Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02129/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Kipp W. Wilson
Appellant

Document Text:

FIL~:D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAUmited S~l\~1 A.ppak 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT MAY 10 lJ9l 

ROBERT L. BOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

KIPP W. WILSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 92-2129 

(D.C. No. 91-422-SC) 

(D. New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant Kipp W. Wilson pled guilty to one count of 

possession with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of 

cocaine in exchange for the government's dismissing the remaining 

four counts of the indictment. In this appeal, he challenges the 

sixty-three-month sentence imposed as a consequence of that plea, 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-2129 Document: 010110110105 Date Filed: 05/10/1993 Page: 1 
contending the court erred in failing to depart downward based 

both on his minor role in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.2(b) 

and his substantial assistance to the government under U. S . S.G. 

§ SKl . l. Finding no error, however, we affirm. 

Defendant bases his entitlement to the two-level decrease 

under§ 3Bl.2(b) on a disparity argument and compares his sentence 

to that of a coconspirator, Luis A. Valenzuela-Talamantes, who was 

not actually present at the hand-to-hand buy and, in fact, later 

received the two-level decrease. While Mr. Valenzuela had 

substantial ties to the body shop from which the drug operation 

emanated, defendant adds, the government knew he was addicted to 

drugs and alcohol and was merely a drone in the operation. Thus, 

defendant asserts he should have received equal treatment in 

sentencing by applying the two-level decrease based on his minor 

participation in the entire scheme. 

Alternatively, defendant contends the district court failed 

to make specific factual findings after he raised these objections 

to the Presentence Report. At a minimum, then, he requests remand 

to the district court to make the required findings under 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (3) (D). We find nothing in the facts of 

defendant's case or the law to support either contention. 

At sentencing, the court adopted the factual findings of the 

PSR evidencing defendant's negotiating sales and participating in 

the ultimate hand-to-hand transaction that resulted in his arrest. 

To the district court, these facts did not reflect defendant's 

minor role in the offense when added to the PSR's inclusion of 

information defendant negotiated and supplied various amounts of 

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l 

cocaine over a substantial period of time to undercover agents. 

The government also apprised the court Mr. Valenzuela had pled 

guilty to possession of a smaller quantity of cocaine. 

Surely on this record, the district court's factual findings 

are not clearly erroneous. United States v. Williams, 923 F.2d 

1397, 1404 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2033 (1991). 

Defendant's bare assertion his conduct is less culpable than that 

of a codefendant is insufficient to supply "by a preponderance of 

the evidence," United States v. Mccann, 940 F.2d 1352, 1359 (10th 

Cir. 1991), he is entitled to a downward adjustment. The district 

court did not err in refusing to apply the two-level decrease. 

Moreover, what defendant now characterizes as factual 

inaccuracies he raised to the PSR warranting the district court to 

make either a finding on the allegations or "a determination that 

no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will 

not be taken into account in sentencing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(c) (3) (D) is not supported by the transcript of the sentencing 

hearing. In her interchange with the court, counsel for defendant 

asked the court to look at the facts of the case and based on 

those facts decide defendant could be considered a minor 

participant. Counsel acknowledged defendant's participation in 

the actual sale and the quantum of evidence of guilt against 

defendant but argued those did not "establish necessarily that he 

was any less of a minor participant." Counsel concluded, 

So the basis of my argument is mainly that in looking at 

all the relevant conduct, I believe Mr. Wilson is a 

minor participant himself and especially in light of the 

fact if Mr. Valenzuela did receive that minor that 

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clearly he's in all fairness entitled to 

consideration. 

R. , Vol. V, 7. 

similar 

This case then differs from United States v. Harris, 944 F.2d 

784, 786 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 903 (1992), on 

which defendant relies. In Harris, defendant made "specific 

objections to statements contained in the presentence report, the 

first of which was directed at the statement 'the 

organization was responsible for the distribution of at least 

seven (7) kilograms of crack-cocaine at various loca,tions in the 

Tulsa area.'" Id. Because no such factual dispute was placed in 

issue at defendant's sentencing, the mandate of Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(c) (3) (D) was not triggered. Remand is therefore unnecessary. 

Finally, defendant contends the court erred in refusing to 

depart downward based on his substantial assistance to the 

government because the government had not filed the requisite 

motion under § 5Kl.1. The court relied on Wade v. United States, 

u. s. , 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843-44 (1992), which held "federal 

district courts have authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to 

file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy if they 

find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive." 

To the district court's statement defendant had not set forth 

any unconstitutional or other impermissible reasons why the 

government had not filed the motion, defendant argued and 

continues to press the contention that allegations of egregious 

prosecutorial conduct under United States v. Perez, 955 F.2d 34, 

35 (10th Cir. 1992), provides the basis for corrective action. 

That the court simply believed it lacked authority to act absent 

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• 

the government's motion without even entertaining the option of 

conducting a hearing to consider whether the government acted for 

arbitrary, capricious and bad faith reasons was the root of the 

error, defendant insists. 

Again we disagree. Wade establishes "a claim that a 

defendant merely provided substantial assistance will not entitle 

a defendant to a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary 

hearing. Nor would additional but generalized allegations of 

improper motive." Id. at 1844. Before the district court were 

such general allegations of improper motive framed, indeed, by the 

fact defendant became a fugitive while on bond. None of the 

predicates warranting the court to act were present in this case. 

United States v. Lee, 

18, 1993). 

AFFIRMED. 

F .2d , 1993 WL 74691 (10th Cir. Mar. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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