Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01414/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01414-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Intervenor
David F. Power
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 13, 1998 Decided July 10, 1998

No. 97-1414

David F. Power,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Labor Relations Authority,

Respondent

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,

Intervenor

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Steven J. Silverberg argued the cause for the petitioner.

Ann M. Boehm, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations Authority, argued the cause for the respondent. David M.

Smith, Solicitor, and William R. Tobey, Deputy Solicitor,

Federal Labor Relations Authority, were on brief. Pamela

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P. Johnson, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations Authority,

entered an appearance.

Nancy S. Heermans, Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty

Corporation, argued the cause for the intervenor. James J.

Keightley, General Counsel, Terrence M. Deneen, Principal

Deputy General Counsel, and Patrick S. Menasco, Attorney,

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, were on brief.

Before: Henderson, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: David F. Power petitions the court to review an order of the Federal Labor

Relations Authority (FLRA or Authority), Pension Benefit

Guar. Corp., 52 F.L.R.A. No. 132 (April 30, 1997), dismissing

his wrongful termination claim against his former employer,

the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). In Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. FLRA, we remanded to the

FLRA to explain more adequately its decision in favor of

Power. 967 F.2d 658, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1992). We also directed

the FLRA to compare Power to another PBGC employee

whose transgressions were "at least comparable" to Power's.

Id. For the reasons set forth below, we uphold the FLRA's

order of dismissal.

I.

In the late 1980s Power was employed as a lawyer in the

Office of General Counsel (OGC) of the PBGC and served as

president of Local Chapter 211 of the National Treasury

Employees Union (NTEU). As we earlier recounted, Power

was fired from his position at PBGC due to "many incidents

of ... insubordinate conduct." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,

967 F.2d at 660.1 While not exhaustive, examples of Power's

__________

1 The facts underlying this appeal have been detailed in earlier

incarnations. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. FLRA, 967 F.2d

658, 659-65 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 52

F.L.R.A. No. 132, slip op. at 1-9 (April 30, 1997); Pension Benefit

Guar. Corp., No. 3-CA-90456, slip op. at 1-9 (July 19, 1994) (ALJ

insubordination include his (1) repeated refusal to respond

properly to a routine, supervisory request for a representative sample of his writing, id. at 659-60; (2) "inexcusable"

failure to follow a "concurrence matrix" used by the office to

ensure the consistency of its policies, id. at 660 (quoting a

warning memorandum sent to Power by the assistant general

counsel); (3) repeated refusal to accept messages from an

assistant general counsel, including one scheduling a meeting

to discuss the status of Power's cases, id. at 660-62; (4)

repeated refusal to obey a management order to return the

printout of an employee survey regarding computer usage

that Power had obtained and kept without the knowledge or

consent of authorized agency personnel, id. at 661; (5) threat

directed to Donald Morrison, a fellow employee who ran for

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vice president of Local 211, id.; and (6) refusal to answer

questions about the Morrison threat during an investigatory

interview, id. at 661-62. Power's conduct eventually led the

assistant general counsel to conclude that discharge was

appropriate. Id. at 662. The General Counsel agreed "after

weighing Power's record of service with the agency and his

'considerable legal talents' against his 'demonstrated lack of

judgment and integrity,' his 'persistent pattern of flouting

supervision' and 'the need for supervisory review to ensure

the consistency of agency decisions,' his 'disregard for ...

[Morrison's] statutory rights,' his 'complete absence of remorse,' and his 'instigation of other employees to violate

established policies.' " Id. The General Counsel concluded

that Power "was either 'unable or unwilling to conform his

behavior to [the] high standard' of conduct expected of an

employee in Power's position." Id.

Power enlisted the assistance of the NTEU, which began

an unfair labor practice claim on Power's behalf, alleging that

Power had been discharged in violation of the Federal Service

Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 5 U.S.C.

__________

Decision); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 47 F.L.R.A. No. 52, slip op.

at 1-4 (May 7, 1993); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 39 F.L.R.A.

905, 905-21 (1991); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 39 F.L.R.A. 935,

935-60 (1990) (ALJ Decision).

