Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-03132/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-03132-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ya Chang
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YA CHANG,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-08-3132 DAD

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ORDER

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for

ruling on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary

judgment. For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is granted, the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) is reversed, and the matter is remanded

with the direction to award benefits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 24, 2005, plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the Act), alleging that she became disabled

on June 11, 2004. (Transcript (Tr.) at 88-95.) Plaintiff claimed disability based on asthma,

kidney problems, depression, memory loss, coughing, shortness of breath, gall bladder problems,

neck and shoulder pain, sleeping problems, and poor concentration. (Tr. at 108.)

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Plaintiff’s application was denied initially on April 12, 2006, and upon

reconsideration on March 16, 2007. (Tr. at 77-81, 70-76.) A hearing was held before an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on December 12, 2007. (Tr. at 23-54, 66.) Plaintiff was

represented at the hearing by an attorney and testified through an interpreter. (Tr. at 23-45, 53-

54.) A vocational expert also testified. (Tr. at 45-53.) In a decision issued on February 20,

2008, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. at 12-22.) The ALJ entered the following

findings:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since October 24, 2005, the application date (20 CFR 416.920(b)

and 416.971 et seq.).

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: moderate,

persistent asthma, back pain, major depressive disorder and post

traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (20 CFR 416.920(c)).

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform light work except avoiding moderate exposure to

temperature extremes and pulmonary irritants and mentally

performing only simple routine tasks (unskilled work).

5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).

6. The claimant was born on June 15, 1969 and was 36 years old,

which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date the

application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).

7. The claimant is not able to communicate in English, and is

considered in the same way as an individual who is illiterate in

English.

8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant

does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968).

9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience,

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can

perform (20 CFR 416.960(c) and 416.966).

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10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the

Social Security Act, since October 24, 2005, the date the

application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).

(Tr. at 14-22.)

On June 25, 2008, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the

ALJ’s decision, thereby making that decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. at 4-

7.) On October 29, 2008, the Appeals Council granted plaintiff’s request for more time to file a

civil action. (Tr. at 2-3.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by filing

the complaint in this action on December 23, 2008.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and the proper

legal standards were applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973

(9th Cir. 2000); Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are

conclusive. Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599); Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971)).

A reviewing court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. Jones, 760 F.2d

at 995. The court may not affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence. Id.; see also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If

substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence

supporting a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive,

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an

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improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence, Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d

1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

In determining whether or not a claimant is disabled, the ALJ should apply the

five-step sequential evaluation process established under Title 20 of the Code of Federal

Regulations, Sections 404.1520 and 416.920. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). 

The five-step process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step

two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so,

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity

to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If

not, the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential

evaluation process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the

sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098

(9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

Plaintiff advances three arguments in her motion for summary judgment. First,

she asserts that the ALJ rejected the opinions of treating and examining physicians without a

legitimate basis for so doing. Second, plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to reference, much

less discuss, the third-party statements of her boyfriend regarding the nature and extent of her

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functional limitations. Third, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess her residual

functional capacity (RFC), failed to pose a legally adequate hypothetical question to the

vocational expert (VE), and failed to credit the testimony of the VE in response to questions that

accurately reflected plaintiff’s functional limitations. The court addresses each argument below.

I. Whether the ALJ Erred in Rejecting Medical Opinions

It is well established that the weight to be given to medical opinions depends in

part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a

treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant . . . .” Id. A treating

doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an

individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Bates v. Sullivan, 894

F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990). Of course, the ALJ need not give controlling weight to

conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113-14 (9th Cir. 1999); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).

“At least where the treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor,

it may be rejected only for ‘clear and convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (quoting

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)). “Even if the treating doctor’s opinion

is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may not reject this opinion without

providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record for so

doing.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

If a treating professional’s opinion is contradicted by an examining professional’s opinion that is

supported by different, independent clinical findings, the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751).

“The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating

physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831 (emphasis in original). See also Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d

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502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the nonexamining doctor’s opinion “with nothing more”

did not constitute substantial evidence for rejecting the opinions of treating or examining

physicians); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the report of

the nontreating, nonexamining doctor, even when combined with the ALJ’s own observation of

the claimant at the hearing, did not constitute substantial evidence and did not support the ALJ’s

decision to reject the examining physician’s opinion that the claimant was disabled). “When an

examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only

in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician are not ‘substantial

evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). “Independent clinical findings can

be either (1) diagnoses that differ from those offered by another physician and that are supported

by substantial evidence or (2) findings based on objective medical tests that the treating physician

has not herself considered.” Id. (citations omitted).

