Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02458/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02458-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Uawndre Larue Fields
Petitioner
USA
Respondent

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1 Citations to “Doc.” refer to the docket in CV-11-2458-PHX-DGC (BSB). Citations to

“CR Doc.” refer to the docket in CR-07-411-DGC. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Uawndre Larue Fields, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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Nos. CV-11-2458-PHX-DGC (BSB) 

 CR-07-411-PHX-DGC 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant-Movant Uawndre Larue Fields (Defendant or Fields) has filed a pro se

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to

28 U.S.C § 2255. (Doc. 1.) Defendant argues that his due process rights were violated because

the government did not exercise “more diligence” in locating a potential witness, Melanie

Martin (Martin), and did not offer this witness immunity in exchange for her testimony at

sentencing. (Doc. 1.)1

 The government has filed a response opposing Defendant’s motion.

(Doc. 10.) Defendant has not replied and the deadline to do so has passed. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendant’s motion should be denied. 

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2

 Citations to “Tr. 1/31/08” and “Tr. 2/1/08” are to the reporter’s transcript, Doc. 250 and

Doc. 244, in CR-07-411-PHX-DGC.

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I. Procedural and Factual History 

On August 14, 2007, a federal grand jury indicted Defendant Fields and two

co-defendants, Depaul Brooks (Brooks) and Julia Fonteneaux (Fonteneaux), on two counts each

of Sex Trafficking of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), and two counts each of

Interstate Transportation of a Minor for Prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) and (e).

(CR Doc. 43.) Defendant and Brooks were tried in a four-day jury trial that began on January

31, 2008 (CR Doc. 142), and Fonteneaux testified at trial pursuant to a cooperation agreement.

(Tr. 2/1/08 at 192-93.)2

 The jury found Defendant and Brooks guilty on all counts. (CR Doc.

149.) On September 25, 2008, the Court sentenced Defendant to 198 months’ imprisonment

on each count of conviction, to be served concurrently. (CR Doc. 251.)

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and argued, in part, that the Court plainly

erred by failing to compel the government to grant Martin use immunity so that she could testify

at sentencing. (CR Docs. 248, 253.) The Ninth Circuit did not address this issue. See United

States v. Brooks, 610 f.3d 1186, 1202 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010). However, on an issue that codefendant Brooks raised, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court misinterpreted the scope

of U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(1) and vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.

On December 13, 2010, the Court sentenced Defendant to 180 months’ imprisonment on each

count, to be served concurrently, and ten years’ supervised release for each count, also to be

served concurrently. (CR Doc. 304.) On December 12, 2011, Defendant filed the pending

§ 2255 motion.

A. Evidence at Trial of Defendant’s Offense Conduct

At trial, the government presented the testimony of the juvenile victims, NK and RO,

and the cooperating witness, Fonteneaux, to establish the following facts supporting

Defendant’s conviction. In April 2006, NK and RO, ran away from a residential treatment

center for juveniles in Scottsdale, Arizona. (Tr. 1/31/08 at 168-72; Tr. 2/1/08 at 43-46.)

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3 In April 2006, Fonteneaux was working as a prostitute in Arizona when Defendant

introduced her to RO and NK at a hotel in Mesa. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 171, 173.) Fonteneaux testified

that she worked for Defendant as a prostitute for two-and-a-half years. Defendant did not have

a “legitimate” job, and had other girls working for him as prostitutes at different times.

(Tr. 2/1/08 at 163-65, 167, 180, 190.) Fonteneaux knew Defendant as “Big Face,” and “Dre”

and had a tattoo with the name “Big Face” on her right shoulder. She worked for Defendant in

several different cities during different times of year, but mainly worked in San Diego.

(Tr. 2/1/08 at 167-70.) 

