Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00954/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00954-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry Davis
Defendant
Empi, Inc.
Defendant
Julia Piazza
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Julia Piazza,

Plaintiff,

v.

EMPI, Inc., Larry Davis, and

DOES 1 - XX,

Defendants.

1:07-cv-00954-OWW-GSA

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND (Doc. 6) AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

STRIKE THE DECLARATION OF

HARRY L. ZIMMERMAN (Doc. 11)

I. Introduction.

This case concerns claims for the sexual harassment, sexual

battery, retaliation, wrongful termination of Julia Piazza

(“Plaintiff”), and failure to pay wages by EMPI, Inc. (“EMPI”)

and Larry Davis (“Davis”) (collectively “Defendants”). Before

the court for decision are Plaintiff’s motion to remand this case

to the Fresno County Superior Court (“Motion to Remand”) and

Plaintiff’s motion to strike the declaration of Harry L.

Zimmerman (“Motion to Strike”). EMPI opposes both motions. EMPI

submitted Davis’s Declaration (“Davis Declaration”) in support of

its opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. Davis, however,

has not been served with a copy of the summons and First Amended

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 Plaintiff attempted to serve Davis with the summons and 1

First Amended Complaint on July 29, 2007, through substituted

service. Plaintiff left a copy of the summons and First Amended

Complaint with an individual by the name of Sherri Davis at 2914

Sommer Star Road, Placerville, CA 95667, a dwelling house or

usual place of abode. This is Davis’s former residence, which he

sold in May 2006. Davis Decl. ¶ 4. Davis does not know of any

individual named Sherri Davis and has never authorized anyone

with that name to accept legal service on his behalf. Davis

Decl. ¶ 5.

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Complaint as of August 24, 2007. Davis Decl. ¶ 5. For the 1

reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and Motion to

Strike are denied.

II. Background.

Plaintiff filed her original Complaint for Compensatory and

Punitive Damages (“Original Complaint”) in Fresno County Superior

Court on April 18, 2007, alleging state law causes of action for

sexual harassment and retaliation, sexual battery, termination in

violation of public policy, breach of employment contract,

failure to pay wages, and waiting time and penalties. Plaintiff

served EMPI by personal service on April 24, 2007. The proof of

service, which was filed with the Fresno County Superior Court on

May 15, 2007, indicates “Lynn Masanz: Managing Agent for Service

of Process” at “599 Cardigan Road[,] St. Paul, MN. 55126-4099” on

“4-24-07” at “1:15 p.m.” received the summons and Original

Complaint on behalf of EMPI.

Lynn Masanz (“Masanz”), the individual whom Plaintiff served

with the Original Complaint, is a medical billing assistant in

EMPI’s Minnesota office. Masanz Decl. ¶ 1; Zimmerman Suppl.

Decl. ¶ 3. As a medical billing assistant Masanz handles

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invoices and requests for medical records. Masanz Decl. ¶ 2. 

Masanz is not an officer, managing agent, or general agent of

EMPI. Masanz Decl. ¶ 4; Zimmerman Suppl. Decl. ¶ 3. EMPI never

authorized Masanz to receive service of process on behalf of the

company. Masanz Decl. ¶ 4; Zimmerman Suppl. Decl. ¶ 3. 

On May 14, 2007, Robert Kristoff (“Kristoff”), counsel for

EMPI, called Plaintiff’s counsel and spoke with his assistant. 

Kristoff Decl. ¶ 3. Kristoff informed her that EMPI had not been

properly served with the Original Complaint, and the Original

Complaint incorrectly named EMPI as “EMPI Medical, Inc.” Id.

Kristoff also informed Plaintiff’s counsel’s assistant that if

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint with EMPI’s correct

name and sent it to Kristoff, he would accept service on behalf

of EMPI. Id. On June 1, 2007, Kristoff received a copy of the

summons and First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) correctly identifying

EMPI. Id. at ¶ 4. Kristoff signed an acknowledgment of receipt

and accepted service on behalf of EMPI that same day. Id.

In response to the FAC, which was filed in Fresno County

Superior Court on May 23, 2007, EMPI filed its Notice of Removal

on July 2, 2007. EMPI’s Notice of Removal invokes the federal

court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a)(1).

III. Legal Standard.

A district court may remand to state court a case that has

been removed to the district court if at any time it appears that

the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c). A motion to remand on the basis of any defect in the

removal procedure must be made within 30 days of the filing of

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the notice of removal. Id. Where a motion for remand is not

made within 30 days of removal of the case to the district court,

the court must remand the case to state court sua sponte when

federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. A federal court

must determine its own jurisdiction even if the parties fail to

raise the issue. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,

230-31 (1990).

Federal courts construe removal statutes strictly to limit

removal jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313

U.S. 100, 108 (1941); Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.

1992). Removal is generally proper when the district courts have

original jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441;

Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Jurisdiction must be determined from the face of the complaint,

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987), and it

must be clear from the face of the complaint under the

well-pleaded complaint rule that federal subject matter

jurisdiction exists. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n. v. Graham, 489 U.S.

838, 840-41 (1989) (per curiam).

