Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00045/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00045-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Heather Stanley
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

ANGELA SCOTT

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

HEATHER STANLEY,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00045 NONE-SKO

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

(Doc. 19)

STIPULATION

This case is set for status conference on June 15, 2020. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until further 

notice, and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters. This and previous General Orders

were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

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or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant

HEATHER STANLEY, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, David Torres, hereby stipulate as 

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 15, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until 

September 14, 2020, and to exclude time between June 15, 2020, and September 14, 2020, under Local 

Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes thousands of pages of reports, photographs, and evidence obtained pursuant to an email 

search warrant. This discovery has been produced directly to counsel.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review 

the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and 

copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial 

motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 15, 2020 to September 14, 

2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4], because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the 

basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the 

best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

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must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: June 11, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ ANGELA SCOTT

ANGELA SCOTT

Assistant United States Attorney

 Dated: June 11, 2020

[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

The Court finds that the discovery associated with this case is substantial and the defense desires

additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and 

research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential 

resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. The Court finds 

also that the failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the defense the reasonable 

time necessary for effective preparation, considering the exercise of due diligence. Based on these 

findings and the fact the government does not object to the continuance, the ends of justice are served by 

continuing the case as requested and they outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial 

within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

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/s/ per email authorization

DAVID A. TORRES

Counsel for Defendant

HEATHER STANLEY

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The status conference currently set on June 15, 2020 is CONTINUED to September 14, 2020 at 

2:30 p.m. The Court excludes time between June 15, 2020, and September 14, 2020, under Local Code 

T4. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 11, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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