Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02228/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02228-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Luis Santiago Ramirez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States courthouse 

1823 stout street 

Denver, co 80257 

October 27, 1995 

Elisabeth Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-2228, USA v. Ramirez 

Filed August 8, 1995 by Judge Tacha 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned decision: 

Throughout only the first full paragraph of the 

decision, the word "kilograms" should be replaced with the 

word "grams". 

Please make this correction to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

LUIS SANTIAGO RAMIREZ, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

FILED 

UDJted States Court ot Ap~JCQ Tenth Circuit 

AUG 0 8 1995 

PATRICK FISHER - Clerk 

No. 94-2228 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR 93-359-JP) 

Edward 0. Bustamante, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant. 

Tara C. Neda, Assistant United States Attorney (John J. Kelly, 

United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Office of the 

United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellee. 

Before TACHA and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and ELLISON,* District 

Judge. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

A jury convicted defendant Luis Santiago Ramirez of 

possessing more than 500 kilograms of cocaine with intent to 

distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and (b) (1) (B), 

* The Honorable James 0. Ellison, Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 2 
conspiracy to possess more than 500 kilograms of cocaine with 

intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a) (1) and (b) (1) (B), and carrying or using a firearm during 

and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 924(c) .1 He was sentenced to a total of 123 months 

imprisonment and a term of supervised release. Defendant now 

appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

affirm. 

I 

On June 11, 1993, a confidential informant purchased cocaine 

from defendant at a building at 838 Bridge Southwest in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico ("the building"). The controlled buy was 

part of a narcotics investigation conducted by officers from the 

Sandoval County Sheriff's Office, including Lieutenant Ramiro 

Flores. During the buy, officers observed defendant use a key to 

open the building, enter alone, leave the building, and hand 

cocaine to a confidential informant. Officers had observed 

defendant entering the building on two other occasions. 

Ten days later, Officer Flores and another officer approached 

the building with a search warrant. Carmela Rojas, one of 

Ramirez's codefendants, allowed the officers to enter. They 

conducted a search of the premises and found a triple-beam scale, 

plastic baggies, six ounces of cocaine, and a loaded revolver. 

1 All three counts also incorporated the charge of aiding and 

abetting in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2. 

2 

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Their search of Rojas uncovered $840 cash, including a $20 bill 

that the informant had given defendant during the controlled buy. 

While the officers were still searching the premises, the 

telephone at the building rang. Officer Flores answered the 

phone, and the caller asked in Spanish what was going on. The 

caller identification box indicated that the call had been placed 

from a pay phone at a gas station at the end of the block. 

Officer Flores called a nearby surveillance team, which 

apprehended defendant near the gas station and escorted him to the 

building. The officers searched defendant and found $940 cash and 

a key to the building on his person. The search of the building 

subsequently uncovered an additional kilogram of cocaine in a 

trash basket and three ounces of cocaine hidden in a pair of 

boots. 

Defendant was charged with one count of possessing more than 

500 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute, one count of 

conspiracy to do the same, and one count of using a firearm in 

relation to a drug trafficking offense. Defendant timely moved to 

suppress the evidence seized in the search of the building. The 

district court conducted a hearing on the matter and denied 

defendant's motion. Defendant then filed a motion in limine to 

exclude evidence of a prior drug-related arrest. The district 

court denied this motion as well. 

Defendant's trial began October 4, 1993. On October 7, the 

jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. Defendant 

then filed a motion to dismiss based on comments made by the 

prosecution during its closing argument, which the district court 

3 

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denied. On September 23, 1994, the court sentenced defendant to 

63 months imprisonment on counts one and two, with the sentences 

to run concurrently, and 60 months for count three, with the 

sentence to run consecutively. Defendant now appeals. 

II 

Defendant first contends that the district court should have 

suppressed the evidence seized at the building pursuant to the 

warrant because the issuing magistrate was not neutral and 

detached. Judge James Blackmer, a New Mexico state district court 

judge, issued the warrant based on an application presented by 

Officer Flores. After reading Officer Flores's supporting 

affidavit, Judge Blackmer altered the warrant and that portion of 

the affidavit listing the items to be searched and seized. 

Specifically, he (1) inserted the word "and" between "person" and 

"place" on the warrant, (2) added the words "and Luis Ramirez 

himself" to the items to be searched on the affidavit, and (3) 

added the words "keys to the doors and/or locks on the doors at 

838 Bridge, Southwest" to the items to be seized on the affidavit. 

Defendant argues that, because Judge Blackmer "substantially 

altered" the affidavit and the warrant, he abandoned his judicial 

role and was no longer neutral and detached from the 

investigation.2 

2 Defendant also contends that Judge Blackmer relied on an unrecorded conversation between Judge Blackmer and Officer Flores in 

altering the affidavit and the warrant in violation of Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 41 or N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-211(E). Judge Blackmer 

testified at the suppression hearing, however, that he relied on 

the narrative portion of the affidavit in making the additions. 

Defendant has offered no evidence contradicting this testimony. 

4 

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On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, 

we review the factual determinations made by the district court 

for clear error, and we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government. United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959, 

965 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990). A 

factual determination is clearly erroneous only if there is no 

factual support in the record or if we are "left with the definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." LeMaire v. 

United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (lOth Cir. 1987). The ultimate 

question of whether a search or seizure comported with the Fourth 

Amendment, however, is a legal issue, which we review de novo. 

