Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04220/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04220-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason Conrad Poole
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 07-4220

JASON CONRAD POOLE,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(8:96-cr-00238-AW)

Argued: March 21, 2008

Decided: June 20, 2008

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge

Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Traxler

joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Michele Walls Sartori, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert

Whelen Biddle, NATHANS & BIDDLE, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States

Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; Barbara S. Skalla, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.

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OPINION

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge: 

This appeal presents the issue of whether a temporary custody

arrangement can form the basis of a district court’s jurisdiction over

a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). For the reasons

that follow, we conclude that it does not, and that the measures taken

by the district court to secure jurisdiction here were improper. We

therefore reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the original

sentence. 

A brief overview of this procedurally convoluted case is warranted.

After a jury trial, Jason Conrad Poole ("Poole") was found guilty in

the United States District Court for the District of Maryland

("Maryland federal district court") of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Designated a

career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines

("Guidelines"), U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (1995), Poole was sentenced to 262

months’ imprisonment and sent to federal prison in Cumberland, Kentucky to serve out his sentence. 

Unable to obtain relief after a direct appeal, three habeas corpus

petitions (two under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and one under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241), and a number of pro se motions seeking collateral review of

his sentence, Poole retained counsel. His counsel secured Poole’s

appearance before the original federal sentencing judge to testify

regarding an outstanding post-conviction motion. Once there, however, Poole abandoned that motion and instead asked to remain in

Maryland long enough to file another habeas corpus petition under

§ 2241(c)(3). In contrast to a § 2255 habeas petition, which is filed

with the original sentencing court, a § 2241 habeas petition can only

be filed in the district in which a prisoner is confined. The district

court acquiesced in Poole’s proposal, keeping him in Maryland for

several months and short-circuiting Poole’s return to his Kentucky

cell, in an express attempt to create the requisite confinement for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction over the forthcoming request. Poole

eventually filed the § 2241(c)(3) petition, seeking reduction in his

sentence on the ground that the career-offender enhancement was

improperly applied to him because a state court judgment had

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amended one of his prior convictions. The district court granted the

petition and resentenced Poole to 135 months’ imprisonment. Having

already served the majority of that sentence, Poole was released over

the government’s objections. 

The government now appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the district

court did not have jurisdiction to consider Poole’s § 2241(c)(3)

motion because Poole was not "in custody" in Maryland. We agree.

I.

A.

We begin with a detailed explication of the complicated factual and

procedural history underlying this appeal. Poole was convicted on

February 6, 1997 in the Maryland federal district court of possession

with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). He faced designation as a career offender based on two

prior convictions in Maryland state court: a 1989 robbery conviction

and a 1991 possession-with-intent-to-distribute-cocaine conviction.1

Such an enhancement would increase his Guidelines sentencing

range, from a range of 151 months to 188 months, to a range of 360

months to life imprisonment.2

Prior to sentencing, in an effort to avoid the career-offender

enhancement, Poole sought modification of the 1991 conviction by

filing a motion in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,

1A defendant with "at least two prior felony convictions of either a

crime of violence or a controlled substance offense" is considered a

career offender when he commits a third such offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1

(1995). Because Poole’s robbery conviction constituted a "crime of violence" and his possession-with-intent-to-distribute conviction constituted

a "controlled substance offense," the Guidelines called for him to be sentenced as a career offender. 

2Before application of the career-offender enhancement, Poole’s federal possession conviction yielded an offense level of 32 coupled with a

criminal history category of III. The career-offender enhancement elevated his offense level to 37 and his criminal history category to VI. See

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(A) (1995). 

