Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02278/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02278-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
3 Daughters Brewing LLC
Counter Claimant
California Brewing Company
Counter Defendant
LMMML, LLC
Counter Claimant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CALIFORNIA BREWING COMPANY, a 

California Corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

3 DAUGHTERS BREWING LLC, a 

Florida Limited Liability Company, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-02278-KJM-CMK 

ORDER 

This action arises from defendant 3 Daughters Brewing, LLC’s (“3 Daughters”) 

and defendant LMMML, LLC’s (“LM”) alleged use of plaintiff California Brewing Company’s 

(“CBC”) “Beach Blonde Ale” mark. Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue. ECF No. 10. 

Plaintiff opposes the motion. ECF No. 14. The court submitted the matter as provided by Local 

Rule 230(g). As explained below, the court DENIES defendants’ motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On November 2, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint, which makes the following 

allegations. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff CBC is a California corporation with its principal place 

of business in Anderson, California. Id. ¶ 11. CBC is engaged in the business of creating, 

manufacturing, distributing, and marketing handmade craft beer. Id. In 2007, CBC created a 

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recipe for a very pale, American ale style beer, and conceived of the “Beach Blonde Ale” mark to 

identify the beer. Id. ¶ 14. CBC applied to register its mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark 

Office (“USPTO”) on December 23, 2007, and the USPTO granted registration of the mark on 

October 7, 2008. Id. ¶¶ 15–17, Ex. 2. CBC has continuously used its mark in connection with 

the advertisement and sale of its beer products and merchandise since 2007. Id. ¶¶ 14–18. 

Defendants 3 Daughters and LM are Florida limited liability companies with their 

principal places of business in St. Petersburg, Florida. See id. ¶¶ 12–13; Harting Aff. ¶¶ 3–10. 

According to an affidavit submitted by Michael Harting, the CEO of LM, LM is the sole manager 

of 3 Daughters. See Harting Aff. ¶ 4. The complaint alleges defendants began selling beer using 

plaintiff’s Beach Blond Ale mark in 2014. Compl. ¶ 25. Defendants allegedly have engaged in a 

marketing campaign promoting the infringing product, and sell the beer nationwide through 

online retailers, tasting rooms, and retail stores. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. The complaint alleges defendants’ 

use of the mark is likely to confuse consumers, because defendants’ product uses an identical 

mark to plaintiff’s product, both products are beer, and both products are marketed and sold 

through similar channels. Id. ¶ 33. The complaint further alleges defendant 3 Daughters filed an 

application with the USPTO to register the word mark “Beach Blonde Ale” on May 17, 2013, but 

the USPTO rejected the application on September 5, 2013 based on CBC’s existing registration. 

Id. ¶ 39. 

The complaint asserts claims for false designation of origin and unfair competition 

under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; unfair competition 

and/or unfair and deceptive practices under the laws of all U.S. states, including California 

Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; trademark infringement under California 

common law; common law unfair competition; false advertising under California Business & 

Professions Code section 17500 et seq.; and unjust enrichment. See id. ¶ 7. 

On December 3, 2015, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 

personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue. ECF No. 10 

(“Mot.”). As noted, plaintiff opposes the motion, ECF No. 14 (“Opp’n”), and defendants replied, 

ECF No. 18 (“Reply”). 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Rule 12(b)(2) Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Even though the defendant makes a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), it is the 

plaintiff’s burden to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction. See Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 

1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). When, as here, the court acts without holding an evidentiary hearing, 

“the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion 

to dismiss.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, “the plaintiff 

need only demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. The 

plaintiff may not rely on “bare allegations” alone, Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 

374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004), but the court assumes the complaint’s allegations are true 

unless “directly contravened” by other evidence, Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & 

Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003). Any factual conflicts contained in the 

parties’ affidavits are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 

(9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 

B. Rule 12(b)(3) Improper Venue 

Under Rule 12(b)(3), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for improper 

venue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Once the defendant has challenged the propriety of venue in a 

given court, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that venue is proper. See Piedmont Label 

Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979). In assessing a motion to 

dismiss for improper venue, a court may consider facts outside of the pleadings, but must draw all 

reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy 

v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004). If the court determines that venue 

is improper, the court must either dismiss the action or, if it is in the interests of justice, transfer 

the case to a district or division in which it could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see 

King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992). 

