Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04035/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04035-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rafael Beltran-Arce
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-4035

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska.

Rafael Beltran-Arce, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 15, 2004

Filed: July 28, 2005

___________

Before SMITH, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Rafael Beltran-Arce guilty of several federal drug crimes alleged

in a four-count indictment, and he was sentenced to 235 months' imprisonment.

Beltran-Arce appeals the district court's refusal to grant a mistrial based on his

allegation that the government was permitted to introduce improper expert witness

testimony at trial. We affirm Beltran-Arce's convictions, but reverse and remand for

resentencing.

I. 

The issues presented in this appeal concern the trial testimony of Sergeant

Langan of the Omaha Police Department. The government called Sergeant Langan

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Beltran-Arce states that he "filed a Motion in Limine to exclude Sergeant

Langan's testimony." However, the record on appeal shows only a verbal objection

to the government's intention to call Sergeant Langan as an expert witness.

Interestingly, the district court does make references to Beltran-Arce's motion in

limine, which supports the hypothesis that the district court considered Beltran-Arce's

verbal objections as motions in limine. Nevertheless, we will accept that the issue was

presented and addressed below and thus properly preserved for appellate review.

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in its case-in-chief to provide expert testimony relating to drug conspiracies in the

Omaha area and typical drug record-keeping procedures. Before permitting Sergeant

Langan to testify, the district court conducted a hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.

104(b).1

 Ultimately, over Beltran-Arce's objections, Sergeant Langan was permitted

to testify as an expert regarding the modus operandi of local drug dealers. During his

testimony, Sergeant Langan opined that much of the methamphetamine coming into

Omaha originated in Mexico. The prosecution did not give Beltran-Arce proper Rule

16(a)(1)(G) notice regarding this type of testimony. Beltran-Arce moved for a

mistrial, arguing that the reference to Mexico was unduly prejudicial. The district

court denied the motion for mistrial and offered a curative instruction to the jury.

II.

First, Beltran-Arce asks us to revisit the district court's initial decision allowing

Sergeant Langan to offer general opinions about criminal drug activity and to

interpret notes—that the government argued were drug records—found in a notepad

seized from Beltran-Arce's residence. We review Beltran-Arce's claim that the district

court erred in allowing Langan's expert testimony under an abuse of discretion

standard. United States v. Molina, 172 F.3d 1048, 1056 (8th Cir. 1999).

We begin our analysis by noting that a district court has "broad discretion to

allow law enforcement officials to testify as experts concerning the modus operandi

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2 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: 

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert

by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,

may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise

if, (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,

(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principals and

methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principals and

methods reliably to the facts of the case.

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of drug dealers in areas concerning activities which are not something with which

most jurors are familiar." United States v. Sarabia-Martinez, 276 F.3d 447, 452 (8th

Cir. 2002) (citing Molina, 172 F.3d at 1056 (8th Cir. 1999)). Federal Rule of

Evidence 7022

 permits a district court to allow testimony of a witness whose

knowledge, skill, training, experience, or education will assist the trier of fact in

understanding an area involving specialized subject matter. Sarabia-Martinez, 276

F.3d at 452. 

The district court considered Sergeant Langan's twenty-five years of service as

a police officer, his seventeen years in the Narcotics Unit, his fifteen years as a

supervisor in the Narcotics Unit, the number of training sessions and seminars in

narcotics investigations he has attended, the articles he has authored for lawenforcement journals, his service as an instructor in narcotics investigations at

different training academies, and the fact that he has testified as an expert witness in

federal and state courts over one hundred times. We are convinced that the district

court's determination as to Sergeant Langan's expert-witness status was proper under

Rule 702.

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III.

Second, Beltran-Arce alleges that Sergeant Langan's testimony was unduly

prejudicial and erroneously led the jury to conclude that Beltran-Arce was keeping

drug records. Beltran-Arce specifically objects to the testimony Sergeant Langan

offered regarding a seized notepad. Sergeant Langan testified that it contained

possible drug notes because numbers on the pad corresponded to certain drug

quantities commonly sold on the streets. Sergeant Langan testified that 250 is a

common amount associated with the sale of a quarter ounce of methamphetamine or

cocaine and that 900 could be an amount associated with an ounce sale of cocaine.

Langan's testimony, even as it related to the numerical notations, was limited

to his specialized knowledge that assisted the jury in its understanding of the

evidence and aided the jury to determine facts at issue. Therefore, the probative value

of Sergeant Langan's testimony substantially outweighed the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury. United States v. Martinez,

358 F.3d 1005, 1010 (8th Cir. 2004). Because Sergeant Langan's testimony was

relevant to show knowledge, and the probative value of the testimony was not

substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice, the district court did not

abuse its discretion by allowing the expert testimony. Id.

IV.

Third, Beltran-Arce argues that the prosecution failed to follow the notification

requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G), and the district court erred in its denial

of a mistrial based on the government's Rule 16 violations. We review a district

court's denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. United States v.

Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 983 (8th Cir. 1999).

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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (a)(1)(G) requires that the government

give the defendant a written summary of any expert testimony that the government

intends to use under Rules of Evidence 702, 703, or 705 during its case-in-chief at

trial. The summary must describe the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for

those opinions, and the witness's qualifications.

Here, in reference to Rule 16, the district court stated:

It seems to me that Rule 16(a)(1)(G) is a rule that is generally not very

well adhered to in this jurisdiction. It seems to me that it ought to be. It's

a reasonable request, by the defendant and is one that would be required

certainly in civil cases. And the purpose of the rule, generally speaking,

is to give the opponent an opportunity to know the testimony of the

expert witness in advance and then to be able to make a determination

whether deposition testimony ought to be taken or a counter-expert

should be retained.

