Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05084/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darren Thomas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH F 1 L E ])A "'""m n 'ted States Courtu~ p ......... UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALsum Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DARREN THOMAS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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SEP 1 ~·1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-5084 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-91-C) 

J::nes L. Swartz, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. Graham, 

U.S. Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Charles Whitman, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, MOORE, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-5084 Document: 01019293527 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 1 
Darren Thomas and five others were charged with conspiring 

with each other, and others, from August 1, 1988, to July 20, 

1989, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846 as 

follows: (1) to knowingly and intentionally distribute a mixture 

or substance which contained cocaine base, a Schedule II 

controlled substance, in an amount in excess of fifty grams, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); and (2) 

to knowingly and intentionally possess with an intent to 

distribute cocaine in an amount in excess of five hundred grams, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)B(ii). 

The other defendants were jointly tried prior to the trial of 

Darren Thomas, who apparently had not been taken into custody at 

the time the others were tried. Four of the other five defendants 

were convicted, and one was acquitted. The four who were 

convicted appealed their convictions and sentences, and opinions 

in those cases have been filed contemporaneously with the filing 

of the instant opinion. 

Some three months after the trial of the other defendants, 

Darren Thomas was tried. The jury convicted Thomas of conspiring 

to knowingly and intentionally distribute in excess of fifty grams 

of a mixture or substance which contained cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Thomas 

was sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines to imprisonment for 

360 months. He now appeals his conviction and sentence. 

In view of the nature of the issues raised on appeal, it is 

unnecessary to recount in any detail the evidence adduced at 

trial. It is sufficient to note that one Willie Junior Louis 

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Appellate Case: 90-5084 Document: 01019293527 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 2 
testified that he left his apartment in Tulsa, Oklahoma in charge 

of a girlfriend when he made a trip to Oklahoma City in March, 

1989. Louis went on to testify that on his return he found the 

defendants, including Thomas, ensconced in his apartment, and that 

for the ensuing five or six weeks they conducted a "crack cocaine" 

operation out of his apartment. He described how they cut up rock 

cocaine with a razor blade, sold it directly to customers who carne 

to the door, and gave it to "runners" who then sold it on the 

street to passing motorists. Louis further testified that these 

"runners" later returned with the money received from the sales 

made. In addition, Louis testified that certain of the defendants 

were armed and that he was fearful for his life. Testimony of 

other government witnesses tended to corroborate Louis' testimony. 

Thomas testified in his own behalf and stated that he had not 

conspired with anyone and denied ever being in Louis' apartment. 

As indicated, the jury convicted Thomas. 

Kevin Rushing was a witness for the government, and in the 

course of his questioning admitted that he had a prior felony 

conviction but denied having a second conviction. Later, when 

presenting his evidence, counsel for Thomas, apparently for 

impeachment purposes, proposed to call to the witness stand a 

court clerk who could identify the official court record which 

showed that Rushing had indeed suffered a second conviction for 

embezzlement, second offense. At this juncture, government 

counsel agreed to stipulate that Rushing had a second felony 

conviction for embezzlement, second offense. The district court 

accepted the stipulation and admitted into evidence an exhibit 

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Appellate Case: 90-5084 Document: 01019293527 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 3 
from Thomas' counsel showing Rushing's second conviction and the 

sentence he received in connection therewith. 

On appeal, counsel argues that the district court erred in 

accepting the stipulation and that he should have been allowed to 

call a witness who could identify the court record of Rushing's 

second conviction. Such, according to counsel, would have made a 

greater impact on the jury than a mere stipulation. No pertinent 

authority is cited for this proposition. 

Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) provides in pertinent part that "[f]or 

the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence 

that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted 

if elicited from the witness or established by public record 

=d=u=r=i=n::.:g:a.-.:c=r:.;o=s=-s_-..:::e~x=am=i=-=n.:.:a:.;t::.:J.=-· o:.n:..:........:..• ----=.•--=·'---"-· " ( emphasis added) . We note that 

during his cross-examination of Rushing, counsel for Thomas had 

every opportunity to impeach him by leading questions regarding 

his second conviction but failed to do so. Further, counsel was 

later allowed to introduce into evidence the official court record 

of Rushing's second conviction and the sentence imposed as a 

result thereof. Under such circumstances, we think that there was 

full compliance with Rule 609(a). In any event, Rule 609(a) 

rulings rest in the sound discretion of the trial court, and we 

find no abuse of that discretion. United States v. Davis, 929 

F.2d 554, 558 (lOth Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Lamb, 575 

F.2d 1310, 1314 (lOth Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 u.s. 854 

(1978)); United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1256 (lOth 

Cir. 1991). 

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Appellate Case: 90-5084 Document: 01019293527 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 4 
As his second ground for reversal, counsel argues that he was 

foreclosed from making closing argument. However, it is agreed 

that he did make closing argument and apparently his present 

complaint is that an objection was made by the prosecutor to 

certain of counsel's closing argument, which objection was 

sustained. Such, counsel maintains, foreclosed him from making 

the closing argument that he wished to make. 

The record before us does not contain counsel's closing 

argument so we are unable to tell whether the objection was 

improperly sustained, and, if so, whether it made much difference. 

Counsel in his brief states that he was attempting to explain to 

the jury the importance of their function when the objection was 

made, and sustained. If this is the case, it would certainly 

appear to be innocuous. 

During the course of their deliberations, the jury asked to 

rehear certain of the testimony of one of the government's 

witnesses. With no objection from either side, the district court 

granted this request and the taped testimony of Officer Witt was 

replayed to the jury. On appeal, counsel argues that such was 

reversible error. We disagree. This, too, is a matter resting in 

the sound discretion of the trial court, and we find no abuse of 

discretion here. United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983 (lOth Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, ____ u.s. ____ , 111 s.ct. 160, 112 L.Ed.2d 

125 (1990). In Keys, we held that permitting the testimony of two 

government witnesses to 

had commenced did not 

be read to the jury after deliberations 

unduly emphasize that testimony, and 

therefore, did not constitute abuse of discretion. Id. at 988. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5084 Document: 01019293527 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 5 
See also, United States v. Brunetti, 615 F.2d 899, 902 (lOth Cir. 

1980); and United States v. Tager, 481 F.2d 97, 101 (lOth Cir. 

1973), cert. denied, 415 u.s. 914 (1974). 

Thomas' final grounds for reversal is that the district court 

erred in allowing evidence of "other crimes" on the part of Thomas 

to be introduced into evidence. Counsel does not point out just 

what evidence of "other crimes" he believes was erroneously 

received into evidence. In such circumstance, we have no basis 

. * for rev~ew. 

Judgment affirmed. 

* Unlike his co-defendants, Thomas makes no claim that he was 

improperly sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines. Thomas' codefendants were sentenced on February 14, 1990, and Thomas was 

sentenced in a separate proceeding on April 19, 1990. 

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