Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-18-01865/USCOURTS-ca3-18-01865-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Omar Sierre Folk
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 18-1865

____________

UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA

v.

OMAR SIERRE FOLK,

Appellant

____________

On Appeal from the United States 

District Court

for the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-11-cr-00292-001)

District Judge: Honorable John E. 

Jones, III

____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit 

L.A.R. 34.1(a): 

January 14, 2020 

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, 

and PHIPPS, 

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 3, 2020)

____________

Philip Gelso

LAW OFFICES OF PHILIP GELSO

63 Pierce Street

Kingston, PA 18704

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Counsel for Appellant Omar Sierre Folk

David J. Freed, United States Attorney

Eric Pfisterer, Deputy Chief, Criminal Division 

(Harrisburg)

Michael A. Consiglio

Kate L. Mershimer

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754

220 Federal Building and Courthouse

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Counsel for Appellee United States of America

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

PORTER, Circuit Judge

Omar Sierre Folk appeals the District Court’s order 

denying his Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment 

denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argues that the 

District Court enhanced his sentence based on an incorrect 

career-offender designation under the advisory Sentencing 

Guidelines. He also moves to expand his certificate of 

appealability. Because Folk’s claim is not cognizable under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255, we will affirm the District Court’s order and 

deny his motion to expand the certificate of appealability.

I

Folk was convicted by a federal jury of one count of 

distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine 

and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; two counts 

of using a firearm to further a drug trafficking offense, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and one count of felon in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Before sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report 

(“PSR”) deemed Folk a career offender under U.S.S.G. 

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§ 4B1.1 because he had at least two prior felony convictions

for “crimes of violence.”1 As a result, the PSR recommended 

enhancing Folk’s Guidelines range from a sentence between 

384 and 465 months’ imprisonment to a sentence between 420 

months and life imprisonment.

At sentencing, the District Court discussed Folk’s four 

previous convictions with the parties and whether the 

convictions constituted crimes of violence. The convictions 

included two robberies in 2001, simple assault in 2003, and 

terroristic threats in 2003. The District Court adopted the 

PSR’s recommended Guidelines range but sentenced Folk to 

264 months’ imprisonment—120 months less than the bottom 

of the unenhanced Guidelines range and 156 months less than 

the bottom of the enhanced Guidelines range. Folk appealed 

his conviction, but we affirmed. See United States v. Folk, 577 

F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2014). Importantly, Folk did not 

challenge his sentence or his career-offender designation.

Then, the Federal Public Defender filed a timely § 2255 

motion on Folk’s behalf. In his § 2255 motion, Folk argued that 

his career-offender designation was invalid because Johnson v. 

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), rendered § 4B1.2(a) 

void for vagueness. Folk decided to proceed pro se and filed 

several motions to amend his § 2255 motion. The District 

Court ultimately denied Folk’s § 2255 motion.

Finally, Folk filed a notice of appeal and a motion to 

alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e). We stayed his appeal pending the District 

Court’s resolution of the Rule 59(e) motion. Folk’s Rule 59(e) 

motion argued that his robbery, simple assault, and terroristic 

threats convictions do not constitute crimes of violence, so the 

District Court erroneously designated him as a career offender. 

1 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (2012) provides that “[a] defendant is a 

career offender if . . . [he] has at least two prior felony 

convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled 

substance offense.” A “crime of violence” is an offense 

punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that 

involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another,” or is an otherwise 

specified offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2012).

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The District Court denied the motion. Folk then filed an 

amended notice of appeal.

Folk’s certificate of appealability identified two issues 

for review: (1) whether an erroneous career-offender 

designation is cognizable under § 2255; and (2) whether he

was correctly designated as a career offender.2

After we issued the certificate of appealability, Folk 

moved to expand the certificate of appealability and to 

supplement his appeal. Folk argued that his conviction for 

possession of 280 grams of cocaine is invalid under United 

States v. Rowe, 919 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that 

separate acts of distribution of controlled substances are 

distinct offenses rather than a continuing crime). The motion 

to expand the certificate of appealability was referred to this

panel and remains pending.

