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Parties Involved:
Rogelio Castro
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FEB 24 1992 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ROGELIO CASTRO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 91-3144 

(D. C. No. 90-30003-01) 

(D. Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

BEFORE HOLLOWAY, MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges 

Defendant-appellant Castro appeals his conviction for 

forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating 

or interfering with Jesse Younger in or on account of his 

performance of official duties as an employee of a United States 

penal or correctional institution, 18 u.s.c. § 1114, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 111. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-3144 Document: 010110226143 Date Filed: 02/24/1992 Page: 1 
I 

Early one morning in February 1990 Younger, a guard at 

Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary, entered the cell that Castro 

shared with Edgar Quan-Guerra. Younger testified at trial that he 

was looking for the source of some liquor he had discovered in a 

common area. Younger said that as he entered the cell, Castro 

jumped him and the two struggled. Their versions of the encounter 

differed. Castro said he was alone in the cell at the time and he 

thought Younger was another prisoner trying to harm him. Younger 

testified, and Castro denied, that Quan-Guerra entered the room 

during the struggle and struck Younger from behind. Castro 

allegedly threw a homemade syringe to Quan-Guerra who fled. There 

was government testimony that Castro was eventually subdued with 

the help of another guard and that Quan-Guerra was later searched 

and a razor blade was found in his possession. 

Castro and Quan-Guerra were charged as codefendants under 18 

U.S.C. § 111, but their trials were severed. Quan-Guerra entered 

into a plea agreement and pursuant to it he pled guilty to illegal 

possession of a weapon. In exchange, the assault charge was 

dismissed. A prominent issue on this appeal by Castro concerns 

the terms of Quan-Guerra's plea agreement with respect to QuanGuerra testifying at Castro's trial and the prosecuting attorney's 

conduct when Castro's trial counsel called Quan-Guerra to testify. 

These facts will be developed later. 

At trial, Castro presented his defense of mistake and selfdefense. He called two inmates, Kennedy and Bagguley, who 

testified on his behalf. He also attempted to call Quan-Guerra, 

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but the prosecuting attorney objected and stated that if QuanGuerra testified, "all bets and deals are off," V R. 280, under 

the plea agreement made with Quan-Guerra. Then after discussions 

by Quan-Guerra with his attorney, Castro's attorney rested without 

calling Quan-Guerra. 

Castro was convicted and was given a 33 month sentence on the 

§ 111 assault charge to run consecutively to another sentence he 

is serving. Castro appeals, asserting principally claims of error 

in the government's peremptory challenges which were allegedly 

made to eliminate members of Castro's ethnic group, ineffective 

assistance by trial counsel, and government coercion causing QuanGuerra not to testify for Castro. As part of his ineffectiveness 

of counsel claim Castro complains of errors, not objected to by 

his trial counsel, in improper attacks on the credibility of his 

defense witness Kennedy, inter alia. 

II 

Castro argues that the peremptory challenge of Ms. Cynthia 

Lopez removed the only venire member who was of Castro's ethnic 

background as a Hispanic person, in violation of Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which prohibits equal protection 

violations by systematic exclusion of jurors of one's own race. 

Batson held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the 

prosecution to make challenges to potential jurors solely on 

account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a 

group would be unable impartially to consider the State's case 

against a black defendant . Id. at 89. Batson further held that a 

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defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful 

discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence 

concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at 

the defendant ' s own trial. To establish such a prima facie case, 

the defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable 

racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory 

challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's 

race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as 

to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges 

constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to 

discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Finally, the 

defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant 

circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that 

practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account 

of their race . Id. at 96. 

Once the defendant makes 

burden shifts to the State 

such a prima facie showing the 

to come forward with a neutral 

explanation for challenging the jurors of the racial group; the 

prosecutor must articulate a neutral explanation related to the 

particular case to be tried . The trial judge then has the duty to 

determine if the defendant has established purposeful 

discrimination . Id. at 97-98. 

The Supreme Court modified these requirements in Powers v. 

Ohio,_ U.S._, 111 s.ct. 1364 (1991), holding that the race of 

the complaining defendant and the jurors excluded because of their 

race need not be the same. Id. at 1373. The Court held that "a 

defendant in a criminal case c an raise the third-party equal 

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protection claims of jurors excluded by the prosecution because of 

their race ... [and] [t]o bar petitioner's claim because his 

race differs from that of the excluded jurors would be to condone 

the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and 

privilege of jury service." Id. at 1373. 1 

Castro argues that he and Ms. Lopez are both Hispanics, a 

recognized racial minority, and that the prosecutor used his 

peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Lopez, the only venire member 

who was Hispanic. Castro says that this establishes the first 

portion of his prima facie case under Batson. Brief of Appellant 

at 12-13. We disagree. 

