Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03953/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03953-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Defendant
Greg Halterman
Plaintiff
Qantas Airways, Limited
Defendant
Skywest, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re DEEP VEIN THROMBOSIS

LITIGATION

This Document Relates To:

Halterman v Delta Airlines, Inc,

Qantas Airways, Limited and

Skywest, Inc, No 04-3953

 /

MDL Docket No 04-1606 VRW

AMENDED ORDER

Deep vein thrombosis (DVT) is a medical condition that

occurs when a thrombus (a blood clot) forms in a deep vein, usually

in the extremities of the leg. DVT can lead to serious injury or

death if the thrombus breaks off and lodges in the brain, lungs or

heart, thereby causing a heart attack, stroke or other debilitating

effects. Studies indicate a link between air travel and DVT, which

can be attributed to relatively prolonged periods of immobility

coupled with low cabin pressure and poor oxygenation (technically,

“hypobaric hypoxia”). Plaintiffs in this litigation suffered (or

sue on behalf of an individual who suffered) from DVT-related

injuries during or after travel aboard commercial aircraft.

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On June 25, 2004, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

Litigation centralized pre-trial proceedings in cases involving

“complex core questions concerning whether various aspects of

airline travel cause, or contribute to, the development of deep

vein thrombosis in airline passengers.” Doc #1 at 2. Ultimately,

all transferred actions were assigned to the undersigned. On

February 14, 2005, the court granted summary judgment in favor of

Boeing in its capacity as manufacturer of the aircraft in question

in 17 cases. Doc #144, 356 F Supp 2d 1055 (ND Cal 2005). All

claims against airline defendants arising from domestic flights

(“non-Warsaw cases”) have been dismissed pursuant to the federal

preemption rationale announced in the court’s order of March 11,

2005. Doc #151, 2005 WL 591241 (ND Cal Mar 11, 2005). See also

Witty v Delta Air Lines, Inc, 366 F3d 380 (5th Cir 2004).

MDL 1606 included approximately 50 cases in which

plaintiffs alleged that they suffered from DVT-related injuries

during or after international flights (“Warsaw cases”). On August

21, 2006, the court granted summary judgment in 37 Warsaw cases in

which plaintiffs alleged liability based on asserted failure to

warn regarding DVT. Doc #469, 2006 WL 2547459 (ND Cal Aug 21,

2006). The court directed entry of summary judgment under FRCP

54(b) in favor of any airline defendant against which the only

Warsaw Convention accidents alleged were “the onset of DVT or the

absence or insufficiency of a warning regarding DVT or policy level

decisions regarding the same.” Id.

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The following Warsaw Convention DVT cases remain in MDL

1606: 

Dabulis v Singapore Airlines, Inc, No 03-1929

Richelet v Lufthansa German Airlines, No 04-3831

Halterman v Delta Airlines, Inc, Qantas Airways, Limited

and Skywest, Inc, No 04-3953 

Rietchel v US Airways, Inc, No 01-3444

Braha v Delta Airlines, Inc, No 05-1544

Bianchetti v Delta Airlines, Inc, No 04-4860

Vincent v American Airlines, Inc, No 07-1604

Before the court is defendant Qantas Airways’ motion for summary

judgment in the Halterman case (Doc #27, 04-3953). For reasons

discussed below, Qantas’s motion is GRANTED.

I

Except as otherwise noted, the following facts are

undisputed. In 2001 or early 2002, Greg Halterman was diagnosed

with Factor V Lieden. Doc #27, Ex A at 31:24-32:2. According to

Halterman, individuals with Factor V Leiden have blood that clots

“a little bit faster than average.” Id at 31:4-13. 

On October 25, 2002, Halterman was a fare paying

passenger on a Skywest, Inc flight from Colorado Springs, Colorado

to Salt Lake City, Utah. Compl (Doc #4, 04-3953) ¶ 8. Halterman

thereafter connected with a Delta Airlines, Inc flight from Salt

Lake City to Los Angeles. Id. After a four hour layover in Los

Angeles, Halterman boarded Qantas Airways flight number QF94 for

what he thought would be an overnight direct flight to Melbourne,

Australia. Id, Doc #613 (04-1606) ¶¶ 2-3. Instead of flying

direct to Melbourne, QF94 stopped in Sydney for a layover. Id. 

