Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15360/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15360-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Joseph McMonagle
Appellant
Don L. Meyer
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN JOSEPH MCMONAGLE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DON L. MEYER, Chief Probation

Officer of Sacramento County,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 12-15360

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-02115-

GGH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Gregory G. Hollows, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 5, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed September 10, 2014

Before: Sidney R. Thomas and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Kevin Thomas Duffy, District Judge.

*

Opinion by Judge Duffy;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

* The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, United States District Judge for

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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2 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing as

untimely a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition

challenging a misdemeanor conviction for driving under the

influence, and remanded.

The panel held that in the context of California

misdemeanants who are required to file a state habeas petition

in order to both reach the state court of last resort and fully

exhaust their claim before seeking relief in federal court,

finality for the purposes of AEDPA occurs once the

California Supreme Court denies their state habeas petition

and the United States Supreme Court denies certiorari or the

90-day period for filing a petition for certiorari expires.

Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson wrote that the majority

opinion erroneously conflates the concepts of finality and

exhaustion and runs afoul of the time limits contained in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

COUNSEL

Charles Marchand Bonneau, II, Sacramento, California; for

Petitioner-Appellant.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MCMONAGLE V. MEYER 3

Brian G. Smiley (argued), Supervising Deputy Attorney

General; Brian R. Means, Deputy Attorney General; Michael

P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kamala D.

Harris, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General,

Sacramento, California, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

DUFFY, District Judge:

Petitioner-Appellant Brian Joseph McMonagle appeals

the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. McMonagle

seeks relief from a misdemeanor conviction for driving under

the influence. In response to McMonagle’s petition, the

Attorney General’s office filed a motion to dismiss the

petition as untimely. On January 30, 2012, the district court

granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that it

had not been filed within the time limit provided in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). For the reasons discussed below, we

reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 21, 2008, Brian Joseph McMonagle was

convicted by a jury of (i) misdemeanor driving under the

influence of alcohol (“DUI”) and (ii) driving with a blood

alcohol level of .08% or more. The jury also determined that

McMonagle drove with a blood alcohol level of .15% or

more. McMonagle admitted a prior conviction as to each

count and was sentenced to summary probation for three

years, and 15 days in jail. McMonagle appealed his

conviction to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of

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4 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

California (“Appellate Division”). On December 18, 2009,

the Appellate Division reversed McMonagle’s conviction for

driving with a blood alcohol level of .08% and in excess of

.15% in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 34 (2004). Following the reasoning

set forth in Crawford, the Appellate Division held that

McMonagle’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated

when the state trial court admitted McMonagle’s blood

alcohol lab report without the sponsoring testimony of the

analyst who prepared the report. The Appellate Division thus

reversed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level

of .08%. The Appellate Division did not, however, reverse

the DUI conviction, holding that there was sufficient

evidence to uphold the conviction, namely that McMonagle

stopped abruptly and irregularly for a red light, drove

abnormally slow, turned abruptly, smelled of alcohol,

mumbled, admitted to consuming alcohol, had red, watery

eyes, was slow and unsteady on his feet, and had difficulty

walking.

McMonagle filed a timely request for certification of the

matter to the California Court of Appeal, which the Appellate

Division denied on January 19, 2010. On February 3, 2010,

McMonagle filed a timely request for transfer in the Third

District Court of Appeal, which was denied on February 11,

2010. On April 7, 2010, McMonagle timely filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court

asserting that he was denied the right to confrontation by the

use in evidence of conclusions drawn by an expert witness

who was not available to testify at trial. The California

Supreme Court denied that petition without comment on June

17, 2010.

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MCMONAGLE V. MEYER 5

On August 10, 2011, McMonagle filed a federal petition

for writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of California. 

The state moved to dismiss the federal petition on the grounds

that it was untimely. The state argued that (i) McMonagle’s

period of “direct review” in the state courts ended on

February 11, 2010, when the state Court of Appeal denied

McMonagle’s request for transfer, and (ii) the 90-day time

period to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court

ended on May 12, 2010. According to the state, the AEDPA

one-year statute of limitations began on the following day,

May 13, 2010, making the last day to file a federal writ of

habeas corpus May 12, 2011, plus any time for tolling. The

state conceded that McMonagle was entitled to a statutory toll

pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2244(d)(2) from May 13, 2010 (the

day after McMonagle’s 90-day period to petition the U.S.

