Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03946/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03946-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rady I. Sdoulam
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3946

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Rady I. Sdoulam, also known as * Western District of Missouri.

Rady I. Sduolam, also known as *

Roddy Ibrahim, also known as *

Rady A. Sdoulam, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 13, 2004

Filed: March 2, 2005

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Rady I. Sdoulam was charged with conspiracy to distribute pseudoephedrine,

then having reason to believe that such chemical would be used to manufacture

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2) and 846, and with

distribution of pseudoephedrine, then having reason to believe that such chemical

would be used to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(c)(2). A jury convicted Sdoulam of both of the charged offenses, and the

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1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

2

Although Sdoulam testified through an interpreter at trial, he has passed the

spoken English portion of the citizenship test administered by the United States

Immigration and Naturalization Service and was heard speaking English on audio

tapes played at trial.

-2-

District Court1

 sentenced Sdoulam to 108 months' imprisonment. Sdoulam now

appeals both his convictions and his sentence. In challenging his convictions,

Sdoulam asserts that the District Court erred in: (1) denying Sdoulam's motion to

dismiss and motion for acquittal or a new trial on Count One of the indictment on the

ground that Count One allegedly charged Sdoulam with conspiring to commit a

negligent act, (2) admitting expert testimony of probability of guilt, (3) denying

Sdoulam's motions for acquittal or a new trial on the ground that there is a variance

between the conspiracy charged in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial,

and (4) instructing the jury on "deliberate ignorance" and "permissive inference." For

the reasons discussed below, we affirm Sdoulam's convictions. In challenging his

sentence, Sdoulam argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the

sentence was premised on facts found by the District Court, rather than the jury.

Given the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005), we remand for resentencing.

I.

Sdoulam is a lawful resident alien from Israel who has lived in the United

States since 1996. While Sdoulam does not read or write English, he is proficient in

spoken English.2

 In 1997, Sdoulam and a partner, Eiad Mousallet, purchased a Quick

Stop convenience store in Kansas City, Kansas. The co-owners shared the operating

duties of the store. In addition, Mousallet owned and operated a Quick Stop store in

Grandview, Missouri. 

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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating the Quick Stop

stores after the FBI received a tip from a former employee of the Kansas store that

large quantities of pseudoephedrine products were being sold out of the store.

Darlene Babcock reported that she had worked in the Kansas store in 1997 as a

cashier and shelf stocker. During her employment, several wholesale venders brought

products containing pseudoephedrine to the store. Sdoulam and Mousallet

—whichever was on duty—would pay for the products with cash from their pockets,

rather than follow the usual procedure of purchasing inventory with funds from the

cash register. According to Babcock, Sdoulam and Mousallet generally stored

pseudoephedrine products behind the counter rather than on the main sales floor.

Babcock introduced Sdoulam and Mousallet to several methamphetamine

manufacturers, or "cooks," who then came to the store and purchased large quantities

of pseudoephedrine. Trial Tr. at 147. When both Sdoulam and Mousallet were

present at the time that a cook came to buy pseudoephedrine, Sdoulam and Mousallet

split the money from the sale. Babcock testified at trial that she was addicted to

methamphetamine while employed at the Quick Stop and that she had multiple

conversations with Sdoulam about methamphetamine during that time. 

At the FBI's request, Babcock agreed to become a paid informant and to aid in

the investigation of the Quick Stop stores. After making some preliminary telephone

contacts with Sdoulam, Babcock went to the Kansas store on November 27, 2001.

Babcock told Sdoulam that she knew someone who might like to purchase

pseudoephedrine. Sdoulam gave her a box containing pseudoephedrine in sixtymilligram tablets and told her to show it to her friend as a sample of what Sdoulam

could provide. On December 1, 2001, Babcock told Sdoulam that her friend was

interested in purchasing pseudoephedrine products, but that he wanted to purchase

in large quantities because "that stuff he does, you know, the meth, that takes a lot of

those boxes to make that up." Trial Tr. at 301. On December 5, 2001, Babcock went

to the Kansas store to purchase pseudoephedrine products, but, despite searching

through boxes in the back room, Sdoulam was unable to find any pseudoephedrine

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to sell. On December 10, 2001, however, Sdoulam sold Babcock boxes of various

cold medicines containing pseudoephedrine for $500.00 in cash. 

