Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-14-02313/USCOURTS-ca6-14-02313-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ibrahim Aoun
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0061n.06

Nos. 14-1834/14-2313

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AQUIL ALKUFI and IBRAHIM AOUN,

Defendants-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, ROGERS, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Following a jury trial, Defendants-Appellants 

Aquil Alkufi and Ibrahim Aoun were convicted of firearm and controlled substances offenses. 

The district court sentenced Alkufi to eighty-four months’ imprisonment and Aoun to 

360 months’ imprisonment. Both Defendants appeal their convictions and sentences. We 

AFFIRM the convictions and Aoun’s sentence and VACATE Alkufi’s sentence and REMAND

for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 25, 2013, Detroit police executed a search warrant at 6135 Stahelin Street 

(Stahelin House). Then-Sergeant Tharadrous White (White) had the first line of sight into the 

house during the search and immediately saw Aoun running “full strength” up the stairs carrying 

a green, cloth bag. (PID 573–74, 577.) Once police entered the house, they “cleared” the second 

floor, where they found Aoun. (PID 712–13.) Later, officers searched Aoun and found he had 

$660 in cash.

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Officers later recovered a green lunch bag from a “crawl space” on the second floor of 

the house, which White identified as the bag he had seen Aoun carrying. (PID 585, 661.) The 

bag contained 1) a loaded Smith & Wesson .38-caliber revolver, 2) 393.5 pills marked “Watson 

540,” 3) 133 pills marked “Watson 853,” 4) twelve pills marked “Watson 3203,” and 5) two 

additional pills. Lab tests revealed all the pills marked “Watson” were dihydrocodeinone and 

one pill found was amphetamine. An officer testified that the quantity of pills found was 

consistent with distribution, and that “[t]he gun was inside the bag next to the pills possibly for 

protection,” which was consistent with narcotics trafficking. (PID 706–07.) 

In the downstairs, front bedroom, officers found 1) a loaded, semi-automatic handgun on 

the bed, 2) “numerous empty, plastic vials with white tops,” and 3) a digital scale. (PID 625–26, 

630.) Officers testified that the types of vials found were commonly used to package high-end 

marijuana and that they often found firearms inside the houses at which they executed search 

warrants for narcotics because drug traffickers often armed themselves to guard against 

robberies. No fingerprints were found on the firearms recovered at the Stahelin House.

Police found several other persons on the first floor of the house, including two women, 

three men, and a small child. Officers testified that they found no weapons or large sums of cash 

on any of these persons. Although no one present claimed the house as their residence, White 

testified that the house did not appear to be vacant. Police also found an “aggressive pit bull” 

locked in the basement, which Aoun said was his. (PID 715.) 

Following the Stahelin House search, Detroit police involved the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) in the case and obtained an arrest warrant for Aoun on 

March 12, 2013. After an ATF source told him Aoun was at a house located at 6352 Auburn 

Street (Auburn House), agent Richard Jury (Jury) observed the location for about three hours. 

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During that time, he saw sixty-eight vehicles arrive at the Auburn House, make contact with 

someone at the location, and depart within approximately thirty seconds to three minutes. He 

testified that in his experience, this was a “clear sign of narcotics trafficking.” (PID 794.) 

Officer James Wiencek (Wiencek) also watched the house from about 10:00 or 10:30 PM until 

1:00 AM and observed twenty-five or thirty persons arrive separately and either meet someone 

on the porch or go inside; they stayed for an “average of 45 seconds to two and a half minutes,” 

which he testified was consistent with narcotics trafficking. (PID 958–59.) After Jury confirmed 

that Aoun was still there, police entered the house to arrest Aoun around 1:10 AM. 

When police arrived, there were seven persons in or just outside the house; someone on 

the porch ran inside the house and officers followed him. Officers testified that the house 

appeared to be vacant—that is, it was in disrepair, there were very few pieces of furniture and 

they were in poor condition, the kitchen had no refrigerator or utilities, several of the kitchen 

cabinets had been ripped off, there was no food, and there appeared to be no running water. 

Two officers testified that they saw Aoun throw a plastic bag out a second-floor window. 

The bag was later found to contain multiple individual containers that collectively contained 

approximately forty-two grams of marijuana. In the room where officers found Aoun, they also 

found $962 in a hole in the wall. 

Sergeant Jeffrey Pacholski (Pacholski) testified that when he reached the second floor of 

the Auburn House, he heard officers outside shouting, and then saw Alkufi “div[e]” back into the 

house through the window carrying a black grocery-style bag. (PID 870–72.) Inside the bag, 

officers found a loaded 9-millimeter Sig Sauer semi-automatic handgun, two loaded Ruger semiautomatic handguns, an unloaded .357 magnum revolver, two additional Ruger magazines, and a 

holster, in which one of the Rugers was found. When police searched Alkufi’s person, they 

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found a key to the front door and $526 in cash. Jury also testified that no one else present had a 

key to the house and that police found ten photographs of Alkufi in a bedroom on the second 

floor. 

Officers testified that they found drugs in several rooms of the Auburn House and 

throughout the property. In the basement, they found a plastic bag containing over 600 pills in a 

number of pill bottles; some of the pills had markings such as “DAN 5513,” “Watson 540,” and 

“Watson 3202.” Wiencek testified that the packaging and quantity of pills was “indicative of 

street-level sales.” (PID 978–79.) Lab tests revealed these pills to be dihydrocodeinone 

(162 pills), amphetamine (52 pills), carisoprodol, or Soma (176 pills), and alprazolam, or Xanax 

(281 pills). Officers also found a one-gallon Ziploc bag in the mailbox “containing small plastic 

vials containing suspected marijuana,” (PID 803, 898); they testified that the vials were similar 

to those they had seen used in drug sales in the neighborhood, and that the way the marijuana 

was packaged was consistent with distribution. In the kitchen, officers found a digital scale and 

a plastic vial containing marijuana. Jury testified that it was “extremely common” to find a 

digital scale “in proximity to the sale of narcotics,” and that the vials were similar to those 

recovered at the Stahelin House. (PID 805, 809–10.) Officers also found a bag of marijuana on 

the living-room floor. 

