Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00662/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00662-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Fresno
Defendant
Farshad Oreizi
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from Plaintiff Farshad Oreizi’s former employment with Defendant 

County of Fresno (“the County”).

A majority of Oreizi’s action is predicated on his allegations of the County’s actions of 

discrimination and retaliation based on his national origin. As drawn from the complaint, Oreizi 

was born in Iran, immigrated to the United States at the age of 15, became a naturalized American 

citizen, and continues to have an Iranian accent. From 1996 until March 2017, Oreizi worked in 

the County’s Department of Agriculture. In 2007, he rose to a position supervising the largest 

district within that department. In 2009, Oreizi’s supervisor Les Wright told him “don’t side with 

the bad guys,” when Oreizi requested leave to go to Iran for his father’s funeral. In April 2016, 

Oreizi’s supervisor Stace Leoni told Oreizi that he had problems working with women because he 

was from the Middle East. Leoni repeated claims of this kind on numerous occasions. Thereafter, 

Oreizi sought advice from the County’s Human Resources Department and later informed Leoni 

about this contact. Following a back and forth, Leoni demanded Oreizi meet with her regarding 

the complaints, at which time Oreizi informed Leoni that he objected to her stereotyping him as a 

sexist Middle-Easterner. In May 2016, Oreizi requested a meeting with Leoni and other 

FARSHAD OREIZI,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF FRESNO and DOES 1 

through 20, inclusive, 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:18-cv-00662-AWI-EPG

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

(Doc. Nos. 40 & 44)

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

supervisors. Leoni recorded the meeting without Oreizi’s knowledge. Leoni also secretly 

recorded another meeting between Oreizi, Leoni, and another person around the same time. In 

June 2016, Oreizi was advised he had been placed on administrative leave. In October 2016, he 

was given a disciplinary action order, which advised that he would be terminated on October 12, 

2016. Oreizi requested a hearing before the Fresno County Civil Service Commission. After 

holding a hearing, the Commission reversed the decision of termination and ordered that Oreizi be 

reinstated subject to a 240-hour suspension without pay. The County’s appeal of the 

Commission’s determination was rejected. Oreizi returned to work on March 15, 2017. He was 

then constructively terminated when he submitted his resignation on March 18, 2017.

Oreizi currently proceeds to trial with eight causes of action: (1) discrimination under the 

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940; (2) retaliation 

under § 12940; (3) failure to provide a workplace free of harassment, discrimination, and 

retaliation under § 12940; (4) whistleblower retaliation (pre-civil service hearing) under Cal. 

Labor Code § 1102.5; (5) whistleblower retaliation (post-civil service hearing) under § 1102.5; (6) 

violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); (7) defamation; and (8) invasion 

of privacy. Doc. No. 1 at 6–19 (“Compl.”).

In anticipation of trial, Oreizi has filed a motion in limine, and the County has filed 

sixteen. Doc. Nos. 40 & 44. The Court held a hearing on the motions on August 30, 2021.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions in limine

“A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or evidence 

in a particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). Motions in 

limine may be “made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the 

evidence is actually offered.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). “Although the 

Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed 

pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Id. at 41 n.4; 

Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997); see also City of 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining motions in limine 

“are useful tools to resolve issues which would otherwise clutter up the trial” (quoted source 

omitted)).

In Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, the Ninth Circuit cited with approval the following 

“standards applicable to motions in limine”: 

Judges have broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine. However, a motion in 

limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence. To exclude 

evidence on a motion in limine, the evidence must be inadmissible on all potential 

grounds. Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred 

until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be 

resolved in proper context. This is because although rulings on motions in limine may 

save time, costs, effort and preparation, a court is almost always better situated during the 

actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence.

735 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Goodman v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 963 

F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1047 (D. Nev. 2013), rev’d in part on other grounds by 613 F. App’x 610 (9th 

Cir. 2015)); see also Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004).

By resolving a motion in limine, the court may prevent the presentation of potentially 

prejudicial evidence to the jury, which also eliminates the need to try to neutralize a prejudicial

taint after the evidence has already been presented. See Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004–05 

(9th Cir. 2003). Notwithstanding a motion in limine ruling, a court may change course at trial in 

the event that testimony or other evidence “bring[s] facts to the district court’s attention that it did 

not anticipate at the time of its initial ruling.” United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1127 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41–42).

