Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02532/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02532-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Amanda Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2532

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa. 

Amanda Williams, * 

*

Appellee. * 

___________

Submitted: December 13, 2006

Filed: January 29, 2007

___________

Before BYE, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

The Sentencing Reform Act provides that a district court has “limited authority

to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum,” upon motion of the government,

“so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution

of another person who has committed an offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). This case

presents the question whether a district court, after reducing a sentence based on

substantial assistance pursuant to § 3553(e), may reduce the sentence further based on

factors, other than assistance, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We hold that it may

not. Where a court has authority to sentence below a statutory minimum only by

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virtue of a government motion under § 3553(e), the reduction below the statutory

minimum must be based exclusively on assistance-related considerations.

Amanda Williams pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams

of methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a protected location. At sentencing, the

government filed motions under USSG § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) to reduce her

sentence based on the provision of substantial assistance to authorities in the

investigation or prosecution of other persons. A motion under § 5K1.1 authorizes the

sentencing court to depart below the applicable advisory guideline range in

determining the advisory guideline sentence, and a § 3553(e) motion permits the court

to sentence below a statutory minimum. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120,

128-29 (1996).

Prior to any reduction for assistance, the advisory guideline sentence for

Williams was 120-121 months’ imprisonment, and the applicable statutory minimum

was 120 months. The district court granted the substantial-assistance motions and

announced that it would reduce the term of imprisonment to 78 months based on

Williams’s assistance. The court then invoked § 3553(a) to reduce the sentence

further, to a final term of 60 months’ imprisonment, based on Williams’s young age,

medical history, drug use, and limited criminal history. The government does not

challenge the district court’s reduction of the sentence to 78 months based on

substantial assistance, but argues that the additional reduction to 60 months was

legally impermissible, because the court relied on factors other than substantial

assistance. This is a legal question that we review de novo. United States v. Peterson,

455 F.3d 834, 837 (8th Cir. 2006).

We have said that a reduction in sentence based on § 3553(e) may be based only

on assistance-related considerations, e.g., United States v. Plaza, 471 F.3d 928, 930

(8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Saenz, 428 F.3d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 2006), but we

have twice reserved deciding whether, in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

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220 (2005), a district court may also rely on § 3553(a) to reduce a sentence further

below the statutory minimum once the government has filed a motion under

§ 3553(e). Plaza, 471 F.3d at 930 n.1; Saenz, 428 F.3d at 1165 n.2. In Peterson, we

implied strongly – if we did not explicitly hold – that a district court in that situation

is limited to assistance-related considerations. The district court in Peterson imposed

a sentence below a statutory minimum after the government filed a motion under

§ 3553(e). We observed that in reducing the sentence, “the district court discussed

factors other than Peterson’s assistance,” and we concluded that a remand was

required because we could not determine “the weight the district court gave

permissible factors regarding Peterson’s assistance.” 455 F.3d at 837 (emphasis

added). The clear implication of Peterson is that factors unrelated to assistance were

not “permissible” considerations in determining the extent of a reduction below the

statutory minimum. 

To the extent the question remains open after Peterson (as the Plaza panel

apparently thought it was), we conclude that the text of § 3553(e) provides a clear

answer, and that Booker does not expand the district court’s authority to impose a

sentence below a statutory minimum. Section 3553(e) provides: 

(e) Limited authority to impose a sentence below a statutory

minimum. — Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the

authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a

minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in

the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an

offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the

guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission

pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code.

Two aspects of the text are particularly instructive. First is the title, which

states that the section provides only “limited authority” to impose a sentence below

the statutory minimum. Congress evidently wanted statutory minimum sentences to

be firmly enforced, subject only to carefully “limited” exceptions. United States v.

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Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2002). The body of § 3553(e) specifies precisely

how a sentencing court’s authority is limited. It may impose a sentence below the

statutory minimum only “so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance.” 18

U.S.C. § 3553(e) (emphasis added). If a district court imposes a sentence below the

statutory minimum in part so as to reflect the history and characteristics of the

defendant, see § 3553(a)(1), then the court exceeds the limited authority granted by

§ 3553(e). The second textual sentence of § 3553(e) refers back to the penal sentence

contemplated in the first textual sentence, and thus “restricts the court’s reference to

those guidelines and policy statements that bear directly upon the desirability and

extent of a substantial assistance departure.” Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 61.

Nothing in the reasoning of Booker expands the authority of a district court to

sentence below a statutory minimum. The Court’s remedial holding provided that to

cure the constitutional infirmity of the mandatory guidelines system, a district court

is authorized to consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a), and to vary from the

sentence otherwise indicated by the sentencing guidelines. But Booker did not

question the constitutionality of statutory minimum sentences, see United States v.

Rojas-Coria, 401 F.3d 871, 874 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005), and while the Court excised

§§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) from the Code, § 3553(e) was unmentioned in the opinion.

The Court deviated from the mandatory guidelines system adopted by Congress only

insofar as the deviation was necessary to make the remaining advisory system

consistent with the Sixth Amendment. Booker, 543 U.S. at 263-64. Because statutory

minimum sentences remain constitutional, and it is constitutional for Congress to limit

a court’s authority to sentence below such minimums, the remedial holding of Booker

does not impact the pre-existing limitations embodied in § 3553(e).

In this case, the district court reduced Williams’s sentence below the statutory

minimum in two increments – one based on substantial assistance and one based on

other factors. Because the second increment was impermissible for the reasons

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explained above, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with

this opinion.

 ______________________________

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