Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01469/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01469-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles David Teafatiller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED· 

PUBLISH 

UNITED,STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci~cuit 

AUG '! 1989 

ROBERT L. :HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

DONALD EUGENE STAGGS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

CHARLES DAVID TEAFATILLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

PEGGY SAVAGE TEAFATILLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

FRANK E. GABRIEL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 88-1275 

(D.C. No. 87-43-2-CR) 

No. 88-1469 

(D.C. No. 87-43-1-CR) 

No. 88-1471 

(D.C. No. 87-43-3-CR) 

No. 88-1473 

(D.C. No. 87-43-5-CR) 

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 1 
Mervyn Hamburg, Attorney,-Appellate Division, Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C. (Roger Hilfiger, United States Attorney, 

and Sheldon J. Sperling, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Muskogee, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Emmett·colvin (Richard F. Aguire with him on the brief), Dallas, 

Texas, for Defendants-Appellants. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, McKAY, LOGAN, SEYMOUR, MOORE, 

ANDERSON, TACHA, BALDOCK, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BALDQCK, Circuit Judge. 

Appellants were convicted by a jury on a variety of federal 

drug and drug-related charges arising out ·of an alleged operation 

to produce amphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance. See 

21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(d)(l987). Specifically, appellants Donald 

Eugene Staggs (Staggs), Charles David "Rusty" Teafatiller 

(Teafatiller), Peggy Savage Teafatiller, and Frank E. Gabriel 

(Gabriel), were each convicted of conspiring to manufacture, 

possess with intent to distribute, and distribute amphetamine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 84l(a)(l). 1 Teafatiller and 

Staggs also were convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal 

enterprise (CCE), contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 848. 2 The jury further 

1 21 u.s.c. § 846 provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or 

conspires to commit any offense defined in this title is 

punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed 

the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission 

of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 21 u.s.c. 

§ 84l(a)(l) makes it unlawful for any person "to manufacture, 

distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 

distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 

2 A person is involved in a continuing criminal enterprise if: 

(footnote continued on next page) 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 2 
-convicted .both Gabriel and Staggs .-on firearms .charges; Gabriel ·of 

possessing an unregistered automatic weapon in violation of 26 

U.S.C. § 586l(d), and Staggs of possessing a firearm shipped or 

transported in interstate commerce after a felony conviction, 

contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l). Finally, Teafatiller was 

convicted of attempted tax evasion as prohibited by 26 u.s.c. 

§ 7201, and Teafatiller and his wife Peggy together were convicted 

of conspiring to defraud the United States by obstructing the 

collection of the revenue, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 371. 

Our jurisdiction of this direct appeal from the judgment of 

conviction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Appellants assert six grounds of error on appeal. First, 

Teafatiller and Staggs challenge the indictment, claiming that the 

continuing criminal enterprise_charges in counts two and three 

failed to allege three felony violations comprising the "series of 

violations" required by the CCE statute. Second, Teafatiller and 

Staggs argue that their respective conspiracy convictions, being 

lesser included offenses of the CCE offense, should be vacated. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

(1) he violates any provision of this title or title III 

the punishment for which is a felony, and 

(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of 

violations of this title or title III--

(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert 

with five or more other persons with respect to whom 

such person occupies a position of organizer, a 

supervisory position, or any other position of 

management, and 

(B) from which such person obtains substantial 

income or resources. 

21 u.s.c. § 848. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 3 
Third, while a.not seeking rever.sal on thi.s .-point.,- Teafatiller seeks 

correction of the judgment and commitment order ... filed after trial 

because the sentence reflected therein differs from that orally 

rendered by the trial judge. Fourth, all appellants claim the 

case should be remanded for a hearing to determine whether the 

government acted outrageously by seeking the cooperation of an 

attorney who, according to appellants, had formerly represented 

them. Fifth, Gabriel argues that the testimony of Sharon Gabriel 

was admitted in violation of the marital privilege. Lastly, 

Gabriel contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction on the conspiracy count. 

This case was assigned originally to a three-judge panel for 

determination of these issues. Prior to the issuance of the 

proposed panel opinion,_a majority of the active judges of the 

Tenth Circuit voted sua sponte to hear the first of the abovelisted issues, regarding the sufficiency of the CCE indictments of 

Teafatiller and Staggs, before the en bane court. By order dated 

March 29, 1989, the court defined the issue for en bane 

consideration as follows: 

Whether a continuing criminal enterprise indictment 

which tracks the language of the statute and contains 

three violations underlying the series in another count 

of the indictment is sufficient to charge a continuing 

criminal enterprise offense under 21 U.S.C. § 848, 

consistent with the requirements for an indictment under 

the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution. 

Given this posture, we will address this appeal in two opinions, 

filed this day: the first, herein, before the en bane court, 

considering the sufficiency of the CCE indictments; and the 

-4-

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 4 
_ .second, .. before the. or iginaL three".""judge .panel., .,considering the 

remaining issues. See F. 2d (10th Cir. ) . 

Appellants Teafatiller and Staggs were charged in a 

superseding indictment, counts two and three respectively, with 

engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, proscribed at 

21 u.s.c. § 848. The essential elements of the CCE offense 

include the following: 

(1) a continuing series of violations of the Controlled 

Substances Act of 1970, 21 u.s.c. et seq., (2) the 

violations were undertaken in concert with five or more 

other persons with respect to whom the accused acted as 

organizer, supervisor or manager, and (3) from which the 

accused obtained substantial income or resources. 

United States v. Hall, 843.F.2d 408, 410 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting 

United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 596-97 (10th Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985)). Courts construing the first 

element, the only one at issue he~e, have generally agreed th~t 

the "continuing series of violations" specified by the CCE statute 

requires proof of three or more drug violations in order to 

support a CCE conviction. United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 

427 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 325 (1988). 

The appellants were charged, in the language of the CCE 

statute, with engaging in "a continuing series of violations," the 

indictment specifying additionally that Staggs and Teafatiller had 

"repeatedly violated Title 21, United States Code, Section 

84l(a)(l) and other provisions of Title 21, regarding amphetamine, 

a Schedule II, stimulant controlled substance. 3 No underlying 

3 Both CCE counts read in pertinent part: 

(footnote continued on next page) 

-5-

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 5 
,violations were specified-in the-CCE-counts, but at least three 

. violations of Title 21 were alleged with regard to each appellant 

in count one of the indictment, the conspiracy count. 4 Both 

Teafatiller, rec. vol. I, doc. 2, and Staggs, rec. vol. I, doc. 

12, filed motions to dismiss the indictment, which were denied. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 18. On appeal, Teafatiller and Staggs do not 

contend that three violations were not charged and proved. 

Neither do appellants contend that any evidence of uncharged 

violations was introduced at trial in support of the CCE counts. 

Rather, they argue that the indictment was insufficient with 

regard to the CCE counts in that those counts failed either to 

list the underlying violations or to specifically incorporate by 

reference the violations charged in count one. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Beginning in or about November, 1985, and 

continuing to on or about the date of this Indictment, 

within the Eastern District of Oklahoma, and elsewhere, 

the defendant [Teafatiller/Staggs] did knowingly, 

intentionally, unlawfully and willfully engage in a 

continuing criminal enterprise in that he repeatedly 

violated Title 21, regarding amphetamine, a Schedule II, 

stimulant controlled substance, which violations were 

part of a continuing series of violations undertaken by 

defendant [Teafatiller/Staggs], in concert with at least 

five other persons with respect to whom [Teafatiller/ 

Staggs] occupied a position of organizer, a supervisory 

position, or any other position of management, and from 

which the defendant [Teafatiller/Staggs] obtained 

substantial income and resources. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 4 at 6-10. 

4 Count one charged each appellant with conspiracy to 

manufacture, possess, and distribute amphetamine,· see 21 u.s.c. §§ 

846 & 84l(a)(l), as well as at least two overt acts of 

manufacturing or possession in furtherance of that conspiracy. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 4 at 1-4. Thus, each were charged with three 

violations sufficient, when proved, to support a CCE conviction. 

See United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 411 (10th Cir. 1988). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 6 
Generally, ·-an .indictment. is sufficient if it. contains .the 

elements of the offense charged, putting.the defendant on fair 

notice of the charge against which he must defend, and if it 

enables a defendant to assert an acquittal or conviction in order 

to prevent being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. 