B. Admissibility generally

Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 

would be without the evidence, and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Fed. 

R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. “Relevancy is not an 

inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of 

evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 

552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee notes). Even if 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

relevance is established, the court may exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 

misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

DISCUSSION

In this order, the Court will address the County’s Motions in Limine Nos. 1 through 15 

(exclusive of Nos. 3 and 4). For the matters not addressed here, during the motions-in-limine 

hearing, the Court instructed the parties to meet and confer and provide a proposed summary 

judgment briefing schedule. The Court will reserve its rulings on these matters at this time.

A. The County’s Motion No. 1 concerning evidence for defamation claim

The County seeks an order excluding evidence regarding Oreizi’s defamation cause of 

action. Doc. No. 44 at 6–7.

As background, under his seventh cause of action, Oreizi first incorporates all preceding 

allegations. Compl., ¶ 50. He then alleges that in June 2016, County employees told a grower 

who had worked with Oreizi that the grower “should call the Sheriff’s Department immediately” if 

Oreizi should come to the grower’s property. Id., ¶ 52. Oreizi alleges that the grower understood 

this to mean that Oreizi was a criminal or terrorist and that Oreizi was a threat to the grower’s life. 

Id. Oreizi alleges that other growers were told the same thing and that there were discussions 

within the County describing him as a threat or a criminal. Id.

In its motion, the County asserts that Oreizi should be barred from introducing evidence to 

prove his defamation cause of action at trial because he failed to first present such a claim under 

California’s Government Claims Act. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4.

Oreizi’s opposition contains two positions. Doc. No. 46 at 3. First, Oreizi concedes that 

he failed to comply with the Government Claims Act as to this claim, and states that he agrees to 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

the dismissal of his defamation cause of action.1 Second, he disputes that, notwithstanding this 

dismissal, evidence regarding relevant defamatory statements should be admissible at trial. He 

contends that such evidence is consistent with and corroborates the central tenet of his case: 

namely, that he was discriminated against because of his national origin and that he later suffered 

retaliation when he complained of such discrimination. To that point, he emphasizes that the 

terrorism-themed comments that were made to growers were similar to others regarding his 

Iranian ancestry that were made to him by his supervisors and that underlie his discrimination 

claim.

In reply, the County accepts Oreizi’s proposal to dismiss his claim. Doc. No. 57 at 3. It 

also asserts that Oreizi’s contention that defamation-related evidence should still be admitted is 

without merit, as none of the alleged statements were based on him being a terrorist or his national 

origin. The County argues Oreizi is merely attempting an end-run on the Government Claims Act.

To start, the Court finds that the County’s motion effectively seeks a dispositive ruling on 

Oreizi’s defamation claim. This is not an appropriate use of a motion in limine. Notwithstanding, 

based on Oreizi’s proposal, the Court will dismiss the defamation cause of action. The Court will 

also deny the County’s blanket request to exclude any evidence that could have supported that 

claim, as the County has not yet identified specific evidence that is properly excluded as 

inadmissible. The County may renew its motion at trial outside the presence of the jury. At that 

time, it must be prepared to show how any disputed evidence is wholly inadmissible.

B. The County’s Motion No. 2 concerning evidence for invasion of privacy claim

The County seeks an order excluding evidence regarding Oreizi’s invasion of privacy

cause of action. Doc. No. 44 at 8–9.

As background, under his eighth cause of action, Oreizi incorporates all preceding 

allegations and then alleges that, in April 2016, County agents or employees secretly recorded a 

conversation or meeting with him without his knowledge or permission. Compl., ¶¶ 55–56. He 

1 Oreizi reiterated and confirmed this position at the motions-in-limine hearing.

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

further alleges that he believed that this conversation or meeting was confidential and not being 

overheard by anyone other than the participants. Id., ¶ 56. Oreizi alleged that these actions of the 

