Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00236/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00236-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Antonio Barbosa
Defendant
Silvia Lopez
Plaintiff
Cathryn Rivera-Hernandez
Defendant
Silas Shawver
Defendant
Genevieve Shiroma
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SILVIA LOPEZ,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

GENEVIEVE SHIROMA, an individual; 

CATHRYN RIVERA-HERNANDEZ, an 

individual; J. ANTONIO BARBOSA, an 

individual; SILAS SHAWVER, an individual; 

and DOES 1-20,

 Defendants.

1:14-CV-00236-LJO-GSA

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO ENFORCE STAY AND MOTION 

TO STRIKE (DOC. 30) AND 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT 

SPECIAL MASTER (DOC. 23).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2014, Parties in the above-captioned case agreed by stipulation to stay proceedings 

before this Court, pending the outcome of Defendants’ appeal of this Court’s decision, Doc. No. 20, 

denying Defendants absolute immunity. Doc. No. 22. On August 19, Plaintiff moved this Court to 

appoint an expert special master to take possession of ballots from the contested union election that is 

the subject of her lawsuit (“Plaintiff’s Motion”). Doc. No. 24.1 On August 22, Defendants filed their 

notice of appeal. Doc. No. 28. Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed a motion to enforce the stipulated stay 

 

1 As the Court will explain in greater detail below, it reads Plaintiff’s Motion as a request injunctive relief.

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and strike Plaintiff’s Motion for Special Master from the record. (“Motion to Enforce Stay”). Doc. No. 

30. Defendants simultaneously filed an Ex Parte Application to Shorten Time (“Application”), Doc. No. 

31, requesting that this Court shorten the briefing schedule on their Motion to Enforce Stay, so that a 

ruling might be delivered prior to briefing deadlines for Plaintiff’s Motion. This Court granted 

Defendant’s request to shorten time to brief the Motion to Stay and suspended briefing on the Motion 

for Special Master pending resolution of Defendants’ Motion. Doc. No. 36. Plaintiff filed her opposition 

to Defendants’ Motion to Stay on September 12, 2014. Doc. No. 38. 

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that a stay should be enforced because an Order to Stay is in place, their notice 

of appeal divested this Court of jurisdiction, and the exceptions based on frivolous appeals do not apply. 

Defs.’ Mem. at 4-5. Plaintiff counters that the Order to Stay should be read narrowly and does not apply 

to its motion for special master, and that she will be highly prejudiced by a broad reading of the Order. 

Opposition at 2-3. Plaintiff acknowledges that she is not currently asking this Court to certify that 

Defendants’ appeal is frivolous. Id. at 5. 

A. Whether this Court Retains Jurisdiction Over Any Part of This Case

Defendants correctly point out that a district court's order denying summary judgment of an

immunity defense is immediately appealable when the question involves a matter of law. Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). At this time, no one disputes that the immunity decision on appeal 

involves a question of law. When an “interlocutory claim is immediately appealable, its filing divests the 

district court of jurisdiction to proceed with trial.” Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir.1992).

However, the rule of exclusive appellate jurisdiction “is a creature of judicial prudence” and is “not 

absolute.” Masalosalo by Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Accordingly, the filing of an interlocutory appeal “does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over 

aspects of the case that are not the subject of the appeal.” United States v. Pitner, 307 F.3d 1178, 1183 n. 

5 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Plotkin v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Defendants cite to Pearson c. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) for the premise that “official 

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immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” This is misleading because 

the holding in Pearson was limited to suits for civil damages. Id. (“The doctrine of qualified immunity

protects government officials from liability for civil damages . . .”); see also Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 525 

(“[T]he essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct 

in a civil damages action.”); and Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1337 (7th Cir. 1989) (“In each of 

these suits for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the individual defendants raised a claim of 

qualified immunity as a matter of law.”). Contrary to Defendants’ implication, it is well established that 

official immunity is not a bar to injunctive or declaratory relief. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541 

(1984); see also Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. 446 U.S. 719, 737 (1980) 

(“If prosecutors and law enforcement personnel cannot be proceeded against for declaratory relief, 

putative plaintiffs would have to await the institution of state-court proceedings against them in order to 

assert their federal constitutional claims. This is not the way the law has developed . . .”).

