Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-19-01290/USCOURTS-ca4-19-01290-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
SAS Institute, Inc.
Appellee
World Programming Limited
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-1290

SAS INSTITUTE, INC.

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

WORLD PROGRAMMING LIMITED,

 Defendant – Appellant,

No. 19-1300

SAS INSTITUTE, INC.,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

WORLD PROGRAMMING LIMITED,

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:10-cv-00025-FL)

Argued: January 31, 2020 Decided: March 12, 2020

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Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee 

and Judge Thacker joined.

ARGUED: Jeffrey A. Lamken, MOLOLAMKEN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. 

Pressly McAuley Millen, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael G. Pattillo, Jr., James A. Barta, Caleb 

Hayes-Deats, MOLOLAMKEN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Raymond M. 

Bennett, Samuel B. Hartzell, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we affirm the district court’s grant of two complementary injunctions

issued pursuant to its All Writs Act authority. While we take the occasion to express our 

respect for the judicial system and judges of the United Kingdom, the district court here 

needed to ensure that a money judgment reached in an American court under American

law—based on damages incurred in America—was not rendered meaningless. The court 

chose to enforce its judgment in the most measured terms, concentrating on the litigants’

U.S. conduct and collection efforts. Failing to take even these modest steps would have 

encouraged any foreign company and country to undermine the finality of a U.S. judgment.

I.

Litigation between WPL and SAS, stemming from conduct dating back to 2003, has 

stretched on for over a decade. It has spanned courts in England, North Carolina, and 

California. Twice before, in 2012 and 2017, the parties have come before this court. SAS 

Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 874 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter 

SAS-2017]; SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 468 F. App’x 264 (4th Cir. 2012)

(per curiam). Given this case’s extensive history, only facts relevant to this appeal are set 

forth below.

A.

World Programming Limited (WPL), a U.K. company, and SAS Institute, a U.S.

company, are software developers that compete in the market for statistical analysis

software. Each company’s software works by running applications that users have written 

in a computer programming language developed by SAS.

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SAS has offered an integrated system of software products for decades. In 2003, 

newly formed WPL decided to launch a competing product, which it called “World 

Programming System” or “WPS.” To aid development, WPL acquired copies of SAS 

software and studied how it functioned. Specifically, “[d]evelopers at WPL ran SAS 

programs through both [SAS software] and WPS, and then modified WPS’s code to make 

the two achieve more similar outputs.” SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 376. When WPL installed

the SAS software, it had clicked “Yes” to indicate it would comply with SAS’s license 

agreement prohibiting “reverse engineering” and allowing only “non-production” use of 

the software. Id.

B.

In September 2009, SAS filed suit against WPL in the U.K. High Court of Justice. 

SAS brought claims for breach of contract, based on WPL’s alleged violation of its 

software license agreement, and for copyright infringement of its software. The U.K. High 

Court ruled in WPL’s favor. It rejected SAS’s copyright claim because, under the European 

Union Software Directive, functionalities of a computer program cannot be copyrighted. 

And, relying on the same Directive, it dismissed SAS’s breach of contract claim because 

“a licensee is entitled . . . to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element 

of the program” and any contrary license provisions are nullified. SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 

376-77; see also J.A. 382-83, 397. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales affirmed, 

and the U.K. judgment became final in July 2014. 

In January 2010, several months after initiating the U.K. litigation, SAS filed suit 

against WPL in the Eastern District of North Carolina. As in the U.K. litigation, SAS 

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brought claims for breach of contract and copyright infringement. In addition, it asserted 

claims against WPL for fraudulent inducement in obtaining SAS software, tortious 

interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective business advantage, and 

violation of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA). After 

cross-cutting motions for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed SAS’s copyright 

and tortious interference claims but found WPL liable for breach of contract. Further, the 

court held that the U.K. litigation did not have a preclusive effect upon the U.S. litigation. 

In September 2015, the U.S. litigation proceeded to trial on SAS’s remaining claims 

for fraudulent inducement and violation of the UDTPA, and for the calculation of damages 

from WPL’s breach of the license agreement. A jury found WPL guilty of both fraudulent 

inducement and violating the UDTPA. It awarded SAS compensatory damages of $26.4 

million, which were trebled under the UDTPA, resulting in total damages of $79.1 million. 

The compensatory damage figure included both realized lost profits—based on specific 

U.S. customers who switched from SAS to WPL before trial—and expected lost future 

profits stemming from those same customers. The following year, the trial court denied a 

motion by SAS seeking a permanent injunction “barring the continuing marketing, selling, 

or licensing” of WPS “for use in the United States.” J.A. 488-89 (quotation omitted).

Both parties appealed to this court. Relevant here, WPL appealed the trial court’s 

holding that the U.S. litigation was not precluded by the U.K. litigation, while SAS 

appealed the court’s denial of injunctive relief. We affirmed the trial court on these claims.

