Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07547/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07547-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Allen
Plaintiff
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY ALLEN,

Plaintiff,

 v

MICHAEL J ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No CV-06-7547 VRW

 ORDER

Plaintiff Anthony Allen brings this action under 42 USC

section 405(g), challenging the final decision of the Social

Security Administration (SSA) denying him social security

disability benefits. Pl Mot (Doc #7); Def Mot (Doc #13). The

parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the

reasons that follow, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment and DENIES defendant Michael J Astrue’s motion for

summary judgment. This matter is remanded to the SSA.

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I

A

Plaintiff was born on August 22, 1954. Administrative

Record (AR) 348. Plaintiff was forty-nine years old at the time of

his application but was treated by the Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) as being over age fifty for purposes relevant to his claim. 

AR 379. Plaintiff completed high school and thereafter entered an

apprenticeship to become a butcher. AR 348. He worked as a

butcher for eighteen years. AR 350. Plaintiff stopped working on

January 29, 2004 and has not returned to employment since. AR 105.

Plaintiff’s chief complaint is lower back pain that

radiates to his hips and down his legs. AR 352. Plaintiff stated

that the pain “runs through my legs, sort of like an electric

shock, all the way out to my toes. And at times it’s so intense

it’s crippling.” Id. Plaintiff alleged that he can only lift five

to ten pounds, cannot stand for long periods of time, cannot sit

upright and experiences tingling and numbness. AR 105. He

reported that he is able to do grocery shopping once a week, dust

and clean windows for ten minutes at a time and drive a car for

about four to five miles. AR 121. For pain, plaintiff takes 500

mg of Vicodin once every six hours, 350 mg of Soma three times

daily and 800 mg of Motrin once every eight hours. AR 122, 128. 

Plaintiff also claimed that he is depressed as a result of his

physical condition and takes 20 mg of Prozac once daily. AR 122. 

Plaintiff’s wife, Alice Allen, stated that plaintiff is unable to

perform yardwork, is so preoccupied with pain that he forgets to

shower and brush his teeth, can only do laundry with her assistance

and does not participate in social activities. AR 139-47. 

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Plaintiff stated that he was first injured on December

21, 1999, while stacking frozen turkeys at Albertson’s. AR 208. 

Plaintiff was seen at the Oakland Kaiser Permanente facility for

this injury. Id. He later visited a doctor through his employer’s

medical plan with Concentra and was diagnosed with “lumbosacral

strain.” Id. Plaintiff did not work for two weeks and was treated

with rest, medications, physical therapy and exercises. Id. 

Plaintiff continued to have pain in his lower back and saw a

physician at the Oakland Kaiser Permanent facility, Dr Ed Seegers,

MD, for treatment. Id. Dr Seegers directed plaintiff to take

Motrin and plaintiff began taking 800 mg of Motrin three times

daily so that he could continue to work. Id. Plaintiff resumed

work thus medicated. Id.

After lifting a case of fresh chickens on January 27,

2004, plaintiff reported increased lower back pain and new pain his

trapezius muscles. Id. Plaintiff soon after consulted Dr Mogro, a

psychologist at Kaiser Permanente, for depressed feelings. Id. On

January 29, 2004, two days after the second incident, Dr Mogro took

plaintiff off work. AR 209. Plaintiff also saw Dr Leavitt, a

psychiatrist at Kaiser, who prescribed Prozac. Id.

Plaintiff did not seek medical attention for the increase

in his lower back pain or his paracervical discomfort until March

1, 2004 when he returned to Dr Seegers at the Oakland Kaiser

Permanente facility. Id. Dr Seegers did not recommend any new

treatment, but rather continued use of Motrin as before. Id. 

Plaintiff later consulted an attorney who referred him to a

physician, Dr Jonathan Francis, MD. AR 178, 215. 

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Dr Francis became plaintiff’s treating physician. AR

276. On March 18, 2004, Dr Francis examined plaintiff and wrote a

“confirmatory medical orthopedic consultation: worker’s

compensation” in which he noted that plaintiff had symptoms of back

pain, intermittent blurred vision, increased fatigability,

difficulty sleeping, nervousness, depression, memory lapses, fear,

anxiety, emotional stress and general loss of enjoyment of life. 

AR 270. Dr Francis also found that plaintiff had “marked limited

mobility present in the lumbar spine” and positive straight leg

raising. AR 273. Dr Francis recommended physiotherapy and ordered

a magnetic resonance imagining study (MRI) of the lumbar spine and

a pelvic x-ray. AR 274. 

