Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00345/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00345-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregorio Miranda-Martinez
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff, 

vs.

 GREGORIO MIRANDA-MARTINEZ, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 06-920-PHX-EHC (BPV)

 CR 04-0345-PHX-EHC (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On March 30, 2006, Gregorio Miranda-Martinez, (“Movant”), presently

confined in the California City Correctional Center, California City, California, filed

a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence By a Person in Federal

Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Motion") (Doc. #25). The Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court enter an order denying the Motion.

Ordinarily, a court must conduct a hearing on a motion unless it "and the files

and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief ...."

28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Motion, as well as the files and records, do conclusively

establish that Miranda-Martinez is not entitled to relief. See Shah v. United States, 878

F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1989). Hence, no hearing is required. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

On April 8, 2004,a grand jury returned an indicted charging Movant with three

counts; Felon in Possession of Firearm; Illegal Alien in Possession of a Firearm; and

Re-Entry after Deportation. (Doc. No. 1.) 

On June 28, 2004, Miranda-Martinez pled guilty to Count 3 of the Indictment,

Re-Entry after Deportation. (Doc. No. 6.)

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The plea was conditioned only upon the understanding that the maximum term

Miranda-Martinez could receive imprisonment for twenty (20) years, and a term of

supervised release of up to three years, and a fine of $250,000.00, and that the United

States would recommend a sentence of imprisonment at the low end of the applicable

guideline. (Doc. No. 12, p.2.)

 The United States agreed to move to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment

after Defendant was sentenced on Count 3 of the Indictment. (Doc. No. 12., p. 3.) 

The plea agreement also contained a waiver of Miranda-Martinez' appeal rights:

“Defendant hereby waives any right to raise on appeal or collaterally attack any matter

pertaining to this prosecution and sentence if the sentence imposed is consistent with

the terms of this agreement.” (Doc. No. 12, p.4.) 

Miranda Martinez was sentenced on October 22, 2004. (Doc. No. 10.) The

Court sentenced him to a prison term of eighty-seven (87) months. (Doc. No. 11.)

Miranda Martinez was also ordered placed on supervised release for a period of three

years following his release from imprisonment. (Id.) 

On October 27, 2004, Miranda-Martinez filed a Notice of Appeal. (Doc. No.

13.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court

on July 14, 2005. (Doc. No. 24.) 

Miranda-Martinez next filed the present § 2255 action. (Doc. No. 25.) He raises

three grounds for relief: (1) sentencing calculation errors regarding the proper criminal

history category; (2) his plea was not consistent with his sentence; and (3) counsel was

ineffective by not adequately representing Movant's interests in the terms of the plea

and regarding the calculation of his sentence under the guideline. (Doc. No. 25, p.5.)

On April 11, 2007, the District Court called for an answer from the United States

Attorney. (Doc. No. 27.) The Government filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence on August 8, 2006, with exhibits one through six

attached. (Doc. No. 31.) No reply was filed. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a one

year period of limitations from the date on which the judgement of conviction becomes

final has been imposed on the filing of motions for collateral relief by prisoners in

federal custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Magistrate Judge finds the Motion timely filed.

B. Waiver

The Government asserts that the Court should deny the Motion because Movant

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his

sentence. 

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.”

United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is

impermissible to presume waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every

reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Id. In this

action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally

be enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory

right to bring a § 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v.

Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). The only claims that cannot be waived are

claims that the plea or waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of

counsel rendered the plea or waiver involuntary. See Lampert, 422 F.3d at 871 (holding

that a plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to

§ 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that

challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt

that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant

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to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156

n.4 (declining to decide whether waiver of all § 2255 rights included ineffective

assistance of counsel claims implicating the voluntariness of the waiver).

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States,

396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and

Tenth Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily

and knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting

to attack, in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel during sentencing.”).

"'Generally, courts will enforce a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal if 1)

the language of the waiver encompasses the defendant's right to appeal on the grounds

claimed on appeal, and 2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made."' United

States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation

omitted). Although waiver of the right to appeal would not prevent an appeal where the

sentence imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement, a waiver is valid

even if a defendant does not know the exact nature of what appellate issues might later

arise at the time the defendant enters the waiver. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. 

Miranda-Martinez does not challenge the validity of the waiver. The Plea

Agreement expressly waived Movant's right to collaterally attack the sentence. (Doc.

No. 12, p. 4.) The Plea Agreement further stated that Miranda-Martinez agreed that his

attorney had fully advised him of the nature of the charges to which he was entering a

plea, that the guilty plea was not the result of force, threats, assurances or promises, that

his acceptance of the plea was voluntary, and that he agreed to be bound by its

provisions. (Doc. No. 12, p. 8.) 

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At Miranda-Martinez' change of plea hearing, he was placed under oath and the

Court queried him on his ability to understand his attorney. (Response, R/T 06/28/04,

2-5.) Miranda-Martinez responded that he was able to understand him in Spanish, and

that he read the Plea Agreement to him. (Id., 5-6.) Miranda-Martinez acknowledged

that he signed the plea agreement. (Id., 4-5.)

The court informed Miranda-Martinez of the constitutional rights he would

forfeit by pleading guilty. (Id., 13-15.) The court specifically directed MirandaMartinez' attention to the waiver of appeal rights and the right to file a petition for

habeas corpus in the plea agreement. (Id., 13). Movant said he understood and was

willing to give up these rights by pleading guilty. (Id.) The plea colloquy indicates

Miranda-Martinez was aware of the waiver provision in the plea agreement. See

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry

a strong presumption of verity.”). 

The court concludes Miranda-Martinez was aware of the waiver provision in the

plea agreement when he pleaded guilty. The Plea Agreement signed by the Movant

demonstrates that Movant entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his

right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter pertaining to the prosecution or

sentence. The Magistrate Judge finds that the Movant knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence. 

Movant’s assertions in his § 2255 Motion pertain to sentencing and do not

pertain to the voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding

the imposition of sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

The Court accepted his plea as voluntarily made. The Court specifically found that

Movant was sentenced “accordingly to your plea agreement and, therefore, find that

you have waived your rights to appeal the sentence that has been imposed on you.”

(Response, R/T/ 10/22/04, 15.) Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the

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sentencing issues raised in his § 2255 Motion. Thus, the Magistrate Judge recommends

that the District Court dismiss the Motion for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly,

RECOMMENDATION

After careful consideration of the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence and all papers filed in this action, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court deny Movant's motion.

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived.

If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case numbers: CR 04-

345-PHX-EHC and CV 06-0920-PHX-EHC. 

DATED this 11th day of May, 2007.

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