Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04876/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04876-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barbara Corby Martin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 06-4876

BARBARA CORBY MARTIN, a/k/a

Barbara Balsley,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.

Norman K. Moon, District Judge.

(3:05-cr-00028-nkm)

Argued: February 1, 2008

Decided: April 15, 2008

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Duncan joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: John Edward Davidson, DAVIDSON & KITZMAN,

P.L.C., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jean Barrett Hudson,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville,

Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John L. Brownlee, United States

Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. 

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OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge: 

Barbara Corby Martin appeals her convictions and sentences for

arson, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(i) (West 2000); using fire to commit

mail fraud, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(h)(1) (West 2000); and mail fraud,

see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 2007). Martin argues that the

evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that she

caused the fire upon which her arson and using fire convictions were

based, and she contends that the district court imposed multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy

Clause. As explained below, we affirm the jury’s verdict and the sentence imposed by the district court. 

I.

Because Martin challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions, we summarize the evidence presented at trial, as

well as the inferences flowing therefrom, in the light most favorable

to the government. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80

(1942); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en

banc). 

From 1998 through 2003, Martin owned and operated the

Swissway Market, a small convenience store located in Scottsville,

Virginia, that was damaged by a fire in October 2003. At the time of

the fire, both Martin’s business and her personal financial affairs were

in significant distress. 

In 2003, the Swissway Market operated at a net loss of approximately $165,487, fell in arrears on its lease (and was three months

late at the time of the fire), routinely issued checks that were refused

for insufficient funds, and lost check writing privileges on its Sam’s

Club account. Additionally, because of continuing overdraft problems, the Albemarle First Bank closed Swissway Market’s business

account. Within a few weeks of the fire, the Swissway Market lacked

sufficient operating funds, rendering it unable to pay suppliers and

vendors, stock its shelves, or compensate its employees. Heinz Gadi2 UNITED STATES v. MARTIN

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ent, who owned and leased the building to the Swissway Market,

observed shortly before the fire that the freezer which was used to

store meats and deli items was covered with butcher paper and closed

off to the public. 

Individually, Martin owed approximately $109,000 in unpaid state

taxes at the time of the fire, including interest and penalties, as well

as at least $17,000 in unpaid federal taxes. In the months leading up

to the fire, Martin consulted David Way, a CPA, to help her negotiate

with Virginia tax authorities regarding Virginia’s tax amnesty date on

November 3, 2003. Pursuant to this tax amnesty plan, Virginia forgave various penalties and liabilities if the debtor arranged to satisfy

the debt before November 3. The fire, as it turned out, occurred about

one week before the amnesty date. 

There were numerous additional problems as well. Martin, having

failed to pay her municipal business license fees or meal taxes for a

number of years, was threatened with legal action in September 2003.

Collectively, Martin and the Swissway Market owed $119,264 in

debts over and above any available funds. 

With her financial problems mounting, Martin explored selling the

business and, a few months before the fire, located a potential buyer.

Unfortunately, the sale of her business never came to fruition, and

Martin openly expressed her dislike of the business and the town and

her desire to "torch" the building "if she had the guts." J.A. 134. At

one point, Martin hinted that "it’s not going to be long and I’m not

going to have to worry about any of it anyway." J.A. 135. About two

weeks before the fire, in fact, Martin removed her computer from the

store. Later, she told a friend that certain items of furniture had been

removed from the store on the day before the fire. 

On October 28, 2003, the day of the fire, Martin climbed into the

store’s loft, where various records, invoices and supplies were stored.

The loft was accessible to Martin and her employees only by use of

a free-standing ladder. Shortly before lunch, Swissway Market

employee Gloria Poe held the ladder in place for Martin, who indicated she needed to get paper bags from the loft for the lunch crowd.

When Martin climbed back down, however, she did not have any

bags. 

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Several hours later, while employee Kimberly Martin was closing

the store for the evening, Martin returned to the Swissway Market,

which had never happened before while Kimberly was working, and

indicated that she was looking for a document. Kimberly continued

her close-of-business routine, unplugged the pizza ovens and other

appliances, and cleaned and turned out the lights. When Kimberly left

at 10:25 p.m., the power to the compressors and freezer was off, the

loft door was closed, and the ladder used to access the loft had been

returned to its place outside of the building. Martin was still on the

premises along with her boyfriend, Tom Snoddy, who drove her to

the store. Snoddy entered the store at some point but returned to the

car to wait for Martin, who exited the store at approximately 10:30

p.m. Martin then told Snoddy she forgot to turn off the lights and

returned by herself to the store for fifteen to twenty minutes. After she

returned to the car, Snoddy drove around the building to inspect a

security camera that he had installed; however, Martin became agitated and told Snoddy they had to leave immediately so she could

search for a tax document at home. 

