Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07121/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07121-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cynthia D. Curry
Appellee
District of Columbia
Appellant
Condwell Freeman
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 1999 Decided November 9, 1999

No. 98-7121

Cynthia D. Curry,

Appellee

v.

District of Columbia,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01088)

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for the appellant. Jo Anne Robinson, Interim

Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on brief.

Elizabeth Margaret Boyle argued the cause for the appellee. Ted Justice Williams was on brief.

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Before: Wald, Henderson and Randolph, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed Per Curiam.

Circuit Judge Henderson filed a separate opinion.

Circuit Judge Wald filed a separate opinion.

Circuit Judge Randolph filed a separate opinion.

Per Curiam: In accordance with the accompanying separate opinions, the district court's order denying the motion for

judgment as a matter of law is affirmed in part and reversed

in part and the district court's judgment on the verdict for

plaintiff is affirmed.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge:

Cynthia D. Curry brought suit against her employer, appellant District of Columbia (District), claiming sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e et seq. The source of the

alleged sexual harassment was a co-worker in the District's

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). Following trial in

the district court, a jury awarded Curry $100,000 in damages.

The District filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law

or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur. Upon the

district court's denial of its motion, Curry v. District of

Columbia, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998), the District appealed. On appeal, the District challenges both the jury's finding

of liability and the award of damages. As explained below,

we affirm the district court's denial of post-trial relief in part

and reverse in part. In addition, I would remand for further

proceedings as to damages.

I.

Curry joined the MPD as a uniformed officer in October

1986. Six years later, she was transferred to the Domestic

Security Section of the MPD's Intelligence Unit where she

met Detective Condwell Freeman. Curry and Freeman soon

began an intimate relationship which lasted about six months

and then "just ended" in April 1993. Joint Appendix (JA)

111.

In July 1993 Curry was again transferred to a different

unit and did not return to the Intelligence Unit until the

following May. Upon Curry's return, Freeman began a daily

routine of telling her sexual jokes and suggesting, while

grabbing his crotch, that she allow him to "slip her the

lizard."1 JA 112-13. This conduct continued from mid-May

1994 until August 12, 1994, when Curry stopped speaking to

Freeman.

In early September 1994 Curry told Sergeant Jacob Major,

who was her (and Freeman's) direct supervisor, that Freeman

had been sexually harassing her. Her report followed a

three-week period for which Major, who was on vacation

during that period, had appointed Freeman acting sergeant in

charge of the Unit. Upon his return, Major admonished

Curry for submitting an untimely report. Curry explained

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that she had completed the work but waited for Major's

return before re-submitting the report because she wanted to

avoid Freeman.2 Major then referred Curry to the MPD

Labor Relations, EEO Office. Adhering to the MPD's formal

complaint procedure, Major initially denied Curry's request

that he speak with Freeman about the problem. Subsequently, however, Major asked Freeman about the allegations,

which Freeman denied, and advised Freeman that sexual

harassment would not be tolerated. Major also alerted Lieutenant Cheryl Peacock, the MPD's EEO Officer, to Curry's

complaint. Although Curry did not contact the EEO Office

until September 30, Peacock began to investigate the matter

immediately. The investigation lasted over four months and

included interviews of Freeman and other co-workers.

__________

1 Curry understood from their earlier relationship that Freeman's

references to "lizard" and "zard" meant his penis.

2 Freeman had ordered Curry to make corrections to the first

draft of the report. Finding certain corrections had not been made,

Freeman demanded them again for the second draft. Curry told

him she thought he was harassing her for rebuffing his sexual

overtures and that she intended to wait for Major's return before

re-submitting the report.

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On September 30, 1994 Curry filed a complaint with the

MPD's EEO Office. Earlier that day, Freeman, while speaking loudly to a third party in earshot of Curry, had stated

repeatedly that he would sue anyone who made unsubstantiated allegations against him. Curry at that time told Peacock

about Freeman's "lizard" remarks, including that they had

ceased. She also reported the incident involving the redrafted reports when Freeman was acting sergeant and Freeman's

remarks she had overheard that morning. Curry reported no

other form of harassment. Shortly thereafter, she requested

and received a transfer to the Analytical Section of the

Intelligence Unit, which was on the same floor as the Domestic Security Section but in a different wing of the building.

JA 497. Roughly ten months later, during August 1995, the

MPD undertook a wholesale reorganization of its offices

which put Curry's and Freeman's offices in closer proximity.

On January 23, 19953 the EEO Office issued a report on its

investigation of Curry's charges. The report found probable

cause to believe Freeman had verbally harassed Curry, that

is, probable cause "to sustain the allegations that sexual

harassment has occurred."4 JA 776. Peacock, the investigating officer who authored the report, testified that "the workplace ... was filled with sexual jokes, sexual language." JA

306. Captain Alan Dreher, the head of the Intelligence Unit,

learned of the report and personally admonished Freeman

that sexual harassment would not be tolerated and, if it was

going on, it was to stop. The EEO Office advised Curry by

letter that she could file a complaint with the District's

Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development (DHR).5 The EEO Office's finding notwithstanding,

__________

3 The EEO Office's investigative report bears a January 23, 1996

date stamp. JA 771. As the parties and the record make clear, the

correct date of the report is January 23, 1995. See Br. of Appellant

at 14; Br. of Appellee at 3; JA 798.

4 The report responded to Curry's formal complaint of verbal

harassment.

5 The MPD's EEO Office and the parties refer to the DHR as the

"Office of Human Rights" and the "OHR." E.g., JA 798. Its

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the MPD's collective bargaining agreement and D.C. Code

s 1-617.1(b-1)(1) (1992)6 prohibited the MPD from taking

disciplinary action against an officer more than forty-five days

after the MPD became aware of the officer's improper conduct. Peacock's investigation took more than forty-five days

to complete and the District took no formal disciplinary action

against Freeman. In June 1996 Curry transferred to the

Court Intelligence Unit.