We agreed that the U.K. litigation did not have a preclusive effect, given the “many legal 

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and factual differences between the U.K. litigation and the present [U.S.] suit.” SAS-2017, 

874 F.3d at 378-79.

In addition, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of a permanent injunction. In doing 

so, we rejected SAS’s concerns about the judgment’s collectability as speculative. At that 

point, there was no reason to believe that a $79 million monetary judgment in SAS’s favor 

was an inadequate remedy for harm suffered. We also expressed concern that the requested

injunction would lower WPL’s sales and thus “frustrate, rather than facilitate, [its] ability 

to pay damages.” SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 387.

C.

After this court’s decision was handed down, SAS sought enforcement of the 

compensatory portion of the U.S. judgment in the U.K. WPL opposed enforcement and 

brought counterclaims under the United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act (the 

“PTIA”) to recover any sums SAS collected tied to non-compensatory damages.

Soon after SAS initiated the U.K. enforcement proceedings, it brought additional 

enforcement proceedings in the Central District of California. The California district court 

granted an order “providing for direct assignment to SAS of rights to payment from 

specified WPL customers located anywhere in the world, except in the United Kingdom, 

until [the U.S.] judgment is satisfied,” (the “assignment order”). SAS Inst., Inc. v. World 

Programming Ltd., No. 5:10-CV-25-FL, 2019 WL 1447472, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 

2019) [hereinafter SAS-2019]; see also J.A. 3135. WPL appealed the assignment order to 

the Ninth Circuit. 

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Meanwhile, SAS filed in California district court another motion for a new order 

obligating “WPL to turn over all income received from customers located worldwide, 

except in the United Kingdom,” (the “turnover order”). SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at 

*3. The district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order due to WPL’s appeal, but stated 

it would do so if the Ninth Circuit allowed limited remand. SAS moved for limited remand, 

but, before the Ninth Circuit responded, a U.K. court issued a judgment in favor of WPL. 

The U.K. court declined to enforce any portion of the U.S. judgment. Further, the 

court ordered that WPL could recover two-thirds of any amount it paid towards the U.S.

judgment, corresponding to the non-compensatory portion of damages (the “U.K.

clawback order”). Clawback could occur even though SAS had “not yet recovered more 

than the compensatory damages awarded.” J.A. 1030.

The week after the U.K. court issued its judgment, it entered an anti-suit injunction

requiring SAS to take certain actions in the United States but forbidding others (the “U.K.

injunction”). For instance, the U.K. court ordered SAS to “take all reasonable steps” to 

prevent entry of the turnover order in California. J.A. 1035. It forbade SAS from seeking—

in the United States—an anti-anti-suit injunction or similar relief designed to protect the 

U.S. judgment and the California collection proceedings. The injunction threatened 

criminal sanctions if SAS disobeyed:

PENAL NOTICE

IF YOU, SAS INSTITUTE INC., DISOBEY THIS ORDER YOU MAY 

BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND YOU MAY BE 

FINED AND HAVE YOUR ASSETS SEIZED AND ANY OF YOUR 

DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, REPRESENTATIVES OR 

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AGENTS MAY BE IMPRISONED, FINED OR HAVE THEIR 

ASSETS SEIZED.

J.A. 1031. SAS stayed its motion to the Ninth Circuit to comply with the U.K. injunction. 

In January 2019, soon after the U.K. injunction was issued, SAS filed an emergency 

motion for injunctive relief in the Eastern District of North Carolina. SAS requested that 

the district court enjoin WPL from licensing its software for use in the U.S. until monetary 

damages were paid. Alternatively, SAS requested a narrower injunction preventing WPL 

from licensing its software to new customers for use in the U.S. until the judgment was 

satisfied. The district court granted SAS’s emergency motion and temporarily issued the 

narrower injunction prohibiting licensing to new customers. 

WPL moved to have the injunction lifted. At a February 2019 hearing with the 

parties to discuss injunctive relief, the district court stated sua sponte that “no money 

collected in the United States or originating in the United States is subject to the claw 

back.” J.A. 1238. Later that day, it reiterated in an order “that no sum previously collected 

or to be collected by [SAS] in the United States is subject to payment to [WPL] on the basis 

of the [PTIA],” (the “anti-clawback injunction”). J.A. 1184-85. Further, the court declined 

to lift the injunctive relief prohibiting WPL from licensing its product to new customers 

for U.S. use.

In March 2019, after an additional hearing, the district court issued a permanent

injunction prohibiting WPL “from licensing WPS to any new customer for use within the 

United States,” (the “U.S. expansion injunction”). SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *18

(internal quotation marks omitted). This injunction would lift automatically once WPL 

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satisfied the money judgment. The court held that the All Writs Act (the “AWA”) and Rule 

60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided alternate bases for its relief.1

Relying on the AWA, the district court found that—in light of WPL’s actions in the 

English courts—the U.S. expansion injunction was necessary to protect the U.S. judgment. 

