Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00023/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00023-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Homeland Security
Defendant
Loren Ishi
Defendant
Transportation Security Administration
Defendant
Jennifer Zamora
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JENNIFER ZAMORA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, LOREN 

ISHII, and DOES 1-20, 

 Defendants. 

_____________________________/ 

No. Civ. S-07-023 RRB EFB 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Jennifer Zamora (“Zamora”) filed an action against the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the Transportation 

Security Administration (“TSA”) and Loren Ishii (“Ishii”) 

(collectively “Defendants”) alleging harassment, retaliation and 

hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964 (“Title VII”). Defendants now move to dismiss pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(1) on the ground that subject matter jurisdiction 

is lacking. Alternatively, Defendants move to dismiss pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(5) on the ground that service of process was not 

Case 2:07-cv-00023-JAM-EFB Document 22 Filed 01/24/08 Page 1 of 9
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properly effected. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS 

the motion.1

I. BACKGROUND 

 Zamora is a former employee of the DHS employed by the TSA 

as a security screener assigned to the Sacramento International 

Airport. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 8, 9. Ishii was Zamora’s supervisor. 

Id. ¶ 5, 9. In the spring and summer of 2003, Zamora alleges 

that she was subjected to sexual harassment by Ishii in the form 

of unwanted touching, inappropriate comments, romantic 

solicitations, favoritism, verbal and written expressions of 

affection and demands to spend time together outside of work. 

Id. 10. Zamora alleges that she complained to TSA management 

about the harassment but TSA failed to investigate or take any 

action to stop it. Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Zamora alleges that the 

harassment escalated after she complained to management. Id. ¶ 

12. 

 On or about June 30, 2003, Zamora filed an administrative 

charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

 

1

 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

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Commission (“EEOC”) alleging sexual harassment and hostile work 

environment. Compl. ¶ 15. Around the same time, Zamora also 

filed a complaint with TSA’s ombudsman. Id. ¶ 16. Zamora 

alleges that TSA retaliated against her for filing these 

complaints by withholding wages and benefits and then by 

terminating her. Id. ¶¶ 16-18. 

 On or about October 29, 2003, Zamora filed a formal 

complaint with the EEOC alleging harassment, reprisal and 

hostile work environment under Title VII. Compl. ¶ 8. After 

the TSA completed an investigation, on or about April 9, 2005, 

Zamora formally requested a hearing before the EEOC. Id. On or 

about October 17, 2005, an administrative law judge issued a 

notice of intent to issue a decision without a hearing in favor 

of Zamora. Id. Following the TSA’s opposition to the 

administrative law judge’s notice of intent, a new order was 

issued on or about April 10, 2006, determining that a hearing 

was necessary because material facts were in dispute. Id. 

Then, before a hearing could take place, Zamora requested to 

withdraw her EEOC complaint in order to pursue a claim in 

federal court. Id. On May 31, 2006, the EEOC granted Zamora’s 

request and her case was dismissed without prejudice by 

administrative judge Caitlin A. Schneider (“Schneider”). Decl. 

of Ernest Robert Wright (“Wright”), Exh, B. In Judge 

Schneider’s dismissal order, Zamora was specifically informed 

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that she could either seek reinstatement of her complaint with 

the EEOC within thirty-days or file an action in federal court. 

Id. On June 5, 2006, Judge Schneider also informed Zamora, via 

written correspondence, that her case was officially closed 

based on her request to withdraw her complaint and pursue an 

action in federal court. Compl., Exh. C. On January 4, 2007, 

Zamora filed the instant action alleging sexual harassment, 

retaliation and hostile work environment under Title VII. Id. 

¶¶ 24-37. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard 

 As an initial matter, because the question of whether 

Zamora’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations is not a 

jurisdictional question,2

 it should have been raised through a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 

not a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

See Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 

n.2 (9th Cir. 1995). The court therefore will treat the instant 

motion as one for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 

 

2

 See Conkle v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1333, 1336 n.5 (10th Cir. 

2003) (“While it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing 

suit in federal district court, the ninety-day filing 

requirement ‘is a condition precedent to suit that functions 

like a statute of limitations.’ ”) 

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 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion essentially tests whether a 

cognizable claim has been pled in the complaint. Under Rule 

12(b)(6), a complaint “should not be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] 

claim which would entitle [them] to relief.” Hughes v. Rowe, 

449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 

F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). All material allegations in the 

complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec 

Lit., 183 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 1999). But “the court [is not] 

required to accept as true allegations that are merely 

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. 

If a claim is barred by the applicable state statute of 

limitations, dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. 

Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 

2000). “A motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute 

of limitations period may be granted only if the assertions of 

the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not 

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” 

Supermail Cargo, 68 F.3d at 1206 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “In fact, a complaint cannot be dismissed unless it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 

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facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Id. at 

1207. 

B. Timely Filing of Civil Action 

 Defendant argues that dismissal is appropriate because 

Zamora did not file the instant action within ninety-days of 

final agency action taken on her EEOC complaint. 

 Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is 

unlawful for “an employer . . . to discriminate against any 

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 

or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 USC § 2000e2(a)(1); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th 

Cir. 2000). To be timely, a Title VII civil action based on sex 

discrimination must be filed within 90-days of receipt of notice 

of final action taken on a complaint of discrimination based on 

sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); see Farrell v. Principi, 366 F.3d 

1066, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When an agency issues a notice of 

final action to a federal employee alleging employment 

discrimination, the claimant may seek de novo review of the 

disposition of his administrative complaint by filing a civil 

action in district court within 90-days); Conkle, 352 F.3d at 

1336 (a federal employee must file a discrimination action in 

federal district court within 90-days of receipt of notice of 

final action taken by the EEOC).3

 

3

 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) provides, in relevant part, that a 

federal employee plaintiff may file a civil lawsuit in federal 

court either: (1) 90 days after a final decision by an agency, 

or a final decision by the EEOC of an appeal of an agency’s 

final decision; or (2) 180 days after filing an initial 

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When a federal employee alleging a complaint of 

discrimination requests a hearing, the EEOC must appoint an 

administrative judge to conduct a hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 

1614.109(a). An administrative judge may dismiss an EEOC 

complaint on their own initiative, after notice to the parties, 

or upon an agency’s motion to dismiss a complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 

1614.109(b). “If an agency does not issue a final order within 

40 days of receipt of the administrative judge’s decision . . . 

then the decision of the administrative judge shall become the 

final action of the agency.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(i). 

The 90-day period to file a civil action after final agency 

action is a statute of limitations. Nelmida v. Shelly 

Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1997); see Conkle, 

352 F.3d at 1336 n.5 (“While it is not a jurisdictional 

prerequisite to filing suit in federal district court, the 

ninety-day filing requirement ‘is a condition precedent to suit 

that functions like a statute of limitations’ ”). Therefore, if 

a claimant fails to file the civil action within the 90-day 

period, the action is time-barred. Nelmida, 112 F.3d at 383. 

In the present case, Zamora’s EEOC complaint was dismissed 

without prejudice on May 31, 2006. Decl. of Wright, Exh. B.4

 In 

 

complaint with an agency, or 180 days after filing an appeal of 

an agency’s final decision, if no final decision by the agency, 

or EEOC decision on the appeal has occurred within those 180 

days. 

4

 On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court 

may take judicial notice of facts outside the pleadings 

including records and reports of administrative bodies. Mack v. 

South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 

1986), overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 (1991). Documents 

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this dismissal order, Zamora was specifically informed that she 

could either pursue her case with the EEOC by requesting 

reinstatement within thirty-days or file an action in federal 

court. Id. On June 5, 2006, Zamora was informed via written 

correspondence that her case was officially closed by the EEOC 

due to her request to withdraw her complaint and pursue an action 

in federal court. Compl., Exh. 3.5 Neither the DHS nor the TSA 

further addressed Zamora’s claim. Thus, forty-days after the 

May 31, 2006 dismissal – on July 10, 2006 - the dismissal became 

the “final” agency action. As such, Zamora was required to file 

her civil action within ninety-days from July 10, 2006. Zamora 

failed to do so. 

For this reason, the court concludes that the instant 

action is time-barred because it was filed on January 4, 2007; 

nearly six-months after the ninety-day filing limit. See Wiley 

v. Johnson, 436 F.Supp.2d 91, 96-97 (D.D.C. 2006).6

 

susceptible to judicial notice may be considered in deciding a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 

F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2003). The court may properly look beyond 

the complaint to matters of public record and doing so does not 

convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment. 

Mack, 798 F.2d at 1282. 

 

5

 Documents attached to the complaint and incorporated 

therein by reference are treated as part of the complaint for 

purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In re Colonial Mortg. 

Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d at 15. 

6

 While the ninety-day period within which to file a civil 

action after dismissal of the charge by the EEOC is a statute of 

limitations subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, 

Nelmida, 112 F.3d at 384, the court concludes that equitable 

tolling is inappropriate under the circumstances. This is so 

because Zamora failed to meet her burden to plead and prove any 

equitable excuse for failing to meet the ninety-day filing 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS the motion 

to dismiss.7

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2008. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

 

period. See Wiley, 436 F.Supp.2d at 96. Instead, Zamora simply 

argues, without authority, that her action is timely because the 

ninety-day filing period was never triggered as final agency 

action was never taken on her EEOC complaint. The court 

disagrees. As discussed above, final agency action was taken on 

Zamora’s EEOC complaint when a final order was not issued within 

forty days of Judge Schneider’s decision to dismiss the 

complaint. As such, Zamora’s claim is time-barred unless the 

doctrine of equitable tolling applies. The court concludes that 

it does not. Zamora is not entitled to equitable relief because 

her failure to file a timely claim was due to a lack of due 

diligence. See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 

147, 151, (1984) (federal courts have typically extended 

equitable relief only sparingly, including situations where the 

claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a 

defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the 

complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s 

misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. Federal 

courts, however, have been less forgiving in receiving late 

filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in 

preserving her legal rights). 

7

 Because this action is dismissed as untimely, the court 

need not address Defendants’ alternative argument for dismissal.

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