Although she made no mention of it until November 1995,

Curry also claimed Freeman regularly glared at her in a

harassing manner from the time his verbal harassment

ceased in August 1994 until her June 1996 transfer out of the

Unit. She testified that Freeman "would look at [her] in a

way that made [her] most uncomfortable, as if he was undressing [her]." JA 235. Although Curry never invoked the

MPD's formal complaint procedure with regard to Freeman's

glaring, she did report it to supervisory personnel. She first

complained on November 7, 1995, during a telephone conversation initiated by Lieutenant Emmogean Simpson-Jones of

the MPD's Labor Relations, EEO Office, who asked her how

things were going. Although the record is unclear, apparently sometime between November 7 and December 14, 1995

Curry also requested that the MPD transfer Freeman. On

December 14, 1995 the EEO Office issued a memorandum in

which the MPD's EEO Director Brenda Wilmore noted that

Curry complained she was "experiencing a 'hostile environment,' because [Freeman] constantly 'glare[d]' at [her]" and

that there was "no verbal communication" between the two.

JA 760. The memorandum concluded that "agency constraints" left the EEO Office unable to act on her request to

__________

proper name is as noted in the text. JA 761. Ultimately, on June

10, 1996 the DHR also found probable cause to believe that Freeman sexually harassed Curry. JA 761.

6 In 1995 section 1-617.1(b-1)(1) provided that "no corrective

adverse action shall be commenced pursuant to this section more

than 45 days ... after the date that the agency knew or should

have known of the act or occurrence allegedly constituting cause."

It has since been repealed. See D.C. Code s 1-617.1 (1999).

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transfer Freeman.7 The Director did offer to help Curry

transfer if she so desired. At that time Lieutenant Alton

Bigelow, another EEO officer, advised Freeman of Curry's

report about his glaring and "warned him against acts of

intimidation." JA 764. Bigelow asked Freeman to agree to a

transfer, a request Freeman declined.8

II.

This court reviews de novo the trial court's denial of a

motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative,

for a new trial. Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit

Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The jury verdict

stands "unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences that

can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men

and women could not disagree on the verdict." Smith v.

Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, evidence supporting the verdict must be "more than merely

colorable; it must be significantly probative." Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

A.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful

for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-2(a)(1).

A claim of sexual harassment is cognizable under this provision if the alleged harassment alters, either expressly or

__________

7 The memorandum uses the term "agency constraints" without

elaboration. Although there was evidence that the term referred to

the forty-five day rule, JA 378, 380, apparently the MPD's collective

bargaining agreement prohibited an officer's involuntary transfer

for disciplinary reasons, the precise request Curry made regarding

the glaring. See Br. of Appellant at 15; JA 538.

8 Curry testified that she also reported the glaring to Bigelow but

the record does not reflect when or how. JA 285.

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constructively, the terms or conditions of an individual's

employment. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986). Courts describe an explicit

alteration as "quid pro quo" harassment and a constructive

alteration as "hostile work environment" harassment. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998). To

be actionable, however, the latter must be severe or pervasive. Id.; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.

Ct. 998, 1002-03 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.

17, 21 (1993).

An employer's liability for a hostile work environment

sexual harassment claim differs depending on who does the

harassing. The harasser can be a supervisor or someone else

whose position in the workplace affords authority over the

target of the harassment such that the harasser is aided by

the "agency relation" in harassing the other employee. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269; see Mikels v. City of Durham, 183

F.3d 323, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1999) ("The fundamental determinant of this form of vicarious liability is not, therefore, the

harasser's formal rank vis-a-vis that of the victim in the

particular employment hierarchy, ... but whether the particular conduct was aided by the agency relation.") (internal

quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court

recently clarified the employer liability standard for supervisory harassment of an employee in Ellerth and Faragher v.

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).9 There the Supreme

Court further noted that circuit courts had not determined

employer liability for co-worker harassment in the same way.

See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799. In Faragher the Court

further noted and declined to disturb the general agreement

among circuits that a negligence standard governs employer

liability for a co-worker's harassment. Id. at 799-801. Every

circuit that has addressed co-worker harassment in the "post-

__________

9 The Supreme Court announced inter alia that the employer can

be held vicariously liable even if the employer did not know of the

harassment. If no "tangible employment action" results from the

harassment, the employer may avoid liability by asserting a twopart affirmative defense. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804-07.

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Faragher era" has distinguished the standard applicable to

co-worker harassment from that governing harassment by a

supervisor, applying to the former a variation of the negligence standard the circuit had applied pre-Faragher.10

While the reasonableness of an employer's response to

sexual harassment is at issue under both standards, the

plaintiff must clear a higher hurdle under the negligence

standard, where she bears the burden of establishing her

employer's negligence, than under the vicarious liability standard, where the burden shifts to the employer to prove its

own reasonableness and the plaintiff's negligence. See Shaw

__________

10 See Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,

180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing Faragher and then

concluding "[i]n contrast, if the harasser is the victim's co-worker,

the employer will be liable only if it is negligent, that is, if it either

provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment and did nothing about it") (internal quotation marks omitted);

Mikels, 183 F.3d at 332 (no vicarious liability for co-worker harassment); Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1999)

(imposing liability if employer "knew or should have known of the

harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action"

and noting standard "was not disturbed by Faragher or Burlington"); Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating

"[e]mployer liability for co-worker harassment is based directly on

the employer's conduct" and employer is liable if it "knew or should

have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action"); Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.3d 500, 508 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Liability for co-worker

harassment requires a showing of negligence ... [so] a plaintiff

must show that her employer failed to take reasonable steps to

discover and remedy the harassment."); Dhyne v. Meiners Thriftway, Inc., 184 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting distinction

between types of harassment and stating "[o]ur court has long

recognized that an employer may be directly liable ... if it knew or

should have known of the conduct and failed to take proper remedial action"); Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 955 (9th

Cir. 1999) (employer liable only for what management knew or

should have known in co-worker harassment scenario); Wilson v.

Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534, 541 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting

distinction between vicarious liability and negligence standard).

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v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812 n.2 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he

reasonableness of the employer's actions in preventing and

responding to sexual harassment is relevant under both standards, the difference being who bears the burden of proof.").

Indeed, in Faragher the Supreme Court reasoned that a

supervisor's harassment is both more detrimental (or threatens to be) to the terms and conditions of an individual's

employment and more difficult to stop or have stopped than

similar behavior by a co-worker. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at

803. Moreover, the employer has a greater opportunity to

guard against the misconduct of supervisors than that of

fellow employees, see id., and, inversely, an employee has a

greater opportunity to stop harassment by a co-worker in the

first instance. See id. ("When a fellow employee harasses,

the victim can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but

it may be difficult to offer such responses to a supervisor....").

Our circuit has not articulated an employer liability standard for co-worker harassment since the Faragher and Ellerth decisions nor had it squarely done so before.11 Consistent with the approach of our sister circuits recognized in

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799, we announce the following standard:12 An employer may be held liable for the harassment of

one employee by a fellow employee (a non-supervisor) if the

employer knew or should have known of the harassment and

__________

11 In Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court

distinguished, in a footnote, a case involving harassment by a

supervisor from those involving harassment by co-workers "who

differ radically from supervisors in the scheme of vicarious liability." 753 F.2d at 147 n.45. And in a supervisor harassment case,

Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995), we noted without

comment the parties' recognition that the negligence standard

applies in certain circumstances. 59 F.3d at 1397.

12 Both parties get the standard wrong, to wit: Curry asserts that

the employer liability standard for supervisory harassment applies,

Br. of Appellee at 10-14, and the District proposes a modified

supervisory harassment standard for co-worker harassment, Br. of

Appellant at 28-31.

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failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.13

Curry's complaint specified two kinds of harassment for

which we must determine whether a reasonable jury could

find that the District knew or should have known of the

harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate

corrective action.14 The first occurred from May 1994 to mid-

__________

13 The district court's jury charge used a negligence standard:

"Plaintiff must prove that management level employees knew or

should have known of the alleged sexual harassment ... and failed

to take immediate and appropriate corrective action." JA 742-43.

Delay inherent in personnel actions, however, particularly in large

organizations, does not necessarily render an otherwise reasonable

response inadequate. See Waymire v. Harris County, 86 F.3d 424,

429 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[I]n analyzing the promptness of response it is

important to keep in mind the entity's lines of command [and]

organization format.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Dhyne, 184 F.3d at 988 ("An employer must be allowed some time

to gauge the credibility of the complainant and the seriousness of

the situation if we are to observe the Supreme Court's caution that

Title VII is not 'a general civility code for the American workplace.' ") (quoting Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002).

14 Given the differences in Freeman's behavior (explicitly sexual

verbal harassment at first and silent "glaring" subsequently) and,

more important, the manner in which Curry handled each (Curry

applied self-help to the verbal harassment and reported it after it

had ceased while she waited more than one year before complaining

about the glaring), we believe each kind of harassment, and the

District's responses thereto, should be analyzed separately. Cf.

Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners Local No. 33, 921

F.2d 396, 401-02 (1st Cir. 1990) (no continuing violation because

plaintiff "believed, at every turn, he was being discriminated

against" but failed to file timely claim for earlier incidents); Rush v.

Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1997)

(continuing violation where harassment intensified after plaintiff

filed EEOC charge); see generally West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,

45 F.3d 744, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1995) (in determining continuing

violation vel non, court considered similarity, continuity and frequency of offensive conduct and whether harassment caused discrete event triggering duty to assert rights); Berry v. Board of

August 1994 and consisted of Freeman's blatantly sexual

remarks. No supervisor ever heard them. Neither Curry

nor anyone else made them known to a supervisor or EEO

official until after the conduct had ceased. Although a reasonable jury could have found from the evidence that Curry's

workplace was filled with sexual banter, that fact alone cannot

support a finding that the District should have known of

Freeman's harassment of Curry, especially in the absence of

any similar problems or complaints. The District had in

place a policy against harassment, it had made its policy

known and it had established an effective complaint procedure. The District, therefore, was entitled to rely on its

employees to bring problems with their co-workers to its

attention.

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ed quickly and reasonably. Major advised EEO Officer

Peacock of Curry's complaint even before Curry lodged a

formal complaint and Peacock began her investigation immediately. Major also admonished Freeman that, if he was

harassing Curry, he was to stop immediately. The probable

cause finding four months later led to a similar warning by

Captain Dreher, the head of the Intelligence Unit. Although

the District took no formal disciplinary action, the clear,

prompt admonitions were appropriate and, at least for this

conduct, effective. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence supporting the verdict as to Freeman's verbal harassment occurring between May and August 1994 was, at most,

"merely colorable," Smith, 135 F.3d at 782, and we therefore

reverse the district court's denial of the District's motion for

judgment as a matter of law to the extent it encompasses that

conduct.15

__________

Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983) (setting forth three

factors for determining if plaintiff alleges continuing violation: (1)

subject matter; (2) frequency; and (3) degree of permanence which,

inter alia, may trigger plaintiff's duty to assert rights).

15 Judge Wald is "puzzled" by this statement (Op. of Wald, J. at

1) and is "unclear what exactly the panel is reversing, and why."

