Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01544/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01544-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Immunogen, Inc.
Appellee
Phigenix, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PHIGENIX, INC.,

Appellant

v.

IMMUNOGEN, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1544

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2014-

00676.

______________________ 

Decided: January 9, 2017

______________________ 

GREGORY LAWRENCE PORTER, Andrews Kurth Kenyon 

LLP, Houston, TX, argued for appellant. Also represented by ROBERT ALAN GUTKIN, PING WANG, MICHAEL YE, 

Washington, DC. 

ELDORA ELLISON, Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox, 

PLLC, Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by OLGA A. PARTINGTON, PAULINE PELLETIER,

BYRON LEROY PICKARD, ERIC K. STEFFE. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 1 Filed: 01/09/2017
2 PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant Phigenix, Inc. (“Phigenix”) sought inter 

partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,337,856 (“the ’856 

patent”), alleging that claims 1–8 (“the Asserted Claims”) 

of the subject patent are unpatentable as obvious over 

various prior art references. In its final written decision, 

the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) found the Asserted 

Claims nonobvious. See generally Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., No. IPR2014-00676, 2015 WL 6550500

(P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2015). 

Phigenix appeals. We possess subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012). Because Phigenix has not offered sufficient proof 

establishing that it has suffered an injury in fact, it lacks 

standing to bring suit in federal court. We dismiss.

BACKGROUND

The ’856 patent generally relates to “huMab4D5 

ANTI-ErbB2 antibody-maytansinoid conjugates.” ’856 

patent, Title. The claimed methods of treatment purport 

to combat a variety of cancers. See id. col. 4 ll. 26–42.

The subject dispute involves three principal parties, 

each of whom allege to have some relation to the ’856 

patent. The first party, Appellee ImmunoGen, Inc. (“ImmunoGen”), is the assignee of the ’856 patent. ImmunoGen provided the second party, Genentech Inc. 

(“Genentech”), with a “worldwide exclusive license” to the 

subject patent, which Genentech uses to produce the drug 

Kadcyla®TM (“Kadcyla”). Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, 

Inc., No. 2016-1544, Docket No. 23 at Ex. A, ¶ 3 (Fed. Cir. 

Mar. 4, 2016) (ImmunoGen’s Mot. to Dismiss (“ImmunoGen’s MTD”)); see id. at Ex. A, ¶ 2. The third party, 

Phigenix, describes itself “as a for-profit discovery stage 

biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and biomedical research 

company” that focuses “on the use of novel molecular 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 2 Filed: 01/09/2017
PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 3

therapeutics” designed to fight cancer. Phigenix, Inc. v. 

ImmunoGen, Inc., No. 2016-1544, Docket No. 26 at Ex. 1, 

¶ 4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 14, 2016) (Phigenix’s Resp. to ImmunoGen’s MTD (“Phigenix’s Resp. to MTD”)). Phigenix 

does not manufacture any products, but purportedly “has 

developed, and is developing, an extensive intellectual 

property portfolio” that includes U.S. Patent No. 

8,080,534 (“the ’534 patent”). Id. at Ex. 1, ¶ 5; see id. at 

Ex. 1, ¶ 7. Phigenix alleges that the ’534 patent covers 

Genentech’s “activities relating to Kadycla[]” and, thus, 

the subject matter claimed in the ’856 patent. Id. at Ex. 

1, ¶ 7; see id. at Ex. 1, ¶¶ 8–9, and Ex. 2, ¶ 14. Phigenix 

alleges that it “was forced” to bring litigation in various 

fora when Genentech refused its offer to license the ’534 

patent. Id. at Ex. 1, ¶ 8.

In that vein, and “[t]o further its commercialization 

efforts with respect to its patent portfolio,” Phigenix 

sought inter partes review of the Asserted Claims of the 

’856 patent. Id. at Ex. 1, ¶ 10. When the PTAB found the 

Asserted Claims nonobvious, Phigenix sought further 

review in this court.

