Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01586/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01586-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Laurie Anita Clark
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LAURIE ANITA CLARK, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-01586-AC 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits (“DIB”) under Title II and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the 

Social Security Act. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment are pending. For the reasons discussed below, the court will grant 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and deny the Commissioner’s cross-motion. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed her first application for DIB on September 24, 2008. Administrative Record 

(“AR”) 18. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially on December 22, 2008, and she did not 

request reconsideration. Id. Plaintiff filed a second application, this time for both DIB and SSI 

on June 29, 2009. Id. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially on October 19, 2009, and again 

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upon reconsideration on April 22, 2010. Id. Plaintiff was initially denied a request for a hearing 

in front of ALJ Maxine R. Benmour based on the ALJ’s finding that she had not shown good 

cause for filing the hearing request four months late. AR 18, 29. Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s 

decision and the Appeals Council remanded. Id. On February 3, 2012, plaintiff appeared at a 

hearing before the ALJ with her husband, Joe Clark. Id. Plaintiff was represented at the hearing 

by Kay Tracy, an attorney. Id. Plaintiff, her husband, and Stephen P. Davis, M.A., an impartial 

vocational expert (VE), testified at the hearing. Id. In a decision dated February 21, 2012, the 

ALJ found plaintiff not disabled. AR 29. 

The ALJ made the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2007. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since December 20, 2006, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, obesity, mild 

degenerative joint disease of the knees, and an affective disorder. 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b), except that she can lift and/or carry twenty pounds 

occasionally and ten pounds frequently, sit for six hours, and stand 

and/or walk for two hours. She cannot climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolding, and cannot bend or stoop. The claimant can 

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, occasionally balance, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl. She must frequently change positions from 

sitting to standing or walking. She retains the abilities to engage in 

one to two-step instruction jobs with occasional contact with the 

public. 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work. 

7. The claimant was born on March 7, 1963, and was forty-three 

years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on 

the alleged disability onset date. 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English. 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

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of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform. 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from December 20, 2006, through the date of 

this decision. 

AR 21–32 (citations to the Code of Federal Regulations omitted). 

Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council, but it denied 

review on May 9, 2014, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security. AR 7–10. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Born on March 7, 1963, plaintiff was 43 years old, which is defined as a younger person, 

on the disability onset date and 48 years old at the time of her administrative hearing. AR 27. 

Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. AR 20–21. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “While inferences from the record can constitute 

substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will suffice.” Widmark v. 

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Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Although this court cannot 

substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the court nonetheless must review the 

record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from 

the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 

576 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, 

one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons 

stated by the ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not 

rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 

871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). In addition, “[t]he ALJ in a social security case has an independent 

‘‘duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are 

considered.’’” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, 

which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the 

ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quoting Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the ALJ propounded an 

incomplete hypothetical to the VE; and (2) the record does not contain any evidence that the VE’s 

testimony is consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The Commissioner, in 

turn, argues that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from legal 

error. In the alternative, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s errors were harmless. For the 

reasons discussed below the court finds that the ALJ erred in failing to explain a conflict between 

the VE’s testimony and the DOT. For the foregoing reasons the court will grant plaintiff’s 

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motion for summary judgment and remand for further consideration consistent with this opinion. 

A. The ALJ’s Hypothetical 

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by propounding an incomplete hypothetical to the 

VE is a thin, and ultimately unconvincing, one. 

Once a claimant has established that he or she suffers from a 

severe impairment that prevents the claimant from doing any work 

he or she has done in the past, the claimant has made a prima facie 

showing of disability. At this point—step five—the burden shifts 

to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform some 

other work that exists in “significant numbers” in the national 

economy, taking into consideration the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 20 CFR § 

404.1560(b)(3). There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet 

the burden of showing that there is other work in “significant 

numbers” in the national economy that claimant can perform: (a) by 

the testimony of a vocational expert, or (b) by reference to the 

Medical–Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 

2. 

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100–01 (citing Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 577–78 (Pregerson, J., concurring)). 

However, “[t]he grids should be applied only where a claimant’s functional limitations fall into a 

standardized pattern accurately and completely described by the grids.” Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 

468 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the ALJ does choose 

to question a VE “[t]he ALJ’s depiction of the claimant's disability must be accurate, detailed, 

and supported by the medical record. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101. 

At plaintiff’s hearing, the ALJ’s questioning of the VE included the following: 

Q Okay. All right. Let’s assume a hypothetical individual the 

claimant’s age, education, work background, and the following 

limitations: lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 

pounds frequently; sitting six hours in an eight-hour day; 

standing/walking, two; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; 

occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, occasional balancing, 

stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling; limited to one to twostep simple instruction jobs with occasional contact with the public. 

Can that person do this claimant’s past work? 

A Your Honor, the sitting was how many hours a day? 

Q Six. 

A Six hours a day, and standing/walking was two. Okay. 

Q Right. 

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A No, Your Honor. None of the jobs could be performed. 

Q Okay. Are there other jobs in the regional or national economy 

that such a person could do? 

A Yes, Your Honor. That would be approximately 80 percent of 

the unskilled light duty jobs available. 