Halterman claims that the layover lasted approximately 3 hours. 

Id. Qantas represents that the layover was actually 1 hour and 57

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minutes. Doc #27 at 2, n 2. After the layover in Sydney,

Halterman reboarded QF94 and flew to Melbourne, arriving on October

27, 2002. Compl (Doc #4, 04-3953) ¶ 8. 

Halterman did not experience any trauma during the

flight. Doc #27, Ex A at 105:6-9. Halterman never requested any

medical assistance from the Qantas flight attendants during the

flight. Id at 105:10-13. Nor did Halterman advise the flight

attendants that he was experiencing any type of medical emergency

during the flight. Id at 105:14-18. 

Halterman testified that he first noticed pain in his

right calf upon deplaning in Sydney during the layover. Doc #613

(04-1606) ¶ 5. Halterman attributed the pain to “having been

seated for such a long period of time.” Id. Halterman continued

to experience the pain during his time in Australia and, two weeks

after arriving in Melbourne, sought out medical attention. Id, ¶¶

5, 7; Doc #27, Ex A at 120:14-18. Dr Michelle Wong, a physician in

Australia, diagnosed DVT in the same part of Halterman’s right leg

where he first experienced pain when he deplaned in Sydney. Id. 

Dr Wong wrote a letter, dated November 19, 2002, confirming

Halterman’s DVT diagnosis and associating it with the long flight

from Los Angeles to Australia. Id, Ex A.

Halterman filed his complaint on September 20, 2004. Doc

#1 (04-3953). In addition to failure to warn, which the court has

already rejected, Halterman contends that one or more of the

following constituted an Article 17 accident: layover, irregular

altitude, inadequate air circulation and oxygenation, inadequate

pressurization, turbulence, cramped seating, inadequate hydration,

improper weight balance and failure to inspect and/or make repairs

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to defective mechanical components. Compl (Doc #4, 04-3953) ¶¶ 8-

12. On June 8, 2007, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendants

Delta Airlines, Inc and Skywest, Inc. Doc ##599, 600 (04-1606). 

Accordingly, Qantas is the only remaining defendant. 

II

“Once a properly documented motion has engaged the gears

of Rule 56, the party to whom the motion is directed can shut down

the machinery only by showing that a trialworthy issue exists.” 

McCarthy v Northwest Airlines, Inc, 56 F3d 313, 315 (1st Cir 1995).

That is, the court must determine whether genuine issues of

material fact exist, resolving any doubt in favor of the party

opposing the motion. “Only disputes over facts that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v Liberty Lobby,

Inc, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). Further, “summary judgment will not

lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Id. And the burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving

party. Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). Summary

judgment is granted only if the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence, by

affidavit or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting its claim

that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv, Inc v

Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). 

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Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party “fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex at 322. The evidence

presented by the nonmoving party “is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson,

477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id at 249.

The evidence presented by both parties must be

admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing

Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730, 738 (9th Cir 1979). Hearsay

statements in affidavits are inadmissible. Japan Telecom, Inc v

Japan Telecom America Inc, 287 F3d 866, 875 n 1 (9th Cir 2004).

III

The United States adheres to the Convention for the

Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International

Transportation by Air, concluded at Warsaw, Poland, October 12,

1929, popularly referred to as the “Warsaw Convention.” 49 Stat

3000, reprinted in note following 49 USC § 40105. The purposes of

the Warsaw Convention are two-fold: “providing uniformity in

respect to documentation and certain procedural matters, and

imposing limitations on liability.” In re Aircrash in Bali,

Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir 1982). 

See also Maugnie v Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F2d 1256,

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1259 (9th Cir 1977) (“[T]he Convention functions to protect

passengers from the hazards of air travel and also spreads the

accident cost of air transportation among all passengers.”).

