Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03364/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03364-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Rodgers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-3364

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT RODGERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 09 CR 50001—Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 2, 2010—DECIDED JULY 9, 2010

Before FLAUM, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Robert Rodgers,

appeals his sentence for possession of child pornography.

Rodgers pleaded guilty to possessing over 2,200 images

and videos of child pornography. He was sentenced to

78 months of imprisonment, the low end of the guideline range determined by the district court. Rodgers

raises three challenges to the manner in which his guideline range was calculated. First, he argues that an enCase: 09-3364 Document: 19 Filed: 07/09/2010 Pages: 10
2 No. 09-3364

hancement to his guideline range imposed because of

the number of images he possessed is unconstitutional

because it was legislated directly by Congress. Second,

he argues that the sentencing enhancement for sadistic,

masochistic, or violent images impermissibly doublecounts the conduct already covered by the base offense

level of the applicable guideline. Finally, he argues that

the government failed to prove these enhancements

because the evidence relied upon was given in violation

of the “advocate-witness rule.” Finding these arguments

without merit, we affirm.

I. Background

On January 6, 2009, the government charged Rodgers

with possessing images of child pornography in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). On February 20, 2009,

Rodgers pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement.

The facts underlying the offense were laid out in paragraphs six and seven of the agreement. Rodgers admitted

that he possessed, through a commercial website, images

of child pornography over 2,200 times between January 18

and January 30, 2006, and that he “wiped” his computer

of evidence of his possession of child pornography on a

daily basis. He also admitted, as relevant conduct, that

he possessed multiple images and a video of unsuccessfully deleted child pornography on October 18, 2006, and

that he had viewed child pornography on two of his

business computers and deleted evidence from those

computers of that possession. The plea agreement did not

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No. 09-3364 3

describe the specific nature of the images and videos

at issue, other than that they constituted child pornography as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A).

After Rodgers pleaded guilty, the court ordered the

government to submit its version of the offense to the

probation office within 14 days and the defendant to

submit a version of the offense within 21 days. The government submitted a version of the offense that

adopted the factual basis and relevant conduct

described in paragraphs six and seven of the plea agreement and advised the probation officer to contact the

Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) working on

the case if additional information was needed. Rodgers

did not submit his own version of the offense or object

to the government’s version.

While preparing the report, the probation officer contacted the AUSA assigned to the case to gather additional information about the offense. In addition to inquiring about several other details of Rodgers’s offense,

the probation officer asked for the government’s position

as to how the images and videos possessed by Rodgers

portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence. The AUSA responded to these inquiries based on a review of the investigative reports

and evidence, in consultation with the case agent.

The information was then included in the presentence

report (PSR).

After the PSR was prepared, it was distributed to

counsel for their consideration. The PSR stated that the

description of the offense conduct came from the facts

in the plea agreement and the additional information

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provided by the AUSA assigned to the case. Rodgers did

not object to the factual findings contained in the PSR.

The sentencing hearing was held on September 4, 2009.

In response to a specific question from the court, Rodgers’s

counsel stated that they had no objection to the factual

findings in the PSR. The court then adopted the PSR’s

findings and its guidelines calculation. Rodgers objected

to the five-level enhancement for the number of images

under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D) and the two-level enhancement for the use of a computer under U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.2(b)(6). The district court rejected these arguments and sentenced Rodgers to 78 months of imprisonment, the bottom of the guideline range.

II. Analysis

Rodgers first argues that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 is unconstitutional because it was legislated directly by Congress,

rather than promulgated by the United States Sentencing

Commission based on empirical data. This is a question

of law which we review de novo. See United States v.

Nagel, 559 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2009).

Rodgers takes the position that Mistretta v. United States,

488 U.S. 361 (1989), requires that a sentencing guideline

be promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission in order for it to be constitutional. He acknowledges that Mistretta does not state this directly, but

argues that it follows from language in the opinion

stating that the reputation of the judiciary “may not be

borrowed by the political Branches to cloak their work in

the neutral colors of judicial action.” Id. at 407.

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The guideline at issue here derives from the Protect Act,

Pub. L. 108-21, § 401(i). Rodgers criticizes the Protect

Act for adopting this guideline without the benefit of

the Sentencing Commission’s usual empirical study,

adopting an argument developed by federal defender

Tory Stabenow in a 2008 paper, Deconstructing the Myth of

Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed Progression of the

Child Pornography Guidelines. We have previously considered these arguments and concluded that regardless

of whether a district court may consider the empirical

basis of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 when crafting a sentence, there

is no requirement that a district court must do so. See

United States v. Huffstatler, 571 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2009).

Rodgers attempts to distinguish Huffstatler by arguing

that the Huffstatler court did not consider his argument

that Mistretta forbids Congress from directly legislating

sentencing guidelines.

Rodgers’s argument rests on a mischaracterization

of Mistretta. In Mistretta, the Supreme Court rejected a

challenge to the then-mandatory guideline system

based on the theory that the guidelines delegated too

much legislative authority to the Sentencing Commission

and violated the separation of powers by requiring

federal judges to serve on the Commission. 488 U.S. at

412. In concluding that neither the nondelegation doctrine nor the separation-of-powers doctrine prohibited

the legislature from seeking the advice of judges when

formulating guideline ranges, the Court relied on the

fact that Congress had constrained the discretion of the

Commission. For example, the Court noted that Congress

had mandated that the guidelines “require a term of

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confinement at or near the statutory maximum for

certain crimes of violence and for drug offenses, particularly when committed by recidivists.” Id. at 376. Thus,

the starting point for the Mistretta opinion was that Congress could legitimately create sentencing guidelines, just

as it creates the statutory maximum and minimum sentences. See also United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757

(1997) (holding that the Sentencing Commission “must

bow to the specific directives of Congress”). Indeed, the

dissent in Mistretta argued that only Congress could

validly promulgate guidelines. 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting). If legislators do not “cloak their work” in

neutral garb of the judiciary when they ask judges to

serve on a sentencing commission while substantially

constraining the work of that commission, surely they

do not do so when they bypass the commission altogether and legislate directly.

