Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01673/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01673-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jeffrey Lynn Stonecipher
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY LYNN STONECIPHER, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

____________________________________

Case No. 1:13-cv-01673-SKO

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

(Doc. No. 15)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Jeffrey Lynn Stonecipher ("Plaintiff"), seeks judicial review of a final decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner" or "Defendant") denying his

application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") 

benefits pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter 

is currently before the Court on the parties' briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, 

to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1

 

1

 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 8, 9.)

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on July 28, 1964, and alleges disability beginning on June 1, 2010. 

Plaintiff claims he is disabled due to hypertension, congestive heart failure, atrial fibrillation, and 

valley fever. (AR 217.) 

A. Relevant Medical Evidence 

On May 28, 2010, Plaintiff was hospitalized at Kern Medical Center reporting symptoms 

of chest pain and shortness of breath for three days. (AR 289-95.) A test measuring heart failure 

indicated left ventricular hypertrophy, global hypokinesis of the left ventricle and “elevated [right 

ventricular systolic pressure].” (AR 381.) A chest x-ray revealed congestive heart failure with 

cardiomegaly, pulmonary vascular congestion, and interstitial edema. (AR 382.) The attending 

physician diagnosed Plaintiff with atrial fibrillation – rate controlled, congestive heart failure, 

hypertension, and a history of drug abuse was noted. (AR 381.) 

On December 15, 2010, State Agency medical consultant Kenneth Glass, M.D., reviewed 

Plaintiff's medical records and completed a residual functional capacity assessment form. Dr. 

Glass opined Plaintiff could lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds 

frequently. (AR 578-82.) Dr. Glass further opined that Plaintiff could stand and walk at least 2 

hours in an 8-hour day and sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday with occasional climbing of 

ramps/stairs, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, but precluding from climbing ladders, ropes and/ 

or scaffolds. (AR 578-82.) 

In March 2011, C. De La Rosa, a state agency physician, reviewed Plaintiff's medical 

records and opined that Plaintiff was limited to lifting 20 pounds and standing and walking 2 

hours out of an 8 hour work day. (AR 651-56.) 

In August 2011, Rushabh Shah, M.D., Plaintiff’s treating physician, reported Plaintiff was

diagnosed in August 2010 with atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure, and Plaintiff had 

been hospitalized multiple times for heart problems. (AR 769.) Dr. Shah opined that prior to his 

illness Plaintiff could work and participate in activities of daily living, but since his illness,

Plaintiff’s prognosis was poor and he was unable to work or hold gainful employment. (AR 769.) 

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

On September 29, 2011, Plaintiff was admitted to the cardiology clinic at Kern Medical 

Center with complaints of nausea and diarrhea that had been bothering him for about two months. 

(AR 772). Plaintiff complained of dizziness and palpitations (AR 772), and he was transferred to 

the emergency room for further evaluation (AR 775). Plaintiff underwent further evaluation, and 

was considered "improved" upon re-check. (AR 779.) He was given medication and his "A-fib" 

was resolved. (AR 779.) A clinical impression of medication noncompliance and polysubstance 

abuse was noted, but his condition was considered stable. (AR 779.)

B. Plaintiff's Testimony

Plaintiff is currently homeless, but stays at a "Christian home" occasionally to shower and 

clean up. (AR 51.) Plaintiff admitted to previous periods of noncompliance with prescribed 

medication because he "misplaces the medication" due to a lack of a "proper place to keep it." 

(AR 51.) Plaintiff also claims there have been times he “completely ran out of medication” and 

“did not have any way to get to . . . the pharmacy to pay for or to pick up any medication.” (AR 

60.) Plaintiff testified that prior to his last visit to the emergency room he had been fully 

compliant with medication. (AR 61.) 

Plaintiff experiences side effects from his medication which include everything becoming 

"fuzzy" and as a result of this fuzziness he has fallen and hit his head. (AR 52.) He has to lie 

down two to three times during the day due to nausea; on a bad day, he will lie down for most of 

the day. (AR 53-54.) 

Two weeks prior to the hearing, Plaintiff saw a cardiologist for a routine visit; an 

electrocardiogram was administered and he was sent to the emergency room because his blood 

pressure was extremely elevated and his heart rate was 140 and very erratic. (AR 51.)

