Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01091/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01091-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Apple Inc.
Appellant
MobileMedia Ideas LLC
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

APPLE INC.,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2014-1060, 2014-1091

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:10-cv-00258-SLR-MPT, 

Judge Sue L. Robinson.

______________________ 

Decided: March 17, 2015

______________________ 

STEVEN M. BAUER, Proskauer Rose LLP, Boston, MA, 

argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant. Also represented by

JUSTIN J. DANIELS, SAFRAZ ISHMAEL, JOHN M. KITCHURA,

JR., JOHN E. ROBERTS. 

GEORGE ALFRED RILEY, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, San 

Francisco. CA, argued for defendant-appellant. Also 

represented by LUANN LORAINE SIMMONS, MELODY 

DRUMMOND HANSEN, TIM D. BYRON; XIN-YI ZHOU, Los 

Angeles, CA. 

______________________ 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 1 Filed: 03/17/2015
2 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

Before TARANTO, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

This is a patent infringement case relating to four patents owned by plaintiff and cross-appellant MobileMedia 

Ideas LLC (MobileMedia). Defendant and appellant 

Apple Inc. (Apple) appeals from a final judgment of the 

United States District Court for the District of Delaware 

finding claim 73 of U.S. Patent No. 6,427,078 (the ’078 

patent) and claim 23 of U.S. Patent No. 6,070,068 (the 

’068 patent) to be infringed and not invalid. MobileMedia 

cross-appeals from the district court’s final judgment 

finding claims 5, 6, and 10 of U.S. Patent No. 6,253,075 

(the ’075 patent) and claims 2–4 and 12 of U.S. Patent No. 

RE 39,231 (the ’231 patent) not to be infringed, and 

claims 5, 6, and 10 of the ’075 patent to also be invalid.

As to Apple’s appeal, we (i) affirm the district court’s 

judgment that claim 73 of the ’078 patent is not invalid, 

(ii) reverse the district court’s judgment that claim 73 of 

the ’078 patent is infringed, and (iii) reverse the district 

court’s judgment that claim 23 of the ’068 patent is not

invalid. As to MobileMedia’s cross-appeal, we (i) affirm 

the district court’s judgment that claims 5, 6, and 10 of 

the ’075 patent are invalid, (ii) vacate the district court’s 

judgment that claims 2–4 and 12 of the ’231 patent are 

not infringed because the judgment is based on an erroneous claim construction, and (iii) remand to the district 

court for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND

MobileMedia is a company formed by MPEG LA, LLC, 

Nokia Corporation (Nokia), and Sony Corporation of 

America. MobileMedia filed suit against Apple, asserting

infringement of sixteen patents by various Apple products. Apple responded with several affirmative defenses, 

alleging, among other things, invalidity of all sixteen 

patents, and also counterclaimed for declaratory judgCase: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 2 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 3

ments of noninfringement. The district court bifurcated 

the issues of willfulness and damages for purposes of 

discovery and trial. During the course of the ensuing 

litigation, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the 

claims and counterclaims related to two patents, and 

MobileMedia deferred the resolution of four other patents

to a later phase of the litigation. The district court then

granted Apple’s summary judgment motions of noninfringement or invalidity for five of the remaining patents, 

including Apple’s summary judgment motion of noninfringement of claims 2–4 and 12 of the ’231 patent. 

MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 

570, 627–28 (D. Del. 2012) (MobileMedia SJ). MobileMedia then selected claims 5, 6, and 10 of the ’075 

patent, claims 23 and 24 of the ’068 patent, and claim 73 

of the ’078 patent to assert at trial against Apple and its 

accused iPhone 3G, iPhone 3GS, and iPhone 4 products. 

MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 

439, 447 (D. Del. 2013) (MobileMedia JMOL). At trial, 

Apple argued that its accused iPhones did not infringe 

any of the asserted claims and that certain combinations 

of prior art references rendered each of the asserted 

claims invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The jury 

returned a verdict finding that (i) Apple’s accused products directly infringed the asserted claims, (ii) Apple did 

not induce infringement of the asserted claims, and (iii) 

none of the asserted claims were invalid as obvious. Id.

After the district court entered a judgment consistent 

with the jury’s verdict, Apple renewed a previously-filed 

motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) under 

Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), 

and in the alternative, moved for a new trial under FRCP 

59(a). Id. The district court granted Apple’s JMOL

motion of (i) noninfringement and invalidity of all asserted claims of the ’075 patent, id. at 457–59, and (ii) invalidity of claim 24 of the ’068 patent, id. at 464–68. The 

district court denied Apple’s motion with respect to (i) 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 3 Filed: 03/17/2015
4 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

invalidity of claim 23 and noninfringement of claims 23 

and 24 of the ’068 patent, id. at 464–68, and (ii) invalidity 

and noninfringement of claim 73 of the ’078 patent, id. at 

472–74. The district court also denied Apple’s motion for 

a new trial, id. at 474–77, and entered a judgment consistent with its partial grant of Apple’s JMOL motion. 

Joint Appendix (J.A.) 1–5. Both parties agree that the 

district court’s judgment is final except for an accounting, 

which includes the determination of damages and willful 

infringement. See Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 

719 F.3d 1305, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).

Apple now appeals the district court’s denial of its 

JMOL motion of noninfringement and invalidity of claim 

73 of the ’078 patent and claim 23 of the ’068 patent. In 

particular, Apple challenges (i) the district court’s claim 

construction of two means-plus-function limitations in 

claim 73 of the ’078 patent and one limitation in claim 23 

of the ’068 patent, (ii) the district court’s determination 

that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that 

a person having ordinary skill in the art would not have 

been motivated to combine two references to render claim 

73 of the ’078 patent obvious, and (iii) the district court’s 

conclusion that claim 23 of the ’068 patent would not have 

been obvious in view of a prior art reference, together 

with the common knowledge of one skilled in the art. 

For its part, MobileMedia cross-appeals (i) the district 

court’s grant of Apple’s JMOL motion of noninfringement 

and invalidity of claims 5, 6, and 10 of the ’075 patent, 

and (ii) the district court’s grant of summary judgment of 

noninfringement of the ’231 patent. In particular, MobileMedia challenges (i) the district court’s finding that 

MobileMedia failed to present evidence that Apple’s 

accused iPhones met a required limitation of the asserted 

claims of the ’075 patent, (ii) the district court’s conclusion

that no reasonable juror could find the asserted claims of 

the ’075 patent to be nonobvious over the prior art, and 

(iii) the district court’s claim construction of a means-plusCase: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 4 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 5

function limitation in the asserted claims of the ’231 

patent.

Because a party may appeal a judgment that is final 

except for an “accounting,” we have jurisdiction over both 

Apple’s appeal and MobileMedia’s cross-appeal under 35 

U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2).

II. DISCUSSION

We review decisions on motions for summary judgment and JMOL under the law of the regional circuit. 

Energy Transp. Grp. Inc. v. William Demant Holding 

A/S, 697 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Third 

Circuit reviews grants and denials of motions for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard of 

review as the district court. Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012). Similarly, the Third Circuit reviews district court JMOL decisions de novo. Pitts v. Delaware, 646 F.3d 151, 155 (3d 

Cir. 2011). We must view the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner, drawing all reasonable 

inferences in its favor. Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. 

Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1095 (3d Cir. 1995). Only if the 

record is “critically deficient of the minimum quantum of 

evidence” on which a jury could reasonably base its verdict does the Third Circuit affirm a grant of JMOL. Pitts, 

646 F.3d at 155 (internal citation omitted). JMOL, however, may be appropriate when there is a purely legal 

basis required for reversal that does not depend on rejecting the jury’s findings on the evidence at trial. Acumed 

LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 

(3d Cir. 2009).

