Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03727/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03727-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adam Sanders
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

BRIAN WILBOURN and ADAM SANDERS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 07-cr-00843 — Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 22, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 26, 2015 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

MANION, Circuit Judge. Over a decade ago, federal authorities conducted an investigation of the drug trade at the 

now-razed Cabrini-Green housing projects in Chicago. That 

investigation, which centered on a drug conspiracy headed 

by Rondell Freeman, yielded a thicket of defendants and 

charges spanning a period of almost nine years. Altogether, 

fifteen persons were charged, ten pleaded guilty, and five 

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2 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

went to trial, including our defendants, Brian Wilbourn and 

Adam Sanders. 

At trial, Wilbourn and Sanders conceded that they sold 

drugs at Cabrini-Green but claimed to do so as small-scale, 

independent dealers and not as part of Freeman’s organization. The jury disagreed and convicted them of multiple 

charges, including participation in the conspiracy. Following 

the trial, the district court vacated and granted a new trial on 

several charges, including conspiracy, because the government secured those convictions through testimony that it 

had good reason to know was false. The government appealed, and we affirmed in United States v. Freeman, 650 F.3d 

673 (7th Cir. 2011). On remand, the government elected not 

to go forward with the vacated counts, and the district court 

sentenced Wilbourn to 184 months and Sanders to 160 

months on the undisturbed counts. 

They have appealed and challenge several rulings of the 

district court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm each of 

the district court’s rulings except for three: we reverse the 

court’s denial of Sanders’ motion to suppress and remand for 

a new trial Sanders’ conviction under Count 32; we likewise 

vacate Wilbourn’s conviction under Count 4 and remand it 

for a new trial; and we vacate Wilbourn’s sentence and remand his case to the district court to make new findings regarding the applicable drug quantity. 

I. Background 

Brian Wilbourn, Adam Sanders, and thirteen others were 

charged with participating in a conspiracy to manufacture 

and distribute narcotics and various related offenses. We 

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Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 3

covered extensively the details of the government’s case in 

Freeman and recount here only those facts necessary to understand the issues relevant to this appeal. In short, the government alleged that the defendants, with Rondell Freeman 

serving as the ringleader, formed a conspiracy to sell narcotics at the Cabrini-Green housing project in Chicago. The 

conspiracy involved approximately fifteen persons and ran 

from 1998 until at least December 2007. 

The government presented a bold case over the course of 

the five-week trial. Utilizing video and audio clips, testimony from informants, and evidence culled from garbage pulls, 

the government contended that Wilbourn and Sanders 

served in leadership roles in Freeman’s conspiracy and not 

as small-time, independent drug dealers, as they claimed in 

defense. For the most part, the jury accepted the government’s case and convicted both Wilbourn and Sanders on 

multiple counts, including conspiracy. 

What the jury did not know, however, was that a significant aspect of the testimony of Seneca Williams—one of the 

government’s key witnesses—was false. Williams had testified that Wilbourn played a prominent role in the conspiracy 

and that he frequently witnessed him engaging in drug trafficking activities at Freeman’s penthouse apartment. The 

problem with Williams’ testimony was that the penthouse 

apartment was only used during 2003 and Wilbourn could 

not have been present because he was in jail for the whole of 

that year. Still more problematic, the government elicited 

this testimony (and argued a variation of it in closing argument) even after the defense counsel had presented it with 

reliable information demonstrating that Wilbourn spent the 

whole of 2003 in jail and so could not have been present. 

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4 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

After the trial, the district court partially granted the defendants’ motion for a new trial and vacated several counts 

against Wilbourn and Sanders, including the conspiracy. We 

affirmed and remanded the vacated counts for a new trial. 

Freeman, 650 F.3d at 683–84. On remand, the government 

elected not to go forward with the vacated counts and the 

district court proceeded to sentence the defendants on the 

undisturbed counts. 

Wilbourn received a 184-month sentence (reduced from 

200 months) based on his convictions on five counts: possession with intent to distribute narcotics (Counts 3, 12 and 13; 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2); using a telephone to 

facilitate a conspiracy (Count 4 or “phone count”; 21 U.S.C. 

§ 843(b)); and being a felon in possession of a firearm (Count 

7; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). 

Sanders received a 160-month sentence for his convictions on five counts: using a telephone to facilitate a conspiracy (Counts 19, 20, 21, and 30 or “phone counts”; 21 U.S.C. 

