Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05339/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05339-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe McGrath
Respondent
Ruben James Puga
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN JAMES PUGA,

Petitioner,

 vs.

 JOE McGRATH, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-5339 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For

the reasons set out below, the petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

A jury convicted petitioner of escape from prison. With enhancements for prior

offenses, the trial court sentenced him to prison for twenty-five years to life. As grounds for

habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) his due process rights were violated when the trial

court denied his motion for change of venue; (2) imposition of an enhancement for prior

convictions violated his double jeopardy rights; and (3) his life sentence for non-forcible

escape was cruel and unusual punishment. 

Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, which are excerpted from the opinion

of the California Court of Appeal: 

On April 30, 2001, Puga disappeared from Pelican Bay State Prison,

where he was an inmate. On May 3, a homeowner named Donald Allen found

that his Honda Civic was missing from his garage. A day or so later, he and

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his wife saw that an intruder had been in their motor home, which was parked

next to the garage. There were muddy clothes in the motor home. There were

also an empty beer can and an empty water bottle, which had been taken

from a refrigerator in the garage.

Puga's fingerprints were found on the beer can and the water bottle.

On May 23, 2001, Puga was arrested in Sacramento. He gave the arresting

officers another man's driver's license as identification. In late June 2001, the

Allens' Honda was found parked on a street in San Francisco. No fingerprints

from the car or its contents could be identified as Puga's. However, Puga's

former girlfriend told investigators that Puga had said he abandoned a car in

San Francisco after it ran out of gas.

Ex. C at 1-2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

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established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at

340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th

Cir.2000). 

DISCUSSION

I. Change of Venue

Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated when the trial court denied

his motion for change of venue. A criminal defendant facing trial by jury is entitled to be

tried by “a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). 

Accordingly, a trial judge must grant a motion for change of venue if prejudicial pretrial

publicity makes it impossible to seat an impartial jury. Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065,

1070 (9th Cir. 1997). A defendant must demonstrate one of two different types of prejudice

in support of a motion for change of venue: presumed or actual. Id. This distinction is

clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court under the AEDPA

standard of review. Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 362 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Murphy v.

Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975), and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 303 (1977)),

overruled on other grounds as stated in Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir.

2000).

The duty of a federal court sitting in habeas corpus is to “make an independent

review of the record to determine whether there was such a degree of prejudice against the

petitioner that a fair trial was impossible.” Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir.

1984) (citing Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723). At the same time, it must presume correct any factual

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determinations made by the state courts unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and may not grant

the writ unless it concludes that the state court decision “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Here, the court is unable to make an independent review of the

pre-trial publicity itself because the media coverage was not included in the record. Thus,

the court relies on the voir dire transcript and the state courts’ findings of fact regarding the

nature and extent of the pre-trial publicity. See Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181,

1210-1211 (9th Cir. 2005).

A. Presumed Prejudice 

“Prejudice is presumed when the record demonstrates that the community where the

trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the

crime.” Gallego, 124 F.3d at 1070 (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 410

(9th Cir. 1996) (as amended)). The publicity must be “so pervasive and inflammatory that

the jurors cannot be believed when they assert that they can be impartial.” United States v.

Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1997)). Prejudice is rarely presumed because

“saturation” defines conditions found only in extreme situations. Gallego, 124 F.3d at 1070;

Croft, 124 F.3d at 1115. Among the factors to be considered are: (1) whether there was a

“barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial amounting to a huge [] wave of

public passion;” (2) “whether the media accounts were primarily factual”; and (3) “whether

the media accounts contained inflammatory, prejudicial information that was not admissible

at trial.” Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787, 795 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),

amended by 152 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998). Compare Daniels, 428 F.3d at 1210-12 (denial

of motion for change of venue violated defendant's due process rights where publicity both

in the wake of the crime and immediately before trial was inflammatory rather than merely

factual in nature and where the public’s response amounted to a “huge” waive of public

passion), with Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2004) (denial of

venue change did not violate defendant's constitutional rights because the six- to eight-year

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 “RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript.