At approximately 11:15 p.m., a passerby noticed a fire burning

through the roof of the Swissway Market and called 911. When firefighters arrived at the scene fifteen minutes later, the fire was raging

twenty feet above the roof line. Firefighters noticed that the door to

the loft was partially open and that the ladder was back inside and

positioned to provide access to the loft. Moreover, at some point that

night, Martin called Dawn Detamore, a close friend, to tell her about

the fire. During the conversation, Martin told Detamore that she had

been in the loft that evening to search for some papers. In a subsequent conversation, however, Martin tried to convince Detamore that,

in fact, Martin had said the opposite — that she "didn’t go into the

loft looking for the papers." J.A. 283. 

Shortly after the fire, Martin filed a claim on a business owner’s

policy issued by Hanover Insurance Company that covered the contents of the Swissway Market and any income lost as a result of a covered event. Martin mailed the claim notice and Hanover, on

November 7, 2003, issued Martin a check for $25,000. Martin later

filed an official proof of claim, including her sworn statement that the

"loss did not originate by any act, design or procurement on the part

of the insured or this affiant." J.A. 38. The policy limit was $105,000,

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and Martin expected to receive the balance of these proceeds at some

point in the future. 

Following the fire, Martin and Way discussed her using the insurance proceeds to resolve her tax liability with the Commonwealth of

Virginia. Way, who was "expecting [that] there was going to be some

money available," J.A. 76, tried to broker a deal whereby Virginia

would accept a discounted amount in satisfaction of the entire

$109,000 tax debt. Specifically, Way hoped Virginia would accept a

lump sum payment of $80,000, the remainder of the insurance proceeds. Martin told Way that the initial $25,000 payment from Hanover was used to pay her employees’ wages. In fact, Martin transferred

$17,000 to her home equity line at Albemarle First Bank and $8,000

to Detamore, who then issued a check in approximately the same

amount to Martin’s mortgage company. 

Agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF") investigated the fire jointly with local officials. Special

Agent Hine, who examined the scene within a week of the fire, testified as an expert on the subject of the cause and origin of fires. Agent

Hine concluded from examining the remains of the building that the

fire started in the loft area of the Swissway Market. He noted that

there was very little fire damage to the contents in the lower part of

the store; that any significant damage was caused by the upper portion

of the structure collapsing and falling down; and that the soot and

burn markings were far heavier in the upper part of the structure. 

As for the cause of the fire, Agent Hine ultimately classified the

fire as "incendiary," i.e., one that was intentionally started. Although

the cause of the fire was classified as "undetermined" when investigators first left the scene, this was merely an initial and preliminary

classification. Agent Hine explained that, "[a]s a fire investigator, [I]

want to try to get every piece of information [I] can from witnesses,

from the fire scene, any forensic analysis that is done before [I] make

a final determination." J.A. 338. Once the investigation was complete,

Hine concluded that the cumulative facts demonstrated that someone

set the fire intentionally: the loft door was open during the fire and

the ladder was in place to provide access to loft, where the fire

started; no ignitable liquids were stored in the loft that could have

accidently ignited; an electrical engineer examined the scene, deterUNITED STATES v. MARTIN 5

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mined the power to the compressors and the lighting in the loft was

off during the fire and ruled out an electrical cause; and Martin had

been inside of the store mere moments before the fire was observed

20 feet above the roof line. 

In December 2003, investigators interviewed Martin for the first

time. Martin claimed that she had not been in the loft at the Swissway

Market for two years and had not gone into the loft on the night of

the fire either. She also suggested that she had experienced problems

with the circuit breakers. Martin claimed that her business was

improving and generally doing well, denied that she was experiencing

financial problems and told agents that her tax problems with Virginia

"had been resolved and . . . taken care of," J.A. 115, and that the IRS

actually owed her a refund of $10,000. In March 2004, investigators

conducted a follow-up interview during which Martin revealed new

claims, most notably that Tom Snoddy stole her keys to the Swissway

Market right before the fire. 

