Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01685/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01685-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rachael Lundquist
Appellant
Rice Memorial Hospital
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1685

___________

Rachael Lundquist, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Rice Memorial Hospital, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 15, 2004

Filed: January 26, 2005 

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

This appeal raises two issues: First, whether the district court erred in finding

that Rachael Lundquist was not disabled within the meaning of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) and granting Rice Memorial Hospital’s (RMH) summary

judgment motion on that basis; second, whether the district court erred in denying

Lundquist’s motion to amend an order setting a filing deadline for amended

pleadings. 

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I. Procedural and Factual Context

Rachael Lundquist was employed by RMH as a nurse during three distinct time

periods. She was first hired in 1968. She left the position voluntarily in 1975 due to

child care responsibilities and injuries she sustained in a car accident. 

In 1980, RMH rehired Lundquist as a nurse. In 1995, she experienced neck

pains. She was diagnosed with degenerative changes at several levels of her neck and

a herniated disc. By March 1995, Lundquist’s doctors restricted her physical

activities to exclude any heavy lifting, so RMH accommodated this restriction by

assigning Lundquist to a shift coordinator position. In July 1995, Lundquist’s

neurologist restricted her physical activity further and ordered that she should not lift

more than fifteen to twenty pounds at one time, and that she should not lift this

weight repetitively for more than thirty consecutive minutes. The doctor also

restricted bending and twisting. By August 1995, RMH placed Lundquist on medical

leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). 

Then, on February 27, 1996, RMH terminated Lundquist for the first time,

reasoning that she could not perform the essential functions of a nursing job.

Lundquist filed a grievance which resulted in an arbitration order that Lundquist

should be allowed to return to work if she was willing to perform the essential

requirements of her job. She returned, but could or would not do any lifting, so on

January 15, 1997, RMH placed Lundquist on administrative leave.

On January 27, 1997, Lundquist filed an action against RMH alleging disability

discrimination under the ADA and various Minnesota statutes (“Lundquist I”).

Lundquist I concerned the time period from July 1995 through January 27, 1997, and

alleged that RMH discriminated against Lundquist on the basis of disability by (1)

placing her on unrequested medical leave; (2) wrongfully terminating her

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employment in February 1996; and (3) failing to provide reasonable accommodation

for her disability. 

While Lundquist was on leave the first time, RMH sent two different job

descriptions to her. RMH instructed Lundquist to submit the job descriptions to her

neurologist to assess whether she could perform either of them. The neurologist

explained that although Lundquist could perform the “cerebral” aspects, she could not

meet the physical demands of either. He later stated that if lifting is an essential duty

of a job, then Lundquist would not be able to perform that job.

During Lundquist’s second leave of absence, RMH required Lundquist to

undergo a functional capacities evaluation (FCE) to determine whether she could

fulfill the physical requirements of a staff nurse position. The FCE concluded that

Lundquist could not perform patient transfers except under very limited

circumstances but could carry out most other physical activities associated with

registered nursing. RMH considered this statement to be “inconclusive” and ordered

another FCE. The second FCE concluded that Lundquist could “rarely” or

“occasionally” lift or push weight in excess of twenty pounds. 

RMH also hired a company to create a functional job description for the staff

nurse position and sent it to Lundquist’s doctor to assess whether she could meet the

requirements of the position, with or without reasonable accommodations, as defined

by the description. The doctor responded that Lundquist could not meet some of the

physical demands in the description.

RMH fired Lundquist for a second time on December 31, 1997. Based on her

medical evaluation, RMH reasoned that her physical restrictions were permanent and

that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her job. 

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In April 1998, Lundquist brought a motion to amend a pretrial order setting

forth the deadlines for amending the complaint in Lundquist I. Although the deadline

had passed, Lundquist hoped to add new counts of retaliatory discharge under the

ADA and a Minnesota statute to her original complaint in light of the December

discharge. The district court denied Lundquist’s motion and enforced the original

deadline. Lundquist did not appeal the denial of her motion. Subsequently, RMH

brought a motion for summary judgment. On March 29, 1999, the district court

released an order dismissing the allegations in Lundquist I, which Lundquist did not

appeal. 

Instead, on February 20, 1999, Lundquist filed another action against RMH

(“Lundquist II”). This action again claimed disability discrimination under the ADA

and various Minnesota statutes, but it was allegedly related to a different time period

than Lundquist I, and involved the heretofore unlitigated claim for Lundquist’s

(second) wrongful termination by RMH on December 31, 1997. 

