Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02065/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02065-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Damion L. Tripp
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James B. Loken stepped down as Chief Judge of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at the close of business on March 31,

2010. He has been succeeded by the Honorable William Jay Riley.

2

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

3

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

__________

No. 08-2065

__________

United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

v. * Eastern District of Missouri

 *

Damion L. Tripp, * [UNPUBLISHED]

 *

Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: December 18, 2009

 Filed: April 5, 2010 

__________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge1

, BENTON, Circuit Judge, VIKEN,2 District Judge.

__________

VIKEN, District Judge.

Following his conviction for two counts of possession with intent to distribute

controlled substances, Damion Tripp appeals the district court’s3

 denial of his motions

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to suppress, to strike the jury panel, and for judgment of acquittal. Tripp also

challenges the conduct of the prosecutor during plea negotiations. We affirm.

I.

On July 5, 2006, a confidential informant (“CI”) contacted Corey Mitchell, a

narcotics officer with the Poplar Bluff, Missouri, Police Department, and Jason

Morgan, an officer with the Drug Task Force. The CI informed the officers that Tripp

and a person whom the CI knew as “Frank” were selling drugs from a residence in

Poplar Bluff, Missouri. The CI told the officers that he had purchased narcotics from

Tripp and Frank for the past year and that Tripp and Frank lived at the residence.

Officers Mitchell and Morgan met with the CI that same day. The CI told them

that he could purchase crack cocaine from Frank or Tripp, who is known as “Fat

Man.” The officers decided to conduct a controlled buy at the residence. To that end,

the officers searched the CI to ensure he was not in possession of any narcotics and

provided the CI with $40 in cash and a recording device. The officers drove the CI to

an area near the target location. The officers observed the CI enter the residence and

exit approximately three minutes later.

The CI returned to the officers’ vehicle. The CI turned over a rock of crack

cocaine, which was field tested by Officer Morgan. The rock tested positive for

cocaine base. A malfunction with the recording device rendered the recording blank.

The CI stated he purchased the crack cocaine from Frank, who had retrieved it from

a black case in his girlfriend’s purse. The CI identified Frank’s girlfriend as

“Amanda.”

Officer Mitchell prepared an affidavit detailing the information provided by the

CI and the events surrounding the controlled buy. Based on the affidavit, a state

circuit court judge issued a warrant to search the residence and to seize any controlled

substances, imitation controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, records and/or monies

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related to drug sales, and mail. Officers Mitchell and Morgan, along with other police

officers, executed the search warrant on July 13, 2006. As the officers approached the

residence, Tripp walked out onto the porch, saw the officers walking toward him, ran

back inside the residence, and shut the door. The officers pursued Tripp into the

residence and found him in the bathroom attempting to flush down the toilet several

bags of what was later identified as marijuana. Two bags of marijuana were floating

in the toilet bowl. Eight other bags of marijuana were recovered from the plumbing

of the toilet. One gallon size bag of marijuana was found on the floor of a bedroom

where Tripp kept his music equipment. 

The police seized other drugs, including what was later identified as cocaine

base, as well as a variety of drug paraphernalia located in the house. The cocaine base

was in two bags inside a size 12 Nike Shox shoe found on the floor of the bedroom

that contained Tripp’s music equipment. Also inside the Nike shoe was a small bag

of marijuana. From Tripp’s person, the police seized $875 in cash and digital scales.

Tripp was arrested and booked into the county jail. At that time, he was wearing a

pair of size 12 Nike Shox shoes.

On August 18, 2006, a federal grand jury indicted Tripp on one count of

possession with intent to distribute a substance containing fifty grams or more of

cocaine base. On March 15, 2007, the government filed a criminal information giving

notice that Tripp was subject to an enhanced sentence due to a prior felony conviction

for a drug offense. On June 21, 2007, the government filed a superseding indictment

charging Tripp with one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance

containing fifty grams or more of a cocaine base (count 1) and one count of possession

with intent to distribute a substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana

(count 2). The government also filed an amended criminal information. The

sentencing enhancement exposed Tripp to a mandatory minimum of 20 years

imprisonment on count one and a term of imprisonment not to exceed 10 years on

count two of the indictment. 

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Tripp filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from the residence

and his person and all statements made to law enforcement. Tripp argued that the

state circuit court lacked sufficient probable cause to issue the search warrant and that

Officer Mitchell’s affidavit contained false or misleading information. The magistrate

judge recommended denying Tripp’s suppression motion, finding that the affidavit did

not contain false or misleading information and that the search warrant was based on

probable cause. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation over Tripp’s objections and denied Tripp’s suppression motion.