///// 

///// 

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III. DISCUSSION 

A. Personal Jurisdiction 

When no federal statute governing personal jurisdiction applies, the district court 

applies the law of the state in which it sits, here California. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). “Because California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution, our inquiry centers 

on whether exercising jurisdiction comports with due process.” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 

1211–12 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; citing Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 410.10). Federal due process requires some “minimum contacts” between the defendant 

and the relevant forum so that the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction “does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 

310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

There are two forms that personal jurisdiction may take: general and specific. 

Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211. CBC does not contend defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in 

California, and instead argues specific jurisdiction exists. See Opp’n at 1. The test for specific 

personal jurisdiction has three parts: first, the plaintiff must show the defendant purposefully 

directed its activities at residents of the forum or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 

doing business in the forum state; second, the plaintiff must show its claim arises out of or is 

related to the forum-related activities; and third, if the plaintiff satisfies the first two prongs, the 

burden shifts to the defendant to present a “compelling case” that the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction would be unreasonable or unfair. Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211–12 (quoting 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802; citations omitted). 

1. Purposeful Direction 

The first prong of the specific jurisdiction test refers to both purposeful direction 

and purposeful availment, in the disjunctive. In cases sounding in tort, the Ninth Circuit typically 

employs a purposeful direction analysis. Id. at 1212 (citing Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802–

03); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (employing 

purposeful direction analysis in action for copyright infringement). Because trademark 

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infringement involves tortious conduct, the court here addresses only purposeful direction, 

without reaching purposeful availment. Purposeful direction is evaluated under the three-part 

“effects” test established in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), which requires a plaintiff to 

show the defendant “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) 

causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Picot, 780 

F.3d at 1214 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803). “The inquiry whether a forum State 

may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant focuses on the relationship among 

the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 

1121 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

a) Intentional Act 

In the context of the Calder effects test, “intent” means “an intent to perform an 

actual, physical act in the real world, rather than an intent to accomplish a result or consequence 

of that act.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. CBC alleges defendants market and sell beer 

products that infringe CBC’s Beach Blonde Ale trademark. Compl. ¶¶ 22–33, 38, 58–59. This is 

a sufficient allegation of an intentional act within the meaning of the Calder test. See Wash. Shoe 

Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2012) (purchasing and selling boots 

that allegedly infringed plaintiff’s copyrighted design constituted “intentional acts” under Calder 

test). 

b) Express Aiming 

The second prong of the purposeful direction inquiry is whether the defendant 

expressly aimed its act at the forum state. Picot, 780 F.3d at 1214. “The ‘express aiming’ 

analysis depends, to a significant degree, on the specific type of tort or other wrongful conduct at 

issue.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 807. In intellectual property cases, “the Ninth Circuit has 

held that specific jurisdiction exists where a plaintiff files suit in its home state against an out-ofstate defendant and alleges that defendant intentionally infringed its intellectual property rights 

knowing [the plaintiff] was located in the forum state.” Amini Innovation Corp. v. JS Imps., Inc., 

497 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton 

Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997), reversed on other grounds by Feltner 

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v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998), and Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 

141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998); collecting subsequent cases); see also Wash. Shoe Co., 704 

F.3d at 675–76; Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Blue Source Grp., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 945, 961 (N.D. Cal. 

2015). Courts often refer to this theory of specific jurisdiction as “individualized targeting” of the 

plaintiff. See, e.g., Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2010). 

