Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05038/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05038-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Hairston
Appellant
Davita Vance-Cooks
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 27, 2014 Decided December 16, 2014

No. 13-5038

KEVIN HAIRSTON,

APPELLANT

v.

DAVITA VANCE-COOKS, ACTING PUBLIC PRINTER,

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01531)

Brian Wolfman argued the cause for the appellant. Anne 

King was with him on brief.

Javier M. Guzman, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen, Jr., 

United States Attorney, John G. Interrante and R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorneys were with him 

on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and GINSBURG and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In 2006, 

Kevin Hairston applied for a promotion within the 

Government Printing Office (GPO). His application was 

ultimately rejected and Hairston believes his rejection was 

based on racial discrimination. He also believes that he was 

the victim of unlawful retaliation in 2009 when the GPO sent 

a group of employees, sans Hairston, to a training program in 

Georgia. Based on these events, Hairston sued the GPO 

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e, et seq., for unlawful discrimination and retaliation. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the GPO on 

all counts. We affirm. 

I. Background1

The GPO is generally responsible for printing official 

documents of the federal government. See 44 U.S.C. § 501. 

The documents include passports, which the GPO prints on a 

six-color Heidelberg press. As its description suggests, the 

Heidelberg press has six ink-fountain units that require the 

constant supervision of employees who have been specially 

trained. Operating the press also requires GPO employees to 

manage special dyes, invisible inks and embedded electronic 

chips to protect the security of passport production. The GPO 

assigns each Heidelberg press a four-person team consisting

 1 Background facts are taken from: (1) Jeffrey Bernazzoli’s EEO 

Affidavit, Joint Appendix (JA) 105–08; (2) Earl Hayward’s EEO 

Affidavit, JA 109–13; (3) Douglas Davis’s EEO Affidavit, JA 283–86; (4) 

Nelson Batty’s Declaration, JA 313–15; (5) Kevin Hairston’s Declaration, 

JA 360–425; (6) Charles Dais’s Declaration, JA 426–30; (7) Carter 

Daniel’s EEO Affidavit, JA 512–13; (8) Kevin Hairston’s Deposition, JA 

517–86; (9) Jeffrey Bernazzoli’s Deposition, JA 587–607; (10) Earl 

Hayward’s Deposition, JA 608–33; and (11) Martin Verter’s Deposition, 

JA 634–54. 

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of a Head Pressperson, a Second Offset Pressperson, a 

Printing Plant Worker and a Feeder.

 

In 2006, the demand for passports rose and the GPO

issued a Vacancy Announcement (VA) seeking applicants for 

the Second Offset Pressperson position. Only permanent 

GPO employees could apply at the time. The VA stated that 

an applicant should be able to do “the work of a Second 

Offset Pressperson with normal supervision,” including “the 

independent operation of offset press machinery as well as the 

ability to perform troubleshooting, maintenance and 

adjustments.” JA 67 (emphasis omitted). Hairston, a black 

male, applied for the position and the GPO Office of 

Personnel determined that he met the minimum qualifications

listed in the VA. A GPO foreman, Earl Hayward, then 

reviewed a list of the qualified applicants to decide whom to 

recommend. Only Hairston’s name was listed because the 

other applicants did not qualify. Hayward ultimately 

recommended Hairston and Superintendent George Domarsky 

approved the selection. Hairston’s application was rejected, 

however, by Jeffrey Bernazzoli, the Production Manager in 

the Press Division of the GPO. Although Hairston met the 

minimal qualifications set out in the VA, Bernazzoli 

explained that the Second Offset Pressperson “was not a 

training position; therefore, we needed someone who could 

step in right away.” JA 105–06. “[I]t was clear” to 

Bernazzoli that Hairston did not have the necessary 

experience and that it “would have been detrimental to Mr. 

Hairston to put him in this position because he would not 

have been able to do it.” JA 105. Bernazzoli likened 

promoting Hairston to sending him “up the creek without a 

paddle.” Id.

According to Bernazzoli, he rejected Hairston’s 

application based on discussions with his GPO colleagues. 

