Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03266/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03266-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Des Moines
Appellee
Jerry Cohoon
Appellee
David Griffith
Appellant
Ronald Wakeham
Appellee

Document Text:

*

The HONORABLE PAUL A. MAGNUSON, United States District Judge for

the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3266

___________

David Griffith, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

City of Des Moines, et al., *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: April 15, 2004

Filed: October 15, 2004

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE, Circuit Judge, and MAGNUSON,*

 District Judge.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

David Griffith, who is Hispanic, joined the Des Moines Fire Department in

1989. He commenced this action in August 2001, alleging on-going disparate

treatment and retaliation by the City of Des Moines, Fire Chief Ronald Wakeham, and

Assistant Fire Chief Jerry Cohoon in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; and the Iowa Human Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216.6. The

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The HONORABLE RONALD E. LONGSTAFF, Chief Judge of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

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district court1

 granted summary judgment dismissing Griffith’s Third Amended

Complaint. Griffith appeals. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo,

and viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Griffith, the

nonmoving party, we affirm. See Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 733

(8th Cir. 2003) (standard of review).

I. A Threshold Issue of Law.

Title VII and the Iowa Human Rights Act prohibit an employer from

discriminating against an employee with respect to his compensation, terms, or

conditions of employment on account of his race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin. Griffith complains that he was suspended and then denied retraining, unfairly

disciplined, and harassed by co-workers because of his Hispanic background.

Griffith urges us to conclude, as some district courts have concluded, that the

Supreme Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003), implicitly

directed us to modify our Circuit’s use of the familiar framework established in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), at the summary

judgment stage of an employment discrimination lawsuit. Griffith’s brief does not

explain how our summary judgment analysis must be modified. But he relies on

Dunbar v. Pepsi Cola General Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1197

(N.D. Iowa 2003), where the court concluded that, at the summary judgment stage,

the third step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis must be modified “so that it is

framed in terms of whether the plaintiff can meet his or her ‘ultimate burden’ to prove

intentional discrimination, rather than in terms of whether the plaintiff can prove

‘pretext.’” We do not agree that Desert Palace affected controlling Eighth Circuit

precedents in this fashion. 

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Desert Palace involved the post-trial issue of when the trial court should give

a “mixed motive” jury instruction under 1991 Title VII amendments codified at 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The Court’s opinion did not even cite

McDonnell Douglas, much less discuss how those statutes impact our prior summary

judgment decisions. While in general the standard for granting summary judgment

“mirrors” the standard for judgment as a matter of law, Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Products, Inc. 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000), the contexts of the two inquiries

are significantly different. At the summary judgment stage, the issue is whether the

plaintiff has sufficient evidence that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor

in the defendant’s adverse employment action. If so, the presence of additional

legitimate motives will not entitle the defendant to summary judgment. Therefore,

evidence of additional motives, and the question whether the presence of mixed

motives defeats all or some part of plaintiff’s claim, are trial issues, not summary

judgment issues. Thus, Desert Palace, a decision in which the Supreme Court decided

only a mixed motive jury instruction issue, is an inherently unreliable basis for district

courts to begin ignoring this Circuit’s controlling summary judgment precedents. For

concrete evidence confirming that Desert Palace did not forecast a sea change in the

Court’s thinking, we need look no further than Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 124 S.

Ct. 513, 517-18 & n.3 (2003), a post-Desert Palace decision in which the Court

approved use of the McDonnell Douglas analysis at the summary judgment stage. 

McDonnell Douglas and most subsequent cases in which the Supreme Court

has applied McDonnell Douglas came to the Court on a trial record, not a summary

judgment record. Prior to Desert Palace, in two recent cases involving the sufficiency

of the plaintiff’s evidence at trial, the Court held that a finding of pretext does not

compel judgment for the plaintiff, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

511 (1993), but conversely, that the plaintiff’s prima facie case combined with

sufficient evidence of pretext may permit the jury to find unlawful discrimination,

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. Hicks and Reeves are far more pertinent to our summary

judgment analysis than Desert Palace, particularly because the Court reiterated the

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Desert Palace held that, under the 1991 amendments, if the plaintiff presents

sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination solely by reason of pretext or other

circumstantial evidence, and if the defendant presents sufficient evidence that it

would have taken the same adverse action in any event, either party is entitled to a

mixed-motive jury instruction. In this regard, the amendments overruled Justice

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principle that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is not the only way for

a plaintiff to prove unlawful discrimination: “Proof that the defendant’s explanation

is unworthy of credence [i.e., pretextual] is simply one form of circumstantial

evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite

persuasive.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. 