In light of the evidence presented by the ATF investigators and

Martin’s clear financial motive to commit arson for the insurance proceeds,1

 a jury convicted Martin on all five counts charged in her

indictment: malicious damage to a building by fire in violation of 18

U.S.C.A. § 844(i); using fire to commit another felony, namely mail

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(h); mail fraud in violation of

18 U.S.C.A. § 1341; and two counts of making a false material statement to ATF investigators (one count based on her assertion that she

had not been in the loft and one count based on her claim that she was

not experiencing financial problems), in contravention of 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 1001(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). 

1The record contains evidence suggesting that the fire was not the

result of arson. For example, Richard Chance, a fire scene investigator

for insurance companies, appeared at trial on behalf of Martin and opined

that he did not see any evidence of an incendiary origin; however, he

acknowledged that he knew nothing about Martin’s dire financial straits

and admitted such information would have influenced his review of the

evidence. Martin also presented expert testimony from an electrical engineer who indicated he could not rule out an accidental cause of the fire.

Given that we must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the

government, we need not dwell on this testimony. 

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Prior to sentencing, Martin moved to dismiss Count II of the indictment — that she used fire to commit the felony of mail fraud — arguing that the elements of this charge appear in Counts I (arson) and III

(mail fraud). Martin contended that a sentence imposed for the conviction on Count II would essentially subject her to multiple punishments for conduct already being punished through her convictions on

Counts I and III. The district court rejected this argument and

imposed a sentence of 60 months each on Counts I and III, and 60

months each on Counts IV and V, all to run concurrently. On Count

II, the district court concluded that it was required to impose a sentence of 120 months to run consecutively to the sentences imposed on

all other counts. 

II.

Martin challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

jury’s conclusion that she committed arson as charged in Count I or

"used fire" as charged in Count II.2 Under the standard of review

established in Glasser, we must sustain the jury’s verdict "if there is

substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it." 315 U.S. at 80. We are prohibited from "overturn[ing] a substantially supported verdict merely because [we] . . .

determine[ ] that another, reasonable verdict would be preferable.

Rather, we shall reverse a verdict if the record demonstrates a lack of

evidence from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt." Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862; see United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d

143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that it is within the province of

2

In the Statement of Issues set forth in her opening brief, Martin also

purports to raise this evidentiary challenge as to her conviction on Count

III for mail fraud. Martin’s argument, however, is limited to whether the

evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Martin intentionally

caused the fire, and she presents no sufficiency of the evidence challenge

to the jury’s conclusion that she committed mail fraud. Martin’s argument was similarly circumscribed at oral argument. Accordingly, we

need not address the sufficiency of the evidence as it concerns Martin’s

mail fraud conviction on Count III. See United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356

F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) ("It is a well settled rule that contentions not raised in the argument section of the opening brief are abandoned."). 

UNITED STATES v. MARTIN 7

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the jury, not the appellate court, to "resolve[ ] any conflicts in the evidence presented, and if the evidence supports different, reasonable

interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to believe")

(citation omitted). Accordingly, in the context of a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence, our task as an appellate court is simply

to determine whether, in light of the evidence presented at trial, "the

jury could rationally have reached a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984). Because

we consider the evidence in the light most beneficial to the government, granting "the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be established," United

States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982), Martin must

carry an imposing burden to successfully challenge the sufficiency of

the evidence, see United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th

Cir. 1997). 

Both Count I (arson) and Count II (using fire to commit mail fraud)

required the government to prove that Martin burned down the

Swissway Market. The federal arson statute, set forth in 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 844(i), requires the government to prove "that the defendant: (1)

maliciously; (2) damaged or destroyed a building, vehicle, or other

real or personal property; (3) by means of fire or explosive; and (4)

the building [or other] property was used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce."

United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1996).3 The malice

requirement imposed by § 844(i) "is satisfied if the defendant acted

intentionally or with willful disregard of the likelihood that damage

or injury would result from his or her acts." Id. at 948. 

In section 844(h)(1), Congress directs that the punishment for any

3

In relevant part, section 844(i) provides: 

Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building,

vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or

foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and

not more than 20 years . . . . 

