Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01341/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01341-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Blue Man Vegas, LLC
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2007 Decided June 10, 2008 

No. 06-1328 

BLUE MAN VEGAS, LLC, 

PETITIONER

v. 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

RESPONDENT

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE 

EMPLOYEES, MOVING PICTURE TECHNICIANS, ARTISTS AND 

ALLIED CRAFTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES,

CANADA, LOCAL 720, AFL-CIO, 

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 

06-1341 

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for 

Enforcement 

of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board 

 Lawrence D. Levien argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs was Edward P. Lazarus. 

USCA Case #06-1341 Document #1120845 Filed: 06/10/2008 Page 1 of 18
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 Amy H. Ginn, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were 

Ronald E. Meisburg, General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, 

Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Assistant 

General Counsel, and Jill A. Griffin, Supervisory Attorney. 

Ruth E. Burdick, Attorney, entered an appearance. 

 Michael A. Urban argued the cause and filed the brief for 

intervenor. 

 Before: GINSBURG, BROWN, and GRIFFITH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Blue Man Vegas, LLC 

(BMV) petitions for review of the National Labor Relations 

Board’s decision that it engaged in unfair labor practices by 

refusing to bargain with the International Alliance of 

Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, 

Artists & Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories & 

Canada, AFL-CIO (the Union), elected to represent certain of 

its employees. BMV argues the Board erred in holding the 

bargaining unit proposed by the Union was appropriate. We 

deny Blue Man’s petition and grant the Board’s crossapplication for enforcement. 

I. Background 

BMV manages and produces the Las Vegas production 

of the Blue Man Group, a theatrical show in which men 

wearing blue grease paint on their faces and heads and 

dressed entirely in black perform a series of skits and dance 

routines involving music, props, and videos. On stage with 

the “Blue Men” are seven musicians. The Blue Men and the 

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musicians are assisted by a stage crew comprising seven 

departments: audio; carpentry; electrics; properties (props); 

video; wardrobe; and musical instrument technicians (MITs), 

who maintain the musical instruments, many of which are 

unique to Blue Man Group productions. There are also a 

handful of so-called “swings,” who BMV explains are 

“trained in numerous departments to provide coverage ... as 

needed due to vacation or illness.” During a performance, 

each of the seven stage crews performs its own “cue tracks,” 

which are series of carefully planned actions. For example, a 

carpentry crew’s cue tracks might involve placing and 

moving scenic backdrops at specified times. 

From 2000 through most of 2005, BMV performed at the 

Luxor Hotel and Casino. During that time, BMV employed 

the MITs directly, but the Luxor employed the members of 

the other stage crews, as to whom it entered into a collective 

bargaining agreement with the Union. As a result, there were 

differences in the terms and conditions of employment of the 

MITs and of the other crews. The MITs reported to BMV’s 

Production Manager, John McInnis, whereas the other stage 

crews reported to the Luxor; the MITs were paid a salary 

whereas the others were paid an hourly wage; and the MITs’ 

pre-performance sign-in sheet was separate from the sign-in 

sheet for the others. 

In September 2005, BMV left the Luxor and reopened a 

month later at the Venetian Hotel and Casino. Incident to the 

move, BMV decided to employ the entire stage crew directly. 

To handle its many new stage crew employees, BMV erected 

a new management structure. A department head would 

supervise the employees in each of the six departments that 

previously reported to the Luxor, and the “technical 

supervisor” would supervise the six new department heads 

and report to McInnis. 

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Although the employees in all seven stage crew 

departments were now employed directly by BMV, several 

differences between the MITs and the other crews were 

carried over from the Luxor to the Venetian. First, whereas 

the others were separated from McInnis, the production 

manager, by two levels of supervision (a department head and 

the technical supervisor), the MITs continued to report 

directly to McInnis. Second, the two MITs who had been 

with BMV at the Luxor were still paid a salary, whereas the 

members of the other crews were paid a wage, as they had 

been at the Luxor. (The four MITs hired after BMV left the 

Luxor were paid a wage, however.) Finally, the MITs’ signin sheet remained separate from the sign-in sheet for the other 

crews. 