On March 25, 2004, radiologist Dr Tom H Piatt, MD, took a

pelvic x-ray of plaintiff and concluded that plaintiff had a

possible right femoral neck stress fracture. AR 190. Dr William V

Glenn Jr, MD, a diagnostic radiologist, took an MRI of plaintiff’s

lumbar on the same day and found that there was “disc protrusion or

herniation with associated endplate osteoarthritic ridging broadly

indenting [the] thecal sac” at L4-5. AR 192. Dr Glenn also found

a “disc/annulus bulge * * * in conjunction with endplate ridging

indenting [the] thecal sac” at L5-S1. Id. 

On April 2, 2004, neurologist Dr Nader Armanious, MD,

performed a lower extremity nerve conduction study on plaintiff. 

AR 194. Dr Armanious concluded that plaintiff’s left tibial nerve

H-reflex was prolonged and that this “could represent S1

radiculopathy on the left.” AR 195. “Radiculopathy” describes a

condition where one or more nerves are affected thus causing pain,

weakness, numbness or a lack of muscle control. On April 23, 2004,

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Dr Armanious diagnosed plaintiff with acute post-traumatic sprain

strain of the lumbosacral spine and lumbosacral radiculopathy

mainly on the left side. AR 202. Dr Armanious also performed an

electromyogramy study on the same day and determined that there was

electrophysiological evidence of moderate chronic radiculopathy at

L5-S1 on the left side. AR 205. 

Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier sent

plaintiff to Dr Giles C Floyd, MD, for an orthopedic evaluation. 

Pl Mot (Doc #7 at 4). On April 12, 2004, Dr Floyd examined

plaintiff and concluded that plaintiff only had a mild disability

that was “adequately described by his subjective complaints.” AR

207, 217. Dr Floyd diagnosed plaintiff with: (1) paracervical

muscular strain, by history, resolved and (2) chronic lumbosacral

strain without radiculopathy. AR 214. Dr Floyd further concluded

that “orthopaedic and neurologic examination in the paracervical

region fails to reveal the presence of any demonstrable objective

findings,” AR 216, but noted mild restriction of lumbar flexion,

although without spasm or tightness. AR 217. On x-rays, Dr Floyd

found “long-standing, preexisting degenerative disc disease at C4-5

with mild spurring, but no acute abnormality” of plaintiff’s

cervical spine area, id, and “[m]inimal age-related degenerative

changes” but “no acute findings” in the lumbar region. Id. Dr

Floyd noted, however, that his opinion was made without the lumbar

MRI study and the radiology report. AR 216. 

On July 27, 2004, Dr Jacob Rosenberg, MD, an

anesthesiologist and pain medicine specialist, examined plaintiff

and wrote a lengthy report concluding that he appeared “to have an

S1 radiculitis from an L5-S1 disc protrusion.” AR 240. Dr

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Rosenberg also noted that plaintiff’s current limitations were

“substantial” based on plaintiff’s report that he could sit for

only thirty minutes to an hour, had difficulty standing in place,

could walk continuously for no more than forty minutes and lift no

more than twenty-five pounds without pain. AR 239. Dr Rosenberg

further determined that plaintiff could return to work, describing

him as “extremely motivated and willing to tolerate a significant

amount of pain in order to return to work,” subject to limitations,

“most notably in lifting and repetitive bending * * *.” AR 240-41. 

On August 6, 2004, Dr Rosenberg again saw plaintiff and treated him

with steroid injections to help relieve his back pain. AR 235. Dr

Rosenberg concluded that plaintiff “probably has a discogenic

problem” and that “a strong rehabilitation program would be

appropriate.” AR 236.

On October 18, 2004, orthopedic surgeon Dr Robert R

McIvor, MD, saw plaintiff for a consulting medical evaluation in

connection with his application for disability benefits. AR 248. 

Dr McIvor found plaintiff “permanent and stationary” with no need

for anything but conservative medical treatment and a home exercise

program. AR 251. Dr McIvor diagnosed “a back strain with a

degenerated disc at L5-S1,” AR 250, and rated plaintiff’s pain as

“intermittent minimal to slight.” AR 251. He found that plaintiff

had “limitation of back motion” and some muscle spasm in his lower

back area but no nerve root pressure or irritation. Id. Dr McIvor

found plaintiff disabled from work as a butcher due to the need to

avoid heavy lifting, repeated bending and stooping. Id. 

On January 20, 2005, Dr Francis completed a “medical

assessment for social security disability applicants,” a check-box

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style form indicating that plaintiff was limited to: (1)

occasionally lifting up to ten pounds; (2) prolonged

standing/walking for two hours in an eight-hour work day; and (3)

prolonged sitting for one to two hours at a time and for two hours

in an eight-hour work day. AR 254. 

