Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07045/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07045-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee
Shelia Winsett
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SHELIA WINSETT,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7045

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 12-2824, Judge Robert N. Davis.

---------------------------------------------------------

SHELIA WINSETT,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7046

______________________ 

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 1 Filed: 05/11/2015
2 WINSETT v. MCDONALD

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 12-2664, Judge William A. Moorman.

______________________ 

Decided: May 11, 2015

______________________ 

SHELIA WINSETT, Parrish, AL, pro se. 

AMANDA TANTUM, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., MARTIN F.

HOCKEY, JR.; DAVID J. BARRANS, AMANDA BLACKMON, 

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

 ______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Shelia Winsett appeals from two decisions of the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the 

Veterans Court). Both decisions arise out of Ms. Winsett’s

long-standing efforts through multiple litigations to 

obtain benefits as the alleged surviving spouse of veteran 

Gary W. Jacks. 

Ms. Winsett appeals: (i) the Veterans Court decision 

affirming the regional office’s conclusion that it did not 

have jurisdiction to entertain her attempts to reopen a 

claim that was pending appeal, Winsett v. Gibson, No. 12-

2824, 2014 WL 2766622 (Vet. App. June 19, 2014) (“June 

2014 Decision”); and, (ii) the Veterans Court order denying her motion to recall the mandate and rescind its 

earlier November 1, 2012 order, that order having denied 

her petition for mandamus and imposed sanctions for 

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 2 Filed: 05/11/2015
WINSETT v. MCDONALD 3

frivolous filings, Winsett v. McDonald, No. 12-2664, 2014 

WL 6968093 (Vet. App. Dec. 9, 2014) (“December 2014 

Order”). 

We consolidate these two cases for purposes of appeal. 

Fed. Cir. R. 3(b)(2). For the reasons that follow, we affirm 

the June 2014 Decision. And because we conclude that 

Ms. Winsett failed to sufficiently raise any legal issues to 

invoke our jurisdiction with respect to the December 2014 

Order, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Jacks and Ms. Winsett were married in 1969 and 

divorced in 1977. After Mr. Jacks died in 1989, Ms. 

Winsett filed successive surviving spouse claims before a 

regional office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(DVA). Ms. Winsett’s successive claims at the RO have 

resulted in eleven prior appeals to this court. See Winsett 

v. Shinseki, 549 F. App’x 998, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). Despite Ms. Winsett’s repeated attempts, to 

date she has yet to succeed on the underlying merits of 

her case.

The procedural history of Ms. Winsett’s cases is well 

chronicled in our prior opinions. See, e.g., id. at 999–

1001; Winsett v. Shinseki, 527 F. App’x 965, 966–68 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013). A concise background of this history is nonetheless necessary to provide context to the facts relevant 

to the present appeals. 

Ms. Winsett’s first relevant claim was denied because 

the RO found that she did not qualify as Mr. Jacks’ surviving spouse. According to Ms. Winsett, even though she 

and Mr. Jacks divorced in 1977, they had maintained a 

common law marriage until Mr. Jacks’ death. See Winsett 

v. Nicholson, 25 Vet. App. 114 (2007). The RO found 

otherwise, and after appeals to the Board and Veterans 

Court, this court affirmed the decision in July 2008. 

Winsett v. Peake, 283 F. App’x 796, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 3 Filed: 05/11/2015
4 WINSETT v. MCDONALD

By then, Ms. Winsett had already filed a second surviving spouse claim with the RO. Although the Board 

recognized the first claim was still on appeal, it reopened 

her case after determining she had presented new and 

material evidence. The Board then denied her second 

claim on the merits. The Veterans Court affirmed, and 

we found no error with that decision. Winsett v. Shinseki, 

397 F. App’x 627, 629 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

Ms. Winsett later filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging that a misstatement regarding the status of 

her case in the Veterans Appeals Control and Locator 

System (VACOLS) prevented the court from rendering a 

fair and just decision regarding her second claim. The 

Veterans Court found that the misstatement had no 

bearing on the merits of its prior decision and denied her 

petition. Winsett v. Shinseki, No. 12-2664, 2012 WL 

5360974 (Vet. App. Nov. 1, 2012). Moreover, noting that a 

prior order had explained to Ms. Winsett that her appellate rights with respect to her first claim had been exhausted, the Veterans Court imposed sanctions “in light 

of the voluminous, repetitive, and frivolous filings . . . 

both in this case and in the past.” Id. at *7. Those sanctions prohibited Ms. Winsett from making additional 

filings without first filing a motion to seek permission and 

paying a $50 filing fee. Id. at *8. The order denying her 

petition and imposing sanctions (the November 2012 

Order) was subsequently appealed to this court, and we 

affirmed. Winsett v. Shinseki, 549 F. App’x 998, 999 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013). 

