Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00697/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00697-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sandra Beckwith
Plaintiff
Mary Kristina Bishop
Plaintiff
Board of Trustees of Lassen Community College District
Defendant
Bernadette Chavez
Plaintiff
Homer Cissell
Defendant
Marshel Couso
Plaintiff
Karen Grosz
Plaintiff
Lassen Community College District
Defendant
Katherine Leao
Plaintiff
Toni Poulsen
Plaintiff
Vicki Ramsey
Plaintiff
Denise Stevenson
Plaintiff

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1 The District moved for dismissal only on its own behalf

(Docket #24). However, in its previous motion to dismiss (Docket

#9) the District also moved on behalf of defendant Board of

Trustees of Lassen Community College District (the “Board”), who

is also represented by the District’s counsel. In light of the

previous motion, the court assumes the District intended to file

the instant motions also on the Board’s behalf. As such, the

court construes the pending motions as brought on behalf of the

District and the Board.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KAREN GROSZ, BERNADETTE

CHAVEZ, VICKI RAMSEY, MARY

KRISTINA BISHOP, SANDRA

BECKWITH, TONI POULSEN,

MARSHEL COUSO, KATHERINE LEAO,

and DENISE STEVENSON;

NO. 2:07-cv-0697 FCD/CMK

PlaintiffS,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASSEN COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DISTRICT, HOMER CISSELL, BOARD

OF TRUSTEES OF LASSEN

COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT;

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

 This matter comes before the court on (1) defendants Lassen

Community College District’s (“District”)1 and Homer Cissell’s

/////

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2 Defendants each filed separate motions. (Docket #s 24,

27). The motions raise nearly identical issues and therefore the

court considers them jointly.

3 In the complaint, plaintiff is alternately referred to

as “Marshel Couso” and “Marshel Pouso.” For consistency, the

court adopts “Couso” throughout this order.

4 Said complaint alleges the following claims for relief:

(1) violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983"); (2) violation of rights

guaranteed by the First Amendment pursuant to Section 1983; 

(3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) violation

of the Brown Act; (5) violation of rights guaranteed by the

California Constitution; (6) hostile work environment in

violation of Cal. Gov. Code. § 12900 et seq. (“Section 12900");

(7) wrongful termination in violation of Section 12900; and 

(8) retaliation. 

5 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

2

(“Cissell”) (collectively, “defendants”) motions to dismiss2

plaintiffs Karen Grosz, Bernadette Chavez, Vicki Ramsey, Mary

Kristina Bishop, Sandra Beckwith, Toni Poulsen, Marshel Couso3,

Katherine Leao, and Denise Stevenson’s (collectively,

“plaintiffs”) second amended complaint (“SAC”)4, pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,5 and 

(2) defendant District’s motion to strike plaintiffs’ request for

punitive and liquidated damages (Docket #26). Plaintiffs oppose

the motions, filing a consolidated opposition (Docket #30). 

Because the court, yet again, concludes that the complaint

lacks the necessary information to place defendants on proper

notice of the claims against them and to give them adequate

ability to respond as required by Rule 8(a), it does not reach

the merits of defendants’ motions to dismiss and motion to

strike. Like the first amended complaint, “[w]hile the [SAC] is

fraught with conclusory statements of the law and sweeping

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6 The facts of this case are taken from plaintiffs’

allegations in the SAC, filed September 6, 2007. The court notes

plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on November 12, 2007,

as an exhibit to their opposition. However, plaintiffs have not

been granted leave to amend, and the court will not consider the

proffered third amended complaint at this time. 

3

allegations of discrimination and general misconduct, it lacks

the necessary information to render the complaint a ‘short and

plain statement of the claim[s]’ as required by Rule 8(a).” 

(Mem. and Order, filed August 17, 2007). Accordingly,

plaintiffs’ SAC must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 8(a). 

