Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05484/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05484-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Aytes
Defendant
Abdul Haq Ghafoori
Plaintiff
Janet Napolitano
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABDUL HAQ GHAFOORI,

Plaintiff,

v.

JANET NAPOLITANO, Secretary,

U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C09-5484 TEH

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

This matter came before the Court on April 19, 2010, on cross-motions for summary

judgment. Plaintiff Abdul Haq Ghafoori (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under the

Administrative Procedure Act against Defendants Janet Napolitano, in her official capacity

as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and Michael Aytes, in

his official capacity as acting Deputy Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff, an asylee from Afghanistan, contends that

Defendants acted contrary to regulation by relying on evidence undisclosed to him to deny

his petition to obtain derivative immigration benefits for his daughter. Defendants seek

dismissal of this action. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED,

and Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and his wife applied for asylum in the United States on May 4, 2000, after

fleeing their native Afghanistan. They were granted asylum on November 13, 2000, at the

San Francisco asylum office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS” or “the

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 After Plaintiff was granted asylum, the functions of the INS were subsumed by the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), which was established pursuant to the

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), the division of DHS that oversees asylum

claims and other lawful immigration, became responsible for Plaintiff’s case following the

agency restructuring. The Court will therefore refer to both the INS and USCIS as “the

Service.”

2

 Facts are drawn from the Certified Administrative Record (“C.A.R.”) (Doc. 10), as

well as from documents authenticated in the declarations of Plaintiff’s former and current

counsel, Gail Nevius Abbas and Tyler Gerking. Defendants argue that reliance on the

declarations is inappropriate as the Court’s review should be limited to the record before the

agency. Although Defendants are correct that “post-decision information” should not be

used “as a new rationalization either for sustaining or attacking” an agency’s decision, Ass’n

of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980), the Court does not rely on

the declarations for that purpose. Rather, the declarations document counsel’s

correspondence with the Service and related agencies in an effort to resolve this matter short

of litigation, and the Court considers them only in that context.

2

Service”).1

 Their daughter, Eida Ghafoori (“Eida”), had been unable to travel to the United

States with her parents and remained in Peshawar, Pakistan, where the family resided after

leaving Afghanistan in the early 1990s.2

When an asylee’s child is outside the United States, the Immigration and Nationality

Act (“INA”) allows the child to “follow to join” and “be granted the same status” as the

asylee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(d). A person must be “unmarried” and

“under twenty-one years of age” to satisfy the INA’s definition of “child” and qualify for

derivative benefits. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). Eligibility for following-to-join benefits is based

on the child’s age at the time the parent applied for asylum. Id. § 1158(b)(3)(B). “[I]f the

alien attained 21 years of age after [the asylum] application was filed but while it was

pending,” he or she “shall continue to be classified as a child for purposes of” derivative

benefits. Id.

On April 15, 2002, Plaintiff filed an I-730 “Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition” on

Eida’s behalf, which declared that she was born on July 6, 1986 – making her 13 years of age

when Plaintiff applied for asylum. “The burden of proof is on the principal alien to establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that any person on whose behalf he or she is making a

request [for derivative benefits] is an eligible spouse or child.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(f); see also

id. § 103.2(b)(1) (“An applicant or petitioner must establish that he or she is eligible for the

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 The U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual noted that “[p]rotracted

wartime conditions and the absence of an established central authority have made document

availability and reliability very uncertain” in Afghanistan. C.A.R. at 64.

4

 At hearing, Defendants asserted that the document described in Plaintiff’s motion

papers as Eida’s passport is in fact a refugee travel document, which does not carry the same

weight as a passport. This distinction is inconsequential for purposes of these motions.

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requested benefit at the time of filing the application or petition.”). Where a “required

document, such as a birth or marriage certificate, does not exist or cannot be obtained,” the

regulations require a petitioner to “demonstrate this and submit secondary evidence, such as

church or school records, pertinent to the facts at issue.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(i). If neither

primary nor secondary evidence can be secured, a petitioner must “submit two or more

affidavits” to overcome their unavailability. Id. Plaintiff was unable to obtain a birth

certificate for Eida, and church, medical, and school records were likewise unavailable.3

Plaintiff therefore supported the I-730 petition with copies of Eida’s passport,4

 a letter from

her high school principal stating when she graduated, a family friend’s affidavit attesting to

the year she was born, another affidavit establishing that Plaintiff and his wife were married

in 1954, money transfer documents evidencing Plaintiff’s continued financial support of his

daughter, and family photographs.

