Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01108/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01108-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Bruce Cox
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

•. 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 95-1108 

RICHARD BRUCE COX, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. Nos. 94-Z-2765 and 88-CR-270) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, John M. Hutchins, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Mountain States Drug Task Force, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Richard Bruce Cox, pro se. 

Before BRORBY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER, • District Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

• Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, District Judge, United States District Court for the 

District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 1 
Defendant appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, 

or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In denying relief, the district court 

determined that all issues either were raised and ruled on at trial or on direct appeal or that 

defendant failed to demonstrate cause for failing to raise the issues at trial or on direct appeal. 

On appeal, defendant argues that the district court erred in denying § 225 5 relief because ( 1) 

his sentence was invalid since prior convictions used to enhance his sentence were 

subsequently vacated, set aside, expunged, or dismissed; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to investigate, interview and call witnesses and present a defense of duress and 

coercion; (3) he presented a valid double jeopardy claim; (4) counsel's cumulative errors 

denied him the right to a fair and impartial trial in violation of his due process rights; and (5) 

his sentence was improperly enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Also, defendant argues, 

based on recent Supreme Court authority, Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), that 

his firearm conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) was improper because he did not 

actively use firearms. Reviewing the district court's legal rulings de novo and its findings 

of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, United States v. Kissick, 69 F .3d 1048, 1051 (1Oth 

Cir. 1995), we remand to the district court to reopen defendant's sentence for further 

proceedings and affirm in all other respects. 1 

After examtntng the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. 

~Fed. R. App. P. 34(t) and lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted 

(continued ... ) 

2 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 2 
First, defendant argues that since his direct criminal appeal, United States v. Cox, 934 

F.2d 1114 (lOth Cir. 1991), he has successfully attacked several prior convictions used to 

calculate his criminal history category and therefore the district court should have granted 

§ 2255 relief and resentenced him without using these prior convictions. Defendant provides 

evidence that (I) a Douglas County, Colorado conviction for attempting to possess cocaine, 

increasing his criminal history score by three points, was dismissed with prejudice; (2) a 

Boulder County, Colorado misdemeanor menacing conviction, increasing his criminal 

history score by one point, was expunged; (3) an Eagle County, Colorado deferred judgment 

for unlawful use of a controlled substance, increasing his criminal history score by one point, 

was dismissed, sealed and expunged; and (4) a Santa Cruz County, California conviction for 

transporting and selling controlled substances, increasing his criminal history score by two 

points, was expunged. Defendant maintains that resentencing without the prior convictions 

would result in a lower criminal history category than the one under which he was 

sentenced. 2 

1

( ... continued) 

without oral argument. 

2 With an offense level of thirty and nine criminal history points, consisting of the seven 

set forth above along with two points for a deferred judgment sentence, defendant was placed 

in criminal history category IV with a sentencing range of 135-168 months. U.S.S.G. Ch. 

5, Pt. A. He was sentenced to 168 months' imprisonment plus a mandatory, consecutive sixty 

months for the § 924( c)( 1) conviction. On direct appeal, this court determined that the 

district court erred in assigning two criminal history points for the deferred sentence. CQx, 

(continued ... ) 

3 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 3 
We conclude the district court should have reopened defendant's sentence. If a 

defendant successfully attacks state sentences, he may then apply for reopening of any 

federal sentence enhanced by the state sentences. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 

1739 (1994)(enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); dicta); see also United States v. 

Nichols, 30 F.3d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1994)(government conceded in light of Custis that 

defendant was entitled to bring § 225 5 action attacking enhanced federal sentence after 

having state conviction invalidated and should get benefit of subsequent overturning of 

previous state conviction); United States v. Payne, 894 F. Supp. 534, 539-40 (D. Mass. 

1995). This court has recognized the availability of sentence review upon the invalidation 

of a predicate offense. ~United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573, 581-82 (lOth Cir. 1994); 

United States v. Allen, 24 F.3d 1180, 1187 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 493 (1994). 

Although defendant's sentence was correct at the time of sentencing, subsequent 

events suggest that a different sentence now may be appropriate. Because there may be a 

change in defendant's criminal history category after his sentencing and direct appeal, the 

district court should have reopened defendant's sentence. 

2

( ••• continued) 

934 F.2d at 1125. Because defendant's corrected criminal history score of seven still fell 

within criminal history category IV, this court did not remand for resentencing. hh Without 

the prior convictions, however, defendant would have no criminal history points and would 

be in category I with a sentencing range of 121-151 months. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. 