Plaintiff testified that he experiences shortness of breath, mostly at night, and “sweat jags.” 

(AR 52.) Plaintiff explains “sweat jags” are episodes consisting of nausea and profuse sweating, 

which occur two to three times a day. (AR 50.) Plaintiff testified that “sweat jags” require him to 

lie down on average three times a day, and occasionally all day long. (AR 53.) Plaintiff states he 

has “good days and . . . bad days.” (AR 53.) He becomes nauseated four days of the week, mostly 

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

during the morning, but it occurs whenever he physically exerts himself or he is in a stressful 

situation. (AR 55.)

Plaintiff testified that the nausea and sweating he experiences are a result of congestive 

heart failure and occur at least four days a week for part of the day. (AR 55.) Plaintiff states these 

symptoms can occur “if [he] ha[s] to climb a flight of stairs twice.” (AR 56.)

Plaintiff last worked as a "steeplejack" which included working on chimneys at power 

plants. (AR 54.) He can no longer perform that work because climbing ladders and stairs, which 

was included in his past work, now makes him "sweat." (AR 55.) 

C. Administrative Proceedings 

On January 27, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision and determined Plaintiff was not disabled. 

(AR 20-30.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments including atrial fibrillation, 

congestive heart failure, hypertension, and valley fever. (AR 25.) The ALJ determined that these 

impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 26.) The ALJ found Plaintiff

retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a reduced range of sedentary work, 

but was limited to occasional postural changes such as bending, stooping and kneeling; no 

climbing ladders, ropes, scaffolds or work in unprotected heights. (AR 26.) Given this RFC, the 

ALJ found that other jobs existed that Plaintiff could perform. (AR 29-30.) The ALJ concluded 

that Plaintiff was not under disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 1, 2010, 

through January 27, 2012. (AR 30.) 

D. Plaintiff's Arguments on Appeal

On October 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint before this Court seeking review of the 

ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 

Plaintiff’s testimony about the extent of his limitations.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The ALJ's decision denying benefits "will be disturbed only if that decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error." Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 

601 (9th Cir. 1999). In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Instead, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards 

and whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's findings. See

Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere 

scintilla but less than a preponderance." Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th 

Cir. 2008). "Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) 

(quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court "must 

consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence 

that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a 

specific quantum of supporting evidence." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he or she is 

unable to engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be 

expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The 

impairment or impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques and must be of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do her previous 

work, but cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind 

of substantial, gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 

1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).

The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential 

analysis in the process of evaluating a disability. In the First Step, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, in the Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her from 

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

performing basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the Third Step, the ALJ 

must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or equals the requirements of the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. 404, 

Subpart P, App. 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, in the Fourth Step, the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity despite the impairment 

or various limitations to perform her past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, in Step 

Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that 

exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a 

claimant is found to be disabled or not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to 

consider subsequent steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520, 416.920.

DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ Erred In Assessing Plaintiff's Credibility

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ 

must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, 

the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged. Id. The claimant is not required to show that her impairment “could reasonably be 

expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 

F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.2007)). If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of 

malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms 

if she gives “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for the rejection. Id. As the Ninth Circuit has 

explained:

The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant's credibility, including 

(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation 

for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or 

inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 

treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities. If the ALJ's finding is supported 

by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing.

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2008) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (9th Cir.2009); 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. Other factors the ALJ may consider include a claimant's work 

record and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect 

of the symptoms of which he complains. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th 

Cir.1997). The ALJ is required to state clear and convincing reasons to support discounting

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and credibility. 

1. The ALJ's Erred in Considering Plaintiff's Daily Activities

Plaintiff argues it was error for the ALJ to discredit his symptom testimony based on his 

daily activities. Plaintiff claims the mere fact he carries on normal daily activities does not detract 

from his credibility as to his overall disability, and nothing in his testimony or reported daily 

activities belies his assertion he experiences both “good and bad days.” Plaintiff maintains the 

ALJ erred because he failed to demonstrate how the capability to perform the cited activities 

translated into the ability to work on a full-time basis. 