First, WPL’s seeking the U.K. clawback order was an “affront” to the U.S. judgment, 

amounting to a collateral attack on the total monetary damage figure when SAS had not 

received “even a fraction of compensatory damages due.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472,

at *13. Second, the U.K. injunction obtained by WPL undermined enforcement of the U.S. 

judgment by “reach[ing] directly into proceedings in the United States” and “prevent[ing] 

SAS from seeking the full panoply of judgment collection tools” available. Id. at *10-11. 

Given WPL’s actions, the court held that failing to provide injunctive relief would not 

“effectuate [its] judgment or promote the interests of justice.” Id. at *14. 

In its holding, the district court reiterated that the anti-clawback injunction remained 

in effect as necessary AWA relief that would “serve to enforce aspects of th[e] court’s

judgment and orders in favor of [SAS].” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *9. The grounds 

for this relief were similar to the grounds for the U.S. expansion injunction. The court noted 

WPL’s attempts to frustrate its judgment by seeking U.K. clawbacks of U.S. collections,

while simultaneously limiting SAS’s ability to access the U.S. courts. Further, it found that 

 1 Because we hold that the U.S. expansion injunction was authorized under the 

district court’s AWA authority, we do not reach or discuss its alternate holding that Rule 

60 provides grounds for relief. 

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WPL’s actions conflicted with its earlier representation that it would hand over 100% of 

revenues from U.S.-based customers to SAS. 

WPL appeals the district court’s grant of the U.S. expansion injunction and 

anti-clawback injunction. 

II.

This court previously declined to issue an injunction impacting WPL’s United States

licensing, based on an expectation that WPL would devote some portion of its revenues to 

satisfaction of the U.S. judgment. SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 386-88. In a way, we cut WPL a 

break; the absence of an injunction was intended to help WPL earn additional revenues

from U.S. operations that it could use towards the judgment. Things did not go as planned.

Since the case was last before this court, WPL has tried to evade, in every way and at every 

turn, using any revenues for satisfaction of the U.S. judgment. This left the district court 

with limited options—but options it needed to exercise in order to prevent its judgment 

from being rendered completely hollow.

A.

The All Writs Act grants federal courts the authority to “issue all writs necessary or 

appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles

of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Of particular relevance in the case at hand, a court may rely 

on the AWA to issue injunctions designed to prevent “collateral attack of its judgments,” 

In re March, 988 F.2d 498, 500 (4th Cir. 1993), and “frustration of orders it has previously 

issued,” United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977).

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The rationale behind the AWA’s broad grant of authority is clear. “[The AWA] is a 

codification of the federal courts’ traditional, inherent power to protect the jurisdiction they 

already have.” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (11th Cir. 

2004). If courts lacked the ability to enforce their judgments, “the judicial power would be 

incomplete and entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the 

Constitution.” Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356 (1996) (quotation omitted).

B.

Despite a complicated procedural history stemming from years of litigation, the case 

before us is straightforward. WPL, a foreign company doing business in the United States,

has attempted to evade a U.S. judgment. Instead of making a good-faith effort to pay up, 

WPL has repeatedly engaged in collateral attacks on the district court’s judgment by calling 

upon the U.K. court system. So far, its tactics have been successful. To date, WPL has only 

paid a small fraction of the judgment, and it is attempting to undo even that much. 

The district court could not allow WPL’s evasion to continue. One need look no 

further than the extensiveness of WPL’s attack on the U.S. judgment to see why the court’s 

two injunctions were necessary. 

Although founded in the U.K., WPL is a company “doing business in America” 

subject to “American law in American courts.” Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian 

World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1984). WPL violated North Carolina law by 

using SAS software to create a competing product in breach of a license agreement. A jury 

in North Carolina set compensatory damages at $26.4 million, based solely on harm SAS 

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incurred from lost U.S. customers and revenues. Under North Carolina law, these 

compensatory damages were trebled to total damages of $79.1 million. 

After obtaining the U.S. judgment, SAS set about to collect on it—as it had every 

right to do. SAS commenced an enforcement action in the Central District of California 

and received the assignment order assigning to SAS “WPL’s right to payments from” 

specified non-U.K. customers “until such a time as the North Carolina judgment in the 

amount of $79,129,905.00 is fully satisfied.” J.A. 3135; see also SAS-2019, 2019 WL 

1447472, at *2. 

Unhappy with the pace of collections and possessing evidence to suggest that WPL 

instructed customers to disregard the assignment order, SAS moved for entry of the 

turnover order obligating WPL to deliver to SAS “all income received from customers 

located worldwide, except in the United Kingdom.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *3. 

Rather than challenge SAS’s efforts in the Ninth Circuit, WPL turned to the English courts 

and engaged in a two-pronged attack on the U.S. judgment. 

First, WPL attacked the U.S. judgment by requesting to claw back two-thirds of 

SAS’s collections—corresponding to the non-compensatory portion of damages. A U.K. 

court granted this relief under the PTIA, even though WPL had “not yet paid sums 

exceeding the value of the compensatory part of the [U.S.] judgment.” J.A. 1026-30; see 

also SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *4. By seeking and receiving the U.K. clawback

order, WPL fundamentally altered the U.S. judgment. Practically speaking, WPL 

relitigated the U.S. damage amount, lowering it by two-thirds. What’s more, SAS would 

need to collect the full $79 million to retain the $26 million in compensatory damages.

