Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04044/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lawrence Charles Bowman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*

The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge of the United States Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-4044

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Southern

v. * District of Iowa.

*

Lawrence Charles Bowman, * [PUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 11, 2004

 Filed: August 24, 2004

___________

Before MURPHY and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,*

 Judge of the United

States Court of International Trade. 

___________

PER CURIAM.

In February 2003 an Iowa grand jury indicted Lawrence Charles Bowman on

federal drug charges. An arrest warrant was sent to California, where Bowman was

living. The warrant did not describe Bowman or provide any identifying information

other than his name. On March 3, 2003, Bowman was arrested in Sacramento,

California. At his initial appearance there, Bowman was represented by appointed

counsel and waived the opportunity for a hearing to determine whether he was the

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**The Honorable Ronald L. Longstaff, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa.

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same person named in the indictment or warrant and thus show the Government

charged the wrong person. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c)(3)(D)(ii). Bowman was

released on bond and directed to report to the Southern District of Iowa for

arraignment a week later. Bowman waived his personal appearance at arraignment.

On March 24, 2003 Bowman retained Iowa counsel who entered an

appearance. On May 22, 2003, Bowman filed a motion for continuance of trial,

which the district court** granted. Finally, on July 18, 2003, more than four months

after Bowman’s arrest, Bowman’s attorney sent the Government a letter stating: 

We have reviewed the discovery in the Bowman file. It appears that

there is insufficient evidence to establish that my client . . . is the same

individual in question with regard to the criminal activity outlined in the

indictment. If you have other information that supports your

identification in this matter, I would certainly appreciate receiving it.

Further, if you have any photographs of any type that support your

position, I would like to review [them]. 

Without waiting for a response to the letter, Bowman sought and received a second

continuance later that month. In August, Bowman filed a notice of alibi, a motion in

limine, and notice of intent to use business records. He filed a trial brief and

exhibit/witness list. Then, on August 22, Bowman’s attorney sent the prosecutor a

letter stating:

We talked last week concerning a resolution of Mr. Bowman’s case. As

I have indicated to you in the past, we believe the government has the

wrong person indicted in this case. As a matter of fact, I spoke with the

co-defendant’s attorney from Michigan. It was the third time that he and

I had spoken about this issue. I asked him for a description from his

client of what Mr. Bowman looked like. The description does not in any

way match my client . . . . We have been able to document Mr.

Bowman’s whereabouts on each occasion when the government is

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alleging that he engaged in illegal conduct. . . . I am asking the

government to drop all charges against Mr. Bowman and that it be done

immediately. . . . Please review your file and let me know if you would

like the photographs of Mr. Bowman in order that we can substantiate

that he is not the same person who was in fact distributing drug

paraphernalia around the United States. 

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigated and presented a

photographic spread to a cooperating witness in mid-September. On September 23,

2003, the prosecutor was notified the witness could not identify Bowman as the

person involved in the criminal activity. The next day, the Government informed

defense counsel of its intent to drop the charges against Bowman and, at the

Government’s request, the district court dismissed the charges on October 1, 2003.

The Government later determined the proper defendant was one Lawrence Carl

Bowman. 

Bowman then filed a request for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment,

which authorizes federal courts to “award to a prevailing party [in a criminal case],

other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation expenses,

where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous,

or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make such an award

unjust.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. Bowman asserted the Government’s position had been

frivolous, the Government knew of its mistake as early as March of 2003 or by July

2003 at the latest, and the Government’s action or lack of action was not reasonable.

Bowman did not contend the Government lacked a reasonable basis for the

indictment, but instead argued the Government did not act quickly enough to dismiss

the charges. To support his Hyde Amendment claim, Bowman sought an ex parte

hearing. See id. (to decide whether or not to award fees or costs under the Hyde

Amendment, “the court, for good cause shown, may receive evidence ex parte and in

camera”). Along with his motions seeking fees and a hearing, Bowman presented

exhibits including an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) interview from the

Government’s discovery file containing a physical description of the proper defendant

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that did not match Bowman’s mug shot after his arrest, and statements by his

codefendant’s attorney that by July 2003, the codefendant had informed the

Government that Bowman was not the person involved in the criminal activity.

Bowman pointed out the warrant for his arrest did not contain a description, address,

or other identifying information; he lived in Northern California and had no

connection with the place identified by the Government informant as the proper

defendant’s place of residence in Southern California; and no search warrant was ever

issued for his residence. The district court denied a hearing and the request for fees,

noting Bowman had waived his right to an identity hearing and the Government had

taken reasonable and prompt steps to resolve the issue after Bowman raised the

identity issue on July 18, 2003. Bowman appeals the denial of his Hyde Amendment

claims, and we affirm.

