Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05411/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05411-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case (Bowles)

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 16, 2009 Decided October 23, 2009

Reissued October 22, 2010

No. 07-5411

IN RE: SEALED CASE (BOWLES)

Stephen L. Snyder argued the cause for appellant. On the

briefs was Frederick D. Cooke, Jr.

Kathleen V. Gunning argued the cause for appellee. With

her on the brief were Colleen J. Boles and Lawrence H.

Richmond. 

Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205

(2007), the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2107,1

 as 

1

 28 U.S.C. § 2107 provides:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no appeal

shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or

proceeding of a civil nature before a court of appeals for

review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after

the entry of such judgment, order or decree.

(b) In any such action, suit or proceeding in which the United

States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the time as to

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carried into practice by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6),2

 is jurisdictional

all parties shall be sixty days from such entry.

(c) The district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30

days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing

appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of

excusable neglect or good cause. In addition, if the district

court finds--

(1) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a

judgment or order did not receive such notice from

the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and 

(2) that no party would be prejudiced, 

the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days after

entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days after receipt

of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal

for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order

reopening the time for appeal.

(d) This section shall not apply to bankruptcy matters or other

proceedings under Title 11.

2

 Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) provides:

(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal. The district court

may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days

after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only if

all the following conditions are satisfied: 

(A) the court finds that the moving party did not

receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

77(d) of the entry of the judgment or order sought to

be appealed within 21 days after entry;

(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the

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and that courts lack power to create equitable exceptions. The

question presented in this appeal is whether Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b) remains available to circumvent the 180-

day deadline in the appellate rule for reopening the time to file

an appeal. Appellant maintains there are unique circumstances

explaining its failure to note a timely appeal: (1) the usual means

of obtaining notice about the status of its case were unavailable

because the case was sealed; (2) appellant’s counsel was diligent

in attempting to discover the status of the case, by filing a

written inquiry about pending motions and making oral inquiries

of the Clerk of the Court; and (3) neither party obtained notice

of the dismissal of the case until after the 180-day deadline in

Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) had passed. Reading Bowles narrowly,

appellant contends that because the time limits in Rule 60(b) are

not jurisdictional, the unique circumstances exception applies

judgment or order is entered or within 7 days after the

moving party receives notice under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is

earlier; and 

(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) provides:

(1) Service. Immediately after entering an order or judgment,

the clerk must serve notice of the entry, as provided in Rule

5(b), on each party who is not in default for failing to appear.

The clerk must record the service on the docket. A party also

may serve notice of the entry as provided in Rule 5(b). 

(2) Time to Appeal Not Affected by Lack of Notice. Lack of

notice of the entry does not affect the time for appeal or

relieve--or authorize the court to relieve--a party for failing to

appeal within the time allowed, except as allowed by Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure (4)(a). 

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and the district court therefore abused its discretion in denying

relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). The holding in Bowles, however,

is broadly stated and appellant’s view that the district court

retained power to recognize an equitable exception to the 180-

day deadline rests on precedent expressly overturned by Bowles. 

Moreover, concluding that Rule 60(b) is unavailable to allow

appellant to file a timely appeal is in accord with the majority of

circuits holding that with the 1991 amendment adding

subsection (6), Appellate 4(a)(6) became the exclusive means of

reopening the time to appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

In affirming we are cognizant of the unfairness of denying

relief to appellant in this sealed case where none of the usual

means of learning the status of its case were available and, as the

parties agree and we will assume, appellant made diligent efforts

through counsel to discover the status of its case. A sealed case

generally presents special circumstances. Neither the federal

rules of civil procedure nor the district court’s local rules

specifically address how parties shall be notified in sealed cases. 

Not only is there no public docket in a sealed case, but the

parties and their counsel also may not be able to access the

sealed docket or receive electronic notification. The ad hoc

procedures in appellant’s case were inadequate to ensure notice. 

