Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cr-00107/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cr-00107-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ruben Gonzales
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

Also pending are two additional Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 53 and 90) which will be

addressed by separate Report and Recommendation. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

Ruben Gonzales, 

Defendant. ______________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CR 10-107-TUC-FRZ (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss - Due Process/Double Jeopardy

Violation (Doc. 89) filed on behalf of Defendant Ruben Gonzales.1

 The motion was referred

to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Marshall for hearing and report and recommendation.

Defendant's motion was heard by Magistrate Judge Marshall on January 10, 2011. Having

considered the motion and the arguments of counsel, the Magistrate Judge submits the

following Report and Recommendation, and recommends that the District Judge, after

independent review of the record, grant the Motion to Dismiss. 

I. Factual Background

This case arises from proceedings before District Judge Roll and Magistrate Judge

Edmonds in CR 09-1411-TUC-JMR (GEE). In that case, Gerardo Benito Ramirez is charged

with multiple counts of juvenile delinquency, including the first degree murder of Gabriel

Friar. Defendant Gonzalez is a material witness to the murder and was subpoenaed to appear

before the grand jury on September 2, 2009, but informed the government that he did not

Case 4:10-cr-00107-FRZ-JR Document 114 Filed 01/24/11 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

intend to testify in the grand jury because he feared retaliation. CR 09-1411-TUCJMR(GEE), Docs. 45 (Warrant) and 65 (Affidavit of Craig Roos). The government

postponed the grand jury so that Defendant Gonzalez could consult counsel. On September

29, 2009, the government also sought and obtained an order that Gonzalez testify before the

grand jury. CR 10-107-TUC-FRZ (JM), Doc. 76-2. 

After agents were unable to locate Defendant Gonzalez, on December 1, 2009,

Magistrate Judge Edmonds issued a material witness arrest warrant for Defendant and

ordered that he be held without bond pending appearance before the grand jury scheduled for

December 18, 2009. Id., Doc. 45. On December 16, 2009, Defendant Gonzalez was arrested

in Tucson and subsequently appeared before the grand jury on December 18, 2009. After

refusing to testify, Magistrate Judge Edmonds informed Defendant Gonzalez that he had

been given a grant of immunity and no longer could refuse to testify. CR 10-107-TUC-FRZ

(JM), Doc. 76-1. Defendant Gonzalez persisted in his refusal and Judge Edmonds ordered

him detained. In doing so, Judge Edmonds overruled arguments of Gonzalez’s counsel that

he could not be detained because he had fulfilled his obligations under the material arrest

warrant by appearing before the grand jury and that a District Judge was required to order

he be held in contempt for refusing to testify. Id. 

On December 23, 2009, Defendant Gonzalez’s counsel appeared before Judge Roll

after filing an emergency motion. Id., Doc. 93-5. Counsel again argued that Defendant

Gonzalez was being improperly held under the material witness warrant which expired on

December 18, 2009. Id., p. 6. Judge Roll determined that because an indictment had been

issued by the grand jury in the Ramirez case, Defendant Gonzalez could no longer be held

on the material witness warrant and therefore ordered that he be released. Id., pp. 14-17. 

On December 24, 2009, the Government filed a Motion for a Material Witness Arrest

Warrant for Defendant, CR 09-1411-TUC-JMR (GEE), Doc. 63, which was denied by

Magistrate Judge Velasco by order dated that same day, id., Doc. 64. 

Case 4:10-cr-00107-FRZ-JR Document 114 Filed 01/24/11 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

By Complaint (Doc. 1) filed December 23, 2009, and Indictment (Doc. 9) returned on

January 13, 2010, the instant matter was initiated and Defendant was charged with one count

of criminal contempt in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). By Superseding Indictment issued

on May 5, 2010, a second count was added. Doc. 38. Count One of the Superseding

Indictment alleges that Defendant Gonzalez disobeyed Magistrate Judge Edmonds’ order by

refusing to answer questions before the grand jury on December 18, 2009, with respect to the

facts and circumstances of the murder of Gabriel Frias. Count Two alleges that Defendant

also violated Judge Bury’s September 29, 2009 order to testify. Id. 

II. Discussion

In United States v. Doe, 125 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit reiterated the

rule that:

[W]hen a district court summarily holds a defendant in civil

contempt for refusing to answer questions at the command of the

court, in order also to prosecute criminally, a warning must be

given that criminal penalties in addition to the civil contempt

measures might be imposed for failing to answer. See

Daschbach v. United States, 254 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1958);

Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1955).

