Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03113/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03113-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terence Coles
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided April 8, 2005

No. 03-3113

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TERENCE COLES,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

(USDC) for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00204-01)

Jenifer Wicks and Bernard S. Grimm were on the brief for

appellant.

Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy

W. McLeese, III, Anthony M. Alexis, and SuzAnne C. Nyland,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before: EDWARDS, SENTELLE, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam. 

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Per Curiam: This case raises an important issue left open

by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125

S. Ct. 738 (2005), concerning the application of the plain-error

doctrine to appeals from sentences rendered under the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines before the Supreme Court ruled that they

are advisory rather than mandatory. In addressing this issue, we

align ourselves generally with the decisions of the Second

Circuit in United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005),

and the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Paladino, No. 03-

2296, 2005 WL 435430 (7th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005), reh’g en banc

denied, id. (7th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005), and most particularly with

the approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit. Because the

record is insufficient for us to determine with confidence

whether the defendant suffered prejudice from the Booker error

in this case, we hereby remand the record to the District Court

so that it may determine whether it would have imposed a

different sentence, materially more favorable to the defendant,

if sentencing had taken place under the post-Booker sentencing

regime.

I.

Terence Coles was convicted of conspiracy, two counts of

bribery, and two counts of fraud, in violation of federal and

District of Columbia law, for his participation in a scheme to

obtain grant money fraudulently from the District of Columbia’s

Escheated Estates Fund while he was the Special Assistant to the

Secretary of the District of Columbia. See 18 U.S.C. §

201(b)(2) (2000) (bribery); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1805a

(2001) (conspiracy); id. § 22-3221(a) (fraud in the first degree).

The District Court sentenced Coles on the bribery counts

pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, under which Coles was

assigned a base offense level of 10 and a criminal history

category of I. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,

GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2C1.1(a), 4A1.1 (2001). The District

Court added two levels to the base offense level, because “the

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offense involved more than one bribe,” id. § 2C1.1(b)(1), and it

added eight additional levels, because “the offense involved a

payment for the purpose of influencing . . . any official holding

a high-level decision-making or sensitive position,” id. §

2C1.1(b)(2)(B). These adjustments raised Coles’ offense level

from 10 to 20, increasing the applicable sentencing range from

6-to-12 months to 33-to-41 months. Id. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing

table).

The District Court sentenced Coles to 36 months’

imprisonment for each of the federal bribery counts, to run

concurrently. The trial court also imposed 36-month prison

sentences for each of the three D.C. Code convictions for

conspiracy and fraud, all to run concurrently with the bribery

sentences.

Coles appealed to this court, challenging both his conviction

and his sentence. We affirmed Coles’ conviction, but held the

challenge to his sentence in abeyance pending the Supreme

Court’s decision in Booker. See United States v. Coles, No. 03-

3113, 2004 WL 2862212 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 2004) (per curiam).

Following the Court’s decision in Booker, the parties submitted

supplemental briefs addressing the impact of that decision on the

sentence in this case. We now address Coles’ challenge to his

sentence.

II.

The Court’s decision in Booker is cogently summarized in

Crosby:

Since November 1, 1987, sentences in federal criminal

cases have been determined pursuant to the Sentencing

Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), Pub. L. 98- 473, Title II, §§

211-238, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984), and the Guidelines issued by

the United States Sentencing Commission, see U.S.S.G. §§

1A1.1-8F1.1. . . .

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. . . .

The Supreme Court’s decision in Booker/Fanfan

significantly altered the sentencing regime that has existed

[under] the Guidelines . . . . The Court’s two-part decision

consists of an opinion by Justice Stevens adjudicating the

merits of the Sixth Amendment issue (“Substantive

Opinion”), and an opinion by Justice Breyer setting forth

the remedy (“Remedy Opinion”). . . .

. . . In the Substantive Opinion, the Court ruled that

“[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is

necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum

authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a

jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to

a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Substantive Opinion,

[125 S. Ct. at 756]. This ruling, the Court explained, was

required for “enforcement of the Sixth Amendment’s

guarantee of a jury trial in today’s world.” Id. at [751]. . . .

The Substantive Opinion emphasized that it was the

mandatory aspect of these determinate sentencing regimes

that implicated the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a

jury trial: 

We have never doubted the authority of a judge to

exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within

a statutory range. Indeed, everyone agrees that the

constitutional issues presented by these cases would

have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted

from the SRA the provisions that make the Guidelines

binding on district judges . . . . For when a trial judge

exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence

within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a

jury determination of the facts that the judge deems

relevant. 

Id. at [750] (internal citations omitted).

