Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13404/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13404-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.
Appellee-Cross Appellant
Jane McGinnis
Appellant-Cross Appellee

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13404

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cv-00284-CAR

JANE MCGINNIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant

Cross Appellee,

versus

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

Cross Appellant.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(March 22, 2016)

Before JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO,

* District 

Judge.

 * Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

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ROBRENO, District Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross Appellee Jane McGinnis (“McGinnis”), a landlord 

of rental properties, brought suit against Defendant-Appellee/Cross Appellant 

American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“Homeward”),1 the servicer of the 

loans on seven of her residential properties, alleging that Homeward violated terms 

of the deed and promissory note governing the loans. At the end of a bifurcated 

trial, the jury found in McGinnis’s favor on all claims and awarded her $6,000 in 

compensatory damages, $500,000 in emotional distress damages, and $3,000,000 

in punitive damages. 

Following the verdict, however, the district court granted Homeward’s 

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on the issue of punitive 

damages and reduced the jury’s punitive damages award to $250,000 based on a 

cap imposed by a Georgia statute. Both parties now appeal on several grounds.

After careful review, and having had the benefit of oral argument, we will 

affirm all of the district court’s rulings except its grant of Homeward’s renewed 

JMOL motion on the issue of reducing the amount of punitive damages. We hold 

that Homeward failed to preserve this argument in its initial JMOL motion, and 

thus remand to the district court for consideration of whether Homeward is entitled 

to a new trial on the issue of punitive damages.

 1 American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. is now “Homeward Residential, Inc.”

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

McGinnis owns a number of residential rental properties, and she has 

entrusted her son Adam with managing the properties and their financial affairs.2

On October 31, 2006, McGinnis refinanced seven of her rental properties with 

Taylor, Bean & Whitaker (“TB&W”). She granted security deeds and promissory 

notes to TB&W, and each loan was subject to a family rider providing that a 

default on any one of the loans triggers a default on all of the others.

According to the deed, the lender may “collect and hold Funds in an 

amount . . . not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can require under [the 

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)].” The “Lender shall estimate 

the amount of Funds due on the basis of current data and reasonable estimates of 

expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with Applicable 

Law.” “If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, 

Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to 

Lender the amount necessary to make up the shortage in accordance with RESPA, 

but in no more than 12 monthly payments.” 3

 2 Although many of the communications occurred between Homeward and Adam—who 

had at least some background in real estate property management and finances—for simplicity’s 

sake, we will refer to Adam’s actions as those done by McGinnis.

3 Although RESPA does not apply to investment loans like those at issue in this case, 

under the terms of the security deeds, the lender voluntarily agreed to calculate and collect 

escrow payments according to RESPA’s requirements. See Deed, Doc. 89-2 at 5.

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Once TB&W originated McGinnis’s loans, it packaged and sold them as part 

of a mortgage-backed security. On October 17, 2009, Homeward obtained the 

rights to service McGinnis’s seven loans, upon which it sent McGinnis a welcome 

letter for each of McGinnis’s seven loans. 

Although McGinnis’s monthly payments to TB&W had been $605.58 until 

that point, the welcome letter included a payment coupon stating—with no 

explanation—that McGinnis’s November 2009 payment had risen to $843.58. The 

same thing happened with McGinnis’s other loans. Believing that she did not in 

fact owe $843.58, McGinnis disputed and refused to pay the increased amount.

Instead, she submitted a check to Homeward for $605.58 to cover her November 

2009 payment for the loan for 172 Hilton Street, and made similar payments for 

the other loans. 

In December 2009, after McGinnis again submitted payments on all of her

loans in the amounts she had previously been paying, Homeward conducted an 

escrow analysis for 172 Hilton Street and mailed this escrow disclosure statement 

to McGinnis on December 17, 2009. The statement describes McGinnis’s “present 

payment” as $843.58, consisting of $490.13 for principal and interest and $353.45 

for escrow deposit. Thus, McGinnis’s escrow deposit payment—which had 

previously been $115.45—had inexplicably increased by roughly 200% to 

$353.45. The statement also describes her “new payment effective 02/01/2010” as 

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$680.08, consisting of $490.13 for principal and interest, $138.46 for escrow 

deposit, and $51.49 for escrow shortage.

In response to the escrow statement, McGinnis sent Homeward a fax, which 

asserted that she had made all of her payments to TB&W and Homeward, she had 

not been receiving billing statements, she should not be charged any late fees, and 

the escrow amounts were too high. 

On January 15, 2010, Homeward sent McGinnis a letter explaining that the 

recent “escrow analysis on [her] loan . . . could have erroneously reflected either an 

escrow overage or shortage due to missing information.” The letter instructed 

McGinnis to disregard the December 17 escrow analysis and to continue making 

payments at the present monthly payment amount. However, on February 20, 

2010, Homeward sent a second escrow analysis statement that described 

McGinnis’s present payment as $843.59 (somehow the payment had been

increased by one cent)4 through March 2010, and described McGinnis’s new 

payment effective April 1, 2010 as $638.32—consisting of $490.13 for principal 

and interest, $140.55 for escrow deposit, and $7.64 for escrow shortage.

Pursuant to the terms of the Security Deed, Homeward placed the $605.58 

payments (which it deemed to be partial) into a suspense account until enough 

funds accrued to pay off the oldest past-due monthly payment. Any remaining 

 4 The escrow deposit amount was increased by one cent to $353.46 in this statement; 

unless otherwise noted, we will use the $353.45 figure for simplicity’s sake.

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funds were held in the suspense account until enough funds accumulated to cover 

the next past due payment, and the process repeated itself for the entire time that 

Homeward serviced McGinnis’s loans. As these patterns persisted, the interest, 

collection calls, and late fees continued to mount alongside the increasing amounts 

McGinnis owed on her monthly escrow payments. Moreover, over the course of 

2010, Homeward also began assessing fees for collection letters, inspections, and 

other expenses relating to the default that Homeward caused. 

On May 19, 2010, McGinnis sent Homeward another fax explaining that 

McGinnis’s correct payment for November 2009 through March 2010 should be 

$605.58, and providing Homeward with Adam’s own escrow analysis and offering 

to pay that amount:

The new total tax and insurance is 1686.59 for the year divided by 12 

equals 140.55/month plus the 490.13 is ($630.68). I have tried to 

explain this over and over again showing you that in February the 

24th via fax and conversation with someone that I though[t] 

understood was helping resolve this and still nothing. I know I owe 

you little more for the shortage in the escrow (tax and insurance) only 

but I have not at any time had a payment of $843.59 . . . . I want to 

pay this loan off ASAP. I will not pay any late fees or any differences 

in monthly payments. . . . I need for AHMSI to come up with a payoff 

as of June 1st 2010[.]

Adam’s analysis was essentially identical to Homeward’s February 19, 2010, 

escrow analysis as to the correct amount for McGinnis’s payments from April 

2010 onward. The only difference is that McGinnis refused to pay the $843.58 

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amount that Homeward insisted was owed for November 2009 through March 

2009 and any late fees or other fees associated with those payments.

On June 30, 2010, Homeward sent a letter in response that offered 

justifications for the assessment of the late fees and explained that the total amount 

due on the loan was $1,491.36, but failed to provide any explanation or retraction 

of the $843.48 amount. 

The same issues persisted through the rest of 2010, and McGinnis continued 

to pay only $605.58 until January 2011, when she began paying the $638.32 

amount that first appeared in the February 2010 escrow analysis statement. 

Homeward began returning or rejecting McGinnis’s payments from 

February 2011 through May 2011, and on March 22, 2011, Homeward’s attorneys 

sent a formal notice of foreclosure for 172 Hilton Street. For several weeks starting 

in April 2011, Homeward ran foreclosure advertisements in the local newspaper. 

Finally, on July 7, 2011, Homeward foreclosed on 172 Hilton Street. 

Following the foreclosure of 172 Hilton Street, Homeward continued the 

same pattern—holding payments in suspense accounts, assessing late fees, 

returning checks, and threatening foreclosure—with respect to the remaining 

properties. 