Trial commenced on January 25, 2008. Prior to voir dire, the district court

granted Tripp a continuing objection to preserve the issues raised in his suppression

motion. During voir dire, a juror inquired as to why there were no African-Americans

present on the venire panel. The district court replied that the voter registration

records and, in some counties, driver’s license registrations were the basis for the jury

pool and that considerable effort was made to enhance diversity in the jury selection

process. The juror then asked whether Tripp could obtain a new panel based on the

fact that no African-Americans were present. The district court declined to answer

this question. During voir dire, Tripp moved to strike the all-white jury panel. The

district court denied Tripp’s motion.

Tripp orally moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s

case-in-chief and again at the close of all the evidence. The district court denied the

motions. Following a two-day trial, the jury convicted Tripp on both counts of the

superseding indictment. Tripp filed motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new

trial. The district court denied the motions. On April 28, 2008, the district court

sentenced Tripp to a term of imprisonment of 240 months on count one and 108

months on count two, with the terms to run concurrently, followed by an aggregate 

term of 10 years supervised release. The sentence included application of the

sentencing enhancement based on Tripp’s prior felony drug conviction. 

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Following the return of the jury verdict, Tripp filed a motion for new trial that

again challenged the racial composition of the jury and the inclusion of evidence

obtained during the execution of the search warrant. The district court denied the

motion. Tripp does not specifically claim on appeal that the district court erred in

denying his motion for new trial. Thus, the court will consider Tripp’s challenges

within the context of his motions to suppress and to strike the jury panel.

5

Tripp’s counsel on appeal does not join in Tripp’s challenge to the prosecutor’s

conduct.

-5-

Tripp timely appealed his conviction, alleging the following errors: (1) the

district court erred in denying his suppression motion because the search warrant

lacked probable cause;4

 (2) the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment

of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to convict him on both counts; (3)

the district erred in denying his motion to strike the all-white jury panel, thereby

violating his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial; and (4) the government violated

his Fifth Amendment right to due process by informing him that if he did not plead

guilty, the government would seek a sentencing enhancement based on a prior felony

drug conviction.5

II.

 Tripp claims the district court erred in denying his suppression motion

because the search warrant was not based on probable cause. Tripp further alleges the

affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant application contained false or

misleading statements and impermissible hearsay. When reviewing a motion to

suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its

conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Montes-Medina, 570 F.3d 1052, 1059

(8th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Hart, 544 F.3d 911, 913-14 (8th Cir. 2008),

cert. denied, __U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 2069 (2009)). We will affirm the denial of a

suppression motion “ ‘unless we find that the decision is unsupported by the evidence,

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based on an erroneous view of the law, or the Court is left with a firm conviction that

a mistake has been made.’ ” United States v. Pennington, 287 F.3d 739, 742 (8th Cir.

2002) (quoting United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 1998)). 

The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be based on probable

cause. Montes-Medina, 570 F.3d at 1059 (citing Hart, 544 F.3d at 914). Probable

cause exists if the search warrant application and affidavit “ ‘describe circumstances

showing a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a

particular place, and our duty on appeal is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a

substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” United States v. Keele,

589 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Montes-Medina, 570 F.3d at 1059)); see

also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (“The task of the issuing

magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all

the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and

‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.

And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a

‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.”) (additional

citation omitted). “Probable cause requires only a showing of fair probability, not

hard certainties.” United States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing

Gates, 462 U.S. at 231).

When the issuing court relies solely on an affidavit to establish probable cause,

only the information “ ‘found within the four corners of the affidavit may be

considered.’ ” United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 286 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting

United States v. Gladney, 48 F.3d 309, 3012 (8th Cir. 1995)). The affidavit must

provide the issuing court with a substantial basis to support a finding of probable

cause; wholly conclusory statements that the affiant “has cause to suspect and does

believe that” illegal activity is occurring “will not do.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 239

(internal quotation marks and additional citation omitted). The affidavit for a search

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warrant should be examined using a common-sense, non-technical approach.

Hudspeth, 525 F.3d at 674 (citing United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627, 631 (8th Cir.

2007)). Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether

information provided by a confidential informant is reliable so as to support a finding

of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34. A reviewing court should afford great

deference to the probable cause determination of the issuing judge. Hudspeth, 525

F.3d at 674 (citing Grant, 490 F.3d at 632). 

We conclude that Officer Mitchell’s affidavit was sufficient to establish

probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. An affidavit based on hearsay

“is not to be deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial basis for

crediting the hearsay is presented.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-42 (internal quotation

marks and additional citation omitted). The CI’s information was based on his

firsthand knowledge. He informed the officers that he had been purchasing crack

cocaine from “Fat Man” and Frank for the past year and described the house in

question with particularity. These facts afford his tip greater weight. See id. at 234

(noting that, even if an informant’s motives are in question, his “explicit and detailed

description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed

first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight . . .”). The CI’s tip was against his penal

interest as it implicated him in criminal activity, a fact which bolsters his credibility.