DISCUSSION

I. Phigenix Lacks Article III Standing

Before the parties fully briefed the subject appeal, 

ImmunoGen filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that 

Phigenix lacked standing to appeal the PTAB’s Final 

Written Decision. See generally ImmunoGen’s MTD. 

Phigenix opposed. See generally Phigenix’s Resp. to MTD. 

A single judge of this court denied the Motion, “deem[ing] 

it the better course for the parties to address the standing 

issue in their briefs.” Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., 

No. 2016-1544 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2016) (order denying 

ImmunoGen’s MTD). 

In its response brief, ImmunoGen argues anew that 

Phigenix lacks standing, Appellee’s Br. 29–37, and PhigeCase: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 3 Filed: 01/09/2017
4 PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 

nix again opposes, Appellant’s Br. 24–25 (incorporating 

the arguments made in Phigenix’s Resp. to MTD); Appellant’s Reply 3–16. “We have an obligation to assure 

ourselves of litigants’ standing under Article III” of the 

Constitution, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 

332, 340 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted), including when a party appeals from a final

agency action, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 

505–06, 516–26 (2007). As the party seeking judicial 

review, Phigenix bears the burden of establishing that it 

has standing. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342.

A. General Article III Standing Requirements

“Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional 

understanding of a case or controversy” required by

Article III. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 

(2016); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 

(2013) (explaining that Article III discusses the powers 

granted to the Judicial Branch and, inter alia, “confines 

the judicial power of federal courts to deciding actual 

‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies’” (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, 

§ 2)). “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” consists of “three elements.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). An appellant “must have 

(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to 

the challenged conduct of the [appellee], (3) that is likely 

to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”1 Spokeo, 

136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citations omitted).

1 We recite the standing framework using the designations “appellant” and “appellee,” rather than “plaintiff” and “defendant,” because we are the court of first 

instance in an appeal challenging the PTAB’s final written decision in an inter parties review. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) 

(2012) (“A party to an inter partes review . . . who is 

dissatisfied with the final written decision of the 

 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 4 Filed: 01/09/2017
PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 5

As to the first element, “the injury-in-fact requirement requires [an appellant] to allege an injury that is 

both concrete and particularized.” Id. at 1545 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). To constitute a

“concrete” injury, the harm must “actually exist,” id. at 

1548 (citation omitted), or appear “imminent,” Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)—a “conjectural or hypothetical” injury will not suffice, id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

And an injury is “particularized” if it affects an appellant 

“in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 

1548 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“[A]lthough Article III standing is not necessarily a 

requirement to appear before an administrative agency,” 

Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 

F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), an

appellant must nevertheless supply the requisite proof of 

an injury in fact when it seeks review of an agency’s final 

action in a federal court,2 see Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 

517 (explaining that, when a party appeals from a final

agency action, it must demonstrate that it suffers an 

injury “that is either actual or imminent” (quoting Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 560–61)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has 

recognized that not every party will have Article III 

standing in an appeal from a PTAB final written decision. 

See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 

2143–44 (2016) (explaining that, although a party that 

[PTAB] . . . may appeal the [PTAB]’s decision only to 

the . . . Federal Circuit.”).

2 An appellant’s obligation to establish an injury in 

fact remains firm even though it need not “‘meet[] all the 

normal standards for redressability and immediacy’” 

when, as here, a statute provides the appellant with a 

right to appeal. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517–18 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).

 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 5 Filed: 01/09/2017
6 PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 

initiated an inter partes review “need not have a concrete 

stake in the outcome,” it “may lack constitutional standing” to sue in federal court).

B. The Legal Requirements to Demonstrate Standing in 

an Appeal from a Final Agency Action

In the nearly thirty-five years since the court’s inception, we have not established the legal standard for 

demonstrating standing in an appeal from a final agency 

action. This standard must identify the burden of production;3 the evidence an appellant must produce to meet 

that burden; and when an appellant must produce that 

evidence. We discuss each item in turn.

As to the burden of production, the Supreme Court 

has held that each element is “an indispensable part of” 

an appellant’s case and “must be supported in the same 

way as any other matter on which the [appellant] bears 

the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of 

evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Interpreting Lujan, the 

D.C. Circuit has held that an appellant’s burden of production is “the same as that of a plaintiff moving for 

summary judgment in the district court.” Sierra Club v. 

EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

At least four of our sister circuits have adopted the D.C. 

Circuit’s standard, see Sierra Club v. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 

662–663 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom., Ohio v. 

Sierra Club, 136 S. Ct. 1491 (2016); N. Laramie Range 

All. v. FERC, 733 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 2013); Iowa 

3 “Burden of production” means “[a] party’s duty to 

introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue 

decided by the fact-finder, rather than decided against the 

party in a peremptory ruling such as a summary judgment or a directed verdict.” Burden of Production, Black’s 

Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 6 Filed: 01/09/2017
PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 7

League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 869–70 (8th Cir.

2013); Citizens Against Ruining the Env’t v. EPA, 535 

F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2008), and two others appear to 

have followed it, see Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers v. 

Bonneville Power Admin., 733 F.3d 939, 971 n.7 (9th Cir. 

2013) (Alarcón, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Ninth 

Circuit has appeared to follow, but not expressly adopted, 

the burden of production standard articulated in Sierra 

Club, 292 F.3d 895); Manufactured Hous. Inst. v. EPA, 

467 F.3d 391, 398 (4th Cir. 2006) (similar).4 Our review 

of Lujan and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions 

leads us to conclude that the summary judgment burden 

of production applies in cases where an appellant seeks 

review of a final agency action and its standing comes into 

doubt. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (explaining that a 

party challenging government action may demonstrate its 

standing, inter alia, “at the summary judgment stage”); 

see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521–23 (relying upon 

evidence typically produced at the summary judgment 

stage (i.e., affidavits and declarations) to find that a party 

possessed standing in an appeal from a final agency 

action).

Having established the relevant burden of production, 

we turn to what evidence will meet the burden. The D.C. 

Circuit has held that, in some cases, an appellant’s 

“standing to seek review of administrative action is selfevident; no evidence outside the administrative record is 

necessary for the court to be sure of it.” Sierra Club, 292 

F.3d at 899–900. Self-evident standing typically arises 

when an appellant “is ‘an object of the action (or forgone 

4 The First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits do not appear to have addressed the precise issue 

before us.

 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 7 Filed: 01/09/2017
8 PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 

action) at issue.’”5 Id. at 900 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

561–62). “When the [appellant]’s standing is not selfevident, however, the [appellant] must supplement the 

record to the extent necessary to explain and substantiate 

its entitlement to judicial review.” Id. In so doing, an

appellant may submit “arguments and any affidavits or 

other evidence” to demonstrate its standing. Id. Taken 

together, an appellant “must either identify . . . record 

evidence sufficient to support its standing to seek review 

or, if there is none because standing was not an issue 

before the agency, submit additional evidence to the court 

of appeals,” such as “by affidavit or other evidence.” Id. at 

899 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Finally, we must determine when an appellant should 

produce the evidence establishing its standing. Because 

standing involves threshold questions over a court’s 

authority to hear a dispute, see Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 

at 505, an appellant must identify the relevant evidence 

demonstrating its standing “at the first appropriate” time, 

whether in response to a motion to dismiss or in the 

opening brief, Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900; see id at 901. 

Imposing on an appellant the dual obligations of producing the evidence and producing the evidence early in the 

litigation comports with the reality that such evidence is 

“necessarily peculiar to” the appellant and “ordinarily 

within its possession.” Id. at 901. Thus, if there is no 

record evidence to support standing, the appellant must 

produce such evidence at the appellate level at the earliest possible opportunity.

