Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02771/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02771-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Guy A. Edwards
Petitioner
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2771

___________

Guy A. Edwards, *

*

Petitioner, *

* Petition for Review of an

v. * Order from the Federal 

* Aviation Administration.

Federal Aviation Administration, *

*

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: March 5, 2004

Filed: May 7, 2004

___________

Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge

We are called upon to answer the novel question whether, under federal

aviation regulations, a licensed heliport is an airport, ever mindful of elementary

physics–what goes up, must come down. We also realize that, although the western

skies are usually friendly, moored balloons drifting near a heliport at the Sturgis

motorcycle rally can be dangerous.

Guy Edwards (Edwards) petitions for review of an order of the Administrator

of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) denying Edwards’s appeal from an

administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision assessing a $5,000 civil penalty on

Edwards for violating 14 C.F.R. §§ 101.7(a) and 101.13(a)(4) (2003), by operating

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a moored balloon near a heliport, and creating a hazard to persons and property. We

deny Edwards’s petition.

 We travel to the western edge of our circuit where each year, in early August,

the city of Sturgis, South Dakota, hosts a large gathering of motorcycle enthusiasts,

affectionately called “Sturgis.” Media reports place attendance at “Sturgis” as high

as 650,000 people in 2000. The motorcycle rally brings the city a remarkable volume

of commerce for its local businesses. This commerce stimulates souvenir and teeshirt sales, vending, and leasing of vending retail space. Edwards owns several such

businesses, including a Best Western Hotel, a restaurant/lounge, and the Sturgis Inn

Shirt Company. The influx of bikers into Sturgis also creates unaccustomed

congestion for the residents, including bumper-to-bumper street traffic and helicopter

overflights.

Beginning in 1995, Rapid Helicopter (Rapid) conducted sightseeing and aerial

photography flights during the annual motorcycle rallies from a location near

Edwards’s property. Edwards believed the flights were unsafe and damaged his

enterprise. In 1998, in an attempt to halt Rapid’s helicopter business, Edwards

purchased the land on which Rapid operated. Undeterred, Rapid leased another

property directly across the street from Edwards’s property. Rapid sought and

obtained a favorable airspace determination for the new site from the FAA, as well

as an airport operating license from the South Dakota Aeronautics Commission.

Nevertheless, Edwards believed the new Rapid helicopter operation was sited in

violation of federal law and was operating without city approval. 

 In late summer of 1999, with the approach of the August biker season,

Edwards moored two large advertising balloons on his property. This action,

Edwards believed, would ameliorate the helicopter problem. With the balloons

flying, two FAA aviation safety inspectors visited Edwards’s property, where they

advised Edwards he was violating FAA regulations. While on site, the inspectors

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observed two large balloons moored by 200-foot lines, approximately 250 feet from

the helicopter launching pad. Both inspectors believed the balloons posed a hazard

to the helicopters. Nevertheless, Edwards denied violating any regulations, and stated

he did not care about the regulations.

Edwards received numerous other warnings from FAA officials, both before

and during the Sturgis rally, advising Edwards his balloons were illegal. Edwards,

however, believed he was justified in flying his balloons because (1) Edwards and his

balloons were there first; (2) Edwards had invested $500,000 in his property, which

would be lost if the helicopter flights occurred, because the helicopters blew shirts off

his racks, frightened his vendors, and distributed dust all over his enterprise; and (3)

Rapid was not a safe operator and Edwards family, staff, and vendors were in danger.

On August 9, 1999, one of the safety inspectors returned to the site, because

the FAA received a complaint that strong winds were causing Edwards’s balloons to

drift across the street, creating a traffic hazard. When the inspector arrived at

Edwards’s business, the balloons had been taken down. Edwards admitted the strong

winds had caused his balloons to fall, and that one balloon had ruptured when it hit

the ground. Although Edwards admitted he did not feel safe flying the balloons, the

balloons kept the helicopters from flying directly over his business, and thereby

avoided endangering him, his employees, and his family.

Two days later a third FAA inspector arrived on Edwards’s property. The

inspector testified Edwards said he would do whatever it took to protect his interests

and his property, even if it meant shooting the windows out of the helicopters.

Because of this threat, an FBI agent visited Edwards on August 13 to investigate.

The agent noticed one balloon flying, and seized the balloon as evidence. 

In March 2000, the FAA filed a complaint with the Department of

Transportation, seeking assessment of a $5,000 civil penalty for Edwards’s alleged

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The regulations apply to moored balloons with a diameter of more than six feet

and a gas capacity of more than 115 cubic feet. (14 C.F.R. § 101.1(a)(1)). Edwards

has not disputed that his balloons were subject to the regulations.

