Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-03390/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-03390-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Orlando Lopez
Petitioner
William Muniz
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORLANDO LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ,

Respondent.

Case No. 17-cv-03390-JCS 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE MOTION TO APPOINT 

COUNSEL

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Orlando Lopez seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from his state 

convictions. See Pet. (dkt. 1). The petition for such relief is here for review under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Because Lopez’s claims are 

cognizable when liberally construed, the Court allows the matter to proceed. Respondent William 

Muniz shall file a response to the petition within 90 days.1 In conjunction with his petition, Lopez 

moves for appointment of counsel pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). See Mot. (dkt. 2). 

Because Lopez has not established that the interests of justice warrant appointment of counsel, the 

Court denies Lopez’s motion without prejudice, as detailed below.

II. BACKGROUND

Lopez states in his petition that he was convicted of murder, among other charges, 

following a jury trial, and sentenced to 311 years to life in state prison in August of 2012. See Pet.

¶¶ 17, 19. On direct appeal, a California appellate court reduced Lopez’s first-degree murder 

conviction to second-degree murder, and ordered the trial court to stay Lopez’s sentence on certain 

counts for mayhem, but otherwise substantially affirmed Lopez’s conviction and sentence. See 

 

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Lopez has consented to the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c).

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People v. Lopez, No. A136253, 2016 WL 634651 (Cal. App. Feb. 17, 2016). Lopez then filed a 

Petition for Review to Exhaust State Remedies with the California Supreme Court pursuant to 

Rule 8.508 of the California Rules of Court, which the California Supreme Court summarily 

denied. Lopez also filed a petition for habeas corpus in the California First District Court of 

Appeal, raising Sixth Amendment claims, but that court, over the dissent of one justice, declined 

to issue an order to show cause, instead denying the petition for failure to present a prima facie 

case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme Court summarily denied 

Lopez’s petition for review of that decision. On June 12, 2017, Lopez filed a petition for habeas 

corpus in this Court on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support Lopez’s 

convictions and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. See Pet. 

III. ANALYSIS

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A 

district court considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus shall “award the writ or issue an 

order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears 

from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2243. Summary dismissal is appropriate only where the allegations in the petition are vague or 

conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently frivolous or false. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 

490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Lopez asserts that there was insufficient evidence to 

convict him and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment. See generally Pet. When liberally construed, these claims are cognizable in a 

federal habeas corpus action. See Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) 

(discussing the availability of federal habeas relief for insufficient evidence under Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–99 (1984) 

(discussing the standard for federal habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel).

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IV. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

On June 16, 2017, Lopez also submitted an ex parte motion for appointment of counsel

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). See Mot. In his motion, Lopez “requests that the Court 

appoint Dylan Schaffer and Matthew Dirkes as counsel to represent him” in connection with this 

matter. Mot. at 2. Lopez explains that Schaffer and Dirkes are currently representing him pro 

bono and have already represented him on his direct appeal in state court as well as state habeas 

proceedings. Id. Asserting that “[t]he interests of justice weigh in favor of the appointment of 

counsel given that Mr. Lopez is indigent and his petition raises complex legal issues,” and noting 

counsel’s prior experience, Lopez urges this court to appoint Schaffer and Dirkes as his counsel 

for the current proceedings. See id. Specifically, Lopez contends that the complexity of legal and 

factual issues, such as state-law errors regarding accomplice testimony, “the number of counts 

charged, the number of defendants, . . . the legal theories upon which the prosecution obtained 

convictions,” and the “manifestly unjust” nature of Lopez’s life sentence all weigh in favor of 

appointment of counsel. Id. at 4. Lopez contends that should he “be compelled to proceed on his 

own, it will be virtually impossible for him to pursue the claims in the petition given his lack of 

understanding of the complex legal issues.” Id. Additionally, Lopez argues that “[c]ounsel should 

be appointed given that Mr. Lopez’s federal habeas claims will rely at least in part on testimony 

from two experts” regarding acoustic signatures of firearms and the cognitive impact of 

methamphetamine. Id. at 5 (citing Pet. ¶¶ 169–94; David v. Johnson, No. 15-cv-05760-HSG, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57516, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2016)).

In support of Lopez’s motion for appointment of counsel, Lopez’s attorney, Dylan L. 

Schaffer submits a declaration detailing his involvement in Lopez’s case and Lopez’s need for 

financial assistance. See Schaffer Decl. (dkt. 22). Schaffer explains that he first became involved 

in Lopez’s legal proceedings when he was appointed counsel for Lopez’s Court of Appeal and 

California Supreme Court appeals, where he spent much time familiarizing himself with Lopez’s 

case. Id. ¶ 2–3. While representing Lopez in those appeals, Schaffer concluded that Lopez 

 

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Schaffer’s declaration is included in the same docket entry as the motion for appointment of 

counsel, appearing as pages six and seven of that document. 

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received ineffective assistance of counsel at the Superior Court level prompting his initiation of 

the present federal and previous state habeas corpus claims. Id. ¶ 4. Schaffer notes that Lopez is 

“indigent and lacks the financial ability to hire counsel to represent him in connection with his 

federal habeas proceedings,” leading Schaffer to file the petition on his behalf pro bono. Id. ¶¶ 5–

6; see Pet. 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2), “representation may be provided for any financially 

eligible person who . . . (B) is seeking relief under . . . section 2254,” where “a United States 

magistrate judge or the court determines that the interest of justice so require.” Appointment of 

counsel for indigent individuals is at the discretion of the district court and flows from the court’s 

determination of whether “the interests of justice so require.” Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 

1196 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[i]ndigent 

state prisoners applying for habeas relief are not entitled to appointed counsel unless the 

circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due 

process violations.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Kreiling v. Field, 431 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1970) (per 

curiam)). 

The Court is not satisfied that the present record demonstrates that failure to appoint 

counsel would violate Lopez’s right to due process, and therefore DENIES the motion at this time, 

without prejudice to Lopez renewing his motion after Respondent Muniz files an answer or 

motion in response to this order. 

V. CONCLUSION

1. The Clerk shall serve a copy of this order, the petition and all attachments thereto, and a 

magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination form on Respondent and Respondent’s 

counsel, the Attorney General for the State of California. 

2. Within ninety (90) days of the date this order is filed, Respondent shall file an answer 

conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause 

why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted based on Lopez’s claims. Respondent shall file 

with the answer all portions of the state trial record that previously have been transcribed and that 

are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition. 

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3. If Lopez wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a traverse with the 

Court within thirty (30) days of the date the answer is filed. 

4. In lieu of an answer, Respondent may file, within ninety (90) days of the date this order 

is filed, a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, as set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes 

to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If Respondent files such a motion, Lopez

shall file an opposition or statement of non-opposition within thirty (30) days of the date the 

motion is filed, and Respondent shall file a reply within fifteen (15) days of the date any 

opposition is filed.

5. Upon a showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will be 

granted provided they are filed on or before the deadlines they seek to extend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 17, 2017

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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