Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06271/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06271-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma
Appellee
Lagretta Mae Maxwell
Appellant
Ray
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LAGRETTA MAE MAXWELL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

} 

} 

} 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cir~it 

JAN 10 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

} No. 90-6271 

v. 

RAY, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

} (W.D. Oklahoma} 

} (D.C. No. CIV-90-487-B} 

} 

} 

} 

} 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a}; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Lagretta Mae Maxwell, proceeding prose, appeals the district 

court's denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Maxwell was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder in 

the death of her husband and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. 

Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief in state court. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6271 Document: 010110069775 Date Filed: 01/10/1991 Page: 1 
When relief was denied and the decision was affirmed on appeal, 

Maxwell then unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in federal 

district court. 

Maxwell asserts five grounds for appeal, arguing that the 

trial court erred by: 1) basing her conviction on uncorroborated 

accomplice testimony; 2) overruling her motion for a continuance; 

3) denying her motion for a mistrial; 4) allowing perjured 

testimony into evidence; and 5) excluding as evidence certain 

letters to which the prosecutor objected. Plainly, each of these 

asserted errors arises from an evidentiary or procedural ruling by 

the trial court. 

In reviewing the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, the scope of our review is narrow. While we must satisfy 

ourselves that Maxwell was afforded the constitutional protection 

of due process, we will not go so far as to exercise supervisory 

authority over the Oklahoma state courts. Nichols v. Sullivan, 

867 F.2d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3169 

(1989), citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 

(1974); accord Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 749 (10th Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 373 (1989). We review only for a 

denial of federal constitutional rights. See,~, Brinlee v. 

Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 

1047 (1980). Thus, we will not question the evidentiary or 

procedural rulings of the state court unless Maxwell can show that 

the trial court's actions were so prejudicial in the context of 

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the case as a whole that she was deprived of the fundamental fairness in which the concept of due process is rooted. Nichols v. 

Sullivan, 867 F.2d at 1253. 

We have considered Maxwell's contentions with the seriousness 

appropriate to an underlying murder conviction and are unpersuaded 

that any of them so prejudiced Maxwell as to deny her a fundamentally fair trial. The district court, in an ably-written 

Memorandum Opinion of August 1, 1990, has carefully and in detail 

e xplained why each of Maxwell's arguments fail to implicate her 

constitutional rights. We agree with the substance of the court's 

reasoning and adopt it. A copy of the opinion is attached and 

incorporated by this reference. 

Because Maxwell has made no showing of the denial of an 

important federal right by demonstrating that the issues raised 

are debatable among jurists, that a court could resolve the issues 

differently, or that the questions deserve further proceedings, 

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983), the certificate of 

probable cause is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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.. _ 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA FILED 

AUG O 1 1990 

£!\GRETTA MAE MAXWELL, ) 

) 

ROBERT D. DENNIS, CLERK 

U.S. DIST. COURT, WESTERN OiST. OF OKLA 

ev ~ . DEPUTY 

Petitioner ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

WARDEN RAY and THE ATTORNEY) 

GENERA!; OF OKLAHOMA, ) 

) 

Respondents ) 

~0-{,21/ 

CIV-90-487-B 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Petitioner, proceeding pro~, brings this 28 u.s.c. §2254 

habeas petition challenging the validity of her conviction of first 

degree murder in the District Court of Lincoln County, Case No. 

CRF-82-113. The State has responded and has supplied the Court 

with relevant state court records. The matter is now at issue. 

The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not required, as the 

matter can be resolved on the basis of the record and the law. 

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree murder in 

the murder of her husband, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 

Her conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Maxwell v. State, 

742 P.2d 1165 {Okla. Crim. App. 1987). Petitioner also sought 

post-conviction relief in Lincoln County District Court, the denial 

of which was affirmed on appeal on December 21, 1989 in Case No. 

PC-89-1282. 

Petitioner's first ground for relief is essentially that the 

State did not produce enough evidence to corroborate the accomplice 

testimony of two witnesses, her daughter, Triphina Bouy, and one 

/ 

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.. _ 

Ronald Arnold. Under Oklahoma law, an indi'1idual cannot be 

convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. See 

Okla. Stat. Tit. 22 §742 (1981). on direct appeal, Petitioner 

argued that Bouy and Arnold were accomplices as a matter of law and 

that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate their testimony 

and therefore the evidence was insufficient to convict Petitioner. 

Thus, Petitioner's claim is essentially that the evidence 

introduced by the state would not connect her to the murder if the 

accomplices' testimony was eliminated. This issue was thoroughly 

addressed on direct review and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals found that there was sufficient corroborative evidence. 

We believe sufficient corroborative evidence exists here. 

