Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01236/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01236-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
LaCrisha Bilog
Plaintiff
Progressive Casualty Insurance Company
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LACRISHA BILOG, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY, and

Does 1-100, inclusive, 

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01236-MCE-CKD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through the present lawsuit, Plaintiff LaCrisha Bilog (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief on 

behalf of herself and others similarly situated against her former employer, Defendant 

Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (“Defendant” or “Progressive”). According to 

the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Progressive failed to correctly calculate 

the regular rate of pay during pay periods in which Plaintiff and putative class members 

worked overtime and “received commissions, non-discretionary bonuses and/or other 

items of compensation” that should have been calculated into regular pay but were not. 

Plaintiff alleges these discrepancies caused her and other members not to receive the 

overtime pay to which they were entitled. As a result, when Plaintiff’s and other class 

members’ employment ended, they failed to receive unpaid wages which were owed, 

and their wage statements were inaccurate. Plaintiff’s FAC consequently alleges five 

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wage-and-hour related causes of action for violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards 

Act, the California Labor Code, and the California Business and Professions Code.

Presently before the Court is Progressive’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),1 on grounds that the FAC fails to state claims upon 

which relief can be granted. Progressive also seeks to strike Plaintiff’s proposed class 

definition and allegations for failure to meet minimum pleading standards. As set forth 

below, with one exception, Progressive’s Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff worked for Progressive from approximately November 2015 to April 2019. 

As a non-exempt employee, she was eligible for overtime pay under applicable statutes, 

rules, and regulations, both state and federal. Plaintiff alleges that during her tenure of 

employment, she and other non-exempt personnel received commissions, nondiscretionary bonuses and other items of compensation that included, but were not 

limited to, “performance and wellness bonuses, ‘gainshare’, ‘Non Tobacco Use’ credits, 

‘R&R Earned’, and shift differentials.” See FAC, ¶ 11 and Exs. 1 and 2. According to

Plaintiff, these components of additional pay should have been used to properly 

calculate overtime wages but at times were not. 

Plaintiff has attached four wage statements to her complaint which show that she 

received various non-discretionary payments during four different pay periods, but that 

the amounts of those payments were not added to her regular rate of pay for purposes 

of calculating overtime wages during the same pay periods. Plaintiff alleges, for 

example, that on December 15, 2017, she received a non-discretionary “Gainshare Odd 

Year” performance bonus for the 2017 calendar year. Although she worked 60.75 hours 

1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts set forth in this Section are taken, at times verbatim, from 

the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s FAC. ECF No. 13.

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of overtime during the same 2017 period, Progressive failed to incorporate that bonus 

into her “regular rate of pay” for purposes of calculating overtime, and accordingly 

Plaintiff was underpaid. Id. at ¶ 19.

Plaintiff cites several other similar examples. During the pay period between 

October 22, 2017 and November 4, 2017, She claims she earned a non-discretionary 

“Non-Tobacco Use Discount” of $15.00, but that Defendant again failed to incorporate 

that payment into the 8.25 hours of overtime Plaintiff earned during that earnings period. 

Id. at ¶ 20. Additionally, for the periods ending May 19, 2018, and June 2, 2018, Plaintiff 

earned not only a non-discretionary “Non Tobacco Use Discount” but also a nondiscretionary “Recognition Award’, both of which she claims should have been reflected 

in the overtime she received. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. 

Plaintiff further alleges that the final paycheck she received when her employment 

ended (FAC, Ex. 5) did not include the balance of the unpaid overtime she earned but 

was not paid. Moreover, because of the above-enumerated discrepancies, Plaintiff 

alleges that the wage statements Defendant issued to her and other employees who 

received similar payments did not properly reflect the correct applicable rates and wages 

earned.

In moving to dismiss, Progressive argues that the FAC includes insufficient 

information as to just how Plaintiff claims she was entitled to overtime but did not receive 

it in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq (“FLSA”) and 

Sections 510 and 1198 of the California Labor Code. Progressive goes on to claim that 

Plaintiff’s other causes of action, which derive from her failure to pay overtime claim, 

similarly fail. Defendant also avers that any claim premised upon failure to pay wages 

upon the cessation of Plaintiff’s employment fails because Plaintiff fails to specify 

whether she was terminated or resigned. In addition, Progressive contends that as a 

former employee, Plaintiff has no standing to pursue injunctive relief restraining its future 

conduct. Finally, Defendant takes issue with the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s class action 

allegations and move to strike those averments.

