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Parties Involved:
Michael Jonathan Booze
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 19, 1997 Decided March 18, 1997

No. 96-3025

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MICHAEL JONATHAN BOOZE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cr00160-24)

M. Elizabeth Kent, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Steven E. Rindner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H.

Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman and William J. O'Malley, Jr.,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: WALD, SENTELLE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1994), vacated

in part on other grounds, 59 F.3d 1323 (in banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 542 (1995), the court

recognized that in a conspiracy, "the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, and hence

relevant conduct, is not necessarily the same for every participant." Id. at 352 (citing United States

Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 1B1.3 n.1 (1990)). The court further noted that "[t]he extent

of a defendant's vicarious liability under conspiracy law is always determined by the scope of his

agreement with his co-conspirators," and that, accordingly, it is the sentencing court's responsibility

to "determine the scope of the conspiratorial agreement each [conspirator] joined." Id. (quoting

United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Concluding that the district court erred

inadopting the presentence report'srecommendationthat eachdefendantshould automatically be held

accountable for all amounts of cocaine involved in the entire multi-state conspiracy, and that, under

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Saro, 24 F.3d. at 288-89, it was "at least "reasonably likely' " that most members of the conspiracy

were accountable for less than the total quantity, the court remanded for resentencing. The court

ordered the district court to make "specific, individualized findings regarding the quantity of drugs

each appellant might have reasonably foreseen his or her agreed-upon participation would involve."

Anderson, 39 F.3d at 353. The instant appeal involves one of those remands.

Appellant Michael Booze appeals his resentencing on two grounds: first, that the district

court erred in finding that there existed a "Booze brothers conspiracy" as a subset of the greater

Anderson conspiracy, and in attributing to himcocaine amountsinvolved in transactionsin which his

two brothers were implicated, regardless of whether evidence existed of his personal involvement;

and second, that the district court erred in accepting the government's calculation that five and

three-eighths kilograms of cocaine were attributable to him under the relevant conduct provisions of

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Because the government proffered evidence at trial to support its view of the

scope of appellant's conspiratorial agreement and the quantity of drugs attributable him as a result of

his participation, and because appellant did not challenge that evidence or object to the adequacy of

the district court's findings, we affirm.

I.

As part of a 126-count indictment that charged thirty-one defendants with conspiracy and

various other offensesrelating to drug trafficking, appellant was chargedwithconspiracyto distribute

and to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, and with use of a

communication facility in furtherance of the conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(b), 846. He and his two

brothers were convicted by a jury of conspiracy based on evidence that they jointly purchased

multiple kilograms of cocaine from Anderson for distribution in Annapolis, Maryland. Anderson, 39

F.3d at 337.

At appellant's original sentencing, the court applied the Sentencing Guidelines based on an

attribution to each defendant of 28.9 kilograms of cocaine, the full amount involved in the Anderson

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1 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3) provides for a base offense level of 34 for offenses involving "[a]t

least 15 [kilograms] but less than 50 [kilograms] of Cocaine...." 

2

See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. 

3 Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a), resentencing occurs under the version of the Guidelines in

effect at the time of resentencing, unless such an application would violate the Ex Post Facto

Clause of Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution. See United States v. Clark, 8 F.3d 839, 844

(D.C. Cir. 1993). 

conspiracy. Thus, appellant was assigned a base offense level of 34 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3)1

which, in combination with his criminalhistorycategoryof 6,2led to the imposition of a totalsentence

of 262 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release. On remand, using a base offense

level of 32 and a criminal history category of 6 that yielded a sentencing range of 210-262 months,

the district court resentenced appellant to 210 monthsimprisonment and five yearssupervised release

on the conspiracy count, and 48 months imprisonment and one year of supervised release for the

communication facility count, the sentences to run concurrently.

II.

Appellant's principal contention on appealisthat the district courtfailed to sentence himbased

upon hisindividualparticipation in the Anderson conspiracyand instead focused on "a quasi-fictitious

entity termed the "Booze brothers conspiracy,' " and attributed to appellant several excess kilograms

of cocaine associated with transactions involving his brothers in which he played no role.

Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, where more than one potential base level exists for an offense, the

base level is to be determined on the basis of:

(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,

induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and

(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity ( ... whether or not charged as

a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance

of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,

that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for

that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that

offense;

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (1996).3 Accordingly, consistent with the remand instructions in Anderson,

the district court had to ascertain the quantity of drugs that could be attributed to appellant by

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determining whether the acts at issue were within the scope of the conspiracy in which appellant had

agreed to participate, and whether the acts were foreseeable to him. See United States v. Childress,

58 F.3d 693, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 825 (1996); United States v. Edmond,

52 F.3d 1080, 1104-1106 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 539 (1995); Saro, 24 F.3d at 288-91.

The government bears the burden of proving the amount of drugs reasonably foreseeable to

the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. McManus, 23 F.3d 878, 885

(4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682, 685-86 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

506 U.S. 901 (1992). If the defense challenges the government's proof, in order to protect the

defendant's due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information, the district court

must either resolve the controverted matter or not consider the disputed evidence in sentencing the

defendant. United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 1996 WL

745296 (Feb. 18, 1997) (citing United States v. Hanono-Surujun, 914 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1989));

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1). Thus, as occurred in the instant case, the government must proffer

sufficiently reliable evidence to support its factual assertions as to the scope of a defendant's

conspiratorial agreement and the quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. See

United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Coonce, 961 F.2d

1268, 1279 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

484 U.S. 956 (1987). The proffers must be sufficiently specific and timely to enable the defense to

examine and, as appropriate, to challenge the evidence on which the government relies prior to the

imposition of a sentence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(A) & (c)(3)(A). Once the government

follows these procedures, it remains for the defense to proffer evidence of its own, placing factual

issues in dispute, or to point out that the government's proffers are deficient or insufficiently

comprehensive. Where the defense offers no evidence to refute the factual assertions by the

government, the district court may adopt those facts without further inquiry. See Pinnick, 47 F.3d

at 437 (citing United States v. Ramirez, 11 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1993)); THOMASW. HUTCHINSON

& DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE, 650 (1994).

Where this procedure is followed, in the absence of a "clear and specific" challenge by the

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defense, Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 438, the government'stimely proffer with specific referencesto the trial

record provides the district court with a sufficient basis on which to impose sentence. Saro, 24 F.3d

at 291. Absent indications to this court that a sentencing court committed obvious error by relying

on findings that are "internally contradictory, wildly implausible, or in direct conflict with evidence

presented at trial," see id., uncontested contentions, as appear in a presentence report, for example,

are considered to be supported by indicia of probable reliability and are sufficient to support factual

findingsfor sentencing purposes. Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 437; Coonce, 961 F.2d at 1279 (citing United

States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1270 (7th Cir. 1989)); HUTCHINSON & YELLEN, supra, at 650.

Even where the district court makesits own inquiry into the record, the procedure just recited

should assist the court in focusing on the relevant contested issues. As this court recently stated in

United States v. Dudley, 104 F.3d 442, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1997), involving another Anderson remand,

"we intended the district court to make detailed findings with respect to the evidentiary links tying

[the defendant and the co-defendants] to the amounts of drugsfor which the district court found them

responsible." Indeed, this court "encourage[d] the government to submit to the district court (with

notice to and service on the defendant) proposed findings that will support the sentence to be

imposed." Id. Although such findings were not submitted to the district court in the instant case, the

government assures the court that it is pursuing the suggestion made in Dudley. The submission by

the government of proposed findings of fact to the court prior to sentencing should ease the burden

on district courts confronted with making individualized sentencing determinationsin complex cases

with multiple defendants, and on appellate courts upon review.

Turning to the instant case, we conclude that notwithstanding the absence of Dudley-type

findings, because the district court afforded appellant an opportunity to respond to the government's

evidentiary proffers and concluded thereafter that the government's representations were supported

by the record, there is no basis for reversal and remand. See United States v. Foster, 19 F.3d 1452,

1455 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 510

U.S. 938 (1993); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3).

Scope of the conspiratorial agreement. To determine the scope of the conspiratorial

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agreement entered into by a defendant, the district court must "spell out specific findings about the

individual defendants and their relation to the conspiracy...." Childress, 58 F.3d at 723. Here, to

support its position that the drug transactions involving appellant's two brothers in Annapolis could

properly be attributed to him, the government set out the evidence upon which it relied in several

sentencing memoranda and at a resentencing hearing before the district court. Specifically, the

government relied on numerous tape recordings of telephone conversations to show that more than

five and three-eighths kilograms of cocaine were properly attributable to appellant for his

participation in distributing drugs in Annapolis prior to his incarceration in December 1988.

