Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02884/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02884-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Unknown Green
Appellee
Unknown Lawson
Appellee
Marlan A. Penton
Appellant
Jimmy Rawson
Appellee
CO II John Shafer
Appellee
Unknown Sheifer
Appellee
Unknown Spears
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2884

___________

Marlan A. Penton, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Unknown Green; Unknown Sheifer; *

Unknown Spears; Unknown Lawson; * [UNPUBLISHED]

Jimmy Rawson; CO II John Shafer, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: April 20, 2006

Filed: May 2, 2006

___________

Before ARNOLD, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Marlan Penton, a Missouri prisoner, appeals the district court’s order dismissing

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action with prejudice as a sanction, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(b). We grant Penton’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on

appeal, leaving the fee-collection details to the district court. See Henderson v.

Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Upon careful review of

the record, we modify the dismissal to be without prejudice.

Appellate Case: 05-2884 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/02/2006 Entry ID: 2039796
-2-

Penton filed this action against prison officials, claiming that they failed to

protect him from two inmate attacks in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In a

pretrial scheduling order, the district court advised the parties that failure to comply

with the scheduling order or to participate in good faith in discovery could result in

sanctions, including dismissal. After Penton was uncooperative at his scheduled

deposition, defendants moved to dismiss the action. The district court found Penton

had intentionally disobeyed the scheduling order by refusing to give substantive

answers to any of defense counsel’s pertinent questions, and the court declined to

grant Penton a second opportunity to obey the scheduling order because of the

inconvenience to defendants from having to drive a considerable distance to depose

him. Thus, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.

Under Rule 41(b), a defendant may move for dismissal of an action for the

plaintiff’s failure to comply with any court order. We review such dismissals for

abuse of discretion. See Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (per

curiam). Dismissal with prejudice is an “extreme sanction” that should be used “only

in cases of willful disobedience of a court order or where a litigant exhibits a pattern

of intentional delay.” See Hunt v. City of Minneapolis, 203 F.3d 524, 527 (8th Cir.

2000). 

We conclude that dismissal with prejudice was a disproportionately harsh

sanction in this case. There was no contemporaneous warning from the district court

alerting Penton that failure to answer the deposition questions could result in dismissal

of his suit, as the scheduling order was issued five months before the deposition

occurred and it contained only a general warning about possible dismissal for failure

to participate in discovery in good faith. Cf. R.W. Int’l Corp. v. Welch Foods, Inc.,

937 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1991) (scheduling order containing general instructions on

scope of discovery did not qualify as order compelling deponent to answer exact

questions posed at his deposition so as to support dismissal of action under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37 for deponent’s refusal to answer those questions). Further, the

Appellate Case: 05-2884 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/02/2006 Entry ID: 2039796
-3-

uncooperative conduct occurred on only one occasion, and we question whether the

inconvenience to defense counsel from having to drive to the prison to depose Penton

again should have been such an important factor in the court’s decision to impose the

most severe sanction. See Doe, 403 F.3d at 990 (sanction imposed must be

proportionate to litigant’s transgression; focus should be on degree of egregious

conduct which prompted dismissal order, and to lesser extent on adverse impact of

such conduct on defendant and administration of justice). In these circumstances, we

believe that a dismissal without prejudice was the most severe sanction that should

have been imposed to punish Penton’s conduct. See Rodgers v. Curators of Univ. of

Mo., 135 F.3d 1216, 1222 (8th Cir. 1998) (ultimate sanction of dismissal with

prejudice should be used only when lesser sanctions prove futile).

Accordingly, we modify the dismissal to be without prejudice.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-2884 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/02/2006 Entry ID: 2039796