Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03244/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth Burton
Appellant
City of Columbia
Not Party
Michael Matthes
Not Party
Cavanaugh Noce
Not Party
Irene Maria Zimbobway Schwartze Bramblett
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3244

___________________________

Irene Maria Zimbobway Schwartze Bramblett

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

City of Columbia, Missouri; Michael Matthes

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants

Kenneth Burton

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

Cavanaugh Noce

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

____________

 Submitted: June 16, 2016

 Filed: August 4, 2016

____________

Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

SMITH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 15-3244 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/04/2016 Entry ID: 4433964 
Irene Maria Zimbobway Schwartze Bramblett ("Schwartze") sued the City of

Columbia, Missouri ("City"); City Manager Michael Matthes; Chief of Police

Kenneth Burton; and Deputy City Counselor Cavanaugh Noce, alleging, inter alia,

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the City violated her constitutional right to procedural

due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating her

employment. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court

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granted in part and denied in part. Relevant to the present appeal, the district court

denied the defense of qualified immunity asserted by Chief Burton in response to

Schwartze's procedural due process claim. Chief Burton now appeals the denial of 2

qualified immunity. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

I. Background

Schwartze is a former City employee. Prior to May 14, 2009, she worked as a

City police captain. On May 14, 2009, she was appointed temporary Emergency

Communications and Management Administrator ("ECM Administrator"). At the

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time of her appointment, she was approximately two years and nine months from

becoming eligible for retirement under the police pension plan. Schwartze would

have declined the ECM Administrator position if her acceptance would have affected

her police pension. To ensure that Schwartze's police-pension eligibility was

unaffected, she was paid for her work as ECM Administrator from the City Police

Department budget and remained a captain in the department. On October 5, 2009,

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

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Western District of Missouri. 

The district court dismissed Schwartze's claims against Noce, and Matthes has

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not appealed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. 

Although the title of this position changed to "Director of Public Safety Joint

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Communications and Emergency Management Director" in 2010, we will continue

to refer to the position as "ECM Administrator." 

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Bill Watkins, then acting City Manager, offered Schwartze a permanent position as

ECM Administrator. The terms ofthisjob offer were memorialized in a memorandum

("October 5, 2009 Memorandum"), which provided, in relevant part, as follows:

I am pleased to offer you the position of ECMA for the City of

Columbia. Should you agree to accept this offer the following are the

terms and conditions of your appointment as Emergency

Communications and Management Administrator.

You will remain a Columbia Police Department captain assigned to the

position of Emergency Communications and Management

Administrator. Your assignment will end when you first become eligible

to retire under the police pension plan. At that time you will have the

option of either being reassigned in the Police Department or retiring

under the police pension plan and continuing as the Emergency

Communications and Management Administrator. If you continue as

Administrator, you will be covered by the LAGERS retirement system.

You must inform me of your decision to return to the Police Department

or remain as Administrator at least six months before you first become

eligible for retirement under the police pension plan.

Of course, your assignment to the position of Administrator as well as

your option to continue as Administrator is subject to satisfactory job

performance.

The following day, Watkins sent a letter to the ECM Administrator Selection

Committee—of whichChief Burton was a member—that contained the relevant terms

of Schwartze's assignment to ECM Administrator. In relevant part, the letter provided

that

Captain Schwartze has a little over two yearsservice remaining with the

CPD until she is eligible to retire and has agreed to remain in this

position until that time. Her assignment will end when she becomes

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eligible to retire under the police pension plan. At that time, subject to

her continued satisfactory performance, she will have the option of

either being reassigned in the Police Department or retiring under the

police pension plan and continuing as the Emergency Communications

and Management Administrator covered by the LAGERS retirement

system.

Because her position as ECM Administrator was funded through a captain

position in the City Police Department, Schwartze was paid about $15,000 more than

the previous ECM Administrator. Section 21-19 of the Columbia City Ordinances

("City Ordinances") states that "[t]he chief of police shall have general supervision

and control of the department, including the enforcement of discipline among the

members thereof, and the instruction of the members in their duties." (Emphasis

added.) However, Schwartze performed no police duties and did not report to Chief

Burton after becoming ECM Administrator. She was paid from the City Police

Department budget. The police captain position was a "classified" position under the

City Ordinances. 

In May 2011, Matthes became the City Manager. At that time, the City was

operating at a nearly $3 million deficit. Matthes instituted a hiring freeze, and by

2012, the City had accumulated a $1.9 million surplus. During May and several times

thereafter, Schwartze indicated to Matthes her intention to retire from the City Police

Department in February 2012 and serve solely as the ECM Administrator. 

In late 2011 and early 2012, Eric Anderson, an independent consultant,

reviewed the administration of the City Police Department. As part of the review,

Anderson spoke with Schwartze who made statements critical of Chief Burton but

made no such comments of Matthes. Schwartze is unaware of anything that she said

to Anderson being relayed to Chief Burton or Matthes. 