On March 13, 2003, the Service notified Plaintiff that the documentation submitted

was insufficient to warrant favorable consideration of his petition for Eida, as two sworn

affidavits are necessary to establish the date and place of a birth or marriage, and Plaintiff

had submitted only one for each event. Plaintiff therefore augmented the petition with two

additional declarations, one attesting to Eida’s birth, and the other to his marriage. The

Service approved the petition on June 19, 2003 at its Nebraska Service Center, and

forwarded it to the American Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan for the issuance of a visa to

Eida.

After Eida appeared at the embassy for visa processing, that office referred her to the

Aziz Medical Center in Islamabad for a “bone-age assessment,” which was meant “to give a

more accurate picture of the true age of the applicant.” Certified Administrative Record

(“C.A.R.”) (Doc. 10) at 5-6. Based on x-rays taken on May 11, 2004, Dr. Ahmed Raza Jan

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concluded that Eida “is 25 years of age or more.” Id. at 6. The DHS office at the embassy in

Islamabad therefore determined that Eida “was over 21 years of age at the time of filing” in

the year 2000, and returned the I-730 petition to the Nebraska Service Center “for possible

institution of revocation.” Id. at 5.

The Service moved to reopen the petition, issuing a notice of intent to deny on

September 21, 2004, which informed Plaintiff that it was “in possession of adverse

information that you may be unaware of regarding” the I-730 petition. C.A.R. at 3. The

notice explained the results of the bone-age assessment and enclosed the letter from Dr.

Ahmed Raza Jan; the x-ray on which he relied was not included. Plaintiff was given thirty

days to submit a written rebuttal. 

Plaintiff’s then-counsel, Gail Nevius, responded in an October 15, 2004 letter by

requesting copies of the x-rays and medical records on which the doctor had relied in making

his assessment. She also asked that the deadline for filing a rebuttal be extended by six

months, to allow time for the records to be obtained and analyzed. Plaintiff attempted to

retrieve the medical records by submitting Freedom of Information Act requests to the

Nebraska Service Center and the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, neither of which produced the

requested documentation. Plaintiff ultimately declined to submit a substantive rebuttal and

stood on his previous submissions. On February 14, 2005, the petition was denied both as

abandoned and based on the record. C.A.R. 1-2; 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13)(i). Although that

decision was unappealable, the denial letter notified Plaintiff that he could “submit a new

petition with the appropriate documentation” to the Service if he believed that he could

“overcome the grounds for denial.” C.A.R. at 2.

Plaintiff then engaged his current counsel, Tyler Gerking, and renewed his efforts to

obtain the x-rays. The office of Congressman Pete Stark contacted USCIS’s Nebraska

Service Center, which informed him that it did not have the records and recommended

contacting the Aziz Medical Center, where the x-rays were taken. Counsel did so, receiving

a response from Dr. Ahmed Raza Jan explaining that their “standard operating procedure” is

to send “all x-ray films . . . to the consular section along with the conclusion letter” so that “if

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 In his papers, Plaintiff also raised a second basis for summary judgment in his favor: 

that the agency’s reliance on the bone scan for its denial was arbitrary and capricious. At

hearing, however, Plaintiff narrowed his focus by stating that the only question before the

Court is whether the Service violated its own regulation. Defendants agreed that this is the

only question the Court should decide on this motion.

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they require a second opinion they may not have to ask the applicant to undergo x-rays again

and thus expose them to unnecessary radiations.” Gerking Decl., Ex. C. Counsel then

contacted the USCIS office at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, which notified him that all

USCIS files had been moved to its New Delhi office. When counsel approached the New

Delhi office, his inquiry was – after a year-long delay – forwarded to the consular section of

the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. That office informed counsel that the USCIS office at the

Islamabad embassy had closed in October 2007, and that the consular section had no record

of having received the petition from USCIS. The embassy recommended contacting the

USCIS office where the petition was originally filed – i.e. the Nebraska Service Center,

where the search began. Plaintiff’s counsel therefore concluded that further requests to

obtain the x-rays would be futile.

Plaintiff filed this action for declaratory judgment and injunction on November 18,

2009, asking this Court to order Defendants to approve the petition or, in the alternative, to

remand to USCIS for an investigation into the petition. Plaintiff moved for summary

judgment on February 16, 2010, arguing that Defendants violated their own regulations by

denying his petition based on undisclosed evidence.5

 Defendants opposed the motion and

cross-moved for summary judgment on March 15, 2010. Defendants argue that Plaintiff

failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that the Service complied with regulations in

reaching its decision, which must withstand the deferential standard of review for agency

action.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to material

facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

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 This action is also brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”),

which provides that a court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested

party.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “This text has long been understood ‘to confer on federal

courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of

litigants.’” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007) (quoting Wilton v.

Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)). Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims should

be evaluated under the APA rather than the DJA, because “the relief sought is essentially the

same” under both statutes. Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir.

1997) (discussing APA and the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962). Plaintiff, in his motion,

does not even reference the DJA. The Court will therefore assess Plaintiff’s claims only

under the APA.

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Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The

Court may not weigh the evidence and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Id. at 255.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at

trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than

for the moving party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). 

However, on an issue for which its opponent will have the burden of proof at trial, the

moving party can prevail merely by “pointing out . . . that there is an absence of evidence to

support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets

its initial burden, the opposing party must then “set out specific facts showing a genuine

issue for trial” to defeat the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

Questions of law are “suitable to disposition on summary judgment.” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank

of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 310 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),6

which subjects to judicial review any “final agency action for which there is no other

adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. A reviewing court “shall . . . hold unlawful

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 Plaintiff argues that this Court may also set aside the Service’s action because it was

“unsupported by substantial evidence,” which is another standard for overturning agency

action under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). However, the Supreme Court has held that

“[r]eview under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only when the agency action is

taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of” the APA itself, “or when the agency action is

based on a public adjudicatory hearing.” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 414. That standard is

therefore inapplicable here.

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and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious,

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. § 706(2)(A). This

“standard of review is a narrow one,” demanding a “searching and careful” inquiry that

assesses “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and

whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.

v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430

U.S. 99, 105 (1977).7

 “The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the

agency.” Id.

Defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff asks the Court to find that the Service violated

its own rule by failing to provide copies of the x-rays on which its decision was based. The

Court will address each of these arguments in turn.

I. Exhaustion

Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not submit

a rebuttal to the Service’s intent to deny letter, and therefore failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. The Service denied the petition as abandoned and also based on the

record. C.A.R. at 1-2; see also 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(13) (allowing petition to be “summarily

denied as abandoned, denied based on the record, or denied for both reasons” when no

response is received). However, whether and how Plaintiff responded to the notice of intent

to deny is a matter of dispute.

Plaintiff’s original counsel, Ms. Nevius, attests that she requested a six-month

extension on October 15, 2004, in a letter to the Acting Director of the Nebraska Service

Center, Gregory Christian, who signed the notice of intent to deny. Ms. Nevius’s letter

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explicitly states that it “responds to” the notice of intent to deny. Nevius Decl., Ex. D. In it,

she requests an extension and copies of the medical records, and asks the Service “to

reconsider” and “grant Eida derivative asylum” based on the record already submitted. Id.

She also cites 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) as requiring that the medical records be made available. 

Defendants dispute that such a letter was ever received as it is not in the certified

administrative record.

When a petitioner is given the opportunity to rebut derogatory evidence, “[a]ny

explanation, rebuttal, or information presented by or in behalf of the applicant or petitioner

shall be included in the record of proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i). It therefore

appears that the October 15, 2004 letter – which explained why the x-rays were necessary to

Plaintiff’s rebuttal – was erroneously omitted from the administrative record. Since Plaintiff

did not “fail[] to respond” to the notice of intent to deny, summary denial of the petition as 

“abandoned” was inappropriate, id. § 103.2(b)(13)(i), and Plaintiff’s failure to respond is not

a basis for concluding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s submission of a rebuttal is not a prerequisite to review by this

Court. In Darby v. Cisneros, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the requirement

that available administrative remedies be exhausted under the APA. The Court focused its

inquiry on 5 U.S.C. § 704, which provides “that judicial review is available for ‘final agency

action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.’” Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S.

137, 143 (1993) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704). That section further provides that, “[e]xcept as

otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the

purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application

. . . for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and

provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency

authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. After examining those provisions, the Court concluded that,

“where the APA applies, an appeal to ‘superior agency authority’ is a prerequisite to judicial

review only when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal

before review and the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review.” 

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Darby, 509 U.S. at 154. Requiring litigants “to exhaust optional appeals as well” would “be

inconsistent with the plain language of” the statute. Id. at 147.

The denial of Plaintiff’s petition was not appealable. 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(e). Even if

Plaintiff did not submit any rebuttal to the notice of intent to deny, that failure merely

affected the record upon which the Service based its final decision. Once the Service had

made its decision, it required no further action by Plaintiff as a prerequisite to judicial

review. Plaintiff’s failure to proffer a substantive rebuttal to the notice of intent to deny

would not, by itself, be an appropriate basis for dismissal.