§ 843(b)) and possession with intent to distribute narcotics 

(Count 32; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2). 

The appeal addresses five discrete issues: (1) whether 

drugs seized from a car in which Sanders was a passenger 

should have been suppressed; (2) whether the phone counts 

should be vacated where they are premised on a drug conspiracy that has been dismissed; (3) whether the district 

court correctly handled premature jury deliberations; (4) 

whether the district court should have granted a mistrial 

where the government entered evidence against Wilbourn 

after it had rested its case against him; and, (5) whether the 

court erred in sentencing Wilbourn based on relevant conduct. 

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Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 5

We address the facts relevant to each of these issues. 

A. Car Search 

Throughout the investigation, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) maintained 

surveillance on Freeman’s residence at Sheridan Road in 

Chicago. During their surveillance, which eventually included a wiretap of Freeman’s telephone lines, the agents gathered evidence of drug trafficking conducted at the Sheridan 

Road residence by numerous individuals. Over a period 

covering almost two years, the police conducted more than a 

dozen trash pulls and recovered plastic baggies containing 

the residue of various narcotics that resembled bags discarded by Freeman’s associates. Agents also observed Sanders 

enter Freeman’s Sheridan Road residence and intercepted 

various calls between Freeman, Sanders, and other defendants. 

On November 13, 2006, the ATF agents observed a Dodge 

Intrepid registered to Wilbourn’s mother parked in a lot outside Freeman’s Sheridan Road residence. At approximately 

8:40 p.m., three black males, one resembling Wilbourn, got 

into the Dodge. The agents surveilled the automobile as it 

drove to a nearby gas station and pulled up next to a maroon 

Buick registered to a co-defendant named McClatchey. Chicago Police Officer Pat Munyon, who was assisting the surveillance operation, pulled in behind the Buick in the gas station. From his vantage point, he observed a black male exit 

the back seat of the Buick, approach the Dodge, and lean into the front passenger side. He remained there for approximately ten seconds before returning to the Buick. Officer 

Munyon did not record observing any drugs during this exchange. 

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6 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

The Buick left the gas station and travelled west for several blocks before it was stopped by Chicago police officers 

Jason Schoenecker and Michael Corlett. The officers observed two females sitting in the front seat and a male passenger in the back seat and instructed the male passenger to 

exit the vehicle. Recognizing the passenger as Adam Sanders, the police officers placed Sanders in the back seat of the 

police vehicle. The officers then searched the back seat area 

and smelled a strong odor of crack cocaine. Searching underneath the front passenger seat, they recovered a black 

plastic bag which contained several hundred smaller baggies, each of which, in turn, contained a rock of crack cocaine. One of those smaller baggies contained a larger, 18-

gram rock, while the others contained less than a gram. A 

number of the baggies bore the orange and white marking 

(120 baggies total) associated with drugs sold by Wilbourn, 

while others carried the blue-devil marking (404 total) associated with Freeman. Laboratory analysis of the bags verified that the individual crack rocks contained approximately 

77 grams of cocaine base. 

Four days after the stop, ATF Special Agent Edward Piacenza prepared a report of the incident that incorporated the 

account of the event given to him by Officer Schoenecker. 

This report described the incident as a traffic stop but failed 

to provide any details about a traffic violation or questioning 

of the driver related to a traffic incident. The report went on 

to describe the search conducted by Officers Schoenecker 

and Corlett and the seizure of the drugs. Five months later, 

Officer Munyon, who had observed the Buick at the gas station, prepared a report which provided additional detail 

about his observations. He stated that he observed Sanders 

sitting in the back seat of the Buick “making tucking and 

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Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 7

pushing motions with his arms towards the lower area of the 

seat.” 

The district court ruled that Sanders’ Fourth Amendment 

rights were not violated because, as a passenger, he had not 

demonstrated a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 

Buick. It also provided a second justification for the search, 

ruling that it constituted a protective sweep of the car following a valid Terry stop because the officers’ surveillance 

(and larger investigation) provided reasonable suspicion 

that the passenger in the back seat of the Buick had committed a crime and that there might be a weapon in the car. 

B. Phone Counts 

Both Sanders (three counts) and Wilbourn (one) were 

found guilty of using a telephone in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. Following trial, the district court vacated and granted a new trial on the conspiracy 

charge and we affirmed this ruling. On remand, the government did not re-try any of the vacated charges but elected 

to proceed to sentencing on the undisputed convictions. 