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); United States 

v. Young, 862 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1988). Because appellants 

could plead the entire record as a bar to future CCE or conspiracy 

charges based on the predicate acts charged in the indictment or 

otherwise considered by the jury, appellants are adequately 

protected from double jeopardy, see Apodaca, 843 F.2d at 430 n.3, 

and the central issue here, as appellants conceded at oral 

argument, involves the notice function of this indictment. 

Teafatiller and Staggs contend that by omitting from the CCE 

counts the underlying violations, the indictment did not 

articulate the essential facts constituting the offense as 

required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c}(l). The practical result, 

according to appellants, was that the indictment failed to provide 

them the notice necessary to prepare their defense. We dis~gree. 

An indictment is generally sufficient to overcome 

constitutional concerns if it sets forth the words of the statute, 

as long as the statute itself adequately states the elements of 

the offense. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117; United States v. Dunn, 841 

F.2d 1026, 1029 (10th Cir. 1988). Each of the other circuits that 

has considered the sufficiency of a CCE indictment either has held 

generally that a CCE indictment is sufficient if it tracks the 

-7-

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 7 
-language.of-the statute,-or specifically that-an indictment need 

not all~ge_ the three violatioris that underlie the "continuing 

series" element. United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 87~ F.2d 1402, 

1408, 1410-11 (11th Cir. 1989) (CCE indictment sufficient when 

alleging offense in language of statute); United States v. Amend, 

791 F.2d 1120, 1125 (4th Cir.) (indictment sufficient although not 

alleging five individuals with whom defendant acted in concert), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); United States v. Sterling, 742 

F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1984) (no legal requirement that specific 

violations underlying series be listed in indictment), cert. 

denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 

1347, 1356 (5th Cir. 1978) (indictment sufficient because it 

charged in the words of the statute that the defendant and others 

had participated in a continuing criminal enterprise), cert. 

denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 

1323, 1344 (2d Cir. 1974) (indictment adequate for preparation of 

defense and avoidance of double jeopardy although not listing five 

individuals with whom defendant acted in concert or violations 

underlying the charged series), cert. denied, 420 U;S. 962 (1975). 

Following oral argument before the en bane court, the court 

first considered whether tracking the language of the statute with 

regard to the "continuing series of violations" element was 

sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of an 

indictment. After discussion, the court was evenly divided on 

that issue; therefore, we reach no conclusion about the 

sufficiency of an indictment that does no more than track the 

-8-

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 8 
language -of theLCCE statute. -We do hold~- however, that a CCE 

indictment is sufficient where, as here, the GCE _counts charge 

appellants in the language of the statute, and the indictment 

additionally alleges at least three violations in another count or 

counts. See United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 752 (7th 

Cir. 1988) (defendant put on actu~l notice by violations listed in 

other counts; indictment held sufficient), cert. denied, 1989 WL 

70306; United States v. Becton, 751 F.2d 250, 256-57 (8th Cir. 

1984) (same), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985). 

Even had we held that an indictment must allege the 

violations underlying the continuing series element, this 

indictment would be sufficient because here, the CCE count need 

not have explicitly incorporated by reference violations listed 

elsewhere in the indictment. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have 

considered the precise factual circumstance before us, from a 

similar legal perspective: While neither adopting nor dispensing 

with a rule requiring a CCE indictment to allege at least three 

violations, both courts considered the indictment sufficient where 

such violations were alleged in other counts of the indictments. 

Although recognizing the prosecutor's ability to avoid the issue 

by listing the violations in the CCE count, the courts in MoyaGomez and Becton both held that the indictments afforded adequate 

notice when read as a whole. See Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 752; 

Becton, 751 F.2d at 256-57. 

Similarly, appellants complained neither at trial nor on 

appeal that the proof of the violations contained in count one 

-9-

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 9 
.. surprised them,, -the.reby .hampering the--preparation~of ,, their 

defense •. Because the allegations in c~unt one afforded appellants 

actual notice regarding the violations proved at trial in support 

of the CCE charge, their argument essentially seeks reversal for 

reasons other than a failure of notice. We approve of the 

approach in Moya-Gomez and Becton: Because the essential issue is 

whether the appellants received notice adequate for the 

preparation of their defense, it would be both anomalous and 

hypertechnical to conclude that, even though the indictment 

provided such notice, the notice function was not served because 

of the failure to explicitly incorporate by reference count one, 

containing the charged violations. See United States v. Esposito, 

771 F.2d 283, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1985) (Travel Act indictment held 

sufficient where indictment read as a_whole put defendants on 

notice of element not alleged in Travel Act counts; dismissal 

"would be an extreme example of technicality"), cert. denied, 475 

U.S. 1011 (1986). But see,~, United States v. Hooker, 841 

Fe2d 1225, 1231 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (element of offense 

missing from one count cannot be read into that count from another 

unless explicitly incorporated by reference). 

This result is supported not only by the factually similar 

cases from other circuits, but also by the weight of analogous 

precedent from this circuit. We have said that in evaluating the 

sufficiency of the indictment, "the entire document may be 

considered." United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d 

902, 906 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); United States v. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 10 
-,Metropolitan EnterprisesI-Inc.,.728 F.2d 444,. 453 (10th Cir. 

1984); Mobile Materials, 871 F.2d at 919-20 (McKay, J., 

dissenting) ("we look first to the charging statement and related 

provisions of count one, then to the remaining paragraphs of that 

count, and finally to all 'four corners' of the indictment"). 

Particularly instructive here is United States v. Neal, 692 

F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982), which addressed the sufficiency of an 

indictment charging the defendant in three counts, respectively, 

with 1) using extortionate means to collect an extension of 

credit, 2) possessing an unregistered firearm, and 3) distributing 

cocaine. The defendant challenged count one, arguing that it did 

not contain sufficient specificity regarding the allegedly 

extortionate threats. In evaluating the sufficiency of count one, 

which did not incorporate by reference_any other counts, see id. 

at 1301 n.4., we considered "it proper to note that the nature of 

the charge and the evidence before the grand jury are further 

revealed by Counts II and III of the indictment." Id. at 1302. 

We upheld the indictment, stating that it "was not fatally 

defective in view of the other details alleged, which we have 

noted. 115 Id • a • t 1303 Given this precedent, and keeping in mind 

5 The dissent contends that prior to these statements, the court 

in Neal had already explicitly held that the count in question, 

count one, was sufficient by itself. Dissent, slip op. at 6. 

This contention is untenable. The discussion in Neal begins with 

the ultimate conclusion that count one is sufficient; that 

conclusion is then followed by more than a page of supporting 

reasoning. It is in this discussion explaining the sufficiency of 

count one that the court looked to other counts, not explicitly 

incorporated by reference, to reveal further the nature of the 

charge and the evidence before the grand jury. Neal, 692 F.2d at -- (footnote continued on next page) 

-11-

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 11 
that,in Jnterp~eting-an.4ndictment, we are .~governed .by practical 

rather than technical considerations," United States v. Phillips, 

869 F.2d 1361, 1364 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 

2074 (1989), we will not require explicit incorporation by 

reference under the facts of this case. 6 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

1302. (Immediately following this reference to other counts, a 

footnote· specifically lists the requirements of an indictment, 

including the grand jury function, id. at n.5.). The court 

describes details alleged in other counts, and later concludes 

with its actual holding regarding count one: "We nevertheless 

feel the indictment was not fatally defective in view of the other 

details alleged, which we have noted." Id. at 1303. It is · inescapable that some of these details came from other counts not 

explicitly incorporated by reference. 

6 After citing cases from other circuits requ1r1ng explicit 

incorporation by reference, the dissent criticizes the use of 

Moya-Gomez, Esposito, and Becton in part because they dealt only 

with the notice requirement of an indictment, rather than the 

grand jury function emphasized by the dissent, an emphasis we 

reject infra at p. 160 See Dissent, slip. op. at 6 n.l. Despite 

such criticism, not one of the cases cited by the dissent as more 

persuasive than the above authorities mentions how the rule of 

express incorporation by reference relates to the grand jury 

function, and only one mentions how the rule relates to any of the 

constitutional requirements relevant to indictments, that being 

notice. See United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 901 (5th 

Cir. 1982) (notice for preparation of defense); see also United 

States v. Miller, 774 F.2d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 1985) (grand jury 

function considered, but rule of express incorporation by 

reference not explained on that basis). In any event, as noted in 

the text, the express incorporation cases cited by the dissent 

conflict with our decision in Neal, which, explicitly considering 

the grand jury function, looked to indictment counts not expressly 

incorporated by reference. 

