Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01022/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01022-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Respondent
State of Utah
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 16, 2004 Decided February 24, 2004

No. 03-1018

MARGENE BULLCREEK, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE, L.L.C. AND

SKULL VALLEY BAND OF GOSHUTE INDIANS,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

No. 03-1022

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

–————

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 1 of 12
2

Thomas R. Lee argued the cause for petitioners. With him

on the briefs were Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General,

Attorney General’s Office of the State of Utah, Monte N.

Stewart, Special Assistant Attorney General, Denise Chancellor and Connie Nakahara, Assistant Attorneys General, and

Paul C. EchoHawk.

Grace H. Kim, Attorney, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, argued the cause for respondent U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. With her on the brief were Karen D.

Cyr, General Counsel, John F. Cordes, Jr., Solicitor, and E.

Leo Slaggie, Deputy Solicitor.

Jay E. Silberg argued the cause for intervenors. With him

on the brief was Tim Vollmann.

Before: ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The issue on appeal is whether

§ 10155(h) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 10101 et seq., repealed or superseded the authority of the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (‘‘NRC’’) under the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq., to license the

storage of private spent nuclear fuel at privately owned awayfrom-reactor storage facilities. The State of Utah and others

challenged the NRC’s jurisdiction to grant a private license to

develop and operate a private away-from-reactor storage

facility on the ground that § 10155(h) barred such facilities.

The NRC rejected Utah’s interpretation of § 10155(h) and

declined to institute a rulemaking to amend its regulations.

Utah and others seek review of the order denying the petition

to institute a rulemaking, contending that the NRC’s interpretation is contrary to the plain language of § 10155(h) and

to the structure and legislative history of the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act. We hold that § 10155(h) does not repeal or

supersede the NRC’s authority under the Atomic Energy Act

to license private away-from-reactor storage facilities, and we

therefore deny the petitions for review.

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 2 of 12
3

I.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (‘‘AEA’’), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2011 et seq., authorized the NRC to regulate the possession, use, and transfer of the constituent materials of spent

nuclear fuel, including special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material. See id. §§ 2073, 2092, 2093, 2111,

2201(b); see also 10 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2003). While the AEA

does not specifically refer to the storage or disposal of spent

nuclear fuel, it has long been recognized that the AEA

confers on the NRC authority to license and regulate the

storage and disposal of such fuel. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.

State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.

190, 207 (1983); Illinois v. Gen. Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214–

15 (7th Cir. 1982); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.

Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1112 (3rd Cir. 1985).

Pursuant to its AEA authority, the NRC promulgated regulations in 1980 for licensing onsite and away-from-reactor spent

nuclear fuel storage facilities for private nuclear generators.

See 10 C.F.R. Part 72.

Two years later, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act of 1982 (‘‘NWPA’’), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101 et seq., in

response to ‘‘a national problem’’ created by the accumulation

of spent nuclear fuel from private nuclear generators, as well

as radioactive waste from reprocessing such fuel, activities

related to medical research, diagnosis, and treatment, and

other sources. Id. § 10131(a)(2). Finding inadequate the

federal efforts in the past 30 years to devise a permanent

solution, id. § 10131(a)(3), Congress established a schedule

for siting, construction, and operation of a permanent federal

repository (Subtitle A), id. §§ 10131–10145, and developed a

federally monitored retrievable storage program in the event

the permanent repository was unavailable by the specified

deadline (Subtitle C). Id. §§ 10161–10169. Finding further

that the generators and owners of high-level radioactive

waste and spent nuclear fuel have ‘‘the primary responsibility

to provide for, and TTT to pay the costs of, the interim storage

of such waste and spent fuel,’’ id. § 10131(a)(5); see also id.