We have long recognized and followed this principle in applying McDonnell

Douglas by holding that a plaintiff may survive the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment in one of two ways. The first is by proof of “direct evidence” of

discrimination. Direct evidence in this context is not the converse of circumstantial

evidence, as many seem to assume. Rather, direct evidence is evidence “showing a

specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision,

sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion

actually motivated” the adverse employment action. Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of

Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997). Thus, “direct” refers to the causal strength

of the proof, not whether it is “circumstantial” evidence. A plaintiff with strong

(direct) evidence that illegal discrimination motivated the employer’s adverse action

does not need the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis to get to the jury, regardless

of whether his strong evidence is circumstantial. But if the plaintiff lacks evidence

that clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive, he must avoid summary

judgment by creating the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination through the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, including sufficient evidence of pretext. See, e.g.,

Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 1994). This formulation

is entirely consistent with Desert Palace. Thus, we conclude that Desert Palace had

no impact on prior Eighth Circuit summary judgment decisions.2

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O'Connor’s view in Price Waterhouse that a plaintiff must have “direct evidence” of

a discriminatory motive to shift the burden of proof. 123 S. Ct. at 2155. The Court's

resolution of that issue meant, “we need not address the second question on which we

granted certiorari: ‘What are the appropriate standards for lower courts to follow in

making a direct evidence determination in ‘mixed-motive’ cases.’” 123 S. Ct. at 2155

n.3. Had the Court addressed that second question, its answer might have affected

our cases defining direct evidence for summary judgment purposes. 

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In this case, Griffith has produced no strong (direct) evidence that racial or

ethnic discrimination motivated any alleged adverse employment action against him.

While he presented co-worker testimony that Chief Wakeham made insensitive

remarks about African American and women employees on other occasions, Griffith

presented no evidence that Chief Wakeham, Assistant Chief Cohoon, or any other

City decisionmaker ever uttered a single negative racial remark about Griffith’s

Hispanic background. Thus, the requisite causal link between remarks reflecting

racial or gender bias and actions taken against Griffith is lacking. See Simmons v.

OCE-USA, Inc., 174 F.3d 913, 915-16 (8th Cir. 1999). In these circumstances,

Griffith must produce sufficient circumstantial evidence of illegal discrimination

under the McDonnell Douglas paradigm -- by presenting a prima facie case of

intentional discrimination plus sufficient evidence that one or more of the City’s

proffered nondiscriminatory reasons is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

II. The Merits.

On appeal, Griffith surrounds his specific allegations with a broad ranging

attack on work conditions and employee relations in the Des Moines Fire Department.

We will ignore this polemic and limit our discussion to Griffith’s specific claims,

stating the relevant facts as pertinent to each.

1. Discriminatory Leave of Absence. In December 1999, Griffith was

charged with three counts of third degree sexual abuse, including one charge of

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abusing a minor. On the day the Des Moines Register published a story headlined,

“Fireman Charged For Alleged Abuse,” Griffith through his attorney requested an

unpaid leave of absence from the Fire Department, which Chief Wakeham granted.

In May 2000, Griffith pleaded guilty to lesser offenses. He was given a suspended

sentence and probation on conditions that included avoiding contact with the victim.

The City then allowed Griffith to return to work. On appeal, he argues that he was

the victim of disparate treatment because the City did not take action for nine months

when a white firefighter was charged with sex abuse in 1998. This contention is

without merit. It is uncontested that Griffith requested the leave of absence.

2. Failure To Retrain upon Griffith’s Return. When Griffith returned to

work in May 2000, he believed that his firefighting skills had deteriorated during his

leave of absence. He declined one or more emergency assignments, asked for

additional retraining, and claims the City unlawfully discriminated in refusing his

request. On appeal, Griffith argues that summary judgment was improper on this

claim because training is a necessary component of his job and there is a dispute

whether adequate training was provided. This contention, too, is without merit. An

employer’s denial of an employee’s request for more training is not, without more,

an adverse employment action. See Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302

F.3d 839, 845 (8th Cir. 2002). Nor does the record permit a reasonable inference that

Griffith’s race was a factor in this training dispute.

3. Three Disciplinary Incidents. Griffith was disciplined three times between

August 2000 and January 2002 and claims unlawful discrimination and retaliation in

each instance. First, in August 2000, Chief Wakeham informed Griffith that a predisciplinary hearing had been scheduled because of Griffith’s “abusive and

argumentative” behavior in a heated exchange with Assistant Chief Cohoon over

Griffith’s alleged lack of training. The next day, Griffith told the Iowa Civil Rights

Commission that he was the victim of discrimination and retaliation on account of his

Hispanic background. The pre-disciplinary hearing took place two weeks later.

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Griffith received an oral reprimand, a referral to the Employee Assistance Program

(EAP) for evaluation and consultation, and additional firefighter training that he later

admitted was adequate to restore his emergency firefighting skills.

On appeal, Griffith argues that a jury could find “disparate and discriminatory”

treatment because a white firefighter received the same discipline -- a reprimand and

referral to EAP – for more serious insubordination. The district court granted

summary judgment because it is undisputed that Griffith exhibited anger and

disrespect to a supervisor and there is no evidence that Wakeham acted from racial

animus in imposing the discipline. After careful review of the record, we agree. 

Second, in late July 2001, Des Moines arson investigators were about to

interview a minor at a fire scene. Griffith asked another firefighter within the hearing

of the minor’s parents whether “we were allowed to question minors without a parent

. . . because if it was my kid, I would want somebody there.” The parents then

interrupted the interview, and the arson investigators complained to Chief Wakeham.