II

The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 

Folk’s § 2255 motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2255. We 

have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and

2253(a). We review legal conclusions de novo and factual 

findings for clear error. United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 

142 (3d Cir. 2015).

III

The first issue we must address is whether a challenge 

to an incorrect career-offender designation under the advisory 

Sentencing Guidelines is cognizable under § 2255. Folk says 

that it is.3 We disagree.

2 The parties identified other issues in their briefs on appeal, 

including an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. But the 

certificate of appealability designated only two issues for 

review, and we need not consider uncertified issues. See 3d Cir. 

L.A.R. 22.1(b)–(c); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

3 For this analysis, we assume without deciding that the District 

Court incorrectly designated Folk as a career offender.

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A

Under § 2255, a federal prisoner may move to vacate, 

set aside, or correct his federal sentence if: (1) “the sentence 

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States”; (2) the court lacked “jurisdiction to impose” 

the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeded “the maximum 

authorized by law”; or (4) the sentence is “otherwise subject to 

collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

The statute’s language “is somewhat lacking in 

precision” but “afford[s] federal prisoners a remedy identical 

in scope to federal habeas corpus [under 28 U.S.C. § 2254].” 

Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). The scope of 

relief does not reach “every asserted error of law.” Id. at 346. 

Rather, § 2255 provides relief for jurisdictional and 

constitutional claims, as well as for certain nonconstitutional 

claims.

Folk’s career-offender Guideline claim does not satisfy 

the first three bases for § 2255 relief. He does not assert that 

his sentence violates the Constitution or federal law. Folk does 

not argue that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to impose 

the sentence. Nor can he argue that his sentence exceeds the 

maximum authorized by law because each of his federal 

convictions permitted a maximum of life imprisonment. See 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (permitting any 

sentence exceeding five years); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) 

(requiring a sentence to exceed 15 years). So, to justify

receiving § 2255 relief, Folk’s nonconstitutional claim—based 

on an incorrect career-offender enhancement—must 

“otherwise subject” his sentence to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255(a); see Bullard v. United States, 937 F.3d 654, 658 (6th 

Cir. 2019). 

Nonconstitutional claims that otherwise subject a 

sentence to collateral attack fall between two poles. See Doe, 

810 F.3d at 155. At one end are plainly cognizable claims, such 

as a federal prisoner’s claims that he is “either actually 

innocent of his crime” or that his “prior conviction used to 

enhance his sentence has been vacated[.]” Spencer v. United 

States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1139 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 

(referencing Davis, 417 U.S. at 346–47 and Johnson v. United 

States, 544 U.S. 295, 303 (2005)); see also Doe, 810 F.3d at 

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155 (citing Davis, 417 U.S. at 343). On the other end are 

plainly noncognizable claims, which include technical 

procedural violations that do not prejudice a defendant. See, 

e.g., Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 27–28 (1999) 

(holding that a district court’s failure to notify a defendant of 

his right to appeal was not cognizable when the defendant 

knew of the right and was not prejudiced).

Supreme Court precedent recognizes that § 2255 may 

remedy a nonconstitutional claim such as a flawed sentence in 

two circumstances. See Doe, 810 F.3d at 155 (noting that Reed 

v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994), explains how to fill the narrow 

space “between [the] poles”). First, if a sentencing error 

resulted in “an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary 

demands of fair procedure.” United States v. Timmreck, 441 

U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (citation omitted). Second, if a sentencing 

error constitutes “a fundamental defect which inherently 

results in a complete miscarriage of justice[.]” Id.4

B

A misapplication of the career-offender Guideline is not 

an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 

procedure. Sentencing errors that qualify as “omission[s] 

inconsistent with” fair procedure include procedural errors that 

prejudice a defendant. Doe, 810 F.3d at 155 (quoting Reed, 512 

U.S. at 348 (plurality opinion)). Ordinarily, the procedural 

error is the failure “to give a defendant advice required by the 

Federal Rules [of Criminal Procedure].” Peguero, 526 U.S. at 

27–28 (holding that a district court’s failure to notify a 

defendant of his right to appeal was not cognizable when the 

4 Relying on the plurality opinion in Reed v. Farley, this Court 

suggested that “aggravating circumstances” amount to a third 

standalone basis for § 2255 relief for nonconstitutional claims. 