“[R]ecovery for a personal injury suffered on board an

aircraft or in the course of embarking or disembarking, if not

allowed under the Convention, is not available at all.” El Al

Israel Airlines, Ltd v Tseng, 525 US 155, 161 (1999) (quotations

and citation omitted). Halterman does not dispute that the injury

he sustained (DVT and resultant complications) was triggered during

“international transportation” for purposes of Article 1(2). Nor

does Halterman dispute that the Warsaw Convention applies and

preempts all claims arising under local law. Accordingly,

Halterman can recover from Qantas, if at all, only within the

framework established by the Warsaw Convention.

Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides:

The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in

the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or

any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if

the accident which caused the damage so sustained

took place on board the aircraft or in the course of

any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.

49 Stat 3018 (emphasis added).

In other words, as explained by the Supreme Court in Air

France v Saks, 470 US 392 (1985), a carrier “is liable to a

passenger under the terms of the Warsaw Convention only if the

passenger proves that an ‘accident’ was the cause of her injury.” 

Id at 396. In Saks, the Supreme Court defined “accident” for

purposes of Article 17 as “an unexpected or unusual event or

happening that is external to the passenger.” Id at 405. “This

definition should be flexibly applied after assessment of all the

circumstances surrounding a passenger’s injuries.” Id. And

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because any injury “is the product of a chain of causes,” a

plaintiff need only show that “some link in the chain was an

unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger.” Id at 406. 

When, however, “the injury indisputably results from the

passenger’s own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and

expected operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an

accident, and Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention cannot apply.” 

Id. And because DVT “clearly is the type of internal reaction to

the normal operation of the aircraft, with no unusual external

event,” the development of DVT is not itself an accident within the

meaning of Article 17. Rodriguez v Ansett Australia Ltd, 383 F3d

914, 917 (9th Cir 2004), cert denied, 544 US 922 (2005). But DVTrelated injuries may be compensable under the Warsaw Convention if

caused by an Article 17 accident. With these principles in mind,

the court proceeds to Qantas’s motion. 

A

Qantas argues that Halterman has not produced and is

unable to produce any evidence to support his allegations. Doc #27

at 10-11. Qantas does not possess any documents that show any

malfunction on the aircraft, and Halterman has not produced any. 

Id at 11. Halterman testified in a deposition that he has no

reason to believe that there was irregular altitude, inadequate air

circulation, inadequate oxygenation or inadequate pressurization on

the flight. Doc #27, Ex A (Halterman dep) at 101:10-25, 102:1-16,

111:11-25, 112:1-7.

Qantas also addresses Halterman’s allegations that he was

rendered immobile as the result of sleeping passengers, the “fasten

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safety belt” sign and the flight attendants’ service of in-flight

meals. Doc #27 at 14. Specifically, in response to Qantas’s

request to describe every unexpected or unusual event that occurred

on the subject flight, Halterman stated:

Plaintiff Halterman was seated against the window and

next to 2 larger men (6'2" or taller and 225 pounds or

heavier) who blocked access to the aisle way, further

limiting the ability to get up and move around on the

flight and ensure adequate blood flow in the lower

extremities. * * * During periods of turbulence, the

seatbelt light was lit in the cabin. When not lit, the

crew served meals or beverages and their carts obstructed

the aisles making it a real challenge to walk around the

cabin and use the lavatory. During these times, Mr

Halterman could not get up and walk around to stretch. 

Instead he was forced to stay seated. 

Doc #27, Ex D at 2:8-18.

Qantas points out that Halterman testified in deposition

that he actually was able to get out of his seat and use the

lavatory “once or twice towards the end of the flight.” Doc #27,

Ex A at 98:25-99:5. Halterman also testified that he could have

used the lavatory earlier but that he was being courteous to his

fellow passengers because they were sleeping. Id at 106:5-107:17. 

Qantas argues that it cannot be unexpected or unusual that a

“bigger” passenger may sit next to “you” during a flight or that a

passenger seated next to “you” might sleep during the flight. Doc

#27 at 15-16. Qantas cites to Potter v Delta Airlines, Inc, 98 F3d

881, 884 (5th Cir 1996) in which the Fifth Circuit held that the

act of sleeping during a flight is not an unusual or unexpected

event. Qantas further argues that temporary periods during which a

passenger is required to remain seated due to turbulence, in-flight

meal service or for other reasons are not unexpected or unusual

events. Doc #27 at 15-16.