RMH filed a motion to dismiss Lundquist II based on res judicata (“claim

preclusion”). The district court granted RMH’s motion. On appeal, the Eighth

Circuit reversed. See Lundquist v. Rice Memorial Hosp., 238 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir.

2001) (per curiam). Since Lundquist II involved a claim arising from a termination

of Lundquist that occurred after the first suit was filed, claim preclusion did not

apply. Id. at 977 (noting “it is well settled that claim preclusion does not apply to

claims that did not arise until after the first suit was filed”) (citing Baker Group, L.C.

v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 228 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2000)). 

Upon remand, RMH again brought a motion for summary judgment. This time,

RMH simply argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Lundquist was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The district court agreed,

concluding that Lundquist had not alleged a disability. Lundquist’s ADA claims

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The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

-5-

were dismissed with prejudice. The district court1

 declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction as to the remaining state law claims and they were dismissed without

prejudice. See Order dated February 6, 2004, at 11 (“Order”). Lundquist now

appeals the district court’s post-remand judgment in Lundquist II. 

II. Discussion

This panel reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 941 (8th Cir. 2001). 

The first element that any plaintiff must establish to succeed on a disability

discrimination claim is that the individual in fact lives with a “disability” as that term

is defined by the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (stating that a person is disabled

within the meaning of the ADA if she has, inter alia, a “physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities”). This

element is of threshold importance; if a plaintiff cannot establish this element, the

claim is meritless. See Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir.

1997) (“Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is a threshold

question.”). 

Although lifting is a major life activity, see Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

115 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)), Eighth Circuit

precedent states that a “general lifting restriction without more is insufficient to

constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA.” Brunko, 260 F.3d at 941;

accord Mellon v. Federal Express Corp., 239 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2001) (same);

Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Snow, 128 F.3d at 1207

(same); see also Helfter, 115 F.3d at 617, 618; Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America,

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Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996). This precedent has been followed time and

again in this jurisdiction because the evidence presented in these types of cases has

suggested that weight lifting limitations – without more – do not tend to significantly

restrict “a person’s ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in

various classes as compared to the average person with comparable skills.” Helfter,

115 F.3d at 617. Rather, they tend to prevent people from performing a narrow class

of jobs.

Even if we consider, arguendo, all the evidence that was referenced in

Lundquist’s brief – including facts and evidence existing prior to January 27, 1997

(the date Lundquist I was filed) – it is apparent that Lundquist alleges solely a 25-30

pound long-term lifting limitation. Our precedents prohibit the advancement of such

a case under the ADA. In order to survive RMH’s motion for summary judgment,

Lundquist would have to present evidence creating a genuine dispute as to whether

she had a physical limitation that was more than a general lifting restriction and

therefore constituted a “disability.” This she has not done. On this basis alone, her

appeal is denied. 

Lundquist claims the district court concluded that a genuine issue of material

fact did not exist solely because it had a faulty understanding of the doctrine of res

judicata, and therefore erred when it narrowed the scope of evidence it would

consider in adjudicating whether Lundquist was disabled. Specifically, the district

court refused to entertain any facts or evidence related to Lundquist’s condition prior

to January 27, 1997 (the filing date of Lundquist I). The district court reasoned that

the doctrine of res judicata precluded it from considering “all of the facts and

evidence adjudicated” in Lundquist I. See Order at 2. The court reasoned that

although “Lundquist present[ed] several pieces of new evidence” to support her claim

of disability in Lundquist II, “[s]ome of this ‘new’ evidence” was “precluded because

it was in existence at the time . . . of the first suit.” Id. at 8 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co. v. FAG Bearings Corp., 335 F.3d 752, 761-62 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing the

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doctrine of collateral estoppel and stating “[w]here the first and second actions are

both based on an evaluation of the same historical facts, a litigant seeking to

introduce newly discovered evidence otherwise in existence at the time of the first

suit may not argue that the facts have changed in the time period between the two

actions . . . to avoid the preclusive effect[s] of the first decision”)). Lundquist argues

this was error because the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel operate to

preclude issues, not facts. Lundquist misunderstands the nuances of these doctrines.

Since we had previously held that res judicata did not apply, see Lundquist II,

238 F.3d at 977, we acknowledge that it was confusing when the district court said

that the doctrine of res judicata precluded it from considering all the facts and

evidence relating to Lundquist’s disability that were adjudicated in Lundquist I.