On August 16, Wakeham wrote Griffith advising him of a pre-disciplinary hearing

regarding “possible interference with an official fire investigation.” Six days later,

Griffith filed this suit. After an August 24 pre-disciplinary hearing, Chief Wakeham

issued a written reprimand and suspended Griffith without pay for one 24-hour duty

shift for “conduct that disrupted an investigation of a fire of unknown origin.” On

appeal, Griffith argues that summary judgment is improper because whether he

interfered with a fire investigation is a disputed issue of fact. The district court

concluded there was no evidence that Wakeham did not believe Griffith was guilty

of misconduct. Again, we agree.

Third, on October 2, 2001, Griffith failed to sign an equipment checklist.

When asked to sign, Griffith stated, “I would sign the sheet if I am required to do so,

but if I am not required to do so, I would prefer to not sign the sheet.” The

Department scheduled a pre-disciplinary hearing that day. Two days later, Griffith

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complained to the City’s EEO Officer that he “perceived [the incident] as

discrimination and harassment.” On October 23, Chief Wakeham suspended Griffith

without pay for forty-eight hours for violating Fire Department policy. Griffith

argues that summary judgment was improper because whether he was ordered to sign

the checklist is a disputed issue of fact. Again, the district court concluded there was

no evidence creating an inference that this discipline was the product of race

discrimination. We agree.

Griffith further argues that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment on his claims that each of these disciplines was illegal retaliation for the

discrimination complaint he filed with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, for the

filing of this lawsuit, and for his letters to Chief Wakeham and to the City’s Equal

Employment Opportunity Officer complaining of discrimination. To establish a

prima facie case of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, Griffith must show that “he

engaged in protected conduct, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and

that the adverse action was causally linked to the protected conduct.” Putman, 348

F.3d at 737. Griffith argues that the temporal proximity between his complaints of

discrimination and the disciplines is sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliation.

The district court disagreed, and so do we.

“Generally, more than a temporal connection between the protected conduct

and the adverse employment action is required to present a genuine factual issue on

retaliation.” Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.) (en banc),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818 (1999). In this case, Griffith lodged complaints of

discrimination days after receiving notices of the pre-disciplinary hearings that led

to the three disciplines. His post-hoc complaints did not without more raise a

retaliation bar to the proposed discipline because “the anti-discrimination statutes do

not insulate an employee from discipline for violating the employer’s rules or

disrupting the workplace.” Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1136. Indeed, complaining of

discrimination in response to a charge of workplace misconduct is an abuse of the

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anti-retaliation remedy. In these circumstances, we agree with the district court that

the temporal proximity between Griffith’s complaints and the subsequent adverse

decisions “is insufficient to allow an inference of a retaliatory motive.”

4. The Hostile Work Environment Claim. Griffith argued in the district

court and on appeal that negative co-worker comments about his Hispanic

background subjected him to a hostile work environment. Griffith testified to three

scattered derogatory comments by two co-workers. The comments were not directed

to Griffith, and one co-worker apologized when Griffith overheard one remark.

Griffith did not complain to his superiors about any of these comments. Another

firefighter testified that co-workers mocked Griffith during his leave of absence and,

in discussing the sexual abuse charges, said “he’s getting what he deserves, and it’s

his own fault” and called him a “stupid Mexican.” In addition to these incidents,

Griffith alleges more generally that the Fire Department is a “racially tense

environment” in which “racial comments and racially derogatory names” are frequent.

The district court concluded that Griffith failed to show harassment pervasive or

severe enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of his employment. See, e.g.,

Woodland, 302 F.3d at 843. We agree. The record contains evidence that Griffith

suffers from depression in large part because he perceives that his co-workers

ridiculed and ostracized him as a “child molester.” That is unfortunate, but

discrimination on this ground is not prohibited by Title VII or by the Iowa Civil

Rights Act.

Griffith asserted other claims in the district court but has not briefed them on

appeal. We therefore deem those issues abandoned. See Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d

982, 986 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 277 (2003). The judgment of the

district court is affirmed.

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3

 Because Mr. Griffith fails to present any evidence to support a claim for

intentional discrimination, the Majority’s discussion of Desert Palace is unnecessary.

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MAGNUSON, District Judge, concurring specially.

I concur in the conclusion that Griffith’s claims fail as a matter of law.

However, I write separately to express my views on how Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,

539 U.S. 90 (2003), affects the analysis used at the summary judgment stage of an

employment discrimination lawsuit.3

 In 1991, Congress extended the protection of

the Civil Rights Act, which until that point only prohibited employment decisions

motivated primarily by an improper characteristic such as race or gender. In

amending the Civil Rights Act in 1991, Congress sought to prohibit any consideration

of race or other improper characteristic, no matter how slight, in employment

decisions. Despite this clear language, courts continued to apply a test that

determined whether a discriminatory motive was the necessary and sufficient cause

of an employment decision, not one to determine whether a discriminatory motive

played a lesser role in the employment decision. Courts ignored the Civil Rights Act

of 1991 in 1991, and they continue to ignore this congressional mandate today.

