Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05794/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05794-15/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Caymas Systems, Inc.
Defendant
Abiodun M. Sodipo
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABIODUN M. SODIPO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CAYMAS SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-05794 CRB

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

In this employment discrimination case, Abiodun Sodipo (“Plaintiff”) claims that his

former employer, Caymas Systems, Inc. (“Defendant”), discriminated against him on the

basis of his race and national origin, and then retaliated against him after he complained of

such discrimination. Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is hereby GRANTED. For

the same reasons, Plaintiff’s most recent request for injunctive relief must be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Defendant is, or was, a technology company located in Silicon Valley. The nature of

its business is described in the record as follows: “The company delivers a highly scalable

product family of low-cost, high-performance ‘Web Platforms’ for the Internet and Intranet

data centers of Enterprise and Service Provider customers.” Weiseth Decl., Ex. E, at 1. As

//

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this description of the company suggests, many of its employees are required to have

technical or scientific skills. Id.

Plaintiff is a black man and a citizen of Nigeria. He is well-educated and possesses

“the equivalent of a Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, along with several

years of related professional experience in technical support and networking.” Id. He came

to the United States several years ago on H-1B Visa, which permits an alien to work in the

United States for a particular employer and for a certain period of time. See 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(B). To obtain an H-1B Visa, an employer must petition the federal

government on behalf of an alien whom it has hired. Initially, in October of 2000, Plaintiff

received his H-1B Visa through a petition submitted by an employer called VPNET

Technologies. This petition authorized Plaintiff to work in the country for a period of three

years. Weiseth Decl., Ex. C. Before this word authorization expired, Plaintiff accepted a

new job at a company called AEKO Consulting, which arranged for an extension of

Plaintiff’s H-1B Visa until August of 2005. Weiseth Decl., Ex. D.

In August of 2004, Plaintiff accepted a new position with Defendant. The title of his

new position was “Technical Support Engineer.” Weiseth Decl., Ex. B, at 1. Again, because

Plaintiff was a foreign national, Defendant was required under federal immigration laws to

seek authorization specifically for his employment with a new employer. Defendant’s

lawyers petitioned the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) for an

extension of Plaintiff’s H-1B Visa in September of 2004. Weiseth Decl., Ex. E, at 1-2. In

November of 2004, USCIS granted the petition and extended the H-1B Visa to permit

Plaintiff to work in the country until September, 30, 2006. 

Plaintiff claims that he experienced discriminatory treatment during his employment

with Defendant. First, he claims that Defendant provided more favorable treatment to other

colleagues in the processing of immigration paperwork. Second, he claims that Defendant

denied him access to his computer when he took a leave of absence from the company for

medical reasons. Third, he claims that Defendant accommodated the request of another

similarly situated employee to transfer from one corporate office to another, but denied

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Plaintiff an identical transfer. Plaintiff argues that all of these were acts of discrimination,

done by his employer out of animus toward Plaintiff because of his race and national origin. 

At the end of November of 2005, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission to protest these actions. Weiseth Decl. Ex. Q; Fine Decl. Ex. A;

Fine Decl. Ex. B. The EEOC eventually dismissed Plaintiff’s grievance. The agency first

concluded that Plaintiff had “failed to provide information, failed to appear or be available

for interview/conferences, or otherwise failed to cooperate to the extent that it was not

possible to resolve [his] charge.” Fine Decl., Ex. C, at 1. The agency also concluded that the

evidence presented in the administrative proceeding was insufficient to “establish[]

violations of the statutes.” Id.

In February of 2006, while Plaintiff’s administrative complaint was pending,

Defendant fired him. On the same day, Defendant also fired eight other employees as part of

a company-wide “expense reduction plan.” See Weiseth Decl., Ex. S, at 1-3. According to

minutes from a contemporaneous meeting by the company’s Board of Directors, the

company reduced its workforce to sixty full-time employees, reduced the CEO’s salary by

half, terminated some of its research and development contracts, and eliminated other costs

related to public relations, finance, technology, and overhead from office leases. Id. at 3. 

