Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03149/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03149-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Veronica Mosley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3149

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa. 

Veronica Mosley, *

 *

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: May 16, 2007

Filed: October 12, 2007

___________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Veronica Mosley pled guilty to aiding and abetting armed bank robbery, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a), (d). The district court sentenced her to 135

months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Mosley contends that the government breached

a plea agreement between the parties when it argued at sentencing that Mosley failed

to accept responsibility because of false statements she made to authorities prior to the

plea agreement. We agree that there was a breach, and in accordance with governing

precedent, we thus vacate Mosley’s sentence and remand for resentencing by a

different judge.

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I.

On October 6, 2005, Mosley and four others participated in an armed bank

robbery in Iowa Falls, Iowa. Mosley was arrested on October 6, the day of the

robbery, and gave two interviews to FBI agents. On October 14, 2005, Mosley took

part in a proffer interview in which she gave statements to an FBI agent and an

Assistant United States Attorney about her involvement in the bank robbery. A grand

jury later returned a four-count Superceding Indictment against Mosley and four codefendants, charging them with violations of federal law in connection with the

robbery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mosley pled guilty to aiding and abetting

armed bank robbery under Count Two of the Superceding Indictment. (R. Doc. 89-2,

Plea Agreement at ¶1). Mosley admits that she made misleading statements during

the proffer interviews by minimizing her involvement in the robbery, but she contends

that the government was aware of her deception before it reached the plea agreement.

Mosley’s plea agreement contained a provision regarding her entitlement to an

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1. That provision

states:

The parties stipulate and agree, that as of the date of this agreement,

defendant appears to qualify for a two-level downward adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility. However, the government shall be free to

contest the adjustment under USSG § 3E1.1(a) should the defendant

subsequently fail to continue to accept responsibility by failing to pay the

special assessment; by providing false information to the court, the

probation office, or the government; by unlawfully using controlled

substances; by attempting to obstruct justice; by breaching this plea

agreement; or by acting in a way that is inconsistent with, or failing to

act in any way that is consistent with, the granting of the adjustment

under USSG § 3E1.1(a).

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(Plea Agreement at ¶ 7B). The agreement goes on to state that “[t]he parties make no

other stipulations regarding offense level adjustments or guideline enhancements.”

(Id. at ¶ 8).

The district court accepted Mosley’s guilty plea, and the United States

Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). The PSR

recommended no upward adjustment for obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1,

and recommended that Mosley receive a two-level downward adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a). The government responded with a

letter to the probation office, stating in part that “[t]he United States has developed

new information that sheds a different light on defendant’s sentencing.” (PSR

Addendum, Govt. Letter at 1). The letter outlined allegations that Mosely played a

prominent role in the robbery and was involved in obtaining a gun that was used in

commission of the crime. According to the letter, “[t]his information is contrary to

information Mosley conveyed in an October 6, 2005 interview after her arrest and

contrary to a proffer she gave on October 14, 2005.” (Id. at 3). The letter then

announced the government’s objections to the PSR’s recommendations on obstruction

of justice, acceptance of responsibility, and role in the offense. It concluded by

arguing that “[d]efendant obstructed justice and, therefore, has not accepted

responsibility.” (Id.)

Through her attorney, Mosely responded with a letter to the probation office.

That letter, dated April 27, 2006, objected to the PSR’s recommendation of a six-level

enhancement for use of a firearm, and said that Mosley “denies knowledge of the use

of any firearm in this offense.” (Id., Mosley Letter at 1). The letter also denied the

government’s claims that Mosley was a leader or organizer of the robbery, and that

she was involved in obtaining a gun. 

The parties next submitted sentencing memoranda to the district court. The

government’s memorandum stated that Mosley “obstructed justice by lying to

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investigators shortly after her arrest and during a proffer interview with counsel and

the government.” (R. Doc. 158 at 2). The government urged that “[s]ince defendant

obstructed justice, she is not entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction.”

(Id. at 3). Mosley’s memorandum, in reply, claimed that “the government now seeks

to withdraw from [the] plea agreement without valid justification or cause,” and asked

the district court to “compel specific performance of the plea agreement by the

government.” (R. Doc. 157-2 at 2). The defense reiterated this position at the

sentencing hearing, where it also requested that the district court assign the case to a

different judge for sentencing. 

