Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00377/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00377-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Celanese International Corp.
Defendant
H.B. Fuller
Defendant
Marcia Miller
Plaintiff
Donald H. Miller
Plaintiff
Southern Pacific Railroad
Defendant

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1 Celanese is the sole remaining defendant in this

action. (See Stip. & Order for Dismissal, filed April 13, 2007

[dismissing defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company, sued also

as Southern Pacific Railroad]; Joint Status Rpt., filed June 26,

2006, at 2:22 [describing that plaintiffs previously dismissed

defendant H.B. Fuller]; see also Opp’n, filed July 23, 2007, at

2:10-11 [plaintiffs acknowledge that defendants Southern Pacific

Railroad and H.B. Fuller have been dismissed from this action].) 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DONALD H. MILLER and

MARCIA MILLER,

NO. CIV. S-06-377 FCD EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD;

H.B. FULLER; CELANESE 

INTERNATIONAL CORP.; UNION

PACIFIC RAILROAD and DOES 1

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Celanese

International Corp.’s (“defendant” or “Celanese”)1 motion for

summary judgment of plaintiffs Donald and Marcia Miller’s

(“plaintiffs”) complaint against it, alleging claims for strict

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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3 According to plaintiffs, they never sought to allege

such a claim against defendant; although, their complaint does

not make that clear. (Id. at 11:14-21.) 

4 In their opposition, plaintiffs, for the first time,

assert that they are also pressing a federal claim under the

Federal Safety Appliance Act against defendant. (Id. at 5:1-7;

9:9-10:2.) However, plaintiffs do not assert this claim in their

complaint and never moved to amend their complaint to add such a

claim. Accordingly, the court will not consider such a claim

herein. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

this court’s Scheduling Order, plaintiffs have not demonstrated

“good cause” to permit amendment of the complaint at this late

juncture in the case (where discovery is closed, the dispositive

motion deadline has passed and trial is set to commence on

November 27, 2007). Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); Sched. Order, filed

July 7, 2006. 

2

products liability, negligence, premises liability and loss of

consortium.2 Defendant contends it is entitled to summary

judgment because said claims are preempted by federal laws

regulating the safety and design of railcars. Alternatively,

defendant argues that even if not preempted, plaintiffs’ claims

fail on the merits, as plaintiffs have no admissible evidence to

support one or more of the essential elements of their claims. 

Plaintiffs concede, in opposition to the motion, that their

products liability claim is preempted by federal law. (Opp’n,

filed July 23, 2007, at 10:16-18 [acknowledging said claim is

barred under Carrillo v. ACF Industries, 20 Cal. 4th 1158

(1999)].) Plaintiffs also concede that they do not have a viable

premises liability claim against defendant, who was not the

landowner.3 (Opp’n at 11:14-21.) Based on these concessions,

the court grants defendants’ motion with respect to plaintiffs’

products and premises liability claims.4

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5 Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is asserted on behalf of

Donald Miller, who was injured in the subject accident. The loss

of consortium claim is asserted by Marcia Miller, Donald’s wife.

6 See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382

(1974).

7 Celanese leases the railcar involved in the instant

accident from its subsidiary. (RUF ¶ 3.)

3

Thus, the only claims at issue are plaintiffs’ negligence

and loss of consortium claims.5 For the reasons set forth below,

the court finds plaintiffs’ negligence claim, like their products

liability claim, preempted by federal law. As such, the court

does not consider defendant’s alternative argument that

plaintiffs’ negligence claim fails because defendant did not owe

plaintiffs a duty, or even if it did, plaintiffs have no evidence

defendant breached any duty. Because the court finds plaintiffs’

negligence claim preempted, their loss of consortium claim must

necessarily be dismissed as well, since this claim cannot stand

without a predicate claim of liability.6

BACKGROUND

Celanese is a manufacturer of industrial chemicals including

vinyl acetate monomer (“VAM”). (Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to

Def.’s Stmt. of Undisp. Facts [“RUF”], filed Aug. 3, 2007, ¶ 1.) 

In or about 2001, Celanese and H.B. Fuller (“HBF”) entered into a

contract wherein Celanese agreed to supply HBF with VAM; the

product was to be shipped in a Celanese-leased7 tanker railcar. 

