Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01199/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01199-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Downtown Bid Services Corporation
Respondent
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 98
Intervenor for Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 23, 2012 Decided June 22, 2012 

No. 11-1199 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

PETITIONER

v. 

DOWNTOWN BID SERVICES CORPORATION, 

RESPONDENT

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE 

WORKERS, DISTRICT LODGE 98, 

INTERVENOR

On Application for Enforcement of an 

Order of the National Labor Relations Board 

Bernard P. Jeweler argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for respondent.

Milakshmi V. Rajapakse, Attorney, National Labor 

Relations Board, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on 

the brief were John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, 

Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Julie 

B. Broido, Supervisory Attorney. Renee D. McKinney, 

Attorney, entered an appearance. 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 1 of 18
2 

Stefan P. Sutich was on the brief for intervenor 

International Association of Machinists & Aerospace 

Workers, District Lodge 98 in support of petitioner. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and 

BROWN, Circuit Judges. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

 Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Chief Judge SENTELLE. 

 Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

 

 BROWN, Circuit Judge: The National Labor Relations 

Board seeks enforcement of an order finding Downtown BID, 

a non-profit business improvement corporation, committed an 

unfair labor practice (ULP) when it refused to bargain with 

the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 

Workers (the Union) following an employee election. 

Downtown BID (the Company) contends agents or supporters 

of the Union unlawfully threatened and harassed employees 

and otherwise engaged in electioneering that interfered with 

the fairness and outcome of the election. The Board 

overruled these objections and certified the Union. Because 

the Board’s findings and conclusions are supported by 

substantial evidence and consistent with Board precedent, we 

grant the Board’s application. 

I 

Around March 2009, in response to an initial overture by 

employee Jennings Brown, the Union began an organizing 

campaign to represent the Company’s approximately 117 

safety and maintenance workers (SAMs). Union officials, 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 2 of 18
3 

including Roosevelt Littlejohn, the Union’s business 

representative and the main organizer of the Downtown BID 

campaign, solicited union authorization cards from the SAMs. 

Littlejohn also held six open informational meetings where he 

presided alone, discussing the Union and answering 

questions. Starting in June, Brown and several of his coworkers volunteered to support the Union, joined an 

organizing committee, and began to solicit authorization cards 

as well. Still, all of the Union’s literature and all of the 

authorization cards were drafted by Littlejohn and had only 

Littlejohn’s name and contact information on them.

Brown and some of his Union-supporting co-workers 

soon took the campaign in an aggressive and deeply troubling 

direction. In separate incidents, a few of these pro-Union 

employees threatened several of their co-workers, telling them 

they would be fired if they did not support the Union. Some 

of those employees were so disturbed by these threats that 

they contacted the Company’s administrative department; the 

Company reassured them that neither Brown nor the Union 

could get them fired and that no one would be fired based on 

the outcome of the election. Some pro-Union SAMs also 

harassed co-workers with profanity and racial epithets, though 

one of those harassed also testified such language was 

unfortunately not uncommon in the workplace. Finally, a 

poster in an employee locker room was anonymously defaced 

with profane and racist language. According to Littlejohn, 

neither he nor the Union had any knowledge that employees 

were campaigning for the Union in an aggressive or harassing 

manner. He also had no knowledge of the threats of job-loss, 

and emphasized—credibly, in the ALJ’s estimation—that 

such conduct was not authorized or approved by the Union.

When voting ultimately took place that July, Brown was 

selected by the Union as its election observer—simply 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 3 of 18
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because, as Littlejohn testified, “[w]e couldn’t get anybody 

else.” ALJ Hearing Tr. at 248. Brown greeted voters and 

approached one as if to embrace him or her, but he was 

admonished not to by the Board’s election observer and 

returned to his seat. One other potential voter was reported to 

have turned and left once he saw Brown in the room, and 

another employee also testified she received a “severe look” 

from Brown, though she voted freely anyway. Id. at 154, 

158–60. Brown also took a phone call during a break in the 

voting and identified the Company’s observer by name to the 

person with whom he was speaking. When the voting ended, 

56 ballots had been cast in favor of the Union and 51 against 

the Union. There was one challenged ballot that was not 

resolved.

The Company timely filed objections to the election, 

arguing that the narrow victory was the result of threats, 

harassment, and unlawful electioneering by Brown and his 

cohorts. An ALJ heard two days of testimony in March 2010, 

after which he recommended that the Board overrule all of the 

Company’s objections and certify the Union. The Board 

adopted the ALJ’s findings and certified the Union on 

December 23. Downtown BID Servs. Corp., Case 5-RC16330 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 23, 2010) (“Election Decision”).

