Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15978/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15978-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Center for Competitive Politics
Appellant
Kamala D. Harris
Appellee
National Organization for Marriage Educational Trust Fund
Amicus Curiae
National Organization for Marriage, Inc.
Amicus Curiae
Charles M. Watkins
Amicus Curiae

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KAMALA D. HARRIS, in her official

capacity as Attorney General of the

State of California,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-15978

D.C. No.

2:14-cv-00636-

MCE-DAD

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 8, 2014—San Francisco California

Filed May 1, 2015

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Richard A. Paez, Circuit

Judges, and Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Paez

* The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 1 of 24
2 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a

preliminary injunction in an action brought by the Center for

Competitive Politics under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to

enjoin the California Attorney General from requiring it to

disclose the names and contributions of the Center’s

“significant donors” on Internal Revenue Form 990 Schedule

B, which the Center must file with the state in order to

maintain its registered status with the state’s Registry of

Charitable Trusts.

The panel first rejected the Center’s contention that the

disclosure requirement was, in and of itself, injurious to the

Center and its supporters’ exercise of their First Amendment

rights to freedom of association. The panel held that the

chilling risk inherent in compelled disclosure triggered

exacting scrutiny. Under the exacting scrutiny’s balancing

test, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the

seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment right. 

The panel held that the Center had not shown any “actual

burden” to itself or to its supporters. The panel determined

that the Center did not claim or produce evidence to suggest

that its significant donors would experience threats,

harassment, or other potentially chilling conduct as a result of

the Attorney General’s disclosure requirement. On the other

side of the scale, the panel held that the Attorney General has

a compelling interest in enforcing the laws of California and

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 2 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 3

that the disclosure requirement bore a “substantial relation”

to the “sufficiently important” government interest of law

enforcement. 

The panel also rejected the Center’s contention that the

disclosure requirement was preempted because Congress

intended to protect the privacy of the donor information of

non-profit organizations from all public disclosure when it

added 26 U.S.C. § 6104, part of the Pension Protection Act of

2006. The panel held that Section 6104 does not so clearly

manifest the purpose of Congress that the panel could infer

from it that Congress intended to bar state attorneys general

from requesting the information contained in Form 990,

Schedule B.

COUNSEL

Allen J. Dickerson (argued), Center for Competitive Politics,

Alexandria, Virginia; Alan Gura, Gura & Possessky, PLLC,

Alexandria, Virginia for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kamala Harris, California Attorney General, Alexandra

Robert Gordon (argued), Deputy Attorney General, San

Francisco, California for Defendant-Appellee.

Joseph Vanderhulst, ActRight Legal Foundation, Plainfield,

Indiana, for Amici Curiae National Organization for

Marriage, Inc., and National Organization for Marriage

Educational Trust Fund.

Bradley Benbrook and Stephen Duvernay, Benbrook Law

Group, PC, Sacramento, California, for Amicus Curiae

Charles M. Watkins.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 3 of 24
4 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

In order to solicit tax deductible contributions in

California, a non-profit corporation or other organization

must be registered with the state’s Registry of Charitable

Trusts. Cal. Gov. Code § 12585. To maintain its registered

status, an entity must file an annual report with the California

Attorney General’s Office, and must include IRS Form 990

Schedule B. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires

non-profit educational or charitable organizations registered

under 24 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) to disclose the names and

contributions of their “significant donors” (donors who have

contributed more than $5,000 in a single year) on Form 990

Schedule B. The Center for Competitive Politics (CCP), a

non-profit educational organization under § 501(c)(3), brings

this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to enjoin the

Attorney General from requiring it to file an unredacted Form

990 Schedule B. CCP argues that disclosure of its major

donors’ names violates the right of free association

guaranteed to CCP and its supporters by the First

Amendment.

CCP appeals the district court’s denial of CCP’s motion

for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Attorney General

from enforcing the disclosure requirement. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirm.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 4 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 5

I.

A.

CCP is a Virginia non-profit corporation, recognized by

the IRS as an educational organization under § 501(c)(3). 

