Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15104/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15104-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gateway Unified School District
Appellee
Kendall Lynn

Robert E. Thurbon
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KENDALL LYNN,

Plaintiff,

and

ROBERT E. THURBON,

Appellant,

v.

GATEWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-15104

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-00981-

JAM-CMK

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 12, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed November 6, 2014

Before: Richard C. Tallman and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Thomas O. Rice, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

 

* The Honorable Thomas O. Rice, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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2 THURBON V. GATEWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

SUMMARY**

Sanctions / Appellate Jurisdiction

The panel dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an attorney’s

appeal from an order finding that he committed ethical

violations, and disqualifying him from representing the

plaintiff in a wrongful termination action.

The panel held that it lacked jurisdiction because the

ethical violations were intertwined with the disqualification

order, and disqualification is not subject to interlocutory

appeal.

COUNSEL

Robert E. Thurbon, Thurbon & McHaney, LP, Gold River,

California, Appellant in Proper Person.

John P. Kelley, Halkides, Morgan & Kelley, Redding,

California, for Defendant-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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THURBON V. GATEWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 3

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

Attorney Robert E. Thurbon (Thurbon) appeals the

district court’s order finding that he committed ethical

violations, and disqualifying him from representing the

plaintiff Kendall Lynn (Lynn) in a pending action against

Gateway Unified School District (Gateway). Because the

ethical violations are intertwined with the disqualification

order, and because the United States Supreme Court has held

that disqualification is not subject to interlocutory appeal, we

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

Lynn is the former Director of Information and

Technology for Gateway. He was responsible “for

maintaining, operating and ensuring the security of

[Gateway’s] Information Technology systems including [its]

email system.” Lynn “reported directly to the Assistant

Superintendent and the Superintendent . . .”

John Strohmayer(Strohmayer)wasthe Superintendent for

Gateway from 2002 to June 30, 2009. From July 1, 2009, to

June 30, 2011, Robert Hubbell (Hubbell) was the

Superintendent. Jody Thulin (Thulin) was the Assistant

Superintendent/Chief Business Official of Gateway. On June

3, 2009, when Thulin was on administrative leave, Hubbell

met with Thulin, among others, to assess whether she would

be a “good fit” for his administrative team.

After his meetingwith Thulin, Hubbell concluded thatshe

“was not a team player and was confrontational . . .[,] had

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very limited experience as a Chief Business Official; seemed

highly opinionated; appeared controlling and would be a

constant battle . . .” On June 29, 2009, Hubbell

recommended to the GatewayBoard of Trustees (Board) that

Thulin be reassigned to a teaching position. The Board voted

unanimously in favor of reassignment, effective June 30,

2009. Thulin “refused the position, resigned and commenced

litigation. . . .” Thurbon was the attorney for both Lynn and

Thulin.

Hubbell also met with Lynn “to inform him of likely cuts

to his department, includ[ing] the possible elimination of

[Lynn’s] position.” On or about August 14, 2009, Hubbell

met with Lynn to tell him that Hubbell would be

recommending that the Board eliminate Lynn’s position

during the next Board meeting. On August 19, 2009,1

Hubbell recommended to the Board that Lynn’s “position be

eliminated for budgetary reasons,” and the Board approved

the recommendation, effective October 6, 2009. Lynn

worked August 21, 2009, and was out on sick leave from

August 24, 2009, through October 6, 2009. Believing his

layoff was based on his race, and because he was thought to

have aided Thulin in her lawsuit, Lynn instituted the

underlying action for wrongful termination.

According to Lynn, some time before June 30, 2009, he

“began a random sampling and review of [Gateway’s] emails

to determine what if any security issues, breaches . . . or

misuse . . . were occurring as expressed by” Strohmayer and

Director of Human Resources Kathy Campbell. Lynn avers

that he discovered emails suggesting racial bias and illegal

1 Hubbell’s declaration reads 2010, but the context shows this was a

typographical error.

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THURBON V. GATEWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 5

“job action against Jody Thulin. . . .” In July, 2009, Hubbell

hired an outside consultant, to whom Lynn was instructed to

give “full ‘administrative rights’ and control over

[Gateway’s] email system.” Believing that Gateway officials

were trying to “erase[] or manipulate[]” the email system “to

create alleged security leaks,” Lynn made a backup copy of

the emails. He also provided a copy to Thurbon.