United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 975 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), Justice 

Jackson delivered perhaps the quintessential explication of the 

policies underlying the Fourth Amendment: 

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped 

by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement 

the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw 

from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that 

those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached 

magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in 

the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 

Id. at 13-14. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, it is 

essential that a magistrate issuing a search warrant be neutral 

and detached rather than "an adjunct law enforcement officer." 

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984); Lo-Ji Sales. Inc. 

v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979). It therefore follows that 

Rather, he merely argues that Judge Blackmer conversed with Flores 

while making the changes. Because defendant has failed to introduce evidence showing that Judge Blackmer relied on unrecorded or 

unsworn statements in making his determination of probable cause, 

this claim must fail. 

5 

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a search premised on a warrant issued by a magistrate who lacks 

such neutrality and detachment "stands on no firmer ground than if 

there had been no warrant at all." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 

u.s. 443, 453 (1971). 

Judge Blackmer's alteration of the search warrant does not 

call into question his neutrality or detachment in this case. 

Indeed, as a judicial officer, it is the duty of an issuing 

magistrate to ensure that a warrant corresponds to the content of 

the supporting affidavit. Determinations concerning the content 

of a supporting affidavit, however, are generally the province of 

law enforcement officers. Thus, Judge Blackmer's additions to the 

affidavit itself are more troubling, requiring more careful 

analysis. 

Clearly, a magistrate's alteration of a warrant applicant's 

affidavit can constitute evidence that the magistrate abandoned 

her judicial role. We decline, however, to adopt any per se rule 

requiring suppression whenever a magistrate alters an affidavit. 

Whether a magistrate was neutral and detached in any particular 

case is necessarily an individualized and contextual inquiry. 

Courts must focus on the specific circumstances surrounding the 

issuance of the warrant and decide whether the magistrate 

"manifest[ed] that neutrality and detachment demanded of a 

judicial officer when presented with a warrant application for a 

search and seizure." Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 326. 

In this case, the district court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on the matter. That hearing revealed that Judge Blackmer 

read the narrative portion of Officer Flores's affidavit and 

6 

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"realized that there was sufficient probable cause to believe that 

Luis Ramirez himself would have possession of controlled 

substances, cocaine and/or paraphernalia for it." He also 

concluded that defendant's key to the building "was a material 

piece of evidence that would be useful in a possible criminal 

prosecution." Judge Blackmer accordingly altered the affidavit so 

as to permit the executing officers to search defendant himself 

and to seize defendant's key to the building. His additions to 

the affidavit were mere common sense extensions of the contents of 

the narrative portion of the same affidavit. 

Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court 

that such common sense changes to the affidavit "do not indicate 

that Judge Blackmer breached his duty to be a neutral and detached 

magistrate." Cf. United States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14, 16 (9th 

Cir.) (holding that the commanding officer of a military 

reservation was sufficiently neutral and detached because he had 

not "participated in any way in the investigation or prosecution" 

of the defendant), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976); United 

States v. Dorman, 657 F. Supp. 511, 514 (M.D.N.C. 1987) 

(concluding that the magistrate did not abrogate her 

constitutional obligation to be neutral and detached even though 

she "summon[ed] ... a detective to assist in the investigation 

of a matter currently before [her]"), aff'd, 846 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 

1988); United States v. Evans, 629 F. Supp. 1544, 1554 (D. Conn. 

1986) (holding that a magistrate who "suggested that the warrant 

application and warrant itself include [certain] items" was not so 

"involve[d] in the application for the search warrant as to 

7 

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disqualify [him] on grounds that he lacked the requisite 

neutrality"). First, the changes to the affidavit constituted 

rather minor additions to the list of items to be searched or 

seized. The Fourth Amendment does not require magistrates "to 

maintain Sphinx-like inscrutability in passing on warrant 

applications." United States v. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. 965, 988 

(D. Mass.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 846 F.2d 786 (1st 

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988). Second, each of the 

additions were based on Judge Blackmer's conclusion that the narrative portion of the affidavit provided probable cause to support 

the search or seizure of these items, and defendant does not challenge the search or seizure of these items on the ground that the 

warrant lacked probable cause. Finally, Judge Blackmer's altering 

of the affidavit is a far cry from the conduct or circumstances 

that the Supreme Court has held to compromise a magistrate's neutrality and detachment. Cf. Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 327 (holding 

that the town justice who had issued a warrant acted as an 

"adjunct law enforcement officer" when he "allowed himself to 

become a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was 

essentially a police operation"); Connally v. Georgia, 429 u.s. 

245, 250 (1977) (per curiam) (declaring unconstitutional a Georgia 

system under which magistrates were paid based on the number of 

warrants that they issued and therefore had a direct financial 

interest in approving warrant applications); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 

450 (holding that a state attorney general, "who was actively in 

charge of the investigation and later was to be chief prosecutor 

8 

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at the trial," was not neutral and detached for purposes of the 

Fourth Amendment) . 

We therefore find that Judge Blackmer did not abrogate his 

duty to be neutral and detached in passing on Officer Flores's 

warrant application. The district court did not err in refusing 

to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search of the 

building.3 

III 

Defendant's next claim concerns the trial court's admission 

of evidence that defendant was previously arrested for possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine. At trial, the government 

called Albuquerque Police Officer Thomas Garduno. Garduno 

testified that defendant had been arrested for possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine on July 11, 1992. Garduno also 

testified that, at the time of that arrest, defendant had been 

found in possession of eight ounces of cocaine and roughly $43,000 

in cash. The district court admitted the evidence pursuant to 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). We review a trial court's evidentiary 

rulings only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 906 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 s. 