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Regarding Halterman’s alleged dehydration, Qantas points

out that plaintiff admitted that he had “approximately two small

cups” of liquid during the flight and that he kept liquids to a

minimum “so as not to have to go to the lavatory.” Doc #27, Ex D

at 2:18-21. And Halterman testified at deposition that he never

made a request for a beverage that was refused. Doc #27, Ex A

(Halterman dep) at 105:2-5 (“Q: At any time during your Qantas

flight from Los Angeles to Sydney, did you ever request a flight

attendant to bring you a beverage that you were refused? A: No.”) 

Regarding Halterman’s allegation of cramped seating,

Qantas points out that Halterman has produced no evidence that his

seat onboard QF94 was defective in any manner. Doc #27 at 17. 

Moreover, Qantas argues that being in cramped seating, even for

extended periods of time, cannot qualify as an unexpected event. 

Id. Qantas points to Margrave v British Airways, 643 F Supp 510,

512 (SDNY 1986), in which the Southern District of New York held

that “extended sitting in an airplane, even in an uncomfortable

position, cannot properly be characterized as the sort of

‘accident’ that triggers an airline’s liability under the Warsaw

Convention.” 

Finally, Qantas addresses Halterman’s allegations of

delay resulting from the rerouting of QF94 through Sydney. 

Halterman alleges in his complaint that:

Apparently due to irregular circumstances deviating from

the normal operation of this flight, Qantas was forced to

stop in Sydney for an unplanned, unexpected, and unusual

layover, deviating from the pre-planned direct flight

from Melbourne. * * * At all relevant times hereto,

Qantas Airways, Limited experienced an unexpected,

unusual delay as a result of various factors, including

but not limited to the aircraft’s fuel imbalance due to a

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mismanaged fuel and/or cross-feed or a mismanaged fuel

tank transfer, and/or as a result of other unexpected,

unusual and abnormal deviations from industry standards,

policies or rules. 

Compl (Doc #4, 04-3953) at 4:7-11; 4:26-5:3.

Qantas asserts that these allegations are false and that

Halterman cannot produce any evidence of such “fuel imbalance.” 

Doc #27 at 18-19. Notably, Qantas submits the declarations of two

of the pilots on the subject flight – Geoff Paul, who flew Los

Angeles to Sydney on October 25, 2002, and Robert Clifton, who flew

Sydney to Melbourne on October 27, 2002. Doc ##28, 29. Qantas

also submits the declaration of John Xuereb, the “Manager of

Schedules Variation” in the Schedule Planning Department at Qantas. 

Doc #30. Because these declarations are the subject of Halterman’s

evidentiary objections, the court recites their contents here. 

Paul and Clifton both declare:

Based on my understanding, QF94 was originally scheduled

as a direct flight from Los Angeles to Melbourne but, on

October 23, 2002, QF94 was rerouted by our Scheduling

Planning Department in Sydney to operate Los Angeles to

Melbourne with a stop in Sydney. QF94's stop in Sydney

was pre-planned and expected by myself and the rest of

the flight crew.

QF94 did not divert to Sydney as a result of any type of

fuel imbalance, fuel mismanagement, mismanaged fuel tank

transfer, or any other aircraft malfunction. The flight

plan called for us to go to Sydney before continuing to

Melbourne.

To the best of my recollection, there was nothing

unexpected or unusual about the operation of QF94 on

October 25 [and 27], 2002. If there had been anything

unexpected or unusual regarding the operation of QF94, I

would have filed an irregularity report. I did not file

such a report because QF94 operated as a normal flight.

I do not recall experiencing any particular maintenance

issues with the aircraft operating as QF94. In

particular, I do not recall any issues involving

irregular altitude, inadequate air circulation and

oxygenation, inadequate pressurization within the cabin

due to a faulty and abnormal pressurization system(s),

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turbulence, cramped seating, or inadequate hydration of

passengers.

If there had been any fundamental maintenance items

outstanding, I would not have flown the aircraft

operating as QF94.

