Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55400/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55400-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseluis Alcantar
Appellant
Hobart Service
Appellee
ITW Food Equipment Group, LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSÉLUIS ALCANTAR, on behalf of

himself and all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HOBART SERVICE; ITW FOOD

EQUIPMENT GROUP, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-55400

D.C. No.

5:11-cv-01600-

PSG-SP

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 3, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed September 3, 2015

Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr. and N. Randy Smith, Circuit

Judges and Joan Humphrey Lefkow,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Lefkow;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge N.R.

Smith

* The Honorable Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Senior District Judge for the

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by

designation.

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2 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

SUMMARY**

Labor Law / Class Certification

The panel affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in

part, the district court’s orders denying class certification and

granting partial summary judgment in an action brought by a

putative class of service technicians, alleging violations of

California Labor Code § 1194 and derivative claims under

California’s Unfair Competition Law and Private Attorney

General Act. 

The district court denied plaintiff’s motion for class

certification because plaintiff failed to satisfy the

commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and the

predominance requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

Addressing the commonality requirement and plaintiffs’

commute-time claim, the panel held that the district court

erred in denying class certification because it evaluated the

merits rather than focusing on whether the questions

presented – meritorious or not – were common to the class. 

Addressing the predominance requirement and plaintiff’s

meal- and rest-break claim, the panel held that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the

proposed class failed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b), where the

district court held that questions as to why service technicians

missed their meal and rest breaks would predominate over

questions common to the class.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 3

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of the employer on plaintiff’s commute-time claim

because there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether technicians were required to commute in the

employer’s vehicles.

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of the employer on plaintiff’s Private Attorney

General Act claim because the letter in which plaintiff

disclosed his allegations against the employer did not contain

sufficient facts to comply with the statute’s notice

requirements. 

Judge N.R. Smith concurred in the majority’s rejection of

plaintiff’s contentions regarding the denial of class

certification on his meal break claim and the grant of

summary judgment to the employer on his Private Attorney

General Act claim. Judge N.R. Smith dissented in part, and

would hold there is no genuine issue of material fact on the

commute time claim, and he would not remand the case.

COUNSEL

Robin G. Workman (argued), Daniel H. Qualls, and Aviva N.

Roller, Qualls & Workman, LLP, San Francisco, California,

for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Thomas E. Hill (argued) and Mara D. Matheke, Reed Smith

LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

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4 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

OPINION

LEFKOW, Senior District Judge:

Joséluis Alcantar wishes to represent a class of service

technicians in his suit against his employer, Hobart Service

(“Hobart”), and its parent company, ITW Food Equipment

Group (“ITW”). Alcantar alleges that Hobart did not

compensate its technicians for the time they spent commuting

in Hobart’s service vehicles from their homes to their job

sites and from those job sites back home. Alcantar also

alleges that Hobart failed to provide its technicians with meal

and rest breaks.

Alcantar appeals from the district court’s denial of class

certification and its grant of partial summary judgment, as

well as its determination that Alcantar did not comply with

the notice requirements of California’s Private Attorneys

General Act (“PAGA”). We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the judgment in part and

reverse and remand in part.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

ITW,Hobart’s parent company, designs and manufactures

commercial food equipment. Hobart provides after-sale

maintenance and repair services to ITW’s customers. 

Alcantar works for Hobart as a service technician.

Alcantar and other service technicians provide most

services on-site. They drive to and from customer locations

in vehicles Hobart provides, carrying the tools and

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 5

replacement parts necessary to make repairs. Although they

spend most of their time at customer locations, each

technician is assigned to one of Hobart’s thirteen California

branch offices.

As hourlyemployees, the technicians are compensated for

the time they spend fixing equipment and the time they spend

driving to and from different assignments. If they commute

in the service vehicles, they are also compensated for the time

spent driving from their homes to their first assignments and

from their last assignments back home, but only to the extent

it falls outside their “normal commute.”

A normal commute is the time it takes a technician to

drive from his home to his branch location. Thus, if a job site

is farther from a technician’s home than his branch office, the

technician is compensated for the extra time it takes him to

reach the job site. But if a job site is the same distance or

closer to a technician’s home than his branch office, the

technician is not compensated for time spent driving to the

job site. Alcantar claims that California law requires Hobart

to compensate technicians for their normal commute. The

crux of this claim is the allegation that, while commuting to

and from work in Hobart’s vehicles, the service technicians

are under Hobart’s control.

As a condition of their employment, Hobart’s service

technicians must sign an agreement governing their use of the

vehicles. The agreement states that the technicians have the

option either to commute in their vehicles or leave the

vehicles at their branch offices:

I understand that I have the option of driving

the company vehicle to my home at the end of

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6 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

the work day and from my home to my first

work assignment of the day. I also understand

I may park the company vehicle at the office

to which I am assigned.