Desert Palace exposes the legal fiction for what it is, and in its wake, I can no longer

adhere to or apply an arbitrary and antiquated test that has been superceded by

Congress.

On July 2, 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted “to promote a more

abiding commitment to freedom, a more constant pursuit of justice, and a deeper

respect for human dignity.” President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Radio and Television

Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, Pub. Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson

1963-64, vol. 2 at 842-844 (1965). In particular, Title VII sought to “eliminate,

through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in

employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin.” H.R. Rep. No. 88-352,

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 Both the House and the Senate rejected amendments that proposed to insert

the word “solely” in the text of the statute. One senator commented:

The difficulty with this amendment is that it would render Title VII

totally nugatory. If anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a

single cause, he is a different kind of animal from any I know of. But

beyond that difficulty, this amendment would place upon persons

attempting to prove a violation of this section, no matter how clear the

violation was, an obstacle so great as to make the title completely

worthless.

110 Cong. Rec. 13,837-38 (1964). 

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at 26, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401. Congress expressly rejected the

notion that Title VII liability attached only when discrimination was the sole cause

of the employment action.4

 As the Supreme Court commented, “[w]hat is required

by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to

employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of

racial or other impermissible classification.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.

424, 429 (1971). Title VII imposed liability when discrimination motivated the

employment decision.

In 1973, the Supreme Court adopted a tripartite analytical paradigm in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973), “to clarify the

standards governing the disposition of an action challenging employment

discrimination.” The Court discovered that employers rarely, if ever, openly

discriminated against their employees, and absent such blatant proof, an aggrieved

plaintiff would lose at summary judgment. Acknowledging that Title VII “tolerates

no [] discrimination, subtle or otherwise,” the Court devised a burden-shifting scheme

to allow a plaintiff to inferentially prove intentional discrimination. See id. at 801.

Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof throughout and the

defendant only bears the burden of production. The plaintiff must first prove a prima

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 As one commentator has noted:

The McDonnell Douglas Court gave no justification or authority for its

establishment of this structure for proof of illegal discrimination. The

Court did not cite or discuss any passage from Title VII or any other part

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Nor did the Court argue that any

legislative history from the Act lent support to, or even suggested, such

a set of rules. The Court did not explain how proof of a prima facie case

had any logical or inferential relationship to proof of the employer’s

intent itself. The Court did not expound upon shifting burdens of proof,

presumptions, or any other procedural rules used in any other cause of

action, whether statutory or common law, from which it had drawn this

scheme. The Court did not cite any power a court might possess to

structure the presentation of evidence in a way most conducive to

accurate fact-finding. The Court’s pronunciation of the prima facie case

and the shift in burden to the employer stands starkly naked, without the

armor of congressional support, common-law authority, or reasoning.

The opinion is unanimous. No Justice bothered to concur and explain

his own rationale for the holding of the case, let alone dissent from the

creation, without explanation, defense, or justification, of the elements

of a cause of action purportedly created by Congress. The rules laid

down in McDonnell Douglas are an audacious and arbitrary exercise of

power. In this way, the establishment of the structure of proof is closer

to a legislative creation of policy than a judicial expression of the law

under authority and reason.

Mark A. Schuman, The Politics of Presumption: St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks

and the Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 St. John’s J. Legal

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facie case of discrimination, and then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. To determine

causation, the plaintiff must prove that the single legitimate nondiscriminatory reason

given by the employer is a pretext for the actual, discriminatory, but-for cause of the

employment decision. See id. at 802-03. Absent from this opinion was any

justification or authority for this scheme.5

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Comment. 67, 70 (1993).

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Following McDonnell Douglas, the Court scrambled to provide guidance to

confused courts across the nation. See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248 (1981). Despite the Court’s efforts, courts continued to struggle with

the McDonnell Douglas paradigm. In 1989, the Court was presented with a case in

which the evidence indicated that both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons

contributed to the employment decision, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228

(1989). The Court discovered that the traditional McDonnell Douglas scheme was

ineffective to analyze such claims. Specifically, the plurality in Price Waterhouse

concluded that Title VII’s use of the words “because of” did not require plaintiffs to

prove that a discriminatory motive was the but-for cause of the adverse employment

decision. Id. at 240. Rather, the plurality held that the words “because of” obligated

a plaintiff “to prove that the employer relied upon [an improper characteristic] when

coming to its decision.” Id. at 242. For cases in which a discriminatory motive

affected the employment decision, the plurality further held that a defendant could

escape liability when it “can prove that, even if it had not taken [an improper

characteristic] into account, it would have come to the same decision regarding a

particular person.” Id. For cases in which a discriminatory motive played a less-thandecisive role in the employment decision, the Price Waterhouse plurality completely

shifted the burden of persuasion off of plaintiffs and onto defendants, creating a

defense to liability where the defendant could meet the “same decision test.” Id. at

244-45.