The presently appealed December 2014 Order stems 

from this November 2012 Order. Specifically, after this 

court’s affirmance, Ms. Winsett moved for leave to file a 

motion to recall the Veterans Court’s mandate and rescind the November 2012 Order. The Veterans Court 

reiterated that the misstatement in VACOLS was irrelevant to the merits of her underlying claim and denied the 

motion. See December 2014 Order, 2014 WL 6968093, at 

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 4 Filed: 05/11/2015
WINSETT v. MCDONALD 5

*3. In addition, the Veterans Court found no basis to 

rescind the sanctions order, finding that Ms. Winsett’s 

repeated filings in multiple cases on the same issue 

warranted sanctions. Id. 

While the second claim was on appeal, Ms. Winsett 

filed a third claim with the RO in 2009 (March 2009 

claim). That claim was initially denied, and then later 

closed after the RO determined it lacked jurisdiction. See 

Winsett v. Shinseki, No. 12-1572, 2012 WL 3554585, at *1 

(Vet. App. Aug. 20, 2012). Specifically, the RO determined it did not have jurisdiction because the third claim 

was identical to the second claim, which was thenpending appeal. Id. Ms. Winsett then filed a petition for 

writ of mandamus in the Veterans Court, alleging that 

the RO violated her constitutional rights when it closed 

the March 2009 claim. The Veterans Court denied her 

petition and we affirmed her appeal of that denial. Winsett, 527 F. App’x at 968–69. 

The current appeal of the June 2014 Decision is an 

off-shoot of the third claim. In addition to her mandamus 

petition challenging the closure of the March 2009 claim, 

Ms. Winsett also filed a claim to reopen that same claim. 

The RO denied her claim to reopen and she subsequently 

appealed to the Board, and then the Veterans Court, 

which both affirmed that denial. See June 2014 Decision, 

2014 WL 2766622, at *2–4. Ms. Winsett now argues the 

Veterans Court erred in the June 2014 Decision because 

it failed to recognize that she was raising a new claim—

which she calls an “abused widow” claim—distinct from 

the then-pending surviving spouse claims. 

II. DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Guillory v. Shinseki, 603 F.3d 

981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction over “all 

relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). 

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 5 Filed: 05/11/2015
6 WINSETT v. MCDONALD

We lack jurisdiction over any “challenge to a factual 

determination” or “challenge to a law or regulation as 

applied to the facts of a particular case” absent a constitutional issue. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). We set aside a 

Veterans Court decision only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law. . . .” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1)(A).

A 

With respect to the June 2014 Decision, Ms. Winsett 

argues that the Veterans Court erred in determining that 

the Board properly dismissed her “abused widow” claim.1 

The Board, as affirmed by the Veterans Court, found that 

Ms. Winsett’s “abused widow” claim was duplicative of 

her previously filed surviving spouse claim. Accordingly, 

the Veterans Court determined that the RO lacked jurisdiction to render a decision regarding the “abused widow” 

claim.

Ms. Winsett’s chief argument on appeal is that her 

“abused widow” claim is legally distinct from her claim for 

surviving spouse status. Because, in her view, the claims 

are different, the RO had jurisdiction to decide the merits, 

and the Board decision to dismiss her latest claim was in 

error. In essence, Ms. Winsett complains that she has not 

yet had the opportunity to litigate her “abused widow” 

claim. 

The government responds that Ms. Winsett misunderstands the law in this area. According to the government, the fact of abuse does not give rise to a claim itself, 

but rather may be a factual consideration when determining whether a claimant qualifies for surviving spouse 

1 To the extent that Ms. Winsett actually seeks to 

challenge the closure of her March 2009 claim, this court 

has already decided the merits of that claim. See Winsett, 

527 F. App’x 965.

 

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 6 Filed: 05/11/2015
WINSETT v. MCDONALD 7

benefits. Specifically, the statute governing entitlement 

to surviving spouse benefits requires that a claimant 

must (1) be the spouse of the veteran at the time of death 

and (2) have lived continuously with the veteran until the 

time of death. 38 U.S.C. § 101(3). The government contends that the fact of abuse merely provides an exception 

to the requirement that a widow satisfy the second requirement. Id. The government concludes that Ms. 

Winsett’s so-called “abused widow” claim is thus not a 

separate cognizable legal claim. Moreover, the government explains that this abuse allegation was raised and 

considered by the Board in a prior decision. The Board 

nonetheless found no valid marriage because Ms. Winsett 

failed to prove that she was Mr. Jacks’ spouse at the time 

of his death as required under the statute.

We agree with the government. As an initial matter, 

we have jurisdiction over the purely legal question of 

whether there exists a stand-alone legal claim relating to 

Ms. Winsett’s claim of abuse. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). We 

find that it does not. As the government properly notes, 

any “misconduct” by the veteran may be taken into account when considering whether the spouse lived continuously with the veteran from marriage until death: 

The term “surviving spouse” means (except for 

purposes of chapter 19 of this title) a person of the 

opposite sex who was the spouse of a veteran at 

the time of the veteran’s death, and who lived 

with the veteran continuously from the date of 

marriage to the date of the veteran’s death (except 

where there was a separation which was due to 

the misconduct of, or procured by, the veteran 

without the fault of the spouse) . . . . 

