Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01718/USCOURTS-ca13-24-01718-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terry R. Chapman
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Office of Personnel Management
Intervenor

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

TERRY R. CHAPMAN,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,

Intervenor

______________________

2024-1718

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. PH-0841-17-0440-I-1.

______________________

Decided: January 17, 2025

______________________

TERRY R. CHAPMAN, Baltimore, MD, pro se. 

 DEANNA SCHABACKER, Office of the General Counsel, 

United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ALLISON JANE 

BOYLE, KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH. 

 JOSHUA N. SCHOPF, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

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2 CHAPMAN v. MSPB

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, for intervenor. Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.

 ______________________

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE and STARK, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Terry R. Chapman appeals from the final order of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing his 

petition for review as untimely. See Chapman v. Off. of 

Pers. Mgmt., No. PH-0841-17-0440-I-1, 2024 WL 1174194

(M.S.P.B. March 18, 2024). We affirm.

I

From 1992 until his resignation in 2005, Mr. Chapman 

was employed by the Social Security Administration 

(“SSA”). When he resigned from SSA, Mr. Chapman signed

and submitted a form entitled “Application for Refund of 

Retirement Deductions – Federal Employees Retirement 

System [(“FERS”)],” which included the following “Applicant Certification”: “I understand that payment of a refund 

will result in permanent forfeiture of any retirement rights 

that are based on the period(s) of [FERS] service which the 

refund covers . . . .” App’x 90.1 Later in 2005, the government refunded the “full balance of [Mr. Chapman’s] employee retirement contributions.” App’x 37.

In 2017, Mr. Chapman applied for retirement benefits 

under FERS. The Office of Personnel Management 

(“OPM”) thereafter issued a decision finding Mr. Chapman 

ineligible for FERS retirement benefits because he had, 

back in 2005, sought and received a refund of his 

1 “App’x” refers to the appendix filed by the Board

(ECF No. 26).

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CHAPMAN v. MSPB 3

retirement deductions. In September 2017, Mr. Chapman 

appealed OPM’s decision to the Board, stating that, when 

he resigned his position, he had been told by SSA to “fill 

out all the forms in the [separation] package” and was unaware that the form at issue would prevent him from collecting FERS benefits. App’x 82.2 At the bottom of one 

page attached to his filing with the Board, Mr. Chapman 

wrote “Discrimination for being protected” and on another 

page he added “I was not treated with Protected Status: As 

A Military Veteran.” App’x 72, 64.

During a subsequent hearing with a Board administrative judge, Mr. Chapman sought to withdraw his appeal 

against OPM. The administrative judge found Mr. Chapman’s request was “clear, decisive and unequivocal” and 

granted it, dismissing his case. App’x 13. The Board’s decision included a notice that it would become final on January 12, 2018, unless Mr. Chapman filed a petition for 

review before that deadline. Id.

In May 2018, Mr. Chapman submitted a filing with the 

Board, stating that he had not intended to withdraw his 

claim. In this document Mr. Chapman also referred to 

“Discrimination for being protected or other veteran’s 

rights.” J.A. 60. The Board construed Mr. Chapman’s 2018 

filing as a petition for review of the administrative judge’s

initial decision to dismiss. On May 24, 2018, the Clerk of 

the Board notified Mr. Chapman that his petition appeared 

to be untimely but he could file a motion requesting that 

the Board accept his petition as timely or that it waive the 

time limit for good cause. Mr. Chapman thereafter filed 

such a motion, explaining, among other circumstances, 

that he had been having problems with the postal service 

and had been “adjusting to the change from prescription 

medications to acupuncture for sickness.” App’x 41. He 

2 Mr. Chapman later alleged he had been “misle[]d 

or misinformed” as to the form he signed in 2005. App’x 40.

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4 CHAPMAN v. MSPB

also stated that “due to the wording of the . . . hearing”

with the administrative judge, he understood he should file 

a new claim with the SSA, and only “after months of correspondence” was he “told that [he had] no recourse” at SSA. 

App’x 39-40.

In its March 18, 2024 final order, the Board found that 

Mr. Chapman failed to show good cause for his untimely 

filing. Additionally, the Board observed that “absent unusual circumstances, such as misinformation or new and 

material evidence, the Board will not reopen an appeal 

once it has been withdrawn.” App’x 4. The Board denied 

Mr. Chapman’s petition to reopen his withdrawn appeal, 

finding he had failed to show “that he received misinformation sufficient to warrant reopening the appeal.” 

App’x 5.