Ct. 1156 (1995). 

Under Rule 404(b) ,4 evidence of a defendant's prior crimes, 

3 Defendant relatedly contends that if the warrant was invalid, 

the officers lacked probable cause to arrest defendant because 

"the law officers at that time relied only on that basis for the 

seizure, arrest and search of [defendant]." Because we hold that 

the search warrant was valid, this argument must fail. 

4 Rule 404(b) specifically states: 

9 

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wrongs, or acts is "admissible only for limited purposes and only 

when various prerequisites are satisfied." United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1558 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. 

Ct. 1855 (1993). As this court has stated on several occasions, 

Rule 404(b) requires that 

(1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) 

the evidence must be relevant; (3) the trial court must make 

a Rule 403 determination of whether the probative value of 

the similar acts is substantially outweighed by its potential 

for unfair prejudice; and (4) pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 105, 

the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that 

the evidence of similar acts is to be considered only for the 

proper purpose for which it was admitted. 

United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1258 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 502 U.S. 884 (1991); see also United States v. Johnson, 42 

F.3d 1312, 1315 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting the same), cert. denied, 

115 S. Ct. 1439 (1995); United States v. Poole, 929 F.2d 1476, 

1481 (lOth Cir. 1991) (same). We address each element in turn. 

First, the record reveals that the government introduced 

Garduno's testimony to show defendant's intent to possess and 

distribute cocaine, and that his participation in the conspiracy 

was knowing. This court has repeatedly held that "the use of 

prior drug involvement to show plan, motive or intent in a drug 

trafficking offense is appropriate." United States v. Sturmoski, 

971 F.2d 452, 459 (lOth Cir. 1992); see also United States v. 

Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1375 (lOth Cir. 1989); United States v. 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 

to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 

other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 

or accident. 

10 

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Mora, 845 F.2d 233, 237 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995 

(1988). Indeed, Rule 404(b) expressly provides that evidence of 

prior crimes is admissible for "proof of ... intent, ... plan, 

knowledge, ... or absence of mistake or accident." Fed. R. 

Evid. 404(b). The evidence of defendant's July 1992 arrest was 

therefore offered for a proper purpose. 

Second, the evidence was clearly relevant. Each of the 

offenses for which defendant was charged required the government 

to prove either knowledge or intent with respect to defendant's 

possession of the cocaine, its distribution, or his participation 

in the conspiracy. Officer Garduno's testimony -- that defendant 

previously had been arrested for drug trafficking and found in 

possession of eight ounces of cocaine and $43,000 in cash -- was 

probative of defendant's knowledge and intent with respect to the 

offenses charged. See United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 

677 (lOth Cir. 1989) (finding testimony of former undercover 

officer that he had previously purchased cocaine from the 

defendant "sufficiently probative of [the defendant's] intent to 

support its admission"); Mora, 845 F.2d at 237 (holding that 

evidence of a prior uncharged drug transaction was "sufficiently 

related to the charge [of distributing cocaine] to establish 

intent, motive, and conspiracy and that the evidence did have real 

probative value"); United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 912, 914 (lOth 

Cir. 1985) (holding that evidence of a defendant's prior arrest 

for marijuana possession "was highly probative of [the] 

defendant's scheme to possess and distribute marijuana"), rev'd on 

other grounds sub nom. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 

11 

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Third, the district court explicitly considered the 

evidence's probative value and prejudicial effect under Fed. R. 

Evid. 403.5 The court concluded that the probative value of 

Garduno's testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger 

of unfair prejudice to defendant. We afford trial courts broad 

discretion in making rulings under Rule 403. United States v. 

Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1508 (lOth Cir. 1994). We find no reason 

to disturb its conclusion here. 

Finally, the district court gave the jury an appropriate 

limiting instruction. Both after Officer Garduno's testimony and 

at the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 

it could consider evidence of defendant's July 1992 arrest only to 

determine whether defendant had the necessary criminal intent, 

whether he had a motive or opportunity to commit the crime, or 

whether he acted according to a plan.6 This instruction 

5 Rule 403 provides: 

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 

Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

6 In fact, the limiting instruction given by the court was suggested by defendant's counsel. It stated: 

[I]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant 

Luis Ramirez did commit the acts charged in the indictment, 

then you may consider evidence of the similar acts allegedly 

committed on other occasions to determine whether the defendant had a state of mind or intent necessary to commit the 

crime charged in the indictment, or whether the Defendant had 

a motive or the opportunity to commit the acts charged in the 

indictment, or whether the Defendant acted according to a 

plan or in preparation for commission of a crime. 

These are the limited purposes for which evidence of 

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appropriately constrained the jury's consideration of the 

evidence. See Brown, 770 F.2d at 914 (upholding the admission of 

evidence of a defendant's prior drug arrest where the trial court 

instructed the jury that the evidence "was not to be considered as 

proof of the offense at trial, but for the limited purpose of 

determining motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake") 

(internal quotation marks omitted) . 