BACKGROUND6

On April 26, 2007, plaintiffs filed a first amended

complaint, as of right, against defendants. In response to

defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court ruled that

plaintiffs’ first amended complaint failed to meet the

requirements of Rule 8(a), and it therefore dismissed the

complaint but granted plaintiffs leave to amend. In so ruling,

the court cautioned plaintiffs that it was “particularly troubled

by the complaint’s surprising dearth of information” and ordered

plaintiffs to supplement their complaint with all pertinent

information to allow defendants to properly and fully answer it. 

(Mem. and Order, filed Aug. 17, 2007). 

Plaintiffs filed their SAC on September 6, 2007. Like the

first amended complaint, plaintiffs sweepingly allege they

suffered retaliation, discrimination in employment, emotional

distress and interference with their professional positions as

the result of acts by the District and Cissell. (SAC at 2). 

However, despite 24 pages of text plaintiffs’ SAC still lacks the

necessary information to render the complaint a “short and plain

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7 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Liebowitz v. Cornell

University, 455 F.3d 586 (2d Cir. 2006) to argue that the court

should adopt a relaxed pleading standard for employment

discrimination claims is inappropriate. (Opp’n, filed Nov. 12,

2007, at 6-7). The Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic

abrogated the Second Circuit’s decision and is binding on this

court. 

4

statement of the claim[s]” required by Rule 8(a), leaving the

court no choice but to again dismiss the complaint in its

entirety. 

STANDARD

The United States Supreme Court recently held, in evaluating

the federal pleading standards, that “without some factual

allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant

could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’

of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim

rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965

n.3 (2007). The Court emphasized that “[a] plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do. . . .” Id. at 1964-65.7 Aptly, the Seventh Circuit,

also elaborating on the federal pleading standards and

particularly Rule 8(a)’s short and plain statement requirement,

noted the following:

Rule 8(a) requires parties to make their pleadings

straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties

need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.

Federal judges have better things to do, and the

substantial subsidy of litigation (court costs do not

begin to cover the expense of the judiciary) should be

targeted on those litigants who take the preliminary

steps to assemble a comprehensible claim.

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5

U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378

(7th Cir. 2003).

Thus, Rule 8(a) does not permit plaintiffs to file a

complaint premised solely on generalized allegations of

discrimination in order to justify a fishing expedition into

potential violations by defendants. While plaintiffs are not

required to plead detailed facts, they must plead some facts. 

See DM Research Inc. v. College of American Pathologists, 170

F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating the complaint need not

provide evidentiary detail, however “the price of entry, even to

discovery, is for plaintiff to allege a factual predicate

concrete enough to warrant further proceedings, which may be

costly and burdensome. Conclusory allegations in a complaint, if

they stand alone, are a danger sign that the plaintiff is engaged

in a fishing expedition.”). As recognized repeatedly by the

Ninth Circuit, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

ANALYSIS 

Preliminarily, the court notes that plaintiffs attached and

referenced throughout their opposition, a “third amended

complaint” which they maintain satisfies the court’s concerns in

its August 17, 2007 order and survives defendants’ instant

motions. (Opp’n at 5). However, plaintiffs have not been

granted leave to file this complaint, and the court interprets

plaintiffs’ reliance on this pleading as a concession that the

SAC, the operable pleading in this case, still does not remedy

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8 Plaintiff Couso has stipulated to dismiss defendants

Lassen Community College District (Docket # 28) and Homer Cissell

(Docket # 23). Couso is apparently continuing to pursue claims

against the Board. 

6

the deficiencies of plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. On that

basis alone, the court could dismiss the SAC pursuant to this

court’s prior order and Rule 8(a). Nevertheless, because the

court allows plaintiffs one final opportunity to amend their

complaint, it provides below an overview of the major

deficiencies that plague the SAC. 

