Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02305/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02305-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Oakland
Defendant
Clement
Defendant
Fought
Defendant
Lavita Oliver
Plaintiff
Lillie Willis
Plaintiff
Richard Word
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LILLIE WILLIS, et al,

Plaintiffs,

v

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al,

Defendants.

 /

No C 04-2305 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiffs Lillie Willis (“Lillie”) and Lavita Oliver

(“Oliver”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) allege violations of federal

and state law based upon the events leading up to and surrounding

the shooting death of Glen Willis (“Willis”). Doc #1 (Complaint). 

Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleading pursuant to FRCP

12(c). Doc #15. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, seek leave to file

an amended complaint. Doc #24. The court heard oral arguments on

these motions on February 24, 2005. For the reasons that follow,

the court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion to amend and DENIES as moot

defendants’ motion. Additionally, the court ORDERS plaintiffs’

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counsel to SHOW CAUSE why they should not (i) pay defendants’

reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred to date pursuant to 28

USC § 1927 and (ii) be sanctioned pursuant to FRCP 11. 

I

On June 14, 2004, attorney John L Burris filed a

complaint bearing his signature, on behalf of Lillie Willis and

Lavita Oliver, respectively the mother and sister of Glen Willis. 

Doc #1 (Compl). The complaint alleged that on August 5, 2003,

Oliver contacted 911 due to concerns about Willis’ conduct. Doc #1

at 5, ¶10. While the complaint states that Willis was a diagnosed

schizophrenic who lived alone, the complaint does not allege

Willis’ “conduct” that concerned Oliver. Id. Two officers were

dispatched to Willis’ home. On arrival, the officers were unable

to locate Willis. Id. The next day, August 6, 2003, Oliver “found

her brother to be home and spoke with him.” Id. “On the basis of

her observation of his condition, she again called the 911

dispatcher.” Id. According to the complaint, Oliver wanted the

Oakland Police Department to “take [Willis] into custody for

treatment under § 5150 of the California Welfare and Institutions

Code as a person manifesting mental derangement.” Id at 1-2, ¶1. 

In response to the second 911 call, defendants Fought and Clement,

Oakland police officers, drove to Willis’ home where they were met

by Oliver who informed them that “Willis was mistrustful, was

likely armed with a knife and that it would be advisable to call

for additional backup and an ambulance.” Id at 5, ¶10. The

complaint then alleges that Fought “obtained the house keys from

OLIVER and gave them to CLEMENT who opened the front door.” Id. 

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Willis was “immediately inside the door and lunged at CLEMENT,

stabbing him in the arm, at which point FOUGHT shot WILLIS in the

back with fatal result.” Id.

Following these factual allegations, the complaint

alleges a scattershot of claims of behalf of Oliver, in her

individual capacity, and Lillie, both individually and as Glen

Willis’ personal representative: (1) § 1983 claim for excessive

force in violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution (Doc #1 at 8), (2) § 1983

survival claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment (id at 8), (3) § 1983 wrongful death claim,

again predicated on the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (id

at 6), (4) § 1983 familial relationship claim, predicated on the

First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (id at 7), (5) negligence

claim for wrongful death (id at 9-10) and (6) intentional

infliction of emotional distress (id at 10). The complaint names

as defendants: (1) City of Oakland (“Oakland”), (2) Richard Word

(“Word”) in his official capacity as Oakland Chief of Police, (3)

Officer Fought and (4) Officer Clement.

On November 8, 2004, Oakland, Word and Fought filed a

joint motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to FRCP 12(c). 

Doc #15. On December 20, 2004, Clement joined in the Rule 12(c)

motion. Doc #19. While arguing such procedural issues as Oliver’s

standing to bring certain claims and the lack of factual

allegations regarding an equal protection violation, the gravamen

of defendants’ motion was that, under the facts alleged in the

complaint, Fought’s use of deadly force was reasonable as matter of

law under the Fourth Amendment and thus no legitimate causes of

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action could flow from the August 6, 2003, incident. Doc #15 at 3-

4. Defendants have ample Ninth Circuit precedent to support their

position. See Reynolds v County of San Diego, 84 F3d 1162, 1168

(9th Cir 1996) (holding that deadly force was reasonable as a

matter of law where an individual, acting erratically, swung a

knife at officers). See also Haugen v Brosseau, 339 F3d 857, 863

(9th Cir 2003) (“Where a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon

such as a gun or knife, the officer is justified in using deadly

force.”), rev’d on other grounds, 125 S Ct 596 (2004) (citation

omitted). 