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On January 18, 2012, after Schwartze's meeting with Anderson, Matthes told

Schwartze that he was considering eliminating the ECM Administrator position.

Schwartze asked Matthes whether she could return to the City Police Department as

a captain. Matthes indicated that he would think about it and get back to her. 

On February 2, 2012, Schwartze became eligible to draw police-pension

benefits. As provided in the October 5, 2009 Memorandum, Schwartze was to have

the option to remain as ECM Administrator or return to the City Police Department.

In February 2012, Matthes reiterated in a meeting with Schwartze that the City was

in the process of eliminating the ECM Administrator position. Matthes told

Schwartze that he had spoken with Chief Burton about the elimination of Schwartze's

position and her possible return to the City Police Department. Matthes told

Schwartze that returning to the City Police Department "was not an option" and "not

his decision to make." On February 6, 2012, Chief Burton e-mailed Matthes and

complained that Schwartze was "stonewalling."

On May 9, 2012, Matthes gave Schwartze two options. First, she could

voluntarily resign and retire from her job as ECM Administrator and begin drawing

her police pension. Second, if she declined the first option, her position would be

eliminated. Matthes gave Schwartze less than one hour to decide. Schwartze

consulted with her attorney and decided not to resign. After being informed of

Schwartze's decision, Matthes gave Schwartze a letter stating that she was on

administrative leave, effective immediately. At approximately5:00 p.m.,Matthessent

an e-mail to the mayor, City Council, and senior staff stating that Schwartze was on

paid administrative leave pending action on the next City Council meeting to amend

the budget. Chief Burton then sent an e-mail to the City Police Department stating

that Schwartze was no longer a City administrator and that her access to the building

was restricted to areas open to the general public unless she was accompanied by an

escort. After DeputyPolice Chief Stephen Monticellilearned of Schwartze'sremoval,

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he e-mailed Chief Burton, stating, "Wow, there has to be a story there? She step in

it again?" Chief Burton responded, "[W]e will talk later."

Section 19-238 ofthe City Ordinances provides that "grievances or complaints"

other than that regarding a poor job review "must be taken to the person who issued

the discipline. Unresolved grievances or complaints will proceed through the

department's chain of command as established by the department head." The

ordinance further provides that "[g]rievances or complaints must be taken to the

person who issued the discipline within seven (7) working days following knowledge

of the occurrence of the problem" and that "[t]he person who issued the discipline

shall have five (5) working days from receipt of the grievance or complaint to

respond in writing."

On May 17, 2012,Schwartze's attorney filed a "Grievance/Complaint/Appeal."

Schwartze addressed the grievance to, among others, Chief Burton. In the grievance,

Schwartze's attorney wrote, "Since Mr. Matthes is the one who purportedly took the

action asto Zim, the Grievance/Complaint/Appeal is directed to him, at the first level,

as provided for by 'Step 1' of Section 19-238 ofthe City's Ordinances. However, since

Chief Burton was her immediate superior, such Grievance/Complaint/ Appeal is also

directed to him, as a part of Step 1." (Emphasis added.)

On June 4, 2012, the City Council voted to eliminate the ECM Administrator

position. But, before that date, Matthes had indicated to Schwartze that even if the

City Council did not eliminate the position, he would not change his decision to

terminate Schwartze. 

On June 11, 2012, Matthes denied Schwartze's complaint. On June 14, 2012,

Schwartze requested a hearing before the Personnel Advisory Board ("Board"). The

City informed Schwartze that layoffs are not subject to hearings before the Board. At

no time did Chief Burton respond to the grievance and request for hearing.

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City Ordinance § 19-211 states that laid off employees will be given "first

consideration" for the position that was eliminated or similar positions. Employees

entitled to first consideration appear on a reemployment list. Following Schwartze's

separation of employment from the City, Schwartze asked to be placed on the

reemployment list. Captain positions opened in August 2012 and September 2012,

but both positions were filed internally. In October 2012, Schwartze applied for the

deputy chief of police position and was considered but not selected. 

Relevant to the present appeal, Schwartze filed a procedural due process claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Chief Burton, contending that he violated her

procedural due process rights when he terminated her from her job as ECM

Administrator and refused to let her return to a job at the City Police Department.

Chief Burton moved for summary judgment on the claim, asserting qualified

immunity. The district court denied Chief Burton qualified immunity. First, the court

found that Schwartze had a property interest in her employment under § 19-237 of the

City Ordinances, which sets forth a "just cause" requirement mandating that a

classified employee receive due process prior to termination. Chief Burton conceded

for purposes of summary judgment that Schwartze was a classified employee.

Therefore, the court found that she was entitled to due process prior to being

separated from her job for reasons other than a layoff. 

