Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00410/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00410-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. Hedgpeth
Defendant
P. F. Lazor
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

P. F. LAZOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. HEDGPETH, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-00410-OWW-SMS PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION, FOR AN

EVIDENTIARY HEARING, AND FOR THE

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, AND

DISMISSING ACTION, WITHOUT

PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING

FEE

(Doc. 9)

Plaintiff P. F. Lazor (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on March 14, 2007. On March 21, 2007,

the Court issued an order finding plaintiff ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g), and ordering plaintiff to pay the filing fee in full within thirty days. The

Magistrate Judge granted plaintiff two extensions of time to comply with the order. In accordance

with the Court’s orders, the filing fee was due on or before August 9, 2007. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (e);

Doc. 8. On August 28, 2007, plaintiff filed what the Court construes to be a motion for

reconsideration of its March 21 order and a request for an evidentiary hearing.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on

grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse

party, . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 60(b). The motion for reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time, in any event “not

more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Id.

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983)

(en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce

the Court to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634

F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). The Ninth Circuit

has stated that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as being exclusive of the preceding

clauses.’” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)

(quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1981)). Accordingly, “the clause is

reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. When filing a motion for reconsideration, Local

Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist

which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the

motion.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915 governs proceedings in forma pauperis. Section 1915(g) provides that “[i]n

no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more

prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court

of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury.” In case number 1:97-cv-06007-REC-DLBPC Lazor v. McCluskey, the Honorable

Robert E. Coyle found plaintiff was subject to 1915(g) and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss

on that ground by order filed March 28, 2003. Judge Coyle counted eleven district court cases and

eight appellate court cases as qualifying strikes. Three such qualifying dismissals were 2:94-cv00421-LKK-GGH PC Lazor v. Jakobosky, 2:94-cv-00476-LKK-JFM PC Lazor v. White, and 2:94-

cv-00629-GEB-GGH PC Lazor v. Church. 

Plaintiff asserts that Judge Coyle erred in concluding he is subject to section 1915(g), this

Court erred in relying on Judge Coyle’s opinion, and the PLRA does not apply to plaintiff and his

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past and present cases. Plaintiff’s position is rejected. Plaintiff may not evade application of Judge

Coyle’s order by challenging and attempting to re-litigate Judge Coyle’s findings in this case. Judge

Coyle’s order of March 28, 2003, was not challenged in that action by plaintiff, and remains in

effect. Plaintiff was found to be subject to 1915(g) and, absent application of the imminent danger

exception, may not proceed in forma pauperis in this action or any other qualifying action.

Plaintiff’s complaint was screened and does not fall within the imminent danger exception.

Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary in his motion for reconsideration is rejected.

In his motion, plaintiff also seeks the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff does not have a

constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th

Cir. 1997), and the Court cannot require an attorney to represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296,

298, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1816 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the Court may

request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek

volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether

“exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of

the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity

of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even if

it is assumed that plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations

which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. This Court is faced with

similar cases almost daily. At this early stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a

determination that plaintiff would be likely to succeed on the merits, and based on a review of the

record in this case, the Court does not find that plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. Id.

Further, plaintiff is not entitled to proceed with this action unless he pays the filing fee, which he has

not done. Accordingly, dismissal of this action is warranted. 

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration, for an evidentiary hearing, and for the appointment of counsel, filed August 28,

2007, is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED, without prejudice, for failure to pay the filing fee.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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