On January 13, 2005, plaintiffs filed a document labeled

as an “opposition” to the motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

Doc #20. This memorandum, however, appears to concede that

defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings. In the first

sentence of the memorandum’s argument, plaintiffs state that they

“seek leave to amend the complaint to clarify causes of action they

intend to maintain and to eliminate the claims to which defendants’

[sic] correctly demur.” Id at 3. Next, and perhaps most

important, plaintiffs state that they “are able to allege

additional facts which will enable their claims to be litigated.” 

Id at 3. Implicit in this statement is that the current recitation

of the “facts” in the complaint does not allow plaintiffs’ claims

to be litigated. 

In addition to the new factual allegations in their

“opposition,” plaintiffs also state that if they are granted leave

to amend, they will not reallege (1) any claims based upon the

equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) any claims

based upon Cal Civ Code § 52.1 and (3) any claims in an individual

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capacity under the Fourth Amendment. Id at 4. Moreover,

plaintiffs state that the amended complaint “will not state a

direct cause of action against the City of Oakland nor will Chief

of Police [Word] be a named defendant.” Id.

Construing this “opposition” as a misguided motion for

leave to file an amended pleading, the court ordered plaintiffs to

file a proper motion for leave to file an amended pleading. Doc

#23. Pursuant to Civ L R 10-1(b), the court ordered plaintiffs

simultaneously to file a proposed first amended complaint (PFAC)

with the motion for leave. Id.

On February 11, 2005, plaintiffs filed their motion for

leave to amend, Doc #24, and included the PFAC. Doc #25. The PFAC

includes a section titled “FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION.” 

Doc #25 at 4-6. Even a superficial reading of the allegations

recited in the PFAC reveals substantial differences between these

factual allegations and the allegations contained in the original

complaint. The PFAC contains allegations that directly contradict

allegations in the original complaint. Because these differences

are critical to the outcome of the current motions, the court will

recite the factual allegations contained in the PFAC and in

brackets contrast these new allegations with the different or

contradictory allegations in the original complaint.

According to the PFAC, on August 6, 2003, Oliver “went to

see Glen Willis, found him at home and a [sic] called 911,

requesting that officers be dispatched.” Id at 4-5, ¶13. In

response to the 911 call, Fought and Clement arrived and were

informed by Oliver that her brother “was a paranoid schizophrenic,

had knives and that his doctor wanted to commit him under section

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5150 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” Id at 5. Next,

“FOUGHT insisted that OLIVER provide him with the phone number to

call Glen Willis. OLIVER told FOUGHT that calling on the telephone

would only make him worse and that he would not answer the

telephone in any event.” Id. Upon making the telephone call,

however, Fought received no “response” from Willis. Id. [This

entire factual scenario is new. The original complaint contains no

allegations regarding (1) Fought’s insistence on calling Willis,

(2) the fact that he actually called inside the house or (3)

Oliver’s warning that such telephonic activity would only make him

worse.] 

Undeterred by the unanswered telephone call, “FOUGHT then

demanded the house keys from OLIVER. OLIVER strenuously warned

them that in her brother’s condition, entering the house would be

provocative and reminded the officers that Willis was armed with

knives.” Id (emphasis added). [The original complaint stated that

Fought “obtained,” not “demanded,” the house keys from Oliver who

voluntarily gave Fought the keys because she wanted the officers to

take Willis into custody. Moreover, the original complaint is

devoid of any reference to Oliver’s strenuous warning to Fought and

Clement that entering the house would provoke her brother.]

“FOUGHT took the keys, gave them to CLEMENT and the

officers went to the front door. When CLEMENT unlocked the

security gate, Glen Willis opened the inner door and stabbed

CLEMENT in the arm.” Id. [In the original complaint, Clement was

the one who opened the door, not Willis.] “The knife lodged in

CLEMENT’s arm and at that point, Glen Willis had no remaining

weapon.” Id. [In the original complaint, there is no allegation

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that the knife lodged in Clement’s arm leaving Willis unarmed. 

Rather, the original complaint simply alleged that Willis stabbed

Clement in the arm.]

After Willis had stabbed Clement, “FOUGHT shot Willis in

the back and Willis fell to the ground.” Id, ¶14. [In the

original complaint, Fought shot Willis and killed him. According

to the PFAC, Fought’s gunshot only wounded Willis, it did not kill

him.] 