At trial, McGinnis’s clinical psychologist, Dr. Andrew Sappington, opined 

that the circumstances leading up to this foreclosure have been a “major cause 

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of . . . depression” for McGinnis. The severity of her emotional distress has caused 

her to suffer major physical symptoms, including “projectile vomiting,” and she 

views the situation as “as life or death.” McGinnis, a retiree, described the effect of 

the dispute with Homeward in her own words: “I am too old to start over. They 

have taken my life away from me.”

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

McGinnis filed suit against Homeward in the United States District Court for 

the Middle District of Georgia. After some initial proceedings and discovery, 

McGinnis filed an amended complaint, asserting a number of claims, including: 

(1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) violation of RESPA; (3) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”); (4) conversion; (5) tortious interference with property 

rights; (6) defamation; and (7) the violation of Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act. McGinnis also sought attorney fees and 

punitive damages. 

Upon completion of discovery, Homeward filed a motion for summary 

judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for Homeward on 

McGinnis’s claims for violation of RESPA, defamation, violation of Georgia’s 

RICO Act, and any wrongful foreclosure claim based on Homeward’s failure to 

respond to her communications, and denied summary judgment on the remainder 

of McGinnis’s claims.

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After the district court’s disposition of the motion for summary judgment, 

Homeward moved to bifurcate the trial into two phases—one for liability and 

another for punitive damages and attorney fees. The district court granted this 

motion. Homeward also moved to exclude various types of evidence, including the 

testimony of its own 30(b)(6) witness, Christopher Delbene.5 The district court 

denied the motion to exclude Delbene’s escrow analysis testimony. 

The case then proceeded to the first phase of trial. After the end of 

McGinnis’s case, the district court held a charge conference, during which it heard 

objections to the proposed jury instructions. At the charge conference, Homeward 

moved, under Rule 50(a), for judgment as a matter of law on McGinnis’s claims 

for conversion, wrongful foreclosure, interference with property rights, and IIED. 

The district court denied Homeward’s Rule 50(a) motion. 

Thereafter, the trial resumed and Homeward put on its case, which consisted 

of one witness—Christopher Delbene, who testified by video deposition. After the 

end of Homeward’s case, the district court submitted only the issue of liability to 

the jury. By special verdict, the jury found in McGinnis’s favor on each of her 

claims—conversion, wrongful foreclosure, interference with property rights, and 

IIED. The jury awarded McGinnis $6,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 

 5 Homeward moved to exclude Delbene’s testimony on the grounds that the topic of 

escrow analysis was not included in Plaintiff’s 30(b)(6) deposition notice to Homeward.

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in emotional distress damages. The jury further found that McGinnis could recover 

attorney fees and punitive damages.

The trial then proceeded to the second phase, during which neither party 

offered additional evidence and McGinnis waived her claim for attorneys’ fees. 

The jury again found in McGinnis’s favor, finding that “the Defendant acted with 

specific intent to cause the Plaintiff harm” and awarding McGinnis $3,000,000 in 

punitive damages. Jury Verdict, Doc. 96 at 1.

Following the district court’s entry of judgment consistent with the jury’s 

verdict, Homeward moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 50(b) and for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. 

The district court granted in part Homeward’s Rule 50(b) motion, holding that 

there was insufficient evidence to show that Homeward acted with specific intent 

to cause harm and reducing the jury’s award of punitive damages to $250,000. The 

district court denied the remainders of Homeward’s motion for judgment as a 

matter of law and motion for a new trial6 and entered an amended judgment.

Following the entry of the amended judgment, McGinnis filed a notice of appeal,

and Homeward cross-appealed.

 6 The district court stated that it denied the entirety of Homeward’s motion for a new trial, 

but because of its ruling on Homeward’s Rule 50(b) motion, the district court in fact declined to 

rule on the portions of the Rule 59 motion relating to punitive damages. 

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III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, McGinnis brings one challenge to the district court’s summary 

judgment ruling, asserting that the district court erred in granting Homeward’s 

summary judgment motion as to McGinnis’s Georgia RICO Act claim. Both 

parties also challenge the district court’s post-trial decisions: Homeward contends 

that the district court erred in denying Homeward’s renewed motion for JMOL and 

motion for a new trial on the grounds that (1) McGinnis failed to prove that 

Homeward’s increase of her escrow calculation was improper, and (2) McGinnis 

was not entitled to recover emotional distress damages, while McGinnis argues 

that the district court erred in granting Homeward JMOL on the issue of specific 

intent.

7 We will address each issue in turn.

 7 McGinnis also raises the issue whether she can recover emotional damages caused by 

Homeward’s wrongful foreclosure without having to separately prove the tort of IIED, stating

the following:

Jane’s appeal of this issue is conditional because the jury did, in fact, find that 

Jane had satisfied the additional elements of IIED, and so there is no need to 

address this third issue if the Court affirms the district court’s judgment on that 

claim. R-93 at 2. And because the trial court instructed the jury that, for Jane’s 

conversion and interference with property rights claims, she did not have to prove 

the elements of IIED to recover emotional damages, there is also no need to 

address this third issue if the Court affirms the district court’s judgment on those 

claims. R-110 at 133. The Court must decide this issue only if, based on 

Homeward’s cross-appeal, the Court directs judgment as a matter of law on all of 

Jane’s claims except her wrongful foreclosure claim or if the Court orders any 

new trial involving Jane’s wrongful foreclosure claim.

Because—as will be further discussed below—we are not directing the entry of judgment as a 

matter of law in favor of Homeward on all of her claims except wrongful foreclosure, nor are we 

ordering a new trial on her wrongful foreclosure claim, we need not reach this third issue.

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A. Summary Judgment on McGinnis’s Georgia RICO Act Claim

First, we consider McGinnis’s challenge to the district court’s granting of 

summary judgment to Homeward on her Georgia RICO Act claim. We review this 

claim de novo, “reviewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, and applying the same standard as the district 

court.” Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999). 

A grant of summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Reasoning that Homeward’s acts constituted a “single extended transaction,” 

rather than a “pattern of racketeering activity,” the district court ruled that 

McGinnis could not establish her RICO claim. On appeal, McGinnis asserts that a 

2001 amendment to the Georgia RICO Act eliminated what she terms the “single 

transaction defense,” and thus the district court should not have dismissed her 

claim. In the alternative, McGinnis argues that, contrary to the district court’s 

opinion, Homeward’s conduct constituted at least two separate transactions, and 

hence can qualify as a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Whether or not 

McGinnis’s reading of the amended language is more faithful to legislative intent, 

however, we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment to 

Homeward on McGinnis’s Georgia RICO claim.

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Georgia courts have long held that a single extended transaction cannot 

provide the basis for a Georgia RICO claim. See Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. 

Clark, 535 S.E.2d 234, 238 (Ga. 2000) (recognizing the single transaction 

defense); Stargate Software Int’l, Inc. v. Rumph, 482 S.E.2d 498, 503 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 1999) (“The fact that elements of two crimes may have been present at two 

separate points in time does not create two predicate acts out of what is in reality a 

single transaction.”); Cobb v. Kennon Realty Servs., Inc., 382 S.E.2d 697, 699 

(Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming summary judgment on Georgia RICO claim based 

on “one extended transaction”). See generally S. Intermodel Logistics, Inc. v. D.J. 

Powers Co., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1359 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (discussing Georgia 

state court cases involving the single transaction defense).

Although this single transaction defense has been consistently recognized by 

Georgia state and federal courts since the Georgia RICO Act was amended in 

2001,8 McGinnis claims that the 2001 amendment eliminated that defense. This is 

so because the amendment changed the definition of “pattern of racketeering 

 8 See, e.g., Duncan v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-1493-TWT, 2014 WL 172228, at 

*10 (N.D. Ga. Jna. 15, 2014), aff’d on other grounds, Nos. 14-10625, 14-1334, 2015 WL 

3718963, at *4 (11th Cir. June 16, 2015); Belcher v. Onewest Bank, FSB, No. 1:12-CV-000960-

AT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190265, at *15 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2012); Franklin v. Consus 

Ethanol, LLC, No. 1:11-CV-4062-TWT, 2012 WL 3779093, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2012); 

Foxworthy Inc. v. CMG Life Servs., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-2682-TWT, 2012 WL 1269127, at *7 

(N.D. Ga. Apr. 16, 2012); Dial HD, Inc. v. Clearone Commc’ns, Inc., No. CV 109-100, 2010 

WL 3732115, at *16 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2010); Rosen v. Protective Life Ins. Co., No. 1:09-cv03620-WSD, 2010 WL 2014657, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 20, 2010); Pollman v. Swan, 723 S.E.2d 

290, 292 n.3 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); Smith v. Chemtura Corp., 676 S.E.2d 756, 761 (Ga. Ct. App. 