(Id. at 1.) The jury verdict necessarily determined the District's

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According to Curry, the second type of harassment began

when the first ended. Thus, from mid-August 1994 until

her transfer in June 1996, Curry experienced sexual harassment in the form of Freeman's glaring at her.16 Neverthe-

__________

liability for the verbal sexual harassment. The district court then

denied the District's motion for judgment as a matter of law and, to

the extent its denial reaffirmed the District's liability for the verbal

sexual harassment, we reverse that denial--in short the District is

not liable to the plaintiff for the verbal sexual harassment because it

had no notice of the conduct until after the conduct had ceased. Its

response once it learned of the conduct was appropriate as a matter

of law. The District is liable, however, for the subsequent nonverbal harassment, and we therefore partially affirm the district court's

denial of the District's post trial motion, because we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the District's response was appropriate once it learned of the nonverbal harassment.

16 Although the District, in its post-trial motion below, disputed

the hostile work environment finding based on Freeman's glaring

JA 808, it does not raise the issue on appeal. If it had, this appeal

might have been disposed of at an earlier analytical stage, namely,

in determining whether the conduct is sufficiently severe to create a

hostile work environment. "Discriminatory conduct results in a

hostile work environment when it is so severe or pervasive that it

create[s] a work environment abusive to employees because of their

race, gender, religion, or national origin, thus offending Title VII's

broad rule of workplace equality." Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d

904, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 22) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In determining if the plaintiff satisfies

this requirement, the court must consider all of the circumstances,

including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Other

courts have held that a co-worker's staring, even when accompanied

by physical touching, is not conduct severe enough to alter the

terms and conditions of an individual's employment. See generally

Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1998)

(teasing plaintiff, police department employee, that waving at squad

cars makes her look like prostitute, comments to her about bananas,

rubber bands and low-neck tops, staring and attempts to make eye

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less, Curry first brought this harassment to light on November 7, 1995 in response to a supervisor's inquiry. Until

then, the District reasonably believed all problems between

Curry and Freeman had been resolved. She never filed a

formal complaint regarding Freeman's glaring. In response

to the complaint Curry did voice to Simpson-Jones over the

telephone, however, an EEO officer (Bigelow) simply told

Freeman about the complaint, warned him against the objectionable conduct (which he denied) and requested that he

voluntarily transfer. EEO Director Wilmore then sent Curry a memorandum informing her the only available remedy

was her own transfer. In view of this evidence, especially

the fact that Freeman by this point was a "repeat offender,"

see Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 676 (10th

Cir. 1998),17 we cannot say that "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so onesided that reasonable men and women could not disagree"

on the adequacy of the District's response once it knew of

Freeman's glaring. Smith, 135 F.3d at 782. We therefore

affirm the district court's denial of the District's motion for

__________

contact and four isolated incidents in which co-worker briefly

touched plaintiff's arm, fingers or buttocks fall within the "safe

harbor for employers"); Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,

168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999) (stares and arm touching were not

severe where none was physically threatening or likely to undermine reasonable plaintiff's workplace competence).

17 "The employer is, of course, obliged to respond to any repeat

conduct; and whether the next employer response is reasonable

may very well depend upon whether the employer progressively

stiffens its discipline, or vainly hopes that no response, or the same

response as before, will be effective." 144 F.3d at 676; see also

Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 702 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Factors

in assessing the reasonableness of remedial measures may include

the amount of time that elapsed between the notice and remedial

action, the options available to the employer, possibly including

employee training sessions, transferring the harassers, written

warnings, reprimands in personnel files, or termination, and whether or not the measures ended the harassment.") (citations omitted)

(emphasis added).

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judgment as a matter of law with regard to Freeman's

glaring.18

B.

The District challenges the district court's denial of its

post-trial motion requesting, in the alternative, remittitur of

the $100,000 damages award. See 9 F. Supp. 2d at 4. We

order remittitur only where, after a "detailed appraisal" of

the evidence bearing on damages, we find the award grossly

excessive. See Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S.

156, 159 (1968). An award is grossly excessive if "it is so

__________

18 In addition to challenging liability, the District appeals the trial

court's admission into evidence of portions of the DHR probable

cause report. Curry disputes that the District preserved its objection below, Br. of Appellee at 16, and the record is unclear on the

issue. Compare Reply Br. at 18 and JA 6-32 with JA 149-56, 371-

77. Assuming arguendo the District properly objected below, its

objection was based on Rule 403, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and we believe the district court's reasons are sufficient for us to

conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

evidence. See 9 F. Supp. 2d at 3-4.

The District also challenges the district court's failure to charge

the jury that an employee who at one time has a consensual

intimate relationship with a co-worker is obliged to tell the coworker that advances are no longer welcome. Whether familiarity

of a sexual nature is "unwelcome" is a question of fact. See

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 ("[T]he question whether particular conduct

was indeed unwelcome ... turns largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact, ... [and t]he correct inquiry is

whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged

sexual advances were unwelcome...."). Here, the district court

properly presented to the jury Curry's and Freeman's past history

as a factor for it to consider in determining harassment vel non.

JA 743 ("The Defendant contends that Detective Curry had engaged in welcome sexual conduct with Detective Freeman and

therefore, she had a burden to inform the District when the conduct

became unwelcome, which she failed to do."). The lapse of time

between the end of their relationship and the alleged harassment,

coupled with Freeman's persistence in spite of Curry's unresponsiveness, are sufficient to support a finding of harassment.

inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit

of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly

operate." Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018,

1024 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Williams v. Stewart Motor Co.,

494 F.2d 1074, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). We allow remittitur,

however, "only if the reduction permits the highest amount

the jury tolerably could have awarded." Langevine, 106 F.3d

at 1024 (quoting Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116,

135 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The jury's liability verdict itself reveals the district court's

legal error in denying a new trial on damages. As the trial

court's order makes clear, the court and the jury considered

the harassment beginning in May 1994, which consisted of the

"lizard" remarks, as well as the glaring that began some

three months later. With the District's liability limited to the

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"glaring" harassment, Curry's damages must likewise be

limited: she can recover only for the glaring that occurred

after she reported it on November 7, 1995 and continued until

her departure in June 1996. At trial, however, the damages

evidence covered, as the district court emphasized, see

9 F. Supp. 2d at 4, a two year period as opposed to the eight

months for which the District can be held liable. Moreover,

Curry's physical problems, including acne, nightmares, headaches, loss of appetite and accompanying weight loss, occurred sometime in 1994, nearly one full year, if not more,

before she reported the glaring. The corroborating testimony of both Curry's sister and Curry's prayer partner, which

described a "dramatic change in [Curry's] appearance and

behavior," 9 F. Supp. 2d at 4, related to late 1994.19

Curry's damages evidence also included the testimony of

her pastor and her supervisor after she transferred to the

Court Intelligence Unit in June 1996. Curry's pastor, Reverend Thomas J. Baltimore, testified that he had counseled her

for more than three years. The two worked "through a

__________

19 Although her sister testified that Curry's acne was "just now

starting to clear," JA 426, Curry testified only to physical problems

that developed "when [the harassment] first started occurring." JA

170.

