Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01778/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01778-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Kane
Respondent
Thomas Kleve
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

2

 Calley's first name was not included in the record.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS KLEVE,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY KANE, Acting Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 05-1778 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner Thomas Kleve has filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to title 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging as a

violation of his constitutional rights the denial of parole by the

California Board of Parole Hearings (Board).1 Respondent Anthony

Kane has filed an answer. Petitioner has filed a traverse. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES

the petition.

BACKGROUND

On September 20, 1987, Petitioner and his passenger, Calley2,

were stopped by police because of an expired registration tag on

Petitioner's truck. The officer observed that Petitioner was

holding a small vial of white powder, which was later determined to

be methamphetamine. The officer also noticed the barrel of a

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shotgun protruding from Calley's jacket. Officers searched

Petitioner's truck and found a semi-automatic pistol, two magazines

loaded with ammunition, a six-inch dagger, and a silencer. While

searching Calley's person, officers recovered a loaded shotgun, a

stick of dynamite, and a blasting cap taped to a magnet. The

officers further recovered five rounds of ammunition from

Petitioner's person. Finally, the officers found a note in

Calley's wallet with the name, address, and description of a

protected government witness who was expected to testify in a

pending drug case. Petitioner and Calley were stopped a short

distance from the location of the witness.

Petitioner was tried for conspiracy to commit first-degree

murder, which resulted in a mistrial. In 1989, Petitioner was

retried and convicted of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder,

but was acquitted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The

prosecution's theory was that Petitioner and Calley conspired to

assassinate the witness to prevent him from testifying. The

evidence consisted of the facts that Petitioner was driving near

the location of the witness, that numerous weapons were found in

his truck, and that Calley had a note containing information about

the witness. Petitioner's defense was that he was unaware of

Calley's plans to murder the witness, that he did not know Calley

well, and that he was merely giving Calley a ride. No direct

evidence showed that Petitioner was aware of Calley's alleged plan

to murder the witness. Petitioner's prior criminal record

consisted of one arrest in 1978 for resisting a peace officer and

an arrest in 1988 for possession for sale of methamphetamine, as a

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3After the hearing, Petitioner appealed the counselor's report

and the counselor changed his prediction to state that "the risk to

the public is moderate to low should Kleve be released from

prison."

3

result of which he received three years of probation. 

Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life with the

possibility of parole. Since his incarceration, Petitioner has had

an exemplary record. His only disciplinary infraction, which

occurred his first year in prison, was for an unmade bed and an

untidy cell. Petitioner has obtained his General Education Diploma

and completed other educational courses. He has attended

Alcoholics Anonymous for over a decade and has attended other selfhelp programs such as Anger Management and Substance Abuse

Recovery. He has received forty-eight laudatory chronos for his

conduct and achievements while in prison. 

On August 27, 2003, Petitioner attended his third parole

suitability hearing before the Board. In addition to Petitioner's

prison record, the Board considered the following evidence. An

evaluation by a forensic psychologist concluded that Petitioner

possessed insight and remorse about his criminal conduct and that

his potential for violence if released would be "no greater than an

average citizen in the community." Prior psychological evaluations

also had found that Petitioner did not possess a tendency towards

violence. However, a report by Petitioner's correctional counselor

stated that his parole would pose a "moderate degree of threat." 

Petitioner's attorney objected to the admission of the counselor's

opinion and the panel overruled the objection.3

 Petitioner also

submitted letters from his family, including his wife, mother, and

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children, supporting his release and confirming that he would have

housing and employment upon his release. Petitioner further stated

that he would continue to attend Alcoholics Anonymous indefinitely. 

Although he did not discuss the crime itself, Petitioner stated

that he felt remorse and took full responsibility for his actions. 

