Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-19-71246/USCOURTS-ca9-19-71246-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bobby Darrell Colbert
Petitioner
Ron Haynes
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BOBBY DARRELL COLBERT,

Applicant,

v.

RON HAYNES,

Respondent.

No. 19-71246

OPINION

Application to File Second or Successive Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

Submitted March 2, 2020*

Seattle, Washington

Filed March 30, 2020

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Ryan D. Nelson,

and Danielle J. Hunsaker, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hunsaker

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 COLBERT V. HAYNES

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel denied Bobby Darrel Colbert’s application 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) for leave to file a second or 

successive habeas corpus petition challenging his 2005 

Washington state sentencing judgment. 

The panel held that the habeas petition Colbert seeks to 

file is a second or successive petition under Magwood v. 

Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010), because, under Washington 

law, removal of a victim-restitution condition from the 

sentencing judgment did not create a new, intervening 

judgment.

The panel also held that Colbert does not satisfy the 

requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) for filing a 

second or successive petition because none of the arguments 

raised in the petition relate to a new constitutional rule and 

each of the arguments raises a procedural error that, even if 

proven true, has no bearing on his guilt.

COUNSEL

Michael C. Kahrs, Kahrs Law Firm P.S., Seattle, 

Washington, for Applicant.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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COLBERT V. HAYNES 3

John J. Samson, Assistant Attorney General, Corrections 

Division; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General; Office of 

the Attorney General, Olympia, Washington; for 

Respondent.

OPINION

HUNSAKER, Circuit Judge:

The primary question in this case is whether removal of 

a victim-restitution condition from Bobby Darrel Colbert’s 

Washington state sentencing judgment created a new 

judgment under Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 

(2010). Originally, Colbert filed an application for leave to 

file a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. He now contends that removal of the victimrestitution condition from his sentencing judgment created a 

new judgment, which makes his habeas petition a first, rather 

than a second or successive, petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and hold that 

removal of the victim-restitution condition did not create a 

new judgment under Washington law. We also hold that 

Colbert does not satisfy the requirements for filing a second 

or successive habeas petition, and we deny his application.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2005, Colbert was convicted in Washington state 

court of one count of rape in the third degree and one count 

of rape in the second degree. He was sentenced to twenty 

months on the third-degree count and 136 months to life on 

the second-degree count, running concurrently. The 

sentencing court also imposed community-custody terms on 

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4 COLBERT V. HAYNES

both counts.1 The conditions imposed for community 

custody included that Colbert pay restitution for his victims’ 

“crime-related counseling and medical treatment” costs.

After an unsuccessful direct appeal, State v. Colbert, No. 

56298-3-I, 2006 WL 2048237 (Wash. Ct. App. July 24, 

2006), rev. denied, 160 Wash. 2d 1004 (2007), Colbert filed 

numerous collateral challenges to his 2005 conviction, 

including five federal habeas petitions, State v. Colbert, No. 

77332-1-I, 2018 WL 3434708, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 

16, 2018). In 2014, Colbert challenged in Washington state 

court two of the community-custody conditions imposed in 

his sentencing judgment—the victim-restitution condition 

and an alcohol-prohibition condition. Id.

The state argued that both conditions were within the 

trial court’s authority but that the victim-restitution 

condition was moot because the victims had not requested 

restitution. The Washington Court of Appeals dismissed 

Colbert’s challenge, and on review the Acting 

Commissioner of the Washington Supreme Court also 

rejected his challenge, stating in part:

[W]hile the State does not concede that the 

trial court lacked authority to require victim 

reimbursement as a community custody 

condition, it has conceded that the condition 

may be stricken because the victims have not 

sought reimbursement. Accepting the State’s 

1 Under Washington law, a term of “community custody” is “that 

portion of an offender’s sentence of confinement in lieu of earned release 

time or imposed as part of a sentence . . . and served in the community 

subject to controls placed on the offender’s movement and activities by 

the department.” Revised Code Washington (“RCW”) § 9.94A.030(5); 

see also RCW § 9.94A.703.

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COLBERT V. HAYNES 5

concession that this condition may be 

stricken, this court need not address the 

merits of the condition.

As to the alcohol prohibition, it is expressly 

permitted by statute without regard for 

whether the crime was alcohol-related. 

Former RCW 9.94A.700(5)(d) (2003).

. . . .

