Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-18-01831/USCOURTS-ca13-18-01831-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kingston Technology Company, Inc.
Appellee
Polaris Innovations Limited
Appellant
United States
Intervenor

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

POLARIS INNOVATIONS LIMITED,

Appellant

v.

KINGSTON TECHNOLOGY COMPANY, INC.,

Appellee

UNITED STATES,

Intervenor

______________________

2018-1831

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2017-

00116.

______________________

Decided: January 31, 2020

______________________

MATTHEW D. POWERS, Tensegrity Law Group LLP, 

Redwood Shores, CA, argued for appellant. Also represented by JENNIFER ROBINSON; AZRA HADZIMEHMEDOVIC,

AARON MATTHEW NATHAN, SAMANTHA A. JAMESON, 

McLean, VA; NATHAN NOBU LOWENSTEIN, KENNETH J.

WEATHERWAX, Lowenstein & Weatherwax LLP, Los Angeles, CA. 

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 DAVID M. HOFFMAN, Fish & Richardson PC, Austin, TX, 

argued for appellee. Also represented by MICHAEL JOHN 

BALLANCO, Washington, DC; NITIKA GUPTA FIORELLA, Wilmington, DE. 

 MELISSA N. PATTERSON, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for intervenor. Also represented by COURTNEY DIXON,

DENNIS FAN, SCOTT R. MCINTOSH, JOSEPH H. HUNT; 

THOMAS W. KRAUSE, JOSEPH MATAL, FARHEENA YASMEEN 

RASHEED, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and 

Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA. 

 ______________________

Before REYNA, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HUGHES, in 

which Circuit Judge WALLACH joins. 

PER CURIAM.

In its opening brief, Polaris Innovations Limited argues that the final written decision at issue in this appeal 

exceeds the scope of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s 

authority and violates the Constitution’s Appointments 

Clause. See Appellant’s Br. 53 (citing U.S. Const. art. II, 

§ 2, cl. 2). This court recently decided this issue in Arthrex, 

Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 

2019). Accordingly, the Board’s decision in No. IPR2017-

00116 is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Board for 

proceedings consistent with this court’s decision in Arthrex. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

POLARIS INNOVATIONS LIMITED,

Appellant

v.

KINGSTON TECHNOLOGY COMPANY, INC.,

Appellee

UNITED STATES,

Intervenor

______________________

2018-1831

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2017-

00116.

______________________

HUGHES, Circuit Judge, concurring, in which WALLACH,

Circuit Judge, joins.

I concur because we are bound by the prior panel 

decision in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 

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1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019).1 However, I write separately to note 

that I disagree with the merits and question the remedy of 

the Arthrex panel decision. I believe that viewed in light of

the Director’s significant control over the activities of the 

Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Administrative Patent 

Judges, APJs are inferior officers already properly 

appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. 

But if APJs are properly considered principal officers, 

I have grave doubts about the remedy Arthrex applied to 

fix their unconstitutional appointment. In the face of an 

unconstitutional statute, our role is to determine whether 

severance of the unconstitutional portion would be 

consistent with Congress’s intent. Given the federal 

employment protections APJs and their predecessors have 

enjoyed for more than three decades, I find no legislative 

intent to divest APJs of their Title 5 removal protections to 

cure any alleged constitutional defect. Because the bar to 

find non-severability is so high, though, I reluctantly agree 

with Arthrex’s remedy.

I

None of the parties here or in Arthrex dispute that 

APJs are officers who exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Buckley v. Valeo, 

1 The parties have raised the same arguments on the 

merits of the Appointments Clause issue in both Polaris

cases before this panel, Nos. 2018-1768 and 2018-1831. 

However, the government contends that Polaris waived its

Appointments Clause challenge in No. 2018-1768 because 

it failed to make the argument before the Board in the first 

instance. I need not address the waiver issue because this 

concurrence addresses only the merits of the Appointments 

Clause argument. And I address this concurrence to No. 

2018-1831 because the parties agree the issue was preserved there.

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424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). But “significant authority” marks the line between an officer and an employee, not a principal and an inferior officer. Despite 

being presented with the opportunity to do so, the Supreme 

Court has declined to “set forth an exclusive criterion for 

distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for 

Appointments Clause purposes.” Edmond v. United States, 

520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997). 