On appeal, the defendants argue that the telephone 

counts should be vacated because they are legally and factually dependent on facilitating “the felony ... as charged in 

Count One.” Because the felony in Count One—the Freeman 

conspiracy—was vacated, the phone counts must also be vacated, according to the defendants. Additionally, Wilbourn 

argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 

C. Premature Jury Deliberations 

On the fifth day (out of eighteen) of witness testimony, 

Patrice Shadd, a girlfriend of one of the defendants, sat next 

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8 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

to a table of jurors at lunch. She testified that she overheard 

those witnesses discussing the trial. According to Shadd, one 

juror opined that two of the defendants were guilty; a second juror agreed and stated that two were guilty but did not 

know about the others; and, a third juror expressed general 

agreements with these statements. Shadd identified for the 

court the three jurors who were active in this conversation. 

The government opposed conducting a voir dire on the 

jury because it would be disruptive and might cause jurors 

to wonder whether they were being watched outside of 

court. Ultimately, the district court instructed the jurors not 

to make up their minds or discuss the case with each other 

until they heard all of the evidence and were instructed by 

the court to discuss the merits of the case. Following the instruction, the judge asked the defense whether they sought 

removal of the jurors alleged to have participated in the conversation. Counsel for the defense declined to have them 

removed. 

D. Wilbourn’s Motion for a Mistrial 

After the government had rested its case, Wilbourn indicated his intention to proceed to closing arguments without 

presenting any evidence. Three of the other defendants had 

also rested their case and the judge instructed the jury that 

“any evidence that’s presented after a defendant rests is not 

to be considered against that defendant.” 

Freeman did not rest his case. Instead, he sought to present to the jury a videotape showing an undercover informant who tried to purchase drugs but was unable to do so 

when he was confronted by various sellers shouting out different lines of drugs, none of which was the “blue devil” 

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Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 9

product associated with Freeman. By showing several dealers hawking various other lines of drugs, Freeman sought to 

disprove the government’s theory that his operation had a 

monopoly of control over that territory to sell his “blue devil” product. 

None of the defendants was depicted on the video. Wilbourn’s counsel did not object to its introduction but asked 

the government to stipulate that none of the defendants was 

on the video. The government agreed to do so but stated, 

“we’d also want evidence to come out that [the dealers in the 

video] were shouting out blue devs and orange stripes.” 

Freeman called ATF Special Agent Joseph Delucio to introduce the videotape. On cross-examination, the prosecutor 

asked whether the agent heard “people in the building yelling orange stripes?” Agent Delucio answered “yes.” The 

prosecutor then asked a follow-up question in which Agent 

Delucio clarified that it was the sellers yelling “orange 

stripes.” Wilbourn then moved for a mistrial on grounds that 

the government, by eliciting that testimony, sought to enter 

evidence solely to impute guilt against Wilbourn because 

previous testimony had linked him to the “orange stripe” 

brand. The judge denied the motion. 

E. Wilbourn’s Sentence 

At sentencing, the government argued that, although the 

conspiracy count had been dismissed, he could still be sentenced as if he were a co-conspirator because the government had established by a preponderance of evidence that 

he was a member of Freeman’s drug trafficking organization. 

The court accepted this argument and found Wilbourn “accountable ... for all of the drugs procured and sold by the 

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10 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

Freeman [drug trafficking organization] from March 11, 2002 

through May 24, 2007.” This drug amount consisted of more 

than 8.4 kilograms of crack cocaine, and 99.7 grams of heroin. This drug amount corresponded to a base offense level of 

38. 

In contrast, Wilbourn argued that he had been in prison 

for large periods of time under which the conspiracy operated and could not have had any role in any drug trafficking 

conducted by Freeman’s operation. Instead, he contended 

that he was responsible only for those drugs he personally 

sold after he was released from prison, an amount that corresponded to a base offense level of 26. 

II. Analysis 

A. Car Stop 

We adopt a mixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing the district court’s factual determinations 

for clear error and de novo its ultimate determination about 

whether the police had sufficient grounds to stop or search 

the individual. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 

(1996). 

