Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02176/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02176-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric D. Strother
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 09-2176

________________

United States of America,

Appellant,

v.

Eric D. Strother,

Appellee.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

 [UNPUBLISHED]

________________

Submitted: June 14, 2010

 Filed: July 19, 2010

________________

Before MELLOY, HANSEN, and SMITH Circuit Judges. 

________________

PER CURIAM.

The Government appeals from the district court's imposition of a 96-month

sentence following Eric Strother's guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a

firearm. The Government argues that Strother should have been sentenced as an

armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based in part on Strother's predicate

felony for possessing a short barreled shotgun under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.020.1.

Applying circuit precedent, we agree. The district court's judgment is reversed, and

the case is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

Appellate Case: 09-2176 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/19/2010 Entry ID: 3684638
1

The only relevant difference between the Missouri statutes in effect at the time

of Strother's conviction and the current statutes is the numbering of the subsections.

We use the current statutes for ease of reference. 

-2-

The sole issue on appeal is whether Eric Strother's 1990 conviction for

possessing a short barreled shotgun under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.020.11

 (the only

contested predicate conviction) is a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of

fifteen years for felons in possession of a firearm who have three previous convictions

for violent felonies or serious drug crimes. See § 924(e)(1). "We review de novo

whether a prior conviction is a predicate offense under the ACCA." United States v.

Johnson, 601 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal marks omitted).

Strother's predicate conviction is a violent felony if it fits within the residual

clause of § 924(e), defining a violent felony to include a felony that "is burglary,

arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)

(emphasis added). A panel of this court recently held that possession of a sawed-off

shotgun under Arkansas law is a violent felony. See United States v. Vincent, 575

F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding "that possession of a sawed-off shotgun is

similar, in kind as well as degree of risk posed, to the offenses listed in § 924(e),"

applying the standard set out in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008)), cert.

denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. May 24, 2010); see also United States v. Harlow, 333

Fed. Appx. 152, 153 (8th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam) (finding no plain error

in district court's conclusion that possession of a short barreled rifle under the

Missouri statute at issue here was a violent felony, relying on Vincent).

The Missouri crime at issue provides that "[a] person commits a crime if such

person knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, repairs, or sells . . . [a] short

barreled rifle or shotgun." § 571.020.1(5). A conviction under this subsection is a

Class C felony. § 571.020.3. It is undisputed that Strother's Missouri conviction was

Appellate Case: 09-2176 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/19/2010 Entry ID: 3684638
-3-

for possessing—as opposed to manufacturing, transporting, repairing or selling—a

short barreled shotgun, so our focus is on the crime of knowingly possessing a short

barreled shotgun. See Vincent, 575 F.3d at 824 (applying the modified categorical

approach to determine which part of the Arkansas statute the defendant violated). 

We recognize that there are slight differences between the Arkansas statute in

Vincent and the Missouri statute at issue here. The Missouri statute defines a short

barreled shotgun as one with a barrel less than 18 inches in length, see Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 571.010(17), whereas the Arkansas statute at issue in Vincent prohibited any sawedoff gun regardless of its length, see Vincent, 575 F.3d at 822. The Arkansas Supreme

Court also construes Ark. Code § 5-73-104(a) as including "the element that the

weapon will inflict serious physical injury or death and serves no lawful purpose" in

the definition of all the listed weapons, Vincent, 575 F.3d at 823, but the Missouri

statute has no similar element. Nonetheless, both statutes target possession of short

barreled shotguns, which we have frequently noted "'are inherently dangerous and lack

usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes.'" United States v. Childs, 403

F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Allegree, 175 F.3d 648, 651 (8th

Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 954 (2005). It is not seriously disputed that a short

barreled shotgun within the parameters of the Missouri statute serves no lawful

purpose and will inflict serious physical injury. 

As for the differences in defining the prohibited weapon based on its length, the

Missouri definition of a short barreled shotgun tracks the federal definition contained

in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), such that Strother's prior conviction is considered a crime of

violence for purposes of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See USSG § 4B1.2,

comment. (n.1) (explaining that the term "'[c]rime of violence' does not include the

offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, unless the possession was of

a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)"); § 5845(a) (defining "firearm" to include

a shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches in length). The Vincent court found the

commentary to USSG § 4B1.2 persuasive in concluding that possessing a sawed-off

Appellate Case: 09-2176 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/19/2010 Entry ID: 3684638
-4-

shotgun was a violent felony even though the Arkansas statute did not track the

federal definition contained in § 5845(a). See Vincent, 575 F.3d at 826. Because a

conviction under the Missouri statute does fit the federal definition, we find the

commentary even more enlightening. Cf. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 204-

06 (2007) (viewing USSG commentary that included attempt offenses as crimes of

violence as "further evidence that a crime like attempted burglary poses a risk of

violence similar to that presented by the completed offense" of burglary for purposes

of the ACCA). 

We see no meaningful distinction between the Arkansas and Missouri statutes.

The reasoning applied by the court in Vincent applies equally to the elements of the

Missouri statute. Out of respect for stare decisis, we follow our prior panel's

precedent. See United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[I]t

is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior

panel." (internal marks omitted)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 962 (2009); United States

v. Barbour, 395 F.3d 826, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying stare decisis to hold that

a Kansas auto theft conviction was a violent felony based on then-binding precedent

established by United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2002), even though

Sun Bear involved a Utah statute with different wording). 

The sentence imposed by the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded

for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

_____________________________

Appellate Case: 09-2176 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/19/2010 Entry ID: 3684638