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Parties Involved:
Romaine Harris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Fl LED 

United States Court of Appnls 

Tench Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

AUG 71991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ROMAINE HARRIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-4124 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-121W) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District 

Judge.** 

Romaine Harris appeals his conviction on one count of child 

sexual abuse. He raises two issues on appeal: 1) because the 

indictment was too vague, it should not have been submitted to the 

jury; and, 2) the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence. 

We conclude any vagueness of the indictment was cured by the 

government's pretrial disclosures and the government's evidence, 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., United States District Judge 

for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

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albeit controverted, was sufficient to support the verdict. We 

affirm. 

Mr. Harris, a Ute Indian, 1 

was charged in a superseding 

indictment with two counts of child sexual abuse, the second of 

which also charged aggravating circumstances. He was acquitted on 

Count I, and the jury found insufficient evidence to support the 

aggravating circumstances charged in Count II. The operative 

charge of Count II alleged "[b]etween August 15, 1985 and May 15, 

1986, . Romaine Harris did touch the genitals and take 

indecent liberties with a seven-year old non-Indian female with 

intent to arouse and gratify a sexual desire." The charge is 

founded upon the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 u.s.c. § 13, and Utah 

Code Ann.§ 76-5-404.1(1). 2 

Defendant filed a motion seeking discovery and a "bill of 

particulars" following the filing of the original indictment. 

That motion did not address the sufficiency of the disclosures of 

the alleged victim's identity or the time the offense was 

committed, issues now raised on appeal. Subsequently, the 

defendant filed a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment 

tangentially addressing those questions. Predicated upon the 

1Because Mr. Harris is enrolled 

within federal jurisdiction 

offense. 18 u.s.c. § 1153. 

2That provision states: 

in the Ute tribe, this case 

although state law defines 

A person commits sexual abuse of a child if, under 

circumstances not amounting to rape of a child ... the 

actor touches the anus, buttocks, or genitalia of any 

child ... or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a 

child ... with the intent to arouse or gratify the 

sexual desire of any person regardless of the sex of any 

participant. 

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falls 

the 

Appellate Case: 90-4124 Document: 010110131431 Date Filed: 08/07/1991 Page: 2 
., 

government's "fail[ure] to comply with the Motion for Discovery 

and Bill of Particulars," the defendant sought dismissal of the 

superseding indictment. 

Although no order issued requiring disclosure by the 

government, the defendant's motion sought dismissal because "the 

information which has been given is insufficient and 

indecipherable as [sic] to tell when and where occurrences of the 

alleged sexual acts have taken place." Although defendant did not 

argue the alleged vagueness deprived him of the ability to mount a 

defense or to prevent his being subsequently submitted to jeopardy 

on the same charges, he did assert the government "has not met the 

proper requirements for furnishing discoverable information to the 

defendant. Because of the failure of the plaintiff to comply, 

Count II should be dismissed." 

Two days before trial, the court held a hearing on the motion 

to dismiss. At that time, defendant's counsel admitted the 

government had disclosed to him the name of the victim "when the 

arraignment took place." R. II, 5. Based upon his reading of 

"reports" furnished him apparently by the prosecution, however, 

counsel asserted confusion over the victim's age and the year in 

which the offense allegedly occurred. The prosecutor responded 

that the indictment related to the same child whose identity had 

been disclosed already, and the only reason her name was not 

mentioned in the superseding indictment was "because she is a 

juvenile and I don't think it's appropriate to put her in the 

indictment." The prosecutor further disclosed some difficulty in 

communicating with the victim, but indicated he had learned from 

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the victim that the offense occurred "in the first part of the 

defendant's wife Maria's pregnancy." He also stated the victim 

was seven when the incident occurred. R. II, 8-9. 

The trial court concluded the defense counsel's confusion 

over the date of the offense was predicated upon conflicting 

statements by prospective witnesses, and those conflicts presented 

questions of fact for the jury. The court added, however, "I 

don't know of any basis that I could just dismiss the indictment 

because the reports are contradictory of each other and so on. 

I'm not going to dismiss the second count." R. II, 12. 

It is evident from our review of the record the accused knew 

well in advance of trial the identity of the victim and when the 

government contended the offense occurred. Defendant attempted to 

capitalize upon conflicting statements made by the victim to 

investigators to obtain the dismissal of the charge. Yet, defense 

counsel never told the trial judge that he was unable to mount a 

defense because the charge contained in the indictment was too 

vague. As did the trial judge, we believe there is a significant 

difference between an indictment which is vague and supporting 

evidence which is in conflict. It is merely the latter which 

formed the basis of the defendant's motion to dismiss in the 

district court. 