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One person he spoke to was Domarsky, who told Bernazzoli 

that Hairston could not immediately run a six-color 

Heidelberg press. Bernazzoli also stated that Martin Verter, 

his Assistant Production Manager, agreed with Domarsky’s 

assessment. Bernazzoli relied heavily on Verter’s opinion 

because Verter was his “eyes and ears on the [production] 

floor.” JA 604. Verter, however, did not recall talking with 

Bernazzoli about Hairston but he emphasized that he was “not 

saying that it didn’t happen.” JA 649. Verter also stated that 

he was unaware of the position that Hairston applied for

because that position “[w]asn’t my concern.” JA 646.

Other GPO employees believed Hairston to be

inexperienced. Hayward said that Hairston was far from the 

“seasoned veteran” the GPO was hoping to hire as Second 

Offset Pressperson. JA 111. Hayward also stated that it 

would take approximately six to eight months to train 

Hairston to be a fully operational Second Offset Pressperson. 

Charles Dais, a former GPO Head Offset Pressperson-inCharge, likewise stated that “it probably takes the average 

pressperson who is promoted from within [the GPO] to 

Second Offset Pressperson about six months to feel 

comfortable enough” to run a six-color press. JA 429. And 

Nelson Batty, a GPO multicolor pressperson, agreed that it 

would take “a minimum of at least six months of daily 

training to train a single color pressperson [like Hairston] to 

be proficient” on a six-color Heidelberg press. JA 314. 

Hairston then attempted to file a complaint with the GPO 

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office alleging that he 

was not promoted to Second Offset Pressperson based on

racial discrimination. The EEO office told Hairston that it

could not process his complaint until the GPO “actually 

b[r]ought in a White employee” for the position listed in the 

VA. JA 540.

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With Hairston’s application rejected, the GPO relisted the 

VA with the same requirements and enlarged the applicant 

pool to include those who did not work in the GPO. The new 

notice was posted on October 13, 2006, and ran for three 

weeks. Hairston applied again under the relisted VA and his 

name was included on a final list of seven applicants who 

then had in-person interviews with a panel of GPO 

supervisors. During his interview, Hairston answered 

numerous questions incorrectly and received the lowest 

overall score among the seven candidates. The GPO 

ultimately hired Douglas Davis, a white male who had ten 

years of experience working on multicolor presses and who 

received the highest interview score. Davis began working at 

the GPO approximately five months after the relisted VA was 

posted. Upon learning of Davis’s hire, Hairston then filed his

EEO complaint. Subsequently, the GPO issued another VA

for a Second Offset Pressperson but Hairston did not apply. 

One of the individuals hired under this VA was black.

Months after the GPO filled the relisted VA, Hairston 

temporarily performed a limited number of the functions of a 

Second Offset Pressperson. Hairston claims that he quickly 

learned how to run the six-color press and that he was able to 

operate it by himself. Hairston received good reviews during 

his temporary stint and he was nominated for a time-off award 

due to his high level of performance. Hayward, however, said 

that Hairston performed only “a condensed part of the job” 

while temporarily filling in as a Second Offset Pressperson. 

JA 629.

Hairston further alleged that he was retaliated against for 

filing his EEO complaint. Because his other retaliation claims 

were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 

Hairston’s only allegation of retaliatory action is that he was 

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excluded from a GPO training program held in Kennesaw, 

Georgia. Davis—who was hired for the relisted VA

position—was in charge of coordinating attendance for the

program. Davis in turn directed Carter Daniel, a GPO Head 

Web Pressperson and union representative, to survey 

presspersons and gauge their interest in attending. According

to Daniel, Hairston expressed no interest in attending the 

training session and Davis ended up sending eight other 

employees, including four black employees, to the Georgia 

training program. Davis claimed that he did not know of 

Hairston’s EEO activity when he selected the eight attendees.

Hairston disputes that he was asked whether he wanted to 

attend the training program, claiming that “[t]here is always 

more to learn on presses, and I like to take advantage of the 

training opportunities I am offered.” JA 390. Yet when 

asked if he would have wanted to attend the Georgia training 

program, Hairston indicated he would not because he “wanted 

to concentrate [his] training on things that [he] hadn’t learned 

at all.” JA 566–67.