County violated California Penal Code § 632. Id., ¶ 57. Elsewhere in the complaint, Oreizi 

alleged that in May 2016 he requested a meeting with his supervisor Stace Leoni and other 

supervisors after he had (1) sought advice from human resources to complain about Leoni and 

inquire about his rights in dealing with difficult supervisors; (2) revealed the contact with human 

resources to Leoni and endured a very angry reaction from Leoni as well as demands to know the 

reason for such contact; and (3) informed Leoni in a meeting that followed that he objected to her 

stereotyping him as a sexist Middle-Easterner. Id., ¶¶ 9–10. Oreizi next alleges that Leoni 

recorded the May 2016 meeting without his knowledge, as well as another meeting between him, 

Leoni, and another person around the same time. Id., ¶ 10. He believed these meetings were 

confidential and not recorded, and only learned of the recordings through a County investigator at 

the end of 2016. Id. Oreizi alleges that he is informed and believes that Leoni recorded other 

meetings without his knowledge. Id.

The County’s motion follows the same pattern as the one above. Namely, the County 

contends that Oreizi failed to comply with the claim presentation requirements of the Government 

Claims Act for purposes of his invasion of privacy cause of action and that Oreizi should be barred 

from introducing evidence to prove the cause of action at trial because of this failure.

Oreizi opposes this motion as he opposed the motion above. Doc. No. 46 at 4. He 

concedes dismissal of the invasion of privacy cause of action on grounds of his failure to comply 

with the Government Claims Act,2but disagrees with total exclusion of evidence regarding the 

statements to growers and secret recording of meetings as that evidence is consistent with and 

corroborates those claims he will bring to trial.

In reply, the County accepts Oreizi’s proposal to dismiss his claim. Doc. No. 57 at 4. It 

also argues that Oreizi’s contention that evidence related to that claim should still be admitted is 

without merit and that Oreizi is merely attempting an end-run on the Government Claims Act.

2 Once again, Oreizi reiterated and confirmed this position at the motions-in-limine hearing.

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

The Court reaches the same conclusion here as it did above for the County’s challenge to 

Oreizi’s defamation cause of action. That is, based on Oreizi’s filing, the Court will dismiss the 

invasion of privacy cause of action. As to the admissibility of any evidence that could have 

supported that claim, the Court will deny the County’s blanket request and reserve further ruling 

on such matters at this time. The County may renew its motion at trial outside the presence of the 

jury, at which time it must be prepared to show why any disputed evidence should be excluded.

C. The County’s Motion No. 5 concerning settlement/compromise evidence

The County seeks an order excluding evidence regarding settlement discussions or offers 

to compromise, including any details therein as it relates to Oreizi and previous plaintiffs. Doc. 

No. 44 at 14. The County bases its request on Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Oreizi does not 

oppose the County’s motion. Doc. No. 46 at 10. Accordingly, the Court will grant the County’s 

motion based on and in a manner consistent with the County’s request.

D. The County’s Motion No. 6 concerning presence of non-testifying witnesses

The County seeks an order requiring exclusion from the courtroom of all non-party 

witnesses who are not testifying. Doc. No. 44 at 15. The County bases its request on Federal Rule 

of Evidence 615. Oreizi does not oppose the County’s motion. Doc. No. 46 at 11. Accordingly, 

the Court will grant the County’s motion based on and in a manner consistent with the County’s 

request. At the motions-in-limine hearing, the Court informed the parties as to their own duty to 

ensure prospective witnesses are not present during the presentation of other witnesses’ testimony.

E. The County’s Motion No. 7 concerning references to law firm size

The County seeks an order excluding reference to the size or number of members of a law 

firm. Doc. No. 44 at 16. The County asserts such information is irrelevant to any matter in this 

case and might be used to engender bias against its lawyers. The County bases its request on 

Rules 402 and 403. Oreizi does not oppose the County’s motion. Doc. No. 46 at 12. 

Accordingly, the Court will grant the County’s motion based on and in a manner consistent with 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

the County’s request.

F. The County’s Motion No. 8 concerning evidence of other lawsuits or adverse 

proceedings

The County seeks an order excluding evidence concerning any other lawsuits in which it 

was or is a named defendant, including any claims or Civil Service Commission matters not 

directly brought by Oreizi in this matter. Doc. No. 44 at 17. The County bases its request on 

Rules 402 and 403. Oreizi does not oppose the County’s motion. Doc. No. 46 at 13. 