“Although Willis was seriously wounded and obviously

unarmed, CLEMENT then approached Willis, who was prone on the

ground and posed no reasonable threat of further violence to

anyone, and shot him in the head, killing him.” Id. [In the

original complaint, it was Fought who killed Willis with the shot

to the back; Clement never fired any shots. In the PFAC, however,

Clement not only shot Willis, but in fact delivered the fatal shot,

to the head, even though Willis was wounded and unarmed.] 

“At the time CLEMENT shot him, Willis made no aggressive

or furtive movements which would suggest to a reasonable officer

that he was armed with any kind of weapon, or had the will, or

ability to inflict substantial bodily harm on any individual.” Id,

¶15. [The original complaint is devoid of any of these

allegations.]

The following chart summarizes the inconsistencies:

//

//

//

//

//

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Complaint, Doc #1 Proposed FAC, Doc #25

[There are NO allegations of this

type in the complaint]

“FOUGHT insisted that OLIVER

provide him with the phone number

to call Glen Willis. OLIVER told

FOUGHT that calling on the

telephone would only make him worse

and that he would not answer the

telephone in any event. FOUGHT

insisted, received the telephone

number and called with no

response.” p 5, lines 5-10.

“Officer FOUGHT obtained the house

keys from OLIVER” p 5, lines 15-16.

[There are no allegations regarding

Oliver’s strenuous warning]

“FOUGHT then demanded the house

keys from OLIVER. OLIVER

strenuously warned them that in her

brother’s condition, entering the

house would be provocative and

reminded the officers that Willis

was armed with knives.” p 5, lines

10-13.

Fought “gave [the keys] to CLEMENT

who opened the front door. Glen

Willis was immediately inside the

door” p 5, lines 16-17. 

“When CLEMENT unlocked the security

gate, Glen Willis opened the inner

door” p 5, lines 15-16.

Willis “lunged at CLEMENT, stabbing

him in the arm” p 5, lines 18.

[There are no allegations that the

knife lodged in Clement’s arm or

that Willis was left unarmed.]

Willis “stabbed CLEMENT in the arm. 

The knife lodged in CLEMENT’s arm

and at that point, Glen Willis had

no remaining weapon.” p 5, lines

16-18.

After Willis stabbed Clement,

“FOUGHT shot Willis in the back

with fatal result.” p 5, line 19.

“FOUGHT shot Willis in the back and

Willis fell to the ground.” p 5,

lines 19-20.

[No allegations that Clement ever

fired a gun]

“Although Willis was seriously

wounded and obviously unarmed,

CLEMENT then approached Willis, who

was prone on the ground and posed

no reasonable threat of further

violence to anyone, and shot him in

the head, killing him.” p 5, lines

20-23.

Plaintiffs’ “opposition” to defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion

is signed by Miles Washington, Doc #20, and the PFAC is signed by

both Burris and Washington. Doc #25. At the February 22, 2005,

hearing, the court questioned both Burris and Washington regarding

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the factual inconsistencies between the complaint and the PFAC. Tr

at 3:3-6, 4:22-25. 

Burris stated that, prior to the filing of the original

complaint, he had interviewed the “whole family at the outset of

the case” and that they “related the story” contained in the

complaint. Tr at 7:6-7. Once Burris had interviewed the witnesses

and gotten what he called “the facts,” he “ultimately turned the

case over to Mr Washington to do the case.” Id at 7:13-14. It

appears that Washington and Burris are not partners; each

apparently owns his own law practice although correspondence to the

court bears a letterhead “Law Offices John L. Burris” and lists

both Burris and Washington. Doc #30 (6/14/05 Letter from

Washington). Both Burris and Washington would appear, therefore,

to be jointly responsible for any costs or liability arising from

the filing and prosecution of this case. It also appears that

Burris conducted no independent investigation beyond the purported

interview with Willis’ family. 

Accordingly, the court turned to Washington, who

apparently drafted the complaint (although Burris signed it), in an

attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies between the complaint and

the PFAC. The following dialogue will suffice to demonstrate

Washington’s explanation for these inconsistences: 

COURT: My concern is this, Mr. Washington, if the

facts in the [PFAC] proved to be correct * *

* then it would appear the investigation that

was done in connection with the initial

Complaint is inadequate.

COUNSEL: It could be, Your Honor, as a result of time and urgency, [the investigation] may very 

 well have been [inadequate]. I did not have 

 an opportunity to contact her. I didn’t even 

 know at the time who the witnesses were. As 

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protection claims together.

10

I said before, I had not had an opportunity to

meet with them.

Tr at 6:14-7:1 (emphasis added).