The dissent also criticizes Esposito, Becton, and United 

States v. Zavala, 839 F.2d 523, 526 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 

S. Ct. 86 (1988), because unlike the instant cas'e;-the indictments 

in those cases were not challenged at trial. Interestingly, only 

Zavala, which we did not even rely upon, factored the lack of 

objection at trial into its standard of review. Zavala, 839 F.2d 

at 526. The court in Becton concluded that the indictment "did 

not prejudice Becton in any way," 751 F.2d at 256, and the court 

in Esposito determined that reversal was "unnecessary to protect 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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-Despite our. previous holdings,- the dissent cites other 

circuits for the proposition that "precedent solidly precludes 

incorporation except by express reference." Dissent, slip. op. at 

3. Significantly, however, three of the nine circuits cited by 

the dissent would uphold this indictment on its face and never 

reach that issue, as those circuits have concluded that a CCE 

indictment tracking the language of the statute is sufficient. 

Amend, 791 F.2d at 1125 (4th Cir.); Johnson, 575 F.2d at 1356 (5th 

Cir.); Sterling, 742 F.2d at 526 (9th Cir.). The other six 

circuits cited by the dissent have not addressed the sufficiency 

of an indictment which tracks the language of the CCE statute. 

Thus, as noted earlier, the decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and 

Ninth Circuits fall into line with those other circuits which have 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

the rights of the defendants," 771 F.2d at 289. These decisions 

were grounded on substantive concerns and cannot be read as being 

in any way tied to a liberal construction of indictments based on 

the timing of objections. This is evidenced by the decision in 

Moya-Gomez, where the defendant did object at trial, and where the 

court relied on Becton to uphold the sufficiency of the 

indictment. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 752. 

In the same vein, we must address the dissent's reliance, in 

this criminal context, upon cases considering the sufficiency of 

civil complaints. See Dissent, slip. op. at 18-19. This is like 

comparing apples with oranges. The underlying processes are 

structurally different. The criminal proceeding is monitored from 

its inception by a district judge (or a magistrate) and a grand 

jury, to satisfy probable cause requirements, among other things. 

The civil complaint is not screened in the slightest by a court 

prior to filing, thus requiring some screening-type rules to be 

instituted by the court itself. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 56. 

Finally, the dissent's citation to civil cases is inconsistent 

with and undercuts its emphasis on the grand jury function, which· 

has no relation to the civil context. Nevertheless, the dissent 

clings to this comparison, see Dissent, slip op. at 19 n.5, 

reemphasizing its primary theme of the grand jury function, but 

not pointing to any authority or logic suggesting that the civil 

complaint context is somehow helpful in analyzing that function. 

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·-previously. consider.ed .. the .. CCE indictment issue, .. ,.see Alvarez-_ 

Moreno, 874 F.2d- at 1402 (11th Cir.); Sperling,. 506 F.2d at 1344 

(2d Cir.), "solid" precedent that the dissent is not nearly so 

enamored of in its Part II. See Dissent, slip. op. at 10, 19 n.6. 

Further, none of the other six express incorporation by reference 

cases cited by the dissent discusses how that rule of express 

incorporation relates to the constitutional protections afforded 

by good indictments. To rely on those cases rather than a 

considered analysis of such protections would advance a technical 

evaluation of indictments, expressly disfavored in modern criminal 

pleading, without necessarily promoting the constitutional rights 

of criminal defendants. Thus we turn to the dissent's discussion 

of those rights.7 

7 This is the approach counseled by Russell v. United StatesF.369 

U.S. 749 (1962): 

"This Court has, in recent years, upheld many 

convictions in the face of questions concerning the 

sufficiency of the charging papers. Convictions are no 

longer reversed because of minor and technical 

deficiencies which did not prejudice the accused. This 

has been a salutary development in the criminal law." 

Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9. "But ••. the 

substantial safeguards to those charged with serious 

crimes cannot be eradicated under the guise of technical 

departures from the rules." Ibid. Resolution of the 

issue presented in the cases before us thus ultimately 

depends upon the nature of "the substantial safeguards" 

to a criminal defendant which an indictment is designed 

to provide. Stated concretely, does the omission from 

an indictment under 2 u.s.c. § 192 of the subject under 

congressional committee inquiry amount to no more than a 

technical deficiency of no prejudice to the defendant? 

Or does such an omission deprive the defendant of one of 

the significant protections which the guaranty of a 

grand jury indictment was intended to confer? 

Id. at 763. 

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The,,portion_. of the dissent .dealing. directly with the 

substantive goals of indictments relies on the decision of the 

Supreme Court in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962). 

In particular, the dissent echoes the fear expressed in Russell 

that "a defendant [could] be convicted on the basis of facts not 

found by, or perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury." Id. 

at 770. While the dissent criticizes what it perceives as our 

failure to address the Russell concern with the grand jury 

function, the fear articulated in Russell simply does not manifest 

itself in this case, ,where the facts at issue were both presented 

to and found by the grand jury. 8 Notably, our approach to this 

indictment is mirrored by that of the defendants who have never 

suggested, either at trial or on appeal, that their right to be 

tried on charges presented to a grand jury has been prejudiced; 

they have instead challenged the indictment on the ground that it 

hampered the preparation of their defense. Additionally, our 

prior decisions where we have considered the entire indictment in 

evaluating the sufficiency of a count have explicitly considered 

8 The Court in Russell held that in prosecutions involving 2 

U.S.C. § 192, which prohibits the refusal to answer questions 

pertinent to a subject under inquiry by a congressional committee, 

pertinency to the subject under inquiry is "the very core of 

criminality." Russell, 369 U.S. at 764. Thus, the allegation of 

the subject was necessary to the sufficiency of the indictment, 

lest it leave "the chief issue undefined." Id. at 766. Because 

of this, courts have distinguished Russell asinvolving a unique 

situation. See Neal, 692 F.2d at 1302; United States v. Perkins, 

748 F.2d 1s1g;-1s26 n.11 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. 

Mcclean, 528 F.2d 1250, 1257 (2d Cir. 1976). In his dissent in 

Russell, Justice Harlan expressed the fear that the decision would 

not be seen as unique but would lead to detailed indictments in 

all criminal cases, contrary to Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). See 

Russell, 369 U.S. at 787, 793. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 15 
the RusselL,.concern with .the .grand jur.y function.,.,. and have found 

that function not to be adversely implicated by considering other 

counts not expressly incorporated by reference. See Neal, 692 

F.2d at 1302 & n.5 ("We also feel it proper to note that the 

nature of the charge and the evidence before the grand jury are 

further revealed by Counts II and III of the indictment.") 

(emphasis added); see also Mobile Materials, 871 F.2d at 910; id. 

at 919-20 (McKay, J., dissenting). 

And the dissent's concern that "the majority's holding would 

not restrict ~he prosecutor to the charges returned by the grand 

jury," Dissent, slip op. at 9, is misplaced in the context of this 

case. The defendanta were not convicted of any crimes other than 

those they were charged with, nor was there evidence introduced at 

trial other than that al~eged in the indictment, as the dissent 

acknowledges. The statement that "neither the majority's holding 

nor its logic necessarily requires" such a factual scenario is not 

surprising, because we are guided by the sound judicial principle 

enunciated in Article III of the Constitution to judge only the 

situation before us. 9 

9 Without the benefit of any factual framework, it is unclear if 

the dissent is referring to an amendment (alteration of charging 

terms), a variance (facts proved at trial materially different 

from those alleged),. or neither. See United States v. Weiss, 752 

Fo2d 777, 787 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). In 

any event, this portion of the dissent's theory is not applicable 

in the context of evaluating the sufficiency of an indictment. In 

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), the Supreme Court 

held that "a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on 

charges that are not made in the indictment against him," 

considering such to be an improper amendment of or variance from 

the indictment. Id. at 217. It is not the anticipation of such 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 16 
In addi t.ion .. to .their notice .. and double je.opar.dy .arguments, 

Teafatiller and Staggs assert another basis for challenging the 

sufficiency of the indictment. The appellants argue that because 

the jury found guilt on the conspiracy count, the jury improperly 

considered the overt acts listed therein as proved for purposes of 

the CCE count. According to the appellants, this result occurred 

because the jury lacked the guidance of a more specific CCE count. 

