Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03083/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03083-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Genthe
Appellant
Quebecor World Lincoln
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3083

___________

Michael Genthe, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Quebecor World Lincoln, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 13, 2004

 Filed: September 7, 2004

___________

Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Michael Genthe appeals from the district court’s1

 entry of judgment as a matter

of law on two claims that Genthe’s employer, Quebecor World Lincoln (Quebecor),

unlawfully failed to promote him because it regarded him as having an impairment

that substantially limited a major life activity, in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12117 et seq. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
2

Prior to Quebecor’s purchase of the factory from American Signature, the J-2

position was divided into three different roles: J-2, “heavy” and “light.” As the name

implies, a “heavy” was required to do most of the heavy lifting in the factory. Genthe

was successfully employed as a “heavy” until the positions were merged into the J-2

role.

-2-

Since the age of one, Genthe has suffered from Marfan’s Syndrome, which is

a connective tissue disorder that can manifest itself in various ways. In Genthe’s

case, he has been left with some curvature of the spine, subluxation of the lenses of

the eyes, damage to his aorta, long extremities, and a sunken chest. Notwithstanding

the effects of the syndrome, Genthe had worked, with some accommodation regarding

limitations on lifting and on overtime hours, for the seven years prior to the initiation

of this lawsuit as a Journeyman II Apprentice (J-2) in Quebecor’s bindery factory.2

J-2s were commonly called upon to assist with the operation of the various machines

in the bindery factory; to lift and move heavy bundles alone or with other employees;

to see accurately and to possess good near, distance, and color vision; and to

frequently work overtime. 

Genthe applied for promotions to the Journeyman I Apprentice (J-1) position

and to the Forklift Operator position, stating that he wanted these promotions because

they were less physically demanding and required less overtime. After Quebecor

denied his requests for promotion, Genthe brought suit, alleging nine claims of

discrimination under the ADA. The jury found in favor of Quebecor on all but two

of the claims. On claim four, the jury found that Quebecor had regarded Genthe’s

impairments as substantially limiting him in one or more of his major life activities;

that Quebecor’s perception of these impairments was a motivating factor in its

decision not to transfer Genthe to the Forklift Operator position; but that nonetheless

Quebecor would not have transferred him because he was not the most qualified

applicant for that position. On claim five, the jury found that Quebecor had refused

to transfer Genthe to the Journeyman I Apprentice position because of its similar

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
-3-

perceptions and motivation and awarded Genthe damages in the amount of $3,302.72.

The district court then granted Quebecor’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law.

Arabian Agriculture Services Co. v. Chief Industries, Inc., 309 F.3d 479, 482 (8th

Cir. 2002). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where the evidence adduced

at trial is entirely insufficient to support the verdict. Id. In making this

determination, we consider all of the evidence in the record without weighing

credibility, and we resolve conflicts and make all reasonable inferences in favor of

the non-moving party. Id. An inference is reasonable, however, when it “may be

drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation.” Id. (quoting Fought v. Hayes

Wheels International, Inc., 101 F.3d 1275, 1277 (8th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Credence should also be given to evidence favoring the moving

party where that evidence is uncontradicted and unimpeached and comes from

disinterested witnesses. Kinserlow v. CMI Corp., 217 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (8th Cir.

2000) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151

(2000)).

The ADA prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual with a

disability because of the disability ... in regard to hiring, advancement or discharge.”

42 U.S.C. 12112(a); Shipley v. City of University City, 195 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir.

1999). A “qualified individual” is a person who, “with or without reasonable

accommodation can perform the essential functions” of the position he or she seeks.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). A disability is “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual . . . .”

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Moreover, an individual is considered disabled under the

ADA if he or she has a record of such an impairment or is “regarded as having” such

an impairment. Id. “[M]ajor life activity means ‘functions such as caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and

working.’” Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir.

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
-4-

1996) (quoting the non-exclusive enumeration of major life activities from 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(i)). 

To survive Quebecor’s post-trial motion, Genthe must have introduced

evidence from which the jury could determine 1) that he was regarded as having an

impairment that limited a major life activity, 2) that he was a qualified individual, and

3) that he was not promoted because he was regarded as having an impairment that

limited a major life activity. Longen v. Waterous Co., 347 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir.

2003). The district court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the

jury’s finding that he was regarded as having such an impairment or that he was

passed over for promotion because of that perception. 

Genthe argues that the district court improperly required him to introduce

direct evidence supporting those two propositions, which, he maintains, is not

necessary in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,

539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (holding that in order to receive a mixed motive instruction

under Title VII, “a plaintiff need only produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable

jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [his or her protected status]

was a motivating factor for any employment practice”). We need not reach this

question, however, because we conclude that there was no evidence, direct or

circumstantial, indicating that Genthe was regarded as having a limiting impairment

or that he was passed over for promotion because of such an impairment. Cf.

Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir. 2003)

(holding that claim could not proceed because of the lack of direct or circumstantial

evidence without deciding effect of Desert Palace). 

With respect to Genthe’s request for promotion to Forklift Operator, the

evidence indicated that Dennis Hruza had sole discretion to decide whether to

promote Kathy Sieck, a co-worker, or Genthe to the position. He interviewed both

Sieck and Genthe and testified that he selected Sieck because she had experience in

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
-5-

material handling and Genthe did not. There is evidence that Hruza was told of some

of Genthe’s health problems on two occasions. First, Hruza testified that during his

interview with Genthe, Genthe mentioned that he had a heart condition and believed

that working as a Forklift Operator would be less physically strenuous than his

position as a J-2. When asked whether Genthe’s heart condition was a factor in his

decision-making process, Hruza said no. Second, one of Genthe’s evaluations,

prepared by Connie Melichar, a co-worker referred to her impression that Genthe was

legally blind. There is no evidence that Hruza saw or considered this comment in his

decision-making process. In fact, he stated that he ignored the evaluation. In the

light most favorable to Genthe, then, the evidence shows that Hruza regarded him as

having some health conditions that impaired him and that Hruza decided not to

promote him. Genthe argues that this coincidence is sufficient circumstantial

evidence of both a perception that his impairment was substantially limiting of a

major life activity and of a causal connection between that perception and the adverse

employment action. We disagree, for no reasonable juror could infer from this

evidence, without resorting to speculation, that the denial of Genthe’s request for

promotion was in any way caused by a perception that he had an impairment which

limited a major life activity. Our cases require both evidence of protected status and

of a causal relationship between that status and the adverse employment decision.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in entering judgment as

a matter of law.

As for Genthe’s request to be promoted to the Journeyman position, the

analysis is the same, although there were more people involved in the decisionmaking process regarding that position. Rather than a single person exercising sole

authority to promote, a committee (composed of half labor representatives and half

company officials) made the determination to pass Genthe over for promotion.

Again, the decision makers knew of certain aspects of Genthe’s physical condition,

including that he had a heart problem, that he at times had lifting and overtime

accommodations, and that his vision had been questioned by Ms. Melichar. In the

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
-6-

light most favorable to Genthe, then, the committee members regarded him as having

some impairments at the time they decided not to promote him. This was the sum

total of the evidence upon which the jury could base its verdict. We conclude that

this evidence is insufficient to support, without resort to speculation, the inferences

that Genthe was regarded as having an impairment which limited a major life activity

or that he was passed over for promotion because of that perception.

Finally, Genthe argues that the district court committed plain error in its jury

charge regarding Genthe’s allegation that he was discriminated against because he

had a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. “Plain

error review is narrow and confined to the exceptional case where error has seriously

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The

verdict should be reversed only if the error prejudices the substantial rights of a party

and would result in a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected.” BBSerCo, Inc. v.

Metrix Co., 324 F.3d 955, 960 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport

Industries, Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 2002)). Without deciding whether the

district court’s instructions were erroneous, we conclude that reversal would not be

appropriate in any event because Genthe has failed to establish any facts upon which

the jury could base a determination that he had a record of an impairment that limited

a major life activity or that such a record of impairment caused any adverse

employment action. Genthe points only to his non-permanent vision problems and

his occasional seizures (by his own admission, none occurred between November

1997 and the summer of 2000) as evidence of a record of impairment. He does not

cite any facts in the record from which a jury could determine that these impairments

limited him in a major life activity, because, but for short periods of convalescence,

he had successfully performed the position of J-2 – which required that he be able to

work, think, read, and lift, among other things – for the seven years preceding

initiation of this law suit. Additionally, he fails to point us to any adverse

employment action that was caused by this alleged record of impairment. We note

too that, given the jury’s rejection of his actual disability claim and our decision with

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
-7-

respect to his perceived disability claim, “it is virtually inconceivable that the jury

would have found for [him] on a record of disability theory.” Weber v. Strippit, Inc.,

186 F.3d 907, 915 (8th Cir. 1999).

The judgment is affirmed.

BYE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join the majority’s decision affirming the district court’s grant of judgment

as a matter of law as to the forklift operator position. But, because I believe there was

sufficient evidence for the jury to find in favor of Genthe as to the J-1 position, I

dissent from that portion of the opinion. 