Nonetheless, the district court arrived upon the correct result. 

As we stated in the prior appeal of this matter, claim preclusion (res judicata)

operates to bar a party from litigating identical causes of action, such as a wrongful

termination claim under the ADA. See Lundquist II, 238 F.3d at 977. If the legal

elements of res judicata are satisfied, then the doctrine forecloses all that might have

been litigated previously. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 335 F.3d at 758 (comparing res

judicata and collateral estoppel and citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10

(1979)); see also Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948)

(stating that res judicata bars relitigation of “every matter which was offered and

received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand” and “any other admissible matter

which might have been offered for that purpose”). Collateral estoppel, or issue

preclusion, operates more narrowly to bar relitigation of a single ultimate issue of fact

(not an entire cause of action) when that issue of fact has actually been determined

by a valid judgment in a prior proceeding between the same parties. See Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 335 F.3d at 758. Collateral estoppel relates to the sub-elements and facts

one must prove up in order to sustain an overarching cause of action. 

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Granted, the district court used the term “res judicata” here, but given the

substance of its reasoning, we think it meant to say “collateral estoppel.” 

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In light of the above, we interpret the district court’s post-remand order as

making two points: First, since Lundquist I already resolved the ultimate issue of fact

of Lundquist’s disability in the negative, relitigation of that issue of fact in Lundquist

II would be precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel2

 unless some new

evidence of disability – other than evidence offered in Lundquist I – were presented;

second, although Lundquist would be given an opportunity to produce truly “new”

evidence in this second case, Lundquist could not receive a second chance at

producing evidence of disability which she either did produce or should have

produced in Lundquist I, as collateral estoppel bars that result, as well. In so ruling,

the district court was correct. See Liberty Mut. Ins., 335 F.3d at 761, 762-63. 

In the prior appeal of this case, we instructed the district court that it could

mention the “events that occurred prior to January 1997,” but “solely for purposes of

historical foundation.” Lundquist II, 238 F.3d at 977 n.2. We explained that conduct

occurring “prior to January 1997 cannot, as a matter of law, constitute proof of

discrimination.” Id. The same is true for Lundquist’s evidence of disability. To the

extent that Lundquist attempted to present evidence of disability in Lundquist II

which was available for production or was actually produced and ruled upon in

Lundquist I, that evidence is barred from constituting proof of disability in Lundquist

II. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 335 F.3d at 761, 762-63 (stating that where a party had

an opportunity to present various pieces of evidence but failed to do so, “it is

precluded from attempting to present that additional evidence” in the second suit). 

To this panel Lundquist asserts that she is not attempting to relitigate settled

facts; rather, her argument is that facts which arose before January 1997 should be

“available” to the parties and to the court in this action. Technically this statement

might be correct, but it is not an accurate assessment of what Lundquist sought to

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accomplish in the district court. Lundquist’s odd theory – i.e., “that the facts are

cumulative,” Brief for Appellant at 5 – cannot avoid the preclusive effects stemming

from Lundquist I. 

In light of the evidentiary parameters set by the district court, Lundquist

presented only one truly new piece of evidence – a report by a rehabilitation

consultant which recounts the many unsuccessful efforts Lundquist made in trying

to find a new nursing job. This is insufficient to establish a disability under the ADA.

It is true that factors relevant to whether someone is disabled include “the number and

type of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified [and] the geographical

area to which the individual has reasonable access . . . .” See Helfter, 115 F.3d at 617.

But these factors are not determinative, whereas our existing precedent is. Even if

such factors were determinative, the rehabilitation consultant’s affidavit does not

support Lundquist’s allegation that the reason she was unable to secure any nursing

positions was because her disability disqualified her from those jobs. The

rehabilitation consultant concedes that Lundquist’s lack of success is linked to the

fact that Lundquist did not have a bachelor of science degree in nursing when she

applied for the jobs. Lundquist’s brief says it best: “To be sure, these positions might

have been closed for some other reason.” Brief for Appellant at 14. Thus, we affirm

the decision of the district court because no genuine issue exists as to Lundquist’s

disability. 

Lastly, we summarily reject Lundquist’s contention that the district court erred

in denying her motion to amend an order setting the filing deadline for amended

pleadings in Lundquist I. This argument is untimely. We refuse to consider it now.

See Orion Fin. Corp. v. Am. Foods Group, Inc., 281 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2002).

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

______________________________

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