In March 2006, the Union petitioned the Board for a 

representation election in a unit comprising all stage crew 

employees except the MITs. BMV objected that the MITs 

should be included in the bargaining unit. After a hearing, the 

Board’s Regional Director (RD) determined, pursuant to 

§ 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 

159(b), that the unit proposed by the Union was an 

appropriate unit and ordered a representation election. The 

RD found significant the differences between the MITs and 

the other stage crews that stemmed from the prior unit’s 

bargaining history, namely, those relating to supervision, 

form of payment, and sign-in sheets. He also found 

significant a number of differences that cannot be attributed 

to BMV’s time at the Luxor: The MITs have separate 

substitutes during days off and vacations, “skills separate 

from the other stage crew members,” and different cue tracks; 

they “do not ‘swing’ to other stage crew positions”; and they 

“work in different areas” and “interact[]” primarily “with 

musicians, not stage crew members.” The Board denied 

BMV’s petition for review of the RD’s decision. 

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The Union won the ensuing representation election by a 

vote of 20-14 and the RD duly certified the Union as the 

exclusive bargaining representative. About a month later, the 

RD issued a complaint against BMV alleging it had refused to 

bargain with the Union, in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5) of the 

NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (5). BMV argued it was not 

required to bargain because the exclusion of the MITs 

rendered the unit inappropriate. Finding BMV had raised or 

could have raised all issues relating to representation in the 

prior unit determination hearing and BMV did not proffer any 

previously unavailable evidence, the Board granted summary 

judgment for the General Counsel. BMV then petitioned for 

review in this court and the Board cross-applied for 

enforcement of its decision. 

II. Analysis 

BMV challenges the Board’s decision that its refusal to 

bargain was an unfair labor practice on the ground that the 

unit was not appropriate. See Terrace Gardens Plaza v. 

NLRB, 91 F.3d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Judicial review 

[of an order directing a representation election] is available 

only if the employer refuses to bargain and is found, in a final 

order of the Board, to have violated § 8(a)(5)” of the NLRA). 

“This court will uphold an NLRB bargaining unit 

determination unless it is arbitrary or not supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.” Country Ford Trucks, 

Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

BMV advances three arguments: The Board applied the 

wrong standard to determine whether the proposed unit was 

appropriate; the unit determination was not supported by 

substantial evidence; and the exclusion of the MITs from the 

proposed unit created a “disfavored residual unit.” None is 

persuasive. 

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A. The Unit Determination Standard 

BMV’s primary argument is that the Board applied a 

standard for the unit determination that conflicts with the 

NLRA and has been, for that reason, rejected by the Fourth 

Circuit. BMV’s position, although superficially plausible, is 

based upon a misapprehension of the framework governing 

unit determinations. 

The Board’s principal concern in evaluating a proposed 

bargaining unit is whether the employees share a “community 

of interest.” NLRB v. Action Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 

(1985); see also Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 

1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “There is no hard and fast definition 

or an inclusive or exclusive listing of the factors to consider 

[under the community-of-interest standard]. Rather, unit 

determinations must be made only after weighing all relevant 

factors on a case-by-case basis.” Country Ford Trucks, 229 

F.3d at 1190-91 (quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis 

omitted). Those factors include whether, in distinction from 

other employees, the employees in the proposed unit have 

“different methods of compensation, hours of work, benefits, 

supervision, training and skills; if their contact with other 

employees is infrequent; if their work functions are not 

integrated with those of other employees; and if they have 

historically been part of a distinct bargaining unit.” Trident 

Seafoods, Inc. v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 111, 118 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 

1996); see also Agri Processor, 514 F.3d at 9 (collecting 

factors); NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co. (Lundy II), 68 F.3d 

1577, 1580 (4th Cir. 1995) (listing factors). And, although 

the NLRA provides “the extent to which the employees have 

organized shall not be controlling,” 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5), the 

Supreme Court has held that the extent of their organization 

may be “consider[ed] ... as one factor” in determining 

whether a proposed unit is appropriate. NLRB v. Metro. Life 

Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442 (1965). 