Instead, the pertinent cases make clear that the hallmark of an inferior officer is whether a presidentially-nominated and senate-confirmed principal officer “direct[s] and 

supervise[s] [her work] at some level.” Id. at 663. Edmond 

does not lay out a more exacting test than this, and we 

should not endeavor to create one in its stead. The cases 

employ an extremely context-specific inquiry, which accounts for the unique systems of direction and supervision 

in each case. See infra Section I. Finally, Edmond also 

makes clear that the Appointments Clause seeks to “preserve political accountability relative to important government assignments.” 520 U.S. at 663. The current 

structure for appointing, directing and supervising, and removing APJs allows such political accountability through 

the Director’s significant, substantive supervision of APJs’

work, and the ability to discipline and terminate APJs to 

promote the efficiency of the service. 

Arthrex, in my view, pays insufficient attention to the 

significant ways in which the Director directs and supervises the work of the APJs and, instead, focuses on whether 

the Director can single-handedly review and reverse Board 

decisions, and whether APJs are removable at will. In doing so, the Arthrex panel essentially distills the Supreme 

Court’s direction and supervision test into two discrete 

questions: (1) are an officer’s decisions reviewable by a 

principal officer and (2) is the officer removable at will? Because I believe that the Supreme Court would have announced such a simple test if it were proper, I respectfully 

disagree with the Arthrex panel decision that APJs are 

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principal officers. The Director’s power to direct and supervise the Board and individual APJs, along with the fact 

that APJs are already removable under the efficiency of the 

service standard, suffices to render APJs inferior officers. 

A

The Director may issue binding policy guidance, institute and reconsider institution of an inter partes review, 

select APJs to preside over an instituted inter partes review, single-handedly designate or de-designate any final 

written decision as precedential, and convene a panel of 

three or more members of his choosing to consider rehearing any Board decision. The Arthrex panel categorized 

some of these as “powers of review” and others as “powers 

of supervision,” but I view them all as significant tools of 

direction and supervision.

As Arthrex recognized, “[t]he Director is ‘responsible for 

providing policy direction and management supervision’ 

for the [United States Patent and Trademark Office].” 941 

F.3d at 1331 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A)). Not only can 

the Director promulgate regulations governing inter partes 

review procedures, but he may also prospectively issue 

binding policy guidance “interpreting and applying the patent and trademark laws.” Gov’t. Br. 21. APJs must apply 

this guidance in all subsequent inter partes review proceedings. Such guidance might encompass, for instance, exemplary application of the law to specific fact patterns, such 

as those posed in pending cases. These powers provide the 

Director with control over the process and substance of 

Board decisions. Gov’t. Br. 8, 21. And though the Director 

cannot directly reverse an individual Board decision that 

neglects to follow his guidance, APJs who do so risk discipline or removal under the efficiency of the service standard applicable under Title 5. See infra Section I C. Such 

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binding guidance, and the consequences of failing to follow 

it, are powerful tools for control of an inferior officer.2

The Director also has unreviewable authority to institute inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), (d). Cf. Free 

Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 

477, 504 (2010) (discussing the importance of the ability to 

“start, stop, or alter individual [PCAOB] investigations,” 

even where the reviewing principal officer already had significant “power over [PCAOB] activities”). Though the Arthrex panel did not address the Director’s ability to 

reconsider an institution decision, our precedent also holds 

that the Board3 may reconsider and reverse its initial institution decision. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert Bosch 

Healthcare Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1382, 1385−86 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (explaining that “§ 318(a) contemplates that a proceeding can be ‘dismissed’ after it is instituted, and, as our 

prior cases have held, administrative agencies possess inherent authority to reconsider their decisions, subject to 

certain limitations, regardless of whether they possess explicit statutory authority to do so” (internal quotation and 

citation omitted)). 

The Director also controls which APJs will hear any 

given instituted inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). In 

2 To be sure, I do not mean to suggest that the Director’s extensive powers of supervision mean that he can dictate the outcome of a specific inter partes proceeding. 

Rather, his ability to issue guidance and designate precedential opinions provides the general type of supervision 

and control over APJs’ decision-making that renders them 

inferior, not principal, officers.

3 The Director’s delegation of his institution power to 

the Board does not diminish its existence. 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.4(a) (stating that “[t]he Board institutes the trial on 

behalf of the Director”). See also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 

Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 

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my view, this power of panel designation is a quintessential 

method of directing and controlling a subordinate. Importantly, I do not believe that in stating that the power to 

remove an officer at-will from federal employment is “a 

powerful tool for control of an inferior,” Free Enterprise, 561 

U.S. at 510 (internal quotation omitted), the Supreme 

Court meant that such removal power is the only effective 

form of control in the context of the Appointments Clause. 