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gap between the publicity and the actual trial mitigated any bias created by the publicity

and majority of published articles were factual in nature, even though the media did

disclose some prejudicial and inadmissible material). 

The three factors indicating presumed prejudice are not satisfied in the present case. 

First, the publicity did not amount to a “barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior

to trial.” See Ainsworth, 138 F.3d at 795. Unlike in Daniels, where the publicity resumed

as the trial approached, here all of the publicity occurred eight months before trial. Daniels,

428 F.3d at 1211; RT 47, 443-44, 457-58.1

 It consisted of just four newspaper articles from

the “one principal paper,” the Daily Triplicate, a wanted poster posted at the post office, and

some television and radio broadcasts to which the trial judge sustained an objection due to

the uncertainty of listener and viewership. RT 442-47, 457-60. Second, the media

accounts were “primarily factual.” See Ainsworth, 138 F.3d at 795. Unlike in Daniels,

where the press accounts included editorials and letters to the editor calling for Daniels's

execution, here the trial court noted the absence of “editorial comment” and concluded that

the paper coverage was “not disproportionate to the event.” Daniels, 428 F.3d at 1212; RT

447, 459-60. Finally, the media accounts did not contain “inflammatory, prejudicial

information that was not admissible at trial.” See Ainsworth, 138 F.3d at 795. In Daniels,

the news articles described Daniels's past criminal offenses, which included an arrest for

shooting at a police officer, and reflected the prosecution's theory of the case by attributing

the killings to Daniels's desire to escape justice. Daniels, 428 F.3d at 1212. By contrast,

the publicity here depicted petitioner as a nonviolent criminal, highlighting that he had

simply “walked away” from the prison, that he had been a low security inmate because he

had not used weapons during the robberies that led to his imprisonment, and that he did

not attempt violence when the police finally apprehended him. RT 457-58. Neither the

newspaper articles nor the posters mentioned that petitioner was a three-strikes criminal. 

RT 451, 458. In addition, although the majority of potential and actual jurors recalled

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reading an article and/or hearing a report on the radio about the escape, most had only a

vague recollection of the details which “did not seem to reflect that it was an inflammatory

sort of thing.” RT 443. 

The trial court denied the motion for change of venue, finding that “it[ was] not even

a close call.” RT 460-61. The state court of appeal affirmed. Because the record indicates

that the community where petitioner’s trial was held was not “saturated” with prejudicial and

inflammatory publicity about the crime, the state courts’ conclusion was neither contrary to

nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. See Gallego, 124 F.3d at

1070.

B. Actual prejudice

 To establish actual prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate “that the jurors exhibited

actual partiality or hostility that could not be laid aside.” Gallego, 124 F.3d at 1070 (quoting

Sherwood, 98 F.3d at 410). The focus must be on the jurors who were actually seated on

the petit jury. Id. at 1071. It is not enough that some of them had some prior knowledge of

the case. Id. See, e.g., Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 909-10 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no

actual prejudice where not one seated juror had said that he or she had definitely formed

opinions about the case, none harbored hostility toward defendant that could not be set

aside, no prospective juror with any connection to the case was seated, and the trial court

allowed the defense unrestricted opportunities to question jurors in voir dire).

The record in this case does not support a finding that the jury as finally constituted

was actually prejudiced. Here is a breakdown of the voir dire responses of the seated

jurors: Juror 68738 (#1) originally stated that he “might edge in [the] direction” of giving

more credit to a correctional officer than a inmate, but he unequivocally accepted the

proposition that “[he] might hear an officer’s testimony and disbelieve it based on other

evidence [he] might hear.” RT 259-60. Juror 67310 (#2) could not remember any publicity

about the case. RT 414. She had been divorced thirty years from her husband who was a

correctional officer and had no other involvement with law enforcement. RT 414. She

agreed that she “could definitely have a fair opinion” of the case and that she would hear all