5 “[W]hen the [appellant] is not himself the object of 

the government action or inaction he challenges, standing 

is not precluded, but it is ordinarily substantially more 

difficult to establish.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 8 Filed: 01/09/2017
PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 9

C. Phigenix Has Not Demonstrated Injury in Fact

Having identified the operative standards, we turn to 

the question of Phigenix’s standing. Phigenix has argued 

its standing in several submissions, see generally Phigenix’s Resp. to MTD; Appellant’s Br.; Appellant’s Reply, as 

well as put into evidence two declarations that purportedly demonstrate its standing, see Phigenix’s Resp. to MTD

at Ex. 1 (“Donald Decl.”) and Ex. 2 (“Gold Decl.”). In these 

documents, Phigenix does not contend that it faces risk of 

infringing the ’856 patent, that it is an actual or prospective licensee of the patent, or that it otherwise plans to 

take any action that would implicate the patent. See 

generally Phigenix’s Resp. to MTD; Appellant’s Br.; Appellant’s Reply. Instead, Phigenix asserts that it has suffered an actual economic injury because the ’856 patent 

increases competition between itself and ImmunoGen, see 

Phigenix’s Resp. to MTD at 6, and “‘[i]ncreased competition represents a cognizable Article III injury,’” id. (quoting Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp. v. FERC, 29 F.3d 697, 

701 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 

Phigenix argues that “[t]he existence of ImmunoGen’s 

’856 patent has . . . encumber[ed] Phigenix’s licensing 

efforts while ImmunoGen receives millions of dollars in 

licensing revenue.” Id. at 9; see id. at 9–10 (citing Gold 

Decl. at ¶¶ 10, 15). Phigenix contends “[t]he most reasonable and commonsense conclusion is that at least a portion of that licensing revenue would inure to Phigenix if 

the ’856 patent were invalidated.” Appellant’s Reply 9–

10. Phigenix does not substantiate these arguments with 

record evidence developed before the PTAB. See generally 

Phigenix’s Resp. to MTD; Appellant’s Br.; Appellant’s 

Reply. Instead, Phigenix relies principally upon the 

declarations accompanying its response to ImmunoGen’s 

Motion to Dismiss and another non-record document.

Rule 56(c)(4) explains that a “declaration used to support . . . a motion must be made on personal knowledge, 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 9 Filed: 01/09/2017
10 PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 

set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and 

show that the . . . declarant is competent to testify on the 

matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (emphasis added). A “conclusion[] of law” in a declaration “cannot be 

utilized [i]n a summary-judgment motion.” 10B Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2738 

(4th ed. 2016) (internal quotation marks and footnotes 

omitted); accord F.R.C. Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 278 

F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2002); Schubert v. Nissan Motor 

Corp. in U.S.A., 148 F.3d 25, 30–31 (1st Cir. 1998); Orthopedic & Sports Injury Clinic v. Wang Labs., Inc., 922 

F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1991); Barfield v. Orange Cty., 911 

F.2d 644, 650 (11th Cir. 1990); Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & 

Co., 827 F.2d 155, 162 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987). 

Phigenix’s documents do not have such supporting 

facts. As stated above, Phigenix relies upon the Gold 

Declaration to argue that “[t]he existence of ImmunoGen’s 

’856 patent has . . . encumber[ed] Phigenix’s licensing 

efforts.” Phigenix’s Resp. to MTD at 9; see id. at 9–10 

(citing Gold Decl. at ¶¶ 10, 15). Phigenix also alleges that 

a letter highlighting concerns over the ’856 patent’s 

validity that its attorney sent to ImmunoGen “underscores the actual, concrete controversy” between the 

parties. Appellant’s Br. 25. In that letter, counsel stated 

that Phigenix “believes that it has a strong patent portfolio” and “believes” that the ’856 patent is invalid. J.A. 

6446.

The Gold Declaration and the attorney letter are insufficient to demonstrate injury in fact. It is possible 

that, if Phigenix had licensed the ’534 patent to the same 

parties to which ImmunoGen had licensed the ’856 patent, the invalidation of the ’856 patent might have increased Phigenix’s revenues. However, there is simply no 

allegation here that Phigenix has ever licensed the ’534

patent to anyone, much less that it licensed the ’534

patent to entities that have obtained licenses to the 

ImmunoGen ’856 patent. The conclusory statements in 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 10 Filed: 01/09/2017
PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 11

the Gold Declaration and the letter as to the hypothetical 

licensing injury therefore do not satisfy the requirements 

of Rule 56(c)(4).6 See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 

U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (explaining that “[t]he object” of Rule 

56 “is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit”). 