Mr. Chapman timely appealed the Board’s final order 

to this court. In addition to a Notice of Appeal, Mr. Chapman filed a Federal Circuit Rule 15(c) Statement Concerning Discrimination (“Form 10”), in which he indicated he 

had raised a claim of discrimination with the Board and did 

not wish to abandon that claim on review. ECF No. 5.

II

We begin by assessing whether we have jurisdiction to 

review Mr. Chapman’s appeal. “In general, we do not have 

jurisdiction over mixed cases in which a federal employee 

complains of having suffered a serious adverse personnel 

action appealable to the Board and attributes the adverse 

action to bias prohibited by certain federal antidiscrimination laws listed in 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1).” McCoy v. Merit 

Sys. Prot. Bd., 121 F.4th 204, 207 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (internal 

punctuation omitted). 

On May 24, 2024, we issued an order directing the parties to show cause why this case should not be dismissed or 

transferred. The Board and OPM responded that our court 

had jurisdiction. Mr. Chapman responded that his 

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CHAPMAN v. MSPB 5

discrimination claims were related to his wrongful termination claim, which is not at issue in this appeal. Mr. 

Chapman’s failure to argue against the Board’s and OPM’s 

position suggests he believes we have jurisdiction. 

On June 18, 2024, we ordered the parties to address 

jurisdiction in their briefs. They have done so. The Board 

and OPM repeat their earlier arguments that we have jurisdiction, citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9). Mr. Chapman’s position is somewhat less 

clear. However, he does not seek to transfer his case or

identify a district court in which his case could proceed, 

leading us to believe his position is also that we have jurisdiction to decide this case.

We have determined that we do have jurisdiction here. 

Although Mr. Chapman has both (i) challenged an appealable OPM action – its final decision dismissing his request 

for FERS benefits – and (ii) alleged discrimination, he has 

not alleged that the discrimination is “a basis for” the challenged, appealable action. Instead, his filings with OPM, 

the Board, and us contain only general references to discrimination, without any effort to tie that alleged discrimination to the OPM decision we are asked to review. 

Therefore, Mr. Chapman’s appeal is not a “mixed case” that 

falls outside of our appellate jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(2) (excluding certain “cases of discrimination” 

from our jurisdiction under § 7702). As the government 

further points out, the only references Mr. Chapman 

makes to discrimination are based on his status as a military veteran, which is not a type of discrimination that may 

give rise to a mixed case in this context. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7702(a)(1) (listing types of discrimination that make a 

case a “mixed case” and not including discrimination based 

on military veteran status).

Thus, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over this 

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

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6 CHAPMAN v. MSPB

III

Turning to the merits, we affirm the Board’s judgment. 

Mr. Chapman has not shown that the Board’s judgment 

was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law; obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or unsupported by substantial evidence.” 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(1)–(3).

“[W]hether the regulatory time limit for an appeal 

should be waived based upon a showing of good cause is a 

matter committed to the Board’s discretion and this court 

will not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board.” 

Mendoza v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 966 F.2d 650, 653 (Fed. 

Cir. 1992) (en banc). In determining whether good cause 

to excuse the untimeliness of an appeal has been shown, 

the Board is free to consider:

the length of the delay; whether appellant was notified of the time limit or was otherwise aware of it; 

the existence of circumstances beyond the control 

of the appellant which affected his ability to comply 

with the time limits; the degree to which negligence 

by the appellant has been shown to be present or 

absent; circumstances which show that any neglect 

involved is excusable neglect; a showing of unavoidable casualty or misfortune; and the extent and 

nature of the prejudice to the agency which would 

result from waiver of the time limit. 

Herring v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 778 F.3d 1011, 1013-14 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Notably, none of those 

criteria include the merits of the underlying case.

Mr. Chapman has failed to identify any fact or set of 

facts that would have required the Board to find good cause 

to excuse his untimely appeal. See J.A. 3-4 (Board considering Mr. Chapman’s four-month delay in filing, pro se status, alleged difficulties with postal service, and medical 

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CHAPMAN v. MSPB 7

treatments). Instead, he focuses on the merits of the underlying case, which – no matter how strong they may be, 

an issue we do not address – cannot, alone, establish good 

cause. 

Additionally, despite finding it untimely, the Board 

considered and denied Mr. Chapman’s petition to reopen 

his appeal. Mr. Chapman’s allegation that the administrative judge advised him his dispute was with SSA, the Board 

found, did not mean that “the administrative judge informed him that he had to withdraw his appeal against 

OPM in order to pursue an action against SSA.” App’x 5. 

We see no error in the Board’s determination that no evidence demonstrated Mr. Chapman had been misinformed. 

We have considered Mr. Chapman’s remaining arguments and find they lack merit and do not require discussion. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the 

judgment of the Board is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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