The motion for discretionary review is denied 

on the condition that the State take steps 

necessary to strike the victim cost 

reimbursement community custody 

condition.

Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

After the Acting Commissioner’s decision, the trial court 

struck the victim-restitution condition but otherwise left 

Colbert’s sentencing judgment intact. Id. Colbert appealed, 

arguing the trial court violated his constitutional rights by 

changing his sentencing judgment when he was not present 

and when he did not have counsel. Id. The Washington Court 

of Appeals denied Colbert’s appeal noting, “the Supreme 

Court Commissioner did not remand the matter to the 

superior court” but instead directed the state “to take steps” 

to strike the victim-restitution condition; an act that “did not 

involve resentencing and amounted to the prosecutor 

stipulating to Colbert’s request to strike the condition.” Id.

at * 2. The Washington Court of Appeals further concluded 

that removing the victim-restitution condition was 

“essentially a ministerial act that was not a critical stage of 

the proceedings.” Id.

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6 COLBERT V. HAYNES

In May 2019, Colbert sought leave from this Court to file 

a second or successive federal habeas petition challenging 

his 2005 sentencing judgment. We appointed counsel for 

Colbert and directed the parties to address whether removal 

of the victim-restitution condition created a new judgment, 

and Colbert filed a supplemental application arguing that a 

new judgment was created.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Is Colbert’s habeas petition a first or a second or 

successive petition?

A petitioner must obtain leave from the Court of Appeals 

before filing a “second or successive” habeas petition in the 

district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). In Magwood, the 

Supreme Court held that “second or successive” does not 

refer to “all § 2254 habeas petitions filed second or 

successively in time.” 561 U.S. at 331–32. Instead, this 

phrase is interpreted “with respect to the judgment 

challenged.” Id. at 332–33. A petition is not “second or 

successive” under § 2244(b) if it challenges for the first time 

a “new judgment intervening between the two habeas 

petitions.” Id. at 341–42 (internal quotations omitted). 

Magwood did not answer, however, what constitutes a 

“new” judgment; “it simply held that the prisoner’s 

resentencing in that case was a new judgment.” Turner v. 

Baker, 912 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing 

Magwood, 561 U.S. at 342).

We look to the applicable state law to determine whether

a sentencing change made by the state court created a new 

sentencing judgment. Turner, 912 F.3d at 1240; Gonzalez v. 

Sherman, 873 F.3d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 2017). Critical to this 

analysis is whether the state court action “replaces an invalid 

sentence with a valid one.” Gonzalez, 873 F.3d at 769; see 

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COLBERT V. HAYNES 7

also Turner, 912 F.3d at 1240. Thus, in Gonzalez, we held 

that changing presentence credits results in a new judgment 

under California law because application of custody credits 

determines “the total duration of time which a convicted 

person will have to spend in prison” and a sentence is legally 

valid only if it awards all the credits to which the person is 

entitled. 873 F.3d at 769; see also Wentzell v. Neven, 

674 F.3d 1124, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding petition 

challenging amended judgment that vacated a conviction on 

one count as invalid under state law but carried forward 

convictions on other counts was not a “second or successive 

petition”). We reached the same result applying Nevada law 

in Turner. 912 F.3d at 1240. Here, to determine whether 

removal of the victim-restitution condition from Colbert’s 

sentencing judgment created a new judgment, we turn to 

Washington law.

In Washington, only sentencing errors stemming from a 

trial court exceeding its statutory authority render a 

sentencing judgment invalid. In re Coats, 267 P.3d 324, 331 

(Wash. 2011) (en banc). Under the Sentencing Reform Act 

(SRA) in effect when Colbert was sentenced, trial courts had 

authority to require defendants to “perform affirmative

conduct reasonably related to the circumstances of the 

offense.” RCW § 9.94A.712(6)(a) (2003). The SRA also 

expressly authorized trial courts to “order the payment of a 

legal financial obligation as part of the sentence” in felony 

cases, including restitution. RCW § 9.94A.760(1) (2003). 

Indeed, requiring payment of restitution to the victim when 

the offense results in injury, including payment for 

“treatment for injury” and “the costs of counseling 

reasonably related to the offense” was expressly authorized. 

RCW § 9.94A.753(3) (2003). Therefore, we conclude that 

the trial court did not exceed its statutory authority by 

ordering Colbert to pay restitution to his victims, and thus 

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8 COLBERT V. HAYNES

there was no error in the sentence, let alone the sort of 

sentencing error that would render a judgment invalid.

