Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02274/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02274-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jennifer Christopher
Plaintiff
RJM Acquisitions LLC
Defendant

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

 

 Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the 

Alternative, Summary Adjudication, (Doc. 31), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, (Doc. 40). The Court now rules on the motions. 

I. Background 

 On November 28, 2011, Defendant purchased an account from 

Bookspan/Doubleday Entertainment LLC (“Bookspan”). (Defendant’s Separate 

Statement of Undisputed Facts (“DSOF”), Doc. 32, at ¶ 1; Plaintiff’s Controverting 

Statement of Facts (“PCSOF”), Doc. 37, at ¶ 1). The account was a Mystery Book Club 

account opened by someone by the name of Jennifer Christopher, with a balance of 

$97.36. (DSOF at ¶ 2). Plaintiff, also named Jennifer Christopher, never opened such an 

account and does not owe the debt, but, as explained below, received collection letters on 

the debt from Defendant. (PCSOF at ¶¶ 2, 15, 16; DRPCSOF at ¶ 15, 16) 

 Bookspan provided Defendant the following address for Jennifer Christopher: 800 

E. Stewart St. Apt. 4, Willcox AZ 85643-1326 (“Willcox address”). (DSOF at ¶ 3; 

Jennifer Christopher, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RJM Acquisitions LLC, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-02274-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

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PCSOF at ¶ 3). Defendant subsequently received a new address for Jennifer Christopher 

from TLO, a third party “skip trace” vendor that specializes in locating new addresses of 

individuals who move. The new address was 525 E. Sequoia Dr., Phoenix AZ 85024-

1621 (“Phoenix address”). (DSOF at ¶ 4, 18; PCSOF at ¶ 4, 18). 

 On April 16, 2013, Defendant sent a collection letter addressed to Jennifer 

Christopher at the Phoenix address. (DSOF ¶ 5; PCSOF at ¶ 5, 12). In pertinent part, the 

letter informed the recipient of the following: 

Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that 

you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will 

assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing 30 days after 

receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion 

thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a 

judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. If you 

request of this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice 

this office will provide you with the name and address of the original 

creditor, if different from the current creditor.

(Doc. 1-1). Although Plaintiff received this letter, Defendant did not receive a response. 

(PCSOF at ¶¶ 11, 13; DSOF at ¶ 5, Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Controverting 

Statement of Facts (“DRPCSOF”), Doc. 39, at ¶ 11). 

 On May 25, 2013, Defendant received another new address for Jennifer 

Christopher via Anchor Software, a company that provides address moves updates via 

what is known as the National Change of Address file. The new address was 1899 

Reserve Blvd. Apt. 4, Gulf Breeze, FL, 32563-7040 (“Florida address”). (DSOF at ¶¶ 6; 

PCSOF at ¶¶ 6, 19; DRPCSOF at ¶ 19). 

 Pursuant to its policy, Defendant sent a collection letter addressed to Jennifer 

Christopher at the Florida address on June 11, 2013. (DSOF at ¶¶ 7, 8; PCSOF at ¶¶ 7, 8). 

Like the letter sent to the Phoenix address, this letter informed the recipient of the 

following: 

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Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that 

you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will 

assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing 30 days after 

receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion 

thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a 

judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. If you 

request of this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice 

this office will provide you with the name and address of the original 

creditor, if different from the current creditor. 

(Doc. 1-2). Plaintiff received this letter, and on August 2, 2013 called Defendant and 

informed one of Defendant’s representatives that she was not the owner of the debt. 

(DSOF at ¶ 9; PCSOF at ¶¶ 9, 13, 14). Defendant has not made any attempts to collect 

the debt from Plaintiff since that phone call. (DSOF at ¶ 10; PCSOF at ¶ 10). 

 Plaintiff brought this cause of action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Oral 

argument was held on January 28, 2015. 

II. Standard of Review 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the 

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits, or 

declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by 

“showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 

dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” 

Id. 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. 

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. To be entitled to summary 

judgment, the movant must support its motion with evidence that would entitle it to a 

directed verdict at trial, id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)); i.e., the party must show that “a 

reasonable jury would not have sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that 

issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish the 

existence of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The non-movant “must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare 

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247–48. However, in the summary judgment 

context, the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). 

