Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00735/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00735-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bradford Darling
Defendant
Edward Jagels
Defendant
Edward Lawrence Kleier
Defendant
County of Kern
Defendant
Carol Darling
Defendant
Andrew Gindes
Defendant
Barbara Jones
Defendant
Kern County Sheriff's Office
Defendant
Kern County Welfare Department
Defendant
Jack Rutledge
Defendant
Irene Valos
Defendant
Howard Weimer
Plaintiff

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The motion to recuse was filed on behalf of the County 1

of Kern, the Kern County Sheriff’s Department, the Kern County

Welfare Department, Edward Jagels, and Edward Kleier. (Doc. 7.) 

Jack Rutledge joined the motion (Doc. 11, filed Sept. 5, 2006),

as did Andrew Gindes (Doc. 15, filed Oct. 4, 2006). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOWARD WEIMER,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

COUNTY OF KERN, et al., 

 Defendants.

1:06-cv-00735

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE MOTION TO RECUSE

JUDGE WANGER

I. INTRODUCTION 

Before the court for decision is Defendants’ motion to

recuse the undersigned district judge from further involvement in

this case. (Doc. 7, filed Aug. 18, 2006.) Defendants contend 1

that recusal is required under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) because

conclusions reached and comments made by the district court in a

prior habeas corpus proceeding involving the Plaintiff

demonstrates the district court’s “deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Plaintiff

opposes the recusal motion. (Doc. 14, filed Oct. 2, 2006.) 

Defendants replied. (Doc. 17, filed Oct. 6, 2006.) 

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II. BACKGROUND

In the summer of 1984, Charlene Ashcraft accused Plaintiff

of molesting her 23 years earlier, while she was a foster child

residing in his home. Based on the accusation, Kern County Child

Protective Services worker Barbara Jones and Kern County

Sheriff’s Deputy Jack Rutledge conducted an investigation into

the allegations. The investigation involved, among other things,

interviewing a number of other females who had previously resided

as foster children in the Weimer home. On September 10, 1984,

Deputy Rutledge requested that the Kern County District

Attorney’s Office file charges against Mr. Weimer. The next day,

Deputy District Attorney Andrew Gindes filed the charges by way

of a criminal information. On March 29, 1985, following a state

criminal trial conducted in Kern County, Plaintiff was convicted

of child molestation. 

Plaintiff was imprisoned until 1997. In June 2004, his

conviction was overturned on federal habeas corpus. A 128-page

memorandum decision issued by the undersigned district judge,

granted Plaintiff’s petition for habeas corpus on a number of

grounds based on Findings and Recommendations (F&Rs) of the

Magistrate Judge, who also recommended the Petitioner’s release

pending review of her F&Rs. (See Weimer v. Duncan, 01:95-cv05411 OWW SMS HC, Doc. 51, filed June 15, 2004.) First, in a 50-

page section of the analysis, the district court found cumulative

prejudice stemming from repeated non-harmless errors made by

Plaintiff’s trial counsel. (Id. at 59-109.) Next, the district

court also found that habeas corpus relief was warranted on due

process grounds because instances of “later-discovered, unduly

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suggestive and overreaching interview techniques utilized by Kern

County authorities around the time Mr. Weimer’s case was being

developed, including improper investigative techniques used by

Deputy Rutledge in other cases,” called into doubt the

reliability and integrity of accusations made by complaining

witnesses. (Id. at 110.) The district court reasoned:

The starting point for evaluation of the due process

claim is the evidence now properly before the Court. 

That consists of the trial record, documents appended

to the federal Petition as exhibits, and the state

court orders in In re Hubbard and In re Kniffen for

which Mr. Weimer has requested judicial notice. 

Cumulatively, this evidence demonstrates a due process

violation stemming from the likelihood that the

evidence supporting Mr. Weimer's conviction was

unreliable. The timing of the Weimer investigation,

fall of 1984 through trial in the spring of 1985, spans

the time period when Kern County officials were

constructing numerous other child sex abuse cases using

methods now acknowledged to have been flawed, which

created false accusations, and violated due process

rights of a number of accused persons who were

incarcerated as a result and later released after

habeas petitions brought to light the unlawful conduct

of county law enforcement and CPS officers. The two

girls' uncorroborated testimony, the only evidence

presented against Mr. Weimer, was unreliable and “so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)

(involving a due process violation claimed to be the

result of improper prosecutorial comment).

The State's argument that the due process claim

fails because Mr. Weimer has presented no direct

evidence of official misconduct in development of the

molestation charges against him is unpersuasive. 

Evidence shows a prevalent pattern and practice of

improper investigation technique during the time period

this case was developed, particularly by Deputy

Rutledge the primary investigator on the case, who has

testified that he utilized the same admittedly improper

interview and investigation practices in every child

molest case he worked on. The fact that CPS workers,

Deputy Rutledge, and District Attorney's staff failed

to maintain records cannot defeat the claim. Through a

combination of judicial notice of other cases, evidence

submitted through attachments to the Petition, and

facts discernible from the record, it is more likely

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than not that these agencies did undertake interviews

of other former foster children who resided in the

Weimer home between the mid-1960s and August 1984. 

