Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07046/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07046-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darin Gray Arnold
Appellant
Henry Bellmon
Appellee
Robert H. Henry
Appellee
Gary Maynard
Appellee
Howard Ray
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TEBTH CIRCUIT 

DARIN GRAY ARNOLD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FIL RD 

Unit.ad St, , ~ -- Tintb r.1·:-·!::-~ · ., 

JAN 141991 

ROBERT L. HO:CC!~R 

Clerk 

No. 90-7046 

HENRY BELLMON; ROBERT H. HENRY, 

Attorney General; GARY MAYNARD; 

HOWARD RAY, 

) 

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(D.C. No. 89-437-C) 

(E.D. Oklahoma) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER ARD JUDGMEN'l'* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. Arnold appeals, pro se, the dismissal of his S 1983 

complaint for failure to state a claim. 

Mr. Arnold is an inmate in the Oklahoma prison system as a 

result of his convictions in 1983 for rape and forcible sodomy. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-7046 Document: 010110076386 Date Filed: 01/14/1991 Page: 1 
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In 1984 Oklahoma passed a law known as the Oklahoma Prison 

Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 570 et 

seq. This law gave inmates who were convicted of nonviolent 

crimes certain credits against their sentences. Mr. Arnold, 

admitting and recognizing that he had been convicted of two 

violent felonies, commenced this suit prose against the Governor 

of the State of Oklahoma, acting in his official capacity, 

contending that he was being arbitrarily discriminated against by 

this law as credits were being given only to nonviolent offenders 

and he further contended that the 1984 law was ex post facto. 

This action was specifically based upon 42 u.s.c. § 1983. 

During the course of the proceedings, Mr. Arnold further 

alleged he had been eligible for emergency time credits and 

because of the 1984 law he was no longer eligible for these 

credits. Mr. Arnold specifically declined to seek the credits to 

which he was allegedly entitled and insisted that he be given only 

"monetary compensation." 

The trial court dismissed Mr. Arnold's complaint after 

concluding that emergency time credits were a matter of state law 

and its administration by defendant and the law was being properly 

administered. The trial court also held the law was not being 

applied ex post facto. 

Mr. Arnold requests he be allowed to proceed on appeal in 

forma pauperis, and we grant this request. 

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Appellate Case: 90-7046 Document: 010110076386 Date Filed: 01/14/1991 Page: 2 
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On appeal, Mr. Arnold asserts that Appellees have violated 

Appellant's constitutional guarantees against the application of 

ex p9st facto law in that he was first allowed to receive 

emergency time credits only to have them summarily and arbitrarily 

taken away. 

Mr. Arnold has sued the Governor of the State of Oklahoma, in 

his official capacity, asking for damages. This is in reality a 

suit against the State of Oklahoma and its treasury. Such a suit 

is barred under the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 

U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ("[T]he rule has evolved that a suit by 

private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid 

from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment."). See also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 

491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2309 (1989), and Quern v. Jordan, 440 

U.S. 332, 342-43 (1979). 

Mr. Arnold's assertions and arguments on appeal do not 

warrant discussion. The judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED for the reasons stated in this Order and Judgment. We 

may affirm the decision of the district court, even though on 

different grounds than those utilized by the district court • . The 

mandate sh~ll issue forthwith. 

Entered 1 for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 90-7046 Document: 010110076386 Date Filed: 01/14/1991 Page: 3