Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01666/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01666-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Des Moines Water Works
Appellee
Sidney Simpson
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Thomas Shields, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1666

___________

Sidney Simpson, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Des Moines Water Works, *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 17, 2004

Filed: October 10, 2005

___________

Before BYE, JOHN R. GIBSON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Sidney Simpson appeals the magistrate judge's1

 order granting summary

judgment in favor of Des Moines Water Works on his discrimination claims under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and

the Iowa Civil Rights Act. He appeals only the disability discrimination claims under

the federal and state statutes. We affirm.

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Simpson began his employment with the Water Works in February 1986. He

worked as an installer-repairer on hydrants, valves, and pipelines until being seriously

injured in a vehicle-pedestrian accident in April 1991. While on the job, Simpson

was struck by a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed and flung almost fifty feet in

the air. As a result of the accident, he suffered multiple compound fractures to his left

leg, damage to his right leg, and a permanent head injury with associated cognitive

difficulties and post-traumatic stress disorder. Two years after his accident Simpson

was able to return to work full-time, but not to his former job as installer-repairer.

Instead, the Water Works created a full-time mail courier position that could

accommodate his medical restrictions. 

Following his return to work in March 1996, Simpson was suspended for going

home to wrap his knee on company time. His supervisor had received a call from a

customer who observed a Water Works truck parked in a neighborhood for an

extended period of time each day. In response to the call, Simpson's supervisors

followed him over a four-day period and documented his unexcused absences from

work. On the basis of these absences, Simpson received a two-week suspension.

In April 1997, Simpson requested and was granted sick leave to take his wife

to a doctor’s appointment. Simpson's supervisor observed him at the Des Moines

river during the time for which he had requested sick leave. At a pre-termination

hearing conducted the next day, Simpson explained that he had dropped his wife off

at the doctor's office and had parked by the river until it was time to pick her up.

Based on this explanation, Simpson's discipline was reduced from termination to a

fifteen-day suspension and a directive to read the employee handbook. He appealed

the suspension, but the discipline was upheld. 

Simpson's problems at work continued. In late October 1999 he failed a drug

test following a co-worker's report that he smelled of a substance thought to be

marijuana. He was not disciplined, and instead received treatment and returned to

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work on December 2, 1999. In February 2000 he was suspended for three days for

leaving work early without supervisor approval; this disciplinary action was upheld

after a grievance. In August 2000 a female employee complained that Simpson had

sexually harassed her, and an investigation into the complaint resulted in his

termination. After arbitration through the union process, his discipline was reduced

to a thirty-six week suspension without pay. 

During the time Simpson was serving his suspension, the Water Works

conducted its annual budgeting process and decided to eliminate the mail courier

position. When Simpson was reinstated, he was put on leave and eventually laid off

with full pay and benefits. Further grievance through the union process led to a

compromise whereby the Water Works would create a new job for Simpson, that of

lab courier. However, two days after he returned to work as lab courier in July of

2001, the Iowa Department of Transportation notified the Water Works that

Simpson’s driver’s license was suspended. Simpson was able to get his license

reinstated that day by paying a small fee, but an investigation by the Water Works

revealed that he had known for months that his driver’s license was invalid. 

On August 21, 2001 a co-worker reported to her manager that Simpson had a

heavy oily smell, which the employee attributed to marijuana. The next morning

Simpson submitted to a drug test, which proved positive. This led to his termination,

effective September 14, 2001, for failing the drug test and for driving a Water Works

vehicle while he should have known that he did not have a valid driver’s license. 

Simpson filed this action alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; disability discrimination,

hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; and discrimination in violation

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 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to have a United States

Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in the case, including the entry of judgment.

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of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code Chapter 216.2 The

Water Works filed a motion for summary judgment, which the magistrate granted

following oral argument. 

Simpson appeals only his disability discrimination claims under the Americans

with Disabilities Act and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. He argues that the magistrate

judge erred as a matter of law in concluding that he was not a qualified individual

with a disability. Simpson also contends that the magistrate judge erred by finding

no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Simpson's alleged disability was a

motivating factor in his workplace discipline and eventual termination.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Chambers v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.

Co., 351 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2003). In doing so we apply the same standard as

the district court and may affirm on any grounds supported by the record. Bass v.

SBC Communications, Inc., 418 F.3d 870, 872 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, "show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial

burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment

"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but

 ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." R.

Civ. P. 56(e)); see also Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th

Cir. 2004).