Alcantar maintains this choice is illusory. The branch offices

do not have enough secured parking spaces for technicians’

vehicles. Because the technicians are responsible for the

tools and parts inside the vehicles, they risk having to pay for

any stolen tools and parts if the vehicles are burglarized at the

branch offices.

The agreement also places numerous restrictions on the

service technicians’ use of the vehicles, including prohibiting

personal use without prior approval:

Personal use of the service vehicle, other than

commuting from home to the first work

assignment and from the last work assignment

to home, is strictly prohibited unless prior

written approval is granted by management. 

(An example of personal use for which prior

approval could be granted would be in case of

a dental appointment which cannot be

scheduled after hours or on a weekend.)

The agreement also prohibits service technicians from

carrying passengers without prior approval. Transporting or

storing alcohol is also forbidden, and the agreement does not

give service technicians the option to seek permission from

management to do so. By signing the agreement, the

technicians acknowledge that “any infraction of these rules

will result in disciplinary action up to and including

termination.” Hobart’s personnel manual echoes the

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 7

agreement, listing the “[o]peration of a service vehicle for

personal use” as grounds for termination. In addition to these

limitations, Hobart also expects service technicians to

respond to calls on their company-issued cell phones while

driving to and from their first and last assignments of the

day.

1 Alcantar alleges that, as a result of these restrictions

and requirements, service technicians are under Hobart’s

control when commuting to and from work and thus must be

compensated for their time.

As hourly employees, the technicians are also required to

take meal and rest breaks throughout the day. Alcantar

alleges that Hobart failed to provide these breaks.

II. District Court Proceedings

Alcantar’s complaint, filed October 5, 2011, alleges

violations of California Labor Code § 1194. The complaint

also alleges derivative claims under the Unfair Competition

Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., and

PAGA, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698 et seq. Alcantar sought

certification of a class of service technicians employed by

Hobart in the four years preceding the filing of the lawsuit.2

1 Hobart changed its policy less than a year after Alcantar filed suit,

announcing to service technicians that it would neither control their

“ability to use the vehicle for personal purposes” nor require them “to

perform any services for Hobart” during the drive to and from work.

2 Alcantar actually sought certification of a class of persons employed

by Hobart in the four years preceding the filing of the lawsuit, with two

subclasses: persons employed as service technicians and persons who

worked overtime and were paid an hourly wage and additional

compensation in the same work week. Only the first subclass is relevant

here.

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8 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

Hobart and ITW opposed class certification and moved for

summary judgment on all claims.

The district court denied Alcantar’s motion for class

certification, explaining that Alcantar failed to satisfy the

commonality requirement of Federal Rule of Procedure

23(a)(2) and the predominance requirement of Federal Rule

of Procedure 23(b)(3). The court then granted the motion for

summary judgment as to Alcantar’s overtime claim for

commute time but held that there was a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Hobart complied with California’s

meal- and rest-break requirements. The district court

concluded that the derivative UCL and PAGA claims

survived to the same extent as the overtime claim.

Hobart and ITW moved for summary judgment a second

time, arguing that Alcantar had not complied with PAGA’s

notice requirements. The district court agreed. The parties

stipulated to dismissal of the § 1194 claim and the UCL claim

and Alcantar timely appealed, challenging the district court’s

orders denying certification, granting in part the first motion

for summary judgment, and granting the second motion for

summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant

or deny summary judgment, viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Alexander v. FedEx

Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2014). 

“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”’ Albino v. Baca,

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 9

747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

We review orders granting or denying class certification

for abuse of discretion. Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 536 F.3d 975,

977 (9th Cir. 2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the

district court, ‘in making a discretionary ruling, relies upon an

improper factor, omits consideration of a factor entitled to

substantial weight, or mulls the correct mix of factors but

makes a clear error of judgment in assaying them.”’ Id. at

977–78 (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray,

208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2000)).

DISCUSSION

I. Class Certification

Alcantar contends that the district court improperly

reached the merits of his claims in denying class certification

under Rule 23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).

“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that

litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual

named parties only.”’ Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.

Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki,

442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)). This exception is justified

where the class members and the class representative possess

the same interest and have suffered the same injury. Id. Rule

23(a) seeks to ensure that the class claims are limited to those

‘“fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.”’ Id.

(quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156

(1982)). To that end, Rule 23(a) conditions certification on

a demonstration that

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10 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable; (2) there are

questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the

representative parties are typical of the claims

or defenses of the class; and (4) the

representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

Courts must perform a “rigorous analysis” of these

prerequisities before concluding that Rule 23(a) is satisfied. 

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at

161). The analysis may “entail some overlap with the merits

of the plaintiff’s underlying claim,” id., but Rule 23 “grants

courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at

the certification stage.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &

Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013). Instead,

“[m]erits questions maybe considered to the extent—but only

to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether

the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” 

Id. at 1195. Once these prerequisites are satisfied, the

proposed class must meet at least one of the three

requirements set forth in Rule 23(b).

