Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02709/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02709-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jessie Ervin Buchanan
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

~lnifri't ~fafrs Qluurt uf c1\pprals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

ROBERT L. HOECKER December 27, 1989 CLERK 

TO: 

RE: 

ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

No. 88-2709 - USA v. Buchanan 

Filed December 12, 1989 by Judge Bobby R. Baldock 

Attached is a new page 2 to be substituted· for page 2 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·3157 

<FTS) 564-3157 

in the original opinion which was sent to you on December 12, 1989. 

PF:fg 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, CLERK 

By 

Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 1 
Petitioner-appellee and cross-appellant, Jessie J;;rvin 

Buchanan (Buchanan), was charged with the manuf actu t:L3 ancl 

po:rncs::;ion of an unregistered firearm, 26 u.::;.c. § SB6l(d) & (f),· 

and conspiracy to commit: these offenses, 113 U.~.;.c § Tll. II.is 

f i r s t: i: r i a l produced a hung j u r y • f:I i s second t: r i a .L r e ,rn 1 t e d i n a 

conviction 1·1hich 1·1as affirmed on direct appeal. i_n UnL!:r~d-~3l:t,tc~s _ _\~_•_ 

U11cl,,111:rn, '/8/ F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986). We affirmed in P:-:1rt, 

rev1~r:;1:d in part: and reil\anded t:hr~ c:-i::;0 after t:llr~ di:nial. of 

13ucha11an 1 s st1bsequent pc:tit.ion for modification ot sent1:nc1, in 

u n i. l:t': d St a t e_:::; v • __ 13 u c 11 an, · \ , B J O F • 2 d 1t16 ( l O th. c i r . 10 n / ) . 

13 u c h a n a 11 s o u g h t co 11 c1 I: e r a 1 r 81 i e f u n d e r 7. :-3 U . S . C . § 2 2 !.i S , 

alleqing that the govecnmenl: 1 :1 fai.lttrr.~ l:o di:-.;clo:1c: a per:~1)11a.L 

r·cL:i.l:ion:_;hip bet·.1·1een il:s Bureau of Alcohol, 'J'obacco and Firearm:, 

( JJ/\'1'1') inve:-,tigZ1tor and Uuch-rnan 1 :, formf:.,r ,•d.fc! violated Brady _v '.. 

MaryLrnd, :rn fJ.S. HJ (J9GJ). 

granl:cd Uucbana11 ,1 11e1•1 trial. 

'l'hc, ·disl:ri.ct court: aq1:eed and 

The; Unil:f~d ~it:c1h::i 11u1·1 i:t];·J.)1':,ll:;. 

1311cl1a11a11 cross-appeals, arguing l:hal: U11_' di:;1.rit:L 1;011rl: 1,rr1,d i.11 

gra11t:in9 him a ne1-1 tria.L ins!:cad of :Jt~l:Linq clsi,!r, his co11vi.ction. 

Our jurisdict).on arises undec :rn· 11.s.c. '.'):) 22SJ & 225 1:i. 

111:: f' ind t:hal: 1:hc t1ndic,cl.0;3ed evLd1,nc:e is not rnaterL:i.l to 

B11clF111a11 1 s guilt: or punish111ent, we reverse. 

l. 

/\. 

ffCCc1US1• 

,fnann Jiuffrnon i:~ l:111• 111ol:h1•r or' t:1,;r,n 1'lhit:L1:n, 1311chan;:rn 1 ~, 

-- 2-

Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 2 
PUBLISHUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

F 1 LED 

LT!iircd Stares Court of Appeals 

7"~lnfh (';!'ri,!.1: 

DEC 1 :~ 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECK.£R 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant and ) 

Cross-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ~ ) Nos. 88-2709 

88-2791 

· JESSIE ERVIN BUCHANAN, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee and 

Cross-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-50-C and 

CR-84-0004-01) 

Paul G. Hess, Assistant United States Attorney (Roger Hilfiger, 

United States Attorney on the brief), Muskogee, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. 

David Booth, Federal Public Defender, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for 

Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. 

Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 3 
( 

Petitioner-appellee and cross-appellant, Jessie Ervin 

Buchanan (Buchanan), was charged with the manufacture and 

possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 u.s.c. § 586l(d} & (f}, 

and conspiracy to commit these offenses, 18 u.s.c § 371. His 

first trial produced a hung jury. His second trial resulted in a 

conviction which was affirmed on direct appeal in United States v. 

Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986). We affirmed the denial 

of Buchanan's subsequent petition for modification of sentence in 

United States v. Buchanan, 830 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Buchanan sought collateral relief under 28 u.s.c. § 2255, 

alleging that the government's failure to disclose a personal 

relationship between its Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

(BATF} investigator and Buchanan's former wife violated Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court agreed and 

granted Buchanan a new trial. The United States now appeals. 

Buchanan cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred in 

granting him a new trial instead of setting aside his conviction. 

Our jurisdiction arises under 28 u.s.c. §§ 2253 & 2255. Because 

we find that the undisclosed evidence is not material to 

Buchanan's guilt or punishment, we reverse. 

I. 

A. 

Joann Huffman is the mother of Gwen Whitten, Buchanan's 

former wife. On September 3, 1982, Huffman's trailer home was 

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Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 4 
government witnesses." United States v. Buchanan, No. 84-4-CR, 

order at 5 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 1, 1984) (emphasis in original). 

At trial, Gwen Whitten testified that a rancorous 

relationship existed between Buchanan and her mother. Tr. 72-73. 2 

She stated that Buchanan threatened Huffman on several occasions: 

"[H]e threatened my mother to me at one time. We were in an 

argument and he told me, he said, 'Gwen I love you and I'm going 

to get you through someone you love.''' Tr. 66. Huffman's 

testimony corroborated the antipathy between Buchanan and herself. 

She testified that Buchanan made a threat directly to her: "[H]e 

took some money out of his pocket, I don't· know how much, he had a 

roll of money, and he said, 'I've got you right here."' Tr. 90. 

The government's principal witness was Eric Elrod. Elrod 

testified that on the evening of September 1, 1982, he was sitting 

in his truck with John Omstead and Kathy Bunch when Buchanan 

motioned Elrod to Buchanan's car. Tr. 126. While Omstead and 

Bunch waited in Elrod's truck, Elrod walked to Buchanan's car, 

whereupon Buchanan offered him $800 to burn Huffman's trailer. 

Tr. 128. According to Elrod, Buchanan paid him $400 that night, 

Tr. 131, and told him to collect the balance at the Tri-a-Nite 

lounge when the job was completed. Elrod explained: 

[Buchanan] wanted to establish his alibi 

there. He told me that he will be there and 

have plenty of people around him. He told me 

when ••• I go in there, he'll go to the 

bathroom, you know, he didn't want me to 

follow him right away, he just, you know, go 

2 The transcript cited in this section is that from Buchanan's 

second trial held February 27, March 1, 2 & 5, 1984. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 5 
( ahead and order me a beer, he told me, and 

wait. And he went in the bathroom and told me 

to follow him in there an he would pay me the 

rest of the money there. 

Tr. 130. Elrod met Buchanan the following evening and the two 

confirmed this plan. Tr. 143. 

Elrod testified that the next day he and Omstead constructed 

a firebomb out of a plastic milk jug filled with gasoline and 

charcoal fluid. Tr. 148-49. They drove to Huffman's trailer, 

made sure no one was inside, and then tossed the lighted bomb 

through the bedroom window. Tr. 152-54. After leaving the 

burning trailer, Elrod and Omstead drove to the Tri-a-Nite lounge: 

PROSECUTOR: 

ELROD: 

PROSECUTOR: 

ELROD: 

PROSECUTOR: 

ELROD: 

PROSECUTOR: 

ELROD: 

PROSECUTOR: 

Did you see Jessie Buchanan 

[there]? 

Yes. 

Where was he? 

He was sitting .. 

crowd of people to 

. with a 

my right. 

And whenever you saw Jessie 

Buchanan over there, did you 

make any comments or gestures 

to him, or did he to you? 

No, I didn't say nothing to 

him, that was part of the deal. 

I looked at him ... and he 

looked at me and kind of nodded 

at him and he knew. 

All right. And then what 

happened next? 

He got up and went to the 

bathroom. 

Is that what he was supposed to 

do? 

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Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 6 
ELROD: 

PROSECUTOR: 

ELROD: 

PROSECUTOR: 

ELROD: 

Tr, 156-57. 