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STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 

detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the 

pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a 

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)).

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & 

Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their 

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claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” 

Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge 

that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and 

unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 

“the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 

Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 

constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)).

B. Motion to Strike

The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he 

function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that 

must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to 

trial. . . .” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Immaterial matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for 

relief or the defenses being pleaded. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 

(9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (internal citations and 

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quotations omitted). Impertinent matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and 

are not necessary, to the issues in question. Id.

ANALYSIS

A. Failure to Pay Overtime

Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Landers v. Quality Communications, 

Inc., 771 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2014), which considered Rule 8(a)’s pleading requirements 

for unpaid wages or overtime, Progressive contends that Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action, 

for Unpaid Overtime, fails to state any plausible claim. Defendant points out that while 

Landers recognized that “detailed factual allegations” are not required in this regard, 

some facts in addition to mere conclusory assertions are nonetheless required. Id. at 

644. According to Progressive, Plaintiff’s claim is insufficient because “[n]o information 

is provided as to the circumstances--- including when, or for what reasons, if any” why 

overtime was not paid. Defs. Memo, ECF No. 15-1: 4:21-22.

The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s FAC discusses four different earning statements

(and attaches those statements as exhibits). From those statements, Plaintiff identifies 

items of compensation which should have been added to her regular rate of pay for 

purposes of calculating overtime. Those items include a 2017 yearly bonus, which 

Plaintiff alleges was non-discretionary, as well as bonuses for refraining from using 

tobacco and a non-discretionary “Recognition Award.” Moreover, according to the FAC, 

those items should have been added to Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay for purposes of 

calculating overtime but were not. Those allegations are specific and not conclusory or 

formulaic as Progressive appears to allege. While Defendant does allege that no 

specifics concerning any unpaid commissions are included, commissions are merely one 

component of an umbrella of additional compensation forms identified by the First Cause 

of Action, which also includes non-discretionary bonuses as well as other items of 

compensation. Since Plaintiff has identified both alleged non-discretionary bonuses and 

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additional payments in the form of a recognition award and credits for not using tobacco, 

her First Cause of Action suffices even in the absence of additional particulars as to any 

commission earnings. Whether all those items should indeed be added to Plaintiff’s 

base wage for purposes of calculation is a matter that will have to be tested through 

discovery and the remainder of the litigation process. In the meantime, Plaintiff has 

sufficiently stated a claim.

B. Failure to Pay Wages Owed Upon Cessation of Employment

Progressive’s primary argument with respect to the Second Cause of Action, for 

Failure to Pay All Wages Due Upon Termination pursuant to the FLSA, is that because 

any claim in that regard (for so-called “waiting time” penalties) is necessarily derivative of 

Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action (for Failure to Pay Overtime itself), the Second Cause of 

Action fails for the same reason as the First. That argument misses the mark since the 

Court has concluded above that Plaintiff’s overtime claim is indeed viable.

Progressive also alleges, however, in attacking the Second Cause of Action, that 

Plaintiff’s claim fails because the FAC does not specify whether she was terminated (and 

would consequently have a potential claim for unpaid wages under California Labor 

Code § 201), or instead resigned in which case the provisions of § 202 would apply with 

respect to exactly when the unpaid wages were due.3 Defendant maintains that the two 

provisions are mutually exclusive and that because it cannot be determined from the 

face of the FAC which provision applies the Second Cause of Action should be rejected 

for failure to provide the requisite specificity.

Because the Second Cause of Action is based on the FLSA, however, and since 

it is unquestioned that the FLSA contains provisions that apply in either instance and 

would pertain to Plaintiff irrespective of how her employment ended, the Court believes 

that it will be readily apparent through discovery the circumstances of Plaintiff’s 

///

3 Under § 202, an employer must pay all wages within 72 hours following resignation, whereas if 

an employee is fired all wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable 

immediately in accordance with § 201.

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departure and the precise basis of her claim for unpaid wages upon the cessation of her 

employment. There is no reason to require more specificity at this early juncture.