IV. Discussion.

A. Motion to Strike Zimmerman Declaration.

Before turning to the merits of the Motion to Remand,

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike must be addressed. Plaintiff filed

two identical and separate documents entitled “Plaintiff’s Notice

of Motion and Motion To Strike Declaration of Harry L. Zimmerman

Submitted by Defendant EMPI in Support of EMPI’s Notice of

Removal.” (Docs. 11 and 12). The Motion to Strike reads “This

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motion will be based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of

Points and Authorities, on all pleadings and documents on file

herein, and on such other oral and documentary evidence that may

be presented at the hearing of this motion.” Plaintiff neither

attached a memorandum of points and authorities to her Motion to

Strike (Docs. 11 and 12), nor did she file the memorandum of

points and authorities as a separate document. EMPI filed an

opposition brief to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. Plaintiff did

not file a reply brief.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, however, references her Motion

to Strike. In the Motion to Remand, Plaintiff contends there is

no evidentiary support submitted in EMPI’s Notice of Removal to

establish the citizenship of either EMPI or Davis. Plaintiff

further contends the Zimmerman Declaration lacks foundation,

contains impermissible hearsay, and contains conclusory

allegations.

On July 2, 2007, and in conjunction with its Notice of

Removal, EMPI filed the “Declaration of Harry L. Zimmerman in

Support of Notice of Removal” (“Zimmerman Declaration”). In the

Zimmerman Declaration, Mr. Zimmerman declares that he is the

Executive Vice President and General Counsel of EMPI; that EMPI

is incorporated under the laws of Minnesota and maintained its

principal place of business in Minnesota, both at the time of

removal and when Plaintiff commenced this case; that according to

EMPI’s personnel records, Davis’s home residence changed from

California to Missouri on June 19, 2006, based on Davis’s

communication to EMPI that he moved to Missouri; and that on June

27, 2007, Mr. Zimmerman called Davis at his home in Missouri, and

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as of that date, Davis was still residing there.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike lacks merit. The first

paragraph of the Zimmerman Declaration indicates Mr. Zimmerman is

the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of EMPI. 

Because of his high-level position with EMPI, Mr. Zimmerman has

personal knowledge of information concerning the company’s legal

status, state of incorporation, and principal place of business. 

While the Zimmerman Declaration does not include EMPI’s articles

of incorporation, Mr. Zimmerman’s personal knowledge may include

inferences and opinions, so long as they are grounded in personal

observation and experience. United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190,

1206 (1st Cir. 1994). As general counsel, Zimmerman has access

to intimate information regarding EMPI’s legal affairs. In any

event, EMPI filed the “Supplemental Declaration of Harry

Zimmerman In Support of Defendant EMPI, Inc.’s Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand” (“Supplemental Zimmerman

Declaration”), which further clarifies any infirmities with the

Zimmerman Declaration. Attached to the Supplemental Zimmerman

Declaration are EMPI’s “Articles of Amendment and Restated

Articles of Incorporation of EMPI, Inc.[,]” which were signed by

Mr. Zimmerman on February 26, 2007, and filed with the Minnesota

Secretary of State on March 2, 2007. The Restated Articles of

Incorporation establish EMPI is a Minnesota corporation.

Mr. Zimmerman’s reference to EMPI’s personnel records

maintained in the ordinary course of the company’s business

indicating Davis moved from California to Missouri on June 19,

2006 is not hearsay. “Hearsay is a statement, other than one

made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,

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offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 801(d). “Hearsay is not admissible except as

provided by these rules . . . .” Fed. R. Evid 802. Federal Rule

of Evidence (“FRE”) 803 contains numerous exceptions to the

hearsay rule. Among these exceptions is the business records

exception which provides:

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any

form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or

diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from

information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if

kept in the course of a regularly conducted business

activity, and if it was the regular practice of that

business activity to make the memorandum, report, record

or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the

custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification

that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a

statute permitting certification, unless the source of

information or the method or circumstances of preparation

indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as

used in this paragraph includes business, institution,

association, profession, occupation, and calling of every

kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The Zimmerman Declaration indicates EMPI

maintains personnel records in its ordinary course of business,

and the company’s records indicate Davis’s home address changed

from California to Missouri on June 19, 2006. This portion of

the Zimmerman Declaration falls within the business records

exception to the hearsay rule. While Plaintiff may challenge the

sufficiency of Davis’s home address contained in EMPI’s business

records to determine his citizenship for diversity jurisdiction

purposes, that inquiry is separate and distinct from the

standards for admissibility. 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Zimmerman Declaration is

DENIED. 

B. Request for Judicial Notice.

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Plaintiff requests the court to take judicial notice of

EMPI’s registration with the California Secretary of State under

FRE 201(b). Attached to Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice

is a copy of EMPI’s registration from the California Secretary of

State’s website. EMPI does not oppose Plaintiff’s request for

judicial notice. EMPI’s registration with the California

Secretary of State is an official public record and its contents

are not reasonably in dispute; it is therefore appropriately the

subject of judicial notice under FRE 201(b)(2). Association of

Irritated Residents v. Fred Schakel Dairy, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1185,

1189-90 (E.D. Cal. 2006); see also Reiner v. Washington Plate

Glass Co., Inc., 711 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (taking

judicial notice of appellee’s date of incorporation by consulting

the records of the District of Columbia Recorder of Deeds

Office).

The attached copy of EMPI’s registration contains the

following information:

CORPORATION

EMPI, INC. WHICH WILL DO BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA AS EMPI, INC.

(MINNESOTA)

NUMBER: C1881016 DATE FILED: 1/5/1994 STATUS: Surrender

JURISDICTION: Minnesota

ADDRESS

599 Cardigan Road

ST Paul, MN 55126

AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS

The Prentice-Hall Corporation System, Inc.