§ 10151(a)(1), Congress, under Subtitle B, id. §§ 10151–

10157, limited the federal government’s obligation to assist

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 3 of 12
4

private nuclear generators with interim storage of spent

nuclear fuel. As a precondition of federal interim storage,

private generators were required to exhaust onsite options

for storage. Id. § 10155(b)(1); see also id. §§ 10151(a)(1),

10152. While the NRC was responsible for the licensing of

technology used at the reactor site, id. §§ 10153–10154, and

for developing the criteria for eligibility, id. § 10155(g); see

also id. § 10155(a)-(b), the Department of Energy (‘‘DOE’’)

was directed to provide, and authorized to enter into contracts for, interim storage of not more than 1,900 metric tons

of capacity, but only until January 1, 1990. Id. §§ 10155(a)-

(b), 10156(a)(1). That said, Congress provided:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing in

this chapter [108, Nuclear Waste Policy,] shall be construed to encourage, authorize, or require the private or

Federal use, purchase, lease, or other acquisition of any

storage facility located away from the site of any civilian

nuclear power reactor and not owned by the Federal

Government on January 7, 1983.

Id. § 10155(h).

The dispute over the effect of § 10155(h) on the NRC’s

authority under the AEA to license private away-from-reactor

storage facilities arises in connection with a lease. The Skull

Valley Band of Goshute Indians (‘‘Band’’) entered into a lease

with Private Fuel Storage, LLC (‘‘PFS’’) for the development

of a private away-from-reactor spent nuclear storage facility

on the Band’s reservation located 50 miles west of Salt Lake

City, Utah. Pursuant to NRC regulations, see 10 C.F.R.

§§ 72.1, 72.16–72.40, PFS filed a license application, and the

NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (‘‘Board’’) initiated

an adjudicatory licensing proceeding. See In the Matter of

Private Fuel Storage, LLC, 47 NRC 142 (1998) (hereinafter

‘‘Licensing Proceeding’’). After permitting the State of Utah

and the Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia (‘‘OGD’’), an association

consisting primarily of members of the Band, to intervene, id.

at 169, the Board concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to

decide whether § 10155(h) excluded from the nuclear waste

management program the creation and use of private awayUSCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 4 of 12
5

from-reactor storage facilities because such argument constituted an attack on the NRC’s regulations. Id. at 183–84.

Proceeding to the NRC, Utah made two filings in 2002.

The first was a ‘‘Suggestion of Lack of Jurisdiction,’’ claiming

that the NRC lacked jurisdiction over PFS’s license application. Utah argued that Congress had established in the

NWPA a ‘‘comprehensive national nuclear waste management

system for the storage of [spent nuclear fuel],’’ and

§ 10155(h) made clear that the storage of such fuel at privately owned away-from-reactor facilities was prohibited. The

second filing was a ‘‘Petition to Institute Rulemaking and to

Stay Licensing Proceeding’’ to amend 10 C.F.R. Part 72 in

light of § 10155(h)’s repeal or supersession of the NRC’s

authority under the AEA to regulate private away-fromreactor facilities, and to suspend the licensing proceedings

during the rulemaking. The OGD also submitted a brief to

the NRC adopting the arguments advanced by Utah’s petitions.

The NRC declined to stay the licensing proceeding. See In

the Matter of Private Fuel Storage, LLC, 55 NRC 260, 261–62

(2002). The NRC also rejected Utah’s argument that it

lacked jurisdiction to issue PFS’s license, and denied Utah’s

request for rulemaking. See In the Matter of Private Fuel

Storage, LLC, 56 NRC 390 (2002) (hereinafter ‘‘Rulemaking

Order’’). The NRC interpreted § 10155(h) to have no effect

on its licensing authority under the AEA of private awayfrom-reactor storage facilities. Id. at 396–401. Observing

that § 10155(h) contains no prohibitory language and ‘‘is

facially neutral on the question of the NRC’s general AEA

authority to license [private] away-from-reactor’’ facilities, id.

at 397, the NRC opined that Congress intended § 10155(h)

‘‘to recognize and distinguish, not abrogate, existing provisions of law authorizing [away-from-reactor] spent fuel storage.’’ Id. at 401. As each word has its own significance

when read in the context of the whole of Subtitle B, the NRC

concluded that Congress simply ‘‘limited the scope of

[§ 10155(h)] to those programs created under the NWPA

itself.’’ Id. at 397–98. By providing that the NWPA did not

‘‘authorize’’ the use of a private storage facility, Congress

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 5 of 12
6

limited DOE’s authority. Id. at 398. As DOE’s authority to

store spent nuclear fuel originated with the NWPA,

§ 10155(h) ensured that DOE would not take over a private

facility to fulfill DOE’s obligations under the NWPA. Id.

