Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-24-01480/USCOURTS-ca4-24-01480-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Natalia Dalton
Appellant
Julio Lacayo
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1480

JULIO LACAYO,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NATALIA DALTON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:24-cv-00653-LMB-WBP)

Submitted: December 5, 2024 Decided: December 9, 2024

Before GREGORY and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Natalia Dalton, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1480 Doc: 12 Filed: 12/09/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
2

PER CURIAM:

Natalia Dalton appeals the district court’s orders dismissing her notice of removal 

and denying her motion for reconsideration. This case stems from child support 

proceedings between Dalton and her child’s father, Julio Lacayo, that were initiated in the 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for Fairfax County, Virginia, and that have 

been ongoing for nearly a decade. As relevant here, in June 2023, Dalton moved that court

to modify her child support obligations. In March 2024, the court granted in part Dalton’s 

motion and decreased Dalton’s child support obligations. Lacayo immediately appealed 

that order to the Fairfax County Circuit Court. Thirty days later, Dalton filed a notice of 

removal in the Eastern District of Virginia seeking to remove Lacayo’s state circuit court 

appeal to federal court. In her notice of removal, Dalton alleged several claims under the 

United States Constitution and attacked the legitimacy of Virginia’s courts. The district 

court sua sponte dismissed the notice of removal for several reasons, including that federal 

subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.1

 And the district court later denied Dalton’s 

reconsideration motion.

1 The district court also appropriately recognized that “[f]amily relations are a 

traditional area of state concern.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979); see J.B. v. 

Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 723 (7th Cir. 2021) (“The adjudication of [the plaintiff’s] due 

process claims threaten interference with and disruption of local family law proceedings—

a robust area of law traditionally reserved for state and local government—to such a degree 

as to all but compel the federal judiciary to stand down.”).

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1480 Doc: 12 Filed: 12/09/2024 Pg: 2 of 5
3

Assuming without deciding that Dalton could remove a state court action in this 

posture,2 we agree with the district court that it lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction.3

 

See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 120 F.4th 390, 398 (4th Cir. 

2024) (“We review de novo questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, including removal.”). 

Starting with diversity jurisdiction, Dalton and Lacayo are both residents of Virginia, so 

diversity of citizenship does not exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (establishing diversity 

jurisdiction); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) (explaining diversity of 

citizenship requirement).

Turning to federal question jurisdiction, Dalton did not demonstrate that Lacayo’s 

appeal—the action that she sought to remove—involved a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 (establishing federal question jurisdiction); In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 

460 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The party seeking removal bears the burden of 

demonstrating that removal jurisdiction is proper.”). Moreover, Dalton could not 

manufacture federal question jurisdiction by raising a federal question in response to 

Lacayo’s appeal or by including federal claims in her notice of removal.4

 See Merrell Dow 

2 Federal law authorizes the filing of a notice of removal after the service or filing 

of “the initial pleading.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). It is unclear that Lacayo’s state court 

notice of appeal is an “initial pleading.”

3 Because the district court never remanded this case to state court, we have

jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (explaining that 

remand order is not reviewable on appeal absent limited exceptions).

4 On appeal, Dalton maintains that her motion to modify her child support 

obligations presented unspecified federal questions and thus authorized removal. Even if 

Dalton’s motion presented a federal question, she could not have removed her own motion 

(Continued)

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1480 Doc: 12 Filed: 12/09/2024 Pg: 3 of 5
4

Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (“Under our longstanding 

interpretation of the current statutory scheme, the question whether a claim arises under 

federal law must be determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint. A defense that 

raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction. Since a defendant may 

remove a case only if the claim could have been brought in federal court . . . the question 

for removal jurisdiction must also be determined by reference to the well-pleaded 

complaint.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 

299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936) (“[T]he controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the 

complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal.”); Hunt v. Lamb, 427 F.3d 

725, 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Generally speaking, a case may not be removed to federal court 

solely because of a defense or counterclaim arising under federal law.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)).

At bottom, the district court correctly concluded that Dalton’s removal attempt was 

improper given the absence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. We are constrained, 

however, to vacate the district court’s orders because the court failed to remand this action 

to state court as required by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final 

judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall 

be remanded.”); Roach v. W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth., 74 F.3d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 

to federal court in the first place. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (providing that only defendant 

may remove state court action to federal court). Apparently recognizing as much, Dalton’s 

notice of removal relied on Lacayo’s appeal. But as explained above, Dalton did not 

establish that Lacayo’s appeal involved a federal question.

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1480 Doc: 12 Filed: 12/09/2024 Pg: 4 of 5
5

1996) (explaining that § 1447(c) requires district court to remand to state court rather than 

dismiss action when federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking).

We therefore vacate the district court’s orders and remand with instructions for the 

district court to remand this action to state court. See Hunt, 427 F.3d at 727. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1480 Doc: 12 Filed: 12/09/2024 Pg: 5 of 5