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Maryland ("Maryland state court"). In the motion, Poole requested a

hearing to reduce the 1991 felony possession-with-intent-to-distribute

conviction to a misdemeanor conviction for simple possession,

explaining that he "was never advised at the time of his entry of his

plea [to the 1991 drug crime] that its effect might be to characterize

him as a career offender for Federal sentencing guidelines purposes

and expose him to such an extreme penalty for a case involving a

small amount of drugs." J.A. 21. Poole attached to the request a proposed order granting both the motion for a hearing and the underlying

relief sought—that "the Court’s judgment of conviction entered on

November 1, 1991, being and is hereby revised such that the conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is stricken in favor

of a judgment of conviction for possession of cocaine." J.A. 23. 

On April 21, 1997, Prince George’s County Judge Darlene Perry

signed and dated the proposed order granting the hearing and the

underlying sentence modification (the "April 21 order").3 On the same

day that the order was filed, however, the underlying matter was also

set for a future hearing before Judge Perry. The hearing was held on

June 6, 1997, after which Judge Perry entered an order denying

Poole’s substantive motion and leaving his felony drug conviction

intact (the "June 6 order"), in direct contradiction to her April 21

order. Judge Perry made no reference to the April 21 order nor to her

ostensible modification of the sentence.

Poole returned to federal court shortly thereafter for a sentencing

hearing regarding his 1997 federal drug conviction. Judge Perry’s

April 21 order was never mentioned during this hearing, and Poole

did not otherwise challenge the application of the career-offender

enhancement. Indeed, the presentence report ("PSR") calculated

Poole’s Guidelines range assuming the applicability of the careeroffender enhancement, recommending a sentence of 360 months to

life imprisonment. The district court departed downwards, finding

that the Guidelines overstated Poole’s criminal history, and sentenced

him to 262 months’ imprisonment. Poole was sent, at his request, to

the federal prison in Cumberland, Kentucky to serve out his sentence.

3As described below, Poole did not become aware until 2002 that this

order was signed, granting him the relief he sought. 

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B.

In the years that followed, Poole pursued a number of unsuccessful

appeals and collateral attacks to his conviction and sentence, including a failed direct appeal and a failed § 2255 petition arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Having exhausted the usual avenues for federal relief, Poole filed

a pro se motion in 2002 with the Maryland state court seeking reconsideration of Judge Perry’s June 6, 1997 order denying him a modification of his sentence for the 1991 drug crime. A law clerk from the

Maryland state court responded to Poole, informing him of Judge

Perry’s April 21 order that appeared to have reclassified his 1991

drug conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. Poole’s subsequent

efforts to leverage the April 21 order to reduce his federal sentence

form the crux of this appeal. 

Poole began by filing pro se another § 2255 petition, his second,

challenging the career-offender enhancement in the Maryland federal

district court for the first time. Poole argued that, in light of Judge

Perry’s April 21 order, he had only one eligible prior felony at the

time of his 1997 sentencing and therefore should not have been subjected to the career-offender enhancement. The Maryland federal district court denied the motion as successive, instructing Poole to first

obtain authorization from this court.4 This court subsequently denied

Poole’s request for leave to file a successive habeas corpus motion.

Poole also sought relief in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Kentucky (the "Kentucky federal district court"),

the jurisdiction in which he was confined, by filing a third petition for

habeas corpus, this time under § 2241 (his first § 2241 petition).5 We

4A second or successive motion under § 2255 must be denied unless

certified "by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain—(1)

newly discovered evidence . . . ; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law,

made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that

was previously unavailable." § 2255(h). 

5As explained in more detail below, § 2255 petitions are generally

filed with the original sentencing court, while § 2241 petitions are generally filed in the district of confinement. 

UNITED STATES v. POOLE 5

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discuss Poole’s first § 2241 petition in some detail because the matter

on appeal today, his second § 2241 petition, closely tracks the arguments Poole made before the Kentucky federal district court. 

In the petition, Poole argued there that he was unlawfully sentenced as a career offender because his 1991 drug conviction could

no longer support the career-offender enhancement. Though recognizing that habeas petitions of this sort must generally proceed under

§ 2255, Poole contended that relief under § 2241 was available to him

via the so-called "savings clause" of § 2255(e).6

The Kentucky federal district court denied the motion, holding that

Poole’s petition did not fall within the ambit of the savings clause of

§ 2255 because Poole had failed to demonstrate that § 2255 was "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention," § 2255(e).