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Decisions of the Board and of the courts in unit 

determination cases generally conform to a consistent analytic 

framework. If the employees in the proposed unit share a 

community of interest, then the unit is prima facie

appropriate. In order successfully to challenge that unit, the 

employer must do more than show there is another 

appropriate unit because “more than one appropriate 

bargaining unit logically can be defined in any particular 

factual setting.” Country Ford Trucks, 229 F.3d at 1189 

(quotation marks omitted). Rather, as the Board emphasizes, 

the employer’s burden is to show the prima facie appropriate 

unit is “truly inappropriate.” Id. at 1189; Dunbar Armored, 

Inc. v. NLRB, 186 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1999) (“clearly 

inappropriate”) (quotation marks omitted); see also 

Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 86 F.3d 227, 236 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (the Board “need only select an appropriate 

unit, not the most appropriate unit”) (quotation marks 

omitted). 

A unit is truly inappropriate if, for example, there is no 

legitimate basis upon which to exclude certain employees 

from it. That the excluded employees share a community of 

interest with the included employees does not, however, mean 

there may be no legitimate basis upon which to exclude them; 

that follows apodictically from the proposition that there may 

be more than one appropriate bargaining unit. If, however, 

the excluded employees share an overwhelming community 

of interest with the included employees, then there is no 

legitimate basis upon which to exclude them from the 

bargaining unit. We held in Trident Seafoods, for example, 

the Board’s unit determination was “irrational” and 

“unsupported by substantial evidence” because the employer 

had adduced unrebutted evidence showing that “the 

functional integration of and the overwhelming similarities

between the [excluded] and [included employees] are such 

that neither group can be said to have any separate 

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community of interest justifying a separate bargaining unit.” 

101 F.3d at 120; see also Jewish Hosp. Ass’n, 223 N.L.R.B. 

614, 617 (1976) (unit limited to service employees 

inappropriate because of “overwhelming community of 

interest” with maintenance employees); Lodgian, Inc., 332 

N.L.R.B. 1246, 1255 (2000) (RD required inclusion in unit of 

employees who “share an overwhelming community of 

interest with the employees whom the [union] seeks to 

represent”). 

A Venn diagram may 

clarify these principles. Each 

rectangle represents the interests 

of a group of identically situated 

employees. The region in 

which two or more rectangles 

overlap represents the degree to 

which those groups have 

common interests. In Figure 1, 

Rectangles A, B, and C all 

overlap because all the groups 

have a community of interest 

with each other. Consequently, any combination of the 

groups – AB, AC, BC, or ABC – is a prima facie appropriate 

bargaining unit. Note, however, that Rectangles A and B 

overlap almost completely; this indicates they have an 

overwhelming community of interest. Any unit that includes 

one but excludes the other is “truly inappropriate.” 

Therefore, the only units that could be deemed appropriate in 

the face of a challenge are AB and ABC.*

 *

 This framework complements the Board’s accretion policy. 

“The term ‘accretion’ ... means the addition of employees into a 

unit without an election.” Frontier Tel. of Rochester, 344 N.L.R.B. 

1270, 1270 n.3 (2005). Typically, an employer seeks an accretion 

USCA Case #06-1341 Document #1120845 Filed: 06/10/2008 Page 8 of 18
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BMV contends the Board applied the wrong standard in 

making its unit determination, effectively “accord[ing] 

controlling weight to the Union’s extent of organization,” in 

violation of § 9(c)(5) of the NLRA. According to BMV, the 

Board erred in basing its decision upon Lundy Packing Co. 

(Lundy I), 314 N.L.R.B. 1042, 1043-44 (1994), in which the 

Board upheld the unit proposed by the union, thereby 

“fail[ing] to heed” the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent refusal to 

enforce that decision, which BMV says rested on the ground 

that the overwhelming-community-of-interest standard 

unlawfully gives controlling weight to the union’s extent of 

organization. 