PO Box 526036

Sacramento, CA 95852

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 A search of the California Secretary of State’s website 2

using the term “EMPI” produced five results, one of which

provides EMPI’s current registration and another being the

registration that Plaintiff requested the court to take judicial

notice of.

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The copy of EMPI’s registration also contains the following

disclaimer: “If the status of the corporation is ‘Surrender’, the

agent for service of process is automatically revoked. Please

refer to California Corporations Code Section 2114 for

information relating to service upon corporations that have

surrendered.” The document that Plaintiff requests the court to

take judicial notice of indicates EMPI’s status was in fact

“Surrender.” The copy of EMPI’s registration indicates the

information was current as of July 20, 2007.

For the same reasons stated above, the court also takes

judicial notice of EMPI’s current registration status with the

California Secretary of State under FRE 201(c). EMPI’s current 2

registration status is “Active.” EMPI’s current registration

contains the following information:

CORPORATION

EMPI, INC. WHICH WILL DO BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA AS EMPI, INC.

(MINNESOTA)

NUMBER: C2976714 DATE FILED: 3/8/2007 STATUS: Active

JURISDICTION: Minnesota

ADDRESS

9800 Metric Blvd

Austin, TX 78758

AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS

CT Corporation System

818 West Seventh St

Los Angeles, CA 90017

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Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. 

C. Motion to Remand to Fresno County Superior Court.

Plaintiff advances several reasons why the court should

remand this case to Fresno County Superior Court. First, EMPI’s

Notice of Removal was untimely. Second, EMPI’s Notice of Removal

was factually deficient and cannot be supplemented. Third,

complete diversity does not exist between the parties. Fourth,

EMPI failed to establish that the amount in controversy

requirement is satisfied. 

1. Timeliness of EMPI’s Notice of Removal.

Plaintiff contends EMPI’s Notice of Removal was untimely

because EMPI waited sixty-nine days after service to file its

Notice of Removal. EMPI maintains it timely filed its Notice of

Removal on July 2, 2007, because Plaintiff’s service of her

Original Complaint and summons on April 24, 2007, was

ineffective. EMPI further maintains Plaintiff properly

effectuated service of the FAC and summons on June 1, 2007, which

triggered the thirty-day period to remove this case from state

court to federal court.

“Any civil action brought in a State court of which the

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,

may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the

district court of the United States for the district and division

embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a). If a defendant or defendants desire to remove a civil

action from state court to federal court, they must file “a

notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules

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of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of

the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process,

pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in

such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). 

“The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall

be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant,

through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading

setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or

proceeding is based . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). “The

statutory time limit for removal petitions is merely a formal and

modal requirement and is not jurisdictional.” Fristoe v.

Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980). 

“Although the time limit is mandatory and a timely objection to a

late petition will defeat removal, a party may waive the defect

or be estopped from objecting to the untimeliness by sitting on

his rights.” Id.

Plaintiff correctly identifies the proper method to

effectuate service upon a corporation under California law and

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In California, “[a] civil

action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Cal.

Code. Civ. P. § 411.10. “[T]he court in which an action is

pending has jurisdiction over a party from the time the summons

is served on him as provided by Chapter 4 (commencing with

Section 413.10.” Cal. Code. Civ. P. § 410.50. 

A summons may be served upon a corporation by delivering

a copy of the summons and the complaint by any of the

following methods:

(a) To the person designated as agent for service of

process [as provided by the California

Corporations Code].

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(b) To the president, chief executive officer, or

other head of the corporation, a vice president, a

secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or

assistant treasurer, a controller or chief

financial officer, a general manager, or a person

authorized by the corporation to receive service

of process.

Cal. Code. Civ. P. § 416.10. Similarly, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure provide service upon a corporation may be

effected 

[pursuant to the law of the state in which the district

court is located], or by delivering a copy of the summons

and complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent,

or to any other agent authorized by appointment or law to

receive service of process and, if the agent is one

authorized by statute to receive service and the statute

so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant . .

. .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1).

Plaintiff did not properly serve EMPI on April 24, 2007. 

Plaintiff’s proof of service describes service on Lynn Masanz as

EMPI’s “managing agent for service of process.” The proof of

service asserts Fresno Attorney Service and Andy Lonergan

personally served Lynn Masanz. It is unclear whether Plaintiff’s

counsel, Fresno Attorney Service, or Andy Lonergan completed the

proof of service naming Lynn Masanz as EMPI’s managing agent. 

EMPI has provided clear and uncontroverted evidence, through the

Supplemental Zimmerman Declaration and Lynn Masanz’s own

declaration (“Masanz Declaration”), that Masanz is not an

individual authorized to receive service on behalf of EMPI. 

Masanz is a medical billing assistant—a low-level employee at

EMPI—who handles medical invoices and requests for medical

records. Masanz states in her declaration that she is neither an

officer, managing agent, or high-ranking employee, nor has she

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ever been authorized to accept service of process on behalf of

EMPI, nor has Mr. Zimmerman ever authorized her to accept

service. Masanz admits in her declaration that she received a

package on April 24, 2007, which contained the Original

Complaint, and that she forwarded it on to the administrative

assistant to the Executive Vice President of Operations. As

Masanz is not a person authorized to receive service under

California Code of Civil Procedure § 416.10, Plaintiff’s

attempted service on EMPI of the Original Complaint and summons

is invalid.

The only remaining question is whether under 28 U.S.C. §

1446(b), the thirty-day removal period is triggered when the

defendant receives a summons and complaint regardless of whether

service was proper, or whether proper service is a prerequisite

to commencement of the thirty-day removal period. Two cases

provide useful guidance. In Estate of Baratt v. Phoenix Mut.