Before trial, Sanders moved to suppress the introduction 

into evidence of the drugs seized from the Buick. Deciding 

the issue on the briefs, the district court denied the motion 

because, as a passenger with no possessory interest, Sanders 

lacked an expectation of privacy in the Buick. It also provided an alternate justification, finding that the original stop 

was valid under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because the 

officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that drugs were 

present in the car due to facts known to the officers as a reCase: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26
Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 11

sult of their investigation of the Freeman drug trafficking 

organization. The court then deemed the search valid as a 

protective sweep because law enforcement had reason to believe that Sanders might possess firearms based on an intercepted call in which Sanders had asked Freeman for a gun. 

Passengers in cars stopped by police are deemed 

“seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes and are entitled 

to challenge the constitutionality of the detention. Brendlin v. 

California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007). This principle, however, 

does not extend so far that it recognizes a legitimate expectation of privacy for passengers who do not have a possessory 

interest in a vehicle. See United States v. Walker, 237 F.3d 845, 

848–49 (7th Cir. 2001). This limits the scope of Sanders’ challenge somewhat: because he was a passenger with no possessory interest in the car, he must demonstrate that the stop 

itself was not justified and that the evidence obtained was 

derived from an illegal stop (in contrast to an illegal search 

after a proper stop, which he would lack standing to challenge). 

The district court rightly disregarded the officers’ first 

justification as a traffic stop because they neither cited nor 

investigated any traffic violation. See Rodriguez v. United 

States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (“A stop for a routine traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.”). The Fourth Amendment allows officers to “stop and 

briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable 

facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 

“Reasonable suspicion” has never been reduced to a mechanical formula, but embodies “something less than probaCase: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26
12 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

ble cause and more than a hunch.” United States v. Baskin, 401 

F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2005). A mere suspicion of illegal activity at a particular place is not enough to transfer that suspicion to anyone who leaves that property. United States v. 

Bohman, 683 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Ultimately, the district court accepted the government’s 

argument that the police officers had a reasonable suspicion 

to stop the Buick based on facts known to them as a result of 

the investigation of the Freeman drug organization. But 

there is a problem with this: none of the evidence in the record demonstrates that the individual officers (Schoenecker 

and Corlett) knew anything about the persons inside the 

Buick at the time of the stop. In its twenty-seven-page response brief, the government recounted an impressive list of 

surveillance operations and phone intercepts depicting various encounters between Freeman, Sanders and other persons. But none of this addressed the central question—

whether Officers Schoenecker and Corlett (and not other 

agents) had a reasonable suspicion that the persons in the 

Buick were engaged in criminal activity. None of the evidence suggests that the officers participated in these surveillance operations before they encountered the Buick. There is 

no indication that they were present at the gas station when 

Officer Munyon observed the encounter between the passenger and the Dodge. There is no evidence that the officers 

derived their suspicions as a result of facts provided to them 

by the other agents. 

Sanders attached to his suppression motion a report written four days after the incident by ATF Special Agent Edward Piacenza. This report contains an account of the stop as 

described (to SA Piacenza) by Officer Schoenecker. It deCase: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26
Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 13

scribes the stop as a traffic stop but gives no account of any 

traffic violation cited. More significantly, however, the report 

provides no other justification for the stop; indeed, the contents nowhere indicate that Officers Schoenecker or Corlett 

knew anything about the persons in the Buick prior to making the stop. One might presume that they received a call on 

the police radio that the persons inside the Buick were engaged in criminal activity, but nothing in the record on this 

motion demonstrates that. 

Reasonable suspicion must be “based on articulable 

facts” that the person stopped may be engaged in criminal 

activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. An officer’s reasonable suspicion should be based on “the totality of the circumstances—

the whole picture.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8. Here, the record is 

devoid of any facts to suggest that Officers Schoenecker and 

Corlett had reason to suspect that the persons in the Buick 

had committed a crime. The key term is “articulable.” The 

government offered extensive evidence to establish that other officers had reason to suspect that the persons in the Buick 

had committed a crime. But it offered no evidence to suggest 

that anyone communicated any basis for these suspicions to 

Officers Schoenecker and Corlett. Because of this, neither officer was able to articulate any grounds to justify the stop. 

The purpose of a Terry stop is to provide law enforcement the opportunity to stop and question a person briefly 

when it believes that person may be committing or may have 

committed a crime. This was not a Terry stop; it was more 

akin to a warrantless arrest. The police stopped a car and 

immediately proceeded to remove a passenger, place him in 

custody in the back of a police car, and engage in a thorough 

search of the automobile. These actions might have been 

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14 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

proper if the officers had probable cause to arrest someone 

in the car. As it was, the officers who made the stop failed to 

articulate any facts addressing reasonable suspicion, still less 

probable cause. For this reason, the stop did not conform to 

the precepts outlined in Terry and was invalid. 