BMV’s reading of Lundy II and of the Board’s decision 

in this case reflect a misapprehension of the governing 

framework just described, as well as a misreading of the 

 

when it has added a new department and wants to include the new 

employees in a pre-existing bargaining unit. See id. at 1270-71. “It 

is the policy of the Board to find accretions only when the 

additional employees have little or no separate group identity ... and 

when the additional employees share an overwhelming community 

of interest with the preexisting unit to which they are accreted.” 

Giant Eagle Mkts. Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 206, 206 (1992) (quotation 

marks omitted). The decision to permit an accretion thus reflects “a 

legal conclusion that two groups of employees constitute one 

bargaining unit.” Northland Hub, Inc. & Gen. Teamsters Local 

959, 304 N.L.R.B. 665, 665 (1991). “In determining ... whether the 

requisite overwhelming community of interest exists to warrant an 

accretion, the Board considers many of the same factors relevant to 

unit determinations in initial representation cases, i.e., integration 

of operations, centralized control of management and labor 

relations, geographic proximity, similarity of terms and conditions 

of employment, similarity of skills and functions, physical contact 

among employees, collective bargaining history, degree of separate 

daily supervision, and degree of employee interchange.” Frontier 

Tel., 344 N.L.R.B. at 1271. 

USCA Case #06-1341 Document #1120845 Filed: 06/10/2008 Page 9 of 18
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Fourth Circuit’s opinion. In effect, BMV contends that, as 

long as the MITs had a community of interest to any degree 

with the other stage crews, they could not be excluded from 

the bargaining unit. That view is obviously at odds with the 

principles discussed above. 

Lundy II, on the other hand, is consistent with the 

framework set out above. The Fourth Circuit there objected 

to the combination of the overwhelming-community-ofinterest standard and the presumption the Board had 

employed in favor of the proposed unit: “By presuming the 

union-proposed unit proper unless there is ‘an overwhelming 

community of interest’ with excluded employees, the Board 

effectively accorded controlling weight to the extent of union 

organization.” Lundy II, 68 F.3d at 1581. As long as the 

Board applies the overwhelming community-of-interest 

standard only after the proposed unit has been shown to be 

prima facie appropriate, the Board does not run afoul of the 

statutory injunction that the extent of the union’s organization 

not be given controlling weight. 

Here, the Board correctly applied the overwhelmingcommunity-of-interest standard; it did not presume the 

Union’s proposed unit was valid, as it had done in Lundy I. 

Rather, the RD first determined “[t]he record ... establishes 

that the petitioned-for unit, which excludes MITs, is an 

appropriate unit for collective bargaining”; indeed, he noted, 

“the parties have never contended” otherwise. The RD then 

went on to apply the overwhelming-community-of-interest 

standard to determine whether BMV had shown the exclusion 

of the MITs rendered the proposed unit truly inappropriate. 

As the Board says, the RD cited Lundy I to support the 

generally correct proposition that “a unit need not be an allinclusive unit in order to be an appropriate unit,” and then 

looked to that decision for guidance as to the “factors” to be 

considered in deciding whether the two groups of employees 

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have an overwhelming community of interest. The Board’s 

use of the overwhelming-community-of-interest standard, 

therefore, did not give controlling weight to the extent of the 

Union’s organization. 

B. Substantial Evidence 

BMV contends the Board’s finding that the proposed 

bargaining unit was appropriate was not supported by 

substantial evidence. As discussed above, the Board based its 

finding upon the many differences between the terms and 

conditions under which the MITs and the other stage crews 

worked. In attempting to refute the Board’s finding, BMV 

contends there are few if any relevant differences between the 

MITs’ terms and conditions of employment and those of the 

other crews. BMV also contends the Board’s finding 

conflicts with precedent. In response, the Board argues the 

differences between the MITs and the employees included in 

the bargaining unit were sufficiently substantial that the unit 

could “constitute a distinct and appropriate unit separate and 

apart from the MITs,” and that its decision was consistent 

with precedent. We agree with the Board. 

