Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30273/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30273-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark William Hertler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK WILLIAM HERTLER,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-30273

D.C. No.

9:12-cr-00032-DWM-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 10, 2014—Portland, Oregon

Filed January 15, 2015

Before: Harry Pregerson, Richard A. Paez,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez

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2 UNITED STATES V. HERTLER

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming a postrevocation term of supervised release,

the panel held that the phrase “any term of imprisonment” in

18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), which authorizes a district court to

impose a postrevocation term of supervised release up to the

statutory maximum less “any term of imprisonment that was

imposed upon revocation of supervised release,” refers to

terms of imprisonment imposed in connection with the

offense of conviction for which an additional term of

supervised release is imposed, not to terms of imprisonment

imposed for all counts of conviction.

COUNSEL

Andrew J. Nelson (argued), Assistant Federal Defender,

Federal Defenders of Montana, Missoula, Montana, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Lori Anne Harper Suek (argued) and Cyndee L. Peterson,

Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorneys’

Office District of Montana, Missoula, Montana, for PlaintiffAppellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. HERTLER 3

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Mark William Hertler appeals a postrevocation

term of supervised release. He argues that the new term of

twenty months exceeds the maximum period that can be

imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). That subsection

authorizes a district court to impose a postrevocation term of

supervised release up to the statutory maximum, but requires

the court to reduce the length of supervised release by “any

term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of

supervised release.” Hertler contends that the phrase “any

term of imprisonment” in § 3583(h) refers to any term of

imprisonment imposed for all offenses following the latest

revocation of supervised release. He therefore argues that the

district court erred when it construed this clause to refer only

to all terms of imprisonment imposed for a single underlying

offense. He further argues that, as a result of this error, the

district court concluded that he was eligible for up to thirtytwo months of additional supervised release when he should

have been sentenced to no more than nine.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we review de novo the legality of Hertler’s sentence. United

States v. Xinidakis, 598 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010). For

the reasons set forth below, we agree with the construction of

“any term of imprisonment” adopted by the district court, the

Eighth Circuit in United States v. Zoran, 682 F.3d 1060 (8th

Cir. 2012), and the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Oswalt,

771 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2014). We therefore affirm.

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4 UNITED STATES V. HERTLER

I

On July 13, 2005, Hertler was named in a two-count

indictment in the Southern District of Texas. The indictment

charged Hertler with: (1) distribution of child pornography in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(B) and 2252A(b)(2),

and (2) possession of child pornography involving sexual

exploitation of minors, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2252A(b)(1), and 2256(8). Hertler pled

guilty to both counts in September, 2005. The district court

ultimately sentenced him to concurrent terms of eighty-seven

months of imprisonment on Count 1 and sixty months on

Count 2. The court also imposed concurrent thirty-six month

terms of supervised release “as to each of Counts 1 and 2.”1

Hertler was released from prison and began his supervised

release on November 22, 2011. In July, 2012, the Southern

District of Texas transferred jurisdiction over Hertler’s case

to the District of Montana. Shortly thereafter, on July 18,

2012, Hertler’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke

Hertler’s supervised release. Among other allegations, the

petition alleged that Hertler violated several conditions of his

release by possessing sexually explicit materials, and by

attending a Christmas dinner at which his nine-year-old niece

was present. Hertler admitted the allegations. The district

court revoked Hertler’s supervised release and sentenced him

to consecutive terms of nine months of imprisonment on

Count 1 and three months on Count 2. The court also

1 The judgment noted that the offense conduct for Count 1 ended

October 31, 2002 and that the offense conduct for Count 2 ended February

5, 2003. Hertler is therefore not subject to the PROTECT Act, which

altered the supervised release limits for violations of § 2252A. See

18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).

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UNITED STATES V. HERTLER 5

imposed concurrent terms of twenty-four months of

supervised release on each of Counts 1 and 2.

Hertler was released from prison on July 17, 2013. 