A. Factual Allegations

As a general matter, plaintiffs’ SAC lacks basic information

about the individual plaintiffs, including their positions with

the District, their duties, and dates of employment. Moreover,

plaintiffs’ complaint completely lacks any discussion whatsoever

of any facts pertaining to plaintiff Couso.8 Nor is there any

mention of facts demonstrating plaintiffs timely complied with

either the requirements of the EEOC or DFEH with respect to

plaintiffs’ claims for harassment and retaliation. For a court

to hear a Title VII claim, an aggrieved employee must (1) file a

charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the

alleged acts of discrimination and (2) timely institute a lawsuit

within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter. See

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). 

Similarly, for the court to hear a FEHA claim, an employee must

file suit within one year of the date of the DFEH’s right-to sue

notice. Cal. Gov. Code § 12965(b). Without this information,

defendants have no way in which to determine whether certain of

plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. 

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Beyond these general observations, the facts alleged

specifically relating to individual plaintiffs are similarly

insufficient. For example, with respect to plaintiff Karen

Grosz, the SAC fails to allege facts regarding how or when Grosz

was “publically humiliated” by Cissell and why it was without

“justification.” (SAC ¶ 33). Plaintiffs’ complaint further

fails to allege the circumstances under which Grosz was allegedly

slandered by Cissell. (Id. ¶ 38). While Grosz alleges she was

“terminated without cause,” the complaint fails to allege any

facts to support this conclusory allegation. Moreover, Grosz

does not allege any underlying factual predicate to support her

claim she was “retaliated against because of her association with

other female employees.” (Id. ¶ 41).

The facts alleged with respect to plaintiff Bernadette

Chavez are similarly deficient. The SAC fails to allege facts in

support of Chavez’s blanket allegation Cissell professionally and

publically slandered her. (Id. ¶ 44). Nor does the complaint

provide facts to support Chavez’s allegation she was removed from

her position as student government advisor “without cause.” (Id.

¶ 48). 

The allegations of plaintiff Vicki Ramsey also do not

provide a sufficient basis for her claims. While Ramsey claims

she received “less than equivalent pay,” the complaint fails to

provide a basis for this allegation. (Id. ¶ 50). The complaint

further fails to connect the repeated “harassment” Ramsey was

allegedly subject to by the Director of Human Resources to any

cause of action against the named defendants. (Id. ¶ 54). 

Moreover, the complaint fails to discuss any of the circumstances

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surrounding alleged threats of “termination or reassignment” that

constitute the purported retaliation against her by defendants. 

(Id. ¶ 55).

Similarly, while plaintiff Toni Poulson makes vague

allegations of being falsely imprisoned and harassed by a “male

coach,” the complaint lacks details regarding whether Poulson

notified Cissell, or whether Cissell knew of the incident. (Id.

¶ 62). 

The allegations by plaintiff Mary Bishop fail to discuss the

circumstances under which she filed complaints against defendants

and who denied her due process in “requiring her to arbitrate her

claims without notice.” (Id. ¶¶ 66, 69). Moreover, the

complaint fails to provide any basis in support of her allegation

of retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 71).

The allegations of plaintiff Denise Stevenson do not discuss

how, by whom, and in what manner, she was unfairly “criticized.” 

(Id. ¶ 72). Moreover, there is no discussion of how this

criticism gives rise to any claim for relief. Similarly, that

Stevenson’s husband was allegedly demoted is not a cause of

action Stevenson can bring. (Id. ¶ 73). Finally, Stevenson

fails to allege any facts in support of her allegation she was

retaliated against. (Id. ¶ 74). 

The allegations of plaintiff Katherine Leao fail to provide

the basis for her termination, and the manner in which she was

“denied accommodation for her temporary disability.” (Id. ¶¶ 75,

76). Leao further fails to provide necessary details regarding

complaints she filed against “the District and the defendants.” 

(Id. ¶ 79). Vital information includes general dates of the

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complaints and the organization to which Leao submitted the

complaints. 