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s 7116(a)(1) and (a)(2) (making it "unfair labor practice" to

discriminate against employee based on union affiliation), for

engaging in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. s 7102 (providing each employee with "right" to affiliate with labor organization "without fear of penalty or reprisal" and "to act for a

labor organization in the capacity of a representative"). Power claimed that his refusal to provide a writing sample was a

"protected activity" because he was "actively engaged in a

grievance over the exact subject matter for which the writing

sample was requested." Pet'r Br. at 18-19. Power also

asserted that he was engaged in "protected activity" when he

obtained the computer survey data, refused to return it and

refused to answer questions about it because "[a]ll of these

actions were undertaken solely for the purpose of representing the interest of the bargaining unit in negotiations with

PBGC over ergonomic furniture." Id. at 19.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who heard the claim

recommended dismissal. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 39

F.L.R.A. 935, 965 (1990). The ALJ credited the testimony of

PBGC managers who stated that union activity played no

part in their decision to terminate Power. The ALJ concluded that Power had failed to establish his allegations by a

preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 960-65. The FLRA

reversed, concluding that PBGC had wrongfully discharged

Power because of his union affiliation and activities. Pension

Benefit Guar. Corp., 39 F.L.R.A. 905, 931 (1991).

PBGC appealed and we reversed, remanding the matter to

the FLRA for further consideration. We began by noting:

We need not decide whether the FLRA made out a

prima facie case [under the unlawful discrimination

framework set forth in Letterkenny Army Depot, 35

F.L.R.A. 113 (1990)] because we believe that PBGC

demonstrated that it would have fired Power absent ...

union animus. The FLRA conceded "that Power engaged in insubordinate acts," see 39 F.L.R.A. at 930, and

implicit in this concession is a recognition that PBGC had

a "legitimate justification for its action." Letterkenny, 35

F.L.R.A. at 118.

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Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 967 F.2d at 666. Under the

Letterkenny framework,2 we next examined whether PBGC

demonstrated--as it must--that it would have discharged

Power "even in the absence of protected activity." Letterkenny, 35 F.L.R.A. at 118. We noted that the analysis required

a comparison of the PBGC punishments meted out to other

similarly situated employees. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,

967 F.2d at 666. We determined, however, that the FLRA's

analysis of the "similarly situated status of the employees

being compared" was "inadequately explained." Id. at 667.

Specifically, we noted that the FLRA's comparison of Power

to two other employees, employee #1 and employee #6, was

insufficiently explained.3 Id. at 668-70. We specifically "reject[ed] the FLRA's finding that the conduct of employee #1

and of Power was 'at least comparable' as unsupported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Id. at 667

(citing 5 U.S.C. s 7123(c); Universal Camera Corp. v.

__________

2 "[T]he FLRA General Counsel makes out a prima facie case

of discrimination [under Letterkenny] if it shows by a preponderance of the evidence that: '(1) the employee against whom the

alleged discriminatory action was taken was engaged in protected

activity; and (2) such activity was a motivating factor in the

agency's treatment of the employee in connection with hiring,

tenure, promotion, or other conditions of employment.' " Pension

Benefit Guar. Corp., 967 F.2d at 666 (quoting Letterkenny, 35

F.L.R.A. at 118). Once the prima facie showing is made, the

employer can establish that (1) there was a "legitimate justification"

for the action and (2) the same action would have been taken even

in the absence of protected activity. Letterkenny, 35 F.L.R.A. at

118.

3 In addition, we "question[ed] the FLRA's attempt to distinguish the case of employee #8 ..., a GS-12 auditor discharged for

insubordination, on the ground that he, unlike Power, received

progressive discipline. Power did receive numerous warnings and

had more than ample notice that his conduct was unacceptable."

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 967 F.2d at 670 n.15. We were "also

troubled by the FLRA's reliance [in its disparate treatment analysis] on PBGC's failure to discharge three of its employees for

physical assaults and obscene gestures" who "were neither lawyers

nor OGC employees." Id. at 668-69.

NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951)).4 With respect to employee

#6, we "question[ed] the FLRA's contention ... that employee #6 is not comparable" in that employee #6 was also an

OGC lawyer, he "repeatedly dealt directly with PBGC's Office

of the Executive Director, urging it to take positions that had

not been approved by the General Counsel and were in some

instances contrary to the General Counsel's positions" and he

was given the choice to resign or be terminated. Id. at 669.