Yes. 

And then what happened ... ? 

I sat there and drank a couple 

more drinks of my beer, and 

then I went in there after him. 

And when you got to the 

bathroom what happened. ? 

Well,_ there was another person 

in there, you know, using the 

bathroom. He walked out, and 

[Buchanan] paid me the rest of 

my money and walked out. 

Elrod testified that the following day he and Omstead went to 

Buchanan's home, informed Buchanan that Huffman's son was expected 

in town and asked for more money to get away from him. Buchanan 

complimented the pair on their ''good job," gave Elrod an 

additional $200 and told the pair to go camping. Tr. 160. On 

cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that Elrod was 

testifying pursuant to a plea agreement, had lied to BATF 

investigators about his involvement in the burning and had been 

convicted of a felony on three prior occasions. Tr. 168-170 172, 

191, 199. 

Omstead's testimony corroborated Elrod!s story in most 

respects. See tr. 234, 236, 238, 241, 243. However, Omstead 

never dealt directly with Buchanan, but indirectly through Elrod. 

Tr. 257. Omstead was cross-examined concerning his plea 

agreement, drug use, and prior inconsistent statements. Tr. 264-

65, 273-74. Kathy Bunch testified that she had remained in the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 7 
car with Omstead when Elrod spoke to Buchanan on the night of 

September 1, 1982. Bunch testified that when Elrod returned to 

his truck he "said something like flick of a light switch and then 

blow something." Tr. 319. 

BATF Agent Doye A. Tilley testified as an expert in firearms. 

Tr. 354, He stated that the firebomb Elrod and Omstead 

constructed was a firearm under federal law for which Buchanan had 

no registration. Tr. 344-45. Tilley sat with the government 

prosecutors throughout the trial. Tr. 534 

In his defense, Buchanan produced three witnesses each of 

whom testified that they did not see Elrod and Omstead at the Tria-Nite lounge on the evening of the fire. Buchanan also testified 

in his own defense, denying any involvement in the bombing. 

B, 

The§ 2255 hearing revealed that agent Tilley and Gwen 

Whitten met before Buchanan's first trial, when Tilley was 

investigating the fire at Huffman's trailer. Tr. 10. 3 Tilley 

obtained one statement from Whitten and reduced it to writing. 

Tr. 70-71. Despite the fact that Whitten "did not know anything 

about the fire," tr. 70, Tilley continued to meet with Whitten on 

a personal basis and the pair soon became ''friends." Tr. 72, 32. 

Between Buchanan's first and second trial, Tilley and Whitten 

continued their friendship, meeting occasionally. Tr. 12-13. 

3 The transcript cited in this section is that from Buchanan's 

§ 2255 hearing held December ,8, 1987. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 8 
Subsequent to Buchanan's conviction in March, 1984, the pair 

continued to socialize and dine together. Tr. 91. Including 

telephone calls, Tilley acknowledged speaking with Whitten 

approximately a hundred times between 1983 and 1985. Tr. 121-22. 

On June 1, 1985, Whitten gave birth to a girl named Angela 

Nicole Tilley. Tr. 13-14. On June 6, pursuant to Whitten's 

request, Tilley signed a sworn affidavit acknowledging paternity 

of the child. Tr. 92. Whitten testified, however, that Tilley 

was not the father and claimed that she had lied on the birth 

certificate. Tr. 35-36. Tilley testified that he did not know 

who the baby's father was. Tr. 120. 

After hearing this testimony, the district court held that 

the undisclosed information concerning the Tilley-Whitten 

relationship raised a "reasonable probability" that Buchanan's 

conviction "may not have occurred." Buchanan v. United States, 

No. 87-50-C, order at 2, (E.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 1988). The court 

therefore held that the government's failure to disclose this 

relationship to Buchanan violated the Brady iule and entitled 

Buchanan to a new trial. 

II. 

We review the factual findings of a district court acting 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 under the clearly erroneous standard. 

United States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493,. 1501-02 n. 16 (10th Cir. 

1989). However, the materiality of withheld evidence under Brady 

and its possible effect on the verdict are mixed questions of fact 

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Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 9 
and law reviewed de nova. Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 610 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986). We therefore 

review de novo the district court's holding that the government's 

failure to disclose the Tilley-Whitten relationship violated 

Brady. 