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s statements in his function report contradict the argument 

that he had a few good and mostly bad days. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s ability to perform the 

daily activities discussed by the ALJ show he is not as limited as Plaintiff claims. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the “mere fact that a Plaintiff has carried on certain daily 

activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car or limited walking for exercise, does not in any 

way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 

1050 (9th Cir. 2001). It is only where the level of activity is inconsistent with a claimed limitation 

that the activity has any bearing on credibility.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 

1998). Further the ALJ must make “specific findings relating to daily activities and their 

transferability to conclude that a claimant’s daily activities warrant an adverse credibility 

determination.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 639.

In assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ noted that “[a]fter careful consideration”

Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 

are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity 

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

assessment.” (AR 29.) The ALJ stated Plaintiff failed to present “objective medical evidence to 

support his claims," and Plaintiff’s “reported activities of daily living [were] inconsistent with his 

alleged inability to do all work." (AR 29.) Plaintiff’s daily activities included “doing laundry, 

ironing, sweeping and dishes, cooking, shopping, watching TV, and yard sales.” (AR 29.) 

Plaintiff's ability to engage in some activities of daily living does not necessarily reflect on 

Plaintiff's credibility. Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049-50. Plaintiff testified that he experiences nausea 

and sweating at least four days per week, but these symptoms occur more frequently when he 

exerts himself or when he encounters a stressful situation. (AR 9.) At times, nausea requires 

Plaintiff to lie down all day. (AR 53.) Plaintiff also testified he experiences light-headedness and 

has fallen down, losing consciousness as a result. (AR 52-53.) It is not clear how the ALJ's

discussion of Plaintiff's daily activities is relevant to these particular symptoms and limitations. 

Plaintiff's ability to iron clothing or watch television for a certain amount of time does not 

necessarily bear on whether he experiences frequent nausea, sweating episodes, or dizziness. The 

ALJ did not discuss how the frequency and nature of Plaintiff's daily activities detract from his 

symptom testimony. Plaintiff's function report indicates he is able to do laundry and iron two 

times per week, and he would perform sweeping activities up to four times per week, if the shelter 

had openings. (AR 235.)2If so, he would help with daily chores. (AR 233.) Thus, may of the 

activities the ALJ referred to as "daily" were not necessarily activities that Plaintiff undertook 

every day for an entire 8-hour period.

Moreover, the daily activities noted by the ALJ are not so incongruent with Plaintiff's 

alleged symptoms that the credibility implication is obvious, requiring no particular discussion –

such as if a claimant alleged disabling and immobilizing back pain yet reported playing golf three 

times per week. Plaintiff's described activities were not clear and convincing evidence to reject 

Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony related to his nausea, sweating episodes, and dizziness. 

 

2 As Plaintiff explained, he would have to inquire daily at the shelter about whether there was bed or meal availability 

on any particular day. (AR 233.)

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

2. The ALJ's Additional Bases for Rejecting Plaintiff's Credibility Were Not 

Clear and Convincing

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's symptom testimony was not supported by objective 

medical evidence. (AR 29.) Plaintiff maintains, however, that a lack of objective medical 

evidence is not a sufficient basis, standing alone, to reject his symptom testimony. Therefore, 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in discrediting Plaintiff's symptom testimony on these grounds.

The ALJ specifically and expressly, in the credibility portion of the decision, stated that 

Plaintiff "alleged disabling conditions yet does not have the objective medical evidence to support 

his claims." (AR 29.) In another portion of the decision, the ALJ noted that "objective findings 

fail to provide strong support for Plaintiff's allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations." 

(AR 27.) The ALJ then listed some of the objective medical findings. An ALJ does not err in 

considering a lack of objective medical evidence to support lay testimony as to the degree of a 

claimant's pain, so long as this is not the sole basis for an adverse credibility finding. Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 

("Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it 

is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis."). As set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(c)(2), objective medical evidence "is a useful indicator to assist" the agency in making 

"reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of [a claimant's] symptoms and the 

effect those symptoms, such as pain may have on [a claimant's] ability to work." However, 

Section 404.1529(c)(2) also provides that the agency will not reject a claimant's statements 

regarding the intensity and persistence of pain symptoms or whether those symptoms affect a 

claimant's ability to work "solely because the available objective medical evidence does not 

substantiate [the claimant's] statements." 

