Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03329/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03329-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anish Dave
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued April 13, 2016

Decided June 20, 2016

Before

 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

 DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

 ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 15-3329

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANISH DAVE, ALSO KNOWN AS 

ANISH NARENDRAKUMAR PATEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:13-cv-08867

Jorge L. Alonso,

Judge.

O R D E R

This is a straightforward immigration appeal brought by Anish Dave, who was 

born in India and later naturalized as a United States citizen in 2005. Before he was 

naturalized, Dave was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault of a minor, and 

he pleaded guilty to this charge after he was naturalized. As this order will discuss, 

Dave was statutorily ineligible for naturalization when he received his certificate of 

citizenship. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision, based on Dave’s illegal 

procurement of his citizenship, to grant summary judgment in the government’s favor.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-3329 Page 2

Dave was a lawful permanent resident when he applied for naturalization on 

May 17, 2004. Four days later, he had intercourse with a 15-year-old girl in Illinois. He 

was 25. Within another week, Dave was arrested and charged with aggravated criminal 

sexual abuse of a minor. As his criminal case unfolded, Dave was interviewed for 

naturalization in February 2005, and his naturalization application was approved that 

month. The parties disagree on whether Dave properly disclosed his Illinois criminal 

charge during this process. Dave became a naturalized citizen in March 2005.

One year after receiving naturalized citizenship, Dave pleaded guilty in Illinois 

state court to aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a minor. The statute under which he

was charged defines the crime as “commit[ting] an act of sexual penetration or sexual 

conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age [when] 

the [defendant] is at least 5 years older than the victim.” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d). By 

pleading guilty, Dave acknowledged that he sexually abused the 15-year-old girl with 

whom he had intercourse. The Illinois court sentenced Dave to 24 months of probation.

In December 2013, the United States filed this civil suit against Dave, asking the 

court to find that Dave was statutorily ineligible for naturalization when his citizenship 

was conferred. The government filed a motion for summary judgment, which Dave 

opposed. He urged that he did not commit a crime of moral turpitude, which would 

have statutorily disqualified him for naturalization. He further argued that, if his crime 

had been known to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), there 

would still be a genuine question of material fact over whether USCIS would have 

denied his application for citizenship. The district court granted summary judgment in 

the government’s favor, and Dave now appeals that judgment to this court.

Denaturalizing an American citizen is not done lightly, given the value placed on 

the right to acquire citizenship and given the severely unsettling consequences that can 

flow from a divested citizenship. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981);

see also United States v. Firishchak, 468 F.3d 1015, 1023 (7th Cir. 2006). The government 

bears the heavy burden of justifying revocation by evidence that is “clear, unequivocal, 

and convincing” and does not leave “the issue in doubt.” Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505 

(citations and internal marks omitted). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “Any 

less exacting standard would be inconsistent with the importance of the right that is at 

stake.” Id. at 505–06. Yet we are also obligated to protect strict compliance with every 

congressional requirement for naturalization. Id. at 506. If an applicant fails to satisfy 

any condition, his certificate of citizenship is illegally procured and can be set aside. Id.

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To be statutorily eligible for naturalization in the United States, an applicant 

must be “a person of good moral character” during the five years leading up to the 

filing date of his naturalization application. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1). 

Committing a crime which reflects adversely on the applicant’s moral character will 

disqualify the applicant from obtaining citizenship. 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii).

Committing a crime of moral turpitude will also render the applicant ineligible. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 316.10(b)(2)(i).

Dave chose to have intercourse with a 15-year-old girl, who was legally unable to 

consent because this society has decided to protect its minors from sexual abuse. Under 

the relevant Illinois statute, the minimum age difference that can be punished is a 22-

year-old molesting a 16-year-old. In this case, the facts are even worse than what the 

statute would punish: Dave was 25, while his victim was 15. This is a crime under 

Illinois law; this is a crime which reflects adversely on his moral character.

We thus apply Section 316.10(b)(3)(iii) in a direct manner: by pleading guilty to

aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a minor, Dave admitted a crime which reflected 

adversely on his moral character.1 By admitting this crime which reflected adversely on 

his moral character, Dave rendered himself statutorily ineligible for naturalization in 

this country. As a result, Dave’s guilty plea disqualified him from naturalization before 

he received it. We recognize that the district court found a factual dispute regarding 

what Dave disclosed to USCIS. Yet whether or not Dave told USCIS that he was facing a 

sexual-abuse charge, the law dictates the same outcome. The independent fact of his 

crime required, and continues to require, that Dave cannot hold citizenship.

In short, we find no genuine issue of material fact in this case. Dave was 

statutorily ineligible for naturalization, which requires setting aside his certificate of 

citizenship. The district court’s judgment in the government’s favor is thus AFFIRMED.

 

1 While Dave also appeals the district court’s finding that he committed a crime of moral 

turpitude under Section 316.10(b)(2)(i), we do not reach the moral-turpitude issue because we conclude 

that Dave was statutorily ineligible for naturalization under Section 316.10(b)(3)(iii).

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