Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01096/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Byron
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

MAY 2 5 1993 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MICHAEL BYRON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Ho. 93-1096 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

D.C. No. 92-CR-277 

Stephen C. Peters, Assistant U.S. Attorney (James R. Allison, 

Interim United States Attorney, and Linda Kaufman, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for the 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

William R. Rapson (Stephen L. Waters with him on the brief) of 

Robinson, Waters, O'Dorisio and Rapson, P.C., Denver, Colorado, 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 93-1096 Document: 010110115173 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 1 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the district 

court denying a motion to dismiss an indictment and a motion for 

disclosure of certain grand jury records. Because the issues are 

posited in the framework of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(b) & (f), we have 

assumed without deciding we are obliged by United States v. 

Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir. 1992), to 

accept jurisdiction. We conclude as a matter of law the 

objections raised by the appellant are without foundation and the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's 

motion for disclosure of grand jury records. 

During the course of the pre-indictment grand jury 

investigation, Mr. Byron requested and was granted the opportunity 

to appear before the grand jury to present exculpatory evidence. 

In a post-indictment affidavit in support of his motions, he 

asserted that on the day he testified he counted the jurors during 

a recess and found only fourteen were present. He further claims 

during the ensuing session two of the jurors fell asleep. 

On the basis of these asserted facts, defendant filed his 

motion to dismiss, contending a quorum of jurors was not present ' 

when he testified. He also filed motions for the disclosure of 

the grand jury attendance and voting records to sustain his claim. 

The motions were submitted to the district court with all 

written submissions, including affidavits of the prosecutor and 

the Chief Deputy Clerk of the district court as well as a 

transcript of Mr. Byron's grand jury testimony. Both affidavits 

attested to the fact that a quorum of grand jurors was in 

attendance. The transcript contains a statement of the grand jury 

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Appellate Case: 93-1096 Document: 010110115173 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 2 
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foreman noting the presence of "a quorum" following the recess 

before resumption of the testimony. 

Defendant now claims he was unjustly denied access to the 

records, and, as a result, could not prove his claim the 

indictment was invalid. He maintains it is required that at least 

sixteen grand jurors attend every session, and because he counted 

only fourteen, two of whom later slept, a quorum did not hear his 

testimony. He also argues he should have been given access to the 

voting records so he could determine whether the twelve who heard 

his exculpatory evidence voted to return the indictment. 

The underlying legal predicate to defendant's case is without 

foundation. Mr. Byron's postulate is that a session of the grand 

jury convened to hear his mitigating evidence was a regular 

session of the grand jury requiring the presence of at least 

sixteen jurors. His only support for this argument is dictum from 

United States ex rel. McCazm v. Tho.npson, 144 F.2d 604, 607 (2d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 790 (1944). In that case, Judge 

Learned Hand suggested that twelve jurors be present to hear 

exculpatory evidence because that testimony could cause a juror to 

find a lack of probable cause. That suggestion, however, was 

nothing more and formed no part of the court's holding. 

Additionally, defendant cites United States v. Leverage 

Frmding Sys., Inc., 637 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. 

denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981), suggesting the Ninth Circuit has 

adopted a standard requiring not fewer than twelve grand jurors 

who hear exculpatory testimony vote to indict in a particular 

case. We disagree. In that case, the court said: 

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Appellate Case: 93-1096 Document: 010110115173 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 3 
[T]he purpose of the grand jury indicates that a juror's 

absence during the presentation of exculpatory evidence 

is not a proper ground to invalidate that juror's vote 

for indictment. It is the function of the grand jury to 

determine whether the evidence presented in a specific 

case is sufficient to es.tablish probable cause to 

believe that a crime was committed and that a specific 

individual committed the crime. A grand juror can 

therefore fulfill his or her constitutional role of 

determining whether the prosecution has presented a 

prima facie case even if he or she was absent during the 

presentation of exculpatory evidence. 

637 F.2d at 648 (citations omitted). It is sufficient under the 

Fifth Amendment and Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(a) (1) that every grand jury 

session is attended by "not less than 16 nor more than 23 

members"; and in Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(f), "[a]n indictment may be 

found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors." See United 

States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir. 1982), rev'd on 

other grounds, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) ("[T]here is no statutory or 

legal requirement that at least twelve grand jurors who vote to 

indict have heard all the evidence relevant to that indictment."). 

More importantly, the Supreme Court has left no doubt that 

the sole function of a grand jury is to test the government's 

evidence for probable cause. In United States v. Williams, 

. U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992), a holding not cited by 

defendant, Justice Scalia stated: 

It is axiomatic that the grand jury sits not to 

determine guilt or innocence, but to assess whether 

there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge. 

That has always been so; and to make the assessment it 

has always been thought sufficient to hear only the 

prosecutor's side .... As a consequence, neither in 

this country nor in England , .has the suspect under 

investigation by the grand jury ever been thought to 

have a right to testify, or to have exculpatory evidence 

presented . 

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Appellate Case: 93-1096 Document: 010110115173 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 4 
Id. at 1744 (citations omitted). Thus, it would follow, if a 

grand jury target does not have the right to present exculpatory 

evidence to a grand jury, the person's appearance before that body 

is a matter of sufferance, and whether sixteen jurors are in 

attendance at that session or whether twelve jurors who hear that 

evidence vote to indict is irrelevant to the validity of the 

indictment. 

Accordingly, we conclude defendant's basic premise is wholly 

lacking in foundation. Moreover, the absence of that foundation 

renders moot any consideration of the competing versions of how 

many jurors were present and alert when Mr. Byron testified. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1096 Document: 010110115173 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 5