Accordingly, the Court will grant the County’s motion based on and in a manner consistent with 

the County’s request.

G. The County’s Motion No. 9 concerning evidence of motivations for 

employment decisions

The County seeks an order excluding evidence consisting of opinions, feelings, and beliefs 

regarding the motivations for its employment decisions. Doc. No. 44 at 18. The County asserts 

that witnesses, including Oreizi, may attempt to testify as to their opinions, feelings, and beliefs 

regarding whether certain engagement in protected activities had anything to do with unwelcome 

employment decisions. Such testimony, the County contends, is irrelevant, pure speculation, 

without foundation, inadmissible opinion, and more prejudicial than probative. As to irrelevance, 

the County clarifies that whether Oreizi or other witnesses “believe” or “feel” that they were the 

victims of retaliation or discrimination is not evidence from which to infer that a specific decision 

was motivated by an engagement in a protected activity. According to the County, to introduce 

such evidence would require a mini-trial to prove or disprove the accuracy of the witness’s

opinion on the question of the lawfulness of the County’s conduct.

Oreizi offers a qualified opposition to the County’s motion. Doc. No. 46 at 14. He does 

not oppose this motion to the extent that it does not purport to prevent him from presenting 

evidence regarding his emotional distress arising from being the subject of discriminatory and 

retaliatory employment decisions. This evidence, Oreizi asserts, is relevant to his damages claim 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

and exclusion of such testimony would be unfairly prejudicial. If such evidence can come in, 

Oreizi proposes that a limiting instruction be given to advise the jury that it can consider such 

evidence only for the issue of determining emotional distress.

In reply, the County asserts that Oreizi’s qualified opposition is without merit and fails to 

provide any supporting authority. Doc. No. 57 at 10. The County asserts that its motion should be 

granted without qualification

The Court will deny the County’s motion. The County has not identified specific evidence 

that is properly excluded as inadmissible and supports its motion only with an inapt comparison to 

a summary judgment decision. Roberson v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 07-2140-JAM-JFM, 

2009 WL 4715859, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009). Oreizi’s opposition indicates that there may be 

some bases for the admission of evidence of this kind and suggests there may be reasonable

alternatives to a blanket exclusion order. The County may renew its motion at trial outside the 

presence of the jury, at which time it must be prepared to show why any disputed evidence should 

be excluded.

H. The County’s Motion No. 10 concerning lay witness opinions on 

discrimination or retaliation

The County seeks an order excluding evidence consisting of lay witness opinions offered 

to prove the existence of discrimination or retaliation. Doc. No. 44 at 19. The County contends 

that lay witness testimony offered to demonstrate discrimination constitutes an inadmissible legal 

conclusion. That is, such testimony is conclusory in nature because of the separate, distinct, and 

special legal meaning of the terms “discrimination” and “retaliation.” The County also asserts that 

such evidence would be irrelevant and worthy of exclusion under Rule 403.

In opposition, Oreizi posits that there are better ways to address and limit the threat of lay 

witnesses testifying as to legal conclusions. Doc. No. 46 at 15–16. Specifically, Oreizi states that 

counsel can be required to preface relevant questions with language indicating that the ensuing 

testimony constitutes a lay opinion (e.g., “is it your law opinion that X was discriminated against,” 

as opposed to “was X discriminated against”). Oreizi also proposes that the jury can be instructed 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

that it is to use any answer to questions of this kind only for purposes of assessing the state of 

mind of the testifying witness. Oreizi asserts that these alternative options should be pursued here 

because granting the County’s motion would unfairly distort the facts presented to the jury and 

prevent him from proving an element of his claim. As to the latter concern, Oreizi points out that

making his case under Labor Code § 1102.5 (for purposes of his fourth and fifth causes of action) 

necessarily involves presenting evidence as to his reasonable beliefs that he was subjected to 

discrimination in violation of Government Code § 12940. He adds that proving his claims will

also involve his testifying that he told others he was discriminated against. Oreizi acknowledges 

that his mere provision of this kind of testimony does not make it true, and that he will still need to 

present evidence of actual discrimination in order to prevail on claims under § 12940.

In reply, the County asserts that Oreizi’s opposition has no legs because his whistleblower 

claims under § 1102.5 are without merit and should be barred. Doc. No. 57 at 10.