III. APPLE’S APPEAL

A. The ’078 patent (camera phone)

The ’078 patent is directed to a “small-sized, portable 

and hand-held work station,” such as a notebook computer, that includes a camera unit, a data processing unit, a 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 5 Filed: 03/17/2015
6 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

display, a user interface, and at least one memory unit. 

’078 patent, Abstract. The specification describes how 

this “notebook computer” uses the attached camera unit 

to take a picture of items such as business cards, handwritten text, and figures. Id. at 5:15–21 (business cards), 

5:43–45 (circles or lines), and 5:37–38 (handwritten text). 

Software applications, such as graphics and optical character recognition (OCR) software, convert the captured 

images into text or rudimentary graphical data for subsequent use by the notebook computer. Id. at 5:21–58. 

According to the specification, adding a camera unit to the 

notebook computer allows a user to “scan different written 

and/or drawn information into the memory of the notebook computer quickly and easily.” Id. at 6:17–20. A 

“digitizer pad” may also be part of the notebook computer, 

which uses “known technique[s]” to recognize input from a 

pen and convert figures drawn on the digitizer pad into 

bitmap images. Id. at 7:6–10.

The notebook computer can include a cellular mobile 

phone unit, which uses “conventional” analog modem or 

digital GSM technology. Id. at 3:37–49. Coupled with a 

miniature speaker and microphone, the GSM interface 

allows the notebook computer to “be used in the same way 

as a conventional hand-held telephone.” Id. at 3:49–53. 

The notebook computer can also transmit SMS (Short 

Message Service) and e-mail messages through its GSM 

interface. Id. at 8:7–17. 

Although the invention is described throughout the 

specification as a “notebook computer,” the specification 

also contemplates that the device “may also be a radiotelephone.” Id. at 8:18–20. Claim 73 of the ’078 patent 

recites such an embodiment of the claimed invention: 

73. A portable cellular mobile phone comprising:

a built in camera unit for obtaining image information;

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 6 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 7

a user interface for enabling a user to input signals to operate the camera unit;

a display for presenting image information obtained by the camera unit;

a microprocessor adapted to control the operations 

of the camera unit in response to input signals 

from the user interface, and to process image information received by the camera unit; and

means, coupled to said microprocessor, for transmitting image information processed by said microprocessor to another location using a radio 

frequency channel; and

wherein the camera unit comprises:

optics for obtaining image information;

an image sensor for obtaining image information; and 

means for processing and for storing at least a 

portion of the image information obtained by the 

camera unit for later recall and processing. 

Id. at 16:1–19 (emphasis added). 

1. Invalidity

Apple contends that the district court erred by denying its JMOL motion that the ’078 patent is invalid as 

obvious over two references: Japanese patent application 

publication no. H6-133081 (Kyocera) and U.S. Patent No. 

5,550,646 (Lucent). Kyocera discloses a mobile phone 

with a built-in camera unit, a user interface, and a viewfinder display. Kyocera, Abstract; J.A. 57596. The camera unit includes an image sensor that captures image 

data through a lens. Kyocera, ¶ 10; J.A. 57601. Lucent 

discloses a portable phone with an integrated camera 

unit, a keypad interface, and an LCD display. Lucent, 

3:21–33, 4:1–31. The Lucent device includes a microproCase: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 7 Filed: 03/17/2015
8 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

cessor that controls camera operations, id. at 3:24–29, and 

processes pictures in order to “enhance presentability,” id.

at 3:47–48. The device stores these pictures in RAM 

memory. Id. at 4:32–33, 4:40–42, and 6:46–62. The 

device can then transmit the pictures using a “built-in 

cellular telephone” and fax modem. Id. at 2:4–5, 2:61–66, 

and 5:26–47.

During trial, Apple contended that the Kyocera mobile phone, together with the microprocessor controlling 

the Lucent device, disclose all limitations of claim 73.1 

Apple’s expert further testified that the two references 

discuss similar technologies, and a person having ordinary skill in the art—someone with a Bachelor of Science

degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or 

the equivalent, and between two and four years of experience in the field2—would have understood the benefits 

and cost advantages of combining the references. MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 471. MobileMedia

responded with testimony from its expert that such a 

skilled artisan would not have been able to combine the 

Lucent microprocessor with the Kyocera mobile phone 

during the relevant time frame due to the “complexity and 

sophistication of software and hardware integration and 

development.” Id. MobileMedia did not present evidence 

of objective indicia of nonobviousness. J.A. 19477–78.

1 Apple also argued at trial that Kyocera anticipated claim 73 of the ’078 patent. MobileMedia contended 

that Kyocera did not disclose a microprocessor or means 

for storing captured images for later recall. The jury 

found that Kyocera did not anticipate claim 73, a finding 

which Apple does not appeal.

2 The parties agreed on the level of ordinary skill in 

the art. Compare J.A. 20464 (testimony from MobileMedia’s expert), with J.A. 20285–86 (testimony from 

Apple’s expert).

 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 8 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 9

The district court determined that there was no material dispute between the parties at trial that Kyocera and 

Lucent together disclose all the limitations of claim 73. 

MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 471. The district 

court also found that the “jury implicitly chose to believe” 

the testimony of MobileMedia’s expert instead of the 

testimony of Apple’s expert regarding the alleged motivation to combine the two references. Id. at 472. Therefore, 

the district court found that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict that the ’078 patent was not invalid, 

and denied Apple’s JMOL motion. 

On appeal, Apple argues that the combination of the 

Kyocera and Lucent references is merely the predictable 

use of prior art elements according to their established 

functions, and therefore would have been obvious. First, 

Apple contends that Lucent discloses a microprocessor 

that performs signal processing to “enhance presentability” of captured pictures, and that its expert testified that 

a skilled artisan would have recognized that modifying 

Kyocera with Lucent provides the benefit of improved 

picture quality. Second, Apple asserts that the Lucent 

microprocessor can be programmed to provide functionality similar to that of the Kyocera mobile phone, and that 

its expert testified that skilled artisans would have understood the cost advantages of using a programmable 

microprocessor for the relevant operations of the Kyocera 

mobile phone. Apple also notes that Lucent discloses a 

commercially-available, off-the-shelf microprocessor, and 

that its expert testified that disclosure of such an ordinary, commercially-available processor would have motivated those of skill in the art to try—and to expect success 

from using—the Lucent microprocessor with the Kyocera 

mobile phone.

A patent is invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if 

the differences between the subject matter sought to be 

patented and the prior art are such that the subject 

matter would have been obvious at the time the invention 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 9 Filed: 03/17/2015
10 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art. See

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2007). 

Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying 

facts, as set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. 

City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The Graham factors are (i) 

the scope and content of the prior art, (ii) the differences 

between the prior art and the claimed invention, (iii) the 

level of ordinary skill in the field of the invention, and (iv) 

any relevant objective considerations of nonobviousness. 

See id. at 17–18. What a particular reference discloses is 

a question of fact, as is the question of whether there was 

a reason to combine certain references. Transocean 

Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors

USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, 

although we review any underlying findings of fact by the 

jury—whether explicit or implicit—for substantial evidence, the ultimate determination of obviousness is a 

question of law we review de novo. Bos. Scientific Scimed, 

Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

The existence of a motivation to combine the Kyocera 

and Lucent references was contested by the parties at 

trial. Thus, while Apple may have presented some evidence to support its position that a skilled artisan would 

have been motivated to combine Kyocera with Lucent, 

this alone does not demonstrate that the jury’s verdict 

was unsupported by substantial evidence.