For example, the Judge Advocate General in Edmond could 

remove the Court of Criminal Appeal judges from judicial 

service without cause, but not necessarily federal employment altogether. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664. See also Free 

Enterprise, 561 U.S. at 510 (relying on both at-will removal 

authority and “the [SEC’s] other oversight authority” in 

finding with “no hesitation” that the PCAOB members are 

inferior officers). That is akin to the Director’s authority to 

designate which APJs will consider a certain case. And despite acknowledging that “when a statute is silent on removal, the power of removal is presumptively incident to 

the power of appointment[,]” the Arthrex panel declined to 

opine on the Director’s ability to de-designate APJs from a 

panel under § 6(c). Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1332. But Edmond 

referenced the ability to remove the judges there “from 

[their] judicial assignment[s],” followed by a recognition of

the potent power of removal. 520 U.S. at 664. If the Director’s ability to control APJs plays a significant part in the 

unconstitutionality at issue, such that the remedy is to 

make APJs removable at will, the panel should have definitively addressed the Director’s de-designation authority. 

Moreover, as outlined in Section I C, infra, APJs already 

may be disciplined or removed from federal employment 

under the routine efficiency of the service standard, which 

is not incompatible with discipline or removal for failing to 

follow the Director’s binding guidance. 

And the Director may continue to provide substantial

direction and supervision after the Board issues its final 

written decision. As Arthrex discusses, the Director may 

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convene a Precedential Opinion Panel (POP), of which the 

Director is a member, to consider whether to designate a 

decision as precedential. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1330. But I 

read the Standard Operating Procedures more broadly, 

such that the Director may also make a precedential designation or de-designation decision single-handedly,4

thereby unilaterally establishing binding agency authority 

on important constitutional questions and other exceptionally important issues. Standard Operating Procedure 2, at 

3−4. Indeed, it appears that the Director has done so in at 

least sixteen cases in 2018 and 2019. See USPTO, Patent 

Trial and Appeal Board Precedential and informative decisions, available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/precedentialinformative-decisions (listing decisions designated as precedential in the past year, where some are labeled as “Precedential Opinion Panel decision” and others are not). The

Director may also convene a POP of his choice, of which he 

is by default a member, to consider whether to rehear and 

reverse any opinion. Standard Operating Procedure 2, at 

4. And, the Director may “determine that a panel of more 

than three members is appropriate” and then choose those 

additional members as well. Id. Though the Arthrex panel 

recognized these powers, it dismissed them because the Director has only one vote out of at least three. 941 F.3d at 

4 “No decision will be designated or de-designated as 

precedential or informative without the approval of the Director. This SOP does not limit the authority of the Director 

to designate or de-designate decisions as precedential or informative, or to convene a Precedential Opinion Panel to 

review a matter, in his or her sole discretion without regard 

to the procedures set forth herein.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Revision 10) 

at 1 (Standard Operating Procedure 2), available at

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP

2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf.

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1331−32. This assessment, however, fails to recognize the 

practical influence the Director wields with the power to 

hand-pick a panel, particularly when the Director sits on 

that panel. The Director’s ability to unilaterally designate

or de-designate a decision as precedential and to convene a

POP of the size and composition of his choosing are therefore important tools for the direction and supervision of the 

Board even after it issues a final written decision.5 

5 The Arthrex panel’s underestimation of the Director’s power is particularly evident in light of this court’s 

prior en banc decision in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. 

Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by In re Bilski, 545 

F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Alappat contained strong language about the ability to control the composition and size 

of panels. See, e.g., id. at 1535 (noting that “the Board is 

merely the highest level of the Examining Corps, and like 

all other members of the Examining Corps, the Board operates subject to the Commissioner’s overall ultimate authority and responsibility”). While the duties of the Board 

and the Director have changed since Alappat was decided, 

the authority to determine the Board’s composition for reconsideration of an examiner’s patentability determination

mirrors the current authority with respect to inter partes 

review. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012) (giving the Director authority to designate “at least 3 members of the Patent 

Trial and Appeal Board” to review “[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review”), with 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988) (giving the 

Commissioner power to designate “at least three members 

of the Board of Appeals and Interferences” to review “adverse decisions of examiners upon applications for patents”). Therefore, I believe the panel should have at least 

discussed how Alappat’s view of the power to control the 

Board might impact the Appointments Clause analysis. 

