Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cr-00350/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cr-00350-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
Ratomir Vukasinovic
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

RATOMIR VUKASINOVIC,

Defendant. /

No. CR 05-00350 WHA

ORDER DENYING (1) MOTION

TO ORDER CONDITIONAL PLEA

AGREEMENT AND (2) MOTION

TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this prosecution for illegal re-entry into the United States, defendant Ratomir

Vukasinovic moves for an order requiring the government to “consent” to a conditional plea

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). He claims the government arbitrarily

withheld such consent in alleged violation of the Due Process Clause. Defendant moves, in the

alternative, for dismissal of the indictment on grounds that the prosecution has engaged in

misconduct by retaliating against him for exercising his due-process right to file a motion to

dismiss. Defendant claims that such retaliation took the form of refusing to consent to a

conditional plea and of refusing to agree to support Mr. Vukasinovic’s anticipated effort to get a

sentence reduction for accepting responsibility. There is insufficient evidence of government

misconduct. The motions therefore are DENIED. 

STATEMENT

On October 28, 2005, this Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. 

Defendant had contended that the order deporting him had been invalid due to unfair

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proceedings leading up to it. On November 8, defendant informed the Court that he hoped to

enter a conditional plea of guilty, thus preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to

dismiss. Neither the Court nor the government has yet consented to entry of such a plea. 

On November 9, defense counsel wrote a letter to the government stating that his client

accepted full responsibility for committing the charged offense and was willing to stipulate to

all factual elements of the crime. Defense counsel also stated that defendant would waive his

right to a jury trial and requested that the government consent to a conditional plea. Defendant

did not actually waive his jury right then (Br., Attach. A, Letter from Daniel Blank, Ass’t Fed.

Public Defender, to Joseph Fazioli, Ass’t U.S. Att’y). On December 19, defense counsel wrote

a letter to the prosecuting attorney’s supervisor repeating the substance of the earlier letter and

alleging that the failure to consent to a conditional plea was arbitrary and violated the Due

Process Clause. Defense counsel further accused the prosecuting attorney of stating that the

government would not support a lower sentence even if defendant accepted responsibility by

stipulating that he committed the crime. Defense counsel stated that “such a position

constitutes misconduct because it effectively holds [support for full sentencing credit] hostage

for Mr. Vukasinovic to forfeit his right to appeal” (Br., Attach. B, Letter from Mr. Blank to

Douglas Sprague, Ass’t U.S. Att’y). The prosecuting attorney has denied “categorically” that

he said these things to defense counsel. On December 23, defendant agreed to stipulate to the

truth of the elements of the charged offense (Br., Attach. C, Vukasinovic Stip.). On January 17,

2006, in open court, defendant waived his right to a jury trial. The bench trial is now set to

begin on January 30. 

ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) allows a defendant to plead guilty or nolo

contendere yet reserve the right to appeal an adverse determination on a specified pretrial

motion. To enter such a plea, the defendant must first obtain the consent of the government and

the court. The Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment bars the federal government from

depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” 

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28 * Wade and its progeny concern sentencing-reduction motions pursuant to both U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Section 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. 3553(e). 

3

Defendant claims that the government violated his due-process rights when it

“arbitrarily withheld consent” to the conditional guilty plea. He also argues that the

government’s withholding of consent was unconstitutional retaliation for exercising his right to

file the original motion to dismiss. (Although he makes this argument only in the section

seeking dismissal of the indictment, this order also addresses it vis-a-vis the request to compel

the government to support a conditional guilty plea.) Defendant claims that the government’s

consent is merely to ensure that defendants do not use Rule 11(a)(2) to appeal non-dispositive

issues, thus building prejudicial delay into the government’s case. In the instant case, that is not

a concern because the pretrial order defendant wishes to appeal was on a motion to dismiss the

indictment. Although counsel suggests that the proper relief in this case is to force the

government to “consent” to entry of the plea, he has not identified any decision in which a court

allowed the entry of a conditional plea without the government’s freely given agreement. 