CCP’s “mission is to promote and defend the First

Amendment rights of free political speech, assembly,

association, and petition through research, education, and

strategic litigation.” CCP supports itself through financial

donations from contributors across the United States,

including California. CCP argues that the disclosure

requirement infringes its and its supporters’ First Amendment

right to freedom of association. CCP also argues that federal

law preempts California’s disclosure requirement.

Defendant Kamala Harris, the Attorney General of

California, is the chief law enforcement officer of the State of

California. See Cal. Const. art. 5, § 13. Furthermore, under

the Supervision of Trustees and Fundraisers for Charitable

Purposes Act (the Act), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12580 et seq., the

Attorney General also has primary responsibility to supervise

charitable trusts and public benefit corporations incorporated

in or conducting business in California, and to protect

charitable assets for their intended use. Cal. Gov’t Code

§§ 12598(a), 12581. The Act requires the Attorney General

to maintain a registry of charitable corporations and their

trustees and trusts, and authorizes the Attorney General to

obtain “whatever information, copies of instruments, reports,

and records are needed for the establishment and maintenance

of the register.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12584.

An organization must maintain membership in the

registry in order to solicit funds from California residents. 

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 5 of 24
6 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12585. The Act requires that corporations

file periodic written reports, and requires the Attorney

General to promulgate rules and regulations specifying both

the filing procedures and the contents of the reports. Cal.

Gov’t Code § 12586(b), Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 300 et seq.

(2014). One of the regulations adopted by the Attorney

General requires that the periodic written reports include

Form 990.1 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 301 (2014). Although

many documents filed in the registry are open to public

inspection, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 310, Form 990

Schedule B is confidential, accessible only to in-house staff

and handled separately from non-confidential documents.

The Attorney General argues that there is a compelling

law enforcement interest in the disclosure of the names of

significant donors. She argues that such information is

necessary to determine whether a charity is actually engaged

in a charitable purpose, or is instead violating California law

by engaging in self-dealing, improper loans, or other unfair

business practices. SeeCal. Corp. Code §§ 5233, 5236, 5227. 

At oral argument, counsel elaborated and provided an

example of how the Attorney General uses Form 990

Schedule B in order to enforce these laws: having significant

donor information allows the Attorney General to determine

when an organization has inflated its revenue by

overestimating the value of “in kind” donations. Knowing

the significant donor’s identity allows her to determine what

1 California is not alone in requiring charitable organizations to file an

unredacted Form 990 Schedule B. At least Hawaii, Mississippi, and

Kentucky share the same requirement. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 467B-6.5

(2014); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 367.650-.670 (2014); Miss. Code Ann.

§ 79-11-507 (2014). According to Amicus Charles Watkins, Florida and

New York also require unredacted versions of Form 990 Schedule B.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 6 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 7

the “in kind” donation actually was, as well as its real value. 

Thus, having the donor’s information immediately available

allows her to identify suspicious behavior. She also argues

that requiring unredacted versions of Form 990 Schedule B

increases her investigative efficiency and obviates the need

for expensive and burdensome audits.

B.

CCP has been a member of the registry since 2008. Since

its initial registration, CCP has filed redacted versions of

Form 990 Schedule B, omitting the names and addresses of

its donors. In 2014, for the first time, the Attorney General

required CCP to submit an unredacted Form 990 Schedule B. 

In response to this demand, CCP filed suit, alleging that the

Attorney General’s requirement that CCP file an unredacted

Form 990 Schedule B amounted to a compelled disclosure of

its supporters’ identities that infringed CCP’s and its

supporters’ First Amendment rights to freedom of

association. CCP also alleged that a section of the Internal

Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6104, which restricts disclosure

of the information contained in Schedule B, preempted the

Attorney General’s requirement.

As noted above, the district court denied CCP’s motion

for a preliminary injunction, ruling that CCP was unlikely to

succeed on the merits of either of its claims, and that,

therefore, CCP could not show that it would suffer irreparable

harm or that the public interest weighed in favor of granting

the relief it requested. Ctr. for Competitive Politics v. Harris,

No. 2:14–cv–00636–MCE–DAD, 2014 WL 2002244 (E.D.