After brief deliberation, the Board panel concluded that

Petitioner was not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety

if released and issued a one-year denial of parole. The Board

panel cited several bases for its decision, but stated the

"paramount reason" was the gravity of the commitment offense. It

noted that Petitioner and his co-conspirator's intended victim was

nineteen years old and a federally protected witness. As other

factors supporting its decision, the panel cited Petitioner's

"inexplicable" motive, his history of unstable relationships with

others, and his need for additional self-help and therapy

programming. The Board also relied on Petitioner's correctional

counselor's assessment that Petitioner would pose a moderate threat

if released.

On July 26, 2004, Petitioner filed in Los Angeles County

Superior Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging

the Board's decision. In its reasoned opinion, the court denied

the petition, finding that some evidence supported the Board's

decision. However, it held that no evidence supported the Board's

findings that Petitioner's motive was inexplicable, that he had a

history of unstable relationships, or that he required further

self-help programming. After the court of appeal and California

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Supreme Court denied his petition summarily, Petitioner brought a

federal habeas petition in this Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge

to a State parole eligibility decision, the applicable standard is

contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.

2002). Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief

unless the State court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412 (2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of

the State court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted his State

remedies by filing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. Where, as here, the highest State court

to reach the merits issued a summary opinion which does not

explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under

§ 2254(d) is of the last State court opinion to reach the merits.

Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In

this case, the last State court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner’s claim is the opinion of the Los Angeles County

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4

 Because the superior court did not address Petitioner's

claim regarding the correctional counselor's risk assessment, the

last explained opinion of this claim is the opinion of the Board.

6

Superior Court.4

 Ex. E.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Respondent argues that the Court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction because State parole matters do not constitute a

federal question on the grounds that denial of parole does not

affect a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Although a

convicted person has no inherent or constitutional right to early

release on parole, a State's statutory parole scheme may create "a

presumption that parole release will be granted" if it uses

mandatory language. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal &

Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). This presumption of parole

release gives rise to a constitutionally protected liberty

interest that cannot be denied without adequate due process

protection. Id. at 11-16; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482

U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987).

In Allen, the United States Supreme Court held that Montana's

statutory parole scheme, which instructed that the parole board

"shall" release a prisoner on parole absent certain conditions,

used mandatory language such that it created a constitutionally

protected right that parole would be granted if those conditions

were not found to exist. Allen, 482 U.S. at 376-78. Also, in

Greenholtz, the Supreme Court held that Nebraska's parole statute,

which instructed that the parole board "shall" release the

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prisoner on parole absent certain conditions, created a liberty

interest in release on parole if those conditions were found not

to exist. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12.

California's parole scheme largely parallels the Montana and

Nebraska schemes. California Penal Code § 3041 instructs that the

Board "shall set a release date" unless it decides this is

inadvisable based on the nature of the current offense and of any

past offenses and in consideration of public safety: 

[a] One year prior to the inmate's minimum

eligible parole release date a panel of two or

more commissioners or deputy commissioners

shall . . . meet with the inmate and shall

normally set a parole release date . . . The

board shall establish criteria for the setting

of parole release dates and in doing so shall

consider the number of victims of the crime

for which the inmate was sentenced and other

factors in mitigation or aggravation of the

crime . . .

[b] The panel or the board, sitting en banc,

shall set a release date unless it determines

that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity

of current or past convicted offense or

offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period

of incarceration for this individual, and that

a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at

this meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a), (b).

The Ninth Circuit has held that the California parole scheme

"gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole"

under the Allen and Greenholtz standards because it "'creates a

presumption that parole release will be granted' unless the

statutorily defined determinations [set forth in § 3041(b)] are

made." McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12). Thus, under Ninth Circuit

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authority, the mandatory language of California's parole scheme

creates a federally protected liberty interest such that an inmate

has a right to a parole date absent the determinations set forth in 

§ 3041(b).

Respondent relies on In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061

(2005), for the proposition that California prisoners have no

liberty interest in parole and thus have no federal due process

rights in connection with parole eligibility. The Ninth Circuit

has recently rejected this contention. Sass v. California Bd. of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the

Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to

decide whether Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process was violated by the Board's determination that he was not

suitable for parole. 