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. . . .

In the Remedy Opinion, the Court ruled that

implementation of the Substantive Opinion required that

two provisions of the SRA be “sever[ed] and excise[d].”

Remedy Opinion, 125 S. Ct. at 764. These are subsection

3553(b)(1), mandating use of the Guidelines, and section

3742(e), which “sets forth standards of review on appeal.”

Remedy Opinion, id.

Having severed and excised the SRA’s standards

governing review of sentences, the Court in the Remedy

Opinion replaced them with “a practical standard of review

already familiar to appellate courts: review for

‘unreasonable[ness].’” Id. at 765 (quoting subsection

3742(e)(3)). . . .

Although the most significant aspect of the Remedy

Opinion is the excision of subsection 3553(b)(1), with the

result that the use of the Guidelines to select a sentence is

no longer mandatory, a critically important aspect of

Booker/Fanfan is the preservation of the entirety of the

SRA with the exception of only the two severed provisions.

As the Court noted in the Remedy Opinion, “The remainder

of the Act ‘function[s] independently.’” Remedy Opinion,

125 S. Ct. at 764 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480

U.S. 678, 684 (1987)). Notably, the Court explained,

“Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth numerous

factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will

guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in

determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.” Id. at 766.

Crosby, 397 F.3d at 107-10 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in

original).

The Court in Booker instructed that its holdings should be

applied “to all cases on direct review.” 125 S. Ct. at 769. The

Court, however, did not “believe that every appeal will lead to

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a new sentencing hearing.” Id. Rather, the Court explained,

“we expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential

doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was

raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.” Id.

III.

Coles contends that his sentence should be vacated in light

of Booker. Specifically, he argues that his Sixth Amendment

rights were violated, because his sentence was enhanced by the

trial court based on facts neither admitted by him nor proved to

a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Coles objected to

the District Court’s findings of fact at sentencing, he raised no

arguments in the District Court questioning either the

constitutionality of the Guidelines or their mandatory

application. Accordingly, we review Coles’ Booker claim only

for plain error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).

Under the plain-error standard of Rule 52(b), “there must be

(1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial

rights.’” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)

(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993))

(alteration in original). “If all three conditions are met, an

appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a

forfeited error, but only if (4) the error ‘seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”

Id. at 467 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732) (internal quotation

marks and alteration omitted).

It is clear that Coles satisfies the first two elements of the

plain-error test, for the District Court applied the Guidelines on

the assumption that they were mandatory. Following Booker,

this was error and it is undoubtedly “plain.” And the Supreme

Court has made it clear that “where the law at the time of trial

was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal

. . . it is enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate

consideration.” Id. at 468. The Government does not dispute

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that Coles has satisfied the first two elements of the plain error

test. See Supplemental Br. for Appellee at 7 n.5.

We are also convinced that, if the District Court’s error was

prejudicial, the error would “seriously affect[] the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” As the

Seventh Circuit aptly observed, “[i]t is a miscarriage of justice

to give a person an illegal sentence that increases his

punishment, just as it is to convict an innocent person.”

Paladino, 2005 WL 435430, at *9; see also United States v.

Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 461 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[L]eaving in place

an error-infected sentence that would have been materially

different absent error and that could be readily corrected would

‘seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.’ Indeed, it would seriously affect all

three.” (footnote and citation omitted) (alteration in original)).

Thus, the only question remaining is whether the District

Court’s error affected Coles’ substantial rights in a material way.

We now turn to that question.

IV. 

We hold that, in assessing whether the District Court’s

Booker error was prejudicial, we must determine whether there

would have been a materially different result, more favorable to

the defendant, had the sentence been imposed in accordance

with the post-Booker sentencing regime. This mode of inquiry

has been adopted, either implicitly or explicitly, by the First,

Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. See United

States v. Mares, No. 03-21035, 2005 WL503715, at *9 (5thCir.

Mar. 4, 2005) (“[T]he pertinent question is whether Mares

demonstrated that the sentencing judge – sentencing under an

advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one – would have

reached a significantly different result.”); Paladino, 2005 WL

435430, at *10 (“[I]f the judge would have imposed the same

sentence even if he had thought the guidelines merely advisory

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(in which event there would have been no Sixth Amendment

violation), and the sentence would be lawful under the

post-Booker regime, there is no prejudice to the defendant.”);

United States v.Antonakopoulos,399F.3d 68,75 (1st Cir. 2005)

(“[T]he defendant must point to circumstances creating a

reasonable probability that the district court would impose a

different sentence more favorable to the defendant under the

new ‘advisory Guidelines’ Booker regime.”); United States v.

Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n applying

the third prong, we ask whether there is a reasonable probability

of a different result if the guidelines had been applied in an

advisory instead of binding fashion by the sentencing judge in

this case.”); Crosby, 397 F.3d at 118 (“[A] sentence imposed

under a mistaken perception of the requirements of law will

satisfy plain error analysis if the sentence imposed under a

correct understanding would have been materially different.”).

The Fourth and Ninth Circuits, in contrast, have found plain

error under Booker when a trial judge determined facts which,

under the Guidelines, increased a sentence beyond that

authorized by the jury verdict or an admission by the defendant.

In other words, these circuits assess plain error without regard

to whether the sentencing judge would have reached a different

result under an advisory sentencing scheme. See United States

v. Hughes, No. 03-4172, 2005 WL 628224, at *5-*12 (4th Cir.

Mar. 16, 2005); United States v. Ameline, 400F.3d 646,654 (9th

Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 2005 WL 612710 (9th Cir.

Mar. 11, 2005). The problem with this approach is that it

employs the wrong baseline for determining prejudice in light of

Booker’s remedy. In other words, the courts employing this

approach assess error and prejudice as if the pre-Booker,

mandatory sentencing regime were still in place, and as if the

error were judicial factfinding under that regime. This flies in

the face of the Supreme Court’s remedial order in Booker.

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In assessing whether a district court committed prejudicial

error under Booker, an appellate court must determine what the

sentencing court would have done had it not committed the

error. In their assessments of plain error, the Fourth and Ninth

Circuits find error when a sentencing court increased a

Guidelines sentence beyond that corresponding to the facts

established by the jury verdict or an admission by the defendant.

But such a finding seems to assume that judicial factfinding is

erroneous even under the advisory sentencing regime left us by

Booker, which it surely is not. The Supreme Court in Booker

plainly says:

We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise

broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory

range. . . . [W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to

select a specific sentence within a defined range, the

defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts

that the judge deems relevant. 

125 S. Ct. at 750.

A prescient pre-Booker sentencing court committing no

error would have behaved just as a sentencing court in the postBooker era will operate: it would have treated the Guidelines as

advisory. And it would have committed no error if it had

increased a sentence beyond that suggested by the Guidelines in

light of the facts established by the jury verdict or an admission

by the defendant, so long as the sentence was within the

prescribed statutory range and otherwise reasonable.

As noted in Williams, the error under Booker “is the

mandatory use of the Guidelines enhancement, not the fact of

the enhancement.” 399 F.3d at 458; see also Antonakopoulos,

399 F.3d at 75 (“The error is not that a judge (by a

preponderance of the evidence) determined facts under the

Guidelines which increased a sentence beyond that authorized

by the jury verdict or an admission by the defendant; the error

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is only that the judge did so in a mandatory Guidelines

system.”); Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300 (“The error that was

committed in pre-Booker sentencing . . . is not that there were

extra-verdict enhancements . . . that led to an increase in the

defendant’s sentence. The error is that there were extra-verdict

enhancements used in a mandatory guidelines system.”).

 V.

This brings us to the question of how to determine whether

the District Court would have imposed a sentence materially

more favorable to the defendant had it been aware of the postBooker sentencing regime. There undoubtedly will be some

cases in which a reviewing court will be confident that a

defendant has suffered no prejudice. For example, “if a judge

were to impose a sentence at the statutory maximum and say

that if he could he would have imposed an even longer sentence,

there would be no basis for thinking that if he had known that

the sentencing guidelines are merely advisory he would have

given the defendant a lighter sentence.” Paladino, 2005 WL

435430, at *9. Indeed, we recently found no prejudice in a case

in which the sentencing judge twice departed upward from the

Guidelines. See United States v. Smith, No. 03-3087, 2005 WL

627077 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2005) (per curiam). When the judge

initially departed upward, he told the defendant, “I believe, in

my view, that you deserve the sentence . . . imposed here.” Id.

at *1. The case was remanded before Booker issued and the trial

judge was forced to impose a shorter sentence on grounds not

relevant here. However, the trial judge again departed upward.

Id. On the second appeal, this court found that it was clear that

the defendant had suffered no prejudice: 

The district judge, on each of the prior two sentencings,

imposed a sentence beyond what the Guidelines require. . . .

On remand, the judge was forced to impose a shorter

sentence – 21 months – but again reached the figure by

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departing upward, even though the government had not

requested an upward departure on resentencing. . . .