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number of crises" which, apart from the workplace harassment, included her father's death and "conflicts" with other

family members and fellow church members. JA 477-78.

Baltimore testified that he continued to counsel Curry, who

"worries [him] to death." JA 477. William E. Wagner, her

supervisor after she transferred, testified that Curry was

emotionally upset in July 1996, manifested by her difficulty in

concentrating and sitting still and by "paranoi[a] in her

work."20 JA 472. Curry eventually told him that her problems related to the pending sexual harassment litigation.

Curry also testified that she was reluctant to seek counseling

from a psychiatrist or psychologist because she feared it

would jeopardize her eligibility to obtain a higher level of

security clearance which she eventually attained.

In my view, the damages award exceeds "the maximum

limit of a reasonable range" of damages for Freeman's glaring harassment which occurred over a period of eight months

and caused Curry some degree of emotional upset. Although

Freeman and Curry apparently had nearby offices during

that time, they no longer worked together. Assuming the

glaring occurred every time Curry saw Freeman, her contact

with him was isolated, incidental to her law enforcement

duties and passing. On these facts, I believe that an award of

$100,000 in damages is grossly excessive. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Stuckey, 952 F.2d 1418, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ($50,000

was excessive for permanent "significant injury" to finger);

Johnson v. Parrish, 827 F.2d 988, 991 (4th Cir. 1987)

($150,000 was excessive for partially disabling neck and arm

injury).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's denial of the

District's motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the

__________

20 Wagner described Curry's paranoia as follows: "She would do

something and immediately bring it to me for approval to see if it

was done properly. Overly to the point where I spent a lot of time

just overlooking her work that she did because she would keep

bringing it to me." JA 472.

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alternative, for a new trial or remittitur is affirmed in part,

that is, as it relates to the District's liability for the sexual

harassment Curry first reported in November 1995. With

regard to the District's liability for harassment occurring

before that date, the district court's denial of the motion for

judgment as a matter of law is reversed. I would remand the

damages award to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. See Hutchinson, 952 F.2d at

1423 n.5.

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Wald, Circuit Judge: The Supreme Court recently defined

negligence by an employer in the Title VII context: "An

employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it

knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to

stop it." Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759

(1998). There is ample evidence in this record to support the

jury's verdict that the District of Columbia was negligent in

not stopping the sexual harassment of Det. Cynthia Curry by

Det. Condwell Freeman, and that because of its negligence

Curry suffered $100,000 worth of damages.

At the outset, I agree with my colleagues that no finding of

liability could be sustained against the District based solely

on its conduct in the period May-August 1994, since there is

not sufficient evidence on this record that the District was on

notice of Freeman's harassing behavior until Curry's complaint in September 1994.1 I am somewhat puzzled, however,

by my colleagues' statement that "we ... reverse the district

court's denial of the District's motion for judgment as a

matter of law to the extent it encompasses that conduct."

Henderson Op. at 11. The district court was quite clear in its

denial of the District's motion for judgment as a matter of law

(j.m.l.) that "[t]here was sufficient evidence introduced at trial

that would support a finding of continued harassment after

the time Defendant claims it had notice." Curry v. District

of Columbia, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1998) (emphasis

added). Since there is no reason to believe the district

court's order was based on faulty analysis, I am unclear what

exactly my colleagues are reversing, and why.

__________

1 This is not to say, of course, that actual notice is always

required to hold an employer liable for co-worker sexual harassment under Title VII. See, e.g., Williamson v. City of Houston, 148

F.3d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[c]onstructive notice can result from

showing the pervasiveness of the harassment.") (internal quotation

marks omitted); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 644, 673

(10th Cir. 1998) ("[M]any courts have held that the pervasiveness of

sexual harassment can properly lead to an inference of knowledge."); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988)

(incidents of harassment so numerous that employer held liable for

not discovering and ending harassment).

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It appears that my colleagues, the district court, and I all

agree that the District can be found liable for harassment

which occurred after it had notice. See Henderson Op. at 9-

10, 11-12 n.15. The only question before us then is whether

the damages the jury awarded Curry are "beyond all reason

or so great as to shock the conscience. Courts may not set

aside a jury verdict merely deemed to be generous; rather,

the verdict must be so unreasonably high as to result in a

miscarriage of justice." Langevine v. District of Columbia,

106 F.3d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). In my view, the jury's award of

$100,000 to a police officer who suffered years of harassment

does not remotely qualify as a miscarriage of justice, whether

Curry can recover for damages incurred before November 7,

1995, as I would find, or only for damages incurred after that

date, as my colleagues find.

"[T]he jury's verdict will withstand challenge unless the

evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women

could not disagree on the verdict." Swanks v. WMATA, 179

F.3d 929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). I

believe on the evidence in the record a reasonable jury could

have found the following facts.

