Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04508/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04508-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Camron Ballesteros
Plaintiff
Brentwood Union School District
Defendant
Constance Forrest
Defendant
Adam Hirsch
Plaintiff
Dina Holder
Defendant
Lauri James
Defendant
Margaret Kruse
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM HIRSCH and CAMRON

BALLESTEROS,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

BRENTWOOD UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,

DINA HOLDER, CONSTANCE FORREST,

MARGARET KRUSE, LAURI JAMES, and

DOES 1-30,

Defendants. /

No. C 15-04508 JSW

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS

Now before the Court is the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Brentwood Union School

District (“Brentwood District”), Constance Forrest, Margaret Kruse, and Lauri James (all defendants

except Dina Holder, hereinafter “Moving Defendants”). Having carefully reviewed the parties’

papers, considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the Court hereby DENIES the

motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

According the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Adam Hirsch and Camron Ballesteros were

students in defendant Dina Holder’s class in the Brentwood District during the school years 1998-

1999 and 2001-2002, respectively. (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 11, 12, 22, 35.) Plaintiffs allege that

Holder was a special education teacher in the Brentwood District from 1996 through 2012 and that

during that time, she subjected her students, all of whom suffered from developmental and language

delays due to disabilities, to ongoing physical, verbal, and psychological abuse. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12, 

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23.) 

Plaintiff Adam was a three-year-old preschooler at the time he was placed in Holder’s 

classroom. He had been diagnosed with septo-optic dyspasia, panhypopituitarism, and Asperger’s

syndrome. (Id. at ¶¶ 21, 22.) Among other charges, Plaintiff alleges that Holder subjected him to

physical abuse such as pulling him around the classroom by his arm, frequently picking him up in

his chair and carrying him around and them dropping him and his chair to floor, thereby injuring

him. Adam also alleges that on one occasion, Holder dumped juice on his head, and left him in

sticky clothes for the rest of the day because he was unable to drink out of a regular cup. (Id. at ¶¶

25-27.) Holder frequently made Adam sit in a chair facing the wall, sometimes for most of the day,

and would hit Adam on the head if he turned around to see that was happening in the classroom. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.) Adam’s parents complained and he was removed from the classroom. Adam still

suffers from trauma as a result of his exposure to Holder’s classroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-33.) 

Plaintiff Camron was a five-year-old student in Holder’s class diagnosed with autism

spectrum disorder, a specific learning disability (reading and writing), and borderline intellectual

functioning. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Camron alleges that he was subjected to frequent timeouts for extended

periods of time, occasionally slammed him in a chair, injuring him, and that Holder intentionally

withheld his medications on multiple occasions. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-39.) 

Plaintiffs allege that the Moving Defendants knew about the unhealthy educational

environment and failed to respond to complaints of abuse. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-16.) Plaintiffs further allege

that Brentwood District’s training of its employees was inadequate. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16.) 

Plaintiffs allege three causes of action for: (1) violation of constitutional rights under the

Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the individual defendants; (2)

discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act against Brentwood District; and

(3) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 against Brentwood District. The

Moving Defendants seek dismissal of all three causes of action.

The Court shall address additional relevant facts in the remainder of this order.

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ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard Governing Motion to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the 

pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court’s “inquiry is limited to

the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). Even under the

liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s obligation to

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 

Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable but must

instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If the allegations are insufficient to

state a claim, a court should grant leave to amend, unless amendment would be futile. See, e.g.,

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990); Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N.

Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). 

As a general rule, “a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled

on other grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted). However, documents subject to judicial notice may be considered on a motion to dismiss. 

In doing so, the Court does not convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. See Mack

v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by

Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991). The Court may review matters

that are in the public record, including pleadings, orders and other papers filed in court. See id.

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B. Claim for Relief for Violation of Constitutional Rights.

In their first claim for relief, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Holder violated Plaintiffs’ rights

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by actions utilizing unjustified and

unreasonable force against them. (Amended Complaint at ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs allege that the Moving

Defendants violated their constitutional rights protected by the Fourth Amendment by acting with

deliberate indifference to the risk of harm to Plaintiffs and for the individuals’ personal participation

in the deprivation of civil rights by their failure to act in response to the allegations of serious child

abuse by Holder. (Id. at ¶ 43.) 

Moving Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action because they have

not alleged an actionable unconstitutional search or seizure against them. The Fourth Amendment

proscribes “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV; Allen v. City of Portland,

73 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995). Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional

acquisition of physical control. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). A seizure “in

the constitutional sense . . . occurs when there is a restraint on liberty to the degree that a reasonable

person would not feel free to leave.” Doe v. Hawaii Department of Education, 334 F.3d 906, 909

(9th Cir. 2003). 

In the context of a school setting, “[w]e begin with the principle ‘that excess force by a

[school official] against a student violate[s] the student’s constitutional rights.’” Preschooler II v.