Supreme Court ostensibly expired) to June 17, 2010 (the date

his state habeas petition was denied by the California

Supreme Court). Thus, the state argued that the habeas

petition filed in the California Supreme Court, while

necessary for exhaustion, is not part of the “direct review”

process for purposes of determining when the statute of

limitations begins to run.

McMonagle argued that his one-year statute of limitations

did not begin until September 17, 2010. This is 90 days after

the California Supreme Court denied his habeas petition on

June 17, 2010, and when his state court claim was fully

exhausted and his period for Supreme Court review ended. 

McMonagle argued that since exhaustion of remedies to the

highest state court is required before a habeas petition can be

presented in federal court, the “direct review” of his claim

ended only after the California Supreme Court denied his

habeas petition and the 90-day time period to file with the

United States Supreme Court had expired.

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6 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss on

January 30, 2012. The district court held that while a

misdemeanor defendant is entitled to appeal their conviction

to the Appellate Division of the California Superior Court, a

denial of a request to transfer to the California Court of

Appeals is “final immediately” pursuant to the California

Rules of Court. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.1018(a). As such,

McMonagle’s 90-day certiorari review period began on

February 11, 2010—the day his request to transfer was

denied. The district court further held that McMonagle was

entitled to a 36-day toll pursuant to AEDPA’s tolling

provision in § 2244(d)(2).1 Tolling the statute of limitations

moved McMonagle’s habeas petition filing deadline to June

17, 2010 by the district court’s calculus.

Following the district court’s decision, McMonagle

moved for reconsideration under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, or, alternatively, that the district court

issue a certificate of appealability. The district court denied

McMonagle’s motion for reconsideration, but granted his

certificate of appealability. This appeal followed.

1 The California Court of Appeals denied McMonagle’s request for a

transfer on February 11, 2010. The district court found that this date

marked the conclusion of “direct review” of McMonagle’s petition. Using

this definition of finality, McMonagle had 90 days, or until May 12, 2010,

to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for review. According to the district

court, McMonagle’s one-year statute of limitations began to accrue the

next day, May 13, 2010. However, McMonagle’s properly filed petition

to the California Supreme Court was pending before that court until June

17, 2010. Therefore, the district court tolled the one-year statute of

limitations for 36-days, or from May 13, 2010 to June 17, 2010.

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MCMONAGLE V. MEYER 7

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The timeliness of a federal habeas petition, including a

district court’s dismissal of a claim under the AEDPA statute

of limitations is reviewed de novo. Porter v. Ollison,

620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010); Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, we review

questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Introduction

McMonagle timely filed his petition for writ of habeas

corpus within the one-year statute of limitations period of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). We hold that, in

the context of California misdemeanants who are required to

file a state habeas petition in order to both reach the state

court of last resort and fully exhaust their claim before

seeking relief in federal court, finality for the purposes of

AEDPA occurs once the California Supreme Court denies

their state habeas petition and the United States Supreme

Court denies certiorari or the 90-day period for filing a

petition for certiorari expires. Thus, we reverse and remand.

Our holding is based on a careful analysis of the related

but distinct concepts of exhaustion and finality. While it is

important that courts not conflate the two, in the context of

California misdemeanants, direct review should not be final

until a petitioner exhausts his state remedies, which includes

filing a habeas petition to the California Supreme Court. This

ensures that the California Supreme Court has an opportunity

to correct any constitutional violations before a petitioner

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8 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

seeks help in either the United States Supreme Court or

federal district court. Any other holding could result in

simultaneous state and federal petitions, which would

undermine the bedrock principal of comity.

II. When AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations Begins to Run

on State Habeas Petitioners

AEDPA “establishes a one-year statute of limitations for

a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition.” 

Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 114 (2009). The

statute of limitations period runs from “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). “[F]or a state prisoner who does not seek

review in a State’s highest court, the judgment becomes

‘final’ on the date that the time for seeking such review

expires.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 646, 181 L. Ed.

2d 619 (2012). In contrast, where a state defendant seeks

direct review in a state’s highest court, the judgment becomes

final when time for seeking certiorari review in the U.S.

Supreme Court expires. See Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 120. This

is because the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction over final

decisions of the highest state court “in which a decision could

be had” respecting a constitutional right or other federal law. 

28 U.S.C. §1257.

The rules articulated in Gonzales and Jimenez do not

definitively resolve this case, however, because California

labels discretionary review of a misdemeanor by its court of

last resort a “collateral” proceeding. Texas—where both

Gonzales and Jimenez originated—considers discretionary

review by the state court of last resort for criminal matters to

be part of the direct review process. California, in contrast,

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MCMONAGLE V. MEYER 9

considers discretionary review of a misdemeanor by the

California Supreme Court—California’s court of last

resort—to be a collateral proceeding. The practical

difference between the two is not self-evident: “the phrase

‘collateral review’” simply means “judicial review of a

judgment in a proceeding that is not part of direct review.” 

Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1282 (2011) (internal

quotations and citations omitted) (holding a state prisoner’s

post-conviction motion to reduce sentence was part of

collateral rather than direct review).

A. The California Path of Review for a Misdemeanor

is Atypical

A California misdemeanant’s path to federal court review

is somewhat unusual. In California, a misdemeanor criminal

conviction may be immediately appealed to the Appellate

Division of the Superior Court. Cal. Penal Code. § 1466. 

After the proceedings in the Appellate Division have

concluded, a misdemeanor defendant may request that the

Appellate Division certify the matter to the state Court of

Appeal. If this certification request is denied, a misdemeanor

defendant may seek a transfer in the Court of Appeal directly. 

See Cal. R. Ct. 8.1002, 8.1006. Pursuant to California Rule of

Court 8.1018(a), “if the Court of Appeal denies transfer of a

case from the appellate division of the superior court after the

appellate division certifies the case for transfer or after a

party files a petition for transfer, the denial is final

immediately.” Cal. R. Ct. 8.1018(a) (emphasis added). The

denial of a misdemeanor defendant’s request to transfer

cannot be reviewed by the California Supreme Court. Cal. R.

Ct. 8.500(a)(1). However, the California Constitution gives

the California Supreme Court original jurisdiction over

misdemeanants’ habeas claims. Cal. Const. of 1879, art. VI,

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10 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

§ 10 (1966). Thus, a habeas petition is the means by which

a misdemeanant can have the California Supreme Court

consider his or her claim.

B. Federal Law Governs When “Direct Review”

Concludes

The state argues that the language of California Rule of

Court 8.1018(a), which renders the California Court of

Appeal Transfer “final immediately,” “strongly indicates that

‘direct review’ [under AEDPA] ends once the California

Court of Appeal denies a misdemeanant’s petition for transfer

and the 90-day period for certiorari elapses.” But California’s

nomenclature is not determinative here because federal law,

not state law, determines “when a conviction becomes ‘final

by the conclusion of direct review.’” Summers v. Schriro,

481 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 2007). “Finality is a concept that

has been ‘variously defined; like many legal terms, its precise

meaning depends on context.’” Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 119. 

The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected a state-specific

definition of finality under AEDPA, holding that it “would

usher in state-by-state definitions of the conclusion of direct

review . . . [a]nd it would pose serious administrability

concerns.” Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 655.

Thus, despite how California categorizes it, seeking

habeas review of a misdemeanor in the California Supreme

Court is, for the purposes of federal law, de facto part of the

direct review process. It is available to all misdemeanants,

and is the sole mechanism by which California’s court of last

resort reviews legal issues before a petitioner may seek

federal review. For that reason, state habeas review in these

circumstances is not truly collateral “in its customary and

preferred sense” because it is not “lying aside from the main

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MCMONAGLE V. MEYER 11

subject.” Wall, 131 S. Ct. at 1284. Accordingly, finality here

for the purposes of AEDPA occurs once the California

Supreme Court denies a misdemeanant’s state habeas petition

and the U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari or the 90-day

period for filing a petition for certiorari expires.