Curry was harassed continually from May 1994 until she

transferred out of her unit in June 1996. At first, the

harassment took the form of daily requests for sexual favors,

which Curry testified she told Freeman were not appreciated.2 After Curry brought this verbal harassment to her

supervisor's attention, he went to Freeman and asked him "to

stop whatever you are doing to Cindy." J.A. at 786. Freeman then threatened to sue Curry if she pursued a harassment complaint, and said he would "take [her] home and [her]

automobile." J.A. at 779. Freeman stopped making his daily

requests for sex, but instead began to harass her by glaring

__________

2 Curry stated she did not complain at first about Freeman's

behavior because, based on what she had seen happen to other

female police officers, she did not think it would be good for her

career if she complained. She seems to have been prescient in that

regard.

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at her in an intimidating way and by staring at her as if he

were mentally undressing her.3 After a month or two of this

behavior, Curry sought a transfer out of her office to avoid

Freeman.

The Metropolitan Police Department investigated Curry's

complaint and concluded that there was probable cause that

Freeman was verbally harassing Curry. However, the Department was unable to take any action against Freeman

because its investigation took roughly four months, and thenD.C. law prohibited disciplining an MPD employee more than

45 working days after the Department had notice of the cause

for discipline. MPD could not even transfer Freeman to

another unit without his consent, which he declined to give.

Freeman's supervisor testified that he did not learn the

__________

3 I disagree with the gratuitous dicta in Judge Henderson's

opinion that Freeman's glares may not have been sufficiently severe

to be actionable under Title VII. See Henderson Op. at 12-13 n.16.

Whether harassing behavior was sufficient to create a hostile work

environment is an intensely fact-based question. See Howard v.

Burn Bros., 149 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Once there is

evidence of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in

the hands of the jury."); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100,

105 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Whether Moore's harassment was sufficiently

severe or pervasive is quintessentially a question of fact."), vacated

in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th. Cir. 1990) (en banc).

The fact that other courts have found harassing behavior which

included staring not to be actionable does not establish any sort of

generalization that "a co-worker's staring, even when accompanied

by physical touching, is not conduct severe enough" to be actionable. Henderson Op. at 12 n.16. There was ample evidence

presented that Freeman's harassment affected Curry's ability to

work, and it is far from clear that no reasonable person would have

been affected by Freeman's intimidation tactics. Cf. Shepherd v.

Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999)

(finding boorish behavior not actionable because it did not undermine plaintiff's workplace competence); see also Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 536 n.18 (7th Cir. 1993) (mere

presence of an employee who has engaged in particularly severe

harassment can create hostile work environment); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 883 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).

results of the Department's investigation of Freeman until

trial, and expressed his view that "[i]t would gain the Department nothing for me to know" that the investigation had

found probable cause that Freeman was harassing Curry.

J.A. at 537. Similarly, a year later, when Curry complained

about the constant glaring she was experiencing, the MPD

told her that it was unable to do anything to help her.4

Meanwhile, Curry was ostracized as a result of the complaints

she filed.

Given this record evidence, I cannot credit my colleague's

confident assertion that the District "had established an

effective complaint procedure." Henderson Op. at 11. The

record shows that the only results of Curry's two complaints

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tion which substantiated Curry's allegations (but whose results were never shared with Freeman's supervisor), and the

ostracism of Curry.5

This meager response is not, in my view, consistent with

what courts have required of a reasonable employer under

Title VII. "Title VII requires more than a mere request to

refrain from discriminatory conduct." Ellison v. Brady, 924

__________

4 An officer did ask Freeman to stop harassing Curry, but that

request had no effect.

5 In its effort to support the notion that the District acted

"quickly and reasonably," Judge Henderson's opinion considerably

overstates the evidence about what Freeman's supervisors said to

him. See Henderson Op. at 11. Far from issuing "clear, prompt

[and effective] admonitions," id., Freeman's supervisors merely

indicated in general terms that sexual harassment was not acceptable, and that if it was going on it should stop. See J.A. at 340-43,

496. There was no evidence that once the MPD concluded that

Freeman had been harassing Curry it said anything more serious to

him. In fact, the Department did not think it necessary to share

the results of the investigation with Freeman's supervisor. Further, I do not consider the "admonitions" to have been effective or

adequate, since their only apparent effect was to convert Freeman's

harassment from verbal requests for sex into silent but intimidating, sexually evaluative stares.

F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991). Where evidence of harassment

exists, an employer cannot avoid liability by simply making

known a general policy against harassment. See Jackson v.

Quanex Corp., -- F.3d --, --, 1999 WL 707766 at *17 (6th

Cir. Sept. 9, 1999); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d

664, 676 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Courts have explained that simply

indicating to a perpetrator the existence of a policy against

harassment is usually insufficient."); cf. J.A. at 342-43 (Capt.

Dreher testifying that "in the aftermath" of Curry's complaint, he "let it be known verbally to my officials to pass

along that it wouldn't be tolerated in the workplace"). This

court has previously found that agency managers should

"promptly take all necessary steps to investigate and correct

any harassment, including warnings and appropriate discipline directed at the offending party." Bundy v. Jackson,

641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wright, J.); accord

Yamaguchi v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d

F.3d 1475, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997) (remedial measures must be

reasonably calculated to end the current harassment and to

deter future harassment).

It is undisputed that Freeman was never disciplined for his

harassment. At the very least, a reasonable juror could

conclude that the failure to take any action against Freeman

for his verbal harassment contributed to Freeman's decision

to continue to harass Curry by staring at her. "Employers

send the wrong message to potential harassers when they do

not discipline employees for sexual harassment." Ellison,

924 F.2d at 882. "Title VII does not permit employers to

stand idly by once they learn that sexual harassment has

occurred. To do so amounts to a ratification of the prior

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harassment." Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1529

(9th Cir. 1995). "In such instances, the combined knowledge

and inaction may be seen as demonstrable negligence, or as

the employer's adoption of the offending conduct and its

results, quite as if they had been authorized affirmatively as

the employer's policy." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 789 (1998). Thus I believe that under precedent

from the Supreme Court, this court, and our sister circuits,

the District could be held liable for failing to take action to

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deter future harassment once it had knowledge of the harassment in September 1994.