A. Commute-Time Claim

Although Rule 23(a)(2) refers to common “questions of

law or fact” in the plural, even a single common question will

do. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556. But because “‘[a]ny

competently crafted class complaint literally raises common

questions,’” id. at 2551 (alteration in original) (quoting

Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 11

Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131–32 (2009)),

courts should look for a “common contention” in determining

whether putative class members’ claims can be litigated

together. Id. “That common contention, moreover, must be

of such a nature that it is capable of classwide

resolution—which means that determination of its truth or

falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of

each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. Thus, it is not just

the common contention, but the answer to that contention,

that is important: “What matters to class certification . . . is

not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves —but,

rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate

common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” 

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Nagareda, supra, at 132).

A common contention need not be one that “will be

answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.” Amgen,

133 S. Ct. at 1191. It only “must be of such a nature that it is

capable of classwide resolution.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at

2551 (emphasis added); see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,

417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (“In determining the propriety of a

class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or

plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the

merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are

met.” (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int’l, 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th

Cir. 1971)). Thus, “whether class members could actually

prevail on the merits of their claims” is not a proper inquiry

in determining the preliminary question “whether common

questions exist.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d

970, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). “To hold otherwise would turn

class certification into a mini-trial,” id., when the purpose of

class certification is merely “to select the ‘metho[d]’ best

suited to adjudication of the controversy ‘fairly and

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12 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

efficiently.”’ Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191 (alteration in

original).

In denying certification, the district court observed that

Alcantar had not offered any evidence demonstrating that

Hobart had a uniform policy requiring technicians to

commute in the service vehicles and stated, “Absent proof of

a company-wide policy, the commonality requirement is not

met.” The court then concluded that, “because there is no

evidence to suggest that technicians were required to drive

the service vehicles to their homes, the lack of a potential

legal argument precludes a common issue of fact or law for

purposes of Rule 23(a)(2).”

The district court’s conclusion is incorrect for two

reasons. First, as explained below, there is a question of fact

as to whether Hobart requires technicians to use its vehicles

for their commute. See infra Part II. Second, it asks too

much of Alcantar, who need only show that there is a

common contention capable of classwide resolution—not that

there is a common contention that “will be answered, on the

merits, in favor of the class.” See Amgen, 133. S. Ct. at 1191. 

His contention is that service technicians, by virtue of their

inability to park at Hobart’s facilities, must drive Hobart’s

vehicles to work and, as a result of the rules applicable to

their use of the vehicles, are sufficiently controlled during

that commute to render the time compensable under

California law. If it should ultimately be determined that

Hobart did not exercise sufficient control over the

technicians, that determination would not amount to ‘“some

fatal dissimilarity”’ among class members that would make

use of the class action device inefficient or unfair. Id. at 1197

(quoting Nagareda, supra, at 107). Instead, it would generate

“a fatal similarity—failure of proof as to an element of the

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 13

plaintiff’s [claim].” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis

added) (quoting Nagareda, supra, at 107). A determination

either way is inappropriate at the certification stage.

We conclude that the district court erred in denying class

certification because it evaluated the merits rather than

focusing on whether the questions presented—meritorious or

not—were common to the class. By doing so, the district

court made an error of law, thereby abusing its discretion.

B. Meal- and Rest-Break Claim

Alcantar contends that the district court also improperly

evaluated the merits in denying certification of the meal- and

rest-break claim. We need not reach this issue, however,

because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in concluding that the proposed class also failed

under Rule 23(b).

In addition to Rule 23(a)’s four prerequisites, a proposed

class must satisfy at least one of the requirements listed in

Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Alcantar moved for

certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a court find

that “questions of law or fact common to class members

predominate over any questions affecting only individual

members” and that “a class action is superior to other

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The district court

held that even if the class met Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites, the

class would still fail under Rule 23(b)(3) because questions

as to why service technicians missed their meal and rest

breaks, whether because of their employer’s failure to provide

them or their own choice to forgo them, would predominate

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14 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

over questions common to the class. This conclusion is well

within the district court’s discretion.

II. Summary Judgment on Commute-Time Claim

Alcantar challenges the district court’s decision to grant

summary judgment in favor of Hobart on Alcantar’s

commute-time claim. The district court’s decision was based

on its conclusion that § 1194 does not require Hobart to

compensate Alcantar for commute time where there is no

dispute that Hobart does not expressly require the technicians

to commute in its vehicles.

An employee’s commute is not typically compensable

under California labor law, even “when the employee

commutes in a vehicle that is owned, leased, or subsidized by

the employer.” Cal. Lab. Code § 510(b). The time may be

compensable, however, if the employee can classify it as

“hours worked.” The Industrial Welfare Commission has

defined “hours worked” as “the time during which an

employee is subject to the control of an employer,” including

“all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work,

whether or not required to do so.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8,

§ 11040(2)(K).

In Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., the California

Supreme Court elaborated on what constitutes control. 

995 P.2d 139 (Cal. 2000), as modified (May 10, 2000). The

plaintiff in Morillion represented a class of agricultural

laborers. Their employer, Royal Packing Company, required

them to meet at specific departure points each morning so

that it could transport them to the fields where they worked. 

At the end of the day, Royal took them back to the departure

points. Id. Royal prohibited the workers from using their

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 15

own transportation to get to and from the fields. The

California Supreme Court held that the workers were entitled

to compensation for the time they spent traveling to and from

the fields, reasoning that they “were foreclosed from

numerous activities in which they might otherwise engage if

they were permitted to travel to the fields by their own

transportation.” Id. at 146. The court rejected Royal’s

argument that its decision would render all activities an

employer requires (even grooming) compensable. The court

explained that “[t]he level of the employer’s control over its

employees, rather than the mere fact that the employer

requires the employees’ activity, is determinative.” Id.

Alcantar does not assert that Hobart exercises control over

him should he commute in his own vehicle. Therefore, to

prevail at trial he must prove not only that Hobart’s

restrictions on him during his commute in Hobart’s vehicle

are such that he is under Hobart’s control, but also that,

despite Hobart’s profession that use of its vehicles is

voluntary, employees are, as a practical matter, required to

commute in Hobart’s vehicles. The first is a question of law

which we return to the district court. The second is a

question of fact, which we find is appropriate for a jury as

Alcantar has raised a genuine issue of material fact.

Alcantar acknowledges that Hobart has no official policy

requiring technicians to commute in the service vehicles but

argues that, in reality, service technicians have no meaningful

choice. Each vehicle is equipped with tools and service parts. 

Although the parties dispute the value of the tools and parts

(Hobart argues that the value ranges from $5,000 to $12,000;

Alcantar insists a stock inventory places it at over $80,000),

they agree that the technicians are responsible for them. 

Thus, Alcantar argues, if the tools or parts are stolen, the

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technicians must pay for them. Alcantar contends that

because Hobart does not provide sufficient secure parking

spaces, the technicians have to take the vehicles home or risk

theft of the tools and service parts.

Alcantar submits numerous declarations from service

technicians supporting this contention. The declarations state

that even though Hobart did not have a policy requiring

technicians to drive the vehicles home, the technicians could

not risk having to pay for stolen tools or parts. In addition to

the declarations, Alcantar offers deposition testimony from

Hobart’s Rule 30(b)(6) representative, who conceded that

although there is enough unsecured parking at each branch,

there is not enough secured parking for every technician to

leave a service vehicle overnight. Alcantar also submits an

excerpt from Hobart’s personnel manual in which Hobart

acknowledges the value of the tools and service parts:

This vehicle is provided to you for business

purposes only. When you consider the high

dollar value of the truck parts inventory, the

value of the tools, along with the information

contained in the technical bulletins you are

required to carry, you can understand why the

use of the vehicle is limited to business

purposes only.

Alcantar has gone beyond the pleadings and has pointed

to declarations and deposition testimony that raise a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether technicians are, as a

practical matter, required to commute in Hobart’s vehicles. 

It is not for the court to evaluate the persuasiveness of this

evidence. Alcantar need only show that a reasonable jury

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 17

could find for him at trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).

Hobart maintains that Alcantar’s claim cannot survive

summary judgment because the agreement between Hobart

and the technicians gives technicians the choice to commute

in their vehicles or leave them at their branch office. But as

we explained above, there is a dispute of material fact as to

whether that choice is genuine or illusory. To the extent

Hobart argues that Alcantar’s claim is foreclosed as a matter

of law, the court is unpersuaded. Hobart cites no precedent

stating that an employer must expressly require employees

commute in their vehicles for the employees’ commute time

to be compensable. Nor does the court read Morillion or the

cases interpreting it as imposing such a condition. Indeed,

Morillion’s chief concern was with what happened in

practice—that Royal determined “when, where, and how” the

laborers commuted to work. See Morillion, 995 P.2d at 146. 

Cases applying Morillion have looked at employees’ behavior

in evaluating plaintiffs’ claims that their employer required

them to take certain transportation. See Overton v. Walt

Disney Co., 136 Cal. App. 4th 263, 271 (Ct. App. 2006), as

modified (Feb. 1, 2006) (concluding that the employer did not

require its employees to take an employer-provided shuttle

where there was evidence that some employees used

alternative means of transportation); see also Rodriguez v.

