Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02318/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02318-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bellfontaine Habilitation Center
Appellee
Jennifer Miles
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2318

___________

Jennifer Miles, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Bellfontaine Habilitation Center, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 6, 2007

Filed: April 12, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, HANSEN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Jennifer Miles (Miles) appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her pro se

Title VII employment discrimination and Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)

action against Bellefontaine Habilitation Center (the Center). Upon de novo review,

see Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Thomas v.

FAG Bearings Corp., 50 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 1995), we affirm in part and reverse

in part.

The district court properly dismissed with prejudice Miles’s FMLA claim,

which was brought under FMLA’s self-care provisions. As an agency of the state of

Missouri, see Mo. Const. art. IV, § 12; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 630.003.1, .5, the Center is

Appellate Case: 06-2318 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/12/2007 Entry ID: 3298081
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entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the claim, see Townsel v. Missouri,

233 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000), overruled in part by Nev. Dep’t of Human Res.

v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735-37 (2003); cf. Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs.,

342 F.3d 1159, 1164, 1165 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003) (construing effect of Hibbs and

concluding immunity was not abrogated for self-care under FMLA).

We conclude, however, the district court improperly dismissed Miles’s Title VII

claim for failure to plead sufficiently she had exhausted her administrative remedies.

Miles’s complaint needed only to contain a “short and plain statement” establishing

the court’s jurisdiction and her entitlement to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While

Miles was required to exhaust her administrative remedies with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) before bringing suit, see Williams v.

Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994), failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that a defendant must prove, see

Miller v. Runyon, 32 F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1994). Miles stated in her form

complaint she filed a charge with the EEOC concerning the alleged discrimination and

retaliation described in her complaint, and she attached a right-to-sue letter the EEOC

issued in January 2006. Defendant’s motion to dismiss did not challenge this

statement. We know of no authority requiring Miles to attach her EEOC charge to her

complaint, or to provide additional support for her unchallenged complaint

allegations.

Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of Miles’s Title VII claim and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-2318 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/12/2007 Entry ID: 3298081