Police found additional firearms and ammunition at the house, including fifty .22-caliber 

rounds in the basement, a loaded 12-gauge shotgun in the yard, and another unloaded firearm 

that “look[ed] like a Tommy gun, assault rifle” in the backyard. (PID 926–28, 966–67.) 

No usable fingerprints were found on any of the firearms recovered at the Auburn House.

In addition to Alkufi and Aoun, there were five persons at the house when police arrived, 

including Durgham Alfadhili (Alfadhili), who was also present when police searched the 

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Stahelin House. None of the other persons were found with illegal narcotics or firearms in their 

possession. Nobody in the house admitted living there. Officers found in the house a manila 

envelope with Alfadhili’s medical records, as well as mail addressed to four persons who were 

not present. 

Both Aoun and Alkufi were arrested at the Auburn House. Aoun was charged with: 

1) one count of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 USC 

§§ 841(a), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(E) (Count One, relating to the Stahelin House); 2) two counts of 

maintaining places for purposes of distributing controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 856(a)(1) (Count Two for the Stahelin House and Count Six for the Auburn House); 3) two 

counts of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Three for 

the Stahelin House and Count Seven for the Auburn House); 4) two counts of possession of a 

firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Four 

for the Stahelin House and Count Eight for the Auburn House); and 5) conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)(D), and 

846 (Count 5, relating to the Auburn House). Counts Five, Six, and Eight also charged Alkufi. 

Several counts charged Alkufi and Aoun with aiding and abetting each other, including Count 

Six, maintaining a place (Auburn House) for the purpose of distributing controlled substances.

Alkufi spoke to police following his arrest. At trial, Jury testified that Alkufi told him 

that he sold pills, carried a gun for protection, and that one of the Rugers found at the Auburn 

House belonged to him. Jury also testified that Alkufi denied selling pills from the Auburn 

House and stated he never sold marijuana, but admitted selling pills from a Metro PCS store. 

When asked whether he had asked Alkufi about “any guns that were found in the house at 

6352 Auburn Street that night,” Jury replied, “Yes. Task Force Officer Wiencek asked Aquil 

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Alkufi, stated to him that you guys have guns because selling drugs is dangerous, to protect 

yourself, protect the money, protect the drugs, and Aquil Alkufi said, yes, sir, and he also said 

that it’s part of the game.” (PID 818.) 

The government also introduced evidence at trial about two incidents that occurred in 

April 2012. Officer Brian Headapohl (Headapohl) testified that on April 16, 2012, after 

receiving a “police run” that persons were selling narcotics, he and a partner went to a vacant 

house on Forrer Street (Forrer House), located in the same neighborhood of Detroit as the 

Auburn and Stahelin Houses. (PID 750–52.) There, he found Aoun in a room upstairs, putting a 

bag into a vent in the floor. Another person was hiding in the closet. The bag contained what 

Headapohl suspected to be marijuana, twenty-two 500-milligram pills marked “Watson 540,” 

and 162 325-milligram pills marked “Watson 538.” Headapohl also found clear plastic vials 

with white caps, which looked like those found in the Stahelin House, and which were similar to 

those he had seen used to package marijuana in other narcotics-trafficking cases. Once at the 

police station, Headapohl recovered $437 from Aoun. 

Later, Hopp testified that on April 11, 2012, he executed a search warrant at a house at 

6797 Montrose (Montrose House), also in the same neighborhood of Detroit, where officers 

found six or seven men inside the house, including Alkufi and Aoun. In the living room, police 

found marijuana and a bag with approximately eleven pill bottles containing pills, and in one of 

the bedrooms they recovered “15 live 30/30 rifle rounds.” (PID 932.) During the search, 

officers recovered $906 from Alkufi and $759 from Aoun. Hopp also recovered “[s]even clear 

plastic tubes with white tops” containing what he believed to be marijuana, weighing twentythree grams, and a total of 566 pills, including 214 marked “DAN 5513,” twenty marked 

“Watson 853,” and 138 marked “Watson 503.” (PID 983–85.) Hopp did not see Aoun in direct 

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possession of either the drugs or ammunition at the Montrose House. Neither Alkufi nor Aoun 

was found in the room with the ammunition and no firearms were recovered at the house.

The jury found Aoun and Alkufi guilty on all counts. The court sentenced Alkufi to 

twenty-four months’ imprisonment each for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

controlled substances and maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing controlled 

substances, to run concurrently, and to the sixty-month minimum for possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of § 924(c), to run consecutive to the other counts. 

The court sentenced Aoun to 360 months’ imprisonment: sixty months and 300 months under 

§ 924(c)’s consecutive mandatory minimums and one day and time served on all other counts.

II. EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES

We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district 

court relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous 

legal standard.” United States v. Dixon, 413 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2005). “[W]e will leave 

rulings about admissibility of evidence undisturbed unless we are left with the definite and firm 

conviction that the [district] court . . . committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it 

reached.” United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 616 (6th Cir. 2004). “‘Even when the district 

court has abused its discretion in admitting evidence, we do not reverse a conviction if the error 

is harmless.’” Freeman, 730 F.3d at 595 (quoting United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 

741 (6th Cir. 2006)). To establish harmless error on a non-constitutional issue, “the government 

must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the error did not materially affect the 

verdict.” United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 378 (6th Cir. 2015). 

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A. Evidence of Firearm Operability

Aoun argues the district court abused its discretion in prohibiting him from introducing 

evidence that the .38 Smith & Wesson seized at the Stahelin House was inoperable. The district 

court excluded this evidence on the ground that operability of the firearm was not relevant. 

At trial, Aoun noted for the record that he had intended to introduce 1) a March 2013 

government report indicating that the .38 Smith & Wesson was inoperable, 2) an examination of 

the gun by an ATF agent in February 2014 indicating that “after three tries of pulling back the 

hammer and pulling the trigger it was possible to cause the hammer to strike the mechanism to 

result in an explosion of the primer,” and 3) testimony from a retired Michigan State Police 

firearms examiner, who had examined the gun and would testify that the gun had been altered, 

and that due to a defect, “it would be necessary to handle [it], at best, with two hands,” to fire it. 

(PID 915–17.)