18 U.S.C.A. § 844(i). 

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other felony be enhanced if the government can prove that the defendant (1) "use[d] fire or an explosive" (2) "to commit [the] felony." 18

U.S.C.A. § 844(h)(1).4 The "use" of fire covered by this provision is

not limited to arson and encompasses, for example, the use of fire to

intimidate or threaten another person. See, e.g., United States v.

Wildes, 120 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Unquestionably, setting

fire to a wooden cross as a means of intimidation constitutes the use

of fire . . . within the plain meaning of § 844(h)(1)."). 

Here, of course, the government’s evidence that Martin "used fire"

and committed arson was the same. Martin contends that this evidence failed to prove a causal link between her and the fire. Because

the government did not present the type of forensic evidence that in

and of itself suggests arson, such as building materials with trace

amounts of liquid accelerants, Martin complains that the government

failed to adduce any evidence that the fire was the result of arson as

opposed to an accidental source, such as faulty wiring. Therefore,

Martin contends that the jury convicted her solely on the insufficient

evidentiary basis of her motive to torch the building and her presence

at the building near the time of the fire. See United States v. Yoakam,

116 F.3d 1346, 1350 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that even if the

government had proven defendant had a motive to commit arson, evidence was insufficient where defendant’s only link to arson was testimony that "he was the last one out of the building, just moments

behind his employees"). 

4Section 844(h)(1) provides: 

(h) Whoever— 

(1) uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony which

may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, . . . shall,

in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be

sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years. . . . Notwithstanding

any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a

violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with

any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for

the felony in which the explosive was used or carried. 

18 U.S.C.A. § 844(h)(1). 

UNITED STATES v. MARTIN 9

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Martin’s primary complaint is that there is no direct evidence that

she caused the fire. As we have observed repeatedly, "circumstantial

evidence is not inherently less valuable or less probative than direct

evidence" and may alone support a guilty verdict. United States v.

Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 731 (4th Cir. 2006); see Holland v. United

States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). And this is no less true in the context of arson. When the government offers evidence of the defendant’s "motives to set the fire, his plan and preparation to do so, his

opportunity to carry out the plan and evidence that [the fire did not

occur] accidentally," direct evidence of arson is not necessary to sustain a conviction under § 844(i). United States v. Lundy, 809 F.2d

392, 396 (7th Cir. 1987); see United States v. Schnapp, 322 F.3d 564,

572-73 (8th Cir. 2003). 

As our recitation of the evidence makes abundantly clear, there is

plenty of strong circumstantial evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Martin intentionally set the building ablaze.

In addition to the overwhelming evidence of Martin’s financial

motive to cause the fire, there was substantial circumstantial evidence, unrelated to motive, establishing that Martin ignited the fire.

First, there was Martin’s opportunity to set the fire and her proximity

to the fire when it began. Martin was alone in the store mere minutes

before the fire was seen by a passerby. Moreover, the evidence suggested that Martin waited until her employees clocked out for the evening, then retrieved the access ladder from outside of her store,

opened the door to the loft and climbed into the loft — where the fire

originated — minutes before the fire was seen. Second, Martin lied

to investigators about her presence in the loft, claiming it had been

two years since her last visit, and she suggested to her friend Detamore that Detamore should not disclose that Martin had been in the

loft on the night of the fire. Third, the government presented expert

testimony that the fire had not been electrical in origin, that the

weather did not play a factor, and that there was no indication of

another accidental cause, such as the presence of flammable liquids

stored in the loft. 

Viewing the evidence as a whole, we conclude that it was more

than sufficient to support Martin’s convictions. See Lundy, 809 F.2d

at 396 (concluding that evidence of arson was sufficient where the

defendant had motive and was alone in the store shortly before the

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fire, and where there was evidence that the fire was not an accident).

We therefore affirm the jury’s verdict on Count I and Count II. 

III.

Martin next challenges her sentences for her convictions on Counts

I, II and III under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.5

Martin argues that because she was sentenced both for committing

arson, i.e., "maliciously damag[ing] . . . by means of fire . . [a] building," 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(i), and for mail fraud, her separate sentence

for using fire to commit mail fraud in violation of § 844(h)(1)

amounted to multiple punishments for a single course of criminal

activity. 