Second, the court found that a factual dispute existed asto whether Schwartze's

position was terminated because of (1) a lack of funds or curtailment of work or (2)

some other reason. Although the City repeatedly told Schwartze that she was being

laid off and her position as ECM Administrator was being eliminated, the City

conceded other facts that the district court found supported Schwartze's claimthat her

layoff was a pretext for unlawful termination. As an example, the court cited Chief

Burton's belief "that Schwartze had made comments critical of him and how he ran

the Columbia Police Department and thought that she was a contributor to the toxic

supervisory culture." 

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Third, the court found that the predeprivation process afforded Schwartze was

insufficient if she wasfired instead of laid off. Fourth, it concluded that assuming the

layoff was a pretext for Schwartze's termination, she was also denied sufficient

postdeprivation process. 

Finally, the court rejected Chief Burton's assertion that he was entitled to

qualified immunity on the procedural due process claim, stating:

Burton contends that he is individually entitled to summary

judgment on this claim because Schwartze has presented no evidence

that he was involved in the decision to eliminate the ECM[]

Administrator position, terminate Schwartze, or not allow her to return

to the Police Department. However, Schwartze has presented facts to

indicate that Burton had conversations with Matthes about the decision

to terminate Schwartze. Moreover, Schwartze contends that Matthes

informed her that he was not the one responsible for deciding whether

Schwartze could be reemployed at the Police Department. It can be

reasonably inferred from these facts that Burton, the Police Chief, was

involved in making this decision. In addition, there are facts to support

an inference that Burton had a negative relationship with Schwartze.

Given the factual disputes regarding Burton's role in Schwartze's

termination, he is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Chief Burton argues that the district court erred in denying him

qualified immunity. He asserts that the district court's ruling erroneously equates

"having a role in the decision to lay-off Plaintiff Schwartze (pretexual or otherwise)

. . . with the City and City Manager's determination that Schwartze was not entitled

to pre or post deprivation due process." According to Chief Burton, such a holding

"imposes a duty and obligation on each and every state actor acting under color of

law to personally provide adequate due process by virtue of having any role in the

decision to separate a governmental employee's employment . . . ." Chief Burton

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contends that he "is entitled to qualified immunity because he played no role in the

decision not to provide Schwartze with due process and had no clearly established

duty to provide due process or intervene to ensure the City Manager and/or the City's

legal department provided due process."

Schwartze has moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on two

grounds. First, she argues that an interlocutory appeal after the denial of a

summary-judgment motion as to qualified immunity is only allowed where there are

issues of law and no disputed issues of fact. According to Schwartze, Chief Burton's

qualified-immunity appeal clearly argues disputed issues of fact. Second, Schwartze

contends that Chief Burton has raised for the first time on appeal the argument that

the decision to terminate Schwartze's employment was unrelated to the decision not

to provide Schwartze any procedural due process. 

A government official is shielded from liability by qualified immunity "unless

his conduct violates 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.'" Mallak v. City of Baxter, 823 F.3d 441, 445

(8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Whether

a government official is entitled to qualified immunity should be resolved "at the

earliest possible stage in litigation." Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227

(1991)). When the parties do not dispute the relevant facts, "a court should always be

able to determine as a matter of law whether or not an officer is eligible for qualified

immunity . . . ." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201

F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000)). "We review de novo a district court's denial of

summary judgment based on qualified immunity." Id. (quotation and citation

omitted). 

While "[a]n order denying qualified immunity can be immediately appealable

despite the fact that it is interlocutory," "our interlocutory jurisdiction is limited." Id.

at 445–46 (citing Cooper v. Martin, 634 F.3d 477, 479–80 (8th Cir. 2011); Johnson

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v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1995)). When a district court denies a defendant

summary judgment based on qualified immunity, that defendant "may appeal the

'purely legal issue' of 'whether the facts alleged . . . support a claim of violation of

clearly established law.'" Id. at 446 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S.

at 313). But a defendant is prohibited from appealing the district court's denial of

summary judgment based on qualified immunity when such denial is premised on a

determination that "the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial." Id.

(quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20). In summary, "we may hear an appeal of an

order denying qualified immunity where the record plainly forecloses the district

court's finding of a material factual dispute." Id. 

"[K]ey factual questions in the present case are both material and disputed."

See id. Chief Burton does not challenge on appeal that he had a role as a

decisionmaker in terminating Schwartze or that Schwartze had a property interest in

her employment for which she was entitled to due process; instead, he argues that he

was not the decisionmaker responsible for providing her with due process. But the

extent of Chief Burton's role as a decisionmaker and his due-process obligations to

Schwartze are unresolved factual questions.

Because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Chief Burton's role in

the termination of Schwartze, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified

immunity.

4

Even if material factual disputes do not preclude jurisdiction, we agree with 4

Schwartze that Chief Burton raised for the first time on appeal his argument that the

decision to terminate Schwartze's employment is separate and distinct from the

decision not to provide Schwartze any procedural due process. "Ordinarily, we do not

consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal." Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

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III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

______________________________

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