On May 18, 2005, Dr Francis noted that plaintiff was

“still experiencing rather severe lumbar pain, with marked limited

mobility and function of the lumbar spine.” AR 221. Dr Francis

recommended: (1) a consultation with a neurosurgeon, Dr Roger

Shortz, MD, for a possible surgical intervention and/or additional

steroid injections; (2) a consultation with a psychiatrist, Dr

Michael Kabar, MD, for plaintiff’s “severe depression”; (3) a

lumbar traction unit for plaintiff to use at home; and (4)

physiotherapy for plaintiff once or twice weekly for twelve weeks. 

AR 221-22. At this point, Dr Francis retired and transferred care

of plaintiff to Dr Shortz. AR 178. 

Dr Shortz referred plaintiff to radiologist Dr Adil

Mazhar for an MRI exam using a “vertically oriented MRI system with

multi-positioning capabilities.” AR 308. Dr Mazhar’s August 3,

2005 report contained mostly normal findings but noted disc

desiccation and osteophytes with disc bulges at L3-4, L4-5 and L5-

S1 and “high intensity zones” representing annual tears which “may

cause pain.” AR 309-10. 

Dr Shortz also referred plaintiff to neurologist Dr Allen

D Bott for a motor nerve study, a sensory nerve study, an H reflex

study and an electromyography (EMG) study. AR 314-15. Plaintiff

saw Dr Bott on September 1, 2005. Id. Dr Bott found that the test

results were largely negative, but noted that the results “could

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conceivably reflect a remote L5 radiculopathy.” Id. Dr Bott was

unable to find any other convincing electrical evidence of

lumbosacral radiculopathy. Id. 

On October 10, 2005, Dr Shortz completed a progress

report for plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. AR 320. Dr

Shortz reviewed plaintiff’s MRI taken on August 3, 2005 and noted

that plaintiff had a herniated disc at L4-5 with stenosis and that

“EMG 9-1-05 was positive at L5 radiculopathy.” Id. 

On February 28, 2006, Dr Shortz filled out a residual

functional capacity (RFC) questionnaire stating that plaintiff did

not “have the capacity to work full time on a sustained basis at a

job which would permit him to sit or stand at will and which

required no lifting over [twenty] pounds and no more than

occasional stooping crawling bending and balancing.” AR 325. Dr

Shortz’s findings exactly matched the RFC posed by the ALJ to the

vocational expert on the record at the January 2006 hearing. Id. 

There are no further noteworthy medical records addressing

plaintiff’s orthopedic complaints.

Meanwhile, plaintiff separately pursued medical attention

for his mental health status. On February 6, 2004, he sought

treatment for his depression at Kaiser Permanente. A handwritten

intake/diagnostic summary reported that plaintiff felt “angry and

mad” and “easily irritated” with “some impairment” as to his

memory, attention and concentration. AR 230. The physician

diagnosed plaintiff as having major recurrent depression and an

“occupational problem.” AR 232. Plaintiff took prozac and

trazodone and had two further mental health appointments in the

spring of 2004, the last of which occurred on May 19. AR 225. 

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On April 30, 2005, Dr Ranald Bruce, PhD, a licensed

psychologist, saw plaintiff for a psychological disability

assessment. AR 279-80. Dr Bruce diagnosed “depressive disorder

NOS” but wrote that plaintiff “did not appear depressed in interview

* * * [and] does not describe serious or disabling levels of

depression at other times.” He found that plaintiff “could carry

out simple, detailed and complex instructions” and “should not have

problems with concentration, persistence and/or pace in an average

work setting for a normal work period”; he estimated plaintiff’s

intelligence to be in the low average to average range. AR 280. 

B

On November 3, 2004, plaintiff applied for disability

insurance benefits giving an onset date of January 29, 2004. AR 65. 

On December 13, 2004, a non-examining Disability

Determination Services (DDS) physician whose signature is illegible

completed a physical RFC form and determined that plaintiff could:

(1) occasionally lift and/or carry up to fifty pounds; (2)

frequently lift and/or carry up to twenty-five pounds; (3) stand

and/or walk (with normal breaks) six hours in an eight-hour workday;

(4) sit with normal breaks about six hours in an eight-hour workday;

and (5) push and/or pull without limitation. AR 281-88. The DDS

physician also found plaintiff limited posturally to occasional

stooping and crouching. AR 283. This report was affirmed upon

review by a different agency physician on May 12, 2005.

On May 13, 2005, agency psychiatrist Craig A Smith, MD,

completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form acknowledging

plaintiff’s affective disorder but marking it “not severe.” AR 306. 

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On December 28, 2004, the SSA initially denied plaintiff’s

application and stated that although plaintiff had a “history of

discomfort in [his] back and pelvis,” his “muscle strength, feeling,

reflexes and ability to bend and move about are sufficient to do

some types of work.” AR 25-29. On May 19, 2005, the SSA denied

reconsideration. AR 31-35.

