Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cr-00113/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cr-00113-18/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Josue Morales
Defendant
Jorge Perez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Emilio Hernandez Yesca
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

JUSTIN J. GILIO

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

EMILIO HERNANDEZ YESCA ET AL,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:21-CR-00113-NONE-SKO

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER

DATE: August 17, 2022

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto

BACKGROUND

This case is set for status conference on August 17, 2022. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until further 

notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue matters, 

excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 issued 

on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s discretion.” 

General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may order case-by-case 

exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or upon the request of 

counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order will 

impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This, previous, 

and subsequent General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

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emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption created “appreciable difficulty” for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-69; see 

also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus poses a similar, albeit more enduring, “appreciable difficulty” to the prompt 

proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a “nonexhaustive” list of seven factors it found to be “relevant” in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act 

continuances “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” United States v. Olsen, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL 

1589359 at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is 

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detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked 

speedy trial rights since the case’s inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a 

population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness 

of the charges a defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes; 

(6) whether there is a reason to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed; 

and (7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. Id.

In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding 

excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) 

(Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. United 

States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be 

“specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through defendants’ counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on August 17, 2022. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until 

November 30, 2022, and to exclude time between August 17, 2022, and November 30, 2022, under 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(i) and (ii) [Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case is 

voluminous and includes thousands of pages of documents including investigative reports and 

photographs as well as large media files including hours of recorded calls, large cell phone 

extractions, social media account search warrant returns, and other items. All this discovery has 

been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. 

Moreover, the government is still receiving discovery from the investigative agency and will 

continue to provide that supplemental discovery on a rolling basis.

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time review the discovery, conduct 

independent investigation, pursue a potential resolution of the case, consult with his/her client, 

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and conduct independent research.

c) In addition, the government recently obtained supplemental discovery and has 

produced that to defense counsel, who need time to review it.

d) As for Defendants Perez and Morales, they are out of custody pending trial, so a 

continuance is particularly appropriate in their situation.

e) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

f) The government does not object to the continuance.

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 17, 2022 to November 30, 

2022, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(i) and (ii) [Local 

Code T4] because the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the 

nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is 

unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within 

the time limits established by this section.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

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Dated: August 4, 2022 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

/s/ JUSTIN J. GILIO

JUSTIN J. GILIO

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: August 4, 2022 /s/ Roger Wilson

Roger Wilson

Counsel for Defendant 

Emilio Hernandez Yesca

Dated: August 4, 2022 /s/ Nicholas Reyes

Nicholas Reyes

Counsel for Defendant 

Jorge Perez

Dated: August 4, 2022 /s/ Peter Jones

Peter Jones

Counsel for Defendant 

Josue Morales

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8/11/2022

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