The Court will deny the County’s motion. Resolution of this motion is similar to the one 

discussed immediately above. The County has not identified specific evidence that is properly 

excluded as inadmissible and Oreizi indicates that there may be some bases for the admission of 

foundational evidence of this kind. The Court is also confident that ensuring lay witnesses do not 

provide legal opinions can be accomplished through means other than the blanket exclusion order 

that the County seeks. To that end, at the motions-in-limine hearing, the Court discussed with 

counsel their ability to object to improper lay witness testimony. Should it prove necessary, the 

County may renew its motion at trial outside the presence of the jury, at which time it must be 

prepared to show why any disputed evidence should be excluded.

I. The County’s Motion No. 11 concerning pre-limitation period discrimination

The County seeks an order excluding evidence of any discriminatory comments made prior 

to the applicable limitation period. Doc. No. 44 at 20. Specifically, the County asserts that any 

evidence of discrimination prior to December 7, 2015, should be barred, as it falls outside of the 

one-year statute of limitations for filing a complaint with the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing. According to the County, such evidence is either not relevant or 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

properly excluded under Rule 403.

Oreizi objects to the County’s request on grounds that case law generally deems such 

evidence admissible under the continuing-violation doctrine or as background information for the 

viable period. Doc. No. 46 at 17–18. Oreizi also challenges the County’s request for a lack of 

specificity regarding what particular evidence the County seeks to exclude.

In reply, the County asserts that Oreizi cannot avail himself of the continuing-violation 

doctrine, as it is his burden to show that that exception to the general rule applies and he has failed 

to meet that burden here. Doc. No. 57 at 11.

Under California law, “[a] plaintiff suing for violations of [the Fair Employment and 

Housing Act] ordinarily cannot recover for acts occurring more than one year before the filing of 

the [Department of Fair Employment and Housing] complaint.” Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles, 

241 Cal. App. 4th 1390, 1400 (2015); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960(e). Recovery for acts 

occurring before the one-year period can still be had if the continuing-violation doctrine applies. 

“[W]hen an employer engages in a continuing course of unlawful conduct under the [Fair 

Employment and Housing Act] . . . the statute of limitations begins to run not necessarily when the 

employee first believes that his or her rights may have been violated, but rather, either when the 

course of conduct is brought to an end, as by the employer’s cessation of such conduct or by the 

employee’s resignation, or when the employee is on notice that further efforts to end the unlawful 

conduct will be in vain.” Jumaane, 241 Cal. App. 4th at 1400 (quoting Richards v. CH2M Hill, 

Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798, 824 (2001)). The plaintiff has the burden to prove that the employer’s 

conduct outside the limitations period (1) was similar or related to the conduct within the 

limitations period; (2) was reasonably frequent; and (3) had not yet become permanent (i.e., clear 

showing to reasonable employee that informal conciliation will be futile). Id. at 1402. Moreover, 

evidence of time-barred discriminatory acts may still constitute relevant background evidence in 

support of a timely discrimination claim. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 102 (2002)); Richards, 26 Cal. 4th 

at 812 (citing United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)).

Based on the parties’ briefing the Court is left in the dark. The County does not provide 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

specific examples of evidence that it believes will be presented and should be excluded. Without 

information of this kind, the Court has no ability to determine the relevance of specific evidence, 

nor whether the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 

effect. Nor can the Court assess any evidence-specific argument regarding potential application of 

the continuing-violation doctrine or admission of evidence as background information. If 

necessary, this issue can be renewed at trial outside of the jury’s presence. At this stage, however, 

the Court will deny the County’s motion for a blanket exclusion order.

J. The County’s Motion No. 12 concerning golden rule arguments

The County seeks an order excluding argument or statement from Oreizi’s counsel to the 

jury suggesting that jurors should calculate Oreizi’s alleged damages according to the amount they 

believe they would be personally entitled to as recompense for similar injuries. Doc. No. 44 at 21. 

The County cites Rule 403 as the basis for its motion. Oreizi does not oppose the County’s 

motion. Doc. No. 46 at 19. Accordingly, the Court will grant the County’s motion based on and 

in a manner consistent with the County’s request.