On March 25, 2005, plaintiff filed a timely request for a

hearing before an ALJ. AR 36. A hearing was held on January 11,

2006 in Oakland, California. AR 344. Plaintiff appeared

represented by his attorney, Glenn Clark. AR 346. Vocational

expert (VE) Jeff Malmuth also testified at the hearing. AR 344. 

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he had lower back

pain that radiated down to his legs. AR 352. Plaintiff also

explained that he had difficulty sitting, walking for more than a

half an hour to forty-five minutes and standing in one position for

more than one minute. AR 353-55. He also complained of trouble

with reading comprehension, feelings of depression and memory

problems. AR 349, 357-58. 

Plaintiff’s counsel stated that plaintiff had not yet

received definitive treatment for his back problems due to insurance

difficulties and that he was awaiting authorization for surgery and

steroid shots. AR 346-47. Plaintiff testified that he had attended

physical therapy sessions once a week for twelve weeks and had

received one steroid injection to date. AR 360. Plaintiff stated

that his employer would not authorize any further physical therapy

or injections and that he was never offered vocational

rehabilitation training. AR 360-62. Plaintiff also testified that

he was then taking Vicodin, Soma, Naprosyn and Paxil. AR 358. 

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For purposes of his examination of the VE, The ALJ placed

plaintiff in the age category of fifty or over with the educational

level of high school graduate and the occupational skills of a

butcher. AR 348, 378-79. In his hypothetical to the VE, the ALJ

described a person having “a capacity for light exertional work that

would permit the work to be done, even with an optional sit/stand ——

option to sit, stand at will, and no work at heights, including no

climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,” who could only

occasionally use ramps and stairs, crouch, crawl, kneel, stoop and

balance. AR 380. In response, the VE testified that jobs were

available for such an individual at the light or sedentary levels. 

Id. 

The VE first testified that plaintiff could perform the

job of unarmed security guard. Id. Plaintiff’s attorney disagreed

that this job could be performed with a sit/stand option. AR 385-

86. The ALJ clarified that the sit/stand option meant that “the job

can be performed either sitting, or standing at the individual’s

option” and agreed with plaintiff’s counsel that the job of a

security guard could not be performed with a sit/stand option. Id. 

The VE next testified that small product assembler or

“assembler of production” jobs would be options that could be

performed either sitting or standing. AR 382, 386. The VE stated

that 2,351 such jobs exist in the local economy and 357,000 such

jobs exist nationally that require standing or walking six hours in

an eight-hour day. AR 382-83. The VE estimated that these numbers

would be eroded by around 50 percent if the sit/stand limitation

were included. AR 389. The VE based his testimony “[o]n hundreds

of job analyses that [he has] performed throughout the [B]ay area on

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similar types of occupations.” Id. Upon questioning by plaintiff’s

counsel, the VE admitted that there were no published materials

indicating the number of assembler jobs available in which the

workers do not actually have to stand. AR 388. The VE also

proposed a “kitchen food assembler” job but withdrew it after the

ALJ reminded him that the sit/stand option was a “critical part” of

plaintiff’s RFC. AR 383. After examination by plaintiff’s counsel,

the VE agreed to provide the names of some employers in the Bay area

who have such assembler positions with a sit/stand option. AR 400. 

The ALJ held the record open until March 9, 2006 to receive this

additional evidence. AR 16.

Following the hearing, the VE submitted the names of two

employers who had jobs that would accommodate the sit/stand option:

“Mr Plastics” and “Mr S Leather CO & Fetters USA Inc”. AR 180. In

response, plaintiff’s counsel submitted his declaration stating that

he had, in essence, tested this evidence by speaking over the phone

with the president of Mr Plastics, Michael Adelson, and that Mr

Adelson had stated that “it was obvious that an individual who had

back pain so severely that they could not tolerate prolonged sitting

or standing is not employable with his company.” AR 185. 

Plaintiff’s counsel also contacted Ray Ellison, the controller

administrator at Mr S Leather Company and Fetters USA, and upon

questioning, Mr Ellison also stated that the company did not have

jobs that would permit a worker to sit/stand at will, but rather

sewing jobs requiring prolonged sitting and assembly jobs requiring

up to seven hours a day of standing. AR 186.