SGLC, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-01971, 2012 WL 5705992, at *18

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (finding that because there was

evidence that all employees took employer-provided

transportation, even though the employer did not explicitly

require they take it, there was a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether plaintiffs were free to choose their mode of

transportation). Thus, we conclude that Alcantar’s argument

is not foreclosed as a matter of law.

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Nor are we persuaded by the reasoning of the dissent,

which relies on a provision of Hobart’s Personnel Policies

and Procedures. That provision states that technicians are

responsible for the replacement of any tool lost or stolen

through the technicians’ negligence and directs technicians

to ensure that their vehicles are locked when left unattended. 

Relying on this provision, the dissent contends that “any

argument that the employees are somehow required to drive

their service vehicles home for the security of the vehicle’s

contents has no basis in the record. ” Citing the lack of

evidence that Hobart has ever held a technician liable for a

break-in at the facility, the dissent overlooks the fact that no

one has ever actually parked there.

In contrast to the provision on which the dissent relies, the

“Service Technician Rules/Understandings” document states

that technicians are absolutely responsible for the tools,

regardless of culpability. It provides that service technicians

“accept full responsibility” if tools are “lost, misplaced or . . .

not . . . available when regularly inventoried.” In addition, as

noted above, Alcantar has submitted numerous declarations

from other technicians, stating that they could not risk leaving

the vehicles at Hobart’s facilities because they would be

forced to pay for stolen tools or parts. These declarations say

nothing of negligence, and suggest that technicians have

received the message from Hobart, implicitly or explicitly,

that they are absolutely responsible for the tools. Hobart’s

apparently inconsistent policies make the testimony of

witnesses necessaryto resolve the extent to which technicians

are held responsible for the tools and parts. This is unlike the

employees in Overton, who demonstrably had options other

than riding a shuttle bus to work.

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 19

III. Summary Judgment on PAGA Claim

Alcantar also contends that the district court erred in

ruling that Hobart was entitled to summary judgment on

Alcantar’s PAGA claim because the letter in which Alcantar

disclosed his allegations against Hobart did not contain

sufficient facts to comply with the statute’s notice

requirements.

PAGA allows an employee to bring an action against an

employer to recover civil penalties for violations of the

California Labor Code. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a). First,

however, the employee must give “written notice by certified

mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and

the employer of the specific provisions of [the California

Labor Code] alleged to have been violated, including the facts

and theories to support the alleged violation.” Cal. Lab. Code

§ 2699.3(a)(1). ITW and Hobart argue that the letter Alcantar

sent them and the Labor and Workforce Development

Agency does not include sufficient facts or theories.3 We

agree.

Alcantar’s letter is a series of legal conclusions:

Our offices have been retained by Joseluis

Alcantara [sic] (Plaintiff). Plaintiff is a

former employee of ITW Food Equipment

 

3

 Alcantar asks us not to reach this issue, arguing that Hobart and ITW

waived this affirmative defense or, in the alternative, that it was

insufficiently pleaded. We have no difficulty concluding that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defense preserved. Hobart

and ITW asserted in their responsive pleading that Alcantar “failed to

satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites mandated byCalifornia Labor Code

Sections 2698, et seq.”

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20 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

Group, LLC aka Hobart Service (Defendant). 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant (1) failed to

pay wages for all time worked; (2) failed to

pay overtime wages for overtime worked;

(3) failed to include the extra compensation

required by California Labor Code section

1194 in the regular rate of pay when

computing overtime compensation, thereby

failing to pay Plaintiff and those who earned

additional compensation for all overtime

wages due; (4) failed to provide accurate

wage statements to employees as required by

California Labor Code section 226; (5) failed

to provide reimbursement for work related

expenses as required by Labor Code § 2802;

and, (6) failed to provide off-duty meal

periods and to pay compensation for work

without off-dutymeal periods to its California

employees in violation of California Labor

Code sections 226.7 and 512, and applicable

Industrial Welfare Commission orders. Said

conduct, in addition to the forgoing, violated

each Labor Code section as set forth in

California Labor Code section 2699.5.

The only facts or theories that could be read into this letter

are those implied by the claimed violations of specific

sections of the California Labor Code—that Hobart failed to

pay wages for time worked, failed to pay overtime wages for

overtime worked, failed to include the extra compensation

required by § 1194 in the regular rate of pay when computing

overtime compensation, and so on. This is insufficient.

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 21

Section 2699.3(a)(1) was adopted as part of an

amendment to PAGA, intended to cure perceived abuses of

the Act. As the California Court of Appeal observed,

The Senate floor analysis stated “[the

amendment] improves [the Act] by allowing

the Labor Agency to act first on more serious

violations such as wage and hour violations

and give employers an opportunity to cure

less ‘serious’ violations. The bill protects

businesses from shakedown lawsuits, yet

ensures that labor laws protectingCalifornia’s

working men and women are enforced—

either through the Labor Agency or through

the courts.”

