Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01914/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01914-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ivan Mendoza Cadavedo
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1914

IVAN MENDOZA CADAVEDO,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A089 506 066

____________________

ARGUED MAY 24, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2016

____________________

Before ROVNER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Ivan Mendoza Cadavedo, a native of the Philippines, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision that affirmed an immigration 

judge’s denial of his request for a continuance. At a 2014 hearing, an immigration judge denied Cadavedo’s request for a 

continuance to allow him to challenge a 2009 finding by 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(“USCIS”) that he had engaged in marriage fraud. That USCIS 

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2 No. 15-1914

finding bars him from obtaining adjustment of his status to 

become a lawful permanent resident. We hold that there was 

no abuse of discretion in denying Cadavedo’s request for a 

continuance. Cadavedo made his request during the hearing 

he sought to have continued, and his entitlement to the belated relief he wanted to seek from USCIS is speculative at 

best.

I. Background

This case revolves around Cadavedo’s past and possible 

future attempts to adjust his immigration status to become a 

lawful permanent resident. Unauthorized immigrants who 

have an immigrant visa immediately available to them 

(among other requirements) may apply to have their status 

adjusted to that of lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1255(a). There are no numerical limits on visas for immediate relatives of United States citizens, including spouses, so a 

visa is immediately available to such an immigrant. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). To obtain this benefit, a United States citizen may petition for recognition of her relative’s classification 

as an immigrant entitled to a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i); 

8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). The immigrant may then apply for adjustment of status. See generally Matter of Hashmi, 24 I. & N. 

Dec. 785, 789–90 (BIA 2009) (describing process for adjustment of status). If an immigrant attempts to obtain adjustment 

of status through a sham marriage, however, no future petition on behalf of that immigrant may be approved. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1154(c); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii).

In 2007, Cadavedo sought to adjust his status through his 

U.S. citizen wife. His wife filed an I-130 petition for recogniCase: 15-1914 Document: 25 Filed: 08/31/2016 Pages: 9
No. 15-1914 3

tion of Cadavedo as her spouse, and Cadavedo filed a corresponding I-485 petition to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident. 

Immigration authorities interviewed the two to establish 

whether their marriage was bona fide. In her interview, Cadavedo’s wife admitted that Cadavedo had promised to pay 

her to marry him for immigration purposes. She gave a sworn 

statement to USCIS and withdrew her I-130 petition. USCIS 

denied Cadavedo’s I-485 petition to adjust his status. It notified Cadavedo that under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) it could not approve any future petitions on his behalf because he had entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.1

In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security issued a 

Notice to Appear to Cadavedo. The Notice to Appear charged 

Cadavedo with removability based on overstaying his visa, 8 

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), working without authorization, 

§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i), and fraudulently attempting to adjust his 

status through a spousal preference, §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 

1227(a)(1)(A). On May 16, 2013, Cadavedo appeared before an 

immigration judge and admitted all of the Attorney General’s 

factual allegations except for his marriage fraud, which he denied. The judge scheduled a hearing on the contested fraud 

charge for October 17, 2013. 

In the fall of 2013, Cadavedo retained new counsel. Cadavedo’s new counsel sought to continue the October 17, 2013 

 1 Manny Aguja represented Cadavedo in his attempt to adjust his status, and Cadavedo worked for Aguja from 2004 to 2007. In 2012, attorney 

Aguja pled guilty to conspiracy to commit marriage fraud by participating 

in arranging fraudulent marriages for immigration purposes.

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hearing to develop his defense against the fraud charges of 

removability. The October 2013 federal government shutdown had the effect of granting a delay of several months, although the judge did not formally grant the continuance request.

On January 29, 2014, Cadavedo again appeared before the 

immigration judge. The Attorney General’s witness for the 

contested fraud charges did not appear for the hearing, so the 

Attorney General dropped that charge and proceeded on the 

other, uncontested grounds for removability. During the hearing, Cadavedo sought a continuance to give him an opportunity to bring a collateral challenge to USCIS’s fraud finding 

from 2009. Cadavedo told the judge he had a daughter who 

was in the process of naturalizing, and he said he wanted to 

seek adjustment of status through her.