Combining these lines of case law, courts in this district have maintained jurisdiction over claims 

for injunctive relief while defendants’ immunity appeals were pending before the Ninth Circuit, so long 

as the issues raised were not “inextricably intertwined” in such a way that the circuit court would have 

“pendent” appellate jurisdiction. Rouser v. White, CIV S-93-0767 LKK GGH P., 2009 WL 4884264, at 

*5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2009) (quoting Kwai Fun Wong v. U.S., 373 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir.2004)); 

Beecham v. City of West Sacramento, CIV S-07-1115 JAM EFB, 2008 WL 4821655, *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 

4, 2008). “Two issues are ‘inextricably intertwined’ if they are (a) [ ] so intertwined that we must decide 

the pendent issue in order to review the claims properly raised on interlocutory appeal, or (b) resolution 

of the issue properly raised on interlocutory appeal necessarily resolves the pendent issue.” Kwai Fun 

Wong, 373 F.3d at 960.

At this early stage in the appellate process, neither side has filed appellate briefs and the

appellate issues are not entirely apparent. However, Defendants represent that their appeal is limited to 

this Court’s denial of official immunity. Defs.’ Mem. at 2; Defendant’s Reply, Doc. No. 41, at 6 

(“Defendants’ appeal involves no factual findings. The Court’s order focused on Defendants’ claim of 

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absolute immunity.”). As discussed in this Court’s July 24 order, whether an official is entitled to 

absolute immunity turns on factors related to whether Defendants’ activities were fundamentally judicial 

or prosecutorial in nature. Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. Of Med. Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 

2012), as amended (June 8, 2012). These issues are unlikely to be related to the merits of the case or the 

issue of whether injunctive relief is warranted2. Thus, this Court retains jurisdiction over these aspects of 

the case. 

B. Effect of the Order to Stay Proceedings

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an attorney’s signature on a “pleading, written 

motion, and other paper” presented to federal court certifies that the document’s legal contentions “are 

warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying or reversing existing 

law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Here, Counsel for Plaintiff signed a “paper”

presented to Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin that stated he stipulated and agreed that “the proceedings 

before this Court, including Plaintiff’s deadline to file any amended complaint and defendants’ deadline 

to file any anti-SLAPP motion should be stayed pending the appeal.” Doc. No. 22 at ¶ 7. This statement 

was repeated a second time in the two-and-a-half page paper under the heading “STIPULATION.” Id. at 

¶ 10 (stating that parties “hereby stipulate and agree” that “the proceedings before this Court, including 

Plaintiff’s deadline to file any amended complaint and Defendant’s deadline to file any anti-SLAPP 

motion are hereby stayed pending any appeal of the Order.” Thus, Counsel for Plaintiff endorsed the 

position that “proceedings before this Court” should be stayed. Magistrate Judge Austin adopted the 

stipulation by order of the court on August 7, 2014.

Now, counsel for Plaintiff claims that “it was not my intent to stop all potential activity on the 

underlying claim or halt Plaintiff from seeking relief from the United States District Court . . .” 

Declaration of Paul J. Bauer (hereinafter “Bauer Declaration”), Doc. No. 39 at ¶3; see also Opposition, 

Doc. No. 38 at 2-3. Rather, he claims, “[m]y intent in staying the filing of the amended complaint and 

 

2 This assessment is valid as of the date of this Order. As the appellate process unfolds, issues may emerge that alter this 

analysis. 

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joint scheduling conference was merely to avoid issues that may be impacted from the appeal.” Id. 