Doc #28 (Paull Dec) ¶¶ 4-9; Doc #29 (Clifton Dec) ¶¶ 4-9.

Mr Xuereb declares:

By way of my position with Qantas, I am knowledgeable of

the schedule planning of Qantas flights departing from

the United States and, specifically, Los Angeles

International Airport (“LAX”). I was also knowledgeable

of this schedule planning in October of 2002.

Qantas Flight No 94 (“QF94") operating on October 25,

2002, was originally scheduled to be a direct flight from

Los Angeles to Melbourne.

On October 23, 2002, QF94 was rerouted by my department,

Network Planning (Sydney), to operate Los Angeles to

Melbourne with a stop-over in Sydney. QF94's stop-over

in Sydney was pre-planned and expected.

The decision to re-route QF94 was made for commercial

reasons. The specific commercial reasons that QF94 was

rerouted are unknown at this time because the records

have been routinely disposed of in accordance with

Qantas’ document retention policy.

Doc #30 (Xuereb Dec) ¶¶ 3-6.

B 

In opposition, Halterman offers three events that he

claims were unusual or unexpected and external to him: (1) delay as

the result of the stopover in Sydney (id at 8-10); (2) “atypical

turbulence which occurred during the flight that forced him to stay

seated” (doc #618 at 8, 11); and (3) the fact that “there might

have been inadequate pressurization or inadequate oxygen supply

because he felt that the air was stuff[y] and he felt a need to get

off the plane.” Id at 11. The court addresses each argument

below.

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Halterman first argues that the stopover in Sydney was an

“accident” causing his DVT. Qantas argues that the rerouting of

QF94 cannot be an unexpected or unusual event because it was a

preplanned decision. Doc #27 at 19. Qantas points to the Xuereb

declaration as evidence that the rerouting was planned on October

23, 2002 (two days prior to Halterman’s departure) and that the

decision was made for commercial reasons. Doc #30 at ¶¶ 5-6. 

Because the stopover was a preplanned decision, Qantas argues, it

cannot be an “accident.” Doc #27 at 19.

Halterman strenuously objects to the declarations

submitted by Qantas and points to purportedly conflicting evidence. 

Specifically, Halterman declares as follows:

My understanding from the cockpit announcement shortly

after takeoff from Los Angeles is that there was some

type of fuel imbalance and they needed to correct the

problem by stopping to refuel in Sydney before proceeding

to the ultimate destination of Melbourne. The cockpit

announcement further explained that the flight was

originally scheduled to continue on to Sydney after

Melbourne and they were simply reversing the order of the

stops due to the fuel imbalance situation and Sydney

being the closer destination from Los Angeles. At no

time did the pilot communicate that this was something

preplanned. The cockpit announcement made it clear to me

that this change was sudden and unexpected.

Doc #613, ¶ 4. 

Halterman also testified in deposition as follows:

Q: And was there any reason given for having to stop in

Sydney?

A: My recollection is they referred to it as a fuel

imbalance where they – due to the extreme weight of the

plane upon take-off they didn’t think they had enough

fuel to get all the way to Melbourne so they were going –

as a safety precaution land in Sydney to re-fuel before

continuing on to Melbourne. * * * [T]hey strictly

referred to it as plane’s too heavy with the fuel they

could carry to make it all the way to Melbourne safely. 

Doc #616, Ex F at 100:9-16, 22-24.

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Qantas responds that whether plaintiff personally

expected the layover is irrelevant to the “accident” inquiry. Doc

#39 at 9. Qantas points to Husain v Olympic Airways, 116 FSupp 2d

1121, 1130 (ND Cal 2000) for the proposition that the accident

“inquiry is an objective one, and does not focus on the perspective

of the person experiencing the injury.”

Halterman cites to no authority, and the court knows of

none, holding that a layover – preplanned or otherwise – triggers

an airline’s liability under the Warsaw Convention. In addition,

common experience would indicate that, unfortunately, a layover is

not an unexpected event in the context of international air travel. 

Halterman himself admits that his various connections to Australia

already included a 4-hour layover in Los Angeles. 