Justice O’Connor, however, was uncomfortable with the notion that defendants

in mixed-motive cases, or cases in which a discriminatory motive played a less-thanbut-for role in an employment decision, bore the burden of proof with respect to

causation. As a result, she concurred with the plurality, holding that courts should

break from the McDonnell Douglas requirement that plaintiffs prove causation

through the pretext test and instead require defendants to disprove causation through

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the same decision test only when a plaintiff first offered direct evidence that a

discriminatory motive played a substantial role in the employment action. Id. at 276

(“In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the

defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an

illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.”). 

O’Connor described how lower courts should approach cases after Price

Waterhouse, deftly distinguishing between the McDonnell Douglas framework and

her Price Waterhouse framework:

Once all the evidence has been received, the court should

determine whether the McDonnell Douglas or Price

Waterhouse framework properly applies to the evidence

before it. If the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Price

Waterhouse threshold, the case should be decided under

the principles enunciated in McDonnell Douglas and

Burdine, with the plaintiff bearing the burden of persuasion

on the ultimate issue whether the employment action was

taken because of discrimination. In my view, such a

system is both fair and workable, and it calibrates the

evidentiary requirements demanded of the parties to the

goals behind the statute itself.

Id. at 278-79. Price Waterhouse thus created a capricious distinction between direct

and indirect evidence and single-motive and mixed-motive cases.

In 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Congress clarified

that a plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment practice when he or she

“demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor

for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The plain meaning of the statute imposes liability on an

employer when an improper consideration is a motivating factor, regardless if other

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6

 Although the legislative history addresses evidence such as conduct or

statements, this reference does not indicate any intent to distinguish between direct

and circumstantial evidence. Rather, Congress commented that although such

evidence is relevant in an intentional discrimination claim, “mere discriminatory

thoughts” alone are not actionable. Instead, conduct and remarks may be sufficient

if the plaintiff can show a “nexus” between the evidence and the employment

decision. H.R. Rep. 102-40 (II) at 18. Congress sought to prevent mere “thoughts”

from being actionable under Title VII. As is with all evidence, there must be a causal

connection to support intentional discrimination. Although the text and history of the

statute do not require the plaintiff to prove proximate cause or some other heightened

level of causation, the plaintiff nonetheless bears the burden to prove some degree of

causation.

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factors also existed. Absent from this clear language is the requirement that

discrimination be a “substantial” factor, a “but-for” factor, or the necessary and

sufficient cause of the employment decision. Instead, Congress unambiguously

required that discrimination be “a” motivating factor in the employment decision.

Any analytical paradigm that requires greater proof to prevail on liability contradicts

the express language of the statute. 

Even though the language of the statute is unambiguous, legislative history

reflects that Congress did not intend to require a heightened standard of evidentiary

proof. Indeed, the legislative history is void of any reference to different degrees of

evidentiary proof. See generally H.R. Rep. 102-40 (I) &( II), reprinted in 1991

U.S.C.C.A.N. 549.6

 Noting that Price Waterhouse “severely undercut” Title VII’s

comprehensive ban on “all invidious consideration” in employment, Congress

clarified that Title VII imposed liability when discrimination was a “contributing” or

“causative” factor in the employment decision. H.R. Rep. 102-40 (I) at 46-48.

Congress did not discuss a heightened level of proof but rather intended to restore the

law consistent with the legislative purpose of Title VII. Id. In addition, by making

the same decision test an affirmative defense to damages but not liability, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), Congress modified the motivating factor analysis originally set

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forth in Price Waterhouse. See H.R. Rep. 102-40 (I) at 48 (“[2000e-2(m)] would

clarify that proof that an employer would have made the same employment decision

in the absence of discriminatory reasons is relevant to determine not the liability for

discriminatory employment practices, but only the appropriate remedy.”).

The direct/indirect evidence distinction, which courts have applied since Price

Waterhouse, should have fallen into disuse after Congress amended the Civil Rights

Act in 1991. Nevertheless, since Price Waterhouse and despite the Civil Rights Act

of 1991, courts including the Eighth Circuit have duly followed O’Connor’s

evidentiary distinction between the burden-shifting framework on causation in single

and mixed-motive cases. For example, in Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.2d 636, 639

(8th Cir. 2002), the Court observed: “The framework for evaluating a Title VII

discrimination claim depends on the type of evidence presented in support of the

claim. Where the plaintiff relies primarily on circumstantial evidence, courts apply

a tripartite analysis as set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.” Similarly,

in Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 847-48 (8th Cir. 2002), the Court made the

distinction between a mixed-motive analysis under Price Waterhouse, and a singlemotive analysis under McDonnell Douglas:

Plaintiffs like Gagnon pursuing claims of discrimination

under Title VII have two models under which they may

proceed. First, a plaintiff can proceed under the threestage, burden-shifting standard set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668,

93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Under this standard, Gagnon must

first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Once

the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to

Sprint PCS to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the

adverse employment action. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407, 113 S. Ct.

2742 (1993). If Sprint PCS articulates such a reason,

Gagnon must respond with sufficient evidence that the

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-17-

proffered reason was really a pretext for intentional

discrimination. Id. At all times under this model, the

burden of persuasion remains on Gagnon, the plaintiff. Id.