Upon learning of the existence of the emails and the facts

regarding their acquisition, Thurbon conducted “certain legal

research regarding [Lynn’s] possession and potential use of

the emails in his Federal District Court action.” Thurbon

concluded that Lynn acquired the emails “during the course

and scope of his employment with Gateway.” Thurbon

believed that “Lynn had authorized access to the emails as

part of his job duties,” including “full administrative control

and discretionary decision making in undertaking steps to

back up and preserve [Gateway] records. . . .” Based on his

research, Thurbon determined that “Lynn had lawfully and

properly accessed the emails . . . and properly backed up the

system and was entitled to possess the back up copy . . .”

“Sometime right after June 14, 2010,” Lynn also informed

Thurbon that there were emails that could support Thulin’s

case. Thurbon then arranged for Thulin to come to his office

to review the emails. Thulin spent roughly “four hours

reviewing emails and identified 146 pages” that she believed

were relevant.

Lynn testified in his state court deposition that “all e-mail

traffic regarding school accounts is school property and can

be reviewed if necessary[.]” Gateway’s Job Description for

Lynn’s position provided that Lynn was to perform his duties

“[u]nder the general direction of the Superintendent.” Lynn

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was asked to review his job description for language that gave

him the “right and sole discretion to review e-mails including

those of the superintendent or board members[.]” Lynn

answered, generally, that he was responsible for establishing

and maintaining “standards of security” and for setting up

user accounts and access rights. He admitted that nothing

else in his job description gave him unfettered authority to

review emails. Also, Lynn acknowledged that “in terms of

reviewing emails,” he was “the designee to do that if Mr.

Strohmayer or the superintendents ask[ed him] to do it. . . .” 

(Emphasis added).

Strohmayer and Hubbell both stated in their declarations

that they did not authorize Lynn’s unfettered access to

Gateway’s email system. Strohmayer recalled giving Lynn

authorization to access Gateway employees’ emails only on

two occasions. The emails produced by Thulin and Lynn

“would not have been included” in those authorizations, and

Lynn was never given “authority to access any of the emails

contained in either production. . . .” Lynn was never given

“blanket authority to view emails of employees[,]” so he

“never should have been reviewing [the] emails” at issue. 

Hubbell stated that “[i]n 2009 and 2010, none of [the emails]

were knowingly released by [Gateway] to anyone other [than]

the recipients . . .” Hubbell “never authorized release of any

of these documents to anyone other than the recipients . . .”

Ultimately, the state court determined that Lynn was not

authorized to possess or disseminate the emails, and enjoined

Thurbon and Thulin from using the emails in state court

proceedings. Thurbon later used the knowledge gained from

the emails to request production of emails which were

otherwise covered by the injunction. Upon learning that the

extent of copied emails was much greater than Gateway had

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THURBON V. GATEWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 7

realized, Gateway filed another action in state court to

recover all emails possessed by Lynn.

The state court issued an emergency restraining order,

which would become a preliminary injunction, again

prohibiting use of the questionably-obtained emails. After

discovering that Thurbon continued to use the knowledge

gained from the emails to prepare a public records request,

Gateway obtained two orders to show cause why Thurbon

was not in contempt of the injunctions. Hearings on the

orders were consolidated, and the state court judge found five

willful violations byThurbon. Thurbon was sanctioned in the

amount of $2,500.

In the meantime, Lynn filed his federal lawsuit. 

Following a hearing, the district court determined that “Lynn

stole 39,312 emails” and “did not make a public records

request to obtain the emails. . . .” The court found that “he

really had absolutely no authority for doing what he did. . . .” 

The court opined that “what a careful lawyer . . . should have

done . . . is the minute that these [emails] were turned over to

him, he should have hired criminal counsel for Mr. Lynn. He

should have advised Mr. Lynn of his Fifth Amendment rights.

He should have advised Mr. Lynn of possible Penal Code

violations[,]” but “[h]e did none of that.” “[E]ven more

shocking,” said the court, is that Thurbon “actually used the

emails in this other lawsuit, creating a clear conflict of

interest for him now between his two clients. . . .”

