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Parties Involved:
Frank Ficarra
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

' 

' FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSm:iited StateJ ~ff: ~f Appeals Tenth C1rcu1t 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FRANK FICARRA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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SEP 14 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1180 

(D.C. No. 90-CR-115) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Two issues are before us: 1) whether a chief district judge 

(chief judge), upon the apparently reasonable belief that the 

presiding senior district judge (presiding judge) is ill, abuses 

his discretion in granting a "manifest necessity" mistrial when 

the defendant does not consent to substitution of judges, and 2) 

whether that chief judge in a criminal bench trial may withdraw an 

earlier mistrial order prior to a second trial of the defendant. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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We hold that the chief judge did not abuse his discretion in 

declaring a manifest necessity mistrial when the defendant did not 

consent to substitution. We further hold that the chief judge who 

stepped into the proceedings for the presiding judge had the power 

to withdraw his mistrial order. We remand for prompt continuance 

of the trial before the presiding judge who has since returned to 

the bench. 

I. 

This case came to us by way of original jurisdiction when 

defendant sought a stay of district court proceedings and a writ 

of prohibition in case no. 90-1177. We granted a stay of 

proceedings. In case no. 90-1180, defendant then appealed from 

the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss on double 

jeopardy grounds on the basis of Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 

651, 662 (1977). We transferred and reentered our stay order in 

the appeal (case no. 90-1180) and dismissed the original 

jurisdiction matter. Our jurisdiction to consider the denial of 

the motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of double 

jeopardy arises under the collateral order doctrine as an 

exception to the finality requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Abney, 431 U.S. at 656-62; United States v. Von Spivey, 895 F.2d 

176, 177 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lynch, 598 F.2d 132, 

134 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979). 

Defendant's criminal bench trial began on June 4, 1990. The 

court had begun the taking of evidence, so jeopardy attached. Lee 

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v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 27 n.3 (1977) (in a bench trial, 

jeopardy attaches when court first hears evidence). When the 

court adjourned that day, the trial was virtually complete and the 

defendant had presented most of his case to the presiding judge. 

That evening, both the government and defense counsel were 

notified that the presiding judge was ill and hospitalized. The 

trial was continued to June 8. On June 8, the trial was again 

continued to June 13. On June 11, however, the chief judge 

transferred the case to himself and directed that the case would 

proceed, apparently having been informed by the presiding judge 

that the presiding judge could not continue. See rec. vol. IV at 

11-12. On June 13, the chief judge sought suggestions on how the 

case should proceed because the presiding district judge was 

unable to go forward. The parties stipulated that a lengthy 

adjournment of up to four weeks and perhaps indefinitely would be 

appropriate in the hopes that the presiding judge could hear the 

case at a later date. 

On June 18, however, the chief judge referred the parties to 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(a) and sought the defendant's consent for a 

substitution of judges that would allow the chief judge to review 

the transcript of the trial and pick up where presiding judge left 

off. The defendant did not consent, so the chief judge declared a 

mistrial on the grounds of manifest necessity after finding "it 

uncertain when [the presiding judge] will return to the bench in 

an active way or when he may in fact resume responsibility in this 

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trial." The chief judge then set the matter for jury trial 

commencing on June 25. 

On June 20, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the 

grounds of double jeopardy. The government responded the next 

day, informing the chief judge that the presiding judge had 

returned to work. On June 21, the chief judge vacated the 

mistrial and reassigned the case to the presiding judge. 

Thereafter, the chief judge entered a minute order denying the 

motion to dismiss as moot. That order is the subject of this 

appeal. 

II. 

To understand the case, it is necessary to delve into the 

rule which informed the chief judge's exercise of discretion in 

part. By way of backgound, "if a presiding judge in a civil case 

becomes disabled prior to issuing findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, the a successor judge must ordinarily retry the case 

unless the parties stipulate otherwise." Home Placement Serv. v. 

Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1202 (1st Cir. 1987) 

(relying upon "negative inference" of Fed. R. Civ. P. 63); 

Townsend v. Gray Line Bus Co., 767 F.2d 11, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1985) 

(same). In criminal jury trials, however, Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(a) 

provides for substitution of judges "when a presiding judge 

becomes ill or otherwise disabled during the course of a criminal 

trial." United States v. Lane, 708 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 

1983). The rule provides: 

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Judge; Disability 

(a) During Trial. If by reason of death, sickness 

or other disability the judge before whom a jury trial 

has commenced is unable to proceed with the trial, any 

other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the 

court, upon certifying familiarity with the record of 

the trial, may proceed with and finish the trial. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(a). A defendant may waive the constitutional 

right to have the same judge proceed throughout the trial, either 

by express consent or by failing to object. Simons v. United 

States, 119 F.2d 539, 544 (9th Cir.) (pre-Rule 25(a)), cert. 

denied, 314 U.S. 616 (1941); State v. McKinley, 455 N.E.2d 503, 

506-07 (Ohio 1982) (construing state rule similar to Rule 25(a)). 

When the defendant consents to substitution and the trial 

proceeds, double jeopardy concerns are not implicated. See Whalen 

v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d 272, 278 n.11 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 459 U.S. 910 (1982). When the defendant objects to 

substitution of judges, however, "[r]ule 25(a) cannot be validly 

applied, and the death or disability of the judge requires 

that a mistrial be granted." 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice & 

Procedure,§ 392 at 403 (1982 & 1990 Supp.); Bailey v. State, 397 

N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (Ind. App. 1979), see also State v. Davis, 564 

S.W.2d 876, 878 (Mo. 1978). 

Although by its terms Rule 25(a) applies only to jury trials, 

it has been mentioned in the context of a criminal bench trial. 

In United States v. Sundstrom, 489 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1973), 

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 934 (1974), the Second Circuit indicated 

that when a district judge, acting as the trier of fact, is 

disabled prior to the resolution of factual matters, a mistrial 

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would be required. Thus, when the presentation of evidence is 

incomplete, or factual matters are pending in a bench trial, the 

proper remedy is a mistrial. Id.; Bailey, 397 N.E.2d at 1026-27. 

Rule 25(a) plainly does not apply to criminal trials in which 

the judge is the trier of fact, and it is clear that, absent 

consent of the defendant, substitution of judges prior to the 

resolution of factual questions in a criminal bench trial is 

impermissible. See Sundstrom, 489 F.2d at 862; cf. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 63. Still, we are satisfied that the chief judge did not 

commit reversible error by considering Rule 25 alternatives, 

particularly given the defendant's unequivocal rejection of them. 

III. 

The substance of defendant's double jeopardy argument is that 

the chief judge did not exercise sound discretion in declaring a 

mistrial. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579, 580 

(1824) (formulation of manifest necessity test). We review the 

mistrial order in this case for a "high degree" of necessity, and 

an exercise of "sound discretion" given defendant's 

constitutionally protected interest in having the case resolved in 

a single proceeding. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506, 

514-515 (1978). Our review is plenary and we may look at the 

entire record, not merely the declaration of mistrial. United 

States v. Bauman, 887 F.2d 546, 549-50 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 1128 (1990). We are particularly attentive to 

the defendant's interest in having his case resolved by the 

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original trier of fact, the presiding judge. See Illinois v. 

Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973). In the absence of an 

"important countervailing interest of proper judicial 

administration," however, double jeopardy would bar retrial of the 

defendant. Id.; United States v. Sartori, 730 F.2d 973, 976-77 

(4th Cir. 1984) (judge recused and declared mistrial after parties 

twice declined recusal; retrial barred); United States v. 

Crotwell, 896 F.2d 437, 441 (10th Cir. 1990) (mistrial granted 

solely for judicial economy; retrial barred). 

The manifest necessity standard is not to be applied 

mechanically; the facts and circumstances of the case must be 

considered with "attention to the particular problem confronting 

the trial judge." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 506. The 

mistrial declaration should be scrutinized based upon the facts 

known to the district judge after a reasonable inquiry at the time 

of the mistrial decision. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 

691-92 (1949). This case does not call for the strictest 

scrutiny, though, given the complete lack of fault by the 

government. Rather, the case is more akin to the declaration of a 

mistrial when a jury is deadlocked or juror bias is involved; such 

circumstances generally occur independently of the parties. Id. 

at 509. In such circumstances, we give the trial judge's finding 

of manifest necessity a high degree of respect. Crotwell, 896 

F.2d at 440; Bauman, 887 F.2d at 549-50; 

Defendant makes much of the fact that within three days of 

the mistrial declaration the presiding judge returned to work, at 

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least part-time to handle brief in-chambers conferences, and was 

scheduling criminal cases for trial in late-July. It is well 

settled that illness of a judge, counsel or juror may be grounds 

for a manifest necessity mistrial. Von Spivey, 895 F.2d at 178 

(illness of defense counsel); Lynch, 598 F.2d at 135-36 (illness 

of trial judge); see also Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 

372-73 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that a manifest 

necessity mistrial would be appropriate "when there is a breakdown 

in judicial machinery such as happens when a judge is stricken, or 

a juror has been discovered to be disqualified to sit, or when it 

is impossible or impractical to hold a trial at the time and place 

set"); Bauman, 887 F.2d at 549 (parenthetically noting that 

"manifest necessity for mistrial exists, where, for example, judge 

or juror cannot attend because of illness or death"); Cherry v. 