At the two-day sentencing hearing, the district court heard evidence in support

of the government’s position that Mosley lied in her pre-plea statements to authorities,

and that she therefore obstructed justice and failed to accept responsibility. The court

ultimately ruled that the plea agreement precluded the government from arguing that

Mosley failed to accept responsibility based on these pre-plea statements, and ordered

specific performance of the agreement. But the court found that the government did

not breach the plea agreement, because rather than making an argument about whether

Mosley was entitled to acceptance of responsibility, the government had “only argued

about how to interpret” the agreement. The court thus denied Mosley’s request that

the case be reassigned to another judge for sentencing. The court further ruled that

even though the government could not use Mosley’s pre-plea statements to argue that

she failed to accept responsibility, it could use these statements to argue that she

obstructed justice. Moreover, the court held, the government could use Mosley’s

post-plea statements to argue both that she obstructed justice and that she failed to

accept responsibility. 

The court concluded that Mosley obstructed justice in her letter of April 27,

2006, to the probation office, a post-plea statement in which Mosley falsely “denied

her role in obtaining the firearm and its use in the armed bank robbery.” Because she

“provided materially false information” to a probation officer in respect to a

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presentence investigation, the court applied a two-level upward adjustment for

obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1. The court also concluded that Mosley

failed to qualify for a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, because in

her letter to the probation office, she falsely denied relevant conduct, namely, her role

in obtaining the firearm. See USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(a)).

After adjusting the offense level upward six levels for use of a firearm, and

declining to make a four-level upward adjustment for role in the offense, the district

court determined that Mosley had an adjusted offense level of thirty-two and Criminal

History Category of I, for an advisory guideline range of 121-151 months. The court

evaluated the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and sentenced Mosley to 135

months’ imprisonment. Mosley appeals her sentence, arguing that the district court

erred by allowing the government to argue for a two-level adjustment for obstruction

of justice and against a two-level adjustment acceptance of responsibility based on her

pre-plea statements. 

II.

A.

We review questions regarding the interpretation and enforcement of plea

agreements de novo. Where a plea agreement has been accepted by the court, we

generally interpret the meaning of the terms in the agreement according to basic

principles of contract law. United States v. Norris, 486 F.3d 1045, 1051 (8th Cir.

2007) (en banc) (plurality opinion); id. at 1054 (concurring opinion).

In the plea agreement, “[t]he parties stipulate and agree, that as of the date of

this agreement, defendant appears to qualify for a two-level downward adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility.” (Plea Agreement at ¶ 7B). The agreement preserves

the government’s right to contest the adjustment “should the defendant subsequently

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fail to continue to accept responsibility.” (Id.). We agree with the district court that

these provisions prohibit the government from arguing that Mosley failed to accept

responsibility based on her pre-plea statements. In exchange for Mosely’s guilty plea,

the government promised to take the position that she had accepted responsibility at

the time of the plea agreement. Any argument that Mosley failed to accept

responsibility because of actions taken before signing the agreement would conflict

with the government’s promise, and would therefore breach the agreement.

We also conclude that the government breached the agreement by making this

prohibited argument. In its letter to the probation office objecting to portions of the

PSR, the government stated that Mosley “obstructed justice and, therefore, has not

accepted responsibility,” because she made false statements in her pre-plea interviews.

(PSR Addendum, Gov’t Letter at 3) (emphasis added). In its opening sentencing

memorandum to the district court, the government argued that Mosley “obstructed

justice by lying to investigators shortly after her arrest and during a proffer interview

with counsel and the government,” (R. Doc. 158 at 2), and concluded that “[s]ince

defendant obstructed justice, she is not entitled to an acceptance of responsibility

reduction.” (Id.) (emphasis added). At the sentencing hearing, the government

reiterated its position, (S. Tr. 11), and offered evidence that Mosley had given false

statements to authorities prior to the plea agreement. We do not think that these were

merely arguments about “how to interpret” the agreement. These were arguments that

Mosley was not entitled to acceptance of responsibility because of her pre-plea

statements. As such, the arguments breached the plea agreement. See United States

v. McCray, 849 F.2d 304, 305-06 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

At oral argument on appeal, the government offered another theory to explain

why its actions were not a breach. It contends that once Mosley submitted false

information to the probation office, she “fail[ed] to continue to accept responsibility,”

(Plea Agreement at ¶ 7B), and the government was therefore free to contest

acceptance of responsibility by using any evidence, including Mosley’s pre-plea

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statements. Even if we accepted this interpretation of the agreement, it would not win

the day, because the government had breached the agreement even before Mosley sent

her letter to the probation office. In its objections to the PSR, the government argued

that Mosley should be denied an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility based on

her pre-plea statements. But we also find unpersuasive the government’s argument

based on the language of the agreement. The more natural reading of the provision

concerning the defendant’s failure “to continue to accept responsibility” is that the

government may contest the adjustment based on subsequent acts of the defendant

that are inconsistent with the previous agreement that the defendant accepted

responsibility. To the extent there is ambiguity in this provision, we are constrained

to construe it against the government. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890

(8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Therefore, we agree with the district court that the

government could not use Mosley’s pre-plea statements to argue that she failed to

accept responsibility.