Michael Genthe suffers from Marfan’s Syndrome, a genetic disorder affecting

the body’s connective tissue. The syndrome affects the entire body but is most

noticeable in its effects on the musculoskeletal system, eyes and cardiovascular

system. Outward manifestations include an elongated skeletal structure, curvature of

the spine and sunken chest. The condition frequently leads to myopia, subluxation

of the lenses in the eyes, and stretching of blood vessels and arteries. Genthe has

suffered from Marfan’s since the age of one. At age sixteen he underwent surgery to

replace part of his ascending aorta which had stretched to the point an aneurysm was

imminent. Genthe also underwent valve replacement surgery to prevent blood from

back-flowing into his heart. The surgeries left him prone to strokes so he takes

blood-thinning medication and undergoes yearly visits with a cardiologist to monitor

the condition. Despite these problems, Genthe is able to work and for purposes of

this appeal does not contend he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 

In 1993, Genthe began working for American Signature, a printing company,

in its bindery department. Genthe worked as a “heavy,” unloading stacks of magazine

parts for insertion into a binder machine and then loading the finished product into

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
-8-

mail bags. The job frequently required him to lift up to seventy pounds and work

overtime up to sixty hours. Genthe also worked periodically as a “light,” making sure

the magazine sections loaded into the binder by heavies were placed in the correct

slots. The job of a light requires light lifting and the ability to read and follow

directions so the magazines are properly configured. Both heavies and lights are

supervised by a Journeyman I or Journeyman I Apprentice who operates the binder

and is responsible for meeting production goals. In January 1997, Quebecor

purchased American Signature and retained Genthe. Quebecor combined the

positions of heavies and lights into a single position nominated Journeyman II but did

not significantly change Genthe’s job requirements. 

In the summer of 1997, Genthe began experiencing significant atrial fibrillation

at work. In July 1997, he suffered a suspected stroke and was hospitalized. After

being released, Genthe began suffering seizures lasting several minutes and occurring

at least three times per week. The seizures affected his ability to work and in

November 1997, Genthe was again hospitalized following a seizure. Thereafter,

Genthe was prescribed anti-seizure medication and released from work until he was

seizure-free for at least six months. In order to qualify for short term disability,

Genthe provided Quebecor with his complete medical file documenting his health

problems. He also met with Warren Lesco, head of Human Relations, to discuss his

medical condition and provide him with information about Marfan’s Syndrome. 

Genthe returned to Quebecor in April 1998, with a twenty-pound lifting

restriction and orders to work no more than forty hours per week. In May 1998,

Genthe underwent eye surgery after the lens in his right eye dislocated. Genthe had

no further problems with seizures (save for one episode in 2001) but suffered severe

episodes of tachycardia. In August 1999, his cardiologist performed an ablation

procedure on the AV-node reentry in his heart which reduced the frequency of his

tachycardia. 

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
-9-

By March 2000, Genthe’s health had improved and he requested a letter from

his physician allowing him to increase his work hours. The physician responded with

a letter indicating Genthe was free to work overtime up to sixty hours per week if he

wished. Quebecor, however, complained the letter left the decision about how many

hours Genthe would work up to him, and asked for a letter establishing a specific

limit on the number of hours he could work. Apparently, no such letter was

forthcoming but Quebecor increased Genthe’s hours and required him frequently to

work sixty hours per week. Genthe concluded he could not regularly work sixty

hours and filed a grievance. Eventually, Genthe’s treating physician restricted him

to a forty-eight-hour work week and imposed a fifty-pound lifting restriction. 

It is against this backdrop that in April 2000, Genthe applied for promotion to

the J-I position. The position involved more pay and was less physically demanding

than Genthe’s current position. Steve Fructl, Bindery Department Head, announced

four openings for J-Is. Eight such positions were expected to be filled but Fructl

chose to begin by advertising only four. The selection process required candidates

to be interviewed by a Journeyman Apprentice Committee (JAC) made up of an equal

number of union and management representatives. Among others, Fructl, Lesco and

union vice president Pete Pietrowski sat on the JAC. After conducting interviews and

reviewing information submitted by the candidates, their supervisors, and Human

Relations, the JAC would submit its selections to Fructl for final approval. 

 

Genthe interviewed in June 2000, and during the interview several questions

were raised about his medical condition. Following the interview, the JAC met to

discuss the candidates and several comments and questions relating to Genthe’s

medical condition arose. One JAC member questioned Genthe’s vision and another

expressed concern over whether he would be able to handle the stress of the position.

Another co-worker indicated Genthe “has a hard time sometimes with his job due to

health reasons. Can’t work overtime because of health.” Still another co-worker

stated Genthe was only able to work thirty-six hours. At his deposition, Fructl denied

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
3

Fructl denied the conversation but the jury was free to disregard Fructl’s

testimony and accept Genthe’s version of the events. 