Life Ins. Co., 787 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), the district

court held that improper service did not trigger the thirty-day

removal period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). In Baratt, the

plaintiff’s process server served a summons with notice on a

part-time receptionist at the defendant’s company on December 9,

1991. The receptionist’s duties included greeting people who

came to the office, typing, opening mail, answering phones, and

reviewing the completeness of insurance applications. On January

23, 1992, plaintiff served a copy of the summons with notice on

the New York State Insurance Department, which defendant received

on January 27, 1992. On January 30, 1992, defendant removed the

case from state court to federal court. Plaintiff sought to

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remand the case arguing the thirty-day time period to file a

notice of removal began on December 9, 1991, when service was

made upon the receptionist. Defendant argued its removal notice

was timely because the thirty-day removal period did not begin to

run until it received the properly served summons on January 27,

1992. The court reasoned “the through service or otherwise”

language in § 1446(b) “was not intended to diminish the right to

removal by permitting a plaintiff to avoid state service

requirements.” Baratt, 787 F. Supp. at 336. The court also

noted the “‘or otherwise’ language of section 1446(b) was not

intended to permit a plaintiff to substitute informal or improper

service for the traditional requirements of personal service.” 

Id. at 337.

More recently, in Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe

Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999), the Supreme Court addressed

a slightly different issue that sheds light on the commencement

of the thirty-day removal period in § 1446(b). The issue before

the Court in Murphy Bros. was whether the named defendant must be

officially summoned to appear in the action before the time to

remove begins, or does the thirty-day period start earlier, on

the named defendant’s receipt, before service of official

process, of a courtesy copy of the filed complaint faxed by

plaintiff’s counsel. On January 26, 1996, the plaintiff had

filed a complaint in state court for breach of contract and

fraud. Three days later, on January 29, plaintiff faxed a

courtesy copy of the file-stamped complaint to one of the

defendant’s vice presidents. It was not until February 12, 1996,

that plaintiff officially served defendant under local law by

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certified mail. The defendant removed the case to federal court

on March 13, 2006, thirty days after service and forty-four days

after receiving the faxed courtesy copy. The Court held that a

defendant’s time to remove is triggered by simultaneous service

of the summons and complaint. Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 347-48. 

In reaching this conclusion, the Court read Congress’s provisions

for removal in light of the following bedrock principal: “An

individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to

engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought

under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Id. at 347

(emphasis added). Service of process, the Court noted, is

fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant

under a longstanding tradition in our system of justice. Id. at

350. “In the absence of service of process . . . a court

ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the complaint

names as a defendant.” Id. Service of the summons is the

mechanism by which a court asserts jurisdiction over the person

of the party served. Id. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and

is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of

a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time

within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id.

The facts of Barrat are indistinguishable from this case,

and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Murphy Bros. is equally

compelling. In California, a court obtains jurisdiction over a

party “from the time the summons is served upon him as provided

by Chapter 4.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.50 (emphasis added). 

As previously determined, Plaintiff did not serve EMPI as

provided under California Code of Civil Procedure § 416.10 (a

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section in Chapter 4), the statute for effecting service upon a

corporation. Instead of serving the Original Complaint and

summons on a person authorized by law to receive service under §

416.10, Plaintiff served Masanz, a low-level medical billing

assistant and an individual not authorized to receive service

under California law or with EMPI’s authorization. Consequently,

under Barrat and Murphy Bros., the thirty-day period for EMPI to

remove this case to federal court began to run on June 1, 2007,

when EMPI’s counsel Kristoff, was properly served with a copy of

the FAC and summons. Thirty days after June 1, 2007, was July 1,

2007, a Sunday. Therefore, EMPI had until Monday, July 2, 2007,

to file a timely notice of removal, which it did. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a)(3).

2. Factual Sufficiency of EMPI’s Notice of Removal.

Plaintiff contends EMPI’s Notice of Removal should be

rejected because there is no admissible evidence before the court 

to establish Davis’s citizenship. Plaintiff maintains the Notice

of Removal and Zimmerman Declaration both fail to establish

Davis’s citizenship and refute the allegation in Plaintiff’s FAC

that Davis is a California citizen. Plaintiff also argues EMPI

is not entitled to amend the Notice of Removal or provide

additional evidence of Davis’s citizenship in its opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. In support of her position,

Plaintiff cites two Ninth Circuit cases, Sanchez v. Monumental

Life Ins. Co. 102 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 1996), and Gaus v. Miles,

Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992), and two unpublished cases

from the Northern District of California, Kanaan v. Freescale

Semiconductor, Inc., 2007 WL 420241 (N.D. Cal. 2007), and Henry

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v. Emery Worldwide, 2003 WL 715899 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Plaintiff

cites these cases for the proposition that the notice of removal

statute is strictly construed, and that a defendant cannot amend

or supplement a previously filed notice of removal. 

EMPI contends the court may consider supplemental evidence

provided in its opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand for

purposes of curing any defect in the original Notice of Removal.

It is well-settled that the notice of removal statute is

strictly construed. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. However, the cases

Plaintiff cite do not support her position that a defendant

cannot amend or supplement a previously filed notice of removal. 

Plaintiff would have the court unduly “exalt form over substance

and legal flaw-picking over the orderly disposition of cases

properly committed to federal courts.” Barrow Dev. Co., Inc. v.

Fulton Ins. Co., 418 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1969). 