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The girls contacted a friend, “Chill,” who picked them up and took them to a hotel

room he was renting in Mesa, Arizona. After spending some time with the girls, Chill left them

alone in the hotel room where they stayed for a couple of days until the front desk told them to

leave. (Tr. 1/31/08 at 173-75; Tr. 2/1/08 at 47-49.) The girls left the hotel and went to the store

to buy toiletries. At the store, they encountered three men. RO told the men that she and NK

had been left in a hotel room and had nowhere to go. At trial, RO identified the men as

Defendant Fields, who she knew as “Big Face” or “Dre,” a man known as “Lee,” and

co-defendant Brooks, who she referred to as “goofy guy.” (Tr. 2/1/08 at 49-51, 113-14.) RO

and NK accompanied the men to a nearby motel, the “Rawl’s Inn.” Fields left for the night, but

Brooks and Lee stayed at the hotel and talked to RO about “turning tricks” in San Diego.

(Tr. 2/1/08 at 51-54, 114-15.)

Defendant returned the next day and took RO for a ride in his car. He told RO he was

a “pimp,” and asked if she wanted to work for him in exchange for “money and a good life.”

(Tr. 2/1/08 at 54-55.) Defendant told RO he had other girls working for him, and that his “main

chick” was named “Sanae.” (Id. at 57.) Defendant introduced RO and NK to “Sanae” at the

Rawls Inn. “Sanae” was later identified as co-defendant Fonteneuax.3

 (Tr. 2/1/08 at 131, 192-

93.) RO had never engaged in prostitution, but was interested in the offer because she was afraid

she would get in trouble if she went home or back to the residential treatment center. (Tr. 2/1/08

at 54-58.) RO later asked NK to go to San Diego with her to engage in prostitution and NK

agreed. (Tr. 2/1/2008 at 56.) 

Defendant and Brooks took NK and RO to a Greyhound bus station where the girls

waited in the car while Defendant and Brooks bought them tickets to San Diego under false

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names. (Tr. 1/31/08 at 176-83; Tr. 2/1/08 at 63-65, 153-60.) Defendant and Brooks said they

would meet the girls in San Diego, and gave them a telephone number to call to arrange for

someone to pick them up at the bus station in San Diego. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 62-65.)

When the girls arrived in San Diego they called the number Defendant had given them

and Defendant’s cousin, Tookie, picked them up and took them to her apartment for the night.

(Id. at 63-65.) The next morning, Defendant, Brooks and Fonteneaux arrived at the apartment.

(Tr. 2/1/08 at 65-66.) Defendant took RO to buy clothes and then picked up “Rene,” another

one of his “girls.” They all returned to Tookie’s apartment, and then Defendant and Brooks

took RO and NK to a Howard Johnson’s hotel. Fonteneaux went with them. She registered and

paid for the room, and stayed with the girls for two nights. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 67-71, 175-77.) 

During that time, Fonteneaux posted prostitution ads on craigslist.com offering the

services of NK and RO. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 178-82, 222-23.) Because she did not have a camera,

Fonteneaux created the ads using photographs she found on the internet that resembled NK and

RO. (Tr. 1/31/08 at 192-95.) She also showed the girls her own internet prostitution ads, which

included her photograph, cell phone number, and pricing for her services. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 71-78,

258-63.) While staying at the Howard Johnson’s hotel, RO engaged in two acts of prostitution

that resulted from the internet ads, and were arranged through phone calls to Fonteneaux’s cell

phone. RO received $200 in exchange for her services with the first customer, and $160 for the

second. She gave all of the money to Fonteneaux, who called Defendant and reported that RO

had “turned tricks.” (Tr. 2/1/08 at 78-82, 180, 182-84.)

Later, Fonteneaux, RO, and NK moved to a Best Value Inn where they stayed for one

night without engaging in prostitution. (Id. at 85-86.) The next day, Defendant and Brooks

arrived at the hotel in a maroon sedan and took RO and NK to Tookie’s apartment. Defendant

later left in the maroon sedan and returned driving a dark-colored Ford Freestyle. Defendant,

Brooks, Fonteneaux, RO, NK, and Rene drove to Phoenix in the Ford Freestyle. (Tr. 1/31/08

at 198-201; Tr. 2/1/08 at 84-88, 184-87.)