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Second, WPL sought relief designed to interfere with the California collection 

proceedings. Its efforts were successful. A U.K. court granted an injunction preventing 

SAS from pursuing normal collection efforts “in this country, the country of origin of the 

judgment at issue.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *11. The U.K. injunction forbade 

SAS from pursuing entry of the turnover order. It explicitly directed SAS not to file a brief 

with the Ninth Circuit due that very day. It limited SAS’s ability to enforce aspects of the 

assignment order that WPL did not challenge. It broadly prohibited SAS from seeking an 

anti-anti-suit injunction or similar relief related to either the California or North Carolina 

proceedings. Finally, the U.K. injunction warned of criminal sanctions if SAS did not 

comply, a serious threat since SAS has around 637 employees in the U.K., J.A. 2715, and 

“none of those employees wants to go to jail,” J.A. 1257. 

The U.K. injunction’s impact on U.S. collections was immediate. SAS’s already 

slow collection efforts were halted in their tracks. In the three months before the U.K. 

injunction was issued, SAS collected $623,886 under the assignment order. J.A. 2311-12. 

Over the following two months, collections dropped to under $40,000. J.A. 2311-12. 

Despite WPL’s initial representations that the decrease was due to slow sales during a 

“quiet period,” J.A. 1210-11, 1237, the district court discovered that WPL “got almost 

$600,000 during that period and kept it,” J.A. 2849-51. WPL had simply stopped paying 

“amounts subject to unchallenged portions of the California court’s assignment order.” 

SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *11.

As a result of the U.K. injunction, SAS was left with few options to collect on the 

U.S. judgment if WPL engaged in further evasive measures. As the district court noted: 

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Indeed, prior to filing of the instant motion and imposition of AWA relief by 

this court, with the UK injunction in place, SAS had at its disposal no 

mechanism to prevent WPL from transferring sums received from United 

States-based customers to accounts in the United Kingdom, from altering 

licensing terms to direct payments to accounts in the United Kingdom, from 

communicating directly with customers special instructions for transmitting 

payments, or from taking any other actions in the United Kingdom to avoid 

paying sums to SAS.

SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *11.

The combined impact of WPL’s actions was particularly destructive. The U.K. 

injunction undermined SAS’s ability to enforce the U.S. judgment, while the U.K.

clawback order attempted to undo SAS’s limited collection success. At the time the district 

court issued its injunctions, SAS had collected $6 million, the majority of which came from 

one-time court ordered payments rather than normal collection efforts. J.A. 962-63, 

1270-73.

2 While not a small amount, $6 million represents only a fraction of the $79 

million judgment. The district court calculated that, if nothing changed, it would take 36 

years for WPL to satisfy the $79 million judgment. J.A. 2916-17. Further, if two-thirds of 

collections were subject to clawback in the U.K., it would take SAS 36 years to recover 

compensatory damages alone.

While the description above may not cover the entirety of WPL’s evasive efforts, it 

demonstrates the situation facing the district court. Collections had all but stopped and were 

 2 WPL alleges that SAS has now collected $8 million of the judgment. Oral 

Argument Audio at 3:30-3:45, SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., Nos. 19-1290, 

19-1300 (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2020). Even if accurate, this updated figure does not alter our 

conclusion that the injunctions were, and are, sound. It still represents a small portion of 

the total damage figure, and it does not account for potential U.K. clawbacks. Further, to 

the extent collections have sped up in recent months, this seems primarily to indicate that 

the district court’s injunctions are working as intended.

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in danger of being undone. An immediate response was required, so the district court turned 

to the anti-clawback injunction and the U.S. expansion injunction. We examine each in 

turn.

III.

As noted above, the anti-clawback injunction provides that “no sum previously 

collected or to be collected by [SAS] in the United States is subject to payment to [WPL] 

on the basis of the [PTIA].” J.A. 1185. WPL argues that the anti-clawback injunction 

cannot stand because it exceeds the court’s AWA authority, violates principles of comity, 

and suffers procedural flaws. We review the district court’s issuance of this injunction for

abuse of discretion. In re March, 988 F.2d 498, 499-500 (4th Cir. 1993). “A district court

abuses its discretion if it relies on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding.” 

SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 384 (quotation omitted). We conclude that no abuse of discretion 

occurred here. The anti-clawback injunction falls within the court’s AWA authority, 

respects comity, and is procedurally sound.

A.

The district court was faced with a daunting situation: its judgment was under 

sustained collateral attack. WPL utilized the English courts to undermine SAS’s ability to 

enforce the judgment in U.S. courts. It obtained authorization to claw back two-thirds of 

SAS’s collections, effectively lowering the U.S. judgment and threatening to shift 

collections into reverse. Given this predicament, the district court was well within its rights 

to issue an injunction preventing U.K. clawbacks of U.S. collections. Consistent with the

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court’s AWA authority, the injunction protects SAS’s ability “to collect the entire amount 

of the [U.S.] judgment.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *9.

