Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00062/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00062-27/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennise Castro-Lopez
Defendant
Julio Chavez-Lucatero
Defendant
Bryan Sahagun
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Destaney Walker
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

United States Attorney 

LAUREL J. MONTOYA 

Assistant United States Attorney 

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 

Fresno, CA 93721 

Telephone: (559) 497-4000 

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

United States of America 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JULIO CHAVEZ-LUCATERO, 

DENNISE CASTRO-LOPEZ, 

DESTANEY WALKER, AND 

BRYAN SAHAGUN, 

 Defendants. 

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00062-JLT-KSO 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER 

DATE: June 1, 2022 

TIME: 1:00 p.m. 

COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto 

This case is set for a status conference on June 1, 2022. The parties stipulate and request the 

Court to order that the status conference be continued until August 31, 2022. On May 13, 2020, this 

Court issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until 

further notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue 

matters, excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 

issued on March 17, 2020, . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s 

discretion.” General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may order caseby-case exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and 

previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. 

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Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”). 

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofCase 1:20-cr-00062-JLT-SKO Document 106 Filed 05/27/22 Page 2 of 5
 

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justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”). 

STIPULATION 

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through defendants’ counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. The parties need additional time to further investigate/explore matters related to resolving 

the case or setting a trial date. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference, and to 

exclude time from June 1, 2022, to August 31, 2022 under Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports, photographs, cell phone records, and related documents in 

electronic form, which are voluminous in nature. All of this discovery has been either produced 

directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. 

b) The government does not object to the continuance. 

c) In addition to the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and 

declarations of judicial emergency, and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an 

ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in this case because: 

 Defendant’s ability to prepare for trial or a plea has been inhibited by the public 

health emergency; 

 The parties need additional time to investigate/explore matters related to 

proceeding via plea or trial. 

d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

1

 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020). 

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original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 1, 2022 to August 31, 2022, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED. 

Dated: May 25, 2022 PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

United States Attorney 

/s/ LAUREL J. MONTOYA 

 LAUREL J. MONTOYA 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: May 25, 2022 /s/ MARC DAYS 

MARC DAYS 

Counsel for Defendant 

Julio Chavez-Lucatero 

 Dated: May 25, 2022 /s/ KEVIN P. ROONEY 

 KEVIN P. ROONEY 

 Counsel for Defendant 

 Dennise Castro-Lopez 

 Dated: May 25, 2022 /s/ MONICA BERMUDEZ 

 MONICA BERMUDEZ 

 Counsel for Defendant 

 Bryan Sahagun 

 Dated: May 25, 2022 /s/ ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI 

 ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI 

 Counsel for Defendant 

 Destaney Walker 

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ORDER 

The parties shall be prepared to select a mutually agreeable trial date at the next status 

conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 

 

 THE HONORABLE SHEILA K. OBERTO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

5/27/2022

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