Here, CBC alleges defendants intentionally infringed its Beach Blonde Ale mark 

with knowledge of CBC’s ownership of the mark and with knowledge CBC is located in 

California. See, e.g., Opp’n at 5–6; Compl. ¶¶ 24, 39, 62. CBC alleges the USPTO rejected 

defendants’ application to register marks in 2013 because the marks were confusingly similar or 

identical to CBC’s existing registered trademark, and the USPTO informed defendants of CBC’s 

superior rights. Compl. ¶ 39; Goschke Decl. ¶ 6. In addition, plaintiff’s CEO, Jack Goschke, 

contacted defendants in March 2015 to inform defendants of CBC’s rights and to ask defendants 

to stop using the mark. See Goschke Decl. ¶ 8; Harting Decl. ¶ 27. CBC contends defendants 

had knowledge of plaintiff’s residence in the forum state because plaintiff’s trademark 

registration identifies CBC as a resident of California and of this district. Opp’n at 5. The court 

notes plaintiff’s name—California Brewing Company—also signals it is a resident of California. 

Defendants have not offered any evidence contradicting these allegations and have not denied 

knowledge of plaintiff’s mark registration or location. Mr. Harting’s declaration admits 

defendants were aware of CBC’s trademark registration and investigated the registration after Mr. 

Goschke contacted defendants. Harting Decl. ¶ 27. 

CBC alleges defendants have used plaintiff’s mark for the purpose of promoting 

defendants’ business and attracting new business in competition with plaintiff. For example, 

CBC avers defendants use metatags and search engine optimization to attract consumers 

searching for “Beach Blonde Ale” to their website and social media pages, and use “Beach 

Blonde Ale” branding throughout their website and social media posts. Goschke Decl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 

16, 20. Because plaintiff and defendants each sell beer using the name “Beach Blonde Ale,” with 

CBC’s use allegedly beginning first in time, it is plausible defendants divert consumers searching 

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for plaintiff’s product to defendants’ web pages to profit from the goodwill and recognition 

associated with the Beach Blonde Ale mark. In addition, CBC has submitted evidence defendants 

sell their product to consumers in California through national retailers and market to California 

consumers through social media, Wilks Decl. ¶¶ 2–3; Gillette Decl. ¶¶ 2–3; Liedtke Decl. ¶¶ 2–9; 

Goschke Decl. ¶¶ 16–20, 28–29; defendants’ website states they ship their beer nationwide, 

Goschke Decl. ¶ 21; and defendants’ CEO has said defendants want to grow significantly, id.

¶ 22. The court finds these allegations of individualized targeting with knowledge of plaintiff’s 

location sufficient to establish express aiming under Ninth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Wash. 

Shoe Co., 704 F.3d at 675–79. 

In their reply brief, defendants argue these allegations cannot form the basis of the 

court’s jurisdiction after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. ___, 

134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). Reply at 3–4, 6–9. In Walden, the plaintiffs alleged an agent of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) violated their Fourth Amendment rights by seizing cash from 

them at a Georgia airport on their return trip to their Nevada residence. 134 S. Ct. at 1119–20. 

The Court held the fact the agent knew a delay in returning the funds would affect persons with 

connections to Nevada was not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the agent in 

Nevada. Id. at 1124–25. The Court emphasized the specific jurisdiction inquiry must focus on 

the relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the forum state, and “a defendant’s 

relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” 

Id. at 1122–23; accord Picot, 780 F.3d at 1214. To illustrate these principles, the Court 

distinguished Calder, explaining: 

The crux of Calder was that the reputation-based “effects” of the 

alleged libel connected the defendants to California, not just to the 

plaintiff. The strength of that connection was largely a function of 

the nature of the libel tort. However scandalous a newspaper article 

might be, it can lead to a loss of reputation only if communicated to 

(and read and understood by) third persons. 

Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–24. In Walden, by contrast, the Court found a DEA agent’s alleged 

tortious conduct of seizing cash from the plaintiffs at an airport in Georgia in no way connected 

the agent to Nevada. See id. 