Shortly thereafter, on August 1, 2013, Hertler’s probation

officer filed a petition to revoke his supervised release. The

petition alleged that Hertler again violated the conditions of

his release by possessing sexually explicit movies. Hertler

admitted the violation. The district court sentenced Hertler to

fifteen months of imprisonment on Count 1 and one month on

Count 2, to run concurrently. The court also imposed a

twenty month term of supervised release on Count 2. The

district court did not impose any additional period of

supervised release on Count 1. Hertler timely appealed his

sentence.

II

We begin our analysis by reviewing the relevant statutes.

Section 3583 governs the imposition of supervised

release. Subsection (a) authorizes district courts to impose

supervised release, while subsection (b) sets forth the

maximum period of supervised release that may be imposed

for an offense of conviction. For example, subsection (b)

provides that “for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than

five years” may be imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b).

Subsection (e) governs the modification of conditions and

revocation of supervised release. As relevant here,

§ 3583(e)(3) provides that a court may “revoke a term of

supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in

prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized

by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of

supervised release.” That subsection also limits the amount

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6 UNITED STATES V. HERTLER

of time that a court may require a defendant to serve in prison

upon revocation, providing different maximum terms for

different classes of felonies. Id.

Subsection 3583(h), the provision at issue in this case,

governs the imposition of any additional term of supervised

release following revocation:

When a term of supervised release is revoked

and the defendant is required to serve a term

of imprisonment, the court may include a

requirement that the defendant be placed on a

termofsupervised release after imprisonment.

The length of such a term of supervised

release shall not exceed the term of

supervised release authorized by statute for

the offense that resulted in the original term

of supervised release, less any term of

imprisonment that was imposed upon

revocation of supervised release.

Id. (emphasis added).

We have held that the limit on the length of a term of

supervised release under § 3583(h) requires that “the

maximum term of supervised release to be imposed following

multiple revocations of supervised release . . . be reduced by

the aggregate length of any and all terms of imprisonment

that have been imposed upon revocation of supervised

release.” United States v. Knight, 580 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir.

2009) (emphasis omitted); accord United States v. Anderson,

519 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, for example, in

Anderson, we held that because the original term of

supervised release was sixty months and, as a result of three

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UNITED STATES V. HERTLER 7

revocations, the defendant had served additional terms of six,

seven, and three months (a total of sixteen months), the

district court could impose no more than forty-four months of

supervised release for the fourth violation. 519 F.3d at 1025.

Also relevant to the imposition of supervised release is

18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which provides that

[t]he term of supervised release commences

on the day the person is released from

imprisonment and runs concurrently with any

Federal, State, or local term of probation or

supervised release or parole for another

offense to which the person is subject or

becomes subject during the term of supervised

release.

In essence, § 3624(e) provides that when a district court

initially imposes multiple terms of supervised release, it must

order that they run concurrently.

III

Relying in part on Knight, Hertler argues that, in

calculating the maximum term of supervised release that

could be imposed for Count 2, the district court should have

aggregated the prison time imposed in connection with both

Counts 1 and 2, and reduced the current term of supervised

release accordingly. This adjustment would have

significantly reduced the maximum term of supervised

release that the court could have imposed for the current

violation. Under Hertler’s approach, the court should have

started with the “term of supervised release authorized by

statute” for Count 2, which was thirty-six months. 18 U.S.C.

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8 UNITED STATES V. HERTLER

§ 3583(b), (h). Next, the court should have aggregated all

postrevocation prison sentences, which totaled twenty-seven

months—nine months on Count 1 and three months on Count

2 for the first violation, and fifteen months on Count 1 for the

second violation. After deducting this amount from the

statutory period of thirty-six months, the maximum length of

supervised release that the district court could have imposed,

according to Hertler, was nine months.