According to Washington, Burris’ possibly inadequate investigation

and Washington’s drafting of a complaint without meeting plaintiffs

or conducting his own investigation is explained, and any

deficiencies excused, because the “period of time to file the

Complaint was getting pretty close to expir[ing].” Tr at 4:14-16.

The court is at a loss to understand this. Six of the

seven claims1

 asserted in the complaint (three § 1983 claims,

wrongful death and intentional infliction of emotional distress)

have a two-year statute of limitations pursuant to Cal Code Civ Pro

§ 335.1. See Wilson v Garcia, 471 US 261, 280 (1985) (holding that

§ 1983 claims are governed by state statute of limitations

pertaining to personal injury actions). The remaining claim, a

state law claim for violation of rights guaranteed by the federal

or state constitution, has a statute of limitations of three years. 

Cal Code Civ Pro § 338. The shooting of Willis occurred on August

6, 2003. Accordingly, none of plaintiffs’ claims would have

expired prior to August 6, 2005. Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the

original complaint on June 11, 2004 – fourteen months before any

claim was set to expire. Burris and Washington appear to have had

plenty of time to perform an adequate investigation. No

consideration of time and urgency is apparent that would excuse the

inadequate investigation which preceded the filing.

Next, the court stated that “in view of what appears to

be the inadequate investigation that was done in connection with

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filing the first Complaint, why isn’t filing of the [PFAC] a

product of undue delay,” for clearly no investigation was done in

this case until after defendants’ filed their Rule 12(c) motion. 

Tr at 10:11-14. Washington responded that defendants’ Rule 12(c)

“motion was filed in lieu of an answer. So we’re talking about 30

days that they filed it from the time that the original Complaint

was filed.” Tr at 11:2-5. According to Washington, little more

than 30 days passed between the filing of the original complaint

and plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend. Id. 

But Washington’s statements regarding the procedural

posture of this case are simply wrong. The original complaint was

filed on June 14, 2004, and defendants (contrary to Washington’s

representations) filed an answer on July 8, 2004. Doc #7. 

Moreover, defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion was not filed until

November 8, 2004, four months after an answer had been filed. Doc

#15. Finally, plaintiffs waited over two months before filing

their opposition/motion to amend. Doc #20. Contrary to

Washington’s representations, more than seven months passed between

the filing of the original complaint and plaintiffs’ request to

amend.

It should be apparent that the court has misgivings about

the origin of the new “facts” that form the basis of the PFAC. 

According to Washington, additional witnesses came forward and

provided the additional and different facts, specifically that

Clement, rather than Fought, killed Willis. Tr at 9:3-12. 

Needless to say, this is a highly relevant fact. Burris, however,

claims that he had already interviewed the whole family at the

outset of the case, so clearly Oliver had already told plaintiffs’

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counsel her version of the events of August 6, 2003. Tr at 7:5-8. 

Neither the original complaint nor the PFAC identifies any witness

other than Oliver. Neither Burris or Washington have identified

any new witnesses. Any new witness remains a mystery.

Accordingly, the court is faced with counsel who (1)

conducted an inadequate investigation preceding the filing of the

original complaint, (2) have sought to justify this inadequacy by

falsely representing that the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’

claims were about to expire and (3) have misrepresented the

procedural posture of this case to rebut a showing of undue delay. 

The court concludes that Burris’ and Washington’s conduct appears

to fall to the level warranting Rule 11 sanctions. See Huetting &

Schromm, Inc v Landscape Contractors Council, 790 F2d 1421, 1426-27

(9th Cir 1986) (affirming sanctions awarded solely against an

attorney for a violation of Rule 11).

“[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless

filings in District Court * * *. [citation omitted] Rule 11

imposes a duty on attorneys to certify that they have conducted a

reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed with

the court are well-grounded in fact * * *.” Cooter & Gell v

Hartmarx Corp, 496 US 384, 393 (1990) (emphasis added); see also

Golden Eagle Distributing Corp v Burroughs Corp, 801 F2d 1531, 1542

(9th Cir 1986) (“Rule 11 is intended to * * * deter[] attorneys who

submit motions or pleadings which cannot reasonably be supported in

law or in fact.” (emphasis added)). To deter baseless filings, a

district court may, on its own initiative, impose Rule 11 sanctions

on attorneys who have filed a pleading premised on an inadequate

investigation. See FRCP 11(c)(1)(B). The only qualification on

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the court’s discretionary power sua sponte to impose Rule 11

sanctions is that the court must provide Burris and Washington with

a written order describing the specific conduct that appears to

violate Rule 11 and provide them with an opportunity to show cause

why they should not be sanctioned. Id. This order serves to give

Burris and Washington notice of the specific conduct that appears

to violate Rule 11. 