BMV launches its challenge to the evidence upon which 

the Board relied by isolating the differences that “are 

holdovers from the Luxor,” namely, the different supervisory 

structure, separate sign-in sheets, and salary versus wage 

compensation. BMV characterizes these differences as 

matters of “bargaining history,” and then ties the bargaining 

history to the “extent of organization,” thus: “The Regional 

Director reache[d] beyond the parties in this case and relie[d] 

on an IATSE contract with a completely different employer 

[i.e., the Luxor]. This bargaining history is not relevant to 

this analysis except to demonstrate the Union’s extent of 

organization.” 

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We need not decide whether BMV correctly equates 

bargaining history with extent of organization in the 

circumstances of this case because this line of argument still 

would fail for two reasons. First, the differences between the 

MITs and the other stage crew employees that are “holdovers 

from the Luxor” are not merely of historical interest; they are 

present facts the Board could reasonably conclude 

differentiate the employment interests of the MITs from those 

of the other crews. As the Board rather forcefully puts it, “the 

... suggestion ... that the Board should have ignored the terms 

and conditions of employment that [BMV] intentionally 

carried over from the Luxor is absurd.” Second, in light of 

the numerous differences that are not “holdovers from the 

Luxor,” the Board cannot be said to have given controlling 

weight to bargaining history nor, if it is the same thing on the 

present facts, to the Union’s extent of organization. 

As for those differences that do not stem from the Luxor 

era, BMV maintains they do not distinguish the MITs from 

the employees in the other stage crews as a group, but rather 

distinguish the employees in each crew from the employees in 

every other crew. For example, BMV observes that, although 

the MITs have separate substitutes, so do the other stage 

crews because “[s]ubs do not work for more than one 

department.” BMV makes a similar point with respect to the 

MITs’ technical skills, cue tracks, use of swings, work space, 

and lack of interaction with other stage crew employees 

during the show. Thus, BMV argues, the Board acted 

arbitrarily by excluding the MITs from the unit on the basis of 

certain differences between the MITs and the other stage 

crews while at the same time ignoring the same types of 

differences among the various crews that were included in the 

unit. 

We need not decide whether that would be an arbitrary or 

otherwise unlawful decision because that is not what the 

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Board did. Rather, as discussed above, the Board recognized 

the MITs also differ from the employees in the other crews in 

ways that are “holdovers from the Luxor” and are therefore 

unique to the MITs, namely, in terms of supervision, form of 

payment, and sign-in sheets. The Board did not act arbitrarily 

by treating the MITs differently from the other stage crew 

employees in light of those differences. 

Moreover, the Board’s finding that the proposed unit was 

appropriate without the MITs was certainly reasonable and 

supported by substantial evidence in view of the analytic 

framework set out above. A unit comprising all the non-MIT 

stage crews is prima facie appropriate because, 

notwithstanding the differences among them, those 

employees share a community of interest. It may well be that 

a unit comprising all the stage crews, including the MITs, 

would also be prima facie appropriate because the MITs also 

share a community of interest with the other stage crew 

employees, but that does not necessarily render the unit 

comprising only the non-MIT stage crews “truly 

inappropriate.” Indeed, both the differences that are unique to 

the MITs and the differences that can be found among all the 

stage crews stand in BMV’s way: The MITs lack an 

overwhelming community of interest with the other stage 

crews (just as each of the non-MIT crews may lack an 

overwhelming community of interest with each of the other 

non-MIT crews). 

To illustrate, in Figure 2 Rectangle M represents the 

interests of the MITs, while Rectangles X and Y represent the 

interests of the employees in any two other departments. The 

shaded regions represent interests relating to subs, technical 

skills, cue tracks, swings, work space, and interaction with 

members of other stage crews during the show, that is, factors 

with respect to which each department has (we assume) 

different interests. The spotted regions represent interests 

USCA Case #06-1341 Document #1120845 Filed: 06/10/2008 Page 13 of 18
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relating to 

supervision, sign-in 

sheets, and form of 

payment, that is, 

factors carried over 

from the Luxor, which 

distinguish the MITs 

from the employees in 

all the other stage 

crew departments. 