After terminating Plaintiff, the company notified USCIS that it wished “to withdraw the H1B petition approved on his behalf.” Weiseth Decl., Ex. T, at 1. USCIS revoked Petitioner’s 

H-1B Visa shortly thereafter. Weiseth Decl., Ex. U.

In this lawsuit, Plaintiff renews his claims for discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff

filed his complaint on September 25, 2006. Five days later, on September 29, 2006, one day

before his H1-B Visa was originally scheduled to expire, Plaintiff filed a motion for a

preliminary injunction. He requested “injunctive relief immediately reinstating [him] to his

lawful work relationship with the defendant until the litigation of the case is completed as

well as requiring the defendant to file all . . . immigration petitions necessary for the plaintiff

to lawfully remain in the United States.” Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 1. 

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The Court agreed to hear Plaintiff’s motion on an expedited schedule. At the hearing,

the Court expressed doubt about “whether it even had authority to provide the relief that

Plaintiff [was seeking],” and questioned whether reinstatement was an appropriate remedy

“given the immigration regulations applicable to Plaintiff as a foreign worker and the parties’

dispute about whether Plaintiff currently has authorization to work in this country.” Sodipo

v. Caymas Sys., Inc., No. C-06-5794-CRB, 2006 WL 2850056, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2006). 

Regardless of the relief available, however, the Court denied the motion for an injunction,

holding that Plaintiff had “not established that there [were] ‘serious questions’ raised by his

complaint sufficient to outweigh any hardships that [might] tip in his favor” and had not

demonstrated a probability of “‘success on the merits.’” Id. at 2-3 (citing Ninth Circuit cases

on the standard for a preliminary injunction).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s denial of injunctive relief. Sodipo v. Caymas

Sys., Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 524, 2006 WL 3421276 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court

denied certiorari. Sodipo v. Caymas Sys., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2061 (2007). Now pending before

the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient

evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a

dispute is “material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A principal purpose of the

summary judgment procedure “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

//

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In ruling on a motion for summary judgment in the context of a discrimination claim

under Title VII, this Court uses the analytical framework established by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that burden-shifting

framework, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination, meaning that he must show (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2)

that he performed his work adequately, (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action,

and (4) that some other circumstance indicates a discriminatory motive, such as the more

favorable treatment of similarly qualified individuals. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); see also Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003);

Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000); Godwin v. Hunt Wesson,

Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). Once the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the

defendant must come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Leong, 347 F.3d at 1124; Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220. 

If the defendant articulates a legitimate justification for its treatment of the plaintiff, the

burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence to demonstrate that the

defendant’s putative justification is merely a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804; Leong, 347 F.3d at 1124; Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220.

The same “order and allocation of proof . . . also governs actions for retaliatory

discharge.” Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth

Circuit has described the burden-shifting framework in the context of retaliation claims as

follows:

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation, a plaintiff

must show that: (1) [he] engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2)

[his] employer subjected [him] to adverse employment action; (3) there was

a causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s action.

Causation sufficient to establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation may

be inferred from the proximity in time between the protected action and the

allegedly retaliatory discharge. Alternatively, the plaintiff can prove causation

by providing direct evidence of retaliatory motivation.

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production

shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for

the action. To satisfy this burden, the employer need only produce admissible

evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the

employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus.

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If the employer successfully rebuts the inference of retaliation that

arises from establishment of a prima facie case, then the burden shifts once

again to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered explanation is

merely a pretext for discrimination.

Id. at 731 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

For claims of discrimination, as well as claims of retaliation, the burden-shifting

framework disappears once a plaintiff demonstrates pretext, and then the only remaining

issue is “discrimination vel non.” See Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292

F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Although the burden of production shifts,

“[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Texas Dep’t of

Commty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

DISCUSSION

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s claims rest on four discrete incidents during which he

claims to have been the victim of discrimination or retaliation. First, he claims that

Defendant provided more favorable treatment to another employee in processing petitions for

foreign workers’ H-1B Visas. Second, he claims that Defendant wrongfully denied him

access to his laptop computer when he took a leave of absence for medical reasons. Third, he

claims that Defendant granted a request from a similarly situated worker to transfer from its

office in Petaluma to its office in San Jose, but denied Plaintiff’s identical request. Fourth,

he claims that Defendant fired him in retaliation for filing a discrimination complaint with

the EEOC. The Court concludes that none of Plaintiff’s claims can survive Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment.

