Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02837/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02837-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Timothy Todd Woolcott
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY TODD WOOLCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-2837-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born November 5, 1959, applied on March 29, 2012 for DIB and SSI, alleging 

disability beginning March 15, 2009.

1

 Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 13, 186-202. Plaintiff 

alleged he was unable to work primarily due to lower back pain, cirrhosis of the liver and other 

 

1

Plaintiff later amended his alleged onset date to November 5, 2009. AT 276, 282. 

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liver problems, insomnia, and depression. AT 249. In a decision dated April 25, 2013, the ALJ 

determined that plaintiff was not disabled.2 AT 13-21. The ALJ made the following findings 

(citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2014.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since March 15, 2009, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: obesity (260 

pounds and 5’ 10” per claimant testimony), stable liver disease, and 

lumbar degenerative disc disease with radiculopathy.

////

 

2 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift up 

to 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk 2 hours in an 8-hour 

workday, and sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

7. The claimant was born on November 5, 1959 and was 49 years 

old, which is defined as a younger individual age 45-49, on the 

alleged disability onset date. The claimant subsequently changed 

category to closely approaching advanced age.

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English.

9. The claimant has acquired work skills from past relevant work. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, the claimant has acquired work 

skills from past relevant work that are transferrable to other 

occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the 

national economy.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from March 15, 2009, through the date of this 

decision.

AT 15-21. 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) improperly assessed the medical evidence regarding the severity of plaintiff’s mental 

impairments at step two and when determining plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); 

and (2) improperly determined that plaintiff was not disabled under the Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines (the “Grids”) by not finding that plaintiff was limited to non-skilled work.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

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F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ did not Err in Addressing the Medical Evidence at Step Two and When 

Determining Plaintiff’s RFC

First, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred at step two of the analysis by finding that plaintiff 

did not have any “severe” mental impairments despite the existence of evidence in the record 

demonstrating that plaintiff suffered from depression, and that that impairment had more than a 

minimal impact on plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related functions. Specifically, plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ improperly considered the opinion of Dr. Sanchez-Barker, an examining 

psychiatrist, at step two by ignoring the limitations Dr. Sanchez-Barker opined. Plaintiff also 

contends that the ALJ failed to consider the opinions of Dr. Meenakshi and Dr. Arnado, two nonexamining State agency physicians who reviewed plaintiff’s medical records and opined that 

plaintiff had “moderate” mental limitations, when determining whether plaintiff had severe

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impairments at step two. Finally, plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed further error by not 

including any mental limitations in her RFC determination that reflected the opinions of these 

physicians.

An impairment is “not severe” only if it “would have no more than a minimal effect on an 

individual’s ability to work, even if the individual’s age, education, or work experience were 

specifically considered.” SSR 85-28. The purpose of step two is to identify claimants whose 

medical impairment is so slight that it is unlikely they would be disabled even if age, education, 

and experience were taken into account. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). “The step-two 

inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 

2001). Impairments must be considered in combination in assessing severity. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1523.

Here, the ALJ considered whether plaintiff’s diagnosed depression caused more than a 

minimal impairment on plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activities and determined that it 

caused no more than mild limitations, therefore warranting its non-inclusion on the list of 

plaintiff’s severe impairments. AT 15-16. Plaintiff argues that this determination was flawed 

because Dr. Sanchez-Barker gave plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 

513and opined that plaintiff’s mental impairments caused mild-to-moderate limitations regarding 

his ability to interact with coworkers and the public, and maintain adequate concentration, 

persistence, pace, and emotional stability in the workplace, therefore indicating that plaintiff’s 

depression was severe for purposes of step two. AT 42-21. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed 

to properly evaluate Dr. Sanchez-Barker’s opinion when considering plaintiff’s impairments at 

step two because she determined that plaintiff’s depression caused no more than mild mental 

limitations. This contention is unfounded.

 

3 GAF is a scale reflecting the “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a 

hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders at 34 (4th ed. 2000). A GAF of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect 

and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, 

occupational, or school function (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers). Id.

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When discussing plaintiff’s impairments at step two, the ALJ directly discussed Dr. 