Arnold testified that he received two weapons, including 

a 12-gauge shotgun from appellant to be used for payment 

to Campbell and Nickels, the men who actually performed 

the murder. He testified that, instead of selling it and 

giving the murderers cash, he gave them the guns. After 

the murder, Campbell related to him that the gun had 

discharged near the murder scene shortly before the 

victim arrived. A law enforcement official testified 

that a spent shotgun shell was found approximately 42 

feet from the body. Arnold also testified that he had 

received $800 from appellant approximately one week after 

the murder. The money was to pay off the murderers. A 

niece testified that she was with appellant approximately 

one week after the murder and remembers appellant going 

into what was identified as a mini-bank containing an 

automatic teller machine. A bank employee testified that 

appellant made withdrawals of $800 from her account eight 

days after the murder. Additionally, there is the 

testimony presented on behalf of appellant herself. A 

call was made to the Meeker Police Department that 

roughly coincides with the time Bouy testified appellant 

made such a call. The police chief testified he 

responded to the call, but could not find a body, in part 

because of thick vegetation. Appellant herself said she 

did not see a body, but knew it was there because she 

recognized her husband's white shirt. Rather than 

stopping to investigate, she proceeded directly to the 

house and notified authorities she had found the body. 

The question of whether accomplice testimony is 

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·- sufficiently corroborated can be determined· by all the 

evidence in the case, including the defendant's 

testimony; it need not be limited to the State's case in 

chief. Wampler v. State, 553 P.2d 198, 203 {Okl. Cr. 

1976). We find sufficient independent corroborative 

evidence here to support the jury's verdict. 

Maxwell v. State, 742 P.2d at 1168-1169. 

Moreover, the state law requirement of accomplice testimony 

corroboration is not a constitutional right cognizable on habeas 

review. Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th cir. 1970). 

See~' Redding v. State of Minnesota, 881 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 1158 (1990). The issue before this 

habeas court is simply whether there was sufficient evidence to 

support the conviction, and "the relevant question is whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. " 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The facts of the 

case are set forth in the published Court of Criminal Appeals 

opinion in this case and will not be repeated here. This Court is 

satisfied on review of all the evidence, including the accomplice 

testimony, that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson v. 

Virginia standard and this claim is without merit. 

Petitioner next claims that the "Trial Court erred in 

overruling Defendant's Motion for Continuance, Motion to remand for 

further preliminary hearing." In support of her claim, Petitioner 

alleges that the defense knew only twenty days prior to trial that 

the witness Triphina Bouy had recanted her earlier testimony at a 

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. ' 

bond hearing and was now prepared to testify that her mother was 

involved in the conspiracy to commit murder. This issue was also 

raised on direct appeal, and the court of Criminal Appeals found 

no abuse of discretion in denying the request for a continuance. 

In its opinion, the Court noted that: 

Bouy' s story essentially echoed Arnold's, a story for 

which appellant had over a year to prepare. Appellant's 

attorney had three weeks to prepare for Bouy' s testimony, 

and the record reflects that the attorney did an 

excellent job of cross-examining Bouy. Appellant can 

hardly claim she was surprised at trial. There was 

simply no suppression of favorable evidence -in violation 

of Brady v. Maryland, 373 u.s. 83, 83 s.ct. 1194, 10 

L. Ed. 2d 215 ( 1963) . This assignment of error is 

therefore meritless. 

Maxwell v. State, 742 P.2d at 1169-1170. 

There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of 

a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process; rather, 

each case must be viewed under the circumstances present at the 

time the request is denied. Ungar v. sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 

(1964). When denial of a continuance forms the basis of a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus, not only must there have been an abuse 

of discretion, but it must have been so arbitrary and fundamentally 

unfair that it violated constitutional principles of due process. 

Schrader v. Whitley, 904 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1990). Petitioner 

simply has not shown that there is a "reasonable probability that 

the granting of a continuance would have permitted (her) to adduce 

evidence that would have altered the verdict." Id. Nor does the 

failure to remand for a new preliminary hearing raise an issue 

cognizable in habeas. See Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103, 119 

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(1970) (absence of a preliminary hearing does not void subsequent 

conviction). 

Petitioner next claims that the trial court erred in 

overruling her motion for a mistrial. This issue was also raised 

on direct appeal. When Petitioner's daughter, Triphina Bouy, took 

the stand and was questioned about her involvement in the murder, 

she asserted her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. At that 

point, in the presence of the jury, the prosecutor moved by written 

application for an order of immunity. The trial court instructed 

the witness that she would not be prosecuted concerning the 

homicide in return for her truthful testimony, but warned her that 

a failure to testify truthfully would violate the grant of immunity 

and would subject her to penalties. Petitioner claims here, as she 

did on appeal, that the trial court's comments placed un~ue 

influence on Bouy's testimony and the jury would be compelled to 

believe her because the judge stressed that she must tell the 

truth. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that it might have been 

better practice for the judge to have granted immunity and warned 

against perjury outside_of the presence of the jury, but the Court 

held that Petitioner was not prejudiced by such comments in view 

of the trial court's instruction to the jury that rulings on the 

admissability of _ evidence or testimony in no way intimated that 

the testimony should be given any additional weight or credit. 