K. The County’s Motion No. 13 concerning recently disclosed witness

The County seeks an order excluding witness Carla Gile. Doc. No. 44 at 22. Gile was 

included in the pretrial order amongst Oreizi’s list of witnesses that were expected to be called at 

trial. Doc. No. 39 at 11.3

The County asserts that Oreizi should not be permitted to call Gile to testify at trial 

because he only disclosed the witness on the eve of trial. The County adds that Oreizi was (or 

should have been) aware of Gile’s identity years ago, and that the witness should have been 

disclosed initially or at least during discovery. The County contends that, without timely 

disclosure, Oreizi prejudicially hampered its ability to consider, analyze, and discover how the 

witness may relate to the claims.

3 The pretrial order referred to Gile as “Carla Giles,” as this is how Oreizi originally identified the prospective witness. 

The parties each alternate between “Gile” and “Giles” throughout their briefing on the County’s motion.

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Oreizi opposes the County’s request. Doc. No. 46 at 20–21. Through declarations from 

counsel and himself (Doc. No. 46 at 31–32), Oreizi provides the following information in support 

of his opposition: Gile was a County employee until late 2020. He accidentally ran into Gile on 

or about July 30, 2021, and his counsel spoke with her on August 4, 2021, after being told that she 

was no longer employed by the County. Through that conversation, Gile confirmed that (1) she 

had the office next to the one that Oreizi was given when he returned to the Department of 

Agriculture in the spring of 2017, (2) she knew that Oreizi’s office had been occupied by her 

former boss before that time, and (3) Oreizi’s office had had a computer, phone, and door, all of 

which were removed immediately prior to Oreizi’s arrival. This information was communicated 

by counsel to the County’s counsel.

With these facts, Oreizi asserts that the relevance of Gile as a witness was not known to 

him until August 4, 2021. He contends that his ignorance constituted substantial justification for 

the prior nondisclosure, and that the County will not be prejudiced because it knew or had access 

to the same information given that Gile was a County employee up until late 2020. He also 

emphasizes allegations in the complaint that indicate the conditions regarding his office have been 

a subject of this action since its inception.

In reply, the County asserts that Oreizi’s opposition is without merit. Doc. No. 57 at 12. 

The County emphasizes that Oreizi fails to establish that he did not know about the identity of 

Gile after working next door to her or within the same department. The County also characterizes 

Oreizi’s claim of having accidentally ran into Gile on July 30, 2021, as “highly suspicious” given 

this occurred right after the pretrial conference and amidst final trial preparation. The County 

states there is no reason to give credence to this “convenient story.” Finally, the County contends 

that it would be prejudiced if Gile is not excluded, as she has not been deposed and there is no 

time to do so prior to trial.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) requires that a party provide the opposing party with 

“the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have 

discoverable information—along with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing party 

may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Fed. 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). Under Rule 26(e), a party is under a continuing obligation to 

supplement its discovery responses in a timely manner. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). If a party 

fails to identify a witness or make a disclosure that is required under Rule 26(a) or (e), Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) states that “the party is not allowed to use that information or 

witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was 

substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Courts consider the following 

factors to determine whether to preclude introduction of evidence pursuant to Rule 37: “(1) the 

surprise to the party against whom the evidence would be offered; (2) the ability of that party to 

cure the surprise; (3) the extent to which allowing the evidence would disrupt trial; (4) the 

importance of the evidence; and (5) the nondisclosing party’s explanation for it[s] failure to 

disclose the evidence.” S.F. Baykeeper v. West Bay Sanitary Dist., 791 F. Supp. 2d 719, 733 

(N.D. Cal. 2011). “The party facing sanctions bears the burden of proving that its failure to 

disclose the required information was substantially justified or is harmless.” R & R Sails, Inc. v. 

Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 673 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2012).

The Court will grant the County’s motion and preclude introduction of Gile as a witness at 

trial. It is not disputed that Oreizi’s disclosure of Gile was tardy in terms of the discovery cutoff 

date. Instead, Oreizi argues that his tardiness was substantially justified. To do so, he cites a case 

where the district court found the belated disclosure of witnesses who had “only recently obtained 

information relevant to the case” was substantially justified. Red Rock Commc’ns, Inc. v. Am.