Sanchez-Barker’s examination findings and opinion of plaintiff’s psychological functioning in the 

context of the entire medical record concerning plaintiff’s depression and came to the conclusion 

that this evidence, as a whole, supported a finding that plaintiff’s depression caused no more than 

mild limitations on his ability to perform work-related mental activities. AT 16. In support of her 

conclusion, the ALJ noted that plaintiff told Dr. Sanchez-Barker during the examination that he 

had never received any type of psychological services prior to the examination and that he had 

not used any anti-depression medication within the prior 10 years. AT 16, 419. The ALJ also 

noted that plaintiff’s mental treatment records dated after Dr. Sanchez-Barker’s examination 

document that the only treatment plaintiff received for his depression during the relevant time

was mental health counseling that occurred over the course of a roughly five-month period, and 

which resulted in the treating therapist determining on September 27, 2012 that plaintiff “has the 

necessary tools to enhance his life management skills independent of therapeutic services” and 

discharging plaintiff from further counseling. AT 16 (citing AT 497-98, 502-505, 516-17). 

Finally, the ALJ further noted that plaintiff had not been prescribed psychotropic medication at 

any time during the relevant period, the treatment records subsequent to the conclusion of 

plaintiff’s counseling treatment provided no indication that plaintiff was suffering from persistent 

psychological symptoms, and that the daily activities described in plaintiff’s own functional selfassessment indicated no more than mild mental limitations. Id. This evidence substantially 

supports the ALJ’s step two determination, even in light of Dr. Sanchez-Barker’s examining 

opinion that plaintiff had moderate mental impairments, because it reasonably indicates that 

plaintiff’s depression had no more than a minimal impact on his functional capacity over the 

course of the relevant period.

With regard to the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Sanchez-Barker’s opinion when 

determining plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ expressly discounted Dr. Sanchez-Barker’s opinion on the 

basis that it was founded on a single examination and did not reflect the other evidence in the 

record regarding the impact of plaintiff’s mental impairments. AT 19. As the ALJ highlighted at 

step two, the medical evidence in the record demonstrates that plaintiff did not receive any 

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treatment for depression during the relevant period prior to his examination by Dr. SanchezBarker in April of 2012, and that the counseling he received after that examination was limited in 

duration and resulted in an improvement of his depression to the point where the treating therapist 

determined that he no longer needed further counseling. AT 497. Furthermore, the evidence 

from after the brief counseling period provides no indication that plaintiff suffered from 

continuing symptoms of depression or received any further care for that condition during the 

remainder of the relevant period. See AT 280, 493, 530. In short, the treating records regarding 

plaintiff’s mental status demonstrate that plaintiff’s depression did not have more than a minimal 

impact on plaintiff’s functioning for the duration of the relevant period. The ALJ’s use of this 

evidence to find that Dr. Sanchez-Barker’s opinion was not entitled to deference to the extent that 

it opined that plaintiff’s depression caused more minimal limitations was legally sufficient. See

Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.1999) (physician’s conclusory, minimally 

supported opinion rejected); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that

the ALJ properly discounted a physician’s opinion when it “was not substantiated by medical 

evidence relevant to the period in question”).

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by not considering the opinions of State agency 

non-examining physicians of Dr. Meenakshi and Dr. Arnado at step two, and by not adopting 

their opinions that plaintiff had moderate mental limitations into her RFC determination. While 

the ALJ did not directly address these opinions when discussing plaintiff’s mental impairments at 

step two, she did discuss and reject these opinions for the same reasons she discounted Dr. 

Sanchez-Barker’s opinion when addressing plaintiff’s RFC. AT 19. These two opinions’ mental 

assessments were based entirely on Dr. Sanchez-Barker’s examination and opinion, and neither 

State agency physician reviewed any of the other medical evidence in the record relating to the 

treatment of plaintiff’s depression, such as the records from his mental health counseling sessions 

from April to September of 2012. See AT 81-110, 113-140. Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasons for 

discounting Dr. Sanchez-Barker’s opinion were equally applicable to the State agency physicians’ 

opinions. The ALJ was not required to adopt the mental limitations opined by these physicians 

when considering plaintiff’s impairments at step two and for purposes of determining plaintiff’s 

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RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2) (“Administrative law judges are responsible for reviewing 

the evidence and making findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . [and] are not bound by any 

findings made by State agency medical or psychological consultants.”).

