Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01346/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01346-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrick R. Clinton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐1346

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DERRICK R. CLINTON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:14‐cr‐00058‐RTR‐1— Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 16, 2016

Before ROVNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and SHAH,

District Judge.*

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.  On March 11, 2014, a grand jury

returned a two‐count indictment against Derrick Clinton,

charging him with possession of a firearm as a convicted felon

*

    Hon. Manish S. Shah of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by

designation.

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in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and possession with intent to

distribute a mixture and substance containing cocaine base in

the form of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

Pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, Clinton

entered a plea of guilty to the felon‐in‐possession count, and

the government agreed to dismiss the second count and to

recommend a sentence within the advisory guidelines range.

The district court ultimately sentenced Clinton to a term of

imprisonment of 76 months followed by three years of super‐

vised release and a $100 special assessment. Clinton now

appeals that sentence.

The arrest in this case stemmed from a domestic violence

call received by the Milwaukee police on January 9, 2014.

When the officers responded to the residence, they spoke with

the victim M.K., who informed them that Derrick Clinton sold

cocaine and had a firearm in the residence. She told the officers

that Clinton kept the firearm in the bedroom closet, but that

she had retrieved it and hidden it under a pile of clothes in the

dining room so that Clinton could not use it. The officers

conducted a search of the residence with M.K.’s consent, and

the officers found a Lorcin 9mm pistol under the clothes in the

dining room. Underneath the couch in the living room the

officers discovered a plate containing 2.29 grams of cocaine

base, a razor blade, a box of baggies, and a digital scale. The

following day, Clinton called a Milwaukee police officer and

admitted to possessing the gun. He stated that he purchased

the gun from a drug addict. He was arrested on January 21,

2014, and subsequently admitted that he owned the firearm

and that he cooked and sold crack cocaine.

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No. 15‐1346 3

Prior to sentencing, the Probation Office prepared a

Presentence InvestigationReport(PSR)that determined a base

offense level of 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) based on

his two prior felony controlled‐substances convictions. The

PSR further recommended that the district court apply a four‐

level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because

Clinton had possessed the 9mm weapon “in connection with

another felony offense”—the drug offense. The PSR also

advocated a three‐level decrease for Clinton’s acceptance of

responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 25. In

conjunction with his undisputed Category III criminal history,

the PSR determined a Guidelines range of 70‐87 months, and

the district court sentenced him to 76 months. Clinton now

challenges that sentence, arguing that the district court erred

inapplying the four‐level enhancementunder § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B),

failed to consider mitigating circumstances, and relied on

improper factors in determining his sentence.

We review a district court’s sentencing procedures and

questions oflaw involving the interpretations oftheGuidelines

de novo. United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 538 (7th Cir.

2014). “‘[W]here the district court bases the application of a

sentencing guideline on factual findings, we review for clear

error.’” United States v. Meece, 580 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2009),

quoting United States v. Wagner, 467 F.3d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir.

2006). Clinton first argues that the district court erred in

applying the four‐level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).A

district court’s application of those Guidelines is a mixed

question of law and fact, and is reviewed for clear error.

Schmitt, 770 F.3d at 538‐39. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for

a four‐level enhancement if the defendant “used or possessed

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any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony

offense; orpossessedortransferredany firearm or ammunition

with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be

used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.”

Only the first of those two provisions is applicable in this case.

Application Note 14 to that section provides that subsection

(b)(6)(B) applies “if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or

had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.”

As we recognized in United States v. Harper, 766 F.3d 741,

747 (7th Cir. 2014), the broad language of § 2K2.1 presents a

danger of sweeping withinits reach wide‐ranging offenses that

may be only tenuously connected to the offense of conviction.

Courts have responded to that potential for abuse by requiring

that the other offense must fall within relevant conduct in

order for the enhancement to apply, and the Sentencing

Commission has followed suit in an amendment effective

November 1, 2014 which clarifies that courts must considerthe

relationship between the offense of conviction and the other

offense consistent with relevant conduct principles.

In this case, the defendant may be found to have used a

firearm in connection with another felony offense if he “‘used

or possessed’ the firearm in connection with (1) his general

drug dealing activities in his home or (2) the purchase of the

firearm, which he allegedly bought with drugs.” Schmitt,

770 F.3d at 539.

The district court began by relying on the second of those

two approaches. In considering whether the four‐level en‐

hancement was proper, the district court first stated that a

“solid presumption” exists that “where you have drugs you

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No. 15‐1346 5

have guns and usually violence.” The district court then found

that “in any event, you have the defendant purchasing a gun

from a drug [dealer.]1 Sure, the inference could be drawn orthe

argument can be made that it was purchased from the sale of

the drugs that he was making, but you’ve got an exchange here

for guns and drugs if you accept that as true.” We have held

that the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement is proper when the

defendant has engaged in an exchange of drugs for a weapon.

