Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02279/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02279-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Arizona
Respondent
Tara Diaz
Respondent
Kevin Dwight Wilkins
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Dwight Wilkins, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Tara Diaz, Deputy Warden; Attorney

General of the State of Arizona, 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 06-2279-PHX-JAT (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Kevin Dwight Wilkins filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 on September 5, 2006. Following a bench trial, he was convicted of sale of

narcotic drugs, and sentenced to a mitigated 6-year prison term. He raises three grounds in

his federal petition: (1) that his rights under the United States and Arizona Constitutions

were violated because the trial court failed to ensure that trial counsel inform Wilkins of his

entitlement to a twelve-person jury prior to a waiver of that right; (2) that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to inform Wilkins of this right, in violation of the United States and

Arizona Constitutions; and (3) that his "conviction constitutes cruel and unusual punishment

because the State knew in advance that the Public Defender's Office and its staff does not

provide adequate representation." Respondents contend that the grounds are procedurally

defaulted. The Court recommends that Wilkins' petition be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

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Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts supporting Wilkins' conviction are summarized in the court of appeals

memorandum decision:

Four undercover Phoenix police officers rented a room at the Sky

Harbor Hotel located at 2323 East Van Buren. On August 12, 2002,

Defendant, who was accompanied by another man and a woman, approached

two of the undercover police officers in the laundry room of the hotel and

asked them "what do you need?" One of the officers responded that they were

looking to buy a "40." This referred to $40 worth of crack cocaine. Defendant

said, "I got it," left the officers and the others, and went to room 112 in the

hotel. When he returned, Defendant presented the officers with a 630

milligram rock of crack cocaine.

That evening, Defendant went to the officers' room and asked if they

needed anything else. The officers said that they did not and Defendant left.

An hour later, Defendant returned with the same male who had been with him

in the laundry room and told the officers that he believed they were police

officers because he did not see them smoke the crack. The officers said that

they presently did not have any crack to prove otherwise. When defendant

said that his friend had some crack that they could smoke the officers did not

respond, but rather closed the door on the two men.

(Doc. #17, Exh H at 2-3).

On direct review, counsel filed an Anders1

 brief, concluding after a search of the

record that he found "no arguable question of law that is not frivolous" (Id., Exh F at 5). At

Wilkins' request, counsel raised two issues: (1) that trial counsel failed to argue the amount

of drugs was under the statutory threshold amount; and (2) that because the undercover

officers supplied all the ingredients of the offense, Wilkins was entitled to raise an

entrapment defense (Id.). In a supplemental brief, Wilkins argued that the trial court failed

to comply with Ariz. R. Crim P. 18.1(b) by not informing Wilkins of his right to a twelveperson jury prior to accepting his waiver. He also maintained that the trial court erred in

enhancing his sentence with a prior conviction that was not proven beyond a reasonable

doubt, and which had been withdrawn prior to the imposition of sentence (Id., Exh G).

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

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The court of appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. In doing so, it concluded

that his argument that counsel failed to argue the drugs were below the statutory threshold

amount was an ineffective assistance claim not raisable on direct review. The court of

appeals also concluded that Wilkins was not entitled to an entrapment defense because he

had denied committing the offense. In reviewing the case for fundamental error, the court

found that Wilkins had not shown that his failure to be informed of a right to a 12-person jury

constituted fundamental error, but amounted "to nothing more than supplemental information

to which [he] was not even entitled before deciding to waive the jury" (Id., Exh H at 8). The

court of appeals also rejected Wilkins' claim that the trial court had erred in enhancing his

sentence with a prior conviction (Id.).