At trial, MobileMedia’s expert focused on Kyocera’s 

failure to teach a skilled artisan how to implement the 

claimed “microprocessor adapted to control the operations 

of the camera unit in response to input signals from the 

user interface, and to process image information received 

by the camera unit.” J.A. 20463; ’078 patent, 16:7–10. 

MobileMedia’s expert acknowledged that had the claims 

merely required a processor, “it [would have been] obvious 

to put one there,” but testified that the surrounding claim 

limitations required the microprocessor to “play[] multiple 

roles” and “make [the claimed components] all work 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 10 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 11

together,” which was “a real challenge” in the art at the 

time of the claimed invention. J.A. 20463–64, 204637. 

MobileMedia’s expert noted that Nokia, which at the time 

“was at the very forefront of innovation in the cellphone 

industry,” needed two years to develop a product with a 

microprocessor that provided the claimed functionality

between a phone and camera. J.A. 20467. In view of 

these considerations, MobileMedia’s expert testified that 

it would not have been obvious for one of skill in the art at 

the time the invention was made (1994), even with 

knowledge of the Lucent microprocessor, to combine the 

Lucent microprocessor with the Kyocera mobile phone in 

a manner that satisfied the limitations of claim 73 of the 

’078 patent. J.A. 20466–67.

As the Supreme Court noted in KSR, even when a

technique has been used to improve a device, and a skilled 

artisan would recognize that it could improve other devices in the same way, using that technique may not be 

obvious if its actual application is beyond his or her level 

of skill. 550 U.S. at 417. Here, MobileMedia’s expert 

testified that integrating the Lucent microprocessor to 

control the camera of the Kyocera mobile phone in the 

manner required by the asserted claims would be beyond 

the technical ability of a skilled artisan. This provided 

the jury with a reasonable basis for finding that the 

claimed invention would not have been obvious to one of 

ordinary skill in the art at the relevant timeframe. Although Apple’s expert offered a differing opinion, when 

there is conflicting testimony at trial, and the evidence 

overall does not make only one finding on the point reasonable, the jury is permitted to make credibility determinations and believe the witness it considers more 

trustworthy. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here, the 

jury credited the testimony of MobileMedia’s expert over 

the testimony of Apple’s expert. MobileMedia JMOL, 966 

F. Supp. 2d at 472. Where there is substantial evidence 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 11 Filed: 03/17/2015
12 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

for a reasonable jury finding, it is not our function to 

second guess or reevaluate the weight given to that evidence. See, e.g., Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 

156 F.3d 1182, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we agree 

with the district court that substantial evidence supports 

the jury’s finding that one of skill in the art would not 

have been motivated to combine the Lucent and Kyocera 

references to arrive at the claimed invention. Consequently, the district court did not err by denying Apple’s 

motion for JMOL of invalidity. 

2. Noninfringement

Apple also contends that the district court erred in 

construing two means-plus-function limitations in claim 

73. MobileMedia SJ, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 601. Apple 

contends that the jury’s finding of infringement was based 

on these erroneous constructions, and that when construed correctly, no reasonable jury could find that Apple’s accused iPhones infringe claim 73 of the ’078 patent. 

Both parties agree that claim 73 includes two limitations that invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 63: a “means . . . for 

transmitting image information” and a “means for processing and for storing” this image information. Both 

parties also agree that the “image information” processed 

and transmitted by the two “means” must be obtained 

from the camera unit. Appellant’s Reply Br. 4 n.1; see 

also J.A. 28470–71.

We turn first to the “means for processing and storing.” Apple argues that the district court erred in identi3 Paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was replaced with 

newly designated § 112(f) when § 4(c) of the America 

Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, took effect on 

September 16, 2012. Because the applications resulting 

in the patents at issue in this case were filed before that 

date, we will refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112.

 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 12 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 13

fying the structure disclosed in the ’078 patent’s specification corresponding to the “means for processing and for 

storing” an image from the camera as any image processing unit in the overall device, rather than the processing and memory units within the camera unit. Apple 

contends that the language of the claim expressly requires the storing and processing of image data by the 

camera to be performed by the camera’s own processor 

and memory unit, and not by the notebook computer’s 

general purpose central processor. Apple also notes that 

the specification only links the functions of storing and 

processing images captured by the camera with the 

camera’s own processor and memory units. 

MobileMedia responds that the “means for processing 

and storing” are not limited to the camera unit’s processor 

and memory units because nothing in the specification 

indicates that these separate units cannot be used for 

other purposes. Although conceding that the claimed 

device includes a central processor that is separate from 

the processor within the camera unit, MobileMedia argues that the means for processing images captured by 

the camera can be either of the disclosed processors. 

Similarly, for the memory units, MobileMedia contends 

that because nothing in the specification suggests that the 

camera’s memory units function solely for the purpose of 

the camera, the means for storing images captured by the 

camera can be the memory units within the camera unit 

or the device’s separate system-level memory unit. 

We review the district court’s claim construction here 

de novo because it relied only on evidence intrinsic to the 

’078 patent. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 

135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, a 

means-plus-function claim “shall be construed to cover the 

corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the 

specification and equivalents thereof.” A disclosed structure is a “corresponding structure” only if the specification 

or prosecution history clearly links or associates that 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 13 Filed: 03/17/2015
14 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

structure to the function recited in the claim. B. Braun 

Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 

1997).

Claim 73 recites a portable cellular mobile phone 

comprising five components: (i) a built in camera unit, (ii) 

a user interface, (iii) a display, (iv) a microprocessor 

adapted to control the operations of the camera unit, and 

(v) a means for transmitting image information over a 

radio frequency channel. ’078 patent, 16:1–13. Claim 73 

further recites that the camera unit comprises (i) optics 

for obtaining image information, (ii) an image sensor, and 

(iii) a means for processing and storing at least a portion 

of the image information obtained from the camera unit 

for later recall and processing. Id. at 16:14–19. In short, 

the language of claim 73 makes clear that the “means for 

processing and storing” is part of the camera unit, not the 

overall device.

The components of the claimed device are diagrammed in Figure 3. Id. at 2:27–28. Figure 3 indicates 

that the device includes both a “data processing unit” with 

a central “processor 4” and system-level “memory unit 

13.” Id. at 2:41–42, 2:66–3:5. The “camera unit 14” is a 

separate and distinct component of the overall device that 

communicates with the “data processing unit” via “input/output controller 5.” Id. at 3:13–14. The specification 

explains that the structure of the camera unit “conforms 

to the block diagram shown in Fig. 5” of the ’078 patent. 

Id. at 4:23–25. Figure 5 illustrates that the camera unit 

includes a “camera 14a and optics 15b, image processing 

unit 14c, [and] battery 21.” Id. at 4:23–28. The camera

unit’s image processing unit is a “microprocessor 23” and 

“a number of memory units 24.” Id. at 4:29–31, 4:37–41. 

Thus, consistent with the express language of the claim, 

the specification indicates that the camera unit’s “microprocessor 23” and “memory units 24” are different than 

and separate from the device’s central “processor 4” and 

system level “memory unit 13.” Id. at 2:41–42, 2:66–3:5. 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 14 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 15

A picture taken by the camera unit is “transferred to 

[its] image processing unit 14c and through its microprocessor 23 to [its] memory unit 24.” Id. at 4:53–54. When 

a user wishes to view the picture, the image information 

is read from the camera unit’s “memory unit 24” by the 

camera unit’s “microprocessor 23,” and is then transmitted to the notebook computer’s “processor 4” for display. 

Id. at 4:54–62. The specification emphasizes that it is the 

camera unit’s “[i]mage processing unit 14c [which] processes the image information into a suitable form” to be 

displayed by the notebook computer. Id. at 4:62–63.