Schmitt, 770 F.3d at 539. Accordingly, the district court’s

finding, if proper, would support the application of that

enhancement.

That finding, however, is not supported in the record, and

the government to its credit acknowledges as much. The

underlying discovery and the factual proffer in Clinton’s plea

agreement establish only that the person from whom he

purchased the weapon was a drug addict. Although it is

possible that the person could have conveyed the firearm to

Clinton in exchange for drugs, there is no evidence of that, and

mere speculation is insufficient to support a four‐level en‐

hancement. United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 394, 400 (7th Cir.

2010) (due process requires that sentencing determinations be

based on reliable evidence rather than speculation or un‐

founded allegations). Therefore, the district court’s reliance on

the drugs‐for‐guns scenario in applying the enhancement was

reversible error.

1

    The transcript says “drug clear” instead of “drug dealer” but the

government acknowledges that was likely a typographical error and that

the PSR‐writer and judge seem to have concluded that the seller of the

weapon was a drug dealer.

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6 No. 15‐1346

In addition to finding that Clinton exchanged drugs forthe

weapon, the court also considered whether the firearm was

used or possessed in connection with drug dealing in the

residence. The court noted that the need to protect drugs is

paramount, “especially if you are living in an area where this

is an activity that occurs on a daily basis,” and that “you can’t

engage in that type of activity and not think that you’re not in

need of some form of protection.” The court then concluded:

“that supports ... the presumption—the rebuttable presump‐

tion for sure that the proximity of this gun in the house was

used for a secondary felony.”

That analysis lacks the findings that would support

application of the enhancement. The enhancement is proper

under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) if the court determines that the defen‐

dant used or possessed the firearm in connection with another

felony offense. Application Note 14 to that section provides

that “in the case of a drug trafficking offense in which a firearm

is found in close proximity to drugs, drug‐manufacturing

materials, or drug paraphernalia...application of [subsection]

(b)(6)(B) ... is warranted because the presence of the firearm

has the potential of facilitating another felony offense.” That

presumptive determination reflects the axiom that guns are

indeed a routine part of the drug trade and facilitate that trade

by providing protection from the theft of drugs or the cash

proceeds of drug sales, as well as a deterrent to those who

would compete in that drug trade. If a firearm is found in close

proximity to the drugs orits paraphernalia,the conclusion that

the firearm is connected to that drug activity is a reasonable

one in light of the common use for that purpose. See United

States v. LePage, 477 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2007).

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No. 15‐1346 7

But that Application Note should not be interpreted to

ordain such a connection whenever a defendant involved in

drug distribution also is in possession of a firearm. The term

“close proximity” must not be read out of the Application

Note. It is the close proximity that allows the court to find such

a connection without any further evidence—the proximity

alone provides the evidence that the two are connected. If that

“close proximity” is lacking, then the connection may still be

established, but it must be determined through evidence of

such a connection.

The government, citing United States v. Meece, 580 F.3d 616,

621 (7th Cir. 2009), argues that it may not be necessary that a

weapon be found in precisely the same location in a residence

in order for the court to find that it was in “close proximity.”

In Meece, two handguns were recovered under the mattress of

Meece’s bed, and in addition the search of the residence found

a scale, several plastic baggies, and a Tupperware bowl—all

containing cocaine residue—in the kitchen, and $3,400 in cash

hidden in the basement rafters. Therefore, paraphernalia and

possible proceeds of the drug trade were found in various

locations on multiple levels of the house. We noted that the

seizure of a firearm in close proximity to illegal drugs is

powerful support for the inference that the firearm was used

in connection with the drug trafficking operation, and we

considered Meece’s argument that the guns were not in close

proximity to the drug paraphernalia and thatthe enhancement

therefore did not apply. Id. We were unpersuaded by that

argument. The district court had concluded that Meece was

trafficking drugs and thatthe guns were in the house to protect

against the increased risk of home invasion occasioned by that

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8 No. 15‐1346

drug trafficking. Id. We held that the evidence was capable of

multiple inferences, and the district court’s interpretation was

not erroneous. Id. In so holding, we noted that the bedroom

was a logical place to store guns if the purpose was to protect

against the increased risk of home invasion. We did not hold

that the guns were located in close proximity to the drug

paraphernalia triggering the enhancement, nordid we identify

any district court holding to that effect. Instead, we merely

addressed Meece’s argument that the guns were not in close

proximity, and held that the district court could nevertheless

properly find that the guns were present in the house to

protect against the increased risks associated with drug

trafficking. In Meece, we were presented with significant

evidence supporting such a finding, including the drug

paraphernalia andcashproceedsdistributedthroughdifferent

levels of the house, the amount of cash on hand in the home,

and the location of the guns under the mattress where they

would be easily accessible in the event of a nighttime home

invasion.

