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Parties Involved:
Rudolph F. Reynolds
Appellant
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeall! Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT FEBO 8 1993 

RUDOLPH F. REYNOLDS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M. D. , Secretary of 

Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee . 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No . 92-5134 

) (D.C . No . 91-C-219-E) 

) (N.D. Okla. ) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER,** District 

Judge . 

**Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, 

District Court for the District 

designation. 

District Judge, United States 

of Wyoming, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed . R. App. P . 

34 (a ); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 . 9 . 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by a ny court within the Tenth Cir cuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines o f the law of the 

case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel . 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3 . 

Appellate Case: 92-5134 Document: 010110170312 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 1 
Claimant Rudolph F. Reynolds appeals from an order of the 

district court affirming the final decision of the Secretary of 

the Department of Health and Human Services denying his 

application for social security disability benefits. We exercise 

jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and reverse and remand for 

further proceedings. 

Mr. Reynolds filed his application for benefits on July 5, 

1989, alleging disability since July 15, 1985, due to problems 

with his heart, lungs, blood pressure, and a nervous disorder. 

Mr. Reynolds was fifty-nine years old at the time of his 

application, with a fourth grade education, and past work 

experience primarily as a sandblaster, but also as a dishwasher 

and child care attendant. 

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must establish 

a severe physical or mental impairment expected to result in death 

or last for a continuous period of twelve months which prevents 

the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 42 

U.S.C. § 423 (d) (1) (A). The Secretary has established a five-part 

sequential evaluation process for determining disability. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)- (f}, 416.920; see also Williams v . Bowen, 

844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing the five steps in 

detail) . If at any step in the process the Secretary determines 

that the claimant is or is not disabled, the evaluation ends. 

Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The first three steps are not at issue here--the 

administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Mr. Reynolds' claim 

was still under evaluation after step three of the five-part 

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Appellate Case: 92-5134 Document: 010110170312 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 2 
process. That is, 

established that he 

the ALJ determined that Mr. Reynolds had 

was not currently engaged in substantial 

gainful activity and had a severe impairment, although he was not 

conclusively disabled by the nature of his impairment. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520 (b) - (d). 

The ALJ denied benefits at step four. The issue at step four 

is whether the claimant retains the ability to perform the 

functional demands and job duties of his past work either as he 

performed the job or as generally required from employers 

throughout the national economy . The ALJ determined that Mr. 

Reynolds could not do medium work but retained the residual 

functional capacity to return to his past jobs as dishwasher or 

child care attendant, which were not medium work . Rec. Vol. II at 

15-16. Therefore, ALJ found that Mr. Reynolds was not disabled. 

Id. at 16. 

"The Secretary's decision must be upheld if it is supported 

by substantial evidence and if the correct legal standards were 

applied." Hill v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 972, 973 (10th Cir. 

1991) (citing Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1987)) . 

Mr. Reynolds raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether his past 

jobs as dishwasher and child care attendant were past relevant 

work; (2) whether the Secretary applied the correct legal standard 

when he failed to make a finding on the stress level of Mr . 

Reynolds' past jobs due to his history of cardiovascular disease; 

(3) whether the Secretary applied the correct legal standard when 

he failed to call a vocational expert witness; and (4) whether the 

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Secretary applied the correct legal standard when he failed to 

consider the advanced age regulation in determining the case. 

A claimant has the burden of proving he cannot return to his 

past relevant work. The Secretary need not produce vocational 

expert testimony when the issue is whether the claimant can return 

to work he has previously performed. See Musgrave v. Sullivan, 

966 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1992). The ALJ did not err in this 

regard. 

In addition, consideration of Mr. 

C.F.R. § 404 . 1563(d) was not required in 

Reynolds' age under 20 

this case because the 

final administrative decision was made at the fourth step of the 

five-part sequential evaluation process. Section 404 . 1563(d) 

relates to age as a vocational factor and becomes relevant only at 

step five, which the ALJ did not reach. See Emory v. Sullivan, 

936 F.2d 1092, 1094 (10th Cir. 1991); Williams, 844 F.2d at 751; 

20 C.F. R. §§ 404.1560(b) and (c), 404.1561, 404.1563(a). All the 

cases cited by Mr. Reynolds involved evaluations at step five. 

Thus, Mr. Reynolds' argument that the ALJ was required to consider 

his age on step four is unsupported. 