Hairston brought suit against the GPO in district court on 

September 3, 2008. He included three counts in his amended 

complaint: (1) Bernazzoli’s failure to promote him was based 

on racial discrimination; (2) the GPO’s failure to include him 

in the Georgia training program was motivated by racial 

animus; and (3) the GPO unlawfully retaliated against him by 

excluding him from the Georgia training program. The GPO 

moved for summary judgment on all three counts. The 

district court held that Hairston had not presented evidence 

from which a reasonable jury could reject the GPO’s 

nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting him. It also held 

that failing to send Hairston to the Georgia program was not 

an adverse employment action and thus could not trigger an 

unlawful retaliation claim. In the alternative, the court held 

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that Hairston had not presented any evidence to rebut the 

GPO’s evidence that the program attendees were chosen 

according to a bona fide understanding of who was interested. 

See Hairston v. Boardman, 915 F. Supp. 2d 155, 162 (D.D.C. 

2013). Accordingly, the district court granted summary 

judgment to the GPO on all counts. Hairston timely appealed. 

Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

II. Analysis

“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” 

Hampton v. Vilsack, 685 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

Summary judgment will be granted when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A 

genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence, viewed 

in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, could 

support a reasonable jury’s verdict for the non-moving party.” 

Hampton, 685 F.3d at 1099 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Hairston no longer argues that the GPO’s failure to send 

him to the Georgia training program evinced racial 

discrimination. His remaining claims, then, involve the 

GPO’s alleged discrimination in not promoting him to Second 

Offset Pressperson and the GPO’s alleged retaliation in

excluding him from the Georgia training program.

A. Failure to Promote

If a Title VII plaintiff does not proffer direct evidence of 

discrimination, “we apply the analytical framework adopted 

by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas.” Ginger v. 

Dist. of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

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(internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court has divided 

that framework into three steps: 

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 

by the preponderance of the evidence a prima 

facie case of discrimination. Second, if the 

plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie 

case, the burden shifts to the defendant to 

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for the employee’s rejection. Third, 

should the defendant carry this burden, the 

plaintiff must then have an opportunity to 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant 

were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for 

discrimination.

Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 

(1981) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We 

need not, however, address the first two steps. The GPO 

contends that it did not promote Hairston to Second Offset 

Pressperson because of his inexperience, rather than his race. 

Once an employer asserts a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its conduct in a Title VII lawsuit, we “need not—

and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made 

out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.” Brady v. 

Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). Instead, we proceed directly to the heart of the matter: 

“Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the 

employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on 

the basis of race . . . ?” Id.

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Ordinarily, if a plaintiff identifies evidence “from which 

a jury could find that the employer’s stated reasons were 

pretextual, [that] will be enough to get [his] claim to a jury.” 

George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(internal alterations omitted). Showing pretext, however, 

requires more than simply criticizing the employer’s 

decisionmaking process. Even if a plaintiff “was victimized 

by poor selection procedures,” we may not “second-guess an 

employer’s personnel decision absent demonstrably 

discriminatory motive.” Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of 

Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal 

alteration omitted). Hairston presses four arguments to

demonstrate the GPO’s proffered reason was pretextual. We 

are not persuaded. 

First, Hairston argues that conflicting testimony 

regarding Bernazzoli’s conversation with Verter suggests the 

conversation was fabricated after the fact. When asked at his 

deposition if he remembered discussing Hairston’s application 

with Bernazzoli, Verter said “[n]o, I don’t recall. I am not 

saying that it didn’t happen. I don’t recall it.” JA 649. When

then asked whether he meant the conversation did not happen, 

Verter said “[i]t is possible [that it happened], yes. We talked 

about a number of things . . . . I just don’t remember this 

specific one.” Id. But Verter’s failure to recall the

conversation is not inconsistent with Bernazzoli’s statement

that the conversation occurred. Indeed, we have found that 

one party’s failure to recall a conversation does not, on its 

own, create a genuine issue of material fact. See Paquin v. 

Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 

(“[a] deponent’s inability to recall specifics three years later 

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does not rebut” defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reasons for employment action).2

Hairston also draws an adverse inference from the fact

that, while Bernazzoli mentioned conversations with Verter 

and Domarsky in his deposition, he did not do so in his EEO 

affidavit. Providing more detailed information once litigation 

begins does not create a genuine issue of material fact. “To 

suggest otherwise is essentially to direct employers to publish 

a contemporaneous statement of reasons every time they 

make a hiring or firing decision—a requirement that Title VII 

has never been understood to impose.” Jackson v. Gonzales, 

496 F.3d 703, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Crockett v. 

Abraham, 284 F.3d 131, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (later statement 

that “does not contradict . . . deposition but rather augments 

and elaborates upon it” does not create genuine issue of 

material fact). 