The NRC’s authority, on the other hand, to license private

generators to store spent nuclear fuel, originated with the

AEA, and hence the NWPA’s failure to ‘‘authorize’’ storage at

private facilities had no effect on this preexisting authority.

Id. The NRC pointed out that Congress did not need to

provide that the NWPA did not ‘‘encourage’’ or ‘‘require’’

DOE to use private facilities, but did need to use those terms

in describing the NWPA’s conditions on private generators’

use of federal interim storage. Id. Subtitle B included

several provisions that ‘‘encourage[d]’’ private generators to

expand onsite storage, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 10152–10154, and

through § 10155(h), the NRC reasoned, Congress made clear

that such provisions were not also encouraging the expansion

of private away-from-reactor storage. Id. Context and legislative background further explained why Congress would

specify that the NWPA did not ‘‘require’’ private away-fromreactor storage: such a requirement appeared early in the

legislative process and in prior bills. Id. at 398–99. By

contrast, the NRC noted, Utah’s interpretation of § 10155(h)

as repealing or superseding the NRC’s authority under the

AEA provided no role for ‘‘encourage’’ and ‘‘require’’ to play.

Id. at 397–98. The NRC thus concluded that neither the text

of § 10155(h) nor the NWPA’s structure or legislative history

indicated that Congress intended to repeal or supersede the

NRC’s authority under the AEA to license and regulate

private away-from-reactor spent fuel storage facilities. Id. at

396–411.

II.

Utah, the OGD, and nine individual Goshute members

petition for review of the NRC’s Rulemaking Order, renewing the arguments before the NRC in challenging the NRC’s

interpretation of § 10155(h). The petitioners read § 10155(h)

to prohibit the creation or use of private away-from-reactor

storage facilities, and thus to repeal or supersede prior

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 6 of 12
7

statutory authority authorizing private away-from-reactor

storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel. Contending that the

plain text, structure, and legislative history of the NWPA

support their interpretation of § 10155(h), the petitioners

seek to have the court direct the NRC to amend its 10 C.F.R.

Part 72 regulations. We address two threshold issues on

standing and our standard of review in Part II, and then turn

to the merits in Part III.

A.

The NRC and the intervenors, PFS and the Band, challenge the standing of certain petitioners under the Hobbs

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2344. The Hobbs Act requires that a party

participate in the underlying agency proceeding and meet the

requirements of constitutional and prudential standing. See

Reyblatt v. NRC, 105 F.3d 715, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also

S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. ICC, 69 F.3d 583, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

It is undisputed that Utah has standing; it participated below

and the administrative record reflects that it met the requirements of constitutional and prudential standing, see Licensing

Proceeding, 47 NRC at 169. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–04 (1998); City of Waukesha v.

EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 233–35 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Hence, inasmuch as the petitioners have filed a joint brief, cf. Ala. Power

Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1364–65, 1366–67 (11th Cir. 2002),

the court need not decide whether the other petitioners have

standing to challenge the NRC’s Rulemaking Order. See

Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,

793 F.2d 1322, 1328–29 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FRC, 489 F.2d 1207, 1212 n.12 (D.C.

Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 420 U.S. 395 (1975).

B.

The court typically defers under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.

NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to an agency’s interpretation of

its own jurisdiction under a statute that it implements. See

Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 1281, 1283–84 (D.C.

Cir. 1994). But such deference may be inappropriate where

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 7 of 12
8

more than one agency implements the same statute. See

Collins v. NTSB, 351 F.3d 1246, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2003);

Rapaport v. Dep’t of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 216–17 (D.C. Cir.

1995). On occasion, the court has viewed the NWPA as the

type of statutory scheme where Chevron deference is due.

See Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272, 1274 (D.C.

Cir. 1996); Gen. Elec. Uranium Mgmt. Corp. v. DOE, 764

F.2d 896, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Public Citizen v.

NRC, 901 F.2d 147, 153–54 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Both the NRC

and DOE, however, are responsible for implementing the

federal interim storage program under Subtitle B of the

NWPA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10151–10157; see also id. § 10101.

