Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01944/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01944-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary Crocker
Plaintiff
Thomas Evans
Plaintiff
State of California, Department of Rehabilitation
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY CROCKER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-01944-MCE-DAD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On August 20, 2014, Plaintiffs Gary Crocker and Thomas Evans (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) filed this action alleging that Defendant State of California, Department of 

Rehabilitation (“Defendant”) is seeking to unlawfully terminate their operating 

agreements in violation of the Randolph-Sheppard Act, 20 U.S.C. § 107-107f (the “R-S 

Act”) and the California Business Enterprise Program for the Blind law, California 

Welfare and Institutions Code sections 19625-19641 (the “BEP” statute). See Compl., 

ECF No. 5. Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining 

Order. Mot., Aug. 20, 2014, ECF No. 2.1 For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion is 

DENIED without prejudice.

 1 Plaintiffs also seek a Preliminary Injunction through the same filing. Mot., Aug. 20, 2014, ECF 

No. 2. Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court resolves this matter on 

Plaintiffs’ brief. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g). Defendant has not yet appeared or filed a response to the 

Motion.

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BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs are licensed blind vendors pursuant to the R-S Act, operating vending 

facilities located in the California. According to Plaintiffs, the BEP mandates that the 

state give priority to blind individuals when determining who shall operate vending 

facilities on state property. When a blind vendor is assigned to operate a particular 

vending facility, the blind vendor enters into an operating agreement which sets forth the 

terms and conditions for the operation of the facility.

Plaintiffs allege that they entered into operating agreements with Defendant that 

did not require them to pay utilities. However, each Plaintiff thereafter received a Notice 

of Intent to Terminate their operating agreement for failure to pay such fees. Moreover, 

the termination notice received by Plaintiff Evans charged him for utilities for months that 

his vending facility was closed and did not credit him for amounts that he had paid 

directly to Caltrans at the direction of Defendant. Nonetheless, Evans alleges that he

subsequently submitted all amounts due prior to the deadline in the Termination Notice. 

Plaintiff Crocker similarly avers that, despite not owing the amount charged, he paid all 

amounts due in full prior to the deadline set forth in the Termination Notice. 

Plaintiffs initiated agency proceedings seeking full evidentiary hearings pursuant 

to 34 C.F.R. § 395.13 and Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 19635.3 According to Plaintiffs, the 

R-S Act’s dispute resolution mechanism is the only avenue open to licensees to resolve 

their complaints against state licensing agencies. The only exception to that 

requirement is when blind licensees seek injunctive relief pending a full resolution of the 

dispute. Plaintiffs fear that Defendant will terminate their operating agreements after the 

full evidentiary hearing, should the decision be adverse to Plaintiffs, despite Plaintiffs’ 

right to have the decision reviewed by an arbitration panel convened by the Secretary of 

 2

 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are taken, often verbatim, from Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in 

Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF No. 3), as well as their Complaint (ECF No. 5).

3 Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Motion make clear that administrative proceedings are ongoing. See 

generally ECF Nos. 2, 5. 

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Education. Termination of Plaintiffs’ operating agreements would result in ejection from 

the vending facilities they currently operate. Each Plaintiff has stated that he would be 

unable to find other employment that would compensate him at the level he earns at his 

respective vending facility. Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to a temporary 

restraining order and a preliminary injunction restraining Defendant from terminating their 

operating agreements.

STANDARD

The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo 

pending the complete briefing and thorough consideration contemplated by full 

proceedings pursuant to a preliminary injunction. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 

Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974) (temporary restraining orders “should be 

restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing 

irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer”); see also

Reno Air Racing Ass’n., Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006); Dunn v. 

Cate, No. CIV 08-873-NVW, 2010 WL 1558562, at *1 (E.D. Cal. April 19, 2010).

Issuance of a temporary restraining order, as a form of preliminary injunctive 

relief, is an extraordinary remedy, and Plaintiffs have the burden of proving the propriety 

of such a remedy. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). In general, 

the showing required for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are 

the same. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 

n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

The party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show that “he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); 

Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter). The 

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propriety of a TRO hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury that must be 

imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th 

Cir. 1988).

Alternatively, under the so-called sliding scale approach, as long as the Plaintiffs 

demonstrate the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and show that an injunction is in 

the public interest, a preliminary injunction can still issue so long as serious questions 

going to the merits are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in Plaintiffs’ 

favor. Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-36 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(concluding that the “serious questions” version of the sliding scale test for preliminary 

injunctions remains viable after Winter). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order fails both procedurally and

substantively. First, Plaintiffs’ Motion is deficient as filed. Second, and most importantly, 

Plaintiffs fail to establish that they face imminent irreparable harm warranting the 

requested extraordinary relief.

“Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that, among other things, they are likely to 

suffer irreparable injury and the injury must be imminent in nature.” Caribbean Marine, 

844 F.2d at 674. Reflecting this requirement, Local Rule 231(c), which governs the filing

of motions for TROs in this district, requires that parties seeking such relief provide, 

among others, the following documents to the Court: “(1) a complaint; (2) a motion for 

temporary restraining order; (3) a brief on all relevant legal issues presented by the 

motion; (4) an affidavit in support of the existence of an irreparable injury; (5) an affidavit 

detailing the notice or efforts to effect notice to the affected parties or counsel or showing 

good cause why notice should not be given, . . . and (7) a proposed order.” E.D. Cal. 

Local R. 230(c). Here, although Plaintiffs reference declarations purportedly signed by 

Plaintiffs, none were submitted to the Court with their Complaint or with their Motion. 

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The failure to comply with this local rule is particularly glaring as Plaintiffs submitted no 

evidence in support of their allegations of irreparable harm. Given that a TRO is 

considered to be an extraordinary remedy and Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing 

its propriety, Plaintiffs’ failure to submit any support for their Motion results in its denial.

4

However, even had Plaintiffs submitted Plaintiffs’ purported Declarations, Plaintiffs 

fail to meet their burden in demonstrating that they face imminent, irreparable harm. The 

harm that Plaintiffs allegedly face is entirely speculative, at best. For instance, “Plaintiffs 

fear that [Defendant] will terminate their operating agreements, after the full evidentiary 

hearing required by 34 C.F.R. § 395.13, should the decision be adverse to Plaintiffs.” 

Mot., ECF No. 3 at 10 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also argue that they “will suffer 

irreparable harm due to the lack of other employment opportunities available to them 

and the uncertainly in the law with respect to the award of damages in this case." Id. at 

20. 

Although Plaintiffs allege that “[u]nlike the typical employment case, it is not 

obvious that Plaintiffs will be able to obtain damages if they ultimately succeed in this 

case,” they fail to adequately support this contention.5 Mot., ECF No. 3 at 19. In fact, 

Plaintiffs provide no reason why a legal remedy, namely monetary damages, would be 

inadequate for the termination of their operating agreements and the resulting loss of 

revenue. Plaintiffs cite the loss of substantial income, attorneys’ fees, and court costs as 

examples of potential harm, yet these are all examples of harm where monetary 

remedies are generally found to be adequate. As to Plaintiffs’ contention that they also 

fear the loss of the opportunity to conduct an administrative review and loss of 

meaningful judicial review, these harms are entirely speculative at best – particularly 

where Plaintiffs acknowledge that an administrative review is ongoing. Speculative 

 4 Plaintiffs also failed to submit a proposed order and the Temporary Restraining Order Checklist. 

Plaintiffs are cautioned that in the future, they must scrupulously observe the requirements of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure as well as this Court’s Local Rules and Temporary Restraining Order Procedures

prior to filing requests for extraordinary relief.

5 Moreover, Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the threat of irreparable harm to a degree 

beyond being “not obvious.” 

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injury does not constitute irreparable harm. See Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674; 

Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir.1984). Because 

Plaintiffs allege only a speculative injury, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining 

Order (ECF No. 2) is DENIED without prejudice to refiling as a properly noticed Motion 

for a Preliminary Injunction in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

this Court’s Local Rules.

6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2014

 6 Finally, the Court notes that were Plaintiffs facing real, imminent harm, it is unlikely that they 

would have waited approximately two weeks from the receipt of an email on August 6, 2014, which 

Plaintiffs assert caused them to fear that Defendant would revive its allegedly unlawful efforts and another 

week after notifying opposing counsel of their intent to file the instant Motion. See ECF No. 2 at 3; ECF 

No. 5 at 5. A “long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of urgency and irreparable 

harm.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985). Stated another 

way, the Court is of the view that the two-week delay between Plaintiffs’ renewed fear of “imminent” harm 

and the filing of this Motion tends to contradict Plaintiffs' claims of irreparable injury. See, e.g., Occupy 

Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 2:11–CV–02873–MCE, 2011 WL 5374748 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) 

(denying application for TRO for twenty-five day delay). This delay further undermines Plaintiffs’ 

assertions.

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