Here, plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the opinions of Allan R. Au,

M.D., who was plaintiff’s allergist; Hari Goyal, M.D., a consultative examiner who performed a

comprehensive internal medicine evaluation of plaintiff on December 17, 2005; and the mental

health provider who treated plaintiff at Sacramento County’s Northgate Point facility in June and

August of 2007.

Dr. Au began treating plaintiff on July 31, 2001, on a referral from Anh Huynh

Nguyen, M.D., who was plaintiff’s primary care physician. (Tr. at 230.) On November 13,

2007, after having treated plaintiff for more than six years, Dr. Au completed a form titled

“Pulmonary Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire.” Plaintiff contends that the ALJ

presented a misleading and incomplete summary of Dr. Au’s opinion of her pulmonary RFC,

failed to recognize the validity of Dr. Goyal’s opinion about her functional limitations, and

rejected the opinions of the treating specialist and the examining physician in favor of the

opinions of non-treating, non-examining state agency physicians who found plaintiff capable of

performing light work, limited only by a need to avoid moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants. 

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Plaintiff argues further that the ALJ minimized the degree of her mental limitation and adopted

the opinion of the examining consultative psychiatrist instead of the opinions of plaintiff’s

treating mental health provider.

The ALJ found that plaintiff had the severe impairments of moderate, persistent

asthma, back pain, major depressive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder but that the

impairments did not meet or equal any listed impairment. (Tr. at 14-16.) As a prelude to his step

four and step five determinations regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform past relevant work or

any other work, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work except that

she must avoid moderate exposure to temperature extremes and pulmonary irritants, and is

limited mentally to performing only simple routine tasks, i.e., unskilled work. (Tr. at 16-21.)

In his RFC analysis, the ALJ discussed or cited the following medical evidence

and opinions: records of plaintiff’s hospitalization in November and December 2002; Dr.

Nguyen’s treatment records from December 2000 to June 2007; the comprehensive internal

medicine consultative examination by Dr. Goyal on December 17, 2005; the comprehensive

psychiatric consultative examination by Hisham Soliman, M.D., on December 14, 2005; Dr.

Au’s treatment records from July 2001 through November 2007 and the pulmonary RFC

questionnaire completed by Dr. Au in November 2007; and Northgate Point psychiatric treatment

records from June 2007 through August 2007. (Tr. at 17-18.)

The ALJ noted that “[t]he State Agency (SA) determined in January 2006

[claimant] could perform light work, avoiding moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants and in

April 2006 affirmed she could perform light work, and that she could perform one-two step tasks

(Exhibits 84F-120F [tr. at 237-73]).” (Tr. at 18.) The exhibits cited by the ALJ include case

activity logs and staff notes (tr. at 237-47), the form assessment of plaintiff’s physical RFC by

state agency physician A.G. Dipsia, dated January 19, 2006 (tr. at 248-55), and the form

assessment of plaintiff’s mental RFC, including a completed Psychiatric Review Technique

form, by state agency physician D.E. Gross, dated April 5, 2006 (tr. at 256-73).

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With respect to the treating and examining physicians’ opinions at issue, the ALJ

found that

Dr. Hari Goyal, Board Certified, performed a comprehensive

internal medicine CE [Consultative Examination] December 17,

2005 for reported shortness of breath and wheezing for seven

years, aches and pain, headaches, difficulty sleeping, back pain,

and depression for eight years. She had a normal physical

examination and review of records resulted in diagnoses of

moderate, persistent asthma, PTSD and pregnancy. The functional

assessment indicated she was limited to sedentary work, avoiding

extreme temperatures, humidity, dust, or chemical fumes. He

explained that her limited ability to walk and stand was due to

pregnancy and bronchial asthma (Exhibits 71F-75F [tr. at 282-86]).