The sealed docket stated electronic notice would not be given

and listed participants to be notified by other means. No other

means were employed. Although counsel for the parties were

also listed on page 1 of the sealed docket as “ATTORNEY[S]

TO BE NOTICED,” neither parties’ counsel received notice of

the October 26, 2006 dismissal of the case. These circumstances

explaining the parties’ failure to receive timely notice of the

dismissal of the case are unique, not to be found in precedent

addressing reopening of the time to appeal. This may be

because the district court and the parties have made special

arrangements for receiving notice in other sealed cases and those

arrangements have worked. When they do not, through no fault

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of the parties and despite the best efforts of the parties to obtain

information about the status of the proceedings, the civil justice

system has failed in light of the implicit assumption underlying

the federal rule on notice, FED.R.CIV. P. 77(d), that parties will

have an easy way to determine the status of their case. The

purpose of the civil rules set forth in Rule 1 contemplates a just

as well as speedy resolution of disputes. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 

Given the mandatory 180-day deadline for reopening the time to

file appeals in civil cases, it would be appropriate in light of

Bowles for the district court to adopt procedures to ensure that

parties and their counsel, if any, in sealed cases receive prompt

notice of final orders and judgments. 

I.

On May 11, 2005 appellant filed an application under the

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10, to vacate an arbitration

award rejecting its claim to additional attorneys fees under a

written contingency fee agreement with the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) in connection with recovering

the subrogated claims of a failed bank against an accounting

firm. The FDIC moved on June 14, 2005 to seal its pleadings

because matters in the arbitration were confidential, and also

moved on June 21, 2005 to dismiss the application to vacate. 

Appellant filed an opposition on July 7, 2005, and the FDIC

filed a reply on July 25, 2005. On August 22, 2005 appellant

filed a motion for a hearing on its application to vacate the

arbitration award and a supplemental memorandum on its

application. Appellant also filed on August 29, 2005 a request

for the district court to take judicial notice of a district court

opinion decided August 23, 2005 in a different case involving

the FDIC. The FDIC filed an opposition to that request on

September 9, 2005, and appellant filed a reply on September 19,

2005. 

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Meanwhile, on June 21, 2005, the district court sealed the

case upon joint consent motion of the parties. Thereafter neither

the district court’s sealed docket nor electronic notification were

available to inform the parties of the status of pending and later

filed motions. As it turns out, despite the filing by appellant’s

counsel of a Notice of Inquiry on February 28, 2007, shortly

after new counsel entered his appearance, inquiring about the

pending motions, the parties represent that neither party or their

counsel received notice of the district court’s October 26, 2006

dismissal of the case until May 30, 2007. See Appellant’s Br.

7–9, 15–16; Appellee’s Br. 5 n.5, 13. On May 30, upon a call to

the district court judge’s chambers, a law clerk advised

appellant’s counsel of the dismissal on the merits.

Appellant moved on June 8, 2007, within 7 days of

receiving notice of the dismissal, to reopen the time to appeal

pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6). The district court denied the

motion as untimely on July 26, 2007. Appellant also moved on

August 31, 2007 for relief from the judgment or order of

dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b). The motion recounted, among

other things, the events leading to appellant’s late notice of the

dismissal of its case and its late motion to reopen pursuant to

Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), and requested either a status conference

or the grant of its pending motion to reopen the time to appeal. 

The FDIC filed an opposition on September 12, 2007, citing

Bowles. The district court summarily denied the Rule 60(b)

motion on November 26, 2007. Appellant filed a notice of

appeal on December 18, 2007.

II. 

Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), a party may seek relief from a

judgment or order for “any other reason that justifies relief,”

FED. R. CIV. P. 60, upon a showing of “extraordinary

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circumstances,” Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir.

2007) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199

(1950)). The unique circumstances doctrine recognized in

Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S.

215 (1962), and Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964), arose in

view of the inequity of foreclosing appeals by parties whose

failure to file timely notices of appeal results from reliance on

the court.3 As later clarified in Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney,

489 U.S. 169 (1989), the doctrine applied only where a party

performed an act, which if properly done, would postpone the

filing deadline and had received specific assurance by a judicial

officer that the act has properly been done. When the doctrine

originated, the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure

did not contain a more specific avenue of relief. It was not until

1991 that the Rules were amended to add subsection (6) to

Appellate Rule 4(a), setting forth a 180-day extension of the

time to reopen the time to file an appeal when “the moving party

did not receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

77(d).” See 16A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3950.3, 3950.6 (4th ed.