The constitutional guaranty established by "the Double Jeopardy

Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for

the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same

offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same

offense." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989); see

United States v. Bowe, 309 F.3d 234, 238 (4th Cir. 2002). The question here implicates only one of these double jeopardy protections —

the prohibition against "cumulative punishments for the same offense

in a single criminal trial." United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202,

206 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]n the multiple punishments context, th[e] interest" protected by the Double

Jeopardy Clause "is limited to ensuring that the total punishment did

not exceed that authorized by the legislature." Jones v. Thomas, 491

U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). The double

jeopardy protections provided by the Fifth Amendment "serve[ ] principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature

remains free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and

fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may not

impose more than one punishment for the same offense . . . ." Brown

v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); cf. United States v. Handford, 39

F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 1994) ("At the root of the limited impact of

the Double Jeopardy Clause on the legislature is the principle that the

5The Double Jeopardy Clause protects "any person [from] be[ing] subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.

Const. amend. V. 

UNITED STATES v. MARTIN 11

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power to define criminal offenses and prescribe punishments imposed

upon those found guilty of them belongs solely to the legislature.").

Thus, the guarantee against multiple punishments serves simply to

ensure that the defendant’s sentence is authorized by Congress. If the

punishment is authorized by statute, there can be no double jeopardy

violation. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983); see

also United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 2008 WL 186180 at *3

(4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2008) ("When a single course of conduct violates

multiple statutes, multiple punishments may be imposed without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, if that is what Congress

intended."). In the end, "[o]ur only task is to determine whether Congress intended to impose multiple punishments." Chandia, ___ F.3d

at ___. 

As in any case requiring us to sort out congressional intent, we

begin with the statutory text itself. See Albernaz v. United States, 450

U.S. 333, 336 (1981). "Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish

the same offense under two different statutes. Accordingly, where two

statutory provisions proscribe the ‘same offense,’ they are construed

not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear

indication of contrary legislative intent." Whalen v. United States, 445

U.S. 684, 692 (1980). Of course, if the statutory language allows multiple punishments, then there is no double jeopardy problem and we

need not go any further. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69 ("Where

. . . a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under

two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the

‘same’ conduct . . . , a court’s task of statutory construction is at an

end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may

impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.").

If, however, the statute provides no definitive indication of congressional intent, we apply the rule of statutory construction prescribed by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284

U.S. 299 (1932). Under Blockburger, "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test

to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one,

is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which

the other does not." 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). If the elements of each

criminal statute "do not overlap, then multiple punishments are pre12 UNITED STATES v. MARTIN

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sumed to be authorized." United States v. Terry, 86 F.3d 353, 356 (4th

Cir. 1996). 

It is unnecessary for us to resort to the Blockburger test to determine whether Congress authorized cumulative punishments for Martin’s mail fraud conviction and her conviction for use of fire to

commit mail fraud. Under section 844(h)(1), Congress clearly contemplated that the use of fire to commit a felony would enhance the

defendant’s punishment for the predicate felony:

Whoever . . . uses fire . . . to commit any felony . . . shall,

in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be

sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years. . . . [T]he term of

imprisonment imposed under this subsection [shall not] run

concurrently with any other term of imprisonment. 

18 U.S.C.A. § 844(h)(1) (emphasis added); see United States v. Patel,

370 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The statute plainly provides that

a defendant who uses fire in the commission of a federal felony will

be punished cumulatively for the predicate felony and for using fire

to commit that felony." (emphasis in original)). Martin wisely concedes this point, as she must, acknowledging that "Congress did

intend to add a second consecutive punishment for violating 18

U.S.C. § 844(h) in addition to the mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1341, because it said so." Br. of Appellant at 26; see Patel, 370 F.3d

at 115 ("Because Congress explicitly authorized cumulative punishments for the predicate felony and using fire to commit the predicate

felony, there was no Double Jeopardy violation in sentencing [the

defendant] for both mail fraud and using fire to commit mail fraud

. . . ."). Moreover, Martin does not suggest that the sentences imposed

for mail fraud and arson, which are wholly separate offenses, create

double jeopardy concerns either. See Patel, 370 F.3d at 116 n.6.

Essentially, then, Martin acknowledges that there would have been no

double jeopardy violation had she been sentenced for either (1) mail

fraud and using fire to commit mail fraud or (2) mail fraud and arson.

