Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03360/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03360-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adolfo Baeza-Suchil
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.... 

PUBLISH 

FILED . Ualted States Court of Appea.:; 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 211995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

------------.-A TRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

ADOLFO BAEZA-SUCHIL, aka Joe 

Garza-Garza, aka Joe G. Garza, 

aka Adolfo Sucsil, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 94-3360 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-40023) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney, Richard L. Hathaway, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender, Marilyn M. Trubey, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Topeka, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Adolfo Baeza-Suchil appeals his sentence for 

aggravated illegal re-entry after deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), 

* After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 94-3360 Document: 01019282154 Date Filed: 04/21/1995 Page: 1 
and felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742(a). We affirm. 

Defendant, a citizen and national of Mexico, pled guilty to 

aggravated illegal re-entry after deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) 

("Count I"), and felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g) (1) ("Count II"). Prior to sentencing, the United States 

Probation Office prepared and filed a presentence report. The 

presentence report recommended that the district court determine 

the combined offense level for Counts I and II under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3D1.4 instead of grouping Counts I and II under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3D1.2. Defendant objected to calculation of his sentence using 

the combined offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, and contended 

that the district court should calculate his sentence by grouping 

Counts I and II pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a) because both 

counts "involve the same victim and the same act or transaction."1 

At sentencing, the district court determined that based on 

United States v. Barron-Rivera, 922 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991), 

Counts I and II did not qualify for grouping pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 3D1.2{a). Instead, the district court calculated the combined 

offense level for Counts I and II under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, and 

sentenced Defendant to two concurrent ninety-two month terms of 

1 Grouping Counts I and II for guideline calculation under 

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 produces an offense·level of 21 after a 

three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which 

combined with a criminal history score of VI, yields a sentencing 

range of 77 to 96 months. In contrast, calculation of a combined 

offense level for Counts I and II under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 results 

in an offense level of 23 after a three-level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, and with a criminal history score of 

VI, produces a sentencing range of 92 to 115 months. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3360 Document: 01019282154 Date Filed: 04/21/1995 Page: 2 
imprisonment and to two concurrent two-year terms of supervised 

release. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Defendant contends the district court erred in 

refusing to group Counts I and II for guideline calculation 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a). We disagree. 

We review the district court's interpretation and application 

of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Cook, Nos. 

92-3238, 93-3027, 1995 WL 92624, at *2, F.3d (lOth Cir. 

March 6, 1995). Section 3D1.2 provides that "counts involving 

substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a 

single Group." U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2; see also United States v. Reetz, 

18 F.3d 595, 598-99 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing grouping of counts 

under § 3D1.2). Section 3D1.2 defines four instances in which 

counts involve substantially the same harm. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a)-

(d). Subsection (a) states that counts involving "the same victim 

and the same act or transaction" should be grouped. Id. 

§ 3D1.2(a). The commentary to§ 3D1.2 states "[f]or offenses in 

which there are no identifiable victims (~, drug or immigration 

offenses, where society at large is the victim), the 'victim' for 

purposes of subsection[] (a) . . is the societal interest that 

is harmed. In such cases, the counts are grouped together when 

the societal interests that are harmed are closely related." Id. 

§ 3D1.2 application note 2 (emphasis added). 

Defendant argues that the district court should have grouped 

Counts I and II under§ 3D1.2(a) because both convictions harm the 

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Appellate Case: 94-3360 Document: 01019282154 Date Filed: 04/21/1995 Page: 3 
same or c __ ~sely related societal interest.2 Specifically, 

Defendant maintains that aggravated illegal re-entry after 

deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and felon in possession of a 

firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) {1), harm the societal interest in 

prohibiting criminal conduct by convicted felons. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected a similar argument in 

Barron-Rivera. In Barron-Rivera, the defendant appealed the 

district court's refusal to group his conviction for illegal 

re-entry after deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, with his convictions 

for illegal alien in possession of a firearm, 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g) (5), and felon in possession of a firearm, 18 

u.s.c. § 922(g) (1). Barron-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 554. The 

defendant argued that all three convictions should be grouped 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a) because each was a victimless 

crime which harmed a societal interest. The court observed that 

"the offenses should not be grouped if they pose threats to 

distinct and separate societal interests." Id. at 555 (relying on 

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 application note 2). Applying these principles, 

the court concluded that the offenses pose threats to distinct and 

separate societal interests because "[s]ection 922(g) protects 

society against those determined unqualified to possess firearms, 

2 Defendant also argues on appeal that the district court 

should have grouped Counts I and II under§§ 3D1.2{c) and (d). 

However, Defendant failed to raise either§ 3D1.2(c) or§ 3D1.2(d) 

before the district court. Indeed, Defense counsel informed the 

district court at sentencing that "[t]he Ninth Circuit [in 

Barron-Rivera] focused its discussion primarily on 3D1.2(c), which 

we are not arguing." Tr. Vol. II at 3 (emphasis added). Thus, we 

do not consider Defendant's contentions that Counts I and II 

qualify for grouping under§§ 3Dl.2(c) and (d). See Hicks v. 

Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

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Appellate Case: 94-3360 Document: 01019282154 Date Filed: 04/21/1995 Page: 4 
while 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is designed to effectively enforce the 

immigration laws." Id. (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit, 

therefore, refused to group the defendant's conviction for illegal 

re-entry after deportation with his two 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) firearm 

convictions. 

We believe the reasoning of Barron-Rivera compels a similar 

result in the instant case. The offense of aggravated illegal 

re-entry after deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), poses a threat to 

a distinct and sepa~ate societal interest than does felon in 

possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). The former 

involves the societal interest in enforcing immigration laws, 

while the latter implicates the societal interest in keeping 

firearms from those unqualified to possess them. See 

Barron-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 555. Defendant was therefore 

convicted for offenses that "pose threats to distinct and separate 

societal interests." Id. 

Further, we reject Defendant's argument that Counts I and II 

qualify for grouping under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a) because the 

offenses implicate the societal interest in prohibiting criminal 

conduct by convicted felons. Under Defendant's logic, nearly any 

combination of offenses would qualify for grouping under 

§ 3D1.2(a) because a societal interest in deterring criminal 

behavior underlies all statutory offenses. The Sentencing 

Commission indictated that it did not intend grouping based upon 

such a general societal interest. Indeed, the Sentencing 

Commission specified that two offenses arguably supported by the 

broad societal interest in deterring criminal behavior do not 

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Appellate Case: 94-3360 Document: 01019282154 Date Filed: 04/21/1995 Page: 5 
qualify for grouping under§ 3Dl.2(a). See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 

application note 2 (" [W]here one count involves the sale of 

controlled substances and the other involves an immigration law 

violation, the counts are not grouped together because different 

societal interests are harmed."); see also United States v. Egson, 

897 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1990) (distribution of cocaine charge 

and illegal acquisition of food stamp charge implicate distinct 

societal interests). As a result, Counts I and II do not qualify 

for grouping under§ 3D1.2(a), and the district court properly 

calculated Defendant's combined offense level under § 3D1.4. 

AFFIRMED. 

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