Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-24-05149/USCOURTS-ca10-24-05149-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randall Travis Green
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

In re: RANDALL TRAVIS GREEN, 

 Movant. No. 24-5149

(D.C. No. 4:09-CV-00480-TCK-TLW)

(N.D. Okla.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, KELLY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Randall Travis Green, an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se, moves for 

authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application 

challenging Counts VI-VIII (rape and sodomy) of his 2006 convictions in Rogers County 

District Court Case No. CF-2006-26. We deny authorization.

Green already has pursued relief under § 2254 with regard to these convictions. 

See Green v. Addison, 613 F. App’x 704 (10th Cir. 2015). He therefore must obtain this 

court’s authorization before he can file another § 2254 application in the district court. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). “A claim presented in a second or successive habeas 

corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be 

dismissed,” § 2244(b)(1), and thus will not be authorized, see In re Jones, 847 F.3d 1293, 

1294 n.2 (10th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“To meet the gatekeeping requirements, [a] claim 

also must not have been presented in an earlier federal habeas petition.”). For claims that 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

January 8, 2025

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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were not presented in a prior application, Green must make a prima facie showing, 

§ 2244(b)(3)(C), that:

(A) . . . the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 

previously unavailable; or 

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 

previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the 

evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

§ 2244(b)(2).

Green proceeds under § 2244(b)(2)(B), alleging that he has newly discovered 

evidence of his innocence in the form of an affidavit he received on November 2, 2023,

from Jeffrey Peppers, who is the brother of Green’s fiancée. The affidavit states that 

Peppers was with Green on the date of the charged crimes; they “went to a house where 

[Green] thought he may have dropped his wallet,” where two girls were present; and “[a]t 

no time did [Green] have any type of physical contact, sexual or otherwise, with either of 

the girls.” Mot. for Auth., Attach. 7 at 1. Peppers states that he “was with [Green] the 

whole time and would have seen him and would have had a problem with [Green] 

cheating on [his] sister.” Id. He further states that he was never contacted by an attorney 

working for Green, and that he would have testified for Green if he had been asked to do 

so. Green’s proposed claims are that: (1) he is actually innocent of Counts VI-VIII; 

(2) his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and speak 

with Peppers; (3) the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony at trial; and 

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(4) the prosecution coerced the victims into giving false testimony so that Counts VI-VIII 

could be joined for trial with Counts I-V, depriving Green of a fair trial. 

Some of the proposed claims duplicate claims Green presented in his first § 2254 

application, in which he alleged that his convictions rested upon the perjured testimony of 

the victims, the prosecution coerced that testimony, and his appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue those points. See Mot. for Auth., Attach. 1 at 7-8; 

see also Green, 613 F. App’x at 705. Green concedes as much by arguing in his motion 

for authorization that Peppers’ affidavit undermines the denial of relief in his first § 2254 

proceeding. But he cannot pursue previously presented claims, see § 2244(b)(1); Jones, 

847 F.3d at 1294 n.2, and we deny authorization for all such claims.

To the extent some of the proposed claims were not previously presented, Green 

fails to show that “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 

previously through the exercise of due diligence,” as required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). The 

factual predicates for Green’s claims are that (1) Peppers was an eyewitness to the events, 

(2) Peppers’ testimony would favor Green, (3) counsel did not call Peppers as a witness

at trial, and (4) counsel did not contact Peppers. The first three predicates were known to 

Green, at the latest, by the end of the trial. And although Green argues that he did not

know his counsel never contacted Peppers until he received Peppers’ affidavit, he fails to 

show that he could not have discovered that information previously, had he used due 

diligence. For example, Green does not explain whether he ever asked his counsel what 

counsel did to investigate or contact Peppers before trial or why Peppers was not a 

witness for Green at trial. 

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The motion for authorization is denied. This denial of authorization “shall not be 

appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of 

certiorari.” § 2244(b)(3)(E).

Entered for the Court

CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

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