In Martin’s view, the problem exists because the government

charged her, based on the same course of conduct, with both arson

and using fire to commit mail fraud. Martin contends that to discern

whether cumulative punishment under all three statutes is permissiUNITED STATES v. MARTIN 13

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ble, we must compare the combined elements of the arson and mail

fraud offenses on the one hand with the elements of the using fire to

commit a felony offense on the other. According to Martin, she was

sentenced twice for the same offense because she received sentences

on the arson count and the mail fraud count, and then she received

another sentence for essentially those two offenses combined into the

single offense of using fire to commit mail fraud. We disagree. 

Martin’s position is fundamentally flawed in that it assumes that

§ 844(i) (arson) and § 844(h)(1) ("us[ing] fire") punish the same conduct. Because an examination of the statutory language is inconclusive, we must apply Blockburger to determine if these offenses are

"the same" for double jeopardy purposes. The fact that the same act

is being punished under both statutes is not important here because

"under the Blockburger test, whether two offenses are the same

depends on the elements of the crimes and not the similarity of the

underlying facts." United States v. LeMoure, 474 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir.

2007). The federal arson statute requires the government to prove that

the defendant "maliciously damage[d]" a "building" by "means of

fire." 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(i). The "malicious damage" element in the

arson statute is not an element of proof in the using fire statute.

Indeed, a "use" of fire under § 844(h)(1) need not result in damage or

destruction of property to violate the statute. See Wildes, 120 F.3d at

470 (holding that defendant used fire by lighting "a wooden cross as

a means of intimidation"). By contrast, § 844(h)(1) requires proof that

a defendant used fire to commit a felony — in this case, mail fraud.

Section 844(h)(1) incorporates the elements of the predicate mail

fraud felony, which in turn requires proof of the existence of a

scheme to defraud as well as the defendant’s use of the mails to further the scheme. See United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 326 (4th

Cir. 2001). The arson statute does not include either of these elements. 

In a substantially similar case, the First Circuit reached the same

conclusion, providing this sound analysis: 

[T]here is no Double Jeopardy bar to imposing multiple

punishments for arson and using fire to commit mail fraud

because these are separate offenses under Blockburger.

Arson requires proof that a defendant, through the use of

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fire, damaged "a building . . . used in interstate commerce."

18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Using fire to commit mail fraud requires

proof that the defendant used the mails to further a scheme

to defraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Thus, arson requires proof

that fire damaged a building, which is not an element of

using fire to commit mail fraud. And using fire to commit

mail fraud requires proof that the defendant used the mails

to further a scheme to defraud, which is not an element of

arson.

Patel, 370 F.3d at 116 (emphasis in original). 

Relying on United States v. Corona, 108 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 1997),

Martin contends that because she was convicted of three offenses,

Blockburger requires that each offense contain an element not found

in either of the other offenses. Assuming for the sake of analysis that

Martin is correct that each statutory provision must contain an element unique to it and not contained in the other provisions, we would

still reach the same conclusion. The First Circuit addressed precisely

this issue in precisely this context, concluding that all three offenses

were separate offenses even under Martin’s suggested approach:

Arson required proof that [the defendant] set fire to a building; mail fraud required proof that [the defendant] used the

mails to further a scheme to defraud; and using fire to commit a felony required proof that [the defendant] used fire to

commit mail fraud. Thus, to gain the use of fire conviction

the government had to convince the jury of an additional

element not required for either arson or mail fraud: [the

defendant] committed arson in order to commit the mail

fraud. In other words, using fire to commit mail fraud

required the government to connect the arson to the mail

fraud. The statutory elements of arson and mail fraud can be

met in a single prosecution without the government connecting the two crimes. Therefore, using fire to commit mail

fraud has an additional element which makes it a separate

offense from the combination of arson and mail fraud.

Patel, 370 F.3d at 117. 

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We agree with the reasoning and result in Patel that the offense of

using fire to commit a felony includes an element of proof not

required in the crimes of arson or mail fraud. We conclude, therefore,

that the offenses charged in Counts I, II and III are separate offenses

under Blockburger and that Martin was not sentenced more than one

time for the same offense.6

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Martin’s convictions and

sentences.

AFFIRMED

6We also reject Martin’s argument that the district court erroneously

imposed her 10-year sentence under § 844(h) to run consecutively to her

sentence for the arson conviction because the statute refers only to felonies involving explosives. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(h) ("[N]or shall the

term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently

with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the felony in which the explosive was used or carried."). Martin’s argument is

foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602,

610 (4th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, Jones v. United States,

529 U.S. 848 (2000). 

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