Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01734/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01734-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Garry Copenhaver
Appellee
Cheryl Luney
Appellant
SGS Automotive Services
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Gary Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1734

___________

Cheryl Luney, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri

* 

SGS Automotive Services, Inc.; *

Garry Copenhaver, *

 *

Defendant - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: December 12, 2005

 Filed: December 28, 2005 

___________

Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Cheryl Luney appeals the district court’s1

 dismissal of her claims against SGS

Automotive Services, Inc. (“SGS”) and Garry Copenhaver. We affirm. However, we

deem her battery claim to have been dismissed without prejudice.

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Cheryl Luney worked for SGS from March 2002 until her termination on

October 11, 2002. Luney alleges that during that time she was sexually harassed by

Garry Copenhaver after having rejected his requests for a date and repeated sexual

advances, including inappropriate touching. Luney complained to Copenhaver’s

superior on September 20, 2002. Soon after, SGS cut Luney’s hours in half. It

eventually terminated her employment.

Luney filed a complaint with the EEOC on November 15, 2002. She received

her right to sue letter on August 13, 2003. Luney filed a sexual harassment and

gender discrimination action against SGS on October 14, 2003. The action was

dismissed on February 23, 2004, for failure to file a proposed scheduling order.

Luney refiled her action against SGS on May 12, 2004, and added a battery claim

against her supervisor Garry Copenhaver. The district court dismissed the second

action, finding that the dismissal of her first action for lack of prosecution was a

dismissal on the merits and thus she was precluded from re-raising the claims against

SGS. The district court rejected the argument that the dismissal was not on the merits

and that the Missouri Savings Statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.230, applied. The district

court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the state law claims. Luney

appeals, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her action without properly

considering the Missouri Savings Statute.

We review a motion to dismiss de novo. In re Acceptance Ins. Cos. Sec. Lit.,

423 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2005). “In considering a motion to dismiss, we must

assume that all the facts alleged in the complaint are true. The complaint must be

liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Holden Farms, Inc. v.

Hog Slat, Inc., 347 F.3d 1055, 1059 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). 

The central question in this case is whether the dismissal by the district court

constitutes a dismissal on the merits. We believe it does. Luney’s action was

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dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b), an involuntary dismissal, because of Luney’s failure

to prosecute her claims. An involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) is with prejudice

unless stated otherwise by the district court. Rule 41(b) states, “[u]nless the court in

its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision . . .

operates as an adjudication on the merits.” In this case, there is no indication in the

district court’s order that it is not an adjudication on the merits. The district court

issued an order to show cause after Luney failed to file a proposed scheduling order

pursuant to an earlier order of the district court. Luney failed to show cause. The

district court’s order included no statements suggesting that the dismissal was to be

a disposition other than with prejudice. Rather, the district court stated that

“[a]lthough Luney contends . . . that the dismissal of the First Action was not on the

merits, she is clearly mistaken.” 

Luney contends she should be permitted to bring her refiled cause of action

under the Missouri Savings Statute. Under this statute, if an action is commenced and

“the plaintiff therein suffer[s] a nonsuit, or, after a verdict for him, the judgment be

arrested, or after a judgment for him, the same be reversed on appeal or error, such

plaintiff may commence a new action . . . within one year . . . .” Mo. Rev. Stat. §

516.230. Luney’s argument fails, however, because the Missouri Savings Statute only

applies to actions “prescribed in sections 516.010 to 516.370” of the Missouri Revised

Statutes. Id. Her actions, filed under Title VII, were not contained within those

provisions. Therefore, even assuming the first action had been dismissed without

prejudice, the Missouri Savings Statute does not apply. 

Finally, as to Luney’s battery claim against Garry Copenhaver, both parties

agree that the dismissal of that claim should have been without prejudice. We agree.

The claim against Mr. Copenhaver was not part of the original cause of action, and

thus that portion of the district court’s dismissal was without prejudice. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-1734 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/28/2005 Entry ID: 1990536