Aoun first argues that the question whether a weapon fits the legal definition of “firearm” 

is an issue of fact that the district court may not take away from the jury. The statute defines 

“firearm,” in relevant part, as “any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to 

or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 921(a)(3)(A). However, this Circuit has previously held that “a firearm need not be operable to 

satisfy the definition of firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).” United States v. Bandy, 239 

F.3d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 2001); 

United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 1994). Even if “the operation of a weapon 

may be relevant to whether it is designed to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” 

United States v. Counce, 445 F.3d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), Aoun’s evidence did 

not show that the .38 Smith & Wesson was not designed to operate as a firearm, only that it did 

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not perform that function well. Moreover, “[a] jury can reasonably conclude that a weapon is 

capable of firing a projectile, or at least that it had been designed for that purpose, where the jury 

has the actual weapon before it and there is testimony that the weapon was loaded when it was 

recovered by the police.” United States v. Morris, 533 F. App’x 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing 

United States v. Forrest, 402 F.3d 678, 686–87 (6th Cir. 2005)). Thus, the district court did not 

err in excluding the evidence on this basis.

Next, Aoun argues that operability of the .38 Smith & Wesson is relevant to whether he 

possessed it in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of § 924(c). To prove a violation of 

§ 924(c), “and specifically the in furtherance element, the government must show a specific 

nexus between the gun and the crime charged.” United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 569, 576 

(6th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That is, the firearm must 

“advance, promote, or facilitate the crime.” United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 

2006) (citation omitted). “To determine whether this specific nexus exists, we consider six 

factors—the Mackey factors—first adopted in United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 462 

(6th Cir. 2001) . . . to help distinguish possession in furtherance of a crime from ‘innocent 

possession of a wall-mounted antique or an unloaded hunting rifle locked in a cupboard.’” 

Brown, 732 F.3d at 576 (citation omitted). First, “[i]n order for the possession to be in 

furtherance of a drug crime, the firearm must be strategically located so that it is quickly and 

easily available for use.” Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462. “Other factors that may be relevant . . . 

include whether the gun was loaded, the type of weapon, the legality of its possession, the type 

of drug activity conducted, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm was found.” 

Id.

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Assuming, arguendo, that Aoun’s evidence was relevant to whether he used the firearm 

in furtherance of drug trafficking and should have been admitted, any error in excluding this 

evidence was harmless. Aoun argues the exclusion materially affected the verdict because the 

government presented no direct evidence to support the § 924(c) charge and because the 

evidence would have shown the gun was so difficult to operate that he could not have used it in 

furtherance of a drug crime. Aoun relies on United States v. Leary, 422 F. App’x 502, 511 

(6th Cir. 2011), where the court held that evidence that firearms were found in the same closet as 

drugs was insufficient to convict Leary of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. 

In Leary, however, the firearms were found in a duffel bag in the closet and were not “easily 

within [defendant’s] reach.” 422 F. App’x at 513. Here, in contrast, the evidence strongly 

suggests the firearm was found in a crawl space because Aoun was able to quickly put it there 

when police arrived. Moreover, in Leary, there was little other evidence to support the charge, 

including no evidence of sale or manufacture of drugs within the apartment and a relatively small 

quantity of drugs. See id. 

Here, there was ample evidence that Aoun possessed a firearm in furtherance of drug 

trafficking. White testified that when police arrived at the Stahelin House, he saw Aoun quickly 

run up the stairs with a bag, which was later found to contain the .38 Smith & Wesson, 

supporting that the firearm was located in a place where Aoun could easily access it. Moreover, 

Aoun’s possession of the firearm was illegal and officers testified that the quantity of pills found 

in the bag with the firearm was consistent with distribution. Further, the firearm fit into what 

officers described as a lunch bag, suggesting it was a “small weapon that is easily transported or 

concealed on the body, making it more likely to be used ‘in furtherance’ of a drug crime than 

would be, for example, a rifle.” United States v. Gill, 685 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 2012). 

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Other evidence that establishes a “specific nexus” was also present here—the firearm was found 

in close proximity to drugs and the cash on Aoun’s person, see United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 

297, 315 (6th Cir. 2009); the government introduced testimony that drug dealers “often carry 

guns to protect themselves and their drugs,” see United States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 236 

(6th Cir. 2010); and Aoun was found in close proximity to the drugs, money, and firearm, 

see United States v. Beals, 698 F.3d 248, 270–71 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Whitehead, 

415 F.3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2005). Although alone, the mere presence of a firearm where drugs 

are found or generalized testimony that drug traffickers often use firearms is not sufficient to 

establish a “specific nexus,” see Mackey, 265 F.3d at 461; see also United States v. Nance, 40 F. 

App’x 59, 67 (6th Cir. 2002), harmless-error review requires the court to consider the evidence 

on the record as a whole, United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 851 (6th Cir. 1996). Viewed in 

light of the record as a whole, the evidence Aoun wished to present would not have materially 

affected the verdict and therefore any error in its exclusion was harmless. 

B. Montrose House Evidence

Alkufi argues the district court abused its discretion in admitting testimony about the 

Montrose House that he contends was improper character evidence under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 404. The government contends we should review Alkufi’s challenge for plain error 

because Alkufi did not object to the evidence at trial. Because Alkufi’s challenge fails under 

either standard, we need not decide whether he adequately preserved the issue for appeal.1

 

1 Although Alkufi did not object at trial when this evidence was introduced, Aoun filed a 

motion in limine to exclude evidence about uncharged conduct (including the incidents at the 

Montrose and Forrer Houses) on the grounds the evidence violated Federal Rules of Evidence 

403 and 404(b). Thus, the district court addressed this issue in ruling on Aoun’s motion.

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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits introduction of “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, 

or other act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 

person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, “[t]his 

evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. 404(b)(2). 

We use a three-tiered analysis to review evidentiary rulings in the 404(b) context:

(1) we first review for clear error a district court’s determination that the “other 

act” took place, (2) we then conduct a de novo review of the district court’s legal 

determination that the evidence was admissible for a proper purpose, and (3) we 

review for abuse of discretion the district court’s determination that the probative 

value of the other acts evidence is not substantially outweighed by its unfairly 

prejudicial effect.

United States v. Perry, 438 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also United States v. Olive, 804 F.3d 747, 754 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. 

Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 694 (6th Cir. 2012).2 

1. Evidence the Act Occurred

First, we look to whether “there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that 

the defendant committed the similar act.” United States v. Yu Qin, 688 F.3d 257, 262 (6th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988)). This requirement was 

satisfied by the testimony of two officers about the Montrose House incident. See United States 

v. Sandoval, 460 F. App’x 552, 562 (6th Cir. 2012) (“‘[T]he testimony of a single witness is 

 

2 Although there is some disagreement in this Circuit about whether the three-tiered 

standard of review conflicts with the general use of an abuse-of-discretion standard to review 

evidentiary rulings, see Clay, 667 F.3d at 694; id. at 702 (Kethledge, J., dissenting), we have 

noted that “the three-part test and the abuse of discretion standard ‘are not in fact inconsistent, 

because it is [an] abuse of discretion to make errors of law or clear errors of factual 

determination.”’ United States v. Richardson, 597 F. App’x 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 443 (6th Cir. 2008)).

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sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant committed the prior acts.’”) 

(quoting United States v. Johnson, 458 F. App’x 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2012)).

2. Purpose of Evidence

“In determining whether the proffered evidence is admissible for a legitimate purpose, it 

must be probative of a material issue other than character.” United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 

143, 150 (6th Cir. 2011). This standard is met “if (1) the evidence is offered for a permissible 

purpose, (2) that purpose is in issue, and (3) if probative to the purpose for which it is offered.” 

Id. at 150–51(citing United States v. Jenkins, 345 F.3d 928, 937 (6th Cir. 2003)).

The government introduced evidence about the Montrose House to show Alkufi’s intent 

and plan, which is a permissible purpose under Rule 404. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Further, 

“where the crime charged is one requiring specific intent, the prosecutor may use 404(b) 

evidence to prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent.” United States v. Johnson,

27 F.3d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Carter, 779 F.3d 623, 625 (6th Cir. 

2015). Alkufi was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled 

substances, which is a specific-intent crime. United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1078 

(6th Cir. 1996). This Circuit “has ‘repeatedly recognized that prior drug-distribution evidence is 

admissible [under Rule 404(b)] to show intent to distribute.’” Hardy, 643 F.3d at 151 (citing 

cases); see also Clay, 667 F.3d at 695; Bell, 516 F.3d at 443.

Alkufi argues that his intent was not “in issue” because he admitted to selling pills at 

Metro PCS and only denied selling them at the Auburn House and in conspiracy with Aoun. 

However, this argument demonstrates that as to a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances 

at the Auburn House, Alkufi’s intent was at issue. Further, where a defendant pleads not guilty 

to a charge requiring specific intent, “he put[s] his general intent and specific intent at issue,” 

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regardless whether he advances a defense on the issue of intent at trial. See United States v. 

Lattner, 385 F.3d 947, 957 (6th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Jenkins, 593 F.3d 480, 485 

(6th Cir. 2010). Thus, Alkufi’s intent was “in issue” at trial.

We next consider whether the evidence offered was probative of intent, that is, “whether 

the evidence relates to conduct that is ‘substantially similar and reasonably near in time’ to the 

specific intent offense at issue.” Yu Qin, 688 F.3d at 263 (quoting United States v. Haywood, 

280 F.3d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 2002)). To be probative of intent, the prior act need not “be identical 

in every detail” to the charged offense. Perry, 438 F.3d at 648 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). However, in drug-distribution cases, this Circuit has “only found . . . [past 

distribution] evidence probative of present intent . . . when the prior [acts] were part of the same 

scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense.” See Carter, 779 F.3d at 

627 (quoting Bell, 516 F.3d at 443–44). “[T]o hold otherwise would be to ‘employ[ ] the very 

kind of reasoning—i.e., once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer—which 404(b) excludes.’” Id.

(quoting Bell, 516 F.3d at 443–44).

Relying on Clay, 667 F.3d at 689, Alkufi argues the Montrose House incident is too 

unrelated and far apart in time to be probative of his intent with respect to the Auburn House. 

However, Alkufi’s reliance on Clay is misplaced. In Clay, this court held that evidence that 

defendant had assaulted someone in 2006 was inadmissible to prove intent to cause serious 

bodily harm to a different person in a 2007 carjacking because “[t]he two offenses at issue—

assault and carjacking—are too unrelated and too far apart in time to be probative of whether 

Clay had the specific intent to do harm to [the victim].” 667 F.3d at 696. Here, the incidents at 

issue were closer in time and bear more similarity than did the offenses in Clay. In both 

incidents, Alkufi was found with a large amount of cash on his person in a house where a 

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considerable quantity of drugs was recovered. Further, the offenses occurred in the same 

neighborhood and with some of the same people, including Aoun. The evidence is thus 

probative of whether Alkufi and Aoun intended to conspire to distribute controlled substances at 

the Auburn House. 

3. Balancing Probative Purpose and Prejudicial Effect

Finally, we must decide whether the district court abused its discretion in determining 

that the prejudicial effect of this evidence did not outweigh its probative value. This court 

considers four factors when making this determination: “(1) whether other act evidence was 

unduly prejudicial; (2) the availability of other means of proof; (3) when the other acts occurred; 

and (4) whether the district court gave a limiting instruction.” United States v. Brown, 147 F.3d 

477, 483 (6th Cir. 1998). “We grant the district court ‘very broad’ discretion in determining 

whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” United 

States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 509 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Yu Qin, 688 F.3d at 261. 

Relying on Jenkins, 593 F.3d at 480, Alkufi argues that the similarity between the 

Montrose and Auburn House incidents renders this evidence “highly prejudicial.” (See Alkufi 

Br. 20–21; Alkufi Reply Br. 3–4.) In Jenkins, the court held that evidence of defendant’s eightyear-old conviction of possession with intent to distribute marijuana was inadmissible to show 

intent to distribute marijuana, crack cocaine, and powder cocaine in 2006 because its prejudicial 

effect outweighed its probative value. 593 F.3d at 484–86. There, however, the only similarity 

between the offenses was possession with intent to distribute marijuana and the location, and the 

court found the probative value of the evidence “microscopic at best” in light of the 

overwhelming other evidence of intent presented at trial, leading the court to conclude that this 

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evidence was “merely piling on.” See id. at 484–86. Here, the incidents at the Montrose and 

Auburn Houses were more similar—that is, they occurred in the same neighborhood with some 

of the same persons and involved substantially similar circumstances—and are therefore more 

probative of a pattern or scheme. Additionally, although the Montrose House incident occurred 

eleven months prior to the Auburn House search, this court has “previously held that evidence of 

an eight-year-old prior drug transaction is not too remote to be admitted as evidence of intent in a 

later drug trafficking prosecution.” United States v. Love, 254 F. App’x 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(citing United States v. Matthews, 440 F.3d 818, 830 (6th Cir. 2006) and United States v. 