Q Okay. So what would be a couple of those? 

A Well, the first job would be a table worker, 734.687-014, 

unskilled at two, light duty. The aggregate numbers are 549,000 

nationally, and approximately 63,000 in California. I’m going to 

apply 25 percent erosion, Your Honor. 

Q Okay. 

A Next job would be assembler of electrical equipment, 729.687-

010, unskilled at two, light duty; 215,000 nationally, approximately 

– one second. I’m sorry, it’s 100 – 215,000 nationally, 4,100 

approximately in California. 

Q Okay. 

A Twenty-five percent erosion, Your Honor. 

Q Okay. If I add in that the person needs to change positions from 

sitting/standing frequently, does that change your testimony? 

A No, it would just add a little bit of erosion, maybe five percent or 

more. 

Q Okay. If instead of occasional – well, let’s just leave that, but 

let’s add in the person cannot do any bending, does that change 

your testimony? 

 A No, Your Honor. 

AR 659–60 (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s inclusion of a “sitting/standing” 

requirement falls short of her own residual functional capacity (RFC) finding, which includes a 

requirement that plaintiff be able to “change positions from sitting to standing or walking.” AR 

24 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff’s argument fails. The RFC specifies that plaintiff must be able to switch 

frequently between sitting and standing or walking. Id. It does not require that plaintiff be able 

to switch from sitting to walking. The gravamen of the requirement is that the claimant needs 

frequent breaks from sitting. Accordingly, the ALJ’s hypothetical adequately supported the RFC 

finding. 

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B. The Consistency of the VE’s Testimony with the DOT 

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by failing to explain, on the record, her 

hypothetical’s deviation from the DOT is more persuasive. 

Social Security Regulation (SSR) 00-4p states the following with regards to the ALJ’s use 

of VE evidence:1

Occupational evidence provided by a VE or VS generally should be 

consistent with the occupational information supplied by the DOT. 

When there is an apparent unresolved conflict between VE or VS 

evidence and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable 

explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE or VS 

evidence to support a determination or decision about whether the 

claimant is disabled. At the hearings level, as part of the 

adjudicator's duty to fully develop the record, the adjudicator will 

inquire, on the record, as to whether or not there is such 

consistency. 

When the ALJ includes a limitation in her hypothetical to the VE that does not appear in the 

DOT, there is a conflict. McCabe v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-00396-LRH, 2015 WL 4740509, at 

*12 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2015) (citing three other unpublished California District Court cases for 

the same proposition); see also Buckner-Larkin v. Astrue, 450 F. App’x 626, 628 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The ALJ has a duty to elicit from the VE an explanation of his findings in light of that conflict. 

SSR 00-4p (stating that “the adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to whether or not there is 

. . . consistency [with the DOT]” (emphasis added)). It is procedural error for the ALJ to neglect 

this obligation. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE included the limitation that plaintiff be able to 

switch between sitting and standing or walking frequently. AR 659–60. This limitation is not 

reflected in the DOT’s definitions of assembler of electrical equipment (DOT Code 729.687-010) 

or table worker (DOT 734.687-014), the two occupations the VE named in response to the ALJ’s 

hypothetical. Id. The ALJ did not ask the VE about the inconsistency, or ask for an explanation. 

 

1

 “SSRs do not carry the ‘force of law,’ but they are binding on ALJs nonetheless.” Bray v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit gives them 

deference so long as they do not produce “a result inconsistent with the statute and regulations.” 

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346 n.3. 

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Id. The additional limitation was ultimately included in the ALJ’s RFC findings. AR 24.2 The 

Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not err because (1) the ALJ was not required to ask 

whether the VE’s testimony conflicted with the DOT in light of the fact that there was no 

“apparent” conflict; (2) the fact that the sit/stand option does not appear in the DOT does not 

mean there is a conflict; (3) plaintiff is barred from challenging the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE 

on appeal because plaintiff did not speak up concerning the alleged error during the hearing; and 

(4) any error was harmless. 

First, the weight of authority in this circuit clearly supports the proposition that a 

limitation that does not appear in the DOT cannot be included in the ALJ’s hypothetical without 

explanation. See Buckner-Larkin, 450 F. App’x at 628; McDaniel v. Astrue, No. 1:11-CV00880-SMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151612 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2012); Pangle v. Astrue, No. 

1:08CV01760 DBL, 2010 WL 668912 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010). In other words, the absence of 

the limitation from the DOT creates an “apparent unresolved conflict” within the meaning of SSR 

00-4p. 

Second, there is no requirement that a claimant challenge an ALJ’s hypothetical during 

the hearing in order to challenge that hypothetical on appeal. The Commissioner cites two 

Central District of California opinions in support of her proposition. In both cases the court 

admonished counsel for failing to raise the VE/DOT conflict issue at the hearing before the ALJ. 