Finally, the assertions of plaintiff Sandra Beckwith fail to

connect her vague allegations of harassment by a male instructor

to any cause of action against the named defendants. Moreover,

Beckwith has not alleged any facts regarding the manner in which

she was “publicly reprimanded” by Cissell and how this

constitutes a claim for relief. (Id. ¶ 80). 

In summary, plaintiffs’ SAC is fraught with conclusory

statements and sweeping allegations against defendants. The

allegations set forth by each and every plaintiff lack

rudimentary facts pertaining to their claims for relief. Without

this information, defendants cannot be expected to properly and

accurately answer plaintiffs’ allegations. 

B. Claims for Relief

Generally, while plaintiffs’ SAC purports to bring the eight

claims for relief on behalf of all nine plaintiffs, the facts

alleged in the SAC do not provide a basis for each of these

claims by each plaintiff. For instance, the SAC alleges a claim

for wrongful termination on behalf of all plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶

137, 140-142) However, only two plaintiffs actually allege they

were terminated from their employment. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 75). 

Similarly, seven of the nine plaintiffs allege a claim for

retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 46, 55, 63, 71, 73, 79) Nonetheless,

only two plaintiffs have alleged any facts showing they suffered

adverse employment actions. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 79) Thus, although each

of plaintiffs’ factual allegations are restated and realleged in 

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9 Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721

(2003), cited by plaintiffs, is clearly inapplicable. In that

case, the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment immunity of

public agencies was abrogated only in respect to the Family and

Medical Leave Act. (Id. at 721). 

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the eight claims for relief, it is clear many of the allegations

are not remotely applicable to specific claims. 

In addition, plaintiffs’ SAC fails simply ignores applicable

statutory and case law. For example, plaintiffs’ first claim for

relief for “violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment” fails to consider that certain defendants are likely

immune from prosecution under the Eleventh Amendment. While

plaintiffs baldly state in their opposition that Congress has

“waived the states’ right to Eleventh Amendment Immunity [sic],”

plaintiffs fail to cite any case law in support of this

proposition.9

 Furthermore, a review of the relevant case law

suggests otherwise. Community college districts are state

entities entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Cerrato v.

San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.

1994); Belanger v. Madera Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251

(9th Cir. 1992); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist.,

861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Moreover, an employee of a community college district is

also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal civil

rights actions when sued in his official capacity. See Mitchell,

861 F.2d at 201 (finding that plaintiffs’ complaint relating to

actions by defendants in their official capacities, acting within

the course and scope of their employment, shared the district’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2 (“a

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public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act

or omission of an employee of the public entity where the

employee is immune from liability.”). While plaintiffs attempt 

to argue it is “irrelevant” whether Cissell is sued in his

official capacity or personal capacity, this is not clear from

the case law cited by plaintiffs. (Opp’n at 2-3). Not only are

plaintiffs’ cited authorities not controlling on this court, the

Oregon case relied on by plaintiffs is wholly dissimilar from the

present situation. For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs’

complaint here is anything but “abundantly clear in alleging loss

caused by defendants’ individual conduct.” (Opp’n at 2 (citing

Cristobal Lumbrearas, Freemont Forest Systems, Inc. v. Roberts,

319 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1203 (D. Or. 2004) (emphasis added)). 

Additionally, with respect to plaintiffs’ third claim for

relief, plaintiffs fail to plead a statutory violation as

required to establish liability against a public entity and its

employees for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cal.

Gov. Code § 815. Plaintiffs’ SAC further fails to assert facts

sufficient to allege a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. While plaintiffs broadly claim Cissell’s

conduct was outrageous, plaintiffs fail to present any facts

suggesting (1) defendants’ conduct was intentional, or with

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional

distress; (2) that plaintiffs suffered severe or extreme

emotional distress; and (3) that defendants’ outrageous conduct

was the actual or proximate cause of such distress. See Simo v.