I. Visas & Labor Certification

At the time of Plaintiff’s employment, Defendant’s work force included nationals of

several foreign countries. See Weiseth Decl. A (showing that Defendant employed workers

from Greece, China, India, Canada, and Nigeria). In connection with their employment of

foreign workers, Defendant used a law firm to obtain visas and submit “alien employment

certifications.”

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 Plaintiff’s perception of differential treatment apparently is due to the fact that, in certain

paperwork relating to applications for permanent residence, there was an indication that

Plaintiff’s and Palanisamy’s paperwork would be processed using the faster RIR method. See

Weiseth Decl. Ex. K. Plaintiff expressed concern to the human resources department about the

fact that his labor certification would be processed using the slower method. He was especially

concerned because his H1-B Visa was at an advanced “stage” and the delay in processing would

hamper his ability to obtain permanent residence. He expressed a “feeling of betrayal” that the

company had “treated [him] in such an underhand and discriminatory fashion.” Weiseth Decl.

Ex. J. The human resources department, after consulting its immigration experts, responded that

all of the employees had been processed “under the traditional method” because Caymas had not

conducted sufficient recruitment for their positions to use the RIR method. Weiseth Decl. Ex.

K; see also 20 C.F.R. § 656.21 (permitting faster processing of a labor certificate for foreign

workers where the employer has conducted open recruitment for the position for six months).

Plaintiff does not dispute the evidence indicating that the processing of his and

Palanisamy’s applications for labor certification was identical. Instead, he now suggests

Defendant subsequently filed a “labor certificate substitution” giving Palanisamy more favorable

treatment. Pl’s Opp. Br. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1, 8. In connection with the motion for

summary judgment, however, he has presented no admissible evidence to show that such a

substitution took place, and Defendant has insisted that it did not. See Fine Decl., Ex. G, at 6.

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Plaintiff claims that Defendant treated another employee, Thiru Palanisamy, more

favorably than it treated him in obtaining a labor certification. Specifically, Plaintiff

contends that Defendant filed documents that “would facilitate faster processing” for

Palanisamy than it did for him. Compl. at 2. His theory is that his application for a labor

certification was filed using the slower, “traditional” method, but that Palanisamy’s

application for labor certification was filed using the faster, “reduction in recruitment (RIR)”

method.

Even assuming that Plaintiff and Palanisamy are similarly situated for purposes of

their immigration paperwork, the evidence still precludes Plaintiff from establishing a prima

facie case with respect to the labor certification. The evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff

and Palanisamy were treated by Defendant exactly the same way. Defendant’s law firm filed

applications for labor certifications on behalf of both men using the “traditional” method. 

Weiseth Decl. Ex. A. Compare Weiseth Decl. Ex. G (Plaintiff’s application), with Weiseth

Decl. Ex. H (Palanisamy application). Because Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to show

that he has been subjected to less favorable treatment, much less to unfavorable treatment for

discriminatory reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be GRANTED as to

the question of labor certification.1

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II. Access to Facilities

On October 7, 2005, Plaintiff went to the emergency room to seek treatment for 

stress-related illness. Thereafter, he requested and was granted permission to take time off

until he could visit a doctor. Memar Decl. Ex. E. More than a week later, he visited a doctor

“for stress related to work circumstances and exhaustion.” Weiseth Decl., Ex. N, at 2. Due

to his poor health, Plaintiff took a leave of absence from his job for more than six weeks,

between October 18, 2005, and November 30, 2006. Weiseth Decl., Ex. N, at 3. During this

time, Defendant denied him access to work-related files on his laptop computer and refused

to allow him into the office. Plaintiff claims that the denial of access was discriminatory and

done in retaliation for his prior complaints, discussed above about Defendant’s putatively

discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis the application for labor certification.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff again has failed to establish a prima facie case on

his theory of discrimination, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that similarly situated

employees, i.e. employees given a medical leave of absence due to work-related stress, were

given access to the office or to work-related files on their laptop. (Plaintiff’s managers

assert, and Plaintiff does not deny, that he was given access to his personal files and

permitted to take them home with him. See Memar Decl. ¶ 11; Weiseth Decl. ¶ 18.) Indeed,