(RUF ¶ 2.) More specifically, the railcar would be loaded with

VAM at a Celanese production facility. The rail line operator,

in this case, Union Pacific, would take possession of the tanker

railcar and deliver it to the shipment destination. The railcar

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8 Plaintiffs attempt to dispute this fact, arguing that

while the railcar’s design and specifications may have been

approved by the AAR, “the components actually used to assemble

the car were not.” (Id.) However, plaintiffs offer no evidence

to support this contention, and defendant’s submitted evidence

establishes the contrary. (See Ex. C to Def.’s Index.) 

Accordingly, the court treats this fact as undisputed.

4

would be unhooked at a spur line at HBF where it would eventually

be offloaded. (Ex. B to Def.’s Index of Documentary Evid.

[“Def.’s Index”], filed June 26, 2007.)

The railcar involved in the instant action is CELX 23266

(sometimes herein, the “Subject Railcar”). (RUF ¶ 3.) Celanese

did not design the Subject Railcar, and it was manufactured in or

about 1980 by North American Car Corp. (“NACC”). (RUF ¶s 4-5.) 

The railcar’s design, specifications and components were approved

by the Association of American Railroads (“AAR”). (RUF ¶ 6.)8

Celanese purchased the Subject Railcar after it was built by NAC

and used it exclusively to transport its products since that

time. (RUF ¶ 7.) 

Plaintiff Donald Miller has been an employee of HBF since

approximately 1980/1981. HBF operates a plant in Roseville,

California, where Mr. Miller worked. (RUF ¶ 8.) Prior to the

incident at issue, Mr. Miller was a Shift Manager on the second

shift, in which is typical schedule was 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 

However, on the day of the accident, October 15, 2003, he came to

work early during the morning shift and undertook offloading the

Subject Railcar. (RUF ¶ 9.) 

A tanker railcar can be emptied by using alternate valve

systems, one located at the belly of the car or from an operating

platform located at the top. On the day of the accident, HBF

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9 Exhibit “N” to Defendant’s Index depicts the assembly

on the platform, including the “hatch,” marked “A,” which houses

the valves of the railcar, the “manway,” marked “B,” the “manway

throat,” marked “B-1,” the “manway hatch,” marked “B-2,” and the

“manway bolts,” marked “B-3.”

5

required its employees to hook a vent hose and pipe to a vent

valve located on top of a tanker railcar. A hose is then hooked

to a fitting located at the bottom of the tanker railcar. (Ex. I

to Def.’s Index [Crandall Dep. 19:7-20:1]; Exs. L, M, N to Def.’s

Index [photographs depicting both systems and the assembly on the

platform].)9

Mr. Miller attempted to utilize HBF procedure to offload the

railcar which requires access to the top operating platform of

the car. While trying to hook up a hose to the vent valve,

plaintiff’s pant leg allegedly caught a manway bolt, causing him

to fall from the top of the railcar. (RUF ¶ 9.) Mr. Miller

claims he suffered a cervical spine injury, which necessitated a

fusion surgery, and a closed head injury. (Opp’n at 1:28-2:2.)

As a result, plaintiffs filed a form complaint in superior

court against Celanese, among others, asserting claims for

products liability, general negligence, premises liability and

loss of consortium. (RUF ¶ 12.) Defendant thereafter removed

the action to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction

and now moves for summary judgment. (Not. of Removal, filed Feb.

24, 2006.)

It is Mr. Miller’s fall from the Subject Railcar that gives

rise to plaintiffs’ remaining liability theories (negligence and

loss of consortium) against Celanese. Specifically, plaintiffs

contend the height of the manway throat and the length of the

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10 Despite their discovery responses to the contrary,

plaintiffs state in opposition to the motion that they “do not

claim that the [Subject Railcar] lacked a safety chain or swing

arm guards.” (Id.) Accordingly, the court does not consider

defendant’s arguments regarding these devices (see Mem. of 

P. & A., filed June 26, 2007, at 8-10), as plaintiffs have

abandoned any theory of liability based on such components of the

railcar. At issue on the motion is only whether the height of

the manway throat and length of the manway bolts give rise to

liability against defendant.

6

manway bolts employed in combination presented a hazard for which

Celanese bears responsibility. (RUF ¶ 13.)10

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©; see California v. Campbell,

138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party only needs to show "that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 325.