Dunlap v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 4th 330, 338–39,

47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 614 (2006) (quoting Calif. S. Rules Comm.,

Off. of S. Floor Analyses, Bill Analysis for SB1809, at 5–6

(Aug. 27, 2004)). Plaintiff’s letter—a string of legal

conclusions with no factual allegations or theories of liability

to support them—is insufficient to allow the Labor and

Workforce Development Agency to intelligently assess the

seriousness of the alleged violations. Neither does it provide

sufficient information to permit the employer to determine

what policies or practices are being complained of so as to

know whether to fold or fight. Thus, we affirm. This

conclusion is consistent with our unpublished opinion in

Archila v. KFC U.S. Properties, Inc., 420 F. App’x 667, 669

(9th Cir. 2011), in which we affirmed a district court’s

dismissal of a PAGA claim, observing that “none of the

materials Archila submitted to KFC or the LWDA contain

‘facts and theories’ to support his allegations” and the

demand letter “merely lists several California Labor Code

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22 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

provisions Archila alleges KFC violated and requests that

KFC conduct an investigation.” See also Amey v. Cinemark

USA Inc., No. 13-CV-05669, 2015 WL 2251504, at **13–14

(N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015); Soto v. Castlerock Farming &

Transp. Inc., No. CIV-F-09-0701, 2012 WL 1292519, at

**7–8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

N.R. SMITH, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

This case should be over. The majority correctly rejects

Alcantar’s contentions regarding (a) the denial of class

certification on his meal break claim, and (b) the grant of

summary judgment to Hobart on his PAGA claim.1 Then, for

reasons quite unclear to me, the majority fails to affirm the

grant of summary judgment on the commute time claim. 

1 The majority also correctly concludes that the district court erred in

denying Alcantar class certification on his commute time claim. 

However, as I would affirmthe district court’s grant ofsummary judgment

to Hobart on the commute time claim, I would not remand the case,

because remand would be futile.

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 23

Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

Alcantar, as we must when reviewing a grant of summary

judgment, see Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898

(9th Cir. 2002), there is no genuine issue of material fact on

this issue.

Under California law, Alcantar may only succeed on his

commute time claim if he can show that he is subject to

Hobart’s control during his commute. See Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 8, § 11040(2)(K). If an employer requires its employees

to commute in employer provided vehicles and “prohibit[s]

them from effectively using their travel time for their own

purposes,” then the employer must compensate the employees

for their time as “hours worked.” See Morillion v. Royal

Packing Co., 995 P.2d 139, 146 (Cal. 2000). However, if the

employees are “free to choose—rather than required— to”

utilize employer provided transportation, then they are not

under their employer’s control, regardless if they ultimately

use the employer provided transportation. See id. at 148 n.5;

Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693, 699 (Ct.

App. 2006).

Here, Alcantar and all Hobart employees can choose to

either commute in their own personal vehicles or commute in

Hobart provided service vehicles. Nothing prevents Hobart

employees from utilizing either option. Thus, because Hobart

employees are free to choose their method to commute, they

are not under Hobart’s control during their commutes and

Hobart is not obligated to pay them for their commute time. 

The facts, as alleged by Alcantar, confirm this result:

• No one disputes that Hobart has a written policy that

allows its employees to either (1) park their service

vehicles at Hobart’s facilities at the end of their shift

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24 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

and commute home in their personal vehicles or

(2) commute in their service vehicles.

• No one disputes that, if Hobart employees choose to

park their service vehicles at a Hobart facility

overnight and commute in their own personal

vehicles, they are not subject to any Hobart policies

that limit how the employees can use their commute

time; i.e., they are not under Hobart’s control.

• Alcantar alleges that, if Hobart employees commute

in their service vehicles, they cannot use the commute

time for their own benefit because of Hobart’s

policies restricting the use of the service vehicles. 

Thus, the employees are under Hobart’s control

during their normal commute if they commute in their

service vehicles.

• No one disputes that Hobart facilities do not have

enough secured parking spaces (i.e., parking spaces in

a locked area, either inside a building or in a fenced

area) to allow all Hobart employees to leave their

vehicles overnight in a secured parking area. 

However, there is enough unsecured parking for all

vehicles, should every employee choose to park their

vehicle overnight at the Hobart facility.

• No one disputes that Hobart has a general policy

declaringHobart employees responsible fortheirtools

and equipment. The “Service Technicians

Rules/Understanding” form (which all Hobart service

technicians sign) states: “Should any of the tools be

lost, misplaced or should they not be available when

regularly inventoried, or returned byme at the request

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 25

of the company, then I accept full responsibility for

such tools, and agree to pay for such tools.” 