Persinger, 83 F. App’x 55, 59 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Alkufi also argues this evidence was prejudicial because the district court did not give a 

contemporaneous limiting instruction. However, Alkufi did not request a contemporaneous 

limiting instruction at trial. “The duty to provide an instruction . . . arises only ‘upon [the] 

request’ of one of the parties.” United States v. Fraser, 448 F.3d 833, 839 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(citation omitted). Indeed, we have previously held that a district court did not err where it did 

not provide a contemporaneous limiting instruction for 404(b) evidence, but later did so during 

the jury charge. See United States v. Waggoner, 207 F. App’x 576, 580 (6th Cir. 2006); United 

States v. Johnson, No. 98-3183, 2000 WL 712385, at *9 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, the jury was 

instructed on the admissibility of “other acts” evidence the day before hearing testimony about 

the Montrose House incident. Although this limiting instruction was made specifically in 

reference to Aoun and the Forrer House incident, the jury was still instructed that it could only 

consider “other acts” as they related to defendant’s intent or plan. Since the court again 

instructed the jury about this evidence during the jury charge—this time as to both defendants—

the failure to give a contemporaneous limiting instruction does not render this evidence unduly 

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prejudicial. Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting testimony about the Montrose 

House incident.

III. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CHALLENGE

This court generally reviews Confrontation Clause challenges de novo. United States v. 

Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 652 (6th Cir. 2014). “However, when a defendant fails to object on 

Confrontation Clause grounds at trial, we review the claim for plain error.” Id. (citing United 

States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 313 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Cromer, 389 

F.3d 662, 672 (6th Cir. 2004). The government argues plain-error review applies because Aoun 

did not timely object at trial to testimony regarding Alkufi’s statements. Aoun argues that he did 

timely object, and therefore a de novo standard of review applies. We need not resolve this issue 

because we find Aoun’s claim fails under either standard.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with 

the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This includes the right to cross-examine 

witnesses regarding testimonial statements used against a defendant at trial. See Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). Where defendants are tried jointly, the prosecution may 

introduce the statement of a nontestifying codefendant only against the defendant who made the 

statement and only where the statement does not “facially incriminate[]” the other defendant. 

See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1987); United States v. Vasilakos, 508 F.3d 

401, 407 (6th Cir. 2007). This principle stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruton v. 

United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124, 137 (1968), where it held that introduction into evidence of a 

nontestifying codefendant’s confession that named Bruton violated Bruton’s Sixth Amendment 

right to confrontation even though the jury was instructed not to consider it as evidence against 

Bruton, observing, “there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, 

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follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the 

practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. at 135. 

Aoun argues that Jury’s testimony that “Wiencek asked Aquil Alkufi, stated to him that 

you guys have guns because selling drugs is dangerous, to protect yourself, protect the money, 

protect the drugs, and Aquil Alkufi said, yes, sir, and he also said that it’s part of the game,” 

violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause because, from the question asked, and in the 

context of evidence presented at trial, “you guys” could only be interpreted to include Aoun and 

Alkufi. 

However, a nontestifying codefendant’s statement must do more than incriminate by 

implication to violate the Confrontation Clause. Cases interpreting Bruton have found no 

Confrontation Clause violation where a nontestifying codefendant’s statement is redacted to omit 

any reference to the defendant and implicates the defendant only when linked to other evidence 

presented at trial. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207–08 (limiting Bruton’s holding to situations 

where statement facially incriminates the other defendant, and not to those where a statement 

“became [incriminating] only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial”); Ford,

761 F.3d at 654; United States v. Winston, 55 F. App’x 289, 293–95 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, this 

Circuit has held that “introduction of a declarant-codefendant’s self-incriminating, extra-judicial 

statement, in a joint trial, where the defendant’s name is redacted and a neutral term is 

substituted, avoids any Sixth Amendment or Bruton violation.” Vasilakos, 508 F.3d at 408.

Aoun relies on United States v. Schwartz, 541 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) and United 

States v. Ramirez-Perez, 166 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that a nontestifying 

codefendant’s statement can violate the Confrontation Clause by “linking [the] defendant by 

implication.” (Aoun Br. 24.) However, the statement at issue in Schwartz was more directly 

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incriminating than the phrase “you guys,” because it named a company of which Schwartz was 

President. See Schwartz, 541 F.3d at 1333, 1351. The court found the statement “powerfully 

incriminat[ing]” because it “compelled an inference that Schwartz directed [his company]” to 

take the actions mentioned in the statement. See id. at 1351. Moreover, the court observed that 

“[a]ny doubt that the limiting instructions were ineffective was erased when the prosecutor, in 

his closing argument, expressly linked Schwartz to the companies named in [the] statement.”3 

Id. And Ramirez-Perez sheds no light on whether a Bruton violation occurred because there, the 

government conceded that there was a Bruton violation and the court therefore proceeded to 

determine whether the error was harmless. See Ramirez-Perez, 166 F.3d at 1109–10. 

The law is clear that introduction into evidence of a nontestifying codefendant’s 

statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause where it does not name the defendant, and 

implicates him only in light of other evidence presented at trial. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 

207–08; Ford, 761 F.3d at 654. Although some redacted statements may still violate Bruton

where the redactions make clear a specific name was omitted, see Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 

185, 188, 192 (1998) (“Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a 

word such as ‘deleted’ or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration, . . . leave 

statements that, considered as a class, so closely resemble Bruton’s unredacted statements that 

. . . the law must require the same result.”), or where the statement itself contains information 

that makes it obvious any redacted name is the defendant’s, see United States v. Macias, 

387 F.3d 509, 519 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding Bruton violation where redacted statement “referred 

directly to ‘subject two,’ who resides on Quest Drive”), neither is the case here. Alkufi’s

 

3 Although Aoun argues the prosecutor in his case used Jury’s testimony about Alkufi’s 

statements against him in its closing argument, that claim is unsupported by the record. 

