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Parties Involved:
Larry Allen Tate
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci:cuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SEP 2 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

WILLIAM TROY BULLOCK a/k/a 

LARRY ALLEN TATE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

89-7066 

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On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The Eastern District 

Of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 89-14-CR) 

Sheldon J. Sperling, Assistant United States Attorney (John Raley, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Muskogee, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Gene v. Primomo of Wilcoxen & Wilcoxen, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE, SETH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-7066 Document: 01019844464 Date Filed: 09/20/1990 Page: 1 
Defendant William Troy Bullock, a/k/a Larry Allen Tate, and 

two co-defendants were charged in a 14-count indictment stemming 

from their operation of an amphetamine manufacturing laboratory in 

Oklahoma, and distribution of the drug. In this appeal, Bullock 

challenges his convictions on Counts 2 and 9 of the indictment: 

Count 2 charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, alleging that 

defendants conspired to, inter alia, "knowingly and intentionally 

use or carry firearms in the commission of [various] drug 

trafficking crimes" in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c); Count 9 

charged a violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 2 and 924(c) for knowingly 

using or carrying firearms unlawfully "during the commission of a 

drug trafficking [crime]." For the reasons that follow, we affirm 

defendant's convictions. 

The defendant Bullock argues that the language of Counts 2 

and 9 of the indictment is fatally deficient in that it does not 

precisely use the language of§ 924(c), i.e., the use or carrying 

of firearms was during "and in relation to" a drug trafficking 

crime. Bullock submits the addition of the "during and in 

relation to" language by the 1984 amendment to§ 924(c) 

established a new element necessary for conviction and that 

because this exact language was not a part of Counts 2 and 9, the 

indictment is fatally deficient in stating an offense. 

We note that this challenge to the adequacy of the indictment 

is made for the first time on appeal, but this court has held 

"that the failure of an indictment to state an offense is a fatal 

defect that may be raised at any time. Nonetheless, the 

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Appellate Case: 89-7066 Document: 01019844464 Date Filed: 09/20/1990 Page: 2 
countervailing interest in judicial efficiency requires that 

tardily-challenged indictments be construed liberally in favor of 

validity." United States v. Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 304 (10th 

Cir.) (citations omitted). In that case we also stated that an 

indictment 

"must be sufficient to apprise the accused of 

the nature of the offense so that he may 

adequately prepare his defense. Following 

conviction, the record of the case must be 

sufficient so as to enable the accused to 

subsequently avail himself of the form of 

jeopardy for future prosecution for the same 

offense." 

Id. at 304-305. 

Having reviewed the record and the language of the indictment 

at issue in light of the standards set out in Freeman, the 

indictment here, which charged defendants with using or carrying 

firearms "in the commission of the drug trafficking crimes listed" 

and with assembling the collection of weapons to protect and 

defend the drug laboratory, was sufficiently specific and 

descriptive. This is notwithstanding that the indictment did not 

quote the precise language used in§ 924(c); that is, the use of 

firearms during "and in relation to" the drug trafficking crime. 

An indictment, of course, need not quote the statutory language to 

be legally sufficient. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87. 

See the admonition to apply "practical considerations" in 

United States v. Phillips, 869 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir.). See also 

United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir.). 

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Appellate Case: 89-7066 Document: 01019844464 Date Filed: 09/20/1990 Page: 3 
As To Count 2 

In any event, as mentioned, the indictment in its preliminary 

portion used the following language: 

"COUNT 2 

"18 USC (§ 371) 

"A. Objects of the Conspiracy 

"To knowingly and intentionally use or 

carry firearms in the commission of the drug 

trafficking crimes listed below, in violation 

of Title 18, United States Code, Section 

924(c); •••• " 

The charge was thus to use or carry a firearm in the commission of 

the crime charged--conspiracy to manufacture and possess 

amphetamine. This firearms use is not directed to a substantive 

offense but, again, a conspiracy. This conspiracy is further 

described in the indictment, Count 2, as follows: 

"B. Means of the Conspiracy 

"The objects of the conspiracy were to be 

accomplished and were accomplished as follows: 

"Defendants ..• traveled from the State 

of Texas to the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

to attempt to manufacture, manufacture, and/or 

possess with intent to distribute 

amphetamine .... 