Next, the court addresses whether Burris and Washington

should be sanctioned under 28 USC § 1927. “Any * * * person * * *

who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and

vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the

excess costs, expenses, and attorney fees reasonably incurred

because of such conduct.” 28 USC § 1927. As this court has

stated: The purpose of § 1927 is “to deter attorneys from

multiplying legal proceedings unnecessarily, and to compensate

attorneys forced to endure such proceedings.” Winfield v Beverly

Enterprises, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 2855, *10 (ND Cal 1994) (Walker,

J). Sanctioning a party under § 1927 requires a “finding of

recklessness or bad faith.” Barber v Miller, 146 F3d 707, 711 (9th

Cir 1998). 

It goes without saying that Burris and Washington acted

recklessly in filing the original complaint, a complaint they admit

was premised on an inadequate investigation. This reckless

behavior was unreasonable and vexatious in that it required the

City Attorney of Oakland to (1) file a now useless answer, (2)

research, draft and file a now moot motion for judgment on the

pleadings and (3) prepare for and attend the February 24, 2005,

oral argument. Section 1927 serves to compensate the City of

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Oakland for having to endure these unreasonably multiplied

proceedings.

These useless steps unnecessarily multiplied the

proceedings. Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion and related steps were

wholly unnecessary except for the unreasonable failure of

plaintiffs’ counsel to investigate before filing the initial

complaint. This unreasonable conduct was undertaken by Burris and

Washington, not plaintiffs. Burris and Washington are officers of

the court and subject to the court’s orders and directives with

respect to their conduct of litigation in this court. United

States v Associated Convalescent Enterprises, Inc, 766 F2d 1342,

1346 (9th Cir 1985).

Accordingly, Burris and Washington are each ORDERED to

SHOW CAUSE in a writing, not to exceed 10 pages, why sanctions

should not be jointly and severally imposed on them pursuant to (i)

Rule 11 based on the inadequate investigation that preceded the

filing of the original complaint and the blatant misrepresentations

offered to the court at the February 24, 2005, hearing and (ii) 

§ 1927 based upon the unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of

these proceedings. Burris’ and Washington’s responses are due on

or before July 1, 2005.

III

Finally, the court turns to the merits of plaintiffs’

motion for leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to FRCP

15(a). “[A] party may amend the party’s pleading * * * by leave of

court * * * and leave shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” FRCP 15(a). The Ninth Circuit directs district courts

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to apply the policy of Rule 15(a) with “extreme liberality.” 

Morongo Band of Mission Indians v Rose, 893 F2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir

1990) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd v Leighton, 833 F2d 183, 186 (9th

Cir 1987)). 

It is clear that plaintiffs may be entitled to recovery

if it is found that Willis’ death was the result of excessive force

and the other elements of § 1983 are satisfied. Given the fact

that Washington (who drafted the original complaint) had not even

met plaintiffs or any relevant witnesses prior to the filing of the

original complaint, it is hard to sustain the idea that plaintiffs

should be faulted for their counsels’ inadequate investigation. 

Thus, as the court stated at the hearing, “it would be unjust to

terminate the litigation at this point, which would be the

[scenario] if [plaintiffs are] not permitted to amend * * *.” Tr

at 20:13-15.

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint should be filed on or

before July 1, 2005.

IV

In sum, plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended

complaint (Doc #24) is GRANTED and defendants’ motion for judgment

on the pleadings (Doc #15) is DENIED as moot. Moreover, the court

reminds plaintiffs’ counsel that they agreed, on the record, to be

bound by their statement not to reallege (1) any claims based upon

the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) any

claims based upon Cal Civ Code § 52.1 and (3) any claims in an 

individual capacity under the Fourth Amendment. Doc #20; See Tr at

3:1-16. Moreover, plaintiffs stated that any amended complaint

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“will not state a direct cause of action against the City of

Oakland nor will Chief of Police [Word] be a named defendant.” Doc

#20. The PFAC, however, contains all of these allegations.

Because the PFAC asserts claims that plaintiffs agreed

not to allege, the PFAC is flawed. Hence, plaintiffs’ amended

complaint should not contain any claims they have agreed not to

allege.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:04-cv-02305-JW Document 30 Filed 06/19/05 Page 16 of 16