Under the rationale of Powers v. Ohio, it is no longer 

necessary to demonstrate that the defendant's ethnic group is the 

same as that of those excluded wrongfully. Nevertheless, the 

record does not support Castro's assertion that during jury 

selection "it was determined that one of the jurors was of 

hispanic origin, Mrs. Cynthia Lopez ... " Brief of Appellant at 

3. In fact, later in his brief on appeal Castro says that his 

trial attorney "failed to cause the record to reflect the race of 

the potential jurors and he failed to object to the peremptory 

challenge of the only hispanic on the jury panel, Mrs. Lopez." 

1 

These principles of equal protection analysis have been 

applied by us in direct criminal appeals. L..g., United States v. 

Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1107 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. 

Esparsen, 930 F .2d 1461, 1465 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. 

Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313 (10th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court's 

approach to equal protection claims asserted as a component of 

Fifth Amendment due process has been precisely the same as to 

equal protections claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S . 636, 638 n.2. 

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Brief of Appellant at 4. We find no showing in the record as to 

Ms. Lopez' ethnic grouping. 

The assertions of defendant Castro must rest on the surname 

of Ms. Lopez as evidentiary 

premise a Batson challenge. 

support. This is not •enough to 

While the arguably Hispanic surname 

may suggest a plausible inference, and while racial identity may 

be clear from appearances at voir dire, we cannot sustain a Batson 

challenge on conjecture . United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 

1461, 1466-67 (10th Cir. 1991). 

III 

Castro further claims that the conduct of his trial attorney 

was so poor that it amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Castro asserts that five separate errors crippled his defense: 

(1) the attorney failed to view and photograph Castro's cell in 

order to demonstrate exactly how dark it was at 6:55 a .m. on the 

morning in question; 

exclusion of the 

(2) he failed to object to the prosecution's 

only prospective juror who was a member of 

Castro's ethnic group and failed to cause the record to reflect 

the jurors' ethnic backgrounds and the government's racial 

motivation in its challenges; (3) he failed to object to the 

improper attacks on the credibility of the defense witness, 

Kennedy; (4) he failed to make a timely motion for discovery of 

the government's interviews of defense witnesses which allowed him 

to be surprised, and permitted important defense testimony to be 

undermined, by the introduction of Bagguley's inconsistent 

statements on cross-examination; and (5) he did not object to 

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the use of the plea bargain by which the prosecution caused Mr. 

Quan-Guerra not to testify. 

On consideration of the claims of ineffectiveness made here 

and the record of this direct appeal, we are convinced that we 

must follow our general rule on such claims. The preferred avenue 

for challenging the effectiveness of defense counsel in a federal 

trial is by a collateral attack under 28 u.s.c. § 2255, except in 

the rare cases when the record is sufficiently complete to judge 

the claims in the direct appeal. Beaulieu v. United States, 930 

F.2d 805, 806-07 (10th Cir. 1991). With respect to each of the 

claims of ineffectiveness which Castro asserts, like those in 

Beaulieu, the merits of these allegations cannot be determined on 

the basis of the trial record alone and must be developed in a 

§ 2255 proceeding if Castro wishes to so proceed. Id. at 808. 

Our disposition of this appeal is without prejudice to the 

assertion of such claims in a collateral proceeding under§ 2255. 

IV 

Further, defendant Castro vigorously argues that he was 

denied fundamental due process under the Fifth Amendment by the 

government's substantial interference with a defense witness' 

decision whether to testify, relying upon Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 

95 (1972), and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), inter 

alia. 

Castro's brief argues that he made it clear at a suppression 

hearing in January 1991 that it was his position that his cell 

mate and then codefendant, Quan-Guerra, was not present at all 

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during the incident with Officer Younger. (Brief of Appellant at 

22-23). Thus, Castro's position disputed the testimony of Younger 

that Quan-Guerra came into the cell and struck him from behind. 

Castro further argues that his trial attorney called Quan-Guerra 

to the stand to testify; that thereupon the prosecutor stated that 

pursuant to a plea bargain, Quan-Guerra had entered a plea of 

guilty to a separate charge of possession of a prohibited object, 

a razor blade shank weapon, in the prison; that the plea bargain 

provided for dismissal of the charge against Quan-Guerra for 

participating in the assault on Younger, and "provided Quan-Guerra 

would not testify at Castro's trial." Brief of Appellant at 23-

24. 

Castro's brief further contends that his trial counsel 

conferred with Quan-Guerra to tell him about the prosecutor's 

position during a recess, and then Castro's trial counsel 

announced that instead of calling Quan-Guerra, Castro would rest 

and present no more evidence. Brief of Appellant at 24. Castro 

claims a violation of fundamental fairness and of his 

constitutional rights by the government's conduct. 

The government responds that this issue is not proper for 

review on this direct appeal because it was not properly raised in 

the trial court or ruled on; and that it was not a threat for a 

prosecutor to advise a potential witness that he might be 

prosecuted for perjury if he testified falsely. Brief of Appellee 

at 21, 25. 