Alternatively, Gagnon can proceed under the mixed-motive

standard set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490

U.S. 228, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989), if he

is able to produce “direct evidence that an illegitimate

criterion . . . ‘played a motivating part in [the] employment

decision.’” Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d

920, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) (alterations in original) (quoting

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258). Once Gagnon

establishes such direct evidence, the burden shifts to Sprint

PCS to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence

that it would have reached the same employment decision

absent any discrimination. Cronquist, 237 F.3d at 924. As

modified by section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2), the mixed-motive model allows for

declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorney’s fees and

costs once Gagnon meets his initial burden regarding direct

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). 

Since Price Waterhouse, as Mohr and Gagnon illustrate, the analysis appropriate at

the summary judgment stage depended on the evidentiary distinction made by Justice

O’Connor. 

In June 2003, the Supreme Court abrogated the proposition that whether the

courts apply McDonnell Douglas or a mixed-motive analysis depends on the

presentation of direct or indirect evidence. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 98-99, 101. The

Court concluded that the Civil Rights Act did not require a heightened evidentiary

standard to proceed under a mixed-motive analysis. Id. Desert Palace admonished

that the key issue under Title VII is whether intentional discrimination occurred,

instead of how intentional discrimination is proved. Absent the distinction between

direct and indirect evidence, principles of statutory interpretation compel the

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7

 With the 1991 Amendment, it is impossible to construe the Civil Rights Act

as imposing liability under §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-2(m) as mutually exclusive.

Title VII does not create varying degrees of liability. The plain language of the

statute forbids an invidious consideration from motivating, in any way, an

employment decision. The 1991 Amendment was intended to clarify the statute from

the improper interpretation articulated in Price Waterhouse. Section 2000e-2(m)

further defines § 2000e-2(a)(1), and together these statutes form the standard for Title

VII liability. Thus, the motivating factor test controls.

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conclusion that Congress never envisioned a dichotomy between single and mixedmotive cases. Congress intended to hold employers liable when discrimination was

a contributing factor in the employment action, even if other motives existed. See 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); H.R. Rep. 102-40 (I) at 48; H.R. Rep. 102-40 (II) at 17.

Whether a plaintiff’s claim is single motive or mixed-motive is not evinced in the

language or the legislative history of the statute; Title VII imposes liability when

discrimination is “a motivating factor” for the adverse employment action. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(m).7

There is no rational connection between the type of evidence presented by a

plaintiff and whether a case involves single or mixed-motives. The language and

legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 do not support a distinction

between direct and indirect evidence. Circumstantial evidence is as equally

persuasive as direct evidence in proving discrimination. Moreover, maintaining a

distinction between direct and indirect evidence creates a legal fiction. Even

assuming that Congress intended to create a dichotomy between single-motive and

mixed-motive cases, a plaintiff that prevails under either theory obtains the same

relief for a defendant’s liability under Title VII. There is no need for a plaintiff to

prove the more onerous single-motive case, when all that Title VII requires a plaintiff

to prove is that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Courts that insist that two frameworks still exist improperly

create a fictional dichotomy of “first degree discrimination” and “second degree

discrimination.” The plain language of the statute does not require a plaintiff to prove

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8

 In the absence of this evidentiary distinction, this Circuit to date has not

provided any basis on which to determine whether to apply a McDonnell Douglas

analysis or the alternative mixed-motive analysis. Instead, this Circuit and the

Majority appear to cling to the distinction articulated in Price Waterhouse and

abrogated by Desert Palace. See supra at 3-4; see Hammer v. Ashcroft, File No. 3-

3259 (8th Cir. Sept. 7, 2004) (“A plaintiff who lacks direct evidence of discrimination

may utilize the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas”). The Majority

misunderstands the history and context of the dichotomy between the single-motive

test articulated in McDonnell Douglas and the motivating factor test, a variation of

which was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse. The Majority

refuses to acknowledge that Desert Palace eliminated direct evidence as a prerequisite

for mixed-motive analysis.

9

 Contrary to what the Majority asserts, this is not simply an issue for the

purposes of giving jury instructions. Although the context of the decision applied to

jury instructions, the practical effect of Desert Palace nonetheless affects the analysis

used at summary judgment. The reasonable jury standard is the same as the summary

judgment standard: whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which

a reasonable jury could logically infer that the adverse employment action resulted

from an improper consideration of a protected characteristic. 

-19-

that discrimination was the “but-for” cause of the employment decision, but rather

requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that discrimination was “a motivating” factor.

There is no evidence that Congress intended to create different degrees of

discrimination under Title VII.8

 Although the statute entitles a plaintiff to damages

beyond that articulated in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), these damages are only awarded if the

defendant employer fails to prove its affirmative defense that it would have made the

same decision in the absence of a discriminatory motive. This burden allows the

defendant employer to limit the plaintiff’s remedy, but does not negate liability.

