Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-01585/USCOURTS-ca8-08-01585-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Thomas Turpin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-1585

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff- Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

John Thomas Turpin, also known as *

John Thomas Goodwin, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 22, 2009

Filed: January 29, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, HANSEN and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

After John Thomas Turpin testified at trial in support of an insanity defense and

to exonerate his brother, Gary Goodwin, a jury convicted Turpin of robbery and

firearm offenses and acquitted Goodwin. Turpin appeals, arguing the district court1

abused its discretion when it denied his motion to sever and refused to instruct the jury

that a person found not guilty by reason of insanity may be involuntarily committed.

We affirm.

Appellate Case: 08-1585 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/29/2010 Entry ID: 3629394
2

The Honorable Raymond L. Erickson, Chief Magistrate Judge of the United

States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

-2-

I. Background

While driving Goodwin from northern Minnesota to Minneapolis, Turpin

stopped and entered A&E Produce, a rural gun store. When he loaded two shells he

brought with him into a shotgun on display in the shop, the proprietor, Arnold

Erickson, attempted to wrest the gun from Turpin. Turpin fired shots, wounding

Erickson and his wife, and left the store with Erickson in pursuit. Goodwin exited

Turpin’s car, and the brothers fled into the woods in different directions. Law

enforcement arrived and found Turpin in a swamp about one hundred yards from the

store. He directed officers to the shotgun and later waived his rights and confessed,

explaining it was a robbery “that just went bad” and that Goodwin was not involved.

The brothers were jointly indicted on related charges. Both moved for

severance on the ground that a joint trial would prejudice Goodwin by depriving him

of Turpin’s exculpatory testimony. The magistrate judge2

 denied the motions, in part

because neither defendant had shown that Turpin would be willing to testify on

Goodwin’s behalf at a separate trial. Both defendants then filed renewed motions to

sever. In support, Turpin submitted an affidavit by Turpin averring that he would

testify to his brother’s innocence but wanted to preserve his Fifth Amendment right

not to testify at his own trial “so that the Jury can decide without knowing about my

criminal record,” and an affidavit by counsel proffering Turpin’s “potential testimony

on behalf of Gary Goodwin.” 

Magistrate Judge Erickson denied the renewed motions for severance. Both

defendants appealed, with Turpin arguing that he had established his willingness to

testify on Goodwin’s behalf and that a joint trial would compel him to “choose

between providing exculpatory testimony for his co-defendant (and brother) or

Appellate Case: 08-1585 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/29/2010 Entry ID: 3629394
-3-

preserving the advantages constitutionally guaranteed him” by the Fifth Amendment.

The district court denied the renewed motions on the eve of trial. Focusing on

Goodwin’s motion, the court held that Turpin’s proffered testimony was not

“substantially exculpatory” and therefore did not establish the “real prejudice” needed

to warrant severance. United States v. Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 818 (8th Cir. 2004).

Turpin asserted an insanity defense at trial and testified. A defense expert,

forensic psychologist John Cronin, first testified that Turpin suffered from substance

abuse, depression, anxiety, and paranoid-type schizophrenia. Dr. Cronin opined that

schizophrenia was indicated by Turpin’s reports of visual and auditory hallucinations

in which Turpin, a Native American, heard voices telling him to kill people. If an

individual is suffering from schizophrenia, Dr. Cronin explained, “the individual’s

view of the world is altered.” Expressly waiving his Fifth Amendment right, Turpin

then testified that visual and auditory hallucinations led him to believe that stores near

Indian reservations are the trading posts that cheated Native Americans during the

19th and early 20th centuries, and that these delusions prompted his actions at A&E

Produce. He further testified that Goodwin was not involved in the attempted robbery

and was unaware of what Turpin was doing. The jury acquitted Goodwin but found

Turpin guilty on all but the conspiracy count in the indictment. 

II. The Severance Issue

Turpin argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion

to sever. The issue reaches us in an unusual posture. Typically, the issue on appeal

after a joint trial is whether the appellant suffered “real prejudice” because, in a

separate trial, “it is likely his co-defendant actually would have testified and that this

testimony would have been exculpatory.” Mickelson, 378 F.3d at 818; see, e.g.,

United States v. Crumley, 528 F.3d 1053, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 2008). That was the issue

the district court addressed in denying Goodwin’s renewed motion to sever. But here,

Turpin testified at the joint trial, and Goodwin was acquitted. Goodwin’s motion to

Appellate Case: 08-1585 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/29/2010 Entry ID: 3629394
-4-

sever is thus moot. On appeal, Turpin raises a different issue. He argues the district

court abused its discretion because denying his motion to sever created a

“constitutional dilemma” by forcing him to choose between preserving his Fifth

Amendment right not to testify and testifying to his brother’s innocence, which would

subject him to cross-examination regarding his extensive criminal history. Turpin

cites no case in which severance was granted, or the denial of severance reversed, for

this reason. The only circuit that to our knowledge has considered this contention

rejected it. See United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The contention is inconsistent with general Fifth Amendment principles. The

Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case

to be a witness against himself.” Although the Fifth Amendment guarantees the

defendant’s right not to testify at his criminal trial, numerous cases reflect the

principle that “the government need not make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment

privilege cost free.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 25, 41-42 (2002) (plurality opinion)

(quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971), and citing other cases).