Id. at 1255. Defendant Gonzalez argues that this rule was violated in this case. His argument

is that, after refusing to testify before the grand jury on December 18, 2009, he was returned

to Magistrate Judge Edmonds courtroom where he was taken into custody for summary

contempt. As such, Gonzalez contends he was entitled to, and was not given, a warning that

criminal penalties in addition to the civil contempt measures might be imposed. Doc. 89, pp.

2-5.

In response, the government contends that Defendant’s position is based on a factual

inaccuracy. “A review of the record in this case,” the government asserts, “will show that

defendant was never subject to coercive civil contempt. Rather, defendant was bing held on

a material witness warrant and was then charged by information with criminal contempt.”

Doc. 99, pp. 1-2. 

Case 4:10-cr-00107-FRZ-JR Document 114 Filed 01/24/11 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

A review of the record in this case is not as clearly dispositive as the government

contends. Turning first to the December 18, 2009 hearing before Judge Edmonds, the

transcript does not expressly reveal the legal basis for the Defendants continued detention.

However, at the hearing the government argued that because Defendant Gonzalez had been

granted immunity, “there is no basis for him to refuse to testify. And I would ask this court

to direct him to testify and if he continues to refuse to do so that he be held in contempt in

jail.” CR 10-107-TUC-FRZ (JM), Doc. 76-1, p. 3. Later, Judge Edmonds asks Gonzalez’s

then counsel, Jeffery Bartolino, if he has advised his client of the possible consequences of

a refusal to testify, to which he responds:

That he could be incarcerated. It’s my understanding that the

could be – it’s not a criminal contempt under the statute under

[18 U.S.C. §] 401, I believe, but that he could be incarcerated

until the body that is investigating this crime – either testifies

pursuant to that order or the body that is investigating the crime

dissolves. That’s my understanding of the possible

incarceration.

Id. at p. 5. The judge then concluded that Gonzalez’s stated intention to refuse to answer

questions from the grand jury was insufficient to find that he had actually refused and

therefore, before proceeding, directed that Gonzalez again be taken before the grand jury and

actually refuse to answer questions. The judge then asked government’s counsel if he agreed

that Defendant’s refusal to testify would constitute civil contempt, to which he responded,

“I don’t know. I’ve asked my colleague to go research it right now. Hopefully I’ll have an

answer by the time we come back.” Id. at pp. 7-8. Judge Edmonds, without describing the

potential penalties previously outlined by defense counsel, confirmed with Gonzalez that he

understood the possible consequences of refusing to testify. Id. at p. 8. The judge then

stated, “I think this may have to go up to Judge Bury for him to issue any contempt order or

any contempt sanctions,” and again reminded Gonzalez that his refusal to testify may result

in “some court sanctions . . . .” Id. at pp. 10-11. 

After Defendant Gonzalez was returned to the grand jury and again refused to testify,

the parties reconvened before Judge Edmonds. Government counsel informed Judge

Case 4:10-cr-00107-FRZ-JR Document 114 Filed 01/24/11 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Edmonds of Gonzalez’s continued refusal to testify, reminded her of the signed immunity

order, and Judge Edmonds stated, “Then what I will do , I will remand Mr. Gonzales [sic]

to the custody of the U.S. Marshal service.” Id. at 14. The judge then indicated to

government counsel that his options were to “file a motion or . . . convene a grand jury and

do whatever you need to do.” Id. at p. 15. The court then noted that it was without

jurisdiction to enter a civil contempt order, and defense counsel proceeded to argue that his

client had complied with the material witness warrant by appearing and requested that the

court order the prosecutor to have a Title [sic] 3 judge make some kind of determination

today to whether there was an order for which he can be held in contempt and which he

would be subject to being incarcerated . . . .” Id. at pp. 16-17. Defense counsel’s objections

were overruled. Id. at p. 16.

The following week Bartolino filed an “emergency motion” which was heard by

Judge Roll on December 23, 2009. CR 10-107-TUC-FRZ (JM), Doc. 93-5 (transcript).

Defense counsel argued that Defendant Gonzalez had satisfied the requirements of the

material witness warrant, but that the judge “ordered him to be continued to be held on the

material witness warrant . . . .” Id. at p. 4. In response, government counsel informed the

court that he did not “recall Judge Edmonds saying that [Gonzalez] was being detained under

the authority of the material witness arrest warrant,” but that, “the best thing I can conclude

is that Judge Edmonds, what she meant to do was hold him under summary contempt, and

that was the basis for his detention.” Id. at p. 8. Counsel then identified 18 U.S.C. § 401 as

an available basis for Judge Edmonds’ finding of summary contempt and the order of

detention. Id. at pp. 9-10. After further argument, Judge Roll indicated that he was “not

convinced or satisfied” that Judge Edmonds had held Gonzalez in summary contempt and

ordered Gonzalez released. Id. at p. 14.

