Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03201/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03201-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ratna Bagwe
Appellant
Tammy Leclaire
Appellee
Angela Papaioannou
Appellee
Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-3201

RATNA BAGWE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT

SERVICES, INC., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:11-cv-02450 — Young B. Kim, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 26, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Ratna Bagwe, who was born in India 

and is of Indian descent, brought this action in the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 

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against Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”) and her former supervisors, Tammy LeClaire1

and Angela Papaioannou. Alleging claims under the Civil Rights Act 

of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Illinois Human Rights Act 

(“IHRA”), 775 ILCS 5/1, she stated that Sedgwick had paid 

her a comparatively low salary because of her race and national origin. She also alleged that she was terminated for retaliatory and racially discriminatory reasons. The district 

court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all 

counts. Ms. Bagwe now seeks reversal of that judgment.2 For 

the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Because the district court entered summary judgment for 

the defendants, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Bagwe, the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Gerhartz 

v. Richert, 779 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Sedgwick is a claims management services company 

headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. Ms. Bagwe began 

 

 1 The defendants note that Tammy LeClaire is now known by the name 

Tammy Worthey. Both the filings and the record refer to Ms. LeClaire, so 

we will use this name for ease of reading.

2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties consented to a federal magistrate judge’s conducting all proceedings including final judgment. Accordingly, we refer to the magistrate judge as the district court throughout 

this opinion.

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No. 14-3201 3

working in Sedgwick’s Chicago office in March 2001. She was 

promoted to Assistant Manager II in 2005, and received a corresponding pay raise. She was then asked to serve as Interim 

Operations Manager in 2007. In late 2007, Ms. Bagwe was promoted to Operations Manager III. Ms. LeClaire, a Managing 

Director at Sedgwick, made the decision to promote 

Ms. Bagwe. Delaine Simmons, Ms. Bagwe’s direct supervisor 

at the time, counseled Ms. LeClaire against promoting 

Ms. Bagwe. In Ms. Simmons’s view, Ms. Bagwe had demonstrated poor leadership skills and had not provided sufficient 

direction to her subordinates.

As Operations Manager III, Ms. Bagwe oversaw short 

term disability claims for Sedgwick’s AT&T account. Ms. Papaioannou, the Area Manager for the AT&T account, was her 

direct supervisor.3 At the time of her promotion, Ms. Bagwe 

 

3 At this stage, it will be helpful to summarize the organizational structure 

of Sedgwick in the years Ms. Bagwe served as Operations Manager III.

Ratna Bagwe reported to Angela Papaioannou, Area Manager for the 

AT&T account. Ms. Papaioannou reported to Tammy LeClaire, Managing 

Director. Ms. LeClaire reported to Brad Johnson, the Executive Vice President. 

Charles French, the AT&T Workers’ Compensation Account Executive, was on the same grade level as Ms. Bagwe. Mr. French reported directly to Ms. LeClaire. 

Within Colleague Resources, Carla Street worked as a Colleague Resources Manager in Sedgwick’s Chicago office. She reported to Stephanie Simpson, Regional Colleague Resources Manager. Ms. Simpson reported to Rachel Jackson, Senior Vice President of Colleague Resources. 

Terri Browne, Executive Vice President and Chief People Officer, oversaw 

Colleague Resources. 

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received a promotional pay raise of $10,000. She received another pay raise of $3,000, sometime in 2008.4

Ms. Bagwe did have some managerial problems as Operations Manager III. In early 2008, one of Ms. Bagwe’s subordinates, Tonya Warner, requested that Ms. Papaioannou reassign her to a different supervisor. Ms. Warner claimed that 

Ms. Bagwe had failed to provide her with important information and was overly confrontational. Ms. Papaioannou and 

Ms. LeClaire considered the complaints and decided to reassign Ms. Warner so that she reported to Ms. Papaioannou instead of Ms. Bagwe.

Ms. Bagwe was also dissatisfied with her compensation.

During an April 2008 conference call with Ms. Papaioannou 

and Carla Street, a Colleague Resources Manager, Ms. Bagwe 

expressed general concerns about her pay increases over the 

three previous years. Ms. Bagwe concedes that she did not 

mention race, national origin, or discrimination in the course 

of that conversation. Ms. Papaioannou allegedly warned 

Ms. Bagwe “that we have to be careful because we don’t want 

to be perceived as a whiner.”5 Ms. Papaioannou later discussed Ms. Bagwe’s complaints with Ms. Simmons in a series 

of text messages:

Ms. Papaioannou: tried to tell [Ms. Bagwe] yesterday 

 

4 Ms. LeClaire explained that an employee’s direct supervisor would recommend salary increases and that she then would review those recommendations. R.163-2 at 27 (47:10–19). After Ms. LeClaire gave her approval, the recommendations went to Terri Browne, Executive Vice President and Chief People Officer; Jim Wiertelak, Chief Operating Officer, 

later made a final review. 

5 R.163-24 at 4.

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to be careful on the whole max 3% thing

Ms. Papaioannou: apparently didn't not hear me

Ms. Simmons: yes i know, she told me you did. i 

tried to talk her down as well. she really has an 

overinflated sense of her importance

Ms. Papaioannou: I am meeting with her again on 

Friday so I’m probably going to be direct with 

her again but if she continues, I’m not going to 

be able to stop [Ms. LeClaire]6

Ms. Bagwe submitted a memorandum to Ms. Street a few 

days later, expressing similar concerns about her compensation. The memorandum was then forwarded to Ms. LeClaire.

Like the earlier conference call, the memorandum did not 

mention race, national origin, or discrimination. Instead, 

Ms. Bagwe claimed that Ms. LeClaire had pressured Ms. Simmons, her direct supervisor before the promotion, to deny her 

a promotional increase in 2005. Ms. Bagwe also claimed that, 

sometime shortly after she sent this memorandum, Ms. LeClaire raised her voice to Ms. Bagwe and told her that “[you] 

think [you’re] good but [you’re] no good.”7

Ms. LeClaire determined that Ms. Bagwe had received appropriate raises since 2005. In her affidavit, Ms. LeClaire 

stated that Ms. Simmons had recommended above-budget 

pay increases for Ms. Bagwe in 2003 and 2004. As a result, 

Ms. Bagwe’s salary already was above the median salary of 

an Assistant Manager II. In addition, Ms. LeClaire determined 

 

6 R.163-23 at 2. 

7 R.163-1 at 6 (231:10–232:20).

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that her subsequent pay raises were average for her peer 

group. Based on these observations, Ms. LeClaire concluded 

that Sedgwick need not take any further action regarding

Ms. Bagwe’s salary at that time.