When they arrived in Phoenix, Defendant left RO, Fonteneaux, and Rene near a

7-Eleven and a Circle K in an area where prostitutes appeared to be working. (Tr. 2/1/08 at

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4

 Citations to “Tr. 2/5/08” are to the reporter’s transcript, Doc. 245 in CR-07-411-PHXDGC.

5 Citations to “Tr. 9/8/08” are to the reporter’s transcript, Doc. 261 in

CR-07-411-PHX-DGC.

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88-90.) RO, Fonteneaux, and Rene each engaged in prostitution. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 189-90.) RO

earned almost $300 and gave all but $30 to Fonteneaux. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 89-90, 93-94.) A police

officer stopped RO, Fonteneaux, and Rene near the Circle K. RO gave a fake name, age, and

birth date. (Id . at 94.) The officer detained RO because he thought she was lying, but released

Fonteneaux and Rene. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 94, 190.) Fonteneaux called Defendant to let him know

that RO had been arrested. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 189-90.) The police officer took RO to the police

station, where she eventually told police her true identity and told them about her recent

activities. (Tr. 2/1/08 at 94.) RO later identified Defendant, Brooks, and Fonteneaux. (Id. at

96-101.) 

After Fonteneaux, RO, and Rene were dropped off on a street corner, NK was taken

to a hotel where she slept until later that night. At some point, Fonteneaux and Rene woke her

up to tell her that RO had been arrested. (Tr. 1/31/08 at 203-04.) NK went back to sleep.

When she woke up, Defendant picked her up, grabbed her clothes, and drove her to a

Greyhound bus station where he left her without a ticket or money. (Tr. 1/31/08 at 203-05.)

NK eventually went home. She was later interviewed by police and identified Brooks,

Defendant, and Fonteneaux. (Tr. 1/31/08 at 205-15; Tr. 2/5/08 at 110-13.)4

B. The Sentencing Hearings

At Defendant’s September 8, 2008 sentencing hearing, defense counsel advised the

Court that Martin, whom she had never met and had previously been unable to locate, had

“appeared outside the courtroom” that morning. (CR Doc. 236; Tr. 9/8/08 at 3-4.)5

 Defense

counsel reported that Martin wanted to testify on Defendant’s behalf, but because Martin had

“rented the car” that Defendant allegedly drove “to Phoenix with the two victims in the car,”

defense counsel moved to continue the sentencing hearing and requested that the Court appoint

counsel for Martin. (Tr. 9/8/08 at 3-4, 6-7.) The prosecutor advised the Court that the

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6

 Citations to “Tr. 9/25/08” are to the reporter’s transcript of the September 25, 2008

sentencing proceeding, Doc. 263 in CR-07-411-PHX-DGC.

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government had also been unable to locate Martin and that she had not spoken with

investigators. The prosecutor agreed to the continuance and appointment of counsel. (Tr. 9/8/08

at 5-6.)

The Court appointed attorney Tyrone Mitchell to represent Martin. ( Id . at 10.) After

consulting with the prosecutor, defense counsel, and Martin, Mitchell advised Martin “not to

say anything” until he obtained more information, and suggested that if the government granted

Martin immunity, it would “take care of this.” (Tr. 9/8/08 at 11-13.) The Court continued the

sentencing hearing to September 25, 2008. (CR Doc. 236; Tr. 9/8/08 at 17.)

When the sentencing hearing resumed, Mitchell informed the Court that, because he

had been unable to reach an agreement with the government, he had advised Martin not to

appear, and she had followed his advice. (Tr. 9/25/08 at 4.)6

 Defense counsel requested an

opportunity to make a proffer regarding the testimony Martin would have given if the

government had granted her immunity. Defense counsel also requested that the Court consider

the proffer substantively for purposes of Defendant’s sentencing objections. The proffer was

“based on [defense counsel’s] brief interview with [Martin], [defense counsel’s] conversation

with [Mr. Mitchell] after he spoke with [Ms. Martin], and . . . her ex-husband [White] . . . .”

