Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00134/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00134-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Teiquon Lewis
Petitioner
Jeff Macomber
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TEIQUON LEWIS,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFF MACOMBER, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00134 AWI MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 14]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, California State Prison Sacramento

is represented in this action by Brian G. Smiley, of the Office of the Attorney General for 

the State of California.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a 1999 judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Solano, for 

four counts of robbery, one count of attempted robbery and various enhancements. (See

E.D.Cal. Case No. 2:05-cv-01136-GEB-EFB, ECF Nos. 45, 47.) Petitioner was 

sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of one hundred and fifty (150) years to 

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life. (Id.) However, Petitioner does not challenge that conviction by way of the present 

petition for writ of habeas corpus.1

Instead, Petitioner challenges a prior 1993 conviction for which he is no longer 

incarcerated. On July 21, 1993, Petitioner plead guilty to second degree robbery and 

various enhancements in Fresno County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 1.) On the same 

date, Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate term of eight years in state prison. (Id.) 

Petitioner did not directly appeal the conviction. However, Petitioner did file five postconviction collateral challenges to the conviction in the forms of petitions for writ of 

habeas corpus. Specifically, he filed two petitions in 2003, and three additional petitions 

in 2015. (Lodged Docs. 3-10.) All of the petitions were denied. (Id.)

On January 6, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus in this Court. 2 On March 25, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the 

petition as being filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d) and based on Petitioner’s failure to present cognizable claims. (ECF No. 14, 

Mot. to Dismiss.) Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion on April 7, 2016. (ECF No. 

15.) The matter stands ready for adjudication. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

 

1 Nor could he. Petitioner already sought and was denied federal habeas relief with regard to that 

conviction. (See E.D.Cal. Case No. 2:05-cv-01136-GEB-EFB, ECF Nos. 45, 47.) Any attempt to again 

challenge that conviction would be considered a second or successive petition and would require 

permission from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals before proceeding to file a petition with this Court. 

2 Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on the date Petitioner handed a petition 

to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385, 101 L. Ed. 2d 

245 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. Although the petition was filed on January 20, 2016, the petition shall be considered 

filed on January 6, 2016, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

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Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of the oneyear limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Respondent's motion to dismiss 

is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state 

remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal 

answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4.

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on January 6, 2016 and is subject to the 

provisions of AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners 

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As 

amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

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habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins running on the date that the 

petitioner's direct review became final or the date of the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review. Because Petitioner’s conviction became final in 1993, prior to the 

enactment of AEDPA, his one-year period for filing a habeas petition in federal court 

began on AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001); Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA 

statute of limitations began to run the following day, on April 25, 1996. Patterson, 251 

F.3d at 1246.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year 

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held 

the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction 

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relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court's disposition of 

a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court 

system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations 

under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was 

timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or 

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the 

requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

Petitioner did not file any post-conviction challenges to the judgment during the 

one year limitations period. Therefore, the period commenced on April 25, 1996 and 

expired on year later on April 24, 1997. 

The statute of limitations expired eighteen years before the instant federal petition 

was filed on January 6, 2016. While Petitioner filed five post-conviction challenges 

starting in 2003, petitions filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations period have 

no tolling effect. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003) ("section 2244(d) 

does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state 

petition was filed."). The instant federal petition is untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010); 

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir. 1993). Petitioner has not presented any grounds for equitable tolling in his petition or 

opposition to the motion to dismiss. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

E. Failure to State Cognizable Claim

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable and must be 

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dismissed as there is no constitutional right to attack a prior conviction that enhanced his

present sentence if the prior petition is no longer open to collateral attack. The Court 

agrees. There is no federal constitutional right to attack a prior state conviction, "once a 

conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right." Nunes v. 

Ramirez-Palmer, 485 F.3d 432, 443 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Lackawanna County Dist. 

Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403 (2001)). Petitioner’s challenges to his 1993 conviction 

are untimely. The fact that the challenged conviction may have enhanced his present 

sentence does not open the prior conviction to renewed attack. Petitioner is not entitled 

to federal habeas review of this conviction, and the petition must be dismissed. 

III. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for Habeas Corpus 

within the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner is not 

entitled to the benefit of statutory or equitable tolling, and the federal petition is untimely 

filed. Furthermore, there is no federal basis for challenging a prior conviction that is no

longer open to direct or collateral attack. Based on the foregoing, this Court recommends 

that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss for 

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period be 

GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States 

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and 

Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and 

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The Finding and 

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Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). Petitioner is advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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