A reasonable juror, admittedly, might have concluded that

the District's "admonitions" were sufficient to deter future

harassment. Compare Yamaguchi, 109 F.3d at 1483 ("[T]o

avoid liability an employer must take at least some form of

disciplinary action against a harassing co-worker ...."), with

Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 412 n.8, 414 (3d Cir.

1997) (remedy may be adequate as a matter of law even

where it fails to stop harassment, so long as it could reasonably have been expected to deter harassment; punitive action

not always necessary). But surely a reasonable juror would

not be compelled to reach that conclusion. See, e.g., Adler,

144 F.3d at 676 ("Repeat conduct may show the unreasonableness of prior responses."); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879

F.2d 100, 106-07 (4th Cir. 1989) (reasonable fact finder could

conclude that severe warning, delayed salary increase, and

similar punitive measures not adequate remedies), vacated in

part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).

My colleagues override the jury and the district court in

finding that the District cannot be held liable for harassment

occurring between September 1994 and November 1995 by

viewing the two phases of Freeman's harassment, the verbal

phase and the staring phase, as totally separate and unconnected. It is of course possible that a reasonable juror could

also view the situation in such a fragmented way, so that

Curry's complaint about the verbal aspect of Freeman's behavior provided no notice to the District that Freeman might

continue to harass her in other ways, and thus the District

had no remedial obligation following notice of the verbal

harassment because it did not recur in that precise form.

But cf. Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1529 (city always has obligation to

take remedial actions against harasser once it learns of

harassment); Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107 (employer's knowledge of prior harassment sufficient to impute liability for

later harassment in the absence of adequate remedial measures).

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However, it certainly cannot be assumed that all reasonable

jurors would have to view the evidence of harassment in that

compartmentalized way. In fact, it does not appear the MPD

itself understood Curry's complaint about glaring as completely separate from the earlier harassment. If it had, then

nothing would have barred the Department from disciplining

Freeman for the glaring--because the 45-day clock was

triggered only when the Department learned of a reason for

discipline. Yet, when Curry complained that Freeman's glaring was creating a hostile work environment, the MPD told

her, in less than 40 days, that it was unable to take any action

to solve the problem. The only reasonable explanation for

that powerlessness is that the Department was already on

notice of Freeman's behavior, but had failed to act within 45

days.6 Thus, the MPD believed that Freeman could not be

transferred in December 1995, because the MPD had been on

notice of his harassment since September 1994. But yet my

colleagues say that Curry cannot recover for pre-November

1995 damages, because the MPD was not on notice of Curry's

ongoing problems with Freeman until November 1995. That

result may make sense to my colleagues, but surely not every

reasonable juror would be compelled to so conclude.

My colleagues also assert that the District could not reasonably be faulted during the period when the verbal harassment had ceased and Curry had not yet complained to anyone

of the staring. But I do not believe that Title VII law

supports such a demarcation between the two types of

harassment such that the District's obligation to monitor the

type of harassment it knew about necessarily stops at the line

__________

6 Judge Henderson suggests the possibility that it was the MPD's

collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that prevented the transfer

of Freeman in December 1995. See Henderson Op. at 6 n.7.

However, Lt. Peacock's testimony was that the CBA prevented the

MPD from transferring an officer as an alternative to discipline,

where discipline was barred by the 45-day rule. See J.A. at 311-

12. Where the 45-day rule was not a barrier to discipline, Sgt.

Major testified that transfer of the offending officer was the usual

practice when there was probable cause to believe one officer had

sexually harassed another officer. See J.A. at 537-38.

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where a new kind of harassment begins. The District was on

notice that an identified employee had been harassing a coworker; it may therefore be held responsible for failing to

prevent the continuation of that harassment, whether in the

same form or a different form, and whether reported or not.

See Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 931 (5th Cir.

1999) (police department liable for harassment despite lack of

complaint by plaintiff where officer had made harassing remarks in past to other women officers; "despite having been

put on notice that [he] might be a problem, [the department]

had made no effort to supervise or constrain his behavior");

Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777,

784 (10th Cir. 1995) (prior harassment of other women can

serve as sufficient notice to hold employer liable for harassing

conduct of co-worker); Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107 (same);

Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635-36 (6th Cir. 1987) (fact

that company was aware that supervisor had harassed women

in past and took no remedial action could establish constructive notice of later harassment because it was evidence of

harassing tendencies and of the failure of company's antiharassment policy).

Finally, I believe my colleagues misunderstand the extent

of an employer's liability for co-worker harassment. Judge

Henderson's opinion appears to suggest that an employer's

liability only extends to the harassment which occurred after

the point at which it had knowledge. But that is not what the

cases say. See Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1529 (employer who fails to

take appropriate remedial action after notice liable for past

harassment even where harassment stopped after employer

received notice); see also Knabe, 114 F.3d at 413-14 (considering whether employer's response was sufficiently reasonable to avoid liability despite fact that plaintiff had quit the

day employer responded to her complaint). In fact, the

Supreme Court has also indicated that an employer's failure

to remedy harassment may constitute ratification of past

harassment: "[T]he combined knowledge and inaction may be

seen as ... the employer's adoption of the offending conduct

and its results, quite as if they had been authorized affirmatively as the employer's policy." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789;

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accord Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1529 (employer's failure to act

"amounts to a ratification of the prior harassment"). Thus,

regardless of the District's knowledge vel non of Freeman's

harassment prior to November 7, 1995, its failure to act after

that date could be found to constitute "adoption" of Freeman's conduct up to that point.7

In the end, we have before us here a classic case of

harassment. The evidence shows that Curry was harassed on

a continuous basis from May 1994 until June 1996, with only

partial relief occasioned by her repeated efforts to transfer

away from Freeman, which were temporarily successful in

1995 and finally successful in 1996. The MPD knew of

Curry's allegations in September 1994, and concluded they

were justified in January 1995. However, MPD was prohibited from doing anything to effectively address the problem by

the 45-day rule, so the only actions ever taken in response

were vague requests that if harassment were going on, it

should stop. Unsurprisingly, given these circumstances, the

harassment did not stop, although it changed to a more subtle

form. This case falls squarely within Ellerth: "An employer

is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or

should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it."