Plaintiff stated in his deposition that he was unaware of any other employees who had taken

leaves of absence due to work-related stress. Fine Decl., Ex. E, at 133. Because Plaintiff has

failed to present evidence of any disparate or unfavorable treatment as to similarly situated

individuals, he has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

As to Plaintiff’s theory of retaliation, the Court also concludes that Plaintiff’s claim

cannot survive summary judgment. In support of this theory, Plaintiff notes that he had

previously complained about his perception of unfavorable treatment in the processing of his

immigration paperwork and had threatened to take his complaint of “adverse treatment” to

“appropriate government authorities.” Weiseth Decl. Ex. M. (As noted above, the evidence

presented to the Court compels the conclusion there actually was no adverse or differential

treatment.) Plaintiff argues that his superiors banished him from the office and barred his

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access to his computer in retaliation for his previous complaints about the immigration

paperwork.

Plaintiff’s theory fails as a matter of law for two reasons. First, he suffered no

“adverse employment action.” Here, an employee took a six-week leave of absence because

work-related stress had detrimentally affected his health. Under such circumstances, it is not

an “adverse employment action” for an employer to keep the employee from continuing to

work. Plaintiff has not claimed that he suffered a deduction in pay, that he suffered a

demotion, or that he was prevented from completing his work upon his return to the

company. In short, Plaintiff has presented no allegations, and has submitted no evidence, to

suggest that the denial of access to Defendant’s facilities detrimentally affected the

conditions of his job. Nor, under the circumstances of the case, could a reasonable jury

conclude that Defendant’s decision to keep Plaintiff from working was “ reasonably likely to

deter [him] from complaining about discrimination in the workplace” when Plaintiff himself

had asked to stop working for six weeks. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, (9th Cir. 2000)

(reviewing cases and describing the Ninth Circuit’s broad standard for establishing an

“adverse employment action”). 

Second, even if the Court were to assume that Plaintiff had established a prima facie

case of retaliation, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the legitimate,

non-discriminatory justifications asserted by Defendant for its actions. Plaintiff’s supervisor

states that she denied Plaintiff access to his computer because “he needed to focus on his

health and not worry about work during his medical leave.” Memar Decl. ¶ 11. The

supervisor denied “access to the company’s laptop computer during his medical leave,”

permitted Plaintiff to “remove personal files from the laptop,” and “reassured [Plaintiff] that

the company would provide him with the time he needed to catch [up] upon his return from

leave.” Id. The manager of human resources did the same thing. Accord Weiseth Decl. ¶

19. Plaintiff has offered no direct evidence to suggest any retaliatory purpose behind his

supervisors’ actions. Nor, given the fact that he suffered no identifiable harm from the denial

of access during his leave of absence, could a reasonable jury conclude that there was one,

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 In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts that “the

defendant clearly link[ed] the retaliatory action to the protected activity by the plaintiff.” Pl’s

Opp. Br. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 7. He claims that his supervisor “had also stated that the

denial by the defendant of access to the company facilities and laptop while the plaintiff was on

FMLA Leave was in part due to the fact that the plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.” Id.

The record, however, contains no evidence to support Plaintiff’s allegation. Plaintiff refers to

an e-mail in which he purportedly communicated to the company’s CEO and his supervisor that

he had been explicitly told that he was denied access to Defendant’s facilities out of retaliation

for his complaints of discrimination. Id. Plaintiff has not produced a copy of this e-mail in

connection with the motion for summary judgment. Moreover, even if he had produced such

an e-mail, it would be insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Simply put, Plaintiff has

presented no admissible evidence from which a jury might be able to conclude that Plaintiff had

met his burden to rebut Defendant’s legitimate explanation for its conduct.