The court does not foreclose the possibility, however,

that an unplanned stopover could comprise a link in a chain of

events causing injury. Moreover, the court agrees that the

evidence is in conflict as to the reasons for the stopover and

whether it was in fact pre-planned. Qantas’s declarants fail to

submit any documentary evidence or other foundation for their

assertions that the layover – which happened almost five years ago

– was preplanned and made for commercial reasons.

For purposes of this motion, the court need not reach the

issue whether a layover constitutes an “accident” under the Warsaw

Convention, and the court declines to do so. Nor is it necessary

to burden a jury with the issue whether this layover might have

constituted an accident under the facts presented here. This is

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because Halterman cannot show any genuine issue regarding

causation.

 The mere occurrence of an accident does not lead to

liability under the Warsaw Convention. Rather, the accident must

have “caused the damage * * * sustained.” 49 Stat 3000. In Saks,

the Supreme Court stated that, “[a]ny injury is the product of a

chain of causes, and we require only that the passenger be able to

prove that some link in the chain was an unusual or unexpected

event external to the passenger.” 470 US at 406. The Supreme

Court also noted that Article 17 “cannot be stretched to impose

carrier liability for injuries that are not caused by accidents.” 

Id.

Halterman’s theory here is that the stopover increased

the time that he was forced to sit. Doc #618 at 10 (“Plaintiff

Halterman is not claiming that sitting for a long time was the

unusual event that caused his DVT; instead, he claims that the

delays of the subject flight prolonged his having to sit and they

themselves were the unusual events.”) But as Qantas points out,

the stopover made the flight into Australia shorter in duration

than if the flight had gone directly from Los Angeles to Melbourne. 

Doc #39 at 11. And the stopover actually afforded Halterman more

time to walk around and exercise at the airport in Sydney than he

would have had if the flight went directly to Melbourne. Doc #27

at 19-20. Moreover, Halterman’s declaration admits that he felt

the pain while deboarding in Sydney as a result of sitting – not

after the stopover or after arriving in Melbourne or even during

the stopover at the airport. Nothing prevented Halterman from

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discontinuing his flight in Sydney. Finally, Halterman’s only

other evidence of causation – a short doctor’s note – is silent on

the stopover. The note only mentions “an economy flight from Los

Angeles.” Doc #613, Ex A. Accordingly, Halterman submits no

evidence supporting his claim that the stopover caused his injury,

and no reasonable jury could so find under the circumstances of

this case.

2

Halterman also argues that his DVT was caused by

“atypical turbulence which occurred during the flight that forced

him to stay seated.” Doc #618 at 11. The only evidence of

turbulence on QF94 is Halterman’s own testimony. In deposition,

Halterman stated:

Q: During your flight from Los Angeles to Sydney, did you

experience any turbulence?

A: Yes, there was turbulence on the plane.

Q: At what point in that flight did you first experience

turbulence?

A: I first experienced it towards probably the last three

hours of the flight when they were doing the breakfast

service. I was asleep most of the flight prior to that

time. * * * No, I guess – let me rephrase that. In the

last like three-hour segment when I was awake for the

duration of the last end of the flight probably the first

20 to 30 minutes of reawakening it was pretty bumpy.

Doc #27, Ex A at 102:17-25, 104:5-9.

In response to interrogatories, Halterman also stated

that “moderate to severe turbulence was experienced during the

Qantas flight – this was true during the Skywest and Delta flights

as well. During periods of turbulence, the seatbelt light was lit

in the cabin.” Doc #27, Ex D at 2:12-14.

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Halterman relies on Magan v Lufthansa, 339 F3d 158 (2d

Cir 2003) for the proposition that turbulence can constitute a

Warsaw accident. In Magan, the plaintiff, John Magan, was a

passenger on a flight from Germany to Bulgaria. Id at 160. Magan

had left his seat to use the lavatory when he heard the pilot

announce that passengers were to return to their seats and fasten

their seatbelts. Id. The pilot made the announcement because he

anticipated turbulence after observing heavy thunderstorms

illuminated on his radar. In the course of returning to his seat,

the plane experienced an episode of turbulence, and Magan was

violently thrown against an overhang protruding from the ceiling of

the cabin. Id. The impact broke Magan’s nose and dislodged a

dental bridge from his mouth, and Magan temporarily blacked out. 

