Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56376/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56376-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Clifford Marcus Winkles
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CLIFFORD MARCUS WINKLES,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-56376

D.C. Nos.

2:04-cv-03527-DDP

2:00-cr-00359-DDP-2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 1, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed July 31, 2015

Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr. and N. Randy Smith, Circuit

Judges and Royce C. Lamberth,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Lamberth

* The Honorable Royce C. Lamberth, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Clifford

Marcus Winkles’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from

judgment following the denial of his section 2255 motion to

vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.

The panel held that a certificate of appealability is

required to appeal the denial of a legitimate Rule 60(b)

motion for relief from judgment arising out of the denial of a

section 2255 motion. 

The panel held that a COA should only issue for the

appeal arising from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion in a

section 2255 proceeding if the movant shows that (1) jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion and

(2) jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

underlying section 2255 motion states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right.

The panel held that Winkles is not entitled to a COA

because he has not made a substantial showing that the

district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b)

motion as to the two aspects of the Rule 60(b) motion he

presses on appeal: (1) whether the district court should have

reopened the time to appeal its denial of his original section

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 3

2255 motion and (2) whether the district court should have

considered his purported amended section 2255 motion.

COUNSEL

Ethan A. Balogh (argued) and Jay A. Nelson, Coleman,

Balogh & Scott LLP, San Francisco, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

NancyB. Spiegel (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Stephanie Yonekura, Acting United States Attorney; Robert

E. Dugdale, Assistant United States Attorney,Chief,Criminal

Division, United States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

OPINION

LAMBERTH, Senior District Judge:

Appellant Clifford Marcus Winkles appeals the denial of

his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment following the

denial of his section 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct his sentence. Winkles was incarcerated for a term of

476 months following his conviction in federal district court. 

His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.

Winkles previously filed a Rule 60(b) motion that the

district court denied. We denied a certificate of appealability

(“COA”). He later filed the Rule 60(b) motion at issue in this

appeal. The district court denied this motion as well. A

motions panel of this court referred the matter to this panel to

determine whether a COA is required to appeal the denial of

a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion, whether Winkles’s appeal

presents such a motion, and whether the district court abused

its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion.

We have jurisdiction to consider the first question under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253(a). For the reasons that follow, we

hold that a COA is required. We next conclude that Winkles

is not entitled to a COA. Because a COA is required and

Winkles is not entitled to one, we lack jurisdiction to consider

his appeal of the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)

motion. The appeal is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Appellant Clifford Marcus Winkles was indicted on

August 11, 2000, along with co-defendant Eric Ruiz. 

Winkles’s Excerpts of Record (“ER”) 479–87. After trial, a

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 5

jury convicted Winkles on all counts. ER 442. The district

court then sentenced him to a prison term of 476 months. ER

443. Winkles appealed. We affirmed his conviction and

sentence in an unpublished memorandum disposition on

February 14, 2003. United States v. Winkles, 56 F. App’x

796 (9th Cir. 2003). The court held that there was sufficient

evidence to sustain the conviction on all counts. Id.

I. Original Section 2255 Motion

Winkles timely filed, by submitting to prison authorities

for mailing, his original section 2255 motion on May 7,

2004.1 ER 16, 431–41. Winkles’s original motion raised six

grounds for relief, based on ineffective assistance of counsel

and denial of Fifth Amendment due process. ER 434–38.

The district court denied Winkles’s motion on November

18, 2005 in an opinion that thoroughly discussed and rejected

each of Winkles’s arguments. ER 15–30.

Winkles did not receive this order in a timely fashion. He

wrote to the district court on February 4, 2007 inquiring about

the status of his section 2255 motion. ER 410. On June 20,

2007, the district court received a letter from Winkles stating

again that he had not received the court’s decision and asking

for a “chance to respond” to it. ER 409. The government

1 The time for filing a section 2255 motion is one year from the date on

which the judgment of conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). 

This period includes the 90 days in which a defendant may petition for

certiorari to the Supreme Court. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 532

(2003). Under this rule, the motion was timely from the date of the

expiration of Winkles’s right to seek review at the Supreme Court, May

15, 2003.

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6 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

concedes for purposes of appeal that Winkles did not receive

the order denying his motion prior to this date.

In September 2007, Winkles filed a request to receive a

copy of the order denying his section 2255 motion, which the

district court granted by minute order. ER 401–03, 13. 

Winkles later declared that he did not receive the court’s

opinion until October 1, 2007. ER 12. Winkles also declared

that he had previously sent a motion to amend his section

2255 motion that was evidently not received by the court. Id.

