Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00017/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Luis Gonzalez-Alvarez
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Jose Luis Gonzalez-Alvarez, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CR 04-0017-PHX-MHM

No. CV 05-1603-PHX-MHM (HCE)

ORDER

Jose Luis Gonzalez-Alvarez (“Movant”), presently confined in the United States

Penitentiary in Lompoc, California, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #19). The Court will summarily dismiss the

action.

A. Procedural Background.

Movant pled guilty to illegal re-entry after deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a). On June 14, 2004, he was sentenced to a term of fifty-five months, to be followed

by thirty-six years on supervised release. Movant did not appeal. Instead, he filed a § 2255

Motion. 

In his§ 2255 Motion, Movant raises two grounds for relief. Both grounds pertain to the

following information in the presentence report:

Case 2:04-cr-00017-MHM Document 21 Filed 10/19/05 Page 1 of 5
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The presentence investigation report reflects separate sentences for two years each

to be served concurrently, C90384 and C91578. Under the sentencing guidelines, even if the

latter offense resulted in a revocation of the earlier probation, the two separate sentences are

assessed three points each. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, Commentary, Application Note 11 (“If,

however, at the time of revocation another sentence was imposed for a new criminal

conviction, that conviction would be computed separately from the sentence imposed for the

revocation.”)

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Date of

Arrest Conviction/Court Date/Sentence Guideline/Points

20. 01/07/1992 Possession/Purchase for 01/31/1992: 36 months §4A1.1(a)

(Age 20) Sale a Narcotic probation, 60 days jail

Controlled Substance 03/20/1992: 2 years

H&S 11351, Orange prison concurrent to

County Superior Court C91578 3

California, C90384 07/06/1993: paroled

Attorney representation is unknown. Court documentation has been requested, but has yet

to be received.

21. 02/26/1992 Possession of a 03/20/1992: 2 years §4A1.1(a)

(Age 20) Narcotic Controlled prison

Substance, Orange 07/06/1993: Paroled

County Superior Court, 3

California, C91578

Attorney representation is unknown. Court documentation has been requested, but has yet

to be received.

(Presentence Investigation Report at 6.) In ground one, Movant claims that the foregoing

two criminal convictions should not be counted toward his criminal history points because

it is not clear that he was represented by counsel. In ground two, Movant contends that his

criminal history should be recalculated. He alleges that both charges at #20 and #21 appear

to be the same, and that #21 may be a probation violation of #20.1

 He asserts that he would

have been serving the sentence in #20 on the date he was arrested for #21. 

B. Summary Dismissal.

A district court shall summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case

that the movant is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), RULES GOVERNING § 2255 ACTIONS.

The district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the movant’s allegations,

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viewed against the record, either fail to state a claim for relief or are patently frivolous.

Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Baumann v. United

States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982) (district court may summarily dismiss without

ordering a response where the record conclusively or plainly shows that the movant is not

entitled to relief). Because Movant plainly is not entitled to relief and the defects cannot be

cured by amendment, the Court will summarily dismiss his motion to vacate.

C. Failure to State a Claim.

The Court finds that Movant has waived the issues he has raised. As part of his plea

agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

The defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections which the defendant could assert to the

information or indictment or to the court’s entry of judgment against the

defendant and imposition of sentence upon the defendant, provided that the

sentence is consistent with this agreement. The defendant further waives:

(1) any right to appeal the court’s entry of judgment against defendant; (2) any

right to appeal the imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18,

United States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right to

collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28, United

States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack. 

(Doc. #18 at 4-5). Movant also asserted that he discussed the terms with his attorney, agreed

to them and understood them, and that he entered into the plea voluntarily. Id. at 6-7. At

a hearing under oath, Movant asserted that he understood his plea and that he made it

voluntarily. He also specifically asserted that he understood that he was giving up his right

in the future to attack the validity of the conviction and sentence. (Transcript of Change of

Plea, Doc. #15, at 13-14, 21-22, 29.) He admitted both in his plea and at the hearing that he

was represented by an attorney on the March 20, 1992 conviction for possession of a

narcotic. (Plea, Doc. #18 at 8, Transcript of Change of Plea, Doc. #15 at 31.) At sentencing,

the Court found that Movant validly waived his right to a collateral attack. (Sentence at 3,

Doc. # 17.)

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), pet. for cert. filed, No. 05-5113 (June 30, 2005). For

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example, a waiver of appellate rights is enforceable if the language of the waiver

encompasses the right to appeal on the grounds raised and the waiver is knowingly and

voluntarily made. Id.

A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255 action challenging the

length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. AbarcaEspinoza v. United States, 508 U.S. 979 (1993). Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that challenges the

voluntariness of a waiver does not, however, preclude jurisdiction over a habeas action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Washington v. Lampert, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 2126606,

at *6-*7 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2005). Similarly, for § 2255, the only claims that cannot be

waived are a claim that the waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of

counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing “doubt” that

a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead

guilty or accept a particular part of the plea bargain); Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly

declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness

of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (summarizing Pruitt and Abarca, but

declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). Movant has not made either claim.

Instead, Movant’s grounds for relief each pertain to sentencing. He contends that his

sentence was improperly calculated under the guidelines. Movant expressly waived issues

regarding sentencing and expressly waived a § 2255 action. The Court accepted his plea as

voluntarily made. Cf. United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2000) (waiving

appeal of sentencing issues also waives the right to argue on appeal that counsel was

ineffective at sentencing), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 921 (2001). Consequently, the Court finds

that Movant waived the issues raised in his § 2255 motion. Because Movant has failed to

present any claim that could possibly warrant relief, the Court will dismiss his § 2255

Motion. 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,

or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #19) is DENIED and that the civil

action opened in connection with this Motion (No. CV 05-1603-PHX-MHM (HCE)) is

DISMISSED.

DATED this 14th day of October, 2005.

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