Either no records of those interviews were maintained,

or they were otherwise destroyed. That fact that no

such interview records were presented to the defense

supports the inference the interviews were unfavorable

to law enforcement and favorable to the accused. At

the very least, such records were not provided to Mr.

Weimer's trial lawyer in violation of his Brady rights

to any exculpatory information known to and in the

possession of law enforcement. Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 

The State's theory that improper investigation is

incongruous with a theory that the girls' account

derived from hysterical conversion is a red herring. 

The State relies on the absence of "record" evidence

Kern County authorities knew the girls had been

sexually victimized in the past and made false

accusations in the past. But CPS records of the girls,

appended to the Petition, demonstrate the contrary is

true. This knowledge was in county files and should

have been reviewed as part of the investigation. The

very reason the girls were in the foster care system

and had been placed in the Weimer home was that they

had suffered sexual molestation in the past. To say

that authorities, particularly CPS workers, did not

"know" of the girls' past is a misrepresentation of the

true facts or gross dereliction of duty by Kern County

law enforcement and CPS that totally abdicated their

constitutional responsibility to find the truth and to

conduct fair, unbiased, and objective criminal

investigations. 

Equally unpersuasive is the State's present

argument that the girls' respective accounts of

molestation were independently inconsistent, when the

prosecutor, Mr. Baird argued just the opposite at

trial. As to the issue of recantations, because the

defense had credible evidence to support its theory of

hysterical conversion/misidentification and prior false

accusations applicable to both Dena and Myra, the fact

that neither girl recanted is less significant. 

Although neither party presents evidence on this issue,

the absence of a recantation is not dispositive in

light of the totality of the evidence that casts

serious doubt on the reliability of the girls' trial

testimony and the improper limitations imposed by the

trial judge that prevented a due process and Sixth

Amendment searching inquiry into the victims'

credibility.

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It is indisputable that the credibility and

reliability of the victims in child molestation cases

present the most important issues for the jury. Here,

in the case of each victim, the crimes were

late-reported, each victim's testimony was the sole

basis for conviction and was uncorroborated by any

independent evidence introduced by the prosecution. 

Each victim suffered from material credibility

problems. The effect of Donnelly due process error is

not harmless. The breakdown in the investigative

process and untrustworthiness of Kern County law

enforcement handling of child molest cases in 1983-85,

deprived Mr. Weimer of fairly presenting his defense. 

The error infected the trial with unfairness and had a

substantial effect on the verdicts. 

The Findings and Recommendations [of the

Magistrate Judge] are not adopted. De novo review

supports a finding that Mr. Weimer's due process rights

were violated by cumulative error by his own attorney

and in the proceedings that produced convictions that

are constitutionally unreliable. The Magistrate

Judge's independent findings of constitutional

violations which infected the convictions justified the

grant of honor release. [This claim] is meritorious. 

(Id. at 121-24 (footnotes omitted).) 

After finding in favor of Plaintiff on this claim, the

district court included a brief section entitled “Cumulative

Prejudice” which is also relevant to the instant motion:

What is most troubling about this case is the zeal

with which both the Kern County District Attorney's

Office on state habeas in the state superior court, and

the California Attorney General's Office, before the

California Supreme Court and on federal habeas, have

endeavored at all costs to sustain Mr. Weimer's

convictions. They ignore the known contemporaneous

improper investigative and untrustworthy methods

utilized by the Kern County District Attorney's Office

in 1984-85 (Mr. Gindes) and the Kern County Sheriff

through Deputy Rutledge in this case and in other child

molest cases in the same time period. Other Kern

County Sheriff's Officers have been found to have

engaged in similar improprieties in other cases. Such

practices were later repudiated by both agencies. The

Kern County District Attorney's Office adopted a policy

by October 1985 (six months after Mr. Weimer's

conviction, but before his appeal) that it would not

file criminal charges on uncorroborated accusations in

child molest cases where the alleged molestation

occurred under ambiguous circumstances or where the

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child had made prior disputed allegations of

molestation. 

In view of these actions taken by both agencies,

it is incomprehensible that the State ignores and

dismisses credible evidence in this case as to the

improper investigative and interview methods used. It

is equally unreasonable to treat Mr. McKnight's errors

in conducting the defense as harmless. Mr. McKnight's

performance was ineffective in failing to address the

issue of the misleading statistics or otherwise to

adequately prepare Dr. Bird for his testimony; in

failing to present evidence clarifying the appearance

of the fences bordering the Weimer property. More

significantly, Mr. McKnight abdicated his duty to

conduct a wide-ranging, penetrating cross-examination

of both victims, and seemingly compromised away Mr.

Weimer's right to cross-examination, the most powerful

engine for finding the truth, by volunteering to limit

his cross where he was limited by improperly

restrictive rulings by the trial judge. 