See Pennington, 287 F.3d at 742-43 (finding of probable cause was supported by the

fact that the CI implicated himself in criminal activity by cooperating with law

enforcement). Most important, Officers Morgan and Mitchell independently

corroborated the CI’s information by arranging and monitoring a controlled buy from

Tripp’s residence. See id. at 742 (finding that officers reliably corroborated the

CI’s information regarding the manufacture and distribution of narcotics at

defendant’s farm by arranging and monitoring a controlled buy at the farm).

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Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

-8-

Tripp concedes he is not entitled to a Franks6

 hearing, yet still asserts that the

affidavit contained false and misleading statements. Tripp claims that, at his

preliminary hearing, Officers Mitchell and Morgan falsely testified that Tripp was

present at the house when the controlled buy occurred. Tripp alleges the officers

failed to inform him they had conducted a controlled buy and obtained a search

warrant. Tripp argues the officers should have recorded the controlled buy or should

have arrested Frank or Frank’s girlfriend to verify the CI’s information. Tripp claims

the officers failed to verify the existence of the purse from which Frank obtained the

rock cocaine. Tripp alleges the officers made no attempt to verify the CI’s statement

that he had purchased drugs from Tripp and Frank over a one year period. Finally,

Tripp challenges the fact that the CI never testified in this case, making the CI’s

statements hearsay. We find these allegations to be without merit. The district court

did not err in denying Tripp’s suppression motion. 

III.

Tripp claims the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment of

acquittal. Tripp challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions

on both counts of the superseding indictment. With respect to count one, Tripp

argues the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in

constructive possession of the cocaine base. With respect to count two, Tripp argues

the evidence should have been suppressed. We review a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence de novo, “consider[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in the Government’s favor.”

United States v. Coleman, 584 F.3d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing United States

v. Ironi, 525 F.3d 683, 689-90 (8th Cir. 2008); and United States v. McAtee, 481 F.3d

1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 2007)). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or re-weigh

the evidence, and we will reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing United States v. Santana, 524

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F.3d 851, 853 (8th Cir. 2008)); see also United States v. Castro-Gaxiola, 479 F.3d

579, 581 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The verdict is upheld if any interpretation of the evidence

could lead a reasonable jury to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”)

(citing United States v. Armstrong, 253 F.3d 335, 336 (8th Cir. 2001)). Because the

standard of review is strict, we will not “lightly overturn” a jury’s verdict. CastroGaxiola, 479 F.3d at 581 (citing United States v. Cruz, 285 F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir.

2002)).

Tripp cannot satisfy this high burden. Because we hold the district court did not

err in denying Tripp’s suppression motion, Tripp’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence with respect to count two must fail. Further, we find the evidence is

sufficient to support Tripp’s conviction regarding count one. Officers seized the

cocaine base from two bags located inside a size 12 Nike Shox shoe, the same size and

style worn by Tripp. The shoe containing drugs was on the floor of a bedroom in

which Tripp stored his music equipment. Tripp made incriminating statements to law

enforcement regarding the cocaine base. From Tripp’s person, police seized a digital

scale with visible white residue. As part of his defense, Tripp theorized the cocaine

base could have belonged to Frank or Frank’s girlfriend. The jury rejected this

argument in light of the substantial evidence establishing constructive possession. We

will not disturb the jury’s verdict. The district court did not err in denying Tripp’s

motions for judgment of acquittal.

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Tripp does not allege a violation of the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28

U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869. Even if he had, he would be barred from pursuing such a claim

because he failed to object to the venire panel before voir dire began. See United

States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e);

United States v. Geelan, 509 F.2d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1974)). Tripp is not barred from

raising a constitutional challenge to the jury selection process. See id. (citing 28

U.S.C. § 1867(e)). 

-10-

IV.

Tripp claims the district court erred in denying his motion to strike the all-white

jury venire and that this error violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.7

 “ ‘The

Constitution does not guarantee a defendant a proportionate number of his racial

group on the jury panel or the jury which tries him; it merely prohibits deliberate

exclusion of an identifiable racial group from the juror selection process.’ ” United

States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v.

Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1977)). The Supreme Court has held that “

‘petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the 

community’ ” in that “ ‘jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which

juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community

and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.’ ” Duren v. Missouri, 439

U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).

The Duren Court set forth the standard by which a defendant may constitutionally

challenge the jury selection process: 

In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section

requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be

excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the

representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is

not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the

community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic

exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.