2009); Overton v. State, 671 S.E.2d 507, 517 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).

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activity” from the pre-2001 version of “engaging in at least two incidents of 

racketeering activity that have same or similar intents, results, accomplices, 

victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated,” O.C.G.A. § 16-

14-3(8) (2000) (emphasis added), to the post-2001 version of “engaging in at least 

two acts of racketeering activity in furtherance of one or more incidents, schemes, 

or transactions that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, 

or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated.” O.C.G.A. § 16-4-3(4)(A) 

(2015) (emphasis added).

According to McGinnis, the plain meaning of the “one or more . . . 

transactions” language adopted by Georgia General Assembly’s amendment 

clearly provides that a pattern of racketeering can arise out of even a single

transaction. Notably, however, McGinnis does not cite any cases for the 

proposition that the single transaction defense was eliminated by the 2001 

amendment, nor does she point to any legislative history supporting her contention

that the 2001 amendment was intended to eliminate that defense. 

In considering the significance of the textual changes to the statute, we note 

some analytical complexities injected by the new language. Before, the text of the 

statute directed courts to look to whether there was evidence of two or more 

“incidents” (or predicate acts) of racketeering activity. § 16-14-3(8)(A) (2000). 

With the amended language, the definition appears to break down the notion of “at 

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least two incidents of racketeering activity” into two separate components: (1) “at 

least two acts of racketeering activity,” and (2) “in furtherance of one or more 

incidents, schemes, or transactions.” § 16-14-3(4)(A) (2015). Although the same 

general concepts are at play in both versions, the newer language breaks the 

concepts down and demands more precision from courts in determining the 

number of predicate acts and the number of transactions at issue.

Although it is plausible that this amended language may have been enacted 

to preclude the single transaction defense, we need not reach that question here—

for this is not a case where the distinction would avail McGinnis.

Georgia courts have held that “[a] pattern requires at least two interrelated 

predicate offenses,” Brown v. Freedman, 474 S.E.2d 73, 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996), 

and such acts must be linked, but distinguishable enough to not be merely “two 

sides of the same coin.” S. Intermodal Logistics, Inc. v. D.J. Powers Co., 10 F. 

Supp. 2d 1337, 1359 (quoting Raines v. State, 467 S.E.2d 217, 218 (Ga. Ct. App. 

1996)). 

Under the traditional analysis, the facts in this case constitute a single 

extended transaction—and the two predicate acts asserted by McGinnis (i.e., theft 

by conversion in the taking of fees from the funds in the suspense account, and 

theft by taking in the wrongful foreclosure of the property) are most accurately 

viewed as “two sides of the same coin.”

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Homeward increased the McGinnis’s escrow payment on the loan on the 172 

Hilton Street Property, and McGinnis disputed the increase; according to the 

procedures laid out in the security deed, McGinnis’s payments were (if wrongly) 

deemed partial, were consistently placed in a suspense account, resulting in the 

continual accrual of late fees and other fees; after a lengthy dispute about the 

escrow payment increase, Homeward foreclosed on the property. Although 

Homeward’s misconduct manifested itself through various acts over this timeline, 

it all came down to a single core thread: Homeward failed to back down from and 

correct a significant and evident miscalculation in its demanded escrow payment

from November 2009 to March 2010. Everything that occurred regarding 

McGinnis’s loan on the 172 Hilton Street property—and everything that happened 

in lockstep with the other six loans, according to the family rider provision that tied 

the loans together—was the logical (if wrongful) result of that same core thread of 

misconduct. Thus, under the pre-2001 amendment approach, the district court 

correctly granted summary judgment on this claim.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the 2001 amendment to the Georgia RICO 

Act theoretically permits a claim to proceed involving only a single transaction, 

McGinnis’s claim would still fail. 

Under the amended language, to demonstrate a “pattern of racketeering 

activity,” a plaintiff must show “at least two [predicate] acts of racketeering 

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activity.” § 16-14-3(4)(A). Thus, just as courts sought evidence of two or more 

“incidents of racketeering activity” under the older language, the newer text still 

calls for courts to look for evidence of at least two predicate acts—and both 

versions of the statute include essentially the same laundry list of predicate 

offenses that are encompassed by the statute, including theft. Compare O.C.G.A. 

§ 16-14-3(9)(ix) (2000) (including “Article 1 of Chapter 8 of this Title, relating to 

theft”), with O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(5)(A)(xii) (2015) (including “Theft in violation 

of Article 1 of Chapter 8 of this title”).

Accordingly, it still falls to courts to inquire into whether a defendant has 

committed two or more predicate acts in order to determine if the defendant has 

engaged in a pattern of such acts—as opposed to an isolated act. However, even 

speaking in these terms, the concern still remains that “the two alleged predicate 

incidents must be sufficiently ‘linked’ to form a RICO pattern, but nevertheless 

sufficiently distinguishable so that they do not become ‘two sides of the same 

coin.’” S. Intermodal Logistics, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (quoting Raines, 467 

S.E.2d at 218). Hence, while alleged predicate acts can be too dissimilar and 

disconnected to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, such acts can also be 

too indistinguishable to give rise to such a pattern—even if a court could 

technically ascribe more than one criminal offense to different aspects of the 

conduct.

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Under this reading, the two predicate acts asserted by McGinnis are still 

most appropriately viewed as “two sides of the same coin.” Again, everything that 

occurred regarding McGinnis’s loan on the 172 Hilton Street property was the 

logical result of that same core thread of misconduct. Thus, even under McGinnis’s 

reading, Homeward’s essential actions were not sufficiently distinguishable 

predicate acts to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, and the district court 

correctly granted summary judgment on this claim.

For these reasons, McGinnis’s Georgia RICO Act claim fails under either 

the pre- or the post-2001 amendment’s language. Although we are not foreclosing 

the possibility that, under certain circumstances, a claim involving a single 

transaction and two sufficiently distinct predicate acts may well establish a viable 

RICO claim, this is not that case.

B. Post-Trial Motions Under Rule 50(b) and Rule 59

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(2) provides that a party may move for 

judgment as a matter of law “before the case is submitted to the jury.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 50(a)(2). “The motion must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts 

that entitle the movant to the judgment.” Id. If a district court does not grant the 

motion, the movant may file “a renewed motion,” under Rule 50(b), after trial. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).

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“The standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law 

under Rule 50(b) is precisely the same as the standard for granting the pre‐

submission motion [under 50(a)].” Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 

1227 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting 9A Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2537 (2d ed. 1995)). Thus, as 

with motions under Rule 50(a), the question before a district court confronting a 

renewed Rule 50(b) motion is whether the evidence is “legally sufficient . . . to 

find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).

In considering whether the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, “the 

court must evaluate all the evidence, together with any logical inferences, in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach 

Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). And, as we have stressed, “[i]t is the 

jury’s task—not [the court’s]—to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and 

determine the credibility of witnesses.” Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 

292 F.3d 712, 715 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of 

Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001)).

A ruling on a party’s “motion for judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de 

novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court.” Bianchi v. Roadway 

Express, Inc., 441 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of 

Hartford v. Fortune Constr. Co., 320 F.3d 1260, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2003) (“We 

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20

review a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo, evaluating 

whether such sufficient conflicts exist in the evidence to necessitate submitting the 

matter to the jury or whether the evidence is so weighted in favor of one side that 

one party must prevail as a matter of law.” (quoting Thosteson v. United States, 

304 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002))).

A losing party may also move for a new trial under Rule 59 on the grounds 

that “the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are 

excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair . . . and may raise 

questions of law arising out of alleged substantial errors in admission or rejection 

of evidence or instructions to the jury.” Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 

U.S. 243, 251 (1940). Thus, under Rule 59(a), a district court may, in its discretion, 

grant a new trial “if in [the court’s] opinion, the verdict is against the clear weight 

of the evidence . . . or will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may 

be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.” Hewitt v. 

B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984) (second alteration in 

original) (quoting United States v. Bucon Constr. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir. 

