Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-19-01282/USCOURTS-ca3-19-01282-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Immigrant Defense Project
Amicus Appellant
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild
Amicus Appellant
Ravidath Ragbir
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 19-1282

_____________

RAVIDATH RAGBIR,

 Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

District Court No. 2-17-cv-01256

District Judge: The Honorable Kevin McNulty

Argued October 30, 2019

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and PHIPPS, 

Circuit Judges

(Filed: February 10, 2020)

Alina Das 

Amy Joseph [ARGUED]

Jessica Rofe

Daniela Ugaz [ARGUED]

Washington Square Legal Services, Inc.

Immigrant Rights Clinic

245 Sullivan Street

5th Floor

New York, NY 10012

R. Scott Thompson 

Wollmuth Maher & Deutsch

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2

500 Fifth Avenue

12th Floor

New York, NY 10110

Counsel for Appellant

Mark E. Coyne [ARGUED]

Office of United States Attorney

970 Broad Street

Room 700

Newark, NJ 07102

Counsel for Appellee

Lawrence S. Lustberg

Gibbons

One Gateway Center

Newark, NJ 07102

Counsel for Amici Immigrant Defense Project and 

National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers 

Guild in Support of Appellant

________________

OPINION

________________

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Ravidath Ragbir, a green card holder from Trinidad and 

Tobago, was convicted of mortgage fraud in 2000. Because 

the loss attributable to the fraud exceeds $10,000, the 

Department of Homeland Security seeks to remove Ragbir to 

his native country. To avoid the immigration consequences 

collateral to his conviction, Ragbir filed a petition for a writ of 

error coram nobis, seeking either a new trial or resentencing. 

Because Ragbir fails to meet the requirements for issuance of 

the writ, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the 

petition.

I

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A. District of New Jersey Felony Conviction

Ragbir came to the United States as a lawful permanent 

resident in 1994, and by the late 1990s, he worked in sales at

Household Finance Corporation (“HFC”). At HFC, Ragbir 

was responsible for soliciting mortgage applications, 

conducting initial reviews, and referring appropriate 

applications to the company’s underwriter. A real estate 

broker going by the name of Robert Taylor—whose actual 

name was Robert Kosch—recruited individuals to submit

fraudulent mortgage applications, which Ragbir preliminarily 

approved. After HFC had disbursed large sums of money, 

company investigators and the police began questioning

various employees, including Ragbir, about the fraudulent 

applications.

Ragbir and four others were eventually indicted on six 

counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit 

wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343. The indictment 

alleged that Ragbir accepted and preliminarily approved 

fraudulent applications from individuals that Kosch hired to 

pose as loan applicants. Attorney Patricia Lee represented 

Ragbir in the criminal proceedings, and before trial, he raised

with her his concerns about the immigration consequences of 

a conviction. Attorney Lee advised Ragbir that a conviction 

could result in deportation, but Ragbir mistakenly gathered that 

a conviction alone would make him deportable.

At his November 2000 trial, the government presented

Ragbir’s confession to the police. Although defense counsel 

challenged the accuracy of the transcribed confession, the jury 

found Ragbir guilty on all counts. The jury was not required, 

however, to make a loss determination, so that issue was

addressed at sentencing. Defense counsel and the government

vigorously disputed the dollar figure, but the two sides

eventually reached an agreement that the actual loss was 

between $350,000 and $500,000.1

 Attorney Lee counseled

 1 The government’s initial loss calculation was over $1 million, 

which Attorney Lee challenged in various ways: she objected 

to the draft presentence report; looked for analysis of title 

searches, appraisals, deeds, defects in title, and whether HFC 

could recover the properties; attempted to persuade the 

government that the loss calculation should exclude bargainedCase: 19-1282 Document: 146 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/10/2020
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Ragbir to waive his right to a hearing at which the prosecution 

and the defense could present evidence about what sentence is 

appropriate and to stipulate to the agreed-upon range. Ragbir 

agreed to the stipulation, believing that his convictions alone 

made him deportable; the amount of loss, in his view, was 

irrelevant.2 The District Court adopted the stipulation, 

sentencing Ragbir to thirty months’ imprisonment, three years’

supervised release, and $350,001 in restitution.