38 U.S.C. § 101(3). Her current claim is no different in 

character from her surviving spouse claim. Accordingly, 

the Veterans Court’s June 2014 Decision correctly determined that her claim was properly dismissed.

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 7 Filed: 05/11/2015
8 WINSETT v. MCDONALD

Ms. Winsett also makes the constitutional claim that 

her Fifth Amendment right to due process has been

violated because: (i) no statement of the case was issued 

with respect to her dismissed “abused widow” claim; and 

(ii) the RO is not allowing her claim to proceed on the 

merits. Ms. Winsett contends that the latter also constitutes a violation of her First Amendment right to an 

appeal. 

We find these claims likewise without merit. As the 

Veterans Court pointed out, because the RO lacked jurisdiction to consider Ms. Winsett’s “abused widow” claim to 

begin with, it did not need to issue a statement of the 

case. See June 2014 Decision, 2014 WL 2766622, at *2. 

Ms. Winsett’s other argument fails for the reason that her 

claims have been heard and considered as part of her 

surviving spouse claims. Id. And to the extent her First 

Amendment claim is separate from her Fifth Amendment 

claim, it is constitutional in name only and does not 

invoke this court’s jurisdiction. See Helfer v. West, 174 

F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

We have considered Ms. Winsett’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the 

foregoing reasons, we affirm the Veterans Court’s June 

2014 Decision.

B 

With respect to the December 2014 Order, Ms. Winsett argues that the Veterans Court improperly denied 

her motion to recall the Veterans Court’s mandate and 

rescind its November 1, 2012 order denying her petition 

for mandamus and imposing sanctions. While the Veterans Court has the authority to recall a prior mandate, it 

does so only in “extraordinary circumstances.” McNaron 

v. W., 12 Vet. App. 334, 336 (1999) (quoting Calderon v. 

Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 550 (1998)). Such discretion 

“should be exercised sparingly, and only upon a showing 

of exceptional circumstances.” Serra v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. 

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 8 Filed: 05/11/2015
WINSETT v. MCDONALD 9

App. 268, 271 (2005) (quoting Boston and Me. Corp. v. 

Town of Hampton, 7 F.3d 281, 283 (1st Cir. 1993)). Here, 

Ms. Winsett challenges the Veterans Court’s determination that the misstatement in VACOLS was not relevant 

to the underlying merits of Ms. Winsett’s claims and thus 

did not warrant recall of the mandate. This court has 

already considered this issue. Winsett, 549 F. App’x at 

1000–01. And to the extent that Ms. Winsett raises new 

factual bases for challenging the Veterans Court’s determination, we do not have jurisdiction to review such 

questions. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

We have considered Ms. Winsett’s remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. Accordingly, 

we dismiss Ms. Winsett’s challenge to the December 2014 

Order for lack of jurisdiction. 

C 

Having access to the courts to vindicate one’s legal 

rights is a hallmark of our judicial system. Yet given Ms. 

Winsett’s litigation history, we caution that any further 

appeals re-challenging issues decided here, or in any of 

this court’s prior eleven decisions, may subject her to 

sanctions. Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure provides that “[i]f a court of appeals shall 

determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just 

damages and single or double costs to the appellee.” This 

is because “[a] frivolous appeal imposes costs not only 

upon the party forced to defend it, but also upon the 

public whose taxes supporting this court and its staff are 

wasted on frivolous appeals.” Finch v. Hughes Aircraft 

Co., 926 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

We also note that this court’s authority to allow petitioners to proceed in forma pauperis is discretionary in 

nature. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). While we recognize the 

importance of making such petitions available to pro se 

litigants, “[i]t is vital that the right to file in forma pauperis not be incumbered by those who would abuse the 

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 9 Filed: 05/11/2015
10 WINSETT v. MCDONALD

integrity of our process by frivolous filings.” Zatko v. 

California, 502 U.S. 16 (1991) (per curiam) (quoting In re 

Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 13 (1991)) (quotation 

marks omitted). Given Ms. Winsett’s repetitive filings at 

this court and the below tribunals, we advise that any 

additional applications to proceed in forma pauperis

should be subject to additional scrutiny or, in the alternative, subject to an order to show cause why the petition for 

review should not be dismissed as frivolous. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Veterans 

Court’s June 2014 Decision, 2014 WL 2766622, and 

dismiss Ms. Winsett’s appeal with respect to the December 2014 Order, 2014 WL 6968093, for lack of jurisdiction.

Appeal no. 2015-7045 is AFFIRMED

Appeal no. 2015-7046 is DISMISSED

Case: 15-7045 Document: 24-2 Page: 10 Filed: 05/11/2015