Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03059/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrek E. Arrington
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 2002 Decided November 5, 2002

No. 01-3059

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Derrek E. Arrington,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00159-01)

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Shawn Moore, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J.

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Tourish, Jr., and Oliver W. McDaniel, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Tatel and Garland, Circuit Judges, and Williams,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Defendant Derrek Arrington appeals from his conviction for using a dangerous weapon--to

wit, an automobile--to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede,

intimidate, or interfere with three United States Park Police

officers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 111(a) and (b). We reject

Arrington's contention that the district court plainly erred in

instructing the jury, as well as his contention that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction.

I

On May 10, 2000, Arrington was indicted on four counts of

violating federal law. Count 1 charged him with using a

dangerous weapon to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede,

intimidate, or interfere with three federal officers engaged in

the performance of their duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 111(a) and (b). Count 2 charged him with attempting to

murder a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1114.

Count 3 accused Arrington of discharging a firearm during a

crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).

And Count 4 charged him with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ss 922(g)

and 924(a)(2).

According to the government's evidence at trial, the case

began on April 13, 2000, when United States Park Police

officers Jonathan Daniels, Martin Yates, and Troy Eliason

stopped Arrington's car because it lacked a front license

plate. As Arrington produced his license and registration,

Daniels observed a small ziplock bag with a residue of white

powder on the floorboard. Upon Daniels' signal, the three

officers retreated to the rear of the car, where Daniels

informed them of the suspected drug paraphernalia and of his

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intention to ask Arrington and his (unidentified) passenger to

get out of the car.

The officers then returned to the front of the automobile

and asked Arrington to step outside. When Arrington instead reached for the gear shift, Daniels and Eliason reached

through the open driver-side door and grabbed him around

the upper body, while Yates leaned in from the passenger's

side to turn off the ignition. With all three officers still

reaching inside the car, and two of them holding onto his

body, the defendant shifted into drive and "floored it."

9/14/00 p.m. Tr. at 36. Although Yates was caught by the

frame of the car door, he soon extricated himself, as did

Eliason. Daniels, however, was dragged by Arrington's car

for at least 50 feet, through an intersection, before he was

able to free himself and fall to the ground.

All three Park Police officers then returned to their cars

and pursued Arrington in what became a high speed chase.

Arrington eventually lost control of his car and crashed into a

curb, whereupon he fled on foot with the officers in pursuit.1

Daniels and an off-duty Metropolitan Police Department officer who had joined the chase finally caught up with Arrington. Yates and the off-duty officer testified that, during the

ensuing struggle, Arrington shot Daniels in the face with a

handgun. Yates and the other officer eventually subdued

Arrington and arrested him.

Arrington testified at trial in his own defense, and the story

he told of his flight from the traffic stop diverged significantly

from that of the officers. Arrington testified that he decided

to drive off because he felt threatened by the police. According to the defendant, he never had physical contact with any

of the officers, and no officer had any part of his body in the

car at the time Arrington drove off. After leading the

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1 At some point during the chase, Arrington's passenger disappeared. Arrington testified that the man leaped from the car just

after Arrington began to accelerate. Daniels and Yates testified

that he escaped along with Arrington, after the crash. Eliason

testified that he saw only one person leave the disabled automobile.

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officers on the car chase, Arrington jumped out of his car and

began to run. According to Arrington, two officers caught up

with him and wrestled him to the ground. During the

struggle, a gun Arrington was carrying in his pocket accidentally discharged, and the bullet hit Officer Daniels.

The jury convicted Arrington on Counts 1 and 4, but

deadlocked on Counts 2 and 3--the attempted murder and

discharging-a-firearm counts. The latter two counts were

retried twice (along with a new, additional count), each trial

ending in deadlock. After the third trial, the government

dismissed the outstanding counts and the district court sentenced the defendant to 240 months' imprisonment on Counts

1 and 4. Arrington's only challenge here is to his conviction,

on Count 1, for violating 18 U.S.C. s 111(a) and (b).

II

Subsection 111(a) provides, in relevant part, that anyone

who "forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates,

or interferes with any [designated federal officer2] while

engaged in or on account of the performance of official

duties," shall be imprisoned for a maximum of three years.