(Tr. at 17.) The ALJ found that the

[m]edical records from Dr. Allan Au document he treated the

claimant from July 31, 2001 through November 13, 2007 for

asthma and allergic rhinitis. A pulmonary function tests [sic]

(PFT) in March and April 2003 resulted in an interpretation of mild

restrictive ventilatory defect and suggested the possibility of

superimposed early obstructive pulmonary impairment. PFT

studies in May and June 2003 resulted in interpretation of mild

obstructive pulmonary impairment and early obstructive

impairment. A May 2007 PFT resulted in an interpretation of mild

restrictive ventilatory defect and suggested the possibility of

superimposed early obstructive pulmonary impairment and a

studies [sic] the next month moderate restrictive ventilatory defect

and early obstructive pulmonary impairment and suggested the

possibility of superimposed early obstructive pulmonary

impairment [sic]. The doctor completed a pulmonary residual

functional capacity [sic] which indicated she had environmental

limitations and would miss about four days of work per month as a

result of her impairment or treatment. The doctor did not identify

any lifting, walking, standing, sitting or postural limitations

(Exhibits 129F-176F [tr. at 190-236]).

(Tr. at 18.)

The ALJ explained his assignment of weight to the medical opinions as follows:

As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned adopted the SA [State

Agency] determinations in combination with the medical opinions

contained in the psychiatric CE [Consultative Examination] as

being the most reliable in establishing [claimant’s] residual

functional capacity. Thus, this evidence was given controlling

weight.

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The medical opinions of Dr. Au were not given controlling weight

as his clinical and PFT [Pulmonary Function Test] findings do not

support that she would miss four days of work per month due to

her impairment or treatment given the findings and functional

assessment by Dr. Goyal and the SA determinations.

Dr. Goyals’ [sic] functional assessment was not given full weight

as the standing and walking limitation was based on her asthma

and pregnancy. Since the claimant has delivered her baby, she

testified to having a nine month old baby, that limitation is no

longer valid. The undersigned accorded only moderate weight to

his assessment.

(Tr. at 20-21.)

The ALJ did not find that the medical opinions of either Dr. Au or Dr. Goyal were

contradicted by the opinion of any treating or examining doctor. The opinions of the nontreating, non-examining state agency physicians were not supported by other evidence which

would have permitted the ALJ to rely on their opinions as a basis for rejecting the opinions of

treating physician Dr. Au and examining physician Dr. Goyal. Thus, the ALJ was required to

provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting Dr. Au’s and Dr. Goyal’s opinions. Lester,

81 F.3d at 830 (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)).

According to the ALJ, Dr. Au’s medical opinions were not entitled to controlling

weight because the doctor’s “clinical and PFT findings do not support that she would miss four

days of work per month due to her impairment or treatment given the findings and functional

assessment by Dr. Goyal and the SA determinations.” (Tr. at 20-21.) The court finds this

assertion by the ALJ baffling. The ALJ did not identify any findings or functional assessments

made by Dr. Goyal in 2005 or any specific determination by Dr. Dipsia in 2006 that rendered Dr.

Au’s clinical and pulmonary function test findings inadequate to support Dr. Au’s conclusion,

after treating plaintiff for over six years, that she would be absent from work, on average, four

days per month.

The court has carefully examined the questionnaire completed by Dr. Au. The

doctor clarified that he was plaintiff’s allergist, not her primary care physician or a

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pulmonologist. (Tr. at 192.) He diagnosed cough, asthma, allergic rhinitis, and allergic

conjunctivitis, citing spirometry showing mild to moderate obstruction. (Id.) He found her

symptoms to include episodic acute asthma, which is manifested in intermittent attacks

precipitated by upper respiratory infection, allergens, or exercise. (Id.) He noted that as of

November 2007 plaintiff had experienced asthma attacks twice since the spring and that an

average attack for plaintiff incapacitates her for one to two weeks. (Tr. at 193.) Dr. Au did not

find plaintiff to be a malingerer and opined that her impairments were consistent with the

symptoms and functional limitations described in his evaluation. (Id.) He opined that her

prognosis was good, explaining that her asthma is probably “lifelong but exacerbations will be

intermittent.” (Id.) Dr. Au indicated with question marks that he was unable to estimate

plaintiff’s exertional limitations in a work situation. (Tr. at 194.) As plaintiff’s allergist,

however, he opined that plaintiff should avoid all exposure to cigarette smoke, soldering fluxes,

solvents, cleaners, fumes, odors, gases, and chemicals; should avoid even moderate exposure to

extreme cold, extreme heat, perfumes, dust, and other irritants; and should avoid concentrated

exposure to high humidity and wetness. (Tr. at 195.) In response to the final specific question

on the form, Dr. Au indicated that plaintiff’s impairments are likely to produce “good days” and

“bad days” and that, on the average, plaintiff is likely to be absent from work as a result of her

impairments or treatment for about four days per month. (Id.)