Ms. Bagwe first raised the issue of racial discrimination in 

a May 2008 conversation with Stephanie Simpson, Regional 

Colleague Resources Manager. The record does not indicate 

whether Ms. Simpson actually reported this complaint to 

Ms. LeClaire or to Ms. Papaioannou, as required by Sedgwick’s policies. 

In June 2008, Ms. Bagwe took a business trip to Atlanta 

with Ms. LeClaire and another Sedgwick employee, 

Anne Coyle. One evening, at the bar of the hotel where they 

were staying, Ms. LeClaire began discussing her pending divorce with Ms. Bagwe and Ms. Coyle. During this conversation, Ms. LeClaire allegedly told Ms. Bagwe that she should 

get rid of her “old Indian husband” and get a “white man because white men are more fun.”8 Ms. Coyle made similar remarks.

About six months later, in January 2009, Ms. Bagwe and 

Ms. Coyle got into a heated exchange at work. Charles French, 

the AT&T Workers’ Compensation Account Executive, overheard the conversation. He sent an email to Ms. Papaioannou 

on January 22, 2009, expressing his concerns about 

Ms. Bagwe’s leadership and some other staffing issues on 

Ms. Bagwe’s team. He then met with Ms. Bagwe and 

Ms. Street on February 10, 2009, to discuss the incident involving Ms. Coyle. At the meeting, Ms. Bagwe relayed Ms. 

 8 R.145-15 at 48–49 (265:23–266:2).

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LeClaire’s and Ms. Coyle’s comments about finding a “white 

husband.” Ms. Bagwe also mentioned that Ms. Coyle previously had made a hand gesture to make fun of a co-worker’s 

sexual orientation. Following this meeting, Ms. Bagwe repeated the information to Ms. Papaioannou.

Mr. French later sent a memorandum to Ms. Street and 

Ms. Papaioannou, expressing his concerns about Ms. Bagwe’s 

leadership. The memorandum mentioned the altercation between Ms. Bagwe and Ms. Coyle, a series of emails from 

Ms. Bagwe in which she questioned a final decision that she 

had previously approved during an earlier meeting, and a 

failure by Ms. Bagwe’s team to share reports with others in 

the company.9

In March 2009, Sedgwick placed Ms. Bagwe on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). The PIP cited several criticisms of Ms. Bagwe’s behavior over the prior year, notably 

that she had not brought any solutions to the February meeting with Mr. French, that she had been unresponsive to 

emails, and that she refused to listen to criticism. The PIP also 

mentioned Ms. Bagwe’s complaints about Ms. Coyle’s comments, noting “that if you overheard comments being made 

by another colleague about someone else, it was your role and 

responsibility to address the issue at that time and not a year 

later.”10 Ms. LeClaire and Ms. Papaioannou presented the PIP 

to Ms. Bagwe in a meeting on March 12, 2009. During this 

meeting, Ms. LeClaire allegedly pointed her finger at 

 

9 R.145-9 at 45–48. 

10 R.145-18 at 30. 

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Ms. Bagwe and warned her that she “better be careful.”11

In April 2009, Ms. Bagwe complained about the PIP to Ms. 

Papaioannou, Ms. LeClaire, Ms. Street, and Ms. Simpson. She 

also sent a complaint to Ms. Simpson in which she described 

“discrimination, harassment, bullying, and hostile work environment.”12 The latter complaint mentioned “disparities in 

salaries for some of [the] other colleagues,” and Ms. LeClaire’s “retaliation” for Ms. Bagwe’s previous complaints.13

Ms. Simpson forwarded this complaint to Ms. Browne and 

Rachel Jackson, the Senior Vice President of Colleague Resources. 

Ms. Simpson then investigated the complaint and issued a 

report on June 15, 2009. The report discussed Ms. Bagwe’s 

complaints about her work environment and set forth her 

coworkers’ perspective of the situation. According to the report, Ms. Warner noted “a perception [that Ms. Bagwe] is retaliatory.”14 Mr. French felt “like [Ms. Bagwe] is the one attacking him.”15 One coworker said that Ms. Bagwe “would 

talk over her and it was her natural instinct to raise her 

 

11 R.163-1 at 36 (777:3–20). In her appellate brief, Ms. Bagwe claims that 

Ms. LeClaire also told her “that she better not tell anyone about a fabricated write-up.” Appellant’s Br. 7–8. However, Ms. Bagwe stated in her 

deposition that “the threatening was about you better be careful...and not 

like you better not tell anyone.” R.163-1 at 36 (777:9–14) (emphasis added). 

12 R.163-30 at 3.

13 Id.

14 R.145-11 at 32.

15 Id. at 33.

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voice.”16 Another co-worker observed that “it was very difficult to get the benefit of the doubt from [Ms. Bagwe] or change 

her perception to be favorable.”17 The report also concluded 

that Ms. Bagwe was compensated fairly, considering her level 

of experience.18

On June 22, 2009, Ms. Bagwe sent Ms. Simpson another email about her concerns, stating that “[i]f discrimination is not 

the reason, please help me understand why my repeated requests to have the compensation addressed based solely on 

the merits of the situation have not been considered[.]”19

Ms. Simpson sent Ms. Bagwe a letter on July 28, 2009, stating 

that “[w]e were unable to obtain tangible evidence or additional witness[es] to confirm that harassment and/or discrimination occurred,” and that “we analyzed your pay and determined that your compensation is fair.”20

At some point around early July, after a lunch outside the 

office, Ms. Bagwe asked Ms. LeClaire how her sister-in-law 

was doing. According to Ms. Bagwe, Ms. LeClaire responded, 

“which one, the Indian?”21 Ms. LeClaire then said that she did 

not like her sister-in-law.22

 16 Id. at 34. 

17 Id.

18 Id. at 37. 

19 Id. at 40.

20 Id. at 48.

21 R.145-15 at 56 (273:6–8).

22 Id.

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In July of 2009, Ms. Warner canceled a meeting and ignored Ms. Bagwe when confronted about the cancellation.