The specification thus clearly links two structures to 

the claimed means for performing the function of processing and storing image information obtained by the 

camera for later recall: “microprocessor 23” and “memory 

unit 24,” the processor and memory units within the 

camera unit. Nowhere in the specification is the claimed 

function of processing and storing an image captured by 

the camera unit performed by the device’s separate “processor 4” or system-level “memory unit 13.” See id. at 

3:18–21, 4:57–62, and 5:17–21 (explaining that later 

recall of image information captured by the camera unit

requires transfer of image information from the camera 

unit’s memory to the device’s separate central processor 

and system-level memory). In addition, the specification 

does not suggest that the camera unit’s processor and 

memory perform functions beyond the processing and 

storing of image information for later recall. Indeed, the 

specification indicates that software for controlling the 

notebook computer’s other functionality—telephone and 

facsimile services, e-mail, SMS, and calendar programs—

resides in the system-level “memory unit 13,” not the 

camera unit’s “memory unit 24.” Id. at 3:54–62. 

MobileMedia’s contention that the specification does 

not expressly limit the function of the camera unit’s 

microprocessor and memory to processing and storing 

image information for later recall does not justify the 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 15 Filed: 03/17/2015
16 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

district court’s construction, which erroneously expands 

the scope of the “means for processing and storing” to 

include any image processing unit or memory unit. The 

scope of a means-plus-function limitation is outlined not 

by what the specification and prosecution history do not

say, but rather by what they do say. As we noted in 

Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 

the fact that “a structure may perform two functions and 

that a function may be performed by two structures” is 

“irrelevant in the context of a § 112, paragraph 6 analysis 

without a clear link or association between the function or 

functions recited in the means-plus-function limitation 

and the structure or structures disclosed in the specification for carrying out those functions.” 248 F.3d 1303, 

1313 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). And MobileMedia identifies no portion of the specification or 

prosecution history that clearly links any structure to the 

claimed function of processing and storing image information for later recall other than the camera unit’s “microprocessor 23” and “memory units 24.” 

Accordingly, the structures corresponding to the 

claimed function of the “means for processing and storing” 

encompass only “microprocessor 23” and “memory unit 

24,” the camera unit’s processor and memory units. 

Correctly construed, no reasonable jury could conclude 

that Apple’s accused products literally infringe the 

“means for processing and storing” limitation of claim 73.4 

Literal infringement of a § 112 ¶ 6 limitation requires 

that the relevant structure in the accused device perform 

the identical function recited in the claim and be identical 

or equivalent to the corresponding structure in the speci4 MobileMedia did not contend that Apple’s accused 

iPhones infringe the ’078 patent under the doctrine of 

equivalents before the district court, J.A. 8302, and does 

not do so here on appeal.

 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 16 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 17

fication. Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 

1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Here, the parties do not 

dispute that the camera module in Apple’s accused 

iPhones has no internal memory for storing image data. 

J.A. 5970–71; J.A. 8914. Thus, the camera module of 

Apple’s iPhones has no structure corresponding to the 

function of storing at least a portion of processed image 

information. Although MobileMedia contends that the 

“main memory of the iPhone” is the camera unit’s means 

for storing, J.A. 19632, this “main memory” is not located 

within the iPhone camera module, which is what claim 73 

requires. 

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s judgment 

that Apple infringes claim 73 of the ’078 patent. We need 

not reach Apple’s alternative noninfringement argument 

that the district court erred in its construction of the 

“means . . . for transmitting” limitation in claim 73.

B. The ’068 patent (call handling)

The ’068 patent is directed to the display of call handling options in a menu on a mobile phone’s display

screen. ’068 patent, Abstract. Examples of call handling 

options include “hold” and “disconnect.” Id. at 6:14–30. 

According to the ’068 patent, at the time of the claimed 

invention, users were required to memorize specific 

sequences of keys in order to execute call handling options 

on a mobile phone. Id. at 1:29–39. The ’068 patent’s

method for displaying a menu of options on the phone’s 

display screen allows users to select an option from a 

menu instead of needing to remember different key sequences. See id. at Figs. 6, 8–11, and 1:62–67. The 

specification explains that the mobile phone either displays this menu automatically when it receives an incoming call, or waits to display the menu until the user 

performs an action, such as when the user presses a key. 

Id. at Fig. 6 and 7:33–37, Figs. 8–9 and 12:42–44 (autoCase: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 17 Filed: 03/17/2015
18 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

matic); id. at Fig. 10 and 12:45–52, Fig. 11 and 14:19–38 

(user action). Claim 23 of the ’068 patent recites:

23. A communicating method for controlling a 

connecting state of a call into a desired connecting 

state upon a predetermined operation by a user, 

comprising the steps of:

displaying processing items [i.e., call handling options] available to the user relative to the call on a 

display;

selecting and determining a desired processing 

item out of said processing items displayed on said 

display by the user operating an input unit; and

controlling the processing items being displayed 

on said display and controlling the call into a connecting state corresponding to the processing item 

selected and determined by the operation of said 

input unit by the user,

wherein said step of controlling the processing 

items includes displaying said processing items 

[i.e., call handling options] on said display when 

only a single predetermined selection operation is 

made by the user, 

wherein said step of controlling the processing 

items includes listing said processing items available to the call on said display for each call.

’068 patent (reexamination certificate), 4:17–37 (emphasis 

added). 

In more plain language, claim 23 recites a method requiring (i) a mobile phone to display call handling options 

on a menu screen, (ii) the user to select one of these 

options, and (iii) the mobile phone to execute the call 

handling option selected by the user. Claim 24 of the ’068 

patent is identical to claim 23 for most of its limitations, 

except that it requires the “processing items” to be disCase: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 18 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 19

played in response to “a predetermined selection operation” instead of “only a single predetermined selection 

operation.” Id. at 4:37–61 (emphasis added).

We turn first to Apple’s JMOL motion of invalidity. 

Although the district court granted Apple’s motion in 

part, finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that 

claim 24 of the ’068 patent was not invalid as anticipated 

by U.S. Patent No. 5,754,636 (Bayless), the district court 

denied Apple’s motion as to claim 23, rejecting Apple’s 

argument that claim 23 is anticipated by or rendered 

obvious over the same reference. MobileMedia JMOL, 

966 F. Supp. 2d at 461–65. Apple contends that the 

district court erred as to claim 23.

Bayless discloses a telecommunications system that 

allows users to make and receive phone calls from a 

computer. Bayless, 1:58–62. Bayless’ system has a 

graphical user interface that can display call handling 

options available to the user in a “Make & Answer Calls” 

window. Id. at Fig. 41. The user prompts the Bayless 

system to display this call handling options window by

activating what Bayless describes as a “Hotkey.” Id. at 

Fig. 42. Figure 42 provides one exemplary configuration 

for this “Hotkey,” showing that the Bayless “Make & 

Answer Calls” window is displayed when a user presses 

the keyboard’s “Ctrl” and “0” keys. Id.

The district court determined that because Bayless’ 

call handling options window is displayed only after a 

user presses two keys in a serial sequence, the jury could 

reasonably find that Bayless’ “Hotkey” constituted “multiple ‘predetermined selection operations’ [] rather than 

one [such operation].” MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 

2d at 463–64. Thus, because claim 23 requires call handling options to be displayed in response to “only a single

predetermined selection operation”—unlike claim 24, 

which allowed these options to be displayed after any 

number of “predetermined selection operation[s]”—the 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 19 Filed: 03/17/2015
20 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

district court denied Apple’s motion for JMOL as to claim 

23, while granting it as to claim 24. Id.; compare ’068 

patent (reexamination certificate), 4:31–34 (emphasis 

added), with id. at 4:51–54. 