2008) (“16A Wright & Miller”). 

In Bowles, a prisoner filed a motion pursuant to Appellate

Rule 4(a)(6) to reopen the time to appeal the denial of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 551 U.S. at 207. The

district court judge granted the motion and extended the

3

 Harris Truck and Thompson concern “unique circumstances” relating to time limits in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. 

In 1968, Rule 73 was “abrogated” and “[m]ost of the provisions of

Rule 73 now appear in substance in Appellate Rules 3, 4, 7, 8, and

12.” 12 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 3062 (2d ed. 1997). Courts, including this one,

applied similar reasoning to Rule 60(b)(6) motions. See, e.g., Polylok

Corp. v. Manning, 793 F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

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deadline by 17 days rather than the 14 days allowed by the rule

and the statute that tracks the rule, 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). Id.

Bowles relied on the judge’s ruling and filed his motion 16 days

after the order. Id. The Supreme Court held that § 2107, as

carried into practice by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), was a

jurisdictional grant and limitation, and the court of appeals could

not hear Bowles’ appeal regardless of the circumstances. Id. at

213. Of significance here, the Supreme Court also stated:

Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice

of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.

Because this Court has no authority to create equitable

exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the

“unique circumstances” doctrine is illegitimate.

Id. at 214. The Court proceeded to “overrule Harris Truck

Lines[, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962)]

and Thompson [v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964)] to the extent they

purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule.” Id.

Read as narrowly as possible, Bowles did not reach the issue

of when “unique circumstances” might apply on a motion

pursuant to Rule 60(b). To support its application, appellant

depicts Rule 60(b) as a “court promulgated rule,” in which time

limitations are not jurisdictional because it is a “claimprocessing” rather than statutory rule. Appellant’s Br. 14, 17. 

Because Rule 60(b)’s time requirements are not jurisdictional

and may be extended for good cause, appellant suggests that the

Harris Truck line of cases overruled in Bowles with respect to

an Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) motion nonetheless still applies to

Rule 60(b) motions.

Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged “the

jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and

limits enacted by Congress,” Bowles, 551 U.S. at 211–212, the

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Court has never held that a party could use a court-promulgated

rule to circumvent the jurisdictional bar on limits for reopening

the time to appeal enacted by Congress. The effect of

appellant’s requested relief — that a court could vacate and

reinstate a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) because of “unique

circumstances” in order to allow a party to appeal where

Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) would otherwise withhold appellate

jurisdiction — would create precisely this scenario. The

Supreme Court has read Congress’ codification of Appellate

Rule 4(a)(6)’s reopening provisions as a jurisdictional

limitation, and taken that limitation very seriously. In so doing,

Bowles changed the legal landscape for Rule 60(b) motions. 

The Court spoke in unequivocal and uncompromising terms in

stating that courts lacked power to carve out equitable

exceptions to jurisdictional statutory requirements. 551 U.S. at

212 n.4, 213–14. It noted the deadline applied even where life

itself was at stake. Id. 212 n.4. While not referring specifically

to Rule 60(b), the Court overruled its precedent on which lower

courts had relied in creating equitable exceptions to time limits.

Id. at 213–14. Hence it would be difficult to imagine that the

Court would not also view the use of Rule 60(b) to circumvent

the deadline in Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) as “illegitimate,” id. at

214. The Court’s acknowledgment, then, of a distinction

between the jurisdictional statutory requirements of Appellate

Rule 4(a)(6) and claim processing rules adopted by the courts,

id. at 210–13, cannot reasonably be read to entertain Rule 60(b)

circumstances as overriding the deadline in Appellate Rule

4(a)(6). 

Reading Bowles as foreclosing Rule 60(b) as an alternative

to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) accords with the prior holding of the

majority of the circuits that the 1991 amendment adding

subsection (6) to the appellate rule was the exclusive means to

reopen the time to appeal because of lack of notice. These

circuits reasoned that using Rule 60(b) to circumvent the 180-

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day deadline in Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) would frustrate the clear

purpose in promoting finality through prohibiting such appeals.

See e.g., Vencor Hospitals, Inc. v. Standard Life & Accident Ins.