Defendant argues there were two other legally sufficient bases the ALJ discussed in 

rejecting Plaintiff's symptom testimony: Plaintiff's lack of medication compliance and that no 

reliable medical source "endorsed" Plaintiff's subjective limitations. Therefore, the ALJ's 

consideration of the lack of objective medical evidence was not the sole basis for rejecting 

Plaintiff's subjective lay testimony.

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

While Defendant articulates the lack of a physician "endorsement" as a separate basis for 

discrediting Plaintiff's symptom testimony, the ALJ's credibility analysis did not articulate such a 

basis. It is also unclear that a distinction can be drawn between a finding that lay testimony is not 

supported by objective medical evidence and a finding that lay testimony is not "endorsed" by a 

physician. Additionally, it is not clear how a treating source would "endorse" subjective 

limitations in any event. Plaintiff reported his symptoms to his treating physicians, which were 

noted in his medical records. (AR 772 (Plaintiff reported nausea, diarrhea, dizziness, and 

palpitations).) Plaintiff was prescribed multiple medications including Diltiazem, Lisinopril, 

Simvastatin, "Coreg," Digitalis, Aldactone, and Lasix (e.g., AR 772), and there is no indication his 

alleged symptoms were not considered part of his diagnosed and treated conditions. Even to the 

extent the lack of a treating doctor's "endorsement" of Plaintiff's symptoms was discussed by the 

ALJ, it is not a clear and convincing basis to reject Plaintiff's testimony.

Defendant argues the ALJ also relied on Plaintiff's lack of medication compliance as a 

basis to reject his symptom testimony. While not discussed in the credibility section of the 

decision, the ALJ did note Plaintiff's lack of medication compliance. (AR 28.) Specifically, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff "has a history of noncompliance but states he takes his medications most 

of the time." (AR 28.) 

Substantial evidence does not support this finding, and it is not a clear and convincing 

basis to discredit Plaintiff's symptom testimony. The ALJ's statement was not an accurate 

characterization of Plaintiff's testimony about his medication compliance. Plaintiff indicated at the 

hearing that he is not good at taking his prescribed medication because there are occasions when 

he does not "have a proper place to keep it," and he has been unable to reach a pharmacy or pay 

for the medications on other occasions. (AR 60.) Plaintiff did not state he takes his medication 

most of the time; rather, he acknowledged his non-compliance and explained why he failed to take 

his medication as prescribed. Not only did the ALJ fail to accurately characterize Plaintiff's 

testimony about his medication compliance, but Plaintiff offered good reasons for not taking the 

medication as prescribed – i.e., lack of funds and, because he is essentially homeless, he often 

lacks a good place to keep the medication. If a claimant offers a good reason for medication nonCase 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

compliance, such as not being able to afford the treatment, then the fact that a claimant is not 

taking medication is not a clear and convincing basis for discrediting symptom testimony. Smolen 

v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). Even if the ALJ relied on Plaintiff's lack of 

medication compliance as a basis to reject Plaintiff's credibility, under these facts it does not 

constitute a clear and convincing reason and it is not supported by substantial evidence. 

In sum, none of the ALJ's bases for discrediting Plaintiff's symptom testimony are clear 

and convincing or supported by substantial evidence. 

B. Remand is Required

“The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a 

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, 

with or without remanding the cause for a hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In Social Security cases, 

the decision to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings or simply to award benefits is 

within the discretion of the court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). “If 

additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceedings, a social 

security case should be remanded. Where, however, a rehearing could simply delay receipt of 

benefits, reversal [and an award of benefits] is appropriate.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 

1399 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Generally, we direct the award of benefits in cases where no useful purpose 

would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has been thoroughly 

developed.” (citation omitted)). Here, the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff's credibility, which can 

be given renewed consideration by the ALJ on remand. Because additional proceedings can 

remedy the defect in the original proceedings, remand rather than reversal and an award of 

benefits is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence and is, therefore, REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the ALJ for 

further proceedings consistent with this order. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter 

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

judgment in favor of Plaintiff Jeffrey Lynn Stonecipher and against Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Commissioner of Social Security. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 8, 2014 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01673-SKO Document 15 Filed 12/09/14 Page 12 of 12