II. Violation of Regulation

Plaintiff claims that the Service defied its own regulations by failing to give Plaintiff

access to the x-rays that were the basis for Dr. Ahmed Raza Jan’s conclusion regarding

Eida’s age. The regulation on which Plaintiff relies is 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii), which

provides that a “determination of statutory eligibility shall be based only on information

contained in the record of proceeding which is disclosed to the applicant or petitioner.” 

Defendants respond that nothing in the regulations requires the Service to provide the actual

x-ray films on which the doctor relied.

In the Ninth Circuit, a claim “that an agency has violated its own regulation . . . is

subject to judicial review,” but relief may only be granted where the claimant can “show that

he was prejudiced by the agency’s mistake.” Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th

Cir. 2007). The APA also provides an independent basis for reviewing “[a]gency violations

of their own regulations,” because such violations “may well be inconsistent with the

standards of agency action which the APA directs the courts to enforce.” United States v.

Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754 (1979). The APA allows a district court to review a

“preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling” in its review of a final

agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 704, and empowers the court to set aside any such action that is

“not in accordance with law,” id. § 706. “A regulation has the force of law; therefore, an

agency’s interpretation of a statute in a manner inconsistent with a regulation will not be

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enforced.” Nat’l Med. Enters. v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 291, 293 (9th Cir. 1988). Judicial review

of Plaintiff’s claims that the Service violated its own regulations is therefore consistent with

Ninth Circuit precedent and the APA.

“[W]here an agency interprets its own regulation, even if through an informal process,

its interpretation of an ambiguous statute is controlling . . . unless ‘plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the regulation.’” Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.3d 927, 930 (2006) (quoting

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). However, deference to an agency’s

interpretation “is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.” 

Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). Deferring to an agency’s contrary

interpretation of an unambiguous regulation “would be to permit the agency, under the guise

of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.” Id. “Courts grant an

agency’s interpretation of its own regulations considerable legal leeway.” Barnhart v.

Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002). 

Two regulatory provisions are in play here. The notice of intent to deny was governed

by 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)(iv), which requires that the notice “be in writing” and “specify . . .

the bases for the proposed denial sufficient to give the applicant or petitioner adequate notice

and sufficient information to respond.” The Service’s notice did so: it stated that Eida had

been referred “to a physician for a bone-age assessment,” which “was performed to give a

more accurate picture of the true age of the beneficiary” and determined that she “was over

21 at the time of filing.” C.A.R. at 3. The notice enclosed the doctor’s letter, which listed

the five x-rays taken, explained the basis for the decision (that the “epiphyses of elbow,

wrist, iliac crest and shoulder joint are united,” and the “epiphysis of medial end of clavicle

has also fused”), and concluded that Eida was “25 years of age or more.” Id. at 6. Although

the notice did not enclose the x-rays themselves, all the regulation requires is “sufficient

information to respond.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)(iv). The “maximum response time” is thirty

days, and “[a]dditional time . . . may not be granted.” Id. The Service gave Plaintiff the

maximum thirty days to respond, and was precluded by regulation from granting the

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six-month extension that Plaintiff later requested. The Service therefore complied with the

requirements for the notice of intent to deny.

A second regulation, governing the “[i]nspection of evidence,” provides that a

petitioner “shall be permitted to inspect the record of proceeding which constitutes the basis

for the decision, except as provided in” four subsequent paragraphs. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16). 

The first of those exceptions is for “derogatory information” unknown to the petitioner; when

an adverse decision will be based on such information, the petitioner “shall be advised of this

fact and offered an opportunity to rebut the information . . . , except as provided in” the next

three paragraphs. Id. § 103.2(b)(16)(i). The following paragraph – characterized as an

exception to both paragraphs previously cited – is the provision that Plaintiff claims the

Service violated: “A determination of statutory eligibility shall be based only on information

contained in the record of proceeding which is disclosed to the applicant or petitioner, except

as provided in paragraph (b)(16)(iv) of this section.” Id. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii). The last two

paragraphs permit reliance on classified information, which a petitioner is not permitted to

access. Id. § 103.2(b)(16)(iii)-(iv).

Defendants stress that § 103.2(b)(16)(ii) is an “exception” to disclosure. The

regulation’s pattern of exceptions is puzzling, because there is nothing inconsistent between

paragraph (ii) and the previous two provisions from which it is excepted. Allowing the

petitioner to “inspect the record,” § 103.2(b)(16), is consistent with advising him of

derogatory information, § 103.2(b)(16)(i), and relying only on “information contained in the

record” to determine statutory eligibility, § 103.2(b)(16)(ii). The pattern of “exceptions” can

be understood only when read collectively: paragraphs (i) and (ii) set out the standards for

disclosure, whereas (iii) and (iv) limit disclosure where decisions are based on classified

information. Thus, although paragraph (ii) is characterized as an exception to the general

disclosure rule, it in fact requires full disclosure of the information on which a determination

of statutory eligibility is based.