The Union requested bargaining and the Company 

refused. This move by the Company sets up judicial review 

of an election certification that is otherwise insulated from 

direct review. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476–

77 (1964) (“Board orders in certification proceedings . . . are 

not directly reviewable in the courts . . . [but are instead] 

normally reviewable only where the dispute concerning the 

correctness of the certification eventuates in a finding by the 

Board that an unfair labor practice has been committed . . . 

.”); Hard Rock Holdings, LLC v. NLRB, 672 F.3d 1117, 1120 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 4 of 18
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(D.C. Cir. 2012). In due course, a complaint was issued 

against the Company for its refusal to bargain, 29 U.S.C. § 

158(a)(5), and the Board, rejecting the Company’s claims that 

the Union had been wrongfully certified, found on April 4, 

2011 that the Company committed the ULP as charged and 

ordered the Company to recognize and bargain with the 

Union.1

 Downtown BID Servs. Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 130 

(Apr. 4, 2011) (“ULP Decision”). 

The Board now seeks enforcement of that April 4 Order. 

Because the Company does not deny its refusal to bargain, the 

validity of the Order turns on the validity of the representation 

election. The scope of our review of the Board’s rulings 

regarding the election is “extremely limited,” Amalgamated 

Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 

1564 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and we must respect the Board’s 

“broad discretion” to assess representation elections, AOTOP, 

LLC v. NLRB, 331 F.3d 100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2003). If the 

Board’s decision to certify a union is consistent with its 

precedent and supported by substantial evidence in the record, 

we may not disturb it. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); see Pirlott v. 

NLRB, 522 F.3d 423, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

II 

 The Board applies a different standard when it reviews 

the misconduct of a union agent acting within the scope of his 

agency relationship than when it reviews either misconduct 

 

1

 “A violation of Section 8(a)(5) [of the National Labor Relations 

Act] is also a violation of Section 8(a)(1), which makes it an unfair 

labor practice for an employer to ‘interfere with, restrain, or coerce 

employees in the exercise’ of their statutory right to bargain 

collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” S. 

Nuclear Operating Co. v. NLRB, 524 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.6 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008). 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 5 of 18
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that occurred outside any such relationship or misconduct of a 

third party. The first question to address is thus whether 

Brown or any of his aggressive colleagues were agents of the 

Union and, if so, what the scope of that agency relationship 

was. 

 Agency status is determined by common law agency 

principles. Mar-Jam Supply Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 337, 337 

(2001). As at common law, an agency relationship exists 

when a person has either actual authority or apparent 

authority to act on behalf of a union. Id. The agency 

relationship, established in either manner, “must be 

established with regard to the specific conduct that is alleged 

to be unlawful.” Cornell Forge Co., 339 N.L.R.B. 733, 733 

(2003). 

 The Company claims Brown and his colleagues had 

actual authority to act for the Union because they solicited 

authorization cards on the Union’s behalf. Under the Board’s 

decision in Davlan Engineering, 283 N.L.R.B. 803, 804 

(1987), “employees who solicit authorization cards should be 

deemed special agents of the union for the limited purpose of 

assessing the impact of statements about union fee waivers or 

other purported union policies that they make in the course of 

soliciting.” The Company is therefore correct that Brown and 

his colleagues were agents of the Union, but the purpose and 

scope of their agency relationship is limited to their 

statements regarding “purported union policies” made in the 

course of soliciting. Id. The name-calling, profanity, and 

other generally reprehensible behavior of which they are 

guilty were unrelated to the subject matter of the authorization 

cards. The Board was therefore justified in concluding those 

were outside the scope of the agency relationship. 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 6 of 18
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 The Board also concluded that the job-loss threats made 

by Brown and others did not reasonably represent “purported 

union policies” and were therefore outside the scope of the 

agency relationship as well.2 Although the Company has the 

exclusive authority to fire people, the record shows a few 

employees were not so sanguine. The Company claims some 

SAMs may not have known this basic fact because they are 

“not schooled in union matters,” Resp’t Br. 35, but an 

inference is not evidence. Moreover, those SAMs who took 

the job-loss threats seriously apparently asked for and 

received assurances from the Company that no one would be 

fired whatever the outcome of the election.