Defendant relies primarily on Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992). Wade held

that district courts may grant a defendant relief if a prosecutor refuses — for an unconstitutional

reason — to move for a sentence reduction despite the defendant’s provision of substantial

assistance to the government. The Supreme Court held that a defendant is not entitled to a

hearing or discovery on that issue unless he or she makes more than generalized allegations of

improper motive and representations that the defendant provided substantial assistance. Id. at

185–86. The Ninth Circuit clarified that a defendant has no right to discovery, an evidentiary

hearing or a remedy unless he or she makes “a substantial threshold showing with specific

allegations of the improper reasons.” United States v. Delgado-Cardenas, 974 F.2d 123, 126

(9th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court said in Wade that improper motives include racial and

religious discrimination, or any other reason “not rationally related to any legitimate

Government end.” 504 U.S. at 185–86.*

 

Since Wade, courts of appeals have defined the constitutional contours of prosecutorial

discretion in the area of sentence-reduction motions. They have held that it was improper to fail

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to make the motion in retaliation for the defendant’s decision to exercise his right to a trial and

in an attempt to ensure a defendant’s continued cooperation. See United States v. Treleaven, 35

F.3d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases from other circuits). In the Ninth Circuit, relief

also was authorized when the government circumvented defendant’s counsel in getting

defendant’s cooperation, thus preventing the attorney from negotiating with the government

over the motion. Id. at 461–62. It was also proper when the government breached a plea

agreement. United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1341 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Even assuming, arguendo, that Wade were extended to Rule 11(a)(2) issues such as the

one here (something no court is known to have done), defendant would not be entitled to relief,

much less a hearing or discovery. He has not made a substantial threshold showing that the

government acted with improper motive. He alleges an arbitrary decision, which the Supreme

Court defined as one “not rationally related to any legitimate Government end.” Wade, 504

U.S. at 186. Defendant suggests that the decision here must be arbitrary because the pretrial

motion he wishes to appeal is clearly dispositive. But the government is not limited to

withholding consent only when the appeal would not be case-dispositive. The government’s

veto under Rule 11 may help prevent delaying tactics. Rule 11 Advisory Committee Notes,

1983 Amendments. But this is a justification for granting the government such discretion, not a

limit on that discretion. Defendant therefore has not shown that the government’s decision was

arbitrary. Furthermore, under Wade the slimmest of reasons qualifies as one rationally related

to a legitimate governmental purpose. In Wade, the Supreme Court stated that it would have

been rational for the government not to support a reduced sentence simply on grounds that the

costs of so moving would outweigh the benefits. 504 U.S. at 187. 

For all this record shows, the prosecution simply wishes to conserve its limited

resources to meet matters of greater substance than the theory on which the motion to dismiss

was grounded. 

Defendant also has made no substantial threshold showing that the government is not

consenting to a conditional plea in retaliation for his original motion to dismiss. Neither of the

letters submitted by defense counsel contain evidence of such a motive. Even if he had made

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such allegations in those letters, that would not be sufficient to merit further inquiry. If such

were the rule, any defense attorney could force a prosecutor to defend his actions with evidence

merely by making unsupported allegations of misconduct. This would bog down prosecutions

without a proportionate benefit. 

***

Defendant also contends alternatively that the prosecutor is engaged in such serious

misconduct as to merit dismissal of the indictment. Such misconduct, he claims, is retaliation

for the original motion to dismiss. He claims it came in two ways: the government’s refusals to

consent to a conditional plea and to agree to recommend full sentencing credit for acceptance of

responsibility. 

Defendant does not make a persuasive showing on these point. First, the evidence is

weak. The only proof defendant supplies is his counsel’s statement that the prosecuting

attorney “told me . . . the government would not agree to recommend full credit for acceptance

of responsibility since he litigated a motion to dismiss” (Br., Attach. B, Letter to D. Sprague). 

The prosecuting attorney contradicts that statement, saying that the government has made no

final decision on what length of sentence to recommend. That makes sense, given that the

defendant has neither agreed to plead guilty nor been convicted. The prosecutor also states that

he has never told defense counsel that government might oppose full credit “solely” because

defendant moved to dismiss the case. 