In January 2002, undercover agent Jay Oliver began accompanying Babcock

to the Kansas store. On January 18, 2002, Sdoulam sold Oliver forty-seven boxes of

nasal decongestant containing pseudoephedrine. Oliver asked Sdoulam if, in the

future, he could obtain sixty-milligram tablets, rather than thirty-milligram tablets,

explaining that it "[t]akes too many [thirty-milligram tablets] to cook." Trial Tr. at

709. On February 8, 2002, Oliver returned to the Kansas store. Sdoulam offered to

sell him sixty boxes of pseudoephedrine products from behind the front counter.

These boxes contained thirty-milligram tablets, and Oliver again told Sdoulam that

he would rather purchase sixty-milligram tablets. Sdoulam went to his minivan in the

store parking lot and retrieved a brown bag containing blister packs of sixtymilligram pseudoephedrine tablets, which had been removed from their original retail

packaging and had no instructions for consumer use. Oliver paid Sdoulam $500.00

for fifty-two of the blister packs. In negotiating the price, Sdoulam noted that he had

to "split [the money] with my buddy." Id. at 694-95; Exh. 60. Oliver's next visit to

the Kansas store was on March 1, 2002. Mousallet was on duty. Oliver asked

Mousallet if any pseudoephedrine was available. Mousallet told Oliver to return to

the store at 3:00 p.m., when Sdoulam was scheduled to work. Oliver returned shortly

before 3:00 p.m., and, although Sdoulam had not yet arrived, Mousallet sold him

twenty-four boxes of sixty-milligram antihistamine tablets containing

pseudoephedrine for $140.00 in cash. Sdoulam arrived as Oliver was leaving, and

Oliver observed Mousallet hand Sdoulam the cash. Oliver told the two owners that

he would return in a few days to purchase additional pseudoephedrine. Oliver next

spoke with Sdoulam on March 19, 2002. Sdoulam told Oliver that he was out of

pseudoephedrine but suggested that they meet at a Home Depot parking lot two days

later for the exchange of additional pseudoephedrine. On March 21, 2002, Sdoulam

met Oliver at the Home Depot parking lot and sold Oliver thirty-six boxes of

pseudoephedrine products for $360.00 in cash.

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The jury also found that Sdoulam's minivan was used to facilitate the offenses

and was therefore subject to forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2).

-5-

 A second investigation related to the sale of pseudoephedrine at the Quick

Stop stores was conducted by the Overland Park, Kansas Police Department (OPPD).

On December 26, 2001, OPPD police arrested Christopher Queen and Nancy Queen

for shoplifting thirteen boxes of cold medicines containing pseudoephedrine from a

Target store. Upon searching the Queens' car in the Target parking lot, police found

a paper bag containing forty-six additional boxes of various pseudoephedrine

products. After being transported to the police department, Mr. Queen called the

Kansas Quick Stop in an attempt to obtain bond money. At trial, Mrs. Queen testified

that she and her husband had been stealing and providing to Mousallet 100–150

boxes of pseudoephedrine products per week since late fall 2001. The Queens

delivered the pseudoephedrine products to Mousallet at a number of locations,

including the Kansas and Missouri Quick Stop stores. Upon receipt, Mousallet would

place the pseudoephedrine products either in the back rooms of the stores, behind the

front counters, or in his car. 

FBI agents arrested Sdoulam and Mousallet on April 23, 2002. Mousallet's car

was searched and five boxes of pseudoephedrine products were found in a paper bag

in the trunk. Sdoulam's minivan was searched and eighty-two blister packs of

pseudoephedrine products, removed from their retail packaging, were found in a

paper bag in the van. 

Sdoulam was brought to trial on May 12, 2003. At the close of the evidence,

the jury convicted Sdoulam of distributing and conspiring (with Mousallet, Mr.

