Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00894/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00894-23/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Conair Corporation
Defendant
Delia Wilson
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DELIA WILSON, on behalf of 

herself and all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CONAIR CORPORATION,

Defendant.

CIV. NO. 1:14-00894 WBS SAB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

FILE FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION 

COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Delia Wilson brought this putative class 

action against Conair Corporation, asserting violations of the 

Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et 

seq., the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§ 17200, and breach of implied warranty for allegedly selling 

curling irons, straightening irons, and curling brushes that have 

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a risk of serious malfunction and failing to warn consumers of 

the potential dangers. On December 4, 2014, this court issued a 

Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order that prohibited further 

amendments to the pleadings “except with leave of court, good 

cause having been shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

16(b).” (Docket No. 26.) Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Docket No. 107.) Defendant 

opposes. (Docket No. 113.) 

I. Proposed Amendments 

Plaintiff’s proposed FAC differs from her original 

Complaint in three significant ways. First, the proposed FAC 

contains new allegations that defendant failed to report consumer 

complaints of power cord ruptures on styling irons to the 

Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) in violation of the 

Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”). (See Proposed FAC ¶¶ 5, 

25-30, 39, 50-52, 58, 60 (Docket No. 107-2).) Plaintiff alleges 

that this conduct constitutes an unfair business practice under 

the UCL. (Id. ¶ 60.) 

Second, the proposed FAC adds counts five and six for 

negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Id.

¶¶ 10, 97-108.) Both claims are based on the personal injuries 

plaintiff allegedly suffered when the power cord on her styling 

iron ruptured, showering sparks on her face, chest, and eye. 

(Id. ¶ 15.) This is a departure from plaintiff’s original 

Complaint, in which she stated that though she “suffered physical 

harm from use of the Styling Iron,” she was “not seeking the 

recovery of her personal injury damages” or “any personal injury 

damages on behalf of class members.” (Compl. at 2 (Docket No. 

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1).) 

Third, plaintiff’s proposed FAC adds two strict 

products liability claims for design or manufacture defect and

failure to warn. (Proposed FAC ¶¶ 81-96.) Defendant does not 

seem to object to the addition of the two products liability 

claims. 

II. Discussion

Generally, a motion to amend is subject to Rule 15(a), 

which provides that the “court should freely give leave [to 

amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

However, “[o]nce the district court ha[s] filed a pretrial 

scheduling order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

16[,] which establishe[s] a timetable for amending pleadings[,] 

that rule’s standards control[ ].” Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–08 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, 

the Scheduling Order controls and plaintiff must meet the 

requirements of Rule 16(b).

A. Good Cause

A party seeking leave to amend under Rule 16(b) must 

demonstrate “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). “Rule 16(b)’s 

‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the 

party seeking amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. “If that 

party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. Although 

the focus of the inquiry is on the moving party’s diligence, “the 

existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the 

modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion.” 

Id.

The court finds that plaintiff has established good 

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cause for seeking leave to amend. She did not become aware of 

defendant’s alleged failure to report consumer complaints of cord 

ruptures until she deposed Conair’s witness, Pam Keegan, on 

December 2, 2015. (Pl.’s Mem. at 3 (Docket No. 107-1).) She 

therefore could not have included this allegation in her original 

Complaint. She diligently filed her motion for leave to amend 

her Complaint on January 11, 2016--just one month after the 

deposition. 

While plaintiff was aware of her personal injuries 

prior to filing her original Complaint and represented that she 

would not be seeking personal injury damages, she has good cause 

for alleging these claims now since she did not know that the 

injuries would still be ongoing nearly two years later. (Id. at 

2; Pl.’s Reply at 2 (Docket No. 116).) Plaintiff continues to 

visit her ophthalmologist and use eye medications for the corneal 

abrasion she suffered on February 12, 2014 due to the rupture of 

her styling iron power cord. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff seeks to 

add these claims now in order to preserve them before the statute 

of limitations runs on February 5, 2016. (Id. at 2.) The 

persistence of plaintiff’s injuries is sufficient to establish 

good cause. 

B. Bad Faith, Futility, Prejudice, or Undue Delay

If good cause is found, the court must then evaluate 

the request to amend the complaint in light of Rule 15(a)’s 

liberal standard. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608. Under Rule 15(a), 

“leave to amend should be granted unless amendment would cause 

prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad faith, is 

futile, or creates undue delay.” Id. at 607. The nonmoving 

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party bears the burden of demonstrating why leave to amend should 

not be granted. Genentech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 127 F.R.D. 529, 

530-31 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 

Courts have understood “bad faith” to mean such tactics 

as, for example, seeking to add a defendant merely to destroy 

diversity jurisdiction. Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 

794, 805 (9th Cir. 1987). Defendant not only argues that 

plaintiff has no excuse for her delay in bringing personal injury 

claims but also that plaintiff seeks personal injury damages in

bad faith. (Def.’s Opp’n at 2, 13-14.) Defendant argues 

plaintiff intentionally waived her personal injury claims in her 

original Complaint and “throughout various pleadings and 

discovery” in order to prosecute this action as a class action. 