II. December 23, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration

The district court construed the June 2007 letter from

Winkles as a request regarding the filing of a motion for

reconsideration. ER 14. It informed him that he was

permitted to file such a motion. Id.

On December 23, 2007, Winkles filed a document styled

as an “[e]x parte application for appointment of counsel;

and/or authorization to file a petition under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255.” Government’s Excerpts of Record (“GER”) 1. In

part, Winkles asserted that he had been without his trial

transcripts until April 2005, despite repeated requests to

prison authorities to deliver materials which were in prison

storage. GER 4–5. He did not realize the transcripts had

been delivered in April until July or August 2005. Id. He

stated that, after receiving the transcripts, he enlisted the help

of a fellow inmate and submitted a motion for leave to amend

in August or September 2005. GER 5, 29. Winkles did not

attach the amended motion or discuss its contents.

The district court construed Winkles’s filing as a motion

for reconsideration and denied it on March 18, 2008. ER 6. 

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 7

The court held that Winkles had not cited “what new

evidence, if any, he has discovered from the transcripts that

support the merits of his claims,” ER 9, and therefore, that no

reason for reconsideration had been presented. Id.

III. April 18, 2008 Rule 60(b) Motion and the First

Version of the Amended Motion

Winkles filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant

to Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) on April 18, 2008. He set forth

much the same argument he had advanced in his 2007 motion

for reconsideration, namely that he was denied a full

opportunity to set forth his section 2255 motion because of

his difficult confinement conditions and because he was

denied access to his trial transcripts for many months. ER

204. He also stated that he submitted an amended section

2255 motion on August 13, 2005 to “staff working the inmate

mailroom, as required by prison procedures” and that the

“envelope was sealed, and stamped by the staff, as all legal

mail is which leaves the prison.” ER 206.

Later, in his “Memorandum in Support,” Winkles stated

that the “same proposed version” as the August 2005

amended section 2255 motion was attached to his Rule 60(b)

motion. ER 211. Winkles seems to be referring to a

document called “Petitioner’s Proposed Issues Related to

§ 2255 Petition.” ER 221–57. This reconstructed version of

the purported amended section 2255 motion sets forth a

number of new bases for relief, based primarily on errors

allegedly committed by the district court and prosecution. 

Winkles also alleges additional grounds of ineffective

assistance of counsel. The document appears to be a

reconstruction of whatever Winkles purportedly filed; it has

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8 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

no date, no reference to the district court or his case number,

and no certificate of service.

On March 3, 2009, the district court denied Winkles’s

motion, again construing it as a motion for reconsideration. 

ER 3. The court once again held that Winkles had not cited

new evidence discovered in the transcripts that would support

the merits of his claims. ER 5.

Winkles appealed to this court, and we remanded to the

district court for the purpose of deciding whether to issue a

COA. No. 09-55987, Dkt. 2. The district court denied the

request for a COA, and we subsequently declined to issue one

as well. Id., Dkts. 3, 12.

IV. Winkles’s Second Rule 60(b) Motion and the

Second Version of the Amended Motion

On January 29, 2013, Winkles filed by mail a motion for

relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). ER 183–203. 

He then submitted a supplement to the motion on February

23, 2013. ER 59–64. Winkles stated once again that he had

filed an amended section 2255 motion, this time claiming that

he had submitted it on October 13, 2005, ER 185, not August

13, 2005, as he had previously contended. ER 206. He stated

that the “constitutional errors he discovered from the

withheld transcripts” were attached to his motion. ER 63. 

We construe this attachment as a different reconstructed

version of his amended section 2255 motion. See ER 186, 63.

The second version of Winkles’s amended section 2255

motion, which he attached to his most recent Rule 60(b)

motion, alleges a few additional grounds for relief, in addition

to recapitulating many of the grounds stated in the first

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 9

version of his amended motion. See ER 77–126. Once again,

it appears to be, at best, a reconstruction of what Winkles

purportedly filed in 2005. There is no date, no reference to

the district court or his case, and no certificate of service.

The district court summarily denied Winkles’s Rule 60(b)

motion by minute order on June 28, 2013. ER 2.

V. This Appeal

Winkles appealed the district court’s denial of his 2013

Rule 60(b) motion. We remanded for the district court to

determine whether a COA should issue. Dkt. 4. The district

court denied a COA. ER 1.

In a separate matter, Winkles filed a petition for a writ of

mandamus arguing that a COA was not required to appeal the

denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. No. 13-72920, Dkt. 1. A

panel of this court denied Winkles’s petition for mandamus

but directed the Clerk to file a copy of the petition in this case

“as a motion for this court to review appeal No. 13-56376

without the requirement of a certificate of appealability.” No.