However, it is also undisputed that Hobart has a

separate provision addressing an employee’s liability

for the theft of tools and equipment from their service

vehicles. Hobart’s Personnel Policies and Procedures

Handbook (which is also provided to each Hobart

employee) states: “You are responsible for the

replacement of any tool lost or stolen through your

negligence. . . . Hobart tools are insured against theft

but only when theft results from forced entry to a

vehicle or workshop. Consequently, you must ensure

that your vehicle is securely locked when it is left

unattended.”2

Given these facts (viewed in the light most favorable to

Alcantar), the commute time is not compensable as “hours

worked.” See Morillion, 995 P.2d at 148 n.5; Overton,

38 Cal. Rptr. 3rd at 699. Hobart employees have the choice

to either (1) park their service vehicles overnight at Hobart’s

facilities in a secured area (if spots are available) or in an

unsecured area with locked doors, and commute in their own

personal vehicle (outside of Hobart’s control), or

(2) commute in their service vehicles (under Hobart’s

2 Alcantar admits that this is Hobart’s policy. In fact, Alcantar quotes

the written policy in his opening brief and specifically recognizes that

Hobart’s Regional Director for the Central West and Southern California

Regions confirmed that the written policy was accurate. Additionally,

Alcantar has not argued that Hobart fails to follow its written policy. Nor

has he presented evidence that Hobart has ever held an employee liable for

the cost of stolen tools even though the employee was not negligent. 

Therefore, based upon the record before us, it is undisputed that Hobart

only holds its employee liable for the cost of tools stolen from his or her

service vehicle if the employee’s negligence facilitated the theft.

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26 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

control). Nothing prevents Hobart employees from leaving

their service vehicles overnight at Hobart’s facilities.

Alcantar first argues (and the majority buys his argument)

that the option to leave the service vehicles overnight at

Hobart’s facilities may be illusory, because the vehicles

would be left in unsecured parking lots and the Hobart

employees would be liable for the cost of replacing any stolen

tools or equipment, should the vehicles be burglarized. 

However, this argument contradicts the undisputed facts in

the record and Hobart’s policy. Hobart’s undisputed policy

regarding equipment stolen from service vehicles states that

employees are only liable for tools and equipment stolen out

of their vehicles if the theft occurred because of the

employees’ negligence. Hobart’s policy further clarifies the

duty of care that its employees must follow when leaving

their vehicles; they must lock their doors. If tools or

equipment are stolen out of a locked vehicle, Hobart’s

insurance covers the loss, not the employee. Further, Hobart

has expressly authorized its employees to leave their vehicles

overnight at its facilities. Therefore, because Hobart has

established the requisite duty for its employees, it cannot be

negligence to do exactly as Hobart has directed. Because

Hobart employees would not be held liable for tools or

equipment stolen from service vehicles left overnight at

Hobart facilities (either in the secured area or locked in the

unsecured area), any argument that the employees are

somehow required to drive their service vehicles home for the

security of the vehicle’s contents has no basis in the record. 

Alcantar has not provided any evidence that Hobart does not

follow its theft policy or has informed its employees that they

would be liable for the cost of tools stolen out of locked

vehicles. Alcantar has not shown that Hobart has ever

required an employee to pay for tools stolen out of his or her

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 27

service vehicle when the tools were stolen after the employee

had locked the doors to his or her vehicle.3 Therefore, the

option of leaving service vehicles overnight at Hobart

facilities cannot be illusory. There is no genuine issue of

material fact on this issue.

To contradict this conclusion, the majority manufactures

the argument that Hobart’s policies are “inconsistent.” 

Alcantar has never even made that argument. Instead, in his

opening brief, Alcantar recognized Hobart’s undisputed

policy, as conveyed in both the Rules/Understandings form

and Hobart’s Manual:

The Rules/Understandings explain that

Technicians are responsible for tools assigned

to them, stating:

3 The majority responds by suggesting that Alcantar shouldn’t be

required to provide evidence that Hobart holds its employees liable for

stolen tools even if they were not negligent. Not true. Alcantar is

responding to a motion for summary judgment. He has the burden to

support his claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)

(holding that summary judgment is appropriate against a “[p]arty who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case”). Evidence of any occurrence, regardless of

the location, when Hobart has held an employee liable for the cost of tools

stolen out of a locked vehicle would be sufficient to show that Hobart does

not follow its theft policy. Such evidence would show that Alcantar’s

alleged reason for employees not leaving vehicles overnight at Hobart’s

facilities is valid. But Alcantar has not provided any such evidence. 

Therefore, we must conclude that Hobart follows its stated policy. Any

fear that Hobart employees would be held liable for tools stolen out of

their vehicle if they left their vehicles overnight at a Hobart facility is

completely unsupported by the record.

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28 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

. . . I assume full responsibility for the

tools as well as any service manuals . . .

Should any of the tools be lost, misplaced or

should they not be available when regularly

inventoried, or returned by me at the request

of the company, then I accept full

responsibility for such tools, and agree to pay

for such tools.