Ms. Bagwe then sent Ms. Warner a series of heated emails, 

which left Ms. Warner in tears. Ms. Warner forwarded these 

emails to Ms. LeClaire. Ms. LeClaire expressed concern about 

the confrontational tone of the emails, and subsequently met 

with Ms. Papaioannou to discuss the matter. Ms. Papaioannou stated in her deposition that she felt that Ms. Bagwe “handled the situation appropriately.”23 However, Ms. Papaioannou said she also received complaints from other coworkers 

about “email war debates” started by Ms. Bagwe.24

At some point in late July or early August 2009, Sedgwick 

decided to terminate Ms. Bagwe. Ms. LeClaire, Ms. Papaioannou, Ms. Browne, and Brad Johnson, Executive Vice President 

of Sedgwick, were involved in the decision. Sedgwick’s policies required that Ms. Browne or Ms. Jackson approve any termination.25 The decisionmakers all stated that Ms. Browne approved Ms. Bagwe’s termination. However, each gave differing accounts of how the company reached the decision to terminate. Ms. Papaioannou said that the decision was reached 

during a conference call between her, Ms. LeClaire, 

Ms. Browne, and Mr. Johnson.26 Ms. LeClaire said that she 

and Ms. Papaioannou reached the decision, and she then 

 

23 R.145-8 at 18 (191:24–192:5).

24 Id. at 17 (185:21–186:11).

25 R.163-8 at 3 (50:18–21).

26 R.163-3 at 2 (9:13–25).

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spoke directly to Ms. Browne.27 Ms. Browne said that she received a recommendation to terminate from Mr. Johnson, and 

never spoke to Ms. LeClaire.28 Mr. Johnson testified that he 

spoke to Ms. LeClaire, and then communicated Ms. LeClaire’s 

recommendation to Ms. Browne.29 

On August 13, 2009, Ms. Bagwe stopped by Ms. Papaioannou’s office to say hello. Ms. Bagwe claims that, as she was 

leaving, she heard Ms. Papaioannou call her an “Indian 

bitch.”30 Ms. Papaioannou disputes that she ever made this 

comment, but we must accept Ms. Bagwe’s testimony as true 

on review of a grant of summary judgment.

Later that day, Ms. Bagwe learned from Ms. Street and 

Ms. Jackson that she was terminated. Ms. Jackson explained 

that there was a “continuing lack of trust” that had “become 

a distraction to the business.”31 Ms. Jackson and Ms. Street 

also made clear that the termination had “nothing to do with 

performance.”32 Following her termination, Ms. Bagwe was 

escorted directly out of the building.

Sedgwick had used a “Termination Checklist and Ques-

 

27 R.163-2 at 11 (203:13–204:13).

28 R.163-5 at 8 (49:23–52:1).

29 R.163-4 at 7 (67:1–68:25).

30 R.163-1 at 22–23 (581:8–582:9).

31 R.163-66 at 2. 

32 R.163-1 at 32 (713:10–24).

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tionnaire” on previous occasions. The form included a number of yes or no questions and ended with an instruction to 

“[a]llow the colleague to say goodbye to co-workers and to 

gather belongings; then escort quietly from the premises.”33

The checklist was not filled out during Ms. Bagwe’s termination. Ms. Street described the checklist as a “routine thing.”34

However, Ms. Jackson stated that “[a]ny time I go [to the termination meeting], for the most part, a termination checklist 

is not involved, because those termination checklists come to 

me to review.”35 At least two other employees were terminated without the use of this checklist.

In February 2010, Sedgwick hired a replacement for the 

Operations Manager III position. Ms. Bagwe’s replacement 

was white and American. He did not have experience with 

disability claims, but he did have management experience 

that Ms. Bagwe lacked. He also started at a higher salary than 

Ms. Bagwe. Ms. Papaioannou could not remember why Sedgwick started him at a higher salary, but Ms. LeClaire explained that it was based on “his level of experience and years 

of management.”36 Ms. Bagwe’s replacement failed to learn 

the aspects of claim management, and settled a workers’ compensation claim without proper authority.37 After being coun-

 33 R.163-19 at 4–6. 

34 R.163-8 at 4 (70:15–16).

35 R.163-7 at 12 (85:7–9); see also R.163-5 at 7 (41:11–12) (Ms. Browne stating 

that the checklist is not used in every situation).

36 R.170 at 2 (104:12–19). 

37 R.145-5 at 58 (119:13–120:23).

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seled by Ms. Papaioannou for about one year, he was terminated on September 21, 2012.

A few months after her termination from Sedgwick, 

Ms. Bagwe applied for a position with Matrix Absence Management. Ms. Bagwe was denied the position. Ms. Bagwe has 

submitted the affidavit of a former employee at Matrix, who 

states that:

Prior to the time I could schedule Ms. Bagwe’s 

trip with the recruiter, I received an e-mail from 

[the CEO of Matrix]. The e-mail indicated [that 

the CEO] had just spoken with someone he 

knew from working at Sedgwick and that, 

based on that, I should not hire Ms. Bagwe. It 

said [that the CEO] learned that Ms. Bagwe was 

a good performer before she was promoted, but 

that then she became a “problem.” The e-mail 

did not provide any specifics about Ms. Bagwe’s 

performance after her promotion, only that she 

was a “problem.” The e-mail specifically said 

“Do not hire her.”38

The Matrix employee further related that, upon receiving this 

email, she terminated the hiring process.

B. Earlier Proceedings

Ms. Bagwe filed timely charges of discrimination, hostile 

work environment, harassment, and retaliation with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on 

 38 R.163-59 at 3–4.

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December 12, 2009. She later filed this action in district court 

against Sedgwick, Ms. LeClaire, and Ms. Papaioannou on 

April 12, 2011. The complaint included discrimination, retaliation, and defamation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e, the IHRA, and state common law.

On May 1, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts. The defendants argued that 

Ms. Bagwe’s claims of pay discrimination were barred by the 

applicable statutes of limitations and that all of the claims fell 

short on the merits. Ms. Bagwe did not respond to the defendants’ argument that certain pay discrimination claims were 

time-barred. Ms. Bagwe did contest, however, the defendants’ merits arguments about the discrimination and retaliation claims. She withdrew her defamation claim.

On September 5, 2014, the district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Sedgwick, Ms. LeClaire, and Ms. Papaioannou on all of Ms. Bagwe’s claims. It concluded that 

Ms. Bagwe’s claims of pay discrimination were untimely, and 

therefore it did not consider these claims on the merits. The 

district court further concluded that Ms. Bagwe’s remaining 

claims of discrimination and retaliation failed on the merits.

II

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014).

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after construing the 

record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we 

conclude that no reasonable jury could rule in favor of the 

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No. 14-3201 15

nonmoving party. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 

2014).

A. Discrimination Claim Based on Termination

Ms. Bagwe first contends that Sedgwick terminated her on 

the basis of race and national origin. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual 

with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate 

on the basis of race or national origin when “mak[ing] and 

enforc[ing] contracts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The IHRA makes it 

unlawful “[f]or any employer...to act with respect to...privileges or conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful 

discrimination or citizenship status.” 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A).

A plaintiff may prove discrimination under Title VII, Section 1981, and the IHRA either directly or indirectly.39 A plaintiff proceeds under the direct method of proof by showing 

“either direct or circumstantial evidence of intentional racial 

 

39 The analytical framework for all three statutes is “essentially identical,”

and therefore we need not analyze them separately. Brown v. Advocate S. 

Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1104 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing Title VII 

and § 1981); Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 545 N.E.2d 684, 687

(Ill. 1989) (discussing Title VII and the IHRA). We therefore accept Ms. 

Bagwe’s contention that the claims should be assessed under the same 

framework. Appellant’s Br. 23–24; see also Moultrie v. Penn Aluminum Int’l, 

LLC, 766 F.3d 747, 754 (7th Cir. 2014) (resolving a Title VII and IHRA claim 

at the same time because the plaintiff “conceded that the merits of his 

state-law discrimination claim would rise or fall with the merits of the federal claim”).

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discrimination.” Tank v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 800, 805 

(7th Cir. 2014). Direct evidence includes actual admission of 

discriminatory intent. Mullin v. Temco Mach., Inc., 732 F.3d 

772, 776 (7th Cir. 2013). Circumstantial evidence includes:

(1) a mosaic of evidence which, taken together, 

would permit a jury to infer discriminatory intent; (2) comparative evidence showing that employees similarly situated to the plaintiff other 

than in the protected characteristic received systematically better treatment; and (3) pretext evidence, where the plaintiff is qualified for and 

fails to receive the desired treatment, and the 

employer’s stated reason for the difference is 

unworthy of belief. 

Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 

1996); see also Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520, 527 

(7th Cir. 2008). We do not employ “some kind of esoteric ‘mosaic test’ or theory” under the direct method of proof. Morgan 

v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2013). The circumstantial evidence, taken together, “must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.” Adams v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003). “[A]n overload of irrelevant or nonprobative facts,” will not “add up to 

relevant evidence of discriminatory intent. ... [Z]ero plus 

zero is zero.” Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 763 

(7th Cir. 2001). Similarly, a single piece of circumstantial evidence, without more, will not support a case of illegal discrimination. Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 644 

(7th Cir. 2013).

Under the indirect method of proof, a plaintiff employs 

the test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

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U.S. 792 (1973). A plaintiff has the initial burden to show that: 

(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting 

her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she was subject to 

an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were 

treated more favorably. Andrews v. CBOCS W., Inc., 743 F.3d 

230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden shifts to the defendants to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 

action, at which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 

submit evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.” Id.

Ms. Bagwe has not specified whether she is proceeding 

under the direct or indirect method of proof, but instead criticizes the entire framework as too rigid. We previously recognized that “serious questions” have been raised about this 

framework, but “[a]s long as the Supreme Court’s precedents 

in this area are still good law, we’re not authorized to abandon the established framework.” Smith v. Chicago Transit 

Auth., 806 F.3d 900, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Simpson v. 

Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 789–90 (7th Cir. 

2015)). We emphasize that “all relevant direct and circumstantial evidence is considered (in its ‘totality’) in both methods,” 

but that “we do indeed consider the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 

methods separately when reviewing summary judgment.” 

Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphases in original).

When “a plaintiff eschews burden-shifting and presents 

direct and circumstantial evidence in opposition to an employer’s motion for summary judgment,” we typically use the 

direct method as the “default rule.” Morgan, 724 F.3d at 997.

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18 No. 14-3201

Here, the district court elected to review the evidence under 

both methods of proof; therefore, for the sake of completeness, we also will evaluate the evidence under both the direct 

and indirect methods.

1. Direct Method

Ms. Bagwe submits that there is sufficient circumstantial 

evidence to permit a jury to conclude reasonably that she was 

terminated on the basis of race and national origin. In her 

view, the record contains “pretext” evidence, comparative evidence, and evidence of remarks that suggest a discriminatory 

motive. We will consider each of these types of evidence in 

turn, and then determine whether the record, taken as a 

whole, “point[s] directly to a discriminatory reason for the 

employer’s action.” Adams, 324 F.3d at 939. 

a.

Ms. Bagwe first contends there is evidence which suggests 

that Sedgwick’s alleged rationale for termination—that 

Ms. Bagwe demonstrated poor leadership skills—is “unworthy of belief.” Piraino, 84 F.3d at 274. To meet this burden, 

Ms. Bagwe must “identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistencies, or contradictions” in Sedgwick’s rationale 

“that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 852 (7th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 

(7th Cir. 2007)).

Ms. Bagwe has not met that burden here. By the time 

Ms. Bagwe was terminated, Sedgwick had received multiple 

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complaints about her inability to work with others. Indeed, 

the company earlier had placed Ms. Bagwe on a PIP because 

of such concerns. Later, at Ms. Bagwe’s termination, Ms. Jackson explained that there was a “continuing lack of trust” and 

noted particularly the “continuing excessive emails.”40

Ms. LeClaire observed that “morale was low in the office” as 

a result of Ms. Bagwe’s leadership.41 Ms. Papaioannou noted 

the “[e]mail communication” and that “[p]ersonal relationships with office colleagues are lacking.”42

Ms. Bagwe nevertheless argues that Sedgwick has given 

“shifting” explanations for her termination, which calls this 

rationale into question. Where decisionmakers’ stated rationales are “sufficiently inconsistent or otherwise suspect,” a 

summary judgment cannot stand. Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, 

Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). However, these “explanations must actually be shifting and inconsistent to permit 

an inference of mendacity.” Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 

F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2003); see also O’Connor v. DePaul Univ., 

123 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a letter which 

described “insubordinate activities on your part which you 

were previously advised to cease” did not conflict with a letter which described “the continued harassment of an employee ... after you were advised to cease”). Here, the decisionmakers’ explanations that Ms. Bagwe identifies are entirely consistent and supported by the record. Ms. Street and 

 

40 R.163-66 at 2.

41 R.145-5 at 39 (204:4–5).

42 R.163-45 at 2.

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20 No. 14-3201

Ms. Jackson told Ms. Bagwe that her termination had “nothing to do with performance,”43 which is in keeping with Sedgwick’s assertions that Ms. Bagwe was fired for interpersonal 

reasons. Sedgwick stated in its EEOC statement that 

Ms. Bagwe “was interfering with everyone’s ability to do 

their job and service their clients satisfactorily,”44 which is not 

inconsistent with Sedgwick’s admission that Ms. Bagwe 

never had an impact on the company’s bottom line. As Ms. 

LeClaire explained in her deposition, the “metrics ha[d] 

been...met” under Ms. Bagwe’s leadership,45 but the company decided to terminate her because “morale was low in 

the office.”46 Contrary to Ms. Bagwe’s suggestion, these semantic differences are not evidence of pretext. Ms. Bagwe 

may have met the company’s goals, but she had done so in a 

manner that jeopardized the ability of those around her to do 

their job. A company can certainly insist on a management 

style that ensures a smooth operating atmosphere. 

