Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08063/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chelsea Dinsmoore
Not Party
Pamela Dinsmoore
Appellant
The Board of Trustees of the Memorial Hospital of Campbell County
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

Doitc-d Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

PUBLISH 

JUN 2 7 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALkOBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

PAMELA DINSMOORE, Individually, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

CHELSEA DINSMOORE, BY AND THROUGH 

PAMELA DINSMOORE, her Natural Mother 

and Guardian Ad Litem, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE MEMORIAL 

HOSPITAL OF CAMPBELL COUNTY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 90-8063 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(C-89-0325-B) 

Eric M. Alden (Bryan E. Sharratt of Sharratt & Sharratt with him 

on the brief), Wheatland, Wyoming, attorney for plaintiffappellant. 

Debra Hecox (John Sundahl with her on the brief) of Godfrey & 

Sundahl, Cheyenne, Wyoming, attorney for defendant-appellee. 

Before HOLLONAY, BARRETT and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-8063 Document: 01019297226 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 1 
Pamela Dinsmoore ("Pamela") appeals from a sununary judgment 

order dismissing her negligence claims against the Board of 

Trustees of the Memorial Hospital of Campbell County ("Memorial"). 

On May 29, 1988, Pamela's two-year-old daughter, Chelsea 

Dinsmoore, was in the care of her grandmother, Joan Dinsmoore, 

while Pamela was returning home from vacation. Joan took Chelsea 

on that date to see a Dr. Schmiedt in Gillette, Wyoming, to get 

treatment for a skin rash. Dr. Schmiedt prescribed an inoculation 

for the rash and instructed that a nurse at Memorial administer 

it. Memorial's pharmacy mistakenly provided the nurse with an 

amount of the medication which was six times the amount prescribed 

by the doctor. In the afternoon on May 30, the nurse injected the 

entire amount into Chelsea. Chelsea suffered a severe reaction to 

the overdose and Dr. Schmiedt placed her in Memorial's intensive 

care unit. There was no known antidote to the drug and Memorial 

could do nothing but monitor Chelsea's condition. 

According to Joan, Dr. Schmiedt told her that Chelsea could 

die, that if she made it until 10 p.m. she had a chance, and that 

if she made it until 1 a.m. she would be okay. According to the 

doctor, he never made those comments. Instead, the doctor claims 

that he told Joan only that there was a possibility that 

Chelsea's life was in danger and that Chelsea was "out of the 

woods" between 8 and 9 p.m. (Supp. R.' Vol. I, tab 37 at 2, 3) . 

Undisputed is that Dr. Schmiedt told Joan that she had to keep 

Chelsea as calm as possible; indeed, Chelsea's elevated heart rate 

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Appellate Case: 90-8063 Document: 01019297226 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 2 
increased dangerously whenever anyone dressed in white approached 

her. 

Dr. Schmiedt repeatedly asked Joan to contact Pamela. Joan 

contacted Pamela's friends in Gillette, Wyoming, who in turn 

located Pamela in Casper, Wyoming. The friends reached Pamela at 

a lounge just as Pamela was making arrangements to spend the night 

in Casper. Pamela had drunk some alcohol and her blood alcohol 

level was at about .07 percent. Pamela called the hospital at 

about 9:15 p.m. and spoke with Joan. In a shaky voice, Joan told 

Pamela that Chelsea had been overdosed. Joan also repeatedly told 

Pamela that Chelsea was "safe," but that Pamela should come home 

instead of spending the night in Casper and that she should drive 

carefully. (Supp. R., Vol. III at 51-52.) Joan did not say that 

Chelsea could die because she made a conscious decision not to 

tell Pamela how serious the situation was. Id. at so. 

After the telephone call with Joan, Pamela left the lounge 

and drove over the speed limit to get to Memorial. On the way, 

she had an accident when a deer ran out in front of her car. 

Pamela tried to avoid the deer, but lost control of her car and 

crashed. She suffered injuries in the crash. While Pamela 

acknowledges that she had no plan regarding what she would do once 

she reached Memorial, she claims that, once there, she intended to 

"rescue" Chelsea (Supp. R., Vol. IV at 74). 

On November 28, 1989, Pamela filed a complaint against 

Memorial on behalf of Chelsea and on her own behalf. In the 

complaint, Pamela alleged on Chelsea's behalf a claim against 

Memorial for negligence in injuring Chelsea by failing to supply 

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Appellate Case: 90-8063 Document: 01019297226 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 3 
and administer the proper dosage of prescribed medication. Pamela 

alleged on her own behalf claims against Memorial for infliction 

of emotional distress, negligent notification to Pamela concerning 

her child's condition, and negligence based on the "rescue 

doctrine." 1 Memorial filed a summary judgment motion to dismiss 

the claims. In response, Pamela withdrew the negligent 

notification and infliction of emotional distress claims. 

In granting summary judgment in favor of Memorial on Pamela's 

remaining claim based on the "rescue doctrine," the district court 

determined that: the "rescue doctrine" was recognized by the 

Wyoming Supreme Court in Dubus v. Dresser Industries, 649 P.2d 198 

(Wyo. 1982); the court in that case held that "the rescue doctrine 

provides that one who is injured in reasonably undertaking a 

necessary rescue may recover from the person whose negligence 

created the situation giving rise to the rescue," Id. at 206; 

application of the doctrine requires finding four elements, only 

two of which exist in this case (i.e., Pamela was injured and 

Memorial was negligent); the two elements lacking are 1) the 

reasonable undertaking of 2) a necessary rescue; there was no 

"rescue" necessary when Pamela set out for Memorial; any 

assistance needed was already being provided by Memorial and there 

was nothing Pamela could have done to aid her child; even if 

Pamela thought she could rescue Chelsea, such an undertaking was 

1 On appeal, Pamela asserts that she also alleged a claim against 

Memorial for negligence under a theory of ordinary tort liability. 