B.

It is undisputed that the government’s stipulation that Mosley was entitled to

an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was part of the inducement for her plea.

“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such

promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); see

also Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984). After the district court has

accepted a guilty plea, the government’s material breach of the plea agreement

violates the defendant’s due process rights. Norris, 486 F.3d at 1048 (plurality

opinion). We turn, therefore, to the proper remedy.

The record suggests that the district court likely would have arrived at the same

sentence, regardless of whether the government breached the plea agreement. The

district court itself recognized that the government could not contest acceptance of

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responsibility based on Mosley’s pre-plea statements, and the court articulated its

decision to deny the adjustment based entirely on Mosley’s actions after entry of her

guilty plea. Mosley does not dispute that the district court may properly consider her

post-plea conduct in determining whether she has accepted responsibility, but she

contends that the government’s breach of the agreement nonetheless requires a new

sentencing proceeding. We are constrained by precedent to conclude that the

government’s breach of the plea agreement is not subject to traditional harmless-error

analysis, and that a remand for resentencing is required.

In Santobello, the prosecution breached a plea agreement by recommending the

maximum sentence, after it had promised to make no sentencing recommendation.

The Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded to the state courts

to determine whether the proper remedy was withdrawal of the defendant’s guilty plea

or resentencing before a different judge. In so doing, the Court stated:

We need not reach the question whether the sentencing judge would or

would not have been influenced had he known all the details of the

negotiations for the plea. He stated that the prosecution’s

recommendation did not influence him and we have no reason to doubt

that. Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice and

appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to

promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by

remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration.

404 U.S. at 262-263 (emphasis added).

By holding that it was immaterial whether the prosecution’s breach influenced

the trial judge’s decision, Santobello necessarily rejected the view that the

prosecution’s breach could have been harmless. This is how we interpreted

Santobello in McCray, 849 F.2d at 305-306, and it is also the consensus view among

our sister circuits, which hold that harmless-error analysis does not apply when the

government breaches a plea agreement. See United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263,

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1

Just before this opinion was transmitted for filing, another panel of this court

relied on Goings to hold that the government’s breach of a plea agreement did not

require resentencing. United States v. E.V., No. 06-2906, 2007 WL 2683023, at *6

(8th Cir. Sept. 14, 2007). At the same time, however, the E.V. panel acknowledged

the “general rule” that the government’s breach is not ameliorated by a district court’s

statement that it was not influenced by the breach. Id. at *6 n.13 (citing McCray, 849

F.3d at 305-06). The E.V. panel nonetheless thought the “general rule” inapplicable

in that case, because “the possible influence of the breach [was] confined by both the

Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory restraints.” Id. Other courts have identified

“exceptions” to the general rule that harmless-error analysis does not apply, in

situations where (1) the government breaches the agreement by failing to do

something it has promised, but then fully cures its breach through specific

performance of its obligation, Vaval, 404 F.3d at 155, (2) the breach is so minor that

despite the breach, the defendant’s reasonable expectations under the agreement are

fulfilled, id., and (3) the district court already has imposed the lowest sentence

possible, such that resentencing would be meaningless. United States v. Belt, 89 F.3d

710, 713 (10th Cir. 1996). None of these potential exceptions is applicable here.

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271 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 154-155 (2d Cir. 2005);

Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 461-462 (3rd Cir. 2001); United States v. Peglera,

33 F.3d 412, 414 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Saling, 205 F.3d 764, 766-767 (5th

Cir. 2000); Cohen v. United States, 593 F.2d 766, 771-772 (6th Cir. 1979); United

States v. Fields, 766 F.2d 1161, 1170 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mondragon,

228 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 693-694

(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1055-1056 & n.6 (11th Cir.

1989); accord United States v. DeWitt, 366 F.3d 667, 671-672 (8th Cir. 2004); United

States v. Van Horn, 976 F.2d 1180, 1183-84 (8th Cir. 1992). One decision from our

court does affirm a sentence, despite a breach by the government, on the view that the

breach had “little if any effect” on the district court’s decision. United States v.

