Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00862/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00862-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alabama Department of Revenue
Defendant
David Beckley
Defendant
Eddie Crowley
Defendant
Kaswana A. Kelly
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

KASWANA A. KELLY, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2:14cv862-WKW-WC 

 ) 

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF ) 

REVENUE, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 Before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 3). On 

August 13, 2014, the District Judge entered an order referring this case to the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge “for all pretrial proceedings and entry of any orders or 

recommendations as may be appropriate.” Order (Doc. 4). For the reasons that follow, it 

is the undersigned’s RECOMMENDATION that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

(Doc. 3) be DENIED. 

I. DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff requests the court “enjoin[] Defendants from further collections actions 

against Plaintiff, which would include the removal of the tax lien found in her credit 

reports.” Mot. (Doc. 3) at 1. The court finds that Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary 

injunction is due to be denied because Plaintiff cannot show a substantial likelihood of 

success on the merits of her case. 

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 “A district court may issue a preliminary injunction where the moving party 

demonstrates (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable 

injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the 

movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing 

party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Four 

Seasons Hotels And Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 

2003). “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be 

granted unless the movant clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to each of the 

four prerequisites.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

 Plaintiff has filed her Complaint against the Alabama Department of Revenue, 

David Beckley in his official and individual capacity, and Eddie Crowley in his official 

and individual capacity, for “intentional violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 

violation of due process, denial of equal protection of law, illegal seizure of the property 

of Plaintiff, conspiracy against rights, invasion of privacy, fraud and intentional infliction 

of emotional distress, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, and 15 

U.S.C. § 1681.” Comp. (Doc. 1) at 1. 

 The undersigned has filed, contemporaneous to this recommendation, an order 

granting Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis and staying the service of 

process of this case, so that the court can conduct its statutorily mandated review under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915. That statute instructs the court to dismiss any action wherein it is 

determined that an in forma pauperis applicant’s suit is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 

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defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). As pled, Plaintiff’s 

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and would properly be 

dismissed. 

 Plaintiff does not specify under which provision she proceeds under the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (“the Act”) except to reference 15 U.S.C. § 1681, which is the 

“Congressional findings and statement of purpose” portion of the Act. Specificity is 

important as several of the “enforcement” provisions of the Act expressly prohibit a 

private right of action. See Burrell v. DFS Services, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447 

(D.N.J. 2010). 

 As to Plaintiff’s claims of “violation of due process, denial of equal protection of 

law, illegal seizure of the property of Plaintiff, conspiracy against rights, invasion of 

privacy, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress,” which she presumably 

brings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, these claims are, at present, not sufficiently pled 

within the Complaint to survive review under § 1915. For example, as best the court can 

discern, Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are that Defendants have colluded against 

Plaintiff because of a law suit filed by her fiancé in the Middle District of Tennessee. 

The court notes numerous problems with these allegations, but suffice it to say that such 

allegations as pled would properly be dismissed under § 1915. In addition, after 

reviewing the Complaint, the court is unable to discern a properly pled illegal seizure 

claim, an invasion of privacy claim, or even a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. 

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 The court finds that the proper course of action in this case would be to deny the 

request for preliminary injunction, then allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her 

complaint to avoid immediate dismissal. 

II. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 3) be DENIED. 

 It is further 

 ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before August 28, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981. 

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 Done this 14th day of August, 2014. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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