Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01156/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rochelle Lucas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

• 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FILED 

Unitlld !it•ttt Court of Appeals •renth Circuit 

JUL l Ll 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1156 

ROCHELLE LUCAS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D. Colo. No. 90-CR-56) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS, District 

Judge.** 

The defendant-appellant pled guilty to possessing with the 

intent to distribute in excess of 50 grams of crack cocaine. She 

reserved her right to appeal the issue of whether the district 

court erred when it denied her motion to suppress both her 

confession as well as the crack cocaine itself. We have reviewed 

the decision of the district court and have found it to be without 

error. Therefore, we AFFIRM. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 

** The Honorable Dale E. Saffels, United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-1156 Document: 010110128875 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 1 
• 

FACTS 

On February 7, 1990, at approximately 11:00 P.M., two 

officers, assigned to monitor late-night outbound flights at Los 

Angeles International Airport, observed the defendant purchasing a 

one-way ticket from Los Angeles to Denver. The flight was to 

leave on February 8, the following morning. For a number of 

reasons, none of which are germane to the issues raised in this 

appeal, the officers' suspicions were aroused, and they notified 

officials at Denver's Stapleton Airport. 

The next morning in Denver, two officers, Fetrow and 

Fortunato, watched for the defendant to deplane. After the 

defendant deplaned, the officers followed her towards the exit. 

The defendant walked past the baggage claim area toward the 

passenger drop-off area. The officers approached the defendant 

approximately forty to fifty feet in front of the exit door. They 

told her that they were narcotics officers and that they would 

like to talk to her for a few minutes. According to the officers, 

they made it clear to her that she was free to leave at any time. 

They asked her if they could search her purse and she agreed. 

Finally, they asked her if she would consent to a search of her 

person. Once again, she agreed. She followed the officers to the 

airport security offices. The officers introduced the defendant 

to a female officer who had agreed to search her. Just before the 

search was to begin, the defendant confessed to the female officer 

that she was carrying cocaine. The officers Mirandized her, and 

she was placed under arrest. 

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The defendant filed a motion to suppress her confession as 

well as the cocaine. The United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado held a hearing and denied her motion. The 

defendant agreed to plead guilty so long as she retained the right 

to appeal the district court's decision to deny her suppression 

motion. The district court accepted her guilty plea and sentenced 

her to a 151 month prison term. The defendant then appealed to 

this court. 

DISCUSSION 

When reviewing on appeal the denial of a motion to suppress, 

we review the district court's findings of antecedent facts for 

clear error. United States v. Berryhill, 880 F.2d 275, 280 (10th 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 853 (1990). We review the 

district court's legal conclusions under the de novo standard. In 

re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by simply 

asking individuals whether they are willing to answer questions. 

United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959, 965 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 2618 (1990). The Fourth Amendment is not 

implicated when an officer asks an individual her permission to 

search her belongings or her clothing, so long as the officer 

makes it clear to the individual that she has no obligation to 

consent and is free to leave. Cf. id. (where the officers told 

the defendant that he did not need to consent to a search, the 

officers did not need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to 

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ask the defendant his permission to search his bag or his jacket 

pockets). 

The defendant admits that she voluntarily consented to the 

search of her purse. However, she claims that the officers did 

not explain to her that she was not obligated to consent to the 

search of her person. The officers, on the other hand, claim that 

they did indeed explain to the defendant that she had no 

obligation to consent to a search of her person. The district 

court made the following findings of fact: 

The officers testified and the Court will find as 

fact that he made clear to Ms. Lucas that at this time 

she was not under arrest, that he understood that it was 

not a violation of the law to travel under an assumed 

name, and that she was free to leave at any time if she 

wished. 

The officer asked if Ms. Lucas would permit a 

search of her purse, and she consented. Officer 

Fortunato did a cursory search of the person, returned 

it -- of the purse and returned it to Ms. Lucas. 

In any event they found nothing in the purse, but 

being still suspicious, Ms. Lucas was asked if a 

policewoman could search her, and was again told that 

she was -- could refuse the search and free to go. 

And was told that the search could be made in a 

private place. And Ms. Lucas consented. 

Again up to this point in time, and at all times 

relevant, the evidence is really not in conflict 

whatsoever that the demeanor of the officers was not 

threatening, that there was not show of weapons; that 

all the officers, including Linda Piedra, were in plain 

clothes; that there were not threats made, there were 

not promises made, no inducements or show of force of 

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Appellate Case: 90-1156 Document: 010110128875 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 4 
any kind. There was no intonation in any of the 

individual voices that would be threatening. 

Tr. Vol. II at 170-72. Therefore, if we find that the district 

court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, we must, 

under Bell, reject her Fourth Amendment claim. 

There is ample evidence in the record to support the district 

court's factual findings. Michael Fetrow, one of the two Denver 

police officers who first talked with the defendant, testified 

that the defendant was told on numerous occasions that she was not 

under arrest and that she was free to go. Id. at 34. Fetrow 

testified that when the defendant was asked for her permission to 

search her person, she was told "that she was free to go, and she 

said she understood and that was not a problem." Id. at 38. See 

also id. at 41 & 47. Officer Fortunato's testimony was in accord. 

See id. at 75. Although the defendant disagreed and testified 

that she was not told that she could refuse to have her person 

searched, see id. at 106, 107, 108, 117-18, 119, 125, 129, the 

district court was free to and apparently did reject her 

testimony. See United States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1417 

(10th Cir. 1987). After carefully reviewing the record, we are 

unable to hold that the district court was clearly erroneous in 

making its factual finding that the defendant consented to the 

police officers' request that they be allowed to search her 

person. Therefore, we AFFIRM. 

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... 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed each of the defendant's claims and have 

found each of them to be without merit. Therefore, the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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