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statement did not name Aoun directly, but implicated him by reference to other evidence from 

which the jury could infer that he was one of the “guys.” In Vasilakos, we noted that because 

there were multiple codefendants, the statements did not necessarily incriminate a single 

codefendant. 508 F.3d at 408. Similarly, although Aoun was Alkufi’s only codefendant, the jury 

heard testimony that five other persons were present at the Auburn House when police arrived. 

Moreover, the government did not attempt to use this statement against Aoun at trial. Thus, 

although Alkufi’s statement implicates Aoun when considered with other evidence presented at 

trial, this is not a case where a codefendant’s statement alone powerfully incriminates the 

defendant and cannot be cured by a jury instruction. Accordingly, the statement did not violate 

Aoun’s Sixth Amendment rights.

IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Alkufi argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any of the offenses. Aoun 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions of maintaining a place for purposes 

of distributing controlled substances at the Stahelin and Auburn Houses. When reviewing a 

challenge to sufficiency of the evidence “we determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 

633, 644 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Kone, 307 F.3d 430, 433 (6th Cir. 2002)). 

“This Court may reverse the jury’s verdict only if it finds that the judgment is not supported by 

substantial and competent evidence, whether direct or wholly circumstantial, upon the record as 

a whole.” United States v. Hall, 549 F.3d 1033, 1040 (6th Cir. 2008).

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A. Alkufi: Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances

To establish the elements of a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, “the government must 

prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) an agreement to violate drug laws, (2) knowledge and 

intent to join the conspiracy, and (3) participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Caver, 

470 F.3d 220, 232–33 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To show 

an agreement to violate drug laws, “the government need not prove the existence of a formal or 

express agreement among the conspirators. Even a tacit or mutual understanding among the 

conspirators is sufficient.” United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 710 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal 

citation omitted). “Indeed, the existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial 

evidence that can reasonably be interpreted as participation in a common plan.” United States v. 

Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 364 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Alkufi argues there is insufficient evidence to prove he conspired to possess or distribute 

marijuana. However, the Second Superseding Indictment charged Alkufi with conspiracy to 

possess with intent to distribute marijuana and a number of other controlled substances that were 

found at the Auburn House. “It is settled law that an offense may be charged conjunctively in an 

indictment where a statute denounces the offense disjunctively. Upon the trial, the government 

may prove and the trial judge may instruct in the disjunctive form used in the statute.” United 

States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The court instructed the jury in the disjunctive at trial. Alkufi further argues that 

negating his participation in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana affects the convictions because 

the government “used the marijuana to convict.” (Alkufi Reply Br. 1.) However, the record 

does not support that the government used only marijuana to convict, or even that it focused on 

marijuana more than other controlled substances found at the Auburn House. 

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To the extent Alkufi intended to challenge his conviction of conspiracy to distribute 

controlled substances generally—rather than only with respect to marijuana—his claim still fails. 

Two officers testified that over the course of about 2 1/2 to 3 hours, activity consistent with drug 

trafficking occurred at the Auburn House. Once inside, officers found a large quantity of pills 

and marijuana, which they testified was consistent with distribution, as well as other indicia of 

trafficking such as vials and a digital scale. Further, officers found a key to the house in Alkufi’s 

pocket and numerous photos of him in the house, which belies his claim that he was “merely 

present,” and indeed suggests he knew about and agreed to the trafficking. See Wheaton, 

517 F.3d at 364 (finding evidence linking defendant to location where drugs were sold relevant 

to conspiracy charge). The jury also could have inferred participation from the fact that Alkufi 

was found with a bag of firearms at the Auburn House, and later admitted one of them was his 

and acknowledged to officers that using guns to protect drugs was “part of the game,” which 

suggests he “took proactive steps to ensure the continued success of the conspiracy.” See United 

States v. Smith, 609 F. App’x 340, 344 (6th Cir. 2015).

Alkufi’s argument that the government did not show he had a relationship, let alone 

agreement, with Aoun, is not supported by the record. Evidence showed Alkufi and Aoun had 

been found eleven months earlier in a house in the same neighborhood with a large quantity of 

drugs, where both were in possession of large sums of cash. Moreover, at the Auburn House, 

Alkufi was found in possession of $526 in cash, a bag of firearms, and a key to the house, all of 

which suggest he agreed to participate in drug trafficking at the house. Thus, there was sufficient 

evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Alkufi conspired to 

sell controlled substances at the Auburn House.

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B. Maintaining a Place for Purposes of Distributing Controlled Substances

Both Alkufi and Aoun challenge their convictions of maintaining a place for purposes of 

distributing controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). To prove a violation of 

this section, “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [a defendant] 

(1) knowingly, (2) maintained any place, whether permanently or temporarily, (3) for the 

purpose of distributing a controlled substance.” Russell, 595 F.3d at 644. In order to satisfy the 

purpose element, “the government need only prove that the defendant’s drug-related purpose for 

maintaining a premises be ‘significant or important.’” Id. at 643.

As to the “maintaining” element, “it is not necessary that the defendant lease or own the 

home.” Id. at 644. “Acts that evidence ‘maintenance’ are ‘such matters as control, duration, 

acquisition of the site, renting or furnishing the site, repairing the site, supervising, protecting, 

supplying food to those at the site, and continuity.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Clavis, 

956 F.2d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 1992)). “A variety of factual scenarios may amount to 

‘maintaining’ a drug house under § 856(a), . . . [including where a person] owns or rents 

premises, or exercises control over them, and for a sustained period of time, uses those premises 

to manufacture, store, or sell drugs, or directs others to those premises to obtain drugs.” United 

States v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574, 591 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). “[W]hether a defendant has 

‘maintained’ a place is necessarily a fact-intensive issue that must be resolved on a case-by-case 

basis.” United States v. Payton, 636 F.3d 1027, 1043–44 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States 

v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 857 (5th Cir. 1997)).