10

based merely upon the timing of the incident in connection with his previous complaints

about the immigration paperwork. In this regard, Plaintiff’s mere suggestion of retaliatory

conduct is insufficient to create a “genuine” issue of material fact as to the causal link

between his prior complaints and the denial of access to his work-related materials. Vasquez

v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646-47 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the “retaliatory” denial of access.2

III. Transfer Request

In “early 2005” Plaintiff requested to transfer from his office in Petaluma, California,

to an office in San Jose, California. Fine Decl., Ex. E, at 78-79. At the time, a number of

people in the company’s “development” department were relocating, and Plaintiff expressed

his desire to relocate, too. Id. His request was denied. According to Plaintiff, at the time he

made this first request, “there was no plan for people in support [such as Plaintiff] to go to

San Jose.” Fine Decl., Ex. F, at 205-06. Thus, technical support engineers such as Plaintiff

were all kept in Petaluma.

Sometime in the middle of 2005, Plaintiff’s colleague Thiru Palanisamy, also a

technical support engineer, requested and received a transfer to the San Jose office. Memar

Decl. ¶ 5 (indicating that Palanisamy was transferred in mid-April); Fine Decl., Ex. E, at 80

(indicating that Palanisamy was transferred in May or June). According to the department

supervisor who granted the transfer, Palanisamy’s request was approved “because there was

cubicle work space available for a Customer Service Department employee at that time.” 

Memar Decl. ¶ 5.

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Plaintiff renewed his request for a transfer after learning of Palanisamy’s transfer,

again in August of 2005, again in October of 2005 after he became ill. Memar Decl. ¶ 5;

Fine Decl., Ex E, at 80-81. As to this last request, Plaintiff had supported his request for a

transfer with a recommendation from his doctor that his health would benefit from working

in San Jose where he had family and friends. Weiseth Decl., Ex. N, at 2. All of Plaintiff’s

requests to transfer were denied. According to his supervisor, these requests initially were

denied, in the summer of 2005, because “cubicle space was unavailable” and because “when

[Plaintiff] made his request, the only open space in the San Jose office was reserved for a

position in the engineering department that the company was actively seeking to fill.” 

Memar Decl. ¶ 5. As to Plaintiff’s request for a transfer due to his medical illness, the

company “agreed to consider [Plaintiff’s] request when he returned to work from his medical

leave should space become available.” Weiseth Decl. ¶ 17. According to the human

resources department, Plaintiff refused to meet with investigators when he returned to work

because, by that point, he had already filed a complaint against Defendant and he “preferred

to take his complaints to the EEOC.” Weiseth Decl. ¶¶ 22, 24. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that he refused to meet with a mediator after returning from

his medical leave, though he asserts that “the proposed mediation process overseen by a party

paid for by the defendant would not [have been] a fair exercise.” Pl’s Opp. Br. to Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. He also does not provide any evidence to rebut the legitimate, 

non-discriminatory explanation for Defendant’s refusal to transfer him. To the contrary,

Plaintiff acknowledges that he has no basis for disputing it. See Fine Decl., Ex. E, at 210-11

(“Q. Did [your supervisor] explain what those constraints were? A. That there was not a

cubicle available that I would be able to move to. Q. Do you have any reason to disbelieve

what Mr. Memar told you about the unavailability of a cubicle for you? A. At that point in

time, I hadn’t been to [the] San Jose office, so I could not tell one way or the other, no, but

they did not give an indication of why Thiru could go and I couldn’t.”). 

On this record, the Court concludes that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination and retaliation vis-à-vis the denial of a transfer to San

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Jose. Plaintiff was hired to work at a position in the Petaluma office. Weiseth Decl., Ex. B,

at 1. The company considered his requests for a transfer and decided that, given its

resources, “[c]urrently the business and the job requirement [was] for [his] position to be in

Petaluma.” Memar Decl., Ex. F, at 1. At the time of his renewed request, Plaintiff seemingly

expressed appreciation for the courtesy extended to him by his supervisors. See also id. at 1

(“Thanks for your response and the subsequent explanation . . . that you would need some

time to be in a position to make a case for my working out of San Jose as well as expressing

an understanding that the move to San Jose would be beneficial to my health.”). On the

record described above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has presented inadequate evidence

for a reasonable jury to decide that the company’s legitimate reasons for denying his transfer

were pretextual, rather than non-discriminatory and legitimate. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646-47.