Id. Magan filed a claim against Lufthansa, and the district court

entered summary judgment for Lufthansa finding that the turbulence

encountered by the aircraft was not “severe” or “extreme” as

defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and thus did

not constitute an “accident” under the Warsaw Convention. Id.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the Supreme

Court’s Saks decision and the history of Article 17 and rejected a

bright-line rule of liability for particular weather events and all

their attendant consequences. Id at 163-64. The court also found

that there was conflicting testimony regarding the degree of

turbulence experienced, and therefore, that there was a material

issue of fact. Id at 165-66. Ultimately, the Second Circuit held

that whether turbulence constitutes an accident should be a “factspecific inquiry best left for resolution on an individual basis.” 

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Id at 165. Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the grant of

summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

The court need not decide whether Magan applied the

proper standard. Here it is not Halterman’s contention that

atypical turbulence caused direct impact or other trauma to his

leg. Rather, Halterman claims that the turbulence should

constitute an “accident” because it forced him to remain seated.

This is, to say the least, a strained theory, and it carries Saks

and Magan to an illogical extreme. The court finds it appropriate

to quote the Southern District of New York’s order in Margrave v

British Airways, 643 F Supp 510, 512 (SDNY 1986): “[S]uch a

definition of the ‘accident’ at issue distorts the factual record

in this case beyond recognition for the transparent purpose of

forcing plaintiff’s injuries into the category of those compensable

under the Warsaw Convention.” As noted above, Halterman testified

that turbulence on QF94 lasted only 20 to 30 minutes and that he

did get up when he was able to do so. Halterman’s alleged

“accident” is, in effect, “prolonged” sitting.

Even accepting Halterman’s theory, it cannot be

unexpected that there will be periods during a flight that a

passenger is required to remain in his or her seat due to

turbulence. And it cannot have been the intent of the Warsaw

Convention that basic safety precautions create liability for

airlines. To the contrary, these safety precautions are intended

to prevent the type of “accidents” that would expose airlines to

liability, as the facts in Magan illustrate. Cf Saks v Air France,

724 F2d 1383, 1389-90 (9th Cir 1984) (Wallace, J, dissenting),

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rev’d, 470 US 392 (1985) (intent of the Warsaw Convention was not

to make carriers insurers of their passengers’ well-being, but to

create incentives for safe and economical air travel). 

Moreover, Halterman was able to walk to the lavatory and

did so “once or twice” by his own admission. Halterman also

admitted that he had other opportunities to walk around but

voluntarily decided not to do so out of courtesy to fellow

passengers. And Halterman admitted he spent much of the flight

sleeping. It is difficult for the court to discern a triable claim

arising out of the two to three hours when Halterman was awake and

did have opportunities to walk around (and did walk around) against

a backdrop of a significantly longer stretch of time in which

Halterman was asleep and, it is safe to assume, in his seat. These

facts cast significant doubt on the proposition that prolonged

sitting (or “turbulence”) somehow caused plaintiff’s injury.

3

Finally, Halterman argues that “there might have been 

inadequate pressurization or inadequate oxygen supply because he

felt that the air was stuff [sic] and he felt a need to get off the

plane.” Doc #618 at 11. This allegation is wholly deficient, and

Halterman fails to meet the “significant probative evidence”

standard required to overcome summary judgment. Moreover, this

allegation is contrary to Halterman’s deposition testimony wherein

he admitted that he has no reason to believe that there was

irregular altitude, inadequate air circulation, inadequate

oxygenation or inadequate pressurization on the flight. Doc #27,

Ex A (Halterman dep) at 101:10-25, 102:1-16, 111:11-25, 112:1-7.

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Plaintiff attempts to downplay this testimony by asking

how “a passenger could possibly be in possession of such

knowledge.” Doc #618 at 11. The answer is simple: discovery.

