Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05251/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05251-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 2008 Decided January 6, 2009 

No. 07-5251 

IN RE: SEALED CASE

______ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 03cv02071) 

______ 

David P. Sheldon argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the brief was Raymond J. Toney. 

Lanny J. Acosta, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, and Brian C. Baldrate, Special Assistant U.S. 

Attorney. 

Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit 

Judge KAVANAUGH. 

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Appellant, a member of the 

Vermont Army National Guard, sued the Department of the 

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Army, claiming that the Vermont Army National Guard 

released his personal information in violation of the Privacy 

Act. The parties agree that the Privacy Act protects state 

guardsmen while on active federal duty. Appellant, however, 

was not on active federal duty at the time his personal 

information was released. For the reasons set forth below, we 

hold that the Privacy Act protects guardsmen even when they 

are not on active federal duty. 

I. 

Though organized in part through the states, the National 

Guard functions as “an integral part of the first line defenses 

of the United States,” 32 U.S.C. § 102. Its organization stems 

from Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives 

Congress authority “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and 

disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them 

as may be employed in the service of the United States, 

reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the 

officers, and the authority of training the militia according to 

the discipline prescribed by Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 

8. Through the Department of Defense’s National Guard 

Bureau, the Department of the Army extends federal 

recognition to state National Guard units that comply with 

federal criteria; it may withdraw recognition if a unit ceases to 

comply. 10 U.S.C. § 10503(8). These state National Guard 

units are known as the Army National Guard. 32 U.S.C. § 

101(4). Together, all federally recognized state units 

comprise one of the reserve components of the Army, known 

as the Army National Guard of the United States. 10 U.S.C. § 

10105. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he Federal 

Government provides virtually all of the funding, the materiel, 

and the leadership for the State Guard units.” Perpich v. 

Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 351 (1990). Although states are 

responsible for training the Army National Guard and rely on 

their units under gubernatorial command “to respond to local 

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emergencies,” Perpich, 496 U.S. at 351, such training must 

conform to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 

Army, 32 U.S.C. §§ 501–505. The National Guard thus plays 

a dual role, operating under joint federal and state control. 

 The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, which covers 

“agenc[ies]” including “military department[s],” §§ 552(f)(1), 

552a(a)(1), “safeguards the public from unwarranted 

collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of personal 

information contained in agency records.” Bartel v. FAA, 725 

F.2d 1403, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Act protects private 

information from unnecessary disclosure and enables 

individuals to correct errors in their files. § 552a(b), (d). At 

issue here are the Act’s non-disclosure provisions. 

Appellant, a member of the Vermont Army National 

Guard, brought a Privacy Act suit against the Department of 

the Army, alleging that a civilian National Guard employee 

and other persons had improperly disclosed appellant’s highly 

sensitive personal information, causing him emotional, 

psychological, and financial harm. Although not disputing 

appellant’s assertion that the Vermont Army National Guard 

is federally recognized, the Department moved to dismiss, 

arguing that the Vermont Army National Guard is not an 

“agency” subject to the Privacy Act. The district court, 

though recognizing that members of state Army National 

Guard units are simultaneously members of the Army 

National Guard of the United States, nonetheless held that the 

Army National Guard is an agency subject to the Privacy Act 

only when on active federal duty. Because the Vermont 

Army National Guard was not on active federal duty at the 

time of the alleged disclosure, the court granted the motion to 

dismiss. 

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The guardsman appeals. Our review is de novo. Muir v. 

Navy Fed. Credit Union, 529 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). 

II. 

Although the National Guard’s dual federal-state status 

has been described as “murky and mystical,” Bowen v. United 

States, 49 Fed. Cl. 673, 676 (2001), this case presents a 

straightforward question of statutory interpretation: does the 

Privacy Act’s definition of “agency” extend to National 

Guard units only when on active federal duty? Answering 

yes, the Department emphasizes the level of state control over 

National Guard units when not on active federal duty. We 

agree with appellant, however, that under the plain language 

of the relevant statutes, the Privacy Act’s definition of agency 

includes federally recognized National Guard units at all 

times. 