The government argues that because the convictions and

sentences for Counts 1 and 2 were separate and distinct, the

district court was not required to reduce the term of

postrevocation supervised release that could be imposed for

Count 2 by any months of imprisonment imposed for Count

1. Rather, the court was required to reduce the term of

supervised release only by the aggregate of all time imposed

on Count 2. According to the government, because the

district court initially imposed thirty-six months of supervised

release on Count 2 and has imposed only four months of

postrevocation imprisonment on this count (three months for

the first revocation and one month for the second), the

maximum term of supervised release the court could have

imposed was thirty-two months on Count 2. The government

argues that, because the district court imposed only a twenty

month term, Hertler’s postrevocation sentence was proper

under § 3583(h). We agree.

A

As an initial matter, Hertler’s reliance on Knight is

misplaced. Hertler argues that Knight supports aggregating

the postrevocation terms of imprisonment for different counts

of conviction. However, in Knight, the defendant was

convicted of only one offense. See 580 F.3d at 935. Thus, in

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UNITED STATES V. HERTLER 9

determining the maximum term of supervised release, the

court was required to consider only whether postrevocation

terms of imprisonment imposed for the same offense should

be aggregated. See id. at 940. The court did not consider the

issue presented here—whether postrevocation terms of

imprisonment for different counts of conviction must be

aggregated. Knight is inapposite.

Although we have not yet addressed the precise issue

raised in this appeal, the Eighth Circuit confronted it in

Zoran. There, the defendant argued that § 3583(h) required

the district court to aggregate all postrevocation terms of

imprisonment imposed on all counts of conviction following

the latest revocation, not just those terms of imprisonment

imposed for the same offense. 682 F.3d at 1064. The court

held that the defendant’s approach “reache[d] beyond the

textual limits of § 3583(h).” Id. In rejecting the defendant’s

argument, the court explained:

the plain text of § 3583(h) provides that a

term of postrevocation supervised release

“shall not exceed the term of supervised

release authorized by statute for the offense

that resulted in the original term of supervised

release, less any term of imprisonment that

was imposed upon revocation of supervised

release.” (emphasis added). Given the

statute’s consistent use of “term” and

“offense” in the singular form, we think the

subsequent phrase “any term of

imprisonment” plainly refers to “all

postrevocation terms of imprisonment

imposed with respect to the same underlying

offense.”

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10 UNITED STATES V. HERTLER

Id. (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336, 342 (4th

Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)). The Fifth Circuit adopted the

Eighth Circuit’s interpretation in Oswalt, 771 F.3d at 853

(“The Eighth Circuit’s construction of § 3583(h) is clearly

correct. The formula in § 3583(h) is count specific and does

not contemplate subtracting the postrevocation terms of

imprisonment imposed on all counts.”). We agree with the

Eighth and Fifth Circuits that the text of § 3583(h) supports

the conclusion, and the government’s argument, that “any

term of imprisonment” refers to terms of imprisonment

imposed for the same offense of conviction.

As Zoran recognized, § 3583(h) uses “term” and

“offense” in the singular. Section 3583(h)’s use of the

singular form suggests that “any term of imprisonment”

means any term of imprisonment imposed for the same

offense. This interpretation is further supported by other

subsections of § 3583, which use the offense of conviction as

a point of reference. For example, § 3583(b) uses the nature

of the offense to set the limit on the maximum period of

supervised release that may be imposed. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(b) (setting the maximum length of supervised release

based on whether the offense was a Class A, B, C, D, or E

felony or a misdemeanor). Section 3583(e)(3) similarly ties

a postrevocation sentence to a specific offense of conviction. 

See id. § 3583(e)(3) (permitting a court to “revoke a term of

supervised release[] and require the defendant to serve in

prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized

by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of

supervised release” (emphasis added)).

Section 3583 therefore suggests a scheme in which terms

of supervised release and terms of imprisonment following

revocation of supervised release are tied to specific offenses. 

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UNITED STATES V. HERTLER 11

In light of this structure, it makes sense that the phrase “any

term of imprisonment” in § 3583(h) means “any term of

imprisonment” imposed in connection with the offense of

conviction for which an additional period of supervised

release is imposed. We therefore agree with Zoran and the

government that the statutory text and structure support

construing “any term of imprisonment” to mean any “terms

of imprisonment imposed with respect to the same underlying

offense.” 682 F.3d at 1064.