He also failed to clarify that just because Mr.

Weimer did not participate in the day-to-day discipline

and care of foster children in his home, Mr. Weimer

still was properly considered an authority figure for

those children, including Dena and Myra. The lack of

clarity on this point enabled the prosecutor to argue

that because Mr. Weimer did not participate in the

day-to-day care and discipline of foster children, he

could not have been considered an authority figure and

only if Mr. Weimer were perceived as an authority

figure would Dena and Myra have been susceptible to

hysterical conversion and likely misidentification

described by Dr. Bird. 

In families modeled on traditions of the 1960s,

however, as in the Weimer household, fathers worked

outside the home and mothers worked in the home. Mr.

Weimer's testimony makes clear that there was a fixed

division of labor in the household. He did not provide

daily care to the children. But in a traditional

family, this omission did not detract from the father's

position of authority. Mr. McKnight did nothing to

develop this concept for the jury. 

The cumulative prejudice from Mr. McKnight's trial

performance inadequacies, most especially his failures

to develop and emphasize additional impeachment of the

victims, is more than sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 23,

123 S. Ct. at 359. See also Turner, 158 F.3d at 457

(holding that cumulative impact of attorney errors may

be considered when assessing prejudice).

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These instances of ineffective representation are

not the only factors informing the prejudice

assessment. Claim C raises Mr. McKnight's inexplicable

failure to conduct additional investigation regarding

impeachment evidence as to Dena. There was an

additional basis for impeaching Myra. Deputy

Rutledge's report attributes an incident of sodomy by

Mr. Weimer after the sexual intercourse behind the

garage, but Myra never described sodomy in any other

account. This discrepancy adds to the accumulation of

undermining factors. Finally, the manner in which the

investigation of Mr. Weimer's case was conducted,

judged by admissible evidence, establishes such

unreliability that the convictions violate due process. 

Evaluated against the relative weakness of the

prosecution case, based on both victims' doubtful

credibility, particularly the delayed reporting of the

molestation and the implausibility of many, many

aspects of both girls' accounts of the events. The

requirements of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, are

satisfied for granting relief. The cumulative effect

of these errors had an impact on the verdicts, because

absent such errors, the defense should have further

called into doubt the credibility and reliability of

the prosecution case. Even in a case where a district

judge cannot decide the harmful effect of the errors,

and is in grave doubt as to whether the errors had “a

substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict, the

error(s) cannot be considered harmless. O'Neal v.

McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). In this case, the

constitutional errors, omissions, and violations

cumulated to destroy confidence in the integrity or

reliability of the convictions.

The attorney errors that abrogated effective cross

examination of both complaining witnesses and the

unreliability of the convictions require issuance of

the writ of habeas corpus and a new trial.

(Id. at 124-28.) 

On June 9, 2006, Plaintiff filed this civil rights suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various provisions of the

California Constitution, and California Civil Code § 52.1(b),

against the County of Kern, the Kern County Sheriff’s Office, the

Kern County Welfare Department, of which Child Protective

Services is a part, Edward Lawrence Kleier (the Sheriff of Kern

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County from January 1983 to 1986), Bradford Darling (the Sergeant

and Unit Supervisor in charge of the juvenile sex crimes unit of

the Kern County Sheriff’s Department), Jack Rutledge (a Deputy

Sheriff who worked on the Weimer case), Edward Jagels (the

District Attorney of Kern County from January 1983 to the

present), Andrew Gindes (the Deputy District Attorney who filed

the original information against Weimer), Carol Darling (the

Sexual Abuse Program Coordinator with the Kern County District

Attorney’s Office from 1980 through 1987), Barbara Jones (a CPS

case worker who worked on the Weimer case), and Irene Valos

(another CPS case worker who worked on the Weimer case). 

Defendants moved to recuse the undersigned district judge on

August 18, 2006. (Docs. 7, 11, & 15.) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework.

Defendants’ recusal motion is based on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 

which provides in pertinent part that:

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the

United States shall disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.

In general, the inquiry is whether “a reasonable person with

knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. Republic

of Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993). Defendants

acknowledge that the standard they must meed to prevail on this

motion is “very high” under the controlling Supreme Court case

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). (Doc. 7 at 2.)

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“It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a 2

judge to sit in the same case upon its remand and to sit in

successive trials involving the same defendant.” Liteky, 510

U.S. at 551.

Litkey does not provide a great deal of guidance as to 3

how courts should apply the extrajudicial source doctrine. 

Litkey does explain that “some opinions acquired outside the

context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge's view of

the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not warrant recusal,” 

510 U.S. at 554, but does not further distinguish between the

types of extrajudicial information that would demand recusal and

those that would be unoffensive. It is not critical to

understand the exact scope of the extrajudicial source doctrine

here, however, as Defendants do not rely on this doctrine as a

basis for disqualification.