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The instant action is more analogous to Calder than to Walden, because the nature 

of defendants’ alleged tortious conduct connects defendants to California. Cf. Schwarzenegger, 

374 F.3d at 807 (“The ‘express aiming’ analysis depends, to a significant degree, on the specific 

type of tort or other wrongful conduct at issue.”). Just as publication to third persons is a 

necessary element of libel, likelihood of consumer confusion is a necessary element of trademark 

infringement. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 602 

(9th Cir. 2005). Specific jurisdiction over 3 Daughters and LM is not based on “random, 

fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts defendants made with CBC, Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 

(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)), but rather on defendants’ 

alleged conduct in marketing and selling an infringing product to California consumers with an 

alleged intent to directly compete with CBC. Accordingly, exercising personal jurisdiction over 

defendants in this action is not inconsistent with Walden. Cf. Tresona Multimedia LLC v. Legg, 

No. 14-02141, 2015 WL 470228, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 2015) (“The central lesson of Walden is 

that . . . jurisdiction must be based on a defendant’s contacts with the forum. Case law has 

established that certain actions by an out-of-state defendant—such as . . . directly competing with 

a person (Brayton)—create contacts with that person’s forum.”). 

Moreover, the court is not persuaded by defendants’ argument that acts by third 

party retailers are irrelevant to the analysis. Although standalone acts by third parties cannot 

establish specific jurisdiction, see Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123, here, there is evidence defendants 

sold their goods to national retailers with the intent to develop a national market, see, e.g.,

Goschke Decl. ¶¶ 21–23. If such allegations are true, it would not be reasonable for defendants to 

disclaim any connection to sales in California. Cf. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. v. 

Cabela’s, Inc., No. 09-102, 2009 WL 9141752, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009) (defendant who 

sold products through a national retailer should have reasonably expected sales in state where 

retailer marketed products); Hilsinger Co. v. FBW Investments, 109 F. Supp. 3d 409, 426 (D. 

Mass. 2015). Otherwise, defendants could avoid jurisdiction in a forum simply by acting through 

a third party and pleading ignorance. 

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At this stage of the proceedings, the court finds plaintiff has satisfied express 

aiming. 

c) Foreseeable Harm 

With respect to the third part of the Calder test, the court finds plaintiff’s 

allegations sufficient to establish defendants knew the resulting harm would be suffered in 

California. Here, it was foreseeable that plaintiff would be harmed by infringement of its Beach 

Blonde Ale mark, and that some of the harm would occur in California, where defendants knew 

CBC resided at least as early as March 2015, Harting Decl. ¶ 27, and likely as early as September 

2013, Compl. ¶ 39; Goschke Decl. ¶ 6. See Brayton, 606 F.3d at 1131. As discussed above, Mr. 

Harting admits plaintiff contacted him and asked him to stop using its Beach Blonde Ale mark in 

March 2015, and he subsequently investigated plaintiff’s use and registration of the mark. 

Harting Decl. ¶ 27. In addition, plaintiff alleges the USPTO rejected defendants’ application to 

register the word mark “Beach Blonde Ale” on or about September 5, 2013, in light of plaintiff’s 

existing mark registration, and CBC’s registration identifies it as a resident of this district. 

Compl. ¶ 39; Goschke Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10. Defendants have not submitted any evidence suggesting it 

was not foreseeable that harm would be suffered in California. 

The court finds plaintiff has established purposeful direction under the Calder test. 

2. The “But For” Test 

The second prong of the test for specific personal jurisdiction focuses on the 

connection between the defendant’s acts and the harm those acts caused. It requires the plaintiff 

to show the claim would not have arisen but for the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. 

Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1500. Other decisions have articulated the test as requiring a “direct nexus” 

between the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the cause of action. Fireman’s Fund Ins. 

Co. v. Nat’l Bank of Coops., 103 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Despite its apparently strict language, many district courts in the Ninth Circuit 

have not applied the “but for” test stringently. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of 

Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1368 (D. Or. 1996) (“The ‘but for’ test should not be narrowly 

applied; rather, the requirement is merely designed to confirm that there is some nexus between 

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the cause of action and defendant’s contact with the forum.” (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise 

Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), reversed on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991))). 