See Doe, 810 F.3d at 155. The Supreme Court has not 

“expressly adopted [the aggravating circumstances] exception 

or defined its parameters.” Pethtel v. Ballard, 617 F.3d 299, 

305 (4th Cir. 2010). But we need not resolve that tension here 

because Folk does not argue that aggravating circumstances 

exist. Nor would his claim meet the requirements for relief 

under an aggravating-circumstances theory. See, e.g., Reed, 

512 U.S. at 357 (Scalia, J. concurring).

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defendant knew of the right and was not prejudiced by the 

failure); see also Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784–85 (declining to 

find cognizable a procedural error under Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11 absent aggravating circumstances); Hill 

v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (holding that a 

district court’s failure to notify a defendant of his right to speak 

at his sentencing did not prejudice him and was not a 

cognizable claim under § 2255); cf. Reed, 512 U.S. at 349–51 

(plurality opinion) (holding that, in a § 2254 proceeding, a state 

court’s failure to observe speedy trial requirements was not 

cognizable when the failure did not prejudice the defendant).

Peguero, Timmreck, and Hill each involved a district 

court’s failure to notify a defendant of certain rights under the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Reed involved a district 

court’s failure to follow certain procedural timing rules. Folk 

does not complain that the District Court failed to notify him 

of his rights under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

Nor does he assert any other procedural error. His case is 

therefore not analogous to Peguero, Hill, and Timmreck, which 

recognized that a prejudicial procedural violation may be 

cognizable under § 2255.5

In Doe, a panel of this Court held that a misapplication 

of the career-offender designation under the mandatory

Guidelines was cognizable. Doe’s holding relied, in part, on 

Peguero. This Court said that “the incorrect computation of a 

mandatory Guidelines range” based on an erroneous careeroffender designation “is at least as serious as the error 

5 A miscalculation of a Guidelines range is a procedural error. 

See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The 

District Court’s designation of Folk as a career offender—a 

substantive decision—increased Folk’s Guidelines range. See, 

e.g., Doe, 810 F.3d at 159 (noting that a “substantive error”—

like a career-offender designation—results in “more time in 

prison”); see also Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 

n.11 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The misapplication of the careeroffender status—which increased Mr. Narvaez’s sentencing 

range—is certainly a substantive error.”); United States v. 

Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1116–17 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that 

a sentence was substantively unreasonable because it failed to 

account for a defendant’s career-offender status).

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discussed in Peguero and thus should also be cognizable 

[when] the mistake prejudices the defendant.” Doe, 810 F.3d 

at 159.

Doe involved a substantive error. Peguero (and its 

predecessor cases at the Supreme Court) involved procedural

errors that potentially caused prejudice. Doe thus blended the 

two avenues of § 2255 relief. Relying on Doe, Folk argues that 

the District Court’s allegedly erroneous career-offender 

designation prejudiced him. For example, Folk parrots Doe and 

argues that the alleged “substantive error, like more time in 

prison, is doubtless more serious than procedural error, like 

failure by the [sic] court to advise someone of appellate 

rights[.]” Appellant’s Reply Br. 3 (quoting Doe, 810 F.3d at 

159).

But the Supreme Court has never conducted a prejudice 

inquiry when deciding whether a substantive nonconstitutional 

error—rather than a procedural error—is cognizable under 

§ 2255. We decline Folk’s invitation to do so here.6 Because 

Folk does not complain of a prejudicial procedural error, his 

claim is not cognizable under § 2255 as “an omission 

6 Even if we analyzed the prejudice to Folk as Doe suggested,

Folk still would not prevail. Folk notes that the career-offender 

designation increased his advisory Guidelines range by one 

level. His resulting range was 420 months to life imprisonment. 