The judge denied the request and ordered Cadavedo’s removal on the uncontested grounds for removability. Cadavedo appealed the denial of the continuance to the Board 

of Immigration Appeals. The Board affirmed the judge’s decision. It applied its precedent, Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 790–

92, and concluded that Cadavedo had failed to demonstrate 

good cause to continue his proceedings. The relief Cadavedo 

wanted to seek from USCIS was untimely, and his entitlement 

to receive it was speculative at best. The Board also found no 

deprivation of Cadavedo’s due process rights.

II. Analysis

A. Scope of Jurisdiction

We have jurisdiction to review Cadavedo’s final order of 

removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). This includes jurisdiction 

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No. 15-1914 5

to review whether the Board erred in affirming the immigration judge’s denial of a continuance along the way to reaching 

that final order. Calma v. Holder, 663 F.3d 868, 873 (7th Cir. 

2011). Due to the limits on our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we have jurisdiction to review the denial of 

the motion to continue unless “the agency’s rationale for 

denying the procedural request also establishes the petitioner’s inability to prevail on the merits of his underlying 

claim” for adjustment of status. Calma, 663 F.3d at 876. Our 

jurisdiction extends to review of the denial of a continuance 

“that is sought for purposes of allowing another agency to 

complete its review.” Id. at 877. Cadavedo sought a continuance to ask another agency to reconsider its previous determination rather than to complete its review, but we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to hear that claim.

B. Denial of Continuance

We review the Board’s and judge’s decision to deny a continuance for abuse of discretion. Calma, 663 F.3d at 870. We 

will not overturn the decision “unless it was made without a 

rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established 

policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious 

discrimination against a particular race or group.” Id. at 878

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Where, as 

here, the [Board] agrees with the [immigration judge’s] decision but supplements his reasoning, we review the [judge’s] 

decision as supplemented by the [Board].” Pawlowska v. 

Holder, 623 F.3d 1138, 1141 (7th Cir. 2010).

An immigration judge may grant a continuance “for good 

cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. In evaluating whether the 

circumstances warrant a continuance to pursue an I-130 petition, the Board and judges presume that “discretion should 

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be favorably exercised where a prima facie approvable visa 

petition and adjustment application have been submitted in 

the course of an ongoing removal hearing.” Hashmi, 24 I. & N. 

Dec. at 790. The “focus of the inquiry is the apparent ultimate 

likelihood of success on the adjustment application.” Id. And 

the Board and judges also consider: “(1) the DHS response to 

the motion; (2) whether the underlying visa petition is prima 

facie approvable; (3) the respondent’s statutory eligibility for 

adjustment of status; (4) whether the respondent’s application 

for adjustment merits a favorable exercise of discretion; and 

(5) the reason for the continuance and other procedural factors.” Id. 

The Board and judge did not abuse their discretion here. 

Cadavedo’s visa petition was not “prima facie approvable” 

due to the USCIS finding in 2009 that Cadavedo had engaged 

in marriage fraud. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 204.2(a)(1)(ii). We agree with the Board and judge that Cadavedo’s “apparent ultimate likelihood of success on the adjustment application” was at best speculative due to the fraud 

bar. Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 790.2

Nothing in the record indicates that Cadavedo had a solid 

case to overturn the fraud bar. In his brief, Cadavedo also 

acknowledges that the possibility that USCIS would agree to 

to entertain an appeal more than six years late was “nil.” The 

 

2 At oral argument, Cadavedo’s counsel represented that Cadavedo 

has obtained an approved I-130 petition. Cadavedo’s briefing does not 

mention this and we have not received any written updates from Cadavedo. Absent information to the contrary, we assume USCIS continues 

to maintain its fraud bar against Cadavedo. In any case, we review the 

Board’s and immigration judge’s use of their discretion, so our review focuses on the information they had when making their decisions.