Cal. May 14, 2014).

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 7 of 24
8 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

II.

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for

preliminary injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. See FTC

v. Enforma Natural Prods., 362 F.3d 1204, 1211-12 (9th Cir.

2004); Harris v. Bd. of Supervisors, L.A. Cnty., 366 F.3d 754,

760 (9th Cir. 2004). We review findings of fact for clear

error and conclusions of law de novo. See Indep. Living Ctr.

of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir.

2008). Our review of a denial of preliminary injunctive relief

must be “limited and deferential.” Harris, 366 F.3d at 760.

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. NRDC,

555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A preliminary injunction is “an

extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear

showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22

(citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). 

Thus, CCP bears the heavy burden of making a “clear

showing” that it was entitled to a preliminary injunction.

We apply exacting scrutiny in the context of First

Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements. 

“Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the

ability to speak, but they . . . do not prevent anyone from

speaking.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore,

courts have “subjected these requirements to ‘exacting

scrutiny,’ which requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the

disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’

governmental interest.” Id. at 366–67 (quoting Buckley v.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 8 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 9

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).2 Exacting scrutiny encompasses

a balancing test. In order for a government action to survive

exacting scrutiny, “the strength of the governmental interest

must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First

Amendment rights.” John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196

(quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008)) (emphasis

added).

III.

A.

CCP argues that the Attorney General’s disclosure

requirement is, in and of itself, injurious to CCP’s and its

supporters’ exercise of their First Amendment rights to

freedom of association. CCP further argues that the Attorney

General must have a compelling interest in the disclosure

requirement, and that the requirement must be narrowly

tailored in order to justify the First Amendment harm it

causes. This is a novel theory, but it is not supported by our

case law or by Supreme Court precedent.

In arguing that the disclosure requirement alone

constitutes significant First Amendment injury, CCP relies

2

 Although most of the cases in which we and the Supreme Court have

applied exacting scrutiny arise in the electoral context, see John Doe No.

1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (referring to long line of such

precedent), we have also applied the exacting scrutiny standard in the

context of a licensing regime. See Acorn Invs., Inc. v. City of Seattle,

887 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the foundational compelled

disclosure case, NAACP v. Ala. ex. rel. Patterson, arose outside the

electoral context. In that case, the NAACP challenged a discovery order

(arising out of a contempt proceeding) that would have forced it to reveal

its membership lists. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 9 of 24
10 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

heavily on dicta in Buckley v. Valeo, in which the Supreme

Court stated that “compelled disclosure, in itself, can

seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief

guaranteed by the First Amendment.” 424 U.S. at 64. 

Notably, the Court said “can” and not “always does.” 

Furthermore, in making that statement, the Court cited a

series of Civil Rights Era as-applied cases in which the

NAACP challenged compelled disclosure of its members’

identities at a time when manyNAACP members experienced

violence or serious threats of violence based on their

membership in that organization.3

Id. The Court went on to

explain that “[t]he strict test established by NAACP v.

Alabama is necessary because compelled disclosure has the

potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First

3 CCP also cites extensively to these cases; however, because all of them

are as-applied challenges involving the NAACP (which had demonstrated

that disclosure would harm its members), these cases are all inapposite: 

Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)

(holding that the NAACP was not required to comply with a subpoena and

disclose membership lists to a Florida state legislative committee

investigating communist activity); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)

(upholding NAACP’s challenge to a Virginia statute barring the improper

solicitation of legal business, which the state had attempted to use to

prohibit the organization’s operation); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479

(1960) (striking down on First Amendment grounds an Arkansas statute

requiring public school teachers to disclose all organizations to which they

had belonged or contributed in the past five years); Bates v. Little Rock,

361 U.S. 516 (1960) (invalidating an Arkansas local ordinance requiring

disclosure of membership lists on First Amendment grounds as applied to

the NAACP, given the substantial record of the threats and harassment

that members of the organization would experience as a result of

disclosure); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the

NAACP was not required to comply with a discovery order requiring

disclosure of its membership lists). In Shelton, while the NAACP was not

a party, the primary plaintiff, Shelton, was a member of the NAACP. 