II. Due Process Claim

Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated

by the Board's decision because no evidence supports its finding

that he is unsuitable for parole. Because California prisoners

have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in release on

parole, they cannot be denied a parole date without the procedural

protections necessary to satisfy due process. McQuillion, 306 F.3d

at 902. A parole board's decision must be supported by “some

evidence” to satisfy the requirements of due process. 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); McQuillion, 306

F.3d at 904; Morales v. California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d

1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 499

(1995). The evidence underlying the board's decision must have

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some indicia of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek

v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003), the

court found that parole denial based solely on the gravity of the

commitment offense can initially satisfy due process requirements,

and that the "some evidence" standard could be satisfied by the

Board's finding that the commitment offense was particularly

brutal. Petitioner argues that the Board must articulate a

rational nexus between the factors it cites in its decision and its

finding that Petitioner's release would cause an unreasonable risk

of harm to society. However, no clearly established federal law

requires that such a nexus be shown. Biggs did not require that

the Board explain how this brutality related to the risk posed by

the petitioner if released. Id. 

However, the Ninth Circuit Biggs panel said in dicta that

courts may also consider the parole board’s decision-making process

over time: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and

requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors

considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor . . . runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process

violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. 

The California Supreme Court has held that the facts of the

crime alone can support a sentence longer than the statutory

minimum, even if everything else about the prisoner is laudable, as

long as the Board points to factors beyond the minimum elements of

the crime for which the inmate was committed. Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

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4th at 1071; In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (2002)

(relying on the nature of the offense might violate due process if

no circumstances of the offense could be considered more aggravated

or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for

that offense).

Here, although the Board cited numerous reasons for finding

Petitioner unsuitable for parole, all but two of these reasons were

rejected by the State habeas court. The remaining two reasons are

the correctional counselor's assessment that Petitioner would pose

a moderate threat to the community if released and the nature of

Petitioner's commitment offense. 

Petitioner asserts that the Board's reliance on his

correctional counselor's risk assessment was impermissible because

the counselor was not a trained psychologist. Petitioner relies on

an unpublished State trial court decision, In re Cortez, BH001953

(Los Angeles Superior Court August, 2003), for the proposition that

the Board should not rely on the risk assessments of correctional

counselors. However, because unpublished opinions have no

precedential value and may not be cited or relied upon by parties,

see California Court Rule 977(a); Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center

v. Belshe, 56 Cal. App. 4th 819, 830-831 (1997), the Court does not

consider this case. The State habeas court noted in a footnote

that the issue of the Board's reliance on correctional counselors'

risk assessments was under review before the court of appeal in In

re Aremu, BH002661 (Los Angeles Superior Court August, 2004), and

therefore did not rule on it pending guidance from the Aremu court. 

In May, 2005, the appellate court issued an unpublished decision,

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5 Under section 2402(c), the listed circumstances tending to

show unsuitability for parole include: 

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the

offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or

killed in the same or separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an

execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated

during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner

11

In re Aremu, 2005 WL 1227656 (Cal. App.). The court denied the

petition because the petitioner had failed to exhaust

administrative remedies, but noted that on August 5, 2004, the

California Department of Corrections (CDC) had issued a temporary

directive instructing correctional counselors to discontinue

providing opinions regarding whether prisoners are a threat to

public safety. Id. at *4. Because In re Aremu is an unpublished

decision, the Court does not consider it either. Therefore, the

correctional counselor's risk assessment constitutes some evidence

upon which the Board relied.

The remaining evidence relied upon by the Board in finding

Petitioner unsuitable for parole was the nature of his commitment

offense. Petitioner argues that no evidence supports the Board's

finding that the gravity of the offense indicated that it was

particularly heinous or calculated, as required for a finding of

unsuitability under title 15, California Code of Regulations,

section 2402(c).5 Petitioner further asserts that the offense

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which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering.

6Section 2403(a) provides that a base term shall be set for

each life term prisoner who is found suitable for parole. The base

term shall be determined solely by the gravity of the base crime. 

Several matrices of base terms are provided and the Board is

generally to impose the middle term of the matrix most closely

related to the base crime.