Defendants also attempt to draw support from a handful of circuit and administrative

decisions interpreting 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i). In Hassan v. Chertoff, the Ninth Circuit

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 Although the BIA’s Firmery ruling cites 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii), the

discussion makes clear that it considered only paragraph (i): “[O]ur reading of the regulations

confirms that an alien must only be ‘advised’ of the derogatory information which will be

‘disclosed’ to her and that she then be given an opportunity to rebut the evidence once the

DHS has indicated an intent to deny the application.” In re Firmery, 2006 WL 901430 (BIA

Feb. 28, 2006).

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addressed a petitioner’s claim that his due process rights were violated by the government’s

failure to comply with paragraph (i) in denying, for national security reasons, his application

to adjust status. The court dismissed that argument: “Hassan was aware of the information

against him. He was questioned about his involvement in the terrorist organization. He was

given the opportunity to explain his association during the course of that questioning. The

regulation that Hassan cites requires no more of the government.” Hassan v. Chertoff, 593

F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2010). The Seventh Circuit, also considering paragraph (i), found

that “the regulation does not require USCIS to provide, in painstaking detail, the evidence . . .

it finds.” Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 2009). The Board of

Immigration Appeals has similarly held – in unpublished opinions cited by Defendants – that

paragraph (i) does “not place upon USCIS a requirement that the actual documents be

provided to a petitioner in order to comply with due process.” In re Liedtke, 2009 WL

5548116 (BIA Dec. 31, 2009); see also In re Firmery, 2006 WL 901430 (BIA Feb. 28, 2006)

(concluding that there is “no statutory or regulatory requirement that” DHS turn over “the

reports which formed the basis for denying” a visa petition).8

 However, those opinions all

deal with paragraph (i), which Plaintiff does not allege was violated.

Paragraph (ii), however, imposes the unambiguous requirement that the information

be disclosed to the petitioner. In Plaintiff’s case, the Service failed to do so. Defendants

argue that the Service complied because its decision was based on the doctor’s letter

interpreting the x-rays, and not the x-rays themselves. However, that reading is

irreconcilable with the regulations. Divorcing the doctor’s analysis from the medical records

on which he relied creates an impossible burden for any petitioner attempting to rebut his

conclusion. In the absence of the x-rays it interprets, the doctor’s letter is unimpeachable; it

allows for no second opinion, and therefore no meaningful rebuttal. The right to rebut that

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 Furthermore, it is unclear whether a showing of prejudice is even necessary here. 

The APA, which provides an independent basis for relief where an agency defies its own

regulations, imposes no such requirement.

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the regulations explicitly confer would be nullified. On a literal level, the Service may be

correct that it – having no medical expertise of its own – relied only on the doctor’s letter. 

However, its determination can only be based on information that is “in the record of

proceeding,” and the information on which it relied – an analysis of x-rays – is incomplete

without the x-rays analyzed. The Service therefore violated its own regulations by failing to

disclose the x-rays on which it relied – by way of the doctor’s assessment – in denying

Plaintiff’s petition.

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Kohli v. Gonzales requires a showing of prejudice before

relief can be granted based on an agency’s violation of its own regulation. 473 F.3d 1061,

1066 (9th Cir. 2007). The clearest prejudice would be a showing that Plaintiff’s petition

would have been granted but for the violation or, in other words, that the failure to disclose

resulted in the denial of the petition. It is impossible to make such a showing because

Plaintiff – due to the Service’s violation – does not have access to the x-rays, and cannot

predict what they may reveal. Since the Service’s violation deprived Plaintiff of the ability

to make a meaningful rebuttal, that is itself sufficient prejudice to justify relief.9

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that the Service violated 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii) by deciding

Plaintiff’s I-730 petition based on an evaluation of x-rays that were not disclosed to Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED, and Defendants’ motion is

DENIED.

Plaintiff requests that the Court remand this action to the Service with orders that the

initial decision granting derivative benefits be reinstated. Such a remedy is inappropriate;

this Court has no basis for assessing whether Eida does in fact meet the requirements for 

//

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derivative asylum status. Instead, this matter is remanded to the Service with orders that it

reconsider the I-730 petition and base its determination of statutory eligibility only on

evidence disclosed to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/4/10 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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