Without the increase, his Guidelines range would have been 

384 to 465 months’ imprisonment. He argues that he therefore

“suffered prejudice because he was sentenced under an 

incorrect Guidelines range regardless of whether the ultimate 

sentence falls within the correct Guideline[s] range upon 

remand.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 4. But the District Court 

sentenced Folk to 264 months’ imprisonment—ten years

below the bottom end of the Guidelines range without the 

career-offender enhancement. Folk is hard pressed to show that 

his below-the-Guidelines-range sentence constitutes a 

complete miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., United States v. 

Hoskins, 905 F.3d 97, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that a 

federal prisoner lacked a cognizable § 2255 claim for his 

within-Guidelines sentence).

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inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” 

Reed, 512 U.S. at 348 (plurality opinion).

C

In Doe, we held that an incorrect career-offender 

designation under the mandatory Guidelines is a fundamental 

defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice 

cognizable under § 2255. See 810 F.3d at 160. But United 

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005), made the 

Guidelines advisory. We have not yet addressed whether an 

incorrect career-offender designation under the advisory

Guidelines is cognizable under § 2255. 

Nearly every other circuit court of appeals has held or 

suggested that such a claim is not cognizable.7 Today, we join 

7 See Snider, 908 F.3d at 189 (holding that the defendant’s 

nonconstitutional “challenge to his advisory guidelines range 

suffers from a great defect: it is not cognizable under § 2255”); 

United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931, 940 (4th Cir. 2015) 

(same); Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1144 (en banc) (same); Hawkins 

v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2013), opinion 

supplemented on denial of reh’g, 724 F.3d 915 (same); Sun 

Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704–05 (8th Cir. 2011) 

(en banc) (holding that because applying the career-offender 

Guideline is an ordinary question of Guidelines interpretation, 

the error is not a fundamental defect resulting in a complete 

miscarriage of justice and is not cognizable under § 2255).

The Fifth Circuit has held that “[§] 2255 motions may 

raise only constitutional errors and other injuries that could not 

have been raised on direct appeal that will result in a 

miscarriage of justice if left unaddressed.” United States v. 

Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 

added) (citations omitted). Because “[m]isapplications of the 

Sentencing Guidelines fall into neither category . . . [they] are 

not cognizable in § 2255 motions.” Id. Because of this blanket 

prohibition, the Fifth Circuit has not expansively delineated the 

rule, unlike other circuits.

Two other circuits have faced the issue. The Second 

Circuit avoided drawing a “categorical conclusion,” but 

identified “the advisory nature of the challenged career 

offender Guidelines as one factor, among others,” that 

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our sister circuits and hold that an incorrect career-offender 

enhancement under the advisory guidelines is not cognizable 

under § 2255 because it is not a fundamental defect that 

inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.

Our conclusion is buttressed by four rationales: (1) the 

lawfulness of a sentence within the statutory limit; (2) the 

advisory nature of the Guidelines; (3) an interest in finality; 

and (4) a concern about workable standards.

1

Even when based on an incorrect advisory careeroffender enhancement, a sentence within the statutory 

maximum is lawful. See Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1138 (noting that 

a sentence is lawful if it is “less than the statutory maximum 

sentence prescribed by Congress” (citing United States v. 

Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1979)); cf. United States v. 

Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that 

statutory ranges “set the floor and the ceiling within which a 

district court must sentence, thereby . . . limit[ing] the extent to 

which a district court may permissibly stray from the 

Guidelines range” (citations omitted)). And a lawful sentence 

is not a complete miscarriage of justice. See Addonizio, 442 

U.S. at 186–87. So an incorrect career-offender designation 

that results in a sentence within the statutory maximum is not 

a fundamental defect inherently resulting in a complete 

miscarriage of justice and cannot be cognizable under § 2255.

District courts possess “broad discretion in imposing a 

sentence within a statutory range.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.