III. Discussion 

 The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from “us[ing] any false, deceptive, or 

misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1692e. “Whether conduct violates [§ 1692e] ... requires an objective analysis 

that takes into account whether the ‘least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a 

communication.’” Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 

2011) (brackets in original) (quoting Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 

1030 (9th Cir. 2010)). This standard is designed to protect consumers of “below average 

sophistication or intelligence,” and those who are “uninformed or naïve.” Id. (quoting 

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Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874–75 (8th Cir.2000)). Although this is a low 

standard, even the hypothetical unsophisticated debtor is considered to retain a “basic 

level of understanding and willingness to read with care” and does not impose liability 

for “bizarre, “idiosyncratic,” or “peculiar misinterpretations.” Id. (quoting Rosenau v. 

Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008)). Moreover, “immaterial statements, by 

definition, do not affect a consumer’s ability to make intelligent decisions.” Donohue v. 

Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Hahn v. Triumph 

Partnerships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2009)). Importantly, “a debt 

collector’s liability under § 1692e of the FDCPA is an issue of law.” Gonzales, 660 F.3d 

at 1061. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute, meaning violations need not be knowing 

or intentional for liability to attach. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 

F.3d 1162, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 Nevertheless, the FDCPA provides a “‘narrow’ bona fide error defense,” under 

which a debt collector is not liable for violations of the FDCPA if it can prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that “(1) it violated the FDCPA unintentionally; (2) the 

violation resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) it maintained procedures reasonably 

adapted to avoid the violation.” McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 

637 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). 

 Plaintiff seeks damages for violations of two subsections of § 1692e. First, 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated § 1692e(2)(A) by falsely stating that Plaintiff 

owed the Mystery Book Club debt. Second, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated 

§ 1692e(10) by sending two letters to Plaintiff, each of which represented that Plaintiff 

could dispute the debt within thirty days.1

 The Court will address each of these claims 

separately. 

 

1

 Plaintiff also claims that Defendant violated § 1692e(10) by falsely stating to Plaintiff that Plaintiff owed the Mystery Book Club debt, which is the same conduct it 

alleges violated § 1692e(2)(A). Because the standards are essentially the same, the Court will analyze this conduct only under § 1692e(2)(A). 

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A. § 1692e(2)(A) 

 1. Violation 

 § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits “[t]he false representation of the character, amount, or 

legal status of any debt.” Plaintiff claims that Defendant made a false representation by 

sending her letters claiming that she owed the Mystery Book Club debt, which was 

untrue. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that receiving a collection letter for a debt 

not owed by the recipient would not confuse the unsophisticated debtor. 

 There is no dispute that Defendant sent two letters to Plaintiff indicating that 

Plaintiff owed the Mystery Book Club debt, or that Plaintiff does not, in fact, owe that 

debt. There is therefore no issue of material fact, and the only question regarding 

Defendant’s alleged violation § 1692e(2)(A) is whether sending a collection letter to 

someone who does not owe the debt would confuse or mislead the unsophisticated 

debtor. As noted above, this is an issue of law. Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1061. 

 The Ninth Circuit has not considered whether sending a collection letter to a nondebtor constitutes a violation of the FDCPA; however, most, if not all, courts to consider 

this issue have held that “an attempt to collect a debt from a non-debtor constitutes a 

‘false representation’ as to the character or status of the debt.” See Stuart v. AR Res., Inc., 

No. CIV.A. 10-3520, 2011 WL 904167, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2011) (citing Beattie v. 

D.M. Collections, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 383, 392 (D. Del. 1991); Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 

F.Supp. 1130, 1137 (D. Del. 1992)); Velazquez v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 2:11-

CV-00263, 2011 WL 2135633, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2011); Berndt v. Fairfield 

Resorts, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1131 (W.D. Wis. 2004); Owens v. Howe, No. 1:04-

CV-152, 2004 WL 6070565, at *11 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 8, 2004). The rationale behind this 

conclusion is that an unsophisticated consumer could be “‘shaken’ by a debt collector’s 

inaccurate representation of a debt, even if the consumer knew she did not owe what the 

collector said that she did.” Crafton v. Law Firm of Jonathan B. Levine, 957 F. Supp. 2d 

992, 997 (E.D. Wis. 2013). 

