Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01047/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tsehaynesh Asfiha Hadera
Petitioner
Immigration & Naturalization Service
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 30, 1998 Decided February 27, 1998 

No. 97-1047

TSEHAYNESH ASFIHA HADERA,

PETITIONER

v.

IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

United States Immigration and Naturalization Service

David Goren argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

petitioner.

Laura A. Smith, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were 

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Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, and Christopher C. Fuller, Senior Litigation Counsel. Michael P. Lindemann, Assistant Director, entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Petitioner seeks review of the Board 

of Immigration Appeals' denial of her application for political 

asylum. Because she failed to file her petition within the 

period required by law, we dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.

I

A native and citizen of Eritrea, petitioner Tsehaynesh 

Asfiha Hadera entered the United States in October 1988 as a 

nonimmigrant visitor authorized to stay six months. Because 

Hadera never left the country as required by the terms of her 

visa, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an 

order to show cause in June 1994 why she should not be 

deported. Conceding deportability, Hadera sought political 

asylum. Alternatively, she sought withholding of deportation 

or voluntary departure.

Testifying before an Immigration Judge in support of her 

asylum application, Hadera explained that she grew up in the 

portion of Ethiopia that became the independent country of 

Eritrea in May 1993, that her husbanda supporter of the 

Eritrean independence movementwas arrested and imprisoned for his political activities, and that the beatings he 

received in prison eventually caused his death. She further 

testified that because she continued her husband's political 

activities, Ethiopian authorities imprisoned her for six 

months, beating her so severely that her right arm remains 

permanently disabled. Hadera testified finally that six 

months after her release from prisonand after one other 

short period of incarcerationshe came to the United States, 

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leaving her entire family in Ethiopia. Acknowledging that 

the movement she supported succeeded in establishing an 

independent Eritrean state, Hadera nevertheless argued that 

her persecution had been so severe that she should not be 

forced to return.

The Immigration Judge recognized that Hadera was persecuted for her political views. Because he also found that "no 

prospect of future persecution exists given the fact that 

[Hadera's] political views ultimately prevailed and the political organization she supported has succeeded in establishing 

an independent country of Eritrea" and that Hadera "will 

more likely be seen as a heroine than an object for potential 

persecution if returned to Eritrea," the Immigration Judge 

denied her asylum application as a matter of discretion, see 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994) ("[T]he alien may be granted asylum 

in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney 

General determines that such alien is a refugee within the 

meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.") (amended 

1996). The Immigration Judge also denied Hadera's application for withholding of deportation.

Affirming the Immigration Judge and emphasizing that 

Hadera would face no persecution in the now-independent 

Eritrea where her remaining family members still reside, the 

Board of Immigration Appeals issued a final order of deportation on November 20, 1996, permitting Hadera to depart 

voluntarily within thirty days of the date of the order. On 

December 13, Hadera asked the district director for an 

extension of her voluntary departure time. Denying this 

request on January 14, 1997, the district director noted on 

what appears to be the back of the rejection letter that "Ms. 

Hadera may file a petition for review within 90 days of the 

Board's decision." On January 23, 1997, Hadera filed a 

petition for review in this court, arguing that the Board had 

abused its discretion by denying her application for asylum.

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II

Not mentioned by the parties in their principal briefs, but 

critical to whether we even have jurisdiction over Hadera's 

petition, section 309(c)(4)(C) of the recently-enacted Illegal 

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 

1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), as 

amended by Act of Oct. 11, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-302, 110 

Stat. 3656 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) 

("IIRIRA"), requires that a "petition for judicial review must 

be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order 

of exclusion or deportation." Id. § 309(c)(4)(C), 110 Stat. at 

3009-626. While most of IIRIRA did not take effect until 

April 1, 1997, see id. § 309(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-625, it 

contained a set of transitional rules governing judicial review 

of all final orders of deportation and exclusion entered more 

than thirty days after IIRIRA's enactment, see id.