In his first post-conviction relief petition, Wilkins argued that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to advise him of his right to a twelve-person jury, making his waiver

of a jury trial involuntary (Id., Exh W). The trial court summarily dismissed the petition,

finding his claim precluded because his waiver had been previously upheld on appeal (Id.,

Exh AA). The trial court also ruled that Wilkins had not established prejudice under the

Strickland2

 standard, and therefore had failed to state a colorable claim. He did not petition

the court of appeals to review this ruling. His second post-conviction petition was summarily

dismissed as untimely, the trial court finding that Wilkins had not provided any facts that

would excuse the timeliness requirement (Id., Exh BB-EE). Wilkins did not petition the

court of appeals to review this ruling.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly exhaust

state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court in a

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procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-846 (1999). In

Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). The exhaustion requirement will not be met

where the Petitioner fails to fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38.

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are available in state court, then the federal court

may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-605 (9th Cir. 1989). The federal

court may decline to consider these claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes,

433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).

Further, a procedural default may occur when a Petitioner raises a claim in state court,

but the state court finds the claim to be defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 730-31. In such cases, federal habeas review is precluded if the state court opinion

contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground "that is both

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Although Wilkins was only sentenced to six years in prison, he potentially faced a

thirty-five year prison sentence, if convicted as charged, with a finding of two or more

substantial aggravating factors.

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'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's

decision." See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. A state procedural default ruling is "independent"

unless application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal

claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856

(2002). A state's application of the bar is "adequate" if it is "'strictly or regularly followed.'"

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-63 (1982)). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, just as in cases

involving defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, federal habeas review of the claims

is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. 

DISCUSSION

Wilkins first contends that his rights under the United States and Arizona

Constitutions were violated because the trial court failed to ensure that trial counsel inform

Wilkins of his entitlement to a twelve-person jury prior to a waiver of that right. On direct

review, he argued similarly that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent

because of the trial court's failure to advise him of his right to a twelve-person jury, in

violation of Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b). However, on appeal he referenced only the Arizona

Constitution, which provides that a defendant facing more than 30 years in prison is entitled

to a twelve-person jury. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, §23; A.R.S. § 21-102(A).3

 There is no

corresponding federal statute or constitutional provision requiring twelve jurors for

conviction. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). Not only has Wilkins failed to

fairly present his federal claim to the state court, thus making it unexhausted, but he cannot

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His reference to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial for the first time in his

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court is insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1989).

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return to state court and satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Teague.

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 Wilkins has not

shown cause or prejudice to excuse the default. Coleman. Finally, the issue is one of state

law, not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-

68 (1991).

In his second ground, Wilkins maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to inform Wilkins of his right to a twelve-person jury, in violation of his rights under the

United States and Arizona Constitutions. Although he raised this claim in his first postconviction petition, he did not seek review of the trial court's dismissal of his Rule 32 petition

from the court of appeals, and it is therefore unexhausted. See Teague. Because he is timebarred from returning to state court, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Id. Wilkins has not

shown cause or prejudice to excuse the default. Coleman. Finally, because there is no

federal constitutional requirement of a twelve-person jury, counsel cannot be ineffective for

failing to so advise Wilkins.

In his third ground, Wilkins argues that his "conviction constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment because the State knew in advance that the Public Defender's Office and its staff

does not provide adequate representation." Although it is unclear what Wilkins is claiming

as error, the record reflects that he did not raise anything resembling an Eighth Amendment

claim in his state court proceedings. The claim is therefore unexhausted, and he is timebarred from returning to state court, making it procedurally defaulted. See Teague. Wilkins

has not shown cause or prejudice to excuse the default. Coleman.

Wilkins has also filed a Motion for Leave of Court and Court Order, in which he

requests leave to return to state court to properly exhaust his claims, and for appointment of

counsel. Because the Court has concluded that a return to state court would be futile, his

motion for leave will be denied. On November 17, 2006, the Court denied Wilkins' previous

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motion for appointment of counsel because he had not established he was more likely to

succeed on the merits than any other habeas petitioner before the Court, and had not

demonstrated that his claims were complex. See Doc. ##13, 14. Wilkins has not since that

time made any showing which would prompt the Court to reconsider its ruling. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Kevin Dwight Wilkins' petition for

writ of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wilkins' Motion for Leave of Court and Court

Order is DENIED (Doc. #18).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2007.

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