan 

Verners's bedroom or was aware of its contents. There is no 

evidence that she "managed" or "supervised" her son's business. 

No rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that she 

had the requisite mental purpose for conviction under this 

statute.4 

4 Congress did intend to punish those who knowingly allow 

others to use their property to run drug operations. However, 

this intent is expressed in 21 U.S.C. 856 (a) (2), not (a) (1). We 

do not mean to second-guess the prosecutor's judgment, but merely 

suggest that Mrs. Verners might have been more easily convicted 

under 856(a) (2), which prohibits those who "control any building, 

room, or enclosure" from "mak[ing] available for use, with or 

without compensation, the building, room, or enclosure for the 

purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or 

using a controlled substance." On the difference between 

856(a) (1) and (a) (2), see generally United States v. Chen, 913 

F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463 

(7th Cir. 1993). 

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The government has provided barely sufficient evidence to 

convict Laroan Verners of the use of a gun in relation to a drug 

offense. To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the 

government must demonstrate that the defendant "use[d]" or 

"carrie[d]" a firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 990 

(lOth Cir. 1993). 

The government concedes that Laroan Verners did not actually 

use (in the sense of fire or brandish) or physically carry the 

guns in this case, but argues that the proximity of the guns to 

the money and drug paraphernalia satisfies the "ready access" test 

set forth in United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 675 (lOth 

Cir. 1989). Although this case is clearly at the outer parameters 

of conduct punishable under this statute, we are unable to discern 

any basis for distinguishing this case from United States v. 

Hager, 969 F.2d 883 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 437 

(1992), where this circuit upheld a conviction under this statute 

on equally marginal evidence. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 

grant Mrs. Verners's motion for a separate trial. United States 

v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1231 (lOth Cir. 1988). To be entitled to 

severance, a defendant must make "a strong showing of prejudice." 

United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 537 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. 

denied, 485 U.S. 908 (1988). In other words, she "must show that 

failure to sever resulted in the denial of [her] right to a fair 

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trial." United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 857 (lOth Cir. 

1989) (citations omitted). Mrs. Verners has failed to show that 

her and Laroan Verners's defenses were "so antagonistic that they 

are mutually exclusive." Esch, 832 F.2d at 538. 

The district court's calculations of the amount of cocaine 

involved for the purposes of determining the appropriate sentencing guideline are not clearly erroneous. The government 

showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Laroan Verners's 

notations were records of drug sales. The court's calculations 

based on these notes and the amount of cash found, plus the actual 

drugs recovered, are also supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. United States v. Cody, 7 F.3d 1523, 1527 (lOth Cir. 

1993). These findings of the district court are therefore 

affirmed. 

Laroan Verners's convictions for possession with intent to 

distribute, maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing 

cocaine, and use of a gun in the course of a drug trafficking 

crime are AFFIRMED, except that his conviction for aiding and 

abetting is REVERSED. We AFFIRM the district court's calculations 

of the amount of cocaine for sentencing guideline purposes. 

Guessinia Verners's convictions for possession with intent to 

distribute, committing a drug offense near a school, and 

maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing cocaine are 

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• 

REVERSED. Her conviction for aiding and abetting possession with 

intent to distribute is AFFIRMED. 

Accordingly, these cases are REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

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