The Washington Court of Appeals’ decision stating that 

removal of the victim-restitution condition was “a 

ministerial act that was not a critical stage of the proceedings 

against Colbert” further supports our conclusion. Colbert, 

2018 WL 3434708, at *2. Even if there had been an error, 

the Washington Supreme Court has indicated that sentencing 

errors correctible through ministerial action that does not 

involve exercising discretion are not errors that render the 

original sentence invalid. See State v. Ramos, 246 P.3d 811, 

812 (Wash. 2011) (en banc). Unlike a sentencing or 

resentencing, which are critical stages of a criminal 

proceeding and do involve discretionary decision-making, 

an offender has no constitutional right to be present or to 

have counsel when a court makes a ministerial sentencing 

correction. Id. Washington law is also clear that if a “trial 

court simply corrects the original judgment and sentence, it 

is the original judgment and sentence entered by the original 

trial court that controls the defendant’s conviction and term 

of incarceration.” State v. Kilgore, 216 P.3d 393, 399 (Wash. 

2009) (en banc). Accordingly, even if there had been an error 

in the sentencing, the Washington Court of Appeals’ 

characterization of the change to Colbert’s sentencing 

judgment as a “ministerial act” is compelling, if not 

determinative.

We simply see no indication in Washington statute or 

caselaw that the trial court exceeded its legal authority by 

ordering Colbert to pay restitution to his victims for their 

crime-related treatment expenses such that removing this 

restitution requirement “replace[d] an invalid sentence with 

a valid one.” Gonzalez, 873 F.3d at 769. Therefore, we hold 

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COLBERT V. HAYNES 9

that Colbert’s habeas application does not seek to challenge 

a new, intervening judgment.

B. Does Colbert satisfy the requirements for filing a 

second or successive habeas petition?

Having concluded that the sentencing judgment Colbert 

seeks to challenge is not a new judgment, we turn to whether 

Colbert satisfies the requirements for filing a second or 

successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). There are two 

circumstances in which a second or successive petition 

challenging a state court judgment is permitted. First, where 

the applicant’s claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional 

law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court.” Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). And second, where 

the applicant could not have reasonably discovered the 

factual basis for his claims at the time of his initial habeas 

petition and the previously undiscovered facts, if true, prove 

by clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable fact 

finder could not “have found the applicant guilty of the 

underlying offense.” Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B); Brown v. Muniz, 

889 F.3d 661, 668 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. 

Brown v. Hatton, 139 S. Ct. 841 (2019).

Before addressing whether Colbert can make a prima 

facie showing under § 2244(b)(2), we address two 

procedural points. Colbert argues it is premature for the 

Court to consider whether he satisfies the second or 

successive petition requirements because when the Court 

appointed him counsel it directed the parties to address only 

whether the change to Colbert’s sentencing judgment 

constituted a new judgment. We disagree. The ultimate issue 

before the Court is whether Colbert can proceed with his 

habeas petition, and the Court’s prior order does not preclude 

this panel from considering whether Colbert satisfies the 

requirements for filing a second or successive petition in the 

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10 COLBERT V. HAYNES

event we conclude, as we have, that the judgment he seeks 

to challenge is not new. Colbert also argues that determining 

whether his petition meets § 2244(b)(2)’s requirements 

requires a “complete record review.” Again, we disagree. 

The only new facts raised in Colbert’s petition relate to 

removal of the victim-restitution condition, which are 

currently before the Court.

Turning to the merits of the § 2244(b)(2) analysis, none 

of the arguments raised in Colbert’s petition relate to a new 

constitutional rule. Likewise, each of his arguments raises a 

procedural error that, even if proven true, has no bearing on 

his guilt. Therefore, Colbert cannot make the necessary 

prima facie showing under either § 2244(b)(2)(A) or (B), 

and we must deny his application for leave to file a second 

or successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).

III. CONCLUSION

Removal of the victim-restitution condition from 

Colbert’s sentencing judgment did not create a new, 

intervening judgment under Washington law. Therefore, to 

proceed with his habeas petition, Colbert must satisfy the 

requirements for filing a second or successive petition under 

§ 2244(b)(2), which he cannot do. Colbert’s application for 

leave to file his habeas petition is

DENIED.

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