§ 309(c)(4), 110 Stat. at 3009-626. Among these rules is 

section 309(c)(4)(C)'s thirty-day requirement for filing petitions for review of Board decisions. Even though this rule 

clearly governs our review of the Board's final order of 

deportation in this case (the Board issued the order on 

November 20, over thirty days after President Clinton signed 

IIRIRA), Hadera filed her petition on January 23, 1997, more 

than a month after the thirty-day deadline had passed.

Because jurisdiction cannot be waived, see Floyd v. District 

of Columbia, 129 F.3d 152, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[J]urisdiction cannot be waived and we have an independent obligation 

to assure ourselves of jurisdiction, even when the parties fail 

to challenge it."), we directed the parties to be prepared at 

oral argument to address the jurisdictional issue. In a supplemental brief and then again at oral argument, the INS 

argued that we lack jurisdiction. Conceding that the thirtyday rule applies, Hadera argued that we nevertheless have 

jurisdiction because the thirty-day period did not begin running until the district director denied her motion for an 

extension of voluntary departure time on January 14, and 

because the district director informed her on that day that 

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she could file her petition for review within ninety days of the 

Board's decision, thereby estopping the agency from now 

claiming that her petition was untimely.

Neither of Hadera's arguments has merit. Filing a voluntary departure extension request does not extend the time 

available to petition for review of a final order of deportation. 

See Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 219 n.1 (1963) ("The granting 

of voluntary departure relief does not result in the alien's not 

being subject to an outstanding final order of deportation."); 

Karimian-Kaklaki v. INS, 997 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1993) 

("The privilege of voluntary departure granted to petitioners 

is irrelevant to the finality (and thus appealability) of the BIA 

order."); see also 8 C.F.R. § 243.1 (1997) ("[A]n order of 

deportation, including an alternate order of deportation coupled with an order of voluntary departure ... shall be final as 

of the date of the Board's decision."). Although INS counsel 

was unable to explain the district director's notation that 

Hadera could file a petition for review within ninety days of 

the Board's decision, we need not decide whether such a 

statement could affect our jurisdiction because the notation, 

made about three weeks after the statutory deadline had 

passed, could not possibly have caused her late filing. We 

therefore lack jurisdiction over Hadera's petition. See Mayard v. INS, 129 F.3d 438, 439 (8th Cir. 1997) (dismissing for 

lack of jurisdiction appeal filed eighty-four days after final 

order); Narayan v. INS, 105 F.3d 1335, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction petition for review filed 

forty-seven days after final order).

During oral argument, the INS identified a second problem 

with Hadera's petition: Section 309(c)(4)(D) of IIRIRA states 

that "the petition for review shall be filed with the court of 

appeals for the judicial circuit in which the administrative 

proceedings before the special inquiry officer or immigration 

judge were completed." IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(D), 110 Stat. at 

3009-626. Because the Immigration Judge conducted Hadera's hearing in Arlington, Virginia, Hadera should have filed 

her petition in the Fourth Circuit.

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Hadera has thus filed her petition not only too late, but also 

in the wrong court. When we asked Hadera's counsel at oral 

argument whether we should dismiss the petition or transfer 

it to the Fourth Circuit, he urged transfer so he would have 

"another shot." The INS told us that the answer might turn 

on whether section 309(c)(4)(D) establishes a jurisdictional or 

a venue requirement, but we think that makes no difference 

in this case. Although we possess statutory authority to 

transfer cases over which we lack jurisdiction "to any other 

such court in which the action or appeal could have been 

brought at the time it was filed," 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994), as 

well as inherent authority to transfer cases over which we 

lack venue if "in the interest of justice," Alexander v. Commissioner, 825 F.2d 499, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1987), neither is 

appropriate here because Hadera's petition would have been 

untimely even if filed in the Fourth Circuit, see Oum v. INS,

613 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that court lacks 

jurisdiction over petition filed after statutory deadline). Hadera's petition is dismissed.

So ordered.

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