Queen, and Mrs. Queen) to possess and distribute pseudoephedrine, while having

reason to believe the pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture

methamphetamine.3

 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court found that the

amount of pseudoephedrine involved in the offenses was at least 300 grams but less

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4

A base offense level of 36, coupled with a criminal history category of I,

results in a Guidelines sentencing range of 188 to 235 months' imprisonment.

However, the District Court granted Sdoulam's motion for downward departure for

substantial assistance in the administration of justice, due to Sdoulam's agreement to

waive his rights in connection with administrative deportation proceedings.

-6-

than 1 kilogram, resulting in a base offense level of 34 under the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines. The District Court then enhanced Sdoulam's base offense level by two

points because the District Court determined that Sdoulam obstructed justice by

perjuring himself while testifying under oath during the trial. Pursuant to the

Guidelines, the District Court sentenced Sdoulam to 108 months in prison.4

II.

Sdoulam first argues on appeal that his motion to dismiss Count One of the

indictment should have been granted because Count One charges him with

"conspir[ing] to commit a negligent act, which is a legal impossibility." Appellant

Brief at 41. We review the District Court's decision on the sufficiency of the

indictment de novo. See United States v. Ferro, 252 F.3d 964, 965–66 (8th Cir.

2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1083 (2002); United States v. Zangger, 848 F.2d 923,

924 (8th Cir. 1988). 

Count One of the indictment provides in relevant part: "RADY I. SDOULAM

[and others] . . . did knowingly conspire, confederate, and agree with each other . . .

to possess and distribute . . . pseudoephedrine, then having reasonable cause to

believe that such chemical would be used to manufacture a controlled substance, that

is, methamphetamine, in violation of Section 841(c)(2), Title 21, United States Code."

Sdoulam asserts that the phrase "reasonable cause to believe," which is taken directly

from 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), creates a negligence standard. Using this interpretation,

Sdoulam argues that Count One charges him with conspiring to commit a negligent

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5

In 2000, Congress redesignated 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2) as 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(c)(2), the statute under which Sdoulam was charged.

-7-

act, which is contrary to the specific intent requirement necessary to support a

conspiracy conviction. 

We agree with Sdoulam that one cannot conspire to commit a negligent or

unintentional act. We find, however, that Count One charges Sdoulam of conspiring

to commit an intentional act: the violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Section

841(c)(2) imposes criminal sanctions on "[a]ny person who knowingly or

intentionally . . . possesses or distributes a listed chemical knowing, or having

reasonable cause to believe, that the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a

controlled substance . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).

Sdoulam's argument that the "reasonable cause to believe" language of

Section 841(c)(2) could punish a negligent act (such that Count One could be

construed to charge Sdoulam of conspiring to commit a negligent act) is

disingenuous. 

Although Sdoulam is correct in his assertion that this Circuit has not

specifically addressed whether "a charge of conspiracy to violate Section 841(c)(2)

results in a legal impossibility," Appellant Brief at 42 n.9, this Circuit has addressed

the underlying premise of Sdoulam's argument. In United States v. Bewig we noted

that Section 841(c)(2) does not criminalize a negligent act: "The section does not

punish the inadvertent sale of a listed chemical to an illegal drug manufacturer, but

instead punishes only those sales where the seller understands, or should reasonably

understand, that the chemical will be used illegally." 354 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir.

2003) (addressing an argument that 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) is unconstitutionally

vague); see also United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) (ruling

that the "reasonable cause to believe" standard of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2)5

 imposes a

criminal mens rea requirement), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 974 (2001). We also have

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See supra note 5. 

-8-

analyzed the "reasonable cause to believe" language in the context of another federal

felony statute and concluded that, although the language "[a]t first glance . . . might

appear to allow the conviction of a merely negligent defendant," the "better reading"

requires a subjective examination of what was reasonable for the specific defendant

to believe. See United States v. Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d 781, 784–85 (8th Cir. 2004)

(examining the "reasonable cause to believe" language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j)); see

also Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27–28 (1941) (ruling that the "reason to

believe" language of the Espionage Act "requires those prosecuted to have acted in

bad faith"). Under these cases, Sdoulam's assertion that 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) might

be construed to impose a negligence standard fails. Thus, in charging Sdoulam with

conspiracy to violate the statute, Count One did not charge Sdoulam with conspiring

to commit a negligent act. 