Relying on Sixth Circuit precedent, the court explained that the savings clause only preserves claims in which a petitioner claims actual

innocence of his conviction, not just "innocence" of a sentencing factor. See Poole v. Barron, No. 04-CV-095-KKC, slip op. at 6 (E.D.

Ky. May 26, 2004) (citing Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753 (6th

Cir. 1999)).7 The court found this result harmonious with the principle

that sentencing errors should generally be addressed by the sentencing

court under § 2255, and that only "in very limited circumstances" can

a distant federal court entertain a challenge to another district court’s

actions. Id. at 4. Poole did not appeal. 

Concurrent with his first § 2241 motion in Kentucky, Poole had

also filed a pro se motion in the Maryland federal district court seeking to amend the 1997 judgment against him.8

 Shortly after the Ken6The savings clause allows a § 2241 habeas petition to proceed if "the

remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." § 2255(e). 

7Fourth Circuit precedent has likewise not extended the reach of the

savings clause to those petitioners challenging only their sentence. See

In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000) (outlining the circumstances in which "§ 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality

of a conviction") (emphasis added). 

8Specifically, the motion sought a writ of coram nobis, one of several

common law writs historically available to those seeking post-judgment

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tucky district court denied Poole’s first § 2241 petition, the Maryland

federal district court likewise denied Poole’s pending motion to

amend its 1997 judgment. In the wake of his failed pro se attempts,

Poole retained counsel. Poole’s counsel moved the Maryland federal

district court to reconsider its denial of his motion to amend the judgment. The court agreed to do so, and scheduled a hearing for May 1,

2006.

Poole’s counsel placed an ex parte telephone call to the Maryland

federal district judge, asking that Poole be permitted to attend the

hearing. The court acquiesced, and on March 30, 2006, issued a writ

of habeas corpus ad testificandum,9 ordering the warden of the Kentucky prison in which Poole was incarcerated to deliver Poole to the

Maryland federal district court for the hearing, and then "to return

said individual at conclusion of proceedings to his original place of

incarceration." J.A. 85. 

relief. See Black’s Law Dictionary 362 (8th ed. 2004) (defining coram

nobis as "[a] writ of error directed to a court for review of its own judgment and predicated on alleged errors of fact"). The writ of coram nobis

and several historical analogues have since been collected and codified

in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) cmt.

to 1946 amendments. Rule 60(b) now acts as a catch-all, providing for

relief from a final judgment in a number of circumstances, including

when "applying it prospectively is no longer equitable," Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(5) (2003), or for "any other reason that justifies relief," Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (permitting courts

to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law"). 

9A writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum may be issued when it is

"necessary to bring [the prisoner] into court to testify." § 2241(c)(5).

Though the statutory seat for the writ lies in § 2241, a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus ad testificandum is decidedly distinct from a petition

seeking habeas relief from incarceration under § 2241(c)(3). The former

is simply a request to have the body of the prisoner transported temporarily for the purpose of giving testimony, and then returned to prison. The

latter represents the real relief sought by Poole, first in the Kentucky federal district court, then in the Maryland federal district court, and now

here: a writ of habeas corpus issued under § 2241(c)(3) that can, and in

this case, did, free him from his federal sentence. 

UNITED STATES v. POOLE 7

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As he explained at oral argument, Poole’s counsel realized in the

week before the hearing that the motion to reconsider would likely

fail. See also J.A. 96 (statement of Poole’s counsel at the ad testificandum hearing that the motion had "significant disadvantages procedurally and legally" and that, "[b]etween published and unpublished

decisions, the handwriting is on the wall"). He nevertheless appeared

at the hearing and, instead of withdrawing the motion, asked that it

be held in abeyance. With no prior notice to the government of this

change in strategy, Poole’s counsel also made the extraordinary

request that Poole be held in Maryland indefinitely so that he could

file a second § 2241 petition, instead of being returned to Kentucky.