13-72920, Dkt. 4.

Upon evaluation of that motion, a two-judge panel

referred the matter to this panel with directions to determine

whether Winkles’s motion was a legitimate Rule 60(b)

motion, whether a COA is required for Winkles’s appeal, and,

if so, whether one is merited in this case.2

2 The government argues that our refusal to grant a COA for the appeal

of Winkles’s 2008 Rule 60(b) motion means that the COA requirement is

law of the case. The government also contends that it is law of the case,

for the same reason, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

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10 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

ANALYSIS

The parties agree that this case involves a motion filed

pursuant to Rule 60(b), not Rule 59(e). Winkles only presses

two aspects of his Rule 60(b) motion on appeal: (1) that the

district court should have reopened the time to appeal the

denial of the original section 2255 motion and (2) that the

district court should have considered the purported amended

section 2255 motion. The government concedes that, insofar

as these are the only aspects of the motion raised on appeal,

Winkles’s motion is a “legitimate” Rule 60(b) motion. 

Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that Winkles’s Rule

60(b) motion was “legitimate.”

I. A Certificate of Appealability is Required to Appeal

the Denial of a Legitimate Rule 60(b) Motion for

Relief From Judgment Arising Out of the Denial of a

Section 2255 Motion

Winkles argues that he need not obtain a COA before

appealing the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from

judgment. He presents arguments rooted in the text of section

2253 and in recent decisions of the Supreme Court. For the

reasons elaborated below, Winkles’s arguments fail.

refusing to consider Winkles’s purported amended petition.

In light of the discretionary nature of the law of the case doctrine and

the motions panel’s decision to expressly refer the issue to this panel, we

decline to apply the law of the case doctrine and will consider the merits

of Winkles’s arguments. See United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874,

876 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that a departure from the law of the case is

appropriate where there has been an intervening change in the law or

“other changed circumstances exist”).

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 11

A. Legal Background

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) provides that “the final order

in a proceeding under section 2255” may not be appealed

unless “a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability.” The policy underlying the COA requirement

is to “prevent frivolous appeals from delaying the States’

ability to impose sentences, including death sentences.” 

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892 (1983) (analyzing the

Certificate of Probable Cause requirement under the prior

version of section 2253).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) “allows a party to

seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of

his case, under a limited set of circumstances.” Jones v.

Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gonzalez v.

Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005)). An order denying a Rule

60(b) motion is indisputably a final, appealable order. In

light of this fact and the policy just described, all circuits but

the Fifth have concluded that a COA is required to appeal an

order denying a Rule 60(b) motion in a habeas corpus

proceeding. West v. Schneiter, 485 F.3d 393, 394 (7th Cir.

2007); United States v. Hardin, 481 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir.

2007); Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir.

2006); United States v. Lambros, 404 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th

Cir. 2005); United States v. Vargas, 393 F.3d 172, 174–75

(D.C. Cir. 2004); Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th

Cir. 2004); Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d

1253, 1264–67 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc), aff’d on other

grounds sub nom. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005);

Kellogg v. Strack, 269 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2001). 

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has sharply limited the

circumstances where a COA is not required for such an

appeal. See Ochoa Canales v. Quarterman, 507 F.3d 884,

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12 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

888 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that a COA is not

required “only when the purpose of the [Rule 60(b)] motion

is to reinstate appellate jurisdiction over the original denial of

habeas relief”).3

There are two Ninth Circuit decisions relevant to the

present issue. First, we held in Lynch v. Blodgett, 999 F.2d

401 (9th Cir. 1993), that a Certificate of Probable Cause

(“CPC”), the predecessor analogue to the COA under the

former version of section 2253, was required to appeal the

denial of a Rule 60(b) motion in a section 2254 habeas corpus

proceeding. Id. at 402–03.

As for the current version of section 2253, we held

without discussion in Langford v. Day, 134 F.3d 1381 (9th

Cir. 1998), that a COA is required to appeal the denial of a

Rule 60(b) motion. Id. at 1382. The Langford court held that

it did not have to decide whether the current version of

section 2253 applied because the petitioner could not meet

the more generous standard for issuance of a CPC under the

old statute. Id. Thus, the court implicitly held that the

petitioner would have needed a COA to pursue his appeal.

B. Discussion

We structure our analysis around the bases for Winkles’s

two primary arguments in favor of his position that a COA is

not required: the text of section 2253(c) and the context

provided by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Harbison

v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009), interpreting that provision.

3

 The Third Circuit has held without analysis that a COA is required in

this context. See Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 1999).