18 U.S.C. s 111(a).3 Subsection 111(b) increases the maximum penalty to ten years for anyone who (so far as is

relevant here), "in the commission of any acts described in

[s 111(a)], uses a deadly or dangerous weapon...." 18

U.S.C. s 111(b).4

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2 Subsection 111(a) covers "any person designated in section 1114

of this title...." Section 1114, in turn, applies to "any officer or

employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the

United States Government (including any member of the uniformed

services)...." 18 U.S.C. s 1114.

3 "[W]here the acts in violation of [the] section constitute only

simple assault," s 111(a) states that the maximum sentence of

imprisonment is one year rather than three. Under s 111(b),

however, "the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon [is] sufficient

... to boost the crime above the level of 'simple assault.' " United

States v. Duran, 96 F.3d 1495, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

4 In full, the subsection applies to "[w]hoever, in the commission

of any acts described in subsection (a), uses a deadly or dangerous

Arrington raises two objections to his conviction for violating s 111(a) and (b): first, that the district court gave erroneous jury instructions regarding the elements of both the (a)

and (b) offenses, and second, that the evidence presented at

trial was insufficient to support his conviction for the (b)

offense. In order to evaluate these claims, we first set forth

the elements of s 111(a) and (b),5 a determination we make

de novo. We then consider, in Parts III and IV, whether the

jury was properly charged and whether the evidence was

sufficient to support Arrington's conviction.

We begin with s 111(a). As the words of that subsection

make clear, to violate its proscription a defendant must: (1)

forcibly; (2) assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or

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weapon (including a weapon intended to cause death or danger but

that fails to do so by reason of a defective component) or inflicts

bodily injury." 18 U.S.C. s 111(b). Neither party suggests that

the definition of deadly or dangerous weapon contained in the

parenthetical applies here or otherwise informs our consideration of

the questions at issue in this opinion. Nor does the alternative to

the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon specified in the subsection--i.e., the infliction of bodily injury--apply to this case. The

government did not request, and the court did not give, a jury

charge regarding this alternative.

5 Both Arrington and the government treat the requirements of

s 111(b) as if they were offense elements, rather than sentencing

factors, and agree that those requirements (along with the elements

of s 111(a)) must be found by a jury. So, too, do those circuits that

have considered the question since the Supreme Court held, in

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that "any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt." Id. at 490; see United States v. Campbell, 259

F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that s 111(b) is a separate

offense from s 111(a) and that use of a dangerous or deadly weapon

is an element of the s 111(b) offense); United States v. Yates, 304

F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2002) (ruling that "Apprendi requires a jury

finding beyond a reasonable doubt of use of a weapon or bodily

injury as a predicate for imposing a sentence over three years"

under s 111(b)).

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interfere with; (3) a designated federal officer6; (4) while

engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.

In addition, the defendant must have: (5) the "intent to do

the acts" specified in the subsection. United States v. Kleinbart, 27 F.3d 586, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting United States

v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975)). Finally, as we indicated in

United States v. Heid, 904 F.2d 69, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the

adverb "forcibly" in the first element of the offense modifies

each of the prohibited acts specified in the second element:

that is, a defendant does not violate the statute unless he

forcibly assaults or forcibly resists or forcibly opposes, etc.

As the parties agreed at oral argument, so far all of this is

common ground between them.

We turn next to the elements of s 111(b), and here, too,

find some common ground. Again, the statutory language

makes clear that, to qualify under this subsection, the defendant must: (1) use a deadly or dangerous weapon7; (2) in the

commission of any of the acts described in the prior subsection. In addition, although the language merely states that

the defendant must "use[ ]" the weapon, the government

agrees--as do we--that: (3) the defendant must use the

weapon intentionally. See Appellee's Br. at 26. As the

Supreme Court stated in United States v. Feola, "in order to

incur criminal liability under s 111 an actor must entertain

... the criminal intent to do the acts therein specified," 420

U.S. at 686, and the act specified in s 111(b) is the use of a

deadly weapon. Accordingly, intent to use the weapon is a

necessary element, and a defendant who does so purely by

accident does not come within the scope of s 111(b).

We now reach the point of the parties' dispute. The

foregoing is sensible enough, Arrington says, when the weapon at issue is one that is inherently deadly, like a gun. But

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6 See supra note 2 (describing officers protected under s 111).

7 As discussed in note 4 above, s 111(b) sets forth an alternative

for this element: the defendant must either use a deadly or

dangerous weapon "or inflict[ ] bodily injury."

