Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00030/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00030-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D. Gonzalez
Defendant
Vernon McNeal
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERNON MCNEAL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

D. GONZALEZ,

 Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:14-cv-00030-BAM (PC)

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Vernon McNeal (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on 

January 2, 2014, is currently before the Court for screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

Case 1:14-cv-00030-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/15/14 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially 

plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each 

named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

(quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere 

consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at Calipatria State Prison. The events alleged in the 

complaint occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Corcoran State Prison CSATF. 

Plaintiff alleges: On June 26, 2012, a fight broke out between two inmates on C yard 

between 2 and 3 building. Plaintiff was at the corner of 4 building. According to a video, 

Plaintiff was well away from the fight, but the Building 4 Tower Officer, Gonzalez, shot Plaintiff 

in the right leg with the 40 mm launcher. 

Officer Gonzalez stated on his crime/incident report that Plaintiff advanced two steps 

toward the altercation. Plaintiff claims that the steps are not substantiated by the videotape 

evidence. Plaintiff further claims that his disoriented state should not have been looked at as a 

threat or advancement toward a fight. Plaintiff believes that Officer Gonzalez invented the two 

steps so that he could use Plaintiff for target practice. Plaintiff contends that he sustained a 

permanent injury to his right leg because of Officer Gonzalez’s illegal action. Plaintiff further 

reports that he was found guilty of willfully delaying, resisting or obstructing a peace officer in 

the performance of duty arising out of the incident. 

Case 1:14-cv-00030-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/15/14 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. Discussion

Plaintiff appears to challenge his disciplinary conviction by contending that Officer 

Gonzalez used excessive force. 

As a general matter, state prisoners may not challenge the fact or duration of their 

confinement in a section 1983 action and their sole remedy lies in habeas corpus relief. 

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). Often referred to 

as the favorable termination rule or the Heck bar, this exception to section 1983’s otherwise 

broad scope applies whenever state prisoners “seek to invalidate the duration of their 

confinement-either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly 

through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.” 

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, “a state prisoner's [section] 1983 

action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable 

relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal 

prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 

confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81–2. The favorable termination rule applies to prison 

disciplinary proceedings if those proceedings resulted in the loss of good-time or behavior 

credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646–48, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997).

Here, the exhibits submitted by Plaintiff demonstrate that he forfeited 61 days in credits 

as the result of being found guilty in prison disciplinary proceedings of willfully delaying, 

resisting or obstructing a peace officer in the performance of duty. According to the disciplinary 

charge, Plaintiff failed to comply with an order and advanced toward an altercation. Plaintiff’s 

failure to comply resulted in Defendant Gonzalez using his 40mm launcher on Plaintiff. (ECF 

No. 1, Ex. E.) 

Plaintiff’s success in this action would necessarily invalidate the result of the disciplinary 

hearing, which was based on finding that Plaintiff failed to comply with orders and caused

Defendant Gonzalez to use his 40mm launcher. As such, Plaintiff may not pursue his excessive 

force claim in this action unless he can demonstrate that his disciplinary conviction has been 

Case 1:14-cv-00030-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/15/14 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 (until and unless favorable termination of the conviction or 

sentence occurs prisoner has no cause of action under section 1983).

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. However, the Court will grant 

Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the identified deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good 

faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations 

must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555 (citations omitted). 

Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 

“buckshot” complaints). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 927. Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form; 

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; 

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a 

first amended complaint; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

this action will be dismissed for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 14, 2014 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00030-BAM Document 10 Filed 10/15/14 Page 4 of 4