Ragbir appealed, and the service of his sentence was 

delayed pending the appeal. Ragbir’s appellate counsel, 

Anthony Fusco, asserted a variety of claims—among them,

that Ragbir’s confession was involuntary and the evidence at 

trial was insufficient to find Ragbir guilty. This Court affirmed 

Ragbir’s convictions and sentence, United States v. Ragbir, 38 

 

for interest; and opposed HFC’s efforts to increase the loss 

amount by including investigation fees and costs of potential 

foreclosures. After several months of negotiations, the parties 

agreed that only HFC’s actual loss—the shortfall after 

accounting for payments and collateral—could count for 

purposes of sentencing. 

Of the eighteen transactions involved in this case, 

Ragbir asserts that only eight loans, five indicted and three 

unindicted, can be properly attributed to him. HFC had 

disbursed $557,697.31 on these eight loans. But it may have 

had no enforceable security interest in certain properties 

pledged as collateral. For example, the nominal borrowers for 

three of the fraudulent disbursements never authorized the 

loans taken out in their names. HFC disbursed approximately 

$290,000 for these three loans, and the record shows that it

recovered only $7,250. Moreover, one loan was based on a 

forged deed, so HFC could not foreclose on the mortgaged

property to recover its $103,000 expenditure.

Despite defense counsel’s efforts, the government 

sought a dollar loss exceeding $800,000. It took considerable 

negotiation before the government agreed to a stipulation of 

around $350,000, and the trial court stated that there was no 

doubt the loss could exceed that amount. Looking solely at the 

five indicted loans, the District Court concluded that the actual 

loss was $426,048.03.

2 A crime of fraud or deceit causing a loss exceeding $10,000 

may qualify as an aggravated felony, triggering potential 

immigration consequences. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).

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F. App’x 788 (3d Cir. 2002), and the United States Supreme 

Court denied certiorari. Ragbir v. United States, 537 U.S. 1089 

(2002). Ragbir never sought relief under § 2255.

Ragbir began serving his sentence in February 2004. 

While imprisoned, he consulted with a lawyer about seeking 

post-conviction relief but was told that nothing could be done. 

Ragbir’s supervised release began in May 2006 and concluded 

on May 22, 2009. 

B. Immigration Related Proceedings

Upon completion of his prison sentence in May 2006, 

Ragbir was placed in immigration custody while the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced 

removal proceedings. It was during those proceedings that

Ragbir learned that his stipulation to a loss of more than 

$10,000, rather than his convictions themselves, was what 

made him deportable. Ragbir’s immigration counsel, David 

Kim, recognized the significance of the loss stipulation and 

represented to the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that a criminal 

defense attorney would be hired to attempt to vacate the 

underlying convictions. Despite this representation, Ragbir did 

not pursue a collateral attack. On August 7, 2006, the IJ held 

that Ragbir’s convictions constituted aggravated felonies and 

ordered him removed from the United States. 

On review, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

affirmed the IJ’s order. Ragbir sought review of the decision, 

and in February 2008, DHS placed Ragbir on supervised 

release pending resolution of his petition. The Second Circuit 

upheld the BIA’s decision in 2010, Ragbir v. Holder, 389 F. 

App’x 80 (2d Cir. 2010), and the Supreme Court denied 

certiorari. Ragbir v. Holder, 565 U.S. 816 (2011).

Later that year, Ragbir married an American citizen. 

Together, they applied for an immigrant visa based on their

marriage and received approval in November 2011. The 

following month, DHS granted Ragbir a stay of removal. 

Ragbir filed a motion to reopen the proceedings before the BIA

based on his having an immigrant visa and the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358

(2010) (narrowing honest services fraud). On May 15, 2012, 

the BIA denied the motion, stating that the issues surrounding 

Ragbir’s conviction were properly the subject of the federal 

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courts. Ragbir filed a petition for review which was 

unsuccessful. Ragbir v. Lynch, 640 F. App’x 105 (2d Cir. 

2016).

DHS eventually elected not to renew its discretionary 

stay of removal, and on January 11, 2018, Ragbir was taken 

into immigration custody. Ragbir then challenged his

detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of New York, which granted his 

habeas petition and ordered him released. Ragbir v. Sessions, 

No. 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 623557 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018). 

On March 23, 2018, the United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey entered a stay of removal. The Second 

Circuit likewise stayed removal. See Ragbir v. Homan, 923 

F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019).