To the extent, if any, that our past cases do not preclude Sdoulam's argument

that a charge of conspiracy to violate Section 841(c)(2) is contrary to the specific

intent or actual knowledge requirement of conspiracy, we adopt the reasoning of the

Seventh Circuit, which has characterized this same argument as "erroneous and

misleading." United States v. Green, 779 F.2d 1313, 1318 (7th Cir. 1985). In Green,

the court rejected the argument that a charge of conspiracy to possess and distribute

piperidine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2)6

 amounts to a charge of conspiracy

to commit a negligent act. The court found that the actual knowledge requirement of

conspiracy was satisfied because "the object of the conspiracy charged was the

knowing and intentional possession of [a listed chemical] knowing and having

reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture [a controlled

substance]." Id. (emphasis in original). Under this reasoning, we likewise hold that

a charge of conspiracy to violate Section 841(c)(2) satisfies the specific intent

requirement and does not give rise to a "legal impossibility." 

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III.

Sdoulam next argues that the District Court erred in admitting the testimony

of the government's expert statistician. The expert, Jonathan Robbin, testified about

the estimated monthly average of pseudoephedrine sales at convenience stores

nationwide in comparison with the estimated monthly average of pseudoephedrine

sales at the Kansas Quick Stop. Using local and national census and marketing data,

Robbin extrapolated that the amount of pseudoephedrine product sales by

convenience stores nationwide was approximately $24.00 per month. Then,

considering the amount of pseudoephedrine products that the Kansas store purchased

from wholesalers, as determined by the wholesalers' business records, Robbin

extrapolated that the amount of pseudoephedrine product sales by the Kansas store

would have averaged $530.00 per month if the products were sold in "ordinary retail

sales transactions." At trial, Robbin contrasted the two amounts as follows:

Q. Going back to our statistical framework and our Bell curve, what

kind of standard deviation are we talking about in the Kansas

store?

 A. At the Kansas Store for combination ingredients the difference,

the standard error, is just phenomenal, so large that the

probability of that being small . . . 

[objection]

Q. You can continue your answer.

A. Yes, the sale by the Kansas City store of $500 a month worth of

combined ingredients pseudoephedrine is 123 times the expected

sale . . . . The standard error, if we compute, which in a normal

statistical wouldn't bother reporting such a huge difference, [is a]

ridiculous 730 standard deviations from the mean. 

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Q. What percentage figure would that be from the norm if you had

calculated it?

A. It would be infinitesimal. The probability of encountering such

a large standard deviation and grand sampling in the real world

would be so small it would be smaller than say the probability one

would cover one atom in all atoms in the universe. For all basic

purposes, it would be zero, no. 

Trial Tr. at 529-31.

Sdoulam argues that this testimony was inadmissible for two reasons. First,

Sdoulam asserts that Robbin's testimony constituted impermissible evidence of

"statistical probability of guilt," insofar as it suggested an "infinitesimal" probability

that the pseudoephedrine sales at the Kansas store were made in legitimate retail

transactions. Appellant Brief at 25. Implicit in this testimony, Sdoulam argues, is a

"concomitant suggestion of a practically certain probability that the sales were illicit,

criminal transactions." Id. at 26. Second, Sdoulam asserts that Robbin's testimony

was irrelevant because the indictment alleged that the defendants purchased "stolen

products containing pseudoephedrine," not that the defendants purchased products

containing pseudoephedrine via legitimate wholesale channels. Id. Sdoulam

contends that Robbin's testimony was "other act" evidence not charged in the

indictment and having a prejudicial effect far in excess of its probative value. Id.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision to admit expert

testimony. See United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2002), cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 1134 (2003). Expert testimony is generally admissible if it is based

upon scientifically valid methodology that is properly applied to the facts in issue.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); see also Fed. R.