That is not to say that the provenance of a particular

guideline is wholly irrelevant to sentencing. Now that

the guidelines are advisory, a district court may vary

from the guidelines when it concludes that they do not

reflect “empirical data and national experience.”

Huffstatler, 571 F.3d at 623 (citing Kimbrough v. United

States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)). Just as in Huffstatler, however,

we need not now decide whether a district court may

vary from the child pornography guidelines on policy

grounds. The district court noted on the record that it

would chose to apply § 2G2.2 regardless of whether it

had the freedom to depart on policy grounds. Just as a

district court may still validly apply the crack guidelines,

even though it has discretion to depart from them, a

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district court may choose to apply the child pornography

guidelines despite their somewhat unusual provenance.

Huffstatler, 571 F.3d at 624.

Rodgers’s next argument is that the sentencing enhancement for sadistic or masochistic conduct or other

depictions of violence, which is contained in U.S.S.G.

§ 2G.2(b)(4), impermissibly double counts conduct

already taken into account by the base offense level for

possessing child pornography. He urges us to overrule

United States v. Myers, 355 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2004), in

which we rejected this argument.

At the outset, we note that Rodgers has forfeited this

issue by not raising it at sentencing. In the district court,

Rodgers did not argue that applying U.S.S.G. § 2G.2(b)(4)

would constitute impermissible double counting. Thus,

we review for plain error, asking whether (1) an error

occurred, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affected

the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Wainwright, 509 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2007); United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993).

We can stop at the first inquiry, as no error occurred.

We decline Rodgers’s invitation to revisit Myers. In our

circuit, impermissible double counting occurs “only if the

offense itself necessarily includes the same conduct as the

enhancement.” United States v. Senn, 129 F.3d 886, 897 (7th

Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original); see also United States v.

Bell, 598 F.3d 366, 372-73 (7th Cir. 2010). The relevant

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(a), defines “child pornography”

to include “any visual depiction . . . of sexually explicit

conduct, where the production of such visual depiction

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involves the use of a minor engaged in sexually explicit

conduct.” “Sexually explicit conduct,” in turn, is defined as

“sexual intercourse . . . ; bestiality; masturbation; sadistic

or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the

genitals or pubic area of any person.” Id. § 2256(8)(2)(a).

We have found that § 2G2.2(b)(4) applies to acts likely to

cause physical pain, Myers, 355 F.3d at 1043-44, as well as

“sexual gratification which is purposefully degrading and

humiliating, conduct which causes mental suffering or

psychological or emotional injury in the victim.” United

States v. Turchen, 187 F.3d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). Rodgers

also suggests that Turchen holds that any depiction of an

“abnormal sexual passion” would trigger § 2G2.2(b)(4), but

this argument rests on a blatant misquotation of Turchen.

The full quotation defines masochism as an “abnormal

sexual passion in which one finds pleasure in . . . being

abused or dominated.” 187 F.3d at 739. Nowhere does

Turchen suggest that all “abnormal sexual passions”

trigger the enhancement.

A straightforward reading of Turchen and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2256(8)(2)(a) makes clear that the statute covers more

conduct than the enhancement. An image of a minor

alone could constitute “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” without additionally depicting conduct that is

likely to cause physical pain or is purposefully humiliating and degrading. See Myers, 355 F.3d at 1044. Thus, the

application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) properly took into

account aggravating circumstances, not the base offense

conduct.

Rodgers’s final argument is that the district court improperly relied on evidence not in the record in reaching

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his sentence. He objects that portions of the PSR came

from the AUSA’s review of the case files and argues that

this violates the general prohibition against a lawyer

acting as both counsel and witness in the same case. See

United States v. Ewing, 979 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1992). Without the evidence from the AUSA that was included in

the PSR, Rodgers argues, there is nothing to support

the district court’s application of the four-level enhancement for sadistic or masochistic material.

Rodgers’s argument is waived, and rests on a misunderstanding of the sentencing process. Rodgers filed no

objections to the factual findings in the PSR. When asked

on the record at sentencing if he had any such objections,

his counsel stated, “No, we do not.” This amounts to

the intentional relinquishment of a known right which

extinguishes any error and precludes appellate review.

Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. A district court is permitted to

adopt the facts of the PSR as support for its findings and

conclusions when the defendant fails to alert the court

to potentially inaccurate or unreliable information. See

United States v. Sonsalla, 241 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2001).

The AUSA never testified in this case, so Ewing is inapplicable. Rodgers’s argument is better understood as a

claim that the record did not support the sentencing

court’s factual findings. But to the extent that the

record is lacking in this case, it is only because

Rodgers relieved the government of the burden of introducing the photographs and videos into evidence. This

was likely a strategic choice—Rodgers had many supporters in attendance at his hearing, and he may also

have been attempting to gain the sympathy of the

district court by cooperating. Once having waived a

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challenge to the factual basis of the PSR, Rodgers

cannot now seek to invalidate his sentence for lack of

evidentiary support.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

7-9-10

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