The jury was guided by more than the indictment, however, as the 

trial court instructed the jury that it only had to find the 

existence of one overt act in order to convict on the conspiracy 

count, rec. vol. XIII at 947-48, while it was required to find 

three drug violations in order to find guilt on the CCE chatge. 

Id. at 949-50. The trial court also instructed the jury that its 

verdict on any one count ~hould not control the verdict with 

regard to any other count~ Id. at 941-42. Thus, appellants' 

contention that the jury may have convicted on the CCE count based 

solely on its finding of guilt on the conspiracy count is without 

merit. See United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 411 (10th Cir. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

an amendment or variance which invalidates an indictment, however, 

but the occurrence of such which may invalidate a conviction. 

Thus, consideration of the possible use of unindicted charges or 

materially different facts at trial is not relevant to the 

analysis of the sufficiency of an indictment. While Russell cites 

Stirone, the Court in Russell had already concluded that an 

essential element was omitted from the indictment, yet proved at 

trial, therefore rendering the Stirone analysis applicable. But 

That the possibility of an amendment or variance is not applicable 

to evaluation of the sufficiency of an indictment is obvious: 

such is always possible, yet not every indictment is invalid. The 

proper inquiry here must be limited to the charges in the 

indictment itself. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 17 
·1988) •. ·The· indictment -·is suff ic.i:ent · to charge ,the· CCE offense and 

support the convictions of.Teafatiller and.Staggs. Based on the 

foregoing, the CCE convictions of appellants Teafatiller and 

Staggs are AFFIRMED. The panel opinion filed this same day 

resolves the baiance of the issues raised by this appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 18 
Nos. 88-1275, 88-1469, 88-14-71, 88-147.3, United.States.v. Staggs, 

et al. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge, co~curring: 

We heard· the instant case en bane on the sufficiency of the 

indictment issue to see if we could obtain a majority on issues 

similar, but not identical, to the issue on which we split 5-5 in 

United States v. Rivera, 874 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1989) (en bane). 

As one of the five votes that found the CCE indictment in Rivera 

insufficient, I take this opportunity to explain why I join others 

to produce a majority upholding the CCE indictment now before us. 

Generally indictments tracking the words of the underlying 

criminal statute are valid. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 

87, 117 (1974). The other circuits cited in Judge Baldock's 

opinion have applied that rule to uphold CCE indictments, often 

with little or no analytical discussion. The indictment before us 

does state the elements of the CCE offense--the contested element 

here being participation in "a continuing series of violations of 

this title [II] or title III." 21 U.S.C. § 848 (before 1986 

amendment). 

Charging a CCE violation only in the language of the statute, 

however, presents two problems not usually present in the charging 

of other crimes. One is how can the court know that enough 

violations were presented to the grand jury to satisfy the 

"continuing series" element, permitting the reviewing court to 

monitor the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to an "indictment of 

a Grand Jury." In Rivera only two violations were mentioned in 

all counts of the indictment and no proof was offered that the 

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 19 
grand. jury had,.considered and found evidence.of-a.third violation. 

Thus, I was not able to satisfy myself that the grand jury indeed 

identified the defendant with three violations, the minimum the 

courts have required for a "continuing series of violations," 

under§ 848. See United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 427 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 325 (1988). 

In the case before us, I am sure that the grand jury did 

identify defendants Teafatiller and Staggs with at least three 

violations, because it so charged them in other counts returned in 

the same indictment containing the CCE count. Thus, my concern in 

Rivera, that the grand jury had not performed its Fifth Amendment 

function, is satisfied here. 

Relying upon Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), 

the dissent would find a Fifth Amendment "indictment of a Grand 

Jury" violation unless the exact offenses presented to the grand 

jury and used to convict are set out in the indictment. They rely 

upon the words of the Supreme Court in Russell that a defendant 

should not "be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and 

perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him." 

Id. at 770 (emphasis added). I think the dissenters take the 

words of Russell too literally. Nowhere in the criminal law do we 

require all evidence presented at trial to be presented to the 

grand jury; it is custom and practice to present just enough to 

get the indictment. In a bank robbery case one teller witness may 

give testimony to the grand jury, but a different or additional 

teller may testify at trial. Facts and witnesses uncovered after 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 20 
the indictment, and therefore not presented to the grand jury, may 

be presented at trial, so long as the offense proved is the same. 

Is proof that defendant committed an additional or ·different 

violation of Title II or III than those presented to the grand 

jury the same as u£ing a teller who did not appear before the 

grand jury to identify a bank robber at trial? The dissenters 

would answer no, because they view the precise violations 

presented to the grand jury, which they would require to be set 

out in the CCE count, to be "elements" of the crime. To me the 

element is "a continuing series of violations," and the specific 

violations the prosecutor presents are merely the evidence used to 

prove that element. The dissenters' reasoning would require that 

the five individuals with whom the defendant allegedly has acted 

in conce{t, see 21 U.S.C. § 848(2), be identified by name in the 

indictment: their identities would be "elements" of the CCE 

crime. Because I believe the three violations are evidence of the 

CCE element, I believe it is permissible to prove any three 

violations at trial. It is little different from utilizing 

eyewitness B instead of eyewitness A, who went before the grand 

jury, to prove a bank robbery. 

This raises, however, the second problem in CCE indictments 

not present in many other federal criminal indictments. That is 

the defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to be informed of the 

nature and cause of the accusation," sufficiently to prepare a 

defense: the notice problem. 1 

1 I agree with the majority opinion that the indictment's CCE 

count in the instant case has sufficient time, place and offense 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 21 
Unlike civil cases, in which full discovery_.and disclosure is 

the norm, the federal ·criminal law contemplates only partial 

disclosure of the government's case. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, 

Conf. Comm. Notes, H.R. Rep. No. 94-414 (In rejecting an amendment 

to Rule 16, committee stated that "[a] majority of the [House and 

Senate] Conferees believe it is not in the interest of the 

effective administration of criminal justice to require that the 

government or the defendant be forced to reveal the names and 

addresses of its witnesses before trial."). Thus, the courts must 

perform a balancing act between requiring enough disclosure to 

fairly treat the defendant and enable him to prepare a defense and 

preserving the government's right to shield witnesses and evidence 

not required to be disclosed by the criminal procedure rules. 

Important in this balance is the bill of particulars. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 7(f). The availability of the bill of particulars, I 

believe, provides adequate protection for the defendant's Sixth 

Amendment rights by giving him the means in a CCE case like that 

at bar to learn the specific violations the government intends to 

use at trial. See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 

(1953); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 66 (1942). Use of 

the bill of particulars is more desirable than requiring the 

government to reconvene the grand jury for a superceding 

indictment should the prosecutor want to present some different 

evidence on the "continuing series of violations" element than was 

originally presented. Although we review the grant or denial of a 

Continued from previous page 

specificity that, with the record, the defendants can avoid any 

double jeopardy problems. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 22 
bill of par.ticulars by an. abuse. of. discretion .standard, ~, 

United States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026, 1029 (10th Cir. 1988), the 

trial court~s discretion would be abused, in my view, if the 

district court refused to grant a bill requiring the government to 

reveal the violations it intended to prove to establish the 

"continuing series" element. 

In the instant case I see no constitutional violations in 

this indictment, and, therefore, I concur in Judge Baldock's 

opinion. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 23 
Nos •. 88~1275, 88-1469, 88-1471, , 8.8-1472 -".United .States of America 

v. Donald Eugene Staggs, et al. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom MCKAY and SEYMOUR, 

Circuit Judges, join: 

The appellants' continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE") 

convictions should, in my opinion, be reversed because the 

indictment in this case violated the appellants' constitutional 

right to be tried only upon charges that have been passed upon by 

a grand jury. My fundamental disagreement with the majority's 

opinion is that it focuses only upon notice concerns and does not 

adequately address the Fifth Amendment requirement that "[n]o 

person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous 

crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." 

