Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02641/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02641-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
L.L. Bean, Inc.
Defendant
William A. Shirley
Plaintiff

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WILLIAM A. SHIRLEY, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

L.L. BEAN, INC., 

Defendant.

CASE NO. 18-cv-02641-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND 

Re: Dkt. No. 67 

Plaintiff William A. Shirley brings the instant class action complaint for breach of contract, 

unjust enrichment, violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 1750), violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), 

violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. § 2301), and for declaratory relief. 

Defendant L.L. Bean Inc. previously moved to dismiss the complaint, which motion the Court 

granted with leave to amend. Shirley filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) thereafter. 

(Dkt. No. 60.) Defendant has again moved to dismiss the complaint, urging that Shirley (i) has no 

standing and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction and (ii) has failed to allege facts sufficient to 

state his claims. (Dkt. No. 67.) 

Having carefully considered the pleadings and the arguments in support of and in 

opposition to the motion, and for the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The FAC alleges that Shirley has been a customer of L.L. Bean since he was six years old 

and that he has seen many advertisements touting its “100% Satisfaction Guarantee” in catalogs 

and in stores. (Id. ¶ 8.) He alleges that he purchased numerous items from L.L. Bean by phone 

and on its website, and that he made a purchase as recently as November 2017. (Id.) He further 

alleges that he “paid more for L.L. Bean’s products than he otherwise would have because of its 

100% Satisfaction Guarantee and has used the Guarantee at times when items he purchased were 

unsatisfactory. (Id.) 

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Shirley alleges that, since 1912, defendant L.L. Bean has provided a “100% Satisfaction 

Guarantee,” a commitment to “to exchange or replace items if a customer determined that the item 

was not “completely satisfactory.” (FAC ¶ 1.) Defendant’s advertising stated: 

Our products are guaranteed to give 100% satisfaction in every way. Return 

anything purchased from us at any time if it proves otherwise. We do not want 

you to have anything from L.L. Bean that is not completely satisfactory. 

(Id. ¶ 12.) L.L. Bean’s catalogs and other advertising described the guarantee as “100% 

Guarantee / No Fine Print / No Restrictions,” “No Conditions [¶] No End Date,” and “Guaranteed 

to Last.” (Id. ¶ 18.) One iteration included a weathered-looking, printed statement reading: 

NOTICE 

I DO NOT CONSIDER A SALE 

COMPLETE UNTIL GOODS ARE 

WORN OUT AND CUSTOMER 

STILL SATISFIED. 

L.L. BEAN, 1916 

(Id.) Shirley alleges that one of the things that made the 100% Satisfaction Guarantee valuable 

and unique was that it did not exclude wear and tear like a typical warranty, but instead promised 

customers that “if something’s not . . . lasting as long as you think it should, we’ll take it back.” 

(Id. ¶ 27, Exh. A at LLBEAN(1)_0000031984.) 

Nonetheless, from August 2014 to September 2017, the company made a number of 

revisions to its return policy,1 including: 

August 2014  receipt required for returns of items missing labels or with labels marked 

with an “X” 

 soiled or contaminated items not accepted for return 

 items not purchased directly from the company not accepted for return 

 requiring valid ID for returns without a receipt 

January 2016  Adding the language: “we may either require a receipt or decline a return” 

in certain circumstances, including “the nature of prior transactions” 

November 2016  Not accepting returns of “[i]tems lost or damaged due to fire, flood, or 

natural disaster”

September 2017  Not accepting returns of items lost or damaged due to accidents (including 

pet damage) 

 Not accepting returns of “items returned for personal reasons unrelated to 

product satisfaction” 

 1

 (See id., Exh. A. LLBean(1)_0000031979-1984.) 

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Then, on February 9, 2018, L.L. Bean announced that it was changing its satisfaction 

guarantee and revising its return policy. The new satisfaction guarantee was limited to one year 

from the date of purchase (Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.) The updated return policy required proof of purchase for 

all returns. The return policy on L.L. Bean’s website was changed to read: 

If you are not 100% satisfied with one of our products, you may return it 

within one year of purchase for a refund. After one year, we will consider any 

items for return that are defective due to materials or craftsmanship. We 

require proof of purchase to honor a refund or exchange. If you provide us your 

information when you check out, we will typically have a record of your 

purchase. Otherwise, we require a physical receipt. 

Please include your proof of purchase with the products you wish to return or 

exchange and bring it with you to any of our stores, or include it in your 

package of returned item(s). We will reimburse the original purchase price to 

either your original method of payment or as a merchandise credit. 

Special Conditions 

To protect all our customers and make sure that we handle every return or 

exchange with reasonable fairness, we cannot accept a return or exchange 

(even within one year of purchase) in certain situations, including: 

 Products damaged by misuse, abuse, improper care or 

negligence, or accidents (including pet damage) 

 Products showing excessive wear and tear 

 Products lost or damaged due to fire, flood, or natural disaster 

 Products with a missing label or label that has been defaced 

 Products returned for personal reasons unrelated to product 

performance or satisfaction 

 Products that have been soiled or contaminated, until they have

been properly cleaned 

 Returns on ammunition either in our stores or through the mail 

 On rare occasions, past habitual abuse of our Return Policy 

(Id. ¶ 24.) Shirley further alleges that L.L. Bean trained employees to go beyond those stated 

conditions and deny returns of any items it could not resell. (Id. ¶ 28.) 

Based upon these changes, Shirley alleges that L.L. Bean “rescinded its 100% Satisfaction 

Guarantee for purchases made prior to February 9, 2018, [and] denied proper returns in retail 

outlets across the country on that basis.” (Id. ¶ 33.) However, Shirley concedes that, on April 5, 

2018, L.L. Bean modified the new satisfaction guarantee on its website to state that products 

purchased prior to February 9, 2018, would not be subject to the one-year limit. (Id. ¶ 32.) 