Apple contends that the unrebutted testimony at trial 

demonstrated that using one key instead of two keys to 

activate a window was well within the common knowledge 

of those with skill in the art. See J.A. 20044–45. For 

example, Apple’s expert explained that in the industry, an 

“operation” would have been understood to include “one or 

more physical keys that result in a single action,” such as 

to bring up and display Bayless’ “Make & Answer Calls” 

window. J.A. 20026, 20043. Apple’s expert further explained that a skilled artisan “would know that [the 

“Hotkey” operation of Bayless] does not have to be two 

keys,” and that the “Hotkey” could easily be programmed 

as a single key. J.A. 20022–23, 20045. In addition, 

Apple’s expert testified that the inclusion of “pull-down” 

selection boxes on the “Hotkey” menu would have explicitly signaled to one of skill in the art that the “Ctrl” and “0” 

key sequence could be changed to a different key sequence, such as to the single “F1” function key. J.A. 

20044. Apple’s expert concluded that it would have been 

obvious to one of skill in the art to implement the Bayless 

“Hotkey” operation with a single key. J.A. 20045. MobileMedia’s expert did not rebut this testimony, offering 

only the conclusory statement that “I don’t see evidence 

for that.” J.A. 20506. Conclusory statements by an 

expert, however, are insufficient to sustain a jury’s verdict. See Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 667 F.3d 1261, 

1268–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

While Apple’s expert provided specific reasons why a 

skilled artisan would have found claim 23 to be obvious in 

view of Bayless and common knowledge possessed by 

those of skill in the art, MobileMedia’s expert provided

only testimony unrelated to the actual limitations of claim 

23. For example, MobileMedia’s expert asserted that it 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 20 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 21

would not have been obvious to a skilled artisan to use a 

single key as Bayless’ “Hotkey” because the designer of 

the Bayless user interface for a computer faced different 

challenges than the designer of the mobile phone interface 

of the ’068 patent. J.A. 20491–92. MobileMedia’s expert 

sought to justify his assertion by explaining that Bayless 

“is talking about keyboards and PCs, whereas [claim 23 of 

the ’068 patent] has a different set of engineering 

tradeoffs,” relating to “cellphones” and “ease of use.” Id. 

In a similar vein, MobileMedia’s expert also testified that 

the 16 months between Bayless’ and the ’068 patent’s 

filing date suggests that claim 23 was inventive because 

Apple “could not point to [] a single person that ever did 

use a single button on a cellphone” during this timeframe. 

J.A. 20653 (emphasis added). Claim 23, however, recites 

only a “communicating method for controlling a connecting state of a call,” and includes no limitation that confines the claimed method to a cell phone or computer. 

’068 patent (reexamination certificate), 4:17–37. And 

during cross-examination, MobileMedia’s expert conceded 

that “the fact that Bayless was implemented on a PC 

instead of on a cellphone [wa]sn’t relevant” to the “communicating method” recited in the preamble of the claim. 

J.A. 20494.

In short, there is no substantial evidence to support a 

conclusion that a skilled artisan would not have found it 

obvious to take the straightforward and commonsensical 

step to configure the Bayless “Hotkey” to display the 

“Make & Answer Calls” window after the press of one key 

instead of two keys. No reasonable jury could conclude 

that claim 23 of the ’068 patent would not have been 

obvious in view of Bayless and the common knowledge of 

a person with ordinary skill in the art. Thus, the district 

court erred by denying Apple’s motion for JMOL of invalidity and we therefore reverse the district court’s judgment that claim 23 of the ’068 patent is not invalid. We 

need not reach Apple’s argument that its accused iPhones

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 21 Filed: 03/17/2015
22 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

do not infringe the “listing said processing items” limitation of claim 23.

IV. MOBILEMEDIA’S CROSS-APPEAL

A. The ’075 patent (call rejection) 

The ’075 patent describes a method for allowing a user to reject an incoming call when the user is already 

active on another call. In particular, the ’075 patent 

describes a cell phone that allows a user, by pressing a 

key, to reject the incoming call. ’075 patent, 3:24–47. 

According to the ’075 patent, pressing this key sends a 

“rejection message” to the applicable cell tower, indicating 

that the mobile telecommunications network should 

immediately release (i.e., drop) the second incoming call 

because the receiving phone is “unavailab[le].” Id. at 

3:63–4:21.

MobileMedia asserts that Apple’s accused iPhones infringe apparatus claim 10, as well as method claims 5 and 

6. For the purposes of this appeal, claim 10 of the ’075 

patent is representative: 

10. In a mobile communications device, apparatus 

in communication with a first calling station for 

selectably rejecting an incoming call, said apparatus comprising:

a transceiver operable to send and receive transmissions to and from a remote transceiver in a 

wireless system on a communications channel, 

said transceiver for receiving a transmission signifying that an incoming call is being attempted; 

and

a control processor coupled to said transceiver, 

said control processor for determining if said incoming call is to be rejected, and, in response to a 

positive determination, said control processor for 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 22 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 23

outputting a rejection message to said transceiver 

for transmission to said remote transceiver,

wherein said rejection message comprises at least 

one information element indicating to the wireless 

system that the wireless system is to immediately 

release the incoming call on the communication 

channel between the mobile communications 

device and remote transceiver.

’075 patent (reexamination certificate), 1:26–45 (emphasis 

added). The parties agree that the asserted claims require a mobile phone, which is already active on a call (“in 

communication with a first calling station”), to receive an 

incoming second call, and send a “rejection message” to a 

cell tower (“remote transceiver”) in the mobile network. 

The “rejection message” notifies the wireless system to 

immediately release the incoming call. Id. at 1:40–42. 

The district court construed the term “immediately release” to require that “the wireless system must, without 

requiring any additional action by or communication from 

the mobile phone, ‘release the incoming call on the communication channel between the mobile phone and remote transceiver.’” MobileMedia SJ, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 

591. Thus, the district court determined that the term 

“immediately” did not refer to a time period, but to an 

action, and specifically, to the absence of an action. Neither party disputes the district court’s construction on 

appeal.

Both parties agree that Apple’s accused iPhones allow 

users to reject an incoming call while active on a first call 

by tapping an “ignore” icon on the iPhone’s screen, or 

alternatively, by pressing the power key twice. Id. at 592. 

The parties focused their arguments for infringement and 

invalidity on the contents of a comprehensive set of interrelated technical protocols developed by the European 

Telecommunications Standards Institute that together 

implement the Global System for Mobile communications 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 23 Filed: 03/17/2015
24 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

(GSM) standard for cellular networks. See, e.g., J.A. 

57185. Apple’s accused iPhones, which operate on GSM 

networks, were designed to comply with this GSM standard. Appellant’s Reply Br. 41. Relevant here, GSM 

24.008 provides “core network protocols” that describe 

how mobile phones communicate with cell towers in a 

GSM network in order to make and receive calls and send 

and receive data. See generally J.A. 56260–56785. GSM 

24.083 provides more specific protocols for implementing

call waiting and call holding functions. See J.A. 56242–

59. These two protocols of the GSM standard supply the 

technical information necessary to implement the particular call waiting function at issue in MobileMedia’s crossappeal. 

Before the district court, Apple filed a motion for 

summary judgment of noninfringement on the ground 

that its accused iPhones do not practice the “rejection 

message” limitation of the asserted claims. In its motion, 

Apple did not contest that its accused iPhones implemented the relevant sections of the GSM 24.083 and GSM 

24.008 protocols, but argued that these sections were 

outside the scope of the asserted claims of the ’075 patent. 

