Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00707/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00707-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Ruben Mejia
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RUBEN MEJIA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-707-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are pending. For the 

reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the 

Commissioner’s motion is denied. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI, alleging that he had 

been disabled since June 1, 2008. Administrative Record (“AR”) 232-244. His applications were 

denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 146-151, 153-158. On April 30, 2013, a hearing 

was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Jean R. Kerins. Id. at 53-83. Plaintiff was 

represented by counsel at the hearing, at which he and a vocational expert testified. Id.

Case 2:15-cv-00707-EFB Document 25 Filed 09/22/16 Page 1 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

On June 27, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled under 

sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 35-45. The ALJ made the following 

specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

December 31, 2013. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2008, the 

alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: history of bilateral knee surgeries, 

back pain and obesity (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

* * * 

 1

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

Case 2:15-cv-00707-EFB Document 25 Filed 09/22/16 Page 2 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined under the Regulations 

except he is limited to frequent stooping, crouching, crawling and kneeling (20 CFR 

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). 

* * * 

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a barista. This work does not 

require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965). 

* * * 

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

June 1, 2008, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)). 

Id. at 37-45. 

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on January 27, 2015, leaving 

the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-6. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

Case 2:15-cv-00707-EFB Document 25 Filed 09/22/16 Page 3 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by (1) finding that he did not have mental impairments 

that impacted his ability to work, and (2) that the Appeals Council failed to provide sufficient 

reasons for rejecting evidence. ECF No. 20 at 5-12. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step two and step four of the sequential evaluation 

process by finding that his mental impairments did not limit his ability to work. Plaintiff 

contends that the ALJ erred in assessing his limitations by rejecting medical opinions from 

treating, examining, and non-examining sources. 

 The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. Ordinarily, more 

weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know 

and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 

1996). To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional 

may be rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. 

Id. at 830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-00707-EFB Document 25 Filed 09/22/16 Page 4 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

However, “[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating 

physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician 

are not ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Plaintiff received treatment from Dodie Newman, a speech pathologist. Plaintiff was 

diagnosed with acquired brain injury from carbon monoxide poisoning, which resulted in deficits 

in cognitive communication. AR 502. Ms. Newman found that plaintiff’s short term memory is 

impaired and his cognitive endurance is poor, resulting in difficultly maintaining concentration. 

Id. at 502. It was her opinion that plaintiff had a good (limited but satisfactory) to fair (seriously 

limited, but not precluded) ability to deal with work stresses and function independently. Id. at 

502. She also opined that plaintiff had a fair ability to maintain attention/concentration and 

understand, remember, and carry out complex jobs. Id. at 502-503. Ms. Newman also opined 

that plaintiff would need to switch tasks after 15 minutes due to cognitive fatigue.2 Id. at 503. 

 Plaintiff underwent a psychological evaluation, which was completed by Dr. Jack Latow, 

Ph.D. Id. at 356-361. Dr. Latow diagnosed plaintiff with major depressive disorder, moderate; 

and cognitive disorder, mild to moderate. Id. at 360. It was his opinion that plaintiff could 

perform simple, repetitive, one and two-step tasks; and detailed tasks, but would have moderate 

difficulty with detailed and complex tasks due to his cognitive impairments and interference with 

psychological symptoms. Id. at 360. He further opined that plaintiff would have moderate 

difficulty managing the pace of a normal workday; moderate difficulty managing changes during 

 2

 Ms. Newman holds a Certificate of Clinical Competence in Speech-Language Pathology 

(“CCC”). A speech-language pathologist holding a CCC is an acceptable medical source for 

purposes of establishing speech or language impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(5), 

416.913(a)(5). Plaintiff contends that Ms. Newman’s opinion was a treating opinion because it 

concerned plaintiff’s cognitive-communication disorder. ECF No. 20 at 13-14. “Cognitivecommunication disorders encompass difficulty with any aspect of communication that is affected 

by disruption of cognition . . . . Cognition includes cognitive process and systems (e.g., attention, 

perception, memory, organization, executive functions). Areas of function affected by cognitive 

impairments include behavioral self-regulation, social interaction, activities of daily living, 

learning and academic performance, and vocational performance.” American Speech-LanguageHearing Association, http://www.asha.org/policy/PS2005-00110 (last visited on September 11, 

2016). The Commissioner does not dispute Ms. Newman’s status as a treating source, but 

contends that the ALJ did not error in rejecting her opinion. As the parties do not dispute her 

status, the court considers Ms. Newman a treating source. 

Case 2:15-cv-00707-EFB Document 25 Filed 09/22/16 Page 5 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

a normal workday; and significant difficulty managing the stress of a normal workday. Id. It was 

also his opinion that plaintiff would be able to get along with other people. Id. 