Although the treatment records from Dr. Au’s office are difficult to decipher in

part due to copy quality and in part due to handwriting, the records provide ample evidence that

plaintiff’s impairments require frequent treatment and extensive medication. (Tr. at 196-236.)

These records also support Dr. Au’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s likely absences from work due

to her condition, on average, four times per month, although the absences may consist of

intermittent acute asthma attacks that leave plaintiff incapacitated for a period of one or two

weeks, as well as months in which she would be absent only for routine follow-up care,

injections, or medication changes.

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On this record, the court concludes that the ALJ did not offer any clear and

convincing reason for rejecting Dr. Au’s opinions about plaintiff’s absences from work and that

the ALJ should have given controlling weight to Dr. Au’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s likely

absences from work.

The court reaches a similar conclusion with respect to the ALJ’s rejection of Dr.

Goyal’s opinion about plaintiff’s limitation to sedentary work. According to the ALJ, Dr. Goyal

“explained that [the claimant’s] limited ability to walk and stand was due to pregnancy and

bronchial asthma.” (Tr. at 17, citing Exs. 71F-75F [tr. at 282-86].) The ALJ stated that he did

not give full weight to Dr. Goyal’s functional assessment because “the standing and walking

limitation was based on her asthma and pregnancy” and, since plaintiff had delivered her baby,

“that limitation is no longer valid.” (Tr. at 21.) Dr. Dipsia, the state agency physician whose

assessment the ALJ found “the most reliable in establishing [the claimant’s] residual functional

capacity,” went even further, stating that, unlike Dr. Goyal, he “didn’t limit her stand/walk to less

than two hours due to her pregnancy,” ignoring the asthma component altogether. (Tr. at 254.)

Dr. Goyal commenced his functional assessment with the statement that “[t]he

number of hours the claimant would be expected to stand and walk in an eight-hour workday is

less than two hours, mainly limited because of her pregnancy and bronchial asthma.” (Tr. at

285.) He went on to say that plaintiff would be expected to sit about six hours in an eight-hour

day but might need frequent breaks and that she could frequently lift 20 pounds but “may not be

able to lift more than 20 pounds because of her pregnancy and asthma.” (Tr. at 285-86.) He

imposed “postural limitations on bending, stooping, crouching, and so on,” but noted “the

limitation is for so long as she is pregnant.” (Tr. at 286 (emphasis added).) He concluded with

workplace environmental limitations precluding her from working “in extreme temperatures,

humidity, dust, or chemical fumes because of her allergic bronchial asthma.” (Tr. at 286.) Dr.

Goyal made it completely clear that the postural limitations he assessed would apply only while

plaintiff was pregnant. The logical inference to be drawn from this record is that the two-hour

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limitation on standing and walking, and the limitation to lifting no more than twenty pounds,

both of which were imposed because of plaintiff’s pregnancy and her asthma, still applied when

plaintiff was no longer pregnant, because the doctor did not indicate otherwise. The court

concludes that the ALJ’s reason for rejecting Dr. Goyal’s two-hour stand/walk limitation is not

convincing and the ALJ should have given full weight to Dr. Goyal’s functional assessment.

The court also notes that the state agency physicians making determinations in

2006 did not have an opportunity to consider Dr. Au’s opinion, which was not rendered until

November 13, 2007. Nor did the state agency physicians have access to Dr. Au’s treatment

records, which included several pulmonary function test results and spanned the period from July

31, 2001 through November 13, 2007, as those records were provided to the ALJ on November

27, 2007. (Tr. at 190.) Dr. Goyal and Dr. Soliman, both of whom examined plaintiff in

December 2005, were provided with few if any medical records to review. (Tr. at 274, 282.) In

contrast, Dr. Au was a specialist who had treated plaintiff for more than six years and whose goal

was to improve plaintiff’s condition. The court finds that Dr. Au’s uncontradicted opinions were

entitled to controlling weight with regard to the effects of plaintiff’s asthma on her residual

functional capacity. The state agency opinions adopted by the ALJ were based largely on the

opinions of the consulting examiners, each of whom examined plaintiff once. Dr. Dipsia’s

opinion consists entirely of boxes marked on the form, with only one explanation and no citation

to facts, and it tracks Dr. Goyal’s assessment except for Dr. Dipsia’s rejection of Dr. Goyal’s

stand/walk limitation. (See tr. at 249-50, 252, 254.)