 The Court agrees with the litany of cases holding that sending a collection letter to 

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someone who does not owe a debt constitutes a “false representation of the character, 

amount, or legal status of any debt” under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C § 1692e(2)(A). While 

many—perhaps most—consumers would not be confused by a collection letter alleging a 

debt they did not owe, the law requires that debt collectors tailor their practices to protect 

even the most uninformed, naïve, unsophisticated consumer. Especially when faced with 

the intimidating nature of the debt collection process, such a consumer could question his 

or her own recollection of events and wonder whether he or she does, in fact, owe the 

debt. 

 The cases upon which Defendant relies to show that it did not violate 

§ 16923(2)(A) are distinguishable. In Wetzel, an unreported case decided by a magistrate 

judge in the District of Oregon, the court stated, in dicta,2

 that the defendant-debt 

collector did not violate the FDCPA for several reasons. Wetzel v. AFNI, Inc., No. 10-

6159-TC, 2011 WL 6122963, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2011) report and recommendation 

adopted, No. CIV. 10-6159-TC, 2011 WL 6122957 (D. Or. Dec. 8, 2011). First, the 

Court found that the debt collector’s allegedly deceptive statements could only be 

misconstrued using a “bizarre, idiosyncratic, or peculiar misinterpretation.” Id. The 

collection letter had stated that “this debt has been acquired by our agency for 

collections,” and that plaintiff argued that this language would evoke images of the 

television show Bewitched in the mind of the unsophisticated debtor. Id. The Court 

rightly concluded that this “bizarre” misinterpretation of the debt collector’s statement 

was “a stretch.” Id. Second, the court in Wetzel found that the debt collector’s statement 

that “[w]e may report information about your account to credit bureaus” was not 

improper, despite the plaintiff’s assertion that the threat “overshadowed” the legally 

required notices in the collection letter. Id. The court reasoned that the debt collector’s 

language was clear and plaintiff himself testified that he understood why the debt 

 

2

 The court’s decision in Wetzel was based upon a holding that the bona fide error 

defense, discussed infra, entitled the debt collector to summary judgment. Wetzel v. 

AFNI, Inc., No. 10-6159-TC, 2011 WL 6122963, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2011) report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV. 10-6159-TC, 2011 WL 6122957 (D. Or. Dec. 8, 

2011) 

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collector used that language. Id.

 Here, however, Plaintiff suggests no bizarre interpretation such as the one in 

Wetzel. Plaintiff also makes no argument that any threats in Defendant’s collection letter 

“overshadowed” the legally required notices. She simply asserts that, when faced with 

collection efforts, an unsophisticated debtor could be confused and shaken in the belief 

that he or she does not owe the debt. For these reasons, the decision in Wetzel is 

unhelpful here. 

Defendant also cites the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 

592 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010) that courts are “not concerned with mere technical 

falsehoods that mislead no one, but instead with genuinely misleading statements that 

may frustrate a consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his or her response.” That case 

dealt with a collection letter that accurately represented the total amount owed by the 

recipient, but inaccurately represented what portions of the total amount were from 

interest and finance charges. Id. at 1033. The court held that these “technical falsehoods” 

were immaterial because they “did not undermine Donohue’s ability to intelligently 

choose her action concerning her debt.” Id. at 1034. The Court reasoned that even if the 

debt collector had accurately described the breakdown of the total amount owed, “we can 

conceive of no action Donohue could have taken that was not already available to her on 

the basis of the information [provided].” Id. 