In particular, Apple argued that a user’s rejection of an 

incoming call did not “immediately release” the call

because additional action by and communication from the 

accused iPhone was required in order to actually terminate and release the call. Id. Apple explained that according to the GSM 24.083 and GSM 24.008 protocols, 

when a user elects to “ignore” an incoming call, the mobile 

phone transmits a “DISCONNECT” message to the mobile network. J.A. 56250 (GSM 24.083, § 1.3.1). After 

receipt of this “DISCONNECT” message, the mobile 

network enters into a “release request” state for the call, 

and waits for further response from the mobile phone. 

J.A. 56455 (GSM 24.008, § 5.4.3.2); J.A. 56429 (GSM 

24.008 § 5.1.2.2.13). The mobile phone then responds 

with a “RELEASE COMPLETE” message, and it is only 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 24 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 25

after the mobile network receives this message that it 

releases the incoming call. J.A. 56455 (GSM 24.008 

§§ 5.4.3.3, 5.4.3.4).

MobileMedia responded that the entire exchange of 

messages should be considered to be “rejection messages.” 

MobileMedia SJ, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 592. MobileMedia 

also pointed to an “abnormal case” in the GSM 24.008 

protocol, in which the “ignored” call is released after 

receipt of the “DISCONNECT” message without the usual 

exchange of further messages between the mobile phone 

and mobile network described above. Id. at 592. MobileMedia contended that in this “abnormal case,” the 

mobile network can release the call if no further communication from the mobile phone is received for the duration of two successive timer periods. Id.; see also J.A. 

56455–56 (GSM 24.008, § 5.4.3.5).

The district court granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement in part. MobileMedia

SJ, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 593. It found that in the normal 

case, there was no genuine dispute that Apple’s iPhones 

did not meet the “immediately release” limitation of the 

asserted claims. Id. The district court determined, 

however, that there was still a question of fact as to 

whether the accused iPhones infringed under the GSM 

24.008 protocol’s “abnormal case.” Id.

Apple also filed a motion for summary judgment of invalidity based on obviousness, relying on disclosures in 

two different sections of prior versions of the same protocols in the GSM standard that MobileMedia relied on for 

evidence of infringement. Id. Specifically, GSM 04.08 

and GSM 04.83—earlier versions of GSM 24.008 and 

GSM 24.083, respectively—were published more than 

three years before the earliest priority date of the ’075 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 25 Filed: 03/17/2015
26 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

patent. Id.5 Further, MobileMedia agreed, and does not 

dispute here, that the prior art GSM 04.83 and GSM 

04.08 protocols are identical in all relevant aspects to 

their later-version counterparts (GSM 24.083 and GSM 

24.008). Id. at 594.

Whereas MobileMedia relied on Apple’s alleged implementation of GSM 24.008, § 5.4 (entitled “Call clearing”) for its infringement theory, Apple based its 

invalidity challenge on GSM 04.08, § 5.2.2 (entitled “Mobile terminating call establishment”). Id. Apple asserted 

that this section discloses a “RELEASE COMPLETE” 

message transmitted from a mobile phone to the mobile 

network that, unlike the “DISCONNECT” message relied 

on by MobileMedia to allege infringement, can release an 

incoming call without any further communication between the mobile phone and the network. Id. Apple 

contended that this message, in combination with GSM 

04.83, §§ 1.1 and 1.3.1, which provide instructions for 

implementing call waiting functionality—including the 

treatment of incoming calls when a user is already active 

on a call, J.A. 57583—discloses every limitation of the 

’075 patent’s asserted claims. MobileMedia SJ, 907 F. 

Supp. 2d at 595.

The district court agreed that MobileMedia had not 

raised any genuine dispute that GSM 04.83 and GSM 

04.08 disclose all limitations of the ’075 patent’s asserted 

5 Before the district court (and here on appeal), Apple also contended that (i) the GSM 04.08 and GSM 04.83 

standards should be treated as a single document, and 

thus anticipate the asserted claims, and (ii) the asserted 

claims of the ’075 patent were rendered obvious by the 

GSM 04.08 and GSM 04.83 standards in combination 

with the ’068 patent. MobileMedia SJ, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 

595; Cross-Appellee’s Br. 67–69. We need not reach 

either of these issues to resolve this appeal. 

 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 26 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 27

claims. Id. at 594. The district court, however, denied 

Apple’s summary judgment motion of invalidity because it 

found that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to 

whether a person having ordinary skill in the art would 

have been motivated to combine the two protocols in the 

GSM standard to arrive at the asserted claims. Id. at 

595–96. At trial, the jury found that Apple’s accused 

iPhones infringed the asserted claims of the ’075 patent 

under the “abnormal” case described in GSM 24.008, 

§ 5.4.3.5. MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 457. 

The jury also found that the asserted claims of the ’075 

patent were not invalid. Id. at 455. The district court, 

however, granted Apple’s renewed motion for JMOL as to 

noninfringement and invalidity for obviousness. Id. at 

457, 459. In its cross-appeal, MobileMedia contends that 

the district court erred in granting Apple’s JMOL motions 

because substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict of 

both infringement and nonobviousness.

We turn first to the district court’s grant of Apple’s 

JMOL motion of invalidity, which we review de novo. 

Bos. Scientific, 554 F.3d at 990. In evaluating that JMOL 

motion, the district court first noted that MobileMedia did 

not dispute that the GSM 04.08 and GSM 04.83 protocols 

disclose every limitation of the asserted claims. MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 454. Nor did MobileMedia offer any evidence of objective indicia of 

nonobviousness. Id. Thus, as on summary judgment, the 

parties’ dispute centered on whether one with ordinary 

skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the 

two GSM standards at the time of the alleged invention. 

The district court found that Apple’s expert provided 

several reasons that a skilled artisan would have combined the two relevant protocols of the GSM standard. Id.

at 453. Apple’s expert explained that the GSM 04.08 

(fundamental interactions between mobile phones and the 

mobile network) and 04.83 (specific call waiting and call 

holding functions) protocols were both part of the same 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 27 Filed: 03/17/2015
28 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

comprehensive GSM standard published by the European 

Telecommunications Standards Institute in 1995. Id. An 

Apple engineer testified that engineers routinely reference different “portions of the GSM standard[]” and that if 

an engineer needed to implement a particular mobile 

phone function according to the GSM standard, it was 

“trivial” to find the relevant sections in the GSM protocols 

because each protocol includes a detailed table of contents 

and index. Id.; J.A. 19941. Apple’s expert also explained 

that GSM 04.83 expressly references GSM 04.08 in numerous places, instructing that mobile phones “shall act 

in accordance with GSM 04.08” to implement the specific 

call waiting and call clearing functions relevant here, and 

that the referenced sections of the GSM 04.08 and GSM 

04.83 protocols are labeled in a “similar” manner. MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 453; J.A. 20185–86. 

Specifically, GSM 04.83, § 1.1 is titled “Waiting call 

indication and confirmation” in the index, and the companion sections in GSM 04.08 are titled “Call indication” 

(§ 5.2.2.1) and “Call confirmation” (§ 5.2.2.3). Compare

J.A. 57577 (table of contents for GSM 04.83), with J.A. 

57175 (same for GSM 04.08).

In contrast, MobileMedia’s expert testified that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been 

discouraged from using GSM 04.08 to implement the 

rejection of an incoming call in a call waiting context 

because GSM 04.08 only describes how to handle a single 

call, not multiple calls. MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 

2d at 454; J.A. 20482. The district court found, however,

that this testimony could only support a jury verdict that 

the GSM 04.08 protocol in isolation did not render the 

asserted claims anticipated or obvious. MobileMedia 

JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 455. As to whether a skilled 

artisan, in view of both the GSM 04.08 and GSM 04.83 

protocols in the GSM standard, would have been motivated to combine them, the district court noted that MobileMedia’s expert offered only conclusory testimony that 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 28 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 29

“[GSM 04.83] is small, [GSM 04.08] is big.” Id.; J.A. 