1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Although a trial judge cannot weigh the evidence when confronted with a 

motion [for judgment] notwithstanding the verdict, in a motion for a new trial the 

judge is free to weigh the evidence.” Rabun v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 678 F.2d 

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21

1053, 1060 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting King v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 618 F.2d 1111, 

1115 (5th Cir. 1980)). “[W]hen independently weighing the evidence, the trial 

court is to view not only that evidence favoring the jury verdict but evidence in 

favor of the moving party as well.” Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964, 

973 (11th Cir. 1982).

We review a ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.

Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001).

“Deference to the district court ‘is particularly appropriate where a new trial is 

denied and the jury's verdict is left undisturbed.’” Id. at 1247-48 (quoting 

Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure Prods., Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir.

1987)).

1. Proof of Improper Escrow Payment Increase

At trial, McGinnis advanced three primary arguments on liability: 

(1) Homeward increased her escrow deposit without proper notice, (2) Homeward 

increased her escrow deposit by an unreasonable amount, and (3) Homeward did 

not properly apply her monthly payments. In its cross-appeal, Homeward asserts 

that the district court erred in denying its Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions, given 

that McGinnis failed to prove each of these grounds for liability. We will treat each 

argument in turn.

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a. Notice of the escrow increase

Beginning in November 2009 and continuing through March 2010, 

Homeward increased McGinnis’s escrow deposit from $115.45 to $353.45. 

McGinnis claims that in making this increase, Homeward did not provide her with 

proper notice. Homeward claims that it did provide proper notice, in the form of a 

payment coupon in October 2009. Homeward is mistaken.

RESPA9 requires that, among other things, “[i]f the new servicer changes 

either the monthly payment amount or the accounting method . . . then the new 

servicer shall provide the borrower with an initial escrow account statement within 

60 days of the date of servicing transfer.” 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(e)(1). 

Homeward did not provide an “initial escrow account statement” within 60 

days of the servicing transfer. Adam testified that he did not receive any escrow 

analysis explaining the escrow deposit increase to $353.45. The earliest escrow 

analysis McGinnis received was Homeward’s December 17, 2009 escrow analysis, 

but that analysis did not explain the escrow deposit increase to $353.45—and 

Homeward actually withdrew it and told McGinnis to ignore it. See also McGinnis 

v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing Inc., No. 5:11-CV-284 (CAR), 2013 WL 3338922, 

at *13 n.164 (M.D. Ga. July 2, 2013) (rejecting the December 17 escrow analysis 

because “the time . . . is [at least] 61 days, not 60”).

 9 Again, under the terms of the security deeds, the lender voluntarily agreed to calculate 

and collect escrow payments according to RESPA’s requirements.

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Homeward responds that Adam admitted to receiving one payment coupon 

in October 2009, but this coupon says essentially nothing more than “Monthly 

Payment 843.58.” And the coupon is clearly not an “initial escrow account 

statement.” See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.17(g)-(h) (2014) (describing the content and 

format of initial escrow account statements). 

Moreover, as the district court aptly noted, “when Mr. McGinnis 

acknowledged that Plaintiff may have received this payment coupon, he also 

testified that, even if the coupon was attached to the letter, it would have been 

questioned because it wrongly showed her to be behind in payments.” McGinnis, 

2014 WL 2949216, at *5. Overall, the district court correctly found that “a 

reasonable jury could conclude that . . . she was not sufficiently notified of a 

legitimate increase in her monthly payment or of an escrow shortage at that time.” 

Id.

b. Reasonableness of the escrow increase

Homeward next contends that McGinnis failed to show that the escrow 

deposit increase was unreasonable. Again, Homeward’s argument is unavailing.

The deed requires that Homeward “shall estimate the amount of Funds due 

on the basis of current data and reasonable estimates of expenditures of future 

Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with Applicable Law.” The deed also 

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provides that payment of escrow shortages must be spread out over a twelve-month 

period.10

The district court succinctly and correctly summarized the compelling 

circumstantial evidence of the unreasonableness of the escrow increase that was 

presented to the jury as follows:

At trial, the jury was also instructed that, if there was a shortage 

in Plaintiff’s escrow, Homeward only had two options under the terms 

of the Security Deed: It could choose to either allow a shortage to 

exist or require Plaintiff “to repay the shortage in equal monthly 

payments over at least twelve months.” The jury was then presented 

with evidence that Homeward’s escrow increase would have recouped 

any shortage in much less than twelve months and that if the amount 

demanded was collected over twelve months, the escrow collected 

would total two or three times the amount needed to cover Plaintiff’s 

tax and insurance costs. The evidence additionally showed that 

Homeward performed a third escrow analysis, in February of 2010, 

that reduced Plaintiff’s payment from $843.58 to $638.32, a number 

much more in line with what she had previously been paying. Yet, 

Homeward still insisted that Plaintiff owed payments of $843.59 from 

November, 2009 through April, 2010.

From this circumstantial evidence, a reasonable jury could have 

inferred that the payments demanded by Homeward were 

 10 Homeward did not object to a jury instruction that said as much. McGinnis, 2014 WL 

2949216 at *16 n.50. 

In its reply brief, Homeward now asserts that the “no more than 12 monthly payments” 

language would have permitted it to collect the alleged escrow shortage in fewer than twelve 

months. However, the deed states that if there is a shortage, “Borrower shall pay to Lender the 

amount necessary to make up the deficiency in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 12 

monthly payments.” As RESPA requires that payments be “at least a 12-month period,” 12

C.F.R. §§ 1024.17(f)(3)(i)(C), (3)(ii)(B), and given that the FAQ section in Homeward’s own 

escrow statement says that “[s]hortage[s] are collected over a 12 month period,” there is surely

sufficient evidence for the jury to have concluded that Homeward was obligated to recoup any 

shortage over no more and no less than twelve months.

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unreasonable and that, by demanding these payments, Homeward 

breached a duty owed to Plaintiff. 

On this issue, Mr. McGinnis also testified that he knew the 

increase was an error based on his calculations and experience 

managing Plaintiff’s properties. This went factually unrebutted by 

Homeward, as it chose not to offer any evidence as to exactly how it 

arrived at the $843.58 payment. The evidence in the case instead 

showed that Plaintiff repeatedly brought this error to Homeward’s 

attention, but Homeward failed to verify or produce a copy of the 

October 2009 escrow analysis. The jury could have reasonably 

considered this as evidence of Homeward’s knowledge of its breach 

and refusal to correct it in violation of its duty to comply with the 

Security Deed.

McGinnis, 2014 WL 2949216 at *6.

Homeward now argues that McGinnis’s evidence does not address “escrow 

items,” “deficiencies,” “shortages,” “time for recoupment,” and a “two month 

cushion.” However, these issues were all addressed by the documentary and 

testamentary evidence introduced at trial, and the jury was fully capable of 

reviewing the evidence, drawing reasonable deductions and inferences, deciding 

what is material, and making ultimate findings on these issues. Moreover, Adam’s 

escrow analysis, which was introduced in evidence, did in fact touch on several of 

these items.

The fact that Homeward failed to offer any clear evidence at trial explaining 

how exactly it arrived at the $843.58 payment speaks volumes. Indeed, it was 

unreasonable for Homeward to expect from McGinnis a comprehensive, in-depth 

escrow analysis, when Homeward itself failed to produce one. 

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c. Application of monthly payments

Finally, Homeward challenges McGinnis’s claim that the monthly payments 

were wrongfully applied. But because this argument stands or falls with the 

argument regarding the reasonableness of the escrow increase, it must also fall.

Neither party disputes that McGinnis’s account was not credited as her 

monthly payments were made and that Homeward instead placed her monthly 

payments in a suspense account until additional funds arrived. Homeward argues 

that it was entitled to withhold the funds in the suspense account under the terms of 

the Security Deed. This argument, however, “assumes that Plaintiff’s monthly 

payments were reasonable and correct and thus that Plaintiff was required to pay 

the amount Homeward charged.” McGinnis, 2013 WL 3338922, at *16. 

If, at trial, the jury found that the monthly payments demanded by 

Homeward were unreasonable and incorrect, then it follows that the jury could also 

have found that Homeward was not entitled to hold McGinnis’s monthly payments 

in suspense. Accordingly, we find that a reasonable jury could, based on this 

evidence, also conclude that Homeward did not properly credit payments to 

McGinnis’s account.

