Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00187/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00187-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fabian Franco-Saenz
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Fabian Franco-Saenz, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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CR 04-0965-PHX-SMM 

CV 07-0187-PHX-SMM (HCE)

ORDER

Movant Fabian Franco-Saenz (“Movant”), presently confined in the Central Arizona

Detention Center in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Motion for Time Reduction by an

Inmate in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. # 32). The Court will

summarily dismiss the motion. 

I. Procedural Background

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit hostage

taking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203 and conspiracy to harbor illegal aliens in violation of

8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(iii) and (a)(1)(A)(v)(1). On January 16, 2007, the Court sentenced

Movant to a 232-month term of imprisonment. (Doc. #30).

In his § 2255 motion, Movant seeks a reduction in sentence on the basis that as a

deportable alien, he is ineligible for placement in a halfway house or early release for

completion of a drug treatment program. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (sentence may be

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reduced by up to one year for successful completion of drug treatment program); 18 U.S.C.

§ 3624(c) (ten percent of a sentence, but no longer than six months, may be served “under

conditions that will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for

the prisoner’s re-entry into the community”). Movant claims his equal protection rights have

been violated.

II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case

that the movant is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), RULES GOVERNING § 2255 ACTIONS.

The district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the movant’s allegations,

viewed against the record, either fail to state a claim for relief or are patently frivolous.

Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1985). A district court may summarily

dismiss a motion to vacate without ordering a response from the government where the

record conclusively or plainly shows that the movant is not entitled to relief. Baumann v.

United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982). Here, Movant plainly is not entitled to

relief.

III. Movant is Not Entitled to Relief

A. Nature of Claim

A motion filed pursuant to § 2255 is for a person “claiming the right to be released

upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the

sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to

collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Movant’s request for a sentence reduction does not fit

in any of these categories and thus is not a proper subject for § 2255 relief.

In addition, under the present circumstances, the Court cannot reduce Movant’s

sentence. A judgment of conviction that includes a sentence is final except in extremely

limited circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b). With few narrow exceptions, which do not

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apply here, a court generally may not correct or modify a sentence once it has been imposed.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Penna, 319 F.3d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 2003).

Finally, the sentencing reduction issue raised by Movant was squarely at issue in

United States v. Martinez-Ramos, 184 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1999). In Martinez-Ramos, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that for convictions under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326, status as a “deportable alien cannot be a ground for downward departure because

deportable alien status is an element of the crime that was necessarily taken into account by

the Sentencing Commission in crafting the offense level of a § 1326 violation.” Id. at 1056.

As a clear matter of law, therefore, Movant was not and is not entitled to a downward

departure on the ground that he is a deportable alien.

Movant’s equal protection claim has also been rejected by the Ninth Circuit. In

McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1086

(2000), the court of appeals affirmed the denial of an equal protection challenge to the

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) policy excluding prisoners with immigration detainers from

eligibility for sentence reduction under a residential substance abuse treatment program. The

court held that “excluding prisoners with detainers from participating in community-based

treatment programs, and consequently from sentence reduction eligibility, is at least

rationally related to the BOP’s legitimate interest in preventing prisoners from fleeing

detainers while participating in community treatment programs.” Id. at 1186. That

conclusion applies with equal force to the BOP policy excluding prisoners with immigration

detainers from early release to community confinement programs.

B. Waiver

In addition, Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.”

United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible

to presume waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable

presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton,

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391 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). For example, a waiver of appellate rights is enforceable

if the language of the waiver encompasses the right to appeal on the grounds raised and the

waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id.

A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255 action challenging the

length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only claims that cannot be

waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of

counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that

a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead

guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to

hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the

waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 ( declining to decide whether waiver of all

statutory rights included claims implicating the voluntariness of the waiver). 

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

Defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections which defendant could assert to

the indictment or information, or to the petition to revoke, or to

the Court’s entry of judgment against defendant and imposition

of sentence upon defendant, provided that the sentence is

consistent with this agreement. Defendant further waives:

(1) any right to appeal the Court’s entry of judgment against

defendant; (2) any right to appeal the imposition of sentence

upon defendant under Title 18, United States Code, Section

3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right to collaterally attack

defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28 ,United

States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack.

Defendant acknowledges that this waiver shall result in the

dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack defendant might file

challenging his conviction or sentence in this case.

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(Doc. # 31 at 6). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he had discussed the terms

with his attorney, that he agreed to the terms and conditions, and that he entered into it

voluntarily (Doc. # 31 at 10). 

Movant’s assertions in his § 2255 motion all pertain to sentencing and do not pertain

to the voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the imposition

of sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his

plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the sentencing

issues raised in his § 2255 motion. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the motion.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the reference of this case to the magistrate

judge is withdrawn as to Movant’s Motion for a Time Reduction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255 (Doc. # 32). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for a Time Reduction Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. # 32) is DENIED and that the civil action opened in connection with

the Motion (CV 07-0187-PHX-SMM (HCE)) is DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 2nd day of February, 2007.

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