524 U.S. at 759; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789 ("[c]ombined knowledge and inaction may be seen as demonstrable

negligence ...."). Thus, I cannot agree with my colleagues

that Curry can recover only for harassment which occurred

after November 7, 1995.

In sum, I believe that the jury would have been fully

justified in awarding Curry compensation for damages suffered before November 1995. But, more than that, I do not

believe that the award of $100,000 was excessive, even adopt-

__________

7 There is no reason why this approach is inconsistent with Title

VII's " 'primary objective' " of preventing harassment, Faragher,

524 U.S. at 806, since an employer who acts appropriately once it

has knowledge will never be liable. On the contrary, it would be

strange if the particular date on which an employee made a futile

complaint had significance for the amount of damages for which she

could recover.

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ing my colleagues' view that compensable damages could only

accrue beginning in November 1995.8 Judge Henderson

states that "the jury considered the harassment beginning in

May 1994." Henderson Op. at 15. The jury returned a

general verdict. There is simply no evidence in the record as

to when the jury found that damages began to accrue, and

this court is required to uphold the jury's verdict if there is

any reasonable basis for it.9 Judge Henderson's opinion

appears to assume that because the jury heard evidence of

damages dating back to 1994, the jury's damage award was

based on the period 1994-1996, and therefore the jury would

have awarded less had it confined itself to the period after

November 1995. This inference is irrelevant to our review of

a jury verdict. We do not sit to second-guess the jury; we

can only order remittitur if the verdict is "beyond all reason."

Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1024. A reasonable jury could well

have found that the harassment which occurred from November 1995 to June 1996, when Curry left the unit, caused

Curry to suffer $100,000 in damages, especially when viewed

against the backdrop of Freeman's prior harassment.

Similarly, Judge Henderson's opinion appears to place

great weight on the fact that Curry's physical problems began

to manifest themselves in 1994, "nearly one full year, if not

more, before she reported the glaring." Henderson Op. at

15. The fact that Curry had suffered prior to November in

no way detracts from her damages from November onward.

Curry testified she had nightmares and felt the need to sleep

__________

8 It is not at all clear on what basis Judge Henderson's opinion

asserts, without citation to the record, that Curry's contact with

Freeman after November 1995 was "isolated, incidental ... and

passing." Henderson Op. at 16. Freeman testified that during this

time his office was roughly 25 feet from her desk. J.A. at 592. I

do not see how that fact supports an inference that the two had

merely isolated and passing contact with one another, particularly

given our deferential standard of review for a jury verdict. See

Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

9 Thus, there is no basis in the record for the assertion that "[t]he

jury verdict necessarily determined the District's liability for the

verbal sexual harassment." Henderson Op. at 11-12 n.15.

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with her gun next to her pillow. Her skin broke out, she had

headaches, and lost her appetite. Other witnesses testified

that she became extremely nervous and would call her sister

almost every night, very late, crying.

Moreover, I can find no evidence to support the suggestion

that damages ceased to accrue in June 1996. See Henderson

Op. at 15 (evidence on damages went beyond "the eight

months for which the District can be held liable"). William

Wagner supervised Curry after her transfer in June 1996,

and he testified that, even in the absence of Freeman, she

was "really emotionally upset." J.A. at 470. "[S]he was

having problems concentrating with the things that I was

trying to discuss with her, almost to the point that she was in

tears." Id. at 471. Curry's sister testified that Curry's skin

problems were, in March 1998, "just now starting to clear."

Id. at 426. Curry's sister also testified that Curry's face was

still "drawn in ... this is not what my sister looked like

[before 1994]." Id. at 427. Similarly, her pastor testified

that he had been counseling her, trying to help her regain her

confidence, from late 1994/early 1995 at least until trial in

March 1998.

The question then that the jury had to decide was what

amount would compensate Curry for the damage she suffered

from Freeman's harassment that can be attributed to the

District's negligence. There was substantial evidence before

the jury that Curry's damages continued until the time of

trial, and perhaps have continued to this day. Cf. id. at 806

(court instructing jury that it could award damages for "emotional and mental anguish and anxiety the Plaintiff has suffered or will continue to suffer") (emphasis added).

"A court must be especially hesitant to disturb a jury's

determination of damages in cases involving intangible and

non-economic injuries." Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1024. I see

no basis for concluding that an award of $100,000 for eight

months of harassment and years of stress is "beyond all

reason." Cf. id. ($200,000 for largely emotional distress

damages from false arrest not excessive); Smith v. Northwest

Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1417 (10th Cir. 1997)

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($200,000 emotional distress damages not excessive where

plaintiff's symptoms included headaches, sleeplessness, and

frequent crying); Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990

F.2d 1051, 1062 (8th Cir. 1993) (damages of $125,000 for past

emotional distress and $25,000 for future emotional distress

from discriminatory discharge not excessive); see also Ruiz v.

Gonzalez Caraballo, 929 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[T]ranslating legal damage into money damages--especially in cases

which involve few significant items of measurable economic

loss--is a matter peculiarly within a jury's ken.") (quotation

marks omitted).

In sum, I do not believe that Curry could only recover

damages which accrued after November 7, 1995. Even if I

did, however, I would still find the jury's verdict a sustainable

and reasonable one.

For these reasons, I would affirm the district court's decision in its entirety and I concur in the decision not to require

remittitur of the jury verdict.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join all of Judge

Henderson's opinion except for Part II-B. For the reasons

given by Judge Wald regarding the period after October

1995, I agree that the jury's award of $100,000 must be

sustained.

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