The Board in effect 

found Unit XY 

appropriate. As the 

diagram shows, the Board was justified in doing so, though it 

could also have found Unit XYM appropriate because all 

three rectangles overlap, reflecting a community of interest 

among them, as represented by the cross-hatched region. 

Unlike Rectangles A and B in Figure 1, however, Rectangle 

M does not have a nearly complete overlap with any other 

rectangle, reflecting the MITs’ lack of an overwhelming 

community of interest with any of the other stage crews. 

Consequently, the exclusion of Rectangle M from a unit 

comprising Rectangles X and Y – that is, the exclusion of the 

MITs from the unit comprising the other stage crew 

employees – does not render that unit “truly inappropriate,” 

notwithstanding the substantial differences among the stage 

crew employees, as represented by the shaded and spotted 

regions. 

Turning from the facts to the law, BMV claims the 

Board’s finding that the MITs do not share an overwhelming 

community of interest with the other stage crews conflicts 

with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Lundy II and with the 

Board’s analysis in Studio 54, 260 N.L.R.B. 1200 (1982). As 

BMV notes, “the Board cannot ignore its own relevant 

precedent but must explain why it is not controlling.” 

USCA Case #06-1341 Document #1120845 Filed: 06/10/2008 Page 14 of 18
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Lemoyne-Owen College v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 

2004) (quotation marks omitted). We find the Board’s 

decision consistent with both Lundy II and Studio 54 because 

neither case involved differences as extensive as here. 

In Lundy II, the excluded employees differed from the 

included employees “in a few respects: (1) the method for 

calculating their earnings; (2) supervision; and (3) a lack of 

interchangeability with” the included employees. 68 F.3d at 

1580. Rejecting the Board’s approval of the proposed unit, 

the court remarked, “The exclusion of ... employees based on 

such meager differences is, to say the least, problematic.” Id. 

at 1581. Here, according to BMV, “the MITs were excluded 

from the bargaining unit based on nearly the same ‘meager 

differences’ – different second line supervision, partly 

different pay structure, and separate sign-in sheets.” The 

Board responds that, “[i]n contrast [to Lundy II], here, the 

Board did not fragment a traditionally appropriate unit.” We 

think the Board’s decision here was consistent with Lundy II 

for a more basic reason: Even if those differences in 

supervision, pay structure, and sign-in sheet are too “meager” 

on their own to justify the exclusion of the MITs from the 

bargaining unit, they are only a fraction of the differences 

upon which the Board relied. The sum of those differences 

was sufficient to justify the Board’s decision that the MITs do 

not share an overwhelming community of interest with the 

other stage crew employees. 

BMV’s comparison of this case to Studio 54 is similarly 

flawed. Studio 54 strove “to create an ambiance through 

music, lights, props, scenery, and ... the participation of many 

employees in an evening’s festivities.” Studio 54, 260 

N.L.R.B. at 1200. The union had proposed a bargaining unit 

of all employees except “stagehands,” including “disc 

jockeys, house board light operators, disco light board 

operators, flymen, and preset men.” Id. The employer raised 

USCA Case #06-1341 Document #1120845 Filed: 06/10/2008 Page 15 of 18
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no threshold question whether the proposed unit was prima 

facie appropriate; the issue it raised was whether the 

exclusion of the stagehands rendered the unit inappropriate. 

Despite a difference in supervision between the stagehands 

and the other employees, the Board concluded that, in light of 

the “interchange of job functions” between them, the 

stagehands did “not possess a community of interest so 

separate and distinct from [that of the included] employees as 

to warrant separate representation.” Id. From this decision 

BMV extracts the rule that “minor supervisory differences 

should not be determinative.” 