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Combined, all of these powers illustrate that the Director has constitutionally significant means of direction and 

supervision over APJs─making them inferior officers under the rule of Edmond. 

B

Despite the Director’s significant powers of direction 

and supervision, the Arthrex panel concluded that APJs are 

principal officers in large part because no principal officer 

may “single-handedly review, nullify or reverse” the 

Board’s decisions. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1329. But Supreme 

Court precedent does not require such power. And in the 

cases in which the Court emphasized a principal officer’s 

power of review, that principal officer had less authority to 

direct and supervise an inferior officer’s work ex ante than 

the Director has here.

In Edmond, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the 

Armed Forces, an Article I court, could review decisions of 

the Court of Criminal Appeals judges at issue. However,

its scope of review was limited. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665 

(explaining that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 

may only reevaluate the facts when there is no “competent 

evidence in the record to establish each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt”). And while the Judge 

Advocate General “exercise[d] administrative oversight” 

and could “prescribe uniform rules of procedure,” he could 

“not attempt to influence (by threat of removal or otherwise) the outcome of individual proceedings.” Id. at 664. 

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that the Court of 

Criminal Appeals judges were inferior, not principal, officers. In comparison, while the Director may not unilaterally 

decide to rehear or reverse a Board decision, he has many

powers to direct and supervise APJs both ex ante and ex 

post, Section I A, supra, that no principal officer had in Edmond. 

Similarly, in Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991),

the Supreme Court considered the status of special trial 

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judges appointed by the Tax Court, whose independent decision-making varied based on the type of case before them. 

The Court held that the special trial judges were inferior 

officers—not employees—when presiding over “declaratory 

judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases” because they “render[ed] the decisions of the Tax Court” in 

those cases. Id. at 882. In doing so, the Court distinguished between cases in which the special trial judges 

acted as “inferior officers who exercise independent authority,” and cases in which they still had significant discretion 

but less independent authority. Id. The Court’s analysis 

distinguished between inferior officer and employee; nowhere did the Court suggest that special trial judges’ “independent authority” to decide declaratory judgment 

proceedings and limited-amount cases rendered them principal officers. See id. at 881−82. Most recently, the Court

applied the framework of Freytag in deciding whether administrative law judges (ALJs) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are inferior officers or 

employees. Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2018). 

The Court reasoned that SEC ALJs and Freytag’s special 

trial judges are extremely similar, but SEC ALJs arguably

wield more power because their decisions become final if 

the SEC declines review. Id. at 2053−54. But again, the 

Court found this structure still only rendered SEC ALJs 

officers, not employees. Id. at 2054. No mention was made

of SEC ALJs being principal officers.6 See id. at 2051 n.3 

(explaining that the distinction between principal and inferior officers was “not at issue here”). Just as the special 

6 In fact, the Court declined “to elaborate on Buckley’s ‘significant authority’ test” marking the line between 

officer and employee, citing two parties’ briefs which argued that the test between officer and employee, not principal and inferior officer, should include some measure of 

the finality of decision making. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 

2051─52. 

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trial judges in Freytag and the SEC ALJs in Lucia were 

inferior officers, so too are APJs.

Nor does this court’s precedent require unfettered review as a marker of inferior officer status. In Masias v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., we rebuffed the argument 

that because the Court of Federal Claims does not review 

decisions of the Vaccine Program’s special masters de novo, 

the special masters are principal officers. 634 F.3d 1283, 

1293−94 (Fed. Cir. 2011). There, we recognized that the

Court of Federal Claims may only “set aside any findings 

of fact or conclusions of law of the special master found to 

be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .” Id. at 1294. This 

limited review means that many of the special masters’ decisions are effectively final because the Court of Federal 

Claims has no basis to set aside findings of fact or conclusions of law. We reasoned that such limited review of special masters’ decisions by the Court of Federal Claims 

resembled the review in Edmond, and that “the fact that 

the review is limited does not mandate that special masters 

are necessarily ‘principal officers.’” Id. at 1295.

Finally, the panel analogized the Arthrex issue to the 

one addressed by the D.C. Circuit in Intercollegiate Broad.

Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 

2012). See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1334. But the facts of Intercollegiate are significantly different than those in Arthrex, or here. The Librarian of Congress—the principal 

officer who supervises the Copyright Royalty Judges 

(CRJs) at issue—was much more constrained in her ability 

to direct and supervise the CRJs than the Director. The 

governing statute grants CRJs broad discretion over ratemaking. See 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(A)(i) (stating that 

“[CRJs] shall have full independence in making” numerous

copyright rate-related decisions). The Librarian “approv[es] the CRJs’ procedural regulations, . . . issu[es] ethical rules for the CRJs, [and] . . . oversee[s] various 

logistical aspects of their duties,” such as publishing CRJs’ 

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decisions and providing administrative resources. Intercollegiate, 684 F.3d at 1338. In fact, it appears the only way 

the Librarian can exercise substantive control over the 

CRJs’ ratemaking decisions is indirectly through the Register of Copyrights, whom she, not the President, appoints. 

See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a). The Register corrects any legal errors in the CRJs’ ratemaking decisions, 17 U.S.C. 

§ 802(f)(1)(D), and provides written opinions to the CRJs 

on “novel question[s] of law,” 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(B), or 

when the CRJ requests such an opinion. 17 U.S.C. 

§ 802(f)(1)(A)(ii). But the CRJs may not consult with the 

Register about a question of fact. 17 U.S.C. 

§ 802(f)(1)(A)(i). The Librarian therefore exerts far less 

control over CRJs than the Director can over APJs using 

all the powers of direction and supervision discussed in 

Section I A, supra.

The ill-suited comparison to Intercollegiate in Arthrex 

again highlights how the unique powers of direction and

supervision in each case should be viewed in totality, rather than as discrete categories weighing in favor of inferior officer status or not. In particular, by breaking up the

analysis into three discrete categories—Review, Supervision, and Removal—the Arthrex panel overlooks how the 

powers in each category impact each other. Again, for example, whereas ex post the Court of Appeals for the Armed 

Forces has more power to review the Court of Criminal Appeals judges’ decisions than the Director has to review a 

Board decision, neither the JAG nor the Court of Appeals 

for the Armed Forces have the Director’s ex ante control, 

such as the power to decide whether to hear a case at all or 

to issue binding guidance on how to apply the law in a case. 

Viewed through this integrated lens, I believe APJs comfortably fit with prior Supreme Court precedent that has 

never found a principal officer in a challenged position to 

date. 

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C

Finally, to the extent that the Arthrex panel decision is 

based on the lack of review along with perceived impermissible restrictions on removal of APJs, I believe it misapprehends the applicable efficiency of the service standard that 

protects APJs. The efficiency of the service standard allows discipline and removal for “misconduct [that] is likely 

to have an adverse impact on the agency’s performance of 

its functions.” See Brown v. Dep’t of the Navy, 229 F.3d 

1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000). To be sure, the efficiency of 

the service standard does not allow discipline or removal of 

APJs “without cause,” as in Edmond. See Arthrex, 941 F.3d 

at 1333. But neither the Supreme Court nor this court has 

required that a civil servant be removable at will to qualify 

as an inferior officer. To the contrary, the Supreme Court 

and this court have upheld for-cause removal limitations 

on inferior officers. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 

654, 692−93 (1988) (holding that the “good cause” restriction on removal of the independent counsel, an inferior 

officer, is permissible); Masias, 634 F.3d at 1294 (stating

that the Court of Federal Claims can remove special masters for “incompetency, misconduct, or neglect of duty or for 

physical or mental disability or for other good cause 

shown”). See also Free Enterprise, 561 U.S. at 494 (explaining that the Court previously “adopted verbatim the reasoning of the Court of Claims, which had held that when 

Congress ‘ “vests the appointment of inferior officers in the 

heads of Departments[,] it may limit and restrict the power 

of removal as it deems best for the public interest’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Perkins, 116 

U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (itself quoting Perkins v. United 

States, 20 Ct. Cl. 438, 444 (1885)))). 

The efficiency of the service standard allows supervisors to discipline and terminate employees for arguably

even a wider range of reasons than the standards above, 

including failure or refusal to follow the Director’s policy or 

legal guidance. Together with the significant authority the 

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Director wields in directing and supervising APJs’ work, 

the ability to remove an APJ on any grounds that promote 

the efficiency of the service supports finding that APJs are 

inferior officers.

II

Assuming for the sake of argument that APJs are principal officers, a remedy is required to cure the constitutional violation arising from their present appointment

scheme. However, I do not believe that the remedy proposed by the Arthrex panel comports with congressional intent as evidenced by the employment protections provided 

to APJs and their predecessors for over thirty years. The 

Arthrex panel makes APJs removable at will by partially 

severing 35 U.S.C. § 3(c) as it applies Title 5’s removal protections to APJs. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1337–38. I question 

whether Congress would have wanted to leave APJs without the removal protections of Title 5. But, given the high 

standard for finding non-severability, I cannot say that the 

Arthrex panel’s remedy was improper.