In a memorandum in aid of resentencing, the government referenced trial evidence that

showed that the three Booze brothers, working with others, purchased multiple kilograms of cocaine

from Anderson for distribution in Annapolis. The memorandum included references to specific

wiretapped conversationsinwhich theBooze brothers arranged prices, quantities, and pick-up points

for cocaine transactions. For example, with regard to a transaction that was negotiated and

completed on November 12-14, 1988, the government relied on over a dozen taped conversations

to show that the three brothers negotiated the sale of a kilogram of cocaine with Anderson, and that

they arranged to pick up the cocaine. Wiretapped conversations also revealed that on multiple

occasions the three Booze brothers took part in transactions involving varying amounts of cocaine,

including half and full kilograms, and that they received extensions of credit fromAnderson. Further,

the memorandum referenced a wiretapped conversation in which Anderson said that he had done

business with the Boozes over a period of years and that he had forged a relationship of trust with

them. Finally, the memorandum pointed to trial testimony that, in addition to participating in drug

transactions with his brothers, appellant had served as an "enforcer" to protect Anderson's drug

distribution operation, had bailed one of Anderson's employees out ofjail, and had assisted Anderson

in locating persons who owed him money and in obtaining a firearm. Based on the foregoing, the

memorandumconcluded that the Booze brothers had agreed to participate in conspiratorial activities

involving "at least" eight and one-half kilograms of cocaine.

A supplemental presentence report by the probation office stated that appellant and his

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brothers purchased one-half to one kilogram from Anderson "every three or four days," and that,

"[b]ased on the evidence, [appellant] jointly undertook the sale of at least 5 kilograms of cocaine."

The report recommended that appellant be sentenced for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with

intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), &846, receiving

a penalty of ten years to life imprisonment and a five year term of supervised release.

In response, appellant acknowledged in a presentence memorandumthat the government had

provided himwith 121 transcripts of wiretapped telephone conversationsthat had been admitted into

evidence at trial. Appellant contended, however, that the evidence showed that only three and

three-fourths kilograms of cocaine could properly be attributed to him. He asserted, without record

references, that although "[t]heBooze conspiracy ... graduallyworked up to getting 1/2 to 1 kilogram

of cocaine almost weekly," during the period prior to his incarceration, the conspiracy was limited

to smaller transactions involving ounces rather than kilograms of cocaine.

At the sentencing hearing, the government designated bydate and numberthe tape recordings

it relied upon to show that appellant, prior to his incarceration in December 1988, participated in

numerous cocaine transactions in Annapolis that involved his brothers. Because appellant failed to

dispute the representationsinthe government'ssentencing memorandum and in the presentence report

that the scope of his conspiratorial agreement included all transactions carried out by his brothers in

Annapolis prior to his incarceration, the district court could properly view appellant's responsibility

as coextensive with that of his brothers for that period. See Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 437; Saro, 24 F.3d

at 291. While appellant's sentencing memorandum challenged the total amount of cocaine attributed

to him, it acknowledged the existence of "[t]he Booze conspiracy" and "[t]he Booze group" and that

he "was found to be [a] member" of this subsection of the larger Anderson conspiracy. Statements

in appellant's brief on appeal are also consistent with the district court's conclusion on the scope of

his agreement: appellant acknowledges that he introduced his brothers to Anderson, assisted

Anderson in operating his drug distribution network, and participated in numerous drug transactions

involving Anderson and his brothers. Hence, there is nothing contradictory or implausible in the

district court's conclusion that the scope of appellant's conspiratorial agreement involved the

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4 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5) provides a base offense level of 30 for transactions involving

between three and a half and five kilograms of cocaine, and § 2D1.1(c)(4) provides a base offense

level of 32 for transactions involving between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine. For

defendants, like appellant, with a Criminal History category of 6, the Sentencing Table at

U.S.S.G. § 5, Part A, provides that the penalties for a level 30 offense are 168-210 months

imprisonment and the penalties for a level 32 offense are 210-62 months imprisonment. 

transactions conducted by the three Booze brothers in Annapolis during the period prior to his

incarceration.

Quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to Booze. As to appellant's contention that the

district court erred in accepting the government's calculation that five and three-eighths kilograms of

cocaine could be attributed to transactions within the scope of his conspiratorial agreement, we find

no basis for a remand.

At the resentencing hearing, the government took the position that because appellant was no

longer active in the conspiracy after his incarceration on December 15, 1988, the total amount of

cocaine attributable to appellant wasfive and three-eighths kilograms, rather than the eight and a half

kilograms that the presentence report had linked to the Booze brothers' conspiracy over its entire

duration. Because a difference of any amount greater than three-eighths of a kilogram would have

placed appellant below the five kilogram threshold, reducing the low end of his sentencing range by

three and a half years under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c),4see Graham, 83 F.3d at 1477, this three-eighths

of a kilogram was the focus of appellant's argument at resentencing.