III. A Misdemeanant Must Exhaust at the California

Supreme Court Before Seeking Federal Review

Here, it is no coincidence that finality coalesces with

exhaustion. A habeas petitioner must exhaust all available

state remedies before seeking review in a federal district

court. Larche v. Simons, 53 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1995);

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Almost two decades ago, this court held

that “before turning to the federal courts for habeas review,

misdemeanants must present their constitutional claims to the

California Supreme Court bymeans of state habeas petitions”

in order to fully exhaust their claims in compliance with

§ 2254. Id. at 1072. The Supreme Court, moreover, has

repeatedly emphasized the importance of full exhaustion in

habeas petitions, stating, for example,

The exhaustion doctrine is principally

designed to protect the state courts’ role in the

enforcement of federal law and prevent

disruption of state judicial proceedings. 

Under our federal system, the federal and state

courts are equally bound to guard and protect

rights secured by the Constitution. Because it

would be unseemly in our dual system of

government for a federal district court to upset

a state court conviction without an

opportunity to the state courts to correct a

constitutional violation, federal courts apply

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12 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

the doctrine of comity, which teaches that one

court should defer action on causes properly

within its jurisdiction until the courts of

another sovereignty with concurrent powers,

and already cognizant of the litigation, have

had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted). The exhaustion requirement

affords state courts a full opportunity to consider and correct

any constitutional or federal law challenges to a state

judgment before a habeas defendant can collaterally attack

the judgment in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

167, 178–79 (2001); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,

526 U.S. 838 (1999) (holding that if a state’s appellate

procedure allows a habeas petitioner to file a discretionary

petition with the state’s highest court that is a necessary step

to exhaustion).

Thus, before a defendant in state custody may seek

federal review, that defendant must fully exhaust all available

state remedies. For misdemeanants in California, this

includes filing a discretionary petition to the California

Supreme Court. Larche, 53 F.3d at 1072. It is only after the

California State Supreme Court petition is denied that a

misdemeanant’s 90-day window within which he can

properly file, or decline to file, a petition for certiorari with

the U.S. Supreme Court begins to run. “A petition for a writ

of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state

court that is subject to discretionary review by the state court

of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within

90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary

review.” U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1). Thus, in habeas cases such

as this one, it would be nonsensical to have finality and

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MCMONAGLE V. MEYER 13

exhaustion occur at different times merely because a state

labels discretionary review by the state court of last resort

“collateral” rather than “direct.” It could create a situation

where a misdemeanant cannot yet petition a federal court

because he has not yet exhausted his state remedies, and yet,

at the same time, he must petition the federal courts lest he

run the statute of limitations.

The state acknowledges that McMonagle was required

file the discretionary petition with the California Supreme

Court in order to fully exhaust his claim for federal purposes. 

See Larche, 53 F.3d at 1071. McMonagle did so, and the

Supreme Court of California denied that petition on June 17,

2010. McMonagle’s 90-daywindow to file certiorari with the

United States Supreme Court began that day and expired on

September 17, 2010. On this date, McMonagle’s claim was

both exhausted and final. McMonagle then had until

September 17, 2011 to file his federal habeas petition. He did

so on August 10, 2011, and his petition was therefore timely.

VI. Finality and Exhaustion Coinciding is Not

Problematic

We find unpersuasive the state’s argument that

incorporating exhaustion into “direct review” would give

misdemeanants two 90-day certiorari periods, “one after the

highest state court had ruled on direct review, whatever the

status of that court, and another further ‘tolling’ 90-day

period after submission of a habeas petition to the highest

state court which could review the habeas petition.” 

California misdemeanants who, like McMonagle, comply

with all of the state’s appellate procedures and deadlines,

including filing a timely discretionary petition with the

California Supreme Court, would be entitled to only one 90-

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14 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

day certiorari period, commencing after the California

Supreme Court denied the discretionarypetition. Our holding

in this case is deliberately narrow, applying only to

misdemeanants who timely file and otherwise fully comply

with all of the California state exhaustion requirements.