364 U.S. at 484.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 10 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 11

Amendment rights.” Id. at 66 (emphasis added). The most

logical conclusion to draw from these statements and their

context is that compelled disclosure, without any additional

harmful state action, can infringe First Amendment rights

when that disclosure leads to private discrimination against

those whose identities may be disclosed.

Of course, compelled disclosure can also infringe First

Amendment rights when the disclosure requirement is itself

a form of harassment intended to chill protected expression. 

Such was the case in Acorn Investments, Inc. v. City of

Seattle, another opinion upon which CCP bases its theory that

compelled disclosure alone constitutes First Amendment

injury. In Acorn, the plaintiff brought a First Amendment

challenge to Seattle’s licensing fee scheme and its

concomitant requirement that panoram businesses disclose

the names and addresses of their shareholders. 887 F.2d at

220. Panorams, or “peep shows,” were a form of adult

entertainment business strongly associated with criminal

activity. Id. at 222–24. Seattle’s disclosure requirement

exclusively targeted the shareholders of panoram businesses,

and the only justification that the city advanced was

“accountability.” Id. at 226. The plaintiff argued that the

disclosure requirement was intended to chill its protected

expression, and, given the absence of any reasonable

justification for the ordinance, we held that it violated the

First Amendment. Id. In so holding, we found especially

instructive and cited as indistinguishable a Seventh Circuit

case, Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir.

1980), in which “the court concluded that there could be ‘no

purpose other than harassment in requiring the individual . . .

stockholders to file separate statements or applications.’” Id.

(quoting Genusa, 619 F.3d at 1217). However, here, there is

no indication in the record that the Attorney General’s

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 11 of 24
12 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

disclosure requirement was adopted or is enforced in order to

harass members of the registry in general or CCP in

particular. Thus, the concern animating the holdings of

Acorn and Genusa does not apply here.

CCP is correct that the chilling risk inherent in compelled

disclosure triggers exacting scrutiny—“the strict test

established by NAACP v. Alabama,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at

66—and that, presented with a challenge to a disclosure

requirement, we must examine and balance the plaintiff’s

First Amendment injury against the government’s interest. 

However, CCP is incorrect when it argues that the compelled

disclosure itself constitutes such an injury, and when it

suggests that we must weigh that injury when applying

exacting scrutiny. Instead, the Supreme Court has made it

clear that we must balance the “seriousness of the actual

burden” on a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. John Doe

No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added); Chula Vista

Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, No.

12–55726, — F.3d —, 2015 WL 1499334, at *13 (9th Cir.

Apr. 3, 2015) (en banc) (applying this standard in evaluating

a First Amendment challenge to a disclosure requirement

under exacting scrutiny). Here, CCP has not shown any

“actual burden” on its freedom of association.

B.

CCP’s creative formulation, however, does affect the

scope of its challenge. In John Doe No. 1, signatories of a

referendum petition challenged the Washington Public

Records Act (PRA),4 which permitted public inspection of

such petitions. 561 U.S. at 191. The plaintiffs sought to

 

4

 Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56001 et seq.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 12 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 13

prevent the disclosure of the names of those who had signed

a referendum petition to challenge and put to a popular vote

a Washington state law that had extended benefits to samesex couples. Id. The complaint charged both that the PRA

was unconstitutional as to the referendum petition to overturn

the same-sex benefits law and as to referendum petitions

generally. Id. at 194. Thus, there was some dispute as to

whether their challenge was best construed as an as-applied

or as a facial challenge. Id. The Court explained that “[t]he

label is not what matters.” Id. Rather, because the

“plaintiffs’ claim and the relief that would follow . . .

reach[ed] beyond the particular circumstances of these

plaintiffs,” they were required to “satisfy our standards for a

facial challenge to the extent of that reach.” Id.