Counsel candidly acknowledged that he sought Poole’s detention in

Maryland solely to enable the Maryland federal district court to assert

jurisdiction over the forthcoming petition. The government objected

to this sudden change in course, explaining that it had no time to consider the appropriateness of the proposed indefinite sequester in

Maryland. 

Nevertheless, without allowing the government further time to

develop a response, the Maryland federal district court agreed to keep

Poole in Maryland until Poole’s second § 2241 petition could be filed

and resolved. The court observed that "this [case] has some interesting issues and I think that it’s something that we can give the defendant an opportunity to address and try to find the best vehicle as

possible to get his petition in front of the courts." J.A. 108. The U.S.

Marshal then transferred Poole to the State of Maryland’s Correctional Adjustment Center, which holds federal prisoners pursuant to

an agreement with the United States Marshal Service. Poole quickly

filed a § 2241 petition in the Maryland federal district court, naming

the warden of the Maryland state prison as the respondent, and the

district court ordered a hearing on the petition.

Just before the scheduled hearing, the Maryland federal district

judge personally called a judge of the Maryland state court, Judge

William D. Missouri (Judge Perry having, by then, retired from the

bench), asking for clarification as to the legal effect of Judge Perry’s

April 21, 1997 order. The call was followed up by a letter from one

of the federal district court’s law clerks, asking Maryland state Judge

Missouri "to provide us with an official position from the [Maryland]

Circuit Court as to the legal effect of the April 21, 1997 order." J.A.

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115. It is not clear on the record whether Judge Missouri responded

to these entreaties before Poole’s § 2241 hearing. In any event, at the

hearing, the court announced that it would refer the question as to the

operative effect of Judge Perry’s April 21 order to the Maryland state

court. Neither Poole nor the government objected. The federal judge

then wrote a letter to Judge Missouri, asking him to "deci[de] . . . the

effect of Judge Darlene Perry’s April 21, 1997 Order." J.A. 116.

Judge Missouri scheduled a hearing on the matter.10 At the hearing,

Poole argued that, by the time of Judge Perry’s June 6 order denying

him relief, she had likely forgotten that she had previously granted

Poole the requested relief. Judge Missouri rejected that explanation,

instead finding that Judge Perry had fallen prey to "an old Defense

attorney’s trick. You submit an order—you request a hearing, . . . and

. . . you include the granting of the relief that you’re seeking a hearing

on. So if the Judge doesn’t read it thoroughly enough, he or she signs

an order and that order grants the relief . . . that you sought." J.A. 149.

Nevertheless, Judge Missouri declared that "public trust and confidence in the Courts dictate that . . . the Court must uphold the signature of one of [its] members that was sitting, whether that member

meant to sign what the member signed or not." J.A. 150. Judge Missouri not only granted Poole’s motion to alter the state court judgment, but vacated the entire 1991 conviction and set the drug charge

for a new trial. Maryland state prosecutors ultimately decided not to

retry the case.

C.

In light of Judge Missouri’s order, the Maryland federal district

court granted Poole’s § 2241 motion. In doing so, the court first found

jurisdiction over the petition, reasoning that since the Kentucky district court denied Poole relief, "if this Court denies Poole’s Section

2241 petition on jurisdictional grounds, it would foreclose the possibility of any court considering the petition on its merits." Poole v.

10Two months after the informal "referral" to the Maryland state court,

Poole also filed a petition to amend the judgment before the Maryland

state court. As Poole’s counsel explained to this panel at oral argument,

the filing provided a more formal vehicle by which Judge Missouri could

exercise jurisdiction over the question. 

UNITED STATES v. POOLE 9

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Dotson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 329, 333 (D. Md. 2007).11 Thus, "[i]n an

effort to avoid such a patently unfair result," the court found its exercise of jurisdiction proper. Id.