Although WPL raises several objections to the district court’s issuance of the 

anti-clawback injunction, none are persuasive. To start, WPL attempts to characterize the 

seminal case Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984), as mandating that U.S. courts tolerate PTIA clawbacks. Laker Airways requires 

no such thing. Although the court there acknowledged that U.K. courts could order

repayment of non-compensatory damages under the PTIA, a factual truism, it did not 

address whether a U.S. court could issue an anti-clawback injunction in response. 

Crucially, the district court’s anti-clawback injunction is consistent with Laker Airways’ 

holding that injunctive relief is appropriate when faced with attempts “to frustrate the 

enforcement of American law in American courts against companies doing business in 

America.” 731 F.2d at 940.

Relatedly, WPL argues that it did not relitigate, attack, or alter the district court’s 

judgment by seeking clawbacks in the U.K., but rather “took independent action under a 

U.K. statute that created a counterclaim in the U.K.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 26 (quotation 

omitted). This argument quickly falters. As an initial matter, it strains logic to characterize 

a proceeding as “separate and independent” of a previous proceeding when its sole purpose 

is “to vitiate” the previous judgment. See Karaha Bodas Co., v. Perusahaan Pertambangan 

Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 122, 122 n.13 (2d Cir. 2007). The weakness

of this argument is further underscored when the initial proceeding has not truly concluded 

because damages remain unpaid and, thus, the court has “an outstanding judgment to 

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protect.” See Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 

355, 368 (8th Cir. 2007). Such is the case here: by seeking U.K. clawbacks, WPL attempted

to undo two-thirds of a U.S. judgment it was not yet close to satisfying. The district court 

needed to protect its outstanding judgment.

B.

Comity does not prevent the district court’s grant of the anti-clawback injunction, 

despite WPL’s arguments to the contrary. “We approach [this] claim[] seriously, 

recognizing that comity serves our international system like the mortar which cements 

together a brick house.” Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937. Still, we recognize that “a

domestic forum is not compelled to acquiesce in pre- or postjudgment conduct by litigants 

which frustrates the significant policies of the domestic forum.” Id. at 915.

North Carolina, and the United States more generally, has a policy of allowing 

non-compensatory damages. North Carolina’s UDTPA, which resulted in the trebled 

damages here, “has at least three major purposes”:

(1) to serve as an incentive for injured private individuals to ferret out 

fraudulent and deceptive trade practices, and by so doing, to assist the State 

in enforcing the act’s prohibitions; (2) to provide a remedy for those injured 

by way of unfair and deceptive trade practices; and (3) to serve as a deterrent 

against future violations of the statute.

Caldwell v. Smith, 692 S.E.2d 483, 485 (2010) (quotation omitted). WPL undermined these

policies when it used the English courts to impede U.S. collection efforts and obtain

clawbacks of the largely unsatisfied U.S. judgment. “There never would have been any 

situation in which comity or forbearance would have become an issue if [WPL] had not 

gone into the English courts to generate interference with the American courts.” Laker 

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Airways, 731 F.2d at 939-40. Because WPL’s actions frustrated U.S. and North Carolina 

policies, comity did not require that the district court surrender enforcement of its 

judgment. 

There is an irony here. Rather than the district court’s anti-clawback injunction 

being an affront to comity, actions by WPL have shown a lack of respect for American

courts and American law. “The conflict . . . we confront today has been precipitated by the 

attempts of another country to insulate its own business entities from the necessity of 

complying with legislation of our country designed to protect this country’s domestic 

policies.” Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 955. Comity is not advanced when a foreign country

condones an action brought solely to interfere with a final U.S. judgment. See Paramedics 

Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda v. GE Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 654-55 

(2d Cir. 2004); Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 930. Nor is comity advanced when one country 

enjoins legitimate collection efforts in another country.

In contrast, the district court showed great respect for comity, limiting the impact of 

its anti-clawback injunction to sums collected in the U.S.—“monies without any nexus to 

any enforcement proceeding in the United Kingdom.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at 

*9. Comity does not advise against such measured relief.

C.

WPL also argues that the anti-clawback injunction suffered procedural defects. We 

disagree. The district court complied with procedural requirements even when WPL’s own 

actions made it difficult to do so. 

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Initially, WPL claims that it was not given the requisite “notice and an opportunity 

to be heard” before the district court issued the anti-clawback injunction sua sponte at a 

hearing. See Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 819 (4th Cir. 2004). But 

the court issued the anti-clawback injunction sua sponte because, under the U.K. 

injunction, SAS was prevented “from seeking relief from [the district] court to preserve its 

ability to keep amounts collected under th[e] court’s judgment.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 

1447472, at *10.