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1. Aoun: Stahelin House

Aoun challenges only the second element, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to 

find him guilty of maintaining the Stahelin House because the evidence establishes only that he 

was present when officers searched the house.

The government offers the following from which the jury could have concluded that 

Aoun “maintained” the Stahelin House. First, although not dispositive, Aoun was present at the 

house during a search for narcotics, suggesting he had some connection to the house. 

See Russell, 595 F.3d at 645. But see Payton, 636 F.3d at 1043 (“A defendant’s mere presence 

during a police search of a residence is insufficient to sustain a conviction under § 856(a)(1).”). 

Additionally, Aoun possessed a firearm and had an “aggressive pit bull” in the basement, 

indicating he took steps to protect the house. See Russell, 595 F.3d at 645; see also Clavis, 

956 F.2d at 1091. Moreover, he knew where a crawl space was located and had a dog in the 

basement, suggesting he was more than a “casual visitor.” See United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 

291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Morgan, 117 F.3d at 856–57 (finding relevant that the 

defendant’s personal items were found at the location and that he stored items in non-common 

areas of the house). Finally, when police arrived, Aoun ran with the pills and was the only 

person with a large sum of cash in his possession, suggesting he had a supervisory role in the 

drug distribution. Russell, 595 F.3d at 644; Clavis, 956 F.2d at 1091.

Relying on Clavis, 956 F.2d at 1090–91, Aoun contends that evidence that a defendant 

may have regularly used the premises as a site from which to distribute drugs is not sufficient to 

show that he “maintained” the house for that purpose. However, in Clavis, the court noted that 

individual acts of sale by co-conspirators alone were insufficient to support the “maintenance” 

element of § 856(a)(1). See id. at 1091. Although there was less evidence of sustained use in the 

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instant case than in some others, there was evidence from which jurors could have concluded that 

Aoun’s connection to the house was more substantial, including that he knew where a crawl 

space was located, had a dog in the basement, and appeared to be the only person in control of 

the drugs. Further, although sustained use is certainly an important factor, the statute states that 

the place may be maintained “permanently or temporarily,” 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), and Aoun 

cites no authority—and we are aware of none—to support that there is a minimum amount of 

time a defendant must maintain a place in order to be convicted under this statute. Based on the 

record as a whole, a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Aoun 

“maintained” the Stahelin House for purposes of drug trafficking.

2. Auburn House

a. Alkufi

Alkufi argues that because the evidence is insufficient to prove he conspired to possess 

and distribute marijuana, it is also insufficient to sustain his conviction under § 856 for 

maintaining a place for purposes of distributing controlled substances, which is dependent on the 

underlying drug-trafficking conviction. Since his only argument is based on insufficient 

evidence to support the drug-trafficking conviction—for which we determined there was 

sufficient evidence—this claim must fail. 

However, even if we construe Alkufi’s argument to independently challenge this 

conviction, that claim would also fail. There was testimony that when police arrived at the 

Auburn House, Alkufi had a key to the front door, a bag containing four firearms, and $526 in 

cash, from which the jury could reasonably conclude that he knew about the drug activity 

occurring in the house. Moreover, Alkufi was the only person found with a key to the front door, 

and ten photos of him were found in the house, suggesting that he “maintained” the house. As to 

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purpose, “the government need only prove that the defendant’s drug-related purpose for 

maintaining a premises be ‘significant or important.’” Russell, 595 F.3d at 643. Officers 

testified that they observed activity consistent with drug trafficking at the house, and once inside 

found a large quantity of pills and marijuana, firearms, and indicia of drug sales. The officers 

also testified that the house appeared to be vacant, with no food or running water, and very little 

furniture—that is, it did not appear to have any other purpose. Based on this evidence, a 

reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Alkufi maintained the 

Auburn House for purposes of drug trafficking.

b. Aoun

The government argues that Aoun’s conviction on Count Six—maintaining the Auburn 

House for purposes of distributing controlled substances—is adequately supported by evidence 

that he possessed marijuana there (and threw it out the window); he and the marijuana were in 

proximity to $962 in cash; and the pills in the basement “bore the same markings as the Vicodin 

pills recovered from his drug houses on Montrose, Forrer, and Stahelin.” (Gov’t Br. 14–15.) 

Although this provides little evidence that Aoun “maintained” the house, the jury was instructed 

that it could find Aoun guilty of aiding and abetting Alkufi in maintaining the house for purposes 

of distributing controlled substances. “In order to aid or abet another to commit a crime, a 

defendant must in some way associate himself with the venture such that his participation is 

intended to bring about the crime or make it succeed.” United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 736 

(6th Cir. 1991). Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, “[a] defendant can be convicted as an aider and abettor 

without proof that he participated in each and every element of the offense.” Rosemond v. 

United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1246 (2014) (quotation omitted). However, “an aiding and 

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abetting conviction [also] requires . . . a state of mind extending to the entire crime,” not merely 

a “different or lesser offense.” See id. at 1248 (emphasis added). 

As discussed, there was sufficient evidence that Alkufi maintained the Auburn House for 

purposes of drug trafficking. Although Aoun argues there was insufficient evidence that he 

engaged in drug trafficking in the house, the record reflects otherwise. More than one officer 

testified that he saw Aoun throw a plastic bag out a window, and that the bag was later found to 

contain individual plastic vials of marijuana that officers testified were consistent with drug 

trafficking. Further, Aoun was found in close proximity to $962 in cash, and the pills found in 

the basement were similar to those found at the Stahelin, Montrose, and Forrer Houses. Thus, 

the jury could have concluded that he participated in drug trafficking at the Auburn House.

As to whether Aoun intended to aid Alkufi in maintaining the house, the Supreme Court 

has “previously found [the] intent requirement satisfied when a person actively participates in a 

criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense.” 

Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1248–49. Thus, “for purposes of aiding and abetting law, a person who 

actively participates in a criminal scheme knowing its extent and character intends that scheme’s 

commission.” Id. at 1249. Here, a reasonable jury could have concluded from Aoun’s presence 

in the house for several hours, participation in drug activity, and evidence that he had previously 

been found in a similar situation with Alkufi at the Montrose House that he had full knowledge 

of the scheme and intended to contribute to its success. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to 

support the conviction on the basis that Aoun aided and abetted Alkufi in maintaining the 

Auburn House for purposes of distributing controlled substances.