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Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier

of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1107. Instead, through admissible evidence the nonmoving party 

“must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

ANALYSIS

By their negligence claim, plaintiffs seek to impose

liability on defendant for alleged design defects of two features

of the operating platform (the walking surface of the railcar). 

First, they claim the throat of the manway was too high. (RUF ¶

13.) Second, they claim the manway bolts on the operating

platform were too high in relation to the manway cover,

ultimately causing Mr. Miller to trip and fall from the railcar. 

(Id.)

The question presented here is whether such a common law

claim of negligence is preempted by federal law. Article VI of

the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States

shall be the supreme law of the land; as such, any state law that

conflicts with federal law is “without effect.” See Cipollone v.

Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing M'Culloch v.

Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 427 (1819)). In evaluating a federal

law’s preemptive effect, however, the court must proceed from the

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presumption that the historic police powers of the state are not

to be superseded by a federal act “unless that [is] the clear and

manifest purpose of Congress.” Id. at 516 (citing Rice v. Santa

Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).

Applying this framework, the United States Supreme Court has

identified three circumstances in which state law is preempted by

federal law: 1) where Congress explicitly defines the extent to

which its enactments preempt state law (“express preemption”); 2)

where state law regulates conduct in a field that Congress

intended the federal government to exclusively occupy (“field

preemption”); and 3) where it is impossible to comply with both

state and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes

and objectives of Congress (“conflict preemption”). English v.

General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-80 (1990) (citations

omitted). 

Congress has specifically addressed the issue of railroad

safety and equipment in several statutes, including, among

others, the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), 49 U.S.C. §

20101 et seq., and the Federal Safety Appliance Act (“SAA”), 49

U.S.C. § 20301 et seq. Congress empowered the Secretary of

Administration to implement this body of regulatory law; this

obligation was delegated to the Secretary of Transportation, who

authorized the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”), an

operating administration within the Department of Transportation,

to assume this responsibility. 49 U.S.C. § 20103; 45 U.S.C. §

431; 49 C.F.R. § 1.49(n). Subsequently, the FRA promulgated a

comprehensive regulatory scheme, the Railroad Safety Appliance

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9

Standards (“RSAS”), in the Code of Federal Regulations, that

preempt a broad range of state laws. Mehl v. Canadian Pac. Ry.,

417 F. Supp. 2d 1109-13, 1116-20 (D.N.D. 2006). Together, these

laws and their implementing regulations create an extensive

network of federal railroad regulations.

The question of whether these federal laws preempt state law

is a legal question for the court to decide. See City of Auburn

v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001). Under FRSA,

Congress included an express preemption clause in order to

achieve its goal of national uniformity with respect to railroad

safety. Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 474 F.2d 1108, 1112

(5th Cir. 1973). Section 20106 of FRSA provides:

Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety

. . . shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.

A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation,

or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary

of Transportation . . . prescribes a regulation or issues

an order covering the subject matter of the State 

requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an

additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order

to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation,

or order –

(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially

local safety or security hazard;

(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order

of the United States Government; and

(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.

Since FRSA has an express preemption clause, a preemption

analysis must focus on the plain wording of the clause, which

necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive

intent. CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). In

that regard, in CSX, the Supreme Court recognized that under

Section 20106, state common law claims are preempted when they

attempt to regulate a subject matter covered by the federal

regulation, unless they are necessary to redress an essentially

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11 The SAA was intended to standardize regulations

regarding freight/railcar safety devices for the benefit of

workers and passengers. See Illinois Central R.R. Co. v.

Williams, 242 U.S. 462, 466-67 (1917). The SAA mandates that

railcars operate with certain safety equipment and features,

including couplers, brakes, running boards and handholds. 49

U.S.C. § 20302.

10

local safety hazard. Id.

The SAA, on the other hand, does not have an explicit

preemption provision.11 However, courts have consistently held

that the SAA “so far occupie[s] the field of legislation relating

to the equipment of [rail] cars with safety appliances . . .

[that it] supercede[s] existing and prevent[s] further

legislation of the subject.” Southern Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm.,

Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 447 (1915); see e.g. Jordan v. Sourthern Ry.