As we said in United States v. McFarlane, 309 F.3d 510, 513 (8th Cir. 2002), “the fact

that a criminal defendant faces difficult choices does not necessarily compel the

individual’s choice so as to implicate the Fifth Amendment.” Accord United States

v. Searing, 984 F.2d 960, 964-65 (8th Cir. 1993). These decisions confirm that

Turpin’s testimony was not compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

This contention is also without merit because Turpin has failed to demonstrate

“an abuse of discretion resulting in clear prejudice.” United States v. Flores, 362 F.3d

1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 2004). Turpin elected to testify, and this testimony was essential

in establishing an insanity defense based on the alleged influence of “visual and

auditory hallucinations.” Though the jury ultimately rejected the defense, the

testimony demonstrates that Turpin’s decision to testify was not based solely on a

desire to exonerate his brother. Thus, denying his motion to sever did not result in

clear prejudice. 

Appellate Case: 08-1585 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/29/2010 Entry ID: 3629394
-5-

III. The Jury Instruction Issue

Turpin argues that the district court abused its discretion when it refused his

request to instruct the jury “that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity or

mental defect is subject to involuntary civil commitment.” In Shannon v. United

States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994), the Supreme Court held that such an instruction is not

required, either by the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, or as a matter of federal

criminal practice. Turpin’s brief argued that Shannon was implicitly overruled by

more recent decisions such as Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). But he

conceded at oral argument that we must “follow the [Supreme Court] case which

directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own

decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amer. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484

(1989). Thus, Shannon continues to be controlling precedent. Accord United States

v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2009).

To make clear it was not adopting “an absolute prohibition,” the Court in

Shannon stated “that an instruction of some form may be necessary under certain

limited circumstances,” noting as one example the need to correct a misstatement by

a witness or prosecutor “that a particular defendant would ‘go free’ if found [not

guilty by reason of insanity].” 512 U.S. at 587. Turpin alternatively argues that such

a necessity occurred during his trial. 

Prior to trial, the court ordered that Turpin be psychologically evaluated for

competency and insanity at a federal detention center. Forensic psychologist Cynthia

Low examined Turpin and reported that various tests showed a high likelihood that

he was malingering. No doubt anticipating that Dr. Low would testify for the

government in rebuttal, defense counsel questioned Dr. Cronin about malingering

during his direct examination. Dr. Cronin testified that “people who malinger usually

have some sort of financial incentive” or other “secondary gain.” During crossexamination, the prosecutor returned Dr. Cronin to the subject of malingering:

Appellate Case: 08-1585 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/29/2010 Entry ID: 3629394
-6-

Q. You . . . gave the jury a definition of malingering indicating that

generally people are malingering . . . to gain a benefit. Is that fair?

A. There usually is some secondary gain.

Q. And you would agree with me that Mr. Turpin has a lot to gain or lose in

this case?

A. I’m not sure.

Q. Well, freedom, right?

A. I don’t know. . . . I thought he was in a lot of trouble.

Q. Okay. Well, being in a lot of trouble, that’s a reason to make things

up?

A. Oh, absolutely.

Turpin did not object to this questioning. Indeed, he pursued the line of inquiry

on redirect, ultimately asking Dr. Cronin to explain, “What’s involved in involuntary

commitments?” At the conclusion of Dr. Cronin’s testimony, Turpin moved for a

mistrial or for a special jury instruction, arguing that the prosecutor’s reference to

“freedom” could be interpreted “by innuendo” as a possible consequence of an

insanity verdict. The district court denied both the mistrial motion and the jury

instruction request.

On appeal, Turpin argues that the prosecutor’s reference to “freedom” required

the corrective instruction referred to in Shannon. We disagree. The prosecutor did

not assert or even imply that Turpin would be set free if found not guilty by reason of

insanity, the example given in Shannon. The cross examination simply confirmed the

common sense notion that Dr. Cronin’s definition of malingering -- a desire to obtain

“some secondary gain” -- could include a desire “to get out of trouble.” No

Appellate Case: 08-1585 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/29/2010 Entry ID: 3629394
-7-

reasonable juror would infer that successful malingering for this reason would in fact

get the defendant “out of trouble” by setting him free. Thus, this brief exchange with

Dr. Cronin was not objectionable, nor was it prejudicial to Turpin, particularly given

Dr. Low’s extensive rebuttal testimony regarding her opinion that Turpin’s claims of

visual and auditory hallucinations were evidence of malingering. Moreover, the

exchange gave Turpin an opportunity to question Dr. Cronin on redirect about the

nature of involuntary commitments. In these circumstances, the district court did not

abuse its substantial discretion in refusing to give the requested instruction. See

United States v. Wipf, 397 F.3d 632, 635 (8th Cir. 2005) (standard of review). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 ______________________________

Appellate Case: 08-1585 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/29/2010 Entry ID: 3629394