C. Coram Nobis Proceedings

After the BIA denied Ragbir’s motion to reopen the 

proceedings in May 2012, he filed a petition seeking a writ of 

error coram nobis in the United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey on November 30, 2012. In that petition, 

Ragbir asserted that his conviction should be overturned 

because jury instructions given at his trial were erroneous in 

light of later Supreme Court rulings—Skilling (2010) 

(narrowing honest-services fraud) and Global-Tech

Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (clarifying 

willful blindness). He also claimed ineffective assistance of 

counsel based on Attorney Lee’s (1) failure to explain that the 

loss attributed to his conviction would have immigration 

consequences and (2) advice to forego a sentencing hearing. 

Ragbir and the government decided to work toward an 

amicable settlement. Aware of these efforts, the District Court 

administratively terminated the matter without prejudice on 

May 30, 2013.

The parties’ negotiations failed. That led Ragbir to file

an amended coram nobis petition in February 2015. This

amended petition included three new allegations: trial counsel 

was ineffective because she failed to (1) sufficiently 

investigate and negotiate the loss amount and (2) retain a 

linguistics expert to challenge the authenticity of Ragbir’s

confession, and appellate counsel was ineffective because he 

(3) failed to assert that the willful blindness jury instruction

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was erroneous. Based on further discussions, the parties 

submitted a joint stipulation to voluntarily dismiss the action 

without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) to 

allow Ragbir to pursue a presidential pardon. The District 

Court granted the agreed-upon relief on March 3, 2016.

Like the settlement talks, Ragbir’s attempt to secure a 

pardon was unsuccessful. He renewed his coram nobis petition 

on February 22, 2017. After briefing concluded, the District 

Court held an evidentiary hearing on May 4, 2018 and denied 

coram nobis on January 25, 2019. Five days later, Ragbir filed 

this appeal. Ragbir asked the District Court to stay the IJ’s 

removal order pending the disposition of this appeal. The 

District Court denied the request, but it extended an earlier 

stay, thereby allowing Ragbir to make an emergency 

application to this Court. We denied the emergency stay 

application because Ragbir failed to show that he was likely to 

succeed on the merits. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit stay

remains in effect. See Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53.

On appeal, Ragbir asserts that the District Court erred

in denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. He 

claims, inter alia, (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel due 

to affirmative misadvice on the immigration consequences of 

stipulating to a deportable loss amount; (2) ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate, negotiate, 

and properly calculate the attributable loss; (3) ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel for not introducing expert testimony; 

(4) an erroneous willful blindness jury instruction permitted 

the finder of fact to convict Ragbir of non-criminal conduct; 

and (5) the “scheme or artifice to defraud” jury instruction, 

which Ragbir characterizes as “dishonesty type language,” was 

unconstitutionally vague, allowing the jury to inappropriately

convict him based on lawful activity. 

II

This Court has jurisdiction to review the District 

Court’s denial of coram nobis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Based on the standards articulated in United States v. Orocio, 

legal questions receive de novo review while clear error review 

applies to factual findings. 645 F.3d 630, 635 (3d Cir. 2011), 

abrogated on other grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 568 

U.S. 342 (2013).

III

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At common law, appeals were not always a matter of 

right.3

 A factual error that was unknown at the time of trial

and that would have resulted in a different outcome did not 

give rise to a remedy until the mid-sixteenth century.

4

 By 

then,

5 the judiciary had fashioned the writs of quae coram 

nobis resident (“let the record remain before us”) and quae 

coram vobis resident (“let the record remain before you”),

6

which were intended to correct the occasional injustice 

stemming from factual errors in the Court of King’s Bench and 

the Court of Common Pleas, respectively.

7

Coram nobis was seldom used, despite its availability in 

both civil and criminal cases.8

 Such rare invocation of the writ

resulted, in part, from the requirement that the challenged 

judgment be erroneous in fact and not in law.9

 Moreover, only 

 3 ELI FRANK, CORAM NOBIS: COMMON LAW, FEDERAL,

STATUTORY, WITH FORMS 1 (1953).

4 Stanley H. Fuld, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 117 N.Y.

L.J., June 5, 1947, at 2212.

5 Just how coram nobis came to be is unclear. See id. (noting 

a 1553 reference in FitzHerbert’s Natura Brevium).

6 “The writs of error coram nobis and error coram vobis

differed from ordinary common law writs of error. An ordinary 

writ of error removed a judgment from an inferior court to a 

superior one for review and correction of errors of law or fact. 