To assess Buchanan's claim that the government's failure to 

disclose the Tilley-Whitten relationship violated Brady, our 

inquiry begins at the source. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), Brady and his companion were separately charged with 

murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery. Under state 

law, punishment for that crime was life imprisonment or death, the 

jury being empowered to restrict punishment to life. Prior to 

trial, defense counsel requested extrajudicial statements by the 

companion. However, the prosecution withheld statements in which 

Brady's companion confessed to the actual homicide. Brady did not 

contest the charge of first-degree murder, but rather denied 

committing the actual homicide and, on that basis, asked that he 

not be executed. The jury found Brady guilty and declined to 

spare him from the death penalty. 

The Supreme Court overturned Brady's death sentence, holding 

that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good 

faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. This oftquoted language established the prosecutor's broad duty to 

disclose exculpatory material to the defense; the limitations of 

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Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 10 
this holding are found in the Supreme Court's discussion of 

Brady's relief. 

Brady had sought an entirely new trial in which the 

suppressed evidence would be introduced to contest his guilt. 

However, the Court concluded that, under state law, the suppressed 

confession could not reduce Brady's culpability below first degree 

murder. The Court acknowledged that introducing the suppressed 

confession in a new trial might have led, through jury 

nullification of the court's instructions, to Brady's acquittal on 

the first degree murder charge. However, by obliging prosecutors 

to disclose exculpatory information, the Court sought to protect 

the constitutional rights of the accused, not arm defense counsel 

with the tools to elicit a jury verdict based on emotion: 

A sporting theory of justice might assume that 

if the suppressed confession had been used at 

the first trial, the judge's ruling that it 

was not admissible on the issue of innocence 

or guilt might have been flouted by the jury 

just as might have been done if the court had 

first admitted a confession and then stricken 

it from the record. But we cannot raise that 

trail strategy to the dignity of a 

constitutional right and say that the deprival 

of this defendant of that sporting 

chance •.• denies him due process ••.• 

Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted). Because punishment was the only 

issue on which the suppressed confession was material, the Court 

restricted Brady's relief to retrial on punishment. 

"A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that 

implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the 

suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial." 

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A prosecutor 

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Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 11 
therefore is "not required to deliver his entire file to defense 

counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused 

that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.'' 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). "'For unless 

the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no 

constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; 

and absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the 

prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose • . '" Id. 

(quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108). 

The standard of materiality required to set aside a criminal 

conviction on Brady grounds varies with the specificity of the 

defendant's request and the conduct of the prosecutor. In Agurs, 

the Supreme Court enunciated three different standards of 

materiality based upon these factors. 427 U.S. at 103-07. The 

first situation involves the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured 

testimony. A conviction obtained through such testimony is 

fundamentally unfair and must be set aside if there is "any 

reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 

affected" the verdict. Id. at 103. A Brady violation in this 

context is deemed material unless determined harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80. 

The second situation is characterized by a defendant's 

pretrial request for specific evidence and the prosecutor's 

failure to disclose responsive evidence. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. 

In that case, a Brady violation is established upon a showing that 

the undisclosed evidence "'might have affected the outcome of the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2709 Document: 010110195392 Date Filed: 12/27/1989 Page: 12 
trial.'" United States v. Warhop, 732 F.2d 775, 778 (10th Cir. 

1984) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104). Under this standard, a 

new trial is required "'if there was a "reasonable possibility" 

that the undisclosed evidence would have materially affected the 

verdict.'" Warhop, 732 F.2d at 778 (quoting Chavis v. North 

Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 223 (4th Cir. 1980)). 

The third situation arises when the exculpatory information 

in the possession of the prosecutor may be unknown to the defense 

and the defendant either makes no request or else asks for "'all 

Brady material'" or "'anything exculpatory.'" Agurs, 427 U.S. at 

106. Such requests provide the prosecutor with no better notice 

than if no request was made; the duty to respond derives from the 

obviously exculpatory nature of the evidence in the hands of the 

prosecutor. Id. at 106-07. In this situation, the reviewing 

court must look to the whole record and determine whether "the 

omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise 

exist." Id. at 112. 