While we in no way condone the tactics in which Brown 

and his colleagues engaged, we cannot say the Board 

exceeded its discretion or acted inconsistently with its 

precedents by placing the responsibility of evaluating the 

plausibility of statements and threats on employees and by 

concluding, based on the circumstances in this case, that the 

impulsive statements of pro-Union employees could not 

reasonably be equated with Union policy. The Board’s 

conclusion is bolstered by the fact that nothing in the record 

suggests either the Union or Brown and his colleagues had 

special leverage with the Company that would permit them to 

effectuate these threats. Cf. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 186 

N.L.R.B. 540, 540 (1970) (rejecting an employer’s objection 

that union threats of job-loss tainted an election because “no 

evidence was offered to show that any employee had reason 

to believe that the [e]mployer favored [the union] [or] . . . was 

disposed to discharge any employees for voting against [the 

 

2

 The Board also noted that the record does not show that Brown 

and his colleagues made the job-loss threats “when they were 

soliciting authorization cards.” Election Decision, at 2. We do not 

rely on this finding.

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 7 of 18
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union]”); compare Serv. Emp. Int’l Union Local 87, 322 

N.L.R.B. 402, 407 (1996) (finding a union to be responsible 

under Davlan for job-loss threats made by a supervisor

soliciting signatures for the union when that supervisor “had 

the authority to hire, assign, and responsibly direct 

employees”).3

 The Board’s characterization of the job-loss 

threats recounted here is thus consistent with prior precedents, 

see HCF, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1320 (1996); Holland 

Indus., Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 739, 739 (1987), so we cannot say 

the Board was unjustified in finding they fell outside the 

scope of the Davlan agency relationship. 

 

 Because the Board’s conclusion relating to the job-loss 

threats is “reasonable, consistent with its prior decisions, 

supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with 

common law determinations on similar facts,” we cannot 

disturb it. Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 259, 265 

(D.C. Cir. 1998). Though Brown and his colleagues were 

agents of the Union under Davlan when they solicited 

authorization cards, that agency relationship was limited to 

statements made about Union policies and therefore did not 

cover “the specific conduct that is alleged to be unlawful.” 

Cornell Forge Co., 339 N.L.R.B. at 733. 

 The Company raises two additional agency-related 

arguments regarding only Brown. First, the Company argues 

Brown had apparent authority to act for the Union. Apparent 

authority “exists where the principal engages in conduct 

that[,] reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to 

 

3

 In Service Employees International Union Local 87, the Board 

adopted the ALJ’s decision, but because no party had filed 

substantive exceptions to that decision, 322 N.L.R.B. at 402 n.1, the 

Board’s adoption is not considered precedential, Stanford Hosp. & 

Clinics v. NLRB, 325 F.3d 334, 345 (D.C. Cir. 2003). We refer to it 

only to highlight the difference from the context of this case. 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 8 of 18
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believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his 

behalf by the person purporting to act for him.” Overnite 

Transp. Co., 140 F.3d at 266 (emphasis added). “[W]hile it 

may be the case that several employees . . . believe [a coworker] acted on behalf of the union, the union cannot be held 

responsible for [his] conduct [when] it did nothing to confer 

apparent authority on him.” Id. Though it is quite clear that 

many SAMs thought Brown represented the Union—and that 

Brown may have fancied himself a Union representative—

there was sufficient evidence in the record for the ALJ and the 

Board to conclude that the Union never engaged in any 

conduct that would reasonably create that impression. The 

Union never held out Brown as its representative; by contrast, 

the Union held out Littlejohn, its own organizer, as its duly 

authorized representative. It was Littlejohn, not Brown, who 

personally created and initiated the distribution of leaflets and 

authorizing cards. Those cards bore Littlejohn’s name and 

telephone number, not Brown’s, thus indicating to employees 

that he was the sole contact person for the Union. Finally,

Littlejohn, not Brown, arranged and presided over 

informational meetings, alone in front of an audience of 

SAMs which often included Brown.

 This case is distinguishable from the case on which the 

Company primarily relies. In NLRB v. Kentucky Tennessee 

Clay Company, an apparent agency relationship was found to 

exist where the union “placed the lion’s share of the 

organizing work upon” and relied “squarely and exclusively” 

on two employees to carry the union’s message. 295 F.3d 

436, 442–46 (4th Cir. 2002). In that case, “there was no 

evidence that [the union representative] or any other 

professional organizer ever obtained a single signature on an 

authorization card, attempted to visit the facility or to speak to 

employees on its outskirts, handed out a single pamphlet, or 

attempted to initiate contact with a single employee beyond 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 9 of 18
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those present at the three organizational meetings.” Id. Here, 

by contrast, the Union was far more directly involved: 