Gaus does not help Plaintiff. In Gaus, the defendant made

an unsupported allegation in its notice of removal that the

amount in controversy exceeded $50,000. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567. 

The defendant stated “the matter in current controversy . . .

exceeds the sum of $50,000.” Id. Gaus found this allegation was

insufficient for removal of the case from state court because no

underlying facts supported the allegation. Id. 

Sanchez is another amount in controversy case. In Sanchez,

the court held that the defendant failed to meet the amount in

controversy requirement. Sanchez, 102 F.3d at 404-06. The

amount in controversy requirement at the time was $50,000. Id.

at 405. The defendant alleged contract damages of $12,500, and

also cited California Civil Code § 3345, which permitted the

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trebling of damages, bringing the amount in controversy to

$50,000. Id. The defendant argued that because plaintiff’s noncontract claims for relief exceeded $0.00, the amount in

controversy requirement had been met. Id. The court concluded,

however, the defendant’s calculation of the amount in controversy

was “entirely premised on a misinterpretation of [the statute

permitting the trebling of damages,]” and had therefore failed to

meet its burden of proof. Id. Plaintiff also had a claim to

force the disgorgement of profits from the defendant. Id. The

court concluded that the defendant “provided us with absolutely

no evidence which would allow us to determine the extent of the

loss which it might incur if an injunction is granted forcing it

to disgorge the premiums.” Id. In Sanchez, the case was

remanded to state court because defendant misinterpreted the

applicability of the trebling statute and failed to provide any

evidence of loss it might incur. Id.

Kanaan involved an employment dispute where the citizenship

of the parties was at issue. Kanaan, 2007 WL 420241 at *1. The

facts of Kanaan are straightforward. Plaintiff was a California

resident when the defendant solicited him to apply for a position

reporting to one of the defendant’s senior vice presidents. Id.

The defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal place

in Texas. Id. Plaintiff accepted a position with the defendant

and resigned his current position in California. Id. Shortly

before commencing his employment with the defendant, the

plaintiff learned that the vice president he would be reporting

to was being replaced. Id. Plaintiff was told that he would

still have a job, although the exact title and responsibilities

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were not certain. Id. Based on these assurances, plaintiff

alleged he put his home in California up for sale and moved his

family to Texas. Id. Plaintiff began working for the defendant

but was terminated several months later. Id. Plaintiff filed

suit in the Superior Court of California for San Francisco County

for promissory fraud, intentional and negligent infliction of

emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, and a violation

of the California Labor Code. Id. The defendant removed the

case to federal court alleging diversity of citizenship. Id.

The defendant alleged that it was a Delaware corporation with its

principal place of business in Texas. Id. The defendant alleged

on information and belief that plaintiff was a California citizen

based on the fact that plaintiff had alleged in his complaint

that he “at all relevant times mentioned herein was a resident of

the State of California.” Id. The plaintiff moved to remand

contending at the time the complaint was filed he had been living

with his family in Texas where he had purchased a home, he was

actively seeking employment in Texas, and it was his intention to

remain in Texas. Id. at *2. The court determined that the

complaint did not adequately allege plaintiff’s citizenship, and

that it also indicated plaintiff had moved to Texas. Id. The

plaintiff submitted a declaration stating that he moved to Texas

from California to accept a position with the defendant, that he

purchased a home in Texas, that he was actively seeking

employment in Texas, that he intended to remain in Texas, and

that his children were enrolled in Texas schools. Id. at *3. 

Because defendant offered no evidence to rebut plaintiff’s

declaration or to support its allegation that plaintiff was a

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California citizen, the court remanded the case to state court. 

Id.

Henry is a wrongful discharge case where the issue was the

defendant’s principal place of business. Henry, 2003 WL 715899

at *1. In its notice of removal, the defendant stated (1) that

the amount in controversy was satisfied because the plaintiff

sought emotional distress damages in excess of $500,000, and (2)

that the defendant was not a citizen of California, plaintiff’s

state of citizenship. Id. The defendant was a Delaware

corporation, which left only the issue whether its principal

place of business was in a state other than California, i.e., 

whether the defendant had a “substantial predominance” of its

business activities in a state other than California. Id. at *2. 

Defendant conceded its “nerve center” was in California. Id.

The court held that the defendant failed to meet its burden of

showing that a “substantial predominance” of its business

activities were in a state other than California, and remanded

the case to state court. Id. at *5. The court found, inter

alia, that the defendant failed to provide evidence regarding the

location of 56% of its workforce, how many of its employees

interacted with the public, the amount of freight shipped to and

from various states in which it did business, the real property

it owned, its sources of income, or where its sales took place.

Id. at *3-4. In Henry, the defendant provided some evidence, but

failed to provide sufficient relevant evidence of residence to

enable the court to perform a meaningful analysis under the

substantial predominance of business test. 

By contrast, determining the citizenship of an individual

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is, generally, a less arduous task than determining the

citizenship of a large corporation doing business nationally. 

Here, EMPI has provided substantial factual evidence regarding

Davis’s citizenship through the Zimmerman and Davis Declarations. 