9

Litkey held that disqualification is generally not required

if a judge merely issues opinions based upon what the judge

learned from his or her participation in the case or in prior

proceedings. 510 U.S. at 551. The Litkey court emphasized that 2

“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for

a bias or partiality motion.” Id. at 555.

In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding

comments or accompanying opinion), [judicial rulings]

cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial

source; and can only in the rarest circumstances

evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism

required (as discussed below) when no extrajudicial

source is involved.

Id. In contrast, disqualification may be warranted where a judge

relies upon an “extrajudicial source” for information. Id. at 3

555. At the hearing, all counsel agreed that there is no

extrajudicial source which is a basis for the motion.

Alternatively, even where a judge’s opinions are based

exclusively on “facts introduced or events occurring in the

course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,” such

opinions can warrant in “the rarest [of] circumstances” if “they

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display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make

fair judgment impossible.” Id.

Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial

that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile

to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do

not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do

so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an

extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they

reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism

as to make fair judgment impossible. An example of the

latter (and perhaps of the former as well) is the

statement that was alleged to have been made by the

District Judge in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22

(1921), a World War I espionage case against

German-American defendants: “One must have a very

judicial mind, indeed, not [to be] prejudiced against

the German Americans” because their “hearts are reeking

with disloyalty.” Id., at 28 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Not establishing bias or partiality, however,

are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction,

annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds

of what imperfect men and women, even after having been

confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A

judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom

administration-even a stern and short-tempered judge's

ordinary efforts at courtroom administration-remain

immune.

Id. at 555-56. 

B. Discussion.

Defendants assert that certain conclusions and opinions

expressed by the district court in the habeas corpus decision

have led defendants “to believe they cannot receive an impartial,

fair judgment from Judge Wanger in this case.” (Doc. 7 at 4.) 

Specifically, Defendants point to certain statements made in the

habeas corpus decision regarding Andrew Gindes, Jack Rutledge,

the public entity defendants, and the minor children who

testified at Plaintiff’s criminal trial.

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1. Comments Regarding Andrew Gindes.

Defendants specifically point to two paragraphs from the

habeas corpus decision that concern Andrew Gindes. The first is

a footnote which states:

Mr. Gindes is the prosecutor who originally filed the

information against Mr. Weimer, and suggested that

investigators “FIND OUT THE REST OF THE CHILDREN PLACED

IN THIS FOSTER HOME AND INTERVIEW THEM – I BELIEVE WE

WOULD FIND MORE VICTIMS – I CANNOT BELIEVE THE

DEFENDANT TOOK A TWENTY YEAR VACATION.” Exhibit M to

Petition. Mr. Gindes was forced to resign from the

Kern County District Attorney’s Office following

investigation of his coercive and improper methods of

investigation and interviewing in child sexual abuse

cases. State Bar records show his license is inactive.

(Habeas Corpus Decision at 112 n.72.) 

That footnote relates to the court’s discussion of evidence

from two other California cases, In Re Hubbard, a habeas decision

issued by the California Court of Appeals (No. F021117), and In

Re Kniffen, a habeas decision issued by the Kern County Superior

Court (HC 5528), along with six declarations submitted by

children involved in other Kern County sex abuse investigations. 

(See Habeas Corpus Decision at 48-53; 111-112.) The cases and

declarations submitted indicate that the California courts found

that Kern County in general, and Andrew Gindes specifically,

utilized “extremely coercive interview techniques” in the course

of prosecuting other child molestation cases contemporaneous to

the Weimer investigation. The district court referred to the

language of the judicially noticed state court decisions. 

The second paragraph of concern is contained within the

habeas corpus decision’s discussion of “cumulative prejudice”:

What is most troubling about this case is the zeal with

which both the Kern County District Attorney's Office

on state habeas in the state superior court, and the

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California Attorney General's Office, before the

California Supreme Court and on federal habeas, have

endeavored at all costs to sustain Mr. Weimer's

convictions. They ignore the known contemporaneous

improper investigative and untrustworthy methods

utilized by the Kern County District Attorney's Office

in 1984-85 (Mr. Gindes) and the Kern County Sheriff

through Deputy Rutledge in this case and in other child

molest cases in the same time period.

(Id. at 124-24.) Defendants complain that

Judge Wanger’s unsupported characterization of how Mr.

Gindes’ career as a prosecutor came to a close, his

inclusion in the opinion of Mr. Gindes’ professional

status with the California Bar Association and his

conclusion that Gindes engaged in “known

contemporaneous improper investigative and

untrustworthy methods” have led Gindes’ employer,

County of Kern, and his supervisor, District Attorney

Edward Jagels, to believe that Judge Wanger possesses a

deep-seated antagonism toward Mr. Gindes and that

County of Kern cannot receive a fair and impartial

hearing in this matter since Mr. Gindes, is a named

defendant in his capacity as a County employee and his

conduct is being attacked by plaintiff.

(Doc. 7 at 5.) 