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Shirley nevertheless alleges that he did not receive the benefits of the bargain promised and 

overpaid for the products he purchased. (Id. ¶ 34.) Shirley thus brings claims on behalf of himself 

and “[a]ll persons in the United States and its territories who purchased, other than for resale, 

products from L.L. Bean prior to February 9, 2018,” including a subclass of such persons in the 

State of California. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 36.) 

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) tests the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. 

See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 

541 U.S. 1009 (2004). A challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. See White 

v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial attack, the jurisdictional challenge is 

confined to the allegations pleaded in the complaint. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 

(9th Cir. 2004). While the plaintiff bears the burden to establish jurisdiction, on a facial challenge 

the court assumes the allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the party opposing dismissal. Id.

III. DISCUSSION 

Defendant moves to dismiss the FAC under Rule 12(b)(1) on the grounds that Shirley has 

not established standing. Article III of the United States Constitution provides that federal courts 

may only adjudicate “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To establish standing 

under Article III, “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable 

to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __U.S.__, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), citing Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). Defendant contends that Shirley has not 

alleged a concrete injury. The Court agrees. 

Shirley alleges that he was denied the benefit of the guarantee under which he purchased 

products in November 2017. However, as Shirley alleges, the new one-year limitation on the 

Satisfaction Guarantee does not apply to purchases, like Shirley’s, made before February 9, 2018. 

The only “new” policies applicable to Shirley’s alleged purchase would consist of any changes in 

the return policy. Exhibit A of the FAC details the timeline of changes in defendant’s return 

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policy. Comparing those prior iterations of L.L. Bean’s return policy to the one announced 

February 9, 2018, the only significant2 differences between it and the policy in effect at the time of

Shirley’s purchase are that returns can be declined for damage caused by: “misuse, abuse, 

improper care, or negligence”3 or “excessive wear and tear.” While Shirley alleges that defendant 

trained employees to go beyond the policy in interpreting “excessive wear and tear,” the document 

Shirley attaches as Exhibit K to the FAC states that “excessive wear and tear” is to be used when 

“misuse, abuse, improper care, or negligence” does not apply, but the product has been used so 

much that it is beyond its useful life and in a condition known as “destroy/trash.” (FAC Exh. K.) 

“‘[W]here a contract confers on one party a discretionary power affecting the rights of the 

other, a duty is imposed to exercise that discretion in good faith and in accordance with fair 

dealing.’” Locke v. Warner Bros., 57 Cal. App. 4th 354, 363–64 (1997) quoting Perdue v. Crocker 

National Bank, 38 Cal.3d 913, 923 (1985). When the agreement concerns “matters of fancy, taste 

or judgment,” while a subjective standard of honest satisfaction is applicable, the assertion of 

dissatisfaction nevertheless must be made in good faith. Id.; see 1 Witkin, SUMMARY OF 

CALIFORNIA LAW (11th Edition), Contracts § 807 (aa) (2018); Uniform Commercial Code § 1-

304, (“[e]very contract or duty ... imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and 

enforcement”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (“Every contract imposes upon each 

party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”). Implicit in 

defendant’s Satisfaction Guarantee—a promise to refund customers who are not satisfied with 

their products—is a reciprocal requirement that customers seek refunds under the guarantee in 

good faith. By their very terms, misuse, abuse, improper care, negligence and excessive wear and 

tear all signify that a customer’s return is for reasons other than a good faith lack of satisfaction 

with the product. Logically then, the addition of these reasons to the return policy did not change 

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 Shirley also complains that the proof of purchase requirement is new. However, all the 

prior iterations of the return policy alleged permitted L.L. Bean to require proof of purchase. 

Making it a regular requirement is not a significant change. 

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 Arguably, “negligence” was not a new provision either. The prior iteration of the policy 

permitted defendant to decline a return where damage was due to “accidents.” (FAC Exh. A at 

LLBean(1)_0000031984.) 

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the Satisfaction Guarantee at all, and therefore did not lessen the value of the product he 

purchased. L.L. Bean was always entitled to ask for proof of purchase and always entitled to 

reject a refund request that was not made in good faith. Thus, Shirley does not allege facts to 

show that he was denied the benefit of his bargain or that he overpaid for an illusory or voidable 

promise.4 

In sum, the FAC alleges that: (1) L.L. Bean extended the satisfaction guarantee for 

customers like Shirley, who purchased before the one-year limit was announced; (2) the current 

return policy differs from the one in effect at the time of his purchase only in the addition of types 

of damage outside the realm of good faith dissatisfaction. Shirley alleges no current, concrete 

injury. At best, Shirley alleges a hypothetical future harm that would arise if he attempts to return 

an item he purchased before February 2018, and L.L. Bean denies the return for reasons other than

those in the current return policy. Such speculative injuries do not establish standing. Schmier v. 

U.S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (“plaintiff must have 

sustained a ‘concrete’ injury, ‘distinct and palpable . . . as opposed to merely abstract’” and that 

the “injury must have actually occurred or must occur imminently; hypothetical, speculative or 

other ‘possible future’ injuries do not count in the standings calculus” (quoting Whitmore v. 

Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Shirley has failed to establish Article III 

jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss on these grounds is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

and this action is DISMISSED. 

This Order terminates Docket No. 67.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 14, 2019 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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 Shirley’s citation to Dubuisson v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Co., 887 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 

2018), where standing was established by plaintiff’s payment of several years’ insurance 

premiums on a policy terminated due to the insurer’s failure to obtain regulatory approval, is 

unavailing. Shirley was not denied the benefit of a promise for which he paid consideration. 

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