We granted en bane review on the following question: 

Whether a continuing criminal enterprise indictment 

which tracks the language of the statute and contains 

three violations underlying the series in another count 

of the indictment is sufficient to charge a continuing 

criminal enterprise offense under 21 U.S.C. § 848, 

consistent with the requirements for an indictment under 

the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution. 

That question necessarily involves two issues: (1) whether it is 

constitutionally sufficient for a CCE count in an indictment 

merely to track the language of the CCE statute without alleging 

the predicate acts that constitute the criminal enterprise, and 

(2) if tracking the language of the statute is not sufficient, 

whether the constitutional infirmity can be remedied by looking to 

allegations in other counts that have not been specifically 

incorporated into the CCE count. 

The majority does not decide the first question because this 

court is evenly divided on that issue. See United States v. 

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 24 
.. .Rivera, __ F. 2d __ ,. 1989. WL 52523 ( 10th Cir •. -1989). Instead, 

the majority addresses the second issue and concludes that a CCE 

count that merely tracks the statutory language is sufficient if 

the three qualifying drug offenses are alleged in another count of 

the indictment, even though the CCE count does not expressly 

incorporate the allegations of the other count. 

I believe that Counts II and III of the indictment, standing 

alone, are constitutionally infirm because they do not protect the 

appellants' Fifth Amendment right to be tried only for charges 

returned by a grand jury. Further, the infirmity of those counts 

is not cured by the allegations of specific drug offenses found in 

Count I because the allegations of Count I are not expressly 

incorporated into Counts II and III. Accordingly, I respectfully 

dissent. 

I. 

INCORPORATING ALLEGATIONS FROM OTHER COUNTS NOT PERMITTED 

IN THE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS INCORPORATION 

The majority opinion holds that deficiencies in one count of 

a multi-count indictment can be cured by looking to allegations 

found in other counts of the same indictment, even though such 

allegations are not expressly incorporated into the deficient 

count. I believe that the majority is mistaken for at least four 

reasons. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 25 
A •. Precedent. Solidly. Precludes . .Incorporation Except by Express 

Reference 

The majority's holding conflicts. with cases from nine other 

circuits that have held that allegations in one count cannot 

supply missing allegations in another count in the absence of 

express incorporation by reference. United States v. Fulcher, 626 

F.2d 985, 988 (D.C. Cir.) ("Each count in an indictment is 

regarded as if it was a separate indictment. Each count must 

stand on its own, and cannot depend for its validity on the 

allegations of any other count not specifically incorporated."), 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); United States v. Winter, 663 

F.2d 1120, 1138 (1st Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied sub nom. 

Goldenberg v. United States, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States 

v. Markus, 721 F.2d 442, 444 (3d Cjr. 1983) (court refused to 

imply incorporation because "nothing shall be added to an 

indictment without the concurrence of the grand jury"); United 

States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1231 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane) 

("court must read each count of indictment independently of all 

other counts"); United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 901 (5th 

Cir. 1982) ("[A]n implicit reference [to other counts in an 

indictment] does not satisfy the requirements of due 

process ..•• [W]hile the specificity required in an indictment 

can be achieved by incorporation of another count, this 

incorporation must be express, not implicit."), cert. denied sub 

nom. Eisenberg v. United States, 461 U.S. 927 (1983); United 

States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1298 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Although 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) permits the government to 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 26 
incorporate in one count allegations made in another count, the 

incorporation must be express, not implicit."), rev'd on other 

grounds sub nom. United States v. McNally, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); 

United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 180 (7th Cir. 1958) 

(allegation of value of stolen goods from other counts could not 

be read into a different count in the absence of express 

incorporation); United States v. Miller, 774 F.2d 883, 885 (8th 

Cir. 1985) ("It is well-settled, however, that each count of an 

indictment 'must stand on its own, and cannot depend for its 

validity on the allegations of any other count riot specifically 

incorporated.'"); Walker v. United States, 176 F.2d 796, 798 (9th 

Cir. 1949) ("[E]ach count in an indictment is regarded as if it 

were a separate indictment and must be sufficient in itself. 

Therefore, it must stand or fall on its own allegations without 

reference to other counts not expressly incorporated by 

reference."). 

The Winter case from the First Circuit ia particularly 

relevant here. In Winter, Count I of a multi-count indictment 

charged several defendants with conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1962(c) (RICO) and listed several predicate acts committed by 

the defendants. However, Charles and James DeMetri, two of the 

defendants charged in Count I, were named only in connection with 

at most one predicate act, whereas two predicate acts are required 

to charge an accused with conspiracy to violate RICO. 663 F.2d at 

1136. The government argued that the indictment was sufficient as 

against the DeMetris because Counts 5 and 32 of the same 

indictment properly charged them with committing two predicate 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 27 
offenses •. The. court.rejected the government's .argument: 

Count One, however, does. not incorporate by reference 

either Count Five or Coun·t Thirty-Two and neither of 

them refers to Count One. Only Count Two, which does 

not name the DeMetris as defendants, incorporates Count 

One by reference. The indictment as drawn does not 

admit of Counts Five and Thirty-Two being used as 

predicate acts for Count One. "Each count in an 

indictment is regarded as if it was a separate 

indictment." ••• "Each count must stand on its own, 

and cannot depend for its validity on allegations in 

another count not specifically incorporated." ••• 

We find Count One legally insufficient as to 

Charles and James DeMetri because it fails to charge 

that they agreed to commit two predicate crimes. It 

must, therefore, be dismissed as tQ them, _and their 

convictions on it reversed. · 

Id. at 1138 (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 

(1932), and Fulcher, 626 F.2d at 988). Just as the First Circuit 

found the indictment invalid against the DeMetris because Count 

One failed to incorporate by reference the predicate acts in 

Counts Five and Thirty-Two, I would hold Counts II and III of the 

indictment here invalid because they failed to incorporate by 

reference the predicate acts in Count I. 

Numerous commentators agree that "each count is considered as 

if it were a separate indictment, and must be sufficient without 

reference to other counts unless they are expressly incorporated 

by reference". l Wright & Miller, Fed. Pract. & Proc. § 123; see 

also 9 Fed. Proc. L. Ed. § 22:489 ("each count must be considered 

as a separate indictment or information for purposes of 

ascertaining its sufficiency, at least where no other count has 

been specifically incorporated"). Cf. Dunn v. United States, 284 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 28 
U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (''Each count in an indictment. is regarded .. as 

if it was a separate indictment."). 1 

Notwithstanding the majority's reliance on our previous case 

of United States v. Neal, 692 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982), I do not 

believe that case is controlling. There we explicitly held that 

the allegations in the first count were sufficient in themselves 

to charge the offense. Therefore it was not necessary to 

incorporate allegations from other counts in order to supply 

essential missing allegations. Id. at 1301. The reference to 

allegations in other counts of that indictment was largely in 

response to the defendant's challenge that he was inadequately 

appraised of the content and nature of the charge against him. 

1 The majority cites three cases, two from the Seventh Circuit and 

one from the Eighth Circuit, to support its conclusion that the 

allegations in Count I can be considered to determine the. 

sufficiency of Counts II and III: United States v. Esposito, 771 

F.2d 283, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 

(1986); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 752 (7th Cir. 

1988); and United States v. Becton, 751 F.2d 250, 256-57 (8th Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985). See also United States 

v. Zavala, 839 F.2d 523, 526 (9th Cir.), cer'E-:-den"Ied, U.S. , 109 s. Ct. 86, 102 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1988). I do not find these 

cases persuasive -for several reasons. First, in Esposito, Becton, 

and Zavala, the defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of 

the indictment before the district court. Because "judicial 

efficiency requires that tardily-challenged indictments be 

construed liberally in favor of validity," United States v. 

Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 304 (10th Cir. 1987), I do not think those 

cases are determinative of our case, where the appellants 

challenged the indictment before trial. Second, Becton was 

decided prior to Miller, 774 F.2d at 885, where the Eighth Circuit 

held that each count must be read as a separate indictment, and 

thus Miller represents current Eighth Circuit law. Third, none of 

those cases focused on the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury 

indictment. Esposito, Moya-Gomez, and Becton dealt only with the 

notice requirements and concluded that, because the defendant had 

actual notice of the predicate offense, the notice requirement was 

satisfied. Finally, Esposito, Moya-Gomez, and Zavala did not 

discuss the reasons for departing from prior precedent from the 

same circuit holding that each count of an indictment must be read 

as a separate indictment. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 29 
This court merely stated that the nature_of-the.charge and the 

evidence before the grand jury were "further revealed" by other 

counts of the indictment. Id. at 1302. That is far from a 

holding that missing allegations can be supplanted from one count 

to another. 2 

B. Right to be Indicted by a Grand Jury Precludes Incorporation 

Except by Express Reference 

The majority errs by failing adequately to address the Fifth 

Amendment right of an accused to be tried only upon charges 

returned by a grand jury. The majority reaches its conclusion 

that the allegations in Count I of the indictment can remedy any 

constitutional deficiencies in Counts II and III by framing the 

central issue as inv?lving "the notice function of the 

indictment," and it then concludes that the appellants received 

adequate notice of the charges from the allegations in Count I. 

However, the rationale for treating each count in an 

indictment separately extends beyond a concern for notice to the 

defendant, although notice obviously is important. The rationale 

also encompasses the concern expressed in Russell v. United 

States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962), that courts will have ''to make a 

subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at 

the time they returned the indictment," which could allow "a 

2 Moreover, the allegations in the challenged count against the 

defendant in Neal (which dealt with a charge of extortion under 

18 u.s.c. § 894(a) rather than a charge of violating 21 u.s.c. 

§ 848) contained significantly more detail and precision than was 

present in the challenged counts against Staggs and Teafatiller. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 30 
defendant to be convicted on the basis of .. facts. not found by, or 

perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury." 369 U.S. at 770. 

The inescapable problem in this case is that we do not know, 

and cannot know, whether the grand jury found probable cause to 

indict the appellants for CCE violations based upon the same 

factual allegations that were contained in Count I, or whether the 

grand jury determined that the organizational aspects of the CCE 

violation were linked instead to other predicate acts that were 

not included in Count I. That the evidence presented at trial 

conformed with the allegations in Count I does not help us because 

we still do not know if those allegations were what the grand jury 

considered when it charged the appellants with CCE. Therefore, 

the indictment did not conform to the constitutional standards 

expressed in Russell. 

C. Rule 7(c)(l) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 

Allows Incorporation Only by Express Reference 

The majority's holding is contrary to Rule 7(c)(l) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that 

"[a]llegations made in one count may be incorporated by reference 

in another count." (Emphasis added.) By expressly providing the 

manner in which incorporation can occur, the Rule suggests that 

alternative methods of incorporation are excluded under the "longhonored rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est 

exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 

others)." United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1434 (10th 

Cir. 1989). If incorporation were automatic among each count in a 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 31 
multi-count -indictment, then there would have been no reason for 

the drafters of the Rule to have added the words, "by reference," 

particularly when "[t]he draftsmen of the Rules fully realized 

that the edifice they were erecting must rest on the sure 

foundation of fundamental rights." Cummings, The Third Great 

Adventure, 29 A.B.A.J. 654, 655 (1943} (discussing history of 

Rules of Criminal Procedure}. 

D. The Majority's Holding Would Not Restrict the Prosecutor 

to the Charges Returned by the Grand Jury 

Because Counts II and III do not incorporate by reference the 

allegations in Count I, the prosecutor presumably was not limited 

at trial by those allegations. Although the prosecutor here did 

in fact limit his CCE evidence to the transactions alleged in 

Count I, neither the majority's holding nor its logic necessarily 

requires that he have done so. Because the prosecutor apparently 

was not so bound, he should not have received the benefit of the 

allegations in Count I to sustain any deficiencies in Counts II 

and III. 

For these reasons, I would hold that the factual allegations 

in Count I cannot be used to cure any deficiencies in Counts II 

and III because those allegations are not specifically 

incorporated by reference into Counts II and III. 

II. 

CCE COUNT IS INSUFFICIENT 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 32 
WHICH MERELY TRACKS STATUTORY LANGUAGE 

WITHOUT ALLEGING SPECIFIC PREDICATE ACTS 

Because I believe that the allegations of Counts I cannot be 

read into Counts II or III, I cannot avoid addressing the issue of 

whether Counts II and III are constitutionally sufficient 

independent of Count I. I would hold that Counts II and III are 

not constitutionally sufficient because they failed to protect the 

appellants' Fifth Amendment right to be tried only upon charges 

specifically returned by a grand jury. 

A. The Protective Function of the Grand Jury 

In my view, this case is controlled by Russell v. United 

States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962). In Russell, the Supreme Court held 

that a defendant cannot be convicted on the basis of facts that 

may not have been specifically presented to, and found by, the 

grand jury: 

To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent 

guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the 

time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant 

of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention· 

of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant 

could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, 

and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which 

indicted him. 

Id. at 770 (emphasis added). 

Russell involved defendants who were charged with refusing to 

answer certain questions when summoned to testify before a 

congressional subcommittee. For each defendant, the indictment 

failed to identify the subject that was under subcommittee inquiry 

at the time the witness was interrogated. Rather, the indictment 

stated only the conclusory allegation that the questions to which 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 33 
.answers were refused."were-pertinent to the question under 

inquiry." Id. at 752. 

The Court there held that the indictments were deficient 

because they failed to satisfy the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 

The Court emphasized that the constitutional import of charging an 

accused with specificity lies not only with providing notice to 

the accused to allow him to prepare his defense, but also with 

ensuring that the accused is not convicted of any offense not 

charged by the grand jury, as evidenced by the indictment. Id. at 

770. Indeed, "[t]he very purpose of the requirement that a man be 

indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses 

charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of 

either prosecuting attorney or judge." Id. at 771 (quoting 

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960)). 

The principles enunciated in Russell are deeply entrenched in 

our legal heritage: 

The constitutional prov1s1on that a trial may be 

held in a serious federal criminal case only if a grand 

jury has first intervened reflects centuries of 

antecedent development of common law, going back to the 

Assize·of Clarendon in 1166. "The grand jury is an 

English institution, brought to this country by the 

early colonists and incorporated in the Constitution by 

the Founders. There is every reason to believe that our 

constitutional grand jury was intended to operate 

substantially like its English progenitor. The basic 

purpose of the English grand jury was to provide a fair 

method for instituting criminal proceedings against 

persons believed to have committed crimes." 

Russell, 369 U.S. at 761 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 

U.S. 359, 362 (1956)). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 34 
Over 100 years ago, in Ex.Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887l, 

the Supreme Court explained the importance of the protective 

aspects of the grand jury system: 

It has been said that, since there is no danger to 

the citizen from the oppressions of a monarch, or of any 

form of executive power, there is no longer need of a 

grand jury. But, whatever force may be given to this 

argument, it remains true that the grand jury is as 

valuable as ever in securing, in the language of Chief 

Justice Shaw in the case of Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 

329, "individual citizens" "from an open and public 

accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense, and 

anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is 

established by the presentment and indictment of a grand 

jury;" and "in case of high offences" it "is justly 

regarded as one of the securities to the innocent 

against hasty, malicious, and oppressive public 

prosecutions." 

The Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed Bain's holding that 

a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense different from that 

which was stated in the indictment: 

If it lies within the province of a court to change the 

charging part of an indictment to suit its own notions 

of what it ought to have been, or what the grand jury 

would probably have made it if their attention had been 

called to suggested changes, the great importance which 

the common law attaches to an indictment by a grand 

jury, as a prerequisite to a prisoner's trial for a 

crime, and without which the Constitution says "no. 

person shall be held to answer," may be frittered away 

until its value is almost destroyed. 

United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 142-43 (1985) (quoting 

Bain, 121 U.S. at 10). The Court also reiterated the rule that 

"nothing can be added to an indictment without the concurrence of 

the grand jury by which the bill was found." Id. at 143 (emphasis 

added; quoting United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 612 

(1930)) • 3 

3 In Miller, the Court rejected Bain's other holding, not here 

[footnote continued ... ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 35 
This court has similarly emphasized0

• the importance of the 

grand jury and its protective function: 

The function of the grand jury "was not only to examine 

into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the 

prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the 

charge was founded upon credible testimony or was 

dictated by malice or personal ill will." We are 

mindful of the oft-quoted words of Judge Learned Hand 

that "[slave for torture, it would be hard to find a 

more effective tool of tyranny than the power of 

unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination." 

