Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00226/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00226-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Gertrude Ward
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GERTRUDE WARD, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 05-0226-WS-M

 :

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, :

Commissioner of :

Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Award of

Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc.

22), Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for

Attorney Fees and Expenses Under the Equal Access to Justice Act,

28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Doc. 23), and Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney’s Fees

Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. 24). After

consideration of the pertinent pleadings, it is recommended that

the motion be granted and that Plaintiff’s counsel be awarded an

Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter EAJA) attorney’s fee in

the amount of $1,292.50.

Plaintiff filed this action on April 13, 2005 (Doc. 1). 

After the issues in dispute had been briefed, the Court, by Order

dated September 26, 2005, set this action for oral argument on

October 21, 2005 (Doc. 15). On September 29, 2005, the parties

agreed to waive oral argument (Doc. 16). On October 4, 2005, the

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undersigned entered a Report and Recommendation, recommending

that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and that this

action be remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings (Doc.

18). On October 28, 2005, the Court adopted the Report and

Recommendation and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff,

reversing and remanding this action for further administrative

proceedings (Docs. 20 and 21). 

On December 29, 2005, Michael Miskowiec, counsel for

Plaintiff, filed a Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant

to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in which

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s position was not substantially

justified and requests a fee of $1,292.50, computed at an hourly

rate of $125.00 for 10.34 hours spent in this Court (Doc. 22). 

Defendant, in her Opposition filed January 12, 2006, contends

that the Court should find that the Commissioner’s position was

substantially justified and requests that Plaintiff’s claim for

EAJA attorney’s fees be denied (Doc. 23). Defendant does not

object to the hours or hourly rate requested.

 The EAJA requires a court to 

award to a prevailing party ... fees and

other expenses ... incurred by that party in

any civil action ..., including proceedings

for judicial review of Agency action, brought

by or against the United States ..., unless

the court finds that the position of the

United States was substantially justified or

that special circumstances make an award

unjust.

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28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA further requires that a

prevailing party file an application for attorney's fees within

thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(B). The court's judgment is final sixty days after it

is entered, which is the time in which an appeal may be taken

pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct.

2625, 2632 (1993).

As set out above, there are three statutory conditions which

must be satisfied before EAJA fees may be awarded under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412. See Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 (11th Cir.

1990). First, the claimant must file an application for fees

within the thirty-day period. Second, the claimant must be a

prevailing party. Third, the Government's position must not be

substantially justified. Defendant concedes that Plaintiff meets

the first two conditions but asserts the Government's position

was substantially justified. 

With regard to this last condition, in order for Plaintiff

to recover attorney's fees under the EAJA, the Government must

fail to "establish that its positions were 'substantially

justified' or that there exist 'special circumstances' which

countenance against the awarding of fees." Myers, 916 F.2d at

666 (interpreting and referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). 

That means that the Government must show that there was a

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"reasonable basis both in law and fact" for the positions it

took. Myers, 916 F.2d at 666 (citations omitted). The Court

notes that "[a]n examination of whether the government's position

was substantially justified encompasses an evaluation of both the

agency's prelitigation conduct and the subsequent litigation

positions of the Justice Department .... Unless the government

can establish that all of its positions were substantially

justified, the claimant is entitled to receive attorney's fees." 

Myers, 916 F.2d at 666 n.5 (emphasis in original; citations

omitted). Though Defendant bears the burden of showing that its

position was substantially justified, "[t]he fact that the

government lost its case does not raise a presumption that the

government's position was not substantially justified." Ashburn

v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 850 (11th Cir. 1984).

In the Report and Recommendation dated October 4, 2005 (Doc.

18), the Court found that 

the ALJ has failed to satisfy the

requirements of Ruling 82-62 and 20 C.F.R.

404.1520(e). Though the ALJ found that Ward

could perform her past work as an assembly

line worker, nowhere in his decision is there

a statement of the physical and mental

demands of that job. Furthermore, while

there is some evidence of the physical

demands of Plaintiff’s job in the transcript,

there is no evidence in the record concerning

the mental demands of her work. 

(Doc. 18, p.8).