Hobart’s Manual also explains:

We feel that a Service Technician cannot

properly service the equipment unless the

proper tools are available at all times. 

Therefore, it is your responsibility to ensure

that the full inventory of assigned tools be

maintained . . . You are responsible for the

replacement of any tool lost or stolen through

your negligence.

[Hobart’s representative] confirmed that

this is an accurate statement of Hobart’s

policy.

Alcantar clearly saw no inconsistency between these two

provisions, but instead viewed them as one complete policy. 

By manufacturing its own argument, the majority again

attempts to create a genuine issue of fact where there is none.

Because Alcantar has presented both the

Rules/Understandings form and Hobart’s Manual as an

“accurate statement” of Hobart’s policy, we must give both

provisions effect. This is not hard to do, because the

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 29

provisions are not inconsistent.4 Hobart’s employees are

responsible for the cost of their tools if they are lost,

misplaced, or otherwise unavailable when requested. 

However, if the tools were stolen, the employees will only be

held liable for their cost if the theft occurred because of the

employees negligence. The only portion of Hobart’s policy

that discusses an employee’s liability for stolen tools remains

the provision contained in Hobart’s Manual. This is an

undisputed fact that the majority cannot ignore.

Alcantar argues (and the majority buys the argument) that

the lack of secured parking somehow renders illusory the

option to leave service vehicles overnight at Hobart facilities. 

However, the availability of secured parking areas at Hobart

facilities does not matter in this analysis. A Hobart

employee’s liability for stolen tools does not depend on

whether the vehicles were parked in a secured parking area. 

Instead, the employee’s liability occurs only when the theft

was facilitated by the employee’s negligence. Parking a

locked vehicle at a location specifically authorized by Hobart

cannot be negligence, because Hobart has expressly

authorized such conduct.

The majority responds by again trying to manufacture a

disputed issue of fact. The majority emphasizes that some

4

 And even if the majority were correct in declaring the two provisions

inconsistent, general contract principles dictate that the more specific theft

provision outlined in Hobart’s manual should qualify the meaning of the

more general provision contained on the Rules/Understandings form. See

Brinderson–Newberg Joint Venture v. Pacific Erectors, Inc., 971 F.2d

272, 279 (9th Cir.1992) (“It is well settled that ‘[w]here there is an

inconsistency between general provisions and specific provisions, the

specific provisions ordinarily qualify the meaning of the general

provisions.’” (quoting Restatement of Contracts § 236(c))).

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30 ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE

Hobart employees have provided declarations asserting that

they thought that commuting in their service vehicles was

their only practical option, because of the concern for the

safety of their tools. According to the majority, this

subjective belief renders the option of leaving the vehicles

overnight at Hobart facilities illusory. However, the

California Court of Appeal rejected similar arguments in

Overton, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 699. In Overton, Disney

employees at the Disneyland Resort in California, who

commuted to work in their own vehicles, were required to

park at a parking lot one mile from the Resort. Id. at 694. 

Disney provided a shuttle bus for the employees that ran from

the parking lot to the Resort. Id. Relying on Morillion v.

Royal Packing Co., the Disney employees sued for unpaid

wages, claiming that the time they spent waiting for and

riding the shuttle bus was compensable time, because they

were required to use the shuttle for their commute. Overton,

38 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 695. The California Court of Appeal

rejected the Disney employees’ claim, holding that the

employees were not required to ride the shuttle bus. Id. at

699. Instead, the court noted that the Disney employees

could use any number of alternative methods to commute,

including riding the train or bus, being dropped off, or

walking or riding their bikes. Id. The court then rejected the

argument that commute time was compensable for

“employees who, as a practical matter, are required to use an

employer-provided shuttle because no alternative

transportation is available or feasible.” Id. at 700. The court

reasoned that the dispositive inquiry in Morillion is not

whether the individual employees had a meaningful

alternative, but whether the employees (as a whole) “were

free to choose—rather than required—to ride their

employer’s buses.” Id. (quoting Morillion, 995 P.2d at 148

n.5).

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ALCANTAR V. HOBART SERVICE 31

Just like the employees in Overton (who thought that

utilizing the shuttle bus was the only practical method of

commuting), Alcantar argues that commuting in his service

vehicle home was the only practical method of commuting,

because it ensured the safety of the tools and equipment for

which he was responsible. However, viewing the undisputed

facts, Alcantar and all other Hobart employees were free to

choose to leave their service vehicles at Hobart facilities and

commute in their own personal vehicles, because there would

be absolutely no negative consequences for doing so. 

Therefore, no reasonable jury could conclude that the option

is illusory. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986) (reasoning that a genuine issue of material

fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).

Under both Morillion and Overton, Hobart is not required

by California law to compensate its employees for their

normal commute time, because employees are free to choose

to commute in their own personal vehicles outside of

Hobart’s control. Hobart is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Accordingly, this case should be over.

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