Petitioner has not cited and this Court has not found any authority 

for the proposition that the granting of witness immunity in the 

presence of the jury, or an admonition to testify truthfully or be 

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. 

subject to penalty raises an issue of constitutional dimension 

warranting habeas relief. Rather, it would appear to raise a claim 

of evidentiary trial error. See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 

179, 185 (1963) (claim that prosecutor's questioning of witnesses 

whose plea of privilege against self-incrimination was sustained 

raised only claim of evidentiary trial error, not a constitutional 

issue). As such, it can be the basis of habeas relief only if the 

alleged trial error deprived petitioner of a fair trial in 

violation of due process. See Brinlee v. Crisp. 608 F.2d 839, 850, 

(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980). In view of 

the fact that the trial court instructed the jury that his rulings 

on the admissability of evidence intimated no view on the weight 

to be given the evidence, Petitioner fails to show prejudice 

amounting to denial of a fair trial. Moreover, the Court takes 

note of the observation of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals: 

In the circumstances of this case, the trial court's 

admonition to the witness could as easily be construed 

as stressing the witness' propensity to lie. Having 

failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the 

exchange, appellant's contention is without merit. 

Maxwell v. State, 742 P.2d at 1170. 

The effect of these comments in context simply does not rise to the 

level of denying Petitioner a fair trial. Petitioner's claim must 

fail. 

In Ground 4 Petitioner contends that the "Court erred in 

allowing perjured testimony of Triphina Bouy who had previously 

testified under oath directly opposite of her testimony at trial." 

Petitioner's bald allegation of "perjured" testimony is based 

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... solely upon the contradictions in testimony at· various times. 

Generally, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 

their testimony are questions within the province of the jury. See 

United States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d 1018, 1019 (5th Cir. 1978), 

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) ("Presentation of a witness who 

recants or contradicts his prior testimony is not to be confused 

with eliciting perjury. It was for the jury to decide whether or 

not to credit the witness.") . It is not disputed that Petitioner's 

daughter previously testified under oath differently from her 

testimony at trial. The jury was well aware that she had 

previously testified differently as this was brought out during 

direct examination (TR-74) and she was thoroughly impeached on 

cross-examination by the defense. However, it was up to the jury 

to decide which version of the testimony they believed. 

ground is without merit. 

This 

In Ground 5, Petitioner asserts she was denied her Sixth 

Amendment right of confrontation and that the prosecution withheld 

evidence. In support of this claim, the Petitioner cites the trial 

testimony of Arnold (TR-173-193) and Bouy (TR-65-69), along with 

the "letters that jury never got to read," which were letters 

written to Triphina Bouy by Ronald Arnold while he was in jail. 

These letters were not withheld by the prosecution, but were 

excluded at trial. The prosecution objected to their admission as 

irrelevant and these objections were sustained. In regards to this 

issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated on direct appeal: 

Appellant claims that the letters would show that Arnold 

received special treatment during his incarceration in 

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•. 

exchange for testimony against appellant .... •. The letters 

related instances where Arnold was allegedly allowed 

sexual contact with Bouy while in jail, and instances 

where the two supposedly discussed the case. Such 

evidence would not be relevant to whether the appellant 

participated in the murder of her husband. See 12 O.S. 

1981 §2401, 2402. In any event, appellant's attorney was 

allowed to use the contents of the letter to impeach the 

witness, and the record indicates he used them 

effectively. Thus appellant can show no prejudice by the 

trial court's refusal to allow the jury to actually 

examine the letters. 

Maxwell, 742 P.2d at 1170. These findings of fact are entitled to 

a presumption of correctness under 28 u.s.c. §2254(d); Sumner v. 

Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982). It is undisputed that the letters were 

used to impeach Bouy and Arnold, who were both thoroughly crossexamined. Petitioner's claim of a denial of the right of 

confrontation is conclusory and totally without support in the 

record. In any event the state court's ruling on the admissability 

of the letters is a matter of state law. For a federal habeas 

court to grant relief based on state court evidentiary rulings, the 

rulings must "render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to 

constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights." Hopkinson 

v. Schillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 

_U.S. __ (June 25, 1990), quoting Brinlee v. Crisp. 608 F.2d 

839, 850 ( 10th Cir. 1979) , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 104 7 ( 1980) • 

Petitioner simply makes no showing that the trial court's ruling 

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, amounting to a denial of 

due process. 

The Court notes that Petitioner has also named ·the Attorney 

General of Oklahoma as a party Respondent. However, since the 

Petitioner is presently in custody pursuant to the state judgment 

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• 

• 

... 

challenged herein, the state officer having custody of the 

applicant is the only proper respondent. Rule 2, Rules Governing 

§2254 Cases. Accordingly, the Attorney General of Oklahoma is also 

entitled to dismissal for this reason. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus is without merit and is denied. A judgment shall enter 

accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 

LUTHER L. BOHANON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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