Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06464/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06464-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Dean Anderson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

. FILED 

Umted States Court of App~:.:; 

Tenth Circuit 

f-;PR 0 '± 1996 

PATRICK FISi-TSR CI~rl.> 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Nos. 94-6463 

JIMMY RAY JONES, 

RONALD DEAN ANDERSON, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

94-6464 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-94-137-L) 

ON THE BRIEFS: 

Joseph L. Wells, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Jimmy Ray Jones, Defendant-Appellant. 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and Jill M. Wichlens, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Ronald Dean Anderson, Defendant-Appellant. 

Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney, and Leslie M. Maye, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

Oklaoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MCKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-6464 Document: 01019277333 Date Filed: 04/04/1996 Page: 1 
Ronald Dean Anderson and Jimmy Ray Jones each pled guilty to counts arising 

out of a drug-trafficking enterprise. Mr. Anderson pled guilty to conspiracy to possess 

and to distribute methamphetamine, and Mr. Jones pled guilty to possession of 

methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Mr. Anderson was sentenced to a term of 144 

months, to be followed by a four-year term of supervised release. Mr. Jones was 

sentenced to a term of 156 months, to be followed by a similar term of supervised release. 

On appeal, both defendants challenge their sentences, contending the district court 

violated Rule 32(b)(6)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and improperly 

applied the Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm. 1 

In July 1994, a confidential informant contacted Oklahoma City Police 

Department (OCPD) officers and told them an individual named Emil Barry Lesley had 

approached the informant about the possibility of purchasing up to four ounces of 

methamphetamine. Two OCPD undercover officers arranged to meet with Mr. Lesley. 

When they arrived, Mr. Jones was present as well. At that meeting, Mr. Lesley and Mr. 

Jones purchased one ounce of methamphetamine from the officers, who then placed them 

under arrest. 

After the arrests, Mr. Lesley and Mr. Jones waived their Miranda rights and agreed 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(±); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 94-6464 Document: 01019277333 Date Filed: 04/04/1996 Page: 2 
to speak with law enforcement officers. Both said that each week for the last six months 

they had purchased one ounce of methamphetamine, which they resold. They worked 

together as partners, and if one ran out of methamphetamine he would send a prospective 

customer to the other. Mr. Lesley and Mr. Jones told the officers their supplier was Mr. 

Anderson, to whom Mr. Jones had introduced Mr. Lesley. 

Officers also learned about Mr. Anderson in a telephone call from another 

confidential informant, who told them Mr. Anderson could supply ounces of 

methamphetamine and that he would soon travel to Pauls Valley, Oklahoma, to acquire 

more methamphetamine. Law enforcement officers maintained surveillance of Mr. 

Anderson's activities. In late July, they followed him from Oklahoma City to a residence 

east of Pauls Valley. After ten minutes in the house, Mr. Anderson left and drove back 

towards Oklahoma City. In Norman, he stopped at a Ramada Inn where officers arrested 

him. In his car, officers found almost four ounces of methamphetamine. 

After waiving his rights, Mr. Anderson told the officers he had gone to Pauls 

Valley to obtain a quarter-pound of methamphetamine and, on several previous 

occasions, had obtained at least two pounds of methamphetamine. Mr. Anderson agreed 

to reveal information to the officers about his methamphetamine source in California, but 

would not tell them anything about his source in Pauls Valley. 

In a later interview, Mr. Lesley told officers that at some point after January 1994, 

Mr. Anderson had gone to California to acquire five to ten pounds of methamphetamine, 

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Appellate Case: 94-6464 Document: 01019277333 Date Filed: 04/04/1996 Page: 3 
which he brought back to Oklahoma. When Mr. Anderson returned to Oklahoma City, he 

called Mr. Jones and Mr. Lesley and arranged to meet them between Elk City and 

Sentinel. They went to Mr. Lesley's residence in Sentinel, where Mr. Anderson 

measured out one ounce of methamphetamine for both Mr. Lesley and Mr. Jones, who 

each paid him $1,800. 

In separate appeals, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Jones now challenge their sentencing. 

Mr. Anderson maintains he should be resentenced because the district court failed to 

allow him sufficient time before the sentencing hearing and because the court 

miscalculated his sentencing range. He also challenges the court's factual findings. Mr. 

Jones argues the controlled substance attributed to him was erroneously determined to be 

d-methamphetamine instead of !-methamphetamine, and also contends a downward 

departure in sentencing was warranted. We consider these arguments seriatim. 

The timing of the events following Mr. Anderson's guilty plea are central to his 

appeal. He entered his plea on October 14, 1994. On November 17, the presentence 

report was provided to his counsel. Five days later, Anderson's counsel filed his 

objections. The next day, the probation office filed a revised presentence report reflecting 

the defendant's objections and responses thereto. On December 13, twenty days later and 

twenty-six days after the initial filing of the presentence report, the district court held a 

sentencing hearing and adopted the guideline calculations recommended in the 

presentence report. 

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Appellate Case: 94-6464 Document: 01019277333 Date Filed: 04/04/1996 Page: 4 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "[n]ot less than 35 days 

before the sentencing hearing--unless the defendant waives this minimum period--the 

probation officer must furnish the presentence report to the defendant, the defendant's 

counsel, and the attorney for the Government." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(A). Mr. 