When sentencing defendants, district courts must consider the 

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which includes the kinds of 

precludes showing that a below- or within-Guidelines sentence 

is a “complete miscarriage of justice.” Hoskins, 905 F.3d at 104 

n.7. The First Circuit avoided the issue entirely by deciding a 

case on alternative grounds. See Cuevas v. United States, 778 

F.3d 267, 272 (1st Cir. 2015) (declining to address “the 

cognizability of a claim, like the one at issue in [Folk’s case],

that the sentencing court legally erred in applying the 

Guidelines”).

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sentences and the sentencing range suggested for certain 

violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). 

So long as a district court considers the § 3553(a) 

factors and imposes a sentence within the statutory limits for 

an offense, the criminal proceeding will not be “infected with 

any error of fact or law of the ‘fundamental’ character.” See 

Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 186. Such a sentence is lawful and

cannot be a complete miscarriage of justice.

Even if a sentencing error affects “the way in which the 

[sentencing] court’s judgment and sentence [will] be 

performed,” it does not “affect the lawfulness of the judgment 

itself—then or now.” Foote, 784 F.3d at 937 (quoting 

Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 187); see also Hawkins, 706 F.3d at

821–22, 824, opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g, 724 

F.3d 915 (noting that a “sentence that is well below the ceiling 

imposed by Congress” is not a complete miscarriage of justice 

even if the imposed sentence were “far above the [G]uidelines 

range that would have been applicable had the career offender 

guideline not been in play”).

For example, in Addonizio, the district court sentenced 

the defendant under the belief that the defendant would be 

eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence. 442 

U.S. at 186. After the defendant was sentenced, the parole 

commission changed its rules, which subjected the defendant 

to more time in prison before he would be eligible for parole. 

The district court’s incorrect assumption did not infect the 

proceeding “with any error of fact or law of the ‘fundamental’ 

character” and did not merit § 2255 relief. Id.

Based on Addonizio, other circuit courts have concluded 

that a sentencing error is not a fundamental defect requiring 

§ 2255 relief when a prisoner is sentenced below the statutory 

maximum. See Foote, 784 F.3d at 937; see also Spencer, 773 

F.3d at 1138 (citing Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 186–87) (noting 

that a sentence “less than the statutory maximum sentence 

prescribed by Congress” is lawful, and thus not a fundamental 

defect); Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 822, 824; Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at

705; cf. Snider, 908 F.3d at 191 (citing Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 

187) (noting that the defendant’s corrected sentence would fall 

within the same Guidelines range). We agree.

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2

Because the Guidelines are advisory and merely one 

factor considered within a sentencing court’s discretion, an 

incorrect career-offender enhancement is not a fundamental 

defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice.

First, oddities may arise if a court “declare[s] that a 

fundamental defect or a complete miscarriage of justice has 

occurred in a situation in which” a defendant could receive the 

same sentence “under an advisory Guidelines scheme requiring 

individualized analysis of the sentencing factors set forth in . . .

§ 3553(a).” Foote, 784 F.3d at 941. Even if a court provided 

§ 2255 relief for an erroneous career-offender designation, “the 

district court could [still] impose the same sentence again.” 

Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1140 (collecting cases); see also Sun 

Bear, 644 F.3d at 705 (noting that the same sentence could be 

reimposed); Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25 (acknowledging that 

the district court might have imposed a lower sentence but did 

not have to do so).

Second, the advisory Guidelines merely inform “the 

exercise of a [sentencing] court’s discretion in choosing an 

appropriate sentence within the statutory range.” Beckles v. 

United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017). It is true that the 

advisory Guidelines are the “starting point and the initial 

benchmark for sentencing.” Id. at 894 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. 

at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted)). But “the advisory 

Guidelines do not fix the permissible range of sentences.” Id.

at 892. “[A] sentencing court may no longer rely exclusively 

on the Guidelines range; rather, the court must make an 

individualized assessment based on the facts presented and the 

other statutory factors.” Id. at 894 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 

49 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Holding otherwise would transform the “advisory” 

Guidelines into more than a discretionary guide and undermine 

Booker. The Guidelines lack legal force and are not 

“tantamount to the laws of Congress” because they are

advisory and therefore not binding on a district court. Spencer, 

773 F.3d at 1142 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 

361, 395 (1989)); see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 

476, 501 (2011) (noting that “a district court may in 

appropriate cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on 

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a disagreement with the [Sentencing] Commission’s views”). 