Evid. 702.

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We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

Robbin's testimony. First, we reject Sdoulam's argument that Robbin's testimony

amounted to improper evidence of the statistical probability that Sdoulam was guilty.

The standards governing expert testimony of statistical probabilities are set out in

United States v. Kandiel. 865 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1989). In Kandiel, the defendant

was convicted on thirteen counts, including making false representation of citizenship

and making false statements in applications for passports. Id. at 969. The issue of

the defendant's true identity was critical, as the defendant asserted that he was not

Mohammed Kandiel, the Egyptian national charged in the indictment but, rather, was

Jeff Howard, the son of a Native American woman. Id. At trial, the government

introduced the testimony of an expert who compared a genetic marker in the

defendant's blood to random population studies of blood group typings. Id. at 970.

Based on this comparison, the expert testified that the defendant was "seventeen times

more likely than someone from a random population" to be the brother of Ahmed

Kandiel, an Egyptian national. Id. at 971. The expert further testified that the genetic

tests indicated that there was only a "one in 1,000" chance that the defendant was the

child of a Native American. Id. The defendant argued that such testimony

"impermissibly established by mathematical certainty that [he] was Egyptian-born

Mohammed Kandiel." Id. On appeal, this Court upheld the admittance of the expert

testimony, ruling that "[s]tatistical evidence is not inadmissible per se." Id. at

971–72. We deemed the testimony proper because the expert laid adequate

"foundational support" for the statistical probabilities by relying on scientific studies

and because the testimony did not "serve to reduce the ultimate question of guilt or

innocence to one of mathematical probabilities." Id. at 971.

We find Robbin's testimony materially indistinguishable from the expert

testimony admitted in Kandiel. As in Kandiel, Robbin laid adequate foundational

support for his conclusions by explaining their bases—national census population and

marketing data and the business records of Sdoulam's wholesale suppliers. Moreover,

Robbin made no statement regarding the mathematical probability that Sdoulam was

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guilty of the crimes charged. Robbin's testimony consisted of nothing more than a

comparison of the amount of expected monthly sales of pseudoephedrine products by

the average convenience store to the amount of estimated sales of pseudoephedrine

products by the Kansas store. While this testimony made the government's burden

of proof on a critical element of the crimes charged more likely satisfied than not, as

in Kandiel, the jury was left to draw whatever conclusions it wished from this

comparison. 

We also reject Sdoulam's assertion that Robbin's testimony was irrelevant and

unduly prejudicial. Indeed, it is the very fact that the testimony helped to prove

Sdoulam guilty of the charged offenses that made the testimony relevant. See Fed.

R. Evid. 401. The indictment charged Sdoulam with distributing pseudoephedrine

and conspiring to distribute pseudoephedrine while having reasonable cause to

believe that the pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture a controlled

substance. Robbin's testimony showing that the amount of pseudoephedrine products

sold at the Kansas store was inordinately greater than the national average was

material to the issue of whether Sdoulam had reason to believe that the

pseudoephedrine was being used to manufacture a controlled substance. Robbin's

estimation of the average retail sales of pseudoephedrine products at convenience

stores also indicated the amount of legitimate sales one might expect at the Kansas

Quick Stop. The wholesale invoices showed that the amount of pseudoephedrine

products purchased by the Kansas store greatly exceeded expected legitimate

consumer demand and indicated that Sdoulam and his partner were obtaining large

quantities of these products to sell to persons without a legitimate need for the

medications. The fact that the indictment did not specifically mention the purchase

of pseudoephedrine products from wholesalers did not substantially prejudice

Sdoulam and does not make Robbin's testimony inadmissible. See United States v.

Cuervo, 354 F.3d 969, 988 (8th Cir. 2004) ("We review claims of variances between

the indictment and proof at trial to determine if the variance substantially prejudiced

the defense."), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 199 (2004).

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IV.