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 13

1. Text

Winkles argues that the statutory text of section 2253

supports his contention that the COA requirement does not

apply in this context. The statute requires a COA for the

appeal of “the final order in a proceeding under section

2255.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). This

implies, Winkles argues, that Congress only intended the

COA to apply to one order per section 2255 proceeding, i.e.

the order denying the section 2255 motion.

In keeping with the reasoning of Lynch and that of many

of our sister circuits, we conclude that contrary to Winkles’s

interpretation, the text of section 2253(c)(1)(B) supports

imposing a COA requirement to appeal the denial of a Rule

60(b) motion for relief from judgment arising out of the

denial of a section 2255 motion.

Congress’s use of the word “the” in section 2253(c)(1)(B)

does not mean that the COA requirement only applies to one

order per section 2255 proceeding. Winkles’s preferred

reading runs contrary to the Dictionary Act, which states that

in “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless

the context indicates otherwise, words importing the singular

include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.” 

1 U.S.C. § 1. Because the purpose of section 2253 is in part

to “prevent frivolous cases from clogging appellate dockets,”

the context of the statute indicates that Congress’s use of the

term “the” does not signify that it intended to limit the COA

requirement to only one order per section 2255 proceeding. 

See Vargas, 393 F.3d at 174; cf. Lynch, 999 F.2d at 403

(holding that the “obvious purpose” of the predecessor

version of section 2253 was to create “discretionary appellate

review for habeas petitions filed by state prisoners”).

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14 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

Winkles’s preferred reading ofsection 2253(c) would also

be contrary to the rule of statutory construction that

“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or

judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that

interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change” or

when it “adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior

law.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978). The

earlier version of section 2253 provided that the prior

analogue to the COA, the CPC, was required to appeal “the

final order in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Reid, 369 F.3d at

368. Courts “consistently required a [CPC] when reviewing

orders denying Rule 60(b) motions in habeas actions.” Id.

When Congress elected not to change the language quoted

above in enacting the COA requirement as part of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), we

may presume that it accepted the existing judicial

interpretation of the CPC, which held that a CPC was needed

to appeal more than one order per habeas corpus proceeding,

including the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from

judgment. Id.

2. Harbison

TheSupremeCourt has interpreted section 2253(c)(1)(A),

the analogous COA provision regarding appeal of section

2254 habeas petitions, as “govern[ing] final orders that

dispose of the merits of a habeas corpus proceeding—a

proceeding challenging the lawfulness of the petitioner’s

detention.” Harbison, 556 U.S. at 183. Given that section

2255 “was intended to mirror § 2254 in operative effect,” and

that the language used in sections 2253(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)

is functionally identical, we may apply Harbison’s reasoning

to Winkles’s section 2255 motion. See Jones, 733 F.3d at

830 n.1 (quoting Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353 (1994)).

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 15

The Court ruled in Harbison that a COA is not required

to appeal the denial of a motion to enlarge federallyappointed

counsel’s authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3599. 556 U.S. at

182–83. The case involved attorneys appointed by a federal

district court to represent a petitioner seeking federal habeas

relief. After the habeas petition was denied, the attorneys

moved the district court to expand their representation to

include state clemency proceedings. Id. The motion was

denied as seeking relief beyond the scope of section 3599. Id.

Winkles asks us to take a substantial step beyond

Harbison and conclude that the COA requirement does not

apply to an appeal of a “legitimate” Rule 60(b) motion for

relief from judgment following the denial of a section 2255

motion. The Supreme Court held in Gonzalez that a

“legitimate” Rule 60(b) motion in the habeas context is one

that “attacks ‘some defect in the integrity of the federal

habeas proceedings.’” United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d

1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at

532). This is in contrast to a Rule 60(b) motion that advances

a “claim,” i.e. “an asserted federal basis for relief from a state

court’s judgment of conviction.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530. 

The latter type of Rule 60(b) motion is treated as a second or

successive habeas petition, and it must meet the stringent

requirements for the filing of second or successive petitions. 

Id. Although Gonzalez was limited to section 2254 actions,

we apply the case’s holding to section 2255 motions as well. 

United States v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 722 (9th Cir.

2011) (per curiam).

The government concedes that Winkles’s motion is a

“legitimate” Rule 60(b) motion as to the portions raised on

appeal. In light of this concession, we consider Winkles’s

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16 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

three step argument rooted in the Supreme Court’s decisions

in Harbison and Gonzalez:

(1) A legitimate Rule 60(b) motion necessarily does not

relate to the substantive claims made in an underlying

section 2255 motion.

