Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01240/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01240-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent
Calvin J. Mosley
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CALVIN J. MOSLEY,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1240

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-0752-10-0469-C-1.

______________________ 

Decided: April 8, 2016

______________________ 

CALVIN J. MOSLEY, Gary, IN, pro se.

SCOTT MACGRIFF, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BENJAMIN 

C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., STEVEN J.

GILLINGHAM. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

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2 MOSLEY v. DVA

PER CURIAM. 

 Calvin J. Mosley (“Mosley”) appeals from the decision 

of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) denying 

his petition for review of the administrative judge’s (“AJ”)

denial of his petition for enforcement. Mosley v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 659 (2015) (Table); see also

Resp’t’s App. (“App.”) 1–6. Because the Board’s decision 

contains no legal error and is supported by substantial 

evidence, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In April 2006, Mosley was hired on a temporary basis 

as a social worker at the Department of Veterans Affairs

(“the agency”) veterans’ center in Gary, Indiana. He was 

converted to a permanent employee in May 2008, but in 

March 2010, he was terminated for failure to obtain the 

necessary licensure. App. 43–44. 

Mosley appealed his removal to the Board, but shortly 

before the hearing, he entered into a settlement agreement (“2011 agreement”) with the agency. App. 34–36. 

Pursuant to the 2011 agreement, Mosley agreed to withdraw his “complaints, grievances, MSPB appeals, and all 

other causes of action against the VA in any forum,” and 

further “waive[d] his right to pursue any and all future 

causes of action.” App. 34 ¶ 1. In exchange, the agency 

agreed to “remove the Standard Form 50 (SF-50) from Mr. 

Mosley’s Official Personnel File reflecting his removal and 

replace it with an SF-50 reflecting that [Mosley] voluntarily resigned from the Agency for personal reasons,” and to 

refrain from objecting to any application Mosley might file 

for unemployment insurance benefits. App. 34 ¶¶ 2–3. 

The AJ accepted the 2011 agreement “as lawful on its face 

and entered into freely by both parties,” entered it into 

the record, and dismissed Mosley’s appeal. App. 27–28.

 Soon thereafter, Mosley filed a petition for review by

the full Board, claiming that the agency failed to provide 

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MOSLEY v. DVA 3

him with a copy of his new SF-50, and requesting $5,000

to compensate for alleged duress. App. 70–73. The Board

denied the petition for review, finding that (1) the agency 

complied with the terms of the 2011 agreement, and in 

fact mailed a copy of the new SF-50 to Mosley; (2) Mosley 

could not show that the 2011 agreement was unlawfully 

or involuntarily entered into, and thus could not convince 

the Board to set aside the 2011 agreement; and (3) “nothing in the [2011] agreement can be read as entitling the 

appellant to $5,000.00, or to any monetary sum for that 

matter.” App. 19. Mosley did not appeal from that decision.

In 2015, Mosley filed a new petition for enforcement 

at the Board, claiming that the agency breached the 2011

agreement when it failed to pay him one year’s salary or 

offer any monetary award. App. 8–9. He did not otherwise challenge the agency’s compliance with the agreement. App. 3 ¶ 3. Additionally, Mosley asked the Board

to invalidate the 2011 agreement and to reopen his earlier 

appeal. App. 9. 

The AJ declined to address Mosley’s request to invalidate the 2011 agreement and reopen the appeal because 

the agreement’s validity had been adjudicated and upheld

by the Board once before, a matter which Mosley did not 

further appeal. See App. 9. The AJ then found that the 

agency did not breach the 2011 agreement, for the agreement did not require the agency to pay any monies, only 

to revise the SF-50 and to refrain from challenging any

future request for unemployment benefits: “Mosley cannot 

ask the Board to enforce any term or provision that is not 

in the settlement agreement.” App. 11. Accordingly, the 

AJ dismissed Mosley’s petition for enforcement. App. 11. 

Mosley petitioned the full Board for review of the AJ’s 

denial, and the Board denied the petition. App. 1. It first 

reasoned that res judicata barred Mosley from challenging the validity of the 2011 agreement, a matter that had 

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4 MOSLEY v. DVA

been formally and finally adjudged. App. 3 ¶ 4. It then

found that the 2011 agreement did not require the agency 

to pay Mosley any monies, and thus the agency could not 

be in breach of the agreement for failing to pay any monies that Mosley demanded. App. 4 ¶ 7. 

Mosley timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION

Our review of a Board decision is limited. We can only set aside the decision if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by 

law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). 

In his informal appeal brief, Mosley first argues: “For 

the MSPB communication–syntax–grammer [sic] translations within the document are with void terms of the 

constitution–contract between these two–or–more persons 

within the document.” Pet’r’s Informal Appeal Br. 1. To 

the extent Mosley is challenging the validity of the 2011

agreement, see App. 87–90, we agree with the Board that 

his challenge is barred by res judicata. 

Res judicata applies to bar a claim where (1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the first suit proceeded 

to a final judgment on the merits in a forum of competent 

jurisdiction; and (3) the second claim is based on the same 

set of transactional facts as the first. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979); Carson v. 

Dep’t of Energy, 398 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As 

the Board found, all three criteria are satisfied here. The 

parties are identical: both actions involve Mosley and the 

agency. The second claim is based on the same facts as 

the first: in both suits, Mosley contests the validity of the 

same 2011 agreement based on the same set of facts. See, 

e.g., Resp’t’s Br. 6. Last, the first suit proceeded to a final 

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MOSLEY v. DVA 5

judgment on the merits: the AJ found, and the full Board 

affirmed, that the 2011 agreement was “lawful on its face 

and freely entered into by both parties.” App. 19. Mosley 

chose to forego any further challenge of the Board’s decision at that time. Accordingly, the Board correctly determined that res judicata precludes Mosley from relitigating

the validity of the 2011 agreement. 

Next, Mosley further asserts: “MSPB neglectful–use 

of the fictional–contract–language with the correctional–

pleading by the claimant.” Pet’r’s Informal Appeal Br. 1. 

To the extent Mosley argues that the agency breached the 

2011 agreement by failing to pay him a monetary award, 

see App. 90–93, we find that argument unpersuasive.

In order to prevail on a breach of a settlement agreement claim, Mosley must show material noncompliance 

by the agency with the terms of the agreement. See, e.g., 

Gilbert v. Dep’t of Justice, 334 F.3d 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 

2003). The 2011 agreement at issue here only requires

the agency to do two things: (1) replace the SF-50 form in 

Mosley’s personnel file with one reflecting his voluntary 

resignation; and (2) not object to any application Mosley 

files for unemployment benefits. App. 34 ¶¶ 2–3. Notably, it does not require the agency to pay Mosley a monetary award. See App. 34–36. Indeed, by signing the 2011

agreement, Mosley waived “any and all rights to seek . . . 

any other remedies for any matters arising out of or 

related to his employment with the Agency.” App. 34 ¶ 2. 

In view of such an agreement, Mosley cannot now contend 

that the agency’s failure to pay a monetary award constituted a breach. As the AJ stated, “Mosley cannot ask the 

Board to enforce any term or provision that is not in the 

settlement agreement.” App. 11. Because Mosley does 

not otherwise challenge the agency’s compliance with the 

2011 agreement, see App. 3 ¶ 3, we affirm the Board’s 

conclusion that the agency did not breach the agreement. 

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6 MOSLEY v. DVA

CONCLUSION

We have considered the remaining arguments raised 

in Mosley’s informal appeal brief, but we find them unpersuasive. For the reasons set forth above, the decision 

of the Board is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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