Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03002/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03002-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lynn M. Soto
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 19, 1997 Decided December 30, 1997 

No. 97-3002

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LYNN M. SOTO, A/K/A LINN JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cr00378-01)

Jerome A. Ballarotto argued the cause and filed the brief 

for appellant.

Thomas C. Black, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Eric H. 

Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, 

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John R. Fisher, Robert A. Spelke and Laura A. Cordero, 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge and 

BUCKLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Even though appellant appeared to 

satisfy the standards for a downward adjustment of her 

sentence under section 3B1.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for minimal or minor participation, her lawyer failed to 

request one. Finding this omission to be ineffective assistance of counsel, we remand this case so the district court can 

determine whether appellant in fact qualifies for a lesser 

sentence.

I

Recognizing that not all offenders are equally culpable, the 

Sentencing Guidelines authorize reduced sentences for defendants whose participation in illegal conduct was minor, minimal, or somewhere in between. Section 3B1.2 instructs:

Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the 

offense level as follows:

(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any 

criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels.

(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any 

criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels.

In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (1995). According to the application notes, 

the reduction "is intended to cover defendants who are plainly 

among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a 

group." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 comment. (n.1). As illustrations of 

"least culpable" participants, the Guidelines refer to "an 

individual [ ] recruited as a courier for a single smuggling 

transaction involving a small amount of drugs," id. n.2, and 

"someone who played no other role in a very large drug 

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smuggling operation than to offload part of a single marihuana shipment," id.

When appellant Lynn Soto was approached by a drug 

dealer named "City," she had neither a criminal record nor 

history of drug abuse. According to the prosecutor, City 

offered her money to take a package of drugs from New York 

to Rocky Mount, North Carolina. Having just lost her fulltime job and described by the probation officer as depressed 

at the time, Soto agreed. City gave her a round-trip Amtrak 

train ticket, issued in the name of Linn Johnson (the alias in 

the caption of this case), and placed a duct-taped package in 

her bag. Nothing in the record suggests that Soto knew how 

much drugs City had given her. During a stop in Washington, D.C., a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency officer boarded 

the train, searched Soto's bag, and discovered the duct-taped 

package. It contained 181.33 grams of powder cocaine and 

235.24 grams of cocaine base or crack, worth approximately 

$43,000. The government charged Soto with one count each 

of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession 

with intent to distribute crack. She pled guilty to the cocaine 

count.

At sentencing, the district court accepted the recommendations of the probation officer contained in the presentence 

investigation report. Based on the amount of drugs in her 

bag, the court assigned Soto a base offense level of thirtyfour, with a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. On its own motion, the court gave her an additional 

two-point reduction because she met the "safety valve" criteria. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(4), 5C1.2. The twenty-nine 

point total produced a sentencing range of 87-108 months.

Although offering no objection to the presentence report, 

Soto's lawyer argued in two separate sentencing memoranda 

that the court should depart downward under section 5K2.0 

because of Soto's extraordinary circumstances: She was a 

first-time offender supporting a disabled child by herself, she 

played a minor role in the trafficking scheme, her conduct 

was aberrational, she showed remorse, and she had no history 

of substance abuse. Counsel relied heavily on a district court 

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decision with similar facts, but we reversed that case prior to 

Soto's sentencing. See United States v. Dyce, 874 F. Supp. 1 

(D.D.C. 1994), vacated by 78 F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir.), amended 

and superseded by and reh'g denied by 91 F.3d 1462 (D.C. 

Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 533 (1996). Finding no extraordinary circumstances, the district court declined to depart 

below the Guideline range, sentencing Soto to eighty-seven 

months, the lowest point on the range.

Now with new counsel, Soto makes three arguments on 

appeal: that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request 

downward adjustment under section 3B1.2; that the district 

court should have adjusted the sentence on its own motion; 

and that the district court misunderstood its authority to 

depart downward under section 5K2.0. We consider each 

argument in turn.

II

Pointing to a single reference to section 3B1.2 in each of 

appellant's sentencing memoranda, the government argues 

that counsel raised the minimum participation issue and was 

therefore not ineffective. We disagree. To "raise" the issue 

properly, counsel had to do more than simply mention the 

provision; he had to "specifically [ ] request an adjustment 

under section 3B1.2." United States v. Foster, 988 F.2d 206, 

210 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). In this case, counsel 

did no more than cite section 3B1.2 in the course of arguing 

for a downward departure under section 5K2.0, a much 

tougher standard to meet. Not only did he fail to challenge 

the presentence report, which made no reference to section 

3B1.2, but his two sentencing memoranda cite only section 

5K2.0. In one memorandum, he described the only issue 

before the district court as "[w]hether the Court may depart 

downward from the mandatory sentencing guidelines range 

... upon a showing of the defendant's extraordinary family 

circumstances, aberrant behavior, and lack of criminal record." The memorandum concluded: "Based upon the foregoing arguments and authorities, and the record before this 

Court, Defendant respectfully urges this Honorable Court to 

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grant a downward departure from the Federal Sentencing 

Guidelines as permitted by U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0" (emphasis added).