Second, even if the government had made such a decision, it would not be retaliatory

because defendant does not qualify now for a full reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

Section 3E1.1(b), the Sentencing Guidelines provision dealing with acceptance of

responsibility, states that a qualifying defendant must “timely notify authorities of his intention

to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial.” This

case is set for trial in just ten days. The government already filed motions in limine. Although

defendant earlier notified the government of his desire to plead guilty conditionally, that is not

the same as a unilateral guilty plea of the type contemplated by Section 3E1.1(b). It makes no

sense that a defendant could automatically qualify for full credit solely because he offered to

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plead guilty conditionally. If that were the law, a defendant could offer to plead guilty

conditionally, see that offer rejected by the government or the court, proceed to trial, then still

claim credit under a sentencing provision designed specifically to reward those who do not go

to trial. 

As stated above, defendant makes no persuasive case that the government is retaliating

against him for his prior motion to dismiss by not consenting to the conditional plea. Even if

the government was engaged in the misconduct alleged, it probably would not warrant a

remedy, must less dismissal of the indictment. Normally, the remedy for a constitutional

violation must be tailored to the actual effect of the violation. Even serious government

misconduct in a criminal proceeding is normally not entitled to relief in the proceeding itself

unless there is “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof.” See United States v.

Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365–66 (1981). No such threat or prejudice has been shown here. 

Even if defendant cannot plead guilty conditionally, he may proceed by a stipulated facts bench

trial and move quickly to the Ninth Circuit. 

***

This order does not rely in any way on defendant’s failure to properly support this

motion with admissible evidence. As noted by the Court at the hearing, defendant’s two letters

by counsel are not authenticated by declaration. All “[m]otions presenting issues of fact shall

be supported by affidavits or declarations . . . .” Crim. L.R. 47-2(b). At the hearing on this

motion, the Court pointed out that defense counsel himself had invoked this rule against the

government in a different case. Defense counsel stated in court and in a post-hearing letter that

he had no record or recollection of ever taking such a position. Raising the specter of

ineffective assistance of counsel, he asked for clarification. Here it is: Defense counsel

invoked this rule on pages three and four of his opening brief on a motion to suppress in United

States v. Olivia, No. CR 05-580 WHA (motion denied Jan. 11, 2006, N.D. Cal.). In that case,

defense counsel was making the point that the motion ought to be granted if the government did

not meet its burden of production. He wrote: 

Northern District Local Criminal Rule 47-1 requires that noticed

motions be made pursuant to Criminal Local Rule 47-2. That rule

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requires that litigation involving issues of fact must be supported

by affidavits or declarations: 

(b) Format: Except as otherwise specifically provided, the

format of motions shall comply with the requirements of

Civil L.R. 7-2(b) and (c). Motions presenting issues of fact

shall be supported by affidavits or declarations which shall

comply with the requirements of Civil L.R. 7-5. Crim. L.R.

47-2(b). 

Civil Local Rule 7-5 clearly specifies the requirements of

affidavits or declarations offered in support of motions: 

7-5. Affidavit or Declaration 

(a) Affidavit or Declaration Required: Factual contentions

made in support of or in opposition to any motions should

be supported by an affidavit or declaration and by

appropriate references to the record. Extracts from

depositions, interrogatory answers, requests for admission

and other evidentiary matters must be appropriately

authenticated by an affidavit or declaration. 

. . . If the government believes that the seizure and search fall

within one of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant

requirement, an affidavit or declaration will be necessary to

support that factual assertion. . . . 

Until the government has met its evidentiary burden of identifying

a Fourth Amendment exception, however, the seizure and search

are presumptively unconstitutional and all fruits deriving from it

must be suppressed.

Defense counsel should not try to have it both ways and selectively invoke or ignore the rules as

it suits him. This time, the violation of the rule will be overlooked. The motion is denied on the

merits. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, all relief requested under the motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 20, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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