In sum, the admission of Officer Garduno's testimony 

satisfied all four elements of this court's test for admissibility 

under Rule 404(b). Moreover, we are mindful that this court has 

"long recognized the admissibility of previous wrongs and crimes 

in the context of narcotics violations, especially when the prior 

activity was close in time, highly probative, and similar to the 

activity with which the defendant is charged." McKinnell, 888 

F.2d at 676. We therefore find that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's prior 

drug arrest. 

IV 

Defendant next contends that a statement made by the 

prosecution during the government's closing argument amounted to 

prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, the government's attorney 

stated: 

I'm not here to explain court rules to you, but if 

[defendant's attorney, Mr. Finzel] wanted it, he could have 

it. If he wanted the government to explain the timing of 

when his client left with the [confidential informant] during 

other similar prior acts allegedly committed by Luis Ramirez 

on July 11, 1992 may be considered. 

13 

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that drug deal, the timing from the exit to the driveway, 

when Ray Flores picks him up again visually, if he wanted to 

hear the timing of the Chapala restaurant incident, why 

didn't he let Tony Lopez tell you that? I brought Tony Lopez 

on rebuttal, but without explaining court rules, Mr. Finzel 

didn't want you to hear it. He objected when I asked the 

question. 

An allegation of prosecutorial misconduct presents a mixed 

question of fact and law that we review de novo. Fero v. Kerby, 

39 F. 3d 1462, 1473 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2278 

(1995). 

This court applies a two-step analysis in determining whether 

the government's behavior constituted prosecutorial misconduct. 

United States v. Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568, 572 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991); United States v. Martinez-Nava, 838 

F.2d 411, 416 (lOth Cir. 1988). First, we examine "whether the 

conduct was, in fact, improper." Lonedog, 929 F.2d at 572. If 

so, "we must then determine whether it warrants reversal." Id. 

In this case, the district court concluded that the prosecutor's 

statement was, in fact, "improper counsel argument." It found 

that "the prosecutor's comments implicitly support[ed] the 

conclusion that if Tony Lopez had been allowed to testify 

concerning the timing of the controlled buy he would have been a 

credible, truthful witness." The court nonetheless concluded that 

the statement did not warrant reversal because, in the context of 

the entire trial, the error was harmless. 

A prosecutor's improper statement to the jury is harmless 

unless "there is reason to believe that it influenced the jury's 

verdict." United States v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1296 (lOth 

Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing 

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whether the misconduct had such an impact, we consider the trial 

as a whole, including "the curative acts of the district court, 

the extent of the misconduct, and the role of the misconduct 

within the case." Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d at 416. To warrant 

reversal, the misconduct must have been "flagrant enough to 

influence the jury to convict on grounds other than the evidence 

presented." United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467, 473 (lOth Cir. 

1993); see also United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 

248 (lOth Cir. 1987/. 

The prosecutor's statement in this case was not so flagrant.? 

First, the statement was "singular and isolated," no more than a 

few brief comments in the course of a four-day trial. See United 

States v. Pefia, 930 F.2d 1486, 1491 (lOth Cir. 1991); Manriquez 

Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 248. Second, the district court instructed 

the jury on more than one occasion that the lawyers' statements 

were not evidence, and that the jury had to decide the case on the 

basis of the evidence presented. See Pefia, 930 F.2d at 1491. 

Finally, we agree with the district court that the record 

contained ample evidence for the jury to have found defendant 

guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.; 

Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 248. The district court was 

therefore correct in concluding that the impact of the 

prosecutor's statement was harmless. 

7 Because we agree with the district court that the 

prosecutor's comments were not prejudicial to defendant, we do not 

reach the question of whether the comments were actually improper. 

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v 

Finally, defendant raises three additional arguments: (1) 

that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to 

sustain his conspiracy conviction; (2) that the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain his section 924(c) conviction; and (3) 

that the evidence seized from the building should have been 

suppressed because the officers executing the search violated the 

Posse Comitatus Act. We address each of these arguments in turn. 

A 

First, defendant contends that the record lacks sufficient 

evidence to sustain his conviction for conspiring to possess 

cocaine with intent to distribute under 21 u.s.c. § 846. Whether 

the government introduced sufficient evidence to sustain a 

defendant's conviction is a question of law that we review de 

novo. United States v. Urena, 27 F.3d 1487, 1489 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 455 (1994). We will not overturn a 

jury's verdict of guilt, however, "unless no rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Romero v. Tansy, 46 F.3d 1024, 1032 (lOth Cir. 

1995), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3890 (U.S. June 19, 1995) (No. 

94-9147). In our examination of the record, we view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the government without "weigh[ing] 

conflicting evidence or consider[ing] the credibility of 

witnesses." Kelly v. Roberts, 998 F.2d 802, 808 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Indeed, we will "accept the jury's resolution of the evidence as 

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long as it is within the bounds of reason." Grubbs v. Hannigan, 

982 F.2d 1483, 1487 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

To establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government 

must "prove that the defendant knew at least the essential 

objectives of the conspiracy and knowingly and voluntarily became 

a part of it." United States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1319 (lOth 

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1439 (1995). The jury may 

infer an agreement constituting a conspiracy "from the acts of the 

parties and other circumstantial evidence indicating concert of 

action for the accomplishment of a common purpose." Id. It may 

also "presume that a defendant is a knowing participant in the 

conspiracy when he acts in furtherance of the objective of the 

conspiracy." United States v. Brown, 995 F.2d 1493, 1502 (lOth 

Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 

353 (1993). Moreover, as the Supreme Court recently held in 

United States v. Shatiani, 115 S. Ct. 382 (1994), section 846 does 

not require the prosecution "to prove that a conspirator committed 

an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. at 383. 