On May 17, 2006, the ALJ issued a decision denying

plaintiff disability benefits. AR 16-22. The ALJ applied the fiveCase 3:06-cv-07547-VRW Document 16 Filed 11/27/07 Page 12 of 26
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step sequential evaluation process set forth in the SSA regulations

at 20 CFR section 404.1520 (see part II infra) and found, as

relevant to this appeal: (1) plaintiff had “severe” impairments in

the form of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with

possible radiculopathy, a possible pelvic fracture and mild

depression; (2) plaintiff does not suffer from any impairment listed

in or medically equivalent to an impairment listed in the Listing of

Impairments under 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (3)

plaintiff could no longer perform his former work as a butcher; (4)

plaintiff retained the RFC for “light work * * * with alternate

sitting and standing at will, occasional crouching, crawling,

kneeling, stooping, balancing, stair climbing and use of ramps, and

no work at heights or use of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds”; and (5)

plaintiff could perform work existing in significant numbers in the

national economy as enumerated by the VE. AR 17. 

In determining plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered the

following medical evidence: (1) the March 2004 MRI of plaintiff’s

lumbar spine showing disc bulges at L3-4, L4-5 and L5-S1; (2) the xray of plaintiff’s pelvis showing a possible right femoral neck

stress fracture; (3) the medical evaluation by plaintiff’s treating

physician, Dr Francis, which reported a decreased range of motion in

the back and positive straight leg raising; (4) the neurological

examination showing a decreased range of motion in plaintiff’s back;

and (5) the EMG showing evidence of moderate L5-S1 radiculopathy on

the left. AR 18. 

The ALJ also considered reports from several other doctors

that found plaintiff significantly less impaired. Id. 

Specifically, the ALJ noted that: (1) Dr Floyd only found a mildly

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decreased range of back motion and no acute findings on x-rays of

plaintiff’s cervical and lumbar spines; (2) Dr Rosenberg noted no

significant positive findings and found plaintiff’s work capacity

generally unrestricted with only minor limitations in lifting and

repetitive bending; (3) Dr McIvor only noted some decreased range of

motion and some muscle spasm and also concluded that plaintiff was

only precluded from heavy lifting and repeated bending and stooping;

(4) the August 2005 MRI only showed some degenerative changes at L3-

4, L4-5 and L5-S1; and (5) the September 2005 nerve conduction study

only showed possible L5 radiculopathy. Id. 

The ALJ gave no weight to the January 2005 opinion of

plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr Francis finding, inter alia, that

plaintiff could only lift up to ten pounds occasionally and sit or

stand for one hour at a time up to two hours each per day. Id. The

ALJ reasoned that Dr Francis’s report should be disregarded since it

was “based on ‘findings’ that are not reflected in his records or

those of the other physicians who have examined the claimant * * *.” 

Id. 

The ALJ also disregarded the post-hearing February 2006

RFC questionnaire completed by plaintiff’s then-current treating

physician, Dr Shortz (Dr Francis’s successor) stating that plaintiff

could not perform a job involving sitting or standing at will, could

not lift more than twenty pounds and could not do more than

occasional stooping, crawling, bending and balancing. Id. The ALJ

explained that Dr Shortz’s conclusion was “completely unpersuasive

since, first, there are no records from Dr Shortz indicating

findings which would be consistent with such limitations and,

second, the fact that Dr Shortz’s conclusions essentially mirror the

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[RFC] [the ALJ] posed to the vocational expert indicates that those

conclusions were suggested to him and were not independently reached

based on his treatment of the claimant alone.” AR 18-19. 

The ALJ found “no significant erosion of [plaintiff’s]

occupational base” due to plaintiff’s claims of depression noting

that plaintiff only received brief treatment for depression

concluding in May 2004 and that consulting psychologist Dr Bruce had

concluded that there was no evidence that plaintiff had any mental

impairment that would limit his ability to work. AR 19. 

In addition, the ALJ wrote that he did not consider

plaintiff’s and his wife’s statements regarding plaintiff’s pain and

other symptoms “particularly convincing or credible.” Id. The ALJ

specifically noted that plaintiff had sought disability benefits

based in part on depression. He also noted that plaintiff “can

perform a variety of household chores including dusting, cleaning,

shopping, light cooking and laundry.” Id. 

The ALJ then credited the VE’s testimony that an

individual vocationally similar to plaintiff could perform the job

of a small products assembler or a production assembler and that an

adequate number of such jobs existed. AR 20. The ALJ disregarded

the declaration submitted by plaintiff’s counsel that cast doubt on

the actual availability of such positions at the two employers named

by the VE. The ALJ wrote that the “hearsay declaration” contained

statements which were “not adduced during the hearing or under oath

and which were not subject to cross-examination or similar inquiry”

and are “inherently unreliable and [] legally insufficient as

evidence.” AR 20-21. Since the ALJ found that the job positions

identified by the VE could be performed by an individual with such 

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plaintiff’s limitations, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR 21. 

