Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01334/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01334-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adventist Health Bakersfield
Defendant
Gwen Arroyo
Defendant
Gallagher Bassett
Defendant
Compass Group
Defendant
David Reed Condie
Defendant
Christina Dietrich
Defendant
Timothy Miller
Defendant
National Union Insurance Company of Pittsburg
Defendant
Floyd Scott
Plaintiff
Kathleen L. Thomas
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLOYD SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADVENTIST HEALTH BAKERSFIELD, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-01334-ADA-CDB

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING

WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO FILE A 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 1)

Plaintiff Floyd Scott (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights 

action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at 1). Plaintiff lists the following 

parties as defendants (1) Adventist Health Bakersfield, (2) John Doe, (3) Kathleen L. Thomas, (4) 

David Reed Condie, (5) Gallagher Bassett, (6) Christina Dietrich (7) Gwen Arroyo, SCLA, (8) 

Compass Group, (9) National Union Insurance Company of Pittsburgh [sic], (10) Timothy Miller, 

R.N. (“Defendants”). Id. at 1-2. 

Preliminary Screening

Plaintiff, who is proceeding without counsel in this action, was granted status to proceed 

in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this action. (ECF Nos. 2-3). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (authorizing 

the commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees or security” by a person who is 

unable to pay such fees). However, the determination that a plaintiff may proceed without 

Case 1:22-cv-01334-KES-CDB Document 4 Filed 11/29/22 Page 1 of 7
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payment of fees does not complete the Court’s inquiry. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 

federal courts must screen IFP complaints and dismiss any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” 

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or seeks monetary relief against an immune 

defendant. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 

1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to 

state a claim.”). 

Procedural and Factual Background

On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff alleges he was taken to Adventist Health Bakersfield. 

(ECF No. 1 at 5). Plaintiff states he was “wearing waist chains with hand cuffs [sic] and leg 

chains with ankle cuffs while at Adventist Health Bakersfield”. Id. Plaintiff claims he was 

placed in a hospital wheelchair and escorted to a pre-operative examination room by an 

unspecified wheelchair attendant. Id. Plaintiff asserts “once at the examination room I was told 

to get up before I could fully move away from the wheelchair my leg chains got caught on the 

wheel chairs foot rest [sic] causing me to fall face forward with no way to stop the fall.” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges the wheelchair attendant did not assist him out of the wheelchair and as a result 

of his fall he injured his left knee. Id.

Plaintiff claims following the fall, the wheelchair attendant and a corrections staff member 

took him to an examination room bed. Id. Plaintiff asserts he was seen by Registered Nurse 

Kathleen L. Thomas and Doctor David Reed Condie. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff claims he informed 

Nurse Thomas and Doctor Condie that his left knee was in pain. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was 

provided a concussion check by Doctor Condie but received no pain medication, was not given an 

X-Ray or “an M.I.R. [sic]” and “did not even get an ace bandage or anything.” Id. at 5. 

Sometime after, Plaintiff claims “X-Rays and an M.R.I. done at the California State Prison-Los 

Angeles County shows an injury to my left knee that was not there prior to January 15, 2021.” Id. 

at 6. Plaintiff states he now has to wear a knee brace on his left knee. Id. at 9. 

Plaintiff claims he attempted to obtain the wheelchair attendant’s name but Adventist 

Health Bakersfield, its office of risk management, and their parent company The Compass Group 

failed to respond to his “numerous requests.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges he made numerous 

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attempts to file an insurance claim for his left knee but the insurance agency Gallagher Bassett its

employees Gwen Arroyo, SCLA, Christian Dietrich, and Timothy Miller, R.N., a person from the 

hospital’s office of risk management failed to respond to his requests. Id.

Plaintiff’s Claims

The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of 

the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ 

conduct violated his “Eighth Amendment Rights to Adequate Medical Care; Deliberate 

Indifference; Denying Medical Treatment.” (ECF No. 1 at 5). Moreover, Plaintiff claims 

Defendants violated his “Due Process Rights.” Id. at 7. 

Standard of Review

A federal court must screen IFP complaints and dismiss any case that fails to state a claim 

on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Failure to state a claim under § 1915 incorporates the familiar 

standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6).”) (citations omitted)). When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon 

which relief can be granted, the court must accept the well-pled factual allegation as true and 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than 

“naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Relief cannot be granted for a claim that lacks facial plausibility. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Instead, “a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A court must dismiss a case if, at any time, it determines that it lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A federal district court generally has jurisdiction over a 

civil action when (1) a federal question is presented in an action “arising under the Constitution, 

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laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) there is complete diversity of citizenship between the 

parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a).

Pleadings by self-represented litigants are to be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a 

plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n .9 

(1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not initially pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 

1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not 

required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 

Unless it is clear no amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a self-represented 

plaintiff proceeding IFP ordinarily is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend before 

dismissal. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). Leave to amend need not be 

granted when further amendment would be futile. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 

339 (9th Cir. 1996).

Discussion

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Plaintiff asserts 

Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights to adequate medical care through deliberate 

indifference and by denying him medical treatment. (ECF No. 1 at 5). In addition, Plaintiff 

claims Defendants violated his due process rights by failing to act with goodwill. Id. at 7. 

Ostensibly, Plaintiff has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Civil Rights Act 

provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 

any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress...

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides 

a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right 

secured by the Constitution and law of the United States and that deprivation occurred under the

color of state law. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. 

v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978)); Marsh v. County of San Diego, 689 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th

Cir. 2012). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if 

he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’”

Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).

Action under the color of state law normally consist of actions taken by a public agency or 

officer. Taylor v. First Wyoming, Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1983). Private parties 

are not generally acting under the color of state law for the purpose of § 1983. Price v. Hawaii, 

939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991); see Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192 

F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (a party charged with constitutional deprivation must be a 

governmental actor because “§ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter 

how discriminatory or wrong”). However, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is 

such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior 

may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit has recognized at least four tests that facilitate the identification of state 

action, namely, “(1) public function; (2) joint action; (3) governmental compulsion or coercion; 

and (4) governmental nexus.” Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, 975 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 

2020) (quoting Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003)). Satisfaction of any of 

these tests is enough to find state action, provided no “countervailing” factors exist. Id. 

Regardless of the test, “[a]t bottom, the inquiry is always whether the defendant has exercised 

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power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed 

with the authority of state law.” Id. at 748 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that defendant is a state actor, and there is a presumption 

that private individuals and entities do not act under the “color of state law” within the meaning 

of § 1983. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff has not alleged that any of these Defendants are state entities, state employees, 

contracted by the state, or were otherwise acting under color of state law. Generally, physicians 

who contract with prisons to provide healthcare to inmates are state actors. West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 51-54 (1988). However, private doctors, nurses, and hospitals who have not assumed the 

state’s obligation to provide medical care to inmates are not state actors simply because they 

provide one-off medical treatment to an inmate. Id.; Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 855-856 

(9th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff has failed to allege Defendants are cloaked in the authority of the state 

or have assumed the state's obligation to provide sufficient care to prisoners to consider them 

state actors. See generally (ECF No. 1). Therefore, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

for failing to demonstrate Defendants alleged constitutional deprivations are attributable to the 

state. 

Plaintiff will be granted an opportunity to file a first amended complaint curing the 

aforementioned deficiencies. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the 

original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded 

pleading.” Local Rule 220.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for 

failure to state a claim;

2. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a first 

amended complaint, curing if able, the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order; and

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3. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 

Court will recommend to the district judge that this action be dismissed, with 

prejudice, for failure to obey a court order, failure to prosecute, and for failure to state 

a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 28, 2022 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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