"In an attempt to secure the clandestine 

laboratory and the operators thereof, in 

December 1988 in Johnston County, Eastern 

District of Oklahoma, the defendants 

assembled, possessed, and/or maintained a 

substantial number of firearms and inventory 

of ammunition in and near various buildings at 

or near the laboratory site." 

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Appellate Case: 89-7066 Document: 01019844464 Date Filed: 09/20/1990 Page: 4 
The use, purpose and connection of the firearms with the· 

conspiracy is so described--to secure the laboratory. The 

indictment continued as to the overt acts in Count 2: 

"C. Overt Acts 

"To effect the objects of the conspiracy, 

the defendants, and others to the Grand Jury 

unknown, committed diverse, overt acts within 

the Eastern District of Oklahoma and 

elsewhere, among which were the following: 

"(3) From on or about August 1, 

1988, through on or about December 14, 1988, 

the defendants, LARRY ALLEN TATE, DOUGLAS 

LESLIE PERRY, and RICHARD PATRICK CARTER 

assembled, maintained, and/or possessed a 

group of approximately 32 firearms, many of 

which were loaded, ammunition for such 

firearms, and parts of various firearms on 

property in Johnston County, Eastern District 

of Oklahoma, which was searched pursuant to a 

search warrant by law enforcement authorities 

on or about December 14, 1988." 

The indictment in Count 2 asserts as to the firearms that 

they were "knowingly and intentionally use[d] ... in the 

commission of the drug trafficking crimes." It does not use the 

statutory language added in 1984--the use or carrying of a firearm 

"during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime. It appears 

to us that the charge to "intentionally use or carry firearms in 

the commission of the drug trafficking crimes" is more than 

adequate. It is a more direct charge than the statutory language 

of use and carrying "during and in relation to any drug 

trafficking crime," and includes such a connection. 

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Appellate Case: 89-7066 Document: 01019844464 Date Filed: 09/20/1990 Page: 5 
The use in the commission of the crime was described in Count 

2 of the indictment as quoted above to "attempt to secure the 

clandestine laboratory and the operators thereof." 

As to Count 9 

Count 9 charges the use of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 

in drug crimes which are substantive offenses--manufacture of 

amphetamine and possession of amphetamine with intent to 

distribute. 

The charge in this count is different from that in Count 2. 

It uses the original statutory language of "knowingly used or 

carried firearms unlawfully during the commission of a drug 

trafficking felony." Thus in Count 9 the wording is "used 

during the commission," while in Count 2 it was "use in the 

commission of. 

language used. 

II In neither appeared the "in relation to" 

As to Count 9 of the indictment the proof shows that 

defendant was sitting or lying on a bed in the house with a loaded 

shotgun on the bed a few feet away. He also had a baggie of 

amphetamine in his hand. The crux of Bullock's challenge to his 

conviction for "using or carrying" a firearm during the commission 

of a drug trafficking crime, as charged in Count 9 of the 

indictment, is based on the fact that he did not have a firearm on 

his person at the time he was arrested. He submits that mere 

presence of firearms is insufficient to satisfy the elements of 

§ 924(c); in support, he relies on what he characterizes as the 

"deliberately" narrow language of that provision. Bullock submits 

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Appellate Case: 89-7066 Document: 01019844464 Date Filed: 09/20/1990 Page: 6 
that the 1984 amendment to the language of§ 924(c), which added 

the "during and in relation to" language, created a new element 

under that provision and thereby evinced a Congressional intent 

that mere possession alone is not sufficient for a conviction 

under that provision. We do not agree with Bullock's view that 

the 1984 amendment to§ 924(c) added a new element to the offense 

which must be specifically alleged but instead refined a factor 

already in the statute with no change in meaning when the "used" 

element is considered. See United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 

(9th Cir.). 

Bullock, as to his point relating to Count 9 that he did not 

have a firearm on his person or did not "use" one, relies heavily 

on United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.), and 

United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669 (10th Cir.), in support 

of his claim that more than the mere presence is necessary to 

support a conviction for violation of§ 924(c). 

The fact that Bullock did not have a firearm on his person at 

the time he was arrested does not preclude a conviction for 

violation of§ 924(c) because he used the firearm--the shotgun. 

This is the important element in this case. 