Ms. Bagwe also highlights the conflicting accounts from 

Sedgwick’s decisionmakers over how and when the termination decision was reached. However, we have held that where 

“there is no conflict in the evidence regarding the reasons for” 

an adverse employment action, “differing recollections” of 

the events surrounding that action “do not raise a reasonable 

inference of discrimination.” Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 

534 F.3d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Schuster, 327 F.3d at 

 43 R.163-1 at 32 (713:10–24).

44 R.163-11 at 3.

45 R.145-5 at 33 (177:14–24). 

46 Id. at 39 (204:3–6).

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No. 14-3201 21

579. Here, the decisionmakers at Sedgwick have provided a 

consistent rationale for Ms. Bagwe’s termination: she demonstrated ineffective leadership skills. Their differing recollections over exactly who spoke with whom do not call that rationale into question.

Next, Ms. Bagwe points to a list of complaints a coworker 

provided to Ms. Papaioannou a few days after the decision to 

terminate was made. Ms. Papaioannou received this list in 

early August, a few days before Ms. Bagwe was actually terminated. She then emailed the list to Ms. Jackson. Ms. Bagwe 

contends that the list suggests that Ms. Papaioannou was trying to “dig up” reasons for her termination. When “evidence 

indicates an attempt to justify a discharge after the fact,” it can 

suggest a discriminatory motive. Futrell v. J.I. Case, 38 F.3d 

342, 349 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding potential discrimination 

where a decisionmaker created a list of deficiencies after a termination and then made “it seem as if he kept the notes contemporaneously”). However, there is no evidence in the record showing that Ms. Papaioannou solicited this list. More 

importantly, Ms. Papaioannou never has intimated that she 

relied on the list when recommending Ms. Bagwe’s termination. This list, therefore, does not raise any inference of discrimination. 

Ms. Bagwe also suggests that Sedgwick deviated from its 

internal procedures when it terminated her. An employer’s 

departure from its own policies may be circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 

F.3d 712, 727 (7th Cir. 2005). However, there must be evidence 

of a specific policy that is regularly enforced and followed in 

similar situations. Tank, 758 F.3d at 806 (holding that there 

was not circumstantial evidence where plaintiff did not offer 

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22 No. 14-3201

any corporate policy); Long v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Illinois, 585 

F.3d 344, 353 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding there was not circumstantial evidence where the “policy permits the employer to 

exercise discretion”). In this case, Ms. Bagwe fails to present 

any regularly enforced company policy that Sedgwick failed 

to follow. Ms. Bagwe contends that Ms. Browne was obligated 

to speak with all of Ms. Bagwe’s supervisors and review all 

documentation and that Ms. Papaioannou was obligated to 

attend her termination meeting. However, she does not point 

to any evidence of a company policy that imposed these obligations. Ms. Bagwe also contends that Sedgwick failed to 

complete the “Termination Checklist and Questionnaire” on 

the day of her termination and failed to follow the checklist’s 

recommendation to allow an employee to return to her office 

after being fired. However, the record indicates that when 

Ms. Jackson, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources, 

attends a termination meeting, the checklist is not employed.

Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 695 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that 

a deviation from company procedure was not suspicious because the company had explained that the procedure was not 

followed when a senior officer was involved).

Ms. Bagwe also argues that the decisionmakers knew that 

she got along with others and that this shows that their rationale was pretextual. First, she points to Ms. Street’s testimony that she had attended meetings run by Ms. Bagwe and 

never had witnessed any communication issues.47 However, 

Ms. Street was not a decisionmaker, and nothing in the record 

 47 R.163-8 at 18–19 (107:17–108:12).

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No. 14-3201 23

suggests that she conveyed that opinion to a decisionmaker.48

Second, Ms. Bagwe claims that Ms. LeClaire was aware that 

she had handled appropriately her dispute with Ms. Warner.

However, she does not provide any evidentiary support for 

that proposition.49 Third, she points to Ms. Papaioannou’s 

comments that, in June, Ms. Bagwe’s relationships seemed to 

be improving and that she was satisfied with the way 

Ms. Bagwe handled the dispute with Ms. Warner. However, 

Ms. Papaioannou explained that her decision to terminate 

was based on the accusations of “email war debates” she 

learned about in July.50 Finally, Ms. Bagwe contends that 

Ms. Simpson and Ms. LeClaire had “objective” evidence that 

she was a team player based on colleague survey results.51

The survey results, however, only assessed management 

teams, not individual employees.52 Sedgwick concluded, after 

receiving several emails and having numerous meetings with 

 

48 Further, Ms. Street testified that she attended these meetings “[s]ometimes. Not—not all the time.” Id. at 18 (107:24).

49 Ms. Bagwe relies on Ms. LeClaire’s deposition for this proposition. Appellant’s Br. 41 (quoting R.166 at 33). However, the material she cites has 

nothing to do with Ms. Warner. See R.166 at 33 (quoting R.163-2 at 3 

(26:24–27:6)).

50 R.145-8 at 17 (185:21–186:11). 

51 The Chicago AT&T management team, for which Ms. Bagwe was partially responsible, scored better than Sedgwick’s Atlanta Disability Bell 

South team in categories such as “[m]y immediate supervisor listens to 

me,” and “[i]n my department, communications are open and honest.” See 

R.163-13 at 35–44. However, the Chicago team performed worse than the 

average Sedgwick management team in these same categories. Id.

52 R.163-5 at 13 (84:17–21). 

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24 No. 14-3201

Ms. Bagwe, that her interpersonal issues were a problem for 

the company. The record does not suggest that Sedgwick’s rationale was insincere or pretextual, and we do not sit as a “superpersonnel department[]” that judges the wisdom of Sedgwick’s decisions. Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 902 

(7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Lastly, Ms. Bagwe contends that Sedgwick called a potential employer, Matrix Absence Management, and told them 

that she was “a problem.”53 Ms. Bagwe believes that this exchange proves that Sedgwick had an improper motive. However, she relies on the affidavit of a former Matrix employee, 

who heard the comment secondhand. “Where a plaintiff attempts to introduce the testimony of an individual who did 

not personally witness the alleged ... statement but was later 

told by another that the statement was made, such testimony 

is rejected as hearsay” on summary judgment. Schindler v. 

Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 554–55 (7th Cir. 2014).54 Moreover, even 

 

53 R.163-59 at 3–4.

54 Ms. Bagwe argues that the statement falls within the “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). To fall within 

this exception: “(1) the statement must describe an event or condition 

without calculated narration; (2) the speaker must have personally perceived the event or condition described; and (3) the statement must have 

been made while the speaker was perceiving the event or condition, or 

immediately thereafter.” United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir.

