Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02150/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02150-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Bartholomew
Petitioner
Tom L. Carey
Respondent

Document Text:

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 Petitioner contends that his petition has been filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In White v. 1

Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 991 (2005), the Ninth

Circuit held that such an attack is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This court shall

construe the application accordingly. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN BARTHOLOMEW,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-2150 GEB KJM P

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , challenging a July 26, 2001 denial of parole. 1

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the petition was filed outside the AEDPA

statute of limitations and arguing that it does not present a federal question.

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 The exhibits attached to the petition are not identified by numbers or letters and so will 2

be identified by document title. 

2

Background

On July 26, 2001, the Board of Prison Terms denied petitioner’s application for

parole. Petition (Pet.), BPT hearing transcript. Petitioner filed an administrative appeal on 2

October 31, 2001, which was denied on June 11, 2002. Motion to Dismiss (MTD), Exs. B & C. 

Petitioner then filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Alameda County

Superior Court; respondent has provided a copy of the face sheet, which shows a file-stamped

date of December 24, 2002. MTD, Ex. D. The minute order denying the petition is also dated

December 24, 2002. Pet., Superior Court Minute Order. 

A new petition was filed in the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District on

February 25, 2003 and denied on March 6, 2003 without prejudice to filing in the correct court. 

MTD, Ex. E. On April 9, 2003, petitioner filed a new petition in the Court of Appeal for the

First Appellate District. Pet., face sheet of petition. This was denied on April 17, 2003, because

petitioner had not provided the “copies of reasonably available documentary evidence. . . .” 

MTD, Ex. F.

Petitioner filed a fourth state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on

September 17, 2003. Supreme Court Docket <http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/

dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=289821&doc_no=S119089> (accessed 12/4/06). This petition was

denied on June 23, 2004. MTD, Ex. G. 

The instant petition was filed in the Northern District of California on June 20,

2005, the date reflected on the proof of service, and transferred to this court on October 26, 2005. 

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3

The AEDPA Statute Of Limitations

A. Statutory Tolling

One of the changes the AEDPA made to the habeas statutes was to add a statute of

limitations for filing a habeas petition:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for

a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post- conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244. In parole cases, the date that triggers the federal statute of limitations is the

denial of administrative review. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner does not claim there was a significant delay in his learning of the administrative denial. 

Accordingly, the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on June 12, 2002 and expired on June

12, 2003. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (excluding the day from which the period begins to run from the

calculation of the time). It is plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the limitations period was

sufficiently tolled to render his federal petition timely. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

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4

The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any “properly filed”

collateral attack in the state courts. Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 7-8 (2000). Petitioner filed four

state habeas petitions. It is unclear when the Alameda County petition was filed, because neither

party has provided a proof of service or other documents showing when petitioner gave it to

prison authorities to be mailed. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (under prison

mailbox rule, document is filed when it is given to prison authorities for mailing). Under

California Rule of Court 4.551, a superior court must issue a ruling on a habeas petition within

sixty days of the date it was filed, unless the time is extended. Accordingly, the court will

presume that the superior court writ petition was filed on October 25, 2002, sixty days before the

superior court’s denial on December 24, 2002, and day 136 of the limitations period.

Respondent does not dispute that the statute of limitations was tolled from the filestamp date of December 24, 2002 on the Alameda County petition through the Supreme Court’s

denial of habeas on June 23, 2004. But see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 126 S.Ct. 846, 852

(2006) (federal court must determine whether “gap” between state petitions renders them untimely

and thus not properly filed); Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8 (petition is properly filed when it meets state

procedural requirements, which include filing in the appropriate court). In this case, the court

need not reach the question of untimeliness with regard to gaps between state petitions, because

even if petitioner is given all benefits of the doubt, his petition is untimely as explained below. 

If the court’s assumption regarding the filing date of the superior court petition is

correct, the statute of limitations began to run again on June 24, 2004, day 137 of the limitations

period. This means that June 20, 2005, the date petitioner mailed his federal petition to the

Northern District, was day 499 of the limitations period. 

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an additional thirty days of tolling because

the California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition was not final until thirty days after the order

was issued. See Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001); Opposition (Opp’n) at 6. 

The court rule upon which Bunney was based was amended, effective January 1, 2003. Rule 29.4

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 Petitioner also includes a memorandum dated 6/17/2006, memorializing the fact that 3

African-American inmates were placed on lockdown on May 25, 2006, and that, as a result, only

inmates with a court deadline could use the law library. These restrictions occurred after the

federal petition was filed and can have no bearing on the issue of equitable tolling. 

5

of the California Rules of Court now provides that the denial of a petition within the court’s

original jurisdiction is final on the day it is issued. Even if petitioner were entitled to Bunney

time, however, the thirty days would not render his federal petition timely.

Petitioner also argues that there was a “state created impediment” to filing, created

by the conflict between his job and the hours the library was open, the extremely restricted access

to the library because he was not designated a “preferred legal user”, and other restrictions on

library time as a result of staff meetings and lockdowns. Opp’n at 5-7 & Memorandum dated

1/6/2005 (outlining “significant interruptions” in inmate access to the law library); id.,

Memorandum dated 12/8/2005 (discussing a program implemented in September 2005 to give

preferred and general legal users with jobs priority access on Friday and Saturday). However, 3

[t]he mere inability of a prisoner to access the law library is not, in

itself, an unconstitutional impediment. The inmate must show that

this inability caused an actual harm, or in other words,

unconstitutionally prevented him from exercising that fundamental

right of access to the courts in order to attack his sentence. . . .

Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1090 (11th Cir. 2000). Petitioner contends that the limited

access made it difficult for him to use the prison typewriters, books and other materials; he does

not show that the limitations made it impossible for him to file. The circumstances described by

petitioner do not create a state-created impediment. 

B. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner further argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because of the

restrictions on his access to the law library.

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 Because the court finds the petition to be untimely, it need not address respondent’s 4

claim that the denial of parole does not present a federal question, an argument that in any event

has been resolved by Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006).

6

The Ninth Circuit has held:

We will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitations period

only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. When external forces,

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may

be appropriate. 

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations & citations omitted). 

Several courts have rejected the impact of restrictions on law library access as bases for equitable

tolling unless the petitioner can show actual harm. Wilson v. Bennett, 188 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353

(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (limited access to library); Lindo v. Lefever, 193 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (E.D.N.Y.

2002) (same). As noted above, petitioner has not shown how the difficulties he encountered made

it impossible for him to file. He is not entitled to equitable tolling.4

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to

dismiss be granted. 

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7

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 20, 2006.

 

2

bart2150.157

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