Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-24-01430/USCOURTS-ca7-24-01430-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Corder
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 10, 2024*

Decided December 18, 2024 

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge 

DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge

No. 24-1430 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ERIC CORDER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 21-cr-114-1 

Steven C. Seeger, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Eric Corder moved to suppress the drug evidence in his criminal case, asserting 

that a confidential informant (CS-2) working for law enforcement violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by entering the curtilage of his property to conduct a search without 

a warrant or consent. The district judge denied the motion and Corder’s motion to 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1430 Page 2 

reconsider. Corder appeals, but we affirm because CS-2 had an implied license to enter 

the property and Corder’s voluntary consent to CS-2’s presence there attenuated the 

discovery of the evidence from any illegal entry. 

Corder lived in a single-family home with a backyard and a detached garage 

behind the house. The property was enclosed by a fence with gates at the front and the 

rear. A sidewalk ran through the yard from one gate to the other, with the back gate 

leading to an alley. Corder lived in the basement (he shared the house with his sister),

and his bedroom had a window on the side of the house. 

On December 15, 2020, law enforcement collaborated with CS-2, an acquaintance 

of Corder who was familiar with his drug dealing, to stage a drug transaction. Law 

enforcement equipped CS-2 with audio and video recording devices and provided $500 

to complete the transaction with Corder. CS-2 approached Corder’s home and passed 

through one of the gates.1 CS-2 walked along the walkway at the side of the house, cut 

through the backyard, and approached the window of Corder’s bedroom. CS-2 knocked 

on the window to get Corder’s attention, but Corder did not respond. CS-2 shined a 

cellphone flashlight into the bedroom. In total, CS-2 knocked on the window 

intermittently for roughly seven or eight minutes until Corder answered. 

About three minutes after answering at the window, Corder emerged from the 

bedroom and met CS-2 in the backyard. They exchanged pleasantries for about 

15 seconds, and then Corder invited CS-2 into his garage to purchase substances later 

confirmed to be fentanyl-laced heroin and cocaine. Corder and CS-2 talked for another 

ten minutes about unrelated topics, and CS-2 then left the garage and returned to law 

enforcement to deliver the drugs. 

Using the evidence from the December 15 transaction (along with evidence from 

a previous transaction between CS-2 and Corder on December 1), law enforcement 

executed two search warrants on Corder’s residence. The warrants resulted in the 

seizure of narcotics, among other evidence.

Two months later, Corder was charged with one count of distributing a mixture 

or substance containing fentanyl and cocaine base for the December 15, 2020, 

transaction (Count 1), and one count of possessing a mixture or substance containing 

fentanyl and cocaine base with intent to distribute for the drugs recovered during the 

1 The record is unclear whether CS-2 entered through the front gate or the back 

gate. 

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No. 24-1430 Page 3 

subsequent search of Corder’s home in February 2021 (Count 2). See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1). He moved to suppress the evidence obtained by law enforcement during the 

December 15 transaction, arguing that he never consented to CS-2’s warrantless entry 

into his backyard. The government argued that CS-2 had an implied license to enter the 

curtilage to purchase drugs because Corder had previously received CS-2 and other 

buyers at the premises. Regardless, the government asserted, Corder later voluntarily 

consented to CS-2’s presence in the garage, attenuating the drug transaction from any 

unlawful initial entry onto the property. Corder replied that CS-2 did not have an

implied license to enter the curtilage and contested the facts surrounding CS-2’s 

knowledge of the property and Corder’s drug-dealing history. He also asserted that his 

later consent was tainted by CS-2’s initial illegal entry onto the curtilage.

The district judge denied Corder’s motion to suppress. The judge concluded that 

CS-2 had an implied license to enter the curtilage because CS-2 and previous buyers

had customarily entered Corder’s backyard to purchase drugs, and CS-2 had a 

reasonable belief that knocking on Corder’s bedroom window was the equivalent of 

knocking on his front door. Further, the judge explained that even if CS-2 did not have 

an implied license to enter the curtilage, Corder later consented to CS-2’s presence. 

Though his consent occurred shortly after the entry, the judge concluded that Corder

was free to tell CS-2 to leave, and CS-2 did not coerce Corder into permitting entry into 

the garage. 

Corder moved for reconsideration, contending that the judge had incorrectly 

engaged in a subjective analysis of the property’s customary use based on CS-2’s 

personal knowledge and misapplied precedent in its consent analysis. 

The judge held an evidentiary hearing to clarify CS-2’s knowledge surrounding

the usage of Corder’s property. At the hearing, CS-2 testified to visiting Corder’s house 

“20-plus times,” going to the backyard “a lot of times,” and entering the basement 

many times. CS-2 also testified that Corder typically greeted buyers from his bedroom 

window and requested that people seeking to buy drugs knock on the “back door” 

because he did not want his sister to know he was selling drugs. Moreover, CS-2 

testified to seeing other buyers knock on the bedroom window on two or three 

occasions. Based on CS-2’s testimony, the judge reaffirmed the prior ruling that CS-2 

had an implied license to enter Corder’s property, go to the backyard, and knock on the 

bedroom window. 

Corder then entered into a conditional plea agreement. He pleaded guilty to 

Count 1, reserving the right to appeal the denials of his motion to suppress and motion 

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to reconsider. In exchange, the government dismissed Count 2. The judge imposed 

57 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. 

Acting pro se on appeal, Corder renews his argument that CS-2 violated his 

Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home’s curtilage without an implied license. 

Further, he disagrees with the district judge’s conclusion that Corder’s invitation for 

CS-2 to join him in the garage to complete the drug transaction was not tainted by any 

unlawful entry onto the property. We review the district judge’s legal conclusions 

de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Jones, 22 F.4th 667, 673 

(7th Cir. 2022). 

