Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01863/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01863-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Motor Vehicles
Defendant
Beau R. Guzman
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BEAU R. GUZMAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 

as a public entity and DOES 1-10 

inclusive, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-01863-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Beau Guzman’s motion to amend his 

complaint and remand the action to state court. The motion was submitted for decision without a 

hearing and is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Guzman filed his original complaint in this action in Sacramento County Superior 

Court in June 2015. Not. Removal Ex. A, ECF No. 1. He alleges he was sexually harassed at 

work and discriminated against on the basis of his sex. He also alleges his employer, the 

California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), did not prevent this discrimination and 

harassment, and in fact retaliated against him after he complained. He advances both federal 

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claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 and the California Fair Employment and Housing 

Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940 et seq. 

On September 2, 2015, the DMV removed the case to this court on the basis of 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, ECF No. 1. The court held a status (pretrial scheduling) conference 

on January 7, 2016, Minutes, ECF No. 7, and issued a Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order on 

January 17, 2016, ECF No. 8. In that order, the court permitted Guzman to file a motion to 

amend his complaint within thirty days of the status conference. See id. at 2. 

Guzman timely moved to amend. ECF No. 9. His proposed amended complaint 

omits the federal-law claims he previously advanced and relies entirely on state-law FEHA claims 

under California Government Code sections 12940 et seq. See generally Proposed Am. Compl., 

ECF No. 9-1. In light of the absence of any federal claims, Guzman now also moves to remand 

the case to state court. ECF No. 9. The DMV does not oppose the amendments or remand, but it 

reads the proposed amended complaint to allege new state-law claims, and it argues the court 

lacks jurisdiction to consider these state-law amendments. 

II. DISCUSSION 

First, this case was properly removed. A defendant may remove an action over 

which a district court would have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts 

have original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal law, id. § 1331, and 

supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims that are “so related to [the federal claims] that 

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 

Constitution,” id. § 1367(a). Because Guzman’s original complaint alleged both federal and 

state-law harassment, discrimination, and retaliation claims, and because those claims were based 

on the same core events, this court had jurisdiction over the removed action in its entirety. 

Later amendments do not destroy the court’s removal jurisdiction; “jurisdiction 

must be analyzed on the basis of the pleadings filed at the time of removal without reference to 

subsequent amendments.” Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 

1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). For this reason, “a plaintiff may not compel remand by amending a 

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complaint to eliminate the federal question upon which removal was based.” Id.

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 Rather, a 

district court has discretion to remand a removed case after the elimination of federal claims, and 

this discretion is informed by “the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). 

One aspect of this discretionary decision involves considering the plaintiff’s 

legitimate choice to pretermit federal claims and return to state court. See Baddie v. Berkeley 

Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1995); Horne v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 969 F. Supp. 2d 

1203, 1208–09 (C.D. Cal. 2013). In most instances, the elimination of all federal claims tips the 

scale in favor of remand. See, e.g., Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 

1997) (en banc); Horne, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1209–10. This case is no exception. Because upon 

amendment the only claims remaining in this action would arise under California law, and 

because this case remains in its early stages, remand to state court would serve the interests of 

convenience, comity, and fairness. 

The DMV agrees the case may be remanded, but it argues the court has 

jurisdiction only to permit Guzman’s desertion of his federal claims, not the assertion of modified 

or additional state-law claims. See Opp’n at 2–3. That is incorrect. As described above, the 

absence of a federal claim is not conclusive of this court’s jurisdiction; rather, the court’s 

continuing jurisdiction depends on the discretionary considerations of economy, convenience, 

fairness, and comity. Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 357. 

The DMV also suggests the decision on amendment would be resolved better in 

state court, where Guzman’s state-law claims will be litigated should they enter the case. Opp’n 

at 3. The court disagrees. The state-law additions Guzman seeks represent no sea-change in this 

litigation. In his proposed amended complaint, as in the original, he pursues claims of sexual 

harassment, a hostile work environment, sex discrimination, a failure to prevent that 

discrimination and harassment, and retaliation under the FEHA. His proposed amended 

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 This case contrasts with those in which the district court lacks jurisdiction from the 

outset. See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 

1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). In that circumstance, a district court has power only to dismiss. Id.

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complaint cites the same provisions of California law as his original complaint. Other than its 

broad assertion of comity, the DMV says nothing about the merits of the amended claims 

themselves, so it is difficult to understand how this court would be making needless 

pronouncements of state law by permitting an amendment. Moreover, the question is now fully 

briefed and squarely presented to this court. The economical, convenient, and fair course, one 

that does little or nothing to offend federal-state judicial comity, is to consider the proposed 

amended complaint now in its entirety. 

In general, leave to amend is granted freely in an effort to “facilitate decision on 

the merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 

833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 

1981)). But leave need not be granted where the amendment would cause the opposing party 

undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates undue delay. 

Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, 

the case is in its early stages, Guzman seeks leave to amend for the first time, and the court 

allowed his current motion to amend in its scheduling order. The court is aware of no prejudice, 

delay, bad faith or futility. 

III. CONCLUSION 

The motion for leave to amend is GRANTED. The proposed amended complaint 

is deemed FILED. Because the amended complaint asserts no federal claims, the case is 

REMANDEND to Sacramento County Superior Court. This order resolves ECF No. 9. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 10, 2016. 

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