Id. at 364.

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Tripp concedes he “does not know” if the underrepresentation of AfricanAmericans in the venire panel was due to a systematic exclusion of the group or “just

by mere coincidence.” Tripp argues the standard is “far too high and that no litigant

is going to be able to show a systematic exclusion of a group or race.” Tripp claims

it is impractical to expect a litigant to research the jury pool and urges this court to

“reassess its current state of the law.”

Tripp’s challenge to the composition of the jury venire is without merit. Even

assuming the first two requirements of the Duren test have been met, Tripp has

presented no evidence to satisfy the third requirement. Absent such evidence, Tripp

cannot make a showing of a constitutional violation. See Jones, 687 F.2d at 1269-70.

Further, this court lacks the authority or discretion to alter binding Supreme Court

precedent. The district court did not err in denying Tripp’s motion to strike the jury

panel.

V.

Finally, Tripp alleges the government violated his Fifth Amendment right to

due process by engaging in vindictive prosecution. Tripp says the prosecutor

informed defense counsel that he would not seek a sentencing enhancement if Tripp

pled guilty. Tripp argues the prosecutor punished him for exercising his right to a jury

trial by seeking a sentencing enhancement.

A defendant cannot be punished for exercising a protected statutory or

constitutional right. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982). “To punish

a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process

violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” Id. (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,

363 (1978)). A defendant can establish prosecutorial vindictiveness through objective

evidence that the prosecutor’s actions were intended to punish the defendant for

exercising a legal right. United States v. Campbell, 410 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 2005)

(citing United States v. Rodgers, 18 F.3d 1425, 1429 (8th Cir. 1994)). Alternatively,

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a defendant is entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness “where there exists a

reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness, which may arise when prosecutors increase

the number or severity of charges.” Id. (citing Rodgers, 18 F.3d at 1429-30). The

presumption of vindictiveness applies only in rare circumstances. Id. at 462 (citing

United States v. Kriens, 270 F.3d 597, 602 (8th Cir. 2001)). The burden is on the

defendant to show that the prosecution took action to punish the defendant for

exercising a legal right. Id. at 461 (citing United States v. Leathers, 354 F.3d 955, 961

(8th Cir. 2004)).

“[I]n the ‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining, there is no such element of

punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the

prosecution’s offer.” Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363. The Supreme Court has

recognized plea negotiation as a legitimate process:

While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment

clearly may have a “discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of

his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an

inevitable”-and permissible-“attribute of any legitimate system which

tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.” It follows that, by

tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has

necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that

the prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the

defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty.

It is not disputed here that [the defendant] was properly chargeable under

the recidivist statute, since he had in fact been convicted of two previous

felonies. In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to

believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the

decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring

before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. Within the

limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of

chargeable offenses, “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in

enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” so long as

“the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard

such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” To hold that the

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prosecutor’s desire to induce a guilty plea is an “unjustifiable standard,”

which, like race or religion, may play no part in his charging decision,

would contradict the very premises that underlie the concept of plea

bargaining itself. Moreover, a rigid constitutional rule that would

prohibit a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in his dealings with the

defense could only invite unhealthy subterfuge that would drive the

practice of plea bargaining back into the shadows from which it has so

recently emerged.

Id. at 364-65 (internal citations omitted).

Here, as in Bordenkircher, the prosecution sought to persuade Tripp to accept

a plea agreement by offering lenient treatment. In Bordenkircher, the prosecution

offered to refrain from bringing additional charges under the state career offender

statute in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea. The additional charges were

wholly warranted by the evidence. Here, the prosecution offered to refrain from

seeking a sentencing enhancement if Tripp entered a guilty plea. Again, the evidence

fully supports the enhancement, and Tripp does not allege the enhancement was not

objectively reasonable. See Campbell, 410 F.3d at 462 (noting there can be no

prosecutorial vindictiveness if the prosecutor’s decision was based on some objective

reason other than to punish the defendant for exercising his legal rights). In both

cases, plea negotiations were unsuccessful, and the defendants faced higher penalties

after trial. In neither case was a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness

warranted. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382-83 (“[T]he mere fact that a defendant

refuses to plead guilty and forces the government to prove its case is insufficient to

warrant a presumption that subsequent changes in the charging decision are

unjustified.”). We find the prosecution did not engage in prosecutorial vindictiveness.

The course of conduct engaged in by the prosecution was no more than openly

presenting Tripp with the choice of forgoing trial or facing a sentencing enhancement

to which he was plainly subject. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365. This commonlyused plea bargaining technique did not violate Tripp’s right to due process.

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VI.

Accordingly, we affirm Tripp’s conviction.

 ______________________________ 

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