The court finds that the opinions of the state agency physicians and the

determinations of the state agency do not constitute substantial evidence justifying the ALJ’s

rejection of any of the opinions of Dr. Au and Dr. Goyal, and the ALJ’s analysis fails to establish

“clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the medical opinions at issue. In the absence of such

reasons, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on her claim that the ALJ

improperly rejected the opinions of treating allergist Dr. Au and consultative examiner Dr. Goyal

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regarding her functional limitations.

The court has considered plaintiff’s argument concerning the opinions of Han

Nguyen, M.D., the psychiatrist who saw plaintiff for an initial psychiatric evaluation on June 29,

2007, and saw her again for follow up treatment on August 17, 2007. (Tr. at 176-81.) Although

the ALJ did determine that plaintiff’s severe impairments include major depressive disorder and

post traumatic stress disorder, there appears to be some merit in plaintiff’s contention that the

ALJ attempted to minimize the seriousness of her mental impairments. (See tr. at 14, 17-18.)

The court has also noted errors in the ALJ’s factual analysis of plaintiff’s mental health. For

example, the ALJ stated that plaintiff’s mental complaints lacked full credibility because, among

other reasons, “there is no evidence of any individual or group therapy.” (Tr. at 20.) Plaintiff’s

adult function report dated January 26, 2007, indicates that she had been going to Turning Point

for mental health issues since September 2006 (tr. at 134), and Dr. Nguyen’s treatment plan in

August 2007 included supportive treatment and counseling with Hmong PSC at Northgate Point

(tr. 15 176). However, the court finds that plaintiff has not pointed to a specific opinion of Dr.

Nguyen’s that was rejected by the ALJ in violation of the law applicable to the treatment of

medical opinions.

II. Whether the ALJ Erred in Failing to Address Third Party Statements

In a Function Report - Adult - Third Party dated November 9, 2005, and in

another such report dated January 27, 2007, Ze Lor, describing himself as plaintiff’s spouse,

provided reports about plaintiff’s abilities and limitations. (Tr. at 150-57, 117-24.) Mr. Lor

indicated that he had known plaintiff for over 10 years, that he saw her every day and night, and

that he was the one who took care of everything around the house and supported the family. (Tr.

at 117, 150.) His statements, which were based on his own observations regarding plaintiff’s

impairments on a daily basis over many years, supported plaintiff’s testimony regarding the

severe restrictions on her daily activities and abilities.

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The Commissioner’s own regulations provide that information from sources like

spouses, other family members, friends, neighbors, and clergy may be used to show how a

claimant’s impairments affect his ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d) & 416.913(d). See

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288;

Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1232. Family members and other persons who see the claimant on a daily

basis are particularly competent to testify as to their observations. Regennitter v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-19

(9th Cir. 1993). If the ALJ chooses to reject or discount the testimony of a lay witness, he must

give reasons germane to that particular witness in doing so. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1298;

Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919.

 Here, the statements of Mr. Lor should have been considered and discussed by

the ALJ. Instead, the ALJ’s decision contains no mention of the function reports submitted by

Mr. Lor. The ALJ’s error in failing to consider and discuss Mr. Lor’s statements was not

harmless because his statements corroborated plaintiff’s testimony and provided support for a

different disability determination. See Robbins, 466 at 885; Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462,

1467 (9th Cir. 1996). The court finds that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on her claim

of error arising from the ALJ’s failure to consider competent third-party statements.

III. Whether the ALJ Erred in Assessing RFC and Posing Hypothetical Questions

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess her RFC, failed to pose a

legally adequate hypothetical question to the VE, and failed to credit the VE’s testimony in

response to questions that accurately reflected plaintiff’s functional limitations.

A claimant’s RFC is “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her]

limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The assessment of RFC must be “based on all the

relevant evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” Id. See also Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

453, 460 (9th Cir. 2001). The Commissioner may satisfy his burden of showing that the claimant

can perform past relevant work or other types of work in the national economy by taking the

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testimony of a vocational expert. Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1340; Polny v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 661,

663 (9th Cir. 1988).