In the present case, we have essentially no fact findings at

all by the district court relevant to this issue. The court did not

find that the firearm was readily accessible in the bedroom

closet, that drugs were kept in that closet or even the bedroom,

or that significant amounts of drugs or cash were kept at the

home that presented a need for protection on that basis. Those

are indicative of the types of factual findings that can support

the enhancement. See, e.g, United States v. Sewell, 780 F.3d 839,

848‐49 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that the district court in applying

an enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with

drug dealing, made the relevant finding of fact: that the gun

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No. 15‐1346 9

was found under the defendant’s side of the bed and was

loaded, and that in that location the gun was readily accessible

to the defendant and capable of being fired instantly). Al‐

though the court concluded that there was a rebuttable

presumption “that the proximity of this gun in the house was

used for a secondary felony,” the court never discussed the

proximity of the firearm to the drugs in so concluding. The

court discussed only the inherent dangers in the drug trade,

and the need for protection that often accompanies it. That

evidence is relevant to determining whether a connection may

exist sufficient to support the enhancement, but it does not

support the determination that the rebuttable presumption

based on close proximity is applicable.

The government, with laudable candor, acknowledges that

the propriety of the enhancement in this case is a close call. We

agree that the evidence supporting such an enhancement here

is sparse. As stated, the court has identified no evidence that

the firearm was in “close proximity” to the drugs, such that the

proximity alone could trigger the enhancement. The evidence

indicated that the firearm was kept in the closet in the bed‐

room, and there was no evidence that any drugs or drug

paraphernalia were found in that closet or even in the rest of

the bedroom. The only drug evidence was found under the

couch in the living room. The proximity of the weapon to the

drugs therefore was not “close” such that the distance alone

warranted the enhancement.

There was also little evidence regardinghisdrug trafficking

activities that would support a determination that the firearm

facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the drug offense. In

many cases regarding drug trafficking, the amount of drugs

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and/or cash on the premises increases the likelihood that a

firearm on the premises is connected to protection for that

activity.In this case,the evidence is atypical. The only evidence

of drug distribution occurring on the premises comes from a

statement by Clinton himselfinaninterview with aMilwaukee

police officer. The officer asked him how often he sells drugs

out of the house, and Clinton responded “Um, not too often.

Ah, just have a few people being we, like the regulars I’ve been

doing since maybe—it’s only been about two or three people.

The kids can even tell you that.” That evidence indicates that

the drug distribution from the residence was limited to sales to

two orthree individuals who had been regulars for some time.

Moreover, there is no evidence indicating that a significant

amount of drugs were processed through the residence. The

amount found in the residence was only 2.29 grams of cocaine

base, which the defendant’s brief characterizes as an amount

worthapproximately $200. See generallyUnited States v. Atkins,

___ Fed.Appx. ___, 2016 WL 1077819 at *1‐2 (informant

testifying that 2 grams of crack cocaine cost $200). With the

evidence indicating only a small‐scale drug operation with

sales in the residence restricted to a few trusted regulars, there

is little basis to connect the firearm to the drug offense. Rather

than indicating a need for protection from unscrupulous drug

buyers, the evidence indicates that Clinton sold to only trusted

buyers in the residence. And there is no evidence that he kept

a sufficient amount of drugs or cash at the residence to support

an inference that the firearm on the premises facilitated, or had

the potential of facilitating, another felony offense. Finally,

there is no direct evidence of a connection, such as evidence

that he was seen in possession of the firearm during drug

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No. 15‐1346 11

transactions, or that he purchased the firearm or retained it in

connection with the drug activity.

The recordthusprovides little supportfor such an enhance‐

ment. We do not hold that the enhancement is inapplicable as

a matter of law, but the fact findings in this record do not

supportthe enhancement. The district courtidentifiedonly the

generalized need for protection by those engaged in drug

offenses. But that would apply whenever a person who sold

drugs also possessed a firearm in the residence. It would

transform the “close proximity” test of Application Note 14 to

a broad‐based rebuttable presumption that the enhancement

applied whenever a firearm was possessed and a drug offense

was also alleged regardless of the location of the firearm and

its proximity to the drugs. The Sentencing Commission could

have imposed an enhancement if any weapon was possessed

without requiring that it be possessed in connection with the

offense, but it chose not to do so. See United States v. Carillo‐

Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 89‐90 (11th Cir. 2013)(comparing the

provision in § 2D1.1(b)(1) requiring only that a weapon was

possessed with the requirement under § 5C1.2(a)(2) that the

firearm was possessedin connection withthe offense).Because

the court’s findings are insufficient to support application of

the four‐level enhancement, that determination is vacated and

the case must be remanded for resentencing.