 There is a substantial difference, however, between the technical breakdown of the 

total amount owed and the identity of the debtor. While the debt collector’s misstatement 

in Donahue may not have had any effect on plaintiff’s circumstances, the same cannot be 

said of Defendant’s misrepresentation here. Had the debt collector in Donahue correctly 

stated the nature of the debt, the plaintiff in that case would have still owed the debt and 

would be faced with the same decision regarding how to proceed. In contrast, had 

Defendant in this case correctly stated the nature of the debt—i.e., that it did not belong 

to Plaintiff—then Plaintiff would not have been forced to make a choice regarding the 

debt to begin with. In short, a misrepresentation that a debt belongs to someone, unlike a 

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misrepresentation about the breakdown of the total amount of a debt, is material. 

Donahue, therefore, does not apply. 

 In sum, Defendant sent two letters to Plaintiff asserting that Plaintiff owed a debt 

which Plaintiff did not owe. This is a material misrepresentation that could confuse or 

mislead an unsophisticated debtor. Plaintiff has therefore shown that Defendant violated 

§ 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA. 

 2. The Bona Fide Error Defense 

Defendant argues that even if it violated § 1692e(2)(A), it is absolved from 

liability by the FDCPA’s “bona fide error” defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). As stated 

above, under the bona fide error defense, a debt collector must prove, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that “(1) it violated the FDCPA unintentionally; (2) the violation resulted 

from a bona fide error; and (3) it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the 

violation.” McCollough, LLC, 637 F.3d at 948; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). 

 a. Intent 

 The starting point for proving the bona fide error defense is proving that the 

violation was unintentional. 15 U.S.C.k(c). In the context of defending a 

misrepresentation, this often means proving the debt collector was unaware that its 

representation was false. See Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, Inc., 330 F.3d 991, 996 

(7th Cir. 2003). When making a showing that a misrepresentation was unintentional, debt 

collectors are entitled to argue that they reasonably relied on information provided by the 

original creditor. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1174 

(9th Cir. 2006). 

 Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s Phoenix 

and Florida addresses from third party vendors that specialized in tracking down specific 

individuals. Importantly, those vendors used the information the original creditor gave to 

Defendant to search for places the actual debtor had moved; they did not simply search 

for every addressed associated with someone by the name of Jennifer Christopher, as 

Plaintiff suggests. Therefore, Defendant’s misrepresentation that Plaintiff owed the 

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Mystery Book Club debt was unintentional, since Defendant had good reason to believe 

that Plaintiff was the same Jennifer Christopher who owed the Mystery Book Club debt.3

 b. Bona Fide

 Even unintentional violations are only excused by the FDCPA if they were a result 

of a “bona fide error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c); see also McCollough, 637 F.3d at 948. This 

means that only mistakes made in good faith—that is, “sincere, genuine” mistakes made 

“without fraud or deceit”—absolve debt collectors from liability. See Black's Law 

Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining “bona fide” as “1. Made in good faith; without fraud 

or deceit. 2. Sincere; genuine.”); Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 584 F.3d 

1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009) (“As used in the Act ‘bona fide’ means that the error 

resulting in a violation was “made in good faith; a genuine mistake, as opposed to a 

contrived mistake.”). Again, debt collectors may reasonably rely on information they 

obtain from the creditor. Clark, 460 F.3d at 1174. 

 In McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 949 (9th 

Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit explained that debt collectors could not prevail on a bona 

fide error defense after burying their heads in the sand when making decisions on how to 

pursue collection efforts. In that case, the debt collector—a law firm—filed suit against a 

debtor who subsequently raised a statute of limitations defense. When the debt collector 

inquired of the creditor, the creditor incorrectly informed the debt collector that a partial 

payment had been made only a few years before, meaning the statute of limitations did 

not bar the suit. The creditor later discovered its mistake and informed the debt collector, 

but the debt collector continued to prosecute multiple suits against the debtor. The debtor 

sued the debt collector, and on appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that, in the face of multiple 

 

3

 The Court recognizes that the Ninth Circuit has indicated that the bona fide error 

defense extends only to “clerical errors.” Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 779 

(9th Cir. 1982). This rule, however, was later rejected by the Supreme Court in Jerman v. 

Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA. In that case, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the bona fide error defense extends to “clerical or factual mistakes.” 

559 U.S. 573, 587 (2010); see also Jerman, 559 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court specifically interprets the . . . language in the FDCPA as providing a defense not only for clerical errors, but also for factual errors.”). 