The SSA Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for

review of the ALJ’s decision. AR 7. On December 6, 2006, plaintiff

timely filed the instant action. 

II

The court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining whether

the SSA’s final decision to deny benefits is supported by

substantial evidence in the administrative record. 42 USC § 405(g). 

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thomas v

Barnhart, 278 F3d 947, 954 (9th Cir 2002). A district court may

overturn a decision to deny benefits only if the decision is not

supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on

legal error. See Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir

1995); Magallanes v Bowen, 881 F2d 747, 750 (9th Cir 1989). 

Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical

testimony and all other ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. 

Morgan v Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 169 F3d

595, 599 (9th Cir 1999). The decision of the ALJ will be upheld if

the evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation.” Andrews, 53 F3d at 1040.

The Act provides that certain individuals who are “under a

disability” shall receive disability benefits. 42 USC § 423(a)

(1)(D). Disability is the “inability to do any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

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impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months.” 20 CFR § 404.1505(a). An individual is

considered “disabled” if his impairments are such “that he is not

only unable to do his previous work but cannot * * * engage in any

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy * * *.” Id.

To determine whether a claimant is disabled and entitled

to benefits, the SSA conducts a five-step sequential inquiry. 20

CFR § 404.1520. Under the first step, the ALJ considers whether the

claimant is currently employed in substantial gainful activity. If

not, the second step examines whether the claimant has a “severe

impairment” that significantly affects his or her ability to conduct

basic work activities. In step three, the ALJ determines whether

the claimant has a condition which “meets” or “equals” the

conditions outlined in the Listing of Impairments in 20 CFR Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the claimant does not have such a

condition, step four asks whether the claimant can perform his past

relevant work. If not, in step five, the ALJ considers whether the

claimant has the ability to perform other work which exists in

substantial numbers in the national economy. If a claimant is

unable to perform any other work, then the claimant will be

considered disabled. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(b)-(f); §§ 404.920(b)-(f). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one

through four of the inquiry. Bustamante v Massanari, 262 F3d 949,

953-54 (9th Cir 2001). At step five, the burden of proof shifts to

the SSA and to support a finding of “not disabled” the Secretary

must prove that there are jobs in the national economy that the

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claimant can perform. Id. 

In the instant case, there is no issue at steps one

through four of the inquiry. Plaintiff contends, however, that the

ALJ erred at step five.

III

Plaintiff makes three major contentions in support of his

motion. First, plaintiff contends that the RFC determined by the

ALJ is equivalent to a limitation to sedentary work which thus

entitles him to benefits under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

(the “Grids”). Pl Mot (Doc #7 at 6-13). Second, plaintiff argues

that the hypothetical propounded to the VE improperly failed to

include plaintiff’s subjective limitations and that the VE’s

testimony accordingly lacks evidentiary value and fails to meet the

step-five burden. Pl Mot (Doc #7 at 21-23). And third, plaintiff

contends that the ALJ failed to meet his duty to fully and fairly

develop the record and thus erred in crediting the VE’s testimony. 

Accordingly, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s step-five burden has

not been satisfied. Pl Mot (Doc #7 at 13-21).

A

Plaintiff argues that his RFC as determined by the ALJ is

equivalent to a limitation to sedentary work and that the ALJ erred

in failing to find him “disabled” under the Grids. Pl Mot (Doc #7

at 6). It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish this error. See

Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir 1995); Magellenes v.

Bowen, 881 F2d 747, 750 (9th Cir 1989). 

The Grids are usually used in social security cases to

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determine a claimant’s disability based on a claimant’s RFC, age,

educational level and transferability of skills. The Grids provide

that an individual is “disabled” if he: (1) has an RFC that limits

him to sedentary work; (2) is closely approaching advanced age; (3)

has an educational level of high school graduate or more; and (4) is

skilled or semiskilled with skills that are not transferable. 20

CFR Pt 404, Subpt P, App 2, Table 1, Rule 201.14. An individual of

the same background, however, who is limited to “light work” rather

than “sedentary work” will be found “not disabled” under the Grids. 

20 CFR Pt 404, Subpt P, App 2, Table 2, Rule 202.14. Where a

claimant’s exertional limitation does not readily fall under one of

the Grid rules, rather than use the Grids, the ALJ may instead

consult a VE to determine whether the claimant is capable of

performing substantial gainful work in the economy. Thomas v

Barnhart, 278 F3d 947, 960 (9th Cir 2002). 

 The ALJ determined that for purposes of this case,

plaintiff should be considered closely approaching advanced age (age

50-54) with a high school education and skills that are not

transferable. AR 348, 379, 383. The ALJ found that plaintiff’s RFC

was “[the capacity] to perform light work, as defined at 20 [CFR]

404.1567(b), with alternative sitting and standing at will,

occasional crouching, crawling, kneeling, stooping, balancing, stair

climbing and use of ramps and no work at heights or use of ladders,

ropes or scaffolds.” AR 18. 