The court next considered the applicability of the savings clause of

§ 2255. It recognized that this court has found the clause to "appl[y]

in only very limited circumstances." Id. The district court properly

cited the controlling test in this circuit:

[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction when: (1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the

legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s

direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law

changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was

convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner

cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because

the new rule is not one of constitutional law. 

In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34. The district court concluded that

though "Poole cannot satisfy the exact standard announced in Jones[,]

. . . the rationale behind the Jones decision is favorably applicable to

Poole’s situation." Poole v. Dotson, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 335. The district court read Jones to stand more generally for the proposition that

a "fundamental defect" occurs when "an individual is incarcerated for

conduct that is not criminal, but through no fault of his own, has no

source of redress." Jones, 226 F.3d at 333 n.3 (explaining the rationale behind the comparable rule in our sister circuits). Because the

district court found as a fact that Poole had been diligent in pursuing

his rights pro se, and because "Poole stands incarcerated as a career

offender when he is not in fact a career offender," the court concluded

that he "had no source of redress" and should be permitted to pursue

a § 2241 petition via the savings clause of § 2255. Poole v. Dotson,

469 F. Supp. 2d at 335. 

11The Kentucky district court had likewise exercised jurisdiction over

Poole’s first § 2241 petition, but failed to reach the merits of the petition

because it found the savings clause inapplicable. See Poole v. Barron,

No. 04-CV-095-KKC, slip op. at 4. 

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Finally, on the merits of Poole’s § 2241 petition, the district court

held that Judge Missouri’s order vacating Poole’s sentence rendered

the career-offender enhancement inapplicable. Because Poole was

therefore "innocent of [his original] sentence," the court vacated that

sentence and resentenced him without the enhancement. Id. at 339.

Poole was resentenced to 135 months’ imprisonment, and, over the

objection of the government, released from custody. The government

timely appealed.

II.

A.

We begin, as we must, with the question of whether the district

court properly exercised jurisdiction12 over Poole’s second § 2241

habeas petition. "[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of

the lower courts in a cause under review." Bender v. Williamsport

Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). We review de novo the district court’s assumption of jurisdiction

over the habeas petition. See United States v. Barton, 26 F.3d 490,

491 (4th Cir. 1994). 

Habeas petitions are usually filed under § 2255 in the court that

imposed the prisoner’s sentence. When § 2255 "appears . . . inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention," § 2255(e),

however, a federal prisoner may seek habeas relief from the court in

the district of his confinement under § 2241. In re Jones, 226 F.3d at

333-34. 

Section 2241 begins, "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by

the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any cir12The Supreme Court has suggested that the meaning of the term "jurisdiction," as used in the habeas statute, is distinct from "the sense of

subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court." Rumsfeld v. Padilla,

542 U.S. 426, 434 n.7 (2004). We have no occasion in this case to delve

further into the precise meaning of the term, it sufficing to say that "jurisdiction" as used here is a sine qua non of addressing the merits of the

petition. See Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 343 (1972). 

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cuit judge within their respective jurisdictions." § 2241(a). A § 2241

petition should name as respondent "the person who has custody over

[the prisoner]." § 2242; see also § 2243 ("The writ, or order to show

cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person

detained.").13 As the Supreme Court explained long ago, "these provisions contemplate a proceeding against some person who has the

immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce

the body of such party before the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary." Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885) (emphasis added). This "immediate

custodian rule" is the default, and is "general[ly] applicab[le] . . . to

habeas petitions challenging physical custody." Padilla, 542 U.S. at

436. 

The rule governing jurisdiction naturally follows from the "immediate custodian rule": a district court properly exercises jurisdiction

over a habeas petition whenever it has jurisdiction over the petitioner’s custodian. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S.

