Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01135/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01135-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Corrections Corporation of America
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 13, 2000 Decided December 26, 2000

No. 00-1135

Corrections Corporation of America,

d/b/a Servicios Correcionales de Puerto Rico,

Petitioner

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Carlos A. Del Valle Cruz, pro hac vice, argued the cause

for petitioner. With him on the brief was Angel MuNoz

Noya.

David A. Seid, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

Leonard R. Page, General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

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Deputy Associate General Counsel, and David Habenstreit,

Supervisory Attorney.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers and Garland,

Circuit Judges

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam: In this case, the

National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") found

that petitioner Corrections Corporation of America ("Company") violated section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor

Relations Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. s 158(a)(1), (5) (1994), when

the Company refused to recognize and bargain with the

Union General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico ("Union"),

and unilaterally changed the work schedules of its social

penal workers. The Company, in its petition for review,

contends, first, that the Board lacks jurisdiction over private

correctional institutions; second, that the Board erred in

disposing of the unfair labor practice complaint on summary

judgement; and, third, that persons employed as "social penal

workers" are either guards or supervisors under the Act, and,

therefore, should not have been included in the unit that was

certified for bargaining. The Company's arguments are meritless.

"Because of its expertise, the Board 'necessarily has a large

measure of informed discretion,' and this court will sustain

the Board's determination that an individual is an 'employee'

and not a 'supervisor' if it is supported by substantial evidence." Passaic Daily News v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1543, 1550

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Amalgamated Clothing Workers of

America v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 1296, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).

"Substantial evidence means 'such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.' " MECO Corp. v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 1434, 1436

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971)). The Regional Director found, and the Board

affirmed, that there was no evidence in the record that the

alleged supervisory duties listed in the job description and job

postings for social penal workers had actually been exercised

by the employees assigned to the job. The Board found no

reliable evidence demonstrating that social penal workers had

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disciplined, recruited, transferred, laid off, or promoted any

employees, and no reliable evidence that social penal supervisors ever gave instructions to other employees. And where

there was any disagreement over these issues, the Regional

Director discredited the Company's witnesses. There is no

doubt that, on the record at hand, the Board's decision is

supported by substantial evidence.

Likewise, the record clearly supports the Board's finding

that social penal workers are not correctional guards.

Though the record shows that social penal workers are

trained in security functions, it is clear that enforcement is

not essential to their main duties. And while security functions are included in the job descriptions of social penal

workers, there is no substantial evidence that employees in

this job actually perform security tasks. Rather, as the

NLRB found, it is the correctional officers, not the social

penal workers, who have the primary responsibility of enforcing prison protection rules.

There is no merit whatsoever to the Company's claim that

the Board erred in entering a summary judgment. The

Board routinely decides cases involving an alleged refusal to

bargain after a Board certification, where the controlling

issues have been, or could have been, litigated in the underlying representation hearing. See, e.g., Spectrum Healthcare

Servs., Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1998) (granting General

Counsel's motion for summary judgment where representation issues were or could have been litigated in prior representation proceeding). In such circumstances, the Board may

rely on findings from the representation hearing in determining whether there has been a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the

Act. See, e.g., E.N. Bisso & Son, Inc., 84 F.3d 1443, 1444 n.1

(D.C. Cir. 1996). The Board's application of the summary

judgment procedure was fully justified in this case. The

Company had a full and fair opportunity to litigate all issues

during the representation hearing, the issues were fully and

fairly considered by the Board, and the Company offered no

new evidence at the unfair labor practice stage that warranted a second hearing on the disputed issues.

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Finally, we reject the Company's so-called "jurisdictional"

issues. At oral argument, counsel for the Company conceded

that the Company had waived any claim resting on 29 U.S.C.

s 164(c)(1) (1994) ("The Board, in its discretion, may ...

decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving

any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of

the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not

sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction."). Therefore, we offer no opinion on whether and under

what circumstances the NLRB should, pursuant to this discretionary jurisdictional provision, decline to assert jurisdiction over private venture correctional institutions.

The Company asserts that, quite apart from the dictates of

29 U.S.C. s 164(c)(1), the NLRB has no jurisdiction under

the Act over any employees in any private correctional institution. Actually, the Company's argument on this point has

varied between a claim that the Board has no jurisdiction

over any correctional institution and one that the Board has

no jurisdiction over any maximum security correctional institution. In either case, however, the Company can cite to no

statutory support for its position (nor is there record evidence

that a maximum security institution is at issue here). It is

clear that the Company is not excluded from the Act under 29

U.S.C. s 152(2) (1994) ("The term 'employer' ... shall not

include the United States or any wholly owned Government

corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or

political subdivision thereof."). It is also clear that there is

nothing in the Act that excludes privately run correctional

institutions from coverage. And since the employees at issue

here are not correctional guards, the Company's argument

that we should "imply" an exclusion for such workers from

the term "employee" is irrelevant. If good policy militates in

favor of exclusion, that will be a matter for the NLRB

(exercising its discretionary authority) or for Congress to

decide, not this court. In short, there is no basis on this

record to overturn the decision of the NLRB for lack of

jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the petition for review is hereby denied, and

the Board's cross-application for enforcement is granted.

So ordered.

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