Defendant in her Opposition (Doc. 23) states that there was

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a reasonable basis in law and fact for the Commissioner’s

position that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity

to perform the requirements of her past relevant work and, thus,

was not disabled. However, the Court disagrees. As more fully

set out in the Report and Recommendation, the Court found that

[i]n light of the ALJ’s specific finding that

Ward suffers from borderline intellectual

functioning (Tr. 20, ¶ 2), ... the ALJ’s

decision that she can return to her past work

as an assembly line worker is not supported

by substantial evidence. Though the ALJ’s

conclusion may be correct, the record-and his

determination as written-does not support it.

(Doc. 18, p.8). 

The ALJ failed to evaluate Plaintiff’s claim and make a

record as required by the regulations and the law. Therefore,

the Court, based on the record before it, finds that the position

that Defendant took was not reasonable both in law and in fact

and, therefore, not substantially justified.

Having found that the three prerequisites have been

satisfied, the Court will now discuss the fee to be awarded in

this action. The EAJA, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is a fee-shifting

statute. The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful

starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Watford v. Heckler,

765 F.2d 1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985)(EAJA), quoting Hensley v.

Eckerhartt, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983)(§

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1988). In describing this lodestar method of calculation, the

United States Supreme Court stated:

This calculation provides an objective basis

on which to make an initial estimate of the

value of a lawyer’s services. The party

seeking an award of fees should submit

evidence supporting the hours worked and the

rates claimed. Where the documentation of

hours is inadequate, the district court may

reduce the award accordingly. The district

court also should exclude from this initial

fee calculation hours that were not

“reasonably expended” .... Cases may be

overstaffed, and the skill and experience of

lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the

prevailing party should make a good-faith

effort to exclude from a fee request hours

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private

practice ethically is obligated to exclude

such hours from his fee submission. In the

private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an

important component in fee setting. It is no

less important here. Hours that are not

properly billed to one’s client also are not

properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant

to statutory authority.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use

professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should

only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he

would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on

vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836

F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).

The Court, after examination of Plaintiff’s Motion and

supporting documentation, and after consideration of the

reasonableness of the hours claimed, finds that Plaintiff’s time

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 Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour to

$125.00 per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp.

1997).

7

expended in prosecuting this action for a total of 10.34 hours is

reasonable. 

With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to apply

in a given EAJA case, the express language of the Act provides in

pertinent part as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this

subsection shall be based upon prevailing

market rates for the kind and quality of the

services furnished, except that ... attorney

fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125

per hour unless the court determines that an

increase in the cost of living or a special

factor, such as the limited availability of

qualified attorneys for the proceedings

involved, justifies a higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp. 1997).

In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be

applied in calculating attorney's fees under the Act.

The first step in the analysis, ... is to

determine the market rate for "similar

services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and

reputation." ... The second step, which is

needed only if the market rate is greater

than $75 per hour, is to determine whether

the court should adjust the hourly fee

upward...to take into account an increase in

the cost of living, or a special factor.

Id. at 1033-34 (citations omitted & footnote omitted)1. The

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applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence

that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates. 

NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more than the affidavit of

the attorney performing the work. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 (1984). Where the fees or time claimed

seem expanded or there is lack of documentation or testimony in

support, the court may make an award on its own experience. 

Norman v. City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.

1988). Where documentation is inadequate, the court is not

relieved of its obligation to award a reasonable fee, but the

court traditionally has had the power to make such an award

without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. 

Id. 

The prevailing market rate in the Southern District of

Alabama is $125.00 per hour. See Smith v. Massanari, Civil

Action 00-0812-P-M (October 25, 2001); Boone v. Apfel, Civil

Action 99-0965-CB-L (August 30, 2001); Lee v. Massanari, Civil

Action 00-0518-RV-S (June 29, 2001); Willits v. Massanari, Civil

Action 00-0530-RV-C (May 4, 2001); and Square v. Halter, Civil

Action 00-0516-BH-L (April 12, 2001). Because the market rate is

not greater than the statutory rate of $125.00 per hour, the

Court need not reach the second step set out in the Meyer case. 

Multiplying the 10.34 hours by the Southern District of Alabama

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inflation-adjusted prevailing market rate of $125.00 results in a

fee of $1,292.50. 

In conclusion, and for the reasons set out above, it is

recommended that Plaintiff’s motion be granted and that

Plaintiff's counsel be awarded an EAJA fee in the amount of

$1,292.50.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

(5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set

out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which

provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original

brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred

to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

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objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 4th day of May, 2006.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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