Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00346/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00346-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alan R. Chinn
Defendant
Victoria Hernandez
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTORIA HERNANDEZ, )

) 02:05-cv-0346-GEB-KJM

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER*

v. )

)

ALAN R. CHINN, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment to recover

statutory damages on one of her state law claims. Defendant opposes

the motion. However, the merits of Plaintiff’s motion are not reached

since Plaintiff’s motion and Defendant’s opposition reveal that one of

Plaintiff’s Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims is moot,

and Plaintiff has not established standing to assert her other ADA

claim. Therefore, the ADA will no longer provide the basis for

federal question jurisdiction and the Court will decline to continue

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims.

Case 2:05-cv-00346-GEB -KJM Document 38 Filed 08/10/06 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed February 21, 2005, asserts two

injunctive relief claims against Defendant for violations of the ADA

and claims for injunctive relief and actual and statutory damages

under state law. Plaintiff’s claims stem from a January 4, 2005,

visit to a restaurant owned by Defendant. Plaintiff asserts that when

visiting Defendant’s restaurant she was “forced to exit (and

eventually re-enter) her vehicle in the middle of the parking lot,

rather than in a parking space” because Defendant’s “purportedly

accessible parking space” “did not have an access aisle.” (Compl. ¶

13.) Plaintiff also states she “went to use the women’s restroom and

discovered she was unable to get into it.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks

injunctive relief under the ADA and state law, and actual and

statutory damages under state law.

 Plaintiff’s partial summary judgment motion seeks “the

statutory minimum of $4,000" in state law statutory damages for the

alleged “lack of an access aisle” violation. (Mot. at 7.) The motion

is supported by Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts. 

Plaintiff’s tenth undisputed fact states that after the Complaint was

filed, Defendant “resurfaced the [r]estaurant’s parking lot [and]

painted a new accessible parking space with an adjacent diagonally

striped [eight] foot wide access aisle.” (Pl.’s Statement of

Undisputed Facts at 5.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s tenth

undisputed fact reveals Plaintiff’s ADA claim for the alleged access

aisle violation is now moot. (Opp’n at 6.)

If an ADA “plaintiff[][has] already . . . received

everything to which [she] would be entitled, i.e., the challenged

conditions have been remedied, then these particular claims are

moot . . . .” Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982

Case 2:05-cv-00346-GEB -KJM Document 38 Filed 08/10/06 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Injunctive relief is the only remedy available to Plaintiff 1

under the ADA. Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)). Plaintiff’s statement in her Reply

that she “continues to allege that there are barriers . . . in the

parking lot” is contradicted by her Complaint and motion since her tenth

undisputed fact makes clear the alleged access aisle violation has been

remedied and Plaintiff has alleged no other parking lot barrier in her

Complaint. 

3

F. Supp. 698, 771 (D. Or. 1997). Since the alleged access aisle

violation has been remedied, injunctive relief cannot be granted under

the ADA for that alleged violation because this ADA claim is moot.1

Plaintiff, however, contends she still has a viable ADA

claim because other unremedied barriers remain in the women’s

restroom. (Mot. at 2.) The issue of Plaintiff’s standing to bring a

claim based on these alleged barriers is raised sua sponte. B.C. v.

Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999)

(stating “federal courts are required sua sponte to examine

jurisdictional issues such as standing”).

To establish standing a plaintiff must show: “(1) [she] has

suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized

and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the

injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;

and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81

(2000). To meet the “concrete and particularized” prong of the injury

in fact element, “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal

and individual way.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560 n.1 (1992). Thus, Plaintiff “must [her]self suffer an injury as a

result of the . . . [restaurant’s] noncompliance with the ADA.”

Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1137. A plaintiff suffers an injury in fact from

Case 2:05-cv-00346-GEB -KJM Document 38 Filed 08/10/06 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s Reply states she “could not get her wheelchair 2

into the women’s restroom,” ostensibly because the doorway was too

narrow. (Reply at 15.) However, Plaintiff has not pled an allegation

supporting the inference that the narrowness of the doorway constituted

an ADA architectural barrier.

4

ADA noncompliance if she personally encounters the barrier complained

of, or she has actual knowledge of the barrier complained of and has

been deterred from visiting the public accommodation because of that

barrier. Id. at 1137-38.

Although Plaintiff states in her motion that “there are

barriers in the women’s restroom,” Plaintiff did not allege in her

Complaint that she encountered or had actual knowledge of said

barriers and was deterred from visiting Defendant’s restaurant because

of them. Plaintiff’s Complaint merely states she “went to use the 2

women’s restroom and discovered she was unable to get into it.” 

(Comp. ¶ 13.) An individual may be unable to “get into” a restroom

for any number of reasons that do not involve encountering an

architectural barrier that violates the ADA, e.g. the facility is

being cleaned or is currently in use. Plaintiff’s vague allegation of

being unable to “get into” the restroom requires conjecture to be

construed as alleging an actionable architectural barrier, and

consequently is insufficient to establish Plaintiff suffered an injury

in fact under the ADA. Cf. Harris v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 389 F.

Supp. 2d 1244, 1251-52 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (plaintiff did not suffer an

injury under the ADA where something other than an architectural

barrier made facility unaccessible to plaintiff). Therefore,

Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of establishing she has

standing to bring a claim based on architectural barriers concerning

Case 2:05-cv-00346-GEB -KJM Document 38 Filed 08/10/06 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

the women’s restroom. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (indicating the

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing each element of standing).

Since Plaintiff’s ADA access aisle claim is moot and

Plaintiff has not established standing to bring a claim based on

barriers concerning the women’s restroom, Plaintiff’s ADA claims are

dismissed. 

Since federal question jurisdiction no longer exists, the

issue is reached whether supplemental jurisdiction should continue

being exercised over Plaintiff’s state claims. Under § 1367(c), the

district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

a state claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction . . . .” The exercise of this

“discretion . . . is informed by the [United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715,(1966)] values of economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). “[I]n the usual case in

which all federal-law claims are eliminated . . . , the balance of

factors to be considered . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Wade v. Reg’l Credit

Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Where a district court

dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims for resolution,

it should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them

without prejudice.”).

Here, a decision on the remaining state injunctive relief

and damage claims should be made in state court since “[n]eedless

decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity

and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a

Case 2:05-cv-00346-GEB -KJM Document 38 Filed 08/10/06 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed without

prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s ADA claims are

dismissed. Further, Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed under

§ 1367(c) as of the date on which this Order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-00346-GEB -KJM Document 38 Filed 08/10/06 Page 6 of 6