A

Before proceeding to the traditional severance analysis, I must note several concerns about the panel’s purported “severance.” In traditional severance cases, both 

the unconstitutional language being severed and the remaining language are usually part of one statute enacted 

at the same time. In what appears to be a smaller number 

of cases, an unconstitutional amendment was severed from 

the original statute. E.g., Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 

38−39 (1941), overruled in part on other grounds by Perez 

v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). But here the “severance” 

is far more convoluted—to the extent that I question 

whether “severance” is even the appropriate characterization of the Arthrex remedy. 

A court may sever the application of a particular statute without striking language explicitly. See, e.g., Nat’l 

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Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 586 (2012)

(invalidating the application of a statute to cure a constitutional defect). But the Arthrex panel did not simply sever 

the application of 35 U.S.C. § 3(c) to APJs. It severed 

§ 3(c)’s application of Title 5 protections, but only with respect to Title 5’s removal protections, and only to APJs. See 

Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1337–38. In doing so, it severed the 

application of a separate statute, indeed, a section in a separate title of the United States Code. Id. Further, the Title 

5 employment protections afforded by 35 U.S.C. § 3(c) already existed when Congress significantly amended other 

portions of Title 35, but made no changes to § 3(c), with the 

America Invents Act in 2011. See infra Section II C. I 

question whether it is appropriate to solve the alleged constitutional infirmity at issue in Arthrex and in this case by 

severing the application of a statute that Congress left untouched in its most recent revision, the substance of which 

had applied in various forms for over 30 years. See infra 

Section II B.

B

When faced with an unconstitutional statute, we must 

determine whether severing the offending portion is possible. To do so, we must determine if the remaining statute 

“will function in a manner consistent with the intent of 

Congress.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 

(1987) (emphasis removed). 

The question of severability is a weighty one and the 

bar for finding an unconstitutional provision non-severable

is high. We “must refrain from invalidating more of the 

statute than is necessary. Indeed, we must retain those 

portions of the Act that are (1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of ‘functioning independently,’ and (3) consistent 

with Congress’ basic objectives in enacting the statute.” 

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59, (2005) (internal citations omitted). 

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Because the statute as severed by Arthrex can function 

independently and is constitutionally valid, the key question is whether the statute as excised “remains consistent 

with Congress’ initial and basic . . . intent.” Id. at 264. 

Here, I question whether the Arthrex-excised statute does 

so. Congress afforded federal employment protections to 

APJs and their predecessors for over thirty years. And it 

seems unlikely to me that Congress, faced with this Appointments Clause problem, would have chosen to strip 

APJs of their employment protections, rather than choose 

some other alternative. However, because the bar for nonseverability is so high, and Congress can, at the end of the 

day, make another legislative choice if it disagrees with the 

outcome here, I reluctantly conclude that § 3(c) can be severed as it applies to the removal protections for APJs.

To be sure, I do not question the ability to sever an unconstitutional provision lightly. But our touchstone must 

remain the intent of Congress, and in this case, Congress 

has maintained federal employment protections for

USPTO officers and employees, including APJs and their 

predecessors, from 1975 to today. This long-standing statutory protection leads me to believe that Congress intended 

for APJs to have removal protections, such as those incorporated through Title 5 in 35 U.S.C. § 3(c), regardless of 

changes made to the Board’s duties in the AIA.

C

As the Arthrex panel noted, examiners-in-chief—“the 

former title of the current APJs”—were in fact nominated 

by the President and confirmed by the Senate until 1975. 

Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1344. See also 35 U.S.C. § 3 (1952). 

But the 1975 amendment did not simply remove Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation; it instead provided for the appointment of examiners-in-chief (1) by the 

Secretary of Commerce (2) “under the classified civil service.” An Act To Amend Title 35, United States Code, “Patents”, and For Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 93–601, secs. 

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1–2, §§ 3, 7, 88 Stat. 1956, 1956 (1975) (codified as amended 

at 35 U.S.C. §§ 3, 7 (1976)). This amendment provided federal employment protections to examiners-in-chief. See, 

e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 150–51 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (explaining that the LloydLaFollette Act’s “efficiency of the service” standard governed the dismissal of a competitive civil service employee); 

Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 543 (1956) (describing dismissal of federal employees as governed by “general personnel 

laws,” such as the Lloyd-LaFollette Act’s “efficiency of the 

service” standard). 