Evidence seized as a result of an illegal stop is the fruit of 

the poisonous tree and should not be introduced into evidence. See Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 568 

(7th Cir. 2014) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 

484–86 (1963)). For this reason, we reverse the district court’s 

denial of their motions to suppress. Additionally, because 

Sanders’ conviction under Count 32 was due in part to evidence seized as a result of an illegal stop, we vacate his conviction on this count and remand it to the district court for a 

new trial. 

B. Phone Counts 

Wilbourn was convicted of one count and Sanders three 

counts of using a telephone in furtherance of a conspiracy in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). In this case, the predicate narcotics offense was the Freeman conspiracy alleged in the first 

count of the indictment. Following their convictions, Wilbourn and Sanders moved for acquittal and a new trial. The 

district court granted a new trial to both of them on the conspiracy charge (and to Wilbourn on two other counts) but 

denied the motion on all other counts. On appeal, they argue 

that the court should have granted its motion for acquittal 

(or for a new trial) because the phone counts are factually 

and legally dependent on the vacated conspiracy conviction. 

Alternatively, Wilbourn argues that there was insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction on this count. 

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Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 15

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for 

acquittal, United States v. Jones, 763 F.3d 777, 807 (7th Cir. 

2014), and the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of 

discretion, United States v. Whiteagle, 759 F.3d 734, 756 (7th 

Cir. 2014). We review a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether the record, 

read in the light most favorable to the government, contains 

sufficient evidence from which any rational juror could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones, 763 

F.3d at 807. 

A defendant violates 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) if he knowingly 

and intentionally uses a telephone to facilitate the commission of a narcotics offense. United States v. Arrellano, 757 F.3d 

623, 631 (7th Cir. 2014). Proof of an underlying narcotics offense is an element under § 843(b) and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Campbell, 534 

F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 2008). “[A] defendant cannot be convicted of using a telephone to commit a drug offense unless 

the defendant also aids or abets, or attempts to commit, the 

drug offense itself.” United States v. Mueller, 112 F.3d 277, 

281–82 (7th Cir. 1997). 

But an acquittal of the underlying offense does not mean 

that there must be an acquittal on the phone counts. United 

States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 985 (7th Cir. 2005). “Typically, a 

guilty verdict will stand (so long as the evidence is sufficient 

to support it) notwithstanding an inconsistent verdict on a 

related offense, even if conviction on the latter is a predicate 

to the conviction of the former.” United States v. Moore, 763 

F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2014). 

The two sides disagree about the effect of the vacated 

conspiracy conviction. The government contends that it can 

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16 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

still serve as a predicate offense because, notwithstanding 

the ruling to vacate, the evidence still supports a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that both Wilbourn and Sanders 

participated in Freeman’s conspiracy. In support, the government cites Justice Holmes’ observation that consistency 

between jury verdicts is not necessary because each count in 

an indictment is regarded as if it were a separate indictment, 

Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932). By contrast, 

the defense argues that this is not a case of inconsistent verdicts but of false testimony contaminating a necessary element of the offense to such a degree as to render a guilty 

verdict impossible. By the defense’s logic, once the court vacated the conspiracy conviction, it was required to vacate as 

well the phone counts that were predicated on the conspiracy. 

Both of these positions, while accurate to some degree, 

fail to take full account of the issue as it stands on appeal. 

The government is correct to note that mere inconsistency 

among verdicts does not, in and of itself, mandate any particular disposition. This principle, long recognized, was reaffirmed in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1986), in which 

the Supreme Court declined to vacate a conviction under 

§ 843(b) where the jury acquitted the defendant of the predicate offense but found her guilty of the phone counts. The 

court held that there was “no reason to vacate respondent’s 

conviction merely because the verdicts could not be reconciled.” Id. at 69 (citing Dunn, 284 U.S. 390). 

But the defense is correct to note that the issue here is not 

inconsistent verdicts—the jury, after all, convicted both Wilbourn and Sanders of the phone counts and the predicate 

conspiracy. The issue, properly understood, is whether the 

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Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 17

trial judge erred by vacating only the conspiracy and not the 

phone counts to which the conspiracy served as predicate. 