Bowman first contends the district court should have held an ex parte hearing

before deciding his Hyde Amendment claim. Bowman seeks to learn from

Government counsel and several DEA agents when they knew Bowman’s identity

was an issue. The district court held that Bowman failed to establish good cause for

a hearing because, in light of Bowman’s waiver of an identification hearing, it was

unnecessary to determine if the government knew identity was an issue before July

18, 2003. In the district court’s view, the waiver led the Government to believe it

had indicted the correct person and, until put on notice by Bowman in July, the

Government had no reason to look into the identification issue. 

Given the discretionary language of the Hyde Amendment and the district

court’s unique familiarity with the litigation, we defer to a district court’s Hyde

Amendment rulings. United States v. Beeks, 266 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 2001) (per

curiam). In this case, we simply cannot say the district court abused its discretion in

concluding Bowman failed to show good cause warranting a hearing. See id.

Although the Government’s discovery file contained a description of the proper

defendant in a three-year-old IRS interview, the description was not at total odds with

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Bowman’s mug shot. Further, given Bowman’s waiver of his personal appearance

in Iowa, the prosecutor had not seen Bowman and had no reason to question his

identity until July, when the prosecutor received Bowman’s letter and learned

Bowman did not match a description given by the codefendant of the person involved

in the criminal activity. The mere fact that the Government charged the wrong

defendant without more does not establish good cause for an ex parte hearing,

particularly as here, when Bowman asserts the only issue is when the Government

knew it had the wrong person and its reasonableness afterwards, not that the

government acted without a basis to believe the charge could not be proven. 

Bowman also argued that if the district court did not grant an ex parte hearing,

the district court should hold the record open until his codefendant’s criminal matter

was resolved, so the codefendant could state when he informed the DEA agent that

Bowman was not the correct codefendant. The district court had no reason to allow

a fishing expedition, however. Bowman had no idea what the codefendant would say,

and the codefendant’s attorney did not give the conflicting description of the proper

defendant to Bowman’s attorney until July. 

 

Aside from the district court’s refusal to grant a hearing, Bowman also

contends the district court abused its discretion in declining to award fees under the

Hyde Amendment. Bowman contends the Government’s prosecution of him was

frivolous, a term that is not defined in the statute. We have stated a position is

frivolous for the purposes of the Hyde Amendment when the position is utterly

without foundation in law or fact. Beeks, 266 F.3d at 883-84; see United States v.

Knott, 256 F.3d 20, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2001) (distinguishing the terms “vexatious” and

“frivolous” in Hyde Amendment; for frivolousness, no improper motive need be

shown); United States v. Heavrin, 330 F.3d 723, 729 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); United

States v. Sherburne, 249 F.3d 1121, 1126 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Thus, although

the Hyde Amendment targets prosecutorial misconduct rather than prosecutorial

mistake, United States v. Braunstein, 281 F.3d 982, 995 (9th Cir. 2002), we stated in

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Beeks that “a prosecution . . . so utterly without foundation in law or fact as to be

frivolous’” amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. Beeks, 266 F.3d at 883-84. 

Here, we do not know whether the Government’s case against Bowman was

utterly without foundation in fact rendering it frivolous, see Beeks, 266 F.3d at 883-

84, because Bowman has failed to show the prosecution was pursued without any

reasonable foundation for the belief that the Government might prevail on the

indictment. See Heavrin, 330 F.3d at 729; Knott, 256 F.3d at 29-30. We need not

determine this issue, however, because Bowman’s Hyde Amendment claim fails on

another ground. To prevail on his Hyde Amendment claim, Bowman also has the

burden to show there are no special circumstances making the award unjust.

Braunstein, 281 F.3d at 994; see United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1339

n.18 (11th Cir. 2004). Although the district court focused on whether the

Government’s conduct in prosecuting Bowman was frivolous, it is clear from the

court’s opinion that it believed a fee award would be unjust in this case. The court

observed that when Bowman finally gave the Government notice in July that he was

the wrong defendant, the Government acted reasonably in investigating the matter

and dismissing the charges against Bowman before trial. We agree. Until Bowman

first questioned his identification in a July letter, and brought evidence that the

Government had charged the wrong person to the prosecutor’s attention in July and

August, the Government was justified in relying on Bowman’s waiver of the

identification issue at his initial appearance before a magistrate following his arrest

in California. Once put on notice by Bowman, the Government took Bowman’s

claim seriously, confirmed Bowman was the wrong defendant, and asked the district

court to dismiss the case. Given that Bowman did not bring the identity issue to the

attention of the Government until more than four months after his arrest, and the case

was dismissed after an investigation revealed the Government had indeed charged the

wrong person, it would be unjust to hold the Government responsible for the payment

of fees that would have been avoided if Bowman had put the Government on notice

of its mistake sooner. 

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Because we conclude the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in

denying Bowman’s Hyde Amendment claim, see Beeks, 266 F.3d at 883, we affirm.

______________________________

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