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 Disability discrimination claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act are analyzed

under the same framework as that used for claims brought under the Americans with

Disabilities Act. See Fuller v. Iowa Dep't of Hum. Svcs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa

1998). 

4

 Simpson argues that the magistrate judge should have applied Desert Palace,

Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), which he contends alters the McDonnell Douglas

calculus. Although relevant in the context of mixed-motive jury instructions, this

Court has concluded that “Desert Palace had no impact on prior Eighth Circuit

summary judgment decisions.” Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736

(8th Cir. 2004); see also Johnson v. AT&T Corp., No. 04-2305, WL 2138808, n.4

(8th Cir. Sept. 7, 2005). Therefore, the McDonnell Douglas framework remains the

proper mode of analysis for summary judgment cases.

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In reviewing Simpson’s claim, we bear in mind that summary judgment is

disfavored in employment discrimination cases, as such cases are "inherently factbased." Mayer v. Nextel West Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting

Keathley v. Ameritech Corp., 187 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir.1999)). Nonetheless,

"summary judgment is proper when a plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on

an essential element of her case." EEOC v. Woodbridge Corp., 263 F.3d 812, 814

(8th Cir. 2001).

The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibit

covered employers from discriminating against an otherwise qualified individual with

a disability on account of that disability. 42 U.S.C § 12112(a); Iowa Code §

216.6(1).3

 In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, claims are evaluated

under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). Kratzer v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 2005).4

First, an employee must make out a prima facie case by showing that "(1) the

employee is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the employee is qualified

(with or without reasonable accommodation) to perform the essential functions of a

job; and (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action because of the

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disability." Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 403 F.3d 1026,1034 (8th Cir. 2005).

Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer must proffer a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If the

employer puts forth such a reason, the employee has the burden of demonstrating that

the proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.

Assuming without deciding, that Simpson's mental impairments qualify him as

disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act, he nonetheless fails to make out

a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Specifically, Simpson has produced

insufficient evidence that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his

disability, the third element of his prima facie case. To survive summary judgment

on this element of the prima facie case, a plaintiff must show "'a specific link between

the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support

a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated’

the adverse employment action." Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736 (citing Thomas v. First

Nat'l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997)). In the absence of direct

evidence, the plaintiff may survive summary judgment with evidence that the adverse

employment action occurred “under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

unlawful discrimination.” Lowery v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 244 F.3d 654, 657 (8th

Cir. 2001). 

Here, Simpson has failed to establish the required "specific link" between the

disability discrimination he alleges and the adverse employment actions he suffered.

See Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736. Simpson has pointed to no direct evidence that his

mental impairment was a motivating factor in his discipline and eventual termination;

nor could he, as it is undisputed that each adverse employment action he complains

of was the direct result of actions Simpson took or failed to take. Simpson does not

deny that he tested positive for marijuana and that his driver's license was invalid at

the time he was terminated from his position as lab courier. Likewise, there is simply

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no evidence from which a jury could infer that Simpson was disciplined or terminated

"under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,"

Lowery, 244 F.3d at 657, as the record is devoid of any indication that employees of

the Water Works harbored animosity towards persons with disabilities or that

similarly-situated non-disabled employees were treated more favorably than Simpson.

See id., at 659-60. In the absence of evidence, direct or otherwise, that Simpson's

alleged disability played any role in his termination, we are left with his allegations

that the Water Works was "out to get him" and his speculation regarding the "true

motives" of his supervisors. Such allegations and speculation are insufficient to

survive summary judgment without facts to support them. See Jeseritz v. Potter, 282

F.3d 542, 546-47 (8th Cir. 2002) (similar claim under Rehabilitation Act). 

Even assuming that Simpson can make out a weak prima facie case, he fails to

rebut the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions

advanced by the Water Works. Henderson, 403 F.3d at 1034. The Water Works

presents facts, which Simpson does not dispute, supporting its claim that Simpson's

four suspensions were the result of, respectively: (1) his unexcused absences from

work; (2) his misuse of sick leave; (3) his leaving work early without supervisor

approval; and (4) the findings of the investigation into a co-worker's allegations of

sexual harassment. The Water Works also presented undisputed facts that it

terminated Simpson for driving a company vehicle while he should have known that

he did not have a valid driver’s license and for failing a second drug test. Although

Simpson claims that each of these reasons are a pretext for disability discrimination,

he fails to point to specific facts which indicate, in any way, that the adverse

employment actions were based on anything other than the proffered reasons. 

We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

____________________

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