Co., 279 F.3d 1306, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2002); Clark v. Lavallie,

204 F.3d 1038, 1040–41 (10th Cir. 2000); In re Stein, 197 F.3d

421, 425–26 (9th Cir. 1999); Zimmer St. Louis, Inc. v. Zimmer

Co., 32 F.3d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 1994). The courts relied on both

the plain text of Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) and the 1991 advisory

committee notes describing the amended rule as providing that

“[r]eopening may be ordered only upon a motion filed within

180 days of the entry of a judgment or order or within 7 days of

receipt of notice of such entry, whichever is earlier,” FED R.

APP.P. 4 advisory committee notes to 1991 amendments. Thus,

in Vencor the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[a]s with the

language of the amendment itself, the advisory committee’s

notes evidence an intent to provide an exclusive, limited

opportunity for relief when a party fails to receive notice of the

entry of a judgment or order.” 279 F.3d at 1310–11. The Eighth

Circuit adopted similar reasoning, quoting the advisory

committee notes that subsection (6) “establishes an outer time

limit” of 180 days for noting an appeal. Zimmer, 32 F.3d at 360

(emphasis in original). One circuit, without referencing the

1991 amendments, took a contrary path, see Lawrence v. Int’l

Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of

Am., 320 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2003); Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d

392 (6th Cir. 1993), but it has also acknowledged in holding that

Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) was jurisdictional that “[t]he Appellate

Rules underscore the exclusivity of the 4(a)(6) remedy,” Bowles

v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668, 672 (6th Cir. 2005). See 16A Wright

& Miller §§ 3950.3 & .6. 

Notably, even before Bowles and the 1991 amendment to

Appellate Court Rule 4(a)(6), the circumstances appellant

recounts might not have entitled it to relief pursuant to Rule

60(b)(6). In Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v.

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Smithsonian Institute, 500 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1974), this court

adopted a narrow exception to the then existing time limit for

noting an appeal: the district court may vacate and re-enter a

judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) when (1) “neither party had

actual notice of the entry of judgment,” (2) “the winning party

is not prejudiced by the appeal,” and (3) “the losing party moves

to vacate the judgment within a reasonable time after he learns

of its entry.” Id. at 810. See Polylok Corp., 793 F.2d at 1320;

Ashby Enterprises, Ltd. v. Weitzman, Dym & Assocs., 780 F.2d

1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Other circuits also carved out equitable

exceptions to the time to appeal pursuant to Rule 60(b), although

most required both lack of notice and diligence by counsel. See,

e.g., Wilson v. Atwood Group, 725 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir.,

1984) (en banc) (citing Mizell v. Att’y Gen. of the State of New

York, 586 F.2d 942, 944–45 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440

U.S. 967 (1979)). However, since Osterneck, 489 U.S. 169, this

court has required a showing of reliance on “some affirmative

assurance which, if proper, would have extended or postponed

the deadline for filing the notice of appeal,” and that the

assurance was based upon “official judicial action,” which does

not include statements from the Clerk of the Court’s office. 

Moore v. South Carolina Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 164 (D.C.

Cir. 1996). Appellant points to its filing of a Notice of Inquiry,

to which it states it received no response, and to claims it

received assurances from the Clerk of the Court that the district

court judge had not issued any order regarding that inquiry or

with respect to the pending motions, Appellant’s Br. at 7, 15. 

But the district court’s silence in response to inquiries does not

constitute an “affirmative assurance,” see Moore, 100 F.3d at

164, and the assurances from the Clerk of the Court, no matter

how affirmative, do not constitute “official judicial action,”

Williams v. Washington Convention Ctr. Auth., 481 F.3d 856,

859 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

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What makes this case unique is that it is a sealed case. The

usual mechanisms under the federal rules of civil procedure for

the parties and their counsel to obtain information about the

status of court proceedings were unavailable. Although

providing for notice by the clerk pursuant to Civil Rule 77(d),

the rules do not specifically address how parties shall receive

notice of judgments or orders in sealed cases. Neither do the

district court’s local rules. The ad hoc procedure for notice

described in the sealed docket in this case proved inadequate. 