(Tr. 9/25/08 at 5-6.) Counsel offered a lengthy proffer making the following points:

(1) Martin had known Defendant for many years, her ex-husband White and

Defendant had known each other since childhood, and Defendant had even lived with Martin

and her ex-husband at various times;

(2) in 2005, at a dinner that Martin hosted, Fonteneaux told Martin that she was a

prostitute;

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(3) Martin was “well versed” in the prostitution/escort trade in San Diego, she had

an escort license, she had worked as an escort for many years, and she had occasionally referred

clients to Fonteneaux;

(4) Fonteneaux was well known on the streets of San Diego as an “independent

contractor” who did not have a pimp;

(5) Defendant was also well known on the streets of San Diego because of his past

gang affiliation, he had a reputation as a person who could get things done, and he knew

everyone in San Diego;

(6) according to Martin and White, prostitutes and escorts who were independent

contractors would often align themselves for protection and safety with someone who had a

gang affiliation or “street cred” and Martin thought that Fonteneaux was using Defendant for

his name;

(7) at one point, Fonteneaux “keyed” Defendant’s car and let the air out of his tires

because she wanted a romantic relationship with Defendant and was upset that he did not want

a relationship with her;

(8) White and Defendant were together “all the time” and considered themselves

family, so if Defendant were a pimp White would have known it, and White was certain that

Defendant was not a pimp;

(9) According to White “sometimes people will look to another person for

protection,” but Fonteneaux was running her own show and “anyone in the business in San

Diego knew that”;

(10) Fonteneaux was in control, she recruited, and while she may have tried to align

herself with Defendant for protection, friendship, or love, she was an independent contractor

and Defendant was not running her business or coercing her or anyone who worked for her; and

(11) Defendant was “basically homeless a lot of the time” so it did not appear that he

was “raking in money” from Fonteneaux. (Tr. 9/25/08 at 8-14.) Defense counsel explained

that she offered these points to refute the application of upward departures recommended in

paragraphs 30, 32, and 35 of the presentence report. 

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7

 Citations to “Tr. 12/12/2010” are to the reporter’s transcript, Doc. 312 in

CR-07-411-PHX-DGC.

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After considering additional arguments from defense counsel and the government

regarding the sentencing enhancements, the Court overruled Defendant’s objections to

enhancements for care, custody, and control of the minors (paragraph 30), use of a computer

to offer or solicit prohibited sexual conduct with the minors (paragraph 32), and role in the

offense as an organizer or leader (paragraph 35). (Tr. 9/25/08 at 14-30.) The Court determined

that Defendant’s offense level was 36, his criminal history category was IV, and his sentencing

guidelines range was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. (Tr. 9/25/08 at 30.)

The Court then heard from a character witness, defense counsel, Defendant, and the

government. (Tr. 9/25/08 at 31-48.) Before discussing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors,

the Court acknowledged defense counsel’s proffer, but stated that it was “persuaded by the

evidence at the end of trial that the jury’s verdict was correct” and “that the government had

proved all four counts beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the evidence that was

presented here. Not just from Ms. Fonteneaux but from several different witnesses and from

other sources, including circumstantial evidence, videotapes, hotel records, computer records.”

(Tr. 9/25/08 at 48-49.) 

The Court “accept[ed] the fact that [Defendant had] contributed substantially to the

youth in San Diego through [his] community efforts and through [his] coaching, and that he had

a difficult childhood.” (Tr. 9/25/08 at 49-51.) The Court also noted that Defendant’s criminal

history category of IV overstated the seriousness of his criminal history. The Court exercised

its discretion and imposed a sentence of 198 months’ imprisonment, “64 months lower than the

bottom end of the guideline range,” for each count of conviction, all counts to run concurrently.