(2) The COA requirement only applies to orders that

dispose of the merits in a section 2255 proceeding.

(3) Therefore, a COA is not required to appeal an order

denying a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion.

In light of Harbison and Gonzalez, we have twice

expressed an interest over the last few years in scrutinizing

the COA requirement with respect to Rule 60(b) motions. 

See Washington, 653 F.3d at 1065 n.8 (stating in dicta that the

question of whether a COA is required to appeal the denial of

a “legitimate Rule 60(b)(4) motion” is “open in our circuit”);

Jones, 733 F.3d at 832 n.3 (observing in dicta that if the

petitioner were “appealing the denial or dismissal of a valid

Rule 60(b) motion, he may have had no need for a COA”). 

A Third Circuit panel recentlymade similar musings in dicta. 

See Wilson v. Sec’y Penn. Dep’t of Corr., 782 F.3d 110, 115

(3d Cir. 2015).

We conclude that the reasoning of Harbison does not

indicate that an appeal from a Rule 60(b) motion for relief

from judgment in this context is exempt from the COA

requirement. It is anomalous to read the Court as having

overturned the statutory construction of every other circuit

court of appeals without recognition of having done so or

reasoning justifying the act. Such a reading is stranger still in

light of the fact that in the Court’s only direct statement about

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 17

the issue, it declined to reject the prevailing interpretation of

the circuits that the COA requirement applies in this situation. 

See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 n.7 (declining to decide if a

COA was required to appeal the denial of a Rule 60(b)

motion but observing that “the COA requirement appears to

be a more plausible and effective screening requirement, with

sounder basis in the statute, than the near-absolute bar

imposed here by the Court of Appeals”).

Furthermore, the matter before the Court in Harbison, an

order on a motion to enlarge the authority of appointed

counsel, was wholly distinct from the habeas petition in that

case. Put simply, the order in Harbison did not pertain to the

district court’s adjudication of the habeas petition. For

example, an order setting the authority of appointed counsel

does not touch on the merits of the habeas petition nor

consider any alleged defects in the integrity of the

proceedings arising out of the district court’s adjudication of

the petition.

Those courts that have extended Harbison to the appeal

of other types of orders in habeas proceedings have done so

when the order had similarly little to do with the adjudication

of the habeas petition. In Lambright v. Ryan, 698 F.3d 808

(9th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Fulton, 780 F.3d 683 (5th

Cir. 2015), we and the Fifth Circuit cited Harbison in

holding, respectively, that a COA is not required to appeal an

order modifying a protective order in a habeas corpus

proceeding or an order transferring a section 2255 motion. 

Lambright, 698 F.3d at 817 n.2; Fulton, 780 F.3d at 687–88. 

By contrast, a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion for relief from

judgment arising out of the denial of a section 2255 motion

pertains to the district court’s adjudication of the section 2255

motion.

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18 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

C. Conclusion

We conclude—in keeping with the Supreme Court’s

holding in Harbison, the text of section 2253(c), and the

policy underlying the statute—that a COA is required to

appeal the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from

judgment arising out of the denial of a section 2255 motion.

II. Standard for Issuance of a Certificate of Appealability

Our last statement about the standard to be applied for

issuance of a COA in this context came in Lynch, where we

considered the standard for issuance of a CPC. We held that

a CPC should only issue upon a “substantial showing that the

district court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 60(b)

motion.” Lynch, 999 F.2d at 403 (quoting Lindsey v.

Thigpen, 875 F.2d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir. 1989)). We have

not yet determined the standard that should be applied to the

COA requirement under the current section 2253 and its

requirement that a COA only issue upon “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2).

Courts of appeals that have articulated standards for

issuance of a COA in this context have generally drawn from

the Supreme Court’s decision in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473 (2000). United States v. Arrington, 763 F.3d 17, 23

(D.C. Cir. 2014); Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1225; Reid, 369 F.3d

at 371; Gonzalez, 366 F.3d at 1267. In Slack, the Court

determined the standard governing issuance of a COA when

the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural

grounds. The Court articulated a two part standard:

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 19

When the district court denies a habeas

petition on procedural grounds without

reaching the prisoner’s underlying

constitutional claim, a COA should issue

when the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that

jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right and [2] that

jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling.

Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.4 The Court held that this test “gives

meaning to Congress’s requirement that a prisoner

demonstrate substantial underlying constitutional claims and

is in conformity with the meaning of the ‘substantial

showing’ standard provided in Barefoot . . . and adopted by

Congress in AEDPA.” Id. The substantial showing standard

is met when “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the

petition should have been resolved in a different manner or

that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Id. at 484 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Similarly, we hold that a COA should only issue for the

appeal arising from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion in a

section 2255 proceeding if the movant shows that (1) jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

4 Because section 2253(c)(2) imposes the same standard for issuance of

a COA in both section 2254 and 2255 proceedings, cases stating the COA

standard in section 2254 habeas proceedings are fully applicable to section

2255 proceedings. See United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.4

(9th Cir. 2000).

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20 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion and

(2) jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

underlying section 2255 motion states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right. In so holding, we adopt the

test set forth by the Second Circuit in Kellogg. 269 F.3d at

104.

This test is appropriate because it accords with the

Supreme Court’s test in Slack while incorporating the

standard of review applicable to Rule 60(b) motions. The test

for issuance of a COA is basically an initial peek at how the

appeal would proceed, based on the standard of review that a

court of appeals will ultimately apply. For example, the

dismissal of a habeas petition is subject to de novo review. 

Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir.

2011). Therefore, the COA standard is based on a de novo

evaluation of the district court’s order. See Slack, 529 U.S.

at 484.

In order to maintain continuity with this approach, the

COA test for appeal of the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion

should coincide with the standard of review the court will

apply during the appeal. Here, that standard of review is

abuse of discretion. See Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 608

(9th Cir. 2012). The standard we adopt today is also in

keeping with our approach to CPCs in the Rule 60(b) context

under pre-AEDPA law. Lynch, 999 F.2d at 403 (holding that

a CPC should issue only if the petitioner “has made a

substantial showing that the district court abused its

discretion by denying the Rule 60(b) motion”) (citation

omitted).

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 21

III. Winkles is Not Entitled to a Certificate of

Appealability

Winkles only presses two aspects of his Rule 60(b)

motion on appeal: (1) that the district court should have

reopened the time to appeal its denial of his original section

2255 motion and (2) that it should have considered his

purported amended section 2255 motion. We conclude that

Winkles has not made a substantial showing that the district

court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b) motion

as to these issues. Because both prongs of the COA standard

must be satisfied and he has failed to meet one of them,

Winkles is not entitled to a COA.

A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

By Refusing to Reopen the Time for Appeal

Winkles argues that the district court should have

reopened the time to appeal the denial of his original section

2255 motion.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) governs a

district court’s authority to reopen the time to file an appeal. 

It states that a district court may reopen the time to file an

appeal for 14 days if all of the following conditions are met:

(A) the court finds that the moving party

did not receive notice under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the

entry of judgment or order sought to

be appealed within 21 days after entry;

(B) the motion is filed within 180 days

after the judgment or order is entered

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22 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

or within 14 days after the moving

party receives notice under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the

entry, whichever is earlier; and

(C) the court finds that no party would be

prejudiced.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

This rule interacts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

77(d), which states that the clerk must serve notice of the

entry of an order or judgment on each party who is not in

default for failure to appear. Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d)(1). The

rule provides that “[l]ack of notice of the entry does not affect

the time for appeal or relieve—or authorize the court to

relieve—a party for failing to appeal within the time allowed,

except as allowed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

(4)(a).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d)(2).

Winkles concedes that he did not meet the 180 day outer

limit stated in part (B) above and, therefore, cannot receive

relief pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). He argues, instead,

that the district court should have used its equitable powers

under Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the prior judgment and reenter

it, thus restarting the clock on his time to appeal. See 16A

Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 3950.6 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing this mechanism as a

“onetime practice” of district courts). He roots his argument

in the injustice arising from the district court’s failure to

notify him of the denial of his section 2255 motion. The

government concedes Winkles was not served with the

court’s order in a timely fashion.

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 23

We have repudiated, however, the practice of vacating

and reentering judgments to reopen the time for appeal as a

remedy for lack of notice. We held in In re Stein, 197 F.3d

421 (9th Cir. 1999), that “Rule 4(a) and Rule 77(d) now form

a tessellated scheme; they leave no gaps for Rule 60(b) to

fill.” Id. at 426. The Stein court concluded that Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a)(6) sets an “outer limit” on the time to appeal;

“[a]llowing further extensions or tampering with those time

limits for conferring appellate jurisdiction upon us, based

solely on notice problems, . . . would undermine (or even

eliminate) the very purpose and need for the rule itself.” Id.

at 425. The court approvingly quoted an Eighth Circuit case

stating that these rules “preclude[] the use of Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(6) to cure problems of lack of notice.” Id. (quoting

Zimmer St. Louis, Inc. v. Zimmer Co., 32 F.3d 357, 360–61

(8th Cir. 1994)).