United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906), and United States 

v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J., 

dissenting)), aff'd sub nom. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 

U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 2369, 101 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1988). 

This history makes clear that a grand jury indictment is more 

than just a means of notifying the defendant of the charges 

against him. The Constitution's requirement that citizens decide 

whether there is probable cause to try an accused for a serious 

crime serves as a check on the discretion of overzealous 

prosecutors. 

B. Counts II and III are Constitutionally Infirm Under the 

Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment 

In light of the importance the Supreme Court has consistently 

placed on an accused's right to tried only on charges passed upon 

by a grand jury, I would hold that Counts II and III, viewed 

independently from Count I, violated the appellants' Fifth 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

relevant, that it is constitutionally impermissible to drop 

unnecessary allegations from the indictment. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 36 
Amendment right to a,grand jury indictment. ~he .bare statutory 

language contained in Counts II and III gave.no assurances 

whatsoever that the grand jury found, or even considered, the 

incidents or transactions for which the appellants ultimately were 

tried and convicted. 

Because Counts II and III did not identify any specific 

predicate acts, the prosecutor could circumvent the grand jury by 

relying on predicate acts at trial other than those that were 

passed upon by the grand jury. Russell flatly rejected that 

result: 

[I]f it be once held that changes can be made by the 

consent or the order of the court in the body of the 

indictment as presented by the grand jury, and the 

prisoner can be called upon to answer to the indictment 

as thus changed, the restriction which the constitution 

places upon the power of the court, in regard to the 

prerequisite of an indictment, in reality no longer 

exists. 

369 U.S. at 771 (quoting Bain, 121 U.S. at 10). 

A grand jury indictment is not an instrument that deals 

simply in abstract legal theory. Rather, it is an instrument of 

practical function -- to ensure that there are sufficient facts 

constituting a crime alleged against a defendant to warrant a 

trial: 

It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that 

where the definition of an offence, whether it be at 

common law or by statute, "includes generic terms, it is 

not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the 

offence in the same generic terms as in the definition; 

but it must state the species -- it must descend to the 

particulars.["] •.. For this, facts are to be stated, 

not conclusions of law alone. A crime is made up of 

acts and intent; and these must be set forth in the 

indictment with reasonable particularity of time, place, 

and circumstances. 

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United·.States .v. Cruikshank, -92 u~s. 542, .558-(1875) .(emphasis 

added; citation omitted), quoterl in part in Russell, 369 U.S. at 

765. "Undoubtedly the language of a statute may be used in the 

general description of an offence, but it must be accompanied with 

such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the 

accused of the specific offence, coming under the general 

description, with which he is charged." Hamling v. United States, 

418 U.S. 87, 117-18 (1974) (quoting United States v. Hess, 124 

U.S. 483, 487 (1888)). See also United States v. Curtis, 506 F.2d 

985, 990 (10th Cir. 1974) (an indictment must contain specific 

factual allegations of "the nature or character of any scheme or 

artifice to defraud," and "it is not sufficient in this regard to 

merely plead the statutory language"). 

The rule that material facts and circumstances must be 

pleaded in the indictment has been codified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 

7(c)(l), which provides: "The indictment or the information shall 

be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the 

essential facts constituting the offense charged." (Emphasis 

added). If we were to abandon that standard and allow the grand 

jury to indict only in the general language of a statute, it would 

then be left to the prosecutor to decide which transaction or 

criminal conduct he wanted to bring within the general language of 

the indictment. The great importance that the Constitution 

assigns to the grand jury as gatekeeper would "be frittered away 

until its value is almost destroyed." Russell, 369 U.S. at 771. 

Moreover, if we did not require "essential" facts to be set 

forth in the indictment, we also would incapacitate reviewing 

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. com;ts ·from. determining what the .. grand ·jury did. -Those courts 

would be .required to "guess as to what was in the minds of the 

grand jury," again diluting to an impermissible degree the 

defendant's right to answer only for specific offenses that were 

returned by the grand jury. See id. at 770. 

There is no dispute that it is "essential" to the crime of 

CCE that the defendant engage in three or more qualifying drug 

transactions .. See United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 427 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 325, 102 L. 

Ed. 2d 342 (1988). The crime of CCE is engaging in three or more 

qualifying drug transactions undertaken in concert with others 

over whom the defendant acts in a supervisory capacity. Unless 

the three component drug transactions are alleged with specificity 

in the indictment, the accused and the court cannot know what 

activity the grand jury found to constitute a continuing criminal 

enterprise. Where the essential factual components of CCE are'not 

alleged with particularity, the indictment fails to "descend to 

the particulars"; it fails to set forth "with reasonable 

particularity the time, place, and circumstances"; it fails to 

contain "a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform 

the accused of the specific offence"; and it fails to contain a 

"definite written statement of the essential facts constituting 

the offense charged." 4 

4 The concurring opinion suggests that the failure to allege the 

specific transactions that constitute "a continuing series of 

violations" is similar to the failure to allege which eye 

witnesses the prosecutor intends to use to prove a bank robbery. 

I respectfully disagree. A defendant does not need to know the 

names of the witnesses who will testify against him in order for 

[footnote continued ... ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 39 
I have no doubt that the majority would stcike down aa 

indictment that charged only, in the words of 18 u.s.c. § 2113, 

that the defendant took or attempted to take something of value 

from a "bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association" 

located somewhere within the Eastern District of Oklahoma within 

the time period of November 1985 to August 1987. Such an 

indictment, although stating the statutory prohibition that was 

violated, would fail to identify the particular offense or 

transaction for which the defendant is being prosecuted. Counts 

II and III of the indictment here, in my opinion, have the same 

infirmity. 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

him to know precisely what acts the grand jury has charged against 

him. However, unless the specific transactions or acts f-or which 

he is being charged are set forth in the indictment, a defendant 

cannot know what "essential facts" (as opposed to conclusions of 

law) were found against him by the grand jury. 

Moreover, the use of the semantic labels "evidence'' or 

"elements" to determine the adequ~cy of an indictment is not very 

helpful because of the inherent ambiguity of those labels and 

because the decision of which label to use is outcome 

determinative. For example, the very definition of a continuing 

criminal enterprise is the commission of three transactions that 

violate sub-chapters I or II of Chapter 13 of Title 21. Hence, 

the three specific transactions charged against the defendant 

together constitute by definition one of the elements of a CCE 

crime -- the element of a "continuing series of violations." 

Surely a simple allegation that a defendant has violated something 

somewhere in sub-chapters I or II of Chapter 13 of Title 21 of the 

United States Code would not allege with sufficient specificity a 

crime upon which a defendant could be convicted. Merely adding 

additional allegations that the violations occurred within a twoyear period within the Eastern District of Oklahoma and elsewhere 

and that they regarded amphetamines would not adequately allege a 

substantive crime under sub-chapters I or II of Chapter 13 of 

Title 21 of the United States Code. It is hard to see, therefore, 

how repeating those generalized legal conclusions three times over 

is somehow sufficient to allege a continuing criminal enterprise 

under 21 u.s.c. § 848. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 40 
This court has frequently sustained-the.dismissal_of civil 

actions for failure to plead sufficient facts, notwithstanding the 

absence of Fifth Amendment grand jury concerns and Si~th Amendment 

notice concerns, the liberal pleading practices permitted by Rule 

8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the availability of 

broad discovery in civil cases. ~, Hammond v. Bales, 843 F.2d 

1320, 1323 ( 10th Cir. 1988) ( "[W]here a plaintiff in a § 1983 

action attempts to assert the necessary state action by 

implicating a state official in a conspiracy with a private 

defendant, the pleadings must specifically present facts showing 

agreement and concerted action. Conclusory allegations without 

supporting facts are insufficient.") (citing Sooner Products Co. 

v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1983); Mountain View 

Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 

1980) (complaint that did "little more than recite the relevant 

anti-trust laws" without providing underlying facts was properly 

subject to dismissal). Moreover, this court has on several 

occasions dismissed prose complaints, which are to be liberally 

construed, for failure to plead sufficient facts. ~, Durre v. 