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statute of limitations defenses raised by the debtor and corrected information provided by 

the creditor, the debt collector could not show that its mistake was made in good faith. 

 As examples of the types of mistakes that might be considered to be made in good 

faith, the Ninth Circuit in McCollough cited two cases from sister circuits. First, the 

Seventh Circuit held that a mistake as to the bankrupt status of a debtor was reasonable 

where the debt collector and creditor-client had an “‘understanding’ that [the] client 

would not forward accounts in bankruptcy,” the “error was made in 0.01% of cases,” and 

the debt collector “immediately ceased collection efforts upon notice from debtor of the 

mistake.” McCollough, 637 F.3d at 949 (citing Hyman v. Tate, 362 F.3d 965, 967–68 (7th 

Cir. 2004)). Second, the Sixth Circuit held that a debt collector was justified in relying on 

information from a creditor where “the debt collector’s referral form, completed and 

signed by the creditor-client, included specific instructions to claim only amounts legally 

due and owing.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1032 (6th 

Cir.1992)) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

 In contrast with the debt collector in McCollough, Defendant here has shown that 

its mistaken belief that Plaintiff owed the Mystery Book Club debt was in good faith.

Defendant sent a total of only three letters in relation to the Jennifer Christopher account. 

The first letter was sent to the original address provided by the original creditor, and the 

other two were sent to addresses where the third party vendors believed the actual debtor 

had moved. In other words, Defendant reasonably relied on the information given it by 

the original creditor and used this information to the best of its ability to try and track 

down the actual debtor. Unlike the debt collectors in McCollough, Defendant did not 

ignore any information provided by the original creditor, nor did it willfully avoid 

discovering any new information that might lead it to the actual debtor’s true address. 

The Court therefore finds that Defendant’s misrepresentation to Plaintiff that she owned 

the Mystery Book Club debt was the result of a bona fide error. 

 c. Procedures Reasonably Adapted to Avoid Error 

 In addition to proving that the misrepresentation was unintentional and in good 

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faith, debt collectors must also show that they maintained “procedures reasonably 

adapted to avoid such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). “The procedures themselves must be 

explained, along with the manner in which they were adapted to avoid the error.”

Reichert v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Defendant here has shown that its procedures are reasonably adapted to avoid 

sending collection letters to non-debtors. Rather than taking a “shotgun approach” by 

sending collection letters to every Jennifer Christopher that Defendant could locate, 

Defendant used vendors that specialized in obtaining new addresses for specific people. 

As a result of these policies, Defendant sent only three letters in relation to the Jennifer 

Christopher account, two of which were received by the same person (Plaintiff). The fact 

that Defendant’s vendors successfully located Plaintiff’s Florida address based on her 

previous address shows that the process was designed to find a specific person, which in 

turn avoids sending letters to non-debtors. The Court finds that these procedures satisfy 

the FDCPA’s requirement that the debt collector’s procedures be reasonably adapted to 

avoid the error which caused a violation of the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). 

 Therefore, because Defendant has shown through undisputed evidence that its 

violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(a)(2) was committed unintentionally, in good faith, and 

despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid error, Defendant is 

entitled to summary judgment on Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

 B. § 1692e(10) 

 1. Violation 

 § 1692e(10) prohibits “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to 

collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated § 1692e(10) by representing in the first letter that 

Plaintiff had thirty days from receipt of that letter to dispute the debt, and then 

representing the same thing in the second letter. Because the FDCPA only provides thirty 

days from the original notice for an alleged debtor to dispute the debt, Plaintiff argues 

that sending the second letter with the second thirty day notice was “false and 

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misleading” because the letters left the impression that Plaintiff has “more rights than the 

law actually provides.” Defendant argues that sending notices cannot violate the FDCPA 

because the second notice actually gave Plaintiff “more rights and protection” than the 

statute provides. 

 It is undisputed that Defendant sent two letters to Plaintiff and that both letters 

contained the same language regarding the thirty days Plaintiff had to dispute the debt. 