The Privacy Act adopts the Freedom of Information 

Act’s (FOIA) definition of agency. § 552a(a)(1); see also 

Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 878 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 

1997). Under FOIA, the term “agency” includes “any . . . 

military department.” § 552(f)(1). Accordingly, we must 

determine whether the Vermont Army National Guard is part 

of a “military department.” The U.S. Code clearly answers 

this question in the affirmative. 

Section 101 of Title 10 defines “military department” to 

include “all . . . reserve components . . . under the control or 

supervision of the Secretary of the department.” 10 U.S.C. § 

101(a)(6). As the Department concedes, Appellee’s Br. 8, the 

Army National Guard of the United States is one of those 

reserve components. 10 U.S.C. § 10101(1). Section 10105, 

in turn, provides that the Army National Guard of the United 

States “consists of,” in part, “federally recognized units and 

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organizations of the Army National Guard.” § 10105. Given 

that the government nowhere disputes appellant’s assertion 

that the Vermont Army National Guard is federally 

recognized, the Privacy Act applies. Put another way, 

because it is undisputed that the Vermont Army National 

Guard enjoys federal recognition, it is part of the Army 

National Guard of the United States, which is a reserve 

component, which is part of the military department of the 

Army, which is included in the Privacy Act’s definition of 

“agency.” Although it takes several steps to reach this 

conclusion, the result is clear. 

At oral argument, Department counsel acknowledged the 

accuracy of each of these steps in the logical chain, conceding 

that the Vermont Army National Guard is always part of the 

Army National Guard of the United States even when not on 

active federal duty. Oral Arg. at 14:21. The Department 

nonetheless seeks to break the chain by relying primarily on 

two other provisions: 10 U.S.C. §§ 10106 and 10107. 

Section 10106 says, “The Army National Guard while in 

the service of the United States is a component of the Army.” 

10 U.S.C. § 10106. According to the Department, this 

provision means that the Vermont Army National Guard is 

part of a military department and thus subject to the Privacy 

Act only while in the service of the United States. Section 

10106, however, says nothing about a state National Guard 

unit’s status when not in the service of the United States, nor 

does it remove state guard units from their continuing status 

as part of the Army National Guard of the United States. 

Rather, section 10106 addresses one of the two ways in which 

Army National Guard units may be called into active federal 

service. First, state guard units may be ordered to active 

federal duty as reserves of the Army through the Army 

National Guard of the United States, 10 U.S.C. § 12301, in 

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which case the Army National Guard of the United States, 

always a reserve component of the Army, provides the status 

under which the guard units serve. Second, in three specific 

circumstances, guard units may be called up directly into 

federal service from their state militia status—the President 

may “call into Federal service members and units of the 

National Guard of any State” in case of invasion, rebellion, or 

an inability to execute the laws of the United States with 

regular forces. 10 U.S.C. § 12406; see also Perpich, 496 U.S. 

at 350 n.21 (describing the “distinct statutes” for “activating 

the National Guard of the United States” and for “calling forth 

the . . . National Guards of the various States”). Section 

10106, which like section 12406 refers to the “National 

Guard” not the “National Guard of the United States,” 

addresses the status of guard units called up in these three 

specific circumstances. In such circumstances, because the 

guard units do not serve as part of an already existing reserve 

component (the Army National Guard of the United States), 

they require some other component status. Section 10106 fills 

this gap, providing that the Army National Guard becomes its 

own component of the Army when called up in this capacity. 

In other words, section 10106 establishes that when the Army 

National Guard, as such, is called directly into federal service 

(as opposed to when activated through the Army National 

Guard of the United States), it constitutes a separate 

component of the Army (rather than serving as an activated 

reserve of the Army). Section 10106 therefore in no way 

undermines our view that the Vermont Army National Guard 

is part of a reserve component (and thus of a military 

department) regardless of federal duty status. 

Section 10107 is no more helpful to the Department. It 

provides that “[w]hen not on active duty, members of the 

Army National Guard of the United States shall be 

administered, armed, equipped, and trained in their status as 

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members of the Army National Guard.” 10 U.S.C. § 10107. 