The record on this issue consists of a brief incident when 

Castro's trial counsel called Quan-Guerra to testify. 

8 

At that 

Appellate Case: 91-3144 Document: 010110226143 Date Filed: 02/24/1992 Page: 8 
point the prosecutor requested a bench conference, which was 

permitted. V R. at 279-280. The prosecutor then referred to a 

January 1991 appearance before the district judge on two charges 

against Quan-Guerra, one being the severed count charging QuanGuerra's participation in the assault on Officer Younger, and the 

second being for the possession of a prohibited weapon, a homemade 

shank razor. The prosecutor related the entry by Quan-Guerra of a 

guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain under which the charge 

against Quan-Guerra for the assault was dismissed, and Quan-Guerra 

entered a guilty plea to the charge of possession of the 

prohibited weapon. The prosecutor then said that the "condition 

of the plea bargain was that he [Quan-Guerra] not be called as a 

witness in this matter. I would like the record to show that the 

Government has not subpoenaed him or is calling him to testify in 

this matter, and, thus, by appearing voluntarily in this matter on 

behalf of the defendant that all bets and deals are off as opposed 

[sic] to Mr. Quan-Guerra. " V R. at 280. 

The record then shows that the court questioned whether there 

was anything in the plea agreement that Quan-Guerra not testify. 

The prosecutor then said that was Quan-Guerra's wish and was made 

part of the plea bargain "that he not testify in this matter." V 

R. at 281. The trial judge pointed out that Quan-Guerra could 

waive that provision. At this point Castro ' s trial attorney 

requested a recess to talk with Quan-Guerra through the 

interpreter. The court noted that the government's position about 

the plea bargain was "not the way I heard you [the prosecutor] 

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explain the plea bargain to me. The plea bargain was for [QuanGuerra's] benefit, he didn't have to testify." If he waived it, 

the judge said he was not sure that the government could charge 

Quan-Guerra with additional charges. The prosecutor stated that 

"(o]ur position is that if he breaches the plea agreement 

those lines then we can bring these charges against him." 

282-283. 

along 

V R. at 

The court then granted a 15 minute recess. At the conclusion 

of it, Castro's trial attorney stated that the defendant rested 

his case. Quan-Guerra was not called. Id. at 284. 

The position of the prosecuting attorney obviously presents a 

very disturbing question. It is clear that the right to offer the 

testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance is a 

fundamental element of due process, and that the Compulsory 

Process Clause protection is a component of due process. 

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967). Moreover where a 

lengthy and intimidating warning concerning perjury was aimed at 

one witness who then refused to testify for a defendant, the Court 

found a due process violation. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 97-98 

(1972). 

However the Court has subsequently held that where a 

defendant makes no effort to explain what material, favorable 

evidence would have been provided by a witness he was denied, the 

defendant failed to establish a violation of the Fifth or Sixth 

Amendments. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 874 

(1982). In applying the Court's teaching in the Valenzuela-Bernal 

case, we have noted that to establish such a due process violation 

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the defendant must establish more than the mere absence of 

testimony: "There must be a plausible showing that an act by the 

government caused the loss or erosion of testimony that was both 

material and favorable to the defense. " Griffin v. Davies, 929 

F.2d 550, 553 (10th Cir. 1991). 

In connection with this constitutional claim, the record does 

show extremely troubling statements by the prosecutor in the bench 

conference, obviously threatening disavowal of the plea agreement 

and prosecution of Quan-Guerra on the assault charge if QuanGuerra testified for Castro. Nevertheless, there are two 

deficiencies in connection with this constitutional claim of 

denial of due process. First, there was no objection made at 

trial concerning the action of the prosecutor and no ruling on 

such a claim by the trial judge. Thus we must consider this claim 

on the more stringent plain error standard. Furthermore, there 

was no offer of proof or other showing in the record as to what 

material and favorable testimony of Quan-Guerra might have been 

given for the assistance of Castro. In these circumstances, the 

claim as now presented in this direct criminal appeal is deficient 

and may not serve as a basis for reversal. 2 

2 

As noted earlier in Part III, this issue is one of the points 

on which the claim of ineffective assistance is asserted - the 

failure of the trial attorney to make such an objection or to 

develop the record on the issue. As our discussion in Part III 

makes clear, our disposition of this appeal is without prejudice 

to the prosecution of a post conviction proceeding if Castro 

wishes, and our determination in this Part IV shall not be 

construed as a bar to the consideration of this due process issue 

as a component of the claim of ineffectiveness by Castro. 

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In sum, we conclude that the present record demonstrates no 

ground for reversal of Castro's conviction in the instant appeal 

and the judgment is accordingly AFFIRMED, without pre judice to 

further post conviction proceedings as provided in this opinion. 

12 

Entered for the Court 

William J. Holloway, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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