The difficulty is in our practice that the request, quote unquote, is made

at the time of arraignment and certainly at the time of the arraignment

government's counsel hasn't developed his trial strategy. So then the

issue is when is a reasonable time that the government should provide

this information to defense counsel?

That issue has really never been broached in this jurisdiction as far as

I'm aware. This is the first time that it has come up at least in my court.

There's a progression order entered by the magistrate judge and I suspect

that it doesn't have any such deadlines in it. Can either of you tell me

whether it does?

As predicted by the district court, the progression order failed to address expert

witness disclosure deadlines. In order to remedy this understandable omission, the

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3 The reference to Mexico was made in the following context:

Q [Mr. Cryne]. . . . Can you explain how a typical distribution chain

would operate?

A [Sergeant Langan]. Typically the present situation in Omaha is this.

The vast majority of meth coming into Omaha is coming up from the

Country of Mexico into California –

Mr. O'Connor: Judge, I need a sidebar.

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district court "tr[ied] to figure out what a reasonable time [would be]." The court's

remedy was to require the government to provide the defense with a written summary

within twenty-four hours after Beltran-Arce lodged his Rule 16 discovery request.

The district court deemed the government's first attempt at compliance insufficient

to satisfy the requirements of Rule 16. Indeed, the district court required the

government to file three amendments to the summary before ruling that it was

sufficient.

We are satisfied that the government's written summary in the original notice

(and the three amended notices), which provided Beltran-Arce with a summary of the

witness's qualifications, his opinions, and the basis supporting his opinions, was

adequate to meet the notice deadlines imposed by Rule 16. However, our Rule 16

inquiry continues.

We next turn to Beltran-Arce's contention that Sergeant Langan's actual trial

testimony went beyond the scope of the Rule 16 summary provided by the

government. Sergeant Langan's testimony was mostly routine and substantially

tracked the summary report. However, the government did not disclose to BeltranArce that Sergeant Langan would testify that most methamphetamine comes into

Omaha from Mexico.3

 After this comment, the district court offered a cautionary

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instruction to the jury. Beltran-Arce claims this cautionary instruction could not erase

the "ethnic slant" that the government improperly utilized at trial. Beltran-Arce insists

that this undisclosed testimony prejudiced his case to such a degree that a mistrial

should have been ordered. We disagree.

Sergeant Langan's unsolicited mention of Mexico, albeit improper, was an

isolated statement. The district court promptly addressed Beltran-Arce's objection and

gave a curative instruction to the jury. The district court "is in a far better position to

weigh the effect of improper testimony." United States v. Davidson, 122 F.3d 531,

538 (8th Cir. 1997). As we have oft stated, "less drastic measures such as a cautionary

instruction are generally sufficient to alleviate prejudice flowing from improper

testimony." Id. The government made no additional use of Sergeant Langan's

undisclosed comment. Accordingly, we find that the curative instruction was an

adequate remedy and the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision not

to order the more drastic remedy of mistrial.

V. Booker Error

Beltran-Arce also attacks his sentence under United States v. Booker, 125 S.

Ct. 738 (2005). In Booker, the United States Supreme Court held, in part, that "[a]ny

fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence

exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a

jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt." 125 S. Ct. at 756. Beltran-Arce argues that his sentence violates

Booker because the court made factual findings concerning the quantity of drugs and

whether he possessed a firearm during the commission of at least one offense.

Beltran-Arce did not, however, object to the factual assertions made in the

presentence investigation report ("PSR"). "[A] fact in the PSR not specifically

objected to is admitted for purposes of Booker." United States v. McCully, 407 F.3d

931, 933 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)). 

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While there was no constitutional Booker error, by applying the Guidelines as

mandatory rather than advisory, the district court made a non-constitutional Booker

error. See United States v. Henderson, 408 F.3d 1078,79 (8th Cir. 2005). BeltranArce failed to argue for an advisory application of the Guidelines, and, thus, we

review for plain error. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (2005) (en banc).

Under our plain error analysis, Beltran-Arce is required to show "a 'reasonable

probability,' based on the appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would

have received a more favorable sentence" to show that his substantial rights were

affected. Id. at 552. (applying the third prong of the plain error test found in United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)). 

The Guidelines range for Beltran-Arce was between 235–293 months'

imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, counsel argued that even the low end of the

Guidelines was unfair and improper under the facts and circumstances of BeltranArce's case. The court explained that, while it would like to grant a downward

departure, it was not allowed under the Guidelines. Accordingly, the district court

sentenced Beltran-Arce to the lowest possible sentence under the Guidelines, 235

months. 

The fact that Beltran-Arce was sentenced at the bottom of the Guidelines range

"is insufficient, without more, to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the court

would have imposed a lesser sentence absent the Booker error." United States v.

Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 553 (8th Cir.2005). However, in this case, the record indicates

that the court would have given Beltran-Arce a lesser sentence had the Guidelines not

been mandatory. We are satisfied that there is a reasonable probability that the court

would have imposed a lesser sentence had it viewed the Guidelines as advisory in

conjunction with the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The record indicates that,

based on Betlran-Arce's factual situation, the district court was not content with

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recommended Guidelines range, and affirming the sentence despite the district court's

erroneous belief that the Guidelines were mandatory would "seriously affect[ ] the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." See United States v.

Rodriguez-Ceballos, 407 F.3d 937, 941–942 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). We

recognize that "there may be plain Booker errors that meet the third Olano factor but

not the fourth," Pirani, 406 F.3d at 554; however, we are persuaded that in this case

Beltran-Arce has satisfied the fourth prong. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Beltran-Arce's convictions, but reverse

and remand for resentencing.

______________________________

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