(Tr. 9/25/08 at 51-52.) On December 13, 2010, after the Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant’s

sentence, the district court sentenced Defendant to 180 months’ imprisonment on each count

of conviction, to run concurrently, followed by ten years’ supervised release on each count of

conviction, also to run concurrently. (CR Doc. 304; Tr. 12/13/2010 at 13-15.)7

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8

 In its response, the government discusses two other issues that Defendant raised on

direct appeal, but that he does not assert in his § 2255 motion. (Doc. 10 at 2.) The Court will

only address the issues raised in the § 2255 motion.

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II. Analysis

In his § 2255 motion, Defendant argues that the government violated his due process

rights by failing to locate Martin and then by failing to offer her immunity in exchange for her

testimony at sentencing. As a result of these violations, he argues that he received a longer

sentence because he claims that Martin’s testimony would have negated two of his sentencing

enhancements. As set forth below, Defendant’s arguments fail and should be rejected.8

A. Standard of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides that a person in custody may challenge the

Constitutionality and legality of his sentence and the court’s jurisdiction to impose the

challenged sentence: 

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of

Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,

or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that

the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is

otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed

the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 

Id. Thus, to prevail, Defendant must demonstrate that his sentence was imposed in violation

of the United States Constitution or federal law. A court that receives a motion filed under

§ 2255 “must grant a hearing to determine the validity of a petition brought under that section,

‘[u]nless the motions and files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is

entitled to no relief.’” United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 2255). Here, because the record conclusively shows that Defendant is not entitled

to relief, the Court need not hold an evidentiary hearing. See id.

B. Failure to Locate a Witness Defendant first argues that he was denied due process because the government “did

not show more diligence in attempting to locate [Martin].” (Doc. 1 at 4.) This is the entirety

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of Defendant’s argument pertaining to the government’s alleged lack of effort to locate Martin.

Defendant’s unsupported, conclusory allegations are insufficient to support his claim for relief

under § 2255. See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that

conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, do not support a claim for relief under §

2255); see also Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (vague or conclusory

allegations warrant summary dismissal of § 2255 claims). 

C. Due Process Violation/Compelled Immunity

Defendant also asserts a due process claim based on the failure of the government to

offer, or the Court to compel, use immunity to Martin at sentencing. As an initial matter, “[a]

defendant has no absolute right to elicit testimony from any witness . . . whom he may desire.”

United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1978). In certain “exceptional cases,”

however, the court can compel the government to offer a witness use immunity. United States

v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008). Specifically, “a district court can compel a

defense witness’s immunity absent a finding of prosecutorial misconduct, where ‘in exceptional

cases, the fact-finding process may be so distorted through the prosecution’s decisions to grant

immunity to its own witness while denying immunity to a witness with directly contradictory

testimony that the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial is violated.’” United States v.

Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 533 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original) (quoting Straub, 538 F.3d at

1166). 

Under this test, the defendant must show that the testimony is relevant and that the

government intentionally distorted the fact-finding process. Defendant must show:

(1) the defense witness’s testimony was relevant; and (2) either (a) the

prosecution intentionally caused the defense witness to invoke the Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination with the purpose of distorting

the fact-finding process; or (b) the prosecution granted immunity to a

government witness in order to obtain that witness’s testimony, but denied

immunity to a defense witness whose testimony would have directly

contradicted that of the government witness, with the effect of so distorting

the fact-finding process that the defendant was denied his due process right

to a fundamentally fair trial. 

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Straub, 538 F.3d at 1162. Under the first part of this test, the “relevancy requirement is

minimal.” Id. at 1163. Defendant is not required to show that the proffered testimony is

“clearly exculpatory or essential to the defense.” Id. 

The government argues that Defendant’s claim fails because, although the Ninth

Circuit has held that due process may require a district court to compel use immunity during

trial, it has not extended this holding to sentencing. As the government notes, the relevant

Ninth Circuit case law involves trial, not sentencing. See Straub, 538 F.3d 1147 (finding that

refusal to grant use immunity to defendant’s witness at trial denied defendant his due process

right to a fair trial); Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 601-02 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that

prosecution did not improperly cause witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege at

trial); United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1991) (remanding for

evidentiary hearing to determine whether “government intentionally distorted the fact-finding

process” by failing to grant immunity to a defense witness at trial). 