If ~here is no reasonable doubt about guilt 

whether or not the additional evidence is 

considered, there is no justification for a 

new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict 

is already of questionable validity, 

additional evidence of relatively minor 

importance might be sufficient to create a 

reasonable doubt. 

Id. at 112-13. 

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III. 

Buchanan does not allege that the government aided in the 

presentation of perjured testimony by either Tilley or Whitten. 

Hence, we need not proceed under a harmless error analysis. See 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80. A closer question, however, is. 

whether Buchanan's request for "any evidence which would tend to 

impeach the testimony of a government witness," supra note 1, is a 

general or specific request under Agurs. In Bagley, the Supreme 

Court held that defendant's request for '''any deals, promises or 

inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony'" 

was specific under Agurs. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669-70, 683-84. 

Similarly, in Warhop, we held that a request for '" [a]ny FBI 

interview statements .•• , which tend to exculpate the Defendant 

and impeach the testimony of Government witnesses'" was specific. 

732 F.2d at 778. What unites these two cases is defense counsel's 

focus on tangible and identifiable sources of information .. Based 

upon the notice contained in these requests, the prosecutor could 

focus her inquiry on distinct sources of information, conduct a 

search and meet her obligation under Brady either by turning over 

exculpatory evidence or notifying opposing counsel that no such 

evidence existed. 

In this case, Buchanan sought "any evidence" of impeachment 

"including but not limited to" four tangible sources of 

information. Evidence of the Tilley-Whitten relationship was not 

contained within any of the four tangible sources; hence it falls 

into the default language of the request. To the extent that 

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Buchanan's motion for impeachment evidence specified tangible 

sources of inquiry, it provided the prosecution with notice of 

where to locate such evidence. However, the default language "not 

limited to" provided no better notice than if no request had been 

made. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-07. With respect to evidence of 

the Tilley-Whitten relationship, Buchanan's request for 

impeachment evidence concerning government witnesses therefore was 

general under Agurs. The district court consequently erred in 

applying the "reasonable probability" standard of materiality. 

Rather, Buchanan's claim must be reviewed to determine whether 

evidence of the Tilley-Whitten relationship, when viewed in 

context of the entire record, creates a reasonable doubt as to 

Buchanan's guilt that did not otherwise exist. See id. at 112. 

IV. 

Before addressing the materiality of the Tilley~Whitten 

relationship, we first must determine whether Tilley's knowledge 

of this relationship can be imputed to the prosecution. This step 

is necessary because there is no indication that government 

prosecutors knew of the relationship between Tilley and Whitten. 

The good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor has no bearing 

on the due process inquiry required by Brady. Brady, 373 U.S. at 

87. Accordingly, "whether the nondisclosure was a result of 

negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor. 

The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the 

spokesman for the Government." Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 

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150, 154 (1972). '"Since ••. investigative officers are part of 

the prosecution, the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather 

than tne prosecutors, were guilty of nondisclosure."' United 

States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 445 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting 

United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

Knowledge by police or investigators is therefore imputed to the 

prosecution under Brady. See,~, Endicott, 869 F.2d at 456 

(BATF agent's knowledge of possibly exculpatory evidence 

attributed to prosecutor); United States ex rel. Smith v. Fairman, 

769 F.2d 386, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1985) (police officer's knowledge 

of ballistic test results attributed to prosecution); Schneider v. 

Estelle, 552 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 1977) (state law enforcement 

officer is part of prosecution team, his knowledge is imputed to 

the prosecutor under Brady). 

Here, agent Tilley worked in close proximity with the 

prosecution in the preparation of the government's case a-gainst 

Buchanan. Tilley certainly knew of his relationship with Whitten. 

Accordingly, his knowledge is imputed to the government, 

regardless of the prosecutor's apparent lack of knowledge. 

v. 

The government contends that impeachment evidence is not 

cognizable as exculpatory evidence under Brady. Thus, the 

government contends that evidence of Agent Tilley's relationship 

with Buchanan's former wife does not fall under the Brady rule 

requiring disclosure. we disagree. 

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Cross-examination is the principal means 

by which the believability of a witness and 

the truth of his testimony are tested. 