In formulating its claim such that the disclosure

requirement itself is the source of its alleged First

Amendment injury, CCP’s claim “is not limited to [its]

particular case, but challenges application of the law more

broadly to all [registry submissions].” Id. Were we to hold

that the disclosure requirement at issue here itself infringes

CCP’s First Amendment rights, then it would necessarilyalso

infringe the rights of all organizations subject to it. Even

though CCP only seeks to enjoin the Attorney General from

enforcing the disclosure requirement against itself, the

Attorney General would be hard-pressed to continue to

enforce an unconstitutional requirement against any other

member of the registry.

5 Therefore, because “the relief that

would follow . . . reach[es] beyond the particular

circumstances of th[is] plaintif[f,] [CCP’s claim] must . . .

satisfy our standards for a facial challenge to the extent of

5 CCP conceded at oral argument that its challenge is best understood as

a facial challenge.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 13 of 24
14 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

that reach.” Id. (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.

460, 472–73 (2010)).

“Which standard applies in a typical [facial challenge] is

a matter of dispute that we need not and do not address . . . .” 

Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472. The Supreme Court has at different

times required plaintiffs bringing facial challenges to show

“that no set of circumstances exists under which [the

challenged law] would be valid,” United States v. Salerno,

481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), or that it lacks any “plainly

legitimate sweep,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,

740, n. 7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Alternatively, in the First Amendment

context, the Court has sometimes employed a different

standard to evaluate facial overbreadth challenges, “whereby

a law may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial

number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in

relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’” Stevens,

559 U.S. at 473 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State

Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, n. 6 (2008)).

The least demanding of these standards is that of the First

Amendment facial overbreadth challenge. Because CCP

cannot show that the regulation fails exacting scrutiny in a

“substantial” number of cases, “judged in relation to [the

disclosure requirement’s] plainly legitimate sweep,” we need

not decide whether it could meet the more demanding

standards of Salerno and Glucksberg.

C.

Although not for the reasons that CCP posits, Buckley v.

Valeo is instructive for assessing CCP’s facial challenge. In

Buckley, the plaintiffs challenged the disclosure requirements

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 14 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 15

of the Federal Election Campaign Act6as overbroad on two

grounds. 424 U.S. at 60–61. The first ground was that the

disclosure requirement applied to minor partymembers, such

as members of the Socialist Labor Party, who might face

harassment or threats as a result of the disclosure of their

names. Id. The plaintiffs sought a blanket exemption for

minor parties. The second ground of the Buckley plaintiffs’

challenge was that the thresholds triggering disclosure were

too low, because the requirement attached to any donation of

$100 or more (with additional reporting requirements to a

Committee, though not to the public, for donations over $10). 

Id.

After applying exacting scrutiny, the Buckley Court

rejected the plaintiffs’ minor party challenge because “no

appellant [had] tendered record evidence of the sort proffered

in NAACP v. Alabama,” and so had failed to make the

“[r]equisite [f]actual [s]howing.” Id. at 69–71. Where the

record evidence constituted “[a]t best . . . the testimony of

several minor-party officials that one or two persons refused

to make contributions because of the possibility of disclosure

. . . the substantial public interest in disclosure identified by

the legislative history of this Act outweighs the harm

generally alleged.” Id. at 71–72. The Court, however, left

open the possibility that if a minor party plaintiff could show

“a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a

party’s contributors’ names will subject them to threats,

harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or

private parties,” then it could succeed on an as-applied

challenge. Id. at 74. Thus, even where, unlike here, the

plaintiffs adduced some evidence that their participation

 

6

 Then codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq., now at 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et

seq.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 15 of 24
16 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

would be chilled, the Buckley Court rejected a facial

challenge.

Further undermining CCP’s argument, the Buckley Court

also rejected the plaintiffs’ “contention, based on alleged

overbreadth, . . . that the monetary thresholds in the

record-keeping and reporting provisions lack[ed] a substantial

nexus with the claimed governmental interests, for the

amounts involved [were] too low.” Id. at 82. The Court

noted that they were “indeed low,” but concluded that it

“[could not] say, on this bare record, that the limits

designated [were] wholly without rationality,” because they

“serve[d] informational functions,” and “facilitate[d]

enforcement” of the contribution limits and disclosure

requirements. Id. at 83. Thus, the Buckley Court rejected the

plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge both with respect to minor

parties and the donation thresholds.