4 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 4 
In reopening defendant's sentence, the district court must determine the basis for the 

expungement or dismissal of the prior offenses and whether they may be included in 

calculating defendant's criminal history score. 3 Under the Guidelines, an expunged 

conviction may not be included in a defendant's criminal history calculation. U.S.S.G. 

§ 4Al.2G). Convictions reversed or vacated for reasons related to constitutional invalidity, 

innocence, or errors of law are expunged for purposes of the Guidelines and therefore cannot 

be included in criminal history calculations. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.2G), Commentary, Application 

note 6; ~United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336, 1343 (5th Cir.), reinstated in relevant 

part on. reb'~ en bane, 38 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1969 (1995). 

When convictions are set aside for reasons other than innocence or errors of law, such as to 

restore civil rights or remove the stigma of a criminal conviction, those convictions are 

counted for criminal history purposes. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.2, Commentary, Application note 10. 

Since expunged convictions are not counted in calculating criminal history, the district court 

must determine whether defendant's state convictions were expunged or treated as expunged 

under state law. ~United States y. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1111 {lOth Cir. 1991); ~ 

abQ United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1479 {lOth Cir. 1995)(noting distinction under 

Guidelines for convictions that are set aside and those that are expunged). 

3 From the papers defendant provides for us, we cannot determine the basis for the 

expungements or dismissals. 

5 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 5 
Just as the Supreme Court expressed "no opinion on the appropriate disposition of ... 

an application" to reopen, Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739, we also express no opinion on an 

appropriate sentence after reopening. After giving proper credit for any expunged 

convictions, it is still within the discretion of the district court to impose a sentence reflecting 

the seriousness of defendant's past criminal conduct. ~ U.S.S.G. § 4Al.3 (permitting 

upward departure when criminal history "does not adequately reflect the seriousness of [] 

past criminal conduct"); Garcia, 42 F.3d at 578; see also United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 

985, 991 (lOth Cir. 1990)("A district court has considerable discretion in appraising a 

. defendant's criminal history."); U.S.S.G. § 4Al.2G) (although sentences for expunged 

convictions are not counted when calculating criminal history, they may be considered under 

§ 4A1.3); U.S.S.G. § 4Al.2, Commentary, Application note 6 (criminal conduct not counted 

in criminal history score may be considered pursuant to§ 4Al.3). 

We reject plaintiffs argument that this court's affirmance of defendant's criminal 

history category on direct appeal precludes the use of§ 2255 to correct defendant's sentence. 

With the exception of the California conviction, defendant alleged on direct appeal that the 

offenses should not be counted for reasons other than expungement. ~ ,C,Qx, 934 F .2d at 

1123-25. This court's affirmance of the sentence on direct appeal does not preclude later use 

of§ 2255 to reopen and correct a sentence based in part upon invalid state convictions. 

Custis does not foreclose reopening a sentence that has been affirmed on direct criminal 

appeal. See also Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1937 (1994)(Ginsberg, J., 

6 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 6 
dissenting)(Custjs presented forum question of where, not whether, defendant could attack 

prior conviction for constitutional infirmity). Likewise, this court's ruling on direct appeal 

that because defendant's evidence indicated the California conviction was not expunged until 

after sentencing it was a prior conviction, ,C,Qx, 934 F .2d at 1124, is not inconsistent with 

Custis' indication that a defendant may later move to reopen his sentence. 

Defendant further argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate the 

validity of his prior convictions at the time of sentencing. Although defendant raised an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, he is not barred from asserting 

ineffective assistance based on a different ground in a first § 225 5 petition. 4 ~ United 

States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1242-43 (lOth Cir. 1995). We review claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel de novo. Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 936 ( 1996). In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

we consider "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 

Strickland v. Washjn~on, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To prove this, defendant must show 

both that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced 

his defense. liL. at 687. 

4 Defendant generally argued ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. This 

court held "[o]ur review of the record does not reveal that defendant's counsel made any 

errors warranting reversal." ,CQx, 934 F .2d at 1123. 

7 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 7 
Defendant has failed to show that counsel's performance was deficient. At sentencing, 

counsel argued that any offenses that effectively had been set aside should not be used to 

calculate defendant's criminal history category. Even if counsel did not thoroughly 

investigate defendant's prior convictions, he did not render ineffective assistance because the 

prior convictions are presumed valid. ~ Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 

(1992)(presumption of regularity attaches to final judgments); see also Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 

1739 (impermissible to use federal sentencing forum to review state conviction). Moreover, 

on direct appeal, this court upheld defendant's sentence and placement in criminal history 

category IV. ~, 934 F.2d at 1123-25. 