* * *

We conclude that the district court correctly ruled that McGinnis met her 

evidentiary burden to prove liability at trial. Under Rule 50(b) , given that the 

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evidence does not “overwhelmingly” favor Homeward, Vahlco Corp., 720 F.2d at 

889) (quoting Boeing Co., 411 F.2d at 374), Homeward is not entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Moreover, under Rule 59, given that the verdict was not 

“against the clear weight of the evidence,” Hewitt, 732 F.2d at 155 (quoting Bucon 

Constr. Co., 430 F.2d at 423), Homeward is not entitled to a new trial on this issue.

2. Emotional Distress Damages

Homeward also argues that the district court erred in finding that its acts 

constituted “extreme and outrageous conduct” as a matter of law, such that 

Homeward was not entitled to JMOL or a new trial on the issue of damages for 

emotional distress.11 Once more, we disagree.

“Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and 

egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a 

question of law.” Racette v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 S.E.2d 457, 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 

2012) (quoting Frank v. Fleet Finance, Inc. of Ga., 518 S.E.2d 717, 720 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 1999)). To support a claim of IIED, the conduct at issue must “go beyond all 

reasonable bounds of decency so as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly 

intolerable in a civilized community” and “naturally give rise to such intense 

 11 In order to sustain an IIED claim under Georgia law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the 

conduct giving rise to the claim was either intentional or in reckless disregard for the rights of 

others; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; 

and (4) the emotional distress was severe. See Racette v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 S.E.2d 457, 

465 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Frank v. Fleet Finance, Inc. of Ga., 518 S.E.2d 717, 720 (Ga. 

Ct. App. 1999)). On appeal, Homeward challenges the district court’s decision as to only the 

“extreme and outrageous conduct” element.

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feelings of humiliation, embarrassment, fright or extreme outrage as to cause 

severe emotional distress.” United Parcel Serv. v. Moore, 519 S.E.2d 15, 17 (Ga. 

Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Peoples v. Guthrie, 404 S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 

1991)).

“[I]t is true that an intentional wrongful foreclosure can be the basis for an 

action for intentional infliction of emotional distress” under certain circumstances. 

Blue View Corp. v. Bell, 679 S.E.2d 739, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Ingram 

v. JIK Realty Co., 404 S.E.2d 802, 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)). However, a finding 

of wrongful foreclosure does not, of itself, mean that the misconduct at issue “rises 

to the level of extreme, outrageous, atrocious or intolerable conduct required to 

support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Clark v. PNC 

Bank, N.A., No. 1:13-cv-1305-WSD, 2014 WL 359932, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 

2014). Nor are “[s]harp or sloppy business practices” generally considered “as 

going beyond all reasonable bounds of decency as to be utterly intolerable in a 

civilized community.” Moore, 519 S.E.2d at 17. When there is evidence of more 

egregious conduct, however, Georgia courts have held that a jury can properly 

infer intentional infliction of emotional distress in actions related to a wrongful 

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foreclosure.12 And as the district court correctly found, “this is one of those cases.” 

McGinnis, 2014 WL 2949216 at *11. 

A number of factors demonstrate the extreme and outrageous nature of 

Homeward’s conduct. For one thing, evidence indicated that over the course of 

Homeward’s relationship with McGinnis, Homeward’s agents frequently harassed 

McGinnis by phone and mail. Because Homeward’s misconduct involved all seven 

properties, McGinnis alleges that this harassment has become a constant fixture of 

their lives—and in fact, “if you stacked all the collection letters together,” they 

would reach “[f]ive feet high.” See, e.g., Margita v. Diamond Mortg. Corp., 406 

N.W.2d 268, 272 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (“Continuous unnecessary harassment 

over a nearly two-year period by a company whose main business is servicing such 

mortgages . . . might easily be viewed as extreme and outrageous conduct under 

the circumstances.”).

Even more crucially, however, we find that Homeward’s awareness of its 

error rendered its opaqueness, unresponsiveness, and belligerence—in pursuing 

foreclosure in a fairly short amount of time for a relatively small amount of 

money—extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. The evidence introduced at 

 12 See, e.g., Kerfoot v. FNF Servicing, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-33(WLS), 2013 WL 5797662, at 

*6 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 25, 2013) (finding complaint adequately pled IIED claim where it alleged that 

mortgage company had been notified numerous times of the unlawfulness of the loan and yet 

“hounded the [plaintiffs] with letters and calls demanding payment at the threat of foreclosure”); 

DeGolyer v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 662 S.E.2d 141, 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (finding 

evidence to support IIED claim where plaintiff informed defendant that it was foreclosing on the 

wrong tract of property, but defendant nevertheless proceeded with foreclosure).

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trial showed that, through Adam, McGinnis repeatedly notified Homeward of 

errors in the handling of her account and attempted to resolve the errors in good 

faith. However, McGinnis’s months of requests for clarification and correction 

were fruitless. Homeward’s agents continually failed to justify the increased 

payment, insisted that McGinnis was behind in payment, and—despite

Homeward’s own tacit admission of its erroneous calculation and subsequent 

decrease in the escrow amount—failed to retract its demand that McGinnis pay the 

inflated amount.

This case is not unlike the case of DeGolyer v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 

662 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), in which the court held that action in light of 

a known error can constitute extreme and outrageous conduct and “support a claim 

for mental anguish damages.” Id. at 148. Although DeGolyer involved knowledge 

that the wrong property was being foreclosed upon, that distinction is merely a 

matter of degree. In both DeGolyer and the present case, the defendants knew that 

clerical or other error rendered their acts fundamentally mistaken, and yet they 

callously proceeded to foreclosure without resolving errors that only they could 

investigate and correct.

Moreover, as the district court observed, 

Homeward’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Christopher Delbene, may have 

in fact provided the jury with some insight into the attitude or 

approach employed by Homeward in this process. During his 

testimony, Delbene insisted that the 2009 escrow analysis was correct, 

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even though he had not seen the document and had not attempted to 

calculate the escrow. Delbene then suggested that Plaintiff was 

required to pay any amount Homeward demanded, regardless of 

whether it appeared reasonable or in error, simply because that is what 

she “agreed to under the note and mortgage.”

McGinnis, 2014 WL 2949216, at *11. This attitude is borne out by the facts of this 

case, and by Homeward’s proceeding with forfeiture despite the fact that McGinnis 

never missed a monthly payment. 

As noted by the district court, “[a]lthough this was not Plaintiff’s residence, 

the evidence did show that this property and all of the others threatened with 

foreclosure are Plaintiff’s livelihood, her nest egg, her security, her life’s work, and 

a representation of her character in the community. Plaintiff likewise provided 

evidence from which the jury could find that all of this has had a severe effect on 

Plaintiff both emotionally and physically.” Id. at *12. In numerous 

communications with McGinnis by telephone, fax, and mail, Homeward almost 

certainly learned the stakes involved with the foreclosure, and yet it never looked 

back.

As with Homeward’s other cross-appeal claim, we conclude that the district 

court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, Homeward’s conduct was outrageous 

and extreme enough to support McGinnis’s IIED claim. Under Rule 50(b), given 

that the evidence does not “overwhelmingly” favor Homeward, Vahlco Corp., 720 

F.2d at 889) (quoting Boeing Co., 411 F.2d at 374), Homeward is not entitled to 

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judgment as a matter of law. Moreover, under Rule 59, given that the verdict was

not “against the clear weight of the evidence,” Hewitt, 732 F.2d at 1556 (quoting 

Bucon Constr. Co., 430 F.2d at 423), Homeward is not entitled to a new trial.

3. Specific Intent

Finally, McGinnis challenges the district court’s ruling that Homeward was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of specific intent, and that 

McGinnis was thus entitled to only $250,000 in punitive damages.

Georgia law provides a bifurcated procedure for assessing the award of 

punitive damages. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d)(1)-(2). In the first phase, the jury 

“shall first resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether an award of 

punitive damages shall be made.” § 51-12-5.1(d)(1). During this phase, “[p]unitive 

damages may be awarded . . . [if] it is proven by clear and convincing evidence 

that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct . . . or that entire want of 

care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to the 

consequences.” § 51-12-5.1(b).