First, the district court’s conclusion in the habeas corpus

decision that Gindes engaged in “known contemporaneous improper

investigative and untrustworthy methods” is entirely supported by

the state decisional record that was placed before the court in

the Weimer habeas corpus matter. This record included the two

California court decisions (In re Hubbard and In re Kniffen), the

declarations from children involved in other Kern County sex

abuse investigations, and a contemporaneous report prepared by

the California Attorney General’s Office concerning sex abuse

investigations in Kern County. (The Attorney General’s report is

summarized at pages 43 through 48 of the Habeas Corpus Decision.) 

The district court’s ruling was based on information the

presiding judge learned from state court decisions and the

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Defendants do not in their motion to recuse assert that 4

such information was not part of the public record or otherwise

untrue. If the assertion is untrue, the statement could have

been corrected. No party or attorney ever brought to the court’s

attention any inaccuracy in the statement. If the information is

erroneous or irrelevant to the issues presented in this case, any

such evidence would not be admissible in any future proceeding

and cannot prejudice any defendant.

13

Attorney General’s report, information that was solely gained

from h participation in the habeas case. This is exactly the

type of ruling that is protected by Litkey. 

[J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that

are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to,

counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not

support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so

if they reveal an opinion that derives from an

extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they

reveal such a high degree of favoritism 

Litkey, 510 U.S. at 555. 

Second, Mr. Gindes’ professional status with the California

Bar Association is a matter of public record. The district

court’s citation to that information can neither be considered a

reference to an extrajudicial source nor an expression of bias or

partiality.

Finally, the district court cannot specifically recall the

basis for the statement about Mr. Gindes’ departure from the Kern

County District Attorney’s Office. In any case, the comment was 4

made in passing (in a footnote) in connection with the conclusion

that at the time of the habeas corpus proceedings, Kern County

had ample reason to know that the interview techniques used by

Mr. Gindes in investigations contemporaneous to the Weimer

investigation were under scrutiny. That conclusion was fully

supported by record evidence.

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Defendants also, again, take exception to the first 5

paragraph of the habeas corpus decision’s discussion of

“cumulative prejudice,” which mentions deputy Rutledge. 

What is most troubling about this case is the zeal with

which both the Kern County District Attorney's Office

on state habeas in the state superior court, and the

California Attorney General's Office, before the

California Supreme Court and on federal habeas, have

endeavored at all costs to sustain Mr. Weimer's

convictions. They ignore the known contemporaneous

improper investigative and untrustworthy methods

utilized by the Kern County District Attorney's Office

in 1984-85 (Mr. Gindes) and the Kern County Sheriff

through Deputy Rutledge in this case and in other child

molest cases in the same time period.

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2. Comments Regarding Jack Rutledge.

With respect to Defendant Rutledge, Defendants maintain that

no direct evidence regarding what Rutledge did in connection with

the Weimer investigation was produced by Plaintiff during the

habeas corpus proceeding. Rather, Defendants assert that both

Plaintiff and the district court relied upon what Rutledge did in

other cases. Defendants point to a portion of a paragarph from

the habeas corpus decision in which the district court rejected

Defendants’ argument that “Mr. Weimer [] presented no direct

evidence of official misconduct in development of the molestation

charges against him.” (Habeas Corpus Decision at 121.) The

portion of the district court’s reasoning to which Defendants

take exception is as follows:

Evidence shows a prevalent pattern and practice of

improper investigation technique during the time period

this case was developed, particularly by Deputy

Rutledge the primary investigator on the case, who has

testified that he utilized the same admittedly improper

interview and investigation practices in every child

molest case he worked on. 

(Id. at 121-22.)5

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(Habeas Corpus Decision at 124-25.) With respect to Deputy

Rutledge, this passage is merely a summary of the conclusions

reached elsewhere and is similarly supported by the record. 

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Defendants argue that “Judge Wanger’s conclusion that Deputy

Rutledge had utilized improper and untrustworthy methods in [the

Weimer] case because of his activities in other cases has led

defendants to believe that Judge Wanger cannot view impartially

the evidence of what Mr. Rutledge did in the Weimer

investigation.” (Doc. 7 at 6.) 

First, Defendants portray the district court’s reasoning in

an overly narrow manner. The entire paragraph from which

Defendants’ excerpt is taken reads as follows:

The State's argument that the due process claim fails 

because Mr. Weimer has presented no direct evidence of

official misconduct in development of the molestation

charges against him is unpersuasive. Evidence shows a

prevalent pattern and practice of improper

investigation technique during the time period this

case was developed, particularly by Deputy Rutledge the

primary investigator on the case, who has testified

that he utilized the same admittedly improper interview

and investigation practices in every child molest case

he worked on. The fact that CPS workers, Deputy

Rutledge, and District Attorney's staff failed to

maintain records cannot defeat the claim. Through a

combination of judicial notice of other cases, evidence

submitted through attachments to the Petition, and

facts discernible from the record, it is more likely

than not that these agencies did undertake interviews

of other former foster children who resided in the

Weimer home between the mid-1960s and August 1984. 