Subject always to the broad discretion of a 

trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly 

harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is 

not only permitted to delve into the witness' 

story to test the witness' perception and 

memory, but the cross-examiner has 

traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., 

discredit, the witness. --

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). A vital means of 

impeaching a witness is revealing possible biases, prejudices or 

ulterior motives of the witness relating to the personalities· at 

trial. Id. For that reason, "the exposure of a witness' 

motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the 

constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." Id. at 

316-17. Thus, because impeachment is integral to a defendant's 

constitutional right to cross-examination, there exists no pat 

distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence under 

Brady. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676. Rather, "[w]hen the 'reliability 

of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 

innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls 

within [the Brady] rule." Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue 

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269· (1959)). 

Brady does not "automatically require a new trial 'whenever a 

combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has disclosed 

evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have 

changed the verdict[.]'" Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting United 

States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968)). Only where a 

witness' credibility is material to the question of guilt does the 

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prosecutor's failure to disclose impeachment evidence violate 

Brady. In Giglio, the government failed to disclose its plea 

agreement with the only witness linking defendant with the crime. 

405 U.S. at 151. Because that witness' credibility was "an 

important issue in the case, and any understanding or agreement as 

to a future prosecution .•• [was] relevant to his credibility," 

failure to disclose such an agreement violated Brady. Giglio, 405 

U.S. at 155. See also Davis, 415 U.S. at 317 (credibility of 

prosecuting witness was a key element in state's case); Talamante 

v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784, 787 (10th Cir.) (where government's case 

rested entirely on eyewitness identification, failure to disclose 

police investigation of suspect resembling defendant violated 

Brady), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877 (1980). 

Conversely, where a witness' credibility is not material to 

the question of guilt, failure to disclose impeachment evidence 

does not violate Brady. In United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 

1450, 1459 (10th Cir. 1989), we held that the government's failure 

to disclose that the author of a letter admitted into evidence was 

under indictment did not violate Brady where the content of the 

letter was "legally irrelevant'' to defendant's guilt; hence the 

author's credibility was ill!ffiaterial. In cases where the withheld 

impeachment evidence is merely cumulative, we have similarly 

declined to find a Brady violation. See United States v. Page, 

808 F.2d 723, 730 (10th Cir.) (where jury already knew that 

government's principal witness had been arrested several times, 

failure to disclose additional arrest did not violate Brady), 

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cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987); United States v. Haskins, 737 

F.2d 844, 852 (10th Cir. 1984) (failure to disclose government 

assistance to witnesses in obtaining prison transfer was only 

cumulative impeachment). Moreover, where a prosecuting witness is 

not key to the government's case, his credibility is not material; 

hence the failure to reveal impeachment evidence concerning a 

minor witness does not violate Brady. See Warhop, 732 F.2d at 

778-79 (credibility of coconspirator immaterial to defendant's 

guilt where focal point of government's case is conspiracy between 

defendant and other charged parties). Thus, while impeachment 

evidence falls under the general Brady rule requiring disclosure 

of exculpatory evidence, it is subject to the same standard of 

materiality as other forms of exculpatory evidence. 

VI. 

In order to determine whether evidence of the Tilley-Whitten 

relationship is material under Brady, we must evaluate (1) whether 

the credibility of either Whitten or Tilley was determinative of 

Buchanan's guilt or innocence, and (2) whether nondisclosure of 

the Tilley-Whitten relationship raised a reasonable doubt to 

Buchanan's guilt that did not otherwise exist. We thus examine 

Tilley and Whitten's respective testimony in the context of the 

entire record. 

Agent Tilley testified that the firebomb used to destroy 

Huffman's trailer constituted a firearm under federal law and that 

Buchanan had no registration for such firearm. This testimony 

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admits of little impeachment. Tilley's testimony was based on 

objective and readily-confirmable criteria involving 

straightforward technical and legal definitions. 4 Therefore, 

cross-examination concerning Tilley's relationship with Whitten to 

elicit Tilley's bias would have had no legal bearing on Buchanan's 

guilt. 

In contrast, Whitten's testimony was admitted to show 

Buchanan's motive for conspiring to burn Huffman's trailer. 