The government’s arguments suggest that a trial judge is no 

more obligated than a jury to maintain consistency among 

jury verdicts. 

We agree with this much: the mere fact that verdicts are 

inconsistent with each other is of no legal significance unless 

a party can demonstrate that such verdicts cannot coexist by 

operation of law. For this appeal, this means that the mere 

inconsistency among the verdicts is of no significance; what 

matters is whether the basis on which the judge vacated the 

conspiracy conviction is of such nature that it also mandated 

vacating the phone charges as well. This, of course, requires 

an examination of the facts as they relate to the elements of 

individual charges. 

But it also involves something else not covered in full by 

the parties—a court’s authority to remedy prosecutorial misconduct by vacating convictions. In addressing these questions, it is helpful to revisit briefly our decision in Freeman, 

which we summarized as follows: 

After a full review of the record, we hold that 

the district court did not err in finding that the 

government knowingly used false testimony 

and that there was a reasonable likelihood that 

the false testimony affected the jury’s verdict 

on the conspiracy charge. Nor did the district 

court abuse its discretion in granting the defendants a new trial. In addition, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by granting a 

new trial for the counts affected by the government’s statements made in closing arguCase: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26
18 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

ments. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

650 F.3d at 683–84. 

Several aspects of that holding are worth highlighting. 

First, we recognized that the false testimony elicited by the 

government affected the jury’s verdict on the conspiracy 

charge. Second, we recognized that the remedy afforded by 

the judge, a new trial on various charges, was an act of discretion designed as a specific remedy. Third, we cited specific prosecutorial misconduct as the bases for these decisions; 

the government elicited false testimony during the trial and 

sought to defend this testimony at closing argument, albeit 

with a different interpretation. 

This serves to highlight the various considerations that 

converged in the decision to grant a new trial; on one level, 

the judge sought to negate the effect that tainted testimony 

might have had against the various charges of disparate defendants; on still another level, the judge sought to fashion a 

remedy commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct. 

Each of these requires discretion from the district judge. 

Here, the judge was present during the weeks of trial and 

was able to evaluate the gravity of the government’s misconduct and the ways in which it affected the individual defendants. Id. at 681 (“For five weeks, the district court listened to this case; she had a feel for it that we can’t replicate, 

and that fact is not lost in our review of her decision.”). 

Of course, this is but a technical prelude to a simple 

point: the tainted evidence harmed Wilbourn (and Freeman) 

more than the other defendants, whereas the dismissal of the 

conspiracy count benefited them all equally. We noted in 

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Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 19

Freeman that virtually the whole of the false testimony of 

Seneca Williams centered upon Wilbourn and Freeman. Id. 

at 677 (“Williams testified at length about the penthouse, 

frequently placing Wilbourn there with Freeman and others 

discussing the drug trade. This included testimony about the 

defendants ‘branding’ their respective types of crack. This 

was a particularly damning piece of testimony ... . [The government] solicited testimony about Wilbourn’s presence at 

the penthouse; it even encouraged Williams to specifically 

detail Wilbourn’s participation in Freeman’s operation 

there... .”). Furthermore, the testimony was only demonstrated to be patently false insofar as it specifically identified 

Wilbourn as participating in various events while he was actually in jail. For this reason, we have little difficulty concluding that the same defects that were fatal to Wilbourn’s 

conspiracy conviction are equally present in his phone 

charge under § 843(b). The government “must prove the 

commission of the underlying offense to obtain a conviction 

on a charge of telephone facilitation.” McGee, 408 F.3d at 985. 

It did not do so, and the trial judge should have vacated that 

count as well. For this reason, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Wilbourn’s motion for a new trial, vacate Count 4, 

and remand it to the district court. 

We decline, however, to vacate Sanders’ convictions under § 843(b). In so doing, we recognize that the dismissal of 

Sanders’ conspiracy charge—a perfectly correct ruling—

owed more to addressing prosecutorial misconduct than to 

rectifying a verdict secured by bad evidence. The effect of 

Seneca Williams’ testimony on Sanders is negligible compared to that of Wilbourn or Freeman. Williams’ testimony 

was not a central component linking Sanders to Freeman’s 

organization; it did not address the specific telephone conCase: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26
20 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

versations between Sanders and Freeman; and it did not address Sanders’ defenses. In short, the introduction into evidence of the various phone calls between Sanders and Freeman, and the content of those calls, suffices to establish the 

predicate offense to support Sanders’ convictions under 

§ 843(b). 