Moreover, and even more significantly, courts have held that Rule 8’s pleading 

requirements are met in a wage and hour claim where a Plaintiff simply alleges without 

further detail that his or her employment ended, just as Plaintiff has done here. See, 

e.g., Lopez v. Wendy’s Int’l. Inc., No. CV 11-00275 MMM (JCx), 2012 WL 13014600 at 

*11 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that waiting time penalty claim was sufficiently pled, 

stating that liability clearly did “not turn on whether wages to which [the plaintiff] was 

entitled were paid immediately or within 72 hours, but [instead] on whether [plaintiff] was 

entitled to the wages she claim[ed] at all.”); Mitchell v. Corelogic, Inc., No. SA CV 17-

2274-DOC (DFMx), 2018 WL 6118444 at *13 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that plaintiffs 

adequately alleged a claim for failure to pay wages at “cessation of employment”). 

Further, in response to Progressive’s argument that the issue should be framed in terms 

of whether Plaintiff has standing to pursue one variant or the other on behalf of other 

similarly situated individuals, courts have also determined that where entitlement to 

waiting time penalties does not turn, as here, on the fact of termination versus 

resignation, an employee who was terminated has standing to represent employees who 

resigned. Alikhan v. Goodrich Corp., No. CV 17-6756-DMG (RAOx), 2018 WL 6333673 

at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 2015).

C. Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements

Citing decisions from both the Central and Northern Districts, Progressive 

contends that Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action, for failure to furnish accurate itemized 

wage statements in contravention of California Labor Code § 226(a), fails because 

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show how the wage statement prevented 

Plaintiff from “promptly and easily” determining the information she required. See de 

Rios v. Gerard Roof Products, LLC, No. 5:18-CV-1163 SJO (FFMX), 2018 WL 6016952 

at *6); Suarez v. Bank of America Corp., No. 18-cv-01202-MEJ, 2018 WL 2431473 at 

*13 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 

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Plaintiff has nonetheless pled that she and other non-exempt employees “were 

unable to promptly and easily determine their gross wage earned from the wage 

statements furnished by Defendant” (FAC, ¶ 31), and in light of the payroll statements 

provided and the numerous cryptic categories of additional compensation claimed 

therein, that claim does not lack factual plausibility. Defendant’s challenge to the viability

Third Cause of Action therefore fails.

Having made that determination, however, the Court nonetheless notes 

Progressive’s argument that the relief sought by way of the Third Cause of Action is 

improper to the extent that it requests injunctive relief. According to Defendant, as a 

former employee, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim against Progressive under 

§ 226 because she no longer stands to benefit from an injunction. See Luna v. 

Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP, No. CV 12-9286 PSG (SSx), 2013 WL 12308201 at 

* 8 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Holak v. Kmart Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00304 AWI MJS, 2012 WL 

6202298 at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“An inunction ‘to ensure compliance’ with Section 226(a) 

is a form of prospective relief that necessarily affects only current and future 

employees.”). Plaintiff fails to oppose that argument and accordingly the FAC’s prayer 

for relief as to the Third Cause of Action, to the extent it requests injunctive relief, will be 

stricken.

D. Unfair Competition

Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action, for Unfair Business Practices in violation of 

California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., necessarily relies upon 

Defendant’s violation of other laws as set out in the First through Third Causes of Action. 

Progressive’s Motion to Dismiss that claim rests solely on the fact that because Plaintiff 

has failed to state a cause of action under any of those underlying claims, the derivative 

unfair competition claim must also be dismissed. See Def.’s Memo, ECF No. 15-1, 

10:11-22 and case cited therein. As explained above, because that premise lacks merit, 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action also survives.

///

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E. Class Action Allegations

Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of “[a]ll current and former non-exempt 

employees of Defendant who received commissions, non-discretionary bonuses and/or 

other items of compensation and worked overtime during one or more pay period from 

July 3, 2015 through the date of final judgment.” FAC, ¶ 43. While conceding that 

courts should generally refrain from ruling on the issue of class certification at the 

pleadings stage, Progressive argues that Plaintiff must still plead specific facts showing 

an entitlement to relief on a classwide basis. Because it claims that basic Rule 8(a) 

pleading standards have not been met in this instance, Defendant urges the court to 

dismiss or strike the class action allegations. It argues that “all allegations, including 

those related to class treatment, must contain sufficient facts for a court to determine 

that a plaintiff is entitled to move forward and subject defendants to the rigors, burdens, 

and costs of the discovery in a class action.” Def.’s Memo, ECF No. 15-1, 11:18-21. 