So, a Guidelines error is not a fundamental defect like a 

“violation of a statute or constitutional provision” and does not 

inherently result in a complete miscarriage of justice. See

Foote, 784 F.3d at 942.

3

An interest in finality cautions against finding that an 

erroneous career-offender enhancement is a fundamental 

defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice.

Section 2255 does not provide relief for “every asserted error 

of law.” Davis, 417 U.S. at 346. It strikes a balance “between 

the interest in finality and the injustice of a possibly mistaken 

sentence,” such as one imposed after an incorrect careeroffender designation. Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 825. Allowing 

collateral challenges based on sentencing errors under the 

advisory Guidelines “would deal a wide-ranging blow to the 

judicial system’s interest in finality.” Foote, 784 F.3d at 943 

(citing Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184). Given a district court’s 

discretion and the advisory nature of the Guidelines, an 

incorrect career-offender designation is not the type of defect

that supports undermining finality. See Spencer, 773 F.3d at 

1144; Foote, 784 F.3d at 943.

4

There is no manageable limit to the types of sentencing 

errors that would be cognizable under § 2255 if an incorrect 

career-offender enhancement were found to be cognizable. 

“[I]t is hard to fathom what the dividing line would be between 

a fundamental defect and mere error” when applying the 

advisory Guidelines. Foote, 784 F.3d at 943. Courts may 

struggle “to catalog the subset of miscalculations of advisory 

[G]uidelines that are miscarriages of justice that can be 

corrected in [federal] postconviction proceedings.” Hawkins, 

706 F.3d at 825.

Perhaps we could establish a rule that an incorrect

career-offender enhancement qualifies for § 2255 relief 

because it is more serious than other sentencing errors. After 

all, the miscalculation increases the Guidelines range. But 

nearly all Guidelines errors will affect the range. See Spencer, 

773 F.3d at 1142 (citation omitted). On one hand, limiting 

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§ 2255 relief only to misapplications of the career-offender 

designation would be underinclusive. See Foote, 784 F.3d at 

943. But, if any sentencing error is cognizable on collateral 

review, then the rule would be overinclusive and disrupt 

finality. Id.; see also Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 825 (noting that the 

defendant’s argument requires “all [sentencing] errors (except, 

presumably, harmless ones) [to be] miscarriages of justice”). 

The breadth of such a rule would make the limited relief 

offered by § 2255 a boundless opportunity for criminal 

defendants to re-challenge their sentences.

D

Folk argues that this Court’s decision in Doe and 

Supreme Court opinions discussing the advisory Guidelines 

require a different outcome. We disagree.

In Doe, we held that an erroneous career-offender 

designation under the mandatory Guidelines is cognizable

under § 2255. 810 F.3d at 160. We reasoned that the 

“misclassification of the defendant as a career offender [was] 

at least as serious as the error discussed in Peguero” and 

“should also be cognizable [when] the mistake prejudices the 

defendant.” Id. at 159. When discussing prejudice to the 

defendant, Doe noted that the career-offender status applies to 

“a subgroup of defendants . . . that traditionally has been 

treated very differently from other offenders.” Id. (internal 

quotation mark and citation omitted). Doe then concluded that 

the “misapplication of the mandatory career-offender 

Guideline, when such a misapplication prejudices the 

[d]efendant, results in a sentence substantively not authorized 

by law and is therefore subject to attack on collateral review.” 

Id. at 160.

To reach the conclusion, this Court noted that 

“sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines” and 

even the advisory Guidelines “exert controlling influence on 

the sentence that the [sentencing] court will impose.” Id.

(quoting Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541, 545 

(2013)). We emphasized that the mandatory Guidelines carry 

“even greater force.” Id. (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 234). Doe 

also rejected the suggestion that a sentence within a statutory 

limit that violates the mandatory Guidelines is lawful and thus 

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15

cannot be challenged under § 2255. Id. We stated that Peugh

and Booker rendered this conclusion “implausible.” Id.