Thus, whether the employer has other nondiscriminatory reasons which enter into the

employment decision is wholly irrelevant to Title VII liability under the Civil Rights

Act of 1991. The only rational conclusion is that no distinction between single and

mixed motives exists. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) applies to all individual disparate

treatment cases.9

 

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Moreover, there is no support for the proposition that the Civil Rights Act of

1991 compels different analyses at different procedural stages of a Title VII case.

Applying the more onerous McDonnell Douglas paradigm at summary judgment and

then applying the Civil Rights Act of 1991 at trial is inconsistent and impractical.

This approach requires the plaintiff to prove at summary judgment that an invidious

characteristic was the but-for cause of the employment action, but then at trial only

requires the plaintiff to prove that this characteristic was a motivating factor in the

employment decision. This inconsistency further interferes with the ultimate issue

of whether there is any evidence that supports a finding that discrimination motivated

the employment decision. It is absurd to require the plaintiff to satisfy a higher

burden at summary judgment when the lesser burden is all that is required under the

statute.

-20-

For thirty years, courts have been slaves to the McDonnell Douglas burden

shifting paradigm that is inconsistent with Title VII. McDonnell Douglas cannot be

reconciled with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as it is indignant to the clear text of the

statute. McDonnell Douglas impermissibly focuses on the but-for cause of the

employment decision, when all that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 requires is that

discrimination be a motivating factor in the employment decision. Because a plaintiff

need not demonstrate that discrimination was the but-for cause in the employment

decision, all cases under Title VII should be evaluated to determine whether invidious

discrimination in any way influenced or motivated the employment decision.

McDonnell Douglas fails to always achieve this result, while the motivating factor

test consistently does.

McDonnell Douglas should not be used by courts to analyze Title VII claims.

The burden-shifting framework is not supported in the language of the statute, nor

does it impose liability under Title VII as Congress intended. Under McDonnell

Douglas, requiring the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the

employment decision is worthless. First, this element is not highly significant to a

plaintiff’s claim because in the vast majority of cases, if not all, the defendant

employer always chooses to deny claims of discrimination and offers a

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-21-

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Moreover, mere

articulation of a nondiscriminatory reason without requiring evidentiary proof is a

useless ritual. Second, even if the plaintiff successfully disproves the employer’s

nondiscriminatory reason, this does not necessarily result in judgment in favor of the

plaintiff. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (prima

facie case plus sufficient evidence of pretext may permit the jury to find unlawful

discrimination); Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (a finding of pretext does not compel

judgment for the plaintiff; but that any reason in the record, even if not specifically

articulated by the employer as the nondiscriminatory reason, is proper for jury

consideration). Finally, the plain language of the statute lacks any reference

whatsoever to a burden-shifting paradigm articulated in McDonnell Douglas. Instead,

the Civil Rights Act of 1991 requires the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a

motivating factor, and then allows the defendant to affirmatively prove otherwise to

negate damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Rather than aiding the plaintiff

in proving that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment decision,

McDonnell Douglas focuses on the legitimacy of the employer’s proffered reasons

without considering whether discrimination played any part in the adverse

employment decision. 

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is intended to root out and deter employment

discrimination and provide public benefit through the active enforcement of a

statutory scheme that ensures equality in employment decisions. Although I

acknowledge that Desert Palace confirms the demise of the McDonnell Douglas

framework, I do not ignore the vitality of “pretext” – that is, the proffered reason

articulated by the employer as a proxy for discrimination – and the underlying value

that it provides in employment discrimination cases. Title VII liability requires a

plaintiff to show that discrimination was a motivating factor in employment, using

either direct or circumstantial evidence. Of course, pretext is circumstantial evidence

that may sufficiently demonstrate that an employer was motivated by an improper

consideration. However, § 2000e-2(m) does not require the plaintiff to prove pretext

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10 I also understand the concern that innocent defendants may be liable to

plaintiffs. However, the same-decision test ensures that no innocent defendant will

owe a plaintiff damages. This differs from McDonnell Douglas, because there are no

longer guilty defendants evading liability and innocent victims denied compensation

because the victims cannot successfully prove pretext. The Civil Rights Act is

designed to provide the victims of discrimination with redress and to sanction

employers’ discriminatory conduct. See H.R. Rep. 102-40(I) at 47. Requiring a

plaintiff to prove pretext frustrates this objective.

-22-

to prevail under Title VII. Regardless if the plaintiff proves pretext or that

discrimination was a motivating factor, the plaintiff is entitled to the same damages

for Title VII liability. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). A plaintiff is entitled to

damages beyond those enumerated in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) only if the defendant

employer cannot sustain its burden on its same-decision affirmative defense. If the

defendant employer cannot prove that there was an existing but-for cause that would

have created the same employment result, then the plaintiff is entitled to greater

damages. Thus, a plaintiff is no worse off if he or she is unable to prove pretext.

Title VII is not designed to provide a windfall to plaintiffs, but rather serves to put

the plaintiff in the same position he or she would have been in absent discrimination.