In the second phase, if the jury has determined that an award of punitive 

damages is warranted, “the trial shall immediately be recommenced in order to 

receive such evidence as is relevant to a decision regarding what amount of 

damages will be sufficient.” § 51-12-5.1(d)(2). And in order for the award to 

exceed the statutory cap of $250,000, see § 51-12-5.1(g)—in tort cases that do not 

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involve products liability—the injured party must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence “that the defendant acted, or failed to act, with the specific intent to cause 

harm.” O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f); see also Kothari v. Patel, 585 S.E.2d 97, 100-02 

(Ga. Ct. App. 2003).

In its JMOL motion under Rule 50(b), Homeward argued that, because 

McGinnis failed to offer evidence that Homeward acted with specific intent to 

cause the harm, the jury’s award of $3,000,000 in punitive damages should be 

reduced to $250,000. Finding that Homeward had properly preserved this 

argument during trial, and concluding that the evidence was insufficient for the 

jury to find specific intent, the district court granted Homeward’s motion for 

JMOL on this issue and reduced McGinnis’s punitive damages award to $250,000.

On appeal, McGinnis argues that the district court erred in granting JMOL 

on the issue of specific intent because Homeward did not request JMOL on that 

issue during trial. 

Again, a motion for JMOL may be brought under Rule 50(a) “at any time 

before the case is submitted to the jury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). Such a motion 

“must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to 

the judgment.” Id. Rule 50(b), in contrast, expressly provides only for renewed

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JMOL motions,13 and thus a district court can grant a Rule 50(b) motion “only on 

grounds advanced in the preverdict [Rule 50(a)] motion,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 

advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. As we have noted previously, a 

primary rationale behind this requirement

is to avoid making a trap of the motion for judgment notwithstanding 

the verdict, either at the trial stage or on appeal. When a claimed 

deficiency in the evidence is called to the attention of the trial judge 

and of counsel before the jury has commenced deliberations, counsel 

still may do whatever can be done to mend his case. But if the court 

and counsel learn of such a claim for the first time after verdict, both 

are ambushed and nothing can be done except by way of a complete 

new trial. It is contrary to the spirit of our procedures to permit 

counsel to be sandbagged by such tactics or the trial court to be so put 

in error.

Quinn v. Sw. Wood Prods., Inc., 597 F.2d 1018, 1025 (5th Cir. 1979).14 However, 

“[b]ecause the rule is a harsh one, we have taken a liberal view of what constitutes 

a motion for directed verdict.” Nat’l Indus., Inc. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 781 F.2d 

1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986).

Accordingly, we have recognized an exception to that rule when confronting 

grounds that are “closely related” to those raised in an initial JMOL motion. “If the 

grounds argued in a motion under Rule 50(a) are ‘closely related’ to those argued 

 13 If a party altogether fails to assert a Rule 50(a) motion on any grounds, we have 

recognized “that a subsequent motion for jnov can be granted only if plain error can be proven.” 

Sims’ Crane Serv., Inc. v. Ideal Steel Prods., Inc., 800 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1986) 

(emphasis added) (citing Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985)).

14 Fifth Circuit decisions issued before September 30, 1981, are binding on the Eleventh 

Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).

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in a Rule 50(b) motion, then setting aside a jury’s verdict is no surprise to the nonmovant. No Seventh Amendment right [to cure any defects] is ambushed.” Ross v. 

Rhodes Furniture, Inc., 146 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nat’l 

Indus., Inc., 781 F.2d at 1549). However, “if the new and old grounds vary 

greatly . . . and the trial court relies upon the new grounds to set aside the jury’s 

verdict, we will reverse.” Id. (citing Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 

845-46 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 

2000) (“If the two sets of grounds are closely related, then no Seventh Amendment 

violation exists because the non-movant was not subjected to unfair surprise; 

however, if the grounds are not closely related, then the district court may not rely 

on the later-advanced grounds in granting the motion.”).

In its Rule 50(a) motion, Homeward did not assert or even discuss the issue 

of specific intent to cause harm, nor did it mention punitive damages. However, in 

the district court’s ruling on Homeward’s Rule 50(b) motion, it stated that 

In this case, Homeward did argue that there was “no evidence 

of specific intent” prior to the close of evidence. Although Homeward 

did not raise this argument in the context of punitive damages during 

trial, Homeward’s arguments regarding the instruction on intent and 

emotional damages at the charge conference were closely related to 

those raised in the present motion. Because Homeward raised a 

similar argument earlier, Plaintiff cannot argue that she has now been 

ambushed with an entirely new legal argument.

McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing Inc., No. 5:11-CV-284 (CAR), 2014 WL 

2949216, at *14 (M.D. Ga. June 30, 2014). Accordingly, the district court held that 

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Homeward’s specific intent argument had not been waived. A closer look at 

Homeward’s arguments at trial, however, reveals otherwise. 

Homeward moved for judgment as a matter of law specifically as to 

McGinnis’s claims of conversion, wrongful foreclosure, interference with property 

rights, and IIED. As to conversion, Homeward argued that it was authorized by the 

deed and note to remove fees from the suspense account. As to wrongful 

foreclosure and interference with property rights, Homeward essentially repeated 

its same argument that its decisions complied with the deed and note. And finally, 

as to IIED, Homeward again repeated its same argument that its decisions 

complied with the deed and note, and also asserted that there was no evidence to 

prove the required element of extreme and outrageous conduct. 

The grounds raised in Homeward’s Rule 50(a) motion did not address 

specific intent to cause harm. In fact, the only statement that comes close to the 

subject of specific intent—and the one that was apparently determinative for the 

district court—was a one-sentence comment made in the course of a legal

argument as to the proper standard to include in a jury instruction regarding 

emotional damages for wrongful foreclosure. This statement, made by 

Homeward’s attorney Mr. Rogers during a jury charge conference, goes as follows:

I’m not aware of a holding from the Court of Appeals that says 

that you can get emotional damages for an intentional wrongful 

foreclosure.

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So I don’t think that is consistent with Georgia Law, Your 

Honor. And I think maybe this would ultimately redound to my 

benefit, but Mr. Gower is now trying to turn wrongful foreclosure into 

an intentional tort which would require a specific intent presumably. 

And just to be honest there isn’t any evidence of specific intent in this 

case.

Mr. Delbene testified that the computer spat out a list and 

somebody confirmed that the payment hadn’t been made required to 

bring it current. 

So, you know, I think that the wrongful foreclosure claim is—

my motion starts sounding better if you include the intentional 

element in there, Your Honor. It’s just not an intentional tort.

This remark, whether viewed alone or in context, does not constitute a 

ground closely related to the specific intent argument that Homeward raised—for 

the first time—in its post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion. Homeward’s arguments 

during the charge conference address a question of Georgia law regarding whether 

the tort of wrongful foreclosure includes an “intentional element in there.” They do 

not relate to the separate argument regarding the sufficiency of McGinnis’s 

evidence vis-à-vis Homeward’s specific intent to cause harm. Moreover, Mr. 

Rogers’ generic reference to the evidence on intent does not transform that 

discussion of legal elements of wrongful foreclosure into a request for judgment as 

a matter of law regarding specific intent to cause harm—nor does it provide 

sufficient notice to either McGinnis or the district court of a potential evidentiary 

infirmity. 

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Applying our “liberal view of what constitutes a motion for directed 

verdict,” a party must “clearly point[] out a claimed evidentiary deficiency to court 

and counsel, not by way of conversation or speculation but on the record in an 

unambiguous formal motion for relief.” Quinn, 597 F.2d at 1025 (emphasis added). 

Were we to permit otherwise, trial courts would be required to countenance 

countless post hoc challenges to verdicts based on such general comments made at 

any time during a trial, and the exception would engulf the rule. In fact, the 

statement by Mr. Rogers here is a prime example of the sort of speculative 

comment which we referred to in Quinn that—unmoored from any discussion or 

formal motion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence of Homeward’s specific 

intent—failed to provide sufficient notice of a forthcoming evidentiary challenge15

to either McGinnis or the district court. See id.