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the evidence. RT 415. Juror 68312 (#3) had not heard about the incident because she

was out of the area when the incident occurred. RT 406. She stated that she did not feel

any bias against petitioner and that she would not give more weight to a correctional

officer’s testimony. RT 406-07. Juror 66822 (#4) heard about the incident by word of

mouth but had not discussed it or formed an opinion on it. RT 409-11. She attended the

same church as three correctional officers, but her relationship with them did not extend

beyond church, and she stated that she did not believe she would give more weight to a

correctional officer’s testimony. RT 409-11. Juror 64451 (#5) stated that he or she could

not remember the publicity surrounding the escape and was not acquainted with any of the

people involved in the case. RT 61, 73. Juror 68619 (#6) rented her family farm to the

Allens; however, she and the Allens were “not close to the extent they visit socially or go

about common social endeavors,” and she assured the court that she “hope[d she] would

be as objective as anyone else on this panel.” RT 476. 

Juror 73128 (#7) worked with law enforcement officers at the state park, but she did

not find them to be particularly trustworthy. RT 197-98, 200. Although she was friends with

an individual on the search team and had read about and discussed the incident with her

boyfriend, she stated that she had no opinion about the case and would have no problem

weighing the evidence fairly. RT 201. Juror 63102 (#8) knew people who worked at the

prison, and hearing about the escape had given him some concern; however, he assured

the court that “[he] wouldn’t give favor toward anyone” and would “start out with a clean

slate.” RT 143-47. Juror 74868 (#9) had a tenant who was employed by Pelican Bay but

stated that he or she would have no problem being “fair and impartial in weighing the

defenses [sic] testimony [even though] he’s on the other side of the fence than a

correctional officer.” RT 95. Juror 74782 (#10) did not have an opinion about the case

because he or she only knew “what [he or she] heard on the radio” and believed that media

sources could “probably not” be accurate. RT 323-24. Juror 71250 (#11) had heard

nothing about the case in the media. RT 467. She had a step-brother who was a

correctional officer, but she had not talked to him in two years and stated that she would

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not give more credence to law enforcement witnesses. RT 467. Lastly, Juror 62700 (#12)

had read about the escape in the newspaper but had forgotten about it until she was

summoned as a juror. RT 331. Although she initially stated that she would “probably tend

to believe a correctional officer” over an inmate, she unequivocally agreed with the court’s

assessment that she was willing “to make a conscientious effort to weigh and evaluate the

evidence and follow the court’s instructions.” RT 334. 

This record indicates that none of the seated jurors exhibited “actual partiality or

hostility that could not be laid aside.” See Gallego, 124 F.3d at 1070. To summarize, four

jurors had no memory of the publicity surrounding the escape. Those who did remember

the publicity did not recall details or indicate that they had formed an opinion about the

case. All jurors who had any connection to correctional officers at Pelican Bay assured the

court that they could be fair and impartial. In addition, the trial judge gave defense counsel

unrestricted opportunities to question jurors individually in voir dire. 

Even if the record did give some indication of bias, however, the results of the trial

alone indicate that petitioner’s jury was impartial. As the state court of appeal noted, the

jury acquitted petitioner of automobile theft and deadlocked on the burglary charge, despite

the ample circumstantial evidence supporting these charges. The only charge for which

the jury returned a guilty verdict was the escape charge. Given the clear evidence of

petitioner’s previous conviction of two felony counts of robbery, his confinement at Pelican

Bay, his absence from prison before his sentence was up, and his arrest in Sacramento, it

is hard to imagine how any impartial jury could have come to a different verdict.

For these reasons, the state courts’ finding that there was no presumed or actual

prejudice was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

authority.