Clark County School Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting P.B. v. Koch, 96

F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1996)). “The consequences of a teacher’s force against a student at

school are generally analyzed under the ‘reasonableness’ rubric of the Fourth Amendment, although

historically courts applied substantive due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment’s

‘shock the conscience’ test.” See id. (citing Doe, 334 F.3d at 908-09) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,

469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)) (applying the Fourth Amendment in the school context, requiring

reasonableness to be assessed “in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the

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 Moving Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs may not state a claim for violation of the

substantive due process afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs do not set out such a claim

in their complaint and make no argument in opposition to the motion to dismiss that it was their

intention to state such a claim.

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infraction,” and explaining the movement from substantive due process to Fourth Amendment

review).1

Here, Plaintiffs allege in the Amended Complaint that Holder physically and verbally abused

them when they were three and five years old and suffering from severe disabilities. (Amended

Complaint ¶¶ 18, 21, 23, 25-29, 34, 38-40.) Such alleged conduct included daily exposure to verbal

and physical abuse, dumping juice on Plaintiff Adam’s head and leaving him in sticky clothes for the

rest of the day because he was unable to drink out of a regular cup, pulling Adam around forcefully

by his arm, frequently picking him up in his chair and carrying him around at chest level and then

dropping him and the chair to the floor, causing injury, as well as placing Adam in the corner for

most of the day and hitting him on the head when he turned toward his fellow students. (Id. at ¶¶ 20,

23, 25-29.) Plaintiff Camron alleges that Holder intentionally withheld medications on multiple

occasions, occasionally picked him up and slammed him into his chair, and frequently held Camron

in timeouts for extended periods of time. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-39.) Plaintiffs allege this abusive treatment

occurred repeatedly over an extended period of time. (Id. at ¶¶ 23, 35, 36.) The Court finds

unpersuasive Moving Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs fail to allege that the force used by

Holder “constituted or resulted in any restriction on the children’s movement beyond the restriction

inherent in every-day school attendance.” (Motion at 7.) The Court finds that, at this procedural

stage, Plaintiffs have set out sufficient facts to meet the threshold showing that Holder’s physical

and verbal abuse was not reasonable “in light of Plaintiffs’ age and disability and the context of the

events.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1180. Where, in school cases, the Ninth Circuit has applied the

objectively unreasonable under the circumstances standard under the Fourth Amendment, the Court

does not find that the allegations on their face comprise a reasonable seizure of Plaintiffs in light of

educational objectives. See Doe, 334 F.3d at 909. Rather, the Court finds, as alleged by Plaintiffs,

the conduct was “excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student[s] and the nature of

the infraction.” Id. (citing New Jersey, 469 U.S. at 342). 

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Accordingly, Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for

violation of constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 is

DENIED.

C. Claims for Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act.

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) provides that “no qualified

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded form participation in or

be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall, solely

by reason of his handicap, be excluded form participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29

U.S.C. § 794. Title II of the ADA was expressly modeled after Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act and the Court analyzes the claims together, as there is no significant difference in the analysis of

rights and obligations created by the two acts. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135

(9th Cir. 2002); Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1055 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

In order to allege a cause of action for discrimination in violation of the ADA and Section

504, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that he is disabled and that the discrimination

was “by reason of” (or in the case of Section 504, “solely by reason of”) his disability. See 42

U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794; see also E.R.K. ex rel. R.K. v. Hawaii Department of Education,

728 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff must show that the discrimination was intentional

or motivated by discriminatory animus, including if it involved an element of deliberate indifference,

defined as “knowledge that a harm to federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to

act on that likelihood.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138-39. The failure to act must be more than mere

negligence, but rather must involve “an element of deliberateness.” Id.

Moving Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to state claims under the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act because they fail to allege that any discrimination was by reason of the minor

plaintiffs’ disabilities. However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have proffered sufficient allegations

that Holder’s abusive behavior was motivated by discriminatory animus. Plaintiff Adam alleges that

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Holder dumped juice on his head and left him in sticky wet clothes all day “because he was unable

to drink out of a regular cup.” (Amended Complaint ¶ 25.) The fact that Adams was unable to drink

out of a regular cup is a symptom of his disability. Plaintiff Camron alleges that Holder

intentionally withheld his medications on multiple occasions. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Ostensibly, the

medications were necessary as a result of Camron’s disability. Plaintiffs allege that “Holder’s

actions were clearly motivated by obvious animus toward” them. (Id. at ¶ 48.) Plaintiffs allege that

Holder “directed epithets toward the Plaintiffs cursing at them and denigrating their intelligence and

their disabilities.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that the Moving Defendants did not act to end the

abuse once the parents of Plaintiffs informed them of it. (See id. at ¶¶ 13, 15, 31, 43, 49, 58.) At

this procedural posture, the Court finds that Plaintiffs state sufficient facts to allege that Holder’s

abusive conduct, and by vicarious liability, the Moving Defendants’, was motivated by

discriminatory animus. 

Accordingly, Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second and third causes of

action for violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. In light of

this ruling, the Court refers this matter to Magistrate Judge Beeler to conduct a further settlement

conference within the next 90 days. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 22, 2016 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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