The record in this case reveals sufficient evidence for a 

rational trier of fact to have concluded that defendant knew the 

essential objectives of the conspiracy and voluntarily became a 

part of it. First, the record shows that all three defendants 

lived on a ranch together, that all three possessed keys to the 

building where the cocaine and drug paraphernalia were found, and 

that Officer Flores had previously observed defendant and 

codefendant Carmelo Rojas enter the building together. Second, 

Officer Flores testified that, in searching the building, he 

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seized from Rojas a marked $20 bill that the confidential 

informant had given defendant in the controlled buy of cocaine 

June 11, 1993. Finally, as discussed earlier, Officer Garduno 

testified that defendant had previously been arrested for drug 

trafficking and had been found in possession of eight ounces of 

cocaine and roughly $43,000 in cash, indicating that defendant 

knew the objectives of the conspiracy. Viewing the record in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that there 

was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that defendant conspired to possess cocaine with 

the intent to distribute. 

B 

Defendant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) for using or 

carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 

offense. Section 924(c) states that "[w]hoever, during and in 

relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries 

a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such 

. . . drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for 

five years . " 18 u. S . C. § 9 2 4 (c) ( 1) . 

This court has held that, for purposes of section 924(c), a 

defendant "uses" a firearm "during and in relation to" a criminal 

undertaking when the firearm "(1) is readily accessible, (2) is an 

integral part of the criminal undertaking, and (3) increases the 

likelihood that the criminal undertaking would succeed." United 

States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1084, 1088-89 (lOth Cir. 1994). To show 

18 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 19 
that a firearm was readily accessible, the government must 

demonstrate that it "was available to the defendant in the 

vicinity where the drug trafficking offense took place." United 

States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293, 1297 (lOth Cir. 1991); see also 

United States v. Coslet, 987 F.2d 1493, 1495 (lOth Cir. 1993) 

("'Access' to a firearm requires only that the weapon be available 

to the defendant in the vicinity where the drug offense 

occurred. " ) . 

The government can demonstrate the ready accessibility of a 

firearm by showing a close proximity between the firearm and the 

drugs. Hall, 20 F.3d at 1089. For instance, in United States v. 

Conner, 972 F.2d 1172 (lOth Cir. 1992), this court held that 

evidence that the drugs were "directly below the firearm" was 

"sufficient for a jury to find that [the defendant] intended the 

weapon to be readily available for use during the drug 

transaction." Id. at 1174. And in United States v. Hager, 969 

F.2d 883 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 437 (1992), we 

upheld a defendant's conviction under section 924(c) where the 

firearms were in close proximity to the drugs and there was 

substantial evidence connecting the defendant to the building 

where the drugs and the firearm were seized. Id. at 889. 

In this case, Officer Flores testified that the officers 

discovered the firearm on top of the water heater right next to 

six ounces of cocaine. This testimony alone is sufficient 

evidence for the jury to have concluded that the weapon was in 

close proximity to the drugs and therefore "readily accessible" 

for purposes of section 924(c). 

19 

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The two remaining elements of the section 924(c) test -- that 

the firearm be an integral part of the criminal undertaking and 

that it increase the likelihood of the undertaking's success 

require "a nexus between the readily accessible gun and the 

offense." United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1401 (lOth Cir. 

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1575 (1994). As an appellate 

court reviewing for sufficiency of evidence, "we presume a nexus 

between a firearm and a drug trafficking offense when an 

individual with ready access to a firearm is involved in such an 

offense." United States v. Holland, 10 F.3d 696, 699 (lOth Cir. 

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 739 (1994); see also Coslet, 987 

F.2d at 1495; Parrish, 925 F.2d at 1298. "However, a defendant 

charged with a drug trafficking offense may overcome this 

presumption by presenting some evidence suggesting the firearm was 

present for a reason other than facilitating the drug operation." 

Parrish, 925 F.2d at 1298; see also Coslet, 987 F.2d at 1495. 

In this case, defendant has offered no other explanation for 

the presence of the firearm. We therefore conclude that there was 

sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant of using a 

firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 

18 u.s.c. § 924(c) (1). 

c 

Finally, defendant argues that, because an Air Force sergeant 

took photographs of the items seized at the building and 

videotaped the arrest scene, the officers conducting the search 

20 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 21 
violated the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385,8 and the 

evidence seized during the search should therefore have been 

suppressed. Defendant, however, failed to raise this argument in 

his motion to suppress evidence before the district court. The 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require defendants to make 

motions to suppress evidence prior to trial, Fed. R. Crim P. 

12(b) (3), and dictate that the failure to do so constitutes a 

waiver thereof, Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(f). And this court has held 

that Rule 12(f) 's "waiver provision applies not only to the 

failure to make a pretrial motion, but also to the failure to 

include a particular argument in the motion." United States v. 

Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1502 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 

u.s. 1118 (1992). 

Having failed to include his Posse Comitatus Act argument in 

his motion to suppress, defendant has waived the claim. We 

therefore will reverse the district court only if its admission of 

the evidence constituted plain error. United States v. Davis, 55 

F.3d 517, 520 (1995). That is, the admission of the evidence must 

have been erroneous, and it must have "affect[ed] the fundamental 

8 The purpose of the Posse Comitatus Act is to "limit 'the 

direct active use of federal troops by civil law enforcement 

officers' to enforce the laws of this nation." United States v. 