Littlejohn did all the organizing work. It therefore cannot be 

said that anything the Union did or did not do created the 

appearance of an agency relationship with Brown. In fact, we 

have even held that a union can leave it to employees to draft 

leaflets themselves without creating an apparent agency 

relationship. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers 

Union, 736 F.2d at 1565. Since Brown did not even do that 

much independent work on behalf of the Union, it was 

consistent with precedent for the Board to find that Brown did 

not have apparent authority to act for the Union.4

 Second, the Company argues Brown had actual authority 

to act for the Union because he was the Union’s election 

observer. See Detroit East, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 935, 936 

(2007) (“It is well settled that election observers act as agents 

of the parties that they represent at the election.”). This is not 

altogether wrong, but it suffers from the same flaw as the 

Davlan argument: that position did not make him an agent of 

the Union for every purpose. Brown was an agent of the 

Union only with respect to his conduct as an election monitor. 

Cornell Forge Co., 339 N.L.R.B. at 733; see also Brinks, Inc., 

 

4

 The Company also emphasizes that Brown was part of an in-plant 

organizing committee, but we have squarely held that “the fact that 

[employees] were members of the Union Organizing Committee, 

alone, is not sufficient to confer apparent authority on them.” 

Overnite Transp. Co., 140 F.3d at 266; see also Amalgamated 

Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 736 F.2d at 1565 (noting that 

“[t]o hold that the [organizing committee] members were union 

agents would be in effect to penalize the union for conduct that it 

has little or no power to prevent” and finding no agency 

relationship). The Company’s attempt to distinguish these cases 

relies on the assumption that the Union was absent from the 

process—an assumption we reject.

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 10 of 18
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331 N.L.R.B. 46, 46 (2000) (assessing election monitor’s 

agency relationship “at the time of his misconduct”). The 

job-loss threats and general aggression and harassment at the 

center of this case are both distinct from Brown’s conduct as 

an election monitor; they are therefore outside the scope of 

that agency relationship.5

 For these reasons, we accept as consistent with precedent 

and supported by substantial evidence the Board’s conclusion 

 

5

 The Company claims that, in the course of his election monitoring 

duties and therefore within his agency relationship, Brown engaged 

in unlawful electioneering when he greeted and started to hug some 

voters. But we have enforced the Board’s conclusion on similar 

facts that “thumbs-up gestures by themselves were not a ground 

upon which to overturn the election.” U-Haul Co. of Nev., Inc. v. 

NLRB, 490 F.3d 957, 964 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In addition, the 

Company notes that one SAM testified she felt unsettled by 

Brown’s “severe look,” but she was clear that it did not sway her 

vote. ALJ Hearing Tr. at 154, 158–60. The ALJ also heard an 

unsubstantiated report that a SAM turned and left the voting area 

when he saw Brown in the room. “The Board has repeatedly 

declined to impose a zero-tolerance rule on voting-day 

electioneering,” Family Serv. Agency San Francisco v. NLRB, 163 

F.3d 1369, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1999), so the Board asks whether 

Brown’s conduct as an election monitor “substantially impaired the 

exercise of a free choice so as to require the holding of a new 

election,” Boston Insulated Wire & Cable Sys. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 

876, 881 (5th Cir. 1983). These “incidents”—a “look” that did not 

sway a vote and an uncorroborated statement that someone left the 

voting area upon seeing Brown—hardly meet this standard, so the 

Board’s conclusion that a do-over was not warranted is supported 

by substantial evidence. Finally, the Company also complains that 

Brown identified the Company’s election monitor by name on a 

phone call he took in the voting area, but it never explains why this 

was even inappropriate nor how it could have “substantially 

impaired” free choice or the validity of the election. 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 11 of 18
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that the conduct to which the Company primarily objects took 

place outside of any agency relationship with the Union. 

III 

 Because the Board was justified in concluding that 

neither Brown nor any of his colleagues acted as agents of the 

Union when they threatened and harassed their fellow 

employees, those actions are evaluated under the standard 

applicable to third-party conduct. The Board will not set 

aside an election based on third-party misconduct unless that 

misconduct was “so aggravated as to create a general 

atmosphere of fear or reprisal rendering a free election 

impossible.” Westwood Horizons Hotel, 270 N.L.R.B. 802, 

803 (1984). Specifically, the Board considers: (1) the nature 

of the threat, (2) whether the threat was directed at an entire 

unit, (3) the extent of the dissemination of the threat, (4) 

whether the person making the threat was capable of carrying 

it out (and whether employees likely acted on that fear), and 

(5) whether the threat was made near the time of the election. 

