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Parties Involved:
Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation
Appellee
Kerr-McGee Corporation
Appellee
Randall Stewart
Appellant

Document Text:

l~ILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unirl'd St1tr1 Cuurt or Appeals 

T,.mh Cir".'.Uit 

JUL l J 1990 

AOBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

RANDALL STEWART, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION; KERR-MCGEE 

CHEMICAL CORPORATION, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-6125 

) (D.C. No. 88-1980-W) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

3 4(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff-appellant appeals the district court's order of 

Ma r ch 1 5 , 1 9 8 9 , entering summary judgment in favor of 

defendants-appellees on the ground that plaintiff did not commence 

his action in a timely manner. Plaintiff filed the underlying 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

no t be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

t he case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6125 Document: 010110038344 Date Filed: 07/13/1990 Page: 1 
action on November 9, 1988, against Kerr-McGee Corporation 

(Kerr-McGee) for alleged discrimination in employment in violation 

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e 

to 2000e-17. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he had filed 

a discrimination charge with the EEOC, which had not been able to 

resolve the controversy and had issued plaintiff a right to sue 

letter dated August 8, 1988. 

Kerr-McGee subsequently filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's 

complaint, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, based in 

pa r t on the alleged untimeliness of plaintiff's complaint. 1 

Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, as well as a 

brief in opposition to Kerr-McGee's motion. Plaintiff alleged in 

the amended complaint that he did not receive the right to sue 

letter until August 11, 1988. He averred the same fact in an 

affidavit attached to his brief and argued in his brief that since 

he filed his complaint within ninety days of receiving the right 

to sue letter, his action was timely. 

Plaintiff's amended complaint also added Kerr-McGee Chemical 

Corporation (Chemical) as a party-defendant. Chemical 

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, 

f o r summary judgment, on timeliness grounds, and Kerr-McGee 

renewed its previous motion. 2 Plaintiff filed a brief in 

o pposition to Chemical's motion in which he asserted that his 

original complaint was timely and that the amended complaint 

1 The motion to dismiss was 

record on appeal. 

not designated as part of the 

2 Neither of these motions was designated as part of the record 

on appeal. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6125 Document: 010110038344 Date Filed: 07/13/1990 Page: 2 
.. 

( 

related back to the date of the original complaint pursuant to 

Fed. R. Ci v. P. 15 ( c) . 

The district court subsequently entered summary judgment 

against plaintiff on the ground that his action was time barred as 

to both Kerr-McGee and Chemical because it was not filed within 

the ninety-day limitations period. The court noted that plaintiff 

had submitted an affidavit averring that he received the right to 

sue letter on August 11, 1988, but said: "[P]laintiff fails to 

state why he did not include this later date in his complaint, and 

fails to provide the Court with any evidence of the veracity of 

this statement, including a copy of any receipt for notice, or a 

stamped or dated copy of such notice." R. Vol. I, Doc. 21 at 2. 

We review a district court's order on summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same standard as the district court under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 

F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 1990). "We will affirm a grant of 

summary judgment if it is clear from the record that there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." Willner v. Budig, 848 F.2d 1032, 

1033-34 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 840 (1989). 

Pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(f)(l), a plaintiff must 

commence any civil action within ninety days after he receives a 

right to sue letter from the EEOC. See Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. 

GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1983). This 

ninety-day period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, 

but is more akin to a statute of limitations. Id. Plaintiff 

averred in his affidavit that he received the right to sue letter 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6125 Document: 010110038344 Date Filed: 07/13/1990 Page: 3 
• l 

on August 11, 1988. Ninety days from that date was 

November 9, 1988, the date on which plaintiff filed suit. 

"Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be 

opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in 

Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves . II Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Among the evidentiary 

materials listed in Rule 56(c) are affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). Plaintiff's affidavit was sufficient to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact on the issue of plaintiff's compliance with 

t he ninety-day limitations period. Therefore, the district court 

erred 1n entering summary judgment on that issue, and we must 

reverse. 

Since the district court ruled that plaintiff's original 

complaint was untimely, it did not address the issue whether 

plaintiff's amended complaint against Chemical related back to the 

date of his original complaint. The district court should address 

the relation-back issue on remand. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is REVERSED and REMANDED for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6125 Document: 010110038344 Date Filed: 07/13/1990 Page: 4