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violations of 14 C.F.R. § 101.7(a) (no person may operate a moored balloon in a

manner that creates a hazard to other people or property), and 14 C.F.R.

§ 101.13(a)(4) (no person may operate a moored balloon within five miles of the

boundary of an airport).1

 An ALJ held a hearing on the complaint.

 Initially, the ALJ ruled, for purposes of the proceeding, the heliport was

lawfully and officially approved. The ALJ based his decision on evidence showing

the heliport received an operating license from the South Dakota Aeronautics

Commission and an airspace determination from the FAA, and Edwards lost a related

nuisance claim in state court. The ALJ granted the FAA’s motion in limine to

consider moot and irrelevant Edwards’s challenge to the legal existence of the airport.

The ALJ further found the heliport was an “airport” within the regulatory definition

of 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2003) (an airport is an area of land or water used or intended to

be used for the landing and taking off of aircraft). The ALJ then concluded Edwards

violated section 101.13(a)(4) by operating a moored balloon within five miles of the

heliport, and also violated section 101.7(a), because the evidence showed the balloons

created a hazard to people and property. Finally, the ALJ decided a $5,000 fine was

appropriate. The FAA upheld the ALJ’s decision, finding, as relevant, Edwards’s

defiance of the authorities and the regulations was not justified by his belief that the

heliport was improperly authorized. 

In his timely petition to this court, see 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a), Edwards argues

(1) because the heliport was not properly sited and authorized, with clearly defined

boundaries, there was no “airport” or “airport boundary,” and thus no violation of

section 101.13(a)(4); and (2) his balloons did not cause a hazard to people or

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Aircraft means a device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air.

14 C.F.R. § 1.1.

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property, but only to the illegally operated helicopters, and so he did not violate

section 101.7(a).

We review the FAA’s decision to determine whether it was arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law, see Friends of Richards-Gebaur

Airport v. FAA, 251 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 2001), giving substantial deference

to the FAA’s interpretation of its statutes and regulations, see Watkins v. Nat’l

Transp. Safety Bd., 178 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1999).

Edwards claims a licensed heliport is not an airport. This interesting

controversy turns on the meaning of the word “airport” as used in 14 C.F.R. § 1.1:

“Airport means an area of land or water that is used or intended to be used for the

landing and takeoff of aircraft, and includes its buildings and facilities, if any.”2

Although we find no cases addressing section 1.1’s definition of “airport,” we

conclude the ALJ reasonably determined this heliport was an airport within the

meaning of the regulation, given the evidence that the site was being used regularly

for the take-off and landing of helicopters, with FAA and state approval. Cf. N.W.

Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1315 (8th Cir. 1981) (where the court

found little case law on point, noting the agency’s construction of a statute is entitled

to substantial deference, and finding no indication the agency’s interpretation was

wrong). Furthermore, deference to an administrative agency’s reasonable

construction of a statute is appropriate where the agency is entrusted with the

administration of the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Deferring to a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute

is based, in part, on the expertise it possesses in implementing federal policy in the

general subject area. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Util.

Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389-90 (1984). The plain language of the aviation regulation

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does not require that the airport comply with any licensing requirements. Rather, the

language is straightforward and functional: if land is used for, or is intended to be

used for, the landing and taking off of aircraft, then that area of land is an airport.

 In some circumstances, a lack of authorization or knowledge of an “airport”

might complicate and restrict an airport’s boundaries for purposes of the five-mile

protected area required around an airport. This is not that case. In the instant case,

Edwards cannot deny he knew the location of the intended helicopter operations, and

there is no question Edwards’s balloons were operated within five miles of the

heliport boundaries–directly across the street, approximately 250 feet from the

helipad. 

We also find meritless Edwards’s argument his balloons did not create a hazard

to other people or property, because the balloons only endangered the helicopters.

See 14 C.F.R. § 101.7(a). (“No person may operate any moored balloon . . . in a

manner that creates a hazard to other persons, or their property.”) Helicopters are

property, helicopters carry people, and a crashing helicopter would certainly pose a

danger to people and property in its path. 

 The FAA, using clear and reasonable language, defined “airport,” for the

purpose of FAA safety regulations, as the place where a helicopter goes up and comes

down. Edwards asks us to adopt a different and creative definition of the word

airport, a definition whose transparent purpose is to protect Edwards’s personal

commercial interests. We decline to do so.

Accordingly, we conclude the FAA’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious,

and we deny Edwards’s petition. 

______________________________

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