Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01654/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01654-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jessie M. Lewis
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Jessie M. Lewis, by her attorneys, Law Offices of Lawrence L. Rohlfing, seeks 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 

denying her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income 

pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) (the “Act”). The 

matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ cross-briefs, which were submitted, without 

oral argument, to the Honorable Sandra M. Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge. Following a 

review of the complete record and applicable law, this Court finds the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole and based on proper legal standards. 

I. Background

A. Procedural History

In September 2007, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff alleged an 

onset of disability date of April 1, 2006. The Commissioner initially denied the claims on January 

JESSIE M. LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-1654-SMS 

ORDER AFFIRMING AGENCY’S 

DENIAL OF BENEFITS AND ORDERING 

JUDGMENT FOR COMMISSIONER

(Doc. 14)

Case 1:14-cv-01654-SMS Document 17 Filed 02/02/16 Page 1 of 8
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16, 2008, and upon reconsideration again denied the claims on March 27, 2008. On May 1, 2008, 

Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing.

On June 9, 2009, and represented by counsel, Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing 

presided over by William C. Thompson, Jr., Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”). See 20 

C.F.R. 404.929 et seq. An impartial vocational expert, Susan Creighton-Clavel also appeared and 

testified. On November 4, 2009, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. The Appeals Council 

denied review on January 13, 2010. The ALJ’s decision thus became the Commissioner’s final 

decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking this Court’s review pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The parties stipulated to a remand for further proceedings.

The Appeals Council remanded the matter for further proceedings on February 22, 2011 in 

order to remove an erroneously included exhibit. On October 5, 2011, Plaintiff appeared with 

counsel for a second oral hearing. An impartial vocational expert, George Meyers (“the VE”), also 

appeared and testified. On January 18, 2012, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. The Appeals 

Council declined to assume jurisdiction on August 23, 2013, thus making the ALJ’s decision the 

Commissioner’s final decision. On October 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action. 

B. Relevant Record

The only issue on appeal is whether the ALJ committed legal error when he failed to 

explain a deviation from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles at step five of the sequential 

analysis. Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments and RFC are not on appeal. Hence, the 

record will not be summarized here.

C. Vocational Expert Testimony

At the October 2011 administrative hearing, the VE classified Plaintiff’s past work as mail 

clerk (DOT # 209.687-026, light, SVP 2), file clerk (DOT # 206.387-034, light, SVP 3), and 

administrative clerk (DOT # 237.367-010, light, SVP 4). The ALJ asked the VE to assume a 

hypothetical person of the same age, education, and work history as Plaintiff, and could only 

occasionally lift twenty pounds; frequently lift ten pounds; stand and walk in combination for six 

hours in a work day; sit at least six hours in a work day; occasionally stop and crouch; never climb 

ropes, ladders, or scaffolding; and never work at heights or around hazardous machinery. The 

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hypothetical person would be further limited to work involving only simple instructions. The VE 

opined that this individual could perform Plaintiff’s past work as a mail clerk. The VE further 

opined that this individual could work as cashier (DOT # 211.462-010, light, SVP 2), office help

(DOT # 239.567-010, light, SVP 2), and storage rental clerk (DOT # 295.367-026, light, SVP 2). 

The VE testified that these jobs existed in significant numbers in the state of California. 

The ALJ asked the VE regarding a second hypothetical person who could sit a total of two 

hours, and stand and walk a total of two hours. The VE testified that there were no jobs that this 

individual could perform.

Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE regarding the mail clerk position. The VE testified that the 

mail clerk distributes mail based on addresses or departments. Plaintiff’s counsel directed the VE 

to assume that “simple work” for purposes of the limitations includes one and two-step instruction 

and includes detailed but uninvolved instructions, but excludes things that are more involved. The 

VE opined that Plaintiff’s counsel’s description was that of unskilled work at SVP one and two. 