Whether a stricter or more lenient interpretation of Ballard’s “but for” test is 

appropriate, defendants’ alleged contacts satisfy both versions. As stated above, this action arises 

from defendants’ alleged individualized targeting of plaintiff and use of plaintiff’s mark in 

advertising, marketing, and sales reaching California consumers. Plaintiff’s injury would not 

have occurred but for defendants’ contacts with California, where plaintiff’s principal place of 

business is located, Compl. ¶ 11. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1021 

(9th Cir. 2002). Defendants’ motion addresses only purposeful direction, the first prong of the 

specific jurisdiction test, effectively conceding the second. The court finds the second prong is 

satisfied. 

3. Reasonableness 

Because plaintiff has established defendants’ contacts were purposefully directed 

at California and caused the alleged injuries, the burden shifts to defendants to present a 

“compelling case” of the unreasonableness of personal jurisdiction over it. See Schwarzenegger, 

374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476–48). In assessing the overall 

reasonableness and fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction, the court considers, among other 

things, 

(1) the extent of a defendant’s purposeful interjection; (2) the 

burden on the defendant in defending in the forum; (3) the extent of 

conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum 

state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient 

judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the 

forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; 

and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. 

Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476–77)). 

Here, as well, defendants’ motion does not address the reasonableness prong. 

Accordingly, defendants have not met their burden of presenting a “compelling case” of the 

unreasonableness of this court’s exercising personal jurisdiction over them. 

Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand 

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

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B. Venue 

A district court may dismiss or transfer a case “to any district or division in which 

it could have been brought” if venue is “wrong.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Venue over trademark 

and UCL claims is governed by the general venue statute. See Adobe, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 959. 

The general venue statute provides in relevant part, “A civil action may be brought in . . . a 

judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in 

which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Section 1391 also provides that “an entity 

with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law . . . shall be 

deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s 

personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .” Id. § 1391(c). Here, the 

court has found defendants are subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to this 

action, so defendants are both deemed to “reside” in this district. See id. Accordingly, venue in 

this district is proper under § 1391(b)(1). 

Moreover, § 1391 also allows a civil action to be brought in “a judicial district in 

which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . .” 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). In trademark cases, infringement takes place in any district in which 

consumers are likely to be confused by the challenged goods. See E & J Gallo Winery v. 

Grenade Beverage LLC, No. 1:13-00770, 2013 WL 6048140, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013); 

see also Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, the 

complaint alleges a likelihood of consumer confusion in this district, where plaintiff is based, as a 

result of defendants’ sales, marketing, and advertising to California consumers. The court finds 

plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred 

in this district. Because venue is proper in this district under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) and 

(b)(2), the court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 

C. Transfer 

Alternatively, defendant moves to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. When 

the district court finds venue is proper, it may still exercise discretion, “[f]or the convenience of 

parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest of justice,” to transfer an action “to any other district 

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where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Ninth Circuit has set out the 

following non-exclusive list of factors to consider in adjudicating a motion to transfer: “(1) the 

location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most 

familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4) the respective parties’ 

contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen 

forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of 

compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, . . . (8) the ease of 

access to sources of proof,” (9) “the presence of a forum selection clause,” if any, and (10) “the 

relevant public policy of the forum state,” if any. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 

498–99 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit requires the defendant to make a “strong showing” of 

inconvenience to overcome the preference traditionally accorded a plaintiff’s choice of forum. 

Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Here, defendants’ motion does not address the Jones factors or provide any 

reasons explaining why transfer to the Middle District of Florida would be more convenient or in 

the interests of justice. See ECF No. 10-1 at 4 n.1. Accordingly, defendants have not met their 

burden of showing transfer is appropriate. See Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843. Defendants’ 

motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss or to transfer venue is 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 18, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-02278-KJM-CMK Document 23 Filed 04/19/16 Page 12 of 12