Second, Hairston argues that “it is implausible that Mr. 

Bernazzoli actually believed” that he, Hairston, “was 

unqualified.” Appellant Br. 31. More specifically, Hairston 

contends that Bernazzoli should not have asked Verter for his

 2 In his reply brief, Hairston argues that Verter’s “hedging” was the 

product of coaxing from GPO’s counsel at a recess during the deposition. 

Before the recess, Verter stated that “to [his] knowledge” and “to [his] 

recollection,” he first learned of Hairston’s application when he was 

notified of his deposition. JA 648. To Hairston, this testimony suggested

that Verter did not discuss Hairston’s application with Bernazzoli. After 

the recess, Verter confirmed that he “d[idn’t] recall” the conversation but 

emphasized that he was “not saying that it didn’t happen.” JA 649. In his

pre-recess testimony, however, Verter did not categorically state that he 

never spoke with Bernazzoli; he qualified his statements by tying them to 

his knowledge and recollection. Verter’s post-recess statements followed 

the same path: namely, he could not recall the conversation with 

Bernazzoli. 

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opinion of Hairston’s application and that, instead, Bernazzoli

should have consulted Hairston’s direct supervisors. This 

argument suggests that, because there were better ways to 

determine if Hairston was qualified, Bernazzoli must not have 

been seeking that information at all. As we have previously 

noted, however, the key question in this context “is not the 

correctness or desirability of the reasons offered but whether 

the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.” 

Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183 (internal quotation mark and 

alterations omitted). Hairston proffers nothing that calls into 

question the genuineness of Bernazzoli’s belief that Hairston 

was not qualified for the job he was seeking. Bernazzoli 

stated that Verter was his “eyes and ears on the floor” and

Verter had in fact supervised Hairston during his GPO 

apprenticeship. JA 604, 641–43. Indeed, Verter affirmed in 

his deposition that he had known Hairston “as long as he has 

been in the pressroom.” JA 641. Bernazzoli also testified 

another supervisor shared Verter’s concerns. He remembers 

Domarsky, who was directly involved in the selection 

decision, opining that Hairston “didn’t have the knowledge 

nor the experience to run” the Heidelberg six-color press

immediately so as to meet the increased demand for passports. 

JA 599. 

Hairston also argues that his temporary stint as Second 

Offset Pressperson demonstrates that he was, in fact, qualified 

for the job. But “it is the perception of the decision maker 

which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” 

Vatel v. Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011). Based on the consistent testimony of Verter, 

Domarsky, Hayward, Dais and Batty, Hairston needed at least 

six months of training to become a Second Offset 

Pressperson. Hairston’s failure to identify even a single GPO 

employee who believed Hairston’s training would have taken 

fewer than six months undercuts his argument that Bernazzoli 

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could not have genuinely believed that Hairston was

inexperienced.

Third, Hairston argues that the GPO’s need to quickly fill 

the relisted VA to meet the increased demand for passports 

was pretextual because it took the GPO approximately five

months to hire Davis. But Hairston does not question the fact 

that the GPO faced an increased demand for passports. The 

question, then, is whether Bernazzoli honestly believed, at the 

time he rejected Hairston’s application, that he could find an 

experienced pressperson in less time than it would take to 

fully train Hairston and with less strain on the Press Division.

See Brady, 520 F.3d at 495 (“employer prevails if it ‘honestly 

believes in the reasons it offers’ ”) (quoting Fischbach, 86 

F.3d at 1183). Every GPO supervisor who was surveyed 

estimated that it would have taken at least six months for

Hairston to become a fully operational Second Offset 

Pressperson. Each estimate also allowed for the fact that the

necessary training could take more than six months. Hairston 

relies on his temporary stint as Second Offset Pressperson as 

evidence that he was a quick learner. But this post hoc 

experience does not suggest that Bernazzoli had reason to

believe Hairston’s training could go quickly at the time he 

reviewed Hairston’s application. See Leavitt, 407 F.3d at 415

(“[A]n employer’s action may be justified by a reasonable 

belief in the validity of the reason given even though that 

reason may turn out to be false.”).