Progressive further maintains that Plaintiff has “not demonstrate[d] that any member of 

the putative class, including those who worked in different positions and/or locations, 

had similar work experiences.” Id. at 13:13-14. According to Defendant, Plaintiff has 

made “no attempt to specify exactly which job classifications, positions, or workers she 

specifically wants to represent.” Id. at 13:8-10.

Progressive asks for too much at this early stage of the proceeding. As the 

Supreme Court and courts within this circuit have indicated, it is generally improper to 

strike class action allegations on the pleadings. “An order striking class allegations is 

functionally equivalent to an order denying class certification. Microsoft v. Baker, 

137 S. Ct. 1702, 1711 n.7 (2017); Johnson v. WinCo Foods, LLC, 2018 WL 6017012 at 

*22 (C.D. Cal. 2018). “Class allegations are generally not tested at the pleading stage 

and instead are usually tested after one party has filed a motion for class certification.” 

Romero v. Securus Techs., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2016). “[T]he 

granting of motions to dismiss class allegations before discovery has commenced is rare 

. . . the better course is to deny such a motion because ‘the shape and form of class 

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action’ evolves only through the process of discovery.” In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage 

and Hour Litigation, 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 615 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

Progressive also overreaches in arguing that the classes are so ill-defined so as 

to defy any meaningful assessment. As Plaintiff points out, the FAC specifically defines

our separate subclasses: 1) a “Regular Rate Class” that pertains to Plaintiff’s FLSA 

overtime claim; 2) a “California Regular rate Class” that pertains to Plaintiff’s California 

Labor Code overtime claim; 3) a “California Waiting Time Penalty Class” that include 

those California employees who Plaintiff alleges would be entitled to waiting time 

penalties under California Labor Code § 203 for underpayment of overtime wages based 

on Plaintiff’s regular rate theory; and 4) a “California Wage Statement Class” that include 

those employees who Plaintiff contends received inaccurate wage statements in the year 

preceding the commencement of this lawsuit, based on Plaintiff’s theory that such 

individuals were not paid overtime due to miscalculation of their regular rate. See Pl.’s 

Opp, ECF No. 17, 14:20-15:8; FAC, ¶ 43.

In addition, Plaintiff’s classwide theory appears, on the basis of the averments 

contained within the FAC, to be premised on allegations that Progressive “had a uniform 

policy and practice of failing to properly incorporate items of compensation earned by its 

non-exempt employees . . . into . . . regular rates of pay for purposes of overtime 

compensation.” Id. at 15:9-12, citing FAC, ¶¶ 10-23. Those allegations of commonly 

applied payroll practices transcend any difference between individual employees and cut 

against Progressive’s argument that Plaintiff has not shown any similarity in treatment 

vis-à-vis Progressive’s employees that could justify class treatment. As Plaintiff remarks, 

there is “nothing about [her] theory of liability [that] turns on any idiosyncrasies of her 

position and [the FAC’s] allegations are equally applicable to any non-exempt employee 

of Defendant who earned compensation that was required to be included in their regular 

rate of pay and who also worked overtime.” Id. at 15:22-25.

Given these circumstances, the Court declines to dismiss and/or strike the class 

action allegations contained in the FAC at this juncture of these proceedings.

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CONCLUSION 

For all the above reasons, Defendant Progressive’s Motion to Dismiss or Strike 

(ECF No. 15) is DENIED, except with regard to the availability of injunctive relief in 

Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action. Plaintiff has failed to oppose Defendant’s Motion as to 

the availability of such relief and the Motion is accordingly GRANTED as to that issue 

only.4 To the extent the FAC’s prayer requests such relief, those allegations are 

STRICKEN. Given Plaintiff’s non-opposition, and because the Court does not believe 

that further amendment will justify Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief as to the Third 

Cause of Action, no further leave to amend will be permitted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2020

4 Having determined that oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered the 

Motion submitted on the briefs pursuant to Local Rule 230(g).

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