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Parties Involved:
William Fuller III
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued July 7, 2016

Decided August 29, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐1328

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM FULLER III,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 4:15‐CR‐40044‐SMY

Staci M. Yandle,

Judge.

ORDER

While incarcerated in the Marion federal penitentiary, William Fuller attacked

another inmate. He pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon by an inmate and assault

with a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to 77 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of

his guidelines range. He now appeals his sentence, contending that the district court did

not adequately consider his arguments in mitigation.   

At the time of the incident, Fuller was serving a 262‐month sentence for two drug

offenses. Approaching the victim from behind, Fuller swung a sock filled with rocks into

the victim’s head. The blow shattered the victim’s bulky headphones and lacerated his

face. The victim fled and Fuller gave chase, swinging a metal combination lock attached

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 16‐1328 Page 2

to a lanyard until prison staff intervened. The attack was captured on the prison’s video

system.   

Fuller was charged with two counts of possession of a weapon by an inmate (one for

the sock and one for the lock), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(2), and one count of assault with a

dangerous weapon, see id. § 113(a)(3). He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to all

three counts.   

In calculating the guidelines imprisonment range, a probation officer identified an

offense level of 24 and a criminal history category of VI, because Fuller is a career

offender, see 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3); U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1(b), (b)(5), yielding a guidelines

imprisonment range of 77 to 96 months. The probation officer noted the Sentencing

Commission’s view that the new sentence should run consecutively to Fuller’s

undischarged sentence, see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a). Fuller did not object to the proposed

guidelines range.

Fuller’s lawyer argued for a total sentence of 77 months’ imprisonment, most of it to

run concurrently with his client’s undischarged sentence. Counsel asserted that Fuller

already had been punished for his crimes by spending 10 months in solitary confinement

and losing administrative privileges. Counsel also asserted that Fuller, as a prison inmate,

must—in counsel’s words—live by the “unwritten rules of those confined by the Bureau”

and that prison guards would not be able to protect him from all violent confrontations.

Fuller did not present evidence at sentencing, but he said during his unsworn allocution

that the victim had three or four times “tried to go to blows” with him and had shown

him a weapon, and that he felt scared and knew the guards might not help him if he was

attacked.   

The district judge sentenced Fuller at the bottom of the guidelines range to a term of

77 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to Fuller’s undischarged sentence. The

judge explained that she would not “relitigate” any “administrative actions and

decisions” by the Bureau of Prisons because that is “not for [her] to judge.” The judge

told Fuller she understood his argument that he did what he thought necessary given

prison culture, but she added that the only evidence she had received about the assault

had come from the presentence report. And in any event, the judge continued, Fuller had

violated the law and must be held accountable. The judge discussed the sentencing

factors in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and stated that she had “consider[ed] everything.”   

Fuller’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court did not adequately consider

his arguments in mitigation and thus committed procedural error. Fuller’s within‐

guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable and required minimal explanation.

See United States v. Dachman, 743 F.3d 254, 263 (7th Cir. 2014). He argues nonetheless that

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the district judge’s statement that she would not “relitigate” administrative penalties

indicates that she did not consider or respond to his argument about solitary

confinement. Fuller also contends that the judge’s emphasis on the absence of evidence

of provocation by his victim shows that she did not think she was entitled to consider his

assertion that the victim previously had threatened him.   

But the contention that Fuller’s arguments in mitigation were not addressed is

meritless; the district judge did consider them and rejected them. The judge acknowledged

Fuller’s contention about the harshness of solitary confinement but explained that she

was not going to rethink the BOP’s determination of the appropriate administrative

penalties for Fuller’s misconduct. She reasonably concluded that administrative sanctions

and criminal sentences serve different purposes, and thus the former is not a substitute

for the latter. See United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1148–49 (3rd Cir. 1993).   

The court had two reasons—both of them sound—for rejecting Fuller’s contention

that going on the attack was the only way to protect himself. First, although

acknowledging that prisons are generally dangerous places, the court noted that the sole

evidence about Fuller’s crime comes from the presentence report, which says nothing at

all about Fuller’s having been provoked or feeling threatened. Fuller’s unsworn

allocution was not evidence, and it is well within a district judge’s discretion to reject

arguments in mitigation that are factually unsupported. See United States v. Chapman,

694 F.3d 908, 913–14 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that district courts “should disregard”

arguments in mitigation that lack factual foundation); United States v. Ramirez, 675 F.3d

634, 641 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[E]very defendant who asserts that his or her personal

circumstances warrant leniency is compelled to supply a factual predicate for the

contention.”); United States v. Diaz, 533 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). And

assertions made by defense counsel or unsworn statements made by the defendant

during allocution are not evidence. See Diaz, 533 F.3d at 578 (“Counsel’s unsupported

statements are, of course, not evidence.”); United States v. Krankel, 164 F.3d 1046, 1055

(7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that unverified declarations from the defendant are not

evidence that can refute a presentence report); United States v. Anderson, 632 F.3d 1264,

1270–71 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that district court need not assign any weight to

defendant’s unsworn statements during allocution).   

Second, in rejecting Fuller’s assertion that he was compelled to assault his victim, the

district judge explained that Fuller still had to be held accountable for his violent act, even

if he felt threatened. Otherwise, the judge explained, prison would be an even more

“unmanageable situation.” We have previously noted that this type of anticipatory self‐

defense argument based on prison culture is sensibly rejected. See United States v. Tokash,

282 F.3d 962, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The possession of weapons by inmates ... does

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not ... lessen the danger and violence of penitentiaries, but instead contributes to it.”);

United States v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1090 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Under the law of the jungle a

good offense may be the best defense. But although prisons are nasty places, they are not

jungles and it is the law of the United States rather than Hobbes’ states of nature that

regulates inmates’ conduct.”)   

In any event, the district court was required only to consider Fuller’s arguments, not

to agree with them, and its explanations for rejecting these two arguments suffice to

provide a “reasoned basis” for its decision. See United States v. Davis, 764 F.3d 690, 694

(7th Cir. 2014); Dachman, 743 F.3d at 262; United States v. Haskins, 511 F.3d 688, 696

(7th Cir. 2007). Fuller’s real complaint is about the court’s refusal to accept his arguments

in mitigation. It committed no legal error in making the choice it did, and so Fuller’s

sentence is AFFIRMED.

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