Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cr-00278/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cr-00278-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ana Cristina Quinonez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

KIRK E. SHERRIFF

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

ANA CRISTINA QUINONEZ,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:18-CR-0278 DAD BAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

AND ORDER

DATE: March 23, 2020

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for a status conference on March 23, 2020. On March 17, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to 

commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns 

related to COVID-19. On March 18, 2020, this Court issued General Order 612 to further address such 

concerns.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

Case 1:18-cr-00278-DAD-BAM Document 32 Filed 03/19/20 Page 1 of 4
2 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7). Although 

the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural 

disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. 

For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. 

Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the 

eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 

F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 

terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more 

enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status 

conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial 

continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on March 23, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 22, 

Case 1:18-cr-00278-DAD-BAM Document 32 Filed 03/19/20 Page 2 of 4
3 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2020, and to exclude time between March 23, 2020, and June 22, 2020. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review 

the current charges and conduct further investigation and research related to the charges, to 

discuss potential resolutions with his client, and to evaluate and potentially prepare pretrial 

motions.

b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

c) The government does not object to the continuance.

d) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Orders 611 and 612 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and 

minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal 

contact should the hearing proceed.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 23, 2020 to June 22, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results 

from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s 

finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Case 1:18-cr-00278-DAD-BAM Document 32 Filed 03/19/20 Page 3 of 4
4 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: March 19, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ Kirk E. Sherriff

KIRK E. SHERRIFF

Assistant United States Attorney

 /s/ Richard Oberto

Dated: March 19, 2020 (authorized on 3/19/20)

Richard Oberto

Counsel for Defendant 

ANA CRISTINA QUINONEZ

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the 5th Status Conference is continued from March 23, 2020 to June 22, 

2020 at 1:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded pursuant to 18 

U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:18-cr-00278-DAD-BAM Document 32 Filed 03/19/20 Page 4 of 4