Plaintiff is clearly unable to perform a full range of

light work and accordingly does not satisfy the Grid requirements of

Rule 202.14. Specifically, plaintiff cannot perform “substantially

all” of the activities specified in the definition of “light work”

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under 20 CFR 404.1567(b) such as: (1) lifting no more than twenty

pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects

weighing up to ten pounds; (2) walking or standing “a good deal”;

and (3) sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of

arm or leg controls. Thus, the ALJ properly refrained from applying

Rule 202.14 to plaintiff’s case. 

Accordingly, the main issue is whether plaintiff’s RFC as

determined by the ALJ limits him to performing “sedentary work”

which would entitle him to a finding of “disabled” under Rule

201.14. Plaintiff contends that the limitations set forth by this

RFC are “no more than the ability to perform sedentary work * * *.” 

Pl Mot (Doc #7 at 8). 

There is not enough information in the record to support a

finding that plaintiff is limited to performing sedentary work and

therefore disabled under Grid Rule 201.14 such as testimony by the

VE, findings by the ALJ and/or medical opinions that plaintiff can

only perform sedentary work or that plaintiff’s RFC as determined by

the ALJ is the equivalent of sedentary work. Since the record as it

stands does not clearly support a determination that plaintiff is

limited to performing sedentary work, Grid Rule 201.14 does not

control this case. 

B

Plaintiff next contends that the hypothetical posed to

the VE at the hearing improperly failed to include plaintiff’s

subjective complaints of pain and that the ALJ erred in finding

plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain not credible. Pl Mot

(Doc #7 at 21-23). 

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The law governing the ALJ’s responsibilities in cases

involving excess pain is well-developed in this circuit. “Excess

pain” is “pain at a level above that supported by medical

findings.” Chavez v Department of Health and Human Services, 103

F3d 849 (9th Cir 1996). If a plaintiff is able to produce

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may

not reject his subjective complaints based solely on lack of

objective medical evidence to corroborate the alleged severity of

pain. Moisa v Barnhart, 367 F3d 882, 885 (9th Cir 2004). If the

ALJ finds the claimant’s pain testimony not to be credible, the ALJ

“must specifically make findings that support this conclusion.” 

Id. Absent “affirmative evidence that the claimant is

malingering,” the ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the

symptoms. Id. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ

must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v Chater, 81 F3d

821, 834 (9th Cir 1996). 

The ALJ’s reasoning for discrediting the testimony about

plaintiff’s pain was as follows:

In this case, I do not find the claimant’s

statements and those of his wife regarding the

claimant’s pain and other symptoms particularly

convincing or credible. Rather, I note that while

the claimant has reported that he takes medications

for his back pain and has received other treatments

for his back pain, as indicated, he has sought no

active treatment for depression since May 2004 even

though he has alleged disability due, in part, to

depression. I further note that the claimant and

his wife have reported that he can perform a variety

of household chores including dusting, cleaning,

shopping, light cooking and laundry. 

AR 19. 

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The record in this case contains objective medical

evidence demonstrating that plaintiff has an underlying impairment,

including a pelvic x-ray showing a possible right femoral neck

stress fracture and MRIs of plaintiff’s lumbar area showing disc

protrusion or herniation and disc bulges that “could cause pain.” 

AR 190, 192, 308-10. Given this evidence in the record, the ALJ

was required to make an affirmative finding of malingering in order

to discredit plaintiff’s subjective complaints. He did not do so. 

AR 16-22. 

The ALJ did not, moreover, provide clear and convincing

reasons for disregarding plaintiff’s testimony regarding his pain. 

The ALJ’s analysis rests on two points. First, he takes the

unusual step of using plaintiff’s inclusion of “depression” in his

application for benefits to find him not credible because the

depression was determined not to be severe. While over-inclusion

of complaints may not be exemplary, it is a common practice that

may reflect improper advice rather than dishonesty. It alone does

not constitute clear and convincing evidence that the claimant is

not credible. Second, the ALJ noted that plaintiff and his wife

reported that he was capable of performing various household

chores. Id. Closer review of the record, however, demonstrates

that plaintiff and his wife both stated that plaintiff was only

capable of performing a limited version of those household chores. 

AR 139-55. Moreover, to be disabled one need not be “utterly

incapacitated.” Benecke v Barnhart, 379 F3d 587, 594. The ALJ did

not meet the legal requirements for rejecting plaintiff’s pain

testimony. 