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what if the weapon is one that is deadly only if used in a

certain manner, like Arrington's car? To this query, the

government responds that a distinction between the two

kinds of weapons is indeed appropriate. For an object that is

not inherently deadly, the government concedes that the

following additional element is required: (4) the object must

be capable of causing serious bodily injury or death to

another person and the defendant must use it in that manner.

Appellee's Br. at 19; see United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d

143, 147 (4th Cir. 1994); 1 Leonard B. Sand et al., Modern

Federal Jury Instructions (Criminal) p 14.01, at 14-25

(2002); 2 Kevin F. O'Malley et al., Federal Jury Practice &

Instructions (Criminal) s 24.06, at 68, 71 (5th ed. 2000).

That is, for a car to qualify as a deadly weapon, the defendant

must use it as a deadly weapon and not simply as a mode of

transportation.

Arrington, however, asks us to add a fifth requirement. It

is not enough, he argues, that a defendant intend to use the

object; nor is it enough that he actually use the object in a

deadly manner. In addition, Arrington contends, the defendant must intentionally use the object as a weapon.

We must state at the outset that, in light of the other

elements of the (b) offense, we see little practical difference

between the positions of the parties. When asked at oral

argument to posit a set of circumstances in which adding

Arrington's fifth element would make a difference, the government was unable to suggest one. Arrington, for his part,

did propose such a scenario: he contended that without the

fifth element, a jury could convict a defendant for using a car

merely as a means of escape, rather than as a deadly or

dangerous weapon.8 Although the government agrees that

the use of a car merely to effectuate an escape would not

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8 Arrington also contends that without his fifth element, a jury

could convict "where a defendant was sitting inside an idling car

and punched or threatened to punch a federal officer." Appellant's

Br. at 19. In this scenario, however, the car itself would not have

been used as a deadly weapon, and hence the conduct would not

satisfy the fourth element of s 111(b) as detailed above.

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qualify under the statute, it contends that its construction of

s 111(a) and (b) would exclude a conviction for such use.

Appellee's Br. at 20-21. We agree. The use of a car purely

for flight would not satisfy the fourth element of s 111(b):

that the object be used in a deadly or dangerous manner.

Nor would Arrington's scenario satisfy the first element of

s 111(a), applicable to the (b) offense by incorporation, because it would not involve the element of force.9

In the end, however, the decisive question is not whether

the element Arrington proposes would make any difference in

this or other cases, but whether Congress intended it to be an

element of the offense. We discern no evidence of such

congressional intent. Arrington's proposed element is certainly not suggested by the language of s 111(b), which

simply requires that the defendant "use" a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the acts described in

s 111(a).10 Nor is s 111(b) bereft of a mens rea requirement.

Conviction requires both the intent to commit one of the acts

specified in s 111(a), and the intent to use the object that

constitutes the deadly weapon. Finally, such evidence of

legislative intent as exists counsels against adding anything

further. As the Supreme Court noted in Feola, Congress

intended s 111 to protect federal officers to the maximum

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9 Arrington further contends that the difference made by his

proposed fifth element is reflected in the facts of his case. Although he concedes that the testimony of the government's witnesses would permit his conviction for using his car as a deadly

weapon, he maintains that it is insufficient to permit conviction for

intentionally using the car as a weapon. We disagree. Officer

Daniels testified that at the time Arrington stepped on the gas,

Daniels' upper body was inside the car and his arms were around

Arrington's neck and shoulders. Given the extent of such physical

contact, a jury could reasonably conclude that Arrington knew that

stepping on the gas would cause the car to injure Daniels seriously,

and hence that Arrington intended to use the car as a weapon

against the officer.

10 Cf. 1 Sand p 14.01, at 14-25 ("If a violation of section 111(b) is

charged, add: Fifth, that the defendant used a deadly or dangerous

weapon to commit such acts....").

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extent possible, 420 U.S. at 684, a consideration that led the

Feola Court to reject an "unexpressed requirement" that the

defendant know that his intended victim is a federal officer:

[I]n order to effectuate the congressional purpose of

according maximum protection to federal officers by

making prosecution for assaults upon them cognizable in

the federal courts, s 111 cannot be construed as embodying an unexpressed requirement that an assailant be

aware that his victim is a federal officer. All the statute

requires is an intent to assault, not an intent to assault a

federal officer.

Id.