IV. Termination

Defendant is a company in dire financial straits. In February of 2006, the company’s

Board of Directors convened and agreed to an “expense reduction plan . . . , including the

headcount reduction described therein.” Weiseth Decl., Ex. S, at 1. The plan included the

termination of eight full-time employees; the termination of six research contractors; the

reduction of three positions from full-time to part-time; the reformation of certain

departments such as information technology and finance; a restructuring of the company’s

debt; a restructuring of the company’s leases; a reduction in the CEO’s salary by fifty

percent; and the elimination of certain public relations expenditures. Id. at 3. By the end of

the “expense reduction plan,” the company consisted of only sixty full-time employees.

Plaintiff was one of the nine employees ultimately terminated as a result of this plan. 

Weiseth Decl. ¶ 24. He was chosen to be fired following an evaluation process that

examined every employee’s “merit,” “versaility,” “seniority,” and “salary.” Weiseth Decl.,

Ex. R, at 1. The evidence indicates that Plaintiff received the lowest score for “merit” and

“versatility” in his department, as well as the lowest overall score. Id. According to

Defendant, because the company’s CEO had ordered one person to be fired from the

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 Since the initial reduction in force in February of 2006, things only got worse for

Defendant. According to the company’s director of human resources, in February of 2007

“Caymas notified all employees that they were being laid off effective immediately.” Weiseth

Decl. ¶ 29. The company gave its employees four hours “to gather their personal items” and

“closed its Petaluma and San Jose office.” Id. Thereafter, Defendant “transferred all of its assets

to a financial institution so that it can effect a plan of liquidation in the near future.” Id.

The fact that Defendant is no longer operating its business prompted Plaintiff to seek

immediate injunctive relief to keep the company from transferring its assets or shutting its doors.

He filed a “emergency request for [a] restraining order on defendant to prevent the dissolution

of the company or the transfer of [its] assets in a manner that would undermine injunctive relief

sought by [him].” Sodipo v. Caymas Sys., Inc., No. C-06-5734, at 3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2007).

The Court denied his request, noting that there was “no legal authority to support the

extraordinary proposition that an aggrieved former employee may singlehandedly suspend a

company’s decision to wind up its affairs on the ground that such dissolution might preclude the

former employee from returning to work at the company.” Id. at 4.

Plaintiff has repeatedly suggested that Defendant has erected a smokescreen in front of

the Court and is not really suffering financial hardship. In support of this proposition, he points

to a recent news article which, after quoting the company’s “senior director of marketing” about

why the company’s website and phones stopped working around the time of its restructuring,

suggests in a headline that the company was “alive and kicking.” See Pl’s Opp. Br. to Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. at 12 (quoting Kevin McLaughlin, Caymas Says Its Still Alive and Kicking, Mar. 29, 2007, available at http://www.crn.com/security/198701204). The Court finds that such

hearsay evidence from a publicist insufficient to raise even the slightest doubt about the fact that

Defendant is now defunct, especially given the overwhelming evidence previously submitted

to the Court regarding the fact that it is winding up its affairs and looking for buyers. See Fine

Decl. in Supp. of Def.’s Appearance at Case Management Conference, Docket No. 168, at 1-4

& Exs. A, B. & C (indicating that Defendant has made a general assignment of all of its assets

and that a third party is now maintaining those assets either “to sell such Assets as a going

concern or to sell such Assets in liquidation [in order to] wind down Caymas”). 

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customer service department as part of the reduction in force, this evaluation formed the

basis for Defendant’s legitimate decision to fire him. Id.; see also Weiseth Decl. ¶ 24.3

In response to this legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for Defendant’s

conduct, Plaintiff has presented no evidence of retaliation, apart from the mere fact that he

submitted a grievance to the EEOC several months prior to his termination. The Court finds

such evidence insufficient, as a matter of law, for the case to go to a jury. Accordingly,

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s motion for

retaliation as well.

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to give rise to a triable issue of fact

with respect to his claims for discrimination and retaliation against his former employer. For

this reason, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Court expresses

no view on the relief that would have been available to him if he had been able to prevail

upon his claims. Because he cannot, Plaintiff’s recently filed motion for the Court to compel

Defendant to reinstate his labor certification application is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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