As its plain language indicates, section 10107 addresses the 

status of individual servicemen, not the status of state Army 

National Guard units within the military department. Because 

the Privacy Act applies to agencies, not individuals, our 

concern here is with the organizational status of National 

Guard units, meaning that section 10107 has nothing to do 

with the issue before us. See Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons, 

444 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (dismissing Privacy Act 

and FOIA claims against individuals because “[b]oth statutes 

concern the obligations of agencies as distinct from individual 

employees in those agencies”). In any event, nothing in 

section 10107 strips non–federally activated guardsmen of 

their membership in the Army National Guard of the United 

States, nor could it. Under Title 10, “a person who enlists in 

the Army National Guard . . . shall be concurrently enlisted 

. . . as a Reserve of the Army for service in the Army National 

Guard of the United States.” 10 U.S.C. § 12107(b)(1). 

Indeed, by its terms section 10107 confirms that non–

federally activated guardsmen remain “members of the Army 

National Guard of the United States.” § 10107. 

We read sections 10106 and 10107 as demonstrating that 

what changes when the Vermont Army National Guard passes 

in and out of active federal duty is the chain of command, not 

the guard’s status as an agency under the Privacy Act. When 

called into federal service under section 12406, the Army 

National Guard, as a “component of the Army,” § 10106, 

operates under the direct command of the Secretary of the 

Army. Even when not serving in this capacity, however, 

guard units remain part of the Army National Guard of the 

United States, § 10105, a reserve component that is itself 

under the control and supervision of the Secretary. Similarly, 

although when not federally activated as reserves of the Army 

under section 12301, guardsmen regain state status and report 

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directly to the governor, § 10107, their guard unit nonetheless 

retains its status as part of the Army National Guard of the 

United States, § 10105. 

In sum, neither section 10106 nor section 10107 deprives 

the Army National Guard of its continuous status as part of 

the Army National Guard of the United States. That can 

occur only if the Secretary withdraws the Army National 

Guard’s federal recognition. § 10105; see also Nelson v. 

Geringer, 295 F.3d 1082, 1093 (10th Cir. 2002) (interpreting 

analogous provisions under Title 10 applicable to the Air 

National Guard of the United States and holding that “[e]ven 

when the Guard is not federally activated . . . the Wyoming 

Air and Army National Guard units remain reserve 

components of the United States Air Force and Army 

respectively, and most if not all functions performed by the 

state are subject to federal requirements and regulations”). As 

long as the Secretary has not withdrawn the Vermont Army 

National Guard’s federal recognition, it is part of an agency 

for purposes of the Privacy Act whether or not federally 

activated. 

We think it worth noting that the Department’s own 

regulations and interpretation of the Privacy Act treat the Act 

as applicable to the National Guard without regard to federal 

duty status. Army Regulation 340-21, issued pursuant to the 

Privacy Act, sets forth the Army Privacy Program and 

“applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard, the 

U.S. Army Reserve, and the Army and Air Force Exchange 

Service.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 340-21, THE ARMY 

PRIVACY PROGRAM i (1985), available at http://www.army. 

mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r340_21.pdf (emphasis added); see also

U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 22-55, THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE ARMY FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM i 

(1997), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/ 

USCA Case #07-5251 Document #1157134 Filed: 01/06/2009 Page 8 of 17
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r25_55.pdf (containing identical language applying FOIA 

regulations to the National Guard). Even more revealing, 

because the Privacy Act generally requires agencies to obtain 

written consent for and to keep an accounting of disclosures 

of information outside the agency, § 552a(b)(1), (c), if the 

National Guard and the Army were not part of the same 

agency, the Army would have to obtain consent and provide 

an accounting virtually every time it shared records with a 

National Guard unit. The Department, however, has never 

interpreted the Privacy Act as requiring such action. 