(Appellant's Brief at 1.) However, Pamela does not specifically 

challenge the district court's finding to the contrary, (R., Vol. 

I, tab 44 at 5), and our review of the complaint reveals no such 

pleading. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8063 Document: 01019297226 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 4 
not reasonable as there was nothing Pamela could have done; thus, 

the rescue doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case. 

The district court also determined that, even if Pamela could 

have made a case under the rescue doctrine, Memorial's negligence 

in administering an overdose to Chelsea was not the proximate 

cause of Pamela's accident. According to the district court, 

Pamela's drinking and speeding and her encounter with a deer 

combined to create an intervening cause of the accident as a 

matter of law. 

Pamela and Memorial settled and dismissed Chelsea's claim. 

On appeal, Pamela argues that the district court erred in finding 

as a matter of law that 1) the "rescue doctrine" did not apply to 

the facts of her case; and 2) Memorial's negligence was not the 

proximate cause of Pamela's accident. Because we affirm the 

district court on the first issue, we need not address the second. 

II. 

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary 

judgment. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 484 u.s. 986 (1987). We construe the alleged facts 

in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id. 

In support of her first argument, Pamela asserts, inter alia, 

that the district court erred when it found that Pamela did not 

"reasonably undertake" a rescue because no rescue was necessary. 

Pamela claims that the "reasonableness of [her] actions must be 

addressed within the context of the situation as [she] saw it." 

(Appellant's Brief at 13.) 

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Appellate Case: 90-8063 Document: 01019297226 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 5 
As noted by the district court, the Wyoming Supreme Court has 

recognized the "rescue doctrine" and defined it as providing that 

"one who is injured in reasonably undertaking a necessary rescue 

may recover from the person whose negligence created the situation 

giving rise to the rescue." Dubus v. Dresser Industries, supra, 

at 206. According to the Dubus court, "'persons injured in the 

course of undertaking a necessary rescue may, absent rash or 

reckless conduct on their part, recover'" from the person whose 

negligence created the peril. Id. (quoting Solgaard v. Guy F. 

Atkinson Co., 6 Cal. 3d 361, 99 Cal. Rptr. 29, 491 P.2d 821, 824-

25 (1971)). As Pamela asserts, a plaintiff's recovery under the 

Wyoming rescue doctrine appears to depend in part on that 

plaintiff's perception of the situation, since "there must 

reasonably appear to the rescuer to be imminent peril of injury or 

death." 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, 

Part 2, Perm. Ed. § 102.36 (cited with approval in Dubus, supra, 

at 206, n.3). 

However, the alleged facts seen in the light most favorable 

to Pamela fail to show that there reasonably appeared to Pamela an 

imminent need to rescue Chelsea. As noted by the New York Court 

of Appeals, "[S]omething more than a mere suspicion of danger to 

the life of another is requisite before the [rescue] doctrine 

should be implemented." Provenza v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 296 

N.Y.S.2d 322, 244 N.E.2d 26, 28 (1968). Here, Pamela was 

repeatedly told that Chelsea was safe; any other conclusion she 

made was speculative. 

to assist Chelsea 

Moreover, there was nothing Pamela could do 

because Joan was already effectively keeping 

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Appellate Case: 90-8063 Document: 01019297226 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 6 
Chelsea calm. Thus, Pamela's alleged belief that she had to 

rescue Chelsea was unreasonable as a matter of law. See Marks v. 

Wagner, 52 Ohio App. 2d 320, 370 N.E.2d 480, 484 (1977)(there is 

no reasonable belief of continued peril if rescuer has knowledge 

that victim's condition is stable requiring only medical 

attention) . 

Pamela asserts on appeal that she believed her presence was 

necessary because Memorial caused Chelsea's injuries in the first 

place. However, this assertion is inapposite because Pamela does 

not cite to any evidence to show that she thought Memorial 

continued to place Chelsea in danger after the overdose or that 

Memorial in fact continued to place Chelsea in danger. 

Pamela also asserts a series of other arguments in support of 

her position that the district court erred in finding she was not 

covered by the rescue doctrine as a matter of law. For instance, 

she claims that a rescue can be investigatory, that she need not 

have a plan for rescue in order to be covered under the doctrine, 

and that the definition of "reasonableness" should take into 

account the relationship of the rescuer to the victim. Each of 

these arguments fail because they assume that Pamela could 

reasonably believe that some form of rescue was necessary when, in 

fact, such a belief would only have been speculative under the 

facts herein. 

Pamela also claims that, even if it should be determined that 

she acted unreasonably, this should not result in an absolute bar 

to her claim because Wyoming is a comparative negligence state. 

However, the rescue doctrine specifically requires a "reasonable 

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Appellate Case: 90-8063 Document: 01019297226 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 7 
undertaking of a necessary rescue" before it can be utilized. 

Such is not the case here. 

We hold that the district court correctly found/concluded 

that Pamela was not covered by the rescue doctrine because she did 

not reasonably undertake a necessary rescue as a matter of law. 

AFFIRMED. 

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