Goings, 200 F.3d 539, 544 (8th Cir. 2000). The Goings opinion, however, does not

address Santobello, and we believe it is inconsistent with Santobello and our earlier

precedents in McCray and Van Horn.

1

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2

Others have suggested that Santobello announced a necessary “prophylactic

rule,” because a district judge cannot erase from her mind damaging information that

resulted from the government’s breach. Foster, 889 F.2d at 1055-1056 n.6. This

strikes us a curious explanation, given that the first act of a new sentencing judge

assuming the case on remand presumably would be to read the opinion of the court

of appeals, which recounts the government’s breach as the reason for the

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Whether the Supreme Court today would follow Santobello’s rejection of

harmless-error analysis is open to question. The Court has made clear that “most

constitutional errors can be harmless,” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306

(1991), and only a “very limited class” of errors, called “structural” errors, are an

exception to this general rule. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999). The

Court has identified a small number in that category: denial of counsel (including

counsel of choice), denial of the right to self-representation, denial of a public trial,

a defective reasonable-doubt instruction, race-based discrimination in jury selection,

and a biased judge. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564

(2006); Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. These errors “affect[] the framework within which the

trial proceeds,” and are not “simply . . . error[s] in the trial process itself.”

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. The Third Circuit has suggested obliquely that

Santobello should be understood as identifying a structural error, Dunn, 247 F.3d at

462, but we have indicated more recently that the class of structural errors likely is

limited to those expressly identified by the Supreme Court in Fulminante and Neder.

See United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); but cf.

Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2564 (expanding list of structural errors to encompass

denial of counsel of choice). Where, as here, the district court consciously refrains

from considering the government’s improper argument, it is not readily apparent why

the breach should be considered among the limited class of errors whose

consequences are “necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate,” Gonzalez-Lopez,

126 S. Ct. at 2564 (internal quotation omitted), or that “necessarily render” the

proceedings “fundamentally unfair” to the accused. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577

(1986).2

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reassignment.

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Nonetheless, Santobello says what is says. The Supreme Court has made clear

that “if a precedent of [the] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest

on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should

follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the] Court the prerogative of

overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,

490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). The decisions of the Supreme Court “remain binding

precedent until [the Court] see[s] fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether

subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality.” Hohn v. United

States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-253 (1998). Accordingly, following Santobello and circuit

precedent, we conclude that harmless-error analysis does not apply.

Mosley seeks specific performance of the plea agreement, so the appropriate

procedure is to remand to the district court for resentencing. See Santobello, 404 U.S.

at 263 (stating that possible remedies include specific performance or withdrawal from

plea). Santobello held that the defendant in that case “should be resentenced by a

different judge.” Id. We adopted this approach in McCray, 849 F.2d at 305-06, and

have followed it on several occasions since then. Thompson, 402 F.3d at 1041;

DeWitt, 366 F.3d at 671; Van Horn, 976 F.2d at 1183-84; Brunelle v. United States,

864 F.2d 64, 65 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); but see United States v. Johnson, 241

F.3d 1049, 1055 (8th Cir. 2001) (remanding to district court with no mention of

reassignment); United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 596 (8th Cir. 1996)

(same). While some courts have held that resentencing by a different judge is not

always necessary, see United States v. Wolff, 127 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United

States v. Travis, 735 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bowler, 585

F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1978), most circuits interpret Santobello to require that a

different judge must sentence the defendant on remand. Canada, 960 F.2d at 271;

Vaval, 404 F.3d at 155; United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 297 (3rd Cir. 2004);

Peglera, 33 F.3d at 415; Saling, 205 F.3d at 768; United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364,

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368 (6th Cir. 2002); Mondragon, 228 F.3d at 981; United States v. Cachucha, 484

F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 2007); Foster, 889 F.2d at 1056; see also Wolff, 127 F.3d

at 89-90 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In accord with our earliest precedent in McCray, we follow the majority

approach here, and conclude that the case should be remanded to a different judge for

resentencing. “We emphasize that this is in no sense to question the fairness of the

sentencing judge,” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, who in this case correctly identified

how the government should have limited its advocacy in accordance with the plea

agreement. At resentencing, the government is not forbidden to contest Mosley’s

eligibility for an adjustment under USSG § 3E1.1, but it must rest any such argument

on Mosley’s post-plea conduct alone.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the sentence is vacated. The case is remanded to the

district court with directions that the case be reassigned to a different judge for

resentencing.

 ______________________________

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