In addition to Mr. Rogers’ previous remark at the charge conference,

Homeward asserts that Mr. Rogers later made a closely related argument in his oral 

Rule 50(a) motion when he stated that “there’s no evidence that’s been presented 

by [McGinnis] that [Homeward] acted inconsistent with its legal right,” and that 

 15 Homeward also contends that McGinnis has failed to show that she would have 

“correct[ed] her failure to present evidence on this issue.” Because “McGinnis made no effort to 

introduce any additional evidence,” Homeward reasons, a more explicit 50(a) argument about 

this evidentiary insufficiency would not have changed anything.

However, this argument is simply incorrect. With sufficient notice, McGinnis “could 

have chosen to provide additional testimony to address this issue” —for instance, “about the 

demeanor, the tone, and the nature of Homeward’s representatives.” Moreover, McGinnis’s 

attorney could have known to sharpen the focus on this issue during closing arguments.

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“there’s no proof that what [Homeward] asked [Plaintiff] to pay was unreasonable 

and the evidence suggests it was reasonable.” Again, these very general statements 

have nothing to do with intent, but instead relate to the issue of breach. Simply 

linking any argument made in support of a Rule 50(a) motion regarding 

evidentiary sufficiency does not open up every minimally related evidentiary 

challenge as fair game in a Rule 50(b) motion.

Aside from the substance of the “closely related” exception, McGinnis 

further asserts that the exception does not extend to arguments made during a jury 

charge conference. However, in Splitt v. Deltona Corp., 662 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 

1981 Unit B), we held that a defendant’s Rule 50(b) challenge was properly 

preserved and “[c]ounsel for plaintiffs was not ambushed” when the very same 

claim had been “strenuously” argued in the context of a challenge to a jury 

instruction. Id. at 1144.16 Although, strictly speaking, that case did not involve a 

closely related ground—given that the arguments were identical—Splitt does at 

least stand for the proposition that a Rule 50(b) argument may, in some cases, be 

properly preserved by an argument clearly and unambiguously raised during a 

charge conference.

 16 In Splitt, we also noted that a “comment of the trial judge at the conclusion of the 

argument seems to indicate he believed a proper predicate for a judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict had been laid. ‘Well, I'm going to go ahead and give the charge. If I am wrong, you can 

move ten days after trial.’ Record at 286. The trial judge was apparently referring to the ten-day 

rule in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(b).” Splitt, 662 F.2d at 1144.

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Had Mr. Rogers not simply made an offhand remark, but instead presented a 

fleshed out argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence of Homeward’s 

specific intent to harm during the charge conference, this case would be closer to

Splitt. 

That said, the setting of Homeward’s purported Rule 50(a) argument 

implicates another dimension in this case. As mentioned above, the first phase of 

the bifurcated trial concerned the reckless disregard or a conscious indifference 

required to support a claim for punitive damages; the issue of specific intent to 

cause harm—the element required in order to exceed Georgia’s statutory cap on 

punitive damages—arose only in the second phase. Accordingly, that issue was not 

pertinent to the jury during the first phase of trial, nor was it addressed in the jury’s 

first set of instructions, nor would it have been relevant even if Homeward had 

specifically raised it in a Rule 50(a) motion at that point. That matter became 

relevant only after the jury found in favor of McGinnis and the trial recommenced 

for the second phase—during which Homeward made no JMOL motion on specific 

intent to cause harm, nor did it otherwise argue that punitive damages had to be 

limited to $250,000. Thus, not only did Homeward fail to offer a closely related 

ground to preserve its Rule 50(b) argument regarding specific intent to harm, but it 

failed to properly preserve that claim during the second phase of trial where it 

would have been properly raised—a conclusion that gives content to the 

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requirement that a court cannot rule on a Rule 50(a) motion until “a party has been 

fully heard on an issue during a jury trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (emphasis 

added). McGinnis had not been “fully heard” on specific intent until after she 

rested during phase two. This is an independent reason to conclude that Homeward 

did not preserve its argument concerning intent.

For these reasons—and finding no other closely related Rule 50(a) ground 

offered by Homeward at trial—we will reverse the district court’s determination 

that Homeward properly preserved its Rule 50(b) argument.

Homeward asserts that even if it did not properly preserve its 50(b) 

argument on that issue, it did in fact properly raise the ground in its Rule 59 motion 

for a new trial. Further, Homeward points out that “[a]lthough Rule 50(c)(1) 

directs the district court to rule on an alternative motion for a new trial when it 

grants a renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law . . . the District Court 

explicitly withheld ruling on Homeward’s Motion for New Trial on the issue of 

specific intent to harm.” See McGinnis, 2014 WL 2949216 at *16 (“In light of [the 

district court’s grant of Homeward’s JMOL motion on specific intent], the Court 

need not consider Homeward’s Motion for New Trial on this ground.”). Because 

the district court declined to address this claim of Homeward’s Rule 59 motion, 

Homeward argues, the case should be remanded for the district court to rule on it.

We agree. Rule 50(c)(1) states that

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If [a district court] grants a renewed motion for judgment as a matter 

of law, it must also conditionally rule on any motion for a new trial by 

determining whether a new trial should be granted if the judgment is 

later vacated or reversed. The court must state the grounds for 

conditionally granting or denying the motion for a new trial.

Here, after granting Homeward’s renewed JMOL based on insufficient evidence of 

specific intent to harm, the district court declined to conditionally rule on this 

portion of Homeward’s motion for a new trial, which made out the same argument 

as to specific intent, as well as the argument that the $3,000,000.00 punitive 

damages award violated due process. McGinnis, 2014 WL 2949216, at *16. 

Accordingly, we will remand the case for a ruling on Homeward’s Rule 59 motion

as to the issue of punitive damages. See Chaney, 482 F.3d at 1229 (“Rule 

[50(c)(1)] obligates the court to rule on a motion for a new trial when issuing its 

ruling on a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Here, the district court 

failed to do so. Thus we also remand this case to permit the district court to 

properly consider . . . [the movant’s] separate motion for a new trial.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s ruling that Homeward’s Rule 

50(b) argument regarding specific intent was properly preserved is REVERSED

and its order reducing the jury’s award of $3,000,000 in punitive damages to 

$250,000 is VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the district court for 

consideration of Homeward’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial on the issue of 

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punitive damages. On all other grounds raised in both the appeal and cross-appeal, 

the district court’s determinations are AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

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JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I join in all parts of the majority’s very thorough opinion in this case, with 

one exception: its holding that Homeward’s post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion for 

judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) did not constitute a renewal of its preverdict Rule 50(a) motion because the latter did not adequately identify the issue 

later asserted in the Rule 50(b) motion. Homeward argued in this Rule 50(b) 

motion that McGinnis had failed to prove a specific intent by Homeward to cause 

harm. Without proof of this specific intent to harm, McGinnis’s punitive damages 

were limited by statute to $250,000, meaning that the jury’s award of three million 

dollars in punitive damages would have to be reduced. Concluding that Homeward 

had adequately preserved this argument—and that the evidence failed to establish 

this element—the district court granted Homeward’s Rule 50(b) motion for 

judgment as a matter of law. Because I agree with the district court that the issue 

now advanced by Homeward was cognizable in its Rule 50(b) motion, I 

respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s holding to the contrary.

As the majority notes, a Rule 50(b) motion is considered to be a renewal of 

the party’s trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a). A Rule 

50(a) motion must be made before the case has been submitted to the jury, and on 

terms sufficient to alert the opposing party and the court of the ground for the 

motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). For that reason, a motion for judgment as a 

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matter of law under Rule 50(b) can be viable only to the extent it renews an earlier 

trial motion. Otherwise, a sly movant, discerning a deficiency in his adversary’s 

presentation of the evidence, could lie in wait, purposely delaying his JMOL 

motion until after a verdict when it would then be too late for the adversary to 

correct what might have been a readily fixable omission. See Quinn v. Sw. Wood 

Prods., Inc., 597 F.2d 1018, 1025 (5th Cir. 1979) (“When a claimed deficiency in 

the evidence is called to the attention of the trial judge and of counsel before the 

jury has commenced deliberations, counsel still may do whatever can be done to 

mend his case.”). Therefore, Rule 50(a)’s requirement that a movant make this 

motion before the case is submitted to the jury operates to prevent the movant’s 

adversary from being “ambushed” or “sandbagged.” Id. 