Two reasons for this change appear in the legislative 

history. First, due to the growing number of examiners-inchief, Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation 

posed a “burden.” H.R. REP. NO. 93-856, at 2 (1974). In an 

early case discussing the Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court said that this was exactly the reason for 

providing for appointment of inferior officers by people 

other than the President. United States v. Germaine, 99 

U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878). Second, the position of examinerin-chief “requir[es] unique legal and technical qualifications and experience.” An Act To Amend Title 35, United 

States Code, “Patents”, and For Other Purposes: Hearing

on S. 645, H.R. 5237, S. 1253 and S.1254 Before Subcomm. 

No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 28−29 

(1974) (letter from William N. Letson, Acting General

Counsel of the Dep’t of Commerce, to Emanuel Celler, 

Chairman of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). In making 

this change, Congress implicitly recognized that APJs belonged in the civil service, where expertise and nonpartisan 

decision-making are expected of all civil servants. Indeed, 

such ideas motivated the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) only three years after Congress provided 

for the appointment of APJs through the civil service system. Lovshin v. Dep’t of Navy, 767 F.2d 826, 832 (Fed. Cir. 

1985) (citing the Senate’s discussion of the public’s right to 

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a government that is both “efficient and effective” and “impartially administered”).

Congress then maintained these federal employment 

protections through several amendments over more than

three decades. In 1985, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 7, 

creating the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 

(BPAI) from the existing Board of Appeals, and again provided that the examiners-in-chief “shall be appointed to the 

competitive service.”7 Patent Law Amendment Acts of 

1984, Pub. L. 98–622, title II, sec. 201, § 7(a), 98 Stat. 3383, 

3386 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988)). 

Though the 1978 CSRA replaced the Lloyd-LaFollette Act 

between the 1975 and 1985 amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 7, 

the CSRA maintained the “efficiency of the service” standard for discipline and dismissal of federal employees in the 

competitive service. 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1978). See also Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 669 (1985) (“The statutory 

phrase ‘such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service’ pre-dates the Civil Service Reform Act’s recognition of 

federal sector collective bargaining.”) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 

In 1999, Congress made four changes significant here. 

First, Congress modified the statutory language governing 

the BPAI, moving the Board’s governing language from § 7 

to its current location in § 6. See Patent and Trademark 

Office Efficiency Act, Pub. L. 106–113, ch. 1, sec. 4717, 

113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-580 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6

(2000)). Second, it introduced the terminology of administrative patent judge, in place of examiners-in-chief. Id. at 

1501A-580–81. Third, Congress removed the previous 

7 For the Appointments Clause analysis here, I treat 

the terms “competitive service” and “classified civil service” 

as interchangeable. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2102(c) (2018) (“As 

used in other Acts of Congress, ‘classified civil service’ or 

‘classified service’ means the ‘competitive service[.]’”).

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language appointing examiners-in-chief under the competitive service, but added the current § 3(c), giving Title 5 

protections to USPTO employees and officers. Id. at sec. 

4713, § 3(c), 113 Stat. at 1501A-577 (codified as amended 

at 35 U.S.C. § 3(c) (2000)). This meant that even though 

their title changed, APJs remained subject to discipline or 

dismissal subject to the efficiency of the service standard. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (2000). Fourth, the amendment transferred the power to appoint APJs from the Secretary of 

Commerce to the Director. Patent and Trademark Office 

Efficiency Act, Pub. L. 106–113, ch. 1, sec. 4717, 113 

Stat. 1501, 1501A-581 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) 

(2000)). 

This fourth change is particularly significant because

only a few years later, Congress explicitly considered the 

constitutionality of this choice—whether APJs were employees that could be appointed by the Director or officers 

that must be appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. 

Congress chose the latter. Consideration of this issue was 

prompted by an intellectual property law scholar’s suggestion in 2007 that APJs were inferior officers, not employees, and therefore must be appointed by the President, a 

Court of Law, or the Head of a Department. See John F. 

Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 2007 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 21, 25 (2007). Congress 

responded swiftly, amending the law in 2008 to give the 

power to appoint APJs back to the Secretary of Commerce. 