Hartley, 796 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States 

v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 922 (D.S.D. 1975). The version 

in force at the time of the challenged search stated: "Whoever, 

except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by 

the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of 

the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to 

execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 

imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1385 

(amended 1994) . 

21 

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right of ... defendant to a fair and impartial trial." Id. We 

find no such error here. 

VI 

For the aforementioned reasons, we find no error in the 

judgment of the district court. The magistrate was sufficiently 

neutral and detached, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's prior drug arrest, 

and the prosecutor's statement during closing argument was not 

prejudicial to defendant. In addition, the record contains 

sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's conspiracy and firearm 

convictions, and defendant has waived his Posse Comitatus Act 

claim. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED. 

22 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 23 
No. 94-2228 

United States v. Ramirez 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 

I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion and 

much of its analysis. However, I am unable to join in the opinion 

fully as written because of my disagreement with the majority's 

analysis of the issue of alleged violation of the constitutional 

requirement that a neutral and detached magistrate determine 

whether probable cause has been shown for the warrant sought. My 

analysis, however, leads me to the same result that the majority 

reaches on this issue and I also would reject the claim that 

reversal is required because the judge who issued this warrant, on 

his own initiative, made significant additions and alterations to 

the affidavit and warrant. On the other issues presented, I am in 

agreement with the majority opinion and its affirmance of the 

judgment. 

I 

A 

Turning to the Fourth Amendment issue raised, the principal 

claim is that the magistrate who issued the search warrant was not 

neutral and detached; thus the warrant was invalid and 

suppression of all evidence seized in the searches based on the 

warrant was required. The underlying facts about this issue are 

not in dispute and they are covered by the testimony of the state 

district judge who issued the warrant, VI R. (Rojas Record) at 

5-13, and of Officer Flores, who presented his affidavit and 

obtained the search warrant. II Supp. R. at 7-16. 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 24 
The troubling facts are stated clearly in the majority 

opinion. Majority Opinion at 4. After reading the affidavit of 

Officer Flores, the state judge who issued the warrant altered the 

warrant and the portion of the affidavit listing the items to be 

searched for and seized. Specifically, the judge inserted the 

handwritten word "and" between the words "person" and "place" on 

the warrant, and put his initials immediately underneath that 

insertion. To the warrant affidavit the judge also added the 

handwritten words "and Luis Ramirez himself: J.F.B." (the 

initials of the issuing judge) , by which were written the initials 

"R.F." (of Officer Ramino Flores). Moreover the judge added to 

the affidavit, which was attached to the search warrant and 

referred to by it, the words "keys to the doors and/or locks on 

the door(s) at 838 Bridge, SW." The initials "R.F." (of Officer 

Flores) and "J.F.B." (of the issuing judge) were also added. 

I Supp. R., Affidavit at 1. The effect of the alterations and 

additions by the judge was to command the seizure and search of 

defendant Ramirez himself, and a search for keys to doors and 

locks -- significant further steps which the affidavit and warrant 

as submitted to the judge did not do. 

The state judge who issued the warrant testified at the 

suppression hearing. He said that when he read the narrative 

portion of the affidavit, he "felt that those [items he added] 

would be concealed on the person of Luis Ramirez." VIR. (Rojas 

Record) at 12. He acknowledged that he made the handwritten 

additions himself, with his insertion of the wording "and Luis 

Ramirez himself," his addition of "and" between "person" and 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 25 
"place," and his addition of the words "Keys to the doors and/or 

locks on the doors at 838 Bridge ... ,"which the warrant 

commanded to be searched for. Id. at 8. It is undisputed, as the 

judge testified, that he did not participate in any way in the 

actual execution of the warrant in question. Id. at 13. 

As the majority opinion notes, in the instant case the 

federal district judge made written findings following the 

suppression hearing. He found that (1) the changes, noted above, 

did not indicate that the state judge breached his duty to be a 

neutral and detached magistrate, citing Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 

442 U.S. 319 (1979), and United States v. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. 

965 (D. Mass. 1988); (2) the state judge's conduct amounted to a 

judicial review of the affidavit and a neutral determination on 

probable cause to search defendant Ramirez's person; and (3) in 

truth, the state judge fulfilled his judicial obligation to review 

the affidavit and determine whether probable cause existed to 

justify the issuance of a search warrant. Order at 1-2. 

B 

The troubling question is, having performed his proper 

judicial duty to review the affidavit and determine whether 

probable cause was shown, why should the issuing judge have made 

the significant changes and additions to the affidavit and the 

search warrant? The majority opinion dismisses this concern, 

viewing the insertions into the warrant and the affidavit as 

"common sense extensions" and "rather minor additions." Majority 

Opinion at 7-8. I cannot agree with that analysis in light of 

clear pronouncements by the Supreme Court and other courts that 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 26 
the Fourth Amendment requires a determination and action by a 

neutral and detached magistrate. 