Moreover, even if the ALJ technically erred by not finding plaintiff’s depression severe 

for purposes of step two, such error was harmless if the ALJ proceeded to consider the effects of 

that impairment at subsequent steps. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Because the ALJ found other impairments to be severe at step two, she proceeded to subsequent 

steps of the sequential disability evaluation process. Furthermore, the ALJ considered the impact 

of all of plaintiff’s medically-determinable impairments, regardless of their severity, when 

determining plaintiff’s RFC. See AT 17 (“In making this finding, the undersigned has considered 

all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent 

with the objective medical evidence and other evidence . . .”). While the ALJ did not specifically 

discuss plaintiff’s depression when determining his RFC, her discussion of the opinion evidence 

addressing the impact of plaintiff’s mental impairments and the fact that the ALJ considered all of 

plaintiff’s medically determinable symptoms demonstrates that the ALJ took plaintiff’s 

depression into account in arriving at her RFC conclusion. See AT 19; Magallanes v. Bowen, 

881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989) (the court may “draw[ ] specific and legitimate inferences from 

the ALJ’s opinion”). Therefore, any error the ALJ could have committed at step two by not 

finding plaintiff’s alleged depression severe would have been, at most, harmless.

In addition, even had the ALJ erred in not giving greater weight to the opinions of Dr. 

Sanchez-Barker and the State agency physicians when determining plaintiff’s RFC, any such 

error would have been harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“we 

may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless”). Dr. Sanchez-Barker 

opined that plaintiff’s depression caused only mild-to-moderate limitations in his ability to 

perform mental workplace activities and determined that plaintiff had a GAF score of 51,

indicating that plaintiff’s mental impairments caused only moderate functional limitations. AT 

420-21. The non-examining State agency physicians opined similar “moderate” limitations. See

AT 91-92, 106-107, 123-24, 137-38. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that moderate 

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mental limitations are not sufficiently severe so as to require vocational expert testimony. Hoopai 

v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving an assessment that the claimant was 

moderately limited in “his ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; 

his ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual 

with customary tolerance; and his ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruption from psychologically-based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an 

unreasonable number and length of rest periods.”).

B. The ALJ did Not Err in Not Including a Limitation to Unskilled Work in Her RFC 

Determination

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have determined that plaintiff was limited to 

performing only unskilled work; therefore rendering the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff could 

perform the representative jobs of layout technician of optical goods, clock/watch inspector, and 

inspector of optical goods erroneous as all of those jobs are considered “skilled” or “semi-skilled” 

jobs under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Plaintiff argues further that this error requires 

the court to remand this case for an award of benefits because plaintiff was 50 years old on his 

amended alleged onset date of November 5, 2009, which made him a person “closely 

approaching advanced age” under the Grids, and the ALJ’s RFC determination limited him to 

only sedentary work, therefore requiring the ALJ to find him disabled under the framework set 

forth in the Grids when an additional limitation permitting only unskilled work is taken into 

account. This argument is without merit.

Plaintiff asserts that the medical record demonstrates that he should be limited to nonskilled work. Specifically, he contends that the opinions of Dr. Sanchez-Barker and the State 

agency non-examining physicians demonstrate that plaintiff was so limited. However, as 

discussed above, the ALJ properly rejected the opinions of the State agency non-examining 

physicians who opined that plaintiff was limited to non-skilled work. AT 19. Dr. SanchezBarker opined no such limitation and her findings and opinions concerning plaintiff’s mental 

impairments and limitations do not suggest that plaintiff was unable to perform skilled or semiskilled work similar to the semi-skilled-to-skilled jobs he previously held. AT 420-21. 

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Furthermore, in any event, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Sanchez-Barker’s opinion for the 

reasons discussed above. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to satisfy his burden in proving that he was 

limited to only non-skilled work. Because the ALJ properly determined that plaintiff was capable 

of performing skilled or semi-skilled work, she did not err in finding that plaintiff could perform 

the representative skilled and semi-skilled jobs she discussed in her decision. As a result, the 

Grids did not require the ALJ to find plaintiff disabled at step five.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: October 15, 2015

11 woolcott2837.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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