Phigenix’s remaining arguments do not necessitate a 

different conclusion. Phigenix contends that it has suffered an injury in fact because 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) “provides a statutory basis for appeal,” Phigenix’s Resp. to 

MTD at 16, and Spokeo recognizes that “[t]he violation of 

a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in 

6 Several aspects of the Declarations submitted by 

Phigenix also fail to lay the requisite foundation to be 

“admissible in evidence,” as Rule 56(c)(4) requires. See 

10B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. 

& Proc. § 2738 (4th ed. 2016) (explaining that “the rules of 

evidence and their exceptions determine what allegations 

the affidavit may contain” (footnote omitted)); see also 

Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding 

that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”). For 

example, Dr. Carlton D. Donald testified that “Phigenix 

and Genentech had multiple discussions 

through . . . telephone conversations concerning the 

Phigenix technology and its patent portfolio,” Donald 

Decl. at ¶ 8; however, Dr. Donald does not establish that 

(1) a particular number was dialed; (2) the number dialed 

was “assigned at the time” to Genentech; or (3) “the call 

related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone,” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(6). 

 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 11 Filed: 01/09/2017
12 PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 

some circumstances to constitute an injury in fact,”7

Appellant’s Reply 16 (emphasis added) (quoting 136 S. Ct. 

at 1549). In relevant part, § 141(c) provides that “[a]

party to an inter partes review . . . who is dissatisfied 

with the final written decision of the [PTAB] . . . may 

appeal the [PTAB]’s decision” to this court. Phigenix 

cannot base its injury in fact upon a violation of § 141(c) 

because it has been permitted to file its appeal, and the 

exercise of its right to appeal does not necessarily establish that it possesses Article III standing. See Raines v. 

Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) (“Congress cannot 

erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily 

granting the right to sue to [an appellant] who could not 

otherwise have standing.” (citation omitted)). As the 

Supreme Court has observed, statutorily “broadening the 

categories of injury that may be alleged in support of 

standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself 

have suffered an injury.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 

727, 738 (1972); accord Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516–17

(discussing the need for injury in fact to pursue appeal 

from a final agency action); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (same). 

Finally, Phigenix asserts an injury in fact based on 35 

U.S.C. § 315(e), arguing that “the estoppel effect of the 

[PTAB]’s decision adversely impacts Phigenix’s ability to 

provide a contractual warranty.” Appellant’s Reply 11 

(capitalization modified). If the PTAB issues a final 

written decision in an inter partes review on a patent 

7 To the extent Phigenix alleges that Spokeo overruled the Supreme Court’s prior decisions on standing, 

that argument ignores governing law. See Hohn v. United 

States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–53 (1998) (“Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider 

them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised 

doubts about their continuing vitality.” (citation omitted)).

 

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 12 Filed: 01/09/2017
PHIGENIX, INC. v. IMMUNOGEN, INC. 13

claim, a petitioner “may not request or maintain a proceeding before” the USPTO, the U.S. International Trade 

Commission, or a federal district court “with respect to 

that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised or 

reasonably could have raised during that inter partes 

review.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1); see id. § 315(e)(2). In 

Consumer Watchdog, we explained that a similar estoppel 

provision “do[es] not constitute an injury in fact” when, as 

here, the appellant “is not engaged in any activity that 

would give rise to a possible infringement suit.” 753 F.3d 

at 1262 (citation omitted). We see no reason to reach a 

different conclusion on the facts before us.

CONCLUSION

Because Phigenix has not substantiated its alleged injury in fact, it lacks standing to appeal the PTAB’s Final 

Written Decision affirming the patentability of the Asserted Claims of the ’856 patent. We have considered 

Phigenix’s remaining arguments to the contrary and find 

them unpersuasive. Accordingly, Phigenix’s appeal is

DISMISSED

Case: 16-1544 Document: 74-2 Page: 13 Filed: 01/09/2017