Nevertheless I join in the result of the majority opinion on 

this issue. This concurring and dissenting opinion will explain 

my analysis in three steps: 

majority opinion's dismissal 

First, my reasons for rejecting the 

of the constitutional claim as 

involving mere "conunon sense extensions" and "minor additions" to 

the warrant and affidavit; second, my analysis that nevertheless 

the denial of the motion to suppress should be upheld as to the 

evidence (the cocaine, the scale, the plastic baggies and the 

loaded revolver) obtained in the search of the building at 838 

Bridge on consideration of the valid portions of the warrant and 

affidavit, after redacting the invalid additions made by the state 

judge; and third, my reasoning that the denial of the motion to 

suppress as to the evidence seized from Ramirez's person should be 

upheld because probable cause existed, independently of the 

warrant and affidavit, for the seizure of Ramirez, and that 

therefore the search of his person was valid as a search incident 

to a lawful arrest. 

c 

1 

First, my disagreement is basically with the analysis of the 

majority opinion at pages 6-9, rejecting the constitutional claim 

of violation of the mandate that a neutral and detached magistrate 

make the determination on probable cause and the issuance of a 

search warrant. There the majority opinion, among other things, 

dismisses the additions to the affidavit and warrant as "mere 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 27 
common sense extensions of the contents of the narrative portion 

of the same affidavit." Id. at 7. The opinion says that such 

common sense changes do not indicate that the state judge 

"breached his duty to be a neutral and detached magistrate," id. 

at 7, and that the insertions made in the affidavit "constitute 

rather minor additions to the list of items to be searched or 

seized." Id. at 8. 

I disagree. When the state judge inserted the provision that 

Ramirez himself should be seized and searched, and when he ordered 

that the search include keys to the doors and locks at 838 Bridge, 

he made significant substantive additions to the affidavit and the 

warrant. In doing so, the judge was not then conforming to his 

prescribed constitutional duty "[s]ince he was not the neutral and 

detached magistrate required by the Constitution." Coolidge v. 

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971); see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., 

442 U.S. at 327; Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 

(1972) ("[A]n issuing magistrate must meet two tests. He must be 

neutral and detached, and he must be capable of determining 

whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or 

search."). Indeed, in Coolidge, the Court voided a search warrant 

because it was issued by a state attorney general who was actively 

in charge of the investigation and later was to be the chief 

prosecutor at trial. See also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 

748 n.10 (1984) (requiring inferences from warrants to be drawn 

"by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of by the officer 

engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 

crime"); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978) ("The 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 28 
bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the Warrant 

Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a 

warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate before 

embarking upon a search.") .1 

Turning to other cases concerning the requirement of a 

neutral and detached magistrate, I am not persuaded that United 

States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 

1024 (1976), cited by the Majority Opinion at 7, helps the 

government here. There a commanding officer was held sufficiently 

neutral and detached to issue a search warrant. The challenge to 

his action was general, and the argument was merely that such an 

officer could in no way be neutral and detached due to his 

position. Here, however, specific actions of the state judge in 

making the changes in the affidavit and warrant, on his own 

initiative, raise serious concerns. United States v. Dorman, 657 

1 

See also State v. Valenzuela, 536 A.2d 1252, 1266 (N.H. 1987) 

(Justice Souter stating for the court that "[W]hatever else 

neutrality and detachment might entail, it is clear that they 

require severance and disengagement from activities of law 

enforcement.") (quoting Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. at 

350), cert. denied sub nom. Young v. New Hampshire, 485 U.S. 1008 

(1988); State v. Stanley, 809 P.2d 944, 950-51 (Ariz.) 

(disapproving magistrate's actions but upholding warrant in 

circumstances), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014 (1991); Gardner v. 

State, 567 A.2d 404, 411 (Del. 1989) (upholding warrant but noting 

"[t]he judge or magistrate must maintain his impartiality and not 

ally himself with one party"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990); 

State v. Wotring, 279 S.E.2d 182, 188 (W.Va. 1981) ("While we 

affirm the lower court on this issue, we are troubled by the fact 

that the justice of the peace worked with the State Police in 

preparing the warrant." (Emphasis added.)). But see State of 

Tennessee v. Nolan, 617 S.W.2d 174, 175-76 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 

1981) (rejecting complaint concerning "certain [unspecified] 

deletions and additions made by the issuing magistrate .... " to 

an affidavit; action of the magistrate upheld on reasoning that 

it did not detract from his neutrality, but demonstrated it). 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 29 
F. Supp. 511 (M.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1988) 

(Table), is also relied on by the majority opinion. While Dorman 

upheld a conclusion that the actions of a magistrate did not rise 

to the level of actions prohibited by the Constitution, the judge 

reviewing the issue seriously questioned the magistrate's actions: 

The court strongly disapproves of some of the 

actions of Magistrate Moon in this matter. A magistrate 

has absolutely no business telephoning a detective and 

requesting that he report to the Sheriff's Department 

and assist in the investigation of a case. It well may 

be that "procedure" dictates that such a call be made. 

but such is the function of a fellow officer. not of a 

magistrate. "Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to 

the law enforcement team." United States v. Leon, 468 

U.S. 897, 917, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3417, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 

(1984). 

657 F. Supp. at 514 (emphasis added). 

The judgment we are making here involves a fundamental 

ingredient of Fourth Amendment protection. We must not dismiss 

the acts in question as insignificant, nor condone them by a 

precedent which may invite disregard of the strict requirement of 

neutrality and detachment of a magistrate issuing a warrant. I am 

convinced that the challenged actions of the state judge in making 

alterations and additions to the warrant and affidavit were 

violations of the standard of conduct required of a neutral and 

detached magistrate. Therefore I cannot agree with the majority 

opinion's analysis and its conclusion that the alterations and 

additions to the warrant should be upheld. 