Anderson contends this rule was violated. 

Although less than 35 days elapsed between the filing of the presentence report 

and the hearing, the government asserts that Mr. Anderson waived the minimum period. 

Indeed, Mr. Anderson raised no objection at the hearing to the scheduling. He told the 

court he had had an opportunity to examine the presentence report and to review it with 

his attorney. Rec., supp. vol. IV at 2-3. He further said he was unaware of any reason 

why the court should not then sentence him. Id. at 44. 

Three circuits have held that a defendant waives the minimum period by 

participating in the sentencing hearing without objection. See United States v. Navejar, 

963 F.2d 732, 734-35 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Knorr, 942 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th 

Cir. 1991); United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 714 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 

962 (1990). We join those courts and hold that Mr. Anderson waived the minimum 

period when he failed to object at the sentencing hearing. 

Mr. Anderson also identifies three errors allegedly made in the calculation of his 

sentence. Because he did not raise these arguments in the proceedings below, we review 

for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572,580 (lOth 

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Appellate Case: 94-6464 Document: 01019277333 Date Filed: 04/04/1996 Page: 5 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1117 (1995). First, he claims he is not the same 

Ronald Anderson convicted for obtaining money by false means in Custer County in 

1981. Second, he maintains that a Garvin County conviction in 1993 was not for driving 

under the influence, but for driving with a suspended license which would not be included 

in his criminal history. Third, he insists he deserves a three-point reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, rather than the two-point reduction he received. 

Under the plain error rule, Mr. Anderson is required to show "clear" or "obvious" 

error that affected his substantial rights, and that seriously affected the integrity of these 

judicial proceedings. See generally United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993). With 

regard to the 1981 conviction and the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Mr. 

Anderson has clearly not borne his burden of establishing plain error. Each of these 

issues involves a factual dispute concerning the applicability of a particular guideline, 

which we have held does not rise to the level of plain error. See United States v. 

Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1518 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1343 (1993). 

Although the government concedes Mr. Anderson's 1993 conviction should not be 

included in his criminal history calculation, his other past convictions are still sufficient to 

place him in the criminal history category of III. 

Mr. Jones argues the court erred in attributing d-methamphetamine to him 

instead ofl-methamphetamine. We review this factual finding for clear error. Deninno, 

29 F.3d at 580. The sentencing guideline commentary recognizes two isomers of 

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Appellate Case: 94-6464 Document: 01019277333 Date Filed: 04/04/1996 Page: 6 
methamphetamine, !-methamphetamine and d-methamphetamine, and treats!-

methamphetamine much less severely. See U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l comment. (n. lO(d)(drug 

equivalency tables)); see ~enerally, United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 88-89 (3d cir. 

1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1812 (1995). For sentencing purposes, the government 

must prove that the methamphetamine attributed to a defendant is more likely than not dmethamphetamine. United States v. Lande, 40 F.3d 329,331 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. 

denied, 115 S. Ct. 1988 (1995); see also United States v. Decker, 55 F.3d 1509 (lOth Cir. 

1995)(addressing sentencing for d,l-methamphetamine). 

No drugs were ever seized from Mr. Jones. However, Mr. Jones told law 

enforcement officers that he had purchased one ounce a week over a period of six months 

from Mr. Anderson. At the sentencing hearing, both a narcotics investigator for the 

OCPD and a DEA chemist testified that the drugs seized during Mr. Anderson's arrest 

were d-methamphetamine. 

Mr. Jones argues that the evidence is ambiguous. Relying on United States v. 

Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990), he suggests 

that in opting between equally plausible estimates we ought to err on the side of leniency. 

Walton is inapposite. Testimony established that Mr. Anderson was Mr. Jones' supplier 

and that Mr. Anderson was caught with d-methamphetamine. This evidence is not 

ambiguous. Moreover, no evidence suggests Mr. Jones ever possessed !-methamphetamine. The district court did not clearly err in attributing d-methamphetamine to Mr. 

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Appellate Case: 94-6464 Document: 01019277333 Date Filed: 04/04/1996 Page: 7 
Jones. 

Mr. Jones also contends the district court should have departed downward from the 

sentencing guidelines because they overrepresent the gravity of his past crimes? A court 

is required to impose a sentence within the guidelines range "unless [it] finds that there 

exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 

taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that 

should result in a sentence different from that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The 

Sentencing Guidelines specify that a downward departure may be warranted where "a 

defendant's criminal history category significantly over-represents" the seriousness of a 

defendant's past convictions or his likelihood of recidivism. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.3. 

However, we have previously held that "[s]uch a departure is discretionary and the 

judge's exercise of discretion not to depart cannot be appealed." United States v. Pace, 

981 F.2d 1123, 1134 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 966 (1993). 

We AFFIRM the sentences. 

2 Mr. Jones claims his record reflects a pattern of non-violent, alcohol-related 

crimes. Although Mr. Jones and those in his path have evidently been lucky in this 

regard, driving under the influence of alcohol is not inherently non-violent. 

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Appellate Case: 94-6464 Document: 01019277333 Date Filed: 04/04/1996 Page: 8