2001). Ms. Bagwe provides no proof that Sedgwick’s comment was immediately conveyed. Instead, she relies on the Matrix employee’s assertion 

that her supervisor told her that the comment had “just” been made. That 

assertion also is based on hearsay, as it is using the supervisor’s statement 

to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, the statement cannot 

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No. 14-3201 25

were we to consider the statement that was allegedly made in 

this phone call, Ms. Bagwe has not explained why the call 

would lead a jury to believe that Sedgwick had an ulterior 

motive. The statement does not mention race, retaliation, or 

anything improper. A Sedgwick employee could have made 

this statement for any variety of equally plausible reasons, including a legitimate concern about Ms. Bagwe’s inability to 

get along with co-workers.55 No jury could infer discriminatory intent from this call, or any of the other supposed “pretext” evidence.

b.

Ms. Bagwe also contends that she has “comparative evidence showing that employees similarly situated to [her] 

other than in the protected characteristic received systemati-

 

fit the “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule. Schindler

v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 2007).

55 It is not clear that a Sedgwick employee even made the call. First, it is 

unclear from the affidavit whether the Matrix supervisor made the call to 

the “Sedgwick employee” or whether the “Sedgwick employee” called the 

Matrix supervisor. See R.163-59. The affidavit does not specify, and it is 

difficult to see how someone from Sedgwick would have known to call 

Matrix about Ms. Bagwe sua sponte. Second, the Matrix supervisor allegedly said that he had “spoken with someone he knew from working at 

Sedgwick.” Id. at 3. It is unclear whether that meant a current Sedgwick 

employee, a former Sedgwick employee, or someone who worked closely 

with Sedgwick employees. Third, this discussion assumes that the Matrix 

supervisor’s statement is true, but that statement is hearsay. Ms. Bagwe 

has not presented an affidavit or deposition from the supervisor, or 

demonstrated that she is otherwise prepared to submit non-hearsay evidence. 

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26 No. 14-3201

cally better treatment.” Piraino, 84 F.3d at 274. Although comparative evidence is traditionally assessed under the indirect 

method of proof, it can be relevant under the direct method 

as well. Tank, 758 F.3d at 808; Coleman, 667 F.3d at 861 n.9; Hasan, 552 F.3d at 529–30 n.4. To be similarly situated, an employee must be “directly comparable to [a plaintiff] in all material respects.” Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 

676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). Typically, we consider whether the 

employees “(i) held the same job description, (ii) were subject 

to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same supervisor, and (iv) had comparable experience, education, and 

other qualifications—provided the employer considered 

these latter factors in making the personnel decision.” Ajayi v. 

Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir. 2003).

Ms. Bagwe first compares herself to her replacement, who 

was a white American that also had leadership problems during his employment at Sedgwick. Ms. Bagwe’s replacement 

also was terminated, which suggests he was not treated more 

favorably. However, Ms. Bagwe contends that he was fired 

for costing Sedgwick money. She believes that Sedgwick 

would have otherwise retained him, despite his leadership issues. Her belief is based entirely on speculation and does not 

constitute evidence of discrimination. Winsley v. Cook Cty., 563 

F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that an employee was 

not a valid comparator when she quit before any adverse action could be taken, and it was therefore “far from clear that 

[she] was treated more favorably”).

Ms. Bagwe also contends that she was paid less than her 

colleagues who were white and American, which suggests 

that Sedgwick acted with a discriminatory motive. Her argument is primarily based on a chart comparing her salary to 

Case: 14-3201 Document: 32 Filed: 01/26/2016 Pages: 38
No. 14-3201 27

other Operations Managers III. However, Ms. Bagwe has provided no further information about these employees. She has 

not explained whether these employees were subject to the 

same standards, subordinate to the same supervisors, or had 

comparable experience and qualifications. Ms. Bagwe cannot

simply rely on the fact that these employees held the same 

title. Tank, 758 F.3d at 810; Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653 

F.3d 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2011). On the subject of pay, Ms. Bagwe 

only identifies one employee with any specificity: her replacement. However, he had additional operations management 

experience when he was hired, and received a higher salary 

based on that experience.56 Therefore, he is not similarly situated to her on the issue of compensation. Wyninger v. New 

Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 979 (7th Cir. 2004).

c.

Finally, Ms. Bagwe contends that there is “evidence of discriminatory intent” that would lead a reasonable jury to find 

in her favor. Specifically, she points to Ms. LeClaire’s remark 

about her sister-in-law, Ms. LeClaire’s suggestion to get rid of 

Ms. Bagwe’s “old Indian husband,” and Ms. Papaioannou’s 

comment referring to Ms. Bagwe as an “Indian bitch.”

Remarks can raise an inference of discrimination when 

they are “(1) made by the decision-maker,57 (2) around the 

time of the decision, and (3) in reference to the adverse employment action.” Egonmwan v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 

 

56 R.170 at 2 (104:12–19).

57 The parties agree that Ms. Papaioannou and Ms. LeClaire were decisionmakers. 

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F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2010). When considering whether a remark is discriminatory, we also consider the context in which 

the remark was made. Oest v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrs., 240 F.3d 

605, 611 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that comments made outside of work, in social settings, are less likely to constitute evidence of workplace discrimination); see also Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a comment did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination 

when it “was made in a casual conversation during a long car 

trip, a setting unrelated to discussions of...work deficiencies”).

Here, both of Ms. LeClaire’s comments were unrelated to 

work and made in settings outside of the workplace. Her alleged comment about her sister-in-law was made after a lunch 

outside of the office. Ms. LeClaire identified the ethnicity of 

her sister-in-law, but the comment is far too ambiguous to 

raise an inference of racial or ethnic discrimination. Her “old 

Indian husband” remark was made in a casual conversation 

in the bar of a hotel, during a business trip to Atlanta. Oest, 

240 F.3d at 611. Further, the comment was made over a year 

before Ms. Bagwe was terminated. Tank, 758 F.3d at 806 

(“[I]solated comments made over a year before the adverse 

action are not evidence of discrimination under the direct 

method.”). Neither of these alleged comments would allow a 

juror to reasonably infer discrimination. 

Ms. Papaioannou’s alleged comment about Ms. Bagwe, 

however, is a closer call. Ms. Papaioannou did not reference 

the termination, but she did make a disparaging comment 

which referenced Ms. Bagwe’s ethnicity, and she made it on 

the day of Ms. Bagwe’s termination. A single “bit” or “piece” 

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No. 14-3201 29

of evidence, however, is not enough to support a claim of discrimination under the direct method of proof. Hobgood, 731 

F.3d at 644. We addressed a similar situation in Dass v. Chicago 

Board of Education, 675 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 2012). In Dass, a 

teacher who brought a claim of racial discrimination alleged 

that a principal told her that she should look for a job “on the 

North Side where most of the Indian kids go.” Id. at 1063. We 

held that, “even if the remark had been closer in time” to the 

adverse action, it could not support a claim of discrimination 

because “[t]he undisputed facts show[ed] that [the plaintiff] 

was non-renewed because she could not control her class.” Id. 

at 1072. Here, the undisputed facts show that Sedgwick terminated Ms. Bagwe because of interpersonal concerns.

