Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03107/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03107-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Otis Mario Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 6, 1995 Decided July 7, 1995

No. 94-3107

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

OTIS MARIO JONES,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00078-01)

Reita P. Pendry, Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender, was on the briefs, argued the cause for appellant.

Barbara A. Grewe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States

Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman, and Shanlon Wu, Assistant United States Attorneys,

were on the brief, argued the cause for appellee.

Before BUCKLEY, HENDERSON, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: Appellant Otis Jones agreed to plead guilty to two criminal charges

in return for certain promises from the United States Attorney. Believing that the Government had

failed to meet its obligations under the plea agreement, Jones filed a motion seeking to compel it to

provide him with the benefit of the bargain to which he felt entitled; specifically, to lodge a motion

with the district court stating that he had provided the prosecution with "substantial assistance," thus

permitting the sentencing judge to depart downward from the range established by the United States

Sentencing Guidelines. Finding no breach of the agreement, we affirm the district court's denial of

Jones's motion but note two concerns raised by this appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant Jones, formerly a U.S. Postal Service employee, wasindicted on one count oftheft

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of mail by a postal employee, 18 U.S.C. § 1709, and one count of forgery on a United States

Treasury check, 18 U.S.C. § 510(a)(1). Rather than go to trial, Jones entered into a plea agreement.

For his part, Jones agreed to plead guilty to the two counts, provide restitution of $22,821,

and to cooperate fully with the Government's investigation of others who were involved in Jones's

scheme. In exchange, the Government made a number of promises. It agreed not to prosecute Jones

for any other economic offenses related to his Postal Service employment, to advise the sentencing

judge ofthe full nature and extent of his cooperation with the investigation, and not to oppose Jones's

receipt of a two-level downward departure under section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines for

acceptance of responsibility. In addition, it made promises that concerned Jones's ability to secure

a downward departure from the range that would otherwise dictate the length of his imprisonment.

The agreement provided that

[i]fMr. OtisJones providesinformation to law enforcement officers or testifies before

the grand jury or at the trial of his accomplices following his guilty plea, the

undersigned Assistant United States Attorney will inform the Departure Committee

of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia of the nature and

extent of Mr. Jones' cooperation. Should the Departure Committee of the United

States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, after evaluating the nature and

extent of Mr. Jones' cooperation, determine that Mr. Jones has provided substantial

assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed

any offense, then the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia will

file a motion pursuant to section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines

in order to afford Mr. Jones an opportunity to persuade the Court that he should be

sentenced to a lesser period of incarceration and/or fine than mandated by the federal

sentencing guidelines.

Plea Agreement ¶ 7. The agreement also affirmed that

Mr. Jones understands that the United States Attorney's Office for the District of

Columbia retains its discretion concerning whether to file a motion for a reduction in

hissentence pursuant to Section 5K1.1 ofthe sentencing guidelines. Mr. Jones agrees

that the failure of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia to

file a "substantial assistance" departure motion shall not be grounds for Mr. Jones to

move to withdraw his plea of guilty in this case.

Plea Agreement ¶ 10.

Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines providesthat "[u]pon motion of the government stating that

the defendant has provided substantial assistance" to the prosecution, the sentencing court maydepart

downward from the Guidelines' punishment range. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. If the Government does not

file a motion, the court is precluded from departing from the range pursuant to that section of the

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Guidelines no matter how helpful the defendant may have been to the prosecution. See Wade v.

United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843 (1992). Therefore, whether the Government files a section

5K1.1 motion is extremely important to a defendant. Jones asserts that the opportunity to earn a

"substantial assistance"motion fromthe Government wasthe primaryinducement that motivated him

to accept the Government's plea offer.

The Departure Committee failed to find that Jones had provided "substantial assistance"; as

a consequence, the Government did not file a section 5K1.1 motion. Jones moved to compel the

Government to do so, arguing that because he had fulfilled his part of the bargain by providing every

assistance that the Government had asked of him, the Government was obligated to file the section

5K1.1 "substantial assistance" motion. The Government did not contend that Jones was other than

fully cooperative. Nevertheless, it maintained that under the terms of the plea agreement, the

Departure Committee retained complete discretion to determine whether Jones's assistance was

"substantial."

U.S. District Judge Harold H. Greene determined that the terms of the plea agreement and

legal precedent required him to deny Jones's motion. Nevertheless, he clearly felt that the

Government had treated Jones unfairly. He referred to its behavior as "lousy" and went so far as to

"invite," "encourage," and even "urge" Jones's attorney to appeal his denial of the motion. Judge

Greene then sentenced Jones to eighteen months' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.

This sentence was within the Guidelines range.

II. DISCUSSION

When a prosecutor secures a plea with a promise, the promise must be fulfilled. Santobello

v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). In other words, a plea agreement is a contract. United

States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1992). As a consequence, courts will look to

principles of contract law to determine whether a plea agreement has been breached. See, e.g.,

United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. McGovern, 822 F.2d

739, 743 (8th Cir. 1987). As the interpretation of a plea agreement's terms is a pure matter of law,

we review the district court's decision de novo. Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1023.