(Id. at 2.) Plaintiff is only now seeking to add these 

individual claims, defendant contends, to hedge her bets in case 

the court denies her motion for class certification. (Def.’s 

Opp’n at 3.) 

While the court acknowledges that plaintiff’s 

individual claims may weigh against class certification, this is 

an issue to be considered on plaintiff’s motion for class 

certification and not grounds for denying plaintiff’s motion to 

amend. Moreover, after reviewing the transcript of plaintiff’s 

deposition, the court cannot find that plaintiff affirmatively 

represented she would not seek personal injury damages during 

discovery. For instance, when asked whether she planned to file 

a personal injury lawsuit she answered, “I don’t know.” 

(MacPherson Decl. Ex. A at 167:19-25 (Docket No. 107-4).) 

Similarly, when defense counsel asked, “do you agree never to 

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pursue personal injury claims in the future in this lawsuit?” she 

responded again by saying, “I don’t know.” (Id. 170:21-24, 

171:11.) The court therefore finds that defendant failed to 

establish bad faith.

An amendment is “futile” only if it would clearly be 

subject to dismissal. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 

F.2d 183, 188 (9th Cir. 1987); Moore v. Kayport Package Express,

885 F.2d 531, 542 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, 

a “proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be 

proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute 

a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Miller v. Rykoff–

Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Defendant contends plaintiff’s UCL claim predicated on 

defendant’s alleged violation of the CPSA is futile because there 

is no private right of action under the CPSA and plaintiff

therefore does not have standing to bring this claim. (Def.’s 

Opp’n at 5); see, e.g., In re All Terrain Vehicle Litig. v. Honda 

Motor Co. Ltd., 979 F2d 755, 756 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the 

CPSA “does not provide an express private right of action for 

violation of the provisions of the Act itself, as distinguished 

from rules or orders issued by the Commission.”). Plaintiff 

counters that the California Supreme Court has expressly rejected 

the notion that a private plaintiff lacks UCL standing whenever 

the conduct alleged to constitute unfair competition violates a 

statute for which there is no private right of action for direct 

enforcement. (Pl.’s Reply at 9); see, e.g., Matoff v. Brinker 

Rest. Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

“While courts will determine the legal sufficiency of a 

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proposed amendment using the same standard as applied on a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion . . . such issues are often more appropriately 

raised in a motion to dismiss rather than in an opposition to a 

motion for leave to amend.” SAES Getters S.p.A. v. Aeronex, 

Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2002). Given the 

dispute between the parties regarding plaintiff’s standing to 

assert a UCL claim predicated on a CPSA violation, the court 

finds that this issue would be better resolved on a motion to 

dismiss. 

Defendant next argues that plaintiff’s CLRA and UCL 

claims are futile because they were not pled with sufficient 

particularity given the heightened pleading standard that applies 

to claims based on fraud. (Def.’s Opp’n at 8-11.) Again, the 

court finds that these issues are more appropriate for a motion 

to dismiss. The court therefore finds that defendant has failed 

to establish futility. 

Lastly, defendant argues it will be prejudiced if 

plaintiff is allowed to amend her Complaint as it “will drive up 

the costs of this litigation by generating additional motion 

practice and delay in order to dispose of these new meritless 

claims.” (Id. at 1.) Under Rule 15, “undue prejudice” means 

substantial prejudice or substantial negative effect--such as 

where the claims sought to be added “would have greatly altered 

the nature of the litigation and would have required defendants 

to have undertaken, at a late hour, an entirely new course of 

defense.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 

1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Despite defendant’s allegations, granting plaintiff’s 

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motion for leave to amend will not cause undue prejudice or 

delay--the pre-trial conference will remain on November 7, 2016 

with trial set for January 10, 2017. Furthermore, defendant has 

until July 1, 2016 to conduct any additional discovery that may 

be necessary. Defendant will also have adequate time to hire the 

additional experts that it argues are necessary to address 

plaintiff’s new personal injury claims because the deadline for 

expert disclosures is May 20, 2016 and rebuttal expert reports

are due June 17, 2016. (Docket No. 49.) Finally, while the 

proposed amendments do significantly expand the scope of this 

case, the court is not persuaded that they have “greatly altered 

the nature of the litigation.” Morongo, 893 F.2d at 1079. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for 

leave to file a First Amended Complaint be, and the same hereby 

is, GRANTED.

Plaintiff has three days from the date this Order is 

signed to file her proposed FAC.

Dated: February 5, 2016

 

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