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Parties Involved:
Raymond Ladell Sloan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

'. 

PUBLISH FILEDUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United StateS Court of AppcdS Tentb CircUit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RAYMOND LADELL SLOAN 

Defendant-Appellant. 

SEP 13 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-6070 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-93-133-W) 

Leslie M. Maye, Assistant United States Attorney (Rozia 

McKinney Foster, U.S. Attorney, and Kim Taylor, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Bill Zuhdi, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorney for Raymond 

Ladell Sloan, Defendant-Appellant. 

Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge,* 

and McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable John C. Godbold, Senior Circuit Judge for the 

Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-6070 Document: 01019276913 Date Filed: 09/13/1995 Page: 1 
• 

In a 38-count superseding indictment Raymond Ladell 

Sloan and six others were jointly charged in the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma 

with various drug and drug related offenses. Two defendants 

pled guilty to one count and have not appealed their sentence. The remaining five defendants went to trial, and all 

were convicted by a jury on various counts. Each filed a 

separate appeal. We are here concerned with one defendant, 

Raymond Ladell Sloan (Sloan) . 

Sloan was convicted on 14 of the 16 charges against him 

and was sentenced to imprisonment for 360 months on certain 

counts and 96 months on other counts, all to be served concurrently.1 He now appeals his convictions and the sentences 

imposed thereon. We affirm. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Sloan was acquitted on count 1 charging conspiracy and 

on count 11 charging a distribution of cocaine base, and convicted on 14 other charges of drug distribution and using the 

telephone to facilitate a drug distribution. Counsel argues 

as his first ground for reversal that as a matter of law the 

evidence is insufficient to support any conviction. This 

argument is apparently based on the fact that much of the 

evidence against Sloan came in the form of testimony of accomplices, which was, according to counsel, "uncorroborated, 

1 Sloan's total offense level was 42 and his criminal 

history category was III, which sets a guideline range for 

imprisonment at 360 months to life. 

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contradictory and incredible, as a matter of law," to the end 

that "no rational trier of the fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

That is not our view of the matter. 

It is true that much of the evidence presented by the 

government consisted of the testimony from accomplices of 

Sloan. Not just one accomplice, but many, we would add. It 

is also true that the jury acquitted Sloan on the conspiracy 

charge. But we reject any suggestion that because Sloan was 

acquitted of conspiracy, the jury could not find him guilty 

on other counts in the indictment. Counsel does not argue 

here that the verdicts were legally inconsistent. 

The instant case involved an ongoing investigation by 

the FBI and the Oklahoma City Police Department into protracted drug distribution within the Soonerhaven and Will 

Rogers Courts housing projects in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 

After the arrest of five individuals transporting cocaine 

base from Texas to Oklahoma, some of those individuals, and 

others, "cooperated" with the authorities which resulted, 

inter alia, in a wiretap of Sloan's residence. As indicated, 

numerous accomplices and co-conspirators testified against 

Sloan and involved him as a key figure in the drug distribution scheme which functioned from 1988 to 1993. 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the government 

in order to determine whether all the evidence, both direct 

and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences 

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therefrom, convinces us that a rational fact finder could 

have found the appellant guilty of the crime charged beyond a 

reasonable doubt. United States v. Chavez-Palacios, 30 F.3d 

1290, 1293-94 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)). In making this determination, we 

review the record de novo, United States v. Grimes, 967 F.2d 

1468, 1472 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 355 (1992). 

In United States v. McGuire, 27 F.2d 457, 462 (lOth Cir. 

1994), we rejected the suggestion that "the testimony of an 

accomplice should seldom, if ever, be believed" and recognized the general rule that in a criminal case a jury may 

convict a defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of an 

accomplice. As indicated, in the instant case, we have the 

testimony of many accomplices. In short, we are not persuaded that there is insufficient evidence to support the 

jury's verdict convicting Sloan on 14 of the 16 counts in 

which he was charged. 

II. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) (e) (1) 

Six weeks prior to trial, counsel for Sloan filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) (e) (1) alleging that Sloan was 

indigent and asking that an investigator be appointed to assist counsel in preparing for trial. The district court denied that motion, and counsel, on appeal, argues that such 

constitutes reversible error. We disagree. 

In this Court, counsel's position is that the district 

court erred in not appointing a CPA and a medical doctor to 

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assist Sloan in preparation for trial. Specifically, counsel 

suggests that if a CPA had examined Sloan's financial status 

he would have found that Sloan had "no assets" whatsoever, 

which, according to counsel, would indicate that he was not 

involved in drug dealing. At trial, however, the 

government's evidence showed that indeed Sloan had no assets 

to speak of, and in this regard, it was the government's 

theory of the case that the drug proceeds were spent when 

received and not used to acquire real estate or stocks and 

bonds, nor put in bank accounts, by way of example. So, the 

CPA would have testified to facts conceded by the government. 

The medical doctor, according to counsel, would have 

testified that Sloan was not a "user" of drugs, which counsel 

suggests would indicate that Sloan was not dealing in cocaine. Be that as it may, the government's evidence showed 

that indeed Sloan was not a drug user. So, again, the doctor 

would have testified to a fact conceded by the government at 

trial. 

Under the circumstances above outlined, we find no error 

in the district court's denial of Sloan's motion. A decision 

to deny, or grant, an application for expert services is a 

matter committed to the sound discretion of the district 

court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of 

prejudice. United States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 

19 8 8) . 

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• 

III. Gang Activity 

Prior to trial, counsel, by motion, sought to prohibit 

the government from introducing any evidence that Sloan, and 

others, were engaged in "gang activity." The district court 

denied the motion, but did express concern about the matter 

and stated that the government could not introduce such line 

of testimony unless it related to the essential elements of 

the crimes charged in the indictment. So, during the trial 

there was testimony relating to Sloan's gang membership, some 

of which was allowed, and some of which was excluded and the 

jury admonished to disregard. Counsel argues that the district court was lax in this regard and should have declared a 

mistrial. We disagree. 

The government's evidence showed that these drug distributions in two housing projects in Oklahoma City were a 

part of the operation of two gangs which apparently had amicably divided up the territory. Gang membership under such 

circumstances was relevant and material to the crimes 

charged. This particular matter was considered in United 

States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554 (lOth Cir. 1992), Judge 

Seth dissenting, where we spoke as follows: 

Gang membership helped to establish an agreement among the subjects, the purpose of the 

conspiracy and knowledge on the part of these 

defendants. We share the appellants' concern 

and reiterate that affiliation evidence alone 

could not support a conviction. However, as 

the government emphasized at oral argument, 

gang membership was but one piece of evidence. 

'An item of evidence, being 

link in the chain of proof, 

conclusively the proposition 

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but a single 

need not prove 

for which it 

Appellate Case: 94-6070 Document: 01019276913 Date Filed: 09/13/1995 Page: 6 
is offered. . . . It is enough if the item 

could reasonably show that a fact is 

slightly more probable than it would appear 

without that evidence. . . . A brick is 

not a wall.' 

United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 887 

(lOth Cir.) (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 

185 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944, 110 S. Ct. 

348, 107 L.Ed.2d 336 (1989). The dissent 

misses this point altogether, arguing that 

"'proof that a person fits the profile, unsupported by evidence of drug trafficking, 

proves nothing.'" Dissent at 1569-70 (quoting 

United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 

(4th Cir. 1990). Here, there is ample evidence of drug trafficking in addition to the 

gang related items discovered at the apartment, which we conclude are not profile evidence in any event. 

Id. at 1563. 

In the instant case, the "gang activity" evidence was 

offered to prove the existence of a conspiracy, and to show 

the basis of the relationship between the defendant and witnesses who participated in the drug distribution . operation. 

As indicated, Sloan was acquitted on the conspiracy charges. 

Nonetheless, our review of the record supports the district 

court's determination that certain gang evidence was more 

probative than prejudicial and thus was properly admitted. 

