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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
John R. Whitlow
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 28, 2010

Decided July 29, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 10‐1063

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

           Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JOHN R. WHITLOW,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:00‐cr‐10029‐001

Michael M. Mihm,

Judge.

O R D E R

John Whitlow pleaded guilty to mail fraud, money laundering, and filing a false tax

return, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1931, 1956(a)(1)(B)(I), 1957, and was sentenced to 108 months’

imprisonment with three years’ supervised release. He began supervised release in 2008,

but in November 2009 his probation officer petitioned for revocation because Whitlow

admitted he violated his supervised release conditions by applying for credit without

permission. The district court revoked his release and ordered him to serve another 8

months’ imprisonment with an additional 16 months’ supervised release. Whitlow appeals,

but his appointed counsel has moved to withdraw because he cannot identify any

nonfrivolous argument to pursue. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Whitlow has

not accepted our invitation to comment on counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). We confine

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 10‐1063 Page 2

our review to the potential issues outlined in counsel’s facially adequate brief. See United

States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel first tells us that Whitlow wants to challenge his waiver of a revocation

hearing, but finds no potential challenge. A revocation hearing may be knowingly and

voluntarily waived if the defendant knows the charge against him and is advised of the

rights being waived. United States v. LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1999). Rule 32.1

outlines the procedural rights required to revoke supervised release: written notice of

alleged violations, disclosure of the evidence against the defendant, the right to appear and

present evidence, representation by counsel, and the right to make a statement in

mitigation, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2); United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 435 n.8 (7th Cir.

2008). The district court directly advised Whitlow, and he specifically acknowledged as

much, that he was giving up each of these rights. Any challenge to his waiver would be

frivolous.

Counsel next considers whether Whitlow could challenge the court’s decision to

revoke his supervised release, but concludes that a challenge would be frivolous. A district

court may revoke supervised release if, by a preponderance of the evidence, it determines

that the defendant violated a supervised release condition. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); Johnson v.

United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000); United States v. Flagg, 481 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2007).

Whitlow’s supervised release conditions forbade him from applying for credit without first

getting his probation officer’s permission, and Whitlow’s admission that he applied for (and

received) credit six times between July and November 2008 conclusively establishes that he

violated these conditions.

Finally counsel considers whether Whitlow might challenge his reimprisonment

term as plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007).

Before imposing the 8‐month term, the district court here correctly determined that the

guidelines counseled a 4 to 10 month imprisonment range. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. The court

then considered the appropriate sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), noting that

Whitlow was convicted of a very serious fraud, id. § 3553(a)(1), and that even though he still

owed more than $600,000 in restitution he flouted the court’s order and ran up an additional

$13,000 in new credit charges beginning even before he left prison, id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C).

The court also noted that Whitlow’s additional credit applications have jeopardized his

ability to make restitution payments to the original victims of his crime, id. § 3553(a)(7). We

agree that any challenge to Whitlow’s imprisonment term as plainly unreasonable would be

frivolous.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is

DISMISSED.

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