Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01175/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01175-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joel Martinez
Respondent
Ramon Dana Sierra
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMON DANA SIERRA, No. 2:16-CV-1175-KJM-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JOEL MARTINEZ,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s unopposed

motion to dismiss (Doc. 12). Respondent argues the instant petition was filed beyond the oneyear statute of limitations and is, therefore, untimely. 

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, false imprisonment by

violence, dissuading a witness, threatening a witness, assault with a semi-automatic firearm, first

degree residential robbery, misdemeanor sexual battery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. 

The trial court found that petitioner had a prior strike conviction and five prior prison sentences. 

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Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate term of sixty three years and eight months. Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, except the trial court was directed to

correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. The California Supreme Court denied review

on August 27, 2014. 

Petitioner then filed the following three state post-conviction actions:1

First Petition Butte County Superior Court

Filed August 3, 2015

Denied August 17, 2015

Second Petition California Court of Appeal

Filed October 30, 2015

Denied November 25, 2015

Third Petition California Supreme Court

Filed December 22, 2015

Denied April 27, 2016

The instant federal petition was filed on May 25, 2016. 

II. DISCUSSION

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of: (1)

the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

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In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a pro se

prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed “filed” at the moment he delivers it to prison officials for

mailing to the court. The so-called “prison mailbox rule” has been extended to apply to other

legal documents submitted to the court by prisoners. See e.g. Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d

1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying rule to prisoner’s habeas corpus petition); see also Huizar v.

Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing rule in context of “prisoner who delivers

a document to prison authorities”); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating

rule in terms of any “legal document” submitted by a pro se prisoner). All filing dates outlined

herein afford petitioner the benefit of the mailbox rule. 

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judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek direct

review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Where a petition for review by the California Supreme Court is filed and no

petition for certiorari is filed in the United States Supreme Court, the one-year limitations period

begins running the day after expiration of the 90-day time within which to seek review by the

United States Supreme Court. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Where a petition for writ of certiorari is filed in the United States Supreme Court, the one-year

limitations period begins to run the day after certiorari is denied or the Court issued a merits

decision. See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). Where no petition for

review by the California Supreme Court is filed, the conviction becomes final 40 days following

the Court of Appeal’s decision, and the limitations period begins running the following day. See

Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002). If no appeal is filed in the Court of Appeal, the

conviction becomes final 60 days after conclusion of proceedings in the state trial court, and the

limitations period begins running the following day. If the conviction became final before April

24, 1996 – the effective date of the statute of limitations – the one-year period begins to run the

day after the effective date, or April 25, 1996. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th

Cir. 1999).

The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000); see also Allen v. Siebert, 128 S.Ct. 2 (2007); Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (holding that, regardless of whether there are exceptions to a

state’s timeliness bar, time limits for filing a state post-conviction petition are filing conditions

and the failure to comply with those time limits precludes a finding that the state petition is

properly filed). A state court application for post-conviction relief is “pending”during all the

time the petitioner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to present his

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claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). It is not, however, considered

“pending” after the state post-conviction process is concluded. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549

U.S. 327 (2007) (holding that federal habeas petition not tolled for time during which certiorari

petition to the Supreme Court was pending). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between

state court applications, however, there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214 (2002). If the state court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as

untimely, the federal court must independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id.

at 226-27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

In this case, the California Supreme Court denied review on August 27, 2014, and

petitioner did not seek review by the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, the one-year

limitations period began to run the day after expiration of the 90-day period to seek review by the

United States Supreme Court, or on November 26, 2014, and ended on November 25, 2015, plus

any time for tolling. 

Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the 15 days 

his first petition was pending in state court. As to the 74-day period between denial of the first

state petition and filing of the second state petition, respondent argues that petitioner is not

entitled to interval tolling because the delay was unreasonable. Petitioner has not filed any

opposition offering an explanation for the delay and the court agrees with respondent. See Carey,

536 U.S. 214; see also Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 201 (2006) (observing that 30 to 60 days

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would normally be reasonable). Numerous judges who have considered this issue also agree that

a delay of more than 60 days is unreasonable. See Contreras v. Curry, 2008 WL 4291473 (N.D.

Cal. 2008) (involving 88-day delay); Livermoore v. Watson, 2008 WL 802330 (E.D. Cal. 2008)

(involving 78-day delay); Hunt v. Felker, 2008 WL 364995 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (involving 70-day

delay); Young v. Hickman, 2008 WL 361011 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (involving 95-day delay); Bridge

v. Runnels, 2007 WL 2695177 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (involving 76-day delay). 

Next, respondent argues that petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the

time the second petition was pending in state court because it was not properly filed. 

Specifically, respondent contends that, because petitioner unreasonably delayed between the first

and second petition, the second petition was untimely under state law and, therefore, not properly

filed. Again, petitioner has offered no explanation for the delay and the court agrees with

respondent. See Curiel v. Miller, 2016 WL 394172 (9th Cir. July 25, 2016) (en banc). 

As to the time between denial of the second state petition and filing of the third

state petition, the court agrees with respondent’s unopposed argument that, because the second

petition was not properly filed due to petitioner’s unreasonable and unexplained delay, the

limitations period continued to run without any tolling for all the time following denial of the

first state court petition through, at the earliest, the filing of the third state petition. As of the date

petitioner filed the third state petition, however, the one-year limitation period had expired. 

Specifically, by the time petitioner filed the first state petition on August 3, 2015, 251 days of the

limitation period had elapsed. The limitation period was tolled for the 15 days the first state

petition was pending and continued to run during the 74-days interval between the first and

second state petitions. The limitation period also continued to run for the 26 days between the

time the second state petition was filed and denied because, as discussed above, the second

petition was not properly filed. Thus, by the time the second state petition was denied on

November 25, 2015, a total of 351 days of the one-year limitation period had elapsed. By the

time petitioner filed the third state petition 27 days later on December 22, 2015, the one-year

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limitation period had expired and the third petition has no consequence on the timeliness of the

instant federal petition. 

Because the limitation expired in December 2015 and this petition was not filed

until May 2016, it is untimely. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that respondent’s

unopposed motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: October 17, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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