The government reviewed for the district court the evidentiary basis for the five and

three-eighths kilograms of cocaine that it contended was within the scope of appellant's conspiratorial

agreement. Identifying the dates of the tape recordings introduced at trial to prove each of the

transactions involving the Booze brothers prior to appellant's incarceration and the amounts they

entailed, the government adequately supported its position. Generally indicating who initiated each

transaction, the amounts of drugs and money involved, the date and time of day when the transaction

occurred, and where the deliveries were made, the government reached its total by aggregating

amounts ranging from one-eighth to one and one-fourth kilograms associated with nine separate

transactions that took place between October and December 1988.

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5 This is so notwithstanding the government's concession in its brief on appeal that the record

concerning the November 2, 1988, transaction, involving one-fourth of a kilogram, was "not as

clear as it might have been" because, at the resentencing hearing, the government mistakenly

described that transaction as having taken place on October 28, 1988. When this quantity is

omitted from consideration, the total quantity attributable to appellant still exceeds five kilograms. 

As with alleged inaccuracies in a presentence report, if the evidence relied on by the

government at the sentencing hearing was erroneous or incomplete, the burden fell on appellant to

come forward with a showing that the government's reliance was misplaced. See Pinnick, 47 F.3d

at 438; cf. Coonce, 961 F.2d at 1279-80 (citing WAYNER.LAFAVE & JEROLD H.ISRAEL,CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE § 25.1(d), at 929 (1985)). Rather than disputing appellant's involvement in any of the

transactions cited or challenging the drug amounts claimed by the government, however, defense

counselresponded to the government's proffer by arguing that appellant was entitled to a downward

departure based on acceptance of responsibility. Although defense counsel had earlier advised the

district court that appellant was responsible for less than five kilograms based on counsel's own

calculations, counsel never offered any record support for this lower figure. Counsel explained only

that by being "a little creative" he had calculated the attributable quantity to be under five kilograms,

asserting that the difference between his figure and the government's was due to indicationsthat one

of appellant's brothers skimmed small amounts of cocaine for himself from transactions negotiated

by the brothers. No record evidence was cited in support of this assertion, however. Moreover,

rather than pressing his point, counsel proceeded to state that, having heard the trial testimony, "the

[c]ourt [was] in a much better position to make a determination" concerning the attributable quantity

than was defense counsel. Although appellant spoke himself, he also did not dispute the specific drug

quantities and transactions relied on by the government, arguing instead that he should not be held

accountable for drug amountsthat he had not personally handled, a position that, asthe district court

pointed out, reflected a lack of familiarity with the principles of conspiracy law.

Absent specific challenges by appellant, the district court was entitled to rely on the trial

record references cited by the government asthe basisfor its own factualfindings.5See United States

v. Goodwin, 72 F.3d 88, 90 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d 1454, 1475 (7th Cir.

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6 Because the record showed that appellant was involved in numerous drug transactions as part

of the Booze conspiracy before his incarceration, and that he had performed a variety of tasks for

Anderson, we find no error in the district court's determination that appellant was not a "minor

participant in any criminal activity" so as to merit a two-point downward departure under

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. See United States v. Olibrices, 979 F.2d 1557, 1559-61 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying appellant a two-point

downward departure for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). While appellant

maintains that the district court's decision was improperly predicated on his refusal to surrender

his right to appeal his sentence, the record shows that the district court stated that the basis for its

decision was that appellant was "not willing to accept responsibility for the crimes for which he

was found guilty by the jury." 

1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2286 (1995). While a memorandum or a more extensive statement

by the district court of its findings would have facilitated review and helped "to avoid needless

misinterpretation" on appeal, Dudley, 104 F.3d at 447, the government'srecitationofthe relevant trial

evidence provided an adequate substitute to support the court'sfindingsthat appellant should be held

accountable for his brothers' participation in the Anderson conspiracy and for a total drug quantity

of five and three-eighths kilograms. Because the government proffered trial evidence to support a

quantity of drugs in excess of five kilograms and appellant failed to identify specific deficiencies in

that evidence, the district court's reliance on that evidence was proper; therefore, there is no basis

to remand for resentencing.

Accordingly, because appellant's other contentions are meritless,6 we affirm.

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