“[T[he plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to

defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. This is

true even where the evidence is likely to be within the possession

of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff has had a full

opportunity to conduct discovery.” Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc,

477 US 242, 257 (1986).

Qantas represents that plaintiff has never demanded to

inspect or test the pressurization system or the oxygenation system

of the subject aircraft and has never propounded a single discovery

request regarding the pressurization or oxygenation systems. Doc

#39 at 17-18. Plaintiff does not deny that he has had opportunity

to propound appropriate discovery. Plaintiff has never made a

motion to compel or motion for continuance to conduct further

discovery. Instead, plaintiff now accuses Qantas of destroying

records, stating that Qantas relies “on the passage of time as

their excuse maintaining that the documents have been purged.” Doc

#618 at 12. Plaintiff offers no support for the accusation that

Qantas destroyed records on aircraft pressurization or oxygenation.

Plaintiff also attempts to overcome his evidentiary

deficiency with citation to medical journals that indicate that

factors such as irregular altitude and inadequate air circulation,

oxygenation and pressurization “play a role in the development of

DVT.” Doc #618 at 12, Doc #611, Exs A-E. This evidence is

irrelevant for purposes of Qantas’s motion. None of these articles

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speaks to conditions on QF94. Accordingly, Qantas’s evidentiary

objections to these articles, doc #40, are sustained.

C

The only remaining issue is Halterman’s FRCP 56(f)

request for further discovery. Doc #618 at 17-21. The party

seeking a Rule 56(f) continuance should demonstrate that: (1) it

has set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that it hopes to

elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts sought actually exist;

and (3) these sought-after facts are essential to resist the

summary judgment motion. California v Campbell, 138 F3d 772, 779

(9th Cir 1998). 

Whether to allow further discovery under Rule 56(f) is a

subject committed to the district court's discretion. Nidds v

Schindler Elevator Corp, 113 F3d 912, 920 (9th Cir 1996). In

considering such a request, the stage of the litigation is an

important consideration. For example, if the movant has failed

diligently to pursue discovery in the past, the court has

discretion to deny the Rule 56(f) application. Id. “Failure to

comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f) is a proper ground for

denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment.” State of

California v Campbell, 138 F3d 772, 779 (9th Cir 1998) (internal

citation omitted); see also Weinberg v Whatcom County, 241 F3d 746,

751 (9th Cir 2001); Kitsap, 314 F3d at 1000.

As an initial matter, the court is concerned with the

adequacy of the declaration - or more properly, the portion of a

declaration - Halterman has filed to justify a FRCP 56(f) motion. 

Halterman’s counsel states:

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[P]laintiff requests that based on defendant’s late

submission of evidence that the Court provide plaintiff

Halterman additional time to take the deposition of the

two pilots, Mr Paull and Mr Clifton, as well as Mr Xuereb

to uncover the source of their information. Plaintiff

would likewise request an opportunity to propound a set

of interrogatories to inquire what are the methods of

recording the events of the subject flight as well as

inquire into the sources of all their information. 

Plaintiff also requests an opportunity to propound a

Request for Production of Documents demanding all

documents referred to by the declarants, as well as

reviewed, read, prepared by them in preparation of their

testimony. Plaintiff will also inquire about the

preparation of the declaration and whether same was made

in their own words due to the fact that both pilot

declarations are identical. In addition, plaintiff

requests all documents that provided the basis for either

declarant’s ‘understanding’ as is stated in their

verbatim and identical declarations should be provided. 

In addition, a full unredacted passenger/flight manifest

should be provided to plaintiff.

Doc #616, ¶ 20. 

The court does not see how the statements in counsel’s

56(f) declaration identify specific facts Halterman hopes to elicit

from further discovery, show that those facts exist or show that

those facts are essential to resist summary judgment. See

Campbell, 138 F3d at 779. Rather, it appears that Halterman is

grasping at straws.

 Accordingly, Halterman’s Rule 56(f) application is

DENIED.

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IV

In sum, Halterman’s FRCP 56(f) application is DENIED. 

Qantas’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Because the court

does not consider Qantas’s declarations in deciding this motion, it

need not rule on Halterman’s evidentiary objections to the said

declarations. The clerk is DIRECTED to close the file, terminate

all motions and enter judgment in 04-3953.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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