II. Double Jeopardy

Petitioner claims that the imposition of an enhancement for prior convictions violated

his double jeopardy rights. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment

guarantees that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy

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of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395

U.S. 784, 794 (1969) held that the Clause’s protections were applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The guarantee against double jeopardy protects against (1) a second prosecution for

the same offense after acquittal or conviction, and (2) multiple punishments for the same

offense. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1995). It is well-settled that an

enhancement of the punishment imposed for a later offense “‘is not to be viewed as either a

new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes,’ but instead as ‘a stiffened penalty

for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive

one.’” Witte, 515 U.S. at 400 (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)); accord

United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In this case, petitioner is not being punished for his previous robberies, but rather for

the latest crime of escape as an aggravated offense. Therefore, there is no violation of the

Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, the decision of the state court of appeal to that

effect was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court authority.

III. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner claims that his life sentence for non-forcible escape was cruel and unusual

punishment. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that there

“shall not be . . . cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “The

Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. 

Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime.” 

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,

1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72

(2003) (“A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years.”). 

The Eighth Amendment does not preclude a state from making a judgment that protecting

the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at

least one serious or violent crime, as may occur under a recidivist sentencing statute. 

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Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25, 29-30. In determining whether a sentence is grossly

disproportionate under a such a statute, the court looks to whether the “extreme sentence

is justified by the gravity of [the individual's] most recent offense and criminal history.” 

Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2004).

In Andrade, the Supreme Court upheld a Three Strikes sentence of two consecutive

twenty-five-to-life terms for a recidivist convicted of stealing approximately $150 worth of

videotapes. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66, 77. Andrade had a criminal history of petty theft,

burglary, and transportation of marijuana. Id. at 66. Similarly, in Ewing, the Court upheld a

Three Strikes sentence of twenty-five years to life for a repeat felon convicted of felony

grand theft of three golf clubs worth nearly $1,200. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18-19, 30-31. 

Ewing had a criminal history of theft, battery, burglary, possession of drug paraphernalia,

illegal firearm possession, robbery, and trespass. Id. at 18-19. By contrast, the Ninth

Circuit in Ramirez held that a Three Strikes sentence of twenty-five years to life on petty

theft with prior conviction was grossly disproportionate to the crime. Ramirez, 365 F.3d at

767. Ramirez’s prior criminal history consisted of two convictions for second-degree

robbery obtained through a single guilty plea, for which his total sentence was one year in

county jail and three years of probation. Id. at 768. The robberies were “nonviolent”

shoplifting crimes in which the “force” used was when a third party drove the getaway car

over the foot of a grocery store security guard and when Ramirez pushed a K-mart security

guard out of his way as he fled the store. Id.

Here, petitioner was convicted of escape from prison, a crime arguably more serious

than the thefts in Andrade and Ewing. In determining whether a sentence is grossly

disproportionate under a recidivist sentencing statute, however, courts look not only at the

most recent offense, but also at the petitioner’s criminal history. Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 768.

Unlike in Ramirez, where Ramirez’s two prior strikes were nonviolent shoplifting crimes,

petitioner’s two prior strikes were robberies that “involved an attack on two victims, one of

whom petitioner hit with a baseball bat and the other of whom he tied up with tape.” 

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 768; Ex. C at 5. In addition, petitioner was on parole from a California

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Youth Authority commitment for assault with great bodily injury when he committed the

robberies. Ex. C at 5. Although this criminal history is not as long as the criminal histories

of petitioners in Ewing and Andrade, a likely reason for this is petitioner’s relative youth–he

was only twenty-three years old at the time of his escape. Id. 

Another factor weighing against petitioner is that a week before he committed the

present offense, a counselor warned him of the third-strike consequences of another crime. 

Id. at 5. Petitioner had approached the counselor to request a transfer to a more secure

unit so he would not be tempted to escape. Id. at 6. That neither petitioner’s CYA

commitment, his prison commitment, nor the counselor’s warning deterred him from

committing the third offense supports the state appellate court’s conclusion that petitioner is

“an especially persistent [recidivist].” On this record, the state court’s rejection of

petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court authority.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 19, 2008. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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