The question of whether Chevron deference applies to the

NRC’s interpretation of § 10155(h) is moot here because the

result is the same whether the court applies de novo review,

deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 232 U.S. 134 (1944),

or Chevron deference, see Collins, 351 F.3d at 1254; Bd. of

Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir.

1999) (citing Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,

519 U.S. 465, 479 n.14 (1997)); Rapaport, 59 F.3d at 220

(Rogers, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); the text of § 10155(h) as well as the statutory structure and legislative history of Subtitle B of the NWPA

support the NRC’s interpretation.

III.

Essentially, Utah’s interpretation of § 10155(h) hinges on

its view that this provision ‘‘expressly disavows’’ any intent to

encourage or authorize private away-from-reactor storage

facilities, Petitioners’ Br. at 13, and that in order to give

meaning to the ‘‘notwithstanding’’ clause it must be read as

eliminating prior authority to allow such storage. Utah also

looks to the NWPA’s structure, noting the protections included for state and local governments where such federal storage is permitted and contends that it would make no sense

for Congress to eliminate those protections when storage is

private rather than federal. Finally, Utah contends that its

interpretation is consistent with congressional concerns about

the location of private storage facilities and assurances that

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 8 of 12
9

§ 10155(h) was designed to eliminate any basis for those

concerns.

In addressing Utah’s challenge to the NRC’s interpretation

of § 10155(h), the court looks first to the language of the

statute. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438,

450 (2002); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991). The

structure of the statute is also relevant in understanding

Congress’s intent. ‘‘[I]f the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,’’ the

court’s inquiry ceases. See Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997))

(internal quotation marks omitted). The legislative history

can assist the court in identifying legislative intent where the

statute is unclear, see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896

(1984), and, on rare occasions, it may suffice to overcome a

result of the plain language of the statute that is ‘‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’’ United States

v. Ron Pair Enterp., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982));

see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088–89

(D.C. Cir. 1996).

The text of § 10155(h), read in light of Subtitle B of the

NWPA, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to repeal

or supersede the NRC’s authority under the AEA to license

and regulate private use of private away-from-reactor spent

fuel storage facilities. Section 10155(h) itself contains no

prohibitory language, and, as Utah conceded at oral argument, the NRC had authority under the AEA to regulate

private away-from-reactor storage facilities. In providing

that ‘‘nothing in this chapter shall be construed to TTT

authorize’’ private storage facilities, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10155(h)

(emphasis added), Congress limited the scope of the NWPA,

but left untouched prior and subsequent statutes that authorized such facilities. As the NRC rests its authority to

regulate and authorize private away-from-reactor facilities on

the AEA, a provision limiting the effects of ‘‘this chapter’’

could not undermine that authority, if at all, without some

fairly unusual accompanying language or context. Section

10155(h) makes no mention of either the AEA, although that

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 9 of 12
10

statute is mentioned elsewhere in the NWPA, see, e.g., 42

U.S.C. §§ 10153(a), (b)(3), 10155(a)(1)(A)(i), or the NRC’s

regulations at 10 C.F.R. Part 72, of which Congress was

aware. See S. Rep. No. 97–282, at 44 (1981); see also

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 491 (1996); Jett v.

Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 729 (1989). Given that

Congress was aware of the NRC’s regulations for licensing

private away-from-reactor storage facilities, the plain language of § 10155(h) provides no support for Utah’s conclusion

that Congress ‘‘expressly disavow[ed]’’ use of private awayfrom-reactor storage facilities or silently meant to repeal or

supersede the NRC’s authority under the AEA. See Morton

v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974). It is a ‘‘cardinal rule

[of statutory construction] that repeals by implication are not

favored.’’ Id. at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This canon is no less applicable when the original grant of

authority is implicit rather than express.