-10-

that Genthe’s medical condition was discussed at the JAC meeting. Later, after

Pietowski’s handwritten notes from the meeting contradicted Fructl’s claim, he

admitted the discussions occurred. At trial, Fructl testified he did not take Genthe’s

medical condition into account in making a hiring decision and admonished JAC

members not to base a hiring decision on any perceived disability. Pietrowski,

however, testified he was the one who told JAC members not to consider Genthe’s

physical problems. Genthe was not hired for the J-I position but was named first

alternate, meaning he would be immediately promoted if a position opened up within

the next ninety days. 

At about this same time, Fructl hired a fifth J-I from outside the company.

Randy Deahn, a former Quebecor J-I employee, was not required to go through the

interview process and was hired ahead of Genthe. At trial, Fructl contended Deahn

may have been hired before Genthe was named first alternate but Pietrowski testified

he did not see Deahn at Quebecor until after the four J-I positions were filled. The

union filed a grievance and in November 2000 reached a tentative settlement whereby

Quebecor would promote the first alternate to J-I. Union president Richard Conn and

vice president Pietrowski testified they believed Quebecor did not realize Genthe was

the first alternate. Fructl told Genthe if he could work forty-eight hours and lift fifty

pounds he would be promoted.3

 Later, however, in January 2001, Genthe was

advised he would not be promoted unless he could produce a note indicating he could

work sixty hours. Genthe did not believe he was capable of consistently working

sixty hours and requested an accommodation allowing him to work forty-eight hours.

Genthe argued a sixty-hour work week was not an essential function of the position

and produced evidence showing Quebecor had accommodated other J-Is by allowing

them to work only fifty hours. In the end, Genthe was not promoted. 

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
-11-

The majority concludes this evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s

conclusion that Quebecor regarded Genthe as disabled. I respectfully disagree. 

Quebecor was aware Genthe suffered from Marfan’s and that beginning in

1997 he experienced serious health problems, including a stroke, seizures, and heart

problems. These health problems culminated in a six-month absence from work

during which time Genthe collected disability insurance. When Genthe returned to

work, he was limited in the number of hours he could work and the amount he could

lift. Quebecor was also aware Genthe suffered from vision problems. Genthe had

two surgeries to replace the lenses in his eyes and at least two co-employees

questioned whether he was fit for promotion due to vision problems. Additionally,

during the J-I selection process several comments were made about Genthe’s health

problems, including problems with his vision, heart and ability to work overtime. 

There is also evidence suggesting Quebecor’s proffered reasons for refusing

to promote Genthe to the J-I position were pretextual. After naming Genthe as first

alternate, Quebecor ignored its own established procedures and hired a fifth J-I from

outside the company. Quebecor officials suggested the hiring decision was made

before Genthe was named as an alternate, but other evidence contradicts the claim.

For JAML purposes, contested evidence contrary to the verdict must be disregarded.

Later, after Quebecor agreed to promote the first alternate, Genthe was told he would

only be promoted if he could work up to sixty hours per week. Previously, however,

despite being unable to regularly work sixty hours per week, Quebecor found Genthe

qualified for the position and named him first alternate. The fact that Quebecor

obviously found him qualified but later imposed additional job requirements renders

the decision suspect.

In order to find in favor of Genthe it was not enough for the jury to conclude

Quebecor regarded him as disabled. Rather, Genthe had to prove Quebecor regarded

him as disabled within the meaning of the ADA, i.e., substantially limited in a major

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855 
-12-

life activity. According to the regulations that guide the interpretation of the ADA,

an impairment is “substantially limiting” if it renders an individual unable to perform

a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or

if it significantly restricts the condition, manner, or duration under which an

individual can perform such an activity compared to the general population. 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). Major life activities include caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and

working, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), as well as sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching.

Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1999). Several

factors are considered in determining whether a person is substantially limited in a

major life activity: 1) the nature and severity of the impairment; 2) its duration or

anticipated duration; and 3) its long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).

Much of the evidence presented in this case was conflicting and circumstantial, and

Genthe could have done a better job explaining what major life activity he claims

Quebecor believed he could not fully perform. Nevertheless, after considering the

evidence, the jury concluded Quebecor failed to promote Genthe because it regarded

him as disabled within the meaning of the ADA. While the jury could have easily

reached a different conclusion, I disagree with the district court’s holding that there

was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. Accordingly, I would reverse the

district court’s grant of JAML on this claim, reinstate the jury’s verdict, and remand

for consideration of Genthe’s post-trial motions. I join the majority opinion in all

other respects. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-3083 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/07/2004 Entry ID: 1807855