Union of Needletrades, Inds. & Textile Employees, Southwest, 322

F.3d 602, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (enumerating elements of

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10 The vague and sporadic references to the EEOC in

plaintiffs’ SAC are not enough to construe plaintiffs’ claims as

brought under Title VII. 

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intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). 

Plaintiffs’ fourth claim for violations of California’s

Brown Act similarly does not allege sufficient facts to state a

proper claim. To state a claim for a violation of the Brown Act,

plaintiffs must plead facts showing that the Brown Act was

violated, and that plaintiffs made a timely demand to cure the

violations. Cal. Gov. Code § 54960.1(b) (applying to the local

agency to cure the deficiency is a prerequisite to filing suit

under the Brown Act). Moreover, section 3509 of the Brown Act

gives the Public Employment Relations Board exclusive

jurisdiction over alleged violations of the Act. See Coachella

Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public

Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal. 4th 1072, 1077 (2005). Such

administrative remedies must be exhausted before plaintiffs may

pursue judicial remedies. See id. at 1080. While “[f]ailure to

exhaust administrative remedies is excused if it is clear that

exhaustion would be futile,” plaintiffs complaint does not allege

futility. Id.

As yet a further example, plaintiffs’ eighth claim for

retaliation does not plead a statutory violation as required by

Cal. Gov. Code § 815.10 In failing to identify the statutory

violation, whether Title VII or FEHA, plaintiffs prevent

defendants from making any meaningful response to this claim. 

Furthermore, plaintiffs fail to state a prima facie case of

retaliation under either Title VII or FEHA. At a minimum,

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plaintiffs must show (1) that they engaged in a protected

activity, (2) the employer subjected plaintiffs to an adverse

employment action and (3) a causal link exists between the

protected activity and the employer’s action. See Yanowitz v.

L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1044 (2005). 

In large part, plaintiffs’ substantive claims for relief

fail in a variety of material respects under relevant and binding

statutory and case law. As such, plaintiffs’ SAC necessarily

fails to satisfy the basic and threshold requirements of Rule

8(a). 

C. Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be freely

given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be

granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). 

While the court has noted a host of problems inherent in

plaintiffs’ SAC, the court is not yet convinced amendment would

be futile. See Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214

(1988). “[A]mendment is futile only if no set of facts can be

proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute

a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Id.; see Johnson v.

Am. Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1987). As such, 

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11 The court is cognizant of the efforts by defendants in

digesting plaintiffs’ complaints and filing substantive motions

under Rule 12(b). However, the court simply does not find the

SAC to meet the threshold requirements of Rule 8(a), and the

complaint therefore must be dismissed under that Rule. 

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plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their complaint one final

time.11 Plaintiffs are cautioned that in light of this case’s

history, the court will not permit any future opportunities to

amend. Plaintiffs have had abundant time to set forth their

claims in a cogent manner. 

CONCLUSION

To permit plaintiffs to “hide the ball” by not providing

vital facts would read the “fair notice” requirement out of Rule

8(a) and would seriously undermine the rule’s goal of encouraging

expeditious resolution of disputes. Therefore, for the foregoing

reasons the court again dismisses plaintiffs’ complaint under

Rule 8(a). 

Plaintiffs shall file and serve a third amended complaint

within twenty (20) days of the date of this order, which complies

with Rule 8(a). Plaintiffs shall supplement their complaint with

the necessary information to allow defendants to properly and

fully answer it. The court notes that the discussion above is

not an exhaustive list of the deficiencies of plaintiffs’ SAC. 

Nonetheless, plaintiffs should seriously consider the court’s

remarks and make all necessary modifications to the draft of

their third amended complaint submitted to the court on 

November 12, 2007. Plaintiffs will not be given another

opportunity to amend their complaint. 

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Defendants shall file their responses to the third amended

complaint within thirty (30) days of service thereof. 

Defendants’ pending motions to dismiss are VACATED as MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 11, 2007.

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