484, 495 (1973). The question of whether the Maryland federal district court had jurisdiction over Poole’s § 2241 petition turns, therefore, on whether Poole’s "custodian" was the warden of the Maryland

state prison, over whom the Maryland federal district court has jurisdiction, or the warden of the Kentucky federal prison, Poole’s "original place of incarceration" to which he was slated "to return . . . at

[the] conclusion of proceedings [before the Maryland federal district

court]," J.A. 85, over whom the court does not have jurisdiction.

B.

The government argues that the district court wrongly exercised

jurisdiction over Poole’s § 2241 petition because neither its issuance

of the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum nor its order keeping

Poole in Maryland transmuted Poole’s temporary presence in the district into a permanent stay that effected a change in custodian. We

agree.

13The term "custody" is not defined in the statute. 

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1.

This court has not had the occasion to address the question of

whether an extraterritorial writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum

changes the identity of a prisoner’s "immediate custodian" for purposes of § 2241 jurisdiction. This court has held, however, in a related

context, that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, issued to

bring a prisoner to his own trial, works a "mere[ ] loan[ ] [of] the prisoner to federal authorities" and does not effectuate a change in custodian for purposes of the federal statute criminalizing escape from

federal custody, 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). See United States v. Evans, 159

F.3d 908, 912 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Pelley v. Matthews, 163 F.2d

700 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not effect a change in custodian). Insofar as the writs

of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and habeas corpus ad testificandum are derived from adjacent language in the same statutory subsection, see § 2241(c)(5), and because their "statutory antecedents . . .

are exactly the same," Muhammad v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail,

849 F.2d 107, 114 (4th Cir. 1988), it is reasonable to believe that the

writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum would likewise be a "mere[ ]

loan[ ]" that does not effect a change in custody. See Evans, 159 F.3d

at 912. 

Moreover, a number of our sister circuits have directly addressed

the effect on custody wrought by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus

ad testificandum. All agree that custody remains in the original place

of incarceration. The Ninth Circuit case of Miller v. Hambrick, 905

F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1990), is emblematic. In Miller, a federal prisoner

serving time in Texas was called by a California federal court to testify in a tax case. The prisoner was moved to a detention center in Los

Angeles. Once he arrived, the prisoner filed a § 2241 petition in the

Central District of California, seeking relief from his incarceration.

The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On

appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining:

The standard writ [of habeas corpus ad testificandum],

requiring transfer of a prisoner to another district in order to

testify, acknowledges that the prisoner is held under the custody of the person to whom the writ issues and authorizes

only "safe and secure conduct" of the prisoner to where he

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will testify. The writ specifies that "immediately" after giving his testimony the prisoner shall be returned to the person

holding him. The writ authorizes a trip[,] not a change of

custodians. 

Id. at 262. See also United States ex rel. Quinn v. Hunter, 162 F.2d

644 (7th Cir. 1947); Rheuark v. Wade, 608 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1979).

Poole concedes that the weight of historical authority is against

him, but argues that the Supreme Court’s recent discussion of the

"immediate custodian rule" in Padilla supports the district court’s

assumption of jurisdiction over his § 2241 petition. We disagree and

read Padilla to substantially support our conclusion. A brief discussion of that case demonstrates the point. 

Jose Padilla was apprehended by federal agents in Chicago as he

stepped off a plane from Pakistan. The agents were executing a material witness warrant that had been issued by the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking Padilla’s testimony in connection with its grand jury investigation into the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001. Padilla was then transferred to New

York and held in federal custody. Before being called to testify, however, Padilla was designated an enemy combatant by order of the

President, and moved by direction of Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld to the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. 

Padilla filed a § 2241 motion in the Southern District of New York,

naming, inter alia, Secretary Rumsfeld and the Commander of the

Naval Brig in Charleston as respondents. The government moved to

dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that only the brig

Commander was a proper respondent, and, since the district court in

New York did not have jurisdiction over the Commander of the brig

in Charleston, the district court likewise had no jurisdiction to hear

the petition. 