Director, State Bd. of Corrections, 635 F.2d 414, 419 (5th Cir.) 

(en bane) (noting "common practice of declaring a mistrial when, 

for good reason, a judge or juror ceases to attend"), cert. 

denied, 454 U.S. 840 (1981). Defendant places too little weight 

upon the factors leading up the mistrial order. Although this was 

a one or two day case, the presiding judge had twice continued the 

trial due to his illness. He had been hospitalized. When the 

mistrial was granted, the chief judge was fully aware that the 

presiding judge had been ill for two weeks and could not resume 

the trial. A protracted continuance with no firm date of return 

for the trier of fact may well have been viewed as impractical. 

Cf. United States v. Williams, 717 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1983). 

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Merely because the chief district judge lacked the clairvoyance to 

foresee the fortunate prompt return of the presiding judge to his 

duties does not render inadequate the chief judge's exercise of 

discretion. Illness of the trier of fact, with no firm estimate 

of when this case would be resolved, constitutes a high degree of 

necessity. 

The chief judge did consider some alternatives to declaring a 

mistrial. Though perhaps not constitutionally required, such a 

practice is desirable. United States v. Jaramillo, 745 F.2d 1245, 

1246 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985). He 

inquired whether the defendant would consent to a substitution of 

judges. Both counsel agreed that a four-week adjournment would 

have been preferable to a mistrial declaration. Perhaps the 

district court should have explained why it rejected this 

alternative given the gravity of a mistrial decision. Cf. Lynch, 

598 F.2d at 136. But such an agreement does not preclude the 

district court from declaring a manifest necessity mistrial. See 

Lynch, 598 F.2d at 134. As explained by the Fifth Circuit: "The 

availability of alternatives less draconian than a mistrial does 

not necessarily preclude prosecution, as reasonable judges may 

differ concerning proper curative measures." Bauman, 887 F.2d at 

550. This is precisely the case for application of that rule; the 

exercise of sound discretion by different judges very well may 

result in different outcomes when the circumstances reasonably 

support various alternatives, and we cannot say that the 

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discretion exercised in this case was irrational or irresponsible, 

Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 514-15. 

IV. 

"A mistrial is equivalent to no trial; it is a nugatory 

proceeding." 58 Am. Jur. 2d, New Trial§ 10 (1989); United States 

v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1478 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 

U.S. 1009 (1988). Had this been a jury trial, the original trier 

of fact likely would have been released and the grant of a 

mistrial could not have been undone; retrial would have been 

necessary. But this was a bench trial, and the chief judge sought 

to reconsider and rescind the mistrial declaration upon learning 

three days later of the return of the presiding judge to his 

duties on a part-time basis. A party may withdraw a motion for a 

mistrial. United States v. Evers, 569 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir. 

1978); United States v. Greenbank, 491 F.2d 184, 188 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 417 U.S. 934 (1974). And a court, after granting a 

defendant's motion for a mistrial, may set aside the mistrial 

order upon contemporaneous withdrawal of the mistrial motion by 

the defendant. Burnett v. Kerr, 835 F.2d 1319, 1322 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 830 (1988); United States v. Gigax, 605 

F.2d 507, 515 (10th Cir. 1979). Although the space of three days 

between the declaration of the mistrial and setting it aside gives 

us pause, we hold that the chief judge's order was effective. 

This conclusion is warranted because this is a bench trial and the 

presiding judge is now available to resume the trial (same trier 

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.. 

of fact) and the defendant earlier expressed preference for this 

alternative, indicating that he would not be prejudiced by the 

delay inherent in this alternative. See rec. vol. I, doc. 5 at 

1-2, ,r,r 3-5. Accordingly the district court's denial of the 

motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is AFFIRMED and the 

case is REMANDED to the presiding judge for resumption of the 

defendant's criminal trial. The mandate shall issue in five days 

from the date of this order. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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