7Section 2403(g) provides that in considering life term crimes

for which no matrix is given, the panel shall impose a base term

applicable to the offense or offenses of similar gravity with

respect to the threat to the public. Petitioner states that no

matrix exists for conspiracy to commit second degree murder. 

Therefore, his use of the matrix for second degree murder appears

to be correct.

12

could not have been carried out in a particularly brutal manner

because the underlying crime never occurred, and that the offense

was no more calculated than any conspiracy, which by its nature,

must be planned. 

However, the variety and number of lethal weapons uncovered

by police inside Petitioner's truck, including firearms and

ammunition, a large dagger, and an explosive device, indicate that

the conspiracy was of a particularly heinous nature. Thus, some

evidence supports the Board's conclusion that Petitioner was

unsuitable for parole based on his commitment offense. 

Petitioner asserts that the Board's reliance on an unchanging

factor such as his commitment offense violates due process. Citing

Cal. Code Regs, title 15, § 2403,6 Petitioner points out that the

base term for a life prisoner convicted of second-degree murder

found suitable for parole is nineteen years.7 Citing Cal. Code

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8

Section 2410 provides that life prisoners may earn postconviction credit for each year spent in State prison and that,

prior to the initial parole consideration hearing, life prisoners

shall have a documentation hearing at which the Board documents the

prisoner's performance, participation and behavior. However,

credit is not granted or denied at the documentation hearing; the

documentation is used by the panel which establishes a parole date

to determine how much, if any, credit should be granted. The

suggested amount of post-conviction credit is zero to four months

for each year served.

13

Regs, title 15, § 2410,8 Petitioner points out that this nineteen

year term would be reduced by sixty months, assuming four months of

credit for each of his fifteen disciplinary-free years in prison

and 137 days of pre-sentence credits awarded by the sentencing

court. Thus, he calculates that the nineteen year base term would

be reduced to a term of thirteen years and seven months which would

result in a parole date in December, 2002. He asserts that the

fact that he has been incarcerated five years in excess of his

fifteen-year minimum term and three and half years longer than the

maximum term set forth for second-degree murder in the regulations,

allowing for credit reduction, shows that the Board, by relying on

reasons that will forever remain unchanged, is converting his

sentence of life with the possibility of parole into a sentence of

life without the possibility of parole. Petitioner distinguishes

his case in which he has been thrice denied parole from Biggs, 334

F.3d at 914, where the petitioner had only been denied parole once,

in support of his claim that his denial of parole is of

constitutional magnitude. 

Nevertheless, the Board's decision at issue here does not

rise to a due process violation. Although the Ninth Circuit has

stated that, over time, continuous denial of parole based on the

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commitment offense could result in denial of due process, see

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17, it has not specified the number of

denials or the length of time served beyond the minimum sentence

that would constitute a due process violation. District courts

which have granted habeas petitions challenging the Board's

decisions addressed situations involving more denials of parole

than in the instant case. See e.g., Irons v. Carey, 358 F. Supp.

2d 936, 947 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (finding due process violation in

denial of parole at fifth parole suitability hearing after

petitioner had served sixteen years of a seventeen-years-to-life

sentence for second degree murder with a two-year enhancement for

use of firearm where all factors indicated suitability for parole),

rev'd, --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 656345 (9th Cir. 2007) (given the

egregiousness of the commitment offense, due process not violated

when Board deemed petitioner unsuitable for parole prior to

expiration of his minimum term); Johnson v. Finn, 2006 WL 195159,

*12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2006) (finding due process violation in

denial of parole at twelfth parole suitability hearing after

petitioner had served twenty-four years of sentence of life with

the possibility of parole for first degree murder where all factors

indicated suitability for parole). 

Accordingly, the superior court's finding that some evidence

supported the Board's finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for

parole was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. However, if Petitioner continues

his exemplary behavior in prison and the Board denies parole based

solely upon unchanging facts such as the nature of the crime, the

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Board's decision may eventually amount to a due process violation. 

See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/21/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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