Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07227/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07227-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Washington
Appellant
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 9, 1998 Decided December 1, 1998

No. 97-7227

Donald Washington,

Appellant

v.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00726)

Barbara B. Hutchinson argued the cause and filed the

briefs for appellant.

Nancy F. Langworthy argued the cause for appellee. With

her on the brief were Robert L. Polk and Robert J. Kniaz.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

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Edwards, Chief Judge: This case involves the timeliness of

a discrimination claim filed by Donald Washington against

the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

("WMATA"). Washington raises various arguments as to

why this court should permit him to proceed on his claim,

notwithstanding his failure to satisfy a clear filing requirement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

("EEOC"). We find Washington's contentions to be without

merit. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's grant of

summary judgment in favor of WMATA.

I. Background

On March 31, 1975, Washington began his employment

with WMATA. He was hired for the position of MechanicalElectrical Repairman and was subsequently promoted to a

supervisory position. According to Washington, however, he

began to experience discriminatory treatment by WMATA

beginning in 1990. See Complaint p 6, reprinted in Joint

Appendix ("J.A.") 6. This alleged treatment consisted of,

inter alia, unfair promotion practices, "bogus" unfavorable

performance evaluations, and temporary re-assignment. See

id. pp 6-9, 11-13, reprinted in J.A. 6-8. The treatment

allegedly worsened after Washington complained of discrimination to his supervisors. See Affidavit of Donald Washington, reprinted in J.A. 74. On August 8, 1995, Washington

was demoted to a non-supervisory position.

On September 5, 1995, Washington filed an internal complaint of discrimination with WMATA's Office of Civil Rights

("OCR"), claiming age and race discrimination and retaliation

in the terms and conditions of his employment, including his

demotion. See J.A. 84-88. On April 12, 1996, WMATA

issued an internal decision, finding that there was "insufficient evidence to support a charge of discrimination." Letter

from WMATA to Washington (April 12, 1996), reprinted in

J.A. 89. While noting that the decision was "final within

WMATA," the OCR's letter informed Washington that he

could file a complaint with the EEOC "no later than 180 days

from the date of the last alleged incident." Id. Five months

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later, on September 12, 1996, Washington filed a race discrimination charge against WMATA with the EEOC. See J.A. 34.

He amended this charge on January 6, 1997 to include claims

of age discrimination and retaliation, as he had originally

alleged to the OCR. See id. In April 1997, Washington

requested and received a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC.

On April 11, 1997, Washington filed suit in District Court,

alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. ss 621-634, and Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e to

2000e-17. On September 19, 1997, WMATA filed a Motion to

Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment, arguing that: (1)

because the last-alleged discriminatory act--the demotion--

occurred more than 180 days before Washington filed his

charge with the EEOC, his complaint was time-barred under

29 U.S.C. s 626(d)(1) and 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(e)(1), see J.A.

24-27; and (2) the court nevertheless lacked jurisdiction over

the ADEA claim because of WMATA's Eleventh Amendment

immunity. See id. at 27-32. Without reaching the sovereign

immunity issue, the District Court granted WMATA's motion,

concluding that Washington's claim was untimely, and that

equitable tolling was not appropriate. See Washington v.

WMATA, No. 97-0726, Memorandum and Order (D.D.C.

Nov. 17, 1997), reprinted in J.A. 1-3.

II. Analysis

Before suing under either the ADEA or Title VII, an

aggrieved party must exhaust his administrative remedies by

filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180

days of the alleged discriminatory incident. See 29 U.S.C.

s 626(d)(1) (1994); 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994); Currier

v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., No. 98-7020, 1998

WL 785623, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 1998). Washington,

however, did not file his charge with the EEOC until more

than a year after his allegedly discriminatory demotion.

Washington's first argument is that his September 5, 1995

internal complaint should be "considered filed with the EEOC

on the date it was filed with WMATA." Brief of Appellant

at 4. For this argument, Washington relies on EEOC regulations entitled, "Procedures for Complaints of Employment

Discrimination Filed Against Recipients of Federal Financial

Assistance," see 29 C.F.R. pt. 1691 (1998), which provide, in

pertinent part, that:

A complaint of employment discrimination filed with an

agency, which is transferred or referred to EEOC under

this regulation, shall be deemed a charge received by

EEOC. For all purposes under title VII ..., the date

such a complaint was received by an agency shall be

deemed the date it was received by EEOC.

29 C.F.R. s 1691.6(a). WMATA, however, is not an "agency"

within the meaning of this provision. "Agency," for these

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purposes, means "any Federal department or agency which

extends Federal financial assistance subject to any civil rights

provision(s) to which this regulation applies." 29 C.F.R.

s 1691.13(a). This definition clearly excludes WMATA, which

is neither a federal department, nor an agency that extends

federal financial assistance. Thus, WMATA's internal procedures offer a separate forum for pursuing discrimination

complaints, which does not displace the ADEA or Title VII

filing requirements.

Washington next argues that, even if he did not satisfy the

filing requirement, the time for filing should be equitably

tolled on the ground that WMATA touted its internal procedure as the appropriate forum for resolving discrimination

complaints, see Brief of Appellant at 10, 15, and thereby

"lulled [him] ... into presuming that he had met the requirements of the law." Id. at 11. Although Washington asserts

equitable tolling, under this circuit's case law, his claim may

be more accurately characterized as one for equitable estoppel. See Currier, 1998 WL 785623, at *4. In either event,

his claim fails. Washington is correct that the administrative

filing requirement is "not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit

in federal court," and is, therefore, subject to equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393

(1982). Washington is not entitled to tolling on either theory

in this case, however, for he has not adequately explained his

failure to timely exhaust.

In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, the Supreme

Court noted:

We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where the

claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by

filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or

where the complainant has been induced or tricked by

his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. We have generally been much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to

exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.

498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (footnotes omitted). Thus, equitable

principles favor tolling where, for example, a defendant engaged in "affirmative misconduct," Baldwin County Welcome

Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984), or "misled [a plaintiff]

about the running of a limitations period." Bowden v. United

States, 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Here, Washington has demonstrated no affirmative misconduct on the part of WMATA. Nor has he shown that

WMATA's decision letter disposing of his claim was misleading. Indeed, because 180 days had already expired between

Washington's demotion and the date the letter was issued,

Washington could not have relied on the letter to his detriment. Moreover, the letter's reference to the filing deadline

was not literally incorrect, for it could have applied to an

instance of discriminatory conduct arising after Washington's

demotion. Finally, Washington, who was represented by

counsel during at least part of the filing period, failed to

demonstrate diligence; he filed his charge with the EEOC

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five months after receiving WMATA's decision letter and over

a year after his demotion. "The court's equitable power to

toll the statute of limitations will be exercised only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances," Smith-Haynie

v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(quotation omitted), and does "not extend to what is at best a

garden variety claim of excusable neglect." Irwin, 498 U.S.

at 96. Thus, we find that equitable principles do not warrant

tolling in this case.

Because our resolution of the timeliness issue disposes of

Washington's ADEA and Title VII claims, we need not reach

the question of whether his ADEA claim is nonetheless

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barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We note, however, that

this issue is currently under advisement by this court in

Jones v. WMATA, No. 97-7186 (D.C. Cir. argued Sept. 9,

1998).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's

grant of summary judgment in favor of WMATA.

So ordered.

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