Engaging in the same balancing that the Buckley Court

undertook, we examine the claims and interests the parties

assert here. In contrast to the Buckley plaintiffs, CCP does

not claim and produces no evidence to suggest that their

significant donors would experience threats, harassment, or

other potentially chilling conduct as a result of the Attorney

General’s disclosure requirement.7 CCP has not

demonstrated any “actual burden,” John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S.

at 196, on its or its supporters’ First Amendment rights. As

7 The minor parties in Buckley feared harassment because they

advocated unpopular positions. CCP has not alleged that its supporters

would face a similar backlash. However, amicus National Organization

for Marriage contends that, like the minor party donors and members in

Buckley, its significant donors could face retaliatory action if their names

were ever released to the public.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 16 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 17

discussed supra, contrary to CCP’s contentions, no case has

ever held or implied that a disclosure requirement in and of

itself constitutes First Amendment injury.

8

Furthermore, unlike in John Doe No. 1 or in other cases

requiring the disclosure of the names of petition signatories,

in this case, the disclosure would not be public. The Attorney

General keeps Form 990 Schedule B confidential. Although

it is certainly true that non-public disclosures can still chill

protected activity where a plaintiff fears the reprisals of a

government entity, CCP has not alleged any such fear here. 

CCP instead argues that the Attorney General’s systems for

preserving confidentiality are not secure, and that its

significant donors’ names might be inadvertently accessed or

released. Such arguments are speculative, and do not

constitute evidence that would support CCP’s claim that

disclosing its donors to the Attorney General for her

8 Contrary to CCP’s contention, Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60

(1960), is not such a case. In Talley, the Supreme Court struck down a

law that outlawed the distribution of hand-bills that did not identify their

authors. Id. at 64. In so doing, the Court did not explicitly apply exacting

scrutiny, though it cited NAACP v. Alabama and Bates. Id. at 65. The

basis for the Court’s holding was the historic, important role that

anonymous pamphleteering has had in furthering democratic ideals. Id.

at 64 (“There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement

would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby

freedom of expression . . . Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and

even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.”). 

Thus, in that case, the Court was certain of the First Amendment harm that

the ordinance imposed.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 17 of 24
18 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

confidential use would chill its donors’ participation.9See

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).10

On the other side of the scale, as CCP concedes, the

Attorney General has a compelling interest in enforcing the

laws of California. CCP does not contest that the Attorney

General has the power to require disclosure of significant

donor information as a part of her general subpoena power. 

Thus, the disclosure regulation has a “plainly legitimate

9 CCP also argues that only an informal policy prevents the Attorney

General from publishing the forms and requires her to take appropriate

measures to ensure the forms stay confidential. However, where a record

is exempt from public disclosure under federal law, as is Form 990

Schedule B, it is also exempt from public inspection under the California

Public Records Act. Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(k) (2015). Thus, it appears

doubtful that the Attorney General would ever be required to make Form

990 Schedule B publicly available. Moreover, while the exemption under

§ 6254(k) is permissive, and not mandatory, Marken v. Santa Monica

Malibu Unified Sch. Dist., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 405 (Ct. App. 2012),

where public disclosure is prohibited under state or federal law, the

responsible California agency is also prohibited from public disclosure. 

See Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(f) (“This section shall not prevent any agency

from opening its records concerning the administration of the agency to

public inspection, unless disclosure is otherwise prohibited by law.”). As

public disclosure (distinct from disclosure to the Attorney General) of

significant donor information is not authorized by federal law, it is likely

not authorized by California law, either. However, because CCP has not

provided any evidence that even public disclosure would chill the First

Amendment activities of its significant donors, the potential for a future

change in the Attorney General’s disclosure policy does not aid CCP in

making its facial challenge.