We have noted an exception to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)’s

limit on a district court’s authority to reopen the time for

appeal. See Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.

2012). In Mackey, a habeas petitioner moved the district

court to reopen the time for appeal. Id. at 1250. He argued

that he had not received notice of the denial of his petition

because his attorney ceased representing him but did not

withdraw as attorney of record. Id. at 1253. Therefore,

“Mackey was deprived of the opportunity to proceed pro se

and to personallyreceive docket notifications from the court.” 

Id.

The Mackey court held that a district court had discretion

in that instance to vacate and reenter a judgment pursuant to

Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen the time for appeal because the

petitioner was not seeking to “cure a Rule 77(d) ‘lack of

notice’ problem.” Id. at 1252, 1254. Instead, he was seeking

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24 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

to cure a problem “caused by his being misled and abandoned

by his counsel of record.” Id. at 1252. Thus, he was not

receiving relief pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). Id. at

1253.

Winkles argues that we should further expand Mackey to

cover his situation. He distinguishes In re Stein on its facts

because that case involved sophisticated attorney litigants. 

ARB 20.

Winkles’s argument is unpersuasive because it ignores the

fact that Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) expressly contemplates a

litigant like himself who did not receive notice of an order as

required by Rule 77(d). See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). Indeed,

other courts of appeals have construed Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(6)’s 180 day time limit to be mandatory in very similar

factual situations. See In re Sealed Case (Bowles), 624 F.3d

482, 488–89 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding Rule 4(a)(6) to be

binding despite the fact that the case was sealed, making it

impossible for the appellant to independently check the

docket); Clark v. Lavallie, 204 F.3d 1038, 1040–41 (10th Cir.

2000) (holding that an unrepresented federal prisoner was not

entitled to Rule 60(b) relief to reopen the time for appeal for

lack of notice because the “essence of Rule 4(a)(6) is finality

of judgment” and its 180 day limit is “specific and

unequivocal”).

These cases are in keeping with the implications of

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007). There, the Supreme

Court held that the statutory time limit for taking an appeal is

jurisdictional. Id. at 213. Because meeting the deadline to

appeal is jurisdictional, courts do not have authority to create

“equitable exceptions” to it. Id. at 214. Thus, a motion to

reopen the time to appeal because of a lack of notice may not

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 25

be granted by way of an “equitable exception” through Rule

60(b).

Jurists of reason would not find it debatable that the

district court abused its discretion by denying this aspect of

his Rule 60(b) motion.

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

By Refusing to Consider Winkles’s Amended

Section 2255 Motion

Winkles also argues that the district court abused its

discretion by failing to deem his purported amended section

2255 motion filed as of August 2005 and refusing to consider

the claims raised therein. Jurists of reason would not find it

debatable that the district court abused its discretion on this

basis because Winkles failed to file his purported amended

section 2255 motion prior to the district court ruling on his

initial section 2255 motion.

1. Legal standard

Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings

governs the filing procedure for Winkles’s amended section

2255 motion. That rule was made effective December 1,

2004, and Winkles’s amended motion was allegedly filed in

August 2005. Rule 3(d) codifies the prison mailbox rule,

which states that a motion or other paper submitted by a

prisoner is deemed filed as of the date he submits it to prison

authorities for mailing if certain conditions are met. See

Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001). We

have held, under the common law prison mailbox rule, that an

inmate bears the initial burden of alleging timely filing. 

Caldwell v. Amend, 30 F.3d 1199, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 1994).

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26 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

Rule 3(d) provides:

A paper filed by an inmate confined in an

institution is timely if deposited in the

institution’s internal mailing system on or

before the last day for filing. If an institution

has a system designed for legal mail, the

inmate must use that system to receive the

benefit of this rule. Timely filing may be

shown by a declaration in compliance with 28

U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement,

either of which must set forth the date of

deposit and state that first-class postage has

been prepaid.

Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, R. 3, 28 U.S.C. foll.

§ 2255. 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2) states that a sworn declaration

executed in the United States may be evidenced by a

document subscribed to by the declarant and containing

substantially the following: “I declare (or certify, verify, or

state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and

correct. Executed on (date).”

We have not authoritatively construed the requirements

of Rule 3. However, we have interpreted Fed. R. App. P.

4(c)(1), substantially identical to Rule 3(d), to generally

require a “declaration or notarized statement” to prove timely

filing. Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir.

2009). The Douglas court held, however, that such a filing

was unnecessary in that case because the prison’s records

showed the inmate’s complaint as having been mailed on the

purported date of filing. Id.