Evidence that Whitten was romantically involved with Tiliey is 

relevant toward proving her bias against Buchanan and in favor of 

the government. Moreover, unlike that of agent Tilley, Whitten's 

testimony was not based on objective and readily-confirmable 

criteria. Because Whitten's credibility could have been impeached 

by cross-examining her about her relationship with agent Tilley, 

we must evaluate the effect of her testimony in establishing 

Buchanan's guilt. 

Buchanan was charged with the manufacture and possession of 

an unregistered firearm and conspiracy. The testimony of Elrod, 

Omstead and Bunch established that Buchanan directed the 

manufacture and delivery of an unregistered firearm, a violation 

of 26 u.s.c_. § 5861. 5 Testimony revealed that on four occasions 

4 Tilley's competance to testify concerning legal definitions 

involving a firearm was affirmed on direct appeal. Buchanan, 787 

F.2d at 483-84. 

5 Where a person is more than a mere participant in a 

transaction and has control over and is able to assure delivery, 

he need not be in actual possession to "possess" a firearm in 

violation of 26 u.s.c. § 5861. United States v. Hawke, 505 F.2d 

(footnote continued on next page} 

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( 

\ 

Buchanan affirmed the existence of the agreement to burn Huffman'·s 

trailer, a conspiracy under 18 u.s.c. § 371. The testimony of 

Elrod, Omstead and Bunch established a violation of 26 u.s.c. § 

5861 and conspiracy independently from the testimony of Whitten. 6 

Whitten's credibility therefore had only the most attenuated 

bearing on the question of Buchanan's guilt; she was not a key 

witness to the government's case. See Bonnett, 877 F.2d at 1459; 

Warhop, 732 F.2d at 778-79. 

Had the governme·nt withheld non-cumulative evidence 

impeachi~g Elrod, a different holding might prevail. Elrod was 

the linchpin connecting Buchanan to the firebombing of Huffman's 

home. However, Elrod was subjected to extensive cross-examination 

and his credibility was called into question on numerous 

occasions. The jury's decision to find Elrod and Omstead more 

credible witnesses than Buchanan therefore will not be disturbed. 

See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 388 n. 5 (1986) (credibility 

determinations cannot be made by appellate court on basis of paper 

record). Our Brady inquiry ends with our determination that the 

jury in this case had sufficient information to make a credibility 

· finding on the prosecution's key witnesses. Having been afforded 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

817, 823 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975). 

Bunch's testimony established that Buchanan anticipated the use of 

a destructive device in burning Huffman's trailer so as to support 

a violation of§ 5861. See·Buchanan, 787 F.2d at 487-88. 

6 A persqn commits a conspiracy to manufacture a firearm when 

he hires someone else to manufacture an unregistered firearm. See 

United States v. Parker, 469 F.2d 884, 894 (10th ·cir. 1972) 

(hiring two felons to manufacture molotov cocktails constitutes 

conspiracy to manufacturer unregistered firearms). 

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such information, the jury performed its required task; its 

verdict should not be second-guessed. 

In holding that the government's failure to disclose the 

Tilley-Whitten relationship did not violate Brady, we recognize 

that the sensational nature of this evidence might have affected 

the verdict. The dramatic effect of exposing a personal 

relationship between a witness and the government's investigator 

seated at counsel table throughout the trial cannot be gainsaid. 

A jury cognizant of this relationship might have ignored 

admonitions that it was only relevant to Whitten's credibility 

and, out of sympathy or disdain, returned a verdict of not guilty. 

However, Brady does not elevate such sporting theories of justice 

to constitutional principles. The withheld evidence of the 

Tilley-Whitten relationship is not material under Brady because, 

as a matter of law, it does not raise a reasonable doubt as to 

Buchanan's guilt that did not otherwise exist. We therefore hold 

that the district court erred in its ruling that Buchanan 

constitutionally is entitled to a new trial. 

Our holding should not signify approval of the government's 

conduct in this matter. Agent Tilley's conduct, in failing to 

disclose his relationship with Whitten, appears highly 

unprofessional. Although, under the unique facts of this case, 

Tilley's failure to disclose did not result in a Brady violation, 

our concern remains that the criminal justice system remain free 

from impropriety in both fact and appearance. 

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Because we hold that the district court erred in granting 

Buchanan a new trial, we need not address Buchanan's cross-appeal 

that the district court should·have set aside his conviction. 

REVERSED. 

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