Although the sealed docket stated “[t]he following participants

should be noticed by other means,” the parties advise that no

“other means” were employed and they did not learn of the

October 26, 2006 judgment and order dismissing the case until

after the 180-day deadline had passed. Under the circumstances,

appellant was not in a position to make a timely “‘free,

calculated, deliberate’ choice not to appeal.” Expeditions

Unlimited, 500 F.2d at 809 (quoting Ackermann, 340 U.S. at

198). Had the arbitrator ruled in appellant’s favor, and awarded

it the millions of dollars in attorneys’ fees that it claimed it was

entitled to under the contingency fee agreement, the FDIC 

likewise would have been barred from challenging the district

court’s affirmance of the award had it learned of the district

court’s dismissal of its case only after the 180-day deadline for

appealing.

A system of procedural rules employing temporal deadlines

implicitly assumes there will be an easy way for the parties to

learn the status of their case. The reference to Civil Rule 77(d)

in the 1991 amendment adding subsection (6) to the appellate

rule evidences such an assumption with regard to noting an

appeal as does the requirement for diligence by counsel. See,

e.g., Fox v. American Airlines, Inc. 389 F.3d 1291, 1296 (D.C.

Cir. 2004); Wilson, 725 F.2d at 258 (citing Mizell, 586 F.2d at

944–45). Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides: “These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions

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and proceedings in the United States district courts. . . . They

should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,

and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see FED. R. APP. P. 1(a)(2). Under the

circumstances confronting appellant — (1) the usual means

provided pursuant to the federal civil rules for notifying the

parties of the status of the case were unavailable in this sealed

case; (2) appellant’s counsel was, the parties agree and we will

assume, diligent in attempting to discover the status of the case;

and (3) neither party received notice of the dismissal of

appellant’s case until after the 180-day deadline — the rules

failed to accomplish their just purpose. As this court observed

long ago, “[i]f the parties do not know of the entry of judgment,

the winning party cannot rely on the judgment and the losing

party cannot make a ‘free, calculated, deliberate’ choice not to

appeal.” Expeditions Unlimited, 500 F.2d at 809 (quoting

Ackermann, 340 U.S. at 198). “In these circumstances the

purposes behind Rule 77(d) would not be served by denying the

losing party the privilege of appealing and, in our view, justice

demands that the losing party be given that opportunity.” Id. So

too here. Because a sealed case raises different concerns about

notice to the parties and reliance on ad hoc procedures based on

a listing in the district court’s sealed docket of the participants

to be notified “by other means” has proven inadequate, it would

be appropriate in light of Bowles for the district court to adopt

procedures to ensure parties to sealed cases shall obtain timely

notice of orders and judgments.

Accordingly, we hold in light of Bowles that the district

court lacks power to adopt a unique circumstances exception

pursuant to Rule 60(b) to circumvent the 180-day deadline of

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Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), and because appellant’s other challenge

to the denial of its Rule 60(b) motion lacks merit,4

 we affirm. 

4

 Appellant’s contention that the district court erred by not

taking judicial notice of a recent district court opinion sanctioning the

FDIC attorney in the arbitration proceedings lacks merit. Appellant’s

allegations of fraud do not meet the high threshold for showing a fraud

on the court. See Baltia Air Lines, Inc. v. Transaction Mgmt., Inc., 98

F.3d 640, 642–43 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Rather the district court denied

appellant’s request to take judicial notice, “in its discretion,” because

the other case “pertains to matters that are outside the scope of this

court’s limited review of an arbitration award.” Mem. Op. at 10 n.8

(Oct. 26, 2006). Appellant’s protest that it was denied an opportunity

to demonstrate fraud by the FDIC in securing the arbitration award is

belied by the record. Appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion stated it was filed

“to bring to the [district court’s] attention a more accurate statement

of the reasons that [it] should take judicial notice” of the other district

court case. Having acknowledged its own earlier failure to articulate

the reasons for judicial notice, appellant cannot use Rule 60(b) to

avoid its strategic choice. See Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v.

Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Explaining its earlier

deficiency as a result of the rush to file before the district court ruled

on the pending motions, appellant fails to explain why it could not

have elaborated its reasoning in its September 19, 2005 reply to the

FDIC’s opposition to appellant’s request for judicial notice.

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