Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02131/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02131-17/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adams
Defendant
Terry Joe Burton
Plaintiff
Evert
Defendant
Lee
Defendant
Quadro
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY JOE BURTON, No. CIV S-05-2131-FCD-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 54). Plaintiff has filed an opposition (Doc. 56). 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: Adams; Lee; Evert; and Quardo. 

Plaintiff claims that defendants Lee, Evert, and Quadro processed his confidential legal mail and

that they delivered it to him having already been opened outside his presence. Plaintiff also

asserts that defendant Adams denied that this happened and approved the re-routing of two

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pieces of legal mail. 

B. Undisputed Facts

Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts, which is supported by exhibits and

declarations, establishes the following:

1. On January 24, 2005, February 8, 2005, March 21, 2005, and March 24,

2005, plaintiff submitted to prison officials for mailing legal documents

related to his habeas corpus case;

2. These documents were for filing with the court;

3. Plaintiff received proofs of service for three of the filings from the court in

an opened condition;

4. Plaintiff admits that the proofs of service were non-confidential;

5. On May 5, 2005, an additional piece of incoming mail was not delivered

to plaintiff because it lacked a return address;

6. Defendants operated under a regulation which directs that all incoming

non-confidential mail is to be opened prior to delivery to inmates; and

7. Prison regulations also require that incoming inmate mail that lacks a

return address is not delivered to inmates.

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence which would put these facts in dispute. 

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

. . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

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to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

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committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow

v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Prison officials may intercept and censor

outgoing mail concerning escape plans, proposed criminal activity, or encoded messages. 

See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see also Witherow, 52 F.3d at 266. Based

on security concerns, officials may also prohibit correspondence between inmates. See Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987). Prison officials may not, however, review outgoing legal mail

for legal sufficiency before sending them to the court. See Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549

(1941). Incoming mail from the courts, as opposed to mail from the prisoner’s attorney, for

example, is not considered “legal mail.” See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996),

amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 

/ / /

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This was not immediately apparent when the court determined the second 1

amended complaint was appropriate for service on defendants. 

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Specific restrictions on prisoner legal mail have been approved by the Supreme

Court and Ninth Circuit. For example, prison officials may require that mail from attorneys be

identified as such and open such mail in the presence of the prisoner for visual inspection. See

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974); Sherman v. MacDougall, 656 F.2d 527, 528

(9th Cir. 1981). Whether legal mail may be opened outside the inmate’s presence, however, is an

open question in the Ninth Circuit. At least three other circuits have concluded that legal mail

may not be opened outside the inmate’s presence. See id. (citing Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462

(5th Cir. 1976), Back v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), and Smith v.

Robbins, 452 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972)); see also Samonte v. Maglinti, 2007 WL 1963697 (D.

Hawai’i July 3, 2007) (recognizing open question). At least one court in this circuit, however,

has concluded, based on citation to a Sixth Circuit case, that a “prison’s ‘pattern and practice’ of

opening confidential legal mail outside of [the] inmate’s presence infringes upon [the] inmate’s

First Amendment rights and access to the courts.” Oliver v. Pierce County Jail, 2007 WL

1412843 (W.D. Wash, May 9, 2007) (citing Muhammad v. Pritcher, 35 F.3d 1081 (6th Cir.

1994)). The Ninth Circuit has, however, held that an isolated instance or occasional opening of

legal mail outside the inmate’s presence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

See Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1989). 

It is clear from plaintiff’s allegations and the undisputed facts that this case

involves incoming mail from the court. Such mail is not considered confidential legal mail. 1

See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094. Thus, the issue is whether the prison regulations concerning

opening of plaintiff’s incoming non-legal mail violated his First Amendment rights. A prison

regulation which infringes a First Amendment right “is valid if it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987); see also Mauro v.

Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (upholding ban on material depicting

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frontal nudity). In making this determination, the court should consider the following factors: (1)

whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the interest used to

justify the regulation; (2) whether prisoners retain alternative means of exercising the right at

issue; (3) the impact the requested accommodation will have on inmates, prison staff, and prison

resources generally; and (4) whether the prisoner has identified easy alternatives to the regulation

which could be implemented at a minimal cost to legitimate penological interests. See Turner,

482 U.S. at 89-91; Mauro; 188 F.3d at 1058-59. 

Here, resolution of the question is simple. Court documents like the return proofs

of service at issue in this case, are public in nature. Therefore, no First Amendment protection

attaches to such documents. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094. As a matter of law, defendants did

not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights with respect to their application of prison regulations

concerning incoming proofs of service from the court. 

Moreover, as defendants argue, they are also entitled to qualified immunity. 

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates

“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In general, qualified immunity

protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity, the initial

inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts

alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the next step is to ask whether

the right was clearly established. See id. Because, as discussed above, there was no

constitutional violation, qualified immunity applies in this case. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 54) be granted; and

2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of

defendants and against plaintiff and to close this file. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 26, 2007

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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