Ms. Papaioannou’s comment did not reference the termination and was made after the decision already had been made.

See Egonmwan, 602 F.3d at 850 (holding that a comment did 

not raise an inference of discrimination because it did not 

“specifically refer” to the termination and the timing did not 

raise suspicion). Moreover, Ms. Papaioannou was one of four 

decisionmakers. She did not make the ultimate decision to terminate Ms. Bagwe, and the record shows that the other decisionmakers based their decision on Ms. LeClaire’s independent assessment of the situation. Davis v. Time Warner Cable of 

Se. Wis., L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 675 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a 

claim that one employer acted in a retaliatory manner had far 

less merit when three other managers signed off on the decision for independent reasons). Ms. Bagwe cannot survive under the direct method of proof on her discrimination claims. 

2. Indirect Method

Under the indirect method, we reach the same result. To 

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meet her initial burden, Ms. Bagwe must show that “similarly 

situated employees” who were not members of the protected 

class were treated more favorably. Andrews, 743 F.3d at 234.

As discussed above, Ms. Bagwe has failed to identify any similarly situated employees. Ms. Bagwe cannot survive summary judgment under the indirect method of proof because 

she cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Tank, 

758 F.3d at 810. 

B. Ms. Bagwe’s Pay Discrimination Claims

Ms. Bagwe also raises claims under § 1981, Title VII, and

the IHRA that Sedgwick paid her a low salary relative to her 

peers on the basis of her race and national origin.

Before we assess the merits of this claim, we must address 

two procedural obstacles. First, Sedgwick contends that all of 

Ms. Bagwe’s claims regarding compensation are time-barred 

and that we need not reach the merits on any claims of pay 

discrimination. That is not the case. Under § 1981, a complaint 

must be filed within four years of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Ms. Bagwe filed her 

complaint on April 12, 2011; therefore, in order to be timely, 

her § 1981 claims must have arisen on or after April 12, 2007.58

 

58 Ms. Bagwe’s other claims of pay discrimination have much shorter limitations periods. Under Title VII, a charge of employment discrimination 

must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Roney v. Illinois Dep’t 

of Transp., 474 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 2007). Under the IHRA, a claim must 

be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1), (A-1)(1). Ms. Bagwe filed her 

EEOC charge on December 9, 2009. Therefore, in order to be timely, the 

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No. 14-3201 31

At the very least, Ms. Bagwe’s claim that she received a comparatively small merit increase in 2008 is not time-barred.59

Therefore, at least one of Ms. Bagwe’s pay discrimination 

claims must be considered on the merits.

Second, Ms. Bagwe contends that Sedgwick only challenged the timeliness, but not the substance, of her pay claims.

Therefore, she believes that summary judgment on her pay 

discrimination claims is inappropriate. See Sublett v. John 

Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2006) (“As a general matter, if the moving party does not raise an issue in support of its motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving 

party is not required to present evidence on that point, and 

the district court should not rely on that ground in its decision.”). Ms. Bagwe specifically contends that Sedgwick only 

addressed Ms. Bagwe’s claims about her raises and did not 

address claims about her salary. Ms. Bagwe is mistaken. Sedgwick clearly addressed Ms. Bagwe’s “complain[t]s about her 

 

cause for her Title VII claims must have arisen on or after March 19, 2009, 

and the cause for her IHRA claims must have arisen on or after July 7, 

2009. Ms. Bagwe may also be able to state a claim based on the paychecks 

she received after these dates. See infra note 59. 

59 Ms. Bagwe may also have claims based on each paycheck she received. 

Under the paycheck accrual rule, a new limitations period is triggered 

each time that a plaintiff is paid less than his or her colleagues. Groesch v. 

City of Springfield, Ill., 635 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2011). The rule applies to Title VII claims, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)(3) (Lilly Ledbetter Fair 

Pay Act), and to § 1983 claims. Groesch, 635 F.3d at 1026. We have not determined whether this rule also applies to § 1981 claims. However, because we conclude that Ms. Bagwe cannot succeed on the merits of any of 

her pay discrimination claims, we need not reach this issue today. 

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32 No. 14-3201

2008 pay raise and her compensation.”60 We must consider 

whether summary judgment is appropriate on the merits.

Turning to the merits, we observe that our conclusions on 

Ms. Bagwe’s discrimination claims based on termination necessarily prove fatal to any claim she has made based on unequal pay. As previously discussed, Ms. Bagwe has not presented any similarly situated employee who received a higher 

salary. Therefore, she cannot prevail under the indirect 

method of proof. She also has failed to present circumstantial 

evidence that would suggest that her employers had a discriminatory motive, and therefore she cannot prevail under 

the direct method of proof.

C. Ms. Bagwe’s Retaliation Claims

Ms. Bagwe finally contends that the defendants engaged 

in a campaign of “escalating retaliation” against her for complaining about workplace discrimination, which ultimately 

resulted in her termination. Title VII makes it unlawful “for 

an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ...

because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 

employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a). Retaliation also is a cognizable claim under § 1981 and 

the IHRA. Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 398 (7th 

Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981); 

775 ILCS 5/6-101. 

 60 R.143 at 17 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[O]nce all relevant factors 

were taken into account, such as experience, time in service, and the 3% 

budget for merit increases, [Ms. Bagwe’s] 2008 salary was equitable.” (emphasis in original)).

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No. 14-3201 33

Retaliation, like discrimination, can be established under 

the direct or indirect method of proof. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 

859. Ms. Bagwe cannot establish a retaliation claim under the 

indirect method because she fails to present any similarly situated employees who were treated more favorably. See Hutt 

v. AbbVie Prods. LLC, 757 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore, she must proceed under the direct method of proof and 

show: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) Sedgwick 

took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there 

was a causal connection between the two. Tank, 758 F.3d at 

807. 

Ms. Bagwe satisfies the first element. The parties agree 

that Ms. Bagwe made several protected complaints in early 

2009, including her accusations in February 2009 of Ms. LeClaire’s discriminatory comments, a memorandum in April 

2009 about her PIP and salary, and an email in July 2009 to 

Colleague Resources about her salary. However, the parties 

disagree about whether Ms. Bagwe engaged in earlier protected activity, specifically on May 21, 2008, when she told 

Ms. Simpson that she was experiencing racial discrimination.