In Theodoropoulos, the Third Circuit said: 

"In this case, the presence of a loaded 

shotgun in plain sight ... where it was 

readily accessible to the occupants was 

evidence that the firearm was in use during 

and in relation to the drug trafficking 

conspiracy proven in this case." 

866 F.2d at 597. 

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Appellate Case: 89-7066 Document: 01019844464 Date Filed: 09/20/1990 Page: 7 
Bullock also relies on United States v. McKinnell, 888 F·. 2d 

669 (10th Cir.), insofar as it cites to Theodoropoulos. However, 

the holding in McKinnell actually supports affirmance of Bullock's 

conviction. Although McKinnell can be distinguished from the 

instant case, as it was an auto case, its discussion of§ 924(c) 

and what is to be considered in determining whether its elements 

are satisfied is instructive here. In McKinnell we agreed with 

the view of the Eighth Circuit, "that the 'uses' element of 

section 924(c)(l) is met when the defendant has 'ready access' to 

the firearm and the firearm 'was an integral part of his criminal 

undertaking and its availability increased the likelihood that the 

criminal undertaking would succeed.'" McKinnell, 888 F.2d at 675 

(quoting United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d, 837, 843 (8th Cir.)). 

See especially the treatment of "carrying" in§ 924(c) in 

United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir.). 

It appears from the above cited cases that courts addressing 

the question of what facts and circumstances will satisfy the 

elements of§ 924(c) have been consistent in holding that one need 

not have a firearm on one's person for a conviction under that 

provision as defendant urges. See also United States v. Lyman, 

892 F.2d 751 (8th Cir.); United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24 (2d 

Cir.); United States v. Robinson, 857 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir.). 

The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that although 

Bullock did not have a firearm on his person at the time of the 

raid on the laboratory, there were guns in virtually every room of 

the house, and a loaded shotgun was on the bed within a few feet 

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Appellate Case: 89-7066 Document: 01019844464 Date Filed: 09/20/1990 Page: 8 
of defendant, who also had a baggie of powdered-out amphetamine in 

his hand. The firearms were thus "used." The firearms were 

charged in Count 9 as used in the commission of the drug crimes. 

If they were used in the commission of the crimes they were 

certainly used "in relation to" the crimes. The charge is in 

equivalent language to the statutory language, and this is 

sufficient. The proof to be considered in this late challenge to 

the indictment showed the "use" of the weapon which necessarily 

was considered by the grand jury. 

Sufficiency of Proof Generally 

Defendant asserts that the proof fails to establish the 

necessary elements for conviction under Counts 2 and 9 of the 

indictment. 

He does not deny that he was a participant in the amphetamine 

manufacturing and distribution operation, nor does he dispute that 

there were a number of firearms (including shotguns, sawed-off 

shotguns, rifles and handguns) found throughout the house, 

outbuildings, and in vehicles parked outside the house. It 

appears from the record that most of the firearms were loaded. 

Nevertheless, Bullock submits he cannot be convicted on Counts 2 

and 9 of the indictment because there was no evidence of an 

agreement among the defendants to use the guns for anything other 

than hunting and sport shooting. Again, he points out that he did 

not have a gun on his person at the time of arrest, unlike his codefendants who were carrying loaded handguns at the time of 

arrest. 

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Appellate Case: 89-7066 Document: 01019844464 Date Filed: 09/20/1990 Page: 9 
( Bullock's argument with respect to the conspiracy conviction 

as such obtained in Count 2 of the indictment ignores the 

testimony from one co-defendant that the group had discussed using 

the guns if necessary to protect their drug operation from being 

"ripped-off", but the group also had decided that the guns would 

not be used in the event of a police raid, Thus, contrary to 

Bullock's assertion, there was substantial evidence presented from 

which the jury reasonably could find that the guns were not 

possessed solely for hunting and sport purposes, and that there 

had been an agreement to use the firearms if necessary to protect 

the drug manufacturing and distribution operation from everyone 

except law enforcement officers, In sum, we find that the 

testimony of the co-defendant was substantial evidence upon which 

the jury could convict Bullock for the conspiracy charged in Count 

2 of the indictment, 

We must conclude that the indictment as to both counts 

contested in this late challenge are adequate to meet the 

requirements of Freeman which includes any constitutional issues, 

We conclude also that the proof was sufficient to support the 

conviction. 

AFFIRMED, 

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