Nor are we persuaded by the state’s argument that if

finality of direct review for misdemeanor defendants

coincides with claim exhaustion, AEDPA’s tolling provision

in § 2244(d)(2) would be rendered a nullity. AEDPA’s

tolling provision states, “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Our holding

onlymakes this provision redundant in states, like California,

that label discretionary review to the court of last resort as

“collateral” rather than “direct.” Ultimately, the

consideration that our holding may render § 2244(d)(2)

inapplicable to misdemeanor habeas petitioners in a few

select states is greatly outweighed by federal courts’

overriding concerns for comity and uniformity.

CONCLUSION

“Finality is a concept that has been ‘variously defined;

like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on

context.’” Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 119. This case is the perfect

example of “finality” varying based on context. In the

context of California misdemeanor habeas petitioners, finality

for the purposes of AEDPA occurs once the California

Supreme Court denies their state habeas petition and the U.S.

Supreme Court denies certiorari or the 90-day period for

filing a petition for certiorari expires. Even though a

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MCMONAGLE V. MEYER 15

misdemeanor judgment is “final immediately” under the

California Rules of Court, the judgment is not final for

purposes of AEDPA until a misdemeanant has exhausted his

claim by filing a discretionary petition in the California State

Supreme Court. This holding ensures that federal courts

“avoid the ‘unseem[liness]’ of . . . overturning a state court

conviction without the state courts having had an opportunity

to correct the constitutional violation in the first instance.” 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

Ultimately, this may be a hollow victory for Mr.

McMonagle. If on remand the district court finds that the

California Appellate Division correctly determined that the

admission of the blood test results was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt, Mr. McMonagle’s petition will be denied

on the merits.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Irespectfully dissent from the holding of the majority that

Brian Joseph McMonagle’s habeas petition was timely. In

my view, the majority opinion erroneously conflates the

concepts of finality and exhaustion and runs afoul of the time

limits contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA).

As the majority opinion discusses, the issue of timeliness

in this case stems from the peculiar review procedure that

governs misdemeanor appeals in the California judicial

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16 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

system. In California, an individual convicted of a

misdemeanor may only challenge the conviction by filing an

appeal with the appellate division of the superior court of

California. See Cal. Penal Code § 1466; see also People v.

Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 209 Cal. App. 4th 1513, 1520

n.3 (2012) (“In a misdemeanor case, appeal is to the appellate

division of the superior court.”) (citing Cal. Penal Code

§ 1466). At the conclusion of proceedings in the appellate

division of the superior court, a party may request that the

appellate division of the superior court certify an appeal to

the California Court of Appeal. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.1005,

8.1002; see also Tecklenberg v. Appellate Div., 169 Cal. App.

4th 1402, 1405 (2009). If the appellate division of the

superior court denies the request for certification, a partymay

seek directly a transfer to the Court of Appeal. See Cal. R.

Ct. 8.1006, 8.1002. “If the Court of Appeal denies transfer of

a case from the appellate division of the superior court . . . ,

the denial is final immediately. . . . ” Cal R. Ct. 8.1018 (a). 

The party may not appeal the denial to the California

Supreme Court. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(a)(1); see also

Tecklenberg,169 Cal. App. 4th at 1405 n.4 (“Rule 8.500(a)(1)

provides: A party may file a petition in the Supreme Court

for review of any decision of the Court of Appeal, including

any interlocutory order, except the denial of a transfer of a

case within the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the original).

To summarize, an individual convicted of a misdemeanor

in California may obtain review of that conviction in the

appellate division of the superior court. If that review is

unfavorable, the party may seek further review via transfer to

the California Court of Appeal directly or through

certification from the appellate division of the superior court. 

However, if the Court of Appeal declines the transfer, no

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MCMONAGLE V. MEYER 17

further direct appeal is available. Specifically, the order

denying transfer to the Court of Appeal is final immediately,

and no petition for review may be filed in the California

Supreme Court.