Coram nobis and coram vobis, in contrast, directed the court 

that rendered the judgment to correct its own error.” Brendan 

W. Randall, United States v. Cooper: The Writ of Error Coram 

Nobis and the Morgan Footnote Paradox, 74 MINN. L. REV.

1063, 1066 n.20 (1990); see also W.W. Thorton, Coram Nobis 

Et Coram Vobis, 5 IND. L.J. 603, 605 (1930).

7 “The English common law distinction between coram nobis

and coram vobis reflects the procedural nature of the English 

judicial system as opposed to the substantive nature of the 

writs. Most American courts have shown little concern for this 

technical distinction and have used the terms interchangeably.” 

Randall, supra note 6, at 1067 n.22; see also Abraham L. 

Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 3 TEMP. L. Q. 365, 

367-68 (1929). Freedman was a member of this Court from 

1964 through 1971.

8 See Freedman, supra note 7, at 374; Randall, supra note 6, at 

1066.

9 FRANK, supra note 3, at 3.

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“certain facts which affect[ed] the validity and regularity of the 

legal decision itself” justified issuance of the writ.10 By the 

nineteenth century, the writ of error coram nobis “was hoary 

with age and even obsolete.”11 Blackstone makes no mention 

of it in his Commentaries,

12 and Holdsworth devotes 

approximately five lines to the subject.13 American courts, 

however, breathed new life into this “hoary” writ.

Coram nobis migrated to the United States with the 

common law, but it developed a more expansive reach than in 

England.14 Although the writ was still available for correcting

factual errors that lie outside the record—in both federal and 

state courts as well as both civil and criminal matters—many

courts imported new grounds from equity.15 Still, the writ’s 

utility diminished over time. Other remedies, such as a motion 

for a new trial or habeas corpus, supplanted it.

16 Some states 

abandoned coram nobis altogether through statutory schemes 

 10 Freedman, supra note 7, at 367. Examples include coverture 

and the death of a party before judgment. See id. at 390-92.

11 Anderson v. Buchanan, 168 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Ky. 1943).

12 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *406

(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 3rd ed. 1884); see also Pickett’s Heirs 

v. Legerwood, 32 U.S. 144, 147 (1833); Fuld, supra note 4; 

Morgan Prickett, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in California, 

30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 6 n.18 (1990). 13 See 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF 

ENGLISH LAW 224 (3d ed. 1922).

14 See Daniel F. Piar, Using Coram Nobis to Attack Wrongful 

Convictions: A New Look at an Ancient Writ, 30 N. KY.L.REV.

505, 507 (2003). 

15 See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882); see also Fuld,

supra note 4; Piar, supra note 14.

16 See Piar, supra note 14, at 508-09.

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for post-conviction litigation,

17 and the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure expressly abolished it in 1948.

18

As the scope of coram nobis narrowed, some began to 

question its continued applicability to criminal convictions in 

federal courts. The Supreme Court reserved judgment on the 

issue,19 and over time, the courts of appeals became divided.20

The 1946 promulgation of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, allowing a district court to correct an 

illegal sentence at any time, and the enactment of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 in 1948 further undermined the usefulness of coram 

nobis.21

The writ of error coram nobis was moribund—at least

in the federal courts—until the Supreme Court revived and 

refashioned it in 1954. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 

502 (1954). In Morgan, the Court held that (1) Rule 60(b) did 

not abolish coram nobis in criminal contexts, (2) Rule 35 did 

not render the writ unnecessary, and (3) section 2255 did not

replace coram nobis. Id. at 505 n.4, 505-06, 510-11. Instead, 

the Supreme Court stated that the continuing vitality of coram 

nobis was grounded in the All Writs Act of 1789. Id. at 506. 

The Court also broadened the scope of coram nobis relief

beyond that of curing factual errors: the writ’s function was to 

correct errors of the most “fundamental character.” Id. at 511-

12. Coram nobis became a collateral remedy to correct 

fundamental errors, whether factual or legal.22

Although the modern contours of coram nobis are 

broader than at common law, the writ is still limited to 

 17 See, e.g., Dewey v. Smith, 230 N.W. 180, 180-81 (Mich. 

1930) (coram vobis had become obsolete due to statutory 

methods of correcting errors); Boyd v. Smyth, 205 N.W. 522, 

523-24 (Iowa 1925) (coram nobis was abolished when omitted 

in revised statute); State v. Hayslip, 107 N.E. 335 (Ohio 1914) 

(finding that common law writs and pleas are defined by 

statute).