Either no records of those interviews were maintained,

or they were otherwise destroyed. That fact that no

such interview records were presented to the defense

supports the inference the interviews were unfavorable

to law enforcement and favorable to the accused. At

the very least, such records were not provided to Mr.

Weimer's trial lawyer in violation of his Brady rights

to any exculpatory information known to and in the

possession of law enforcement. Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 

(Habeas Corpus Decision 121-22.) The district court examined a

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wide range of admissible evidence available in the Weimer case. 

Among other things, the district court found the absence of

investigative agencies’ record-keeping consistent with a finding

that it was more likely than not that improper investigative

techniques were utilized in the Weimer investigation. Moreover,

the habeas corpus decision notes that “Deputy Rutledge testified

in the Hubbard case that he followed the same interview practice

for all child interviews and that he never changed his practice

during his entire tenure on the child sexual abuse unit.” (Id.

at 111.) Finally, Rutledge admitted in In re Hubbard that he

lacked specific training in conducting interviews of child molest

victims and he was unfamiliar with the standards for recruitment

and training of peace officers established by P.O.S.T. (Id. at

50.) 

Most importantly, with respect to the habeas corpus

decision’s conclusions regarding Deputy Rutledge, Defendant has

utterly failed to demonstrate why such comments show any bias by

the assigned district judge. Although Defendants may take

exception with the soundness of relying upon other cases as

evidence of a pattern of misconduct, this is what the law calls

for in civil rights cases where a Monell claim is raised. The

other cases are matters of public record and cannot constitute an

extrajudicial source. Nor, do the conclusions themselves exhibit

any kind of bias or partiality. Rather, they are inferences

based entirely on information the presiding judge learned from

his participation in the case. Such comments do not warrant

disqualification under Litkey. Moreover, they are not binding

for the purposes of this civil action, as the parties and issues

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are different.

In their reply brief, Defendants reiterate their concerns

with the district court’s comments about Defendants Rutledge and

Gindes as follows: 

[T]here is no evidence in the habeas corpus record as

to what Defendant Rutledge did in the Weimer

investigation. Other than a note in a file, there is no

evidence in the habeas corpus record as to what

defendant Gindes did, if anything, in the Weimer case.

There is no evidence in the habeas corpus record of how

children in the Weimer investigation were interviewed.

Nevertheless, relying on information from other cases

not before the court and which did not involve Mr.

Weimer or the children involved in the Weimer

investigation, Judge Wanger concluded that Gindes and

Rutledge and the institutional defendants completely

abdicated their constitutional responsibilities and

violated Mr. Weimer’s constitutional rights and, in

reaching that conclusion, offered comments and opinions

that, when viewed objectively, show a deep-seated

antagonism toward the defendants that makes fair

judgment impossible....The fact that those opinions and

comments may have had their root in the opinions and

comments of others does not diminish the concern that,

when viewed objectively, such opinions and comments

reflect partiality.

(Doc. 17 at 2.) It appears, facially, that Defendants simply

take issue with the conclusions reached by the district court in

the habeas case which were based in part on the decisions of the

California courts and the Attorney General’s review of such

conduct. The appropriate remedy for such concerns is appeal, not

recusal of the judicial officer from subsequent related

proceedings. See In Re Focus Media, Inc., 378 F.3d 916, 930 (9th

Cir. 2004). No party appealed the district court’s grant of the

habeas petition. 

3. Comments Regarding the Public Entity Defendants.

Defendants concisely summarize their concerns with respect

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to the comments in the habeas corpus decision regarding the

public entity defendants: 

In ruling on the Weimer habeas corpus petition, Judge

Wanger drew extensively from sources that commented on

the investigations in other Kern County cases that were

under way during approximately the same time as the

Weimer investigation. It appears from Judge Wanger’s

conclusions that he has pre-judged the agency

defendants’ conduct in the Weimer investigation and

that it will be impossible for the agency defendants to

receive fair judgment in the civil matter. 

(Doc. 7 at 6.) As examples, Defendants cite the following

comments and opinions expressed in the habeas corpus decision:

The timing of the Weimer investigation, fall of 1984

through trial in the spring of 1985, spans the time

period when Kern County officials were constructing

numerous other child sex abuse cases using methods now

acknowledged to have been flawed, which created false

accusations, and violated due process rights of a

number of accused persons who were incarcerated as a

result and later released after habeas petitions

brought to light the unlawful conduct of county law

enforcement and CPS officers. (Habea Corpus Decision

at 121.) 