20482. But as the district court found, the fact that one 

protocol is “big” and one protocol is “small” in terms of its 

number of pages provides no counter to the testimony of 

Apple’s expert that it would have been obvious to a person 

of ordinary skill in the art to consult both GSM protocols

to implement the claimed call waiting functionality by 

following the express references to GSM 04.08 within 

GSM 04.83 and using the detailed table of contents in 

GSM 04.08 to locate the relevant “Call indication” and 

“Call confirmation” sections within that document. MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 455. 

MobileMedia also argues that the rejection message 

disclosed in the GSM 04.08 protocol—which includes 

several fields providing information about the mobile 

phone sending the message to the mobile network—has 

one informational field suggesting that the mobile phone 

is not busy, and thus the skilled artisan would have been 

discouraged from combining GSM 04.08 with GSM 04.83, 

which addresses scenarios where the mobile phone is

busy. Specifically, MobileMedia points to where GSM 

04.08 indicates that the RELEASE COMPLETE message 

includes an informational field stating “cause #21 ‘call 

rejected.’” J.A. 57262 (GSM 04.08, § 5.2.2.3.1). MobileMedia’s expert testified that one of skill in the art, to 

understand the meaning of that text field, would have 

used the table of contents to locate the “Annex H” section

of GSM 04.08 (which includes “GSM specific cause values 

for call control”), and find that “cause #21” indicates that 

“the equipment sending this cause does not wish to accept 

this call although it could have accepted the call because 

the equipment sending the cause is neither busy nor incompatible.” J.A. 20474–76; J.A. 57559–60 (GSM 04.08, 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 29 Filed: 03/17/2015
30 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

Annex H and Annex H.1.9) (emphasis added).6 MobileMedia’s expert testified that “this message means I’m 

[not] busy” and that “to a person of ordinary skill, this 

message is sent only if [the mobile phone] is not busy.” 

J.A. 20476–77. 

The district court, however, correctly found that this 

testimony again failed to consider that the skilled artisan 

would be aware of both the GSM 04.08 and GSM 04.83 

protocols. MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 456. 

The trial record shows that MobileMedia sought testimony from its expert only on “the ability of [GSM] 04.08 to 

be used to reject [a] second call.” J.A. 20474 (emphasis 

added). Thus, MobileMedia’s expert testified merely that 

a skilled artisan looking at this “cause value” would have 

“been discouraged from using this document [GSM 04.08]” 

and would have been “discouraged [after] looking at the 

document [GSM 04.08] and finding no help” for implementing the claimed invention. Id (emphases added). As 

the district court found, “MobileMedia’s validity theories 

did not address the fact that one of ordinary skill also 

knew the contents of GSM 04.83 and could start there.” 

MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 456 (emphasis 

added). 

And Apple demonstrated that after starting with 

GSM 04.83, a skilled artisan would have been led to GSM 

04.08. In particular, GSM 04.83, § 1.1 (entitled “Waiting 

call indication and confirmation”) expressly instructs that 

a mobile phone and the mobile network should interact in 

6 MobileMedia’s expert did not explain why one of 

skill in the art would allegedly rely on the indices provided in GSM 04.08 to locate more detailed definitions of 

certain terms, while at the same time ignoring the indices 

for the purpose of locating the similarly-titled call waiting 

protocol sections in GSM 04.08 expressly referenced by 

GSM 04.83.

 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 30 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 31

accordance with GSM 04.08 if a user receives an incoming 

call when the user is already active on a call. J.A. 57583. 

To release the incoming call, the mobile phone, inter alia, 

sends a “[call] clearing message” to the mobile network 

indicating that the user is busy. J.A. 57585 (GSM 04.83, 

§ 1.3.1). GSM 04.08 discloses several types of “call clearing” messages and procedures for handling those messages. See J.A. 57174–75. One type of “call clearing” 

message is the “DISCONNECT” message that MobileMedia relied on as evidence of infringement, which is 

described in §§ 5.4.2, 5.4.3.1, and 5.4.3.2, among others. 

Section 5.2.2.3.1 describes another type of “call clearing” 

message—a “RELEASE COMPLETE” message—that in 

some circumstances can be sent by the mobile phone 

instead of the “DISCONNECT” message, and is “processed” by the mobile network “in accordance with section 

5.4.” J.A. 57262.7 Relevant here, upon receipt of a 

“RELEASE COMPLETE” message, the mobile network 

releases the incoming call without waiting for additional 

communication from the mobile phone. J.A. 57273 (GSM 

04.08, § 5.4.3.4). Thus, as Apple notes, it is the message

(i.e., RELEASE COMPLETE), and not the text field 

within that message (e.g., “cause #21”), that prompts the 

mobile network to release the call. Indeed, the GSM 

standard requires that the mobile network “shall accept 

an incoming RELEASE COMPLETE message used to 

initiate the [call] clearing even though the cause information is not included.” J.A. 57272 (GSM 04.08, § 5.4.2)

(emphasis added). 

On the basis of these findings, the district court concluded that even when resolving all disputed facts in 

MobileMedia’s favor, no reasonable jury could conclude 

that the asserted claims of the ’075 patent are not invalid 

7 According to Apple, its accused iPhones do not 

implement this particular GSM protocol. J.A. 20185.

 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 31 Filed: 03/17/2015
32 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

as obvious over the GSM 04.08 and GSM 04.83 protocols 

in the GSM standard. MobileMedia JMOL, 966 F. Supp. 

2d at 457. After careful examination of the record, we 

agree with the district court’s finding that no substantial 

evidence supports a determination that one of ordinary 

skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine 

§§ 1.1 and 1.3 of GSM 04.83 and § 5.2.2 of GSM 04.08. 

Similarly, we find no error in the district court’s ultimate 

conclusion that no reasonable jury could conclude that 

claims 5, 6, and 10 of the ’075 patent are not invalid as 

obvious in view of those two protocols in the GSM standard.

We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of Apple’s motion for JMOL of invalidity of the asserted claims 

of the ’075 patent. We need not reach MobileMedia’s 

appeal from the district court’s grant of Apple’s motion for 

JMOL of noninfringement of those same claims.

B. The ’231 patent (call alerts)

The ’231 patent discloses a communication device, 

such as a mobile phone, that permits a user to stop a

ringtone alert for an incoming call without notifying the 

caller. ’231 patent, Abstract. According to the ’231 patent, when a user received an unwanted call, the prior art 

provided several options for silencing the ringtone triggered by receipt of that call: (i) answering but then quickly “hang[ing] up,” thus “forcibly disconnecting” the call, or 

(ii) turning off the phone. Id. at 1:17–25. Forcibly disconnecting the call, however, left the caller with “an 

unpleasant feeling” because the caller “c[ould] notice that 

the circuit was broken off intentionally.” Id. at 1:26–29. 

Turning off the phone was not preferable because the user 

could forget to turn the phone on again, “possib[ly] missing the next incoming call.” Id. at 1:37–42. The ’231 

patent provides several alternatives to silence a ringtone 

without these drawbacks. Id. at 4:66–5:17.