18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946) (effective Mar. 19, 1948).

19 See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914).

20 See Randall, supra note 6, at 1067 n.26.

21 See id. at 1067-68.

22 David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil 

Disabilities, and the Right to Clear One’s Name, 2009 BYU L.

REV. 1277, 1286-87 (2009).

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“‘extraordinary’ cases presenting circumstances compelling its 

use ‘to achieve justice.’” United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 

904, 910-11 (2009) (quoting Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510). Coram 

nobis may not issue if alternative remedies, such as habeas 

corpus, are available. Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911; United States 

v. Rhines, 640 F.3d 69, 71 (3d Cir. 2011). 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

provides a means to vacate, set aside, or correct a conviction, 

yet it does not apply if a defendant is no longer in custody. As 

a residual and interstitial remedy, coram nobis can fill that gap. 

It provides a means to challenge a federal conviction where a 

party who is no longer in custody for purposes of § 2255 faces

continuing consequences as a result of being convicted. 

Rhines, 640 F.3d at 71; United States v. Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 

189 (3d Cir. 2000); Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 345 n.1; United States 

v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1989). 

“[T]he standard for obtaining [coram nobis] is more 

stringent than that applicable on direct appeal or in habeas 

corpus” in recognition of judicial interests in finality and

efficiency. Rhines, 640 F.3d at 71; Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106. 

Accordingly, coram nobis relief is limited and seeks out error 

of the most fundamental character—the kind that renders the 

proceeding itself irregular and invalid. Mayer, 235 U.S. at 69;

see also Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511 (“[R]eview should be 

allowed through this extraordinary remedy only under 

circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.”);

Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106 (“The error must go to the 

jurisdiction of the trial court, thus rendering the trial itself 

invalid.”). “An error which could be remedied by a new trial, 

such as an error in jury instructions, does not normally come 

within the writ,” Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106 (citing Mayer, 235 

U.S. at 69 and United States v. Gross, 614 F.2d 365, 368 (3d 

Cir. 1980)), and it is presumed that the prior proceedings were 

properly conducted. The petitioner has the burden to show 

otherwise. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512; United States v. Cariola, 

323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1963). This means that “it is 

difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case 

today where [a writ of coram nobis] would be necessary or 

appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 

(1996) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

A distillation of our caselaw establishes five 

prerequisites for coram nobis relief: the petitioner (1) is no 

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longer in custody; (2) suffers continuing consequences from 

the purportedly invalid conviction; (3) provides sound reasons 

for failing to seek relief earlier; (4) had no available remedy at 

the time of trial; and (5) asserted error(s) of a fundamental kind. 

See Mendoza v. United States, 690 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 

2012); Orocio, 645 F.3d at 634 n.4; Rhines, 640 F.3d at 71; 

Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 105-06. The government concedes that 

the first two conditions are satisfied. The last three 

requirements are, however, in dispute. 

A. Sound Reasons for Delay

Coram nobis reflects the tension that so often exists 

between finality and equity. While the writ has no rigid time 

limit, our caselaw emphasizes that “[the] ‘sound reason’ 

standard is even stricter than that used to evaluate § 2255 

petitions” because habeas is generally the exclusive means to 

collaterally challenge a federal conviction or sentence.23 See 

Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 159.

A defendant seeking to avoid the collateral 

consequences of a conviction cannot postpone seeking relief 

until it appears that a collateral consequence is imminent. Still,

coram nobis is a “remedy of last resort.” Fleming v. United 

States, 146 F.3d 88, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1998). Consistent with 

these principles, a petitioner is not required to “challenge his 

conviction at the earliest opportunity”; the writ “only requires 

[a petitioner] to have sound reasons for not doing so.” United 

States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005).

Yet the more time that elapses between a party’s

conviction and his petition for coram nobis, the less likely it 

becomes that sound reasons exist. We have previously found

delays of less than five years untimely. See, e.g., Mendoza, 

690 F.3d at 159-60 (four-year delay in bringing ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim was unjustified, even though 

immigration law was unsettled). Legal ambiguity is also not a 

sound reason for delay. Id. at 160. It may be that the diligent 

pursuit of administrative remedies qualifies as a sound reason, 

but we have yet to address that question. See Kwan, 407 F.3d 

at 1013-14; Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 

 23 We do not address whether the failure to pursue § 2255 relief

constitutes a procedural default barring coram nobis relief.