At bottom, Hairston disagrees with the GPO’s gauging 

the likelihood that his training would take longer than the time 

it would have taken to hire an experienced candidate and we 

do not reweigh an employer’s balancing of factors it 

considered. Jackson, 496 F.3d at 709 (“[G]iven the dynamic 

nature of the hiring process . . . we will not second-guess how 

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an employer weighs particular factors in the hiring 

decision.”). 

 

Fourth, Hairston argues that two allegedly patronizing 

comments Bernazzoli made and an alleged history of 

discrimination in the GPO are evidence of pretext. Bernazzoli 

stated that promoting Hairston would be akin to “throwing, 

you know, an infant in there,” JA 602, and also suggested that 

Hairston would be “up the creek without a paddle” if he were 

promoted to Second Offset Pressperson, JA 105. These

statements, however, are neither explicitly racial nor infused

with racial undertones based on common usage. We do not

infer discriminatory intent if the words uttered are plainly 

lacking in racial animus. Cf. Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 764–66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (comments 

calling Asian woman “China doll” and “Little Gook” 

sufficient to infer racial animus).

Moreover, Hairston’s claim that there is a history of 

discrimination at the GPO is unconvincing. He relies on 

discrimination complaints filed in the past to establish

institutional discrimination but we have rejected similar 

arguments before. See, e.g., Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 899–900 

(“We are not persuaded that the mere filing of two informal 

discrimination complaints . . . where nothing more is known 

about the nature, merit, or outcome of those complaints, can 

be used as a proxy to establish [the defendant’s] 

discriminatory animus in the present case.”). Additionally, 

Hairston’s argument that there are too few black employees in 

GPO management positions misses the mark. We have held 

that “[i]n individual disparate treatment cases, however,

statistical evidence is less significant because the ultimate 

issue is whether the particular plaintiff was the victim of an 

illegitimately motivated employment decision.” Krodel v. 

Young, 748 F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

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In sum, Hairston has not raised a genuine issue of material 

fact regarding whether the GPO’s legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting him was

pretextual. 

B. Unlawful Retaliation

“Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to 

[retaliate] against any of its employees because she has made 

a charge or participated in any manner in an investigation of 

discrimination.” Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

A prima facie showing of retaliation requires that “(1) [the 

plaintiff] engaged in protected activity; (2) he was subjected 

to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal 

link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” 

Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

 

In district court, the parties disputed whether the GPO’s 

failure to send Hairston to the Georgia training program was 

an adverse employment action. We do not resolve that 

question. Assuming arguendo that Hairston’s exclusion from 

the training program was sufficiently adverse, he nonetheless 

does not survive summary judgment because he offered no 

evidence that the GPO’s proffered reason for denying him 

training—that the decisionmaker thought he did not want it—

was pretextual. Although Hairston raises questions about the 

reliability of Daniel’s survey results, he offers no reason 

Davis would have doubted them at the time. Moreover, Davis 

had no reason to retaliate. See Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 

303, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“To prove unlawful retaliation,” 

the plaintiff must “show that [the supervisor], who made the 

promotion selection, had knowledge of her protected 

activity.”). Davis stated that he “had no knowledge of any

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prior EEO complaints filed by Mr. Hairston” when he was 

organizing the Georgia training program. JA 285. Hairston 

identifies no contrary evidence.3

 On this record, then, there is 

no basis to conclude that Hairston’s EEO complaint was the 

reason for his exclusion from the training event. See Brady, 

520 F.3d at 495 (“If the employer’s stated belief about the 

underlying facts is reasonable in light of the evidence, 

however, there ordinarily is no basis for permitting a jury to 

conclude that the employer is lying about the underlying 

facts.”). 

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is 

affirmed.

So ordered.

 3 Hairston argues that the GPO’s knowledge of his EEO complaint should

be imputed to Davis because Davis was GPO’s agent. Our holding in 

Talavera forecloses that argument. See Talavera, 638 F.3d at 313 

(“[plaintiff] had to show that [her supervisor], who made the promotion 

selection, had knowledge of her protected activity” to establish unlawful 

retaliation claim) (emphasis added). 

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