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 32 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 33

In one embodiment, a user can press the phone’s power key for some amount of time in order to stop the ringtone sound without ending the call. Id. at 2:57–3:6; see 

also id. at Fig. 3 (“stop alert sound”). In another embodiment, pressing the phone’s power key reduces the volume 

of the ringtone sound. Id. at 4:40–47; see also id. at Fig. 4 

(“reduce volume of alert sound”). Asserted claim 12 is 

excerpted below:

12. A communication terminal for informing a user of a received call from a remote caller by an 

alert sound, comprising:

an alert sound generator for generating the alert 

sound when the call is received from the remote 

caller;

control means for controlling said alert sound 

generator; 

. . . ;

wherein said alert sound generator is generating 

the alert sound and . . . , said control means controls said alert sound generator to change a volume of the generated alert sound only for the 

received call, without affecting the volume of the 

alert sound for future received calls, while leaving 

a call ringing state, as perceived by the remote 

caller, of the call to the terminal from the remote 

called unchanged . . . . 

’231 patent (reexamination certificate), 2:11–39 (emphasis 

added). Asserted claim 2, which depends from claim 12, 

recites:

2. The communication terminal according to claim 

12, wherein said control means controls the state 

of said alert sound generator to stop the sound. 

Id. at 1:31–34 (emphasis added). Asserted claim 3, which 

also depends from claim 12, recites:

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 33 Filed: 03/17/2015
34 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

3. The communication terminal according to 

claim 12, wherein said control means controls the 

state of said alert sound generator to reduce the 

volume of the sound. 

Id. at 1:35–39 (emphasis added).

Relevant to MobileMedia’s cross-appeal, the district 

court construed the term “to change a volume of the 

generated alert sound” in claim 12 as “to alter the degree 

of loudness of the alert sound that is being generated 

without cutting off the telephone circuit.” MobileMedia 

SJ, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 598. Further, the district court 

interpreted the “stop[ping] the sound” limitation in dependent claim 2 as not encompassed by the “chang[ing] a 

volume” limitation in independent claim 12. Id. Thus, 

rather than narrowing the scope of claim 12’s “change a 

volume” limitation, the district court appears to have 

interpreted dependent claim 2’s “stop the sound” limitation as providing an additional, separate function to the 

claimed communication terminal recited in independent 

claim 12. In support of its construction, the district court

reasoned that “chang[ing] a volume” and “stop[ping] the 

sound” were described in the specification as “alternatives, not interchangeable terms.” Id. 

Under this construction, the district court determined 

Apple did not infringe any asserted claim of the ’231 

patent. Id. at 599. In particular, while Apple’s accused 

iPhones include a control means that can stop the sound 

of a ringtone, the district court found that Apple’s iPhones

do not “reduce, increase, mute, or otherwise change the 

volume of the audio [alert sound] playback [as required by 

claim 12].” Id. at 598. MobileMedia contends that the 

district court erred by construing this limitation of the 

independent claim to exclude both the narrower “stop the 

sound” and “reduce the volume of the sound” embodiments disclosed in the ’231 patent’s specification and 

recited in asserted dependent claims 2 and 3, respectively. 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 34 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 35

Because the district court’s construction relies only on 

intrinsic evidence, we review its construction de novo. 

Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841. Neither party disputes that the 

“control means” invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Thus, this 

means-plus-function limitation covers the corresponding 

structure described in the specification for performing the 

claimed function, and equivalents thereof. Saffran v. 

Johnson & Johnson, 712 F.3d 549, 561 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

The language of the claims indicates that the function 

performed by the “control means” is “controlling the alert 

sound generator to change a volume of the generated alert 

sound.” See ’231 patent (reexamination certificate), 2:26–

27. The only structure disclosed in the specification for 

performing this claimed function is the phone’s CPU and 

alert sound generator on/off controller. Id. at 2:49–52. In 

response to depression of the phone’s power key, the 

specification indicates that the CPU and on/off controller 

can “stop the generation of the alert sound.” Id. at 3:3–6;

see also id. at 2:53–55. As an alternative, the specification indicates that depression of the power key can instead result in the “volume of an alert sound [being] 

reduced.” Id. at 4:37–43, 5:7–11. Compare id. at Fig. 3 

(stopping a sound), with id. at Fig. 4 (reducing a volume). 

In short, the specification indicates that the “control 

means” controls the alert sound generator to change a 

volume of the generated alert sound by either stopping 

the alert sound or reducing a volume of the alert sound. 

In the context of the specification, “chang[ing] a volume” 

encompasses both “stop[ping] the sound” and “reduc[ing] 

the volume of the sound.” See id. Further, neither party 

has identified anything in the prosecution history or 

extrinsic evidence that would suggest otherwise.

Apple contends that dependent claim 2 does not explicitly tie the “stop the sound” limitation to the “change a 

volume” limitation in claim 12. In essence, Apple defends 

the district court’s construction on the ground that it is 

possible to construe claim 12 and claim 2 in a manner 

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 35 Filed: 03/17/2015
36 MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 

such that “stop[ping] the sound” and “chang[ing] a volume” are mutually exclusive. Apple speculates that a 

device could practice both by “dialing down the audio level 

to alter the degree of loudness . . . and then stopping the 

generation of the sound.” Cross-Appellee’s Br. 75. Apple, 

however, provides no support in the specification or 

prosecution history for its example. Regardless, Apple’s 

construction ignores that claim 2 ties “stop[ping] the 

sound” to the control means—the CPU and alert sound 

on/off controller. And as discussed supra, the specification describes this control means structure as stopping or

reducing the volume of the alert sound.

Finally, Apple contends that MobileMedia seeks to 

improperly use the doctrine of claim differentiation in 

order to broaden the scope of independent claim 12 beyond what is supported by the specification. While we 

agree with Apple that “[t]he dependent claim tail cannot 

wag the independent claim dog,” N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. 

Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993), no 

such concern is present here. Rather, it is Apple that 

urges us to affirm a claim construction that would exclude 

a preferred embodiment of the invention disclosed in the 

specification. Such a construction is rarely correct without any persuasive evidentiary support. Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 

Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

Consistent with the specification, “controlling the 

alert sound generator to change a volume of the generated 

alert sound” by the “control means” encompasses both 

stopping and reducing the volume of the alert sound as 

recited in dependent claims 2 and 3, respectively. Because the district court’s grant of Apple’s motion for 

summary judgment of noninfringement of claims 2–4 and 

12 of the ’231 patent was based on an erroneous construction, we vacate the district court’s grant of this motion 

and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 36 Filed: 03/17/2015
MOBILEMEDIA IDEAS LLC v. APPLE INC. 37

* * *

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that (i) substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination that 

claim 73 of the ’078 patent is not invalid, (ii) no reasonable jury could find that claim 73 of the ’078 patent is 

infringed by Apple’s accused iPhones, (iii) no reasonable 

jury could conclude that claim 23 of the ’068 patent is not 

invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, (iv) no reasonable jury could conclude that claims 5, 6, and 10 of the ’075 

patent are not invalid as obvious in view of the GSM 

04.08 and GSM 04.83 protocols, and (v) that the district 

court’s claim construction of “to change a volume of the 

generate alert sound” was erroneous. Therefore, we (i) 

affirm the district court’s denial of Apple’s motion for 

JMOL of invalidity of claim 73 of the ’078 patent, (ii) 

reverse the district court’s denial of Apple’s motion for 

JMOL of noninfringement of claim 73 of the ’078 patent, 

(iii) reverse the district court’s denial of Apple’s motion for 

JMOL of invalidity of claim 23 of the ’068 patent, (iv) 

affirm the district court’s grant of Apple’s motion for 

JMOL of invalidity of claims 5, 6, and 10 of the ’075 

patent, (v) vacate the district court’s grant of summary

judgment of noninfringement of claims 2–4 and 12 of the 

’231 patent, and (vi) remand for further proceedings. In 

view of these holdings, we need not resolve any of the 

parties’ remaining appeals or cross-appeals. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, 

VACATED, AND REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 14-1091 Document: 3-2 Page: 37 Filed: 03/17/2015