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2014). Given the nature of coram nobis, we must adapt the 

principle of timeliness to the facts before us.

B. No Available Remedy at the Time of Trial

We have not previously elaborated on the requirement 

that there was no available remedy at the time of trial, but we 

can say that it focuses on whether a party was unable to make 

certain arguments at trial or on direct appeal. See Mendoza, 

690 F.3d at 159; Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106.

C. Fundamental Error

The fifth prerequisite is two-pronged: there must be an 

error, and the error must be fundamental. The identification

and assertion of “error” is sine qua non of all appellate 

adjudication, but “fundamental error,” within the context of 

coram nobis, is unique. The term “fundamental” refers to 

“defect[s] which inherently result[] in a complete miscarriage 

of justice.”24 United States v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 676 (3d 

Cir. 1993) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 

(1974)). Errors that can be remedied through a new trial do not 

usually fall within the writ. Rhines, 640 F.3d at 71. Instead, 

the defects must completely undermine the jurisdiction of the 

court, rendering the trial itself invalid. Id. Coram nobis is

therefore generally inappropriate when an alternative remedy 

is available. Id. 

Because a new trial can correct faulty jury instructions, 

such errors will not typically qualify as fundamental. Id. 

However, instructions that result in a conviction on a charge 

based on activity that is lawful are fundamentally erroneous. 

See Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 105, 107-08; United States v. 

McClelland, 941 F.2d 999, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 1991); United 

States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988). 

Stoneman, a case where the jury heard both correct and 

incorrect instructions, held that “[a]n error in the jury 

instructions—when a valid conviction could have been had 

under different instructions . . .—is not the sort of fundamental 

defect that produces a complete miscarriage of justice.” 870 

F.2d at 108 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 

Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 205 (7th Cir. 1988)). Ineffective 

assistance of counsel, by contrast, is normally considered 

 24 As coram nobis affords an additional layer of review, the 

standard for relief may be higher than for other remedies.

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“fundamental.” See United States v. Rad–O–Lite of Phila., 

Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1979) (The writ is available to 

“persons not held in custody [to] attack a conviction for 

fundamental defects, such as ineffective assistance of 

counsel.”).

IV

On appeal, Ragbir offers numerous reasons why he 

waited nearly ten years25 before seeking a writ of coram 

nobis:

26 while incarcerated, a criminal defense attorney told 

him that nothing could be done to challenge his conviction; he 

did not discover his trial attorney’s purported errors until 2006;

after being taken into immigration custody, he focused on 

challenging his removal rather than his conviction; he was 

exhausting his administrative remedies; his jury instruction 

arguments were unavailable until after 2010’s Skilling decision 

and 2011’s Global-Tech ruling; his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims were not ripe until after Padilla v. Kentucky in 

2010 and Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye in 2012; and 

he promptly filed a coram nobis petition after being informed 

that challenges to his criminal conviction could not be heard 

administratively. None of these reasons excuse Ragbir’s delay.

First, this Court does not apply a timeliness standard for 

coram nobis that is forgiving of delay and dilatoriness. See

Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 159. Though Ragbir claims he was 

unaware of the immigration consequences of his sentencing 

stipulation until 2006, from that time forward he knew that the 

underlying conviction needed to be challenged. Yet he waited 

another six years before taking any action to collaterally 

challenge his conviction. During those six years, Ragbir chose 

to pursue administrative remedies rather than coram nobis

relief. He offers no acceptable explanation for why he did not 

seek both forms of relief concurrently. Furthermore, Ragbir’s

pursuit of administrative remedies cannot constitute a sound 

reason for delay since the immigration relief he seeks is 

 25 Ten years passed from direct appeal in 2002 until his first 

coram nobis petition in 2012.

26 The government’s timeliness argument does not rely on the 

five years (2012–17) that elapsed between Ragbir’s first coram 

nobis petition and the current iteration. 

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15

dependent upon a successful collateral challenge to his 

underlying conviction.27

Second, Ragbir mistakenly believes that his jury instruction 

arguments were unavailable until 2010 and 2011.28 He admits 

that, at the time of his trial, caselaw already existed addressing

willful blindness and “dishonesty type language.” He claims, 

however, that our precedent was ambiguous before Skilling and 

Global-Tech. That claim is unavailing: we have rejected the 

 27 Ragbir asked the BIA to assess the validity of his conviction, 

but it refused, stating that the issues surrounding his conviction 

needed to be raised in the federal courts. In re Ravidath 

Lawrence Ragbir, No. A044 248 862 (B.I.A. May 15, 2012).