See H.R. Rep. 102-40 (II) at 19 (“complaining party may receive relief only for the

harm that actually results from the illegal discriminatory conduct”). This is the

fundamental purpose behind our civil litigation system.10

Since its inception, McDonnell Douglas has befuddled the Courts. Over time,

the Supreme Court has gradually chiseled McDonnell Douglas away from its original

failing framework to an analysis that still fails to give effect to the language of the

Civil Rights Act. Since Desert Palace, courts all over this country have attempted to

interpret, understand, and give effect to the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See, e.g.,

Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004); Dunbar v. Pepsi Cola

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11 I am likewise cognizant that the Supreme Court acknowledged the

McDonnell Douglas burden shifting paradigm following Desert Palace. See

Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 124 S. Ct. 513, 518 n.3 (2003). In Raytheon, the

Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit because the panel improperly applied the

disparate impact standard to a disparate treatment case. In acknowledging

McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court stated that, “the plaintiff can still prove

disparate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence demonstrating that the

employer’s explanation is pretextual.” Id (emphasis added). Although the Supreme

Court acknowledged McDonnell Douglas, it did not revisit the Ninth Circuit’s

analysis nor did it discuss McDonnell Douglas as applied to Title VII cases. Just as

the Supreme Court ignored McDonnell Douglas in the Desert Palace opinion, the

Supreme Court likewise ignored Desert Palace in the Raytheon opinion. These

inconsistencies further demonstrate the confusion that McDonnell Douglas creates.

Moreover, it is the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that overruled McDonnell Douglas, and

the Supreme Court’s failure to acknowledge this effect does not resurrect McDonnell

Douglas.

12 The modified McDonnell Douglas approach, as advocated in Dunbar and

Rachid, essentially creates varying degrees of discrimination, by allowing a plaintiff

to prove Title VII liability by either demonstrating that discrimination was (1) the

“but-for” cause of the employment decision, or (2) a motivating factor in the

employment decision. However, the plain language of the statute only requires the

plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a motivating factor. It is ridiculous for

courts to adopt a scheme that provides a plaintiff the option to prove something more

than what the statute actually requires for liability. 

-23-

General Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1197 (N.D. Iowa 2003).11

However, courts have failed to thoroughly examine the language of the statute and

congressional intent, and instead have fought to keep an arbitrary paradigm alive. It

is imperative for courts to acknowledge a congressional mandate and give effect to

the express language of the statute. There is no need to adopt a modified McDonnell

Douglas approach when the Civil Rights Act of 1991 effectively allows a plaintiff to

prove discrimination without invoking the complexities and insensibility of the

McDonnell Douglas paradigm.12 There is simply no need to retain the McDonnell

Douglas paradigm when the Civil Rights Act of 1991 effectively allows a court to

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-24-

analyze the evidence to determine if discrimination was a motivating factor in the

employment decision. Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1991sufficiently provides an

analysis that achieves what Congress has always intended: the absolute elimination

of discrimination in employment decisions. 

As jurists, courts have the insurmountable task to interpret and apply the law

as prescribed by Congress. In limited circumstances, courts have the power to

invalidate congressional mandates that exceed the scope of congressional power.

Nonetheless, courts do not have unfettered discretion and are not entitled to rewrite

legislation as they see fit. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1991 Amendments

expressly prohibit any discrimination in employment. Courts are not empowered to

impose an arbitrary and analytical scheme that contradicts the express, unambiguous

language of the statute. If Congress intended that Title VII impose varying degrees

of liability, then Congress needs to amend Title VII to reflect that intent. It is simply

impossible to reconcile the ancient McDonnell Douglas paradigm with the clear

language of the Civil Rights Act. Courts are required to apply the law. McDonnell

Douglas does not apply Title VII as Congress envisioned. In its place, the express

language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should emerge.

Thus, courts should adhere to the statute rather than divine standards of

analyzing claims. “[T]he complaining party must demonstrate that discrimination

was a contributing factor in the employment decision - i.e., that discrimination

actually contributed to the employer’s decision with respect to the complaining

party.” H.R. Rep. 102-40 (II) at 18. The plaintiff may use any type of evidence to

prove liability. The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that discrimination was

a motivating factor in the employment action. If the evidence is sufficient for a

rational factfinder to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor in the

employment action, then the employer may rebut with evidence that discrimination

was not a motivating factor for the employment decision. The defendant employer

also bears the burden to prove that it would have made the same employment decision

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-25-

absent the discriminatory motive. Judgment may be entered against either party

depending on the sufficiency of the evidence presented. A plaintiff’s claim will fail

if the evidence is insufficient for a rational factfinder to find intentional

discrimination. Eliminating the tripartite framework provides an aggrieved plaintiff

with redress when the plaintiff proves that discrimination played, not the but-for role,

but a role in the employment decision. 

The distinction between the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and McDonnell Douglas

cannot be articulated in this case. As a matter of law, regardless of what type of

evidence Mr. Griffith has presented and regardless of the standard utilized by the

Court, Mr. Griffith fails to present sufficient evidence to support his claim for

intentional discrimination. Therefore, I concur that Mr. Griffith’s claims fail, and

concur in the decision to affirm the district court.

______________________________

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