\\

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Accordingly, the court is required to credit plaintiff’s

pain testimony. Lester v Chater, 81 F3d 821, 834. This is not a

case, however, in which “the claimant would be disabled if his

testimony were credited,” id at 834. Plaintiff’s hearing testimony

establishes both that he could walk for up to one-half hour and

perform various other activities then, and that he planned to

pursue opportunities for further therapy and treatment as well as

vocational rehabilitation. AR 353-65. On this record, as

previously noted, it cannot be determined that plaintiff is

permanently limited to sedentary work and therefore “disabled”

under the Grid rules. 

C

Plaintiff last contends that the ALJ should not have

credited the VE’s testimony without further development of the

record and that as such, the ALJ’s step-five burden has not been

met. Pl Mot (Doc #7 at 13); Pl Reply (Doc #14 at 6-7). 

Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ solely relied on the

testimony of the VE to meet his step-five burden, but that the VE’s

testimony should not have been credited without further inquiry

since it was self-contradictory and appeared to be inaccurate. Pl

Reply (Doc #14 at 5-7). 

The ALJ in a social security case has a “duty to fully

and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s

interests are considered.” Tonapetyan v Halter, 242 F3d 1144, 1150

(9th Cir 2001). This duty extends to both represented and

unrepresented claimants. Id. The ALJ’s duty to supplement the

record “is triggered by ambiguous evidence, the ALJ’s own finding

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that the record is inadequate or the ALJ’s reliance on an expert’s

conclusion that the evidence is ambiguous.” Webb v Barnhart, 433

F3d 683, 687 (9th Cir 2005). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should not have credited

the VE’s testimony without further inquiry for several reasons. 

First, plaintiff contends that the VE’s testimony was repeatedly

self-contradictory. Pl Mot (Doc #13 at 14). For example, the VE

first testified that plaintiff could perform the job of a security

guard but later changed his opinion upon cross-examination by

plaintiff’s counsel. Id. The VE then changed his testimony and

stated that the job of a security guard could not be performed with

a sit/stand option. Id. Plaintiff also contends that the VE

contradicted himself when he testified that plaintiff had

transferable skills and could work as a food assembler, and then

later admitted that such a job would not accommodate a sit/stand

option. Id. Plaintiff further argues that the VE initially

testified that 2,351 light assembly jobs existed in the Bay area

which plaintiff could perform and that again upon questioning by

plaintiff’s counsel, the VE admitted that this estimate would be

further eroded due to plaintiff’s need to sit/stand at will. Id. 

In addition, plaintiff argues that the VE conceded that

his testimony regarding the availability of jobs that plaintiff

could perform that afforded a sit/stand option was not

substantiated by any published data and was based merely “[o]n

hundreds of job analyses that [the VE] performed throughout the

[B]ay area on similar types of occupations.” Pl Reply (Doc #14 at

5). When asked by plaintiff’s counsel for the names of specific

employers, the VE could only name two employers. Id.

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Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to investigate the

credibility of the VE’s testimony and submitted a declaration to

the ALJ stating that these two employers denied the existence of

any such position that would allow for a sit/stand option. AR 184-

86. The ALJ disregarded this declaration in its entirety as

hearsay evidence. AR 20. 42 USC section 405(b)(1) explains,

however, that the rules of evidence do not apply to social security

hearings. In administrative settings such as social security

cases, hearsay may constitute substantial evidence and is

admissible if it has probative value and bears indicia of

reliability. Calhoun v Bailar, 626 F2d 145, 149 (9th Cir 1980). 

The ALJ in this case employed a formalistic application of the

hearsay rule to reject the post-hearing evidence submitted by

plaintiff’s counsel. AR 20. The declaration, however, clearly

throws doubt on the accuracy of the VE’s already confused testimony

and appears reliable, since the two employers quoted have no

apparent reason to lie and the declaration is signed and sworn

under penalty of perjury by plaintiff’s counsel, Glenn Clark. 

Since hearsay evidence may be allowed in social security cases and

the declaration submitted by counsel appears to be admissible, the

court finds that the ALJ disregarded the declaration for improper

reasons and that, on remand, the agency should develop a more

competent record regarding the availability of jobs matching

plaintiff’s RFC at step five. 

IV

The SSA has not met its burden at step five of showing

plaintiff is capable of performing work substantially available in

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the national economy. The record in this case remains murky and

contains significant inconsistencies, but the ALJ did not handle

those inconsistencies in a legally correct manner. As noted above,

this case is not an appropriate one to remand for an award of

benefits. 

The matter is remanded to the SSA for further examination

and re-evaluation at step five, including enhancement of the record 

if appropriate. Benecke v Barnhart, 379 F3d at 593. 

The clerk is directed to enter judgment for plaintiff and

against defendant and to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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