Corder first argues that CS-2 exceeded the scope of the implied license to enter 

the backyard when CS-2 walked through a closed gate, knocked on his bedroom 

window for seven or eight minutes, and used a cellphone flashlight to look through the 

window. But we agree with the district judge that CS-2’s conduct fell within the license 

that Corder customarily granted to drug buyers who came to his property. A person 

has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage of his home—the area 

“immediately surrounding and associated with the home.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 

6 (2013) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). Warrantless intrusions 

into the curtilage are prohibited unless law enforcement enters in accordance with 

“social norms,” id. at 9, and “for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant,” 

Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); see also United States v. Shelton, 997 F.3d 

749, 766 (7th Cir. 2021). Here, CS-2 knew from previous encounters with Corder that he 

had permitted familiar buyers to access his backyard and knock on his bedroom 

window. And CS-2 entered the curtilage of the property intending to purchase drugs, a 

purpose contemplated by Corder when he previously opened his home to drug buyers. 

Next, Corder asserts that the district judge erred when he concluded in the 

alternative that Corder’s invitation to complete a drug transaction in the garage was 

sufficiently attenuated from any unlawful entry onto the property. We disagree.

Warrantless intrusions onto the curtilage by law enforcement “to engage in 

conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner” are unreasonable. Id.

But a warrant is not required when a search is conducted pursuant to consent. 

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 

The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment be suppressed unless the connection between an unlawful search and the 

subsequent discovery of evidence “become[s] so attenuated that the deterrent effect of 

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the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” United States v. Carter, 573 F.3d 418, 

422 (7th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 

(1975) (Powell, J., concurring)). Indeed, “the exclusionary rule should not apply when 

the causal connection between illegal police conduct and the procurement of evidence is 

‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’ of the illegal action.” United States v. Fazio, 

914 F.2d 950, 957 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 

(1984)). To determine whether a person’s voluntary consent to a search is sufficiently 

attenuated from the unlawful action, courts balance three factors: “(1) the time elapsed 

between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of 

intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official 

misconduct.” United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 1999). 

Here, as for the timing factor, the district judge found that the mere ten or eleven 

minutes that passed between CS-2’s first knock on the window and the drug sale 

weighed more in favor of suppression than attenuation. To be sure, a few minutes may 

not always be sufficient to purge the taint of an unlawful intrusion from later-collected 

evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 1997) (five minutes 

likely insufficient). On the other hand, the interaction between Corder and CS-2 was 

friendly, and Corder was free to end it at any time (and free to tell CS-2 to leave), 

attenuating any underlying violation at least slightly. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 

98, 108 (1980) (“congenial atmosphere” made up for otherwise short passage of time, 

weighing in favor of attenuation). In any event, timing is “only one factor to consider, 

and is never dispositive.” Carter, 573 F.3d at 425 (internal citation omitted).

As for the second factor, we agree with the district judge that Corder’s consent to 

CS-2’s presence on his property was an intervening circumstance, weighing in favor of 

attenuation. Voluntary consent can serve as an independent intervening event so long 

as the consent was not obtained immediately following an illegal entry or after an 

illegal stop, detention, or arrest. See United States v. Conrad, 673 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 

2012). Here, Corder’s voluntary consent favors attenuation: After Corder discovered 

that CS-2 was outside his window, Corder emerged from the basement, engaged in 

pleasantries with CS-2, and invited CS-2 into the garage to buy drugs. CS-2 did not ask 

to go into the garage, nor did CS-2 attempt to lead Corder there. CS-2 did not threaten 

Corder or otherwise pressure Corder to sell the drugs. After the transaction, CS-2 

remained in the garage for ten minutes, engaging in casual conversation with Corder. 

Nothing about the circumstances surrounding Corder’s consent reflect that he was 

coerced into consenting to CS-2’s presence in the garage. 

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Finally, the lack of purpose and flagrancy of any official misconduct supports 

attenuation. A Fourth Amendment violation is purposeful and flagrant when “(1) the 

impropriety of the official’s misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, 

that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the 

misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose and executed in the hope that 

something might turn up.” Carter, 573 F.3d at 425 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 

439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if law 

enforcement errs, a lack of evidence supporting an inference of bad faith means the 

violation is not flagrant. Id. at 425–26. 

Here, the evidence does not support an inference that law enforcement acted in 

bad faith. No doubt, law enforcement set up the controlled buy at Corder’s house to 

advance their investigation into Corder’s illegal drug activity. But CS-2 did not use the 

initial entry and knock at the window for the purpose of gathering additional 

information: CS-2 did not use the flashlight to look for contraband in the bedroom, 

wander around the yard, or attempt to enter the garage alone. See Conrad, 673 F.3d 

at 736 (law enforcement initially violated the curtilage of a home to advance an 

investigation but did not enter as part of a “fishing expedition,” supporting 

attenuation). Moreover, law enforcement did not encourage CS-2 to engage in any 

behavior that was “coercive or calculated to cause surprise, fright or confusion.” 

United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 2003). CS-2 relied on the knowledge of 

drug dealing activity at Corder’s house and entered the property in a manner consistent 

with previous visits and with knowledge of how others entered the property to buy 

drugs. Further, an officer involved in the controlled buy testified that law enforcement

believed CS-2 had an implied license to enter the property because of CS-2’s friendly

relationship with Corder. See, e.g., Carter, 573 F.3d at 426 (agent did not act in bad faith 

where he relied on tenant’s statement that unit was unoccupied before engaging in 

unconstitutional search). 

We agree with the district judge’s conclusion that the evidence obtained by CS-2 

on December 15 did not need to be suppressed where CS-2 had an implied license to 

enter the property and, even if there had been an unlawful entry, the discovery of the 

evidence was sufficiently attenuated from it. 

AFFIRMED

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