Defendant next argues that he is actually innocent and his attorney was ineffective for 

failing to investigate, interview, and call witnesses and present a defense of duress and 

coercion. He also contends counsel was ineffective for failing to request a downward 

departure based on duress and coercion. Due to alleged factual disputes not established in 

the record, defendant argues the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to 

decide this issue. 

Applying the standard set forth above, we conclude· defendant has failed to prove 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant admits that he explained the facts for his alleged 

innocence and a defense of coercion and duress to his attorney and that counsel made some 

effort to investigate his allegations of kidnapping and beating. Counsel apparently made an 

informed strategic choice not to pursue a duress and coercion defense. ~ Strickland, 466 

8 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 8 
U.S. at 689,691. Furthermore, on direct appeal, where defendant filed separate prose briefs, 

C,Qx, 934 F .2d at 1118 n.1, he indicated that he had wanted to allege an entrapment defense, 

not coercion or duress. ~ lll at 1119-20. Thus, defendant has failed to show his counsel's 

performance was constitutionally deficient. Because defendant is not entitled to § 225 5 relief 

for ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court did not err in failing to hold an 

evidentiary hearing. See ienerally Machibroda y. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 494-95 

(1962)(error in failing to hold evidentiary hearing when issue raised in§ 2255 motion could 

not be conclusively determined by motion itself). 

Third, defendant argues that his criminal case was barred by the Double Jeopardy 

Clause, because many of his assets were forfeited in separate administrative and civil 

forfeiture proceedings based on the same conduct for which he was subsequently criminally 

prosecuted. Defendant argues his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise 

a double jeopardy claim before trial as a defense. 

Defendant did not raise a double jeopardy claim on direct appeal. A§ 2255 motion 

is not available to test the legality of a matter which should have been raised on direct appeal. 

United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287,291 (lOth Cir. 1994). When a defendant fails to raise 

an issue on direct appeal, he is barred from raising the issue in a § 225 5 proceeding, unless 

he establishes either cause excusing the procedural default and prejudice resulting from the 

error or a fundamental miscarriage of justice if the claim is not considered. hL. A defendant 

may establish cause for procedural default by showing he received ineffective assistance of 

9 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 9 
\ \ 

counsel. United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d ·388, 392 (lOth Cir. 1995). Here, defendant's 

allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is merely conclusory. Therefore, he has failed 

to prove cause for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. Also, because he has not made 

a colorable showing of factual innocence, he cannot establish a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. ~Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1992). 

Fourth, conceding that each of the above alleged ineffective assistance of counsel 

errors may not rise to a constitutional level, defendant argues that the cumulative errors of 

counsel denied him a fair and impartial trial in violation of the due process clause and 

therefore constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Cumulative error analysis evaluates 

the effect only of errors, not the cumulative effect of nonerrors. United States v. Wynne, 993 

F.2d 760, 768 {lOth Cir. 1993). We therefore conclude this argument lacks merit. 

Defendant's fifth argument is that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 

claim that his sentence was improperly enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(a) for being a 

leader or organizer. This issue was decided on direct criminal appeal. ~ 934 F .2d at 

1126. The district court correctly concluded defendant may not again raise this issue in a 

§ 2255 motion. ~Warner, 23 F.3d at 291. 

In supplemental authority citing Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 505 (1995), 

defendant challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c){l), alleging for the frrst time 

that he did not actively use a firearm for any drug trafficking offense. Generally, we do not 

consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 

10 

' 

Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 10 
• 

: ' 

966, 970 (lOth Cir. 1991). We, however, exercise our discretion to do so in this case,~ 

Lyons y. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721 {lOth Cir. 1993), and conclude 

defendant's argument is without merit. Bailey addresses the requirements for using a firearm; 

whereas defendant was charged with and convicted of carrying firearms. ~ 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(l) (imposing prison term on person who "during and in relation to any ... drug 

trafficking crime ... uses or carries a frrearm"); Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 507 (acknowledging 

§ 924( c) specifies two types of conduct with a firearm: using and carrying); ~, 934 F .2d 

at 1121 (upholding defendant's conviction for carrying firearms). Bailey, therefore, does not 

apply to this case. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is 

AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part. The action is REMANDED for reopening of 

defendant's sentence. Defendant's request to supplement the record on appeal with the trial 

transcripts is DENIED.5 In this court's order of September 26, 1995, plaintiffs request to 

supplement the record with the sentencing transcript was provisionally granted, leaving the 

propriety of the inclusion to the merits panel. Plaintiffs request to supplement the record on 

appeal with the sentencing transcript is now GRANTED. 

5 Upon the court's own motion the record was supplemented to include the presentence 

report. 

11 

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Appellate Case: 95-1108 Document: 01019276554 Date Filed: 05/03/1996 Page: 11