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C. Alkufi: Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking 

Alkufi next argues that the evidence was insufficient to show he possessed a firearm in 

furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of § 924(c).4 The Second Superseding Indictment 

charged Alkufi with possession of a firearm in furtherance of, inter alia, maintaining a place for 

purposes of distributing controlled substances. As discussed, there is sufficient evidence to 

establish that Alkufi committed the underlying offense. 

Alkufi contends that only his statement to Jury tied his firearms to a drug-trafficking 

offense, and because he admitted selling pills only at Metro PCS, there was no evidence 

connecting his firearm to drug trafficking. However, the record belies this claim. Alkufi was 

found in possession of four firearms, three of which were loaded, as well as $526 in cash, in a 

house where officers testified that drug activity was taking place and large quantities of pills and 

marijuana were found, along with other indicia of trafficking such as a digital scale and vials.

There was also sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Alkufi possessed a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. As discussed 

supra, to prove a violation of § 924(c), “the government must show a specific nexus between the 

gun and the crime charged.” Brown, 732 F.3d at 576. Factors bearing on this analysis include 

whether the firearm was strategically located, “whether the gun was loaded, the type of weapon, 

the legality of its possession, the type of drug activity conducted, and the time and circumstances 

 

4 Alkufi argues in his brief that the evidence is insufficient to show he possessed a 

firearm in furtherance of a marijuana-trafficking conspiracy. However, the Second Superseding 

Indictment did not charge Alkufi with possession of a firearm specifically in furtherance of a 

marijuana-trafficking conspiracy. Rather, it charged Alkufi with possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of either possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance or maintaining a 

place for the purpose of distributing controlled substances. Because Alkufi’s arguments 

challenge the nexus between his firearm and any drug-trafficking offense, we address those 

arguments here.

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under which the firearm was found.” Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462. Jury testified that Alkufi 

admitted that he had a gun to protect himself, his drugs, and his money. The jury was not 

required to accept Alkufi’s later qualification that he only sold pills from a different location. 

Moreover, Alkufi was found in possession of four firearms, three of which were loaded. Officers 

testified that the activity they observed at the house indicated drugs were being sold, and once 

inside they found large quantities of pills and marijuana and other indicia of drug trafficking. 

Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Alkufi of possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.

V. SENTENCING CHALLENGES

A. Aoun

The district court sentenced to Aoun to 360 months’ imprisonment based on consecutive 

mandatory minimum sentences for two violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(1), (c)(1)(C)(i), (c)(1)(D)(ii). Aoun argues these mandatory consecutive 

minimum sentences violate the separation-of-powers doctrine because they allow prosecutors—

via their charging decisions—to determine the sentence, rather than judges. This Circuit has 

already rejected the arguments Aoun now makes. In United States v. Cecil, 615 F.3d 678, 695–

96 (6th Cir. 2010), we held “the separation-of-powers doctrine provides no comfort for those 

seeking additional judicial discretion in the sentencing context” because “Congress has the 

power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion.” 

See also United States v. Odeneal, 517 F.3d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting argument “that a 

statutory mandatory sentence violates the separation of powers doctrine because mandatory 

minimums unconstitutionally shift sentencing discretion away from the courts to prosecutors”). 

More recently, this court also rejected a separation-of-powers challenge to consecutive

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mandatory minimum sentences under § 924(c). United States v. Richardson, 793 F.3d 612, 632 

(6th Cir. 2015). Since the precedent established in these cases is binding on this panel, Aoun’s 

challenge to his sentence fails.

B. Alkufi

Alkufi challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. A sentence is 

procedurally erroneous when a district court “fails to calculate the Guidelines sentencing range, 

improperly applies the Guidelines or otherwise calculates the incorrect Guidelines sentencing 

range, treats the Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, 

selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen 

sentence.” United States v. Garcia, 758 F.3d 714, 724 (6th Cir. 2014). “While the district court 

need not explicitly reference each of the section 3553(a) factors, there must still be sufficient 

evidence in the record to affirmatively demonstrate the court’s consideration of them,” United 

States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 475 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006), and “[the court’s] decision should be 

sufficiently detailed . . . to permit meaningful appellate review,” Martinez, 588 F.3d at 325 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Alkufi did not object to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence before the district 

court. Although this would ordinarily subject Alkufi’s claim to plain-error review, we review his 

sentence for abuse of discretion because the district court failed to ask the parties at the close of 

sentencing “whether they ha[d] any objections to the sentence just pronounced that ha[d] not 

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previously been raised,” in accordance with United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 

2004). See United States v. Batti, 631 F.3d 371, 379 n.2 (6th Cir. 2011).5

Alkufi argues his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed 

to (1) calculate the Guidelines range, (2) make findings under § 3553(a), and (3) address Alkufi’s 

mitigation arguments. The government concedes that Alkufi’s sentence should be vacated and 

remanded for resentencing because the district court did not provide a sufficient explanation for 

the sentence pursuant to § 3553(a).6 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the convictions and Aoun’s sentence and 

VACATE Alkufi’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.

 

5

The district court asked only “And do you have something you’d like to say?” which is 

not sufficient to meet the requirement under Bostic. See Batti, 631 F.3d at 379 n.2 (holding that 

“[a]nything else concerning sentence?” was insufficient to meet the Bostic requirement). 

6

The government does not concede Alkufi’s other two arguments. As the government 

notes, Alkufi’s first claim has no merit because the district court did calculate the Guidelines 

range by stating that it found the offense level, the criminal history category, and the calculation 

from the PSR accurate. Moreover, defense counsel explicitly acknowledged at the sentencing 

hearing that the presentence report scored the offenses for Counts Five and Six at 18 to 24 

months and said it was “an appropriate scoring of the guideline.” (PID 1177–78.) In his third 

argument, Alkufi lists issues he raised at sentencing that the district court failed to consider as 

1) severe mental handicap, 2) strong family support, and 3) peripheral role in the offense. 

The government contends Alkufi never argued to the district court that he had a peripheral role in 

the offense. However, Alkufi argued at sentencing that he was merely present at the house 

during the search. Thus, we do not agree that Alkufi failed to raise this challenge at sentencing.

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