Booker’s requirement that the sentencing judge

appreciate that he is not bound by the Guidelines thus

plainly cannot help Smith. Smith . . . recognizes that giving

the district judge wider latitude in this case could very well

result in a longer sentence. Smith was not prejudiced by the

impermissibly mandatory nature of the Guidelines; if

anything, he benefitted from it.

Id.

Conversely, there will be some cases in which we are

confident that the defendant suffered prejudice, say, for

example, if the sentencing judge indicated on the record that, but

for the Guidelines, she would have imposed a lower sentence.

In a case like this one, however, the record simply is not

sufficient for an appellate court to determine prejudice with any

confidence. The Government notes here that the District Court

sentenced Coles to 36 months in prison, “somewhat above the

lower end” of the 33-to-41 months Guidelines range, but this is

hardly conclusive. “A conscientious judge – one who took the

guidelines seriously whatever his private views – would pick a

sentence relative to the guideline range. If he thought the

defendant a more serious offender than an offender at the bottom

of the range, he would give him a higher sentence even if he

thought the entire range too high.” Paladino, 2005 WL 435430,

at *9. We agree with the Seventh Circuit, following the lead of

the Second Circuit, that “[t]he only practical way (and it

happens also to be the shortest, the easiest, the quickest, and the

surest way) to determine whether the kind of plain error argued

in these cases has actually occurred is to ask the district judge.”

Id. at *10; see also Crosby, 397 F.3d at 117.

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that,

because the burden of showing prejudice is on the defendant, the

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fact that the record is insufficient to reach a conclusion

regarding prejudice means that the defendant necessarily loses.

See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1301 (“[W]here the effect of an error

on the result in the district court is uncertain or indeterminate –

where we would have to speculate – the appellant has not met

his burden of showing a reasonable probability that the result

would have been different but for the error; he has not met his

burden of showing prejudice; he has not met his burden of

showing that his substantial rights have been affected.”); see

also Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *9. But as the Seventh Circuit

has noted: 

Given the alternative of simply asking the district judge to

tell us whether he would have given a different sentence,

and thus dispelling the epistemic fog, we cannot fathom

why [we should] condemn some unknown fraction of

criminal defendants to serve an illegal sentence. Crosby is

the middle way between placing on the defendant the

impossible burden of proving that the sentencing judge

would have imposed a different sentence had the judge not

thought the guidelines mandatory and requiring that all

defendants whose cases were pending when Booker was

decided are entitled to be resentenced, even when it is clear

that the judge would impose the same sentence and the

court of appeals would affirm.

Paladino, 2005 WL 435430, at *11.

Persuaded by the Second and Seventh Circuits, we conclude

that, because the record is insufficient to determine whether the

error was prejudicial, we will remand the record to the District

Court so that it may determine whether it would have imposed

a different sentence materially more favorable to the defendant

had it been fully aware of the post-Booker sentencing regime.

In making this determination, the District Court “need not

determine what that sentence would have been.” Crosby, 397

F.3d at 118 n.20. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 118 n.20. And while

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“‘the District Court should obtain the views of counsel, at least

in writing, [it] “need not” require the presence of the

Defendant.’” Paladino, 2005 WL 435430, at *10 (quoting

Crosby, 397 F.3d at 120 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(3))). 

We note that the “limited remand” procedures adopted by

the Second and Seventh Circuits offer slightly different

approaches. The Second Circuit procedure requires that the

district court itself vacate the original sentence if it determines

that resentencing is warranted. See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 117,

120;see also Williams, 399 F.3d at 461 n.15. By contrast, under

the Seventh Circuit’s procedure, the appellate court retains

jurisdiction throughout the limited remand, and thus it is the

appellate court that will “vacate the sentence upon being

notified by the judge that he would not have imposed it had he

known that the guidelines were merely advisory.” Paladino,

2005 WL 435430, at *10. We think the Seventh Circuit’s

approach is more faithful to Booker’s instruction that “reviewing

courts” should apply “ordinary prudential doctrines” such as

plain error, see 125 S. Ct. at 769, and we will accordingly retain

jurisdiction over this case.

Because the record is unclear, in this case the District Court

should also state whether the sentences for the defendant’s D.C.

Code convictions were the product of the court’s independent,

discretionary judgment. See United States v. Cutchin, 956 F.2d

1216, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Sentencing Guidelines

apply only to federal crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a).

Defendants found guilty of violations of the D.C. Code can only

be sentenced under the D.C. Code.”).

VI.

Accordingly, while retaining jurisdiction over the case, we

remand the record to the District Court for the limited purpose

of allowing it to determine whether it would have imposed a

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different sentence, materially more favorable to the defendant,

had it been fully aware of the post-Booker sentencing regime. 

So ordered.

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