Sedgwick contends that Ms. Simpson did not understand this 

complaint to concern race. However, Ms. Bagwe testified that 

she explicitly mentioned racial discrimination. We must accept Ms. Bagwe’s testimony as true on review of summary 

judgment. Sedgwick also contends that Ms. Simpson did not 

report Ms. Bagwe’s complaint to any decisionmaker, and 

therefore no decisionmaker could have possibly retaliated 

based on a complaint he or she never heard. However, one 

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wick. For the purposes of summary judgment, we must construe the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Bagwe and 

conclude that this conversation also was a protected activity.

We now consider whether these protected statements are 

causally connected to any adverse employment action.

Ms. Bagwe presents a series of events that she believes were 

adverse actions and argues that Sedgwick engaged in repeated retaliatory responses to her complaints. We have held 

that a “sequence of protected activity and punitive action 

could lend some support to a reasonable juror’s inference of 

retaliation.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 862 (emphasis added). However, temporal proximity, without additional evidence, is 

“rarely sufficient” to establish a causal connection. Castro v. 

DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 

2011)); see also Coleman, 667 F.3d at 861 (noting that a sequence 

of protected activity and punitive action, without more, 

“might not be enough” to defeat summary judgment). Here, 

viewing the events in chronological order, we must consider 

whether a reasonable juror could find that an adverse employment action occurred and that the action was causally 

connected to Ms. Bagwe’s protected complaints. 

Ms. Bagwe first submits that the defendants demonstrated 

a motive to retaliate before any protected activity took place.

In April 2008, Ms. Bagwe complained about her pay, without 

mentioning race or discrimination. In response, Ms. Papaioannou told her to be careful, and noted to a co-worker that she 

was “not going to be able to stop” Ms. LeClaire.61 Ms. LeClaire 

allegedly yelled at Ms. Bagwe about a week later. Ms. Bagwe 

 61 R.163-23 at 2.

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No. 14-3201 35

concedes that these complaints were not protected activity.

See Kodl v. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 45, Villa Park, 490 F.3d 558, 563 

(7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a complaint must indicate a protected class to constitute protected expression). Nevertheless, 

she believes that Ms. Papaioannou’s and Ms. LeClaire’s responses suggest that these decisionmakers had an intent to 

retaliate in the future. However, the reasonable characterization of these comments is that they simply responded to an 

employee’s general complaints about her pay. In their responses, neither Ms. Papaioannou nor Ms. LeClaire mentioned discrimination, race, or retaliation. Their “generic, forward looking remarks,” without more, would not allow a reasonable jury to infer that Sedgwick acted in a retaliatory manner. Castro, 786 F.3d at 569.

Next, Ms. Bagwe contends that Sedgwick took its first retaliatory action in March 2009, when she was placed on a PIP. 

To rise to the level of an adverse action, a change “must be 

one that a reasonable employee would find to be materially 

adverse such that the employee would be dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 

F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Roney v. Illinois Dep’t of 

Transp., 474 F.3d 455, 461 (7th Cir. 2006)). A PIP, without 

more, does not rise to this level. Davis, 651 F.3d at 677; see also

Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 761 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 

2014); Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 2009).

Ms. Bagwe alleges that this PIP had materially adverse consequences. Specifically, she claims that the PIP prevented her 

from receiving a performance evaluation, and that the evaluation would have resulted in a pay raise. However, nothing 

in the record ties the PIP to her evaluation, much less her compensation. Therefore, this PIP is not an adverse employment 

action.

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36 No. 14-3201

A PIP could still constitute relevant evidence of retaliation.

Oest, 240 F.3d at 613. However, nothing in the record suggests 

that this PIP was pretextual or retaliatory. Ms. Bagwe received the PIP after a confrontation with Ms. Coyle and two 

detailed complaints sent by Mr. French. The PIP provides a 

detailed list of concerns regarding Ms. Bagwe’s performance, 

including her refusal to reply to emails or listen to criticism.

The PIP does mention Ms. Bagwe’s complaints about her 

coworkers’ prejudiced comments, but states that “it was [her] 

role and responsibility to address the issue at that time and 

not a year later.”62 The PIP is, on its face, encouraging 

Ms. Bagwe to report allegations of discrimination. It is neither

an adverse employment action nor evidence of retaliation.

Ms. Bagwe also alleges that Sedgwick investigated her immediately after she complained of pay discrimination in April 

2009 instead of taking her accusations seriously. She believes 

this investigation was improper and, therefore, constitutes evidence of Sedgwick’s retaliatory motive. However, we have 

held that a company’s investigation of a plaintiff immediately 

after she makes a complaint is “not suspicious,” because the 

company might well need “to determine whether there was a 

larger problem.” Tank, 758 F.3d at 805, 807. Indeed, Ms. Simpson explained that Sedgwick’s investigation of Ms. Bagwe 

was “related to the overall investigation of what was occurring in the office with relationships.”63 The subsequent report 

addressed both Ms. Bagwe’s complaints and her relationships 

 

62 R.145-18 at 30.

63 R.145-11 at 14 (71:22–23). 

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No. 14-3201 37

with coworkers. Sedgwick’s investigation does not constitute 

evidence of retaliation. 

Finally, Ms. Bagwe claims that she was terminated for retaliatory reasons.64 A termination is undoubtedly an adverse 

employment action. Oest, 240 F.3d at 613. However, 

Ms. Bagwe has not linked her termination to her complaints 

of discrimination, or established that the reasons given by 

Sedgwick are pretextual. Rather, Sedgwick’s rationale for terminating Ms. Bagwe has been consistent and finds support in 

the record. The PIP laid out in detail the company’s concerns 

with Ms. Bagwe’s leadership skills. The investigation showed 

that Sedgwick took Ms. Bagwe’s complaints of discrimination 

seriously and that its willingness to investigate her claims 

cannot be characterized as a punitive action. The termination 

came after numerous complaints from coworkers and 

Ms. Bagwe’s placement on a PIP. See Langenbach, 761 F.3d at 

800 (affirming summary judgment where the timing and pretext arguments relied on “unbridled speculation,” and the 

record presented a clear history of performance issues).

Ms. Bagwe therefore has not met her burden with regard to 

her claims of retaliation. 

 64 Ms. Bagwe also argues that Sedgwick engaged in post-termination retaliation by giving a negative recommendation to Matrix. However, as discussed above, that argument is based entirely on inadmissible hearsay.

Further, even were we to consider that call, there is nothing in the record 

suggesting that the call was made for retaliatory reasons. 

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38 No. 14-3201

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. 

AFFIRMED

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