Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06184/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06184-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Knowles
Respondent
George Jose Ramirez
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE JOSE RAMIREZ, )

)

)

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Petitioner, )

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vs. )

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)

MICHAEL KNOWLES, WARDEN, )

)

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Respondent. )

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)

No. CV-F-03-6184 REC/SMS HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

FOR RESPONDENT 

On April 7, 2005, the United States Magistrate Judge

recommended that the court deny petitioner's petition for writ of

habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On April 29, 2005, petitioner timely filed objections to the

recommendation.

The court has reviewed the record herein de novo.

Petitioner objects that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly

described the standard of review required by the Supreme Court

for a determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. In the recommendation, the Magistrate Judge properly

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described the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). However, with regard to the prejudice prong of

the Strickland test, the Magistrate Judge stated in pertinent

part:

Second, the petitioner must show that

counsel’s errors were so egregious as to

deprive defendant of a fair trial, one whose

result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688. The court must also evaluate whether

the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or

unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id. Quintero-Barraza, 78

F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31

F.3d 1356, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994). To set

aside a conviction or sentence solely because

the outcome would have been different, but

for counsel’s error, may grant the petitioner

a windfall to which the law does not enable

him. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,

369-70 ... (1993). Thus, if the court finds

that counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and

that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been

different, the court must then ask whether

despite the errors and prejudice the trial

was fundamentally fair and reliable. Id. 

In Lockhart v. Fretwell, the Supreme Court, after referring

to Strickland’s two components to an ineffective assistance

claim, stated:

Under our decisions, a criminal defendant

alleging prejudice must show ‘that counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable.’ ... Thus, an analysis

focusing solely on mere outcome

determination, without attention to whether

the result of the proceeding was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is

defective. To set aside a conviction or

sentence solely because the outcome would

have been different but for counsel’s error

may grant the defendant a windfall to which

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the law does not entitle him.

506 U.S. at 369-370. However, in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 392-395 (2000), the Supreme Court explained that Lockhart

does not alter the generally applicable Strickland standard for

determining ineffective assistance of counsel:

The Virginia Supreme Court erred in holding

that our decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell ...

modified or in some way supplanted the rule

set down in Strickland. It is true that

while the Strickland test provides sufficient

guidance for resolving virtually all

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims,

there are situations in which the overriding

focus on the fundamental fairness may affect

the analysis. Thus, on the one hand, as

Strickland itself explained, there are a few

situations in which prejudice may be presumed

... And, on the other hand, there are also

situations in which it would be unjust to

characterize the likelihood of a different

outcome as legitimate ‘prejudice.’ Even if a

defendant’s false testimony might have

persuaded the jury to acquit him, it is not

fundamentally unfair to conclude that he was

not prejudiced by counsel’s interference with

his intended perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475

U.S. 157, 175-176 ... (1986).

Similarly, in Lockhart, we concluded that,

given the overriding interest in fundamental

fairness, the likelihood of a different

outcome attributable to an incorrect

interpretation of the law should be regarded

as a potential ‘windfall’ to the defendant

rather than the legitimate ‘prejudice’

contemplated by our opinion in Strickland. 

The death sentence that Arkansas had imposed

on ... Fretwell was based on an aggravating

circumstance ... that duplicated an element

of the underlying felony ... Shortly before

the trial, the ... Eighth Circuit [in Collins

v. Lockhart] had held that such ‘double

counting’ was impermissible ..., but

Fretwell’s lawyer (presumably because he was

unaware of the Collins decision) failed to

object to the use of the pecuniary gain

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aggravator. Before Fretwell’s claim for

federal habeas corpus relief reached this

Court, the Collins case was overruled. 

Accordingly, even though the Arkansas trial

judge probably would have sustained a timely

objection to the double counting, it had

become clear that the State had a right to

rely on the disputed aggravated circumstance. 

Because the ineffectiveness of Fretwell’s

counsel had not deprived him of any

substantive or procedural right to which the

law entitled him, we held that his claim did

not satisfy the ‘prejudice’ component of the

Strickland test.

Cases such as Nix v. Whiteside ... and

Lockhart v. Fretwell ... do not justify a

departure from a straightforward application

of Strickland when the ineffectiveness of

counsel does deprive the defendant of a

substantive or procedural right to which the

law entitles him. In the instant case, it is

undisputed that Williams had a right -

indeed, a constitutionally protected right -

to provide the jury with the mitigating

evidence that his trial counsel either failed

to discover or failed to offer.

Nevertheless, the Virginia Supreme Court read

our decision in Lockhart to require a

separate inquiry into fundamental fairness

even when Williams is able to show that his

lawyer was ineffective and that his

ineffectiveness probably affected the outcome

of the proceeding. ....

...

Unlike the Virginia Supreme Court, the state

trial judge omitted any reference to Lockhart

and simply relied on our opinion in

Strickland as stating the correct standard

for judging ineffective-assistance claims.

...

...

The trial judge analyzed the ineffectiveassistance claim under the correct standard;

the Virginia Supreme Court did not.

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Because the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel made by

petitioner in this action are not similar to those made in Nix

and Lockhart, the standard for determining such claims on habeas

relief set forth in the recommendation is incorrect as a matter

of law. However, it is clear that the recommendation that the

court deny petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is based on the Strickland standard. Consequently, the

error of law stated in the recommendation does not affect the

analysis of petitioner’s various claims set forth therein.

The court concludes from its review of the record and the

arguments of the parties that petitioner has not demonstrated

ineffective assistance of counsel entitling him to relief under

the Strickland standard and the standards governing federal

habeas review under Section 2254 as amended by the AEDPA. The

court concurs with the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge

with respect to petitioner’s claims and adopts the recommendation

with respect to each of petitioner’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 is denied.

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for

respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 26, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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