The district court in New York rejected the government’s arguments, finding Secretary Rumsfeld to be a proper respondent because

of his personal involvement in Padilla’s custody, and therefore found

that it could exercise jurisdiction over the petition under New York’s

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long-arm statute. On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the lower

court’s jurisdictional analysis. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695,

705-08 (2d Cir. 2003). 

The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Rumsfeld was not a

proper respondent to Padilla’s petition and that the district court in

New York did not properly exercise jurisdiction over the petition.

Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430. The Court parried Padilla’s attempts to distinguish the "unique facts" of his case, instead affirming that the

default "immediate custodian rule" controlled Padilla’s petition just as

it does the core of habeas petitions under § 2241. Id. at 436. The

Court also rejected the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Secretary

Rumsfeld was an appropriate respondent because he exercised the

"legal reality of control" over Padilla. Id. at 437-48. Instead, the Court

held that "identification of the party exercising legal control only

comes into play when there is no immediate physical custodian with

respect to the challenged ‘custody.’ In challenges to present physical

confinement, we reaffirm that the immediate custodian, not a supervisory official who exercises legal control, is the proper respondent." Id.

at 439. The Court therefore concluded that only the brig Commander,

not Secretary Rumsfeld, was an appropriate respondent to Padilla’s

petition. Id. at 442. 

The Court went on to explain that selection of the proper respondent is critical to the question of jurisdiction because, "[i]n habeas

challenges to present physical confinement, . . . the district of confinement is synonymous with the district court that has territorial jurisdiction over the proper respondent." Id. at 444. Combining the issues of

proper respondent and jurisdiction, the Court summarized that the

procedure in § 2241 cases is governed by "a simple rule": "Whenever

a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement." Padilla, 542

U.S. at 447. Because Padilla filed his petition in a different district

than that of his "warden," the brig Commander, the Court held that

the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. Id.

Here, Poole seizes upon certain language from Padilla to argue that

the warden of the Maryland state prison was his "immediate custodian" and therefore the proper respondent to his § 2241 petition.

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Poole argues that the warden of the prison in Kentucky in which he

had been serving his sentence was a mere "distant custodian," Appellee’s Br. at 28, akin to the "Attorney General or some other remote

supervisory official" denounced as an inappropriate respondent in

Padilla. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435. 

Poole takes this language from Padilla out of context. As an initial

matter, the Padilla Court drew a contrast between a prison warden as

"immediate custodian" and a federal agency appointee with only a

nominal connection to a petitioner. This demarcation does not directly

inform the question before us, which is a matter of deciding which

warden, each of whom had control over Poole’s body at some point,

was the "immediate custodian." 

Moreover, the Padilla Court explained that the immediate custodian rule "serves the important purpose of preventing forum shopping

by habeas petitioners. Without it . . . . [t]he result would be rampant

forum shopping." Id. at 447. This purpose would be thwarted by a

rule allowing a prisoner to file a § 2241 petition anytime he is able

to secure a hiatus to another jurisdiction. Indeed, the facts of this very

case demonstrate the point. Poole had already had an opportunity to

seek habeas relief in his first § 2241 petition, filed in Kentucky. Having had his day in court and lost, Poole was able to procure a second

opinion by filing another, substantially similar petition in a different

jurisdiction. This is precisely the kind of confusion the Padilla Court

warned against: "district courts with overlapping jurisdiction[ ] and

the very inconvenience, expense, and embarrassment Congress sought

to avoid when it added the jurisdictional limitation [on § 2241] 137

years ago." Id.

Followed to its logical end, Poole’s proposed rule might encourage

the proliferation of § 2241 filings by prisoners testifying in jurisdictions outside their district of incarceration. Recognizing this danger,

Poole suggests that we could craft a rule recognizing only a limited

exception to the standard "district of confinement" test, id., allowing

the district court that originally sentenced the prisoner to also exercise

jurisdiction over a § 2241 petition. There is simply nothing in either

the language of the habeas statute or the caselaw interpreting it to support our carving out a tailor-made exception to provide Poole with the

relief he seeks. Indeed, Poole’s proposed exception is not substan16 UNITED STATES v. POOLE

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tially different from the statutory relief granted by Congress when it

first enacted § 2255, allowing an avenue for habeas petitions to be

filed with the original sentencing judge. Absent statutory authority,

we decline to transplant this feature of § 2255 onto the § 2241 habeas

scheme. 