 The record also contains opinions from two non-examining physicians. Based on his 

review of the record, Dr. Timothy Schumacher, Ph.D., opined that plaintiff was moderately 

limited in carrying out detailed instructions; maintaining attention and concentration for extended 

periods of time; completing a normal workday and workweek without interruption from 

psychologically-based symptoms; and performing at a consistent pace without unreasonable 

number of rest periods. Id. at 93-94. He further opined that plaintiff was moderately limited in 

interacting appropriately with the general public and accepting instructions and responding 

appropriately to criticism from supervisors, but could engage in routine contacts with coworkers 

and supervisors in settings where major collaboration with others is not involved. Id. at 94. Dr. 

Michael Hammonds, Ph.D., a non-examining physician, agreed with Dr. Schumacher’s opinion. 

Id. at 125-126. 

 In assessing plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ summarized the opinions provided by 

Ms. Newman, Dr. Schumacher, and Michael Hammonds. Although each of these sources 

concluded that plaintiff had at least moderate mental impairments, the ALJ determined that 

plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ gave no 

explanation for why these opinions were rejected. An ALJ, however, is not permitted to 

disregard opinions from treating and examining sources without explanation. Lester, 81 F.3d at 

830 (An ALJ must provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting a treating or examining 

medical professional’s opinion); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 570 (9th Cir. 1995) (An ALJ 

“may not reject ‘significant probative evidence’ without explanation.”); see also SSR 96-6p 

(ALJs cannot ignore opinions from state agency physicians and psychologist and must explain the 

weight given to these opinion in their decision). 

 The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly rejected Ms. Newman’s opinion because 

subsequent treatment records indicated that plaintiff made steady gains in treatment and his 

impairments improved. ECF No. 21 at 10. The ALJ, however, did not find that Ms. Newman’s 

opinion was inconsistent with treatment records demonstrating improvement. See Bray v. 

Case 2:15-cv-00707-EFB Document 25 Filed 09/22/16 Page 6 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing principles of 

administrative law require [the court] to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and 

factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the 

adjudicator may have been thinking.”); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (a 

district court is “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts”). Accordingly, the 

Commissioner’s post hoc rationalization may not serve as a basis for rejecting these opinions. 

 The Commissioner further argues that any failure to explain why Ms. Newman’s opinion 

was rejected was harmless because Ms. Newman did not assess any impairment that would 

preclude plaintiff from performing her past work as a barista. ECF No. 21 at 10. The 

Commissioner explains that “according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), a 

barista’s job functions are limited to accepting and calling orders, serving customers, processing 

payment, preparing short order items, and cleaning” and that these “tasks are not implicated by 

Ms. Newman’s opinion.” Id. at 11. This argument requires the court to speculate as to why the 

ALJ rejected Ms. Newman’s opinion. 

Ms. Newman opined that plaintiff has serious limitations in maintaining attention and 

concentration, and that plaintiff would need to switch tasks after 15 minutes due to cognitive 

fatigue. Id. at 503. The vocational expert did not testify that an individual with such impairments 

could work as a barista, and there is no evidence that an individual with this impairment would be 

able to do so. See id. at 74-82 (transcript of vocational expert’s testimony); see also Tackett v. 

Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (An ALJ may rely on a vocational expert “to testify as 

to . . . what jobs the claimant, given his or her functional capacity, would be able to do . . . .”). 

Accordingly, the ALJ’s failure to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Ms. Newman’s 

opinion was not harmless. 

 The only opinion addressed by the ALJ was Dr. Latow’s opinion, which the ALJ accorded 

reduced weight. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Latow’s opinion are 

insufficient and not supported by substantial evidence. The court need not decide whether the 

reasons were sufficient because, even assuming that they were, the ALJ failed to give any 

justification for rejecting the other medical opinions concluding that plaintiff had moderate 

Case 2:15-cv-00707-EFB Document 25 Filed 09/22/16 Page 7 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

mental impairments. Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s mental impairments are not 

severe is not supported by substantial evidence and this case must be remanded for further 

consideration of plaintiff’s mental impairments.3 Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative proceedings would 

serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide benefits.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 3. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order; and 

 4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor. 

DATED: September 22, 2016. 

 3

 The court does not address plaintiff’s remaining argument that the Appeals Council 

failed to properly consider evidence plaintiff submitted after the ALJ’s decision issued. ECF No. 

20 at 16-18. The ALJ will be able to address in the first instance any new evidence on remand. 

Case 2:15-cv-00707-EFB Document 25 Filed 09/22/16 Page 8 of 8