Sdoulam's third argument for reversal is that there was a fatal variance between

the conspiracy charged in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial in that the

evidence demonstrated either multiple conspiracies or a different conspiracy than the

one charged. As noted by Sdoulam, the indictment alleged that Mr. Queen and Mrs.

Queen "would steal boxes containing pseudoephedrine products from retail stores,

and then sell these stolen products to [Sdoulam and Mousallet]" and that Sdoulam and

Mousallet "then sold these products to persons whom they believed or knew to be

manufacturing methamphetamine." Indictment at 3. Sdoulam argues that the

evidence at trial, however, failed to demonstrate that he had any knowledge of or

involvement in the Queens' shoplifting or sale of pseudoephedrine products to

Mousallet. Moreover, Sdoulam asserts, the evidence at trial was that Sdoulam and

Mousallet obtained the vast majority of the pseudoephedrine products from wholesale

distributors, not from the Queens.

"The issue of whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies existed is

a question for the jury." United States v. Adipietro, 983 F.2d 1468, 1475 (8th Cir.

1993). In reviewing claims of variances between the indictment and proof at trial, we

examine whether a reasonable jury could have determined that the defendant

participated in the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. See United States v.

Regan, 940 F.2d 1134, 1135 (8th Cir. 1991). In so doing, we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the verdict. See United States v. Crouch, 46 F.3d 871, 874

(8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 871 (1995); United States v. Dijan, 37 F.3d

398, 403 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1044 (1995). Even if a variance is

found to exist, the conviction will be upheld unless we find that the defendant was

prejudiced by the variance. See United States v. Lopez-Arce, 267 F.3d 775, 781 (8th

Cir. 2001). 

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A single conspiracy "involves two or more persons agreeing to commit a

criminal offense plus an act in furtherance of the conspiracy." Adipietro, 983 F.2d

at 1475; see also United States v. Watts, 950 F.2d 508, 512 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 503 U.S. 911 (1992). "A single conspiracy can exist notwithstanding the fact

that the participants or their roles change or that multiple groups performing separate

crimes or acts exist." Adipietro, 983 F.2d at 1475 (internal citations omitted).

Moreover, a defendant "does not have to be aware of the existence of all other

conspirators or all the details of the conspiracy, as long as the evidence shows s/he

made a knowing act in furtherance of the conspiracy." Watts, 950 F.2d at 512; see

also, United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 1357 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the

defendant "did not have to be personally acquainted" with the other defendants in

order to participate in the conspiracy), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was

ample support for the jury's finding that Sdoulam engaged in the single conspiracy

charged in the indictment. The evidence showed that, on at least one occasion, Oliver

purchased large quantities of pseudoephedrine at the Kansas store from Mousallet,

who then handed the money to Sdoulam. On his way out of the store, Oliver told

Sdoulam, in Mousallet’s presence, that he would return in a few days to purchase

additional pseudoephedrine. The evidence also showed that, although the Queens

usually sold stolen pseudoephedrine products to Mousallet, it was Sdoulam who sold

a bulk quantity of pseudoephedrine blister packs to Oliver on February 8, 2002. It is

reasonable to infer that these products had been removed from their retail packaging

in order to mask the fact that they had been stolen by the Queens from other stores.

Moreover, in negotiating the price of the products, Sdoulam told Oliver that he had

to "split [the money] with my buddy," from which the jury could reasonably infer that

Sdoulam and Mousallet worked together in obtaining the blister packs. Eighty-two

blister packs were also found in Sdoulam's minivan upon his arrest. Finally, the

evidence established that Sdoulam and Mousallet were partners, and both the

purchase and sale of large quantities of pseudoephedrine products revolved around

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7

This instruction was taken from the Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Jury

Instructions (Criminal), Instruction 5.06(G) (2000).

-15-

the Quick Stop stores. Indeed, Mr. Queen called the Kansas store on the night of his

arrest to obtain bail money. It is without consequence that Sdoulam may not have

dealt directly with Mr. and Mrs. Queen, as the evidence supports a finding that all

four defendants knew that they were participating in a drug conspiracy. See Baker,

855 F.2d at 1357 (holding that the supplier of drugs and the seller of drugs were part

of the same drug conspiracy, even though each had only met the "middleman" and not

one another). 