The State’s argument that the due process claim fails

because Mr. Weimer has presented no direct evidence of

official misconduct in development of the molestation

charges against him is unpersuasive. Evidence shows a

prevalent pattern and practice of improper

investigation technique during the time period this

case was developed, particularly by Deputy Rutledge the

primary investigator on the case, who has testified

that he utilized the same admittedly improper interview

and investigation practices in every child molest case

he worked on. The fact that CPS workers, Deputy

Rutledge, and District Attorney’s staff failed to

maintain records cannot defeat the claim. Through a

combination of judicial notice of other cases, evidence

submitted through attachments to the Petition, and

facts discernible from the record, it is more likely

than not that these agencies did undertake interviews

of other former foster children who resided in the

Weimer home between the mid-1960s and August 1984.

Either no records of those interviews were maintained,

or they were otherwise destroyed. That fact that no

such interview records were presented to the defense

supports the inference the interviews were unfavorable

to law enforcement and favorable to the accused. At the

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very least, such records were not provided to Mr.

Weimer’s trial lawyer in violation of his Brady rights

to any exculpatory information known to and in the

possession of law enforcement. (Id. at 121.) 

To say that authorities, particularly CPS workers, did

not “know” of the girls’ past is a misrepresentation of

the true facts or gross dereliction of duty by Kern

County law enforcement and CPS that totally abdicated

their constitutional responsibility to find the truth

and to conduct fair, unbiased, and objective criminal

investigations. (Id. at 123.) 

The breakdown in the investigative process and

untrustworthiness of Kern County law enforcement

handling of child molest cases in 1983-1985, deprived

Mr. Weimer of fairly presenting his defense. The error

infected the trial with unfairness and had a

substantial effect on the verdicts. (Id. at 124.) 

Defendants assert that these comments indicate that “Judge

Wanger has pre-judged the matter” to such an extent that

Defendants “do not believe they can receive a fair and impartial

judgment in the civil case.” (Doc. 7 at 8.) For example,

Defendants maintain that “Judge Wanger’s conclusion that Kern

County law enforcement and CPS may have totally abdicated their

constitutional responsibilities has lead the defendants to

believe that Judge Wanger will not be able to view their

activities any differently in the context of the civil case.” 

(Id.) Defendants are concerned that “[s]hould a CPS worker or

law enforcement official state they were unaware of the sexual

abuse history of someone placed in the Weimer home, Judge Wanger

will either reject such testimony as untruthful or conclude the

employee abdicated their constitutional responsibility though

there may be other considerations that come into play.” (Id.)

Finally, Defendants are concerned that “Judge Wanger has

[already] concluded that the agency defendants are culpable in

this matter because of activities reportedly undertaken in other

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cases occurring around the same time.” (Id.) Specifically,

Defendants assert that in the habeas corpus decision the district

court was “willing to draw inferences from presumed facts which

result[ed] in a conclusion that Weimer’s Brady rights were

violated.” (Id. at 7.) This is of particular concern to

Defendants, “[g]iven that plaintiff is now suing for alleged

Brady violations arising out of the same facts....” (Id.)

Without revisiting the entire reasoning of the habeas corpus

decision, it is sufficient to point out that none of the concerns

articulated above warrant disqualification. The district court’s

conclusions are almost entirely drawn from the California court

decisions that analyze such conduct. Defendants are correct that

bias or prejudice may be present even where a judicial officer

only relies upon knowledge properly gained during the course of

judicial proceedings:

A favorable or unfavorable predisposition can also

deserve to be characterized as “bias” or “prejudice”

because, even though it springs from the facts adduced

or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as

to display clear inability to render fair judgment. 

Litkey, 510 U.S. at 551. However, 

“Partiality” does not refer to all favoritism, but only

to such as is, for some reason, wrongful or

inappropriate. Impartiality is not gullibility.

Moreover, even if the pejorative connotation of

“partiality” were not enough to import the

“extrajudicial source” doctrine into § 455(a), the

“reasonableness” limitation (recusal is required only

if the judge's impartiality “might reasonably be

questioned”) would have the same effect. To demand the

sort of “child-like innocence” that elimination of the

“extrajudicial source” limitation would require is not

reasonable.

Id. at 551-552. All of the conclusions that are of concern to

Defendants were taken from the record of the habeas case. The

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essential inquiry in the habeas proceeding was whether the

totality of the alleged errors -- ineffective assistance of

counsel, witness unreliability, flawed investigative and

interviewing techniques, failure to provide petitioner with

impeachment information as to key prosecution witnesses, and

cumulative prejudice at trial -- resulted in federal

constitutional violations of due process, the right to effective

assistance of counsel and, and the right to a fair trial, so as

to destroy confidence in the integrity and reliability of the

proceedings. There was no need in the habeas proceedings to

reach independent, severable, final determinations as to each

matter of concern now raised by defendants. 

That the district court, upon analyzing the record, reached

conclusions that the convictions Weimer suffered did not

withstand constitutional scrutiny does not warrant recusal. See

e.g., United States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.1988)

(comments by judge reflecting outrage at crime and failure of

parties to take responsibility did not demonstrate pervasive bias

warranting recusal from sentencing; comments were supported by

the evidence presented during the course of sentencing process). 

