Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-18-05963/USCOURTS-ca6-18-05963-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Scott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 19a0286n.06

Case No. 18-5963

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DONALD SCOTT,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE

OPINION

BEFORE: COOK, NALBANDIAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Donald Scott appeals his 15-year sentence for unlawfully 

possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 

mandatory 15-year minimum violates the Eighth Amendment. We affirm. 

The Memphis Police Department received a call late one night in February 2017 about a 

domestic assault. They responded to the scene and spoke to Lashawn Kreighbaum. Kreighbaum 

claimed that Scott, the father of her children, assaulted her. She had several injuries on the side of 

her face. The officers completed a report and left. Later that evening they received a second call. 

Scott apparently returned to the residence, so the officers went back and saw him standing on the 

front porch. They arrested him for domestic assault, and during the pat down found an unloaded 

firearm. Scott told the officers he returned to collect some of his things, including the gun.

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But Scott had several prior felony convictions, making his possession of a firearm unlawful 

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). So the Government charged him with being a felon in possession. 

And he pleaded guilty to that charge.

Scott’s prior convictions (including multiple acts of aggravated robbery) also meant that 

he qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Section 924(e) imposes a 

mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months. The Guidelines range went as high as 188 months, 

but the United States asked for a sentence in line with the mandatory minimum. The district court 

accepted that recommendation and sentenced Scott to 180 months in prison. 

Scott argues that § 924(e), at least applied to him, violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban 

on cruel and unusual punishment. While in most cases district courts must consider a range of 

factors to decide whether to vary upwards or downwards in selecting sentence, § 924(e) imposes 

a minimum sentence the district court cannot bypass. For Scott, that meant the district court could 

not consider mitigating evidence that weighed against a 15-year sentence, which (he claims)

resulted in a sentence “so disproportionate to the underlying facts of the case that it constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment.” Appellant Br. at 8. 

Scott did not raise this constitutional objection below, so we are limited to reviewing it for 

plain error. United States v. Watkins, 509 F.3d 277, 281–82 (6th Cir. 2007). But that standard 

amounts to little here because we stop at the first step. There is no error, plain or otherwise, because 

Scott’s sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Moore, 643 F.3d 

451, 454 (6th Cir. 2011).

The Eighth Amendment only prohibits “extreme sentences that are grossly 

disproportionate to the crime.” United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2010)

(quoting United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50 (6th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks and 

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No. 18-5963, United States v. Scott

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alterations omitted). While many “[s]evere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, [ ] they are not 

unusual in the constitutional sense.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991). And 

when the legislature has enacted a mandatory minimum, the Eighth Amendment “does [not] 

require consideration of a defendant’s mitigating factors.” Moore, 643 F.3d at 454 (citing 

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995). “Rather, only an extreme disparity between crime and sentence” will

run afoul of the constitution. Id. (quoting United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 474 (6th Cir. 2003))

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Scott’s only argument that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment is that the 

mandatory minimum prevented the district court from considering mitigating factors to impose a 

lower sentence. But we squarely rejected that same argument in Moore. See Moore, 643 F.3d at 

454–55. Just as in that case, “the imposition of a mandatory sentence without considering 

mitigating factors does not . . . run afoul of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 455.

Moreover, Scott’s 15-year sentence comfortably fits within the Eighth Amendment’s 

parameters. He received the sentence because of an extensive criminal history. That history 

includes three convictions for aggravated robbery, a conviction for possession of a controlled 

substance with the intent to distribute, and a prior conviction for illegally possessing a firearm. 

Given his criminal history, we cannot say that Scott’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to his 

crime. Id. at 454–55.

We affirm. 

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