Telecasting, Inc., No. CV-S01-0611-PMP(LRL), 2006 WL 2432628, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 

2006). As that court explained, the disclosing party had “articulated a basis for substantial 

justification for its late disclosure because the witnesses’ relevance became apparent due to events 

which occurred after the discovery cutoff date.” Id. Despite efforts in Oreizi’s and counsel’s 

declarations, the facts here cannot be drawn parallel with those in Red Rock. That is, nothing 

suggests that Gile was not in possession of the information she shared with counsel before 

discovery closed, nor has Oreizi represented that he did not know of Gile before that date. 

Although Oreizi states in his declaration that “[p]rior to speaking to Ms. Gile, I did not know what 

Ms. Gile knew about my office or the retaliation against me,” this is simply an indictment of his 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

investigation and prosecution of his claims. Counsel’s asserted lack of knowledge of Gile’s 

relevance to the case prior to Oreizi’s run-in is more understandable. But this too brings things 

back to Oreizi’s own failure to investigate and prosecute his claims. Because Oreizi has not 

articulated a basis for substantial justification (or harmlessness) of his late disclosure of Gile, he 

will be barred under Rule 37(c) from calling the witness at trial.

L. The County’s Motion No. 14 concerning references to limine motions

The County seeks an order excluding any comment or reference to any motion in limine 

made on behalf of any party regardless of whether said motion is granted or not. Doc. No. 44 at 

23. Oreizi does not oppose the County’s motion. Doc. No. 46 at 22. Accordingly, the Court will 

grant the County’s motion based on and in a manner consistent with the County’s request.

M. The County’s Motion No. 15 concerning insurance evidence

The County seeks an order excluding evidence regarding the insurance of any group or 

party. Doc. No. 44 at 24. It bases its request on Federal Rule of Evidence 411. Oreizi does not 

oppose the County’s motion. Doc. No. 46 at 23. Accordingly, the Court will grant the County’s 

motion based on and in a manner consistent with the County’s request.

ORDER

Accordingly, consistent with the explanations above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The County’s Motion No. 1 (Doc. No. 44 at 6–7) concerning evidence for 

defamation claim is DENIED; 

2. The County’s Motion No. 2 (Doc. No. 44 at 8–9) concerning evidence for invasion 

of privacy claim is DENIED; 

3. The County’s Motion No. 5 (Doc. No. 44 at 14) concerning settlement/compromise 

evidence is GRANTED; 

4. The County’s Motion No. 6 (Doc. No. 44 at 15) concerning presence of nontestifying witnesses is GRANTED; 

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

5. The County’s Motion No. 7 (Doc. No. 44 at 16) concerning references to law firm 

size is GRANTED; 

6. The County’s Motion No. 8 (Doc. No. 44 at 17) concerning evidence of other 

lawsuits or adverse proceedings is GRANTED; 

7. The County’s Motion No. 9 (Doc. No. 44 at 18) concerning evidence of 

motivations for employment decisions is DENIED; 

8. The County’s Motion No. 10 (Doc. No. 44 at 19) concerning lay witness opinions 

on discrimination or retaliation is DENIED; 

9. The County’s Motion No. 11 (Doc. No. 44 at 20) concerning pre-limitations period 

discrimination is DENIED; 

10. The County’s Motion No. 12 (Doc. No. 44 at 21) concerning golden rule arguments 

is GRANTED; 

11. The County’s Motion No. 13 (Doc. No. 44 at 22) concerning recently disclosed 

witness is GRANTED; 

12. The County’s Motion No. 14 (Doc. No. 44 at 23) concerning references to limine 

motions is GRANTED;

13. The County’s Motion No. 15 (Doc. No. 44 at 24) concerning insurance evidence is 

GRANTED; 

14. Oreizi’s seventh (defamation) and eighth (invasion of privacy) causes of action are 

DISMISSED; 

15. The Court’s rulings on Oreizi’s Motion No. 1 and the County’s Motion Nos. 3, 4, 

and 16 are RESERVED; and

16. The Jury Trial set for September 14, 2021, and all related submission deadlines in 

the pretrial order (Doc. No. 39) are VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2021 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

Case 1:18-cv-00662-JLT-EPG Document 60 Filed 08/31/21 Page 17 of 17