In this case, McMonagle’s request for transfer to the

Court of Appeal was denied on February 11, 2010. Two

months later, McMonagle filed an original petition for a writ

of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, which was

denied on June 17, 2010. The outcome of this case turns on

whether McMonagle’s case became final upon the denial of

the requested transfer to the Court of Appeal or upon denial

of his habeas petition by the California Supreme Court.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply

to an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation

period shall run from the latest of - -

(A) the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct

review . . .

(Emphasis added).

We have consistently determined the timeliness of a

habeas petition by calculating the running of the limitations

period with reference to the completion of direct review in the

state court. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158–59 (9th

Cir. 1999). Although filing of collateral proceedings may toll

the running of the limitations period, it does not affect

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18 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

commencement of the running of the limitations period. See

Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 968–69 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing

tolling due to collateral review proceedings).

The majority opinion seeks to alter our well-established

interpretation of finality by conflating the concepts of finality

and exhaustion of state remedies. See Majority Opinion,

p. 11 (“Here, it is no coincidence that finality coalesces with

exhaustion. . . . ”). However, the United States Supreme

Court does not agree. In Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167

(2001), the Supreme Court distinguished the concepts of

exhaustion and finality. The Court explained that the

exhaustion requirement set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)

fosters comity between state and federal courts by ensuring

that state courts have a complete opportunity to review

federally-based challenges to a state conviction before

initiating a collateral challenge in federal court. See id. at

178–79. In contrast, the statute of limitations period

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) advances the goal of

finality in state court judgments, thereby reducing the

potential for delay. See id. at 179. The tolling provision

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)1bridges the gap between

the limitations period in § 2244(d)(1) and the exhaustion

 

1

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides:

The time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . .

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

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MCMONAGLE V. MEYER 19

requirement of § 2254(b)(1)(A).2 Even though the limitations

period begins to run when direct review becomes final, the

collateral review required to exhaust state remedies tolls the

running of the limitations period.3 See id. at 179–80.

The majority’s approach conflating exhaustion and

finality obliterates the balance struck by the exhaustion and

statute of limitation provisions of AEDPA and impermissibly

renders the tolling provision superfluous. See Ctr. for

Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 695 F.3d 893, 903 (9th Cir.

2012) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that

a statute should be construed, if possible, so that no clause,

sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant

. . . .”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The

majority is of the view that no proceeding in California is

final until the California Supreme Court has ruled. See

Majority Opinion, pp. 7. Thus, the majority calculates the

running of the habeas statute of limitations in this case from

the date the California Supreme Court denied McMonagle’s

habeas petition, rendering his federal habeas petition timely. 

See id., p. 13. However, the rules governing misdemeanor

appeals in California provide that denial of a certification to

the California Court of Appeal for review “is final

 

2

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall

not be granted unless it appears that - -

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available

in the courts of the State . . .

3

It is notable that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) speaks of exhaustion in

terms of “the remedies” available in the state courts while § 2244(d)(1)(A)

speaks of finality in terms solely of direct review.

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20 MCMONAGLE V. MEYER

immediately” and may not be appealed to the California

Supreme Court. Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(a)(1); see also

Tecklenberg, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 1405 & n.4. The denial of

McMonagle’s appeal on February 11, 2010, was “final

immediately,” triggering the running of the federal habeas

statute of limitation. Without tolling, the one-year statute of

limitations expired on May 12, 2011. See Greene v. Fisher,

132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011) (“Finality occurs when direct state

appeals have been exhausted and a petition for writ of

certiorari from [the United StatesSupreme Court] has become

time barred . . .”) (emphasis added); see also United States

Supreme Ct. R. 13 (providing 90 days within which to file for

a writ of certiorari). As the district court noted, McMonagle

was entitled to tolling for the thirty-six days during which his

habeas petition was pending before the California Supreme

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Addition of these thirtysix days extended the statute of limitations deadline to June

17, 2011. I agree with the district court that his habeas

petition filed on August 10, 2011, was untimely.

It is no surprise that the majority fails to cite even one

case adopting its novel view conflating the concepts of

exhaustion and finality. This will be the first.

I respectfully dissent.

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