Rejecting the "unexpressed requirement" proposed by Arrington, one with an even less persuasive appeal to fairness

than that proposed in Feola, follows a fortiori. In Feola, the

Court responded with little sympathy to the claim that it

would be unfair to convict a defendant who did not know that

his victim was a federal officer:

This interpretation poses no risk of unfairness to defendants. It is no snare for the unsuspecting. Although

the perpetrator ... may be surprised to find that his

intended victim is a federal officer in civilian apparel, he

nonetheless knows from the very outset that his planned

course of conduct is wrongful. The situation is not one

where legitimate conduct becomes unlawful solely because of the identity of the individual or agency affected.

Id. at 685. Similarly, there is certainly no "snare for the

unsuspecting" in the absence of the element sought by Arrington. To convict a defendant of the s 111(b) offense, the

jury must find (inter alia) that he forcibly assaulted (or

forcibly resisted, etc.) a federal officer, that he did so intentionally, that he used a dangerous weapon in the commission

of that act, and that he used the weapon intentionally. Any

defendant who engages in such behavior knows "from the

very outset that his planned course of conduct is wrongful."

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Id. Accordingly, we have no warrant to impose the "unexpressed" offense element advocated by Arrington.11

III

Having determined the elements of the s 111(b) offense,

we now proceed to Arrington's argument that the district

court erroneously instructed the jury as to those elements in

two respects. The first of these--Arrington's contention

regarding s 111(b)'s dangerous weapon element--is readily

dismissed. Although the court instructed that the government had to prove both that Arrington committed one of the

acts specified in s 111(a) "while using a deadly or dangerous

weapon," and that he "intentionally" used the weapon, 9/18/00

a.m. Tr. at 20-21, Arrington contends that the court should

also have required the government to prove that he intentionally used his car as a weapon. Since, as we have just held,

that kind of intent is not an element of the offense, the court's

failure to so instruct the jury did not constitute error.12

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11 In further support of his proposed element, Arrington cites

United States v. Duran, 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1996), in which we

remarked that "the act of using a deadly weapon with the purpose

of causing Secret Service agents to fear imminent serious bodily

injury constituted a crime punishable by ten years' imprisonment

under s 111." Id. at 1511. That statement was not intended to

describe a generally applicable element of the s 111(b) offense, but

rather to summarize the evidence against defendant Duran. In

Duran's case, unlike Arrington's, there was no evidence that the

defendant assaulted the officers by attempting to cause them bodily

injury, since "there was no evidence that he ... even saw them,

while he was firing" his weapon. Id. at 1509. Instead, the evidence

against Duran constituted a different category of assault: attempting to put the officers in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Id.

12 Arrington also claims that the court exacerbated the alleged

error by ambiguously instructing the jury that, to convict, it must

find that the defendant intentionally used the weapon "in some

manner." 9/18/00 a.m. Tr. at 21. Although we agree that the

instruction was ambiguous, it immediately followed the court's

explanation that a deadly weapon was a device "capable of inflicting

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Arrington's second complaint is that the district court erred

by failing to instruct the jury that the term "forcibly" in

s 111(a) modifies not only the proscribed act of assault, but

each of the alternatives as well: that is, the government must

prove that the defendant forcibly assaulted, forcibly resisted,

forcibly opposed, forcibly impeded, forcibly intimidated, or

forcibly interfered with a federal officer. Because Arrington

did not object to the court's instruction at trial, we review this

complaint solely to determine whether the district court

committed plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).

As we have discussed in Part II above, Arrington is correct

in contending that the adverb "forcibly" modifies each of the

verbs it precedes, and not only "assault." See Heid, 904 F.2d

at 71; see also United States v. Schrader, 10 F.3d 1345, 1348-

50 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Giampino, 680 F.2d 898,

902 (2d. Cir. 1982); Long v. United States, 199 F.2d 717, 718-

20 (4th Cir. 1952). The government concurs. See Appellee's

Br. at 29. In order to avoid uncertainty, it is therefore the

better practice for the trial court to advise the jury, along the

lines approved in Heid, that " '[b]efore you can find the

defendant guilty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant acted forcibly.' " 904 F.2d at 71.13 Here,

the court did not give such guidance, but rather simply

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serious bodily injury or causing the death of another person," id. at

20, and that an "automobile may be considered a deadly or dangerous weapon if used in this manner," id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).

