Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02807/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02807-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lamarr T. Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Dean Whipple, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2807

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Lamarr T. Davis, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 2, 2005

Filed: June 8, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, McMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Lamarr Davis challenges the sentences the district court1

 imposed after he

pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of cocaine base

(crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and to violating the

terms of his supervised release on a prior felon-in-possession sentence. His counsel

has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), arguing the court erred by sentencing Davis pursuant to the Guidelines in

violation of Blakely v. Washington,124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), by failing to give effect

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to an oral agreement reached with the previous prosecutor, and by giving Davis

consecutive sentences for the drug-trafficking conviction and the supervised-release

violation.

We do not consider Davis’s challenge to his drug-trafficking sentence, because

in the written plea agreement, Davis expressly waived the right to appeal this

sentence, and the record demonstrates the waiver should be enforced. See United

States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-91 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997

(2003). To the extent Davis is arguing that his indictment on the drug-trafficking

crime violated an oral agreement with the previous prosecutor, such an argument is

not covered by the sentence-appeal waiver, but it is foreclosed by his guilty plea. See

United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1187-88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S.

1094 (1994). 

The revocation sentence is not covered by the plea agreement, but the sentence

is not implicated by United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), because Chapter

7 of the Guidelines is merely advisory, see United States v. Holt, No. 04-3252, 2005

WL 1109624 (May 11, 2005), at *1 n.4 (unpublished per curiam) (Chapter 7 of

Guidelines has always been advisory and remains unaltered by Booker), and the

revocation sentence was not an abuse of discretion, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

(district court may revoke supervised release if it finds by a preponderance of

evidence that defendant violated terms; maximum term of 2 years imprisonment is

authorized upon revocation of supervised release if original offense was Class C

felony); United States v. Holmes, 283 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2002) (revocation

sentence within bounds of § 3583(e) will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion);

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) (revocation term shall be served consecutively to any other

sentence).

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Having carefully reviewed the record independently pursuant to Penson v.

Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm,

and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

______________________________

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