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Jones believes that the only reasonable interpretation of his agreement is that if he did what

he was asked to do, the Government would file the substantial assistance motion. He contends that

he provided all the information the Government requested and, in fact, all the information the

Government could reasonably have expected him to possess when it entered into the agreement. The

Government does not dispute his claim of complete cooperation. Instead, it construes the contract

as vesting in the Departure Committee the sole power to determine whether that cooperation

constituted "substantial assistance."

The plain language of the plea agreement clearly supports the Government's interpretation.

Paragraph 7 obligated the Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case to inform the Departure

Committee of Jones's assistance, and it required the U.S. Attorney's Office to file a section 5K1.1

motion onlyifthat Committee "[s]hould ... determine that [he] ha[d] provided substantial assistance."

The agreement does not obligate the Departure Committee to make a finding of "substantial

assistance" if Jones fully cooperates with the prosecution. In fact, paragraph 10 of the agreement

disclaims any such obligation by stating that "the United States Attorney's Office for the District of

Columbia retains its discretion concerning whether to file a [substantial assistance] motion."

In United States v. Sparks, 20 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we reviewed a challenge to the U.S.

Attorney's Office's failure to file such a motion under a nearly identical plea agreement. In that case,

the agreement provided that

if the Departure Guideline Committee of the United States Attorney's Office for the

District of Columbia after evaluating the full nature and extent of your client's

cooperation, or lack thereof, determines that your client has provided substantial

assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed

any offense, then this Office will file a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and

5K1.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines....

Sparks, 20 F.3d at 479. We found that this language created only a contingent obligation and that

"[i]f the contingency is not fulfilled, the departure motion is not filed. Period." Id. at 478. There is

no material difference between the Sparks provision and the language at issue in this case. Because

the Departure Committee did not find thatJones had provided substantial assistance, the contingency

was not met and the Government had no obligation to file the motion. Nothing in the agreement

suggests that if Jones volunteered all the information that he had, or all that was asked for, the

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Government would be bound to file the motion.

* * *

Although we are satisfied that the Government fulfilled its obligations under the plea

agreement, two aspects of this case trouble us. First, the U.S. Attorney enjoys extraordinary power

under section 5K1.1 because, by its terms, a motion of the Government is a prerequisite to the

exercise ofjudicial discretion to depart below the Guidelinesrange. See United States v. Justice, 877

F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir. 1989). This power makes us sensitive to the concern expressed by Jones and

shared by Judge Greene; namely, that prosecutors might dangle the suggestion of a section 5K1.1

motion in front of defendants to lure them into plea agreements, all the while knowing that the

defendant's cooperation could not possibly constitute assistance valuable enough for the Departure

Committee to find it "substantial." Cf. United States v. Fairchild, 940 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1991)

(admonishing the Government to be forthcoming about what will constitute "substantial assistance").

Often, of course, the Government will not know prior to the plea agreement whether a

defendant will be capable of providing substantial assistance; counsel for the Government assures

us that this was the case here. But we are troubled by counsel's concession, at oral argument, that

the contingent promise at issue here is standard plea agreement fare, regardless of individual

circumstances. The Government's claim that its interest in maintaining its reputation for fairness

among criminaldefendants guaranteesthe judicious exercise ofits ability to promise to considerfiling

a section 5K1.1 motion,see United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States

v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir. 1990), is undermined by the use of boiler-plate provisions.

Second, the Government's contention at oral argument that, under the terms ofits agreement

with Jones, its decision not to file a departure motion can only be reviewed for constitutional

infirmities proves too much. Even in the absence of any contractual arrangement, the Government's

decision not to file a section 5K1.1 motion, like any other prosecutorial decision, is subject to

constitutional limitations. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1843-44. The plea agreement, however, provides

additional protection for Jones. Like all contracts, it includes an implied obligation of good faith and

fair dealing. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981); see also Sparks, 20 F.3d at 479

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(noting Government's concession that nonperformance ofits contingent obligation in plea agreement

is reviewable for bad faith). Thus, while the plea agreement did not guarantee Jones a section 5K1.1

motion, we believe it did guarantee fair dealing. In addition to explicitly obliging the prosecutor to

present the Departure Committee with accurate information as to the nature and extent of Jones's

cooperation, the agreement implicitly required the Committee to consider that evidence and, if it

believed the assistance to be "substantial," to so find. In other words, Jones was entitled to an honest

and fully informed evaluation by the Committee. See Rexach, 896 F.2d at 713 ("where the explicit

terms of a cooperation agreement leave the acceptance of the defendant's performance to the

judgment of the prosecutor, the prosecutor may reject the defendant's performance provided he or

she is honestly dissatisfied").

In this case, Jones does not allege that the Government acted in bad faith. Because a

defendant is not privy to the deliberations and actions of the U.S. Attorney's Office, however, a

defendant will face enormous difficulty in supporting such a charge. To ameliorate this problem and

to provide both the trial judge and a reviewing court with information that might help them weigh an

allegation of bad faith, we suggest that prosecutors who enter into agreementslike the one before us,

but subsequently fail to file a section 5K1.1 motion,summarize for the district court what information

they provided the Departure Committee, while at the same time safeguarding information that could

compromise an ongoing investigation or endanger the defendant or others, together with any

explanation,similarlycircumscribed, that the Committee may have offered for finding the defendant's

assistance to be insubstantial.

With these notes of caution, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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