The district court noted that “at least eight violations of

professional conduct” had been raised. Although the court

denied Gateway’s request to dismiss the lawsuit completely,

Thurbon and his firm were disqualified from further

participation in the case. The court also ruled “that none of

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the emails which were stolen can be used in any way in this

lawsuit.” The court memorialized these rulings in an order,

and Thurbon timely filed a Notice of Appeal.2 As a threshold

issue, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to

consider this appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We consider our jurisdiction de novo.” Metabolic

Research, Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2012)

(citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

As an appellate court, we only have jurisdiction over final

judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. An exception to the final

judgment requirement is made for a collateral order. See

United States v. Tillman, 756 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.

2014). A collateral order is one that is conclusive, resolves

an important question that is separate from the merits of the

underlying case, and is effectively unreviewable on appeal. 

See id. The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held

that “orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases . . . are not

collateral orders subject to appeal as ‘final judgments’ within

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court of Appeals

lack[s] jurisdiction to entertain [such an] appeal . . .” 

Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440–41

(1985) (citation omitted).

2 Thurbon challenges only the disqualification and findings of ethical

violations in this appeal. While this appeal has been pending, Lynn’s

wrongful termination case has been continued in the district court.

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THURBON V. GATEWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 9

In Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198

(1999), the Supreme Court considered whether the collateral

order doctrine applies to a sanctions order coupled with

disqualification of an attorney. See id. at 200–01. The

Supreme Court explained that it is unlikely that a sanctions

order can be reviewed separately from the merits. See id. at

205. In addition, the Court noted its ruling in RichardsonMerrell that an order disqualifying an attorney was not a final

decision subject to appeal. See id. at 207. The rationale of

Cunningham leads to the conclusion that a sanctions order

coupled with disqualification of counsel is doubly

unappealable. See id. at 205–07. Indeed, Thurbon conceded

during oral argument that, to the extent the sanctions and

disqualification rulings are intertwined, we lack jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, Thurbon argues that United States v. Talao,

222 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2000), provides us with appellate

jurisdiction based on the sanctions order. In Talao, a

government attorney appealed a district court order finding

that she had violated a rule of ethical conduct and that this

violation warranted a referral of her misconduct to the state

bar, and an instruction informing the jurors in an ongoing

criminal case that they could take her misconduct into

account when assessing a particular witness’s credibility. See

id. at 1136. We held that this order was per se a sanction, and

hence appealable, because “the district court made a finding

and reached a legal conclusion that [the government attorney]

knowingly and wilfully violated a specific rule of ethical

conduct.” Id. at 1138. We have endorsed this standard in

distinguishing between a criticism and a reprimand, although

other circuits have adopted slightly different standards for

determining when an attorney may in his or her own right

appeal an order. See United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109,

1117 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, in Talao, we focused on whether

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the court’s verbal reprimand rose to the level of a sanction

rather than on whether the sanction constituted a final order

subject to appeal. See id. at 1138. Notably, the Talao

decision fails to mention either Richardson-Merrell or

Cunningham in its analysis. Indeed, Talao does not discuss

the interlocutory nature of the appeal whatsoever, other than

to recognize that the sanctions appeal was consolidated for

consideration with the government’s mandamus petition to

prevent the district court from giving its proposed remedial

instruction. See Talao, 222 F.3d at 1137. In such a

circumstance, where the prior case did not delve into the issue

at hand, we have not considered ourselves bound to reach the

same outcome. See V.S. ex rel. A.O. v. Los Gatos-Saratoga

Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 484 F.3d 1230, 1232 n.1 (9th

Cir. 2007). Moreover, we have not extended Talao’s holding

beyond its limited facts where a sanction imposed against

government counsel may affect the outcome of an underlying

criminal proceeding. See Talao, 222 F.3d at 1135; see also

Stanley v. Woodford, 449 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006)

(relying upon Cunningham in concluding that an attorney

may not pursue an interlocutory appeal of a sanctions order). 

In addition, we have recognized our lack of jurisdiction to

consider an interlocutory appeal of disqualification only. See

Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc.,

765 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1985) (citingRichardson-Merrell,

472 U.S. at 424). We are persuaded that we lack jurisdiction

over this appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

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