Because we are remanding on the enhancement issue, we

address only briefly Clinton’s other challenges to his sentence.

First, Clinton argues that the court erred in failing to address

his health problems as a mitigating circumstance that war‐

ranted a sentence below the Guidelines range. Although a

district court may properly remain silent regarding frivolous

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arguments for leniency, “where a defendant presents an

argument that is ‘not so weak as not to merit discussion,’ a

court is required to explain its reason for rejecting that argu‐

ment.” United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir.

2008), quoting United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785, 792 (7th

Cir. 2007). On appeal, Clinton argues that the district court

erred in failing to address his health problems identified in the

PSR, but Clinton never sets forth any details as to those health

problems nor does he present any argument as to how those

problems should impact his sentence. In fact, one has to read

the PSR or the government’s brief to even realize that the

significant health issue is Type 2 diabetes and complications

from it. We have recognized that serious health ailments may

militate in favor of a lower sentence, and specifically have

remandedfor adistrict courtto consider adefendant’sdiabetes

which resulted in serious health issues. United States v. Harris,

567 F.3d 846, 855 (7th Cir. 2009). In this appeal, however,

Clinton has failed to discuss his health condition at all, instead

choosing to simply reference the PSR as setting forth that

information. That cursory discussion ofthe issue is insufficient

to properly present it on appeal. Nevertheless, because this

case is being remanded for resentencing, we note that severe

health conditions may indeedbe a militating circumstance that

the court should considerin conducting the § 3553(a) analysis,

and unless the argument is clearly without merit the court

should address it in determining the appropriate sentence.

Finally, Clinton asserts that the district court improperly

considered extraneous factors that veered far beyond the

§ 3553(a) factors. Specifically, the district court lamented the

adverse impact the drug trade has had in Mexico and Latin

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No. 15‐1346 13

America which supply the drugs, and referenced the kidnap‐

ping and murder of 23 school children by Mexican drug gangs.

The court then concluded that Clinton’s participation in that

type of enterprise is a very serious offense. Clinton argues that

the court erred in linking his offense to the kidnapping and

murder of school children in Mexico because there is no

indication in the record that Clinton is in any way connected to

a Mexican drug cartel, let alone involved in narco‐terrorism,

kidnapping, or murder. Clinton also argues that the court

veered beyond the proper bounds of sentencing in its state‐

ments as to his character in response to his claim that he is not

a bad person. The district court judge questioned that, stating

that “you just told me you’re a good man and made some

mistakes. But you’re not, you’re a bad man. And I’ll tell you

how simple this is. Good men do good things, bad men do bad

things. Dealing drugs is a bad thing; ergo, therefore, you’re a

bad man. Simple as that.” We have cautioned against a focus

on such extraneous factors in past cases. In United States v.

Figueroa, 622 F.3d 739, 743‐44 (7th Cir. 2010), we addressed a

similar “odd focus on nation‐states and national characteris‐

tics,” where the district court linked the drug trade to Mexico,

then to Colombia and Venezuela, and then to Iranian terrorists

through the person of then‐Venezuelan President Hugo

Chávez. In combination with other improper statements, we

held that the litany of inflammatory remarks undermined

anything else the court said during the hearing, and we had no

way of discerning how, if at all, those extraneous consider‐

ations influenced the sentence. Id. at 744.

Similarly, in United States v. Webster, 528 Fed.Appx. 648, 651

(7th Cir. 2013), we addressed remarks by the district court that

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people are basically “decent” or “indecent,” which mirror the

remarks in this case that there are “good people” and “bad

people.” In that case, we held that those remarks alone fell

short of the litany of inflammatory remarks that would

undermine the court’s explanation for the sentence. Id. at 652.

Therefore, we have repeatedly identified such remarks as

straying beyond the proper § 3553(a) analysis whether or not

the remarks required that the sentence be vacated. Because we

are remanding on other grounds, we need not determine

whether or not the remarks in this case would alone require

that the sentence be vacated. We simply note the potential for

such remarks to derail the sentencing hearing and require a

subsequent remand for resentencing, so that the court can

avoid that prospect in this resentencing.

The sentence is VACATED and the case REMANDED for

resentencing consistent with this opinion.

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