When directed to exclude jobs of Level 3 Reasoning, but allowed detailed but uninvolved 

instructions and simple one and two-step instructions, the VE opined that cashier, storage rental 

clerk, and mail clerk would be affected. The office clerk position required Level 2 Reasoning and 

would not be affected. 

Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual who was markedly 

limited in interacting with the public, supervisors, coworkers, or responding appropriately to work 

situations and changes in a work setting. The VE testified that this individual would not be able to 

sustain work. 

D. Disability Determination

After considering the evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability. He found that Plaintiff had the following 

severe impairments –degenerative disc disease of the lumbosacral spine, obesity, mood disorder, 

and pain disorder– which significantly limited her ability to perform basic work activities. The 

ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or medically equaled the severity of 

a listed impairment. He found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 

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C.F.R. 404. 1567(b) and 416.967(b), but could only occasionally lift or carry twenty pounds; 

frequently lift or carry ten pounds; stand and walk for six hours in combination; sit up to six hours; 

should not be required to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, could not work at heights or around 

hazardous machinery, and was limited to work involving simple instructions. The ALJ concluded 

that Plaintiff was not capable of performing his past relevant work as a mail clerk, file clerk, and 

administrative clerk, but there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy 

that Plaintiff could perform. Hence, he determined that Plaintiff was “not disabled.” 

II. Legal Standard

A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if she is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a) 

(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment(s) must result from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically 

accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity that the 

claimant is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering her age, education, 

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that exists in the 

national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D). 

To encourage uniformity in decision making, the Commissioner has promulgated 

regulations prescribing a five-step sequential process for evaluating an alleged disability. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f); 416.920 (a)-(f). In the five-step sequential review process, the burden 

of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, but shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Id. at 

1098–99; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

In the first step of the analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently 

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, in the 

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second step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a 

combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. Id. 

§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the third step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the requirements of 

the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If 

not, in the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC, despite 

the impairment or various limitations to perform his past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If 

not, in step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform 

other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 

416.920(g).

B. Standard of Review

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny benefits under the Act. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper 

legal standards. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). If an ALJ 

applied the proper legal standards and the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, 

this Court must uphold the ALJ’s determination that the claimant is not disabled. See, e.g., Ukolov 

v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 104 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial 

evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Ryan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1998 (9th Cir. 2008). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 

2005). Where the evidence as a whole can support either outcome, the Court may not substitute its 

judgment for the ALJ’s, rather, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. Id. 

III. Discussion

Plaintiff argues the descriptions for cashier and storage rental clerk in the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”) requires her to perform at a higher reasoning level, Level 3, than is 

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permitted by her RFC which restricts her to simple, repetitive tasks.

1

She argues that the ALJ erred 

in failing to resolve the deviation from the DOT. She further argues that the office helper, at Level 

2 Reasoning, requires her to perform at a higher reasoning level than is permitted by her RFC. 

A. Applicable Law

“The DOT lists maximum requirements of occupations as generally performed, not the 

range of requirements of a particular job as it is performed in specific settings.” SSR 00-4p. “The 

term ‘occupation,’ as used in the DOT, refers to the collective description of those jobs. Each 

occupation represents numerous jobs.” Id. “Information about a particular job’s requirements [...]

may be available [...] from a VE's or VS's experience in job placement or career counseling.” Id. 

A VE may be able to provide more specific information about jobs or occupations than the DOT.

Id. 

An ALJ cannot rely on the VE’s testimony without inquiring whether it conflicts with the 

DOT and obtaining a reasonable explanation for any apparent conflict. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 

F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007). “An example of a conflict between the DOT and a VE’s 

testimony is when the DOT’s description of a job includes activities a claimant is precluded from 

doing, and the VE nonetheless testifies that the claimant would be able to perform that job.” Tovar 

v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3997, *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015)(citing Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2008)). If the ALJ relies on a VE’s testimony that 

contradicts the DOT, the record must contain “persuasive evidence to support the deviation.”