Gonzalez argues that because the government argued before Judge Roll, and to a

lesser extent before Judge Edmonds, that after December 18, 2009, the basis for Gonzalez’s

detention was summary contempt, it should now be estopped from arguing otherwise.

Case 4:10-cr-00107-FRZ-JR Document 114 Filed 01/24/11 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party form gaining an advantage

by asserting one position, and then later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent

position.” Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2001).

Judicial estoppel is intended “not only to prevent a party from gaining an advantage by taking

inconsistent petitions, but also because of ‘general consideration[s] of the orderly

administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings,’ and to ‘protect

against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts.’” Id. (quoting Russell v. Rolfs, 893

F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

The Supreme Court has identified three non-exclusive factors that may be considered

when determining whether judicial estoppel is appropriate: (1) whether the party’s later

position is “clearly inconsistent” with an earlier position; (2) the party’s success in

persuading a court to accept an earlier inconsistent position and (3) “whether the party

seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an

unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.

742, 750-51 (2001). These factors are not “inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula

for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel. Additional considerations may inform

the doctrine’s application in specific factual contexts.” Id. at 751.

Applying these factors in the instant case makes for a strong, but not perfect, case for

the application of judicial estoppel. The government’s position in opposing the instant

motion is clearly inconsistent with its position at the hearing before Judge Roll. As set out

above, during that hearing government counsel informed the court that he did not recall

Judge Edmonds saying that Gonzalez was being detained under the authority of the material

witness arrest warrant and indicated that his belief was that she intended to detain him under

summary contempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401. In contrast, in its opposition to the instant

motion, the government expressly states the Gonzalez “was being held on a material witness

warrant and was then charged by information with criminal contempt.” These two arguments

cannot be reconciled and are clearly inconsistent. 

Case 4:10-cr-00107-FRZ-JR Document 114 Filed 01/24/11 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

The second factor is not satisfied. The government was not successful in persuading

Judge Roll to accept its argument that Defendant Gonzalez was detained on the basis of

summary contempt. Judge Roll expressly stated that he was “not convinced or satisfied” that

Judge Edmonds detained Gonzalez on the basis of summary contempt.

The third factor is satisfied. If the government is permitted to now argue that

Gonzalez was held by Judge Edmonds based on the material witness warrant, Gonzalez

would not be entitled to the warnings described in Doe, Daschbach, and Yates. Under the

circumstances, allowing the government to change its theory to avoid the obligation to

provide the required warnings would be unfair to Gonzalez. Without the warnings, Gonzalez

was not aware of the full panoply of potential penalties he faced by refusing to testify.

Allowing the government to avoid the requirements of due process by simply

recharacterizing its arguments certainly amounts to an unfair detriment supporting the

application of judicial estoppel. 

Thus, although the government did not persuade Judge Roll to adopt its position that

Gonzalez had been held on summary contempt, and because the factors of judicial estoppel

are not “inflexible prerequisites,” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 751, the Court finds

that this case is appropriate for the application of judicial estoppel. Simply put, the

government cannot now change its position simply because it would be expedient to do so.

There is an additional reason for concluding that Defendant Gonzalez was not being

held on the material witness warrant and was therefore entitled to a warning that he might

be subject to criminal contempt charges. As Judge Roll concluded, relying on 18 U.S.C. §

1826, Gonzalez could be held on the material witness warrant only so long as the life of the

court proceeding or the term of the grand jury. CR 10-107-TUC-FRZ (JM), Doc. 93-5

(transcript), p. 12. The grand jury for which the warrant was issued returned an indictment

against the target defendant on December 18, 2009. At the December 23, 2009 hearing,

Judge Roll confirmed with the government that it would not seek a superseding indictment.

Accordingly, the court proceeding for which Defendant Gonzalez was being held had

Case 4:10-cr-00107-FRZ-JR Document 114 Filed 01/24/11 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

terminated and he could no longer be held to testify. As such, the only remaining basis for

Defendant Gonzalez’s detention was civil contempt. Since this was the case, he was entitled

to the warning warnings described in Doe, Daschbach, and Yates.

III. Recommendation 

Based on the foregoing and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule Civil

72.2(a)(1), Rules of Practice of the United States District Court, District of Arizona, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the

record, GRANT Defendant Ruben Gonzales’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 89).

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy

of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to

the objections. If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CR

10-107-TUC-FRZ. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc).

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation

to the respective parties and/or their counsel.

DATED this 21st day of January, 2011.

Case 4:10-cr-00107-FRZ-JR Document 114 Filed 01/24/11 Page 8 of 8