C. Premature Deliberations 

We review a district court’s handling of premature jury 

deliberations and juror bias for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Farmer, 717 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2013). The defendants argue that the discussion by three jurors on the fifth day 

of witness testimony denied the defendants their due process right to an impartial jury. They further contend that the 

trial judge was obligated to conduct a voir dire examination 

of the jury because there was a reasonable claim of juror bias. 

A central duty of a trial judge is to ensure that a defendant enjoys a presumption of innocence throughout the trial. 

Id. To that end, every trial begins with a set of instructions to 

jurors to avoid discussing the case until the jury deliberates 

after the conclusion of the trial. Notwithstanding these directions, mistakes often occur, especially in longer trials. Id. 

(“It’s a rare jury trial in which there are no mistakes on anyone’s part.”). For this reason, judges have a variety of 

measures they can take, including conducting a voir dire of 

the jurors, or admonishing the jury and instructing jurors to 

avoid discussing the case with anyone or forming an opinion 

about the resolution of the case until all the evidence has 

been presented. The appropriateness of a particular measure 

hinges, in large part, on the nature of the alleged misconduct. See United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1112 (7th Cir. 

Case: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26
Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 21

1998) (“Not every allegation of jury misconduct is sufficiently substantial or sufficiently well substantiated to warrant 

putting the jurors on the spot.”). 

The trial judge heard arguments from both sides about 

how to address the alleged misconduct. The government argued that voir dire was likely to unsettle jurors who might 

fear that they were being observed outside of the courtroom. 

The defense, in contrast, sought to conduct voir dire. The trial judge decided to instruct the jury that: “[I]t is essential 

that you not talk about the case. And it is absolutely essential 

that you not make up your mind until you have heard all the 

evidence.” Following the instruction, the judge asked the defense whether they sought removal of the jurors alleged to 

have participated in the conversation. The defense declined 

to have them removed. 

The judge was within her discretion to handle the matter 

this way. Intra-jury discussions, such as the one at issue here, 

are viewed as less threatening than extra-jury influence or 

bias. See United States v. Morales, 655 F.3d 608, 632 (7th Cir. 

2011). The discussion alleged here was certainly improper, 

but it was not so egregious that it required more stringent 

investigation or curative measures. Jurors are “presumed to 

follow limiting and curative instructions unless the matter 

before them is so powerfully incriminating that they cannot 

reasonably be expected to put it out of their minds.” United 

States v. Harmon, 721 F.3d 877, 886 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations 

omitted). 

Here, the comments were not of such nature as to rebut 

the presumption that they could not be addressed by an instruction from the court. Nothing in the communications 

suggests that any juror was trying to lobby other jurors to 

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22 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

adopt a particular position or to interpret the evidence presented in accordance with a stated position. Finally, there is 

no evidence that the statements had any lingering effects after the judge issued her instruction. The jury deliberated for 

five days before arriving at its verdict. Significantly, the juror 

alleged to have started the conversation did not take part in 

the ultimate deliberations. Taken together, these facts do not 

demonstrate that any alleged misconduct affected the basic 

fairness of the trial. 

D. Motion for Mistrial 

Wilbourn moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the 

government entered evidence against him after he had rested his case. The judge denied the motion—a ruling that we 

review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lauderdale, 571 

F.3d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 2009). 

We quickly dispatch this issue because there is no evidence to suggest that the trial judge abused her discretion in 

denying Wilbourn’s motion. “To win a new trial based on a 

prosecutor’s improper comments, a defendant must establish that the prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his 

right to a fair trial.” United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 602 

(7th Cir. 2011). Here, there is no indication that the two questions posed by the prosecutor had any effect on the fairness 

of the trial. Agent Delucio did not mention Wilbourn by 

name; the testimony centered upon questions regarding the 

availability of Freeman’s brand of drugs and did not extend 

beyond two brief questions; and the prosecutor did not mention this testimony at closing argument. The judge instructed 

the jury not to consider any evidence against an individual 

defendant after that defendant has rested his case. Unless 

rebutted, we presume that a jury will follow the court’s inCase: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26
Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 23

struction to limit its consideration of testimony in accordance with instructions received from the trial judge. See

Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 610 F.3d 434, 446 (7th Cir. 