We do not think the jury was misled regarding the "manner" to

which the court was referring, and we therefore do not agree that

the instruction--to which Arrington did not object--constituted

plain error. See United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1510

(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[W]e have long recognized that one ambiguous

part of an instruction may be made clear by another unambiguous

part of the same instruction.") (citing United States v. Lemire, 720

F.2d 1327, 1339-41 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

13 Better still is this two-sentence pattern instruction:

All of the acts--assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate

and interfere with--are modified by the word "forcibly."

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instructed that an essential element of the offense was that

"the defendant forcibly assaulted, resisted, opposed, impeded,

intimidated, or interfered with" one of the officers. 9/18/00

a.m. Tr. at 20.

But while we would prefer a more explicit instruction, we

cannot say that the instruction given by the district court

constituted plain error. Nor need we decide whether the

instruction was error at all, because any error certainly was

not "plain." To the contrary, the instruction tracked the

statutory language, and it is precisely that language that

caused us to infer that "forcibly" is applicable to each of the

prohibited acts in the first place. Because this construction

seems to us to be the obvious reading of the statutory

language,14 the court's use of that language did not constitute

plain error.

Arrington also argues that the district court further confused the situation because, after reading the above-quoted

instruction, it subsequently referred to this element as one

requiring "forcible assault," without continuing to name the

alternative prohibitions.15 In context, we think it clear that

the judge simply used "forcible assault" as a shorthand for

the entire list of prohibited acts,16 and we expect that the jury

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Thus, before you can find the defendant guilty you must find,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that he acted forcibly.

1 Sand p 14.01, at 14-10.

14 See Long, 199 F.2d at 719 ("The use of the adverb 'forcibly'

before the first of the string of verbs, with the disjunctive conjunction used only between the last two of them, shows quite plainly

that the adverb is to be interpreted as modifying them all.").

15 See 9/18/00 a.m. Tr. at 20 (listing other elements of the offense

as requiring, for example: that "at the time of this forcible assault

the person or persons assaulted ... were officers or employees of

the United States"; that "the officer employees ... were engaged

in their official duties at the time of the assault"; and that "the

defendant committed the assault while using a deadly or dangerous

weapon" (emphasis added)).

16 Indeed, Arrington used a similar shorthand in his own appellate brief, frequently reducing the list of prohibited acts from six to

would have understood as much. To the extent that the jury

did not understand, however, any confusion was likely to

favor the defendant, as it would have caused the jury to

believe that proof of a different act--such as forcible resistance or forcible opposition--was insufficient for conviction.

IV

Finally, Arrington contends that the evidence presented at

his trial was insufficient to support his conviction under

s 111(b). Our review of such a challenge is limited to determining "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

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(1979) (emphasis in original).

Although Arrington does not dispute that the evidence was

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of s 111(a), see Appellant's Br. at 11; Reply Br. at 3 n.1, he contends that it did not

meet the additional requirements of s 111(b). In his view,

the evidence "established no more than that [he] used his car

to try to flee from the officers." Appellant's Br. at 17.17

There was, to be sure, evidence from which a reasonable jury

could have reached that conclusion: namely, Arrington's own

testimony that he had no physical contact with the officers

and that no part of any of their bodies was in the car at the

time he hit the gas. But we are required to view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, not

the defendant, and from that perspective there is no question

that a reasonable juror could have found a violation of

s 111(b).

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three. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 1, 3, 9, 10 (characterizing the

offense as using a dangerous weapon "to assault, resist, or impede"

a federal officer).

17 In fact, this claim is inconsistent with Arrington's representation that he does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to

establish a violation of s 111(a). Under that subsection, the defendant must have committed the prohibited acts "forcibly," a description that is inconsistent with Arrington's "mere flight" theory.

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The Park Service officers testified that they reached into

Arrington's car and grabbed the defendant around his upper

body. At that point, Arrington reached down, put the gearshift into the drive position, and "took off"--throwing two of

the officers away from the car and dragging another for at

least 50 feet through an intersection. Such testimony was

sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that Arrington forcibly assaulted the officers, that he did so intentionally, that he

used his car in the commission of that assault, that he used

his car intentionally, and that he used the car as a deadly

weapon. Nothing more is required to sustain a conviction for

violating s 111(b).

V

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district

court did not plainly err in charging Arrington's jury regarding the elements of 18 U.S.C. s 111(a) and (b), and that the

evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. The judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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