2.

Neither do we find the extraordinary actions of the district court—

sequestering Poole in Maryland for the sole purpose of solidifying its

own jurisdiction—a proper circumvention of the immediate custodian

rule contemplated by statute and longstanding precedent.

The district court justified its exercise of jurisdiction based on a

"necessity" rationale of its own creation, relying on the Kentucky federal district court’s suggestion that "examination of the events of 1997

. . . are issues properly addressed by the Maryland trial and/or appellate courts," Poole v. Barron, No. 04-CV-095-KKC, slip op. at 8. In

light of this suggestion, and the reality that a denial of Poole’s petition

may very well "foreclose the possibility of any court considering the

petition on its merits," the district court found jurisdiction "[i]n an

effort to avoid such a patently unfair result." Poole v. Dotson, 469 F.

Supp. 2d at 333. 

Tellingly, neither Poole in his brief nor the district court itself cites

to any authority suggesting that jurisdiction that would otherwise be

improper may nevertheless lie based on necessity or a weighing of the

equities. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held the opposite: "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that

power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be

expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A court is to presume, therefore, that

a case lies outside its limited jurisdiction unless and until jurisdiction

has been shown to be proper. See id. (citing Turner v. Bank of N. Am.,

4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799)).

We can find no constitutional or statutory font for the power exercised by the district court here. Holding Poole in Maryland for the

express purpose of securing jurisdiction over his forthcoming § 2241

petition was simply insufficient to circumvent the immediate custoUNITED STATES v. POOLE 17

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dian rule and create jurisdiction where there was none. We therefore

conclude that neither the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum nor the retention of Poole in the district conferred jurisdiction on the Maryland federal district court.

III.

Because we hold that the district court did not properly exercise

jurisdiction over Poole’s § 2241 petition, we have no occasion to

address its legal conclusions regarding either the applicability of the

savings clause of § 2255 to these facts or the merits of Poole’s § 2241

petition. We do, however, wish to express some concern regarding

two procedural anomalies that occurred below. 

First, we note that the district court, at the ad testificandum hearing,

allowed Poole to abandon the very motion he was there to testify

about, a motion Poole himself recognized was unavailing, and substitute instead a request to be held in Maryland to give him time to file

a different motion altogether.14 Even if the district court was correct

in finding that Poole’s maneuver was not an intentional "transparent

manipulation of the court system," J.A. 105, the end result was the

same—Poole got a second bite at the § 2241 apple by bootstrapping

a § 2241 petition onto an admittedly questionable and quickly abandoned motion to amend the 1997 judgment. 

Second, considering the numerous legal hurdles Poole faced before

his petition could be heard, let alone granted, the process might have

been better served had he not been released prior to our being

afforded the opportunity to consider these issues of first impression.

Of course, this situation was exacerbated by the government’s failure

to seek a stay of Poole’s release with this court. But because Poole

has already been resentenced and released, we are now in the uncomfortable position of ordering reinstatement of the sentence of a freed

man.

14Nor was the government afforded any time to prepare an argument

that Poole should not be detained in Maryland. See J.A. 98 ("Your

Honor, I’m not sure why we’re here. I thought we were here on the

defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration."); J.A. 101 ("The Government

hasn’t had an opportunity to even review this."). 

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IV.

Because we find that Poole’s immediate custodian remained the

warden of the Kentucky prison in which he was permanently confined, we hold that the district court did not properly exercise jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the

district court and remand with instructions to reinstate Poole’s original sentence of 262 months’ imprisonment.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

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