10

In Harriss, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge

to an act imposing disclosure requirements on lobbyists, where plaintiffs

presented “[h]ypothetical borderline situations” where speech might be

chilled, because “[t]he hazard of such restraint is too remote” to require

striking down an otherwise valid statute.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 18 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 19

sweep.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473. CCP argues instead that

the disclosure requirement does not bear a substantial enough

relationship to the interest that the Attorney General has

asserted in the disclosure, and that the Attorney General

should be permitted only to demand the names of significant

donors if she issues a subpoena. CCP’s argument that the

disclosure requirement exceeds the scope of the Attorney

General’s subpoena power is similar to the Buckley plaintiffs’

argument that the low monetary thresholds exceeded the

scope of Congress’s legitimate regulation.

Like the Buckley Court, we reject this argument,

especially in the context of a facial challenge. The Attorney

General has provided justifications for employing a

disclosure requirement instead of issuing subpoenas. She

argues that having immediate access to Form 990 Schedule

B increases her investigative efficiency, and that reviewing

significant donor information can flag suspicious activity. 

The reasons that the Attorney General has asserted for the

disclosure requirement, unlike those the City of Seattle put

forth in Acorn, are not “wholly without rationality.” See

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83. Faced with the Attorney General’s

“unrebutted arguments that only modest burdens attend the

disclosure of a typical [Form 990 Schedule B],” we reject

CCP’s “broad challenge,” John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 201. 

We conclude that the disclosure requirement bears a

“substantial relation” to a “sufficiently important”

government interest. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366

(internal citations omitted).

However, as the Supreme Court did in Buckley and John

Doe No. 1, we leave open the possibility that CCP could show

“a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of

[its] contributors’ names will subject them to threats,

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 19 of 24
20 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or

private parties” that would warrant relief on an as-applied

challenge. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 199 (2003)

(rejecting a facial challenge, but leaving open the possibility

of a future as-applied challenge).

In sum, CCP’s First Amendment facial challenge to the

Attorney General’s disclosure requirement fails exacting

scrutiny.

IV.

CCP also contends that federal tax law preempts the

Attorney General’s disclosure requirement. CCP argues that

Congress intended to protect the privacy of the donor

information of non-profit organizations from all public

disclosure when it added 26 U.S.C. § 6104, part of the

Pension Protection Act of 2006, and that, therefore,

permitting state attorneys general to require this information

from non-profit organizations registered under § 501(c)(3)

would conflict with that purpose. CCP’s argument is

unavailing.

Federal law is supreme and Congress can certainly

preempt a state’s authority. However, principles of

federalism dictate that we employ a strong presumption

against preemption. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.

2492, 2500 (2012). Therefore, federal law will only preempt

state law if such preemption was “the clear and manifest

purpose of Congress.” Id. at 2501. Congress can express that

intent explicitly, or the intent can be inferred when a state law

irreconcilably conflicts with a federal law. Id. Alternatively,

“the intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred”

when the federal government has established a legislative

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 20 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 21

framework “so pervasive that Congress left no room for states

to supplement it.” Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator

Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). A state law can be in

conflict with a federal law when the state law “stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id.; see also Barnett

Bank of Marion Cnty. N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996)

(holding that such an obstacle can arise even where the two

laws are not directly in conflict).

CCP argues that 26 U.S.C. § 6104(c)(3) expressly

preempts the Attorney General’s disclosure requirement. 

That section provides:

Upon written request by an appropriate State

officer, the Secretary may make available for

inspection or disclosure returns and return

information of any organization described in

section 501 (c) (other than organizations

described in paragraph (1) or (3) thereof) for

the purpose of, and only to the extent

necessary in, the administration of State laws

regulating the solicitation or administration of

the charitable funds or charitable assets of

such organizations.

(emphasis added). CCP reads this language to ban the

Secretary from sharing the tax information of § 501(c)(3)

organizations with state attorneys general. The language is

better construed as a limited grant of authority than as a

prohibition. However, even if CCP’s reading were accurate,

a statute restricting the disclosures that the Commissioner of

the IRS may make does not expressly preempt the authority

of state attorneys general to require such disclosures directly

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 21 of 24
22 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

from the non-profit organizations they are tasked with

regulating.