Plaintiff argues that “none of the recitals in the Stipulation address staying the entire case pending the 

results of the yet-to-be-filed appeal.” Opposition at 3 (emphasis added). This argument is disingenuous

given that (a) the appeal was noticed well before Plaintiff submitted her Opposition and (b) the 

stipulation does more than push back deadlines for the papers it mentions; it also vacates the scheduling 

conference and all meet and confer requirements, which in turn postpones discovery. Thus, the practical 

effect is that the stay order imposes a significant roadblock to further proceedings. Additionally, at the 

time the parties entered into their stipulation, there were no pending motions before this Court. Given 

this context, it is unclear how the stipulation can be read as intending to allow the case to proceed in any 

manner. Tellingly, Plaintiff doesn’t argue that she intended for the case to proceed as normal. Rather, 

she argues that she intended for this Court to maintain jurisdiction when a “legitimate dispute arose that 

the Court’s intervention was needed, such as a Motion to Appoint a Special Master.” Bauer Declaration 

at ¶ 3. The plain language of the stay agreement does not support this assertion. For these reasons, the 

Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and finds that Plaintiff’s motion for a special master is subject to 

the stipulated stay. This conclusion is without prejudice to a properly supported motion to lift the Order 

for Stay. The current motions before the Court do not provide an adequate factual or legal basis to grant 

such relief at this time. 

C. Whether this Court Should Strike Plaintiff’s Motion 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Motion for a Special Master should be struck from the record 

because it (a) violates the stay order and (b) does not request relief available under Rule 53. In light of 

the above conclusion that Plaintiff’s motion is subject to the stipulated stay, Plaintiff’s motion for 

appointment of a special master and Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s motion are DENIED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their renewal upon termination or lifting of the stay. 

In the interest of judicial and party efficiency, however, the Court observes that Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 53 allows a Court to appoint a special master to 

(A) perform duties consented to by the parties;

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(B) hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on 

issues to be decided without a jury if appointment is warranted by:

(i) some exceptional condition; or

(ii) the need to perform an accounting or resolve a difficult 

computation of damages; or

(C) address pretrial and posttrial matters that cannot be effectively and 

timely addressed by an available district judge or magistrate judge of the 

district.

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 53(a)(1).

The Court has serious doubts as to whether a Special Master is warranted under subpart (C) to

“take possession of the decertification ballots to ensure they remain secure,” as Plaintiff suggests.

Plaintiff’s Motion at 6. Plaintiff does not explain how taking possession of the ballots - ordering the 

seizure of the State’s property - is a typical pretrial matter which this Court would ordinarily handle 

itself. Plaintiff also claims that the special master is needed to “count the decertification ballots and 

report the result of the count to the Court.” Id. She argues that her request is “in the interest of justice, as 

well as the interest of judicial economy to determine the result of the election.” Id. Essentially, Plaintiff 

asks this Court to dispense with the formalities of litigation and award her the relief she requests. 

Plaintiff misunderstands the role of this Court. This Court may award Plaintiff relief she requests only in 

the context of final judgment or preliminary injunctive relief. The proper vehicle for seeking the relief 

requested prior to entry of final judgment on the merits is a motion for preliminary injunction or 

temporary restraining order pursuant to Rule 65.3

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above:

 

3

Plaintiff cites to several cases as examples where special masters were appointed to oversee contested elections. 

Plaintiff’s Motion at 6. These cases are irrelevant, however, because the issue before the Court is not whether it has the 

authority to appoint a special master; or even whether such an appointment might be helpful. The issue before the Court is 

whether Plaintiff has shown that this relief she requested is appropriate at this stage in the litigation. None of the cases cited 

by Plaintiff address this issue. N. L. R. B. v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., 437 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1971) (special 

master appointed to investigate alleged violation of court’s order); Rosebud Sioux Tribe of S. Dakota v. Driving Hawk, 407 F. 

Supp. 1191, 1197 (D.S.D. 1976) aff'd, 534 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1976) (court ordered special master after it found that evidence

showed “conclusively” that underlying proceedings were prejudicially predetermined); King Lincoln Bronzeville 

Neighborhood Ass'n v. Blackwell, 448 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (court ordered evidence preserved; no special 

master appointed); Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 691 A.2d 77, 91 (D.C. 1997) (court of appeals appointed trial 

court to act as “special master” and conduct evidentiary hearings and find facts where court of appeals had jurisdiction to 

review disputed election). 

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Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Stay is GRANTED;

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Expert Special Master is 

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Expert Special Master is DENIED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 22, 2014 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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