Dempsey, 869 F.2d 543, 545 (10th Cir. 1989) (prisoner's conspiracy 

action was properly dismissed where the complaint failed to allege 

specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action); Cotner 

v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986) (prisoner's 

complaint was properly dismissed where allegations were conclusory 

and unsupported by underlying facts). A fortiori, a criminal 

indictment, which carries greater constitutional proscriptions 

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Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 41 
than, 0 do civil complaints., .should be ~required to- ,plead. spec.i.fic 

transactions or events that constitute the alleged offense. 5 

Because the bare statutory language of Counts II and III 

provides none of the protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment 

right to a grand jury indictment, I would hold that those counts 

are not sufficient to charge the appellants with CCE. 6 

C. Counts II and III do not Provide Adequate Notice 

Under the Right to be Informed Clause of the Sixth Amendment 

A second issue that gives me concern is whether Counts II and III, 

which cite little more than the statutory language of CCE and 

5 The majority would dismiss this comparison between civil and 

criminal pleading requirements because "[t]he underlying processes 

are structurally different" and " [ t ]he er iminal proceeding i.s 

monitored from its inception by •.• a grand jury." (Majority 

Opinion at n.S).c However, it is precisely to ensure this critical 

monitoring process by the grand jury that we must insist that the 

grand jury find and explicitly include in the indictment all the 

essential facts of the crime charged in the indictment. If the 

grand jury can merely write a blank check and leave it to the 

prosecutor to fill in the blanks by deciding later which 

"essential facts" should form the basis of the prosecution against 

the defendant, then the monitoring process of the grand jury, upon 

which the majority appears to rely, is imperiled. 

6 The majority cite cases from other circuits that reached a 

different result. See,~, United States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 

1120, 1125 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); United 

States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1356 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 

denied under various names, 440 U.S. 907 (1979); United States v. 

Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1344 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied under 

various names, 420 U.S. 962 (1975), 421 U.S. 949 (1975); 

United States v. Sterling, 742 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985). Those cases, and others that 

have held that tracking the statutory language is sufficient, or, 

in the alternative, that the predicate acts need not be alleged, 

have generally limited their analysis to notice and double 

jeopardy concerns, and have not focused on the Fifth Amendment 

right to have a grand jury issue the indictment and define the 

charges which the defendant must answer at trial. In any event, 

to the extent that those cases are inconsistent with Russell, I 

disagree with them. 

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which do not incorporate the allegations found in Count I, 

violated the appellants' Sixth Amendment right to be informed of 

the "nature and cause of the accusation" against them. Because I 

would hold that Counts II and III are constitutionally infirm 

under the grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment, I do not dwell 

on the notice function of the indictment under the Sixth Amendment 

except to point out that, in my opinion, the appellants also 

received constitutionally inadequate notice of the charges against 

them when Counts II and III of the indictment charged only in the 

naked language of the statute. 

To satisfy Sixth Amendment notice requirements, an indictment 

must be "accompanied with such a statement of the facts and 

circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offence." 

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-18 (1974) (emphasis 

added; quoting United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1887)). 

Here, Counts II and III lacked such a statement. Those counts 

merely charged the appellants, in the statutory language, with 

violating§ 848 by "repeatedly violating Title 21 United States 

Code, Section 84l(a)(l) and other provisions of Title 21, 

regarding amphetamine," within a two year period "within the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma, and elsewhere." This language could 

merely be charging defendants with three incidents of distributing 

amphetamines in a suburb of Muskogee, Oklahoma, or it could be 

charging defendants with controlling an amphetamine manufacturing 

operation that operated nationwide over the entire two-year 

period, or it could be charging anything in between. Counts II 

and III of the indictment tell defendants what statutes they 

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_.allegedly violated, but it .does not tell .. .them what acts they did 

that will form the essential basis of the charge against them. 

It is sometimes suggested that a defendant can rely on a bill 

of particulars to fill in details about an offense. But a bill of 

particulars cannot fill in "essential" facts that constitute the 

very offense charged, for "it is a settled rule that a bill of 

particulars can not save an invalid indictment." Russell, 369 

U.S. at 770. 7 

III. 

HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS INAPPROPRIATE 

The government argues that any deficiencies in Counts II and 

III were rendered "harmless'' by the petit jury's guilty verdict. 

See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73 (1986) ("the petit 

jury's verdict rendered harmless any conceivable error in the 

charging decision that might have flowed from the violation"). 

The government misconstrues the import of Mechanik. There, the 

alleged error in the grand jury proceeding was not called to the 

district court's attention until the second week of trial, and the 

motion was not ultimately ruled upon until after trial. The 

Supreme Court, in holding that the relatively technical violation 

7 In any event, a bill of particulars is answered by the 

prosecutor, not by the grand jury. Therefore, whatever it might 

do to satisfy the notice requirement, a bill of particulars does 

nothing to protect the defendant's right to have the grand jury 

operate as the gatekeeper to decide which specific offenses he 

will be required to defend against in a criminal trial. If a 

prosecutor, by means of a bill of particulars, can unilaterally 

choose which transactions within a two-year period the defendant 

must respond to, then the prosecutor is usurping the grand jury's 

role. 

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of _.procedures before the. grand jury was. harmless error in .that 

context, specifically stated that it was expressing "no opinion as 

to what remedy may be appropriate for a violation of Rule 6(d) 

that has affected the grand jury's charging decision and is 

brought to the attention of the trial court before the 

commencement of trial." Id. at 72. 

Here, the error was called to the attention of the district 

court before the trial, and the error does not involve the 

procedural matters addressed by Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, but rather goes to the very essence of the 

grand jury's function. Accordingly, I believe that this issue is 

controlled by the rule articulated in United States v. Miller, 471 

U.S. 130 (1985), that the right to be tried only on charges 

presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury is not 

governed by the harmless error standard: "Deprivation of such a 

basic right [to indictment by a grand jury] is far too serious to 

be treated as nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as 

harmless error." Id. at 140 (quoting Stirone v. United States, 

361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960). See also Russell, 369 U.S. at 763 ("the 

substantial safeguards to those charged with serious crimes cannot 

be eradicated under the guise of technical departures from the 

rules") (construing Rule 7(c); quoting Smith v. United States, 360 

U.S. 1, 9 (1959)); cf. United States v. Smith, 553 F.2d 1239, 1242 

(10th Cir. 1977) ("the absence of prejudice to the defendant does 

not cure what is necessarily a substantial, jurisdictional defect 

in the indictment"). 

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In this regard, . I-agree·,wi-th .,the-- F.ourth Ci:..rcui t 's decision .. in 

United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1233 (4th Cir. 1988) (en 

bane}, where the court dismissed a count that failed to allege 

interstate commerce even though other counts in the indictment 

alleged acts involving interstate commerce. Citing the Tenth 

Circuit decision in Smith, 553 F.2d at 1242, the court held that 

the error in the defective count could not be harmless under 

Mechanik even though the defendant was subsequently convicted by a 

petit jury under that count: 

The absence of prejudice to the defendant in a 

traditional sense does not cure a substantive, 

jurisdictional defect in an indictment. Unlike the 

situation in Mechanik, the defect of a completely 

missing essential element cannot be cured by a later 

jury instruction because there is nothing for a petit 

jury to ratify ...• A petit jury verdict can do no 

more than show that the grand jury could have given the 

defendant adequate notice had it chosen to do soo This 

cannot undo the harm of failing to give that notice· 

timely, nor can it confer jurisdiction on the court 

where none existed. Neither instructions nor a petit 

jury verdict can satisfy after the fact the Fifth 

Amendment right to be tried upon charges found by a 

grand jury. 

Id. at 1232. 

Because the indictment here failed to conform to minimal 

constitutional standards, the harmless error standard does not 

apply. Therefore, the appellants' convictions on the CCE charges 

should be reversed. 

IV. 

CONCLUSION 

I am persuaded that merely tracking the statutory language is 

not sufficient in this case, and that each count of an indictment 

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.... 

Appellate Case: 88-1469 Document: 01019831449 Date Filed: 08/07/1989 Page: 46 
_ \ must be viewed as .. a. separate indictment rwithout refer.ence to other 

counts in the absence of an express incorporation by reference. 

Because the majority opinion has split from almost every other 

circuit and is, in my opinion, contrary to controlling Supreme 

Court precedent, I must respectfully dissent. 

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