According to an advisory opinion entitled “Applicability of 

the Privacy Act to National Guard Records” issued by the 

Defense Department’s Defense Privacy Board, which 

oversees implementation of the Privacy Program, 32 C.F.R. § 

310.9(a)(2)(i), the National Guard and the Army are part of 

the same agency for Privacy Act purposes. Because its 

analysis is particularly compelling, we quote the relevant 

section of the opinion in full: 

Reserve components of the Army and the Air 

Force include the Army and Air National Guards of 

the United States respectively, which are composed 

of federally recognized units and organizations of the 

Army or Air National Guard and members of the 

Army or Air National Guard who are also Reserves 

of the Army or Air Force. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3077 and 

8077 [now 10 U.S.C. §§ 10105 and 10111]. 10 

U.S.C. § 275 requires the Departments of the Army 

and the Air Force to maintain personnel records on 

all members of the federally recognized units and 

organizations of the Army and Air National Guards 

and on all members of the Army or Air National 

Guards who are also reserves of the Army and Air 

Force. Such records are “maintained” by the Army 

or Air Force for the purposes of the Privacy Act. 

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These records are not all located at the National 

Guard Bureau. Some are in the physical possession 

of the state adjutant general. However, records need 

not be physically located in the agency for them to 

be maintained by the agency. See OMB Guidelines. 

Records located at the state level are under the 

direct control of the Army and Air Force in that they 

are maintained by the state under regulations (NGR 

600200 and AFR 3544) implementing 10 U.S.C. § 

275, and promulgated by authority of the Secretaries 

of the Army and the Air Force under 10 U.S.C. § 

280. Therefore, the records are Army or Air Force 

records and subject to the provisions of the Privacy 

Act. 

That the records are subject to the Privacy Act 

does not mean they cannot be used by the members 

of the state national guards. The state officials using 

and maintaining the records are members of the 

reserves (members of the Army or Air Force 

National Guard of the United States). Disclosure to 

them in performance of their duties is disclosure 

within the Department of Defense not requiring a 

published routine use or an accounting.

DEFENSE PRIVACY BOARD, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ADVISORY 

OPINION 5, APPLICABILITY OF THE PRIVACY ACT TO NATIONAL 

GUARD RECORDS (1992) (emphasis added), available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/privacy/opinions/op0005.htm. 

Based on the same straightforward statutory interpretation we 

adopt here, then, the Department itself has concluded that the 

members of the National Guard and the Army are part of the 

same agency for Privacy Act purposes. 

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Although finding this statutory analysis “alluring,” the 

district court ultimately rejected it given “the substantial body 

of case law that has explained the National Guard’s hybrid 

federal-state status.” In re Sealed Case, No. 03-cv-02071, 

Slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. May 25, 2007). In particular, the district 

court relied on Perpich v. Department of Defense, in which 

the Supreme Court held that nothing in the Militia Clauses 

requires gubernatorial consent to Congress’s calling up the 

National Guard for training outside the United States. 496 

U.S. at 354–55. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted 

that all guardsmen enlist simultaneously in both the National 

Guard and the National Guard of the United States, id. at 345, 

and that “a member of the Guard who is ordered to active 

duty in the federal service is thereby relieved of his or her 

status in the State Guard for the entire period of federal 

service,” id. at 346. Although Perpich thus stands for the 

proposition that federally activated guardsmen temporarily 

lose their State National Guard status, nothing in the 

decision’s holding severs the continuous link between the 

Army National Guard of the United States and federally 

recognized units of the Army National Guard when not on 

active federal service. § 10105; see also Matreale v. N.J. 

Dep’t of Military & Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 156 (3d 

Cir. 2007) (interpreting Perpich as holding only that a 

guardsman loses state status while on federal duty, not that a 

guardsman loses federal status when deactivated). Moreover, 

Perpich does not involve the Privacy Act, and as we 

demonstrated above, the Privacy Act is clear: National Guard 

units, whether activated or not, are part of an “agency.” Nor 

do the other appellate decisions the district court cites and the 

parties debate compel a different result. None of those 

decisions deals with the Privacy Act or interprets the Act’s 

definition of “agency.” Moreover, to the extent the cases 

discuss the federal or state nature of a particular act by a 

National Guard member, they have little to do with the 

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question we face here, i.e., whether, as an organization, a 

non–federally activated National Guard unit falls within the 

Privacy Act's definition of “agency.” 

The Department reminds us that the Privacy Act 

constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity that “‘must be 

unequivocally expressed in statutory text.’” Webman v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). True 

enough, but the Privacy Act clearly waives sovereign 

immunity for improper disclosures by agencies, § 552a(g), 

and expressly defines “agency” as including military 

departments, § 552(f)(1). And as we have demonstrated 

above, the Army National Guard is clearly part of a military 

department. Though requiring several steps to discern, the 

waiver is “unequivocally expressed in statutory text.” 

