Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03615/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03615-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonio Lamont Rice
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3615

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Antonio Lamont Rice

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: December 14, 2015

 Filed: February 11, 2016

____________

Before MURPHY, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Antonio Rice pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1

 sentenced Rice to 110 months in prison

based in part on its conclusion that his prior conviction for second degree battery was

1

The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

Appellate Case: 14-3615 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/11/2016 Entry ID: 4365797 
a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines. Rice appeals his sentence, and

we affirm.

Rice was arrested in 2013 and later pled guilty to being a felon in possession

of a firearm. At sentencing the district court calculated a base offense level of 22

under § 2K2.1 of the guidelines after concluding that Rice had a prior felony

conviction for a crime of violence, specifically a 2006 felony conviction of second

degree battery in Arkansas. After adjusting Rice's offense level, the court calculated

an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months and sentenced him to 110 months. 

Rice appeals, arguing that the district court erred while calculating his base offense

level because his prior battery conviction was not a crime of violence.

We review de novo a district court's interpretation and application of the

guidelines. See United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 484 (8th Cir. 2011). Section

2K2.1 of the guidelines provides that courts should apply a base offense level of 22

for a conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm if, among other things, the

defendant had previously "sustain[ed] one felony conviction of either a crime of

violence or a controlled substance offense." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). The guidelines

define "crime of violence" as any federal or state offense punishable by more than one

year imprisonment that either "(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a

dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Id.

§ 4B1.2. The question thus is whether Rice's felony battery conviction was for a

crime of violence under the guidelines, as the district court concluded.

To determine whether a prior conviction was for a crime of violence, "we apply

a categorical approach, looking to the elements of the offense as defined in the . . .

statute of conviction rather than to the facts underlying the defendant's prior

conviction." United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2012) (alteration in

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original). If the statute of conviction is divisible in that it encompasses multiple

crimes, some of which are crimes of violence and some of which are not, we apply a

modified categorical approach to “look at the charging document, plea colloquy, and

comparable judicial records" for determining which part of the statute the defendant

violated. Id. at 794–95. We then determine whether a violation of that statutory

subpart is a crime of violence. See id. at 795. Here, the Arkansas second degree

battery statute is divisible, id., and the district court correctly applied the modified

categorical approach to determine that Rice was convicted under subsection (a)(4) of

that statute. The issue is therefore whether a violation of that subsection is a crime of

violence. Since the violation "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against the person of another," U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, we conclude

that it was a crime of violence.

Subsection (a)(4) provides that a person is guilty of second degree battery if he

"intentionally or knowingly, without legal justification, causes physical injury to one

he knows to be” a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, a correctional facility

employee, a school employee, an elderly person, a young child, a state officer or

employee, a healthcare provider, or incompetent. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202 (2006). 

The Supreme Court recently held in United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405

(2014), that a similarly worded statute included the use of physical force as an element

under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). In Castleman, the defendant had been convicted

of "intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury" to his child's mother in

violation of Tennessee law. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414. The Court held that this

conviction included the use of physical force as an element because "[i]t is impossible

to cause bodily injury without applying force." Id. at 1415.

Here, as in Castleman, Rice had been convicted of "intentionally or knowingly

. . . caus[ing] physical injury"2

 to another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202 (2006).

2

"Physical injury" under Arkansas law means "(A) Impairment of physical

condition; (B) Infliction of substantial pain; or (C) Infliction of bruising, swelling, or

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His offense of conviction therefore includes the use of physical force as an element. 

See Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1415. Castleman does not end our analysis, however,

because the Court held there that the physical force requirement of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)

could be "satisfied by even the slightest offensive touching." Id. at 1410. By contrast,

physical force under the guidelines refers specifically to "violent force," meaning

"force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." United States v.

Williams, 690 F.3d 1056, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted). On the record

here, we conclude that Rice's conviction includes the use of violent force as an

element "since it is impossible to cause bodily injury without using force 'capable of'

producing that result." Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1416–17 (Scalia, J., concurring).

Rice argues that a person can cause an injury without using physical force, for

example, by offering his victim a poisoned drink. The circuit courts that have

considered whether a person uses physical force in causing an injury through indirect

means such as poisoning have reached differing conclusions. See, e.g., Chrzanoski

v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188, 194–96 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414

F.3d 1282, 1285–87 (10th Cir. 2005); compare United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d

390, 399–401 (6th Cir. 2012); De Leon Castellanos v. Holder, 652 F.3d 762, 764–67

(7th Cir. 2011). We believe that Castleman resolves the question before our court,

however, because there the Court held that even though the act of poisoning a drink

does not involve physical force, "the act of employing poison knowingly as a device

to cause physical harm" does. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1415. The Court explained,

"[t]hat the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick or punch), does

not matter," because otherwise "one could say that pulling the trigger on a gun is not

a 'use of force' because it is the bullet, not the trigger, that actually strikes the victim." 

Id. 

visible marks associated with physical trauma." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102 (2006). 