We provide district courts with “broad discretion” to manage the timing of 

injunctive relief, “so long as the opposing party is given a reasonable opportunity,

commensurate with the scarcity of time under the circumstances, to prepare a defense and 

advance reasons why the injunction should not issue.” Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 

312, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2000). Here, the district court went out of its way to comply with this 

requirement. It issued the anti-clawback injunction at a hearing scheduled to address

injunctive relief—after extensive discussion on the U.K. clawback order. It set another 

hearing for the following month. At the second hearing, the court discussed the 

anti-clawback injunction with WPL in some detail; WPL argued against the injunction but 

the court declined to lift it. Given WPL’s attempts to frustrate the court’s judgment, it can 

hardly claim it was without notice that the court would act to protect that judgment.

IV. 

A.

WPL next argues that the district court exceeded its AWA authority by issuing the

U.S. expansion injunction. As noted above, the injunction provides that: 

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WPL is HEREBY ENJOINED from licensing WPS to any new customer for 

use within the United States. . . . This injunction expires automatically once 

defendant / judgment debtor has satisfied the judgment in this case. 

SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *18 (internal quotation marks omitted).

WPL alleges that “[t]he injunction . . . does not protect the money judgment this 

Court previously affirmed.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 22. We disagree. Once again, we 

review the district court’s grant of injunctive relief pursuant to its AWA authority for abuse 

of discretion. In re March, 988 F.2d 498, 499-500 (4th Cir. 1993). And once more, we 

conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred. After observing WPL’s collateral attack and 

frustration of the U.S. judgment, the district court sensibly concluded that this injunction 

was necessary to incentivize WPL to satisfy, rather than evade, its judgment. 

As noted, we earlier affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief tied to 

WPL’s U.S. licensing, expressing concern that such relief would frustrate WPL’s ability to 

pay the money judgment. SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 387. WPL took no heed of our 

forbearance. It collaterally attacked the judgment by obtaining clawbacks in the U.K. It

interfered with U.S. collection proceedings and avoided collection efforts “with impunity”

because there was no mechanism short of the previously denied injunctive relief by which 

the judgment could be meaningfully satisfied. SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *11. Thus, 

the district court faced a very different situation than it did several years ago. Its concern 

was “no longer so much WPL’s ability to pay damages but rather the conditions under 

which it will pay the damages.” Id. at *16.

To create the right payment conditions, the court issued the U.S. expansion 

injunction. The injunction discourages WPL’s evasion of the U.S. judgment by ensuring 

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that its frustration strategies will no longer be painless. While WPL can continue licensing 

its software to existing customers for U.S. use, its U.S.-related operations cannot grow until 

the judgment is satisfied. People, and companies, respond to incentives. In the end, “there

must be some degree of impact upon WPL’s operations for [injunctive relief] to have any 

practical coercive effect . . . .” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *14.

The U.S. expansion injunction is narrow and carefully tailored. It is not intended to 

put WPL out of business. It does not affect WPL’s current customers. It guards against 

double recovery, since “damages attributable to WPL customers engaged after trial in this 

matter [were] not incorporated into the . . . damages awarded at trial.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 

1447472, at *16. It expires automatically once the U.S. judgment is satisfied. It does not 

foreclose the possibility of modification earlier if WPL makes good-faith payment efforts. 

Moreover, consistent with “principles of international comity,” the injunction 

“focuses on conduct in the United States and touching upon United States based 

transactions and commerce.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *13. Namely, it addresses

only licensing for use within the U.S. Finally, the injunction is consistent with the historical 

practice of allowing equitable relief necessary to protect “a creditor who had already 

obtained a [money] judgment.” Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, 

Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319-21 (1999).

As for the necessity for the U.S. expansion injunction, the court below explained it 

well:

Where WPL has removed most tools available under US collection law, and 

where the UK judgment and injunction persist, SAS must resort to its own 

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more extraordinary and coercive measures such as the instant injunction to 

compel relief from WPL.

SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *16. “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the 

power of the Chancellor . . . to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.” 

Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). Because WPL “left SAS with few choices 

for asserting relief,” it is unsurprising that SAS sought, and the district court granted, one 

of the last remaining options. SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *12.

Failing to act would have left the district court looking helpless. The court was 

“bound to implement” the “strongly mandated legislative policies” of the U.S. and North 

Carolina. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 916 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984). Had the court not granted relief, its judgment would have become virtually 

meaningless, leaving SAS dependent on WPL’s “voluntary acquiescence” to paying. 

SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *14. The court rightly held that “voluntary 

cooperation . . ., all while [SAS] is severely restricted in the tools available to it to enforce 

this court’s judgment,” was no longer sufficient given WPL’s evasive maneuvers. Id. The 

court did not abuse its discretion by issuing an injunction necessary to protect its judgment. 

B.

The parties disagree on whether the U.S. expansion injunction, issued pursuant to 

the district court’s AWA authority, must satisfy the four-factor test traditionally required 

for injunctive relief. While there is strong support for the view that these factors “are 

pertinent in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief,” including AWA relief, we 

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need not settle this issue at present. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 

32 (2008). If the traditional equitable analysis applies, it is satisfied.

Under the traditional equitable analysis, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must 

demonstrate:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at 

law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 

(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 

defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 

would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). In the case at hand, SAS 

has met this burden. 