Webman, 441 F.3d at 1025. 

In still another effort to avoid the Act’s plain language, 

the Department invokes the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672, which, like the Privacy Act, 

defines “[f]ederal agency” as including “military 

departments,” 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The FTCA expressly waives 

immunity for torts committed by an “employee of the 

government,” a term that includes both agency employees 

and, separately, National Guard members “while engaged in 

training or duty” under specific statutory provisions. § 2671. 

According to the Department, “[i]n contrast to the FTCA, 

where Congress unambiguously waived immunity for actions 

of the National Guard in limited circumstances, Congress did 

not provide such a specific waiver of sovereign immunity for 

State National Guard units under the Privacy Act.” 

Appellee’s Br. 19. That Congress expressly defined 

“employee” under the FTCA does not, however, imply that it 

must define “agency” under the Privacy Act more 

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specifically. And Congress’s decision to limit FTCA liability 

to acts by National Guard members in specific situations 

neither suggests nor even hints that the National Guard itself 

qualifies as an agency under the Privacy Act only in those 

situations. 

Finally, the Department warns that were we to interpret 

the Privacy Act as extending to non–federally activated Army 

National Guard units, “all State National Guards and their 

members would always be on federal status and could always 

be seen as federal actors,” meaning that “[t]he United States 

would face potential liability for any and all actions 

committed by State Guard units and members regardless of 

the capacity in which the unit or the individual was 

purportedly serving.” Appellee’s Br. 15–16. We disagree. 

Determining what laws apply to the National Guard is a 

question of statutory interpretation, whose resolution 

necessarily turns on the particular provision at issue in each 

case. Here the statutes could hardly be clearer: the Privacy 

Act defines agency as including any military department, 

which includes the Army National Guard of the United States, 

of which a federally recognized Army National Guard is a 

continuous component. This conclusion says nothing 

whatsoever about the United States’s liability under any other 

statute. 

For the foregoing reasons, the order dismissing the 

complaint is reversed. 

So ordered. 

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: 

The Department of the Army is a military department, and it 

is therefore an agency subject to the Privacy Act. See 

5 U.S.C. §§ 552(f)(1), 552a(a)(1); 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(8). The 

Army is defined to include “reserve components” under “the 

control or supervision” of the Secretary. See 10 U.S.C. 

§ 101(a)(6). The statutory list of reserve components includes 

the “Army National Guard of the United States,” which is a 

federal entity under the control or supervision of the 

Secretary. § 10101(1). The Army National Guard of the 

United States is in turn defined to include the “federally 

recognized units and organizations” of the state National 

Guards. § 10105. 

The question in this appeal concerns one of those state 

National Guards, the Vermont Army National Guard. It is 

subject to the federal Privacy Act if it is either (i) itself a 

“reserve component” of the Army “under the control or 

supervision” of the Secretary of the Army or (ii) a “federally 

recognized unit or organization” of the Army National Guard 

of the United States. 

The Vermont Army National Guard is not itself a 

“reserve component” of the Army under the control or 

supervision of the Secretary. The statute lists the seven 

specific entities that qualify as reserve components of the 

armed forces. They are the Army National Guard of the 

United States, the Air National Guard of the United States, the 

Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, 

the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. 

§ 10101(1). The statute does not list state National Guards as 

reserve components. Even assuming arguendo that the 

Vermont Army National Guard were a reserve component of 

the federal Army, it is not under the “control or supervision” 

of the President, Secretary of Defense, or Secretary of the 

Army, except in those rare circumstances when a state Guard 

itself is federally called forth for domestic purposes under the 

USCA Case #07-5251 Document #1157134 Filed: 01/06/2009 Page 14 of 17
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Militia Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 

(empowering Congress to provide for “calling forth the 

Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 

Insurrections and repel Invasions”); 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-

33, 12406. The majority opinion does not dispute the 

conclusion that the Vermont Army National Guard is not 

itself a reserve component of the Army under the control or 

supervision of the Secretary. 