28 As to appellate counsel’s failure to raise willful blindness on 

appeal, Ragbir’s opening brief addresses the issue in a single 

footnote. Footnote seven states in its entirety:

In 2002, appellate counsel failed to object to the 

improper willful blindness jury instruction, 

despite trial counsel’s preservation of this claim, 

and despite Mr. Ragbir’s insistence that his 

attorney look into the issue of the jury 

instructions. JA125 ¶ 10; JA345.

We have previously considered one-sentence footnotes 

insufficient to preserve an issue on appeal. See, e.g., McBride 

v. Superintendent, SCI Houtzdale, 687 F.3d 92, 95 n.5 (3d Cir. 

2012) (“[Petitioner] only references this colloquy in a footnote 

in his opening brief, and therefore has failed even to adequately 

raise the issue before us.”); United States v. DeMichael, 461 

F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2006) (“An issue is waived unless a 

party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a 

passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue 

before this court.” (citation omitted)). 

Footnote seven also references two parts of the joint 

appendix. J.A. 125 ¶ 10 includes a statement from Ragbir’s 

coram nobis affidavit asserting that appellate counsel failed to 

litigate the issue of willful blindness without providing an

explanation for this failure. J.A. 345 is a copy of Ragbir’s 

direct appeal brief, containing no arguments addressing willful 

blindness. Absent from footnote seven is any assertion of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Any

ineffectiveness claim regarding appellate counsel is therefore

waived.

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notion that ambiguity in the law justifies “a delay in filing a 

coram nobis petition.”29 Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 160. What 

matters is whether a claim can be reasonably raised.

 29 Even if legal ambiguity constituted a sound reason for delay, 

we do not perceive any opacity in our caselaw. Ragbir argues 

that our caselaw prevented him from addressing willful 

blindness at trial or on appeal because (1) Global-Tech was not 

decided until 2011 and (2) this Circuit did not previously 

recognize the distinction between subjective and objective 

knowledge that Global-Tech articulates. We disagree. 

Global-Tech did not promulgate a new test; rather, it 

stated already settled law. 563 U.S. at 769 n.9 (citing United 

States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 257 (3d Cir. 2010)). 

Although Stadtmauer was decided ten years after Ragbir’s 

trial, it cites two examples of Third Circuit precedent 

accurately describing the “subjective awareness” element of 

willful blindness before Ragbir’s direct appeal. See, e.g.,

United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000); 

United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) 

(indicating that a willful blindness charge must “make clear 

that the defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high 

probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a 

reasonable man would have been aware of the probability”). 

The “deliberate avoidance” prong was also clear law 

within this Circuit by 1995. See United States v. Hayden, 64

F.3d 126, 133 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that knowledge 

can be imputed where a defendant deliberately avoided 

learning a fact but not where a defendant was “merely 

negligent or reckless in failing to realize the unlawfulness of 

his actions”); see also Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d at 255. We perceive 

no ambiguity in our caselaw. Yet even if a lack of clarity 

existed, Ragbir could have reasonably argued at trial or on 

appeal that the willful blindness instruction was erroneous.

Ragbir also asserts that he was unable to bring his 

scheme or artifice to defraud claim prior to 2010’s Skilling

decision, which narrowed honest-services fraud. However, 

Skilling is inapposite because Ragbir was not convicted under 

an honest-services fraud theory. And even if he had been, 

Skilling would not be determinative. Ragbir acknowledges that 

at the time of his trial and appeal caselaw existed criticizing

“dishonesty type language.” See, e.g., United States v.

Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 698 (3d Cir. 2002). As a result, 

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17

Third, Ragbir could have brought his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims at least six years earlier. 

Counsel’s alleged failures to adequately investigate the loss30

and obtain expert testimony31 were actionable by 2006, if not 

on direct appeal. Ragbir could have also raised his affirmative

misadvice argument by 2006.

32 Lafler and Frye do not justify 

 

Ragbir could have reasonably asserted that the scheme or 

artifice to defraud instruction was flawed. Whether our 

caselaw was still evolving is of no moment: if a claim can be 

reasonably made, then legal ambiguity is not a sound reason 

for delay.

