Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-09-04142/USCOURTS-ca10-09-04142-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Hunsaker
Appellee
K&H Enterprises
Appellee
Susan Ketchum
Appellee
Midtown Chevron
Appellee
Jordan M. Wilkins
Appellant

Document Text:

*

This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th

Cir. R. 32.1.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 30, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JORDAN M. WILKINS,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 09-4142

v. (D. Utah)

MIDTOWN CHEVRON, K&H

ENTERPRISES, CHARLES

HUNSAKER, SUSAN KETCHUM,

Defendants - Appellees.

(D.C. No. 2:08-CV-01000-DS)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this court has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Jordan M. Wilkins, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal

of the civil rights complaint he brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights

Appellate Case: 09-4142 Document: 01018393538 Date Filed: 03/30/2010 Page: 1 
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Midtown Chevron’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal is hereby DENIED. 

Although the district court granted Midtown Chevron’s motion to Dismiss

Wilkins’s complaint on June 10, 2009, that judgment was not set out in a separate

document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). Thus, the judgment did not become final until

150 days after the entry on the docket of the district court’s order granting

Midtown Chevron’s motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B). Accordingly,

Wilkins’s July 20, 2009, notice of appeal was timely filed. Fed R. App. P.

4(a)(1), (2), (7).

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Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291,1

 this court affirms.

In his complaint, Wilkins alleged the discriminatory acts which were the

basis of his suit were as follows: “I’ve got a file full of things about this.” As the

factual basis supporting his claim of discrimination, Wilkins simply alleged he

“wasn’t treated right while under employment, it’s all in the report to the Labor

Commission.” In light of these exceedingly Spartan allegations, the district court

concluded that even liberally construed, Wilkins Title VII complaint failed to

state a valid claim of discrimination. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242,

1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that allegations in a complaint “must be

enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively)

has a claim for relief”); E.E.O.C. v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 800 (10th Cir.

2007) (noting generally that to state a valid Title VII claim of disparate treatment,

a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate (1) he is a member of a

protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse

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After Midtown Chevron filed its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Wilkins

filed an amended complaint. The district court struck the amended complaint

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) because Wilkins had not previously obtained

leave of court or consent of Midtown Chevron. This court need not determine

whether the district court’s decision to strike Wilkins’s proposed amended

complaint amounts to an abuse of discretion, Hertz v. Luzenac Group, 576 F.3d

1103, 1117 (10th Cir. 2009), because the proposed amended complaint does not

rectify the deficiencies that justified dismissal of the original complaint. In

particular, even construed liberally, the proposed amended complaint does not

allege any action that could amount to an adverse employment action and the

three isolated instances of alleged improper conduct on the part of Midtown

Chevron employees are simply not sufficient, under any standard, to state a claim

of hostile work environment.

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employment action took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

discrimination).

This court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of a Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555

F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2009). Here, even assuming the truth of each

allegation in Wilkins complaint, the complaint does not state a valid Title VII

claim.2

 Thus, we AFFIRM the district court’s order of dismissal for substantially

those reasons set out in the order of dismissal dated June 10, 2009.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Michael R. Murphy

Circuit Judge

Appellate Case: 09-4142 Document: 01018393538 Date Filed: 03/30/2010 Page: 3