2 

Second, despite my disagreement with the analysis in the 

majority opinion on the neutral and detached magistrate issue, I 

join in the affirmance of the denial of suppression. In my 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 30 
opinion, the proper remedy for the invalid additions made here by 

the state judge to the affidavit and warrant does not require the 

invalidation of the warrant and search as a whole. Instead I 

believe the proper remedy is that the warrant and affidavit be 

redacted and that only the evidence obtained under the unlawful 

additions to the affidavit and warrant be set aside. This would 

follow the practice approved in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 

171-72. There, the Court said that when a proper showing is made 

of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth in an 

affidavit supporting a search warrant, then, after setting aside 

the material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or 

disregard for truth, if there remains sufficient further 

information to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is 

required. 

Following a similar procedure here, only the evidence 

obtained as a result of the improper additions to the warrant and 

affidavit would be inadmissible. I feel this procedure is proper 

here since this case does not involve circumstances like those in 

Coolidge where a warrant was rejected in its entirety because it 

had been issued improperly by the chief investigator and state 

prosecutor in the case obviously tainting the affidavit and 

warrant as a whole. 403 U.S. at 453. Here the state judge's 

office and his duty to judge whether there was probable cause for 

a warrant did not demonstrate such a fundamental conflict of 

interest as Coolidge involved. As the Court noted in Coolidge, 

403 U.S. at 450, where the State's chief investigator and 

prosecutor issued the warrant, "there could hardly be a more 

8 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 31 
appropriate setting for a per se rule of disqualification . . . " 

No such per ~ rule for invalidation of everything the state judge 

did is justified here. 

It was only when the particular actions by the state judge 

were taken in making the invalid additions to the affidavit and 

warrant that the constitutional violation occurred. These 

discrete actions by the state judge distinguish this case from 

Lo-Ji. There the Court noted that because of the overall conduct 

of the magistrate, "[i]t is difficult to discern when he was 

acting as a 'neutral and detached' judicial officer and when he 

was one with the police and prosecutors in the executive seizure 

" 442 u.s. at 328. 

Under the Franks rationale, here I would reject reliance only 

on the portions of the affidavit and warrant invalidly added by 

the judge. To me, this is a reasonable constitutional 

accommodation, protecting the Fourth Amendment right of the 

defendant while avoiding an unnecessary wholesale invalidation of 

the warrant and suppression of evidence. 

3 

Third, while I would reject reliance on the improperly added 

portions of the affidavit and warrant, I would uphold the denial 

of suppression of evidence obtained in the search of Ramirez and 

the fruits of that search. I would do so on the alternative basis 

argued by the government that even if the warrant for the search 

of Ramirez was defective, his arrest was supported by probable 

cause and thus the subsequent search was a lawful search incident 

to arrest. Appellee's Answer Brief at 17. 

9 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 32 
.. 

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), supports the 

arrest of Ramirez which was made in a public place in daytime. 

Watson noted that history clearly supports warrantless felony 

arrests in public places, and that such arrests need only be 

supported by probable cause at the time of arrest. Id. at 417. 

Neither an arrest warrant nor exigent circumstances is required. 

Id. at 423; see also United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 877 

(lOth Cir.) ("Law enforcement personnel may arrest a person 

without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that 

person committed a crime."), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991); 

United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1449 n.7 (1989) (a 

warrantless arrest in public with probable cause does not violate 

the Fourth Amendment, even though exigent circumstances do not 

exist) . 

Here in his order denying the motion to suppress, the 

district judge cited Watson and found: 

The officers who arrested defendant were aware of a 

controlled drug transaction consummated in the recent 

past at 838 Bridge, SW, between defendant and a 

confidential informant. Moreover, the officers knew 

prior to defendant's arrest that cocaine and a loaded 

firearm were found at 838 Bridge, sw, based on the 

successful execution of the search warrant. These 

factors rise to the level of probable cause and justify 

the officers' warrantless arrest of defendant. "The 

facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the 

agents and those of which they had reasonably 

trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant an 

objective belief that a crime had been committed." 

United States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1417 

(lOth Cir. 1987). The evidence seized from defendant's 

person was legally obtained per the dictates of the 

search warrant, and alternatively, was validly seized 

pursuant to a constitutionally permitted search incident 

to a lawful arrest. 

10 

Appellate Case: 94-2228 Document: 01019279369 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 33 
Order of September 24, 1993 at 2-3 (emphasis added). 

I agree with the trial judge to the extent that he found that 

the evidence seized from Ramirez's person was validly seized 

pursuant to a constitutionally permitted search incident to a 

lawful arrest. The valid search incident to the lawful arrest of 

Ramirez thus supports the admissibility of the key and cash found 

on his person. The remaining evidence the cocaine, the scale, 

the baggies and the loaded revolver -- was obtained by a valid 

search under portions of the search warrant which were not 

affected by the invalid additions. Therefore all of the evidence 

in question was properly held admissible, and the motion to 

suppress was correctly denied. 

II 

In sum, I respectfully dissent from the analysis of the 

majority opinion on the constitutional claim of violation of the 

mandate concerning a neutral and detached magistrate. However, as 

is explained above, on the basis of a different analysis I reach 

the same result on the issue as does the majority opinion, namely 

that suppression was not required. On all other issues, I concur 

fully in the analysis and conclusions of the majority opinion. 

11 

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