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Parties Involved:
Kathy Lemens
Appellee
Jean Lutsey
Appellee
David A. Slaughter
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted May 19, 2020*

Decided May 20, 2020 

Before 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2545 

DAVID A. SLAUGHTER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JEAN LUTSEY and KATHY LEMENS, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 17-C-1448 

Lynn Adelman, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

David Slaughter, a Wisconsin inmate, sued a prison nurse and the health services 

manager, alleging that they provided inadequate medical treatment in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment by failing to schedule him an appointment with a prison doctor 

and by not conducting proper tests. The district court entered summary judgment for 

the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the nurse’s actions 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 19-2545 Page 2 

fell outside the bounds of accepted professional judgment or that the supervisor 

ignored complaints that put her on notice of a serious risk to his health. We affirm. 

We construe the facts in the light most favorable to Slaughter, the nonmoving 

party. Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrs., 746 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2014). On January 9, 

2017, Slaughter went to the health services unit at Green Bay Correctional Institution 

complaining of a mouth infection. The dentist prescribed antibiotics, pain medicine, and 

a lidocaine rinse. 

Two weeks later, on January 24, Slaughter wrote to the health services unit that 

he had lost consciousness for fifteen minutes, experienced a lot of pain, and had a fever. 

Kathy Lemens, a nurse, examined him. Her treatment notes reflect that Slaughter 

reported he had diarrhea, no appetite, a fever, and body aches. Based on these 

symptoms and her observations, Lemens suspected that Slaughter had a stomach virus. 

She followed the prison’s “abdominal protocol,” which provides that the inmate should 

take anti-diarrheal medicine, avoid spicy foods, and drink more water. She also referred 

Slaughter’s chart to an advanced care provider (a doctor or nurse practitioner) and 

scheduled a follow-up appointment in three days. 

Two days later, Slaughter reported to a guard that he had blood in his stool. The 

guard informed the health services unit of Slaughter’s complaint, and a nurse 

responded that Slaughter should file a request for an appointment. The next day, 

Slaughter submitted a request, stating that his condition had deteriorated and that 

Lemens had failed to notify the prison doctor of his condition or schedule an 

appointment with the doctor. He also wrote to Jean Lutsey, the health services manager, 

reiterating these concerns. Lutsey responded that Lemens had consulted with the 

doctor, but that the doctor had not been available for an appointment. 

Lemens examined Slaughter again that day. Her treatment notes reflect that 

Slaughter reported blood in his stool but do not mention diarrhea (Slaughter says he 

also told her that he had been coughing up blood). Slaughter acknowledged at the 

appointment that he had not taken the medicines that Lemens had previously ordered. 

Lemens decided to continue the abdominal protocol and instructed Slaughter to take 

the anti-diarrheal medicine and acetaminophen, eat as tolerated, and drink water. 

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Two days later, Slaughter submitted another health services request, stating that 

he was still in pain and “bleeding” (without further description). He also sent another 

letter to Lutsey, asserting that Lemens had retaliated against him for his previous 

complaint about her treatment by discontinuing the pain medication that the dentist 

had prescribed for his mouth infection. A nurse (not Lemens) examined Slaughter in 

response to his request and recorded that his main complaints were of mouth pain and 

diarrhea. This nurse also followed the abdominal protocol, referred Slaughter to the 

dentist, and instructed him to take acetaminophen one to two times per day for a week. 

She also scheduled a follow-up appointment for four days later and told Slaughter to 

submit another health services request if he did not see improvement. Lutsey then 

responded to Slaughter’s letter a few days later, explaining that the dental order for 

pain medication for his mouth infection had originally been for only ten days, but that a 

new ten-day order had been entered that day. 

On February 1, Slaughter complained to a guard that his whole body was in 

pain, that he coughed up blood, and that he felt like he was going to die. A nurse 

examined him and consulted a prison doctor, who, on February 3, ordered Slaughter 

transferred to the emergency room. Slaughter was diagnosed with meningitis (“likely 

viral”), treated, and sent back to the prison after a six-day hospital stay. 

Slaughter sued Lutsey and Lemens under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they had 

been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment by not consulting with a doctor sooner and by failing to conduct more 

appropriate tests to accurately diagnose his ailment. The district court entered judgment 

in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that Slaughter did not present sufficient 

evidence that Lemens provided ineffective treatment, as she had properly noted his 

symptoms, prescribed a course of treatment to remedy those symptoms, and ordered 

follow-up appointments. The court also concluded that the evidence did not show that 

Lutsey was deliberately indifferent to Slaughter’s complaints because she had 

responded to all of Slaughter’s grievances within a few days (if not the same day) and 

had given him relevant information about his care. 

On appeal, Slaughter maintains that Lemens and Lutsey were deliberately 

indifferent to his health by not providing adequate medical care or scheduling him to 

see a doctor. Healthcare staff at a prison violate the Eighth Amendment if they 

intentionally disregard a known, objectively serious medical condition that poses an 

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excessive risk to a prisoner’s health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Wilson 

v. Adams, 901 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2018). 

Slaughter first contends that Lemens was deliberately indifferent because she did 

not schedule an appointment for him to see a doctor after he first reported blood in his 

stool. He maintains that Lemens—a nurse—could not perform the types of medical tests 

that a doctor could, so she prevented an accurate diagnosis by treating him without 

involving a doctor. But Slaughter lacks evidence that Lemens acted with deliberate 

indifference when she treated him for a stomach virus after examining him multiple 

times. Even if Lemens was incorrect about the cause of his symptoms, an incorrect 

diagnosis alone is insufficient to show deliberate indifference. See Norfleet v. Webster, 

439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006). Slaughter has presented no evidence showing that 

Lemens’s treatment decisions—grounded on her observations and his complaints—

were not based on the exercise of her medical judgment. See Whiting v. Wexford Health 

Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Slaughter also argues that a factual dispute exists as to whether Lemens 

consulted with the prison doctor after she examined him the first time because there is 

no record evidence that the doctor made a diagnosis based on his symptoms. Slaughter 

has not, however, presented evidence that refutes the notes in his treatment record that 

a doctor was consulted and affirmed Lemens’s proposed course of care. Furthermore, 

even if the doctor did not review Slaughter’s medical chart, Slaughter still lacks 

evidence that Lemen’s treatment decisions substantially departed from accepted 

medical practice. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663. Slaughter also maintains that Lemens was 

deliberately indifferent and retaliated against him by discontinuing his pain medication. 

As Lutsey explained to him, though, the pain medication he received for his mouth 

infection was scheduled to lapse ten days after the dentist prescribed it. Additionally, 

Slaughter has presented no evidence that Lemens was responsible for ordering more 

medication or that she deliberately failed to order more medication so that he would 

suffer. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013). 

 

Next, Slaughter contends that Lutsey was deliberately indifferent because he 

alerted her that the nursing staff were not giving him proper treatment, but she did 

nothing. Lutsey did not examine or treat Slaughter, and she may be liable as a 

supervisor only for acts that she personally directed or authorized. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009); Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 757 (7th Cir. 2011). Slaughter has 

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presented no evidence that Lutsey personally directed his care. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; 

Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498–99 (7th Cir. 2018) (supervisor not deliberately 

indifferent when not involved in treatment decisions). Lutsey responded to Slaughter’s 

inquiries and made sure that he was being seen by medical professionals. Her reading 

of his complaints alone does not demonstrate that she knew that he was receiving 

inadequate care (even assuming he was) and chose to do nothing. See Mitchell, 895 F.3d 

at 498–99; Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 657 (7th Cir. 2005). 

We have considered Slaughter’s remaining arguments, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED 

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