Mr. Reynolds' past jobs as dishwasher and child care 

attendant are past relevant work. The Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles (D.O.T.) is helpful in answering this question. See Potter 

v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 1346, 1349 (10th 

Cir. 1990); Soc. Sec. R. 82-61 . 

"Past relevant work is defined as work that (1) occurred 

within the past fifteen years (the so-called recency requirement) , 

(2) was of sufficient duration to enable the worker to learn to do 

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Appellate Case: 92-5134 Document: 010110170312 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 4 
the job (the so-called duration requirement), and (3) was 

substantial gainful employment." Jozefowicz v . Heckler, 811 F . 2d 

1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 20 C. F.R. § 41.965(a) ); see 

also Soc. Sec. R. 82-62 . Mr. Reynolds argues he did not work at 

either his dishwashing or child care job long enough to learn the 

job. There is substantial evidence in the record, however, to 

support the ALJ's inclusion of these jobs as past relevant work. 

Mr . Reynolds reported that he washed pots and pans at the 

Oklahoma Osteopathic Hospital from September 1984 until January 

1985- - i.e. , for four or five months. Rec. Vol. II at 93. This 

job, as he described it, fits within the job title of "kitchen 

helper," D.O.T. 318.687-010, pp. 245-46, 1009. This job title is 

classified at specific vocational preparation level 2; that is, 

the job can be learned within thirty days. Id. Although Mr . 

Reynolds did not perform every function described under the job 

title "kitchen helper," he worked as a dishwasher long enough to 

learn the j ob, and it therefore qualifies as past relevant work. 

Mr. Reynolds testified that he also worked as a child care 

attendant at Hissom Center, a state facility for the mentally 

handicapped, for four or five months. Rec. Vol. II at 50. The 

work he performed, as he described it, falls within the job title 

of "attendant, children's institution," D.O.T. 359.677 - 010, pp. 

259, 1009. This job title is classified at specific vocational 

preparation level 3; that is, the job can be learned within thirty 

days to three months. Id. Although Mr. Reynolds did not perform 

all of the functions described under the job title, "attendant, 

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Appellate Case: 92-5134 Document: 010110170312 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 5 
children's institution," he worked at the job long enough t o learn 

it, and it therefore also qualifies as past relevant work. 

However, we consider the record on appeal incapable of 

meaningful review on the ultimate conclusion that Mr. Reynolds 

retained the residual functional capacity to return to his past 

relevant work and was therefore not disabled. The ALJ failed to 

make certain specific findings required by Soc. Sec. R. 82- 62 . 

Ruling 82-62 requires: 

In finding that an individual has the capacity to 

perform a past relevant job, the determination or 

decision must contain among the f i ndings the following 

specific findings of fact : 

1. A finding of fact as to the individual's RFC 

[residual functional capacity]. 

2. A finding of fact as to the physical and mental 

demands of the past job/occupation. 

3. A finding of fact that the individual's RFC 

would permit a return to his or her past job or 

occupation. 

Soc. Sec. R. 82-62. 

The Secretary's rulings are binding on the agency . 20 C.F. R. 

§ 422.406 (b ) (1). However, the ALJ did not make any of these 

required findings. See Rec. Vol . II at 15-16. Rather, the ALJ 

found that Mr. Reynolds could not perform medium work, and his 

past jobs as dishwasher and child care attendant were not medium 

jobs. The ALJ did not determine, however, whether Mr. Reynolds' 

RFC was light or sedentary, and whether his past jobs should be 

categorized as light or sedentary. We point out also that the ALJ 

fai led to make a finding concerning the stress or mental demands 

of Mr. Reynolds' child care attendant job, even though Mr. 

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Appellate Case: 92-5134 Document: 010110170312 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 6 
Reynolds testified that the job got on his nerves, the "kids" were 

mentally retarded young adults, and on one occasion, at least, he 

had to break up a fight. Rec. Vol. II at 50-52. 

In the absence of these required underlying findings, this 

court cannot determine whether the Secretary's conclusion that Mr. 

Reynolds is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence 

without weighing the evidence and engaging in speculation. This, 

we may not do. See Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th 

Cir. 1991); Baker v. Bowen, 886 F.2d 289, 291 (10th Cir. 1989). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is 

REMANDED to the agency for additional proceedings consistent with 

this order and judgment. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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