ECF No. 22 at 14 (citing Solorzano v. Astrue, No. ED CV 11-369-PJW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

4059, at *16–18 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) and Cortez v. Colvin, No. CV 13-0499-JPR, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 61022, at *25–27 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2014)). However, both Solorzano and Cortez, 

as well as the cases they rely on, are distinguishable on one or more of the following grounds: (1) 

the ALJ’s alleged error occurred at step four, where the burden is still on the claimant, not step 

five, where the burden is on the Commissioner; (2) the plaintiff was represented by the same firm 

that represented him or her at the ALJ hearing; or (3) the VE sufficiently explained his or her 

variation from the DOT so that there was no conflict, or the conflict was harmless. Cortez, 2014 

 

2

 If the requirement that plaintiff be able to switch between sitting and standing or walking had 

not been part of the ALJ’s RFC findings, then the ALJ’s error likely would have been harmless. 

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61022, at *25–27; Solorzano, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4059, at *16–18. None 

of those factors are present here. To the extent these cases stand for the proposition that a 

plaintiff is barred from seeking reversal of an erroneous ALJ decision when they neglect to object 

to said errors at the hearing, they are unconvincing. 

The Commissioner’s attempts to distinguish this case from Buckner-Larkin v. Astrue, 450 

F. App’x 626 (9th Cir. 2011); McDaniel v. Astrue, No. 1:11-CV-00880-SMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 151612 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2012); and Pangle v. Astrue, No. 1:08CV01760 DBL, 2010 

WL 668912 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010) also fail. First, the Commissioner asserts that the court in 

McDaniel held the ALJ erred not because she failed to explain the VE testimony’s conflict with 

the DOT, but because the VE had incorrectly found no erosion with the inclusion of a sit/stand 

requirement. AR 22 at 13. The Commissioner’s assertion is simply incorrect. The court in 

McDaniel held that the ALJ erred for exactly the reason plaintiff states: she failed to explain a 

conflict with the DOT. McDaniel, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151612, at *23 (“The ALJ failed to ask 

Ms. Najarian if a conflict existed between her testimony and the DOT, and on what basis she 

rendered her opinion.”). 

The Commissioner also argues that Pangle’s holding is contradicted by the Ninth Circuit’s 

opinion in Cole v. Astrue, 395 Fed. App’x 387, 390 (9th Cir. 2010). In Pangle, the court 

remanded an ALJ’s decision for further consideration upon finding that he failed to explain a 

contradiction between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. Pangle, 2010 WL 668912, at *11–12. 

In Cole, the Ninth Circuit also found a failure to explain a contradiction between VE testimony 

and the DOT to be legal error. Cole, 395 F. App’x at 390. Unlike the court in Pangle; however, 

the Ninth Circuit held that the error was harmless, finding “[t]here was sufficient remaining 

evidence in the record to support the conclusion that significant numbers of jobs existed that Cole 

could perform.” Id. The Commissioner does not explain how the Ninth Circuit’s finding of 

harmlessness in Cole contradicts the court’s holding in Pangle. Indeed, it does not. 

The Commissioner also asserts that the Ninth Circuit in Buckner-Larkin found including a 

sit/stand requirement limitation in a hypothetical does not create a conflict with the DOT because 

the DOT does not discuss a sit/stand requirement. ECF No. 22 at 13 (citing Buckner-Larkin, 450 

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Fed. App’x at 628). This is again, incorrect. In Buckner-Larkin, the Ninth Circuit found the 

VE’s testimony did conflict with the DOT, but that reversal was not necessary because the VE 

otherwise sufficiently explained the basis of her findings. Buckner-Larkin, 450 F. App’x at 628–

29 (“The vocational expert noted that although the DOT does not discuss a sit-stand option, his 

determination was based on his own labor market surveys, experience, and research. Therefore, 

the conflict between the DOT and the vocational expert was addressed and explained by the 

vocational expert, and the ALJ addressed this in the decision.”). Here, there was no such 

explanation. 

Finally, the court finds that the ALJ’s error was not harmless. The Commissioner is 

correct that procedural errors such as the one committed by the ALJ are subject to harmless error 

review. A procedural error regarding a perceived conflict between vocational expert testimony 

and the DOT is harmless if there is no conflict or if the VE provided sufficient support for her 

conclusion to justify any potential conflict. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154 n.19. Here there is an 

actual conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, and the VE did not supply any further 

explanation for her findings. Accordingly, the ALJ’s error cannot be considered harmless. See 

Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056 (ALJ error is not harmless unless it is irrelevant to the nondisability 

finding; “[a] reviewing court cannot consider the error harmless unless it can confidently 

conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a 

different disability determination.”). The court finds that the ALJ erred in failing to explain the 

conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT and will grant plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment accordingly. 

C. Remand 

Plaintiff requests that the decision of the ALJ be vacated and this case be remanded for the 

determination of benefits or, in the alternative, for further consideration. The decision whether to 

remand for further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings. Barman v. 

Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000). In this matter, the court concludes that outstanding 

issues remain that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made. Pursuant to 

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this remand, the ALJ shall reconsider the basis of the VE’s testimony that plaintiff could sit or 

stand at will when performing the exemplary positions. 

CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 21, is GRANTED; 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 22, is DENIED; 

and 

2. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

DATED: September 21, 2015 

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