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 27

Thus, Douglas indicates that at a minimum, an inmate

must file a sworn declaration or notarized statement as set

forth in the rule to meet the initial burden of proving timely

filing unless more probative evidence, such as the prison mail

log, is available. Consistent with the text of the rule, a sworn

declaration or notarized statement in support of timely filing

under Rule 3 must (1) include a statement indicating in some

fashion that postage was prepaid and (2) include the date the

filing was submitted to prison officials. Courts have strictly

construed the substantially identical text of Fed. R. App. P.

4(c) as requiring that both of these statements be included in

the declaration or notarized statement to comply with the

rule. Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands,

705 F.3d 80, 84 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013); Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d

1158, 1166 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Craig, 368 F.3d

738, 740 (7th Cir. 2004).

Winkles contends that Rule 3’s use of the word “may”

means these provisions are only suggestions. To adopt this

interpretation, however, would render this portion of the rule

mere surplusage. Such an interpretation would be contrary to

the “cardinal” canon of statutory construction that courts

must interpret statutes so that “no clause, sentence, or word

shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” See United

States v. Ceballos-Martinez, 387 F.3d 1140, 1144–45 (10th

Cir. 2004) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174

(2001)).

Indeed, reading these statements as superfluous would

remove from the rule provisions that have evident value as a

matter of policy. For example, requiring an inmate to swear

to the date he gave his filing to prison officials for mailing

functions as a screening mechanism on false claims of timely

mailing. It also creates a more readily confirmed or rebutted

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28 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

evidentiary record. The postage requirement also has value

because, as one court reasoned, “mail bearing a stamp gets

going, but an unstamped document may linger.” Craig,

368 F.3d at 740.

2. Application

As a threshold matter, we observe that there is little

evidence of the amended motion’s contents, or even its

existence. A copy of the amended section 2255 motion

appears never to have reached the district court and it is not

before us either. As counsel conceded at oral argument, the

two purported amended motions in the record are mere

reconstructions of whatever Winkles claims he filed in 2005. 

Even if a reconstruction might be permissible in a different

circumstance, the two purported amended motions before us

are of dubious value, setting forth different claims and

appearing on their face to have been separately created.

It is with this woefully inadequate record in mind that we

now consider Winkles’s evidence of timely filing by mail. 

Winkles has not submitted evidence of the prison’s mail logs

or other more probative evidence of mailing. Therefore, he

was required to submit a sworn declaration or notarized

statement in support of timely filing.

There are two sworn declarations in the record that

discuss the filing of the amended section 2255 motion and

meet the requirements of section 1746. First, a fellow inmate

named Frank Gabaldon executed a sworn declaration on

December 1, 2007. GER 29. Gabaldon states that the

amended motion was given to the mail room guard “between

August and September 2005” and that Gabaldon allowed

Winkles to “borrow several stamps to place on both

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UNITED STATES V. WINKLES 29

envelopes.” Id. Second, Winkles executed a sworn

declaration on October 3, 2007. ER 12. In it, Winkles states

only that he “placed [his] motion to amend [his] 2255 motion

into the hands of correctional officers as required by prison

mail rules.” Id. The declaration says nothing about the date

this occurred, calling into question his unsworn

representations of mailing on August 13, 2005, ER 206, or

October 13, 2005, ER 185. Thus, Gabaldon’s declaration is

the only one in the record that is remotely responsive to Rule

3(d)’s requirements.

These declarations and the evidentiary record before the

district court show that jurists of reason would not find it

debatable that the district court abused its discretion by

refusing to consider the purported amended section 2255

motion. Here, the district court had before it conflicting

evidence of the contents of the filing allegedly made,

inconsistent representations by Winkles about the date of

mailing, and no sworn declaration from Winkles himself as

to the date of mailing. Although Gabaldon’s declaration

vaguely refers to Winkles having deposited his amended

motion with prison officials in “August or September 2005,”

this declaration is insufficient in the context of the record

before the district court to lead us to view the district court’s

decision not to credit the claimed date of filing as an abuse of

discretion.

We conclude that Winkles has failed to make a substantial

showing that the district court abused its discretion by

refusing to consider his purported amended motion. 

Whatever the effectiveness of Gabaldon’s declaration as to

the date of deposit with prison officials in a vacuum, the

circumstances presented to the district court were such that it

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30 UNITED STATES V. WINKLES

was no abuse of discretion to conclude that Winkles had

failed to comply with Rule 3(d).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a COA is required

to appeal the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from

judgment arising out of the denial of a section 2255 motion. 

Winkles is not entitled to a COA. The request for a COA is

denied, and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Certificate of Appealability DENIED. Appeal

DISMISSED.

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