We explained:

We view [employee #6's] transgressions as 'at least

comparable' to Power's failure to follow the concurrence

matrix. We further note that employee #6 did not

engage in the multiple types of insubordination Power

did. That PBGC did not offer employee #6 a suspension

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but instead sought his removal may be further evidence

that Power did not receive disparate treatment. In any

event, the FLRA made no mention of employee #6, an

employee whose situation, we conclude, was in some

respects analogous to Power's.

Id. at 669-70. Accordingly, we concluded that "the FLRA

failed to define 'similarly situated' in conducting its disparate

__________

4 We held:

The record demonstrates that, unlike employee #1 who had

received no warnings before the imposition of the disciplinary

sanction, Power had received numerous verbal warnings. Nevertheless, Power continued his insubordinate conduct. Indeed,

the record further indicates that even after the investigatory

interview, at which time Power had knowledge that his conduct

was being closely scrutinized, he continued to refuse to follow

the concurrence matrix and he continued to delete CEO messages without reading them. The FLRA's decision ignores this

critical difference between employee #1's conduct and Power's

conduct.

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 967 F.2d at 667. Moreover, we noted

that employee #1's supervisors "retained sufficient confidence in

him to grant him a second chance" whereas "two management

officials who the FLRA concedes did not have a union animus,

testified that Power could not return to the office as an effective

employee." Id. at 668.

treatment analysis" and remanded "for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including the direction that the

FLRA consider employee #6 in conducting its disparate

treatment analysis." Id. at 670. Following our directive, on

remand the FLRA articulated its criteria for determining

whether an employee has been treated differently from similarly situated employees:

In making such a determination, the Authority considers

the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case.

The Authority compares, among other things, the consistency of treatment received by an employee who engaged

in protected activity with that received by other employees: (1) from the same supervisor, and (2) in the workplace as a whole.

Moreover, in determining whether employees are similarly situated in circumstances where an adverse or

disciplinary action was taken against an employee who

engaged in protected activity and against one who did

not, we find that it is relevant to compare: (1) the nature

of the misconduct; (2) the positions the employees occupied; (3) the employees' past disciplinary records; and

(4) the extent to which employees were previously

warned that their conduct may result in discipline. We

also find that it is appropriate to examine the elements

listed in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5

[M.S.P.B.] 280, 305-06 (1981) (Douglas) that are relevant

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to a particular adverse action decision and the extent to

which a respondent consistently relied on the Douglas

elements, or any other factors, when imposing adverse or

disciplinary actions. We note that the weight given to

the above-noted factors may vary with the circumstances

presented in a specific case.

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 47 F.L.R.A. No. 52, slip op. at 5

(May 7, 1993) (internal citations omitted). The FLRA, however, subsequently sent the case back to the ALJ because it

found the record inadequate for it to make the specific

determinations with respect to Power required by this court.

Id. at 5-7. The FLRA directed the ALJ to adduce "additionUSCA Case #97-1414 Document #365646 Filed: 07/10/1998 Page 7 of 15
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al evidence to decide whether Power was similarly situated to

Employees Nos. 1, 6, 7, 9 and/or 10 and, based on the

evidence ... determine ... whether Power was subject to

disparate treatment." Id. at 6-7.

On remand, the ALJ conducted a one-day hearing during

which "all parties were afforded the full opportunity to be

heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues set forth in the [FLRA's]

remand." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 3-CA-90456, slip

op. at 4 (July 19, 1994). "Upon the basis of the entire record,

including ... observation of the witnesses and their demeanor," the ALJ concluded, once again, that "I cannot find that

Mr. Power was subjected to disparate treatment." Id. at 4,

11. Specifically, the ALJ found that employee #6 and Power

"were similarly situated," and "[i]nasmuch as both Employee

No. 6 and Mr. Power were given like penalties for the same

indiscretions, I find that Mr. Power was not treated differently than Employee No. 6." Id. at 10. In addition, "[w]ith

respect to Employee No. 1, in agreement with the Circuit

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, I find that

Employee No. 1 and Mr. Power were not similarly situated."