CCP further argues that the AttorneyGeneral’s disclosure

requirement conflicts with the purpose of § 6104, but neither

of the two subsections of § 6104 upon which CCP relies can

support its argument. Neither subsection indicates that

Congress sought to regulate states’ access to this information

for the purposes of enforcing their laws, or that Congress

sought to regulate the actions of any entity other than the IRS. 

The first subsection allows for the public availability of the

tax returns of certain organizations and trusts, but goes on to

qualify that “[n]othing in this subsection shall authorize the

Secretary to disclose the name or address of any contributor

to any organization or trust.” 26 U.S.C. § 6104(b) (emphasis

added). The second subsection lays out disclosure

requirements for § 501(c)(3) organizations generally, and

then provides an exception to those requirements, such that

they “shall not require the disclosure of the name or address

of any contributor to the organization.” Id. § 6104(d)(3)(A).

These subsections may support an argument that

Congress sought to regulate the disclosures that the IRS may

make, but they do not broadly prohibit other government

entities from seeking that information directly from the

organization. Nor do they create a pervasive scheme of

privacy protections. Rather, these subsections represent

exceptions to a general rule of disclosure. Thus, these

subsections do not so clearly manifest the purpose of

Congress that we could infer from them that Congress

intended to bar state attorneys general from requesting the

information contained in Form 990 Schedule B from entities

like CCP.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 22 of 24
CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS 23

The district court relied on our opinion in Stokwitz v.

United States, 831 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1987), in holding that

CCP was unlikely to succeed on its preemption argument. In

that case, an attorney for the U.S. Navy was charged with

misconduct and his personal tax returns were seized. Id. at

893. He argued that 26 U.S.C. § 6103, regulating public

disclosure of such documents, forbade their use in the

proceedings against him. Id. at 894. We disagreed:

“[c]ontrary to appellant’s contention, there is no indication in

either the language of section 6103 or its legislative history

that Congress intended to enact a general prohibition against

public disclosure of tax information.” Id. at 896. Instead, the

legislative history of the section revealed that “Congress’s

overriding purpose was to curtail loose disclosure practices

by the IRS.” Id. at 894. Here, since nothing in the legislative

history of § 6104 suggested that its purpose was in any way

different from that of § 6103, the district court concluded that

the Attorney General’s disclosure requirement was likewise

not preempted.

While CCP is correct that Congress added § 6104 thirty

years after § 6103, and that, therefore, Congress’s intent may

have differed, our opinion in Stokwitz is nevertheless

instructive. The very legislative history to which CCP directs

us describes the operation of sections 6103 and 6104 in

tandem. See Staff of the Joint Committtee on Taxation, 109th

Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, the “Pension

Protection Act of 2006” at 327–29 (Comm. Print 2006). 

Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress

sought to extend the regulatory scheme it imposed on the IRS

with § 6103 to other entities when it added § 6104. 

Moreover, when two sections operate together, and when

Congress clearly sought to regulate the actions of a particular

entity with one section, it is not unreasonable to infer that

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 23 of 24
24 CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS V. HARRIS

Congress sought to regulate the same entity with the other. 

Therefore, Stokwitz supports our conclusion that § 6104, like

§ 6103, is intended to regulate the IRS, and not to ban all

means of accessing donor information.

Section 6104 does not so clearly manifest the purpose of

Congress that we could infer from it that Congress intended

to bar state attorneys general from requesting the information

contained in Form 990 Schedule B. See Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at

2501. CCP’s preemption claim must fail.

V.

In order to prevail on a motion for a preliminary

injunction, a plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on

the merits and that irreparable harm is not only possible, but

likely, in the absence of injunctive relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at

20. CCP has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. 

Because it is not likely that the Attorney General’s disclosure

requirement injures CCP’s First Amendment rights, or that it

is preempted by federal law, it is not likely that CCP will

suffer irreparable harm from enforcement of the requirement. 

Thus, CCP cannot meet the standard established by Winter.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of

CCP’s motion for a preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-15978, 05/01/2015, ID: 9521622, DktEntry: 36-1, Page 24 of 24