Be that as it may, we agree with the Board that Studio 54 

does not conflict with the Board’s decision here because of 

the panoply of other differences that separate the MITs from 

the other stage crew departments. Further, as the Board 

notes, the functional integration of Studio 54’s employees 

“far exceeded anything in BMV’s show.” For example, nonstagehands at Studio 54 “occasionally perform[ed] stagehand 

work,” “[a]t least two stagehands ... occasionally work[ed] on 

non-stage electrical equipment and perform[ed] general 

maintenance,” and “[n]on-stagehands and stagehands alike 

often mingle[d] and/or dance[d] with patrons[,] ... help[ing] to 

create the festive atmosphere [Studio 54] desire[d].” Studio 

54, 260 N.L.R.B. at 1200. The only evidence of functional 

interchange BMV offers is that, when the company performs 

at a location other than the Venetian, “[t]he entire crew will 

work together to pack up the needed equipment and gear, load 

it, transport it, and set it up at the outside site ... with little 

differentiation between the segments of the stage crew.” But 

whether BMV performs at the Venetian or offsite, it appears 

that each stage crew department remains solely responsible 

for the technical tasks ordinarily within its domain; nothing 

suggests the MITs perform tasks ordinarily assigned to, say, 

the wardrobe crew. Therefore, though certainly relevant to 

this case, Studio 54 is not “so inconsistent with the [RD’s] 

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decision so as to mandate reversal here.” Int’l Union of 

Operating Eng’rs v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 844, 850 (D.C. Cir. 

1979); see Overnite Transp. Co., 325 N.L.R.B. 612, 612-13 

(1998) (holding unit need not include mechanics in light of 

their separate work area and supervision, different uniforms, 

special skills, and lack of significant functional interchange). 

In summary, we see no reason to disturb the Board’s 

finding that the proposed unit was not rendered “truly 

inappropriate” by the exclusion of the MITs. The Board was 

justified in considering the ways in which the terms and 

conditions under which the MITs work differed from those 

under which the other stage crews work, including the 

differences that stem from BMV’s time at the Luxor and 

therefore are unique to the MITs. The Board was also 

justified in considering the differences that do not stem from 

the Luxor era but distinguish each crew from every other 

crew. The Board reasonably concluded that whatever 

interests the MITs shared with the employees in the unit were 

not overwhelming in light of those numerous differences. 

C. Residual Unit 

Finally, BMV contends the Board’s decision is arbitrary 

and capricious because it creates an allegedly “disfavored 

residual unit.” According to BMV, a residual unit consists of 

excluded employees “sharing a community of interest with 

the [included] employees.” Thus, BMV argues, because the 

MITs “shar[e] an obvious community of interest” with the 

other stage crew departments, the Board improperly created a 

residual unit of MITs by excluding them from the unit. 

BMV’s supposed rule against residual units is 

misconceived. It implies that all employees who share a 

community of interest must be included in the same unit, 

which proposition conflicts with the principle that more than 

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18 

one bargaining unit may be appropriate in any particular 

setting. See, e.g., Country Ford Trucks, 229 F.3d at 1189-91 

(holding that although “broader unit encompassing all parts 

and service department employees at both facilities” may 

have been appropriate, Board not “required” to include all 

such employees in unit in light of differences between 

facilities). In any event, the Board’s residual unit policy has 

no bearing upon this case because it relates only to whether a 

proposed residual unit is appropriate, not to whether a 

proposed initial unit is appropriate. See Carl Buddig & Co., 

328 N.L.R.B. 929, 930 (1999).*

III. Conclusion 

In sum, we hold the Board applied the correct legal 

standard to determine whether the proposed bargaining unit 

was appropriate. The Board’s determination that the MITs 

may be excluded from the bargaining unit because they do not 

share an overwhelming community of interest with the stage 

crew employees included in the unit is supported by 

substantial evidence and does not conflict with precedent or 

the Board’s residual unit policy. We therefore deny BMV’s 

petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for 

enforcement. 

So ordered. 

 *

 BMV’s other arguments are sufficiently lacking in merit as 

not to warrant consideration in a published opinion. Also, we deny 

BMV’s motion that the court “take judicial notice of several artistic 

reviews of the Blue Man Group show that aptly describe the unique 

and highly unusual experience of attending a Blue Man Group 

performance.” See Pa. Transformer Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 

217, 225 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

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