Id. And finally,

[T]urning to Employee [sic] Nos. 7, 9 and 10 ... I cannot

find that they are similarly situated to Mr. Power. In

reaching this conclusion I note, among other things, the

fact that they are not lawyers, they do not work in the

same department under the same supervision, the type of

misconduct they were involved in, i.e., fighting as opposed to insubordination, the respective grades held by

the employees and Mr. Power, and the responsibilities

imposed upon Mr. Power as an independent operator

representing Respondent in the legal arena.

Id. at 11. The FLRA affirmed the ALJ:

[W]e find Power similarly situated and treated comparably to Employees Nos. 6 and 8,5 who were also separat-

__________

5 While the ALJ did not adduce further evidence with respect

to Employee No. 8, the FLRA determined that the record was

sufficient to allow it to again compare Employee No. 8 with Power.

ed from Federal service. As to Employee No. 1, although Power and Employee No. 1 were both attorneys

and engaged in somewhat comparable misconduct, we

find that significant differences between them rebuts

[sic] the conclusion that Power was disparately treated.

We also find that Power was not similarly situated to

Employees Nos. 7, 9, and 10 who, like Employee No. 1,

received lesser sanctions than Power. We therefore find

that Power was not treated disparately by PBGC, and

that PBGC would have taken the same action even in the

absence of Power's protected activity.

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 52 F.L.R.A., slip op. at 27-28.

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Power now petitions this Court to reverse the FLRA's

April 30, 1997 decision. He requests that the PBGC be

ordered to offer him immediate reinstatement to his former

(or a comparable) position with full backpay and interest and

that it be instructed to expunge from its records all references to his removal, to post a notice to all employees

admitting its error and to pay attorney's fees.

Power also claims that, in any event, the FLRA's decision

should be set aside because, on remand, one of the two voting

FLRA panel members, Donald S. Wasserman, should have

recused himself based on an incident with Power when both

were employed by the American Federation of State, County

and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME). After

PBGC terminated Power, he secured a position with

AFSCME as a labor economist in the research department.

Power Decl. p 3. At that time, Wasserman was the director

of research and collective bargaining services at AFSCME.

Wasserman Decl. p 3. Power claims that the incident occurred during a meeting in Wasserman's office while they

were discussing a letter that Power drafted. He claims that

Wasserman criticized the letter and then reacted angrily to

Power's explanation which Wasserman viewed as condescending, disrespectful and insubordinate. Power Decl. pp 15, 16.

Soon after the meeting he was informed that his employment

would not continue past the probationary period and he now

alleges Wasserman had a role in that termination decision.

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Power Decl. pp 19-20. For his part, Wasserman declares

that he "played no part, directly or indirectly, in the decision

to terminate" Power, that his decision as an FLRA member

"was based solely upon my consideration of the facts of the

applicable law" and that the earlier incident "in no way

affected my decision in the case, nor could it have" because he

was unaware "that the employee with whom I met briefly

while I was at AFSCME was the same individual." Wasserman Decl. pp 4-6.

II.

We affirm the FLRA's findings of fact "if supported by

substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." 5

U.S.C. s 7123(c); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,

340 U.S. 474 (1951). We will set aside an FLRA order only if

it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. ss 7123(c),

706(2)(A); see also Overseas Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. FLRA, 858

F.2d 769, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Power again advances several arguments, none of which

has merit. First, we reject both of Power's "protected activity" claims under the FSLMRS. Pet'r Br. at 18-19. With

respect to his repeated refusals to provide a writing sample,

Power's pending grievance "over the exact subject matter for

which the writing sample was requested," id. at 19, does not

immunize him from responding to a supervisor's good faith

request for rating material. Moreover, Power's assertion

that he merely wished to be judged on his entire body of

writing over the rating period does not explain his insubordinate behavior in submitting over 2,000 pages of unstapled,

uncollated pages, many of which were totally irrelevant,

including other individuals' court filings and LEXIS printouts. Power's strained argument--that he was engaged in a

statutorily "protected activity" by tardily submitting nonresponsive documents in response to his supervisor's repeated

and legitimate requests for writing samples--is without merit. We also reject Power's claim that his refusal to obey the

management order to return the computer usage surveys was

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a statutorily "protected activity." We agree with the FLRA

that "the information was ... PBGC's property that Power

obtained from an unauthorized source without PBGC's knowledge or consent" and that Power's "first obligation [was] to

comply with [his] supervisory order[s], reserving any complaints or grievances for a later time." Pension Benefit

Guar. Corp., 52 F.L.R.A. at 16-17.6

Power also claims that the FLRA's dismissal of his wrongful termination claim is "arbitrary, irrational, unsupported by

substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, and

is otherwise not in accordance with law." Pet'r Br. at 20.