Defendant does not argue that Martin should have been granted immunity to testify

at trial. The government argues that the due process concerns that are present when a defense

witness is denied immunity at trial are not present during sentencing and, therefore, it is not

error for the court to fail to compel the government to offer immunity to a witness to testify at

sentencing. The Court need not resolve this issue because even assuming that the law regarding

compelled use immunity extends to sentencing, Defendant fails to establish a due process

violation based on the failure to grant use immunity to Martin. 

Here, Martin’s proffered testimony pertained to Defendant’s reputation in the San

Diego community, his relationship with Fonteneaux, and cumulative testimony about

Fonteneaux’s profession and her business practices. (Tr. 9/25/08 at 8-14.) In addition, although

not part of the proffer, defense counsel stated that Martin had rented the vehicle in which the

minors were transported from San Diego to Phoenix and therefore sought separate counsel for

Martin. (Tr. 9/25/08 at 8-14.) Aside from information about the rental car, the proffer of

Martin’s expected testimony did not pertain to the specific events giving rise to the charges

against Defendant. However, because the relevancy requirement for compelled use immunity

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is “minimal,” the Court will assume that Martin’s testimony could have been relevant to

impeach Fonteneaux’s testimony and thus could have been relevant to the upward departures

recommended in the presentence report.

Nonetheless, even if Martin’s testimony could have been relevant, Defendant cannot

not satisfy the either prong of the second part of the compelled use immunity test. First, there

is no evidence that the government “intentionally caused [Martin] to invoke the Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination with the purpose of distorting the fact-finding

process.” Straub, 538 F.3d at 1162. To satisfy this requirement, Defendant must show that the

government’s actions were “akin to prosecutorial misconduct.” Id. at 1157-58. The Ninth

Circuit has found that intimidating or harassing a witness “by threatening the witness with

prosecution for perjury or other offenses” may constitute such misconduct. See Williams, 384

F.3d at 601-02. “The prosecution’s conduct must amount to a substantial interference with the

defense witness’s free and unhampered determination to testify before the conduct violates the

defendant’s right to due process.” Id. at 602. (citations omitted). 

Here, although Defendant argues that the government failed to offer Martin immunity,

there is no indication that the government had any contact with Martin or otherwise interfered

with her decision not to testify at sentencing. Rather, at Defendant’s scheduled sentencing,

defense counsel spoke with Martin and advised the Court that she might benefit from the

appointment of counsel. The Court appointed counsel for Martin, and her counsel subsequently

advised her not to testify or appear at the resumed sentencing hearing. (Tr. 9/8/08 at 4.) There

is no evidence that the government engaged in conduct that was “akin to prosecutorial

misconduct.” See Straub, 538 F.3d at 1157-58. 

Second, Defendant also fails to establish that Martin’s testimony would “have

supported a finding that the testimony directly contradicted that of the government’s witness.”

Straub, 538 F.3d at 1163. As previously noted, other than testimony that Martin rented the car

that Defendant drove from San Diego to Phoenix, Martin’s proffered testimony did not involve

the specific events giving rise to the charges. Additionally, Defendant has not identified the

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testimony of any immunized government witness that Martin’s testimony would have directly

contradicted. 

Because Defendant has not shown that the government’s actions caused Martin to

invoke the Fifth Amendment or that Martin’s testimony would have directly contradicted the

testimony of an immunized government witness, the Court need not consider whether the failure

to compel the government to grant Martin immunity distorted the fact-finding process. See

Straub, 538 F.3d at 1159-60. Because Defendant has not satisfied the Straub test, the district

court did not violate Defendant’s right to due process by failing to compel the government to

grant Martin immunity.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendant is not entitled to relief and his § 2255 motion

should be denied. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Defendant has not made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not

be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from

the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written

objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file

timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver

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of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 19th day of October, 2012.

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