We noted in our previous opinion that “[s]atisfying these four factors is a high bar.” 

SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 385. That remains the case. Injunctive relief “does not follow from 

success on the merits as a matter of course.” Id. (quotation omitted). Rather, it is “a drastic

and extraordinary remedy” that should be used only when “essential in order effectually to 

protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.” Id. (quotation omitted).

That being said, the eBay factors must be interpreted in light of the context to which they 

apply. 

Here, the backdrop is, to repeat, that of a party who when faced with a lawful 

judgment under North Carolina law rendered in the Eastern District of North Carolina

addressing the wrongful actions of WPL in North Carolina, and more broadly the United 

States, determined to dig in and use every possible means to avoid paying the judgment. 

Further, in 2017, we upheld the district court’s denial of broad injunctive relief barring 

WPL from all licensing for U.S. use permanently; the present U.S. expansion injunction 

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provides much narrower relief, impacting only licensing to new customers for U.S. use 

while the money judgment is outstanding. It is through the lens of WPL’s determined effort 

to avoid the legal consequences stemming from the jury’s verdict on its breach of contract 

and unfair trade practices claims, and the changed nature of the relief at issue, that we now 

apply the eBay criteria.

Viewed through this lens, SAS has demonstrated irreparable injury from WPL’s 

actions. Although in possession of a $79 million judgment, SAS has been able to collect 

little. Collections to date represent only a fraction of the compensatory damage award, 

much less the total damage award. At their current pace, collection efforts will take 

decades. Because “the unsatisfiability of a money judgment can constitute irreparable 

injury,” this first factor is satisfied. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 

206 (3d Cir. 1990).

Second, SAS has shown that legal remedies, “such as monetary damages” alone, are 

inadequate. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. When SAS was last before this court, it raised concerns 

about the U.S. judgment’s collectability. While we noted that “[i]njunctions 

have . . . sometimes been deemed appropriate based on barriers to collectability after 

judgment,” we determined that, at the time, “SAS ha[d] offered only vague concerns on 

this front.” SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 387. 

That is no longer the case. When the district court granted the U.S. expansion 

injunction, it found that:

[T]he court now knows that WPL has sought and will continue to seek to 

clawback two-thirds of every dollar SAS collects. Furthermore, there is no 

clearer “barrier to collectability” than the UK injunction that has forced SAS 

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under penalty of criminal contempt to bring a halt to judgment collection

activity available in the California court. 

SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *16. We agree. Without injunctive relief incentivizing 

WPL to satisfy the judgment, SAS’s money judgment would be rendered near “illusory.”

See SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 387.

Third, the balance of hardships has shifted to support a grant of injunctive relief. 

Previously, we expressed concern that the broader injunction’s impact on sales might prove 

ruinous for WPL, when the company would “already face significant hardship based on 

the monetary damages it owes.” SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 387-88. Now, the narrowly tailored

injunction granted by the district court encourages WPL to satisfy the judgment, while 

limiting any negative sales impact by allowing the company to continue serving existing 

customers. Thus, harm to WPL is lessened and our concern that an injunction “would 

frustrate, rather than facilitate, WPL’s ability to pay damages” is lessened as well. Id. at 

387. 

WPL suggests the injunction is unnecessarily harsh because it prevents global 

licensing to new customers, even ones located outside the U.S. However, this feature was 

necessary to prevent easy circumvention of the injunction. Without it, WPL could 

“structure its customer relationships, licensing agreements, and invoicing practices, to 

allow or encourage new . . . licensing to global businesses for use in the US,” and thus 

“engage countless new global company customers to undertake new substantial use of 

WPS products in the United States, without falling under the restriction.” SAS-2019, 2019 

WL 1447472, at *14. 

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Fourth, “the public interest factor has changed in light of WPL’s activities in 

securing the UK injunction and judgment.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *17.

Previously, we held that “abstract rule of law concerns” could not justify the broad

injunction given concrete harms WPL customers would face in changing software. 

SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 388. Now, under the district court’s narrow injunction, WPL’s

customers are unimpacted. 

In contrast, rule of law concerns are no longer abstract. They “have become 

paramount” where: 

The ability of US courts to enforce their own laws and to allow litigants to 

pursue freely rights accorded to them under US law have been significantly 

eroded through WPL’s conduct in seeking the UK injunction and clawback 

relief in the UK judgment.

SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *17. WPL alleges that this injunction will harm 

competition, by giving potential customers one less option. While protecting competition 

is of vital interest, SAS has many competitors in “the market for software used to manage 

and analyze large and complex datasets.” SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 375; see also J.A. 1467. 

Thus, rule of law concerns predominate at present. The final equitable factor is satisfied.

When denying broad injunctive relief several years ago, we noted that “the future 

sometimes declines stubbornly to be prophesied.” SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 385. At the time, 

we did not know that WPL would undermine U.S. collection proceedings at every turn and 

seek clawbacks in the U.K. Now we do. These changes in circumstance have made 

equitable relief essential. 

C.

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WPL next turns to procedural complaints, arguing that this injunction is not 

authorized by Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or by North Carolina law. 