The trickier question in this case is whether the Vermont 

Army National Guard is a federally recognized unit or 

organization of the Army National Guard of the United States. 

The plaintiff alleges that it is – albeit without citations or 

support. I am dubious. 

The Army National Guard of the United States is an 

umbrella federal entity that was created in 1933 as part of a 

federal-state effort to work around Militia Clause limits on 

federal use of state National Guards. The goal was to 

authorize federal use of state National Guard units not just for 

the domestic purposes specified by the Militia Clause but also 

for foreign wars. Under this arrangement the states ensure, in 

return for federal funding, that state Guard units and members 

become part of both the state Guard and the federal Army 

National Guard of the United States. This allows the Federal 

Government to quickly activate Guard units – as units – and 

deploy them into foreign wars, as exemplified by the many 

Guard units that have been activated and continue to serve in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. See generally Perpich v. Department 

of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990); Frederick Bernays Wiener, 

The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 

205-10 (1940). 

To implement this federal-state cooperative effort, the 

members of each state’s Army National Guard are also 

USCA Case #07-5251 Document #1157134 Filed: 01/06/2009 Page 15 of 17
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members of the federal Army National Guard of the United 

States. In addition, individual units of each state’s National 

Guard – such as the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team of 

the Vermont Army National Guard – are also federally 

recognized units of the Army National Guard of the United 

States and can be ordered into active federal status in 

wartime. 

Even though they share members and units, each state’s 

Army National Guard and the federal Army National Guard 

of the United States remain “distinct organizations” – the one 

commanded by the state’s Governor, the other commanded by 

the President of the United States. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 345. 

The plaintiff here therefore appears to be legally and 

factually incorrect when he asserts that the Vermont Army 

National Guard is itself “a federally recognized Army 

National Guard unit.” Appellant’s Br. at 33 (emphases 

added). Consistent with the principle that the federal Army 

National Guard of the United States and the state Guard are 

separate entities that share units and members, the federal 

recognition process seems to envision federal recognition of 

units and organizations within a state’s Guard, but not of the 

entire state Guard as an entity. See, e.g., Organization and 

Federal Recognition of Army National Guard Units, Nat’l 

Guard Reg. 10-1 § 2-2, at 5-6. To be sure, it is conceivable 

that the Vermont Army National Guard as an entity in fact has 

been federally recognized and is thus itself part of the Army 

National Guard of the United States. But that seems 

somewhat unlikely given the governing legal structure and the 

apparent practice. Cf. NATIONAL GUARD ALMANAC 2001 

141-44 (listing “Major Army National Guard Units” not 

including any state National Guards); United States Army 

Website, Organization, Units and Commands (listing 

USCA Case #07-5251 Document #1157134 Filed: 01/06/2009 Page 16 of 17
4 

“National Guard Units” not including any state National 

Guards). 

In any event, the parties have offered no information 

beyond the plaintiff’s allegation about whether the Vermont 

Army National Guard is a federally recognized unit or 

organization of the Army National Guard of the United States 

– or, more to the point, about whether the person in the 

Vermont Army National Guard who allegedly disclosed 

information about the plaintiff in violation of the Privacy Act 

was part of a federally recognized unit or organization of the 

Army National Guard of the United States. If the 

Government produces evidence that the person who allegedly 

disclosed the information was not part of a federally 

recognized unit or organization of the Army National Guard 

of the United States, it presumably could prevail on a 

summary judgment motion.*

 I agree with the majority 

opinion, however, that the plaintiff’s complaint cannot be 

dismissed on this sparse record at the motion to dismiss stage. 

I respectfully concur in the judgment. 

 *

 The Government also suggests that, for Privacy Act 

purposes, a federally recognized state Guard unit is part of the 

federal Army National Guard of the United States only when the 

unit is ordered into active federal duty. But as the majority opinion 

concludes, there is no statutory support for that broad-brush theory: 

Under the statutory scheme, a federally recognized unit or 

organization of the Army National Guard of the United States is 

always part of the Army National Guard of the United States – and 

the Army National Guard of the United States in turn is a reserve 

component of the Army under the control or supervision of the 

Secretary. 

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