Sdoulam's argument that a variance further exists because the evidence at trial

indicated that the bulk of the pseudoephedrine products was purchased from

wholesalers, while the indictment lists purchases from shoplifters as overt acts, is also

without merit. The inclusion of some overt acts in an indictment does not bar proof

of other acts, and proof of other acts in furtherance of the same conspiracy does not

constitute a variance. The jury was specifically instructed that Sdoulam could only

be found guilty of conspiracy if the jury found that the conspiracy charged in the

indictment, and not another conspiracy, was the conspiracy in which Sdoulam

participated.7

 Cf. Watts, 950 F.2d at 512 ("[J]ury did not have the option of

convicting . . . on a different conspiracy . . . but was instructed to find only one

particular conspiracy and determine its members."); Adipietro, 983 F.2d at 1475

("[T]he instructions given to the jury by the district court would only permit the jury

to arrive at a finding of guilt for each defendant if the jury found that the conspiracy

charged in the indictment was the conspiracy engaged in by that defendant."). The

jury found Sdoulam guilty of participating in the conspiracy charged in the indictment

involving stolen pseudoephedrine products purchased from the Queens, and the

evidence is ample to support the jury verdict. We conclude that Sdoulam's variance

argument is without merit; the District Court correctly denied Sdoulam's motion for

judgment of acquittal or a new trial.

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8

The District Court instructed the jury as follows:

You may find that a defendant acted knowingly if you find beyond a

reasonable doubt that such defendant was aware of a high probability

that large quantities of pseudoephedrine were being purchased by a

single buyer for the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine, and

that the defendant deliberately avoided learning the truth. The element

of knowledge may be inferred if the defendant deliberately closed his

eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him.

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V.

Sdoulam next challenges the District Court's decision to instruct the jury on

deliberate ignorance and on permissive inference. In reviewing challenges to jury

instructions, this Court recognizes that "the district court has wide discretion in

formulating the instructions," and we will "affirm if the entire charge to the jury,

when read as a whole, fairly and adequately contains the law applicable to the case."

United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1057 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal citation and

quotations omitted). An instruction is properly given if it is a correct statement of the

law and supported by the evidence. See Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil,

Inc., 125 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1997). In deciding whether the evidence

warranted a particular instruction, we view the evidence, and any reasonable

inferences from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party defending the

instruction. See United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756, 764 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.

1033 (1998). 

We have reviewed the instructions given to the jury and are convinced that the

District Court committed no error in fairly and adequately stating the applicable law.

First, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by giving the deliberate ignorance

instruction.8

 "A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the defendant

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You may not find that the defendant acted knowingly, however, if you

find that the defendant actually believed that the pseudoephedrine was

being purchased for legitimate purposes. A showing of negligence,

mistake, or carelessness is not sufficient to support a finding of

knowledge.

Final Instructions Read to the Jury, Instruction No. 34.

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asserts a lack of guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of

deliberate ignorance." Hildebrand, 152 F.3d at 764. Deliberate ignorance is

established if the defendant was "presented with facts that put him on notice that

criminal activity is probably afoot" but "failed to investigate those facts, thereby

deliberately declining to verify or discover the criminal activity." Id. (quoting United

States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1992)). 

Sdoulam's defense at trial was that he lacked knowledge and had no reason to

believe that the pseudoephedrine was being used to manufacture methamphetamine,

in part because he spoke only limited English. Thus, according to Sdoulam, he did

not comprehend what Babcock meant when Babcock told him that her friend was

interested in purchasing large quantities of pseudoephedrine products to make

"meth," nor what Oliver meant when Oliver told him that he would prefer to purchase

sixty-milligram tablets, rather than thirty-milligram tablets, because it "takes too

many [thirty-milligram tablets] to cook." Trial Tr. at 709. The government presented

evidence, however, that when Sdoulam did not understand other English references,

such as to "connections" and "coffee filters," Sdoulam asked the speaker for

definitions and/or contextual explanations. Id. at 662-67, 907. The evidence also

showed that Sdoulam sold pseudoephedrine products to a single buyer in amounts

that far exceeded the recommended dosage, and often in blister packs without

consumer use instructions. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found

that Sdoulam suspected that the pseudoephedrine products that he was selling in bulk

were probably being used for criminal means but deliberately failed to investigate.