Rule 69 directs that a federal “money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless 

the court directs otherwise,” and that, generally speaking, “[t]he procedure on execution—

and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord 

with the procedure of the state where the court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). WPL 

alleges that no provision of North Carolina law authorizes this injunction. 

As an initial matter, North Carolina law authorizes injunctive relief:

When, during the litigation, it appears . . . that a party thereto is doing or 

threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering some act to be done 

in violation of the rights of another party to the litigation respecting the 

subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-485. Here, WPL’s interference with collection proceedings which SAS 

had a legal right to pursue—and its collateral attack by seeking clawbacks of funds SAS 

had a right to collect—undermined the effectiveness of the U.S. judgment.

Even if North Carolina law did not speak to the propriety of injunctive relief, the 

U.S. expansion injunction is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Rule 69 specifies 

that, “a federal statute governs [collection proceedings] to the extent it applies.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 69(a)(1). The district court issued the U.S. expansion injunction pursuant to the 

AWA, a federal statute. And, the Court has held that the AWA affords courts residual 

authority to issue necessary writs so long as no “statute specifically addresses the particular 

issue at hand.” Pa. Bureau of Correction v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985). 

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The Court noted that, while the AWA “does not authorize [federal courts] to issue 

ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less 

appropriate,” it “empowers them to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises.” 

Pa. Bureau, 474 U.S. at 43 (emphasis added). We are faced here with the need for an 

extraordinary remedy. SAS, a litigant holding a U.S. judgment, attempted collection in 

California following Rule 69 and state procedures. Soon after, WPL obtained an injunction 

preventing “SAS from seeking the full panoply of judgment collection tools” available 

there. SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *10. In response to the “restraints that WPL has 

placed on SAS’s ability to use the tools normally available . . . in United States courts, 

particularly in the California court[s],” SAS returned to North Carolina seeking the U.S. 

expansion injunction. Id. at *12.

Given these circumstances of WPL’s own making, we cannot fault SAS or the 

district court for “resort[ing] to [their] own more extraordinary and coercive 

measures . . . to compel relief.” SAS-2019, 2019 WL 1447472, at *16. After 

straightforward collection procedures were thwarted, the AWA and Rule 69 allowed for 

“extraordinary” relief. See Pa. Bureau, 474 U.S. at 43. Thus, the district court possessed 

authority to issue the U.S. expansion injunction.

V.

To recapitulate, WPL’s main effort at frustration involved seeking an anti-suit 

injunction from the courts of the United Kingdom. The U.K. anti-suit injunction was not 

only an attempt to relitigate our holding that the original U.K. judgment, while effective in 

the U.K., had no preclusive effect upon a lawsuit brought under North Carolina law, given 

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the “many legal and factual differences” between the U.K. litigation and the U.S. suit. 

SAS-2017, 874 F.3d at 378-80. The post-judgment anti-suit injunction issued by U.K. 

courts would prevent SAS from utilizing the laws of this country to satisfy a judgment 

rendered by courts of this country. Specifically, the injunction disrupted SAS’s collection 

proceedings in the federal courts of California and sought to stop those proceedings in their 

tracks.

The district court naturally took steps not to leave its judgment defenseless. The 

court’s U.S. expansion injunction and anti-clawback injunction work in tandem. The 

former incentivizes WPL to satisfy the U.S. judgment, while the latter ensures that U.S.

collections remain with SAS. WPL would prefer “to continue unfettered in licensing its 

product for use in the United States,” all the while seeking clawbacks. SAS-2019, 2019 WL 

1447472, at *14. In other words, WPL would like to have its cake and eat it too. It would 

like to operate in the U.S. but face limited consequences for its violations of U.S. law. To 

illustrate the fallacy of this position, it’s helpful to recall how this case began—with WPL’s

breach of a license agreement. 

SAS is “the world’s largest privately-held software company.” SAS-2017, 874 F.3d

at 387. Since its formation in 1976, SAS has sought to improve its products, investing a 

sizable percentage of revenue into research and development. When WPL decided to offer 

a competing product, it took a short cut. In violation of a license agreement, WPL reverse 

engineered a SAS product to speed development of its own product. See id. at 376, 380-

83. This is not the sort of “innovation” or “competition” encouraged by U.S. law. A federal 

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jury found WPL liable for this behavior in federal district court and set damages based 

solely on the breach’s impact in the U.S. Now, WPL seeks to avoid paying even those. 

The situation before us did not have to come about. WPL could have proceeded

differently at many points. It could have developed its product without violating SAS’s 

license agreement. Or it could have declined to enter the U.S. market. But WPL cannot

participate in the U.S. market, violate U.S. law, and expect to avoid the consequences of 

its conduct. “A foreign corporation doing business within the United States reasonably 

expects that its United States operations will be regulated by United States law.” Laker 

Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The 

district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the injunctions in this case. To have 

done nothing would invite foreign litigants to undermine the finality of many an American 

judgment and foreign countries to doubt the very efficacy of American law.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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