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). “[I]n order for an ALJ to rely on a job 

description in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles that fails to comport with a claimant’s noted 

limitations, the ALJ must definitively explain this deviation.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 

847 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The Ninth Circuit found that “there is an apparent conflict between the residual functional 

capacity to perform simple, repetitive tasks, and the demands of Level 3 Reasoning.” Zavalin v. 

Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015). This conflict invokes the ALJ’s duty to resolve the 

 

1 The ALJ limited Plaintiff to work involving simple instructions. Plaintiff argues that this limitation is equal to a 

similar limitation to simple, repetitive tasks. The Court treats these similar limitations interchangeably in this order

because the outcome in this case would be the same under either specification.

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deviation. The Zavalin appeal was reversed because the ALJ in that case had failed to recognize 

the inconsistency and did not ask the expert to explain why a person with Zavalin’s limitation 

could nevertheless meet the demands of Level 3 Reasoning. Id. While Level 3 Reasoning seems 

inconsistent with an RFC limited to simple and routine work tasks, Level 2 Reasoning appears 

more consistent. Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005).

B. Analysis

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was limited to work involving simple instructions. Thus, 

there was an apparent conflict between Plaintiff’s capacity and the cashier and storage rental clerk 

positions, which require Level 3 Reasoning. However, the VE also found that Plaintiff was 

capable of working as an office helper, which requires Level 2 Reasoning and exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy. 

Plaintiff argues that office helper position is also in conflict with Plaintiff’s capacity 

because it requires the ability to perform a variety of job duties, and, thus, it is not simple and 

repetitive. Plaintiff argues that the office helper position, with its Level 2 Reasoning designation, 

requires the ability to adapt to performing a variety of job duties and to seamlessly transition from 

different task to different task. Plaintiff cites to the Revised Handbook for Analyzing Jobs, which 

describes temperaments –or the “adaptability requirements made on the worker by specific types 

of jobs” to support this position. Plaintiff requests that this Court find that a facial conflict exists 

between a RFC to perform simple, repetitive tasks with occupations requiring the worker to 

perform a variety of duties. This request is far beyond the scope of Zavalin. 

Level 2 Reasoning requires a person to: “Apply commonsense understanding to carry out 

detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions. Deal with problems involving a few concrete 

variables in or from standardized situations.” DOT, Appx. C, III; Zavalin, 778 F. 3d at 847. The 

office helper title describes the functions as follows:

Furnishes workers with clerical supplies. Opens, sorts, and distributes incoming mail, and 

collects, seals, and stamps outgoing mail. Delivers oral or written messages. Collects and 

distributes paperwork, such as records or timecards, from one department to another.

Marks, tabulates, and files articles and records. May use office equipment, such as 

envelope-sealing machine, letter opener, record shaver, stamping machine, and 

transcribing machine. May deliver items to other business establishments.

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DOT # 239.567-010. This DOT description reveals that the office helper is required to perform 

work involving simple instructions and simple, repetitive tasks and that seem to comport with the 

requirements of Level 2 Reasoning. There is no apparent deviation from the DOT and there is no 

apparent conflict with Plaintiff’s capacity. 

Further, there is no conflict between Plaintiff’s RFC and the ability to adapt to performing 

a variety of job duties. Plaintiff has been restricted to tasks involving simple instructions or 

simple, repetitive tasks. Nothing in her RFC suggests that she is unable to perform a variety of job 

duties or that she is unable to transition between different tasks. Using the office helper position as 

an example, each task described may be considered simple and repetitive. Plaintiff’s limitation to 

simple, repetitive tasks does not preclude her from performing a variety of such tasks. 

Thus, the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform as an office helper did not deviate 

from the DOT and did not conflict with Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ properly relied on this testimony 

in making his finding at step five. Therefore, the ALJ’s step-five finding that there are jobs in the 

national economy that Plaintiff can perform is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ applied appropriate legal standards 

and that substantial credible evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not 

disabled. Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter 

judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2016 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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