Co., 970 F.2d 1350, 1352 (4th Cir. 1992). Thus, the SAA, as

interpreted by courts under principles of “field preemption,”

divests states of all authority to regulate on the devices

enumerated therein, whether the regulation is “consistent,

complementary, additional or otherwise.” See e.g. Gilvary v.

Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 292 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1934). 

In this case, whether defined as the safety requirements for

working on railcars or as the safety requirements of the walking

surface of operating platforms, plaintiffs’ negligence claim

relating to the manway throat and manway bolts is preempted by

the above laws. Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, to preempt

their claim, the federal regulation need only speak to the

broader subject matter at issue.

[A] regulatory framework need not impose bureaucratic

micromanagement in order to substantially subsume a

particular subject matter . . . the regulations need

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not set forth in minute detail each action a railroad

must take. Rather, the regulations must substantially

subsume a particular subject matter.

In re Derailment Cases, 416 F.3d 787, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). In

Mehl, for example, the court recognized that FRSA’s regulations

regarding bolt tightness, crack joint bars and restressing

clearly intended to prevent claims of negligent construction and

maintenance, although the regulations did not prescribe any

actual standards for construction and maintenance. 417 F. Supp.

2d at 1116-17.

Here, federal regulations encompass the design and

components of a operating platform of a railcar, the area

plaintiff allegedly fell from while attempting to offload the

VAM. For example, the RSAS provides various regulations

addressing the operating platform, including, among other things,

the requisite dimensions for the platform, the number of ladders

required and safety railing. 49 C.F.R. §§ 231.21(j)(1),

(j)(2)(vi), (j)(3), (j)(4)(ii). The RSAS also addresses the

walking areas of the operating platform, including bolt

specifications, the tread and the distance extending from the

railcar. See generally id. at § 231.1. These regulations, at

times, are highly specific, prescribing such details as the

height of the tread on the sill steps, the depth of the sill

steps and the bolts that must be used in securing the sill steps.

Id. at § 231.1(d)(3)(iii), (d)(3)(ii), (d)(4). The RSAS also

addresses the manways of a tanker railcar, requiring that the

“manway cover must be an approved design.” 49 C.F.R. § 179.103-

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12 In this case, it is undisputed that prior to Celanese’s

purchase of the Subject Railcar, its design, components and

specifications were approved by the AAR, and thus the Subject

Railcar was designed and built in accordance with federal

regulations. (RUF § 6.) 

12

2(a).12 Federal regulations further mandate requirements for

manway bolts, including the circumference of the bolts and the

general holding capacity of the bolts. Id. at § 179.100-12.

This level of detail, with which the FRA regulates the

operating platforms of tanker railcars (through the RSAS),

demonstrates that the walking surface of the platforms, including

the manway-bolt ratio and the height of the throat of the manway,

is covered by federal regulation leaving no room for state common

law theories to regulate the subject. Similar to Mehl, discussed

above, because plaintiffs’ negligence claim asserts liability for

design components of the railcar which are broadly regulated by

federal laws, their state law claim is preempted. 417 F. Supp.

2d at 1112-13 (preempting claims for negligent application of the

train’s emergency brakes, failure to inspect, and improper

movement of defective railcars, among others, because said claims

did not “lie beyond the ambit of the FRSA’s broad regulatory . .

. system”); see also Carrillo, 20 Cal. 4th at 1170 (recognizing

that where federal laws, such as the SAA, “touc[h] a field in

which the federal interest is so dominant” the federal system of

regulation will be “assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws

on the same subject”). Carrillo addressed a state law claim for

products liability, and plaintiffs concede that their claim here

for the same is preempted under Carrillo. (Opp’n at 10:16-18.) 

Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is based on the very same facts as

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13 Because plaintiffs failed to timely seek leave to

assert a claim for relief under any of the above federal laws,

the court does not consider the merits of any such claim herein.

13

their products liability claim and is likewise preempted under

the reasoning of Carrillo. Their negligence claim seeks recovery

for alleged design defects in components of railcars which are

heavily regulated by federal law, as set forth above. That

federal regulation precludes pursuit of state law remedies for

such defects, including plaintiffs’ instant negligence claim.13

See e.g. Gilvary, 292 U.S. at 60-61.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in its entirety. The Clerk of the Court is

directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: September 7, 2007

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