30 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) 

(finding “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations 

or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary”).

31 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 109 (3d Cir. 2005) 

(evaluating claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 

failure to introduce expert testimony); Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 

792, 799-801 (9th Cir. 2006) (addressing whether failure to 

present expert testimony constituted ineffective assistance of 

counsel); Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486, 1493-96 (11th 

Cir. 1995) (determining that failure to present expert 

psychological witness did not amount to ineffective assistance 

of counsel); Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 229, 231-36 (4th Cir. 

1994) (discussing whether failure to secure expert witness was 

ineffective assistance of counsel); Bruns v. Thalacker, 973 

F.2d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1992) (examining whether lack of 

expert testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); 

St. Louis v. Carroll, 429 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710-11 (D. Del. 

2006) (holding that failure to obtain expert testimony was not

ineffective assistance of counsel); Venezia v. United States, 

884 F. Supp. 919, 923-24 (D.N.J. 1995) (reviewing claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present expert 

testimony). 32 Several cases would have supported a pre-Padilla misadvice 

claim. See, e.g., Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005; United States v. Couto, 

311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 

765 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Shaw, No. 03-

6759, 2004 WL 1858336 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2004); United 

States v. Khalaf, 116 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 1999).

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Ragbir’s delay since they adopted previously established law.

33 

Thus, sufficient caselaw already existed such that Ragbir could 

have reasonably brought his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims much earlier. Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 160. 

Fourth, the allegedly vague “scheme or artifice to 

defraud” instruction was fair game on direct appeal or soon 

afterward.

34 In United States v. Panarella, we acknowledged

that the breadth of the term “fraud” in federal statutes may raise 

concerns regarding “notice of criminality.” 277 F.3d at 698. 

We also observed, in United States v. Leahy, the increasing 

criticism in the courts of the formulation of fraud in federal 

statutes. 445 F.3d 634, 649-51 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 

Panarella, 277 F.3d at 698; Matter of EDC, Inc., 930 F.2d 

1275, 1281 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 

304, 309 (7th Cir. 1987)). Based on this caselaw, we conclude 

there was no sound reason for failing to raise this issue in 2002 

or 2006.

Fifth, considerations of finality, judicial efficiency, and 

potential prejudice towards the government—if a new trial or 

re-sentencing is ordered—also counsel against concluding 

there were sound reasons for delay.35 After examining our 

caselaw and the record before us, we conclude that Ragbir had 

the ability to bring all his claims at least six years before his

 33 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012) (citing United 

States v. Rodriguez Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 753 n.1 (1st Cir. 

1991) (per curiam); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 

380-381 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Day, 969 

F.2d 39, 43-45 (3d Cir. 1992); Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 

F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1981); Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 

498-500 (7th Cir. 2007); Wanatee v. Ault, 259 F.3d 700, 703-

704 (8th Cir. 2001); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1052-

1053 (9th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1094-

1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Gaviria, 

116 F.3d 1498, 1512-1514 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam)).

34 Contrary to Ragbir’s assertion, there was a remedy available 

for his vagueness claims on direct review. See Panarella, 277 

F.3d at 698. 35 Ragbir, who has already served his sentence, does not 

address how a new trial or resentencing, which could 

theoretically result in an increased penalty, would comport 

with the double jeopardy clause.

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19

2012 petition for coram nobis. He provides no sound reason 

for his delay.

V

Coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy, available only 

when all its conditions have been met.36 Ragbir’s claims fail 

to satisfy at least one necessary requirement.37 Accordingly, 

we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the petition.

 36 In some circumstances, overlap may exist between the coram 

nobis elements of “sound reasons for delay” and “no available 

remedy at the time of trial.” While Ragbir lacks “sound 

reasons” for his delay, many of his claims also fail to satisfy 

the “no available remedy at the time of trial” requirement.

The lack of expert testimony at trial could have been

raised on appeal. See supra note 31. Similarly, Ragbir’s 

vagueness claim could likely have been brought on direct 

review. See Panarella, 277 F.3d at 698. We have also already 

concluded that Ragbir’s willful blindness and scheme or 

artifice to defraud claims were available at the time of trial. See 

supra note 29.

37 In addition to a lack of “sound reasons for delay,” we fail to 

see any claim that constitutes a “fundamental error.”

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