Most important, an equal or greater basis for the court’s finding

of unreliability of the outcome of the state convictions was the

ineffectiveness of Petitioner’s counsel, whose failure of

performance and errors cumulated to deny Petitioner a fair trial. 

Defendants have not cited a single case in which a judicial

officer has been disqualified under even marginally similar

circumstances. 

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4. Comments regarding the minor children who

testified.

The last category of comments that are of concern to

Defendants relate to the reliability of testimony given by two

minor children during the Weimer trial. Specifically, the habeas

corpus decision found:

The two girls’ uncorroborated testimony, the only

evidence presented against Mr. Weimer, was unreliable

and “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make

the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”

(Habeas Corpus Decision at 121.) Defendants assert that they

“fully expect both of the young women (now adults) who testified

against Mr. Weimer to confirm he abused them.” (Doc. 7 at 9.) 

In addition, Defendants assert that “there are other young women

(now adults) who will also so testify.” (Id.) Given the intent

to present this evidence, Defendants maintain that “it is clear

from the comments of the court that it will not believe the

testimony of either young woman who testified at trial. Thus,

defendants are deprived of any reasonable chance to establish a

defense that the crimes did, in fact, occur.” (Id.) 

In making this accusation, Defendants reach an unsupportable

conclusion. In the habeas case, the district court found that

defense counsel’s failure to explore for their full impeaching

effect witnesses’ prior allegedly false reports and

inconsistencies in prior statements rendered the overall outcome

of the first trial unreliable. Further questions about the

reliability of the witness testimony were raised by questionable

interviewing and investigation methods in contemporaneous child

molestation cases. The court made no judgments about the

ultimate credibility of each witness, a question that is solely

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Plaintiff correctly points out that the inquiry 6

undertaken in a habeas case is substantially different from the

burden of proof that plaintiff will be required to meet in this

civil case. In the Weimer habeas case, the district court

examined whether the actions of Plaintiffs trial counsel and

Defendants’ actions combined to produce prejudicial

constitutional error. Here, Plaintiff will be required to prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants are culpable

under prevailing civil rights laws. The district court has not

prejudged any Defendant’s responsibility under these standards. 

Perhaps most importantly, the ultimate finder of fact in this

case will be a jury, not the district court. 

Defendants assert that the different standards of proof “are

irrelevant considerations when determining whether the presiding

judicial officer is partial.” (Doc. 3.) Defendants are correct

that the different standards of proof are not directly relevant

to the recusal inquiry. However, here, Defendants repeatedly

question the district court’s ability to be impartial in a civil

rights case based upon conclusions reached in a habeas corpus

decision based in material part on the decisions of the state

courts and the California Attorney General. The divergent

standards of proof are relevant insofar as they support the

conclusion that the expression of an opinion as to which party

should prevail in a habeas case does not necessarily predispose a

court to finding for the same party in a related civil rights

action.

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reserved for the trier of fact, the jury. The habeas corpus

decision does not express any opinion as to the County’s capacity

to present such evidence here or the basis on which such witness

testimony will be evaluated. The assigned judge has not

prejudged the credibility of any witness who will testify in this

case.6

5. Appearance of Impropriety.

Finally, Defendants point to Justice Kennedy’s concurring

opinion in Litkey, in which he emphasized that “[t]he relevant

consideration under § 455(a) is the appearance of partiality, see

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Liljeberg [Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.] at 860, not

where it originated or how it was disclosed.” Litkey, 510 U.S.

at 558. Essentially, Defendants suggest that, even if there is

not sufficient evidence to demonstrate the type of pervasive bias

required by the majority opinion in Litkey, there is sufficient

appearance of impropriety here to warrant recusal. With respect

to this argument, the example cited by Justice Kennedy are

telling. 

If, for instance, a judge presiding over a retrial

should state, based upon facts adduced and opinions

formed during the original cause, an intent to ensure

that one side or the other shall prevail, there can be

little doubt that he or she must recuse. Cf.

Rugenstein v. Ottenheimer, 78 Or. 371, 372, 152 P. 215,

216 (1915) (reversing for judge's failure to disqualify

himself on retrial, where judge had stated: “‘This case

may be tried again, and it will be tried before me. I

will see to that. And I will see that the woman gets

another verdict and judgment that will stand’ ”)

Id. 

The fact that the undersigned district judge issued a

reasoned decision that reached a conclusion adverse to Defendants

in the habeas case on different issues expresses no such intent

“to ensure that one side or the other shall prevail” in this

civil rights case. The district court has no predisposition.

//

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//

//

//

//

//

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As noted at oral argument, the assigned judge has tried to

verdict numerous jury trials in which Kern County and its

Sheriff’s Department and deputies have been defendants. The

Court has also decided scores of dispositive motions involving

Kern County, its District Attorney, Sheriff, and Sheriffs’

Deputies, ruling for and against these parties, always on the

merits. The Court has no bias against any party in this case. 

No such suggestion has ever been previously made. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion for recusal is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 29, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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