Sinclair, Gaus, Kanaan, and Henry do not stand for the

proposition that a defendant cannot amend or supplement a

previously filed notice of removal. The common thread of these

cases is the defendant’s failure to provide any evidence

regarding the amount in controversy or the citizenship of a

particular party. Here, by contrast, EMPI stated in its notice

of removal that Davis was a citizen of Missouri because he

resided there. Unlike the defendants in Gaus, Sanchez, Kanaan,

and Henry, EMPI provided the following evidence that Davis was a

Missouri citizen: (1) the Zimmerman Declaration, which states

“According to the personnel records maintained by EMPI in the

ordinary course of its business, Larry Davis’s home residence was

changed from California to Missouri on June 19, 2006, based on

his communication to EMPI that he moved his home residence to

Missouri[;]” and (2) the Davis Declaration that states that in

May 2006 he sold his residence at 2914 Sommmer Star Road in

Placerville, California, that he bought a residence at 78 Harbor

View Drive in Reeds Spring, Missouri, that he intended to remain

in Missouri indefinitely, that he registered to vote and obtained

a driver’s license in Missouri, that he paid Missouri state

income taxes in 2007, and that he currently resides in Missouri. 

EMPI’s evidentiary submissions are sufficient to support its

removal notice.

Plaintiff’s argument that EMPI is not entitled to amend its

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 Plaintiff objects that EMPI filed Davis’s declaration in 3

conjunction with its opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand

rather than with its notice of removal. At the hearing on

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, counsel for EMPI satisfactorily

explained the delay in obtaining and submitting Davis’s

declaration. EMPI no longer employed Davis as of November 2006

and had no control over him at the time this lawsuit was filed in

state court and when EMPI filed its notice of removal on July 2,

2007. Counsel for EMPI explained it was difficult to reach Davis

while they were preparing the notice of removal, and Davis was

unaccessible two days before the thirty-day limit on filing a

notice of removal would have expired.

22

notice of removal or provide additional evidence of Davis’s

citizenship after the time period expired for filing a notice of

removal ignores the Ninth Circuit’s Barrow decision. In Barrow,

the court held that allegations in a removal notice that are

defective in form, but not so lacking in substance, may be

amended. Barrow, 418 F.2d at 318. The court held that allowing

amendment of a formally defective removal notice that is not

lacking in substance is the majority view. Id. The Barrow court

also specifically rejected the rigid formality Plaintiff suggests

should be followed here, to strictly construe the notice of

removal statute to prevent supplementation or amendment. Id.

The Davis Declaration merely supplements EMPI’s notice of

removal. EMPI’s notice of removal was not so lacking in

substance that it could not be amended or supplemented with the

information contained in the Davis Declaration. The Barrow 3

court also held that 28 U.S.C. § 1653 applies to removed actions

as well as actions initiated in United States District Courts. 

Id. at 317. Section 1653 provides: “Defective allegations of

jurisdiction may be amended upon terms, in the trial or appellate

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 Section 1653 was enacted in 1948 and has never been 4

amended.

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courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Plaintiff has offered no evidence 4

to rebut the Zimmerman Declaration and the Davis Declaration. 

Plaintiff’s argument rests solely on an allegation in the FAC to

establish Davis’s citizenship in California. Through EMPI’s

notice of removal, the Zimmerman Declaration, and the Davis

Declaration, EMPI has met its burden to provide substantial

evidence which overcomes Plaintiff’s assertion that Davis is a

California citizen.

3. Complete Diversity of the Parties.

Plaintiff contends diversity of citizenship is absent

between Plaintiff, EMPI, and Davis. Plaintiff argues all parties

are California citizens. EMPI argues the parties are completely

diverse as Plaintiff is a citizen of California, EMPI is a

citizen of Minnesota, and Davis is a citizen of Missouri. 

Plaintiff’s California citizenship is not disputed.

“Subject matter jurisdiction based upon diversity of

citizenship requires that no defendant have the same citizenship

as any plaintiff.” Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better

Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001). 

a. Diversity as to EMPI

“In determining whether there is diversity between corporate

parties, a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any

State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it

has its principal place of business.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §

1332(c)) (internal quotations omitted). “Thus, corporations are

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 Plaintiff’s argument the Zimmerman Declaration lacks 5

foundation, contains inadmissible hearsay, and contains

conclusory allegations, rendering the Notice of Removal

ineffective lacks merit and is not repeated here.

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citizens of both the state where they are incorporated and the

state where they have their principal place of business.” Id.

“Federal courts generally use one of two tests to determine

a corporation’s principal place of business.” Tosco, 236 F.3d at

499. “First, the ‘place of operations test’ locates a

corporation’s principal place of business in the state which

‘contains a substantial predominance of corporate operations’.” 

Id. (citing Industrial Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d

1090, 1092 (9th Cir.1990)). “Second, the ‘nerve center test’

locates a corporation’s principal place of business in the state

where the majority of its executive and administrative functions

are performed.” Tosco, 236 F.3d at 499 (citing Industrial

Tectonics, 912 F.2d at 1092-93). 

The Ninth Circuit uses a hybrid approach to determine where

a corporation’s principal place of business is located. The

“total activities” or “hybrid test” is as follows:

Where a majority of a corporation’s business activity

takes place in one state, that state is the corporation’s

principal place of business, even if the corporate

headquarters are located in a different state. The

“nerve center” test should be used only when no state

contains a substantial predominance of the corporation’s

business activities.

Industrial Tectonics, 912 F.2d at 1094.

Plaintiff’s assertion that EMPI is a citizen of California

is unfounded. Plaintiff’s FAC only states “EMPI, Inc., is a 5

corporation doing business in the State of California, and doing

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business in the County of Fresno” and is devoid of facts to

determine EMPI’s true citizenship. Plaintiff has not provided

any additional evidence to determine EMPI’s citizenship other

than alleging its state of incorporation. In any event, “the

burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party

seeking removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed

against removal jurisdiction.” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix

(U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Emrich

v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Here, that party is EMPI.