On appeal, however, defendant now takes a different tack. He 

claims his Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the charges was 

abrogated. He argues, "there must be some specificity given to 

the defendant so as to allow him to properly prepare his defense." 

While we agree with that contention, we believe that right was 

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complied with because the time of the offense was disclosed by the 

government prior to trial with sufficient specificity to allow the 

preparation of a defense. 

The prosecution fixed the time by advising the defense that 

the crime occurred during the "first part of the defendant's wife 

Maria's pregnancy." At the hearing on the defendant's motion, the 

government also stated the date of the child's birth was May 16, 

1986. R. II, 9. 3 Those two facts sufficiently fix the time the 

government contended the offense was committed. Because this is a 

child sexual abuse case, we also consider the difficulty a young 

child may have in identifying precise dates. State v. Wilcox, 808 

P.2d 1028, 1033 (Utah 1991). 

Moreover, we have not been shown a consequent prejudice to 

the defendant. He has not claimed, for example, the government's 

inability to be more precise in the statement of the date of the 

offense deprived him of the ability to provide alibi testimony. 

Nor has he asserted any other factor by which his defense was 

prejudiced. 4 We therefore conclude his Sixth .Amendment right was 

not transgressed. See United States v. Morris, 700 F.2d 427, 430 

(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 947 (1983). 

Defendant next argues the evidence that he touched the 

victim's clothed genitalia is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 

constitute the crime charged. He also argues variations between 

testimony at trial and the pretrial statements recorded by 

3

At trial, the child's birth certificate was 

establishing the date as May 13, 1986. R. III, 64. 

4 Indeed, his defense was one of absolute denial. 

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introduced 

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investigators render the government's case insufficient to support 

the verdict. We disagree. 

The victim testified defendant touched her "[o]n part of my 

butt between my legs." R. III, 55. Contrary to defendant's 

argument that the victim related "she [was] touched on part of her 

bum on the outside of her clothing," the evidence more precisely 

indicates the defendant touched the victim's genitalia. Because 

the statute specifically includes touching of the buttocks as a 

form of sexual abuse, however, the distinction is insignificant. 

Nonetheless, the authority relied upon by defendant does not 

support his argument that a touching of the clothed genitalia or 

buttocks of a child does not constitute a violation of Utah Code 

Ann. § 76-5-404.1(1). Both cases, State in Interest of J.L.S., 

610 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980), and State in Interest of L.G.W., 641 

P.2d 127 (Utah 1982), involved Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-404 (1979) 

(amended 1983 & 1984), a forcible sexual abuse provision which did 

not distinguish the treatment of children, and not the offense 

charged in this case. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the 

standards for child sexual abuse are different. J.L.S., 610 P.2d 

at 1295-96; State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 482-83 (Utah 1988). 

Both cases also dealt with the scope of the term "indecent 

liberties" rather than with a specifically prohibited act. 

The third case relied upon by defendant, State v. Thatcher, 

667 P.2d 23 (Utah 1983), does not preclude his conviction. In 

Thatcher, the defendant was found guilty under§ 76-5-404 because 

he engaged in a simulated sex act with his twelve-year old 

daughter. Contrary to defendant's argument here, however, the 

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Utah court in Thatcher did not establish a minimum level of 

conduct required to prove the sexual abuse of a clothed child. 

Consequently, we conclude the touching of the clothed genitalia or 

buttocks of a child is sufficient to satisfy Utah Code Ann. § 76-

5-404.1(1). 

The defendant also contends the government failed to prove he 

acted with the specific intent "to arouse or gratify the sexual 

desire of any person" as required by§ 76-5-404.1(1). Viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must 

on appeal, it may be inferred that the touching of the victim 

"between the legs" was not innocuous contact. When coupled with 

the victim's testimony that defendant threatened her if she told 

anyone of the incident, R. III, 55, we believe there is sufficient 

evidence of his intent to gratify sexual desire to satisfy the 

statute. 

Finally, evidence is not necessarily insufficient merely 

because of contradictory or incredible testimony. United 

States v. Vigil, 743 F.2d 751, 753 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 

U.S. 1090 (1984). Moreover, most of the testimony referred to by 

the defendant as inconsistencies are not necessarily so. The 

victim's telling one investigator that she had been grabbed or 

threatened but omitting those accusations from statements given 

another investigator is not necessarily an inconsistency. The 

same can be said for her initially telling her mother nothing had 

happened. The victim may have recalled events in a different way 

or merely chosen to relate different details at different times. 

Nothing she said, however, was diametrically opposed to any prior 

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statement she had given. It was the jury's function to sort out 

these matters, and it's determination is not incompatible with the 

evidence. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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