2010). Here, the defense has not brought forth any grounds 

to rebut this presumption and the judge was within her discretion to deny Wilbourn’s motion for a mistrial. 

E. Wilbourn’s Sentence 

We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of the 

guidelines and its findings of fact for clear error. United 

States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 815 (7th Cir. 2008). At sentencing, Wilbourn received enhancements for firearms and for 

having a supervisory role in Freeman’s drug organization 

and a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Additionally, the court found Wilbourn responsible for all of the drugs 

procured and sold by Freeman’s organization from March 

11, 2002, through May 24, 2007. Specifically, the court found 

Wilbourn accountable for 8.4 kilograms of cocaine base in 

the form of crack and 99.7 grams of heroin. 

The court did this despite the fact that Wilbourn was in 

prison from April 23, 2002, until September 8, 2005. The 

court based its findings on two phone calls that Wilbourn 

conducted while in prison. The first call took place on October 3, 2003. In that call, Wilbourn urged Sanders to “step up” 

and fill in for him while he was in jail. The second call took 

place on January 13, 2004, wherein Wilbourn discussed a police raid on an apartment associated with Freeman’s organization with a defendant named Hill. 

The court calculated his offense level as 41 and his criminal history as III, which yielded a guidelines sentence of between 360 months to life imprisonment. The court originally 

Case: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26
24 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

sentenced Wilbourn to 200 months’ imprisonment but later 

reduced the sentence to 184 months. 

First, the court provided ample grounds to support the 

imposition of the firearms and supervisory enhancements. 

The court noted various instances in which Freeman prepared and packaged drugs at Freeman’s premises, the frequent communications between Wilbourn and Freeman on 

matters related to drug distribution, and the shared methods 

and personnel used by Wilbourn and Freeman to manufacture and distribute drugs. Pointedly, there is a recurring 

theme to these conversations: they repeatedly address the 

day-to-day operations of the organization and how to direct 

lower-level persons to carry out their duties. In other words, 

these are properly the conversations of two persons in management roles giving advice and direction to each other. Finally, the fact that we vacated Wilbourn’s conviction for conspiracy has no bearing on this enhancement. At trial, a district court need only find by a preponderance of the evidence facts sufficient to support the enhancement. United 

States v. Belk, 435 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, there 

was sufficient evidence to find that Wilbourn and Freeman 

shared operations related to drug distribution and that Wilbourn had a supervisory role in those operations. 

In contrast, the court committed clear error in concluding 

that Wilbourn was responsible for drugs produced and sold 

by Freeman during the period in which Wilbourn was incarcerated. The sole evidence supporting this finding was two 

phone calls, neither of which addressed drug distribution in 

anything but the most attenuated sense. The first call took 

place almost eighteen months after the beginning of Wilbourn’s incarceration. In that call, Wilbourn encouraged 

Case: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26
Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 25

Sanders to fill his role within Freeman’s organization. If anything, this call demonstrates that Wilbourn did not have an 

active role in Freeman’s organization during that period; 

were it otherwise, he would not need Sanders to address the 

void created by his absence. The second call likewise fails to 

show any involvement by Wilbourn in Freeman’s organization. Neither phone call discussed drug distribution specifically or anything involving the regular operations of Freeman’s organization. To be sure, a person can participate in 

(or even lead) a conspiracy from a prison cell, but to do so 

requires that their actions inside prison have some effect on 

the operations of the conspiracy. There is no evidence that 

Wilbourn’s actions in prison had any effect on the operation 

of the conspiracy. 

For this reason, we vacate Wilbourn’s sentence and remand it to the district court to make a drug amount finding 

that does not include the periods of time in which Wilbourn 

was incarcerated. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM each of the district 

court’s rulings except the following: 

(1) We reverse the district court’s denial of Sanders’ motion to suppress evidence seized from the Buick and 

we vacate Sanders’ conviction on Count 32 and remand it to the district court for a new trial; and 

(2) We vacate Wilbourn’s conviction under Count 4 and 

remand it to the district court for a new trial; and, 

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26 Nos. 13-3715 & 13-3727 

(3) We vacate Wilbourn’s sentence and remand it to the 

district court with instructions to quantify an applicable drug quantity that does not attribute to Wilbourn 

amounts sold by Freeman’s organization during those 

periods that Wilbourn was in jail. 

Case: 13-3727 Document: 75 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 26