Hertler’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He

contends that, because 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) mandates that all

terms of supervised release run concurrently, those terms

merge into a unitary whole. Accordingly, under his reading,

in this case the district court could have imposed a

postrevocation supervised release term of no more than nine

months, the difference between his concurrent terms of

supervised release (thirty-six months) and the sum of

postrevocation terms of imprisonment imposed on both

counts (twenty-seven months).

But nothing in the text of § 3624(e) or any other relevant

statute demands this merger of counts for purposes of

calculating the appropriate postrevocation term of supervised

release. Terms of imprisonment and terms of supervised

release attach to particular counts of conviction, not to the

combination of all counts. See Johnson v. United States,

529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (holding that § 3583(h), added by

statute after Johnson’s offense of conviction, could not apply

retroactively because “postrevocation penalties relate to the

original offense.”). Thus, with respect to a particular count

of conviction, a defendant may not be ordered to serve a term

of supervised release longer than the maximum term the

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12 UNITED STATES V. HERTLER

district court could have imposed on that count, less any

postrevocation prison time imposed on that count.

Although Knight did not address the particular question

at issue here, both that decision and the circuit cases it

followed support this conclusion. One of the cases we cited

in Knight, United States v. Merced, clearly explained why a

sentencing court must aggregate all postrevocation terms of

imprisonment related to a particular offense in calculating the

available term of supervised release. As the Second Circuit

observed, the contrary result “would permit an endless cycle

of consecutive terms of imprisonment and supervised release

based on a single underlying offense, a result that Congress

gave no indication whatsoever of intending.” United States

v. Merced, 263 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curium)

(emphasis added). Thus, in Merced as in Knight, the concern

was avoiding a scheme that would permit sentencing courts

to avoid ever exhausting the statutory maximum sentence

otherwise applicable to a particular offense. Achieving that

goal does not require aggregating the terms of imprisonment

for all counts of conviction; and, as the language in Merced

makes clear, in reaching its conclusion, the Merced court

assumed that terms of supervised release would be tied to

individual offenses. See also United States v. Mazarky,

499 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Merced’s

reasoning and reference to a “single underlying offense”);

Maxwell, 285 F.3d at 341 (expressing concern that if a

sentencing court failed to aggregate postrevocation sentences,

a defendant “could be sentenced to a term of supervised

release that exceeded the statutory maximum term of

supervised release authorized for the original offense.”). In

other words, the scheme established by Congress is countspecific.

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UNITED STATES V. HERTLER 13

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that the text

of § 3583(h) and the structure of § 3583 support the

government’s argument that “any term of imprisonment”

means any “terms of imprisonment imposed with respect to

the same underlying offense.” Zoran, 682 F.3d at 1064.

B

Hertler finally argues that the rule of lenity requires that

we interpret § 3583(h) in his favor. We disagree. The rule of

lenity is a rule of statutory construction that instructs that,

where a statute is ambiguous, courts should not interpret the

statute “so as to increase the penalty that it places on” the

defendant. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342

(1981). “The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity,

however, is not sufficient to warrant application of [the] rule,

for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.” Muscarello

v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998). Rather, “[t]he

rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from

which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a guess

as to what Congress intended.” Id. (internal alterations and

quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson, 529 U.S. at 713

n. 13 (“Lenity applies only when the equipoise of competing

reasons cannot otherwise be resolved.”). In other words, the

rule only applies where “a reasonable doubt persists about a

statute’s intended scope even after resort to the language and

structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the

statute.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, § 3583’s text and

structure allow us to conclude that the most reasonable

interpretation of § 3583(h) is the one advanced by the

government. In sum, there is no “grievous ambiguity,”

Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139, and no “reasonable doubt

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14 UNITED STATES V. HERTLER

persists” regarding our construction, Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108.

Accordingly, we reject Hertler’s rule of lenity argument.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hertler’s

postrevocation sentence of twenty months of supervised

release.

AFFIRMED.

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