This is similar to the definition of "bodily injury" under Tennessee law which the

Castleman Court concluded "necessitate[d] [the use of] force." See Castleman, 134

S. Ct. at 1414.

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On the record here, we therefore conclude that Rice's battery conviction was for

a crime of violence and that the district court correctly calculated his base offense

level under § 2K2.1 of the guidelines. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Rice’s base offense level was calculated pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3)(B),

based on the assumption that he had previously committed a crime of violence. An

offense is a “crime of violence” if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1). 

Relying on the definition of “physical force” in the context of the Armed Career

Criminal Act, Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), we have said that

“[p]hysical force” as used in § 4B1.2(a)(1) refers to “violent force.” United States v.

Williams, 690 F.3d 1056, 1067–68 (8th Cir. 2012).

By contrast, the Supreme Court’s decision in Castleman involved the definition

of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). United

States v. Castleman 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1408 (2014). Like “crime of violence” in

§ 4B1.2(a)(1), the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is defined to

include offenses that have, “as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force.” 

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). But Castleman held that in the context of misdemeanor

domestic violence, “physical force” must be defined more broadly, to encompass not

just “violent force” but also the common-law meaning of “force” – a meaning that

included “even the slightest offensive touching.” Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410–13

(quoting Johnson, 559 U.S. at 139). The Court explained that the word “‘violence’

standing alone ‘connotes a substantial degree of force,’” but domestic violence is not

just a type of “violence” but rather “a term of art encompassing acts that one might not

characterize as ‘violent’ in a nondomestic context.” Id. at 1411 (quoting Johnson, 559

U.S. at 140). Castleman’s conclusion that causing bodily injury required the

application of physical force was based on this broader definition of “physical force,”

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as the Court repeatedly emphasized. See, e.g., id. at 1415 (“It is impossible to cause

bodily injury without applying force in the common-law sense.” (emphasis added));

id. at 1414 (“[T]he common-law concept of ‘force’ encompasses even its indirect

application.” (emphasis added)).

This case, on the other hand, involves the definition of “crime of violence” in

USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1). The question at the heart of the case, then, is whether

intentionally or knowingly causing physical or bodily injury to another, as Arkansas

Code Annotated § 5-13-202(a)(4) requires, necessarily involves the use, threatened

use, or attempted use of violent force by the defendant. This question could not have

been implicitly resolved by Castleman, for the majority opinion there explicitly

reserved it. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414 (2014) (“Justice SCALIA’s

concurrence suggests that [bodily injury] necessitate[s] violent force, under Johnson’s

definition of that phrase. But whether or not that is so – a question we do not decide –

these forms of injury do necessitate force in the common-law sense.” (emphasis

added) (citation omitted)).3

A number of courts and judges, including a clear plurality of the courts of

appeals, have concluded that a person may cause physical or bodily injury without

using violent force. Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463, 469–72 (1st Cir. 2015); United

States v. Torres-Miguel, 701 F.3d 165, 168–69 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.

Villegas-Hernandez, 468 F.3d 874, 880–82 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. PerezVargas, 414 F.3d 1282, 1286–87 (10th Cir. 2005); Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d

188, 196 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fischer, 641 F.3d 1006, 1010–11 (8th Cir.

2011) (Colloton, J., concurring); United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 404–05

(6th Cir. 2012) (White, J., concurring). In my view, they are correct. A person could,

for example, direct a firefighter acting in the line of duty to drive towards a bridge at

3

See also id. at 1413 (“Whether or not the causation of bodily injury necessarily

entails violent force – a question we do not reach – mere offensive touching does

not.” (emphasis added)).

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night, knowing that it was out. Or he might cancel an incompetent individual’s insulin

prescription, knowing her to be severely diabetic. Or he could, on finding out that a

60-year-old was going skydiving, suggest that she use a parachute that he knew was

defective. Each of these examples would qualify as a violation of § 5-13-202(a)(4),

but none could reasonably be described as involving the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of violent force, because none involves a “substantial degree of force.” 

Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1411 (quoting Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140). “[T]he ordinary

meaning of [a ‘crime of violence’] . . . suggests a category of violent, active crimes”

quite unlike the examples just given. Id. at 1410 n.3 (second alteration and ellipsis in

original) (quoting Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140).4

Because I believe it is possible to violate § 5-13-202(a)(4) without using violent

force, I conclude that Rice’s conviction under that statute does not qualify as a crime

of violence as that term is defined in § 4B1.2(a)(1). For that reason, I respectfully

dissent. 

______________________________

4

United States v. Salido-Rosas, 662 F.3d 1254, 1256–57 (8th Cir. 2011), does

not compel a contrary conclusion. Although analyzing the definition of the “use of

force” clause found in application note 1(B)(iii) of section 2L1.2 of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines, Salido-Rosas based its conclusions at least in part on the

analysis of the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act in James v. United

States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007) – an analysis that has since been rejected in Johnson

v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). See Salido-Rosas, 662 F.3d at 1257.

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