EMPI has provided clear, convincing, and uncontroverted

evidence that it is a citizen of Minnesota. The Zimmerman

Declaration, the Supplemental Zimmerman Declaration that contains

EMPI’s articles of incorporation, and Plaintiff’s request for

judicial notice of EMPI’s registration with the California

Secretary of State unquestionably establish EMPI is incorporated

under the laws of the State of Minnesota. If EMPI’s principal

place of business is in California, complete diversity will not

exist.

EMPI’s principal place of business is in Minnesota. EMPI

manufactures and sells medical devices. The Supplemental

Zimmerman Declaration, which Plaintiff does not refute, indicates

the bulk of EMPI’s workforce is based in Minnesota. EMPI employs

approximately 988 individuals. EMPI’s Minnesota office has 443

employees, or approximately 44.8% of its workforce. EMPI’s South

Dakota Manufacturing centers have 149 employees, or approximately

15.1% of its workforce. EMPI’s Kentucky office has 83 employees,

or approximately 8.4% of its workforce. EMPI’s Florida office

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has 4 employees, or 0.4% of its workforce. The remaining 232

employees sell EMPI products throughout the United States. Of

these 232 salespeople, only 14 are based in California, or

approximately 6% of its salesforce and 1.4% of EMPI’s entire

workforce. These numbers establish that a substantial

predominance of EMPI’s business activities are conducted in

Minnesota. EMPI’s principal place of business is Minnesota. 

EMPI’s citizenship for diversity jurisdiction purposes is

Minnesota.

It is unnecessary to analyze the company’s citizenship under

the “nerve center” test. Assuming, arguendo, no state contained

a substantial predominance of EMPI’s business activities, EMPI

would also be a citizen of Minnesota under the nerve center test. 

EMPI exercises day-to-day control of its entire business from its

corporate headquarters in Minnesota, nearly all of EMPI’s

executives maintain their offices in Minnesota, EMPI’s

administrative and financial offices are in Minnesota, and EMPI

keeps and maintains its records at its Minnesota headquarters.

b. Diversity as to Davis.

Federal district courts are vested with original

jurisdiction over matters in controversy between “citizens of

different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The determination of

a litigant’s state citizenship for purposes of section 1332(a)(1)

is controlled by federal common law, not by the law of any state. 

Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th

Cir. 1983). “To show state citizenship for diversity purposes

under federal common law a party must (1) be a citizen of the

United States, and (2) be domiciled in the state.” Id. 

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Section 1332—the diversity jurisdiction statute—“speaks of

citizenship, not of residency.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co.,

265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). “To be a citizen of a state,

a natural person must first be a citizen of the United States.” 

Id. “The natural person’s state citizenship is then determined

by her state of domicile, not her state of residence.” Id. A

person’s domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with

the intention to remain or to which she intends to return.” Id.

An individual’s manifestation of intent to remain in a location

is gauged by various objective factors including where the

individual resides, is employed, has assets, is registered to

vote, seeks medical treatment, has a driver’s license, banks, and

pays state taxes. See, e.g., Altimore v. Mount Mercy Coll., 420

F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2005).

EMPI has provided, clear, convincing, and uncontroverted

evidence that Davis is a citizen of Missouri. The Notice of

Removal states Davis is now, and was at the time Plaintiff

commenced this case, a citizen of Missouri because he resides and

is domiciled there. Davis used to work for EMPI as its vice

president of sales, which required him to travel throughout the

United States. Davis Decl. ¶ 2. In November 2006, Davis severed

his employment with EMPI. Id. However, while Davis was still

employed with EMPI, he decided to move to Missouri because it was

easier, in terms of work-related travel, to be centrally located. 

Id. at ¶ 3. In May 2006, approximately ten months before

Plaintiff filed her Original Complaint, Davis sold his former

California residence located at 2914 Sommer Star Road, in

Placerville. Id. at ¶ 4. In June 2006, Davis moved to Missouri

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and bought a house located at 78 Harbor View Drive, in Reed

Springs, Missouri, where he presently resides. Id. Upon moving

to Missouri, Davis registered to vote, obtained a Missouri

driver’s license, and paid Missouri state taxes in April 2007. 

Id. Davis also has family ties to Missouri. Id. Davis’s mother

and father live in Missouri, and his daughter and her family

moved to Missouri around the same time Davis moved in June 2006. 

Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. These uncontroverted facts clearly establish

Davis has planted his roots in Missouri and intends to remain

there. 

Plaintiff’s argument that Davis is a California citizen is

not supported by the record. The only evidence Plaintiff

provides to establish Davis’s citizenship is the declaration of

Jesse Zuniga (“Zuniga Declaration”), a private investigator. The

activity report attached to the Zuniga Declaration contains

Davis’s California driver’s license number, which was issued in

1997 and was most recently renewed in May 2006; his social

security number; and an address of a piece of real property

located at 5101 Newton Road, Placerville, CA. The Zuniga

Declaration indicates Davis owned property located at 5101 Newton

Road in Placerville. Plaintiff provides no evidence Davis ever

resided at this property, and Davis states in his own declaration

that he bought the Newton Road property as an investment in

September 2004 and sold it in January 2007, three months before

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit. Plaintiff has not provided any

credible evidence indicating Davis is a citizen of California. 