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9

The District Court instructed the jury as follows:

That the defendants had reasonable cause to believe that

pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture a controlled substance,

that is, methamphetamine is an essential element of each of the offenses

charged, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find

proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant purchased large

quantities of stolen pseudoephedrine, or that a defendant purchased

abnormally large amounts of pseudoephedrine from wholesalers, or that

a defendant sold pseudoephedrine in such a way that the chemical would

not normally be sold from a retail outlet, and there is additional evidence

that a defendant knew that pseudoephedrine could be used to

manufacture methamphetamine, these are facts from which you may, but

are not required to, find or infer that a defendant had reasonable cause

to believe that pseudoephedrine which he sold would be used to

manufacture methamphetamine.

Final Instructions Read to the Jury, Instruction No. 26.

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Sdoulam correctly notes that this evidence also could have supported a finding that

he actually knew, and was not ignorant, that the pseudoephedrine was being used to

manufacture methamphetamine, but we have held that a superfluous giving of the

instruction is not reversible error. See United States v. King, 351 F.3d 859, 867 (8th

Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court did not commit reversible error in giving

deliberate ignorance instruction when the evidence suggested that the defendant knew

of the criminal scheme), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2852 (2004). The District Court did

not abuse its discretion in giving the deliberate ignorance instruction.

Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in giving the permissive

inference instruction.9

 The District Court instructed the jury that it was permitted to

infer that Sdoulam had reasonable cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine was

being used to manufacture methamphetamine if the jury found that Sdoulam knew

that pseudoephedrine could be used to manufacture methamphetamine and that

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10Neither the indictment nor the jury's verdict stated an amount of

pseudoephedrine attributable to Sdoulam. 

-19-

Sdoulam either purchased abnormally large quantities of pseudoephedrine products

or sold pseudoephedrine products in a way that they would not normally be sold from

a retail outlet. This instruction permitted the jury to make an inference as to

Sdoulam's state of mind, but it also clearly indicated that the jury was "not required"

to make the inference. Final Instructions Read to the Jury, Instruction No. 26. Thus,

the instruction was one of permissive, not mandatory, inference. See United States

v. Clark, 45 F.3d 1247, 1250–51 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kocher, 948 F.2d

483, 486 (8th Cir. 1991). Instructions on permissive inferences are constitutional so

long as the suggested conclusion is "one that reason and common sense justify in

light of the proven facts before the jury." Clark, 45 F.3d at 1250. Given the evidence

of the stolen pseudoephedrine products coming from the Queens, of the abnormally

large purchase of pseudoephedrine products from wholesalers, and of the bulk sales

of pseudoephedrine products (sometimes without retail packaging), we find that

reason and common sense support the giving of the permissive inference instruction.

We are satisfied that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving

either of the challenged instructions.

VI.

Finally, Sdoulam argues that his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment

because it was based on judge-found facts regarding drug quantity10 and obstruction

of justice. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. At the sentencing hearing, Sdoulam

objected to both the District Court's finding of pseudoephedrine quantity and to the

two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. This Circuit has held that when a

defendant objects to a District Court's determination of drug quantity at sentencing,

the defendant preserves a Booker-based challenge to his sentence and is entitled to

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a new sentencing proceeding. United States v. Coffey, Nos. 04-2176 & 04-2247,

2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1090 (8th Cir. Jan. 21, 2005); United States v. Fox, No.

03-3554, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1454 (8th Cir. Jan. 31, 2005). Accordingly, we

remand for resentencing in accordance with Booker.

In summary, we affirm Sdoulam's convictions but remand for resentencing in

accordance with Booker. 

______________________________

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