Folk adopts Doe’s approach and relies on Peugh and 

Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016), to 

argue that Doe’s holding applies to the advisory Guidelines. 

Folk emphasizes that Doe looked to “the actual world of 

sentencing.” Doe, 810 F.3d at 160. He argues that “the 

determinative role the advisory Guidelines continue to hold at 

federal sentencing, which is de facto similar to the role held by 

the mandatory Guidelines” requires us to apply Doe here. 

Appellant’s Br. 48. Folk’s argument is incorrect for several

reasons.

First, Doe’s narrow holding specifically did not extend 

to the advisory Guidelines. See 810 F.3d at 160 (“Our holding 

is narrow, and we do not consider challenges to the advisory 

Guidelines[.]”).

Second, the advisory Guidelines do not have “the force 

and effect of laws.” See Booker, 543 U.S. at 234. They are but 

one factor among many statutory factors that a district court 

considers when exercising its discretion at sentencing. So a 

district court may have multiple possible rationales supporting

a sentence. See United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 165 (4th 

Cir. 2008). A sentencing court is free to deviate from a 

Guidelines range within its discretion and after consideration 

of the mandatory factors in § 3553(a). Indeed, the District 

Court sentenced Folk to a term of imprisonment ten years 

below the bottom end of the Guidelines range without the 

career-offender enhancement.

What’s more, a sentencing court cannot presume the 

reasonableness of a within-Guidelines sentence. See Nelson v. 

United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (“The Guidelines are

not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not 

to be presumed reasonable.” (emphasis in original)). In sum, 

the Guidelines are a “system of guided discretion” that advises 

sentencing courts in “choos[ing] a sentence within [the] 

statutory limits.” Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894–95 (emphasis 

added).

Third, Folk’s reliance on Peugh and Molina-Martinez is

misplaced. Both cases involved direct appeals and not 

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postconviction collateral attacks. See Spencer, 773 F.3d at 

1144 (discussing Peugh’s differences); see also MolinaMartinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1341. The standards employed in both 

cases were “far less demanding than the standard” Folk “must 

satisfy: that an error in the application of [the] advisory 

[G]uidelines ‘inherently results in a complete miscarriage of 

justice.’” See Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1144 quoting Hill, 368 U.S. 

at 428). In Peugh, the petitioner had to show that “a change in 

law create[d] a significant risk of a higher sentence.” Hawkins, 

724 F.3d at 917 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Peugh, 569 U.S. at 550). And in Molina-Martinez, the

petitioner had to demonstrate error creating a “reasonable 

probability of a different outcome.” 136 S. Ct. at 1346. Finally, 

Peugh involved a constitutional error—a violation of the Ex 

Post Facto Clause. 569 U.S. at 538–39. Thus, the constitutional 

error—and not a nonconstitutional error misapplying a 

Sentencing Guideline—“invalidated the sentence.” Hawkins, 

724 F.3d at 916 (discussing Peugh).

Molina-Martinez established a mere “rebuttable 

presumption of prejudice” on direct appeal when a sentencing 

court miscalculates a Guidelines range, see Payano, 930 F.3d 

at 193, which suggests that the error does not inherently result 

in a complete miscarriage of justice.

Essentially, Folk contends that perhaps the District 

Court would impose an even lower sentence on remand. And 

because that possibility exists, Folk assertsthat he is prejudiced

and the incorrect career-offender designation is a fundamental 

defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. 

But it is also possible that, after further review of the § 3553(a) 

factors, the District Court would resentence Folk to the same

sentence—or perhaps a higher one. We will not speculate

about how a district court might resentence a criminal 

defendant were we to grant collateral relief. Even if one

hypothetical judge might lower a sentence upon remand, 

another judge may not. And the theoretical possibility of a 

lower sentence does not demonstrate the type of prejudice

necessary to show that the criminal defendant’s current 

sentence rests on a fundamental defect inherently resulting in 

a complete miscarriage of justice. Cf. Foote, 784 F.3d at 942;

Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1142–43; Hawkins, 724 F.3d at 917; Sun 

Bear, 644 F.3d at 706.