Patent and Trademark Administrative Judges Appointment Authority Revision, Pub. L. 110–313, sec. 1, § 6, 122

Stat. 3014, 3014 (2008) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 

§ 6(a) (2012)). While some legislators viewed the fix as unnecessary, none suggested that APJs were in fact principal 

officers appointable only by the President. Compare 154 

Cong. Rec. H7234 (daily ed. Jul. 29, 2008 edition) (statement of Rep. King) (“[A] straightforward reading of article 

II, section 2, which I strongly endorse, suggests the 1999 

authority that Congress bestowed on the Patent and 

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Trademark Office Director to appoint administrative law 

judges is unconstitutional, inconsistent with article II, section 2. Instead, this right is more properly reserved for . . . 

the Secretary of Commerce . . . .”), with id. (statement of 

Rep. Cohen) (“We firmly believe that appointments made 

by the Director are constitutional.”). That Congress explicitly considered the constitutionality of APJ appointments just four years before passing the AIA, and 

confirmed their appointment by the Head of a Department,

strongly suggests that Congress believed APJs were inferior officers in 2000, 2007, and 2011, and thus, could be 

constitutionally appointed by the Secretary, even with restrictions on their removal.

Finally, though Congress made significant changes to

Title 35 through the AIA, it did not modify § 3(c)’s application of Title 5 protections to USPTO employees and officers.8 35 U.S.C. § 3(c) (2012). Yet again, APJs remained

subject to the efficiency of the service removal standard applicable to many federal employees. 

Further confirmation regarding Congressional intent 

comes from the fact that § 3 provides specific, and limited, 

removal procedures for the Director and the Commissioner 

for Patents, as opposed to all other officers and employees 

subject to § 3(c). The Director may be removed only by the 

President. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(4). The Commissioner may be 

removed “for misconduct or nonsatisfactory performance” 

under her performance agreement, “without regard to the 

provisions of title 5.” 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(2)(C). That Congress 

described specific removal procedures for these two 

8 The AIA did amend 35 U.S.C. § 3(b), see LeahySmith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, sec. 21, § 3(b), 

125 Stat. 284, 336 (2011) (governing the Director’s ability 

to fix pay for APJs), and 35 U.S.C. § 3(e)(2), id. at sec. 20 

§ 3(e)(2), 125 Stat. at 334 (technical amendment changing

“this Act” to “that Act”). 

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positions strongly implies it intended that all other USPTO

employees and officers enjoy the Title 5 protections provided in § 3(c).

Given this unbroken line of federal employment protection afforded to APJs and their predecessors for over three 

decades, I question whether severing § 3(c)’s Title 5 removal protections for APJs “remains consistent with Congress’ initial and basic . . . intent.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. 

My concerns are not alleviated by the Arthrex panel’s focus 

on Congress’s intent as it pertained to the importance of 

inter partes review, without considering why Congress 

chose to provide Title 5 employment protections to APJs for 

decades. See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1337–38.

D

Finally, I am mindful of the Supreme Court’s guidance 

that:

Our ability to devise a judicial remedy that does not 

entail quintessentially legislative work often depends on how clearly we have already articulated 

the background constitutional rules at issue and 

how easily we can articulate the remedy. . . . But 

making distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing is inherently complex, 

may call for a ‘far more serious invasion of the legislative domain’ than we ought to undertake.

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 

320, 329−30 (2006) (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury 

Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 n.26 (1995)). Given the 

limited extent of Appointments Clause jurisprudence and 

Congress’s repeated decisions to provide federal employment protections to APJs for decades, I am particularly 

concerned that Arthrex’s remedy constitutes an unwise invasion of the legislative domain. 

I recognize that the Arthrex panel considered several 

potential fixes and chose the one it viewed both as 

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constitutional and minimally disruptive. But removing 

long-standing employment protections from hundreds of 

APJs is quite disruptive. Given no clear evidence that Congress would have intended such a drastic change, I would 

defer to Congress to fix the problem. This is a legislative 

problem best left to a legislative solution. Congress faces 

fewer constraints than we do in fixing an unconstitutional 

statute. For example, Congress might choose to: grant the 

Director unilateral review over all Board decisions; make

the Chief PTAB Judge a presidential appointee and grant

her review of all Board decisions; provide for review of 

Board decisions by a panel of three Presidential appointees

at the USPTO (having created at least two such positions 

in addition to the Director); or provide for presidential appointment of all APJs.

In sum, I believe the Director currently exercises sufficient oversight and supervision of APJs to render them inferior officers under the Appointments Clause. But if APJs 

must be viewed as principal officers, I question curing the 

ensuing constitutional violation by removing their Title 5 

removal protections because I believe it conflicts with Congress’s intent.

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