In fact, Plaintiff’s evidence supports EMPI’s assertion that

Davis is a Missouri citizen. Curiously, the Zuniga Declaration

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also lists the address of Davis’s current residence at 78 Harbor

View Drive in Reed Springs, Missouri. Davis is a citizen of

Missouri. Complete diversity exists as Plaintiff is California

citizen, EMPI is a Minnesota citizen, and Davis is a Missouri

citizen.

4. Amount in Controversy Requirement.

Plaintiff contends the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction in this case because the FAC does not set forth the

amount of damages Plaintiff seeks and EMPI has failed to

establish that the jurisdictional amount exceeds $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs. Plaintiff also contends EMPI’s

counsel’s declaration fails to establish the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000 based on the fact that Plaintiff’s

counsel would not stipulate that Plaintiff’s damages were less

than $75,000. EMPI argues based on the nature of the allegations

in the FAC and the damages sought, Plaintiff has placed in

controversy an amount exceeding $75,000, exclusive of costs and

interest.

Diversity jurisdiction exists “where the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of

interests and costs . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In removal

cases, the amount in controversy is determined based on the

plaintiff’s complaint at the time that the notice of removal is

filed. See Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166

F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating “the amount in controversy

is measured as of the date of removal, a practice similar to that

in original jurisdiction suits where the inquiry is directed to

the time when the complaint is filed.”), abrogated on other

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ground by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.

546 (2005); see also Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537

(1939) (stating defendant’s right to remove “was to be determined

according to the plaintiffs’ pleading at the time of the petition

for removal.”). In removal cases, “[t]here is a strong

presumption that the plaintiff has not claimed a large amount in

order to confer jurisdiction on a federal court or that the

parties have colluded to that end.” Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564

at 566. 

“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means

that the defendant always bears the burden of establishing that

removal is proper.” Id. The burden of proof is on EMPI, as the

removing party, to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence

that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Guglielmino v.

McKee Foods Corp., No. 05-16144 at 13580 (9th Cir. October 9,

2007). In cases where the state court complaint is silent or

unclear as to the amount of damages sought by the plaintiff, the

defendant must prove that the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567. The defendant may prove that

the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 in one of two ways:

“(1) by demonstrating that it is facially apparent that the

claims are likely above $75,000, or (2) by setting forth the

facts in controversy–preferably in the removal petition, but

sometimes by affidavit–that support a finding of the requisite

amount.” Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th

Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original) (citing Allen v. R & H Oil &

Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff’s FAC seeks an unspecified total amount of

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special, general, compensatory, and punitive damages, and

attorney’s fees. The FAC contains six causes of action for

violation of California Government Code § 12940, et seq. for

unlawful employment practices including the prohibition of

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in employment on the

basis of sex; sexual battery; termination in violation of public

policy; breach of employment contract and wrongful termination;

failure to pay wages due and owing; and waiting time penalties. 

The prayer for relief seeks damages for loss of wages,

earnings, salary, bonuses and other employment benefits; for loss

of future wages, earnings, salary, bonuses, and benefits; for

interest under California Civil Code § 3291; general damages for

emotional and mental distress; general damages for physical

personal injury; consequential damages arising out of the

violation of Plaintiff’s statutory rights and for termination of

Plaintiff; general damages for pain and suffering, including

emotional distress; punitive damages; and attorney’s fees and

costs. Plaintiff’s failure to pay wages cause of action permits

the award of attorney’s fees under California Labor Code sections

218.5 and 1194. 

The face of the FAC establishes that Plaintiff is seeking

damages in excess of $75,000. Plaintiff alleges EMPI breached

its employment contract with her by refusing to pay her

approximately $30,000 in earned wages and commissions. FAC ¶ 39. 

As Plaintiff has put at least $30,000 at issue, it must be

determined if the remaining causes of action support damages

totaling more than $45,000. Plaintiff has alleged Davis made

numerous unwanted sexual advances, lewd and salacious

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suggestions, and unwanted physical contact, including sexual

battery. Davis compelled Plaintiff to engage in sexual relations

with him, Davis grabbed Plaintiff’s buttocks and breasts, and

Davis informed Plaintiff if she engaged in sexual activity with

him he would improve the terms and conditions of her employment

with EMPI. When Plaintiff refused to engage in sexual activity

with Davis, he would verbally abuse her, make unwarranted

criticisms of job performance, and would assert his influence

over Plaintiff’s compensation and continued employment with EMPI. 

Plaintiff alleges she complained to supervisors, who did nothing

to stop the sexual harassment. Plaintiff was terminated on July

6, 2006. Plaintiff also alleges EMPI terminated her for

complaing about EMPI’s refusal to pay her wages. 

Plaintiff levels serious allegations of workplace misconduct

against EMPI and Davis. Excluding the $30,000 for wages and

commissions due, the face of the FAC more than adequately alleges

over $45,000 in damages. Davis is alleged to have mentally,

verbally, physically, and sexually harassed Plaintiff, and

requested that Plaintiff engage in sexual favors in return for an

improvement of the terms and conditions of her employment. Such

conduct, if proven, would give rise to compensatory and punitive

damages, without considering attorney’s fees, in excess of

$45,000. These damages, plus the damages of $30,000 for past

wages and commissions, exceed $75,000. Additionally, counsel for

Plaintiff conceded that the amount in controversy was not at

issue at the hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.

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D. Plaintiff’s Request for Costs and Attorney’s Fees.

EMPI properly removed this case from state court to this

court. Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees under 28

U.S.C. § 1447(c).

V. Conclusion.

For all the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to

Strike the Zimmerman Declaration is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s

Motion to Remand to state court is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

474bb4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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