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* * *

In sum, we hold that a nonconstitutional claim based on 

an incorrect career-offender enhancement under the advisory 

Guidelines is not cognizable under § 2255. Because Folk’s 

career-offender claim is not cognizable, we need not address 

whether his previous convictions are “crimes of violence” 

under the career-offender Guideline.

IV

Folk has moved to expand the certificate of 

appealability to include his argument under our decision in 

Rowe, 919 F.3d 752. To resolve the motion, we must decide 

whether (a) Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of 

appealability is properly construed as a motion to amend his 

§ 2255 motion or as a second or successive habeas motion,

8

and (b) Folk’s motion survives the resulting standard. Based 

on our precedent, Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of 

appealability is a second or successive habeas motion. We also 

conclude that it fails to satisfy § 2255’s standard for second or 

successive habeas motions. So we will deny Folk’s motion to 

expand the certificate of appealability.

A

If a federal prisoner “has expended the ‘one full 

opportunity to seek collateral review’” that § 2255 affords him, 

then a later-filed motion to expand the scope of his § 2255 

motion is a second or successive motion. Santarelli, 929 F.3d 

at 105 (quoting Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 413 (3d Cir. 

2011)). A federal prisoner has expended his opportunity for 

collateral review if he “has exhausted all of [his] appellate 

remedies with respect to [his] initial habeas petition.” Id. But 

if a federal prisoner’s first § 2255 motion has not been 

resolved, then a motion to expand the scope of his § 2255 

motion is a motion to amend. Id. at 105–06.

8 Even though Folk filed his motion to expand the certificate of 

appealability with this Court, we may still find that it is a 

motion to amend. See, e.g., United States v. Santarelli, 929 

F.3d 95, 106 (3d Cir. 2019) (construing a petition filed with 

this Court during an appeal as a motion to amend).

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Thus, whether Folk’s motion to expand the certificate 

of appealability is a motion to amend or a second or successive 

§ 2255 motion depends on whether his incorrect careeroffender enhancement claims is cognizable. See id. It is not, so 

Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability is a 

second or successive habeas petition because Folk has

“expended the ‘one full opportunity to seek collateral review’” 

that § 2255 affords him. See id. (quoting Blystone, 664 F.3d at 

413).9

B

Having determined that Folk’s motion to expand the 

certificate of appealability is a second or successive § 2255 

motion, we must now decide whether to certify it. We must 

certify a federal prisoner’s second or successive § 2255 motion 

if the motion contains: (1) “newly discovered evidence ... 

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no 

reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of 

the offense;” or (2) “a new rule of constitutional law, made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 

that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)–(2). 

Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability

presents neither newly discovered evidence nor a new rule of 

constitutional law, so we will not certify Folk’s motion as a 

second or successive § 2255 motion. As Folk concedes, “Rowe

. . . is not ‘new evidence.’” See Appellant’s Reply to Gov’t’s 

Resp. to Mot. By Appellant to Expand the Certificate of 

Appealability and Permit Suppl. Briefing 5 n.3 (June 18, 2019).

So he fails to satisfy § 2255(h)’s first prong. And Rowe was a 

decision of this Court—and not the Supreme Court—so Folk 

does not satisfy § 2255(h)’s second prong. Accordingly, we 

will deny his motion.

V

Today we join every other circuit court of appeals in 

deciding that an incorrect career-offender enhancement under 

9 If we had decided to vacate or reverse the District Court, “the 

district court would again be vested with jurisdiction to 

consider” the motion to expand the certificate of appealability 

as a motion to amend. Santarelli, 929 F.3d at 106.

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the advisory Guidelines does not present a cognizable claim

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Thus, we will affirm the District 

Court’s order denying Folk’s § 2255 motion. We will also deny 

Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability 

because he does not satisfy the standard for a second or 

successive § 2255 motion.

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