Describing Soto's role as minimal or minor is insufficient to 

raise the section 3B1.2 issue; counsel cannot properly invoke 

a particular Guideline provision "merely by reciting to the 

court a list of mitigating facts." Id. (quoting United States v. 

Sergio, 934 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1991)). This is particularly 

true where, as here, the guideline requires the district court 

to make empirical judgments and where factual subtleties can 

make a real difference. Whether Soto's role was minimal or 

minor, as well as whether she would receive a two, three, or 

four-point reduction, depends on the particular facts of the 

case and how well counsel marshals them: For example, did 

Soto play a particularly passive role or have little or no 

knowledge of the larger distribution scheme? Was she sentenced based on relevant conduct in which other actors played 

a part? Do other circumstances demonstrate that her culpability was less than others involved in the scheme? Compare 

United States v. Olibrices, 979 F.2d 1557, 1559-61 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) (courier who was part of larger operation held responsible for the drugs that she was carrying and was not entitled 

to an adjustment for minor participation) with United States 

v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (single 

defendant courier entitled to section 3B1.2 consideration). 

Developing these issues requires more than just reciting the 

words "minimal participant."

Turning to the substance of Soto's ineffectiveness claim and 

applying the familiar two-part test articulated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), we ask whether counsel's performance fell below professional standards and, if so, 

whether it prejudiced Soto. Generally, we do not resolve 

ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal except in those rare 

circumstances where the record is so clear that remand is 

unnecessary. United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1303-04 

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (ineffectiveness claims may be decided on 

appeal without additional fact-finding either "when the trial 

record alone conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled 

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to no relief ... [or] when the trial record conclusively shows 

the contrary"). This is one of those clear cases.

" '[F]amiliarity with the structure and basic content of the 

Guidelines," we have explained, "has become a necessity for 

counsel who seek to give effective representation.' " United 

States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 

(quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992)). 

In Gaviria, defendant met Strickland's first test because his 

lawyer, ignoring case law interpreting the Guidelines' career 

offender provision, gave him flawed advice, which influenced 

his decision to go to trial. The same principle applies where, 

as here, counsel ignores a relevant Guideline provision altogether. Whether lawyers get the Guidelines wrong by misinterpreting the implication of a particular provision (Gaviria) 

or by failing to raise a potentially helpful provision altogether 

(this case), such drastic missteps clearly satisfy Strickland's 

first test: They amount to errors "so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by 

the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see 

United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (3d Cir. 

1991) (counsel's failure to seek potentially fruitful downward 

adjustment under section 3B1.2 fell outside "prevailing professional norms" and therefore was ineffective).

Soto satisfies Strickland's prejudice test as well: There is a 

"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Not only would downward 

adjustment have reduced Soto's sentence by at least seventeen months (two-point adjustment) or by as much as two and 

one-half years (four-point adjustment), but according to section 3B1.2's application notes, Soto is precisely the sort of 

person the minimal/minor participation provision covers. She 

sought out no illegal activity herself; instead, she was "recruited [by City] as a courier for a single smuggling transaction," U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 comment. (n.2). She "lack[ed] knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the 

enterprise and of [City's] [ ] activities," id. n.1, she knew 

nothing about what she would be paid, and perhaps not even 

how much contraband she carried. Although it is not for us 

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to decide whether Soto's sentence should be reduced"[t]he 

application of section 3B1.2 is inherently fact-bound and 

largely committed to the discretion of the trial judge," Caballero, 936 F.2d at 1299we cannot imagine a defendant 

better suited for serious consideration under section 3B1.2 or 

more squarely prejudiced by counsel's failure to raise it. The 

government's claim, advanced both in its brief and at oral 

argument, that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise 

a losing argument, thus lacks merit. Indeed, we are surprised that the United States, relying on a record so obviously flawed by the failings of constitutionally ineffective counsel, 

would even offer such a theory.

III

In view of our conclusion that counsel was ineffective, we 

need not reach Soto's alternative argument that the district 

court committed plain error in failing to address section 3B1.2 

on its own. As for her final contention that the court 

misunderstood its authority to depart from the Guidelines 

under section 5K2.0, we have no reason to believe that the 

district court misconstrued our analysis in United States v. 

Dyce that it could depart either if it found "extraordinary 

family circumstances" or an "extremely rare" combination of 

other factors. See Dyce, 91 F.3d at 1466-71 (defendant's 

family responsibilities, lack of prior record, remorse, and 

allegedly positive societal contributions insufficient to warrant 

departure). Since the court expressly concluded that no such 

exceptional circumstances or factors existed, we must uphold 

its decision. United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995).

We remand this case for further proceedings. Because 

Soto's eligibility for a section 3B1.2 adjustment depends upon 

further fact-finding by the district court, we will not vacate 

the sentence, instead leaving it to the district court to determine whether a revised sentence is in order and, if so, to 

fashion one consistent with the Guidelines.

So ordered.

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