Notwithstanding his repeated efforts to re-write the facts of

this case, characterizing his insubordination as "minor and

inadvertent" and "mistaken violations of office protocol," id.

at 40, 32, we have already concluded that Power engaged in

"many incidents of insubordinate conduct" and "multiple

types of insubordination." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 967

F.2d at 660, 670. The facts underlying Power's termination

are the same today as they were when this Court first heard

__________

6 Power invokes for support the decision in United States Air

Force Logistics Command, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma City

and AFGE, which overturned the management's discipline of a

union representative who was detained by security officers after

refusing to leave a work area where he was attempting "to personally serve copies of unfair labor practice charges filed by the Union

on Activity supervisors who were named in the charges." 34

F.L.R.A. 385, 386 (1990). We find the decision inapposite because,

as noted above, Power's insubordinate conduct was neither unionrelated nor statutorily protected. Nor was it "grounded" or "rooted" in any provision of a collective bargaining agreement. See

NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831-32 (1984).

Moreover, United States Air Force reaffirms "[m]anagement's right

... to discipline a union representative for activities which 'are not

specifically on behalf of the exclusive representative or which

exceed the boundaries of protected activity such as flagrant misconduct.' " Id. at 388-89 (quoting Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Long

Beach, Calif., 25 F.L.R.A. 1002, 1005 (1987)). Finally, as we have

repeatedly recognized, "[e]ngaging in union activities does not

shield an employee from being fired." Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931

F.2d 924, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

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the matter. Now, as then, the FLRA's conclusion that PBGC

"had a legitimate justification for its action," id. at 666

(internal quotations omitted), is supported by substantial

evidence.

As a result, the question on remand was simply whether

Power would have been terminated even in the absence of

protected activity. After comparing Power's circumstances to

those of other disciplined employees, both the ALJ and the

FLRA concluded that Power had not been treated disparately. While Power uses selective facts from the record in an

attempt to recast his misconduct in a more favorable light, his

attempts fail to demonstrate that the ALJ's and FLRA's

findings lack substantial support in the record as a whole.

Indeed, even if the case were closer, we would nonetheless

affirm the FLRA because its findings, supported by substantial evidence, "may not be displaced on review even if the

court might have reached a different result had the matter

been before it de novo." LCF, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1276,

1281 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).

Power next argues that the FLRA erroneously adopted

and applied the factors outlined in Douglas v. Veterans

Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 280, 305-06 (1981). Specifically, Power

contends that the Douglas factors apply only to Merit Systems Protection Board cases and that the FLRA could not

adopt those factors as its own because they had been developed by another administrative body. As we specifically

noted in Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. FLRA, however, "[i]t

is, of course, for the FLRA to determine in the first instance

what factors are relevant in deciding whether employees are

similarly situated." 967 F.2d at 668. We then discussed in

detail numerous Douglas factors to be considered after declaring that "many factors may be relevant in determining an

appropriate sanction." Id.7

__________

7 Power also claims that the FLRA erroneously refused to

consider more "evidence" on remand. We reject this claim as well.

On remand, the ALJ and the FLRA followed our narrow instructions, which did not include reopening the entire record. Power has

had more than a "fair opportunity to develop and present" his case

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Finally, Power's bias claim regarding FLRA member Wasserman is meritless. We will set aside an official's decision

not to recuse "only where he has 'demonstrably made up [his]

mind about important and specific factual questions and [is]

impervious to contrary evidence.' " Metropolitan Council of

NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1165 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1209 (D.C.

Cir. 1980)). No such showing has been made here. Nothing

in Power's declaration regarding his brief exchange with

Wasserman suggests--much less establishes--that Wasserman had "a fixed opinion--'a closed mind on the merits of the

case.' " Throckmorton v. NTSB, 963 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (quoting United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 136

(D.C. Cir. 1976)).