To the extent that the words of § 10155(h) derive contextual meaning, the statutory structure demonstrates that the

more reasonable reading of § 10155(h) is that it sets forth the

limits of the NWPA. As the NRC explained, when viewed in

light of the whole of Subtitle B, each word of § 10155(h) has

its own significance. See Rulemaking Order, 56 NRC at 397–

99. In not ‘‘authoriz[ing]’’ private storage facilities, Congress

intended to limit the scope of the NWPA. DOE’s authority

originated with the NWPA, and therefore, the NWPA’s failure to ‘‘authorize’’ storage at private facilities resulted in

restricting DOE’s powers to take over a private facility to

fulfill its NWPA obligations. The NRC’s authority, however,

originated with the AEA, and nothing in the text of

§ 10155(h) suggests that Congress intended to repeal this

authority. Although it may have been unnecessary for Congress to add that the NWPA does not ‘‘encourage’’ or ‘‘require’’ DOE to use private facilities, it was necessary for

Congress to use such terms in describing the preconditions on

private generators for obtaining federal interim storage; provisions in Subtitle B ‘‘encourage’’ private onsite storage, and

inclusion in § 10155(h)’s introductory clause of the phrase

‘‘[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law’’ eliminated

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 10 of 12
11

reliance on a prior draft of § 10155 that ‘‘require[d]’’ private

generators to exhaust private away-from-reactor options before requesting federal interim storage. Once each word of

§ 10155(h) is given a role in Subtitle B, it reasonably follows,

as the NRC pointed out, that § 10155(h) is ‘‘facially neutral:

neither prohibiting nor promoting the use of private [awayfrom-reactor] storage facilities.’’ Id. at 407.

Contrary to Utah’s position, the NRC’s interpretation of

§ 10155(h) does, in fact, give full meaning to Congress’s use

of the word ‘‘authorize.’’ In light of the role of that word in

Subtitle B, there is no reason to conclude that Congress

intended in relatively obscure terms for the NWPA’s failure

to ‘‘authorize’’ such storage to repeal or supersede the NRC’s

preexisting authority under the AEA to license storage of

spent fuel at private away-from-reactor facilities. The NRC’s

interpretation also gives full meaning to the other words of

§ 10155(h) in light of Subtitle B. To the extent that Utah

maintains that the NRC’s interpretation creates a ‘‘big anomaly’’ between the NWPA’s system of allowing federal awayfrom-reactor facilities that are capacity-limited and subject to

numerous restrictions and the AEA’s regulatory system of

permitting private away-from-reactor facilities of unlimited

size and without any of the restrictions imposed on federal

facilities, see Petitioners’ Br. at 31–36, Utah ignores that

private away-from-reactor storage was already regulated by

the NRC under the AEA prior to the NWPA. It was not an

anomaly for the NWPA to focus on regulating those ‘‘supplements’’ that the NWPA itself added, namely federal storage

programs, and to leave the pre-existing regulatory scheme as

it found it. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131, 10151; S. Rep. No. 97–

282, at 1 (1981). In the absence of irreconcilability between

the AEA and the NWPA, there is no basis to conclude that in

enacting the NWPA Congress implicitly repealed or superseded the NRC’s authority. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 550–51

(1974); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,

468 (2001).

The legislative history of the NWPA on which Utah relies

does not reflect, contrary to the text of § 10155(h), an ‘‘express[ ] disavow[al]’’ of the NRC’s authority under the AEA

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 11 of 12
12

to license private away-from-reactor storage facilities. The

congressional reports and debates referred to by the parties

indicate that § 10155(h) represented a compromise of three

contested issues: (1) the level of federal involvement in

interim storage; (2) federal use for interim storage of private

away-from-reactor storage facilities, of which there were

three; and (3) political and social limitations on private

generators to develop away-from-reactor solutions to spent

fuel storage problems. See S. Rep. No. 97–282 (1981); H.R.

Rep. No. 97–491, pt. 1 (1982); 128 Cong. Rec. 28,032 (1982);

see also 42 U.S.C. § 10131. Section 10155(h) thus ensured

that DOE would not take over private facilities to fulfill its

NWPA obligations, and clarified that private generators were

not obligated under the NWPA to exhaust all away-fromreactor options prior to receiving federal assistance. Nothing

in those reports and debates suggests that Congress intended

to prohibit private use of private away-from-reactor facilities.

For these reasons we hold that the NRC’s interpretation is

more in conformance with the language of § 10155(h) viewed

in the context of Subtitle B than that offered by Utah.

Accordingly, we deny the petitions for review of the NRC’s

Rulemaking Order and the motion to dismiss as to certain

petitioners for lack of standing.

USCA Case #03-1022 Document #805700 Filed: 02/24/2004 Page 12 of 12