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No. 15-1914 7

Board and judge did not abuse their discretion by denying 

Cadavedo’s continuance request on these grounds. See Souley 

v. Holder, 779 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2015) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to continue to allow petitioner’s wife 

to file second I-130 petition after first one was denied); Calma, 

663 F.3d at 878 (“sound reason” existed for denying continuance when adjustment of status was speculative and, if successful, would occur far into the future).3

The judge also properly considered “the reason for the 

continuance and other procedural factors.” Hashmi, 24 I. & N. 

Dec. at 790. Cadavedo requested the continuance during a 

hearing and after he had received a de facto three-month continuance due to the 2013 government shutdown. Nothing in 

the record suggests that Cadavedo informed the Board or immigration judge of any action he took to contest the fraud bar 

and obtain an approved I-130 petition during his de facto

three-month continuance. Nor is there any indication that he 

did so during the years between USCIS’s notification that it 

had imposed the fraud bar and the 2014 hearing before the 

immigration judge. 

 

3 Cadavedo asserts that the Board erred in identifying the daughter 

through whom he wished to have his status adjusted. The Board identified 

the daughter as the one who was in removal proceedings at the same time 

as Cadavedo, but he said he intended to seek adjustment of status through 

a daughter who he says is currently a legal permanent resident in the process of naturalizing. As the Attorney General acknowledges, the Board 

erred, but that error was harmless: Cadavedo did not claim that his daughter had been naturalized, only that she was applying for it, and the fraud 

bar would prevent Cadavedo from adjusting his status through any relative. See Calma, 663 F.3d at 878 (harmless error analysis applies).

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Cadavedo argues that the Board abused its discretion because it failed to consider the factors for granting a continuance the Ninth Circuit identified in Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89 

(9th Cir. 1988). But the Board properly applied the factors 

from Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 790. As we have repeatedly 

recognized, that was the correct legal standard for the Board 

to apply. See Adame v. Holder, 762 F.3d 667, 672–73 (7th Cir. 

2014); Aimin Yang v. Holder, 760 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2014); 

Calma, 663 F.3d at 872. The Board did not abuse its discretion 

here in affirming the immigration judge’s denial of the request 

for a continuance to seek speculative relief from USCIS’s fraud 

bar.4

C. Due Process

Cadavedo also argues that the immigration judge’s decision not to hold a contested hearing on the fraud charge of 

removability deprived him of his due process rights by preventing him from challenging the fraud finding in the immigration court. Cadavedo, of course, has a constitutional right 

to removal proceedings that satisfy the requirements of due 

process. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). But Cadavedo does not have a due process right to seek relief from 

removal that is purely discretionary, such as adjustment of 

status, because he has no protected liberty interest in obtaining such relief. Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1061 (7th 

Cir. 2005); see also Adame, 762 F.3d at 670. Cadavedo also has 

not demonstrated that the immigration judge’s refusal to let 

 4 To whatever extent Cadavedo seeks review of the Board’s decision 

to deny him administrative closure, the Board did not abuse its discretion 

in denying that request for the same reasons stated in this section. See Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907, 919 (7th Cir. 2010) (court of appeals has jurisdiction to review denial of administrative closure for abuse of discretion). 

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No. 15-1914 9

him challenge the fraud bar prejudiced him. See Souley, 779 

F.3d at 724 (no due process problem because no prejudice 

from denial of continuance). 

In any case, Cadavedo had sufficient process available to 

him to challenge the fraud bar. As the Attorney General 

points out, Cadavedo could have moved for reconsideration 

of USCIS’s denial of his petition for adjustment of status and 

challenged the bar that way. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i). Presumably, if Cadavedo could have demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel in his original petition for adjustment of status, that could provide good reason for USCIS to reconsider

its decision. If Cadavedo had taken steps to obtain an approved I-130 petition during his administrative proceedings, 

he could have asked immigration authorities to reconsider 

their denial of a continuance on the basis of that new information. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (motion to reopen before Board); 8 

C.F.R. § 1003.23 (motion to reopen before immigration judge); 

Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 471–72 (BIA 1992) (describing motion to remand to immigration judge). The immigration laws and regulations accorded Cadavedo sufficient 

process. 

The petition for review of the Board’s decision is DENIED.

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