See id. 

The job-loss threats were serious, but they were only 

directed at and disseminated to a few individuals. The record 

reveals that, of the 117 SAMs in the unit, six were subjected 

to job-loss threats in separate incidents, some of which 

occurred at least a month before the election. At the earliest 

of these incidents, three SAMs were present to overhear the 

threat. The Company argues that, because the election was so 

close, this small number of affected voters would have been 

enough to tip the scale. But the inquiry for third-party 

misconduct focuses more broadly on the “general 

atmosphere” of the election, and the small number of affected 

employees suggests that the atmosphere was not the sort that 

would make a free election “impossible.” See id. In any 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 12 of 18
13 

event, even if those factors militated slightly in favor of rerunning the election, we would still defer to the Board’s 

decision because the remaining factors so clearly negate the 

existence of a general atmosphere of fear. The Company’s 

reassurances were sufficient to dissipate any threat. 

 Indeed, the Board has held that even job-loss threats from 

union representatives themselves would not necessarily void 

an election because such a threat would, in the ordinary 

circumstance, be “illogical”: “employees could be expected to 

conclude that the Employer would not fire employees who 

aided its cause” by voting against representation.

Underwriters Labs., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 300, 302 (1997), 

enforced, 147 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 1998); see Janler Plastic 

Mold Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. at 540 (finding job-loss threats 

from a union unobjectionable); compare Lyon’s Rest., 234 

N.L.R.B. 178, 179 (1978) (finding that a reasonable person 

could have believed threats of job loss because a unique 

“prior bargaining history between the [e]mployer and [the 

union’s] sister local [union]” meant that the threats “carried a 

sufficient ring of plausibility”). Coming from third parties, 

such threats represent an even smaller contribution to an 

atmosphere of fear. The Board’s conclusion that the job-loss 

threats did not sufficiently taint the voting atmosphere is 

therefore one that is consistent with its precedents and one to 

which we must defer. 

 The remaining harassment also does not rise to the 

demanding level necessary for us to conclude the Board erred. 

Name-calling, the use of racial epithets, and the anonymous 

defacement of posters with bigoted and threatening language 

are deplorable, but these isolated incidents do not warrant 

setting aside the election under either the Board’s precedents 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 13 of 18
14 

or our own.6

 See Benjamin Coal Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 572, 573 

(1989) (certifying election because “[t]he Union did not . . . 

either in its campaign literature or through the conduct of its 

five full-time staff organizers working on the campaign, either 

echo or condone these highly offensive sentiments”); El Fenix 

Corp., 234 N.L.R.B. 1212, 1213–14 (1978) (certifying 

election when there was no evidence that the Union made or 

endorsed racial slurs); see also Amalgamated Clothing & 

Textile Workers Union, 736 F.2d at 1568 (finding the Board’s 

decision not to overturn an election based on anonymous 

incidents was within its discretion because ordering a rerun 

election on that basis would “risk futility” and would “be 

devastatingly unfair to the majority of employees who have 

voted for the union”). To be sure, no employee should be 

bullied or suffer vicious and racially charged attacks in the 

workplace, but the Board’s assessment that the general 

atmosphere at the Company did not render a free election 

“impossible,” Westwood Horizons Hotel, 270 N.L.R.B. at 

803, is consistent with its precedents and supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. 

IV 

 Given the high level of deference we owe to the Board’s 

assessment of the facts and of an election atmosphere, we find 

the Board properly certified the Union as the employees’ 

representative. The Board was justified in concluding that the 

misconduct of a few pro-Union employees was not 

 

6

 In addition, one employee gave conflicting testimony as to 

whether she was isolated from her work team because she would 

not support the Union. She also said she witnessed Brown 

pressuring an employee to sign an authorization card, but the 

supposedly pressured employee never corroborated this testimony. 

Even apart from the questionable evidentiary value of these 

statements, they do not warrant setting aside the election. 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 14 of 18
15 

attributable to the Union. There is also substantial evidence 

to support the Board’s finding that the various forms of 

misconduct were not sufficiently pervasive or threatening to 

invalidate the representation election. The Company’s 

subsequent refusal to bargain was therefore unlawful, so we 

must enforce the Board’s order. 

So ordered. 