Here, the court has determined that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of

Dr. Au and Dr. Goyal as to plaintiff’s limitations and that the ALJ improperly failed to consider

the statements of plaintiff’s boyfriend regarding her functional limitations. As a result of these

errors, the ALJ failed to base plaintiff’s RFC upon the whole record and reached the erroneous

conclusion that plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work as long as she is limited to

performing simple, routine tasks and avoids moderate exposure to temperature extremes and

pulmonary irritants. If the rejected opinions and third-party statements had been properly

credited, additional impairment-related limitations would have been reflected in the ALJ’s final

RFC assessment, in the hypothetical questions posed and in the VE testimony that the ALJ

ultimately relied upon. See Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding that the ALJ is required to question a vocational expert in a manner that properly takes

into account the limitations on the plaintiff’s abilities to engage in various work-related

functions).

Plaintiff notes that when the ALJ included Dr. Goyal’s two-hour stand/walk

limitation in his hypothetical question, the VE testified that plaintiff would be limited to

sedentary work, which would require that she have better communication skills and/or the ability

to withstand dust, fumes, etc., which are abilities plaintiff does not possess. With a two-hour

stand/walk limitation, the VE was not able to identify any jobs that plaintiff would be able to

perform. (Tr. at 48-49.) The VE also testified that there would be no jobs for a person who

missed four days of work per month or for a person who could not be exposed to any dust. (Tr.

at 53.) When the ALJ added that the person would be limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks

not performed in a fast production-paced environment, with only simple work-related decisions,

relatively few workplace changes, and limitations in math, reading, writing, and speaking

English, the VE responded that the jobs he had identified would require a person to keep up with

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the pace, but he was not sure whether those jobs qualified as “fast-paced.” (Tr. at 51.)

Plaintiff argues that if the limitations assessed by Dr. Au and Dr. Goyal had been

properly credited, a finding of disability would have resulted on the basis of the VE’s testimony. 

The court agrees. The ALJ’s failure to credit the opinions of Dr. Au and Dr. Goyal, along with

the third-party statements of plaintiff’s boyfriend, led to the erroneous exclusion of significant

limitations from the assessment of plaintiff’s RFC and from the hypothetical questions relied

upon by the ALJ. It is evident from the VE’s testimony in response to hypothetical questions that

contained appropriate limitations that, when the effects of plaintiff’s impairments are properly

considered, plaintiff is not capable of performing any work on a sustained basis, and there are no

jobs in the national economy that she can perform.

CONCLUSION

The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence or to simply award

benefits is within the discretion of the court. Ghokassian v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir.

1994); Pitzer, 908 F.2d at 506. The Ninth Circuit has stated that, “[g]enerally, we direct the

award of benefits in cases where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative

proceedings, or where the record has been thoroughly developed.” Ghokassian, 41 F.3d at 1304

(citing Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988)). This

rule recognizes the importance of expediting disability claims. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1210;

Ghokassian, 41 F.3d at 1304; Varney, 859 F.2d at 1401.

Here, it is plain that no useful purpose would be served by further administrative

proceedings. Plaintiff filed her application for SSI almost five years ago. The record has been

fully developed. The VE’s answers to certain hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ

affirmatively establish that plaintiff is unable to perform a significant range of sedentary jobs in

the national economy. Had the ALJ based his decision on the VE’s testimony in response to the

more accurate hypothetical questions, the ALJ would have found plaintiff entitled to benefits as

of her application date. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1023, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding

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the claimant entitled to benefits where he needed to lie down two or three times each day for up

to 45 minutes due to pain and where the vocational expert testified that there were no jobs

available in the national economy in light of that limitation).

For all of the reasons discussed in this order, this matter will be remanded with

the direction to award benefits on the ground that plaintiff was under a disability as defined by

the Social Security Act on October 24, 2005. See Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 278

F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for payment of benefits where the ALJ improperly

rejected the testimony of the plaintiff’s examining physicians); Ghokassian, 41 F.3d at 1304

(awarding benefits where the ALJ “improperly discounted the opinion of the treating physician”).

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 18) is granted;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 19) is denied;

3. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is reversed; and

4. This case is remanded with the direction to award benefits.

DATED: August 11, 2010.

DAD:kw

Ddad1/orders.socsec/chang3132.order

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