Therefore, the only question regarding Defendant’s alleged violation of § 1692e(10) is 

whether sending two letters, each representing that the alleged debtor has thirty days from 

receipt of the letters to dispute the debt, would confuse or mislead the unsophisticated 

debtor. This is a question of law. Gonzalez, 660 F.3d at 1061. 

 The problem with Plaintiff’s argument is that the notice in the collection letters did 

not purport to notify Plaintiff of her legal rights; rather, the letter stated what Defendant 

would do if Plaintiff disputed (or did not dispute) the debt within thirty days. In other 

words, the letters did not mention what rights “the law actually provides” as Plaintiff 

suggests, but what rights Defendant was privately extending to Plaintiff. The law does 

not prohibit this, nor does the law require that debt collectors notify debtors of their 

“legal right” to dispute the debt. In fact, the notices in the letters almost perfectly mirror 

the language in the statute. In short, the letters could not misrepresent Plaintiff’s legal 

rights without first making some sort of representation about legal rights. Defendant 

made no such representation, and therefore Plaintiff’s argument fails in this respect. 

 The Court finds, however, that an unsophisticated debtor could be confused by 

receiving two nearly identical letters that, using identical language, state that he or she 

has thirty days to dispute the debt. The unsophisticated debtor might have a lot of 

questions when he or she receives the second letter: “Did the debt collector already 

‘assume this debt is valid,’ since I did not respond to the first letter? If so, then why did 

the debt collector send me a second notice, saying that I have another thirty days? Does 

this new letter restart the thirty days mentioned in the first letter, or does the second letter 

act as an extension of the thirty days afforded by the first letter? If I don’t respond to this 

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second letter, will the debt collector actually assume that I owe this money, or will it send 

me yet another letter?” Many people would no doubt be perceptive enough to deduce that 

the debt collector sent the second letter after it obtained the debtor’s new address, and 

conclude that despite the first letter, the debt collector would not assume the debt is valid 

until thirty days after the second letter was received. But the unsophisticated debtor 

standard is very low, and the most naïve, uninformed person could conceivably be 

confused as to his or her options after receiving the second letter. The Court therefore 

finds that Defendant violated § 1692e(10) by sending two letters to the same person, each 

representing that Plaintiff had thirty days from receipt of the letter to dispute the debt. 

 2. The Bona Fide Error Defense 

 Defendant’s bona fide error defense fails because it cannot show that its conduct—

sending two letters to the same person indicating two different deadlines for the debtor to 

dispute the debt—was unintentional. To the contrary, Defendant’s policies required it to 

send multiple letters with identical language regarding the dispute deadline to a debtor if 

they obtain information that the debtor might have moved. Defendant followed those 

policies in the present case, intentionally sending two letters to Plaintiff that, together, 

could confuse the unsophisticated debtor. Defendant cannot argue, therefore, that its 

misconduct was the result of any clerical error or mistake of fact. 

 Therefore, because Plaintiff has shown through undisputed evidence that 

Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by sending two letters that set conflicting 

deadlines for the debtor to dispute the debt, and because Defendant has failed to show 

that its misconduct was unintentional, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on Count 

II of her Complaint.4

 3. Damages 

 Neither party briefed the issue of damages. At oral argument, the Court inquired as 

 

4

 Plaintiff also argues that Defendant violated § 1692e(10) when it erroneously sent the collection letters to Plaintiff, who does not owe the debt. This is the same 

conduct the Court analyzed in relation to Count I of the Complaint, and for the same reasons explained supra, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment for that conduct. 

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to damages, and counsel for Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff seeks only statutory 

damages. Defendant declined to address the issue of damages during oral argument. 

 The FDCPA requires the Court to award statutory damages for violations of the 

Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). The amount of statutory damages the Court may award 

is within the Court’s discretion, but statutory damages may not exceed $1,000 per 

violation. Id. The Court therefore awards $1,000 statutory damages for Defendant’s 

violation of § 1692e(10). 

IV. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the 

Alternative, Summary Adjudication, (Doc. 31), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 

IN PART. The Clerk of the Court is ordered to enter judgment in favor of Defendant on 

Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

(Doc. 40), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Clerk of the Court is 

ordered to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1,000 on Count II of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

 Dated this 3rd day of February, 2015. 

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