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Parties Involved:
Shaun Chaney
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Argued June 3, 2010

Decided July 28, 2010

Before

DANIEL A. MANION,  Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS,  Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES,  Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2069

United States of America,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

Shaun Chaney,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 08 CR 108‐2

Samuel Der‐Yeghiayan, Judge.

O R D E R

Shaun Chaney was a middle‐man in a large mortgage fraud scheme.  He pleaded

guilty, and was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment.  He appeals only his sentence

and argues that the district court failed to adequately address his principal argument

for mitigation, namely that he cooperated with the government.  Because the sentencing

transcript reflects that the district court addressed his principal arguments for

mitigating his sentence, we affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 Case: 09-2069 Document: 40 Filed: 07/28/2010 Pages: 3
No. 09-2069 Page 2

Shaun Chaney participated in a large mortgage fraud, spanning two years

during the height of the housing bubble. It involved over forty properties and loan

amounts in excess of nine million dollars. Chaney was a middle man in the scheme.  In

this capacity, he found straw buyers for the properties and received kickbacks between

ten‐ to twenty‐thousand dollars per deal.

In January 2007, the FBI approached Chaney about his role in the scheme, and he

immediately agreed to cooperate.  At this time, he was warned that he had to abandon

this activity. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud, and the parties contemplated that the

government would file a § 5K.1 motion at sentencing because of his cooperation. He

told the FBI much about the operation and testified before a grand jury.  Despite his

candor about the operation, he omitted the fact that after he agreed to cooperate he

completed two more fraudulent deals. When the government learned about this, it

viewed Chaney’s behavior  as breach of the plea agreement and notified him that it

would not make a § 5K.1 motion for a reduced sentence.

At sentencing, his counsel agreed that Chaney exhibited poor judgment and was

not entitled to the benefit of the plea agreement and a § 5K.1 motion.  He did argue,

however, that his cooperation merited a lesser sentence.  When he pronounced his

sentence, the judge acknowledged the defendant’s argument that his cooperation

should be considered a mitigating factor: “The defendant argues that his cooperation is

a mitigating factor in this case and a sentence below the advisory guidelines range

would be sufficient to serve the purposes of sentencing. However, [Chaney] concedes

that he, in fact, did a couple of things subsequently and even though his cooperation

was truthful, that he should not have gotten involved in a couple areas that he got

involved in.” The judge then sentenced him to 84 months’ imprisonment. Chaney

appeals and argues that the district judge failed to address his argument that his

cooperation merited a lower sentence.   

II.

A sentencing judge must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for

meaningful appellate review.  Part of this entails addressing the defendant’s arguments

of recognized legal merit for a lesser sentence.  United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d

673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).  And when a judge fails to do so, he “is likely to have

committed an error or oversight.”  Id.  We review de novo whether the district court

followed proper sentencing procedure and addressed the defendant’s arguments of

recognized legal merit.  United States v. Curby, 595 F.3d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 2010).

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No. 09-2069 Page 3

While we require a sentencing judge to address all grounds of recognized factual

and legal merit that a defendant raises at sentencing, the amount of comment and

explanation given depends on the circumstances of the case.  Id. at 797.  And we look at

the transcript for some assurance that the court actually exercised its discretion by

considering the defendant’s argument.  Id.

Here, the transcript reveals that the judge gave a fair amount of reasoning for his

sentence.  He acknowledged Chaney’s argument that his cooperation should be

considered a mitigating factor; he then countered, “However, [Chaney] concedes that

he, in fact, did a couple of things subsequently and even though his cooperation was

truthful, that he should not have gotten involved in a couple areas that he got involved

in.” Here, it is clear what the judge was saying: Chaney had his chance to receive a big

benefit for cooperating but his bad choices cost him that.  We don’t require the judge to

use any specific rhetorical formulation to show that he has considered an argument and

found it unpersuasive.  And we certainly don’t require the judge to add a superfluous

sentence, “Thus, I reject his argument for a lower sentence based on his cooperation,”

for us to find he exercised his discretion and rejected the defendant’s argument.  

The Judge said enough.  This fraud amounted to over nine million dollars.  And

the testimony the government anticipated from Chaney’s cooperation was canceled

once his subsequent illegal conduct was disclosed.  Thus, the judge was well within his

discretion to cancel out whatever mitigating considerations Chaney might have

received.  

III.

Therefore, based on a full review of the record before us, it is clear that the district

court exercised his discretion by considering and rejecting Chaney’s argument for a lower

sentence.   The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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