On the other hand, given the “harshness” of a determination that a Rule 

50(a) motion was too imprecise to preserve a particular issue, “we have taken a 

liberal view” of what constitutes a compliant motion. Nat’l Indus., Inc. v. Sharon 

Steel Corp., 781 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986). In National Industries, the 

defendant sought the equivalent of a JMOL1 during trial on the plaintiff’s claim for 

loss of future profits, but failed to mention in that motion a request for a JMOL on 

a claim for loss of goodwill and reputation. In its post-verdict JMOL motion, 

 1 Prior to 1991, Rule 50(a) used the term “motion for directed verdict,” instead of the present 

term “judgment as a matter of law,” and Rule 50(b) used the term “judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict,” often shortened to “jnov,” instead of the present term “renewed motion for judgment as 

a matter of law.” See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 134 F.R.D. 525, 

679–82 (1991).

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however, the defendant also sought judgment on the latter claim, and the district 

court granted the motion. Notwithstanding the defendant’s omission of any 

mention of the goodwill/reputation claim in its Rule 50(a) motion, we nonetheless 

held that its Rule 50(a) motion “encompassed” that claim because the two issues 

were “closely related.” Id. We also noted that “[e]ven if the subject matters of the 

two motions were much farther apart, we would not read Rule 50(b) so narrowly . . 

. .” Id. Noting that the purpose of the requirement of a pre-verdict motion is to 

avoid ambushing the non-movant, we concluded that the plaintiff had not been 

“lulled into complacency regarding the sufficiency of its evidence” on the

particular claim. Id. 

Since National Industries, we have continued to characterize our approach to 

assessing the adequacy of a Rule 50(a) motion as being both liberal and flexible. 

See Sims’ Crane Serv., Inc. v. Ideal Steel Prods., Inc., 800 F.2d 1553, 1556–58 

(11th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging circuit precedent that adopts “a flexible 

approach” and “look[s] not to the specific wording of the Rule 50(b) but toward its 

purpose,” which purpose is “‘to avoid making a trap’ of the motion for jnov so that 

counsel is not ‘ambushed’ or ‘sandbagged’ regarding the sufficiency of the 

evidence he adduced”); Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1432–33 (11th Cir. 1998)

(acknowledging the “liberal view” that our circuit has taken of what constitutes a 

motion for directed verdict and citing with approval Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC 

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v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 1996), which held that 

“[t]echnical noncompliance with Rule 50(b) may be excused in situations in which 

the purposes of the rule are satisfied,” and Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of 

Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 691 (3rd Cir. 1993), which found compliant a JMOL 

motion that only implicitly raised the issue later advanced on the renewed JMOL 

motion, because the court and counsel had actual notice of the basis of the motion);

Etienne v. Inter-Cty. Sec. Corp., 173 F.3d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting this 

circuit’s “liberal view of what a constitutes a motion for judgment as a matter of 

law” and holding that a party’s Rule 50(b) motion could be considered, even 

though the latter had not even made a Rule 50(a) motion, because counsel had 

made a statement at trial expressing his belief that the court should grant judgment 

on the ground underlying the subsequent Rule 50(b) motion). 

In determining whether a ground identified in a Rule 50(b) motion has been 

preserved via an earlier Rule 50(a) motion that failed to specifically identify or 

expound on the particular ground, we have held that “[s]trict identity of issues . . . 

is not required . . . .” So long as the issues identified in the earlier and later JMOL 

motions “are ‘closely related,’ such that opposing counsel and the trial court may 

be deemed to have notice of the deficiencies asserted by the moving party, the 

purposes of the rule will be satisfied.” Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 

1243 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Sharon Steel, 781 F.2d at 1549). If, however, “the 

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new and old grounds vary greatly,” the new ground will not provide a basis for 

granting a JMOL. Id.; accord Ross v. Rhodes Furniture, Inc., 146 F.3d 1286, 1289 

(11th Cir. 1998). 

Applying the above principles to the present case, I agree with the district 

court that Homeward’s motion for JMOL, based on the absence of evidence 

showing a specific intent to harm, did not cause McGinnis unfair surprise. Along 

those same lines, I further agree that Homeward’s arguments during the 

consolidated charge conference and Rule 50(a) colloquy were closely enough 

related to the ground it later articulated in support of its post-verdict motion to cap 

punitive damages. 

As our caselaw explains, the purpose behind Rule 50’s requirement that a 

pre-verdict motion be made before a litigant can later seek a post-verdict judgment 

is to ensure that the opposing party is not lulled into a false assurance that he has 

presented a triable jury question. Allowing a putative movant to lie in wait, poised 

to ambush his adversary once the latter can do nothing to correct an overlooked 

omission in the evidence, is contrary to the goal behind Rule 50. 

In this case, however, there is no indication that McGinnis had any 

additional evidence in her arsenal to prove what she knew was the only factual 

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question for the jury to decide in this second phase of the trial2: whether 

Homeward had acted with specific intent to harm. Indeed, even though 

Homeward’s counsel emphasized in his closing argument that McGinnis had failed 

to offer any evidence of a specific intent to harm, the response of McGinnis’s 

attorney in his own subsequent closing argument was comparatively cursory and 

not entirely responsive. There is no reason to believe that there was some other 

piece of evidence that McGinnis had available to introduce if, in the jury 

charge/motion colloquy, Homeward had explicitly articulated its position that any 

punitive damages would be subject to a cap, given the absence of evidence of a 

specific intent to harm. 

As to whether the grounds for JMOL urged by Homeward in both the preverdict colloquy and post-verdict written motion were related closely enough to 

alert McGinnis to the possibility of a claim of insufficient evidence concerning the 

specific-intent-to-harm element, it is true that during the colloquy, Homeward 

mostly discussed McGinnis’s purported failure to prove that Homeward had been 

unreasonable in calculating escrow payment amounts and in ultimately foreclosing 

on her property after McGinnis continued to refuse to pay the amounts Homeward 

 2 In the first phase of the trial, the jury determined liability and also decided whether McGinnis 

was entitled to punitive damages. Based on the instructions provided by the court as to that 

question, the jury decided that she was. In the second phase of the trial, the jury was directed to 

determine the actual amount of punitive damages and was told that it had to first find that 

Homeward acted with a specific intent to harm McGinnis before it could set damages any higher 

than $250,000.

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said it was owed. Thus, much of the colloquy focused directly on the wrongful 

foreclosure claim. But the remaining claims were largely derivative of that claim. 

In fact, Homeward’s counsel asked for judgment on the intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim, whose elements were closely related to the question 

whether Homeward acted with the intent to harm McGinnis. Finally, at the end of 

the colloquy, Homeward’s counsel asked for JMOL “as to all claims.” 

Yet, even assuming that the above remarks were too subtle or imprecise for 

purposes of preserving the argument at issue here, Homeward’s counsel at one 

point in the colloquy actually pointed out the absence of evidence of specific 

intent, stating: “And just to be honest[,] there isn’t any evidence of specific intent 

in this case.” Granted counsel was not speaking about punitive damages, but was 

instead observing that McGinnis was trying to turn a wrongful foreclosure claim 

into an intentional tort warranting emotional distress damages. Nevertheless, 

counsel did make clear his position that evidence of specific intent was lacking in 

the case. Given that the only claim in the case calling for proof of “specific intent” 

was the claim for punitive damages exceeding $250,000, McGinnis should have 

immediately recognized that the evidentiary basis for that claim was likewise in 

play. 

There is no bright-line rule in deciding a question such as the one before us 

in this case. Instead, one must make a judgment call. Applying the liberal, 

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flexible, and pragmatic standard that our Court uses to determine whether a Rule 

50(a) motion has adequately preserved an issue for Rule 50(b) purposes, I conclude 

that McGinnis was necessarily aware that Homeward questioned the evidentiary 

sufficiency of her claim that Homeward had acted with the specific intent to harm. 

Further, however imprecise and inartful Homeward’s notice of this potential 

challenge may have been, it could not have mattered because McGinnis had no 

additional evidence to offer on this point. For these reasons, like the district court, 

I conclude that Homeward’s Rule 50(b) motion constituted a renewed JMOL 

motion, subject to consideration on its merits. I therefore respectfully dissent from 

the contrary holding of the majority opinion but concur in all other aspects of the 

opinion.

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