Even if Power's argument had merit, he would be precluded from raising it now because "[c]laims of bias must 'be

raised as soon as practicable after a party has reasonable

cause to believe that grounds for disqualification exist.' "

Pharaon v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 135

F.3d 148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Marcus v. Director,

Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 548 F.2d 1044,

1051 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted)). Indeed, the Federal Labor Relations Act provides that "no objection that has

not been urged before the Authority, or its designee, shall be

considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge

the objection is excused because of extraordinary circumstances." 5 U.S.C. s 7123(c); see also United States Dep't of

Commerce v. FLRA, 7 F.3d 243, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1993). It is

undisputed that Power failed to apprise the FLRA of Wasserman's potential bias when Power first became aware of

Wasserman's participation. At oral argument, Power's counsel conceded that the reason no objection was made was that

__________

and the "strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close," INS

v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1984), was--and is--manifest in this

matter, which has now been before the ALJ twice, before the

FLRA three times and before us twice. Moreover, "[r]eopening an

evidentiary hearing is a matter of agency discretion, and is reserved

for extraordinary circumstances." Cities of Campbell v. FERC, 770

F.2d 1180, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).

Power was "embarrassed" by the episode and hoped for a

favorable decision, thus obviating the need to reveal how his

AFSCME employment had ended. We have specifically instructed that in similar circumstances:

[i]t will not do for a claimant to suppress his misgivings

[regarding bias] while waiting anxiously to see whether

the decision goes in his favor. A contrary rule would

only countenance and encourage unacceptable inefficiency in the administrative process. The APA-mandated

procedures afford every party ample opportunity to enforce and preserve its due process rights. Under the

present circumstances, however, petitioner must be

deemed to have waived his claim.

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Marcus, 548 F.2d at 1051. We therefore have little difficulty

concluding both that Power's embarrassment regarding one

of his workplace conflicts does not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying his failure to object below, 5

U.S.C. s 7123(c), and that he "must be deemed to have

waived his claim" based on his admitted "suppress[ion of] his

misgivings while waiting anxiously to see whether the decision [would] go[ ] in his favor," Marcus, 548 F.2d at 1051.8

__________

8 Power attempts to expand our decision in Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1988), claiming that "[i]n fact, Jenkins

provides in the case of actual bias there can be no waiver of the bias

claim, and thus Power had no obligation to raise it before the

Authority." Pet'r Reply Br. at 23. But Jenkins, which involved a

court-appointed special master, turned on Canon 3.D. of the Code of

Judicial Conduct, which expressly provides that disqualification for

personal bias is not waivable for those covered by the Code. As

noted above, by contrast, Power was expressly bound by statute to

raise his objection before the FLRA. See 5 U.S.C. s 7123(c); see

also Administrative Procedure Act s 7(b), 5 U.S.C. s 556(b) ("On

the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit of

personal bias or other disqualification of a presiding or participating

employee, the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the

record and decision in the case.") (emphasis added). Moreover, in

decisions both preceding and subsequent to Jenkins, we have held

that in administrative agency proceedings, an actual bias claim can

be waived. In Pharaon v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve

III.

As did the ALJ and the FLRA below, we conclude that

Power's termination resulted not from anti-union animus but

from his "many incidents of ... insubordinate conduct."

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 967 F.2d at 660. Accordingly,

the petition for review is

Denied.

__________

Sys., the petitioner claimed that the ALJ was biased, "relying

chiefly on a statement made by the ALJ" in ruling against him.

135 F.3d 148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We held that because the

petitioner was "[a]ware of the ALJ's alleged bias when he appealed

the [ALJ's] recommended decision" but "failed to raise the issue or

argue that the case should be remanded to a different ALJ," he

"thus waived his principal ground for asserting bias" and could not

first raise the issue on appeal. Id.; see also Marcus v. Director,

Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 548 F.2d 1044, 1051,

1050 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("petitioner must be deemed to have waived

his claim" of ALJ's bias because he "wait[ed] until after the initial

adverse decision [of the ALJ] to raise the[ ] allegations" that "the

ALJ 'demonstrated personal bias, religious bias, and bias based

upon the nativity of appellant' ").

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