 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 15 of 18
SENTELLE, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part: While I concur in the conclusion and most of the

opinion of the court, I write separately to express my misgivings

over the extension of what I think is already a dangerous and

mistaken line of precedent with respect to the Board’s

ascertainment of the existence of an agency relationship. The

idea that the existence of an agency relationship can be

determined by the reasonableness of the representation made by

the possible agent seems to me wholly illogical. There seems to

me to be no inherent reason why actual agents could be

presumed to say only reasonable things and self-appointed

agents could be presumed to say unreasonable ones. Further, as

applied to this case, the Board seems hardly consistent in its

analysis. The evidence before the Board, and indeed accepted

by the Board, supported the proposition that some employees

were so convinced of the reasonableness of the proposition that

the union could get them fired that they sought reassurance from

management. The record does not reveal and could never reveal

how many other employees may have heard the statements but

not sought reassurance. Indeed, to ask that question is rather

like inquiring of a spelunker as to how many miles there are of

unexplored caves. But whether one assumes that the

unsophisticated worker could be deceived by the lack of

reasonableness so apparent to the Board would appear to me to

be a question of the effect of the representation, not its apparent

authorization by way of agency.

Neither do I think the result in this case is compelled by

Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 736

F.2d 1559, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984). That case, whose correctness

I would question, appears to me to be sufficiently fact-specific

as to have little compulsive force as precedent, although I

concede that it does push us in the direction taken by the court. 

In the end, I will concur in the judgment, but I dissent from that

portion of the opinion relying upon the “reasonableness” of the

representation made in the determination of agency.

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 16 of 18
HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I agree with my colleagues that “[g]iven the high level 

of deference” we accord the certification decision of the 

National Labor Relations Board (Board) as well as the 

impossibility standard by which the Board assesses a 

challenge to a union election based on third-party conduct, we 

should uphold the Board. Majority Op. at 14; see also N. Am. 

Enclosures, Inc. v. NLRB, 213 F. App’x 2, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(“[T]he Board’s union certification decision may be 

overturned [] if the activities of union supporters created an 

atmosphere of fear and coercion rendering a free and fair 

election impossible.”). I write separately, however, to 

question whether our hands-off approach has provided these 

employees with a free and fair opportunity to choose their 

collective bargaining representative as guaranteed by the 

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. 

First, Jennings Brown and his lieutenants engaged in 

unrelenting thuggery, harassment and job-loss threats which 

may not have made an untainted election impossible, but 

certainly affected the result of the razor-thin Union victory. At 

least nine employees heard the job-loss statements, and, as 

noted by the Chief Judge, at least three of them “were so 

convinced of the reasonableness of the proposition that the 

union could get them fired that they sought reassurance from 

management.” Concurrence at 1 (Sentelle, C.J.). While we 

may never know “how many other employees may have heard 

the statements but not sought reassurance,” id., we do know 

that if just three employees had changed their vote, the 

election would have come out differently (56 votes for the 

Union, 51 votes against the Union, one challenged ballot). 

Second, while I agree that “nothing in the record 

suggests either the Union or Brown and his colleagues had 

special leverage with the Company that would permit them to 

effectuate [the job-loss] threats,” Majority Op. at 7, fellow 

employees can have a “hereafter” effect on the results of an 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 17 of 18
2 

election. Whether the Union wins or loses, beginning the day 

after the election, a threatened employee will still have to deal 

with his harasser. 

Finally, I echo the Chief Judge’s caution regarding our 

treatment of the agency issue, especially our endorsement of 

Davlan Engineering, 283 N.L.R.B. 803 (1987). In my view, 

when the Board concluded in Davlan that an employee who 

solicits authorization cards is a special agent for the “limited 

purpose of assessing the impact of statements about union fee 

waivers or other purported union policies [he] make[s] in the 

course of soliciting,” 283 N.L.R.B. at 804, it unnecessarily 

limited the scope of the employee’s agency and in turn 

expanded the Board’s application of the ill-begotten 

impossibility standard. 

In short, while I cannot say that the Board’s 

certification is arbitrary in light of our standard of review, I 

believe the Board’s impossibility standard and our deference 

to it lead to a dubious result. If the standard is not met here—

where numerous pro-Union employees repeatedly intimidated 

enough colleagues to affect the election—then this case casts 

serious doubt on the efficacy of the impossibility standard to 

preserve the “laboratory conditions” necessary “to determine 

the uninhibited desires of the employees.” Serv. Corp. Int’l v. 

NLRB, 495 F.3d 681, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quotation marks, 

alteration and citation omitted). 

USCA Case #11-1199 Document #1380231 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 18 of 18