IV. Other Crimes 

A government witness was asked on direct examination 

whether Sloan owed him any money, and the witness replied, 

"Yes." When asked "from what" the money was owed, the witness said, "From giving him drugs and me paying my money--or 

I got him out of jail." Defense counsel objected to the "out 

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of jail" statement. 

jury was instructed to 

The objection was sustained, and the 

disregard the statement. Defense 

counsel later moved for a mistrial based on the witness's 

"out of jail" statement, and the district court denied the 

motion. Counsel now argues on appeal that the district 

court's denial of his motion for mistrial is reversible error. We disagree. 

A district court's denial of a motion for mistrial is 

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United 

States v. Hartsfield, 976 F.2d 1349, 1353 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

Under the described circumstances, we find no such abuse. 

The objection was sustained and the jury instructed to disregard the statement. There is nothing in the record before 

us to suggest that the jurors did not remain "true to their 

oath . [to] conscientiously observe the instructions and 

admonitions of the court." United States v. Greschner, 802 

F.2d 373, 381 (lOth Cir. 1986). Further, the evidence 

against Sloan was, in our view, overwhelming. The evidence 

indicated that Sloan was a major player in this cocaine operation. Where the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming, any error in mentioning a defendant's criminal 

record is harmless. United States v. VanScoy, 482 F.2d 347, 

349 (lOth Cir. 1973). In short, the district court did not 

err in denying the motion for a mistrial. 

V. Drug Quantity 

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• 

The pre-sentence report in paragraph 41 set Sloan's base 

offense level at 38 based on the fact that approximately 

4.885 kg. 's of cocaine was "attributable 11 to Sloan. Sloan 

filed objections to paragraph 41, asserting, generally, that 

the evidence of drug dealing other than the transactions for 

which he was convicted as "relevant conduct" was 

contradictory and unreliable and he challenged, in 

particular, the testimony given at trial by Carlos Gonzales 

and Chris Scott. In rejecting Sloan's objections, the 

district judge stated that although he had "some concern" 

regarding the testimony of Gonzales, he nonetheless "felt 

that the testimony was reliable enough to sustain the drug 

amounts submitted by the government." We agree. 

We review a district court's drug quantity determination 

under a clearly erroneous standard, and we will not disturb 

it unless it has no support in the record or unless we are 

firmly convinced that an error has been made. United States 

v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289, 296 (lOth Cir. 1991). The government 

has the burden of proving the quantity of drugs for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence. United 

States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1508 (lOth Cir. 1993). In 

determining the quantity of drugs involved, the government is 

not limited to the amount of drugs involved for which a defendant was convicted, and a defendant is responsible for 

"all quantities . . . with which he was directly involved and 

. all reasonably foreseeable quantities . . . that were 

within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly 

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undertook." U.S.S.G. § 1Bl3, Comment, n.2 (1993). The credibility of a witness whose testimony is relied upon at 

tencing is for the sentencing court to analyze. 

States v. Deninno, 29 F.2d 572, 578 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

senUnited 

The 

information underlying an estimate of the amount of drugs 

attributable to a defendant must possess "a minimum indicia 

of trustworthiness." United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289, 

296 (lOth Cir. 1991). Our study of the record leads us to 

conclude that the determination by the district court of the 

quantity of drugs attributable under the guidelines to Sloan 

is not clearly erroneous. 

VI. Criminal History 

On February 4, 1991, Sloan pled guilty in an Oklahoma 

state court to possession of a controlled dangerous substance 

and received a seven-year suspended sentence. Counsel argues 

in this Court that the district court erred in counting that 

conviction as a so-called "predicate felony" under U.S.S.G. § 

4Bl.l, arguing that the state conviction did not meet the 

definition of a "controlled substance offense" under § 4Bl.2. 

That is not our reading of the presentence report. Rather, 

the state conviction was used in calculating Sloan's criminal 

history category under U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(c), which was proper. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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